



**SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
INSTITUTE FOR GRADUATE STUDIES IN
SOCIAL SCIENCES**

CEYHAN ERENER

**THE EFFECT OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION POLICIES ON UNIVERSITY
STUDENTS' PERCEPTION OF RELIGIOSITY DURING THE AK PARTY
PERIOD**

**MASTER THESIS
DECEMBER, 2020**



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THESIS SUPERVISOR

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gülsen KAYA OSMANBAŞOĞLU

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TEZ ONAYI

PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all materials and results that are not original to this work. I declare that this thesis is written according to the writing rules of Social Sciences University of Ankara, Institute of Social Sciences.

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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECT OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION POLICIES ON UNIVERSITY STUDENTS' PERCEPTION OF RELIGIOSITY DURING THE AK PARTY PERIOD



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Religious education policies are among the hottest topics in our country. In line with the needs of the society and that of the state, the education of individuals via schooling is generally determined through religious education policies. There is no doubt that states demand to raise individuals they like to mould, and they implement education policies to that end. Accordingly, religion and state relations are regarded as inseparable.

In this study, firstly, in order to understand the concepts and end the confusion, the conceptual framework will be mentioned, and then the history of the religious education policies will be discussed. In this context, the religious education policies during the Ottoman and Republican period will be briefly examined. Then, the religious education policies of the AK Party period will be examined.

Social change reports and religiosity studies prepared by research companies have led us to conduct the research on the effects of religious education policies on religiosity. As a matter of fact, it was expected that the religious propaganda and education carried out by the state would affect the religiosity of the citizens in the desired way. For example, with the 4 + 4 + 4 education system implemented in 2012, the number of secondary religious schools increased significantly. However, many studies have revealed that the situation proves to be the opposite and directed us to study this area.

Within the scope of our study, 12 region-based interviews were conducted across Turkey and in line with Level 1 of Statistical Region Units (SRU). In this context, open-ended questions were asked to the participants. In addition, the process tracing method was used in this study. In this method, periods were written in the number line column, signifying a historical process. Presidents, prime ministers, and the religious education policies in practice were placed in the number line column. Finally, the religiousness graph was compared with these periods. This made it possible to comment on how religionization differs according to the president, prime minister, government of the period and the policies implemented.

This research aims to answer such questions as: Do religious education policies affect religiosity? Have people questioned their religious beliefs more in recent years? Can religious education policies direct the rate of the increase and decrease in religiosity? Do religious discourses increase devotion, or drive people away from religion or lead to the corruption of the sacred? Have the policies implemented by the AK Party has increased or decreased religiosity? If so, is the policy problem implemented, or is a rapidly decreasing religiosity decreasing with these policies? Do the changing perceptions on religiosity reflect global changes in our country or is it due to the developments in Turkey?

Keywords: Religion, Religious Education Policies, Religiosity, AK Party

ÖZET

AK PARTİ DÖNEMİNDE DİN EĞİTİM POLİTİKALARININ ÜNİVERSİTE ÖĞRENCİLERİNİN DİNDARLIK ALGISINA ETKİSİ

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Din eğitim politikaları ülkemizde üzerinde en fazla tartışılabilen konuların arasında yer almaktadır. Toplumun ve devletin ihtiyacı doğrultusunda bireylerin okullar aracılığıyla yetiştirilmesi genel itibarıyla din eğitim politikalarıyla sağlanmaktadır. Kuşku yoktur ki devletler var olmasını istediği bireyler yetiştirmek isterler ve bu doğrultuda eğitim politikaları uygulamaya özen gösterirler. Bu doğrultuda din ve devlet ilişkileri birbirinden ayrılmaz bir bütün oluşturmaktadır.

Yapılan bu çalışmada ilk olarak kavramları doğru algılamak ve kavram karmaşasına son vermek adına, kavramsal çerçeveye değinilecektir. Akabinde din eğitim politikaları tarihsel olarak ele alınacaktır. Bu bağlamda Osmanlı Dönemi ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi din eğitim politikaları kısaca incelenecektir. Ardından Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti) dönemi din eğitim politikaları incelenecektir.

Araştırma şirketlerinin hazırlamış olduğu, toplumsal değişim raporları ve dindarlık araştırmaları bizleri din eğitim politikalarının dindarlık üzerine etkileri konusunu araştırmaya yönlendirdi. Nitekim devlet eliyle yapılan dini propagandanın ve din eğitiminin vatandaşların dindarlıklarını istenilen yönde etkilemesi beklenmekteydi. Örneğin 2012 senesinde uygulanan 4+4+4 eğitim sistemiyle İmam Hatip Liselerinin sayılarında ciddi artışlar meydana gelmiştir. Ancak birçok araştırma durumun tam aksi yönde olduğunu ortaya koyarak bizi bu alanı çalışmaya yönlendirdi.

Çalışmamız: Türkiye geneli ve İstatistiki Bölge Birimleri Sınıflaması (İBBS) Düzey 1'e göre 12 bölge bazında röportaj çalışmalarını gerçekleştirmiştir. Bu çerçevede katılımcılara açık uçlu sorular yöneltilmiştir. Ayrıca Yapılan bu tez çalışmasında özellikle süreç takibi yöntemi kullanılacaktır. Bu yöntemde dönemler tarihsel süreç halinde sayı doğrusuna yazılacaktır. Cumhurbaşkanları, başbakanlar ve uygulanan din eğitim politikaları sayı doğrusuna yerleştirilecektir. Son olarak dindarlık grafiği bu dönemler ile kıyaslanacaktır. Bu sayede dindarlaşma dönemin cumhurbaşkanına, başbakanına, hükümetine ve uygulanmış olan politikalara göre nasıl farklılıklar gösterdiği üzerine yorumlar yapabilmek mümkün hale gelecektir.

Araştırmamız; Din eğitim politikaları dindarlığa etki eder mi? İnsanlar son yıllarda dini inançlarını daha fazla mı sorgulamaktadırlar? Dindarlığın artıp azalmasına din eğitim politikaları yön verebilir mi? Dini söylemler dine bağlılığı artırır mı, insanları dinden uzaklaştırır mı yoksa kutsalı mı yozlaştırır? AK Partinin uyguladığı politikalar dindarlığı arttırmış mıdır, azaltmış mıdır? Azaltmışsa sorun uygulanan politikalarda mıdır yoksa hızla azalan bir dindarlık bu politikalar sayesinde yavaşlayarak mı azalmaktadır? Dindarlık üzerine değişen algılar, küresel değişimlerin ülkemize yansımaları mıdır yoksa Türkiye'deki gelişmelerden mi kaynaklanmaktadır? Gibi sorulara yanıt aranmaya çalışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Din, Din Eğitim Politikaları, Dindarlık, AK Parti

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AK Party: Justice and Development Party

DIB: Religious Affairs Presidency

DISK: Revolutionary Confederation of Trade Unions

MISK: Confederation of Nationalist Trade Unions

HIS: Secondary Religious Schools (Secondary Religious Schools)

MEB: Ministry of National Education

DKAB: Religion and Ethics

OKS: Secondary Education Pass Exam

TEOG: Transition to Basic Education

YGS: Transition to Higher Education Exam

LYS: Undergraduate Placement Exam

LGS: High School Transition System

SBS: Placement Test

CHP: Republican People's Party

MSP: National Salvation Party

DP: Democratic Party

YÖK: Higher Education Institution

TDV: Religious Foundation of Turkey

İLITAM: Theology Undergraduate Completion Program

ÖSYS: Student Selection and Placement System

AFAD: Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency

ISIS: Iraq Sham Islamic State

FETO: Fethullah Terrorist Organization

YHT: New High-Speed Train

YSK: Supreme Election Board

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Religion has played a leading role in people's life in certain periods. Regarding this perspective, religion emerged with the dawn of men and it has been mentioned as a phenomenon that constantly affects the state. Religion and the state have eventually affected each other in every period of history. It cannot be said that these two phenomena were completely independent from each other at any time in history. In some periods, religion had a significant impact over political institutions while in other periods the opposite was experienced.

Throughout history, holiness and religion were accepted as highly regarded values for the people in Turkish society (Atay, 1981, p. 1). For this reason, religion had a leading role not only in the early periods of the Republic, but also in the modernization process of Turkey (Kara, 2012, p. 4). Political institutions generally control society through religious education policies. There is no doubt that states like to control individuals as they wish and adapt education policies to that end. Thus, it can be inseparably integrated with religion and state. In this context, religious education policies are among the hottest topics in our country.

There are academic studies available in the literature such as “Religiosity in Turkey” (Akşit, 2012) “Changing Religion, Politics, and Society in Turkey (Çarkoğlu ve Toprak, 2000) and “Conservatism in Turkey: Family, Religion, State, Gender” that can be specified in Turkey (Yılmaz, 2006). However, my research study markedly differs from the aforementioned studies since I aim to compare the current level of

religiosity by referring to the previous studies conducted in Turkey and finally my research shows the distinct contribution of interviews.

Social change reports prepared by research companies have led us to conduct research on the impact of religious education policies on religiosity. It was expected that religious propaganda and religious education dictated by the state would affect the desired level of religiosity of the citizens. In 2012, the number of the secondary religious schools increased significantly with the implementation of 4 + 4 + 4 compulsory education system. However, KONDA research company, IPSOS Think Tank, and certain researches in this field revealed that the introduction of the new education system was not in line with the expected outcome. Therefore, this directed us to study in this field.¹

In this study, firstly, the aim is to understand the concepts correctly and thus end the ongoing confusion. Therefore, the conceptual framework will be mentioned and then the religious education policies will be discussed from a historical perspective. In this context, religious education policies ring the Ottoman and Republican period are briefly covered. Then, religious education policies during the AK Party period are examined. In this framework, the concept of religiosity and religious discourses are emphasized. The AK Party has been in power the longest in the Turkish political arena. The AK Party, which was established on August 14, 2001, succeeded in coming to power in a short time and has remained in power for approximately 18 years as of today. As such, the AK Party period emerges as an important phenomenon that needs to be studied. In this thesis, process tracing method is used. This method can be used for "case studies that aim better understanding of the causal dynamics that produce the outcome of a particular historical event and shed light on generalizable causal mechanisms that link causes and consequences in a population of causally similar cases" (Beach, 2017, pp. 1-2). In this method, periods are mentioned in a historical timeline. Presidents, prime ministers, parties, and coalitions that came to power with general elections, and religious education policies are also mentioned in the timeline. Especially in our country, political power of the presidents has increased in 1980 and 2017. In this case, the role of the president in state policies cannot be overlooked. This is a milestone in including the presidents in the process tracing table that we created.

¹ Details of this and such studies will be further discussed in the third part of our study.

The government come into a being thanks to the political parties that rise to power. These political parties represent the right (religious, conservative) and the left (secular) side. In this case, it is expected that religiosity level has increased during the AK party rule since the party represents the ideology of the right side. However, the decrease in religiosity during these periods made it worth researching. The study also includes the governments in the table.

Finally, the religiousness graph compares these periods. This makes it possible to comment on how a religious nation differs along with the president, prime minister, the government of the period, and the policies implemented. The aim is to evaluate more clearly what shapes the religious nation rates take according to the parties, periods, their presidents, and especially the religious education policies pursued. However, since only the AK Party period is examined in this study, the period covers only after 2000.

The research aims to give answers to such questions as: Do religious education policies affect religiosity? Are people questioning their religious beliefs more? Can education policies control the rate of increase and decrease in religiosity? Are religious discourses volatile, do they drive people away from religion or corrupt the sacred? Have the policies implemented by the AK Party increased or decreased religiosity? If so, is it a problem in politics, or is a rapidly decreasing religiosity decreasing slowly thanks to these policies? Are the changing perceptions on religiosity reflecting global changes on our country or is it due to the developments in Turkey?

1.1 CONCEPTS OF EDUCATION, EDUCATIONAL POLICY, RELIGION, RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND RELIGIOSITY

People constantly talk via certain concepts while expressing their thoughts, whether they fully conceive their meanings or not. However, in general, they do not know the meanings of these concepts fully or may not use them properly. In this case, people face with some difficulties and confusions while transmitting their thoughts. At this point, it is necessary to define some concepts for a better understanding. For instance, education, religion, religious education, educational policy, religiosity etc. are frequently used throughout our study. Therefore, this chapter includes the definitions of these concepts.

1.1.1 Education

It will be insufficient to define only the dictionary meaning while considering education from a conceptual perspective. For this reason, it is significant to cover how the terms were used in the past. The understanding of education has developed in accordance with ideologies. Throughout history, the relationship between thought and education has been experienced in different ways (Küken, 2001, p. 15). This has played a leading role in almost all changes since the early ages of societies. Education, which is an important factor in the formation of the mental capacities of the future generations, is the transfer of knowledge in societies. In this sense, it is difficult to define education through only one perspective. It differs from period to period and from society to society. In this case, it is difficult to fit the concept into a standard type and to draw a chrystal clear definition.

There are various definitions for education. However, the general perspective can be considered as a phase of changing people's life and consciousness in their behaviour (Büyükkaragöz, 1999, p. 27). Education is the process of realizing an individual's existence as a whole with its spiritual, intellectual, moral, social, and political dimensions. All the structures through which people live are referred to as education and are a part of this picture. Besides having such a wide scope, education is seen as a means of socialization (Oğuzkan, 1968, p. 13). In other words, it can be

understood from all these definitions that it is possible to consider life as a part of life long learning.

Rather than the definitions of education, two of the leading ancient philosophers, i.e., Plato and Aristotle, systematically dealt with the concept of education. They discussed education from the perspective of free individuals and within the context of the concepts such as consciousness, competence, pleasure, thought and discipline. For example, while Plato considered education as a revealing phase of certain truths hidden in individuals (Başkaya, 2005, p. 151), Aristotle defined education as a part of politics and examined it as a practice. According to Aristotle, education aims to raise individuals who will realize situations with the possibility of maintaining the welfare of the state (Burnet, 2008, p. 7). Aristotles conceptualizing the notion of education as the creation of desired individuals by the state makes this definition significantly vital to our study. Therefore, our study approaches the concept of education though this perspective.

Emile Durkheim defines education as the process by which the nature, social institutions, and societies are effective on our will (Akyüz, 2004, p. 1). According to the political thought of French Philosopher Louis Althusser, for the class, person, or group in the office to sustain state power permanently, they must continually impose their ideological stance upon society. This means that they call only the “Ideological Devices of the State”; it will be possible by spreading the state ideology to its smallest units of the society through religious institutions, educational institutions, legal institutions, political groups, unions, family, communication and cultural institutions (Althusser, 2016, pp. 36-39) (Özer, 2017, p. 1). According to Freire, education is a phenomenon that has political aims. It can be used to protect the current political and social system and to transform it (1998, p. 28). Freire sees education as a purely political goal in his statement and asserts that it is oriented towards preserving, reproducing, or transforming the existing social and political order. After all, he claims that education concentrates on the different reflections of it and the transfer of the idea in creating the desired behaviours in individuals. This view is also extremely significant for the views of Louis Althusser and Freire. Undoubtedly, creating desired behaviours is carried out by education and by the state. As stated above, there have been several definitions of

education, therefore it is necessary to discuss the education policy which is directly related to the concept of education.

1.1.2. Education Policy

The phenomenon of educational policies has been called "learning the principles that lead to the decisions taken and the practices to be implemented to ensure that the education system reaches a group or an institution. In addition, educational policies take different forms according to the social lifestyles of the state's official institutions and organizations and their structure (Aydoğanoglu, 2003, p. 128). While expressing the quality of education policy, the main criterion in creating policies should be comprehensive, controllable, and adaptable to the scientific criteria (Chomsky, 1997, p. 25). In addition to Chomsky's statement, it is extremely important that it is purposeful and scientific.

The education policy, defined as the process of creating behavioural changes in the individual and raising an individual in the most common sense, is expressed as deliberate and planned activities to achieve a set of goals with an educational-teachable nature (Keyifli, 2013, p. 105).

Education aims to provide individuals with certain skills and knowledge, and at the same time to convey the existing culture to the future generations thus, enabling the society to reach the desired level by using the individual potentials and skills of individuals (Ayhan, 1997, p. 18). Education policies have a significant impact on shaping and changing society. Besides, political power and education policies are in harmony (Ergün, 1994, p. 16). At this point, education both promotes the social stability and culture to the individuals it educated in order for them to fit into the society in which they will live and also tries to equip these individuals with the skill that improves, criticizes, and takes them ahead.

It is impossible to deal with the educational policy in a society other than the social structure, political formation, and current dominant ideology. Therefore, the policy followed for a specific end is determined by the government (Çeçen, 1983, p. 66). Besides, it is meaningless to see education policies as universal. Indeed, policies developed should be special to the societies because of their community's structures. For this reason, the education system and the current political understanding are affected by

the political environment. So, it is important to state that education policies have a unifying role in the nation and are regularized by following the current activities.

Education policies are the determination of the actions that aim to reach the desired goals towards the issues related to education (Trowler, 2003, p. 176). Education policy in the shortest form is the creation of citizens by the state through educational institutions of the state. Undoubtedly, every society wants to raise people that have the ability to sustain in the future. Governments prepare education policies in this direction. This is the meaning that should be understood from the concept of education policy used in our study.

1.1.3. Religion

There are numerous definitions about different characteristics of religion thus, a common definition cannot be given. Definitions of religion are related to the perception of the individuals and varies according to their own beliefs and goals (Peker, 2011, p. 29). It is important to put this definition more concretely.

Sociologically, the concept of religion is perceived as a mass perception that shapes cultural rules or as a common outcome of the society. Marx claims, “religion is the opium of the people” (Özyurt, 2014, p. 215). To him, religion can be described as a person that is manipulated for those who have power so that the repressed crowds consent to their fate (Cox, 2004, s. 25). Taking a pragmatist attitude towards religion, Durkheim draws our attention to the function of determining and preserving social values. According to him, religion is a system consisting of beliefs and practices regarding the sacred (1995, s. 44). Through these beliefs and practices, it becomes possible to hold societies together.

Religion is the bond of individuals believing in the facts which they consider sacred. In our study, the concept of religion will be used in its two meanings: first, it will refer to the common definition by which Islam is referred and secondly, the effect of religion on determining and preserving the social values.

1.1.4. Religious Education

Conceptually, it is seen that the concept of religious education emerged with the combination of the concepts of religion and education. Religious education is neither religion nor education. In this way, this concept expresses the meaning of neither religion nor education (Keyifli, 2013, p. 117). Religious education is considered as a systematic development of attitudes, which will support individuals to have a positive effect on their life by revealing their sense of religion since their birth (Keyifli, 2013, p. 118). Religious education deals with the whole human existence. While dealing with human beings, it examines the human beings from its perspective, in other words, it deals with the individual because they are human (Bilgin, 2007, p. 39). Although the field of religious education deals with the individual and life, it also includes the interactions of religion with life and the problems associated with them (Yavuz, 1998, p. 50). Therefore, the question of how a believer can make sense of his life with religion is the main question and the main subject of religious education.

The science of religious education uses the above-mentioned disciplines to work towards raising individuals under God's will. Learning explores theoretical and practical problems related to religious understanding and life that they may encounter throughout their lives, tries to find solutions, and develops theories for the future. In short, the aim of education in religion is to help people to develop behaviours in their integrity of life that fit to the divine will (Cebeci, 2005, p. 30). Regarding why the state does this, as mentioned before, French Philosopher Louis Althusser argued that the class, person, or group that holds the state administration to retain state power permanently, must embed their ideological understanding into the society. This can only be possible by spreading the system called "Ideological Devices of the State" even to the smallest unit of the society.

After examining the effects of religion and education on societies, it is not necessary to focus on how important religious education is. This mechanism, highly effective in societies, is undoubtedly used by states in every era. In some periods, religious education was suppressed and attempted to be put under the state control (closing dervish lodges and zawiyah, establishing the Presidency of Religious Affairs and bringing religion under the control of the state, etc.). Therefore, it has been used as an indispensable instrument by the state in all periods.

1.1.5. Religiosity

In the dictionary of the Turkish Language Association, religiosity is defined as “being religious” (TDK, 2020). Religiosity with its dictionary meaning is defined as “the concept that shows the degree of a person’s belief and attachment to religion” (Kirman, 2004, p. 62-63). The definition of this concept should not be considered separate from the definitions made on religion. Therefore, it is possible that attitudes towards the religiousness of the individual or society can be reduced to a certain framework. Perhaps more difficult than defining the concept of religion is to define the concept of religiosity. Religion is an abstract concept by its nature, but the concept of religiosity appears to be the behaviour of an individual who applies the rules set by religion, which itself is an abstract concept.

Uysal notes that religiosity can be defined from the perspective of the Islamic religion, based on two aspects of religion, namely faith, and acts. According to Uysal, religiosity is the individual’s primary belief in the principles revealed by the dogmas of religion, that is meant to be described within the framework of the integrity of faith-acts, and to practice religious worship related to this (1996, p. 118). At this point, our study is based on the following meaning of the concept of religiosity. The individual’s adherence to any religious system, accepting the beliefs, symbols, and worship that exist in this religion, applying them to his life, and continuing his life in this direction. Of course, the most important point is the Islamic religious perspective mentioned by Uysal above. The religiosity mentioned in our study is Islam. Religiousness is said to be the way individuals have transferred religious slogans to their daily lives. The elements that are among the most commonly used definitions of religiosity are almost the same and these concepts have emphasized the reflections of one’s religious behaviour and attitudes in his practical life. In this study, we will consider the criterion of religiosity as a concept related to whether or not the individual reflects the conditions of the religion he/she believes in terms of living conditions. This definition of religiosity will be used frequently in this study, and this meaning will be what is meant by religiosity.

1.1.6. Other Concepts

Secularity and Secularism: The word secular is an adjective that qualifies the name coming before it. There are different uses such as secular country, secular individual, secular society. What should be understood where this word is used is that what is described (individual, country, society) experiences a life far from supernatural. Therefore, there is an important difference between the expression, “secularized society” and “secular society”. Considering the secularized society, it is understood that there is a comparison with the past; that is, in the secularized society, it loses its supernatural effect from the past to the present, and the interest turns into “this world” from the supernatural. Therefore, even a religious society can become secular compared to its past, yet still have a high level of religiousness (Ertit, 2019, p. 330-331). This definition is important for the better understanding of the concept of secularism used in the study. In addition, the concept of secularization, which expresses the separation of religion and state affairs, and that religion has lost prestige at the social level, can affect a smaller number of people compared to the past, and the concept of secularization, which indicates that it is gradually becoming a point of reference for society, are not interchangeable concepts (Ertit, 2014, p. 112).

Conservatism: When it comes to conservatism, a classification such as “conservative world view”, “conservative politics” and “conservative attitude” is usually uttered. While the conservative world view is based on the belief in God, religion, and spirituality, conservative politics is a style of politics that foresees policy making over such values. There is a great overlap, a parallel line drawn between conservative worldviews and conservative politics. The conservative worldview constitutes the main frame and source of inspiration for conservative politics. In other words, it can be said that the starting point of conservative politics is the conservative world view. However, “conservative attitude” is generally accepted as a different type of conservatism in the literature of political thought. The conservative attitude is not only fed by the conservative worldview. The saying “Yesterday’s revolutionaries, tomorrow’s conservatives” describes exactly this kind of conservatism (Çaha, 2004, p.15). It has been confirmed that the “conservative worldview” is defined by our participants who claim to be conservative.

Deism: It dates back to the 17th century and is the doctrine that was used as the term opposite to atheism because it originated from the Latin Deus-god root in the early days, but later reduced to the belief of a God who only created the universe and left it to itself. In addition to accepting the existence of God and being the first cause of the world, it is a school of thought that doubts or denies the prophets in the context of a rational understanding of religion (Erdem, 1994, p. 109). In short, it is an understanding of God whose existence is known by reason and does not interfere with the universe (Topaloğlu, 1996, p. 19). It is possible to say that this concept generally emerges within the framework of a non-interventionist God and a trust in science.

Atheism: Since the term atheism is derived from Theos, which means God in Greek, and is called “theism” in English, it is formed by the prefix, “a”, which gives the word a negative meaning. If we assume that theism is defined as “having believed in God”, we can define atheism as “not having a belief in God”. Atheists first reject theism’s concept of God, and then indirectly reject the god of divine religions (Topaloğlu, 2001, p. 14-15). Generally, the concept of atheism expresses that it does not need a creator.

Agnosticism: The concept of agnosticism represents the view that all efforts to know reality in a philosophical, religious, and scientific sense are a futile effort, and defines people with this type of thought (Shanahan, 2016). In another definition, he who is agnostic, says that nothing is known about the existence or absence of God, and has the opinion that nothing can be said about this subject (Aydın, 2010, p. 211). However, agnosticism is of the view that the human mind is not sufficient to provide enough rational grounds to justify believing that God exists or does not exist (Rowe, 2018). When the concept of agnostic turns into a form of agnosticism, the suffix ‘ism’ makes it a doctrine or a teaching. This concept claims that the answer to the question that a creator can exist is never known, thus it is always a state of doubt.

Pantheism: Pantheism is the doctrine in which the God-Universe duality is eliminated, God covers everything, nature and man are the expansions of the divine being in different ways (Aydın, 2010, p. 186). God does not have a separate and independent existence from the universe. Everything in the universe is a part of God. God and the universe are the same. There is no rule of worship in beliefs. They do not have a post-life belief (Aktan, 2019). In pantheism, nature is accepted as God’s appearance.

Materialism: Materialism is the general name given to the movement that tries to explain everything that is going on for material reasons, that everything that exists consists of matter, that there is no extra physical field independent of matter, that abstract things such as emotion, thought and consciousness in human beings are also derived from matter (Topaloğlu, 2007, p. 137). Materialism is the view that connects everything that is real and existing to matter which is accepted as the fundamental and essential element of this world. Besides, it is a thought system that accepts the existence of realities that can only be obtained and perceived as a result of senses (Akgün, 2014, p. 15). There is a belief that everything, including consciousness, is made of matter.



CHAPTER II

In this part of the study, the AK Party's religious education policies and religious discourses will be examined. However, before addressing these, religious education policies of the period from the Ottoman Empire to the AK Party period will be covered briefly in order to understand the AK Party period more accurately.

2. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION POLICY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

Because the Republic of Turkey has been born out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, the studies related to the Republic of Turkey are generally conducted by including the last 150 years of Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, when considering the history of religious education in the country, it is important to date it back to the Ottoman Empire in order not to break the chain of education because the concept of secular education in our education system is based on the Tanzimat Period (İnalçık, 2014, p. 377). While examining the education systems, previously existing systems should be reviewed, and these education systems should not be considered separately from the previous ones. Analyses made without examining previous systems are inaccurate and shallow, and the data revealed remains inactive. Therefore, our research in the education system on behalf of the Republic of Turkey will be initiated to correct analysis from the late Ottoman period.

2.1. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION POLICIES FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE PRESENT

Since the establishment of the Ottoman Empire until today, religion-state relations in Turkey pursued a course like: “religion dependant state” period from the establishment of the Ottoman Empire until the first half of the 19th century, “quasi-

religious state” period from the Tanzimat Edict of 1839 until the adoption of the constitution in 1924, and finally the Republic period, dominated by the “state-dependant religion” understanding and strict secular policies regarding religion and religious education were applied (Başgil, 1998, p. 192-201). From this perspective, we will start our work from the 1839 Tanzimat Edict, that is, the “semi-religious state” period. Indeed, the origin of many of the newly established state institutions of the Republic of Turkey was laid in this period. It is especially impossible to consider the education system separately from this period.

When the Ottoman education system is mentioned, madrasahs should be covered first. Madrasahs are educational institutions related to the state and society that influenced the Ottoman administration system and a way of thinking. The *ilmiye* class, which formed one of the main pillars of the Ottoman administrative system together with the *Kalemiye* (bureaucracy) and the *seyfiye* (military people), separated from the other segments in the system and gained a more independent position from the period of Sultan Süleyman, the Magnificent, and in the 17th century, it gained an institutional identity (Cihan, 2004, p. 14). It cannot be said that the madrasahs remained in place, did not develop, and did not progress in the process from the Seljuks to the Ottoman Empire. However, from the 17th century, it was realized that there was a need for innovation in the field of education, as in many other fields of the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, when the West started to advance in science and technique, the Ottoman turned to the West from the 18th century and found it necessary to innovate in the field of education (Baltacı, 1993, p. 12). However, it was not easy to make changes in these institutions that had existed for many years. As a matter of fact, these established institutions did not welcome change and caused a duality within the institutions that were formed later.

Although the first madrasahs had religious-oriented education, with the emergence of the madrasahs that gave expertise after the conquest of Istanbul, the diversity in the lessons also increased. In this sense, Mehmet II focused on the standardization of the madrasahs and brought them to a certain standard. The military defeats in the 19th century brought reform in the military field. In addition to military developments, innovation movements started in areas such as law, bureaucracy, and education. In 1839, with the Tanzimat Edict, the innovations were to be declared at the

legislation (Tonguç, 1998, p. 105). The most important of the reforms initiated with the order of Sultan Abdülmecit on education, which was handled with a more comprehensive program after the announcement of the Tanzimat, is undoubtedly the establishment of the Meclis-i Maarif-i Umumiye. The Ministry of National Education was established in 1847 and the education centre was subordinated to the state with a control mechanism. In the same period, few new schools with a more secular structure were opened. The purpose of this innovation in education was to train the personnel who would meet the needs of the new period of the state (Gökçe, 2005, p. 79). One of the important innovations came with the Education Regulation dated back to 1869. According to this charter, primary schools, high school, and *darülfünun* schools were divided into five categories: primary schools, junior high schools, high school, sultans, and *darülfünun* (Kırpık & Ünal, 2012, p. 219). Here we come across with a dual education problem between western modern style education and classical Ottoman education that will be transformed into a single system by the new state to be established in the future.

An important change that took place in the madrasahs during the reign of Abdülhamit II was the exemption of madrasahs from military service in 1892. This situation was later criticized because it harmed the madrasah education. It is claimed that the last 16-17 years of Abdülhamit II rule was as an ineffectual period for the madrasahs. Without making any changes in the organization and program of madrasahs, it has been observed that the increase in the number of students did not increase the quality of education, on the contrary, it decreased the quality (Unat, 1964, p. 80). The aim was to increase the public's interest in education. However, in the future, it was seen that this method did not work, and the quality of education decreased.

In order for the states to survive, as in many other fields, the "Ministry of National Education of the General Directorate" was established on March 17, 1857, under the head of a minister included in the Council of Ministers, in order to handle the innovation studies in the field of education as a whole. Thus, for the first time, the foundation of today's Ministry of Education, which is within the government, founded (Kodaman, 1991, p. 16). This institution continued to be a source of inspiration in the Republic Period. As a matter of fact, it is emphasized that the mentioned supervision played an important role in the formation of the education system of the Republic

period. It has been observed that some Islamic practices, which were described as *backwardness* by the Ottoman bureaucrats of the Tanzimat period, were changed and practices that could be described as secular were put into effect (Mardin, 2012, p. 44-45). When the Republic Period is examined, it is possible to see that many institutions that were actually established were related to the institution that existed in the Ottoman Period. In many parts of the study, these institutions of the Ottoman Empire will be explained by comparing them with today's institutions.

In the last 15-20 years of the Ottoman Empire, religious education was also included in modern schools, which are now considered to be secondary and high schools. During this period, religious and moral education were given 3 hours a week in high schools (MEB, 1999, p. 355). Apart from these, religious education was given 2 hours a week in sultans, and schools of instruction, which had a European style establishment. In fact, the lessons of religion and morality, varying between 1-3 hours a week in modern educational institutions, continued until the first years of the Republic (MEB, 1999, p. 356). With these modernization efforts of the Ottoman Empire, primary schools that were teaching basic knowledge at the primary school level were made compulsory by Mahmut II (Tonguç, 1998, p. 105). In fact, there were visible changes in education, but unfortunately, the dual education system continued, and the disadvantages of this system were experienced. In the Republican Period, the aim was to eliminate dualism and to switch to a single system. According to Berkes, in the Republican Revolutions, the basic principle in the field of education, as in many other fields, was the principle of unifying and integrating education. One side of this is the abolition of the duality in the education rules of the Muslim people, and the other side is the inclusion of the primary education, especially for Muslims or non-Muslims, under the state authority, and the advent of the concept of national education (2002, p. 532). The madrasahs, which have been in existence for a long time, did not feel the need to renew themselves and were outdated by not responding to innovations against Western schools. However, the Tanzimat Edict I and II with the declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy, many schools were opened and were subject to reforms. As such, the Ottoman State faced a dual education problem. As a matter of fact, in the 19th and 20th centuries, there were three types of educational institutions. These were madrasahs,

Western schools, and foreign schools. These systems were in opposition to each other on many points. Therefore, this situation became a necessity to be changed for the state to be established later.

In 1923, the Ottoman Empire was completely destroyed, and a new state was established. The system of the newly established state was also completely different. With the establishment of the Republic, a brand-new era began in the field of education with the Law of Unification of Education (Unity of Education Law) enacted on 3 March 1924. Although this law contained some articles on both formal and non-formal religious education, the implementation took a completely different direction. In the context of religion-state relations, an anti-religious “confrontational secularism” began to be used instead of passive or conciliatory secularism (Stepan, 2013). At this point, it is important to focus on the Single Party period between 1923 and 1950.

With the second law enacted on the day of the abolition of the Caliphate on 3 March 1924, the Ministry of Foundations and Religious Affairs and the Ministry of General Staff were also abolished. Religious Affairs Presidency (DIB) was established instead of the Ministry of Foundations and Sharia (Lewis, 2008, p. 557). DIB was the most important institution related to controlling religious affairs in terms of education, law, and state relations during the Republican period (Berkes, 2009, p. 535). As we have mentioned before, the third law enacted on the day the Caliphate was abolished was the Unification Law, which unified all the educational institutions. By law, all madrasas and schools were to be supervised to the Ministry of Education. Based on this law, madrasas were also closed (Jaschke, 1972, s. 74). The main purpose of enacting the Unification of Education Law was to bind all educational institutions to the Ministry of National Education and to end the two different types of education that has been going on since Tanzimat by closing madrasas.

The problem of unifying national education was addressed in the election campaign of 1923. Madrasas were abolished with the unification of education. Instead, Secondary religious schools were opened by the same ministry and the Faculty of Theology at Istanbul University. After the provision that “the state has a religion” was removed from the Constitution in 1928 and caused to remove compulsory religious education lessons from school programs, in 1930 it was implemented in city schools and in 1933 in village schools. In 1933, the articles in the Organization and Duties Law

of the Ministry of National Education regarding religious education in schools were removed. In 1928, Arabic and Persian courses were abolished, and the teaching of these languages were transformed into teaching at the university level as scientific research tools (Berkes, 2012, p. 536). In the first years of the Republic, modernization was regarded as the main goal. At this point, all innovations in the fields of education, political institutions, and law were put into practice.

The changes made in the following periods were related to the schools under the name of “Mekteb-i İbtidailer” during the Ottoman Empire period. These schools were accepted as primary schools and the duration of education were reduced from six to five years. Although the courses such as the Holy Quran, Religion, and Morality in the programs of these schools were included in the beginning, they were gradually removed from the program until 1931. In 1931, religious teaching was completely removed from the curriculum of primary schools. This process in primary schools progressed faster at the level of secondary schools, and the religion courses included in the program were completely removed from the secondary school curriculum with a change in 1927 (Cebeci, 2005, p. 148). In high school programs, on the other hand, religion lessons could not find a place after Unification. Religion lessons, removed from the curriculum of high schools in 1924, from the secondary schools in 1927, from primary schools and teacher schools in 1931, were given in Village Primary Schools until 1939, and after this date, they were also removed from the program in Village Primary Schools (Öcal, 44, 1998, p. 244) (Gündüz, 1998, p. 544). In this period, the founders of the Republic attempted to remove religion from social life as much as possible and tried to shape people’s conscience.

Since the secular-oriented methods of the Single Party Period aimed at shaping the “reform in religious culture”, a political mind that identifies secularism with modernity and a sphere of power, it has been evaluated as a stance towards traditional religious culture. This perception led to the realization of the struggle for power over cultural codes and lifestyles and to identity-based social alienation (Göle, 2000, p. 66-90). While this perception of secularism is directed towards the discursive side, two elements are emphasized. First of all, it is the statement that secularism should not be perceived as atheism. The other is the statement that secularism protects freedom of religion and conscience. At this stage, the same ideas are constantly kept on the agenda

in order to reduce any opposition to reforms. Moreover, it should not be ignored that they are portrayed as the rules of religion (Subaşı, 2005, p. 44-54). For the staff of the newly established government, strengthening the power of the state was the primary goal. Indeed, the reason for the existence of this staff was this state. Sects were a great threat to this power. At this point, state control gained great importance (Koştas, 1985, p. 344). In addition, the revolutionary staff of the Republic was using the community centres as an important instrument to spread their revolutions to society. Thus, community centres were the leading institutions that played an important role in the establishment of the new ideology and the acceptance of the reforms by the society.

Even though the Republican era modernization movements were based on the rejection of the Ottoman legacy by the new ideals, they are actually a continuation of the Ottoman Modernization. It is seen that the foundations of many institutions that took root in the Republic Period were laid in the Ottoman Period. At this point, it would not be wrong to say that the Republican era modernization is the reorganization of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire by adapting it to the period. However, according to Mardin, difference “is not the radicalization of the original founders of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic border between the Republic of Turkey alone but attitudes revealed in full conceptualized as a nation-state of the Republic of Turkey” (Mardin, 2000, p. 65). Especially in the Republican Period, westernization is no longer a means but an end. It is seen that the Kemalist elite was quite radical in spreading the Enlightenment project to all areas of social life. According to Mustafa Kemal, modernization must be a total change that includes the social order, perception of the world, and the modernization of all material and spiritual elements (Mahcupyan, 2008, p. 46).

Various political reforms such as the declaration of the Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate and the Sultanate were basically realized with positivist understandings. In this period, the state emphasized that by placing itself above the society, it could determine what is good and more correct. Society, on the other hand, had to comply. During the transition to the nation state, state legitimacy became non-religious with political reforms. At this point, especially with the abolition of the Sultanate, the period of personal sovereignty in both discourse and structural sense has ended and the period of national sovereignty has started. In addition, with the abolition of the Caliphate,

religion was tried to be turned out of the state and made a matter of conscience. Turkey severed its ties with Eastern values and has declared itself as a Western country. With the regulations made in the social field, a Western type of society was aimed to be generated. First of all, the Caliphate was abolished, secularism, the unification of education, the closure of the tekkes, adoption of the Civil Law, the transition from the Arabic alphabet to the Latin alphabet, the hat revolution and a series of revolutionary changes were adopted. In the following period, despite the occasional softening in the authoritarian principle of secularism, discussions on the implementation of the principle of secularism were not lacking. After the proclamation of the Republic, the secular perspective, which emerged as the modernization of the West as an example and limited the functional structure of religion to private life, brought some popular ideas to the agenda as well as dictative measures. Newspapers, magazines, and textbooks emphasized the separation of religious affairs and world affairs, and this transition was also supported by the hadiths of the prophet. The state approached ceremonies and religious holidays with this perception. The Diyanet (the religious regulatory department of the state) and some clergymen have also regarded such changes as appropriate (Kara, 2012, p. 70-77). These methods both aimed to prevent the reaction of the society and tried to impose revolutions on the society. Turkey had several discussions about life styles, and the transition to a multiparty system. In this context, Kongar emphasizes three main factors as the reason for the transition to democratization, which he claims arises from the nature of Kemalist ideology. Accordingly, the first factor is the influence of the Western world. West forced Turkey to accept democratization. The collapse of oppressive regimes is also effectively related to this. The second is the reaction of the people to the one-party regime rule. Thirdly, the result of status quo practices and war economy up to that time is the emergence of a capitalist class (Kongar, 1995, p. 158). It is possible to say that besides these internal reasons, external reasons outweigh these. Indeed, the threat of Soviet Russia was highly important in that era. The effects of World War II and its consequences were significant, too. After the World War II forced global actors to be on the stage, the Republic of Turkey have not looked too hot to state governed by one-party rule to multiparty realization. In this process, with the victory of the countries described as the democratic front in the World War II, the regimes governed by authoritarian one-party systems lost their value. To adapt to the new world

order established after the war, and be a founding member of the United Nations, to receive military and economic aid from the West and in order to stand against the Soviet threat against her, Turkey was seen closer to the West. All these external factors abandoned the authoritarian single-party administration in Turkey, and it can be said that the need for the transition to democratization increased.

Religion lessons started to take place in the 3rd-grade programs of secondary schools in 1976 (Öcal, 44, 1998, p. 262). Religion courses, which were removed from the high school program after the announcement of the Unification of Education, was added to the curriculum in 1967 (Gündüz, 1998, p. 551). This course, to be taught one hour a week in the 1st and 2nd grades of high schools and its equivalent schools, was an elective course, as in primary and secondary schools. In 1976, religion lessons for one hour per week were added to the 3rd-grade programs of high schools. Another important development regarding religious education in this process was the inclusion of the compulsory moral/ethics course in the program. In this context, from the 1974-1975 academic year, one hour of compulsory religion lessons was started to be taught per week from the 4th grade to the 2nd grade of high schools (Öcal, 44, 1998, p. 110). This course was included in the 3rd-grade programs of high schools in the 1976-1977 academic year, thus, besides the elective religion course, which was studied for 8 years, the religion course, which was compulsory for 8 years, was added (Öcal, 44, 1998, p. 263). After the religious education policies were briefly put into the program until the end of the 1970s, the "apolitical era" in the 1980s will be mentioned.

As in every stage of history, political developments in the post-1980 period have affected religious education. According to Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution, which was prepared after the military coup of September 12, 1980, "Education and teaching of religion and morality are carried out under the supervision and control of the state. Religion and ethics are among the compulsory courses taught in primary and secondary schools." Such expressions making religion course compulsory were included (Öcal, 2011, p. 411). According to this, the elective Religion and Morality course, which was taught from the 4th grade to the 3rd grade in primary schools, was transformed into a single course under the name of "Religion and Moral Knowledge" and added to the curriculum (Gündüz, 1998, p. 111). Students who certified their non-Muslim status in 1990 were granted exemption from this course, which started to be taught in the 1982-

1983 academic year (Meydan, 2013, p. 221). One of the goals of those who carried out the 1980 coup was to make the people who were politicized by the 1960 constitution passive and apolitical. Indeed, it was dangerous for people to become so politicized for political stability. After the military coup d'etat, all political parties were closed, youth organizations were banned, all meetings and seminars of professional organizations and trade unions were banned, newspaper publications and all kinds of left-wing publications were suspended and banned, and all kinds of activities were suppressed for two years. The reasons all mentioned can be considered as evidence of the efforts to make the people apolitical.

The 1982 Constitution also paved the way for the development of conservative thinking. It is possible to say that the principles of strong government, social authoritarianism, disciplined society, hierarchy, and nationalism, which were the basic elements of neoconservative thought, prevailed on September 12 and later. The fact that religion courses were made compulsory in primary and secondary education, and the elected right-wing party came to power despite the coup plotters show that this period embraced neo-conservative thinking (Köse, 2010, p. 66). As a matter of fact, while individuals were acting freely in the economic field in this period, they were subjected to many restrictions in areas such as political activities.

Looking at 1982, 1988, and 1992 Basic Education religion and ethics programs, it can be said that an Islam-centred religious education approach was adopted. On the other hand, explaining the course subjects in relation to Kemalism, adding topics related to secularism to the curriculum, and including subjects for national unity and solidarity in order to keep national feelings alive shows that the official ideology was clearly reflected in the religion course programs (Altaş, 2002, p. 164). In addition, these programs aimed to gain tolerance towards other religions by including different religious beliefs and thoughts.

From the Edict of Tanzimat announced in the 19th century until the 2000s, religious education policies were briefly mentioned. There is no doubt that the Ottoman Empire, which was governed by religious rules until the second half of the 19th century, was a religious state. There was a semi-religious state from the Tanzimat Edict until 1924. Indeed, the institutions that existed in the Ottoman Empire were no longer able to fully respond to the needs of the state and the age, and they needed updating. With the

reforms made at this point, the state tried to keep up with the times and became a semi-religious state. However, after 1924, a white page was opened and everything that had been done in the past changed. This was sometimes done as an update, and sometimes with radical changes. However, the existence of religion was never denied, but it always continued to be the source of problems with the existence of secularism. As a matter of fact, ruling the people of a state, 90% of whom were Muslims, with secularism, fossilized the problems. Especially after the establishment of the Republic Regime, the administrative power eliminated the duality in every sense and tried to spread these revolutions to a wide area in the public sector, especially with devices such as community centres. After the Republican Period, religion began to be suppressed first, then felt partially and finally used as an apparatus of the state because the ideology of the state was tried to be adopted by the public through religious courses. Especially when the contents of the religion and ethics course in the 2000s are examined, the aim can be understood more clearly. This course included general information about religion, worshipping and principles of belief in Islam, prayers and suras read in prayers, the life and ethnical behaviours of Hz. Muhammed, love for the country and the nation, national and religious holidays, religion, reason and science, information about the four holy books, universal advice within the scope of the major religions living today, respect for the beliefs of others, Christmas and New Year, reincarnation, and differences in religion. It covered subjects such as sects, general information about communities, secularism, religion, and freedom of conscience (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 2000). All of these summarize the essence of the individual the state wanted to create. It is especially important to say that the understanding of Republican education was reflected in the contents of religious lessons as nationality, secularism, and scientific. After briefly examining religious education from the Ottoman period to the 2000s, the AK Party period, the central subject of this dissertation, will be examined.

2.2. AK Party Period Religious Education Policies

Religious education was tried to be subjected to a lot of pressure, especially during the single-party period. Especially in this period, the founders of the Republic were clearly determined to monopolize religion by the state. They tried to do this by

highlighting secularism. However, trying to control a state, 90% of which is comprised of Muslims, with confrontational secularism practices (Stepan, 2013) brought problems. In this part of our study, the AK Party's religious education policies will be discussed in detail. Comparing with previous practices, especially the AK Party's religious education policies will be addressed.

2.2.1. AK Party Period Religious Education Policies

In 2002, when the AK Party came to power and a new era in the context of the relationship of religion and politics with religion and religious regime started. The AK Party government has followed a more moderate policy compared to previous governments. However, it has experienced some changes in its politics from time to time. In this part of our study, religious education policies will be discussed. As a matter of fact, as we argued at the beginning of our study, states direct the societies they want to shape with educational policies. At this point, we will try to explain more clearly how to create a society in the desired direction with the policies implemented. Especially the AK Party's discourse through which it desires to raise a devout generation shows the existence of a society that is tried to be created by the state.

In this part of our study, the AK Party's religious education policies will be defined under certain headings and explained in detail. The policies that will be described under the heading of religious education in primary and secondary education, Secondary religious schools, Educational Institutions, and Religious Affairs will also detail subjects such as 4 + 4 + 4 and Koran courses. In this context, the legacy of the AK Party will be briefly emphasized, and then comparisons will be made with figures and tables between the past and the present.

2.2.1.1. Religious Education in Primary and Secondary Education

The debate about education has never finished in the new established Republic of Turkey. The issue of where religion should stand at the state, society, among individuals has always been discussed. In this context, sometimes religious lessons were not included, sometimes they became elective, and sometimes it was made compulsory. Now, this process will be explained from the foundation of the Republic to the present day.

In the first years of the Republic, religion lessons were included in the primary school curriculums under the name of “Koran and Religion Lessons” for two hours in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th grades. In high school programs, one hour per week of religion lessons under the name of “Religious Studies” was included in the 1st and 2nd grades. Religion lessons in city Primary Schools took place for one hour in 3rd, 4th, and 5th grades since the academic year 1927-1928. In 1929, it was also an hour in the same classes, but it was decided not to have an exam. By 1930, it was foreseen that the Religious Studies course in elementary schools would be taught for half an hour in the afternoon on Thursdays to students who desire. In village primary schools, religious studies lessons continued in the 3rd grade as half an hour on Thursdays until 1939. Religious studies in secondary schools were excluded from the curriculum in 1927, long before that date. Thus, religious education did not take place in any level of education from 1933 (except village schools until 1939) until 1949 (Ayhan, 1999, p. 118-125) (Doğan ve Tosun, 2003, p. 2).

In 1948, an optional extra-curricular “Religious Studies” course was added to the 4th and 5th grades of primary schools and it began in 1949. Religion lessons, which were given optionally to the 1st and 2nd grades of secondary schools in 1956, have been included in the 1st and 2nd grades of high schools as an optional course out of the curriculum since 1967-1968. It was popularized in the third grade of secondary schools and the third grade of high schools in 1976-1977. In addition to the elective religion courses since 1949, the compulsory moral course were taught in the 4th and 5th grades between 1974-1975. This course was combined with religion lessons in 1982 (Doğan, 2003, p. 611-630) (Ayhan, 1999, p. 206-257).

Before 1982, practices of religion lessons were conducted in a rather inadequate and unhealthy way. It almost brought society to the point of segregation. While some educators paid attention to the optional religious lessons, some educators overlooked the importance of lessons. Besides, the hours of lessons changed in schedules that students would not be interested. Pre-1982 can be accepted as an extremely unsuccessful and insufficient period in religious education. However, 1982 was a turning point, the compulsory religion lessons opened the doors for a new beginning.

After the 1980 military coup, religious education was made compulsory in the 1982 constitution. The Ministry of National Education decided in 1982 to combine the

“Religious Studies” course, which was optional before 1980, and the “Morality” course, which was mandatory, should be taught at the level of primary education and secondary education under the name of “Religion and Moral Knowledge” (MEB, 1982, p. 37). With the 24th article of the new constitution amended in 1982, it was stipulated that religious education should be compulsory (Altaş, 2002, p. 146). Thus, the optional religion course, which was given until 1982, became compulsory.

Religion and Morality Lesson was obligatory to be “compulsory to be taught” twice a week in the 4th and 5th grades of primary schools and every 3 grades of secondary schools, and 1 hour in every 3 classes of high schools and vocational high schools (Akyüz, 1999, p. 306). Primary Education Religion and Moral Knowledge course contents, principles of Islamic belief and worship in the 4th and 5th grades, the life and morals of the Prophet, Atatürk’s views on religion and secularism, love of the country, and some moral issues were included (MEB, 1982, p. 156-157). Although the content of the 4th and 5th grades largely overlapped with the contents of the previous programs, the most important difference of this program was that it included subjects related to Kemalism. As a general framework in the content of the 6th, 7th and 8th grades, general information about religions, principles of Islamic belief and worship, Turks, and Islam (7th and 8th grade), secularism and Islam (6th and 7th grade), ceremonies and traditions, religious days and months, homeland and nation love, some etiquette, and some moral issues were included (MEB, 1982, p. 157-160). According to Altaş, this situation shows that the general goals of national education have begun to be necessary in the content of religious education (2002, p. 155). The general aims and principles of the 1982 Secondary Education (High School) religion and moral knowledge program were similar to the aims and principles in primary education. Providing information about religion and religions, in general, was added only in the high school program. Religion, religions and their characteristics (1st grade of high school), religion, morality, customs, Islam as a universal religion, our duties towards the state, national unity and solidarity as a general framework in the course contents of High School 1, 2 and 3, religions in the world and the religion of Islam (High School 3rd grade), Turkish-Islamic culture and civilization, Atatürk and our religion were included (MEB, 1982, p. 160-161). It is seen that especially the state ideology is reflected in the course contents.

There was not a big difference between the 1982 High School Religion and Morality curriculum and the 1992 High School Religion and Morality curriculum. In the 1992 high school program, very little space was allocated to prayers with the principles of Islamic belief, especially social and moral issues that came to the fore. In 1988, an important change was made in terms of religious education. In the preparation of the program, taking into account that students from different religions could be found in the classrooms, information about Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and other religions were included to support national culture. It was stated that this information would expand the world of belief and culture of students and enabled them to behave more tolerant and understanding towards members of other religions (MEB, 1989, p. 625). At this point, it was important not to force students from different religions to be taught and practised in Islamic religious beliefs and practices. Besides, these students had the right to be exempted from these courses, by certifying that they belonged to different religions.

The inclusion of issues of “Threat: the duties of individuals in the fight against anarchy and terrorism, being loyal to the Turkish state, society and Turkish national values and culture, being full of love for homeland and flag” in the 1988 program (MEB, 1989, p. 633) is important in terms of showing the reflection of the political and social conjuncture of the period in the programs.

In the compulsory religion lessons put into effect after 1982, it is seen that a religious understanding centred on Islam religion was adopted. But these lessons to protect the rights of persons belonging to other religions was not mandatory for these people. However, especially in this period, when the content of religion lessons is examined, it is seen that the subjects were explained with the concept of Kemalism, the reflection of secularism, national unity and solidarity, and especially the national feelings and spirit were constantly tried to be brought to the fore. This approach is an indication that the official ideology was tried to be accepted by society through religious lessons. However, with the fact that the principle of secularism was still incompatible with religious education, these lessons were constantly criticized and there were debates over the issue of problems related to the non-Muslim individuals. However, despite these, the contribution of the post-1982 era to the religious education cannot be underestimated.

In particular, the most important feature of the programs that started to be implemented in 2000 is the implementation of recommendations in the scientific studies on religious education (Altaş, 2002, p. 164). This curriculum offered a rather new and more comprehensive perspective compared to the previous ones in terms of curriculum development processes. In particular, the scope targeted in these lessons was expanded. Many individual, social, universal, cultural and moral goals have been set (Zengin M., 2017, p. 130). Again, the religion course applied in this year was not separated from the programs applied in 1982 and after. It is noteworthy that more space was allocated to other religions and religious understanding. National, secular, and scientific approaches maintained their persistence in this period as well (Yürük, 2011, p. 131). It is striking that many innovative steps were taken in this period, provided that the basic dynamics remained the same.

Approximately five years later, in 2005, the religious education curriculum continued to be comprehensive and systematic in terms of program development processes. In addition to other programs, the aim was to raise individuals who were modern, who incorporated Atatürk's principles and reforms, attached importance to democratic principles, sensitive to human rights and the environment, interprets information according to his experiences and deals with social and cultural context, understanding towards all religions, adopts national, moral, human and cultural values, and know his responsibilities and rights. It was envisaged to raise individuals who were aware of their responsibilities and rights, and it was emphasized that freedom of religion and conscience was always taken into consideration in the execution of the program with the principle of secularism (MEB, 2005, p. 11). First of all, in the 2005 Secondary Education DKAB program, it was stated what kind of approach the program had in terms of education and religion. Therefore, the educationally constructivist approach, multiple intelligences theory, and student-centred learning approaches were taken into consideration. In the context of religion, scientific and research-based information about both Islam and other religions has been brought to the fore, and erroneous information regarding superstition has been tried to be revealed (MEB, 2005, p. 12-13). Considering the main objectives of the secondary education DKAB program, following the basic approaches seen, recognizing the principles of belief, worship, and morality of Islam, displaying a rational and critical approach in matters related to religion and morality,

distinguishing between correct religious knowledge and superstitions, awareness of contributions, understanding the relationship between secularism and freedom of religion and conscience, living together and assimilating the culture of tolerance, and recognizing other religions with their basic characteristics are remarkable (MEB, 2005, p. 12-13). Within the scope of this learning area, the Alevism issue, which caused an important discussion in religion lessons, was added to the programs. A moderate policy towards Alevi communities was followed in this period. In the field of learning morals and values, there were issues such as rights, freedom and religion, and Islam and peace, values, and family. In the field of religion and secularism, the issue of secularism and religion and Atatürk's ideas on religion took place as a unit at all classes. In the field of learning religion, culture, and civilization, issues such as the contributions of Turks to Islamic civilization and eminent figures, Islam and science, Islam and aesthetics, current world religions and their characteristics were examined (MEB, 2005, p. 74-80). During this period, expanding the course contents was significant to mention. Also, the official ideology of the state was tried to be reflected in the lessons at every opportunity.

In 2010, the Secondary Education DKAB program was similar to the previous semester programs. The program was similar in almost all respects except for a few minor differences. However, as a result of the objection of Alevi citizens to the court regarding the content of the DKAB course, some regulations were made in the content. In this framework, the 12th grade "Sufi Comments in Islamic Thought" unit was expanded, and more subjects related to Alevism were included (MEB, 2010, p. 64). One of the important changes in the 2006 program is seen in the unit names. Naming such as "I believe in God" in the 2000 program was changed to "Belief in God" in the 2006 program (MEB, 2006). Some regulations were made in line with the objections of some citizens with Alevi religious understanding in 2010 Primary Education DKAB Curriculum. In this context, the content of Alevism was expanded, and various readings were included (MEB, 2010). In the following years, religious education was tried to be expanded by including elective religion courses in addition to these courses. The aim was to increase the sense of respect to the other religions. Especially in 2012, these elective courses were implemented with the AK Party. Again, in these years, the Quran and The Life of the Prophet courses have been added to the curriculum as elective courses. With a decision made in 2017, the DKAB lessons, which were taught one hour

a week, have been increased to two hours. Finally, there is another important issue in terms of increasing the importance of these lessons. At this point, the importance of the DKAB lessons in OKS (secondary education proficiency exam), TEOG (transition to basic education), YGS (Transition to Higher Education Exam), and LYS (Undergraduate Placement Exam) exams have been increased. It is of great importance for students to learn and give importance to these lessons

To give an example to one of these exams, five different transitions to secondary education examination system were implemented in Turkey since 1998. These are the High School Entrance Exam (LGS (High School Transition System), 1998-2004), Secondary Education Institutions Selection and Placement Exam (OKS, 2005-2008), the triple Placement Exam (SBS) applied in 6th, 7th and 8th grades and the SBS (Placement Test) exam (2009-2013) and, most recently, the TEOG exam administered since 2013-2014 academic year.

With the TEOG, the DKAB lesson was included as a separate course like other lessons and as separate questions in the tests. The number of lessons and questions according to the exams are given in the following Table.

Table 1: Number of Courses and Questions According to

Lessons and Exams	Turkish	Maths	Science*	Social studies**	Foreign language	Religion and Ethics
LGS	25 Questions	25 Questions	25 Questions	25 Questions	-	Social studies 4 in test question
OKS	25 Questions	25 Questions	25 Questions	25 Questions	-	Social studies 4 in test question
Triple SBS	6. Class: 19 Questions 7. Class: 21 Questions 8. Class: 23 Questions	6. Class: 16 Questions 7. Class: 18 Questions 8. Class: 20 Questions	6. Class: 16 Questions 7. Class: 18 Questions 8. Class: 20 Questions	6. Class: 16 Questions 7. Class: 18 Questions 8. Class: 20 Questions	6. Class: 13 Questions 7. Class: 15 Questions 8. Class: 17 Questions	Social studies in the classroom 6. Class: 3 Questions 7. Class: 3 Questions 8. Class: 4 Questions
SBS	23 Questions	20 Questions	20 Questions	20 Questions	17 Questions	Social studies 4 in test question
TEOG	20 Questions	20 Questions	20 Questions	20 Questions	20 Questions	20 Questions

* In SBS and TEOG Exams, the name of the course is mentioned as Science and Technology.

** The name of the course in the TEOG exam is Turkish Republic History of Revolution and Kemalism (Zengin, 2017, p. 24).

2.2.1.2. Secondary Religious Schools

It is thought that Ottoman Empire experienced a political, social, and economic regression in the face of the West, and lagged behind the modern age in the field of education in the last century. To eliminate this decline, many reforms were carried out in the field of education. However, as the reforms realised in the Ottoman state are deemed to be insufficient, these institutions will be abolished. Besides, with these reforms, the Ottomans presented science, humanities, and religious sciences under one roof. However, as the principle of secularism in the newly established state stood against this duality, all these institutions were to be abolished.

Secondary religious schools are one of the most important institutions of Turkish education history. These schools are based on the Unification Law with the term of Imam and Hatip. However, these schools are based on the pre-Republic period. These schools were accepted as the continuation of the institutions that started operating under the name of “Medresetül-Eimme-ve’l Huteba” to train imams, preachers, and muezzins in the II. Constitutional Period (Öcal, 2013, p. 66-67). Besides, there were madrasahs, dervish lodges, Enderun schools, mosques, and primary schools where religious education was given during this period. There were even juniors and sultans who had religious lessons (Dinçer, 1998, p. 29). The origins of secondary religious schools, which were considered as a model school in the Republic Period, dates back to the Reform Edict period (Bozan, 2007, p. 11). Especially in the last period of the Ottoman Empire, it was possible to come across with the examples of secondary religious schools. However, even though it is claimed that all the institutions of the Ottoman State were abolished, the link between the old and the new era has never been completely broken.

The Republic Period was the beginning of a history that would ensure the change of society in every aspect and create a new structure (Berkes, 2012, p. 33). Although there was a break between the social structure desired to be created with the proclamation of the Republic and the past belonging to the Ottoman Period (Çağlar, 2013, p. 82), there are overlapping aspects between the II. Constitutional Era and the

religious education system established with the new Republic (Zengin, 2002, p. 13). Educational institutions were gathered under a single roof under the Unification Law enacted after the proclamation of the Republic. Moreover, by this law, it was decided to establish secondary religious schools.

Secondary religious schools underwent many changes over time after they started to be established. The first secondary religious schools, which were opened as 29 schools in 1923-1924, were closed at the end of 1927, except the schools in Istanbul and Kütahya, and their number dropped to 2 (Dinçer, 1998, p. 57). The last two schools did not admit students since the 1929-1930 academic year and were closed in 1932, when they their last graduates left school (Dinçer, 1998, p. 57). They were closed because of the lack of demand (Ayhan, 2014, p. 55). Since secondary religious schools were opened only at the secondary school level and not at the high school level, the graduates were not provided with tertiary education opportunities, their graduates were not promised a future, they were not given allowance under the name of austerity measures, and the religious duty was excluded from the scope of civil service, which caused the distrust of the public towards these schools (Ünsür, 2005, p. 142). When all these reasons are taken into consideration, it is seen that students were deliberately led to reduce their interest. Later, the need for religious education started to be felt. However, in 1948, not a school to train imams and preachers, but ten-month Imam-Hatip courses were opened (Dinçer, 1998, p. 80-81). These courses were activated in 10 different provinces starting from 1949 (Toprak, 2013, p. 787).

After Democratic Party (DP) came to power, they decided to open secondary religious schools. In 1951, 7 secondary religious schools were opened for the first time in Ankara, Istanbul, Adana, Isparta, Kayseri, Konya, and Kahramanmaraş (Hayıt, 1993, p. 117). Then, during the DP period, 12 more schools were opened, and the number of schools reached 19 until 1960. Schools continued to be opened during the government established after the 1960 military intervention. During the AP governments that came to power after the 1965 elections, the number of secondary religious schools increased to 72 (Öcal, 1998, p. 247). During the CHP-MSP coalition government, 29 secondary religious schools were opened, and then, during the coalition governments established under the Prime Ministry of Süleyman Demirel (until 1980), a total of 272 more schools

started education. By the coup d'etat on September 12, 1980, the number of schools had reached up to 374.

After the coup on September 12, the opening of new IHLs was stopped, but existing schools started to expand sideways by opening branches with the approval of the governor, most of which were turned into individual schools. Until post modern coup on February 28, the current number of secondary religious schools (as of 1998-1999 academic year) reached 464 (Öcal, 1998, p. 247). The increase and decrease in the numbers can be seen in the Table 2. Especially the rapid increase and decrease in some periods draw attention. It is possible to see that these increases and decreases are generally shaped in line with the ideologies of the governments that came to power. While the right-wing parties that came to power tended to increase the number of these schools, the leftist parties did not take a stand in favour of increasing the number of these schools. In some periods, these schools were found unnecessary and deliberate closing policies were followed.

Secondary religious schools have started to rise or fall according to the views of the parties that came to power. In the table below, the number of secondary religious schools opened by governments attracts attention.

In the first years of their establishment, secondary religious schools attracted great attention from the public, which were built by the voluntary contributions of people and donation to the MEB for public service. Conservative citizens were willing to send their children to secondary religious schools, especially when they were first opened, and with the direction of girls to these secondary religious schools, they sent their children to these schools (Öcal, 1998, p. 249). In particular, the availability of free accommodation in these schools' premises has been effective in the choice of the prospective parents. In addition to other courses, vocational religion courses also became a preference for some families (Bozan, 2007, p. 25). In 1955, when the secondary schools had their first graduates, a three-year high school was opened, and thus, a total of seven-year (4 + 3 Secondary religious schools were established (Öcal, 1998, p. 110). First, a total of 7 schools were opened in Adana, Ankara, Isparta, Istanbul, Kayseri, Konya, and Kahramanmaraş (Dinçer, 1998, p. 97). The curricula of these schools included religious/vocational courses, as well as regular courses in science and social fields. The programs were designed as an average of 40% of religious

vocational courses and 60% as regular syllabus and science courses and were implemented for about 20 years in the 1951-1971 period. Secondary religious schools, which were opened as 7 schools in the academic year of 1951-1952, reached up to 72 schools until 1970 due to the public interest (Öcal, 1998, p. 139). During the period of the interim government established after the military memorandum on 12 March 1971, the first period of four years, namely the middle part of secondary religious schools, was closed. Besides, in the Administrative Regulations of Secondary Religious Schools published on May 22, 1972, female students were prevented from enrolling in these schools by the regulation dictating the enrolment of boys as the student admission requirements of these schools (Ayhan, 2014, p. 192). One of the most important developments regarding secondary religious schools took place in 1973. At this time, these schools were transformed into secondary religious schools. In 1974, it was decided to add the Quran, Arabic, and Religion courses to the secondary school period of these religious schools instead of elective courses. Thus, it was ensured that the secondary schools of the IHLs were opened, albeit partially (Aşlamacı, 2017, p. 57). In the 1970s, this led to a rapid increase in the number of schools and the number of schools reached 374 by 1980. (Ayhan, 2014, p. 304).

Until the 1980 period, religious education was very problematic. However, positive progress started to occur after this period. Making religious education compulsory especially in this period is seen as an important development. After religious education was constitutionally guaranteed, many debates were thus closed.

The martial law that was enacted after the military coup dated on 12 September 1980 put a limit on the number of secondary religious schools. Since 41 of the existing 374 schools had students at the secondary school level, these schools were converted into normal secondary schools, and the number of secondary religious schools was limited to 333 (Öcal, 1994, p. 115-117). During this period, it was tried to expand these schools by opening branches in many of the existing schools. With the opening of IHLs as independent schools in the 1990s, the number of schools went up to 604 in 1997 (Öcal, 2011, p. 275-276). During this period, the existing schools were aimed to be expanded by opening new branches. With the opening of IHLs as independent schools in the 1990s, the number of schools increased again until 1997 and reached 604 (Göle, 2011, p. 88). However, this rise soon brought along the period called February 28 and a

totally-new and drastic period began for secondary religious schools. The existing rise left its place to the declining process.

The IHLs, which showed a significant increase in the number of schools and students until 1997, faced a breakthrough period in 1997. A change in primary and secondary schools were held in the elementary schools after the education amendment as of August 16, 1997, and during the period called the February 28 period in Turkey, secondary schools were combined with primary schools and the 8-year compulsory education was adopted (İlköğretim ve Eğitim Kanunu, 1997). Especially with the decisions taken in this process, religious education was tried to be prevented. Especially in this period, religious education was seen as a reactionary activity. This became a major obstacle to the development of schools. With this arrangement, the secondary school parts of religious schools were closed. In this process, with the “coefficient decision” taken by the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) on July 30, 1998, regarding the university entrance system, it was made almost impossible for IHL graduates to enter any department other than theology faculties at universities. Closing the middle parts of IHLs and imposing restrictions on admission to the university were effective in the decrease in the number of students in these schools (Öcal, 2013, p. 295). Continuous compulsory education was determined to last 8 years to cover the middle parts of secondary religious schools and prevent the rise (Aşlamacı, 2014, p. 36). As a result, just as in the past, the policy of indifference to the consciousness was followed. In this period, students were deliberately removed from their different options and left only the option of going to the theology faculties. This change naturally discouraged students from choosing these vocational high schools. In particular, 8-year compulsory education and the ban on not choosing outside their relevant vocational religious field of study blocked the way for secondary religious schools. However, they were not satisfied with these, and the coefficient calculation system in the university entrance exams started in 1998, causing these students to lose points when they attempted to choose other departments apart from divinity faculties. High school secondary education entrance cumulative scores were multiplied by 0.5 while calculating the scores of vocational high schools were multiplied by 0.2. With this method, an average of 30 points difference occurred between vocational high schools and other regular high schools. With this exactly targeted difference, secondary religious schools were blocked. Students who

graduated from these high schools were made unable to choose the departments they wished to study, even if they answered almost all of the questions correctly. In the following periods, this difference of 30 points increased. As a result, the number of students in these schools decreased considerably. However, after all these developments, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) became the sole ruling party in the parliament with a 34.28% vote and 363 deputies (YSK, 2002) in the 3 November 2002 General Elections. Particularly, the AK Party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and many of its founding members graduated from secondary religious schools, which gave hope to those who expected a solution to this matter.

With the protocol signed between the Ministry of National Education in 2004 (Ministry of Education) and TDV (Religious Foundation of Turkey), the “International Anatolian Imam and Hatip School” model was developed with the inclusion of the secondary school students coming from the Turkish Republics. With this aim, the International Anatolian Secondary religious schools continue to provide education to the pupils in 13 schools in different provinces of Turkey since 2006 (Bahçekapılı, 2012, p. 140). In addition to all these developments, the biggest development was tried to be implemented in 2012 with the 4 + 4 + 4 system.

In particular, 8-year continuous compulsory education, which was introduced in 1997, was replaced by 12-year compulsory gradual education in 2012. These 12 years have been started to be given in 3 stages of 4 years. The first level is a 4-year primary school, the second level is a 4-year secondary school, and the third level is a 4-year high school (Örs, 2013, p. 131).

In this context, the middle parts of IHLs, which were closed in 1997 with an uninterrupted 8-year compulsory education practice, were reopened. Besides, university entrance and placement procedures were rearranged, allowing IHL graduates to enter all departments of universities without any obstacles. Also, changes were made in the coefficient calculation practice for the entrance exams that was an obstacle to IHL during the AK Party period. The coefficient calculation difference was considerably reduced. This difference was removed completely in the following periods. Especially after this period, the number of schools and students started to increase. The table 2 gives the number of secondary religious schools opened during the governments.

Table 2: Distribution of IHO Opened by Heads of Governments

Years	Politicians opening secondary religious schools	Number
1951-59	Menderes, Adnan	19
1962-63	İnönü, İsmet	7
1965-71	Demirel, Süleyman	46
1974-75	Ecevit, Bülent	29
1975-78	Demirel, Süleyman	233
1978-79	Ecevit, Bülent	4
1979-80	Demirel, Süleyman	36
1984-89	Özal, Turgut	90
1990-92	Yılmaz, Mesut	23
1992-94	Demirel, Süleyman	12
1994-95	Çiller, Tansu	13
1995-97	Diğer hükümetler	97
1997-99	Yılmaz, Mesut	11
1999-02	Ecevit, Bülent.	154
2002-18	Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip	4000

(Yavuz, 1998), (MEB, 2012-2013) (MEB , 2020)

After explaining the secondary religious schools in detail, the situation will be summarized briefly with the table given below. Indeed, opening and closing schools is getting very complicated. While opened quickly in some periods, these schools were tried to be closed quickly in some other periods.

Table 3: The historical adventure of secondary religious schools

1924-1930	CUMHURİYET HALK PARTY (İSMET İNÖNÜ, ALİ FETHİ OKYAR)	Established in 1924 as İmam Hatip Schools in 29 different places. The number of Secondary religious schools decreased to 2 in 1929, and were completely closed in 1930 due to the absence of students.
1949-1950	CUMHURİYET HALK PARTY (ŞEMSETTİN GÜNALTAŞ)	Religious education was given in the Quran courses opened under the Directorate of Religious Affairs between 1930-1948. When it was stated in a report that the Quran courses were insufficient to train "intellectual clergymen", the practice of training religious officials in "secondary religious schools Courses" affiliated to the Ministry of National Education began in 1949.
1950-1960	DEMOKRAT PARTY (ADNAN MENDERES)	The Democrat Party, which came to power after the 1950 elections, opened Secondary religious schools (IHO) in the first year of its rule. Secondary religious schools, the first period of which is 4 years, the second period is 3 years, and constituting a whole, was opened in 7 provinces in the period 1951-1952. During the Adnan Menderes period, 19 secondary religious schools were opened.
1962-1963	COALITION GOVERNMENT (İSMET İNÖNÜ)	Free boarding students started to be accepted to secondary religious schools for the first time. During the period when İsmet İnönü was the prime minister again, 7

		secondary religious schools were opened.
1965-1971	ADALET PARTY (SÜLEYMAN DEMİREL)	Between 1970-1971, the number of IHO increased to 72. 46 secondary religious schools were opened when Süleyman Demirel was the head of the government.
1972-1973	PRAYER LEADER AND PREACHER SCHOOLS WERE OPENED	With a regulation published on May 22, 1972, secondary religious schools were turned into a vocational school providing education for 4 years after secondary school and the right to study in all programs of higher education was abolished for those who graduated from high school. In 1973, schools which were known as secondary religious schools, was changed to secondary religious schools (IHL). During this period, IHL graduates were given the right to go to the literary branches of universities without giving prerequisite courses.
1974-1975	COALITION GOVERNMENT (BÜLENT ECEVİT)	During the CHP-Milli Selamet Party government established in 1974, the secondary school of religious schools was opened again. 29 new IHLs were opened, and the number of schools increased to 101.
1975-1978	COALITION GOVERNMENT (SÜLEYMAN DEMİREL)	Female students started to be accepted to IHL with the decision of the Council of State. During the governments in which the National Salvation Party was a coalition member (1975-1978), the number of new IHLs which were opened was 230. During the prime ministry of Süleyman Demirel; In 1975-1976 academic year 70, In 1976-1977 academic year 77, In 1977-1978 academic year 86 secondary religious schools were opened.
1980	1980 MILITARY COUP	After the military coup of September 12, 1980, no new IHL was opened until 1985. With an amendment made by the September 12 administration in Article 32 of the Basic Education Law, IHL graduates have been able to go to all departments of the universities.
1984-1989	ANAVATAN PARTY (TURGUT ÖZAL)	90 Secondary religious schools were opened when Turgut Özal was the prime minister.
1990-1992	ANAVATAN PARTY (MESUT YILMAZ)	23 Secondary religious schools were opened.
1992-1994	COALITION GOVERNMENT (SÜLEYMAN DEMİREL)	13 Secondary religious schools were opened.
1995-1997	COALITION GOVERNMENT (NECMETTİN ERBAKAN)	97 Secondary religious schools were opened. By 1997, while the number of Anatolian secondary religious schools was 7, the number of branches related to them reached 100; In short, the number of Anatolian secondary religious schools reached 107.
1997	28 FEBRUARY POST MODERN COUP	Two implementations during the 28 February period negatively affected secondary religious schools. One of them is the closing of secondary education departments in secondary religious schools as a result of the 8-year continuous education; The other was that the coefficient calculation practice in the university exams prevented graduates from entering the university outside of their field.
1997	THE CLOSURE OF THE SECONDARY SCHOOL PART OF IHLs	The eight-year continuous education law numbered 4306, enacted on August 16, when Mesut Yılmaz was the prime minister. This was a turning point for schools as it caused the closure of the secondary school part of IHLs. With the law, Imam-Hatip High Schools have become 4-

		year high schools.
1998	COEFFICIENT SYSTEM IN ÖSS	When Mesut Yılmaz was the prime minister, the coefficient system was introduced by YÖK and ÖSYM in 1998. This practice prevented secondary religious schools graduates from entering departments other than their own. While Anatolian secondary religious schools managed to place 75 percent of their students in 4-year faculties before the coefficient decision, this rate decreased to 25 percent after the coefficient calculation decision.
2002-2003	AK PARTY (ABDULLAH GÜL)	During the 2002-2003 academic year when Abdullah Gül was the prime minister, the total number of secondary religious schools was 450 and the number of students was 71100.
2003-2007	AK PARTY (RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN)	Between 2003 and 2007, when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the prime minister for the first time, the number of IHL increased from 452 to 455, and the number of students from 90 thousand to 120 thousand, as well.
2007-2011	AK PARTY (RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN)	In 2009, the coefficient application was abolished, but this decision was cancelled by the Council of State. As of 2011, the possibility of secondary religious schools graduates to enter university departments outside their own fields has reappeared. The success of Secondary religious schools graduates in university exams has increased again. As of December 1, 2011, the score advantage system has completely disappeared.
2011-2014	AK PARTY (RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN) (4+4+4 SYSTEM)	In the 2012-2013 academic year, secondary school departments of secondary religious schools were reopened, and 5th grade students started to be enrolled in these schools.
2014-2016	AK PARTY (AHMET DAVUTOĞLU)	During Ahmet Davutoğlu's prime ministry, the total number of secondary religious schools was 1143.

(platform24, 2016)

Table 4: Numbers of secondary religious schools

Period	Number of Students	IHL Numbers	Prime minister	Independent IHS	Number of IHS
2003 -2004	90066	452	Recep T. Erdoğan	-	-
2004 -2005	96851	452	Recep T. Erdoğan	-	-
2005 -2006	108064	453	Recep T. Erdoğan	-	-
2006 -2007	120668	455	Recep T. Erdoğan	-	-
2007-2008	129274	456	Recep T. Erdoğan	-	-
2008-2009	143637	458	Recep T. Erdoğan	-	-
2009-2010	193581	465	Recep T. Erdoğan	-	-
2010-2011	235639	493	Recep T. Erdoğan	-	-

2012-2013	380771	708	Recep T. Erdoğan	730	369
2013-2014	474096	851	Recep T. Erdoğan	746	415
2014-2015	546443	1017	Ahmet Davutoğlu	1219	378
2015-2016	555870	1143	Ahmet Davutoğlu	1622	339

(platform24, 2016)

The number of secondary religious schools, which was 4 thousand 340 in 2017-2018, rose to 5 thousand 138 in 2018-2019. According to the official data, 473 of the 798 new secondary religious schools built in one year were Anatolian İmam Hatip High Schools. Four new schools were added to the number of international Anatolian Secondary religious schools in 2018-2019, which was nine in 2017-2018. In the same period, the number of Anatolian Secondary religious schools, which accepted students with an exam, jumped from 131 to 311. 636 new schools were added to the Secondary religious secondary schools, which were 2,899 in the 2017-2018 period. The 2019-2020 academic year started with 3 thousand 5 hundred secondary religious secondary schools (MEB, 2020).

During the AK Party period, the optional Quran Course and The Life of the Prophet Lesson also came to the fore. Besides, the Basic Religious Studies course in Secondary School has been turned into an elective course with 2 hours a week. This course aimed to teach the religion of Islam correctly and properly in the axis of the Quran and Sunnah, one of the main sources of Islam (Çekin, 2016, p. 63). At this point, the optional courses added to the curriculum are shown in detail in the table below. These added lessons are important in terms of explaining the ideologies of the dominant powers of the period. The added religious lessons contain a more detailed and intensive religious education compared to the previous periods.

Table 5: The Optional Courses Added to The Curriculum

Secondary religious schools		SECONDARY EDUCATION
REQUIRED COURSES	ELECTIVE COURSES	
Arabic (For 9th and 10th grade)	Arabic Text Comparison (11th and 12th grade)	Religion and Ethics
Professional Arabic (For grades 11-12)	Religious Music	Holy Quran (Optional)
Holy Quran	Marbling	The Life of the Prophet (Optional)
AIHL Vocational Courses (General)	Readings of Fiqh	Basic religious knowledge (Elective Islam 1-2)
Akaid	Hadith Texts	Second Foreign Language Arabic
History of Religions	Husn-i Hat	
Canon law	Islamic Ethics	
Hadith	Islamic History	
Oratory and Professional Application	Islamic Science and History of Thought	
Islamic Culture and Civilization	Reading the Quran Techniques	
Kelam	Vocational practice	
Siyer	Tafsir Readings	
Commentary	Tezhib	
Basic religious knowledge	Ethics and Sufi Culture	

(MEB, 2019)

Kolukisa briefly summarized the adventure of secondary religious schools. According to him, the historical adventure of the imam / preachers has been the explanation of the structure between society and the state. The history of a society can only be so intertwined with the history of such a school. The history of the nation can

match the fate of the school to this extent (2015, p. 1). The pressures and disinterested policies experienced until the 1950s were tried to be implemented again in 1997. As a result, we can see how true the adage, "history repeats itself" is when we consider the history of secondary religious schools. Each group that came to power took the exactly opposite decisions of the previous group, which was opposed to it, and implemented opposite policies. However, this contrast has never ended and has been repeated throughout history.

2.2.1.3. Educational Institutions

When the objectives and functions of the Theology Faculties as Educational Institutions institutions are examined, it is observed that they have similarities with the IHOs in many ways. The functions of providing human resources especially for religious services are a common point within the two institutions. When we consider it from this framework, it is possible to say that they have many common points with IHOs.

Turkey, on the higher religious education in the modern university system, from the late Ottoman period is an important experience. The reforms in the field of education that started from the Tanzimat era and the search for a Western-style university gained momentum in the last quarter of the 19th century. In line with these pursuits, it was decided to establish a university named Darülfünun in 1845, but this institution was first opened in 1865. Darülfünun had the adventure of opening and closing three times due to various reasons such as the inadequacy of secondary school graduates and financial support (Furat, 2010, p. 135). During the reign of Abdülhamit II, on September 1, 1900, the university reopened under the name of Darülfünun-ı Şahane for the fourth time, and its branches/faculties were included as Fünun-u Tabiiyye, Ulum-u Hukukiye, Fünun-u Hikemiyye and Edebiye, Fünun-u Riyaziye and Theology (Furat, 2010, p. 135). Thus, unlike the madrasah system in the Ottoman state, an Educational institution, which can be regarded as the origin of today's theology faculties, was included for the first time within the Western style university structure (Zengin, 2009, p. 80). Then, with the Unification of Law, religious higher education was brought again under universities in the Republican Period in Turkey.

In the first article of the Istanbul Darülfünun Instruction, which entered into force on 21 April 1924, the Faculty of Theology was included as the fifth faculty within the university (Zengin, 2009, p. 95). The faculty, whose education period was determined as 3 years, was opened on May 7, 1924 (Selçuk, 2010, p. 207-214). Istanbul University was established instead of Istanbul Darülfünun through the university reform in 1933. In this process, the Faculty of Theology was closed due to reasons such as the abolition of religious courses from primary and secondary education institutions, and the fact that new graduates could not be employed in the Religious Affairs organization, and instead, an Islamic Studies Institute was opened with no students in the Faculty of Literature (Ayhan, 2014, p. 67). Thus, from the closure of this faculty in 1933 until 1949, the faculty of theology was not included in the university. Among the proposals of the commission, which was established in 1948 to meet the need for religious education in the CHP parliamentary group, was the reopening of the Faculty of Theology (Ayhan, 2014, p. 217). Then, it was designed to open under the name of “Faculty of Theology” affiliated under Ankara University and the bill was approved in this way in the parliament on June 4, 1949 (Ayhan, 2014, p. 218-219). During the Democratic Party, which came to power in 1950, developments such as the reopening of secondary religious schools, the addition of elective religion lessons to primary and secondary school programs caused the need for more religious lessons, and secondary religious schools vocational lessons. To meet this need and to provide Educational Institutions opportunities to the graduates of secondary religious schools, “High Islamic Institutes” were opened under the status of 4-year high schools under the Ministry of National Education. These institutes, the first of which was opened in Istanbul in 1959, were opened in Konya (1962), Kayseri (1965), Izmir (1966), Erzurum (1969), Bursa (1975), Samsun (1976), and Yozgat (1980) respectively (Aşıkoğlu, 2013, p. 264). While these institutes trained teachers for the Ministry of Education, they also trained religious officials for the Religious organizations. Besides, after Ankara University Faculty of Theology, the second faculty for Educational Institutions became the Faculty of Islamic Sciences, which was opened in Erzurum in 1971 depend on Atatürk University. The most important feature that distinguished this 5-year faculty from Ankara University Faculty of Theology was that secondary religious schools graduates could apply (Aydın,

2016, p. 169). Although there were attempts to make innovations, it is seen that radical changes in religious education were made after 1982.

Arrangements made after the 1980 coup d'etat includes important structural changes related to Educational Institutions in Turkey. During this period, Higher Islamic Institutes, which were opened in various provinces under the Ministry of National Education since 1959, were transformed into theology faculties and affiliated with the universities in the provinces where they were located. Thus, the number of Theology faculties in Ankara, Erzurum, Istanbul, Konya, Kayseri, Izmir, Bursa, and Samsun increased to eight. After that, Faculty of Theology started to teach with a 5-year joint program, one year being preparatory (Ayhan, 2014, p. 433). With the transformation of higher Islamic Institutes into theology faculties within the university, the field of Educational Institutions gained the opportunity to achieve a more academic structure. 15 new faculties were added to the Theology Faculties established in eight universities in 1982 and the number of these faculties increased to 23 by 1997. In addition, YÖK opened two-year Theology Vocational High Schools in Istanbul, Bursa, Trabzon, Izmir, Van, and Erzincan since 1989 to increase the education level of religious officials (Aşıkoğlu, 2013, p. 236). This situation increasingly continued until February 28. The number of such schools continued to increase with the number of students.

As of the 1998-99 academic year, two different programs, namely the Theology Undergraduate Program and the Primary Education religion and ethics (DKAB) Teaching Program, were implemented. Among these programs, the Theology Undergraduate Program was available in all Theology Faculties, but the Primary Education religion and ethics Teaching Program was in the Faculty of Theology affiliated in Ankara, Çukurova, Dicle, Dokuz Eylül, Erciyes, Istanbul, Marmara, 19 Mayıs, Selçuk and Uludağ Universities, which had strong education faculties (Muhammet, 2016, p. 249). Also, starting from the 1998-1999 academic year, student admission to secondary education programs of Theology faculties was stopped and the student quotas allocated to these faculties were reduced from year to year. While in 1996, a total of 2927 quotas were allocated for the first and second education programs of 23 theology faculties, this number was reduced to 972 in 2004, including the quotas of the DKAB teaching departments (Bahçekapılı, 2012, p. 148-165). The reason for this

decline was essentially the February 28 Post modern military intervention. AK Party, which came to power in 2002, first gave great importance to religious education only in the 2007s. the president and the ruling party did not have the same ideology. Besides, the fact that the AK Party had an obstacle in front of the AK Party, such as the case for closure, was a major obstacle to achieving its goal.

The problems and limitations experienced concerning the higher religious education in Turkey was in the Higher Education Council on 28 February and continued until the December 2007 changes to the administrative staff. Since this date, there has been a significant quantitative increase in theology faculties, and the number of faculties and student quotas have increased exponentially. In this process, student admission to the evening classes of these programs of the faculties was resumed and, in a few years, at least one faculty of theology was opened in almost all cities (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, 2017). Theology Faculties went through the golden age in this process and reached more schools and students than ever before.

Other important developments in the field of Educational Institutions in Turkey, outdoor education associate degree programs through distance learning degree completion program for graduates (ILITAM) was opened. It was first opened in the 2005-2006 academic year with the cooperation of Ankara University Distance Education Centre and the Faculty of Theology for the graduates of open education theology associate degrees to complete their undergraduate education through distance education (Altaş, 2015, p. 398). Later, following this program, ILITAM programs were opened within the Faculty of Theology of Sakarya in the 2009-2010 academic year, Atatürk, İstanbul and ILITAM in the 2010-2011 academic year, and in the Faculty of Theology of the Cumhuriyet, Dicle, Dokuz Eylül, Fırat and On Dokuz Mayıs Universities in the 2011-2012 academic year (Altaş, 2015, p. 398). As of 2018, the number of ILITAM programs reached 13. Providing employment equivalent to graduates of formal theology, such as teaching, for those who graduated from these programs, which were opened to raise their education level, especially for Diyanet personnel who could not find the opportunity to study informal education, the level of realization and efficiency of these programs' objectives continue to be discussed (Aydın, 2016, p. 385). Thanks to this program, the number of students has increased significantly, and it has brought discussions on quality education.

One of the other developments regarding Educational Institutions in the post-2010 period was the opening of Educational institutions under the name of faculties of theology or faculties of Islamic sciences within the foundation universities for the first time in the history of the Republic. The number of theology departments has exceeded 70 with these faculties included in the OSYM guide to accept students for the 2011-2012 academic year (2011 ÖSYS Tercih Kılavuzu, Tablo-4, 2011).

In this process, the preparatory class was resumed, partial changes were made in the programs, increasing the credits of the Basic Islamic courses, and reducing the credits of some courses related to religious sciences (Aşıkoğlu, 2013, p. 221-223). In the following years, three faculties with different names, apart from the Faculty of Islamic Sciences, were opened as Educational institutions: Faculty of Theology, Faculty of Religious Sciences, and International Faculty of Islamic and Religious Sciences (Demircan, 2015, p. 66). With the quantitative growth in higher religious teaching in Turkey in the last 10 years, Educational institutions were established under a total of 94 universities including 60 faculties of theology, 32 Islamic studies faculties, 1 religious sciences faculty, and 1 Educational institution by 2018. As of 2018, 90,130 students continue their formal undergraduate education in these faculties. Approximately 42% of the students enrolled in formal theology undergraduate programs were male and 58% were female (Higher education undergraduate atlas 2018 data, 2018). Having functions such as research, development, writing, and responding to the religious needs of the people makes the theology faculties important in the eyes of society. The words to be said at this point are actually not different from the words for secondary religious schools. Therefore, it is meaningless to repeat the same words. It is not known whether the importance given to these faculties by the recent AK Party Government has met the needs of the society adequately, but it is a known fact that their number has increased significantly.

Finally, if we need to examine the number of Theology Faculties; the President of Religious Affairs Ali Erbaş announced that while there were 22 theology faculties in 2011 when he was the dean, this number increased to 105 after 8 years (TDV, 2019). Finally, considering the number of theology faculties, it is possible to report that the quotas of the theology faculties reached 20 thousand by 2020. This is important to show the point where theology faculties have reached.

2.2.1.4. Directorate of Religious Affairs

The proclamation of the Republic caused the secularization of institutions in Turkey, restructuring activities in line with the modernization, policies needed revision of all institutions conducting religious services.

The establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs by abolishing the Ministry of Sharia and Foundations is not only a simple name change. It is the result of the efforts to establish a different understanding and mentality with the new administration. Because, with the abolition of the Ministry of Sharia and Foundations and the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the political authorities, which were previously at the ministerial level, were transformed into administrative duties and religious services were included in the general administrative services and were taken under state control (Kaya, 1998, p. 118). Especially in the 1961 and 1982 constitutions, the Directorate of Religious Affairs was included. The provision of Article 136 of the 1982 Constitution is as follows: “The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is included in the general administration, fulfils the duties specified in its special law in line with the principle of secularism, excluding all political views and opinions, and aiming at national solidarity and integration” (tbmm.gov.tr). In addition, the duties of the Presidency of Religious Affairs were expanded over time. The number of service units were increased, international fields of activity were expanded, religious services outside the mosque were activated and the way to establish radio and television was granted.

The numbers of mosques opened during the AK Party period are given below to explain the ideology of the period.

Table 6: Numbers of Mosques in 2006-2019

YEARS	NUMBER OF MOSQUES
2006	78,608
2008	80,053
2009	80.636
2010	81.984
2011	82.693
2012	84.684
2013	85.412
2014	86.101
2015	86.762
2016	87.381
2017	88.021
2018	88.681
2019	89.259

(DİB-Strateji Geliştirme Başkanlığı , 2020) (Veri Kaynağı, 2018)

Fourteen service units were established in 2010 under the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Two of these were at the fixed board and nine were at the general directorate level (Resmi Gazete 13 Temmuz 2010). The Directorate of Religious Affairs was hierarchically raised from the level of the general directorate to the level of under secretariat. Then, in 2012, the ranking of the President of Religious Affairs in the state protocol was rearranged (Akyüz, 2004, p. 227). With this arrangement, the ranking of the Chairman, who was in the 51st place, was raised to the 10th place. Finally, with the Presidential Degree numbered 1 enacted in 2018, the Presidency of Religious Affairs was affiliated to the Presidency (Cumhurbaşkanlığı 1 nolu Kararnamesi, 2018). All these changes show the government's view of religious affairs.

The most important of the non-formal religious education service areas run by the Directorate of Religious Affairs is the Quran courses. Recitations and *Hafız* education of the Quran appears as the first scientific discipline formed in the history of Islamic education. At this point, it will be useful to briefly touch upon the history of Quran courses.

Educational institutions called Daru'l-Quran, Daru'l-Kurra, and Daru'l-Huffaz (Baltacı, 1976) where the Quran was taught and memorized throughout the history of Islamic education, where religious belief, worship, and moral information were given, transformed into Quran courses in Republican period (Başkurt, 2007, p. 123). With the closure of madrasas in 1924, Daru'l-Kurras, which were specialized madrasas, were also closed. However, although 4-year secondary religious schools were opened instead of madrasahs, it is seen that Daru'l-Kurras were removed from school lists and continued their existence as courses (Baltacı, 2000, p. 16). Along with the alphabet reform in 1928, with the prohibition of writing in Turkish in Arabic letters, the existing Quran courses were also stopped in 1929. The exclusion of Arabic and Persian lessons from the secondary school curriculum in the 1929-1930 academic year (Yücel, 1994, p. 186) implied that the learning of Arabic letters functioned as a religious language and naturally learning of the Quran proved to be difficult. In fact, this situation appears as the biggest obstacle in front of reading and teaching the Quran.

Quran courses continued to carry out their activities in a limited number. These courses were the most affected ones because of the decisions taken especially during the 28 February coup. In fact, restrictions were imposed on the activities of these courses, which were affiliated with the religion, during this period. It was stipulated that only students who had graduated from primary education could enrol in these courses and that students who had completed the 5th grade of primary education could attend summer Quran courses. Thus, the age limit was imposed on all Quran course activities carried out by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, students who did not graduate from primary school were prohibited from attending long-term Quran courses, and students who did not complete the 5th grade of primary school were prohibited from attending summer Quran courses (Bahçekapılı, 1997-2012, p. 87-97). In particular, the reduction of the targeted number of students and schools was implemented with these regulations.

The number of students, 164,308 in the 1996-1997 academic year in the long-term Quran courses, decreased to 95,437 in the 2000-2001 academic year and dropped to its lowest level. While the number of students who received hafiz certificate in 1998 was 5 thousand 8, this number saw the lowest level in 2003 and dropped to 417. At the same time, the student profile of long-term Quran courses changed significantly during this period and these courses started to appeal mostly to housewives (Bahçekapılı, 1997-

2012, p. 87-97). While the number of Quran courses, 5241 in 1996, decreased to 3664 due to the 28 February military practices in 2002. In the first year of the AK Party, the number of courses closed to education reached 3153 (Bozan, 2007, p. 66). Especially during this period, eight-year uninterrupted education became a major obstacle in front of the courses. Even though there were attempts to harm religious education in this process, the AK Party has endeavoured to reverse this process and continuously increased the number of Quran courses, secondary religious schools, and theology faculties. The age restrictions on Quran courses were lifted, additional course fees were given to imams and muezzins working in summer Quran courses, and opportunities for opening Quran courses were expanded. Thus, there was a serious increase in the number of Quran courses. In the table below, the number of Quran courses during the period from the foundation of the Republic to today is given.

Table 7: Quran Course Numbers

ACADEMIC YEAR	NUMBER OF COURSES	ACADEMIC YEAR	NUMBER OF COURSES	ACADEMIC YEAR	NUMBER OF COURSES
1932-1933	9	1967-1968	661	1995-1996	6518
1934-1935	19	1968-1969	699	1996-1997	6387
1935-1936	15	1969-1970	749	1997-1998	6514
1936-1937	16	1970-1971	786	1998-1999	6556
1940-1941	56	1971-1972	808	1999-2000	6461
1941-1942	65	1972-1973	848	2000-2001	6308
1943-1944	38	1973-1974	977	2001-2002	6796
1944-1945	46	1974-1975	1007	2002-2003	6817
1945-1946	61	1975-1976	1037	2003-2004	6935
1947-1948	99	1976-1977	1267	2004-2005	4880
1949-1950	127	1977-1978	1490	2005-2006	5654
1951-1952	158	1978-1979	1538	2006-2007	6770
1952-1953	163	1980-1981	2773	2007-2008	7230
1953-1954	199	1981-1982	2946	2008-2009	8164
1954-1955	222	1982-1983	3047	2009-2010	8707
1955-1956	237	1983-1984	3047	2010-2011	9486
1956-1957	245	1984-1985	3335	2011-2012	14,676
1957-1958	263	1985-1986	3662	2012-2013	13,021
1958-1959	279	1986-1987	4058	2013-2014	15,457
1959-1960	301	1987-1988	4420	2014-2015	15,611
1960-1961	326	1988-1989	4715	2015-2016	15,742
1961-1962	345	1989-1990	4715	2016-2017	15,796
1962-1963	371	1990-1991	4998	2017-2018	16,159
1963-1964	399	1991-1992	5446	2018-2019	18,675
1964-1965	434	1992-1993	5614	31.12.2019 İtibariyle	19,264
1965-1966	485	1993-1994	5923		

1966-1967	621	1994-1995	6044		
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(Öztürk Ş. , 2000, p. 179) (Ünsür, 2005, p. 89-90) (Veri Kaynağı, 2018) (DİB-Strateji Geliştirme Başkanlığı , 2020) (Öcal M. , 2004)

The Directorate of Religious Affairs carries out many activities apart from the Quran courses. For instance, “Family and Religious Guidance Offices” were established for families. As of 2014, a total of 1,831 personnel worked in these offices, which served under 81 provincial and 253 district mufti offices (DİB web sayfası, 2017). In addition, through TRT Diyanet and various radio channels, the Diyanet has started to use audio-visual media channels more actively in the mission of enlightening the society on religious issues (DİB web sayfası, 2017). The service areas carried out by the Presidency of Religious Affairs in the context of common religious education and services, apart from the Quran courses, expanded and diversified during the AK Party period, and the role and visibility of the institution in the field of religious education increased greatly. Various cooperation protocols have also been signed between Diyanet and some public institutions (DİB web sayfası, 2017). A brief list of the protocols signed by the Presidency of Religious Affairs include meeting the religious services and educational needs of convicts and detainees in penal institutions and educational premises with the Ministry of Justice, strengthening social support systems for families, women, children, youth, elderly and disabled individuals with the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, contributing to the Green Affairs with the possibilities of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in order to protect people from all kinds of addiction, providing morale and motivation to patients, patient relatives and hospital staff in hospitals, institutions and organizations affiliated to the Ministry, providing consultancy and guidance services on religious / spiritual issues with the Ministry of Health, with the Ministry of Youth and Sports providing religious services and education, spiritual guidance and counselling in dormitories, sports facilities, camps and youth centres affiliated to the Ministry and at last, meeting the religious services and education needs of refugees in cities and temporary accommodation centres with AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency) (DİB web sayfası, 2017).

When we examine religious education in this period, it is possible to see that there occurred a great progress compared to both previous periods and previous governments. As a matter of fact, it can be seen how much religious education has

enriched both in content and in number. In addition, educational institutions, instructors, and the number of students indicate how much attention is paid to this training. As a matter of fact, the numbers have increased considerably compared to the previous years. In no time have religious education been so comprehensive. As a matter of fact, these trainings are tried to be conveyed to the public through many channels. One of these channels is the Directorate of Religious Affairs. DIB, which is explained in detail above, is an important part of this system and it reaches a wider audience with the activities it carries out.



CHAPTER III

3. RELIGIOSITY IN TURKEY STUDY ON THE STRUCTURES AND PROCESS TRACING

Religion has an important place in people's lives. As such, it constantly maintains its vitality in the agenda of countries. Especially in this area, research companies are working intensively and publishing data. In this part of our study, we will focus on the studies related to this area in Turkey. Periods will be compared using a follow-up process.

3.1. Religiosity on The Studies Carried Out in Turkey

In this part of our study, we will examine the quantitative data in the field of religiosity in Turkey. In this sense, doctoral theses, surveys of private companies, reports published by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, etc. have been examined. To give brief information about these studies:

Firstly, in a survey conducted by KONDA in 2007, when the participants were asked how they position themselves based on their definitions of religiosity or their relationship with religion, 52.8% defined themselves as “a religious person trying to fulfil the requirements of the religion (RELIGIOUS)”, 34.3% defined themselves as “believers but cannot fulfil the requirements of religion (BELIEVER)”, 9.7% defined themselves as “a religious person who fulfils all the requirements of the religion (SOFU)”, 2.3% defined themselves as “a person who does not believe in the necessities of religion (UNBELIEVER)”, and 0.9% defined themselves as “someone who does not have a religious belief (ATEIST) (KONDA, 2007, p. 30).

Secondly, a doctoral study conducted by Sinan Yılmaz with 2 thousand 790 families at Marmara University Faculty of Theology is important. According to this

study, 87 percent of families in Turkey said that the new generation is influenced by Western values and this caused the decrease in interest towards religion (Yılmaz, 2008, p. 243).

The third is the “Religious Life Survey in Turkey” research conducted by the Directorate of Religious Affairs in 2014. According to this study:

While 99.2% of the people living in our country stated that they belong to the religion of Islam, only 0.4% of them stated that they belong to other religions other than Islam or do not belong to any religion.

The rate of those who always perform their prayers across the country is 42.5%, and the rate of those who never perform is 16.9%. When the frequency of people performing their daily prayers is evaluated according to their education level, it is seen that the rate of those who always perform their daily prayers decreases as the education level increases. While the proportion of illiterate people who always perform their time prayers is 69.3%, this rate drops to 27.4% for undergraduate and higher graduates. When the results are evaluated according to the working conditions of the individuals, 29.4% of the employees always perform their prayers, while this rate is 51.3% for those who do not work.

In general, 83.4% of people in Turkey stated that “I fast in Ramadhan if have no health problems”, 2,5% responded “I never fast”, 7,3% responded that “fasting is impossible because of health issues”.

In Turkey, the rate of people that practice charity properly is 71.9%, the rate of people who rejects practising charity despite good financial status is 1.1%.

In Turkey, the rate of those who go on a pilgrimage to Mecca is 6.6%, those who will go but cannot because of financial impossibility is 84.9%, and those who have financial facilities but rather prefer helping poor people is 3.2%.

When we look at where people consult on religious issues, it is seen that the highest rate is those who have religious knowledge from friends or relatives by 65.5%. The rate of those who stated that they consulted the religious officers (imam, muezzin) on religious issues was 58.9%, the rate of those who stated that they consulted the mufti and preachers was 17.9%, and the rate of those who stated that they consulted the Quran Course instructors was 17.2%. 12.6% of the people stated that they consulted religious

programs on television, and 11.3% consult religious group members about religious issues. The rate of those who consult the “alo fatwa” is in the last place with 4.5%.

The rate of those who state that they almost always shape their lives according to the orders of religion is 64.9%, the rate of those who state that they shape their lives sometimes according to the orders of religion is 28.3%, and the rate of those who never shape their lives according to the orders of religion is 4.6%.

Throughout the country, the rate of those who say “I am extremely religious” is 19.4%, the rate of those who say “I am religious” is 68.1%, the rate of those who say “I am neither religious nor not” is 10.2%. The rate of those who state that they are not religious is 1%, while the rate of those who state that they are not by any means religious is 0.3%. It is observed that the proportion of those who state that they are quite religious increases as the age also increases.

50.7% of people believe that the most important criterion of religiosity is to fulfil prayers completely and to live in accordance with Islamic morality, 37.2% to believe in God and have a pure heart, 7.9% to worship on holy days and nights, 1.1 states that it is to perform the prayers completely (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 2014, p. 34).

Fourth, Aksaray University Department of Sociology Research Assistant, Volkan Ertit, claimed that Turkey is not devout. He puts forward some criteria. Briefly, if Turkey is becoming more religious, then we can say that new generations should be more religious than the older generation. However, he states that the surveys show the opposite. He expresses that homosexuality is to decrease. However, he mentions that in the early 2000s, crowded groups protested in Ramadan. He says that premarital dating should decrease, but there are developments in the opposite direction. As a matter of fact, in his interview with 12 high school teachers, he stated that the students went to each other’s houses, sent each other obscene photos, and kissed in schools. He says that the current young people are texting their fathers at the dinner table with their cell phones. While there should be a decrease in the number of pre-marital or extramarital sexual relations, research show that new generations are much more open to premarital sexual intercourse than older generations. In fact, this situation gives the example that the famous football player Arda Turan goes on vacation with his lover and does not find it odd in the society. He expressed that if Turkey is becoming more religious, marriages

between different faith groups are expected to decrease. However, according to him, the situation is again the opposite, suggesting that Alevi-Sunni marriages have increased, and such identities are less determinant than in the past. Also, he says that in Turkey, clothes highlighting the lines of the body are more preferable now than in the past. He says that especially women prefer clothes that reveal their body lines compared to their mothers and that men show their body lines more than in the past. Lastly, the decrease in the prestige of religion, the fact that the imams are not directive compared to the past, the words of the experts are decisive, the extent to which the media has moved away from religiosity with the programs they make and the language they speak, abortion and alcohol can still be discussed in the society despite the prohibition by the religion. He argues that it is a contradiction to use secular references, not Islam, and finally putting forward human rights and health reasons. He emphasizes that religious references should be used in a religious society, but on the contrary, secular references are at the forefront (Ertit, 2017, p. 307).


Fifthly, in a worldwide study conducted by the Ipsos think tank, it is claimed that 49 percent of people believe that religion is doing more harm than good. Research conducted by Ipsos in many countries shows that the public is divided into two on this issue. The rate of those who think religion is harmful is higher in developed countries. Belgium has the highest number of people who think religion is harmful. 2 out of every 3 people in Belgium state that religion has a detrimental effect on the world. Belgium is followed by Germany, Spain and Australia. Those who think religion is harmful and beneficial in 23 countries are divided into two. In Turkey, the percentage of those believe that religion is harmful rather than being beneficial is 40% (Euronews, 2017).

Sixth, according to the report submitted by KONDA in 2018, which compares 10 years, those who say they are “religious” also declined from 55 percent to 51 percent in 10 years. While the rate of those who said they were “believers” increased from 31 percent to 34 percent, the rate of those who said they were “devout” fell from 13 percent to 10 percent. The proportion of those who described themselves as “Atheists” increased three times from 1 percent to 3 percent, while the rate of “unbelievers” rose from 1 percent to 2 percent. According to the “Worship” and “Veiling” sections in the report, the rate of those who fast fell from 77 percent to 65 percent. The proportion of those not covered increased from 34 percent to 37 percent. While the rate of those who

call their veil “headscarf” increased from 52 percent to 53 percent, the rate of those who say “turban” fell from 13 percent to 9 percent (Konda, 2019).

Seventh and lastly, according to the interview method survey conducted by the Optimar research company between 7 and 14 May 2019 with 3500 people face to face, 89.5% of the respondents said they believe in the existence and uniqueness of God. The rate of those who said “I think there exists a creator, but I don’t believe in religions” remained at 4.5. According to the religion and beliefs survey conducted by the Optimar research company in Turkey, the proportion of those who practise prayers regularly is 39.1%, and the percentage of those who fast during Ramadan is 66%. 89.5% of the respondents stated that they believe in the existence and unity of God. According to the survey questioning religious attitudes and behaviours, the rate of those who pray regularly is 39.1%, and the rate of those who fast during the month of Ramadan is around 66% (tv100.com, 2019).

3.2. Process Tracing



Religious Ratios

2007	2008	2014	2017	2018	2019
2007 KONDA	A research conducted by Sinan Yılmaz who is a Phd student in Marmara University includes 2 790 families	The research conducted by Religious Affairs in 2014 " Religious Life Survey in Turkey " according to the study:	According to the research conducted by the Ipsos think-tank in 2017 worldwide	According to the report made by KONDA in 2018 and comparing 10 years:	According to a face-to-face interview method conducted by the Optimar research company between 7 and 14 May 2019 with 3500 people
“Those who define as a religious person (DİNDAR) trying to fulfil the requirements of the religion” is %52,8, “A person who has faith but cannot fulfil the requirements of the religion (BELİEF) " is %34,3 “Those who define as "a religious person who fulfils all the requirements of religion (SOFU)" is %9,7 “Someone who does not believe in the necessities of religion (FAITH) " is %2,3, “Someone with no religious belief (ATEİST)” %0,9	87% of people that took part in this research argued that the youth are affected by the West and the rate of religiousness is decreasing	99.2% of the people living in our country belong to the religion of Islam The rate of those who stated that they almost always shaped their lives according to the orders of religion is 64.9% The proportion of those who state that the order is shaped according to the orders of religion 28.3% The rate of those who have never shaped their lives according to the orders of religion is 4.6%. The rate of those who say "I am very religious" is 19.4% The rate of those who say I am religious is 68.1% The rate of those who say 'I am neither religious nor not' is 10.2% While the rate of those who state that they are not religious is 1% The rate of those who state that they are not religious at all is 0.3%.	Religion is not beneficial; it effects people in a bad way 40% said this	Those who said they were "religious" also declined from 55 percent to 51 percent in 10 years. While the rate of those who say they are "believers" increased from 31 percent to 34 percent, The proportion of those who said they were "pious" dropped from 13 percent to 10 percent. The proportion of those who define themselves as "Atheists" increased 3 times from 1 percent to 3 percent, "The proportion of unbelievers rose from 1 percent to 2 percent. The rate of those fasting fell from 77 percent to 65 percent. The rate of those not covered increased from 34 percent to 37 percent.	89.5% of the respondents said they believe in the existence and unity of God. The rate of those who said "I think there is a creator, but I don't believe in religions" remained at 4.5. The rate of those who pray regularly is 39.1%, The rate of those who fast during the month of Ramadan is around 66 percent. 89.5% of the respondents stated that they believe in the existence and unity of God. According to the survey questioning religious attitudes and behaviours, the rate of those who pray regularly is 39.1%, while the rate of those who fast during the month of Ramadan is around 66%.

Process tracing method is a method that can be used for case studies that aim both to better understand the causal dynamics that produce the outcome of a particular historical event and to shed light on the generalizable causal mechanisms that link the causes and consequences in a population of causally similar cases (Beach, 2017, pp. 1-2). The tables above were arranged according to this method. As a matter of fact, presidents, prime ministers, and parties that came to power are placed in the number line. However, since the implemented policies are included in the study, they are not given here again. At this point, since the AK Party period is examined, post-2000 data is included in our study.



CHAPTER IV

4.1. METHOD

Within the scope of our study, 12 region-based interviews were conducted across Turkey and in line with Level 1 of Statistical Region Units (SRU). At this point, while a student was selected from a state university due to the university density in Istanbul and Ankara regions, a student was selected from a private university. Our study included a total of 15 participants. While choosing our participants, we used snowball method also named as chain sampling technique. Snowball or chain sampling technique is used in situations where it is difficult to access the units that make up the universe or when information about the universe is incomplete (Patton, 2005, s. 7). This technique focuses on people and critical situations where rich data can be obtained and reaches the universe by following these people and critical situations (Creswell, 2013). A researcher who wants to make a snowball sampling begins by asking the following questions to the people and investigates: “Who knows the most about this topic? With whom should I start the meeting?” (Flick, 2014). In this way, the researcher tries to get new information by asking people who else they can meet with. The important point here is that the researcher gains the trust of the people he interviewed (Grix, 2010). Because people may be afraid to give information to a person they do not trust and may not be a reference to meet new people (Marshall, 1996, s. 522). The data collection phase of the research is completed as soon as the data saturation is reached as a result of the research conducted by the researcher in a chain (Kerlinger & Lee, 1999).

Due to the current Covid-19 threat, interviews have been made online as much as possible. However, some interviews could be made face to face provided that social distance was maintained. However, due to the political nature of the interviews, our participants did not prefer the audio and video recordings. For this reason, interviews were taken in writing. To check the accuracy of the data, the notes taken were checked by the participants. The

speeches were written as heard, without correction, only taking the statements of the participants.

In the study, the qualitative research method was used as it aims to examine the effect of religious education policies on religiosity and student evaluations. Qualitative research is a research method that includes reduction, explanation, and interpretation processes in order to explain the main characteristics of social and individual phenomena and events experienced by people, to observe people in natural environments by the researcher, and to examine the processes in the formation of phenomena and events (Creswell, 2013) (Mertens, 2014). Such studies aim to gain an in-depth perspective on a certain subject (B y k zt rk, Kılı   akmak, Akg n, Karadeniz, Demirel, 2015). It is a research model that generally aims to make sense of the process in which individuals or groups are formed regarding social events and phenomena (Yıldırım ve Şimşek, 2016). Research process covers the processes of preparing questions to be directed to the study group and determining the steps of the process and making sense of the data after collecting the data in the participants' environment and analysing it using the inductive method (Creswell, 2013). The interview technique is one of the qualitative data collection tools that we used in our study. Interview is an interactive communication process based on asking and answering questions for a specific purpose in line with a predetermined plan (Yıldırım ve Şimşek, 2006).

In the study, open-ended questions were asked to the participants in a semi-structured interview form. To record the detailed information questions such as why, how, and in what way were asked to the participants. In order to check to what extent the interview form served its purpose, its understandability, and applicability, the questions were technically examined by two experts in the field of measurement and evaluation. The interview form was finalized after taking the opinions of the experts.

4.2. INTERVIEW

As in every study, some difficulties were encountered in this study, too. In the studies conducted with the interview technique, it was observed that some participants were uncomfortable, even though it was stated that the research was conducted for scientific research and that the identity information would be kept confidential, especially in the political questions asked. Although it was stated that the survey was conducted with the confidentiality of the survey and the decision of the referee ethics committee during our interview, an average of 30% people withdrew from the process without terminating the study.

4.3. INTERVIEWS REVIEWS

In this part of our study, the application of the interview stated in the method of our research will be explained in detail. Interviews in this section will be explained in summary tables and will be conveyed to the other party by making direct quotations at many points. In this section, only the application will be transferred directly without comment. Comments will be mentioned in the results section in the fourth part of the study.

First of all, we need to give details on snowball samples in our study.

Figure 1: TUIK: Interviews Made in 12 Regions




Figure 2: Participants by Education Level




Figure 3: Participants by Age Distribution




Figure 4: Participants by Gender





Figure 5: Ideological Definitions



Approximately 24% of our participants selected with the snowball method call themselves conservative. We asked our participants how they first assess the policy of religious education in Turkey. A large part of the responses we have received from the conservative segment is that religious education policies are what they should be in quantity but qualitatively inadequate. It is criticized that the training provided is insufficient, the

quality is low, and it mostly serves the capitalist system. Participants who also complain about the lack of integrity in religious education complain that the system is constantly changing, and that stability cannot be achieved. It is also stated that it would be more correct to process the system by more qualified instructors and students instead of opening many schools. It is thought that the targeted quality will be achieved with the right choice, correct placement, and enthusiastic students. Some individuals who graduated from secondary religious schools stated that these schools have certain good and bad sides. For example, while criticizing secondary religious schools, they expressed that the mufti and preacher schools are efficient. They expressed the reason for this as the political identity of religion.

When we examine those who said that they are Kemalists, they responded that in general, they are not against and are also moderate with religious education as long as it serves the right purpose. However, they stated that the education and job opportunities seen here should be in the same direction. Besides, they expressed that they were against choosing schools that provide religious education for purposes such as finding easy jobs, earning easy money, and gaining benefits. Our participants, who said that religion was abused in this way, complained that the quality of religious education decreased and that this way the religion has to be explained by people who are not competent. According to the other participants, while some of the groups who said that religious education is focused on, this situation is beneficial, others find it worrisome. As a matter of fact, they claimed that the emphasis on religious education puts scientific education in the background, and competition with the global world will be negatively affected. In addition, although the education given is thought to be good and beneficial, it is thought that this situation has no reflections on daily life. It is also claimed that secondary religious schools have more damages than benefits because of their poor quality and unqualified nature. It is thought that the solution to this situation should be realized with a radical change. At this point, it is said that the training should be done in accordance with the essence of Islam, the Quran and Sunnah, attention should be paid to family education before schools, and above all, education should be based on morality and spirituality. Nowadays, it is emphasized that everything is easier than it was in the past. Finally, it is stated that politics is too much involved in religious education and this situation politicizes religion, religion is perceived as the monopoly of a political party or ideology, and those who vote for that party seem religious and those who do not seem to be non-religious, especially the new generation youth are uncomfortable with this whole image. It is stated that the policies implemented backfire on young people. At this point, it is thought that it would be

appropriate for some participants to give their answers directly before finishing the answers to the first question. Here it is significant to mention that it must not be overlooked that the participants are prone to generalize their answers. The 12th participant stated:

“I graduated from secondary religious schools, but I think secondary religious schools affect students in a bad way. The solution is not to close the schools, of course, but a radical transformation from students to teachers is necessary. The focus needs to be on the content, not superficial. The situation of secondary religious schools and Theology is not pleasant at all.”

The 13th participant answered:

“Bilal Erdoğan graduated from Istanbul Kartal Secondary religious schools. For this reason, it is seen as the most famous school. There is no religious priority here, most families enrol their children in these schools because they are the best. When I did a research, I came across some students who were so arrogant and I felt very uncomfortable.”


According to the 15th participant:

“There is positive discrimination in terms of the official religion of the country regarding religious education policies. It seems that this is the reason for the increase in secondary religious schools. I think this is not true, it is not the same in other religions, they should definitely be optional. What is the need for so many secondary religious schools? I support positive sciences. I do not find this policy of the government correct; I do not find this generation transformation project correct.”

According to the 14th participant:

“I see secondary religious schools inefficient because I think they have a political identity. I know because I graduated from these schools. The thought about these schools was bad yesterday, but good today. I think these schools should not be preferred because I am afraid that I will get blacklisted in the future when the government changes.”

Figure 6: How do you assess the policy of religious education in Turkey?



Red: The quality of education is decreasing- Education is insufficient – Quality should be increased.

Purple: Religion is exploited - Religion is exploited for interests - Religion is politicized

Green: Religious education is important - Religious education is beneficial - Emphasis on religious education is important

Yellow: other negative causes


Blue: Positive sciences are being left behind - The increase in religious education is alarming - global competition is negatively affected.

Second, we asked our participants whether religious education policies could lead to an increase or decrease in religiosity. Our participants responded that they could give as a majority, but they added that education will not be the only factor. Besides, according to them, the role of social media, technology, family and social environment has an advantage over education. However, the number of those who think that religious education policies will not affect religiosity is not at a low level. These participants think that religious education policies provide religious information but do not force them to be religious. According to them, if education provides religiousness, it is that everyone studying there must be religious. However, this is not the case. As the first participant states, “.... schools are no longer the main actors for religiosity. Social channels are more effective on people in changing the

perception of religion than schools.” Besides, the abuses experienced within the sects cause negative perceptions among people about religion.

Finally, the 15th participant underlined a significant point, “I think that ‘religiousism’ has increased with the implementation of common religious education policies and the opening of many secondary religious schools. Thanks to these policies, life is easier for those who study at these schools. They give priorities such as earning money in an easy way, being advantageous in every respect. This situation leads people to be hypocritical. Thus, religion lose its value.” The number of participants who think in this way is quite high. The situation has been summarized in the following figure.

Figure 7: Do you think that religious education policies can lead to increase and decrease religiosity level?



Blue: Different factors are triggered (social media, environment, family, etc.).

Green: So, called religious, not essentially.

Red: Yes, it can, but it is not the only factor.


Purple: No, it cannot give, it only increases the knowledge.

Thirdly, we asked our participants, “Do you think that non-religious people feel under pressure in Turkey?” The vast majority of our respondents think that this is a pressure, but they argue that this pressure is felt indirectly on non-religious people. Besides, it is suggested that the state gives priority to religious people in recruitment. The belief that religious people

are positively discriminated against, emphasizing that it is a country whose majority is Muslim, administrators indirectly apply religious pressure to their subordinates, psychological pressure on those who do not think like themselves, and marginalize them. The view that non-religious people are oppressed by sending them to exile comes to the fore. The rate of those who say that there is no pressure and that everyone lives as they wish is around 15%. To directly state the thoughts of some of our participants:

The first participant said, “I think there is pressure as a state (government), but not socially.” The 12th participant mentioned, “I do not think there is pressure. Secularization is increasing day by day.” According to the 14th participant, “I do not feel under pressure because I am religious, but I would feel if I were not religious. There is psychological pressure, not physical pressure.” According to the 15th participant, “I think both parts are indirectly pressured. For example, to close restaurants in Ramadan is an example for psychological pressure. There is also pressure on the religious side. For instance, calling them as ‘şucu bucu’ (sided for one belief) is a kind of psychological pressure.”

Figure 8: Do you think that non-religious people feel under pressure in Turkey?




Red: The state oppresses those who are religious by discriminating, the majority of the society is called Muslim, and religious people are favored.

Blue: No pressure, everyone is free.

Green: There is social pressure, not religious.

The 4th question we asked our participants was “What kind of relationship do you see between economy and religiosity?” Our respondents generally think that as economic prosperity increases, religious sensitivity decreases. Also, it is claimed that people who have achieved economic prosperity need no one as savior and thus fell apart from religion. Some of our participants, who look from a different perspective, argue that religion is used for economic prosperity, which is named as “instrumentalization of religion”. It is emphasized that some parties try to appear religious in order to gain economic benefit, that they appear religious in order to make people’s lives easier, and that they have jobs, self-interest, or just appear religious, but change their shape according to those who have power at all times. Finally, some of our participants stated that some of the practices in religion such as the interest being *haram* (sinful) and protecting individual rights positively affect people and economies.

Figure 9: What kind of relationship do you see between economics and religiosity?



Red: Religiosity decreases as economic prosperity increases.

Blue: Religiousness is used as a tool for economic interests.


Yellow: It has a positive effect on the economy due to the rules within religion.

Purple: There is no connection between religion and the economy.

The 5th question we asked the participants was, “Is Turkey becoming more and more religious day by day?” Approximately 87% of our participants claimed that they did not become religious. In particular, it is claimed that the new generation has become secular

rather than religious. Some participants claimed that the current use of interest and banking systems, the new generation's indifference to the sensitivities of religion, the increase in the number of murders, harassment and theft, the increase of deist and atheist masses, women being more closely involved with men, not referring to religion in decisions taken, people materializing everything, money, profit, earnings are proving reasons, such as to look as if Turkey is not religious. In addition to these thoughts, we often encounter that there is a claim that religiosity is used as a show. The thought that Turkey is getting more “dincileştiği/politico-religious” and that religion is used as a steppingstone to achieving certain objectives is not quite low. There are expressions such as self-interest and vanity increased, religiosity was emptied, deism and atheism debates increased, youth's interest in religion decreased, Western values and westernization were attractive to today's youth and young people were encouraged to do so. It is claimed that especially the applied religious education policies backfire and distract the youth from religiousness.

Figure 10: Do you think that Turkey has been increasingly becoming more religious?




Red: No, it's not getting religious.

Blue: The number of people who seem religious is increasing, but religiousness is decreasing.

Yellow: Doesn't want to answer.

To directly examine the answers of some of our participants regarding this question, according to the 5th participant, "... the number of people who have relations with religion is increasing but religiosity is decreasing. In the past, those who perform all prayers are called religious, now even those who go on Friday prayers are called religious." According to the 9th participant, "... Turkey is not going devout. The essence of Islam is gradually deteriorating. Religiousness increases in the image, but a hollow religion emerges. Social media, TV shows etc. It negatively affects the religiousness of individuals. The government must intervene in this situation." According to the 12th participant, "... people become religious in appearance but not inherently. They are even moving away from religion. Religiousness has become a phenomenon that is spoken and shown, but not experienced and felt." According to the 14th participant, "... religiosity decreases because there are no examples that live religion. People become irreligious. When it comes to interests, people do everything. Religiousism is on the rise. Religion is regressing." Finally, according to the first participant, "... piety in Turkey is dwindling. At this point, it is wrong to blame only the government, and information pollution in social media also causes this situation. The perception of Islam in society has changed. An empty perception of Islam developed. Head scarved individuals do not actually dress as required by religion, wear exaggerated make-up, wear tight pants, go hand in hand with their lovers, etc. It actually shows how much religion has been emptied." After directly quoting some of the answers to our fifth question, it is thought that it would be appropriate to visualize the alleged foundations of those who think that religion has been emptied.

Figure 11: Why do people avoid being religious?



Purple: Lack of examples representing religion - 15 July coup attempt - Sects, communities - Religious lifestyles of those who seem religious

Green: Utilitarianism and using religion as a steppingstone


Red: AK Party and Religious Affairs are inadequate

Yellow: Social media and young people's fascination with Westernization

Blue: Atheism, Deism, freedoms, etc.

We posed the question, "Is Turkey getting increasingly secular?" The responses of our participants are shown in the table below.

Figure 12: Does Turkey getting secular day by day?



Green: torn between secularism and piety

Red: Doesn't become secular


Blue: getting secular

According to the participants who think that Turkey is not more secularized and those who think they are secular say that their desire for Western societies leads to secularism. But mainly the answer given is that Turkey is neither devout nor in the direction of secularization. To refer to these thoughts directly from the responses of the participants, according to the first participant, "... the state is not becoming more secular; society is becoming more and more secular." According to the 4th participant, "... the respect for the sacred has decreased

compared to the past, so she does not become religious. The sharp speeches made by religious groups are increasing day by day. So, we cannot say that she has become secular. If these speeches were made during the period of February 28 coup, they would have very different results.” According to the 5th participant, “Yes, I think she has become more secular. Especially after the events such as July 15 and the abuse of the sects, people were directed to the idea that state affairs and religious affairs should be separate.” According to the 9th participant, “Turkey is in a state torn between religiosity and secularism, more consumer society, a non-precision/blurred ideology turns out.” Finally, according to the 15th participant, “The more we want to create a devout generation, the more middle age and younger people are backfiring. Secularization does not happen, secularization is increasing. However, I think that secularization is more prominent than religiousness.”

As the seventh question, we asked our participants, “How do you evaluate youth’s approach today to religiosity?” However, all of our participants stated that young people are moving away from religiousness. At this point, the question of why young people turned away from religiousness started to gain importance. Therefore, the answer to the question of why young people turned away from religiousness was started to be sought in the answers given. The table below tries to depict these reasons as a divergence.

Figure 13: Why do young people stay away from religion?



Blue: Unconsciousness - Lack of knowledge - Religion politics

Purple: Lack of beautiful examples of living religion - Politicization of religion

Yellow: Comfort - Changing the rules of religion according to themselves - Evacuation of the Holy - freedoms

Red: Worship is hard to find - Prohibitions of religion

Green: Technological and global causes

After evaluating the responses of our participants about the seventh question, below we directly address some of the most repeated thoughts. According to the 5th participant, “The religion told to the youth is different, the religion the narrators live is different. There is a religion that is learned from the internet, not from the family. Therefore, there is an increase in deism and atheism.” According to the 10th participant, “Young people approach religion purely visually, superficially, and politically. They evaluate religion by looking at political, social (businessmen, bureaucrats), and socially religious figures. They see these groups as religious examples. The sins committed by these individuals individually are attributed to the youth. While it is possible to believe in ready-made resources, young people act with the logic that if they pray, I do not perform; if they are fasting, I do not perform. There is such a generalization, but maybe they will not do it anyway, they use this situation as an excuse.” Again, according to the 12th participant, “Young people are moving away from religion, and are living superficially. Not only the state but also the indifference of the family, media, non-governmental organizations, and associations are responsible for this. The words Islam and religiosity do not mean positive for today’s youth anymore.” According to the 13th participant, “I see young people away from religion, they see veiling as a fashion. In fact, while the goal is not to attract attention, they make it more noticeable. The girls are covered, but they wear tight pants underneath. It is possible to increase such examples.” Finally, according to the 15th participant, “I think the new generation does not care about religiosity. They do not take it seriously. They have a phone in their hands and can easily access everything. They are very free. Rather than turning away from religion, they have seriously never met religion. In the past, families sent their children to Quran courses, Friday prayers, and etc, but now they are sending to courses such as swimming, tennis, guitar, language, etc. This is how this antipathy in parents against religion is reflected in their children.”

As of the 8th question to our participants on today’s youth, we asked their thoughts on whether prayers, zakat, fitrah, charity, and fasting are practised more than in the past. Our participants mostly stated that the practice of such worship has decreased. It is emphasized

that the application of such practices especially today is by no means an example for young people. For example, a father performs the sacrifice worship by sending an SMS to any company. This worship is impossible to be seen and understood by young people. Or the family keeps the majority of the meat of the sacrificed animal for winter and distributes a small part of them to the neighbours. In this case, it is claimed that it does not affect young people. Many participants stated that women in particular had difficulty in praying. If there is nail polish, it should be removed. So, this makes the prayer difficult for women and it is not practiced for these reasons, with the thought that it is necessary to wear clothes that cover the body. It is also stated that these kinds of worship are less common than in the past. As a matter of fact, it is thought that the sacred is not valued as much as before. It is stated that worldly life precedes religious life and people consider their own interests above all.

The second most frequent answer to this question is the idea that those who do worship perform these prayers for different purposes. Such discourses were stated by the participants that it is made for a political and cultural show, that it is made to avoid any reaction from the society or family elders, that it is performed as a ritual, as a tradition, and that it is made empty. Finally, there is an opinion that young people are not even aware of these prayers. There are answers that they do not perform worship, do not respect those who do it, and see the majority of worship as outdated. Finally, to take the frequently repeated answers of our participants directly:

According to one participant: "Most of the young people do not even know the word meaning of these prayers. I pass them doing the meetings. Let them respect those who do, even if they do not eat or drink next to the person who is fasting will be respected. "


According to the 4th participant: "No, I do not think they are practicing this worship. These saints are not valued as much as before. No matter how good their financial situation is, people think of themselves first. Worldly life has overtaken religious life. They see many of their worship as outdated. I think religious education policies are effective. Some of the attitudes of famous people, in particular, make young people completely dislike religion. For example, a famous artist "I do not think to have a feast by slaughtering animals." his words suffice to summarize the situation. "

Again, according to the 6th participant: "I think young people practice prayers very little and continue to practice less and less. With simple logic, if you go to the mosque for the time of prayer, look at the number of congregations and the proportion of young people in this number, the answer is obvious.

Finally, according to the 15th participant: "I do not think that any other worship is practiced except prayer and fasting. I think that these prayers are practiced hollowly. It is practiced as a ritual. It is practiced as a show off and hypocrisy. For example, I assume; my administrator sees me. It has the purpose of showing someone something. There is no need for other prayers. Because they are not flashy. In fact, religion comes to the point of emptying. there is a self-interested, opportunist approach. Let me come across, let me look like you, his thoughts are common. "

The most common answers to our question are listed in the table below.

Figure 14: Do you think that in today's youth: prayers, zakat, fitrah, charity and fasting were practiced more than in the past?



Red: Worships have decreased - Not done - They are moving away from religion

Blue: The perpetrators set different goals (showing off - not getting a reaction, etc.)

Green: They don't even know the meaning of the word - Respect does not stop - They see worship as outdated

The 9th participant; We asked whether people question their religious beliefs more and more in recent years. It was stated that approximately 90% of people question their religion more. People can easily access false and false information, deism and atheism discussions are on the rise, the lack of satisfactory answers to sensitive religious issues, the failure of religious people to be good examples, the inconsistency of what is said and what is done, the

constant repetition of religious arguments, the use of religion as a tool, the bad news encountered on TV channels and social media. It is claimed that the existence of examples and the activities of religious sects and communities cause people to question religion. At this point, to refer directly to the answers of the participants:

According to one the 5th participant: "Yes, he questions more, especially young people, because those who are seen as religious cannot set good examples to young people, what they say does not match with what they do."

According to another participant: "They question more. They have easy access to information. There is no rich variety of resources. There is information pollution. Especially the abuse of religious orders affects young people very much. They are starting to question religion and get cold from religion. They look very superficial. They believe what Google says. No looking at resources, no going deep. "

Again, according to the 12th participant: "This questioning exists in all religions and countries. Religion is not as effective and determinant in human life as before. People shape their lifestyles and lifestyles more according to the global and spiritual conditions. If we look at the TV series: Which one has religion, prayer, fasting, wealth, party, betrayal, love, fight, etc. where is the religion. "

Finally, according to the 15th participant "Yes, questioning has increased. Daring questions arose. Religion is emptied. Even the holy book is interpreted differently on TV every day. No, whether our prophet intervenes or not, the verse written in the book means the following, no it does not mean the discussions. On the one hand, there is a religious interpretation of Adnan Oktar, with naked girls dancing, on the other hand, ISIS beheading and playing ball with him for jihad, how else can confusion be created. "

As the 10th of our participants, do you think that the recent religious freedoms affect religiosity? We posed his question. The vast majority of our participants think that this freedom affects religiosity negatively. It is thought that with the disappearance of social pressure, there is a relief in young people and they start to question everything. However, some find the increase in freedoms positive. Expressions are used such as that people express themselves more comfortably, can freely practice their religion, and send their children to Quran courses comfortably. According to our participants:

According to the first participant: "Religious freedom affects religiosity. Religious people express themselves more easily. There are no old prohibitions. People could not even send their children to Quran courses. Those who were religious became more relaxed and

practiced their religion. However, those who are not sensitive to religion have moved away from religion. "

According to the 3th participant: "Religious freedoms do not affect religiosity anyway; religion favors love rather than coercion. Forced fasting, the prayer called "let it end, let me be saved" has no equivalent in religion anyway. So, I don't think such freedom is important for religious people. "

According to the 5th participant: "The pressure exerted on religion brings them closer to God, those who cannot resist oppression turn to God. When the pressure on religious people is lifted, they need less of God. The headscarf used to be forbidden, but it was so sweet to people. They were trying to wear it, albeit by force, but now the purpose of wearing is very different: fashion, vanity, saying I'm a Muslim, self-interest, getting somewhere, etc. no prayers, but head scarved, I think it is not sincere at all. "


According to the 6th participant: "Religious freedom negatively affected religiousness. In the past, there were prohibitions and this was more valuable for people, headscarves, prayers, and beards were applied much more intimately. There have been negative consequences on religiosity with the increase of freedoms and prosperity. Religious freedom increased, but the essence of religion was lost, religion was empty. The hijab has become a fashion icon, not an order of Allah."

According to the 9th participant: "It affected negatively. Difficult is precious, when you are free like this, the old value is lost. There has been a struggle for the headscarf for years. Then look at the clothes of those wearing headscarves, now they are wearing tight pants underneath. "

According to the 13th participant: "It creates a positive effect. I can do my meetings more comfortably. The struggle was more beneficial, as the comfort increased, worldliness increases. While there were prohibitions, people were more devoted to religion. I think this comfort dulls religion. "

Finally, according to the 14th participant "It affects religiosity badly. There was a protective instinct because it used to be a pressure. Now there is comfort and no ownership. When there was pressure, the religious people were few, secret and sincere. Who did it for the sake of Allah? Freedom has increased, piety has become glorious, this time hypocrisy has increased, and self-interest has increased.

Figure 15: Do you think that recent religious freedoms affect religiosity?



Green: Religious freedom negatively affects religiousness.

Red: Religious freedoms positively affect religiosity.

Blue: Religious freedoms do not affect religiousness.

As of the 11th Question, we asked our participants whether global or domestic sources was the source of the differing perceptions on the reduction of piety and religiosity in Turkey. As can be seen in the figure below, approximately 45% of our participants attribute the decrease in religiosity to both global causes and internal dynamics. An attitude from outside can easily find an effect inside by creating a domino effect, especially due to the weakness of internal dynamics. It is claimed that a current movement in the world can easily affect the whole world. Many traditions and behaviours that do not exist in our culture are interpreted that these movements are easily implemented in our country. Among the examples given are breaking the plate, throwing tomatoes, and the New Year celebration. Especially the answers given to this question show that the freedoms that emerged with globalization had a bad effect. According to some of our participants:

According to the 3th participant, the “negative effects of religious education policies were implemented in Turkey too. Instead of the right of servants in our religion. The fact that religious people do not refrain from violating the rights of the religious people, even while an

atheist is a judge, negatively affects the attitude towards belief and religion. Haram, slave rights, adultery, interest, etc. but never eat pork, officially religion is based on that.”


According to the 7th participant: “Especially since they have the opportunity to easily reach the developments in the world, today's youth aspire to them and thus, religiosity decreases. It is not appropriate for the young to say that the family pray. Sounds out of date. Worship is difficult when living the dream of a different world. He closes because his family said. He makes it because his father asked him to pray. When this is the case, with his head covered but with make-up and tight clothes. There is a hollow belief because he has a different world on his phone and he admires it.”

According to the 9th participant: “With social media and the internet, people can easily access any information. They cannot reconcile life on a global scale with today's religiosity. Globalization has a huge impact, and TV, the Internet, and social media play a huge role in this.”

According to the 14th participant: “I do not think it is a situation caused by the world. Conscious people become more cautious about the developments in the world, become more devoted to their religion, and protect their values. I think the real problem stems from those who say Muslims. For example, ISIS, Taliban, FETO, claim to be Muslims and it is obvious that they do: kill people, beheadings, suicide bombings, infiltrations into the state, etc. Where is Islam in these, there could not be more effective methods to alienate religion.”

Finally, according to the 15th participant: “Actually, I think this situation stems from the world. With modernity, traditions are being rubbed off. Rationality is brought to the fore by reason. This coincides with the AK Party, but the coup that happened in Turkey in recent years, developments such as orders and congregations also gave impetus to exploit this situation.”

Figure 16: The source of the differing perceptions on the Reduction of piety and religiosity in Turkey; Do you think it is globalism or internal resources?



Green: Both

Red: Sphericity

Blue: Internal resources

As the 12th question to our participants, we asked what they think about the developments in religious education policies from past to present. We have briefly summarized the responses we received in the table of figures below. Approximately 47% of our participants stated that there are improvements but insufficient. These deficiencies are thought to be mostly in consciousness and morality. In addition, our participants are among the most frequently given answers that the qualitative increase is noticeable but the qualitative increase is insufficient. They attribute these claims to policies carried out with wrong curricula, the increase in secularization, the attachment of religion to traditions rather than beliefs, and the non-continuity of religious education systems. To look at the comments of some of our participants:


According to the 13th participant: “The effort of the state at this point cannot be ignored, but the mistake is here, construct a building, put students inside, put a teacher, but the work has no morality, the work has no spirit. At this point, I think the state is lacking.”

According to the 14th participant: “There is an increase in knowledge but not effective education. People are officially captured on social media. Reading no books, no researching the sources of religion, there is ready-made information, and we are just consuming them.”

According to the 10th participant: “There are developments, but I think there is no awareness and quality as human resources. The number is many, the buildings are beautiful, the possibilities are good, the legislation is wide, there are no prohibitions, there are no restrictions, there is freedom, but there is no religiousness, these are not enough for religiousness. There is no old consciousness, old teachers, no guides. The former teachers were devoted to their work. Now there are teachers who do not pray on holidays. There are lots of Islamic movements: Süleymanism, Nurculuk, Nationalists, Nakşilik, Menzil Group, İskender Pasha, İsmail Ağa Community, etc. but there are no religious figures or leaders. There are no figures like M. Zahit Kotku, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, Said Nursi. These figures existed despite prohibitions and torture. However, these figures do not exist today despite all the comfort, freedom, and positive discrimination. I think this situation reduces devotion to religion.”

Finally, according to the 15th participant: “I don't think there's an improvement. The building is very empty but no consensus has been reached on religious education since the Republic. Each government has made an arrangement of its own and tried to dominate the masses in this way. There is no guarantee on any issue, whether the headscarf is free today, will it be banned tomorrow, the coefficient barrier is lifted, will it come again tomorrow, everything depends on the ideology of the next government. For this reason, I cannot see any improvement. Religion has been used as a commodity to increase the power of political power. “

Figure 17: What do you think about the developments in religious education policies from past to present?



Green: Positive developments - Improvements but insufficient

Red: Quantitative increase but not qualitative - Quality very poor

Blue: There is change according to political will rather than development

Purple: I don't think there is the improvement

As the 13th question to our participants, we asked whether religion classes should be optional or compulsory. According to our participants who gave the answer whether it is optional: Something should not be imposed on people, otherwise, there will be antipathy to religion. It should be optional or there will be no scientific improvement. Comments are made in the form. Those who think it is compulsory; state that the family will be insufficient in this regard. To examine the direct responses of some of our participants:


According to the 6th participant: "Religion lessons should be compulsory, but provided that they are applied correctly, lessons should be given in all areas such as human rights, halal haram, personal life, and social environment. Islam covers all areas of religion. Religious education without morality is meaningless."

According to the 12th participant: "Basically, religion and moral lessons should be given. However, it should be given in a way that can be reflected in social life rather than the lesson. Apart from that, it should be elective. The main education should be given in the family and society. I do not think that success can be achieved with pressure."

Finally, according to the 13th participant: "This is a Muslim country, of course, it should be compulsory, there is no such thing as not wanting to. This education is the condition of Islam. There is no such thing as being selective."

The rates of the answers given to the 13th question are shown in the figure below.

Figure 18: Should religion classes be optional or compulsory?



Red: Must be optional

Yellow: Must be required

Green: Mandatory until you have the will to choose, then elective

Blue: Religion classes should not be in education

As the 14th question to our participants, we asked “Does the propaganda made through religion increase the devotion to religion, will it drive people away from religion or corrupt the holy?” The great majority emphasized that the content of the propaganda is important. The necessity of style, purpose, sincerity, and consistency was emphasized. It is stated that propaganda made in a true sense of heart will surely find its place, but when it is done for profit, it will lead to a departure from religion rather than devotion to religion. It is thought that the attitude and approach of the person creating the propaganda is quite determinant, and irritating propaganda will cause shunning away from religion. At this point, the person speaking is thought to be important in the spoken environment. It is emphasized that it would be beneficial not to do it widely without boring people. Otherwise, it is stated that it will have an adverse effect on people. At this point, while expressions that make some segments happy are emphasized, it should be taken into account that some segments will be disturbed by this situation. However, it is stated that the happy parts will get bored after a certain period and the sacred will be corrupted. At this point, to put some of the most frequently repeated answers directly:

According to the 5th participant: “Propaganda over religion drives people away from religion. The wrong act of a politician who takes a religious reference is seen as a mistake of religion, and things that are sacred degenerate over time.”

According to the 13th participant: “It depends on the propaganda made. Good propaganda good discourses affect religion well. Nihat Hatipoğlu's discourses leave a good effect, while the Deputy Chief Physician of the Faculty of Medicine saying to take a second wife leaves a bad effect.”


According to the 15th participant: “Maybe the person who does it makes his voter, his audience happy, but certainly these concepts are hollow. It definitely harms religion. Although it makes its own segment happy, it distances other segments from religion completely. I especially think that using their own saints in this way corrupts the sacred.”

According to the 14th participant: “I think it is wrong to use all rhetoric and all propaganda. Words such as "God, Religion" are prohibited in the Israeli parliament. Therefore, all these words, including the word "Atatürk", should be banned in our country. Leaders, artists, political leaders, etc. refrain from using these concepts. As a matter of fact, these concepts are emptied by doing so.”

Finally, according to the first participant: “I think that the political speeches of the teachers in mosques recently and the political attitude of the Diyanet have kept people away from religion. The Diyanet's muftis should not act like the AK Party Provincial Chair, even if this is not the case, this perception should be removed. That's why I know people who don't go to the mosque.”

The answers given in the figure below are summarized.

Figure 19: Does propaganda through religion increase devotion to religion, drive people away from religion, or corrupt the holy?



Red: Depends on the content of the propaganda made

Purple: It takes away from religion

Green: Corrupts the Holy

Blue: Religion should not have a place in politics

Yellow: increases devotion to religion

The 15th question asked to our participants: What do you think that the use of religious discourse or religious symbols by the politicians in consideration can affect religiosity? We posed this question. The majority of our participants disagree with the use of religion by politicians. As a matter of fact, there is an impression that religion is used as a stepping stone and the view that it contributes to religiousness, not religiousness, comes to the fore. In addition, it is thought that the extremely fragile sacred should be kept away from politics. Politicians especially using religion and making mistakes damages the sanctity of religion. Mistakes start to be attributed to religion rather than people. His discourse is also frequently voiced. To give the frequently repetitive answers directly:

According to the 6th participant: “It is not wrong for politicians to use religious arguments. On the contrary, the religion of Islam should be in politics as in every field of life. However, if these discourses are not put into practice and the opposite policies are followed, it will cause people to question and react to religiousness through the portrait of the religious.”

According to the 11th participant: “I think that discourse and actions have a positive effect, especially in shaping the young generation.”


According to the 8th participant: “If what is done and what is said agree, it will undoubtedly have a beneficial effect.”

According to the 7th participant: “Politics should not be confused with religion. As a matter of fact, later mistakes of politicians can be attributed to religion. The statements are undoubtedly true, but the practices may not be in the same direction.”

According to the 12th participant: “I think it has negative effects on this issue. I think it causes increasing marginalization and polarization. It is enough to live in person rather than rhetoric and image.”

Finally, according to the 13th participant: “I like Recep Tayyip Erdogan's reading the Quran. When he gave a speech during Ramadan, to see an empty glass next to him makes me happy.”

Figure 20: What do you think that the use of religious discourse or symbols by the politicians in view can affect religiosity?



Purple: Religion should not be used in politics

Green: It will be useful if the discourse and action match

Yellow: Useful

We asked our participants as the 16th question: What kind of an impact the applied religious education policies have on young people. Those who think that the policies implemented have a negative impact on young people, as a matter of fact, those who think that the state is secular and the government is religious express that this contradiction lead to unhealthy consequences. In addition, the incompatibility between social life and global life creates a second contradiction effect among young people. It is also thought that especially young people see the contradictions of living examples rather than policies and institutions, and this situation causes antipathy towards religion among young people. Most importantly, there is a widespread opinion that religious education is given to young people without being adopted. To look at direct quotes from common answers:

According to the 6th participant: "I do not think that the current religious education policies have positive effects on young people. If you go to Secondary religious schools (you can find dozens in almost every city), you will see that most of the young people do not even go to Friday prayers in their building."

According to the 10th participant: "I don't think religious consciousness has an impact on young people. It has a negative effect, not a positive one, but I think this is due to the upbringing of young people."


According to the 12th participant: "No, it has no effect. Young people are turning away from religion. Once the youth perceived religiosity and Islam badly, the policies applied will not affect this perception without changing."

According to the 13th participant: "I think it is neutral. The students see education only as a score. There is no difference between the lessons. Mathematics will be another lesson."

Finally, according to the 15th participant: "Absolutely negative effect. Look at the religious policies implemented, and the bad examples, the sects are after exploitation, the communities either try to infiltrate the state or sell fireproof shrouds. Those who say I am Muslim are beheaded. The bombers claim that they are doing jihad. Which training can be more effective than these examples."

The figure in the table below summarizes the opinions of the participants.

Figure 21: What are the effects of the religious education policies implemented on young people?



Red: negatively affects

Green: It positively affects individuals who adopt the religion

Yellow: Has a neutral effect

Blue: Nice but inadequate

As the 17th, we asked our participants. Surveys conducted on religiosity in Turkey, shows a decline in religiosity. How do you interpret this situation? Our participants firstly think that such a decrease has occurred after the 15th of July. Of course, it is thought that the politicization of religion and the bad examples of living religion in mind accelerate the decline in this process. Those who consider themselves religious complain that religious communities and religious institutions are inadequate and that forms and symbols come to the fore rather than the essence of religion. The contradiction of religious discourses and practices, the conversion of religion into a field of income and interest, the fact that religious leaders are seen to act contrary to religious orders and prohibitions cause a cold against religion and it is stated by the youth that the idea of "if this is religiousness, I am not religious" It is claimed that worldliness also contributes to this situation. As a matter of fact, it is thought that many people rather than young people do not take religion seriously. There is a perception that he does not show the value, respect, and seriousness he gives to his car, house, boss, and superior to his religion. To put the most common answers directly:

According to the 4th participant: "I am also of this opinion. religion is not as intense as before in Turkey. The new generation of youth, like the other young generation in the world, first of all, care about their enjoyment. They avoid taking responsibility for meetings. They prefer to go a little more easily. As a matter of fact, when we consider today's lifestyle: Factors such as clothing, hobbies, and lifestyle make religious life difficult. For example, factors such as women not wearing make-up (to make ablution), not having nail polish, paying attention to their dressing come to the fore to pray. Therefore, individuals have to renounce many attempts to comply with all of these."

According to the 3th participant: "Religiosity begins with good morals, tolerance, and refusal from servant rights. I am of the opinion that the surveys reflect the facts because the society skips these and fasts, gives zakat in front of the cameras, performs prayers by looking around, and deems adultery right."

According to the 2th participant: "Globalization and the communication network can now quickly issue of conflict in the world in which we apply to Turkey's religious policy. The policies implemented do not appeal to young people."

According to the 10th participant: "In fact, visibility is increasing, but religiousness is decreasing. I think this situation also depends on generations. They question a lot, okay, they try to act logically. Today, religion has become a source of income. It is an area where exploitation is high, sects play an important role, and with this government, excessively spoiled Islamic organizations and groups emerged. Especially the fact that these are very visible in the media, their non-Islamic attitudes are immediately brought to the fore. I mean, even if someone is to be religious, he looks at these people and says that if they are Muslim, he is not me, and this perception holds very well. This is very intense on social media. Social media plays an important role at this point. In fact, I see that many young people use this as an excuse at this point. Worships such as praying are difficult. Atheism sounds easy. This way they try the easy way. Generations are very spoiled, actions such as easy obtaining, easy access, pleasure, and entertainment keep the individual away from actions such as reading the Quran, fasting, and doing things that are difficult for the soul. Instead of performing these meetings, they use bad examples in the media, and in this way religiosity decreases."


According to the 13th participant: "I see it in one word connected with worldliness. Religion and politics do not go together. After the 15th of July, people started to doubt even themselves. Everyone was suspected. Perspective on religion has also changed. He is a

Muslim but has become a secularist. You know, they were religious. You know, they were teaching Turkish, etc. When the examples are bad, the problems are big.”

According to the 14th participant: “I’m not surprised. The point of view of the communities after 15 July also affected. Religiosity is turned into a scapegoat, but in fact, we are not conscious, we cannot be difficult, we are running easy. Our logic is this; let me know everything, do nothing.”

Finally, according to the 15th participant: “I see this very normal. What politicians who are in front of the media do, degeneration of the sacred, etc. Especially July 15 showed a section that communalization is bad. Congregations should not have actually shown this to us. What does Diyanet do? What does it mean for a community to enter the state staff, what does it mean to take over the state, of course, a great allergy to religion was created, after we learned what kind of a terrorist organization it was, after exploiting people so much, everything changed, the belief was shaken?”

Figure 22: Surveys conducted on religiosity in Turkey, shows that the decline of religiosity. How would you interpret this situation?



Red: Politicization of religion - July 15 - Bad examples of insight

Green: The difficulty of living religion - The prohibitions and rules of religion

Blue: Social media - Globalization - Technology

Yellow: Doesn't believe in polls

Finally, we asked our participants: How do you think the AK Party's religious education policies and religious discourses affect religiosity? It is at the top of the criticisms that the policies implemented do not reach their goals and then it thus backfires. At this point, it is thought that there is an obvious decrease in religiosity and a decrease in quality even though it seems to have increased formally. The number of people who call themselves religious is increasing compared to the previous period, but it is stated that there is no connection between these people and religiousness in practice. For example, "Islamism is on the rise but Islam has not. In fact, the higher the number, the lower the quality. The discourse I want to raise a religious generation was not bad rhetoric, I liked it, but I supported this discourse not because the AK Party liked it, but because it stems from its own traditionalist production, and I supported it because I thought that this religious generation would keep the society together. However, this situation was only formal. It could not be filled enough in terms of content." Actually, at this point, the number of those who like the AK Party's policies is substantial, but the criticism is the perception that they fail in implementation. Their religious discourse is pleasing to some segments, but the statement that it completely excludes those who do not. As a matter of fact, the group that feels excluded gives the reaction to religion rather than to individuals or groups. At this point, it was deemed important to include the opinion of a 10th participant who describes himself as conservative. "No, on the contrary, I think these discourses reduce religiosity, as these discourses appeal to more radical groups rather than the middle class. Addressing too many extremes is counterproductive. I think it polarizes society. As a matter of fact, I think the policies implemented do not serve the purpose. An increase in religiosity cannot be expected as a result of an unqualified education."

The biggest share in the answers given to this question is the claim that discourses and actions do not match. As a matter of fact, most of our participants have mentioned this issue many times. For example, according to the 12th participant: "When discourses turn to action and statements to practice, they do not have much effect. If contradictory, it has a negative effect. I have serious doubts about this as if these statements have no real-life equivalent and validity. " According to 14th participant: "If the comparison of Hz. Ömer were true, it would be a good analogy and we would like it. But otherwise, it loathes religion. I do not find this logic correct. It makes even the devout shun away from religion. Your rhetoric is not full. Abdülhamit movie is being produced. I used to love Abdülhamit, now I feel uncomfortable about the man. Every visitor finds and uses an argument according to his or her claim and

makes people stay away from the argument they use. People who live as they believe do not exclude religiosity from religion. For example, there was the example of Faki Baba. He's always been so, it doesn't backfire. It is not difficult to open a school, to open a theology class, to open a Quran course, but to train a scholar for many years. The trick is not to construct a building but to fill in it. The important thing is not making buildings but building people. Policies implemented reduce religiousness. While the physical dimension of religion is getting better, its soul dies.”

The number of our participants who say that religiousness has decreased due to reasons other than the government is also considerable. At this point, there are great reactions to the congregations. At this point according to the 4th participant: "Actually, I find the AK Party's training useful, but I think that factors outside the government have a bad effect. As a matter of fact, the harassment incidents that occur in the sects, the attitudes of the clergy incompatible with the religion, keep people away from religion. When an individual whose personality and consciousness are not settled encounters such examples, he does not feel belonging to that religious community. This situation becomes clearer, especially after 15 July. " To look at 15th reaction to the congregations: "Religious discourses, reading the Quran, praying in the mosque, opening a mosque constantly, open the Imam-Hatip School, clashes between different communities begin, one is closer to the other than the other, and after July 15, we have been concerned about who will fill this gap. There will be polarization, such as groups that will sever the secular that will make the members of the congregation happy. There were as many congregations in the world and influenced as many people like the world. Where is religion, not the end but the means? There is no essence of religion. " In addition to communities, sects, social media, cell phones, global factors are also counted among non-governmental factors.

In addition to these answers, we also have participants who view the policies of the AK Party positively. To take a look at these:

According to the 8th participant: "I think that policies in the field of religion rather than religious discourses are positive but insufficient.”


According to the 13th participant: "It makes me happy because I am a Muslim, but it delights me but it backfires for the other side. Speaking this much creates a bad effect. In my opinion. If the same propaganda was made about secularism, I would be uncomfortable. Stopping the sale of alcohol in YHTs, opening beaches special to women, increasing IHLs,

giving religious services to public channels, banning alcohol advertisements, etc. applications make me happy.”

Finally, according to the 15th participant: “For me, the reasons for the fall of religiosity are global factors. However, the activities of the AK Party until the 2010s slowed down this decline. These are its stance against military tutelage, the understanding of the state that respects human rights, the application of welfare state policies, etc. we can increase the examples. Yes, the AK Party was a religious party, but until a certain period, it could not be sharply criticized by anyone. However, be it the coup, cyclical reasons, the populist approach to the right, AK Party has completely changed and started to accelerate, let alone slow down, the falling religiosity. ”

This situation has been summarized in the figure below.

Figure 23: How do you think the religious education policies and religious discourses



Red: AK Party's religious rhetoric backfired - discourses and actions do not match - religiosity decreases - pretentiousness increases

Green: Factors outside the government negatively affect

Yellow: Has positive effects

Magenta: Has a neutral effect

Blue: It reflects on different segments in different ways

4.4. FINDING SUMMARIES

Our study aims to find answers to questions such as “Do religious education policies affect religiosity? Have people questioned their religious beliefs more and more in recent years? Can education policies control the increase and decrease in religiosity? Do religious discourses increase devotion, drive people away from religion or corrupt the holy? Did the policies implemented by the AK Party increase or decrease religiosity? If so, is the problem with the policies implemented, or does religiosity decrease with these policies? Is our country changing perceptions on religiosity or reflection of global change is not due to developments in Turkey?” After the literature review and interviews, answers are given to these and many similar questions. To summarize the results of our study:

The vast majority of our participants believe that religious education policy in Turkey is high in quantity but insufficient in quality. Besides, according to them, the high number does not mean that it increases quality, on the contrary, it reduces the quality. Indeed, it is often claimed that religion has been politicized and abused. At the same time, the increase in the number of teachers and students in religious education is alarming, with the thought that it overshadows positive sciences. To sum up, most of our participant selected with snowball method have a negative attitude towards the policies on religious education in Turkey.

According to the answers we received about the effects of religious education policies on religiosity, our participants think that religious education policies do not show the expected interest compared to the past. As a matter of fact, against religious education in schools, there stands the growing environment within the family, neighbourhood, and social media. At this point, it comes to the fore that religious education policies are quite insufficient and ineffective in people’s life. However, the opinion that those who have power, that is, that the government implements religious education policies, and positively discriminates against religious people, push many individuals to benefit from this area is common. Therefore, people are not actually religious, but they talk as if they were religious in order to benefit from opportunities. In other words, with the discourse of our participants, attitudes such as “dincilik, dindarmışçılık” come to account. In addition, the thought that “religious education policies increase religious knowledge, not religiosity” is common, and especially the examples are given by our participants who graduated from secondary religious schools confirm this situation. Indeed, religious education is given intensively in these schools, but there is no high level of religiousness in the students who study in these schools.

The majority of our participants think that non-religious people are under pressure. However, it is thought that this pressure was done indirectly. The belief that the state positively discriminates against those who are religious and the emphasis on Muslims in the majority of the country is perceived as an element of pressure felt by non-religious people. The vast majority of our participants think that as economic prosperity increases, religiosity decreases, and as people's needs decrease, they invoke less of sacred power. In addition, according to the common belief in the connection between economy and religion, it is argued that people use religion as a tool for their economic interests.

In addition to strictly attaching to the idea that Turkey is increasingly getting devout, our participants stated that the number of those who seem to be religious has increased. In fact, it is thought that the people are between religiosity and secularism.

Although the opinion that today's youth is quite insufficient in worship is very common, it is seen that our participants do not practice, and they do not even know the meaning of the word. In other words, there is almost no participant who looks at this issue in a positive way. It is thought that young people do not learn how to worship by adopting from their family, they do it by force, and they do not practice these prayers with the thought that today's social life and conditions make it difficult to live. Especially at this point, the biggest reaction is the girls' wearing the headscarf. Indeed, it is especially emphasized by many participants that they cover their heads but do not comply with any other religious criteria. It is thought that the decrease in social pressure and the increase of religious freedoms compared to the past have a negative effect on religiosity. In fact, the idea that the decrease in social pressure, social media, globalization, and bad examples of religion have started to question the linkage among these all factors and religion.

Our participants are not surprised when they learned the level of religiosity decreased in Turkey. In addition, they claim that the reason for this is not only internal dynamics but also the great contribution of globalization.

The majority of our participants think that there are developments in religious education from the past to the present, but they think that this is insufficient and that quality rather than quantity should come to the fore. In addition, the idea that religious lessons in these schools should be optional in terms of not causing antipathy comes to the fore.

When asked about the effect of propaganda on religiosity: Our participants generally stated that the content of propaganda is important. Besides, it is thought that it will contribute positively to religiosity if the content and practice match. However, when we combine the

responses of distancing from religion and corrupting the sacred, the idea that it constitutes the vast majority, that making propaganda will reverse in religiousness and have unacceptable negative consequences is also in the foreground. As a matter of fact, the propaganda is emphasized that although some people are happy, it will push those who have opposing opinions to be prejudiced against religion.

The opinion that the applied religious education policies have a negative impact on the youth is emphasized by the majority of our participants. These policies have a positive effect only on religious people who adopt religion and this is quite insufficient.

The surveys conducted on religiosity in Turkey show that the decline of religiosity and in this case, we asked our respondents how they interpret this. General responses from our participants are: It is emphasized that 15 July is the politicization of religion and poses bad examples. Yes, it is among the frequently given answers that religion is difficult for young people today and that worshiping does not fit the lifestyle.

Especially when we ask about the AK Party's discourses on religiosity; we see that this situation as backfired. As a matter of fact, it is emphasized that the AK Party's discourses and actions are incompatible, religiosity is gradually decreasing, demonstrative religiosity increases, Islamism increases, and Islam falls. However, it is often stated that it is at the forefront of reasons outside of the government. In fact, the issue here includes components that are too complex to be explained by a party policy.

Finally, to explain the situation in a general framework, it is clearly seen that religious education policies do not have a positive effect on religiosity. As a matter of fact, these policies cannot go beyond being quantity. Especially according to many segments, those who attend this school aim to be exposed to positive discrimination rather than receiving religious education and use religion as a step-through these schools. Lack of unity in education and its variation depending on the political party that came to power also create negative thoughts in young people. Yes, religious education given is very good, meaningful, and raises people's religious awareness. However, in this way, religious knowledge increases and does not make people religious. Families cannot be good examples for people regarding religious worship, and when people are added to the virtual life they live on social media, the sacredness of religion disappears and people's respect for religion decreases. At this point, the most emphasized examples are the recent ones. The perception of "If they are religious, I am not" has spread so much that it is not possible to prevent it, imagine that an individual who has not yet reached religious consciousness first meets the religion Adnan Oktar offers on social

media and that girls dance, after the acts of the ISIS terrorist organization under the name of 'Jihad'. In addition, young people meet with the FETO terrorist organization, which constantly uses religious rhetoric, tries to capture state staff and attempted a coup on 15th July. In such a complex conjuncture, it becomes inevitable for people to become complicated how religion should be defined. The reason I dwell on these issues, is that our participants frequently give these examples. Subsequently, bad examples of sects and congregations are also highlighted such child abuse etc. These examples distract people from religion and push them to not feel that they belong to that religion. Especially politicians, sects, religious people, etc. The faults and deficiencies of those who show themselves as living the religion in a perfect level are attributed to that religion and there is a perception that the religion is bad rather than the mistakes of the people.

Religious education policies may be necessary for a society. Unfortunately, the lack of visibility of a sufficient number of good examples, that is, the fact that young people do not see this from people who experience it, unfortunately, does not leave a permanent effect on young people. The fact that the government's policies are not bad totally, actually expressed at most points. Especially the actions of the leading staff of the AK Party appeal to many people. Creating a devout generation, giving a speech next to an empty glass in Ramadan, imposing a prohibition on alcohol, trying to create environments unique to women, etc. Unfortunately, it is observed by people that these situations are not supported by good examples and that bad examples are at the forefront. In particular, the bad examples experienced within the AK Party are attributed to religion rather than individuals and perceived as the deficiency or fault of religion. Finally, there is a perception that religion is more valuable in periods such as February 28. As a matter of fact, although religion was suppressed at that time, it was valuable. Therefore, it is seen that the greatest damage to religion is inflicted by Muslims. It is thought that the real problem stems from those who say I am Muslim. For example, ISIS, Taliban, FETO, etc. These are Muslim examples and it is obvious that they do, kill people, beheadings, suicide bombings, etc. These all can be defined as negative acts among people. In this study, I found that such negative examples affect people in a negative way about religion. Thus, one of the biggest obstacles to religiousness is the insufficient visibility of good examples, bad examples, religious structures that abuse their power, etc. is in consideration.

CHAPTER V

5.1. CONCLUSION

This thesis has studied the effect of the AK Party's religious education policies on religiosity. In this part of our study, the important results of the thesis will be summarized by sharing some frequently repeated and important sections from the results found in particular. According to our participants, the increase in religious education policies does not affect religiosity, but only increases religious knowledge. At this point, secondary religious schools students are generally given as an example, and the thesis is put forward that if religious education policies increase religiosity, all students in these schools should be religious. In general, the increase in religious discourses has the perception that religious people corrupt the holy, and non-religious people even more so than religion. Many of our participants think that the people who chose religious schools can aim to find a job more easily, to earn easy money and to take advantage of the government in general, which they did not make for the purpose of learning religion. In addition, there is a fear that some sections of the secondary religious schools will be the blacksheeps after the change of power. Especially, approximately 90% of our participants claimed that university students do not become religious. Again, some of our participants stated that young people do not have a desire to practice religion and use everything they encounter as an excuse not to practice prayers. It is stated that religious rituals in particular do not fit the lifestyle of young people. To some of our participants, while men who do not get up for the morning prayer, grow a beard and become a bad example to society. According to our participants, some of the girls with the headscarves pose a big problem. It is particularly noteworthy that there is a discrimination based on gender here. It is stated that the perception of Islam is gradually changing, and that young people form a religious lifestyle for themselves. According to them, the state does not become secular, but society becomes secular. Finally, when it comes to the AK Party issue, our participants are

divided into two at this point. As a matter of fact, according to some, the AK Party causes bad examples. For some, the AK Party acts appropriately and slows down the rapidly declining religiousness. According to those who support AK Party acts, the statement that the AK Party will raise a devout and pious generation was a very appropriate statement. In addition, the AK Party's sensitivity to religious rituals and religious prohibitions makes some people very happy. According to them, the government is doing more than what it has to do, but the problem is with external factors, youth, social media, etc. But on the contrary, those who see the problem in the AK Party claim that the government is not a good example, it abuses religion rather than living it and makes positive discrimination against religious people. I think it would be appropriate to mention the example given by one of our participants here, as a matter of fact, according to him, the muftis affiliated to Religious Affairs act like AK Party provincial heads. Such a perception is felt by many regardless of whether this situation is real or not. In summary, it is important to be aware that schools are no longer the sole determining factor. As a matter of fact, today social media, internet resources, TV, radio etc. are more prominent than religious education. Young people perceive religious education as a normal lesson and perceive the lesson as taking notes. According to them, religious lessons are no different from mathematics or science. In addition, it is a very wrong attitude to just blame the government at this point. Besides, the July 15 coup attempt, religious sects abusing religion, murders committed in the name of religion and jihad drive young people away from religion. The vast majority of young people are either misrepresented with religion or never met at all from an early age. At this point, it is important that governments work in coordination with families in order for the religious education policies to be perceived correctly by young people, and especially to highlight examples that reflect religion badly. As a result, according to this study, our participants think that religiosity is decreasing. Religious visibility has increased or decreased, religiousness has increased or decreased, it is not possible to say this clearly for all. However, the results we found are in this direction within the scope of our research. At this point, it is useful to address an extremely important issue. Besides, the generation we interviewed is considered as the "Generation Y and Generation X" and we made evaluations accordingly. If we had done this research with a previous generation, we could reach considerably different results.

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APPENDICES

1- INFORMED CONSENT FORM

BİLGİLENDİRİLMİŞ ONAM FORMU

(LÜTFEN BU DÖKÜMANI DİKKATLİCE OKUMAK İÇİN ZAMAN AYIRINIZ)

Sizi Ceyhan ERENER tarafından yürütülen “Ak Parti Döneminde Din Eğitim Politikalarının Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Dindarlık Algısına Etkisi” başlıklı araştırmaya davet ediyoruz. Bu araştırmaya katılıp katılmama kararını vermeden önce, araştırmanın neden ve nasıl yapılacağını bilmeniz gerekmektedir. Bu nedenle bu formun okunup anlaşılması büyük önem taşımaktadır. Daha fazla bilgi isterseniz bize sorunuz.

Bu çalışmaya katılmak tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır. Çalışmaya katılmama veya katıldıktan sonra herhangi bir anda çalışmadan çıkma hakkında sahipsizsiniz. Çalışmayı yanıtlamanız, araştırmaya katılım için onam verdiğiniz biçiminde yorumlanacaktır. Size verilen formlardaki soruları yanıtlarken kimsenin baskısı veya telkini altında olmayın. Bu formlardan elde edilecek bilgiler tamamen araştırma amacı ile kullanılacaktır

1. Araştırmayla İlgili Bilgiler:

Araştırmanın Amacı: Din eğitim politikasının dindarlığa etkisini araştırmak

Araştırmanın İçeriği: Dindarlığın gelişimi ve mevcut politikalar üzerine hazırlanmış 20 Adet soru.

Araştırmanın Nedeni: Tez çalışması

Araştırmanın Öngörülen Süresi: Ortalama 20 dakika

Araştırmaya Katılması Beklenen Katılımcı/Gönüllü Sayısı: Maksimum 20

Araştırmanın Yapılacağı Yer (ler): Türkiye Geneli

2. Çalışmaya Katılım Onayı:

Yukarıda yer alan ve araştırmadan önce katılımcıya/gönüllüye verilmesi gereken bilgileri okudum ve katılmam istenen çalışmanın kapsamını ve amacını, gönüllü olarak üzerime düşen sorumlulukları tamamen anladım. Çalışma hakkında yazılı ve sözlü açıklama aşağıda adı belirtilen araştırmacı tarafından yapıldı, soru sorma ve tartışma imkânı buldum ve tatmin edici yanıtlar aldım. Bana, çalışmanın muhtemel riskleri ve faydaları sözlü olarak da anlatıldı. Bu çalışmayı istediğim zaman ve herhangi bir neden belirtmek zorunda kalmadan bırakabileceğimi ve bıraktığım takdirde herhangi bir olumsuzluk ile karşılaşmayacağımı anladım.

Bu koşullarda söz konusu araştırmaya kendi isteğimle, hiçbir baskı ve zorlama olmaksızın katılmayı kabul ediyorum.

Araştırmayı yapan

Adı-Soyadı:

İmzası:

Araştırmaya katılan

Adı-Soyadı:

İmzası:

2-INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

PART 1

3. Cinsiyetiniz?

Kadın () Erkek ()

4. Yaşınız?

a. () 20-25 yaşları arası

b. () 26-30 yaşları arası

c. () 31-40 yaşları arası

d. () 41-50 yaşları arası

e. () 51-60 yaşları arası

f. () 61 ve yukarısı

g. () cevapsız

5. Eğitim durumunuz?

a. () Hiç okula gitmemiş

b. () İlkokul mezunu

c. () Orta veya dengi okul mezunu

d. () Lise veya dengi okul mezunu

e. () Üniversite veya yüksek okul mezunu

f. () Diğer

6. Kendinizi İdeolojik olarak nasıl tanımlarsınız?

7. Doğduğunuz yer?

PART 2

1. How do you assess the policy of religious education in Turkey? (Secondary religious schools, Elective Quran and Siyer Courses etc.?)
 2. Do you think that religious education policies can lead to increase and decrease religiosity level?
 3. Do you think that non-religious people feel under pressure in Turkey? Why?
 4. What kind of relationship do you see between economics and religiosity?
 5. Do you think that Turkey has been increasingly becoming more religious? Why?
 6. Why do people avoid being religious? Why?
 7. Why do young people stay away from religion? How do you assess this?
 8. Do you think that in today's youth: prayers, zakat, fitrah, charity and fasting were practiced more than in the past? Why?
 9. Do you think that people interrogate their believes in recent years?
 10. Do you think that recent religious freedoms affect religiosity? Why?
 11. The source of the differing perceptions on the Reduction of piety and religiosity in Turkey; Do you think it is globalism or internal resources?
 12. What do you think about the developments in religious education policies from past to present?
 13. Should religion classes be optional or compulsory? Why?
 14. Does propaganda through religion increase devotion to religion, drive people away from religion, or corrupt the holy?
 15. What do you think that the use of religious discourse or symbols by the politicians in view can affect religiosity?
 16. What are the effects of the religious education policies implemented on young people?
 17. Surveys conducted on religiosity in Turkey, shows that the decline of religiosity. How would you interpret this situation?
 18. How do you think the religious education policies and religious discourses implemented by the AK Party affect religiosity?
- Is there anything you want to add?
-

Note 1: The questions were examined by experts related to the field.

Note 2: A technical examination was conducted by an expert in the field of measurement and evaluation.

3-DATA OF PARTICIPANTS

PARTICIPANT	GENDER	AGE	EDUCATION	IDEOLOGY	PROVINCE
Participant 1	Male	20-25	Undergraduate Study	Conservative	Adana
Participant 2	Male	31-40	PhD student	Social Equality	Adıyaman
Participant 3	Female	26-30	PhD student	Ataturkist	K. Maraş
Participant 4	Male	20-25	Graduate student	Secular	Afyon
Participant 5	Male	31-40	PhD student	No Ideology	Ordu
Participant 6	Male	26-30	Graduate student	National Opinion	Siirt
Participant 7	Female	20-25	Undergraduate Study	Liberal	Şırnak
Participant 8	Female	20-25	Undergraduate Study	Nationalist Conservative Secular	Giresun
Participant 9	Male	26-30	Graduate student	Islamist	Bursa
Participant 10	Male	31-40	PhD student	Democrat Conservative Religious Traditionalist	Burdur
Participant 11	Female	20-25	Undergraduate Study	Conservative Social democrat	Eskişehir
Participant 12	Male	20-25	Graduate student	Islamist	Trabzon
Participant 13	Male	31-40	PhD student	Conservative	Balıkesir
Participant 14	Male	31-40	PhD student	Conservative Liberal	Kayseri
Participant 15	Male	31-40	PhD student	Social Democrat	Mardin

4-ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL

Karar: 7666

KARAR:2020/

T.C.

ANKARA SOSYAL BİLİMLER ÜNİVERSİTESİ REKTÖRLÜĞÜ
SOSYAL VE BEŞERİ BİLİMLER ARAŞTIRMALARI



VE
BİLİMSEL YAYIN ETİK KURULU

ETİK ONAY BELGESİ

Araştırma Yöntemi	Mülakat
Araştırmanın Adı	AK Parti'nin Din Eğitim Politikalarının Dindarlığa Etkisi
Sorumlu Araştırmacının Adı Soyadı	Araştırma Görevlisi Ceyhan ERENER
Karar	UYGUNDUR

e-imzalıdır

Prof. Dr. Mehmet Hakan TÜRKÇAPAR
Başkan

e-imzalıdır

Prof. Dr. Aslı AKAY
Üye

e-imzalıdır

Prof. Dr. Ejder OKUMUŞ
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Prof. Dr. Mustafa AVCI
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e-imzalıdır

Prof. Dr. Mehmet Emin BİLGE
Üye

e-imzalıdır

Prof. Dr. İsmail ÇAKIR
Üye

e-imzalıdır

Prof. Dr. Çetin ÖNDER
Üye

15/10/2020 Bilgisayar İşletmeni

Mehmet DOĞAN

Evrakı Doğrulamak İçin : <http://ebysbackend.asbu.edu.tr/enVision.Sorgula/Belgedogrulama.aspx?V=BELM3ADH1>

Bu belge 5070 sayılı Elektronik İmza Kanununun 5. Maddesi gereğince güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

5-CURRICULUM VITAE

CEYHAN ERENER

WORK EXPERIENCE

Social Sciences University of Ankara

Self-Access Centre – Moderator 09/2017 –09/2019

IELTS IDP EDUCATION

Test Supervisor 02/2018 – 01/2020

University of Şırnak

Research Assistant 01/2020–

EDUCATION

Master's degree
2018 –2020

Social Sciences University of Ankara
Political Science (English)

Bachelor's degree in Sociology
2010 - 2015

University of Mersin
Public Administration

Bachelor's degree in Sociology
2008-2010

University of Selçuk
Archaeology

Şırnak Anatolian High School
2000-2005

LANGUAGES

8. Turkish – Mother Language
9. English – Good