

**YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**IMPACT OF THE ENERGY ISSUE ON TURKEY’S EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN POLICY**

Gökçe Öztürk

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MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

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Gökçe Öztürk

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ABSTRACT

IMPACT OF THE ENERGY ISSUE ON TURKEY'S EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

Energy and its security is one of the most important issues in making of a foreign policy. As mentioned in this thesis chapters, the seeking of alternative energy resources and having their own share, stirred the Eastern Mediterranean with the discoveries of hydrocarbon reserves. The fact that Turkey is highly dependent on energy resources, that its consumption rates are increasing year by year, and that it aims to be the energy hub that transfers energy to Europe, has also led Turkey to want to be part of the energy equation that is emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although the parties to this equation excluded Turkey. Turkey took some actions in the region, but it is not enough plus after Covid-19 Turkey stopped its actions, and recently it shifted its interest mainly to the Black Sea in terms of energy. In this context, this thesis answered the question of what Turkey should do in the Eastern Mediterranean. And concluded that she needed to take actions to better her relations with the regional actors-states and non-regional actors that had a part in the equation. Turn the current situation of exclusion otherwise and use the disagreements between those actors to her advantage. Also, continue her activities of drilling and research in the Eastern Mediterranean that she initiated before, but shift to the Black Sea.

Key Words: Continental Shelf, Eastern Mediterranean, Exclusive Economic Zone, Delimitation, Energy Security

ÖZET

ENERJİ MESELESİNİN TÜRKİYE'NİN DOĞU AKDENİZ POLİTİKASINA ETKİSİ

Enerji ve enerji güvenliği dış politika oluşturmada en önemli unsurlardan biridir. Bu tezin bölümlerinde de belirtildiği üzere, alternatif enerji arayışı ve bu enerji kaynaklarında hak sahibi olma arayışı ile birlikte Doğu Akdeniz’de keşfedilen hidrokarbonlar, Doğu Akdeniz’i karmaşaya sürükledi. Türkiye’nin dışarıdan gelen enerji kaynaklarına bağımlı oluşu, artan enerji tüketimi ve dış politika stratejisi olan Avrupa’ya enerji transfer noktası olma isteği, Türkiye’nin de Doğu Akdeniz’de oluşmakta olan enerji denkleminin içine dahil olma isteğini ortaya çıkardı. Buna karşın bu denklemin tarafı olan aktörler Türkiye’yi bu denklemin dışında bıraktı. Türkiye, belirtildiği üzere, bu duruma karşın bazı aksiyonlar aldı fakat bunlar yeterli olmamakla beraber Covid-19’dan sonra Türkiye bu bölgede aktivitelerine son verdi ve daha ziyade ilgisini Karadeniz’e ve buradan çıkacak enerji kaynaklarına çevirdi. Bu bağlamda bu tez çalışmasında Türkiye’nin Doğu Akdeniz’e yönelik ne yapması gerektiğine cevap verilmiştir. Ve şu sonuca varılmıştır; öncelikle Türkiye Doğu Akdeniz’deki enerji denkleminde yaralan bölgesel ve bölge dışı aktörlerle ilişkilerini düzeltmelidir. Var olan durumdaki Türkiye’yi bölgede dışlama stratejilerini tersine çevirmesi, bölge ülkeleri arasındaki anlaşmazlıkları kendi lehine çevirmesi gerektiği belirtilmiştir. Ayrıca Doğu Akdeniz’de başlatılan ve daha sonraları Karadeniz’e yöneltilen sondaj ve arama çalışmalarının devam ettirilmesi gerektiği de vurgulanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Doğu Akdeniz, Enerji Güvenliği, Münhasır Ekonomik Bölge, Kıta Sahanlığı, Sınırlandırma,

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZET	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	v
LIST OF FIGURES	vii
LIST OF TABLES.....	viii
INTRODUCTION	1
1. LITERATURE REVIEW	2
2. ENERGY IN FOREIGN POLICY	24
3. DEFINING EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION & ITS RIPARIAN STATES	
28	
3.1. Historical Importance of Eastern Mediterranean.....	30
3.2. Strategic Importance of Eastern Mediterranean Today	34
3.3. Discovered Hydrocarbon Reserve Basins, Their Distributions Continental Shelf & Exclusive Economic Zone: 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea	35
4. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.....	43
5. TURKEY'S EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN POLICY: CURRENT CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPCTS.....	52
CONCLUSION.....	54
REFERENCES	57

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Map of Eastern Mediterranean, Boundries & Subregions	29
Figure 2. Eastern Mediterranean Under the Rule of East Roman Empire	31
Figure 3. Eastern Mediterranean Between 7'th and 9'th Century with Islamic Conquest ..	32
Figure 4. Eastern Mediterranean and the Ottoman Empire	33
Figure 5. Eastern Mediterranean and the Dissolution of Ottoman Empire	33
Figure 6. Oil and Gas Fields in Levant.....	36
Figure 8. Oil and Gas Fields in Nile Delta Basin.....	37
Figure 9. Continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone.....	42
Figure 10. Offshore licence areas of the GCASC overlapping Turkey's outer limits of continental shelf & EEZ delimitations GCASC made with Lebanon, Egypt, and Israel	43
Figure 11. EastMed Pipeline Project Map	45
Figure 12. Turkey- TRNC Delimitation Agreement & Licenced TPAO Blocks	46
Figure 13. Map of Turkey-Libya Delimitation Agreement	50
Figure 14. GCASC Licenced Blocks and the Share of International Energy Companies Doing Drilling and Research	50
Figure 15. Turkey-TRNC- GCASC Overlapping Licence Areas	51
Figure 16. Turkish Drill Ships Doing Seismic Researches and Drilling	51

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. USGS Assessment Results on Levant Basin 36

Table 2. USGS Assessment Results on Nile Delta Basin 37

Table 3. Discovered Natural Gas fields by States in Eastern Mediterranean and Their
Quantities..... 38



INTRODUCTION

Energy and energy security has always been very important topic in the international relations since the current society deeply needs the unrenewable fossil energy resources in every aspect of the life and they are being scarce. Actors in the system, nation states, seeks to have control of those sources, which eventually leads conflicts and aggressions between those actors. Recently Eastern Mediterranean has been at the centre of the attention, due to; its newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves starting from the 2000's which could be the answer to many states concern and insecurity with the dependency on exporting countries, regarding to the notion of variety as Churchill answered to the question of how to secure energy back in the day. And of course, the East Mediterranean's never changing strategic location that is making the region highly important throughout history was another important factor.

As for Turkey, her actions in the region had been limited to the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece. Turkey was and still is highly dependent on the energy resources that has coming from mostly Russia and Iran and had lack of variety. So those newly found resources could solve his insecurities over energy. Although the newly emerged energy equation with the founded energy resources in the region excluded Turkey from that equation. In 2011, when GCASC opened her block/ parcels in her so-called economic zone to bid and not acknowledging Turkey's and TRNC's (Turkish Republic of Cyprus) existence and rights in the region, Turkey started to pay more attention over East Mediterranean and its Hydrocarbon reserves, and as a result maritime issue (Continental shelf, EEZ's). This made Turkey become more aware/sensitive over the region and make her take action in the Eastern Mediterranean in scope of the maritime boundaries and rights (drilling and exploring of the under-water reserves namely hydrocarbon reserves).

This thesis paper aims to analyse the Turkish foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean region starting with 2011 to current time. And finding an answer to what sort of foreign policy method in the region Turkey could fallow to maintain the position that she seeks. In that regard a through literature review on the subject firstly going to be done. This literature review would be a chronological manner to show how the studies build up and the views changed with the developments occurring in the region. At first the literature would

be summarised briefly with a chronological order and then, it will -as it is also mentioned before- be reviewed and compared to see the changing views. After that, this thesis as a theoretical background firstly discusses over what is energy and what is the so-called energy security and its place in the making of a foreign policy since taking control over it in Eastern Mediterranean is the reason of conflict. the following chapter will be mentioning/showing the geography: questions of: where the Eastern Mediterranean Sea is and what are the surrounding countries are? In the later chapter the historical and current importance of the region will be defined. With that information clarified about the region than this paper dives in the hydrocarbon reserves which leads to the current state today. Those reserves, their names, amounts will be stated, while mentioning 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention that defines the “*exclusive economic zone*”, “*continental shelf*”, “*maritime boundaries*”. And then specifically Turkish foreign policy that has been followed over the Eastern Mediterranean since 2011 to current state will be addressed by some actions that she took in the region diplomatically and strategically. Following those actions, their critics will be made; criticize the foreign policy approach has been followed by government which is fundamentally makes itself isolated and singled out in the region, then addresses what should be done from now on what kind of diplomatic and strategic maneuverers that she should take. And then concludes.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, related literature resources starting from 2011 will be reviewed. The resources mentioned below will be giving an insight about: The Turkish foreign policy style and behaviours in the given time which effect and affected by Turkey’s energy strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. And Energy and energy security issues arise with the Hydrocarbon reserves found in the region and possible outcomes (conflicts and cooperations), solutions, for the regional actors and especially for Turkey. These articles, research papers will be reviewed in a chronological manner this way the changing dynamics and ideas over possible outcomes and solutions over the issues in the region -specifically for Turkey- would be viewed with the newly occurrences. So, it could also be said that since this is a contemporary issue that is ongoing and changing its way with each development,

the outcomes and solutions offered by the authors also changes. In that regard the chronological method will help us to see this. So, from this point on the chosen literature sources (starting from published 2011) that is in line with this thesis's context of energy security and Turkish foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean regarding to security issues arise with the found Hydrocarbons in the region, and what should Turkey do (what are the possible solutions for her) in the current equation while being excluded.

Ziya Öniş in his research called “Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique” published on January 1st 2011 on Insight Turkey; - as it could be understood from the title- focused/studied on Turkish Foreign Policy after 2007. Which also discussed over the previous years and drew international attention under the name of “axis-shift”. While he disagreed with that notion that indicates a total change of behaviour, he stated that there are shifts in Turkish Foreign Policy which in his word “subtle”. Regarding to this statement; in his work he aimed to answer the questions of what the elements of rupture and continuity in the behaviour and style of the Turkish foreign Policy are. Then what are the factors that resulted these “observed” changes/shifts ruptures in Turkish Foreign Policy. After that, he aims to answer, if those changes with the new behaviour/style of the Turkish Foreign Policy effective by focusing on the short-term gains coming with the new style versus long-term consequences. (Öniş, 2011)

He showed/expained those continuities and discontinuities with those dimensions: Style of the foreign policy, commitment to the European Union and Western orientation, defined regional and global roles, mediation style, ownership and leadership style of the Turkish Foreign Policy and lastly link between domestic and foreign policy. (Öniş, 2011)

He argues that while the style/behaviour of the Turkish Foreign Policy continued as multi-dimensional with emphasis on soft power throughout the AKP government's era, after 2007 a more assertive and independent foreign policy style adopted. And following this new style an increase in the scale of diplomatic activities followed. According to Öniş it was related with; Dvutoğlu becoming the minister of the foreign affairs at post-2007 that is directly responsible of the implementation and formulation of foreign policy. His perspective of “strategic depth” that is taking Turkey as the “central country” globally and regionally becoming the major implementation and principle following President Abdullah Gül actively taking the role of de facto foreign secretary that is complimentary to the Davutoğlu initiatives. (Öniş, 2011)

As for the second dimension of Western orientation and commitment to European Union: it has argued by Öniş that, what has continued was the “commitment” to it, with declining interest from 2005 to 2007 which is also in line with public opinion. But again, the “rupture” also emerges from the commitment side and that is as Öniş argued the commitment unlike pre-2007 only stayed in rhetoric and a foreign policy approach that acts independent which according to Öniş will result direct conflict with the West. According to Öniş the reason behind this rupture, was the disappointment against the membership process to EU. This has resulted in both public and elite level drastic decrease in support of EU membership. And government (AKP) act in line with this public opinion. (Öniş, 2011)

As for the regional and global role, while efforts to play a more active role being intact with the emphasis on performing the role of mediator to endorse cross-cultural dialogue in the international and regional conflicts, it has become more active in the middle east which is according to Öniş because of the scope of leadership role in that region more abundant. Where regions such as Central Asia and Balkans these activities more limited compared to before 2007 since the regional leadership role is harder because of the rivals that are powerful. Öniş argued that the reason behind this is due to having the regional leadership role became the major motive for post-2007 Turkish foreign policy. Also, he argued that the Middle East chosen as the focal point implies that; there is a dimension of identity in the new style. (Öniş, 2011)

On the other hand, the mediation style; while continuing to the behaviours of pre-2007’s keeping “zero problem with the neighbours” and trying to keep the impartiality and neutrality at regional conflicts, after 2007 a tendency of taking sides in the regional issues occurred. Such as taking a Palestinian in Palestinian-Israeli conflict and taking Iranian side in the context of the threat caused by the Iranian nuclear program where “West” also involved. Which according to Öniş; limits the Turkish role of mediator or arbitrator at international conflicts. (Öniş, 2011)

Regarding to the leadership style and ownership of the foreign policy; the importance of the leadership stayed intact with Ahmet Davutoğlu being the key figure of formulating since the AKP governments’ early years at the office accompanied Abdullah Gül playing an important role. The rupture is that with the post-2007 era changing roles (Abdullah Gül becoming President and Ahmet Davutoğlu becoming the minister of foreign affairs). (Öniş, 2011)

Lastly, as for the link between domestic and foreign policy, Öniş argued that: what continued was the civil society's increasing involvement in the initiatives in foreign policy regarding to democratisation of it. Therefore, the greater role of the public opinion on making of the foreign policy. What changed is that the distinction of the two (domestic policy and foreign policy) became more blurred. Rather to use it as a tool for consolidating the domestic coalitional base. (Öniş, 2011)

Öniş then argued that indeed this new behaviour in Turkish foreign policy have resulted positive developments; more confident Turkey -playing active role in international and global affairs- in changing world order which is multi-centric to pluralistic global order. He also argued that Turkey should keep her commitment to the European Union and westernisation since it is the reason of taking her neighbours' attention namely potential European Union membership. If Turkey completely leave this commitment out by losing attention of the neighbours while wanting to be regional role model to its neighbours. On the other hand, Öniş argued that not being neutral as she had been in some examples which also mentioned above (Israeli-Palestinian conflict by taking Palestinian side...) Turkey could lose its mediator role and cause additional instability as an unintended result of its actions. And she will be better off using more constructive role in the international conflicts by positioning herself with the international coalitions and acting in line with Western powers rather than taking a more ambitious independent way. Also, Öniş argued that over confidence/assertiveness may lead to unwanted consequences such as isolation even in the short-term it might have substantial payoffs. (Öniş, 2011)

Ebru Oğurlu in her paper published in March 2012 at "Istituto Affari Internazionali" called "*Rising Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy*" focused on Turkish foreign policy regarding to tension occurring at the Eastern Mediterranean and its implications on it. In her paper Oğurlu aimed to explain how and why policy choices done by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean put her constructive and positive style at risk of replacing it with an assertive and antagonistic one. To do that she beforehand clarified the importance of the region for Turkey. And highlighted the ambition of Turkey to become a regional leader and pivotal state in Eastern Mediterranean also becoming the energy hub for the EU. (Oğurlu, 2012)

Oğurlu firstly mentioned the origins of the tension at Eastern Mediterranean as: dispute over natural resources found in the region turning around Exclusive economic zone arguments between Cyprus and Turkey where Israel's discovery of natural resources occurred at the same time Turkey's and Israel's relations deteriorated and get the lowest point due to conflict on Freedom Flotilla incident which follows a Cyprus-Israel alignment backed by EU and UN. Which then again follows with traditional alliances changing into new partnerships in the region. (Oğurlu, 2012)

Oğurlu mentions that after 2008 with the second term of the AKP government which is Islam-rooted previous allegiance with Israel -as the two westernised states in the region- eroded because of the fear of isolation in the Muslim surrounded region following the incident in 2010. Oğurlu then stated that Turkey could face with implications with US and EU relations due to its policies followed in Eastern Mediterranean by confronting against Cyprus and Israel since Cyprus is a member state of EU and Israel being staunchest ally of the United States and in a case where they should choose between the two US will choose Israel (which she already stated) and EU will choose Cyprus since it is a member state. (Oğurlu, 2012)

Oğurlu stated that Turkey could face internal and external challenges that might directly influenced by or influence the occurrences in the Eastern Mediterranean. Internal challenge according to her will show itself on domestic politics. The majority of the population generally have found Turkey's assertive rhetoric as a sign of a strong, powerful, and determined nation, particularly when it comes to nationally sensitive issues like its relations with Cyprus. Likewise, it happens in the Palestinian -Israeli conflict where Turkey stands with Palestinians against Israel. And therefore, according to Oğurlu: AKP government could reasonably want to reap the profits of this mentioned assertive style to consolidate its domestic rule and compensate its weekend democratic and reform-oriented image. (Oğurlu, 2012)

Then Turkey could face external challenges with recent developments that occurred in the region on -energy issue and wider Cyprus problem as mentioned before- with the Island's sharing of island's natural resources and Turkey's European Union accession. (Oğurlu, 2012)

As for the energy issue as mentioned by Oğurlu; Turkey's main concern is becoming the energy hub as a transit country supplies gas and oil to the EU therefore Turkey is cautious to developments that might render it. And also, these developments could affect her becoming a member state to EU. (Oğurlu, 2012)

Oğurlu then propose 3 foreign policy approach options for Turkey:

1) Turkey could *“emerge as an over-assertive power aiming to become the region's hegemon, defending what it perceives as its national interests while tightening ties with all regional actors”* (Oğurlu, 2012 p.13)

2) It could *“side with the West, thus selecting regional actors to partner with and others to keep at arms' length.”* (Oğurlu, 2012 p.13)

3) Lastly it could find a middle way/ balance between the two prior policy approaches, establishing connections with a broad spectrum of regional states and non-state actors, *“while remaining anchored to the Euro-Atlantic alliance”*. (Oğurlu, 2012 p.13)

According to Oğurlu as she stated in her article: *“In this context, what Turkey needs to avoid is taking steps that might have unexpected consequences eventually resulting in greater regional instability”*. (Oğurlu, 2012 p.13) Oğurlu mentioned that several actors in the region have already estranged with the current foreign policy actions. And she argued that therefore Ankara (government) *“would be better off if it followed a more moderate and balanced approach.”* (Oğurlu, 2012 p.13) Because keeping the way it is now will lead a backlash. (Oğurlu, 2012)

Lastly, she makes this argumentation that Turkey can only reach its goal being a regional pivot *“only if it builds strong ties with both near and far neighbours with the view to shaping the regional environment along a non-confrontational, and where possible cooperative, pattern”* (Oğurlu, 2012 p.13)

Justyna Misiągiewicz in her article called Turkey as an Energy Hub in the Mediterranean Region published in March 2012 at Journal of Global Studies, pointed out the importance of energy security in the current international system which influenced both

Turkish foreign policy strategy with the increasing consumption/demands for energy in both Turkey and EU. (Misiągiewicz, 2012)

She mentioned that Turkey knows its geopolitical location's benefits which is having connection to Europe and energy producing states in Middle East, Caspian, and Caucasus it builds its energy policy strategy infrastructure around pipeline projects aiming to be the energy hub in the region and a means to acceptance into European Union membership. (Misiągiewicz, 2012)

She stated some key actor in Turkey in that regard; Ahmet Davutoğlu (as Minister of Foreign Affairs) which is actually -according to article- one of the noteworthy creators of Turkish foreign policy at 21st century whom find Turkey's role in international and neighbouring politics as 'Strategic Depth' underlines Turkey have the means to play such role and her security lies in becoming to a bridge between consumers and producers that backed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (as Prime Minister) with almost the same sentiment. (Misiągiewicz, 2012)

In her article Misiągiewicz, with this notion in her first chapter mentioned European Union's energy security issue with -like Turkey- increasing demand for energy coming from natural resources (gas, oil) within the EU and the dependency to Russia, she also mentioned 2006 incident with Russia where she cut her energy flow to EU and it created a crisis in EU. With that in mind she mentioned that EU aims to secure the energy flow and avoid dependency to the gas from Russia through variety. In that regard Misiągiewicz, mentioned the main pipeline projects (where Turkey plays as a transit line transport resources coming from Central Asia and Caspian) in a separate chapter (although some important ones that connects to Europe couldn't accomplish such as: Nabucco and Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector) and Turkey could offer benefits to EU although it would conflict with the Russia's interest since she wanted to hold the monopoly in Central Asia and Caspian. (Misiągiewicz, 2012)

What can be understood from Misiągiewicz's arguments is that; energy security of the EU and Turkey is interconnected. Misiągiewicz argued that; The European Union should actively engage Turkey in the development of its energy strategy, not just with regard to diversification but also with regard to energy in foreign policy in general. Turkey has a great opportunity to ensure that its national energy policy supports Europe's energy security as the

EU's energy strategy is being developed. Some critics to this article would be not considering the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, found natural resources and its implications to European energy strategy and its Effects to the Turkish foreign policy strategy regarding to energy security. (Misiągiewicz, 2012)

Mehmet Ögütçü in his article called *Rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Turkish Dimension* published in 2012, discussed about the conflict/disputes occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean with the discovered hydrocarbon reserves specifically around Cyprus and Israel while focusing on Turkish dimension. So, it could be said that this study took Turkey in the centre.

Ögütçü firstly presented the political background for Turkey by stating that; those discoveries between 2009-2012 (around Israel and Cyprus' coasts) happened when Turkey's relations with Israel deteriorated and "renewed efforts to find a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem, under United Nations auspices, failed to produce a breakthrough." (Ögütçü, 2012 p.1) Meanwhile Turkey's EU accession process face with more obstacles. Also, as he stated that Turkey's 'zero problem with neighbours' foreign policy strategy overall did not give expected results.

Then in the second part Ögütçü pointed out the Turkish energy policy and the meaning of the discovered hydrocarbons mentioned before. He stated that to meet the increasing domestic demand on energy, Turkey aimed to develop a variety of energy routes, and becoming an energy hub for Europe with these routes (pipelines) by transferring the energy coming from Central Asia, Middle East, and Southern Caucasus and by doing that also secure the sufficient resources Turkey herself for her own consumption. It also mentioned that Turkey is one of the greatest natural gas consuming states in the world. And to ensure her energy security Turkey aims to diversify her energy resources (by type and geography) and this is where the new discovered resources around Cyprus and Israel's coast mentioned at the beginning come. Ögütçü in that regard argues that: If the resources (natural gas) found in the eastern Mediterranean transferred to Europe through Turkey's territory she would have much to gain. "This would give Turkey access to a new source of gas at relatively low prices and could tip the balance in favour of going ahead with the still elusive Southern Corridor, where several projects are in contention." (Ögütçü, 2012 p.2)

Then after mentioning Turkey's energy policy and the discovered hydrocarbons' importance in her policies. He talked about the events in the region and Turkey's response to those in there he mentioned that Turkey just recently started to focus on the region whereas her attention before on the Black Sea in terms of energy. Then Ögütçü mentioned a new alignment/cooperation occurred between Israel and Cyprus in terms of marketing and production of the both states' discovered natural gas to Europe by a pipeline. In that regard it is stated in the article that Ankara will not welcome this cooperation because it is crossing Turkey's energy policy which has mentioned before. He later on also discussed about the conflict between those (Turkey and Israel-Cyprus-Greece) sides could affect Turkey's relations with both United States and Russia negatively. In the end Ögütçü said that clashes disputes mentioned gave some implication to Turkey. (Ögütçü, 2012)

His first and most important argumentation is that Turkey should prioritize avoiding harsh rhetoric and resorting military means to express her discontentment on Cypriot an Israeli initiatives in the region. And Turkey must use soft power in order to influence the regional environment in a non-confrontational and, if possible, cooperative manner. Also, Ögütçü said that Ankara might think of nurturing her relations with United States and Russia to persuade Israel and Cyprus to exercise some restraint like herself. And assure international community the things happen in Eastern Mediterranean will not drive attention apart from efforts to tackle nuclear question of Iran and crises in Syria. (Ögütçü, 2012)

Then Ögütçü also mentioned, Ankara may think about pursuing limited interim agreements with Cyprus without affecting the possibility of a final, comprehensive solution to the Cyprus issue. According to him that would allow delimitation disputes to be arbitrated by the ICJ (International Court of Justice) or by alternative body. And that interim agreement should be on transportation of the natural gas found in the EEZ (exclusive economic zone) of Cyprus to Turkey for her own use and also sending the gas to Europe by the Southern Corridor when it becomes effective. Ögütçü mentioned that: Cyprus might also think about setting up an escrow account for incomes and consider cooperation on exploration, production, and transportation of gas from the eastern Mediterranean with Israel, Turkey, and Cyprus. (Ögütçü, 2012)

James Stocker in his study called *No EEZ Solution: The Politics of Oil and Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean* published in 2012 discussed about development happening in the Mediterranean regarding to hydrocarbon reserves serves a great threat to security of the Eastern Mediterranean region. And this could fuel already existing regional tensions which could actually turn into an armed conflict. (Stocker, 2012)

In his study he aimed to suggest possible answers to emerged or emerging conflicts by this issue. He discussed on both possibilities for cooperation and conflict in the region. And argued that how states poise their economic interests within delicate political issues that are disrupting the region's interstate relations will be reflected in how the issue develops. (Stocker, 2012)

He states that there are two main energy conflict in Eastern Mediterranean. The future of the pipeline infrastructure -which is to transfer gas- especially between Egypt and Israel. And the second -according to Stocker most important-serious one- is conflict-dispute over EEZ borders of Turkey-Lebanon- Cyprus- Egypt – Israel and Palestinian state that is emerging. Stocker then mentions the ways of determining EEZ which are in overall, determining by government decree or international legislation and secondly bilateral agreements between states. However, he argues that it is difficult to apply in practice. And it is hard to apply in enclosed seas likewise in Mediterranean because its area is small and with the given 200 nautical miles with EEZ, any of the riparian states' zones will overlap. And that is why chance of cooperation on bilateral relations seems to be unlikely according to Stocker. (Stocker, 2012)

He also mentions that even if states would benefit economically from such an agreement; since conflict due to rising security expenditures means rise in the overall expenditure in extraction of mentioned natural resources is costly, cooperation like pipeline infrastructure and EEZ agreements between states reduces that cost, but in the end political interests will prevent it to happen. (Stocker, 2012)

Therefore, he points out some other mechanisms to resolve conflict in the region determined by UNCLOS at part XV: “the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, arbitration by a special arbiter, or arbitration by a panel of experts approved by the states party to the convention” (Stocker, 2012 p.595) Which are also available for states not a member of UNCLOS. Stocker also mentions some advantages of

using those mechanisms such as avoiding political complications could be resulted by bilateral agreements and avoiding the maritime borders' becoming stuck with further issues between disputing parties. According to Stocker one of the cons is that these mechanisms do not provide definite solution to concerns of the states' governments. And other mentioned option is third party mediation and given examples by the Stocker are UN, US, and EU. (Stocker, 2012)

Nursin Ateşoğlu Güney in her paper called “New Balance of Power in the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey” published in 2019 June by Center for Strategic Research by analysing aimed to explain the reason; why Western/American behaviour is forming antagonistic alliances intended to keep Turkey and the TRNC out of the on-going balance of power game in Eastern Mediterranean. And she wanted to explain why President Trump's strategy over Mediterranean -which by Güney found as shortsighted – will fail to bring peace into the region. (Güney, 2019)

She argued that present geo-economic and geo-political rivalry between Western forces and Russia developing in the region (Eastern Mediterranean) could be explained by emergence of a new Cold War between Euro-Atlantic world and Russia. And United States' efforts to build new alliances in the region might worsen the current rivalry. (Güney, 2019)

The alliance she mentioned was: Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Greece, and Greek Cyprus, with United States against Iran, Russia, and Turkey. Güney claimed that; this alignment and support of United States happened due to Russia's strengthening position- which is rapidly- in Eastern Mediterranean along with diplomatic dialogs through Astana process. And this alignment and support became more obvious with the beginning of the hydrocarbon discoveries made in the region. And as Güney stated; between this developments, alignments, and rivalry Turkey, gets affected and responding them accordingly. (Güney, 2019)

In later chapters she went in more detail about the hydrocarbon reserves and added tension/conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean as a result of it around the previously mentioned balance/ alignments in the region. She stated that whereas it has previously believed that hydrocarbon discoveries around Israel and Cyprus would unwind the

tension/conflict in the region and bring peace by cooperation, these discoveries increased the possibility of tension/conflict in Eastern Mediterranean. (Güney, 2019)

Güney explained the possibility of the conflict by; due to geographical shape (concave) of the Eastern Mediterranean basin there are overlaps in the riparian states' legal claims over maritime borders, and that requires compromises by the riparian states. And she stated that; this has worsened already existing tension between Southern Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. (Güney, 2019)

In that context Güney mentioned: Southern Cyprus (Greek Cypriots) signed EEZ (exclusive economic zone) agreements to delimitate her maritime borders with Lebanon, Israel and Egypt which objected by Turkey due to being against Turkish Cypriots' equal rights on hydrocarbons (gas) in the region. Apart from that, she also mentioned; EEZ agreement made between Egypt and Southern Cyprus also objected by Turkey as it was violating her continental shelf where she exercises her ipso facto and ab initio right in accordance with international law. And the EastMed pipeline project which -according to Güney- aimed to exclude Turkey which is like the previous mentioned developments it was also related to the Trump Administration's Eastern Mediterranean strategy that construction of alliances based on gas among Greece, Israel and Greek Cyprus against Russia and Turkey. (Güney, 2019)

Güney also mentioned the strategies Turkey resorted in that context; against the Southern Cyprus (Greek Cypriots') acts that are not legitimate in Eastern Mediterranean Ankara issued a Navtex around Cyprus and bring newly required naval vessels with two objectives to protect its seismic vessel's exploration process around Cyprus and preventing mentioned illegal activities. (Güney, 2019)

Güney also suggested that Turkey in that kind of environment should prepare itself for further offensive and assertive policies projected through external powers and act realistically. And also argues that although it is not known what will happen in the future to the relations that is good now between Turkey and Russia, Russia at least for the EastMed project Russia will stand on Turkey's side since she wants to have hegemony over natural gas export in European market. (Güney, 2019)

Lastly Güney (as an answer to its question of why Trump Administration's strategy will be condemned to fail to bring peace in the Eastern Mediterranean) argued that Gunboat

diplomacy has already practiced by riparian states as well as by outside powers. Güney claims: people who have backed peace pipelines and still do so in the name of fostering cooperation in the region will soon come to realize their mistake therefore in Eastern Mediterranean basin one should focus on prevention of the conflict rather than promotion of peace pipelines. Which in this paper's context EastMed pipeline that is -as mentioned before- excluding Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey. If not, the gunboat diplomacy will increase already existing tension between the actors in the region's geopolitics and result in a zero-sum game. (Güney, 2019)

In the research written by Muhammed Kürşad Özekin: *Changing Energy Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey* published in 2020 at '*Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*' (*The Journal of Security Strategies*) 33'th issue; Özekin evaluates the newly emerged dynamics in Eastern Mediterranean due to discovery and distribution of the hydrocarbon reserves. And possible cooperation and disputes/conflicts that it will occur for Turkey. (Özekin, 2020)

In that regard he firstly discussed the attitudes and strategies that riparian states and the global powers that developed in the region thus the distribution of hydrocarbon reserves and basic security dynamics that those were created. He claimed 4 scenarios/ strategic maneuverers for Turkey in order to assure her security and interests in the East Mediterranean. (Özekin, 2020)

The first one states that Turkey should eliminate her state of isolation in the region plus need to take steps for divide-split the front against her. Özekin argued in that regard; Turkey can follow more proactive and multilateral energy policies to carry Libyan agreement-accordance further, she can make diplomatic attempts towards Syria, Lebanon and other regional actors-countries and as for the front against her Özekin argues that those actors that are building the front are already conflicted within themselves, so Turkey should use that as an advantage by using Lebanon- Israeli disputes or disputes between Israel and Arab World, relations with Israel and Egypt related to Muslim Brotherhood policy, thus USA's and Russia's differentiations. (Özekin, 2020)

As for the second one, Özekin states in order to change the equation in the region Turkey needs to take concrete steps; Turkey should extend the Libyan-Turkish agreement-

in accordance with EEZ by also making it with other riparian states (Syria, Egypt, GCASC, Greece, Libya) as well and declare it in the United Nations. Also, according to Özegin; Turkey should explain to Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel's government authorities and public, by doing so their maritime zones will also enlarge so they will also benefit from it. And point outs that especially the EEZ agreement with Libya and Egypt are important because of the fact that; median line between Anatolian and African shores with those states will change all equations that are existing. (Özekin, 2020)

Third one argues that; knowing there are military alliances and political developments opposed to Turkey; if it becomes necessary, she can create situations like '*Zeytindalı*' and '*Firat Kalkanı*' that can strengthen her position in the equation at the East Mediterranean. Turkey by using International Law, self-defence and strengthening her military power in the region; Turkey- TRNC should open a joint air-sea base at TRNC which will strengthen her hand in a possible negotiation. (Özekin, 2020)

And lastly as the fourth scenario argued by Özegin underlines that; Turkey should determinately continue drilling activities. In that regard Turkey should fasten her drilling activities and find international partners for the generation-production of energy through those resources in the East Mediterranean basin. Also considering the problematic relations with the USA and the EU and their exclusion of Turkey in the region, Özegin states therefore China and Russia are possible actors that she can take her side, although she should not close all the doors to the West. (Özekin, 2020)

In his paper Muazzez Harunoğulları published in 2020 May, talks about energy its effects and importance in scope of east Mediterranean region. More specifically he pinpoints the hydrocarbon reserves that has been explored, as a source of conflict and dispute in East Mediterranean.

According to Harunoğulları, energy has always been a critical component of the international relations. And trying to have monopoly over energy resources, historically a driving force to conflict and wars. And with the current developments in world economy and growth in population, the need and search for new alternative energy resources correspondently increased. And these current explorations of energy resources in the east

Mediterranean basin, specifically around Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus; made the region centre of the attention for regional, non-regional actors, and international energy companies.

Harunoğulları also states that current conflicts occurred at the region, such as Arab Spring; which effected, Egypt, Libya (interference on the government by the West), Syria (civil war), conflict between Palestine and Israel and disputes between Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and Turkey due to delamination/ violation of Turkey's rights resulted changes in the balances on the region and occurrence of new geopolitical importance and sensitivity in that geography. And according to him those changes and conflicts towards the energy resources in East Mediterranean; increases the pressure on the riparian states thus creates new opportunities and threats. (Harunoğulları, 2020)

So, in order to benefit from those hydrocarbon reserves and export them, there are political, legal, commercial difficulties that must be overcome. In that context Harunoğulları; defined the geography and its importance by its historical aspects, strategic impacts in terms of being a transit point beholding the important energy centres in the Middle East and the Caspian Basin and consequently economic advantages that it gives. After that he makes a legal framework on the issue; by pointing out the international law that is; EEZ's (exclusive economic zone) which defines, draws a line on the rights that riparian states have in the east Mediterranean and consequently distribution and exploitation over the hydrocarbon reserves. (Harunoğulları, 2020)

Harunoğulları used some geopolitical theories: Brzezinski's '*Garand Chess Board*' Alfred Thayer Mahan's sea power theory and Mackinder Heartland theory to underline the East Mediterranean's geopolitical importance. Harunoğulları later gives some information on the energy resources that the region has. And thus, states the approaches that the non-regional and regional actors' (states) take and furthermore the riparian states' approaches towards the region following: Israel-Palestine, Turkey- Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Libya. (Harunoğulları, 2020)

Harunoğulları, after all those information that she gathered, concludes that Turkey is the most important riparian state by her transit capabilities and also as actor whose geopolitical location makes her important to ensure the political stability and security in the region, she has taken the political and legal necessary steps in order to secure her rights in the region such as the Libya-Turkey EEZ agreement. And also mentions, recent

developments in the region such as war in Libya and Syria, the fluctuations on oil prices, economic difficulties caused by the 2019 pandemic (Covid-19) and such, made this issue less emergent or a subject to discuss in the international relation's agenda. (Harunoğulları, 2020)

Ferhat Kökyay in his research article called "Neorealism Theory and Eastern Mediterranean Energy Policy of Turkey" published in September 2020; examined Turkey's Eastern Mediterranean energy policy around the theory of Neorealism. He chooses neorealism as the theory "which acknowledges the international system is anarchic and from the viewpoint of the states focuses both on increasing their power and ensuring security" (Kökyay, 2020 p. 2506) to get a proper standpoint about the interpretation on the recent regional occurrences and policies. (Kökyay, 2020)

In that context Kökyay explained current international system in the region, he stated that; after WW2 the region become an area of conflict with the different ethnic, political, religious, and cultural backgrounds. And with the recent events such as Arab spring and Syrian crises, established an environment where hegemon states such as United States and Russia's increased interest to build a hegemony over the region. And deep-rooted historical conflicts between regional actors created concerns over their security. Furthermore, Kökyay states; lack of hierarchy between actors (lack of a hegemon power in the region) pushed states to be anarchic and maximize their power in the region. (Kökyay, 2020)

With that notion Kökyay analysed Turkish Energy policy in the region, but before that he mentioned some of the dynamics that affected it. He stated that Turkish energy policies - in accordance with widened security definition- being connected to Cyprus issue, developed around economic, military, political, security concerns. Thus, he mentioned recent hydrocarbon reserves that have discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean as the key element shaping its current energy policy. (Kökyay, 2020)

It is because -as he stated- energy due to its varying area of usage and strategic importance that it stays as the international society's most important interest area for a long time. Also, Kökyay mentions that states holding the control over energy resources would have a more prominent position in global economy. (Kökyay, 2020)

In the article Turkey's increasing energy demand also mentioned, and consequently her aim to be the transit state for energy routes. It is also argued in the article that Turkey assesses, the EEZ delamination agreements, bids on the hydrocarbons, production, and commercial projects around Cyprus, that excludes/ ignores her and the one she is guarantor of aka. Northern Cyprus, as a seize to its right coming from international law. (Kökyay, 2020)

In that context -as Kökyay states- Turkey go towards power maximisation to balance attempts and alliances against itself and Northern Cyprus which it is guarantor of. He named these alliances in three groups the first group contains: Lebanon, Israel, Egypt which signed EEZ delimitation agreements with Greek Cypriots and take a position against Turkey. The second group contains Greece, France, and Italy whom not in the region as a de facto but taking a role to shape the regional energy policies and this group also aims to support Greek Cypriots and lastly there is the third group which is again supporting Greek Cypriots; United States and European Union. (Kökyay, 2020)

Kökyay argues that these groups forming alliances to create a new balance against Turkey which is one of the most powerful states in the region. And he also argues against these actions, Turkey responds to these alliances against to itself by creating its own alliances in the regions and balance it such as the agreement she made with Libya and announcement of that it will be open to alliances with other states in the region besides Southern Cyprus. (Kökyay, 2020)

Aside from balancing herself with alignments, it has mentioned in the article that she also went to a process of strengthening its military capabilities and to apply her energy policies in the field/region increasing her seismic research, drilling capabilities. And this is related to Turkey not getting enough support from her allies on the issues related to her security such as terrorism and Cyprus issue which has mentioned as before interlinked with the hydrocarbon issue in the Eastern Mediterranean. (Kökyay, 2020)

Kökyay argues that the steps, policies that she took in the region can be related to concept of defensive realism because every action it has took in the region is rise out of as a reaction to the offensive actions taken. (Kökyay, 2020)

In the end Kökyay argues: from a neorealist point of view it could be expected to reach a systemic balance or a rise of hegemon power that would stabilize the current

developments in the region. Although according to him it is not possible to expect that discovered hydrocarbons in Eastern Mediterranean would stay still as it is forever. He stated that in that regard every further step that could have taken might feed the offensive realist approaches and increase the tension in the region and result to conflict in line with the concept of security dilemma. (Kökyay, 2020)

In the previous paragraphs, related researches, articles, and papers summarised the Author's research questions and argumentations which is related to this thesis mentioned. It has been mentioned before that this review would be chronological, so it first started by the first related study by Ziya Öniş published in 2011 which followed by Ebru Oğurlu in 2012 both authors mentioned shifting Turkish foreign policy styles, it's even right to say in some ways Oğurlu build her arguments her study on the Öniş's study over shifting Turkish foreign behaviours which mentioned in detail in previous paragraphs.

Differently from him Ebru Oğurlu while building on Öniş's study, she took Eastern Mediterranean as the focal point of her study. So, in other way-perspective the study by Öniş was a more general analysis of Turkish foreign policy behaviours lacking by not mentioning Eastern Mediterranean and energy in Turkish foreign policy at the region. Although it created a base for the future studys.

The point from these two studies with the shifting foreign policy behaviour of Turkey which tends to take sides against her previous allies (Western powers) in recent conflicts and losing its view of neutrality and by that being mediator and more importantly her new over assertiveness in the region might render her energy security policies-strategies in the region which is: becoming the energy hub in the region by transferring energy resources to EU markets.

The two of the Authors argued in that regard Turkey should prefer more moderate and balanced approached that is not risk her energy security ideals by not putting her Euro-Atlantic relations at stake. And following more cooperative approaches.

Following these two authors Justyna Misiągiewicz in her study focused more on pipeline projects and Turkey becoming an energy hub for Europe as providing connection to energy producing Middle Eastern, Caucasus and Caspian states. She mentioned like

previous authors Davotuğlu's foreign policy approach. Misiągiewicz mentioned the dependency as an issue for energy security and while also specifically mentioning Turkey's increasing demand and argued that Turkey's and EU's energy security are interconnected and with the mentioned pipelines the variety issue could be solved which is why this is a great opportunity for both of them. So it could be said that she was more optimistic over thinking of a cooperative future for both but unfortunately she forgot to include the issues, conflicts happened in the Eastern Mediterranean by EEZ delimitation primarily around Turkey and Southern Cyprus with the discovered hydrocarbons in the Cyprus's basins and she putting them into bid for international companies to start drilling and researches activities by ignoring Turkish Cypriot's right eventually ignoring Turkey in the region as well as being a guarantor.

So, in the end her claims and argumentations not become reality by missing, not mentioning the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean with the discovered hydrocarbon reserves and its effects to the actors which created a conflict in the region and created new alliances and balances in the region where the interlinked interest she mentioned is no more. On the other hand Ögütçü included that missing (lacking) part of Misiągiewicz's paper and actually turned her paper around this issue with Turkey as the focal point he give a political background which is including what discussed by Oğurlu as Turkey's relations with Israel, her accessions negotiation were rendered and her not finding a solution to the Cyprus issue. As the discoveries of the hydrocarbons happened around Israel's and Cyprus's basins.

He also mentioned what its discussed in the previous studies that Turkey's energy security strategy by becoming the energy hub in the region for Europe (likewise its mentioned by Oğurlu and Misiągiewicz) by varying the energy recourses. Ögütçü mentioned that previously Turkey was more focused on Black Sea region rather than Eastern Mediterranean which started currently. This statement is also be mentioned in this thesis. Like previous studies argued Ögütçü also argued that Turkey should avoid harsh rhetoric and overassertiveness and advocates a more cooperative manner or using soft-power by nurturing her relations with US and Russia and make them -by convincing that it is their interest- persuade Israel and Cyprus to restrain themselves.

He discusses about an interim agreement arbitrated by International Court of Justice on the transfer of the discovered natural resources where Turkey also benefits by sending Europe by Southern Corridor when it is effective and an escrow account for the incomes

coming from these resources for Cyprus, Israel, and Turkey's use, which will eventually delimitation disputes to be solved.

Although these are good possible solutions at a first glance -in reality- recent years showed that it is not possible. Even the relations -disputes become more bitter and Turkey's existence in the region disregarded more. Also, a possible arbitration by international bodies (like ICJ) not seem to be happening. Stocker on the other hand unlike Misiągiewicz states pipeline infrastructures-projects as one of the main energy conflicts in Eastern Mediterranean (the other one and the most important one as being determination of the EEZ).

He in that regard explained it as, even if it will benefit the states economically political interests will prevent it to happen. Likewise, it is the same for the bilateral agreements between states. So, he too (like Ögütçü) found the solution in the arbitration or a third-party mediation: US, US, and EU. Although with time it has seen that third party mediation will not work in Turkey's case because while GCASC ignored Turkish Cypriot's rights and most importantly breaching Turkish rights in the region (overlapping parcels with Turkey and Cyprus) the mentioned actors (US, EU) support and sided with GCASC.

When we come to the 2019, we see a change in way literature sources written by authors. While previous literature not wanting Turkey to be assertive in the Eastern Mediterranean and there is a possibility of cooperation that would bring peace in the region with mostly pipeline projects which includes Turkey, after 2019 we see a pattern where a more active and assertive position for Turkey in the region has wanted due to newly emerging equation, balance in the region. Also, her actions in the region found fair.

For example, in Nursin Ateşoğlu Güney's study it has openly stated that the hydrocarbons found in the Eastern Mediterranean around Cyprus' offshores bring not peace or cooperation but rather it brings conflict. She also argued about a formation-construction of a new balance in the region where Turkey excluded, the constructed balance she mentioned is US's side: Greece, Israel and Greek Cyprus against Russia and Turkey. Her study foresees a future where actors in the region and specifically Turkey should prepare themselves into conflict prevention rather than how to achieve peace. And says Turkey should also prepare herself further offensive and assertive policies by external powers and act realistically.

Following Güney's paper we see Özekin's study published in 2020 he also mentions that the discovery of the hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean brought conflict in the region over its distribution he claimed four strategic manoeuvres scenarios for Turkey to take for strengthen her position and ensure her security interest in the region which contributed this thesis as an answer to its question; what needs to be done in the Eastern Mediterranean by Turkey. And as it is being the study that actually mentions some concrete strategies.

Like the previous study by Güney, he also mentions about a front against here, and an equation. He also claims that Turkey should increase her military power in the region as an upper hand in the region in line with the concept of self-defence. Studies prior to 2019 mentioned in this literature review was against this kind of strategy by claiming it will create more conflict in the region and this kind of behaviour (assertive behaviour) would result losing her allies in the region. From this point on it seems that this view also changed.

After Özekin's study Muazzez Harunoğulları's article taken as a source of literature. While her article doesn't give direct answers to this thesis's research question of what Turkey should do in the Eastern Mediterranean it provided to understand the importance of the region. She also in her study likewise this thesis does take Eastern Mediterranean as the geography of study. In her study she also similarly to prior studies that have mentioned in this literature review mentioned the importance of energy resources and occurrence of a conflictual state in the region due to actors' (states') aim to have monopoly over discovered hydrocarbon reserves in Eastern Mediterranean. She believed like the previous studies - especially after 2019- the steps she took in the region were necessary to secure her rights and place in the region, and like Özekin also stated found Turkey's EEZ delimitation agreement with Libia as political-legal one of the important and essential steps she took.

Differently from the previous studies she mentioned a true fact that recent events affected this issues priority and importance in the international societies and most importantly Turkey's agenda which is as she has mentioned Covid 19. Which is also argued and highlighted similarly in this thesis paper as well.

On the other hand, Ferhat Kökyay in his Study published also in 2020 (following Harunoğulları's article) brought out a more theoretical framework compared to other studies to explain and understand the dynamics in the region. He in his study believed that the

developments in the region could be understood from a realistic perspective and she used specifically Neorealistic approach. He also mentioned that the existence of the alliances like Güney also mentioned in her study, but Kökyay additionally to that brought out a more detailed structure of alliances, he divided them into three groups: first group contains: Lebanon, Israel, Egypt which signed EEZ delimitation agreements with Greek Cypriots and take a position against Turkey. The second group contains Greece, France, and Italy whom not in the region as a de facto but taking a role to shape the regional energy policies and this group also aims to support Greek Cypriots and lastly there is the third group which is again supporting Greek Cypriots; United States and European Union.

Kökyay argued Turkish strategies and actions in the region are related to defensive realistic approaches and explained that every action she took in the region was a result an offensive action took against her in the region. As it can be seen from that Kökyay actually set the Turkish strategies on a more theoretical framework as well compared to prior studies. Like Harunoğulları he also regarded Turkey as one of the most important state in the region.

It could be said that following 2019 by the literature above given a mentioning of visible balance, alliances, and front (as its mentioned by the authors) against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. Also, the earlier studies were more optimistic of a more cooperative and peaceful end for the region with an eventual agreement over distribution of the found resources around Cyprus's offshore especially with the mentioned pipeline projects if they became true. But time and developments showed otherwise and as the later studies mentioned showed an emergence of a new equation, balance, front, alliances happened in the region and as all of them agreed Turkey was excluded from that and not just became excluded but as it has stated her rights coming from international law also disregarded and it resulted Turkey took necessary actions. Development of the literature could also bring us to an understanding of her earlier mentioned shifting -specifically by Öniş and Oğurlu- behaviours in Turkey's foreign policy eventually resulted -as it has expected – isolation in the region. And especially she lost her one of the most important allies where her energy security interest lies in the regard of being energy hub with a pipeline infrastructure that is EU and with the found resources around Southern Cyprus a new possible scenario appeared for EU where she could fulfil her energy interest and that is; as the studies above mentioned, EastMed project. Even as it is more costly compared to a pipeline infrastructure going through Turkey, regardless of it has become intact. And it resulted coming to a notion by the

authors (after 2019) where Turkey needs to take active-defensive actions in order to strengthen her place in the region likewise earlier done EEZ agreement with Libya, drilling and the research activities and increasing her naval force/ military capabilities in the region as an upper hand and use her right in accordance with the international law against the offensive behaviour coming from the Southern Cyprus backed by US and EU.

2. ENERGY IN FOREIGN POLICY

Before discussing what is energy and energy security, its impact on forming a foreign policy, importance in the international society and ways to ensure it. This chapter will be firstly defining the concept of foreign policy.

Foreign policy is strategies and principles followed by the governments in their interactions with the other states and/or international organisations. It includes a variety of actions such as; trade negotiations, diplomacy, military alliances, cultural exchanges, humanitarian aid and so on. The primary objective of the so-called foreign policy is to safeguard and promote a state's national interests in international arena meanwhile keeping stability, peace, and prosperity. In that regard, foreign policy of a national state shaped by economic, geopolitical, ideological, and other factors. And -likewise current state of Turkey- it can be often influenced by domestic politics and public opinion which will be discussed more detail in further chapters of this thesis where Turkey's foreign policy regarding to Eastern Mediterranean discussed.

When it comes to national states interest; in a realistic perspective gaining power and ensuring security can be count as the most significant factors. States will be wanting to form and follow foreign policies that secure those national interest. Importantly. When it comes to the national security which is the most primitive and important notion for the nation states and the “energy” is an important element in that regard. So, what is this so-called energy where does it originate from?

Energy is a Greek originated word, and it is consisting of the two words “en” (which means internal) and ergon (which means work). The notion of the “energy” derived of Energia – a Greek word- which is meaning; “effecting force” that is exists in material. It can

reveal itself by light or in the form of heat and make action possible. To create this “effecting force” a resource is needed and that is bring us to the concept of energy resources. (FERHAT İLGEN, p.32-33)

Energy resources can be divided into two categories: renewable and unrenewable. Unlike renewable energy resources, unrenewable energy resources can't be formed in a short period of time they are formed by the fossils that is remains of the animals and plants exposed to heat, pressure, and some other environmental factors under soil and/or under water for millions of years and they are scarce. Some examples are oil, coal, natural gas, hydrocarbon reserves, etc. Also retrieving and refining those resources to the point where it can be used also takes lots of time, effort, and pecuniary/ financial resource. Although renewable energy resources nowadays more and more tried to be replaced unrenewable ones by the international society, they are still highly dependent on those unrenewable energy resources in variety of areas; technology, industry, logistics and so on... Those areas being important factors for a state's development it can be argued that those energy resources create a question/ issue over national security for the states. (FERHAT İLGEN, p.32-33)

Daniel Yergin in his article “Ensuring Energy Security” which he wrote in 2006 at Foreign Affairs volume 85 No. 2; points out the historical context of this notion -energy security- back to eve of WWI. When Winston Churchill decided to change the power source -which was coal- of the British Royal Navy's ships to oil. By doing so Churchill intended to make the British Royal Navy's ships faster in comparison with the German's ships. But it meant that they cannot be relied on the coal that they supplied from the Wales -in state recourse- any more rather they had to retrieve/supply that “oil” which was insecure, from Persia (what was called that time). Thus, this insecurity became a national strategy issue/question for Churchill. He answered this question back then certainty and safety in oil depended on variety, which still implies today. Yergin says that since that time energy security arisen as a topic with great importance. (Daniel Yergin, p. 69)

So, what is this energy security? The common definition of this notion energy security in todays developed world; “availability of the sufficient supplies at affordable prices” Yergin says. (Daniel Yrgin, p. 70-71). And he adds; different states/countries interpret this concept's meaning for them differently. For example, states that are exporting energy, mainly focuses on the way of preserving the security of demand for their exported energy, because in the end it is makes the most of the government's revenues. In that context Yergin

points out the Russia as an example of energy exporting states: for her the goal is to reassert control over those resources and have primacy over main market and pipeline channels through which she ships her hydrocarbon resources into international market, says Yergin. On the other hand, for the developing countries' interpretation of the energy security: concern (that creates this insecurity over energy) over how changing prices in energy will affect balance of payments. And for Europe debates evolve around mainly how they can manage the dependence over natural gas that has imported. Some solutions that they could find are building nuclear plants addition to already existing ones or maybe returning to the coal.

After defining energy and energy resources pointing out its usage and therefore its importance to the international society, then mentioning some of these interpretations over energy security and how it differs from state to state. It can be said that; in international society where unrenovable energy recourses such as oil, natural gas and in the context of this thesis hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, are remarkably important and a key part of the international and national economy and trade. Therefore, the national states that did not have their own resources or not being self-sufficient bound to depend on other national state's already existing resources that they have control and monopoly over.

In that kind of situation, as how Churchill also back than mentioned; the first and the best solution would be diversification of those imported energy resources as much as possible, meaning not depending on solely on one option rather to have many alternatives as possible. Because energy exporting countries are bound to abuse their power that they gained from their resources if they are only option. Additionally, to diversification using (partially) to other resources and if possible renewable energy resources already existing in the nature such as biomass energy, solar energy, geothermal energy, wind energy and hydropower will be a plus. Although shifting mainly to those resources are out of the question for the coming decade since it cannot be achieved in a short amount of time and needs technological and economical infrastructure. As for the energy exporting countries there is the question of having the control/ monopoly over those resources and keeping the already existing status quo intact. Which means staying as the primary source for the energy importing states.

Yergin adds some principles to that mentioned diversification claiming that it is not enough which are: "*Resilience*" (flexibility): a "security margin in the energy supply system that provides a buffer against shocks and facilitates recovery after disruptions." (Yergin, p.

76). So how to achieve this buffer? Yergin says it comes from various factors such as: “sufficient spare production capacity, strategic reserves, backup supplies of equipment, adequate storage capacity along the supply chain, and the stockpiling of critical parts for electric power production and distribution, as well as carefully conceived plans for responding to disruptions that may affect large regions.” (Yergin, p. 76). Recognition of the “*reality of integration*”: as there is already an existing market in the international system and the security resides in the stability of that system, knowing leaving that system is out of question. And lastly Importance of high-quality information: information that is high quality on resources can support existing market that is functioning. In that regard IEA (International Energy Agency) has the key role of improving the flow of information about energy prospects and markets supported by the Newly emerged international Energy Forum.

As it seems from the ways to secure energy and its importance to the nation states and of course international society it is obvious that nation states will be wanting to form foreign policies that fulfil those ways mentioned above (such as diversification). Both energy exporting and importing states, interdependent to each other, because to export something you’ll need a demand, a market that is searching for the resource. As for importing states as it already mentioned before they need to have different alternatives that they could get from in other words as many states that is exporting energy resources as possible to not to be shaken when the flow of the exported resource is interrupted. Or as it has happened back in the 1973 Arab oil embargo. (Yergin, p.75) So as Yergin mentions, in such a world of interdependence security of the states will be depending on how they manage their relations with each other and those interactions will define the context of their foreign policy. (Yergin, p.82)

With those been said such as the interdependence between foreign policy making and energy security (as it is an issue of national security). Also mentioning ensuring it by diversification. It can be argued that states wanting to search for new resource that can multiply the alternatives or even having their own share of energy resources is inevitable and it is what we are facing in East Mediterranean today. Where is this East Mediterranean? This question will be answered in the coming chapter.

3. DEFINING EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION & ITS RIPARIAN STATES

In the book called Limits of oceans and seas which published by International Hydrographic Organization in 1953, on page 15 at the 28'th article: Mediterranean Sea, which is: "*bounded by the coasts of Europe, Africa and Asia, from the Strait of Gibraltar on the West to the entrances to the Dardanelles and Sues Canal on the East*" (International Hydrographic Organization, 1953, p. 15) and it is divided into 'Eastern Basin' and 'Western Basin'. There, geographical limits of Eastern Basin or -in the conduct of this thesis-Eastern Mediterranean's limits defined as:

At the west: "*The North-eastern (The West Coast of Italy. In the Strait of Messina, a line joining the North extreme of Cape Paci (15'42' E) with Cape Polero, the East extreme of the Island of Sicily. The North Coast of Sicily.*") and Eastern (*A line joining Cape Lilibeo the Western point of Sicily (37'47' N, 12'22' E), through the Adventure Bank to Cape Bon (Tunisia).*") limits of the Western Basin". (International Hydrographic Organization, 1953, p. 15)

At North East; Aline joining Kum Kale (26'11' E) and Cape Helles, the Western entrance to the Dardanelles." At Southeast; "The entrance to the Suez Canal." And lastly at the East; The coasts of Syria and Palestine." (International Hydrographic Organization, 1953, p. 15) And those definitions on the region gives us this map:



Figure 1. Map of Eastern Medediterranean, Boundries & Subregions

After defining the geographic limits of the region, and looking to the map given above, it can be said that riparian states to the Eastern Mediterranean basin are: Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Libya, Cyprus, Malta, and Tunisia. Although it should also be mentioned that Eastern Mediterranean basin also consists of sub regions such as: Ionian Sea, Adriatic Sea, Aegean Sea, Sea of Marmara. (International Hydrographic Organization, 1953, p. 17-18) This thesis will not be mentioning and focusing on those sub-regions. It will be focusing on mainly but not limitedly; the area where resources found below Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) and the area above of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). where basins contain of hydrocarbon reserves discovered such as Zhor, Leviathan, Tamar, Aphrodite, Calypso and Glaucus. And of course, areas where there are conflicts/discussions over delimitations and continental shelf discussions, EEZ's.

Since the region has been defined geographically and surrounding riparian states have been mentioned in this chapter, this paper is going to be defining importance of the Eastern Mediterranean (that has always been an important region throughout history that took many civilizations, empires, nation states, and international actors' interest resulted and still resulting conflict between those actors) under two subchapters.

At the first subchapter (see 2.1.) the region's historical importance will be examined, where its importance was due to geographical location having; most abundant territories in its shores, trade routes, and enabling to control over transportation.

Following that, at the second subchapter (see 2.2.) contemporary/current strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean is going to be defined. which has occurred due to discoveries of hydrocarbon reserves in the region that gave another dimension to its importance by its impact on the energy security. And the one today actors-states are primarily focused on while its historically adopted one also being intact.

After stating the historical and current strategic importance of the region, this paper is going to be mentioning/discussing the discovered hydrocarbon reserves-basins, their distribution, and exclusive economic zones (EEZ's) in the last subchapter (see 2.3.).

3.1. Historical Importance of Eastern Mediterranean

East Mediterranean, located in the "*fertile crescent*" as it has called by many scholars, witnessed many great conflicts and wars in different stages of the history. It is true to call it fertile crescent regarding having the most abundant soils such as Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and Egypt. But at the same time this abundance resulted that fertile and abundant soils wanted by many. Thus, the first aim of the civilizations was to have dominance-control over of this "*fertile crescent*" or in other words Eastern Mediterranean region. With this, it has become one of the most crowded/populated and important centres of the world, with influx of the people.

In every period of history having dominance over Mediterranean region had been the priority of the many empires and the states. East Roman- Byzantine Empire that has found by Alexander the Great, did also cantered around Eastern Mediterranean and had dominance

on the region. As a reference to this dominance, they had called it as “*Mare Nostrum*” which literally meant “*Our Sea*” in Latin. The map shown below will also prove that sentiment.




Figure 2. Eastern Mediterranean Under the Rule of East Roman Empire (“Division-of-the-roman-empire-map C64,” n.d.)

Following the emergence of Umayyad’s in 7th century, Muslims also started to place emphasis on naval force. Then after ruled the Mediterranean Sea -except some of the Northern shores- for centuries.




Figure 3. Eastern Mediterranean Between 7th and 9th Century with Islamic Conquest (Natchev, 2023)

Although crusade in 12th and 13th century resulted interruption of those naval activities for a long time. Again in 12th and 13th centuries Egypt, Syria, Mamluks had a position in the Eastern side of the Mediterranean Sea. Ottomans with the following of 15th century also followed this understanding of “maritime nation”. Ottoman Sultans who take the throne gave great importance to the Mediterranean Sea. Regarding to this given great importance, finally in the 16th century with the rule of Suleiman the Magnificent Ottomans almost ruled all the Mediterranean Sea. From 16th to 17th century they stayed as the dominant force in the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea. In 17th century Venetians benefitted from Ottomans were being behindhand of the modernizations for some time, but with the modernization Venetian half century supremacy over the region come to an end yet again. Ottoman’s dominance in Eastern Mediterranean continued until mid-19th century. There was a correspondence between its territories retreating and lessening of the given importance to the maritime as Yaycı argues. (Yaycı, 2021, p.16)



Figure 4. Eastern Mediterranean and the Ottoman Empire (Shaw & Yapp, 2023)



Figure 5. Eastern Mediterranean and the Dissolution of Ottoman Empire (Shaw & Yapp, 2023)

3.2. Strategic Importance of Eastern Mediterranean Today

As it seems from the chapter above before the eve of WW I importance given to the Eastern Mediterranean was mostly due to its geographical location that; domination over the region gave the empires and civilizations control over transportation and trade routes. Although, as Özekin stated “the region harbouring one-third of the world’s maritime commerce” (Özekin, 2020, p. 6) being this geographical importance intact, today’s importance mostly regarding to the contexts on energy and energy security.

Since, Eastern Mediterranean harbouring Middle East and Caspian Region that has control over energy hubs and pipelines that the current society dependent on pretty much in every aspect, such as transportation, industry, trade and so on (as it has mentioned in the chapter where energy resources’ importance discussed). As Yaycı stated and Harunoğulları mentioned in his article; Eastern Mediterranean gives control over the Middle Eastern and its neighbouring states who are having more than half of the world’s oil (Yaycı p. 16). And that aspect of the Eastern Mediterranean drives the interests of riparian, neighbouring and other nation states also consequently international organizations.

In the context of international organizations giving the example European Union (EU) would be appropriate. Especially knowing nation states that are forming up the EU have high interest in the recent discovered hydrocarbon reserves that had been found and yet to be discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean since EU states especially northeastern Europe are highly dependent on the energy resources from exporting countries such as Russia (Silvia Colombo and Ian Lesser 2010 p.4).

And recently Russia being in war with the Ukraine which supported by EU resulting with the questions and insecurities on energy flow, pricing for EU states. Furthermore, global powers such as Russia even if they had recourses and do not particularly need this found energy resources in Eastern Mediterranean, as it has mentioned in previous paragraphs, they would want to preserve the control they had as an energy exporting actor by hindering the usage of those resources by other actors/states. By doing so they can use those resources in East Mediterranean to their advantage against their rivals. (Yaycı, 2021, p.18)

3.3. Discovered Hydrocarbon Reserve Basins, Their Distributions Continental Shelf & Exclusive Economic Zone: 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea

In previous chapter, the strategic importance of the eastern Mediterranean regarding to its discovered energy resources and its meaning for the states mentioned. This chapter will be mentioning those reserves in more depth.

The existence of the hydrocarbon reserves leads back to discovery made at Abu Qir (Egypt) basin in 1969. After that many other natural gas field discoveries made in Egypt. In the second half of the 1980's important discoveries at the region made around Egyptian shores, specifically at Nile cone and Port Said. As a result, in the beginning of 90's many international energy companies such as ENI, British Petroleum, British Gas, increased their investments around Egyptian shores. (Harunoğulları, 2020, p. 461)

But current interest of the states, international companies and international organizations on Eastern Mediterranean comes from the deceleration of hydrocarbon reserves (natural gas to be precise) discovered at offshore of the Gaza strip in 2000. Namely, Gaza Marine-1 Gaza Marine-2. (Kökyay, 2020, p. 2514)

The milestones: however, was the discovery made at Tamar1 and Dalit 1 in the offshore of Israel by; US based Noble Energy with Israeli Avner Oil, Isramco and Derek Drilling (Özekin, 2020, p. 9) following Leviathan (Israel) and Zohr (Egypt) in 2010. On April 8'th in 2010 US Geological Survey published in their report that in Levant basin; the region around Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, 3.45 trillion cubic meter natural gas, 1.7 billion barrels of petroleum predicted to be existed. And this prediction pinpoint one of the world greatest natural gas basins could be existing in Eastern Mediterranean.

Following figure and table in the next page would be showing the detailed explorations and finds in the mentioned Leviathan basin which has published by United Nations Geological Survey's fact sheets in 2010. These maps would be much help to understand and visualise the mentioned area in the region.




Figure 6. Oil and Gas Fields in Levant (USGS, 2010b)

Table 1. USGS Assessment Results on Levant Basin (USGS, 2010b)

Total Petroleum Systems (TPS) and Assessment Units (AU)	Field type	Largest expected mean field size	Total undiscovered resources											
			Oil (MMBO)				Gas (BCFG)				NGL (MMBNGL)			
			F95	F50	F5	Mean	F95	F50	F5	Mean	F95	F50	F5	Mean
Levant Basin Province, Mesozoic-Cenozoic Composite TPS														
Levant Margin Reservoirs AU	Oil	177	278	763	1,765	857	340	944	2,202	1,062	7	19	45	22
	Gas	1,074					1,678	4,559	10,594	5,135	51	142	333	160
Levant Sub-Salt Reservoirs AU	Oil	184	148	460	1,242	548	179	569	1,559	679	4	12	32	14
	Gas	12,238					32,462	74,210	150,573	80,758	1,006	2,309	4,721	2,519
Plio-Pleistocene Reservoirs AU	Oil	130	57	217	752	284	68	265	933	351	1	5	19	7
	Gas	4,756					15,360	32,066	61,569	34,393	157	328	633	353
Total Conventional Resources			483	1,440	3,759	1,689	50,087	112,613	227,430	122,378	1,226	2,815	5,783	3,075

Then again US Geological Survey stated that they predict 1.8 billion barrel of petroleum, 6.3 trillion cubic meter natural gas and 6 billion barrel of liquid natural gas (LNG) reserves existing around Nile delta basin.




Figure 7. Oil and Gas Fields in Nile Delta Basin(USGS, 2010a)

Table 2. USGS Assessment Results on Nile Delta Basin (USGS, 2010a)

Total Petroleum Systems (TPS) and Assessment Units (AU)	Field type	Expected largest mean field size	Total undiscovered resources											
			Oil (MMBO)				Gas (BCFG)				NGL (MMBNGL)			
			F95	F50	F5	Mean	F95	F50	F5	Mean	F95	F50	F5	Mean
Nile Delta Basin Province, Mesozoic-Cenozoic Composite TPS														
Nile Margin Reservoirs AU	Oil	214	449	1,150	2,600	1,288	551	1,425	3,237	1,597	11	29	66	32
	Gas	766					698	2,193	5,750	2,574	21	68	181	80
Nile Cone AU	Oil	311	42	256	1,666	475	152	930	6,123	1,758	6	38	255	73
	Gas	17,194					91,213	197,850	410,825	217,313	2,413	5,269	10,962	5,789
Eratosthenes Seamount AU	Not quantitatively assessed													
Mediterranean Ridge AU	Not quantitatively assessed													
Total Conventional Resources			491	1,406	4,266	1,763	92,614	202,398	425,935	223,242	2,451	5,404	11,464	5,974

And 8 billion barrels of petroleum has been told to existing around Cyprus worth approximately around 400 billion dollars. The area in south and southeast of Crete called

Herodot harbours in total 3.5 trillion cubic meter of natural gas (one of it 1.5 other one 2 trillion). Regarding to those data above; there is hydrocarbon basins equivalent of 30 barrel of petroleum which approximately worth 1.5 trillion dollar to be existing in East Mediterranean. And as Yaycı stated; those resources can provide Europe's 30, Turkey's 572 years of natural gas that she need according to the consumption data of 2010.

From 2009 to 2011 many great natural gas discoveries made around Israel and Cyprus. Cyprus's natural gas history started with the discovery of Aphrodite natural gas zone September 2011 at the 12'th parcel, near to Leviathan zone by US based Noble Energy. With the discovery of the Aphrodite zone, first deep drilling well to find petroleum and natural gas opened. It has predicted that the amount of natural gas in this area was around 140-220 billion cubic meters. And these discoveries triggered other discovery activities. (Yaycı, 2021)

Noble Energy took licences from Irreal and Cyprus' exclusive economic zones to commence drilling activities and in 15'th November Noble Energy announced that approximately 3.9 trillion cubic meter natural gas could be found. It also announced that in Leviathan zone where Noble Energy done drilling activities it has found 18 trillion cubic meter natural gas which was 50 km away from the 12'th parcel. After explorations in Tamar-1 and Dalit-1 drilling activities, hydrocarbon reserves also discovered in Dolphin and Tannin zones. It has predicted that in 2013 Tamar in 2017 Leviathan would start to production. First commercial natural gas sales from Tamar zone were made on 1 April 2013. As for Leviathan due to some political and legal issues the production interrupted and only started ten years after fist discovery in 2019. (Harunoğulları, 2020, p. 462) The discoveries are still on-going, and it is possible to find new reserves around the region. (Yaycı, 2021)

Table below shows (Table 3.) the discovered reserves in Eastern Mediterranean in more detail with the amount and discovery date of the reserves. It should be noted that those datas retrieved from different sources namely from: Özekin's study that is also mentioned at the literature review published in 2020, and Kavaz's study which has published in 2021. The reason behind this choice is that this topic is a current-contemporary issue that researches over mentioned hydrocarbons ongoing. So, with time the findings and the quantities consequently changed. Therefore, a need to merge the latest data regarding to the natural resources/ hydrocarbons found in the region.

Table 3. Discovered Natural Gas fields by States in Eastern Mediterranean and Their Quantities

Countries	Natural Gas Field	Date of Discovery	Amoun of Reserves (Milion cubic meter)
Israel	Noa	1997	28
	Mari-B	2000	42
	Dalit	2009	14.1
	Tamar	2009	283
	Leviathan	2010	623
	Dolphin	2011	2.2
	Shimshon	2012	8.4
	Tanin	2012	33.9
	Karish	2013	50.9
GCASC	Aphrodite	2011	198
	Calypso*	2018	150
	Glaucus*	2019	142
Palestine	Gaza Marine	2000	28.3
Egypt	Zohr	2015	850
Syria	**	**	240
Lebanon	**	**	850
Jordan	**	**	6
Table retrieved from: (Özekin, 2020, p. 11)			
* This data retrieved from a different source: (Kavaz, 2021, p. 144)			
** There is no clear information			

While those discovered hydrocarbon reserves in Eastern Mediterranean especially the ones around Cyprus increasing the geopolitical importance of the region, it actually made Eastern Mediterranean a centre of power struggle for global and regional actors, such as: EU, USA, Russia, Israel, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, and GCASC to take control of those

resources. Consequently, to gain over hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, riparian states of the region create strategies and form cooperation with each other such as: declaring exclusive economic zones or/and delimitations of continental shelf and exclusive economic zones. The next chapter will be defining continental shelf and exclusive economic zone in more detail.

Since 1958 with the conferences taking place on law of the sea, the states gain more sovereignty over the seas then before. Additionally, to the classical maritime zones such as; territorial sea, contiguous zone, fishing zone which were very limited regarding to the area that they cover, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone that cover more space and gave much more sovereignty over the sea to states took its place in international law. The continental shelf has firstly mentioned in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and defined as: “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas” (İlgen, 2019, p. 47) where coastal states’ express consent needed in order to commence exploration on the continental shelf or/and natural resources that the shelf may harbour. (İlgen, 2019, p. 47). And it has regulated in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention’s part VI between article 76 and 85. In the UNLOS its definition has made as the area which “comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.” (UNCLOS, 1982 p. 53)

On the other hand, the exclusive economic zone that has applied as common law before, with the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) became written rules of law. An exclusive economic zone refers; the area starting from the baseline with 200 nautical miles (at most) that gives right to exploration, exploitation, preservation, and management of the natural resources (alive or not) in the given area (under seabed, under land and waters above land) to the sovereign coastal state. (Yaycı, 2021, p.30)

To do so coastal states can “exercise of its sovereign rights” by taking measures as such; “boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention” (UNCLOS, 1982 p. 52) Not just management, preservation, and exploitation of the natural resources but it also gives the right to build artificial islands, structures, and facilities in that area. (Harunoğulları, 2020, p. 458) Related provisions to EEZ regulated in between 55-85'th articles of the 1982 UNCLOS. (Yaycı, 2021, p.30)

Also apart from that It is again mentioned in the convention how the EEZ can be determined if the subject parties (states) show their “outer limit lines of the exclusive economic zone and the lines of delamination” (UNCLOS, 1982 p. 52) “on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position” (UNCLOS, 1982 p. 52-53) “Where appropriate, lists of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted for such outer limit lines or lines of delimitation.” (UNCLOS, 1982 p. 53) And the subject party should “give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” (UNCLOS, 1982 p. 53) Some of the states that declared exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean are; Tunisia, Syria, GCASC (Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus), Libya, Israel, and Lebanon.

EEZ regarding to how the declaration has made different from the continental shelf because, continental shelf considered as the natural right of a sovereign coastal state whereas for EEZ as it mentioned before a declaration to the Secretary General of the United Nations needed. Another difference is continental shelf is a “natural prolongation” as it described in UNCLOS. Which means topography of the coastal states would be considered while for EEZ topography is not a variable. (Harunoğulları, 2020, p. 458)




Figure 8. Continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone

The figure above which shows the continental shelf and EEZ, makes it easier to understand those maritime zones and shows us the difference of both. In that regard saying EEZ is more inclusive will be correct, because whereas continental shelf gives states sovereign right on only subsoil and seabed, EEZ additionally gives rights on the waters above the seabed and gives more rights to the coastal states.

As for this thesis' context definitions of EEZ and continental shelf has been made above. Also, some of the differences have mentioned. Because the current dynamics and balances in the region manifests itself through exclusive economic zones and given licences to drilling hydrocarbon reserves in those areas. This thesis takes Turkey as a case so in further chapters the GCASC's EEZ delimitations (especially the one made with Egypt) will be taking in consideration since those areas are the ones effecting/breaching Turkey's maritime boundary rights. The figure below shows the situation more clearly. As it has shown in the figure licenced areas that GCASC declared overlaps with the outer limits of Turkish continental shelf in the 4'th 5'th 6'th 7'th and 1'st parcels. And it is breaching Turkey's right that she

gained naturally from her continental shelf because GCASC opened those parcels into bid to the international energy companies to explore and exploit the hydrocarbon reserves that discovered.




Figure 9. Offshore licence areas of the GCASC overlapping Turkey's outer limits of continental shelf & EEZ delimitations GCASC made with Lebanon, Egypt, and Israel (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2019)

4. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

As it mentioned in the previous chapter foreign policy is strategies and principles followed by the governments in their interactions with the other states and/or international

organisations. And its primary objective is to safeguard and promote a state's national interests in international arena meanwhile keeping stability, peace, and prosperity. And as all the other states energy and energy security is one of the most important components that forms those policies.

In the last decade Turkey experienced one of the fastest growths in energy demand among the OECD countries, second to China whereas its dependency to the imported energy resources also arisen. İpek says that it is increased from 67 % (in 2002) to 75 % by 2014. (İpek, 2017, p. 174) Although there was a rapid growth in the energy demand Turkey stood dependent onto the same energy suppliers as before and do not resort to diversification method between 2004 to 2014. (İpek, 2017, p. 174) And at the current time Turkey's main gas sources are Algeria, Qatar, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Nigeria where Russia and Iran still take the lead. (Öğütçü, 2012, p.2)

In 2005 Turkey mostly imported her energy resources (specifically natural gas) from Russia with 66 % and 16 % from Iran which was a large sum. Not surprisingly Turkey faced with difficulties when gas imports cut; due to technical issues and increasing domestic consumption in Iran and gas crises between Russia and Ukraine, in the winter of 2006. (İpek, 2017, p. 174) As we can see from this example; Turkey is very insecure regarding to not having appropriate energy reserves to handle her growing energy demand. And an interruption to her energy imports will affect her gravely. (Bilgin, 2010, p.82) Also, another problematic issue is that; her current energy resource mix which is mostly based on fossil fuels and excluding renewable energy resources. (Bilgin, 2010, p.83) Being aware of this Turkey also try to develop foreign policy strategies to diversify energy resources and find alternative solutions. In that regard hydrocarbon reserves that found in Eastern Mediterranean like all the other riparian and non-regional states, arouse Turkey's attention. As it has already mentioned in the previous chapters, those resources can provide Turkey's 572 years of natural gas that she needs according to the consumption data of 2010. (Yaycı, 20221, p.26) Also it should have mentioned that as an energy strategy Turkey considering and being aware of its geopolitical advantage, present itself as an energy hub between Russia, Caspian (supplier) and EU, world market (demanding part). (Bilgin, 2010, p.84)

In that context she focused on pipelines that could fulfil this objective. One of them was the TANAP project signed between governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey in 2012 that could transport natural gas coming from Russia to Europe with the extensions of TAP

(Trans-Atlantic Pipeline). Turkey first started the flow of natural gas through this pipeline to Europe in December 2020. (ETKB, n.d.) As a contrast to that Europe also proposed a natural gas pipeline EastMed, which connects gas fields coming from Levantine basin at Cyprus to the Southern Europe over Greece. (Baconi, 2017, p.9)



Figure 10. EastMed Pipeline Project Map (Baconi, 2017)

As it can be seen from the map of the EastMed project, Turkey did not include in this pipeline project (that predicted to start in 2025) as a transit line, therefore the energy equation. Which consists of Greece, Israel, Crete GCASC and as a result EU. Indeed, this pipeline is directly a result of the discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, namely Aphrodite, Zohr, Leviathan, Tamar. Ofcourse being excluded was against Turkey's energy security strategy of being "energy hub in the region". And knowing the fact that those basins around Cyprus and Levantine had high potential and the reason was to decrease their dependence to the Russian energy resources (which is also at some point Turkey's interest in the area as she is one of the coastal states in the region and highly dependent on the resources imported from Russia) pushed Turkey to finally focus on the Eastern Mediterranean.

Before those events -discovery of mentioned reserves around GCASC- her main interest in the area was the Cyprus issue of TRNC and GCASC; TRNC not being acknowledge in the international arena (as it has also manifested itself in this case in Eastern Mediterranean). And Turkey's hydrocarbon explorations were mainly in Black Sea. (Öğütçü, 2012, p.2) From this point on Turkey's interest in the region regarding to her concerns in energy strategy -which is securing it diversification and making herself energy hub by her geographical location- manifested itself by continental shelf and EEZ issues around Cyprus. Since those maritime zones determined by international law, defined how those recourses can be exploited and who had the right to do it or/and give another state or international company right to do it in her behalf. And so, Turkey started to conduct some action in that regard starting from 2011.

On 21 September 2011 Turkey signed an agreement on continental shelf delimitation with TRNC then on 22 September 2011 TRNC' council of ministers gave TPAO to operate-manage hydrocarbon reserves around the island. On 27 April 2012 some other licence areas were added that she gave before on 22 September 2011. (Yaycı, 2021, p.161-162)




Figure 11. Turkey- TRNC Delimitation Agreement & Licenced TPAO Blocks (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2019)

And with the licence that TRNC gave to the Turkish TPAO, Turkey started seismic surveys in those areas. Those areas were overlapping with the GCASC declared MEB. GCASC signed bilateral agreements to delaminate her EEZ (firstly on 17 February 2003 with Egypt then on 17 January 2007 with Lebanon and lastly on 17 December 2010 with Irreal) and opened those parcels-blocks in it into bid/tender from 11 February 2012, without acknowledging TRNC and Turkey regarding to her TPAO licenced areas. Those are 2'nd 3'rd 8'th and 9'th parcels-blocks which have by GCASC licenced to ENI (Italian energy company), TOTAL (French energy company) and KOGAS (Korean Energy Company) to make researches- explorations (see figure 14) and drilling starting from 19 September 2011. (Yaycı, 2021, p.135) So saying Turkey's declaration of her delimitation of continental shelf with TRNC on 21 September 2011 and actions following that -as it mentioned above- was the starting point of the conflict in the region over maritime boundary rights as a response to her exclusion in this energy equation.

Following her delimitations with TRNC, on 12 March 2013 Turkey declared to United Nations her continental shelf as: starting from 32°16'18'' east longitude and following the median line between Egypt-Turkey and staying in between 028° east longitude. And the western limits beyond 028° east longitude would be decided with the related states' participation to an agreement in line with the international law. And from June 2018 Turkey started her seismic research activities in her claimed areas with Fatih drill ship. And following year she sailed her newly recruited drill ship Yavuz. While those two vessels making drilling activities Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa and Oruç Reis continued seismic researches. (See figure below) (Stratejik Ortak, 2023)

Although her drilling activities reflected as illegal action by the states backing GCASC. Examples can be given as: EU stated they gravely concerned by Turkey's announced intention of drilling activities within the EEZ of Cyprus and that being said, it was an illegal action (On 4 May 2019). Which is also seconded by US on 5 May 2019 and France on 7 May 2019. Turkey in this regard, as it has mentioned in a presentation made in Brussels by Çağatay Erciyes in 27 May 2019 (Ambassador Director General for Bilateral Political & Maritime-Aviation-Border Affairs) publishes in the official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: she will continue her surveys and drilling activities in her continental shelf determinedly where Turkish government granted the Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) licence areas (by TRNC) in 2012. And GCASC should acknowledge and include

TRNC as the equal partner of the island regarding to decision making process on hydrocarbon reserves and/or stop their unilateral activities over it. Otherwise, Turkey will protect TRNC's rights as well as hers. (Erciyes, 2019, p. 50) Although Turkey and TRNC had already been excluded and their rights not acknowledged from the energy equation in Eastern Mediterranean. It has due to foundation of EMGF (East Mediterranean Gas Forum) in early 2019 by seven members: Italy, Greece, GCASC, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Palestinian Authority. Its purpose is to; serve as a forum for bringing together gas producers, consumers, and transit nations in order to establish a shared vision and a systematic, structured policy dialogue on natural gas (Erdoğan, 2021, p 89). Thus, not including Turkey in this forum meant that; parties that forming it did not consider her as a transit nation, a coastal/riparian state that has a say in what happening in the region.

Although Turkey's steps-actions to secure her position in East Mediterranean was intact. She and Libya's UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) signed an agreement in November 2019 (see Figure 13) defining the boundaries of the continental shelf and the Turkish and Libyan EEZs with a borderline in the Mediterranean Sea that is roughly 30 km long. (Erdoğan, 2021, p 88)

The Turkish-Libyan agreement was indeed a wise strategic choice that fundamentally altered the region's energy situation. For Turkey, the agreement contains three crucial aspects:

First Turkey established its western and southern borders in the Mediterranean and changed from being a demurrer to a nation that bases and upholds its claims on a solid legal foundation. (Erdoğan, 2021)

Second, Turkey stopped a possible agreement from being signed against its interests between the Libyan GNA and the GASC, Greece, Israel, and Egypt. (Erdoğan, 2021)

Third, Turkey has repeatedly demanded that actions be taken in accordance with international law, whose main principle is that states with coasts on closed or semi-closed seas must cooperate with one another in order to exercise their rights and fulfil their obligations. (Erdoğan, 2021)

With this agreement, Turkey demonstrated that it would not ignore *fait accompli* (done deal) policies by Greece, the GASC, and Egypt on maritime issues that directly affect its

interests in response to the coastal states' attempts to ignore its exclusive rights in the Mediterranean. (Erdoğan, 2021, p 88)

Regarding upcoming delimitation agreements and anticipated disputes over maritime zones in the Mediterranean, two articles are of utmost importance. If any resource is discovered in the area extending from one party's EEZ to the other party's EEZ, the parties may form agreements for the purpose of cooperatively exploiting potential resources, according to Article 4(2) of the Turkish-Libyan maritime delimitation agreement. Second, in accordance with Article 4(3), before coming to an agreement, a party must inform and negotiate with the other party if discussions about the delimitation of its EEZ begin. (Erdoğan, 2021, p 88-89)

By signing this agreement, Turkey and the Libyan GNA made it clear that any future partnership or agreement would be subject to negotiations between the two parties. Turkey and Libya were at conflict with other coastal states as a result of the deal. Along with France and Cyprus, Egypt and Greece regarded the agreement "null and void" and claimed it threatened regional stability. Given that it completely ignored the existence of the island of Crete between the shores of Turkey and Libya, Greece referred to the agreement as "geographically absurd." (Erdoğan, 2021, p 88-89)

Roughly eight months after the Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement was made, Greece and Egypt agreed on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction. It is clear from the agreement that Turkey's maritime territorial claims were being blocked. The Turkish Foreign Ministry deemed the agreement "null and void," (Like how her agreement with Libya found "*null and void*" by France, Greece, Egypt, GCASC) claiming that Egypt and Greece do not have any maritime borders with each other. (Erdoğan, 2021, p 88-89)

Moreover, Turkey reported to the United Nations that the Greek-Egyptian agreement's demarcated area was located on Turkey's continental shelf. The agreement caused a rise in tensions as Turkey renewed her exploration operations and naval deployments. (Erdoğan, 2021, p 88-89)



Figure 12. Map of Turkey-Libya Delimitation Agreement (Harunoğulları, 2020)




Figure 13. GCASC Licenced Blocks and the Share of International Energy Companies Doing Drilling and Research (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2019)




Figure 14. Turkey-TRNC- GCASC Overlapping Licence Areas (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2019)




Figure 15. Turkish Drill Ships Doing Seismic Researches and Drilling (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2019)

5. TURKEY'S EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN POLICY: CURRENT CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPCTS

In previous chapter Turkey's foreign policy towards East Mediterranean regarding to energy end energy security discussed. In that purpose Turkey's increased energy dependency and importance of the hydrocarbons that found in the region mentioned since it would diversify her resources. It has also mentioned that she is tried to be excluded (with TRNC) in the energy equation by the regional actors mainly by Southern Cyprus (which's offensive behaviours backed by EU and US) through declared EEZ's and formed organizations such as East Mediterranean Gas forum.

Before starting to discuss what needs to be done in the East Mediterranean by Turkey to overcome this exclusion and securing her rights and position in the region to get over her energy security concerns, her dependency to Russia and Iran energy resources, and achieve her goal of being an energy hup in the region, the political context of her exclusion should also be mentioned.

When hydrocarbon reserve discoveries happened between 2009 and 2012, Turkey's relations with Israel had worsened significantly and repeated efforts to find a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus issue under UN auspices had failed to generate a breakthrough. (Öğütçü, 2012, p.1) Turkey's relations with Egypt detorriated with the coup happened in 2013. And, her relations with Israel worsened with the "*Mavi Marmara*" happened in 2010. So, in short, she did not have good relations with the key regional actors specifically Cyprus and Israel since the discoveries and new energy equation created turns around them. Plus, with US which is not a regional but a global actor that is in the energy equation. As matter of fact a worsening in the relations with Israel would also be affecting relations with United States since it is US's one of the most important allies in the region. And as US stated: in a situation where US stuck between choosing Turkey and Israel, Israel would be chosen. Likewise, Cyprus being the ally of EU and a member state. Therefore of course, an exclusion would be inevitable.

This worsening of the relations (that eventually resulted the exclusion by the actors in the region) as also mentioned in the Literature before- could be traced back to shifting

foreign policy behaviour of Turkey. The shifts on the Turkish foreign policy behaviour tainted her neutrality and in the eyes of Euro-Atlantic alliances, with the recent events, her taking side against them. Also, using harsh rhetoric in favour of the nationalistic public opinion by the government (AKP) for the coming elections, resulted (as it has expected and mentioned by the studies) damage her long hard-earned western alliances. Which eventually resulted an equation where Turkey being excluded, and Turkey being isolated in the region.

This exclusion in the region manifested itself with the previous events; Southern Cyprus's action where Turkey's and TRNC's rights in the region coming from international law being ignored and while it is supported by EU and US, and most recently the pipeline project of EastMed where hydrocarbon reserves that retrieved from the region would be transferred through Israel to Southern Cyprus to European markets while Turkey did not included in this pipeline project event it is known that a line from Turkey could be more convenient.

Unquestionably, this occurrence was highly against Turkey's energy security strategy of being the energy hub in the region transferring energy to EU markets. Nevertheless, against this exclusion Turkey took some actions in the region like increasing her military/naval capability in the region, acquiring drill ships and research vessels, and making bilateral agreements with regional states. (Turkish Petroleum-TRNC delimitation agreement, Turkish-Libyan delimitation agreement)

Although starting with this proactive seeming approach recently Turkey withdraws from East Mediterranean turned her face back to Black Sea on drillings and searching energy resources as it can be understood from no news or activities in the region occurred in the region and when government of Turkey talks about energy resources those are mostly about the resources found in Black Sea region with the drill ships supposed to make researches in East Mediterranean in Turkey's claimed continental shelf and licenced areas given by TRNC.

Of course, one of the reasons she firstly withdraws from the region was same as all the other actors was Covid-19 that event made all states focus primarily how to cope with the epidemic rather than focusing on energy strategies in East Mediterranean. But the worst times of the epidemic passed and with the emergence of Ukraine- Russian war the importance of energy and energy security especially for EU states regain its importance maybe more than

ever. In that kind of an environment Turkey should not turn her back to the Region but focus the region.

In that regard first thing that Turkey might consider doing would be; eliminate her state of isolation in the region and promote her relations with the regional actors, most importantly with Egypt and Israel. Then possibly, carry Libyan agreement-accordance further, make diplomatic attempts towards Syria, Lebanon, and other regional actors-countries and as for the front against her. As Özekin argues that those actors that are building the front are already conflicted within themselves so Turkey may use that as an advantage by using Lebanon- Israeli disputes or disputes between Israel and Arab World, relations with Israel and Egypt related to Muslim Brotherhood policy, thus USA's and Russia's differentiations.(Özekin, 2020, p.41) To change the equation in the region that excludes Turkey, she could take concrete steps; Turkey might extend the Libyan-Turkish agreement-in accordance with EEZ by also initiating it with other riparian states (Syria, Egypt, GCASC, Greece, Libya) as well and declare it in the United Nations. And explain to Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel's government authorities and public, by doing so their maritime zones will also enlarge so they will also benefit from it. And might point out that especially the EEZ agreement with Libya and Egypt are important because; median line between Anatolian and African shores with those states will change all equations that are existing. Finally, Turkey should restart her drilling activities in the Ester Mediterranean perpetuity and seek international partners to produce energy from the East Mediterranean basin's resources.

CONCLUSION

The Eastern Mediterranean -as it is today- always been an important region that harboured and captured interest of ancient civilizations, empires, and states. While the reasons changed-evolved over time, the interest over the region itself stayed still. As it has mentioned in the chapters that evaluating historical and current importance of the region; the importance coming from being a strategical location, that gave control over transportation and trade routes. Although that being intact, with the discoveries of energy resources in the region that the society deeply needs, it gained another importance namely energy security.

Since most of the nation states in the international arena did not have their own energy resources and those energy resources that society mostly dependent on are unrenewable ones it made energy importing states insecure. The question arised that whether sufficient energy resources could be available at affordable prices. As Churchill states back in the eve of WWI that question relied on variety. And for the states that exporting energy and have control over energy market making sure they stay that way.

In that regard discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean opened a new door of opportunity to the states in the search for diversification to not rely on one and be at its mercy but secure their incoming energy with potential suppliers or even better resources that they themselves have control over.

What happening in Eastern Mediterranean, all those conflicts and tension, has also coming from this notion. Since Europe, US likewise Turkey highly dependent on the resources coming from middle eastern and Russian energy market. And historical events such Arab oil embargo in 1973. The pressure on Europe being highly dependent on Russian energy resources. Those events made actors in the region want to have control over those newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves in Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey is one of the states that have this notion, and she also is a coastal/riparian state. But because of her late inclusion (since earlier she was mostly focused on the Black Sea region regarding to the energy and her attention being taken with the Southern Cyprus's hydrocarbon finds and opening them into bid to international companies where she did not take consideration TRNC's rights and eventually mirrored it to Turkey), isolation in the region and worsened relations with the regional actors she excluded from the energy equation that emerged in the region. And her rights in the region tried to be ignored.

Nevertheless, Turkey took some important actions against the block against her, she took strategic maneuverers such as delimitation her continental shelf with Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and get licenced blocks form her to start research and drilling. Declaring her continental shelf to UN, making an agreement on EEZ with Libya. And in every opportunity uphold her rights coming from international law against the actors (mainly Greece, GCACS, regional actors and non-regional actors supporting them).

Although recently it seems Turkey withdraw from Eastern Mediterranean but rather focus on possible energy resources that could be retrieve from Black Sea. Yes, the Covid-19

that occurred made every actor in the energy equation of Eastern Mediterranean turn their focus on how to cope with this pandemic and for a time Eastern Mediterranean regarding to energy security was not the hot topic as before. However, with the Ukrainian -Russian war and EU backing Ukrainian side with the fear of possible interruption of energy resources made the region and the possible pipeline project more important. Turkey should not turn its back to the region because it is not just an issue of energy issue for her but there is also another dimensions of sovereignty and locking up to narrow limits maritime boundaries determined by declared EEZ's breaching her continental shelves by GCASC backed by EU and regional actors as Israel, Egypt.

So, as it has mentioned in the previous chapter Turkey might consider to; eliminate her state of isolation in the region and promote her relations with the regional actors, most importantly with Egypt and Israel. Then carry Libyan agreement-accordance further, it could initiate diplomatic attempts towards Syria, Lebanon, and other regional actors-countries and as for the front against her Turkey should use Lebanon- Israeli disputes or disputes between Israel and Arab World, relations with Israel and Egypt related to Muslim Brotherhood policy, thus USA's and Russia's differentiations, against each other to divide the front and use it on her behalf.

To change the equation in the region that excludes Turkey, she might consider extending the Libyan-Turkish agreement- in accordance with EEZ by also making it with other riparian states (Syria, Egypt, GCASC, Greece, Libya) as well and declare it in the United Nations. And explain to Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel's government authorities and public, by doing so their maritime zones will also enlarge so they will also benefit from it. And it should be pointed out that; the EEZ agreement with Libya and Egypt are important because; median line between Anatolian and African shores with those states will change all equations that are existing.

Lastly, Turkey might consider restarting her drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and bring other regional countries to contribute drilling and distribution of the existing oil and gas resources. By doing this, Turkey will benefit hugely from these recourses economically. While these efforts will contribute regional prosperity, also enhance Turkey's strategic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean.

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