

DEPICTING THE ENEMY: RUSSIANS AND OTTOMANS IN THE PRESS
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

A Ph.D. Dissertation

By

ZHARMUKHAMED ZARDYKHAN

Department of History
Bilkent University
Ankara
September 2007

Светлой памяти профессора Стэнфорда Дж. Шоу
(1930-2006) посвящается...

DEPICTING THE ENEMY: RUSSIANS AND OTTOMANS IN THE PRESS
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

ZHARMUKHAMED ZARDYKHAN

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

September 2007

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Asst. Prof. Oktay Özel
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Asst. Prof. Ferdan Ergut
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Asst. Prof. Paul Latimer
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Asst. Prof. Evgeni Radushev
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Professor Norman Stone
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel
Director

ABSTRACT

DEPICTING THE ENEMY: RUSSIANS AND OTTOMANS IN THE PRESS DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Zardykhan, Zharmukhamed

Ph.D., Department of History

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Oktay Özel

September 2007

The intricate course of events that led both the Russian and Ottoman Empires towards the Great War had been the culmination of long-lasting domestic and international developments, which were reflected in their policies towards the other side. However, despite the ardent hatred and evident enmity that prevailed over the Russo-Ottoman relations for centuries, both of these empires were faced with similar problems of political, socioeconomic and national character that distinguished them from the rest of Europe and Asia.

Whether out of hopelessness, inevitability, greater expectations or simply as a precious opportunity to rehabilitate their former reputation, seriously damaged after

the humiliating Russo-Japanese and Balkan wars, the levying of war against their historical enemies deeply affected each countries' entire population. The effect was particularly strong because of the advanced and elaborate total war propaganda techniques employed primarily by the press, while the religious, nationalistic and historical aspects of the confrontation made the propaganda warfare a diverse and complicated battlefield.

The main objective of this work is the presentation, comparison and analysis of a great variety of controversial pieces of information related to the Russo-Ottoman confrontation prior to and during the First World War. This information reveals personal prejudice, ethnic, religious and political affiliation of the authors, as well as deliberate attempts to spread misinformation and propaganda.

Keywords: Russo-Ottoman relations, First World War, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, Eastern Anatolia, Muslims of Russia, Central Asia

ÖZET

DÜŞMANI BETİMLEMEK: BİRİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞI SIRASINDA BASINDAKİ RUSLAR VE OSMANLILAR

Zardykhan, Zharmukhamed

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Oktay Özel

Eylül 2007

Hem Rus, hem de Osmanlı imparatorluklarını Büyük Savaş'e sürükleyen olaylar silsilesi, bu ülkelerin birbirlerine yönelik siyasetlerinde de yankı bulan uzun süreli iç ve dış gelişmelerin doruk noktası olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Ancak, Osmanlı-Rus ilişkilerine asırlardır hâkim olan ateşli nefret ve bariz düşmanlığa rağmen, her iki imparatorluk da benzer siyasî, sosyo-ekonomik ve millî sorunlarla karşı karşıya kalmıştı ve bu durum onları Avrupa'nın ve Asya'nın gerisinden farklı kılmaktaydı.

Osmanlı ve Rus imparatorluklarını birbirleriyle savaşmaya iten nedenler, o dönemde içinde bulundukları çaresizlik, savaş sonrasında umdukları büyük beklentiler ya da

Osmanlıların Balkan harbinde, Rusların ise Japon harbinde zedelenen itibarlarını kurtarmak istemeleri olmuştı. Bu savaşın ortaya çıkışında basın da büyük bir rolü vardı. Dönemine göre ileri ve özenle hazırlanmış savaş propaganda tekniklerinin, dinî, milliyetçi ve tarihî unsurları da kullanması bu savaşın bir başka yönüydü.

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesi ve savaş sırasındaki Osmanlı-Rus ihtilafı üzerine yapılan propagandaların bir kısmını kaleme almış yazarların üslubunu irdelemektir. Çalışma, bu yazarların sergiledikleri etnik, dini ve siyasi söyleme ve bu söylemin kamuoyunu yanıltması üzerine odaklanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı-Rus ilişkileri, Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Panislavizm, Panislamizm, Pantürkizm, Doğu Anadolu, Rusya Müslümanları, Orta Asya

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Assistant Professor Oktay Özel for his willingness to supervise this research after it had already begun and for his enormous support and understanding throughout this work.

I am also deeply grateful to the dear members of the Examining Committee – Professor Norman Stone, Assistant Professor Evgeni Radushev and Assistant Professor Paul Latimer of Bilkent University and Assistant Professor Ferdan Ergut of the Middle East Technical University – for their remarks and constructive criticism.

Finally, this humble work of mine would not have been conceived and completed without the encouragement and inspiration of the late Professor Stanford J. Shaw, who always respected my thoughts and ideas, even when they were wrong.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND DATES

Throughout the text, the transliteration of terms, notions and proper names from non-Latin alphabet languages and sources is carried out in the following ways:

- **Russian:** The Russian and East Slavic names and terms are Romanized according to the Library of Congress Transliteration System with slight modifications [e.g., *Yeliseev* instead of *Eliseev*, *Dostoevsky* instead of *Dostoevskii*].
- **Arabic:** The Classical Islamic terms and notions are transliterated according to the *The Encyclopedia of Islam* transliteration system [e.g., *Shawwâl* instead of *Şevvâl*], although avoiding excessive diacritics [e.g., *Safar* instead of *ŞAFAR*].
- **Ottoman:** For the terms and proper names associated with the Ottoman Empire, the proper Turkish transliteration reflecting the orthographic peculiarities of the Ottoman language is preferred over Arabic or Modern Turkish [e.g., *Mahmûd* instead of *MAHMÛD* or *Mahmut*; *Tercümân-i Hakîkât* instead of *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*].
- **Turkic:** The Turkic languages are transliterated reflecting their orthographic and phonetic peculiarities, instead of their substitution with the closest

Ottoman or Turkish counterpart [*Aq Masjid* instead of *Ak Mescit*, *vilâyât* instead of *vilâyet*].

However, for certain words like *mullah* and *Pasha*, which are widely used in English, the Standard English spelling is preferred.

Although in the main text the possible reference to a publication follows the Gregorian calendar, the dates in the footnotes appear in their original form. In case of the mention of several dates for the same publication, the most persistent and convenient one is chosen. For the dates in *hidjrî* or *Rûmî* calendars, the appropriate Gregorian year is added in brackets upon their first mention.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vii
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND DATES	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 SCOPE OF THE WORK	4
1.2 STRUCTURE	6
1.3 SOURCES	8
1.4 TERMINOLOGY	9
CHAPTER II: SEEING THE EVIL: THE RUSSIANS AS PERCEIVED BY THE OTTOMAN TURKS	11
2.1 THE SPIRIT OF RUSSIA	11
2.1.1 The Russians in History	11
2.1.2 Russia and the Third Rome	18
2.1.3 Russian Nationalism: Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism	24
2.2 RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE	35
2.2.1 Russia and the Eastern Question	38
2.2.2 The Balkans	48

2.2.3	Constantinople and the Straits.....	64
2.3	THE PEOPLE OF RUSSIA.....	75
2.3.1	Russian Morals and Manners.....	76
2.3.2	The Russian Society.....	82
CHAPTER III: MUSLIMS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE: PAN-ISLAMISM AND PAN-TURKISM IN THE OTTOMAN PRESS.....		92
3.1	RUSSIA AND ISLAM.....	92
3.1.1	Islam and the Rise of the Russian Empire.....	92
3.1.2	Conquests and Colonial Rule.....	101
3.2	MUSLIMS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.....	115
3.2.1	Russian Muslims: A Demographic Overview.....	115
3.2.2	Islam and Society.....	122
3.3	BETWEEN TSAR AND CALIPH.....	135
3.3.1	Political Islam and the Muslims of the Russian Empire.....	135
3.3.2	Pan-Turkism and Turkish Nationalism.....	149
3.3.3	Language and Politics.....	173
CHAPTER IV: RUSSIA AND OTTOMAN WARTIME PROPAGANDA.....		182
4.1	RUSSIA AND THE OTTOMAN ROAD TO THE GREAT WAR.....	182
4.1.1	Russia and the Origins of the War.....	183
4.1.2	Russia and the Holy War.....	191
4.2	FRIENDS AND ENEMIES IN WARTIME PROPAGANDA.....	204
4.2.1	Germano-Ottoman Relations and Russia.....	205
4.2.2	The Russian Army in Ottoman Press.....	220

CHAPTER V: RUSSIANS AND OTTOMANS: THE EMPIRES AT THE BATTLEFIELD	234
5.1 THE OTTOMAN LANDS IN RUSSIAN MILITARY PLANS	234
5.1.1 The Black Sea and the Straits	235
5.1.2 Eastern Anatolia	248
5.2 THE GREAT WAR AND MINORITIES	253
5.2.1 Ottoman Kurds and Armenians during the First World War	253
5.2.2 The Russo-Ottoman Warfare and the Muslims of Russia	268
5.3 THE OTTOMANS AND THE FALL OF TSARISM	279
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION	288
BIBLIOGRAPHY	295

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The First World War was noted not only for its horrific physical destruction and tremendous financial ruin, but for the first time the overall and systematic international propaganda became one of the most effective means of the warfare. As was noted by George G. Bruntz, “in no other war in history has propaganda played so important a part as in the world conflict of 1914-1918,” adding that among the principal tools of the First World War propaganda were the shattering the faith of the military, preparation for the overthrow of the imperial governments and the propagation of the feeling of ‘profound depression’.¹ In this respect, the Ottoman wartime propaganda, spread through its periodical press did not make an exception at all, while, on the contrary, being able to engage the religion through Islamic and Pan-Islamic appeals as well as nationalism and even supra-nationalism, presents a very interesting and thoroughly unique phenomenon.

¹ George G. Bruntz, “Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of German Morale in 1918,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January 1938), pp. 61-62.

In doing so, the Ottoman wartime propaganda duly employed, as elaborated in the following parts of this work, the basic and advanced tools of the current total war propaganda techniques, including the so-called psychological warfare targeting the enemy morale,² the caricature and leisure reading,³ as well as the manipulation of the official reports of the General Staff.⁴ However, the Ottoman wartime propaganda targeted not only the Entente powers, but often fought against domestic obstacles, thoroughly imposing censorship⁵ and even eradicating Socialist and Anarchist movements,⁶ sometimes even in the Russian Empire. But nevertheless, the main target of the Ottoman wartime propaganda was the Tsarist State, whose ‘cult of the offensive’ was so vigorously propagated in the Ottoman press, for which the classical propaganda tricks of ‘secret preparation’ and the ‘preventive’ nature of the war were duly employed.⁷

Despite the existence of numerous academic works partially or thoroughly based on the information provided by the Ottoman periodical press of the period around the First World War, most of them have a rather limited thematic, geographic or linguistic scope. Some of them focus on a certain journal, like the work by Irmgard

² See Robert E. Park, “Morale and the News,” *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 47. No. 3 (November 1941), pp. 360-377.

³ Eberhard Demm, “Propaganda and Caricature in the First World War,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 1993), pp. 163-192.

⁴ Mary T. Reynolds, “The General Staff as a Propaganda Agency, 1908-1914,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July 1939), pp. 394-397.

⁵ Deian Hopkin, “Domestic Censorsip in the First World War,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1970), pp. 151-169.

⁶ Alex Hall, “The War of Words: Anti-Social Offensives and Counter-Propaganda in Wilhelmine Germany 1890-1914,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 11, No. 2/3 (July 1976), pp. 11-42.

⁷ Stephan Van Evera, “The Cult of Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107.

Farah on the German press and propaganda activities in the Ottoman Empire prior to and during the First World War,⁸ based almost exclusively on the publications in *Osmanischen Lloyd*, which naturally, although briefly, referred to the Russian policies towards the Ottoman State as well.⁹ Most of the works which directly deal with the Russian Empire and policies usually based on certain publications of a limited group, whether non-Muslim¹⁰ or Muslim,¹¹ or cover a limited geographic area.

In this respect, the elaborate work by Volker Adam on the Russian Muslim emigrants in Istanbul and the reports in the Ottoman periodical press on Russia and Central Asia on the eve of the First World War might be considered as the forerunner of this present research. Besides, in addition to the Ottoman periodicals thoroughly used by the author, the work presents an impressive analysis of the Muslim press of the Russian Empire.¹² Among the general works on the Ottoman propaganda during the First World War, an impressive research by Erol Koroğlu on the Ottoman wartime propaganda and its role in the Turkish nation-building

⁸ Irmgard Farah, *Die deutsche Pressepolitik und Propagandatätigkeit in osmanischen Reich von 1908-1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des "Osmanischen Lloyd"* (Beirut: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993).

⁹ Ibid., pp. 149-150.

¹⁰ For instance, the Ottoman *El Tiempo* examined in Sarah Abrevaya Stein, "The Creation of Yiddish and Judeo-Spanish Newspaper Cultures in the Russian and Ottoman Empires" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1999).

¹¹ For instance, the St. Petersburg journal *Ülfet* examined in Hasan Demirci, "*Ülfet* Gazetesi (11 Aralık 1905 - 7 Haziran 1907 / Petersburg) (1905-1907 Yılları Arasında Yapılan Müslüman Kongreleri)" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Marmara University, 2002).

¹² Volker Adam, *Rußlandmuslime in Istanbul am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges: Die Berichterstattung osmanischen Periodika über Rußland und Zentralasien* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002).

process¹³ deserves special mention. Not confined to the periodical press and the context of the Russian Empire, his work elucidates the ideological, cultural and sentimental backgrounds of the Ottoman wartime propaganda, placing special emphasis on the current literary developments.

1.1 SCOPE OF THE WORK

Contrarily to *wie es eigentlich gewesen*, the aphoristic statement by Leopold von Ranke, often considered the father of scientific history, intending to present history the way it actually happened, this work takes up a rather limited and unambitious task of presenting Russo-Ottoman confrontations prior to and during the First World War the way it had been represented by the contemporaries, making *wie es eigentlich geschrieben wurde*, if ever possible, the basic motto and guideline. Therefore, the main objective of this work would be the presentation and comparison of a great variety of controversial information that would reveal, among other things, personal prejudice, ethnic, religious and political affiliation of the author, as well as deliberate attempts of misinformation and propaganda, rather than the examination of the actual historical sources and events from the standpoint of their veracity.

¹³ Erol K ro lu, *T rk Edebiyatı ve Birinci D nya Savaşı (1914-1918): Propagandadan Mill  Kimlik İnşasına* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004).

Thematically, the main focus of this work is the examination of the Russian Empire prior to and during the First World War in the light of current political, strategic, economic, social and ethno-religious developments. However, despite having Russia at the focal point of this research, all of the above mentioned aspects of Russian life are scrutinized and presented from the Ottoman point of view, that is, primarily taking into consideration the current political, strategic, economic, social and ethno-religious developments in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the analysis of the Russo-Ottoman relations prior to and during the First World War is preceded by the historical and traditional trends and inclinations that profoundly influenced the classical patterns of their relations, which, in their turn, shaped the current perceptions, fears and beliefs.

Having the imperial policies and confrontations as its main point, the chronological limits of this work are confined within the period of Imperial Russia and, therefore, the Russo-Ottoman relations after the February Revolution, including the periods of the Provisional Government and Bolshevik regime are beyond the scope of the research. In this respect, although being the main focus, the whole duration of the First World War is not the exact chronological sketch. As was mentioned above, the analysis of the Russo-Ottoman relations of the period around the First World War would also take into consideration the historical background of the topic, so that the analysis of the theme would be thoroughly based on the historical developments that gradually led to the Great War.

1.2 STRUCTURE

The four main chapters of this work, which represent the principal focus of this research, scrutinize the nature of the Russo-Ottoman confrontations at certain different and distinct levels, all of which in complementary and comparative analysis make up a comprehensive and integrated picture. The Ottoman perception of the Russian state and society as represented primarily in the periodical press is scrutinized in this work at three distinct levels, which represent different thematic and chronologic limits of the question, as well as the nature of the reflections itself. The first level presented in Chapter II of this work, which could be defined as the ‘traditional’ set of representations, reveals certain perceptions of the Russians and the Russian State by the Ottomans, which refer to the general image of the Russians in the eyes of the Ottomans. Revealing the traditional Russian aspirations directly or indirectly concerning vital Ottoman territories and interests, these perceptions tend not to change in the course of time and represent a persistent and particularly negative image of Russians generated in the minds of common Ottomans that could easily survive the changes in daily politics or conjuncture.

The second level of representations presented in Chapter III scrutinizes the Russian Empire in connection with its Muslim and Turkic population, where the Ottomans are represented not only as a mere victim of the Russian imperial ambitions, but play an active role as the domain of the Caliph, as well as the only independent Muslim and Turkish state. Thus, the Russian territories with predominant or sizeable Muslim

and Turkic population became in a sense the playground for the Ottoman imperialistic policy that duly employed Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist propaganda. Taking into consideration that many Ottoman publications had an impressive distribution in those areas, as well as the prominent role played by certain émigré publicists in the Ottoman press, the Russian Muslims and Turks also derived benefit from the Ottoman periodicals using them as a herald for their own ambitions, often bringing their local clashes with fellow Muslims to the Ottoman proscenium.

The third level of analysis presented in Chapter IV and Chapter V examines the reflections of the First World War events and policies in the Ottoman periodical press directly related to the war and warfare that duly employ all the techniques and strategies of the wartime propaganda. In addition to the Islamic or Pan-Islamic appeals for the Holy War, along with all other means of religious encouragement and instigation, the Ottoman wartime propaganda targeting the Russian Empire as reflected in periodical press resorts not only to traditional Ottoman sentiments revealed in Chapter II, but also reflects the current balance of powers and alliances. Therefore, the classical notion of *jihād* as a Holy War against the infidels as well as the Pan-Islamic appeal are considerably modified because of the alliance with Germany, while the collaboration with Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, the countries until recently considered responsible for the loss of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, often made Russia and only Russia guilty even for the policies it never pursued.

1.3 SOURCES

The descriptions of the Russian Empire, Russians and the Muslims of the Russian Empire in this work are mainly to reflect their representation in the Ottoman periodical press of the period prior to and during the First World War or, more specifically, the *national* newspapers and magazines published in Ottoman Turkish language. Therefore, the non-Ottoman Turkish language periodicals, whether the minority journals, foreign journals or Ottoman journals in European or Middle Eastern languages other than Ottoman, as well as local publications in any language would be beyond the primary scope. Taking into consideration that numerous publications in French, German, Arabic, Persian, Armenian, Urdu and even Russian¹⁴ were published in the Ottoman Empire, the primary source of reference for this work is confined within chronologic, linguistic and geographic limits. However, the comprehensive analysis of the period and events would certainly require comparative study of numerous current and contemporary sources in many other languages, above all in Russian.

However, since the thorough and comprehensive analysis of the Ottoman representation of the Russian state and society during such a complicated and internationalized conflict like the First World War, with cross-border and cross-ethnic politics and aspirations involved, could not be carried out only through

¹⁴ For instance, the Russian language journal *Stambul'skie novosti* [The Istanbul News] that thoroughly covered domestic and international situation of the Ottoman Empire was published in Istanbul in 1909-1910. See Yu. A. Petrosian, *Russkie na beregu Bosfora (Istoricheskie ocherki)* (St. Petersburg: "Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie," 1998), p. 155.

periodical press, a great variety of contemporary Russian sources, both in Russian and Turkic languages, as well as Ottoman and European sources of that period are scrutinized to complete the comprehensive picture. The supplementary sources in Ottoman, Russian, English, German, French, Belarusian, Kazan Tatar, Uzbek, Uighur, Kazakh and Crimean Tatar include official documents and correspondence, memoirs, travelogues, campaign notes, political and strategic essays, and, naturally, the periodical press.

1.4 TERMINOLOGY

Since this work scrutinizes the reflections and perceptions of the Russian Empire in all its facets, including political, strategic, economic, religious and ethnic aspects, by the Ottoman Turks, as well as a whole set of domestic and international policies and propaganda by states and groups, the main concern of this work was to retain, as far as possible, the original terminology of the authors. Hoping that certain geographic, political, ethnic and religious terms might reveal the original sense of the statement or the current style, as well as personal, ethnic, religious and political affiliation and beliefs of the author and those of the audience, certain terms and proper names follow different spelling forms or even expressed by different words according to the original use of the author. Moreover, in order to reproduce the original sense of the source, the expressions and terminology of the author are preferred even in indirect references and quotations.

Therefore, for instance, the Ottoman capital might be referred throughout this work as *Tsar'grad*, *Constantinople*, *Kostantiniye*, *Der-sa'âdet* or *İslâmbûl* and the country as the Ottoman Empire or Turkey. The same is valid for the Russian State as well, so that according to the original reference the Russians might be referred as *Kazaklar*, *Moskoflar*, or *Ruslar*, which in indirect reference would be substituted by the appropriate English counterparts, namely, *Cossacks*, *Muscovites* and *Russians*. Consequently, certain geographic areas in the Ottoman Empire or in Russia might be referred differently by different authors, which would be duly reflected. Thus, for instance, it is possible to encounter controversial definitions of the Eastern Anatolian *vilâyets* of the Ottoman Empire, referred by the authors as *vilâyât-i şarkîye*, *Armenia*, *Zapadnaia Armeniia* [Western Armenia] or *Turkish Armenia*.

The use of the personal names throughout the text, especially those of the Russian Muslims referred differently by Russians and the Ottomans, also follow the original spelling of the source presenting different spellings like *Akçûraoğlu Yusuf*, *Yusuf Akçûra* or *Yusuf Akçûra Bey*, while for the certain ambiguous names like Ismail Gasprinsky the closest English counterpart of the Russian *Ismail Gasprinskii* and Ottoman *İsmâ'il Gasprinski*¹⁵ is preferred instead of modern Turkish *İsmail Gaspıralı*.

¹⁵ See, for instance, "İsmâ'il Gasprinski'ye," *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 6, No. 12 (27 Teşrîn-i sâni 1330) [1914], pp. 353-354.

CHAPTER II

SEEING THE EVIL: THE RUSSIANS AS PERCEIVED BY THE OTTOMAN TURKS

2.1 THE SPIRIT OF RUSSIA

2.1.1 The Russians in History

While analyzing the motives behind the widely prevalent notion of the Russian expansionism subjected to the paradigms of Darwinism, Marxism and geographical determinism and often intertwined with the “earlier fears of Russia’s drive for universal domination,” Alfred J. Rieber highlights that those three modes of analysis generated three concepts or myths of Russian expansionism:¹⁶

1. the search for warm-water ports, or “the urge to the sea;”
2. the description of Russia as a form of Oriental or Asian despotism, or alternately, as a patrimonial state; and

¹⁶ Alfred J. Rieber, “Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay,” in *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. and trans. Hugh Ragsdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 316.

3. the notion of Russian messianism, a quasi-religious belief in the Russians as the chosen people.

According to Rostislav Fadeev, a prominent Russian military historian and participant of anti-Turkish wars in the Balkans, Russia, being the ‘head of a great race’ and, eventually, the ‘refuge of all the Orthodox’, “never enclosed herself within strictly defined boundaries, and has indeed been compelled to step beyond them,” adding that Russia *must* extend her direct power either to Adriatic Sea or withdraw beyond the Dnieper River.¹⁷ Thus, as the famous Russian historian Vasily Kliuchevsky had noted, migration and colonization became the fundamental aspects or the Russian statehood.¹⁸

While comparing Moscow, which itself originated ‘on colonial grounds’ and much more vigorous eastward expansion, with other prominent Russian states such as Novgorod, Kliuchevsky adds that colonization was the ‘principal fundamental factor’ in Russian history.¹⁹ According to Hugh Seton-Watson, for Russia, which was the “land without natural frontiers,” the Ural Mountains did not form a real physical barrier, thus, the distinction between Europe and Asia is very artificial in Russian history and geography.²⁰ The Ottomans, however, were more alerted by the Asiatic nature of the Russian state. Although they agreed on the significance that

¹⁷ Rostislav A. Fadeev, “What Should Be the Policy of Russia?” in *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy*, eds. Robert A. Goldwin *et al.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 67, 70.

¹⁸ Philip E. Mosely, “Aspects of Russian Expansion,” *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (October 1948), p. 197.

¹⁹ O. Halecki, “Imperialism in Slavic and East European History,” *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (February 1952), p. 7.

²⁰ Hugh Seton-Watson, *The New Imperialism* (London, Sydney and Toronto: The Bodley Head, 1971), pp. 11, 13.

Russia possessed in European affairs, they, nevertheless, considered it more an Asian and Oriental state, whose area of action lay in Asia.²¹ Nevertheless, the transcontinental nature of the Russian Empire, this country “divided into discrete ‘European’ and ‘Asiatic’ components,”²² became one of the key features of the Russian imperial ideology up to the present day.

The peculiarity of the Russian state and identity, as well as the Russian people, was often explained by the characteristic features of geography and people. The Russians were often characterized – even by Russian authors – as an Eastern people whose educated elite recently adopted Western ideas, while the boundlessness of the Russian landscape was reflected in the breadth of Russian soul and despotic nature of the Russian government.²³ The principal functions of the Russian government, according to William M. Salter, was reduced to defense against foreigners, mainly Turk or Tatar, destruction of the traditional power of landed aristocracy and establishment of a rudimentary civil order.²⁴

As an Ottoman journal claims, starting from the late 15th century on, the Russians, a young nation that even the Europeans did not deign to recognize, emerged at the foreground of international politics, a nation which was initially interested only in

²¹ “Rusya,” *Hikmet*, No. 59 (4 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1329) [1911], p. 3.

²² Mark Bassin, “Inventing Siberia: Visions of the Russian East in the Early Nineteenth Century,” *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 96, No. 3 (June 1991), p. 768.

²³ Nicholas Berdyaev, “Religion and the Russian State,” in Robert A. Goldwin et al, eds., *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 25-27.

²⁴ William M. Salter, “The Russian Revolution,” *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (April 1907), p. 301.

spreading over the cultivated soil and plain.²⁵ Upon achieving independence from Tatar rule, the Russians became profoundly involved in Eastern affairs by driving out their former lords into the East, while, in the meantime, they proliferated there the morals and beliefs of the Ancient Greece and Rome which they adopted from the Byzantines.²⁶

Despite the widespread idea of superiority and originality of the Russian state and society often intertwined with divinity, truthfulness and its indispensable European identity, its Oriental roots, especially those derived from the Byzantine and Mongol empires, were often pronounced by many prominent Russian authors. While Kliuchevsky pointed at the Mongol Empire as the origin of the Russian concept of the supreme landowning prince, the state rights of the ruler and even the emergence of private property, Kovalevsky, the famous Russian economic historian, saw the roots of the Russian system of military service lands in the practice of the entire Muslim world, especially the Tatars khanates, whom the Russians persistently tried to imitate.²⁷ Even Ivan Kireevsky, one of the prominent ideologists of Russian Slavophilism, found the Mongol period of Russian history beneficial, since it made the Russian isolation from Western Europe possible, thus helped Russia preserve 'original traditions'.²⁸

²⁵ "Garb Nazârında Şark Mes'eleşi," *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 11, No. 7 (24 Teşrîn-i sâni 1332) [1916], p. 101.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Karl A. Wittfogel, "Russia and the East: A Comparison and Contrast," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (December 1963), pp. 628, 630-631.

²⁸ *Istoriografiia istorii SSSR: S drevneishikh vremen do Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1961), p. 172.

The concept of ‘Oriental Despotism’ proposed by Professor Karl A. Wittfogel and, with certain reservations, attributed to the Russian state, according to which Russia adopted the features of classical ‘Oriental Despotism’ through the Mongol Empire from China as well as through their interaction with the Byzantine Empire, another Orientally despotic state, was criticized by some Russian authors, who, among other things, see the description of the Mongol influence over-exaggerated.²⁹ However, the period of Mongol rule in Russia is depicted in Russian literature in predominantly unfavorable light and often associated with everything backward and inhumane in Russian state and society. As Alexander Herzen noted, not only did the Mongol yoke devastate the country and exhausted the people, but, during those two unfortunate centuries, “Russia let Europe outstrip itself.”³⁰

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were describing Russia and the Russian autocracy as an Oriental despotism or a ‘semi-Asiatic’ state, basing their assumptions on the fact that scattered village communities widespread in Russia “were the solid foundation of Oriental despotism,” while Friedrich Engels went even further, referring to the Russian state simply as ‘patriarchal-feudal barbarism’ or ‘Russian-Mongol barbarism’, adding that Tatar-Mongol khans in association with their

²⁹ See Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, “‘Oriental Despotism’ and Russia,” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (December 1963), pp. 644-649.

³⁰ A. I. Gertsen, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i pisem*, Vol. VI, pp. 316-317; cited by *Istoriografiia istorii SSSR*, p. 207.

Russian agents created a political system based on brutal expansion of despotic power and internal enslavement.³¹

Despite the excessively self-glorifying description of the Russian state and people by its prominent writers and officials, the image of Russians and, especially, the Russian state in Europe was, almost without exceptions, extremely critical and detractive. Along with its utmost backwardness in regard to the West and incompetence and corruptness of its officials, the Russian state was unanimously depicted as “an example of extraordinarily oppressive autocratic despotism.”³²

While criticizing the assertion of Nikolai Danilevsky, the prominent Russian Pan-Slavist, that Europe feared Russia for its emerging potential and new rising force, Vladimir Solov’ev saw the reason for the European hostility and resistance towards Russia in Russia’s ‘obvious, definite and far-reaching’ claims, since Russian nationalism “wants to destroy Turkey and Austria, rout Germany, seize Tsargrad, and if opportunity offers, perhaps India too.”³³

As for the extreme expansionist and aggressive policy of the Russian Empire traditionally attributed to Russian policy, some authors, Russian and foreign, asserted that this thesis was somewhat biased and did not regard current economic and political conditions. According to Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, the greatest Russian

³¹ Karl A. Wittfogel, “The Marxist View of Russian Society and Revolution,” *World Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (July 1960), pp. 488-489, 491-492.

³² Valerie Kivelson, “Merciful Father, Impersonal State: Russian Autocracy in Comparative Perspective,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1997), p. 635.

³³ Greg Gaut, “Can a Christian be a Nationalist? Vladimir Solov’ev’s Critique of Nationalism,” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Spring 1998), p. 91.

expansion, unlike that of certain European states, was directed towards the adjacent and accessible virgin lands of Siberia, “whereas several other countries constructed far-flung maritime empires overcoming danger and obstacles not faced by Russians.”³⁴ Asserting that following the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna Russia proved itself to become one of the European powers and admitting that surely Russia committed aggressive acts, since “imperialism was one of the things that it had in common with the other great states of Europe” he, nevertheless, claims the following:³⁵

Russian aggression in China was a part of the general aggression of several European countries, as well as of the recently Europeanized Japan. Russian advance towards Persia and Afghanistan was preceded by that of Great Britain. Russian interest and ambitions in the Near East can be best understood in the context of similar interests and ambitions of England, France, Austria, and later Germany. The often cited messianic ideas of some Russians were quite like corresponding doctrines developed in Poland, in Italy, and in other lands, and they were often derived from German romanticists. The Pan-Slavs had their twin brothers in the Pan-Germans, and the two groups by no means exhausted European chauvinism and prejudice.

In any case, the foreign policy aspirations of the Russian Empire were depicted as extremely invasive and destructive [*istilâkârâne ve muhribâne*] and that if the Russian Tsardom had possibilities, it surely would not spare from devastation almost all nations and countries in the world. Moreover, as was asserted, this aggressive foreign policy of the Russian state destroys any country it can reach, even

³⁴ Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, “Old Russia, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,” *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (October 1952), p. 172.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

threatening the existence of countries like Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, for whom Russia is a deadly enemy.³⁶

2.1.2 Russia and the Third Rome

From the very beginning of the Mongol rule over Russian lands, referred in Russia, almost unanimously, as the Mongol-Tatar Yoke (*mongolo-tatarskoe igo*), the Mongol Khan of the Chinggisid descend was *always* entitled in Russian chronicles of that period as *tsar*’, the title previously associated only with the ‘universal Christian ruler’, while his heirs and co-rulers were referred as *tsesar*’, the counterpart for *caesar*, the junior emperor.³⁷ However, it was the fall of Constantinople that totally changed the attitude of the Russian ruling elite towards the notion and the concept of the Christian ruler, when in their search for the a political ideology they assumed the orphaned ‘Byzantine heritage’, thus, the *basileus*, as opposed to *khan*, became the image of the Russian Christian Tsar.³⁸

The Russian messianic regard towards Moscow as the ‘Third Rome’, that is “the only independent center of the Orthodox faith, with a special duty to preserve and extend the only true faith,” became, starting from the late 15th century onwards, the binding and essential part of the Russian official ideology, as well as the matter of

³⁶ “Moskof Huşûneti: Bulgaristan ve Rusya,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, Vol. 49, No. 1272 (26 Dhu l’-Hidjdja 1333) [1915], p. 373.

³⁷ Michael Cherniavsky, “Khan or *Basileus*: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October-December 1959), p. 464.

³⁸ See Cherniavsky “Khan or *Basileus*: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory,” pp. 472-473.

popular pride.³⁹ Interestingly, at the beginning, the Russian state did not employ this messianic notion in an active, proselytizing way, using it rather as a ‘defensive weapon’ against the claims of the Greek Church that fell under the Ottoman control after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, as well as those of the Papacy, which was eager to extend its control over the Russian lands.⁴⁰ In any case, as was noted by the late 19th century Russian historian Vasily Kliuchevsky, the Orthodox Church in Russia did not try to reorganize the structure and the basis of the Russian state, preferring or, rather, being forced to retain them as they were.⁴¹

The legal claims of the Muscovite state over the Byzantine legacy and the notion of the Third Rome started taking clear shape during the reign of Ivan III, the son of Vasily II and the first Muscovite ruler to hold the title of the Grand Duke of All Russia (*velikii kniaz’ vseia Rusi*), who, as Nikolai Kostomarov, the prominent 19th century historian, wrote, received the hatred towards Turkey as a dowry from his wife.⁴² Indeed the marriage of Grand Duke Ivan Vasil’evich⁴³ to Princess Sophia, the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos, was considered the righteous disposal of the hereditary rights of the Byzantine Empire at the hands of the Muscovite rulers. With her brother Manuel submitted to the Ottomans and the incessant ‘flirting’ of Andreas, another brother of hers, to sell out the Byzantine

³⁹ Mosely, “Aspects of Russian Expansion,” p. 198.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ V. O. Kliuchevsky, *Russkaia istoriia*, Book I (Moscow: “Olma-Press,” 2003), p. 212.

⁴² N. I. Kostomarov, *Gospodstvo doma Sv. Vladimira* (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo, 1993), p. 273.

⁴³ In the traditional Russian official nomination Grand Duke Ivan III was called Ivan Vasil’evich, Ivan son of Vasily, just like the first Russian Tsar Ivan IV (Terrible), son of Vasily III, which often causes confusion.

hereditary rights both to the French King Charles VIII and the Spanish King Ferdinand the Catholic, the marriage of Princess Sophia to an Orthodox ruler, thus the disposal of the hereditary rights of Orthodox Byzantine monarch, seemed in the eyes of the Orthodox a far more righteous and justifiable act than that to any Catholic King.⁴⁴ As Edward Dirault, commonly known (and quoted) in Ottoman press as Edvar Diriyol, states in the Ottoman translation of his *Eastern Question*, Ivan III had impudently claimed Istanbul alluding to the rights of his newly married wife, Sophia Paleolog, after a long lapse of time.⁴⁵

Although the marriage of the felicitous Muscovite Grand Duke to a niece of the last Byzantine Emperor, who was already noted in Europe for her overweight and unattractiveness,⁴⁶ seemed to be a shrewd and thoughtful political move on the side of the Russian ruler, the Byzantine princess, nevertheless, turned out to have great respect in the Muscovite court and be able to have tremendous personal influence on the Grand Duke himself. As it was noted by Baron Herbertstein, the envoy of the German Emperor who had visited Moscow twice, Sophia Paleolog was an exceptionally cunning lady who was able to persuade the Grand Duke into radical actions.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Kostomarov, *Gospodstvo doma Sv. Vladimira*, p. 275.

⁴⁵ Edvar Diriyol, *Şark Mes'alesi: Bidayet-i Zuhûrundan Zamanımıza Kadar* (Istanbul: Muhtâr Hâlid Kitâbhânesi, 1328) [1912-1913], p. 63.

⁴⁶ See, for instance, Kliuchevsky, *Ruskaia istoriia*, Book I, p. 388. Some authors, on the contrary, praise her exceptional beauty. See, for instance, N. M. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*, Book 2, Vol. 6 (Moscow: "Olma-Press," 2004), p. 216.

⁴⁷ Kliuchevsky, *Ruskaia istoriia*, Book I, p. 388.

The messianism around the rise of the Orthodox Russian State who freed itself from the infidel Mongol grip almost exactly the same time the Byzantine Empire fell under the attacks of the Muslim Ottomans, raised speculations about the reincarnation of the Byzantine state in the guise of the Russian State, the country whose church was already considered to be the reincarnation of the Greek Church.⁴⁸ This divine reincarnation that entitled the Muscovite ruler to a sole independent Orthodox (but often simply Christian) kingdom on earth was duly reflected in many Russian tales and chronicles. According to the *Tale on the Origins of Moscow*, “all Christian kingdoms died out and condescended to the united kingdom of our sovereign. Two Romes had fallen, the third one still stands and there will be no forth. In truth this city is called the Third Rome....”⁴⁹

While analyzing the rapid advance of the Russian Empire and the peculiarities of its national and historical policies, an Ottoman *Hikmet* was quite explicit in its conclusion. According to the journal, the force behind impressive Russian grandeur was hidden in its tormenting of the Muslims and Turks, since the most important parts of the Russian territory are those constituted by the Muslims lands captured from the Turks.⁵⁰

From the time of Ivan III, the previously ‘barbarous’ Muscovite principality, a long-time vassalage of the Mongol khans, adopted extravagant and pompous Byzantine

⁴⁸ Kostomarov, *Gospodstvo doma Sv. Vladimira*, pp. 274-275.

⁴⁹ “Povest’ o nachale Moskvyy,” in *L’Idea di Roma a Mosca Secoli XV-XVI – Ideia Rima v Moskve XV-XVI veka* (Rome: Herder Editrice e Libreria, 1993), p. 194.

⁵⁰ “Rusya,” *Hikmet*, No. 59 (4 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1329), p. 3.

customs and traditions, as well as its worldly and spiritual imperial aspirations. One of the main factors in this process seems to be the extreme Byzantine devotion of the new Muscovite Grand Duchess, who even after twenty-six years of her marriage continued to sign her handmade silk embroidery as the Princess of Constantinople (*tsarevna tsaregradskaia*).⁵¹

The practical implementation of the concept, or rather the myth, of Russian messianism, was, as Alfred J. Rieber describes, derived from the “Byzantine legacy of Caesaropapism, that is, the fusion of secular and ecclesiastic authority in the hands of the tsar, with the ideas of the Third Rome and later Panslavism.”⁵² The genealogical part of the newly adopted imperial ideology was supported in a proper manner by invention, reinterpretation or proliferation of certain legends, treatise or chronicles that trace origins of the Muscovite rulers all the way back to the Byzantine emperors and even to Augustus, the first Roman Emperor. In an epistle to the Muscovite Grand Duke Vasily III written in the 1520s, the Muscovite ruler is addressed not only as “the sole heavenly Christian king [*tsar*],” but even Constantine the Great was reckoned among his forefathers.⁵³

As a sign of the Muscovite succession to the Byzantine legacy, the double-headed eagle of the former Eastern Roman Empire was hastily adopted as the coat of arms

⁵¹ Kliuchevsky, *Russkaia istoriia*, Book I, p. 389.

⁵² Rieber, “Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay,” p. 320.

⁵³ “Poslanie Psevdofilofeia velikomu kniaziu moskovskomu Vasiliuu III Ivanovichu o tret’em Rimem ob’iazannostiakh pravitelia, obriade krestnogo znamenii,” in *L’Idea di Roma a Mosca Secoli XV-XVI – Ideia Rima v Moskve XV-XVI veka*, pp. 163-164.

of the Russian State, as well as the title of *tsar*' (caesar), to whom, upon making the *boyars*, the formerly highest stratum of society, a mere title, everyone in the state became a slave or servant.⁵⁴ Following the elimination of Mongol rule over the Russian lands, Ivan III started to officially entitle himself as the Tsar of All Russia (*tsar' vseia Rusi*), initially in his correspondence with insignificant rulers, such as the Grandmaster of Livonia, while in domestic correspondence this Russian version of *caesar* was often accompanied with *samoderzhets* (autocrat), the Slavic translation of the Byzantine imperial title.⁵⁵ Already in 1492, a treatise by Metropolitan Zosima addressed Ivan III – in addition to the prevalent title of the Autocrat of All Russia (*samederzhets vseia Rusi*) – as the new King [*tsar*'] Constantine.⁵⁶

Although from the second half of the 17th century onwards, especially by the introduction of the Roman 'pagan' title of Emperor after Peter the Great, the idea of the Third Rome was abandoned at the official level, it was continuously referred by the Russian nationalists, as well as the opponents of Russia.⁵⁷ However, the 'traditional Russian nationalism', which was itself regarded as the creation of the Russian state to eulogize the "glories of the Tsars of Moscow, the achievements of Peter the Great, and the Orthodox church as a sanctuary of religious and truth passed

⁵⁴ Kostomarov, *Gospodstvo doma Sv. Vladimira*, pp. 275-276.

⁵⁵ Kliuchevsky, *Russkaia istoriia*, Book I, p. 390.

⁵⁶ "Predislovie mitropolita Zosimy k Paskhalii na vos'muiu tysiachu let," in *L'Idea di Roma a Mosca Secoli XV-XVI – Ideia Rima v Moskve XV-XVI veka*, p. 124.

⁵⁷ Norman Stone, Sergei Podbolotov and Murat Yaşar, "The Russians and the Turks: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Era of Empires," in *Imperial Rule*, eds. Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2004), p. 29.

on from Rome and Constantinople to the ‘Third Rome’, Moscow,” the image of Russia’s holiness and piety of the Tsars remained to be a popular theme in the writings of popular Russian authors and thinkers, including Pushkin, Tiutchev and many Slavophiles up until the 19th century.⁵⁸

2.1.3 Russian Nationalism: Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism

Although the initially idea of ‘mutual assistance among the Slavs’ expressed by the 17th century Ragusan poet Ivan Gondulić in his poem *Osman* depicted the Turks as the sole oppressor of the Slavonic race, Juraj Krizanić later added the Germans to the list of oppressors,⁵⁹ making Germany, Austro-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire during the First World War not only the primary military rivals in Europe, but also the bitter enemies of the Slavic race in general. This vivid idea later echoed in the famous *Ode to the Eagle* (1832) by Aleksei Khomiakov, the prominent Russian poet and philosopher and one of the leaders of the Slavophil movement, who wrote: “Look Southwards over the vast steppes, and the distant West. ...Numerous are they, in the Carpathians and in the chasm of the Balkans, numerous are our brethren, slaves of the Turk or the German.”⁶⁰

The Ottomans, on the other hand, were, naturally, aware of this strife and often brought it to the foreground, expectedly favoring their German ally. For instance, an

⁵⁸ Robert C. Williams, “The Russian Soul: A Study in European Thought and Non-European Nationalism,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (October – December 1970), p. 574.

⁵⁹ Albert Mousset, *The World of the Slavs* (New York: Frederic A. Praeger Inc., 1950), pp. 10-11.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 16.

article entitled “Slavs and Germans” published in 1916 in *Servet-i Fünûn*, states that compared to the situation of the non-Russian [*Moskof olmayan*] Slavs in the Russian Empire, the Slavs of Prussia enjoyed considerable freedom and autonomy, adding that even the Poles regarded the Germans as a potential ally.⁶¹

The infamous Crimean War, in which the Ottoman Empire had played an important part, and humiliating terms of the Treaty of Paris aroused the ideas for the inevitability of reforms in the Russian Empire and served as another proof of the impotence of the reign of Nicholas I.⁶² The Crimean War that was often mentioned to be the instigator of the rise of Pan-Slavism, also served as an indicator of social and economic instability.⁶³ Pan-Slavism, “a response to Russia’s post-Crimean dilemma,” had already been appealed before being formulated as a doctrine of *Realpolitik* due to its messianic substance⁶⁴ and its connection to the Eastern Question, which aroused Ottoman anxiety ever since the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774.

Since Slavophilism and later Pan-Slavism found their inspiration in the humiliation of the Russian Empire during the Crimean War against the anti-Russian coalition of Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire, their antagonism that was equally directed

⁶¹ “İslavlar ve Almanlar,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1281 (29 Safar 1334) [1916], p. 92.

⁶² Paul Miliukov, Charles Seignobos and L. Eisenmann, eds., *History of Russia: Reform, Reaction, Revolution (1855-1932)*, Charles Lam Markmann, trans., Vol. 3 (New York: Funk & Wagnalis, 1969), p. 5.

⁶³ Hans von Erckardt, *Russia*, trans. Catherine Alison Phillips (London: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1932), p. 178.

⁶⁴ Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 368.

towards any part of this former coalition, often put the Ottomans and Western Europe to the same category. For instance, Ivan Aksakov, the prominent ideologist of the Slavophile movement, not only saw the conspiracy of the Latin-Germanic countries to form a united anti-Russian coalition at the first opportunity, but prophesied the division of Europe into two main camps: “on the one side, Russia with the Slavic Orthodox peoples (including Greece), and on the other, all of Protestant, Catholic, and even Muslim and Jewish Europe together.”⁶⁵

Despite the lack of a satisfying definition of Pan-Slavism, there are two distinct notions related to Pan-Slavism, which seem to be generally agreed on. The first is notion that all the Slavs in the world should have a consciousness of belonging to a common Slavic nation or a community of nations, while the second one supposes that the Slavs spread around the world – who, for this matter, ought to be conscious of their Slavic affiliation in the first place – must live in a united Slavic state.⁶⁶ However, since Pan-Slavism, in general, “has been identified with the movement of the Slavs for political union,”⁶⁷ the existence of Pan-Slavism in its rudimentary form can be traced back to the ninth century, that is, to the earliest Slavic written literature, namely, *The Lives of Constantine-Cyril and of Methodius* and *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, the earliest chronicle of the Slavs, which mention the common

⁶⁵ “Writings of Ivan S. Aksakov, 1863-1883,” in *A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917*, ed. George Vernadsky *et al.*, Vol. 3 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 657-658.

⁶⁶ Zdenko Zlatar, “Pan-Slavism: A Review of the Literature,” *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, Vol. 17, No. 1-2 (1990), p. 222.

⁶⁷ John Erickson, *Panslavism* (London: Historical Association, 1964), p. 3.

Slavic consciousness and include expression of the linguistic unity of all the Slavs and even registered various Slavic peoples of that time.⁶⁸

In his article entitled “The Slavs and Russ of Ancient Arab Writers” published in 1868, A. A. Kotliarevsky, one of the leading experts of the 19th century Slavonic studies in Russia, asserts that Ibn Khurdādhbih, the ninth century geographer, was already aware of the Russ who belonged to the tribe of Slavs, as well as al-Mas‘ūdī, the famous tenth century Arab geographer and traveler, whose thorough knowledge made him aware of individual South and Western Slavic tribes, such as Serbs, Croats and Moravians, although Kotliarevsky comments that some Arab authors considered the Turks among the Slavs, others claimed that the land of the Slavs verged on China, while some, oppositely, claimed that the Russ belonged to the Turks.⁶⁹

One of the crucial questions of the 19th century political Pan-Slavism was the position of the Russian Empire in its plans and aspirations. While describing the Slavic nation “with national-political interests and aspirations,” John Erickson divides them into two main groups, the Great Russians and the non-Russian Slavs; the latter divided into Western, Eastern and Southern Slavs.⁷⁰ Already in 1846, the famous French Slavist Cyprien Robert mentioned the existence of two distinct types

⁶⁸ Zlatar, “Pan-Slavism: A Review of the Literature,” p. 222.

⁶⁹ A. A. Kotliarevsky, “Slaviane i Rus’ drevneishikh arabskikh pisatelei (1868),” in *Sochineniia A. A. Kotliarevskago*, Vol. 2 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 1889), pp. 76-84.

⁷⁰ Erickson, *Panslavism*, p. 3.

of Pan-Slavism, that is ‘Russian Pan-Slavism’ and ‘Pan-Slavism of another type’, affirming the prominent, if not dominating, role of Russia in Pan-Slavic idea.⁷¹

One of the essential elements of the messianic nature of Pan-Slavism was related to Constantinople as was vividly depicted in Fedor Tiutchev’s famous poem “Russian Geography” written in 1849: “Moscow and Peter’s city and the city of Constantines – These are the secret capitals of Russia’s realm.”⁷² Fedor Dostoevsky, whom Hans Kohn describes as the foremost spokesman in Russia of all who “were united in their hostility to the West, in the idealization of Russia, and in their extreme nationalism,”⁷³ on the other hand, regarded the war with the Turks as a precondition of achieving ‘eternal peace’, although, as often mentioned, Pan-Slavism was not actively supported and reflected in governmental policies, since its application would have led to war against the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburgs or even other European states.⁷⁴

The initial manifestations of Russian Slavophiles at their earlier stage were directed against the West and did not regard it as perilous.⁷⁵ However, as Max Webber claimed, unexpected from their ‘liberal conviction’ and their idealist mottoes for the emancipation of various nationalities in the Russian Empire, the Russian bourgeois

⁷¹ C. Robert, “Les deux Panslavismes,” in *Revue des Deux Mondes* (1848), p. 467; cited by Erickson, *Panslavism*, p. 3.

⁷² F. I. Tiutchev, *Lirika* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), Vol. 2, p. 118; cited by Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917*, p. 368.

⁷³ Hans Kohn, “Dostoevsky’s Nationalism,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October 1945), p. 391.

⁷⁴ Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire*, pp. 370-371.

⁷⁵ Liah Greenfeld, “The Formation of the Russian National Identity: The Role of Status Insecurity and *Ressentiment*,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (July 1990), p. 568.

intelligentsia turned into aggressive nationalism, championing for the idea of the Greater Russia and subjection of others.⁷⁶

Although Tsar Nicholas I and his followers always emphasized and praised the purity and glory of everything Russian, their history, morals, language and institutions, especially in contrast to “the dissatisfied, restless and revolutionary West,” the ‘nationality’ (*narodnost*) of the ideologists of the state and their doctrinal principles were, in the first place, to support and protect the existing order, rather than having any ideal perspectives.⁷⁷ Security always remained the primary objective of the Russian state, which, for its sake and in order to avoid unnecessary confrontation with European powers, was eager to sacrifice and even suppress nationalism and its doctrines any moment as it happened during the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878, despite the fact that Pan-Slavists were among the official and governmental circles.⁷⁸

The policy of the Russian government at the time of the Crimean Wars and the proclamation of a manifesto on the severance of diplomatic relations with England and France by the Russian Emperor Nicholas I in February 1854 still caused disillusionment among the Russian Slavophiles. The Slavophiles, who greeted the outburst of the Russo-Turkish war and were excited to turn the Balkan Slavs into

⁷⁶ Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Max Weber and the Regeneration of Russia,” *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 69, No. 1 (March 1997), p. 12.

⁷⁷ Nicholas Riasanovsky, “‘Nationality’ in the State Ideology during the Reign of Nicholas I,” *Russian Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (January 1960), pp. 40-41.

⁷⁸ Hans Rogger, “Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (April 1962), p. 260.

Orthodoxy and unite them under Russian rule, were disappointed by the manifesto, since they expected the Tsar to appeal to the Russian people to liberate the Balkan Slavs and, in the meantime, would openly appeal to all the Slavs to revolt against the Ottoman Sultan.⁷⁹

Soon after the end of the Crimean War, in 1858, the Moscow Benevolent Committee with an aim “to foster Slav cultural and religious activities under Ottoman rule and to educate Slav students in Russia” was formed with the support of private benefactors and the Russian Ministry of Education to host intellectuals and officials of Slavophil and nationalistic inclination, whose leaders, namely A. Khomiakov and I. Aksakov, started warning their Serbian brethren not to adapt the poisonous system of Western Europe, but follow the ‘true Orthodox path’ of their Russian ‘elder brother’.⁸⁰

Interestingly enough, the period of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 became the time of a temporal and short-lived success and popularity of already declining Slavophilism, after which, from the end of 1870s on, it grew feeble altogether.⁸¹ Since the very birth of Pan-Slavist idea, the Turkish factor, or the hatred against the Turks was never drifted apart from the idealist faith in Slavic fraternity. Križanić, a Croatian Jesuit sent to Russia in the 17th century to promote Catholic ideas, who,

⁷⁹ I. N. Kovaleva, “Slavianofily i zapadniki v period Krymskoi voyny (1853-1856 gg.),” *Istoricheskie zapiski*, Vol. 80 (1967), pp. 183-184..

⁸⁰ David MacKenzie, “Russia’s Balkan Policies Under Alexander II, 1855-1881,” in *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. and trans. Hugh Ragsdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 224.

⁸¹ Janko Lavrin, “Populists and Slavophiles,” *Russian Review*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (October 1962), p. 311.

during his stay in Russia, turned out to become a Pan-Slav activist, cherished an idea, or rather a dream, that Russia would one day expel the Turks from Europe and assume the leadership of all the Slavs in the world without exception.⁸²

It ought to be mentioned that throughout history the Russian people hardly had any concern and involvement in *Western Slav* affairs – as often and erroneously⁸³ the Slavs outside the Russian Empire were referred – especially with the Serbs, Bulgars and Montenegrins, whom in the 19th century they were so eager to liberate.⁸⁴ So, it was only during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, when souvenirs and pictures of the leaders and heroes of the Serbian revolt “who fought for the Christian faith and liberation of the fatherland from the barbarians” were sold by peddlers touring Russian villages and peasants’ concern for the fate of Slavdom increased.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the consciousness of the Russian peasants of that time was extremely limited, since being ‘aware’ that they were fighting against ‘Suleiman’, they, yet, could not distinguish the Russian flag from Turkish, expecting the former to bear the cross and latter to bear an eagle.⁸⁶

⁸² Janko Lavrin, “The Slav Idea and Russia,” *Russian Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January 1962), p. 11.

⁸³ Accordingly, the *Songs of the Western Slavs* [*Pesni zapadnykh slavian*], the famous collection of the Dalmatian, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian songs translated by Alexander Pushkin, which among other things often mention the Godless Sultan [*sultan bezbozhnyi*] and traitor Bogomils, would be the prominent example of this misnomer.

⁸⁴ von Erckardt, *Russia*, p. 145.

⁸⁵ S. A. Smith, “Citizenship and the Russian Nation during World War I: A Comment,” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 319.

⁸⁶ Aleksandr Nikolaevich Engelgardt, *Letters from the Country, 1872-1887*, ed. and trans. Cathy A. Frierson (New York: 1993), p. 135; cited by Smith, “Citizenship and the Russian Nation during World War I,” p. 319.

The nationalistic aspirations expressed in Pan-Slavist doctrines, namely by such prominent Russian writers like Fadeev and Danilevsky, often went far beyond the design of liberating the Slavic peoples under Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule and culminated in the idea of “creating a federation embracing all the non-German peoples of Eastern and Southeastern Europe up to and including Constantinople.”⁸⁷ Danilevsky’s idea of a Pan-Slav Union “largely of peoples homogeneous in spirit and blood,” as expressed in his famous book *Russia and Europe (Rossiia i Evropa)*, went far beyond Slavic world, comprising, in addition to traditionally Orthodox Romanian and Greek kingdoms, the Magyar Kingdom, as well as the ‘Tsargrad District’ with about 2 million of population spread over the areas in Rumelia and Asia Minor adjacent to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.⁸⁸ This 125 million-strong Pan-Slav union of Danilevsky, however, claimed control over “only that which legally belonged to it, not endangering anyone, and not being afraid of any threats, such a union could withstand all storms and adversities and march peacefully along the road of independent development.”⁸⁹ The ‘rightful’ incorporation of non-Slavic peoples into the Slavic Union was also propagated by Mikhail Pogodin, another prominent Pan-Slavist.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Cyril E. Black, “The Pattern of Russian Objectives,” in *Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Ivo J. Lederer (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 26.

⁸⁸ “Russian Pan-Slavism: Danilevskii’s Views,” in *Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917*, ed. Basil Dmytryshyn, 2nd ed. (Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1974), pp. 329-330.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

⁹⁰ See Michael Boro Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 30.

The liberation of the Balkan Slavs from Ottoman rule, the idea proliferated so ardently Russian Pan-Slavists, rarely received official approval except from a few influential official figures like Ignat'ev and Hartwig, while officially, both Alexander I and Nicholas I and their successors were inclined to preserve the Ottoman Empire.⁹¹ Similarly, despite the immense popular support and sympathy towards the Serbs and their national aspirations among Russians and, particularly, Russian Pan-Slavists, the Russian government was eager to support the Bulgarian case due to their more important strategic position regarding Constantinople and the Straits, as seen in the establishment of the Bulgarian exarchate.⁹²

As the Russian ambassador in Berlin, von Meyendorff, had noticed in 1849,⁹³

This Panslavism is a theory, it has no existence in practice. At the Slav Congress in Prague the delegates of the various nationalities had to speak German in order to understand one another. Do we not see the Poles fraternizing with the Hungarians in order to combat the Serbs and Croats? Besides, these languages have no literature, no history, and no poets, and the most distinguished men of these nationalities think in French or German.

Therefore, having the conservative forces in the Balkans as a target group, the Russian policy in the region aimed at expanding Russian ideological and political influence rather than having economic aspirations.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Ivo J. Lederer, "Russia and the Balkans," in *Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Ivo J. Lederer, p. 422.

⁹² Charles Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1958), pp. 3-4.

⁹³ von Erckardt, *Russia*, p. 145.

⁹⁴ V. N. Vinogradov, "The Personal Responsibility of Emperor Nicholas I for the Coming of the Crimean War: An Episode in the Diplomatic Struggle in the Eastern Question," in *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. and trans. Hugh Ragsdale, p. 161.

Already on the eve of the First World War, the Octobrists, the rightwing political group efficient in the State Duma, expressed their political priorities and views by the classic formula of ‘Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality’, the ideas extremely outmoded and archaic compared to the contemporary European conservatism.⁹⁵ As often mentioned, nationalism in Russia, as well as in the Ottoman Empire, was a relatively recent notion and was regarded as the sign of crisis and decline, especially with the decline and impotence of the formerly effective autocratic rule based on the strict obedience of all the subjects to the autocrat, the regime that would not allow any kind of nationalistic feelings.⁹⁶

In any case, for the most of the 19th century, the period of the rise of Russian and Slavic nationalistic feelings in the Russian Empire, the Tsarist state was hardly regarded as “the embodiment of the national purpose, as the necessary instrument and expression of national goals and values,” while the state itself had a very negative and suspicious attitude towards any expression of nationalism, whether Russian or not.⁹⁷ Hence, the Tsarist government was criticized for their alienation from and extreme hatred towards anything Russian, which made it unworthy of ruling Russia and these complaints were frequently expressed by the representatives of the Russian nationalism, namely the prominent poet and thinker Fedor Tiutchev.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Mikhail Loukianov, “Conservatives and ‘Renewed Russia’, 1907-1914,” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Winter 2002), p. 764.

⁹⁶ Stone, Podbolotov and Yaşar, “The Russians and the Turks: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Era of Empires,” p. 30.

⁹⁷ Rogger, “Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma,” p. 253.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

On the other hand, despite the overall agreement on the alienation of the official Russian governmental policy from Pan-Slavic ideals and aspirations, if not its total rejection, and the scanty influence Pan-Slavism had upon and among the state officials, certain authors disagree over this assumption. First of all, the very appointment of Count Nicholas Ignat'ev, a noted Pan-Slavist and General, as the Russian ambassador in Constantinople is regarded as the sign of the existence of influential adherents of Pan-Slavism in Tsarist Court and Government.⁹⁹

2.2 RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

As Vasily Kliuchevsky, the prominent 19th century historian of Russia, mentions in his *Russian History*, the passionate desire of the Muscovite rulers to adopt the Byzantine heritage culminated, in addition to numerous administrative customs and practices, in the development of a certain political program based on two definite notions, both of which were, indeed, certain political claims. These were “the idea of the Muscovite ruler as a national sovereign of *all* Russian lands and the idea of him as a political and spiritual successor of Byzantine emperors.”¹⁰⁰

Although the image of the Russian state apparatus or simply that of a common Russian civil servant became the caricature of ineffectiveness of bureaucracy and corruption not only in Europe, but also in the Russian press and literature, as

⁹⁹ Erickson, *Panslavism*, p. 23.

¹⁰⁰ Kliuchevsky, *Russkaia istoriia*, Book I, p. 390.

brilliantly depicted in famous works of Nikolai Gogol', the foreign policy of the Russian Empire with its entire staff and apparatus was always a subject of praise, admiration or envy. While describing Russian diplomatic corps, Friedrich Engels, a man usually very critical of everything Russian, praised their

perseverance, eyes set fixedly on the goal, not shrinking from any breach of faith, any treason, any assassination, any servility, distributing bribes lavishly, never over-confident following victory, never discouraged by defeat over the dead bodies of millions of soldiers and at least one Czar...,¹⁰¹

claiming that their talent extended 'all the Russian armies put together'. Albert J. Beveridge, another admirer of the Russian foreign and intelligence services, wrote in 1904, just a few months before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, that the work of the bureau of information in the Orient started bearing golden fruits, since "Russia's foreign statesmanship [had been] as much superior to that of other nations as her internal and economic statesmanship previous to Witte's administration had been inferior."¹⁰² Among the methods and aims of the Russian foreign policy was the struggle against the anti-Russian publications in foreign press, including the physical destruction of the anti-Russian books published abroad.¹⁰³

The professional merits of the Russian diplomats, or rather their viciousness and slyness, were noticed by the Ottomans, who almost without exceptions depicted the

¹⁰¹ Friedrich Engels, "The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism," in *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy*, eds. Robert A. Goldwin *et al.*, p. 75.

¹⁰² Albert J. Beveridge, "The Russian Advance," in *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy*, eds. Robert A. Goldwin *et al.*, p. 279.

¹⁰³ Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Propaganda: Tsarist and Soviet," in *Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Ivo J. Lederer, p. 280.

envoys of the Tsar as men ready to achieve their goals by any possible means.¹⁰⁴ This image of the Russian treacherous conduct of relations with the Ottomans, who “always behaved with righteousness and honesty,” survived until recent times and can be encountered even in the works of some present-day authors, who are still eager to see only two patterns of Russian diplomacy: by fraud when impotent and by threat when self-confident.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, an Ottoman author who analyzed the antagonist flow of the Russo-Ottoman relations that often led to imprudent bloodshed and material loss and who had personally examined “almost all Ottoman documents,” came to a conclusion that Turkey always intended to be on good terms and get along with Russia, while Russian diplomats intended exactly the opposite.¹⁰⁶

Although Russia’s successful advance into the East and South and establishment of a well-organized colonial rule over the newly captured Eurasian lands immediately made it an influential global actor in Eastern politics, its main focus was never drifted apart from Europe and its relations with European powers. Not only had Pan-Slavic and Russian expansionist imperial ideology had their main target in Europe, as well as in the fate of the Ottoman Straits, but even the need for the Russian invasion of Central Asia was caused by its confrontation with England and other European powers.¹⁰⁷ The Russian expansionist drive was often related to being an Oriental despotism or a patrimonial state, the ground behind both being the

¹⁰⁴ “Çarikof Mes’elesi,” *Beyân-ul-Hak*, Vol. 6, No. 151 (6 Rabî’ al-Âkhir 1330) [1912], p. 2684.

¹⁰⁵ Kadir Mısıroğlu, *Moskof Mezâlimi* (Istanbul: Sebil Yayinevi, 1976), p. 89.

¹⁰⁶ “Türkiye – Rusya,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1036 (14 Rabî’ al-Âkhir 1329) [1911], p. 507.

¹⁰⁷ Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, trans. Bruce Little (Leamington Spa, Hamburg and New York: Berg. 1987), p. 94.

weakness of private property that led to the concentration of political power entailing unlimited expansion.¹⁰⁸ However, close to the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, the Tsarist state started pursuing a more nationalistic policy, while, accordingly, the Russian nationalism, previously oppositional and critical of the state, started becoming more and more state-oriented, losing its romanticism and spirituality.¹⁰⁹

2.2.1 Russia and the Eastern Question

From the second half of the 19th century onwards, Russo-Turkish relations or, more precisely, the Russian policy towards the Ottoman Empire, advanced and developed around the Eastern Question, often defined as “the control of Constantinople and the Straits..., the fate of the Christian population in Turkey and, in the last analysis, the survival or dissolution of the Ottoman empire,” which became, from that time on, the “central question of Russian foreign policy.”¹¹⁰ However, the very spirit of Russia’s ‘Eastern affairs’ contained in itself a very inconsistent and even controversial character, since, according to Golovin, a prominent Russian publicist, Russian policy towards the Ottoman Empire was an act of vacillating between “unselfish intervention in favor of the Slavs and the very selfish desire to obtain the heritage of Turkey.”¹¹¹ On the other hand, in the eyes of Vladimir Solov’ev, a prominent Russian thinker, the Eastern Question already took shape of a historical

¹⁰⁸ Rieber, “Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay,” p. 320.

¹⁰⁹ Rogger, “Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma,” p. 253.

¹¹⁰ Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A History and an Interpretation*, Vol. 2 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), p. 826.

¹¹¹ von Erckardt, *Russia*, p. 159.

struggle between the Christian and Muslim worlds thirteen centuries ago.¹¹² Interestingly, while comparing Russia with Spain and their role in the continuous struggle between East and the West, he points out that Spain fought against Islam for seven centuries just like Russia was hurling back the Turco-Mongol Hordes, however, unlike Russian, the Spaniards turned from Christian warriors into butchers, which resulted in their loss of overseas colonies.¹¹³

As for the Ottomans themselves, their interpretation of the Eastern Question was somewhat more comprehensive and was not exclusively limited to the Ottoman realm. For them, “in quite an obvious and plain definition” the Eastern Question referred “to the efforts of the European states and European nations to capture and occupy the Ottoman country and the whole Near East by any possible ways and means, and to destroy and exterminate all non-Christian Easterners.”¹¹⁴ According to Ahmed Sâib, the Eastern Question is definitely related to the Muslim world in general and its independent survival, however, on more specific terms, it has its roots in the Ottoman wars with Russia, its eternal enemy, for the last two centuries and all the losses the Ottomans had suffered.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Vladimir Solov'ev, “Pis'mo o Vostochnom voprose,” in *Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov'eva*, Vol. 8 (1897-1900) (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Tovarishchestva ‘Obshchestvennaia Pol'za’, 1903), p. 222.

¹¹³ G. I. Shchetinina, *Ideinaia zhizn' russkoi intelligentsii: Konets XIX – nachalo XX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1995), p. 76.

¹¹⁴ “Garb Nazârında Şark Mes'elesi,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 11, No. 7 (24 Teşrîn-i sâni 1332), p. 104.

¹¹⁵ Ahmed Sâib, *Şark Mes'elesi: Hakâik-i Târihiyeyi Hâvidir* (Istanbul: İkbâl Matba'ası, 1327) [1911-1912], p. 2.

The Russian vigorous involvement and interest in the Ottoman minorities, which is often referred as Russia's historic mission, was put into practice in the time of Catherine II, who indeed "discovered the *rayahs*," as it is said, under the influence of Voltaire, the prominent figure of the Age of Enlightenment, with whom she was in correspondence. However, her beneficence towards the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire initially did not go beyond the instigation of the local population to revolt against Ottoman rule, as was done among the Greek population of Morea and Magnesia [Manisa] by Admiral Orlov during the Russo-Turkish War of 1767-1774.¹¹⁶ In any case, the very essence of Catherine's Greek Project of 1782 was eager to make the Russian Empire the physical and spiritual heir of the Byzantine, rather than creating a free Slavic world.¹¹⁷

This controversy of imperial priorities found reflection in the writing of a prominent Russian thinker and philosopher Konstantin Leont'ev, the participant of the Crimean War and the Russian diplomat in Crete. Promoting his idea of Byzantinism, he criticized Pan-Slavism for being nationalistic in nature, thus, conflicting with the idea of Russism. According to him, unlike Slavism, this obscure and rudimentary idea, Byzantinism was the foundation and even 'the nervous system of Russia', which would keep Catholic and Protestant Slavs outside.¹¹⁸ While promoting his thoughts, he often went too far, so, his Utopian ideals were never considered with

¹¹⁶ Valentine Chirol, "The Attitude of the Powers," in *The Balkan Question*, ed. Luigi Villari (London: John Murray, 1905), p. 229.

¹¹⁷ Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan Slavism, 1856-1870*, p. 11.

¹¹⁸ Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia: Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul, Vol. 2 (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1968), p. 212.

gravity, as was his idea to capture Constantinople and establish there a patriarchal throne over all Orthodox countries, which would be, in addition, independent from any secular authority.¹¹⁹

As for the Ottoman perception, the ambitions of the Russian religious policy and its endeavors to obtain the exclusive protection rights over the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire were simply regarded as an effort to oust and replace the Greek Orthodox Church [*Rûm kilisesi*] and establish the dominance of the Russian church. Thus, the establishment of the Russian Jerusalem Society in 1882 with a rhetorical task to achieve the domination over the Orthodox population, was claimed, in practice, to force out and replace the Greek Orthodox Church in Syria and Jerusalem, to win over the local Christian assemblies and, in the long run, to pave the way for capturing the entire country through the Society founded by Pobedonostsev, the Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod.¹²⁰

While mentioning the Russian claims over Constantinople, Friedrich Engels himself was very passionate and enthusiastic, calling Constantinople, or, more precisely, Tsar'grad, the third Russian capital after Moscow and St. Petersburg, the mysterious city that would endow Russia with moral dominion over Eastern Christendom, facilitating its way to dominate the whole Europe.¹²¹ Karl Marx, however, was less excited by the possible Russian possession of 'Turkey', warning that in case it

¹¹⁹ Shchetinina, *Ideinaia zhizn' russkoi intelligentsia: Konets XIX – nachalo XX v.*, pp. 71-72.

¹²⁰ "Rusya'nın Şarkda Kilise Siyaseti," *Sebilü'r-Reşâd*, Vol. 9-2, No. 21-28 (30 Ramadân 1330) [1912], p. 33.

¹²¹ Engels, "The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism," p. 77.

happened, Russia would double its strength and become “superior to all the rest of Europe put together,” an act ‘unspeakably calamitous’ for the revolutionary cause.¹²² It was also mentioned that Napoleon would have never wished to leave Constantinople to Russians since its very location was to become the center of the universal domination.¹²³

The Russian prospective warfare against the Ottomans with all its possible consequences, among which were the destruction of the latter and Russian possession of the captured lands, was widely anticipated by many in Russia, whose implications were not only limited to strategic and political matters. While Nikolai Mikhailovsky, the prominent populist leader, hoped that “to destroy Turkey meant to resolve the social question” in Russia, the famous Russian writer Fedor Dostoevsky has expected anything ‘new and progressive’ from the war against Turkey, “the last great struggle which will bring about the great regeneration of mankind.”¹²⁴ However, in the eyes of the celebrated author of the *Karamazov Brothers*, the war against the Ottoman Empire was not simply a local war for Russia’s regional prevalence or strategic advantage. Except for being confident in Russian victory, he hoped that Russia’s anti-Turkish war would soon spread “to a general war which

¹²² Marx – Friedrich Engels Werke, Vol. 9 (Berlin: 1960), p. 17; cited by Neil A. Martin, “Marxism, Nationalism, and Russia,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April – June 1968), p. 245.

¹²³ Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre* (Paris: 1891), p. 268; cited by Suzanne Champonnois, *Le mythe de Constantinople et l’opinion publique en Russie au XIXe siècle* (Istanbul: Éditions ISIS, 1989), p. 13.

¹²⁴ J. H. Billington, *Mikhailovskii and Russian Populism* (Oxford: 1958), p. 100; cited by Rogger, “Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma,” pp. 260-261.

would decide all the great problems with one stroke and so save the world many future wars,” so that, “the face of Europe would be completely changed.”¹²⁵

The extreme anti-Turkish stance of Dostoevsky could not have been passed unnoticed by the Ottoman press, which itself was amazingly keen on Russian literary development. *Genç Kalemler*, a prominent Ottoman journal published a thorough analysis of the literary and political views of the writer entitled “Enemies of Turkey: Dostoevsky.” Although the author deeply appreciates his *Crime and Punishment* calling it his most beautiful novel, he nevertheless considers it as the death of his literary talent, since following its publication he got involved into politics and became an extreme Pan-Slavist.¹²⁶ In addition to his notorious statements about the capturing the Ottoman capital, the article quotes certain excerpts from his writings, some of which are of extremely harsh style. In addition to urging the Russians to defend “the Christianity, Orthodoxy, religious and consanguineous brethren,” against the unfaithful Turks, he depicted them as “a deceitful and disgraceful nation that denies its corrupted brutality,” while “we still treat these rapacious animals as human beings.”¹²⁷

As was often articulated by different and often antagonistic circles in and around Russia, the prospective war against the Ottoman Empire, which was almost unanimously expected to end up in its total destruction and expulsion from Europe,

¹²⁵ Kohn, “Dostoevsky’s Nationalism,” pp. 405-406.

¹²⁶ “Türk Düşmanlarından: Dostoyevski,” *Genç Kalemler*, Vol. 3, No. 19 (Nisân 1328) [1912], p. 162.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

seemed to satisfy everybody. In that respect, the notorious paragraph by Mikhail Pogodin, the prominent Russian historian, could be considered exemplary, since it asserts that:¹²⁸

What war can be more honorable, more humane, more holy! Forward! God is with us! ...

Here is our purpose – Russian, Slavic, European, Christian!

As Russians, we must capture Constantinople for our own security. As Slavs, we must liberate millions of our older kinsmen, brothers in faith, educators and benefactors. As Europeans, we must drive out the Turks. As Orthodox Christians, we must protect the Eastern Church and return to Saint Sophia its ecumenical cross.

As was remarked, it is not possible to imagine a single Russian, in whose hearts there would not be a grievous image or a booming sound of Hagia Sophia, since “the question of the Slavs is not simply a meaningless and aimless term.”¹²⁹ However, not everybody saw the common European and Christian cause in the war against the Ottoman Empire, while some, on the contrary, claimed that the calamities survived by the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire were indeed a result of European policy. According to Ivan Aksakov, the ‘Christian Europe’ itself threw Orthodox Christians “into the bondage to the Moslems,” since it preferred “the triumph of Islam to the triumph of the Greek ‘schism’,” adding that the Pope himself was encouraging and blessing the Moslems and European Christians to the war against Russian and the Orthodox.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ M. Pogodin, *Sobranie statei, pisem i rechei po povodu slavyanskogo voprosa* (1878), p. 24; cited by Riasanovsky, “‘Nationality’ in the State Ideology during the Reign of Nicholas I,” p. 45.

¹²⁹ “Boğazlar Mes’elesî,” *Mecmû’a-i Ebû’z-Ziyâ*, No. 116 (19 Shawwâl 1329) [1911], p. 1210.

¹³⁰ “Writings of Ivan S. Aksakov, 1863-1883,” p. 658.

Starting from the early 19th century and up to its end, the fate of the Ottoman Empire and the consecutive disintegration of its territories became the subject of every multilateral agreement that this way or another involved Russia, regardless to the composition of contracting parties. The very first article of the agreement between the Three Emperors signed in June 1881 and stipulating their neutrality in case of war between one of the Three Powers with another European state, had a special clause concerning the Ottoman Empire. According to it, in case of the “war between one of the three powers and Turkey,” the neutrality rule would be applied “in case a previous agreement has been arranged between the three courts relative to the results of the war.”¹³¹ As Serge Goriainov, the former chief of the Tsarist Foreign Ministry Archive, asserts, Russian agreement with Germany and Austria-Hungary was, as could be expected, directed to the solution of Russia’s ‘vital question’, that is, the occupation of the Straits in case of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, where the complete neutrality of these two powers would balance Russia’s position against a European coalition and would help isolating England, “which would never yield to us the Straits.”¹³² Thus, as an Ottoman journals summarizes Goriainov’s views on that ‘vital question’, “that famous Eastern Question in the eyes of Russia is the question in whose hands the straits of Bosphorus [*Boğaziçi*] and Dardanelles [*Çanakkale*] would be, to whom these two straits would belong.”¹³³

¹³¹ Serge Goriainov, “The End of the Alliance of the Emperors,” *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (January 1918), p. 325.

¹³² Goriainov, “The End of the Alliance of the Emperors,” p. 325.

¹³³ “Boğazlar Mes’alesi,” *Mecmû’a-i Ebû’z-Ziyâ*, No. 116 (19 Shawwâl 1329), p. 1210.

In this light, as well as in the light of the Russo-German relations, the statement of the Tsar to his German counterpart, Wilhelm II, in 1896, saying “I have no interest whatever in Constantinople; all my interest and attention are directed towards China,”¹³⁴ does not seem very convincing, especially, since already in 1901, that is before the Russian Japanese adventure, *Novoe vremia*, the prominent representative of the Russian nationalist press, declared that Russia’s goal “is the good of Slavdom and the entrance to the Black Sea; no Port Arthur, no Shan-hai-kwan, no Pei-ho can take the place of the Bosphorus.”¹³⁵

Undoubtedly, the Russian Empire, thanks to its geographic location, political and strategic aspirations, as well as historical background, was considered among the key player of the Eastern Question. While mentioning the European lands of the Ottoman Empire, James Bryce’s assertions written already in 1905 had very limited alternatives, stating that¹³⁶

European Turkey, for instance, may be conquered and seized by Russia, or be partitioned either between Russia and Austria, or perhaps between Russia and Austria, with some concessions of territory to Italy and Greece, the Bulgarians, Servians, Vlachs, and other inhabitants losing after a time their individuality, and becoming blent in the great Slavonic mass of the two Empires, and especially of Russia.

As for the Near East in general, Russia and the Ottoman Empire often played different and contradictory roles, where the Ottoman state either represented a rival

¹³⁴ Miliukov, Seignobos and Eisenmann, eds., *History of Russia: Reform, Reaction, Revolution (1855-1932)*, Vol. 3, p. 187.

¹³⁵ B. H. Sumner, *Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East, 1880-1914* (n. p.: Archon Books, 1968), pp. 20-21.

¹³⁶ James Bryce, “Introduction,” in *The Balkan Question*, ed. Luigi Villari (London: John Murray, 1905), p. 9.

to the Russian aspirations or simply the target of them. Although the Russian Empire had already enjoyed some success in their expansionist design towards the Muslim world, namely the Central Asia, Caucasus and, to some extent, Persia, their ambitions often seemed feeble in the Ottoman lands mainly because of the increasing influence of the European banking corporations that made the Ottoman Empire not only a part of the European financial capitalism, but also that of the European policies of the concert of powers. Thus, unlike the Asian periphery and borderland of the empire, Russia was unable “to imitate the ways and means of modern imperialism” in the Near East, where, compared to European imperialism, Russia definitely remained ‘pre-modern’.¹³⁷ Therefore, it was by no means the Ottoman Empire that obstructed the realization of the Russian aspirations and interests in the Eastern Question, but European states, which, guided by the maximization of their benefits, protected and preserved the Ottoman Empire from being occupied by Russia despite the latter’s actual victories in the wars.¹³⁸

Nevertheless, whether exaggerated or not, Russia posed a tremendous military threat for the Ottoman lands in Anatolia, as was duly reflected in the Ottoman press of that period. According to *Tercümân-i hakikât* and its assertions that were ‘documentarily authenticated’ by its sources obtained in St. Petersburg, Russia planned to capture the Eastern Anatolia the way it did in Iran, and was, currently, in expectation of an uprising there, while the ultimate aim of the Russian Empire was to descend to the

¹³⁷ Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, pp. 342, 345.

¹³⁸ Ahmed Sâib, *Şark Mes’alesi: Hakâik-i Târihiyeyi Hâvidir* (Istanbul: İkbâl Matba’ası, 1327), pp. 9-10.

shores of Eastern Mediterranean.¹³⁹ Indeed, the final aim of the Russian policy over the Straits was often asserted to be the free passage from the Black Sea to Mediterranean, which, of course, would only make sense in case of providing the protection for its Black Sea shores against foreign attack.¹⁴⁰

2.2.2 The Balkans

As Charles Jelavich claims in his *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism* that although since the decade after the Congress of Berlin Russia had achieved great success and made impressive advances in the Middle East and Inner Asia, the Balkan question remain the focal point of Russian diplomacy. He adds, however, that the primary goal in possessing the Balkan Peninsular was the control over the Straits and Constantinople, which made the Balkan Question a subordinate to this principal goal.¹⁴¹

Since from the second half of the 19th century, Russia had virtually abandoned its ‘divine’ policy of the protector of the entire Christian population of the Ottoman Empire and embraced the doctrine of Pan-Slavism, which automatically made the Balkans a crucial scene of actions. In doing so, the Tsarist state now relied on the traditional antagonism between the Greeks and the Slavs and intended to make good use of this in fostering national consciousness among the Slavic peoples of the Balkans, freeing them from the Ottoman rule and the dominance of the Greek

¹³⁹ “Rusya ve Anadolu,” *Tercümân-i Hakikât* (31 Kânûn-i evvel 1328) [1913], p. 3.

¹⁴⁰ “Rusya’nın Endişeleri,” *Tercümân-i Hakikât* (7 April [Nisân-i efencî] 1913), p. 2.

¹⁴¹ Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, pp. 1, 3.

Patriarchate, as was the case, as was claimed, in their encouragement for the establishment of an autocephalous Bulgarian Church.¹⁴² Despite the initial cordiality of the Russo-Greek relations and the common incorporation of Greece in nationalistic and religious rhetoric by notable Russian thinkers and politicians, Russian Pan-Slavic policy and efforts to eliminate the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Balkans caused the gradual alienation of the Greeks, who, in their turn, later followed an active policy to impede nationalistic Slavic movement in the area.¹⁴³

Although the general Slavic orientation of the Russian state policy is often exposed as its vital pillar, the concern of the Russian Emperors, as stated by Albert Mousset, was simply limited, if not to count the Slavs within the Empire's borders, to the ten million Balkan Slavs, since the Tsars considered the Balkans as (1) the avenue of approach to gate of the Straits, desired by them for so long, (2) the barrier against the influence of Western culture and Catholicism and (3) as a trump card to get access into European politics.¹⁴⁴

As Nicholas Riasanovsky claims, Russia's 'natural' leadership of the Slavs was due not only to its great history, messianic prospective, enormous population, political power, land and natural resources, as well as the subjugation and misery of the other Slavic groups, but also thanks to its freedom from the "petty rivalries and jealousies

¹⁴² Chirol, "The Attitude of the Powers," in *The Balkan Question*, ed. Luigi Villari, p. 237.

¹⁴³ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 149.

¹⁴⁴ Mousset, *The World of the Slavs*, pp. 26-27.

which plagued the other Slavs.”¹⁴⁵ The Russian assumption of the natural leadership over the Slavs was not, somehow, limited to the Orthodox majority and even comprised non-Slavic Eastern Europeans, some of whom were not even Orthodox, regarding them an indivisible part of the Slavic or Russian world.¹⁴⁶ Naturally, the Russian leadership over the Slavs, whether claimed or attributed, was also acknowledged by the Ottomans, since the Russians, “so eager to destroy Islam and the Ottoman Empire,” were described as “the sole protector of the Slavs.”¹⁴⁷ As for the Orthodox in general, as the Ottoman journal *İctihâd* claims, the peace conference at The Hague had already recognized the Tsar [*Çar hazretleri*] as the protector of the Orthodoxy.¹⁴⁸

The liberation of the Slavdom and the Orthodox Christendom, though not ultimate, but still an important task in the rhetoric of the Russian state, found vivid reflection among the prominent Russian writers and thinkers of that time. The ‘East of Europe’ liberated by Russia should be ruled, according to Fadeev, by a common head, who would assume the military command and international affairs. Although he claims that Russia would not wish to turn the ‘kindred countries’ into ‘subject provinces’, the common ruler as well as the Chief of all the Slavs and Orthodox, is, naturally, the Tsar of Russia, who, in the anticipation of the people, is the “direct heir of

¹⁴⁵ Riasanovsky, “‘Nationality’ in the State Ideology during the Reign of Nicholas I,” pp. 44-45.

¹⁴⁶ Halecki, “Imperialism in Slavic and East European History,” p. 18.

¹⁴⁷ H. Cemâl, *Yeni Harb: Başımıza Tekrâr Gelenler* (Istanbul: Şems Matba’ası, 1332) [1916-1917], p. 3.

¹⁴⁸ “Rusya’nın ‘Dîn ‘Asâsı’,” *İctihâd*, No. 66, p. 1446.

Constantine the Great,”¹⁴⁹ Count Nikolai Ignat’ev, the then Russian ambassador in Constantinople and a prominent Pan-Slavist in the Russian government, suggested a slightly different but, nevertheless, an ‘immediate solution’ to the Eastern Question, which is the establishment of a common Serbo-Bulgarian state under Russian guidance and control after the defeat of the Turks.¹⁵⁰

Already in the 17th century, “the utilization of the natural hatred of the Orthodox population subjugated by the Turks,” during the conflict with the Ottoman Empire was among the popular foreign policy tools at the disposal of the Russian Empire.¹⁵¹ Therefore, as could have been expected, the Ottomans regarded the Russian Empire the primary force behind the separation from the Ottoman Empire of not only Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, but also that of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁵²

Theoretically, the principal assumption of the Pan-Slavic ideology over the federation of Slavic states does not necessarily imply it to be a Russian state and, again theoretically, there is no hierarchy between the Slavic peoples or inclination to absorb or annihilate smaller Slavic peoples into the Russian Empire.¹⁵³ However, many prominent Russian Pan-Slavists disagreed with this assumption and proposed much more radical Russo-centric solutions for the Slavic Question. In his famous letter to the famous French historian Jules Michelet, Alexander Herzen mentioned

¹⁴⁹ Fadeev, “What Should Be the Policy of Russia?” pp. 70-72.

¹⁵⁰ MacKenzie, “Russia’s Balkan Policies Under Alexander II, 1855-1881,” p. 225.

¹⁵¹ Barghoorn, “Propaganda: Tsarist and Soviet,” in *Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Ivo J. Lederer, p. 280.

¹⁵² “Rusya,” *Hikmet*, No. 59 (4 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1329), p. 3.

¹⁵³ Zlatar, “Pan-Slavism: A Review of the Literature,” pp. 222-223.

the aspiration of the Slavic world towards unity that became apparent after the Napoleonic period. According to him, the yearning towards unity was already taking shape of Slavonic Federation, since “centralization is alien to the Slav spirit – federation is far more natural to it. Only when grouped in a league of free and independent peoples will the Slav world at last enter upon its genuine historical existence.”¹⁵⁴ However, further in his letter, while describing this union of ‘free and independent peoples’ he claims that there was “indeed, no future for the Slav world apart from Russia. Without Russia it will not develop, it will fall to pieces and be absorbed by the German element; it will become Austrian and lose its independence.”¹⁵⁵

As Fedor Dostoevsky wrote in his “Confessions of a Slavophile,” Russia ought to assimilate all the Slavs under Russian domination and, disagreeing with Danilevsky’s desire to make the Ottoman capital a sacred city of all the Slavs, he categorically asserted that “Constantinople must be ours, conquered by us, Russians, from the Turks and remain ours forever.”¹⁵⁶ While mentioning Russia’s special mission of ‘world reconciliation’, which, strangely, could be fulfilled only through a decisive war, Dostoevsky claimed that¹⁵⁷

First, Russia must unite under her leadership all the Slav peoples, not for the sake of expansion or empire, as other nations would do, but to insure their peace and freedom. The next step must be the conquest of Constantinople, acquired not for profit, but for the realization of that truth which is preserved

¹⁵⁴ “Herzen’s Letter to Michelet, September 22, 1851,” in *Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917*, pp. 237-238.

¹⁵⁵ “Herzen’s Letter to Michelet, September 22, 1851,” p. 238.

¹⁵⁶ Erickson, *Panslavism*, p. 28.

¹⁵⁷ Kohn, “Dostoevsky’s Nationalism,” p. 405.

only in Russia. That cannot be understood by the Europeans who do not believe in the brotherhood and regeneration of man.

The idea did not drift apart with the conception of general Russian policy in the Ottoman realm which stipulated that “all intervention in favour of the Christian subjects of the Porte should be carried out by Russia alone – ostensibly because they were members of the same faith as the Russians.”¹⁵⁸ The Russian support for the Balkan peoples against the Ottomans Empire and its aspirations for the exclusive right for military intervention in the Balkans, as claimed by Russian diplomats, was already a common question in Ottoman press.¹⁵⁹

In any case, the prominence and domination of the Russian state, policy and culture in the whole Pan-Slavist visions did not rise to any doubts. While describing his views of the Slavic world in a letter to Sergei Uvarov, the Imperial Russian Minister for Public Education, Mikhail Pogodin, the prominent Russian Pan-Slavist and the founder of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee wrote that “then, say the Slavs, will be built the great Slavonic Kingdom with Russia at the head, stretching from the Pacific to the Adriatic, one realm such as has never been seen in history and which will control the rest of the entire world.”¹⁶⁰ In his ‘grandiose’ vision of the building of a great Slavonic Kingdom, Pogodin “saw Russian Grand Dukes on the thrones of various Slavic countries such as Bohemia, Moravia, Croatia, Slovenia,

¹⁵⁸ Chirol, “The Attitude of the Powers,” in *The Balkan Question*, ed. Luigi Villari, pp. 232-233.

¹⁵⁹ “Rusya’da Cereyân-ı Efkâr,” *Vazife*, No. 27.

¹⁶⁰ Mikhail Pogodin, *Politische Briefe aus Rußland* (Leipzig: 1860), p. 32, cited by Zlatar, “Pan-Slavism: A Review of the Literature,” p. 223.

Dalmatia, Serbia, and Bulgaria, but also of non-Slavic ones, such as Hungary, Greece, Moldavia, and Walachia.”¹⁶¹

For nearly two hundred years both Austria and Russia were considered the main competitors for the European lands of the Ottoman Empire, whose days in the Balkans, according to these powers, were already numbered. However, differently from Austria, the Russian policy towards the Balkans was not a policy of territorial expansion, but that of political and ideological domination and consideration of local nationalistic movements, for which it devoted much of its economic and human resources, which lately resulted in the independence of Greece, Montenegro and Bulgaria.¹⁶² While briefly summarizing the Russian policy in the Balkans and the Ottoman lands, the prominent Ottoman journal *Türk Yurdu* asserted that¹⁶³

Russian had conducted numerous wars in Muslim countries; it gave independence to the Christians of the Ottoman state and awarded privileges to all of them. However, despite great endeavors, despite the blood it had spilled and resources it spent, Russia received a very scanty reward: the Straits are closed; the Indian Ocean [*Hind denizi*] is out of reach....

Thus, as was noticed by N. Dascovici, Russia had already learnt and fully contemplated that in aspirations against the Ottoman Empire it had to take Europe into consideration, so the tricky policy of the Tsars for domination over the Orient was concealed under the mask of religious mysticism and the so-called policy of

¹⁶¹ Zlatar, “Pan-Slavism: A Review of the Literature,” p. 223.

¹⁶² Norman Dwight Harris, “The Southern Slav Question,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (May 1915), p. 241; and Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 2, p. 149.

¹⁶³ “Türk-Rus Mukâreneti Hakkında,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 1 (Istanbul: Tanîn Matba’ası, 1328) [1912-1913], p. 55.

liberation.¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, the Pan-Slavic stress of the Russian governmental rhetoric was not unanimously accepted in the Slav world, some of whom had serious concerns about the role Russia was assuming for it. The Poles, in the meantime, were already considering themselves as a part of the ‘civilized West’ and were the inflexible opponents of anything Russian, while the Orthodox Slavs of the Balkan Peninsular were seeing in Russia a great Orthodox country able to liberate them from Ottoman rule, paying little or no attention to the cultural, linguistic or historical side of the brotherhood.¹⁶⁵

As for the Ottoman press, Pan-Slavism, conspicuously based on the idea of Russianness [*Moskofluk*], was an instigator for Catholic Poles to fight against the oppression of the Russian Church, while the clash of religious denominations among the Slavs always prevented them to form a unity, so that the Poles, Slovenians and Croats considered themselves as a part of the Western family.¹⁶⁶ In this respect, the unifying description of the Slavic world made by Herzen seems indeed to be more dissociative in nature.¹⁶⁷

The Slav World is not essentially made up of nationalities so different in kind. Its people are physiologically and ethnographically identical whether they live under the outer crust of chivalrous, liberal and Catholic Poland or of imperial enslaved Byzantine Russia, or under the democratic rule of the Serbian Voivod, or under the bureaucratic yoke with which Austria oppresses Illyria, Dalmatia, and the Banat, or under the patriarchal authority of the Osmanli and with the blessing of the Archbishop of Montenegro.

¹⁶⁴ N. Dascovici, *La question du Bosphore et des Dardanelles* (Geneva: Georg & Compagnie, 1915), p. 274.

¹⁶⁵ Janko Lavrin, “The Slav Idea and Russia,” *Russian Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January 1962), p. 12.

¹⁶⁶ “İslavlar ve Almanlar,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1281 (29 Safar 1334), p. 92.

¹⁶⁷ “Herzen’s Letter to Michelet, September 22, 1851,” p. 238.

The attitude towards Russia's Slavic 'brethren' in the Balkans was not unanimous even in the Slavophil circles. Konstantin Leont'ev, one of the prominent Russian writers and an ardent opponent of liberalism, stated that the political fragmentation of the Balkans was in favor of the Russian state that ought to pursue a policy of *divide et impera*, since the only concern should be the attainment of religious unification. Claiming that the Russians, who were by nature closer to Asians, Turks and Tatars, had little in common with southern and western Slavs, who were already infected by European Liberalist ideas, he asserted that indeed it was Ottoman rule that saved them from its disastrous impact.¹⁶⁸

Although it is a widespread notion that the Russian policy towards the Balkans lands of the Ottoman Empire was nothing beyond an imperial policy to turn them into another subject land abroad, their treatment by the Russian government was somewhat an exemplary matter for those inside Russia, since, after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, a delegate from the Khar'kov local assembly was begging the Tsar to grant 'His loyal people' the right to self-government that he already granted to the Bulgarians.¹⁶⁹ The similar mood was already reflected in 1854 by Alexander Herzen in his article entitled "To the Russian Soldier in Poland," where he stated:¹⁷⁰

Orthodox Christians, the Tsar adds, are oppressed by the Turks. We have never heard that the Christians in Turkey are more oppressed than our peasants, especially those who are serfs in bondage by the Tsar's command.

¹⁶⁸ Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia: Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy*, Vol. 2, p. 213,

¹⁶⁹ Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917*, p. 325.

¹⁷⁰ Quoted by Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology*, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1953), p. 165.

Would it not be better to begin by freeing the slaves at home? After all, they are Orthodox too, fellow believers, and Russians into the bargain.

The complicated role of the Balkans in Russo-Ottoman relations, which for a long time were simply regarded as the land route to Constantinople and the Straits, was mainly stipulated by two contradictory assumptions of the Russian foreign policy: first, to assure the existence of the Ottoman empire in the European balance of powers, and, second, to facilitate national and liberation movements in the Orthodox and Slavic countries of the empire.¹⁷¹ However, from 1825 until 1881, when the Romanian and Serbian kingdoms were established, Russia was still eager to “limit the Balkans communities to mere principalities, enjoying indeed local autonomy, but kept under her domination by intrigue and intimidation.”¹⁷² As Moise Cohen had stated, the Russian policy towards its Slavic brethren had nothing to do with the establishment of a real fraternity among them, but to gradually spread the Russian rule and autocracy through Slavdom, so that Serbia, the only Slavic people that follow Russian Slavic policy today is a mere slave of the Russians, rather than their brother.¹⁷³

Their attempt to control and dominate the Balkan states did not pass unnoticed in the region, often causing disillusionment among the local leadership. Thus, Dr. Vladan Djordjević, the leading Serbian delegate to the Moscow Slavic Congress organized by the Moscow Committee in 1867, rejected the proposal of the Russian side to use

¹⁷¹ Lederer, “Russia and the Balkans,” p. 420.

¹⁷² Harris, “The Southern Slav Question,” p. 241.

¹⁷³ M. Cohen, *Türkler Bu Muhârebede Ne Kazanabilirler?* (Istanbul: “Türk Yurdu,” 1330) [1914-1915], p. 19.

the Russian language as a common literary language for all the Slavs, claiming, to the general disappointment of the Russian hosts, that the Serbs were rather eager to adopt the advantages of the Western European civilization.¹⁷⁴ On the other hand, according to Vladimir Solov'ev, not only was Russia's foolhardy Pan-Slavist foreign policy prone to provoke a widespread diplomatic backlash, but the oppression of the Poles, Jews and other minorities within the borders of the Russian Empire, which considerably worsened its reputation, prevented Russia to strive for national aspirations of the Balkans Slavs.¹⁷⁵

The Russian attitude towards the Slavic Balkan states was not unanimously expansive and subjugating, since in the early 1880s, at the time of the growing Russian influence in Bulgaria, *Novoe vremia*, the Russian conservative newspaper, asserted that in case of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Straits could form a part of Bulgaria, "a friendly and allied state."¹⁷⁶ Interestingly, as H. Cemâl, refers to certain publications in the Bulgarian press in his book *Yeni Harb: Başımıza Tekrâr Gelenler*, the realization of the longtime desire to placing a cross over Hagia Sophia [*Ayasofya câmi'i*] and to capture Istanbul and the Straits was to come soon.¹⁷⁷ However, as *Şark Mes'elesi* quotes the widespread Russian opinion of dissatisfaction with the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878,¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ MacKenzie, "Russia's Balkan Policies Under Alexander II, 1855-1881," p. 225.

¹⁷⁵ Gaut, "Can a Christian be a Nationalist? Vladimir Solov'ev's Critique of Nationalism," p. 91.

¹⁷⁶ *Novoe Vremia* (16 May 1880); cited by *Rossii i chernomorskie prolivy (XVIII – XX stoletia)* (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1999), pp. 245-246.

¹⁷⁷ H. Cemâl, *Yeni Harb: Başımıza Tekrâr Gelenler* (Istanbul: Şems Matba'ası, 1332), p. 4.

¹⁷⁸ Ahmed Sâib, *Şark Mes'elesi: Hakâik-i Târihiyeyi Hâvidir* (Istanbul: İkbâl Matba'ası, 1327), p. 7.

As the whole world knows, our ultimate desire is to capture Istanbul. ...in the past we bordered with Turkey in Europe. We might have become able to verge on Istanbul by gradually capturing lands by warfare. But now, there are Rumania and Bulgaria between us and Turkey and these are the states whose legal independence is under the absolute guarantee of European powers.

Indeed, many prominent Russian politicians were not supporters of Russia's historic Slavic mission to protect the Balkan Slavs and maintain their independence from the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary, one of whom, Foreign Minister Alexander Izvol'sky, found the Russian objection to the Austrian annexation of the two Balkan provinces 'senseless and unprofitable'.¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless, at the meeting of the Russian Council of Ministers at the time of the Austro-Hungarian expansion to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ministers and the leading commanders came to an agreement that since Russia was not able to prevent this annexation, it still "should behave at the conference like a [real] defender of its interests, that of Turkey and the Balkan states, rather than Austria-Hungarian accomplice and concealer."¹⁸⁰ As is often mentioned, the insurrections of 1875 in Bosnia and Herzegovina that led to the Austro-Hungarian occupation were not a part of the direct Russian plan to liberate the Orthodox Slavs from Ottoman rule, neither were they instigated by the Russian agents, nor were they provoked by the agitation of the Russian Slavic committees.¹⁸¹

The Pan-Slavist writers lead by Ivan Aksakov, one of the most influential ideologists of the Slavophilism and an ardent activist of the anti-Turkish and pro-Slavic

¹⁷⁹ William L. Langer, "Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8," *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 44, No. 173 (January 1929), p. 84.

¹⁸⁰ *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, No. 5 (1962), p. 133; cited by *Rossiia i chernomorskie prolivy*, p. 267.

¹⁸¹ Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, p. 68.

campaign during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, vigorously condemned the dismemberment of the Greater Bulgaria, seeing in it the “loss of Russian domination of Constantinople and the Straits area.”¹⁸² However, the Russian zeal to see Bulgaria solely as an outpost and base on their way to the Straits and their army as subsidiary force damped the faith of the Bulgarian leadership who soon became reluctant to accept Russian domination.¹⁸³

However, the official policy of the Russian government and the Tsar himself towards the Slavic lands of the Ottoman Empire often conflicted with public opinion and, especially, with the expectations of the Pan-Slavic circles in Russia, although Tsar Alexander II himself was, ‘in a moment of exaltation’, referring to Russia’s role in the liberation of Balkans as ‘our sacred mission’.¹⁸⁴ However, upon the revolt of the Slavic Christians in Herzegovina in 1875, the Russian Tsar officially denounced the rebels as bandits, while the Russian Pan-Slavist newspapers, on the contrary, were already anticipating the unification of the Ottoman Slavs by Serbia.¹⁸⁵ As was later noticed by a Soviet author, the overall crisis in the Balkans was due to “the domestic disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan peoples’ complex interweaving of national liberation movements against Turkish rule, and with predatory aspirations of the ruling groups in the Balkan countries.”¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, p. 15.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

¹⁸⁴ Black, “The Pattern of Russian Objectives,” p. 27.

¹⁸⁵ David MacKenzie, *Imperial Dreams, Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917* (Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), p. 73.

¹⁸⁶ E. Uribes, “Balkanskaia politika Rossii nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny v sovetskoi istoriografii 20-h – pervoi poloviny 30-h godov,” *Istoriia i istoriografiia: Istoricheskii ezhegodnik* (1978) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo “Nauka,” 1981), p. 51.

Not only had Russian officials warned Serbia and Montenegro not to aid the rebels militarily, but, to the disappointment of the Pan-Slavists, Tsar Alexander II threatened the Serbian prince Milan through Kartov, his council in Belgrade, to abandon him in case Serbia is attacked by the Turks.¹⁸⁷ Although Russia was persistently encouraging the nascent idea of national liberation among the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire, already starting from the time of Tsar Alexander I and followed by his successor Nicholas I, Russian Emperors were eager to preserve the Ottoman state as a 'legitimate regime' and, at the same time, tried to avoid wars with European powers over the cause, ignoring, in the meantime, the national aspirations of Serbia and Montenegro.¹⁸⁸ As an Ottoman book suggested, from the very origins, Russia was always involved in Turkish affairs and up to the present day it never stepped aside from that political line, although an alleged quote from a former Russian foreign minister stating that "the defeat of Turkey would be a blow for Russia's European policy and would pose a terrible threat for the Russian national policy,"¹⁸⁹ sounds at least equivocal.

Throughout 1870s, Pan-Slavism was somehow drifted apart from the official policy of the Russian state and did not have much influence in the Tsarist government until the outburst of the First World War, when its impact became vivid not only in the governmental circles, but also on nationalistically oriented liberals, who already

¹⁸⁷ MacKenzie, *Imperial Dreams, Harsh Realities*, p. 74.

¹⁸⁸ MacKenzie, "Russia's Balkan Policies Under Alexander II, 1855-1881," p. 221.

¹⁸⁹ Nikerled Krayblis, *Rusya'nın Şark Siyâseti ve Vilâyât-i Şarkîye Mes'elesi*, trans. Hâbil Adem (Istanbul: İkbâl Kitâbhânesi, 1332) [1916-1917], p. 8.

started seeing it as a an important tools to achieve Russian goals in case of the anticipated victory.¹⁹⁰ The adventurous career of General-Lieutenant Mikhail Cherniaev, an ardent Pan-Slavist and for a time being Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian troops, reveals, indeed, the conspicuous discrepancy between the official Tsarist policy and the Pan-Slavist ‘idealism’, which could not come to the realization without the consistent support of the former.¹⁹¹ In any case, the aspirations (or, rather, claims) of the 120-million-strong Slavic world to discover a common realm aroused anxiety in the Ottoman Empire and, naturally, spurred the armament talks.¹⁹²

In the last quarter of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, the Pan-Slavic striving of the official Tsarist policy was generally replaced by a harsh policy of Russification, while, in the meantime, it became extremely suspicious of the manifestation of nationalism in any form and essence inside and outside the Russian Empire. This attitude was claimed to be the reason behind Russian abandonment of the Armenians and Macedonians due to their excessively ‘revolutionary spirit’, as well as its displeasure with the newly-created Balkan states whose constitutions seemed to be utterly democratic and anti-autocratic.¹⁹³ However, there seems to be another important reason for the official Russian neglect of its Balkan brethren that is the growing struggle of the Balkan countries for their national independence, which exhausted the already feeble Ottoman Empire.

¹⁹⁰ Black, “The Pattern of Russian Objectives,” p. 36.

¹⁹¹ MacKenzie, *Imperial Dreams, Harsh Realities*, p. 79.

¹⁹² “Rusya ve Ruslar,” *Sıyânet*, No. 16 (9 July [Temmûz-i efrecî] 1914), p. 9.

¹⁹³ Chirol, “The Attitude of the Powers,” p. 263.

The Russian Diplomacy felt seriously anxious by the possibility that the keys to the Straits could have fallen out of “the old feeble hands and snatched by a young predator.”¹⁹⁴ Interestingly enough, in an article on the present stage of the Eastern Question published just at the time of the outburst of the First Balkan War, it was stated that “whether one is a progressist [*terakkîperver*] or conservative [*efkâr-i âtika erbâbı*], in general [he will know that] the enemies of the Turks are the Greeks on the one hand and Bulgars,” without any mention of Russians, adding that the Bulgars, considering themselves the *avant-garde* of the Slavic race, lay claim to Constantinople [*Kostantiniye*] and crave for driving out the Turks to their former domains in Asia.¹⁹⁵

This complicated struggle between Russia and the newly liberated Balkan states was often employed in the Ottoman press, although with roles slightly switched, especially towards the outburst of the First World War, when the participation of Bulgaria on the side of Central Powers became considered to be very likely. Thus, “the Russian [Muscovite] Tsardom regarded Bulgaria as a Russian province, while treated the Bulgarian as its own subjects, whom it sent to Siberia by thousands and did not considered their blood and lives worthy of respect.”¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ *Rossia i chernomorskie proliwy*, p. 255.

¹⁹⁵ “Şark Mes’elesinin Bugünkü Safhası,” *Mecmû’a-i Ebû’z-Ziyâ*, No. 113 (21 Ramadân 1329) [1911], pp. 1099-1100.

¹⁹⁶ “Moskof Huşûneti: Bulgaristan ve Rusya,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, Vol. 49, No. 1272 (26 Dhu l’-Hidjdja 1333), p. 373.

While describing the course of the Russian policy in the Near East in his Duma speech of 17 April 1908, Alexander Izvol'sky, the ambitious Russian Foreign Minister, stated that hence it “must be dictated by a healthy egoism,” by which he meant that “Russian must not allow herself to be misled by exaggerated emotions and by anxiety for the fate of other Slav peoples to the extent of neglecting her own purely Russian interests.”¹⁹⁷ As an Ottoman author described the attitude of the Russian public towards the last Russo-Turkish war, “we had fought with the Turks thirty-three years ago. After enormous self-sacrifice, both financially and in human lives, we won with heavy losses,” however, “despite our glorious voluntary self-sacrifice, all the benefits of the victory are reaped by others,”¹⁹⁸ this time by the Balkan states. As *Türk Yurdu* quotes a report of Aleksandr Bezobrazov, the Tsarist Secretary of State [*stats-sekretar*'], to the Tsar,¹⁹⁹

Our position in the Near East became desperately strained due to the dreaminess of Slavophiles. For us, the question of the Christian subjects of Turkey was not an aspiration, but a tool to implement our genuine aspirations, such as approaching our natural borders and achieving free passage though the Black Sea. On the other hand, all our actions of interference in favor of the Christians of Turkey anytime did only harm to us, since the Christians that achieved their independence do not need us anymore.

2.2.3 Constantinople and the Straits

Throughout history, since the very time of the formation of the Russian statehood, Russia was attracted by Constantinople (and, naturally, the Straits), the city that

¹⁹⁷ *Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914*, eds. Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelsson-Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme (Berlin: 1922-26), XXV (ii), no. 8745; cited by Langer, “Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8,” pp. 59-85.

¹⁹⁸ Ahmed Sâib, *Şark Mes'alesi: Hakâik-i Târihiyeyi Hâvidir* (Istanbul: İkbâl Matba'ası, 1327), p. 5.

¹⁹⁹ “Cihân Harbinin Mes'ûli,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 8, No. 12 (13 Ağustos 1331) [1915], pp. 204-205.

comprised the source of Russian religion and culture with the control over the Straits, so vital for the prosperity of the Russian state. As was noted in Byzantine chronicles, already in the first half of the 9th century, the Russian merchant ships initiated the historical Russo-Byzantine liaison, where the uninterrupted waterway between the centers of the Kievan Russ, the so-called path from the Varangians to Greeks (*iz variag v greki*), the northernmost end of which started at the Gulf of Finland, started playing a very important strategic and commercial role for the Russian state.²⁰⁰

The classical authoritative Russian claims over the Ottoman Straits were documented in the so-called ‘Goriainov’s Thesis’, named after the author of the famous book, *Bosfor i Dardanelly*, originally published in St. Petersburg in 1907 by Sergei Goriainov, the Chief of the Russian Imperial Archives. According to this book based almost entirely on unpublished records of the Tsarist Foreign Ministry, which, as many authors claim, frequently applies manipulation and falsification of the facts, in the secret clauses of Russo-Ottoman bilateral treaties of 1799 and 1805, the Sublime Porte, voluntarily and on its own initiative, “consented to the principle of barring the Black Sea unconditionally to the warships of third Powers, as a means of promoting the ‘mutual tranquility’ of the signatories. Any attempted infringement of that principle the two allies would view as a hostile act.”²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ Yu. A. Petrosian, *Russkie na beregu Bosfora (Istoricheskie ocherki)* (St. Petersburg: “Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie,” 1998), pp. 38-39.

²⁰¹ J. C. Hurewitz, “Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origins of the Problem,” *World Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (July 1962), p. 611.

Nevertheless, the provisions of the Treaty of Paris concerning the neutralization of the Black Sea and Danube River, signed on 30 March 1856, stipulated the free passage of the merchant ships of any country to the ports and waters of the Black Sea, excluding, however, formally and perpetually, military vessels “of the powers possessing its coast, or of any other power” (Article 11), with the exception of the limited number of the light vessels necessary for the maintenance and service of the coast by the Ottoman and Russian empires (Articles 14 and 19).²⁰² Although, according to the treaty, both Russia and the Ottoman State were, with insignificant exceptions, “forbidden to maintain naval forces in the Black Sea or to build military or navel arsenals on its shores,” the restrictions and prohibitions did not cover the Straits area, thus “the Ottoman government remained free to maintain a fleet there.”²⁰³ However, in his evaluation of the Russian attempts to modify the treaty in its own favor profiting by the occasion of the Franco-Prussian War, Doctor Abdullâh Cevdet claims that the present status of the Black Sea regime, that is the neutrality of the Straits that made the Black Sea a ‘Russian Lake’, remained intact only because it was advantageous for Russia.²⁰⁴

On the other hand, according to Suzanne Champonnois, by capturing Constantinople and the Straits, the Russian Emperors intended to fulfill three of its incessant

²⁰² “Provisions Concerning the Neutralization of the Black Sea and Danube River Contained in the General Treaty Between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey,” *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Supplement: Official Documents (April 1909), pp. 114-115.

²⁰³ Barbara Jelavich, *The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, 1870-1887* (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 20.

²⁰⁴ Doktor Abdullâh Cevdet, “Avrupa Ahlâk-ı Siyâsiyesi,” *Hürriyet-i Fikrîyye*, No. 6 (13 Mart 1330) [1914], p. 10.

historical goals: first, it would satisfy their imperial design (*idée impériale*), the idea inherent to the notion of the Tsar of All Russia (*tsar' vseia Rusi*), second, it would serve as a crusade by which Russia would capture the road to Byzantium either under the banner of the Orthodox faith or in the name of liberation of their Slavic brethren, and third, it would relieve Russia's vital economic and strategic necessities.²⁰⁵ On the other hand, certain prominent Russian thinkers like Leont'ev claimed that their desire to capture Constantinople was not based on nationalistic grounds, but on the idea to revive the Eastern Roman Empire.²⁰⁶

The persistent motive behind the Russian endeavor to possess the Ottoman Straits, besides the security of the Black Sea and the south of the Russian Empire, became the lack of fully accessible and functioning seaports, especially since Arkhangel'sk was frozen throughout the winter and Murmansk had no railroad connection. As is often asserted, no power was located so remote from the sea and ocean lane than Russia; moreover, the Black Sea Straits was also the shortest way to the Far East, the area so attractive and important in the aspirations of the Russian Government in the late 19th and early 20th century.²⁰⁷ However, the aspiration of the Russian Empire were not confined to the Black Sea Straits, since, as an Ottoman author put, "Russia did not content itself with being imprisoned by icy plains and steppes of the north; it needed an exit to a free sea, to the Mediterranean, Indian or Pacific oceans," and

²⁰⁵ Champonnois, *Le mythe de Constantinople et l'opinion publique en Russie au XIXe siècle*, p. 1.

²⁰⁶ Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia: Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy*, Vol. 2, p. 213.

²⁰⁷ *Rossiiia i chernomorskie prolivy*, pp. 10, 224.

craved for “getting rid of their endless deserts and plains, of their country of Satanic darkness and death, and reaching the seas and the kingdom of angelic brightness.”²⁰⁸

Moreover, for the period of 1903-1912, the 37 percent of the total Russian export – which mainly consisted of certain products like wheat and other cereals whose export at a high transportation rates could not be possible – passed through the Ottoman Straits, while the alternative land transportation was reported to be 25 times more expensive.²⁰⁹ Even in the Ottoman market, the Russian share of the imported flour amounted to some 20-25 percent in 1890s.²¹⁰ Therefore, the 1913 statement by the Russian Minister of Navy I. K. Grigorovich, that “the Straits in the hands of another state would mean the complete control of the economic development of southern Russia by foreign power”²¹¹ does not seem groundless.

An interesting material for the current analysis of the matter was provided by an Ottoman journal publishing an article from Russian *Novoe vremia* in 1913 that thoroughly dwells on the question of the Straits. According to it, although it had an initial aim to achieve freedom from the Turkish rule, this ‘government of prisons’, the uprising of the Balkan peoples had definitely lightened the further implementation of the Russian policy in the Near East, namely that against the

²⁰⁸ “Garb Nazârında Şark Mes’esi,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 11, No. 7 (24 Teşrîn-i sânî 1332), pp. 103-104.

²⁰⁹ Samuel Kuchеров, “The Problem of Constantinople and the Straits,” *Russian Review*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 1949), p. 219.

²¹⁰ Petrosian, *Russkie na beregu Bosfora*, p. 148.

²¹¹ Grigorovich to Sazonov, December 9, 1913, *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, 7 (1924), p. 34, cited by Lederer, “Russia and the Balkans,” p. 420.

Ottoman Empire that held Southern Russia in captivity by holding the keys to the Straits.²¹²

On the other hand, the question of capturing Constantinople and the Straits became, among other things, a matter of a vital military and political rehabilitation for the Russian state. Starting already from the mid-nineteenth century, European powers systematically hampered the Russian advance and domination of Constantinople and the Straits, which usually took shape of a diplomatic victory *vis-à-vis* successful Russian military campaigns. Russian halt at Adrianople (Edirne) in 1829 under English threat, the annulment of the benefits granted by the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi by the Convention of London of 1841, the neutralization and demilitarization of the Black Sea after the Crimean War and, finally, unfavorable amendments made to the Treaty of San Stefano by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 represented a whole chain of Russian failures that created a very negative image for the Russian government, which, in their turn, felt desirous to correct the situation to their favor right up to the Great War.²¹³ Even the nationalistic *Türk Yurdu* sounded astonished by the interdiction for the Russian passage through the Straits by the Treaty of Berlin, despite the fact that the Russians had won against the Ottomans, blaming the West in their inherent character of maximizing their own benefits.²¹⁴ Another Ottoman author, however, had complaints about the crafty Russian

²¹² “Rusya’nın Endişeleri,” *Tercümân-i Hakîkât* (7 April [Nisân-i efrencî] 1913), p. 2.

²¹³ Kuchеров, “The Problem of Constantinople and the Straits,” p. 206.

²¹⁴ “Türk-Rus Mukâreneti Hakkında,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. I (Istanbul: Tanîn Matba’ası, 1328) [1912-1913], p. 55.

diplomats, since Russia, being the source of evil and being actually defeated in the Crimean war, had been treated at the Paris Conference as the absolute victor.²¹⁵

The fate of the Ottoman Straits and alternative solutions of this vital problem was a matter of the hidden agenda in non-official circles as well, which was reflected in a great number of articles and books on the matter. One of the eccentric solutions was presented by A. Vladimirov in his book *To Whom Constantinople? [Komu Tsar'grad?]* published in 1887. The author suggested creating a Slavic Federal State with Bulgaria at its head, which would be ruled by the Duke of Edinburgh, the second son of the English Queen, who was married to Maria Aleksandrovna, the sister of Alexander III, while another fantastic project stipulated the building of a new alternative canal parallel to the Straits.²¹⁶

The struggle around the Straits and its importance was not only the widespread matter of adverse clashes in Russian and Ottoman press, but often received compassionate response in the Muslim press of the Russian Empire. Thus, the journal *Añ* published in Kazan was confident enough to call the question of the Straits not only the most popular question, but also one able to make all important questions in the world of secondary importance.²¹⁷ As to the journal asserts, according to the prominent Russian thinkers and politicians of the current time, the future and the magnitude of the Russian Empire lies not only in political and

²¹⁵ "Türkiye – Rusya," *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1036 (14 Rabî' al-Âkhir 1329), p. 508.

²¹⁶ *Rossiiia i chernomorskie prolivy*, p. 248.

²¹⁷ "İstanbul ve Çanakkale Mäsäläsi," *Añ* (17 January 1915), p. 104.

economic domination, but indeed in making Istanbul the religious center and the new capital of the empire, and thus, by controlling the Straits they plan to control the world.²¹⁸

However, as was mentioned above, despite the widespread controversy, the official policy of the Russian Government tended to preserve the existence and integrity of the Ottoman state as a weak, but, nevertheless, legal possessor of the Straits, preferably free from the influence of the European powers. Therefore, despite the traditional hostility between the two empires, the Tsarist state often intended to support and protect the Ottoman integrity, even at a price of its Balkan brethren's friendship and loyalty. As Ahmed Sâib states,²¹⁹

For a long time, Russia had developed a routine practice of conducting war with the Ottoman Empire [*devlet-i 'âliye*] once in twenty years. However, despite the fact that more than ten years had passed since the [last] defined time, not only it does not want to fight with us, but a few years ago, it even helped us against other states.

The author adds that in Russia, the country “that is the most interested in the Eastern Question after us,” the dominant opinion was to preserve Turkey the way it was, so that “it would not undergo even a slight change in its domestic and foreign affairs.”²²⁰ This shift of the Russian policy to back the survival of the Ottoman Empire and deter the Balkan states was, nevertheless, depicted by *Tercümân-i hakikât* as duplicity of the Russian foreign policy.²²¹

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 106.

²¹⁹ Ahmed Sâib, *Şark Mes'elesi: Hakâik-i Târihiyeyi Hâvidir* (Istanbul: İkbâl Matba'ası, 1327), p. 3.

²²⁰ Ibid., pp. 3, 9.

²²¹ “Rusya'nın İkiyüzlülüğü,” *Tercümân-i Hakikât*, (11 January [Kânûn-i sâni-i efencî] 1913), p. 2.

Traditionally, the fear of the collapse of the Ottoman State, or, what is worse, the establishment of a 'more Europeanized régime' was the reason behind the urgent Russian expedition to defend the Ottoman capital and, naturally, the Straits, from İbrahim Pasha of Egypt in 1833, which was crowned by the signing of the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, "the farthest advance ever made by Russia towards solving the problem of the Straits in her own favor and to the exclusion of other influences."²²² The treaty, or rather its separate and secret article, stipulated to limit the actions of the Ottoman Sublime Porte to closing the Straits for Russian vessels, while, in the meantime, urged the Ottomans to close the Straits for the foreign military vessels.

Apprehending the exclusive domination of the Russian Empire over Constantinople and the Straits by the secret clauses of this treaty, both France and England develop somewhat excessive Russophobia that later appeared in their defense of the Ottoman integrity against Russia.²²³ In this respect, the notorious work by Gustave Doré, *The History of Holy Russia*, the ludicrous embodiment of the anti-Russian propaganda in the West published in 1854, is a good example of a radical shift in the personification of villain from Turks, the oppressor of Christians, to Russians during the crisis leading to the Crimean War.²²⁴ In that work, the application of the image of loathsome military atrocities and intensive propagation in press, the technique to

²²² Philip E. Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1934), p. 9.

²²³ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 2, pp. 34-35.

²²⁴ David Kunzle, "Gustave Doré's *History of Holy Russia*: Anti-Russian Propaganda from the Crimean War to the Cold War," *Russian Review*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (July 1983), p. 278.

be resorted in later history more frequently and effectively, became for a time being the milestone of anti-Russian propaganda.

It is interesting to note that in the Ottoman translation of the *Russia's Eastern Policy and the Question of Eastern Provinces*, the role of the Russian Empire in the Eastern Question seems somewhat overconfident, if not exaggerated, since the author claims that the Eastern Question is, in the first place, a Russian question carried out in accordance with St. Petersburg's prescriptions, and adds that although for the last two centuries the Near East was controlled by Europe, the Russian policy always prevailed over it.²²⁵

While analyzing the works of the Russian and Soviet authors over the policy of the Tsarist State in the Balkans, thus, indirectly, Constantinople and the Straits, E. Uribes, criticized the works of certain authors, namely that of Mikhail Pokrovsky, for their erroneous emphasis on the importance of commercial capital as the driving force behind the Tsarist foreign policy and its struggle over the trade routes. He adds that Pokrovsky²²⁶

exaggerated the significance of the of the Black Sea Straits in Russian foreign policy, while the entire Balkan and Near Eastern policies of Russia were tendentiously seen through the prism of Russia's drive towards the Straits, which ostensibly became one of the main reasons of the World War.

²²⁵ Krayblis, *Rusya'nın Şark Siyâseti ve Vilâyât-ı Şarkîye Mes'elesi*, pp. 4-5.

²²⁶ Uribes, "Balkanskaia politika Rossii nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny v sovetskoi istoriografii 20-h – pervoi poloviny 30-h godov," pp. 53-54.

He, nevertheless, dwells on contradictory instances, such as V. A. Gurko-Kriazhin, who emphasized the tendency of the Tsarist diplomacy to force the solution of the Eastern Question, claiming that Russia participated in the World War mainly in the hope of obtaining ‘Turkish heritage’, which what the Great War was all about in the eyes of the Tsarist regime.²²⁷ It is interesting to note that an article entitled “The Question of the Straits” published in October 1911 in *Mecmû’a-i Ebû’z-Ziyâ* also claims that prevailing drive behind Russia’s Eastern policy, however important it might have been, was not only material or economic interests, since certain ideological and religious consideration were also very influential.²²⁸

While analyzing the Tsarist and later Soviet policy towards the Black Sea Straits, especially the attitude of the non-Russian Western authors, a recent Russian comprehensive work on the topic entitled *Russia and the Black Sea Straits (18th – 20th Centuries)* claims that often the basic idea in their work was found on the false Testament of Peter the Great or ‘reserve’ Greek Project by Catherine II.²²⁹ Nevertheless, the Ottoman version of Edward Dirault’s *Napoleon’s Eastern Policy* claims that compared to the Testament of Peter the Great, Catherine’s Greek Project [*Rûm projesi*] was more functional and therefore served as guidance for the 19th century Tsardom.²³⁰

²²⁷ V. A. Gurko-Kriazhin, *Blizhnii Vostok i derzhavy* (Moscow: 1925), pp. 30-31, 53; cited by Uribes, “Balkanskaia politika Rossii nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny v sovetskoi istoriografii 20-h – pervoi poloviny 30-h godov,” p. 58.

²²⁸ “Boğazlar Mes’elesi,” *Mecmû’a-i Ebû’z-Ziyâ*, No. 116 (19 Shawwâl 1329), p. 1210.

²²⁹ *Rossiia i chernomorskie prolivy*, pp. 13-14.

²³⁰ [Edvar] Diriyol, *Napolyon’un Şark Siyaseti: Selim-i Sâlis ve Napolyon* (Istanbul: Kan’âat Matba’ası, 1329) [1913-1914], p. 34.

The Testament of Peter the Great was itself a matter of widespread circulation in Ottoman publications and was often quoted in many serious articles. Thus, according to the testament,²³¹

Istanbul and India ought to be approached as close as possible, since whoever holds these places would be the master of the world. For the implementation of this purpose, we ought to fight with Persia from time to time and with Turks, thus they would be prevented from obtaining real power.

As for the Turks in particular, the testament offers the following practical measures:

In order to expel the Turks from the European continent, we ought to reach a consensus with the Austrian ruling dynasty. In order to distract its desirous attention [*enzâr-ı gıbtâsını*] away from Istanbul, either it should get involved with any other state or, to be later retaken, the seizure of the European territories released by the Ottomans should not be prevented.

However, the very question of the Testament of Peter the Great often remained a matter of vivid discussion and reference by Turkish authors of much later times. While mentioning the conclusion of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca that empowered Russia to greater possessions in the Black Sea and free passage over the Straits, M. Sadık Atak confidently stated that Catherine II had finally obtained a chance for the implementation of the Article 9 of the testament.²³²

2.3 THE PEOPLE OF RUSSIA

²³¹ “Rusya’nın Şarkda Kilise Siyaseti,” *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*, Vol. 9-2, No. 21-28 (30 Ramadân 1330) [1912], pp. 32-33.

²³² M. Sadık Atak, *Rusya Siyaseti ve Rusların Yayılma Siyaseti* (Ankara: 1964), p. 6.

2.3.1 Russian Morals and Manners

While describing the Russians in her article entitled “Russians and Turks,” Hâlide Edib quotes an interesting observation by “a person with a deep soul who tried to understand not Russia, but the Russians,” saying that²³³

Russians of today are both the paradise and the hell for a human imagination. We hear the most astonishing news about Russia. All of them are true and all of them are false. Russia and the Russians are so diverse, so wide, composed of so different parts and peoples, that any news we hear can be true only for a small part of Russia, but cannot be true for the Russians [in general].

As was scornfully noticed by an Ottoman journal, the cultural development of the Russians was not much ahead of that of the Muslims and a common Russian was much closer to a Turk or a Persian than to an Englishman or a German.²³⁴ Moreover, “despite the doubting stance of the Russian press and even the Russian population on Turkey,” an Ottoman writer was wondering, “what difference Russia has from us? The general situation of the present-day Russia could have been easily compared with the general situation of the present-day Turkey.”²³⁵

However, the comparative method of the analysis of Russian life was not often an issue in many Ottoman publications, which preferred to attach a unique (and, naturally, negative) quality to the Russian race. Russians were often noticed for being alcoholics with a low level of morality and inclined to criminal offence, as

²³³ [Hâlide Edib,] “Ruslar, Türkler,” *Büyük Mecmû’a*, No. 16 (11 Kânûn-i evvel 1919), p. 1.

²³⁴ “Türk-Rus Mukâreneti Hakkında,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 1 (Istanbul: Tanîn Matba’ası, 1328), p. 55.

²³⁵ “Türkiye – Rusya,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1036 (14 Rabî’ al-Âkhir 1329), p. 510.

well as for being barefoot, hungry, exhausted and ill.²³⁶ According to an article published just a few days prior to the outburst of the First World War,²³⁷

In the Middle Ages, Russians used to live a tribal life on vast plains of Eastern Europe. Their lifestyle was indescribably ugly. At that time, among other nations, the Russian were noticed by a long beard overgrown around their dirty faces, thick and rusty moustaches and long filthy hair hanging down to their shoulders. ... and that life had nothing worthy to be ever researched.

In January 1916, the Ottoman navy journal *Donanma* published an article by Ali Rıza Seyfî with a comprehensive and analytic title “Domestic Wounds of Russia: Landless Peasants,” which, among other things, describes the lifestyle and manners of the Russian countryside. The article thoroughly quotes an American traveler who happened to visit Russia and had been deeply impressed by their bizarre uncivilized habits. The traveler complains that despite being a foreign guest and upon his approach to the villagers, no one let him in, adding that in his opinion “the God [Cenâb-ı Hakk] would not blame them on the Judgment Day for the failure to comply with rules of hospitality.”²³⁸ However, while comparing the Russians with other Slavs, namely the Serbs, Bulgars, Czechs and Croats, even Konstantin Leont’ev stated in the same mood that they were “lazier, more fatalistic, more obedient to authority, more good-natured, more regardless of consequences, braver, more inconsistent, and much more inclined to religious mysticism.”²³⁹

²³⁶ “Rusya’nın Dâhilî Yarası: Arâzisiz Köylüler,” *Donanma*, No. 123-74 (29 Safar 1334) [1916], pp. 1182-1183.

²³⁷ “Rusya ve Ruslar,” *Sıyânet*, No. 16 (9 July [Temmûz-i efrencî] 1914), p. 9.

²³⁸ “Rusya’nın Dâhilî Yarası: Arâzisiz Köylüler,” *Donanma*, No. 123-74 (29 Safar 1334), p. 1182.

²³⁹ Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia: Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy*, Vol. 2, p. 213.

On the other hand, as was noticed by Hâlide Edib, some Russians, who can simply kill hundreds with outmost brutality and blood-thirstiness just as a necessity of the outmoded rule, could easily and heroically risk their own lives in order to save life or protect their beloved.²⁴⁰ She adds that

A Russian is so kind and generous that he can give you everything, not only his property, but even his life; a Russian is so vigorous and rude that he can take all what you have, not only your property, but your life and everything yours and raze you to the ground. A Russian is violent, a bandit and even a murderer at a moment, but in a minute he can turn into pious, faithful and merciful.²⁴¹

Although the atrocious nature attributed to the Russian military in the Ottoman press would be the subject of the following chapters of this work, it ought to be noted that the ‘criminal nature’ of a common Russian was also continuously mentioned in publications, which often had nothing to do with the psychological survey of the Russian population, often being simply those of political interest. An article on Russian culture published in October 1915 depicted the Russian peasant as an incomprehensible creature who, because of his drunkenness, could easily commit murder or theft and, what is more astounding, he would not be frightened at all by any punishment that can be imposed for his acts.²⁴²

Interestingly enough, even an Ottoman article on the spread of Nihilism and anarchism in Russia found its origins in the nature of Russians, claiming that the

²⁴⁰ “Ruslar, Türkler,” *Büyük Mecmû’a*, No. 16 (11 Kânûn-i evvel 1919), p. 1.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² “Rus Medeniyeti,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, Vol. 49, No. 1266 (7 Dhu l’-Ka’da 1333) [1915], p. 280.

only way to understand the peculiarities of these two political currents is to analyze the essential character of the Slavs in general. According to it,²⁴³

Due to the specific influence of their inborn character, the Slavic race in general is more materialistic and is of harsh disposition than other nations. In order to reach his goals, no matter how hard and difficult it is, a Russian would choose the shortest path. Being very eager to achieve his aims as soon as possible, he would do immediately what he should do last.

Interestingly, the governmental policy to control and reduce drunkenness was broadly criticized by many authors and newspapers in the pre-war Russia, namely, *Novoe vremia*, which did not have the slightest optimism towards the success of this policy by the state that itself managed to increase the alcohol sales by 12.5 percent for a short period from 1911 to 1913 and from which it collected more than 28 percent of the budget revenues.²⁴⁴ The Ottoman press was not out of tune with the pessimism of the Russian press, claiming that upon the limitations on the sales of alcohol, the Russian peasants were simply gathering in front of the tavern and drinking the alcohol they brought with themselves, adding that their unconscious bodies lying in mud were later picked up by their wives.²⁴⁵ The endeavor of Count Witte to keep the production and sale of vodka under strict governmental control, this ‘dirty way’ of dealing with the problem, was regarded as a great calamity for the population that caused an extreme spread of drunkenness, since despite the alleged

²⁴³ “Nihilizm ve Anarşizm,” *Resimli Kitâb*, Vol. 6, No. 36 (Kânûn-i sâni 1328) [1912], p. 1005.

²⁴⁴ David R. Costello, “Novoe Vremia and the Conservative Dilemma, 1911-1914,” *Russian Review*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 1978), pp. 47-48.

²⁴⁵ “Rus Medeniyeti,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, Vol. 49, No. 1266 (7 Dhu l’-Ka’da 1333), p. 280.

sale of alcohol in specially defined places under strict governmental control, every village had its own house that sold alcohol anytime.²⁴⁶

Strikingly, the Ottoman public was routinely informed of detailed statistical figures of the alcohol consumption in the Russian Empire, or, in fact, of their growth, although presenting data on Russian economic growth was not its regular habit. Thus, for the year 1908, only the income for the consumption of Russian vodka [*Rus rakısı*] amounted to 774,000,000 roubles, with a total number of 86 million buckets [*kova*] of vodka consumed.²⁴⁷ The scrupulous reports on alcohol consumption often covers the areas and towns of no importance or connection to the Ottoman Empire, such as that on the annual increase of alcohol revenue for the small town of Grodno (present-day Belarus) from 2.2 to 2.5 million roubles for the years 1910-1911.²⁴⁸ The reports, however, are often not limited to the impressive progress of the Russian liquor industry and cover the indirect effects of this progress, often coming to a conclusion concerning the Ottomans. Thus, for instance:²⁴⁹

Within a year throughout Russia 113,835 people died of alcohol consumption, 26,187 people contracted incurable deceases [related to alcohol], 81,849 people underwent medical treatment in hospitals and 7343 people became insane for this reason. As for the death statistics for the city of St. Petersburg, 30 per 1000 are because of vodka.

As for the Ottomans, the author urges that “the Muslims should estimate the value of the illustrious *shari’a* of Muhammad. It is nonsense to look for a greater proof of the

²⁴⁶ “Rusya’nın Dâhilî Yarası: Arâzisiz Köylüler,” *Donanma*, No. 123-74 (29 Safar 1334), p. 1183.

²⁴⁷ “Rusya’da Müskirât İsti’ mâli,” *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*, Vol. 6-1, No. 207-25 (9 Ramadân 1330) [1912], p. 429.

²⁴⁸ “Rusya’da Müskirât İsti’ mâlinde Terakki,” *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*, Vol. 8-1, No. 204-22 (18 Sha’aban 1330) [1912], p. 432.

²⁴⁹ “Rusya’da Müskirât İsti’ mâli,” p. 429

unlawfulness of wine.”²⁵⁰ On the other hand, while indirectly approving the governmental attempts to decrease drunkenness and alcohol consumption in Russia, *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, nevertheless, did not miss the opportunity to criticize the Tsarist government for such a belated act, adding that the decree was particularly welcomed by the Muslim population of the empire, especially in Turkestan.²⁵¹

Especially prior to and during the First World War, the reports on alcohol consumption in Russia started appearing in the context of low morale and military capabilities of the Russian army. Therefore, the official ban imposed on alcohol consumption for the regular and reserve army staff was duly elucidate in the Ottoman press.²⁵² While examining the Ottoman alcohol practice, an article by Âkçûrâoğlu Yûsuf claims that alcoholic drinks were under a ban already at the time of Chinggis Khan, who throughout his life had drunk only water, milk and *kımız*,²⁵³ adding that the limitations and prohibition timely imposed to control alcohol consumption in the Russian Empire, especially those for the military, are the only reason we encounter some (though very poor) kind of resistance on the side of the Russians.²⁵⁴ It ought to be noted, that despite the widespread Ottoman disparagement because of the Russians’ alcohol addiction, some authors,

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ “Men’-i Müskirât ve Fuhiyât,” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, No. 13 (7 Ramadân 1332) [1914], p. 30.

²⁵² “Rusya Ordusunda Meşrûbât-i Küliyenin Men’i,” *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*, Vol. 12, No. 302 (1 Sha’aban 1332) [1914], p. 292.

²⁵³ Another article, however, considered mare's milk among alcoholic drinks: “Meşrûbât-i Küliye,” *Tedrisât-i İbtidâ’iyye Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 3 (15 Nisân 1326) [1910], p. 92.

²⁵⁴ [Âkçûrâoğlu Yûsuf,] “Şarhoşluğa Karşı,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 8, No. 8 (18 Hazirân 1331) [1915], pp. 2651-2653.

nevertheless, considered the consumption of alcohol in Russia not only among the lowest in the ‘civilized world’, but found it even decreasing at that time.²⁵⁵

2.3.2 The Russian Society

As is often claimed, the Tsarist government wittingly pursued a policy to exacerbate the material wellbeing of the ethnic Russians in Russia proper vis-à-vis its non-Russian subjects in the remote areas of the country, which enjoyed certain tax exemptions and subsidies. This ‘disparity’ and ‘inequality’ was also reflected in the illiteracy rates, where the Russians on average had much lower percentage of literacy than Poles, Jews, Finns and even Volga and Crimean Tatars.²⁵⁶ Accordingly, as an Ottoman article claims, only one fifth of the ethnic Russian population was literate, which, together with other instances of national wickedness [*seyyiât-i millîye*] that took roots in the society, such as drunkenness, duly reflected the low stage of cultural development.²⁵⁷

As was described, the Russians, being the dominating nations [*millet-i hâkime*] of Russian society, are composed of two distinct groups: “enlightened city-dwellers and extremely primitive and religiously bigoted commoners and villagers,” of whom

²⁵⁵ William M. Salter, “The Russian Revolution,” *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (April 1907), p. 305.

²⁵⁶ Stone, Podbolotov and Yaşar, “The Russians and the Turks: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Era of Empires,” p. 34.

²⁵⁷ “Rus Medeniyeti,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, Vol. 49, No. 1266 (7 Dhu l’-Ka’da 1333), p. 280.

the former are considered among the most advanced European nations, while the latter are equal to the most degenerated peoples of Asia.²⁵⁸

Along with illiteracy, immorality and drunkenness, the Russian Orthodox Church was often made responsible for the nation's despair. Not a rare occasion in recent Russian history and state system, the Russian Orthodox Church was always an ardent supporter of the autocracy against the opposition and revolution, as was openly interfering on the side of Tsarist reaction during the First Duma elections.²⁵⁹ As Ottoman *Donanma* quoted the words Lev Tolstoy on the late autocratic regime, "the autocracy might have been survived only in some distant edge of Central Africa only to satisfy the expectations of an isolated [*mütecerred*] tribe, but in no ways that of the Russian population, steadily instructed by the light of education and freedom, which is the right of every nation in the world."²⁶⁰

Throughout the whole period of the Russian Empire, people of any faith and confession could be easily converted into the Orthodox faith, while only after the reforms of 1905 someone baptized in the Orthodox faith became able to pass to a religion other than Orthodoxy. Slightly resembling the Ottoman *millet* system, it is often stated that in the Russian Empire a non-Russian of any ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic origin was considered a full-fledged Russian in any sense of the word once converted to Orthodoxy, which, in its turn, facilitated to some extent their

²⁵⁸ "Rusya," *Hikmet*, No. 59 (4 Djumâdâ 'l-Âkhira 1329), p. 3.

²⁵⁹ Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia: Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul, Vol. 1 (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1919), p. 194.

²⁶⁰ "Tolstoy ve Çar," *Donanma*, No. 31 / 7 (Eylül 1329) [1913], p. 309.

colonization of Eastern Europe and Northern Asia and incorporation of different ethnic groups into the imperial establishment.²⁶¹

Similar to the state of Islam in the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Orthodox Christianity played a very important role in the Russian state and society. Even Tiutchev, the famous poet and a prominent Pan-Slavist, affirmed that “Russia is above all a Christian empire. The Russian people is Christian not only because of the Orthodoxy of its beliefs, but also because of something more intimate than belief. It is Christian because of that capacity for renunciation and sacrifice which serves as the foundation of its moral nature.”²⁶² Therefore, since Russia “could not succeed in forming a structure called government,” an Ottoman author claimed, the Russian society is simply an association of peoples [*cem’iyet-i akvâm*], which is a mechanism consciously created by people.²⁶³

Thus, an interesting instance of the criticism of the official Tsarist policy towards its ‘alien’ subjects appeared in the oppositional *Kolokol* newspaper in February 1868. First, the author quotes a very ‘remarkable and progressive’ article published on 14 December 1867 in *Moskovskie vedomosti*, the newspaper published by Mikhail

²⁶¹ Mosely, “Aspects of Russian Expansion,” pp. 198-199.

²⁶² F. Tyutchev, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (1913), p. 344; cited by Riasanovsky, “‘Nationality’ in the State Ideology during the Reign of Nicholas I,” pp. 39-40.

²⁶³ “Ruslar, Türkler,” *Büyük Mecmû’a*, No. 16 (11 Kânûn-i evvel 1919), p. 1.

Katkov, the prominent Russian publicist often considered to be one of the leading inspirers of counter-reforms. As the ‘remarkable and progressive’ article says,²⁶⁴

Religious toleration became the indispensable condition of the state order. People of other beliefs [*inovertsy*] in the Russian Empire are not only those newcomers, as it used to be. To a great extent they belong to the indigenous inhabitants of the Empire that comprise its state structure, thus, as a part of its nation [*narod*], enjoy all the rights and are subject to all the obligations of its citizens. The Legislation and Government can by no means refuse their patronage to them.

However, the following paragraphs of the articles quoted in *Kolokol*, saying that “in Russia only the Orthodox Church is the national Church, all other beliefs, no matter how much privilege they enjoy, cannot be national in character” or a somewhat ambitious claim that “only the most potent states have their national institutions and their national church” seemed, in the eyes of the writers, far from promoting religious toleration as “the indispensable condition of the state order.” The critics did not hesitate to go even further, asserting that the “Tatars created the Muscovite Tsar, while he, taking advantage of the people’s ignorance, started creating new institutions on the Russian soil, christening them into national institutions.”²⁶⁵

The criticism of the Russian state and society or rather the attempt to generate an overall negative image of the country in the Ottoman press was often carried out by quoting writings of prominent Russian writer and thinkers or by referring to the Russian press. As could have been expected, the more prominent and famous the

²⁶⁴ *Kolokol (Russkoe pribavlenie)*, No. 2 (1 February 1868), p. 6. The facsimile copy available in *Kolokol: Gazeta A. N. Gertsena i N. P. Ogareva, Zheneva 1868-1869 (Faksimil'noe izdanie)* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo “Nauka,” 1979).

²⁶⁵ *Kolokol (Russkoe pribavlenie)*, No. 2 (1 February 1868), p. 8.

writer was, the more reliable and credible it might be considered. In this respect, the letter of Lev Tolstoy to the Russian Emperor Nicholas II is worth examining. The lengthy letter was full of criticism of Tsarist rule and often prophesied the impending calamities that the unlawfulness of the regime could provoke. However, referring to the two basic pillars of Tsarist rule – the Orthodoxy and Autocracy – Count Tolstoy, who was at that time officially excommunicated from the Russian Orthodox Church by the Holy Synod, stated that,²⁶⁶

To claim that Orthodoxy, which for the time being was considered quite inherent for Russians, is such an absurdity today. As you can see in the official reports of the [Holy] Synod, the most enlightened parts of the population are joining other reasonable denominations [*mezâhib-i ma'kûle-i sâire*] in large numbers, despite inevitable destruction, oppression and humiliation they are to undergo.

Due to his conspicuous opposition to the regime, Tolstoy became a very popular figure in Ottoman Empire and numerous articles on his ideas and works appeared in the Ottoman press.²⁶⁷

The overall crisis-ridden state of the Russian Empire vividly depicted in the Ottoman press abounded with articles highlighting the social, political, economic and ethnic dissociation of the country. The news on the thousands-strong strikes of workers that led to arrests of hundreds of activists and students in Moscow,²⁶⁸ were followed by the news on demonstrations of the university students and Socialists in St. Petersburg, which not only ended up in 280 dead as a result of the clashes with the

²⁶⁶ “Tolstoy ve Çar,” *Donanma*, No. 31 / 7 (Eylül 1329), p. 308.

²⁶⁷ “Tolstoy: Efkâr ve Mesâ’îsi,” *Hikmet*, No. 34 (5 Dhu l’-Hidjdja 1328) [1910], p. 9.

²⁶⁸ “Rusya’da Grevler,” *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*, Vol. 6-1, No. 193-11 (3 Mayıs 1328) [1912], p. 21.

police and gendarmerie, but also in censoring of all outgoing telegrams from St. Petersburg by governmental forces.²⁶⁹

In conformity with systematic report on the ongoing strikes and demonstrations in the Russian Empire, the news related to the famine, especially in the countryside, became another influential tool at the disposal of the Ottoman press. Apart from being simply a statistical data, these reports were often accompanied by impressive tragicomic stories, such as one on starving villagers, who out of their despair invited the priest to perform the death prayer for them, or the terrible stories of an allegedly widespread practice of selling own children in order to survive the famine.²⁷⁰

As could have been expected, towards the outburst of the war, any news that can discredit the Russian military had wide circulation in press. The news of the numerous mutinies that broke out in the Russian army with detailed information on the detained,²⁷¹ and introduction of the martial law in Sevastopol', the biggest navy port of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as that in Kronstadt, the biggest navy port of the Baltic Fleet,²⁷² became for a time being one of the most common types of report on the Russian Empire. These reports, often based on rumors and indirect reference, were not just informative in their nature, but frequently contained evaluation and interpretation of the whole Russian state and society.

²⁶⁹ "Rusya'da Sosyalistler," *Sebilü'r-Reşâd*, Vol. 6-1, No. 193-11 (3 Mayıs 1328) [1912], p. 21.

²⁷⁰ "Rusya'da Kaht ü Galâ," *Sebilü'r-Reşâd*, Vol. 8-1, No. 188-6 (23 Rabî' al-Âkhir 1330) [1912], p. 111.

²⁷¹ "Rus Zırhlısında 'İsyân," *Sebilü'r-Reşâd* (3 Mayıs 1328) [1912], p. 21.

²⁷² "Rusya'da İdâre-i Örfiye," *Sebilü'r-Reşâd*, Vol. 6-1, No. 207-25 (9 Ramadân 1330) [1912], p. 492.

A short report on a mutiny among the Russian Black Sea fleet, the military unit so vital for the Ottomans in many respects, could in the meantime mention that “up to now, the Russian government had always been abusing the ignorance of the Russians, so that no one hoped that even among the Russian troops there might appear someone bright,” and go on with certain shocking facts of a seaman’s disobedience to admiral’s order, as well as thorough details of the number of perished and executed.²⁷³ As was mentioned above, the Socialist ideology like anything else that entered the Russian society was said to be adjusted to the innate nature of the Russians and took shape of a harsh and materialistic character and created a destructive course called Nihilism.²⁷⁴

On the other hand, as an Ottoman journal put, the political aspirations and cravings of the ignorant majority [*ekseriyet-i câhile*] of the Russian society can be summarized as:²⁷⁵

1. to Russify the non-Russian peoples;
2. to make Orthodoxy the sole confession in Russia;
3. to put all different Slavic peoples under Russian influence;
4. to make the Russian language the sole language in the Russian Empire.

In any case, already during the reign of Alexander III, the father of Nicholas II, only the dominant Orthodox Church was allowed to proselytize and children of mixed marriages with an Orthodox ancestor were automatically considered Orthodox,

²⁷³ “Rusya Askerinde İğtişâş,” *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*, Vol. 8-1, No. 204-22 (18 Sha’aban 1330) [1912], p. 432.

²⁷⁴ “Nihilizm ve Anarşizm,” *Resimli Kitâb*, Vol. 6, No. 36 (Kânûn-i sâni 1328), p. 1005.

²⁷⁵ “Rusya,” *Hikmet*, No. 59 (4 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1329), p. 4.

while many confessions, including Roman Catholic, Lutherans and Old Believers, were deprived of their rights.²⁷⁶

This let another Ottoman author state that for the most part the Russian government strives for the implementation of missionary and nationalistic ideas and aspirations from which the Muslims suffer the most.²⁷⁷ In the same mood, the Russian oppression of Muslims (to be examined in the following chapter of the work) and the Jews became a matter of incessant complaints on the pages of the Ottoman press.²⁷⁸ In fact, the Ottoman claims on the above-mentioned religious and political aspirations of the Russian nationalists did not seem groundless at all, especially since Nikolai Zhedenov, a prominent monarchist and one of the founders of the Union of the Russian People [*Soiuz russkogo naroda*], openly stated that “one who is not an Orthodox is not a Russian; he is already a degenerate. The one who is not loyal to the Tsar is also not Russian.”²⁷⁹

Along with the Muslims of the Russian Empire to be scrutinized in the later chapters of this work, the state of the Jews, another prominent non-Christian group, was also noteworthy. The situation of the Russian Jews, especially the outburst of anti-Jewish violence in the second half of the 19th and early 20th century became a troublesome

²⁷⁶ Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 5th ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 394.

²⁷⁷ *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (24 Eylül 1331) [1915], p. 23.

²⁷⁸ See, for instance, “Rusya’da Museviler,” *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*, Vol. 6-1, No. 188-6 (29 Mart 1328) [1912], p. 111.

²⁷⁹ M. N. Luk’ianov, “‘Rossia – dlia russkikh’ ili ‘Rossiia – dlia russkikh poddanykh’? Konservatory i natsional’nyi vopros nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny,” *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, No. 2 (March-April 2006), p. 38.

question in late Imperial Russian history. Indeed, the word *pogrom* was adopted into many foreign languages, becoming as popular as *vodka* or *intelligentsia*. As for the 1880s, the number of the Jews in the Russian Empire made up 4.2 percent of the entire population, amounting to 4,086,650,²⁸⁰ most of whom were obliged to live in the Pale of Permanent Jewish Settlement [*cherta postoiannoi evreyskoi osedlosti*], the area comprising fifteen provinces of the north-western and south-western regions of European Russia. By the turn of the century, the number of the Jews increased to 5 million, about 82 percent of whom lived in urban areas.²⁸¹

Interestingly, as was recorded by the *zemstvo* assembly of the Kherson *guberniia*, an alleged rumor that each Jew would be sold to the Ottoman Sultan for 40 kopecks after destruction of their property was widespread in the area.²⁸² Already in the early 19th century, Colonel Pavel Pestel, the founder and leader of the revolutionary Southern Society, intended to create a centralized state not only on its administrative and political level, but also on the cultural and linguistic levels, naturally, with Russian language and culture prevailing. However, being somehow reluctant to Russify the Jews, he went even further and proposed to settle them in Anatolia.²⁸³ Interestingly, even the second and third generations of Jews whose ancestors had

²⁸⁰ *Obshchaia zapiska vysshei komissii dlia peresmotra deistvuiushchikh o Evreiakh v imperii zakonov (1883-1888)* (St. Petersburg: 1888), pp. 1-2; cited by John D. Klier, "Russian Jewry on the Eve of the Pogroms," in *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History*, eds. John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 5.

²⁸¹ I. Michael Aronson, *Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), p. 35.

²⁸² *Trudy gubernskoi komissii po Evreiskomu voprosu* (St. Petersburg: 1884), cited by Aronson, *Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia*, p. 83.

²⁸³ Sergei Pushkarev, *Self-Government and Freedom in Russia*, ed. and trans. Paul Bannes (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 31-32.

converted to Orthodoxy were subject to certain restrictions, the total liberalization of which was bound to the condition of “their upbringing under the supervision of the Russian clergy.”²⁸⁴

While criticizing Orthodoxy and the official position of the state towards it, the Ottoman author referred to Tolstoy stating that the Russian Orthodox faith could not be an inherent and inalienable religion for Russians, since, instead of gaining its own respect and recognition, it is being imposed by force and violence from above and those who abandoned it are being punished, and added that since only the luck and unpredictable circumstances make someone a Tsar, thus there is quite a probability that a cruel or insane person could become one.²⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the widespread conversion of the non-Christian subjects of the Russian Empire into Christianity, mainly the Russian Orthodoxy, had for the most part nothing to do with the non-Christians’ interest in the Christian doctrines and teachings, but took place either by force or due to the attraction of the benefits promised by the government upon conversion.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴ Ya. Arakin, *Evreiskii vopros* (St. Petersburg: 1912), p. 77; cited by M. N. Luk’ianov, “‘Rossia – dlia russkikh’ ili ‘Rossiia – dlia russkikh poddanykh’? Konservatory i natsional’nyi vopros nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny,” *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, No. 2 (March-April 2006), p. 38.

²⁸⁵ “Tolstoy ve Çar,” *Donanma*, No. 31 / 7 (Eylül 1329), p. 308.

²⁸⁶ Michael Khodarkovsky, “‘Not by Word Alone’: Missionary Policies and Religious Conversion in Early Modern Russia,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (April 1996), p. 268.

CHAPTER III

MUSLIMS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE: PAN-ISLAMISM AND PAN-TURKISM IN THE OTTOMAN PRESS

3.1 RUSSIA AND ISLAM

3.1.1 Islam and the Rise of the Russian Empire

The peculiarity of the Russian political system and a story of its impressive advance from a peripheral principality to a great multiethnic empire were often connected to its distinctive geographic location and history, where Islam and the history of the Turko-Mongol peoples played an influential role. While analyzing the ‘persistent’ conditions beyond Russian foreign policy, Alfred J. Rieber distinguishes four of them as:²⁸⁷

²⁸⁷ Alfred J. Rieber, “Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay,” in *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. and trans. Hugh Ragsdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 322.

(1) [R]elative economic backwardness in relations to Western Europe and later the United States and Japan; (2) permeable frontiers all along the periphery of the state power; (3) a multicultural state and society composed of ethnoterritorial blocs; and (4) cultural marginality.

Differently from other great European powers, the Russian interactions with the Muslim world had been shaped by a lengthy period of the domination of the Turko-Mongol Muslim khanates over the Russian lands, which became an indispensable part of the folklore and official historiography and was thoroughly employed in the era of nationalism. Indeed, along with Spaniards and the Balkan peoples, the Russians were the only European Christian people that endured direct Muslim domination.²⁸⁸ However, as has been recently reexamined, the period of the Turko-Mongol domination referred as the Mongol-Tatar yoke [*mongolo-tatarskoe igo*] could have even been considered as a period of relative economic welfare and political stability and had been deliberately defamed in the later copies of the Russian chronicles of that period.²⁸⁹

The Muslims of the Russian Empire, especially the Caucasian mountaineers, were traditionally regarded as savages by the Russians and their ‘savagery’ and ‘wildness’ [*dikost’*] were seen as the principal obstacle in their way towards citizenship and adaptation into the imperial order.²⁹⁰ Since the loyalty of nationalities in imperial

²⁸⁸ Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), p. 5.

²⁸⁹ See Donald Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-cultural Influences of the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

²⁹⁰ Austin Lee Jersild, “From Savagery to Citizenship: Caucasian Mountaineers and Muslims in the Russian Empire,” in *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*, eds. Daniel R. Brower and Edward Lazzerini (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 102.

Russia was claimed to be rated mainly on the religious basis, the Muslims in this sense were, naturally, considered inferior to the non-Russians Christians, while, at the same time, the Muslim Tatars of the Volga region who experienced Russian rule for centuries were regarded more loyal than, for instance, the Uzbeks of Bukhara, which made the latter exempt from military service.²⁹¹ As a result, differently from the rest of the Muslim Turks, the Volga Tatars and the Crimean Tatars were conscripted into the Imperial Army by the time of the First World War.²⁹²

Moreover, the Russian ongoing domination over the Muslim khanates of Central Eurasia won international acclaim already in the late 15th century, since Pope Sixtus IV, just like his predecessor Pope Paul II, hoped, through the influence of Ivan III, the Grand Duke of Moscow, to induce the Khan of the Golden Horde to fight against the Ottomans, hoping to oust them from Constantinople. Interestingly, for such an adventurous campaign, only ten thousand silver *talers* and special personal gifts to the still-influential Khan were seen sufficient to win him over.²⁹³ However, even in 1737, at the time when the Russian state started realizing their aspirations for transcontinental sovereignty and the decline of the Ottoman state was already evident, the Enderi chief of Daghestan who already swore loyalty to the Tsar following the Russian conquest rejected to obey the order to send his troops for a

²⁹¹ Philip E. Mosely, "Aspects of Russian Expansion," *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (October 1948), pp. 200-201.

²⁹² Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets: The Turks of the World and Their Political Objectives* (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1957), p. 40.

²⁹³ N. M. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*, Book II, Vol. 6 (Moscow: "Olma-Press," 2004), p. 218.

campaign against the Ottoman Empire claiming that “it was not befitting him to help an infidel ruler (*giaurskii tsar*) against a Muslim one.”²⁹⁴

As is often mentioned, initially the Muscovite state had no interest in the conquered land, but needed the employment of local inhabitants as irregular military force along the southern borders.²⁹⁵ However, at the time when the Ottoman state was still an influential power in Europe, the Russian tsars had to take into consideration its claims and demands as the protector of all Muslims which regarded certain lands that fell under Russian rule, such as Astrakhan and Kabarda, as traditional Ottoman domain, as was claimed by Sultan Selim II, so that even Ivan IV, the Terrible, had to implement his Ottoman counterpart’s demands to reopen the Astrakhan route for the merchants and pilgrims from Bukhara.²⁹⁶

Despite the ambiguity of the overall attitude of the Russian State towards its Muslim subjects and Islam in general, the anti-Muslim legal or religious regulations often remained intact and were the inspirational source behind certain practices up to the end of Tsarism. Upon the Russian conquests of Kazan and Astrakhan in 1552 and 1556 respectively, the policy of conversion to Orthodox Christianity became a part of the official policy that started being applied already during the reign of Ivan IV.

²⁹⁴ RGADA Senat f. 248, op. 113, d. 1257, l. 14 ob.; cited by Michael Khodarkovsky, “Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russia in the North Caucasus, 1550-1800,” *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (June 1999), p. 411.

²⁹⁵ Khodarkovsky, “Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russia in the North Caucasus, 1550-1800,” p. 398.

²⁹⁶ Michael Khodarkovsky, “‘Not by Word Alone’: Missionary Policies and Religious Conversion in Early Modern Russia,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (April 1996), p. 273.

In his letter of 1556 to the Archbishop Gurii of the newly established Kazan Eparchy, the Russian Tsar was already depicting the conversion of the ‘pagans’ and teaching them the basics of the Orthodoxy and the Russian language as a divine task, for an efficiency of which the archbishop was even advised first to threaten the locals to be punished with death and then forgive them for the love of the Christ, for which, before expressing his or her desire to be baptized in the Christian faith, the new convert had to denounce “the most false Prophet (Muhammed) and his most false and ungodly laws (the Qur’an).”²⁹⁷

As late as in 1681, accused of attempts to convert Russian peasants to Islam, the governmental decree allowed the confiscation of the service and hereditary lands from Tatars “who failed to convert,” to be compensated with the allotment of lands in districts with non-Christian population, while in 1713, the Muslim landowners from Azov and Kazan *gubernii*s “were presented with an ultimatum to convert within six month or face the confiscation of their estates.”²⁹⁸ Besides denominating Muhammad a lying prophet (*lzheprorok*) by the official decree of 1750 of the Russian Holy Synod, the laws stipulated an execution “up to the breast level” just to be burnt later “without any mercy” for an attempt to convert one to Islam.²⁹⁹ However, despite all the violent acts, propaganda, economic and administrative pressure or encouragement, as Akdes Nimet Kurat claims, the Russification policy failed to have the desired effect and, on the contrary, strengthened religious and

²⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 272-273, 286.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 279-280.

²⁹⁹ R. G. Abdulatipov, *Sud’by islama v Rossii: Istoriia i perspektivy* (Moscow: “Mysl’,” 2002), p. 118.

national feelings of the Muslim population.³⁰⁰ Furthermore, while revealing the failure of the Tsarist government to Russify and Christianize the Kazakhs (who were incidentally noted for their lack of religious devotion) by settling Cossacks among them, an Ottoman journal claims that not only did they retain their faith and language, but even partially converted the Cossack settlers to Islam.³⁰¹

The prominent Russian thinker Vladimir Solov'ev similarly noted in 1897 in his essay "On Russian Language," it was possible to teach forcibly to the *inorodtsy*³⁰² literary Russian language in schools, however, teaching Russian under constraint would only cause aversion to it and reluctance to use it outside the sphere of compulsion.³⁰³ Although he supported the idea of the Russian language as the official language for the entire Empire, he supposed that the imposition of it to the population outside state functions and official relations would certainly cause the estrangement from everything Russian and revitalization of local languages and dialects even in the areas where they previously had no influence and power.³⁰⁴

The conversion to Islam, although not without reservations, was legalized only in April 1905 by the so-called Religious Toleration Edict, which allowed the re-conversion to Islam of Christians who could prove their concealed practice of Islam,

³⁰⁰ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Rusya Tarihi: Başlangıçtan 1917'ye Kadar* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1948), p. 361.

³⁰¹ "Kırgızlar," *Hikmet*, No. 4 (3 Djumâdâ 'l-Ûlâ 1328) [1910], p. 4.

³⁰² *Inorodtsy* (singular: *inorodets*; literally 'alien' or 'foreigner') is a collective name denoting non-Slavic (and prevalingly non-Orthodox) peoples of the Russian Empire.

³⁰³ *Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov'eva*, Vol. VIII (1897-1900) (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Tovarishchestva 'Obshchestvennaia Pol'za', 1903), p. 81.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

being Christians only in name, but Islamic proselytizing remained prohibited anyway and all conversions ought to be approved by the government. In any case, from the time of the edict until January 1909, the number of those who had legally converted to Islam reached 49,000, of whom about 39,000 were from the Kazan province only.³⁰⁵ Interestingly, in the villages of the so-called *kryashen* [Christened] Tatars, who returned to Islam following the Toleration Edict, certain habits of the Orthodox times still seemed to be intact, while their unconcerned attitude towards female head veil amazed an Ottoman guest.³⁰⁶

The policy of winning the hearts of the local population through love and enlightenment was also directed at undermining the physical presence of Islam, since a great number of mosques, *madrasas* and other religious and spiritual buildings and constructions were destroyed. In 1742, as a part of the decree of 1740 to strengthen the Christianization of the non-Russian (*inorodcheskii*) regions of the empire by Empress Anna Ioannovna, the Holy Synod issued an order to demolish all mosques built after 1552, so that within a very short time, 418 out of 536 mosques in the Kazan *uezd* (district) and 29 out of 40 mosques in the Astrakhan *uezd* were demolished.³⁰⁷ As for other Muslim provinces of the Volga region, only one mosque

³⁰⁵ Robert Geraci, "Russian Orientalism at an Impasse: Tsarist Education Policy and the 1910 Conference on Islam," in *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*, eds. Brower and Lazzerini, p. 140. The Ottoman *Beyân-ul-Hak* presents the same number in "Rusya'da Tazyîk-i İslâm'a Lüzûm Gösterenler," *Beyân-ul-Hak*, Vol. 5, No. 126 (11 Ramadan 1329) [1911], p. 2285.

³⁰⁶ "Rusya mektûbları," *İslâm Dünyâsı*, Year 1, No. 11, p. 173.

³⁰⁷ Abdulatipov, *Sud'by islama v Rossii: Istoriia i perspektivy*, p. 119.

was to be left in each village that had a Muslim population of no less than 200-300 males.³⁰⁸

Following the Toleration Edict of 1773, in an attempt to establish state control over the Muslim community and inspired mainly by Baron Igelstrom, Catherine II ordered the governmental supervision and sponsorship of the mosque construction for every 1,500 persons, as well as hiring of mullahs and teachers for Muslim schools submitted to the governmental Commission for Public Schools and distribution of books for these schools translated and printed at governmental expense.³⁰⁹ Moreover, already during the reign of Catherine II, the Qur'an printed at governmental expense had been distributed for free among the Kazakhs.³¹⁰

Despite the perceptible indifference of the Russian Muslim elite towards the Tsar, the Russian Government and the Tsar himself were regarded by the Ottomans as ardently anti-Muslim fanatics. The news on the abrogation of the Friday holidays for the Russian Muslims that obliged them to have a day off on Sunday instead was considered by an Ottoman author as an attempt to turn them into Christians in the end by trick or by force [*hile ve cebîrle Hıristiyân etmek*].³¹¹ On the other hand, the initiatives of the Holy Synod to establish Christian religious schools in provinces

³⁰⁸ Khodarkovsky, "Not by Word Alone": Missionary Policies and Religious Conversion in Early Modern Russia," p. 284.

³⁰⁹ Abdulatipov, *Sud'by islama v Rossii: Istoriia i perspektivy*, p. 120.

³⁰⁹ Alan W. Fisher, "Enlightened Despotism and Islam Under Catherine II," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (December 1968), p. 549.

³¹⁰ Liutsian Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Antireligioznoe Izdatel'stvo, 1936), p. 69.

³¹¹ "Türkler," *Hikmet*, No. 11 (23 Djumâdâ 'l-Âkhira 1328) [1910], p. 4.

like Vladikavkaz and Kherson were considered as an attempt to withstand the ongoing growth and spread of Islam in the Russian Empire, especially since, as an Ottoman journal claimed, these schools had an ultimate objective of attracting the Muslim youth to Christianity.³¹² Besides, the gathering of the Orthodox missionaries in Kazan and noticeable increase in their activities among the Muslim population had also become an issue of complaints in Ottoman journals.³¹³

While covering the news about the complaints of the Muslim Duma deputies against the bill that “tries to impose the Christian worship service days on the whole population,” an article in *Beyân-ul-Hak* reminds that even in the era of ignorance the Russians under Tatar rule were not treated with such contempt and feels timely to note that the Christians in the Ottoman Empire enjoy total freedom in matters related to worship and religious holidays.³¹⁴ The imposition of closing regulations on Sunday in the Volga-Ural region was also confirmed by the travel notes published in *İslâm Dünyâsı* that revealed a signboard in Russian at the entrance of the Muslim religious administration in Orenburg, notifying of the Sunday holiday.³¹⁵

³¹² “Rusların İslâmiyete Karşı Bir Teşebbüsleri,” *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*, No. 299 (10 Radjab 1332) [1914], p. 244.

³¹³ “Rusya Müslümânları,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 998 (14 Radjab 1328) [1910], p. 63.

³¹⁴ “Rusya Müslümânları,” *Beyân-ul-Hak*, Vol. 3, No. 66 (19 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1328) [1910], pp. 1312-3312[1313].

³¹⁵ H. Sâmî, “Rusya mektûbları,” *İslâm Dünyâsı*, Year 1, No. 8, p. 127.

3.1.2 Conquests and Colonial Rule

The idea of Russian domination over the whole of Asia was often regarded as a historical mission or as a fate of the Russian Empire due to its peculiar historical, geographical and cultural entity. Being an ardent supporter of the prospect of domination, Fedor Dostoevsky was pretentious enough to claim that “the name of the Russian autocrat be raised above that of all the princes of the East including the Caliph of all the Mohammedans and the Empress of India,” adding that this was an inevitable step for the future of Russia that was “as much an Asiatic as a European.”³¹⁶

Although the initial drive behind the Russian expansion into the heart of Central Asia was expounded as the “necessity of defending the settled Russian population against the incursions of the nomads” which forced them to extend their military outposts into the lands of Central Asian Muslims,³¹⁷ the Russian inclination towards the East and its expansionist policy was at the same time directly related to the state of its affairs in Europe, its image and its failure to compete the European powers, which became so conspicuous after the Crimean defeat. Nevertheless, as Mikhail Katkov, the prominent Russian publicist, would duly notice on the eve of the Russian conquest of Tashkent, it was not Asia in general, nor Central Asia in particular, that would make Russia a great power, but rather its domination over its

³¹⁶ Hans Kohn, “Dostoevsky’s Nationalism,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October 1945), p. 405.

³¹⁷ Paul Miliukov, Charles Seignobos and L. Eisenmann, eds., *History of Russia: Reform, Reaction, Revolution (1855-1932)*, Charles Lam Markmann, trans., Vol. 3 (New York: Funk & Wagnalis, 1969), p. 115.

western borders and the Black Sea.³¹⁸ However, in the age of industrialization, it was Asia or the East in general, where the Russian Empire could make a significant advance and reserve its place among the great imperialistic powers.

By the second half of the 19th century, the Russian Empire was divided into 76 *gubernii*s, 15 regions, three townships, two circuits, one department and a special Cossack territory, where some provinces or countries, like the Kingdom of Poland and the Caucasus, were supervised by the Governmental lieutenants or viceroys (*namestnik*), while some, like the Baltic provinces, Finland, Siberia and Turkestan were entrusted to governor-generals (*general-gubernator*).³¹⁹ According to the general census in the Russian Empire carried out in February 1897 for the first time on such a broad and thorough scale, the total population of the empire amounted to 129,211,113, with the main bulk of the population concentrated in fifty governments (*gubernii*s) of European Russia (94,188,750), followed by the Caucasus (9,723,553), the Kingdom of Poland (9,442,590) and Siberia and Sakhalin (5,731,732), making the Russian population nearly doubled within fifty years since the census of 1851.³²⁰

Throughout the whole period of the Tsarist rule from the very time of its conquest up to the Bolshevik Revolution, the Turkestan Territory [*Turkestanskii krai*] or the

³¹⁸ Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, trans. Bruce Little (Leamington Spa, Hamburg and New York: Berg. 1987), pp. 86, 94.

³¹⁹ Robert Michell, "Summary of Statistics of the Russian Empire," *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (September 1872), pp. 342-343.

³²⁰ P. K., "The Census of the Russian Empire," *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 6 (June 1897), p. 658.

Government-General of Turkestan [*Turkestanskoe general-gubernatorstvo*] remained under a special protection status [*polozhenie usilennoi okhrany*], while, from time to time, the whole of the *krai* or its parts were declared an emergency protection zone and therefore, the military body of the *krai* was permanently retained and the area remained under the authority of the Ministry of War. Therefore, any member of the *krai* administration could impose a penalty, including fines and arrests.³²¹ Moreover, the *oblasts* of the Territory were headed by the governor [*gubernator*], who controlled the district [*uezd*] administration and was the Commanders-in-Chief of the *oblast'* troops.³²²

In pre-Soviet Russia, the term *Turkestan* or *Türkistân* comprised a vast area that in the north verged on *Ural'skii*, *Turgaiskii*, *Akmolinskii* and *Semipalatinskii* oblasts of the Government-General of the Steppe [*Stepnoe general-gubernatorstvo*], in the south on Iran and Afghanistan, in the east on China and in the west on the Caspian Sea, comprising an area of 1,652,238 sq. km,³²³ although the historical *Türkistân*, the land of the Turks, constitutes a somewhat wider area.³²⁴ The Governorate-General of Turkestan with its capital in Tashkent was established by the Tsarist Government in

³²¹ P. G. Galuzo, "Turkestan i tsarskaia Rossiia," *Revoliutsionnyi Vostok*, No. 6 (1929), p. 96.

³²² N. S. Kiniapina, M. M. Bliev and V. V. Degoev, *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii (Vtoraiia polovina XVIII – 80-e gody XIX v.)* (Moscow: "Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta," 1984), p. 290.

³²³ Kh. Tursunov, *Natsional'naia politika Kommunisticheskoi Partii v Turkestane (1917-1924 gg.)* (Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo "Uzbekistan," 1971), p. 16.

³²⁴ See "TURKISTÂN," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, eds. B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat and J. Schachts, Vol. 10 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), pp. 679-681. For the contextual use of the term *Turkestan* see Hasan Ali Karasar, "National Identity and Regional Integration in Central Asia: Turkestan Reunion" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Bilkent University, 2002), Chapter II: "Turkestan' in the Encyclopedical References," pp. 9-36.

1867, following the Russian annexation of the territories of the former Khanate of Khokand and parts of the Emirate of Bukhara and Khanate of Khiva.³²⁵

Nevertheless, the pattern of colonization by the Russian state or individual colonists did not have an elaborate intention for the displacement or extermination of the indigenous population, especially since, initially, the serfdom and attachment to a certain area prevented the mass migration of Russian peasants into the newly captured areas. Moreover, the Orthodox Church of the pre-Petrine era was not aggressively proselytizing and historically the Russian state never pursued an official policy of ethnic or racial exclusion, tolerating upper class intermarriage with members of other ethnic groups and states and their acceptance into the Russian nobility.³²⁶ Similar to the Ottoman *millet* system based on religious affiliation, in the Russian Empire religion was also the key factor for the acceptance into society rather than racial or ethnic characteristics, since, upon conversion into the Orthodoxy, persons of non-Russian (and even non-Christian) origin were able to enter even the Russian nobility.³²⁷

Interestingly, the first ever classification of the Russian subjects published in 1776 by Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov, the prominent Russian writer and historian,

³²⁵ Tursunov, *Natsional'naiia politika Kommunisticheskoi Partii v Turkestane (1917-1924 gg.)*, p. 16.

³²⁶ Rieber, "Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay," pp. 338-339.

³²⁷ Khodarkovsky, "'Not by Word Alone': Missionary Policies and Religious Conversion in Early Modern Russia," p. 275.

attempted to classify the population of the empire into six categories according to their taxation, military service and religion in the following way:³²⁸

1. Russians and all non-Christians who pay the souls tax and provide recruits;
2. Russians and non-Christians who pay taxes but do not provide recruits;
3. Christians other than Russian Orthodox;
4. All kinds of Cossack and other military settlers;
5. Bashkirs and other savage peoples who practice Islam; and
6. Kalmyks and other nomadic idol-worshippers.

While describing the population of the Russian Empire, Nikolai Ogarev took a critical stance, saying that the four Slavic nations “with definite peculiarities” – Poles, Belorussians, Ruthenians (*rusiny*) from Little Russia and Russians from Great Russia³²⁹ – were forcefully united under centralized imperial regime.³³⁰ However, in spite of his compassion towards the fate of the suppressed Slavic brethren, his attitude towards the Lithuanians merged with Poles, as well as Finns and Tatars merged with Great Russians, although some of them retained their denomination, was somewhat different. These ‘scattered’ peoples, which “resemble each other in their social structure,” took the common law of ordinary Russians, thus, as he claims, “have no inclination towards national autonomy whatsoever.”³³¹

³²⁸ M. M. Shcherbatov, “Statistika v razsuzhdenii Rossii,” in *ChOIDR*, Book 3, pt. 11 (1859), p. 46; cited by Khodarkovsky, “‘Not by Word Alone’: Missionary Policies and Religious Conversion in Early Modern Russia,” p. 270.

³²⁹ In official Russian lexicon Ukraine was called *Malorossiiia* (literally ‘Little Russia’) since the mid-seventeenth century, while Russia proper, mainly its European provinces with predominantly Russian population, was called *Velikorossiiia* (literally ‘Great Russia’). *Belorussiiia* literally means ‘white Russia’.

³³⁰ N. Ogarev, “Sovremennaia Rossiia i ee razvitie,” *Kolokol*, No. 2 (15 January 1868) in *Kolokol: Gazeta A. N. Gertsena i N. P. Ogareva, Zheneva 1868-1869 (Perevody, kommentarii, ukazateli)* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo “Nauka,” 1978), pp. 28-29.

³³¹ *Ibid.*

The Cossack settlement of North Caucasian foothills started already in 1861, the year of the emancipation of serfdom in Russia, when by the statute of Emperor Alexander II 1,360 *desiatinas* of the Adighe land was allotted to Cossack officers and men, while following the appointment of General N. I. Yevdokimov as the Commander-in-Chief of the Kuban *oblast'*, the plan of the displacement of the Adighes from the coastal areas and settlement of the Cossacks was elaborated, so that by the end of 1864 the Russian Government established 111 *stanitsas* (Cossack villages) inhabited by 142,333 families.³³²

The Russian colonization of the Central Asian region, at least at the initial stage, followed different patterns in the Steppe area, inhabited predominantly with nomadic or semi-nomadic population, and in southern parts of Turkestan. While the pasture lands of the nomadic Kazakhs in the Steppe area were incessantly ousted out by the newcomers from the European provinces of the Russian Empire, who were establishing colonies all around the area, the number of Russian settlers in Southern Turkestan at the time of the First World War was only about 250,000 out of 13 million, which were settled mainly around a few major cities and were composed mainly of military or administrative staff.³³³

³³² *Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v. – 1917 g.)* (Moscow: “Nauka,” 1988), p. 202.

³³³ Roland B. Dixon, “Central Asia and the Steppe” (14 October 1918), The National Archives (Washington, D.C.), Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents “Special Reports and Studies,” 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 127, p. 8.

According to the census of 1897, the Russian population of the Steppe Territory [*Stepnoi krai*], traditionally inhabited almost entirely by Kazakhs, was two and a half times greater than that of Turkestan, whereas, the distribution of Tatars in both *krais* was more or less even.³³⁴ Nevertheless, starting from 1892 and until 1908, the Russian settlements were armed with rifles, which, if not to count a short period of disarmament from 1908 to 1911, continued until 1914 and the rifles were distributed not only among the male adults, but even among adolescent and children.³³⁵

One of the first measures to be taken upon the conquest of Central Asia was the reorganization, or rather, elimination, of the local religious administration and elite, which prior to the Russian advance had a profound effect on political, legal and judicial life in the area. Thus, due to a series of measures initiated by General Konstantin Kaufman, the governor-general of Turkestan, the post of *shaykh al-islâm*, the highest position in local religious hierarchy, was eliminated, as were those of the local Muslim judges [*qâdî kalân*] and the religious police [*re'îs*], so that the administration of Turkestan was to be made of secular figures.³³⁶

The legal authority of the *qâdîs*, however, was left untouched for the sedentary population of Central Asia, although parallel Russian courts were established for the trial of local cases, but most important cases concerning both Russian and local population were anyways tried by military legal commissions [*voenno-sudebnaia*

³³⁴ Lawrence Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press Ltd, 1997), p. 174.

³³⁵ Galuzo, "Turkestan i tsarskaia Rossiia," p. 97.

³³⁶ Daniel Brower, "Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan," in *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*, eds. Brower and Lazzerini, p. 120.

komişsiia] and court-martials formed by the order of the governor-general.³³⁷ The later elimination of the Islamic courts [*mehâkim-i şer'îyye*] in Turkestan, as was reported by an Ottoman journal, was substantiated by the claims that the Islamic courts were beyond any control, which instigated bribery, and the increasing number of abuse, especially at the time of the *qâdîs'* elections.³³⁸

Despite being generally very critical of everything Russian and seeing it as a main rival in their imperialistic struggle, the Russian rule over the Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia was often depicted as a positive and progressive event by the Western authors. Thus, the Russian rule over “slave-holding, predatory, and murderous propensities and practices” somehow turned, in their eye, to be “of greater advantage to a general humanity and civilisation.”³³⁹ Although not considering the Russian conquest of Central Asia as a march of civilized Europe over barbarian Asia, but rather as “barbarian Asia, after a sojourn in civilised Europe, returns upon its former footsteps to reclaim own kith and kin,” Lord George N. Curzon nevertheless notices that,³⁴⁰

Those who have read descriptions of the state of the country from the Caspian to the Amu Daria, in the pre-Russian days of rapine and raid, when agriculture was devastated, life and property rendered insecure, and entire populations were swept off under circumstances of unheard-of barbarity into a long-life servitude, can form some idea of the extent of the revolution by which peace and order and returning prosperity have been given to these desolated tracts....

³³⁷ *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii*, pp. 288, 291.

³³⁸ “Türkistan’da Mehâkim-i Şer’iyyenin Lağvı,” *İslâm Dünyası*, Year 1, No. 19, p. 301.

³³⁹ “The Sea of Aral and the Russians in Central Asia,” *The New Monthly Magazine*, ed. William Harrison Ainsworth, Vol. 143 (London: Hard Bentley, 1868), p. 125.

³⁴⁰ George N. Curzon, *Russia and Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question* (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1967), pp. 383, 392.

Moreover, as far as the land of “almost an uninhabited wilderness” between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea was concerned, the centuries-long period of intertribal wars had “now happily ended” by the Russian rule and the “migration to Turkey of great numbers of these untamable savages,” unopposed by Russia.³⁴¹ Interestingly, one of the first measures taken by the Russian Government upon the annexation of Khiva in 1873 was the elimination of slavery and slave-trade, and what is even more striking, out of 40,000 emancipated slaves, the Persians were not only released, but escorted by the Russian troops on their way to Iran.³⁴² Earlier, in 1840s, upon the pressure of the Russian state, the Khan of Khiva already issued a decree that forbade capturing and buying of the Russian citizens.³⁴³

Not only did the Westerners acknowledge the scope of the Russian accomplishments in Muslim areas, but so did an Ottoman author traveling in the Volga region just prior to the First World War, who noticed that³⁴⁴

The Russian did not hesitate to carry out anything for the organization and amelioration of social life; they had spent millions and were decisive enough to build numerous high schools, preparatory schools, as well as musical, commercial, industrial, agricultural schools, male gymnasiums and midwife colleges for thousands of students and the great buildings situated at the most lively and neat streets are all school buildings.

³⁴¹ James Mascarene Hubbard, “Russia as a Civilizing Force in Asia,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 75 (1895), p. 198.

³⁴² *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vnesheinei politike Rossii*, p. 300.

³⁴³ L. Kostenko, *Sredniaia Aziia i vodvorenii v nei russkoi grazhdanstvennosti* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. Bezobrazova i komp., 1871), p. 125.

³⁴⁴ H. Sâmî, “Rusya mektûbları,” *İslâm Dünyası*, Year 1, No. 8, p. 128.

Upon describing the automobiles and transportation systems for the students of Orenburg and the carefree youth, the author could not resist the temptation of exclaiming: “Ah! When would our unfortunate homeland become lucky enough to see such happy and fortunate days?”³⁴⁵

In addition to a radical change in economic and political status of a nation subjugated to the Russian rule, the Tsarist regime also caused considerable shift in social and ethnic status and composition within a tribe or an ethnic group, since, as often noticed, it was a traditionally weaker or uninfluential division that took refuge in Russian patronage and, subsequently, became the dominant local power.³⁴⁶ As was already noticed in a Russian ethnographic treatise of 1871, the tribal and clan subdivisions of the Kazakhs already started disappearing as a result of the administrative system introduced there by the Russians.³⁴⁷

In doing so, the strategy and methods of the Russian conquest seem to be always the same, since “Russians began by dividing them, settling them against one another, and then backing each faction in regular rotation against its enemies.”³⁴⁸ On the other hand, the *volosts* and *auls* in the Muslim provinces of the empire were formed on the territorial basis, deliberately avoiding tribal and clan affiliation, in order to

³⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 128.

³⁴⁶ *Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East*, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1838), p. 24.

³⁴⁷ Kostenko, *Sredniaia Aziia i vodvorenii v nei russkoi grazhdanstvennosti*, p. 32.

³⁴⁸ Paul Miliukov, Charles Seignobos and L. Eisenmann, eds., *History of Russia: Reform, Reaction, Revolution (1855-1932)*, Charles Lam Markmann, trans., Vol. 3 (New York: Funk & Wagnalis, 1969), p. 115.

weaken the authority of local notables.³⁴⁹ The structure of the Russian administration with units that did not correspond to the original division left the *sultans* and *biis* outside administration, which was considered as the main reason behind the objections of the local population against the introduction of the Russian administration in 1869 that even led to armed resistance.³⁵⁰ Similarly, the borders of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva did not correspond to the ethno-territorial settlement of their peoples.³⁵¹ Moreover, the toponymic changes in Turkestan that clearly bore the signs of colonialism by naming the towns of Margelan and Chimkent after the conquerors of Turkestan, Tsarist generals M. D. Skobelev and M. G. Cherniaev respectively, had been reproached by the Ottomans, especially since both of the commanders actively participated in anti-Ottoman campaigns in the Balkans.³⁵²

As far as the Volga-Ural region was concerned, the Russian policy of *divide et impera* accomplished by the division into *gubernii*s, whose borders deliberately comprised a mosaic composition of different ethnicities, as well as the settlement of Russians “on the lands inhabited by Turko-Tatars,” was claimed to be among the primary reasons that prevented them from developing a viable national and political consciousness and activity.³⁵³ Moreover, along with the policy of geographic fragmentation there was a socio-economic one, since, as an Ottoman author had noticed, arousing hatred among certain classes of the local society [*sunûf-i ahâlî*] in

³⁴⁹ *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii*, p. 291.

³⁵⁰ Kostenko, *Sredniaia Aziia i vodvorenîe v nei russkoi grazhdanstvennosti*, p. 33.

³⁵¹ Tursunov, *Natsional'naia politika Kommunisticheskoi Partii v Turkestane (1917-1924 gg.)*, p. 20.

³⁵² “Türk Şehirlerinin Adlarını Değiştiriyorlar,” *Türk Sözü*, Year 1, No. 2 (17 Nisân 1330) [1914], p. 16.

³⁵³ “Volga Boyu Târîhinden,” *Kırım Mecmû'ası*, Year 1, No. 12, p. 217.

the Caucasus was among the elaborate policies at the disposal of the Tsarist government for decades.³⁵⁴

To a great extent, from the very time of the rise of the Russian state, the eastern lands became the vital element of the Russian economy, since already in the mid-1600s one-third of the overall state revenues were made up exclusively from the Siberian pelts, while during the reign of Catherine the Great the coinage of the special Siberian currency created the new image and association of Siberia in the European part of Russia, this time as Russia's *zolotoe dno*, 'the golden mine'.³⁵⁵

In January 1906, after the completion of the Central Asian [*Tsentral'noaziatskaia*] and Orenburg-Tashkent railway lines with a total length of 4,452 *versts* (about 4750 km), the Central Asian colonies were fully linked to the rest of the empire, and starting from the early 20th century, the tax and other revenues from Turkestan were not only able to cover the expenses, but were quite lucrative for the treasury.³⁵⁶ The prime product to be exported from Central Asia to Russia and other countries was cotton, whose export for the year 1914 amounted to 235.8 million rubles compared to 65.9 million rubles for that of other products in total.³⁵⁷ At the same time, only the direct taxes in Turkestan *krai* increased tenfold between 1869 and 1914.³⁵⁸ The

³⁵⁴ "Kafkasyâ Müslümânları," *Hikmet*, No. 2 (23 Djumâdâ 'l-Âkhira [Rabî' al-Âkhir?] 1328) [1910], p. 7.

³⁵⁵ Mark Bassin, "Inventing Siberia: Visions of the Russian East in the Early Nineteenth Century," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 96, No. 3 (June 1991), pp. 767, 770.

³⁵⁶ *Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg. v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane* (Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo "Fan," 1985), pp. 36, 46.

³⁵⁷ Galuzo, "Turkestan i tsarskaia Rossiia," p. 99.

³⁵⁸ Tursunov, *Natsional'naia politika Kommunisticheskoi Partii v Turkestane (1917-1924 gg.)*, p. 37.

constant increase in the production of cotton that was reflected in the appearance of modern cotton processing factories throughout Turkestan, as *Sebilü'r-Reşâd* had noted, could also be felt in the perceivable improvement of the economic welfare of the local population and the increasing number of prosperous Muslims.³⁵⁹

One of the unavoidable side effects of the Russian colonization of Turkestan, in addition to its purely economic and strategic matters, was the incessant migration and settlement of the predominantly Russian population from the inner European parts of the empire, which was often considered as one of the principle aims of the imperial policy in Central Asia. Although, unlike Siberia and the Far East, the importance of the Turkestan area for the Tsarist regime was claimed to be mainly of military and strategic significance and, therefore, was not intended to be turned into a Russian colony, the emerging economic value of the region radically changed the situation.³⁶⁰

The law of 6 June 1904 that was later amended by the regulations of 10 March 1906 and 9 November 1906 stipulated absolute freedom of migrations, which were indeed encouraged by the stimulatory credit aid of the Peasant Bank [*Krest'ianskii bank*] and the grant of property rights over the lands they had taken up.³⁶¹ Only between 1907 and 1914, more than 70,000 people settled in the Orenburg and Ufa *gubernii*s

³⁵⁹ "Türkistân," *Sebilü'r-Reşâd*, No. 186-4 (9 Rabî' al-Âkhir 1330) [1912], p. 72.

³⁶⁰ Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, p. 327.

³⁶¹ P. I. Liashchenko, *Istoriia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR*, 4th ed., Vol. 2 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1956), pp. 270-271.

and what was worse, the special credits and land sales issued by the Peasant Bank on very preferential terms, which for a while became a matter of complaints of the Muslim group members in the Third State Duma, drove the local population who rented these lands into a very unfavorable situation vis-à-vis the newcomers.³⁶² As for the Steppe region, between 1906 and 1915, 42,000,000 hectares of land previously in communal possession of the local population were defined by the government as state property and passed to the ownership of the migrants.³⁶³ The disparity of land allotments distributed for the Russian settlers and local population in favor of the former did not pass unnoticed by the Ottomans.³⁶⁴

It is interesting to note that in the official statement, as seen from the announcement of 1914 for those desirous to settle in Russian colonies in Asia, the Russian Government “invites no one to emigrate, and is anxious only to show all possible help to those who have decided to take that step, and to make the emigration laws and the grants and privileges accorded to colonists clear to everyone,” although, among other things, the six years’ exemption from military service for settlers in Turkestan, would have been more than convincing at the time of the impending war.³⁶⁵

³⁶² N. S. Sidorenko, “Ural’skie deputaty Gosudarstvennoi dумы (1906-1917),” *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, No. 5 (September-October 2006), p. 95.

³⁶³ D. A. Amanzholova, *Kazakhskii avtonomizm i Rossiia: Istoriia dvizheniia Alash* (Moscow: “Rossiia molodaia,” 1994), p. 20.

³⁶⁴ “Kazakların Arâzîsini Gasb,” *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*, No. 242 (25 Djumâdâ ‘l-Ûlâ 1331) [1913], p. 136.

³⁶⁵ Stephen Graham, *Through Russian Central Asia* (London and New York: Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1916), pp. 138-151.

Besides weakening the basis for the indigenous rural and agrarian elite by driving them out from the best arable lands or pastures, the Tsarist regime intended to create a class of petty farmers that would unconditionally back the regime and, at the same time, reduce the tension of the agrarian crisis in the inner areas, which, by 1905-1905, were threatening to grow into massive agrarian disturbances.³⁶⁶ As for the Ottomans perspective, the intense establishment of village churches [*köy kilisâları*] in Southern Caucasus and Turkestan at the expense of the Holy Synod were considered by the Ottomans as an attempt to Christianize the area by the planned settlement of Russian migrants to the lands around the already established churches.³⁶⁷

3.2 MUSLIMS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

3.2.1 Russian Muslims: A Demographic Overview

In the Ottoman press of the period one could encounter a variety of denominations and terms referring to the Muslims of the Russian Empire and the choice of a definition would simply be up to the author's habit and style, rather than a sound argument. Moreover, even the terms Muslim and Turk could often be used interchangeably and could sometimes be misleading. The most frequent denomination would be *Rus müslümânları*, *Rusya müslümânları* or *Rusyalı*

³⁶⁶ *Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg. v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane* (Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo "Fan," 1985), pp. 35-36

³⁶⁷ "Rusya'nın 'Din 'Asâsı'," *İctihâd*, No. 66, p. 1447.

müslümânlar,³⁶⁸ although for a less careful author the widespread terms like *Şimâl Türkleri*, or the Northern Turks, that usually comprises the Turkic population of the Volga basin, European Russia and Siberia³⁶⁹ or *Şark ve Simâl Türkleri*³⁷⁰ might mean the same thing.

For the period around the First World War, the estimation of the overall number of Muslims in the world became itself a controversial matter and would substantially differ according to the person, time or character of the source. Out of a great variety of figures varying from 175 million to 360 million, an updated and allegedly more accurate estimate carried out by Samuel M. Zwemer, presents an overall number of 234,814,989, of which 105,723,000 are under direct or indirect British rule and other 94,482,077 are under other Western governments, leaving outside Western dominance only 33,000,000 Muslims, of which 8,321,000 are in the Ottoman Empire.³⁷¹ The pre-war figures by Davis Trietsch presented similar numbers, estimating the overall number of the Muslims in world to be 249,742,000 and the Muslim populations of Russia and the Ottoman Empire, including the latter's African domain, as 19,430,000 and 32,430,000 respectively.³⁷² Apparently, the

³⁶⁸ "Rus Müslümânları," *Hikmet*, No. 9 (9 Djumâdâ 'l-Âkhira 1328), p. 6.

³⁶⁹ "Rusya'da Sâkin Müslümânların Mahalle ve Müftülük Teşkilâtı," *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (10 Eylül 1331) [1915], p. 11.

³⁷⁰ "Şark ve Simâl Türklerinde," *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (15 Eylül 1332) [1916], p. 3174.

³⁷¹ Samuel M. Zwemer, "A New Census of the Muslim World," *Journal of American Oriental Society*, Vol. 44 (1924), pp. 30-31.

³⁷² Davis Trietsch, *Almanya ve İslâm* (Istanbul: Efhâm Matba'ası, 1331) [1915-1916], pp. 115-119.

pledge by Kaiser Wilhelm II to become a friend and protector of 300 million Muslims in the world³⁷³ seems slightly exaggerated.

In a Russian report of 1871, the whole population of *Turan* is estimated as 6,371,500, out of which the Russians amounted to about 70,000.³⁷⁴ According to the first general census of the Russian Empire taken in February 1897, out of the total population of the empire of about 129 million, the populations of the areas with considerable Muslim and Turkic population were: Caucasus – 9,723,553, the Steppe region – 3,425,174, Turkestan, Trans-Caspian region and the Pamirs – 4,175,101, while the population of the Russian settlers in Bukhara and Khiva at that time was only 6,412.³⁷⁵

In an official report of 1915, the total population of Central Asia is reported to be 10,921,600, not including the populations of the khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, which in 1909 were estimated to be around 3 million, and the population growth in the region for a period between 1897 and 1915 reached 40.9 percent.³⁷⁶ At the same time, according to the estimation of the Russian council in Jeddah made in 1893, the Muslim pilgrims from the Russian Empire made up the third largest foreign group after Indians and Persians with a total number between 18,000 and 25,000, the biggest contingent of which coming from the Caucasus and Central Asians

³⁷³ Dr. [Ernst] Jaeck, *Balkan Harbinden Sonra Şarkda Almanya* (Istanbul: Efhâm Matba'ası, 1331), p. 5.

³⁷⁴ Kostenko, *Sredniaia Aziia i vodvorenie v nei russkoi grazhdanstvennosti*, pp. 54, 88.

³⁷⁵ P. K., "The Census of the Russian Empire," pp. 657-658.

³⁷⁶ Dixon, "Central Asia and the Steppe" (14 October 1918), pp. 9-10.

numbering between 4,000 and 7,000, although these numbers did not probably include the illegal pilgrims from the empire.³⁷⁷

Interestingly, among the Muslims population of Central Asia the townsmen were regarded to be more fanatical in term of religion, since they, contrary to the nomads and rural inhabitants, “had ‘absorbed’ the spirit of this [Muslim] faith, have organized their lives around the general type of Muslim life and observe the moral code of the Shari’a.”³⁷⁸ As Annette M. B. Meakin notes in her travelogue through Russian Turkestan, the Kazakhs are “the least fanatical of all the Prophet’s followers,” however, she suggests that the reason of this frivolity might be the fact that “they can neither read nor write, nor worship in a mosque except when they come into towns,” although she find their private life definitely more moral than that of the Sarts.³⁷⁹

Although the Steppe region and the north of Turkestan are associated with nomadic lifestyle, the nomads still made up a sizeable part of the population of southern khanates. According to a travel report by the Imperial Russian Geographic Society carried out in 1850, the proportion of sedentary and nomadic population of the Khanate of Khiva amounted to 53,000 and 20,500 households [*kibitok*] respectively,

³⁷⁷ Daniel Brower, “Russian Roads to Mecca: Religious Tolerance and Muslim Pilgrimage in the Russian Empire,” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Autumn 1996), p. 571.

³⁷⁸ Daniel Brower, “Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan,” in *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*, eds. Brower and Lazzerini, p. 122.

³⁷⁹ Annette M. B. Meakin, *In Russian Turkestan: A Garden of Asia and Its People* (New York and London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1915), p. 231.

aggregating, according to the author, a total number of 294,000 persons.³⁸⁰ As for Turkestan, by 1914, the civilian population amounted to 7,061,500, out of which 5,861,500 were rural inhabitants and 1,200,000 were townsmen.³⁸¹ Already in 1897, the populations of the towns with sizeable Muslim population was led by Tashkent (156,506) and followed by Saratov (133,116), Kazan (131,508), Astrakhan (113,075) and Baku (112,253).³⁸²

In the meantime, between 1860s and 1880s, the ratio of the sedentary population in the region increased twofold from 30 to 60 percent and in 1870-80s, in order to encourage the sedentarization of the Kazakhs, the government even intended to allot them land on equal terms with Russians.³⁸³ Thus, it might have been the despair and inexperience of the newly sedentarized Kazakhs in the Ural region that astounded an Ottoman author, who, in addition to finding the Muslim agricultural lands in general in a state of neglect and scarcity compared to those of Russians, found Kazakh lands in the most desperate condition.³⁸⁴

The legal and administrative structure in the Muslim provinces of the Russian Empire also had certain peculiarities for the nomadic and sedentary population of the area. The nomadic population of the districts [*uezds*] consisted of *volosts*, which in

³⁸⁰ "Opisanie Khivinskogo Khanstva," *Zapiski imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva*, ed. P. G. Redkin, Book V (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del, 1851), p. 100.

³⁸¹ Marco Buttino, "Study of the Economic Crisis and Depopulation in Turkestan, 1917-1920," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1990), p. 64.

³⁸² P. K., "The Census of the Russian Empire," p. 658.

³⁸³ *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii*, p. 295.

³⁸⁴ "Rusya mektûbları," *İslâm Dünyâsı*, Year 1, No. 11, p. 174.

their turn consisted of *auls* represented by elders [*aul'nyi starshina*] elected for three years, while the administrative and police powers among the sedentary population was represented by *aksakals* elected by the local population and approved by the governor of the *oblast'* for three years.³⁸⁵ One out of two deputies of the uezd head [*uezdnyi nachal'nik*], who maintained both the public-administrative and military affairs, was appointed among the indigenous population.³⁸⁶

At the time of the introduction of the constitutional regime in the Russian Empire, the non-Russian and predominantly Muslim population of the Urals region amounted to 62 percent in the Ufa *guberniia*, 30 percent in the Orenburg *guberniia* and 23 percent in the Viatka *guberniia*, although thanks to the strong political organization and awareness the Muslim population of the area succeeded to dominate the Duma elections, so that after the Second State Duma elections ten out of thirteen liberal deputies from the Urals were members of the liberal *İttifâk al-muslimîn* Party.³⁸⁷ Nevertheless, as an Ottoman author noticed, according to the Russian electoral law the number of the Muslims deputies in Russian State Duma should have been 57 for the population of 25 millions compared to the actual number of seven deputies, while the Poles with a population of nine millions were represented by 18 deputies.³⁸⁸ On the other hand, being adhered to absolutely

³⁸⁵ *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii*, pp. 290-291.

³⁸⁶ Kostenko, *Sredniaia Aziia i vodvorenii v nei russkoi grazhdanstvennosti*, pp. 32-33.

³⁸⁷ Sidorenko, "Ural'skie deputaty Gosudarstvennoi dумы (1906-1917)," p. 92.

³⁸⁸ "Rusya mektûbları," *İslâm Dünyası*, Year 1, No. 11, p. 173.

opposite views on the matter, the prominent Russian nationalist publicists Mikhail Men'shikov stated:³⁸⁹

I consider as a tremendous mistake the admission of the representatives of other tribes [*plemen*] to the Russian Parliament. The parliament is a temple of legislation, so, as in a temple, there ought to be one national confession, one political belief. As in the temple only one God is avowed, so the parliament is inherent to one master, one nation and one rule.

As for the year 1911, the overall native population of Central Asia formed 81.2 percent, with the mainly Russian newcomers already forming 18.8 percent, although the percentage of Russian among in the Steppe was 32.9 percent compared to 3.8 percent of them in Turkestan.³⁹⁰ However, following the extension of the railway networks in the late 19th – early 20th centuries and the agrarian reforms, the Russian population of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Siberia rapidly increased. As Prime Minister Petr Stolypin had noted in his report on a tour through Siberia, “after 300 years of our rule in Siberia the Russian population there amounted only to 4.5 million, while for the last 15 years about 3 million arrived straight away, of which more than 1.5 million in the course of three year during 1907-1909.”³⁹¹

At the time of the outburst of the First World War, the population of Central Asia amounted to 15,329,000, out of which 7,062,000 inhabited Turkestan, 4,467,000 the borders of the later Kazakhstan, while the populations of Bukhara and Khiva were

³⁸⁹ M. N. Luk'ianov, “‘Rossia – dlia russkikh’ ili ‘Rossiia – dlia russkikh poddanykh’? Konservatory i natsional’nyi vopros nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny,” *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, No. 2 (March-April 2006), p. 37.

³⁹⁰ Dixon, “Central Asia and the Steppe” (14 October 1918), p. 11.

³⁹¹ Liashchenko, *Istoriia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR*, 4th ed., Vol. 2, p. 271.

3,000,000 and 800,000 respectively.³⁹² As for the ethnic composition of the Turkestan *krai* at the time of the First World War, as derived from the all-Russian census of 1917 and data by provincial statistical committees, Kh. Tursunov presents the following table.³⁹³

Nationalities and ethnic groups	Total in the <i>krai</i>	
	number	percentage
Uzbeks	2,347,491	39.2
Kazakhs	1,166,790	19.5
Kirghiz	809,524	13.5
Tajiks	437,656	7.3
Turkmen	295,914	4.9
Karakalpaks	77,825	1.3
Uighurs	63,465	1
Russians	542,509	9.1
...	...	...
Others	141,706	2.4
Total:	5,989,726	100

3.2.2 Islam and Society

Although, in regard to the lands east and south of the Russian mainland, the Russian state and Russians regarded themselves, almost without exception, superior to their culture and civilization, assuming commonly European civilizing mission towards them, the local population rarely regarded them as a superior and civilizing country. Similarly, up until 20th century, Russia was in the eyes of Chinese an inferior and barbarous country that would pose no real threat to China and whose representatives

³⁹² Buttino, "Study of the Economic Crisis and Depopulation in Turkestan, 1917-1920," p. 69.

³⁹³ Tursunov, *Natsional'naiia politika Kommunisticheskoi Partii v Turkestane (1917-1924 gg.)*, p. 18.

to the Celestial court had to bow to the emperor.³⁹⁴ Therefore, as was claimed, it was the superiority of the Sarts of the Ferghana province in agricultural and business skills, as well as sobriety, vis-à-vis the Russian peasant or merchant that discomforted the government to plant colonies among them.³⁹⁵

The Ottomans also noticed the advanced commercial skills of the inhabitants of certain areas like Ferghana, Syr Darya, Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva, and the prosperity and commercial progress provided there. They seemed somewhat fascinated while describing the cars and wagons driving all over the area, gramophones in *chaykhânas*, circus at the marketplace, telephones in the houses of the rich and were even excited about the blue-eyed Russian blondes that settled in their cities, but despite all these progressive events the ideas and thoughts of the local population seemed extremely outmoded even for a not very adventurous Ottoman.³⁹⁶

Despite the widespread representation in the Ottoman press on the opposition of the Central Asian Muslims to Russia, a certain part of the Muslim population had welcomed the Russian annexation and establishment of the Russian administration. Moreover, some of the wealthiest Muslim merchants maintained contact with the

³⁹⁴ David MacKenzie, *Imperial Dreams, Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917* (Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), p. 100.

³⁹⁵ Hubbard, "Russia as a Civilizing Force in Asia," p. 202.

³⁹⁶ "Türkistân'ın Hâli," *İslâm Dünyası*, Year 1, No. 12, p. 189.

Russian State prior to the annexation of Central Asia.³⁹⁷ Consequently, as Ismail Gasprinsky had claimed, the Muslims in the Russian Empire, except only the nomadic Kazakhs, were in fact growing richer, rather than otherwise.³⁹⁸ In fact, along with his prudence in pleasing the Russian readers or, probably, in avoiding the imposition of censorship by Tsarist authorities, Ismail Gasprinsky had an impeccable reputation among the Ottomans, as was duly reflected in his “great struggle that did not leave any ravings of Russian newspapers hostile to Islam unanswered.”³⁹⁹

Interestingly, the news on the financial success or commercial endeavors of the Russian Muslims in the Ottoman press could be encountered as often as the news of Tsarist oppression of the Russian Muslim and Turkish population. At times, in fact, it is difficult to figure out the real nature of the publication: whether it is an advertisement, information on the banks and financial organizations with Muslim funding and capital or simply elucidation of the life of Muslim community in the Russian Empire. For instance, an article on a Muslim bank in Ganja published in *İslâm Mecmû'ası* presented a detailed report on the Board of Directors, as well as data on annual transactions and dividends.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁷ Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 67.

³⁹⁸ Ismail Gasprinsky, “Russko-Vostochnoe soglashenie: Mysli, zametki i pozhelaniia Ismaila Gasprinskogo,” in Ismail Bey Gasprinsky, *Rossiia i Vostok* (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1993), p. 65.

³⁹⁹ “Dilde, Fikirde, İşde Birlik,” *Kırım Mecmû'ası*, Year 1, No. 3, p. 44.

⁴⁰⁰ “İslâm Bankası,” *İslâm Mecmû'ası*, No. 13 (7 Ramadan 1332) [1914], p. 30.

The activities of local Islamic societies or charitable organizations [*cem'iyet-i hayriyye*] were thoroughly reported in the Ottoman journals, which was not only confined to big cities like Moscow or St. Petersburg,⁴⁰¹ or cities within Muslim-populated areas like Simferopol [Aq Mescid]⁴⁰² and Bakhchisaray,⁴⁰³ but even covered cities with minor Muslim community like Arkhangelsk.⁴⁰⁴ Besides, recreational activities and entertainment style of the Russian Muslims such as theatrical performances and cultural evenings all around the Russian Empire were also a matter of intense interest by the Ottoman press.⁴⁰⁵

During the reign of Catherine II, following the edict of the Holy Synod of 1773 which urged the tolerance between the followers of any religion, the religious directorate of the Muslims was formed for the first time in the Russian Empire to be located in Ufa and later in Orenburg and was officially entitled “The Spiritual Assembly of the Mohammedan Law” [*Dukhovnoe magometanskogo zakona sobranie*], that after 1788 became known as the Orenburg Mohammedan Religious Assembly [*Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie*] and referred in Ottoman as *Teşkilât-i ruhâniye* or often simply as *Orenburg müftiliği*.⁴⁰⁶ This institution was responsible for the regulation of the communal life of the Russian Muslims and dealt with certain issues like the appointment of clergymen,

⁴⁰¹ “Rusya Müslümânlarında Cemiyet Hayâtı,” *İslâm Dünyâsı*, Year 1, No. 7[?], p. 111.

⁴⁰² “Aq Mescid Cem’iyyet-i Hayriyyesinin Bir Teşebbüsü,” *İslâm Dünyâsı*, Year 1, No. 20, p. 319.

⁴⁰³ “Bağçesaray’daki Millî Müessesesi,” *Kırım Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 4, pp. 61-65.

⁴⁰⁴ “Arhanjel Cem’iyyet-i Hayriyye,” *İslâm Dünyâsı*, Year 1, No. [7?], p. 112.

⁴⁰⁵ “Petersburg’da Şark Gecesi,” *İctihâd*, No. 43 (15 Mart 1328), p. 1040.

⁴⁰⁶ See, for instance, *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (10 Eylül 1331), p. 11; and *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (24 Eylül 1331) [1915], p. 22.

registration of birth and death, and marital matters.⁴⁰⁷ The Edict of the ‘Toleration of All Faiths’ issued by the Holy Synod on behalf of the Empress was noted to be a response specifically to the Muslim discontent with the restrictions on mosque construction.⁴⁰⁸ Although considered quite restricted, the religious rights of the Muslims of the Russian Empire, or, rather, their quasi-autonomy [*bir nev’-i muhtâriyeti*] on certain marital, legal and spiritual matters, as well as on religious education and administration was already noticed in the Ottoman press.⁴⁰⁹

Despite the general fuss over the establishment of Russian-indigenous schools [*russko-tuzemnye shkoly*] in Turkestan, their overall number for almost twenty years of existence between 1886 and 1905 was only 83 and by 1911 it reached only 89, while already in 1886, the directive of the governor-general Rozenbakh [Rosenbach] stipulated the teaching of Islam in these schools by indigenous mullahs.⁴¹⁰ As for local religious education, S. Gramenitsky had noticed in his *Indigenous Education in Turkestanskii Krai* that “the Muslim religion is hostile to development, although it does not forbid attending schools, where the male young generation learns to hate infidels from one’s youth and does not learn anything but reading.”⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁷ Abdulatipov, *Sud’by islama v Rossii: Istoriia i perspektivy*, p. 120.

⁴⁰⁸ Fisher, “Enlightened Despotism and Islam Under Catherine II,” p. 545.

⁴⁰⁹ “Rusya’da Sâkin Müslümânların Mahalle ve Müftülük Teşkilâtı,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (10 Eylül 1331) [1915], p. 11.

⁴¹⁰ Liutsian Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Antireligioznoe Izdatel’stvo, 1936), p. 71.

⁴¹¹ S. Gramenitsky, *Inorodcheskoe obrazovanie v Turkestanskom krae* [n. p.: 1900], p. 6.

Interestingly, the final aim of the Russian education in the Muslim areas of the empire might not have been the *complete* Russification of the local population, since even Nikolai Il'minsky, the prominent Turkic philologist and inspirer of the policy of Russification among Turkic peoples of the empire, wrote in 1885 to his fellow confederate Konstantin Pobedonostsev, the Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, that⁴¹²

[H]e would like that a Tatar, even the one who received Russian education, would remain a complete nonentity, that he would become entangled 'in the Russian speech' and blush [for shame], would write in Russian with a considerable amount of mistakes and would be frightened not only of the governor, but of any desk-keeper and the like.

Thus, as Lord Curzon claims, the Russian rule left the system of Muslim indigenous education and its *maktabs* and *madrasas* untouched and did not intend to elevate the level of their intellectual development, so that they kept on their "senseless lessons by rote, and their falsified philosophy."⁴¹³ According to the census of 1897, the rate of illiteracy among the Central Asian peoples was extremely low, namely: Uzbeks (96.4 percent), Tajiks (99.5 percent), Kirghiz (99.4 percent), Turkmen (99.3 percent) and Kazakhs (97.9 percent).⁴¹⁴ For reference, the illiteracy level among the Egyptian of about the same period was 90.1 for men and 99.4 for women.⁴¹⁵ Therefore, while criticizing the intellectual backwardness of the population of Southern Turkestan, even an Ottoman author felt obliged to note that for over a half century of Russian

⁴¹² Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii*, p. 72.

⁴¹³ Curzon, *Russia and Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question*, p. 394.

⁴¹⁴ Z. D. Kastel'skaia, *Iz istorii Turkestanskogo kraia* (Moscow: 1980); cited by *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii*, p. 296.

⁴¹⁵ Zwemer, "A New Census of the Muslim World," p. 33.

rule out of a population of eight million, not even eight people with knowledge in modern science and accomplishments and aware of world events had been raised.⁴¹⁶

As a part of the program to bring adult educational programs in the provinces and countryside under the direct control of the provincial *zemstvos* in 1910, the Ufa province had built a network of 778 libraries managed by district *zemstvos*, twenty-six of which were non-Russian indigenous [*inorodcheskie*] libraries with Tatar-language books, mostly in Tatar and Bashkir villages and half of the twelve new libraries planned to be opened in 1914 by the Ufa *zemstvo* assembly were to be in Tatar and Bashkir villages.⁴¹⁷ Being accused of being covert Orthodox missionaries planning to proselytize the local Muslim population, the *zemstvo* libraries in non-Russian villages had to appeal to the consent of local mullahs, who would precede the lecture by the librarian with readings from the life of Prophet Muhammad.⁴¹⁸

As a sign of the Muslim revival in Russia, only within seven years, between 1853 and 1859, the newly emerging private Tatar printing houses had already printed 82,300 copies of Qur'an, 169,900 copies of its parts and 77,500 copies of handbooks on Islam.⁴¹⁹ According to a report in *İslâm mecmû'asi*, only within 1913, a total number of 567 titles was published in Russia in Muslim languages [*müslümânca*], out of which 267 were in Kazan [language], 94 in Azerbaijani, 93 in Kazakh

⁴¹⁶ "Türkistân'ın Hâli," *İslâm Dünyası*, Year 1, No. 12, p. 189.

⁴¹⁷ Scott J. Seregny, "Zemstvos, Peasants, and Citizenship: The Russian Adult Education Movement and the World War I," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 298, 300-301.

⁴¹⁸ Seregny, "Zemstvos, Peasants, and Citizenship: The Russian Adult Education Movement and the World War I," p. 303.

⁴¹⁹ Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii*, p. 68.

[*kazâkca*], 43 in Arabic and Ottoman, 35 in simplified Arabic and only one in Persian, Daghestani and some other languages and dialects.⁴²⁰ However, contrary to the impressive advance in religious publications and education in the Volga region, the qualifications and personal characters of the local imams and mullahs, at least in the areas with predominantly *kryashen* Muslim population, were found quite inadequate and unworthy by an Ottoman visitor.⁴²¹

On the other hand, the life and situation of the Muslim women in the Russian Empire was a matter of a certain concern in Ottoman periodicals, often having a trace of resentment, comparison and even admiration. The publications on and by women in the Ottoman press were not only a frequent event, but certain journals like *Hanımlara mahsûs gazete* were specifically devoted to women issues published not only in Ottoman Turkish, but also French, Russian, English, German and Arabic.⁴²² Some titles on the topic like “The Feminism Issue”⁴²³ that appeared in *Sebilü’r-Reşâd* were quite progressive for that period.

The Muslim women of the Russian Empire that made up twice of the number of Muslim women in the Ottoman Empire, were classified by an Ottoman journal according to their place and style of residence into nomadic, rural, urban and residents of the capital, adding that the lifestyle and conditions of the nomadic

⁴²⁰ “Müslümân Matbû’atı,” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 6, p. 191.

⁴²¹ “Rusya mektûbları,” *İslâm Dünyâsı*, Year 1, No. 11, p. 174.

⁴²² See “Müslümân Kadının Hürriyeti,” *Siyânet*, No. 2 (2 April [Nisân-i efrecî] 1914), pp. 6-7.

⁴²³ “Feminizm mes’alesi,” *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*, No. 197-15 (27 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1330) [1912], p. 278.

women is not much different from nomads elsewhere in the world.⁴²⁴ However, as Annette M. B. Meakin noted, “of all Mohammedan women, the Turkomans seem to enjoy the greatest freedom; they go where they like, unveiled, and mix freely with men from childhood onwards.”⁴²⁵

In the meantime, the Muslims of Kazan appealed to the religious council in Orenburg to legalize as a compulsory rule the following procedures for marriage: (1) the unconditional interdiction of marriage registration in case of maid’s reluctance, and (2) the requirement of ascertaining the healthy condition and absence of infectious diseases for both groom and bride at the time of marriage registration.⁴²⁶ Moreover, the appeal by two Muslim girls, Selîma Yakubova and Mahfûza Maksudova, that was scrutinized at a special council in St. Petersburg was even more elaborate and in addition to the two above-mentioned clauses stipulated holding the imam and parents of an under-age girl legally responsible for conducting a marriage and in case any of the sides did not fulfill the pledges and duties of marriage, the other side, whether bride or groom, could divorce without the spouse’s permission.⁴²⁷ Moreover, the permission for the Muslim women of Kazan to use the Kazan Islamic Library exclusively on their own for a few days a month attained with great endeavors was also mentioned as an achievement of the Muslim women of Russia.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁴ “Rusya’da Nisvân-i İslâm,” *Styânet*, No. 17 (16 July [Temmûz-i efencî] 1914), p. 5.

⁴²⁵ Meakin, *In Russian Turkestan*, p. 289.

⁴²⁶ “Kazan Müslümânlarının Bir Teşebbüsü,” *İslâm Dünyası*, Year 1, No. 12, p. 192.

⁴²⁷ “Nikâh Hakkında Bir Arîze,” *Türk Sözü*, Year 1, No. 16 (24 Temmûz 1330) [1914], pp. 125-126.

⁴²⁸ “Şimâl Türklerinde Terakkî Eserleri,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 5, (1329) [1912-1913], p. 1136.

The social and political composition of the Muslims of the Russian Empire and the role Islamic belief and traditions played in their lives differed in accordance with historical, geographic, social and economic peculiarities of the populations. Areas annexed to the Russian Empire earlier were naturally considered better adapted to the Russian society and legislature than those which were conquered recently and with great violence, especially those which were located at the edge of the empire and in direct proximity to other Muslim countries.

Thus, the Kazakhs, pastoral nomads inhabiting the Steppe region to the north of Turkestan, were noticed to have vague connections to the Turks as well as to Islam and Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist propaganda carried out by the Ottoman emissaries there had little effect among them.⁴²⁹ However, the devotion of the Russian Muslims might have been manifested in different (and, sometime, unexpected for an Ottoman Turk) ways, since those who did not visit mosques at all could have denounced the clothes of an Ottoman traveler for being blasphemous and infidel [*küffâr elbisesi*] and totally inappropriate for prayer.⁴³⁰

On the other hand, the personality and qualifications of Muhammedyâr Sultanov, the *muftî* of Orenburg appointed by the Tsarist Ministry of Interior who was implied to be an accomplice of Il'minsky by *Türk Yurdu*, was described as someone who received Russian military training without getting any Turkish-Islamic upbringing

⁴²⁹ Dixon, "Central Asia and the Steppe" (14 October 1918), p. 28.

⁴³⁰ H. Sâmî, "Rusya mektûbları," *İslâm Dünyası*, Year 1, No. 12, p. 187.

altogether.⁴³¹ The election and approval of the *muftîs* only by the members of the Russian Muslim community was frequently mentioned among the constant resentments of the Muslims of Russia.⁴³² Nevertheless, *Beyân-ul-Hak*, another Turkish journal, was somehow more benevolent towards Sultanov's deeds and upon the eighteenth anniversary of his service as a *muftî*, praised Sultanov *efendî*, the man of virtuous perfection [*erbâb-i fazl-i kemâl*], for his great efforts for the wellbeing of the Muslim community of Russia and for protecting it during the time of impending oppressions.⁴³³

One of the main subjects of the Ottomans' ardent involvement in the affairs of the Russian Muslim population became the struggle between the so-called Jadidists and Qadimists, whose confrontation well exceeded the geographic borders of the Russian Empire. The rivalry, or rather hatred, between the supporters of the new and old methods of education could not leave an Ottoman traveler in the Volga regions indifferent, especially since he had a chance to visit in person a Jadidist *husayniyye* school and Qadimist *Velî Mollâ* school, which excluded even arithmetic and geography from its syllabus. But what was the most astounding for an Ottoman idealist, the members of both groups did not even greet each other, which appeared to him as a sign of grave confrontation.⁴³⁴ Indeed, disparaging of personal relations was not the only way to clarify the matter and upon frequent appeals to the *muftî* of

⁴³¹ "Rusya'da Sâkin Müslümânların Mahalle ve Müftülük Teşkilâtı," *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (10 Eylül 1331), p. 13.

⁴³² *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (24 Eylül 1331) [1915], p. 23.

⁴³³ "Rusya 'Âlem-i İslâmında Bir Merâsim," *Beyân-ul-Hak*, Vol. 4, No. 94 (22 Muharram 1329) [1911], p. 1770-1771

⁴³⁴ H. Sâmî, "Rusya mektûbları," *İslâm Dünyâsı*, Year 1, No. 8, pp. 127-128.

Orenburg to provide the list of sciences and disciplines approved by Islam and permitted for the school program, a special joint commission had to gather even in St. Petersburg at the Department of Religious Affairs.⁴³⁵

Despite their struggle for the freedom of press and establishment of European-style secular schools, the initial target of the *jadîd* movement or the followers of the New Method [*usûl-i jadîd*], became the religious fanaticism that they intended to eradicate.⁴³⁶ Due to the prevalence of the Jadidists in the Ottoman press and social life or, more precisely, their manipulation of the Ottoman readership by involving it into “a black-and-white portrayal that reduced all aspects of Muslim life in Russia to a battle between the good jadidists and the evil qadimists,” generated a prejudice against everything directly or indirectly related to the supporters of the so-called Old Method [*usûl-i qadîm*] that also endured through the Republican Turkey.⁴³⁷

Along with the politics in the Russian Empire, the Central Asian Jadidists kept up closely with the development and politics of the Second Constitutional regime in the Ottoman Empire following the Young Turk revolution of 1908, however, ironically, they mainly sympathized with the Ottoman Islamists rather than Turkists, some of whom seemed in the eyes of Central Asians eager to repudiate Islam.⁴³⁸

⁴³⁵ “Rusyada Müslümânlarının Medrese ve Tahsîl İşleri,” *İslâm Dünyası*, Year 1, No. 17, pp. 267-269.

⁴³⁶ Sarfraz Khan, *Muslim Reformist Political Thought: Revivalists, Modernists and Free Will* (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 98.

⁴³⁷ Volker Adam, “Ottoman Perception of Muslim Life in Russia and Central Asia,” in *Looking at the Coloniser: Cross-Cultural Perceptions in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Bengal, and Related Areas*, eds. Beate Eschment and Hans Harder (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2004), pp. 303-304.

⁴³⁸ Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*, pp. 110-111, 113.

The aversion to the supporters of the *usûl-i qadîm* in the Ottoman press was so evident that a short report on a local conflict in Bukhara mentioned in the “News from the Muslim World” section of *İslâm Mecnû’ası* was overloaded with epithets whose partiality is beyond any doubt. Thus, a certain Dâmlâ Akrâm, whose title of *mufîî* was taken upon his conflict with conservatives, was restored to his post by ‘open-minded’ *qâdî kalân*, the local *shaykh al-islâm*, so “the modernist youth of Bukhara received their knowledgeable, self-sacrificing, as well as influential teachers” and returned to their *madrassa*, which for a while fell under the control of “bigoted fanatics, immoral ones and robbers” [*yobâzlar, ahlâksızlar, akıncılar*].⁴³⁹ However, there were instances, although very rarely, when the conservative ‘*ulemâ*’ of Turkestan was presented in positive light, as was the case with their attempts of taking measures to restrain alcoholism, constantly increasing among the region’s Muslim population.⁴⁴⁰

While presenting the news about the establishment of a *Shî’a* high school [*mekteb-i ‘âlî*] in the Tiflis province, whose graduates would receive the certificates of the scholarly rank of *âhûndluk* and *imâmlık*, even the traditionally conservative *İslâm Mecnû’ası* had praised the modern syllabus of the school, whose students would be knowledgeable not only in Islamic science, but also in modern science, since along

⁴³⁹ “Buhârâ,” *İslâm Mecnû’ası*, Year 1, No. 2 [Şubât 1329] [1914], pp. 63-64.

⁴⁴⁰ “Türkistânda ‘İşret ve Fuḥş’ Aleyhinde Tedâbir,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 6, No. 9 (26 Hazirân 1330) [1914], p. 288.

with religion, they would be trained in natural sciences [*fünûn*], modern sciences [*'ulûm-i cedide*] and Russian language.⁴⁴¹

3.3 BETWEEN TSAR AND CALIPH

3.3.1 Political Islam and the Muslims of the Russian Empire

While describing propaganda, which at the time of the First World War obtained an ambivalent feature of being claimed to be an actual cause and at the same time the product of the war, George Sylvester Viereck asserted that propaganda “is a campaign camouflaging its origin, its motives or both, conducted for the purpose of obtaining a specific objective by the manipulation of public opinion.”⁴⁴² Nevertheless, the very entrance of the term *propaganda* into political lexicon was directly related to religion and missionary activities in foreign lands, since the establishment of *Congregatio de propaganda fide* by Pope Gregory XV in 1622 “to spread Catholic doctrines in non-Christian lands,” followed by *collegium de propaganda* liable for the training of missionaries.⁴⁴³

Whether Pan-Islamists or Pan-Turkist, their activities were always regarded by the Russian Government as the clandestine influence and intrigue of the Ottoman

⁴⁴¹ *İslâm Mecmû'ası*, No. 13 (7 Ramadan 1332) [1914], pp. 29-30.

⁴⁴² George Creel, “Propaganda and Morale,” *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (November 1941), p. 342.

⁴⁴³ Erwin W. Fellows, “‘Propaganda’: History of a Word,” *American Speech*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (October 1959), p. 182.

Empire, as was abundantly reflected in police reports or speeches of Russian politicians and activists.⁴⁴⁴ Already in the 18th century, the active participation of the local Muslim population in the revolt of 1755 and the Pugachev revolt, which often intertwined with religious fanaticism, was considered by the government as a result of the instigation of the foreign *mullahs*, primarily from the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁴⁵ As was mentioned by a Russian author in 1900, the predilection for everything Ottoman or non-Russian in local *madrasas* and *maktabs* was so obvious that even the books in Arabic script printed in Russia aroused suspicion and the Istanbul and Bombay editions were always preferred.⁴⁴⁶ Therefore, a *sadâret tezkire* issued by the Ottoman Grand Vizier in 1906 stipulated the dispatch of 500 sets of various Ottoman printing letter types to the Muslims of the Russian Empire to be used for printing educational material in Muslim schools.⁴⁴⁷

According to Adeeb Khalid, the strengthening of Pan-Islamic sentiments in Central Asia grounded not on local religious fanaticism or manipulations by the Ottoman emissaries, but on “Muslim elites’ encounter with modernity.”⁴⁴⁸ Thus, the dominating Muslim religious elite of the Russian Empire were yearning to get the governmental support and appreciation in their struggle against Islamic reformist forces. In a letter sent to Prime Minister Stolypin, an influential group among the

⁴⁴⁴ A. Arsharuni and H. Gabidullin, *Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo “Bezbozhnik,” 1931), p. 13.

⁴⁴⁵ Fisher, “Enlightened Despotism and Islam Under Catherine II,” p. 550; and Abdulatipov, *Sud'by islama v Rossii: Istorii i perspektivy*, p. 120.

⁴⁴⁶ Gramenitsky, *Inorodcheskoe obrazovanie v Turkestanskoy krae*, p. 18.

⁴⁴⁷ BA, *Yıldız Sadâret Resmî Maruzatı*, No. 138/27 in *Osmanlı Devleti ile Kafkasya, Türkistan ve Kırım Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münâsebetlere Dair Arşiv Belgeleri (1687-1908 Yılları Arası)* (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1992), pp. 190-191, appendix 118.

⁴⁴⁸ Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*, p. 194.

Muslim clergy stated that at the disposal of the Muslim clergy, Islam was a weapon directed at anything revolutionary.⁴⁴⁹ Whatever might have been uttered or intended, religion played a very important, if not decisive, role in the formation of the Russian imperial ideology and identity and often became the key factor for the Muslim population of the Russian Empire behind their association and affiliation with the Ottomans and the Sultan being their spiritual leader.⁴⁵⁰

Although the essence of *ittihâd-i islâm* is claimed to be “an attempt to utilize the bonds of Islamic faith as a kind of substitute for nationalism to unite all of the Muslim subjects within the Ottoman empire under the Ottoman sultan, and to cause difficulties to the European colonial regimes by dividing the loyalties of their Muslim subject populations outside the empire,”⁴⁵¹ not only did the Pan-Islamic ideology of that time draw on “traditional Islamic loyalties, but also on nascent anti-imperialist and protonationalist sentiments,” and thus had “more resemblance to modern nationalist movements than to older Islamic feelings.”⁴⁵²

As G. Wyman Bury notes, Pan-Islam “is a movement to weld together Moslems throughout the world *regardless of nationality*,” and what is more, it is a practical movement beyond spirituality as well as a “working proposition which has to be

⁴⁴⁹ Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii*, pp. 84, 86.

⁴⁵⁰ Austin Lee Jersild, “From Savagery to Citizenship: Caucasian Mountaineers and Muslims in the Russian Empire,” in *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*, eds. Daniel R. Brower and Edward Lazzerini (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 102.

⁴⁵¹ Edmund Burke, “Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900-1912,” *Journal of African History*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1972), p. 98.

⁴⁵² Nikki R. Keddie, “Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism,” *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 1969), p. 18.

reckoned with when dealing with Moslems even in secular matters.”⁴⁵³ In the context of the Muslim community of Russia, Kemal H. Karpat’s statement that Pan-Islamism, along with Pan-Turkism, “constituted a modern, national, and secular process of identity formation,”⁴⁵⁴ might be considered as an approximate conclusion of the two preceding statements. However, for some Ottoman writers of the period, the two essential parts of the above sentence – modern and national – were not always on the same side of a dilemma, or, at least, was presented so, since ‘nationalization’ [*millîleşmek*] and ‘Europeanization’ [*Avrupalaşmak*] were defined as absolutely opposite ideological trends.⁴⁵⁵

In this respect, the *Shî’a* - *Sunnî* division played a minor role in Pan-Islamic ideology, although, being prevailingly *Sunnî*, there were certain sizeable *Shî’a* enclaves not only in the Caucasus, but also in Turkestan, since, according to an official Russian report of 1850, the *Sunnî* - *Shî’a* ratio in the Khanate of Khiva was 58,500 and 15,000 household respectively.⁴⁵⁶ However, while describing a bloody *Shî’a* - *Sunnî* conflict in Bukhara in 1910 whose further exacerbation by ending up in mutual throat slitting was prevented only by the *Russian* army interference, the Ottoman *Hikmet* had nevertheless noticed that despite the will and capabilities, it

⁴⁵³ G. Wyman Bury, *Pan-Islam* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1919), p. 12 [emphasis added].

⁴⁵⁴ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 68.

⁴⁵⁵ Sâmî zâde, “Millîleşmek ve Avrupalaşmak,” *İslâm Dünyâsı*, Year 1, No. 24, p. 389.

⁴⁵⁶ “Opisanie Khivinskogo Khanstva,” *Zapiski imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva*, p. 100.

would be problematic for the Ottoman Empire to interfere even at humanitarian level since the Russian government, which controls the area, simply would not allow.⁴⁵⁷

In any case, despite complex political intrigues and ethno-tribal rivalries, the compassion and solidarity between the Muslims of the Russian Empire, as with the Muslims from some other parts of the world, were always evident and could be seen in their diurnal concerns and complaints. Therefore, the Russians and the Tsar were often described as untrustworthy infidels as could be seen in the letter of the Crimean Khan to ‘Âdil Girây, the *shâmkhâl* of Daghestan, sent at the time of the Russian advance there and urging the latter “not to trust the words of the infidel Muscovites, but instead to rally all the Muslims against the infidels for the sake of Islam.”⁴⁵⁸

Similarly to Pan-Slavic ideology, the rise of Pan-Islamism in the Ottoman Empire was a response to the failure of the *Tanzîmât* reforms that were associated with the European political and economic expansion as well as a counteraction to the rise of Pan-Slavism among the Slavic peoples of the empire and seemed much more acceptable in the minds of the Ottomans than the idea of Ottomanism that propagated the obnoxious idea of unity and equality among the Muslims and

⁴⁵⁷ “Buhârâ ve Asyâ-i vustâ,” *Hikmet*, No. 1 (11 Rabî’ al-Âkhir 1328) [1910], p. 6.

⁴⁵⁸ *Russko-dagestanskii otnosheniia 17 – pervoi poloviny 18 vv. Dokumenty i materialy* (Makhachkala: 1958), pp. 261-262, cited by Khodarkovsky, “Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russia in the North Caucasus, 1550-1800,” p. 411.

‘infidels’.⁴⁵⁹ As Feroz Ahmad notices, although intertwined with a strong Islamic spirit, the anti-Western movement of Sultan Abdülhamid II was not reactionary but anti-imperialist by nature and emerged as a reaction to the European domination over the Islamic world.⁴⁶⁰ Moreover, the term Pan-Islamism itself is claimed to be of non-Muslim origin and used as a counterpart of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism.⁴⁶¹ As an Ottoman author complaining about the indisputable dominance of the Western ideas and power exclaimed: “in which question of the universal history we, the current inhabitants of the Islamic East, did succeed in defining our own point of view!”⁴⁶²

Since, as Nikkie R. Keddie notes, the rise of Pan-Islamic ideas in or outside the Ottoman Empire was greatly triggered by European conquests, the first appeals for the Caliph logically came at the time of the British occupation of India and Russian advance in Central Asia, while the Ottomans, on the other hand, resorted to active Pan-Islamism during the Russo-Turkish wars, the French occupation of Tunisia and the British occupation of Egypt.⁴⁶³ Whether inspired and instigated by the aspirations of the Ottoman Empire, the Islamic revivalist endeavor by the *Wahhâbîs*, or the West itself, as Hans Kohn claims, the emergence of the Pan-Islamic

⁴⁵⁹ I. L. Fadeeva, *Ofitsial'nye doktriny i politike Osmanskoi imperii (Osmanizm-Panislamizm): XIX – nachalo XX v.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo “Nauka,” 1985), pp. 104, 106.

⁴⁶⁰ Feroz Ahmad, “The Late Ottoman Empire,” in *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1996), p. 11.

⁴⁶¹ Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 2.

⁴⁶² “Garb Nazârında Şark Mes’eleşi,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 11, No. 7 (24 Teşrîn-i sâni 1332) [1916], p. 99.

⁴⁶³ Nikkie R. Keddie, “The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1966), p. 48.

movement was certainly an attempt to withstand the assaults of the European Powers.⁴⁶⁴

The rise of Pan-Islamism or, more precisely, the application of Pan-Islamic ideas in the Ottoman policies during the reign of Abdülhamid II was claimed to be a covert policy of counteraction against the rise of Russification and Pan-Slavism⁴⁶⁵ and thus it never drifted apart from Russia and its Muslim population. Furthermore, the question of the Ottoman claims to protect the Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire were raised in response to the Russian claims to protect the Ottoman Christians, which were documented in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774.⁴⁶⁶ As is noted, the first aspect of the caliphal claims of the sultans was the request to add an article to the treaty on the right of the sultan to appoint the *qâdî* of Crimea.⁴⁶⁷

It is also interesting to note that during their study and stay in Russia the two prominent figures and inspirers of Pan-Islamism, Ismail Gasprinsky and Jamal al-Dîn al-Afghânî, not only had encountered Russian Pan-Slavic thought, but had personal opportunities to get involved into it in one way or another. While the young Gasprinsky had spent a summer in the family circle of Mikhail Katkov, al-Afghânî,

⁴⁶⁴ Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929), p. 38.

⁴⁶⁵ Selim Deringil, "The Ottoman Empire and Russian Muslims: Brothers or Rivals," in *The Ottomans, the Turks, and World Power Politics: Collected Essays*, ed. Selim Deringil (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2000), p. 74.

⁴⁶⁶ Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," p. 19.

⁴⁶⁷ Fadeeva, *Ofitsial'nye doktriny v ideologii i politike Osmanskoi imperii (Osmanizm-Panislamizm)*, pp. 140-141.

escaping from British persecution, was planning to excite the Muslims of India in cooperation with Slavophiles during his stay in St. Petersburg.⁴⁶⁸

Already in April 1877 following the outburst of the recurrent Russo-Turkish war, the Ottoman Sultan in the capacity of the Caliph started sending appeals for aid to the Muslims outside the empire as a response to the nationalistic and crusading sentiment of the Russian propaganda, while his mission to Afghanistan in autumn of the same year intended to convince the Muslim states to act against Russia and even to create a Muslim League, hoping for its help in defeating Russia and urge upon Islamic solidarity, so that a mullah was preferred to lead his mission to Afghanistan.⁴⁶⁹

Thus, an appeal sent to the Ottoman Sultan by the Foreign Ministry in July 1877 to set up measures to deter Shîr ‘Alî, the Amîr of Afghanistan, from serving Russian rapacious and expansionist plans to capture most of the Muslim peoples by threatening British positions in India, urges the Sultan to send a worthy and appropriate envoy and carry out adjustments that would undermine Russian intrigues and seditious acts [*Rusyaluların mevâ'id ü mefâsidini hükümsüz bırakdıracak tedbîrler iltizâm olunur ise*] in Afghanistan.⁴⁷⁰ In addition to incessant hints at

⁴⁶⁸ N. P. Goroshkov, "İsmail Gasprinsky, dzhaddidy i pantiurkizm," in *Istoricheskie zapiski*, Vol. 4 (Voronezh: Izdatel'stvo Voronezhskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1999), pp. 122-123.

⁴⁶⁹ Dwight E. Lee, "A Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, 1877," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 13 (March-December 1941), pp. 335-336, 350-351, 353.

⁴⁷⁰ BA, *Îrâde-Hâriciye*, No. 16642/3 in *Osmanlı Devleti ile Kafkasya, Türkistan ve Kırım Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münâsebetlere Dair Arşiv Belgeleri (1687-1908 Yılları Arası)* (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1992), pp. 146-147, appendix 90.

British interests in the region and proper gifts to be presented to the family members of the Amîr, the document suggests the envoy to be from the ‘ulemâ and fluent in Persian language [*ricâl-i ilmiyyeden olması ve lisân-ı fârisî’yi bilmesi*].

At the same time, Central Asia was also claimed to be the place of the emergence of Pan-Islamic ideology aiming at withstanding the British and Tsarist advances in Afghanistan and Central Asia respectively and the Khan of Khokand Khudâyâr was named among the first leaders of the movement.⁴⁷¹

In any case, every war in Southern Caucasus against the Russian troops immediately obtained religious shade and was propagated among the mountaineers as the holy war.⁴⁷² Eager to set up the theological basis for his newly propagated ideology, Sultan Abdülhamid II resorted to the writings and ideas of many prominent Muslim scholars of that time, one of whom was Sheikh Abu’l-Hudâ. The numerous writings of Abu’l-Hudâ were constructed around two main ideas: “defending the legitimacy of sultan Abdulhamid’s assumption of the Caliphate and calling upon the Muslims to rally behind him and be submissive to him,” and that “unqualified obedience to the Caliph was a basic duty in Islam.”⁴⁷³

As was often the case for the Pan-Islamic propaganda by the Ottoman press, whether overt or concealed, the religious and theological themes and argumentation played

⁴⁷¹ Fadeeva, *Ofitsial'nye doktriny i politike Osmanskoi imperii*, p. 135.

⁴⁷² *Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East*, p. 74.

⁴⁷³ B. Abu-Manneh, “Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1979), pp. 140-141.

an important role. Thus, a series of post-Balkan War articles in the Ottoman *el-Medâris*, urging for the unity of Islam and support of the Muslims from outside the empire, did not resort to traditional Islamic conceptions, but duly reflected the urgency in their article titles like ‘Muslims, Wake Up!’, ‘Unity and Islam’, or ‘Muslims, Open Your Eyes!’.⁴⁷⁴

The emerging interest of the Ottoman Sultans in the support of the Indian Muslims that in its turn induced them to take up their spiritual leadership over all the Muslims as Caliphs was duly stimulated by their importance as represented in their great number and the temptation of financial support, while the Muslims of India in their turn did not only regard the Ottoman Empire as the sole independent Muslim state, but their Mughal past had linked them to the common Central Asian heritage, just like it did for the Ottoman dynasty.⁴⁷⁵ The appeal for financial aid from the Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire also seems to be a crucial element of the Pan-Islamist idea and was duly employed in the letters of Jamal al-Dîn al-Afghânî to the Ottoman Sultan, where he urges that he would “call all the Muslims of India to contribute money” through the eloquent ‘*ulamâ*’ dispatched to distant cities.⁴⁷⁶

Thus, one of the principal appanages of the Ottoman Sultan’s caliphal rights and protection over the Muslims around the world became the provision of refuge to immigrants from Muslim lands captured and annexed by the infidels. Following the

⁴⁷⁴ See *el-Medâris*, Nos. 1-14 (Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira – Ramadan 1331) [1913].

⁴⁷⁵ Syed Tanvir Wasti, “The Political Aspirations of Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Nexus,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 5 (September 2006), p. 709. 711.

⁴⁷⁶ Keddie, “The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid,” p. 57.

rapid advance of the Russian forces into the Caucasus and owing to the proximity of the region to the Ottoman borders, the outflow of a great number of mountaineers, mainly Adighes and Abaza, became an indispensable part of the caliphal duties. Although, their flight to the Ottoman lands is not considered as a direct forcible act by the Russian government since it allotted for them up to 1,500,000 *desiatinas* of land, though not as valuable as their previous possessions, it is well known that the Tsarist government did not try to hold them and even encouraged their migration, so that for their transportation the ship-owners were receiving payment both from the government and the migrants themselves.⁴⁷⁷

On the other hand, being “eager to strengthen its Muslim element,” the Ottoman Government, allowed and even encouraged the immigration of Muslim peoples from the Caucasus, Crimea and South-Eastern Europe, attracting them to the unpopulated provinces of the empire by allotting them land exempt from taxation, especially following the unsuccessful wars, and what is more striking, they claimed to enjoy comfort and lifestyle “unknown to the Turkish peasants.”⁴⁷⁸

According to Classical Islamic jurisprudence, any territory of *dâr al-islâm* [the Land of Islam] automatically becomes *dâr al-harb* [the Land of War], as soon as it is reconquered by the non-Muslims, as is the case for the Muslim lands of the Russian Empire, and thus subject to *jihâd*, or the holy war, and the voluntary residence of a

⁴⁷⁷ *Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v. – 1917 g.)*, 203.

⁴⁷⁸ Leon Dominian, “The Peoples of Northern and Central Asiatic Turkey,” *Bulletin of the American Geographic Society*, Vol. 47, No. 11 (1915), p. 842; and Fadeeva, *Ofitsial'nye doktriny v ideologii i politike Osmanskoi imperii*, p. 115.

Muslim in *dâr al-harb* is prohibited by the Islamic law. However, the legal status of the Muslim territories in the Russian Empire may represent an intricate and complicated matter, since one of the generally accepted conditions of this transformation is the replacement of the Islamic law by that of the unbelievers,⁴⁷⁹ which is not a uniform and clear-cut situation here.

It also seems like the Islamic law and its interpretations concerning residence in an enemy country are even more complicated since, as seen from the *fatwâ* by Imam al-Mazari, who set the exceptions for residence in *dâr al-harb* as “sojourn in an enemy country for an imperative reason; voluntary sojourn in ignorance of the fact that the sojourn is forbidden; and the sojourn in an enemy territory hoping to snatch it from the occupying force and return it to the Muslims,” adding that the probity of a Muslim judge nominated even by a non-Muslim ruler cannot be attacked.⁴⁸⁰

On the other hand, a more mundane and utilitarian explanations for the emergence of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism were also uttered, one of which connected their rise with Russian conquest of Turkestan and misgivings of Tatar commercial capital, which lost their monopolistic access to its markets after the establishment of Tsarist administration there and simply turned into a trade competitor with its Russian counterpart.⁴⁸¹

⁴⁷⁹ “DÂR al-HARB,” *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, eds. B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat and J. Schachts, Vol. 2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), p. 126.

⁴⁸⁰ Sami A. Adeeb Abu-Sahlieh, “The Islamic Conception of Migration,” *International Migration Review*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 46.

⁴⁸¹ Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii*, p. 8.

As a measure to prevent the spread of Tatar influence in Central Asia, the Tsarist government issued a decree in 1886 that forbade non-Christian newcomers purchasing land throughout Turkestan *krai*,⁴⁸² that is, to prevent the Tatars from purchasing real estate and establishing trading companies.⁴⁸³ Therefore, the assertion of a Soviet author that Pan-Islamism, “the political current with a religious slant,” emerged in the second half of the 19th century as a result of the penetration of capitalism to the East seems suitable from this perspective.⁴⁸⁴

However, as Stephen Graham mentions in his travel notes through Russian Central Asia in the 1910s, most of the traveling merchants who were selling tea, sugar, cotton and ironware were Tatars or Armenians.⁴⁸⁵ Interestingly, while presenting the anti-Ottoman statements of Fedor Dostoevsky, the Ottoman *Genç Kalemler* quotes an exemplary perception of that time, saying that “if we would take away the power and arms from their hands, the Turks would start selling their clothes and soap, just like the Kazan Tatars.”⁴⁸⁶

As for Russian Pan-Islamists, their political and social profile was by no means homogeneous and gathered both leftists and rightists. As a list of about 170 persons

⁴⁸² Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii*, p. 221.

⁴⁸³ Kurat, *Rusya Tarihi: Başlangıçtan 1917'ye Kadar*, p. 377.

⁴⁸⁴ Nigmat Sabitov, "Panislamizm i pantiurkizm na sluzhbe imperialisticheskoi reaktsii," *Vestnik AN KazSSR*, No. 7 (1951), p. 1.

⁴⁸⁵ Graham, *Through Russian Central Asia*, p. 125.

⁴⁸⁶ “Türk Düşmanlarından: Dostoyevski,” *Genç Kalemler*, Vol. 3, No. 19 (Nisân 1328) [1912], p. 163.

reckoned as Pan-Islamists in the documents of the Tsarist secret services during 1911-1913 reveals, their leftist wing was dominated by Jadidists comprised of petty bourgeois intelligentsia, while their rightist wing was dominated by representatives of the rich, nobles, clergymen and local administration.⁴⁸⁷ As was also claimed, the Tsarist aspirations to eradicate the power of local Muslim clergy by replacing their institutions with ones controlled by the government and by secularization and expropriation of the *waqf* properties facilitated their later turn into a radical revolutionary force.⁴⁸⁸

This politically diverse affiliation of the Russian Muslims was also reflected in the composition of the Muslim group of the Second State Duma with nine members out of 28 considered leftist and socialists, six known for their affinity to the Cadet (Constitutional Democrat) Party and thirteen uncertain, although in term of political activity the whole group was definitely in opposition to the government and often voted along the Polish autonomists⁴⁸⁹ and as a group the Muslim deputies were considered to have an inclination towards left.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁷ Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii*, p. 6.

⁴⁸⁸ Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), p. 12.

⁴⁸⁹ V. A. Demin, "Fraktsii II Gosudarstvennoi dumy," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 10 (2006), p. 31.

⁴⁹⁰ Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia: Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul, Vol. 1 (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1919), p. 184.

3.3.2 Pan-Turkism and Turkish Nationalism

As Benedict Anderson states in his *Imagined Communities*, “all communities larger than primordial villages of the face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity / genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”⁴⁹¹ Interestingly, while writing a letter of Pan-Islamic appeal to Abdülhamid II to win over the sultan’s mind, Jamal al-Dîn al-Afghânî refers, to the magnitude of the Turkish race and the Turkomans, who were unfortunate enough to “submit to the subjection of the commands of Russia,” adding “I will call them to revenge and incite the pride of their Turkish race [*jinsiyyat-i turkiyyeh...*] and carry the banner of Unity of Islam (*ittihad-i islamiyyeh*) on my shoulders into those regions also, and call to religious war.”⁴⁹²

As Roland B. Dixon had noticed, with the outburst of the Balkan Wars the “attempt to purify the language,” which had been mainly an academic matter, obtained its political essence and transformed into a governmental policy as “a selfish policy, seeking to gain control over other Turkish peoples and possessions of their territories for the benefit of the Osmanli and the Turkish Empire,” especially since the Ottomans seemed to be “the ones who expect to be the chief gainers.”⁴⁹³ Similarly, the craving of the peripheral Muslim communities for Islamic unity with the Ottoman sultan at its head, as Kemal H. Karpat claims in *The Politicization of Islam*,

⁴⁹¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 2006), p. 6.

⁴⁹² Keddie, “The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid,” pp. 58-59 [original transliteration].

⁴⁹³ Dixon, “Central Asia and the Steppe” (14 October 1918), pp. 23-24.

“was a strictly self-interested political initiative confined to a small group of elites rather than a move representing the consensus of the community.”⁴⁹⁴

Whatever is the case, the pending rule of Ottoman Sultan as the head of the Turkish world, at least as a conception, had been frequently uttered, as could be seen from an Ottoman poem devoted to the sultan that refers to him as “the sultan of the Ottoman land, [and] the future khan of Turan” [*Osmanlı ilinin sultânı, Tûrân’ın mustakbel hâkânı...*].⁴⁹⁵ In the same mood, the editors of the prominent *Genç Kalemler* were addressing their readers as “Turkish cubs, sons of the Khan!” [*Türk yavrûları, Hâkânın oğulları*] in the introductory line of their foreword.⁴⁹⁶ As another Ottoman article asserts,⁴⁹⁷

Today, just like when we say Turkness, a state, the Ottoman State [*devlet-i ‘alîyye*], occurs in our minds; when we say the education, industry, commerce, agriculture, entrepreneurship and culture of Turkness, we think of education, industry, commerce, agriculture, entrepreneurship and culture of that very state.

Interestingly, as it turned out, not always did the terms Turkish and Ottoman mean the same thing. In this respect, the following anecdotal dialogue of an Ottoman officer and a local boy of the Erzurum region mentioned in his memoirs seems noteworthy.⁴⁹⁸

- What nationality you’re of? (I was suspecting him to be an Armenian).

⁴⁹⁴ Karpas, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 49.

⁴⁹⁵ Feyzullâh Sâcid, “Hâkâna du’a,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 9, No. 13 (25 Şubat 1331) [1916], p. 193.

⁴⁹⁶ *Genç Kalemler*, Vol. 3, Nos. 24-25 (10 Temmuz 1328) [1912].

⁴⁹⁷ “Türklük – Müslümânlık,” *Büyük Duygu*, Year 1, No. 7 (29 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1331) [1913], p. 98.

⁴⁹⁸ Rahmi Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), p. 99-100. The author notes later that the term *Türk* in the region refers to *Shî’as* (Azerîs and the Turks of Kars, Ardahan and Tiflis), while *Osmânî* refers to *Sunnîs*.

- I'm an Ottoman...
- What you mean you're Ottoman, aren't you a Turk?
- No, I'm not a Turk, I'm an Ottoman.
- Well, which language you speak, Armenian or Turkish?
- I speak Turkish.
- If you speak Turkish then you're a Turk.
- No sir, I'm not a Turk.
- You fool [*ulen*], you're a Turk, and so I am.
- Sir, if you're a Turk, then you're. Why would I care? I'm not a Turk.
- You fool; even the Sultan [*Padişâh*] is a Turk.
- Sir, don't blaspheme, the Sultan can't be a Turk.

According to a Soviet author, Pan-Turkism “advocated the unification of all Turkish-speaking peoples [*tiurkoiazychnykh narodov*] around the Turkish nation by seizure of the territories of adjacent countries, in the first place those of Russia.”⁴⁹⁹

In addition to being a *diplomatic activity* to subjugate Turkish-speaking *countries* directly to the Ottomans and indirectly to the Germans, as M. A. Czaplicka asserts, the Pan-Turkic or Pan-Turanian movement aspire after certain economic benefits, namely “the cotton of Turkestan, the gold of the Altai, and Central Asian riches in general.”⁵⁰⁰

Thus, despite numerical disparity, the Ottomans, naturally, regarded themselves as the dominant and exemplary group in the Islamic and Turkic world, which they audibly uttered. Noting that in the Islamic world “today, it is only the Turks who aspire to benefit from Western civilization and contemporary progress [just] as much we need and the Islamic civilization permits,” the authors stated that the second most

⁴⁹⁹ G. Z. Aliev, *Turtsiia v period pravleniia mladoturok (1908-1918)* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo “Nauka,” 1972), p. 181.

⁵⁰⁰ M. A. Czaplicka, *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918), p. 9.

important member [*a'zâsı*] of the Turkish nation after the Ottomans are the Muslims of Kazan [*Kazân müslümânları*], formerly known, as he adds, as the Bulgars of the Kama and Volga regions.⁵⁰¹ Besides, not only was the Ottoman state considered the most prominent power in the Islamic world by the Ottoman Turks, but the Muslims of Russia were also aware of this fact, at least in their rhetoric. Thus, in his article on Turko-Tatar history published in *Resimli Kitâb*, Zekî Velidî praised the Ottoman state, or to be more precise, Turkey-Ottoman government [*Türkiyâ-Osmânî hükümeti*] as the only existing Turkish state.⁵⁰²

However, as the herald of the All-Russian Muslim Council suggested in 1917, the defeat in the Balkan Wars⁵⁰³ became the turning point in the attitude of the Russian Muslims towards the Great War, undermining the prestige of the Ottoman Empire as the historical center of the Muslim world and the last independent Muslim state,⁵⁰⁴ while being firmly convinced of unavoidable perishing of the Ottoman state, the Muslims of Russia, “who are much superior by culture,” ought to “take their destiny

⁵⁰¹ “Kazan Müslümânları,” *Hikmet*, No. 7 (24 Džumâdâ ‘1-Ûlâ 1328) [1910], p. 5.

⁵⁰² Ahmed Zekî Velidî, “Türk ve Tatar Târihi,” *Resimli Kitâb*, Vol. 9, No. 49 (Hazirân - Temmûz 1329) [1913], p. 29.

⁵⁰³ For the sociocultural impact of the Balkan Wars on the Ottoman society see, Erol Köroğlu, *Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1914-1918): Propagandadan Millî Kimlik İnşasına* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), pp. 115-126.

⁵⁰⁴ *Izvestiia Vserossiiskogo musul'manskogo soveta* (20 October 1917); cited by Iskhakov, “Pervaia mirovaia voina glazami rossiiskikh musul'man,” pp. 419-420.

in their own hands.’’⁵⁰⁵ As Moise Cohen had noted in *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal*,⁵⁰⁶

In short the intellectual standard and moral attainment of these Russian Turks is so high, that they are in no need of the leadership of the Ottoman Turks. They only demand one thing of the Ottoman Empire; – the strengthening and progress of the Turkish Government and the Turkish nation, for therein they see the one support of the whole Turkish people.

As the nationalist *Türk Yurdu* stated in 1910, the Russian Empire could easily be considered the greatest Turkish state [*Türk devleti*] just like Britain [*İngiltere*] is considered the greatest Muslim state due to the number of its Muslim subjects, adding that “today, the majority of the Turks inhabiting the Earth are the subjects of the ‘White Tsar’ [*ak çar*].”⁵⁰⁷ According to the *Report on the Pan-Turanian Movement* of 1917 by the Intelligence Bureau, as could be observed in the table below, the Turkish-speaking population of the Russian Empire was twice as much as that of the Ottoman Empire.

Statistical table of Turkish-speaking populations:⁵⁰⁸

Yakuts	250,000	
Kazan (and Astrakhan) Tatars	1,500,000	
West Siberian Tatars	50,000	
Crimean Tatars	200,000	

⁵⁰⁵ *Natsional'nye dvizheniia v period pervoi revoliutsii v Rossii* (Cheboksary: 1935), pp, 274-275; cited by Iskhakov, “Pervaia mirovaia voina glazami rosiiskikh musul'man,” p. 420.

⁵⁰⁶ Tekin Alp, *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal* (Weimar: Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1915), The National Archives (Washington, D.C.), Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents “Special Reports and Studies,” 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 579, p. 78.

⁵⁰⁷ “Türk-Rus Mukâreneti Hakkında,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 1 (Istanbul: Tanîn Matba'ası, 1328), p. 53.

⁵⁰⁸ [A. J. T.], “Report on the Pan-Turanian Movement,” Intelligence Bureau, Department of Information, No. 2 (October 1917), The National Archives (Washington, D.C.), Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents “Special Reports and Studies,” 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 458, p. 2.

Total in Western Russia and Siberia	2,000,000	
Tatars in the Caucasus [Azerbaijanis]	2,000,000	
Bashkirs and Chuvash	2,400,000	
Kirghiz [Kazakhs]	4,692,000	
Turkmens	290,000	
Other tribes in Russian Central Asia	2,772,000	
Turkish population of Khiva and Bukhara	1,500,000	
Turkish population of Chinese Turkestan	1,000,000	
Total in Central Asia	13,000,000	
Ottoman Empire (Constantinople and Anatolia)	8,000,000	
Persia, Afghanistan and lost Ottoman provinces in Europe	2,000,000	
Turks in the Russian Empire	16,000,000	
Turks in the Ottoman Empire	8,000,000	
Turks under other Governments	3,000,000	
Total Turks in the World	27,000,000	

It ought to be noted, however, that not all of the Central Asian Muslims – the area of the most dense and isolated habitation of Russian Muslims – were Turks, with Tajiks being the most numerous group that amounted to 358,000 according to the 1897 census, whereas the indigenous Turks made up 86 percent of the population of the *krai*.⁵⁰⁹ Therefore, as Serge A. Zenkovsky states, the manifestation of national sentiments among the Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire before 1917 was only as a Central Asian Muslim, while “a Moslem and Iranian-speaking Tajik was a member of the same social and cultural community as a Moslem Turk, while a Turkic-speaking but Christian Tatar, Yakut, or Chuvash would have been considered a representative of an alien and perhaps inimical culture.”⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰⁹ Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia*, p. 174.

⁵¹⁰ Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 8.

The desperation and compassion of the Russian Muslims upon the Ottoman defeat during the Balkan Wars was also noticed by an Ottoman traveler, who himself tried to encourage them and assure that the reality was not as desperate as it seemed all the way from Russia.⁵¹¹ However, the despairing expectations of the Russian Muslims for the failure of the Ottomans in the Balkan Wars might not be a widespread phenomenon. For instance, the diary of Muhammad-Sharîf-i Sadr-i Ziyâ, a Bukharan poet and writer, did not only dispose the crusading spirit of the enemies that “directed [the Balkan countries] against the blooming gardens of the East-European provinces of Turkey and with a great effort and with their help took these lands from the Ottomans,” but still praise the heroism of Anwar-bêk-i Ghâzî, or Enver Pasha, for taking back the Ottoman territories by force.⁵¹²

On the other hand, Ismail Gasprinsky, the prominent ideologist of the Russian Muslims, was much less optimistic about the current state of his community. As he wrote in his *Russkoe musul'manstvo* [The Muslim Community of Russia],⁵¹³

The Muslim Community of Russia vegetates in the cramped, stuffy realm of its old notions and prejudice as if estranged from the rest of mankind and has no other concern but in daily bread, has no other ideal but the instructions of the stomach.

⁵¹¹ “Rusya mektûbları,” *İslâm Dünyâsı*, Year 1, No. 11, p. 174.

⁵¹² *The Personal History of a Bukharan Intellectual: The Diary of MUHAMMAD-SHARÎF-I SADR-I ZIYÂ*, trans. Rustam Shukurov (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), pp. 287-288.

⁵¹³ Ismail Gasprinsky, “Russkoe musul'manstvo: Mysli, zametki i nabliudeniia,” in Ismail Bey Gasprinsky, *Rossiia i Vostok* (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1993), p. 21.

On the other hand, the dominant role of the Turkic émigrés from the Russian Empire, namely Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Yûsuf Âkçûrâ and Ali Hüseyinzâde, played in promoting the ideas of Turkish nationalism and greater Turkish world in the Ottoman press was so evident that the space and attention devoted to the Turks of the Russian Empire in *Türk Yurdu*, the influential herald of Turkish nationalism, was not less than that to Ottoman Turks.⁵¹⁴ A thorough content analysis of some Ottoman journals of the pre-First World War period with nationalist inclination carried out by Masami Arai reveals the great importance and popularity of the topic of Russian Muslims and Turks.⁵¹⁵ Moreover, the elucidation of the subject was not without academic touch, since, despite the general bias and sentimentality of the Ottoman press, an Ottoman author writing on the appointment of a new *mufî* of Orenburg would apologize for not possessing the recent protocols of the Muslim assemblies and legislation bills, so that the information he provided would definitely be incomplete and faulty [*eksik ve kusurlu*].⁵¹⁶

Indeed, Pan-Turkism was claimed to be a product and reflection of Russian political reality that only found shelter and patronage in the Ottoman capital and was the result of years-long cooperation of Turkish and Russian Pan-Turkists to overcome Ottomanism, “which was, in essence, based on the rejection of affinity between the Ottoman Turks and Russian Turko-Tatars despite the common religion and evident

⁵¹⁴ A. Holly Shissler, *Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 158, 160.

⁵¹⁵ See Masami Arai, *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era* (Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1992).

⁵¹⁶ *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (10 Eylül 1331), pp. 10-11.

linguistic similarity.”⁵¹⁷ In the light of the pity experience of the uprising among the Muslims Albanians and revolts in Yemen and Hawrân, the Muslims (and Turks) of the Russian Empire and India seemed to be the only ones to offer their help, which was not confined to financial aid and was carried out by their Red Crescent missions.⁵¹⁸

Since, as Ernest Gellner notes, nationalism “is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent,” and the nationalist sentiment “is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment,”⁵¹⁹ its emergence in the Ottoman Empire and the Turks of Russia in the light of current political events seems a timely phenomenon. What is more interesting, as Symmons-Symonolewicz divides nationalism into two distinct categories – that is, “1) *nationalism of majorities* which hold political power in their respective realms, and 2) *nationalism of the subject peoples* which strive for political and cultural emancipation,”⁵²⁰ – the Turkish nationalism in its Pan-Turkist form seems to fit both of the categories.

In the light of the above-mentioned classification of nationalisms into nationalism of majorities and nationalism of the subject peoples, the ardent debates around the Turkness and Tatarness, the terms used – depending on the ideas and personality of

⁵¹⁷ Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii*, p. 13.

⁵¹⁸ Tekin Alp, *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal*, pp. 3, 10-11.

⁵¹⁹ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1.

⁵²⁰ Konstantin Symmons-Symonolewicz, “Nationalist Movements: An Attempt at a Comparative Typology,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (January 1965), p. 221.

the author – as synonyms, upper and lower identities or incompatible notions, filled a significant place on the list of topics related to Turkish nationalism. The controversy around the terms was not a specifically Ottoman or Turkish matter and was widespread in foreign literature as could be seen from an article entitled “The Muslims in Russia” that states while mentioning the peoples of the Russian Empire, that “then come the Muslim peoples; the so-called Tatars” and continues on the same page saying “the Turks, who started being called the Tatars....”⁵²¹

An article in *Kırım Mecmû'ası* on Turkness and Tatariness depicted everybody who considers them different as simpletons and naïves, and asserts that there would be no doubt that “a Turk and a Tatar and then little by little every society [*cem'iyet*] in the world with the same religion, the same language but with different pronunciations would gather in a national unity [*vahdet-i millîye*].”⁵²² However, not everybody used these two terms as synonyms and *Mecmû'a-i Ebû'z-Ziyâ*, a weekly that has Constantinople [*Kostantîniye*] on its title page instead of common *Der-sa'âdet* or *İstâmbul*, initiated a debate on the metaphorical use of ‘a Tatar’ as a bloodthirsty one that led all the way to the exodus of the early Ottomans and even the innate cruelty of Russians due to the existence of Tatar blood in their veins.⁵²³

While mentioning the ‘Russian factor’ of the emergence of Pan-Turkism, as was often the case for Pan-Islamism as well, an interesting interpretation is made by

⁵²¹ Alisova, “Musul'mane u Rasei,” p. 709.

⁵²² “Türklük –Tatarlık,” *Kırım Mecmû'ası*, Year 1, No. 2, p. 27.

⁵²³ “Türklük ve Tatarlık Bahsi,” *Mecmû'a-i Ebû'z-Ziyâ*, No. 94 (5 Djumâdâ 'l-Ûlâ 1329) [1911], pp. 483-488.

Roland B. Dixon in his special report on Central Asia. According to him, Pan-Turanianism originated from the defeat of the Magyar revolution in 1849 by Russian and Austrian troops and a great number of prominent Magyars taking asylum in Constantinople, who upon their return took a very strong pro-Turkish stance during the Balkan disturbances of 1875-78. Thus, at the heart of this movement, which was political rather than racial, lay the desire of the Magyars to accept as allies “a people speaking a related language and who were as well, the bitter enemies of Russia” as an opposition to the “Pan-Slavic rapprochement between the southern Slavs and the Russians.”⁵²⁴

Whether as a fashion among educated nationalists or simply as a tribute to a wartime ally, the theme of the Magyars had been thoroughly elaborated in the Ottoman press of the First World War period. The publications on the Magyar subject covered a wide range of topics on their history, language and culture and, expectedly, emphasized the bounding links between the Magyars and Turks.⁵²⁵ An article by Bekir Sıdkı Çobanzâde written during his stay in Budapest in 1918 and entitled, unsurprisingly, “The Magyar Brothers,” reveals a great amount of ethnic, linguistic, political and even physiognomic similarities not only between the Magyars and the Ottoman Turks, but also with the Crimean Tatars. The astonishing similarities go far beyond the congeniality of *csárdás*, the national dance of the Magyars, with Crimean *kaytarma* and *zeybek* of the ‘Ottoman brothers’, and continues claiming that “the appearance, embroidery, songs, language as well as entertainment and

⁵²⁴ Dixon, “Central Asia and the Steppe” (14 October 1918), p. 22.

⁵²⁵ See, for instance, ‘Alî Rızâ Seyfî, “Macarlar,” *Şehbâl*, No. 81 (1 Eylül 1329) [1913], pp. 162-164.

mentality of the Magyars have many things in common with our Çongar Tatars.”⁵²⁶

The mysterious link between the Magyars and the Crimean Tatars is further supported by the publication of excerpts by Dr. Ignác Kúnos, the prominent Hungarian Turkologist, under the title “The Tatars from along the Danube.”⁵²⁷

Consequently, Pan-Turanianism, which “in its origin, is (a) artificial, and (b) European,” is claimed to emerge as a result of the sense of isolation and disconnectedness the Finno-Ugric Magyars felt among Latin, Slavonic and Teutonic speakers, as well as their search for an anti-Slav ally.⁵²⁸ The term Turanian itself that was claimed to be unknown to the Turks from Asia, was used primarily in linguistic context and did not correspond to Turkish or Turkic, since also comprised Mongolic and Tungusic languages.⁵²⁹ According to *A Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism* compiled by the Naval Intelligence Division of British Admiralty in 1920, the overall number of the Turanians was about 48 million, while the number of the Turks made up only about 26 million.⁵³⁰

However, as the 17th century historian Abu'l-Ghâzî Bahâdur Khân states in his *Shajarat al-Atrâk*, which is somehow translated as *Genealogical Tree of the Turks and Tatars*, both Tatar and Mongol [*Moghûl*] appeared to be the twin sons of the

⁵²⁶ Bekir Sıdkı Çobanzâde, “Macar Kardâşlar,” *Kırım Mecmû'ası*, Year 1, No. 7, p. 121.

⁵²⁷ “Tuna Boyu Tatarları,” *Kırım Mecmû'ası*, Year 1, No. 8, p. 141.

⁵²⁸ [A. J. T.], “Report on the Pan-Turanian Movement,” Intelligence Bureau, Department of Information, No. 2 (October 1917), The National Archives (Washington, D.C.), Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents “Special Reports and Studies,” 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 458, p. 3.

⁵²⁹ Czaplicka, *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day*, p. 19.

⁵³⁰ *A Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism* (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1920), pp. 17, 116.

legendary Alumchi Khan, among whom he divided his hereditary possessions.⁵³¹ An article in *Edebiyyât-i 'Umûmiyye Mecmû'ası* on the origin of the Turks, however, regarded the assertion on the proximity with the Mongols an allegation of the Europeans who never considered the Turks of the same origin with themselves and claimed instead that the Turks hailed from the mixture of Tatars and Mongols, the latter being from the same root with Chinese.⁵³² Since “there is at the present day no difficulty in distinguishing between Turks and Mongols,” the two Turanian peoples, *A Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism* offers a simply but ‘genius’ pattern:⁵³³

[T]he former speak Turkish dialects, are Muslims by religion, live almost entirely in the western half of Asia, and fall within the Arabic and, to some extent, the European sphere of influence; the latter speak Mongolian languages, are Buddhists by religion, live in the eastern half of Asia, and fall within the sphere of Chinese influence.

Nevertheless, it was the Mongols or, more specifically, Chinggis Khan himself and his descendants that provided the Muslims of the Russian Empire with an ethnopolitical and national identity owing to the peculiarities of the Mongol state structure.⁵³⁴

Although the Ottomans’ Pan-Turanian solidarity with the Mongols were confined to the reference of prominent Mongols, namely Chinggis Khan, mentioned, usually, as

⁵³¹ *The Shajrat ul Atrak or Genealogical Tree of the Turks and Tatars*, trans. Colonel [William] Miles (London: H. Allen & Co., 1838), p. 29.

⁵³² “Türklerin Aslı,” *Edebiyyât-i 'Umûmiyye Mecmû'ası*, Vol. 2, No. 31 (2 Hazirân 1917), p. 81.

⁵³³ *A Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism*, p. 115.

⁵³⁴ Karpát, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 276.

historical Turkish leaders,⁵³⁵ the bond with Magyars around the First World War was extremely lively and close due to political and strategic reasons and propaganda, for which the circulation of assertions in Ottoman press on ethnic and linguistic proximity between Turks and Magyars played a significant role. Often – as is the case with two young brothers who decided to take different roads from a crossroad, one being the ancestor the Magyars and the other of the Turks – it is hard to grasp the real tone and style of the text, since it might have the characteristics of a fiction, folklore and scientific assumption at the same time.⁵³⁶

Some authors, however, were eager to confine Turkism to Islam, claiming that peoples like Magyars or Bulgars that failed to become Muslims lost their Turkness irretrievably.⁵³⁷ An article on Turkish and Islamic constituents of the Ottoman state published in June 1913 stated that for the Ottomans Turkness cannot be taken apart from their state and these two cannot be taken apart from Islam, goes on with a poem saying that “Islam and Turkish nation are together from time immemorial; If religion will live on, the nation will not die and Turkness will gloriously live on; Our state is Muslim, it is Turkish and we are in search of fame....”⁵³⁸

⁵³⁵ See, for instance, “Şarhoşluğa Karşı,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 8, No. 8 (18 Hazirân 1331) [1915], pp. 2651-2653.

⁵³⁶ “Türkler, Macarlar” *Türk Duygusu*, Year 1, No. 1 (1 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1331) [1913], p. 6.

⁵³⁷ Kadir Mısıroğlu, *Moskof Mezâlimi* (Istanbul: Sebil Yayinevi, 1976), p. 95.

⁵³⁸ “Türklük – Müslümânlık,” *Büyük Duygu*, Year 1, No. 7 (29 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1331) [1913], p. 99

Interestingly, the preliminary statistical estimation for the short-lived Volga-Ural Republic [*İdil-Ural cumhûriyeti*] project published in *Kırım Mecmû'ası* presented the following distribution of ethnic groups within the republic to-be,

	%
Turko-Tatars	43.85
Chuvash	11.86
Cheremiss	4.76
Russians	35.86
Other nations	3.67

not considering the Chuvash among the Turko-Tatars, although both the Chuvash and Cheremiss are counted among the Turanian peoples [*akvâm-i Tûrânî*] that made up 60.47 percent of the region's population.⁵³⁹

Indeed, the specific denomination of certain ethnic groups of (predominantly) Islamic creed would not be usually exposed in the Ottoman press at all even for such diverse regions like the Caucasus where the Muslims, as well as Christians, are of different ethnic, linguistic and racial background, preferring a generic term Caucasian Muslims [*Kafkasyâ müslümânları*]. Moreover, a local conflict between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis would be presented as a conflict between *müslümânlar* and *Ermenîler*, rather than a Muslim-Christian conflict.⁵⁴⁰ However, the same journal was, somehow, meticulous enough to have separate columns for news on Iran, Turks and Turan, so that news on Bukhara with a sizeable Tajik population would go under 'Turan' rather than 'Turks'.⁵⁴¹

⁵³⁹ "Volga Boyu Târihinden," *Kırım Mecmû'ası*, Year 1, No. 12, p. 218.

⁵⁴⁰ See, for instance, "Kafkasya," *Hikmet*, No. 2 (23 Djumâdâ 'l-Âkhira [Rabî' al-Âkhir?] 1328) [1910], p. 3.

⁵⁴¹ "Tûrân," *Hikmet*, No. 11 (23 Djumâdâ 'l-Âkhira 1328), p. 4.

Indeed, the monumental work *Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, Mu'âsırlaşmak* (often translated, although not quite correctly, as *Turkism, Islamism and Modernism*) by Ziyâ Gök Alp published initially as a lengthy series in *Türk yurdu*, became, for a time being, a guideline and inspirer for Turkish nationalists in and outside the empire. Considering these three notions as three different approaches to a single and common need, as he acknowledged in the first and introductory part of this work, he defines his ultimate aim and necessity as “creating a Modern Muslim Turkness [*Mu'âsır İslâm Türklüğü*].”⁵⁴² Consequently, following the publication of this work, a series of articles by other authors on similar matters and with similar titles appeared in Ottoman periodicals, namely *Türklük, İslâmlık, Osmânlılık*⁵⁴³ and *Türklük, Müslümânlık, Osmânlılık*.⁵⁴⁴

While debating on the assertion that pious Turks follow Pan-Islamism while profane ones follow pan-Turanism, another article published in *Sebilü'r-Reşâd* in 1912, which surprisingly uses the very terms *pân-Tûrânîzm* and *pân-İslâmîzm* in Ottoman Turkish, states that “even the atheists [*dînsiz olanlar*] should be adherent to Pan-Islamist ideas. In order to become a supporter of Pan-Turanism, one ought to accept the ideas of Pan-Islamism first.”⁵⁴⁵ Besides, an opening article in the first volume of

⁵⁴² [Ziyâ] Gök Alp, “Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, Mu'âsırlaşmak,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 3 (1329) [1913-1914], p. 337.

⁵⁴³ Köprülüzâde Mehmed Fuâd, “Türklük, İslâmlık, Osmânlılık,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 4, No. 9[?] (1329) [1913-1914], pp. 692-702.

⁵⁴⁴ “Türklük; Müslümânlık; Osmânlılık,” *Hikmet*, No. 12 (30 Djumâdâ 'l-Âkhira 1328) [1910], pp. 4-6.

⁵⁴⁵ “İslâmiyet ve Türklük,” *Sebilü'r-Reşâd*, No. 191-9 (15 Djumâdâ 'l-Ûlâ 1330) [1912], p. 165.

Türk Duygusu clearly states that “we, Turks, are, above all, a Muslim Turkish nation.... By saying [only] this, we reveal all our principles.”⁵⁴⁶ However, it was even asserted that the feeling of Turkness is by no means incompatible with the idea of Ottomanism,⁵⁴⁷ although an article with a clear title “Can the Principle of Nationalism Be Adapted for Real Muslims?” assures that ideas of nationalism are definitely incompatible with Islamic principles, of course in case you are a real Muslim [*hakîkî müslümân*].⁵⁴⁸

Despite the moderate or even neglectful attitude of the Turkish nationalists in the Ottoman Empire, as the Russian Muslims complained, the link between the Turkness and Islam had still played an important role in their rhetorical publications and took up a more intense form upon the outburst of the war, when the notion of the Holy War became a leitmotif of the wartime propaganda. While Ziyâ Gök Alp was praising the “common language and religion” of all the Turks,⁵⁴⁹ Mehmed Şemseddîn, the later Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic, was eager to prove the existence of essential Islamic notions, characters and institutions such as *jihâd*, *zakât*, *tawhîd*, as inherent parts of the Turkish nation and character long before their conversion to Islam and even claimed that already from the time of the legendary

⁵⁴⁶ “Cânımız İslâm, Kanımız Türk,” *Türk Duygusu*, Year 1, No. 1 (1 Djumâdâ ‘1-Âkhira 1331), p. 2.

⁵⁴⁷ “Türklük Duygusu Osmânlılık Fikrine Mâni’ Mı?,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 2, No. 4[?] (1328) [1912-1913], pp. 491-493.

⁵⁴⁸ “Millîyet Prensibleri Hakîkî Müslümânlara Kâbil-i Tatbîk midir?” *Kırım Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 16, p. 284.

⁵⁴⁹ Ziyâ Gök Alp, “Türke Göre: Millet,” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, No. 30 (11 Sha’bân 1333) [1915], p. 5.

Oğûz Khan on, the Turks were the adherents of the “religion of Abraham” [*dîn-i hanîf*].⁵⁵⁰

Nevertheless, not everybody in the Ottoman Empire was so excited about the Great Turanian ideal and some were somewhat critical of the activities of *Türk Yurdu* and *Türk ocağı*, stating that Anatolia, rather than imaginary Turan should be the concern of the Ottomans.⁵⁵¹ Some, like Sâmi zâde, were harsher in the tone or even mocking and not only uttered: “‘Towards Turan!’ This is another expression that I cannot understand or grasp the spirit of its meaning... Where is Turan? What is our concern? What we are going to do there?” and went even further since the examples of crippled and corrupted Turkish language and poetry presented in his article started the unambiguous “Turan! Turan, where are you?”⁵⁵²

One of the peculiar characteristics of the Russian state and country that would play an important role in the security concerns during the Russo-Turkish Wars and the First World War was the lack of definite frontier zone, especially since the Caucasus and Central Asia were the area of expansionist aspirations of other powers, while the local population of these areas, which were not subjected to a policy of systematic assimilation, were of ‘uncertain loyalties’, often had separatist intentions and thus

⁵⁵⁰ Mehmed Şemseddîn [Günaltay], “Türkler ve İslâmiyet,” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, No. 42 (7 Djumâdâ ‘l-Ûlâ 1334) [1916], p. 7.

⁵⁵¹ “Livâdyâ ziyâreti,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, Vol. 47, No. 1197 (18 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1332) [1914], p. 2.

⁵⁵² Sâmi zâde, “Millîleşmek ve Avrupalaşmak,” *İslâm Dünyâsı*, Year 1, No. 24, p. 392.

became the matter of grave concern for foreign and domestic policies of the Tsarist state.⁵⁵³

In the light of rising Russian nationalism and extremism in the early 1900s, the loyalty of the Muslim population of the Russian Empire started being called into question. While A. S. Stishinsky, the rightist member of the Council of State urged on the necessity of special treatment for Muslims since “in Russia, it was the conservative element that played the decisive role among the Muslims,” the nationalist *Novoe vremia* stated that the loyalty of the Russian Tatars ought to be thoroughly scrutinized, since Muslims had a peculiar religious organization and teaching in religious schools was provided through Turkish books and maps.⁵⁵⁴

In a report of 1909 addressed directly to Nicholas II, the governor-general of the Turkestan *krai* stated that during 1905-1907 “a kind of an evolution took place among the Muslims of Central Asia, [and] Pan-Islamic or all-Muslim [*vsemusul'manstvo*] ideas were replaced first by the striving for national unification, then appeared revolutionary-separatist and even socialist tendencies.”⁵⁵⁵ As a travelogue suggests, already in 1915, that is long before the Soviet policy of national delimitation, the answer to the question ‘What is your nationality?’ among the

⁵⁵³ Rieber, “Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay,” pp. 335, 338.

⁵⁵⁴ GARF, f. 588, op. 1, d. 1247, l. 54 ob., 55 ob.-56; and *Novoe vremia* (4 July 1911); both cited by Luk'ianov, “‘Rossia – dlia russkikh’ ili ‘Rossiia – dlia russkikh poddanykh’? Konservatory i natsional’nyi vopros nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny,” pp. 39, 41.

⁵⁵⁵ “Vsepoddanneishii doklad general-gubernatora o polozenii Turkestanskogo kraia v 1909 godu,” p. 13; cited by Tursunov, *Natsional'naiia politika Kommunisticheskoi Partii v Turkestane*, p. 51.

Central Asians would be *invariably* ‘I am an Uzbek’ or ‘I am a Tajik,’ although the author states that⁵⁵⁶

The Kirgiz [Kazakhs] spring from the same stock as the Uzbeks; or rather they are Uzbeks who have remained nomads. Russian ethnographers divide them into two classes, the dwellers in the mountains and the dwellers in the plains. The former are called Kara-Kirgiz, and the latter Kirgiz-Kaizaks.

An article entitled “The Muslims in Russia” published in 1910 in a Belarusian language journal divides the *Turkish peoples* into three distinct groups, stating that⁵⁵⁷

Some of the Turkish peoples - the Kirghiz [Kazakhs], for instance - wander, like thousand years ago, with their herds through infinite steppes of Russia; others already have a superior culture, namely, Arabic and Persian; the third get closer to the Russian culture and develop a new culture of their own.

It is interesting to note that the confusion of the Kazakhs with Kirghiz by early Russian travelers that resulted in the widespread misuse of the terms *kirgiz* or *kirgiz-kaisak* for modern Kazakhs and *kara-kirgiz* for modern Kirghiz, the misnomers later adopted by many Russian and European authors, was also common among the Ottoman authors. Although, as L. Kostenko mentions in his *Middle Asia and the Establishment of the Russian Citizenship There* in 1871 that⁵⁵⁸

All this nomadic population call themselves Kazakhs [*kazakami*] (which in Turkic means homeless vagabonds). Kirghiz (*krgyz*) is the name assumed by the nomads belonging to a totally different tribe, inhabiting the environs of the Issyk Kul Lake and to the south of it across the Tien Shan, around the Kashgar River and the uplands of the Pamirs.

However, the misnomers related to the word Kazakh or Kazak extends even further.

Thus, the appeal for immigration “of *Kazakhs* from the Kuban region, numbering

⁵⁵⁶ Meakin, *In Russian Turkestan*, pp. 6, 225.

⁵⁵⁷ G. Alisova, “Musul'mane u Rasei,” *Nasha niva*, Year 5, No. 47 (November 1910), p. 709.

⁵⁵⁸ Kostenko, *Sredniaia Aziia i vodvorenie v nei russkoi grazhdanstvennosti*, p. 31.

some twenty thousand”⁵⁵⁹ to the Ottoman Empire in 1899, mentioned by Selim Deringil, mistakes, most likely, the Kazakhs for Kasaks or Kashaks, the Adighe-Cherkes tribe known in Russian sources as the Kasogs [*kasogi*].⁵⁶⁰ In this respect, the frequent Ottoman term *islâm Kâzâklar*⁵⁶¹ that might mean both the Muslim Kazakhs and Muslims Cossacks does not seem helpful at all, especially since the conversion of Cossacks to Islam was mentioned earlier in this chapter. Moreover, the Ottoman and Turkish homonym *Kazak*, which caused confusion from the Ottoman times on, might mean both the Kazakhs and Cossacks, while among the Crimean Tatars, for instance, the same word might simply mean a Russia or a Slav in general.

Interestingly, the Russian (and later Soviet) denomination of Central Asia as a compound entity of Middle Asia and Kazakhstan [*Sredniaia Aziia i Kazakhstan*] instead of Central Asia [*Tsentral’naia Aziia*], the cliché that loses its sense in Turkish and English due to frequent interchangeable translation of both *sredniaia* and *tsentral’naia* as Central or Orta [*vustâ*], could often be encountered in Ottoman press as *Türkistân-i vustâ ve Kazakistân*.⁵⁶² However, instances of a broader use of the term Central Asia [*Orta Âsyâ*] could also be encountered in Ottoman publications such as the mention of “the population of Turkestan in Central Asia.”⁵⁶³

⁵⁵⁹ Deringil, “The Ottoman Empire and Russian Muslims: Brothers or Rivals,” p. 76 [emphasis added].

⁵⁶⁰ See “KUBAN,” *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, eds. B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat and J. Schachts, Vol. 5 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), p. 288.

⁵⁶¹ “Kazakların Arâzisini Gasb,” *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*, No. 242 (25 Djumâdâ ‘l-Ûlâ 1331) [1913], p. 136.

⁵⁶² For instance, *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (10 Eylül 1331) [1915], p. 11.

⁵⁶³ “Türkistân’ın Hâli,” *İslâm Dünyası*, Year 1, No. 12, p. 189.

The rhetorical accent on the unity and unanimity of the Turkish world and existence of the unique and common culture so widespread in Pan-Turkist publications was considered by Soviet authors as a gross distortion of history, since “there is no such a thing like Turkic world, but Turkish-speaking nations: Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Tatars, Bashkirs and others; each of them have their peculiar history and distinctive culture.”⁵⁶⁴ However, an impressive poem by Ziyâ Gök Alp, the prominent Ottoman Pan-Turkist, with an ambitious title “What is a Nation for a Turk” published in June 1915, which states that “we had lived like a nation for five thousand years,” apparently disagrees with the above mentioned statement with the following verses:⁵⁶⁵

Do not call me Turkmen, Kâyî, Ottoman,
I am a Turk; this name is superior to every title.
There is no Uzbek, Tatar, Kirghiz or Shirvani,
The Turkish nation is the indivisible whole.

Interestingly, confronting the evergrowing domination of Russia over its Muslim and Turkic population of the Caucasus and Central Asia accompanied with a policy of Russification and, what is more important, being unable to interfere or influence the situation in any drastic way, the Ottomans even resorted to the policy of

⁵⁶⁴ Sabitov, "Panislamizm i pantiurkizm na sluzhbe imperialisticheskoi reaktsii," p. 12.

⁵⁶⁵ Ziyâ Gök Alp, “Türke Göre: Millet,” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, No. 30 (11 Sha’bân 1333) [1915], p. 5.

Below is the transliterated original form:

Deme bana “Türkmen, Kayî, Osmânî.”
Türküm bu ad her ‘unvândan üstündür,
Yokdur Özbek, Tatar, Kırğız[,] Şîrvânî
Türk milleti bir bölünmez “bütün”dür.

alienation from their ‘brethren’ by banning the import of some Islamic publications by Russian subjects and introducing certain restriction on their movement and settlement within the Ottoman territory.⁵⁶⁶ In this respect, an *irâde* by Abdülhamid II issued in December 1905 concerning the migrants from Batumi that denies permission of settling in the Ottoman territories to everyone except Muslim Ottoman subjects and leaves out the Russian Muslims as well as non-Muslims of any nationality, seems conformable to this attitude.⁵⁶⁷

At the same time, as Volker Adam notices, the *émigré* writers were eager to present to the Ottoman audience ‘a shocking, nightmarish picture’ of the fate of the Muslims in Russia, as well as evil and despotic character of the Tsarist state, implying that “once a Muslim community, either nomadic or settled, was conquered, a slow but irreversible process of assimilation or expulsion was initiated that could not be stopped for lack of international organization as well as lack of support from the outside Muslim world.”⁵⁶⁸

Being at the core of the political propaganda, the sentiments around Turkness, as could have been expected, were duly employed in the Ottoman press prior to and during the First World War by creating a glorious image of greatness and

⁵⁶⁶ Deringil, “The Ottoman Empire and Russian Muslims: Brothers or Rivals,” pp. 79, 81.

⁵⁶⁷ BA, *İrâde-Husûsî*, No. 60 in *Osmanlı Devleti ile Kafkasya, Türkistan ve Kırım Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münâsebetlere Dair Arşiv Belgeleri (1687-1908 Yılları Arası)* (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1992), p. 93, appendix 36.

⁵⁶⁸ Adam, “Ottoman Perception of Muslim Life in Russia and Central Asia,” p. 304.

superiority. As *Büyük Duygu*, a journal whose very name stands for The Great Affection, stated:⁵⁶⁹

Turkness? This word that whispers some things, so many things, in the ears of all the nations in this universe, that brings the shadows of astonishment, great astonishment, right in front of their empty eyes, is so pure and stainless, so white and clear....

The appeal for the Turkish sentiments and nationalism was not only a matter of politicized statements or romantic poetry and folklore, since numerous scientific or semi-scientific publications on the nature of nationalism, national ideas and culture in general and Turkish nationalism in particular appeared in the Ottoman press. The same Ziyâ Gök Alp, this time as a Professor of Sociology at the University of Istanbul [*Dâr-ül-Fünûn*], had published a series of articles on contemporary scientific and explicitly Durkheimian theoretical approaches to the study of nations and nationalisms, where the famed author of the “great and eternal country of Turan” was sober enough to define the primary condition of scientific approach not as an aspiration to find out what would come out of a nation in the future, but what had really happened in the past and what is its current state.⁵⁷⁰

⁵⁶⁹ “Türklük – Müslümânlık,” *Büyük Duygu*, Year 1, No. 7 (29 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1331) [1913], p. 97.

⁵⁷⁰ Ziyâ Gök Alp, “Bir Kavmin Tedkîkinde Ta’kîb Olunacak Usûl,” *Millî Tettebbu’lar Mecnû’ası*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Mayıs-Hazirân 1331) [1915], p. 193.

3.3.3 Language and Politics

While analyzing the character of the ‘newer nationalisms’, which appeared between 1820 and 1920, Benedict Anderson highlights their two main features that made them influential and distinguished them from previous ones:⁵⁷¹

First, in almost all of them ‘national print – languages’ were of central ideological and political importance.... Second, all were able to work from visible models provided by their distant, and after the convulsion of the French Revolution, not so distant, predecessors.

Already in the report of Nikolai Ignat’ev, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, sent to Emperor Alexander II in 1873, the Ottomans’ emerging interest towards their coreligionists abroad attracted special attention and it was noticed that the representatives of the Muslim communities from abroad held frequent meetings often discussing matters related to Central Asia attended by Ahmed Vefik, the former Ottoman Minister of Education, under the guise of a linguistic council preparing a dictionary of Turkic and Persian dialects.⁵⁷²

Accordingly, the language question, which was noted as the most substantial of all the essences of nationhood by an Ottoman author, became a matter of great concern among the Turkish nationalists already at the time of Ahmed Vefik Pasha and Şemseddîn Sâmî Bey.⁵⁷³ Needless to say that Istanbul was the center for of Pan-

⁵⁷¹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, p. 67.

⁵⁷² AVPR, f. Kantseliaria, Konstantinopol’, 1873, d. 25, 3/15 May; 10/22 May, 2/14 June, l. 416-416 ob.; cited by Fadeeva, *Ofitsial’nye doktriny v ideologii i politike Osmanskoi imperii*, p. 110.

⁵⁷³ “Türk Dili Üzerinde Tetebbu’ ve Tahkikler,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 9, No. 13 (25 Şubât 1331) [1916], p. 200.

Islamic activities of any kind, including education and agitation,⁵⁷⁴ therefore, it should not be surprising that in a letter sent to an Ottoman journal by a Central Asian reader published with the original orthography, as the editor noted, Istanbul was referred as *İslâmbûl*,⁵⁷⁵ which might also mean ‘become Islamic’ in Central Asian Turkic languages.

While emphasizing the unique and special significance of Istanbul as a religious center for all the Muslims and national center for all the Turks, Ziyâ Gök Alp in his famous *Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, Mu’âsırlaşmak* added that “the Istanbul Turkish should be the national language for all the Turks, since the marvel and sanctity had passed on the language. Besides, the Istanbul Turkish is the most beautiful of all the Turkish dialects, the most refined, the most elaborate in terms of literature and science.”⁵⁷⁶ Interestingly, an article in *Kırım Mecmû’ası* entitled “Istanbul and Turkness” could not pass the Ottoman censorship, leaving us with a title, an empty page and unsatisfied curiosity.⁵⁷⁷

As a part of the Turkish linguistic nationalism and policy, the question of the adjustment or even unification of Turkish languages had been energetically

⁵⁷⁴ Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, pp. 68-72.

⁵⁷⁵ “Asyâ-i vustâ: Semerkand’dan Yazılmış Bir Husûsî Mektûbdan,” *Hikmet*, No. 3 (25 Rabî’ al-Âkhir 1328) [1910], p. 4.

⁵⁷⁶ “Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, Mu’âsırlaşmak,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (20 Mart 1330) [1914], p. 41.

⁵⁷⁷ “İstâmbul – Türklük” *Kırım Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 19.

scrutinized on the pages of Ottoman journals of that time. Thus, as an Ottoman author claimed,⁵⁷⁸

In order to maintain the implementation of political relations among the Turanian peoples that inhabited a vast area that stretches from the Chinese Turkestan to the borders of Austria, we would feel an intense need for the unification of different Turkish dialects if not today, then definitely tomorrow.

It is interesting to note, as Arminius Vambéry mentions in his memoirs, that upon his handing of his monograph on ancient Uighur linguistic works to Abdülhamid, the Ottoman sultan complained about the lack of knowledge about ancient philological monuments among contemporary Ottomans and praised *their ancestors* for creating such impressive works long before the adoption of Islam, adding that with the help of this book “he could prove the unadulterated Turkish national character of the Osmanli dynasty.”⁵⁷⁹

The main idea behind Pan-Turkist ideology was, as *The Essays on Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Russia* claims, the unification of the Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire through the creation of a common literary language and culture in the first place and then of political organizations to lead their struggle for national revival. For the achievement of this goal the authors saw two main obstacles: “the Tsarist autocracy that mercilessly oppressed all non-Russian ethnicities including the Turko-Tatars and the reactionary Muslim clergy.”⁵⁸⁰ Indeed, some authors asserted

⁵⁷⁸ “Türk Lisânlarının Tevhîdi,” *İctihâd*, No. 31 (15 Eylül 1327) [1911], p. 841.

⁵⁷⁹ Arminius Vambéry, *The Story of My Struggles: The Memoirs of Arminius Vambéry* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1905), pp. 352-353.

⁵⁸⁰ Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii*, pp. 12-13.

that not only did Pan-Turkism emerged and developed in the Russian Empire, but it was inspired by Slavophilism and took Pan-Slavism as its model.⁵⁸¹

As for the Jadidists, their principal demand was claimed to be the priority of the Tatar language as a dominant language for all Muslim peoples in Russia.⁵⁸² Indeed, the Jadidists still preferred Tatar language textbooks in their schools long after the local language edition became available.⁵⁸³ A report on the opening of a New Method school in Qara Köl published in *Hikmet* in 1911 stated that the language of instruction there was the Noghay dialect [*Nogâý şîvesi*]; however, the author felt obliged to remind that the Noghays were not the only inhabitants of the area and numerous Sarts, considered by the author as a mixture of Turks and Iranians, and the Dungans, defined simply, and mysteriously, as Dungan Turks, also lived in the area.⁵⁸⁴

Supporting, at least rhetorically, the necessity of the university instruction in Russian, Ismail Gasprinsky promoted the idea of teaching in Tatar language in public and lower professional schools, adding that this would be the only way for obtaining any kind of knowledge and contemplate what Russia and Russians really are instead of fruitless cramming of Russian words.⁵⁸⁵ However, Gasprinsky himself was often claimed to be the supporter of the idea of introducing the Ottoman Turkish

⁵⁸¹ Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), pp. 33-34.

⁵⁸² Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii*, p. 188.

⁵⁸³ Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*, p. 90.

⁵⁸⁴ "Rusya Müslümânları," *Hikmet*, No. 72 (6 Ramadân 1329) [1911], p. 3.

⁵⁸⁵ Gasprinsky, "Russkoe musul'manstvo: Mysli, zametki i nabliudeniia," p. 49.

as the common literary language in Muslim press and schools in Russia and would still insist on the necessity of teaching Arabic in Muslims schools.⁵⁸⁶ Moreover, the debate around the common language seemed to be an issue not only for the Turkic peoples, but for the whole Muslim world as well, which mainly focused on the elimination of Arabic in not Arabic-speaking countries.⁵⁸⁷

Disapproving the pedagogical methodology of the purely Russian schools as well as Muslim *maktabs*' instruction in (again foreign) Persian or Arabic, this idea of Gasprinsky was in a way similar to Il'minsky's curriculum of 'Russian-Tatar' schools with instruction in Tatar in lower classes, which, interestingly, was criticized in its time for supporting native separatism.⁵⁸⁸ In the meantime, in the New Method *husayniyye* schools established by the prominent Tatar millionaires and benefactors Brothers Huseinov, whose progressive educational program including secular and commercial subjects put them "among the best educational institutions of the Moslem world,"⁵⁸⁹ the students appealed for the increase in the number of modern science in the educational program instead of Arabic, religious classes and Turkish language.⁵⁹⁰ Besides, the introduction of the Russian language courses in the *madrasas* of Tashkent at government expense had already been reported.⁵⁹¹

⁵⁸⁶ Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, p. 32.

⁵⁸⁷ "Beyn-el-İslâm Müşterek Lisân," *Sebilü'r-Reşâd*, No. 242 (25 Djumâdâ 'l-Ülâ 1331) [1913], p. 133.

⁵⁸⁸ Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, p. 29.

⁵⁸⁹ Serge A. Zenkovsky, "A Century of Tatar Revival," *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (October 1953), p. 315.

⁵⁹⁰ H. Sâmî, "Rusya mektûbları," *İslâm Dünyası*, Year 1, No. 8, p. 127.

⁵⁹¹ "Türkistân Medreselerinde Rusca," *İslâm Mecmû'ası*, Year 1, No. 10, p. 318.

In any case, the impact of the Turkish language, both local and Ottoman, was undeniably strong not only among the Russian Muslims, but even among certain Christian groups within the empire, especially in the Caucasus. The official Russian embassy that visited the court of King Alexander of Georgia in 1596-1599 found no other means of communication with the Georgians but in the Turkish language and, what is more important, the letter of compassion to their Christian brethren sent by the Russian Tsar containing “many wise words from the divine scripture” could not be understood by their hosts since the translator was not able to translate them into Turkish.⁵⁹²

As the prominent Russian linguist and orientalist Aleksandr Kazembek notes in the introduction of his *General Grammar of the Turko-Tatar Language*, the Turko-Tatar language is divided into three main groups, namely (1) the Chaghatay [*tschagataische*], (2) Tatar [*tatarische*] and (3) Turkish [*türkische*], each of which further splits into dialects, while, noteworthy, the Kazan dialect, along with Turkmen and Uzbek, belongs to the first group and the Anatolian [*anatolisch*] and the Rumelian [*rumelisch*] dialect of Istanbul are presented as different dialects of the third group, along with Azerbaijani, Crimean and Derbend dialects.⁵⁹³

In practice, however, the characteristics of the languages could be much more complicated and in accordance with the style or purpose of expression might follow

⁵⁹² Khodarkovsky, “Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russia in the North Caucasus, 1550-1800,” p. 405.

⁵⁹³ Mirza A. Kasem-Beg, *Allgemeine Grammatik der türkisch-tatarischen Sprache*, trans. Julius Theodor Zenker (Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1848), p. xi.

grammatical structures of different languages and dialects.⁵⁹⁴ However, as an article on the Turks suggested, a Turk from as far as China would be able to immediately communicate with an Anatolian Turk from the Mediterranean with very slight confusion.⁵⁹⁵ *İctihâd* went even further by claiming – with a reference to a famed orientalist – that a Yakut from the banks of the Lena River could communicate with and easily comprehend someone from Istanbul.⁵⁹⁶

The necessity to reform the Turkic languages to make them grammatically and orthographically homogeneous and comprehensive was frequently mentioned in Ottoman and local Turkic press, where the language, as an essential part of the struggle for domination, often involved politics and discrepancies. Thus, the language reforms to be carried out in *jadîd* schools of Bukhara and Khiva were presented as an inevitable attempt to make the local vernacular [*lisân-i mahallî*] closer to the Ottoman Turkish.⁵⁹⁷

In the meantime, even the Ottoman authors accepted the compulsory nature of the Russian language education in the Russian Empire, claiming that the local population felt obliged to attend them since Russian was the official language of the courts and official institutions, adding that the teaching of national languages [*lisân-i millîye*] and religion in Russian schools was thoroughly neglected, which led to

⁵⁹⁴ M. Ilminsky, "Über die Sprache der Turkmenen," *Mélanges asiatiques tirés du Bulletin de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de St.-Pétersbourg*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (1860), p. 63.

⁵⁹⁵ Ahmed Zekî Velidî, "Türk ve Tâtâr Târihi," p. 30.

⁵⁹⁶ "Türk Lisânlarının Tevhîdi," *İctihâd*, No. 31 (15 Eylül 1327), p. 841.

⁵⁹⁷ "Buhârâ ve Hive," *Hikmet*, No. 4 (3 Djumâdâ 'l-Ûlâ 1328) [1910], p. 4.

moral degradation and weakening of national traditions.⁵⁹⁸ On the other hand, as an Ottoman traveler in Orenburg had picked up from his conversation with local Muslims, the reason behind the inclination of the youth towards the Russian language education was the competence and motivation of the Russian instructors “able to inculcate the spirit of the Russian language in students’ hearts,” compared to the incompetence of the instructors of Turkish language and literature there.⁵⁹⁹

With the rise of Turkish nationalism and abandonment of the previously vivid policy of Ottomanism, the study of the Turkish language and its depth and even superiority vis-à-vis Persian and Arabic became a popular topic in Ottoman press, for which the language of the Central Asian Turks, its history and traditions, became the cornerstone. Sometime the topic was elucidated by translations from prominent European Turkologists and represented a highly academic research on the history of Turkish languages.⁶⁰⁰

Around the same time, a lengthy series of articles entitled “The New Language” on the necessity of language reforms in the Turkic world that itself contained broad information on the Turkic languages in the Russian Empire appeared in *Genç Kalemler*.⁶⁰¹ The rise of the new Turkish language, as was mentioned in an article with an allusive title ‘Turkish vs. Enderûnish’ – the latter denoting the language of

⁵⁹⁸ “Kafkasyâ Müslümânları,” *Hikmet*, No. 4 (3 Djumâdâ ‘1-Ûlâ 1328), pp. 6-7.

⁵⁹⁹ H. Sâmi, “Rusya mektûbları,” *İslâm Dünyası*, Year 1, No. 8, p. 127.

⁶⁰⁰ For instance, Túri József, “Orta Asyâ Türkçesi Üzerine Tedkîkler,” *Millî Tetebbu’lar Mecmû’ası*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Mayıs-Hazirân 1331) [1915], pp. 206-233.

⁶⁰¹ *Genç Kalemler*, Vols. 3-4, Nos. 13-27 (1328).

enderûn, the officials of the Ottoman court presumably of non-Turkish origin and distant from the people – was linked to the calamities of the recent years: the Balkan Wars and the Great War. Emphasizing on the boom of *Turanian* restaurants, groceries and tailor shops within the last two-three years, the author claims that *all* the newborns now have Turkish names and states that “just like our fatherland is Turkey [*Türkiye*], our language is Turkish.”⁶⁰²

Similar approach was carried on in numerous other articles of the same journal, namely “Not Ottoman but Turkish”⁶⁰³ and “Who Would Call Turkish Ottoman?”⁶⁰⁴ However, not everybody was so optimistic about the existence and domination of the real and new Turkish language. As a response to an article published in *The Times* that asserted that the only way to solve the language problem in Turkey that reminds of Babel was by imposition of Turkish as a sole official language in the country, the Ottoman *Türk Derneği* stated:⁶⁰⁵

The peoples that live in the Ottoman lands are not only [of] Turkish [stock]. There are Lazes, Kurds, Albanians, Arabs, Greeks [*rûm*], Armenians and other nations [*cinsler*]. Before learning Turkish an Arab should first learn Persian. In order to understand Ottoman, a Laz or Greek ought first to know Arabic and Persian.

⁶⁰² “Türkçeye Karşı Enderûnca,” *Türk Sözü*, Year 1, No. 4 (1 Mayıs 1330), p. 25.

⁶⁰³ “Osmânîca Değil Türkçe,” *Türk Sözü*, Year 1, No. 5 (8 Mayıs 1330) [1914], pp. 33-35.

⁶⁰⁴ “Türkçe’ye Kimler Osmânîca Der,” *Türk Sözü*, Year 1, No. 7 (22 Mayıs 1330) [1914], pp. 49-50.

⁶⁰⁵ “Dilimiz,” *Türk Derneği*, Year 1, No. 1 (1327) [1911-1912], p. 20.

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIA AND OTTOMAN WARTIME PROPAGANDA

4.1 RUSSIA AND THE OTTOMAN ROAD TO THE GREAT WAR

As G. P. Gooch mentions in his book *Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy*, it was the Russian Empire that ought to be considered as “the leading power in Turkey,” since it “could exert the strongest pressure” on it and would not wish to see it too strong, but in case of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the primary concern of the Tsarist state would be to assure “that no other Power gained a dominating position on the Bosphorus.”⁶⁰⁶ Despite general perception, the Russian policy tools were not confined to military threat or the exertion of pressure upon the Ottoman Government and its public, but had at its disposal certain financial instruments obtained through

⁶⁰⁶ G. P. Gooch, *Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy*, Vol. 1 (London, New York and Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1936), p. 194.

the acquisition of controlling shares in Ottoman banks and often resorted to its traditional policy of bribing the local newspapers.⁶⁰⁷

4.1.1 Russia and the Origins of the War

In a report presented by British consulate just before the First World War on social, economic and military effects of the Balkan Wars on the Ottoman Government and society, censorship and press restrictions as well as “the unreliable news coverage and corresponding public reaction of disbelief or resignation” was mentioned.⁶⁰⁸ Moreover, throughout the war and despite the scarce and vague elucidation of certain strategic and political matters even within the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman press was, nevertheless, devoted to detailed coverage of famine, drought, fires, riots and other calamities befalling the country of Russia.⁶⁰⁹

As was recorded by Maurice Paléologue, the French Ambassador to the Tsarist court, even after the formal procurement of *Goeben* and *Breslau* by the Ottoman Navy, the Russian Government still hoped to secure the neutrality of the Ottoman Empire, since the Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov said that “if we don’t take immediate action Turkey is lost to us... not merely lost to us but she’ll come out against us! And *then* we shall have to distribute our forces over the Black Sea coast

⁶⁰⁷ I. V. Bestuzhev, “Russian Foreign Policy: February – June 1914,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (July 1966), pp. 110-111.

⁶⁰⁸ Glen W. Swanson, “A Note on the Ottoman Socio-Economic Structure and its Response to the Balkan War of 1912,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 1978), p. 124.

⁶⁰⁹ “Moskva’da Ahvâl - Tahribâtın Derecesi,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1256 (18 Sha’bân 1333) [1915], p. 128.

and the Armenian and Persian frontiers!”⁶¹⁰ Although towards the First World War, the Tsarist Government was eager to take up remedies for the improvement of relations with the Ottoman Government damaged after the Balkan Wars and to assure at least its neutrality, the influential strata of the Russian society, including the landlords and bourgeoisie, still sought the final dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.⁶¹¹

The presentation of the Russian expansionist and belligerent policy at the time of the First World War was often accompanied in the Ottoman press by the dichotomous peaceful policy of the German Empire, and not only in connection with the Ottoman state. At the same time, “the Russian Tsarist regime was not directed only against Germany, but was threatening the whole world. The Autocracy [*istibdâd*] always tried to distract the attention of the public from inside [of the country] to outside and is in desperate need for external disturbances.”⁶¹² Moreover, eager to present Russia as the instigator and the primary beneficiary of the Great War, the Ottoman press was often presenting Germany as a victim of Tsarist intrigues and secret war preparations that forced it to self-defense.⁶¹³

⁶¹⁰ Maurice Paléologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs by Maurice Paléologue (Last French Ambassador to the Russian Court)*, trans. F. A. Hold, 4th ed., Vol. 1 (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1925), p. 80.

⁶¹¹ Bestuzhev, “Russian Foreign Policy: February – June 1914,” p. 110.

⁶¹² “İslavlar ve Almanlar,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1281 (29 Safar 1334), p. 92.

⁶¹³ See, for instance, “Harb-i ‘Umûmînin Esbâbını İzâh,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1215 (26 Shawwâl 1332) [1914], p. 300.

Accepting that neither Ottomans, nor Russians, these “two great nations of the Orient,” were satisfied with the current trend of affairs, an Ottoman author states that for hundreds of years the Russian statesmen conducted a steady policy of aggression and disturbance, adding that “Turkey had already renounced its principle of conquests, while the Russian diplomacy never intended to change its old policy.”⁶¹⁴ Besides, on 5 July 1914, a few days after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand when the escalation of the war seemed unavoidable, the Ottoman navy journal *Donanma* published a series of articles with an intriguing title “One Hundred Projects on the Partition of Turkey,” which revealed to the Ottoman reader the European intrigues to divide Turkey from the Middle Ages on, where countries like Russia, Britain and France, as well as the Holy See were of primary concern.⁶¹⁵

One of the main themes in the Ottoman justification of the warfare and the wartime policies not only in religious terms but also in terms of justice and fairness was the emphasis on the inherent magnanimity and historical rightfulness of the Ottoman state in general and the Ottoman army in particular. As Doctor Abdullâh Cevdet stated,⁶¹⁶

For Islam had obliged respect to be the inalienable part of political agreements, the political morality of Muslim governments is unshakeable. For instance, among all existing states there is not any that had fought and struggled for the right and justice as did the Ottoman state.

⁶¹⁴ “Türkiye – Rusya,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1036 (14 Rabî’ al-Âkhir 1329), p. 507.

⁶¹⁵ “Türkiye’nin Taksîmi Hakkında Yüz Proje,” *Donanma*, No. 50-2 (5 Temmûz 1914), p. 28.

⁶¹⁶ Doktor Abdullâh Cevdet, “Avrupa Ahlâk-ı Siyâsiyesi,” *Hürriyet-i Fikrîyye*, No. 6 (13 Mart 1330), p. 11.

However, not everybody in the pre-war Ottoman Empire was eager to present the Tsarist state as the archenemy of Turks and Muslims and some impartial and fairly liberal interpretations also appeared in Ottoman journals. Thus, an article in *Tercümân-i Hakikât* entitled “Russia’s Concerns” had quoted excerpts from an article from Russian *Novoe vremia*, stating:⁶¹⁷

Since the incompetence [*ehliyyetsizliği*] of Turkish statesmen is so apparent, the antagonist [*adâvetkârâne*] policies they adopted against Russia would pave the way for the inevitable destruction of the Turkish Empire [*Türkiyâ İmparâtôrluğu*]. Whenever Russia tried to help Turkey, in the end it was always left without benefit and result. We saved the Sultan from the Khedive of Egypt, freed modern Turkey from Austrian aggression, and at the time when its domestic affairs were in great disorder, we save the country from Bulgarian assaults. For this, we had spent 25 million roubles and all in vain.

Even some Ottoman authors were often aware of the artificial impasse of the mutual perception of the Ottoman and Russian press. A couple of years before the war, an article in *Servet-i Fünûn* stated that “the time has changed. Russia is no longer the old Muscovite state; it is a new great Russia. And it does not matter how irresolute the Russian press and even the Russian people might be about Turkey. Our situation is the same. However, these should not be an obstacle for a great endeavor.”⁶¹⁸ Even on the eve of the Balkan Wars, the time when Russia was regarded as force behind all separatist and anti-Ottoman movements⁶¹⁹ in the European provinces of the empire, the Ottoman author compassionately uttered:⁶²⁰

⁶¹⁷ “Rusya’nın Endişeleri,” *Tercümân-i Hakikât* (7 April [Nisân-i efrencî] 1913), p. 2.

⁶¹⁸ “Türkiye – Rusya,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1036 (14 Rabî’ al-Âkhir 1329), p. 510.

⁶¹⁹ Indeed, as often stated, the Russian Empire was enthusiastic about preserving the integrity of the Ottoman state that went as far as exerting pressure on the Balkan governments to cut off help for anti-Ottoman movements. See, M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), pp. 291-292.

⁶²⁰ “Türkiye – Rusya,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1036 (14 Rabî’ al-Âkhir 1329), p. 507.

Both the Ottomans and Russians followed the wrong path. Lots of blood has been spilt. Numerous devastations led to nothing but bloodshed. As a result, both nations mourned over a lot. Both states found themselves under great material and moral responsibilities.

Stressing on the importance and vitality of the Russo-Ottoman friendship and cooperation for both governments and nations, for which the recently founded Russian-Ottoman Society [*Rûs-Osmânî cem'iyeti*] played an important role, an Ottoman author claimed a few month before the war.⁶²¹

While we intend to widen and strengthen our friendly relations with Russia and Russians, we take into consideration that it would be impossible to free ourselves from the economic and political influence of such a great neighbor of ours, we ought to reach a consensus from the very beginning, set our common interests and achieve friendship and intimacy on this basis.

As could have been expected, the thorough anti-Russian propaganda in the Ottoman periodical press started with the very declaration of the war through *irâde-i seniyye* by Sultan Mehmed V Reşâd long before the warfare reached its active stage. The text of the declaration that appeared in *İslâm Mecmû'ası* under an inspirational title “Cihâd-i Ekber İ'lânı,” the Declaration of the Greatest *Jihâd*,⁶²² not only contained misinformation about the Black Sea incident and certainly intended to present the Ottoman state as a rightful victim, but, expectedly, exposed Russia as an aggressive expansionist country by employing the traditional Ottoman fears.

As the *irâde* pronounced, the Russo-Ottoman naval collision in the Black Sea occurred between some battleships of the Imperial Ottoman Navy [*Donanmâ-i*

⁶²¹ “Livâdyâ ziyâreti,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, Vol. 47, No. 1197 (18 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1332), p. 2.

⁶²² The text of the *irâde-i seniyye* appeared in several, for instance, “Hâl-i Harb İdâre-i Seniyyesi” *Cihân-i İslâm*, No. 50, pp. 5-6.

hümâyûn] and a group of Russian Navy battleships, “whose task, as lately became obvious, was to install mines in the Black Sea Strait” [*Kara Deniz Boğâzına tûrpîl [torpille] dökme vazîfesi ile hareket ittiği bil’âhire ânlaşulan*].⁶²³ Interestingly, just a few years before the war an Ottoman author was confidently claiming that “in the 20th century the transformation of the Black Sea into a Russian lake by Russia is just as impossible as the Turkish assault of the Russian coasts there [in the Black Sea].”⁶²⁴ Moreover, the Russian advance into the Caucasus, which was depicted by the Ottoman press as a raid of the same nature with the Russian attack on the Straits, was assumed in the official Ottoman wartime reports as an action planned and prepared for a long time.⁶²⁵ Taking into consideration that the reports on the secret Russian war preparations and disposition of its troops at its western and southern borders were frequently reported in the Ottoman press from as early as 1912,⁶²⁶ the presentation of the very fact of the Ottoman engagement into the Great War as an elaborately planned Russian game might have been found reliable.

Following the *irâde* on the declaration of wartime, the manifest of the Sultan to the Ottoman army elaborated the righteousness of the Ottoman State by employing certain legal notions, and once more dwelled on traditional antagonist aspirations of the enemies over the Ottoman domain. According to the manifest, “Our state and country that incessantly endured sudden and unjust aggression called you up under

⁶²³ “Cihâd-i Ekber İ’lânı,” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 15 (30 Dhu l’-Hidjdja 1332) [1914], p. 437.

⁶²⁴ “Türkiye – Rusya,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1036 (14 Rabî’ al-Âkhir 1329), p. 510.

⁶²⁵ “Kafkasya’daki Muhârebâtın Târîhçesi,” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 15 (30 Dhu l’-Hidjdja 1332), p. 443.

⁶²⁶ “Rûsya’nın Hazırlıkları,” *Salâ-i Millet*, No. 3 (21 Dhu l’-Hidjdja 1330) [1912].

arms to duly defend our lawful existence [*hukûk mevcûdiyetini*] against opportunist enemies.”⁶²⁷ Elaborating on the immediate cause of the conflict, the Sultan once more mention the Russian ships advancing to the Black Sea Strait to install mines and whose encounter with Ottoman battleships conducting maneuvers in the area ended up in “sudden firing” on the latter, which, in its turn, became the cause of the breach of the Ottomans’ ‘armed neutrality’ [*müsellâh bî-taraflık*] and afterwards, the Russian troops invaded our Eastern borders.⁶²⁸

Theoretically, this neutrality was retained up until the Black Sea incident, since, formally, the *İttihâd ve Terakkî* resolution of March 1914 asserted that in case of general European war, the Ottoman Empire should not support Germany and ought to take a strictly neutral position without complicating its relations with France and especially with Russia, and what is more astounding, this statement was claimed to be proposed by Enver Pasha himself.⁶²⁹

Contrary to the decree and manifest of the Sultan, the appeal of the Supreme Military Command by Enver Pasha had an apparent populist and invigorating style and frequently addressed its audience as ‘friends’ [*ârkadâşlar*] and ‘brothers’ [*kardâşlar*] and despite the fiasco of the Ottoman troops during the Balkan Wars, had a self-reliant mood as it uttered that “up to now, on the ground and in the sea,

⁶²⁷ “Beyânnâme-i Hümâyûn Sûreti,” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 15 (30 Dhu l’-Hidjdja 1332), p. 438.

⁶²⁸ Ibid., p. 438.

⁶²⁹ V. N. Vinogradov, ed., *Za Balkanskimi frontami Pervoi mirovoi voyny* (Moscow: “Indrik,” 2002), p. 43.

the heroism displayed by my officer and soldier brothers is the greatest evidence that our enemies would be demolished.”⁶³⁰ Interestingly, the appeal of the acting Supreme Commander-in-Chief [*baş kûmândân vekîli*] Enver Pasha had no mention of the Turkic world whatsoever, but extensively referred to the Islamic and Pan-Islamic theme. Along with the 300 million Muslims and “our former citizens” [*eski vatandâşlarımız*] praying for the Ottoman victory, it mentioned the souls of the Prophet, his prominent companions [*sahâbe-i güzîn*] and ‘our glorious ancestors’ hovering around our heads, so “if we want to prove that we are their real descendants and if we want to avoid the curse of our scions, we ought to act.”⁶³¹

Âkçûrâoğlu Yûsuf, the then the editor-in-chief of *Türk Yurdu* who had claimed that “among all the belligerents, no one is as righteous as the Ottomans,” stated, “I do not remember whether the Muslims and Ottomans ever waged a more just war than this.”⁶³² The fact that made this war special compared to all previous wars waged by the Ottomans was the notion that the final victory would bring freedom to all the *Turks* of the Russian Empire.⁶³³ In fact, even a Republican Turkish author would later summarize the whole course of the Russo-Ottoman relations as a confrontation between the Turks, “who always acted with justice and honesty [*hakkanîyet ve*

⁶³⁰ “Baş Kumandanlık Vekâletinin Beyânnâmesi Sûreti,” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 15 (30 Dhu l’-Hidjdja 1332), p. 441.

⁶³¹ Ibid., p. 441.

⁶³² “Cihân Harbi ve Türkler,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (11 Kânûn-i evvel 1330) [1914], p. 2430.

⁶³³ *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (5 Mart 1331) [1915], p. 2519.

*dürüstlük*le]” and Russians, who would resort to trick [*hîle*] in times of weakness and to threat [*tehdid*] in times of confidence.⁶³⁴

Except the nationalistic and religious nature of the Ottoman wartime proclamations in the press, the vow of vengeance against Russians was frequently expressed. Thus, probably having a hidden reference to the Caucasian migrants from Russia, *İslâm Mecmû'ası* excitedly uttered that “regardless of nationality and creed [*mezheb*], all Muslims of Turkey have a grudge with an intense feeling of vengeance.”⁶³⁵ In addition, numerous articles on the history of the Russo-Ottoman wars and reminiscences of its participants were published throughout the war. Moreover, these publications, as did the *tebrîknâme* by Diyâr Bekîrlî Sa'îd Pasha, dwelled mainly on the aggressive and atrocious nature of the Russian state and people rather than the events of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 themselves.⁶³⁶

4.1.2 Russia and the Holy War

The sacred character of the Russo-Ottoman Wars, known in Russian as Russo-Turkish Wars [*russko-turetskie voyny*], was propagated by both sides for a long time, although in the light of Pan-Slavism and later Pan-Turkism, it obtained much more elaborate and at the same time popular nature. As Ivan Aksakov, the famed ideologist of Slavophilism, stated at his public speech in September 1877, the

⁶³⁴ Kadir Mısıroğlu, *Moskof Mezâlimi* (Istanbul: Sebil Yayinevi, 1976), p. 89.

⁶³⁵ “Beyânnâme-i Cihâd,” *İslâm Mecmû'ası*, Year 1, No. 16 (14 Muharram 1333) [1914], p. 459.

⁶³⁶ “Tebrik-i Cihâd,” *Edebiyyât-i 'Umûmiyye Mecmû'ası*, Vol. 1, No. 11 (31 Kânûn-i evvel 1332) [1917], p. 206.

conduct of the warfare against the Ottomans was “a natural and involuntary moral duty” and “an inescapable sacred task imposed upon it [Russian people] by Providence,” since it was a war “waged *for the faith*, for Orthodox Christians who moreover belong to its own racial stock, who were oppressed and tormented by the wicked enemies of Christ, the Asiatic Moslems.”⁶³⁷ Simultaneously, the incorporation of the notion of *jihâd* into wartime propaganda had already gained strength during the Balkan Wars⁶³⁸ and, in fact, did not slacken its pace up until the First World War.

On the other hand, towards the outburst of the First World War, the growing anti-European sentiments in the Ottoman press were catching up with the growth of Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist publications. Referring to the foreign schools in the Ottoman Empire, an article in *Ma'lûmât* with an instigating title “The Hearth of Mischief” published a few months before the war revealed centuries-long intrigues of the Europeans to destroy and tear down the Ottoman state and warned that sending a child to a foreign schools was a treason to the Fatherland and nation.⁶³⁹ It ought to be noted, that the accusations were not targeting Germany directly, since unlike British or French, the Germans themselves were frequently complaining about the lack of educational institutions in the Ottoman Empire.

⁶³⁷ “Writings of Ivan S. Aksakov, 1863-1883,” in *A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917*, ed. George Vernadsky *et al.*, Vol. 3 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 658.

⁶³⁸ See, for instance, “Wa jâhidû fî sabîl-i-Ilâh,” *Sebilü'r-Reşâd*, Vol. 8-1, No. 183-1 (19 Rabî' al-Awwal 1330); and “Cihâd - i Mukaddes İ'lânı,” *Sebilü'r-Reşâd*, Vol. 8-1, No. 183-1 (19 Rabî' al-Awwal 1330) [1912], p. 16.

⁶³⁹ “Fesâd Ocakları,” *Ma'lûmât*, Year 1, No. 13 (8 Mayıs 1330) [1914], pp. 193-194.

Indeed, the very notion of the warfare, whether offensive or defensive, obtains certain character in traditional Islam and its interpretation depending on the part it is conducted, so that, according to Ibn Khaldûn, any warfare conducted by Muslims, including the offensive one, is not only legitimate, but also a holy war, or *jihâd*, since “they have a universal mission to lead all populations to join the Islamic religion.”⁶⁴⁰ However, the Central Asian and later Anatolian tradition of even pre-Ottoman times sets up a difference between *jihâd* and *ghâzâ*, the first being “a duty incumbent upon all Muslims, [that] refers to defense of Muslim cities against invasion by ‘infidel’ armies,” while the latter refers to “invasion of ‘infidel’ lands by Muslims authorized by the caliph or to defense of far-distant parts of Muslim territory.”⁶⁴¹

Following the declaration of war by the Ottoman Sultan, the *fatwâ* by the Ottoman *şeyh-ül-islâm* Ürgüplü Hayrî Efendî⁶⁴² that justified the religious and spiritual grounds of the war appeared in Ottoman periodicals. Structured in the traditional Ottoman pattern, this *fetvâ-i şerîf* contained five issues [*mes’ele*] concerning different features of the war and answers to them [*el-cevâb*] shortly expressed as ‘yes’ [*olûr, olûrlar*]. Interestingly, the expression of self-identification, Pan-Islamic

⁶⁴⁰ Sami A. Adeeb Abu-Sahlieh, “The Islamic Conception of Migration,” *International Migration Review*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 40.

⁶⁴¹ Linda Darling, “Contested Territory: Ottoman Holy War in Comparative Context,” *Studia Islamica*, No. 91 (2000), p. 140.

⁶⁴² Or Khayrî bin Awnî al-Urkûbî, as he signed his *fetvâ-i şerîf* in Arabic. For the text of the *fatwâ* see also “Fetâvâ-i Şerîfe,” *Cihân-i İslâm*, No. 50, pp. 6-7; and “Fetâvâ-i Şerîfe,” *Donanma*, No. 68-20 (16 Teşrîn-i sâni 1914).

solidarity of the Ottomans and the title of the Sultan differed in each of these questions from Islamic countries [*memâlik-i islâmiyye*] and the Sovereign of Islam [*pâdişâh-i islâm*] to the Islamic Caliphate [*hilâfet-i islâmiye*], Islamic Government [*hükümet-i islâmiye*] and Islamic Population [*ahâlî-i islâmiye*].⁶⁴³ It ought to be noted that most of its issues concerned and addressed the Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire.

In brief, the *fetvâ-i şerîf* assured that: (1) at the time when Islam is assaulted and Islamic population is threatened by annihilation and imprisonment, the physical and material contribution of every Muslim to the holy war is an individual and unavoidable obligation [*farz-i ‘ayn*]; (2) it is an obligation [*farz*] for the Muslim population of Russia, Britain and France to declare *jihâd* against these governments and actually joint it; (3) even if they were threatened by death or the extermination of their families, fighting against the soldiers of the Islamic Government [i.e. Ottoman State] is absolutely forbidden [*harâm-i kat’î*] by religious law and the infringers would be thrown to infernal fire [*nâr-i cahîm*]; (4) the fighting of the Muslim subjects of Britain, France, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro against Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman allies, would harm the Islamic Caliphate and those who fought would suffer grievous wrath [*gazâb-i elîm*].⁶⁴⁴

⁶⁴³ “Cihâd-i Ekber ve Fetvâ-i Şerîf,” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 15 (30 Dhu l’-Hidjdja 1332) [1914], p. 440.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 440-441.

Ironically, in 1909, following the *de jure* annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, the anti-Austrian stance of the Ottoman periodicals extended even into a hidden pro-Serbian mood. Reporting on the ‘noteworthy’ Serbian response to the Austrian ultimatum, the Ottoman *İ’tidâl* stated that “the Foreign Office of the Serbian Government is entrusted to really powerful hands who are competent to conduct a foreign policy that considers the true needs of the country.”⁶⁴⁵ Interestingly, some journals published by the Muslims of Russian Empire indirectly notified their readers of the issue of the *fetvâ-i şerîf*, as did the Kazan journal *Añ*, which printed a photograph of the famous proclamation of *cihâd-i ekber* with a short note saying: “The *şeyh-ül-islâm* of Turkey is proclaiming the *fetvâ* on the declaration of war in Istanbul [*İstânbûlda Törkiâniñ şäyx-ul-islâmı sûğış iğlân itälü toğrısında fetvâ uqıy*],”⁶⁴⁶ naturally avoiding the term *jihâd*.

Referring to the analysis of a German newspaper on the Balkan Wars, Moise Cohen wrote in 1914 that “Turkish soldiers would not have been able to exhibit their bravery in that war, because there was no final goal that would inspire them to heroism. In older times, [however,] *jihâd* had occupied a great place in the Turkish soldiers’ minds.”⁶⁴⁷ However, as a Russian war journalist had extracted from the confessions of captive Ottoman soldiers, the war was not popular among the majority of soldiers, while the Arabs are eager to surrender simply because they could not endure the cold; they were hungry, poorly dressed, intimidated, perceived

⁶⁴⁵ “Siyâset,” *İ’tidâl*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (28 Safar 1327) [1909], p. 1.

⁶⁴⁶ *Añ*, No. 2 (31 January 1915), p. 32.

⁶⁴⁷ M. Cohen, *Türkler Bu Muhârebede Ne Kazanabilirler?* (Istanbul: “Türk Yurdu,” 1330), p. 5.

the *fatwâ* as a mere order and lacked patriotism and incentive.⁶⁴⁸ Whether efficiently or not, some authors tried to cheer up the Ottomans' courage and piety by connecting the previous failures of the Ottoman army and loss of territories to the immorality [*ahlâksızlık*] of their lifestyles,⁶⁴⁹ while some were alerting beforehand by exclaiming: "Come to belief, since a nation can be destroyed only because of [its] moral feebleness."⁶⁵⁰

Apart from Pan-Turkism that had been so vigorously propagated during the war, but had, in fact, not much practical implementation, the idea of *jihâd* and religious affiliation was the matter of primary concern and perception of the Russian troops in their warfare with the Ottomans. As is mentioned in a collection of memories of the Russian soldiers who participated in the war, published in 1916 under an over-romantic title *The Second Patriotic War According to the Reminiscence of its Heroes*,⁶⁵¹ the Russian troops often encountered the Arabs, who, unlike the regular Turkish soldiers, often shot all the night through, although, as the witnesses suggested, just in order to warm themselves.⁶⁵²

In his book *What Turks Could Gain from this War?* Moise Cohen, the prominent inspirer of the Pan-Turkist ideal, was very hesitant to accept the rise of Pan-Turkism

⁶⁴⁸ *Vtoraia Otechestvennaia voina po razskazam eia geroev* (Petrograd: Izdaniie sostoiashchago pod Vysochaishim Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Gosudaria Imperatora pokrovitel'stvom Skobelevskago

Komiteta, 1916), pp. 189-190.

⁶⁴⁹ "Türk'ün Beyâz Kâtîli," *Türk Sözü*, Year 1, No. 12 (26 Hazirân 1330) [1914], p. 90.

⁶⁵⁰ "Cihâd yâ Muslimîn...", *Donanma*, No. 68-20 (16 Teşrîn-i sânî 1914).

⁶⁵¹ The first or, simply, the Patriotic War [*Otechestvennaia voina*] is the Franco-Russian war during the French invasion of Russia in 1812.

⁶⁵² *Vtoraia Otechestvennaia voina po razskazam eia geroev*, p. 148.

in the Ottoman Empire, claiming it to be exaggerated by false and erroneous [*yalan yanlış*] assumptions of the European press, adding that despite the rise of national spirit [*vicdân-i millî*] among the Ottomans, there was no considerable rise of Pan-Turkism apart from certain isolated instances.⁶⁵³ He, nevertheless, considered the existence of twelve – fifteen million Ottoman Turks insufficient for the formation of a Turkish culture, so the cooperation of the forty – fifty million foreign Turks would be compulsory.⁶⁵⁴

It comes as no surprise that the Crusade – *jihâd* dichotomy was employed as an essential part of the war propaganda not only by the Ottomans and Russians, but also for Britain, which controlled at the time of the First World War a Muslim population over one hundred million.⁶⁵⁵ Thus, the capture of Jerusalem by the British troops from the Ottomans in December 1917 was vividly presented in British press as the *Last Crusade*, the *Modern Crusade*, or the *New Crusade*, although some British officials and military men had objected the presentation of the conflict as a Christian – Muslim confrontation, taking into consideration its Muslim subjects and even deprecated questioning of the Caliphate, preferring *The Turk Must Go* slogan instead.⁶⁵⁶ As a British report from Mosul previously confirmed, “the Christians universally rejoiced at the overthrow of Turkey, while the Moslems were for the

⁶⁵³ Cohen, *Türkler Bu Muhârebede Ne Kazanabilirler?* p. 3.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁵ Samuel M. Zwemer, “A New Census of the Muslim World,” *Journal of American Oriental Society*, Vol. 44 (1924), p. 30.

⁶⁵⁶ Eitan Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917-18,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January 2001), pp. 87-109.

most part indifferent. If they felt any annoyance it was as Moslems and not as Turkish subjects.”⁶⁵⁷

Similarly, upon the Ottoman engagement into the First World War, numerous articles on the nature of *jihâd* and its place and justification by the Islamic law started appearing in Ottoman periodical press. As “Religion and War” acknowledged thoroughly using quotations from Qur’ân, “the Muslims do not fight for personal and arbitrary causes,” while *jihâd* is bound to the greater cause and is both permitted and obligatory.⁶⁵⁸ At the same time, the outburst of the war came out as an opportunity to strengthen the image of the Caliphate not only outside, but also within the Empire, as did “What Kind of a Caliph the Enemies of the Caliphate Want?” by stating that “the Caliphate of Islam is not a weak [*kuvvetsiz*] and humble [*şevketsiz*] institution like Papacy that only has religious guardianship and spiritual governance.”⁶⁵⁹

Interestingly, the anti-Russian character of agitations among the Muslims was noted by Ismail Gasprinsky to be a manipulation by Western Europeans, whose primary intention was to present Russia as a destroyer and bitterest enemy of Islam and Western culture.⁶⁶⁰ As Hasan Kayalı similarly asserts, the very notion of *jihâd*

⁶⁵⁷ Swanson, “A Note on the Ottoman Socio-Economic Structure and its Response to the Balkan War of 1912,” p. 123.

⁶⁵⁸ “Din ve Harb,” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, Year 2, No. 42 (7 Djumâdâ ‘l-Ûlâ 1334) [1916], p. 881.

⁶⁵⁹ “Hilâfet Düşmânları Nasıl Bir Halife İstiyor?” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, Year 2, No. 46 (9 Dhu l’-Ka’dâ 1334) [1916], p. 939/

⁶⁶⁰ Ismail Gasprinsky, “Russko-Vostochnoe soglashenie: Mysli, zametki i pozhelaniia Ismaila Gasprinskogo,” in Ismail Bey Gasprinsky, *Rossii i Vostok* (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1993), p. 63.

during the First World War was not meant to arouse an overall hatred against Christian Europeans; instead, it intended “to achieve more limited aims consistent with and supported by the ideological and political circumstances preceding it,”⁶⁶¹ just like Russian Pan-Slavism was, in the eyes of Moise Cohen, “not really directed towards the union of all Slav nations, but the extension and glorification of Russian despotism by means of Slav nations.”⁶⁶² Interestingly, an article in *Cihân-i İslâm* on the individual obligation of *jihâd* for every Muslim in the world, started with a mention of the Testament of Peter the Mad [*Deli Petro*],⁶⁶³ as the Ottomans referred to Emperor Peter I of Russia, whose implementation became the backbone of Tsarist policy, adding, among other things, that the Russian state formed commissions to restrict and forbid the Qur’ân and ban calls for prayer [*ezân*].⁶⁶⁴

However, already in 1833, the Russian Emperor Nicholas I had issued a decree [*ukaz*] that stipulated the implementation and performance of all Islamic liabilities and obligations by the Muslims of the Russian Empire and even ordered to punish the apostates.⁶⁶⁵ One of the evident signs of Tsarist involvement in religious affairs of its Muslim population was the increase in the number of religious edifices in the

⁶⁶¹ Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1997), p. 187.

⁶⁶² Tekin Alp, *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal* (Weimar: Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1915), The National Archives (Washington, D.C.), Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents “Special Reports and Studies,” 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 579, p. 60.

⁶⁶³ Although infrequently, the Russian Emperor was also referred as *Koca Petro* [Peter the Great]. See for instance, *Edebiyyât-i ‘Umûmiyye Mecmû’ası*, Vol. 1, No. 6 (13 Safar 1335) [1916], p. 113.

⁶⁶⁴ “Cihâd Farz-i ‘Ayn Olmuş İdi,” *Cihân-i İslâm*, No. 51, p. 1.

⁶⁶⁵ R. G. Abdulatipov, *Sud’by islama v Rossii: Istoriia i perspektivy* (Moscow: “Mysl’,” 2002), p. 121.

newly conquered areas of Central Asia, so that, for instance, the number of prayer houses in the district of Merv increased from three in 1893 to 233 in 1911.⁶⁶⁶

As for the Islamic propaganda in the Russian Empire, already in the second half of the 19th century, General Konstantin Kaufman, the governor-general of Turkestan, was complaining about the activities of the Tatar mullahs who undermined Russian rule by spreading fanatical propaganda of Islam and proposed, for that reason, to ban the settlement of Tatars in Turkestan *krai*.⁶⁶⁷ As a response towards the strengthening of Pan-Islamic ideas among the Muslims of the Russian Empire around the time of the Great War, the Tsarist government also tried to resort to the means of Islamic propaganda, for which the official Muslim clergy and institutions served as the main buttress. Thus, an official part of the Muslims prayer that begged the Merciful and Beneficial God for the longevity, health and protection from all earthly and heavenly misfortunes for the gracious Sovereign, also asked for making Nicholas II ‘the protector of *sharī’a*’ who would save the Muslims from offenders and misfortune.⁶⁶⁸ At the same time, the Russian Muslim press was eagerly reporting on the deterioration of the Ottoman Sultan’s health, whose condition in January 1915 was found ‘very grave’.⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁶ Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii*, p. 73.

⁶⁶⁷ N. S. Kiniapina, M. M. Bliev and V. V. Degoev, *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii (Vtoraia polovina XVIII – 80-e gody XIX v.)* (Moscow: “Izdatel’svo Moskovskogo Universiteta,” 1984), p. 295.

⁶⁶⁸ Liutsian Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Antireligioznoe Izdatel’svo, 1936), p. 80.

⁶⁶⁹ *Sādā-i Türkestān*, No. 54 (6 January 1915), p. 2.

Soon after the issue of the famous *fatwâ* by the Ottoman *şeyh-ül-islâm* and, in fact, as a response to it, *mufîî* Sultanov, the head of the Orenburg Mohammedan Religious Assembly, urged the Muslims of Russia in his appeals of 14 October and 11 November to march off not only against Germany and Austria-Hungary, but also against the Ottoman co-religionists and stated that “the Russian State is our fatherland, which is dear and lovely to our Muslim hearts just like it is for the hearts of every people living in it.”⁶⁷⁰ At the same time, the Imperial decrees and appeals published in Muslim journals throughout the war often followed the Islamic style, as was the decree of the Majestic Padishah [*Şâvkâtlü Padişâh*] Nicholas II to assume the authority of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief by the mercy of Allah [*Allâ’niñ mârhamâti*].⁶⁷¹

Indeed, even after the Ottoman engagement into the Great War, not only did “the Muslims and Turks living in Russia wish this victory in all sincerity,” but even the Muslim clergy in the person of Imam Aga Khan of the *Ismâ’îlî* sect was actively enrolled into the Tsarist propaganda, so that the appeal of the latter despising the Turkish involvement into this insanity “under the arbitrariness of German and other non-Muslim commanders” was broadly spread among the Muslim population of the Caucasus.⁶⁷²

⁶⁷⁰ *Tsarskaia armiia v period mirovoi voiny i Fevral’skoi revoliutsii* (Kazan: 1932), p. 175; cited by S. I. Iskhakov, “Pervaia mirovaia voina glazami rosiiskikh musul’man,” in *Rossii i Pervaia mirovaia voia (Materialy mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kollokviuma)* (St. Petersburg: “DB,” 1999), p. 420.

⁶⁷¹ “Padişâh-i A’zamımız Ğâskâr Bâsında,” *Añ*, No. 17 (28 September 1915), p. 2.

⁶⁷² *Açıq söz* (1 January 1916) and TsGIA Gruz. SSR, f. 2s, d. 3957, ll. 2-3; both cited by Sh. I. Basilaia, *Zakavkaz’e v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny* (Sukhumi: “Alashara,” 1968), p. 79.

As a part of the information warfare for which the elucidation and interpretation of strategic and political events in press held a vital position, the zemstvo agriculture journals in the Volga-Ural region previously published in Russian, introduced Tatar language editions from autumn 1914 on and added a special section on the war news.⁶⁷³ Moreover, the Russian Muslim clergy played an active role in supporting Tsarist wartime policies not only materially by collecting sizeable donations for army needs, but also served as a part of the Tsarist propaganda machine, for which even the Bukharan mosques were used to propagate the news of the Russian military success during public worship.⁶⁷⁴ Consequently, even the Amir of Bukhara donated from his personal wealth one million roubles for the expenses of the Russian Army during the war.⁶⁷⁵

Indeed, the donations by the Muslims for the Tsarist army needs in the war against the Ottomans was not a unique phenomenon for the First World War, since already during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 the notables of Aq Masjid (present-day Qyzylorda, Kazakhstan) handed to governor-general Kaufman a donation of 10,000 roubles for the wounded Russian soldiers.⁶⁷⁶ However, Akdes Nimet Kurat presents the sizeable donations in a different light by claiming that the ‘donations’ of as much as 2.4 million roubles were indeed imposed on the population of Turkestan by governor-general Alexei Kuropatkin as extraordinary wartime taxes and a great

⁶⁷³ Scott J. Seregny, “Zemstvos, Peasants, and Citizenship: The Russian Adult Education Movement and the World War I,” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 302.

⁶⁷⁴ Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii*, p. 296.

⁶⁷⁵ *Türkestân vilâyetiniñ gazyeti*, No. 1 (1 January 1916), p. 1.

⁶⁷⁶ Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 71.

part of them were shared out by Russian generals and high officials and never reached those in need.⁶⁷⁷

Interestingly, in late July 1916, the government-controlled *Türkestân Vilâyatiniñ Gazyeti* that was published in Central Asian Turkic language, hastened to announce that the Ottoman Sultan was no more the Caliph of the faithful, because henceforth the Arabs independently controlled the Holy cities of Islam.⁶⁷⁸ At the same time, the Muslim press of the Russian Empire was eager to present the solidarity of the Tsarist state with the Muslims of the world, as upon the Russian conquest of Erzurum, the letter of congratulations by the Sultan of Egypt appeared in Central Asian journals.⁶⁷⁹

Despite its spiritual character, the Ottoman warfare against the Russian Empire and other Entente powers was presented in the Ottoman press as a matter of life and death, the evasion of which would surely end up in total destruction of the Ottoman state. As an Ottoman author states,⁶⁸⁰

Henceforth, there would be two options for Turkey: either to preserve its absolute entity or to be perished. This great nation that survived for seven centuries would either hold an honorable position with all proper rights, or would not be able to.... Thus, we should at least sacrifice our souls with honor and die.

⁶⁷⁷ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Rusya Tarihi: Başlangıçtan 1917'ye Kadar* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1948), p. 427.

⁶⁷⁸ *Türkestân vilâyatiniñ gazyeti*, No. 42 (17 July 1916), p. 2.

⁶⁷⁹ *Türkestân vilâyatiniñ gazyeti*, No. 18 (6 March 1916), p. 1.

⁶⁸⁰ "Türkiye – Rusya," *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1036 (14 Rabî' al-Âkhir 1329), p. 510.

4.2 FRIENDS AND ENEMIES IN WARTIME PROPAGANDA

Niyâzî Fahreddîn Bey, the Ottoman Ambassador in St. Petersburg stated in his private letter – found among the letters⁶⁸¹ that survived destruction by burning upon the release of his residence in St. Petersburg – to his longtime friend Hüseyin Hilmî Pasha, the former Grand Vizier and the Ottoman Ambassador in Vienna, that in the impending war the Ottoman Empire would be a defeated party regardless to who would be the winning side, since the victory of Russia would lead to the resettlement of the Straits question, while in case of German victory, the Germans would, without any doubt, turn Turkey into Egypt as soon as they assume the governance.⁶⁸²

Being the bloodiest and most destructive of all previous wars, the technological advancements of the First World War was not limited to military and strategic technologies and intensely concerned the field of propaganda that not only aimed at manipulating, misinforming or encouraging the local population, but directly targeted the public of the enemy. Thus, throughout the war, the reports on economic upheaval, social unrest and rise of criminality in Russia⁶⁸³ appeared in Ottoman press hand in hand with those of its military failure at the frontline.

⁶⁸¹ A much broader scrutiny of their correspondence that was mysteriously handed to the Tsarist Intelligence service is available in V. Sheremet, *Bosfor: Rossiia i Turtsiia v epokhu pervoi mirovoi voiny (Po materialam russkoi voennoi razvedki)* (Moscow: “Tekhnologicheskaiia shkola biznesa,” 1995), pp. 56-69.

⁶⁸² Vitalii Ivanov, “Oni tak ne khoteli voevat’: Perepiska turetskikh poslov v Peterburge i Vene v 1914 godu,” *Rodina*, No. 5-6 (1998), p. 118.

⁶⁸³ See, for instance, “Rusya’nın Dâhilî Yarası: Arâzisiz Köylüler,” *Donanma*, No. 123-74 (29 Safar 1334), pp. 1182-1183.

4.2.1 Germano-Ottoman Relations and Russia

As the prominent Russian Orientalist and the later head of the Moscow Institute of the Oriental Studies Mikhail Vel'tman [Weltmann] commonly known under his pen-name M. Pavlovich mentioned in his book *Asia and Its Role in the World War*, unlike France and Britain whose imperial aspirations lay in areas outside Asia Minor, for Germany and Russia the hegemony in this area was the primary cause of their rivalry, which, in its turn, led both of the countries into the war.⁶⁸⁴ However, being “always suspicious of Russia,” the Turks would naturally reject any possibility of an alliance with the Russian Empire, since the presence of the Russian fleet in the Bosphorus would be considered by the Ottoman Government, as well as the people of the empire, as “the end of independence,” so that any proposal by the Russians would push the Ottomans towards the Central Powers.⁶⁸⁵ Besides, for the year 1913, the overall industrial production of the Russian Empire was six times less than that of Germany, while the production of coal in these two countries was 30 and 190.1 million tons respectively.⁶⁸⁶

The growing German support that unlike ambiguous compassion of the Muslims and Turks outside the Empire turned into a solid argument in favor of holding on the German alliance at the time of impending war, especially since, as a Russian author observed, “the Imperial Germany tried to move away the danger threatening the

⁶⁸⁴ M. Pavlovich, *Aziia i eia rol' v mirovoi voine* (St. Petersburg [Petrograd]: “Novaia zhizn',” 1918), p. 59.

⁶⁸⁵ G. P. Gooch, *Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy*, Vol. 2 (London, New York and Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1938), pp. 307-308.

⁶⁸⁶ P. I. Liashchenko, *Istoriia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR*, 4th ed., Vol. 2 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1956), p. 289.

Ottoman Empire and intended, on the other hand, to strengthen Turkey by increasing its military and economic strength.”⁶⁸⁷ As *Mecmû'a-i Ebû'z-Ziyâ* had noticed,⁶⁸⁸

Russia is the bitterest enemy of the Ottoman Government for a very long time. Therefore, the affiliation of Russia with one of the sides is a sufficient reason for Turkey to immediately choose the opposite side. It was Russia who established and invented Bulgaria; Russia is the natural protector of the Slavs, just likewise it is Russia that for more than a century nourishes the dream of hoisting the Christian cross [*salîb-i 'Îsâî*] on the dome of Hagia Sophia once again.

A similar statement on the Russian impact on the Germano-Ottoman alliance was mentioned in the memoirs of Henry Morgenthau, the US Ambassador to the Ottoman Court, saying that⁶⁸⁹

Above all, the Turks feared Russia in 1914, just as they feared her ever since the days of Peter the Great. Russia was the historic enemy, the nation which had given freedom to Bulgaria and Rumania, which had been most active in dismembering the Ottoman Empire, and which regarded herself as the power that was ultimately to possess Constantinople. This fear of Russia, I cannot too much insist, was one factor which, above everything else, was forcing Turkey into the arms of Germany.

On the other hand, the ruling circles in the German Empire and Kaiser Wilhelm II himself incessantly uttered that Germany had no territorial claims in the Middle East and, what is more important, the German Government presented itself as an ardent supporter of the Ottoman territorial integrity, although these statements were regarded by some as a mere tactical rhetoric.⁶⁹⁰ Moreover, the necessity and urgency of alignment with one of the emerging blocs that was propagated by the press served

⁶⁸⁷ Pavlovich, *Aziia i eia rol' v mirovoi voine*, p. 61.

⁶⁸⁸ “Şark Mes’elesinin Bugünkü Safhası,” *Mecmû'a-i Ebû'z-Ziyâ*, No. 113 (21 Ramadân 1329), pp. 1103-1100.

⁶⁸⁹ Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1918), pp. 26-27.

⁶⁹⁰ A. S. Silin, *Ekspansiia germanskogo imperializma na Blizhnem Vostoke nakanune Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1908-1914)* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo “Nauka,” 1976), p. 218.

its purpose of prompting the Ottomans towards Germany, especially since the Ottoman State was situated at the milieu of the World War and “the victory of one of the sides would mean the imprisonment for the other.”⁶⁹¹

A similar perception of the inevitability of the Ottoman alliance with Germany, which under current circumstances was a predictable and logical choice rather than a reckless scheme and adventurism of the *İttihâd ve Terakkî* leadership, was asserted by Michael A. Reynolds in his scrupulous and elaborate work on the geopolitics of the Russo-Ottoman struggle in Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus during the First World War. As he states,⁶⁹²

Germany’s primary virtue in Ottoman eyes’ was that it was powerful yet could not pose a direct threat. It neither shared borders with the Ottoman Empire nor did it have any immediate pretensions to Ottoman land. Yet Germany shared with the Ottoman Empire an interest in stymieing the advances of the other Great Powers into the Near East. For so long as it remained outside the Near East, Germany was a natural ally of the Ottoman Empire, and a critical one by virtue of its economic and military might.

On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire was not the sole beneficiary of the Germano-Ottoman alliance, since Germany seemed to benefit from the affection of the Ottomans that anyways posed no threat to its vital interests. Not only the growing Turkish nationalism or Pan-Islamism were far from targeting the Germans, but even the revisionist Ottoman attempts to recover the territories that once belonged to it did not threaten any lands in German possession, therefore the

⁶⁹¹ “Türkiye’nin ve İslâm ‘Âleminin Kurtuluşu,” *Harb Mecmû’ası*, No. 1 (Teşrîn-i sâni 1331) [1915], p. 7.

⁶⁹² Michael A. Reynolds, “The Ottoman-Russian Struggle for Eastern Anatolia And The Caucasus, 1908-1918: Identity, Ideology and the Geopolitics of World Order” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2003), pp. 44-45.

strengthening of the Ottoman State, so undesirable by the Entente, would in the long run serve German interests.⁶⁹³ Thus, the Germans seemed to be well aware of their trump card, since “the German and Austro-Hungarian patronage and favoritism towards Turkey would not only be far from weakening the position of these countries *vis-à-vis* other states, but, on the contrary, would considerably improve and strengthen their international positions.”⁶⁹⁴

Upon the outburst of the Great War and the Ottoman engagement into it – not without German help and instigation – the term and idea of Central Europe [*Ôrtâ Âvrûpa*], the equivalent of the German *Mitteleuropa*, was often used to refer the Central Powers, of which the Ottomans were a part. As the introductory article in the first issue of *Harb Mecmû’ası* stated, “the Muscovites and their allies that were secretly working on and preparing for years, intended to destroy the heroic Central European states by encircling them in a chain of fire from the four sides,” while the Ottomans had learned their bitter lessons of the calamities of the Balkan Wars and were just prepared to any kind of events.⁶⁹⁵ The compassion towards its allies was so evident throughout the war that *Harb Mecmû’ası*, the journal devoted to military and strategic issues, published a romantic poem by Mehmed Emîn entitled “To a Magyar Girl” under a joint photography of the German Kaiser and Ottoman Pashas, starting with a line: “Hey, beautiful girl, you resemble my younger sister.”⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹³ Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923), p. 223.

⁶⁹⁴ Davis Trietsch, *Almanyâ ve İslâm* (Istanbul: Efhâm Matba’ası, 1331) [1915-1916], p. 21.

⁶⁹⁵ “Harb Mecmû’ası,” *Harb Mecmû’ası*, No. 1 (Teşrîn-i sâni 1331) [1915], p. 3.

⁶⁹⁶ “Macar Kızına,” *Harb Mecmû’ası*, No. 13 (Teşrîn-i evvel 1332) [1916], p. 193.

The idea of the fraternal Austro-Germano-Ottoman alliance was also mentioned by Dr. Ernst Jaeck, as could be seen in the introductory paragraph of his *Germany in the Orient Following the Balkan War* published in Ottoman in 1915, where he reveals his dream of an Austro-Germano-Ottoman Empire, “whose principal ports would be Hamburg and Istanbul [*Der-sa’âdet*]. An empire, which would possess numerous ports at the North, Baltic, Adriatic, Aegean [*Adalar denizi*] and Black Seas. An empire, whose authority would dominate and prevail far beyond Anatolia, the Islands and Iraq.”⁶⁹⁷

The growing Germano-Ottoman relations and the reinforcement of the Ottoman Army by German officers and advisors, as was noticed by Russians, immediately led to the strengthening of chauvinistic and especially anti-Russian sentiments in the ruling circles of the Ottoman Empire, which, feeling the backing of Germany and Austria-Hungary, intended to act like the ‘Japanese of the Middle East’.⁶⁹⁸ Moreover, in strengthening their control over the Ottoman Army and politics and inducing it to an alliance, the Germans had successfully deployed the Russian threat, as could be seen from the reinforcement of the Ottoman Fourth Army Corps on the

⁶⁹⁷ Dr. [Ernst] Jaeck, *Balkan Harbinden Sonra Şarkda Almanya* (Istanbul: Efhâm Matba’ası, 1331), pp. 3-4.

⁶⁹⁸ *Rossiia*, (30 January 1911) and *Rossiia*, (1 June 1911); both cited by Silin, *Ekspansiia germanskogo imperializma na Blizhnem Vostoke nakanune Pervoi mirovoi voyny (1908-1914)*, pp. 63-64.

Caucasian front by the plan of military actions against Russia elaborated by German officers led by Baron von der Goltz.⁶⁹⁹

Needless to say that one of the decisive factors that contributed to the strengthening of the German influence among the Ottoman military lay in the background of the Unionist officers. The majority of the *İttihâd ve Terakkî* member Ottoman officers received German education, while over a hundred of high rank officers had even served in German Army and were referred by Kaiser Wilhelm as ‘German officers’ who even think like Germans.⁷⁰⁰ Accordingly, the power and prestige of the German Army had always been the decisive factor for the Ottomans’ inclination towards an alliance with Germany, so that as late as October 1917, during the third visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Istanbul, the German Sovereign was still praised by *Türk Yurdu* as “the Supreme Commander of the German Army and Navy that earn the greatest praise and amazement in the whole world.”⁷⁰¹

Besides, the German factor played an important role in the Ottoman propaganda to boost the military and national morale that was seriously undermined following the Balkan Wars. Thus, overcoming a grave destruction and military defeat was mentioned to be a *sine qua non* condition for a great economic, social and political awakening and advancement of a nation, for which the defeat and occupation of the

⁶⁹⁹ Silin, *Ekspansiiia germanskogo imperializma na Blizhnem Vostoke nakanune Pervoi mirovoi voyny (1908-1914)*, p. 64.

⁷⁰⁰ Sheremet, *Bosfor: Rossiia i Turtsiia v epokhu pervoi mirovoi voyny*, p. 85.

⁷⁰¹ “Almanya İmparatoru İkinci Vilhelm Hazretlerinin İstânbûlu Ziyâretleri,” *Türk Yurdu*, Year 6, Vol. 13, No. 6 (8 Teşrîn-i sâni 1333) [1917], p. 94.

German lands by French troops during the Franco-Prussian War was presented as the most appropriate example.⁷⁰² The growing German influence in the prewar period was visible not only in economic, political and military spheres, but also in widespread deference to German culture and civilization in general. As was noted, the Viennese journal *Neue Freie Presse* had a noticeable distribution among the officers of the Third Ottoman Army Corps stationed in Macedonia with Mahmûd Şevket Pasha at its head.⁷⁰³ What is more, not only did the Ottoman military simply admire and get inspired by the ideas and technique of their German counterpart in creating the *Nation in Arms*, but duly reflected it in their own ideas and writings represented in the Ottoman press.⁷⁰⁴

As Moise Cohen stated, at the time when even tiny nations [*ufacık milletler*] in the Balkans like Bulgarians, Serbians and Greeks had their national ideas, the Turkish national idea ought to be elaborated and developed, for which the notorious *Deutschland über alles* was found much more appropriate than the outmoded *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*.⁷⁰⁵ The grandeur of the German idea vis-à-vis its British and French counterpart, not to mention that of Russia, was not the only matter of the Ottoman malicious joy and Ottoman periodicals abounded with instances of German superiority in industry, science, technology and literature. It was even claimed that

⁷⁰² Cohen, *Türkler Bu Muhârebede Ne Kazanabilirler?*, p. 10.

⁷⁰³ Sheremet, *Bosfor: Rossiia i Turtsiia v epokhu pervoi mirovoi voiny*, p. 85.

⁷⁰⁴ Handan Nezir Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 68-69.

⁷⁰⁵ Cohen, *Türkler Bu Muhârebede Ne Kazanabilirler?*, pp. 14-15.

the British industry unable to compete with German goods in quality were stamping their products with 'Made in Germany' tags.⁷⁰⁶

On the other hand, the role of Germany in supporting the Ottoman advance against the Russian Empire in the Caucasus was not confined to military reinforcement and arms supplies, but went far beyond by providing assistance in spreading Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist ideas among the Muslim population of the Caucasus. As is often claimed, the Ottoman Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist propaganda in the Caucasus was carried out in close cooperation with the German intelligence services, which involved not only diplomatic missions and local German settlers, but also German companies, tourist agencies, publishing houses and even representatives of the Lutheran clergy.⁷⁰⁷ Indeed, in his conversation with the US Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, his German counterpart Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim had stated that "Turkey herself is not the really important matter," and added that "her army is a small one, and we do not expect it to do very much. For the most part it will act on the defensive. But the big thing is the Moslem world. If we can stir the Mohammedans up against the English and Russians, we can force them to make peace."⁷⁰⁸

Thus, one of the key arguments of the pro-German propaganda in the Ottoman press during the First World War became the German support to the Islamic world against

⁷⁰⁶ "İngiliz Oyunları," *Harb Mecmû'ası*, No. 2 (Kânûn-i evvel 1331) [1915-1916], p. 22.

⁷⁰⁷ Sarkisian, *Ekspansionistskaia politika Osmanskoi imperii v Zakavkaz'e nakanune i v gody Pervoi mirovoi voyny*, pp. 106, 118-119.

⁷⁰⁸ Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, p. 161.

the expansion and aggression of the Great Powers and even its alleged encouragement of Pan-Islamic ideas. Emphasizing the growing importance of the Islamic world played in world politics, the Ottoman version of *Islam and Germany* by Davis Trietsch published during the war had clearly contrasted the policies of other powers – the French occupation of Morocco, Italian aggression towards the last Ottoman domains in Africa, Russian advance towards the Iranian hinterland and the British policy in Crete – with the German attempts to revive the Islamic unity.⁷⁰⁹

In return, the Ottoman press was vigorously promoting the idea of German benevolence towards Islam among the Muslims throughout the world. Thus, an article in *İkdâm* on the state of the Muslim prisoners of war in Germany, accompanied by a picture of a crowd in traditional (and yet too archaic) Islamic dress and headgear, proudly announced that for the Muslim prisoners of war captured during the warfare with the French, the German Government had already built a mosque near Berlin and a library with old and new religious books.⁷¹⁰ As for the Muslims among the Russian prisoners of war, the German Government, as was said, went even further not only by building special barracks, mosques, libraries and kitchens, and organized special courses of Turkish and German for the Muslim prisoners of war, but even allowed those who wish to emigrate and settle in the Ottoman Empire.⁷¹¹

⁷⁰⁹ Trietsch, *Almanyâ ve İslâm*, pp. 3-4.

⁷¹⁰ “Almanya’da Müslümân Esîrleri,” *İkdâm*, No. 6550 (14 May [Mayıs-i efencî] 1915).

⁷¹¹ “Almanya’da Müslümân Esîrler Ordugâhında Kurbân Bayramı,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 11, No. 10 (5 Kânûn-i sâni 1332) [1916], pp. 3306-3308.

Interestingly, an article in a Russian Muslim journal on the Ottoman soldiers taken prisoners by the Tsarist troops presented an exact contrast to the above-mentioned statements. According to the article, the majority of the Turkish prisoners of war had voluntarily surrendered to the Russian troops and assured their guards that they were ready to do any heavy work without any payment, begging to keep them there and not return to their former German masters.⁷¹² Besides, the living conditions of the prisoners of war in Russia were thoroughly praised in Russian press, as according to a report on the prisoners of war in Odessa published in *Novoe vremia* their daily food allowance consisted of coffee with sugar and bread in the morning, *borsch*, *kasha* and macaroni for lunch and hot supper in the evening.⁷¹³ Although the journal had no reference to Islam, it nevertheless claimed that on Sundays the Christian prisoners of war were allowed to go to the church and those of Jewish creed to go to the synagogue on Saturdays.⁷¹⁴

On the other hand, the Ottomans' cordial liaison with the German Empire was not simply a matter of interim military alliance or financial cooperation, but also derived from deeply rooted Russo-Ottoman confrontation. The whole question of the Slavic World or Slavdom in the eyes of Russian nationalists and Pan-Slavists was not only related to the Ottoman Empire, but with Germany as well, which emerged at that time as another common feature between Germany and the Ottoman State. Since Germany, or the German race, was often described as the chief enemy of Russia, the

⁷¹² *Türkestân vilâyetiniñ gazyeti*, No. 17 (3 March 1916), p. 1.

⁷¹³ "Zhit'e-byt'e voennoplennykh," *Novoe vremia* (27 November 1916).

⁷¹⁴ Ibid.

control of the ‘disputed ground’, that is the Slavonic lands under German political and cultural influence, was to become the utmost and decisive strike in the battle, thus making the solution of the Slav Question the keystone of the entire struggle.⁷¹⁵ On the other hand, the primary confrontation between German and Slavic races concluded in the emergence of similar notions and ideals, since the German perception of the *Mitteleuropa* (Central Europe) to be, naturally, an intrinsic part of the German civilization often found its counterpart in the notion of the Russian Eastern Europe.⁷¹⁶ According to an Ottoman article entitled “The Slavs and Germans,” Pan-Germanic movement appeared in Germany as a response to Pan-Slavist movement in Russia that was gradually becoming more and more belligerent and expansionist with an aim to strengthen Germanic elements at its frontiers in order to withstand Russian aggression and expansion and defend its borders.⁷¹⁷

Thus, one of the expected scenarios of the impending Great War in Europe, whose outcome and consequences would directly affect the fate of the Ottoman State, was the great and decisive struggle between the Slavs and Teutons that was openly stated and expected by high German officials like Kanzler Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and General Helmuth von Moltke,⁷¹⁸ which definitely had an impact on the wartime preferences of the Ottoman leadership, some of whom personally suffered from aggressive Slavic nationalism in the Balkan provinces of the empire. The

⁷¹⁵ Rostislav A. Fadeev, “What Should Be the Policy of Russia?” in *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy*, eds. Robert A. Goldwin *et al.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 67.

⁷¹⁶ O. Halecki, “Imperialism in Slavic and East European History,” *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (February 1952), p. 18.

⁷¹⁷ “İslavlar ve Almanlar,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1281 (29 Safar 1334), p. 92.

⁷¹⁸ Albert Mousset, *The World of the Slavs* (New York: Frederic A. Praeger Inc., 1950), p. 33.

possibility of an all-out warfare between the Slavs and Teutons was also uttered by the Russian officials, as could be seen from the letter of Aleksandr Izvol'sky, the Russian Ambassador in Paris and the former Foreign Minister, to the current Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov on 23 October 1912. Fearing that the conclusive victory of the Balkan states would become "eventually the most threatening for the peace of Europe," Izvol'sky wrote that,⁷¹⁹

It would at once bring into the foreground in its full historic magnitude the question of the struggle of Slavdom not only with Islam but also with Teutonism. In this case no hope can be placed in any sort of palliative, and preparation must be made for a great, decisive, universal European war.

Interestingly, in a private correspondence to his friend Niyâzî Fahreddîn Bey, Hüseyin Hilmî Pasha, who, just like the former, had been personally linked to the European provinces of the empire, wrote that the Balkan Turks "who escaped from European Turkey to Asia Minor 'where they were unwanted'," were full of despair and hatred and "could turn into a weapon in the hand of anybody who would promise them to return their lands in the Balkans."⁷²⁰ However, despite the generally accepted Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist stance of the Ottoman Government throughout the First World War, the existence of a pan- or pro-Slavic policy of the Tsarist Government remained open to question and at some point was even claimed

⁷¹⁹ Friedrich Stieve, *Isvolsky and the World War*, trans. E. W. Dickes (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), p. 128.

⁷²⁰ Sheremet, *Bosfor: Rossiia i Turtsiia v epokhu pervoi mirovoi voyny*, pp. 59-60. The excerpts of the same letters are also quoted in Ivanov, "Oni tak ne khoteli voevat': Perepiska turetskikh poslov v Peterburge i Vene v 1914 godu," p. 117.

to be anti-Slavic, especially after cession of Dalmatia to Italy, objection to the union of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and refusal to grand concessions to Poland.⁷²¹

At the same time, by the transfer of the two German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau* to the Ottoman Navy, as Sazonov had noticed “the Germans have doubled their prestige at Constantinople.”⁷²² As it seems, the transfer of the cruisers to the Straits was in strict coordination with the secret Germano-Ottoman agreement of 2 August 1914, since already on 4 August 1914 Admiral Wilhelm Souchon received an order to depart to Constantinople immediately while approaching the Algerian coast.⁷²³ Moreover, as was already reported in November 1912 by the Russian Senior Naval Agent in Istanbul Aleksandr Shcheglov, the Ottomans were ready to purchase *Goeben* by offering 75 million marks, while the estimated price was only fifty million.⁷²⁴

However, even upon the bombardment of the Russian Black Sea ports by the Ottoman Fleet, when the Ottoman involvement in the Great War became more than evident, the Russians still saw Germany as the main source behind this, so that and Germany still remained their primary concern, so that “the defeat of Germany will necessarily involve the ruin of Turkey,”⁷²⁵ but not otherwise. Even the short Imperial Manifest by Tsar Nicholas II that declared war against the Ottoman Empire openly

⁷²¹ Mousset, *The World of the Slavs*, p. 36.

⁷²² Paléologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs by Maurice Paléologue*, Vol. 1, p. 80.

⁷²³ A. S. Silin, “Begstvo ‘Gebena’ i ‘Breslau’ v Dardanelly v 1914 g. (Iz istorii pervoy mirovoy voyny),” *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, No. 3 (1983), p. 134.

⁷²⁴ Sheremet, *Bosfor: Rossiia i Turtsiia v epokhu pervoi mirovoi voiny*, p. 44.

⁷²⁵ Paléologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs by Maurice Paléologue*, Vol. 1, p. 177.

proclaimed that “trying hard to increase their power by all means, Germany and Austria-Hungary, which vainly tried to compete with Russia up to now, resort to the help of the Ottoman Government and dragged blinded Turkey into the war with us.”⁷²⁶ Consequently, the German victories over the Russian troops were reported in Ottoman press with no less excitement than those from the Caucasian front, as an Ottoman journal reporting in mid-September 1914 on the German troops defeating Russians at Königsberg (present-day Kaliningrad, Russian Federation) with 3,000 Russian soldiers taken prisoners exclaimed with admiration that “both in terms of precision and in terms of force, the German guns are several time more effective than Russian ones.”⁷²⁷

Despite enormous influence of the German economy, politics and military on the Ottoman press and politics throughout the First World War, not everybody in the Ottoman Empire shared pro-German sentiments that were so vigorously exposed in periodical press. According to a confession of a captive Ottoman officer, “the ‘Liberating Mission’ of Germany in Turkey is one thing, but the insulting treatment of the Turkish officers by Germans is another thing. Thus, on the ground of this, certain pretty serious excesses had occurred, which [in its turn] exclude the possibility of a real unity of action.”⁷²⁸ As Ahmed Refik asserted in 1915 in one of his recollections entitled *İki Komite, İki Kıtâl*, “the majority of Turks were cursing [*tel’in*] the alliance with Germany in their hearts, while those who were seduced by

⁷²⁶ *Letopis' voiny*, No. 11 (1 November 1914) [original emphasis].

⁷²⁷ “Moskoflar Ne Yapıyor,” *Donanma*, No. 59-11 (1 Eylül 1330) [1914], pp. 169-170.

⁷²⁸ *Vtoraia Otechestvennaia voina po razskazam eia geroev*, p. 190.

the tempting words of the government regarded the alliance as the sole means of avoiding the destruction of the Great War.”⁷²⁹

Indeed, the German theme of the Russo-Ottoman propaganda war was not confined to military and strategic matters and often involved the attitude of the German Government and the Germans towards Muslims, in general, and the Turks, in particular. Thus, in March 1917, the Russian *Semirechenskiia oblastnyiia vedomosti* published in Vernyi (present-day Almaty, Kazakhstan) suddenly felt appropriate to publish the excerpts from a private conversation of Otto von Bismarck with Sidney Whitman, in which the German Kanzler states, among other things, that,⁷³⁰

The Turks are wonderful people. They are the only gentlemen in the East. But, nevertheless, they do not deserve to be in Europe. One fine day the Russians would appear at Constantinople and the Sultan would not object them if they would not touch his eunuchs and pashas and would allot him a tidy sum to maintain his harem.

In fact, already in the first months of the war, the conflict between the German and Ottoman officers, and the formers' contempt for the Turks and Islam in general, became a frequent theme in Russian press. As early as January 1915, *Sâdâ-i Türkestân*, one of the most prominent Muslim journals in the Russian Empire published in Tashkent, reported on bloody collisions [*qânli musâdâmâlär*] between the Turkish and German [*nyems*] officers as well as the German enmity towards the Arabs.⁷³¹ The Germano-Ottoman conflict was presented in Russian Muslim press not just as a mere local collision between the military, but also as a political problem

⁷²⁹ Ahmed Refik, *Kafkas Yollarında, İki Komite İki Kıtâl*, p. 139.

⁷³⁰ *Semirechenskiia oblastnyiia vedomosti*, No. 49 (2 March 1917), p. 2.

⁷³¹ *Sâdâ-i Türkestân*, No. 55 (15 January 1915), p. 3.

for the Ottoman leadership. As was claimed in March 1916 by *Türkestân Vilâyetiniñ Gazyeti*, Tal'at Bey was at the head of a widespread group that was extremely displeased with the growing attempts by Germany [*Gyermanya*] to dominate the Ottoman economy, industry and military.⁷³²

Remarkably, the discord and discrepancy of interests between Germany and the Ottoman Empire would become conspicuous towards the end of the First World War in which Russia would once more have a decisive share. As soon as Russia (this time the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) made its exit from the First World War by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, the confrontation between two allies over the Caucasus hastily turned into clashes, collision and bloodshed.⁷³³

4.2.2 The Russian Army in Ottoman Press

As George G. Bruntz had stated, “the destruction of the enemy morale by the dissemination of defeatist, disheartening, and revolutionary leaflets, pamphlets, books and propaganda ‘news sheets’, was recognized as an important part of the offensive against the enemy.”⁷³⁴ This was particularly important in case of the Muslims of the Russian Empire, both civil and military, who were often reluctant or

⁷³² *Türkestân vilâyetiniñ gazyeti*, No. 15 (25 February 1916), p. 1.

⁷³³ The investigation of the conflict between German and Ottoman troops in the Caucasus is definitely beyond the chronological scope of this work. For further information see, for instance, Ye. F. Ludshuveit, *Turtsiia v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny: 1914-1918 gg.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1966), pp. 197-207.

⁷³⁴ George G. Bruntz, “Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of German Morale in 1918,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January 1938), p. 61.

unable to follow the Russian language press and felt, despite everything, connected to their righteous Caliph.

On the eve of the First World War, the Russian Army staff amounted to 1,423,000 men, which considerably exceeded that of France and Germany, which, at the time of their entrance into the war amounted to 582,000 and 597,000 respectively.⁷³⁵ Apart from being the fifth greatest economy in terms of industrial production, fourth in steel production and second in petroleum production, the Russian population on the eve of the First World War was 2.5 times that of Germany, its greatest European opponent, and amounted to some 162 million,⁷³⁶ which already in 1917 reached 184.6 million.⁷³⁷ However, as William M. Salter amazingly found out just a few years before the outburst of the Great War, Russia was the only country in the world where a soldier enjoyed much better living conditions than an average commoner, one of its signs, as he mentioned, was the fact that a common man had pay almost two thirds more for alcoholic drinks due to governmental monopoly on liquor.⁷³⁸ Moreover, the conscription of an overall number of 14.6 million men into the Tsarist army by 1916, created a tremendous lack of men in the hinterland, who were in traditional Russian families the sole bread-winners, and the enrollment of millions of

⁷³⁵ Peter Gatrell, *Government, Industry and Rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 295.

⁷³⁶ Paul R. Gregory, *Russian National Income, 1885-1913* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 4.

⁷³⁷ Paul Gregory, "Economic Growth and Structural Change in Tsarist Russia: A Case of Modern Economic Growth?" *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (January 1972), p. 419.

⁷³⁸ William M. Salter, "The Russian Revolution," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (April 1907), p. 306.

women into industrial plants caused a great social upheaval that put *soldatkas*, the soldiers' wives, in the foreground of revolutionary events.⁷³⁹

Whether to encourage the Ottomans and regain their formerly militant confidence or to induce the Russian officials and public to avoid warfare against the Ottoman Empire, an Ottoman publication of 1913 stated that in case of the Turkish attack on Russia, the Ottoman troops would enjoy the support and assistance in the Muslim-populated provinces of Russia that would many times surpass their support for Russia, mainly by a few Muslim Russophiles and non-Muslims.⁷⁴⁰ Therefore, at the initial stage of the war, the official war reports were indeed very encouraging, as was the report of 5 November 1914 laconically summarizing the state of land warfare as “the warfare against the infidels [*dâr-ül-harblere*]” that “carries on successfully on every side.”⁷⁴¹

As expected, the depiction of the same military events in the Russian and Ottoman press could take totally different and often contrary light. Thus, an introduction to the memoirs of İhsân Latîf Pasha, the former commander of the Ottoman Ninth Army Corps of the Caucasian front, states that he was taken prisoner by the Russian troops following our glorious attack [*şânli ta'arruz*] at Sarıkamış.⁷⁴² Just a couple of

⁷³⁹ Barbara Alpern Engel, “Not by Bread Alone: Subsistence Riots in Russia during World War I,” *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 69, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 708-709, 713.

⁷⁴⁰ Trietsch, *Almanya ve İslâm*, p. 102.

⁷⁴¹ “İki Haftalık Cihâd Haberleri (5 Teşrîn-i sâni 330),” *İslâm Mecmû'ası*, Year 1, No. 16 (14 Muharram 1333) [1914], p. 463.

⁷⁴² İhsân Latîf, *Bir Ser-encâm-i Harb: Harb-i Umûmî Safahâtine 'Âid Hatırât* (Istanbul: İlerî Gazetesi, 1335) [1919], p. 1.

months before the defeat at Sarıkamış, the attacks of the ‘miserable’ enemy were faced by the resistance and strength of the Ottomans, whose power and strength surpassed those of the “castles of steel,” and, from time to time, the Ottoman troops were crossing over the Muscovite borders and spreading death among their troops.⁷⁴³

However, about three years after the Sarıkamış battle, an estimated death of 180,000 men⁷⁴⁴ was already uttered, so that Ahmed Refik would sigh: “At the time when one hundred fifty thousand Turks fell prey to Enver Pasha’s ignorance, who dared to lift up his voice?”⁷⁴⁵ Ironically, as soon as in 1919, it seemed like Ahmed Refik had successfully overcome his previous denunciation and accusation against the Ottoman command as he wrote an article in *Ümîd* where he thoroughly praised the Ottoman Army and stated that “if there is a nation among European peoples whose military history deserves to be written the most, that would be the Turks.”⁷⁴⁶

In the meantime, while reviewing the military events of the past year a few months after the Sarıkamış battle, *Türk Yurdu* was optimistic enough to conclude that “the Eastern Army was not only able to carry out bold and courageous maneuvers in Southern Caucasus, but impeded the Russians from gaining a noteworthy victory anywhere.”⁷⁴⁷ On the other hand, the Russian Muslim press was somehow more precise and up-to-date on the Sarıkamış battle, so that as early as February 1915, the

⁷⁴³ “Harb Mecmû’ası,” *Harb Mecmû’ası*, No. 1 (Teşrîn-i sâni 1331) [1915], p. 3.

⁷⁴⁴ Of which the casualty inferred by the Russian side would make up about 30,000 men.

⁷⁴⁵ Ahmed Refik, *Kafkas Yollarında, İki Komite İki Kıtâl*, p. 190.

⁷⁴⁶ Ahmed Refik, “Târih-i Harb,” *Ümîd*, Year 1, No. 1 (13 Rabî’ al-Awwal 1337) [1918], p. 6.

⁷⁴⁷ *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (5 Mart 1331) [1915], p. 2519.

prominent Tatar journal *Añ*, published a photographs of the Ottoman commanders of the Ninth Army Corps “taken prisoners at the Sarıkamış battle by *our* troops [*ğäskärimiz tarafından*],” including İhsân Pasha, ‘Ârif Bey, the commander of the 29th Division, Şerîf Bey of the Army Headquarters, Captain Yûsuf Ziyâ Bey and Lieutenant Colonel Mehmed ‘Âli Yûsuf Bey.⁷⁴⁸

As could have been expected, the image of a brave, noble and devout Ottoman soldier was thoroughly propagated through the Ottoman press by any imaginable means: official reports, photography, historical and literary publications, letters and memoirs. Thus, long before the actual outburst of the First World War the mottoes like “A man never runs away, a soldier never runs away,” were transformed into the glorious “A Turk never runs away,” which frequently appeared in the press.⁷⁴⁹ In fact, slightly different from that of an Ottoman soldier, the image of an ordinary Russian soldier from the Caucasian front possessed, along with bravery and devoutness, the clear signs of obedience and simplicity of soul, both definitely in a good sense.⁷⁵⁰

While describing the religious devotion of the Russian Army, Albert J. Beveridge wrote that “the religious faith of the Russian soldier is of the same quality as that said to be characteristic of the Turk, with Christ substituted for Mohammed and the

⁷⁴⁸ “Kafkaz Suğış Mâydanı,” *Añ*, No. 2 (31 January 1915), p. 32 [emphasis added].

⁷⁴⁹ *Türk Duygusu*, Year 1, No. 3-7 (29 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1331) [1913], p. 45.

⁷⁵⁰ See, for instance, F. I. Yeliseev, *Kazaki na Kavkazskom fronte 1914 – 1917: Zapiski polkovnika Kubanskogo kazach’ego voiska v trinadsati broshiurakh-tetradiakh* (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’sтво, 2001).

Bible for the Koran.”⁷⁵¹ Interestingly, a few years earlier, the Duke of Argyll was much more negative in his description of the military spirit of the Ottomans by saying that “we have deprecations of the ‘Crusading spirit’; as if the agency of religious fanaticism were not notoriously enlisted entirely on the side of Mohammedans, in so far, at least, as that agency was superior to vulgar greed, and lust, and the thirst for blood.”⁷⁵²

Interestingly, towards the culmination stage of the warfare the detailed information about certain military operations or the situation at the frontline started becoming more and more scarce and laconic, while articles on the glory of martyrdom became a frequently appealed theme.⁷⁵³ Whether the eulogies for martyrdom or stories about real persons killed in the war, they often appealed to both religious and nationalistic feelings to present the sacrifice of their lives as an ultimate goal [*gâye*] and a lossless game, since the greatest triumph of a man is to die on his way to the Almighty, for which, in the meantime, the Fatherland was being elevated.⁷⁵⁴ Besides the martyrdom, the Ottoman press intended to employ positive incentive to join the Holy War by, among other things, by presenting those who had “joined under the banner of the Holy War [*mukaddes cihâd*] to protect the rights of the Caliphate and religion” as real Muslims.⁷⁵⁵

⁷⁵¹ Albert J. Beveridge, *The Russian Advance* (London and New York: Harper and Brother Publishers, 1903), p. 141.

⁷⁵² The Duke of Argyll, *Our Responsibilities for Turkey: Facts and Memories of Forty Years* (London: John Murray, 1896), p. 128.

⁷⁵³ See, for instance, “Şer’îşerîfin Nazarında Şehâdetin Şerefi,” *Cihân-i İslâm*, No. 52, p. 1.

⁷⁵⁴ “‘Âlem-i İslâm ve Osmâniyye: Beyân-i Ta’ziyet-i Fethî ve Sâdık Beylerin Üfûli,” *Ma’lûmât*, Year 1, No. 2 (20 Şubât 1329) [1914], pp. 17-18.

⁷⁵⁵ “Harb Mecmû’ası,” *Harb Mecmû’ası*, No. 1 (Teşrîn-i sâni 1331), p. 3.

In the meantime, the official reports released by the Army Press Headquarters [*Harb matbû'ât karârgâhı*] mentioned only light collisions, certain occurrences of no strategic importance such as the rescue of a carrier ship, or no action at all, so that the expressions like “no noteworthy incident occurred” [*şâyân-i kayd bir vukû'ât olmadı*] became the burden of these reports.⁷⁵⁶ Interestingly, at the early stages of the Russo-Ottoman warfare in the Caucasus, the initial justification for the lack of detailed information about the course of the war was mentioned to be the anxiety that the enemy might obtain information about the operations of the Ottoman Army.⁷⁵⁷ Moreover, the scarce information about a certain stage of the warfare persistently preferred to inform about the Russian casualties and prisoners of war, rather than those of the Ottoman side,⁷⁵⁸ and, from time to time, even objected to the information provided by the Russian army headquarters on the state of affairs at the Germano-Russian front.⁷⁵⁹ On the other hand, some reports on the Russian atrocities towards the Muslims of the Caucasus referred to secret ‘Russian documents’, whose extreme brutality prevented the Tsarist Government to disclose them officially.⁷⁶⁰

⁷⁵⁶ “Havâdis,” *Cihân-i İslâm*, No. 52, p. 8.

⁷⁵⁷ “Kafkasya’daki Muhârebâtın Târîhçesi,” *İslâm Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 15 (30 Dhu l’-Hidjdja 1332) [1914], pp. 442-443.

⁷⁵⁸ See, for instance, “Oltu’nın Garb-i Cenûbisinde - Harekât-i Ta’arruziyyeye Karşı Muvaffakiyyet,” *İkdâm*, No. 6544 (8 May [Mayıs-i efencî] 1915).

⁷⁵⁹ “Rusya’nın Yalanları,” *İkdâm*, No. 6620 (23 July [Temmûz-i efencî] 1915).

⁷⁶⁰ “Rus Mezâlimi Hakkında Yine Rusların bir Vesîkası,” *İkdâm*, No. 6462 (15 February [Şubât-i efencî] 1915).

Referring to the wartime censorship in the Ottoman Empire, Ahmed Refik who was a longtime civil and military censorship inspector himself wrote in 1918 that⁷⁶¹

In Istanbul, people knew about nothing. The terrible censorship by Enver Pasha was trying to conceal all the calamities from the people, as if the lost lands were ever to be retaken. Sometimes, the enemy planes were destroying Adana through bombardment, and unfortunate people were struggling with sudden death. The government was reporting a death of a single camel or an Entente subject hit by a bomb. While the English troops were approaching Haleb, the Headquarters were distracting people in the meantime by reporting about the Sinai front.

However, the lack of detailed information from the Russo-Ottoman warfare on the Caucasian front was duly made up by abundant reports from the Germano-Russian front, often depicting the humiliations suffered by Russians or atrocities committed by them,⁷⁶² not to mention robberies⁷⁶³ and marauding⁷⁶⁴ committed by Russian troops. In these reports, the atrocities committed by Russians against local population were often directed against minority groups, which were not directly involved in the warfare, as was the case of Jewish massacres at the Germano-Russian front⁷⁶⁵ or the Russian assaults on the Greek Orthodox priests.⁷⁶⁶

In the table of war casualties published in *Servet-i Fünûn* in July 1915, that is long after the terrible Ottoman defeat at Sarıkamış, the Ottoman column was simply. As for the Russian Empire, the number of prisoners of war and the number of the killed amounted to 759,000 and 743,060 respectively, compared to those of 128,000 and

⁷⁶¹ Ahmed Refik, *Kafkas Yollarında, İki Komite İki Kıtâl*, ed. Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu (Istanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1998), pp. 189-190.

⁷⁶² See, for instance, “Şarkî Prusya’da Rus Mezâlimi,” *Donanma*, No. 61-13 (15 Eylül 1330) [1914].

⁷⁶³ “Rus Zâbitlerinin Münâsebetsiz Harekâtı,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1261 (23 Ramadân 1333) [1915], p. 204.

⁷⁶⁴ “Rus İdâresine Bir Misâl,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1235 (19 Rabî’ al-Awwal 1333) [1915], p. 207.

⁷⁶⁵ “Kazakların Vahşeti,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1235 (19 Rabî’ al-Awwal 1333), p. 207.

⁷⁶⁶ “Rus ‘Askerlerinin Barbarlığı,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1264 (22 Shawwâl 1333) [1915], p. 255.

340,000 for Germany.⁷⁶⁷ Already around that time, the Ottomans accused the Tsarist Army of conscripting child soldiers and often exposed photographs of them in Ottoman captivity.⁷⁶⁸ As for September 1915, the Russian casualties, excluding ill and wounded, were reported to be 1,400,000 men.⁷⁶⁹

As Moise Cohen mentions, “had Turkey not possess men such as Enver, Talaat, Jemal and others, during those hard and disastrous times, the Ottoman Empire would have disappeared entirely by to-day.”⁷⁷⁰ However, the governmental and strategic performance of the notorious triumvirate was not found satisfactory by many in the Ottoman Empire and some reproved them audibly. One of them, Ahmed Refik, the former censorship inspector who was, ironically, dismissed from his post and relegated as forage supplier [*arpa ve saman emîni*] for his article that did not please *Sadr-i a’zam* Sa’îd Halîm Pasha, was quite audacious in his memoirs written in 1915. Not only did he depict Grand Vizier Sa’îd Halîm Pasha as marionette with no real influence manipulated by the triumvirate, but mentioned the renowned ignorance of Tal’at referring to him as an ignorant bully [*câhil zorba*].⁷⁷¹ He also mentioned the unpunished murders of honest writers and journalists “who tell the truth for the wellbeing and fortune of the country and curse the wretchedness of

⁷⁶⁷ “Harbin Elîm Bir Bilânçosu,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1257 (25 Sha’bân 1333), p. 135.

⁷⁶⁸ “Rusya Ahvâl-i Dâhiliyesi ve Tezebzübâtı,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1257 (25 Sha’bân 1333) [1915], p. 137. Interestingly, despite the description of the captured soldiers as children [*çocuklar*] in the Ottoman text, the French text was more precise about the age: *Voici un prisonnier fait là-bas qui n’a que 17 ans*.

⁷⁶⁹ *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1264 (22 Shawwâl 1333), p. 254.

⁷⁷⁰ Tekin Alp, *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal* (Weimar: Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1915), The National Archives (Washington, D.C.), Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents “Special Reports and Studies,” 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 579, p. 57. The same statement can also be found in Cohen, *Türkler Bu Muhârebede Ne Kazanabilirler?*, p. 16.

⁷⁷¹ Ahmed Refik, *Kafkas Yollarında, İki Komite İki Kıtâl*, p. 150.

İttihâd,” the murders “committed with the help of the Government and officials.”⁷⁷²

As for Enver Pasha, he stated that even Germans knew well enough that his military commanding competence was less than that of a German captain and added that Enver, endowed with power unable to handle, would perfectly fit the German aspirations to turn Turkey into a German colony.⁷⁷³

On the other hand, differently from the Russian language press, the depiction of the Ottoman leadership in Turkic language press of the Russian Empire with predominantly Muslim readership bore signs of implied discredit, especially in terms of religious chastity. Thus, following the report on the suicide of Yûsuf ‘İzzeddîn, the heir to the Ottoman throne,⁷⁷⁴ the *Türkestân Vilâyâtiniñ Gazyeti* went on claiming that the Ottoman heir was poisoned by the aide-de-camp of Enver Pasha in the presence of the Ottoman *şeyh-ül-islâm*.⁷⁷⁵ Interestingly, even the US Ambassador Morgenthau had notices that Tal’at Bey, “like most leaders of his party,” “cared nothing for Mohammedanism.”⁷⁷⁶

One of the most frequent descriptions of the Russian Army to be encountered in the Ottoman press that became the burden of the image of a Russian military man – along with his drunkenness and indiscipline – was his extreme atrocious and brutal nature. Moreover, these characteristics presented as inherently Russian features were

⁷⁷² Ibid., p. 151.

⁷⁷³ Ibid., p. 171.

⁷⁷⁴ *Türkestân vilâyâtiniñ gazyeti*, No. 15 (25 February 1916), p. 1.

⁷⁷⁵ *Türkestân vilâyâtiniñ gazyeti*, No. 20 (13 March 1916), p. 1.

⁷⁷⁶ Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story*, p. 20.

mentioned not only as directed towards the Ottomans or Muslims in general, but even towards fellow Christians, Slavs and even Russians. The cruelty and severity of their massacres, were “recorded by historians,” already during their assault on Constantinople in the mid-eight century.⁷⁷⁷

On the other hand, anti-Russian caricatures and texts of derisive and degrading characters often appeared within an article out of context. For instance, a ludicrous image of Russian soldiers bearing an inscription “The arrival of the unarmed Russians and French who were shouting before the war: ‘To Berlin! To Berlin!’ under escort to Berlin,” accompanied with a French title *Les prisonniers russes et français à Berlin* to avoid misunderstanding, was incorporated into an article on modernity and traditional features of the Turkish race.⁷⁷⁸

Like anything related to the Russian Army, the Russian treatment of the Ottoman prisoners of war was also presented in an extreme negative shade, sounding sometimes slightly out of the current reality. As İhsân Latîf Pasha describes his transfer as *a prisoner of war*, “towards morning, our Cossack guard said with a very insulting tone: ‘Come on, we’re leaving!’” and transferred us to the train as if we were murderers and put us onboard of a miserable fourth class coach with wooden

⁷⁷⁷ “Rusya ve Ruslar,” *Sıyânet*, No. 16 (9 July [Temmûz-i efrecî] 1914), p. 10.

⁷⁷⁸ *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1215 (26 Shawwâl 1332), p. 290. For the Ottoman caricatures before the First World War see Palmira Brummet, “Dogs, Women, Cholera, and Other Menaces in the Streets: Cartoon Satire in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-11,” *Interational Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (November 1995), pp. 433-460.

beds.⁷⁷⁹ However, more severe treatment of the prisoners of war by Russian authorities, such as their forcible employment at a railroad construction in the Kola Peninsula in the Arctic Ocean,⁷⁸⁰ or the atrocities towards the Ottoman prisoners of war committed by the Armenians among the Russian troops in the Caucasus⁷⁸¹ were also mentioned. Indeed, out of more than two million soldiers and officers of the Central Powers taken prisoners by the Russian Empire, more than 50,000 were the Ottomans of different ethnicities.⁷⁸² Although, the mentions of the Russian prisoners of war employed in mining and heavy industry would understandably be out of agenda, it ought to be noted that only in the mining industry of Upper Silesia more than 170,000 Russian prisoners of war were employed by the end of the war.⁷⁸³

The indiscipline of Russian privates and low rank officers and lack of any respect towards their commanders, although in extraordinary time, was noted by Ahmed Refik during his travel to Batum in April 1918. Upon mentioning an instance when a private who decides to take a revenge on an officer who had punished him once, captures the poor man with the help of his friends and discusses with them whether they should kill him, cut his hands or beat him to death, Ahmed Refik shudders with

⁷⁷⁹ İhsân Latîf, *Bir Ser-encâm-i Harb*, p. 4.

⁷⁸⁰ “Üserâ-i Harbiyye ve Tavassut-i İnsâniyetkârâne,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1334 (1 Rabî’ al-Âkhir 1335), p. 97.

⁷⁸¹ See, for instance, “BOA. HR. HU, Kr. 122/6,” *Armenians in Ottoman Documents (1915-1920)* (Ankara: Directorate of Ottoman Archives, 1995), p. 23.

⁷⁸² Yücel Yanıkdağ, “Ottoman Prisoners of War in Russia, 1914-22,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1999), p. 69.

⁷⁸³ Iris Lenzen, “İspol’zovanie truda russkikh voennoplennykh v Germanii (1914-1918 gg.),” *Voprosy istorii*, No. 4 (1998), p. 136.

horror that “no command, no discipline, no law, no order, no compassion, no justice, nothing is left.”⁷⁸⁴

The cruelty, baseness and incompetence of the enemy troops were broadly exposed not only in the wartime press that was primarily concerned with propaganda, misinformation or public morale, but also in the memoirs of its participants, most of which appeared at the time when strategic, political and ideological concerns had changed. While depicting his encounter with Russians, those “blond-bearded ghosts with tiny blue eyes,” the later Colonel Rahmi Apak states that they were dumb enough not to pull the triggers of their rifles, but would run into a bayonet fighting shouting from as far as fifty steps away, adding that “if they would shoot, we would all be riddled with bullets.”⁷⁸⁵ However, distinctly from the wartime publications, the memoirs of the officers did not neglect to express their compassion and respect for the fellow officers and soldiers from the other side of the frontline. During an interrogation of a seriously wounded Tsarist Major Nikitin, as Rahmi Apak mentions, the Ottoman officer was kind enough to ask him whether he wanted to send a message to his family, while later this exhausted Russian officer amazed the author by his morale and patriotism when he shouted to his captive soldiers: “Friends, anything can happen to a soldier. This befell us now. Long live the Russian Tsar!”⁷⁸⁶

⁷⁸⁴ Ahmed Refik, *Kafkas Yollarında, İki Komite İki Kıtâl*, p. 33.

⁷⁸⁵ Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları*, p. 104.

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 106.

Similarly, despite the overall scornful description of the Ottoman soldiers by Russians, some were more reasonable, as a Russian officer who said that despite the overall illiteracy of soldiers, one can encounter well-educated Turkish officers and although the Turkish army “is certainly less organized than the Germans, they are relatively brave and strong. The misfortune of the Turkish army is their bad clothing, lack of discipline, but, primarily, the lack of inspiration and insight.”⁷⁸⁷ Ironically, as Richard Pipes had mentioned, “Russian troops were courageous under fire and showed little fear of death, but they had no idea why they were fighting and obeyed only from habit: as soon as authority weakened, they would disobey orders and desert,” adding that “no other army in World War I surrendered to the enemy in such numbers.”⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁸⁷ *Vtoraia Otechestvennaia voina po razskazam eia geroev*, p. 189-190.

⁷⁸⁸ Richard Pipes, *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), pp. 58-59.

CHAPTER V

RUSSIANS AND OTTOMANS: THE EMPIRES AT THE BATTLEFIELD

5.1 THE OTTOMAN LANDS IN RUSSIAN MILITARY PLANS

Prior to, throughout the war and afterwards, the whole territory of the Ottoman Empire was the subject of special strategic, political and economic interests of the Great Powers, both allies and antagonists, since “the country is rich in natural resources; it is held by a people whose incompetence to convert nature’s gifts into use or profit is historically patent; it occupies a commanding situation with reference to the trade of Europe with Asia or Africa.”⁷⁸⁹ Hence, the Russian aspirations to capture Constantinople and the Straits, or, in the words of the Russian Emperor Alexander I, the ‘keys to our door’, forced it to wage eleven wars against the Ottoman empire from the very beginning of the 18th century up to the First World

⁷⁸⁹ Leon Dominian, “Europe at Turkey’s Door,” *Geographical Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (April 1916), p. 286.

War and the warfare itself lasted more than thirty years altogether, while the two countries were short-time allies only in 1798 and 1833.⁷⁹⁰ The Ottomans, on the other hand, were also well aware of the Russian historical aspirations to capture Constantinople and the Straits, as they already noted the attacks on the Byzantine capital “by the Russians from around the Black Sea” from the mid-eighth century on.⁷⁹¹

5.1.1 The Black Sea and the Straits

While ardently, and not less passionately, speculating on the future of the Russian policy towards the Ottoman lands, Rostislav A. Fadeev described Constantinople and the Straits as a land “immeasurably important to belong to any small people,” meaning, naturally, the Ottoman Turks, and proposed that for the best of Russia it should become a “free city of a tribal union.”⁷⁹² Thus, for the time being, the question of capturing and possessing Constantinople and the Straits became an object of widespread discussion among prominent Russian thinkers and writers, among whom were Fedor Dostoevsky, the famous writer, and Nikolai Danilevsky, the famous publicist and Pan-Slavist. While the former incessantly proposed the idea that Constantinople should belong to Russians, the latter was more inclined to see

⁷⁹⁰ Samuel Kuchеров, “The Problem of Constantinople and the Straits,” *Russian Review*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 1949), pp. 205-206.

⁷⁹¹ “Rusya ve Ruslar,” *Siyânet*, No. 16 (9 July [Temmûz-i efrençî] 1914), p. 10. It is interesting to note the contradictory use of the city’s name: “İstânbûl’dan Âzâk ve havâlsine giden kayıkçılar Kostantîniye’nin şevket ve ihtişamından bir çok kabâili haberdâr eylemişdi.”

⁷⁹² Fadeev, “What Should Be the Policy of Russia?” pp. 70-71.

the city as the capital of the Slavic federation.⁷⁹³ According to Danilevsky, Constantinople, ‘once freed’, ought to become the real *Tsar’grad*, the capital of a Pan-Slav Union, rather than the capital of the Russian state, for which he credited Moscow alone.⁷⁹⁴

As for the current Ottoman perception, the question of the Straits seemed like a real gridlock, since along with the Ottoman inability to act, the country had to be faced with various aspirations and scenarios by the Great Powers concerning the fate of the Straits. Thus, an interesting report by the Tsarist Secretary of State Aleksandr Bezobrazov (known for his ardent support of the expansionist policy in the Far East),⁷⁹⁵ to Caesar [*çesâr*] Nicholas II that was presented in Ottoman *Türk Yurdu*, depicted the future of Istanbul and the Straits as a ‘zero-sum game’ within the following alternatives: (1) the possession of Istanbul and the Straits by Slavs or Greeks would make the Eastern Question very complicated and impossible, since Russia will encounter there only enemies and no friends; (2) if Russia would pursue a policy of capturing Istanbul, then it would face the economic interests of the whole European industry; (3) the neutrality of the Straits would be a dangerous scheme, since the Black Sea would no longer be our inner sea.⁷⁹⁶ However, at that period, the official Tsarist policy towards the Ottoman Straits was to maintain the *status quo*

⁷⁹³ Suzanne Champonnois, *Le mythe de Constantinople et l’opinion publique en Russie au XIXe siècle* (Istanbul: Éditions ISIS, 1989), p. 63.

⁷⁹⁴ “Russian Pan-Slavism: Danilevskii’s Views,” in *Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917*, ed. Basil Dmytryshyn, 2nd ed. (Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1974), p. 329.

⁷⁹⁵ *Türk Yurdu* presents no first name and the identity of Bezobrazov is derived from his official title *stats-sekretar*. However, there was also Vice-Admiral Petr Bezobrazov, who in November 1904 was the acting Head of the Russian Naval Staff.

⁷⁹⁶ “Cihân Harbinin Mes’ûli,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 8, No. 12 (13 Ağustos 1331) [1915], p. 205.

and the balance of powers, which stipulated the opposition to the division of the Ottoman Empire and territorial expansion of any Balkan state at the expense of Ottoman territories, and securing the free passage through the Straits, as was conveyed to the German ambassador by Aleksandr Izvol'sky, the Tsarist Foreign Minister.⁷⁹⁷

As is often claimed, differently from Germany, the primary and sole Russian consideration was to secure its passage through the Straits or Alexandretta, since “Russia does not need more land or fresh resources. She only seeks the warmth of the sun’s rays.”⁷⁹⁸ Thus, as an Ottoman author reveals – and not without optimism – the current Russian perception concerning Istanbul and the Straits, the recent independence of the Balkan states, which formerly belonged to the Ottoman domain and whose independence was assured by European powers, made the possibility of the Russian possession of the Straits impossible, so that the Russians overtly accept that “having any aspirations after that is nothing but a dream.”⁷⁹⁹

However, an interesting interpretation of the Russian drive towards the Ottoman Straits was presented by Gasprinsky in his *Russian – Eastern Consent*, where he finds Russian inclination towards the Straits and the open sea ‘quite understandable’,

⁷⁹⁷ William L. Langer, “Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8,” *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 44, No. 173 (January 1929), pp. 71-72.

⁷⁹⁸ Dominian, “Europe at Turkey’s Door,” p. 291.

⁷⁹⁹ Ahmed Sâib, *Şark Mes’alesi: Hakâik-i Târihiyeyi Hâvidir* (Istanbul: İkbâl Matba’ası, 1327), pp. 7-8.

‘natural’ and ‘legitimate’ in the light of economic⁸⁰⁰ and political conditions of this “great continental country,” which should not be considered by the Muslims as craving for expansion or animosity towards Islam.⁸⁰¹ The Ottomans, on the other hand, were also aware of the fact that the Ottoman Straits and, consequently, the access to the Mediterranean had vital importance for Russian economy and knew that the Tsarist Government never renounced its claims on Constantinople [*Kostantîniye*], where the future of Russia lay.⁸⁰²

By the time of First World War, the Russian Government started making incessant attempts to recover and reconstruct the Russian Navy, which was seriously undermined by the Russo-Japanese War. Inspired by I. K. Grogorovich, the Minister of Navy, and V. A. Sukhomlinov, the Minister of War, the program of the navy’s rehabilitation stipulated the transfer of 512.6 million rubles to the Baltic Fleet and 102.2 million rubles to the Black Sea Navy, while for the period between 1908 and 1914, a total amount of 2.301 million, almost the whole expenditure of the Russo-Japanese War, was marked out in the Russian budget for armament and military costs.⁸⁰³ Consequently, in the overall steady increase in military expenditure of the Russian Empire following the Russo-Japanese War, it was indeed the navy

⁸⁰⁰ For the economic effect of the closure of the Straits during the Italo-Turkish War on the Russian grain trade and the trade balance in general see Alan Bodger, “Russia and the End of the Ottoman Empire,” in *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1996), pp. 83-84.

⁸⁰¹ Gasprinsky, “Russko-Vostochnoe soglashenie: Mysli, zametki i pozhelaniia Ismaila Gasprinskogo,” p. 69.

⁸⁰² “Şark Mes’elesinin Bugünkü Safhası,” *Mecmû’a-i Ebû’z-Ziyâ*, No. 113 (21 Ramadân 1329), pp. 1103-1104.

⁸⁰³ Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, trans. Bruce Little (Leamington Spa, Hamburg and New York: Berg. 1987), p. 261.

expenditure that was growing with grueling pace. While the army expenditure for the years 1907 and 1913 were 405.7 and 581.1 million roubles respectively, the navy expenditure for the same years amounted to 87.7 and 243.1 million roubles respectively, increasing almost thrice,⁸⁰⁴ while the expenditure on ship-building increased from 26.2 million roubles in 1910 to 108.1 million roubles in 1913, which is a four times increase within three years.⁸⁰⁵

In any case, it was more than obvious that the implementation of the Russian 'historic mission', that is Russia's thirst for the open sea, could never be realized by "international treaties but solely by means of the struggle and the presence of well-armed forces."⁸⁰⁶ Already by the early 1914, the majority of the Russian government believed that the capture of Constantinople and the Straits would become possible only in case of the world war, although they were also aware of the fact that the Russian military capabilities of that period were still insufficient for the realization of this idea.⁸⁰⁷ Nevertheless, as a letter sent in October 1914 by a student newly enlisted to the Tsarist army to the Foreign Minister Sazonov, by whom it was revealed to the French ambassador, utters: "If this war is to bring us Constantinople I will die twenty times, and gladly. But if we are not to have Constantinople I shall die but once, with death in my heart."⁸⁰⁸

⁸⁰⁴ Peter Gatrell, "Industrial Expansion in Tsarist Russia, 1908-14," *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 35, No. 1 (February 1982), p. 104.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 105.

⁸⁰⁶ Geyer, *Russian Imperialism*, p. 252.

⁸⁰⁷ E. Uribes, "Balkanskaia politika Rossii nakanune pervoi mirovoi voyny v sovetskoj istoriografii 20-h – pervoi poloviny 30-h godov," *Istoriia i istoriografiia: Istoricheskii ezhegodnik (1978)* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1981), p. 56.

⁸⁰⁸ Paléologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs by Maurice Paléologue*, Vol. 1, p. 172.

As a Soviet author noted, the very idea of the Ottoman neutrality that it tried to promote, although rhetorically, and even the alliance with the Russian Empire proposed by Enver Pasha through the Russian Ambassador Mikhail de Giers would not be satisfactory for the ‘Russian imperialism’ to have the Ottoman Empire even as the most docile ally: Russia “did not need Turkey at all, but Constantinople, and the best excuse to capture it would be the war with Turkey.”⁸⁰⁹ At the time of the outburst of the First World War, the strife for the Black Sea Straits was ‘the principal question’ of the Russian policy in the Middle East, for which the British capture of the Suez Canal was exemplified as a pattern for the sole radical solution, although in terms of real capabilities Russia seemed to have no chance.⁸¹⁰ Even according to the reports of the Russian naval agent in Istanbul on the eve of the First World War, Tsarist endeavors to capture the Ottoman capital and the Straits had no prospect of success. Already in 1913, A. Shcheglov, the Senior Naval Agent in Istanbul, had depicted the Russian delusive aspirations to raise the Tsarist flag at the Straits as “a nonsense, and a very dangerous one,” while his prophetic warnings in November 1913 that any naval operation in the Dardanelles would be a vain effort that would cost 100,000 lives was proved to be even an optimistic estimation in less than two years.⁸¹¹

⁸⁰⁹ A. M. Zaionchkovsky, *Pervaia mirovaia voina* (St. Petersburg: Poligon, 2000), p. 311.

⁸¹⁰ V. M. Khvostov, *Istoriia diplomatii*, Vol. 2 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1963), p. 761.

⁸¹¹ Sheremet, *Bosfor: Rossiia i Turtsiia v epokhu pervoi mirovoi voiny*, p. 45-46.

In the meantime, a lengthy series of articles on the military and strategic capabilities of the Russian Army frequently appeared in *Cerîde-i 'Askeriyye*, which often presented detailed technical and strategic issues, rather than usual politicized publications of that period,⁸¹² while, especially the Russian naval forces were often a matter of special concern in the Ottoman press.⁸¹³ The Ottomans, on the other hand, also seemed well aware of the Russian uneasiness for the state of its Black Sea Fleet, as the translation of an article by certain Mikhailovsky published in *Russkoe slovo* appeared in Ottoman *Donanma* under a title “The Turkish Fleet and the Anxiety of *Russkoe slovo*.” Being generally very critical of the financing and equipment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet vis-à-vis Ottoman Navy, the excerpts contained some encouraging messages for the Ottomans as it stated that “as long as the Turks would dominate the sea, they can transfer their troops anywhere they wish at any time, even behind our troops in the Caucasus.”⁸¹⁴

Pavel Miliukov, the prominent Russian politician and a renowned apologist of Tsarist expansionist policy, who would later become the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government upon the fall of Tsarism, also saw the world war as a fortunate turn of events for Russia. Hoping for ‘ultimate measures’ to be taken by the end of the war, he was expecting the conclusion of two important questions – the existence of European Turkey and the previous formulation of the Straits problem that stipulated the preservation of the Ottoman Empire – on conditions

⁸¹² See, for instance, “Rusyâ Kuvâ-i Berriyesi,” *Cerîde-i 'Askeriyye*, No. 35, (30 Dhu l’-Ka’da 1329) [1911], pp. 673-677.

⁸¹³ See, for instance, “Rûs Donanması,” *Donanma*, No. 50-2 (5 Temmûz 1914), pp. 30-31.

⁸¹⁴ “Türk Donanması ve ‘Rus[k]oe slovo’nun’ Telâşı,” *Donanma*, No. 51-3 (13 Temmûz 1914), p. 34.

“exceptionally auspicious for us.”⁸¹⁵ Consequently, as Nicholas II proclaimed in his Imperial Manifest declaring war against the Ottoman Empire, “the current reckless engagement of Turkey into the military operations would only hasten the fatal course of events for her and would clear the way for Russia to the settlements of its historical tasks on the shores of the Black Sea bequeathed by our ancestors.”⁸¹⁶ At an extraordinary meeting of the State Duma in August 1914, Miliukov as the leader of the Constitutional Democrat Party assured the government that in order to achieve the historical task of obtaining free passage to the Mediterranean his party would resign its opposition throughout the war.⁸¹⁷ As a justification of the inevitability of his step he stated at a public lecture in April 1915 that “‘Turkish statehood’ represents a coexistence of organized robbery and state authority, and therefore Turkey ought to be divided.”⁸¹⁸

The Tsarist wartime claims on Istanbul and the Straits were duly reflected in the Russian Muslim press, although in much neutral terms. As was mentioned in *Añ*, the prominent journal published in Kazan, both the members of the Cabinet and leaders of all kinds of parties [*türlü partiya başlıklarınıñ*] unanimously stated that “Istanbul and the Straits must belong to Russia.”⁸¹⁹ Interestingly, as is evident from the above mentioned article, while presenting the wartime news and events, the Muslim author

⁸¹⁵ P. N. Miliukov, “‘Neitralizatsiia’ Dardanell i Bosfora,” *Voprosy mirovoi voyny* (Petrograd: “Pravo,” 1915), p. 546.

⁸¹⁶ *Letopis’ voiny*, No. 11 (1 November 1914).

⁸¹⁷ *Istoriia vneshnei politiki Rossii: Konets XIX – nachalo XX veka* (Moscow: “Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia,” 1999), p. 445.

⁸¹⁸ Pavlovich, *Aziia i eia rol’ v mirovoi voine*, p. 63.

⁸¹⁹ “İstanbul ve Çanakkale Mes’elesi” *Añ* (17 January 1915), p. 104.

of the article was quite careful in taking up sides by avoiding statements like ‘we’, ‘our army’, or ‘our side’.

The question of the Russian possession of Constantinople and the Straits became for the time being a matter of consensus for Constitutional Democrats in opposition and the extreme rightist pro-governmental monarchist Rightists’ Group [*fraktsiia pravyykh*] in the Fourth State Duma. Nikolai Markov, the leader of the Rightists better known as Markov II to avoid confusion with Nikolai Markov (1866-1945), another member of the same group and later an ardent opponent of ‘Jewish Bolshevism’, stated that before the end of the war, Russia ought to discuss and clarify with the allies its ‘absolute and unconditional’ possession not only of the Straits, Constantinople, Adrianople [Edirne], and adjacent areas in the Sea of Marmara, but also of Armenia and Trapezund [*Trabzon*], along with the joint possession of the Holy Lands with allies.⁸²⁰

While interpreting the proclamation of Tsar Nicholas II that urged “to make Turkey pay dearly for her mistake of to-day,” Foreign Minister Sazonov told the French Ambassador Paléologue on 2 November 1914 that “we must have tangible guarantees on the Bosphorus. As regards Constantinople, personally I don’t want the Turks to be cleared out. I’d gladly leave them the old Byzantine city with a good-sized kitchen-gardens all around. But no more!”⁸²¹

⁸²⁰ V. S. Vasiukov, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii nakanune Fevral’skoi revoliutsii: 1916 – fevral’ 1917 g.* (Moscow: “Nauka,” 1989), p. 84.

⁸²¹ Paléologue, *An Ambassador’s Memoirs by Maurice Paléologue*, Vol. 1, p. 178.

Interestingly, the official Ottoman war reports of the same period were very encouraging and presented the Russian Black Sea Navy not in their best light, as the advance of the Ottoman navy ‘to chase’ the Russian battleships engaged into fight with five Russian battleships and two cruisers at Sevastopol, so that the enemy fleet had to retreat all the way to the port of Sevastopol.⁸²² The Central Asian journals, on the other hand, frequently reported on similar events, but from the Russian point of view, so that in revenge to the bombardment of Yalta and Sevastopol by the notorious Ottoman cruiser *Breslau*, ‘our cruisers’ moved on and bombed the Turkish city Trabzon and wrecked two Turkish boats, including the *Bûrsa* steamboat.⁸²³

Throughout the First World War, from the Imperial Manifest declaring war against the Ottoman Empire up until the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, the policy of the Russian Government never drifted apart from its aspirations to capture the Ottoman Straits. In a memorandum to the French and British ambassadors in Petrograd, the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov conveyed the will of Emperor Nicholas II that “the question of Constantinople ought to be settled once and for all in accordance with Russian centuries-old aspirations,” meaning the annexation of “the city of Constantinople, the Western coast of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, as well as the Southern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line” to

⁸²² “İki Haftalık Cihâd Haberleri (5 Teşrîn-i sâni 330),” p. 463.

⁸²³ “Yalta vâ Trabzôn Şâhirlârge Tôp Âtâş,” *Sâdâ-i Türkestân*, No. 58 (6 February 1915), p. 3.

the Russian Empire.⁸²⁴ *Fortunately* for Russia, both governments hastened to acknowledge the Tsarist aspirations on absolutely identical terms, that is “the continuation of the war to a successful finish and realization of the British and French desires both in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere” [the British memorandum of 12 March 1915],⁸²⁵ or in case “the war would be carried on until triumphant conclusion and in case France and England implement their plans in the East, as well as in other places” [the French verbal note of 10 April 1915].⁸²⁶

Among the immediate consequences of the Russian conquest of Erzurum mentioned in a Russian treatise of 1917 on the military operations in Eastern Anatolia, the conquest of the city, which was named by the author as the *Siberia of Armenia* for its harsh climate and whose original name, *Arz-i Rûm*, was linked to the Byzantines, led to the opening of the way for further advance to Constantinople and the Mediterranean Sea as well as gaining access to the Baghdad-Constantinople railroad connection.⁸²⁷ As for the French Ambassador in Petrograd, as he put in his memoirs, the news of the capture of Erzurum by the Russians in February 1916, which made

⁸²⁴ “Pamiatnaia zapiska ministra inostrannykh del Sazonova frantsuzskomu i velikobritanskomu poslam v Petrograde M. Paleologu i Dzh. B'ukanenu,” *Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s drugimi gosudarstvami, 1856-1917* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1953), p. 428.

⁸²⁵ “Pamiatnaia zapiska velikobritanskogo posol'stva v Petrograde ministru inostrannykh del Sazonovu,” *Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s drugimi gosudarstvami, 1856-1917*, pp. 431-432.

⁸²⁶ “Verba'naia nota frantsuzskogo posol'stva v Petrograde ministru inostrannykh del Sazonovu,” *Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s drugimi gosudarstvami, 1856-1917*, p. 435.

⁸²⁷ B. Koliubakin, *Na maloaziatskom teatre vsemirnoi voyny 1914 - 1916 gg.: Bagdadskaia zheleznaia doroga*, (Petrograd: Tipografiia Nikolayevskoi voyennoi akademii, 1917), pp. 36, 40.

them “masters of Armenia,” cleared their way to Baghdad, rather than Constantinople.⁸²⁸

As was so rhetorically expressed in the *irâde-i seniyye* and *fetvâ-i şerîf*, the theme of the initial Russian aggression to the Ottoman Straits and Black Sea coast that became the *casus belli* for the Ottoman involvement into the World War, was vividly exposed in numerous periodicals for a long time and each time new details and meanings were attributed to the same alleged event. According to *Harb Mecmû’ası*, the semi-official illustrated journal of war reports, as a response to the assault on the Black Sea, “formerly a Turkish lake,” by Russia, “the everlasting enemy,” the rightful self-defense of the Ottoman fleet intended not only to chase and sink the Muscovite ships, but also to “fire a gun at the gates of our brother countries – the Crimea and Caucasus – that had been groaning and suffering under enemy yoke throughout never-ending years of separation.”⁸²⁹

Interestingly, a short text in *Servet-i Fünûn* with an impressive title “The War against Turkey is a Betrayal of Humanity and Mankind” had openly stated that “the war directed against Çanakkale and Turkey is surely a Russian war.”⁸³⁰ In any case, the Russian military operations in the Black Sea were not only those directed towards the capture of the Straits and adjacent areas but also engaged in maritime

⁸²⁸ Maurice Paléologue, *An Ambassador’s Memoirs by Maurice Paléologue (Last French Ambassador to the Russian Court)*, trans. F. A. Hold, 4th ed., Vol. 2 (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1925), p. 186.

⁸²⁹ “Harb Mecmû’ası,” *Harb Mecmû’ası*, No. 1 (Teşrîn-i sâni 1331), p. 3.

⁸³⁰ “Türkiyâ’ya Karşı Harb – İnsâniyyet ve Beşeriyyete İhânet,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1261 (23 Ramadân 1333) [1915], p. 206.

and landing operations on several coastal areas of the Ottoman Black Sea shores, including Mepavri [*Çayeli*], Atina [*Pazar*] and Trapezund [*Trabzon*], which were carried out in strict coordination with other areas of warfare.⁸³¹

Up until the last days of the Imperial Russia, the Russian Government cherished hopes for the annexation of the Ottoman Straits, with the Ottoman capital and adjacent areas, by a military operation, which towards the end of the war was regarded as the only realistic way to control the passage to the Mediterranean Sea, especially since after the summer campaigns of 1916 the victory of the Entente cast no doubt. In March 1916, during his speech at the session of the State Duma, Pavel Miliukov would proclaim that Russia cannot end the war without getting access to the open sea. According to him, “the present time is not only the most appropriate moment for the settlement of the question of the open sea. This might be the last one.”⁸³²

Moreover, on 6 March 1917, that is just a few days before the February Revolution, the last Tsarist Foreign Minister Nikolai Pokrovsky presented to Tsar Nicholas II a project of the prospective landing operation of the Black Sea Fleet to capture the Bosphorus and *Tsaregrad* before the actual end of the war. Emphasizing the urgency and vital importance of the operation, the Foreign Minister was asking for 200,000 –

⁸³¹ For detailed information on the Russian Navy operations in the Black Sea during the First World War see N. Novikov, *Operatsii flota protiv berega na Chernom more v 1914 – 1917 gg.*, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1937).

⁸³² P. N. Miliukov, *Taktika fraktsii narodnoi svobody vo vremia voiny* (Petrograd: 1916); cited by *Rossii i chernomorskie prolivy (XVIII – XX stoletii)* (Moscow: “Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia,” 1999), pp. 337-338.

250,000 men with full equipment and ammunition and six to seven months for their preparation.⁸³³ However, the disapproval of the Russian high command as well as the impending revolution did not allow this scheme to be realized.

5.1.2 Eastern Anatolia

Russia's 'historic mission' was not only the prescription behind its Balkan policy and its attitude towards the Ottoman Empire, but had far-reaching implications, affecting, in the long run, the fate of the whole Europe and beyond.⁸³⁴ While criticizing the incapacity and passivity of the Russian diplomats preceding him, Alexander Izvol'sky, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and an ardent supporter of the radical and ultimate solution of the Straits problem, urged the government to pursue a much closer relations with England, which would facilitate the realization of the mission. At the conference of the Cabinet of Ministers held on 3 February 1908, he was enthusiastic enough to suggest war against the Ottoman Empire under the pretext of the border dispute between the Ottomans and the Persian Government, which was, however, categorically rejected by the Prime Minister Stolypin on the basis of Russia's unpreparedness.⁸³⁵

⁸³³ "Projet d'une expédition dans le Bosphore: Memorandum de N. N. Pokrovsky, ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à S. M. l'Empereur," *Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917: D'après les archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Petrograd*, trans. J. Polonsky (Paris: Payot, 1928), p. 276.

⁸³⁴ Naturally, the Tsarist territorial claims during the First World War did not content themselves with the capture of the Ottoman lands and the Straits and included certain territories under German and Austro-Hungarian rule. See Robert Wesson, *The Russian Dilemma: A Political and Geopolitical View* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974), p. 9.

⁸³⁵ William L. Langer, "Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8," *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 44, No. 173 (January 1929), p. 71.

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that during the Balkan Wars, at the time when the Ottoman State had not fully recovered from the war with Italy and yet found itself at the Balkan battlefield, the constant disposition and increase of Russian troops in the Caucasus and Iran found much moderate and sympathetic response in current Ottoman publications. Being fully aware of the graveness of their situation, the Ottoman author who referred to Russia simply as ‘Our Friend Russia’ [*Rûsyâ dostumuz*] was realistic enough to suggest that⁸³⁶

Even in time of peace and at the time when we are totally exempt of internal anxieties, we would not be interested in getting involved in a border question with our neighbor Iran, and especially we would certainly not let such a problem involve Russia indirectly to an extent that it can damage [*bozuşmak*] our relations [with Russia].

Interestingly, a Russian author passing from Bitlis to Siirt shockingly found out that the influence of the Ottoman Government in the region seemed loose and ineffective, especially in restraining ‘wild Kurds’.⁸³⁷ At the same time, the Russian involvement in Kurdish affairs, at least academically, and the great knowledge they possessed on the matter were already acknowledged by the Ottomans, whose herald of sociology, *İctimâ’iyyât Mecmû’ası*, assured two facts: first, “there is no serious research on the Kurds,” and second, the Russian Oriental Academy [*Rûs şark akâdemîsi*] sent an expedition to Kurdistan that came out with a great work on Kurds, which became the reference book even for German Orientalists.⁸³⁸

⁸³⁶ “Rusyâ Şarkda Ne Maksad Ta’kîb Ediyor?,” *Mecmû’a-i Ebû’z-Ziyâ*, Vol. 14, No. 146 (28 Djumâdâ ‘l-Ûlâ 1330) [1912], p. 168.

⁸³⁷ Koliubakin, *Na maloaziatskom teatre vseмирnoi voyny 1914 - 1916 gg.*, p. 40.

⁸³⁸ “Kürdler Hakkında Tedkîkât,” *İctimâ’iyyât Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 5 (Ağustos 1917), p. 225.

One of the consequences of the Russo-Ottoman warfare in Eastern Anatolia that later led to the advance of the Russian Army into the Eastern Ottoman provinces became the population movement over and within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. Starting from late 1914, a great number of Armenians and Assyrians from the Ottoman Empire and Persia “fleeing from violence and slaughters by Turks and Kurds” sought refuge in Russia and by October 1915, the overall number of Armenian refugees of non-Russian citizenship reached 200,000 for Russian territories and 300,000 for the whole of the Caucasus, although throughout 1916, some of the Armenian refugees returned to their native lands with the advance of the Russian troops into Ottoman hinterland.⁸³⁹ Moreover, in a report on the fate of the Asiatic possessions of Turkey sent to Emperor Nicholas II on 29 February 1916, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov defined the territories to pass at Russia’s disposal according to the Sykes-Picot proposal as “the whole area between the Black Sea and a line starting from the Lake Urmia, stretching to Anamur to the south of Van, Bitlis, Muş and Harput through the mountain ridges of Taurus and Anti-Taurus,” whose exact borders were to be delimited with the Turkish Sultan.⁸⁴⁰

While considering the possible settlements of the Armenian Question, Sir Mark Sykes, one of the principal architects of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, wrote in March 1916 to Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, that the (a)

⁸³⁹ A. N. Kurtsev, “Bezhtensy pervoi mirovoi voiny v Rossii (1914-1917),” *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 8 (1999), pp. 105, 107.

⁸⁴⁰ “No. 357: Dokladnaia zapiska ministra inostrannykh del Nikolaiu II,” *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma: Dokumenty iz arkhivov Tsarskogo i Vremennogo pravitel'stv 1878-1917 gg.*, Series III (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1938), pp. 393-394.

establishment of an Armenian state under Turkish suzerainty would not be a workable plan “since the Armenians cannot compete with the Kurds,” the (b) formation of an Armenian Government under international control would lead to numerous questions and intrigues, from which Germany would benefit in the end, while the (c) the transfer of the entire Armenia under Russian rule would exacerbate Russian political situation already worn out by revolutionary movements by involving those of Turkey and Persia.⁸⁴¹ Interestingly, the German involvement in the settlement of the Armenian Question still seemed as an important factor, since the Memorandum of the Russian Foreign Ministry of March 1916 proposed the propagation among the local [Armenian] population of the idea of the prospective Armenian autonomy under the Sultan’s suzerainty, “without the proclamation of which we risk to throw the Armenians into the arms of Germans.”⁸⁴²

Interestingly, as the Russian Foreign Minister had previously reported to the Tsar, “for us the most beneficial would be a common border in the south with any Asiatic Muslim state, whether an Arab Caliphate or an Ottoman Sultanate.”⁸⁴³ Therefore, as a memorandum by Sazonov to the French Ambassador in Petrograd Maurice Paléologue reveals, the Tsarist Government would agree on the prospective

⁸⁴¹ “LXXVI: Chrezvychainyi upolnomochennyi velikobritanskogo pravitel’sva ser Mark Saiks poslu v Petrograde seru Dzh. B’ukenenu,” *Razdel Aziatskoi Turtsii po sekretnym dokumentam byvshego Ministerstva inostrannykh del*, ed. E. A. Adamov (Moscow: Izdatel’svo NKID, 1924), p. 158.

⁸⁴² “No. 363: Zapiska, sostavlennaia v ministerstve inostrannykh del,” *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma: Dokumenty iz arkhivov Tsarskogo i Vremennogo pravitel’stv 1878-1917 gg.*, Series III, p. 402.

⁸⁴³ “No. 357: Dokladnaia zapiska ministra inostrannykh del Nikolaiu II,” p. 394.

administration of the territories of Syria, Cilicia and Mesopotamia and recognition of the French rule over several other provinces only under the condition that⁸⁴⁴

- 1) Russia would annex the provinces of Erzerum, Trapezond, Van and Bitlis up to a point at Black Sea coast to the west of Trapezond to be defined later.
- 2) The area of Kurdistan, situated to the south of Van and Bitlis, between Mush, Sert, the Tigris stream, Jezire-ibn Omar, and mountain heights line over Amadia and the region of Margawar would be ceded to Russia....

Later, at a special meeting of the Tsarist Government on 30 March 1917, Ordu was defined as the most appropriate location as the utmost point of the Russo-Turkish border to the west of Trabzon.⁸⁴⁵

Ironically, despite the unanimously evil and negative image in the Ottoman press, the Russian rule in North East Anatolia might not have unambiguously perceived as a period of overall devastation and calamity. Despite his steadily anti-Russian stance, Ahmed Refik constantly mentions the accomplishment provided by Russians, including roads, houses, factories as well as crafty Russian masters throughout his trip through the Black Sea and Eastern Anatolian provinces. When he asked a local Muslim in a village around Trabzon how did they get along under Russian rule, the man responded: “Efendî, those Russians were taking care of us, although there was fear in our hearts. Now we have no fear, but hunger is much worse.”⁸⁴⁶ In fact, the ‘Russian bread’ might have really been a prompting factor for

⁸⁴⁴ “CIII: Pamiatnaia zapiska rossiiskogo ministra inostrannykh del S. D. Sazonova frantsuzskomu poslu v Petrograde M. Paleologu,” *Razdel Aziatskoi Turtsii po sekretnym dokumentam byvshego Ministerstva inostrannykh del*, p. 185.

⁸⁴⁵ “No. 435: Osoboe soveshchanie,” *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma: Dokumenty iz arkhivov Tsarskogo i Vremennogo pravitel'stv 1878-1917 gg.*, Series III, p. 534.

⁸⁴⁶ Refik, *Kafkas Yollarında, İki Komite İki Kıtıl*, p. 43.

the Ottoman population, since a religious appeal inducing the Ottoman Muslims to *jihâd* exclaimed: “Do not listen to those scumbags [*alçaklara*] who are allured by enemy’s money, Muscovite bread, English glamour [*hevâ*] and French wine.”⁸⁴⁷

5.2 THE GREAT WAR AND MINORITIES

Asserting that Russia had not reached its “historical and natural borders,” Ismail Gasprinsky believed, or at least stated, that “sooner or later, the borders of Russia would enclose all Turko-Tatar tribes and, as a matter of fact, despite temporal halt, would reach there where the Turko-Tatar population in Asia ends.”⁸⁴⁸ In the meantime, the main strategy of the Russian Government concerning the Ottomans is claimed to be its endeavor to settle non-Muslim peoples between Turkey [*Türkiyâ*] and Asian Muslims and Turks [*Âsyâ İslâm-Türkleri*] and the role of such buffer zone for the six Eastern Anatolian *vilâyets* of the Ottoman Empire was to be played by Armenia, which had previously fallen into oblivion for centuries.⁸⁴⁹

5.2.1 Ottoman Kurds and Armenians during the First World War

In examining the role the Ottoman minorities played in the Russo-Ottoman warfare during the First World War and the influence of the war on their fate, two ethnic groups – Armenians and Kurds – were brought to the foreground. First, due to the

⁸⁴⁷ “Cihâd yâ Muslimîn...,” *Donanma*, No. 68-20 (16 Teşrîn-i sâni 1914).

⁸⁴⁸ Ismail Gasprinsky, “Russkoe musul’manstvo: Mysli, zametki i nabliudeniia,” in Ismail Bey Gasprinsky, *Rossiia i Vostok* (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1993), p. 17.

⁸⁴⁹ Nikerled Krayblis, *Rusya’nın Şark Siyâseti ve Vilâyât-i Şarkîye Mes’eleleri*, trans. Hâbil Adem (Istanbul: İkbâl Kitâbhânesi, 1332), p. 9.

area densely populated by these groups, that is, the Eastern Anatolian *vilâyet*s of the Ottoman Empire, which substantially became the theatre of Russo-Ottoman warfare; second, due to growing nationalistic sentiments there, as elsewhere in the empire; and third, due to imperial policies directly or indirectly targeting these two groups.

One of the principal stereotypes of the First World War period attributed to the Ottoman Government, the Turkish race or the Muslims in general, for which the Western press played a decisive role, was the claims of systematic suppression of their Christian subjects. Interestingly, as Lord Salisbury “most truly” explained, the predisposition of the Ottomans towards “butchering the Armenians” was not just an act of ephemeral wartime affection, but was related to their hereditary instincts and lineal descendance from Chinggis Khan and Tamerlane and the influence of Islam, which “is liable to produce the most dreadful outbursts of fanaticism.”⁸⁵⁰ While evaluating the reign of Abdülhamid II, James Bryce stated in 1905 that “his Khalifial pretensions and a stimulation of Muslim fanaticism,” became the two main claims that consequently “led to the massacre of myriads of Asiatic Christians.”⁸⁵¹ Buttressed by another inherited predisposition, “the Kurdish instinct for robbery,”⁸⁵² eruditely noticed by reverent Priest Bekguliants, the scrutiny of the history of interethnic conflicts in Eastern Anatolia prior to and during the First World War

⁸⁵⁰ The Duke of Argyll, *Our Responsibilities for Turkey: Facts and Memories of Forty Years*, p. 120.

⁸⁵¹ James Bryce, “Introduction,” in *The Balkan Question*, ed. Luigi Villari (London: John Murray, 1905), pp. 4-5.

⁸⁵² R. Bekguliants, *Po Turetskoi Armenii: Vpechatleniia ot poezdki letom v 1914 godu* (Rostov-on-Don: Tipografiya Ya. M. Iskidarova, 1914), p. 76.

have always been carried out with a set of strictly predisposed ideas by any party, whether interested or disinterested.

The Ottomans, in their turn, depicted the Tsarist State as the archenemy of all small nations, both Muslim and Christian. According to an Ottoman article of October 1915, the Russian policy towards smaller nations, whether in time of war or peace, was that of gradual annexations and destruction of those helpless and wretched [*biçâre*] peoples who happened to accept the Russian policy. Making indirect reference to Bulgaria, the new Ottoman ally in the Balkans, the article optimistically states that “at the beginning of the war, as soon as the greedy aspirations of the Muscovite Tsar concerning the Straits became obvious, there left no government, no nation and no person in the Balkans who would not understand the ruinous and destructive nature of the Russian policy based on usurpation and annexation.”⁸⁵³

Before the war, the Muslim – non-Muslim relations in the Eastern Anatolian provinces were often mentioned to be quite friendly, as was the case for their relations with the local Kurds who are traditionally noted for their savagery, belligerence and defiance by Western, Russian and even Turkish authors.⁸⁵⁴ The friendship noted by travelers in the region was not confined only to happy

⁸⁵³ “Moskof Huşûneti: Bulgaristan ve Rusya,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, Vol. 49, No. 1272 (26 Dhu l’-Hidjdja 1333), p. 373.

⁸⁵⁴ For the common patterns of Kurdish representation in Russian and Western sources see Zharmukhamed Zardykan, “Ottoman Kurds of the First World War Era: Reflections in Russian Sources,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (January 2006), pp. 67-85.

cohabitation,⁸⁵⁵ but even involved protection of the Armenians by the Kurds.⁸⁵⁶ As was also mentioned, the Kurdo-Assyrian relations prior to the war seemed to be fairly friendly as well.⁸⁵⁷ Moreover, prior to the outburst of the Great War, the Ottomans often expressed their confidence in the loyalty of the Ottoman Armenians and their reluctance to accept Tsarist rule. As was noted by Ottoman *Tercümân-i Hakîkât*, “It is beyond any doubt that no Armenian would prefer to live under the Cossack dominance [*Hiç bir Ermenînin, Kâzâkların taht-i tahakkümünde yaşamağa ârzû itmediği şübhesizdir*].”⁸⁵⁸

The deterioration of the Muslim – non-Muslims relations, which in the light of the religious affiliation and identification of the Ottoman subjects also meant the majority – minority relations, and exacerbation of the tension that led to separatist movements among them was also claimed to be the effect of Western powers, who not only directly fostered the ideology of separateness amongst them, but also did it through their Western type of education, as well as by providing preferential rights to non-Muslims through their consular or commercial institutions.⁸⁵⁹ Thus, it should not come as a surprise that the primary concerns of the wartime Ottoman Empire

⁸⁵⁵ Major Kenneth Mason, “Central Kurdistan,” *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 54, No. 6 (December 1919), p. 329.

⁸⁵⁶ M. G. Nersisian, ed., *Genotsid armian v Osmanskoi imperii: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, 2nd ed. (Yerevan: “Aiastan,” 1983), pp. 415-416; and Bekguliants, *Po Turetskoi Armenii: Vpechatleniia ot poezdki letom v 1914 godu*, pp. 32, 54.

⁸⁵⁷ M. Philips Price, *War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia* (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1918), p. 124.

⁸⁵⁸ “Rusya ve Anadolu,” *Tercümân-i Hakîkât* (31 Kânûn-i evvel 1328), p. 3.

⁸⁵⁹ See Fatma Müge Göçek, “Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Society,” *Politics Today*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 507-538.

were: (1) to preserve its sovereignty as a Muslim state; and (2) to prevent the constant interference of the Great Powers because of its Christian subjects.⁸⁶⁰

Indeed, towards the First World War, the Ottoman State, which in the course of the last few decades endured a chain of separatist movements and wars with its Christian subjects as well as foreign aggression and annexation, preferred to follow a wait-and-see policy towards the Ottoman Armenians and international policy around them, so that, in the meantime, the Armenian theme was scarcely exposed in Ottoman periodicals. Thus, a short article entitled “Armenia,” which appeared in *İslâm Dünyâsı* revealed the Russian and British policies towards the settlement of the Armenian question by quoting statements by Pavel Miliukov and William Gladstone and added that “the loyalty of our Armenian citizens to us deserves amazement” [*Ermenî vatandaşlarımızın bize olân sadâkatleri şâyân-i hayretidir*].⁸⁶¹ In the meantime, while protesting against the growing infringement of the Russian Muslims’ religious and linguistic rights, the Ottoman *Beyân-ul-Hak* had stated:⁸⁶²

For God’s sake let our Christian citizens [*vatandaşlarımız*] tell whether there was any attack on their national languages and religious practices. In Islamic countries they even enjoyed religious privileges and peculiarities, let alone their religious freedoms and national traditions being assaulted.

As Salâhi R. Sonyel had stated, the Western allies seeking for the cooperation of Ottoman minorities had “created a false impression among the vanquished people” by promising them “protection, or independence, if they were prepared to fight

⁸⁶⁰ “Cihân Harbinin Mes’ûli,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 8, No. 12 (13 Ağustos 1331) [1915], p. 2715.

⁸⁶¹ “Ermenistân,” *İslâm Dünyâsı*, Year 1, No. 19, p. 302.

⁸⁶² “Rusya Müslümânları - ve Duma Meclisi,” *Beyân-ul-Hak*, Vol. 3, No. 66 (19 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1328) [1910], p. 1313.

against Turkey.”⁸⁶³ However, in the overall confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia, it was asserted that not only the Ottomans or Russians were used as targets for the Ottoman minorities through wartime propaganda, since sometimes they were instigated against another minority group. As M. Philips Price claimed, the Turkish emissaries were eager to incite the Kurds against non-Muslims by Pan-Islamic appeal and promise of paradise crying “The Giaour is coming!”⁸⁶⁴ At the same time, according to Sonyel, it was the Russians who “incited the Kurds to attack the Armenians.”⁸⁶⁵

Thus, in the strained Ottoman-Armenian relations that led to the tragic and mournful events during the First World War, an influential role is often attributed to the Kurds of Eastern Anatolia, who are often accused of committing the atrocities on their own seeing the Armenians as the prospective rival in consolidating their “future national homeland.”⁸⁶⁶ However, the incentives of the Ottoman Kurds are not confined to their nationalistic aspirations, since they were frequently accused of their intrinsic contemptuous attitude towards the Armenians,⁸⁶⁷ of being the executors on behalf of the Ottoman Government,⁸⁶⁸ or even of serving as accomplices in the implementation of Tsarist imperial aspirations.⁸⁶⁹

⁸⁶³ Salâhi R. Sonyel, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 1993), p. 329.

⁸⁶⁴ Price, *War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia*, p. 125.

⁸⁶⁵ Sonyel, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 392.

⁸⁶⁶ Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 57.

⁸⁶⁷ Kamal Madhar Ahmad, *Kurdistan during the First World War*, trans. Ali Maher Ibrahim (London: Saqi Books, 1994), p. 148.

⁸⁶⁸ V. Gordlevsky, “U sipandagskikh kurdov. Iz poezdki na kavkazkii front,” *Musul'manskii mir*, Year

At the time of the First World War, the Ottoman Government, which had for the time being thoroughly appealed to Pan-Islamic (and even Pan-Turkist) policies, was eager to win over the Kurdish population of Eastern Anatolia for which the Ottoman press played its part, although comical complaints of the Kurds blaming the Ottoman officials for forcing them, the illiterates, to subscribe to newspapers and benefiting from the tax were also mentioned.⁸⁷⁰ An article in *Türk Duygusu* with a dichotomous title “The Kurds and Armenians” published in May 1913 claimed that the Kurds hailed from the ancient Hittites, who were “revealed to be completely and quite certainly Turanians, and all scientists and historians accept that.”⁸⁷¹ Interestingly, this assertion became very popular lately, so that General Kâzım Karabekir would assure in his *Kurdish Question* that the Kurds descended from the Hittites, who were “the most ancient of the Turks.”⁸⁷² Not unexpectedly, an introduction to an article on the Kurds published in *İctimâ’iyyât Mecmû’ası* in August 1917, counted the Arabs and Kurds among the primary nations [*milletler*] that – apart from the Turks – formed the Ottoman Empire, adding that “without knowing the social structure of these two peoples [*kavm*], the researches and assumptions about the social, political and administrative organization of our country would be if not wrong, then [definitely] insufficient.”⁸⁷³

I, Issue I (1917), p. 23.

⁸⁶⁹ Dzh. Kirakosian, *Zapadnaia Armeniia v gody pervoi mirovoi voyny* (Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo Yerevanskogo Universiteta, 1971), pp. 414–415.

⁸⁷⁰ Beggulians, *Po Turetskoi Armenii: Vpechatleniia ot poezdki letom v 1914 godu*, p. 32.

⁸⁷¹ Mehmed Hulûsî, “Kürdler ve Ermeniler [Part I],” *Türk Duygusu*, Year 1, No. 1 (1 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1331) [1913], p. 15.

⁸⁷² Kâzım Karabekir, *Kürt Meselesi*, ed. Faruk Özerengin (Istanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1994), p. 10.

⁸⁷³ “Kürdler Hakkında Tedkîkât,” *İctimâ’iyyât Mecmû’ası*, Year 1, No. 5 (Ağustos 1917), p. 225.

As for the Armenians, the article in *Türk Duygusu* was sure that they were not autochthonous and no one knew where they came from exactly, although “it is said that they are Indo-European and came from around Afghanistan.”⁸⁷⁴ However, while describing the almost indistinguishable closeness between the Turks and Kurds, the sequel of the article nevertheless stated that some people consider Saladin a Kurd and clarified that “this is a terrible mistake; Selâhaddîn Eyyûbî is the greatest and the most noble [*asîl*] Turk.”⁸⁷⁵

The evaluation of statistical data concerning the Armenian and Kurdish populations in Eastern Anatolian *vilâyets* of the Ottoman Empire presents certain technical and political problems that could be roughly summarized into the following: (1) the Ottoman *millet* system of national affiliation designated religious, rather than ethnic or linguistic identity of the subjects, so that the Catholic and Protestant Armenians were reckoned separately from Gregorian Armenians,⁸⁷⁶ while the Kurds were counted among the rest of the Muslim population; (2) the over- or underestimation of these two groups in statistical data became the matter of incessant claims by any

⁸⁷⁴ Mehmed Hulûsî, “Kürdler ve Ermenîler [Part I],” p. 16.

⁸⁷⁵ Mehmed Hulûsî, “Kürdler ve Ermenîler [Part II],” *Türk Duygusu*, Year 1, No. 2-6 (15 Djumâdâ ‘1-Âkhira 1331) [1913], p. 31.

⁸⁷⁶ See, for instance, Karpas, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914*, pp. 194-197.

of the interested parties, being accused of underrating the Kurdish population,⁸⁷⁷ the Muslim population in general,⁸⁷⁸ or the Armenian population.⁸⁷⁹

According to the Ottoman population data for the year 1914 derived from a variety of sources and presented by Stanford J. Shaw, the non-Muslim population of the empire was 3,475,170, compared to 15,044,846 Muslims out of a total population of 18,520,016, with the number of Gregorian and Catholic Armenians being 1,161,169 and 67,838 respectively.⁸⁸⁰ According to Justin McCarthy, the total Armenian population of Anatolia by 1912 was 1,493,276, which made up 8.52 percent of the whole Anatolian population.⁸⁸¹ In the Ottoman translation of *Les réformes en Turquie d'Asie: La question arménienne, la question syrienne* published in 1913, the Armenian population of Anatolia⁸⁸² is mentioned to be 1,150,000, while those of the European Turkey [*Rûm îli*] and the Armenian regions of the Caucasus and Russia proper were 250,000 and 1,500,000 respectively.⁸⁸³

The statistical estimation of the Ottoman Kurdish population, as was mentioned above, seems more difficult than that of the Armenians. The data presented by Jean

⁸⁷⁷ G. R. Driver, "Studies in Kurdish History," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, Vol. 2, Issue 3 (1922), p. 495. For "provinces in which Kurds were greatly underscoring" see Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1983), p. 107.

⁸⁷⁸ Karpas, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914*, p. 53.

⁸⁷⁹ Bekguliants, *Po Turetskoi Armenii: Vpechatleniia ot poezdki letom v 1914 godu*, p. 85.

⁸⁸⁰ Stanford J. Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (October 1978), pp. 334, 337.

⁸⁸¹ McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, pp. 110-111.

⁸⁸² It ought to be noted that the term 'Asiatic Turkey' [*Turquie d'Asie*] of the original book title is translated into Ottoman as Anatolia [*Anadolu*], which for the year 1913 did not mean the same thing.

⁸⁸³ Ludovic de Contenson, *Anadolu'da Islahât: Ermenî Mes'elesi, Sûriye Mes'elesi*, trans. Ragıp Rıfıkı (Istanbul: Matba'a-i Nefâset, 1913), p. 21.

Henri Ubicini – based on the Ottoman census of 1844 – that designates the Ottoman population by ethnic affiliation, presented the number of the Kurds as one million throughout the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁸⁴ The population data by the Tsarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the year 1912 presents the numbers Kurds in six Eastern Anatolian *vilâyet*s, the area of intense Russo-Ottoman military and political confrontation, as 424,000.⁸⁸⁵ The data by Davis Trietsch presented in his *Almanyâ ve İslâm* published in Istanbul in 1915, reveals relatively higher figures for the number of both Armenians and Kurds in the Ottoman Empire, estimating them to be 2,652,000 and 1,250,000 respectively.⁸⁸⁶

It ought to be noted that the statistical data provided by the Ottomans and that by foreigners could have a sizeable discrepancy, especially those concerning the number of non-Muslims. As is mentioned, the Ottoman and British figures for the Armenians in Eastern provinces and Hellenic Greeks differ up to 62 and 70 percent respectively and the reasons for their underestimation are claimed to be (1) the manipulation of the Ottoman Government, (2) the intention of the non-Muslims to avoid registration, especially after 1908 when military service became obligatory for non-Muslims, or (3) the disagreement on the citizenship status of certain groups, which was the case for the Hellenic Greeks.⁸⁸⁷

⁸⁸⁴ [Jean Henri] A[bdolomyne] Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey*, trans. Lady Easthope (London: 1856; repr. New York: Arno Press, 1973), pp. 18-19, 22; cited by Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914*, p. 116.

⁸⁸⁵ A. O. Arutunian, *Kavkazskii front: 1914–1917 gg.* (Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo 'Aiastan', 1971), p. 347.

⁸⁸⁶ Trietsch, *Almanyâ ve İslâm*, p. 25.

⁸⁸⁷ Meir Zamir, "Population Statistics of the Ottoman Empire in 1914 and 1919," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1981), p. 87.

While Asia Minor and Western Asia [*peredniaia Aziia*] were considered the key regions for the economic and strategic dominance and rivalry and, as the center of the Muslim world, for threatening Russian and British interests in the Caucasus, Persia, India and Egypt, special importance was attributed to ‘mountainous Armenia’ as the cross-road between East and West, as well as North and South.⁸⁸⁸ Therefore, during the State Duma sessions of December 1912, Pavel Miliukov drew special attention to the possession of *Turkish Armenia* by the Russian Empire, stating that “the situation of the Armenians in the sanjak of Van and neighboring districts wholly or mainly inhabited by the Armenians cannot be indifferent for us.”⁸⁸⁹ However, the Russian annexation of ‘Turkish Armenia’, which was demanded not only by Russian politicians like Miliukov, but also by Russian Armenians represented in the State Duma, did not seem plausible by the Foreign Minister Sazonov who could only promise to press for reforms in the Ottoman Empire, while, especially after the Balkan Wars, the Russian Government feared that the Armenians within Russia might dare to form a nation together with their Ottoman brethren by taking advantage of the war-weakened Ottoman state.⁸⁹⁰

Thus, an interesting account was mentioned in the travel notes during the reconnaissance trip of V. P. Liakhov, the Lieutenant Colonel of the Tsarist General Staff, written by his Turkish translator Staff-Captain K. N. Smirnov, to investigate

⁸⁸⁸ Koliubakin, *Na maloaziatskom teatre vseмирnoi voyny 1914 - 1916 gg.*, p. 32.

⁸⁸⁹ Pavlovich, *Aziia i eia rol' v mirovoi voine*, p. 61.

⁸⁹⁰ Roderic H. Davison, “The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914,” *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (April 1948), p. 487.

the real intention behind the mobilization of the Ottoman Fourth Corps, since the Russian General Staff suspected the plausible Ottoman advance to the Caucasus that was already weakened by the partial mobilization of its troops to the Russo-Japanese front. Upon the passage over the Russo-Ottoman borders of an Armenian band of sixty men that took advantage of the joint celebrations of Russian and Ottoman border officers “who were heavily drinking for two days,” both the Russian and Ottoman troops attacked the band from both sides killing forty and arresting twenty men, so that “the Turks saw for themselves that the Russian Government is not patronizing the Armenian revolutionaries.”⁸⁹¹ The rapprochement brought by the incident was so visible that the Ottoman Sultan ordered to grant an allowance to the widow of Lieutenant Colonel Bykov, the commander of the Russian border troops killed by the Armenians.⁸⁹²

In any case, as was noted by M. Philips Price, the special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, who was visiting the area during the First World War, the decision of some non-Muslims of Eastern Anatolia to join the Russian side was dictated by despair vis-à-vis terrific wartime news, especially the battle of Sarikamış and the sudden fear that in the end “if something were not done, and sides were not taken, the victors, whoever they might be, would turn on them and say, ‘He that was

⁸⁹¹ Nugzar Ter-Oganov, ed., “Poezdka podpolkovnika General’nogo shtaba V. P. Liakhova i shtabs-kapitana K. N. Smirnova v Turtsiiu v 1904 godu,” *Russian History – Histoire Russe*, Vol. 33, No. 1, Document (Spring 2006), p. 141.

⁸⁹² “Poezdka podpolkovnika General’nogo shtaba V. P. Liakhova i shtabs-kapitana K. N. Smirnova v Turtsiiu v 1904 godu,” p. 141.

not with us was against us’.”⁸⁹³ As would later turn out, the Ottoman defeat at Sarıkamış was not only the turning point that had shaken the faith of the Ottoman minorities, but turned into a bitter disappointment for those who dreamed of the Great Turan. Upon the failure of the Ottoman advance on Sarıkamış led by Enver Pasha, an over-sixteen-thousand-strong division that was to penetrate to Turkestan through Iran was called back to the north to defend Erzurum from Russians, so that an officer of the division would sigh out that “our dreams of Turan were smashed to pieces.”⁸⁹⁴

As was noted by the British officials in the Ottoman Empire, the non-Muslim population of the empire did not accept the idea of equality with the Muslim population wholeheartedly and were extremely reluctant to serve in the Ottoman Army along with Muslim subjects and often chose to emigrate from the country.⁸⁹⁵ At the same time, the active participation of the local Armenians in the Russian military operations in Eastern Anatolia was also thoroughly noted.⁸⁹⁶ In response, at the Congress of *İttihâd ve Terakkî* in 1916, foreign powers and Russia, in particular, were blamed for instigating the Armenians against the Ottoman state. As was mentioned in the records of the congress, “although the political difficulties caused during the most critical period for our state by this nation, whose property, lives and religious values we had been guarding for six hundred years, should have caused

⁸⁹³ Price, *War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia*, pp. 124-125.

⁸⁹⁴ Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları*, pp. 95-96.

⁸⁹⁵ Swanson, “A Note on the Ottoman Socio-Economic Structure and its Response to the Balkan War of 1912,” p. 119.

⁸⁹⁶ See, for instance, “Vân’ın Moskoflardan İstirdâdı,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 8, No. 12 (13 Ağustos 1331), p. 2726.

wrath, we, guided by our religious and congenial upbringing, considered this baseness an act of a few brainless.”⁸⁹⁷

As is often mentioned, the Ottoman non-Muslims were not the only peoples eager to avoid Ottoman military service. The reluctance of the Ottoman Kurds to serve in the army, however, was claimed to be because of their fear to be sent to remote districts in Europe or Gallipoli, as well as their unwillingness to lose the loot, since in case they would have to fight, they would prefer to stay in their lands and fight their neighbors, so that they would get all the loot, instead of losing it to the Sultan.⁸⁹⁸ Yet even in their habitat, the mass desertion of Kurdish troops was noted by the Russian military, who estimated that the number of Kurdish cavalymen drastically dropped from 18,000 to 2,800 following the Köprüköy operation of November 1914.⁸⁹⁹

In his travel notes through Anatolian lands occupied by the Russian troops during the First World War, at the time when following the October Revolution the Russian troops had already retreated and the two states were no more at war, Ahmed Refik, the prominent Military Censorship Inspector [*askerî sansür müfettişî*] and historian, presents an interesting perception of the Russians vis-à-vis Armenians and Greeks. Upon his arrival to Trabzon, the land “that suffered Muscovite invasion for months,” whose walls were covered with inscriptions in Russian and disgraceful pictures

⁸⁹⁷ Eşref Yağcıoğlu, ed., *İttihâd ve Terakkî'nin Son Yılları: 1916 Kongresi Zabıtları* (Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992), p. 19.

⁸⁹⁸ Price, *War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia*, p. 125.

⁸⁹⁹ N. G. Korsun, *Pervaia mirovaia voina na kavkazskom fronte: Operativnostrategicheskii ocherk* (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1946), p. 30.

aiming at “outraging [*tahkîr*] Turkish women,” where mosques were turned into stables, the people found the Russian rule quite orderly, since there was not problem in public food supplies, the alcoholic drinks were banned altogether and Russians offered numerous work places at road construction for which they were receiving generous payments, sugar and tea.⁹⁰⁰ Moreover, as he adds, “the Russian rule caused no harm to people at all” [*halk Rus idâresinden hiç bir kötülük görmemiş*], and, on the contrary, the Russians even protected them from Armenian assaults, at the time when the population of the region had been tormented by the molestations of the fellow Greeks and Armenians [*Rûm ve Ermenî vatândâşlarının*], in comparison with which the Muscovite invasion would be a grace [*ni’met*].⁹⁰¹

Thus, in comparison with the overall negative image of the Tsarist colonial rule thoroughly presented in the Ottoman press, the impressions by Ahmed Refik might be the only description of the First World War period that might indirectly confirm the assertions of Albert J. Beveridge who was once impressed by the ‘chivalry’ of the Russian army and the Russians in general, so that he states in his book *The Russian Advance* published in 1903 that “the Russian soldier’s ability to make friends with the people with whom he mingles, and even with those whom he conquers, is one of his striking characteristics, and common to all Russians.”⁹⁰²

⁹⁰⁰ Ahmed Refik, *Kafkas Yollarında, İki Komite İki Kıtâl*, pp. 22-24, 27.

⁹⁰¹ Ahmed Refik, *Kafkas Yollarında, İki Komite İki Kıtâl*, pp. 26-27.

⁹⁰² Albert J. Beveridge, *The Russian Advance* (London and New York: Harper and Brother Publishers, 1903), p. 140.

5.2.2 The Russo-Ottoman Warfare and the Muslims of Russia

Traditionally, the Russo-Ottoman wars were always presented from both sides as a righteous confrontation of the Orthodoxy and Islam that was duly represented in wartime rhetoric and propaganda. The righteousness of the conflict and the vital importance of the Ottoman Empire for the survival of the whole Muslim world were mentioned in an ‘eloquent’ letter by Jamal al-Dîn al-Afghânî sent to the Ottoman Sultan as early as 1892, saying: “I shall emphasize Russia’s aims and convey with an eloquent tongue that if, God forbid, a calamity befalls the Ottoman Government, neither will permanence remain to Mecca nor majesty to Madina, and not even the name of Islam or a rite of the faith will survive,” and continued with a much optimistic tone by claiming that “I have no doubt that all the Muslims will attack the Russians enthusiastically. They will conquer the Russians on that side, and even altogether destroy them.”⁹⁰³ Indeed, the Ottoman attempts to establish a Pan-Islamist and Pan-Turkist propaganda network among the Muslims of the Russian Empire were indirectly confirmed even in the Ottoman press, as the establishment of pro-Ottoman and Pan-Islamist youth associations among the Kazan Tatars was proudly exposed in *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*,⁹⁰⁴ while an article in *Beyân-ul-Hak* was impliedly referring to the alleged claims that *İttihâd ve Terakkî* had a branch in the Volga region.⁹⁰⁵

⁹⁰³ Nikki R. Keddie, “The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1966), pp. 58-59.

⁹⁰⁴ “Rusya ve Panislâmizm,” *Sebilü’r-Reşâd*, Vol. 8-1, No. 198-16 (5 Radjab 1330) [1912], p. 311.

⁹⁰⁵ “Rusya’da Tazyîk-i İslâm’a Lüzûm Gösterenler,” *Beyân-ul-Hak*, Vol. 5, No. 126 (11 Ramadan 1329) [1911], p. 2286.

The memoirs of Rahmi Apak, who volunteered for an Ottoman propaganda mission to the Caucasus, Iran and Turkestan in 1914, also seem to confirm these claims, although put the German concerns in the forefront. As he mentions, Germany was instigating Turkey to Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamic aspirations and taking advantage of the Unionists' Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamic dreams, hoping that the numerous Muslim and Turkic community of Russia would weaken Russian positions vis-à-vis Germany. As for the author, he was "going to Turan. We were to enter Iranian Azerbaijan and excite rebellion among Azeri Turks, then to penetrate into Turkestan and arm the local Turks and serve there for the cause of the Great Turan."⁹⁰⁶

In reality, as was noted by Arminius Vambéry, the man with profound firsthand knowledge of the Orient and a personal acquaintance of Sultan Abdülhamid II, despite numerous agents⁹⁰⁷ propagating Pan-Islamic ideas throughout Southern Russia and Central Asia, the only materialized success was the celebration of the Caliph's birthday in Islamic lands.⁹⁰⁸ Moreover, during the First World War, even the Muslims of the North Caucasus, who, unlike Muslims from Russian hinterland, were immediate to the Russo-Ottoman battlefields, received Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist appeals without vivid enthusiasm and their compassion on the Ottomans did

⁹⁰⁶ Rahmi Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), p. 95.

⁹⁰⁷ For more detailed information on the Ottoman agents among the Russian Muslims see E. K. Sarkisian, *Ekspansionistskaia politika Osmanskoi imperii v Zakavkaz'e nakanune i v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny* (Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk Armianskoi SSR, 1962), pp. 99-125.

⁹⁰⁸ Arminius Vambéry, *The Story of My Struggles: The Memoirs of Arminius Vambéry* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1905), pp. 368-369.

not go beyond lofty ideals.⁹⁰⁹ Therefore, despite an extremely negative attitude towards Pan-Islamism, especially for its influence upon certain ‘religious-nationalistic’ movements among the Muslims of Russia, namely the Musavatists in Azerbaijan, Bukharan Jadidists and *İttifâk al-muslimîn*, even the Soviet authors mentioned its insignificant practical outcome.⁹¹⁰ In fact, this might have been the reason behind an unexpectedly modest description of the Russian Muslims’ contribution to *jihâd* by *Türk Yurdu*, as those “bound to *jihâd* with their heart and mind.”⁹¹¹

On the threshold of the Great War to come and, probably, dizzied by their own Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist propaganda, the Ottomans expressed great concern and pinned their hope over the attitude of the Russian Muslims in case of Russo-Ottoman war. As an article in *Sebilü'r-Reşâd* with an evident title “Will the Muslims of Russia Join in Case of War” revealed, there were 200,000 Muslim *sâldâts*⁹¹² ready to join the Russian Army in case of war, although they would be definitely reluctant to serve at the Caucasian border.⁹¹³ This estimation turned out to be a realistic figure, since according to an article published in *Türk Yurdu* in late December 1914, the number of Turko-Muslims [*türk – müslümân*] soldiers among the Russian troops

⁹⁰⁹ *Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v. – 1917 g.)* (Moscow: “Nauka,” 1988), p. 541.

⁹¹⁰ I. L. Fadeeva, *Ofitsial'nye doktriny i ideologii i politike Osmanskoi imperii (Osmanizm-Panislamizm): XIX – nachalo XX v.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo “Nauka,” 1985), pp. 175-176.

⁹¹¹ *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (5 Mart 1331) [1915], p. 2518.

⁹¹² Turkification from Russian *soldat* [soldier].

⁹¹³ “Muhârebe Olursa Rûsyadaki Müslümânlar İştirâk İdecek mi,” *Sebilü'r-Reşâd*, Vol. 8-1, No. 186-4 (9 Rabî' al-Âkhir 1330) [1912], p. 72.

fighting on the Austro-Hungarian and German borders amounted to 200,000 men.⁹¹⁴

The overall number of the Muslim soldiers in regular Tsarist army during the First World War, however, was estimated to be between 800,000 and 1,500,000, the Tatars being the prevalent groups.⁹¹⁵

Despite the image of an overall compassion and sacrifice of the Muslim population of the Russian Empire towards the Ottoman state during the First World War, with which the Ottoman press was overflowed, the attitude of some Russian Muslims and especially their elite somehow mismatched the general pattern. Immediately after the Russian declaration of war against the Ottomans, mass demonstrations of Muslims accompanied by Russian national anthems and prayers for the Tsar took place in Kazan, where the local Muslim elite emphasized that the Entente warfare waged against the Ottoman Empire would not in any way undermine their patriotic feelings.⁹¹⁶ Moreover, in December 1914, the congress of the representatives of Turko-Tatar bourgeoisie for the elaboration of measures to help the injured soldiers was convened by the initiatives of the Muslim Fraction of the State Duma.⁹¹⁷

Previously, Ismail Gasprinsky had praised the equality of rights provided by the laws of the Russian Empire among Russian Muslims and native Russians and added that “in some cases, as a sign of respect for their social and religious life, [the

⁹¹⁴ “Cihân Harbi ve Türkler,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (11 Kânûn-i evvel 1330), p. 2426.

⁹¹⁵ S. I. Iskhakov, “Pervaia mirovaia voina glazami rosiiskikh musul’man,” in *Rossiia i Pervaia mirovaia voia (Materialy mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kollokviuma)* (St. Petersburg: “DB,” 1999), p. 424.

⁹¹⁶ Iskhakov, “Pervaia mirovaia voina glazami rosiiskikh musul’man,” p. 419.

⁹¹⁷ Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii*, p. 50.

Russian Muslims] have some advantages and privileges.”⁹¹⁸ Indeed, unlike other peoples, the Kazan Tatars were claimed to have long-lasting material interests with Russia, as well as common geography, so that their conservative nature “would disincline them to break away violently from a State under which they have lived for three centuries,” especially since the habitat of the Kazan Tatars was the place where “barrier between Islam and Christianity has been broken down more successfully than anywhere else in the world.”⁹¹⁹ As was later asserted by Soviet authors, the material benefit and the welfare owed to Tsarism was the primary reason behind the prosperous Muslims’ loyalty and open support to the Tsarist Government throughout the war.⁹²⁰

On the other hand, the contribution of the Russian Muslims to the advancement of the Tsarist troops was not only confined to financial aid, but included the provision of horses and certain items and goods of a vital strategic importance. Thus, an appeal to the Dungan and Taranchi population of the empire, “who know best how to produce opium” so urgently needed for the production of morphine for the army, published in many Central Asian newspapers both in Russian and Uighur, urged them that whoever would sell opium not for the needs of the state “would turn into a parricide and traitor of his brothers.”⁹²¹

⁹¹⁸ Gasprinsky, “Russkoe musul’manstvo: Mysli, zametki i nabliudeniia,” p. 22.

⁹¹⁹ [A. J. T.], “Report on the Pan-Turanian Movement,” Intelligence Bureau, Department of Information, No. 2 (October 1917), The National Archives (Washington, D.C.), Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents “Special Reports and Studies,” 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 458, p. 11.

⁹²⁰ Basilaia, *Zakavkaz’e v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny*, p. 79.

⁹²¹ *Semirechenskiiia oblastnyiia vedomosti*, No. 110 (24 May 1917), p. 4.

One of the astounding stages of the First World War revealing the attitude of some Muslims of the Russian Empire towards the war became the formation of the Caucasian Mounted Indigenous Division, known as the Wild Division [*Dikaia diviziia*], by volunteer Muslim mountaineer cavalrymen that comprised of six regiments, namely the Daghestani, Kabardian, Ingush, Chechen, Cherkas, and Tatar,⁹²² the latter [*tatarskii*] being a current Russian misnomer for Azerbaijanis commonly referred as Caucasian Tatars [*kavkazskie tatary*].⁹²³ Moreover, when the Muslim members of the division were awarded Tsarist army decorations for their valor, the images of Christian saints were replaced by the coat of arms of Imperial Russia.

Interestingly, The Russian Muslims' reluctance to wear Christian insignia turned out to be a widespread phenomenon, and was noted even in the memoirs of Aleksandr Spiridovich, the head of the Imperial Court Guard during the First World War. During the Tsar's visit of one of the military hospitals, he witnessed a heavily wounded young Tatar soldier Sherakhudinov, who was begging to let him kiss the hands of the Tsar and Tsarina, but when he was offered by the latter an Orthodox icon with a necklace, he, nevertheless, dared to refuse it saying that Muhammad forbade wearing of images.⁹²⁴

⁹²² *Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v. – 1917 g.)*, pp. 540-541.

⁹²³ The term Caucasian Tatars [*kavkazskie tatary*] refers to the Tatars of the Caucasus and does not designate their Caucasian race.

⁹²⁴ A. I. Spiridovich, *Velikaia voina i Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia 1914-1917 gg.* (New York: Vseslavianskoe izdatel'stvo, 1960-1962), pp. 77-78.

As for the contribution of the Russian Muslims to the Tsarist Army, some of the Muslim officers and soldiers took an active part even in the war against the Ottomans, although many of them were noted to be devoted Muslims and were received ambiguously both by Russians and Ottomans. Tsarist Colonel Suleymanov, an Azerbaijani who led the Russian unit that launched an attack against the Ottomans troops at Malazgirt, was mentioned by Rahmi Apak to be a devout Muslim who started reading Qur'an as soon as the battle started, instead of commanding his troops, and was noted for preventing the attacks of the Russians and Armenians on Cherkes villages.⁹²⁵ Among other prominent Muslim commanders of the Caucasian front during the First World War were Colonel Sultân Qırım Gerây, the commander of the Caucasian division,⁹²⁶ and Captain Krym Shamkhalch of the 2nd Caucasian Rifle Division, who was noted for stating in his report on Armenian events to the commander of the division that he would mention *"only those facts, which coincide with the testimonies of both the Turks and Armenians."*⁹²⁷

The detailed memoirs and campaign notes of Colonel Fedor Yeliseev refer with respect and admiration to the Muslim soldiers and officers among the Tsarist troops who actively participated in military operations against the Ottomans. Along with

⁹²⁵ Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları*, pp. 107-109.

⁹²⁶ "Kâfkâz Diviziyâsı ve Hükümet-i Muvakkite," *Millet*, No. 56 (4 September 1917), p. 3.

⁹²⁷ "Iz doklada nachal'niku 2-i kavkazskoi strelkovoi divizii," *Genotsid armian v Osmanskoi imperii: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, ed. M. G. Nersisian, 2nd ed. (Yerevan: "Aiastan," 1983), p. 414 [original emphasis].

the voluntary cavalry campaign [*sotnia*] of the Caucasian Tatars under the command of Ali Khan, who were noted for their funny accent in Russian,⁹²⁸ the author thoroughly mentions the Commander of the First Caucasian Regiment Colonel Elmurza Mistulov,⁹²⁹ a Muslim Ossetian who would be recognized and greeted by the captured Ottoman soldiers for his overtly Mountaineer appearance and respected by fellow Cossacks, who would nickname him the ‘God of Warfare’ [*bog voiny*] for his extreme fearlessness and courage.⁹³⁰ As for the overall number of Tsarist officers of the ‘Mohammedan creed’ at the time of the war, it included 9 Generals, 56 staff officers, 287 chief-officers [*ober-ofitser*] and 39,289 staff of lower ranks.⁹³¹

Throughout the Russo-Ottoman warfare on the Caucasian Front, the Tsarist troops of Muslim origin got into skirmish with Ottoman troops, although in rare cases some of them passed on the Ottoman side.⁹³² One of them, once a cadet of the Vladikavkaz Corps who escaped to the Ottoman Empire “out of chauvinistic feelings” and became a Turkish officer, was later taken prisoner by the Cossack troops.⁹³³ Thus, as an attempt to prevent the Russian subjects from coming over to the Ottoman side, the Tsarist Government resorted to “punitive measures against the Russian-subject Muslims of the Kars and Batum *oblasts*, who infringed their loyalty to Russia,” while Vorontsov-Dashkov, the Imperial Viceroy in the Caucasus, proposed to

⁹²⁸ Indeed, many Muslim cavalymen of the Wild Division did not speak Russian at all. See Spiridovich, *Velikaia voina i Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia 1914-1917 gg.*, p. 205.

⁹²⁹ He would soon be promoted to the rank of Major-General to become the Commander of the 2nd Brigade of the Second Kuban Cossack Division.

⁹³⁰ Yeliseev, *Kazaki na Kavkazskom fronte 1914 – 1917*, pp. 92-93, 192, 196, 208.

⁹³¹ Basilaia, *Zakavkaz'e v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny*, p. 80.

⁹³² Zaionchkovsky, *Pervaia mirovaia voina*, p. 376.

⁹³³ Yeliseev, *Kazaki na Kavkazskom fronte 1914 – 1917*, p. 172.

deprive of Russian citizenship those who cooperate with the Turks against Russian troops, confiscate their property and deport them to Turkey.⁹³⁴

However, the overall suffering and dissatisfaction of the Russian Army throughout the First World War could not leave the Muslims of the Russian Empire untouched. As the governor of the Kazan province had reported to the Russian capital in 1914, the military censors noticed an increase of complaints on religious matters in the correspondence of Muslim soldiers from the frontline who were utterly dissatisfied with the lack of mullahs and funerals held in Russian way, as well as total vainness of the war for the general interest of Muslims.⁹³⁵ Consequently, in the course of the war the attitude of the Muslims of Russia towards the Tsarist State and authorities evidently deteriorated,⁹³⁶ so that the assertion that the majority of the Tatars desired the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Great War became widespread.⁹³⁷

As for the Ottoman publications, they were not only compassionate about the Russian *Turks*, who had joined the warfare “not because of their own desire and will, but because of the orders and command of their masters,” somehow expected pro-German sentiments from their brethren, since besides hating the Russians more than Germans, at whom they had to direct their arms, they were supposed to give way to

⁹³⁴ TsGIAL, f. 1276, op. 19, d. 1061, l. 50; cited by Basilaia, *Zakavkaz'e v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny*, p. 96.

⁹³⁵ A. Arsharuni and H. Gabidullin, *Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo “Bezbozhnik,” 1931), pp. 53-54.

⁹³⁶ Iskhakov, “Pervaia mirovaia voina glazami rosiiskikh musul'man,” p. 424.

⁹³⁷ Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets: The Turks of the World and Their Political Objectives* (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1957), p. 40.

despair between “the threat of their commanders from behind and the attack of their favorite [*muhibb gösterdikleri*] army from the front.”⁹³⁸ However, the German economic and political power seemed far to have a profound effect on the population of Central Asia and the Steppe Region, while the possibility of the German domination in the area was found by the experts to be a “decidedly fantastic idea.”⁹³⁹

One of the key events concerning the previously dormant Muslim population of the Russian Empire during the First World War that immediately aroused excitement in the Ottoman press became the mass insurrection following the Tsar’s decree [*ukaz*] of 25 June 1916 on the mobilization of the alien [*inorodcheskii*] population of the Astrakhan *guberniia*, Siberia and Central Asia. The possibility of their mobilization had already been noted in *Türk Yurdu* in November 1915, when it was claimed that the Tsarist Government intended to gain 300,000 cavalymen by conscripting the Kazakhs [*Kâzâk Kîrgîz Türkleri*].⁹⁴⁰

The *ukaz* stipulated the conscription of men between 19 and 43 years of age “for the construction of defensive installations and military communication in the area of front-line forces” from among the Muslim communities of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which were previously exempt from conscription, except the Ossetians

⁹³⁸ “Cihân Harbî ve Türkler,” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (11 Kânûn-i evvel 1330) [1914], p. 2426.

⁹³⁹ Roland B. Dixon, “Central Asia and the Steppe” (14 October 1918), The National Archives (Washington, D.C.), Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents “Special Reports and Studies,” 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 127, p. 29.

⁹⁴⁰ “Kırgız Türkleri ‘Asker İdilecekmiş,’” *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 11, No. 10 (5 Kânûn-i sâni 1332) [1916], p. 2806.

who are liable for regular military service, Turks and Kurds.⁹⁴¹ Interestingly, the Ottoman reports that mainly emphasized the reluctance of the Russian Muslims to serve in the Tsarist Army and armed uprisings against the local administration, seemed eager to put into forefront the events in the Caucasus,⁹⁴² although the most active and violent riots were fomented in Turkestan and the Steppe Region.

As was often mentioned, one of the decisive incentives that discouraged the Russian Muslims to serve in the army was the circulation of *mysterious* rumors about the inadequacy and impotence of the Russian armed forces and a series of grave defeats they suffered recently.⁹⁴³ Thus, as *Türk Yurdu* mentioned, the Muslims despaired deeply, but, nevertheless, preferred to stay at their homes and die, rather than dying at the frontline.⁹⁴⁴ The secret reports of the Tsarist military administration in Central Asia to the center, however, could have been more interesting to an Ottoman reader, since, among other thing, the *qâdîs* of Tashkent appealed to the Amîr of Afghanistan to set out against the Russian troops,⁹⁴⁵ while according to the confessions of the captured insurgents, a Turkish general and two Europeans were commanding an army of as much as 60,000 Kazakhs.⁹⁴⁶

⁹⁴¹ "Doc. No. 1," *Vosstanie 1916 goda v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane: Sbornik Dokumentov* (Moscow: "Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk," 1960), pp. 25-26.

⁹⁴² See, for instance, "Şark ve Şimâl Türklerinde," *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (15 Eylül 1332) [1916], p. 3174.

⁹⁴³ "Doc. No. 35," *Vosstanie 1916 goda v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane: Sbornik Dokumentov*, p. 59.

⁹⁴⁴ "Kırgız ve Kazak Türkleri ve 'Askerlik,'" *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (12 Teşrîn-i evvel 1332) [1916], p. 3206.

⁹⁴⁵ "Doc. No. 38," *Vosstanie 1916 goda v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane: Sbornik Dokumentov*, p. 61.

⁹⁴⁶ "Doc. No. 46," *Vosstanie 1916 goda v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane: Sbornik Dokumentov*, p. 67.

The Ottoman Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamic propaganda was not confined to Muslims within the Russian Empire and often sought for audience in other countries. In late December 1915, an article in *Servet-i Fünûn* mentioned about a special delegation from the Muslims of Russia sending memoranda to the governments of *Der-sa'âdet*, Vienna and Budapest to facilitate in the establishment of their former khanates, the Kazan Khanate in the first place. The special delegation of the Russian Muslims, which was totally eligible for such an action on behalf of the Muslims of Russia [*Rûsya müslümânları nâmına idâre-i kelâm iden hey'etin bunâ hakkı vardır*], was led by Yûsuf Âkçûrâ Bey, who was simply referred by Russians as a Turkish spy,⁹⁴⁷ and Hüseyin Zâde 'Âlî Bey, both of whom had already settled in the Ottoman Empire for several years.⁹⁴⁸ However, in response to Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist agitation in and outside Russia, in early 1916, the Tsarist Government arrested several prominent Pan-Islamists accused of spying in favor of Turkey in cities like Irkutsk, Odessa, Taganrog, Ufa, as well as several Siberian towns.⁹⁴⁹

5.3 THE OTTOMANS AND THE FALL OF TSARISM

The most decisive impact on the fall of Tsarist regime in Russia that had never fully recovered from the humiliation of the Russo-Japanese War and the revolutions of 1905-1907, was profoundly undermined by great wartime expenses that lead to a

⁹⁴⁷ See, for instance, Sarkisian, *Ekspansionistskaia politika Osmanskoi imperii v Zakavkaz'e nakanune i v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny*, p. 106.

⁹⁴⁸ "Rusyada Müslümânlar," *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1279 (15 Safar 1334) [1915], pp. 67-68.

⁹⁴⁹ Sh. I. Basilaia, *Zakavkaz'e v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny* (Sukhumi: "Alashara," 1968), p. 85.

social and political unrest in the empire. Thus, already on 9 July 1914, a few days after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, an Ottoman author concluded that the freer the Russian political life and system were getting in the last few years, the more violent and aggressive they became.⁹⁵⁰ As Richard Pipes had mentioned,⁹⁵¹

[T]he most striking – and most ominous – aspect of this period was the prevalence and intensity of hatred: ideological, ethnic, and social. The radicals hated the establishment. The peasants loathed those of their neighbors who had withdrawn from the commune. Ukrainians hated Jews, Muslims hated Armenians, the Kazakh nomads hated and wanted to expel the Russians who had settled in their midst under Stolypin.

Moise Cohen similarly notes that “even the Slavic peoples like the populations of Poland [*Lehistân*] and Ukraine that belong to the Russia Empire feel terrible hatred and hostility towards Russians, who belong to their own race.”⁹⁵²

The attitude of the Ottoman press towards socialists and revolutionaries, including those of the Russian Empire, was almost unanimously negative and regardless to their background and political aspirations they were equated with anarchists. As Abdullâh Cevdet exemplarily depicted,⁹⁵³

The Socialists, Internationalists, and Anarchists possessed by demons [*iyi sâ'atde olsun*] raise their red flags almost everywhere around the world! However, this group of lunatics [*gürûh-i meczûbîn-i beşer*] who try to serve for the cause of peace always end up doing nothing but shedding blood!

He also wondered whether it was fitting the European honor and decency to ignore the impending threat of these radical groups.⁹⁵⁴

⁹⁵⁰ “Rusya ve Ruslar,” *Siyânet*, No. 16 (9 July [Temmûz-i efrencî] 1914), p. 9.

⁹⁵¹ Pipes, *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution*, p. 54.

⁹⁵² Cohen, *Türkler Bu Muhârebede Ne Kazanabilirler?* p. 19.

⁹⁵³ Abdullâh Cevdet, “Avrupa Ahlâk-ı Siyâsiyesi,” p. 9.

⁹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

Another description of the radical groups that appeared in *Resimli Kitâb* generalized Socialism, Communism, Collectivism, Anarchism and Nihilism as trends intending to destroy the cultural and existential bases of mankind, while in case of Russia, differently from that in Germany and France, its radical movements became extremely materialistic and harsh, “just like its people.”⁹⁵⁵ At the same time, similar opinions relating the growing violence in both of the empires with the expansion of political freedoms that restrained the power of the sovereign were uttered even before the First World War. Thus, an Ottoman author wondered, “whether the constitutional monarchy that both nations enjoy today – however inevitable it might be found for our progress – is to throw us into bloodshed, or is it to make us understand and love each other?”⁹⁵⁶

From the first months of the Great War, the news on the social and economic unrest in Russia created a uniform image of a grave crisis in the Russian Empire, which was often accompanied with the reports on discontent in the Tsarist Army and its poor finance and equipment.⁹⁵⁷ Since the Russo-Ottoman warfare on the Caucasian Front was beneath notice and expectations, most of these reports derived from “their own confessions” were directly relating the social upheaval and constant disturbance

⁹⁵⁵ “Nihilizm ve Anarşizm: Vech-i Zuhûrları,” *Resimli Kitâb*, Vol. 6, No. 36 (Kânûn-i sâni 1328), pp. 1004-1005.

⁹⁵⁶ “Türkiye – Rusya,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1036 (14 Rabî’ al-Âkhir 1329), p. 509.

⁹⁵⁷ See, for instance, “Rusya’da Muhârebeden Ziyâde İhtilâlden Korkuyorlar,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1257 (25 Sha’bân 1333) [1915], pp. 142-143.

[*iğtişâş-i dâimî*] to the Russian defeat in Galicia, predicting its imminent collapse.⁹⁵⁸

Moreover, the existence of a direct threat to the institution of Tsardom started being pronounced, and the restoration of the title of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to Tsar Nicholas II was interpreted by them as a sign of intensification of “revolutionary and insurgent movement eager to threaten Tsardom.”⁹⁵⁹

Some authors were quite prophetic about the fate of Tsardom in Russia, as did an article in *Servet-i Fünûn* with an unambiguous title “Revolution in Russia: Towards the Fall of Tsardom” published in July 1915. Distinguishing the impending revolution from the activities of the radical anarchist groups, the article hastened to clarify that the discontent and revolutionary mood was gradually penetrating higher strata of the society,⁹⁶⁰ while some were already proclaiming the fall of Tsardom in moral and spiritual sense.⁹⁶¹

Despite the lingering exacerbation of the Russo-Ottoman relations towards the First World War, the reference to the institution of Tsardom and the royal character of the Russian sovereign in the Ottoman press always remained respectful and within the bounds of propriety and diplomatic etiquette. Thus, an article on the trip of Tal’at Bey to the Livadia Palace, the summer residence of Tsar Nicholas II in Crimea, a few month before the war, referred to the Russian Tsar and Tsarina as *hazret*, the same way it referred to the Ottoman Sultan in the same statement [*taraf-i hazret-i*

⁹⁵⁸ “Rusya Ahvâl-i Dâhiliyesi ve Tezebzübâtı,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1257 (25 Sha’bân 1333), p. 136.

⁹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁹⁶⁰ “Rusya’da İhtilâl: Çarlığın Sukûtuna Doğrû,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1257 (25 Sha’bân 1333), p. 138.

⁹⁶¹ “Çarın Sukût-i Ma’nevîsi,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1267 (14 Dhu l’-Ka’da 1333) [1915], p. 294.

padişâhdan çâr ve çâriçe hazerâtına], adding that the Sultan sent his Russian counterpart his greetings and precious gifts.⁹⁶² At the same time, as the official salutation of the Russian Sovereign by the Muslim peoples of the empire, the dual title “The Greatest Padishah and His Excellency the Emperor” [*pâdişâh-i a’zam impyerâtor hâzrâtlârı*] was used, while any member of his family was mentioned to be of the ‘royal dynasty’ [*xânâdân-i humâyûn*].⁹⁶³

The shaky position of Tsar Nicholas II, his political impotence and personal feebleness, however, became for the time being a topic of frequent mockery in Ottoman periodicals. Thus, an article “A Secret Tsar” published in *Edebiyyât-i ‘Umûmiyye Mecmû’ası* just a month before the February Revolution referred to Grigory Rasputin, this “scum of underworld and one of the most fraudulent among the Muscovites” as “a priest who plays the role of a king,” and went even further by claiming that the ‘Mad Monk’ “had enslaved the Tsar,” so that he became the deputy of Rasputin.⁹⁶⁴ Moreover, even the immediate response to the overthrown of Tsar Nicholas II, “the event that the Muslims, Turks and Ottomans were hoping and expecting for centuries,” turned into euphoria, since the religious and political symbol of Russia as the oppressor of the universe was replaced with anarchy.⁹⁶⁵ Somehow the author was so excited, that he seemed not very much aware of the World War in progress and was constantly repeating that in the end all the

⁹⁶² “Livâdyâ Ziyâreti,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, Vol. 47, No. 1197 (18 Djumâdâ ‘l-Âkhira 1332), p. 2.

⁹⁶³ *Türkestân vilâyâtiniñ gazyeti*, No. 42 (17 July 1916), p. 1.

⁹⁶⁴ “Gizli Bir Çâr,” *Edebiyyât-i ‘Umûmiyye Mecmû’ası*, Vol. 1, No. 16 (24 Rabî’ al-Âkhir 1335) [1917], p. 285.

⁹⁶⁵ Süleymân Nazîf, “Rus İnkilâbı ve Biz,” *Harb Mecmû’ası*, No. 20 (Temmûz 1333) [1917], p. 307.

sufferings, sacrifices and destructions endured by the Ottoman people were worth this single glorious event.⁹⁶⁶

In general, however, the news and reports on the February Revolution in Ottoman periodicals were extremely sober and realistic, which was not peculiar to its overly sentimental journalism, and still retained their anxiety about the future of the Russian State and the Great War. In fact, the Ottomans seemed not much satisfied with the plausibility of the collapse of the Russian Empire initiated by Finland, while, on the other hand, hoped that the pacifist forces within the Provisional Government would be influential enough to make Russia withdraw from the Great War even despite Pavel Miliukov being the Foreign Minister.⁹⁶⁷

The publications following the overthrow of Tsar Nicholas II, referred at that time as the Great Russian Revolution [*Rûs ihtilâl-i kebîri*]⁹⁶⁸ or the New Petrograd Revolution [*yeni Petrôgrâd ihtilâli*], were eager to blame anybody but the Tsar himself, stating that in history there always were foreign powers behind any insurrections and uprisings against the Tsar and pointed, this time, at English Liberals and pro-British Cadet (Constitutional Democrat) Party.⁹⁶⁹ In this respect, the coming to power of Empress Catherine II, this outlandish daughter of a peasant [*köylü kızı*] from Livonia who was thoroughly despised by the Ottomans, was

⁹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 308.

⁹⁶⁷ “Rusya İhtilâli,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1341 (29 Mart 1333) [1917], p. 227-228.

⁹⁶⁸ “Finlandya,” *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 1341 (29 Mart 1333), p. 216.

⁹⁶⁹ “Holstein-Gottorp-Romanov Ne Demek?” *Edebiyyât-i ‘Umûmiyye Mecmû’ası*, Vol. 1, No. 22 (31 Mart 1917), p. 375.

mentioned among the historical instances of the foreign overthrown of legitimate Russian sovereigns.⁹⁷⁰ Referring to the Russian system of succession to the throne that allows ‘any tramp’ [*her serserî*] to become a Tsar or Tsarina, the article claimed that although “the Romanovs were surely Russians,” the Holstein-Gottorp-Romanov dynasty had no Muscovite blood at all and were indeed Germans.⁹⁷¹

In fact, following the February Revolution, the Ottoman press seemed worried more about the fate of Tsar Nicholas II, his family and the future of Tsardom, rather than the international policy of the Provisional Government. Therefore, numerous articles, such as the expected the emigration of the royal family to Britain⁹⁷² or the trial of the Tsar and Tsarina for treason,⁹⁷³ became for the time being a more frequent topic than the reforms of the Provisional Government that “turned upside-down the whole administrative, social, political and economic life in the country.”⁹⁷⁴

Despite their traditional animosity towards Tsarist state, the Ottomans, which were already exhausted and destroyed by years of warfare, were still not content with the overturn of the monarchy in Russia. According to an article published in June 1917, the new system of Russia, the country whose “severity of autocratic regime sizably exceeded the power of the opposition, [and] who had medieval feudal landlords against its Socialist workers,” was generally depicted in negative shade as it turned

⁹⁷⁰ “Holstein-Gottorp-Romanov Ne Demek?” p. 375.

⁹⁷¹ Ibid.

⁹⁷² “Çar ve ‘Âilesi İngiltere’ye Nakl Olunacak,” *Tercümân-i Hakîkât* (28 Mart 1333) [1917].

⁹⁷³ “Çar Câsûslukla İthâm Olunuyor,” *Tercümân-i Hakîkât* (29 Mart 1333) [1917].

⁹⁷⁴ “Rus İhtilâli,” *Tercümân-i Hakîkât* (29 Mart 1333).

out to become “worse than a republic, which resembled more to freedom [*serbest*], rather than liberty [*hürriyet*].”⁹⁷⁵ However, differently from the widespread opinion, the article characterized it to be a national movement led by national needs, rather than a British plot.⁹⁷⁶

Upon the execution of the overthrown Tsar Nicholas II and his family by the Bolshevik regime, a careful, but at the same time sorrowful article appeared in *Donanma* in August 1918. Suggesting that the reason behind his scornful policy towards the Muslims could have been the influence of others taking advantage of his weak personality, this informal obituary nevertheless stated that “despite the features and policies of the Tsar that insulted the Ottoman and Islamic feelings, the attitude of the Ottomans towards his fate reveals certain facts, the very first of which is the respect and love to the institution of the Sovereign.”⁹⁷⁷ As for the Soviet rule, the article uttered that “out of such a great mass of people and on such a broad territory, it turned out that the Russian Soviets [*Rûs sovyetleri*] neither possess even a single guard able to protect the life of their Tsar [*sâr*], which is the honor⁹⁷⁸ of the Russian history, nor to provide the safety for the Russian nation.”⁹⁷⁹

⁹⁷⁵ “Rusya’nın Eski ve Yeni Hürriyetleri,” *Edebiyyât-ı ‘Umûmiyye Mecmû’ası*, Vol. 2, No. 31 (2 Hazirân 1917), p. 90.

⁹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁹⁷⁷ “Rus Sarının İ’dâmı,” *Donanma*, No. 177-128 (8 Ağustos 1334), p. 2054.

⁹⁷⁸ Interestingly, as was mentioned, it was Emperor Nicholas II himself who was convinced to be “responsible to God and to his conscience to preserve the autocracy and to defend the dignity, honor, and worth of Russia.” See Raymond A. Esthus, “Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War,” *Russian Review*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (October 1981), p. 397.

⁹⁷⁹ “Rus Sarının İ’dâmı,” pp. 2055-2056.

Besides dignity and honor, the dethronement and execution of Nicholas II seemed an apparent violation of the Russian Constitution of 1906 officially known as the *Imperially Approved Fundamental State Laws*, the implementation of which was so ardently opposed by the Russian Emperor himself, although it defined His personality as “sacred and inviolable,” since obeying His authority “is ordered by God Himself.”⁹⁸⁰

⁹⁸⁰ For the Russian text of the Fundamental Laws see *Rossiiskoe zakonodatel'stvo X-XX vv.*, Vol. 9 (Moscow: Iuridicheskaiia literatura, 1994); for the English text see “The Fundamental Laws of Imperial Russia, 1906,” in *Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917*, pp. 386-393.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Despite great expectations and patriotic sentiments of achieving the historic goals in the Black Sea or uniting all the Muslims and Turks in the world under the banner of the Sultan and Caliph, the First World War became the period of abrupt change and tragic collapse for both of the empires: the Tsarist Russia and Ottoman State. In an article written in 1919, the period when the future of the Ottoman State was as dim as that of Russia, Hâlide Edib still cherished hopes for the prospective rapprochement between the Turks and Russians, stating that Russia was not looking towards the West anymore, but instead it was in search of a new East where its revival lay, and added that,⁹⁸¹

Upon all the similarities, all the calamities, would it be ever possible that this neighbor, the former hostile neighbor [of ours], would become our friend? Could we lay the foundations of tomorrow like two brothers, who turned their faces to the East, who found their power in their own souls, own races, own resources and own lives? Or would the former artificial imperialist nightmarish spirit of Russia try to suffocate us in a terrible dream?

⁹⁸¹ [Hâlide Edib,] “Ruslar, Türkler,” *Büyük Mecmû’a*, No. 16 (11 Kânûn-i evvel 1919), p. 1.

Indeed, despite the ardent hatred and evident enmity that prevailed over the Russo-Ottoman relations for centuries, both of these empires had many things in common that could not be found in a Western European or an Asiatic state. Both of these societies, whose social and political structures bore definite signs of the Byzantine heritage, were stuck in the middle of Europe and Asia, witnessing the furious struggle between the pro-Westerners and Traditionalists in their own countries. Both governments were bewildered to carry on the Western-type reforms they had undertaken and to retain, at the same time, the spiritual banner of the Orthodoxy and Islam they had raised. Moreover, by 1914, Russia and the Ottoman State were the only countries in the world that required the travel visa from a European or American.⁹⁸²

On the other hand, both sovereigns, the Tsar and Sultan, who led their countries to the Great Battleground, were thoroughly criticized for being weak and docile and eager to fall under the influence of others. This came in the time when the sacred institution of the Sovereign was called in question, while the constitutional reforms facilitated their further decline. Besides, both countries, which suffered humiliating defeats in the Russo-Japanese war and the Balkan Wars just a few years before the First World War, were equally regarding it as an opportunity for moral and strategic rehabilitation.

⁹⁸² Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Propaganda: Tsarist and Soviet," in *Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Ivo J. Lederer, p. 283.

As for the Russo-Ottoman confrontation prior to and during the First World War as reflected in the Ottoman periodical press, certain distinct and persistent assumptions and claims were propagated on a systematic basis. These assumptions, which became the leitmotif of the Ottoman propaganda during the war, included both the traditional Ottoman perceptions of Russia that lingered through centuries, as well as the ephemeral outbursts of the wartime excitement.

Thus, the aggressive nature of the Russian Empire, its traditional claims on the Ottoman Straits and its Eastern Anatolian territories were the persistent theme of the Russian representations in the Ottoman press. At the same time, the backwardness and primitiveness of the Russian people and society, their natural inclination towards violence and rebelliousness, were thoroughly exposed. These same features attributed to the Russian State and population were duly employed in the wartime publications directly related to the strategic matters, making violence and atrocity the inherent and innate character of the Russian Army. These images were contrasted with the righteousness, devotion and nobleness of the Ottoman army and people, as well as their fearlessness, vigor and discipline.

Not unexpectedly, the image of the Russian Army in the Ottoman press was the exact opposite of that of the Turks in Russian accounts, which mentioned their violent and atrocious nature, as well as the lack of discipline and valor.⁹⁸³ Besides,

⁹⁸³ See, for instance, *Vtoraia Otechestvennaia voina po razskazam eia geroev* (Petrograd: Izdaniie sostoiashchago pod Vysochaishim Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Gosudaria Imperatora pokrovitel'stvom Skobelevskago Komiteta, 1916).

the grandeur and nobleness of the Ottomans and their peaceableness often equated to the Muslims in general presented a striking contrast with those of the Russians that abounded the Russian publications. Even Ivan Aksakov, the prominent Pan-Slavist publicist known for his aggressive anti-Turkish stance, would confidently claim a few years after the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878, that “there is no power in the world more peace-loving than Russia; there is no race that is naturally more peaceful and good-natured than the Slavs.”⁹⁸⁴

On the other hand, one of the peculiarities of the Ottoman propaganda during the First World War was its pragmatic features that often contradicted the traditional appeals for the Holy War and Pan-Islamic endeavors, as well as nationalistic sentiments and proclamations. Thus, despite the overall Ottoman misgivings and complaints accusing the European Powers in the gradual decline and collapse of the Ottoman State, Germany was granted an exclusive and privileged place in the Ottoman official and non-official rhetoric, while the formerly odious Austria-Hungary turned into a convinced companion. Moreover, even Bulgaria, which was the hateful enemy of the Ottomans just on the eve of the First World War, started being presented as a pitiful victim of the ruthless Russian imperialistic policy in the Ottoman wartime statements of *Realpolitik*.

⁹⁸⁴ “Writings of Ivan S. Aksakov, 1863-1883,” in *A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917*, ed. George Vernadsky *et al.*, Vol. 3 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 659.

As for the domestic Ottoman audience and the Muslim world, the Tsarist state was presented as the infamous oppressor and enslaver of the Muslims and Turks, where the latter, differently from other Entente Powers, would perfectly target the rising Turkish nationalism and Pan-Turkist sentiments. Indeed, the Pan-Islamist and Pan-Turkist appeals and actions occupied a highly important place in the Ottoman wartime propaganda, since the Ottoman journals abounded with reports on anti-Russian and pro-Turkish disturbances in the Muslim areas of the Russian Empire, creating an image of a powder-barrel ready to explode anytime. Besides, the image of a Russian Muslim or Turk generated in the mind of a common Ottoman did not differ from the latter culturally, intellectually, politically, linguistically or even physiognomically, for which the émigré publicists had played a decisive part.

In reality, however, the attitude of the Muslims and Turks of the Russian Empire towards the Ottoman Empire and the Great War, contrarily to the image so vigorously propagated by the Russian emigrants, was at least equivocal and ambiguous, as could be inferred from the support and participation of the Russian Muslims, whether physically or financially, to the Russian wartime policies. Moreover, the indignations and disturbances of the Russian Muslims during the First World War, including armed insurrections, so eagerly depicted in the Ottoman press as their compassion and collaboration with the Ottoman Turks, were, in fact, mainly of socio-economic and political grounds and hardly differed from those by the rest

of the Russian population. As for the future of Turks, both Ottoman and Russian, a report of October 1917 prophetically stated:⁹⁸⁵

If the Ottoman Empire ceases to be a great power, there may be a genuine Turkish national revival in Anatolia. In such a revival, the Turkish-speaking peoples of Russia would probably play the same part that Russia herself has played towards the Balkan Slavs.

This is the only form in which the Pan-Turanian idea is ever likely to be realised.

On the other hand, by January 1918, the Ottomans were still anxious about the future of the Russian state and, as anybody in the former Tsarist state, they tried to find out the political stance of certain newly emerged trends in terms of nationalism, Pan-Slavism and capital, this time having certain new names like Ukraine appearing frequently in Ottoman press.⁹⁸⁶

Interestingly, despite the persistently negative and pejorative image of the Tsardom, the very fall of the Russian Monarchy and the establishment of the Bolshevik regime,⁹⁸⁷ which indirectly facilitated the integrity of the Ottoman State, and especially the later execution of Nicholas II and the royal family, caused thorough compassion in the Ottoman press. Thus, even as late as October 1919, the Ottoman *Türk Dünyası* excitedly published an article “Lenin is Overthrown!” which claimed,

⁹⁸⁵ [A. J. T.], “Report on the Pan-Turanian Movement,” Intelligence Bureau, Department of Information, No. 2 (October 1917), The National Archives (Washington, D.C.), Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents “Special Reports and Studies,” 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 458, p. 20.

⁹⁸⁶ *Teceddüd*, No. 1 [1918], p. 12

⁹⁸⁷ For the Ottoman perception of the Bolshevik regime see Uygur Kocabaşoğlu and Metin Berge, *Bolşevik İhtilâli ve Osmanlılar* (Ankara: Kebikeç Yayınları, 1994). This elaborate research, thoroughly derived from the Ottoman periodical press, examines the ideological background of the Bolsheviks from the Ottoman perspective, comprehensibly and comparatively analyzing the complex nature of the regime.

appealing to the report by a British journalist in Russia, that Lenin was overthrown by Felix Dzerzhinsky who currently claimed control over Moscow,⁹⁸⁸ while another report announced hastily, and not without delight, that the Bolshevik leader was seriously wounded.⁹⁸⁹

Nevertheless, after the First World War, following the collapse of the Russian and Ottoman empires, both nations found themselves in a totally different set of policies and relations facing the threat of the rest of Europe, the situation that could have been precisely expressed by the following statement of Ismail Gasprinsky, the man whose heritage was equally claimed by both the Ottomans and Russians:⁹⁹⁰

We think that it would have been wise and beneficial, if the Turks and Russians would sincerely chum in, leaving the past behind. Europe would not like that and probably would not let this happen, which is the reason we ought to bustle about it even more for our common advantage and benefit. Europe is the common enemy of Turkey and Russia.

⁹⁸⁸ “Lenin Düşmüş,” *Türk Dünyası*, No. 43 (10 Teşrîn-i evvel 1335) [1919].

⁹⁸⁹ “Lenin Yaralanmış,” *Türk Dünyası*, No. 60 (27 Teşrîn-i evvel 1335) [1919].

⁹⁹⁰ Ismail Gasprinsky, “Russko-Vostochnoe soglashenie: Mysli, zametki i pozhelaniia Ismaila Gasprinskogo,” in Ismail Bey Gasprinsky, *Rossia i Vostok* (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1993), p. 67.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PERIODICALS

Añ

Beyân-ul-Hak

Büyük Duygu

Büyük Mecmû'a

Cerîde-i 'Askeriyye

Cihân-i İslâm

Donanma

Edebiyyât-i 'Umûmiyye Mecmû'ası

el-Medâris

Genç Kalemler

Harb Mecmû'ası

Hikmet

Hürriyet-i Fikrîyye

İctihâd

İctimâ'ıyyât Mecmû'ası

İkdâm

İslâm Dünyâsı

İslâm Mecnû'ası

Kırım Mecnû'ası

Kolokol

Letopis' voiny

Ma'lûmât

Mecnû'a-i Ebû'z-Ziyâ

Millet

Millî Tetebbu'lar Mecnû'ası

Nasha niva

Novoe vremia

Resimli Kitâb

Sâdâ-i Türkestân

Salâ-i Millet

Sebilü'r-Reşâd

Şehbâl

Servet-i Fünûn

Sıyânet

Teceddüd

Tedrisât-i İbtidâ'iyye Mecnû'ası

Tercümân-i Hakîkât

Türk Derneği

Türk Dünyâsı

Türk Duygusu

Türk Sözü

Türk Yurdu

Türkestân Vilâyetiniñ Gazyeti

Ümîd

Vazife

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

Adamov, E. A., ed. *Razdel Aziatskoi Turtsii po sekretnym dokumentam byvshego Ministerstva inostrannykh del*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo NKID, 1924.

Alp, Tekin. *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal* (Weimar: Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1915). The National Archives (Washington, D.C.), Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents "Special Reports and Studies," 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 579.

Armenians in Ottoman Documents (1915-1920). Ankara: Directorate of Ottoman Archives, 1995.

Dixon, Roland B. "Central Asia and the Steppe" (14 October 1918). The National Archives (Washington, D.C.), Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents "Special Reports and Studies," 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 127.

Dmytryshyn, Basil, ed. *Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917*. 2nd ed. Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1974.

Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma: Dokumenty iz arkhivov Tsarskogo i Vremennogo pravitel'stv 1878-1917 gg.. Series III. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1938.

Nersisian, M. G., ed. *Genotsid armian v Osmanskoi imperii: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*. 2nd ed. Yerevan: "Aiastan," 1983.

Osmanlı Devleti ile Kafkasya, Türkistan ve Kırım Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münâsebetlere Dair Arşiv Belgeleri (1687-1908 Yılları Arası). Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1992.

Polonsky, J., trans. *Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917: D'après les archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Petrograd*. Paris: Payot, 1928.

"Report on the Pan-Turanian Movement." Intelligence Bureau, Department of Information, No. 2 (October 1917), The National Archives (Washington, D.C.), Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents "Special Reports and Studies," 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 458.

Rossiiskoe zakonodatel'stvo X-XX vv. Vol. 9. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1994.

Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s drugimi gosudarstvami, 1856-1917. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1953.

Vosstanie 1916 goda v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane: Sbornik Dokumentov. Moscow: "Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk," 1960.

Yağcıoğlu, Eşref, ed. *İttihâd ve Terakkî'nin Son Yılları: 1916 Kongresi Zabıtları*. Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992.

MEMOIRS AND TRAVELOGUES

Latîf, İhsân. *Bir Ser-encâm-i Harb: Harb-i Umûmî Safahâtine 'Âid Hatırât*. Istanbul: İlerî Gazetesi, 1335.

Morgenthau, Henry. *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1918.

Paléologue, Maurice. *An Ambassador's Memoirs by Maurice Paléologue (Last French Ambassador to the Russian Court)*. Translated by F. A. Hold. 4th ed., 2 Vols. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1925.

- R. Bekguliants, *Po Turetskoi Armenii: Vpechatleniia ot poezdki letom v 1914 godu* (Rostov-on-Don: Tipografiya Ya. M. Iskidarova, 1914).
- Rahmi Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988).
- Refik, Ahmed. *Kafkas Yollarında, İki Komite İki Kıtâl*. Edited by Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu. Istanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1998.
- Ter-Oganov, Nugzar, ed. "Poezdka podpolkovnika General'nogo shtaba V. P. Liakhova i shtabs-kapitana K. N. Smirnova v Turtsiiu v 1904 godu," *Russian History – Histoire Russe* 33, No. 1 (Spring 2006): 109-142.
- The Personal History of a Bukharan Intellectual: The Diary of MUHAMMAD-SHARĪF-I ŠADR-I ZIYĀ*. Translated by Rustam Shukurov. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004.
- Vtoraia Otechestvennaia voina po razskazam eia geroev*. Petrograd: Izdaniie sostoiashchago pod Vysochaishim Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Gosudaria Imperatora pokrovitel'stvom Skobelevskago Komiteta, 1916.
- Yeliseev, F. I. *Kazaki na Kavkazskom fronte 1914 – 1917: Zapiski polkovnika Kubanskogo kazach'ego voiska v trinadtsati broshiurakh-tetradiakh*. Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 2001.

DISSERTATIONS

- Karasar, Hasan Ali. "National Identity and Regional Integration in Central Asia: Turkestan Reunion." Ph.D. dissertation, Bilkent University, 2002.
- Demirci, Hasan. "*Ülfet* Gazetesi (11 Aralık 1905 - 7 Haziran 1907 / Petersburg) (1905-1907 Yılları Arasında Yapılan Müslüman Kongreleri)." M.A. thesis, Marmara University, 2002.
- Reynolds, Michael A. "The Ottoman-Russian Struggle for Eastern Anatolia And The Caucasus, 1908-1918: Identity, Ideology and the Geopolitics of World Order." Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2003.
- Stein, Sarah Abrevaya. "The Creation of Yiddish and Judeo-Spanish Newspaper Cultures in the Russian and Ottoman Empires." Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1999.

BOOKS

A Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism. London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1920.

Abdulatipov, R. G. *Sud'by islama v Rossii: Istoriia i perspektivy*. Moscow: "Mysl'," 2002.

Adam, Volker. *Rußlandmuslime in Istanbul am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges: Die Berichterstattung osmanischen Periodika über Rußland und Zentralasien*. Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang, 2002.

Ahmad, Kamal Madhar. *Kurdistan during the First World War*. Translated by Ali Maher Ibrahim. London: Saqi Books, 1994.

Akmeşe, Handan Nezir. *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I*. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005.

Aliev, G. Z. *Turtsiia v period pravleniia mladoturok (1908-1918)*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1972.

Almedingen, E. M. *The Romanovs: Three Centuries of an Ill-fated Dynasty*. London, Sydney and Toronto: The Bodley Head, 1966.

Amanzholova, D. A. *Kazakhskii avtonomizm i Rossiia: Istoriia dvizheniia Alash*. Moscow: "Rossiia molodaia," 1994.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso, 2006.

Anderson, M. S. *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966.

Arai, Masami. *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*. Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1992.

Aronson, I. Michael. *Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990.

Arsharuni, A. and H. Gabidullin. *Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Bezbozhnik," 1931.

- Arutiunian, A. O. *Kavkazskii front: 1914–1917 gg.* Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo 'Aiastan', 1971.
- Atak, M. Sadık. *Rusya Siyaseti ve Rusların Yayılma Siyaseti.* Ankara: 1964.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay. *Islam in the Soviet Union.* London: Pall Mall Press, 1967.
- Beveridge, Albert J. *The Russian Advance.* London and New York: Harper and Brother Publishers, 1903.
- Bury, G. Wyman. *Pan-Islam.* London: Macmillan and Co., 1919.
- Cemâl, H. *Yeni Harb: Başımıza Tekrâr Gelenler.* Istanbul: Şems Matba'ası, 1332.
- Cohen, M. *Türkler Bu Muhârebede Ne Kazanabilirler?* Istanbul: "Türk Yurdu," 1330.
- Contenson, Ludovic de. *Anadolu'da Islahât: Ermenî Mes'elesi, Sûriye Mes'elesi.* Translated by Ragıp Rıfkı. Istanbul: Matba'a-i Nefâset, 1913.
- Curzon, George N. *Russia and Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question.* London: Frank Cass & Co., 1967.
- Czaplicka, M. A. *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918.
- Dascovici, N. *La question du Bosphore et des Dardanelles.* Geneva: Georg & Compagnie, 1915.
- Diriyol, [Edvar]. *Napolyon'un Şark Siyaseti: Selim-i Sâlis ve Napolyon.* Istanbul: Kan'âat Matba'ası, 1329.
- Diriyol, Edvar. *Şark Mes'elesi: Bidayet-i Zuhûrundan Zamanımıza Kadar.* Istanbul: Muhtâr Hâlid Kitâbhânesi, 1328.
- Earle, Edward Mead. *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923.
- Erckardt, Hans von. *Russia.* Translated by Catherine Alison Phillips. London: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1932.
- Erickson, John. *Panslavism.* London: Historical Association, 1964.

- Fadeeva, I. L. *Ofitsial'nye doktriny v ideologii i politike Osmanskoi imperii (Osmanizm-Panislamizm): XIX – nachalo XX v.* Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1985.
- Farah, Irmgard. *Die deutsche Pressepolitik und Propagandatätigkeit in osmanischen Reich von 1908-1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des "Osmanischen Lloyd".* Beirut: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993.
- Florinsky, Michael T. *Russia: A History and an Interpretation.* Vol. 2. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953.
- Gasprinsky, Ismail Bey. *Rossiia i Vostok.* Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1993.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Geyer, Dietrich. *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914.* Translated by Bruce Little. Leamington Spa, Hamburg and New York: Berg, 1987.
- Gooch, G. P. *Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy.* Vol. 1. London, New York and Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1936.
- Gooch, G. P. *Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy.* Vol. 2. London, New York and Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1938.
- Gregory, Paul R. *Russian National Income, 1885-1913.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
- Hosking, Geoffrey. *Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997.
- Hostler, Charles Warren. *Turkism and the Soviets: The Turks of the World and Their Political Objectives.* London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1957.
- Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v. – 1917 g.* Moscow: "Nauka," 1988.
- Istoriia vneshnei politiki Rossii: Konets XIX – nachalo XX veka.* Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1999.
- Istoriografiia istorii SSSR: S drevneishikh vremen do Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii.* Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1961.

- Jaeck, Dr. [Ernst]. *Balkan Harbinden Sonra Şarkda Almanya*. Istanbul: Efhâm Matba'ası, 1331.
- Jelavich, Barbara. *The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, 1870-1887*. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1973.
- Jelavich, Charles. *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1958.
- Karabekir, Kâzım. *Kürt Meselesi*. Edited by Faruk Özerengin. Istanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1994.
- Karamzin, N. M. *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*. Book 2, Vol. 6. Moscow: "Olma-Press," 2004.
- Karpat, Kemal H. *Ottoman Population 1830-1914*. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
- Karpat, Kemal H. *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Kasem-Beg, Mirza A. *Allgemeine Grammatik der türkisch-tatarischen Sprache*. Translated by Julius Theodor Zenker. Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1848.
- Kayalı, Hasan. *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1997.
- Khalid, Adeeb. *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
- Khvostov, V. M. *Istoriia diplomatii*. Vol. 2. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1963.
- Kirakosian, Dzh. *Zapadnaia Armeniia v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny*. Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo Yerevanskogo Universiteta, 1971.
- Klimovich, Liutsian. *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii*. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Antireligioznoe Izdatel'stvo, 1936.
- Kliuchevsky, V. O. *Russkaia istoriia*. Book 1. Moscow: "Olma-Press," 2003.

- Kocabaşoğlu, Uygur and Metin Berge. *Bolşevik İhtilâli ve Osmanlılar*. Ankara: Kebikeç Yayınları, 1994.
- Köroğlu, Erol. *Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1914-1918): Propagandadan Millî Kimlik İnşâsına*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004.
- Kohn, Hans. *A History of Nationalism in the East*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929.
- Kohn, Hans. *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology*. 2nd ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1953.
- Koliubakin, B. *Na maloaziatskom teatre vsemirnoi voyny 1914 - 1916 gg.: Bagdadskaia zheleznaia doroga*. Petrograd: Tipografiia Nikolayevskoi voyennoi akademii, 1917.
- Kolokol: Gazeta A. N. Gertsena i N. P. Ogareva, Zheneva 1868-1869 (Faksimil'noe izdanie)*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1979.
- Korsun, N. G. *Pervaia mirovaia voina na kavkazskom fronte: Operativnostrategicheskii ocherk*. Moscow: Voiennoe izdatel'stvo, 1946.
- Kostenko, L. *Sredniaia Aziia i vodvorenie v nei russkoi grazhdanstvennosti*. St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. Bezobrazova i komp., 1871.
- Kostomarov, N. I. *Gospodstvo doma Sv. Vladimira*. Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1993.
- Kotliarevsky, A. A. *Sochineniia A. A. Kotliarevskago*. Vol. 2. St. Petersburg: Tipografiia imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 1889.
- Krader, Lawrence. *Peoples of Central Asia*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press Ltd, 1997.
- Kurat, Akdes Nimet. *Rusya Tarihi: Başlangıçtan 1917'ye Kadar*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1948.
- L'Idea di Roma a Mosca Secoli XV-XVI – Ideia Rima v Moskve XV-XVI veka*. Rome: Herder Editrice e Libreria, 1993.
- Landau, Jacob M. *The Politics of Pan-Islam*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
- Ludshuveit, Ye. F. *Turtsiia v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny: 1914-1918 gg.* Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1966.

- MacKenzie, David. *Imperial Dreams, Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917*. Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994.
- Masaryk, Thomas Garrigue. *The Spirit of Russia: Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy*. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Vol. 1. London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1919.
- Masaryk, Thomas Garrigue. *The Spirit of Russia: Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy*. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Vol. 2. London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1968.
- McCarthy, Justin. *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*. New York and London: New York University Press, 1983.
- Meakin, Annette M. B. *In Russian Turkestan: A Garden of Asia and Its People*. New York and London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1915.
- Mısıroğlu, Kadir. *Moskof Mezâlimi*. Istanbul: Sebil Yayinevi, 1976.
- Miliukov, Paul, Charles Seignobos and L. Eisenmann, eds. *History of Russia: Reform, Reaction, Revolution (1855-1932)*. Translated by Charles Lam Markmann. Vol. 3. New York: Funk & Wagnalis, 1969.
- Mosely, Philip E. *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1934.
- Mousset, Albert. *The World of the Slavs*. New York: Frederic A. Praeger Inc., 1950.
- N. Novikov, *Operatsii flota protiv berega na Chernom more v 1914 – 1917 gg.*, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1937).
- N. S. Kiniapina, M. M. Bliev and V. V. Degoev, *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii (Vtoraia polovina XVIII – 80-e gody XIX v.)* (Moscow: "Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta," 1984).
- Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 5th ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
- Nikerled Krayblis, *Rusya'nın Şark Siyâseti ve Vilâyât-i Şarkîye Mes'elesi*, trans. Hâbil Adem (Istanbul: İkbâl Kitâbhânesi, 1332).
- Olga Crisp, *Studies in the Russian Economy Before 1914* (London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 1976).

- Ostrowski, Donald. *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-cultural Influences of the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- P. I. Liashchenko, *Istoriia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR*, 4th ed., Vol. 2 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1956).
- Pallot, Judith, and Denis J. B. Shaw. *Landscape and Settlement in Romanov Russia, 1613-1917*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
- Pavlovich, M. *Aziia i eia rol' v mirovoi voine*. St. Petersburg [Petrograd]: "Novaia zhizn'," 1918.
- Peter Gatrell, *Government, Industry and Rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
- Petrosian, Yu. A. *Russkie na beregu Bosfora (Istoricheskie ocherki)*. St. Petersburg: "Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie," 1998.
- Petrovich, Michael Boro. *The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956.
- Pipes, Richard, ed., *Russia Observed: Collected Essays on Russian and Soviet History*. Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press, 1989.
- Price, M. Philips. *War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia*. London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1918.
- Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East*, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1838).
- Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg. v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane* (Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo "Fan," 1985).
- Richard Pipes, *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).
- Robert Wesson, *The Russian Dilemma: A Political and Geopolitical View* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974).
- Rossiia i chernomorskie prolivy (XVIII – XX stoletii)* (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1999).
- S. Gramenitsky, *Inorodcheskoe obrazovanie v Turkestanskom krae* [n. p.: 1900].

- Sâib, Ahmed. *Şark Mes'elesi: Hakâik-i Târihiyeyi Hâvidir*. Istanbul: İkbâl Matba'ası, 1327.
- Salâhi R. Sonyel, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 1993).
- Sarfraz Khan, *Muslim Reformist Political Thought: Revivalists, Modernists and Free Will* (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003).
- Sarkisian, E. K. *Ekspansionistskaia politika Osmanskoi imperii v Zakavkaz'e nakanune i v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny*. Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk Armianskoi SSR, 1962.
- Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967).
- Sergei Pushkarev, *Self-Government and Freedom in Russia*, ed. and trans. Paul Bannes (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988).
- Seton-Watson, Hugh. *The New Imperialism*. London, Sydney and Toronto: The Bodley Head, 1971.
- Sh. I. Basilaia, *Zakavkaz'e v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny* (Sukhumi: "Alashara," 1968).
- Shchetinina, G. I. *Ideinaia zhizn' russkoi intelligentsii: Konets XIX – nachalo XX v.* Moscow: Nauka, 1995.
- Sheremet, V. *Bosfor: Rossiia i Turtsiia v epokhu pervoi mirovoi voiny (Po materialam russkoi voennoi razvedki)*. Moscow: "Tekhnologicheskaiia shkola biznesa," 1995.
- Shissler, A. Holly. *Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey*. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003.
- Silin, A. S. *Ekspansiia germanskogo imperializma na Blizhnem Vostoke nakanune Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1908-1914)*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1976.
- Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov'eva*, Vol. 8 (1897-1900) (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Tovarishchestva 'Obshchestvennaia Pol'za', 1903).
- Spiridovich, A. I. *Velikaia voina i Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia 1914-1917 gg.* New York: Vseslavianskoe izdatel'stvo, 1960-1962.

- Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
- Stephen Graham, *Through Russian Central Asia* (London and New York: Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1916).
- Stieve, Friedrich. *Isvolsky and the World War*, trans. E. W. Dicks. Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971.
- Sumner, B. H. *Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East, 1880-1914*. n. p.: Archon Books, 1968.
- Suzanne Champonnois, *Le mythe de Constantinople et l'opinion publique en Russie au XIXe siècle* (Istanbul: Éditions ISIS, 1989).
- The Duke of Argyll, *Our Responsibilities for Turkey: Facts and Memories of Forty Years* (London: John Murray, 1896).
- The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, eds. B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat and J. Schachts. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983.
- The Shajrat ul Atrak or Genealogical Tree of the Turks and Tatars*. Translated by Colonel [William] Miles. London: H. Allen & Co., 1838.
- Trietsch, Davis. *Almanyâ ve İslâm*. Istanbul: Efhâm Matba'ası, 1331.
- Tursunov, Kh. *National'naia politika Kommunisticheskoi Partii v Turkestane (1917-1924 gg.)*. Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo "Uzbekistan," 1971.
- Vambéry, Arminius. *The Story of My Struggles: The Memoirs of Arminius Vambéry*. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1905.
- Vasiukov, V. S. *Vneshniaia politika Rossii nakanune Fevral'skoi revoliutsii: 1916 – fevral' 1917 g.* Moscow: "Nauka," 1989.
- Vernadsky, George, Ralph T. Fisher, Jr., Alan D. Feguson, Andrew Lossky, and Sergei Pushkarev. *A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917*. Vol. 3. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972.
- Villari, Luigi, ed. *The Balkan Question*. London: John Murray, 1905.
- Vinogradov, V. N., ed. *Za Balkanskimi frontami Pervoi mirovoi voyny*. Moscow: "Indrik," 2002.
- Zaionchkovsky, A. M. *Pervaia mirovaia voina*. St. Petersburg: Poligon, 2000.

ARTICLES AND CHAPTERS IN BOOKS

- Abu-Manneh, B. "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi." *Middle Eastern Studies* 15, No. 2 (1979): 131-153.
- Abu-Sahlieh, Sami A. Adeeb. "The Islamic Conception of Migration." *International Migration Review* 30, No. 1 (Spring 1996): 37-57.
- Adam, Volker. "Ottoman Perception of Muslim Life in Russia and Central Asia." In *Looking at the Coloniser: Cross-Cultural Perceptions in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Bengal, and Related Areas*, edited by Beate Eschment and Hans Harder, 299-309. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2004.
- Ahmad, Feroz. "The Late Ottoman Empire." In *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, edited by Marian Kent, 2nd ed., 5-30. London: Frank Cass & Co., 1996.
- Ainsworth, William Harrison, ed. "The Sea of Aral and the Russians in Central Asia." *The New Monthly Magazine* 143 (1868): 123-144.
- Barghoorn, Frederick C. "Propaganda: Tsarist and Soviet." In *Russian Foreign Policy*, edited by Ivo J. Lederer, 279-309. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962.
- Bar-Yosef, Eitan. "The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917-18." *Journal of Contemporary History* 36, No. 1 (January 2001): 87-109.
- Bassin, Mark. "Inventing Siberia: Visions of the Russian East in the Early Nineteenth Century." *The American Historical Review* 96, No. 3 (June 1991): 763-794.
- Berdyayev, Nicholas. "Religion and the Russian State." In *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy*, edited by Robert A. Goldwin, Gerald Stourzh, and Marvin Zetterbaum, 25-33. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Bestuzhev, I. V. "Russian Foreign Policy: February – June 1914." *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, No. 3 (July 1966): 93-112.

- Beveridge, Albert J. "The Russian Advance." In *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy*, edited by Robert A. Goldwin, Gerald Stourzh, and Marvin Zetterbaum, 279-293. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Black, Cyril E. "The Pattern of Russian Objectives." In *Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective*, edited by Ivo J. Lederer, 565-582. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962.
- Bodger, Alan. "Russia and the End of the Ottoman Empire." In *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, edited by Marian Kent, 2nd ed., 76-110. London: Frank Cass & Co., 1996.
- Brower, Daniel. "Russian Roads to Mecca: Religious Tolerance and Muslim Pilgrimage in the Russian Empire." *Slavic Review* 55, No. 3 (Autumn 1996): 567-584.
- Brower, Daniel. "Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan." In *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*, edited by Daniel R. Brower and Edward Lazzerini, 115-135. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- Brummet, Palmira. "Dogs, Women, Cholera, and Other Menaces in the Streets: Cartoon Satire in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-11." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27, No. 4 (November 1995): 433-460.
- Bruntz, George G. "Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of German Morale in 1918." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 2, No. 1 (January 1938): 61-76.
- Bryce, James. "Introduction." In *The Balkan Question*, edited by Luigi Villari, 1-15. London: John Murray, 1905.
- Burke, Edmund. "Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900-1912." *Journal of African History* 8, No. 1 (1972): 97-118.
- Buttino, Marco. "Study of the Economic Crisis and Depopulation in Turkestan, 1917-1920." *Central Asian Survey* 9, No. 4 (1990): 59-74.
- Cherniavsky, Michael. "Khan or *Basileus*: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 20, No. 4 (October-December 1959): 459-476.
- Chirol, Valentine. "The Attitude of the Powers." In *The Balkan Question*, edited by Luigi Villari, 228-273. London: John Murray, 1905.

- Costello, David R. "Novoe Vremia and the Conservative Dilemma, 1911-1914." *Russian Review* 37, No. 1 (January 1978): 30-50.
- Creel, George. "Propaganda and Morale." *The American Journal of Sociology* 47, No. 3 (November 1941): 340-351.
- Darling, Linda. "Contested Territory: Ottoman Holy War in Comparative Context." *Studia Islamica* No. 91 (2000): 133-163.
- Davison, Roderic H. "The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914." *The American Historical Review* 53, No. 3 (April 1848): 481-505.
- Demin, V. A. "Fraktsii II Gosudarstvennoi dumy." *Voprosy istorii*, No. 10 (2006): 25-41.
- Demm, Eberhard. "Propaganda and Caricature in the First World War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 28, No. 1 (January 1993): 163-192.
- Deringil, Selim. "The Ottoman Empire and Russian Muslims: Brothers or Rivals." In *The Ottomans, the Turks, and World Power Politics: Collected Essays*, edited by Selim Deringil, 73-81. Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2000.
- Dominian, Leon. "Europe at Turkey's Door." *Geographical Review* 1, No. 4 (April 1916): 286-294.
- Dominian, Leon. "The Peoples of Northern and Central Asiatic Turkey." *Bulletin of the American Geographic Society* 47, No. 11 (1915): 832-871.
- Driver, G. R. "Studies in Kurdish History." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* 2, Issue 3 (1922): 491-511.
- Edelman, Robert. "The Russian Nationalist Party and the Political Crisis of 1909." *Russian Review* 34, No. 1 (January 1975): 22-54.
- Engel, Barbara Alpern. "Not by Bread Alone: Subsistence Riots in Russia during World War I." *The Journal of Modern History* 69, No. 4 (December 1997): 696-721.
- Engels, Friedrich. "The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism." In *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy*, edited by Robert A. Goldwin, Gerald Stourzh, and Marvin Zetterbaum, 74-92. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Esthus, Raymond A. "Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War." *Russian Review* 40, No. 4 (October 1981): 396-411.

- Evera, Stephan Van. "The Cult of Offensive and the Origins of the First World War." *International Security* 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984): 58-107.
- Fadeev, Rostislav A. "What Should Be the Policy of Russia?" In *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy*, edited by Robert A. Goldwin, Gerald Stourzh, and Marvin Zetterbaum, 67-73. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Fellows, Erwin W. "'Propaganda': History of a Word." *American Speech* 34, No. 3 (October 1959): 182-189.
- Fisher, Alan W. "Enlightened Despotism and Islam Under Catherine II." *Slavic Review* 27, No. 4 (December 1968): 542-553.
- Galuzo, P. G. "Turkestan i tsarskaia Rossiia." *Revoliutsionnyi Vostok*, No. 6 (1929): 95-119.
- Gasprinsky, Ismail. "Russkoe musul'manstvo: Mysli, zametki i nabliudeniia." In Ismail Bey Gasprinsky, *Rossiia i Vostok*, 17-58. Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1993.
- Gasprinsky, Ismail. "Russko-Vostochnoe soglasenie: Mysli, zametki i pozhelaniia Ismaila Gasprinskogo." In Ismail Bey Gasprinsky, *Rossiia i Vostok*, 59-98. Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1993.
- Gatrell, Peter. "Industrial Expansion in Tsarist Russia, 1908-14." *The Economic History Review*, New Series 35, No. 1 (February 1982): 99-110.
- Gaut, Greg. "Can a Christian be a Nationalist? Vladimir Solov'ev's Critique of Nationalism." *Slavic Review* 57, No. 1 (Spring 1998): 77-94.
- Geraci, Robert. "Russian Orientalism at an Impasse: Tsarist Education Policy and the 1910 Conference on Islam." In *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*, edited by Daniel R. Brower and Edward Lazzerini, 138-161. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- Gleason, William E. "The All-Russian Union of Towns and the Politics of Urban Reforms in Tsarist Russia." *Russian Review* 35, No. 3 (July 1976): 290-302.
- Göçek, Fatma Müge. "Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Society." *Politics Today* 14, No. 3 (Autumn 1993): 507-538.
- Gordlevsky, V. "U sipandagskikh kurdov. Iz poezdki na kavkazkii front." *Musul'manskii mir*, No. 1 (1917): 23-34.

- Goroshkov, N. P. "Ismail Gasprinsky, dzhaddidy i pantyurkizm." *Istoricheskie zapiski* 4 (1999): 118-134.
- Greenfeld, Liah. "The Formation of the Russian National Identity: The Role of Status Insecurity and *Ressentiment*." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32, No. 3 (July 1990): 549-591.
- Gregory, Paul. "Economic Growth and Structural Change in Tsarist Russia: A Case of Modern Economic Growth?" *Soviet Studies* 23, No. 3 (January 1972): 418-434.
- Halecki, O. "Imperialism in Slavic and East European History." *American Slavic and East European Review* 11, No. 1 (February 1952): 1-26.
- Hall, Alex. "The War of Words: Anti-Social Offensives and Counter-Propaganda in Wilhelmine Germany 1890-1914." *Journal of Contemporary History* 11, No. 2/3 (July 1976): 11-42.
- Harris, Norman Dwight. "The Southern Slav Question." *The American Political Science Review* 9, No. 2 (May 1915): 227-251.
- Hopkin, Deian. "Domestic Censorship in the First World War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 5, No. 4 (1970): 151-169.
- Hubbard, James Mascarene. "Russia as a Civilizing Force in Asia." *The Atlantic Monthly* 75 (1895): 197-205.
- Hurewitz, J. C. "Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origins of the Problem." *World Politics* 14, No. 4 (July 1962): 605-632.
- Iskhakov, S. I. "Pervaia mirovaia voina glazami rossiiskikh musul'man." In *Rossia i Pervaia mirovaia voia (Materialy mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kollokviuma)*, 419-431. St. Petersburg: "DB." 1999.
- Ivanov, Vitalii. "Oni tak ne khoteli voevat': Perepiska turetskikh poslov v Peterburge i Vene v 1914 godu." *Rodina*, No. 5-6 (1998): 116-118.
- Jersild, Austin Lee. "From Savagery to Citizenship: Caucasian Mountaineers and Muslims in the Russian Empire." In *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*, edited by Daniel R. Brower and Edward Lazzerini, 101-114. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- Keddie, Nikki R. "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism." *The Journal of Modern History* 41, No. 1 (March 1969): 17-28.

- Keddie, Nikki R. "The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid." *Middle Eastern Studies* 3, No. 1 (1966): 46-67.
- Kerensky, Alexander. "Russia on the Eve of World War I." *Russian Review* 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1945): 10-30.
- Khodarkovsky, Michael. "'Not by Word Alone': Missionary Policies and Religious Conversion in Early Modern Russia." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38, No. 2 (April 1996): 267-293.
- Khodarkovsky, Michael. "Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russia in the North Caucasus, 1550-1800." *The Journal of Modern History* 71, No. 2 (June 1999): 394-430.
- Kingston-Mann, Esther. "Marxism and Russian Rural Development: Problems of Evidence, Experience, and Culture." *The American Historical Review* 86, No. 4 (October 1981): 731-752.
- Kivelson, Valerie. "Merciful Father, Impersonal State: Russian Autocracy in Comparative Perspective." *Modern Asian Studies* 31, No. 3 (1997): 635-663.
- Klier, John D. "Russian Jewry on the Eve of the Pogroms." In *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History*, edited by John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, 3-12. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Kohn, Hans. "Dostoevsky's Nationalism." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 6, No. 4 (October 1945): 385-414.
- Kovaleva, I. N. "Slavianofily i zapadniki v period Krymskoi voyny (1853-1856 gg.)." *Istoricheskie zapiski* 80 (1967): 181-206.
- Kuchеров, Samuel. "The Problem of Constantinople and the Straits." *Russian Review* 8, No. 3 (July 1949): 205-220.
- Kunzle, David. "Gustave Doré's *History of Holy Russia*: Anti-Russian Propaganda from the Crimean War to the Cold War." *Russian Review* 42, No. 3 (July 1983): 271-299.
- Kurtsev, A. N. "Bezhtensy pervoi mirovoi voyny v Rossii (1914-1917)." *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 8 (1999): 98-113.
- Langer, William L. "Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8." *The English Historical Review* 44, No. 173 (January 1929): 59-85.

- Lavrin, Janko. "Populists and Slavophiles." *Russian Review* 21, No. 4 (October 1962): 307-317.
- Lavrin, Janko. "The Slav Idea and Russia." *Russian Review* 21, No. 1 (January 1962): 11-24.
- Lederer, Ivo J. "Russia and the Balkans." In *Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective*, 417-451. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962.
- Lee, Dwight E. "A Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, 1877." *The Journal of Modern History* 13 (March-December 1941): 335-356.
- Lenin, V. I. "Padenie Port-Artura." In *Lenin o mezhdunarodnoi politike i mezhdunarodnom prave*, 23-29. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo instituta mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, 1958.
- Lenzen, Iris. "Ispol'zovanie truda russkikh voennoplennykh v Germanii (1914-1918 gg.)." *Voprosy istorii*, No. 4 (1998): 129-137.
- Loukianov, Mikhail. "Conservatives and 'Renewed Russia', 1907-1914." *Slavic Review* 61, No. 4 (Winter 2002): 762-786.
- Luk'ianov, M. N. "'Rossia – dlia russkikh' ili 'Rossiia – dlia russkikh poddanykh'? Konservatory i natsional'nyi vopros nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny." *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, No. 2 (March-April 2006): 36-46.
- MacKenzie, David. "Russia's Balkan Policies Under Alexander II, 1855-1881." In *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, edited and translated by Hugh Ragsdale, 219-246. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Martin, Neil A. "Marxism, Nationalism, and Russia." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 29, No. 2 (April – June 1968): 231-252.
- Mason, Major Kenneth. "Central Kurdistan." *The Geographical Journal* 54, No. 6 (December 1919): 329-342.
- Matsui, Masato. "The Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907: Its Causes and the Progress of Negotiations." *Modern Asian Studies* 6, No. 1 (1972): 33-48.
- McCaffray, Susan P. "The Association of Southern Coal and Steel Producers and the Problems of Industrial Progress in Tsarist Russia." *Slavic Review* 47, No. 3 (Autumn 1988) 464-482.

- Michell, Robert. "Summary of Statistics of the Russian Empire." *Journal of the Statistical Society of London* 35, No. 3 (September 1872): 341-372.
- Miliukov, P. N. "'Neitralizatsiia' Dardanell i Bosfora." In *Voprosy mirovoi voyny*, 532-548. Petrograd: "Pravo." 1915.
- Mommsen, Wolfgang J. "Max Weber and the Regeneration of Russia." *The Journal of Modern History* 69, No. 1 (March 1997): 1-17.
- Mosely, Philip E. "Aspects of Russian Expansion." *American Slavic and East European Review* 7, No. 3 (October 1948): 197-213.
- "Opisanie Khivinskogo Khanstva." In *Zapiski imperatorskago russkago geograficheskago obshchestva*, edited by P. G. Redkin, Book V, 62-139. St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del, 1851.
- Park, Robert E. "Morale and the News." *The American Journal of Sociology* 47, No. 3 (November 1941): 360-377.
- Reynolds, E. K. "The Economic Resources of the Russian Empire." *The Geographical Review* 1, No. 4 (April 1916): 249-265.
- Reynolds, Mary T. "The General Staff as a Propaganda Agency, 1908-1914." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 3, No. 3 (July 1939): 391-408.
- Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. "Old Russia, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe." *American Slavic and East European Review* 11, No. 3 (October 1952): 171-188.
- Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. "'Oriental Despotism' and Russia." *Slavic Review* 22, No. 4 (December 1963): 644-649.
- Riasanovsky, Nicholas. "'Nationality' in the State Ideology during the Reign of Nicholas I." *Russian Review* 19, No. 1 (January 1960): 38-46.
- Rieber, Alfred J. "Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay." In *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, edited and translated by Hugh Ragsdale, 315-359. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Rogger, Hans. "Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4, No. 3 (April 1962): 253-264.
- Sabitov, Nigmat. "Panislamizm i pantiurkizm na sluzhbe imperialisticheskoi reaktsii." *Vestnik AN KazSSR*, No. 7 (1951).

- Salter, William M. "The Russian Revolution." *International Journal of Ethics* 17, No. 3 (April 1907): 301-316.
- Seregny, Scott J. "Zemstvos, Peasants, and Citizenship: The Russian Adult Education Movement and the World War I." *Slavic Review* 59, No. 2 (Summer 2000): 290-315.
- Serge A. Zenkovsky, "A Century of Tatar Revival," *American Slavic and East European Review* 12, No. 3 (October 1953): 303-318.
- Serge Goriainov, "The End of the Alliance of the Emperors." *The American Historical Review* 23, No. 2 (January 1918): 324-349.
- Shaw, Stanford J. "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 9, No. 3 (October 1978): 325-338.
- Sidorenko, N. S. "Ural'skie deputaty Gosudarstvennoi dumy (1906-1917)." *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, No. 5 (September-October 2006): 91-98.
- Silin, A. S. "Begstvo 'Gebena' i 'Breslau' v Dardanelly v 1914 g. (Iz istorii pervoy mirovoy voyny)." *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, No. 3 (1983): 131-146.
- Smith, S. A. "Citizenship and the Russian Nation during World War I: A Comment." *Slavic Review* 59, No. 2 (Summer 2000): 316-329.
- Stone, Norman, Sergei Podbolotov, and Murat Yaşar, "The Russians and the Turks: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Era of Empires." In *Imperial Rule*, edited by Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber, 27-45. Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2004.
- Swain, G. R. "Bolsheviks and Metal Workers on the Eve of the First World War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 16, No. 2 (April 1981): 272-291.
- Swanson, Glen W. "A Note on the Ottoman Socio-Economic Structure and its Response to the Balkan War of 1912." *Middle Eastern Studies* 14, No. 1 (January 1978): 116-126.
- Symmons-Symonolewicz, Konstantin. "Nationalist Movements: An Attempt at a Comparative Typology." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 7, No. 2 (January 1965): 221-230.
- The Census of the Russian Empire." *The Geographical Journal* 9, No. 6 (June 1897): 657-659.

- Uribes, E. "Balkanskaia politika Rossii nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny v sovetskoï istoriografii 20-h – pervoi poloviny 30-h godov." *Istoriia i istoriografiia: Istoricheskii ezhegodnik* (1978) (1981): 51-67.
- Vinogradov, V. N. "The Personal Responsibility of Emperor Nicholas I for the Coming of the Crimean War: An Episode in the Diplomatic Struggle in the Eastern Question." In *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, edited and translated by Hugh Ragsdale, 159-170. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Wasti, Syed Tanvir. "The Political Aspirations of Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Nexus." *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, No. 5 (September 2006): 709-722.
- Williams, Robert C. "The Russian Soul: A Study in European Thought and Non-European Nationalism." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 31, No. 4 (October – December 1970): 573-588.
- Wittfogel, Karl A. "Russia and the East: A Comparison and Contrast." *Slavic Review* 22, No. 4 (December 1963): 627-643.
- Wittfogel, Karl A. "The Marxist View of Russian Society and Revolution." *World Politics* 12, No. 4 (July 1960): 487-508.
- Yanıkdağ, Yücel. "Ottoman Prisoners of War in Russia, 1914-22." *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, No. 1 (1999): 69-85.
- Zamir, Meir. "Population Statistics of the Ottoman Empire in 1914 and 1919." *Middle Eastern Studies* 17, No. 1 (January 1981): 85-106.
- Zardykhan, Zharmukhamed. "Ottoman Kurds of the First World War Era: Reflections in Russian Sources." *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, No. 1 (January 2006): 67-85.
- Zlatař, Zdenko. "Pan-Slavism: A Review of the Literature." *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 17, No. 1-2 (1990): 219-233.
- Zwemer, Samuel M. "A New Census of the Muslim World." *Journal of American Oriental Society* 44 (1924): 29-37.