

FATİH TOKATLI

TURKISH-AMERICAN MILITARY COOPERATION

Bilkent University 2024

TURKISH-AMERICAN MILITARY
COOPERATION AND
TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH ARMY
IN THE
EARLY COLD WAR, 1947-1950

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
FATİH TOKATLI

The Department of
History
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
September 2024

To My Father who instilled in me the thirst for learning

And to Hocabey who made Bilkent possible

TURKISH-AMERICAN MILITARY COOPERATION AND
TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH ARMY
IN THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1947-1950

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

FATİH TOKATLI

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY

THE DEPARTMENT OF
HISTORY
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

September 2024

TURKISH-AMERICAN MILITARY COOPERATION AND
TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH ARMY, 1947-1950

By Fatih Tokatlı

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy History.

Kenneth Weisbrode
Advisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Daniel P. Johnson
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Owen Miller
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Mustafa Kibaroglu
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

İsmail Burak Kuntay
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

Refet S. Gürkaynak
Director

ABSTRACT

TURKISH-AMERICAN MILITARY COOPERATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH ARMY IN THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1947-1950

Tokatlı, Fatih

Ph. D., Department of History

Advisor: Assistant Professor Kenneth Weisbrode

September 2024

This dissertation documents the start and evolution of U.S. military assistance to Turkey from 1947 to 1950 and then analyzes the impact of U.S. military assistance especially on Turkish Army in organizational, doctrinal as well as in social and political dimensions. It especially focuses on how and to what extent Turkish military doctrine, especially Turkish Army's tactical doctrine has changed after 1947. The end result of U.S. military assistance has been that from 1947, Turkish Army has, rather than becoming an effective fighting force by mid 1960s, become a better equipped version of itself before 1947 and transformed into a much more resource intensive military preparing to implement "American way of war". In addition, Turkish focus on adopting US tactical doctrine prevented it from focusing on its own peculiar national needs and designing units to meet such needs. Nevertheless, through many years of training and exchange of information through US military assistance, the groundwork of which was laid from 1947, Turkish military became a potent force which has had a transformational effect on even today's international security scene. In that sense, US military assistance to Turkey from 1947 has not only been a turning point for Turkey and for U.S.-Turkish relations but for regional and international security as well.

Keywords: Truman Doctrine, military assistance, U.S. Military Aid Mission, TUSAG, JAMMAT, JUSMMAT

ÖZET

ERKEN SOĞUK SAVAŞ DÖNEMİNDE TÜRK AMERİKAN ASKERİ İŞBİRLİĞİ VE TÜRK KARA ORDUSUNUN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ, 1947-1950

Tokatlı, Fatih

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü

Danışman: Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Kenneth Weisbrode

Eylül 2024

Bu tezde Amerikan askeri yardımının 1947-1950 yılları döneminde başlangıç ve dönüşümü ele alınmakta ve askeri yardımın Türk Kara Ordusu üzerindeki organizasyonel, doktrinel, sosyal ve siyasi etkileri analiz edilmektedir. Tez, Türk Kara Ordusunun taktik doktrininin 1947’den sonraki dönüşümüne de odaklanmaktadır. 1947’de başlayan A.B.D. askeri yardımının pratik sonucu, Türk Kara Ordusunu 1947’ye göre daha etkin bir harp gücünden ziyade daha iyi donanımlı bir ordu haline getirmiş ve Türk Kara Ordusunu “Amerikan tarzı harp” yürütmeye çalışan çok daha kaynak yoğun bir orduya dönüştürmek olmuştur. Buna ilaveten, bizatihi Türk tarafının Amerikan taktik doktrininin benimsenmesine odaklanması, Türkiye’nin kendine has milli ihtiyaçlarına odaklanmasına ve bu ihtiyaçları karşılayacak birliklerin tasarlanmasına engel olmuştur. Buna karşın uzun vadede, temeli 1947’de atılan ve yıllar süren Amerikan askeri yardımı yoluyla alınan donanım, eğitim ve bilgi alışverişi sayesinde Türk Ordusu önemli bir güç haline gelmiş ve bu durum bugünkü uluslararası güvenlik dengesine uzanan etkiler yaratmıştır. Bu anlamda A.B.D.’nin Türkiye’ye 1947’de başlayan askeri yardımı sadece Türkiye ve Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde değil, bölgesel ve uluslararası güvenlik açısından da bir dönüm noktası olmuştur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Truman Doktrini, askeri yardım, Amerikan Askeri Yardım Heyeti, TUSAG, JAMMAT, JUSMMAT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Truman Presidential Library for a generous travel grant during the research phase of this dissertation. I also would like to thank the John A. Adams '71 Center for Military History & Strategic Analysis at the Virginia Military Institute for the dissertation grant generously awarded.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	v
ÖZET.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
LIST OF FIGURES	x
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER II: TURKEY’S SEARCH FOR SECURITY AND PROSPERITY BEFORE AND AFTER WORLD WAR II	35
1. International position.....	35
2. Military/security situation	45
3. Economic Developments.....	49
CHAPTER III: TURKISH MILITARY BY 1947 AND TURKISH AMERICAN MILITARY COOPERATION BEFORE 1947.....	55
1. Turkish Armed Forces by Spring 1947	55
2. Turkish American Cooperation before 1947	76
3. Conclusion.....	81
CHAPTER IV: The Birth of American Aid Mission, March-December 1947.....	82
1. Background	82
2. Legal Process.....	89
3. Activation of TUSAG	105
4. TUSAG arrives in Turkey	119
CHAPTER V: From Embryo to Skeleton: American Military Aid Mission Army Group in Action, January 1948- June 1950	124
1. Initial Steps.....	124
2. Organization	130
3. Sections of the U.S. Army Group and their activities until mid-1950	137
4. The Fight Over the Future of Mission Funds	168
5. End of Honeymoon with Turkish General Staff and McBride’s New War .	173
CHAPTER VI: Conclusion and Assessment	185
BIBLIOGRAPHY	192

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Turkey's establishment of diplomatic relations certain countries	36
Table 2. Turkish Ground Forces Organization during WWII.....	48
Table 3. Central Bank Money Supply by year-End (1000 TL).....	50
Table 4. Comparison of International Price Indices.....	50
Table 5. U.S. Assistance provided to Turkey before Truman Doctrine.....	80
Table 6. Number of Graduates from TUSAG supervised training courses.	140
Table 7. TUSAG Supervised Infantry courses at Çankırı Infantry School.....	150
Table 8. Turkish Infantry Officers and NCOs Trained in U.S. Schools	151
Table 9. Transportation Section Courses Organized Through March 1950.	167
Table 10. Number of graduates from Transportation courses under TUSAG.	168

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Command Relationships in Turkish Armed Forces in 1947	63
Figure 2. The document legally establishing the US Army Group.....	106
Figure 3 Picture of an M24 tank being unloaded probably at Derince port.....	127
Figure 4 The first US supplied M-24 tanks on their way.....	127
Figure 5 US supplied military trucks.	128
Figure 6. A US supplied M-101 howitzer being unloaded from ship.....	129
Figure 7. TUSAG Organization Chart, 11 June 1948.....	131
Figure 8. TUSAG Organization Chart, 1 October 1949.	132
Figure 9. Ambassador Wadsworth in Combat Team in Ayaş on 24 June 1949	146
Figure 10. A picture attached from Monthly Progress Report of July 1949.....	147
Figure 11. “The Combat Team exercises held by the Armored School on the tank range at Ayash on 24 June were witnessed by General Abdurrahman Gurman, new Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces (front).”	148
Figure 12. Lt. Col. François d’Eliscu and a Guerrilla Leaders Course cadet	154
Figure 13. Guerrilla Leaders course cadets during a training.	154
Figure 14. Guerrilla Leaders Course cadets training to jump from a jeep.....	155
Figure 15. A Guerrilla Leaders course cadet learns to pack his chute.	155
Figure 16. As part of the Guerrilla Leaders course, cadets made 5 training jumps.	156
Figure 17. A US provided C-47 just before a jump	157
Figure 18. Organization Chart of Staff College Section, TUSAG, 1950.....	159

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Turkish military attaché walked into the Pentagon on a cold Washington D.C. morning in mid-December 1944, wondering about the reason of the invitation he received from the Pentagon to see General Marshall.

Concerned and excited at the same time, the young lieutenant colonel was trying to guess whether the invitation from General Marshall was going to be good news. Since Lend-Lease assistance to non-belligerent countries was cut by autumn of that year, he had paid many visits to the new giant complex many times, spending enormous efforts to restart military equipment aid, to no avail.

Once Col. Aydınalp was in the office and after the regular niceties, General Marshall said a couple of sentences praising President İnönü's contributions to the new Turkish Republic and his efforts to keep Turkey out of the war and then came to the real issue:

Yes, we think the war in Europe will soon come to an end. But the end of the war will lead us to a destroyed Europe. Middle East will play a great role in the industrial revival of Europe. İnönü has always seen that if Turkey, which we accept is the key to Middle East, becomes a worn down and collapsed country, the Western world would go into a greater collapse. He also emphasized during the Cairo Conference and in occasional communications that there would be a post-war world order after the war and that we should be very careful to prevent this post-war world from falling into darkness entirely. Therefore, we feel the necessity to take action to bring Turkey, which has such a great leader as İnönü, up to the strength required by its great importance for the post-war world. Please convey our conversation to your General Staff immediately. Also please bring together a team and contact the chief commander of our Middle Eastern Forces in Cairo. Reserve there any weapons and equipment you deem necessary for Turkish Armed Forces. Apart from this, also bring your Army, Navy and Air Force officers here to be trained so they can start being acquainted with our equipment. On the economic front, the assistance that has been suspended will also restart soon. We are also considering initiating other programs. When the time comes, we will give the necessary information to your government.¹

¹ Cemal Aydınalp (E. General; General, Ret.), *Bugüne Nasıl Geldik* (How We Arrived at Today?) (Ankara: Damla Printing House, 1965), 11–12. The author of this forgotten pamphlet was a key figure in US-Turkish military relationship from 1930s until 1960s. The minutes Col. Aydınalp says he sent to Turkish General Staff in an encrypted message is yet to see the daylight. Writing about his meeting with General Marshall more than 20 years after the meeting and being a staunch İnönü supporter, he may have lost the clarity of some of his recollection and even exaggerated some of the General

As Colonel Aydinalp was leaving the Pentagon, he was more excited than when he had arrived. He rushed back to his office in the Turkish Embassy and sent the minutes of the meeting to the Chief of Turkish General Staff in a personal and encrypted message.

When WWII was over, Turkey was in one of the most vulnerable times of its history. Among the multiple challenges brought by the year 1945, first was the need to demobilize the military that had tied up a labor force of almost one million productive men so that economic development could pick up. The second was to ensure that Turkey did not become an outcast in the new world that resulted from WWII. Although the country had avoided direct involvement in the war and kept a formal alliance with France and Britain, it had strayed towards Germany while fearing an invasion from it. Turkey shipped chromium to Germany for a long time, resisting calls to open a front against Germans in the Balkans and at the very same time allowing Allied planes to make emergency landings on Turkish soil, letting Allied pilots go back to the fight. Therefore, as Turkey managed to appease both sides, it also managed somehow to break hearts on both sides while trying to walk a tightrope. Turkey severed all trade ties with Germany in May 1944 and declared war on Germany in February 1945 when the result was obvious: the declaration was effectively a gesture as the only place Turkey could have gone into war against Germans was the Balkans which by then was invaded by Russian armies.

Thirdly, though the country was spared the physical destruction of the war due to its neutral stance, 6 years of full military mobilization and economic deprivations had consumed Turkish people and there was widespread reaction against Republican People's Party elite and the policies in place. This meant that the

Marshall's niceties about İnönü (not quoted above) but there is little reason to question whether the

RPP Government had to act quick to jump start the economy if it was to continue its rule. Therefore, Turkey needed foreign financing and technology transfers for its own reconstruction efforts.

The fourth challenge of military modernization was even more acute given the huge gap in capabilities between the onset of the nuclear warfare and jet age and Turkey's military, which was basically a 1920s vintage military with sporadic and piecemeal upgrades of recent technology. Turkish Government and the General Staff made every effort, throughout the war, to obtain whatever bit of usable additional equipment, especially from the British. Following the end of the war, with the realization of the enormous gap between military capabilities of Turkey and potential rivals, efforts were stepped up to purchase surplus equipment from any source that could provide them, without much of an effort at reforming the existing structure.

The fifth challenge was that Turkey's northern and eastern neighbor, USSR, was by 1945 in control of Bulgaria and the whole Balkans, had still troops in Iran and supported the establishment of a Kurdish "Mahabad" state neighboring Turkey's porous borders with Iran and Iraq. Moreover, in March 1945, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov informed Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Selim Sarper that the Soviet Union would not extend the Treaty of Friendship of 1927, which had been regularly extended by 5 years until then; pointing at the treaty that was recently signed by Poland under Red Army's invasion as a new model of friendship treaty and repeated the demand to revise Montreux Treaty so as to allow "joint" control of Straits by Turkey and the USSR.

During the years of the War of Liberation and afterwards, Mustafa Kemal and his friends were attentive towards Soviet aims. While they sought close relations

visit ever took place and General Marshall said the things he did.

with and as much assistance as possible from U.S.S.R. during the War of Liberation, the young regime of Ankara was unrelenting towards any attempt at widespread Communist activity before and after the Republic. Especially from 1927, as the new regime settled and felt more secure, Turkey sought closer ties with the West, namely Britain, the United States and France. The United States extended recognition and sent a new Ambassador to Turkey in 1927, which was a major success for the new regime in furthering its legitimacy as a viable state, rather than an anomaly of history.

Therefore, by 1945, Turkey's need for rapid development and modernization in both economic and military fields, its intrinsic inclination towards becoming a member of the Western world, bipolarization of world architecture as well as clear Soviet attempts to subjugate Turkey left her little choice than full engagement with the West and namely the United States, which had risen as its leader. To this must be added the critical factor of President İnönü and RPP leadership's survival instincts as they knew that without a miracle in democratization and economic as well as military development, they had little chance of sustaining their grip on power. Therefore, by the time of Truman Doctrine, Turkey had already been seeking sizeable assistance from and a strong security relationship with the U.S. Whatever caveats U.S. military assistance and security guarantees could come with seemingly did not bother neither Turkish public in general nor President İnönü and RPP.

On the U.S. side, Truman Doctrine was the response by the United States to the situation developing around Turkey and Greece as well as an instrument to alert and educate the American public and Congress on the dangers of inaction vis-à-vis Soviet demands from Turkey regarding joint defense of the Turkish Straits. In this sense, it was the final act in a painful process of consensus building in public,

political and national security spheres about the policy and strategy to sustain US leadership in post WWII world. It was at the same time the first act in implementing such a strategy. By the time Britain announced to U.S. on February 21, 1947, that it was cutting assistance to Greece and Turkey, the Truman Administration already knew of British vulnerabilities and had been pre-occupied with possible consequences. In Turkey's case, U.S. military aid brought by Truman Doctrine acted as a catalyst for the onset of a much-needed leap forward in the country's development process, first and foremost in the military. Turkish Government and military enthusiastically embraced the entire American military doctrine, education and training philosophy and even tables of organization except for some inevitable and minor differences, starting from 1948 even before NATO itself was established.

Starting from the end of World War II, Turkey's military was preoccupied with the developments in the U.S. services in terms of doctrine and organization, notably in the U.S. Army. The sense of inferiority due to the gap in technological capabilities was a huge concern for the top brass of the military as well as the hot-headed young generation of officers. The quality of the U.S. military as the undisputed victor of WWII and the interest in "American way of war" accelerated following the start of U.S. military aid. In fact the enthusiasm and willingness with which Turkish governments under both Republican People's Party and Democratic Party embraced American military model seems to validate Geir Lundestad's "Empire by Invitation" thesis.² Lundestad argues that by the end of WW II, the United States appeared as the most powerful state in centuries and that "its tremendous lead over other Great Powers provided the basis for an expansion which was more comprehensive than that of the Soviet Union and in an important respect

² Geir Lundestad, *The American "Empire"*, (Oslo, Norwegian University Press, 1990), p. 55.

also more comprehensive than that of Britain in the 19th century.”³ Therefore, Lundestad argues, the United States created its own version of empire and it was an informal one, resembling the informal parts of the British Empire. In certain places, United States was invited to play the role it did. This is what Lundestad calls “empire by invitation.” In Turkey’s relationship with the United States, nothing better explains U.S. involvement in Turkey’s security than an “empire by invitation”. By the end of WWII, Turkey was unable to defend itself properly should it be involved in a shooting war against a modern military. On the other hand, to become economically and militarily self-sufficient, Turkey needed a sustained long-term development run that could be financed only externally. Therefore, at the strategic level, Turkey made the choice of voluntarily seeking refuge under the wings of the American eagle. RPP’s and İnönü’s need to maintain their grip on power also increased the sense of urgency as well as the willingness to join “the empire”. Turkey’s military assistance relationship with the U.S. and its willingness to transform its military according to the U.S. military model was therefore a function of its willingness to join “the empire” and identify as a part of it.

The development of Turkish-U.S. relations after World War II, especially the introduction of Truman Doctrine and the related aid program to Turkey, is a well-known story told from different angles by prominent scholars. William Appleman Williams argued in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* that Truman Doctrine and Marshall Program were the two sides of the same coin, intended to implement a new Open Door policy for the United States and Truman Doctrine was the ideological manifesto of American strategy, blaming the Soviet Union for the troubles of the world and announcing the determination of the United States to halt the spread of

³ Ibid., p.31.

revolutionary radicalism.⁴ However, Williams does not even mention Turkey once in the pages devoted to the Truman Doctrine in the above work.

Walter LaFeber argued that with the speech on 12 March 1947, Truman and Acheson cornered the Republican majority in the Congress which both sounded anti-Communist and tended to drastically cut the budget. Therefore, Truman Doctrine slaved the Congress to the Administration's definition of national strategy. LaFeber identifies four important functions of the Truman Doctrine: first it marked the first time the fear of communism was used at home and abroad to convince Americans of the necessity of a Cold War policy. Secondly, the Congress had relinquished enormous power to the president to wage the Cold War as he saw fit. Third, the United States ended up intervening in a civil war of another nation first time since WWII. And finally, LaFeber argued, "Truman used the doctrine to justify a gigantic aid program to prevent collapse of the European and American economies...So the Americans embarked upon the Cold War for the good reasons given in the Truman Doctrine, which they understood and for real reasons which they did not understand. Thus, as Truman and Acheson intended, the doctrine became an ideological shield behind which the United States marched to build Western political-economic system and counter the radical left."⁵ While LaFeber aptly describes the political tactics of the Truman Administration in managing the Congressional reaction to the new policy being formulated, no analysis was made with regard to the situation in Turkey.

In another classical revisionist work of Cold War history, Thomas G. Patterson wrote in "Soviet-American Confrontation" that "although historians cannot precisely determine whether the Soviet objective in Turkey was the creation of a

⁴ William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, Fifteenth Anniversary Edition, 2009), 268-269.

⁵ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-2002*, 9 ed. (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2004), 59-63.apl

satellite, previous and subsequent events would suggest that (U.S. Ambassador to Turkey) Wilson, like the United States officials in Iran and Greece, exaggerated the extent of the Soviet threat.”⁶ We may never know what the Soviets intended for Turkey to become, but the fate of Baltic nations, Finland and Eastern European nations where Soviets had enjoyed freedom of action certainly provided solid grounds for Turkey to become fearful. But Paterson does not engage in any such comparison. Nevertheless, Paterson differed from previous, more ideological Revisionist theories in that “Expansion and containment were again partners in the Truman Doctrine-not the expansion of narrow economic self-interest but a ‘way of life’ Truman summarized so often as ‘peace and prosperity’. The Soviet Union and/or Communism had to be contained because they challenged the conception of a world open to the intertwined ideals and interest of the United States.”⁷ John Lewis Gaddis argued in “The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947” that The Truman Doctrine deliberately portrayed the Soviet-American conflict as a clash between two mutually irreconcilable ideologies and the Truman Administration “managed to shock Congress and the public into providing the support necessary to implement a tough policy. But in the process they trapped themselves in a new cycle of rhetoric and response which in years to come would significantly restrict the Administration’s ability in dealing with Moscow.”⁸ In his conclusions, Gaddis also disputed the Revisionist claim that the United States had more room to maneuver to decide by arguing that Stalin did not have a Congress, public opinion or press to consider and that he was not even constrained by ideology as he was the living master of Marxism-Leninism. Melvyn Leffler argued that Turkey did not face an

⁶ Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Post War Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 190-191.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 194.

imminent Russian military threat in 1946-1947 and that “the American fears did not stem from aggressive Soviet moves against Turkey. The Soviets had done little more than send a diplomatic note. The real problem was that there loomed gaping vacuums of power in this part of the world.” Leffler argued that the rationale in providing military aid to Turkey was the product of geopolitical considerations according to which Russia would gain an overwhelming control of the Middle East, with all sorts of follow on effects, in a period where vacuums of power facilitated the Soviets’ job.⁹ While Leffler may seem right when focusing strictly on the period of 1946-1947, a larger time frame beginning from 1939 when Soviets rejected to sign an agreement with Turkish Prime Minister Saraçoğlu, whom they treated not so kindly in Moscow for almost a month may help better understand Turkish fears. The Soviets then instead agreed with Nazis to share Eastern Europe. Before that, Turkey was extremely careful, from the time of the War of Liberation, not to allow Communists, legally or illegally, to organize comfortably. Therefore by 1939, the Soviet-Turkish friendship was already dead, and it was only the Nazi attack that tied the hands of the Soviets in 1941 with regard to their claims on Turkey. Moreover, Leffler does not consider the prevailing mood of despair and exhaustion in the Turkish society as well as in the military by 1945. First, there was realization among well-educated people and policy elite in Turkey, that Turkey’s delay in cutting its relationship with Germany as well as its circular demands as precondition to join the war had deprived the country a place on the table for the post war world order. While there was a determination to resist Soviet demands, Turkish people were stretched to the limits in terms of difficulties of life to put up with and there was widespread reaction against

⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1972), 316-361.

⁹ Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992), 124-125.

the ruling elite. The situation of the Army against a possible Red Army attack was not any better than that against a Nazi attack that was feared in 1942. What Leffler implies as being “just a diplomatic note” was a note by the second superpower of the world that happened to encircle Turkey from both East, North and Northwest by 1945. These factors were why Turkey felt so precarious during the period of 1945-1946. However, Leffler also rightly underlines that Turkey was an attractive partner for the United States in the Middle East as it was eager for American aid, especially military aid. Indeed, JCS had by 1946 had identified Turkey of high military value.

Bruce Kuniholm, in his seminal work on the origins of the Cold in the Middle East, argued that “...events in the Near East point less to cynicism and strictly imperialistic economic motives on the part of the United States than they do to an aggressive idealism which, to a considerable degree, derived from a profound belief in the virtues of America’s political and economic system.”¹⁰ Kuniholm argues that the Truman Doctrine overstated the Greek problem but that “did not overstate the larger crisis of instability and disequilibrium along the Northern Tier that was bound to follow the collapse of British influence.”¹¹ Similarly, Eduard Mark masterfully used U.S. and British military planning and intelligence sources to argue that regardless of whether Stalin intended to invade Turkey, the Soviet objective of subduing Turkey was beyond discussion. Mark argued that at the minimum, Stalin was seeking a strategic intimidation on a very large scale. Stalin would of course deny that he planned to attack Turkey. But actions spoke louder than words and just as he attacked Finland and conquered Baltic states, Besarabia and Bukovina, the Soviets made exorbitant claims on Turkey which would have, upon acceptance,

¹⁰ Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), p.428.

¹¹ Ibid., 426.

made Turkey a puppet of Soviet orbit while threatening British lines of communication. To back up his threats, Mark argues, Stalin maintained large forces in the Balkans that would be more than enough to defeat Turkey's defenses, parts of which were deployed on natural avenues of approach on the Bulgarian side of Turkish-Bulgarian border.¹²

In *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Michael H. Hunt states that with the Truman Doctrine speech, Truman invoked Wilsonian collective security concept, invoked the Munich analogy and reminded the costs of inaction and appeasement in the past and declared that the United States had to take a stance against totalitarianism. "Americans had an obligation to maintain an international environment hospitable to 'free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppression'".¹³

On the Turkish side, late Oral Sander, writing twelve years before Melvyn Leffler's "Preponderance of Power", draws similar conclusions, arguing that for Truman, it was important to save Greece from civil war and to secure Europe, and that he would anyway start a program regardless of whether Turkey was under pressure from the Soviets or not. Sander underlined that the emphasis in favor of Greek situation in Truman's speech on 12 March 1947 and in other Administration figures throughout the Congressional process is a sign that Truman Administration placed more importance on Greece and put Turkey on second priority. In this conclusion, Sander takes the attitude of representatives of Truman Administration during the Congressional process on Truman at face value. Indeed, as Kuniholm

¹² Eduard Mark, "Turkish War Scare of 1946", in *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, eds. Melvyn Leffler & David Painter (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 125.

¹³ Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1987), 158.

indicated, the Greek situation was overstated to “scare the hell out of American people” while the part of the program on Turkey was being deemphasized at the very same time as the Soviet threat against Turkey was being emphasized. Sander also stressed the Truman Administration’s tactic to scare the U.S. public to ensure the approval of aid to Greece and Turkey.¹⁴ In one of the most recent comprehensive works on Turkish-U.S. relations, Nasuh Uslu minimizes the importance of Truman Aid program in the transformation of Turkish military and takes instead NATO membership as the take-off in military relations. This conclusion is rather debatable. Moreover, Uslu’s work depends almost entirely on secondary works published in 1960s and 70s and fails to consult US archives which were fairly accessible by the time he wrote his book.¹⁵ Ayşegül Sever notes that the real reason for the United States to include Turkey in the aid program was not so much the gravity of the Turkish situation as the problems that a possible Soviet domination of this country could cause. Sever’s work, which was written originally as a Ph.D. dissertation like that of Uslu’s work and around the same time frame in the first half of 1990s, depends on extensive use of British and U.S. foreign and military archives.¹⁶ Sever’s work focuses on Turkey’s efforts to lead a Middle East defense structure in line with U.S. interests and therefore does not investigate the military assistance relationship.

Few works in English language focused on U.S.-Turkish military relationship, while both English and Turkish works were unable to access Turkish archival material, for different reasons. On the other hand, the fact that Turkey went through three military coups and two abortive coup attempts from 1960 to 1980 also

¹⁴ Oral Sander, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri (Turkish American Relations)*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1979);

¹⁵ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri (Turkish-American Relations)*, (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000).

¹⁶ Ayşegül Sever, *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Ortadoğu, 1945-1958 (Turkey, the West and the Middle East in the Siege of the Cold War, 1945-1958)*, (İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 1997).

led to the birth of an enormous literature on the role of military in politics and civil-military relations in Turkey.¹⁷ The dominance of scholarship by the theme of civil-military relations as well as difficulties to reach primary sources in Turkish military archives culminated in a surprisingly low number of works, even at book chapter or article level, or at least book chapters dedicated to Turkish-American military relations.

As examples of scarce scholarship in the U.S. about Turkish-U.S. military ties, certain works stand apart. In the most recent of them, Philip Nash, although making extensive use of declassified government documents, looks exclusively at the U.S. policy relating to the deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and criticizes the Eisenhower Administration for deploying an already obsolescent system to Turkey and Italy but does not place the deployment issue in the frame of U.S.-Turkish military relationship.¹⁸ George Harris's work "The Troubled Alliance", though a dated one (published in 1971), contains solid analyses of the U.S.-Turkey relationship from the perspective of an insider. Harris, relying extensively on open sources mainly in the Turkish language and *The Department of State Bulletin*, worked in the U.S. Embassy in Ankara from 1957 to 1962 after being awarded a Ph. D. about Turkey from Harvard University. With regard to military relationship,

¹⁷ To name a few examples, Kemal H. Karpat, "The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 75, No. 6 (Oct., 1970); Roger P. Nye, "Civil-Military Confrontation in Turkey: The 1973 Presidential Election", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (April 1977); Feroz Ahmad, "Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey", *MERIP Reports*, No. 93, (January 1981); Ahmet Kemal, "Military Rule and the Future of Democracy in Turkey", *MERIP Reports*, No. 122, (March - April 1984); Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January 1997); Tanel Demirel, "The Turkish Military's Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980", *Armed Forces & Society* 29 (Winter 2003); Aylin Güney, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From Cold War to War on Iraq", *Turkish Studies* 6:3 (2005); Tanel Demirel, "Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective" *Armed Forces & Society* 31 (Winter 2005); Nil S. Şatana, "Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy, *Armed Forces & Society* 34 (April 2008).

¹⁸ Philip Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters*, (Chapel Hill, N.J: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

Harris argues that the carelessness on both sides in the 1950s in managing military relations on a daily and personal basis rather than on a more structured approach substantially damaged the future of relations.¹⁹

Similarly, few works by Turkish scholars and researchers on U.S.-Turkish military relations of scholarly value can be cited. Nur Bilge Criss's book chapter on U.S. military presence in Turkey frames the military ties in the historical development of Turkey's search for a place in the West and the rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR. Dr. Criss informs about the introduction and structure of American presence in Turkey and then provides information about incidents that led to the debates on the violation of Turkish sovereignty by U.S. military personnel and their acts. Dr. Criss concludes that the reaction of the governments in the 1960s, especially Demirel Governments, translated into an insistence on exercising sovereign rights on Turkish territory as the basic principle against all nations, regardless of whether they are allies or not.²⁰ In an article on Jupiter missiles, Criss analyses the deployment and removal of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and argues that if one of the two motives of Turkey in accepting Jupiter was the perception of a Soviet threat, the other was the fear of losing U.S. economic and military aid.²¹

The only comprehensive book length work on U.S.-Turkish military relations was written by retired Rear Admiral Sezai Orkunt. In his work, *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri* (Turkey-U.S.A. Military Relations), Orkunt firstly depicts the political framework of U.S. military aid as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and stresses

¹⁹ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective*, (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972).

²⁰ Nur Bilge Criss, "US Forces in Turkey" in Simon Duke & Wolfgang Krieger, eds. *U.S. Military Forces in Europe: the Early Years, 1945-1970*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Clifford Bernath, "JUSMMAT and Turkey: History and Overview", *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* 7 (Summer 1985).

²¹ Nur Bilge Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963", *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 20 (September 1997).

the need for recipient countries to be aware of the domestic political agenda and process of the United States. He provides comparative data about arms transfers by the U.S. and USSR to their allies and the details of arms Turkey received. He also explores in detail the process in the 1960s through which the bilateral military agreements of the 1950s were put in order and argued that the recklessness of U.S. military personnel vis-à-vis Turkish authorities and their tendency to play authorities against each other or to circumvent them to get their job done is the main factor in the deterioration of the mood of the relations in the 1960s. Moreover, when the Turkish Government moved to correct the problems created by a lack of tight grip on bilateral agreements, it was by acting upon the analysis and recommendations of the Turkish General Staff and out of a national need, rather than a tendency to bow out to propaganda charges. He also hints that the Turkish Military Representation in Washington D.C. strongly advised against installing Jupiter missiles in 1959 for exactly the same reasons as they were taken out but that these views were not taken into consideration by the General Staff and political authorities at the time. Orkunt therefore makes a valuable contribution by hinting that the Turkish side wanted U.S. missiles more than the Eisenhower Administration wanted to deploy them in Turkey. However, Orkunt does not address the formative period of U.S.-Turkish military cooperation after 1947. It must also be noted, that Orkunt was a Navy admiral, with little exposure to the processes taking place Ground Force, where a large part of the modernization effort focused and also where the organizational and doctrinal transformation was most challenging.²²

A recent series of book chapters and articles relate directly to the subject at hand. A book chapter by Serhat Güvenç on the transformation of Turkish military

²² Sezai Orkunt, *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri, (Turkey-US Military Relations)* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976);

and American military aid stands out as a piece of highest relevance for this dissertation.

Another recent contribution to Turkish military history is a book chapter by Gencer Özcan on Prussian influence on the Turkish Army in the Republican period.²³ While this chapter does not directly relate to the period at hand, it includes comparisons of German military presence and influence in Turkey with that of the United States military. While providing an impressive survey of secondary literature on German-Turkish military relations from early 19th century to 1945, the chapter title on “Prussian” influence and the content, talking about a wider German influence are contradictory at best. Most importantly, Özcan argues that since Atatürk, İsmet İnönü and Fevzi Çakmak were not as deeply influenced by Germans as others, German influence waned in 1920 and especially in 1930s. This is contrary to common knowledge of close working relationship Çakmak and İnönü had with German officers during WWI period. These relationships are known to have continued after WWI into Turkey’s Republican age. Özcan nevertheless also informs us while writing about German influence on the Republican Army that until 1949-1950, all the manuals and command procedures were basically adopted from the Germans. The same Fevzi Çakmak who Özcan describes as farthest from German influence indeed never strayed from German tactical and operational thinking. It was in Fevzi Çakmak’s Chairmanship of General Staff in 1936 and 1937 that the new German warfighting manual *Truppenführung* was translated into Turkish and published as the “Muhtelif Sınıfların Birlikte Sevk ve Muharebesi Talimnamesi” (Field Manual on Command and Combat of Combined Arms). Indeed, the Turkish General Staff had been meticulously and loyally adopting the predecessor of

Truppenführung manual, H.Dv. 487, *Führung unde Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen* (Command and Combat of Combined Arms) published in two parts in 1921 and 1923. When the Germans gave a new name to the new manual, Turkish General Staff retained the translation of H.Dv.487's title as the title of the Turkish version of *Truppenführung*. The first part of *Truppenführung* manual was published on 24 February 1936²⁴ and the second part was published on 20 September 1937.²⁵ A close look at *Truppenführung* and its Turkish version reveal a mot-a-mot translation from German into Turkish, with the entire text being the same, and only some annexes in the second part omitted or different in the Turkish version.²⁶ Therefore German warfighting philosophy and military education style did not really wane, at least in the case of Turkish Army and Turkish General Staff.

Özcan also argues that the old generation trained according to "Prussian" methods wanted to keep the Republican Party in power in 1950 and were than swept away by the younger generation of officers in 1960 who were trained according to American methods. Here, Özcan unfortunately falls into a trap of oversimplification. Indeed, pro-İnönü generals, including the Chief of General Staff General Nafiz Gürman and some officers were swept, not in 1960 but in June 1950, just after Democratic Party took over as they were aligned too much with the outgoing Government and there were rumors that they were involved in preparations of a military coup to prevent DP from taking over. Those with whom they were replaced,

²³ Gencer Özcan, "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ordusunda Prusya Etkisi", in Evren Balta Paker & İsmet Akça (eds.), *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010).

²⁴ Genelkurmay Başkanlığı. 1939. *Muhtelif Sınıfların Birlikte Sevk ve Muharebe Talimnamesi*, 1. Kısım, 2. Tabı. Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası, unnumbered page following the cover bearing Fevzi Çakmak's order on the application of the manual.

²⁵ Genelkurmay Başkanlığı. 1937. *Muhtelif Sınıfların Birlikte Sevk ve Muharebe Talimnamesi*, 2. Kısım. Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası, unnumbered page following the cover bearing Fevzi Çakmak's order on the application of the new manual. Çakmak says in his order: "...Command and Battle manual's second part and annexes is hereby published. I ask the Army to implement it fully..."

starting from the new Chief of General Staff Nuri Yamut, were more or less from the same generation and had the same educational background. In other words, the underlying theme of the sweep was not “Prussian versus American trained” but “Republican versus Democrat leaning” generals and officers. Coming to the sweep in 1960, the generation of colonels and lieutenant colonels that constituted the bulk of the sweep were predominantly graduates of Turkish Military Academy between 1936 and 1945, when German thinking and education style prevailed unchallenged in the Turkish Army and the General Staff. They were subjected to U.S. doctrines and training starting from 1948 but whether they went from “Prussian” to “American” is doubtful. While there was a solid ground by 1960 to reduce the number of officers at certain levels, the determining factor as to who was going to be chosen was whether the officer in question was sympathetic to the 1960 coup and had close relations to its perpetrators, the National Unity Committee, or not. On the negative side, having worked closely and loyally with DP Government meant an express ticket out of the military, however successful one officer has been. Too much alignment with the deposed Government even put the then Chief of General Staff in jail with a death sentence converted to life in prison.

Özcan depends in developing his argument on the memoirs of officers like Dündar Seyhan, Orhan Erkanlı and Talat Aydemir, who were involved in the turmoil of the coup in 1960. It is true that these were the leaders of a younger generation of officers who sent to retirement almost all of the generals and around 3000 officers from the Armed Forces in 1960, but it was not a U.S. trained vs. German trained kind of rivalry that triggered the onslaught of officers. In addition to the underlying political reasons given above, the high numbers of general officers as well as the

²⁶ A detailed comparison of the two German and Turkish versions will be provided in the chapter on Turkish Military by 1947.

high numbers of officers, especially due to high numbers of officers trained during just before and during WWII had made it impossible for the young and restless generation of officers to reach higher echelons at some stage in their lives. In fact, young officers had been uneasy even during Atatürk's and İnönü's time as promotion periods were long (9 years for captain) and upper echelons were filled with War of Liberation heroes who had served with Atatürk, İnönü and Fevzi Çakmak. Another reason why officers like Dündar Seyhan and Talat Aydemir were so negative about the older generation was that General Fevzi Çakmak and his likes came to signify everything this younger generation hated about the deprivations of their profession and their country.²⁷ However, reliance on the accounts of the Turkish military's most daring and uncontrollable officers in the 1950s and early 1960s may obscure the overall picture and such accounts must be used very carefully. The intergenerational fight was not about military training styles, it was a fight on who would rise. The role of the American aid at this point in late 1940s and early 1950s was that it provided many young and aspiring officers the chance to break the vicious circle they were in. They were sent abroad, trained, and brought back to service schools to disseminate their knowledge and experience and thus gained and wielded enormous prestige in the Armed Forces.

Serhat Güvenç's chapter²⁸ in the same volume is most relevant for this

²⁷ We must note again that the memoirs written by officers belong mainly to those who were involved in coups and coup attempts. Of the officers Özcan quotes, Seyhan, Erkanlı and Aydemir were all involved in the preparation of the 1960 coup at some stage. Dündar Seyhan was assigned to Washington D.C. just before the coup, Aydemir was assigned to the Turkish Brigade in Korea and both returned quickly to the country after the coup while Orhan Erkanlı was the coup's strong man who organized officers in armored units. But since Seyhan and Aydemir were not in the country during the coup on May 27, they could not become a member of the Committee of National Union. They cooperated to bring about a new junta, the Armed Forces Union, and were against the handover of the administration to the civilians. Seyhan and Aydemir launched a coup attempt on 22 February 1962 but were unsuccessful. Aydemir was immediately retired from the Army, but he did not stop planning and launched another coup attempt in May 1963, after which he was convicted and executed.

²⁸ Güvenç, Serhat, "ABD Askeri Yardımı ve Türk Ordusunun Dönüşümü, 1947-1960 (U.S. Military Assistance and the Transformation of Turkish Army)," in Evren Balta Parker and İsmet Akça eds.,

dissertation. Güvenç argues that it was not possible to argue a full shift from the German/Prussian paradigm to the American military paradigm by 1960. He argues that especially due to the success of the General Staff to preserve its influence over that military structure, a mix of German/American military structure has prevailed in Turkey. Adding to this was the fact that Turkey's resources were limited and a military philosophy based on operational maneuvers rather than resource-based attrition was preserved by the Turkish military for a considerable period.

Indeed, Turkish General Staff had to change under U.S. (and to some extent NATO) pressure from an Army dominated German style General Staff into a joint headquarters. In fact, an American way of war by the resource hungry Turkish Army was adopted willingly and this caused enormous problem for Turkish economy and was the main issue in Turkey's problems in the 1950s. By 1954, it was agreed by the Turkish Government and the U.S. side to bring Turkish Army to revised U.S. Army tables of organization and equipment (TO&E). An already large military establishment that was equipped to the teeth with U.S. motorized equipment, armor, weaponry and ammunition as well as American emphasis on resource use and combat readiness implied huge amounts of foreign exchange needs beyond the country's resources. Güvenç's arguments tend to contradict himself also as he argues on one hand that U.S. field manuals were being naturalized into Turkish practice rather than directly translated and on the other hand, he goes on to quote Orhan Erkanlı that field manuals were translated down to every bit of detail, including "regiment chaplain" as "regiment imam". It is also rather debatable whether the preservation of the General Staff on top of American military organization, doctrine and education made the Turkish system a strange amalgamation of

Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti (Military, State and Politics of Security in Turkey), (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 255-284.

“German/American Paradigms”. It is true that there was widespread reaction against the way U.S. Army field manuals were translated mot-a-mot around 1948-1949. During General Nuri Yamut’s tenure as Chairman of Turkish General Staff, there was an effort to produce a field manual system that stood between old German inspired model and new American model. As Güvenç rightly argues, “Field Operations 100-5” was adopted as “TAB 100-1 Sevk ve Muharebere (Harekat)”.²⁹ A quick look at this manual reveals however, that it was almost entirely the same as 1949 version of U.S. Army Field Service Regulations-Operation. There were only minor and logical changes such as the addition of “horse cavalry” into Part II “Arms and Services” as the Turkish Army at that time still contained horse cavalry.³⁰ The most important addition is Part III “Air Forces” which defines the functions of various Air Force units such as Tactical Air Force, Air Defense Command, Air Service Command, Air Engineer Command and most strangely, Strategic Air Force.³¹ There never was and has never been a Strategic Air Force within Turkish military at any time. Therefore, this part looks borrowed from American sources as well. Indeed, the cover of the manual indicated the words “Kara, Deniz, Hava Kuvvetlerine ve Her Sınıfa Mahsus” (Pertaining to Ground Force, Naval Force, Air Force and all arms and services). Thus Chapter 3 Leadership, Chapter 4 The Exercise of Command, Chapter 5 Combat Intelligence, Chapter 6 Security, Chapter 7 Troop Movements, Chapter 8 Offensive were respectively enumerated 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 in the Turkish version. One of the few important differences in the Turkish version is that it defined frontal widths of infantry battalions and divisions while the American manual did not make any such prescription and mentioned general principles, which

²⁹ Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *TAB 100-1 Sevk ve Muharebe (Harekat), Kara, Deniz ve Hava Kuvvetlerine ve Her Sınıfa Mahsus*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1950.

³⁰ Ibid, p. I. This part strangely threw out Quartermasters, Medical Department Units, Ordnance and Transportation.

were also translated into the Turkish version. The only difference that can be considered as “major” was that in the content of the Turkish chapter on “The Defensive”, the part on “delaying action” was taken out from “The Defensive” and inserted into the following chapter on “Retrograde Movements”. Finally, in the Turkish manual TAB 100-1, there was an added part on “Border Protection” under chapter 12 “Special Operations”.³² Similarly, the organization of cavalry division was added to Chapter 14 on “Division”.³³ Finally, the appendix on “Lessons of the Pearl Harbor Attack” was omitted from the Turkish version. While Güvenç evaluates these differences as an effort to preserve some autonomy and originality, indeed it reflects a tendency on the part of the General Staff to act as a direct command of all field forces, in a way resenting the existence of Ground Force Command and Air Force Command as independent forces. It was therefore an attempt of power grab by the General Staff, rather than an effort to preserve “the German inspired” tradition. In any case more than 90 % adoption of American content hardly qualifies the Turkish manual as “hybrid”. Moreover, in 1952,³⁴ the General Staff changed the code of the manual from “TAB 100-1” to “ST 100-5”, a sign of full adoption of U.S. Army manual methodology. Indeed, in order to use the old TAB 100-1 under the new title, labels bearing the “ST 100-5” abbreviation were just stuck over the TAB 100-1 title.³⁵ Moreover, in June 1953, a new version was published by the same General Staff headed by the same General Nuri Yamut, this time omitting the strange part on Air Force and even containing the appendix of the original American manual on

³¹ Ibid, p. II.

³² Chapter 11 in 100-5 Operations, 1949.

³³ Chapter 13 in 100-5 Operations, 1949.

³⁴ Order of General Staff, Chief of Operations, Training Department, dates 7 May 1952, no. 136083, enclosure in ST 100-5 1952 version, author’s collection. This version was produced by putting a sticker “ST 100-5” on the previous TAB 100-1 version of 1950. When this change was made, Chairman of General Staff was again General Nuri Yamut.

³⁵ Author’s collection includes both versions of the 1950 Turkish manual.

Pearl Harbor³⁶, becoming much more loyal to the original U.S. Army version. Güvenç does not explain this change and indeed it is difficult to trace a consistent argumentation in Güvenç's work other than the dichotomy of German inspired vs. American inspired systems. In fact, in just 3 years of transition to jets, Turkish Air Force, jealous of its identity and status as a separate force, had become a powerful and popular focus of Turkey's military transformation and thus was able to push back General Yamut's power grab by refusing to be described by a General Staff manual. The only case where American model was collectively rejected by the Turkish military happened in the field of staff officer education. Until 1950, War Academy education lasted for uninterrupted 3 years based on the German *Kriegsakademie* model. First year education involved battalion and regiment level operations, second year involved division level operations and 3rd year involved command higher than division and joint warfare.³⁷ The U.S. Army system, on the other hand, distributed these 3 years to different schools as officer talent management and retention was entirely different in the U.S. Army. At the insistence of JAMMAT, U.S. system was adopted in Turkish War Academies from 1950. Nevertheless, it was reversed in a couple of years as the American system of staff education blurred the boundaries between staff and non-staff officers. In the Turkish officer training and development system, however, generalship was reserved for staff officers, with their red collar labels, constituting the "crème de la crème" of the Army. Becoming a staff officer meant a shift in class and the opening of further promotion opportunities beyond colonelship. Army officers, especially those that were the first subjects of change in 1950 and 1951, were most reactive against the change as this was creating

³⁶ Erkanıharbiyeyi Umumiye Riyaseti Sahra Talimnamesi, ST 100-5, Harekat (Sevk ve Muharebe), E.U. Basımevi, 1954; author's collection.

uncertainty for their future careers.

In another article published in *Cold War Studies Journal* in 2021, Serhat Güvenç, together with Mesut Uyar have apparently made more use of RG 334 sources without referring to the Record Group as such. The authors argue that “that the two militaries clashed over a number of institutional, strategic and cultural matters from the onset. The US military assistance did not result in Turkish military’s transformation along the US military system. Nevertheless, it precipitated a long overdue generational change within a decade. The US-trained young officers purged the Prussian/German-trained old guard from the ranks.” While it is true, as will be seen in this dissertation, that U.S. trained officers rapidly advanced in the Turkish Army, their education and experiences along American practices accelerated the transformation Güvenç & Uyar denied ever having taking place.³⁸ Güvenç and Uyar argued that “the Turkish military authorities were not as obedient in their dealings with the US military mission....From the onset, the resistance to reform and reorganisation along the lines of the American model had been strong. The transformative impact of US military aid was thus mitigated by the Turkish military’s peculiar historical, institutional and societal experiences for much of the Cold War.”³⁹ The authors use of sources seem to be sporadic and selective, tending to favor their pre-conceived string of arguments for a relatively very long period of time from 1947 to 1960 that is really difficult to fit in an article length work with all three services included. Indeed, in this time span, Turkey’s military went through a deep, painful and costly transformation in which it willingly became ever more like

³⁷ Avni Çırnaz, *Harp Akademisi 1944-1945 Tedrisatından: II. Sınıf Tabiye Meseleleri (From War Academy 1944-1945 Curriculum: 2nd Year Tactical Problems)*. (Ankara: Harp Akademisi Matbaası, 1946); p. 1.

³⁸ Serhat Güvenç and Mesut Uyar, “Lost in translation or transformation? The impact of American aid on the Turkish military, 1947–60”, *Cold War Studies* 41 No. 2 (2022): 59-77.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 60.

the U.S. military. Moreover, the authors' arguments completely clash with the findings in this thesis. There was wholesale willingness to transform Turkish military along U.S. lines which was largely successful. Problems occurred from time to time, understandably in such a large and complex relationship. But the principal direction did not change over the long term.

In a more recent article, this time with lead author as Mesut Uyar, Uyar and Güvenç argued that "The Americans, on the other hand, had extremely limited experience and previous knowledge of Turkey and the TAF. Additionally, their mandate constrained them to focus on short-term quick-impact projects. Consequently, they did not consider it an opportunity to re-cast the Turkish military in line with the global interests of the US yet."⁴⁰ Indeed, JAMMAT was from the very outset intent on making Turkish military a potent force along U.S. lines and indoctrination of current and future officers was key to such mission from day one, as will be seen in activities undertaken by the Mission between 1947-1950.

This Uyar-Güvenç article basically compares and contrasts the German Military Mission and U.S. Military Mission, with 35 years, two world wars and one Turkish Revolution apart. It falls into the trap of generalizing such as "There were many similarities between the experiences of both missions. They suffered from ignorance, insensitivity and cultural prejudices due to their poor linguistic and cultural preparations."⁴¹ Uyar and Güvenç start the German military mission on 1913 and ignore more than 50 years of German influence over the Ottoman military. They also find German mission more successful with their top-down approach in contrast to Americans' bottom-up approach, whatever it means. Indeed, such top down approach led to severe clashes between Turkish and German Generals and was a

⁴⁰ Mesut Uyar and Serhat Güvenç, "A tale of two military missions: The Germans in the Ottoman Empire and the Americans in the Republic of Turkey", *War & Society* 47 No: 2 (2022), 85-106.

critical lesson learned for the founders of the Republic. On the other hand, available evidence from the records of JAMMAT, which the authors claim to have consulted in fact proves that Chief of JAMMAT and members of the US Military Mission in Ankara enjoyed a very high respect for years, with their chief, a Major General, having comfortable access to Chief of General Staff, Ministers, Prime Minister and even the President. One then wonders how much top down a military relationship can be. Most importantly, I have not come across the trace of any documents with the content the two authors claim took place between two sides in December 1950.⁴² Uyar also argues that with entry into NATO, JAMMAT lost its primacy and was placed under European Command with other Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGS). Indeed, this was just a natural consequence of Turkey's becoming a NATO member that became part of NATO's Southern Flank, whose American Army units were placed under U.S. European Command. There is no indication that the U.S. Military Mission lost influence from then on. Just the opposite, by this time, U.S. Mission had become an almost integral part of Turkish military life.

One recent Ph.D. dissertation by Howard Munsoon IV from Washington State University is of greatest interest for this dissertation. In this dissertation, Munsoon makes significant use of Joint American Military Mission to Turkey (JAMMAT) archives among Record Group 334 of National Archives. Munsoon argues that while U.S. military assistance was on the surface a military modernization program designed as part of a containment strategy, in reality "JAMMAT also functioned to outfit and direct the Turkish military into a crucial and unknown role in top secret Anglo-American contingency war plans as a sacrificial

⁴¹ Ibid., 85.

⁴² The footnote of the authors contain the following: "Memorandum for Record", 6 December 1950, 250/6, Conferences TGS, RG 334, NA." Entry 250 under RG 334 does not include any such 6TH folder. There are Conferences folders in Entry 255, but those folder contain records from 1954.

speed bump in the event of full-scale war with the Soviet Union. Within this context, the work of JAMMAT did serve overt Turkish national security interests, but only secondarily to secret U.S. strategic designs.” Munsoon also argues that ironically, this work of JAMMAT combined with the Korean War where the Turkish brigade performed excellently, increasing the value of Turkey as an ally to such a degree that the U.S. pushed for Turkey’s inclusion into NATO. Munsoon also underlines the work of JAMMAT as a blueprint for other military assistance missions the United States undertook in other parts of the world.⁴³

Munsoon’s main argument is that Turkey unwittingly walked into a trap of accepting American-British war plans that would involve Turkish forces withdrawing in the face of Soviet attack until the pocket of the Gulf İskenderun in the South. This argument is one that has become a conventional wisdom among military history enthusiasts in Turkey. The acceptance of this thesis assumes that during and after WWII, Turkey was willing and able to stand its ground against a Soviet attack from East and West and did not plan or implement withdrawals. Indeed, during the War against the Germans and during the 1946 crisis, Turkish Army implemented strategic withdrawals aimed at force protection and at mobile defense. The withdrawals of the Turkish Army’s withdrawals from Kars-Sarikamis area to Erzurum lines in 1946 is well known if not properly researched.⁴⁴ In the west, Turkish units on the Bulgarian and Greek fronts, mostly consisting of foot soldiers and horse drawn units, were forced to their limits in mobile deployments. The ordeal of 32nd Division during the period of 1941-1942 is a case in point. With the German

⁴³ Howard Munsoon IV, “The Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, Implementing the Truman Doctrine and Transforming the U.S. Foreign Policy, 1947-1954” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation), Washington State University, 2012; p. iv.

⁴⁴ In September 1946, 9th Corps and other units on the Kars defense line had withdrawn overnight to Erzurum lines. Dündar Seyhan, *Gölgedeki Adam* (The Man in the Shadows), (İstanbul: Nurettin Uycan Matbaası, 1966); pp. 24-25.

invasion of first Bulgaria and then Greece, Turkish Army indeed implemented a rather flexible and “mobile” defense. In early April 1941 when Germany entered Bulgaria, 32nd Division was ordered to withdraw to Edirne from Havza, closer to the frontline. This division returned to Havsa after 3 months once it became known that Germans would not attack Turkey. Then in October 1941, when Germans attacked Greece, 32nd Division was tasked to cover the retreat of 10th Corps from Turkey’s Bulgarian border back to Hadımköy, close to İstanbul and further east of Çatalca. It was feared that a German incursion through Turkey’s borders with Greece would put the forces up north on the Bulgarian borders in an impossible situation. Then 32nd Division was ordered to defend northern section of Gallipoli peninsula from Karaburgaz Village (currently Ocaklı village) and spreaded to Ganos (currently Gaziköy) of Şarköy on South Thrace. In sum, just as an example, 32nd Division moved several times in a matter of 7 months from April to October 1941. The division first moved from Havsa to Edirne from Edirne back to Havsa, from Havsa to Pehlivanköy, from Pehlivanköy to Çöpköy, from Çöpköy to Çokal village and finally from Çokal village to Ocaklı village, a distance of 232 kilometers in today’s road conditions. This division was finally separated from 10th Corps and was included in 2nd Corps organization on the Gallipoli peninsula, a corps that consisted of 5 divisions.⁴⁵

As the 32nd Division covered the retreat of 10th Corps, it was passing through such towns as Keşan and Malkara.

It was nighttime as we passed through Keşan. People were on the street, stopping our march columns and shouting at us ‘Where are you going? How can you leave us?’. We were destroyed by these scenes but there was not much to do. It was really a right decision at the time. Instead of having our foot and horse drawn units annihilated by German armored and motorized units in the vast flatland of Thrace, it was much safer to move to position ourselves along the lines of Koruköy, Ganos and Hadımköy. In our entire division, the only motor

⁴⁵ Kenan Evren. *Kenan Evren’in Anıları, Cilt 1* (Kenan Evren’s Memoirs, Vol. 1. (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990); 69-70. By coincidence, Kenan Evren and Dündar Seyhan were both graduates of

*equipment was a German Stover brand car and a truck, the first being the division commander's car and the truck being used for food supplies.*⁴⁶

As Kenan Evren further thought about this period, he underlined "...with such a division, how could we fight against an armored and motorized enemy division in open land? Therefore, it was found more appropriate to fight in fortified positions, an idea with which I agree." Evren further stated that "...the Army of the time could fight the Germans to death only in such fortified positions."⁴⁷

Indeed, during WWII, İnönü and the Turkish High Command were counting on British (and possibly American assistance after 1941) in case of German attack. "İnönü used to gather and talk to staff officers frequently. He used to start speaking asking 'Do you hear me?' and used to continue: 'If we can hold against the enemy three to four months, we will receive a lot of assistance. If we dissolve suddenly, we will be destroyed.'"⁴⁸ İnönü, Turkish General Staff, Army and corps level commanders were all veterans of the War of Liberation and had skillfully implemented a mobile defense during the War of Liberation in which Turkish Army retreated close to Ankara during Sakarya Battle against the Greek Army and finally defeated it a year later in West Central Anatolian plateau. Therefore, arguing that Turkish political leadership and the General Staff by late 1940s had no clue on how to fight a war in Anatolian heartland and that they were sweettalked into accepting American-British war plans lacks historical background. The JAMMAT emphasis on using the Gulf of İskenderun as a pocket to stop and finally push back Turkish withdrawal against possible Soviet attack was the only plan that made sense, there was not much alternative to it and that is why Turkish General Staff accepted it. In fact, I have found not a single page in JAMMAT archives that suggested any

War Academy Class of '38 and both graduated from Artillery School.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 69.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 70.

rejection by Turkey of such plans. While a very important contribution to history of U.S.-Turkish military relations, Munsoon has used, among thousands of pages of documents in JAMMAT archives, almost exclusively the Monthly Progress reports and several minutes of meetings. This is also the case for Güvenç's chapter. A great part of source material stays untouched in NARA archives. Interestingly, both Munsoon and Güvenç have referred to Monthly Progress Report files of JAMMAT but have failed to make use of or mention the existence of hardcopy pictures attached to the end of each Progress Report from January 1948 to late 1952, which are a treasure trove with which JAMMAT tried to showcase as its success story.

This dissertation aims at writing a narrative of the formative years of Turkish-U.S. military relationship by focusing on two dimension one political and the other military. On the political dimension, I focus on the role played by the Turkish Government at the time, namely the İnönü Government in the narrow sense and İnönü's Republican People's Party at a larger sense. I argue that İnönü and Turkey embraced large scale U.S. assistance and influence willingly as in the "Empire by invitation" thesis. The conventional view takes Turkey's alignment with the United States and the resulting military assistance program as granted and inevitable. Apparently, the United States, especially the Pentagon and the State Department had a place in mind for Turkey in their version of the post-war world. This place required supporting Turkey militarily and economically but domestic political conditions for this step became permitting when Britain declared it could no more support Greece and Turkey. Truman Administration skillfully mounted Turkey to the sense of great urgency occurring around Greece and thus into the aid package. Once Truman Aid was adopted in Congress, both the Pentagon and the State Department were publicly

⁴⁸ Cemal Madanoğlu, Korgeneral Cemal Madanoğlu'nun Anıları (Memoirs of Lt. General Cemal Madanoğlu), (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2019); p. 239.

very careful about making any statement that would alarm the Congress by mentioning a multi-year program. But both the Pentagon and State Department worked behind the scenes to prepare the conditions to continue military assistance to Greece and Turkey and then other European countries for extended periods.

On the other side, Turkish Government was not an idly sitting and passive player. On the opposite, Turkish Government, under President İnönü, aptly used Soviet moves against herself to ensure closer political alignment with the West and especially with the United States. Therefore, Turkish Government's embrace of U.S. assistance was an active move not only engaging American strength in Turkey's defense but also seeking to ensure the continuity of the political power of RPP and İnönü in the post WW II period. This was therefore an act of "invitation" of "American Empire".⁴⁹

On the military dimension, this dissertation also argues that the U.S. military assistance to Turkey made several lasting effects on US policy as well as Turkey's fate. Firstly, before US military assistance, Turkey's military was already the nation's strongest institution. With the assistance, Turkish military took a sudden leap toward gradually becoming an effective fighting machine. If anything, through the adoption of US equipment, doctrine and organizational model, Turkish Army became a solid military institution able to wage sustained maneuver warfare and therefore an effective deterrent.

While the initial Truman Aid legislation did not foresee assistance beyond 1948, successive extensions and finally Turkey's inclusion into NATO, which itself is at least partially the product of military-to-military cooperation and trust, ensured Turkey's military modernization became an everlasting focus of the relationship

⁴⁹ Geir Lundestad, *The American "empire" and other studies of US foreign policy in a comparative perspective* (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press ; Oslo ; Norwegian University Press, 1990), 5.

between Turkey and the United States. By the end of the Cold War in late 1980s the Turkish military had become one of the strongest in its region and its ability to secure the country had reached levels incomparable to those in the first three decades of the existence of Turkish Republic. Therefore, the U.S. military assistance that started in 1947, aside from itself being a non-binding but unmistakable commitment by the United States in Turkey's security, is an extremely, if not "the most", important element of Turkey's history after WWII also because of its effects on the Turkish military's long-term viability and therefore on the security situation of Turkey. For the first time in almost three centuries, Turkey ensured a solid security guarantee with U.S. commitment to its defense and then through NATO from 1952.

In further detail, this dissertation seeks to answer the following questions:

1. What was the role of Turkey's Government and the general Turkish public sentiment in embracing U.S. assistance after WWII?
2. How did Turkey's armed forces look like following the end of WWII and before the introduction of Truman Aid?
3. What were the legal instruments and bureaucratic mechanisms that started the cooperation?
4. How did Turkish-U.S. military cooperation start and evolve until 1950? Was there a structured way of managing the assistance?
5. What was the impact of U.S. military assistance especially on Turkish Army in organizational, doctrinal as well as in social and political dimensions? How and to what extent did Turkish military doctrine, especially Turkish Army's tactical doctrine, change after 1947?

In answering the above questions, this dissertation mainly makes use of Records of Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey under Record Group

334, Records of Interservice Agencies at the College Park location of U.S. National Archives and Record Administration. In addition to this, a more limited use has been made of records at Truman Presidential Library, Prime Ministry State Archives in Ankara and Turkish General Staff archives. Memoirs of Turkish officers have been very helpful in providing critical glimpses into the thinking of political and military leaders of the era as well as insights into the inner workings of the aid process.

This dissertation does not analyze U.S. military presence in Turkey. While covering the processes and evolution of the relationship, it focuses on the doctrinal and capability aspects of the impact of U.S.-Turkish military relationship on the transformation of Turkish military. In this, focus will be placed on Turkish Army and the interaction with U.S. Army doctrine. This is due to three factors. Firstly, the Army has traditionally been the largest part of Turkish military. Second and relatedly, it was the most difficult part to reform. Third, the physical constraints of a dissertation would not be enough to cover the assistance process in all three services (land, sea and air) in enough detail.

Turkish civil-military relations, about which thousands of pages have been written, will not be discussed as a distinct topic.

In analyzing the much talked about U.S. inspired doctrinal change, this dissertation looks at the evolution of Turkish Army's tactical doctrine, tracing it through, primarily, "FM 100-5 Operations" manual and its Turkish equivalent "ST 100-5 Harekat". This comparative approach also analyzes how the command structure of Turkish military looked like before 1947-1948, when a series of reforms were introduced and also identifies the contours of prevalent military thinking at the end of WWII and before the introduction of Truman Aid.

The dissertation covers the years between 1947 and 1950 which will be treated as the first major period of U.S.-Turkish military relationship. June 1950 has been selected to limit the volume of the work as with the onset of the Korean War and the subsequent acceleration in Turkish US military assistance relationship, the amount of archival material increases exponentially, and the material becomes more technical and procedural.

CHAPTER II: TURKEY'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY AND PROSPERITY BEFORE AND AFTER WORLD WAR II

The conventional view of Turkey's victory in the War of Liberation in 1922 and the proclamation of the Republic in 1923 tends to ignore and overview the economic and security problems of the new country, most of which it inherited from the Ottoman State and some of which its mere existence as a non-Islamist nation state based on Turkish identity gave rise. The official history view, while romantically amplifying the achievements of the new Republic, has indeed blurred the existential pains of the young Republic over the years and rather than praising the survival achievement of the young republic, this view has sought to highlight domestic political and social achievements as well as paint a romantic picture of self-sufficiency. This interestingly undermined an understanding by the large masses in the Republican period of the dangers and continuous crises the young country found itself in and tried to navigate its way through. This chapter briefly explores the economic, international and military situation from 1923 until 1947 in general outlines. It is necessary to lay out the perilous conditions and years in which Turkey frantically searched to ensure its security to understand why Turkey, almost as a whole embraced American involvement in its security after World War II in the form of military assistance with such enthusiasm.

1. International position

Turkey after 1923 had to re-establish links with practically the entire world due both to its belligerency in WWI as well as the regime change from Ottoman State to the Turkish republic. While Lausanne Treaty established the basis of Turkey's relations with Lausanne parties, the country spent a significant effort to be recognized and establish diplomatic relations with European and World countries.

Russia and Afghanistan had extended recognition before Lausanne while Iran had recognized Turkey in 1922. Turkey then established diplomatic relations with the following countries:

Table 1. Turkey's establishment of diplomatic relations with non-Lausanne Treaty Parties⁵⁰

Date	Country
July 23, 1923	Poland
December 15, 1923	Albania
December 18, 1923	Hungary
January 28, 1924	Austria
March 3, 1924	Germany
May 31, 1924	Sweden
August 16, 1924	Netherlands
September 28, 1924	Spain
October 11, 1924	Czechoslovakia
December 1, 1924	Estonia
December 9, 1924	Finland
January 3, 1925	Latvia
January 26, 1925	Denmark
May 2, 1925	Norway
September 19, 1925	Switzerland
October 18, 1925	Bulgaria
October 28, 1925	Yugoslavia
January 30, 1926	Chile
June 29, 1926	Argentina
September 8, 1927	Brazil
January 4, 1929	Uruguay
August 3, 1929	Saudi Arabia
September 17, 1930	Lithuania
April 4, 1934	China

The above list is that of countries with which Turkey has signed Friendship Agreements establishing diplomatic relations. Such an effort itself was a time consuming and exhausting effort with the meager sources of the country, especially in the mid-1920s when sympathy for Turkey in the world was not very high. As Turkey progressed under Atatürk's leadership undertaking sweeping political and social reforms, acceptance of the regime widened towards the end of 1930s.

Since the U.S. was not at war with the Ottomans at any time, the U.S. had only observer status during Lausanne Treaty negotiations and thus was not a party to the main agreement. Nevertheless, Turkish Delegate İnönü was in contact with U.S.

observer Joseph Grew and signed a separate instrument with Grew, a Friendship and Commerce Treaty, on 6 August 1923 in Lausanne.

This Treaty was not voted in the Senate for a long period due to pro-Armenian circles and when the U.S. Government decided to push it in the Senate out of fear that the U.S. would fall in a disadvantageous situation as Turkey adopted a new Customs Act erecting tariff protections, it failed to receive 2/3 majority in the Senate. Following this, the U.S. and Turkey signed an executive agreement laying the basis for exchange of Ambassadors, after which Joseph Grew came to Ankara in 1927 as first U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. It took another 4 years until 1931 for a Friendship and Commerce Treaty to properly set the base of the diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Following the establishment of relations, the U.S. acted much more positively towards Turkey than France and the UK. This was largely due to the excellent work of both first Ambassadors on each side, Joseph Grew and Ahmet Muhtar. However, Ahmet Muhtar's arrival in the U.S. was eventful with large demonstrations staged by Armenians. It is interesting to note, however, that Turkish Ambassador Ahmet Muhtar identified British involvement and support as a major factor behind the Armenian propaganda activity causing complications in the relationship with the new Turkish Republic.⁵¹

The story of the period of 1923-1938 is in sum a torture for the new Republic as it fought to maintain a fragile security vis-à-vis the West and its neighbors while trying to sustain a bumpy relationship with the Soviets. Soviets seemingly wanted a Turkey that turned firmly in Russian orbit and were wary of any sign of rapprochement with any Western country.

⁵⁰ Gürün, *Savaşan Dünya ve Türkiye*, p. 144.

⁵¹ Gürün, *Savaşan Dünya ve Türkiye*, p. 194-196.

“From Montreux onwards, it was evident that trust and sincerity was at a loss in the relationship between Turkey and the Soviets. Turkey’s increasing cooperation with Western countries was a point of concern for Russia. Russian dissatisfaction with Turkey’s friendship with states other than themselves couples with demands repeating old Czarist claims such as joint defense of the Straits naturally pushed Turkey towards cooperation calls from the West, which increasingly soured relations.”⁵²

Turkey’s struggle to stay out of WWII and its policies during the War have direct relationship with its position in the post WWII era. Although Turkey’s WWII policies are almost universally hailed as successful in keeping the country out of war, this story is not the subject of this dissertation. However, if it comes to summarizing Turkish foreign policy in WWII, we have to state that Turkey under President İnönü wanted the best of the two worlds, allying with Britain and requesting military assistance of enormous amounts from the Allies on one hand while continuing to trade with Germany and other Axis powers, turning a blind eye to German use of the Straits and hopelessly wishing for German survival at the end of the war. The second most important thing to state about Turkey’s foreign policy between 1938-1947 period is that it was unquestionably the policy of President İnönü. If Turkish Foreign Policy was a three-way process between Atatürk, İnönü and Tefik Rüşti Aras until İnönü’s resignation as Prime Minister in 1937, under İnönü’s Presidency there was an unquestionable İnönü mark on the making of the foreign policy, centralizing the process at the Presidential Palace in Çankaya.

While it is not the purpose of this dissertation to analyze in detail Turkey’s foreign policy during WWII, it is nevertheless necessary to understand the complex and often contradictory nature of Turkey’s balancing moves.

a) Relations with Russia

Turkey’s relations with USSR took a turn for the worse from 1936 Montreux Convention and especially in 1937 during the Nyon Conference.

⁵² Gürin, Savaşan Dünya ve Türkiye, p. 530.

Without much of a development in 1938, 1939 was the year that marked the beginning of the end in the relations. While seeking to align itself with Britain and France under a military alliance as the war approached, the ideal scenario for Turkey was an alliance with the participation of Soviets so that Turkey would not be seen as threatening to the Russians. A process to seal a mutual assistance agreement between USSR and Turkey, however, went on from 15 April to 15 October, without any result. By 23 August, much to the shock of Turkey and the whole world, Soviets signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, rendering Turkish efforts for a Soviet pact useless as the main aim of Turkey's search for a Soviet Pact was against Germany. The process ended on 15 October, with Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu returning to Turkey in reaction to increasingly blunt Soviet demands from Turkey. Saraçoğlu stayed in Moscow from 15 September to 15 October, negotiating with Soviet high-level officials, including Stalin and had the opportunity to understand first-hand Soviet motivations, resisting endless Soviet pressures and demands focusing on a change of Straits regime in favor of USSR.

b) Relations with Allies

Turkey first signed an Anglo-Turkish Declaration with Britain on 12 May 1939. Following solution of final issues on Sanjak with France, a declaration with same content was signed with France on 23 June. These declarations contained the commitment of the three parties for a mutual assistance pact toward aggression by a European power. The treaty was negotiated throughout the summer and initialed on 23 September. It consisted of comprehensive economic and military assistance provisions toward Turkey while Turkey added a 2nd protocol that it would not fulfill its commitments if such fulfillment put it in danger of Soviet aggression. Once Turkey understood that Soviets could not be

relied upon for security against Germany, the Government signed Anglo-French-Turkish on 19 October 1939 in Ankara.⁵³

The first article of the treaty committed Britain and France to assist Turkey militarily should Turkey be attacked by a European State. The second article mentions an aggression by a European state in the Mediterranean Sea against Britain and France or against Turkey, in which case parties were obliged to assist each other. The aggressor state implied in this clause was Italy.

The third article committed Turkey to assist Britain and France should these two be involved in war due to the security guarantees they have extended to Greece and Rumania. Article 4 stipulated that should Britain and France be attacked in a manner not requiring Turkey's assistance, Turkey retain a benevolent neutrality and that parties would hold consultations.

Article 5 stipulates that parties would hold consultations in case of aggressions against states other than Greece and Romania to which France and Britain have given security guarantees, such aggression in the opinion of any party to be constituting a threat also to its own security. This article probably meant countries like Belgium and Netherlands from Franco-British perspective and Yugoslavia from Turkish perspective.

Article 6 underlined the defensive nature of the treaty and that it was not aimed against any one state. Article 7 clarified that while it was a tri-partite treaty, commitments included therein were bilateral, thus keeping the Treaty in force after Germany's invasion of France. Finally, article 8 stipulated that should parties engage in war because of their commitments, they would not conclude separate armistice and peace treaties.

⁵³ Gürin, *Savaşan Dünya ve Türkiye*, p. 668-669.

The treaty also included three protocols; a secret first protocol being related to the immediate entry into force of the Treaty. The third protocol was also secret and committed Britain and France to undertake effective cooperation with Turkey and to assist Turkey upon its demand when a military operation by a European state reached Bulgarian or Greek border.

The second protocol involved Turkey's reservation regarding the Soviet Union and stated that commitments undertaken by Turkey within the Treaty would not force or require her to be engaged in armed conflict with the Soviet Union.⁵⁴

Together with this Treaty, a Military Agreement was signed, regulating how military assistance to Turkey was to be made. Moreover, a Special Agreement was also signed, including three different lines of credit by the UK and France worth a total of 43.5 million pounds sterling.⁵⁵ 25 million of this amount was a loan to be paid back in 20 years over 4 % interest and to be used for military equipment and arms purchases. 15 million of the amounts was to be delivered to Turkey in gold to strengthen Turkey's reserves and this was going to be paid back in tobacco and other merchandise. The remaining 3.5 million pounds would be used for payment of short-term commercial debts by Turkey. The political commitments by Turkey would enter into force upon the delivery of war material and opening of credit lines. Turkey had thus left its neutrality, but İnönü was happy as Turkey had obtained a lucrative deal ensuring the security of the country which gave it enough field of maneuver to evade its commitments. This continued until the fall of France when all calculations of the Turkish Government collapsed.

⁵⁴ Gürin, p. 668-670..

The rapid invasion of Belgium, Netherlands and above all, France, was a complete shock to Turkey. The invasion had completely turned the power balance in Europe upside down and the most important instrument that ensured Turkey's security against Germany now seemed to force her into war against the seemingly undefeatable German war machine on the side of its defeated Allies. From then on, Turkey started a game of evading Allies' requests to join the war, accommodating Germany's position of strength, engaging in lucrative economic relations with her and preparing to defend herself against the same Germany, all at once.

In parallel to German defeats on both fronts towards the end of 1943, British stepped up pressure over Turkey to join the war against Germany. During this period, Allies had landed in Italy and were working their way up north while in the Eastern Front Germans were in a constant retreat. Nevertheless, again during this time, Germans secured one of their latest victories in the war and using their air superiority over the Aegean, defeated the remaining British force in the Aegean Islands and became a much closer danger for Turkey.

During this time, Turkey continually and willingly foot dragged, contrary to its obligations under the British-French-Turkish Alliance of 1939, using as pretext the failure of British and American sides to provide the equipment Turkey asked for and also the Soviet reserve. At the very same time, Turkey was shipping large amounts of chromium to Germany and allowing its naval vessels to navigate freely through the Straits under the guise of merchant vessels. By this time in war, Turkey's main preference was that none of the sides would reach a definitive victory and the war would end through a stalemate, which meant that a

⁵⁵ Approximately 2 billion pounds sterling by 2021. Calculation made using Bank of England Inflation Calculator at <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation/inflation-calculator>; access on 15 April, 2022.

strong Germany and strong German Army would survive to oppose a possible expansion of Soviets and the Red Army in Central Europe.⁵⁶

Turkish playbook had its limits and by February 1944, British ran out of patience with Turkish attitude. Turkey continued to tolerate the use of the Straits by German naval vessels under the guise of merchant ships by continuing to narrowly interpret the Montreux Convention throughout the first half of 1944. Only and only after Allies undeniably secured a beachhead as a result of the largest amphibious operation to date with D-Day landings, a German merchant ship, Kessel, which had used the Straits many times before, was searched and somehow found to be a naval vessel in violation of the Montreux Convention and was seized on 13 June. The incident led to resignation of pro-German Turkish Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu next day on 15 June 1944 as the Cabinet of Ministers declared in an unprecedented manner that they did not approve of the acts of the Foreign Minister.

Obviously, the Turkish policy for which Numan Menemencioğlu was made to pay the price was not his own making in Turkey of 1944. İnönü decided and implemented this foreign policy turn. “It was as if the policy followed up until that point was Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu’s personal policy and Turkish Government had not approved of this policy. However, both the owners of the statement and those targeted by the statement knew that this was untrue. But what mattered at this stage was that Turkey had undertaken the necessary policy change under the pressure and insistence of the Allies.”⁵⁷ The timing of the turn itself also reflects the mindset of İnönü with zero tolerance for risk. The U.S. economy had been on full mobilization producing enormous

⁵⁶ Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, Cilt 2, p. 144.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 250-251.

amounts of ammunition and equipment and the whole world was waiting for an imminent landing in Western Europe. The only thing unknown by 5 June was the exact spot of the landings. Still, İnönü wanted to make sure that the Allies obtained a secure beach head and that there would be no possibility left for Germans other than defeat. The move about Menemencioğlu only came at this stage.

But pro-Allies acts of Turkey always came too little and too late. It was also the case with the shipments of chromium to Germany when Turkey continued to send them until the last possible minute. Turkey declared war on Germany in February 1945 when it became a pre-condition to join the United Nations. In other words, Turkey jumped on the absolute last wagon in the Allied cause. The price was British and to some extent American anger and at best, indifference. Turkey now had a long way to regain British and U.S. sympathy. Had it not been for the Soviet bullying starting from Spring 1945, Turkey had a very difficult job to do.

In March 1945, just as the Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper was about to travel to Ankara, he was invited to call on Foreign Minister Molotov. Turkish Government and the Turkish Embassy had been prepared for a Soviet move on the nature and content of Turkish -Soviet relationship and when Molotov formally declared to Ambassador Sarper that the Soviet Union wanted to withdraw from 1925 Treaty of Friendship, this was no surprise to Ankara or the Embassy. The timing was understandable as UN was to convene soon in San Francisco, signifying the establishment of a new world order.

The Soviets kept their hand for a time and when Ambassador Sarper returned to Moscow, Molotov verbally declared to him Soviet requests:⁵⁸

- 1921 Kars Agreement delineating Turkish-Soviet borders should be revised,
- Straits regime should be rearranged to ensure Soviets's security,
- Turkey and Soviets should bilaterally decide the changes to be made to the Montreux Convention,
- If Turkey had a "friendly" government in Ankara, none of the demands above would have any meaning and Soviets would be the ally and protector of such a Government.

This started a marathon of meetings, consultations and demarches by Turkey with the British and the U.S. and brought a sharp change in İnönü's famously prudent foreign policy stance. The Soviet proposal was unmistakably clear: either become a Soviet satellite or Soviets would intimidate and force Turkey into submission. 1945 and 1946 was spent in this environment in a continuing war readiness atmosphere and until the U.S. was able to clarify its policy of containment with the appointment of George C. Marshall as secretary of State instead of James Byrnes, Turkey went through an awful nightmare not knowing how to stave off the Soviet pressure.

2. Military/security situation

With little to spare in terms of public finances due to the impoverished state of the country and the burden of Ottoman debts, Turkey spent whatever else it had on strengthening its military and security apparatus in 1920s and 1930s as it was in search of security from outside attack as well as from insurgencies. With little to

⁵⁸ Metin Toker, *Türkiye Üzerinde 1945 Kabusu (The Nightmare of 1945 over Turkey)*, Akis Yayınları, May 1971, 1-28.

spare for the military, the new regime emphasized a policy of peaceful relations with regional countries and European major powers. Understanding the internal and international security challenges faced by Turkey in this period is key to the post-WWII context in which Turkey sought a firm and secure place in the emerging world order.

There was an almost incessant chain of insurrections in the East and Southeast of the country from 1924 onwards, some of which took years to suppress. The 1925 uprising in the Southeast, called by its leader “Sheikh Said”, following the Nestorians’ uprising the previous year in what is today’s Hakkari province, prevented the young country from projecting whatever power it had onto Mosul and broke its willingness to play brinkmanship with Britain over the issue. Some of the troops on the way to suppress the Sheikh Said uprising broke ranks, fled and rose up against the New Republic. One of their officers, Captain Nuri, who was a known Kurdish activist, fled to Syria, then returned to the country over Iran in 1927 and started the “Aghri Dag” Revolt by claiming a Kurdish state around Mount Ararat region. This insurrection lasted until 1932 and took successive expeditions over the years. Other insurrections took place in Dersim, in Siirt, Bingöl, Mardin, Diyarbakır, Ağrı and Bitlis while a religious uprising resulting in killing of an Army officer took place even in the Western town of Menemen close to İzmir in December 1930. These operations required huge amounts of spending and put an enormous strain on the already very tight budget of the New Republic.

It was in 1938 that the final Dersim insurrection was suppressed totally. The young Republic spent enormous efforts and resources to end these rebellions, and the Army was, up until the invasion of Poland, concerned and busy with insurrections. While the Army held regular exercises in Thrace in the 1930s as a preparation for the

approaching World War, Turkish military had difficulty keeping up with the military technological developments especially in terms of standardization and was a nightmarish and piece-meal collection of equipment from pre-WWI period to late 1930s technology. Turkey could not hope to control its skies and seas against a major modern military and all hopes for the defense of the country were placed on the Army. Still, as Europe was trying to deal with German and Italian expansionism, Atatürk was focused on the issue of Hatay (Alexandretta), which was a crucial port if Turkey was to control its security from the sea in Eastern Mediterranean. Atatürk spent almost all of his energy to the problem in his last months and the project was completed in 1939 by İnönü.

Having achieved a critical threshold by 1938 for Turkey's control on the entire country, The Turkish military entered the WWII period unable to hope to wage modern industrial warfare. The leadership of the country, including President İnönü and Chief of General Staff Fevzi Çakmak understood that Turkey's military had little hope of successfully defending against a strong military like Germany in case of war. İnönü and Çakmak frantically sought new equipment and new infrastructure especially from the Allies throughout WWII but by the end of the War, the technological gap between the Turkish military and victors of WWII had reached extraordinary levels.

Throughout 1920s and 1930s, Turkey had prioritized economic development and could spend little on building a war economy. Whatever resources it could spend on its military, they were absorbed by insurgencies and the sporadic nature of weapons acquisitions. When WWII arrived, heavily neglected Turkish Military had to mobilize and modernize at the same time. In 1940, President İnönü convened "Supreme Military Council", which advised an authorized strength of 40 infantry

divisions, 3 cavalry divisions. This translated into 1.3 million strong Army but equipping such a large Army with Turkey's meager resources and almost nonexistent military industry was an impossible task. Turkish Army's organization looked like as follows by 1941:

Table 2. Turkish Ground Forces Organization during WWII⁵⁹

Field Army	Region	Corps	Division	Cavalry Division	Fortification	Brigade
1 st Army	A (Thrace)	X	46 th	2nd	100,0	26 th (Kırklareli)
		XX	23 rd , 24 th , 33 rd and 52nd			
	B (Çatalca)	IV	8 th , 22 nd , 28 th and 64th		Çatalca	
		III	1 st , 61 st , 46 th and 62nd			
	C (İstanbul)	İstanbul Command and Black Sea Strait	11th		Black Sea Strait	Black Sea
2 nd Army	A (Dardanelles Strait and Marmara Region)	II	4th, 69th, 32nd and 66th		Demirkapı	72nd
	B (Aegean and Mediterranean Coasts)	XII	70 th , 71 st and 63rd		İzmir Antalya	
3 rd Army		IX	9 th , 3 rd and 29th	1st	Erzurum	
		VIII	12 th and 15th			
		VII	2 nd , 10 th and 53			
		XVIII	48 th , 51 st and 67th		Kars	
Under Direct Command of General Staff	A (Kocaeli)	VI	7 th , 41 st and 17 th			
	B (Syria)	XVII	20 th and 39th	14th		68th

⁵⁹ Mete Tunçay, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın başlarında (1939-1941) Türk Ordusu, Tarih ve Toplum, İssue: 35, Nov. 1986, p. 34-41.

Turkey hoped to supply its needs from UK primarily and sent extensive lists covering everything from aircraft to Vaseline of very significant amounts but ended up receiving few of these materials as UK herself became dependent on U.S. support as war intensified. When Turkey's Mediterranean supply routes were taken under control by Germans following their invasion Greece, it became much harder to receive anything in meaningful numbers. After that, Turkey had to rely on some items transferred from British bases in Egypt and some U.S. Lend & Lease equipment but could never come close to adequately equip its units, which looked like "an army of flesh and bones deprived of movement and maneuver."⁶⁰

3. Economic Developments

a) Macro developments

Less than a year into İnönü's presidency, the world was at war again and İnönü's time was marked by WWII. During war years, Turkish Government tried to increase taxes and increase internal borrowing on one hand and deferred heavily to printing money on the other hand to finance the deficits.

From 1939 to 1945, Turkey's domestic debt had increased from 620 million TL to 1.5 billion TL, meaning a more than two fold increase in internal borrowing. This was rather natural as there was little chance, if any, of any foreign borrowing. Gold reserves in the Central Bank also increased from 26 tons to 195 tons but the main issue was about money supply which started around 220 million TL to reach almost 1 billion TL by 1945 (see Table 1), causing significant inflation by 1942.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Koçak, v. 1., p. 335.

⁶¹ Koçak, *ibid.*, p. 537.

Table 3. Central Bank Money Supply by year-End (1000 TL))⁶²

Years	Banknotes	Coins	Total Money Supply	Money Supply Index
1938	193.970	25.452	219.422	100.0
1939	281.490	26.589	308.079	140.4
1940	403.556	30.344	433.900	197.7
1941	512.473	31.029	543.502	247.7
1942	733.944	31.601	765.545	348.8
1943	802.110	31.544	833.564	379.9
1944	960.834	33.707	994.514	453.2
1945	881.212	37.355	918.567	418.6
1946	937.050	38.389	975.439	444.5
1947	888.462	44.342	932.804	425.1

With such access to money printing that was not successfully matched on tax collection side, the natural results would be inflation and during the War, successive Governments failed spectacularly in preventing inflation.

Table 4. Comparison of International Price Indices⁶³

Years	UK Retail	U.S. Consumer	Germany	Japanese Retail	Swiss General Living Cost	Turkish Consumer
1938	100,0	100,0	100	100.0	100,0	100,0
1939	103,3	98,6	100	112.0	101,2	102,1
1940	117,0	99,3	104	130,1	110,6	110,8
1941	128,8	104,3	106	131,7	127,1	132,5
1942	137,3	115,6	109	135,5	141,2	220,9
1943	141,8	122,7	110	143,7	149,4	322,0
1944	145,1	124,8	113	161,0	154,1	330,1
1945	147,1	127,7				333,0
1946		138,3				320,4
1947		158,2				325,2

In Table 4, four of the six countries actively fought in WWII while the last two remained non-belligerent. Turkey, however, suffered much higher price increases although the country did not actively fight in the war, let alone be destroyed like Germany and Japan. This certainly translated as a major failure⁶⁴ and together with RPP's policy choices that disproportionately affected small and

⁶² İlhan Tekeli, Selim İlkin. İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si, Cilt 2 (Turkey in WWII, Vol. II: Economic Policies and Practices; p.68.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 77.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 77.

medium farmers, workers and other fixed income earners, laid the groundwork for a political change.

b) Urgent Industrial Development Plan

Starting from 1944, Saraçoğlu Government ordered a group of experts to prepare a development plan for the period after the war. Led by two Soviet educated economists Şevket Süreyya Aydemir and İsmail Hüsrev Tekin, “Urgent Industrial Development Plan” was adopted on 7 May 1945, a day before Germany surrendered. The plan assumed that Turkey would follow a neutral policy between the emerging blocs in the period after the war. Therefore, the main objective of the economic policy should be on one hand to avoid full or near colonization which is a disease of the democratic world while also being protected from pressures that could disrupt national development. To achieve this objective, it was necessary to find solutions to establish the economic integrity of the country which would develop both, industry, agriculture as well as transportation.⁶⁵ The prevailing idea in Turkey’s policy circles at the time of preparation and adoption of this plan was that Turkey should remain neutral between the two emerging economic systems and this thinking informed the strategic approach of the plan.

In view of these, the plan targeted an industrialization path based on making use of mineral and marine sources and agricultural polyculture. This agricultural polyculture would ensure diversification in agriculture, also guaranteeing access of the industry to raw materials. Such a polyculture that would fuel industrialization in the country was also the first condition of “development with a national character”.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ İlhan Tekeli, Selim İlkin. Savaş Sonrası Ortamında 1947 Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı (1947 Turkish Economic Development Plan in the Post WWII Environment), Ankara, 2009; p. 2.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

This plan looked similar to the 1936 Second Industrial Development Plan except its approach of regional specialization around energy sources. The total cost of investment projects implied in the Plan was initially estimated at 300 million TL and would reach upwards of 697 million TL by end of 1946. Financing all these investments was not possible but external financing was almost nonexistent. Therefore the Government allocated 150 millions in June 1946 just before general elections and relied on internal borrowing.⁶⁷ Moreover, relations with Soviets reached crisis levels at around this time, putting the Army back on war footage and limiting available budgetary sources. Most importantly, with the Soviet crisis, the plan's main assumption had been proven wrong while Turkey had to continue keeping its hard earned war time gold and foreign exchange reserves. Turkey had to align herself again with the West, which necessitated a different political and economic approach.

c) 1947 Economic Development Plan

Increasing challenges by the newly formed Democratic Party against RPPs statist policies and projects and its liberal campaign promises, as well as the need to engage the U.S. in Turkey's military and economic development projects meant that another Soviet inspired development plan by ex-Marxist economists was more of a liability than asset. Just after the famed visit by Missouri battleship to İstanbul in April which was welcome with great fanfare, Turkey applied for a 500 million USD credit line from the U.S.⁶⁸

Following the general elections on 21 July 1946, the newly elected Prime Minister Recep Peker focused on ensuring Turkey's access into the Bretton Woods

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

system and to obtain credit from U.S. led institutions. By this time, RPP was also not alone in the Parliament and DP was constantly pressuring the Government to obtain funds from the West. In this environment, 1946 plan gradually died and in February 1947, Prime Minister Peker asked a group of liberal economists led by Chief Advisor of the Ministry of Trade Kemal Süleyman Vaner to prepare a new plan.⁶⁹

This group of economists worked intensively and produced a new plan called “Turkish Recovery Plan” in English, to tune in with European Recovery Plan, introduced by Marshall Plan in June. However, although Turkey applied for 615 million USD for a period of 4,5 years, Turkey became the only country among 16 EECC countries to have applied for a loan and not received any. This was the result of assessment by U.S. analysts that the purpose of the European Recovery Plan was not to fund development, but remedy wartime destruction and that Turkey had enough gold and foreign exchange reserves to at least partially fund some of its investment plans.⁷⁰

Conclusion

By the end of WWII, Turkey was a near outcast in world affairs, subject of British anger, unable to rely on German economic and occasional political support anymore and a hate object as well as a potential prey for the Soviets. With Turkish people at their limits of patience against poverty, deprivations and the inefficiencies of the one-party rule, the famously prudent President İnönü started working hectically to draw America’s attention to Turkey and to ensure the U.S. was involved in Turkish affairs. Not only was such involvement the only way to keep the ship of Turkey afloat vis-à-vis the Soviet threat, but an economic and military development

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 7.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 11.

story fueled by U.S. political support and a potential U.S. credit and assistance was the key with which RPP and İnönü could hope to remain in power in post-WWII era.

CHAPTER III: TURKISH MILITARY BY 1947 AND TURKISH AMERICAN MILITARY COOPERATION BEFORE 1947

1. Turkish Armed Forces by Spring 1947

By spring of 1947, Turkish Armed Forces consisted of land forces, a navy fleet and a separate air arm designated as a corps level force. There was no Land Forces or Navy as separate services. The General Staff retained overall operational command while logistical services were being provided through Land, Air and Sea Undersecretariats under the Ministry of National Defense. Both channels were leading to the President, albeit separately, therefore giving the President of the Republic the power to control the Army financially while giving the General Staff a degree of operational autonomy. These power relationships cannot be isolated from the personalities that shaped Turkish military immediately before, during World War II, where İsmet İnönü, who rose to the rank of brigadier general, was elected as President over Chief of General Staff Marshall Fevzi Çakmak, who was 8 years his senior at the Military Academy, Chief of General Staff and Minister of War of the Ottoman State and the successful planner of the Great Offensive (1922) during the War of Liberation.⁷¹

a) Force Structure

i) Land Forces

By 1947, the Turkish Land Forces were still on war footing and the wartime units mobilized against war threats during WWII had not been deactivated due to the Soviet threat. The Army consisted of 3 field armies (and a core 4th Army that existed on paper), 15 corps, 43 divisions (37 Infantry, 3 Cavalry, 3 Armored), 4 independent brigades (2 armored, 2 infantry, 7 fortress commands) and also covered 47,250

additional security troops (Gendarmes as well as Customs and Frontier Guard units).⁷²

Turkey received supplies of British and American tanks, artillery, motorized equipment and other military material during World War II, and also possessed considerable quantities of such materiel of German and other foreign origin. Much of this equipment were obsolescent, however. A quantity of small arms and ammunition, powder, shells, fuses, mines, etc. were being produced locally but all heavier and motorized materiel had to be imported.

Over one half of Army divisions were concentrated in Thrace and south of the Straits area. First Army Headquarters was in Istanbul and the Second Army's HQ in Balıkesir. The Third Army, headquartered in Erzurum had taken its main defense line between Pazar (Rize) and Erciş (Van), with an advance line between Kars and Kağızman.

The Turkish Army was well disciplined and loyal, and its morale was assessed to be high. With certain exceptions (notably the Supply Services), its officer corps, was made up of well-educated and idealist Turks. Many of the officers belonged to military families of generations. Serving in the military was also a source of proud also for soldiers of lower ranks, with the exception of those recruited from non-Moslem minority groups, who were usually consigned to labor gangs and given such tasks as road building and repairs. Owing partly to military background, partly to faith and partly nationalistic pride, the Turkish soldier was an loyal and courageous soldier. In spite of the warrior spirit, however, all ranks had one outstanding and very serious failing: a lack of mechanical aptitude and understanding

⁷¹ See figure on command relationships.

⁷² This assessment is a summary of an intelligence assessment presented to President Truman in late April or early May 1947, before Greek-Turkey Aid Bill was approved at the Senate. "Turkey", (undated report), pp. IV-1/IV-6, President's Secretary's Files (hereinafter referred to as PSF), Subject File, 165: Truman Papers, Truman Library.

of the necessity for proper mechanical maintenance in modern warfare. While this was less so for the Turkish military than most of its Near and Middle Eastern neighbors, it was nevertheless-by Western standards- a shortcoming.

ii) Navy

The Turkish Navy consisted of 1 old battle cruise, 2 light cruiser, 8 destroyers, 2 old torpedo boats, 10 submarines, and a few auxiliary vessels. In 1945 the strength of the Navy was reduced from total personnel of about 20.000 to 1000 officers and 15.000 enlisted men and was reported as being increased to a total of 20.000 again. No air arm existed, and there were no trained amphibious units.

The general characteristics of the Turkish soldier also applied to the sailor. Discipline and loyalty was no issue but mechanical aptitude was lacking. The usefulness of the small Turkish Navy was, moreover, lessened by the obsolescence of its larger units. The battle cruiser, called YAVUZ, was the German built ex-GOEBEN, turned over to Turkey at the beginning of World War I.

iii) Air Force

The Turkish Air Force consisted of a total of 748 aircraft: 139 bombers of various types, 255 fighter and reconnaissance planes, and 354 trainer, transport and other types. Most of these types were British, United States and German. To these were to be added 398 planes of various British types (Mosquitoes, Spitfires, Beaufighters and Oxfords) recently acquired and in process of delivery. Personnel strength was estimated at about 26.000, organized in 2 Air divisions, one consisting of 2 bomber and 1 fighter regiments and 1 reconnaissance group and the other of 1 bomber and 2 fighter regiments, 2 reconnaissance groups and 1 torpedo bomber group. The Headquarters Command consisted of 1 communications squadron and 1 photo transport squadron.

Efficiency in combat was assessed to be very poor because of low pilot proficiency, as well as insufficiently organized means for refueling, arming and loading, lack of well-constructed and equipped operational fields and particularly because of mechanics and maintenance. For this latter reason and because of the obsolete aircraft, the morale of the Turkish Air Force –unlike that of the Army and the Navy- was not high. It was however, relatively higher in Spring 1947 than it was a year ago, with the acquisition of aircraft from Great Britain, larger allocations of gasoline for training flying personnel, and the possibility of a completely independent Air Force on an equal basis with the ground and naval forces.

There was no effective air warning system in Turkey, although with British help and training, permanent radar systems were established at Istanbul and Ankara, and mobile radar defenses were planned for Eastern Turkey and Turkish Thrace. Lack of competent personnel was a great handicap to the efficient operation of radar defenses. Anti-aircraft artillery units were organized within the Turkish Army, and numerous batteries were strategically located in the Straits zone, in eastern Turkey, in Ankara, Eskisehir, İzmir and other important areas. However, lack of efficiency was indicated in World War II, during the period of Turkey's neutrality, when anti-aircraft batteries opened fire on the United States, British, Soviet and German planes flying over Turkish territory, almost entirely without success.

b) War potential

i) Natural resources

As a largely agricultural state, Turkey possessed sufficient soil products to supply the food required by a large number of unit in the field. Bread and olives were Turkish soldier's staple diet and both were plentiful. Moreover, Turkey was rich in

meats –particularly mutton, lamb and beef- and there was an abundance of fruits and vegetables.

Mineral production was very localized. While lignite was mined in various parts of the country, production of bituminous coal was confined to a small area on the Black Sea coast. The production of copper, iron ore, chromite, and other minerals was similarly localized and vulnerable, especially if transportation should be disrupted. Turkey had to rely on foreign sources for all of her petroleum needs.

ii) Industry

By 1947, Turkey had to import most of its military industrial needs. The Turkish armament and munitions factories produced some small arms, ammunition, powder, shells, explosives, bombs, mines etc. During the War, through Lend-Lease, a variety of types of British and American arms were provided the Turkish Army, which also possessed many German types, and for almost all of these, ammunition and spare parts had to be imported, complicating the logistical situation even further. Local production could be crippled by the effective bombing of a few factories, notably at Kırıkkale, Ankara, Erzurum and İstanbul.

iii) Technology

The relatively inferior position of Turkey in the fields of basic and applied scientific research necessitated reliance upon external sources. Considering the capabilities of technical staff and facilities available, together with expenditure of moneys for the purpose, any development of new war weapons was not likely in the foreseeable future.

c) Military Policy and Capabilities

The policy of the Turkish Government was to maintain peace with all countries, and by 1947 it relied largely on the United States, Great Britain and the

United Nations for support in its resistance to Soviet pressure. Meanwhile, in a situation which was regarded as critical, large forces were maintained under arms at considerable expense.

The three Turkish armies were disposed to meet attack from the only source believed possible in 1947: the USSR, with or without satellite aid. This attack was expected to take the following major forms:

1. An attack in force from Bulgaria, with the object of breaching Çakmak and Çatalca lines in Turkish Thrace, primarily to occupy all of Turkish Thrace and to straddle the Straits.
2. An attack in force from the northeast, through Kars and Sarıkamış, to breach the Third Army's eastern defenses. A further attack would be expected through Doğubayazıt toward Muş, Elazığ and eventually the Mediterranean coast at Mersin and İskenderun. Thus the whole of southeast Turkey would be cut off, and Turkey's two chief southern ports and only railroad from the south would be lost.
3. Attacks of various types (parachutist, naval, combined operations, etc.) upon Black Sea points, such as the mouth of the Bosphorus, coal ports like Ereğli, Zonguldak and Amasra and such strategic harbors as Samsun and Trabzon, from which communications led inland. Capture of Zonguldak would also make available to the enemy the railroad from there to Ankara.
4. Strategic and tactical bombing of vulnerable targets, including railroads, naval establishments, oil storage tanks, (particularly at İstanbul, İzmir, İskenderun and Samsun), aircraft, and airfields and all facilities for the transport of reinforcements and supplies across the Marmara, such as those at Haydarpaşa (İstanbul), İzmit, Bandırma, Çanakkale, Eceabat, Gelibolu and Tekirdağ.

The aggressor's basic aim would be to gain control of Turkey, particularly the Straits, as quickly as possible and to prevent substantial aid coming to the support of the Turks. Thus the USSR, if successful in any such aggression, would not only gain control of the Straits and a dominant position in the Aegean Sea but would also move forward its area of control next door to the Arab Middle East and establish a shoreline on the Mediterranean Sea, within easy range of the Suez Canal.

With or without aid from abroad, Turkey would resist with all the strength at their command. The disposition of the army, as described above, with three armies in Istanbul, Balıkesir and Erzurum and large forces in Thrace or near it, indicated where initial resistance would be offered. The Turkish Navy would assist in transporting and convoying troops and supplies across the Marmara and the Aegean Sea, in closing the Straits with nets, booms, and minefields, and in helping to protect the Turkish left flank in the Aegean. It seemed quite doubtful by 1947 whether any naval sorties, except by submarines, could be made into the Black Sea, unless the situation as it developed would make the risk worth taking.

The Turkish Air Force would assist ground operations but was a weak force at best. Lacking efficient ground crews, enough operational fields, and proper refueling facilities, it was likely to be knocked out of action very quickly, thus leaving Turkish ground forces at the mercy of enemy air attacks.

The general topography of Turkey and its climate also had to be considered. Anatolia looked like an inverted saucer, with a mountainous plateau in its center and a narrow rim of lowland plains around the edges. Terrain in Eastern Turkey was particularly difficult and was covered with deep snow during the winter months. Moreover, transportation difficulties would hold up the invader as well as hamper operations of the Turkish Armed Forces. Thus, although the weakness of the Turkish

Air Force would speedily make the entire country an open target for air attack, indicating that resistance on the ground might be soon overcome, difficulties of transportation and terrain could well prolong resistance (especially in winter conditions) for several months. In any event, it was assumed that Turkey would resist a major aggression to the bitter end.


Turkish Government budget was by 1947 already strained to meet the cost of maintaining the armed forces at their present strength. To modernize these forces and to meet immediate needs for materiel, foreign aid was necessary, since very little of the equipment needed could be manufactured in Turkey. The Turkish General Staff would continue to be severely handicapped in its efforts to improve standards of the armed forces or to fill deficiencies in material without such aid from abroad.⁷³

In May 1947, immediately following the ratification of Greece-Turkey Assistance Act as part of Truman Doctrine, a Survey Team led by U.S. Army Major General Lunsford Oliver⁷⁴ was sent to Turkey, staying in the country until July. Oliver was an experienced career officer who This team, generally known as Oliver Mission, produced an assessment that only confirmed the deficiencies in the war fighting capabilities of the Turkish military.

⁷³ Ibid., p. IV-6.

⁷⁴ Lunsford Errett Oliver was born on March 17, 1889 in Nemaha, Nebraska. After his graduation from West Point, he received his commission in the Corps of Engineers. During World War I he organized and trained a number of railway engineer battalions in the United States. He attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, later returning as an instructor, and also attended the Army War College. In January 1941 he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned to the 1st Armored Division as commander of Combat Command B. He led this command during the landing at Oran in North Africa in November 1942 and then into Tunisia. Here he led the first American ground forces to fight against the Germans in World War II. He was promoted to major general and returned to the United States in December 1942. In March 1943, he took command of the 5th Armored Division, which he led for the remainder of World War II. In August 1944, following the breakthrough from the Normandy beachhead, the 5th Armored led the drive which created the Falaise-Argentan pocket. In September 1944, patrols of the 5th Armored were the first of Allied units to set foot on German soil and to breach the Siegfried Line. In April 1945, the division went out a hundred miles in front of supporting infantry and fought its way to the Elbe River, closer to Berlin than any other American unit. It was stopped there by order from the Ninth Army. His awards included two Distinguished Service Medals, a Silver Star, two Legion of Merits, three Bronze Stars and the Order of Orange Nassau, with Swords, degree of Grand Officer, from the Netherlands. In September 1945, he returned to the United States. He had several assignments, including being the head of a survey group sent to Turkey. In May 1948, he retired. He died in 1978 and was interred at West Point Cemetery. <https://alumni.westpointaog.org>, last access 30.08.2024.

Figure 1. Command Relationships in Turkish Armed Forces in 1947⁷⁵



⁷⁵ “Tarihçe” (History), Turkish Naval Forces website, www.dzkk.tsk.tr; “Tarihçe” (History), Turkish Land Forces website, www.kkk.tsk.tr; “1944 Yılından İtibaren Türk Hava Kuvvetleri” (Turkish Air Forces from 1944), Turkish Air Force website, www.hvkk.tsk.tr; Craig Livingston, “One Thousand Wings: the United States Air Force Group and the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, 1947-1950”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct. 1994), p. 786. Livingston’s article include a similar figure but it appears that the author has mixed up the Ministry of Defense undersecretaries and included separate service commands under the General Staff. In fact, contrary to the conventional wisdom, only the Air Force existed as a separate service in early 1947, albeit at corps level and with limited scope, while Army (Land Forces) Command and Naval Forces Command were not established as separate services until 1949. Therefore by the time Truman Doctrine was adopted, the Turkish General Staff had direct control of field armies and the Navy Fleet. In the above figure, no subdivisions in the Army beyond field armies has been shown due to the large numbers of corps and divisions that would have followed.

d)

Doctrine

The basic document laying out the tactical doctrine of Turkish General Staff by 1947 was the manual called “Muhtelif Sınıfların Birlikte Sevk ve Muharabesi Talimnamesi”⁷⁶ (Manual on Command and Combat of Combined Arms). Along with this basic document, there were other manuals for the specific branches such as a manual on the training and combat of the infantry, but the fundamental operational thinking was meant to be guided by the above manual. In fact, the first time such a manual was published was in 1928, in Arabic letters.

Later, new editions of the manual were printed in 1936 and 1939. However, although the name of the manual was unchanged, in fact the manual printed in 1928 and that printed in 1936 and 1939 were based on two different (or successive German manuals). The first one was Heeresdienstvorschrift (or H. Dv.) 487, Führung und Gefecht der Verbundenen Waffen (Command Combat of the Combined Arms) and the other being “Truppenführung”. Heeresdienstvorschrift 487, generally known as “Das FuG”, published in 1921 and 1923 in two parts. This new manual was the product of extensive studies, analysis and exercises based on the lessons and experiences of World War I and launched by Hans von Seeckt, who had become the head of the German Army “Reichswehr”⁷⁷, whose centuries old General Staff was liquidated by the Versailles Treaty and replaced by a limited core cadre called “Truppenamt”. Condell et al. underline that H.Dv. 487 was different than the manual of almost all other countries’ armies in the post-World War I period in that it completely disregarded positional, static trench warfare. It focused on mobile

⁷⁶ T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Muhtelif Sınıfların Birlikte Sevk ve Muharebe Talimnamesi, I. Kısım (Manual on Command and Combat of Combined Arms, Part I), Genelkurmay Matbaası, Ankara, 1936; T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Muhtelif Sınıfların Birlikte Sevk ve Muharebe Talimnamesi, II. Kısım (Manual on Command and Combat of Combined Arms, Part II), Genelkurmay Matbaası, Ankara, 1937.

⁷⁷ Bruce Condell & David T. Zabecki (eds.). *On the German Art of War-Truppenführung: German Army Manual for Unit Command in World War II*, Mechanics, Pa: Stackpole, 2009, pp. 2-3.; Robert Citino, *The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-1939*, Mechanics, Pa: Stackpole, 2008, p. 22.

warfare at the same time as it adopted many of the tactical innovations developed during the Great War. It also refocused on the war of annihilation, which had become forgotten in the trench stalemates of the war and emphasized mobility as well as the primacy of offensive, “encirclement combined with frontal action as the path to the best results and defense as a purely temporary prelude to the offense”, which the authors argue were Schlieffen-type concepts that were embedded in Das FuG.⁷⁸

This manual was followed by *Truppenführung*, written by Generals Ludwig Beck, Werner von Fritsch and Otto von Stulpnaegel, which “updated the basic concepts of Das FuG to bring them in line with the rapidly emerging potentials of motorized warfare, aviation and electronic communications.”⁷⁹ The new manual preserved the offensive tone of Das FuG and certain paragraphs and sections were carried over to *Truppenführung* in their entirety. However, most important novelty was 15 introductory paragraphs that were highly philosophical and that even more clearly identified the approach of the manual to warfare.⁸⁰

In addition to the continuing offensive focus through *Truppenführung*, another important concept of post-World War I German military doctrine was “*Auftragstaktik*”, or mission type order, meaning that a commander would define the objective to a subordinate commander and the way the mission would be completed would be up to the subordinate commander. Therefore, subordinate commanders would be given a large degree of flexibility in fulfilling their missions. “Although traditional German deference to higher authority and preference for well-defined procedures were the very anti-thesis of *Auftragstaktik*, the German Army made it work to a degree unsurpassed by any other army in history.”⁸¹

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

⁷⁹ Condel & Zabecki, p. 3.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 4.

The Truppenführung manual was first translated for official adoption for Turkish military in 1936.⁸² The time lapse between Das Fug and the publication of its Turkish version was 7 years. This is understandable as in the years immediately following the establishment of the Republic, Turkish Army had to deal with suppressing several major insurgencies in the eastern part of the country and was also busy optimizing units as well as the officer corps. This last point was especially important in that the new Republic had to make absolutely sure that officers and generals in the military would be loyal. Then in the case of Truppenführung, the time lapse was down to 2 years, reflecting an increased capability to follow and adapt foreign doctrines. A comparison between 1936-1939 versions of Turkish “Sevk ve Muharebe” manual reveals that the total of more than 1000 paragraphs in both versions are identical. In other words, as stated in the Introductory chapter, this was not an adaptation but direct translation of the German manual.

The only difference between the Turkish translation and the German original was in the “XXII. Transport” section of the second volume. Here, the German original explains the general principles of transport in combat and refers the details to technical manuals, while the Turkish version, albeit retaining the original paragraphs from the German versions, adds the following sub-headings:

- Common general principles for rail and maritime transport vehicles
- Explanation of certain transport related terms
- Transport through Syrian territory
- Capacities of maritime transport vehicles according to type
- Travels
- Security in mounting, travel, stoppages and dismounting
- Loading and unloading
- Transport exercises
- Transport with planes⁸³

⁸² See footnote 5.

These detailed explanations in the transport section in the Turkish version make it much more technical and instructive, which might shed further light on the intended use of the manual by Turkish General Staff. It could also indicate a need as perceived by the Turkish General Staff to improve the performance in logistics and transport, which were not popular areas of work for Turkish officers.

Apart from this difference, and up until the transport section, even the paragraph numberings were the same in both manuals. Due to the additional technical information in the Turkish manual, it contained 56 extra paragraphs. Why the Turkish General Staff needed to add this technical information and needed to adapt it as it did remains to be answered. In other parts, however, the direct translation has seemingly not been reviewed. *Truppenführung* contains 7 paragraphs at the very end on “Military Police Services”. The term used in the original German manual for military police was *Feldgendarmerie* and the Turkish manual uses, “*Sahra Jandarması*” (Field Gendarmerie), instead of the Turkish term “*Askeri İnzibat*”. We know that there was never in Turkey an organization called *Sahra Jandarması*, therefore the loyalty to the original manual seems to be curious for a military with a strong tradition of military police.

Overall, whether the German philosophy focusing on offensive was the right one for Turkey at that time is rather questionable. As the events during World War II proved, the Turkish military could at best wage a strategic defensive, the length of which depended on the attacking force. It had little mechanization and very little armor. But the more immediate need, as in the 1920s, was a force that was specially trained to deal with insurgencies that were still continuing throughout 1930s, especially the one at Dersim. Turkish military did not have a specific manual or announced philosophy to deal with such urgencies and traditionally opted to

⁸³ Sevk ve Muharebe II., pp. 86-160.

intervene using regular army units, a habit that lasted well into 1990s. Instead, the Turkish military focused on creating a Western type, resource intensive conventional military above and beyond its national resources, an ambition that was kept alive by US military assistance over a long period.

The “Auftragstaktik” embedded in the German Manual *Das FuG* and *Truppenführung* was also condemned to remain on paper as the bureaucratic/hierarchical tradition of the Turkish military did not grant subordinate commanders the necessary flexibility. This surfaces as one of the main source of resentment of the young generation of Turkish officers who spent WWII years as young lieutenants and first lieutenants, drowning under the obsession of older generation of commanders with details. These officers were also having difficulty in coming to terms with the deprivations of the country as well as those of the military and were seeing an enormous gap between the capabilities of Turkish military and those of the fighting sides in the war. They were also extremely resentful of the approach of the older generation of officers who always started their sentences with “when we were in the War of Liberation...” in response to concerns and complaints of young ambitious officers who were desperate to change things.⁸⁴

In the period *Truppenführung* was drafted, published, translated and introduced into Turkish service, military innovation was continuing at an incredible pace. Turkish officer corps had just come to grips with the content of the manual as World War II rendered much of the content obsolescent, especially the relationship between air and land forces as foreseen in *Truppenführung*. One Turkish officer wrote in 1948: “Many years and a whole World War having passed over our

⁸⁴ Dündar Seyhan, *Gölgedeki Adam (The Man in the Shadows)*, İstanbul, 1966, p. 7-8. As one of the conspirators in the process that led to May 27 coup in 1960, Seyhan was on duty in Washington DC and therefore could not take active part in the coup nor in the Committee of National Unity established by revolutionary officers after the coup. He was later involved in two other coup attempts in February 1962 and May 1963. While his memoirs deal mainly with the period from 1957-1965, his observations on the conditions of the military early in his career are valuable.

Command and Battle manual, it is still in force, and we don't have a newer one. I think it would be beneficial to revise the articles of this manual, which are prepared through an extensive flexibility of thought, in light of weapons and instruments and tactical changes introduced on the scene of war by World War II.”⁸⁵ Therefore the Turkish officer corps, at least those that were intellectually most active, were aware of the shortcomings of Turkish copy of Truppenführung and were suggesting revising it. Truppenführung being the product of the lessons of World War I and that those lessons were still valid by the end of World War II, such concepts as the front, weak and strong sides of front, types of combat and their content did not have to be revised in the Turkish manual, another colonel wrote in Turkish Military Review in 1949. However, the roles of these concepts had to be re-determined in light of the new situation. “The tactical and operational combat missions to be assumed by various units (infantry divisions, armored units, artillery units, airborne infantry, tactical and strategic air forces) must be explained.”⁸⁶ Therefore, there was a significant soul-searching debate going on by 1947-48 as to how the Turkish military should model itself, but no clear political direction existed.

e) Human Resources and Training

i) Conscripts

In addition to the professional officer and NCO corps, three classes of conscripts (1925, 1926, 1927) were under arms in 1947, while the class of 1924 was being demobilized. Total strength of the Army, exclusive of security troops and the Air Force, was estimated at 489.000 in the spring of 1947. The conscripts used to join their units directly, and there were no training centers in the American fashion,

⁸⁵ Kızıloğlu, M. İhsan. “Sevk ve Muharebe Talimnamemizin Esaslarına Göre Hava Savunması ve Uçaksavar Birliklerinin Kullanılması Hakkında Bir İnceleme”, (A Review of Air Defense and the Employment of Anti-Aircraft Units in line with the principles of our Command and Battle Manual), Ordu Dergisi (Military Review), September 1948, Year 67, Issue: 147, p. 40.

⁸⁶ Çevik, Cavit. “Sevk Talimnamemizde Yapılacak Değişiklikler”, (Changes to be Made in Our Command Manual), Ordu Dergisi (Military Review), March 1949, Year 68, Issue 149, pp.1-8.

where green soldiers would be trained and readied for service in the specialized units. This would also be an innovation introduced by the US assistance. The Air Force had around 30,000 personnel and the Navy around 20,000. The largest forces under arms during World War II (at a time when German attack was thought to be imminent) totaled from 800,000 to 900,000. Mobilization of trained reserves could be a slow process, owing to lack of equipment and also to the disruption which an aggressor would undoubtedly affect in transportation. If forewarned of an impending attack, the mobilization could be completed in advance, but such large-scale mobilization could not be affected entirely in secrecy, and it had for several years been Turkish policy to avoid taking steps which might result in accusations of provocative action.

ii) Officer Education

(1) Military Academy

By 1947, officers of the Turkish Land Forces were being supplied by the Military Academy (known as “Harbiye”) going through 2 years of education after high school. Most of the cadets were inducted from Kuleli, Maltepe and Bursa military high schools. Graduating officers were being given the rank of sub-lieutenant (asteğmen) and were being transferred to officers’ courses at different branches for two years of advanced technical training. High school graduates and university graduates were being trained at Reserve Officer School in Ankara for 6 months and were serving at least 24 months as sub-lieutenant and first lieutenant officers.

The Navy had a long tradition of academic education and in 1924, it was giving 4 years of education. In successive reforms, this period was reduced and between 1941 and 1953, naval cadets went through 2 years of education, 1

theoretical and 1 practical year on board a training ship.⁸⁷ Air Force did not have its own academy until 1953 and by 1947 designated cadets were attending *Harbiye* and complementing their studies with additional courses.

(2) War College

The War College, modelled after the German “Kriegsakademie” tradition, had by 1947 been temporarily moved to Ankara from İstanbul due to WWII. Before reorganization under American model, officers had to take an exam to earn the opportunity to enter the War Academy and take 3 years of advanced training on tactical command. By 1947, the War College had just relocated to İstanbul and consisted of Army, Naval and Air War Colleges as well as High Command Course and High Quartermasters School. Naval War College and Air War College were introduced in 1930 and 1937, respectively. War College Command was organized as a corps level command directly under the General Staff.

Officers who won the entry exam to the War College spent a certain period of internship in field units of various branches like infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineer, and communication while the same principles were adopted for periods between education years. The purpose was to allow candidate officers belonging to certain branches of the Army to adapt themselves to the organization, training, tactics and weapons of other branches to which they were going to be exposed during their education at the War College.⁸⁸ The first year of the education was mainly a preparation for the second and third years. At the end of second and third years, students from different services were obliged to join staff rides at other services and having completed their own internship at the end of the third year, would transfer to General Staff Headquarters as junior staff officers. General Fevzi Çakmak, who was

⁸⁷ “Tarihçe”, Deniz Harp Okulu (Naval Academy), www.dho.edu.tr, accessed 4 April 2015.

the Chief of General Staff until 1944, spent significant personal effort in the design and development of the War College system and the system by 1947 was very much his product.⁸⁹

(a) Army War College

Army War College was the first among the service War Colleges and was introduced initially in 1846 as part of the Military Academy. Through successive reforms in 1866, 1883, 1894 and 1903, War College as an institution was shaped under competing influences of French and German models. However, German influence has increased after 1880s and the founding fathers of Turkish Republic were almost entirely the graduates of the War College. Named as General Staff School and organized as a Directorate until 1927, it was renamed as War College or “Harp Akademisi” and reorganized as an independent command that year.⁹⁰

The curriculum consisted of the following courses:

- General Tactics
- Branch Tactics
- Infantry weaponry and infantry tactics (including tank)
- Cavalry weaponry and cavalry tactics
- Artillery weaponry and artillery tactics
- Signal instruments and Signal tactics
- Aerial weapons and air tactics
- Aerial reconnaissance and analysis of reconnaissance pictures
- Staff Duties
- Any and all kinds of peace time staff duties, preparation for war in peace time
- Mobilization (national, military, economic)
- Any and all kinds of staff duties and war time field operations,

⁸⁸ İşkora, Muharrem Mazlum. 1968. *Harp Akademileri Tarihçesi, 1930-1965, Cilt 2.* (History of War Academy, 1930-1965, vol. 2). Ankara: Gnkur Basımevi. 120.

⁸⁹ Ibid. 1966. *Harp Akademileri Tarihçesi, 1846-1930, Cilt 1.* (History of War College, 1846-1930, vol. 1). Ankara: Gnkur Basımevi, 139.

- Rear communication roads, including railroads
- Quartermasters duties
- Defense of rear areas
- Intelligence, espionage and counterespionage, propaganda, subversion and moral support for the military
- Printing and the art and science of encryption
- The art and science of decrypting, communication
- Military History
- Army Organization
- Modern and future weapons and war instruments
- Naval Military History and Naval Tactics
- Modern cartography and photography (several conferences)
- Statistical and economic general geography
- Statistical and military geography of Turkey
- Diplomatic History
- International Law
- Essential knowledge on Turkish public administration and relevant legislation (several conferences)
- Economics (several conferences)
- Sociology (several conferences)
- Philosophy of commandship (several conferences)
- Public health (several conferences) and written tasks
- Foreign languages (French, German, English)
- Horse-riding, fencing, physical fitness

Staff missions and tactics courses and military history courses would constitute two main blocks of courses to be instructed by one permanent instructor each. Other courses were to be taught by permanent or temporary instructors.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 103.

⁹¹ Ibid, p. 122.

The first year's tactics courses covered command of units up to the level of divisions, the second-year covered division and corps level units and the third year covered the command of corps and larger units.

The 1929 regulation of the War Academy also explained how the course curricula would be designed and how the courses would be delivered. According to the regulation, before each academic year, the curricula for each class would be designed, along with the distribution of education time between various types of delivery (in-class instruction, conferences, classroom work, homework, on-map exercise, war games, field visits and trips) throughout the year and the examples of each year's curricula would be presented to the Chief of General Staff for his examination and endorsement.⁹² This actually reveals that Marshall Çakmak retained a keen interest in the shaping and development of the War College in terms of the details of the content of education. Indeed, Marshall Çakmak was personally involved in the delivery of some of the conferences above, such as the "The Way Western Balkans Were Lost and the Western Front in the Balkan War" Conference he gave in 1925 at the then Staff College and the "Conference on Eastern Front Operation in the Great War", delivered in 7 sessions in the War College in 1935. Both these conferences were published in 1927 and in 1936, respectively, by the Turkish General Staff and have been reprinted recently, the volumes of which indicate the time and effort Marshall Çakmak spent in teaching young generations of officers the mistakes of the past. The conference on the loss of Western Balkans is an important event due to the time and effort Marshall Çakmak had spent to prepare and deliver the conference and the meticulous design of the content of the conference, which as a book is an excellent military history of Turkey's loss of Western Balkans and a strong message by the commander in chief of the armed forces about what the

young generations of officers should avoid in the future at all costs: loss of territory.⁹³

(b) Naval and Air War Colleges

Before the introduction of the Naval War College, staff positions in the Turkish Navy were fulfilled by top of the class graduates of the Naval War Academy. These used to carry additional insignia on their uniforms and would be sent to training abroad and given privileged staff positions in HQ missions. They would also be given intensive language training. Famous figures trained in this tradition include Admiral Vasıf (Undersecretary of Ottoman Navy) and Captain Rauf Orbay (Minister of Navy in 1918 and later Prime Minister of Turkey). However, this ad-hoc method of raising staff officers did not meet the needs of Turkish Navy after the Republic. It was with the introduction of the Naval War College that it became possible to train the staff officers of Turkish Navy in line with contemporary standards and techniques.⁹⁴ From the start of the Naval War Academy until 1939, teaching staff consisted of foreign instructors, Army staff officers and Naval non-staff officers. From 1939 onwards, instruction was delivered by Navy staff officers trained at the Naval War College.⁹⁵ The teaching cadre also included reputable French, German and British as well U.S. instructors.

Air War College was introduced in 1937 and started instruction in 1939. Subject to the same general rules as the other service colleges, the course program covered 3 years and involved expert British and U.S. instructors.

⁹² Ibid., p. 123.

⁹³ Çakmak, Fevzi. *Batı Rumeli'yi Nasıl Kaybettik?: Garbi Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyai ve Balkan Harbi'nde Garp Cephesi* (How Did We Lose the Western Balkans?: The Way Western Balkans Were Lost and the Western Front in the Balkan War), Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010.

⁹⁴ İşkora, p. 32.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 33.

2. Turkish American Cooperation before 1947: Relations during WW II and Lend Lease

As World War II approached, Turkey's decade long efforts had come to fruition also with the help of the gathering clouds and on May 1939, Turkey and Britain signed an agreement of mutual assistance in case of aggression in Mediterranean region. Through this act, Turkey had taken a bold step identifying itself with the Franco-British bloc, in spite of important economic ties with Germany. Soon, a similar agreement followed with France on June 23, 1939, and once the war erupted, Turkey, Britain and France signed a 15-year mutual assistance pact on October 19 of the same year.⁹⁶

Through this relationship, Britain was to become Turkey's main guarantor of security and therefore supplier of arms. However, Turkey's needs for military weaponry were enormous, and itself already dependent on the United States for much of its military industrial needs, Britain was not in a position to provide such materiel comfortably. Therefore, began a long effort on the part of Britain to persuade the United States to include Turkey in the scope of Lend Lease Act. This effort climaxed in the summer and fall of 1941 and on 30 July 1941, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden sent a long letter British Ambassador in Washington D.C. Viscount Halifax underlining Turkey's importance for Britain and for the Allies as a whole.

Firstly, of course, Turkey held a critical position for Britain blocking to access to Syrian and Iraq, the steppingstones for the control of Middle East. Eden underlined that "Our friendship with Turkey was, and remains, one of the most important political and strategic points of our whole policy in the Middle East... To put the matter at its lowest estimate, our position particularly in Iraq and Syria would

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. C-3,4.

be very different today if Turkey had followed a policy friendly to the Axis instead of forming, as she has done, a barrier against German infiltration towards the Middle East.”⁹⁷

In his letter, Eden continued to describe how Turkey was helpful towards the Allies, allowing their aircraft to land on its territory, refuel and continue to safety while interning Axis military personnel and aircraft; how Turkey allowed a free hand to the military attachés of Britain and France while denying the same opportunities to German attachés. So much so, Eden told, “...The Turkish Air Force is practically run by British instructors, and the Air Attache has direct access to the Minister of Defence, the Under-Secretary of State for Air and the Chief of the Air Staff in the same way as the Military Attaché has to the Chief of the General Staff.”⁹⁸

At the time Eden had written his letter, Americans had decided to grant Turkey a lower priority than Latin American countries in Lend Lease scheme, and Eden told this would have serious consequences in the Allied effort to ensure Turkey’s continuation of its benevolent neutrality towards the Allies. In order to make the fullest and most economic use of the production and shipping resources at its disposal, Britain had been diverting to the United States many of Turkey's military requirements, some new and some old obligations outstanding from the time of the signature of the Tripartite Treaty⁹⁹. “It was hoped that this procedure would enable us to remove the well-worn Turkish objection that Turkey would have been able to fulfil her obligations if we had fulfilled ours, i.e. to supply her with the armaments necessary to put her defenses in a fit state to resist direct attack.”¹⁰⁰ Eden was also at pains to convey the message by Turkish Chief of Air Staff that Turkey wished the

⁹⁷ Eden, Anthony. "Secret letter on Turkish-US relations and Lend-Lease" Atlantic Archive: UK-US Relations in an Age of Global War 1939-1945, 30 July 1941, accessed May 1, 2015, <http://archive.atlantic-archive.org/327>.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Tripartite Agreement between Turkey, Britain and France of October 19, 1939.

¹⁰⁰ Eden, "Secret Letter",

Tripartite Agreement to be seen as the cornerstone of its foreign policy, in the hope that it would raise more sympathy in American circles.

In the end, the United States did finally agree to include Turkey officially in Lend Lease and on December 3, 1941, President Roosevelt declared the defense of Turkey as essential to the defense of the United States, enabling extension of Lend-Lease assistance to Turkey.¹⁰¹ However, the Pearl Harbor attack a few days later and the official entry into war of the United States prevented the shipments of enough materiel as Turkey would like.

Following the Tehran conference in late 1943, the suggestion was made to the Turkish Government by the Soviet, British, and American Governments that Turkey should enter the war on the side of the United Nations. The Turkish Government agreed in principle, but pointed out that its force would require substantial quantities of equipment if they were to play an effective role in the war. Negotiations in this regard were opened and continued over a considerable period, but, in view of their other commitments, especially the upcoming European invasion, the Allies were unable to meet the Turkish needs. The decision not to undertake a Balkan campaign, of course, greatly reduced the part Turkey could have played in the conduct of the war. In the opinion of the United States Government, Turkish neutrality was useful to the United Nations, and it was doubtful whether any greater benefits would have been derived from active Turkish belligerence.¹⁰²

In general, throughout the war, Turkey maintained an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward the Allies and lived up to the obligations of her treaty with Great Britain and France. In many ways Turkey actively assisted the Allies by admitting Allied technicians to Turkish territory, allowing the establishment of Allied supply

¹⁰¹ *Turkey*, (undated report), p. C-5, PSF, Subject File, 165: Truman Papers, Truman Library.

¹⁰² Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1947. Supplement. "Aid to Greece and Turkey", Vol. XVI, No. 409 A, p. 876.

dumps, and facilitating the passage of Allied wounded, escaped prisoners, and so forth, through Turkey, all of which was in technical violation of the requirements of neutrality. Before the outbreak of the war, Turkey, like many other European nations, especially those of Southeastern Europe, necessarily depended upon Germany as an important market for her exports. Under the Nazi trading system, Turkey could realize upon their sales in Germany only by importing German goods in return. Consequently, a large share of Turkey's foreign trade fell into German hands before the war. During the war, and especially after the invasion of Greece and Aegean Islands, the situation was further complicated by Turkey's isolated position and the inability of the Western Allies to send ships to the principal Turkish ports, Istanbul and Smyrna. While Turkey seemingly tried to reduce her trade dependence upon Germany both before and during the war and to open trade channels with other countries, it also made full use of trade with Germany until the last moments since it meant precious income. When Turkey had to end chromium shipments to German in May 1944, all railcars in the whole country were brought together to send the maximum amount of supplies to Germany in the final shipment. Following her entry into the war, Turkey was not called upon to provide troops or materials or take an active part in the fighting, because the Balkans, the only theater in which her contribution would have been effective, had already been occupied by the Soviet and British forces¹⁰³ and by this time, no one needed Turkey to claim a share on the hard earned zones of influence.

The United States disbursed or advanced 101,000,000 USD to Turkey as aid of one sort or another from the start of the war until 1947. By January 31, 1947,

¹⁰³ Ibid.

Turkey still had 30,000,000 USD of available authorizations to be used in the future.

A summary of these aids were as follows:¹⁰⁴

Table 5. U.S. Assistance provided to Turkey before Truman Doctrine

Agency	Authorized	Disbursed	Available Balance Jan. 1, 1947
Export-Import Bank			
Westinghouse	3.060.000	-----	3.060.000
Exporter Credit	25.000.000	4.905.440	20.094.560
OFLC Credits	10.000.000	3.226.518	6.773.482
Lend Lease	90.000.000 ¹⁰⁵	90.000.000	-----
Maritime Commission	2.919.811	2.919.811	-----
Total	130.979.811	101.051.769	29.928.042

Weapons transfers from the United States to Turkey through Lend Lease were made through Great Britain for the most part. Most importantly, items were accounted for over their replacement value, which meant that, in contrast to most transfers under Truman Aid to Turkey, less items were transferred to Turkey though Lend Lease than in Truman Aid for the same amount of budget. Most importantly, as will be seen later, the equipment transferred through Lend Lease to Turkish Armed Forces failed to make any systemic change as, in the heat of the war and as a nature of the differences in the underlying framework of Lend Lease and Truman Doctrine, Lend Lease equipment was not accompanied by U.S. advisors intent on transforming Turkish Armed Forces. Therefore, unlike under Truman Aid, Lend Lease was just about sending and receiving equipment, without much effort on how Turkish Armed Forces could make better use of them.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 873.

¹⁰⁵ Footnote in original: "In addition, the Turkish Government received \$ 5.000.000 in lend lease articles for which it paid cash."

3. Conclusion

In sum, before Truman Doctrine was announced and the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill was adopted, Turkey had already turned to the United States as an arms supplier and was desperately seeking to receive more economic and military aid from the United States. A certain degree of military equipment and aid relationship had been established. But this relationship lacked a strategic framework and did not have any structural approach regarding the organization, efficiency and effectiveness of the Turkish military. Nor did Turkey ask such aid to comprise these. However, it took until March 1947 for the United States to decide on what kind of commitment it would undertake vis-a-vis Turkey's security. By that time, Cold War tensions had risen to new heights and Turkey, out of its own vulnerability and defenseless situation vis-à-vis the USSR, presented itself as a future bastion for United States-led Western military power. On the other hand, since the establishment of the Republic, Turkey was in a constant effort to transform its military based on Western style of training, doctrine and equipment. By 1947, Turkey had also found in the United States the new model on which to transform and modernize its military. The introduction of U.S. military assistance and the accompanying tacit However, the appropriateness or affordability of that model was a question that went unanswered in the heat of Turkey's desperate efforts to align itself among Western nations.

CHAPTER IV: THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN MILITARY AID MISSION, MARCH-DECEMBER 1947

1. Background

The official justification that launched Truman Doctrine and the Greek Turkish Assistance legislation were two notes sent by the British Government in February 1947. The British underlined in these two notes that the Greek situation was quickly turning into a fully-fledged civil war, with partisan guerillas infiltrating the country through the borders with countries like Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, which had by then fallen into the Soviet orbit. Regarding the Turkish situation, the notes emphasized there was a concerted effort by the Soviets for joint control of the Straits together with a Soviet base on the Straits, meaning a direct threat on Turkish sovereignty. The third point was that Britain no longer possessed the economic sources to continue economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey and therefore called in the United States to take over the role of supporting these two countries.¹⁰⁶

While the notes triggered final U.S. policy action to provide assistance to Greece and Turkey, the U.S. interest in these two countries increased from 1945 onwards. In that sense Truman Doctrine was the result of an evolving set of policy ideas that were the “product of the State Department’s growing confidence”. “Whatever the real intent of Josef Stalin’s probing, U.S. officials took it seriously. And they saw in his retreat in Iran and Turkey evidence that exerting U.S. strength worked.”¹⁰⁷ In addition to the specific concerns regarding Turkey and Greece, Truman Doctrine reflected a wide consensus in the Administration that time had

¹⁰⁶ U.S House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations. *Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1943-50, Vol. VI: Military Assistance Programs, Part 2.* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976); p. 307.

¹⁰⁷ Robert Beisner. *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War.* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.52.

come to take a stance against what was seen as Soviet expansionism. “The Soviet pressure on Iran and Turkey and the guerrilla war in Greece were all interpreted as part of a program undertaken by a monolithic Communist movement to dominate the world.”¹⁰⁸ The challenge was to convince the Republican-dominated Congress for such an unprecedented foreign assistance action. On the other hand, the conservative Republican-dominated Congress allowed the Administration to mobilize anti-communist sentiments instead of having to use elaborate economic theories.¹⁰⁹

Before President Truman took the floor to read his speech on 12 March 1947, he had his Administration’s heavy weight names, Secretary of State George C. Marshall and Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson meet with congressional leaders prior to the introduction of the aid bill. Marshall and Acheson emphasized the dangers the United States could face in the Middle East and in Western Europe should the Soviets succeed in their plans regarding Greece and Turkey. Truman also followed Senator Arthur S. Vandenberg’s advice “to scare the hell out of American people.” Though almost all aspects of the assistance proposal -lack of a definite time horizon and scope, the monetary value as well as the nature (grant versus loan) of assistance proposed- were criticized or questioned in both Chambers, the underlying logic of American-Russian bipolar rivalry or the descriptions of Russian behavior or motivation were not subjected to any rigorous questioning at any time in the process.¹¹⁰ “While the basic concepts underlying the aid program can be traced to wartime diplomacy, the aid to Greece and Turkey indicated the official public acceptance of an international system characterized by bipolarity and overt Russian - American hostility.”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ House, 308.

¹⁰⁹ Beisner, p. 52.

¹¹⁰ House, 308-309.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 315.

Exactly a week before Truman was set to address the Congress, a Memorandum was delivered to President Truman on 5 March, 1947. This 8-page memorandum also included 6 annexes. “The Broad Implications of the Proposed U.S. Assistance to Greece and Turkey”, as the Memorandum was titled, was a hard core geopolitical analysis of what would happen if the United States failed to take over the burden of Great Britain in the Near East and how “bold foreign policy” was not incompatible with US foreign policy followed until then.¹¹²

The paper started by outlining how extremely important in those critical months of the post-war period where formative patterns of future relationships were being formed, that the actions of the US Government on requests by the Governments of Greece and Turkey for financial and economic assistance be considered realistically in the light of their effect on the larger area of the Middle East and elsewhere in the world.

The British Government, on the other hand, had found itself compelled to liquidate its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece and Turkey, due to dire economic conditions. Such reduction in the power position of Great Britain in the Middle East would, without question, put in doubt the strength and effectiveness of her future policies to deter the expansion of an aggressor.

The Soviet Union, according to the author of the Memorandum, had shown no lack of interest in the Middle East during this early post war period. On the contrary, Soviets had given firm evidence of a desire if not an intention to expand her

¹¹² “Memorandum For the President, The Broad Implications of the Proposed U.S. Assistance to Greece and Turkey”, 5 March 1947, RG 334, Entry 263 Box 131 Joint American Military Mission for Aid To Turkey, Air Force Group, Decimal File 1947-53, 000.4 045.92, NARA. The document is unsigned, therefore the copy found in the file above may be a carbon copy. The six annexes were

- A. General Survey of the Greek Situation
- B. General Survey of the Turkish Situation
- C. Greek Economic Conditions
- D. Turkish Economic Conditions
- E. British Economic Conditions
- F. Security Council Commission of Investigation on the Situation Along the Northern Greek Frontier

The title page of the document stated that the Annexes were not attached

interests and control in the area. The Soviet proposal that she be given a mandate over Libya, the bid for establishment of domination over Northern Iran, its claims on Turkey's Kars and Ardahan provinces on behalf of Armenian hegemony¹¹³, the proposal for revision of the Montreux Convention to allow for Soviet military bases along the Dardanelles; the effort of her satellites to encourage and assist dissident minority Greek elements along their borders in resistance against the established government in Athens; the vilifying Soviet press campaign against the so called reactionary and fascist governments of Greece and Turkey- all appeared to constitute a ceaseless probing for weak spots through which a Soviet controlling grip on the area could be exercised and expanded, the paper claimed.¹¹⁴

The paper also claimed that a failure to assist the Greek government and the Greek people would amount to accepting the inevitable consequences of early Soviet domination of the country and the extension of Soviet power and control, either directly or through her satellites to the Aegean Sea. With Soviet control of the "Grecian" Islands, the paper asked, would Turkey still feel it worthwhile to resist the establishment of Soviet bases flanking the Dardanelles? Or would the question itself have lost significance when Turkish accesses to world trade was channeled through Russian controlled waters? The influence of such a situation on Turkish politics and Turkish policy would gradually, if not at once, condition Turkey to accept increasing Soviet pressures which, if resisted lead to growing frictions and finally to war. Here the domino theory was introduced: if Turkey were to submit to progressive coercion, the effect on other countries of the Middle East would lead to complete Soviet domination. If Turkey continued to resist Soviet pressures from her strategically and politically weakened position, the whole of the Middle East could well become a

¹¹³ Ibid, original term used in the Memorandum to the President.

battleground. Therefore, the paper argued, if the US policy was destined at any point to pursue practical measures to prevent control of the Middle East by the USSR, both the best point to start and the point least that was least risky to bring early conflict with the USSR was that of aid to Greece and Turkey.

The authors of the paper then took a bolder step ahead that until then a decision about aid to Greece and Turkey concerned these two countries very much. But by the time the Memorandum was written, other countries of Europe and Asia, suffering from the recent war, still in bad economic shape, lacking political stability and confused as to the future patterns of world power were ripe for an indication of which way “the wind blows.” Hence the importance of the decision of US Government on aid to Greece and Turkey. Failure to heed the requests of countries resisting Soviet pressures would give an impression that the United States is unable or unwilling “to enter the European arena of ideologies and play a forceful or practical role.” Each of these countries had their Leftist elements whose inspiration and line of action stemmed from Europe. Therefore, if Greece fell and then Turkey followed, Leftist movements directed by Moscow would result in new Communist controlled Governments.

If the United States failed to support Greece and Turkey and as result Soviet power is strengthened in the Middle East, then eventually the United States would be limited eventually to its own hemisphere, with Soviets aptly taking over countries one by one using subversion, infiltration and totalitarian methods. If the United States was to contribute just ideology and example to democratic way of life, US political and military grand strategy would once again be limited to the Western Hemisphere in such a case. Such a strategy or isolationism had, on the other hand,

¹¹⁴ The reading of the events regarding the Soviet pressures on Turkey almost perfectly overlap with Turkish justification of its needs vis-a-vis Soviet pressures. Hence Turkish diplomacy can be credited with a degree of success in inviting “the American

proven itself to be very costly as evidenced by two costly world wars. So, the price of not acting now would be higher in the long run.

What if, after Greece and Turkey, countless countries lined up to ask economic and military assistance? The Memorandum answered this question in a straight forward way. Aside from purely humanitarian motives, certain other criteria would apply:

1. The strategic or political importance of the area;
2. Whether the commitment was within US means;
3. Whether the commitment would reasonably expect to strengthen the forces of democracy and
4. the possible consequences of not accepting the responsibility in question.

The memorandum also underlined that the US could not commit itself to opposing Communist expansion everywhere but by applying sound judgement and energetic leadership, the US would use its resources to best support the principles for which it stood.

The next question then would be whether unilateral assistance to Greece and Turkey in the form now proposed constitute a change in US foreign policy or the US method of conducting international relations? The answer, according to the authors of the memorandum, was no since the United States had for a long time been providing loans, credits, military assistance, equipment and staff missions to allied and friendly nations. Therefore the methods to be employed were not in themselves new. *“The difference then lies not in a change in policy or method so much as the boldness of implementing US policy in that area at this time.”*¹¹⁵

Empire” to replace the British.

¹¹⁵ This author’s emphasis.

The memorandum then proceeded with the following paragraph containing maybe one of the boldest statements of US power in the post WWII era: “The military corollary of a bold foreign policy is of course military strength. This does not necessarily mean a change in the military program, but lends emphasis to the need for carrying that program through. It will however have the effect of impressing on those to whom it may not yet be clear that all American thinking must henceforth be global in scope in peace and war and that training must be conducted with this constantly in mind.”

The author or authors of the paper felt the need to emphasize one final point of great importance. That was that a piece meal program that had only half-hearted support by the US Government and its people could be disastrous to the very purpose for which it was undertaken for and to the prestige of the United States. “Assumption of the responsibilities involved in the program now under consideration must be fortified with a conviction of its rightness and with the resolution, energy and means to see it through.” ¹¹⁶

The paper referred to above, most likely originating from Pentagon, was far from shyness when it came to power politics and global action. It also proves that there was widespread consensus in Washington D.C. Government circles on what to do against Soviet moves in Europe and the Middle East and on a long-term strategy based on power projection. It also bears signs that close coordination by Turkish diplomats and military staff with their US counterparts led to US perceiving the Turkish Russian situation pretty much from Turkish eyes.

¹¹⁶ “Memorandum For the President, The Broad Implications of the Proposed U.S. Assistance to Greece and Turkey”, 5 March 1947, RG 334, Entry 263 Box 131 Joint American Military Mission for Aid To Turkey, Air Force Group, Decimal File 1947-53, 000.4 045.92, NARA.

2. Legal Process

While the main legislative mechanics of Truman Doctrine, or the Turkish-Greek Assistance is well known, the Congressional phase will be briefly mentioned here. Later, and executive stages are less or almost totally unknown in Turkish historiography and nearly forgotten in U.S. diplomatic and military history writing, though Public Law 75, as the Congressional final product was named, was a relatively short text and left a very wide field of maneuver for the executive on the conduct of the assistance. Therefore, the mechanics of legislation that governed the work of U.S. aid to Turkey after the Congressional phase deserves a much more detailed analysis for purposes of setting the historic record straight within a comprehensive work on the history of US Mission for Aid to Turkey.

Following Truman's speech at the joint session of Congress on 12 March, Chairman of House Foreign Affairs Committee, Charles A. Eaton (R; NJ) submitted "H.R. 2616- A Bill to provide assistance to Greece and Turkey" to the House of Representatives on March 18, 1947.¹¹⁷ The bill was forwarded to Committee on Foreign Affairs and then began a two-month process of legislative adoption.

Representative Eaton was also the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee began its hearings on the bill on March 25, 1947. Executive and open hearings were held in March and April, and the bill was favorably reported on April 25, 1947 by the Committee (House Report 314).¹¹⁸ A general debate was held in the House on May 6 and 8, 1947 and the bill was passed in the House on May 9, 1947, 287 to 108 (*Yeas*: Republicans 127, Democrats 160.

¹¹⁷ "H.R. 2616-A Bill to provide for assistance to Greece and Turkey", 80th Congress, 1st Session, Entry 256, JAMMAT 1947-1954, Army Group, Adjutant General's Section, Decimal File, Box 83, Folder 10 32.1 Legislation 1947, Record Group 334, National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

¹¹⁸ U.S House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations. *Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1943-50, Vol. VI: Military Assistance Programs, Part 2.* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976); p. 417.

Nays: Republicans 94, Democrats 13, American Labor 1)¹¹⁹ On the Senate side, the bill was introduced by Senator Vandenberg as S. 938 and favorably reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate Report 90). The bill passed the Senate on April 22, 1947 with 67 votes in favor and 23 votes against (*Yeas*: Republicans 35, Democrats 32. *Nays*: Republicans 16, Democrats 7).¹²⁰ After that, proceedings vacated, S. 938 was amended and passed in lieu of H.R. 2616 on May 15, 1947. House and Senate conference report was approved by both chambers of the Congress (House Report 377) on 16 May 1947 *viva voce*¹²¹; and on May 22, 1947, bill was signed by President Truman and became Public Law 75.

Just after the bill was favorably reported to the House on 25 April 1947, a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee on Near East and Middle East circulated to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee a report on 28 April on the necessity, terms of reference and composition of a group of experts to be sent to Turkey in order to make suggestions for the detailed use of the funds to be allocated. According to the report of the Subcommittee, the recommendations to be drafted by this group

“...should cover a wide scope, including specific requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces for equipment and supplies, relative priority of various items, such as economic and industrial assistance as might be required, reorganization desirable in the Turkish Armed Forces, additional training to be accorded Turkish Armed Forces by the U.S. and British, the part to be played by the British in further assistance to Turkey, relationship between the U.S. and British personnel, if both remain in Turkey, the phasing of supply of required items and the degree of supervision to be exercised over the utilization of any assistance furnished.”¹²²

¹¹⁹ CQ Researcher, “Record of the 80th Congress, January-July 1947”; www.cqpress.com, last accessed: 21 May 2021.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of United States (hereinafter cited as FRUS), 1947, Vol. V, (Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 155; “SWCC 358/1, Survey of U.S. Assistance to Turkey”.

The report indicated that by then already some work had already been undertaken to assemble the survey group. It finally concluded that a group of not more than 23 experts consisting of 4 State Department representatives, 12 War Department representatives and 7 Navy representatives be designated to leave Washington D.C. on 19 May for Turkey. This report was approved by SWNCC on 12 May, pending Congressional approvals and Presidential authorizations. Therefore, from the outset, U.S. Military Mission was intended to be not a simple giveaway of equipment but a comprehensive reform of the Turkish Armed Forces.

On the same date as he signed H.R. 2616 into law on 22 May 1947, President Truman also signed an Executive Order delegating his authority in implementing the Greek-Turkish Assistance Act to the Secretary of State. **“Executive Order 9857: Regulations for Carrying Out the Provisions of the Act Entitled ‘An Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey’”** was published on the Federal Register of 24 May 1947. This Executive Order outlined the authorities delegated to the Secretary of State, the duties of Chiefs of Greek and Turkish Missions, modalities of further delegation of authority by the Secretary of State as well as those of cooperation between Department of State and other government agencies, above all War Department. Soon after this, the Survey Group arrived in Turkey and started visiting various cities, garrisons and units.¹²³ The Terms of Reference of the Survey Group¹²⁴ included the following items:

- “1. The survey of Turkey will be conducted by the US Amb. to Turkey.
2. An over-all study of the Turkish Armed Forces will be conducted to include the Turkish economic and industrial potential for national defense and to determine recommendations for assistance to Turkey, within the limits of appropriated funds, to include the following:
 - a. Specific requirements of Turkish Army, Navy, and Air Forces for equipment and supplies, including a relative priority of various items.

¹²³ “*Amerikan Askeri Yardım Heyeti mensuplarının grupları halinde yapacakları inceleme gezilerinde ikinci yasak bölgelere girmelerine izin verilmesi (Authorization of Members of U.S. Military Assistance Group to enter 2nd level forbidden zones throughout the country)*”, 31.05.1947; Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri, 30-18-1-2, Box 113, Folder 36 Page 3.

¹²⁴ FRUS 1947, Volume V, p. 233.

- b. Detailed economic and industrial assistance, including specific projects or types of projects, which would improve the efficiency and/or the self-sufficiency of Turkish Military establishment.
- c. The desirability and feasibility of reorganization of Turkish Armed Forces designed to improve their efficiency and/or reduce the burden of maintenance of present large forces.
- d. Training of Turkish Armed Forces to be provided by US or British.
- e. Objectives, type, composition, and size of any US mission required in Turkey.
- f. Continuing participation of British in furnishing assistance, economic or military, to Turkey.
- g. Relationship of US and British missions, if both are required or desired in Turkey.
- h. Phasing of supply of required items.
- i. The degree of supervision to be exercised by US over the utilization of assistance furnished Turkey, and the method of exercising such supervision.”

In addition to the above analytical content sought in the Turkish survey, the terms of reference officially restated objectives of assistance to Turkey to guide the work of the Survey Group as follows:

“a. The maintenance of present strong Turkish determination to resist Soviet aggression.

(This will require continued confidence in US as a source of actual and potential support and the maintenance of a sufficiently strong and well-equipped Turkish Army to give Turks a feeling that their own defenses are strong.)

b. Maintenance of Turkish economic well-being so that social unrest will not open way for Soviet-Communist penetration. (This involves reduction of economic burden of Turkish Armed Forces to a point at which Turkey can eventually support them without outside assistance.) At present time the strength and productivity of Turkish economic system should be increased both to promote the general welfare of Turkish people and to permit Turkey to maintain by herself adequate defense forces.”

The first sentences of both paragraphs were actually pronounced in different wording during President Truman’s speech and the following legislative process as well as in the press. However, the part in parenthesis in Objective a, which read “This will require continued confidence in US as source of actual and potential support and the maintenance of a sufficiently strong and well-equipped Turkish Army to give Turks a feeling that their own defenses are strong”, *hinted at a long term military supply relationship to be established with Turkey or in other words,*

declared a government decision to be Turkey's go-to shop for military hardware and political support. The prospect of such a long-term assistance relationship was never affirmed during the Congressional process.

Headed by Major General Lunsford Oliver, the Survey Group worked in Turkey from 22nd May, the day President signed the bill into law and worked in Turkey until early July 1947, drafting a report which was signed by Ambassador Wilson and submitted to the Department of State for the allocation of funds appropriated under P.L. 75.

In parallel to the signing into law of Greek-Turkish Assistance Bill, State Department instructed the Ambassador in Ankara on May 23 to deliver an official note to the Government of Turkey to start the process of signing a framework agreement for the assistance to be provided.¹²⁵ Ambassador Wilson¹²⁶ delivered this note to Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Saka on May 26 and Minister Saka replied in an official note on Turkey's positive intention to engage in negotiations for such an agreement.¹²⁷ Secretary of State Marshall first forwarded a draft to President Truman on May 28, 1947 and stated that the agreement for Turkey did not have to be as comprehensive as that for Greece as the Turkish program had a "more restricted nature."¹²⁸ Subsequently, the text of a draft agreement, approved by President Truman, was sent by the State Department to Ambassador Wilson in Ankara on June 4, 1947. Ambassador Wilson delivered this draft to the Turkish Government on 6 June and through a series of exchanges on wordings, the agreement was signed by

¹²⁵ FRUS 1947, Volume V, pp. 176-177.

¹²⁶ Edwin C. Wilson was born in 1893 in Palatka, Florida. In 1920, Wilson began his extensive diplomatic career by joining the foreign services. Throughout the span of his career, he held such positions as First Secretary of the Embassy in Paris (1926-1930), observer for the U.S. at the International Congress of Reparations and Rhineland Evacuation held at the Hague (1929-1930), Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs at the Department of State in Washington (1931-1935), U.S. Minister to Uruguay (1939-1941), U.S. Ambassador to Panama (1941-1943), and Representative of the U.S. to the French Committee of National Liberation and post of Counselor of American Embassy in Paris (1943-1944). As President Franklin D. Roosevelt's diplomatic representative in Algiers, Wilson worked with General Charles de Gaulle on plans for a provisional government in France. He was U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 1945-1948. Source: https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt238nf2z6/admin/#aspace_51f4ad63c36af031ce1e5378e79f6ea1_last accessed 25 June 2024.

Turkish Foreign Minister Saka and Ambassador Wilson on 12 July 1947.¹²⁹ The Greek Agreement was signed by the Greek side without any alterations.¹³⁰ Regarding the Turkish version, although it is noted in FRUS that many telegrams detailed negotiations of Ambassador Wilson with Turkish officials and his questions to the States Department for clarifications, there were changes in three articles between the draft sent to Ambassador Wilson and that signed on 12 July. In the State Department draft sent to Ambassador Wilson on 28 May, the second paragraph of Article 2 read:

The Government of Turkey will permit the Chief of Mission, and members of his staff designated by him, to observe freely the utilization of any such assistance, and will furnish the Chief of Mission such reports and information on the utilization and progress of assistance furnished as he may request for the performance of his functions and responsibilities.¹³¹

In the final agreement that paragraph was revised as:

The Government of Turkey will make use of the assistance furnished for the purposes for which it has been accorded. In order to permit the Chief of Mission to fulfill freely his functions in the exercise of his responsibilities, it will furnish him as well as his representatives every facility and every assistance which he may request in the way of report, information and observation concerning the utilization and progress of assistance furnished.

The second change involved Article III. In this case, Turkish side added a qualifying sentence after the first paragraph which committed to allow information concerning the assistance “in so far as may be consistent with the security of the two countries.”

¹²⁷ FRUS 1947, Volume V., 177.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 180.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 190-192.

¹³⁰ See FRUS 1947, Volume V, pp. 185-187 for draft Greek Agreement and for signed version see Charles I. Bevans, ed. *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949, Volume 8 Germany-Iran* (Department of State, 1971); pp. 403-411.

¹³¹ FRUS 1947, Volume V, p. 191.

Most importantly, the third change involved Article IV. Instead of the first sentence of the article that imposed on Turkey the obligation to undertake whatever provisions “for the security of any article, service, or information received pursuant to this Agreement”¹³², the final version of the agreement mutualized the obligation to ensure the security of aid articles, service or information and made their undertaking dependent on consultation with each other.¹³³ While these changes may seem to be the work of Turkish statesmen aware of their responsibilities and the experiences of the Ottoman past in foreign abuse, they look more as theatrics aimed at domestic consumption with little fundamental change in the nature of assistance relationship as will be seen in the later stages.

The signing of Turkish Aid Agreement on 12 July 1947 also coincided with President İnönü’s “Declaration of 12 July”, in which he pledged to play a bipartisan role as President and asked Government officials to be impartial between the newly founded Democratic Party and the RPP. Following the elections of 1946 where widespread irregularities were reported¹³⁴, Democratic Party had stepped up its campaign for free and fair elections while İnönü had asked hardliner Recep Peker to form the new Government in August 1946. Throughout the period from summer 1946 to July 1947, Turkey under İnönü and Peker struggled for U.S. protection and support against Soviets abroad while trying to devise a strategy against the rapidly developing support Democratic Party enjoyed throughout the country. Peker Government’s instinctive reaction against modern campaign tactics of Democratic Party was to leverage RPP’s monopoly on state and further restrict freedoms.¹³⁵ This

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ For Turkish text see Fahir Armaoğlu. *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri* (Turkish -American Relations in Documents). (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 162-164; for English text: Charles I. Bevans, ed. *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949, Volume 11 Philippines- United Arab Republic* (Department of State, 1974); pp. 1163-1165.

¹³⁴ İlhan Tekeli & Selim İlkin. *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye’si, Cilt 3: Savaşın İçinden Geleceğine Yönelen*. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018); p. 314.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 317.

policy and Peker's strongman attitudes became untenable after 12 March 1947, as criticism of Turkish political system was voiced in the Congress especially in the House.¹³⁶ After Truman Doctrine, İnönü tried to smoothen the relationship between RPP and Democrats and the Declaration of 12 July was the result of this search. It was read on radio on 11 July and printed in the press on 12 July. İnönü's declaration on 12 July worked to defuse the tension with the Democrats but further accelerated the difference between İnönü's pragmatism and Recep Peker's hardline tactics while at the same time seeking to clear İnönü of the sins of Peker Government and previous stages of one-party rule.¹³⁷

The ratification of Turkish Aid Agreement took some time in this atmosphere, and also because Turkish Parliament had gone into summer recess on 18 June 1947 to reconvene on 25 August 1947.¹³⁸ Peker's Council of Ministers adopted the Agreement for ratification on 15 August 1947 and the Agreement was submitted to the Parliament as a Government proposal on 25 August 1947.¹³⁹ The text was reviewed by Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Budget and Finance Committees, all of which reviewed the text forwarded by the Government through procedural meetings with just votes of acceptance and one technical addition by the Budget Committee. TGNA ratified the Agreement with the votes of all 339 members that were present at the session on 1 September 1947.¹⁴⁰ The act ratifying the Agreement stated the entry into force as 12 July 1947, the date of signature by Saka and Wilson. On 5 September, Recep Peker asked for a vote of support in RPP Parliament Group for 5 of his "hardliner" ministers and 47 RPP deputies voted against. Peker

¹³⁶ For example see Democratic Representative from Illinois Adolph Sabbath's speech on March 17 at the House of Representatives which reads: "...It would be equally incredible to believe that any aid we might extend to Turkey, which has never shown undue friendship for democracy as we know it, would be knowingly used to help keep the present absolute government in power there against the desire of the Turkish people." *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 80th Congress, First Session, Volume 93, Part 2, February 26 to March 28, 1947*, p. 2142.

¹³⁷ Tekeli & İlkin, v.3, p. 325-326.

¹³⁸ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem: VIII, Cilt: 6, Toplantı: 1, 18.6.1947, p. 453.

¹³⁹ Ibid., Dönem: VIII, Cilt: 6, Toplantı: 1, 1.9.1947, p. 15.

understood that he was losing control of the RPP Group in the Parliament and asked İnönü to give Deputy Chairmanship of the party to himself. When İnönü declined Peker's request, he resigned on "health grounds" on 9 September, anniversary of RPP's foundation.¹⁴¹ İnönü appointed Foreign Minister Hasan Saka as the new Premier the next day, who had been unquestioningly following İnönü's orders on foreign policy.

As the negotiations on the Turkish-American Aid Agreement was starting in June 1947, Lunsford Oliver's Survey Group was already in Turkey visiting military headquarters and barracks and sharing impressions with Ambassador Wilson. Upon these first impressions, Wilson wrote to the State Department that the situation was worse than estimated and that there was "greater need for such assistance than was at first anticipated. There is ample evidence that funds to be made available can be applied on effective projects, many of which are of urgent character. It is clear that program which will be of inestimable assistance to Turkey is being developed and that benefits of aid program should be fully as effective as anticipated."¹⁴² The groundwork was being laid from day one for a long-term program.

Ambassador Wilson submitted the Survey Group Report on 15 July, as required by the Terms of Reference of the Group.¹⁴³ The report's most important recommendations were:

- Provision of equipment and supplies at a level of 48.500.000 USD for ground forces, 14.750.000 USD for Turkish Navy and 26.750.000 for Turkish Air Force respectively;

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁴¹ Tekeli & İlkin, v.3, p. 326.

¹⁴² FRUS 1947, Volume V, p. 194.

¹⁴³ FRUS 1947, Volume V, p. 233.

- Introduction of a road building program of 5.000.000 USD involving transfer of some equipment as well as use of US and Turkish contractors to build priority roads of strategic value;
- Allocation of another 5.000.000 USD to improve Turkish arsenals so as to reduce the amount to be spent on ammunition to be given to Turkey and to allow Turkey self-sufficiency in ammunition production
- Reorganization of the General Staff system to subordinate units as well as the supply system.
- Dispatching U.S. military instructors to Turkey to train Turks on the use of modern military equipment to be delivered and
- Sending members of Turkish military to U.S. military and naval schools for training and education.

One final recommendation by Ambassador Wilson, which suggested an additional 100.000.000 dollars each year under a 4-year program was later removed by him upon recommendation of the State Department,¹⁴⁴ as it risked provoking the Republican Conservative majority in the Congress, whose support for foreign assistance was vital.

With the conclusion of the Survey Group Report and the signing of the Turkish Aid Agreement, the most political part of the process led by State Department was coming to an end and Pentagon was coming into play. How Pentagon was going to play its role was defined in two basic documents.

U.S. military, or the Joint Chiefs to be specific, perceived the objectives of military aid to Turkey much more different than that to Greece. In Greece, it was about urgently putting down a communist insurgency. In the case of Turkey, the

¹⁴⁴ FRUS 1947, Volume V, pp. 234-238; p. 258.

objective was from the outset on a long-term perspective, focusing on strengthening Turkey's will and ability to resist the Soviets and in case of a shooting war, "to improve its military capability to conduct a strong holding and delaying action in the event of a Soviet invasion."¹⁴⁵ In any case, there was a strong state structure in Turkey and with no prospect of internal instability. Therefore, on the organizational and supply side. Greece came first. Once the Greek Aid system was organized and supply line organized, focus was turned onto the Turkish case. As a result, State Department and Department of War experts worked on a "Memorandum of Understanding between Department of State and the Department of War on the Turkish Aid Program."¹⁴⁶

The Memorandum set forth that the State Department would consult with the War Department on matters of common interest. Such consultation would take place in accordance with established practice by either Department presenting their policy issues to their respective Secretaries or by introducing policy questions in the proceedings of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

Questions of policy involving departments other than the State, War and Navy Departments, and questions of implementation would be raised initially with the Interdepartmental Interim Greece-Turkey Assistance Committee. Meetings of this Committee would be called by the Chairman (the Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey)¹⁴⁷ at the request of War Department or other member Department or agency, as well as upon his own initiative. Problems of procurement and administration would be brought first to the attention of the Committee.

¹⁴⁵ Steven L. Rearden, *History of The Office of the Secretary of Defense Series: Volume 1 The Formative Years, 1947-1950* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984); p. 164.

¹⁴⁶ "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of State and the Department of State Regarding The Turkish Aid Program", Entry 256, JAMMAT 1947-1954, Army Group, Adjutant General's Section, Decimal File, Box 83, Folder 10 32.1 Legislation 1947, Record Group 334, National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

¹⁴⁷ George McGhee fulfilled this role.

The American Mission for Aid to Turkey would consist of the Chief of Mission (also the Ambassador to Turkey) and Army, Navy and Air Force Groups, the chiefs of which would be responsible to the Chief of Mission. These groups would be initially organized in Washington to consult directly in Washington with a Turkish Mission that would represent the Turkish General Staff in working out the details of each military supply or training programs as specified in general terms in the Survey Group Report. At an appropriate time to be determined by the progress of the work in Washington and shipments to Turkey, the chief of each group and members of his group and suitable instructors would proceed to Turkey for the purpose of advising with respect to supply matters and of instructing Turkish personnel in the operation and maintenance of the United States equipment and material. The Chief of Mission would be kept advised regarding these activities and would review and make recommendations to the Secretary of State respecting the final programs developed in this way.

The War Department would assign an agreed number of military and civilian personnel to the Army Group of the Mission and to the military supply or training programs, including their implementation. The War Department would also provide for any instruction of Turkish military personnel in the United States or elsewhere determined to be necessary by the Chief of Mission under P.L. 75.

The regular pay and allowances of members of the United States Armed Forces on duty with the Mission or on military supply or training programs in Turkey, or assigned to programs in the United States to train Turkish nationals would be paid from regular appropriations of the War Department. Travel expenses, per diem while travelling, and extra allowances for the additional costs of living in Turkey would be paid to all military personnel ordered to duty in Turkey from funds

other than US War Department Appropriations. Salaries, travel and other relevant and necessary expenses of civilian personnel assigned to duty under the Mission and travel expenses for dependents of all personnel would also be paid from funds other than War Department appropriations. Rates of travel expenses, of per diem while travelling, and of allowances for the additional cost of living in Turkey would be determined by the State Department uniformly for the Mission and program personnel as a whole. Salaries, to the extent not payable out of War Department appropriations, and other relevant and necessary expenses of program personnel, including travel expenses of their dependents, would be paid from funds allocated by the State Department to the War Department to cover the cost of approved military supply or training programs.

The channel of communication between the Army Group of the Mission after its arrival in Turkey and the War Department in matters of policy guidance would be regularly through the Chief of Mission and the State Department. Communication relating to the technical matters and problems associated with implementation of approved programs, much as the establishment of particular requirements, would be direct. The Chief of Mission in his discretion could authorize further direct communication in the interest of expedition or administrative convenience. The State Department would in any case have to be kept informed on matters of importance.

Proposed programs for the Turkish Military Forces approved by the Chief of Mission would be forwarded by the Chief of Mission to the Secretary of State, who would make the final program determination after consultation with the War Department. The State Department, upon request of the War Department, would allocate funds as required to cover the cost of approved procurement and supply and training programs, including transportation and other relevant and necessary

expenses, subject to availability of funds and within limits established by the State Department. The War Department would have full responsibility for arranging the procurement and supply , inland and ocean transportation, and delivery of supplies and equipment for the military programs to the points of transfer of possession to the Turkish representatives as determined by the Chief of Mission.

The War Department was made responsible by the MoU to maintain accounts of obligations and disbursements made from funds allocated to it by the State Department out of appropriations under P.L. 75 and would make reports as requested by the State Departments after consultation by the War Department.

The War Department would also keep such records and prepare such reports of its activities as may be necessary for the preparation of quarterly report to the Congress. The form and content of these Departmental reports would be determined by the State Department after consultation with the War Department.

Finally, The War Department would be responsible for such services, supplies and facilities as could be considered necessary by the Chief of Mission and as mutually agreed between State and War Departments.¹⁴⁸

Acting Secretary of War Robert Lovett presented this Memorandum of Understanding to Secretary Royall for approval on 19 August, which suggests that all technical work on it had probably been completed in July.¹⁴⁹ Secretary Royall confirmed War Department approval of the MoU the same day to the Secretary of State and the document went into effect the same day.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of State and the Department of State [??] Regarding The Turkish Aid Program", Entry 256, JAMMAT 1947-1954, Army Group, Adjutant General's Section, Decimal File, Box 83, Folder 10 32.1 Legislation 1947, Record Group 334, National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

¹⁴⁹ "Letter by Acting Secretary of War Robert Lovett to Secretary of War Kenneth Royall, 19 August 1947", Entry 256, JAMMAT 1947-1954, Army Group, Adjutant General's Section, Decimal File, Box 83, Folder 10 32.1 Legislation 1947, Record Group 334, National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

¹⁵⁰ "Letter from Secretary of War Kenneth Royall to the Secretary of State, 19 August 1947", Entry 256, JAMMAT 1947-1954, Army Group, Adjutant General's Section, Decimal File, Box 83, Folder 10 32.1 Legislation 1947, Record Group 334, National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

At around the time of the negotiation of the MoU between the State and War Departments, George McGhee, States Department's Coordinator of Aid to Greece and Turkey, wrote directly to War Secretary Kenneth Royall for the recommendations of the Department regarding the Survey Group Report that was dispatched by telegram by the Ambassador and hand carried by General Oliver to Washington D.C. McGhee was on one hand under pressure from Truman for a speedy and effective program, especially for the Greek leg so that results could be shown and criticism could be avoided. Although he had no military background, McGhee was also trying to navigate bureaucratic processes at a formative time when roles were being redefined, political and bureaucratic wars were being fought and wholesale institutions were being established. Having sensed the vulnerability of depending on the results of a survey of barely a month long in this near chaotic environment for a country of Turkey's scale, McGhee sought an official reappraisal from the War Department of the Survey Group recommendations vis-à-vis the objectives of P.L. 75, asked whether those were the best recommendations under the circumstances and requested modifications if necessary to accord with supply availabilities and with the limitation of funds, so as to recommend a "firm supply program statement."¹⁵¹

Royall replied on 7 August, after 13 days and on the date of activation of the Army Group of the Aid Mission. In the letter, Royall stated that considering the length and scope of Ambassador's report and the short period of time War Department had to study it, it was impossible to give a categorical answer to McGhee's question. But Royall personally found the report sound and in line with the intent of P.L. 75. Whether the recommendations of the Survey Group were the

¹⁵¹ "Letter by George McGhee, Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey to Kenneth Royall, Secretary of War, 25 July 1947", Entry 263, JAMMAT, Air Force Group, Administrative Division, Decimal File, 1947-1953, 000.4 to 045.92, Box 131, Record

best under the circumstance was a question the War Department was unable to judge, Royall answered and noted that this was more an issue of placing reliance of the judgment of the Ambassador and Survey Group experts and their military experience and observations on the ground. Therefore, Royall added that subject to this qualification and to the issue of availability, his Department found the measures suitable. Royall's answer intimates ridiculing McGhee's asking such a question.

On the availability front however, there were problems. Some of the items foreseen in the Survey Group Report for Turkey were not available now. Procurement of certain materials from civilian market meant their delivery in summer 1948 and not all of the items recommended for Turkey would be available and maximum efforts would be made to substitute them with a view to achieving program objectives. Royall noted that a study of the availability was initiated.

Royall also pointed to a major deficiency in the report in that it did not sufficiently allow for the cost of maintenance and spare parts for one year nor for the cost of packing materials for shipment. Royall finally noted that a comprehensive review of the lists and recommendations would be accomplished by the War Department General Staff in coordination with Turkish military representatives in Washington and only after this, the War Department would recommend a *firm supply program* that McGhee sought.

Most important paragraph, however, was saved for the end. "It is understood that the Ambassador's report as originally written included a recommendation to the effect that military assistance to Turkey, to be effective, should extend over a period of several years. The War Department concurs in this view."¹⁵²

Group 334, National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

¹⁵² "Letter by Secretary of War to the Honorable Secretary of State, 7 August 1947", Entry 263, JAMMAT, Air Force Group, Administrative Division, Decimal File, 1947-1953, 000.4 to 045.92, Box 131, Record Group 334, National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

3. Activation of TUSAG

One day before Royall replied to Department of State request to analyze the Survey Group report and while State-War Memorandum of Understanding was being prepared and negotiated, the Chief of the U.S. Army Group was identified and Major General Horace McBride was appointed on 6 August 1947, taking office on 7 August and officially activating U.S. Army Group component of the Turkish Aid Mission.¹⁵³ McBride was one of division commanders in the European Theater in World War II. The documentation in National Archives Record Group 334 demonstrates that he was a careful and meticulous planner, attentive to details and very careful about the role of the Mission as well as his own role.

¹⁵³ “United States Army Group, American Mission for Aid To Turkey, General Order 1, August 7, 1947”, Entry 256, JAMMAT 1947-1954, Army Group, Adjutant General’s Section, Decimal File, Box 95, Record Group 334, National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 96A 266

UNITED STATES ARMY GROUP
AMERICAN MISSION FOR AID TO TURKEY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Washington, D. C.
7 Aug 1947

GENERAL ORDERS

No. 1

1. Pursuant to authority contained in War Department Group Personnel Authorization, Serial No. 1, 6 Aug 1947, the activation of the United States Army Group, American Mission for Aid to Turkey, Ankara, Turkey, is announced effective 7 Aug 1947.

2. Pursuant to authority contained in W.D. letter AC-PA-G 201 McBride, Horace L. (6 Aug 47) subject "Permanent Change of Status Order" dated 6 Aug 1947, the undersigned assumes command of the United States Army Group, American Mission for Aid to Turkey.

H. L. McBride
H. L. McBRIDE

Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Figure 2. The document legally establishing the US Army Group within American Mission for Aid to Turkey. The Army Group later came to dominate the entire Military Mission. NARA RG 334, Entry 256, Box 95.

McBride quickly set out to build his team. He would above all need a chief of staff and then sections and their chiefs for each major branch of the Turkish Army for which major amounts of supplies and equipment were to be delivered. In a letter to Chief of European Branch Operations Group of Plans and Operations Division of War Department General Staff, McBride asked by name critical figures of for his core team: Colonel E.B. Whisner as Executive Officer, Lt. Colonel A.G. Elgar for G-3 Section, Lt. Colonel H.C. Willcox for G-4 section (Highways), Colonel Isaac W. Little of Transport Corps as Port Officer and Sergeant James R. Flohr as steno-typist. The letter then defined the terms of reference for one Chief of Training Section, one Chief of Supply section and an ordnance officer in G-4 section. In addition to these, General McBride sought for his core team:

- 1 field officer to be senior American instructor at the Turkish tank school;
- 1 field officer to be the senior American instructor at the Turkish Technical School;
- 1 field officer to be the senior American instructor at the Turkish Motor Transport School;
- 1 field officer to be the senior American instructor in anti-aircraft artillery at the Turkish Artillery College;
- 1 field officer to be the senior American instructor in field artillery at the Turkish Artillery College;
- 1 company grade officer to be the senior American instructor at the Turkish Infantry College;
- 1 field officer to be the engineer officer in the supply(G-4) section of the U.S. Army Group;

- 1 warrant officer or master sergeant with and administrative background to handle administrative matters for the U.S. Army Group.
- 3 civilian clerk-typist;
- 2 civilian stenographers to handle dictation and other clerical matters;
- 1 civilian draftsman to handle the preparation of charts and graphs;
- 2 civilian interpreters of American nationality.¹⁵⁴

This core group first convened in Washington D.C. and started working with a Turkish General Staff delegation sent to Washington D.C. on 11 August. This Turkish Military Delegation was headed by Lt. Col. Cemal Aydınalp, who was previously military attaché in Washington D.C and in London during WWII. Col. Aydınalp's team also included Lt. Col. M. Tokcan of Turkish Army Transportation Corps, Major Cahit Tokgöz from Mobilization & Organization Division, Major S. Sarpter of Operations Division as well as Mr. Vecdi Diker and Mr. M. Özarker from Ministry of Public Works. This team was joined on 17 August by Lt. Colonel Arif Güvener of Tank Corps, Major C. Ozanalp of Artillery & Radar Corps, Major S. Özdilek of Engineer Corps and Major S. Tarhan of Signal Corps. A further three officers arrived on 31 August 1947. These were Major Nevzat Gökeri, Major Göksu and Senior Captain Semih Yürükaslan of Turkish Air Force.¹⁵⁵ Turkish Military Delegation worked in Washington D.C. until 15 October 1947, when it was dissolved and from this date on, its functions for the Turkish Army side were taken over by the office of the military attaché in Washington DC.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ "Memorandum for Chief of European Branch Operations Group of Plans and Operations Division, WDG, August 14, 1947", Entry 256, JAMMAT 1947-1954, Army Group, Adjutant General's Section, Decimal File, Box 88, Folder 2 200 Personnel 1947, Record Group 334, National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

¹⁵⁵ Undated document, NARA RG 334 Entry 258 Box 84 Folder 13 091.112-A 1947

¹⁵⁶ "Letter from Turkish Military Attachée to Foreign Liaison Office, War Department, 15 October 1947", NARA RG 334 Entry 258 Box 84 Folder 13 091.112-A 1947

With coordination between Turkish and American teams being established and shipments to Greece having started to unload in Pireaus on 1 August¹⁵⁷, the Department of Army turned to regulating the internal budgetary and technical procedures of Turkish assistance. For this purpose, the Department of Army published “Memo 700-5-9” on 29 August 1947, titled “Procedures for Furnishing Aid to Government of Turkey Under Public Law 75-80th Congress”, signed by Chief of Staff of the Army Dwight. D. Eisenhower.

This was a two-page document that in fact took the Greek version “Memo 700-5-6” of 14 July 1947, which was a 27 page document, and replaced words “Greece” and “Greek” with “Turkey” and “Turkish”, USAGG with TUSAG and the codes of Greek ports with codes for Turkish Ports. It was 700-5-9 that for the first time put an end to confusion regarding the name and abbreviation of the Mission referred to as AMAG, AMAT, USAG etc. From 29 August 1947, US Army Mission would be called “U.S. Army Group, American Mission for Aid to Turkey referred to as TUSAG”. The document also identified only three ports for which deliveries would be made. These and their codes were: İstanbul, GOGI; İskenderun, JOAN and İzmir, UDAD.¹⁵⁸

This document explained in smallest detail how to draft equipment requisitions, how to check availability of sources and prices, confirmation of availability, approval of shipments, documentation to be signed at the delivery as well as documentation proving that the recipient country (Turkey in this case) had asked the equipment delivery all the way to the specific codes to be placed on each crate and included forms to be used throughout the program for logistical management procedures. With this important piece of administrative regulation, U.S.

¹⁵⁷ Beisner, p. 63.

side had matured its preparations at least on the procedural and organizational side. The available documentation shows that there was no such preparation on the Turkish side aside from the establishment of liaison bureau within the Turkish General Staff in September-October period under Brigadier General Rüştü Erdelhun.

August and September was a period of technical consultations between Turkish and U.S. teams. Policy work had to wait until the end of September as the U.S. military establishment and defense bureaucracy was undergoing a fundamental change with the signing into law of P.L. 253 “National Security Act.” Public Law 253 provided legal status to the existing membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—namely, the Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Staff, US Air Force; the Chief of Naval Operations, which had been working without a legal mandate since WWII.¹⁵⁹

The Act also created the National Military Establishment over which the Secretary of Defense was to preside. This establishment consisted of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Research and Development and Munitions Boards. The Department of the Air Force replaced the former Army Air Forces. The Munitions Board was an existing joint Army-Navy agency, while the Research and Development Board had formerly enjoyed independent status. “Public Law 253 also established a National Security Council (NSC), consisting of the President; the Vice President; the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and the Air Force; and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board”¹⁶⁰ The National Security Council superseded the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) established during World War II to coordinate political and military policies at the assistant secretary level. “After the

¹⁵⁸ “Memo 700-5-9, Procedures for Furnishing Aid to Government of Turkey Under Public Law 75-80th Congress, 29 August 1947”, NARA RG 334 Entry 258 Box 83 Folder 10 32.1 Legislation 1947.

¹⁵⁹ Kenneth W. Condit. *History of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume II: The JCS and National Policy, 1947-1949* (Washington D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996); p. 4.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.4-5.

passage of the National Security Act, SWNCC was renamed State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) and continued in existence until 30 June 1949.”¹⁶¹

In the new national defense architecture, Secretary of Defense was equipped with wide ranging authorities but not a Department. By limiting Defense Secretary’s authority over military department secretaries and by giving these secretaries a place on the NSC table, the role of Secretary of Defense was no more than a coordinator.¹⁶² The National Military Establishment officially began operations on 17 September 1947, when James Forrestal was sworn in at the Navy Department Building in Washington D.C.¹⁶³ The next day, Forrestal attended the ceremony for swearing-in of John L. Sullivan as Secretary of the Navy and W. Stuart Symington as Secretary of the Air Force at the Pentagon while Kenneth C. Royall, previously Secretary of War, had automatically become Secretary of the Army. By 18 September therefore, the civilian leadership of the new military establishment was ready and in place as President Truman had been pressing for.¹⁶⁴ As the President had desired, the civilian leadership of the new military establishment was in place and ready to function with James Forrestal’s confirmation by the Senate as the Secretary of Defense.

With the turmoil of reorganization at least partially behind and aware of the deliberations and consultations between Turkish and U.S. teams throughout August and September, Department of State sent a letter to the Department of Army on 30 September 1947, asking for its recommendations concerning the scope and cost of the Turkey Aid Program prior to authorizing expenditure of funds to implement the program.¹⁶⁵ In the 30 September letter, Department of State indicated that a sum of

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid. p.3.

¹⁶³ Rearden, p. 1.

¹⁶⁴ Rearden, p. 2.

¹⁶⁵ NARA, RG 334, Entry 256, Box 83, Folder 10 Legislation 1947.

45.000.000 USD was allocated to the Army to cover a portion of Turkey Aid program. The same letter also stated that while the funds were being allocated to the Army, the authorization to spend the funds was being withdrawn. The Department of State would like to see presented “a firm schedule of requirements and the cost thereof” and only then would approve the program and authorize the expenditure of the funds. Department of Army and Air Force sought clarification from the State Department for this unexpected show of exercising its authority under P.L. 75 and the point was confirmed in a meeting on 9 October. State representatives reiterated again in this meeting that the Department desired to see the overall program for Turkey prior to authorizing expenditure of funds to implement the program.¹⁶⁶

Major General McBride and the U.S. Army team therefore went into further paperwork, preparing a cover letter addressed to the Secretary of State and to be signed by the Secretary of the Army, which clearly defined the objectives and expected outcomes of the Army component of Turkish Aid programs, detailed requirements on the basis of the Survey Group report with additions and deletions due to availability of items and funds and a summary sheet of items for the secretary of Army and a personnel authorization sheet, in total four annexes that together constituted the road map for military aid to Turkey.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ “Memorandum for the Record, 16 October 1947”, NARA, RG 334, Entry 256, Box 83, Folder 10 Legislation 1947.

¹⁶⁷ NARA, RG 334, Entry 256, Box 83, Folder 10 Legislation 1947.

SUMMARY SHEET¹⁶⁸
Equipment and Allocation of Funds Recommended

9 October 1947

Item	Ambassador's Recommendation	Department of Army Recommendations
AA-Antitank Support Artillery	\$ 6,017,000	\$ 5,266,000
Ammunition	21,154,000	7,061,000
Tanks and Vehicles	16,178,000	18,539,000
Maintenance, Spare Parts, Equipment	900,000	9,079,000
Engineer	750,000	984,000
Signal	750,000	1,146,000
Medical	250,000	1,000,000
Training	1,500,000	1,500,000
Ocean Transportation	---	1,500,000
Contingencies (State Department)	---	2,425,000
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>\$ 48,499,000</u>	<u>\$ 48,500,000</u>

The cover letter sent to the Secretary of State for approval of programs first provided the breakdown of the total amount to be managed by TUSAG. This included, in addition to the 48,500,000 USD for Ground Force Equipment and Supplies, 5,000,000 USD for Highway construction Equipment and Supplies, 5,000,000 USD for Arsenal Improvement Program and 650,000 USD for Mission Table of Organization, bringing the total to 58,500,000 USD, by far the largest of the three parts of the Mission.

Then the letter defined general and specific outcomes to be achieved by the TUSAG component. Firstly, the assistance was to increase the combat efficiency of the Turkish Army. It would initiate the modernization and standardization of weapons in combat units while improving and modernizing standards of instruction in the military school system. The assistance would permit a substantial reduction of the number of men and animals in the armed forces without decreasing the combat effectiveness of the Army. It would also initiate a foundation for an extensive

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

highway improvement program and substantially increase the output of ammunition from Turkish arsenals.

Specific outcomes much more clearly defined the means with the ends foreseen in the Survey Group, which was to ensure that the Turkish Military, should the Soviets attack, resisted long enough until help arrived from Americans and the British. While this was the strategic rationale of U.S. side, there is no evidence that the Turkish delegation objected to it. Specifically, the assistance would provide advisors and technical instructors for operation and maintenance of equipment and supplies furnished in the Aid Program as well as improving the standards of instruction, training and maintenance in the Turkish Army. U.S. assistance would seek to replace obsolete and badly work direct support light artillery in & Infantry Divisions, 4 Cavalry or Mountain Divisions, and 6 Armored Combat Commands with standard American weapons. Assistance furnished would also contain fire direction and signal equipment for these Artillery units.

On the armored side, the assistance would provide armored vehicles for 6 Armored Combat Commands suitable for use in local counterattack and ground operations against airborne drops. It would also strengthen materially antitank defenses by providing equivalent of 16 Battalions of 90 mm Antitank Guns.



This picture from July 1948 Monthly Progress Report of TUSAG shows Turkish officers at Infantry School in Çankırı training with 90 mm antitank gun, possibly in June 1948. Original caption reads: "Turkish infantry officers changing targets during sub-caliber firing of 90 mm Gun under supervision of American Infantry Officer, U.S. Army Group, American Mission for Aid to Turkey. NARA RG 334 Entry 251 A, Box 13

With regard to motor transportation, the assistance would provide sufficient motor transportation to motorize all Artillery Units equipped with light artillery furnished in the U.S. assistance program; to motorize the infantry components of 6 Armored Combat Commands and to provide a pool of motor transport to increase the strategic mobility and supply possibilities of the Army.

On the ammunition side and other support branches, the assistance would provide ammunition for each weapon furnished under the Program in quantity to permit a limited amount of familiarization firing and a small reserve. This was a complete U-turn from Survey Group report which, in addition to providing Turkey 5 million USD worth of assistance for arsenal improvement, also foresaw furnishing Turkey more than 21 million USD worth of ammunition. It was mostly McBride's

team that noted this discrepancy and proposed reducing the amount for ammunition while transferring most of that savings to previously non-existent line of spare parts and maintenance.



Another picture from July 1948 Monthly Progress Report of TUSAG shows Turkish armor officers on Tank Gunnery Range with M 36 tank recently delivered to Turkey. Original caption reads: "Turkish officers on Tank Gunnery Range preparing to fire the M-36 Tank with 90 mm Gun under the supervision of American Tank experts with the U.S. Army Group, American Mission for Aid to Turkey." NARA RG 334 Entry 251 A, Box 13 (Note that M-36 indeed was a self-propelled anti-tank gun, not truly a tank as it did not have enough armor to classify it as tank.)

The assistance would also provide .50 caliber anti-aircraft weapons for incorporation into existing units to increase the anti-aircraft protection of ground forces and a small increase in the general anti-aircraft defenses. It would also provide signal, medical and engineer supplies and equipment to permit training and instruction of service personnel as well as furnishing modest quantities of urgently needed equipment and supplies for service units.

On the highway side, the plan was to furnish highway construction equipment and supplies to permit training of Turkish operators, initiate construction of strategic roads and lay a basis for future expansion of highway development. Finally, the

arsenal improvement program would help increase production capacity in an 8-hour day to 300.000 cartridges for 7.92 mm ammunition, 500 rounds for 105 mm ammunition, 1800 rounds for 75 mm ammunition and 10.000 cartridges of .50 caliber ammunition.

The letter also requested authorization for 111 personnel for TUSAG consisting of 29 officers, 3 enlisted and 79 civilians.¹⁶⁹ Now the roadmap was drawn, the team was authorized, and a major milestone was achieved with the authorization of expenditures.

Around the time of the submission of the revised Army program letter, Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett wrote to the Secretary of Defense James Forrestal on 8 October 1947 that the Department of State as well as Chief of American Aid Mission Ambassador Wilson believed that “the objectives of the American Mission for Aid to Turkey would be furthered by integrating the separate Army, Navy and Air Groups of the Mission under a single military head.” Lovett continued to ask Forrestal to designate at the earliest convenience an officer of senior rank to coordinate for the Chief of Mission the work of the Army, Navy and Air Force Groups.¹⁷⁰ For the Ambassador as Chief of Mission, dealing with each Group Chief was too burdensome of a task and an overly military one, especially as the Mission was going into implementation phase with much of the strategic decisions having been made. The request was, however, contradictory both in itself and with the spirit of National Security Act. It was internally inconsistent as it first mentioned “integrating the separate Army, Navy and Air Groups under a single military head” and on the other had defined the task of the senior officer as “to coordinate the work of the Army, Navy and Air Groups.” It was also inconsistent with the National

¹⁶⁹ “Letter from Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall to the secretary of State, 10 October 1947”, NARA, RG 334, Entry 256, Box 83, Folder 10 Legislation 1947. The letter consists of a copy of the Summary Sheet as well as 4 “Tabs” from A to D.

Security Act where there were separate Departments for each service and an abstract National Military Establishment. This abstract National Military Establishment obviously never worked under a Secretary of Defense with no Department and was one of the first occasions that proved that the struggle between services had already metastasized onto the American Mission for Aid to Turkey. Moreover, as Groups and their Chiefs prepared to move to Turkey, the question of who was going to talk to Turkish military as the military voice of the Mission had to be answered.

Forrestal replied on 20 October, underlying the concurrence by all three departments to the State Department proposal and that they agreed that Major General Horace McBride, as the senior officer, would act as the overall coordinator in matters of common interest for the Army, Navy and Air Force Groups. Forrestal however noted that each Group Chief was authorized under the terms of the State-War Memorandum of Understanding to communicate directly with their respective Departments on technical matters and problems associated with the implementation of approved programs.¹⁷¹ In this letter, Forrestal did not allude in any way to the proposal on “integration” but used the wording “overall coordination in matters of common interest” and emphasized that “the three Departments concerned” had agreed to such a modality as well as to the appointment of Major General Horace McBride, correctly pointing to the power they held in their own turf. From that point on, Horace McBride started carrying two hats: One was the Chief of TUSAG and the other as COMAT, Coordinator for Military Assistance to Turkey. This two-hat position for the Army Group Chief would lay the ground for the single most important and long term internal problem between the Army and Air Force Groups

¹⁷⁰ “Letter from Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, 8 October 1947”, NARA, RG 334, Entry 256, Box 83, Folder 10 Legislation 1947.

¹⁷¹ “Letter from Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, 20 October 1947”, NARA, RG 334, Entry 256, Box 83, Folder 10 Legislation 1947.

of the Mission over the long term vision for the restructuring of Turkish Armed Forces and therefore, for the allocation of U.S. military assistance funds.

4. TUSAG arrives in Turkey

The first TUSAG member to arrive in Turkey was Colonel Isaac W. Little of the Transportation Corps. Col. Little arrived in Turkey on 8th September 1947 and in addition to other duties, immediately started preparations for the receipt of supplies to be shipped to Turkey under the aid program. By October 1, 1947, Col. Little had prepared five previously ports, İstanbul, Derince, İzmir, Mersin and İskenderun to receive shipments of aid supplies and Turkish Military Receiving Commissions had been established in each of these ports to supervise and account for the receipt and final delivery of those supplies (Mersin was later abandoned before shipment of any supplies). In addition to organizing the ports for the receipt of aid supplies, Col. Little made a survey of the Port of İstanbul from the point of view of commercial operations and until the arrival in late October 1947 of Colonel Shugg, G-3 of TUSAG and the first contingent of Mission personnel, assisted the Embassy in laying the groundwork for the Mission. In December, Colonel Little was joined by Lt. Col. Case Willcox and preparations accelerated for the arrival of aid equipment.¹⁷² The port section history notes that the first ship carrying aid supplies to Turkey (road building equipment then under the Army Engineer program), the SS Netherlands Victory, arrived in İskenderun on 22 October 1947 and was discharged without incident.¹⁷³ However, in the first report of the Mission from Ankara dated February 1948 and covering the period from 7 August 1947 to 30 January 1948, the first ship was identified as SS Lafayette, carrying 5 tons of Public Roads Administration

¹⁷² "Brief Historical Report of TUSAG PORT SECTION" undated document, , NARA, RG 334, Entry 250, Box 4, Histories-(Sections).

¹⁷³ Ibid.

equipment and having arrived on 18 December 1947 and the only equipment arrival in 1947.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, there was confusion on the American record keeping side in the initial stages.

After Colonel Little, Colonel Roland P. Shugg¹⁷⁵, G-3 (Chief of Operations Division) was scheduled to leave for Ankara. Col. Shugg was the forward element to establish the base of the Mission in Ankara and McBride instructed Col. Shugg on 9 October to carry out a series of substantial tasks in Ankara, including most importantly the establishment of the Mission in Ankara and a survey of Turkish Army school system with a view to prepare a list of training equipment desired for the Turkish military school system for which 500.000 USD was allocated. Other tasks included collection of information on living conditions and the support to be received from the Turkish authorities. McBride's plan was to build up Mission personnel gradually as assistance shipments picked up. On this point, McBride told Shugg that "The Ambassador should be informed of our personnel ceiling and limitations prior to establishing necessity for increasing the members and being able to justify the increase to Congress."¹⁷⁶ It is striking that McBride did not believe that the task at hand was achievable with personnel ceilings at hand and had a game plan from day one to overcome those ceilings and to create a large mission before the Mission was established. Such a position could not have been part of a written letter of instructions if it had only been McBride's personal belief rather than U.S. Army or Department of Army position.

¹⁷⁴ "Monthly Progress Report on Aid to Turkey Program for 7 August 1947 to 31 January 1948", NARA RG 334 Entry 251 A, Box 13, August 1947-31 January 1948.

¹⁷⁵ Colonel Robert P. Shugg was born in 1893 in Boston, Massachusetts. He graduated from US Military Academy Class of 1916. He served in various artillery and staff positions and graduated from the two year Command and General Staff College Ft. Leavenworth, Class of 1931. He served as Corps Artillery Regiment Commander of XII Corps during World War II in between November 1944 and May 1945. He retired as Brigadier General and he died on 28 July 1989, in Oakland, Alameda, California, United States, at the age of 95.

¹⁷⁶ "Letter of Instructions to Colonel R.P. Shugg, G-3, US Army Group, American Mission for Aid To Turkey, 9 October 1947", NARA, RG 334, Entry 256, JAMMAT, 1947-1954, Army Group, Adjutant General's Section, Decimal File, Box 84, Folder 13 091.112-A 1947.

Colonel Shugg arrived in mid-October in Ankara and quickly set out to perform his tasks as defined by McBride. After a month of hard work in Ankara and port cities, Colonel Shugg wrote back to McBride screaming about the conditions the Mission was facing in Turkey. Firstly, the Turks were not yet prepared to receive any great amount of shipping as they had not devised a detailed program for receipt of U.S. equipment. Turks did not do much so far, Shugg claimed, beyond the harbors to be used and establishing port commissions which, according to Shugg, teams knew nothing about shipping. Shugg also added that the Turkish General Staff had in terms of preparation only a distribution list for ground equipment.

Shugg was even more alarming about the supply system in the Turkish Army. Describing his visit to the Master Depot as “not a pretty picture, it consists of a handful of what we would call cow-sheds, poorly lighted, without windows, and filled with some very crude looking rows of wooden boxes containing a very few odd parts for 38 assorted types of motor vehicles in the motor section”. There was no place in the Master Depot for the soon to be arriving loads of U.S. equipment and when Shugg asked the Depot Commander where he would keep this equipment, the Turkish Commander said he would put them in piles and wait until spring.

After describing other incidents, he faced during his brief time in Turkey, Shugg concluded that the Turkish side was interested only in the end items, namely the delivery of so many guns to a battalion. “They are not prepared nor educated sufficiently in the shipment, receipt, storage and issue of the parts and maintenance program necessary to operate and back up these end items.” Shugg therefore recommended McBride to slow down shipment of equipment and personnel to meet these primary conditions. “I would hold as a price over their heads full compliance our suggestion to properly setup the operation and maintenance picture before they

ever.”¹⁷⁷ According to Shugg, the British had already been through this, having delivered tons of equipment to various depots in Turkey and had never been able to identify them properly as the Turkish operators, according to Shugg, were not ready to receive them. Shugg warned McBride again “what you need over here immediately are the people who will receive, store and teach them how to issue this equipment. Nobody else matters for some time to come.”¹⁷⁸ Shugg also warned McBride to send bachelors to Turkey, as Ankara and İstanbul were the only cities where American families could live. Shugg concluded his report with a final blunt warning: “I know we can whip this thing but a child must walk before he can run and to dump our Aid Program on them within six months would mean undigested masses of equipment and would bring heavy criticism on you before the year is out.”¹⁷⁹

Shugg was right. Turkish military by 1947 was barely a collection of human beings and equipment administratively organized as a gargantuan paper producing and money wasting structure. During World War II, significant amounts of British and U.S. equipment had been received but no systematic effort was made for transforming the lethargic structure towards an organization that could effectively prepare for and wage 20th century industrial warfare. Instead, Turkish military’s insatiable appetite for more and newer equipment was not matched on the side of systemic management and both national resources and those transferred from Britain and U.S. had been either wasted or used without any benefit or impact. Whenever a new weaponry or system was bought or transferred from these countries, the solution was to send a few experts abroad or bring in a few experts to Turkey without any structural effort focusing on how best to use them. From day one, Colonel Shugg, who was an able and experienced officer, had rightly seen the true dimensions of the

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

task the Mission was facing: *to help transform the Turkish military to manage itself according to the principles and requirements of modern industrial warfare*. This was a transformation that the US Military mission had to achieve, both in spite of Turkish General Staff and subordinate services as well as with their help and commitment. But it would take not a year or two, but decades of assistance and increasing American commitment and dollars to achieve.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

CHAPTER V: FROM EMBRYO TO SKELETON: AMERICAN MILITARY AID MISSION ARMY GROUP IN ACTION, JANUARY 1948- JUNE 1950

With the arrival of initial and then follow-up cadres of the Army Group, first a headquarters structure appeared with embryonic units to take care of the contemplated training activities. These embryonic units gradually grew into small missions on their own, in particular like those in training schools or in the Staff College in İstanbul. By mid-1950, U.S. military presence through Army Group in Turkish military units had reached a significant level where training activities were closely monitored and “inspected” by U.S. Army officers and NCOs.

1. Initial Steps

The US Military Mission was established on 7 August 1947 and throughout the rest of 1947, was busy setting itself up. Up until 31st January 1948 when the Mission’s first report was delivered, a period during which Turkish civilian and military authorities were expecting a rapid downpour of U.S. equipment, the operations of the US Army Group were mainly concerned with procurement and formation of staff organization, orientation of the staff, preparation and submission of supply requirements, conduct of surveys of Turkish military establishment especially the school system, and preparation of plans and material for the conduct of the instruction and training to be delivered to the Turkish Army in the spring training program. During this period, no actual training could be delivered, nor could any equipment be delivered for the ground force program. As we have seen for Colonel Shugg’s conclusions of his field visits, this was a deliberate choice where US Army

Group gave priority to reform Turkish Army depot system so that the inflow of equipment could be better managed.¹⁸⁰

February 1948 was a busy and formative month. At this time, Turkish General Staff told the US Ambassador that they thought the Turkish-US military relationship was entering a third phase where tactical instruction along US doctrine had to be started immediately (first phase being general Oliver's mission, second phase being supply and technical instruction in handling of the equipment). So much so that the Turkish General Staff could sacrifice some of the aid equipment to expedite and implement this phase. Accordingly, during this period, US Army Group focused on drafting the training program, translation of texts to implement these courses and the further writing of lesson plans. A detailed plan for the distribution of equipment was drafted. Most critically, considerable time was spent on revision of Turkish Army tables of organization, bringing them in line with US tables of organization. In parallel, Turkish Army started revising its training and technical manuals to correspond with those used by the United States Army.¹⁸¹

The next month, US Army Group continued its focus on the training program in schools and was able to bring in 98% of the equipment needed for the 1948 training program.¹⁸² In addition to the ongoing work on training, seven Turkish Army officers, including two generals were sent to US for a tour of ordnance plants and supply installations for the purpose of observing US production methods of ammunition and arms. In this period, Turkish General Staff was presented recommendations by the US Army Group on organizational changes in the combat

¹⁸⁰ "Monthly Progress Report on Aid To Turkey Program for 7 August to 31 January 1948", RG 334, Entry 251A, JAMMAT Monthly Reports, Box 13.

¹⁸¹ "Monthly Progress Report on Aid To Turkey Program for February 1948, 17 March 1948", RG 334, Entry 251A, JAMMAT Monthly Reports, Box 13.

¹⁸² "Monthly Progress Report on Aid To Turkey Program for March 1948, 13 April 1948", RG 334, Entry 251A, JAMMAT Monthly Reports, Box 13.

units of the Turkish Army. The US Army group also requested the Government to coordinate at the highest level the handling of incoming supplies as lack of coordination among a range of government agencies was causing problems and backlogs at ports. On 31st March, a Prime Ministerial decree established a coordinating committee chaired by Chief of General Staff General Salih Omurtak and including representatives from Ministries of Defense, Interior, Public Works, Customs and Monopolies, Transportation, Commerce and Foreign Affairs as well from Army, Air Force and Navy. That such a coordinating committee including such an array of institutions had to be chaired by the Chief of General Staff attests to the bureaucratic nightmare the US mission faced when bringing in US military equipment to Turkey.

As the flow of equipment reached significant levels in April, the Mission started publicizing the arrival to both Turkish domestic public by engaging journalists to witness equipment arrivals in ports and supply centers as well as to Washington through pictures attached to the end of the Monthly Reports.¹⁸³ From April 1948, more than a year after the announcement of Truman Doctrine and almost a year from Congressional adoption of P.L. 75, the flow of equipment and pace of trainings started to accelerate.

¹⁸³ “Monthly Progress Report on Aid To Turkey Program for April 1948, 17 May 1948”, RG 334, Entry 251A, JAMMAT Monthly Reports, Box 13.



Figure 3 Picture of an M24 tank being unloaded probably at Derince port, Photo caption reads “Unloading Tanks”¹⁸⁴




Figure 4 The first US supplied M-24 tanks on their way probably to Armor School in Ankara; photo caption reads “Tanks enroute to supply center.”¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.
¹⁸⁵ Ibid.



Figure 5 US supplied military trucks probably in Transportation School in Konya. Photo caption reads: "Newly arrived trucks lined up at supply centre in Turkey."¹⁸⁶ Note the happy and proud face of the Turkish officer in front of the trucks.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.



Figure 6. A US supplied M-101 howitzer being unloaded from ship probably at Derince port. Original caption reads: "Unloading guns."¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

2. Organization

The United States Army Group was activated in Washington D.C. per General Orders No.1, dated 7 August 1947. Following the establishment of the Mission in Ankara and arrival of a substantial number of officers, General Orders No. 1 of 16 January 1948 by General McBride was the first attempt to organize the US Army Group but was basically a staff assignment document identifying different branches within the US Army Group structure and this order did not include an organizational chart.¹⁸⁸

TUSAG Headquarters was first established in an apartment house at 23, İzmir Street, Yenışehir, Ankara. In March 1948, TUSAG Headquarters was moved to a new apartment building at 371 Atatürk Bulvari, Kavaklıdere (later Headquarters for ECA). In December 1949, TUSAG Headquarters moved to 234 Atatürk Boulevard.

In June 1948, General McBride expanded the US Army Group significantly and ordered a better-defined organization chart. With General Order No 3189 of 11 June 1948, the US Army Group would include the following sections:

- Office of the Chief
- Office of the Chief of Staff
- AC¹⁹⁰ of S G-1 Section
- AC of S G-3 Section
- AC of S G-4 Section
- Artillery section
- Armored Section

¹⁸⁸ American Mission for Aid To Turkey, United States Army Group. General Order No 1: Staff Assignments TUSAG, 16 January 1948. RG 334, Entry 256, JAMMAT 1947-1954, Army Group, Adjutant General's Section, Decimal File, Box 95; NARA.

¹⁸⁹ American Mission for Aid To Turkey, United States Army Group. General Order No 3: Organization of TUSAG, 11 June 1948. RG 334, Entry 256, JAMMAT 1947-1954, Army Group, Adjutant General's Section, Decimal File, Box 95; NARA.

¹⁹⁰ Assistant Chief of Staff.

- Antiaircraft Section
- Finance Section
- Infantry Section
- Medical Section
- Motor Transportation Section
- Ordnance Section
- Port Transportation Section
- Signal Section

These sections had indeed been practically established as their staff had arrived and General Order No 3 formalized the structure. This basic structure went through minor revisions due to evolving needs but practically remained more or less same over the years.




Figure 7. TUSAG Organization Chart, 11 June 1948

General Orders No 6 of 1 October 1949 further extended the structure of US Army Group, formalizing the existence of newly established staff section but most importantly adding a “War Plans Group” directly related to the Chief of TUSAG.¹⁹¹




Figure 8. TUSAG Organization Chart, 1 October 1949.

However, General Order 6 did not include a word on the task or staff of War Plans Group. Indeed, in more than 130 declassified boxes accessed in RG 334 series during the archival work for this dissertation, not a single document or folder was found under this title, meaning that whatever was done by this Group was still classified and were therefore still placed in the classified boxes of the series.

¹⁹¹ United States Army Group, Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, General Order Number 6, Organization of TUSAG, 1 October 1949. RG 334, Entry 256, JAMMAT 1947-1954, Army Group, Adjutant General's Section, Decimal File, Box 95; NARA.

This War Plans Group probably stemmed from the realization by the entire Mission that the Turkish General Staff did not have a coherent and functionable strategic plan while the Turkish military was being provided thousands of tons of modern equipment. This wakeup call was put into writing by Admiral Richard I. Connolly, Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. In his “TOP SECRET” letter¹⁹² of 2 February 1949 to Mission Chief Ambassador Wadsworth and Mission Coordinator Major General McBride, Admiral Connolly outlined the results of his brief survey of Turkish strategic planning, a summary of which is given below:

- Turkish General Staff have so far not developed a coherent strategic plan, only an outline strategic concept that was rather vague in parts and upon which there was not a general agreement either between themselves or with the U.S. Military Mission.
- Turkish staff organization was such that it would be difficult for them to put together a plan until the planned reorganization was completed and began to function. (By this time, General Staff HQ still lacked a joint character and was almost entirely made up of Ground Force officers. Only Navy and Air Force presence was in the form of Undersecretaries at Ministry of National Defense. US Military Mission was frantically seeking to change this at the time.)
- The level of military education, background and staff experience of the Turkish officers would make planning a slow process.

¹⁹² Memorandum for CHAMAT and COMAT on Turkish Strategic Planning by Admiral Richard I. Connolly, 2 February 1949. RG 334, Entry 262, Box 3, Folder 12, 320 Organization of the Mission 1949.

- There was a great need for a strategic plan as this had to be the basis of all efforts to prepare the Turkish military, naval and air forces and the Turkish nation for mobilization and the continuing support for war.
- The strategic planning of the Turkish General Staff had to be coordinated with the theatre planning conducted under the direction CINCNELM (Connolly's post.)

Connolly then offered his analysis of then Turkish President İnönü, who was trying to involve the United States in Turkey's defense through a legal arrangement:

"The President of Turkey, probably more than anyone else, senses the deficiency in strategic direction of the efforts being made to build up and, in case of war, the mobilization, deployment and operations of the Turkish Armed Forces but does not realize the limited planning abilities of his General Staff, the amount of time and effort necessary to produce a strategic plan nor exactly what constitutes such a plan and the points of its impact upon the strategy of the whole theatre. Neither does he comprehend what constitutes inter-nation planning but he is determined that we commit the United States, either by political defense pact or by a formal association of military staffs, on a higher level than the Mission contact."¹⁹³

Connolly went on to argue that Turkish General Staff needed further education, organization and continual guidance in strategic planning. He also warned that a too intensive and immediate effort devoted to planning would interfere with both the work of the Turkish General Staff and the US Military Mission. He also emphasized that Coordinator of the US Military Mission (Major General McBride) now had a directive which provided for liaison between the Military Mission and the Turkish General Staff for the purpose of familiarization with Turkish Strategic Plans and furnishing advice that would lead to their development in accordance with U.S. strategic planning.

Connolly then outlined his recommendations to improve the situation. Firstly, weekly meetings between the Mission (at Group Chief level) and TGS would devote

some part of their time and effort to consideration of strategic planning. As the reorganization of TGS became effective, the development of the Strategic Plan be undertaken by that body with the advice and assistance of COMAT¹⁹⁴ and the Military Mission. Connolly also suggested that in line with the progress, ***the directive given to COMAT would be superseded by another from the JCS that would explicitly provide for this relationship, which was agreed by the President İnönü, with the provision that the Mission would act as an intermediary between CINCNELM and COMAT and the Military Mission.***

Connolly also stated that as the tempo of the planning increased, the Military Mission would require additional staff that would either be provided by increasing the Mission cadres or by providing assistance from CINCNELM¹⁹⁵ Joint Planning Staff on a temporary basis as specific work developed need for various types of planning officers. Finally, Connolly proposed a revision of the situation regarding strategic planning in six months and the closest possible liaison between Chief of Mission, Coordinator of the Mission and CINCNELM be maintained and frequent visits of staff officers from CINCNELM would take place during these six months. After this period, Admiral Connolly and his entire Joint Planning Staff would make a visit. Connolly concluded that at the end of this six months period, staff talks between CINCNELM and the Military Mission on one hand and Turkish General Staff on the other might be politically feasible and might then prove to be timely and possible.

Interestingly, any involvement by the US Military Mission in any strategic planning work was politically outside the boundaries of its term of reference. If this work had

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Coordinator of Military Aid to Turkey.

¹⁹⁵ Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces East Atlantic and Mediterranean.

been heard of in US Congress at the time, Truman Administration would have a hard time explaining it. Moreover, in a highly political matter as combined strategic planning, State Department seemed to leave control of the process as well as that of the Mission to JCS, as there was no mention of the State Department in Connolly's message aside from the involvement of Chief of Mission. Hence the War Plans Group made its way into TUSAG structure and the US Military Mission, less than a year from the announcement of Truman Doctrine, had stepped into the most intimate part of Turkish military thinking, again with Turkish request and consent.

As stated above, Chief of US Army Group, Major General Horace McBride, was appointed as Coordinator of the US Military Aid Mission but under such title, he had no authority on individual Group Chiefs. The interservice rivalry, especially on future funds to be allocated Turkey and the need to speak with one voice at certain levels required a new structure. On 7 November 1949, a JCS directive established Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT) and Chief of US Army Group, Major General Horace McBride, assumed the position of Chief of JAMMAT consisting of Army, Air Force and Navy Groups. JAMMAT was part of the overall American Mission for Aid to Turkey. As Chief of JAMMAT, General McBride retained command of the US Army Group. In the later stages, a separate joint staff organization would be developed for JAMMAT. This structure would continue until 1991, when JUSMMAT, as it was called at the time, was dissolved.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁶ Monthly Progress Report of Aid to Turkey Program, November 1949, December 22, 1949. RG 334, Entry 251 A, JAMMAT, Monthly Activity Reports, Box 17.

3. Sections of the U.S. Army Group and their activities until mid-1950

a) G-1 (Personnel & Administration)¹⁹⁷

General Order No 1 of 16 January 1948, which announced the TUSAG staff organization, designated one staff section as the Administrative Office. Lt. Colonel Eugene T. Adler was announced as Administrative Officer for the U.S. Army Group.

General Orders No. 3, 11 June 1948, Organization of TUSAG, redesignated the Administrative Office as the Assistant Chief of Staff (AS of S), G-1 Section, to include the responsibilities of the Adjutant General's section as outlined in FM 101-5.

General Orders No. 8 dated 22 November 1948, established the office of Headquarters Commandant (FM 101-5) including headquarters supply and operation of headquarters motor pool, under the supervision of AC of S, G-1.

Lt. Col. Adler served as the Administrative Officer and AC of S, G-1, from 16 January 1948 until 12 September 1949, at which time he was replaced by Colonel Willard S. Renshaw, who continued this task until end of 1950.

The gradual growth of the Mission, together with the dual functions of the AC of S¹⁹⁸, G-1 Section (both policy making and operating) necessitated additional personnel to carry out the functions of the Section, the primary mission of which was the administrative support of the Headquarters, thus leaving other sections free to concentrate on the Group mission of re-equipping, re-organizing, and re-training the Turkish Army. The Section focused both the continued administrative support of the

¹⁹⁷ Brief Summary, AC of S, G-1 Section, United States Army Group, 27 March 1950, RG 334, Entry 250 Box 4, Histories TUSAG Sections 1947-1950.

¹⁹⁸ Assistant Chief of Staff.

Army Group as well as on assisting the Turkish side to introduce a personnel classification system within the Turkish Armed Forces.

b) G-3 (Operations & Training)

G-3 Section, TUSAD, was originally designated as the Plans and Training Division and was headed by Brigadier General (initially Colonel) R. P. Shugg.

During the period from August 1947 to end of February 1948, inspections were made of the existing Turkish Schools to determine their value and the additional instructor personnel, housing facilities, training aids and other equipment necessary to implement the American supervised Program of Courses for Turkish Army Schools proposed by the Plans Division to the Turkish General Staff.

The Turkish General Staff agreed as a result of these inspections: 1) details of courses to be conducted in Turkish Army Schools,, 2) proposed improvements in School facilities, 3) provision of instructors needed to conduct the courses at the various Service Schools, 4) increasing the length of the courses conducted at the Turkish Military Academy from two years to three years, and 5) transfer of the AAA¹⁹⁹ School from Polatlı²⁰⁰ to Tuzla²⁰¹.

Requirements for necessary supplies and equipment which could not be obtained from Turkish sources to support the American supervised Training Program for Turkish Army Schools were prepared under the supervision of the G-3 Section and submitted to the United States for action.

¹⁹⁹ Anti-aircraft artillery.

²⁰⁰ A farming district to the west of Ankara housing Turkish Ground Force's Artillery School.

²⁰¹ A one remote district of Tuzla to the east of İstanbul province. Infantry School was also moved to this district and both the AAA School and the Infantry School remain there to this date.

The preparation of new Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) for Turkish Army Units began in March 1948. Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) were prepared by the various special Staff sections of TUSAG, submitted to G-3 Section for review and final publication. The following T/O&Es were proposed to and accepted by the Turkish General Staff prior to 1 September 1949:

- All units of Infantry Division up to and including Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company
- All units of the Armored Brigades
- Corps Combat Engineer Battalions
- Anti-tank Gun Battalions
- Corps Artillery Regiments
- All units of the Cavalry Divisions
- All AAA battalions.

Prior to this date, functional charts and T/O and E's by all schools (except T/O&E's for Infantry School) were prepared by various staff sections and submitted to G-3 Section for review and after review submitted by G-3 Section to Turkish General Staff for approval and publication. It appears from the time frame and the intensity of work undertaken by a small cadre of U.S. Army officers that the submission by the TUSAG and acceptance by Turkish General Staff of American designed T/O & E's was a rather straightforward and bureaucratic process.

In addition to the above, between 1 January 1950 and April 1950, T/O & E's for Army Engineer Construction Battalions, Engineer Maintenance Platoons, Engineer Depot Companies, Ordnance Depot Companies, Infantry Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Reconnaissance Company and Military Police Platoon were

submitted to TGS by G-3 Section for approval. It must be noted that not a single US drafted T/O&E was turned down by the Turkish General Staff and all were approved.

On the other hand, G-3 Section closely monitored the results of reformed training system in the Turkish Army. A list of US supervised schools together with the number of graduates from each school is shown below:

Table 6. Number of Graduates from TUSAG supervised training courses in Turkish Army Service Schools by May 1950.

School	Graduates		
	Officers	Enlisted Men	Total
Staff College ²⁰² , İstanbul	33	-	33
AAA School	384	104	488
Armored School, Ankara	292	280	572
Artillery School, Polatlı	631	382	1013
Engineer School, İstanbul	245	371	616
Infantry School, Çankırı	1158	14	1172
Medical School, Ankara	103	-	103
Ordnance School, Ankara	255	363	618
Signal School, Ankara	276	719	995
Transportation School, Gazimir, İzmir	286	4282	4568
Total	3663	6515	10178

In the same period, 124 officers and 1 NCO completed courses in U.S. service schools. Sixty officers completed courses in EUCOM²⁰³ Schools in Germany. Nearly all of those officers and enlisted men were assigned as instructors to Turkish Army Schools.

Training Inspections of Turkish Army units were conducted under supervision of G-3 Sections. Technical inspection of Aid equipment was conducted under the general supervision of the G-3 Section.

²⁰² Previously mentioned as War Academy. Here original use by U.S. Mission was maintained.

²⁰³ U.S. Army European Command.

Under the general supervision of G-3 Section and in collaboration with the Turkish General Staff, 371 (three hundred and seventy-one) Field Manuals, Technical Manuals and other military publications were translated and published or made ready for publication. Two hundred and twenty-one military publications were in the pipeline for translation by March 1950.

This translation effort was not flawless, though. There were warnings made by high-ranking officers on various aspects of the doctrinal transformation. First and foremost was the adoption of FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations, and subsequently FM 100-5 Operations. The army of professional translators and English-speaking officers under time pressure and without enough time for editorial control, inevitably made mistakes and these amounted to impeding understanding of the concepts.²⁰⁴

By March 1950, G-3 plans for future work included the following, which, more than 2 years before Turkey's entry into NATO and before the positive storm around Turkey after Turkey's entry into war in Korea, gives a perfect idea on how the US Army Group, more or less like the rest of the military mission, had prepared itself to reform (or manage, more realistically) the Turkish military in the long run:

- Revision of Infantry Division T/O &E to provide for new equipment being ordered from the United States to include operating personnel to man this equipment
- Revision of Cavalry T/O & E (same reason as above)
- Revision of Tank Destroyer Battalion (changed from Anti-tank Gun Battalion, same reason as above)
- Preparation of new T/O &E's for Army and Corps Headquarters

²⁰⁴ Nurettin Türsan, "Birlikte Sevk ve Muharebe Talimnamesi komisyonuna bazı notlar" (Some Notes to the Field Service Regulations Manual Commission), *Ordu Dergisi* (Military Journal), June 1949, 123-131.

- Preparation for new T/O & E's for the Infantry, Armored and Artillery Schools to provide for additional personnel needed to meet recent expansion
- Assisting Turkish General Staff in the organization of the Transportation Corps and in conduct of decentralized Driver Training Centres established upon recommendation of TUSAG
- Assisting Turkish General Staff with plans for reorganization of Turkish Ground Forces made necessary by reductions of strength of Turkish Army and if possible arrange for disbandment of many useless units
- Complete plans for Training Inspections of Turkish Army units in the field and technical inspections of American Aid Equipment shipped to Turkish Army Units
- Complete plans for Program of Courses for Turkish Army Schools 1950-1951
- Complete plans for providing necessary equipment to modernize the Turkish Army units which are organized and trained to the extent that they can maintain and operate equipment which may be ordered for them.

The significance of the above list is that by Spring 1950, TUSAG teams were deeply involved in re-creating the Turkish Army, by now well beyond the initially careful Greek-Turkish Assistance Act limits. By this time, well beyond the catalyst of Turkish participation in Korean War, TUSAG was preparing itself and the Turkish Army for a long-term relationship of training, doctrine transfer and equipment provision.

c) G-4 (Logistics)

The G-4 Section, Headquarters TUSAG, organized with a Colonel as Chief, and a Lieutenant Colonel as assistant as military personnel, was responsible for effecting control of the requisitioning of all aid materials and regular army property ordered by the Mission. The section also assumed responsibilities for the functions of those Technical Services not represented by a special staff section at TUSAG headquarters, for example, Quartermaster and Transportation Corps. The Section further supervised the activities of the TUSAG Port Section, which in turn supervised the four Turkish military port detachments where aid supplies were received.

The initial distribution of all aid supplies was directed for the Mission Chief by the G-4 Section, TUSAG, in coordination with the American Mission for Air Force and Navy Groups and the Turkish General Staff.

The Section was further responsible for the supervision of all logistical activities of the Ordnance, Signal, Medical and Engineer Special Staff Sections of TUSAG Headquarters. This included the establishment and operation of a new Turkish depot and supply system. Records were maintained in the G-4 Section for major items of aid material received in Turkey.

There were additionally certain administrative functions of the headquarters which were supervised by the G-4 section. These included the handling of incoming and outgoing household goods, personal effects and general cargo as well as packing and crating activities. Also included was the meeting of incoming transportation and the transporting of personal and cargo to appropriate mission groups.

Up until mid-1950, The G-4 section:

1. Initiated a depot and supply system modelled along the lines of American Army depot and supply system.
2. Requisitioned, received and distributed 169.935 weight tons of aid material for the Turkish Armed Forces.
3. Organized and supervised the new structure for the G-4 Section of the Turkish General Staff.
4. Reorganized the technical services of the Turkish Armed Forces along lines similar to those of the American Armed Forces.
5. Organized and supervised port units in the Turkish Armed Forces to handle aid materials shipments.

d) Artillery Section

Artillery Section began functioning in January 1948 with 3 officers, 1 Master Sergeant and 2 civilian inspectors, headed by Col. Thomas de Shazo.

Artillery Section was one of the most effective in its mission, due also to the enthusiasm of Turkish artillery officers to rapidly learn and adopt US techniques as well as interest by high level commanders.

The Section had also perfect working relationship with US Army Artillery School at Fort Sill and quickly procured programs, schedules, plans and training aids from Fort Sill to permit modernizing of Artillery School at Polatlı, Turkey. With the help of this material, the Section reorganized Artillery School at Polatlı, patterning it in detail after U.S. Artillery School as to courses, program, operational facilities and instruction, to train Turkish personnel in the use of American weapons, techniques and tactical methods. The section effectively operated and supervised the Turkish

Artillery School, preparing all programs, schedules and lesson plans. Originally all lessons were conducted through interpreters until the development of instructors progressed to the stage where all lessons were conducted by US trained Turkish officers. The Section also secured U.S. School attendance of thirty-six officers and one non-commissioned officer of Turkish Artillery. These graduates were employed with two-year assignments as instructors at Polatlı on return to Turkey.

Artillery Section also introduced Field Artillery Light Aviation to Turkish Army through a Department of Air Training at the Polatli School including the construction of a liaison aircraft field and necessary buildings and training aids. In connection with the above and the reorganization of the entire school, the Section obtained the go-ahead for an extensive building program at Polatli to provide much needed space to prevent overcrowding caused by the amplified programs.

The Section also published at the Department of Training Literature and Publications, very much along US lines, a Quarterly Artillery Journal and numerous Field Manuals for general distribution as well as reproduction of lesson plans, charts and maps and all other training literature and visual aids for use at the school. American and Turkish equipment was added to modernize this Department.

As part of its training work, the Section supervised the graduation from eleven courses of six hundred nineteen officers and two hundred twenty-nine enlisted men. Also, to prove the level reached through training, the Section staged a demonstration in July 1949 illustrating the technique and power of modern artillery methods. Chief of Turkish General Staff and many senior Commanders attending were impressed by the performance of the artillery units taking part in the exercise.



Figure 9. Ambassador Wadsworth during Combat Team Maneuvers in Ayaş on 24 June 1949. Original caption reads: "The Honorable George Wadsworth, American Ambassador to Turkey and Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, observed the Combat Team Demonstration of tanks, infantry and artillery put on by the Armored School on June 24 at Ayash, Turkey."



Figure 10. A picture attached to the Army Section of Monthly Progress Report of July 1949. Original caption reads: "This picture shows a battalion concentration fired in preparation for an attack by Armored units. The demonstration was part of the Combat Team exercise held at the Tank Firing Range near Ayash on June 24." The picture was probably taken from L-4 observation-liaison aircraft. The smoke column in the background is the impact point of the artillery concentration.



Figure 11. “The Combat Team exercises held by the Armored School on the tank range at Ayash on 24 June were witnessed by General Abdurrahman Gurman, new Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces (front).”

As part of its organizational work, the Section also prepared, for G-3’s review, complete tables of organization and tables of equipment for reorganized American equipped artillery units of Turkish Army. Revised present Turkish tables of equipment of other Turkish artillery units to introduce modernization with present weapons and transportation. It also prepared detailed requirements for equipping the Artillery Units of the Army and requisitioned for 68% of the units.

In addition to this intense work, the Section also “inspected” artillery units in each of the three Armies in 1949 to determine efficiency. Many improvements identified were initiated through Turkish General Staff.

As explained before, the mutual objective of US military aid for both the US and the Turkish side was to make the Turkish military an exact copy of the US military. Artillery section’s founding chief Col. Thomas E. de Shazo, gave an enlightening

explanation of this phenomenon in an article published in *Military Review* and then translated into Turkish to be published in Turkish General Staff's "*Ordu Dergisi*" (Military Journal) in 1949. By then, at least half of *Ordu Dergisi* was allocated to translations of articles in American military periodicals. Colonel de Shazo explained in his article that following the arrival of the first training teams and the coordination meetings on how to organize the trainings, the Turkish General Staff declared that it accepted the entire US Army doctrine overnight with some minor necessary changes and therefore the whole range of field manuals and technical manuals were translated by a pool of translators that consisted of engineers, professional translators and English speaking officers. In parallel, unit organizations were redesigned in a similar manner to US Army tables of organizations. In the end, de Shazo explained, an observer could hardly distinguish Turkish and American artillery units on the march or in encampment. Furthermore, de Shazo said "there is nothing wrong about saying that the Turkish Field Artillery School was a direct copy of its American counterparts".²⁰⁵ So much so that a popular joke back at Fort Sill²⁰⁶ was that "if it would be possible to fly in an artillery instructor from Fort Sill to Polatlı²⁰⁷ over night, he would continue the training from where he left it the day before."²⁰⁸

e) Infantry Section

An Infantry Section was not included in the original plans for the organization of the U.S. Army Group. However, Captain Charles H. Reidenbaugh, Infantry, came to Turkey in October 1947 to teach the employment of those Infantry weapons which had been or were to be ordered for the Turkish Infantry. During 1948, Captain Reidenbaugh conducted instruction for two classes, totaling 263 officers in the 90

²⁰⁵ Thomas E. De Shazo, "Türkiye'ye Yardım" (Aid to Turkey), *Ordu Dergisi* (Military Journal), June 1949, 131-138.

²⁰⁶ Short name for US Army's Artillery School.

²⁰⁷ The town where Turkish Artillery School is still located.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 135.

mm antitank gun, and for 2 classes with a total enrolment of 115 officers in the 60 mm and 81 mm mortars and the 2.36 Rocket launcher.

However, as the doctrinal work intensified, a decision was made in August 1948 to organize the Infantry Section and to conduct courses in Infantry Tactics and Techniques at the Turkish Infantry School at Çankırı. In November 1948, Lt. Col Edward M. Minion, Inf., the Assistant G-3 TUSAG, was appointed Acting Chief of section, and with Captain Edwin V. Baccus, Inf., who arrived during that month, and Cap. Reidenbaugh as assistants began the organization of the Infantry Section.

A basic course and advanced course, each of 17 weeks duration, commenced in January 1949. During that month Major Buford E. Boyd joined the Infantry section and Lt. Colonel François D'Eliscu arrived to organize a Guerilla Leaders course. With the organization of the Infantry Section, it assumed supervision of the Cadet Course which is conducted each year at the Infantry School.

Until mid-1950, the Infantry Section organized the delivery of the following courses:²⁰⁹

Table 7. TUSAG Supervised Infantry courses at Çankırı Infantry School until mid 1950.

No	Type of course	Duration of course	Students trained
2	90 mm& 3 inch AT Weapons	1 month	263
3	Infantry Weapons	1 month	170
2	Basic Infantry	3 months	77
3	Advanced Infantry	3 months	204
1	Guerilla Leaders	5 months	19
2	Infantry Communication	3 months	100
1	Cadet (Basic Infantry)	10 months	279

²⁰⁹ All officer courses.

1	A.T Course	3 months	55
15	Total		1158

The training work undertaken by the Infantry Section seemed to be less ambitious in comparison to, for example, Transport or Artillery section. This was mainly due to the fact that the nature of the innovations brought by US military aid to infantry units were mainly about new weapons being put into use and organizational changes stemming therefrom, resulting in a focus on officer training. On the other hand, Infantry Section had a more daunting task of organizing the delivery of large numbers of weapons and equipment to units all over the country. From early 1948 to mid-1950, the Infantry Section coordinated the distribution of the following equipment to 16 Infantry and 3 Cavalry Divisions that were covered by the US military aid.

1. Delivery of 1566 60 mm mortars
2. Delivery of 1683 2.36" Rocket launchers
3. Complete TE Communications Equipment
4. Complete Engineer Demolitions Sets & Pioneer Equipment for 16 Infantry Divisions
5. Delivery of 104 90 mm and 85 3" Anti-Tank guns to 10 Anti-Tank battalions
6. Training ammunition and limited war reserve of delivered weapons.

Table 8. Turkish Infantry Officers and NCOs Trained in U.S. Schools under

Course	School	No	Course	School	No
NCO Light Weapons	TIS	3	Associate basic	TIS*	12
NCO Heavy Weapons	TIS	2	Advanced	TIS*	7
Officers Communication	TIS	4	NCO	TIS*	3

Associate Advanced	TIS	6	Pathfinder	TIS*	1
			Language Course	C&GS*	7

The Infantry Section also helped establish a complete Training Aids Section at the Infantry School to include translation subsection, reproduction subsection, visual aid subsection, and electric power and wood working facilities, in similar manner to that in the Artillery School in Polatlı. It also prepared new T/O&Es for Turkish Infantry Units under supervision of G-3 and carried out “Spot Inspections”²¹⁰ of Turkish Infantry Units in each Army area by Infantry Officer teams to determine status of training and equipment, use of American aid equipment and application of Infantry School instruction within unit.

The Section also helped reorganize Turkish Infantry School along functional lines. But this meant recreating the Turkish Infantry School to make it look like its US counterpart in Fort Benning. As part of the reorganization of the Infantry School, the Section helped introduce a School Demonstration Troops at war strength including one infantry battalion, one composite AT battalion, one field artillery battery (105 mm howitzer), one truck company (6X6 GMC) and one tank platoon. The section prepared a detailed training program for the Infantry Demonstration battalion to cover a one-year cycle of training, and supervised this training by American instructors to develop a “type” program for the training of Turkish Infantry Units.

Finally, the Section conducted a two week special course in Training Methods for all instructor personnel at the Infantry School to ensure sustainability of

trainings in the future, increased the types of courses conducted in the Infantry branch from two in 1948 to eight in 1949 while also commencing a new Advanced course of 800 hours/24 weeks instead of the old Advanced Course of 387 hours/7 weeks.

Guerilla Leaders Course

The first officers in the Turkish Armed Forces ever to receive training as Guerilla Leaders started a five-month course under TUSAG supervision at the Çankırı Infantry School in summer 1949. Lt. Col. François d'Eliscu, who was the head of US Army's Ranger and Combat School, conducted all of the training work with the help of Turkish Infantry assistants. The training was purposefully rigorous: out of 52 who began the course, only 18 graduated.

"Guerillas", as they were referred to in TUSAG reports, were taught every infantry tactic from underwater sabotage to overcoming barbed wire obstacles.

²¹⁰ Original wording in source document.



Figure 12. Lt. Col. François d'Eliscu and a Guerrilla Leaders Course cadet during training.²¹¹



Figure 13. Guerrilla Leaders course cadets during a training on overcoming barbed wire obstacles.

²¹¹ "Monthly Progress Report on Aid To Turkey Program – November 1949", RG 334, Entry 251A, JAMMAT Activity Reports, Box 17.



Figure 14. Guerrilla Leaders Course cadets training to jump from a jeep at 30 miles an hour and land upright.



Figure 15. A Guerrilla Leaders course cadet learns to pack his chute. Photo caption reads: *"Because in time of war they might be used to form behind-the-lines harassing unit, the Guerilla Leaders were trained in parachuting and learned how to pack their own chutes."*²¹²

²¹² Ibid.



Figure 16. As part of the Guerrilla Leaders course, cadets made 5 training jumps as part of their parachute training. Original caption reads: *"Fifty-one-year-old Colonel d'Eliscu led every one of the five training jumps. He trained the officers in techniques very new to them, but no casualties were suffered during the parachute training."*²¹³

²¹³ Ibid.



Figure 17. A US provided C-47 just before a jump by Guerrilla Leaders course cadets. Original caption reads: *"Jumps were made from ex-US C-47 now assigned to the Turkish Air Force. It was the first time that type plane had ever been used for parachute work in Turkey."*

This training laid the foundations of Turkish Ground Forces commando, airborne and special force units for decades to come. The course cadets continued to serve in those units and contributed to their development. However, as Turkish Special Forces came under closer scrutiny in later years by left wing politicians and anti-Americanist circles, it has become a conventional wisdom in Turkey to start the inception of Turkish Special Forces with NATO's so called "Gladio" program. So much so that a search in Google for "Special Forces Gladio" in Turkish produces thousands of search results. All of these sources, mostly newspaper, magazine and web articles, refer to "Mobilization Inspection Board" being established in 1952 and taken under NATO's so-called Gladio's control after Turkey's entry into NATO. We should also underline that these sources parrot each other without referring to one single reliable source on the history of NATO and the so-called Gladio.

Indeed, as it can be seen from above, Guerrilla Leaders was a highly technical course focusing on physical aspects of fighting and did not include a single intelligence content. Lt. Col d'Eliscu was not even a career officer. "During the war he was the Head of the Ranger and Combat School but before the war, he was an instructor of physical education at both Columbia and New York Universities. Also, he was America's foremost exponent of Judo."²¹⁴ Therefore, d'Eliscu was purely a close combat tactician that did not have any background to equip those Guerrilla Leaders with intelligence and political skills as resistance fighters. His own skills as well as the course content was closely based on U.S. Ranger courses, focusing on close combat skills, physical stamina and on building fighting spirits. More interestingly, the training and its nature was widely publicized in Turkey, with the fifth jump taking place in Etimesgut airfield in front of a large number of spectators.

While this "Gladio" legend has overwhelmed the debate on the history of Turkish special force units suggesting that Turkish Special Forces was an instrument of outside forces, in a twist of history the most spectacular success of the generation of officers that went through "Guerilla Leaders" course has been the establishment of Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı-TMT) in Cyprus and the formation and sustainment of the Turkish Cypriot resistance movement up until the Turkish intervention in the island in 1974.

f) Staff College Section

Staff College Section was one of those parts of TUSAG that almost became a Mission in itself. It started functioning at its location in Istanbul on 20 December 1948 with 5 officers and 2 EM. Lt. Cl. Murray (Inf), the first officer of the section, arrived in Ankara on October 24 1948 followed within the next 6 weeks by Lt.


²¹⁴ "School for Rangers", anonymous author, Yank: The Army Weekly, 9 December 1942; <http://www.indianamilitary.org/YANK/1942-12-09YankMagazine.pdf>, last accessed: 24 November 2022.

Colonel Tilghman (FA), Lt. Col. Weaver (Inf), Colonel Hartman (AF) and Colonel Earl M. Miber (Inf), Chief of Section. Some preliminary work was done in Ankara by this group prior to their move to Istanbul on 16 December. The Section was initially organized as follows:

- Col. Earl M. Minor, Chief of Section and Infantry Instructor
- Col. George F. Hartman, Air Force Instructor
- Lt. Col. Mayo T. Tilghman, Field Artillery Instructor
- Lt. Col. Roy A. Murray, Jr., Infantry Instructor
- Lt. Col. Maynard B. Weaver, Logistics Instructor

With the arrival of Major Thomas (Engineer) in February 1950, the section was filled to authorized strength and looked like as follows:

Figure 18. Organization Chart of Staff College Section, TUSAG, 1950.



Some instruction was also given by 4 Turkish officers, graduates of US Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.

The main objective of the work of The Staff College Section was *to indoctrinate selected senior field and general officers with U.S. Command Staff organization and procedures; the powers and limitations of modern arms and the essential elements of tactics of the combined arms with special emphasis on defense and counterattack.* Its training subjects covered staff organization and procedure, employment and limitations of combat branches and services, combined tactical operations etc. The definition above is critical since it reflects the self-designated purpose of the U.S. Army Group in transforming the Turkish Ground Forces.

First course ever implemented by the Staff College Section comprised 33 Army and Air Force generals and colonels, and Naval officers of corresponding grades and was run during the period 1 March 1949 to 30 May 1949. According to the leaders of the Section, the indoctrination and training given these higher Turkish officers at this course resulted in better utilization of the officer and enlisted men graduating from the various service schools operated by JAMMAT, and also contributed to more efficient use of American Aid Equipment by Turkish Armed Forces. The second course, composed of 57 Army and Air Force generals and colonels and of Naval officers of corresponding ranks, commenced on 10 October 1949 and completed on 10 April 1950.

By mid-1950, a third course was prepared as the first of regular 9-month courses to start on October 1, 1950. This course would be attended by 140 students of company and field grade officers in the 1950-51 period.

g) Engineer Section

The Engineer Section began functioning in Turkey in early September 1948 with the strength of one officer. This late start resulted from the shift at the request of the State Department of the Roads Construction Program from TUSAG control to the Public Roads Administration Group (PRAG). Initially the Mission had planned under the Oliver Report to organize engineer units using \$5 million of Aid funds and to employ them on roads of military importance. Thus in November 1947, one officer and six civilians had been recruited for the Engineer Section. The six civilians were turned over to PRAG along with the equipment and funds and the officer was reassigned to the Port Transportation Section of the mission. However, in March 1948, the Chief of the Mission recognized the necessity for an Army Engineering Program and allocated \$1,000,000 to purchase a small nucleus of bridging equipment and engineer mechanical equipment for the 6 "A" divisions and the 6 armored brigades to be equipped under the 1948 Aid program. At the same time the Chief of the Mission set up position vacancies for a small engineer section of the Mission consisting of three persons headed by a Lieutenant Colonel. This was implemented about first September 1948 with the transfer of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Lipscomb from the Air Force Group to the Army Group to assume his duties as Chief of the Engineer Section. During the remainder of 1948 the Engineer Section was gradually augmented to a total of three officers and three enlisted men. By the end of 1948, however, it was apparent that the engineer program was far behind the other programs and that the Turkish Army could not achieve combat effectiveness unless a large-scale engineer program was implemented. Thus during 1950 a new table of distribution was authorized for the Engineer Section, giving it a strength of

19 and this strength was gradually built up until it was finally achieved in February 1950.

The first task of the Engineer Section was to reorient Turkish thinking as to the duties and functions of engineers and to establish a large-scale retraining program. Formerly there was no engineer core in the Turkish Armed Forces corresponding to that of the U.S. Army but there had been only a fortifications core which was largely concerned with permanent fortifications and obstacles. It contained less than 1% graduate civil engineers and was not qualified to undertake large scale construction projects or to provide for the routes of communication essential to the supply and movement of the Turkish Army. New Tables of Organization were prepared and pressed up on Turkish General Staff together with a new troop basis for the engineer core. In the fall of 1949 these were finally accepted.

The Engineer School, which had formerly been combined with Signal School and which was training about 25 officers a year, was reestablished at a new location on 8 November 1948 with a total student body of 47 officers and with virtually no facilities. This was rapidly expanded and by mid-1950, the school was training at one time approximately 140 officers, 280 noncommissioned officers and 250 enlisted specialists, utilizing a faculty of approximately 50 Turkish personnel, 14 U.S. personnel and 2 British. In the intervening time, over 50% of the Turkish engineer officers were given courses of from two to three months duration to familiarize them with their new organization, equipment and techniques. In addition, the program for training Turkish engineer officers in Turkish civilian engineering installations were initiated. To assist in the training at the Engineer School and the application of this training in the units, a large-scale translation program was undertaken by Turkish personnel under the Engineer Section. By mid-1950, 25 US engineer manuals

translated into Turkish were in use at the Engineer School in Istanbul and distribution was being made to units.

Early in 1949, the Engineer Section undertook the supervision of the former fortifications depot at Ankara and reorganized it so as to effectively redistribute engineer supplies furnished under the Aid Program. The development of this depot was still far from complete in June 1950. The engineer depo system was to be expanded under the 1950 program with the establishment of Army engineer depots and sub depots. Each Army was also to have an engineer maintenance platoon for 3rd echelon maintenance of engineer equipment. In the fall of 1949, a program for construction of petroleum storage installations utilizing American military pipeline equipment was initiated by the Engineer Section and construction started on the first installation. By mid-1950, two such installations were under construction with a good prospect of completing the entire program of six facilities by the fall of 1950.

h) Ordnance Section

The Ordnance Section, TUSAG, started functioning in Turkey on 2 December 1947 with the arrival of Captain James J. McEntee. The original table of organization authorized two (2) officers and (9) civilian employees. By 1950, authorized table of organization had reached 10 officers, one NCO, and sixteen civilians.

Before the inception of the U.S. Military Aid Program, no ordnance department existed in the Turkish Army. All supply activities were concentrated in a Supply Department (İkmal) and maintenance, when and if performed, was accomplished by the Military Factory system in addition to manufacture. The primary task confronting the Ordnance Section in this situation, was the

establishment of sufficient storage facilities for Ordnance. The G-4 and the TUSAG Chief of Ordnance selected a site and made arrangements for the construction of a Shipping and Receiving Warehouse. Fifteen (15) double warehouses were erected, and a contract signed for roads and utilities. After a series of conferences, the Turkish Army adopted the Missions's recommendations for the establishment of an Ordnance Department. The latter was established by Law 5301, January 3, 1949, effective July 1, 1949. From time-to-time regulations were issued implementing the law.

By the time U.S. Military Mission started to work in Turkey, the Turkish Army Supply System was cumbersome and unworkable, according to the U.S. specialists. The Ordnance Section designed a new system patterned after that in use in the U.S. Army Ordnance Department which was adopted by the Turkish General Staff in early 1950. After a phase in period of three months, it went into effect in mid-1950. A National Stock Control Section was created and started to function from early 1950. A Master Depot was established in 1948 and most importantly, U.S. Army Fuel and Lubricants Specifications were adopted. Even today, many Turkish officers assume that the adoption of U.S. technical standards in Turkish Armed Forces started with Turkey's accession into NATO. As can be seen here, in the most important field of ordnance, U.S. standards and classifications were adopted by Turkish Army even before NATO itself was established.

On the maintenance side, the Ordnance Section faced a true nightmare. Lack of facilities, mechanics, and money had handicapped the Maintenance System. Ordnance Section quickly set out to introduce new facilities in the form of prefabricated buildings and money was provided to hire civilian mechanics and to supplement construction. Six new Field Maintenance Shops were established, two

Field Shops expanded, and two base shops were completed in 1950. Six Division Ordnance Maintenance Companies and Six Ordnance Tank Maintenance Companies were formed in 1949. Six additional Division Ordnance Maintenance Companies were formed in 1950. Those Military Factory Installations whose primary function was maintenance were transferred to the Ordnance Department. A tire repair shop was also established.

On the training side, the Section had to help create everything from scratch. Adequate facilities for an Ordnance School were lacking. Despite this fact, plus a shortage of personnel, courses for shop officers and NCOs were conducted. A suitable area was obtained with existing buildings modified, and with construction of new prefabricated buildings, Ordnance School was opened on 2 April 1949.

i) Transportation Section

The section was organized in October 1947 with three (3) officers and eleven civilians authorized. Officers arrived in Turkey in early December with civilians following during the period June-July.

The original mission of the Section was to train 2nd and 3rd echelon automotive mechanics and truck drivers. Existing Turkish schools were to be utilized, drivers to be trained at Kayseri and mechanics at Konya which were 285 miles apart from each other.

Preliminary work began in Ankara during December 1947 with the Section Chief., Col. C. C. Duell, FA,²¹⁵ handling staff plans, and Lt. Col. R.E. Goode, TC, and incoming civilians assigned to write training courses. The latter project was handicapped by lack of technical reference material, qualified translators, typewriters

and administrative operative supplies, but by March 1948 sufficient work had been accomplished to permit personnel to be distributed to field sites; one officers and three civilians to Kayseri and one civilian remaining in Ankara.

At Kayseri, though no aid equipment had arrived, an instructor's course was begun during early March 1948, in a primitive plant. Enough aid trucks, tools and equipment arrived during the month to be processed and distributed to one truck company in time to accept the first class of 350 driver trainees and the first organized training class under Mission auspices began on 1 April 1948. As additional aid equipment arrived two (2) additional truck companies were equipped and manned by U.S. trained Turkish instructors so that monthly increments of 350 trainees could be accepted. The course, of 3 months duration was phased so that the 3 companies at capacity level had 1050 students, with one increment of 350 graduating each month and a like number of new students being introduced. This capacity and general training procedures were sustained by mid-1950.

At Konya, also at a primitive plant, an instructor's course was conducted but failure of the Turkish side to furnish adequate requirements, general progress was slow, and it was not until July 1948 that the initial mechanics class of 1000 enlisted men began training.

To furnish fleet support to mechanics course and to integrate transport corps training activities, the Kayseri school was transferred in June 1948 to Konya. This movement was accomplished by truck convoy and involved approximately 400 vehicles and 1350 men. Driving was done by advanced students. U.S. advisory groups joined in the movement and combined activities were accelerated so that by

²¹⁵ Field Artillery.

late summer 1948, 1050 enlisted drivers, 4000 enlisted mechanics, 50 NCO mechanics and 50 motor officers were under training. All student groups were from the Army at large, representing all arms and services.

Also, in line with standard U.S. practices, a command decision was given by Turkish General Staff during the summer to transfer all responsibility for training 3rd echelon mechanics and trade specialists to the Ordnance Branch.

The winter of 1948-1949 was severe at Konya. This fact, plus inadequate road net, primitive facilities etc. caused driver training to close down at the end of November and led to the decision to transfer the Transport School again, this time to the Aegean coast near İzmir, where it is still located. Over the road convoys were again successfully employed as training exercises.

During 1949 a new T/D was authorised and the strength of the Section was brought to 16 military and 11 civilian. This permitted acceptance of additional training courses at levels listed below:

Table 9. Transportation Section Courses Organized Through March 1950.

Course Title	Duration	Class Capacity	No of Classes Trained until March 1950
Advanced Officers' Course	3 months	50	2
Basic Officers Course	10	50	2
Motor Officers Course	4 months	50	6
Motor Sergeants Course	6 months	50	6
Organized Mechanics Course	6 months	400 (4 classes)	13
Driver Training Course	3 months	1050 (3 classes)	18
Driver Instructor Course	3 months	120	1
Tank Destroyer Officers Course	1 month	55	1

The following table indicates the number of students who graduated from Transport School courses since instruction began under the auspices of TUSAG.

Table 10. Number of graduates from Transportation courses under TUSAG through March 1950.

Course	1948	1949	1950	Total
Advanced Officers' Course			37	37
Basic Officers Course		34	*	34
Motor Officers Course	83	166	*	249
Motor Sergeants Course	78	109	*	187
Organized Mechanics Course		510	196*	706
Driver Training Course	1494	1883	522	3899
Driver Instructor Course			*	
Tank Destroyer Officers Course		52		52
TOTALS	1565	2754	755	5164

4. The Fight Over the Future of Mission Funds

With increasing numbers of officers arriving in Turkey under the US Military Aid Mission from October 1947 and their observations in the field came the realization that the task of assisting the Turkish Armed Forces to become a modern and efficient establishment was a far more difficult task that required much more time and resources than initially foreseen by Oliver Report. This consideration spread on to Pentagon where the mood on Turkish Aid Program seemed to change towards a less aggressive one. At around the time that much awaited equipment shipments and trainings in Turkey had barely started, Air Force Headquarters sent a

TOP SECRET message to Air Group (TUSAFG) Chief Brigadier General Earl Hoag on 11 May 1948 on the apportionment of 1949 funds.²¹⁶

The message explained the then prevailing thought in the Pentagon's Joint Strategic Plans Committee regarding the scale of support to be given Turkey's military and the apportionment of future funds. The message also indicated that the Committee had come to this thought based largely on the testimonies given by members of the US Military Mission in Ankara and on which the message said, "other factors under consideration", most likely the political process in the Congress.

The Committee was considering the size and composition of Turkish Defense Forces for which modern equipment to be provided as 3 Armies of 2 Corps each (in total 6), consisting of 12 Infantry, 6 Armored and 3 Cavalry Divisions in the Turkish Army; 7 Tactical and Air Defense Regiments with service and training facilities for the Air Force and about present strength for the Turkish Navy except for cruisers but with replacement program to produce improved operational efficiency and fighting effectiveness. The message also indicated that the Committee foresaw a distribution of 54 % for Army, 10 % for the Navy and 36 % for the Air Force.

In implementation of 1949 Funds, the Committee also made a principal decision to use the funds solely for military equipment and not for supporting projects such as port construction, mapping and arsenal expansion. Supporting projects considered necessary would only be undertaken at the decision of a Chief of Service from his allocation.

²¹⁶ Message from AFOP signed AFCCS to TUSAFG for Hoag, 11 May 1948, TOP SECRET, re: apportionment of 1949 funds, document no 81492, 11 May 1948, Entry 262, Box 5, Folder 7, "120 Funds, Disbursements 1948"; RG 334, Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA. A similar message was sent by all three services to their respective Groups in Ankara but Army and Navy versions could not be found in the boxes accessed in TUSAG and TUSN documents in RG 334.

The message went on to conclude that “an important consideration in arriving at above recommendations has been the economic ability of Turkey to continue to support equipment of technical nature in the event US financial aid does not continue indefinitely. The size of the Armed Forces should be limited to that which Turkish economy can support without outside assistance other than that currently planned.”²¹⁷

The Air Force asked Brigadier General Hoag to submit as soon as possible his concurrence or comments on the above so as to give further substantiation to planners in recommending JCS apportionment of Turkish funds and to introduce any new considerations which may have developed since Hoag returned from Washington. Asking Hoag to give either his concurrence or his comments meant that this apportionment was either acceptable to the Air Force and TUSAFG or that it was close to it. The Air Force also indicated that if possible, a joint Army-Air Force-Navy response was requested and similar messages were being dispatched to Chief of TUSAG and Chief of TUSN by their respective services.

TUSAG Chief McBride’s answer to the query of his USAF Headquarters suggested that this apportionment did not fit his plans and his strategy was to use the opinion of the Turkish side, which obviously favored the Army. However, at the start of his message he indicated that a coordinated answer between Chiefs was not possible and that he attributed this to service rivalry and inability to view problems from impersonal standpoint.²¹⁸ Since at the level of Turkish Military Assistance program, the rivalry between US Army and US Navy was negligible, therefore the address of these remarks was the US Air Force and Chief of TUSAFG Earl Hoag.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Horace McBride to Chief of Staff, Department of Army, Washington, 13 May 1948. RG 334, Entry 262, Box 3, Folder 7, “120 Funds, Disbursements 1948”; Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA.

McBride insisted that his recommendations were based on an estimated contribution of each service to defensive potential of Turkish Forces and the ability of Turks to maintain the military structure and equipment at a possible conclusion of American Aid. He also referred to the position of Turkish General Staff and Minister of Defense who recommended 65 % for the Army, 25 % for the Air Force and 10 % for the Navy and made their positions the base of his recommendation. McBride's recommendation as "Coordinator" of US Military Mission, not as Chief of TUSAG, was 66 % for the Army, 26 % for the Air Force and 8 % for the Navy. This apportionment would unquestionably require a reduction in Air Force combat units and possible elimination of destroyers from Navy program. However, according to McBride, supplying basic deficiencies such as antitank weapons, antiaircraft, ammunition and communications for restricted number of ground force units would be more remunerative and effective in increasing Turkish defensive capabilities.

I have not been able to locate the answer of Chief of TUSAFG Earl Hoag on file but Chief of the Navy Group Admiral Settle's answer was found in the Air Force file on the subject. Settle, in response both to the incoming request from Chief of Naval Operations as well as McBride's cable referred to above, provided an excellent analysis of the scenarios under which Turkey could be attacked by the Soviets, which in turn would shape the distribution of US military assistance to Turkey. Settle argued that mean manpower allocation between scenarios of Soviet attacks would be 60: 30: 10 (percentages for Army, Air Force and the Navy). Translating these mean manpower ratios into ratios of maintenance and operation costs (from Turkish budget) they would become around 50: 36: 14. Further translating them into costs for capital equipment and training in such capital equipment (Mission Funds) these ratios would become 40: 40: 20. Finally at the initiation of the Aid Program, while

all services were archaic in their equipment, Air and Navy were in a worse situation than the Army, thus requiring relatively heavier expenditures by Air than Army and still heavier by Navy, in the early years of the program. Therefore, on such an assumption, first year allocations would have been 35:40:25. However, due in part to the work of Oliver Board as well as urgency of the situation at the time, initial allocations worked in favor of the Army in the first year than would have been logical had it been possible to plan a five-year program.

From this reasoning, Settle went on to emphasize that “determinations must be made with broad horizons, viewing the team as a whole, rather than concentrating upon a few members of the team. An All-American backfield is of little avail without competent ends and tackles, just as a star line can’t win games without the backs. And each player must have a reasonable number of arms and legs, and proper equipment.”²¹⁹

After 2 months of battling among services, the decision from Washington by 20 July 1948 was to allocate the first 1/3 of the 75 million USD 1949 allocations on the same basis as 1948. These ratios were 56.5 % for Army, 28.9 for the Air Force and 14.6 % for the Navy.²²⁰ This was the minimum acceptable for the Navy Group, a happy result for Army Group but a slap in the face of the Air Force Group and Earl Hoag, who had lobbied hard in Washington for a more balanced distribution. This tension between Army and Air Force Groups on one hand and Hoag and McBride on the other continued until the decision to appoint McBride as Chief of JAMMAT in

²¹⁹ Message from Chief Naval Group, American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey to Chief of Naval Operations re: Second Year Money Allocations for Army, Air, Navy- Analysis, TOP SECRET, 14 May 1948., No: 359. RG 334, Entry 262, Box 3, Folder 7, “120 Funds, Disbursements 1948”; Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA.

²²⁰ Computations: 1949 Percentage of 25.000.000 25.000.000 USD, 20 July 1948.. RG 334, Entry 262, Box 3, Folder 7, “120 Funds, Disbursements 1948”; Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA.

November 1949, before which TUSAFG Chief Earl Hoag elected to leave his post rather than serve under McBride.

5. End of Honeymoon with Turkish General Staff and McBride's New War

In June 1949, then Chief of Turkish General Staff Salih OMURTAK, who had overseen the start and flourishing of US military aid to Turkey and who had been in bad health for a long time, was replaced by Abdurrahman Nafiz GÜRMAN, who was İnönü's class mate in the Class of 1906 at the then Ottoman Staff College in İstanbul. Gürman was an İnönü loyalist and born in 1882, which meant he was older than two of his predecessors after General Fevzi Çakmak. Gürman fought extensively in Northern Africa during World War I and even fell prisoner to French and Italians for a year. After he was released, he joined Mustafa Kemal's Army in Anatolia and commanded important units after 1921. He had thought and written extensively on tactical doctrine including comparative works on German and French tactical doctrines.

At around this time, McBride had successfully got rid of his archenemy Earl Hoag, Chief of the Air Force Group and had the structure of JAMMAT redesigned under his leadership. This emboldened McBride to take new steps in pushing the Turks to implement his vision of the Turkish military aid program. There was also an agreement between President İnönü and US CINCNELM (Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces East Atlantic and Mediterranean) Admiral Connolly to make US and Turkish planning parallel and therefore Connolly appointed McBride as a liaison between the Military Mission and the Turkish General Staff for the purpose of familiarization with Turkish Strategic Plans and furnishing advice that would lead to their development in accordance with U.S. strategic planning. One of the first

examples of McBride's initiatives in the planning field involved Bosphorus Defense.²²¹

The proposal was sent by McBride on 30 November 1949 and was an American made plan based on a joint inspection of the entrance of Bosphorus. McBride wrote in the introduction of the paper that "as a result of this inspection, it appears desirable to consider a command reorganization and a reassignment of missions." After enumerating the measures, McBride suggested "that this proposal considered by the Turkish General Staff and that this Headquarters be consulted as to the details of the reorganization."²²² Command reorganization and reassignment of missions were already big items and however logical or rational the proposed measures may have been, this kind of a communication from JAMMAT to the Turkish General Staff represented a big departure from when US Ambassador as Chief and McBride as Coordinator of American Mission were very careful in 1947-48 to avoid an image of American officers effectively running Turkish military.

Most possibly because the way McBride pushed the proposal onto the Turkish General Staff having raised eyebrows in the Turkish Headquarters, McBride did not receive a response to his proposals for a long time and felt compelled to write to the Chief of Staff Nafiz Gürman another letter on 9 February 1950, asking the fate of the proposed plan. McBride wrote in this letter:

1. Reference is made to my letter on this subject dated 30 November 1949, file no. 381 (30 Nov 49) (JAMMAT)-536.
2. No reply has been received to this letter nor has any information been received as to any action taken on the proposed reorganization of the defense of the Bosphorus.
3. It is considered that the Bosphorus Entrance is a particularly vital area and in its present condition is especially vulnerable. This Headquarters would like to assist in improving

²²¹ The proposal referred to is the only available example found in the declassified boxes of RG 334.

²²² Memorandum to the Chief of Turkish General Staff re: Bosphorus Entrance Defense, 30 November 1949. RG 334, Entry 263, Box 131; Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA.

the defenses of the Bosphorus but little or nothing can be done until a decision is reached on the reorganization of the area as recommended in my letter.²²³

This was replied to by a proxy of the Chief of Turkish General Staff on February 21st, 1950 with a short and straightforward letter, with a corrected subject line that read “Black Sea Straits Fortified Area.” The Turkish response simply said that the submitted report was being studied and the results so far were that:

- Infantry forces in the fortified area were reduced to a minimum-one battalion on each side of the Bosphorus- to perform needed services and to take care of probable operations in this area
- The 24 French guns (240 mm) that JAMMAT declared unsuitable for the Straits fortified area were removed from tables of equipment for the area and that studies were being made to determine whether or not to use them in the Çatalca fortified area.
- The Black Sea Straits Fortified Area Command had under its command a naval command which would accomplish all services and duties connected with naval warfare. The subject of transferring the duties and responsibilities of the Black Sea Straits Fortified Area Command to the naval command is being studied at present.²²⁴

In summary, it was an official low point between the Turkish General Staff and JAMMAT. It must be considered, however, that such a result would not happen over one issue overnight and that relations between McBride and Gürman must already have hit the floor beforehand so that that McBride used this event to prove to his superiors that the Turkish side was not cooperating.

Soon after this, as the country was headed for the first fully democratic elections, McBride staged and meticulously executed a plan which ended up in a swift removal of Gürman and almost the entire high level General Staff cadres and with a whole new team being appointed.

As part of his game plan, McBride apparently sought an appointment with and met the then Turkish Minister of Defense on 2 May 1950, less than two weeks to

²²³ Memorandum to the Chief of Turkish General Staff re: Bosphorus Entrance Defense, 9 February 1950. RG 334, Entry 263, Box 131; Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA.

²²⁴ Memorandum to Headquarters American Military Aid Mission, 21 February 1950. RG 334, Entry 263, Box 131; Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA.

the general elections. He conveyed his observations pertaining to lack of cooperation on the part of Turkish General Staff on US aid program and apparently again the Minister asked him to put his observations and requests in writing. This McBride did only with a correspondence dated 13 May, the Saturday before the election day.

In this letter of 13 May 1950²²⁵ addressed to the Minister of Defense, McBride furnished a number of examples of delay or non-cooperation by the Turkish General Staff in furtherance of the Aid Program. The selected examples he gave were meant to indicate that the progress of the Aid Program was being delayed by inaction and indecision on the part of the General Staff. Most of the examples given involved personnel requirements and assignments requiring no expenditure of Aid funds. Most of the decisions, McBride explained, pertained to the training centers where American personnel were assisting in a training program designed primarily to train Turkish personnel to effectively maintain and operate equipment provided by the Aid Program. McBride noted that full support of this essential training program was the keystone of the success of the Aid Program.

McBride then went on to enumerate individual problems at Service Schools in a detailed manner from Transportation School to Engineer School. Most of these problems involved either length delays of approvals or misallocation of training staff. In general

1. All schools operated with inadequate Turkish personnel, including instructors and school troops.
2. Students reported late for courses openings, though the dates were announced months in advance.
3. Instructors were abruptly removed from schools without even notification to School administrations and without any replacement measures.
4. Conflict between Eastern Front duties and school instruction duties of officers remained unresolved despite repeated assurances.

²²⁵ Memorandum to the Minister National Defense re: Cooperation of Turkish Joint Staff in Said Program, 13 May 1950. RG 334, Entry 263, Box 131; Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA.

McBride went on to report other major deficiencies and each had a bomb effect for the recipient. Deficiencies reported in units by American inspection teams following their inspections were unresolved. The same deficiencies were being discovered by the same inspectors months later. Spare parts and tools provided in the Aid Program were not being distributed to all units receiving aid equipment. Visits of inspection teams revealed that many motor vehicles were simply not being operated due to lack of distribution of existing equipment. Steel tanks provided through the aid program in 1949 had still not been erected by the time the letter was written because the Turkish General Staff had failed to employ and maintain adequate staff for the job.

Then came more important and sensitive issues. Agreement was reached with the Turkish General Staff in the past that Tables of Organization submitted by the Mission and approved by the General Staff would be issued without change. However, many tables of organization issued by the General Staff happened to be drastically changed before any reference to the Mission before publication. Since, McBride underlined, aid equipment had to be coordinated with these tables, any changes made by the General Staff would require coordination to ensure proper programming of Aid Funds.

More importantly, assignment of Aid Equipment was not according to the agreements in many cases. Priority units were not being delivered the agreed equipment while other units were being delivered equipment without necessary staff to use them. American field manuals had been translated into Turkish with a great effort, but these were not being distributed to the units in an effective and timely manner, therefore equipment were arriving and trainings were being held without the

corresponding field manuals at hand. Consequently, Turkish instructors trained by American instructors at service schools using US field manuals could not replicate the training at unit level effectively.

After all these examples, McBride launched his nuclear attack against the Turkish General Staff and its Chief General Gürman in the last two paragraphs of the 5-page letter:

“This letter would become too voluminous should I attempt to present a complete picture of the problems encountered in dealing with the Joint Staff. I have attempted to make it clear that there is not the 100 % cooperation that you, Mr. Minister, have been led to believe. I must frankly state that the cooperation has deteriorated in the past nine months, and I feel that if this Aid Program is to achieve the success it deserves and be of utmost benefit to both Turkey and the United States, a change in both personnel and attitude in the Joint Staff is necessary.

I have reviewed this letter with the Chief of American Aid Mission, Ambassador Wadsworth, who asks me to add his earnest plea that it receive Your Excellency’s personal and most careful consideration. If our recommendations for continuing aid, in the form of equipment and training are to continue to receive full support of the American Departments of State and Defense, we must, as of highest priority, be able to assure them unequivocally that such aid has been, is being and, in our view, will continue to be put to effective use²²⁶ by the Turkish Military Establishment. The overall implication of the matters presented to you in this letter is to throw serious doubt on whether, unless there be improved performance and cooperation on the part of Turkish Joint Staff, such assurance can be given.”²²⁷

McBride clearly put the blame of deterioration in the relationship on General Gürman since he had taken over just 11 months ago; intimated that the Minister of Defense was simply being lied to by the General Staff about the level of cooperation and made change in personnel and attitude in General Staff a pre-condition of the continuation of the Aid Program. It was not too difficult to guess whose head McBride wanted most. McBride ended the last paragraph with a thinly veiled threat that if the Mission’s recommendations were not accepted and the Turkish General Staff did not improve its cooperation with the Mission, the Aid Program would lose its support in the State and Defense Departments, the consequences of which was not difficult to guess. Moreover, McBride seems to have selected the date of 13 May

²²⁶ Emphasis in original text.

1950 as at the very same date, US JCS published his reappointment to a stateside duty and the appointment of Major General William Arnold as new Chief of JAMMAT. Therefore, if after such a letter, Republicans won the elections and the attitude of the Turkish General Staff did not change, McBride's removal would save face. If the Democrats won, the letter would give the US Mission advantage of initiative since there was already accusations by the Democrats that İnönü's Government had failed to insert Turkey into NATO and to receive more aid from the USA. Therefore, the Democrats having found this hot issue on their table in the first days and would feel compelled to act.

It is not difficult to guess the kind of storm McBride's letter must have caused in the Turkish General Staff at the time. McBride's letter was replied on 1 June, by General Gürman himself. This was just one day before Democrat Party's new Government by Adnan Menderes was set to receive a vote of confidence. Gürman's letter was again relatively short (3 pages long). answering McBride's claims point by point and then General Gürman expressed himself more freely as to how he perceived the aid relationship in general:

1. T/O's²²⁸ applied by the Turkish Army is 95 % in accordance with recommendations made by the American Aid Mission. 5% change is because of the capacity of the Turkish Army. However, it is always possible to discuss matters concerning T/O's with American Specialists.
2. The Engineer Depot is operating with 75 % of officers T/O. The main personnel shortage is in NCO T/O. It is impossible at this time to complete the NCO T/O requirements in the whole Army. The NCO needs will be more available from this year on with graduates of the Technical Schools. Until then it is imperative that NCO requirements will be met by the enlisted men.
3. When it was found out that the Aid Equipment was distributed to wrong places because of A, B, C types of divisions in 1948 and 1949, necessary action was taken to correct the condition by assigning the units in 1950 in accordance with reduction plan.
4. General Staff departments have been organized parallel to American system but this has been done in accordance with Turkish administrative capacity and requirements. Engineer, Ordnance and Transportation departments are operating like the others.

²²⁷ Memorandum to the Minister National Defense re: Cooperation of Turkish Joint Staff in Said Program, 13 May 1950. RG 334, Entry 263, Box 131; Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA.

²²⁸ Tables of Organization.

5. Necessary measures have been taken in application of American manuals in view of Turkish Army's capacity and requirements. It must be appreciated that to change the manuals and instructions of a whole Army in a year or two is not possible nor is it favorable. In spite of that however, much progress has been made to this effect.
6. It is not fair to have a negative conclusion regarding cooperation with American Aid Mission by citing the individual problems stated above. Acceptance of every recommendation on 100% basis cannot be a subject matter. You may rest assured, however, that every recommendation made by the American Aid Mission is carefully studied and those recommendations that the Turkish Army is capable of fulfilling are readily accepted thus cooperation in this matter is on a high level being 90-95% affirmative.²²⁹

In the meantime, however, Democratic Party of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes had won the elections on 14 May and the new Government was established on 22 May with Adnan Menderes as Prime Minister. Immediately rumors started to be circulated that the Chief of the General Staff General Gürman had visited İnönü in the immediate aftermath of the election and declared the Army ready to stage a coup if İnönü wanted. Gürman is also reported to have visited the newly elected President Celal Bayar upon these rumors and denied the allegations.²³⁰

Nevertheless, General Gürman and his assistant Chief at the General Staff were relieved of duty on 6 June 1950 by the new Government. McBride reported the above correspondence with the Minister and then General Gürman to the US Ambassador on 8 June with the following letter:

Attached is the reply to my letter about non-cooperation on the part of the Turkish Joint Staff.

I sent the letter directly to the Minister of National Defense. The Chief of the Turkish Joint Staff either was directed to prepare an answer or did so on his own. I have no positive knowledge that the Minister of National Defense has seen either my letter or the reply.

As you can see, the Turkish Joint Staff says they are doing their best and that everything is going along smoothly. Statements like those in paragraph D 3,4 and 5 do not mean anything. Unfortunately, the Turkish Joint Staff never learns about deficiencies except through our reports. Their subordinates always report everything as going fine.

Will file these letters. We may get some results as a consequence of the recent shake-up.²³¹

²²⁹ Memorandum to the Headquarters, TUSAG, 1 June 1950. RG 334, Entry 263, Box 131; Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA.

²³⁰ Abdurrahman Nafiz Gürman, 1887-1966, <https://ataturkansiklopedisi.gov.tr/bilgi/abdurrahman-nafiz-gurman-1887-1966>, last access 21 June 2023.

²³¹ Memorandum to the Ambassador, 8 June 1950. RG 334, Entry 256 JAMMAT, 1947-1954, Army Group, Adjutant General's Section, Decimal File, Box 84, Folder 16, 091.112-C AMAT 1950, NARA.

Following this letter, on 30 June 1950, McBride sent a new letter to the new Chief of Turkish General Staff, General Nuri Yamut who had replaced General Gürman on 6 June 1950. We do not have any archival document that could shed light on what happened in those critical days of June 1950 until McBride approached General Yamut but the content and tone of his communication was entirely different.

The scope of the content of McBride's 30 June letter was much more expansive than his correspondence with General Gürman. Instead of focusing mainly on failures in service schools and misallocation of staff and equipment, this time McBride touched upon everything under three main headings. First one was called "Inactivation of Units" and in fact asked for any and all units deemed unnecessary by the US Mission, including so-called barrier units, separate tank battalions, frontier brigades, corps reconnaissance units and fortress commands to be dissolved and their staff and equipment to be absorbed into other units. Other headings covered the issue of NCOs, water transportation, service schools, training gasoline, POL tank farms, introduction of amateur radio, changes in training directive and content of education and Army Military Academy.

But most important suggestions came at the end, advising General Yamut that his Field Army, Corps and General Staff level leaders were not making sufficient inspections of troop units. To obtain first-hand information of the conditions existing in the units, McBride suggested funds to be made available by the Turkish side to permit commanders and staff officers to make frequent inspections of troops, units and activities and Army and Corps commanders to make frequent training inspections of all units in their commands. McBride also complained that Turkish officers that worked with Mission officers in the War

Plans Group had other duties and could not finish their work. Though in the final paragraph, McBride intimated again that the “unfinished business” was largely unfinished because of the failure of the Turkish side, his tone obviously was much more friendly and polite than the one he had sent to the new Minister of National Defense on 13 June.²³²

This letter was replied almost a month later by General Yamut on 28 July 1950. Yamut’s letter was kind, graceful and carefully worded and avoided blaming any of his fellow officers and generals and also refrained from entering a written dialogue on each individual points raised by McBride. Instead, General Yamut assured McBride that each of the points raised by him were being analyzed separately and that best efforts were being made to solve them swiftly. Yamut also underlined that McBride would be invited to a conference with him in the first week of August to discuss progress on these individual items. Yamut also assured McBride that he was sure that all his Turkish friends fully appreciated the great importance of the existence of the friendliest cooperation of the Mission, the Turkish General Staff and service commands, necessary steps were being taken to prevent the occurrence of even the slightest breakdown in this principle. This was especially true in the case of requests which could not be granted because of compulsory and/or legal obstructions. For such cases, General Yamut wrote that he had established a procedure whereby requests which could not be fulfilled would be handled only after a decision of the General Staff and would be answered only by correspondence bearing the signature of General Yamut’s signature or that of Deputy Chief of General Staff.

²³² Memorandum for General Nuri Yamut, Chief of Staff, Turkish General Staff, 30 June 1950. RG 334, Entry 263, Box 131; Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA.

General Yamut went on to confirm once again that as the Chief of Turkish Armed Forces and as a person aware of the great significance of American Aid Program, he and his friends were determined to face realities, to work with understanding, friendliness and meticulousness to arrive as quickly as possible to the goal Turkey had set for its Armed Forces.²³³

Finally, on 29 July, Horace McBride put together all these 4 letters under a cover letter and sent them to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 at Department of the Army. In this letter, McBride explained that as a result of the elections on 14 May, when the Democratic Party succeeded the Republican People's Party, there was a "wholesale housecleaning" in the Turkish Military Establishment. According to McBride, there was every indication that the new government intends to give more attention to correcting the deficiencies existing in the Military Establishment. However, McBride added, there was little evidence of definite action in this line since Democratic Party took control. Many personnel changes were made, which were mostly good according to McBride, but little action was taken so far. McBride also noted that the tone of General Yamut's reply to him on 28 July was indicative of the changed attitude of the high command against JAMMAT.

McBride also noted that his letter of 30 June 1950 to General Yamut had seen wide circulation among high government circles and was the subject of a lengthy conference called by the new President at Yalova in mid-July. McBride also reported in his letter of 29 July that at the conferences with the new Foreign Minister²³⁴ and Minister of National Defense²³⁵ in early July, he had described the conditions in the Military Establishment. McBride informed the Ministers that in the opinion of

²³³ Memorandum to General H.L. McBride, Chief JAMMAT, 28 July 1950. RG 334, Entry 263, Box 131; Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA.

²³⁴ Fuat Köprülü.

JAMMAT conditions were “alarming” and that immediate and positive action was required to correct the existing deficiencies. McBride proceeded then to bring his main point to the US side:

Assuming that the Turks take the necessary action to correct their deficiencies and that there is a compelling urgency to bring the Turk Military Forces to their maximum potential in the shortest possible time, there are two contributions which the United States must make:

- a. Additional Aid Funds must be made available to cover costs which cannot be met by the Turk Budget. Funds will be required for construction, POL products, uniforms, training and war reserve ammunition in addition to the funds available for the 1950 and 1951 programs. If these additional funds become available, Turk funds now being used for these items can be utilized for other purposes such as pay for additional NCO's.
- b. American field teams are required with all Turkish major units and installations to assist them in tactical and technical matters. It is estimated that the minimum additional requirements for TUSAG alone will amount to 426 officers and enlisted men. It is realized that this is a large order, but it is imperative if urgency is the dominating factor.²³⁶

Indeed, urgency was more of a dominating factor than at any time else by end of July 1950. On 25 June, war had erupted on Korean peninsula and the Turkish Government had decided to send troops to Korea alongside the United States on 30 June 1950, the very date that McBride had sent his letter to the new Chief of Staff General Nuri Yamut. The convergence of these changes and events placed Turkish Military Aid Program on an entirely new footing, breathing new spirit of partnership and opening the floodgates of additional fund and equipment from the United States for Turkish Aid Program, leading to a much bigger and complex Mission.

²³⁵ Refik Şevket İnce.

²³⁶ Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Department of the Army re: Correspondence with Turk Military Authorities, 29 July 1950. RG 334, Entry 263, Box 131; Records of the Air Force Group; Records of Military Assistance Units in Turkey, 1947-1954; NARA.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, 1947-1950

Truman Doctrine and the subsequent US military assistance to Turkey is “the” most important turning point in Turkey’s international relations in post WWII era while also being a watershed moment in US diplomatic history. Turkish-American military relations and cooperation has been the cornerstone of Turkish-American relations, and no other country, including Germany, has had a military relationship with Turkey in the post WW II period as strong as that with the United States. The relationship has gone through multiple ups and downs, but the common interests of the two countries as well as the interest and respect of Turkish and American military institutions against each other have ensured a lasting cooperation.

For the United States, Truman Doctrine was, although the subject countries were apparently Greece and Turkey, an unprecedented move on a global scale that asserted American power globally, in a sense vowing not to go back to “status quo ante bellum”. It was also the first time the US was launching such a peacetime military assistance project. On top of these, while there was a careful communications strategy towards the domestic constituency, the Doctrine and the ensuing program was designed to ensure long-term influence for the United States vis-à-vis countries that needed and sought military and economic assistance against possible or perceived Soviet threat.

In the case of Turkey, alignment and preferably an alliance with the United States after WWII was a decisive solution for Turkey’s long-term security problem which reached new heights with the emergence of the Soviet Union as the second superpower. With the relegation of the United Kingdom and France to secondary powers and the

complete destruction of Germany as an economic and political power, there was also no other power than the United States to help Turkey finance its economic development goals. Turkey's Government under President İnönü therefore consistently and meticulously worked to engage the United States in the security of Turkey in one way or another. Geopolitical considerations at the Pentagon and to a certain extent at the State Department aimed at keeping Turkey on US side in the immediate post-WWII period of escalating tensions between the US and the Soviets. The US military assistance unleashed by Truman Doctrine was therefore a first step in two dimensions. On one hand, it was a successful conclusion for Turkey's long sought objective of engaging the United States in Turkey's security. On the other hand, the United States successfully broke out of the pre-WWII political tradition of peacetime disengagement from the world. With immediately succeeding Marshall Plan, the United States expanded this break by financing the reconstruction of Europe. On top of these, with the National Security Act in August of 1947, the United States ended up having a permanent National Military Establishment.

On its account, Turkish Government skillfully analyzed the direction of events during the war and played to ensure a place in the Western architecture through close relations with the United States. In less than two rapidly evolving years following the end of the war in Europe, Turkey succeeded in this objective. This outcome was as much a focus of national interest as it was a political goal for President İnönü himself and the Republican People's Party elite to extend their grip on power. İnönü and anyone in CHP with some political grit were aware of the RPP's diminishing popularity among the populace. One move was to allow a new multi-party experiment starting from 1945 but

İnönü went for a snap election in 1946 and did not let the newly formed and potent Democratic Party strengthen sufficiently. Election irregularities on one hand and inability to return to peace time economy further fueled anti-RPP sentiment in the country and thus it became more urgent for İnönü and his government to rapidly align with the West and the U.S. in search for both security guarantees as well as military and even more than that, economic assistance to finance the much-needed development. Therefore, in this period, Turkish Government under İnönü did everything in its power to “invite the Empire.” Notably, this invitation was happily shared by all segments of society and colors of the political spectrum except maybe the die-hard underground Communist movement.

By the end of WWII and further by the start of US military assistance, Turkish military lacked what it needed to defend the country, to explain in the simplest terms. Turkish Army lacked mechanization and armor. The tiny Air Force was a collection of many different types of vintage aircraft. The Navy was not in a better condition. But equally importantly, Turkish Armed Forces also mismanaged and wasted its resources and lacked a strategic management. When US military assistance started, US experts found out that Turkish Air Force had more Spitfire spare parts in Turkey than the British possessed in the whole of British territories. The Army had no centrally managed logistics and depot system. There was no system at hand for spare part management. If all of these existed, the country was dependent on fuel imports, which meant that even Turkey’s existing armor units could not train with their tanks and trucks and pilots could not fly enough hours with their Spitfires. The most abundant source was therefore foot soldiers, whose continued retention in the Army by hundreds of thousands deprived the

economy of its most critical resource, putting the country in a vicious circle of stagnant economy and low levels of development. Organizationally, Turkish military was dominated by a German type of general staff which directly commanded combatant commands while Army Inspectorates mainly took care of logistics and training. It was not before 1949 that Turkish Land Forces as a separate service was established. The General Staff which had strategic and operational control over units and the Ministry of Defense which controlled the logistics of the armed forces were directly reporting to President İnönü. This overall structure was the product of tradition and vested interests as well as deliberate design for political reasons. The end result was that the Turkish Armed Forces was destined to be ineffective had a major offensive taken place against her during and after the war. The only hope both within and outside the military was that the Turkish soldiers would create miracles all over again as in the War of Liberation and that rapid assistance from the West would save the country from annihilation.

On the American side, there has been an elaborate system of legislation, from PL 480 to Mutual Security Act in later stages and meticulously designed and followed administrative procedures that were continuously improved and developed. On the Turkish side, however, there was little focus on structuring the assistance, especially in the period up until 1950, except the initial legislation in 1947. On top of that, Turkish General Staff introduced a liaison office led by a Brigadier General which would coordinate all communication between the US Military Mission and Turkish Military Commands. In practice, the increasing intensity of the work quickly left the Liaison Office out of control and the effort of both sides to take contacts under control never fully worked. In the heat of time pressure to complete projects, on many occasions

officers on both sides cut corners to organize meetings or send correspondences. But most importantly, contrary to the view of American military advisors imposing plans upon the Turkish General Staff (TGS), TGS generals happily asked JAMMAT officers to prepare and come up with detailed plans of strategic importance for the Turkish Armed Forces on many occasions.

The process of transformation of the Land Forces, as the largest and most inert of the Turkish Services in terms of transformation from 1940s through the 1950s along with constant budgetary problems of the Turkish Government stretched the entire military establishment to the limit. As a result of both uncalculated Turkish requests and US designs, Turkey's military ended growing too fast with negative implications for Turkish economy, for US ability to provide aid and equipment and for human resources, especially the officer corps. Top Turkish military and political leadership focused on equipment transfers and wholesale adoption of American doctrinal publications as the panacea to creating an effective Turkish military. In other words, adoption of the latest American Doctrine as well as latest American equipment meant Turkish military would become modern.

In fact, both the Turkish Government and Turkish General Staff were almost hysterically searching to make Turkey's military, especially the Army, an exact copy of the US Army. Adoption of US doctrines was no easy task, and the result was that while one field manual was being put into force, it was becoming obsolete in the US and being replaced, creating a vicious circle of translating and publishing field manuals and all conceivable follow-on effects on the training structures. Added to this was the Turkish

military preoccupation with nuclear weapons, which culminated in the adoption of the pentomic division starting from late 1958.

From early 1950s on, the US Army put great emphasis on integrating tactical nuclear weapons into battle units as an extension of a struggle to prove its relevance in the age of strategic bombers and supersonic fighters. The Army's share of the budget constantly shrank after the Korean War. On the Turkish side, however, there was almost no such questioning of the role and mission of Turkish Army -at least not until 1960, nor an interservice rivalry that could come close to that in the US.

This happened through the work of the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, established as a result of what is called Truman Aid and Turkey thus tied itself to the outcome of American doctrinal debates, which were the product of intense inter service and intra service fights, discussions and budgetary constraints. Hence began a long period of following up, translating and trying to implement US doctrines (and field manuals) that still continues, though in a much more selective manner.

On the other hand, US military representatives seem to have been overly optimistic in their estimate of the Turkish military. Once on the ground, they realized the true scale of the task. This stemmed from two reasons. On the ground, the need for transformation was not as enthusiastically shared at the top echelons of the Turkish military and political leadership. The attitude at the lower levels was rather to enjoy the incredible flow of arms and equipment with little effort towards maintenance and order. The second problem was that no one from the Turkish side ever thought, calculated or planned for future implications of the assistance in terms of fuel, spare parts and human resources. As time went on and the scale of assistance grew, economic implications of

the assistance grew increasingly, putting Turkey in a position of requesting more and more aid which became a significant problem for the Turkish economy and for US-Turkey relations.

The end result has been that although Truman aid started in 1947, it took a long period for the Turkish Army to come close to being an effective fighting force. When Turkish Army reached a certain level in its organizational, doctrinal and material transformation along U.S. lines by late 1950 to mid-1960s, it had become a much more effective fighting force in comparison to its shape in 1947 but this time it had also become a much more resource intensive military trying to implement “American way of war”. In addition, Turkish focus on adopting US tactical doctrine prevented it from focusing on its own peculiar national needs and designing units to meet such needs. Nevertheless, through many years of training and exchange of information through US military assistance, the groundwork of which was laid from 1947, Turkish military became a potent force which has had a transformational effect on even today’s international security scene. Turkey’s strong military which still is organized, equipped and trained along general U.S. lines by far exceeds the capabilities of its peers in its region and is a critical part of NATO force today. This is the result of the far reaching US military assistance to Turkey that started in 1947, which has not only been a turning point for Turkey, its Armed Forces and for U.S. Turkish relations but also for regional and international security scene as well.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources

Air Force Historical Research Agency

Papers of Maj. Gen. Earl Hoag

Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO

Papers of Harry S. Truman

President's Secretary's File

White House Central Files

Papers of George McGhee

National Archives, College Park, MD.

RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies

Published Sources

Books

Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Arcayürek, Cüneyt. *Şeytan Üçgeninde Türkiye*. (Turkey in Devil's Triangle). Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987.

Aybarlas, Fahamettin. *Tabiye Notları. 1. Kısım: Küçük Sevk ve İdareye Göre Kısaltılmış Esaslar*. Ankara Harp Okulu Matbaası, 1939.

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir. *İkinci Adam: Cilt III. 2nd ed.* İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1968.

Aydemir, Talat. *Hatıratım*. (My Memoirs). İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2010.

Aydınlı, Cemal. *Bugüne Nasıl Geldik* (How We Arrived at Today?). Ankara: Damla Matbaası, 1965.

Baban, Cihad. *Politika Galerisi: Büstler ve Portreler* (Gallery of Politics: Busts and Portraits). İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1970.

Faik Ahmet Barutçu. *Siyasi Anılar, 1939-1954* (Political Memoirs, 1939-1954), Milliyet Yayınları, 1977.

- Batur, Muhsin. *Anılar ve Görüşler: Üç Dönemin Perde Arkası*. (Memoirs and Views: Backstage of Three Episodes). İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1985.
- Beisner, Robert. *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Belen, Fahri. *Harp Akademisi 1935-35 Ders Yılı: III. Sınıf Askeri Tarih Meseleleri*. (War Academy 1935-36 Year: 3rd Year Military History Problems). İstanbul, Yıldız: Harp Akademisi Basımevi, 1936.
- Bölügiray, Nevzat. *Geçmişten Geleceğe*. (From the Past to the Future). İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 2009.
- Citino, Robert M. *The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-1939*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2008.
- _____. *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005.
- Clifford, Clark.. *Counsel to the President: A Memoir*. New York: Random House, 1991
- Condell, Bruce M & David Zabecki, eds. *On the German Art of War: Truppenführung-German Army Manual for Unit Command in World War II*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2009.
- Corum, James S. *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992.
- Çelikoğlu, Adnan. *Bir Darbeci Subayın Anıları: 27 Mayıs Öncesi ve Sonrası*. (Memoirs of a Revolutionist Officer Before and After May 27). İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2010.
- Çırnaz, Avni. *Harp Akademisi 1944-1945 Tedrisatından: II. Sınıf Tabiye Meseleleri*. (From War Academy 1944-1945 Curriculum: 2nd Year Tactical Problems). Ankara: Harp Akademisi Matbaası, 1946.
- Dora, Celal. *Kore Savaşı'nda Türkler, 1950-1951* (Turks in the Korean War, 1950-1951). İstanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1963.
- Doughty, Robert A. *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76. Leavenworth Papers No. 1*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 1979.
- Eren, Asım. *Kara Harp Akademisi 1943-44 Ders Yılı Tedrisatından: I. Sınıf: Tümenlerden Küçük Birlikler için Tatbiki Kurmay Ödevleri Meseleleri*. (War Academy 1943-44 Year: 1st Year Practical Staff Problems for Units Smaller Than Division). Ankara: Harp Akademisi Matbaası, 1944.
- Erkanlıharbiyei Umumiye Riyaseti. *Erkanlıharbiyei Umumiye Riyaseti Sahra Talimnamesi: ST 100-5 Harekat (Sevk ve Muharebe)*. (General Staff Field Manual: FM 100-5 Operations). Ankara: Erkanlıharbiyei Umumiye Basımevi, 1954.
- Erkanlı, Orhan. *Anılar, Sorunlar, Sorumlular*. (Memoirs, Issues and the Responsibilities). İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972.
- Erkilet, Hüseyin Hüsnü et. al. *Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri, 1950-1953: Özet* (Battles of Turkish Brigade in the Korean

- War, 1950-1953: A Summary). Ankara: Erkanıharbiye-I Umumiye Harb Tarihi Dairesi, 1959.
- Esin, Numan. *Devrim ve Demokrasi: Bir 27 Mayısçının Anıları*. (Revolution and Democracy: Memoirs of a May 27 Putschist). İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2005.
- Evren, Kenan. *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* (Memoirs of Kenan Evren). İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- _____. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı. *Kore: Kore'de Cereyan Eden Muharebelerden Alınacak Dersler*. (Korea: Lessons to be Learned From Battles That Occurred in Korea). Ankara: Gnkur Basımevi, 1979.
- Genelkurmay Başkanlığı. *Muhtelif Sınıfların Birlikte Sevk ve Muharebe Talimnamesi, 1. Kısım, 2. Tabı*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası, 1939.
- Genelkurmay Başkanlığı. *Piyade Talimnamesi* (Infantry Field Manual). Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası, 1941.
- Genelkurmay Başkanlığı. *TAB. 100-1 Sevk ve Muharebe (Harekat)*. (TAB. 100-1 Command and Combat-Operations). Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1950.
- Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Yayınları. *FM 7-20 Amerikan Piyade Tabur Talimnamesi*. (FM 7-20 American Infantry Battalion Manual). İstanbul: Askeri Basımevi, 1949.
- Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Yayınları. *FM 7-40 Piyade Alayı, 9 Şubat 1942*. (FM 7-40 Infantry Regiment, February 9, 1942). Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1949.
- Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Yayınları. *FM 100-15 Sevk ve Muharebe Talimnamesi: Büyük Birlikler, 1 Eylül 1948*. (FM 100-15 Operations: Large Units, September 1, 1948). Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1950.
- Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı. *Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri, 1950-1953*. (Battles of Turkish Armed Forces in the Korean War, 1950-1953). Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1975.
- Gürkan, Celil. *12 Mart'a Beş Kala* (5 Minutes to 12 March). İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1986.
- Gürün, Kamuran. *Savaşın Dünya ve Türkiye 2: 1926-1939* (The World at War and Turkey 2: 1926-1939). İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1997.
- Harris, George S. *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective*. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972.
- Hunt, Michael H. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1987.
- İlter, Zeki. *Bir Ömür Boyu Askerlik, 1919-1972* (A Life in Military, 1919-1972). İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınevi, 2003.

- İnönü, İsmet & Sabahattin Selek, ed. *Hatıralar* (Memoirs). Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi. 3rd printing in single volume, 2009.
- İşkora, Muharrem Mazlum. *Harp Akademileri Tarihçesi, 1846-1965, Cilt 1.* (History of War Academy, 1846-1965, vol. 1.) Ankara: Gnknr Basımevi, 1966.
- _____. *Harp Akademileri Tarihçesi, 1930-1965, Cilt 2.* (History of War Academy, 1930-1965, vol. 2). Ankara: Gnknr Basımevi, 1968.
- Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı Yayınları. *Atom Harbinde Kara Ordusunun Sevk ve İdare Esasları* (Command Principles of Land Army in Atomic Warfare). Ankara: Erkanıharbiyei Umumiye Basımevi, 1958.
- Karavelioğlu, Kamil. *Bir Devrim, İki Darbe: 27 Mayıs, 12 Mart, 12 Eylül.* (A Revolution, two coups d'état: May 27, March 12, September 12). İstanbul: Gürer Yayınları, 2007.
- Kocatürk, Kenan. *Bir Subayın Anıları: 1909-1999* (Memoirs of An Officer: 1909-1999). İstanbul: Kastaş, 1999.
- Koçak, Cemil. *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi, 1939-1945, Cilt 1* (The Era of a National Chief in Turkey, vol.1). Ankara: İletişim Yayınları, 2007.
- _____. *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi, 1939-1945, Cilt 2* (The Era of a National Chief in Turkey, vol.2). Ankara: İletişim Yayınları, 2003.
- Kretchik, Walter E. *U.S. Army Doctrine. From the Revolution to the War on Terror.* Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011.
- Krueger, Anne O. *Foreign Trade Regimes & Economic Development: Turkey.* New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1974.
- Kuniholm, Bruce. R. *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in İran, Turkey and Greece.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Küçük, Sami. *Rumeli'den 27 Mayıs'a: İhtilalin Kaderini Belirleyen Köşk Harekatı.* (From Rumelia to 27 May: The Operation that Decided the Fate of the Revolution). İstanbul: Mikado Yayınları. 2008.
- LaFeber, Walter. *America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-2002*, 9th ed. New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2004.
- Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992.
- Linn, Brian McAllister. *The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
- Lundestad, Geir. *The American "Empire".* Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1990.
- Madanoğlu, Cemal. *Korgeneral Cemal Madanoğlu'nun Anıları* (Memoirs of Lt. General Cemal Madanoğlu). İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2019.
- McGhee, George C. *Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in Diplomacy.* Harper & Row: New York, 1983.
- _____. *On the Frontline in the Cold War: An Ambassador Reports.* Westport, CT: Prager, 1997.

- _____. *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection : how the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO entry contained the Soviets*. London: Macmillan, 1990.
- Mittelberger, Hilmar Ritter von. *Harp Akademileri 1937-1938 Senesi III. Sınıf Tedrisatından: Sevk ve Muharebe Talimnamesinin Bazı Maddelerinin İzahı*. (From III. Year Curriculum of War Academy 1938-1939 Year: Explanations on Certain Articles of Operations Manual). İstanbul: Harp Akademisi Matbaası, 1939.
- Orkunt, Sezai. *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri, (Turkey-US Military Relations)* İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976.
- Paterson, Thomas G. *Soviet-American Confrontation: Post War Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
- Posen, Barry R. *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.
- Rearden, Steven L. *History of The Office of the Secretary of Defense Series: Volume 1 The Formative Years, 1947-1950*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Kenneth Rogoff. *This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Sander, Oral. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, 1947-1964*. (Turkish-American Relations, 1947-1964.) Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1979.
- Sawyer, Robert K. *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War*. Washington D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1962.
- Schifferle, Peter J. *America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education and Victory in World War II*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010.
- Sever, Ayşegül. *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Ortadoğu, 1945-1958*. (Turkey, the West and the Middle East Under the Siege of the Cold War, 1945-1958). İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1997.
- Seyhan, Dünder. *Gölgedeki Adam*. (The Man in the Shadows). İstanbul: Nurettin Uyan Matbaası, 1966.
- Tekeli, İlhan & Selim İlkin. *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si, Cilt 2: İktisadi Politikaları ve Uygulamalarıyla* (Turkey in WWII, Vol. II: Economic Policies and Practices). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014.
- İlhan Tekeli, Selim İlkin. *Savaş Sonrası Ortamında 1947 Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı (1947 Turkish Economic Development Plan in the Post WWII Environment)*, Ankara: 2009;
- Toker, Metin. *Türkiye Üzerinde 1945 Kabusu: 2. Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk-Sovyet ve Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri Üzerine bir İnceleme*. (Nightmare of 1945 over Turkey: An Analysis of Turkish-Soviet and Turkish-American Relations after World War II.) Ankara: Akis Yayınları, 1971.

- Torumtay, Necip. Orgeneral Torumtay'ın Anıları (General Torumtay's Memoirs). İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1993.
- Trauschweizer, Ingo. *The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008.
- U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations. *Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1943-50, Vol. VI: Military Assistance Programs, Part 2*. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.
- Uslu, Nasuh. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri* (Turkish American Relations). Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000.
- Wallach, Jehuda. *Bir Askeri Yardımın Anatomisi: Türkiye'de Prusya-Alman Askeri Heyetleri, 1835-1919* (Anatomy of a Military Assistance: Prussian and German Military Mission in Turkey, 1835-1919). Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1977.
- War Department. *Field Service Regulations: FM 100-5 Operations*. 1992 Reprint Edition. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1941.
- Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. Fiftieth Anniversary Edition. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2009.
- Yalta, Bahtiyar. *Bir Darbeci Subayın Hatıraları*. (Memoirs of a Revolutionary Officer). İstanbul: Kronik Yayınevi, 2020.
- Yamak, Kemal. *Gölgede Kalan İzler ve Gölgeleşen Bizler*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2006.
- Yazıcı, Tahsin. *Kore Birinci Türk Tugayı'nda Hatıralarım*. (My Memoirs in the First Turkish Brigade in Korea). İstanbul: Ülku Basımevi, 1963.
- Yetkin, Çetin. *Atatürk'ün İhanetle Suçlandığı S.C.F Olayı: Atatürk'ün CHP'den sonra kurduğu İkinci Parti Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*. (The Phenomenon of F.R.P. for which Atatürk Was Accused of Treason: the Free Republican Party as the Second Party Atatürk Founded After Republican People's Party). İstanbul: Otopsi Yayınevi, 3rd Edition, 2004.
- Yirmibeşoğlu, Sabri. *Siyasi ve Askeri Anılarım*, vols. 1 & 2. (My Military and Political Memoirs). İstanbul: Kastaş 1999.

Book Chapters

- Criss, Nur Bilge. "US Forces in Turkey" in Simon Duke & Wolfgang Krieger, eds. *U.S. Military Forces in Europe: the Early Years, 1945-1970*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.
- Güvenç, Serhat. "ABD Askeri Yardımı ve Türk Ordusunun Dönüşümü: 1942-1960," (US Military Aid and the Transformation of the Turkish Military: 1942-1960) in İsmet Akça & Evren Balta Paker, eds., *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti* (The Military, State and Security Policy in Turkey), İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010.

Mark, Eduard. "Turkish War Scare of 1946", in *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, eds. Melvyn Leffler & David Painter New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.

Özcan, Gencer. Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ordusunda Prusya Etkisi”, in İsmet Akça & Evren Balta Paker, eds., *Türkiye’de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti* (The Military, State and Security Policy in Turkey), İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Journal Articles

Ahmad, Feroz. "Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey", *MERIP Reports* 93 (Jan. 1981): 5-24.

Bernath, Clifford. "JUSMMAT and Turkey: History and Overview", *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* 7 (Summer 1985).

Criss, Nur Bilge. "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963", *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 20 (September 1997): 97:122.

Demirel, Tanel. "The Turkish Military's Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980", *Armed Forces & Society* 29 (Winter 2003): 253-280.

Demirel, Tanel. "Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective", *Armed Forces & Society* 31 (Winter 2005): 245-271.

Güney, Aylin. "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From Cold War to War on Iraq", *Turkish Studies* 6:3 (2005): 341-359.

Güvenç, Serhat and Mesut Uyar, "Lost in translation or transformation? The impact of American aid on the Turkish military, 1947–60", *Cold War Studies* 41 2 (2022): 59-77.

Karpat, Kemal H. "The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution", *The American Historical Review* 75 (Oct. 1970): 1654-1683.

Kemal, Ahmet. "Military Rule and the Future of Democracy in Turkey", *MERIP Reports* 122 (March - April 1984): 12-15.

Livingston, Craig. "‘One Thousand Wings’: The United States Air Force Group and the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, 1947-50", *Middle Eastern Studies* 30 (Oct. 1994): 778-825.

Nye, Roger P. "Civil-Military Confrontation in Turkey: The 1973 Presidential Election", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 8 (April 1977): 209-228.

Paone, Rocco M. "Military Aid To Turkey", *Military Review*, June 1970: 74-79.

Sakallıoğlu, Ümit Cizre. "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", *Comparative Politics* 29 (Jan. 1997): 151-166.

Şatana, Nil S. "Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy" *Armed Forces & Society* 34 (April 2008): 357-388.

Uyar, Mesut and Serhat Güvenç, “A tale of two military missions: The Germans in the Ottoman Empire and the Americans in the Republic of Turkey”, *War & Society* 47 2 (2022):, 85-106.

Unpublished Sources

Cannon, Michael W. “The Development of FM 100-5 From 1945 until 1976.” MA Thesis, University of Iowa, 1984.

Howard Munsoon IV. “The Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, Implementing the Truman Doctrine and Transforming the U.S. Foreign Policy, 1947-1954”. PhD Diss., Washington State Univerty, 2012.