SILA USLU

THE POLITICS OF (NON) RETRENCHMENT IN TWO MOST DIFFERENT CASES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIETAL RESPONSE IN FRANCE AND TÜRKİYE BETWEEN 1980-2018

Bilkent University 2024

THE POLITICS OF (NON) RETRENCHMENT IN TWO MOST DIFFERENT CASES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIETAL RESPONSE IN FRANCE AND TÜRKİYE BETWEEN 1980-2018

A Master's Thesis

by
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Ankara
September 2024

To my parents, Mehtap and Mehmet Maşuk, who never lose their belief in me

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The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

SILA USLU

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
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İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
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By Sıla Uslu

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Political Science and Public Administration.

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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICS OF (NON) RETRENCHMENT IN TWO MOST DIFFERENT CASES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIETAL RESPONSE IN FRANCE AND TÜRKİYE BETWEEN 1980-2018

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The neoliberalism brings the notion of welfare state retrenchment into discussion that is followed by welfare state transformation. This thesis compares France and Türkiye's welfare states after the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s. It argues that both states avoided retrenchment because of the existence of a causal mechanism that is societal response thar also has a root cause that is familization. The thesis adopts most different systems design (MDSD). It identifies similarities in two dissimilar cases to establish the causal mechanism that produces similar outcomes, namely, non-retrenchment. France is a continental-European welfare state that had a developed welfare state at the time and is regarded as most resilient to change, whereas Türkiye is a Southern European welfare that is not developed but emerging. Therefore, the thesis analyzes France and Türkiye's as most different cases' responses to neoliberal pressures for fiscal retrenchment to determine the common characteristics that produce similar outcomes. Causal analysis is used to investigate the relationship between cause and outcome. The empirical analysis uses social expenditure (SOCX) as the quantitative data source and analyzes policy paradigms between 1980-2018. The thesis identifies that even though France and Türkiye are significantly different cases, the legitimacy of the incumbent party for citizens is quintessential in policymaking, which is the causal mechanism. The role of the family as a structural constraint is seen through familization and its resistance to the changes that would weaken the family. The established gender and intergenerational roles within a family create the societal response to the retrenchment in social welfare. The trilemma of state-family-market is visible in both cases, with the mere strong state and family that retains family as a structural constraint.

Keywords: France, Türkiye, neoliberalism, retrenchment, familization, societal response, welfare state, most different systems design (MDSD)

ÖZET

EN FARKLI İKİ ÖRNEKTE DARALMA(MA) POLİTİKASI: 1980-2018 ARASINDA FRANSA VE TÜRKİYE'DE TOPLUMSAL TEPKİLERİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ

Uslu, Sıla

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Onur Özgöde

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Neoliberalizm, refah devletinde daralma kavramını gündeme getirmiş ve bu kavramı refah devletinin dönüşümü izlemiştir. Bu tez, 1980'lerin neoliberal devriminden sonra Fransa ve Türkiye refah devletlerini karşılaştırmaktadır. Her iki devletin de ailecilik kavramının yapısal sınırlama olarak var olması ve bunun toplumsal tepki nedensellik mekanizmasında görülmesiyle refah politikalarında daralmaya gitmeyeceği savunulmaktadır Fransa, değişime en dirençli olduğu düşünülen gelişmiş bir Kıta Avrupası refah devletiyken, Türkiye artan refah cömertliği ile gelişmekte olan bir Güney Avrupa refah devletidir. Tez, iki vakanın uygunluğunu dikkate alarak, en farklı sistem tasarımını (MDSD) benimsemektedir. Benzer sonuçlar üreten nedensel mekanizmayı, yani geri çekilmemeyi ortaya koymak için iki farklı vakada toplumsal tepkinin ortak bir paydasını tanımlamaktadır. Bu nedenle tez, Fransa ve Türkiye'nin benzer sonuçlar üreten refah devleti daralmasına yönelik neoliberal baskılara verdikleri tepkileri en farklı örnekler olarak analiz etmektedir. Sebep ve sonuç arasındaki ilişkiyi araştırmak için nedensel analiz yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Ampirik analiz, nicel veri kaynağı olarak sosyal harcamaları (SOCX) kullanmakta ve 1980-2018 yılları arasındaki politika paradigmalarını analiz etmektedir. Tez, Fransa ve Türkiye'nin önemli ölçüde farklı vakalar olmalarına rağmen, iktidar partisinin vatandaşlar için meşruiyetinin, nedensel mekanizma olan politika yapımında çok önemli olduğunu incelemektedir. Ailenin yapısal bir kısıtlama olarak rolü, ailecilik uygulamaları ve aileyi zayıflatacak değişikliklere karşı direnci aracılığıyla görülür ve seçimler aracılığıyla ifade edilmektedir. Bir aile içindeki yerleşik cinsiyet rolleri ve kuşaklar arası roller, toplumsal refahtaki gerilemeye karşı toplumsal tepkiyi yaratır. Devlet-aile-piyasa üçgenindeki üç önermeli durum, her iki ülkede de görülmekte ve güçlü devletçilik ve yapısal bir kısıtlama olarak ailecilik üçgenin iki güçlü elementidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Fransa, Türkiye, neoliberalizm, daralma, ailecilik, toplumsal tepki, refah devleti, En Farklı Sistem Tasarımı (MDSD)

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always my emergency kit, and always had time for me. Without you, it would be impossible to have the motivation. Thank you all for choosing me.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
MDSD	Most Different Systems Design
MENA	Middle East/North Africa
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
SOCX	Social Expenditure
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States

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INTRODUCTION: THE ERA OF THE NEW WELFARE STATE

From World War II to the 1973 OPEC Oil Crisis, the welfare state has been a key agenda item for policymakers in most Western countries. This period, known as the Golden Age of Capitalism, was marked by a relatively fair redistribution of resources among the citizenry (C. Pierson, 1991). Social welfare states adopted the responsibility for taking care of their citizens through social expenditure and protection of social rights (Briggs, 1961; Prasad, 2006; Wincott, 2011). The turmoil of the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 created a new approach to economic policy and state expenditure. The stagflation, marked by high inflation and unemployment, paved the way for the neoliberal agenda. One major outcome of the crisis period was budget deficits. Based on the typologies Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990) formulated, liberal welfare states, especially the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), went into a period of retrenchment to eliminate the negative impacts of crisis by decreasing the public deficit.

As neoliberalism spread throughout the world, one would have expected fiscal austerity to spread. While this holds for a wide range of cases, especially the African and Latin American ones, it does not for others. France and Türkiye are two cases where one does not observe retrenchment. In this thesis, I use most different systems design method (MDSD) to explain why these two countries did not experience retrenchment. I find that despite their differences, their policymaking is not only driven by an enhanced level of responsiveness to societal demands, but they are also structurally constrained by the family as an institutional mechanism that complements the welfare state. The elections are representation of the social backlash, and this shapes the party politics. By looking at the election results parties set their agenda and policy preferences to get popular support. In Türkiye, there is extended family and gender and intergenerational roles within them. The welfare state supports strong family ties through family benefits. In France, even families are not extended; there are gender roles that give financial responsibility to men and domestic duty to women to take care of family members, including infants and the elderly. The family benefits support the family ties. In both states, established family roles and state support prevent retrenchment. The alternative for the state support is market-supplied benefits, but citizens do not prefer to take the market benefits that are already given by the state. Therefore, I argue that societal response is the causal mechanism that explains the absence of retrenchment in both cases and familization in aspects of social policies, which shows the structural constraint affecting the causal mechanism.

Neoliberalism prescribes states to cut fiscal deficits by lowering social spending—a process called "retrenchment" (P. Pierson, 1994a). Instead of pursuing interventionist policies, states also take on regulatory roles in markets. Before the 1980s, the state's goal was legitimation through providing social benefits to citizens. Legitimation means gaining popular support by increasing the state's credibility as a protector of the social in the eyes of the citizenry. Neoliberalism leads to a "new politics" (P. Pierson, 1996). As part of a new economic and political agenda of austerity, the states seek to take away already given social protections and rights to foster economic efficiency as a remedy for financial crises.

In the field of comparative welfare research, the "new politics" is defined as either austerity or politics of retrenchment after neoliberalism (P. Pierson, 1994; Starke, 2020). Here, the definition of the welfare state is a state responsible for protecting the minimum standards of economic security for its citizens against the risks of the market that is social protection. (i.e., income, health, housing, education, etc.). The welfare state maintains social protection by redistributing goods and services (Briggs, 1961; Gough, 1979; Weir, 2001; Wilensky, 1974). Proceeding from this definition, retrenchment in the welfare state is cutting or decreasing social protection expenditure or narrowing the scope of the protection programs.

In this thesis, I sought to answer one major research question to contribute to comparative welfare state research by examining the *characteristics* of welfare states and key drivers for their transformation. The research question is as follows: Despite their differences what explains the emergence of similar outcomes in France Türkiye to neoliberalism between 1980-2018?

The earlier studies of the comparative welfare state and political economy literature focus on the inevitability of the retrenchment for all welfare states but do not mention the complexity of making a policy change, which may challenge the transition to neoliberalism (C. Pierson, 1998). Later studies discovered the structural and institutional challenges in diverse welfare states and the differences in contexts. Monica Prasad (2006) claims that there is no typical path for a neoliberal transition that would be applicable to all cases. Social and political institutions are determinant in policymaking and states must be careful about not reinforcing the inequalities while driving for the economic growth. As pointed out by Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990), different welfare states' responses to the economic crisis of the 1970s and their approach to neoliberalism are not all the same. In his work, *Three Worlds of Capitalism,* Esping-Andersen (1990) classifies state responses under three different headings: Anglo-Saxon (liberal), Continental European (corporatist-conservatism), and Scandinavian (social-democratic). The study of welfare states classification is further extended by specifying Southern European and Middle East/North Africa (MENA) countries (Gough, 1996).

The classification of welfare state regimes depends on their handling of the decommodification and stratification among the citizens within the context of a tripartite relationship between state, market, and family (Esping-Andersen, 2008). These classifications presume retrenchment as inevitable. In recent studies, scholars found unique paths in the post-neoliberal period (Piven, 2015; Prasad, 2006; Öniş, 2012; Yörük, 2022). For instance, Erdem Yörük (2022) diagnosed the importance of the labor movements in shaping the neoliberal agenda in Türkiye. Monica Prasad (2006) makes a comparative analysis of different welfare states and concludes the uniqueness of the French welfare state by calling it the *most resilient* case.

The literature focuses on neoliberalism as the union of economic, political, and social policies but does not distinguish the separate policies that only represent economic, political, or social transformation. Comparative welfare state literature does not touch upon the uniqueness of different phases or critical junctures in a comparative way(Merrien et al., 2005). The existing literature accepts that similar trends are seen in the states of the same class. Therefore, this study aims to bring a new perspective to the study of the welfare state by moving beyond the limits of classification and challenging the ultimate retrenchment after neoliberalism. These two interrelated narratives see neoliberalism as the unified response of economics, politics, and social practices and focus on the classification of the welfare state but do not mention the peculiarity of different cases. This represents the gap in comparative welfare literature that misses out on the singularity of cases and state practices only in political means. Therefore, this thesis aims to provide a better understanding of the sui-generis nature of each welfare state.

By referring to the differences in various contexts, the classification of the welfare states is not the best way to understand specific policy actions. The centrality of the state and strong family in the triangle of the welfare state is the denominator common to both cases (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Yörük, 2022). Both states' social protection programs target the lower income groups (Boratav & Yeldan, 2006; Leibfried & Obinger, 2000). Even though similarities exist between the two states, they are in different classifications of welfare states where France is conservative-corporatist, and Türkiye is Southern-European (Esping-Andersen, 1990). They end up experiencing different phases of transition after neoliberalism by means of economic, political, and social policies.

My second argument is that societal response plays a crucial role in shaping political agendas. Elections, combined with popular policies, cause states to have the same outcome: non-retrenchment. The societal response also includes opposition from the unions because their support for the opposition or incumbent is decisive in welfare state policies.

The puzzle in the comparative welfare literature once again is seen in the assumption that neoliberalism would bring retrenchment; however, as Grütjen (2008), Öniş (2012), Prasad (2006), and Yörük (2022) emphasize, this does not always happen. In order to understand the reason behind non-retrenchment, I study two most different cases, one that is most resistant to neoliberalism, France, and the other that is one of the most embrasive of neoliberalism after the US, Türkiye. In both cases, we see that the interplay of the structural role of the family and politics meeting the demands of the society provides an explanation for the failure of retrenchment. I aim to make a comparative analysis of structural constraints and causal mechanisms in French and Turkish welfare states that affect the post-neoliberalism agenda.

For the first part of my paper, I bring systematic differences in the context of welfare state practices of Continental European and Southern European aspects of the selected countries. A literature review of the welfare state and neoliberalism is explained in Section 2. In the second phase of my paper, I clarify the methodology and sampling of cases that are introduced in Section 3. Most Different Systems Design is elaborated, and indicators and variables are shown. In the third phase and consecutively Section 4 and Section 5 of my paper, I separately analyze French and Turkish welfare state practices since 1980s since both countries start their neoliberal agenda by that time. In fourth phase of the thesis, which is Section 6, I make a comparative analysis of two states policies and their outcomes. In the final phase of the thesis, I derive comparative conclusions and answer the research question based on characteristics and stimuli of French and Turkish welfare states.

SECTION 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ON WELFARE STATES AND THE NEOLIBERAL REVOLUTION

In this section, I present a collection of comparative welfare state and political economy literature explaining post-neoliberalism in welfare states since the 1980s. First, I define and conceptualize the welfare state. After classifying different welfare states, the thesis provides a literature review of the politics of retrenchment and expansion.

Definition and Conceptualization of Welfare State

Although the initial implementations of the welfare state are based on the Speenhamland Law of 1765 implemented in Great Britain, the term "modern welfare state" was first used after World War II (Huzel, 1969; Weir, 2001). By definition, a welfare state is a state that protects its citizens against social risks produced by the market (Briggs, 1961; Weir, 2001). In short, a welfare state has the sum of all benefits provided to the citizens through diverse public policy programs (Bolukbasi, 2021). In the welfare state literature, there is the "independent variable problem," which points out there is no unified approach on "how to conceptualize, operationalize, and measure" the alteration in the welfare states (Clasen & Siegel, 2007). The debate in the welfare state research has evolved through time by making modifications in its scope. The earlier studies measure the total social expenditure (e.g. Briggs, 1961; Wincott, 2001) but some of the scholars excluded the healthcare and social security expenses from that total (e.g. Mera, 2002). The disagreement on which social policy programs should be included in welfare state practice enhances the dependent variable problem. The inclusivity of a social program is challenged when a certain group or policy is excluded, as in social policies of healthcare and education. Concurrently, the level of poverty and maintaining equality among citizens are considered measures of welfare state change, too, by taking the program level developments (Brady, 2009).

The later studies focus on social security benefits and coverage rates by the welfare states by taking the social security expenditures in addition to the social rights provided by the state

(Bolukbasi et al., 2021). Social Citizenship Indicators Program (SCIP) and Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED) are used to measure welfare state changes. Here, it is essential to define *social protection* and *social security* to examine the welfare state's responsibility towards its citizens. *Social protection* is a general name given to the actions of the state that are taken against the social risks that threaten the well-being of citizens by means of economic situations and social rights. Social security is the state practice that stands behind citizens in case of a discrepancy related to social risks (Standing, 2007). The definition of social protection itself and what goes under the social protection policies define the responsibilities of the welfare state. A wide range of policies are covered to maintain social protection.

Within a welfare state, key policy implications exist for bringing citizens social security. Table 1 below represents the different types of social welfare characteristics based on six main headings. As indicated in Table 1, beneficiaries of the welfare state can access them either through employee contributions, by citizenship rights, or by being recipients due to needs. The benefits can be in monetary or benefit-in-kind form, which means they are not always in the form of a payment. The level of benefit can be flat-rate (independent of income) or proportional (dependent on income). Financing of the welfare state can be sustained by the taxes directly or the contributions of the employees. The decision maker and deliverer of the social benefit can be the central state, but local branches of the state can deliver, too. Lastly, the management of social welfare can be done by private organizations or the representatives of the business owners or workers. Briggs (1961) calls social protection a state activity that uses its power to distribute goods and services. The essence of the welfare state is government-protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health, housing, and education, assured to every citizen as a political right, not as charity (Wilensky, 1974). Esping-Andersen (1990) adds that all the developed European states actualize the functions of the welfare state. At that point, by looking at the different camps on the welfare literature creating the dependent variable problem in a welfare state change, we can conclude that this thesis follows the aggregated definition: any action of the state considering providing benefits to its citizens can be regarded as welfare state practice both including social expenditure and extending the benefits and beneficiaries (e.g. extending the eligibility criteria, coverage or policy implementation).

Table 1

Key Features of Delivering Benefits in the Welfare State

Key Feature	Policy Implementation
Access to the benefit	Employee contribution in case of employment By citizenship getting the universal benefit Based on needs getting benefits
Type of benefit	Monetary or in kind
Level of benefit	Flat-rate or proportional
Source of social welfare budget	Taxes or social contributions
Decision maker	Central state or local government agency
Delivery of the benefit	Private actor or representatives of unions

Note. Author's own conclusions based on *Modèles de solidarité, divergences, convergences: perspectives pour l'Europe* by M.iFerrera, 1996a, p.1-18. Copyright by Swiss Poltical Science Review and *on How do welfare states change? Institutions and their impact on the politics of welfare state reform in Western Europe* by Bonoli and Palier, 2000, p.333-352. Copyright European Review.

The abundance of approaches towards measuring the development in welfare states challenges the comparative welfare state analysis. Large-N studies are mostly carried out to compare different welfare states, and the differences among cases are not highlighted in case studies. Therefore, most-different systems design (MDSD) is avoided (e.g. (Ferragina, 2017). To make a comparative analysis, looking at the cases that do not have all common characteristics but have the same outcome would enhance the methodology in the field. The comparison among different welfare states is scrutinized in various perspectives due to the dependent variable problem. However, we can state that a wider comparison is carried out, too. Recent studies in welfare state literature do not reflect a unanimous perspective, but they are distinguished in two ways: analyzing the relationship between state, market, and family and analyzing the "economic, political, institutional and ideological factors" (Papachashvili et al., 2023; Weir, 2001). Figure 1 below represents the triangle of welfare state where state, family, and market are key determinants of setting the agenda in social policies. The degree to which each actor is active varies from one state to another (Huges & Muñoz Guzmán, 2016).

Figure 1 *Triangle of welfare state*



Note. author's own conclusion adapted from the information provided in *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* by G. Esping-Andersen, 2010. Copyright 1990 by Princeton University Press and in *The 'Welfare State' and the Labour Market* by P. Thane, 2007, p.178-2002. Copyright by Oxford Academic.

The triangle represents two key points explaining a welfare state's mechanism. Firstly, all three actors are intermingled and are present in all welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The state provides social security for its citizens through social policies against social risks. Apart from its duties, the state is also related to family and the market. The decommodification of labor ensures workers have benefits even if they are not in the workforce, and the system of providing benefits is determined by the state. The role of the family and both the state and market's approach to family determines the extent of welfare policies. The relationship between the state-family-market produces two concepts in the comparative welfare literature: defamilization and familization. Familization is a state policy that increases economic and social dependence among family members. A state might choose to enhance family benefits or leave the family outside of policies by stating its privacy. The market may also consider the family members of the worker by providing benefits to them, but also may leave the family outside of its security plan. Here, a second conclusion from Figure 1 can be drawn. There is a welfare trilemma: a strong state effective in decision-making and setting the welfare state agenda, a strong market where social protection benefits against social risks are provided like sickness, unemployment, etc., and a strong family in which the social benefits serve for sustaining the strong ties in the family like payment for elderly and child care (Taylor-Gooby, 2013). The impossibility of providing all three conditions simultaneously creates the trilemma. The existence of a conflict of interest between the state, market, and society is inconceivable. On the one hand, proponents of a strong welfare state urge for the extension of social benefits, and on the other hand, the state tries to minimize the costs to decrease the budget deficit. Besides, by taking Karl Polanyi's approach into account, when people are forced by the state to turn to market for their needs, a reaction from the society is inevitable. In welfare triangle, if the state pushes the citizens to get their welfare benefits from the market, the market would also present a response in return (Lacher, 2019).

Strata of Welfare States

One major contribution to the comparative welfare state literature is made by Gøsta Esping-Andersen Alan (1990) with his preliminary work "The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism." His work brings two core contributions: drawing the outline of the tripartite relationship between state, market, and family and providing a framework for the classification of Western capitalist democracies based on *decommodification* and *stratification* concepts. Decommodification is defined as the right to maintain livelihood even after leaving the market

(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huo et al., 2008). Higher labor force participation or full unemployment is desired end for the welfare states to secure the employed or unemployed citizens. Stratification is “someone’s class position” in the welfare state and social citizenship is determined by looking at one’s class (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The social protection policies are legislated and implemented through citizens’ social status. For example, wage-earners’ social benefits are different from unemployed citizens. According to Esping-Andersen (1990) welfare state’s protective agenda by managing the decommodification and paying attention to stratification in the state, market and family are the key to classify welfare states. Different levels of decommodification among various welfare states creates or existence or non-existence of hierarchies are main determinants to categorize welfare states.

Esping-Andersen’s (1990) brings up classification of different welfare regimes that are liberal, conservative-corporatist and social democratic. Another terminology that is equivalent to the precedent classification in consecutive order is under the names of Anglo-Saxon, Continental European and Scandinavian welfare states. For the liberal welfare states, we can give examples of the US, UK, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland, and Australia. The main aspect of liberal welfare states is being market-oriented. Means-tested programs are seen rather than universal ones. Countries like Austria, France, Germany, and Italy are conservative-corporatist (Continental European) welfare regimes. In that model, there is high stratification in policies helping the most needy, and a social insurance system is applied. The market is not the main regulator of policies, unlike the liberal welfare states. The third category is the social democratic or Scandinavian welfare state. Under this typology, Sweden, Finland, and Norway are classified. cat The social democratic model has the lowest stratification level that provides universal entitlements for its citizens. The state is the main provider of welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

Table 2

Welfare State Typologies

Characteristics	Welfare State Typology

	Liberal (Anglo-Saxon)	Conservative-Corporatist (Continental European)	Social Democratic (Scandinavian)	Southern European
Countries	US UK Canada New Zealand Ireland Australia	France Germany Japan Netherlands Austria Belgium	Sweden Norway Finland Denmark	Greece Türkiye Portugal Spain Italy
Stratification	Dual	High	Low	High
Decommodification	Low	Medium	High	High
Provider	Market	Family	State	State and Family

Note. author's own conclusion adapted from the information provided in *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* by G.Esping-Andersen, 2010. Copyright 1990 by Princeton University Press and in *The Turkish Welfare Regime: An Example of the Southern European Model? The Role of the State, Market, and Family in Welfare Provision* by D. Grütjen, 2008, p.11-129. Copyright by Turkish Policy Quarterly 7(11).

Table 1 above represents a comparison of different welfare states by means of their decommodification, stratification, and provider of welfare. It is derived from Esping-Andersen's (1990) classification of three worlds of welfare states and Grütjen (2008) and Ferrera's (1996) distinct characterizations of the Southern European model. According to the table, France is conservative-corporatist welfare state. For Esping-Andersen (1990), Türkiye can be analyzed using the same model as France. However, as Alan Gough (1996) puts in his work, further studies represent that Türkiye has a unique model that can be regarded as a Southern European welfare state.

The decommodification is highest in social democratic and Southern European, medium in conservative-corporatist and lowest in liberal welfare states. In liberal welfare states, social benefits are limited, and citizens are highly dependent on market making, which means livelihood for the unemployed is hard to sustain. Means-tested benefits are implemented by the state's distribution of the benefits based on people's income or capital. In case of unemployment, citizens would suffer from a lack of protection. In conservative-corporatist welfare states, a moderate level of decommodification is seen where employed citizens who are part of the market benefit from their contribution to the social security system. The major difference with other welfare state typologies is role of family. The responsibility of families to take care of their members is seen as traditional duty by the state. Therefore, even a person is unemployed, family support would maintain the benefit either through their own benefits given by the state or within family support. In social democratic and most of the Southern European welfare states, highest decommodification is witnessed since citizens can get benefits regardless of their employment status. Since available public services coverage is high, dependency on market is low.

Esping-Andersen's (1990) classification of different welfare states based on decommodification relies on the degree of individuals dependency on the market. Stratification is highest in Southern European and conservative-corporatist, dual in liberal and lowest in social democratic welfare states. The liberal welfare states imply policies that enhance the existing stratification in society. Means-tested benefits create a distinction for individuals. On the one hand, there are those who have higher income and can get access to private and extensive benefits on their own. On the other hand, citizens with lower incomes must rely on limited public services. The conservative-corporatist and Southern European welfare states tend to keep the existing stratification. The hierarchies in the system are constructed in accordance with people's occupation. The existing hierarchies are kept constant because people get benefits in alliance with their social contribution rates. In addition to employment status, gender is also a key determinant because the welfare state aims to preserve the traditional family structure. For example, maternal and paternal leave opportunities are limited or non-existent due to male breadwinner-system (Neyer, 2021). The stratification based on family and gender roles can be regarded as the *defamilization* of the welfare state and might be seen as a structural constraint for the development t and coverage of a welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Orloff, 1993). The provider of welfare is the state itself in social democratic, the market in liberal, the family in conservative-corporatist, and both state and family in Southern European models. The main distinction between different welfare states is sourced by the implementation of decommodification and existing social positions and the role of state, market, and family in each of them.

Another distinction among different typologies, in the comparative welfare literature, is seen in the type and system of social protection. The system defines the borders of action of the state, whom to cover under which social benefits, and focus is on whether protection is contribution based or not. Table 3 indicates different social security schemes and redistribution of benefits in different welfare states. Liberal welfare states are residual which means there are leftovers in the coverage system. Richard Titmuss (1974) as the founder of social policy, gives a distinction of two welfare states: institutional and residual. Institutional welfare states tend to decrease the effect of fluctuations in market on citizen's life and redistributes the wealth. On the other side, residual welfare state is selective by considering means-tested benefits and moves in accordance with needs rather than rights of citizens (Heclo, 1975). The residual welfare state, in this case liberal welfare state, provides protection only when family and market cannot provide it. The social welfare program's coverage is temporary, which means they are not life-long. The social protection systems can be distinguished based on the benefits as follows: *targeted benefits, basic security benefits* or *flat rate benefits* and *contribution-based benefits* (Cremer & Pestieau, 2003). *Targeted benefits* are seen in residual welfare states for those in proven need and common in liberal typology, this is also called as means-tested benefits. *Basic security benefits* are independent of income, and everyone gets the same amount or quality of benefits. It is also called as *Beveridgean system*. Basic social security benefits are redistributed equally. In UK, National Health Service and state pensions are provided to all target population in equal way (Hills et al., 1994; Makowiecki, 2015). *Contribution- based benefits* are provided in Bismarckian insurance system and benefits redistribution depends on individual's early contributions to state's social security system and it is directly related with income. In example, a retired person gets the pension benefits in accordance with his/her insurance payments when he/she was in labor force. Germany and France as conservative-corporatist welfare states follow Bismarckian insurance scheme (Barr, 2020).

Another classification can be built for social democratic welfare state which is combination of contribution-based and flat-rate benefits and call it *mixed social security system.* Besides universalist social security system is rendered in *universalistic* social security system. The aim is to decrease poverty and letting everyone to get benefits equally independent of their income or contribution (Atkinson, 2015; P. Pierson, 1996). In final, Southern European welfare states, like Türkiye, follow both Bismarckian social insurance scheme with universalist standards that brings another social security scheme to classification (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Grütjen, 2008).

Table 3

Social Security Systems and Redistribution of Benefits in Welfare States

	Welfare State Typology			
	Liberal (Anglo-Saxon)	Conservative-Corporatist (Continental European)	Social Democratic (Scandinavian)	Southern European
Social Security	Residual	Social Insurance	Universalist	Social Insurance and Universalist
Redistribution of Benefits	Targeted and Flat-Rate	Bismarckian	Mixed	Bismarckian and Mixed/Targeted

Note. author's own conclusion adapted from the information provided in *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* by G. Esping-Andersen, 2010. Copyright by Princeton University Press, in *Social Insurance Competition Between Bismarck and Beveridge* by H. Cremer and P. Pestiau, 2003, p.181-196. Journal of Urban Economics 54(1), and in *The New Politics of the Welfare State* by P. Pierson, 1996. Copyright by Cambridge University Press.

Post neoliberal period of the welfare state

In this paper, I aim to compare conservative-corporatist French and Southern European Turkish welfare states' approaches to social security after the neoliberal revolution of the 1970s. The effects of the crisis have been visible after the 1980s in both states (Erensü & Madra, 2022; Prasad, 2006). Paul Pierson (1996) calls the new era "The New Politics of Retrenchment," where states transform their welfare policies in the opposite direction of the earlier policies. Therefore, it is crucial to mention the effect of neoliberalism on welfare states apart from their classification, characteristics, and social protection schemes for selected cases of France and Türkiye. The 1950s and 1960s resemble the decades after World War II; a key aspect is states' behavior and willingness to provide welfare to their citizens (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Keynesian economic model is adopted, and the state is the main actor regulating the social policies. For this reason, the post-war period is called the Golden Age of Capitalism and the expansion period for the welfare state. During the Golden Age, states regulated the markets on behalf of their citizens by providing social equality and integration, employment, economic stability, and efficiency and distributing wealth (MacGregor, 2014:2). States take responsibility for healing the wounds of World War II. They both target citizens' welfare by providing them with services and aiming at full employment and zero inflation to sustain economic efficiency. The pre-neoliberal period can be characterized as having two folded agendas covering social and economic well-being that also bring political popular support in the end (Ferrera, 2005; P. Pierson, 1996).

The epochal events that challenged states to provide social security to their citizens were the 1973 and 1979 Oil Crises. In 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announcement on decreasing the oil output, and in 1979, the drop in Iran's oil production because of the Revolution in the country paved the way for economic crises. In return, unemployment and inflation occurred, leading to a stagflation trend in world economies (C. Pierson, 1998). The new model of economy and politics under the name of *neoliberalism* has emerged to decrease the cost of crises. In that context, neoliberalism means less state intervention in the market and limited government expenditures to cover the budget deficit caused by more expenditure than earnings in the government during the Golden Age (Huber, 2012). Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Raegan in the US are primary figures who imply the neoliberal model that gives a new impulse to the relationship between the economy of state and business enterprises (Middleton, 2000). The transformation from the Keynesian model to neoliberalism is an abrupt change, and it regulates state-society relations by decreasing the responsibility of the state (Kus, 2006). According to the new approach, the assumption is that there is a regress in the welfare state, which drives states to implement politics of retrenchment (Gough, 1979). Pierson (1996) defines welfare state retrenchment by stating that there should be policy change that ends up with decrement in social expenditure, or the welfare state agenda needs to be changed in a way to be closer to the residual model, or there must be an attempt to make minor changes in the system not for an immediate but a future retrenchment. One of the three conditions is necessary to call a welfare policy a retrenchment policy. The new trend that keeps social expenditure at moderate levels or retrenched shows austerity in welfare states. Within the framework of retrenchment, states are less willing to provide all social protection under state practices. Privatization of social protection mechanisms like pensions, insurance, and healthcare is enforced. The new welfare state brings a new understanding of social protection, too. This time, states aim at reaching high economic efficiency in addition to social equity (Hemerijck, 2013:130). In order to sustain economic growth and development, social risk management is provided. Those social risks are mostly related to the economic efficiency itself rather than the citizen's welfare. Inflation and unemployment are key obstacles before the economy, so it is targeted most (Bonoli, 2005). The post-war period's agenda to balance social and economic welfare becomes more prone to economic efficiency. The austerity or retrenchment policies develop around economic efficiency goals.

What differentiates the politics of retrenchment from the politics of expansion is the goals of policymakers' and the political context's modification (P. Pierson, 1996). As Esping-Andersen highlighted, to make sense of the politics of retrenchment, the mechanism that built the expansion must be perceived well (Pierson,1994). Up until industrial capitalism, or in other words, the neoliberal revolution's stepping into the spotlight, the viable state policy was maintaining the welfare of people. All over the world, most states aim to provide welfare to their citizens before the neoliberal turn (Esping-Andersen,1990). For that matter, under politics of retrenchment, states want to take off the welfare given by the state hand through subsidizing with privatization, gradual shrinking in programs, or major cut-offs. Against new reforms for the retrenchment, new interest groups emerge to defend their already existing social benefits and prevent the shrinking of the programs. Another difference in the retrenchment period is seen in political claims. Previously, in the expansion period, citizens were supported by the generosity of the state and were satisfied. However, retrenchment has the risk of political return to losing political support, and states would prefer "blame avoidance" (Weaver, 1986). The new atmosphere of the retrenchment period challenges both the government in power and leads to the formation of new interest groups against social risk.

Neoliberal transition's concrete practices are seen in two major leaders' reigns, Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Raegan in the US (Peters, 2023). Their policy agenda aims at the privatization of certain social protection services and deregulation. The Washington Consensus of US is also shaped around that globalized free-trade economy that will bring development. The state's role in providing services is limited to the economic well-being of the state itself (Peters, 2023:2). As Pierson (1994) puts out, not all states follow the same path as the Anglo-Saxon world does, and they rather choose continuity either because of inertia within the institutions or path dependency. There are two camps in the comparative welfare state literature on retrenchment studies. On the one camp, states that have been through cuts or retrenchment of social policies are facing a transformation in policymaking based on the needs of society, like implementing unemployment insurance in European (e.g. Burgoon et al., 2023), the pushing effect of immigration to states to spend more (e.g. Eger, 2010), or political partisanship's directing the politics (e.g. Allan & Scruggs, 2004). On the other camp, there are scholarly works indicating that continuity or expansion of politics of retrenchment in welfare states either by slowly integrated austerity programs (e.g. Hacker, 2004) or through the effect of systematic change like becoming a member of the European Union (EU) (e.g.Korpi, 2003). Even the comparative welfare literature focuses on the presence or absence of retrenchment or expansion; it does not focus on the transformation or developments of welfare states from the point of comparing different welfare states from different typologies drawn by Esping-Andersen (1990). This paper aims to contribute to the literature by studying the development of two typologically different welfare states after neoliberalism.

SECTION 3: A COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY FOR MOST DIFFERENT SYSTEMS AND SAMPLING OF CASES

This chapter of my thesis outlines my research design, the sources of my data, and the methodology I used for analysis. The chapter's main objective is to present the method utilized to compare the conservative-corporatist French welfare state and Southern European Turkish welfare state after neoliberalism in the 1980s. First, I introduce the Most Different System Design (MDSD) as part of my qualitative approach. After explaining the sampling of cases, I clarify the data sources used for welfare state expenditure and policies. The chapter ends with the analysis method used in the paper with the theoretical framework.

This paper employs MDSD to compare France's welfare state practices transformation and development with Türkiye's welfare state, taking into account their very different policymaking styles. MDSD is a comparative analysis method that takes John Stuart Mill's induction approach to agreements and differences (Anckar, 2008). Within MDSD, different cases have similar outcomes. By looking at the same dependent variable for all cases the paths ending up in similar outcomes are observed (Steinmetz, 2021).The dependent variable (DV) is the same, but the independent variables (IV) are different. Table 4 below represents the IVs that are different in France and Türkiye. The development of welfare programs in France dates to the 19th century, whereas in Türkiye, the welfare programs were rendered in the late 20th century. This time gap gives the French welfare state more opportunity to develop itself, (Demossier et al., 2019). Therefore, coverage and benefits in France is more comprehensive than Türkiye which might be considered as developing welfare state (Hassenteufel & Palier, 2016; Öniş, 2012). The developing welfare state combines both universalist and targeted benefits. For instance, healthcare benefits are universal like in France but cash transfer benefits are targeted to poor (Yörük, 2022). Most of the policies of French state is determined by the Maastricht Criteria that binds the state to EU. On the other side, Türkiye is not a member of the EU but a candidate. France is obliged to follow the market regulations of the EU, but Türkiye is more flexible in abiding by the (Palier, 2004; Tezcür, 2022). Moreover, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Türkiye is a developing economy, whereas France is a highly industrialized and developed country (Burgoon et al., 2023; Dierks, 2024). Considering the economic development level and redistribution of resources, the Human Development Index (HDI) ranking of France is 27th, and Türkiye is 48th (UNDP, 2024). This indicator shows that France is more concerned about the rights of individuals and is more generous than Türkiye in reallocation. Another major difference is their political system. Even though both states have parliamentary democracies, France has a semi-presidential, and Türkiye has a parliamentarian system which has changed to presidential system by July 2018. In the presidential system of Türkiye, the president is central and plays a major role in decision-making after 2018. Before that, president used to have representative role. In a semi-presidential system, the president mostly has a representative role too and does not intervene in decision-making. The policy-making process and establishing new rules or introducing new policy agendas depend on one person and are quicker in a presidential system, whereas, in a semi-presidential, the process is longer due to multiple interest groups in the parliament. It must be noted that until the 16 April 2017 referendum and implementation of amendments on 9 July 2018, Türkiye had been ruled by a parliamentary democracy with a semi-presidential system (Güler, 2018). Apart from the differences, both states imply a Bismarckian insurance system that depends on the contribution of the individuals to the social security system (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Grütjen, 2008). These differences in IVs among the two welfare states make building this study on MDSD possible.

Table 4

Characteristics of France and Türkiye

Characteristics	Countries	
	France	Türkiye
Development of welfare programs	19th century	Mid 20th century
Form of welfare state	Developed	Emerging
Coverage	Comprehensive	Developing
Social security benefits	Universalist	Targeted & Universalist
Membership to EU	Member	Candidate
Market/ Economy	Industrialized	Emerging
Human Development Index Ranking	27th	48th
Politics	Semi-presidential	Parliamentarian
Insurance	Bismarckian	Bismarckian

Note. author's own conclusion adapted from the information provided in *Human Development Report 2023-2024* by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2024. Copyright by UNDP, in *Origins of the French Welfare State: The Struggle for Social Reform in France, 1914–1947* by P.V. Dutton, 2002. Copyright by Cambridge University Press, in *The Routledge Handbook of French Politics and Culture* by D. Marion et al., 2019. Copyright by Routledge, and in *The Oxford Handbook of Turkish Politics* by G.M. Tezcür, 2022. Copyright by The Oxford University Press.

The paper is *case-oriented,* and in making a comparative case study, the similarities and differences between France and Türkiye are scrutinized. While making the case selection, France and Türkiye's existence as typologically different welfare states is taken into consideration. I targeted Southern European and Continental European typologies due to the existing puzzle in the literature that does not have unanimity whether they are separate typologies or the same (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Grütjen, 2008). Esping-Andersen (1990) puts Türkiye into the Continental European category, but starting from Maurizio Ferrera (Alan 1996), the question of another category of the Southern European welfare state model emerged. According to Ferrera, the Southern European model has similarities with the Continental European model. However, its distinct characteristics prevent those states from being categorized under the Continental European welfare state typology. For example, although it is a secular state, Türkiye has Islamic connotations geographically and politically. Perspective towards women in Islam that attributes domestic duties to them may shape social security policies covering women (Bilir & Açıkgöz, 2017). The French case is regarded as the most resilient state to change (P. Pierson, 1994; Prasad, 2006). Both France and Türkiye follow the Bismarckian insurance system, which makes them resilient to reform. Since the system is funded by contributions of employers and employees, it is hard to replace the funding of the social security budget of states. Therefore, comparing two originally Bismarckian welfare states' responses to neoliberalism brings insight into comparative literature. Since the paper aims to analyze various types of welfare states' responses to neoliberalism, two different cases are selected ideologically different in their social protection agenda. Another common aspect of the two states is the adoption of neoliberalism's interval in the 1980s (Palier, 2004; Yörük, 2022). Both states have implemented neoliberal policies since this date, which orients them to be compared simultaneously. Despite being different cases, two states end up in same outcome of expansion in welfare state. In this paper, I aim to analyze the common denominator that drives two welfare states to end up in same outcome.

While collecting data about France and Türkiye, social expenditure and welfare policy programs are taken into account as Bölükbaşı et al. (2021) find it necessary to include social rights and welfare efforts. Welfare effort is the term for representing how much the state spends for the well-being of its citizens. It is also a tool to measure the scope of the welfare state. The share of social spending (SOCX) on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is spent on social programs is included in the welfare effort. It is represented by SOCX/GDP. Another ratio calculation measures the share of social expenditure on government spending (G) that is represented by SOCX/G. The welfare outcome is the result of the policy input within the frame of the welfare state, like poverty and unemployment rates (Aitken, 2019). These indicators are selected based on evidence in the literature that suggests including health, unemployment, pensions, and social security benefits (Bolukbasi et al., 2021; Prasad, 2006; Wincott, 2001). The data to measure the welfare effort is taken from OECD SOCX, World Bank Development Indicators, ESSPROSS, *Service des Études Statistiques et de l'Information* (*SÉSI*) in France case and Turkish STAT for Turkish data. Table 5 below represents the indicators that are measured under the scope of social security policies. Social expenditure is based on the classification of the OECD SOCX Database(OECD, 2024). By using Pierson's (1996) indicators of policy change shifts in welfare programme through their expansion and retrenchment is evaluated too.

Table 5

Welfare Indicators

	Social Expenditure	Policies	Implementation of Law
Welfare Indicators	Pensions Healthcare Family Housing Unemployment Active Labor Market Programmes	Increasing /decreasing coverage (e.g. Maternity, fraternity benefits)	Expansionary law Retrenchment law

Note. author's own conclusion adapted from the information provided in the OECD Social Expenditure Data Base by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development by OECD, 2024. Copyright by OECD and in *The New Politics of the Welfare State* by P. Pierson, 1996. Copyright by World Politics.

I use causal analysis to analyze the most different cases of France and Türkiye and their welfare state transformation after the 1980s neoliberalism. A causal mechanism explains the relationship between different units of analysis. Causal mechanisms are "portable concepts that explain how and why a hypothesized cause, in a given context, contributes to a particular outcome" (Falleti & Lynch, 2009, pg.1141). Figure 2 below represents the modeling of the causal mechanism. As shown in the figure, a cause leads to the emergence of an outcome through a mechanism. In this paper, causal analysis of French and Turkish welfare states' responses to neoliberalism is carried out. The cause is neoliberalism in both cases, and a specific outcome is reached. The causal mechanism that shapes and triggers the same outcome in both cases is analyzed. Apart from the causal mechanism, the context in which cause and outcome interact is also important to understand the relationship. Goertz (1994) claims the context does not cause the outcome. Instead, it affects how cause and outcome interact. In this paper, for both France and Türkiye, the causal mechanism paving the way for the same outcome is analyzed separately, and the context that includes the structural constraints is examined.

Figure 2

Causal mechanism modeling

Note: *C* = cause; *M* = mechanism; *O* = outcome. Author's own conclusion adapted from the information provided in *Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis* by T.G. Falleti and J.F Lynch, 2009. Copyright by Comparative Political Studies.



SECTION 4: FRENCH WELFARE STATE AFTER NEOLIBERALISM

This chapter explains the French welfare state by examining its policies after the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s. France has a comprehensive welfare system that provides social security benefits to its citizens through unemployment, healthcare, pensions, housing, and family benefits. After World War II, the French welfare state expanded. The neoliberal revolution was a turning point, and it can be analyzed in two phases: the periods during François Mitterrand's presidential reign (1981-1995) and after France's membership in the Eurozone (1999). The French welfare state does not follow the retrenchment path, but its social policies go through a period of transition. The main causal mechanisms are electoral politics and labor unions' support for the incumbent party, and they interact with the traditional family as a structural constraint for policy change.

Figure 3

Social Expenditure of France in Percentage of GDP Between 1980-2018 (%)



Note. The author's own conclusion was adapted from the information provided in the OECD Social Expenditure Database by 2024. Copyright by OECD and in *Elections in France* by OSCE, 2024. Copyright by OSCE.

The French welfare state faces an attempt of retrenchment, but the opposition pacifies it. The opposition is seen through the societal response from the family. The established family roles and the state's in-kind and monetary support to the families make them resistant to the changes.

The earlier pushback comes from the labor representatives, as explained in the 1995 Strikes explained below. The retrenchment pushes markets to provide benefits that is not given by the state including the family policies. Figure 3 above shows France's social expenditures as a percentage of GDP (SOCX/GDP) between 1980 and 2018. The data in each year represents the moving average of every three years. The grey-shaded columns represent the parliamentary elections in the given time interval. The figure indicates that there are certain periods when the percentage of SOCX/GDP drops and periods that continuously climb. The retrenchment is seen between 1980 and 1982, from 20.1% to 17.3%, which is the early years of neoliberalism. Apart from that point, in 2000, 2003, and 2018, there was a slight drop that is smaller than 0.05%. Another drop in social expenditure is seen in 1985-1988. Apart from these falls, an increasing trend is observed in social expenditure. Especially before the election of 1993 and 1997, there is a significant increase in expenditure, and another major increase is seen between before and after the 2012 elections. The year 1993 represents socialist Mitterrand's rise to power as a reaction to neoliberal policies spreading around the world (Sachs et al., 1986). The drop in 1988 and then increase after 1993 elections indicate the effect of elections on welfare state spending. The drops in the percentage of social expenditure depend on both endogenous and exogenous actors. Elections are one factor that leads states to spend more on social services to gain political support (P. Pierson, 1994). As an exogenous actor, we can see EU membership, which obliged states to decrease social expenditure and join the monetary union by the end of 1999. The absence of a strong increase around this time also shows the importance of international relations in the French welfare state.

From this point onwards, the paper gives the reasons behind the trend in Figure 3 above. The major causal mechanism behind the current trends lies in structural constraints that take the family into the center of the decision mechanism. It is essential to mention the key aspects of the French welfare state. Firstly, the continental-European welfare state is built on the Bismarckian insurance system. In this system, citizens have to pay in to get healthcare and elderly benefits. The second aspect is based on the male bread-winner model (MBM), where women are responsible for domestic jobs, and the state does not support women's labor force participation. Thirdly, there are means-tested benefits favoring the neediest people from the economically disadvantaged groups. The target is not the middle class but rather the lower-class (Leibfried & Obinger, 2000). These three notions summarize the modern characteristics of the French welfare state.

The Bismarckian insurance system assures that if a person contributes to the social security system for his/her retirement or sickness times, there must be a return. If that person gets retired, pensions must be paid back to them. This brings an inevitable continuity that cannot be abandoned. Traditional family perspective is very strong that prevents women to get benefits unless they do not work. However, elderly care and child benefits strengthen the traditional family. If you want to change the traditional family, the benefits for taking care of elderly people or children would be taken away by the state. People are not willing to loose benefits provided by the state. Finally, benefitting the lower class that has the highest political support is decisive in electoral politics. A resistance from the lower class and workers can be witnessed when taking their benefits away. This would result in the loss of elections and social upheaval, as illustrated by the reaction to the implementation of Juppe's Plan in 1995 (explained below). Here we see familization constructed by the state and the family as a structural constraint to change. As Bismarckian insurance system acquires continuity and family members get benefits from the state, they oppose against a change that would take the benefits.

When we look back to the formation of welfare state in France, it is vital to mention Pierre Laroque's name who is regarded as funding father and architect of social security in France in 1944 (Jabbari, 2006). As a civil servant, Laroque invents a system in which state and industrial society relations are restructured with the concern of providing workers with social security and protection. Decommodification of labor process starts with his initiative. The first phase of the modern welfare state in France originated to Laroque's introduction of the *Sécurité social* (Cooper, 2019). After World War II, France adopted *dirigisme,* where a state-centric approach was followed between 1945 and 1974 with Laroque's initiation. Dirigisme means that the state is superior to the market and controls investments with a centralized economy. Institutions build the channel of economic development via flow of the resources to industry (Levy,2009). The first beneficiaries of the welfare practices were workers. The law of 12 May 1946 on Social Schemes has been drafted and implemented since then (Nadal, 2005). The Law gave the state a legislative framework for social security policies. Beyond this, centralism is an essential feature of the past and present of French politics at all levels. The origins of the state-centric conservative political economy date back to the French Revolution of 1789 and the Paris Commune of 1871 (Silberman, 1993). By taking the heritage of the old, the state develops a new agenda.

The second phase of French welfare state is in post-war period between 1974 and 1983, when the oil crisis affected the whole world and European integration forced the states to step back from intervention in the economy (Kus, 2006). The third phase is after 1983, when the neoliberal shift occurs in the French welfare state which is in French called *l'État providence* (Guillaume, 2001). The third phase begins by the changes in objectives of French welfare state. The major driving force behind pursuing a new welfare agenda to decrease the social expenditure lies in the 1970s oil crisis that caused stagflation. The period right after the oil crisis changes the profile of French welfare state. After 1980s, France is regarded as one of the most inegalitarian societies by means of social risks which are not distributed in an adversary manner towards businesses (Prasad, 2006: 4). One major claim in the literature about the French welfare regime that describes the post-neoliberal era indicates it is the most resilient case to changes (Pierson, 1998). Unlike the British and American responses of sustained cuts on expenditure, France's attempts to narrow down and cut the budget policies do not last long.

The profound aspects of France's welfare state lie under the consistency and harmony within the welfare institutions. One can argue that there are four characteristics of *l'État providence (French welfare state)*. Firstly, there is pay-as-you-go system, the Bismarckian insurance system. Secondly, a regressive tax system that looks at the contribution while arranging the benefits. Thirdly, the funding for the social security system is sustained by the social contribution of citizens. Finally, there is veto power of organizations within politics who are the employee and employer representatives (Prasad, 2006; Palier, 2004: 5). These four aspects are key to distinguishing the French system from other types of welfare systems. One major claim employed by Pierson (1996) is on the impartial role of the opposition party in the decision-making process specific to welfare reforms. While comparing US and UK cases both weak and strong Left are taken into consideration, and they are found necessary to oppose retrenchment policies. France does not have a strong leftist party to challenge the decision-making. However, France, in its origins, has Bismarckian insurance norms, and as Arend Ljphart (1984) highlights, competing powers come along to form a coalition under consensual politics. There are political actors with veto power under the French system that challenge the implementation of a law or reform (Pierson, 1998). In the case of retrenchment politics, employees' representatives have the higher potential to go against any change that will prevent their representatives from losing their benefits. Here, the resistance from the opposition groups can be seen through elections or direct protest against any policy change. Here we see the causal mechanism that shapes the French welfare politics. The power of veto-players and their representatives in the government is decisive. Therefore, for France, even though there is not a strong opposition from the Left parties due to the incumbent long-lasting position in politics, the veto players are important for the welfare state policies, which also include electoral politics.

By looking at the legal foundations of French welfare state and its transition after 1980s, we can observe enlargement and increased coverage. The regulations after 1945 are a guide to understand the evolution of the welfare state in France. In the beginning, the major problem in the development of the French welfare state was the lack of cohesion and harmony among different social insurance schemes. Workers were the first beneficiaries of the welfare state thanks to Laroque. Then it continued with the students' inclusion in social protection. The welfare state expands through time but there not a unified law or regulation for social security. The Scheme of 1946 regulating welfare state practices is not sufficient for covering all social protection that provides sickness, healthcare, employment/unemployment benefits and pensions. Each programme had its own regulation and was fragmented for different classes like workers and public servants. For that matter, in 1967 under the name of Minister of Justice Jean-Marcel Jeanneney a General Scheme is launched to have a unified frame for different social security schemes. In that way, there is one legal document and the social protection is unified under a scheme (Nadal 2005; Republique Français CLEISS, 2023).

The expansion and evolution of the General Scheme continues until the 1973 Oil Crisis. The crisis challenges all state practices because the economic situation gets worse. Unemployment and inflation occur together, forming stagflation. Due to increasing unemployment, more social security spending is acquired from the state. The reason is that states need to take care of the unemployed and their families to protect them from social risks. For that reason, public expenditure that increases the public deficit are tried to be kept limited and cost-reducing policies are launched. Another problem France faced during the 1970s economic crisis is an aging population. The generation known as baby boomers, who were born at a time when birth rates were at their peak, began retiring. Therefore, pensions also emerge as another area for higher social expenditure. To compensate for social expenditures, new taxes are introduced in the form of increasing the prices of alcohol and tobacco (Patron, 2012). To diminish the negative impact of the aging population, 37.5 years of contribution to the social security system is increased to 40 years (Schramm, 2023). In this way, people getting benefits from pensions and do not contribute to the social security budget is tried to be decreased. The previously existing population agenda to increase the population has changed because social security is capitalized. To cover the economic losses, neoliberal policies are applied to the system.

The 1973 oil crisis created economic and political urge to minimize the negative consequences for the citizens. Nevertheless, concern of at least baring minimum standards for everyone in society does not change even at crisis times. Before the 1980s, during the 1970s, the French *Sécurité sociale régime general* was challenged by the financial crisis of high inflation and immense unemployment. Because the state is spending more than it gets from the revenues, then a budget deficit is seen. However, the crisis does not result in reducing the benefits but rather increasing the contributors to the system. Societal response and popular support are causal mechanism for policy making. In France, representatives of employers and employees are the main opponents of reforms and defenders of social welfare. For employers, contributions allow them to pay lower wages, and for employees, getting subsidies and having moderate wages is essential. The state itself does not come up with a retrenchment reform that would change the whole agenda of the welfare state. The budget deficit is covered by the change in finance instruments, and contributions are increased (Palier, 2004). According to the OECD Social Expenditure data, the healthcare expenditure of France in 1980 was 76.5% of the total GDP, whereas it was 66% in 1970 (OECD SOCX, 2023). Until 1993, the French welfare state's ultimate aim was to retrench the budget deficit by increasing the contributions. The benefits gained by the contribution is 19.4% of all social welfare benefits by 1974. This percentage changed to 27.3% in 1985 (Palier, 2004). There is a shift in the way of financing the welfare state, but the social welfare system does not face a profound change.

The effect of neoliberalism is seen from the 1980s onwards in the world, and by that time, socialist reforms were being held in France (Nadal, 2005). We see the welfare state in two time frames: Mitterrand's reign and EU integration. In the 1981 Presidential elections, the leader of the Socialist Party, François Mitterrand, won the election. His election is critical since it starts the "French road to socialism," and with this new way of making politics, neoliberalism's effect on social protection is minimized. Notwithstanding the retrenchment wave in the Anglo-Saxon world, France even further extends welfare state capabilities. The nationalization of many private banks was seen under the Mitterrand regime. In the socialist decade, eligibility criteria and coverage increased. Employment and economic growth are of the most importance. The limit for the minimum wage is standardized. The retirement age is dropped to 60. However, Mitterrand also faced an economic problem where he turned the focus to price stability—the recessionary period of 1993 started to shake the pillars of existing welfare state practices. Monetary unit Franc faces devaluation, but still, social expenditure is not cut, but a freeze in wages is seen (Sachs et al., 1986). Mitterrand's economic reforms are regarded as economically inefficient. With his social protection policies, social spending increases and the budget deficit also increases. However, he managed to sustain welfare even in crisis moments (Sachs et al., 1986, p.314).

The change to Mitterrand's expansionary welfare state comes from outside. During Mitterrand's reign, European states, including France, started working on the common European market. This means the market is getting stronger than the state in the triangle of state, family, and market. The Maastricht Treaty was concluded in 1992 for the sake of European integration. The euro is dedicated to being the common currency in all European states. The staggering expectation from the welfare state in Maastricht criteria calls upon a threshold for the public deficit. According to Articles 32 and 104c(2), the public deficit may not exceed 60% of GDP, and this percentage must be decreased at least by 12% each year following the agreement (Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, 1992).

The European prospect is representing a contest to *Sécurité sociale.* This limit on the public deficit drives states to limit their social expenditures and individuals rely on the market. Even though most present attempts at amending the social welfare instruments are seen after Mitterrand's regime, by 1992 unemployment compensation reform was applied with the name *Allocation Unique Dégressive (AUD). AUD* is an attempt to decrease temporary unemployment and to create a dependency between benefits and payments of recipients. The unemployed are getting as much compensation as they pay the system. Following *AUD*, a new pensions scheme was introduced that is *Fonds de Solidarité Vieillesse (FSV)* in 1993. According to *FSV,* private sector workers are supposed to pay for social insurance for 40 years which was 37.5 beforehand. In 1999, *Couverture Maladie Universelle (CMU) wa*s created to regulate health policies. In this new model, complementary insurance schemes are introduced, which means the state Alan provides both private and institutional insurance (ESSPROS, 2021). These three unemployment, pension, and healthcare reforms represent a transition that limits expenditure but increases coverage in the French welfare system. Even if the instrument of policies is changed and dualized, the aim is to have social welfare that indicates a second-order change(Hall, 1993).

By 1994, a new reform process is introduced into the system to neutralize the 1970s economic crisis' negative effects. Then in 1995, Jacques Chirac become president and Alain Juppe becomes the prime minister. The Juppe Plan is introduced in 1995 and it covered the programmes to shrink the benefits of health, pensions and unemployment. It faced opposition from the employee representatives leading the social movement of 1995 Strikes (Howard, 1998). The content of the plan was aimed at reducing the social expenditure. There were three main pillars of the plan that were healthcare, pensions, and employment benefits and Juppe's main criticism was against the existence of 19 different social security schemes (Bouget, 1998). Even though Juppe's plan aims to regulate social expenditure, the expansion of inclusion is also witnessed in this reform agenda. For instance, establishment of the regional healthcare institutions aims to benefit more people and decrease inequality among different regions. For the pensions, the wage year is increased from 37.5 to 40 years, and working years are increased from 10 to 25 years. This regulates the unemployment benefits reforms too in the public sector. Pay as you go system remained. The same policies are tried to be implemented in the private sector too but the strikes prevented it. Another aspect of the social welfare reform of Juppe's plan is seen in family benefits. The system allowed for 24 types of benefits, including child, school, and maternal benefits, which created confusion on the allocation of resources. Juppe's plan led to the inclusion of the neediest ones rather than benefiting everyone. Means-tested benefits are introduced in family benefits. Already established General Social Security Scheme of 1991, is intensified by increasing the income taxes, and some of them are given up due to strikes. Besides, contributions are cut from 5.6% to 0.75% (Bouget, 1998).

The main objective of the French welfare state is to keep the state as centralized as possible with a strong economy. In return for Mitterrand's socialist policies' failure to reduce the public deficit, the government had the legitimization to come up with reforms to change the social policies. The already established authority of the Fifth Republic also created room for exercise for the Juppe Plan. The power of the Republic gives the state to exercise its power and it is sourced by its legitimacy. Even strikes were coming from the beneficiaries like union representatives, European integration and budget deficit paved the way for implementing the Juppe Plan's reforms. Controversially, while the social expenditure is planned to be diminished, the coverage rate increases. Especially by shifting the healthcare policies to universal, already existing Bismarckian norms that only cover the workers themselves are changed. In 1999, France adopted the universal healthcare system (Nadal, 2005). Centralization has always wanted to be kept as a core principle before and after the neoliberal revolution affecting the whole world. The general overview of the French state is as follows: the state still tries to hold the centralism aspect at hand but also adopts the situation of liberalism the EU is bringing.

Following the 1999 revolution that adopted the universal healthcare system, in 2001, another amendment to the law for social protection was launched to provide all family support by means of maternity and paternity. The expansion of old-age allowance is seen under this new law and occupational accidents are covered under the general scheme The social expenditure increases because of the coverage and eligibility criteria's expansion. 2010 is another reform year where occupational accidents started to be covered under the General Scheme in addition to the pensions (ILO, 2023). Even it is not in this studies time interval, in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had spread around the world. During that time, health and unemployment benefits are provided for contributors of social security and non-contributors (Kuhlmann et al., 2021). This also increased the social security spending.

Figure 4

Labor Force Participaiton Rate in France Between 1990-2020



Figure 4 above represents the labor force participation rate in France between 1990-2020. Yellow points show women and purple points show men participation rate to labor force. The latest date measured in the Europe indicates that women labor force participation rate in Europe OECD countries is 46.4%. Through time the gap between men and women decreases in France but the number of men are still higher. However, the rate in France is still lower than many other European countries like Germany. As a Western industrialized country, French rate is lower

Between 2007-2012, The Republicans became the party in power under the rule of Nicolas Sarkozy. During his reign, the "child welcome benefits" are only provided for the mothers and fathers were not able to get it. Besides, the benefits could not be transferrable. The opposition from the families emerge to change it to let fathers have parental leave, too. Therefore, he made reforms to extend the benefits. Even the widespread opposition forced him to reform, he had a policy "work more to earn more" that pushed women to join the labor force by cutting the family benefits. Therefore, he became an unpopular political leader(Windebank, 2012). François Hollande from the Socialist Party takes over the reign. One major event emerges in his rule that is the protest the family law implemented by Hollande. Even though protests are against same-sex marriage and not directly related with the welfare policies, the primary motivation in protest is to defend the traditional family in France, which leads to a pushback from the government (Johnson, 2012). We can observe that French society is strictly bound by family's strength and not in favor of changes in the family.

Figure 5

Age Dependency Ratio, Old (& of working-age population) in France



Figure 5 above represents the age dependency ratio in France between 1980 and 2018. After 1984, the dependency increased until 2018. Even though the graph gets steeper between 2000 and 2006, there is no year for the dependency ratio to fall. The retired or elderly people who are not in the work force get benefits from the contributions of the working population. As their number increases more than the number of people in the workforce, the state gets under the stress of providing elderly people with either pensions or other benefits from its own budget. This is the reason behind the existence of taxes in financing welfare in France (CLEISS, 2023).

Figure 6 below shows the number of people with low income who were below the 60% poverty line in France between 1979 and 1980. The falls between 1999, 2001-2002, 2012-2013 and 2015-2016 are very low that differ at most by 10 people. The highest point is seen in 2018, with number 93127. 2007-2008 is the year with the highest decrease, representing the 2008 Municipal Elections. Regional governments are effective in providing benefits to the needy. Low-income people receive benefits to give popular support (Vail, 2023). In 2006, *Allocation de solidarité aux personnes âgées (ASPA*) was implemented to cover low-income old-age people, which increased social expenditure in Figure 3. As a response to the increase in the number of poor people beginning in 2004, as shown in Figure 4. Figure 3 supports the increase in social expenditure after 2001 to cover the neediest ones, that is, people with low incomes in that context. Figures 4 and 5 represent increasing patterns that do not equate with the value provided in Figure 3 totally. Even though the number of people who need social benefits increases, the social expenditure does not increase in the same ratio. This situation is sourced by the strong family role in the welfare triangle. The family in France means responsibility for taking care of the families, including old-aged people (Trabut et al., 2021). Even though there is social expenditure by the state, it is limited because the traditional notion of women as caregivers remains. In 2001, maternity benefits also allowed mothers to take care of their kids after birth (Neyer, 2021). For low-income people, family support is also essential to provide financial and psychological support.

Figure 6

Number of Low-Income People below the 60 percent poverty line from 1979 to 2018



To sum up, in the French case, we can see the role of a centralized strong state even in the case of neoliberal pressure and European integration obligations. In the welfare state triangle, family is also vital for the French case, as it takes responsibility for its members in a way that shares the duties of the state. The societal response is seen even in the early phases of neoliberalism in the 1980s by the victory of a socialist government ruled by Mitterrand and the reaction from the labor representatives to the Juppe Plan. The plan to decrease state benefits to employees and their families is rejected and creates a vast strike that prevents restrictive policies. The family policies are extended between 1980-2020. The Bismarckian insurance system guarantees the continuity of benefits and feeds family policies. People contribute to the insurance system with the certainty that they and their families will get the benefits when they are retired or unable to work. This cyclical form of funding the insurance system makes citizens stick to the policies and pushes the state to extend family policies more. Society rejects anti-family policies, and active opposition is seen in protests. The societal response against the limitations of family benefits shapes the French welfare agenda.

SECTION 5: TURKISH WELFARE STATE AFTER NEOLIBERALISM

This chapter analyzes the neoliberalism period in Turkish welfare state between 1980-2020. Türkiye is a developing country but also an emerging/developing welfare state where original policies were witnessed in the late 1950s (Öniş, 2012). It has a universal healthcare system but also targeted social protection policies too like conditional cash transfers. Neoliberalism appears in Turkish politics in the 1980s with the reign of President Turgut Özal. The new ideology shows its effects on the economic, social, and political life of Türkiye. By analyzing the Turkish welfare state, this chapter explores the non-retrenchment, the transformation of the Turkish welfare state by looking at the structural constraint of traditional family and the role of popular support, including the labor unions reactions to state policies. looks after the answers to questions of how it behaves under neoliberalism and what the causes of its welfare policies are.

Figure 7

Social Expenditure of Türkiye in Percentage of GDP % Between 1980-2020



Note. The author’s own conclusion was adapted from the information provided in the OECD Social Expenditure Database by 2024. Copyright by OECD and in *Elections in Türkiye* by TURKSTAT, 2024. Copyright by TURKSTAT.

Figure 6 above represents the mean average of social expenditures as a percentage of GDP in Türkiye between 1980 and 2018. Grey-shaded columns show the election years. The only years indicating a fall in social expenditure percentage are 1982 and 2015. Apart from that, social expenditures always increase. The time interval between 1997 and 2009 highlights a sharp increase with a high slope. The lowest social expenditure value is in 1981, which follows the January 24 Decisions aiming at decreasing the state intervention.. One of the major policy social security development attempts is witnessed in April 2008 by a social security reform (Grütjen, 2008). The benefits for the public servants are enhanced by the new reform by regulating the retirement pensions, sick leaves, and also health insurance on behalf of the workers themselves (Alper, 2011). New reform expands the benefits for the citizens and contributes to the increase in social expenditure, too. In addition to that, 2009 is the year when the urban population witnessed a sharp increase to 71%, which increases the number of people in need of benefits (Yörük, 2019: 49). Migration from rural to urban areas means getting more benefits from the services provided in urban areas like access to health benefits, getting employed and reaching the employment benefits and also having the chance of getting retired and accessing to pensions. Legal and demographical changes leads a jump in social expenditure in 2009 that is from 10% to approximately %13. In 1995 and in the year 1996 two major riots emerge from the grassroots level in May 1 celebrations (Koç, 2003). Major actors in the riots are the unofficial workers that demand for better social protection facilities. In return, the government increases employment and neighborhood benefits. The popular supports and grassroots movement's effect in the agenda setting is seen. In the year 2016, there is another jump and this is regarded as the main success of the establishment of Ministry of family and Social Policy in 2011. The total social expenditure in year 2016 is recorded as $9.34 billion (Yörük, 2019). Institutional changes and centralization of the welfare policies are seen by the establishment of a per se unit of conducting programs.

The neoliberal transition in Turkish welfare system coincides with the time Turkish President Turgut Özal's ascent to power in 1983. Therefore, neoliberal policies of the welfare state are associated with his name. Under Özal's reign neoliberal agenda is implemented in economic, social, and political levels. In the economic level, Özal supports business owners and enhances privatization and economy becomes more export oriented. Another economic policy is decreasing the social security payments through cuts in wages. This economic transition causes a social transition in public level where wages are decreased, and social security benefits are limited. Özal also goes for a transformation bureaucratic level to enhance neoliberal agenda (Özen, 2013). Like Thatcher and Raegan, Özal's aim is also to bring economic development and growth through deregulation. The traditional role of the state evolves in a way that it is hesitant to provide benefits to the citizens. Income levels are decreased by cutting social security benefits. This situation creates increased social inequality and negatively affects the implementation of policies. By agreeing to the conditions of Washington consensus, Türkiye gets aid and guidance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). These two institutions are essential to shaping the Türkiye's neoliberal agenda, starting from Özal's political rule. The IMF and WB provisions aim at austerity measures to be taken (Bedirhanoğlu, 2021). Limiting the state's role in providing social protection is dedicated to their economic plans. One major social protection policy is implemented by Özal's time that did not end up with success because the aids were not distributed equally. The policy was named as Fakir-Fukara-Fonu (*FAK-FUK-FON) (Poor- Needy-Fund).* The benefits were covering the lower-income people only. Because of the social and economic atmosphere of the time lower income people suffered from lower wages or unemployment. However, Özal's attempts result in high dependency on foreign investment and brings a social unrest and economic crisis following 1990s onwards (Boratav & Yeldan, 2006). The applicability of the neoliberal transition faces the challenge of political support too.

Through the end of 1980s, the consequences of Özal's neoliberal policies do not bring political and economic mobilization. Fall in wages, currency depreciation, and unsustainable export activities lead the state to transform again (Boratav & Yeldan, 2006). This creates social and political instability. Following the year 1989, the Turkish state that is governed by Özal's *Anavatan Party (Motherland Party-ANAP)* that is now ruled by the Yıldırım Akbulut, takes initiatives to increase the state's role in the economy. By the time Özal is the president of the Republic. Özal's policies are regarded as inefficient and not the best fit for structure of the Turkish economy and well-being.

The 1990s period is the time interval where Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), intervened in the Türkiye's economic plan (Boratav, 2019). Neoliberalism and decreasing public deficits are the main policy agendas according to Bretton Woods institutions obligations, and they affect social policies. The 1990s period has six different coalition governments. The political instability societal response. Even though wages are suppressed, the support for the poor people, especially those living in urban areas, continue. By that time migration from rural to urban areas are high in number. The support for the families in urban areas is maintained by the state. This is the continuation of Özal's FAK-FUK-FON policy. Between 1999-2002, under the prime ministry of Bülent Ecevit under *Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP)* and following this under the coalition of *DSP, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party, MHP)* and *ANAP*, IMF and WB agenda continues, however the political instability during the time leads parties to have favorable agenda for the citizens (Boratav, 2019). Here, we can see that the neoliberal agenda is carried out as an economic policy but not as a social policy. The social and political instability leads governments to have pro-society policies.

The heritage from the 1980s and 1990s neoliberal agenda is taken to 2000s Justice and Development Party's (AKP) term too. In first phases of AKP's rule Kemal Derviş's provisions that are guided by the IMF are applied. For this reason, first decade of the AKP's reign is regarded as neoliberal too. However, the dependency on foreign investment and high international debts, the neoliberal model and IMF provisions are found to be economically inefficient (Ekzen, 2014). Even though an economically neoliberal agenda is followed, the social protection agenda does not get affected in the same way. The economy causes a shrinking in the payments but not the policy changes. This is again because of the bascklash of society that leads part gaining support from the voters.

Before the elections of 2002, parties joining the elections prepared written propaganda for the planned reforms that is election bulletin. AKP is the only part that mentions the family policies and dedicates two pages for it. One of the election promises is to strengthen the family and support it both in in-king and cash benefits (AKP, 2002). As shown in Figure 6, social expenditure value has a sharp increase after the elections of 2002, where AKP became the ruling party in government. This is a victory after the political instability of coalition governments in the 1990s. The success in elections is related to the election bulletin promises that cover the family and find it as an essential unit of the state (AKP, 2002). In the triangle of state, state, and family are the most predominant ones in the Turkish welfare system. Besides, in the same bulletin, the party elite mentions the restrictive notions of the IMF and WB regulations and their promise to end its controlling power. The policy for the good of the family and the plan for leaving the neoliberal agenda creates electoral support and makes AKP incumbent. The traditional role of the family to take of its members is essential in shaping the welfare regime. Here gender roles that give women to take care of the domestic duties while man is breadwinner and intergenerational roles of taking care of elderly and children reflect traditional family characteristics. The existing social policies and coverages also drive families to be essential actors. Traditional family structure keeps members within the same household. The traditional family structure adopts women's domestic characteristics like taking care of their kids and housework. Conversely, men are responsible for making a living by earning a salary. Women’s domestic role puts them in the special burden that is the house. When women stay in the house, they take care of old relatives, too (Sakallı et al., 2018). The dependency of family members on each other is seen in statistics. According to the TURKSTAT report in the year 2022, a number of extended families that are large households is 12.8 %, whereas the rate of single member households is 19.4% (TURKSTAT, 2023). Traditional family structure’s perspective towards female employment is also negative. Women are regarded as domestic housewives who need to take care of the housework, whereas the male breadwinner model is seen, too. Therefore, family provisions are also a newly emerging area. As the participation of the female labor force will increase by 32,8 % in 2023, the childcare provisions will be endorsed by (World Bank, 2022). In 2016, an addition to Public Servants Law was made to let mothers have breast-feeding and maternal leave (Public Servants Law, 2016). The evolution of the perspective towards women’s presence in the labor force affects the laws and welfare policies to facilitate its citizens lives.

Figure 8

Labor force participation rate in Türkiye Between 1990- 2018



Note. data is taken from *World Bank Gender Data Portal, 2024.* Copyright by World Bank. https://liveprod.worldbank.org/en/economies/turkiye

Figure 8 above represent the labor force participation rate in Türkiye between 1990-2018. Yellow points represent the women, and purple points show male labor force participation rate. The recent OECD (2024) average for women labor force participation rate is 46.4% and Türkiye is always below that level (WB, 2024). We can see increases and drops through time. The figure indicates that the levels in Türkiye are low that strengthens the argument that gender roles for women to have domestic duties are present. There is a huge gap between men and women enhancing the idea that male bread winner model is seen in Türkiye.

The pension system in Tukey is not very old but has existed over the last two decades. There are three different pension schemes. The first one is the pay-as-you-go system (PAYG), where official workers' pay certain social security contributions while they are working, and then they get benefits in retirement in the form of disability/unemployment/accident and healthcare benefits. The second one is occupational that mainly targets only *Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu* (OYAK) OYAK *Türkiye Taşkömürü Kurumu* (TTK) retirees. Third scheme is enacted in 2017 to support the savings of people under the name private pension scheme (BES). In that system, the state contributes to the citizen's savings by 30% and increases their welfare (Erensü & Madra, 2022; Palier, 2004; (Peksevim & Akgiray, 2019). Even pension schemes are new in Türkiye, their coverage increases by the new regulations of the state. Specific groups are prioritized based on their previous work experiences as in case of OYAK and TTK.

One significant trend in welfare state programs in recent decades has been the focus on poor and minority populations to gain political support. Yörük (2019) introduces a conceptualization of the current welfare regime known as the income-based social assistance program. This model represents a shift from the previously dominant employment-based social assistance programs. Traditionally, welfare benefits were distributed based on individuals' employment status, exemplified by the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) system, where benefits are funded by current workers' contributions and distributed to retirees.

The newly emerging system integrates income and employment criteria for determining social assistance eligibility. By targeting the most economically disadvantaged individuals, the program aims to reduce wealth inequality and address the needs of the most vulnerable. This shift reflects a political strategy designed to appeal to a broader base by directly addressing poverty and economic disparity. The approach seeks to ensure that social assistance reaches those in greatest need, thereby narrowing the wealth distribution gap and providing a more inclusive safety net for the population.

To conclude, Turkish welfare state is an emerging welfare state. 1980s neoliberalism trend is first employed by the ruling party ANAP, however the policies are mostly limited to economic policies. Like in FAK-FUK-FON policies, social policies represent stratification by means of welfare benefits. In 1980s and 1980s, migration wave to urban areas makes state to pay its attention more on the families in migrated families. Benefits are given to urban areas that are most needy and structure of the family must be preserved. The AKP's promises for the elections and its further policy reforms makes family even stronger. The election success for AKP and also

Ecevit's reign relies on the family policies. The societal response against neoliberal reforms makes Özal government unpopular and leads other party leaders to have more family favorable agenda. The state strengthens the family by social policies and family wants to get stronger by the benefits. The market is outlined in the welfare triangle validating the welfare trilemma.

SECTION 6: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This paper provided a comparative analysis of French and Turkish welfare states' responses after the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s. Their social expenditure and policy implementation areas are researched by employing the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). The first argument is that both French and Turkish welfare states did not face retrenchment after the 1980s neoliberalism. The second argument is that family is the structural constraint behind the policy changes in both states, and societal repsonse is the mechanism that shapes state behavior. French and Turkish welfare states social expenditure data, legal implementations, and the role of state, family, and market in each welfare state are compared.

The trilemma of the welfare state that occurred because of the impossibility of coexistence of the state, family, and market simultaneously is visibly seen in France and Türkiye cases. As mentioned in the literature review, all three cannot be strong in a welfare state. The central state is decisive in making policies, but family is a structural constraint for increasing the coverage. A strong family means that the benefits provided for families strengthen the traditional ties and lead the members of the family to resist any change to decrease the benefits. Decrease in benefits is a strategy on the part of the state to pressure workers to seek such benefits in the market, but because the market would weaken the family ties, individuals' commitment to strong family makes them resist such acts of delegation to the market. Maternity leaves and old-age pensions have been apparent in France for two decades and less than a decade in Türkiye. For maternity leave, we can see a strong family presence as women are the main caregivers for the children and do not participate in the labor force. Therefore, the maternity leave benefits are not necessary for the housewives. The existence of maternity leave benefits also shows that women give first care to the baby, which also emphasizes the importance of family. Besides, elderly pensions appearance very lately also represents that there are people responsible for taking care of the elderly in the family. With pensions, individuals take care of them after retirement. Even though this seems to weaken the family members' reliance on each other, pensions can be transferred to first-degree relatives even after death. We can state that even elderly pensions are transmitted and, in this way, support the family ties financially. The structural constraint of the family that gives importance to a woman's traditional structure and domestic duties prevents the state from making investments, too. The human labor force participation rate in Türkiye and dependency rates in both states show how women are more dependent on the house, supporting the traditional family structure.

Figure 9

France and Türkiye Social Expenditure % in GDP Between 1980-2018



Note. The author’s own conclusion was adapted from the information provided in the OECD Social Expenditure Database by 2024. Copyright by OECD

Figure 9 above shows the comparison of French and Turkish welfare states social expenditures between 1980-2018. The table shows that France's spending is always higher than Türkiye, proving the more comprehensive aspect of the French welfare state. Their jumps and falls almost coincide with those in 2008 and 2002. This is an indicator that both states can be affected by exogenous shocks like economic crises.

Table 6 below gives a brief comparison of French and Turkish welfare states by comparing legal scheme, role of family, legal foundations, pensions and contribution system. The name of French welfare state

Table 6

Comparison of French and Turkish Welfare Practices

Welfare Practices	**France**	**Türkiye**
Insurance Scheme	General Scheme	SGK
Family	Traditional family	Traditional family
Protection by Law	Socio-economic rights in constitution Contribution sociale généralisée (CSG)	Social protection as a Constitutional right No.6552 Law of SGK
Pension Schemes	Managed by funding agencies but state is central. Employee and employer contribution Universal flat-rate benefits	Newly emerged Managed by SGK as agency and state is central. Employee and employer contribution
Contribution	Pay as you go system	Pay as you go system

Note. The author's own conclusion was adapted from the information provided in the *Code de la sécurité sociale* by Republique Frainçaise, and No.6552 Law of SGK by SGK.

Both France and Türkiye are affected by the veto powers and social movements. In the Juppe plan of the French case, the state node of the welfare triangle is tried to be weakened by emphasizing the importance of the market and family. The market would be responsible for pensions, unemployment, and welfare benefits. The family would be responsible for taking care of its members without getting any benefits from the state. However, this is not welcomed by the veto-players. The opposition to Juppe Plan 1995 in France and May 1, 1996, events in Türkiye represents the resistance against the retrenchment of benefits (Bouget, 1998; Koç, 2003). They are effective in both welfare states because the year after the events, social expenditure increases, and new laws or programs are introduced. The opposition in the France is politically strong too.

Mitterrand's rise as a socialist leader shows how political popularity is affected by the social policy promises.

An institutional difference between the two states affects their policies in regulation of the market. Since France is member of EU, the state's role in social protection is limited due to 60% budget deficit limit. On the other hand, Türkiye does not have any deficit ceiling.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, French and Turkish welfare states do not show retrenchment under neoliberalism. They rather transform the welfare state in accordance with opposition/support mechanism. The welfare states in France and Türkiye faces a structural constraint of strong family that is prioritized by the state and citizens get benefits in accordance. Politics of retrenchment turned towards the market, invites societal response to be the familialism that is observed in both countries. Elections are the expression of societal response or the social backlash. Political party's election results become a signal for them to how to relate their priorities or preferences in public policy making. In that case, for both France and Türkiye benefits provided to families form a structural constraint to implement new policies as neoliberalism suggests. The resistance of the society is rooted in strong ties in a family an also benefits enhancing these ties.

According to comparative welfare literature, not all states end up in retrenchment, and this might be validated by looking at different welfare states typologically. The existing typologies might be restrictive to understand specific policies in different cases (Merrien et al., 2005). In this paper, two dissimilar cases that belong to separate welfare typologies are compared through MSDD. There are two arguments in this thesis. In the occurrence of the same cause that is emergence of neoliberalism, both respond in non-retrenchment. The causal mechanism that paved the way for the welfare transition is societal response stemming from the strong familization in policies of both welfare states. The familization represents the state support for the family polices. Even though France and Türkiye are most different cases, they end up with more coverage and higher social expenditure. Despite the presence of retrenchment on certain occasions, this is a common reaction against an external threat like an economic crisis for both states. In France, the societal response is seen through the family. The traditional family makes its members to be co-dependent on each other, and parties enhanced this. When an attempt to decrease the benefits provided by state, family opposes it. By retrenchment, state leaves its welfare benefits responsibilities to the market. Individuals opposes it through strong protests and governments need to change the agenda as seen in 1995 Strikes, opposition to Sarkozy's labor reforms and Hollande's attempt to change the structure of the family. In Türkiye, party agendas on families determines the political success like in case of AKP and expansion in family policies are observed. FAK-FUK-FON of Özal's period to support lower income families, Ecevit's migrant family's support or AKP' election promise to extend family benefits represent the importance of family benefits in shaping the welfare policies. The societal response is seen through political punishment in elections for Turkish case.

Even though the coverage in France is higher than Türkiye since it is an older and more developed welfare state, the comparative graphs' slope shows they behave similarly. The major commonality between the two is strong family and state in the trilemma of welfare. Since the role of the family is important and traditional, the benefits that would be supplied by the state are limited. Old-age pensions are not extended that much because traditional family allows them to take of its members. The causal mechanism that drives both states to transform is opposition and veto powers, and family remains a structural constraint. The causal mechanism is related to societal response. The main veto players as opposition groups are labor unions or the representatives of employers and employees both in France and Türkiye in early stages. The retrenchment in state provided benefits that would negatively affect individuals, and their families faces opposition. Their political support is essential for the incumbent party. The strong family and strong state are present in both welfare states. This prevents the strengthening of the market in the welfare state triangle in Figure 1. The trilemma includes a strong traditional family that led both states to have maternity leave and elderly benefits. Besides, the state always provides child benefits for having children to support the family structure.

Future studies can further examine the role of the family for both states. Focusing on the traditional aspect of women and men, other causal mechanisms and structural constraints can be understood in a gendered perspective. By looking at this thesis, most different cases might be studied further to move beyond the classifications of literature. Different welfare states might respond to a stimulus in the same way because of shared constraints. Besides, even though the causal mechanism in this thesis does not directly reflect a populist agenda, it might be considered as articulation of it. In further studies, the populist policies or populist pushback in accordance with familialism can be extended.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN FRANCE BETWEEN 1980-2018

Election Year	**Incumbent**
1981	*Parti socialiste* (PS- Socialist Party)
1986	Coalition: *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR -Rally for the Republic*)* and *Union pour la démocratie française* (UDF -Union for French Democracy)*
1988	Coalition: *PS, UDF and RPR*
1993	Coalition: RPR, UDF and PS
1997	Coalition:, PS, RPR and UDF
2002	*Union pour la majorité présidentielle* (UMP-Union fort he Presidential Majority)
2007	UMP
2012	PS
2017	*La République En Marche !* (LREM- The Republic on the Move)

*Coalition governments are written in descending order of seats.
Note. The author's own conclusion was adapted from the information provided in the Le ministère de l'Intérieur et des Outre-mer by 2024. Copyright by https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/rubriques/b/b3_elections/b32_resultats.

LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN TÜRKIYE BETWEEN 1980 -2018

Election Year	**Incumbent**
1980 – no election	Military government
1983	*Anavatan Partisi* (ANAP- Motherland Party)
1987	ANAP
1991	Coalition: *Doğru Yol Partisi* (DYP- True Path Party) and *Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti* (SHP- *Socialdemocratic Populist Party)*
	Coalition : DYP, SHP and *Republican People's Party* (RPP- Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
	DYP
	DYP, RPP and Independent representatives
1996	ANAP and DYP
	Refah Partisi (RP- Welfare Party)
	ANAP, *Demokratik Türkiye Partisi* (DTP- Democrat Turkey Party), *Demokratik Sol Parti* (DSP- Democratic Left Party)
	DSP
1999	DSP, ANAP, *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (MHP-Nationalist Movement Party)
2002	*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP- Justice and Development Party)
2007	AKP
2011	AKP
2015	AKP
2018	AKP

Note. The author's own conclusion was adapted from the information provided in the Yüksek Seçim Kurulu (YSK), by 2024. Copyright by YSK.

APPENDIX B

THE TRANSITION FROM TARGETED HEALTH BENEFITS TO UNIVERSAL BENEFITS IN TÜRKIYE

Policy /Law	**Content**
Health Transformation Program (2003)	Marketizaiton and universalization of health insurance
Law 5510, Social Security and Universal Health Insurance Law (2006	Single social security system (SGK) for public hospitals
Law 5754 (2008)	Public intervention to private hospital expenditures and supplementary helth insurance
Ministry of Health Regulation on Private Health Institutions and Private Hospitals (2008/26788) (2008)	Medical inventory and staff qualification in both public and private
Ministry of Health Regulation on Private Hospitals (2008/26788) (2008)	Increasing number and qulity of private hospitals
Council of Ministers Decree 2008/13728 (2008)	%30 SGK coverage in private hospitals
Council of Ministers Decree 2009/15627 (2009)	%70 SGK coverage in private hospitals
Council of Ministers Decree 2012/2939 (2012)	%90 SGK coverage in private hospitals
Law 6486 (2013)	%200 of SGK reimbursement
Prime Ministry (Treasury) Regulation on Private Health Insurance (2013/28800) (2013)	Supplementary health insurance provided by Ministry of Treasury
Council of Ministers Decree 2013/5385 (2013)	%200 of SGK reimbursement

Note. author's own conclusion adapted from the information provided in *Universal Health Coverage with Private Options: The Politics of Turkey's 2008 Health Reform* by T. Dorlach and O. Yeğen, 2010. Copyright by Springer, in Studies in Comparative International Development pg.58:430–456.