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THE POLICY OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
TOWARDS TURKEY, 1953-1961

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ABSTRACT

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Master's Thesis, Department of History

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This thesis analyzes the objectives, implementation and outcomes as well as making of the policy of Eisenhower Administration toward Turkey between 1953 and 1961. Specific emphasis was placed on newly declassified U.S. primary sources. During the research phase. The policy of Eisenhower Administration toward Turkey was shaped within the confines of Eisenhower's overall concept of ensuring a balanced budget while putting emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons, a concept which aimed at winning the Cold War in the long run without exhausting the American economy. This concept coupled with the sensitivity of the Republicans about balanced budget and their economic understanding, led to disagreements with Turkey, which was implementing a very ambitious development programs both in the military and economic fields and which was looking to the United States for the primary source of funding. In the eight-year-period of the Eisenhower Administration, an almost perfect cooperation was sustained between the two countries in the military and political fields, while the endless requests for aid by Turkey and the perceived failure of Turkey to stabilize its economy created tensions in the relationship.

Key words: U.S- Turkey relations, Dwight David Eisenhower, Adnan Menderes, John Foster Dulles, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Cold War, military aid, economic aid

ÖZET

EISENHOWER YÖNETİMİNİN TÜRKİYE POLİTİKASI, 1953-1961

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Bu tezde Eisenhower Yönetiminin, 1953-1961 yılları arasında Türkiye'ye ilişkin olarak takip ettiği politikaların hedefleri, uygulanması ve sonuçları ile bu politikanın oluşturulma süreçleri incelenmektedir. Tezin araştırma aşamasında A.B.D.'de yakın zamanlarda tasnif dışı bırakılmış olan birincil kaynaklara özel önem atfedilmiştir. Eisenhower Yönetiminin Türkiye'ye yönelik politikası, Başkan Eisenhower'ın, dengeli bir bütçe sağlarken bir yandan da nükleer silahlara ağırlık veren ve Soğuk Savaşı uzun dönemde Amerikan ekonomisine zarar vermeden kazanmaya yönelik genel konseptinin çerçevesi içerisinde şekillenmiştir. Bu konsept, Cumhuriyetçilerin dengeli bütçe konusundaki hassasiyetleri ve muhazakar ekonomi anlayışları ile birlikte, o dönemde hem askeri hem de ekonomik alanlarda büyük çaplı kalkınma programları yürüten ve öncelikli fon kaynağı olarak sürekli A.B.D.'den destek arayışında olan Türkiye ile anlaşmazlıklar çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Eisenhower'ın sekiz yıllık başkanlık döneminde, iki ülke arasında askeri ve siyasi alanlarda mükemmel denebilecek düzeyde bir işbirliği düzeyi sürdürülmüş, buna karşılık Türkiye'nin sürekli ek yardım talepleri ve algılandığı şekliyle Türkiye'nin kendi ekonomisini istikrara kavuşturma yönündeki başarısızlığı iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerde gerilime yol açmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: A.B.D. - Türkiye ilişkileri, Dwight David Eisenhower, Adnan Menderes, John Foster Dulles, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Soğuk savaş, askeri yardım, ekonomik yardım

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to explore U.S. – Turkey relations during the Eisenhower Administration from the U.S. policy making standpoint. The thesis explores the objectives, constraints and outcomes U.S. policy makers experience in U.S. - Turkey relations between 1953 and 1961. This thesis also aims to explore the context of Eisenhower's policies toward Turkey within his overall view of the Cold War and national security strategy.

The period of Eisenhower's presidency has received much scholarly attention and has been the subject of an enormous volume of writing since Eisenhower's last years in office through today. Three main currents in this multitude of works can be distinguished. The first current starts with contemporary critical assessments and extends well into 1960s, portraying Eisenhower as a weak leader with little capacity who chose to delegate his authority to his subordinates for the most part.¹ Then, starting from the late sixties and accelerating in the seventies, a revisionist approach found that Eisenhower was not a weak leader, but was in firm control of his Administration and the policies that were being produced². In the third current, a

¹ Marquis Childs, *Eisenhower: Captive Hero; A Critical Study of the General and the President* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958); Richard Rovere, *Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years* (New York: Farrar, 1956); Richard Neusadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960).

² Herbert Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (New York: Macmillan, 1972); Peter Lyon, *Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974); Charles C. Alexander, *Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952-1961* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press); Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1977); Elmo Richardson & Chester Pach, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 1991; George H. Quester, "Was Eisenhower a Genius?", *International Security* 4 (Fall 1979): 159: 179; Fred I. Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President", *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Winter 1979-80), 577:597; William Bragg Ewald, Jr., *Eisenhower the President: Crucial Days, 1951-1960*, (Englewood

critical tone has reappeared in the late eighties and nineties, emphasizing Eisenhower's use of covert operations against governments in the Middle East and Central America and his failure to understand the particularities of the nationalist movements around the world³. Within these currents, U.S. relations with Turkey received very little attention by American historians although Turkey played a key role with regard to U.S. policies in the Middle East and the period of Eisenhower presidency was a high time for U.S. military presence and activity in Turkey. The two exceptions are Philip Nash, the author of *The Other Missiles of October*, and George Harris who wrote *The Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*. In the first work, although making extensive use of declassified government documents, Nash looks exclusively at the U.S. policy relating to the deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and thus, has written with a limited coverage of the Eisenhower Administration, which he criticizes for deploying an already obsolescent system to Turkey and Italy. Although Harris's work is a dated one (published in 1971), it contains solid analyses of the U.S.-Turkey relationship from the perspective of an insider since Harris, relying extensively on open sources mainly in the Turkish language and *The Department of State Bulletin*, worked in the US Embassy in Ankara from 1957 to 1962 after being awarded a Ph. D. about Turkey from Harvard University. The value of his work is due to the substantial

Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1981); Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Ike Age", *New Republic*, 9 May 1981, 26-34; Stephen Ambrose with Richard Immerman, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment*, (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1999); Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: Norton, 1981); Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower, II. The President* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984);

³ David W. Lesch, *Syria and the United States: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Audrey R. Kahin & George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995); H.W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947- 1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); H.W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Security State", *The American Historical Review*, Volume 94, Issue 4 (Oct. 1989), 963-989.

practical knowledge he had about Turkey. On the other hand, there is a great deal of work on US-Turkish relations written by Turkish scholars and other interested persons. Oral Sander's work on Turkish American Relations, while written in 1979, is the most distinguished work on the relationship that contains very sound analyses.⁴ Türkkaya Ataöv's book on NATO and Turkey is an analysis of US-Turkish relationship from a leftist perspective and can be considered to be a reflection of the "New Left" revisionism in the historiography of US foreign relations.⁵ Nur Bilge Criss has contributed to the field with a rare analysis of the early phase of US military presence in Turkey.⁶ Even recent works which have the advantage of available declassified resources do not match the depth of the analyses of the above mentioned works and fail to consult those resources.⁷ In a striking example, Nasuh Uslu's work on Turkish American relations with focus on Cyprus⁸ does not make any reference to Foreign Relations of United States Series covering the period after 1954, when Cyprus appears as an issue between Greece and Turkey.

To shed additional light upon US-Turkish relations during the Eisenhower Administration, this thesis takes an initial step toward a more comprehensive history of that era. It is also aimed to be a modest contribution to fill the gap in the historiography of US foreign relations at this very point. In doing so, this thesis takes advantage of additional declassified material acquired from U.S. archives. Due to restrictions of resources and length, this work narrows itself to identifying key U.S.

⁴ Oral Sander, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri* (Turkish American Relations), (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1979).

⁵ Türkkaya Ataöv, *NATO and Turkey*, (Ankara: Publications of the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Ankara, 1970).

⁶ Nur Bilge Criss, "US Forces in Turkey" in Simon Duke & Wolfgang Krieger, eds. *U.S. military forces in Europe : the early years, 1945-1970*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

⁷ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan ilişkileri* (Turkish American Relations), (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000).

⁸ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs* (Cyprus in Turkish American Relations), (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000).

policy makers, the objectives they sought to achieve regarding Turkey, the constraints they faced, and the resulting outcomes for U.S. foreign relations.

The Truman Legacy

By the end of WWII, Turkey was a country exhausted to its limits both materially because of the high level of defense expenditures in proportion to its economic power and also psychologically because of the effort to avoid war. But the end of the war did not mean an end to all those difficulties as the developments soon after WWII unfolded. After a brief period of post-war isolation, Turkey was able to engage the United States and Britain in the defense of Turkey against a possible Soviet attack. By 1946, Soviets and Americans had embarked upon a full rivalry and at the height of the controversy over Soviet demands for a revision in the regime of the Turkish straits, the United States delivered a note to the Soviets in August 1946 declaring that the U.S. fully supported the Turkish position and that any aggression by the USSR towards the straits would trigger action by the UN Security Council.⁹ American and British Navies also increased their activities and presence in the Mediterranean. By this time, the line-up of forces was becoming clear and in 1947 the United States delivered a large package of military aid to Turkey to bolster its forces. While the pressures on Turkey by the Soviets had already eased by 1947, there was now an unmistakable American interest established towards Turkey and the aid was being given not because Turkey was under immediate danger but because the prospect of a future Soviet take over of Turkey was strategically unbearable.¹⁰ Another argument was that Turkey would be unable to develop in the economic field without help in her defense efforts.¹¹ This point was also underlined to a great length by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Chairman of Joint Chiefs of

⁹ Harris, 22.

¹⁰ Leffler, 145.

¹¹ Harris, 26.

Staff, in a report prepared in response to a request by the State Department to assess a possible military aid to Turkey.¹² In other words, the aid package that came with Truman Doctrine was an investment for the U.S. to help Turkey to become an economically viable country able to stand on its own feet. This, it can be argued, is a line of continuity in US policy towards Turkey since its inception down to the period under scrutiny in this thesis.

After securing US engagement in the defense of Turkey, the Turkish Government started to seek to formalize this engagement into a formal alliance and this was possible with Turkey's membership into the NATO alliance in 1952. But in the meantime, power in Turkey changed hands and the RPP government that was in place since the establishment of the Republic was substituted peacefully with free elections by the Democratic Party of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes. Menderes became the Prime Minister in late May 1950 and one of the first actions the new Democratic Government took was to contribute troops to UN forces fighting in Korea. This commitment and the performance of Turkish soldiers strengthened the hand of US officials in helping get through the Turkish push for membership to NATO, which, by then, had become all the more advantageous for the US military planners as well as for the British in the wake of a need for a solid foothold in the Middle East.¹³ The push was successful at last and Turkey became a NATO member along with Greece in February 1952 at a time when Truman was experiencing his lowest place in popularity among American people and when Dwight David Eisenhower, who was SACEUR in NATO and who had already developed a relationship with the highest level Turkish government officials, was preparing for

¹² *Memorandum for Secretary of War & Secretary of Navy, March 13, 1947 Dwight David Eisenhower, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of State Documents Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1945-1949. {Microform} National Archives and Records Administration. Reel 8.*

¹³ Harris, 43.

the presidential nomination. On the other hand, the Truman Administration had introduced a series of changes within the State Department, bringing it to a position of primacy as well as introducing a new “Policy Planning Staff” to be headed by George Kennan. The other part of the change was the National Security Act, which established the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Resources Boards.¹⁴ While Truman intended NSC to be a coordinating board and never a decision making body¹⁵, the National Security Act of 1947 formalized a Cold War bureaucracy which meant that, by the time Eisenhower was inaugurated in January 1953, there was in place a National Security and Defense establishment for Eisenhower to forge and implement his policies. However, while Eisenhower supported the internationalist stand of the Truman Administration, he felt that “the Truman policies and programs for carrying out his strategy had to be reshaped to make them more coherent and sustainable over the long haul of the cold war”¹⁶

This thesis discusses the creation, implementation and objectives of the U.S. policy toward Turkey between 1953 and 1961 during the Eisenhower Administration, making use of available declassified documentation from the Eisenhower Library and *Foreign Relations of United States* series. The available documentation shows that the policy toward Turkey reflected a great deal of elements of, and was part of a coherent strategy Eisenhower sought to create to wage the Cold War. Eisenhower’s vision and philosophy in this strategy did not, however, fit those of the Turkish Government especially with regards to the economic practices of Turkey. This was a bone of contention throughout the Eisenhower period between the two Governments.

¹⁴ Leffler, 175.

¹⁵ Leffler, 176.

¹⁶ Robert R. Bowie & Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.11.

The lack of responsiveness in the way Eisenhower formulated his policies toward Turkey also prevented U.S. agencies from taking prompt actions, except for last minute solutions, in the face of developments.



CHAPTER 2

US and TURKEY, 1953-1956

The Overall Setting

When Eisenhower was inaugurated in January 1953, it had been six years since the start of the Truman aid scheme, and Turkey had recently become a NATO member. Thus, by the time Eisenhower won the Presidency and took over the post, there was a formal alliance structure between the two countries. However, Eisenhower's first steps which had an impact on the U.S. policy toward Turkey were related to the shaping of his grand strategy to wage the Cold War. As soon as Eisenhower entered the Oval Office, he set on to streamline and strengthen the National Security policy making process according to his understanding. Having appointed Robert Cutler as the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to fulfill this task, Eisenhower ordered a reexamination of national security policies taken over from the previous Administration. Project Solarium, as the reexamination was called, concerned three groups called "Task Force A, B and C", each defending a different policy for the United States to fight the Cold War. The end result, the NSC-162/2 policy paper "advocated the protection of American national security through the preservation of a cautious and conservative economic policy coupled with a reliance upon nuclear weapons."¹⁷ This overall policy of conservative economic policy to ensure a balanced budget was the foremost

¹⁷ Anna K. Nelson, "The Importance of Foreign Policy Process: Eisenhower and the National Security Council", in Günter Bischof & Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 117.

determinant of the overall policy of the Eisenhower Administration within the framework of which policies toward Turkey were shaped in his tenure of eight years.

Among any of the Truman Administration policies, nothing was more troublesome for Eisenhower than the cost of the national security program. According to Eisenhower, Democrats' overall strategy was a failure and in turn, more money was being poured in order to offset the shortfalls of the overall strategy. Eisenhower was also uneasy with the concept of "year of maximum danger", where, in line with NSC 68, 1954 would be the year when the Soviets would reach the capability to launch a crippling attack on the US. "Convinced that economic strength played just as important a role in the nation's security as did military strength, and that the United States would have to engage the Communists over the long haul, he made clear that the budget required to implement Truman's global posture exceed what a sound economy could bear. And this extravagance was unnecessary as it was dangerous. Eisenhower promised to better integrate advances in U.S. technology and capabilities and strategic planning."¹⁸ In other words, he aimed at ensuring security with solvency, without endangering any of the two. While reliance upon nuclear forces was one instrument, another instrument was to strengthen the collective security measures of the free world.¹⁹ An outgrowth of this thinking was to support Turkey to build its military establishment without the need for US military existence and increase its self-defense capability, which would be a cheaper solution for the US.

In absolute contrast to Eisenhower's concept of national security, the Menderes Government in Turkey was aiming at development in all spheres in a very short time. While the Democrats were aiming at jumping the country to the level of

¹⁸ Bowie & Immerman, 75.

¹⁹ Ibid., 74.

Western European countries in 50 years in terms of economic development, they were also trying to build a military force which would by 1958, convert to US tables of organization. Focusing on quick and concrete results in economic development, the Menderes Government wanted to reach as high growth figures as possible instead of long term improvement in the production capacity of the country. Government credits and subsidies were poured into the agricultural sector as a political choice.²⁰ In all directions, Turkey was going to overspend and thus look at the US both for economic aid and for equipment for the military. This whole attitude of Turkish Government contrasted deeply what the restrictions within which Eisenhower had placed his national security strategy. In addition, his own thinking and conceptualization of national security strategy in the term “security with solvency” affected the way he analyzed the Turkish economic problems during his mandate. This chapter, which covers the first four years, focuses on the processes, constraints, actions and problems of U.S. policy making toward Turkey from the inauguration of President Eisenhower until the start of his second term in January 1957.

Policy Objectives

As soon as Eisenhower took over the Presidency, he and his staff started working on the budget for 1954. His vision of the way the Cold War should be waged, his promises as the Republican candidate as well as the expectations of the Republican constituency after more than 20 years of Democratic overspending dictated that Eisenhower put a balanced budget on the top row of his agenda. Thus the immediate overall objective was to reduce the deficit in the forthcoming budget for 1954. Of course the dilemma was that while Republicans, including Eisenhower, were dedicated to the reduction of federal spending and to prospective tax cuts, in

²⁰ Eric Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi (Turkey: A Modern History)*, (Ankara: İletişim, 1993), p. 327-328.

view of the picture of the financial situation of the U.S. Government, Eisenhower was not willing to take these measures at the cost of weakening the defense posture of the U.S. “The course we must set for ourselves is a difficult one. It must avoid, on the one hand, the indefinite continuance of a needlessly high rate of federal spending in excess of federal income. It must avoid, on the other hand, any penny-wise, pound-foolish policy that could, through the lack of needed strength, cripple the cause of freedom everywhere.”²¹

Within this framework, Turkey did not have any specific place on the Presidential agenda. Rather, until the end of the second year of Eisenhower’s term in office, the policy relating to Turkey, as the available declassified documentation shows, was mainly guided by the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover and executed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs in Washington D.C. and by the Ambassador in Ankara within the overall strategy designed by Eisenhower. Documents suggest that the first time Eisenhower was personally involved in decision making regarding Turkey was in early January in 1955, the start of his third year in office. In the NSC meeting on that day,

“the President, turning to Secretary Humphrey, said that the real criterion with respect to the level of US economic assistance was the security advantage which the United States obtained. He pointed out that US economic assistance to Turkey was the best possible way to buttress our security interests in the Near Eastern area. Moreover, it was much better and cheaper to assist the Turks to build up their own armed forces than to create additional US divisions.”

The document shows that the remark by the President came in response to “Secretary of Treasury Humphrey’s comments on the need to progressively reduce

²¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (Garden City: Doubleday), pp. 123-131 passim.

United States economic aid on a worldwide basis.”²² This document also implies, and other documents also show that, by early 1955, an intense pressure had been built up within the Eisenhower Administration for a review of economic and military aid policy regarding Turkey.

a) Economic and Military Aid

Thus, the first²³ policy objective specific for Turkey was to assure that Turkey would make efficient use of funds made available through military and economic aid channels. Since, as a natural outgrowth of the Administration’s policy to cut down the budget, there was the prospect that Turkey would receive less in aid from the U.S. in the future, the Embassy staff in Ankara as well as the MSA staff revised the programs under implementation and came forward with several recommendations to the Turkish Government aimed at ensuring best use of US funds at minimum cost.²⁴ However, economic aid as an issue grew more after 1954. From early 1955 onwards, the above mentioned policy objective evolved into one that prohibited any commitment on the part of the U.S. in favor of any increase in the amount of economic aid, foresaw systematic rejection of loan requests by the Turkish Government and imposition of pressure on Turkish Government regarding the economic policies in place.

b) Regional Security Arrangements

The second policy objective specific to Turkey was to build a chain of alliances that extended from Balkans to Pakistan where Turkey would be instrumental in initiating an indigenous defense organization aimed at preventing

²² U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of United States (hereinafter cited as FRUS), 1955-1957, Vol. XXIV, (Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 608.

²³ The sequencing of the objectives does not imply any order of importance.

²⁴ FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. VIII, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean (Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 923.

communist influence in the Middle East area as well as maintaining a link with the Tito's Yugoslavia. In spring 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director for Mutual Security Harold Stassen made two successive trips, the first one to European Allies and the second one to the Middle and Near East countries. Back from the trip, Dulles and Stassen made a presentation at the NSC Meeting on June 1st, 1953 and explained how they saw the situation in the Middle East. According to Dulles, "the old MEDO concept was certainly finished."²⁵ Based on the observations and recommendations of Dulles and Stassen, the NSC "noted the conclusion of Secretary of State that the present concept of a Middle East Defense Organization, with Egypt as the key, was not a realistic basis for present planning, and that the U.S. should now concentrate upon building a defense in the area based on the northern tier, including Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey."²⁶ Turkey was to become the cornerstone in the efforts to setup this new security system in the Middle East which was to originate indigenously.

c) US Military Requirements

The third, but earliest objective that came forward during the Eisenhower Administration was the issue of US military requirements in Turkey. The objective was to ensure access to Turkish military facilities by US forces within the framework NATO responsibilities and to negotiate a secret agreement under article 3 of North Atlantic Treaty.²⁷ This objective was put into action by the Ambassador in Ankara, George McGhee, in early February 1953.

²⁵ *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East (Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 385.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 386.

²⁷ *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. VIII, 913.

Actions and Problems

As the part on objectives states, the issue of the level of US aid increasingly became an issue from 1954 onwards and finally made its way onto the presidential agenda in early 1955. In March 1953, Turkey approached the US Embassy with a request for an increase in Eximbank loans. Reporting the conversation back to Washington D.C., Ambassador McGhee noted that as the result of the Embassy's and MSA's analysis of the Turkish economy, it was recommended that the long range economic assistance to Turkey should be by loan on project basis rather than by grants, considering that grant aid schemes would suffer cut-downs in the near future. He stated that Turkey could well borrow at least 100 million dollars in addition to its current foreign debt.²⁸

This same point was also confirmed by Harold Stassen, director of MSA, who, in his visits together with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to Prime Minister Menderes and the President Celal Bayar, conveyed President Eisenhower's policy message that "United States defense expenditures and overseas programs must be somewhat reduced to assure sound United States economic and financial position having in mind need to maintain strength over a period of years to meet any existing threat." As a result, it was not likely for Turkey to receive as much in economic grant aid as in the previous year.²⁹

These messages, together with the close scrutiny by the Turkish side of the actions of the new Administration seem to have produced some concerns on the Turkish side, according to Ambassador McGhee. One might need to remember that in the spring of 1953, Korean War armistice negotiations were underway³⁰, Stalin

²⁸ FRUS 1952- 1954, vol. VIII, 917.

²⁹ FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. VIII, 930.

³⁰ John Whiteclay Chambers III, ed., *The Oxford Companion to American Military History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 372.

had died and the USSR started seemingly modifying its policies.³¹ In one of his last messages from Ankara as Ambassador, McGhee warned Washington in mid-June in a blasting tone. In this letter, McGhee identified certain points causing problems in US-Turkey problems. These points were:

1. Turkish leaders feeling disturbed over lack of consistency in US foreign policy (contradictory statements by civilian and military officials and Congress members.) In connection with this, Turks are concerned that US might give up its position of leadership in the free world.
2. Turks were led, rightly or wrongly to believe, as numerous Embtels have reported, that NATO commands favor large increases in Turkish military program and onus for failure of this to come about has attached largely to US.
3. US has failed to invite Turkish President to visit US (perceived as indication that US attaches less importance to Turkey).
4. Turks have always attached great importance to consultations with US on matters of common concern. They feel, however, that we have not been equally forthcoming with them, and that we have not taken great interest in matters vital to them, i.e. tripartite pact, with adverse results.³² McGhee also drew attention to increasing prestige of Britain and Germany as partners of Turkey.

His recommendations to alleviate the situation were as follows:

- a) carefully implement policy of consultation with Turkish Government on all matters of mutual interest on the world as well as the NATO and Middle East levels,

³¹ Two days after the visits by Dulles and Stassen to Prime Minister Menderes and President Bayar, the Soviets made a statement that USSR had given up its claims on certain Turkish territory. Mehmet Gönübol et al., eds., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 9th ed., (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), 397.

³² June 12nd 1953, Ambassador McGhee to the Department of State, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. VIII, 931-933.

b) pursue NATO procedures in such a manner that Turks are not led to expect special end-item assistance from NATO or more American aid that can be made available to them, beyond this, convey to Turkish Government in near future some definite indication of our desire to invite President or alternatively Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

It is highly likely that McGhee's message had a profound impact at the Department of State, since the Department, after McGhee left his post in Ankara, asked William Rountree, then Chargé d'Affaires in Ankara, to provide his frank estimate on how Turks perceive the United States. In his report³³, Rountree described the positions of Turkish Government and public as regards the international situation. Following that, he confirmed the perceived concerns of the Turkish Government and public as set forth in McGhee's letter of 12th June:

- the contradictory currents in the U.S. regarding foreign aid and its implications for U.S. leadership,
- Turkish expectations that through NATO more aid would be coming,
- Turks have reason to think that U.S. has not been equally forthcoming with them as far as consultations on matters of common interest are concerned.

In his conclusions, Rountree recommended the following:

- a policy of adequate consultation with Turks should be instituted. This policy should not only seek Turkish support of US lines of action but should demonstrate that the US side solicits Turkish views upon international developments (to be fully taken into account.)
- In connection with the above policy, Rountree suggested that if it should become evident that circumstances will render it absolutely necessary to reduce

³³ July 30th, 1953, Chargé d'Affaires William Rountree to the Department of State, FRUS 1952-54, vol. VIII, 933-939.

economic and military assistance to Turkey below levels which present plans indicate Turks will need, a full and frank explanation of the reasons therefore in advance of the actual decision will make it more palatable to the Turkish Government and far easier for it to adjust its plans accordingly.

He also recommended that an invitation to Turkish President or Prime Minister be extended for an official visit to US. The rationale was that such an invitation had been expected by the Turks from the US. Additionally, the fact that a similar invitation had already been extended to the King of Greece made it necessary to make an invitation to the Turkish side. "It is believed that such a visit will have substantial advantages, particularly with respect to the substance of the communication, and would provide an excellent opportunity for the Administration to give the Turkish leaders the benefit of its views on world problems and the methods proposed to cope with them. In this way the confidence of the Turks in the United States and in American leadership could be materially enhanced."³⁴

In connection with the above recommendations, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote to President Eisenhower on August 13th, 1953, suggesting extending an invitation to the Turkish President Celal Bayar. In the letter, JFD stated that since the US has invited the King of Greece to visit the US, it became necessary to extend a similar invitation to the Turkish President considering the policy of bracketing the two countries together and in view of the fact that Turkish side had been expecting such an invitation for some time. Secondly, Dulles emphasized the invitation as a gesture to mark the Turkish efforts in the military field along side the US as "a nation which has steadfastly resisted Soviet pressures and which has become an outpost of Western strength and stability in a disturbed area."

³⁴ Ibid.

Upon the agreement of the President, the invitation was extended to the President of Turkey on the occasion of Ambassador Avra Warren's presentation of his credentials which took place on September 17, 1953. The visit would start on January 27, 1954.

In quite a striking manner, Ambassador Avra Warren sent a letter in January 1954 to the Department of State which is not less blasting in its tone than the one that had been sent by McGhee the previous June. Warren identified a loss of confidence on the part of Turks toward the United States. The underlying reason, according to Warren was that "...we are asking them to accept commitments and make decisions which may well determine the course of their foreign policy for the foreseeable future, without having made the corresponding decisions on our side and being willing to accept the corresponding commitments."³⁵

The point was especially related to the issue of constructing another belt of alliances at the southern periphery of the Soviet Union and in the Balkans and of use of Turkish territory by U.S. Forces.

"For several years, we have tried to organize same kind of regional defense for the vulnerable southern periphery of the Soviet Union. it might be said that we have had the opportunity to make these attempts in peace thanks largely to the existence of the Turkish deterrent against Soviet aggression in the area. Having failed in our direct efforts, we are now asking the Turks to take the initiative and accept the primary responsibility for organizing the security of the region, and to "bell the Indian cat" in the process. What are we offering in return? At the same time, we are asking the Turks to allow us to establish additional military targets in their own territory in the form of a forward strategic air-base and widespread electronic installations, together with over 3,000 personnel to man them." Under *my* instructions in these negotiations, I have firmly refused to accept any US commitment for the defense of these facilities, or even to promise US support for any upward revision of Turkish level of forces in NATO. Since it is equally clear to the Turks and to us that they do not and will not have the capability to defend these installations, they must obviously conclude that:

- (1) We do not trust them enough to give them an indication of our defense plans in the event of hostilities; or
- (2) We have no such plans; or
- (3) We regard our installations here and Turkey itself as expendable."

³⁵ Ibid., Ambassador Warren to the Department of State, January 21, 1954, 940-941.

According to Warren, the U.S. not only asked the Turks to assume considerable additional risks and responsibilities without compensatory protection. At the same time, the U.S. seemed to be reluctant for a commitment to sustain even the presently projected levels of Turkish forces. "The impending decision to provide budgetary support during this fiscal year of course carries the implication of continued support of the agreed level in succeeding years. However, the fact that this year's decision may involve a slow-down in the Turkish military build-up leaves a doubt which can only be dispelled by a firm for-war decision on the subject and corresponding reassurances to the Turks." In his conclusion, Warren expected the Turkish side to grow more reluctant to extend themselves until the U.S would be prepared to give them more concrete evidence of the consistency and dependability of its support.³⁶

The visit of the Turkish President Celal Bayar to the U.S. started on January 27th, 1954. A few days after that, Ambassador Warren wrote to the Department another message warning about two specific problems on the Turkish side. The first one was about the short-fall in the Turkish defense budget for the coming Turkish fiscal year and the Ambassador recommended that, instead of dealing with Turkish problems on a daily basis, a comprehensive review of aid policy in this regard be made so as to encourage Turkish side to plan for self-sufficiency at a prospective date.³⁷ The importance of this message is that it is the first instance where a high level U.S. official seems to be aware of the approaching problems in the aid issue and recommended a more structured way to deal with them. Later developments would turn out to prove him right.

In May, the Turkish Prime Minister approached the U.S. ambassador for a

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid, The Ambassador in Turkey (Warren) to the Department of State, February 5, 1954, 942-943.

visit to the United States within a month, which was quite a short notice. The motive behind the visit was to discuss a 4 year military and economic program with the U.S. officials. The visit was scheduled and carried out from June 1st, 1954 to June 15th. The Prime Minister and his team met the President, the Secretary of State, FOA Director and other officials from military and civilian agencies.³⁸

The memoranda of conversation³⁹ drafted following the Prime Minister Menderes's visit do not refer to a specific amount requested by Turkey and seem to focus on exchange of views on regional security arrangements in which Turkey was involved. Harold Stassen of FOA submitted to Prime Minister Menderes an *aide-mémoire* representing the U.S. position vis-à-vis the Turkish request. Secretary Dulles in his memorandum of June 5 to the Embassy in Turkey provided a summary of this aide-memoire which was cleared by Harold Stassen with President Eisenhower and handed to Prime Minister Menderes by Stassen.⁴⁰ The aide-mémoire expressed appreciation of Turkish efforts in the field of collective security and recognized that this effort put a heavy burden on the Turkish economy. The basis for U.S. aid to Turkey was to help Turkey reach the NATO approved force goals. It was emphasized that

“assuming that the Congress indicates its approval of the planned addition to the world wide military assistance program which they now have under consideration, and assuming no extraordinary necessity for a redistribution of our over-all programs to meet critical emergencies which may arise elsewhere, and subject to review if important changes take place, the United States Government is prepared to increase the presently approved military assistance program by an amount to meet one fourth of the unfunded United States screened requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces to achieve NATO goals. This Government is further prepared to accelerate deliveries of items in the present pipeline of roughly one-half billion dollars of military equipment presently funded and programmed for Turkey.”

³⁸ Ibid, 943.

³⁹ Ibid, Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of the State, June 4, 1954, 944; Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Jernegan), June 2, 1954, 945; Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, June 4, 1954, 946; The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, June 5, 1954, 949.

⁴⁰ Dwight David Eisenhower Library (hereinafter cited as DDEL), White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, box 15, NSC 5510, US Policy on Turkey, February 14, 1955, Annex A, pp. 16-18.

Coming to economic aid, it was underlined in the document that “the US executive branch has requested the Congress for funds which would permit the furnishing of economic assistance to Turkey in the magnitude of 70 million dollars during the coming fiscal year” while further commitment for the following years with a specific amount was avoided. At this point, concern was also expressed regarding some negative developments in the Turkish economic situation and it was underlined that Prime Minister Menderes had committed Turkey to undertake measures to prevent any adverse development.

The above mentioned visit of Prime Minister Menderes and the way the two sides understood the commitments contained in the results had very important ramifications on the course of the relations between the two countries. Secretary Dulles’s above mentioned memorandum to the Embassy in Turkey⁴¹ ended with a phrase indicating that the amount of military aid for FY 1955 would be increased to 200 million USD instead of the previously planned 87 million USD. However, events would unfold in a different way in the next few months.

The Turkish Government insistently continued their pressure after the Prime Minister Menderes’s visit in June, and the Ambassador in Washington D.C., Feridun C. Erkin, visited the State Department officials on October 7, 1954, upon his return from Turkey. The Ambassador especially focused on how “the military assistance understandings of Menderes-Stassen communiqué”⁴² were being implemented. John Jernegan, from the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, explained that the U.S. clearly would not be able to provide the 200 million USD assistance discussed by Stassen and Menderes for this fiscal year. Jernegan expected that the Turks would understand

⁴¹ *The Secretary of the State to the Embassy in Turkey, June 5, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, vol. VIII, 949.*

⁴² *Ibid, Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, October 14, 1954, 950.*

the issue since the aide-mémoire was written with a wording that the aid amount for FY 1955 would be subject to Congressional action, which actually made substantial cuts in the whole military aid program. From the record of the discussion, it also becomes evident that during Prime Minister Menderes's visit in June 1954, the Turkish side approached the U.S. with a request for a 300 million USD loan. As the last point in the discussion, the Turkish Ambassador said he was under instructions from the Prime Minister to reopen the issue of this 300 million USD loan "in the light of Turkey's need." The cuts in the previously promised levels of military assistance as well as the re-introduction of the request for 300 million USD loan set the stage for a sour period in the U.S-Turkey relationship, and the aid issue would become the focal point of the relations until well into the end of Eisenhower Administration.

The insistence of the Turkish Government for larger aid amounts as well as the internal developments in U.S. to reduce foreign aid ignited comprehensive reviews of aid policies, and in this framework, the policy towards Turkey became more and more a point of discussion. However, until the NSC decision on the final shape of the policy toward Turkey, that is the NSC 5510/1; there were conflicting ideas within the Eisenhower administration regarding the policy toward Turkey. In the period immediately before the discussion of NSC 5510 in the National Security Council, Eisenhower became personally involved in these discussions for the first time, according to the available evidence, in his presidency, providing essential guidance on the policy toward Turkey. In a meeting of the NSC on January 5, 1955, Eisenhower said, in response to Secretary of Treasury Humphrey's remarks on the need to reduce U.S. aid levels on a global basis, Eisenhower said that "the real criterion with respect to the level of US economic assistance was the security

advantage which the United States obtained. He pointed out that US economic assistance to Turkey was the best possible way to buttress our security interests in the Near Eastern area. Moreover, it was much better and cheaper to assist the Turks to build up their own armed forces than to create additional US divisions.”⁴³ These remarks seemed to be a strong backing for Turkey in the face of its difficulties in military and economic spheres but by the time NSC 5510 was brought to discussion in February in the Council, the direction of the tide had changed. The process of discussion of NSC 5510 surfaced the tensions among U.S. government agencies since the alleged commitment of the U.S. to Turkey to meet in FY 1955 one –fourth of the requirements to bring Turkish armed forces to NATO standards (a modified U.S. tables of organization and equipment)⁴⁴ was an extremely hot potato. The Department of Defense, according to Jernegan’s letter, was complaining that such a commitment was made without any consultation with them and JCS went, in a memorandum by Admiral Arthur Radford to the Secretary of Defense on February 18, 1955, so far as “to question whether this Government made any commitment at all.” The JCS view was that “aside from the question of the extent, if any, to which the United States was committed to an increase by the aide-memoire of 4 June 1954, there is some doubt as to whether adequate funds will be available to meet the presently approved United States military assistance program for Turkey and, hence, little prospect of an early expansion of the program without seriously affecting other country programs.”⁴⁵ In other words, JCS was doubtful as to whether the current approved program would be financed as it should be, let alone an increase in the program.

⁴³ FRUS 1955-1957, vol.XXIV, *Editorial Note*, 608.

⁴⁴ Ibid, *Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)*, February 21, 1955, p. 610.

⁴⁵ Ibid, *Arthur Radford to Secretary of Defense re policy on Turkey*, February 18, 1955.

NSC meeting was held on February 24, 1954 and discussion focused on whether there was a commitment made by the United States. Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover underlined that the Department of State “felt, in view of the aide-mémoire of June 1954, that the United States had made a definite commitment to the Turkish Government, even if that commitment were qualified in some respects...Accordingly, it appeared to the State Department to be a question of the US honoring what, at least in Turkish eyes amounted to a firm commitment.” The Planning Board had prepared two policy alternatives on this point. The first alternative, which was suggested by the State department, FOA and ODM members and the CIA Adviser, read: “a. determine by April 1, 1955, as part of the review of military assistance programs called for by NSC 5434/1, how best to fulfill such commitment.” This meant acceptance of the content of the scope of the commitment of June 4, 1954 and to decide how to fulfill it. The second alternative was suggested by the PB members from Defense, Treasury, JCS and Budget Departments and it read: “a. determine by April 1, 1955, as part of military assistance programs called for by NSC 5434/1, the nature of such commitment and the extent to which the U.S. can fulfill it, taking into consideration: 1. whether necessary mutual security funds and equipment can be made available without seriously affecting other country programs. 2. The ability of Turkish armed forces to absorb the increased military assistance. 3. The necessity for not seriously harming the Turkish economy.”⁴⁶

Clearly, the State Department, on one hand, was concerned with the ramifications of diluting the commitment which in turn could end up creating a Turkish outcry for broken promises, and the Defense and JCS, on the other hand, claiming they had not been consulted at the time the commitment was made, were

⁴⁶ DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, box 15, *NSC 5510, US Policy on Turkey*, February 14, 1955, p. 13.

concerned with the already tight budgetary policies and a deficit-alert Congress which usually made substantial cuts in planned foreign aid levels. However, the President's intervention was critical at this point. He argued that the commitment was made without his explicit agreement and that he thought it to be a general and qualified one. Apart from this, he was doubtful whether Turkey could absorb even higher levels of assistance and Admiral Radford supported him on his point, arguing that his visit to Turkey in November 1954 demonstrated serious shortfalls in the Turkish military in terms of technical skills. Admiral Radford also underlined, as in his memoranda cited above, that such an increase as the commitment was argued to have made would not be possible without having an effect on other country programs. On the treasury side, Secretary Humphrey argued that the U.S had out committed itself and was concerned more with the enormous financial and economic problems Turkey posed for the U.S. rather than with the issue of whether a commitment was made or not. The conclusion of this part of the meeting on Turkey was the acceptance of the second alternative, as cited above, and that a high level expert group would immediately go to Turkey to study the problem in more detail, and specifically to calculate the costs of the conversion of Turkish armed forces to U.S. modified tables of organization and equipment.

The part of the meeting regarding economic assistance to Turkey was not less contentious, and Secretary Humphrey of Treasury was of the view that there was no use in the United States "bailing out" the Turks each successive time they got themselves into trouble. What was needed to do was to go over to Turkey and deal with the whole situation. Secretary Humphrey was, in a way, representing a hard-line within the Eisenhower Administration toward Turkey and defending tight policies. However, President Eisenhower drew the line saying that one should

remember the situation when the U.S. had made the promises to build up the economy and military of Turkey. At that time the U.S. was scared to death and only too glad to welcome Turkey as a military ally. Secretary of Defense Wilson supported the idea and opposed overemphasizing the concept of “cooling the Turks off” in their ambitions for rapid economic and military build up, since there were few nations which were really steamed up on the U.S. side against the Soviet Bloc. This point was reemphasized by both President Eisenhower and Admiral Radford who “warned the members of the Council not to overlook the fact, in their criticism of Turkey’s economic conditions, that the Turks were among the few people who had openly manifested the will to fight.”⁴⁷

The significance of NSC 5510/1, apart from its content, is that it is the first comprehensive document that sets the guiding principles of U.S. policy towards Turkey. It superseded NSC 42/1 and NSC 109, both of which were limited in scope and purpose.⁴⁸ However, with NSC 5510, the U.S. Government made the first revision of its statement of policy toward Turkey since prior to its joining NATO. It covered all areas of the relationship but focused mainly on the role to be played by Turkey in the Middle East area, the U.S. commitment regarding the assistance for the building up of Turkish Armed Forces, and Turkish economic difficulties.

NSC 5510 identifies Turkey as a natural ally, the most stable and anti-Soviet country in the Eastern Mediterranean and Near Eastern area able to make possible multiple security arrangements, a possible model for underdeveloped countries in terms of peaceful transformation from a tyrannical, inefficient and theocratic state into a modern state based on western cultural ideas and democratic forms of

⁴⁷ FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XXIV *Memorandum of Discussion at the 238th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 24, 1955*, pp. 612-619.

⁴⁸ NSC 42/1, *U.S. Objectives with Respect to Greece and Turkey to counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security*, FRUS, 1941, vol. VI, p. 269-279; NSC 109, *The Position of the United States with respect to Turkey*, FRUS, 1951, vol. V, p. 1151-1162.

government. Coming to the military aid issue, the document outlines that the Turkish expectation for a 4-year \$ 800 million program aiming at partial conversion of Turkish Armed Forces by 1958 to modified U.S. tables of organization and equipment would be impossible to finance considering the availability of U.S. funds, the global military assistance commitments of the U.S., the impact of such increase on Turkish economy and the questionable ability of Turkish Armed Forces to convert to mechanization so rapidly. As for the economic aid issue, the document outlined that any aid that would be provided to Turkey would be far less than \$ 300 million that has been sought for by the Turkish Government since Prime Minister Menderes's visit to the U.S. in June 1954. The document described the Turkish economic situation as being the result of living beyond means and careless debt policies, as well as the crop failures of 1954.

"Most if not all, of the adjustment needed to restore stability...could be obtained through fiscal and financial measures which would reduce investment and curtail credit but still allow a reasonable rate of economic progress. The problem is that the Turkish Government, while it has made some gestures in the direction of controlling inflationary pressures, has been reluctant to recognize the seriousness of the situation and to accept reasonable limitations on the rate of economic development. The Turkish Government has already turned to the United States in an attempt to obtain additional aid, and Turkish officials have taken the position that the U.S. is committed to extend Turkey a \$ 300 million loan. The U.S. has made no such commitment. In this situation we must expect continued difficulty in persuading the Turkish Government to take the necessary actions. In view of Turkey's special position as a staunch ally which has consistently withstood Soviet threats, the U.S. must consider carefully the effect of pressures and actions that would offend Turkish pride and adversely affect this basic US-Turkish relationship."

The above statements, along with the following objectives and courses of actions, set the stage in US-Turkey relations until the end of the Menderes era in May 1960, although new elements intervened in the period until then. The objectives, in connection with the above statements were as follows:

"a. Continuance of Turkey's independence, territorial integrity, identification with the free world, and will and ability to resist Communist invasion or subversion.

- b. Turkish armed forces capable of repelling attack by a Soviet satellite or of providing maximum practical resistance to direct Soviet attack as part of a concerted allied defense.
- c. Access by the United States and its allies to Turkish resources and military facilities necessary for the preservation and further strengthening of the free world and furthering the development of such arrangements in the Middle and Near East.
- d. Improved relations between Turkey and the Arab States.
- e. Achievement of a stable Turkish economy which, with maximum Turkish efforts, can support an increasingly greater share of defense expenditures, while maintaining investment outlays at realistic levels."

The courses of action identified to achieve these goals were to continue a program of substantial military aid which would firstly ensure the implementation of existing military facilities agreements and availability of Turkish facilities to U.S. and its allies in case of hostilities, and secondly to achieve and maintain Turkish forces in a state of readiness in order to be able to repel an attack by a Soviet satellite, or to provide maximum practical resistance to direct Soviet attack as part of a concerted allied defense. In other words, the priority for the U.S. had become the availability of the facilities and Turkish territory for its operations. On the economic side, the course of action identified by the document clearly sought to avoid any commitment and emphasized relying on Turkey to take, on its own, the necessary fiscal and financial measures, especially limiting its rate of development to one consistent with a viable economy. The possibility of a loan was also strictly prohibited in the document. The above course of action would be strictly observed by the U.S. Government in the following period, and consequently a new period in the U.S-Turkey relationship was being introduced. In other words, the honeymoon was over.

With NSC 5510, the U.S. Government agencies had a common guideline or policy ground in their dealings with Turks. The decisions in NSC 5510 not to consider any increase in the present levels of economic aid created violent reaction on the side of the Turkish Government, as soon as this policy was made known to them. On April 21, 1955, the U.S. ambassador reported a conversation where Prime

Minister Menderes violently criticized the U.S. rejection of further aid and went so far as to say that “...the logical conclusion of our (the United States) approach would be that since we can not change his policy, we would have to change the government.” Menderes also indicated that his Government intended to drop the economic aid issue as a whole and warned that “Turkey could get along and would confound our predictions. He was sure our refusal to help Turkey in her time of need would long remain to trouble our conscience.”⁴⁹

However, the Turkish Government could not drop the issue in any way and decided to send Fatin Rüştü Zorlu to Washington to make another push for further aid. George Allen of the State Department gathered a group of interdepartmental experts on May 18, 1955 to discuss the road map in the discussions with the Turkish team and also to discuss the conclusions of the report of the “Interagency Committee on Turkish Economic Problems”, called for by NSC. The concrete points to be pressed for in the negotiations with Turks were, 1. qualitative and quantitative control by the Central Bank over credit; 2. bringing the overall budget into approximate balance, including the expenditures for State enterprises, 3. measures to expand the export of Turkish products and to improve the competitive position of Turkish exports on the world market, 4. eventual elimination of control of imports and foreign exchange.⁵⁰ John Parke Young, who was the chairman of the Interagency Committee and who made the above summary of reform agenda, also explained that these recommendations were informally discussed with IMF officials and agreed to by them. Thus, the U.S. was starting to involve the IMF in trying to

⁴⁹ FRUS 1955-1957, vol. XXIV, *Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for political Affairs (Murphy) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford), Washington, March 15, 1955*, pp. 628-629; *Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, April 1, 1955*, pp. 629-630; *Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, April 21, 1955*, pp. 630- 632.

⁵⁰ Ibid, *Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 18, 1955*, p.324.

persuade Turkey for economic reform. While the meeting ended without concrete recommendations, it became clear that the State Department team which was going to negotiate with Zorlu under the leadership of George Allen, did not have much room for maneuver beyond categorically denying Turkish request for loan and kindly asking for devaluation as a precondition for additional support, if any.

Mr. Zorlu met George Allen and his team on May 19. From the first moment, the difference between the negotiation points of the two sides was dramatic. The U.S. view point was that the measures deemed necessary by the U.S. to ensure a stable economy and low inflation had not yet been taken by Turkey and that the problems were not of a temporary nature which could be easily dealt with by the help of a large cash loan. Consequently, the Administration did not intend to suggest the Congress to vote for such a loan. In response, the Turkish position was that the amount asked for was made necessary because of the crop failure of the previous year and the Turkish representative Mr. Zorlu claimed that political aspects should also be considered since a purely budgetary view could endanger Turkey's future.

The meeting resumed the following day, where the U.S. position was put forward even stronger. George Allen informed Zorlu that there was no hope for the \$ 300 million loan requested by Turkey. In the course of the discussion where State Department and Treasury Department officials also joined, Zorlu was forced to guarantee that the intention of the Turkish Government in asking for a loan was not to finance the debts owed to the European creditors, which was a concern for the U.S. officials. The reason for this concern was that Turkey , because of its foreign exchange difficulties, was unable to pay the European creditors for the capital goods that were imported at a high rate until 1954, and because of these arrearages, flow of materials and goods from Europe was slowing down.

During the talks, Zorlu also visited Secretary Dulles, and Dulles only reiterated the known position of the U.S. regarding the loan, aside from “appreciating the excellent work of Turks at Bandung”. Dulles said overtly that “a prerequisite to any additional aid would be United States satisfaction that present difficulties are not of a recurring nature.”⁵¹ Zorlu, who was then Deputy Prime Minister, had led the Turkish Delegation in the Bandung Conference which took place from 18 April to 24 April 1955, a month before Zorlu’s arrival Washington D.C. The conference was the ground for a showdown between Zorlu and the Indian Prime Minister Nehru. In the conference, Turkey defended NATO and in general the Western Bloc and thus started a confrontation with those states who were against any blocs and adopted neutralism as the guiding principle of their foreign policy. These countries perceived Turkey as the speaker of the West and therefore were quite uneasy.⁵² Interestingly, even Zorlu later confessed that Turkey participated in the conference upon the insistence of its Western allies and to speak for them.⁵³ In his speech in the Turkish Grand National Assembly during the talks on 1956 budget, he said “the mission that falls upon us is clear. We will defend our own policy and our own position first ourselves and with our friends. We went there (Bandung) at the last minute. Our allies really wanted our participation and they said ‘please go, it will be bad if you do not participate’.”⁵⁴ If the Turkish team participated at the Bandung Conference at the last minute upon the insistence of its allies, one might well argue that Zorlu might have felt strong with his negotiation point because Turkey had not disappointed her friends a month earlier on an important issue.

⁵¹ FRUS 1955-1957, vol.XXIV, *Memorandum of a conversation, Department of States, Washington, May 18, 1955*, pp. 632-637; *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, Washington, May 21, 1955*, pp.637-639.

⁵² Mehmet Gönlübol, et. al. *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1995* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), 274-276, translated from Turkish.

⁵³ Ibid., 275.

⁵⁴ Quoted in Ibid, p. 276.

The day after his visit to Dulles, Zorlu asked to see Allen with a small group and it was then already evident that a bitter stage in the talks had become unavoidable. In the course of this meeting, Zorlu said that “if this (no) was the answer, he would have to tell his Government that the United States would not help Turkey in its time of need....He believed that the United States would not be acting in its own best interests if it made a decision which would weaken a country so important to free world and to United States objectives as is Turkey.”⁵⁵ Actually, these remarks, albeit weakly, point to an expectation of the Turkish side that an uncompromising alignment with the West at the cost of confrontation with newly appearing neutral states could give Zorlu a stronger hand in his search for extraordinary U.S. economic support in the form of a large loan.

While Zorlu fought hard in Washington D.C., Prime Minister Menderes was pressuring the U.S. ambassador on the grounds that the economic situation was deteriorating and said “the country and its friends now face the risk of having to work with a government whose people become in a national sense, there’s no telling what may happen”. According to Menderes, the fight between his Government and the opposition over the economic situation and “interchanges of polemics would do nobody good, unless it is the Soviets.”⁵⁶ Menderes was accompanied by Bayar in putting forward the Soviet card, but it seemed that the U.S. analysis of the Turkish internal political situation was sound enough not to give much credit to these tactics.

Deputy Prime Minister Zorlu was still in Washington by June 7, when the Ambassador visited the Prime Minister in Ankara, and the following day he made a final push for the 300 million USD loan. The U.S. team, led by Deputy Under

⁵⁵ FRUS 1955-1957, vol.XXIV, *Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 21, 1955*, pp. 639- 642.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, *Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, June 7, 1955*; p. 645.

Secretary Robert Murphy, informed the Turkish Delegation that the U.S. decided to increase the amount of grant economic aid to Turkey by 30 million USD from 70 million to 100 million USD. This also meant, Zorlu was informed, the confirmation that the request for 300 million USD loan was definitely rejected.⁵⁷ Zorlu was told “1. that the increased allocation was taken in confident expectation that the Turks would formulate and implement a comprehensive economic reform program and 2. that the level of future aid would depend on the effectiveness of the reform measures as well as on the amount of funds appropriated and on worldwide requirements.”⁵⁸ The significance of this was that US aid was becoming conditional upon Turkey’s taking economic reform measures. The U.S. did not want to feel like pouring money down a black hole.

The Turkish side was thankful but not happy.⁵⁹ However, Zorlu returned to Turkey. Interestingly, the new Ambassador Haydar Gök, tried in late June to reopen the talk of a 300 million USD loan during his courtesy visits to State Department officials Hoover and Allen. This presented another opportunity for the U.S. side to confirm the rejection of such a request and to reiterate the U.S. position that Turkey had to depend on herself to solve her economic problems, mainly by limiting its ambitions for rapid economic development.⁶⁰

This did not mean that Turkish hopes for the loan were exhausted. U.S. officials had to reemphasize several times in the course of the year 1955 that no such loan would be forthcoming and had to respond to criticisms of the highest level Turkish authorities that the U.S. officials did not understand the “strategic

⁵⁷ Ibid., *Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 8, 1955*; p. 647-648.

⁵⁸ DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, box 15, *Progress Report re NSC 5510/I*, September 7, 1955, p. 2

⁵⁹ FRUS 1955-1957, vol.XXIV, *Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 8, 1955*; p.648.

⁶⁰ Ibid., *Telegram from the State Department to the Embassy in Turkey, Washington, July 2, 1955*; p. 649.

importance of Turkey” and that they did not take into account the broader views of the relations between the two countries.⁶¹

The issue of Turkey’s deteriorating economic situation was brought back onto the National Security Council on November 3, 1955, on the occasion of the Progress Report on Policy on Turkey and was discussed thoroughly. There was a split in the council on whether to provide Turkey additional aid and on the importance of Turkey. The idea of negotiating a comprehensive package with Turkey was put forward and seemed to gain weight. However, no clear decision came out except for “noting that an interdepartmental committee at the Assistant Secretary level is developing a US position for early negotiations with Turkey on the Turkish military and economic situation and US aid programs related thereto.”⁶²

The deadlock continued into 1956, with mutual maneuvering and the Turkish Government invited Clarence Randall, then the Chairman of Council on Foreign Economic Policy, in early 1956 to advise on economic matters. Randall arrived in Turkey on January 28th and left the country on February 11th, 1956. Just as Randall was on his way to Ankara with his staff, Prime Minister Menderes announced a new economic program that included tight budgetary controls, strict control on Central Bank credits, self- dependency for state enterprises, control of agricultural subsidies and control on the flow of foreign exchange.⁶³ The measures were very much of the kind being asked for by the U.S. Government for a long time and Randall saw this as a new beginning for the Turkish Government over their old practices and a new basis on which to consider the problem of Turkish economy. His findings and recommendations were as follows:

⁶¹ Ibid., *Memorandum of a Conversation, Ankara, September 14, 1955*; p. 650-653.

⁶² Ibid., *Memorandum of Discussion at the 264th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 3, 1955*; p. 653-657.

⁶³ Ibid., *Letter From the President’s Special Consultant (Randall) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey) and the Under Secretary of State (Hoover), Washington, March 6, 1956.*; pp.669-673.

1. Contrary to the general view prevailing in U.S. Government circles, Randall believed it would not be possible to convince Turks to reduce their foreseen force structure. The issue of U.S. commitment also needed to be clarified urgently so that a sound basis for planning could be formed.

2. In the short-term, Randall believed the Turkish economy was in a difficult position and suggested, emphasizing his opposition to a soft loan, that the grant aid amount for Fiscal Year 1956 be brought to FY 1955 level, which was 100 million USD.

3. As for the short-term debt problem, Randall recommended that OEEC should become instrumental, by bringing together potential creditors and Turkish Government, in Turkey's efforts to borrow money especially for capital goods. As for long-term debts, Randall's recommendation was to convince Turkey for an IMF program, a component of which would be the refinancing of the long-term debt.

4. Randall deliberately avoided even mentioning the word "devaluation", seemingly not to jeopardize his personal relationship with Prime Minister Menderes, and recommended that the pressure for devaluation of the Turkish lira should build itself up from within the Turkish Government rather than imposed from outside.⁶⁴

Following Randall's return and subsequent decisions in Washington, the Turkish Government was officially informed that "...the U.S. supports the announced stabilization program and it was urged to consult the IMF on monetary and foreign debt problems, as recommended by Mr. Randall."⁶⁵

However, Washington was careful about the signals from Ankara and had the impression that the Turkish government was trying another tactic to ensure increased

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, box 15, *Progress Report re NSC 5510/1*, April 5, 1956, p. 4.

aid from the U.S. and that the Turkish expectation for a large loan still survived.⁶⁶ Randall submitted another report in mid April in which he made more specific recommendations. By this time, the economic crisis in Turkey had reached its climax and Randall reported that the country was not able to finance its POL⁶⁷ requirements so he suggested that a 13 million USD part of the aid allocation for Turkey be urgently used to finance Turkey's POL requirements for the next three months. The U.S. Government immediately implemented this recommendation, although it was totally an exceptional case in terms of the use of the funds and it meant that the U.S. started to directly "bail out" the Turkish economy.⁶⁸

The National Security Council meeting of May 17th was a crucial milestone in U.S. policies towards Turkey. In the meeting, Secretary of State Dulles openly took issue with President Eisenhower and complained about the slow pace of decision making on such issues as Turkey's economic problems. The core of the issue was that a committee had been established nearly a year before to review the economic strength of certain countries as Turkey and to come up with recommendations about the military force these countries could support. Dulles argued that the policy in place for the last five years that was introduced against the Soviet moves against such countries as Turkey, Greece and Iran was putting so much strain on the economy of, for example, Turkey that, in the end, the U.S. was going to end up with two disagreeable choices. One was to start financing the whole effort of Turkey which would amount to 400 million USD a year or to make drastic cuts in the military force structure of Turkey. President Eisenhower said what the draft report of the Prochnow Committee demonstrated, as outlined by Under Secretary Hoover, was

⁶⁶ FRUS 1955-1957, vol.XXIV, *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, Washington, March 8, 1956*; pp. 674-675.

⁶⁷ Petroleum, oil, lubricants.

⁶⁸ Ibid., *Letter from the President's Special Consultant (Randall) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey) and the Under Secretary of State (Hoover), Washington, April 17, 1956*; pp. 675-677.

that the cost of the program for Turkey would amount to 2 billion USD over the next five years, in which case it had to be kept in mind that Turkey was one of the many claimants on U.S.⁶⁹

Dulles, in response, complained about the lengthy process and said “we already know the broad answer to the Turkish problem. No one, however, has received any authority yet to recommend what we should do in response to the Turkish problem.”⁷⁰ Eisenhower, while strictly defending the process, agreed with Dulles and Humphrey in that “..we were probably in a position to make a decision on the case of Turkey.”⁷¹

The significance of this discussion was that, as a result of the findings of the Progress Report prepared by the Planning Board⁷² it was the first time the Eisenhower Administration officially started discussing the reduction of planned Turkish force levels as a long-term solution for Turkey’s economic problems. Maintenance of a large military establishment beyond a country’s means was, according to members of Eisenhower Administration and Eisenhower himself, destructive for the economy of a country and thus should be avoided. However, since the report of Prochnow Committee had not yet been completed, the Council did not take any action but “noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board, with particular reference to the economic burden imposed upon Turkey by the current plans for Turkish Armed Forces.”⁷³ In other words, while the Turkish situation was repeatedly defined as critical and

⁶⁹ Ibid., *Memorandum of Discussion at the 285th Meetings of the National Security Council, Washington, May 17, 1956*; pp. 680-685.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, box 15, *Progress Report re NSC 5510/1*, April 5, 1956.

⁷³ FRUS 1955-1957, vol.XXIV, *Memorandum of Discussion at the 285th Meetings of the National Security Council, Washington, May 17, 1956*; pp. 680-685.

requiring immediate solution, another NSC deliberation had ended without a clear conclusion and policy guidance.

What was referred to as the Prochnow Committee was officially called “The Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programmes” and consisted of Herbert Prochnow (chairman), Karl Harr, Andrew Overby and John Ohly.⁷⁴ The Report was referred to as NSC Document 5610 and was submitted on August 3, 1956. The report analyzed the situation with regards to six countries which included Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Taiwan, Vietnam and Thailand. The country report on Turkey took as the basis “the basic requirements established for Turkish forces in support of NATO defensive operations and do not reflect additional requirements which might be generated by the Baghdad Pact and for new weapons.”⁷⁵ The country report on Turkey recommended that the Administration

1. Determine the extent of the military build up necessary to achieve U.S. military objectives in Turkey,
2. Determine whether a rate of economic aid to Turkey of \$ 100 million to \$ 200 per year for an indeterminate period is acceptable for planning purposes.
3. Consider whether the rate of military build-up should be contingent upon progress towards economic and financial stability and
4. Determine whether the Turks should be advised of our military and economic aid intentions on a year-to year basis or on a longer term basis.⁷⁶

This last point was important in light of the sensitivity of the Eisenhower Administration against commitments to be made to foreign governments about aid issues. The sensitivity was such that President Eisenhower gave a directive, which

⁷⁴ DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 18, NSC 5610- Rpt by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain US Aid Programs

⁷⁵ Ibid., Turkey Country Report, p.2.

⁷⁶ Ibid., Turkey Country Report, p.4.

became NSC Action 1550, the purpose of which was “to insure that the United States does not make commitments, express or implied, to furnish funds, goods or services to foreign governments without” the fulfillment of certain criteria and this directive was to be implemented throughout the whole range of U.S. Government departments⁷⁷. Eisenhower had learned a bitter lesson from the issue of commitment to Turkey.

As a result of the complicated picture presented in the report of the Prochnow Committee, the OCB recommended in the Progress Report of November 7, 1956 that the existing policy statement on Turkey (NSC 5510) be reviewed by the NSC “because of the operational problems that require policy decisions affecting the scope and magnitude of future military and economic assistance for Turkey”.⁷⁸ Thus, the U.S. officially started the preparations to change its aid policy to Turkey since the inception of Truman Aid. The Planning Board of NSC started its work and the new policy draft could be ready in early 1957, as will be seen in the next chapter.

The second overall policy objective for Turkey, which was to build a chain of alliances, proceeded positively until well into 1955. In the Balkan Pact, the Yugoslav and Turkish sides could not agree on defense planning, which was an indication for the Turkish side for the developing lack of will of Yugoslavs. More importantly, however, problems between Turkey and Greece over the Cypriot problem dealt a major blow to cooperation within the framework of Balkan Pact.⁷⁹ In the Northern Tier, on the other hand, Turkey obtained more successful results, concluding a

⁷⁷ DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 18, Guidance for the Implementation of NSC Action 1550 re Aid Programs, October 5, 1956.

⁷⁸ DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 15, Progress Report re NSC 5510, November 7, 1956.

⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 2.

Mutual Defense Pact with Iraq on February 24, 1955⁸⁰; brought Pakistan and Iran into it on September 23 and November 3, 1955, respectively.⁸¹ In striking contracts to the tension experienced in the aid issue, Turkey and the United States had a very positive cooperation in the regional security arrangements. Starting from Dulles's 1953 visits to Middle East, the U.S. and especially Dulles paid a very high degree of importance to the views of the Turkish Government about the situation the Middle East. The belligerent tone in the analyses of Menderes and Bayar about the Middle East, strict opposition to Soviet existence and influence in that part of the world led Dulles to believe the Turkish claims of leadership in the region. The end result was that U.S. analysis of the Middle East situation excessively relied on the Turkish vision, and ended up distorted because of a not-so-accurate claim of leadership by Turkey.

The policy objective, on which virtually no problem had been experienced was the one relating to the access by the U.S. to Turkish military installations facilities. The U.S. had full access to those facilities and this point was underlined as the most satisfactory point in the bilateral relations. Even when problems occurred because of the aid issues and U.S. pressures on Turkey to agree with IMF, "Turkish willingness to share with the U.S. its resources and military facilities continued unchanged, and there was no attempt to use existing arrangements, through which U.S. derives very substantial benefit, in bargaining for increased aid."⁸²

⁸⁰ DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 15, Progress Report re NSC 5510, September 7, 1955.

⁸¹ DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 15, Progress Report re NSC 5510, April 4, 1956.

⁸² DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 15, Progress Report re NSC 5510, November 7, 1956.

Processes and Constraints

From the inception of the 1st Eisenhower Administration in early January 1953 to the end of 1956, two basic trends in the processes of U.S. policy making can be distinguished. In the first which continued from early 1953 to early 1955, the Eisenhower Administration did not have a specific policy tool for Turkey. The reason for the most part was that Eisenhower was trying to formulate and implement an overall strategy to fight the Cold War. It was in mid-1954 that Turkey, mainly because of its economic problems and ambitions for rapid economic and military development, for both of which it relied on the U.S., started posing a problem for the U.S. and it was thus decided that an overall policy was required for Turkey. The end result was NSC Document 5510, which was promulgated in February 28, 1955.

There is an abundance of works dealing with exact process of policy making within NSC.⁸³ Therefore, only a brief explanation of the process of decision making on Turkey will be given here.

Under NSC, a Planning Board consisting of representatives of various departments such as State, Treasury, Defense and JCS would prepare the policy drafts to be discussed at NSC meetings. The draft policy statements would be sent to each individual department concerned to receive their feedback and in case disagreement appeared over a certain statement of policy, the draft paper would include alternative statements to be decided at the NSC Meeting. Then the draft statement would be discussed at the NSC Meeting where President Eisenhower would make use of individual views of members and of their discussions. Eisenhower always shaped the contours of the debate, however, and it was always

⁸³ Most notables are Bowie, Robert R. & Richard Immerman. *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) and Bose, Meena. *Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy: The National Security Decision making of Eisenhower and Kennedy*. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998).

him who had the final say on the way the draft statements would be finalized and adopted.

Once the policy paper was adopted for implementation, a body called the Operations Coordinating Board would coordinate the implementation, communicating the policy paper to concerned departments. The OCB again consisted of the representatives of various government departments and it was also responsible for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the policy, through the preparation of regular Progress Reports. These Progress Reports would be discussed at NSC meetings and action would be taken, in line with the President's final decisions, upon the recommendations of the Report.

While the above mentioned process worked quite effectively and along the lines Eisenhower would like it to work, it was quite a lengthy process and fell short of being responsive. Individuals within the U.S. Government started alerting the Administration on the Turkish economic difficulties starting from late 1953 but it took more than a year for the NSC to consider the situation in detail and to come up with a coherent policy statement. The consequence was that in the meantime where there was a lack of consistent policy statement, there were different policy statements made and commitments given, such as the infamous commitment of June 5, 1954 made by Harold Stassen to Prime Minister Menderes, which turned out to constitute enormous problems in bilateral relations. Although by the end of Eisenhower's first-term an overall policy had been in implementation, the second term would present more challenges for Eisenhower and the United States.

CHAPTER 3

US and TURKEY, 1957-1961

Changes in US policy and constraints

At the end of 1956, the general opinion ruling among the members of the Eisenhower Administration was that the policy toward Turkey needed revision and as a result, the process of formulating a new policy statement was initiated at the end of 1956. Already by November 1955, the prospect of early negotiations with Turkey on Turkish military and economic problems and the related US aid programs was discussed in the NSC.⁸⁴ The comprehensive discussion and decision on a possible change in the policy, however, was pending what was called “the Prochnow Committee Report”, or “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain US Aid Programs”, which was only partially submitted as of May 1956 and in final form only in December 1956. Only after the Prochnow Report became available that the NSC was able to take action and the Planning Board was asked to prepare a report on Turkish aid programs, based on the recommendations of the said Report. Still, it was not before the meeting on March 17, 1957 that the report, NSC 5708 could be discussed at the NSC in the presence of President Eisenhower. Regarding the military aid, the main recommendation of the NSC 5708 was that “the rate of military build-up should take into account Turkish capabilities to absorb and support the military program.”⁸⁵ On the

⁸⁴ FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XXIV, *Memorandum of Discussion at the 264th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 24, 1955*, p. 657.

⁸⁵ DDEL, NSC Series, Policy Papers Sub-series, Box 20, NSC 5708/2, *U.S. Policy Toward Turkey, U.S. Policy Toward Turkey, NSC 5708, February 26, 1957*, p. 4.

economic aid, it was recommended “to continue to encourage to take reform measures at home to put the economy in a better shape, and to provide economic aid in minimum amounts calculated to maintain maximum economic pressure for economic reforms...”⁸⁶ Based on what the Prochnow Report and NSC 5708 outlined, the discussion March 17 meeting focused on the possibility of a reduction in the projected Turkish force levels and the need on the part of the Turkish Government to put its own economy in order. Eisenhower remarked that if the countries the U.S. assists fail to take certain measures to solve their own problems in the economic field, then the U.S. would have to alter its policy course. He added that if Turkey persisted to take such measures, they could not be called “staunch” allies, as Turkey was consistently depicted throughout NSC policy documents. Eisenhower, also building upon the recommendations of Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford, ordered that a new policy statement should be prepared regarding the policy toward Turkey, that the new policy should state that the U.S. military assistance to Turkey should be based on the assumption that Turkey will make some progress toward economic and financial stability and that General Lauris Norstad, SACEUR, should be contacted as soon as possible to initiate talks with the Turkish Government to persuade them to a lower level for their armed forces.⁸⁷

The National Security Council:

...

b. Directed the Planning Board to prepare for subsequent Council consideration a new statement of policy on Turkey, to supersede NSC 5510/1, in the light of the discussion at the meeting with particular reference to:

1. Prompt discussion with General Norstad as to the possibility of achieving a reduction in the NATO approved force level for Turkey, in phase with the availability of *advanced weapons to the Turkish Armed Forces*.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 5.

⁸⁷ FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XXIV, *Memorandum of Discussion at the 316th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 17, 1957*, p. 709.

2. Provision of economic aid of not more than \$ 100 million annually, unless Turkey takes reasonable steps towards stabilizing its economy and a realistic rate of exchange.
3. Making clear that the entire U.S. assistance program to Turkey is based on the assumption that Turkey will make progress toward stabilization and a realistic rate of exchange.⁸⁸

This meant that Eisenhower decided a major policy shift in U.S. policy by conditioning not only economic but also the military assistance to Turkey on economic reform in Turkey; by instructing a search for possible reduction in Turkish force levels in company with *advanced* weapons. *Advanced* weapons, as the subsequent correspondence carried out by Eisenhower demonstrates, meant nuclear forces and it was the first time that the issue of nuclear forces was coming onto the agenda of U.S. –Turkish relations.

Policy objectives

The Planning Board, as instructed by the President prepared a new draft statement on U.S. policy toward Turkey (NSC 5708/2), along the lines of the conclusions of March 17 meeting and the new document was discussed during the meeting on June 26, 1957. The core of the discussion focused on the statements regarding a possible modification of Turkish force levels. Eisenhower had a leading role in these discussions and the following objectives and actions were finally approved as NSC 5708/2.

- a. Continuance of Turkey's independence, territorial integrity, identification with the Free World, and will and ability to resist Communist invasion or subversion.
- b. Continued Turkish cooperation in NATO and in strengthening other Free World regional security arrangements.
- c. Continued maintenance of Turkish armed forces capable of resisting direct Soviet attack apart of a concerted allied defense, withstanding an assault by satellite forces, protecting the vitally important Straits, protecting Turkey's southern flank, and maintaining internal security; thereby also assisting Baghdad Pact defense.
- d. Continued access by the United States and its allies to Turkish resources and military facilities necessary for the preservation and further strengthening of the Free World.
- e. Improved relations with Greece, the Arab states and Israel.
- f. Achievement of a stable Turkish economy which can support and increasingly greater share of its defense expenditures, while maintaining investment outlays at realistic levels.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 709-710.

The objectives did not seem to have changed much in comparison to those in NSC 5510. But it can be quickly observed that there was a new emphasis on Turkish self-sufficiency in defense expenditures, and “realistic investment outlays”. A new element also was improved relations with Greece, which made its way into the policy agenda after deterioration of Turkish-Greek relations over the Cyprus issue.

The real change in policy, however, was hidden in the “General Considerations” and “Major Policy Guidance” parts, respectively. The most striking element mentioned in the general considerations was that Turkey should be provided advanced weapons.

Overall military planning for the defense of NATO is based on the provision by the United States of advanced weapons to NATO members. Accordingly it is in the US interest to provide for Turkey such advanced weapons as are essential to accomplish the NATO mission in Turkey, taking into consideration the availability of US resources and Turkey’s technical capabilities to absorb such weapons. The provision of such weapons in Turkey may remove the feeling of disappointment held by Turkish leaders regarding the fulfillment of the US 1954 commitment for military aid, and also may afford the basis for a joint reevaluation of Turkish military requirements.⁹⁰

The part on policy guidance, that is, courses of action to be followed, included other important new elements:

...
Deal in a friendly yet realistic manner with the Turks, making clear that the entire U.S assistance program to Turkey is based on the assumption that Turkey will make progress toward economic stabilization and a realistic rate of exchange.

...
The total military aid program for Turkey for the period FY 1957-1960 should provide for appropriate advanced weapons, for appropriate conventional equipment, and for recurring costs. The United States should review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO approved force levels for Turkey and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish Armed Forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements.

...
Encourage the Turkish Government to take more effective actions to stabilize the economy and establish a realistic rate of exchange in order that Turkey’s own resources as well as assistance can be more effectively utilized and progress made toward the creation of a stronger economy.⁹¹

⁸⁹ DDEL, NSC Series, Policy Papers Sub-series, Box 20, NSC 5708/2-US Policy Toward Turkey, June 29, 1957.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 8.

⁹¹ Ibid, pp. 3-9.

In sum, the new policy elements were that the United States identified devaluation of the Turkish lira as an explicit policy, tied the whole assistance program to Turkey's economic reform actions and decided to provide *advanced* weapons to Turkey, in order to pave the way for a reduction of projected force levels for Turkey.

Actions and problems

The policy to provide Turkey with advanced weapons, in fact, meant nuclear forces to be installed in Turkey, paving the way for the Jupiter deployment in the subsequent years. The reason that *advanced weapons* is interpreted as nuclear weapons in this thesis actually stems from the fact that the United States started searching for such possibilities even before the approval of NSC 5708/2 in June. Two months before the adoption of this document, on March 26, 1957 Ambassador Fletcher Warren wrote to the State Department, in response to a request by the Department, that "added sense of military security resulting from stationing combined American indigenous atomic task force in Turkey would outweigh political risks arising from propaganda charges that we were preparing Turkey to be atomic battleground".⁹² The Ambassador commented that:

The Turkish military will be receptive to the idea of stationing an American ground force with an atomic capability in Turkey for substantially the same reasons that they were receptive to the stationing of a USAF all weather fighter squadron and radar unit here. They consider that a ground⁹³ atomic capability is required for the survival of Turkey and would realized that under present conditions too only way in which such atomic capability could become available to Turkey quickly would be through the stationing of appropriate US forces in this country. The Turkish Government is aware that it is going to receive 2 Honest John battalions under the FY 57 program. The Turkish military will know that these 2 Honest John battalions will be inadequate to provide the degree of fire support essential to effective defense. They will estimate that *the addition of atomic capable force under consideration* will greatly enhance their defensive capability and for that reason will look favorably on the offer. The proposal that the American unit be phased out of Turkey in FY 60 will serve to reduce such reluctance as the Turkish Government and people may have to

⁹² FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XXIV, *Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, March 26, 1957*, p. 713.

⁹³ While the word "ground" could remind us of purely tactical systems then in use by the US Army, it should also be kept in mind that Jupiter systems had been developed by and in 1957 was still being managed by the US Army.

permit foreign military forces, as such, on Turkish territory. If the weapons and the equipment brought in by the American force will ultimately be made available to Turkey, as well as the permanent installations developed in support of them, and if the stationing of the American force is utilized to provide on the job training for Turkish personnel, the attractiveness of the offer for the Turkish Government would, of course, be correspondingly increased.

In other words, by March 1957, Eisenhower Administration was considering the deployment of an atomic task force in Turkey, in addition to and beyond the nuclear capable Honest John system. The hints provided in the Ambassador's letter as to the way the prospective deployment would be carried out are highly reminiscent of the way, except for the timescale, the Jupiter deployment was actually carried out in Turkey. The period also coincides exactly with the initiation of the talks between the US and Britain on the deployment of the Thor missile system to Britain.⁹⁴

The logic of the new emphasis by the US on the provision of such advanced weapons to Turkey was an extension of Eisenhower's overall national security concept. Soon after the adoption of NSC 5708/2, unlike during his previous term in the office, he took personal action in the implementation of the policy toward Turkey and wrote a letter to General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. In his letter of July 15, 1957, to General Norstad, Eisenhower wrote that he was concerned with the economic situation in Turkey which was aggravated by the amount of military force being maintained in this country. In the letter, Eisenhower outlined four points that also clearly set his conceptual framework for the role of the United States in NATO and collective security:

... There are certain facts of life that must be recognized if we are to carry on a collective security program effectively and continuously.

1. One of these points is the indispensable element of Western collective security, although it must be supported by those other elements of political and military strength

⁹⁴ Philip Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Jupiters, 1957-1963* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 9-10.

- and unity to deter the Communists from attempting to take over Western lands by political action or limited military power.
2. WE must insure that military organization and force programs within each allied nation are properly related to the impact of advance weapons systems and to the contribution of the whole security apparatus to the security of the individual member nation.
 3. We must make certain that each recipient country is technically capable of absorbing, maintaining and exploiting advanced material and new weapon systems, as well as such conventional forces as may be required for the joint strategy and that it carries a fair share of economic burden of collective defense. I repeat that such force levels must take into account the first two facts I have stated above.
 4. We must like wise always remember that the resources of the United States are not unlimited; moreover, the sustained economic health and vigor of the United States is important to each one of the NATO nations.⁹⁵

From this conceptual framework, Eisenhower proceeded to compare the military force of Turkey as it was before the start of American assistance in 1947 and as it was by 1957. Eisenhower emphasized that although Turkey carried out a significant modernization of its armed forces through U.S. assistance and although it made use of the overall security provided by NATO and the growing U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability, force level goals for Turkey had increased after NATO membership, which seemed “an illogical end result which requires careful appraisal.”⁹⁶ He wrote:

I am aware of the impact upon local sensibilities that can result from an attempt to reduce United States supported force levels. On the other hand, it is essential that our limited resources be applied in such fashion as to achieve the greatest possible security for least cost. In this connection, one of my principal responsibilities to the American people is to insure hard-headed economies are observed in connection with these same security expenditures. Failure on my part to do this could easily result in the collapse of our entire aid program. Exercise of this responsibility leads me to question the need for conventional forces in Turkey now being maintained and our wisdom in supporting these levels.⁹⁷

The point these thoughts were leading to was that the United States should seek to reduce overseas indigenous forces supported by military assistance and convince the allies to rely more on the American nuclear umbrella against military attack. He emphasized that this effort should not be rushed by unilateral action but aim at introducing phased reductions in parallel to the impact of modern weapons systems. He added that a major effort should be made by the United States to

⁹⁵ FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XXIV, *Letter from the President to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe (Norstad), Washington, July 15, 1957*, pp. 727-730.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 729.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 729.

persuade those allies whose economies could not support the targeted military establishments to put more reliance on the nuclear deterrent and to accept smaller but more powerful forces that would meet the objectives of collective security.⁹⁸

While Eisenhower drew a new policy line regarding the policy toward Turkey, events that developed in 1957 pushed this to lower levels of the policy agenda. Throughout the fall of 1957, there was an intense crisis between Syria and Turkey, to which the United States and the Soviet Union became party. The crisis developed slowly from spring 1957 and Turkey was accusing Syria of obtaining more weaponry from the Soviet Unions that it could use itself. Syria in return accused Turkey of having designs towards its territory. In August, Syrian expelled three American diplomats and the crisis escalated. On September 10th, 1957, The Soviet premier Bulganin delivered a note to Turkey, including accusations of designs of aggression towards Syria. Prime Minister returned replied on September 30th with a much sharper note and some border skirmishes took place on 8th October. On October 9th, Khrushchev accused Dulles of encouraging Turkey for aggression and contended that Turkey's resistance would not last more than a day in the case of a war. The State Department responded to this threat by declaring that the U.S. would stand by Turkey against aggression. The crisis, however, subsided after talks in the UN General Assembly while the tension remained high for several months.⁹⁹

Another development was the early elections in Turkey on October 27, 1957, which kept the Menderes Government in power with 48 % of the votes and with a reduced majority in the Parliament. However, the elections caused an increased political tension in the country with claims of fraud by the Government.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 729-730.

⁹⁹ *Gönlübol*, pp. 290-300.

Public protests after the elections in certain spots such as Gaziantep indicated that the Government would face a stronger opposition in the Parliament, while popular support for Menderes and the Democratic Party could no more be taken for granted.¹⁰⁰

Following the elections, when Menderes and Zorlu came together with U.S. officials for the first time in Paris during the NATO summit, they launched a new drive for U.S. assistance to overcome Turkish economic difficulties, seemingly seeking financing for the DP's new term in power. The two met the Secretary of State Dulles on December 19, 1957 in Paris. The difference, however, this time was that Menderes had handed a memorandum to the US Ambassador Warren on December 12, outlining Turkey's intention to take measures to lower its price structure and stabilize Turkish money.¹⁰¹

The drive was continued by President Bayar during a visit by Secretary Dulles to Ankara in January 1958 on the occasion of the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact. In response to Bayar's request that Dulles give personal attention to Turkey's needs, the only certain answer Dulles gave was that "the development of a sound economy must in any event be at least ninety percent the responsibility and the role of the home government" and that the role to be played by the US in this vein could be but marginal.¹⁰²

The progress on the implementation of the policy toward Turkey was appraised in the Report of the Operations Coordinating Board Progress Report, dated January 29, 1958. The report outlined that there was continued progress

¹⁰⁰ Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları, 1944-1973: Demokrasiden Darbeye, 1957-1960*. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi), pp. 11-22. The seven book series provides valuable insight into the domestic struggles and the military coup of May 27, 1960, from the standpoint of the opposition.

¹⁰¹ FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XXIV., *Memorandum of a Conversation, Turkish NATO Delegation Headquarters, Paris, December 19, 1957*, p. 749.

¹⁰² FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. X., *Memorandum of Conversation, Ankara, January 26, 1958*, pp. 738-740.n

towards meeting the major objectives in the reporting period (November 6, 1956 to January 29, 1958.) However, there was little, if any, progress toward the goal of achieving a stable Turkish economy. The report indicated that Turkey's alignment with the West continued to be close and effective, as witnessed during the Syrian Crisis. Turkish participation and support in NATO and in regional security arrangements as Baghdad Pact continued in high profile. US access to Turkish military facilities remained good. On the difficult side, the economy continued to worsen, in view of the situation where the Turkish government left altogether in the election year the limited stabilization measures it had introduced. The report emphasized that greater economic stability could be achieved by cutting back the military or the economic development programs, particularly if such cutbacks were accompanied by effective fiscal and monetary measures. Cyprus also constituted a problem area, where despite repeated US efforts to promote a peaceful settlement to the dispute, The Turkish Government held a firm position in support of the partition of the island as the only feasible solution. On the military side, Turkish authorities were yet to appreciate the need for a reduction in the number of conventional units in phase with modern weapons. However, the Turkish Government pressed for even more armament, in the form of four destroyers from the US and four from the UK. The response of the US Government was that it could support only forces designed to carry out the approved strategic concepts of the United States. It was also outlined in the report that following the offer to NATO allies by President Eisenhower in Paris in December 1957 to place IRBMs in their territory, General Norstad would make recommendations relating to the stationing of IRBMs and Turkey was a possible location. However, it was argued that in such a prospect, the Turkish Government

would use the deployment as an item to strengthen their hand in bargaining for aid.¹⁰³

The most important element in this report was the fact that, in view of a standstill on the revision of Turkish force levels, the US had decided and acted, on a unilateral basis to provide assistance, not to help Turkey achieve NATO approved force goals, but to support those forces which are designed to carry out the strategic concepts of the United States. In line with this, the FY 1959 program was designed toward fulfilling the deficiencies in the M-day (first priority forces).¹⁰⁴ This was actually an example of the implementation of the policy guidance in NSC 5708/2, which said that the entire US assistance program was based on the assumption that Turkey would take the necessary reform measures at home to ensure economic stability. In view of the lack of such reforms and recurring laxity in the election year, and an apparent unwillingness to revise the force level goals, the US Government chose to limit also the military assistance to only the most needed items, not for NATO approved forces but those forced designed to achieve the strategic concept of the U.S.

The increasing economic pressures at home, however, slowly pushed the Turkish Government towards the direction of economic reforms and negotiations with the IMF and OEEC. In light of Turkish actions to negotiate with European organizations in search for support and a deal, and of reported assurances from the Turkish Government on drastic reforms to be carried out, Secretary of State Dulles instructed the Ambassador in Ankara that the US considered the approach of Ankara to both the IMF and EPU-OEEC as the most appropriate way of

¹⁰³ DDEL, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 20, NSC 5708/2, US Policy toward Turkey, *Progress Report (January 29, 1958) on U.S. Policy Toward Turkey (NSC 5708/2) by the Operations Coordinating Board.*

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 3.

exploring the possibility of help. The reason was that Turkey had become a very expensive country and a hot potato to handle, the US wanted the European allies to get involved. Assuming that an adequate Turkish program would be agreed to by IMF and OEEC-EPU, the U.S. would consider additional assistance. However, the U.S. would in no way finance outstanding Turkish debts to European creditors.¹⁰⁵

While the efforts were underway by Turkish officials to reach a deal with the above mentioned institutions, the Turkish Government felt extremely hard pressed and consequently the Turkish President Celal Bayar wrote a letter on May 29, 1958 to President Eisenhower to secure his help to reach an agreement and to obtain U.S. commitment to the support to be provided.¹⁰⁶ Eisenhower's remarks in his reply, meant that Eisenhower hoped Turkey had learned her lessons from the past experience of overspending, overextension deficit spending and that Turkey would realize that it was her own responsibility to manage her economy properly. He, however, promised in his letter that the U.S. would do what it can to help Turkey implement a specific and effective program to restore the stability and good health of the Turkish economy."¹⁰⁷

The Operations Coordinating Board had actually prepared a report on "Turkey's Current Economic Position", apparently upon the request of the President. The report included a rather cynical analysis of the way the Turkish Government managed its economy, its intentions and the prospects for stabilization. The letter President Eisenhower sent was actually drafted as an

¹⁰⁵ FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. X., *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, Washington, March 7, 1958*, pp. 745-746.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., *Letter from President Bayar to President Eisenhower, Ankara, May 29, 1958*, pp. 747-750.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., *Letter from President Eisenhower to President Bayar, Washington June 13, 1958*, pp. 752-753.

annex to this report and presented to the President.¹⁰⁸ The report put forward the basic analysis of the U.S. Government as to the economic problems of Turkey again and the finding was that “Turkey’s economic difficulties are caused by a complex of several factors, primarily the following: a. investment ambitions that exceed domestic savings, b. subsidization of the current economic output of the economy and c. the accumulation of large foreign short and medium term debts, which call for repayments far in excess of any Turkish repayment capacity.”¹⁰⁹ This was a concise yet best analysis of the Turkish economic situation that one could express without consuming too much paper.

After several months of contacts by Turkish officials, analysis by IMF and OEEC - EPU and consultations among the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and France, a joint aid program was approved early August 1958 in which OEEC would provide \$ 100 million in loans, the IMF would provide Turkey drawing rights up to \$ 25 million and the United States agreed to provide \$ 234 millions in loans, grants, supplies and debt waivers.¹¹⁰

Following the introduction of the stabilization program, the first OCB Progress Report was prepared on November 12, 1958. The most important element in NSC 5708/2 which stated that the United States should review the possibility of achieving a reduction of NATO approved force levels in Turkey, was the main point the implementation of which was being assessed in the report. Before the United States could take action on this through it staff at NATO, however, the Syrian crisis erupted in fall 1957 and “actions were taken by the U.S. on directives from the highest level, at the time of the Syrian union with

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., *Operations Coordinating Board Special Report “Turkey’s Current Economic Position”, Washington June 18, 1958*, pp. 753-755.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 754.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., *Editorial Note*, p. 756.

Egypt, to accelerate U.S. aid to Turkey. The Iraqi coup resulted in even greater efforts to enhance Turkey's military posture."¹¹¹ In NATO, however, a new planning document, MC 70 had been adopted; the Turkish Government consented to its recomposition of the Turkish ground forces and a slight reduction. However, as the part of the report on "actions under paragraph 28 of NSC 5708/2" states,

- a. the possibility of achieving a reduction of NATO approved force levels for Turkey has been reviewed with some measure of apparent success with respect to ground forces; b. This apparent success in the NATO review was more than offset from an economic point of view by the naval and air units listed in the resultant MC 70;
- c. Despite the heavy costs of maintaining and operating the forces listed in MC 70, the Turkish Government proposes Navy and Air Force, if not Army, goals even higher and
- d. whereas policy guidance preceded by a discussion of the desirability of reducing economic burdens, MC 70 calls for expenditures above those previously contemplated in the U.S. policy paper on Turkey and the SHAPE international staff is urging a joint U.S.-Turk program to achieve the more costly MC 70 objectives by 1963.¹¹²

This translated into the fact that one of Eisenhower's most important objectives in his policy toward Turkey had failed, in part because NATO did not turn out to be instrumental in the actions needed and largely because of the unfolding situation in the Middle East because of which programmed yet undelivered military assistance items were urgently shipped to Turkey in a fashion as to bring Turkish military POL and ammunition level to war reserve requirements.

After the introduction of the stabilization program, the relations between the two countries, which were already in a very good shape in the fields of political and military cooperation, also progressed towards easing of old tensions

¹¹¹ DDEL, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 20, NSC 5708/2, US Policy Toward Turkey (1), *Operations Coordinating Board Report on U.S. Policy Toward Turkey (NSC 5708/2)*, November 12, 1958.,

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

in the economic cooperation. The period from November 1958 to November 1959 was marked by good cooperation on the stabilization program, Turkish willingness to accept IRBM deployment and the related negotiations. On the negative side, however, there was an increase in the number of incidents involving the U.S. military personnel, creating public relations problems for the U.S. Most critical, however, was the deteriorating internal political situation in Turkey and U.S. officials regularly briefed the President on the internal political situation. In one such briefing during the 406th meeting of the NSC on May 13, 1959, deputy Director of Central Intelligence Charles P. Cabell reported that

the rising political tension in Turkey is threatening the political stability of that country. The Democratic Party is restricting the activities of the major opposition party, the popularity of which is increasing. Criticism of the Government is growing and riots and other disturbances are becoming more frequent. The opposition party maintains that the Government is trying to have Mr. İnönü lynched. The Turkish Minister of Defense remarked that the military leaders may have to intervene if the tension continues. If İnönü were killed, a revolt could take place in Turkey.¹¹³

This was the first time that the US Government was being informed at the highest level, exactly a year before the coup on May 27, 1960, that there was the prospect of a military coup because of the increased tension in the internal situation of Turkey.

Just before the OCB prepared and presented its new report on the policy toward Turkey on December 1959, which covered the period from November 13, 1958 to the date of the report, President Eisenhower visited Turkey on 5-6 December as part of his good will tour to 11 nations. The visit was, as it was called, part of a good will tour and did not include anything more than exchange of views between President Eisenhower and his team and their Turkish counterparts.

¹¹³ FRUS, 1958-1960, vol.X, *Editorial Note*, p. 805.

The general evaluation of the OCB report of December 16, 1959, was that progress had been made towards achievement of most of the policy objectives for Turkey, particularly with the Cyprus agreement and the resulting easing of tensions with Greece. It was also noted in the report that Turkey had been reasonably successful in the stabilization program introduced in August 1958. It warned however that some momentum was lost and there were concerns about the ongoing lack of a consistent investment planning. Attention had been drawn on the negative side to the incidents involving U.S. service personnel causing serious public relations problems. Although the Report did not officially recommend a policy review, the recipients were also reminded that there had been a reduction in the force level goals for Turkey. The point was raised by Karl Harr of NSC on the 430th meeting of NSC on January 6, 1960, that this actually required a policy review. However, President Eisenhower decided that including detailed provisions and figures on force levels was not absolutely necessary since these “did no more than indicate the amount of equipment we should ship to Turkey.”¹¹⁴ The reason the President did not want to include provisions of force levels into the the prospective policy paper could also be that although it was one of the major policy objectives in the still valid NSC 5708/2, the practicalities of life made the Turkish military assistance program much more costly than the level NSC 5708/2 sought to reduce and the addition of *advanced weapons*, that is tactical and strategic nuclear forces like Honest John battalions and Jupiters, into the Turkish arsenal as well as the deteriorating situation in the Middle East were influential on this outcome.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., *Memorandum of Discussion at the 430th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 7 1960*, pp. 828-829.

In 1960, the internal political tension grew worse everyday. The situation was closely monitored by the Embassy staff and regularly reported by the Ambassador as well as by the CIA Director Allen Dulles. Ambassador Fletcher Warren was in contact throughout the month of May with the Chief of General Staff and depended on such high level military sources in trying to determine whether the Army was loyal to the Government or not. The CIA assessment was different, however, and Allen Dulles reported to the NSC on May 23 that the officers were torn into several factions, with high level officers loyal to the Government and lower level officers divided between the Government and the opposition. He also assessed that Prime Minister Menderes did not realize the extent of discontent and warned that the military might eventually take over if the tension did not ease.¹¹⁵

The Eisenhower Administration did not, in view of the internal situation in Turkey, take any position although the Administration was informed at the highest possible level of the developments. The fight between the ruling party and the opposition and between their principal figures, which was defined to have turned into a constitutional crisis by CIA Director Dulles in his briefing of May 23, was regarded basically as an internal question of Turkey in which the U.S. did not intend to intervene. Eventually, the CIA prediction materialized and in the morning of May 27, the Government of Menderes was toppled by a military coup consisting mainly of colonels and lower grade junior officers..

One of the first actions the junta, which called itself “Committee of National Unity” took on the morning of May 27, apart from arresting the President, all ministers including Menderes and some high level officers including

¹¹⁵ Ibid., *Editorial Note*, p. 843.

the Chief of General Staff General Erdelhun, was to declare that Turkey would remain loyal to NATO and CENTO. Later on May 28th, the Turkish ambassador in Washington D.C., Melih Esenbel assured the US government that the new military government in Turkey “intended to honor all Turkey’s existing commitments.”¹¹⁶ After an initial analysis of the characters in the coup and their intentions, the United States extended recognition to the military government on May 30, 1960.¹¹⁷

In an ironical fashion, the first request of General Cemal Gürsel, who took over the posts of Head of State, Head of Government and Commander in Chief of Armed Forces, from the U.S., was assistance to pay the salaries of the government employees. General Gursel told Ambassador Warren during the latter’s call on him on May 28 that “the previous administration left the country in awful financial mess. He had asked Undersecretary of Finance how much money he needed on June 1. He replied he had 23 million lira but needed 180 million lira to meet civil and other payrolls. Gursel said I need not tell you how important it is for new government (to) meet that first payroll. He asked me whether it would be possible for US (to) advance its usual payment such way and in time help government meet its June 1 deadline.”¹¹⁸ While the Ambassador of course did not make a commitment, the request was not turned down and the US provided assistance to the new regime in the critical task of paying the salaries on the first month. The source was the counterpart funds out of which an advance was made to Turkey.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Ibid., *Editorial Note*, pp. 843-844.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 834.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., *Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, May 28, 1960*, pp. 845-848.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., footnote in source text.

After a two year period of relative silence on aid issue between the two countries following the introduction of the Turkish stabilization program of 1958, Turkey again started to push for additional aid under the military junta. A special item on the agenda was the source needed to fund the compulsory retirement of some three thousand excess officers, who were mainly colonels and Navy captains. The retirement was a high priority for the junta, for which an estimated source of 100 million lira was sought¹²⁰, and the response at first was negative. The United States informed the Government of Turkey through Ambassador Warren that “a carefully timed program might well minimize the potentially damaging effect of a widespread reaction that PGOT engaged in a political purge. ..The United States in any event would not wish to finance and thus become identified any such program.”¹²¹ Of course, Warren received a negative reaction from General Gürsel and Colonel Türkeş, by then the two most powerful figures in the junta.

On June 25, General Norstad visited Turkey and had extensive contacts during his stay in Turkey. After his mission in Turkey, Norstad met a group of officials in Washington D.C., led by the Secretary of State Christian Herter and advocated US assistance for the Turkish Government plan to retire excess numbers of officers.¹²² Norstad believed that the cost to the United States of such a plan would be around \$ 10 million and the provision of it was very important for the Provisional Government that stage. Norstad had met all 38 members of the Committee of National Union, as the junta was called, and found them to be well disposed toward the U.S., many of them able to speak English, having received

¹²⁰ Ibid., *Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, July 13, 1960*, pp. 854-857.

¹²¹ Ibid., *Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara July 25, 1960*, pp. 862-864, footnote in source text.

¹²² Ibid., *Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 2, 1960*, pp. 866-867.

training in the U.S. Norstad said “They give the impression of wanting and expecting U.S. leadership and assistance and it is most important to step in at this early stage.”¹²³

The arguments put forward by Norstad seemingly were effective, and after consultations with the Secretary of State, President Eisenhower wrote a letter to President Gürsel informing implicitly of the decision that the U.S. would provide support for the program.¹²⁴

Within the NSC Staff and between NSC staff and OCB, a debate was going on whether there should be a review of policy regarding Turkey since NSC 5708/2 had arguably become obsolete. Finally, the differences of opinion were overcome in early January and a review of the policy was suggested to the NSC on June 3, just after the military coup. Over the summer, NSC Planning Board staff were busy preparing a new draft statement on policy toward Turkey. The new draft policy was discussed on 461st meeting of the NSC on September 29, 1960. This was the last formal policy statement prepared within the NSC system as designed and utilized by President Eisenhower.

In that meeting, the only point that caused discussion was again the issue of force levels. There was a difference of opinion between Joint Chiefs of Staff on one hand and Budget and Treasury Departments on the other hand. It was underlined by Budget and Treasury officials that the Turkish force levels might be unrealistically high and such levels would require American assistance of \$ 400 million a year, which was far in excess of the planned \$ 277 million. Another argument was the familiar argument that even if the U.S. could support such a high force levels goals, Turkey would not be able absorb it. The State Department

¹²³ Ibid. p. 867.

¹²⁴ Ibid., *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey*, p. 868.

view was that, it was also important to consider Turkey's ability to support such an establishment. However, there were NATO requirements on the other hand and the State Department objected to citing only the Turkish capacity to absorb assistance and its economic capacity to support force levels, without mentioning the requirements. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Nathan Twining, on the other hand said they were anxious to see Turkey reach NATO force goals if Turkey could absorb sufficient assistance to do so. President Eisenhower intervened to ask what the new Government in Turkey thought about their force levels. General Twining replied that the new Government had informed General Norstad that Turkey would not be able to meet NATO approved force goals so that they should be revised. Eisenhower said in response that in revising Turkish force goals, it would be necessary to consider Turkish economic capacity as well as the amount of assistance nations other than the U.S. could provide. Consequently, the statement under discussion was modified as to read "42. In reviewing NATO approved force goals for Turkey, consider the possibility of revision in those goals in relation to NATO requirements, as well as to Turkey's ability to absorb and the overall ability of the NATO alliance to support the military assistance."¹²⁵

The new policy statement, bearing the title NSC 6015/1 and superseding NSC 5708/2, included new objectives in US policy apart from the routine objectives:

- a. Continuance of Turkey's independence, territorial integrity, identification with the Free World, and will and ability to resist Communist invasion or subversion.
- b. Continued Turkish cooperation in NATO and CENTO, including continued access to military facilities required by the United States and its allies.
- c. Continued maintenance of Turkish Armed Forces capable of contributing to the maintenance of Turkey's territorial integrity in support of U.S., NATO

¹²⁵ Ibid., *Memorandum of Discussion at the 461st Meeting of the National security Council, Washington, September 29, 1960*, pp. 884-887.

and CENTO agreements and plans, and of maintaining internal security against subversion by Communist or other elements hostile to U.S. interests.

- d. Achievement of a stable, democratic form of government representing the will of the people.
- e. Vigorous economic growth within the framework of reasonable price stability which will permit the achievement of the above objectives for Turkey and will reduce, and eventually eliminate Turkey's need for economic assistance.

Reflecting the U.S. concern for a democratic form of government, the handover of power to a democratic government became a U.S. policy objective. Another change was that maintenance of internal security against Communist subversion or other elements hostile to U.S. interests suggests that vulnerability was perceived.

The policy guidance part accordingly emphasized long-term economic military and economic support as a counterforce to Communist attempts at penetration and subversion, the holding of free elections and transfer to democratic government, avoidance of over-identification with any political faction, and encouraging continued control over Communist elements in Turkey. In the military field, as mentioned before the single most important element of policy guidance was formulated to read as "in reviewing the NATO approved force goals for Turkey, consider the possibility of revision to those goals in relation to NATO requirements, as well as to Turkey's ability to absorb and overall ability of the NATO alliance to support the military program."¹²⁶ This last point meant that after ensuring the Western European contribution to the solution of Turkish economic problems in 1958, the United States was planning to involve these players also in sharing the burden of Turkey's military program.

During his second term in office, Eisenhower had to focus a great deal of his efforts on the developments in the Middle East. First the Syrian-Turkish crisis

¹²⁶ DDEL, NSC Series, Policy papers Subseries, Box 29, *US Policy Toward Turkey, NSC 6015/1, October 5, 1960.*

in the fall of 1957, then the overthrow of the Hashemite regime in Iraq in July 1958 and the concurrent operation in Lebanon had crucial impacts regarding the implementation of the policy toward Turkey. The new policy paper NSC 5708 was approved in June 1957. Its main focus was, in a very much Eisenhower fashion, to limit and if possible scale down Turkish force level objectives while at the same time providing nuclear capability, so that Turkey could have a smaller but more effective defense establishment. The main logic behind this policy was that a large military establishment would drain Turkish resources and would require, as Prochnow and Holcombe Reports indicated, very high levels of sustained expenditures by the Turkish Government and corresponding military assistance by the U.S. Government over long periods. This prospect was in no way sympathetic to Eisenhower and he ordered that Turkey be provided with *advanced* weapons, which included a combined American-Turkish atomic ground force. Eisenhower told SACEUR Lauris Norstad that the method of relying on the deterrent nuclear capabilities was especially suitable for countries like Turkey which had problems in building and maintaining large conventional forces. It appears, in line with these, that contrary to the general wisdom, the U.S. started considering to deploy nuclear deterrent force in Turkey long before the offer to NATO allies was officially made in December 1957 in the NATO meeting in Paris.

However, although a possible reduction of Turkish force level goals was an official objective of the US policy toward Turkey, events as they unfolded in the Middle East seriously impeded their implementation as they were designed and on the contrary, the US had to order accelerated military aid to Turkey during the period 1957-1958 at the time of Syrian and Iraqi crises. That the US

Government was persuaded rather swiftly in July 1958 to provide the bulk of the multilateral economic aid to Turkey at a level almost \$ 300 million in its effort to stabilize the economy also suggests that the developments in the Middle East where U.S. lost friendly governments one after other had been influential in its decision. However, it must also be underlined that the stabilization program Turkey committed itself to undertake included every single element that had been advocated by the U.S. Government officials and official policy for almost 4 years, which, in fact was the achievement of one of the policy objectives set out in NSC 5708/2. Ironically, the overthrow of the government in May 1960 meant that a good deal of the efforts spent in the last 4 years was wasted and the Eisenhower Administration again found itself in a situation of responding to Turkish requests for aid. The US executive received somewhat conflicting reports about the Turkish political situation at the time, and while the CIA was able to evaluate the situation in a better way and to sense that the Menderes Government was in trouble and a coup could happen, Ambassador Fletcher Warren was unable to analyse the situation in a balanced manner. It seems from the available documentation that his satisfaction of the Turkish cooperation with the US and his personal working relationship with Menderes led him to identification with the Menderes Government, which in turn prevented him from listening to sources that could have provided him a better picture of what was happening in the country. Instead, Warren relied on government sources and limited his information channels, thus being taken with surprise when the coup happened in the morning of May 27, 1960. The result of this failure on the part of Ambassador Warren to evaluate the Turkish situation led to an inability by the US Government to foresee the coup and to prepare a contingency plan.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Eisenhower as decision maker

The historiography of Eisenhower Presidency has for a long time been shaped around a debate as to whether Eisenhower was able to control the policies of his Administration or not. In terms of the policy toward Turkey, the analysis of the available documentation shows that Eisenhower was the only decision maker for policy level issues. This did not mean that Eisenhower did not let any other person talk. On the contrary, the way he used the NSC on the basis of regular weekly meetings ensured that he heard the views of different individuals and departments. As Meena Bose states, “the NSC meetings were themselves were occasions for brisk debate in which Eisenhower’s associates argued often conflicting positions in the President’s presence. No one was more emphatic on the importance of such debate than Eisenhower himself.”¹²⁷ However, Eisenhower also made it clear that decision lay in his hands alone.¹²⁸ The whole range of documentation referred to within the framework of this thesis strongly confirms this finding. In order to prepare himself for informed decisions, he placed utmost importance to the formal structure of decision making within the NSC structure. Nevertheless, the content of the documentation imply that a good deal of informal decision making was underway.

¹²⁷ Bose, 99.

¹²⁸ Bose, 28.

The decision making authority of his subordinates were limited within the confines of the NSC policy documents on which Eisenhower had the final say. Under this level, in other words, on the operational level, Secretaries and their Under Secretaries enjoyed a certain freedom of decision making, such as a decision to release counterpart aid funds, generally made by either the Secretary of States or Undersecretary of State.

While Eisenhower placed a great deal of importance to the decision making structure which monopolized decision making authority through various government levels, it was this decision making process that caused significant delays. In the case of Turkey, the economic difficulties and their reasons were known since 1953. However, the Eisenhower Administration could not come up with a coherent policy statement on Turkey which also addressed the policy toward economic situation, until February of 1955. In the face of deepening Turkish economic problems and realization that the picture was more complex, it took two and a half years to revise the policy toward Turkey. Such a delay was unacceptable for such important figures as Secretary of State Dulles, who, in the face of lacking policy guidance in developing situations complained openly in NSC meetings. It took another three years to revise the policy on Turkey again. Such detailed policy statements depending on thorough analyses ended up creating a mixed record of impact because during their implementation, deviations were being made because of the actual situation. At the very same time that the formal structure of NSC was debating whether or not to review the policy statement, the Government of Menderes was toppled by a military coup. The Eisenhower way of decision making, which had a critical dependence on the right kind of information through the formal information channels, was not responsive

in the case of the fast developing problems as posed by Turkey and led to shortfalls in American policies and readiness, as in the example of May 27 coup.

On the other, one would need to reserve a margin of prudence since the above findings depend on the available declassified material. Considering that some material will never be declassified and that the US government during the Eisenhower era had an entirely separate decision making mechanism for covert actions, which it frequently and adroitly used as a tool, it might well have been that the US foresaw the coup, evaluated the pros and cons, was not concerned about a change in the direction Turkish foreign policy and thus simply sat back and waited. Unfortunately, current restrictions on the declassification of US government material limit the researchers to such sources as NSC and State Department sources, which are the basis of the conclusions of this thesis, and do not give the opportunity of validating the above hypothetical situation.

Outcomes of US policies toward Turkey during Eisenhower Administration

The following points can be outlined as the major outcomes of the policies of the Eisenhower Administration toward Turkey:

1. Turkey actively undertook successful regional security arrangements in the case of the Balkan Pact and the Baghdad Pact.
2. The difference between the economic philosophies of the two governments and the stiff stand by the Eisenhower Administration on economic matters caused continuous friction between the Governments.
3. In the end, however, the United States achieved a Turkish stabilization program which accommodated the elements and outputs desired necessary by the U.S. Government.

4. The policy toward Turkey inhibited from the very outset the general elements of Eisenhower's thought on national security strategy. In this sense, reliance on nuclear forces also made its way into the policy toward Turkey and this idea started a process that ended up with the deployment of IRBMs in Turkey.
5. The unresponsive nature of the policies had to be offset by ad hoc decision making especially in the face of the developments in the Middle East in 1957-1958, which had the effect of reversing the elements in the policy paper of 1957.
6. The slow-down in the pace of decision making towards the end of the Eisenhower Administration resulted in an inertia within which the U.S. could neither formulate a contingency policy towards, nor act in the face of, a military coup that toppled the most cooperative ally the United States had in this part of the world.

This thesis has been an effort to examine U.S. policies toward Turkey making use of available declassified documentation in U.S. archives and sources. It appears from the documentation that, largely because of the Turkish Government's identification with the West and its search to rapidly become a militarily and economically developed country, there was a very successful cooperation in the political and to a great extent, in the military field. However, because of the very much the same ambitions of Menderes's Democratic Party Government to push Turkey to the development level of Western countries in a matter of a decade, the economic cooperation suffered. This philosophy was totally contrary to Eisenhower's national security understanding and the Republican principle of restrained government spending. The differences in the

economic philosophies and the resulting friction and bitterness marked the relations for most of the period of the Eisenhower Administration from 1953 to 1960.



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