

**ENSURING ENERGY SECURITY IN THE CAUCASUS AND
CASPIAN BASIN AND ITS EFFECTS IN THE REGION**



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ENSURING ENERGY SECURITY IN THE CAUCASUS AND
CASPIAN BASIN AND ITS EFFECTS IN THE REGION

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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ABSTRACT

Energy became the key source for transportation and defense industry particularly during wars, and over time, such sources constituted the core of energy policies. Therefore, energy-rich soils became critical for countries in addition to being the target of international actors. For instance, countries in the Caucasus and Caspian Basin – that are important actors in the world's oil production – have been subject to several military, economic and political strategies. In this region, certain countries gained their independence after the end of the Cold War. In this context, it can be uttered that the region has been unstable due to turmoil and remittent policies. Furthermore, the region witnesses issues regarding energy security and energy transport due to terrorist attacks. Major powers such as the US, EU, Russia and China, shaping the world economy, and regional powers including Iran and Turkey, have been in pursuit of getting a share of the energy in the region by various strategies according to their national interests.

This study features primary and secondary data for detailed research and analysis, and it is designed to answer the following research questions: What is energy? Is energy security provided in the Caucasus and Caspian Basin? Is there stability in the countries in the region? What are the policies of the global and regional powers towards the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin?

Keywords: *Energy, Energy Security, Caucasus and Caspian Basin, Regional and Global Actors*

ÖZET

Ulaşım ve savunma sanayinde, özellikle savaş dönemlerinde enerjinin avantajı, enerji politikalarının oluşumunda önemli bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Böylece, enerji açısından zengin toprakların önemi artmış ve uluslararası aktörlerin hedefi haline gelmiştir. Bu nedenle, dünya petrol üretiminin önemli bir parçası olan Kafkasya ve Hazar Havzası Ülkelerinde birçok askeri, ekonomik ve politik strateji üretilmiştir. Soğuk savaşın sona ermesi ile birlikte bağımsızlığını yeni kazanan bölge ülkelerinde, inişli çıkışlı politikalar mevcut olduğundan istikrarsız bir yapıya sahip olduğu söylenebilir. Ayrıca bölgede terör saldırıları nedeniyle enerji güvenliği ve enerjinin taşınması sorunu da mevcuttur. ABD, AB, Rusya ve Çin gibi dünya ekonomisini şekillendiren büyük güçler ile İran ve Türkiye gibi bölgesel güçler, bölge için ulusal çıkarlar doğrultusunda stratejiler geliştirerek enerjiden pay almanın yollarını aramaktadırlar.

Bu çalışmada detaylı bir araştırma yapılması ve iyi bir şekilde analiz edilmesi için birincil ve ikincil verilerden yararlanılmıştır. Çalışmanın amacı; Enerji nedir? Kafkasya ve Hazar Havzasında enerji güvenliği sağlanıyor mu? Bölgedeki ülkelerde istikrar var mı? Küresel ve bölgesel ülkelerin Kafkasya ve Hazar Havzası'na yönelik politikaları nelerdir? gibi soruları cevaplamaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Enerji, Enerji Güvenliği, Kafkasya ve Hazar Havzası, Bölgesel ve Küresel Aktörler*

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INTRODUCTION

Due to the fact that natural energy resources are limited and located in different geographies, it affects the politics of the regional in particular and the whole world in general. While providing energy, states try to protect their interests and benefits. Therefore, the concept of Energy Security can be defined differently from country to country. In addition, it may show differences with the developing world over time. For example, while in the past, the definition of energy security was understood as providing energy at affordable prices, today it constitutes all of the elements such as terrorist acts. Another example is that while energy demand security is important especially for countries with oil and natural gas deposits, this concept appears as energy supply security for countries that are dependent on foreign energy. As can be seen, countries have used the energy factor as a weapon in every period. On the other hand, when we look at the historical process of the Caspian Basin, it is seen that the Soviets had 86% and Iran 14% before the collapse of the USSR. Iran argued that the status of the Caspian should be redefined in order to increase its share to 20% right after this disintegration. When looking at the region in general; The independence struggles of Chechnya, North Ossetia and South Ossetia, the weak economy of Dagestan and more than thirty ethnic groups, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Iran's nuclear weapons development program, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan's use of the common water channel, and the USA The fact that most of the natural gas is sold to Russia due to the embargo imposed by Iran clearly reveals the problematic structure of the region. These problems pose great risks in the transport of energy. Therefore, it is essential to solve the problems of the region in order to ensure energy security in the Caucasus and

Caspian Basin. Briefly; Our work is to solve the energy problem in the Caspian Basin region in a way that covers all countries, to ensure security on the energy supply routes, to ensure prosperity and stability in the region; It will contribute to the development of regional democracies and the peaceful resolution of regional problems. Therefore, in this study, the concept of Energy Security, its differences according to countries and the reasons for these differences will be examined. It will be compared with the current security strategies and what has changed in the Caspian before and after 1991 will be mentioned. Within the framework of Energy Security, concepts such as physical energy security, economic energy security and environmental sustainability will be discussed; Within the Caucasus and Caspian Basin, issues such as international waters, status, stability problem in the countries of the region, Policies of Global and Regional Actors towards the Caspian Basin will be discussed. Topics such as summit meetings, treaties, international organizations will also contribute to our research, and the balance policy it has created will be emphasized. In addition to these issues, energy supply and demand will be discussed. Regarding the subject, the political and economic effects of the Caucasus and Caspian Basin Countries will be mentioned. In addition, the strategies of countries such as the USA and China, which are the superpowers of the world, regarding this region will be mentioned.

Importance of the research: If the Caucasus and Caspian Basin cannot solve the problem of regional instability, it cannot produce and implement strategies that shape world politics. In this regard, resolving conflicts and problems in the countries of the region may make it possible to become an exemplary region for energy security all over the world in the near future. Today, it is aimed to prevent terrorist acts,

embargoes and price manipulations by bringing political, social and economic prosperity to the inadequate central governments in the region.

The aim of this dissertation and its contribution to the literature: This study is designed to propose solution suggestions for the issues in the Caucasus and Caspian countries that have not been able to achieve economic, political or social welfare despite being rich in energy sources. In addition, this study suggests ways to ensure energy security for the countries in the region.

The study flourished from the following main research question: Is Energy Security Provided in the Caucasus and Caspian Basin?

Research Method: Focusing on energy security in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin, this study particularly elaborates on economic, political and social factors using the comparative research method. Through this method, energy security policies in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin are compared to those in the Middle East and the European Union. Using primary and secondary data sources, the study aims to provide a better understanding of energy security policies in the Caucasus and Caspian Basin along with their political, social and economic impacts.

Limitations and Scopes:

- In our research, the concept of energy security in the cold war period (1945-1990) and the concept of energy security in the post-cold war (1991-present) will be compared.
- Only Physical, Economic and Environmental Sustainability energy security will be discussed.

- Renewable Energy Resources that each country may have and that do not pose a security threat will not be included in the research.
- Only Turkish, English, Russian and Azerbaijani sources will be used.
- Comparative method will be used.

Population: As it is known, many countries in the world have natural energy resources. The fact that energy is generally limited and it is located in underdeveloped countries has made these regions a target, making them one of the main factors that constitute the foreign policy elements of developed states. Therefore, the framework of our work will be Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the center, as well as Georgia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Turkey, America and China, which have taken their place in the region due to economic, political and geographical reasons.

CHAPTER I

1. A THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF ENERGY SECURITY

Throughout history, humans have always depended on natural resources to survive and facilitate their lives. Energy has been the essential source for heating and lighting. Nevertheless, this basic need has turned into a driver of competition ever since the ancient times, as tribes of the past struggled for power through efforts to dominate energy sources. In the same vein, energy today is the primary component of national security, affecting decision-making bodies of states (Yılmaz & Kalkan, 2017, p. 176). Therefore, the fact that energy has become so important for all societies has made it necessary to ensure energy security.

With mechanization and mass production that started with the industrial revolution, the demand for energy increased ever more and energy supply became compulsory. Therefore, states consider seeking, finding and securing energy as one of their national security components. In this line, some countries are observed to refrain from supplying energy from others due to concerns over protecting their national interests. According to these notions, it can be understood that the emergence of the concept of *energy security* lies in the industrial revolution (Karabulut, 2016, p. 35)

During World War I and II, energy security began to be considered the most important military strategy. Indeed, military vehicles previously depending on coal as source of energy started to run by oil. This was marked as a turning point during the aforementioned wars. As a matter of fact, countries shaped their war strategies according to the supply of oil and other energy sources they needed. Therefore, the

concept of energy security indisputably became the top priority for countries (Barton, Redgwell, Rønne, & Zillman, 2004, p. 3). When it became clear that energy power would turn into political power in the near future, all eyes turned to energy-rich lands leading to the formation of the new world order.

In the first half of the twentieth century, energy producing countries such as Mexico, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Qatar nationalized their sources to control their energy. In this regard, the most important factor in the development of energy security was the establishment of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) in 1960. Founded with the aim of setting a common price, this organization has been serving to implement common policies to prevent competition among oil exporting countries (Karabulut, 2016, p. 36).

Although energy security became important during the two world wars and peaked with the start of the Cold War, the oil embargo imposed during the “Arab-Israeli” wars further revealed its criticality across the globe. Due to this embargo, oil producing countries reduced their supplies, leading to exorbitant price increases and ultimately a global economic crisis. Thus, the global powers felt the need to intervene. In this regard, the modern concept of energy security was created to prevent the use of energy as a weapon in the near future causing economic crises (Çelikpala, 2013, pp. 8-9).

Nevertheless, the “Arab Spring, the Gulf Crisis, the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine” as well as the revolutionary movements in the Middle East negatively affected the world politics after the Cold War. In this context, the importance of ports, regions and diplomatic relations increased within the frame of energy security (Yılmaz & Kalkan, 2017, p. 177).

1.1. The Concept of Energy and its Categorization

The word energy originates from Greek “*en*” and “*ergon*” referring to power, movement and work (Akbalık & Kavcıoğlu, 2013, p. 99). Energy is often defined as obtaining light or heat through using resources (Yılmaz M. , 2012, pp. 33-35). In the same vein, resource is briefly defined as “the place where energy forms and spreads” (Erkan, 2015, p. 198). In other sources, energy is also referred to as the capacity to work machines. Currently, energy sources are divided into many categories including heat, light, thermal, electric, chemical and nuclear energy sources. Furthermore, such sources are also referred to in two categories as “renewable and non-renewable energy sources” (Satman, 2006, p. 16). Since this study focuses on the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin, the subject of analysis is limited to coal, oil and natural gas as non-renewable, exhaustible sources.


Non-renewable energy sources are considered irreplaceable since their formation in the nature takes thousands or even millions of years. Among such non-renewable energy sources, coal, oil and natural gas form as a result of the reaction of animal and plant residues as well as plant residues under soil by exposure to pressure and heat in thousands of years (Çebi, 2006, p. 26).

In our rapidly developing world, almost all means of production depend on energy. Therefore, energy plays a significant place for trade and strategic relations among states. Considering the advantages of energy in economic and foreign policy issues, energy security is accepted as the most important part of national security.

1.2. Energy Sources

Humans use many resources in nature to meet their energy needs throughout their lives. However, limited resources force people to migrate to different regions in pursuit of new living space with new energy sources. In this regard, it can be observed that the types of energy used has been diversifying. Indeed, there are several studies analyzing the use of energy in various areas.¹ On the other hand, the difficulty to access energy sources and the environmental pollution caused by the energy consumed increase the importance of transfer and supply of energy (Altın, 2013, pp. 130-133). In this regard, energy sources are categorized according to their use and transformability

¹ The steam machine, the first product of mechanization that started with the industrial revolution, is the best example to energy used in different areas. Steam machine converts coal (energy source) into heat energy, and heat converts water into steam and thus the machine can be used as desired.

Table 1: Categorization of energy sources

(Koç & Şenel, 2013, p. 33)

1.2.1. Coal

Among fossil fuels, coal is one of the oldest energy sources used, and it is defined as a “sedimentary”² rock type with a flammable component such as carbon, hydrogen and oxygen. There are several types of coal including “hard coal, charcoal, lignite, peat, graphite and anthracite”. Coal generally forms underground by exposure to physical and chemical reactions for millions of years. In addition, it is known that regions rich in vegetation have higher coal reserves than other regions (Kavaz, 2019). The “International Coal Board” categorized coal into two types as hard coal and brown coal in 1957 (Taş Kömürü Raporu, 2010). More detail can be found in Table 2.

² Sedimentary Rocks: “This type of rock is formed at different times and under different conditions by physical, chemical and biological decomposition as a result of disintegration and dispersal, and accumulation in a certain place.”

Table 2: Categorization and Properties of Coals

Categorization and Properties of Coals			
Brown Coals		Hard Coals	
Lignite	Sub-Bituminous	Bituminous	Anthracite
Brown	Dull (black)	Black	Shiny (black)
Brittle, becoming powder	Becoming Powder Result of Oxidation & Drying	Block-shaped Fracture	Lenticular Fracture
Massive, woody or Clayey texture	Massive	Banded and Compact	Tough and Durable
Thermal Value: Below 4610 kcal/kg	Thermal Value: Between 4610-6390 kcal/kg	Thermal Value: Between 5390-7700 kcal/kg	Thermal Value: Above 7000 kcal/kg
The volatile substance amount and moisture content are high.	The volatile substance amount and moisture content are higher than bituminous coals.	The volatile substance amount and moisture content are low.	The volatile substance amount and moisture content are low.
Low carbon content	Its fixed carbon content is lower than bituminous coals.	High carbon content	High carbon content

(Taş Kömürü Raporu, 2010)

Coal quality depends on the density of hard or soft chemical properties in various types of coals, while the particular developments in their formation also play a role in quality. For instance, lignite is a type of soft coal with high moisture, and low

carbon, and its content is not glossy. On the other hance, anthracite is a hard type of coal with a low amount of moisture and high carbon, while its content is highly glossy (Toprak, 2020, pp. 1-3).

In general, the chemical structure and physical properties of lignite and anthracite coals are the opposite of each other. It is possible to say that lignite coal burns faster and produces less heat than other coal types. On the other hand, burning time is longer with anthracite coal. It can be said that anthracite coal has a higher quality providing more energy.

Table 3: Coal Total Proven Reserves at the end of 2018

COAL					
Total proven reserves at end of 2018					
Million tones	Anthracite and bituminous	Sub-bituminous and lignite	Total	Total share	R/P ratio
Canada	4,346	2,236	6,582	0.6%	121
Mexico	1,160	51	1,211	0.1%	89
US	220,167	30,052	250,219	23.7%	365
Total North America	225,673	32,339	258,012	24.5%	342
Brazil	1,547	5049	6,596	0.6%	*
Colombia	4,881	-	481	0.5%	58
Venezuela	731	-	731	0.1%	*
Other S. & Cent. America	1,784	24	1,808	0.2%	*
Total S. & Cent. America	8,943	5,073	14,016	1.3%	158
Bulgaria	192	2,174	2,366	0.2%	78
Czech Republic	110	2,547	2,657	0.3%	61
Germany	3	36,100	36,103	3.4%	214
Greece	-	2,876	2,876	0.3%	79
Hungary	276	2,633	2,909	0.3%	368
Poland	20,542	2,937	26,479	2.5%	216
Romania	11	280	291	*	12
Serbia	402	7,112	7,514	0.7%	199
Spain	868	319	1,187	0.1%	433
Turkey	551	10,975	11,526	1.1%	139
Ukraine	32,039	2,336	34,375	3.3%	*
United Kingdom	29	-	29	*	1
Other Europe	1,109	5,172	6,281	0.6%	189
Total Europe	56,132	78,461	134,593	12.8%	215

Kazakhstan	25,605	-	25,605	2.4%	217
Russian Federation	69,634	90,730	160,364	15.2%	364
Uzbekistan	1,375	-	1,375	0.1%	125
Other CIS	1,509	-	1,509	0.1%	358
Total CIS	98,123	90,730	188,853	17.9%	329
South Africa	9,893	-	9,893	0.9%	39
Zimbabwe	502	-	502	*	165
Other Africa	2,756	66	2,822	0.3%	164
Middle East	1,203	-	1,203	0.1%	*
Total Middle East & Africa	14,354	66	1,4420	1.4%	53
Australia	70,927	76,508	147,435	14.0%	304
China	130,851	7,968	138,819	13.2%	38
India	96,468	4,895	101,363	9.6%	132
Indonesia	26,122	10,878	37,000	3.5%	67
Japan	340	10	350	*	336
Mongolia	1,170	1,350	2,520	0.2%	46
New Zealand	825	6,750	7,575	0.7%	*
Pakistan	207	2,857	3,064	0.3%	*
South Korea	326	-	326	*	271
Thailand	-	1,063	1,063	0.1%	72
Vietnam	3,116	244	3,360	0.3%	81
Other Asia Pacific	1,326	687	2,013	0.2%	38
Total Asia Pacific	331,678	113,210	444,888	42.2%	79
Total World	734,903	319,879	105,4782	100.0%	132
Of which: OECD	322,234	177,484	499,718	47.4%	291
Non-OECD	412,669	142,395	555,064	52.6%	89
European Union	22,612	53,356	75,968	7.2%	171

(BP, 2019, pp. 44-45)

Table 3 shows the proven world coal reserves in 2018. According to the table, the US has the largest reserve in the world. It has 250219 million tons of reserves with a rate of 23.7%. Russia follows the US with a rate of 15.2% amounting to 160364 million tons. Australia is in the third place with 14.0% with 147435 million tons. China holds the fourth largest reserve in the world with 13.2% and 13,8819 million tons. Europe is the fourth with 12.8%, while India is the fifth with 9.6%. Among European countries, Germany (3.4%), Ukraine (3.3), Poland (2.5) and Turkey (1.1) hold a significant share of the reserves in the world. According to Turkey's Ministry

of Energy and Natural Resources, The existing coal reserves in the world are foreseen to last only for 134 years from 2015 (T.C. Enerji ve Tabi Kaynaklar Bakanlığı, 2020).

1.2.2. Oil

Before the discovery of energy sources, human power was used to meet energy needs. Over time, needs increased and human power was replaced by animal power. First, wood was used for primarily heating needs and this was later replaced by coal. In the 1850s, on the other hand, oil replaced coal. Today, oil is considered as the most important energy source. The ever-increasing need for energy became more evident with the onset of mechanization (Aktaş, Kayalidere, & Elçiçek, 2018, p. 358). Currently, it can be observed that 90% of the energy consumed is “primary energy sources” such as “coal, oil and natural gas”. Particularly, the oil consumption is estimated as 36% and this rate is expected to increase further as the pursuit for energy sources continues (Gürel, 1979, p. 148).

-Petra and *-oleum* in Latin form today’s term petroleum (oil) meaning oily stone. It consists of a combination of chemical elements such as carbon and hydrogen. Oil started to be used to meet individual needs Before Christ (B.C.) and it was commercially used after the 1850s (Özsabuncuoğlu & Uğur, 2005, p. 179).

Since oil is the primary energy source, its formation process is similar to coal and natural gas. In geological periods, animal and plant residues trapped in layers form as a result of breaks occurring in land fragments and become exposed to airless environment. These residues decay over time and form energy sources with the effect of heat and pressure in millions of years (Öztürk & Karbuz, 2006, p. 50).

Currently, although oil is important enough to shape world politics, it has no significance unless there are tools to use it (Ayhan, 2006, p. 17). Inventions added by technology in our lives such as bulbs, automobiles, and aircraft have increased the need for energy and made it important.

Moreover, the use of oil in the fields of medicine, transportation, textile, and heating has made oil an important political force. Its use in weapons and military vehicles has completely renewed states' war strategies. In this context, oil serves as a source of income and raw material for manufacturer Western states. Therefore, ownership of oil reserves can be interpreted as having economic, military and political power. In connection with this understanding, oil is considered as part of national security strategies of states (Yılmaz & Kalkan, 2017, p. 175). On the other hand, ownership of oil reserves does not necessarily mean oil producing in the case of a particular state. As a matter of fact, it is the Western states that produce oil in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin.

Since oil is a consumable energy source, the world energy reserves are regularly calculated by international companies based on regular updates in the given figures. Table 4 shows countries and regions with oil reserves with figures.

Table 4: Total World Oil Reserve at the end of 2018

OIL Total proven reserves							
	At end of 1998	At end of 2008	At end of 2017	At end of 2018			
	Thousand million barrels	Thousand million barrels	Thousand million barrels	Thousand million barrels	Thousand million tones	Total share	R/P ratio
Canada	49,8	176,3	168,9	167,8	27,1	9,7%	88,3
Mexico	21,6	11,9	7,7	7,7	1,1	0,4%	10,2
US	28,6	28,4	61,2	61,2	7,3	3,5%	11,0
Total North America	100,0	216,6	237,8	236,7	35,4	13,7%	28,7
Argentina	2,8	2,5	2,0	2,0	0,3	0,1%	9,3

Brazil	7,4	12,8	12,8	13,4	2,0	0,8%	13,7
Colombia	2,5	1,4	1,7	1,8	0,3	0,1%	5,6
Ecuador	4,1	4,3	3,0	2,8	0,4	0,2%	14,8
Peru	0,9	1,1	1,0	1,0	0,1	0,1%	17,6
Trinidad & Tobago	0,7	0,8	0,2	0,2	+	*	7,6
Venezuela	76,1	172,3	302,8	303,3	48,0	17,5%	*
Other S. & Cent. America	1,1	0,8	0,5	0,5	0,1	*	11,5
Total S. & Cent. America	95,6	196,0	324,0	325,1	51,1	18,8%	136,2
Denmark	0,9	0,8	0,4	0,4	0,1	*	10,1
Italy	0,6	0,5	0,6	0,6	0,1	*	16,2
Norway	11,7	7,5	7,9	8,6	1,1	0,5%	12,8
Romania	1,2	0,5	0,6	0,6	0,1	*	22,2
United Kingdom	5,1	3,1	2,5	2,5	0,3	0,1%	6,3
Other Europe	1,9	1,9	1,6	1,6	0,2	0,1%	14,1
Total Europe	21,4	14,2	13,7	14,3	1,9	0,8%	11,1
Azerbaijan	1,2	7,0	7,0	7,0	1,0	0,4%	24,1
Kazakhstan	5,4	30,0	30,0	30,0	3,9	1,7%	42,7
Russian Federation	113,1	106,4	106,3	106,2	14,6	6,1%	25,4
Turkmenistan	0,5	0,6	0,6	0,6	0,1	*	7,4
Uzbekistan	0,6	0,6	0,6	0,6	0,1	*	25,4
Other CIS	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	+	*	18,1
Total CIS	121,1	144,8	144,7	144,7	19,6	8,4%	27,4
Iran	93,7	137,6	155,6	155,6	21,4	9,0%	90,4
Iraq	112,5	115,0	147,2	147,2	19,9	8,5%	87,4
Kuwait	96,5	101,5	101,5	101,5	14,0	5,9%	91,2
Oman	5,4	5,6	5,4	5,4	0,7	0,3%	15,0
Qatar	13,5	26,8	25,2	25,2	2,6	1,5%	36,8
Saudi Arabia	261,5	264,1	296,0	297,7	40,9	17,2%	66,4
Syria	2,3	2,5	2,5	2,5	0,3	0,1%	284,8
United Arab Emirates	97,8	97,8	97,8	97,8	13,0	5,7%	68,0
Yemen	1,9	2,7	3,0	3,0	0,4	0,2%	121,4
Other Middle East	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,2	+	*	2,1
Total Middle East	685,2	753,7	834,3	836,1	113,2	48,3%	72,1
Algeria	11,3	12,2	12,2	12,2	1,5	0,7%	22,1
Angola	4,0	9,5	8,4	8,4	1,1	0,5%	15,0
Chad	-	1,5	1,5	1,5	0,2	0,1%	40,9
Republic of Congo	1,7	1,6	1,6	1,6	0,2	0,1%	13,2
Egypt	3,8	4,2	3,3	3,3	0,4	0,2%	13,6
Equatorial Guinea	0,6	1,7	1,1	1,1	0,1	0,1%	15,8
Gabon	2,6	2,0	2,0	2,0	0,3	0,1%	28,2
Libya	29,5	44,3	48,4	48,4	6,3	2,8%	131,3
Nigeria	22,5	37,2	37,5	37,5	5,1	2,2%	50,0
South Sudan	n/a	n/a	3,5	3,5	0,5	0,2%	73,4
Sudan	0,3	5,0	1,5	1,5	0,2	0,1%	41,1

Tunisia	0,3	0,6	0,4	0,4	0,1	*	23,2
Other Africa	0,7	0,7	3,9	3,9	0,5	0,2%	33,7
Total Africa	77,2	120,4	125,3	125,3	16,6	7,2%	41,9
Australia	4,8	4,2	4,0	4,0	0,4	0,2%	30,8
Brunei	1,0	1,1	1,1	1,1	0,1	0,1%	27,0
China	17,4	21,2	25,9	25,9	3,5	1,5%	18,7
India	5,4	5,8	4,5	4,5	0,6	0,3%	14,1
Indonesia	5,1	3,7	3,2	3,2	0,4	0,2%	10,7
Malaysia	3,4	5,5	3,0	3,0	0,4	0,2%	12,1
Thailand	0,4	0,5	0,3	0,3	+	*	1,8
Vietnam	1,9	4,7	4,4	4,4	0,6	0,3%	43,9
Other Asia Pacific	1,3	1,3	1,2	1,2	0,2	0,1%	12,9
Total Asia Pacific	40,8	48,0	47,7	47,6	6,3	2,8%	17,1
Total World	1141,2	1493,8	1727,5	1729,7	244,1	100,0%	50,0
of which: OECD	124,5	234,0	254,4	254,0	37,6	14,7%	26,4
Non-OECD	1016,7	1259,8	1473,1	1475,8	206,6	85,3%	59,1
OPEC	827,9	1027,9	1240,2	1242,2	174,8	71,8%	86,5
Non-OPEC	313,3	465,9	487,3	487,5	69,4	28,2%	24,1
European Union	8,7	5,7	4,9	4,8	0,6	0,3%	8,6
Canadian oil sands: Total	43,1	170,3	163,4	162,3	26,4	9,4%	
Of which: Under active development	8,4	27,0	22,0	20,9	3,4	1,2%	
Venezuela: Orinoco Belt	-	94,2	260,9	261,4	41,9	15,1%	
+	Less than 0,05						
*	Less than 0,05%						
n/a	Not available						
*	More than 500 years						

(BP, 2019, p. 14)

As can be understood from Table 3 showing the world oil reserves in 2018, statistical information reveals that the world oil reserve was 1729.7 billion barrels (1.729 trillion barrels) in the given year and the region with the highest amount of oil reserves in the world was the Middle East having 48.3% of the existing reserves amounting to 836.1 billion barrels. The region with the lowest number of reserves, Europe has only 0.8% of the world oil reserves. This rate is equivalent to only 14.3

billion barrels of the total reserve. Looking at the top three countries with the highest number of oil reserves in the world, Venezuela ranks first with 17.5% (303.3 billion barrels), Saudi Arabia second with 17.2% (297.7 billion barrels), and Canada third with 9.7% (167.8 billion barrels).

1.2.3. Natural Gas

As explained before, energy sources such as coal and natural gas form when decomposing animal and plant residues are exposed to high temperature and pressure in the depths of the earth and transformed by seas and oceans in many years (Carruthers, 2020). Natural gas is the type of energy that harms the environment the least compared to other fossil fuels. In addition, its other distinguishing feature is that it is colorless and odorless (Karakoç, 2006, p. 3).

It is estimated that the amount of natural gas found in limited numbers will continue to increase as the exploration studies to increase natural gas production yield positive results. As new natural gas production sites are discovered, significant changes should be expected in world politics. Indeed, the natural gas reserves of the countries around the world are known thanks to such discovery studies. In this context, statistics provided by international energy institutions or companies should be examined for a better understanding of the subject.

Table 5: Total World Natural Gas Reserves at the end of 2018

Natural Gas Total proven reserves							
	At end of 1998	At end of 2008	At end of 2017	At end of 2018			
	Trillion cubic meters	Trillion cubic meters	Trillion cubic meters	Trillion cubic meters	Trillion cubic feet	Total share	R/P ratio
Canada	1,7	1,7	2,0	1,9	65,4	0,9%	10,0
Mexico	0,8	0,4	0,2	0,2	6,5	0,1%	4,9
US	4,4	6,6	11,9	11,9	419,8	6,0%	14,3
Total North America	7,0	8,7	14,1	13,9	491,7	7,1	13,2
Argentina	0,7	0,4	0,3	0,3	12,2	0,2%	8,8
Bolivia	0,1	0,3	0,3	0,3	10,3	0,1%	18,3
Brazil	0,2	0,4	0,4	0,4	13,4	0,2%	15,1
Colombia	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1	3,7	0,1%	8,3
Peru	0,2	0,3	0,4	0,4	12,4	0,2%	27,4
Trinidad & Tobago	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,3	10,9	0,2%	9,1
Venezuela	4,6	5,5	6,3	6,3	223,8	3,2%	190,7
Other S. & Cent. America	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	2,2	*	18,5
Total S. & Cent. America	6,8	7,5	8,2	8,2	289,0	4,2%	46,3
Denmark	0,1	0,1	+	+	1,0	*	6,6
Germany	0,2	0,1	+	+	0,9	*	4,8
Italy	0,3	0,1	+	+	1,6	*	8,9
Netherlands	1,7	1,2	0,6	0,6	20,7	0,3%	18,2
Norway	1,2	2,2	1,7	1,6	56,8	0,8%	13,3
Poland	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	2,2	*	16,0
Romania	0,3	0,6	0,1	0,1	3,6	0,1%	10,7
Ukraine	0,8	0,8	1,0	1,1	38,5	0,6%	54,9
United Kingdom	0,8	0,3	0,2	0,2	6,6	0,1%	4,6
Other Europe	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,1	5,0	0,1%	16,2
Total Europe	5,6	5,5	3,9	3,9	137,1	2,0%	15,5
Azerbaijan	0,7	1,1	1,3	2,1	75,2	1,1%	113,6
Kazakhstan	1,3	1,3	1,0	1,0	35,0	0,5%	40,7
Russian Federation	33,4	34,0	38,9	38,9	1375,0	19,8%	58,2
Turkmenistan	2,5	8,2	19,5	19,5	688,1	9,9%	316,8
Uzbekistan	1,2	1,3	1,2	1,2	42,7	0,6%	21,4
Other CIS	+	+	+	+	1,2	*	113,1
Total CIS	39,2	45,9	62,0	62,8	2217,4	31,9	75,6
Bahrain	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,2	6,4	0,1%	12,3
Iran	22,8	28,0	31,9	31,9	1127,7	16,2%	133,3
Iraq	3,0	3,0	3,6	3,6	125,6	1,8%	273,8
Israel	+	+	0,5	0,4	14,6	0,2%	41,1
Kuwait	1,4	1,7	1,7	1,7	59,9	0,9%	97,0
Oman	0,5	0,9	0,7	0,7	23,5	0,3%	18,5

Qatar	11,3	26,3	24,7	24,7	872,1	12,5%	140,7
Saudi Arabia	5,8	7,1	5,7	5,9	208,1	3,0%	52,6
Syria	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,3	9,5	0,1%	75,4
U.A. Emirates	5,8	5,9	5,9	5,9	209,7	3,0%	91,8
Yemen	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	9,4	0,1%	480,7
Other Middle East	+	+	+	+	0,2	*	48,4
Total Middle East	51,5	73,7	75,3	75,5	2666,7	38,4%	109,9
Algeria	3,9	4,3	4,3	4,3	153,1	2,2%	47,0
Egypt	1,0	2,1	2,1	2,1	75,5	1,1%	36,5
Libya	1,2	1,5	1,4	1,4	50,5	0,7%	145,9
Nigeria	3,3	5,0	5,3	5,3	188,8	2,7%	108,6
Other Africa	0,8	1,1	1,2	1,2	41,7	0,6%	44,3
Total Africa	10,3	14,0	14,4	14,4	509,6	7,3%	61,0
Australia	1,6	2,7	2,4	2,4	84,4	1,2%	18,4
Bangladesh	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,2	5,7	0,1%	5,9
Brunei	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,3	9,5	0,1%	21,4
China	1,4	2,7	6,1	6,1	214,4	3,1%	37,6
India	0,6	1,0	1,2	1,3	45,5	0,7%	46,9
Indonesia	2,2	3,2	2,9	2,8	97,5	1,4%	37,7
Malaysia	2,4	2,4	2,4	2,4	84,5	1,2%	33,0
Myanmar	0,3	0,3	1,2	1,2	41,3	0,6%	65,6
Pakistan	0,4	0,6	0,4	0,4	12,9	0,2%	10,7
Papua New Guinea	+	+	0,2	0,2	6,4	0,1%	17,8
Thailand	0,4	0,4	0,2	0,2	6,6	0,1%	5,0
Vietnam	0,2	0,6	0,6	0,6	22,8	0,3%	67,0
Other Asia Pacific	0,4	0,3	0,2	0,2	8,8	0,1	14,4
Total Asia Pacific	10,5	15,0	18,2	18,1	640,3	9,2%	28,7
Total World	130,8	170,2	196,1	196,9	6951,8	100,0%	50,9
Of which: OECD	13,0	15,7	19,7	19,4	686,8	9,9%	13,7
Non-OECD	117,7	154,5	176,4	177,4	6265,1	90,1%	72,5
European Union	3,5	2,5	1,1	1,1	39,6	0,6%	10,3
+	Less than 0,05						
*	Less than 0,05%						

(BP, 2019, p. 30)

Table 5 demonstrates the values of the world natural gas reserves in cubic meters by countries and regions. It can be seen that the total world natural gas reserve was 196.9 trillion in 2018. An analysis of the distribution of the world natural gas by regions shows that Europe had 2% (3.9 trillion cubic meters), South and Central


America 4.2% (8.2 trillion cubic meters), North America 7.1% (13.9 trillion cubic meters), Africa 7.3% (14.4 trillion cubic meters), Asia Pacific 9.2% (18.1 trillion cubic meters), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, CIS) 31.9% (62.8 trillion cubic meters) and the Middle East 38.4% (75.5 trillion cubic meters). Based on these figures, the natural gas reserve owned by the Middle East and the Commonwealth of Independent States is equivalent to two-thirds of the world's natural gas reserve (70.3%). An analysis of the distribution of the world natural gas by countries, on the other hand, shows that the natural gas reserve of Russia, Iran, Qatar and Turkmenistan (top four countries) is 58.4% (115 trillion cubic meters) amounting to over half of the world total natural gas reserve. Russia ranks first with 19.8%, Iran second with 16.2%, Qatar third with 12.5% and Turkmenistan fourth with 9.9%.

Studies by international energy companies on when the core energy resources will be exhausted through calculating the annual energy consumption of the world energy reserves show that the results are variable. The main reason for this variability is the constant search for energy and newly discovered reserves. A detailed overview of this variability is given in Figure 1 with statistics by years.

Figure 1: Distribution of Proven Natural Gas Reserves in 1998, 2008 and 2018

Distribution of proved reserves in 1998, 2008 and 2018
Percentage

■ Middle East
 ■ CIS
 ■ Asia Pacific
 ■ Africa
 ■ North America
 ■ S. & Cent. America
 ■ Europe



(BP, 2019, p. 31)

While the proven natural gas reserve was 130.8 trillion cubic meters in 1998, it was calculated as 170.2 in 2008 and 196.9 trillion cubic meters in 2018. As can be seen from the figures, energy reserves constantly change. Accordingly, it is not known exactly in which year the consumable energy resources will be consumed totally.

1.3. Security versus Energy Security

1.3.1. The Concept of Security and its Historical Development

The concept of security is used with various meanings in different settings throughout history depending on political, social and economic developments. Although there is not an agreed definition of security, several scholars attributed different meanings to the concept:

According to Czeslaw Mesjasz, security is “*freedom from fear or anxiety*” (Mesjasz, 2004). Brauch Hans Gunter, on the other hand, defines it as the “*basic concept that corresponds to the general framework and dimensions in social sciences and adapts to individuals, subjects, social customs and changing historical conditions and situations*” (Brauch, 2008, p. 2).

In this regard, the concept of security first emerged with the defense practices against external threats through tools and equipment by primitive people. While coexistence initially enhanced security and paved the way for the spread of social life across the world, interests always formed the basis for conflict among different groups, leading to the flourishing of the concept of security. Furthermore, methods and tools used to ensure security changed over time with the effect of wars, reconciliation, peace agreements as well as technological developments. In this context, the concept of international security can also be found in BC. Indeed, this concept has a deep-rooted history prevailing until the formation of city states.

“Kadesh Treaty”, the first written treaty between Egypt and the Hittites, is one of the examples of international security that ensures border security of the contracting parties. Another example of security practices is from ancient history: The Greek Sites (city states) acted together against the powerful Persians. The “Attica Delos Marine Union”, which was founded in 478 BC by the weak Greek Sites, succeeded against the powerful Persians (Dedeoğlu, 2008, pp. 11-23).

At times when there was no independent state understanding in the world, management was provided by communities such as dynasties or civilized groups. In fact, civilizations such as China, Persia and Egypt always pursued to dominate each other. Containing many ethnic groups within itself the Roman Empire, on the other hand, used an advantage thanks to having legal norms when it comes to

administration of citizens (Kurubaş, 2015, p. 17). However, it is crystal clear that even if ancient communities united under a common administrative understanding, they still created a security system based on military power.

In this context, the discovery of underground resources paved the way for more sovereignty wars, while fostering political and economic development of societies. The discovery of iron and agricultural tools contributed greatly to economies. Furthermore, iron contributed to the development of war weapons, completely changing military policies and war strategies (McNeill, 2008, pp. 83-84). These developments in the international area diversified security practices as well as the concept of international threats. More precisely, security threats increased with the struggle for religion and power, competition in the military-economic-political field, the colonial race, the desire to control trade routes, capitalism, nuclear and chemical arms race, hunger, poverty, refugee and migration.

In medieval Europe, the fight against the so-called unreligious formed the basis of the social security system. As a matter of fact, Christians fought against Muslims to ensure trade security by taking the control of Eastern trade routes, resulting in the Crusades. These developments brought a new dimension to the concept of security with struggles for religious and political power (Dedeoğlu, 2008, pp. 24-26). European countries started geographical explorations in order to obtain products that had not existed in their lands, and they clashed with the local people in the trade routes they aspired to dominate. For many years, the desire to control the economic and military power caused colonial states to move their natural riches in Asia and Africa to their own countries causing great wars (Buzan, 2008, pp. 110-111).

From this perspective, the beginning of capitalism was marked by the geographical explorations initiated by the European states in the 14th and 15th centuries, the pursuit of sources and the struggles they had for the control of trade routes. The increasing demand for energy sources due to the industrial revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries brought all the raw materials in the colonies to Europe. Thus, class and regional discrimination emerged as prosperity spread in Europe while poverty dominated Africa. At that time, increasing population and industrialization caused global-scale security problems (Foster, 2002, pp. 13-14). In the face of this issue, hegemonic powers such as the US, Europe and Japan produced security strategies in line with their national interests. However, previously-colonized states declared their independence in the early 20th century and brought a regional dimension to the control of energy sources in accordance with their security strategies (Buzan, 2008, pp. 109-112). Due to conflicts between colonized communities and hegemonic power, World War and I broke out, marking the largest destruction in history with struggles to own energy sources across the world. On the other hand, policies implemented to repair post-war destruction changed the concept of security. In other words, it was understood that great wars should come to an end as the budget allocated to the army during the war negatively affected social life and the economy. Therefore, a peaceful structure that would strengthen international relations, ensure security and protect human rights was needed for a new world order, and thus, the “United Nations Convention” (UN) was signed in 1945. Likewise, the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (NATO) was established in 1949 to ensure peace and prevent the threat of the USSR (Bakan & Şahin, 2018). The Warsaw Pact was signed in 1955 by Soviet Russia to secure the Eastern Bloc against the Western Union. Barry Buzan suggests that as a result of these developments, the world turned into an area of

competition for the US and Russia to control power. Also, continuing the development of nuclear weapons posed a war threat (Buzan, 2008, pp. 112-113). According to realist policies implemented after World War II, world wars caused difficulty and destructive results for countries. In order to prevent such destructive activities from happening again, it was expected to ensure disarmament. However, this expectation was not met, but turned into an exacerbated arms race. In particular, the two superpowers focused on developing bombing aircrafts, long-range and nuclear weapons by developing their weapons industries. On the other hand, the struggle between the colonial states and the small nations that gained their independence continued with guerrilla and conventional weapons. Thus, those conflicts made energy the biggest fund of the defense industry. Middle Eastern countries came at the center of this competition where nuclear and chemical weapons are heavily produced (Tuna, 2003, p. 165).

The inconsistent and irregular use of sources in the wars that have been ongoing for centuries has caused an increase in economic and environmental problems. In particular, the oil crises in the 1970s extended the concept of security by adding a global dimension to such problems. Likewise, the scope of the concept of international security has been extended by addition of socio-economic and environmental issues. In this context, global threats such as damage to agricultural lands, increased hunger and poverty and migration have occurred with the increase of environmental disasters. In addition, the concept of security also included measures against terrorist attacks such as the one against the US on September 11, 2001. In this regard, organized crimes, smuggling, terrorism and religious conflicts are also included among the components of the security concept (Gürcan, 2012, pp. 71-129). In the fight against these global threats, a “collective security” approach was

established within the framework of the idea that a country alone cannot prevent such global-scale issues. This understanding of collective security revealed the need for interdependence and cooperation (Bakan & Şahin, 2018, p. 138). Consequently, the concept of security developed by the effect of global social, political, economic and environmental threats and the recent issues pertaining to cyber security, since any global issue would be impossible for one state to mitigate alone.

1.3.2. Components of Security

Throughout history, people have always sought ways to defend themselves against external factors that threaten their survival. This process started with fighting against an individual threat, however, it has expanded to the global level with multiple social threats. Furthermore, threats were only physical in the past, while today's threats are multi-dimensional, planned and strategic. More precisely, threats against states have military, political, economic, psychological, sociological, individual, social and environmental features today. As these developments imply, the understanding of security has gained different meanings over time by the effect of international actors and took a multi-dimensional shape. Indeed, this is because the extent and damage caused by violence in the developing world has never been the same. During World War II, the US used nuclear weapons against Japan. However, these tactics are now replaced by psychological, ideological and economic war tactics. It can be said that nuclear wars are replaced by new types of war since the world we live in is completely vulnerable to nuclear destruction. An example of new war types can be seen in the Cold War, where ideological threats prevailed. Here, the communist ideology of the USSR disturbed the US, causing the US to create

economic aid and development plans for European countries, the Caucasus and the Middle East. This also implies that countries' economic development level shapes how they perceive threats against their security.

1.3.3. Changing Security Perceptions

The rapidly changing world order in the century we live in diversifies the understanding of security. It can take many years to tackle problems in the face of sudden economic, political and natural events. In fact, such events are difficult to predict and hence, the relevant authorities develop regional and global plans to avoid vulnerability and negative consequences of such threats in the name of national security. In this line, the accumulation of years of work has diversified by increasing security perceptions.

Recently, one of the largest international threats is unification versus fragmentation. With technological development, communication spreads beyond borders and international organizations provide financial and other type of aid to countries. All that contributes to the understanding of unification against a certain development to ensure security, while nationalism and religious concerns cause fragmentation (Sander, 2009, p. 590).

From this perspective, the concept of security is the most important factor that determines and maintains the discipline, order and system in international relations. The concept, according to the realist and idealist perspective, is built on power and peace in international relations. Realists assume that security is defined based on power, while idealists argue that it must be defined based on peace. Since the concept

of security in the Cold War period aimed at shaping government policies and controlling economies, realists accepted the notion as “state security (Öke, 2001, p. 53).

According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “National security is a common term that includes the country’s defense and foreign affairs.” Although national security differs for countries, certain common features can be observed: Army superiority, good diplomacy relations and anti-intelligence activities (Denk, 2000, p. 2).

National security was especially at the forefront during the Cold War, shaped by the military priorities of the US and USSR. In fact, the understanding of national security started with military power competition between the two countries, while international security included political, social, economic and environmental issues. From this perspective, the largest threats against international security are listed as follows: Significant gaps in life standards among different societies of the world, increasing environmental issues and nuclear weapons that some countries hold.

On the other hand, the changing governance structure and approach in countries since World War II have also led to the formation of new threats against international security: “Migration, instability, ethnic conflicts, extreme religiousism, smuggling and terrorism”. Therefore, peace and security cannot be provided only by military initiatives, since other complex threats than military threats are now targeting national security of countries. Hence, it can fairly be stated that the concept of threat has also become multi-dimensional (Öke, 2001, p. 55).

Factors Threatening National Security:

- Terror
- Provocative Policies
- Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Cyber Attacks
- Intelligence Activities
- Organized Crime

Among these components, drug trafficking and prevention of income from public tenders which are the most important sources of income for terrorists, may be the largest step in combating terror.

It can be observed that the concept of national security has been negatively affected by the prominent regional problems in the new world order. On the other hand, unusual methods of war against terrorism and similar violent activities also contribute to the transformation of the concept of security. As a matter of fact, regional problems have made it obligatory for countries to make changes in their foreign policies, strategies and armed forces structures. More precisely, it can be observed that armies around the world are recently engaged in preventing destructive activities, as they are tasked with peacekeeping and economic aid rather than war (Özcan & Kut, 2000, p. 16).

It can be deduced from these analyses that the concept of security has evolved over time into a notion that requires countries to be a part of international organizations at global, political, economic and military levels as they would remain inefficient alone in the international system.

1.3.4. Energy Security

States prioritize their interests when defining the concept of energy security. Therefore, the definition of the concept differs from country to country and it is not possible to refer to a common clear definition (Caballero-Anthony, Chang, & Putra, 2012, p. 32). Energy security may also differ according to the development level of a given country as well as the different circumstances at different times. For instance, energy security meant providing energy at affordable prices in the past, while it now means protecting energy sources from terrorist attacks with all the relevant components. Furthermore, “energy demand security”, especially in countries with oil and natural gas deposits, while in energy dependent countries, this concept appears as “energy supply security” (Cherp & Jewell, 2014, pp. 415-418).

Although there is no clear definition of the concept, some organizations and scientists have proposed the following definitions of energy security:

- International Energy Agency (IEA) explains energy security as “the need for energy that must be obtained from uninterrupted sources at affordable prices.” (IEA, 2020).
- The World Energy Council defines this concept as “the ability of a state to provide reliable and sustainable, uninterrupted energy services to its citizens” (Davletov, 2010, p. 46).
- When the European Union defines the concept, it draws attention to the danger of energy dependence, emphasizing the need to ensure stable and abundant energy supply for EU citizens and economy” (European Commission, 2020).
- NATO defines energy security underlining uninterrupted energy supply and prioritizing the need to protect transportation routes (Energy Security, 2020).

- In the “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, the concept of energy security was referred to as “providing sufficient, stable and predictable energy sources, creating sufficient infrastructure for production, storage and development, utilizing technology in this context, establishing energy demand and supply at competitive and stable prices.”

On the other hand, certain scientists define the concept of energy security as follows:

- According to energy specialist, Daniel Yergin, energy security is “availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices” while arguing that this definition may vary by country. In this definition, Yergin also points out to the risk of depending on major powers in energy supply, the negative effects on prices on the market for less developed countries, worsening of payment conditions, as well as securing demands for countries that have energy sources (Yergin, 2006, pp. 70-71).
- Christian Winzer, on the other hand, places energy security at the center of foreign policy and draws attention to economic growth and continuity of energy.

In the light of all these definitions, energy security can be divided into three categories: “Physical energy security, economic energy security and environmental sustainability.”

- **Physical Energy Security:** This corresponds to all physical threats such as terrorist initiatives coming from various countries to energy sources, search activities, transportation, and marketing processes (Ediger, 2010, p. 46).

- Economic Energy Security: This is about supply, demand and transportation of energy. Economic energy security is divided into two categories:

a) Energy Demand Security: This is related to energy-rich countries that earn income by exporting the energy they have. Their aim is to always find buyers at high prices in the market (Selçuk, 2010, p. 32). Examples of such countries are Russia and Saudi Arabia.

b) Energy Supply Security: States supplying energy keep energy at the center of their foreign policy and economy. The main aim of countries that are foreign dependent in energy is affordable prices and sustainability (Team, 2012, s. 330). “European Union Countries (EU)” can be cited as an example of such countries.

- Environmental Energy Security: It aims to leave a better environment for future generations (T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı, 2017, pp. 193-194).

As can be observed, there are many different definitions of the concept of energy security. Scientists have pointed out that energy security varies according to country economies and the geography where they are located. In addition, physical and economic energy security are underlined the most since they are interconnected. Since energy security is a sensitive issue for all countries around the world, its importance has increased in national security and foreign policy. Particularly in the context of physical security, several problems may arise in the supply and sales of energy due to terrorist activities. At this point, international actors are needed to implement deterrence policies to address any such issue.

Overall, it can be stated that countries that are rich in energy sources aim to find buyers with high prices within the framework of demand security, and countries that have to import energy aim to find sellers at an affordable price within the

framework of supply security. On the other hand, other countries such as Turkey have a significant place in energy supply and demand by acting as transit countries in line with their strategies.



CHAPTER II

2. GEOGRAPHICAL, CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN THE CAUCASUS AND THE CASPIAN BASIN REGION

2.1. Geographical Location

The Caucasus region is geographically located in the northern hemisphere on the latitudes 40-45 and on the longitudes 37-50 in the East. The Black Sea is in its west, and the Caspian Sea in its east. It starts from the Taman Peninsula in the West where the North and South Caucasus Mountains are located and extends to the Absheron Peninsula in the East (Berkok, 1958, p. 2). The Kuma and Kuban rivers are located on the northern border of the Caucasus region. In addition, the Manic Region, where there are many lakes around the Don and Volga rivers, is considered to be its northern region (Saray, 1988, p. 7). On the southern part, Iran and important rivers such as Çoruh, Arpaçay-Aras are located.

As a geographical area, the Caucasus Mountains constitute the most important part of the Caucasus region. These mountains consist of two mountain ranges as the Northern or Great Mountain Range and the Southern or Smaller Mountain Range. The length of the Great Caucasus stretching from North to South is 1,200 km. The mountains' most important feature is that they have a height of over 5,000 meters. These mountains are Elbrus (5.642 meters), Dintau (5.203 meters), Kostantau (5.144 meters), Pushkin (5.100 meters), Shhara (5,068 meters) and Kazbek (5,033 meters). In addition, there are 2,200 glaciers in the mountains, and they cover an area of 1,424 km² (Owen, 2019). The mountain range known as the Little Caucasus is 600 km long

and forms the southern part of the region. Alagöz Mountain, with a height of 4,090 meters, is the highest mountain in the southern part of the region.



(Kantarıcı, 2006, p. 10)

The Caucasus region is divided into three regions within itself: The first one, the “Step Caucasus” region, is suitable for agriculture, located between the Don and Volga rivers, while the second one is the “Greater Caucasus Mountains” region and the third is the “Transcaucasia” or “Lesser Caucasus” consisting of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (Ayan, 2010, p. 22).

In the region, the main source of life is undoubtedly water. In the primitive ages, people settled on the water’s edge to sustain their lives. Indeed, the Egyptian Civilization settled on these lands as the Nile River basin country. In the Caucasus geography, the Nile River is composed of many glaciers at the summit of the Caucasus mountains and some streams that flow into the Azov, Caspian and Black Sea, fed by snow covering a large area. The main rivers flowing into these seas are:

Kuban, Kuma, Sulak and Terek rivers. These rivers have a high flow rate in many valleys in the north, east and west of the region. The fact that the valleys are quite deep has enabled the locals to use it as a safe shelter for a long time (Berkok, 1958, p. 4).

Although the Caucasus region has a temperate climate, the average annual precipitation is 1000 mm. For this reason, there are forests formed by many linden, beech, chestnut, oak and pine trees in the mountains. Various animals such as bears, foxes, deer, cattle and mountain goats live in the forests of the region. Lakes and rivers in the region are rich in trout.

The Caucasus mountains are rich in natural energy and mineral sources. There are mineral deposits such as coal, lead, iron, zinc and important energy deposits such as oil and natural gas (Owen, 2019).

The North and South Caucasus mountains have been a great obstacle for the tribes who wanted to migrate due to their height, hard curves and lush forest structure since ancient times (Kalkan, 2007, p. 47). Despite these obstacles, there are many gates in the Caucasus Mountains. However, only two of these gates are now available. These are “Daryal” and “Derbent” gates or passages.

The history of the Daryal passage dates back to a thousand years (circa BC. IV). The Daryal Passage runs along the north-south direction starting from the city of Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia, to the city of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. The passage, which Russians call the “Georgian Military Road”, is 228 km long.

Another important passage in the north-south direction is the Derbent passage. Located on the shore of the Caspian Sea, this passage is 2 km long. Apart from these, there are about 70 other pathways in the Caucasus region (Saydam, 1997, p. 15).

Although the Caucasus mountains provide a natural defense opportunity in terms of military due to their physical structure, they prevent peoples of the same ethnic and cultural background from uniting (Saydam, 1997, p. 14). Yet, as it is a safe zone, different communities that escaped from invasions throughout history continued their culture by living together in the valleys here.

The fact that the communities living in the North and South Caucasus geographies have different cultural backgrounds and speak different languages is the most evident proof of the division of the Caucasian geography. Considering the history of the region, it has not been part of any state other than the Khazar Khaganate as a whole (Açma & Yenişen, 2013, p. 135).

The Caucasian geography is close to Turkey, Iran and the Russian Federation and thus, it is a strategic transport and trade route for these regional powers (Kantarıcı, 2006, p. 29). While the region forms an important transition corridor between Europe and the Middle East in the east-west direction, the North-South connection is also provided through this region.

2.2. Cultural Background

Although there is no clear information about what the word Caucasus means, there are various opinions about the origin of the word in studies published at different times.

The name Caucasian was first used in the work “Chained Pleasure and Entertainment” written by the Greek author Aischylos in BC 490. The author expressed the word Caucasia as “Mount Kaukasos” (Kırzioğlu, 1998, p. 79).

According to Azeri researcher and author Nadir Mammadov, the origin of the word Caucasian goes back to earlier times. In Memmedov’s work “*Place Names in Azerbaijan*”, the following expressions are given: “The term Caucasus was first used in BC 6-5., and found as “*kavkosos*” in the work of Eshil, a Greek scientist who lived in the same century.” The Greek historian Herodotus also mentioned the word Caucasian in his work “*Istoria*”. Eratosfen, one of the ancient Greek historians, just used the name “*Kaspios*” instead of *Kafkasa Azeridi* (Yıldız, 2006, p. 23).

When the meaning of the word Caucasian is investigated, it appears in different meanings in various languages. For instance, the word “Caucasus”, which is a combination of the words “qas” and “kovat” (“clan” and “to forge metal”) in Slavic languages, means “country of mountains with people forging metal”.

The word Caucasian is derived from the words “Qaz”, “Qravan” and “Kuh-Kasp”, meaning “shining”, “rock” and “Kaspi Mountains” respectively in the Sanskrit language. In other words, the word “Caucasus” means beautifully shining snow and glaciers on the summit of mountains (Yıldız, 2006, p. 23).

In today’s literature, it is stated that the word Caucasus is a combination of the words “Qaf” and “Qas”, which mean “mountain” and “tribe” respectively, referring to “the mountain where the Qas tribe lives”.

In this context, when Georgia came under Russian rule in 1801, Russians put effort to make their presence felt in the region and used the old name “*Kavkasos* or

Kavkasus” instead of the current name of the region “*Qafqas*” (Kırzioğlu, 1998, p. 4).

Due to the geography they live in, the Caucasian people have been influenced by various tribes and civilizations throughout history. Considering the historical background of the region, it is known that many civilizations lived there in addition to the local people. With the combination of Caucasian peoples, Turkish tribes (Bulgarian, Hun, Kipchak, Khazar, Alan), Western colonies (Roman, Byzantine, Greek, Genoese) and various civilizations contributed to today’s Caucasian culture (Tavkul, 1997, p. 140).

Another feature of the Caucasian geography is that it hosts many communities from different ethnic origins. Indeed, it is one of the peculiar characteristics of the region that different communities with different languages, religions, races and cultures coexist in the same geography. The impenetrable, hard and declivitous structure of the mountains provided protection against invasions and even prevented the invading tribes from returning their home and forced them to settle in the region. Hence, there is no easy access due to the mountainous and wetlands of the region. Therefore, the communities that settled in the region throughout history have fused with each other over time. Moreover, the impenetrable physical structure of the mountains has prevented the different ethnic elements living in the region from coming together. Therefore, there is no question of assimilation of ethnic elements based on power struggles.

Various sources provide information about 300-350 different languages spoken in the Caucasian basin. European researchers who conducted detailed research and investigation on the subject gave information that at least 40 languages are

spoken in the region (Baddeley, 1995, p. 22). The existence of a large number of communities speaking different languages in the region confirms the thesis of Arabs saying “*Cebel ’ül-Elsine*” or “*Mountain of Languages*” for the Caucasus (Grigorianz, 1999, p. 176). These languages are generally categorized in four main groups: Old Caucasian, Indo-European, Turkish and Semitic.

There are also other languages belonging to smaller ethnic groups in today’s Caucasus. One of them belongs to one of Caucasian native groups, the “Yasefi”. Although Yasefis are a relatively smaller ethnic group with their own language, they have survived in the Caucasus for many years. Another nation that has survived for many years in the Caucasus is Armenians belonging to the group of Indo-European tribes. On the other hand, Georgians are the most populous people in the Caucasus. The presence of Turks and Russians in the region is not as old as other tribes. Ethnic groups living in the Caucasian region can be shown as follows:

- Ethnic groups that make up the Turkish peoples living in the region: “Kumyks, Nogais, Kalmyks, Karachays, Balkars, Karakalpaks, Kundurs and Azerbaijanis.”
- Other ethnic groups living in the region are: “Circassians, Abazas, Chechens, Ingush, Avars, Laks, Dargis, Lezgins, Ossetians.”

There are different races and languages as well as different religions in the Caucasus Basin. These religious beliefs can be listed as follows: “Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Barhmanist and Magi (Yıldız, 2006, p. 23).”

Nations can be represented according to their religious beliefs as follows:

- Christianity: Russians, Abkhazians, Ossetians, Georgians and Armenians

- Judaism: Khazars
- Islam: Azerbaijanis, Balkars, Laks, Ingushs, Dargins, Avars, Karachays
Lezgins, Circassians, Chechens and some parts of Georgians.

Considering the Caucasus region in general, it can be stated that although there are various languages, religions and races, there are also common social and economic ties that make up the Caucasian culture (Grigorianz, 1999, p. 178)

2.3. Economic Structure

The Bolshevik Revolution that took place in Russia in 1917 led to certain political, social and economic changes in the neighboring geography. Under the communist regime, the Planned Economy Model principle was adopted. According to this model, production facilities in the republics of the Soviet Union were determined. It was made sure that the goods already produced were not also produced in other republics. This restriction was intended to making the republics dependent on each other since they could find products only in one country not in others.

The Planned Economy Model left deep marks on the Caucasus with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Indeed, with the collapse of the Soviets, the newly independent states experienced severe economic problems. The inter-republic dependency, created by the economic model applied in the Soviet period, became dysfunctional. All these developments led to the economic collapse in the newly established countries in the region.

In this context, the centrally-planned economic system in the North and South Caucasus Region was replaced by a market economy. However, the economic

transformation brought ethnic conflicts, instability and many other problems to the region. Moreover, production came to a standstill as a result of consecutive wars in the region (Acar, 2009, p. 39). Especially the North Caucasus, where industrialization and agriculture are very low, survives with the support of the Russian Federation. Unemployment rate hikes in the region.

In this line, the economic structure of the Caucasus region started to alter following the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the autonomous republics in the North Caucasus continued their existence under the roof of the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia in the South Caucasus became independent actors in the international system.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, three states in the South Caucasus were negatively affected by the economic transformation. Azerbaijan tries to overcome these negativities by using its underground sources. Since Georgia does not have valuable underground sources, it evaluates its geographical position and cooperates with neighboring countries. It has a very important port opening from Central Asia to the world market. Poti port in the Black Sea is one of the most important sources of income for the Georgian economy. On the other hand, Armenia has not developed its foreign trade sufficiently due to its unsuccessful foreign policy towards neighboring countries. The Armenian economy has become dependent on Russia.

2.4. Political Structure


The Caucasus region consists of the North and South Caucasus. The North Caucasus consists of seven autonomous republics affiliated with Russia. In addition, it

is located in the southeast of Russia, with the Caspian Sea in the east, the Black Sea in the west and the Azov Sea in the northwest. The northern border of the region is surrounded by the Manich River and the southern border by the southern line, which is supposed to extend from the Samur River, which flows into the Caspian Sea, to the Ingur River, flowing into the Black Sea (Ateş, 2013, p. 165). The South Caucasus is located in the south of the Patara Enguri River. The geography of the Caucasus is politically divided into two as “Ciscaucasia” and “Transcaucasia”. It is important in political terms that the west of the region is Europe and the east is Asia (Ayan, 2010, p. 22). In short, the northwest of Asia forms the southeastern border of Europe and is located between Asian-European continents.

Although North and South Caucasus are accepted as the name of the geography, it is observed that these concepts are discussed in various branches of science. Geographers may have allowed the name of the region to be included in the literature as North and South Caucasus with a simple definition considering the coordinates. However, political scientists object to this notion. Turkish Languages Researcher Prof. Dr. Ufuk Tavkul explains his objection as follows: *“When the North Caucasus is mentioned, the so-called autonomous Adige, Karachay-Circassian, Kabardin-Balkar, North Ossetia, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan Republics that are within the borders of the Russian Federation come to mind.”* The South Caucasus consists of the Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, Abkhazia, Adjara, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhichevan Autonomous Republics and the South Ossetia region. However, the names of the North Caucasus-South Caucasus are made up at the desk and do not fit the historical, ethnic, sociological and cultural realities of that region. Scientifically speaking, there is actually only one Caucasus, which is today called the North Caucasus by many circles. However, this designation is not

sufficient, either. The reason for this is that Abkhazia and South Ossetia – which are politically affiliated with Georgia today – are part of the Caucasus in ethnic and cultural terms, and they have been included in the Caucasus throughout history. In this line, the term South Caucasus is completely fictitious. The real name of this region in the literature is “*Trans-Caucasus*”. The names of “*Zakavkaz*” given by the Russians, “*Transcaucasus*” given by the British, “*Trans-Caucasia*” given by the Ottomans and Arabs do not mean South Caucasus, but Trans-Caucasus (Tavkul, 1997, p. 11).

Figure 2: The South Caucasus Map



(The South Caucasus Map, 2016)

The South Caucasus or Transcaucasia region is composed of three independent countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. There are also four autonomous regions in the same geography. Two of them are Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh

autonomous regions, which are subordinate to Azerbaijan de jure. The other two are the Adjara and South Ossetia autonomous region, which are connected to Georgia.

Figure 3: The Northern Caucasus Map



(The Northern Caucasus Map, 2017)

The North Caucasus consists of Georgia and 7 autonomous republics that form the northern border of Azerbaijan. These are: Adygea, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingsushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan are the autonomous republics.

2.4.1. Political Structure in the North Caucasus

2.4.1.1. The Autonomous Republic of Adygea

The Republic of Adygea was first established on July 27, 1922 under the name of “Adygea-Circassian Autonomous Region” after the Russian civil war. Its capital was Krasnodar when it was founded. Later, when Krasnodar became a state, Maikop became the capital of the Republic of Adygea (Bukvic, 2016, p. 20).

Figure 4: The Northern Caucasus Conflict Zones



(The Northern Caucasus Map, 2017)

In the dusty pages of history, it has not been seen that the name Circassian was used for any other people except the Caucasian peoples. The term Circassian is used for the Kabardinians, Shapsugs, Besleneys, Abkhasia and simply all peoples who speak the Adyghe language. For example, the Ottomans used the name “Akvam-ı Çerakise” to refer to all of the Caucasian people.

As a result of the work done by ethnographers, it is seen that Circassians are divided into two groups. These are Kabardinians and Adygea. There is no information about how long the Circassian people have been living in the Caucasus. On the other hand, there are different theories about their origins. Although they did not lose anything in terms of language, religion or culture, they could not establish a state (Grigorianz, 1999, p. 180). The Muslim Circassian people in the North Caucasus maintain their existence in the “Adyghe, Karachay-Circassian and Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republics” today.

The Autonomous Republic of Adygea has a weak economic structure. The backwardness of the country and its weak economy have been continuing since the time of Soviet Russia. Indeed, Russians have been running most of the administrative work in the republic.

2.4.1.2. *The Karachay – Circassian Autonomous Republic*

The capital of the Karachay-Cherkessia Republic is the Cherkessk city located in the northwestern Caucasus. Ethnic groups in this republic include “the Karachay, Kabardino, Besleney, Abkhasian, Nogai, Russian, Ossetian, Armenian and Ukrainians” (Özdemir, 1999, pp. 13-15).

Figure 5: Karachay-Cherkessia Republic



(Karaçaymalkar, 2014)

After the Russian civil war, Circassians established a state in the North Caucasus under the name of “North Caucasus” or “Mountainous”. The Republic was soon divided into two as “Dagestan” and “Mountainous”. Over time, the struggle for independence of other ethnic groups started to yield results and the separations continued. Firstly, two autonomous regions, Ingush and North Ossetia, were established in place of the Mountainous Republic in 1924. Secondly, the Karachay-Circassian Autonomous Region was established in 1928 by the merger of two provinces in the region.

Circassians were exiled to Central Asia and Siberia on the grounds that they helped the German army towards the end of World War II. Therefore, the region lost its autonomy. Circassian people, who had been exiled during the Stalin period, could only return to their homeland during the Khrushchev period. Under these conditions, the region regained its autonomy as Karachay-Circassian.

Today, Circassians maintain their existence in six regions of Russia: Karachay – Cherkessia, Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai regions (Tsutsiev, 2014, pp. 143-144).

2.4.1.3. *The Autonomous Republic of Kabardino – Balkar*

The majority of the population of the Republic, whose capital is Nalchik, consists of Kabardians (45%), Russians (10%) and Balkars (10%) respectively (Özdemir, 1999, p. 129). The rate of Turkish speakers in Kabardino and Balkars is 46% (Yıldız, 2006, p. 55).

The regions of Kabardino and Balkaria, which became a part of Russia after the October Revolution of 1917, were united with the victory of the Bolsheviks. The region was named the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Region in the Russian Federation in 1922. In 1936, its name and status were changed to the Russian Federation Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. With the exile of the Balkars to Central Asia in 1944, its name was changed again and Kabardin was transformed into the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. With the Balkars who returned to their homeland in 1956, the name of the region took its final form as the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic (Yemelianova, 2005, p. 54).

Figure 6: The Autonomous Republic of Kabardino – Balkaria Map



(BBC, 2011)

2.4.1.4. *The Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia*

Located in the middle of the North Caucasus, North Ossetia is neighbors with Ingushia in the east and Kabardino-Balkaria autonomous regions in the west. The region is mostly populated by Christians in addition to Muslims. Ossetians are cultured people with a high level of education. In addition, they speak two different languages “Digor” and “Iron” (Grigorianz, 1999, p. 178). The capital of the republic is Vladikavkaz and its population consists of Ossetians (66%), Russians (22%), and Ingushs (5%). As a result of the conflicts between Muslims and Christians in 1991, 30,000 Muslims took refuge in neighboring Chechens and Ingush. The major factor in the strategic importance of the region is the Darial Gorge (Darial Pass) between Vladikavkaz and Tbilisi.

Figure 7: The Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia



(BBC, 2016)

2.4.1.5. *The Autonomous Republic of Chechnya*

Grozny (Caharkala) is the capital of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya, and 58% of the people living in the region are Chechen and 23% are Russian.

Chechens are considered indigenous people of the North Caucasus. There are nearly twenty dialects spoken in the region. The people of the region call themselves “*Nohchi*” in the local language and their country as “*Nah coy*”. “*Nohchi*” means “*our people*” in the local language (Grigorianz, 1999, p. 185).

After the Bolsheviks took power, the Chechnya Autonomous Region was established in 1922. Later, in 1934, it was united with the Ingush Autonomous Republic and then in 1936 it was promoted to the status of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic (Yıldız, 2006, p. 68). Exiled to Siberia and Kazakhstan from their homelands in 1944 for collaborating with Germans, Chechens returned from exile in 1957.

Figure 8: The Autonomous Republic of Chechnya Map



(BBC, 2011)

Although Chechnya became independent in the early 20th century, its development in the historical process has been very painful. Russians wanted to eliminate Islam in the Caucasus lands, yet they encountered the resistance of Sheikh Shamil in Chechnya in 1859. Soon, the resistance was suppressed. Similarly, Russian bloody repressions continued in 1861, 1864, 1877 and 1878. Even though Chechens were given an autonomous region permission in 1922, there was no such permission regarding faith, and the struggle against Islam continued. Between 1920 and 1930, the Chechen alphabet was changed, the prominent Islamic clerics were tortured, and the Chechen people were eventually exiled in 1944. In 1957, they were allowed to return to their countries with certain restrictions in politics, education, economy and social fields (Campana, 2006, pp. 129-148). Chechens, who lived under these restrictions

and pressure, demanded full independence by protecting their language, religion, culture and identity in the early 1990s. This demand resulted in a bloody war between Russians and Chechens between 1994-1996 and 1999-2008 (Askerov & Vatchagaev, 2020, pp. 153-179). Chechnya still exists today as one of the Autonomous Republics of the Russian Federation.

Oil and natural gas constitute a large part of Chechnya's source of income as the country is rich in underground resources. It is also known that mineral water sources are abundant in these lands.

2.4.1.6. *The Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia*

The capital of Ingushetia, located between North Ossetia and Chechnya, was changed to "Magas" in 2002 (Hille, 2010, p. 286). Chechens and Ingus belong to the same nation and have been divided into two branches over time. Ingush calls themselves "Lamur", meaning "those who live in the mountains" in the local language. Russians call the Ingushs "Mountain Chechens". The Ingush, who were Christians and animists before the 1860s, later became Muslims (Grigorianz, 1999, pp. 170-171).

There are still uncertainties and problems regarding land integrity in certain regions of the North Caucasus. Due to both political and economic reasons, mergers and divisions are experienced in land plots from time to time. For example, Ingushetia and Chechnya were united between 1917-1924 and again divided between 1924-1934. The two provinces were divided again between 1934-1944. The Ingush were subject to mass exile with the Chechens towards the end of World War II by Josef Stalin

(1944-1956). Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev took office after Joseph Stalin and provided those who were exiled with amnesty and they could return to their homeland. Thereupon, Ingushetia and Chechnya were reunited between 1957-1991 (Jimenez, 2008, p. 12). The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was divided into the Republic of Ingushetia and the Chechen Republic following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Figure 9: The Autonomous Republic of Ingushetia Map



(BBC, 2018)

The Republic of Ingushetia is not located on a large territory, but has a high population density. The source of income of the economically poor republic is based on animal husbandry.

2.4.1.7. *The Autonomous Republic of Dagestan*

The capital of the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan is Makhachkala.

Makhachkala is the only port of Russia in the Caspian Sea that is open year-round.

Dagestan is surrounded by the Caspian Sea in the east, Chechnya in the west,

Kalmykia in the north, Stavropol Krai in the northwest, Azerbaijan in the south and Georgia in the southwest (Walker, 2000, p. 1).

The majority of the ethnic groups previously living in Russia now lives in Dagestan (Ibragimov, 1991, p. 136). Indeed, over thirty ethnic groups are living in the region. 14 languages are spoken in the region with the support of the government. More than 98% of the population of Dagestan is made up of people speaking these languages. The rate of people who receive state support in speaking these languages is given below: 29% of Avars, 16.9% of Dargins, 14.8% of Kumyks, 13.2% of Lezgians, 5.5% of Laks, 4.5% of Azerbaijanis, 4% of Tabasarans, 3.6% of Russians, 3.2% of Chechens, 1.4% of Nogays, 1% of Rutuls, 0.9% of Aghuls, 0.3% of Tsahurs and 0.004% of Tats (Rozanova & Yarlykapov, 2014, p. 28).

Figure 10: Dagestan Map



(Uyar, 2021)

Agriculture, stockbreeding and fishing make up most of the economic source of income of the Autonomous Republic of Dagestan. The Republic is also rich in underground resources, since there are significant oil and gas deposits.

2.4.2. The Political Structure of the South Caucasus

2.4.2.1. *The Republic of Georgia*

Located in the Southern Caucasus Region, the capital of Georgia is Tbilisi. Georgians constitute the majority of the population with 69%. The rest are Armenians (9%), Russians (7%), Azeris (5%), Ossetians (3%) and other nations (7%). Georgians are known as the indigenous people of the Caucasus like Chechens (Pamuk, 1995, p. 134).

Figure 11: Georgia Map



(Djibladze, 2021)

Since Georgia remained under Russian rule for many years, it came together with two other South Caucasus countries such as Azerbaijan and Armenia and established the “Transcaucasian Federal Republic” after the revolution of February 1917. This union dissolved one year later, when the Georgians established an independent state on May 26, 1918 and came under German protection. The country was occupied by the British with the defeat of the Germans at the end of World War I. However, Georgia was officially recognized by the Allied Powers in January 1920. One year later, on February 21, 1921, the Red Army captured Georgia under the leadership of Stalin and Anatoliy Gekker, and ensured that it was under the protectorate of the Soviets. In 1936, the status of Georgia was changed to the “Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic” (Karabayram, 2011, pp. 59-62).

The reforms that took place in Soviet Russia in the last years of the Cold War led to historical changes. Taking advantage of these reforms, Georgia both declared its independence in 1991 and became a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Today, there are three autonomous republics within Georgia. These are: “The Autonomous Republic of Adjara”, “The Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia” and “The Autonomous Republic of South Ossetia”.

2.4.2.1.1. The Autonomous Republic of Adjara

The Autonomous Republic of Adjara, whose capital is Batumi, is located in the southwestern region of Georgia and has a coast to the Black Sea. The Adjars

constitute the majority of the population in the region, and they have adopted the religion of Islam (Yalçinkaya, 2006, p. 97).

The major ethnic group living in the Autonomous Region of Adjara consists of Georgians (including Adjars) (93.4%). The rest of the population consists of Russians (2.4%), Armenians (2.3%), Greeks (0.6%), Abkhaz (0.4%), Ukrainians (0.2%) and other ethnic groups (0.2%).

Figure 12: Adjara Map



(Etheredge, 2018)

Adjara was united with the Democratic Republic of Georgia, an independent state, after its liberation from the British occupation in 1920. However, when the Red Army became the winner of the Soviet-Georgian war that took place in 1921, the region was annexed to Soviet Russia. Since the majority of the population living in

Adjara is Muslims, it became the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Adjara on July 16, 1921.

Adjara maintained its status as in other parts of the Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It became an autonomous region connected to the Republic of Georgia. Nevertheless, it built relations with Turkey in order to prevent economic influence of Georgia (Gürses, 1998, p. 167). Due to its location, it has an important place especially in opening Kazakh and Turkmen oil from Batumi Port to the world market.

2.4.2.1.2. The Autonomous Republic of South Ossetia

The capital of South Ossetia is the city of Tshivali. Its population consists of Ossetians (66%) and Georgians (29%). It forms the southern part of Ossetia, located between the Great and Small Caucasus mountains.

Figure 13: The Autonomous Republic of South Ossetia Map



(All World Wars, 2008)

The People of South Ossetia demanded to unite with North Ossetia in 1989. However, this demand resulted in a harsh response from Georgians, responding with military action and they declared that South Ossetia abolished its autonomy. On the other hand, South Ossetia continued to resist and declared its independence in November 1990. After Georgians responded for the second time, 200 thousand Ossetians in the country had to migrate to the North. In June 1992, as a result of the Russian-Georgian negotiations, the Sochi (Dagomys) agreement was signed and the conflicts came to an end. However, the desire of South Ossetia to become a part of Russia by uniting with North Ossetia caused the political crisis to continue for many years (Kasim, 2001, p. 71).

The fate of the region finally turned into a war in 2008 with the participation of Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia. The war resulted in Georgia losing control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Currently, there are two administrations in the region: On the one hand, the South Ossetian administration supported by the Russians, on the other hand, the administration representing the Georgian government. While the center of South Ossetian administration is “Tskhinvali”, the center of Georgian administration is “Kurta”.

The Republic of South Ossetia is recognized by the Russian Federation, Venezuela, Nicaragua and the Republic of Nauru.

2.4.2.1.3. The Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia

The Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, the capital of which is Sokhumi, is a region legally bound to Georgia. In geographical terms, Georgia has a coast to the

northwest and the Black Sea. Since the Adygians come from the same root, they are also called the Abkhaz-Adige peoples. Abkhazians are a Muslim community by faith. The population of the republic consists of the Abkhaz (18%), Georgian (44%), Russian (14%), Armenian (14%), Turkish (4%) and Greek (3%).

Abkhazia was brought under control by the Bolsheviks in 1919, after the October Revolution and in 1921, it gained the status of the Autonomous Soviet Republic. The region was later annexed to Georgia in 1936 according to Article 25 of the then Soviet Constitution (Tanili, 1976, p. 591).

Figure 14: Abkhazia Map



(Zeidan, Lotha, Tikkanen, & Etheredge, 2020)

As a result of the Abkhaz-Georgian war that took place in 1992, the Abkhaz unilaterally declared independence in 1994, thus the region received its current status. Although Abkhazia is not recognized by the United Nations, it is recognized by the countries of Russia, Syria, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. The Abkhaz people comprise only 18% of the ethnic groups living in Abkhazia due to the exile and assimilation policies since World War I.

2.4.2.2. *The Republic of Armenia*

Yerevan is the capital of Armenia, the smallest republic that left the Soviet Union. Armenia is a landlocked country and its neighbors are Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran and Georgia. Its population consists of Armenians (98%), Yazidis (1.3%) and Russians (0.5%).

Figure 15: Azerbaijan and Armenia Maps



(Al Jazeera, 2020)

With the collapse of Tsarist Russia, violent separatist movements took place in the region. Following the end of World War I, the Transcaucasia Federal Republic was established by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, however, it was dissolved after a short while. Armenia was occupied by Russia in 1920 after the Bolshevik Revolution. With the Constitutional amendment in 1936, Armenia continued its existence in the USSR under the status of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. With the dissolution of the Soviets, it declared its independence in September 1991. The population of the country is 2,969,900 as of 2020.

Developments in the years of the collapse of the Soviets had positive effects on the countries that gained their independence. As a result of ongoing reforms, the foundations of democracy began to be laid in countries that gained their independence after the dissolution of the USSR. Within this framework, multi-party elections were held for the first time in Armenia in 1990. As a result of the popular vote, Armenia declared its independence in 1991. At the same time, the people of Armenia started demonstrations to annex the Nagorno-Karabakh region to its lands. As a result, Azerbaijan-Armenia relations deteriorated. The Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan was occupied by the Armenian army in 1992. Although the reason is not yet clear, the two countries fought again in July 2020. Armenia lost Karabakh at the end of this war.

Armenian economy is based on agriculture and industry. The lands in the regions where the Aras river passes contribute significantly to the agricultural economy. Although the country has a terrestrial climate, a desert climate is also seen. In this line, the country's climate is suitable for growing various grains and fruits. On the other hand, with the abundant mineral reserves, production is made in the fields of machinery, chemical and textile industries. Yet, the deteriorating relations with

neighboring countries are ultimately causing a significant amount of investment in the military rather than improving the welfare of people (Cabbarlı, 2004, p. 76).

2.4.2.3. *Azerbaijan*

Due to its geographical location, Azerbaijan has the Russian Federation in the north, Iran in the south, the Caspian Sea in the east, Armenia in the west and Georgia in the northwest. In addition to this, the geographical location of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan, which is the territory of Azerbaijan is as follows: Armenia in the North and West, Iran in the South, and Turkey in the East. Between Azerbaijan and the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan, Armenia is located. Azerbaijan and Turkey are the two neighboring countries due to Nakhichevan. The capital of Azerbaijan is Baku.

Figure 16: Azerbaijan Map



(Howe, 2021)

The population of Azerbaijan consists of Azerbaijanis (91.2%), Lezgins (2.2%), Russians (1.8%), and Armenians (1.5%). The Armenian population lived in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. However, as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh War that took place in July 2020, the Armenians left the region.

The Nagorno-Karabakh region was legally regarded as Azerbaijani territory during the Soviet Union period. However, Armenia also claimed rights in this region due to the Armenian people living there. The Azerbaijani people living in the region were forced to migrate after the collapse of the Soviet Union, suffering genocide by the Armenian Army. Therefore, the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which constitutes

approximately 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory, was under Armenian occupation between 1994-2020. Azerbaijan was the winner of the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in July 2020.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Transcaucasia Federation established between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia dissolved after a short while. It is known that the reason for the breakup was the movements of ethnic nationalism (Swietochowski, 1988, p. 147). After the collapse of the union, Azerbaijan declared its independence in 1918 under the leadership of the Musavat Party (Gürses, 2001, p. 257). However, Azerbaijan was invaded by Russia in 1920 and joined the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. With the collapse of the Soviets in 1991, it regained its independence.

Azerbaijan is the most developed country of the Caucasus thanks to its underground resources. Along with its economic structure, the country's strong political stability has a great role in achieving this development. The most important source of income for the economy is oil and natural gas.

2.4.2.3.1. The Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan

Although it is annexed to Azerbaijan, Nakhichevan does not have any land connection with Azerbaijan. Nakhichevan is surrounded by Armenia in the north and the east, and Iran in the south and the west. It also has a 13-kilometer border with Turkey in the west. The capital of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan is the Nakhichevan city. The ethnic structure of the region generally consists of Azerbaijanis (95%), Russians and Armenians (5%).

Figure 17: Nakhichevan Map



(Azadlıq Rədiosu, 2014)

There are some important agreements in the background of Nakhichevan being the Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan. Indeed, they signed the Treaties of Moscow and Kars, to which Turkey is a party, as well. The main reason for these treaties is to ensure border security in the countries of the region. The Moscow Treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and Turkey in Moscow on March 16, 1921. The Kars Treaty was signed by Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in Kars city of Turkey on October 13, 1921. According to Article 3 of the Moscow Treaty, Nakhichevan was given the status of autonomy and annexed to Azerbaijan. In the Kars Treaty, the resolutions of the Moscow Treaty were accepted as they were and the status of Nakhichevan became clear. With the amendments made in the Constitution of the Soviet Union in 1924, the name of the Autonomous Region of Nakhichevan was changed into the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Nakhichevan. The

Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh Region was secured by the 1936 Constitution (Tanili, 1976, p. 591).



CHAPTER III

3. ENERGY SECURITY IN THE CAUCASUS AND CASPIAN BASIN REGION

3.1. Policies of Global and Regional Actors for the Region

With the end of World War II, world politics began to re-shape. States needed to become powerful actors in international relations in order to survive. The precondition for becoming a powerful state is to have advanced political, military and economic mechanisms and to be able to direct global politics. As a matter of fact, the concept of “power” in international relations is defined as “the ability to direct other states”. Therefore, psychological warfare methods began to be used after World War II instead of the classical warfare methods used in preceding wars. These methods are aimed entirely at developing strategies for national security. These strategies are often based on political, military and economic cooperation. In addition to cooperation, actors also produce alternative strategies to eliminate competitors with the aim of protecting their personal interests. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Caucasus and Central Asia hosted this strategy game. The main reason for this is that energy as the raw material for manufacturing industries is located in this geography. Having 60% of the world’s energy, this geography has become the target of global actors over time.

According to Friedrich Ratzel and Halford Mackinder, who work in the field of geopolitics, the geography of the Caucasus and Central Asia is the center of the struggle for global sovereignty. The US, one of the global actors trying to survive in the region, believes that the heart of the “New World Order” is dominating this geography. On the other hand, the main policy of Russia and China towards the

region is to act within the framework of common strategies to eliminate the US in the region. Hence, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the most evident proof that these two states are acting together. The European Union does not want to experience energy shortages in the near future, and their policies towards the region are entirely related to the security of energy supply. Turkey's policy towards the region is to make its presence felt in the region and to take part in the global area where there are states of Turkish origin (Aktürk, 2010, p. 20). In addition, one of the countries shaping global politics in the region is Iran. Iran aspires to gain political and economic power by ensuring that energy pipelines that will transport energy to the West pass through its country in line with its policy to prevent the US presence in the region.

3.1.1. US Policies towards the Region

In the book "War and Change in World Politics" by Robert Gilpin, an expert in political science, it is understood that the change in the international system occurred as a result of 'hegemonic wars' (Gilpin, 1981, pp. 186-189). As a result of the permanent damage left by the two world wars in 1918 and 1939, the world was divided into two poles as the US bloc and the USSR bloc, and moved into psychological warfare. With the collapse of the USSR, on the other hand, the perception of the New World Order was created by several people known for their traces in world history. During the Gulf War, the term-US President George H.W. Bush said the following to refer to the new world order: *"It is the end of the bipolar system that defined the international system, and the emergence of a complex multipolar and multicenter system in which the United States is the dominant but not the only power."* In the same vein, important theses opening up discussion on how the new world order will shape include *"The End of History"* written by famous political

scientist Francis Fukuyama and published in 1989, and “*Clash of Civilizations*” written by renown political scientist Samuel P. Huntington and published on Foreign Affairs in 1993.

The most important element for becoming an important actor in the New World Order is undoubtedly economic power. Production is essential for obtaining economic power, and energy source is essential for production. Therefore, global and regional actors have strategies and policies for the Caucasus and Central Asia, which have energy sources rich in oil and natural gas.

The US meets the majority of its need for energy by oil from the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the US has to search new energy sources due to its energy consumption increasing every year, and therefore, they have opted for new strategies in this regard. Indeed, the American government supports American companies that want to operate oil and gas energy deposits internationally (Gürpınar & Kesici, 2005, p. 165).

In this context, the strategic goal of the US for the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin region – which is rich in oil and gas deposits – is to prevent the region from being under the control of a single state. However, the presence of multiple states, such as Russia, China and the EU that want to dominate the region jeopardizes this strategy of the US. The US can probably fight any of these states with its strong army, yet its chances are quite low when two or three states unite against it (Nogayeva, 2011, p. 5).

Nevertheless, it has been impossible for the US to continue its presence in the region without using military force due to reasons such as the presence of supranational organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the

region, China's advanced economy, Russia's nuclear power and the EU becoming increasingly independent (Efegil, 2000, pp. 187-188).

The US wants to maintain its position as a world power by dominating Eurasia based on the idea that *"Whoever gains control of Eastern Europe, controls the Heartland, and whoever controls the Heartland, can easily gain control of the World Island"* given in the Heartland Theory of Sir Halford Mackinder, British scholar famous for his geopolitical theories (Kılıçbeyli, Sochineva, & Sochnev, 2021, p. 220). Mackinder's Heartland Theory can be briefly summarized as follows: *"The whole of Asia, Europe and Africa continents make up the world-island. Continents such as America, Australia and Antarctica, which are outside these ancient land masses, constitute the Satellites of the World-Island. Eastern Europe and Siberia, within the World Island, form the "Heartland" of the world. The area extending from the Balkans around the Heartland to China is the "Inner or Marginal Crescent" or "Rimland" Belt. Other than that, the America-Africa-Australia-Japan line is accepted as "Outer or Insular Crescent" or "Satellites of the World Island."* Following his categorization of the world as such, Mackinder concludes his theory as follows: *"A state that rules Eastern Europe will dominate the Heartland. If it rules the Heartland, it first rules the Inner or Marginal Crescent or Rimland. Then the Outer or Insular will dominate the Crescent, that is, the whole world."* (Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality A Study In The Politics of Reconstruction*, 1919, p. 97; Mackinder, 1904, p. 423). The US foreign policy is based on its desire to control regions rich in energy sources, critical straits, important passages and transportation routes. Thus, the Caspian Basin's strategic location and security are important for the US in line with its national interests (Kılıçbeyli, Sochineva, & Sochnev, 2021, p. 220). To continue its existence in the region, the US has bilateral cooperation relations with Turkey in

addition to Russia and Iran. It believes that the route of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey is essential in order for energy resources to reach Europe safely. Furthermore, the US sometimes uses the regional issues for its interests when necessary (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 40). However, the US has not been able to put an end to the strategies of regional powers in the Caspian Basin as planned. Additionally, it has not been able to implement stability policies and reforms in the region despite being in the position of a country that distributes democracy to the world (Somuncuoğlu, 2006, s. 39).

3.1.2. Russia's Policies towards the Region

Rich in natural energy resources, the Russian Federation has a completely economic and strategic policy towards the Caucasian region. Since it has sufficient amount of energy reserves, Russia does not need the energy in the Caucasia. However, it aspires to become an important actor in the delivery of oil and natural gas by the countries in the region to Europe (Olson, 2002, pp. 111-115). More specifically, Russia wants to ensure that energy pipelines pass through its lands and reach Europe by taking control over the countries in the region. Thus, it aims to take political and economic advantage by making countries needing energy depend on Russia (Gazigil, 2006, p. 105). Moreover, Russia has expanded its influence in foreign policy by spreading to Central Asian countries as well as the Caucasus region. Although the countries in the region have high trade volumes, Russia has significant economic investments in the region. Most of these investments are in the field of hydroelectric power plants and gas industry (Jafalian, 2003, p. 55).

In this context, Russia has made joint energy investments with the Caucasus and Central Asian countries. The main reason for this is to make its presence felt in

the countries of the region and to prevent the spread of external forces. Thus, Russia is able to direct the domestic and foreign policies of these countries to take individual interests by making them dependent on itself. The first example of Russia's large investments in the region took place on July 25, 2000 with the merger of three major companies, Lukoil, Yukos and Gazprom, to establish the Caspian Oil Company (Purtaş, 2006, pp. 169-170). Russia established the Eurasian Association of Gas Producers (EAGP) in January 2002, creating a joint area of cooperation that includes Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. By this means, Russia managed to make its presence felt in the region.

Russia's complex post-Cold War political structure began to improve during the Putin era. After OPEC countries started to implement the 'campaign to limit production' at different times, Russia was able to turn the existing crisis into an opportunity by increasing energy production and making it explicit that there was a Russian alternative to the Middle Eastern energy (Stulberg, 2005, p. 8). Such acts by Putin remind us of a 2009 book by British author and civil engineer Andrew Wolstenholme, as well as a phrase that is popular in politics: "*Never Waste a Good Crisis*".

Two of Russia's largest competitors in terms of natural gas are Iran and Turkmenistan. Russia has pursued different policies towards these two countries to maintain control over energy and managed to eliminate its competitors in the energy market thanks to several agreements. In this regard, the 25-year natural gas agreement between Russia and Turkmenistan signed on March 10, 2003 is critical (Vasánczki, 2011, p. 8). According to the gas purchase agreement concluded as a result of political pressure, Russia purchased \$300 billion-worth natural gas for a 25-year period and exports it to European countries for a profit of two to three times of this digit. Thus,

Russia has managed to take control of Eurasia by temporarily blocking EU plans seeking an alternative to Russian natural gas. However, the EU does not want to depend on Russia in terms of energy, and thus, they have produced projects such as TANAP (Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project) to transport Turkmen natural gas to Europe by following a fairly determined policy on ensuring the security of energy supply (Kaya, 2019). Although Russia's efforts to make the countries of the region dependent on itself were successful in Turkmenistan, it did not succeed in gaining oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan until 2005. Indeed, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan wanted to act independently in the field of oil exports, and implemented the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project in 2005 with the support of the United States (Akgül, 2007, p. 136; Stulberg, 2005, pp. 10-11; Winrow, 2005, p. 92). In recent years, however, it can be observed that the relations of these states with Russia have strengthened. Russian oil company Lukoil's \$9 billion investment in Kazakhstan in 2019 shows strengthening bilateral relations (Anadolu Ajansı, 2019). Russia has also proven that it fully dominates the Caucasus and the Caspian region by making various agreements with other regions. Russia's famous company Gazprom signed a 5-year gas purchase agreement with Uzbekistan in 2017 (Dünya Newspaper, 2021). Similarly, Russia has taken control of the countries around the Caucasus and has shown that it is an important actor in delivering natural gas to Europe by starting to ship gas to both Turkey and Europe in January 2020 with the project TurkStream (NTV, 2021). In May 2014, the governments of Russia and China signed a 30-year natural gas agreement with the 'Power of Siberia' project (Gazprom, 2021).

In short, Russia – both a global and regional power – is observed to take advantage of the crises that the newly independent countries experienced after the Cold War and benefit from their energy reserves by making these countries depend on

it through long-term agreements. In different years, it has managed to make the countries of the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin directly dependent on itself, while the EU also became partially dependent on Russia. Russia's agreement with China on the 'Power of Siberia' pipeline is purely for economic purposes against rival pipelines built in Europe.

3.1.3. EU Policies towards the Region

The main policy of the EU towards the Caucasus region is related to the economic and security related dimensions of energy. The oil and gas resources in the region constitute the "economic" dimension of the EU's policy towards the region, while the issue of transporting energy constitutes the "security" dimension. It is known that the EU's policy towards the region is only related to Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia in the South Caucasus. This thesis is also supported by the EU projects such as the "European Neighborhood Project" launched in 2002 and the "Eastern Partnership" launched 2009, since these projects included only the above-mentioned three states among the Caucasian and Caspian Basin countries.

The foundations of the EU's policies towards the Caucasus region are based on the "Partnership and Cooperation Agreement", which entered into force in 1999. The aim of the agreement is to assist development in economic and technical matters. TACIS (Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States) mediates the financial affairs of the agreement (Çakmak, 2004, p. 141).

On 15 April 2002, the EU also laid the foundations of the "European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)" in order to strengthen bilateral relations between non-

European Union countries with its expansionist policy. The name of this initiative at the 2421st Council Meeting. The most important agenda item of the meeting was, “Wider Europe: Relations Between the Future Enlarged EU and Its Eastern Neighbors” (European Council, 2002, p. 10). The aims of the initiative can be listed as follows: “To promote bilateral relations, consolidate security and cooperation, eliminate borders between enlarged Europe and its neighbors, and ensure political, economic and cultural cooperation” (Barbe & Johansson-Nogues, 2008, pp. 90-91).

Within this scope, it was decided at the meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations of the European Union on June 14, 2004 that Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia in the South Caucasus should be included in the ‘Neighborhood Policy’ (Arman, 2011, p. 45).

In 2009, the EU launched a new initiative called the ‘Eastern Partnership’ to address the discrepancies and problems that may arise in the neighborhood policy, including the countries of Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia (Schäffer & Tolksdorf, 2009, p. 2). As an example of discrepancy, it can be observed that the ‘action plan’ in the neighborhood policy refers to territorial integrity for Azerbaijan while referring to self-determination in the action plan for Armenia. Hence, confidence in the European Union Neighborhood Policy has been weakened.

On the other hand, one of the EU’s important policies towards the region is “security”. Although the geography of the EU is poor in terms of fossil energy sources, it is among the most energy-consuming countries in the world. Almost a quarter of EU energy consumption is covered by natural gas (BP, 2019, p. 9). According to 2017 Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) figures, the EU

covers 37% of its imported natural gas and 30% of its oil from Russia (Kakışım, 2019, p. 461). Being dependent on a single country with such high figures endangers the EU's energy security. Due to their proximity, the South Caucasian countries seem to be the most advantageous alternative energy import for the EU. Nevertheless, Russia's policy of direct and indirect rule over the countries of the region complicates the EU's efforts. Therefore, the EU has to ensure stability in the countries of the region by making institutional, political and legal reforms in these countries, ensuring that the administration is freed from Russian influence. In this way, the EU's energy agreements with the countries in the region will be an alternative to Russian energy, and the agreements concluded will be long-term, ensuring the EU's energy supply security. Otherwise, if the infrastructure of Caucasasia is not intact and if there is no stability, this would give the impression that the administration is not reliable and there might emerge problems at any moment. For this reason, such a weak administration would threaten the EU's energy supply security, while also cause continuing its dependence on Russia in energy supply.

Another policy of the EU towards the Caucasus region is related to its economy. In this regard, the EU has developed various projects on this subject such as:

- TACIS (Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991)
- TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia, 1993-)
- INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe, 1996-2016).

TACIS: This is a project to help countries that dissolved from the Soviet Russia. Currently, support is provided to twelve member states in areas such as education, energy, transport and food. The main aim of the project is to enable

member states under the influence of socialism to adopt the free-market economy understanding by helping them in transitioning to a Western-type liberal regime (European Union, 2001, p. 10). In brief, the EU puts effort to modernize the region so that the relevant countries become fully independent countries. In this way, the EU will increase its energy security.

TRACECA: This project, also referred to as the Great Silk Road project, was established within the scope of TACIS with the aim of improving Europe-Caucasus-Asia or East-West transportation route. The project covers all transportation areas such as land, air and sea (Mercan, 2012).

INOGATE: It is a project developed to safely transport oil and gas to Europe along the East-West route within the scope of TRACECA. The main aim of the project is to strengthen regional cooperation and play an important political role in the construction of oil and gas pipelines to transport these energy sources to Europe (Ayhan, 2009, p. 163).

3.1.4. China's Policies towards the Region

China has the second largest economy in the world after the United States, and ranks first in exports. In addition, China has become a production center for the world and ranks the first in the world in oil and natural gas imports (Oktay & Cerrah, 2018, pp. 24-26).

China's economic growth plan began in 1978 with foreign trade and reform policies. This policy by China increased its energy consumption by 245% by 2004. During this time, its energy production increased by only 194% (Ata, 2008, p. 86). As

the industry continues to develop, it is seen that China's national energy sources do not meet the need in productions for exporting. Considering China's growth rate, it can be said that its need for energy will constantly increase (Brzezinski, 2005, p. 222)

On the other hand, the Russian Federation has become the center of the oil and gas distribution network with its monopolistic pressure on the Caucasus and Central Asian countries. This is considered one of the biggest threats to the Chinese economy. It can be uttered that the Russian Federation has indirectly made China dependent on itself by controlling alternative countries and transport routes where China can meet its energy needs.

However, China has made oil and gas agreements with various countries around the world to ensure energy supply security and not depend on Russia. For example: (Güneş, 2006, p. 41)

- Kazakhstan – China Oil Pipeline (1997) (Kazakhstan-China Pipeline, 2019)
- Central Asia – China Gas Pipeline (2009) (Gazprom, 2021).

Another policy of China towards the region is to break the US influence in the region. Aspiring to maintain its world leadership in imports, the Beijing administration is concerned that the United States is controlling the energy routes in the Middle East. Therefore, China believes that it is safer to turn to Central Asian and Caucasian energy. For his reason, it cooperates with Russia to break American influence in the region when necessary (Pamir, 2003, pp. 110-113). An example of such cooperation is:

- Power of the Siberia (2014) (Gazprom, 2021)

Another policy of China towards the region is to ensure stability. In a sense, China is considered a neighbor with the region. Located in the northwestern region of China, the “Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region” is located in Central Asia. Therefore, it also has to deal with the Central Asian region, where a significant part of its territory is located (Soligo & Jaffe, 2004, p. 6). The possible spread of ethnic problems that may occur in Central Asian countries to the region where Uighur Turks live could result in disaster. Such a scenario could put China’s energy supply and national security at risk.

In this line, economy is the basis of the Chinese government’s policies. However, China’s national energy sources remain insufficient in meeting the needs emerging as a result of production increasing every year. Furthermore, this insufficiency falls short in actualizing the desired economic growth. As stated before, energy is the most important source of production and has also shaped China’s foreign policy. Hence, China has concluded various agreements and developed many projects with the countries of Central Asia, the Caspian Basin and the South Caucasus in order to obtain energy, ensure its security, and not become dependent on another country for energy. Additionally, China has developed various projects such as “One Belt One Road” and “Silk Road” to open up to the European market. It does not support the unstable structure, separatist nationalist movements and the struggle for independence of ethnic races in order to ensure the security of energy and trade routes in the Central Asia and Caucasus region. Shortly, China has two main policies for the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin region. First is to move energy sources in the region to its own country and produce projects to ensure the security of these routes. Second is to ensure that the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin are China’s gateway to Europe.

3.1.5. Iran's Policies towards the Region

Iran's policy towards the region is entirely based on the countries of the South Caucasus. The reason for this is that Iran sees the North Caucasus as an internal matter of Russia.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus region reshaped Iranian foreign policy from a historical, cultural and geopolitical point of view. The three Caucasian countries that declared their independence after the collapse of the USSR brought with them threats and opportunities. On the one hand, the Republic of Iran sought to increase its power in the region by taking advantage of such opportunities, and on the other hand, it developed pragmatic and status quo strategies to eliminate threats that could damage its territorial integrity (Aydın, 2013, p. 229).

The South Caucasian region constitutes the economic and security dimensions of Iranian foreign policy. One of the countries in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan is important in terms of security for Iran, while Georgia and Armenia are important in terms of economy. The possibility of the "Great Azerbaijan Project" mobilizing 30-40 million Azerbaijani Turks living in the north of Iran is an important security problem that threatens Iran's territorial integrity. Iran's policy towards Armenia in the region is purely an economic policy. Armenia is stuck in the region due to its relations with neighboring countries, yet it can open to the world through Iran in the South and Georgia in the North. Making good use of this opportunity, Iran has started energy investments in Armenia. Iran's policy towards Georgia is similarly economic. In this regard, Iran wants to open up to the world market by reaching Georgia via Armenia and then to the Black Sea (Aslanlı, 2017, pp. 31-33).

However, after Azerbaijan took back the “Nagorno-Karabakh” region in 2020, the possibility of actualizing the “Great Azerbaijan Project” has become higher, increasing the level of the threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. Russia perceived the size of the pipeline to be used in the “Iran-Armenia gas pipeline” project as a threat and pressured Iran on this issue. Thus, Iran was forced to reduce the diameter of the pipeline and is now at odds with Russia. As a matter of fact, a large-scale pipeline that Iran will use can be extended in the future and delivered to Georgia, and from there to the European market via the Black Sea. The realization of such a scenario would constitute an alternative to Iranian energy for the EU and an energy security problem for Russia. In contrast, Iran and Russia are cooperating in developing policies that will prevent the US presence in the region.

3.1.6. Turkey’s Policies towards the Region

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey wanted to strengthen bilateral relations with the Caucasus region, where it felt culturally close. The EU and the US supported Turkey to become a powerful actor to prevent Russia and Iran to control the countries in the region. However, Turkey was not ready strategically and economically for this role, resulting in it not being effective enough in the region.

Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Caspian Basin region, which became the center of the New World Order after the dissolution of the Soviets, should be based on the following foundations: (Davutoğlu, 2004, p. 181)

- Ensuring the delivery of rich energy sources in the countries of the region to international markets through Turkey,

- Acting as a corridor in the Caspian region as an alternative source of energy for European countries that depend on Russia,
- Ensuring Turkey's energy security and increasing the strategic importance of the country by acting as a bridge between Europe and the Caspian Sea (East and West),
- Creating a Turkish hinterland by further developing our economic and cultural ties with the countries in the region.

Transportation and marketing of oil and natural gas in the Caucasus and Caspian Basin are at least as important as their production. Due to its proximity to the region, Turkey has an advantage over Western countries in terms of energy supply. Therefore, Turkey is a very strategic country both for the Caspian Basin and the European Union countries. It has to produce many alternative policies to ensure long-term economic growth and continuity in meeting the growing energy needs by taking advantage of its strategic location.

The fact that the majority of the peoples living in the countries of the region are of Turkish origin facilitates the goals that Turkey will implement and plan for the region. In determining these policies, it should not be ignored that the countries in the region were part of Russia in the past, and good relations should be established with Russia.

On the other hand, the fact that Turkey acts together with the United States in its policy towards the Caspian Basin causes a reaction of the regional powers – Russia and Iran (Ekici, 2015, p. 335). Since Turkey, unlike the US, is a regional state, it should get along well with neighboring countries. It must have an oil and gas pipeline

project that will go from Iran to European Union countries in order to resist possible US sanctions on Turkey and to take advantage of Iran's rich energy resources.

One of Turkey's policies towards the countries in the region is to examine the region as a whole. However, Turkey needs to develop separate strategies for all the relevant countries in the region (Birsal, 2007, p. 37). Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are competing states in oil and gas projects and their transportation in the Caspian region. In this regard, while Turkey developed relations with Azerbaijan, it has ignored the other two countries. Such problems in Turkey's policies towards the region constitute the gaps in its energy policies.

The opening of energy sources in the Caspian Basin to international markets especially in the last 15 years, has further increased the importance of the region. In this regard, Turkey is actively using the "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline" (BTC) and "Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline" (BTE) projects to meet its energy needs. European countries, on the other hand, use the "Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline" (TANAP) project to meet a significant part of their energy needs. The TANAP project provides Europe a great advantage in energy by reducing its dependence on Russia, and has also attracted the attention of other Caspian countries who want to open their energy to international markets. These projects provide important opportunities to increase the diversity of energy transfer between East and west of Turkey.

3.2. The Problem of Stability in the Countries of the Region

As stability continues in the Caucasus and Caspian Basin countries, the flow of oil and gas will continue uninterrupted. In other words, ensuring stability in the countries of the region means that there is energy security. As long as the stability environment continues, Caspian energy can be seamlessly exported to Europe through Turkey, independently of Russia. In this way, all countries that export, import and transport energy will receive revenues, while Russia will be prevented from having a monopoly on energy. Yet, it cannot be said that the stability environment has been fully achieved in the countries of the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin. The reason for this is that the new republics that gained independence with the dissolution of the USSR have brought many problems (Devlet, 2006, p. 97).

3.2.1. The Dagestan Issue

Dagestan is a troubled region located in the North Caucasus. It is the most complex region of the Caucasus since it hosts a wide variety of ethnic groups. Indeed, it is not possible to maintain control in the region, which contains more than thirty ethnic groups.

The Republic of Dagestan is an unstable region due to competition for superiority between the two leading ethnic groups in terms of population density, the Avars and the Dargins, as well as many other factors. The struggles of the Avars and Dargins for dominance angers other ethnic groups and causes tension. In addition, fourteen ethnic groups govern with Russian support and this causes other ethnic groups to demand autonomy, which is another source of instability (Safeworld, 2012, p. 5).

Due to the large number of ethnic groups in Dagestan, territorial division does not seem possible. As a matter of fact, the expression of such a demand could cause a reaction throughout the country. For example, Kumyk citizens who cannot take place in administration demand autonomy, while other Kumyk citizens who are in administrative roles want to remain in Russia. Therefore, these differing wishes eliminate the possibility of autonomy (Bugajski, 2014, p. 37). Likewise, the Dagestan administration also opposes the Dargins, who demand autonomy.

Dagestan is rich in natural gas and its economy runs through the support of Russia. There is no hot conflict in the Republic, which is of strategic importance due to its coast to the Caspian Sea. Energy sources carried from the Caucasus to Europe have further increased the importance of the region. However, the region's potential for conflict also puts its energy security at risk (Kantarci, 2006, p. 160).

3.2.2. The Nagorno-Karabakh Issue

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had been a territorial issue between Azerbaijan and Armenia continuing for 30 years. The problem, based on a fairly deep-rooted past, ended with Azerbaijan taking Nagorno-Karabakh that had been under the occupation of Armenia in November 2020. However, since the issue was not resolved through diplomatic means, it is highly probable that it will threaten the security of the region for many years to come. The fact that the conflict and unstable environment will continue will negatively affect not only Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also Turkey and all of Europe.

On the other hand, oil and natural gas transported to Europe from the Caucasus and Caspian Basin countries is provided by multibillion-dollar pipeline projects. Thus, the fact that Azerbaijan and Armenia are two unstable neighboring countries and that their conflict has not been resolved by diplomatic means endangers the security of the above-mentioned pipelines. With a possible attack by Armenia on the pipelines, Europe, and especially Turkey, will be left without energy. If Europe's energy supply security is at risk, this will also give rise to the problematic concept of "Security of Supply and Demand in International Trade". Hence, energy security, which is apparently simple but could have catastrophic consequences in practice, needs to be reconsidered in the context of this issue.

3.2.3. The Abkhaz-Georgian Issue

As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, an unstable period began, especially with the ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus region. Georgia, one of 15 countries that seceded from the Soviet Union and gained independence, has faced many problems after its independence such as the failure of state institutions to function properly, ethnic conflicts and weak authority (BBC, 2019).

After Georgia gained its independence, it intervened in the region using military force against the separatist movements that began in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 1994, Russia placed troops in the region under the name of "peace force" to ensure security, allowing the two sides to sign a peace agreement.

Mikheil Saakashvili, who became head of the government in 2003, adopted a policy strategy that was completely far from Russia, with becoming members of the

EU and NATO among his primary goals. Upon this development, Russia increased its support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and consequently, the Tbilisi administration was disregarded in the independence referendum held in South Ossetia in 2006. After Georgia broke the ceasefire in 2008 and attacked South Ossetia, the Russian army waged war against Georgia. At the end of the eight-day war, a ceasefire agreement was signed between Russia and Georgia. On August 26, 2008, Russia became the first country to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states (Çalışkan, 2016). In short, it can be argued that the Abkhaz desire for independence is the basis of the Georgian-Abkhaz dispute. Although Abkhazians act as a fully independent state due to the recognition of several Latin American countries, as well as Russia, Georgians express that their territorial integrity continues. Therefore, the region is still considered disputed today.

3.2.4. The South Ossetia Issue

The geography of Ossetia had been divided throughout history and its status did not change during the Soviet Union, either. One part was annexed to Georgia in 1922, and another part was annexed to the Soviet Union in 1925. After the collapse of the Soviets, North Ossetia was included in the borders of the Russian Federation, while South Ossetia remained within the borders of Georgia (Mert, 2004, p. 60). As an alternative source of energy for Western states rather than depending on Russia, Georgia is the only country where Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Caspian oil and gas can be opened to international markets. Russia, therefore, is afraid of losing its energy-dependent economic and political superiority and it is creating a country profile that threatens energy security by supporting internal turmoil in Georgia. Thus,

if Georgia cannot ensure energy security due to its unstable structure, it will have no significance for Europe (Özçelik & Zandaradze, 2020, p. 174).

3.2.5. The Chechnya Issue

Chechnya is located on a critical position connecting the Eastern and Western Caucasus. Important land roads, railways, and energy pipelines such as oil and natural gas pipelines pass through the territory of Chechnya. For this reason, Chechnya is of great importance to Russia and for the world in general and it is at the center of all transport routes (Tanrısever, 2001, pp. 180-182). Clashes in the region and attacks on pipelines threaten energy security. Moreover, sabotage attempts on pipelines have a serious negative impact on energy supply security from the perspective of importing countries.

In this context, Chechnya is also one of the troubled and unstable countries in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, separatist demonstrations were organized by the Chechen people, who wanted independence. As a result of the incidents, the first Russian-Chechen War took place in 1994. The main reasons for the dispute between Russians and Chechens included the resentment against the Russian administration that wanted to protect their territorial integrity, the privileged position of Russians living in Chechnya, and the fact that Chechens wanted to have more control over economic resources (Özçelik S. , 2015, p. 360). For similar reasons, the second Russian-Chechen War took place in 1999. The Moscow administration pursued policies against Chechens' demands of independence.

The Chechen people responded to the pressure they felt due to the Moscow administration's policies against their demand of independence with attacks on energy pipelines. Not only have the Russian and Chechen leadership been negatively affected by these developments, but they have also greatly negatively affected countries that want to ensure the security of energy supply and demand.

3.2.6. The Iran Issue

The whole world felt anxious when many powerful intelligence services around the world, especially the United States and Israel, announced the news that Iran was working to develop nuclear weapons. The intelligence was later supported as the Tehran administration announced in 2006 that they were enriching uranium. In this line, Iran's nuclear weapons development project has raised the level of tension between the United States and Iran to a dangerous level. This crisis, which poses a threat to international security, was included in the final declaration of the 5th summit of the D8 (Developing Muslim States) held in Bali on May 13, 2006. In line with national interests, no country has directly supported Iran, but has fully supported its peaceful development of nuclear energy and continuation of its membership of the World Trade Organization. Hence, the embargoes imposed to stop Iran's nuclear program have been insufficient. As a result of pressure from Western countries, negotiations were held with Iran for a nuclear program with the participation of the five permanent members of the "United Nations Security Council (UNSC)" and Germany (5+1). As a result of these negotiations, Iran accepted some restrictions imposed on it, and also approved an audit by the "International Atomic Energy

Agency”. In this way, Iran’s nuclear work would continue under European control, and the embargoes imposed on Iran would be eased (Ünal, 2015, p. 2).

On the other hand, Iran’s nuclear development activities have a negative impact on the US policy of expansionism in the Middle East. That is why Iran has a very important place in the Middle East policy of the United States. Iran’s nuclear project posed a security threat to many countries of the world, as well as the United States. On the other hand, the United Nations Security Council intervened in the situation in 2006 and managed to keep Iran on the legal line. Later, the United States imposed an embargo on Iran, alleging that Iran was secretly developing nuclear weapons. After Iran announced that it would continue to develop nuclear weapons despite the embargo, the US-Iran relations were completely severed.

On January 4, 2021, Iran announced that it would develop uranium at the level of 20%. Upon this announcement, an article under the title, “Russia Considers Iran’s Decision To Enrich Uranium as a Weapon” was published, where political scientist Stanislav Tkachenko, professor of St. Petersburg State University interpreted that “the developments were used by Iran as a tool of pressure on the United States, to increase Tehran’s influence in international politics” (ORSAM, 2021, p. 22). Therefore, Iran, which is politically, economically and militarily targeted by the United States, poses a great threat to the countries of the Caucasus, the Caspian Basin and the Middle East.

3.2.7. The Kazakhstan Issue

Kazakhstan declared its independence from the Soviet Union as an unstable and troubled country. On the other hand, as one of the rapidly developing countries in

with its underground resources, Kazakhstan gave priority to welfare and social development. In a short time, the country's economy was stabilized and its welfare level increased. In addition, the country managed to make a name for itself by taking important steps in the field of democracy (Kaletaev, 2009, p. 145).

Although energy sources contribute greatly to the country's revenue, Kazakhstan still experiences sensitive security issues. The presence of a significant number of Russian population in the country has led to problems arising with nationalism. The government has difficulty trying to achieve a permanent balance between the Kazakh and Russian populations. As a matter of fact, the Russian population within the country is a very important factor in shaping domestic and foreign policy.

Another problem in Kazakhstan is that although it has large territory, its population rate is not high (Kocaman, 2018, p. 161). The basic problem here is that large land security cannot be adequately provided due to a lack of population. In addition, agricultural lands dry and lose function due to the lack of population to undertake farming activities.

The pollution of the Caspian Sea, Lake Aral and other surrounding water sources that feed Kazakhstan cause desertification and erosion while nuclear tests also lead to environmental problems, which altogether increasingly deteriorate quality of life in the region (Yüksel, 2010, p. 2).

3.2.8. The Turkmenistan Issue

Turkmenistan ranks 4th in the world in terms of natural gas reserves, while also having significant amount of oil reserves. Due to US sanctions against Iran and international pressure, Turkmenistan sells most of its natural gas to Russia. However, the Ashgabat administration is uncomfortable with looking like a country that supports Russia as a result of its energy agreements with Moscow. Although prosperity has been achieved in Turkmenistan thanks to energy revenues, there is a serious water stress in the country. The water needs of the country are met by the thousand km-long Kara-Kum Channel and Ceyhun River. Another country that meets its need for water from the Ceyhun River is Uzbekistan. The fact that Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are using the same water source may cause a crisis between the two countries in the near future. In addition, the tensions caused by the small number of Uzbek minorities living in the country negatively affect the relationship between the two countries (Devlet, 2006, p. 110).

3.2.9. The Uzbekistan Issue

Uzbekistan is one of the troubled and unstable countries in Central Asia. Although it does not have a good form of government, it is the most populous country in the region. Bribery has become widespread in society and local governments have weakened central authority, causing the country's internal problems to increase.

Basically, the conflicts of interest resulting from the policies of the countries that are part of the territory in the "Fergana Valley" are one of the important reasons that push the countries to instability. Considering the post-Soviet history of

Uzbekistan, it can be seen that radical Islamic movements such as the Uzbek-Kyrgyz conflict in the “Osh” region in 1990 and the “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” (ÖIH) in 1999 are among the most important examples of instability (Demirtepe & Özkan, 2010, p. 54).

Separatist conflicts in the region, international terrorism and drug trafficking activities are seen as sufficient reasons for global powers such as the United States, Russia and China to focus on the region after the September 11 attacks (FEWER, 2021).

3.2.10. The Kyrgyzstan Issue

After Kyrgyzstan declared its independence in 1991, it experienced serious political and economic problems. The country faced a high amount of foreign debt, instability, poor political authority, and coups with popular uprisings in 2005 and 2010. As a result of the developments, Kyrgyzstan became the first country among the Central Asian countries to adopt the parliamentary system. According to the World Economic Forum’s 2014-2015 competitive index data, Kyrgyzstan’s political instability is at the level of 20.2%, corruption at 17.4%, unstable policies at 13.1%, inefficient bureaucracy at 8.6% and insufficiently trained labor force at the level of 6.2%. However, it ranked 106th out of 144 countries and was shown in the category of problematic countries (SİTSO, 2018).

Kyrgyzstan is poor in terms of underground resources. In relation to this fact, foreign aid, foreign remittances and borrowing from abroad determine the framework of the country’s economy. The fact that the unemployment rate is 21% manifests the

poverty level very clearly. Already fighting poverty, the country's economy has turned into a social catastrophe due to the outbreak of the novel Corona Virus (Covid-19) (Çalışkan, 2016). Consequently, the current economic problems in the country have also negatively affected political and social life, creating an unstable structure.

3.2.11. The Tajikistan Issue

Tajikistan declared its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it is now the most troubled country in Central Asia. The civil war that began after independence caused a large number of casualties. The backwardness in the country sometimes affects its neighboring countries, while Tajikistan itself is negatively impacted by the unstable surrounding countries since it is disadvantageous due to being a weak country. The main concern of the Tajik administration is that the Uzbek, who largely populate the north of the country, could seize political and economic power by the support of Russia and Uzbekistan, just as in the Soviet era. Moreover, Tajikistan's second major threat is the Taliban, which maintains its presence in northern Afghanistan. The latest threat is the drug trade through Afghanistan and the infiltration of members of the Uzbek Islamic Movement into the country (Kocaman, 2018, p. 161).

Tajikistan's trade relations came to a standstill with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and thus, it switched from a planned economy to the market economy. However, the weak functioning of the central authority caused the process to work quite slowly. Due to the instability caused by the Civil War and natural disasters that followed, Tajikistan could only benefit from international loans, aid and foreign

investment very late. Only since the 2000s has the country experienced economic growth (DEİK, 2012, p. 3).

3.3. Legal Status of the Caspian Sea

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan gained their independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the number of countries bordering the Caspian Sea increased to five (Mehdiyoun, 2000, p. 179). Since the coastal lengths of these five states (Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) on the Caspian Sea are different from each other, they have not been able to reach a common decision on how to use the Caspian Sea (Metin, 2004, p. 143). However, they adopted the Caspian Sea Convention on August 12, 2018, agreeing that disputes in the region could be resolved if the coastal states were granted a suitable legal regime in the Caspian Sea (Kahraman & Merdan, 2020, p. 437). Although the status issue has been resolved today, it is necessary to know the legal status of the Caspian Sea before the Soviet Union was dissolved.

The first known official treaty on the Caspian Sea in history is the Treaty of Resht, signed between Russians and Persians in 1729. By this treaty, Russians were granted far-reaching rights such as free trade movement (Poyraz, 2011, pp. 27-29). The reason for many wars between Russia and Iran during the 19th century is due to the desire of Russians to move south. As a result of several wars, the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) and the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) were signed, which caused Iran to lose its rights in the Caspian Basin. These treaties caused military restrictions on the Caspian, while providing commercial freedom (Kocaman, 2018, p. 161). Signed in 1813 with the victory of Russia, the Treaty of Gulistan ruled that only

Russian warships could be found in the Caspian Sea. Moreover, the Treaty of Turkmenchay, signed in 1928, further increased Russia's military powers. From a commercial point of view, the Caspian Sea was designated as a common shared area of the two states (Poyraz, 2011, pp. 29-31).

With the Bolshevik Revolution of 1921 in Soviet Russia, all previous treaties were terminated. Therefore, the treaties against Iran were invalidated and the Treaty of Moscow was signed between the USSR and Iran on February 26, 1921, extending Iran's powers and granting it the right to keep warships in the Caspian Sea. In addition, Russia and Iran signed a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1935 and both sides confirmed a 10-mile fishing area. This Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was revised in 1940, granting the two countries the right to free fishing in waters beyond the 10-mile fishing area. In this context, the legal issue with the Caspian Basin is about the problem of sharing the Basin. In fact, Russia accepted the Caspian as a lake rather than sea, since it wanted to exclude these waters from International Maritime Law and make sure that all decisions about the Caspian would be similar to the decisions of the treaties made in 1921 and 1940 (Avci, 2014, p. 3). Looking at the treaties on the legal status of the Caspian Sea during the Soviet Union, two important considerations can be observed: The first is that the principle of equality has been adopted in the Caspian, and the second is that the Caspian is closed to third countries other than the coastal states. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the number of states located on the Caspian coast increased. This led to the failure to grant equal rights to the newly established states, bringing many problems alongside (Poyraz, 2011, pp. 32-35).

Furthermore, the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 led to the termination of all treaties regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea. As a matter of fact, three new

states (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan) gained their independence and became coastal states in the Caspian Basin. On the one hand, Russia desired to gain an advantage over the energy sources by means of treaties similar to those that were signed with Iran, and on the other hand, the fact that the states that gained independence wanted to get a share of the Caspian caused new problems in the legal status of the Caspian (Kocaman, 2018, pp. 161-163).

In 1992, the “Treaty on the Protection of State Borders and Maritime Economic Zones of CIS Member States” was signed in Kiev to solve the problems that could arise when states that gained independence after the dissolution of the Soviets asked for a share of the Caspian Sea. According to this treaty, states shall protect their borders and not interfere economically or politically with other states. This treaty served as an advisory document to solve the existing problems (Terzioğlu, 2008, pp. 26-29).

The newly independent countries with coasts in the Caspian started to make reforms in order to protect their national interests and contribute to the development of their countries. Within this scope, they opened up their oil and natural gas reserves to foreign capital. Accelerating its work on this issue, Azerbaijan signed an international treaty entitled “Joint Use and Division of Azerbaijani, Çırağ and Güneşli Oil Deposits in the Azerbaijani Sector of the Caspian Sea”, also referred to as “the Treaty of the Century”, on September 20, 1994, enabling foreign companies to invest significantly in Azerbaijan (Erkan, Sevimli, & Kısacık, 2015, pp. 140-143). The legal status of the Caspian Sea had been on the agenda since 1992, and the consecutive developments brought this issue back to the agenda. In this context, coastal states in the Caspian Basin adopted policies to take advantage of their oil and natural gas

reserves, and started to struggle to ensure a fair share of the energy sources in the region.

A study on determining the legal status of the Caspian was carried out in Iran in 1995. The aim of this study was to learn the common ideas of the Caspian coastal countries on energy sharing. According to the agreement signed by Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan in 1996, energy sources in the Caspian would be evenly distributed among the coastal countries. On the other hand, Iran and Turkmenistan reacted to the Treaty that Russia and Kazakhstan signed in 1998 to draw the regional borders, arguing that decisions taken on the Caspian basin should be submitted to the unanimity voting of the coastal countries.

The country with the longest coastline to the Caspian is Kazakhstan. Therefore, equal sharing of Caspian resources would be to the detriment of Kazakhstan. Therefore, in spite of Iran's proposal for equal sharing, Kazakhstan adopted Russia's "Shared Line" model on September 9, 2000. According to the shared line model, the seabed is divided into national sectors, while the water surface is opened to common sharing. A similar agreement was made with Azerbaijan in 2001. Moreover, according to the agreement on seabed sharing in 2003, it was decided that countries would benefit at the following rates: Azerbaijan (17%), Russia (19%) and Kazakhstan (27%). Nevertheless, this agreement did not resolve the legal status issue pertaining to the Caspian Sea. The commission, formed by 5 coastal countries to solve the problem, held 15 meetings in capitals until 2004. From the decisions and recommendations taken at these meetings, no results were obtained until 2007. At a meeting held on October 16, 2007 with presidents of the coastal countries, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized in his speech "acting jointly" rather than "dividing", which had previously caused a dispute over the sharing of the

Caspian Sea. He stated that there was no need to determine the legal status of the Caspian Sea for the use of energy sources and determination of the seabed, and that an agreement similar to the agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan can also be made to determine the southern border. However, no agreement was reached on this issue, and Kazakhstan again stated in 2011 that the legal status of the Caspian Sea should be resolved (Avcı, 2014, p. 5).

An agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea was signed between Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on August 12, 2018. The summit held with heads of state focused on issues such as the economy, transport, co-operation, environment and security. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated that the agreement would ensure security and stability in the region. In accordance with the agreement, the Caspian Sea was granted special status, excluded from the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, based on the lake principle, citing the depth of the water. Hence, riparian states shall determine the use of resources such as seabed and subsoil, territorial waters, internal waters and fishing areas within the framework of certain principles. In addition to this, decisions on how the air space will be used will be determined in the negotiations that will be held in the following processes. Moreover, this agreement also regulates that countries other than coastal states shall not have military ships in the Caspian. As a result, problems related to the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which continued for many years, were solved thanks to this agreement (SDE, 2018).

3.4. Energy Security of the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin Region

Although Middle Eastern oil was known before the first and second world wars, Soviet energy was considered advantageous both in terms of its transport and in terms of its more affordable cost. The most important part of the energy sources in the Caspian Basin remained to Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan after the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a significant part of the energy sources changed hands, causing other actors in the world to turn to the Caspian Basin (Turan, 2010, p. 48).

The Caspian oil is an alternative to Middle Eastern oil in all aspects and it also indirectly interests the Caucasus countries in addition to the Basin countries. In this vein, the use of the territories of Georgia, Armenia and Uzbekistan in the transport of energy to the East and West ensured the presence of these countries in the policies related to the region. One of the neighboring states in the region, Turkey has gained a place in the region both with its historical and cultural ties and the safe transportation of energy to Europe. The US, on the other hand, has shown an example of its presence in Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism, stating that it is concerned about the competitive environment in the region and has also gained a place for itself in the region (Kocaman, 2018, p. 156).

Due to its rich energy sources, the Caspian Basin has caused great disputes in global policy. In fact, at the heart of these disputes is the lack of any legal status on how to share energy sources. In this context, Russia wants to be the only power in the region, and aims to show that the security of the region is under its protection by first creating turmoil in the region. In addition, Russia aspires to ensure the withdrawal of supranational oil companies from the region (Brzezinski, 2005, p. 135). On August 12, 2018, the coastal states met in Aktau, Kazakhstan and reached an agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. According to this agreement, five states located on

the Caspian coast have 15 nautical miles-wide internal waters and 10 nautical miles for the fishing sector. Waters beyond the designated 25 nautical miles are determined as a common use area. By this agreement, the Caspian was granted a special status, and only coastal states were allowed to benefit from the basin on the basis of the lake principles, excluding the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, third countries other than coastal states cannot have warships in the Caspian Sea, according to the same agreement. The aim of the agreement was to resolve the long-term disputes between the states located on the Caspian coast, as well as resolving their economic and security problems (Anadolu Ajansı, 2018).

Oil formed the basis of rapid economic growth between 1950 and 1970 after World War II. Five Turkic Republics hosted the oil struggle that began in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, while the United States, China, Russia, Turkey, Iran and the European Union (EU) came to the fore with producing policies for the region. The United States, China and the EU want to move the oil and natural gas of producing countries including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which are central to the determination of the Caspian Basin energy policy, to the international market and to take a share from it. In addition, regional actors such as Iran and Turkey, on the other hand, are creating strategies to profit by hosting pipelines in international oil and gas treaties. Russia, however, is trying to control the countries of the region (Birsal, 2006, p. 78).

Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, the countries bordering the Caspian Basin, are more important than Russia and China in terms of having significant energy reserves. Russia and Iran need advanced technology support to reach the reserves of other coastal countries. Therefore, international companies that can provide this support are now focusing on the region (Koçgündüz, 2010, p. 487).

Yet, the delivery of Caspian Basin energy sources to international markets causes both regional and global actors to confront each other, as it is an important alternative to the sources in other parts of the world. Although energy agreements of regional states are short-term, global states want to control the region by trying to make longer-term agreements (Yüce, 2007, p. 47; Külebi, 2007, p. 139).

According to BP Statistical Review of World 2018 data, 38.4% of the world's gas reserves are located in the Middle East and 33.9% in Eurasia (Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States) (BP). In light of these data, countries outside the region aspire to take advantage of the Caspian's energy sources. Furthermore, due to the chaos and unstable structure in the Middle East, countries that need energy are turning their attention to the Caspian. At the same time, energy sources in the Caspian can prevent price crises that may emerge in the Middle East. In addition, the Caspian Basin serves as an important bridge between Eastern and Western economies. Furthermore, due to the projected depletion of energy sources in the North Sea in the coming years, the Caspian Basin is seen as an important alternative energy source for Western countries (Nogayeva A. , 2007, p. 20). Predictions that the need for energy sources will increase in the following years are expected to make foreign country dependence on energy mandatory. Therefore, Caspian energy sources are among the critical alternative regions for countries that want to ensure the security of their energy supply (Pala, 2003, p. 17).

In this context, access to energy sources is not enough to ensure energy security. The issue of transporting energy after it is provided is just as important. Moreover, transportation of oil and natural gas obtained in the Caspian Basin to importing countries is also a problematic process. In order to address this problem, alternative routes were built to Soviet Union-era pipelines. Currently, the North Line

and South Line pipelines deliver Caspian oil to the Black Sea (Meulen, 2009, pp. 833-836). Today, East-West energy transfers are increasing with projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline and TANAP.

In this regard, the easiest way to safely and economically transfer energy sources such as oil and natural gas for exporting and importing states is through pipelines. Indeed, energy sources are essential in terms of trade while they also increase the strategic importance of the region where they are located. From this point of view, global states that want to control energy competition in the region show how important the Caspian Basin is (Oğan, 2007, p. 8).

In light of this information, the most important element for Western states that want to obtain Caspian energy sources – that are not connected to the high seas – is having a reasonable price and a reliable pipeline system. However, the complex geopolitics of the region, as well as the high cost of building pipelines, make the process of forming the system difficult. Yet, pipelines built to transfer energy create a competitive environment in the region, especially harming the interests of OPEC member countries that want oil prices to remain high. Hence, Caspian energy sources have significant impact on world oil prices (Pala, 2007, p. 207).

Given the policies in the Caspian Basin, historical background of the region, cultural ties and bilateral relations, it seems that there is a distinctive competitive environment in the region. As a matter of fact, Russia sees the Caspian as its backyard due to its historical and cultural ties and uses a significant amount of energy sources in the region in a way that gives it an advantage in foreign policy (Meulen, 2009, pp. 835-839). On the other hand, the US energy companies that have become integrated

with the region's economy have forced the US to take measures against the growing economies of China and Russia. Iran, on the other hand, wants the energy competition in the region to remain freer. Energy importing countries are also focusing on the Caspian as an important alternative to ensure security of supply and get rid of the monopoly of Russia and OPEC member countries (Koçgündüz, 2010, p. 499).

Since the struggle in the Caspian Basin is based on energy-oriented balance policy, being able to participate in regional policy is very important for the future of a country. At the same time, energy sources represent power in the century in which we live (Kasım, 2006, p. 243). In this context, energy sources can be examined from a realist point of view, as 'power' is the basis of being a successful actor in international relations, and 'energy' is the basis of 'power'. In order to be powerful, it is necessary to be superior to other states in all aspects. From this perspective, it can be said that the security dilemma in realist theory is literally seen in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin. In international relations, especially in the political, economic and military areas, the fact that one side wins means the other side loses. In the context of the Caspian region, blocking among countries due to several developments and conflicts caused by the state structure have literally made the region a center of conflict.

In short, energy-importing countries are concerned about instability in energy-rich Middle Eastern countries, volatile oil prices, and becoming dependent on Russia for energy. For this reason, importing states that are in pursuit of energy sources and want to increase their sources have turned to the Caucasus and Caspian Basin region. The region is known to be safer than Russia in terms of energy supply security compared to Middle Eastern countries that are subject to instability and terrorism. Therefore, the Caspian region breaks Russia's monopoly as an alternative energy

source, and it has an important strategic position both because it is close to Russia, China and the Middle Eastern countries and it is on the East-West transition route.

3.5. Ensuring Energy Security in the Caucasus and Caspian Basin Region and its Implications for the Region

The diversity of energy supply and demand is central to energy strategies. States rich in energy sources are looking for recipient diversity to strengthen their economies, while states that are foreign-country dependent on energy are also looking for source diversity. Thus, both exporting states and importing states provide energy security. Thanks to energy source diversity, both exporting states and importing states provide energy security. By this means, importing states do not experience lack of energy during any possible political and economic crisis, while exporting states can also continue to generate income from energy, not adhering to a single state (Turan, 2010, p. 46). In order to ensure energy security in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin, the production and distribution of energy sources should be determined within the framework of cooperation by energy-rich states as well as regional and global powers.

In the modern world, states have become dependent on energy in industrial and military fields. The 1973 OPEC oil crisis has shown the world how important energy supply security is (Turan, 2010, p. 47). In order to ensure energy supply, it is necessary to ensure a lasting peace environment and political and economic stability. In order to achieve this goal, it is extremely important to use assistance programs such as TACIS.

However, countries are likely to experience tension both politically and economically in international relations. In such a case, the presence of multiple export routes in order to avoid problems in energy distribution will create a safer environment in ensuring energy security. Hence, the best way to ensure the security of supply of importing countries is based on cooperation with multiple producer states. In other words, the abundance of energy supply means that stability and security can be ensured in the energy market. However, political tensions and wars in the Middle East lead to the gradual withdrawal of energy importing countries from this region (Bahgat, 2005, p. 5). This situation has made energy importing states focus on the Caucasus and Caspian Basin. As energy is transported through pipelines, there is a competitive environment between regional and global powers as well as between oil companies. In this competitive environment, the main purpose is to acquire political and economic interests, ensure diversity in energy demand and supply, make long-term agreements, and ensure stability in cooperation for energy production and distribution. When stability is provided, this will make sure that there is energy security as well. As can be seen, diversity in energy provides energy supply security for energy importing countries, while political stability also provides energy demand security for energy exporting countries. In short, the most important factor in ensuring energy security is the diversity of supply and demand, mutual agreement and sustainability.

4. CONCLUSION AND EVALUATIONS

The industrial revolution is considered the milestone of the modern world, and after this revolution, the need for energy sources increased immensely as a result of the rapid growth in production. Since natural energy sources – the raw material of production – are not distributed evenly in the world geography, there has been the problem of energy sharing all over the world. In this regard, countries' desire to acquire energy sources in different geographies has led to the formation of a competitive environment. The irregular market created by the competitive environment has made it necessary to ensure energy security.

There are three dimensions to ensuring energy security. These are physical, economic and sustainability dimensions. From the perspective of sustainability in energy security, energy importer states try to ensure the security of energy supply, while energy exporter states try to ensure the security of energy demand. Energy importer states want to eliminate the problem of power shortages by making long-term agreements. Exporter states, on the other hand, want to evaluate offers from other countries, trying to keep the deal periods short. On the other hand, the aim of physical energy security is to transfer energy safely. Pipelines have been built since they are economical, practical and safer in transferring energy. Countries with stable structures away from terrorism are generally preferred for energy transfer to ensure the security of pipelines.

Frequent wars and instability in the Middle East have been considered a threat to energy security. Therefore, importing states have turned to the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin as alternative regions. However, the separatist movements in the region, the struggle for independence and the influence of the great powers have shown that this region has been unstable. On the other hand, the fact that pipelines

built for the transfer of energy sources to Europe pass through Turkey shows that Turkey is a safe and stable country.

In light of this information, countries have developed strategies to gain a greater share in the global energy struggle. Indeed, the United States has gained a place in the region by using the competition and unstable structure in the region as an excuse. Additionally, the EU has managed to become a part of the region through the TACIS, TRACECA and INOGATE programs established for the development of the region. Russia has targeted foreign energy companies to leave the region by causing turmoil, however, has not succeeded. Iran has tried to ensure that pipelines built to transfer energy to Europe pass through its country. China has improved cooperation with Russia to break US influence in energy transport routes. Turkey, on the other hand, aims to be the transit route of pipelines.

Global powers will continue to generate policies for the countries in the region to benefit from energy in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin for many years to come. Although the assistance programs implemented for the region are successful, they will be insufficient in the long term. The countries in the region that are under the influence of global powers today will not need foreign assistance in the future due to their economies growing every year, and they will rise to the level of independent states that can make their own decisions. Hence, stability and democracy are essential, as well as economic growth in order to ensure energy security in the region in the long term. In addition, governments that continue to exist with the support of external powers should be overthrown and replaced by a government coming into office by fair elections. Energy security can be established with stability and administration where there is independence of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, as well as the rule of law, and respect for human rights.

In conclusion, ensuring energy security in the Caucasus and Caspian Basin will have a positive impact on the countries in the region. Dictatorial regimes looking like democratic will be overthrown and replaced by governments that come to office through fair elections to make sure the construction of real democracy.



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