

DIPLOMATIC ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN THE
VENETIANS AND THE OTTOMANS IN CASE OF
CAPTIVITY (1560-1590)

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
NİDA NEBAHAT NALÇACI
BAŞ

Department of History
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
January 2023

NİDA NEBAHAT
NALÇACI BAŞ

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Bilkent University 2023

To My Grandfather



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The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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NİDA NEBAHAT NALÇACI BAŞ

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By Nida Nebahat Nalçacı Baş

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Luca Zavagno
Advisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Evgeni R. Radushev
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Selim Tezcan
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Vera Costantini
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Fatih Yeşil
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

Refet Soykan Gürkaynak
Director

ABSTRACT

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Nalçacı Baş, Nida Nebahat

Ph.D., Department of History

Advisor: Asist. Prof. Luca Zavagno

Co-advisor: Prof. Dr. Suraija Roschan Nadira Erika Faroqhi

January 2023

This dissertation is about the transformation of the legal, economic and social status of captives taken during the wars between the Ottomans and Venetians. It also covers how the events between 1560-1590 affected both countries' and the Mediterranean's history. This study argues that the political, military, and economic interaction between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire profoundly affected the history of slavery in the Mediterranean. This dissertation focuses mainly on these two states. The changes in the status of war captives and slaves through the years were studied, along with the changes caused by the establishment of Ottoman domination in the region. After the emergence of the Ottomans, a regional power, it took a long time for the Venetian Republic, a European state with active commercial operations both in the Eastern

Mediterranean and the Black Sea, to develop a reflex for liberating her subjects from captivity. While other states usually outsourced their liberation operations to religious institutions, Venice used her government agencies for such purposes. But as the number of Venetians increased steadily, they introduced some regulations. By tracking the transformation of such practices, this study contributes to the historiography of the Early Modern Mediterranean. This dissertation argues that the War in Cyprus in 1570 was a major turning point during the aforementioned transformation. The events that occurred during and after the war significantly affected the law of war captives and slaves through social, economic, and military means.

Keywords: Mediterranean, Ottoman Empire, Slavery, The Republic of Venice, War Captivity.

ÖZET

ESİRLİK BAĞLAMINDA VENEDİKLİLER VE OSMANLILAR ARASINDAKİ DİPLOMATİK TEMASLAR (1560-1590)

Nalçacı Baş, Nida Nebahat

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Doç Dr. Luca Zavagno

2. Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Suraija Roschan Nadira Erika Faroqhi

Ocak 2023

Bu tez çalışması, Osmanlılar ve Venedikliler arasındaki savaş esirlerinin hukuki, ekonomik ve sosyal durumunun dönüşümünü ve 1560-1590 tarihleri arasındaki gelişmelerin hem iki devletin hem de Akdeniz coğrafyasının tarihine olan etkisi hakkındadır. Tezin konusu olarak Venedik ve Osmanlıların seçilmesinin sebebi, bu iki devletin siyasi, askeri ve ekonomik temaslarının Akdeniz'in kölelik tarihini etkileyen önemli bir etken olması iddiasındandır. Akdeniz'de yerleşik bir uygulama olan savaş esirliği ve kölelik statüsünün zamanla geçirdiği dönüşüm ile birlikte, Osmanlıların bölgede etkin olması ile devam eden değişim incelenmiştir. Aslen Avrupa devleti olup, Doğu Akdeniz ve Karadeniz'de etkin ticari faaliyetleri olan Venedik Cumhuriyeti'nin, Osmanlıların sahneye çıkması ile bölgede esir düşen kendi tebaasını koruma refleksi geliştirmesi zaman aldı. Diğer devletlerin esir kurtarma

operasyonları genellikle dini kurumlar üzerinden yürütülürken Venedik Cumhuriyeti Kurtarma operasyonlarını ilk zamanlar devlet organları bünyesinde devlet temsilcileri üzerinden organize ettiyse de Osmanlıların eline düşen Venediklilerin sayısı çoğaldıkça bu faaliyetler için yeni düzenlemelere gidildi. Tez, bu dönüşümü incelemek suretiyle Erken Modern Akdeniz tarihyazımına katkı sağlamıştır. Dönüşümün en önemli kırılma noktalarından biri olarak 1570 yılında Osmanlı Devleti'nin başlattığı Kıbrıs Savaşı'nı kabul eden tez bu savaş esnasında ve sonrasındaki değişikliklerin bölgenin savaş esirliği ve kölelik hukukunu sosyal, ekonomik ve askeri olarak etkilediğini iddia etmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Akdeniz, Kölelik, Osmanlı Devleti, Savaş Esirliği, Venedik Cumhuriyeti.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

By the time I started archival research in January 2020, the news of the global pandemic had already reached Venice. Lockdown measures were discussed in Italy. I was in the city where the term “quarantine” had been born, and I was planning to study in the archives through the spring and summer. But circumstances did not allow it.

After my return to Ankara, the whole world was shut down for nearly two years. And my time to complete my dissertation was running short. I recognized that I would not be able to write the text I initially planned to write, so I decided to narrow down my study. I left two chapters out. One was about the relationship between other city-states and the Ottoman Empire regarding their captive subjects. The other one was about the role of Istanbul’s catholic community in saving the captives. To write these chapters, I had planned to visit the archives in Vatican, Palermo, Florence, Naples, and Simancas, but travel restrictions did not allow it.

But during the lockdown, I noticed something I had not noticed before. Italians always eyed the East both in the 16th century and in the 19th century, and a sizeable amount of their works in different forms survived to this day; some in the form of narratives, some in chronicles, and some in academic studies. Academic works that were written from the 1800s and on contained a good many amounts of document transcriptions as appendices. The perseverance of Eugenio Alberi was already known to me, as to anyone who studied

in this field. But through these works, I also got to know productive historians such as Michiel Rosi and Vladimir Lamansky. Their works were of enviable quality, considering the limitations of the period they lived in.

My research on Ottoman documents was relatively more straightforward. Remote access to the Ottoman archives was already possible long before I began my research. But during the pandemic, it became much better when they offered remote access to the entire database.

Secondary sources written in the past 150 years helped me understand the period. Still, apart from a couple of works, the issue of slavery was mentioned only partially in most of the sources. This is why I had to extract relevant information and form them into a patchwork. But after gathering all the information about slaves and the captives of war, the result turned out to be satisfying.

Compared to accessing sources in English, accessing sources in Italian is a challenge for any researcher outside Italy. But a few developments during the pandemic helped me overcome this challenge. Italian Ministry of Culture started to digitize numerous publications and offered online access to these works. Many works that were not available online in the spring of 2020 became available a year later.

Suraiya Faroghi encouraged me to study the issue of captives years ago. In the intervening twelve years, I continued to work with my professor Suraiya Faroghi. And as the second advisor of my dissertation, I am ever so grateful to her for having picked me up at my worst time, for placing her trust in me, and for doing this with her usual humility and patience. First, Mehmet Kalpaklı, Bilkent University Department of History, has not regarded my dyslexia as a flaw and has always supported me since my admission to the

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Here, I have to thank four people: Serap Mumcu and Zahit Atıl especially. Mumcu provided me with the correspondence volumes between the Venetian Senate and the bailo in Constantinople. Atıl provided me with the correspondence volumes between the bailo in Constantinople and *Consiglio dei Dieci*. After examining those documents, I noticed that most of them had already been used in secondary sources, but they still were extremely valuable to me for confirming my arguments. Nur Sobers-Khan and Kerim İlker Bulunur sent me the Sharia *court records* of Galata district.

The greatest help I received in accessing sources came from my university. Any digital or published work I needed was provided by Bilkent University Library in 3 days to a month, either by purchasing or through interlibrary loaning. Even during the pandemic, when postal services were under strain, the library -specifically Fusun

Yurdakul- was able to provide me with any book I needed from abroad in a very short time.

During the writing process of the dissertation, there were many times when I could not make sense of what I read. I am grateful to Filiz Dıġıroġlu, Göksel Bař, Elçin Arabacı, Mehmet Kuru and Hüseyin Serdar Tabakoġlu, who answered my every call when this happened and replied all my questions, to Ayře Kavak and Beyza Eroġlu who came to my help right away whenever I had a difficult time in deciphering Ottoman texts, to Burcu Halaç and Ece Lanan Abana who provided support for English. And I will never forget Artık's help despite his busy work schedule regarding the French texts with which I had a hard time.

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I am grateful to my cousin Özgün Rüya Oral who encouraged me to move to Ankara by making a leap of faith and who made my life immensely easier in Ankara, and to Elif Karadeniz, to whom I ran whenever I felt unable to breathe after having moved to Ankara. If it had not been for Seval Göçmen, who helped me in every way imaginable during my illness, I would not have been able to return to writing this dissertation. And I am very grateful to my husband, Mehmet Fatih Bař, for the best decision of my life. As if it was not sufficient alone that a day lasted for 35 hours in Ankara, our newly married

days also coincided with the gloomiest days of the pandemic; however, the days passed in harmony and infused with history as two Ph.D. students living in the same house.

My entire family, especially my father, Şerafettin Nalçacı, and my mothers, Nesrin Nalçacı and Aliye Baş, who sooner or later tried to help me indirectly or directly to the best of their abilities on the road that I chose, endeavored to understand me.

And my grandfather! Just like K rođlu, who always kept Ayvaz at his side for 20 years, you gave me a lifetime of experience in addition to mine. Even after you passed away, your shadow and support enveloped me. You never understood what I strove for, but you still stood behind me like a fortress. I will never forget that and always talk about it. Maybe we will wander among the streets of İstanbul again, where you drove around in your red car, always listening to Emel Sayın.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION



*“From year to year – the battles, sieges, fortunes
That I have passed.
I ran it through, even from my boyish days
To th’ very moment that he bade me tell it,
Wherein I spake of most disastrous chances,
Of moving accidents by flood and field,
Of hair-breadth scapes i’th’ imminent deadly breach,
Of being taken by the insolent foe
And sold to slavery; of my redemption thence
And portance in my travailous history;”¹
(William Shakespeare, from *Othello*, 1/2)*

1.1 Brief Overview of Historiography on Slavery

Until recently, studies on slavery had been dominated by and had focused on the Atlantic slave trade and ancient era slavery. Slavery in other regions and other eras had rarely been studied. However, slavery was a common institution in almost every society in different corners of the world, taking various shapes defined by geographical, cultural and economic circumstances. It kept on changing its form throughout the ages until it was finally abolished officially. Nevertheless, various “hidden forms of slavery” continued to exist in the contemporary world where we have witnessed the Gulags, concentration

¹ Andrew Hadfield, *William Shakespeare's Othello: A Sourcebook* (London: Routledge, 2003), 162.

camps etc. The very institution of slavery that survived thousands of years and is still alive in our time.

Slavery was also a reality in the medieval and the early modern Mediterranean. The Ottoman Empire, just like all of its contemporaries, effectively employed slave labor in its workforce.² The Ottomans inherited the institution of slavery from the Eastern Mediterranean societies and reshaped it according to the Roman, Christian and Islamic laws and tradition.³

For a long time, modern historians who studied the history of the Ottoman Empire refrained from commenting on Ottoman slavery. The general consensus was that the Ottomans “treated their slaves well.” This very utterance can still be heard from the university lecture halls to the research rooms in the archives. The absence of capital punishment to the runaway slaves and certain differences in practice which were in contrast with the Western practices, may give this claims a certain degree of credit. Nevertheless, this argument about benevolent slave ownership, combined with the historiography that predominantly focuses on the machinations of the Ottoman state, leads to a certain attitude, which was accurately defined by Toledano as the habit of ignoring diverse elements of society such as minorities or slaves.⁴ The scholarly works, which

² Since the start of Islam, city-life and state industry created a permanent demand for a workforce which, governed by the stipulations of Islam, triggered a boost in the importation of slaves from the conquered territories and beyond. See. Kurt Franz, “Slavery in Islam: Legal Norms and Social Practice”, *Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean (c. 1000-1500 ce)*, ed. by Reuven Amitai and Christoph Cluse (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2018), 90, 91; Ghada Hashem Talhami, “The Zanj Rebellion Reconsidered”, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 10 (3), (1977), 454, 455.

³ Robert Davis, “The Geography of Slaving in the Early Modern Mediterranean, 1500–1800”. *Critical Readings on Global Slavery*, ed. by Damian Alan Pargas and Felicia Roşu (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 863-865.

⁴ Ehud Toledano, “Enslavement and Freedom in Transition”, *Journal of Global Slavery*, 2 (2017), 100–121; ‘Models of Global Enslavement’, ed. by Stephan Conermann and Gül Şen *Slaves and Slave Agency in the Ottoman Empire* (Göttingen: V&R Unipress & Bonn University Press, 2020), 31- 51.

showed that slavery had long been in existence in all layers of the Ottoman society, made a belated appearance in Ottoman historiography. It may be argued that the lack of adequate research on this subject was the result of turning a blind eye to the elephant in the room.

In most cases, Ottoman historians (chroniclers) recorded the events of political importance that they observed in their own lifetime and/or the narratives that were passed on from preceding generations. Their works, rarely match the integrity which is expected of today's academic works and most of them narrate contemporary political events by underlining the virtues of the ruler and the ideal of a world which is dominated by him. In these works, political events of the day were given the utmost priority to be recorded, mainly for practical needs. Such events had to be learned and remembered by the future generations. In all these works, the centerpiece of the narratives were the rulers, such as the kings, the sultans or the shahs. In the epic histories of sultans, the accounts of major battles or the deeds of prominent statesmen, slaves appear only as statistics among the spoils of victory or never even mentioned at all. In actual events of the era, thousands of people could have been put in shackles and forcibly relocated from their homes but their stories were not mentioned in chronicles. Until late 19th century, when the mass media appeared as an influential information source, these stories were seldomly noticed.

As the societal elements of a slaveholding empire, slaves of the Ottoman Empire have only recently been able to attract the attention of contemporary historians.⁵ When it comes to the historians' indifference to the subject of slavery in the Ottoman Empire, a number of reasons become apparent. The primary reason among them is the modern historians'

⁵ On detailed literature survey see, Suraiya Faruqi, *Slavery in the Ottoman World: A Literature Survey*, (Berlin: EB-Verlag, 2017).

effort to portray a powerful state for the period they study. The sultan, imperial institutions and state officials are naturally perceived as the major actors. Special attention is shown to individuals of slave or *devşirme* origin who survived slavery and succeeded to rise to prominent positions such as the rank of the pasha.⁶

Naturally, this indifference did not develop its own literature. When people take interest in Ottoman slavery, they easily recognize the persistent avoidance of writing on the subject. However, the primary documents in the Ottoman archives offer a rich source on slavery in the Ottoman Empire. Unused archive documents are not to be accused here. The centerpiece of historians' attention have mostly been the work of chroniclers, and such works are generally focused on the all-powerful state institutions. And so, the history of the common people is usually ignored.

It is of course worth studying a story that starts from captivity and ends with a relatively “glamorous” ending. But during the search for such stories, one may focus only on achievers like high-ranking military officers⁷ and can easily ignore the fate of a

⁶ For further reading on elite subjects, see Gilles Veinstein, “Sokollu Mehmed Pasha”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition (EI2), v. 9 (Leiden: Brill, 1960–); Richard Franz Kreutel, *Kara Mustafa Paşa vor Wien: das türkische Tagebuch der Belagerung Wiens 1683, verfaßt vom Zeremonienmeister der Hohen Pforte* (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1955); Hester Donaldson Jenkins, *Ibrahim Pasha, Grand Vizir of Suleiman the Magnificent* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1911); Norman Itzkowitz, *Mehmed Raghib Pasha: The Making of an Ottoman Grand Vizir* (Unpublished doctoral thesis, Princeton University, 1959), Robert Dankoff, *The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588-1662): As Portrayed in Evliya Çelebi's Book of Travels* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); Ilario Rinieri, *Clemente VIII^e Sinan Bassà Cicala. Studio storico secondo documenti inediti* (Roma: Civiltà Cattolica, 1898); Klaus Schwarz and Hars Kurio, *Die Stiftungen des osmanischen Grosswesirs Koğa Sinân Pascha (gest 1596) in Uzunğaova / Bulgarien* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag 1983); Heath W. Lowry, *Hersekzâde Ahmed Paşa: The Career & Pious Endowments of an Ottoman Statesman (Hersekzâde Ahmed Paşa: Bir Osmanlı Devlet Adamının Meslek Hayatı ve Kurduğu Vakıflar* (İstanbul: Bahçeşehir University, 2011);

⁷ Suraiya Faruqi, “Civilian Society and Political Power in the Ottoman Empire: A Report on Research in Collective Biography (1480-1830)”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), 109-117.

dismissed *pasha*. On the other hand, focusing on such personalities⁸ and considering them as the only components of the institution of slavery may prove to be an extremely short-sighted approach, which prevents one from seeing Ottoman slavery as a whole. Since the institution as a whole has usually been ignored, this short-sightedness became a norm. This is the case with Ottoman-Turkish historiography. Although during the 20th century there had been noteworthy exceptions to this approach⁹, the historical approach that focuses on the mighty sultan and certain individuals in his impressive orbit. Such approach treats the rest of the Ottoman society, in Ehud Toledano's words¹⁰, "as if silent and absent".

The rise of the global history in the past couple of decades¹¹, indirectly benefited the historiography of slavery. By promoting concepts such as "history from below", "post-

⁸ Paul Wittek, "Devşirme and *şarī'a*", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*, V. 17, No. 2 (1955), 271-278; V. L. Ménage, "Some Notes on the 'devshirme'", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*, V. 29, No. 1 (1966), 64-78; Basilike D. Papoulia, *Ursprung und Wesen der "Knabenlese" im osmanischen Reich. Südosteuropäische Arbeiten* (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1963); İ. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650* (New York: Columbia University Press), 1983.

⁹ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "XV ve XVI Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Toprak İşçiliğinin Organizasyonu Şekilleri: I Kulluklar ve Ortakçı Kullar", *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, I/1 (1939), 29-74; I/2 (1940), 198-245; Otto Meinardus, "The Upper Egyptian Practice of the Making of Eunuchs in the XVIII. and XIX. Century (sic)" *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, 94/1 (1969), 47-58; Alan Fisher, "The Sale of Slaves in the Ottoman Empire: Markets and State Taxes on Slave Sales, Some Preliminary considerations", *Boğaziçi University Journal*, VI (1978), 149-74; Halil Sahillioğlu, "Slaves in the Social and Economic Life of Bursa in the late 15th and early 16th Centuries" *Turcica*, XVII (1985): 43-112; Murray Gordon, *Slavery in the Arab World*. (New York: New Amsterdam Press, 1989); Bernard Lewis, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Inquiry* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Suraiya Faruqi, "Black Slaves and Freedmen Celebrating (Aydın, 1576)", *Turcica*, XXI-XXIII (1991), 205-215; Jane Hathaway, "The role of the kızlar ağası in 17th-18th century Ottoman Egypt", *Studia Islamica*, 75, (1992) 141-58; Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Yvonne J. Seng, "Fugitives and Factotums: Slaves in Early Sixteenth- Century Istanbul", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 39/2 (1996): 136-16; Ehud Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East*, Seattle (London: The University of Washington Press, 1998); Madeline Zilfi, *Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire: The Design of Difference* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Olivier Bouquet, *Les pachas du sultan : essai sur les agents supérieurs de l'État ottoman (1839-1909)* (Paris-Leuven: Peeters, 2007); Gülay Yılmaz, "Change in manpower in the Early Modern Janissary Army and its Impact on the Devshirme System", *Rivista di Studi Militari*, 6 (2017), 181-188.

¹⁰ Toledano, Ehud, *As if Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle East* (New Haven CN and London: Yale University Press, 2007).

¹¹ For further reading on Global History, see. Daniel Woolf, *A Concise History of History; Global Historiography from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019); Georg G.

colonialism” and “non-Western-centric historiography”, the global history therefore contributed toward the creation of the works on the various practices of slavery in different parts of the globe. The first European Congress on World and Global History was held for the first time in 2005 and the first volume of the Journal of Global History was published in 2006. A decade later, in 2016, the Journal of Global Slavery was issued.

During the last decade, while the historians around the world discussed the subject, slavery in Near and Middle East unexpectedly became a topic for historians. Until 2010s, the historiography of slavery had focused more on the global history, or connected history. In such approach, slavery was not a contemporary result of continuous political development or fact like taxation, poverty, structure of the states or the image of the nations etc. In last one-hundred-fifty years, slavery entered into a rapid process of abolition across the world and by the beginning of 20th century it became illegal throughout the world. During 20th century, people around the world lived their lives without the fear of being captured against their, except for being taken prisoners while they fight in wars. This was the case until the breaking news came out about an Islamist terror organization based in northeastern Nigeria, Boko Haram. In May 2013, in a video¹² released by Boko Haram, their leader declared that they had captured women and children, including teenage girls, in retaliation to the arrest of its members' wives and children. In 2014, they started to kidnap girls and young women for sexual abuse. Some of the

Iggers and Q. Edward Wang, Supriya Mukherjee, *A Global History of Modern Historiography* (New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2017); Matthias Middell, *The Practice of Global History European Perspectives* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019); Dominic Sachsenmaier, “Global History and Critiques of Western Perspectives”, *Comparative Methodologies in the Social Sciences: Cross-Disciplinary Inspirations*, Vol 42, No. 3, (2006); David Abulafia, “Mediterranean History As Global History”, *History and Theory*, V. 50, No. 2, (2011).

¹² ‘Boko Haram timeline: From preachers to slave raiders’, BBC New, May 15, 2013 <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22538888>> [accessed 15 June 2021].

kidnapped girls were forced into being concubines of the so-called Islamic fighters. In the end, Boko Haram's activities were contained in northernmost parts of Nigeria. Compared to what the world was about to witness in the Middle East, it was not even that dreadful.

In early 2014, Iraq-based terrorist organization ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) took advantage of the ongoing chaos in the country and declared an independent caliphate in northern Iraq. They forced Yazidi -one of the religious minority groups in the northern Iraq- women into sex slavery and treated them as spoils of war.¹³ The whole world was shocked by their conduct. Their treatment of those women reminded a 21st-century form of "comfort women" who were abused by the soldiers of Imperial Japanese Army in occupied countries during World War II, rather than traditional Islamic practice for prisoners of war. Authorities labeled these actions in Nigeria and Iraq as the "horrific" return of slavery in a region, which was the center of the slave supply in previous centuries.¹⁴ Journalist tried to find out the Islamic legitimacy and historical background of this asinine practice.¹⁵ Though the global press aroused the interest in slavery, journalists were still not quite informed about the case. Though the public was familiar with the

¹³Ruth Sherlock, 'Islamic State commanders "using Yazidi virgins for sex"', *The Telegraph* October 18 2016, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11171874/Islamic-State-commanders-using-Yazidi-virgins-for-sex.html>> [accessed 15 June 2021]. ; Sangwon Yoon, 'Islamic State Circulates Sex Slave Price List', *Bloomberg*, August 04, 2015, <<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-03/sex-slaves-sold-by-islamic-state-the-younger-the-better>> [accessed 15 June 2021].

¹⁴ Paul Trewhele, 'Slavery returns to Africa', *Politicsweb*, February 09, 2015, <<http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/slavery-returns-to-africa>> [accessed 15 June 2021].

¹⁵ Matthew Barber 'ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape', *New York Times*, August 13, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html?_r=1> [accessed 15 June 2021]; Sani Bukhari, *New York Times*, <<http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=980CE1DF163AE033A2575BC2A9659C94679FD7CF>> [accessed 15 June 2021]; Nour Malas, *The Wall Street Journal*, November 18, 2015, <<http://www.wsj.com/articles/ancient-prophecies-motivate-islamic-state-militants-1416357441>> [accessed 15 June 2021].

concept of Jihad since 9/11, these new events were hard to comprehend. It caused a worldwide outcry from various media outlets, NGOs and governments.

On the other hand, historians -especially social historians who focused on the region- were familiar with the case thanks to the limited and existing works. Slavery was one of the dominant institutions in the Middle East for ages and required chapter to gain insight into the social history of the region. In this manner, by Ottomanists and historians focused on Islamic world, various studies have been published about the region. Though, in comparison to researches on Atlantic Slavery, those works were not enough. Recent studies published after 2000's, are mostly based on archive records and illustrate the common people under institution of slavery. From customs records to court papers, from *muqaata* (royal revenue parcels distributed generally per year) records to salary accounts, many different documents contain information about the use of slaves in the Ottoman society.¹⁶

İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı's *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatından Kapıkulu Ocakları*¹⁷ may be regarded as a study that focuses on the status of these people. This study examines *devşirme* together with slavery and provides information about slave labor from all around the empire. However, the state slaves appear in Uzunçarşılı's work, in the form of an encyclopedic entry as a part of the Empire's workforce. The 1970s witnessed the rise of

¹⁶ Nida Nebahat Nalçacı, *Sultanın Kulları: Erken Modern Dönem İstanbul'unda Savaş Esirleri ve Zorunlu İstihdam* (İstanbul: Verita Kitap, 2015); Yağcı, Zübeyde Güneş. 'Slave Traders (Esirciler) in the Ottoman İstanbul, *Slaves and Slave Agency in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Stephan Conermann and Gül Şen. (Göttingen: V&R Unipress & Bonn University Press, 2020), 321-352; Hayri Gökşin Özkoray, *L'esclavage dans l'Empire ottoman, (XVIe-XVIIe s.)* (Unpublished doctoral thesis, l'École Pratique des Hautes Études, 2017); Fatma Sel Turhan, *18. Yüzyıl Osmanlı'da Savaş Esirleri* (İstanbul: Vadi, 2018).

¹⁷ İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatından Kapıkulu Ocakları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988).

an interest in the “history of labor” among the historians around the globe. Equally, slavery studies attracted the interest of historians of the Ottoman Empire.

From 1970s on, studies that pointed out to the existence of *mirî* slaves (state-slaves) in the Ottoman Empire started to appear, but they were still scarce. Though all of these works have been reviewed in this study, the ones that do not directly mention the state slavery are omitted. Most of these studies which have been consulted in this study, regarded state slaves as an element of an economic institution. State slaves are examined in the context of labor force in the textile industry, agriculture or shipbuilding where official documents provide massive amount of details regarding this essential labor force. In his 1956 paper, Ömer Lütfi Barkan have tried to analyze the employment of state slaves in agriculture by questioning whether serfdom existed in Turkey or not. Almost twenty years later, the first illustrative study that focuses on state slavery had been completed by Halil İncalcık in 1979. In this article, entitled “Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire”, İncalcık analyses the institution of slavery as a whole without making any distinction between the state slaves and household slaves, neither he discusses their fields of employment. Following the publication of this article, the subject of slavery in the Ottoman Empire slowly started to gain attention of historians in Turkey. Published a few years prior to İncalcık’s study, Halil Sahillioğlu, while he surveyed in his article the slaves in textile works in the late fifteenth century Bursa, discussed the role of slavery, just like Barkan, in a single commercial field: textile industry.¹⁸

¹⁸ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “XVII-XVIII Asırlarda Türkiye’de İnşaat İşçilerinin Hukuki Durumu”, *Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları Dergisi* 14 (1963), 21-36; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Türkiye’de Servaj Var mıydı?” *Bellekten*, v. XX, 78 (Ankara: 1956) 237–246; Halil İncalcık, “Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire”, *The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds: The East European Pattern*, ed. by Abraham Ascher, Tibor Halasi-Kun, and Béla K. Király. (New York: Columbia University Press: 1979), 25-43; Halil

Historians of the previous generation of the Ottoman Empire in the western hemisphere, on the other hand, have examined the sultan's slaves differently. Unlike Turkish historians, these scholars are interested in slavery as a system that prevents emergence of aristocracy in the Ottoman Empire. This, of course, is a justified interest. Despite being members of the state elite, the slave-origin Ottoman bureaucrats were not aristocrats and this caused an unusual appearance when compared to the European states governed by the established aristocracies. The astonishment caused by this fact can even be traced in contemporary documents. For instance, when a Venetian *bailo* who was a member of a patrician family arrived in the Ottoman capital, he had to discuss state matters with an Ottoman pasha who was born into a peasant family in one of Venice's dominions. For the western diplomat, this was somewhat insulting. For the West, slavery was also a consequence of sultan's reign in his realm, with the unlimited power of an oriental despot. The Western tradition, when it started to define the government forms in the East, especially after the writings of Machiavelli, as "oriental despotism", is unable to comprehend Ottoman slavery without the influence of the sultan's power. Moreover, in modern historiography, just like the far-sightedness of Turkish historians, Western historians regard Ottoman slavery as a success story.¹⁹

Over the centuries, as the Western democracy transforms, this system preventing the emergence of an aristocratic class has been tried to describe with an exotic

Sahillioğlu, "Slaves in the Social and Economic Life of Bursa in the late 15th and early 16th Centuries", *Turcica*, XVII (1985), 43-112.

¹⁹ Further discussion on the Oriental Despotism, see, Lucette Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot Venice and the Sublime Porte* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993); Michael Curtis, *Orientalism and Islam European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Gülay Yılmaz, "Osmanlı Yönetiminin Oryantalist İnşası (The Orientalist Construction of the Ottoman Governance)", *Studies of Ottoman Domain*, v.4 nr:7 (2014), 54-81.

interpretation. Through the works of contemporary chroniclers and modern historians who focus on the all-powerful state structure, Western scholars once again discovered that the empire, which was deemed as the gate to the Exotic East, had not have a system as their own empires did. The term, oriental despotism was a product of this astonishment and an extreme socio-political and intellectual effort to comprehend this alien system. A bureaucracy without aristocracy could only be the system of an imperial realm, reigned by a self-styled ruler.

Thankfully, there are now more historical studies that approach the issue exactly as it is. New studies raise questions from a much more nuanced historical approach. Research is being conducted without showing reflexes of glorification, astonishment or vilification. This process is so past due that current studies are still busy with defining Ottoman slavery. We still lack sufficient amount of studies on the Ottoman slavery in order to have a platform for discussion. What kind of a system was it? How was it organized? How was the supply chain maintained? What was the social and legal status of the slaves? Such questions were recently inquired by the historians who aimed to understand the past as it had occurred.

Although there are numerous studies discussed slavery in a global scale²⁰, only a handful of them include discussions on slavery in the Ottoman Empire. As Kostas Vlassopoulos rightfully puts, it is need to be populate our comparative imagination with examples from the global phenomenon of slavery; but it also means that the history of

²⁰ John Millar, *The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks* (London: Murray, 1778); Herman J. Nieboer, *Slavery as an Industrial System: Ethnological Researches* (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1900); Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Claude Meillassoux, *The Anthropology of Slavery: The Womb of Iron and Gold*, (London: Athlone, 1991); Alain Testart, *La servitude volontaire I-II*, (Paris: Errance, 2004).

slavery needs to be incorporated within wider narratives of global history.²¹ But even Vlassopoulos includes Ottoman historiography in a broad discussion on Islamic world. This, in fact, is a consequence. Vlassopoulos claims that in the last decade, the landscape of slavery studies has changed radically but the studies about Ottoman aspect took off much later. Since most of those studies are published in Turkish, they are barely mentioned in global discussions.

1.2 The Aim of the Thesis

This study is an effort to contribute to the subject of war captives by a historian who wants to act upon these questions. Although this study is the first of its kind and may presumably have some certain shortcomings, of course, it may offer some answers to questions about war captives since there is virtually nothing written before about the subject matter. When war captives are viewed from an aspect which is the exact opposite of the aspect mentioned above, the archives provide an extremely valuable insight. The archive documents provided in the appendix are those kinds of documents that are rarely used, and I humbly believe that it is worthwhile to introduce them with the reader in this study. Their archive document codes would offer guidance to researchers who are willing to conduct research about the subject.

This dissertation covers an episode of the history of slavery. It may also be interpreted as a chapter of the history of the Mediterranean, explained through the

²¹ Kostas Vlassopoulos, "Does Slavery Have a History? The Consequences of a Global Approach", *Journal of Global Slavery*, 1 (2016), 5-27.

institution of slavery. It was only natural that the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice were chosen as the subjects. For a long time, Eastern Mediterranean remained as a scene of Venice's economic activities and her intelligence operations, and some parts of the region were scene to Venice's political activities. In time, Eastern Mediterranean transformed gradually into a region that was under the total domination of the Ottomans; and this transformation had not been a pleasant one.

During this transformation, the conflicts between the two powers produced numerous documents. Compared to other European states that operated in the Mediterranean, Venice's "Eastern Policy" was much older and more consistent. Venice possessed privileges in Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean, and the Black Sea. The Republic's struggle to hold on to those privileges was the main reason why so many documents were produced in this period. Despite the existence of these documents, a comparative history of this period that focuses on the institution of slavery is not known - at least not known by myself- to be written yet.

This dissertation study has been based on the claim that ordinary people, who were the subjects of the Republic of Venice and who fell captive in the lengthy and exhaustive series of wars, gradually became one of the items on the agenda of politics and diplomacy whose subject and object had usually been the people from the nobility. This transformation observed in Ottoman-Venetian relations has been discussed in the first three chapters. In the first chapter, issues that can help us better understand the subject at hand, such as the Ottomans' slave-keeping tradition and how they treated the slaves, have been addressed. The second chapter focuses on the state of the slaves in the Venetian Republic's own society, the Republic's ties with the slave trade, and the social layers of

its free subjects. The third chapter examines the place of captivity in the interaction between these two states. The fourth chapter focuses on the War of Cyprus and the Battle of Lepanto period, the enslavement processes of the local people on the island, and liberation attempts from both sides during the war. The fifth chapter examines the situations of the captives on both sides and the liberation operations mediators. The last and sixth chapter summarizes the after-war era with its changes that affected the whole enslavement and liberation practices in the region for years besides the politics.

Through the use of her trade privileges, Venice tried her best to protect her subjects from being captured and enslaved by the Ottomans. While these efforts yielded no results at times because of the protracted wars, the Republic made an extraordinary effort to save and bring her subjects home compared to other states.

In such an ambiguous situation, one might think that nobody was enslaved. But primary documents show otherwise. On the Ottoman side, there was a vast cycle that constantly required manpower. *Devşirmes* aside, the Ottoman army recruited captives to fight the wars for geographical and political expansion of the empire. The army captured new people in these wars, trained them for a couple of years, and recruited them to fight in upcoming battles. Despite the Venetian officials' efforts, the Republic's subjects often found themselves in this cycle.

During the War of 1539-1540 and the War of Cyprus in 1570-1571, Venetian masses were sucked into this cycle. This dissertation aims to understand and explain the circulation of captured people before, during, and after the War of Cyprus; and the new elements born out of this circulation.

This dissertation, being a text on conceptual history, was not written as a product of the classic chronological historiography method. Furthermore, on many occasions, chronological sequences were left out of the text. Since the text is focused on the circumstances that the states were drawn into because of their subjects, and not the other way around, it was inevitable to divert from chronological order. But still, the human mind desires to follow a chronological order of events. This is why I tried to maintain chronological flow through the order of chapters. The linear historical narration of chronicles was utilized to remind and explain the events' timeline.

In short, this dissertation does not provide a detailed account of the War of Cyprus or a history of the Ottoman-Venetian relations of the period. This dissertation aims to explain why a war that affected the entire history of the Mediterranean and the military history was perceived as a breaking point; and how deeply this breaking point was affected by the issue of slavery.

It claims to explain how slaves and captives were in the center of the war and in the center of macro policies of states; and how the captured ordinary people can affect the policies and economies of states in the long term.

After the War of Cyprus, nothing remained the same in Venice or Europe. This was also the case with the Ottoman Empire. But this change has always been tried to be explained by the dynamics of higher politics. When this change is interpreted through slavery -especially through the captives of war-, it becomes apparent how slavery was a central element in higher politics and how lengthy imprisonments became one of the main leverages of states.

1.3 Sources

Ottoman Documents

Many documents in the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry's Office referred to war captives. The registrations of these captives who were brought to Istanbul so that they could be employed in various units of the state or raised according to their needs or qualifications were regularly kept. The countless war captives kept in the shipyard's dungeon and turned over to the shipyard attendant with the ship were listed in many books. In the directory, a publication of the General Directorate of State Archives, it was indicated that there were 1068 dungeon books kept between the years 1058-1217 / 1648-1802.⁷ These books, which were kept for different reasons and by adopting various methods, were among the different catalog classifications of the archive.

The documents regarding captives can be found in various catalogs of the archive. The only classification in which the dungeon books can be found together in the archival records is D. BŞM.TRZ list (*Bâb-ı Defter-i Başmuhasebe Kalemî*). In that list, 67 books from different categories were gathered together. Only three of these books were explanatory (*mübeyyin*) books in which the names and crimes of the criminals in the dungeon were registered. The other 64 books were accounting books in which the expenses of the dungeon's bakery were noted. However, while some of these books were kept for the captives and offenders in the dungeon, the others were kept for noting down

⁷ *Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Dokümantasyon Daire Başkanlığı Rehberi* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Dokümantasyon Daire Başkanlığı, 1996), 152.

the provisions expenses (*tayinat*) of the governors (*ümerâ*), captives (*üserâ*), porters, and other servants that worked in the navy galleys.

It is pretty difficult to ascertain the total number of captives by looking at the books in which only the bread expenses of captives and offenders were kept. However, in the books where the captives were registered together with the galley rowers, it is possible to calculate how many captives there were in a galley, based on the assumption that all of the people, excluding the attendants, were captives since the food items of the captives and the attendants were registered and calculated separately.

Esam-Eşgal Books for Captives

The captives brought to Istanbul were often turned over to the Shipyard Administration. The information on where the convoy came from and how many people there were in the convoy were registered in Esir Esam-Eşgal Books in the form of lists. The first examples of these lists that were able to survive until today usually included only the total number and the names of the captives. In time, the information about where the captives came from and their physical characteristics were also registered in addition to their names. In this way, each captive took up a larger space in the document. How these captives, who were turned over to Imperial Naval Shipyard, would be employed as mariners, seamstresses, carpenters, rope makers, etc., were subsequently ascertained. This information was noted on the document with a single word where their names and appearances were registered.

It can be discerned from the correspondences in the archives that the administrative center asked the administrators to keep these books regularly. One can also see that a copy

of each submitted captive dispatch note had to be sent to the shipyard administrator and another copy to the chief accounting office (*başmuhasebelik*). If the captives were brought to Istanbul during an expedition, the certificate of this delivery was required to be consigned to the army.⁸

Captive Mevacib-Tayinat Books

Lists were kept to write down the daily alimony and the food items consumed by the captives that were kept together during the day so that they would work along with the amount of money required for covering these expenses. These books usually contained the expenses to be made for three months, and the captives were listed with all the other shipyard workers. Some of these books were kept for the crew working in the galleys. In addition to other workers' information, the types of food, the daily food requirement, and the basis weight of food items reserved for the captive rowers can also be observed from these books. Since the quality of food items varied in accordance with the job definition and status of the crew members, which was reflected in these lists, these books also make it possible to know the number of captives working on each ship simply because the distributed food was calculated per person.

The most regularly kept books after *Mevacib* were the expense books of the bread baked daily for the captives in the dungeon's bakery. The number of total captives employed in state industries, especially in the shipyard dungeon, can be accurately predicted from the weight of the wheat consumed for the captives in the bakery for the recorded months. Even though the bakeries in Istanbul previously supplied the bread for

⁸ BOA.MAD., 10007 (02 Muharram 1186 / 13 April 1772).

some time, the bread that the captives would subsequently consume was always baked in the dungeon bakery.

Arıza, Hüccet, Firman, and other similar books

There are many provisions, *arz*, *hüccet*, rescripts (*hatt-ı hümayun*), certificates (*berât*), *buyuruldu*, *telhis*, and *tezkiye* found in the internal correspondences in the Ottoman Archive of the Prime Ministry's Office that mentioned captives. The required *hüccet* documents indicated the legal status of the captives that were sent to the slave ship, stated that a captive died a natural death or certified those captives that were called *kacgun* (runaway) who lacked an owner and would be purchased by the state.⁹ Those documents also testified that the captives were treated lawfully. The *telhis* documents that were written to supply a sufficient number of captives who would be employed in required positions¹⁰ are another source. *Arz* documents indicate the condition of the captives or any other issue regarding the captives to be brought to Istanbul from various places of the Empire. The Firmans documents written by the Sultan concerning captives and the *buyuruldu* of the grand viziers are the documents that help one describe the characteristics of the captives of war employed in different lines of work.

It must be pointed out that dates on some Ottoman documents might be misleading. In some archival classifications, the date that appears in the catalogue and on the document may not be the same. This problem is apparent, especially in the petition documents of Topkapı Palace dated early 1400s and 1500s. For example, records dated 905, 918, 974,

⁹ Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *Tarih Araştırmalarında Usul* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2011), 350.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 206.

1008, and 1255 according to the Hijri Calendar in the Topkapı Palace documents generally do not correspond to the actual dates.²²

Qadi registers

By looking at the qadi registers, it is possible to obtain information with regard to many aspects of industrial slavery in the Ottoman Empire, the implementation of religious (*şer-i*) rules, and slaves and their masters. These registers also provide information on how the slaves that belonged to the state/Sultan were treated.¹¹ The name, sex, professional status, salary, origin, and work conditions of a slave could be learned in this way. Since these registers also included descriptions of the slaves' physical properties, we can even visualize how those slaves looked like. It is possible to make predictions concerning the slave population in a particular city, the proportion of this population to the population of free individuals and the population of slave owners, and the proportion of the slaves in terms of value in a deceased person's inheritance list. There are many cases regarding certain irregularities, such as the disagreements between the master and his slave, the escape of the slave, and the enslavement of a free individual.¹²

Mühimme Books

Another source in this regard is *Mühimme* books. These imperial court registries in which important political, military, social and economic decisions regarding the internal and external issues negotiated at the Imperial Court in the Ottoman Empire were registered included provisions concerning the captives of war in the capital and other cities. The form

²² I sincerely thank to Göksel Baş who helped me to notice this misdating of the Topkapı Palace records.

¹¹ Seng, "Fugitives and Factotums", 136-169.

¹² Y. Hakan Erdem, *Osmanlıda Köleliğin Sonu 1800-1909* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004), 31.

of the orders in these records always summarizes the situations which were discussed in the court briefly. We cannot find the direct voice of the owner of the petition, report or dispatch sent to the court.

Regarding the orders related to a campaign, the volumes of these records dived into the two types. The first one is the orders given and recorded in the ongoing Imperial court in the capital. The second one was the war court, which discussed and recorded every decision taken during the campaign.²³ A copy of the orders should frequently be sent to the Capital as far as we understand from the orders shipped from the Capital to the battlefield in two or three weeks.

Memoirs/Travel Books

Travel books, reports of embassies, or memoirs are among the sources that provide information about the captives living in Istanbul. The captives, the shipyard dungeon where the captives were held, and many other issues concerning the captives intrigued the visitors. Nearly all the captivity accounts that survived until today were written by European visitors or officers. Among these people who came to the city for various reasons, there were also captives that were brought to the city after the wars or pirating activities, and these were the people who conveyed the daily lives of the captives in the city with the most detail. Some of them began telling their stories from the very beginning of their journey, while the others told their stories starting with the first day they spent in the city. Even though these captives stayed in the town for a long time, they were able to

²³ For further information on the Mühimme records see. Emel Soyer, *XVII. yy. Osmanlı Divan Bürokrasisi'ndeki Değişimlerin Bir Örneği Olarak Mühimme Defterleri*, (Unpublished master thesis, İstanbul University, İstanbul, 2007).

write their memoirs only after they returned to their countries since they didn't have the opportunities that the other visitors had.¹⁵

Venetian Documents

Dispacci Constantinopoli is a collection of dispatches sent to Venice by the Venetian bailo in İstanbul. The correspondence appears to have become less frequent in wartime due to the difficulty of letters being delivered to Venice. *Deliberazioni Constantinopoli* is the collection of senate decrees that concern the Ottoman Empire. Those decrees were issued according to the intelligence reports received from the bailo in İstanbul and from other representatives of the Republic in different parts of the Mediterranean. *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori* is the collection of reports that were read in the senate by the ambassadors who concluded their tours of duty. This dissertation mainly used secondary works based on these collections.

Documenti Turchi is a collection of records in the *Archivio di Stato di Venezia*, which consists of documents sent by the Ottoman Empire to Venice. *Ospedali e Luoghi Pii e al Riscatto degli Schiavi*, a central institution responsible for liberating captives, contains various records, including documents about charity collected for captives and letters from captives that convey ransom demands.

Consiglio dei Dieci Dispacci Constantinopoli is a collection of intelligence reports and letters sent from İstanbul. Most of the reports are encrypted. The decrypts of those

¹⁵ For further information see, Linda Colley, Perceiving Low Literature: The Captivity Narrative, *Essays in Criticism*, July 2003, Vol. 53 Issue 3, 199-218; Nida N. Nalçacı, "İstanbul'un Tarihsel Kaynakları Olarak Seyahatnameler", *TALİD*, İstanbul Tarihi Sayısı, 16 (Güz 2010), 523-562.

reports are also included in this collection, as it's also the case in other collections that include encrypted correspondence. There are two copies of some pieces. The bailo sometimes sent two or three copies to ensure that at least one had reached its destination. Also, in wartime, since all letters were subjected to the inspection of the consul, it would be expected that at least one copy had reached the intended institution of the state. Some letters which were not delivered to maintain secrecy are also kept in this collection.



CHAPTER II: OTTOMANS

“The third is Musii Hrach, the military trumpeter,
The fourth is Liakh Buturlak, the galley’s keeper of the keys.
He had been a lieutenant in Pereiaslav
And now he was a traitor to Christendom.
He had been in captivity for thirty years,
And it had been twenty-four years since he had been freed.
He had become Turkified and Islamicized
For the sake of great wealth,
For the sake of miserable luxury.”²⁴

Slavery was among the primeval institutions and widespread in Mediterranean societies. Slave trade had always been a kind of cornerstone of Mediterranean economy up until the 20th century. Ottoman Empire kept slaves like other countries in the region and Istanbul was a city that harbored captured people since the Byzantine Empire. After the Turks started to rule the city, slave population of the city continued as it used to be. Besides the slaves used for domestic service, slavery for public service was also a significant part of social structure of the society. Captives, the mandatory visitors of the Empire, could find representation only in the narratives of former captives and in brief passages of the travel narratives of foreign visitors to Ottoman Empire. Ottoman Archives,

²⁴ From the Ukrainian epic poem (duma) on Kishko Samiilo, a Bratislavian nobleman, a famous Cossack leader who was captured by Ottoman forces in 1573. After spending 26 years in captivity, he escaped in 1599. See. Natalie Kononenko, *Ukrainian Epic and Historical Song: Folklore in Context* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 2019), 96.

on the other hand, hold numerous documents about those people. These documents, which include names, descriptions and salaries, reveal a lot about both the presence of captives in Ottoman Istanbul and the prisoner employment practices in the Ottoman Empire. Captive memoirs and the authority records reveal not only presence and employment of the captives but also the Ottoman Diplomatic perspective and attitude regarding the European captives and slaves and the conditions for their freedom.

Building up on the existing literature and fueled with the new rising interest, this chapter focuses on the Ottomans as a *society-with-slaves* on which no comprehensive study is made, but some studies made a note of them. Captivity is generally regarded as a part of “Slavery in the Ottoman Empire”. Apart from domestic slavery there is rare separate study either on the captivity process or the diplomacy on captivity. Captivity was the first step before to continue to live as a state-owned *mirî* slave or domestic slave, the time of their presence inside the borders of the Empire, their social conditions or their legal status were related numerous variable factors of the Empire. The individuals had always been present in the colossal structure of Ottoman slavery, but from the shipbuilders to the oarsmen, the stories of insignificant figures were not so much intriguing. Despite their staggering numbers, the slaves were invisible like ants who were living in an enormous web of underground tunnels with only a small entry hole visible above the ground. What went on above the ground was almost completely irrelevant to their experience underground and this experience was not that desirable when compared to the lives of those above the ground.

As stated above, Ottoman Archives hold numerous documents about the state slaves who were the mandatory visitors in Ottoman lands, especially in Istanbul. While

they could find representation only in the narratives of former captives and in the brief passages of the travel narratives of foreign visitors to Ottoman lands, these documents, which include mostly the names, descriptions, salaries etc. These records reveal a lot, about not only the presence and quantity of the captives, but also the captive employment practices in the Ottoman lands. Captive records and official records, as muniments of historical knowledge about the presence and employment of the captives, reveal the Ottoman Diplomatic perspective and attitude over the issue and gives the opportunity to compare them with the policies and practices in terms of state slavery and the conditions of their freedom in other lands such as Europe, Russia, Persia, etc.²⁵

Losing all of one's personal rights and being held captive after being captured by the enemy during the war or running into a slave in the street might seem a little 'imaginary' today, but it was a common occurrence in the past. Certain people were reduced to the status of slaves all across the world in nearly every society due to various reasons and other people would capitalize on the labor of these people. Moreover, states would utilize this labor for those needs that arose out of their internal structure.

Enslavement of people by other people was a universal phenomenon. This was neither specific to any single culture nor stemmed from a certain system of shared social values. Human enslavement has existed in almost every society throughout history by assuming different manifestations. Since the Old Testament, all the monotheistic religions

²⁵ For a further discussion on the employment of the captives of war as state slaves in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire see: Nida Nebahat Nalçacı, *Sultanın Kulları: Erken Modern Dönem İstanbul'unda Savaş Esirleri ve Zorunlu İstihdam*, (İstanbul, Verita Kitap: 2015); Nida Nebahat Nalçacı, "Inherited institution: Ottoman State Slavery and War captives in the Early Modern Era", *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, Volume 64, Issue 2, (December 2021), 39–50.

have embraced slavery and yet tried to soften its harsh realities.²⁶ Working as an obligation and the wish to be freed of this obligation have acquired a distinctive quality in the modern world depending on technology; however, this wish manifested itself differently in different periods of history. Slavery goes hand in hand with the concept of working, which can be concisely described as ‘laboring to form or create something.’ This wish to save oneself from the obligation to work and the tendency of those people who have sufficient resources at their disposal to use others’ labor since the time immemorial led the concept of enslavement to develop and become widespread.²⁷

Wars were the most productive source for the supply of slaves throughout history. Since the people who were taken captive during the war provided an advantage to the parties in question, the legitimacy of the concept of slavery was not problematized much. The emancipation of a slave required that another slave be employed in his place and thereby did not help in bringing down the system of slavery at all.

These people whose capture was deemed legitimate due to the fact that they were ‘others’ were also employed as ‘others’ in the enemy state. Since holding slaves/enslavement was a tradition in almost every society, there was a consensus among the high-ranking officials. Each administration would meet its cheap labor needs from the ‘other’ societies that were the closest. The prisoners of war became the first solution to provide labor force for the rulers who monopolized the biggest industries in their countries. Unlike the slaves who would be passed down to their owners from the market after their

²⁶ Toledano, *As if Silent and Absent*, 1.

²⁷ Many intellectuals have produced works on human life and the obligation to work. For one of these discussions see Hannah Arendt, “Viva Activa”, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 7-39.

taxes were paid off, the slaves of the rulers never had the same legal status as the other slaves. However, they were not considered prisoners of war either. On the other hand, these people who were somewhere along these two statuses constituted a group of people that could be easily tracked thanks to the records.²⁸

The practice of holding captives existed in quite different communities, at least at some point in their historical development. Holding slaves as state property and forcefully employing them in different state bodies was a common tradition/practice in the Mediterranean basin. The reasons as to why states and dynasties employed slaves were similar. This practice called ‘Public Slavery’ by Salvatore Bono was a method that was sooner or later resorted to by the states on the Mediterranean coast, which had intense interactions with one another.²⁹ In addition, similar practices were implemented so as meet the housing and feeding needs of these state slaves.

This chapter aims to provide a better understanding regarding the implementation of state slavery, a subgroup of slavery that was not included within the employment schema of modern economy as a labor category, in the Ottoman State and in the capital of the state. With the help of sources, this chapter also attempts to depict the circumstances in which the state sustained the tradition of holding slaves and the order it established within its internal organization so as to ensure the continuity of this system.

This chapter focuses on 16th century when the open sea wars were at their highest number and the following two centuries in an attempt to investigate the state captive

²⁸ Will Smiley, *From Slaves to Prisoners of War: The Ottoman Empire, Russia, and International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 36, 37.

²⁹ Salvatore Bono, *Yeniçağ İtalya'sında Müslüman Köleler*, trans. by Betül Parlak (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 26.

employment in the Ottoman state industry. During this time period, the use of sailing vessels in addition to galleys became widespread in the Ottoman Navy. In this way, the number of required captives did not drop considerably while the nature of the job that required employment changed to some extent. Besides, the world was then faced with the phenomenon that was called Atlantic slavery during that period.³⁰ While a heavy slave trade logistics was established among Africa, Europe, and America on the Atlantic coast, the supply of slaves in the coastal waters of the Ottoman State, right next to this region, continued to be implemented in its own unique way. The indifference of the Ottoman State to the need for plantation slaves, the triggering element of the Atlantic slavery, might have caused this isolation, at least during the earlier periods.³¹

While all of these developments took place and the parameters of holding slaves changed completely across the world, the Ottoman Empire, the sovereign power in the east of Mediterranean region, was not affected much by these changes. Here, the practice of holding slaves took shape in line with the needs of the Empire.³² Even though the Atlantic slavery enslaved a lot of people and employed them in agricultural activities, the Ottoman State whose main source of revenues was agricultural related taxes did not choose this practice. The indifference and the evident isolation that are at hand here require a comprehensive research and they will thereby remain as comments with question

³⁰ John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400- 1800* (Cambridge: New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13-43.

³¹ Charles Verlinden discussed that the enslavement of the people for the agricultural activities in Venetian Crete, Genoese Chios, and Cyprus served as a model for Atlantic colonial slavery in the pre-Ottoman period. See. Charles Verlinden, *The Beginnings of Modern Colonization* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 31.

³² Actually, slavery was characterized by a widening gap between legal norms and social practice. Keeping slaves in the Islamic World also developed a great deal and its initial form in many aspects. This development took place against the background of Islam adopting slavery as an existing institution and initial elementary regulations on enslaving during the period of the Prophet. For further information on discussion see. Franz, "Slavery in Islam", 51-141.

marks in this study. In addition to the comments stating that the agricultural slavery was not preferred due to its high cost, it could also be assumed that one of the reasons was the wish to protect the state's *timar* / manorial system.³³

During the second Ottoman-Mamluk war (1516–1517), the Ottoman State halted the supply of slaves through its lands by seizing the slaves in the Caffa-Crimea region and this put the Mamluk state and its army into a very difficult position.³⁴ The fact that the Ottoman State, which was engaged in slave trade to such an extent that the number of these slaves was sufficient to employ an army, did not acquire slaves to utilize in agricultural activities or found the cost of employing slaves high is an issue that deserves to be further discussed. It is known that in addition to this system that slackened in the beginning of 17th century, there were slaves working in the large farms of state officials as '*kapı halkı*.' The demand of manpower that increased with the introduction of the manorial system was probably fulfilled by this system of employing '*kapı halkı*' which was similar to plantation slavery. However, since this dissertation is restricted to the practices of 16th century and generally based on War of Cyprus and Lepanto, these issues will stay as questions that beg for answers.

³³ Though holding slaves (they were generally called *ghulam*) by *timar* holders was known by modern historians, the *timaroits* used those *ghulams* as domestic servants instead of plantation slaves. See. Gèza David and Pál Fodor, "Changes in the Structure and Strength of the Timariot Army from the Early Sixteenth to the End of the Seventeenth Century", *Eurasian Studies*, IV/2 (2005), 157-188; The anonymous *relazione* dated in 1554 records that Eugenio Alberi, *Le relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato durante il secolo decimosesto*, serie III, (Florence: Soc. ed. Fiorentina, 1840), v. I, 255.

³⁴ Shai Har-El, *Struggle for Domination in the Middle East: The Ottoman-Mamluk War: 1485-91* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 213.

The employment of prisoners of war by the states and dynasties lasted for a long time in the Mediterranean world in compliance with the needs of the involved parties.³⁵ Reaching to the sea, Turks picked up this 'established' system quickly and integrated their organizational structure into this system. Slavery, which was abolished in Northern Europe and France in 16th century, continued quite vividly in the form of domestic slavery in Eastern and Western Mediterranean, Italy, and Spain. Thanks to various sources, one can learn that slavery was widespread in certain countries and that it was common to encounter enslaved people in daily life. On the basis of different documents, Fernand Braudel states that domestic slavery continued in different places of the Mediterranean, especially in Southern Italy. Braudel also records that the notary registers in Naples and Venice notified the sale of slaves and that the *portate* registers in Livorno sometimes reported the arrival of a few black slaves.³⁶

The mobility of the slave trade in eastern Mediterranean can be followed from the registers of the slave markets. Until the Ottomans set foot in Rumelia, the dominant slave market of eastern Mediterranean region was the Island of Crete, which was then controlled by Venice. The captives would come to this market from Greece or Aegean islands, which was then under the thumb of other Latin city-states, and from there they were subsequently transferred to the captive markets in Italy. When Ottomans came to Rumelia, the supply source for this market dried up and consequently, the market was closed in the 16th

³⁵ For an article addressing the slavery system of the Muslim states in the Mediterranean in 8th and 9th centuries, see Dmitrij Mishin, 'The Saqaliba slaves in the Aghlabid state, *Annual of medieval studies at the CEU* (1996/1997), 236-244.

³⁶ Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, v. 1, 146.

century.³⁷ As the Rumelia lands came under Ottoman domination, the importance of the captives coming from the Balkans after the raids in the slave markets also increased. In the beginning of 1380s, Latin merchants purchased many Bulgarian slaves from Ottomans and then sold them in Heraklion.³⁸

Another region that fulfilled the Europeans' need for slaves was the Black Sea region. The greatest client of this trade that took place under the control of the Genoese city-state in the region was the Mamluk State in Egypt. The presence of the Ottoman State both in the Mediterranean and Aegean and also in Black Sea region changed this traffic completely. In time, the slave flow to Italy from Balkans, Dubrovnik, and Black Sea came to a stop, and the traffic from Black Sea to Egypt came under the control of the Ottoman State.³⁹ Having lost their supply sources in Black Sea and Balkans, the Latin states headed towards North Africa for the supply of slaves.

It is quite difficult to ascertain the number of people who were captured and enslaved

so that they could be employed in households and in the internal organizations of the states in the Mediterranean region. However, some researchers referred to this in their studies by means of their sources. For example, Salvatore Bono estimates that enslaved people from both sides were from 4,5 to 9 million 1450-1850 period. Robert Davis also states that approximately 1,5 million Christians were enslaved between 1530-1780 in the

³⁷ Verlinden, *The Beginnings*, 31; Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2000), 320; Sally McKee, "Inherited Status and Slavery in Late Medieval Italy and Venetian Crete", *Past and Present* 182/1 (2004), 31-53.

³⁸ Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 41.

³⁹ İnalçık, "Servile Labor", 35.

Barbary coasts.⁴⁰ Even though we may think that these numbers are a little exaggerated, once can still discern that slavery with more than one million people involved had an important place in the Mediterranean world.

2.1 State Slaves

According to Islamic Martial Law, one-fifth of the war loot belongs to the state treasury, therefore to the Sultan as an unquestionable owner of the treasury.⁴¹ Among those loots, captives of war were one of the most precious goods for the state that deployed navies and armies along vast imperial frontiers and the Ottomans were quite successful in merging the Islamic Law and secular law when the situation demanded. In the early period of the Ottoman Empire, it was not a usual practice to employ the male captives in different positions of the state other than the military. This practice had changed in time and captives that were supplied from different regions were employed in various state-owned facilities in various duties. The main reason for this change of practice was not only the need for human sources but also the expansion in the variation of the state facilities in parallel to the changes in the nature of the state. The Ottoman Empire successfully adapted

⁴⁰ Salvatore Bono, *La Schiavitù nel Mediterraneo Moderno Storia di Una Storia, L'esclavage en Méditerranée à L'époque Moderne*, 65, (2002), 1-16; Robert C. Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500–1800* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 23.

⁴¹ Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1955), 118-133; Muhammad Munir, "Debates on the Rights of Prisoners of War in Islamic Law", *Islamic Studies*, v. 49, No. 4 (Winter 2010), 465; Kadı Ebu Yusuf, *Kitabü'l-Haraç* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi, 1970), 47-54.

itself to the changing circumstances of different institutions and slavery was among them. State slavery became a usual practice in all the components of the state.⁴²

Slave provision was a system, which the Ottoman Empire insisted on and therefore, constructed a logistic and financial network to sustain it. Slaves that were required as man power and that were convenient to work⁴³, were brought continuously by land or sea, from North, South, West, or even from the East.⁴⁴ Istanbul, the capital and the most populated city of the Ottoman Empire, was also the city that inhabited most of the slave population, as it was the center of state-owned industry (arsenal, armory).⁴⁵ The main groups of slave population in the empire were household slaves and state slaves. Under the rule of the Ottomans, the slaves reserved as the Sultan's share were kept under the control of the state upon their arrival in the city.

One of the responsibilities of the government's governors, commanders, captains etc. was to send Sultan's share of the slaves to the capital city. Even the grand vizier, who held the highest rank in the governmental order, had the responsibility to record and send

⁴² Viorel Panaite, *Ottoman Law of War and Peace. The Ottoman Empire and Its Tribute-Payers from the North of the Danube* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 63; Colin Imber, "The Ottoman Dynastic Myth", *Studies in Ottoman History and Law* (New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2010), 305-322; Ebül' ulâ Mardin, "Development of the Shari'a Under the Ottoman Empire", *Law in The Middle East VOL. I: Origin and Development of Islamic Law*, ed. by Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny. (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1955), 279-291.

⁴³ BOA., MAD.d., 10159 (3 Rajab.1130 / 2 July 1718).

⁴⁴ Baron Wratislaw, *Anılar*, "16. Yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Çizgiler", trans. by, M. Süreyya Dilmen. (İstanbul, 1981), 80; BOA., TS.MA.e., 753 / 66 (29 Jumada al-thani 892 / 22 June 1487); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 5 / 1596 (27 Zulquadah 973 / 15 June 1566); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 58 / 78 (19 Rabi' al-thahi 993 / 20 April 1585); BOA., D.BŞM.d., 40880 (18 Ramadan 1108 /10 April 1697); BOA., İE.ML., 36.3536 (03 Rabi' al-awwal 1104 / 12 November 1692); BOA., D.BŞM.d.,1291; BOA., D.BŞM.d.,1990; BOA., İE.ML.,13.1217 (29 Zuhijjah 1098 / 5 November 1687).

⁴⁵ Robert Mantran, *XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyılda İstanbul'da Gündelik Hayat* (İstanbul: Eren, 1999), 120-121; BOA., MAD., 10056 (21 Muharram 1128-3 Rajab 1130 / 16 January 1716 - 2 June 1718).

captives⁴⁶ to the capital city.⁴⁷ In theory, the governors that were attached to the Ottoman Sultan had to send the captives that they captured to Istanbul, while in practice he administrative center frequently reminded the administrators of this obligation on a number of occasions. For this reason, the captives who were continuously sent to Istanbul were handed over to the shipyard administrator and their official reports were, in a sense, kept. However, the administrators in the provinces would not send all of the captives to Istanbul even though it was forbidden to do so.⁴⁸ In his memoirs, Heberer states that his boss, the banner/sanjak lord would reserve the young and healthy captives for himself while handing over the old and weak ones to the Rhodes galleys, which were then on the port, belonging to the Turkish ruler. Heberer records that half of these captives were duly to be sent to the Turkish ruler while the other half was to be sent to the Alexandria Governor, who ruled the country.⁴⁹

Although the slave population was quite dynamic in the Ottoman Empire, both the qualitative and quantitative features of slavery in the imperial domain are predictable, thanks to various sources. The most regular information sources are undoubtedly the reports of Venetian ambassadors. Halil İnalçık estimates through these reports that the

⁴⁶ The captives brought from the frontiers or battlefields were often used for intelligence. By making these prisoners talk, the aim was to obtain information about the enemy's situation. That's why captives were called "*dil*" (tongue). The concept frequently appears in the documents as "*dil almak*" and "*dil tutmak*" instead of captive or enemy. See. S. Takats, *Macaristan Türk Aleminde Çizgiler*, trans. by Sadrettin Karatay (İstanbul: M.E.B. Yayınları, 1992), 131, 166, 173, 184, 187; BOA., TS.MA.e., 731 / 19 (29 Zuhijjah 915 / 9 April 1510); For early samples in documents see BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 1, orders dated between Ramadan 961 and Safar 962 / between July 1554 and January 1555); *12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri* (12th Imperial Court Record, dated 973 /1565-1566) (Ankara: BOA: 1996), p. 289, nr. 362.

⁴⁷ BOA. MAD.3279. 102-104 (29 Zuhijjah 1074 /23 July 1664) – O offer my belated thanks to Özgür Kolçak who informed me about this document and shared generously with me- ; BOA., MAD., 10007 (02 Muharram 1186 / 5 April 1772) dated invoice.

⁴⁸ Géza Pálffy, "Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman–Hungarian Frontier in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", *Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders: (Early Fifteenth, Early Eighteenth Centuries)*, ed. by. Geza David, Pál Fodor (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 35-84.

⁴⁹ Michael Heberer von Bretten, *Osmanlı'da Bir Köle: Brettenli Michael Heberer'in Anıları 1585 – 1588*, trans. by Türkis Noyan (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2003), 136.

total number of people who were previously or still slaves, war captives, and spoils in Istanbul was 60.000 in 1568, 100.000 in 1609, and these figures were equivalent to the one-fiftieth of the total population of the city. The total population of the captives of war was by far beneath this number.⁵⁰

Apart from slaves brought to the bazaar for the households and slaves brought to the palace, the fact that the female slaves were not sent by the administrators as state slaves (*mirî üsera*) apart from the expeditions was a method preferred by the center rather than being their own decision. In the early modern Ottoman world, the most important property of a captive to be employed was his/her 'usefulness.' Many lines of work in the state organizations where there was a need for labor were not suitable for women and children. Therefore, the most suitable people were preferred for employment since the supply and transfer of these captives were quite grueling.⁵¹ One can understand that this decision was consciously taken upon seeing that the majority of the registered captives were male in dozens of lists and that these male individuals were generally suitable for the line of work in question. Those male slaves were generally young age since soldiers generally had to be killed during the battle.

So much that, the slaves bought from slave bazaars would meet state slave power gap in a state enterprise.⁵² Rinaldo Marmara narrates in four texts recording that captive number in 1583 was 4.000, in 1592 was 2.000-4.000, in 1664 was 2.000 and in 1695 was

⁵⁰ İnalçik, "Servile Labor", 40.

⁵¹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 258 (26 Safar 978 / 30 July 1570); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 10 / 339 (4 Ramadan 979 / 20 January 1572); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 28 / 449 (25 Rajab 984 / 27 September 1576); A.DVNS.MHM.d., 64 / 224 (29 Zulhijjah 996 / 19 November 1588); BOA., MAD.d., 10159 (3 Rajab 1130 / 2 June 1718).

⁵² BOA., İE.BH., 5.405. f.2 (20 Shaban 1101 / 29 May 1690).

3.000. Most of these people being Sultan's slave, public officials also kept a great number of slaves. For instance, one of Süleyman I's viziers, İskender Çelebi reportedly had 6.000-7.000 slaves. Since there were no military expeditions in winter, it is related that approximately 2.000 Christian prisoners of every nationality were kept in *Tersane Zindanı*; 1.500 other captives were either on expedition on Rhodes galiots / *kadırgas* or carrying stone for construction works in Istanbul or kept in other dungeons of the city.⁵³

The arrival of the captives, who were transferred with ships, in the capital would last relatively longer, but they were generally transferred through a single journey. However, the forced journey of the captives that were brought to Istanbul after ground wars or raids was quite gruesome. The captives who were generally brought on foot were sometimes used as an element of propaganda in the regions that they passed. And sometimes if the number of the women and children were high, funds would be allocated for carriages/ox carts. This amount, which was called *baha-ı kây*, included the rent of the carriages, the daily alimonies of the captives, and the expenses of the sergeants that were in charge of looking after the captives.

The captives were sometimes brought to the capital on foot given that there were roads and when there were convoys including women and children, they were sometimes brought with carriages. The number of captives that were transferred would increase during great wars; however, their number wouldn't amount to thousands like it was told in various memoirs. S. Takas states that almost each captive consignment was mentioned

⁵³ Rinaldo Marmara, *İstanbul Deniz Zindanı: 1740* (İstanbul: Denizler Publication, 2005), 16, 18, 55; Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, 72; Özlem Kumrular, *Türk Korkusu: Avrupa'da Türk Düşmanlığının Kökeni* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008), 310.

in the official reports of the ambassadors in Istanbul and the recorded number was generally around 10-20-30.⁵⁴

Giovanni Maria Angiolello, who was taken captive with his brother during the reign of Mehmed II (1451-1481) and who was put to service in the palace, wrote what he lived through during the time he spent in the Ottoman palace after he returned to his country and he said that he came to Istanbul from Negroponte on foot. Baron Wrastislav, who worked for the embassy in the city in 1591, stated that the captive procession once came to the city with hundreds of carts/carriages in which there were hundreds of women, girls and boys.⁵⁵

Daily books were kept at the customs for the captives brought to Istanbul.⁵⁶ The names of the captives reaching to the customs each day and where they came from were recorded. In addition to these daily books, the receipts in which the expenses during the transfer were recorded provide information regarding the logistics of captives. The state would allot a certain budget from the treasury for these transfers. The daily alimonies of the captives, the cost of the rented ox carts, and the salaries (*mecavib*)⁵⁷ of the sergeants in charge of looking after the captives were calculated and recorded.

For example, in a document dated 29 Zulhijjah 1098/ November 5, 1687, it was recorded that 46 captive soldiers were brought to Istanbul from Belgrade through six

⁵⁴ Takats, *Macaristan*, 52.

⁵⁵ Baron Wratislaw, *Anılar*, 80.

⁵⁶ For examples see BOA., D.BŞM.d., 1291; BOA., D..BŞM.d., 1990.

⁵⁷ Mevacib: The salary given to the janissaries; it is a term used instead of allowance, 'Ulufe' was also used. Mevacib would be given every three months and these were called *masar*, *recec*, *lezez*, *resen*. The janissaries' mevacib was distributed from the kapikulu corps in Imperial Council while the other soldiers' mevacib was distributed from their own corps or from the Council of the Grand Vizier. See Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, "Mevacib", *Osmanlı Tarih Terimleri ve Deyimleri Sözlüğü* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1983), v. 2, 495.

transfers. Each time ten carriages were rented between Belgrade-Nis, Nis-Sofia, Sofia-Plovdiv, Plovdiv-Edirne, and Edirne-Istanbul. A total of 31,000 silver coins were paid for this transfer. The cost of the total transfer was 49,000 including the captives' alimonies, which amounted to 1610 silver coins, and 6000 silver coins for the traveling expenses of two soldiers.⁵⁸

Some expenses had to be made while transferring them to Istanbul from where they were kept. The most important of these expenses was their need for food. During these captives' journey, the state was responsible for supplying their food. For this end, a certain amount was determined as alimony and the soldier who oversaw the procession was held accountable for other expenses.⁵⁹ Apart from the expenses that concerned the captives' eating & drinking needs, accommodation, clothing, and transfer, shackles that were used to prevent the captives from escaping or for their transfer were procured separately from the blacksmiths and the expense receipt was handed on to the treasury.⁶⁰

The captive processions brought to the city were a usual scene in Istanbul's daily life. The most powerful evidences confirming the victory after the holy wars were those captives who were made to walk in the city and who were then presented to the Sultan. The captive processions were especially made to pass by the houses of the foreign ambassadors and delegates.⁶¹ Antonio Erizzo, who was a bailo in the city records that the miserable Venetian captives on parade were in chains and look at their bailo with

⁵⁸ BOA., İE.ML., 13.1217 (29 Zulhijjah 1098 / 5 November 1687).

⁵⁹ BOA., D.BŞM.d., 40880 (18 Ramadan 1108 / 10 April 1697).

⁶⁰ BOA., İE.ML., 36.3536 (03 Rabi' al-thani 1104 / 12 December 1692).

⁶¹ Salomon Schweigger, *Sultanlar Kentine Yolculuk: 1578-1581*, ed. by Heidi Stein, trans. by S. Türkis Noyan. (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004), 107.

desperation.⁶² On the one hand, these captives would constitute one of the elements for the psychological infrastructure in the diplomatic negotiations and on the other hand they were made to stroll around the city so as to raise the morale and motivation of the people while the army was at war. The procession of these captives constituted events that were told in detail by many travelers who came to Istanbul and recorded these events. One can see that those captive processions did not only take place in Istanbul of the early modern era but they took place even in the 19th century. For example, the Russian captives who were taken during the battle that took place in Şumnu on 29 Zulhijjah 1225 (January 25, 1811) were passed under the Alay Mansion through *Divanyolu* and were sent to the Shipyard.⁶³ These people who were made to walk one after another in a miserable condition with the iron rings put on their necks and with the chains mounted on those rings and tied to one another were a scene that the people of Istanbul were used to.

Some of the captives who were brought to the city in this manner had to carry decapitated heads that were put on spears. The fact that the decapitated heads were brought from such faraway places was not only a tradition that was practiced so as to confirm that the rebels or chartered state officials were punished but it was also a material evidence supporting the good news of victory. These decapitated heads could belong to people who resisted and became belligerent during an attack⁶⁴, the governors of the regions that the war was waged with or just ordinary people.⁶⁵

⁶² Alberi, *Le relazioni*, serie III, v. III, 143.

⁶³ BOA., HAT., 1295.50310 (29 Zulhijjah 1225 / 25 January 1811).

⁶⁴ Baron Wratislaw, *Anılar*, 80.

⁶⁵ "... niçe bin baş ile dest-gîr ü esir olan müşrikin tabl u alemleri menkûs ma'khus Sûdde-i sa'âdete gönderdiği toplar ile geldi." See. Selânîkî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânîki*, ed. by Mehmet İpşirli (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1989), v. 2, 508.

Captives who were the share of the Sultan were categorized with respect to their gender, education, craftsmanship and age, before being sent to Istanbul in order to provide the needs of these public enterprises or to be sold in the slave bazaar.⁶⁶ After their arrival in Istanbul, the captives were delivered to *Tersane Eminliđi* (Superintendent of the Imperial Docks). In the lists that were kept there, the sender of each procession, its origin, and the number of slaves it consisted of were recorded. In the first examples of the extant lists, total amount and the names of each captive were stated. In time, the origin of individual names and physical characteristics started to be inscribed in these registries as well, and the specifications of captives in the documents were enlarged gradually.⁶⁷ Captives that were delivered to *Tersane-i Âmire* (The Imperial Shipyard), were later determined as to be employed as oarsmen, tailors, carpenters or rope makers and it was noted in where their names and figures were inscribed. In addition, the records of the captives who were not suited to be employed in state-owned facilities and would be employed as household slaves were kept in *Gümrük Eminliđi* (Customs Office).⁶⁸ After their individual customs prices (*pençik*) have been paid, slaves were directed to the slave bazaar.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Mantran, *XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyılda*, 120-121.

⁶⁷ For comparing the documents to examine the evolution of the record style see. BOA., İE.ADL.4.1.18 f.18 (24 Zulhıjjah 973 / 12 July 1566); BOA., C.HR.22.1072 (12 Rabi' al-awwal 1154 / 26 July 1741); Seng, "Fugitives and Factotums", 136-169.

⁶⁸ Zübeyde Güneş Yağcı, "İstanbul Gümrük Defterine Göre Karadeniz Köle Ticareti (1606- 1607)", *History Studies*, no. 3/2 (2011), 371-384.

⁶⁹ Mehmet İpşirli, "XVI. Asrın yarısında Kürek Cezası ile İlgili Hükümler", *İ.Ü Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 12 (1982), 203-248; BOA., MAD.d., 3497, 2-4 (17 Shavval 1147-16 Shavval 1149 /12 March 1735-17 February 1737); Murat Çizakça, "Ottomans and the Mediterranean: An Analysis of the Ottoman Shipbuilding Industry as Reflected by the Arsenal Registers of Istanbul 1529-1650", *Le Genti del Mare Mediterraneo*, v. II, ed. by Luigi de Rosa. (Napoli: Lucio Pironti Editore, 1981, 787; Yusuf Alperen Aydın, *Sultanın Kalyonları: Osmanlı Donanmasının Yelkenli Savaş Gemileri (1700-1770)* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2007), 331-326.

The situation for the captives who became household slaves was entirely different on the other hand. Household slaves were the ones bought from the slave markets and they lived and employed in private houses. These slaves, living with their owners while serving them, ended up in Ottoman lands in various ways, served at owners' homes or workplaces and generally blended into society.⁷⁰ Slaves lived within the privacy borders of the houses they served in; they often converted to Islam at one stage and completed their lives as Muslims. The state captives who lived and served as household slaves, came up as an issue only in heritage or freedom cases. Their traces remained in the Sharia court records kept in the archives. By the help of these records, we can track that domestic slaves had more chance to be freed than state slaves did. Direct communication with her/his master raised slave's chances of being freed, whereas some predefined rules in society set forth the time and conditions of their freedom.

Even though household slaves' employment ways were obscure and off the record after they were sent to the slave bazaar⁷¹, state slaves were generally kept under record and mainly employed as oarsmen in ships; and on land in shipyards. Slaves were categorized concerning their education, craftsmanship and age and sent to Istanbul to provide the needs of public enterprises. These people used to be delivered to *Tersane Eminliđi* by State or Sanjak directors and were interrogated; the work they were supposed to be employed in have been recorded on top of their names.⁷²

⁷⁰ Since these slaves were generally kept in houses, after payment of their taxes, almost no record about them were kept.

⁷¹ For some records about household slaves who belonged to military officers see also: Said Öztürk, *Askeri Kassama Ait On Yedinci Asır İstanbul Tereke Defterleri: Sosyo-Ekonomik Tahlil* (İstanbul: OSAV, 1995).

⁷² Giovan Antonio Menavino, *Trattato de costumi et vita de Turchi, composto per Giouan Antonio Menauino genouese da Vultri [...]*. (Firenza: 1548), 11, 12; Schweigger, *Sultanlar Kentine Yolculuk*, 107; BOA., İE.ML., 17.1608 (20 Jumada al-thani 1042 / 13 January 1632); BOA., İE.ML., 25.2403 (4 Shawwal 1089 / 19 November 1678); BOA., MAD.d., 10350, f. 138-139 (27 Muharram 1162 / 17 January 1749).

2.2 Division of Labor

Some of the captives that were employed in agriculture, weaving, mining, and construction were reemployed as *Enderûn* (The Ottoman Palace School) student, *ehl-i huref* (an institution that constituted of distinguished artists and craftsmen such as poets, goldsmiths, binders, ceramicists, carpenters, clerks, damaskers) or *diloğlanı* (interpreter). Although these people were tied legally to the Sultan, because of their talents as artisans, most of them were more independent than the other slaves in practice and constituted the most remarkable members of the slave population of Istanbul.⁷³

Using slaves in military service was a worldwide and convenient tradition for the states. This tradition and the slave trade fed almost all armed forces in the Mediterranean lands. The professional military career of captive boys started from the Janissaries. In the Ottoman army, especially *yeniçeri* / janissary troops were formed from the captives and *devşirme* (gathered) boys who were recruited from Christian families of defined regions. Unlike the captives, *devşirme* boys were from *reaya* (subject of the Ottoman Empire) families. As the right of testacy, they legally had more advantages compared to the captive boys. Likewise, *devşirme* boys, if they were patient and talented, had the opportunity to get promoted in the army. This step was the starting point to become a chief admiral, chief

⁷³ Bahattin Yaman, *Osmanlı Saray Sanatkarları:18. Yüzyılda Ehl-i Huref* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2008), 18; Sai Mustafa Çelebi, *Yapılar Kitabı: Tezkiretü'l-Bünyan ve Tezkiretü'l-Ebniye, Mimar Sinan'ın Anıları. 1005/1596*, ed. by Hayati Develi (İstanbul: Koçbank, 2002), 173; Halil Sahillioğlu, *Koca Sinan Paşa'nın Telhisleri* (İstanbul: IRCICA, 2004), 192; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "XVII - XVIII Asırlarda Türkiye'de İnşaat İşçilerinin Hukuki Durumu", *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi: Osmanlı Devlet Arşivleri Üzerinde Tetkikler-Makaleler*, ed. by Hüseyin Özdeğer (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2000), v. 2, 1161.

architect, a member of the royal council or a grand vizier in the Early Modern Ottoman period.⁷⁴

Those children from these two groups were taken in their early ages, converted to a Muslim soldier and trained as such to be loyal and devoted to the ruler. The trained slave army, as a sociological issue, could be conceived more easily with the understanding of the concept of the loyalty of the time in Ottoman domain. They were simply motivated as the most loyal military unit to protect the authority of the Sultan against anyone. On the other hand, they were a cost-efficient, standing army for the Sultan. Though they received a share from the war loot as subjects of Sultan, this share had never been a large sum as the free commanders/soldiers earned.

The Ottoman Palace was an important workplace where captive labor was utilized. With the reign of Mehmed II, the high-level bureaucracy started to build up of slave-rooted converted Muslims. In the Early Modern Era, almost the all the pashas were mirî esir and *devşirmes*.⁷⁵ The palace offered a more positive working environment and was more convenient for captives compared to other employment areas. For the bureaucratic posts, slave boys were educated in *Enderûn*, the royal school of the palace. The healthiest, most good-looking, patient, talented and smart boys were selected among the slaves.⁷⁶ Following approximately 20 years of education in the palace, close to the

⁷⁴ Menavino, *Trattato de costumi*, 138, 139, 143-145; Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire 1300-1650: The Structure of Power*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 130.

⁷⁵ For a further and wide scale discussion on Devşirme system of Ottoman Empire see: Gülay Yılmaz, "Becoming a Devshirme: The Training of Conscripted Children in the Ottoman Empire" *Children in Slavery Through the Ages*, ed. by Gwyn Campbell, Suzanne Miers, and Joseph C. Miller (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 119-134.

⁷⁶ Albertus Bobovius, *Albertus Bobovius ya da Santuri Ali Ufki Bey'in anıları, Topkapı Sarayı'nda yaşam*, trans. by Ali Berktaş (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2012), 56; Maria Pia Pedani, "Ottoman Diplomats in the West: The Sultan's Ambassadors to the Republic of Venice", *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 11 (1996), 187-202.

Sultan and his daily life, they were entrusted with governmental positions. The lowest of these positions were the *sancak beyi* / flag offices and could be *silâhdâr*, the imperial armorer of the Sultan depending on the talents and proficiency of the *devşirme* and captive-rooted boys. During their initial training period, they were not allowed to contact with their families, strongly motivated to protect the Sultan at the cost of their own life. If they died in battle, everything they owned as property was transferred to the state treasury.⁷⁷ They had limited permission to marry, and only with a woman chosen by the Sultan. The bride was generally slave-rooted as well. When some pashas were needed to be kept close to the palace, they could become the royal grooms by marrying to the daughter or sister of the Sultan.

Ottoman palace was at the same time, the one and only place where women existed as state slaves.⁷⁸ The Ottoman state slavery institution produced not only the slave-rooted wives, concubines and the servants of the palace but also the most convenient wives of the high-level bureaucrats. Compared to the male captives, the imperial facilities were almost in no need of female captives except for the imperial palace services. The Imperial Court Records contain numerous orders, issued to the commanders of the armies and the other officials on the frontiers, to not to send any more female captives to the capital. The reason for issuing such orders was that the only place where the female captives were held was the palace. And the palace always avoided keeping unqualified female state slaves in

⁷⁷ For further reading on the confiscation of high-rank Ottoman officials, see. Cavit Baysun, “Müsadere”, *İA*, v.VIII, 1960, İstanbul, 669-673, Yasin Arslantaş, “Making Sense of Müsadere Practice, State Confiscation of Elite Wealth, in the Ottoman Empire, circa 1453-1839”, *History Compass*. 2019; 17: e12548; Dror Ze’evi and Ilkim Buke, “Banishment, Confiscation, and the Instability of the Ottoman Elite Household”, *Society, Law, and Culture in the Middle East*, ed. by Dror Ze’evi and Ehud R. Toledano. (De Gruyter Open, 2015), 16-30; Selim Karahasanoğlu, “Osmanlı Uygulamasında Müsadere: Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Paşa’ya Ait Muhallefat Zaptı Örneği”, *1. Uluslararası Nevşehir Tarih ve Kültür Sempozyumu*, Turkey, (01 April 2012), v.7, 179-205.

⁷⁸ BOA., MAD., 10056 (21 Muharram 1128-3 Rajab 1130 / 16 January 1716 - 2 June 1718).

imperial service. Another reason for avoiding transporting female slaves to the capital was the financial costs. Transporting female captives, who were usually with their children, by carriages and under guard was more expensive for the state, than transporting male captives.⁷⁹

2.3 Daily Circumstances of Captives

Ordinary male state slaves were forced to work primarily in naval facilities. Though Ottomans preferred to supply rowers from *avârızs* (extraordinary tax), the gradual extension of the navy compelled Ottomans to use more slave rowers in *kadırgas* and galleons. State slaves used to be kept in a *banyols*⁸⁰ (dungeon) in Pera in Byzantine Istanbul in winter (from November to April) and in galleons in wartime / summer (from April to November). In *banyol*, all captives lived with felons which were also employed to meet the needs of manpower for shipbuilding and worked as carpenters, caulkers, oar makers, potters, rope makers at the construction of galleons.

Almost all of the captives that lived and worked in *Tersane* (Shipyard) area were subjects of European Christian states. Seldom, if ever was it possible to see people of other nationalities as Sultan's slave. Especially during or after Eastern expeditions, Persian or North-African captives could be found in *Tersane Zindanı* (Shipyard

⁷⁹ BOA., İE/ML., 13.1217 (29 Zulhijjah 1098 / 5 November 1687); BOA., İE/ML., 36.3536 (03 Rabi' al-awwal 1104 / 12 November 1692); BOA., D.BŞM.d., 40880 (18 Ramadan 1108 / 10 April 1697); BOA., MAD.d., 10159 (3 Rajab 1130 / 2 June 1718).

⁸⁰ Apart from the dungeon, *banyol* directly refers to a place where the captives were kept, though later the felons were started to be kept among the captives as rowers. Arsenal dungeon in Istanbul was constructed in the reign of Suleyman I (1520-1566) and repaired in 1585, 1681 and 1664.

Dungeon).⁸¹ Sometimes Ottoman citizens could also be seen as captives, and those were the citizens enslaved from a region revolted against the Sultan; those were always kept as state slaves.⁸² Slave traders mostly captured slaves from the peoples of the Black Sea coast and brought them to the capital.

On the other hand, the captives of war who were ranking soldiers of the enemy armies, or members of ruling classes of their countries of origin, had never been sent to Tersane Dungeon. These high-valued captives were immediately harboured away from the central districts and allocated in military facilities such as Rumelihisarı (Black Tower) or Yedikule (Seven Towers). Thus, particularly during wartime, they could be utilized immediately when needed without losing time for the transfer.⁸³

Captives harboured in the arsenal and galleons during winter were listed in *Mevâcib* (quarterly paid allowance for the expenses of captives and the salaries of certain soldiers and officials) inventories. Individual names of all captives were recorded in these inventories as well as the extra daily expenses of some individual captives. It is seen that the state slaves or felons who had been working as oarsmen, the ones who had been sent to the ships of the *Donanma-yı Hümayun* (Ottoman Navy) or the sick and crippled ones were all recorded regularly. Number and quality of the captives employed in public service have been perfectly recorded in exhaustive detail in the *Mevâcib* (salary) inventories

⁸¹ Friedrich Seidel, *Sultan'ın Zindanında, (Denkwürdige Gesandtschaft an die Ottomanische Pforte)* trans. by Türkis Noyan (İstanbul, Kitap Yayınevi, 2010), 50.

⁸² BOA., İE.ADL., 3.1.8 (24 Ramadan 967 - 20 Shawwal 968 / 18 June 1560 - 4 July 1561); BOA., C.ADL., 7.466 (29 Muharram 1122 / 4 May 1761); BOA., C..DH., 91.4537 (4 Ramadan 1189 / 29 October 1775).

⁸³ Baron Wratislaw, *Anılar*, 115; Pálffy, “Ransom Slavery”, 35-84; Seidel, *Sultanın Zindanında*, 43-44.

which are excellent sources of our historical knowledge about the male slaves in the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁴

The subsistence inventories demonstrate the budget of the state to be expended for the slaves, though they received no payment whatsoever. The state treasure records tell us that the daily payment per slave in the shipyard was one *akçe*⁸⁵ a day. Certainly, the slaves did not receive the money directly. Every *akçe* was put together to buy goods to cook for the people in the dungeon. The regular lists recorded in the arsenal consist of bread wheat, rice, lentil, chick-peas, olive oil, vinegar and sometimes grape, black-eyed pea and vine. On the other hand, the food lists of the captives in the galleys were not the same. It was recorded that each captive would receive two *akçe* for the additional food as hard biscuit, foodstuff for soup and rarely meat. The regular records for the subsistence of the captives must have been gradually customized, since the early memoirs of the former captives and the reports of ambassadors did not portray that there was a systematic supply chain for the foodstuff of the captives. While Diego Galán, ex-captive who was kept between 1589 to 1600, records that the captives in the dungeon had received three small breads, weighed approximately 3 libra⁸⁶ and every four captives had received legume mash backed with some olive oil and vinegar. Seidel states that all the captives had to find their own foodstuff

⁸⁴ BOA., D.BŞM.TRE., d.14845 (7 Shaban 1164 / 1 July 1751).

⁸⁵ *Akçe*: Until the minting of gold coins in the last quarter of the 15th century, Ottoman coinage consisted of the small silver *akçe* and the copper mangor. The basic unit of account was the *akçe* or *akça*, which has the connotation of “white.” Western sources also refer to it as *asper* which has the same connotation. Its weight fluctuated. Its silver content was 0.66 gr. and it was equal to 0,81 \$ in 1556. (In 1566: 0,61 gr / 0,78 \$; in 1578: 0,61 gr. / 0,72; in 1654: 0,28 gr. / 0,32 \$; in 1664: 0,23 gr. / 0,29 \$; in 1691: 0,130 gr. / 0.15 \$) For further information see. Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 34.

⁸⁶ *Libra/Libbra*: Or pound, was also used in Ottoman territories and equal to app. 350 gr. For the list of weights and measures see, Halil İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1600*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 987-994.

and they were even allowed to steal something in bazaars of Istanbul from 1591 to 1596, in the period of financial crisis of the Empire.⁸⁷

Clothing of the captives was essential to understand their identity at a glance; therefore, state slaves in galleons wore uniforms in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state regulated the clothing supply as a tax in various providences of the empire. The captives were generally given two different clothes for summers and winters. Winter clothes were made up by a kind of canvas (*kirpas*) which is also used as a sailcloth. In winters, the fabric of the clothes - especially for the captives who were employed in galleons - were thicker, warm and waterproof.⁸⁸ Immediately after they fell captive, their clothes were changed. As opposed to Italian galleon-volunteers, Ottoman felons and rowers as tax payers were ordered to have a moustache and to have a piece of hair on top of their heads while shackle-captives were ordered to be clean-shaven in their faces and heads altogether.⁸⁹

Slave population also generated a new and simple language in the Mediterranean region. It was a special "Lingua Franca", a mixture of French, Italian and Greek, and generated specifically for slaves to conduct the basic orders like "get up", "row", "line up" etc. Shipyard area in Istanbul was a kind nest for this simple mix language though people used their own languages inside and the beyond the walls of the shipyard. Even the captives who arrived to the dungeon after being captured during battles in regions like

⁸⁷ BOA., MAD., 17866, f. 4 (29 Zulhijjah 984 - 29 Zulhijjah 985 / 19 March 1577-9 March 1578); BOA., MAD., 6188, 2, f. 97,98 (9 Zulhijjah 1064 / 10 November 1654); BOA., MAD., 6382 (4 Shaban 1074 / 2 March 1664); BOA., İE.BH., 4.373 (14 Shaban 1102 / 13 May 1691); Kumrular, *Türk Korkusu*, 309; Heberer, *Osmanlı'da Bir Köle*, 116; Seidel, *Sultan'ın Zindanında*, 43, 57.

⁸⁸ BOA., MAD., 5956 (17 Jumada al-thani 1019 / 6 September 1610; BOA., C.BH., 127.6311 (22 Safar 1196 / 6 February 1782); C..BH., 234.10853 (02 Muharram 1197 / 8 December 1782).

⁸⁹ Cristobal de Villalon, *Türkiye Seyahati Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Devrinde İstanbul: 1557 Yılında Bir El Yazması* (İstanbul: Erko, 2011), 35.

Peloponnesus, Hungary, Austria, Persia etc. had to learn this professional jargon to facilitate in his own life in captivity.⁹⁰

Neither the state captives' mingling directly with the public nor their getting closer to people were welcome. The acceptance of Islam did not mean automatic manumission. Moreover, a Christian captive's conversion to Islam was not preferable⁹¹ as it meant a loss in manpower. State slaves got into touch with the citizens in Istanbul only when they went to the bazaar to supply their needs or while they were brought to a district to work.⁹² Captives were easy to be noticed since they were made to wear uniforms. It was usual to encounter with state captives all around the city. Around the Palace, *Tersane* (shipyard) and *Tophane* (the Imperial Arsenal), in the construction of a vizier's palace, in bazaars, the status of almost everyone could be perceived through their outfit. Their occupation, social and economic status within society, etc. could easily be understood through their dresses or their caps, turbans, or their chains when tied. *Baratas* for example, as a very specific long red cap, were only be worn by Ottoman royal gardeners, axmen and porter.⁹³

Slave bazaar was one of the most important indicators of Istanbul's slave population. Istanbul, as one of the most famous slave trade centers of the area along with

⁹⁰ Seidel, *Sultan'ın Zindanında*, 43-44; Henry Kahane, Renee Kahane and Andreas Tietze, "Forza", *The Lingua Franca in the Levant: Turkish Nautical Terms of Italian and Greek Origin* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1958), 229.

⁹¹ Since Islam's early period, the jurist debated releasing the converted captives after the battle. *Al-Hidayah*, the Hanafi code, directly refused to release them after the battle if they converted in time between their captivity in war and their enslavement. Although this judicial opinion apparently contravened a 'sword verse,' 9:5: 'Slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent, and perform the prayer, and pay the alms, then let them go their way; God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate.' The jurists feared that slaves would pretend to accept Islam to secure their release and cause social dislocations. See. William Gervase Clarence-Smith, *Islam and the Abolition of Slavery* (London: C. Hurst. & Co, 2006), 40.

⁹² Suraiya Faruqi, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Etrafındaki Dünya* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007), 185-186.

⁹³ Bono, *Yeniçağ İtalya'sında*, 244.

Crete, had had a slave bazaar nearby *Kapalıçarşı* (The Grand Bazaar) in Byzantine Era. In the Ottoman rule, it is known that the same slave bazaar extended towards *Bedesten* (Covered Bazaar). Records also indicate that another slave bazaar functioned in the *Tavukpazarı* area. It is known that the slave bazaar located between *Grand Bazaar* and *Nuruosmaniye* had actively operated from the beginning of the 17th century up until the second half of the 19th century.⁹⁴

2.4 Practice of Exchange

The population exchange was a practice often widely mentioned in the chronicles, documents and the other sources. Constantinople had entertained many guests who came to the city for the captive exchange or ransom payments since the Byzantine period. Ottoman state had always allocated its resources and time for captives and conducted the issues related to captives always with elaboration.

The Ottoman state generally exchanged the captives due to the needs for the labor force in its lands or regarding the political statue of the state addressée. For example, in a decree, numbered 1622 in a *Mühimme Defteri* (Imperial Court Registry) dated 966-968 /1558-1560, it was said that “The French captives captured in the naval battle and from

⁹⁴ Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi, *Osmanlı Mimarisinde Fatih Devri: 855-886 (1451-1481)* (İstanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti İstanbul Enstitüsü, 1974), v. IV, 579; Ehud R. Toledano, “Slave dealers, women, pregnancy, and abortion: The story of a circassian slave-girl in mid-nineteenth century Cairo”, *Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies*, Volume 2, (1981) Issue 1, 53-68; Ehud R. Toledano, *The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression: 1840–1890* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) 107, 108.

Djerba Fortress could not be delivered back unless the Ottoman state would decide to respond to a manifestation of friendship by the State of France.”⁹⁵

It was tough to rescue a captive by paying *fidye* (ransom)⁹⁶ or exchange if he was a skilled sailor or a specialized artisan.⁹⁷ The state had always preferred to employ captives as long as they were needed since the captives could be forced to overwork and their costs were much lower than a free laborer, artisan or master. Exchange operations also decreased the money spent from the treasury of the state as ransom.

Captives in Ottoman lands could have their ransom paid by someone who knew the captive’s family and was assured to be paid back in the future. For the Ottoman subjects who fell into enemy hands, the state had to rely upon ransom for liberation, and this ransom was typically raised from their families and associates. Ottoman central state took a minor role in liberating ordinary subjects, whether through financing or logistics. Instead, the Sultan devoted attention only to the “so-called ‘principal captives’ or to those with influential relatives or acquaintances.”⁹⁸ Such exchange operations also decreased the money spent from the treasury of the state as ransom.

Until the last quarter of the 18th century, it had always been easy to find captives that could be exchanged within the borders of the Ottoman State. The high number of the

⁹⁵ 3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (3th Imperial Court Record) 966-968 /1558-1560 (Ankara: BOA, 1993), p. 722, nr. 1622.

⁹⁶ Fidyе: in Ac, fidâ-fidya. Initially, it was an amount of money to release captured enemies at war after surely defeating them. (Qur’an 47:4). There is a contradiction among the Hanifah jurists about allowing the enemy to be free by ransom. While Abu Hanifah does not allow ransom because this will strengthen the enemy (and also because the Qur’an 9: 5), Abu Yusuf and Shaybani allow it. Both also agree to exchange captives. See. Munir, “Debates on the Rights”, 466.

⁹⁷ Faroqhi, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, 187.

⁹⁸ Pál Fodor, “Piracy, Ransom Slavery and Trade: French Participation in the Liberation of Ottoman Slaves from Malta during the 1620s”, *Critical Readings on Global Slavery*, ed. by Damian Alan Pargas and Felicia Roşu (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 886, 887.

people who were the subjects of other European states not limited to Venice alone led the state to generally choose the method of exchange to rescue someone from its *reaya*. Venice's treaty advantage did not work in the treaty of 1575 just like in the aftermath of the war of 1538-1540 when captives were not released. For a long time after the War of Cyprus and the Battle Lepanto, Ottoman territories witnessed the attempts to rescue not only the Venetians but also the Europeans who fought against the Ottomans through the Holy League and fell captive.

The most important factor that provided this advantage to the Ottomans was the concepts of *Dar-al İslam* and *Dar-al harb*. Factors such as its closest neighbor being generally thousands of kilometers away from the capital, the established habit of keeping the captives of the state that the Ottomans were at war with in the capital, and the implementation of the laws pertaining to the borders of Islamic territories facilitated the control of the captives within the borders despite certain exceptions.

Until his early reign, Paul III. (1534-1549) safe passage for the Ottoman citizens was rare in Papal territory. The Pope offered safe passage to everyone (Turks, Jews, and other infidels) regardless of their nationality. In 1544, the same Pope allowed Levantine Jews to settle in his lands. In 1551 Florence⁹⁹ issued a similar invitation and put Greeks, Turks, North Africans, Jews, Armenians, and Iranians under her protection.¹⁰⁰ In short, until the mid-16th century, it was not safe for Muslims to travel in *Dar-al harb*. In such an

⁹⁹ Mikail Acıpinar, "XVII. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Toskana Grandukalığında Türk Esirler", *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 25 / 1 (June 2010), 15-38.

¹⁰⁰ Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean* (Leiden: Brill: 1995), 4; Bernard Dov Cooperman, "Venetian Policy Towards Levantine Jews in Its Broader Italian Context", *Gli ebrei e Venezia, secoli XIV—XVIII* ed. by Gaetano Cozzi (Milan: Edizioni Comunità, 1987), 71, 72.

environment, Muslim mobility would be a problem. So, the Muslims neither traveled abroad nor conducted their business through Christians.

Since its own citizens did not pass frequently from the *Dar-al harb* borders and the ones who passed from these borders were merchants with permission, messengers, ambassadors or armed soldiers, the Ottoman State was naturally able to protect its own subjects from taken captive. For the return of the subjects who fell captive during a border or sea expedition, the terms of the treaty were implemented if there were any; otherwise, an exchange of captives was demanded by supplying captives from the vicinity who belonged to the nationality of the opposing party.

Though Sultan did not need¹⁰¹ ransom, his captives generally attained their freedom through captive exchange or by diplomatic negotiations, through which the Ottoman state preferred to benefit. The captives from the ruler class or military had had the priority in those exchanges while it was not easy for the captives to gain their freedom if they were ordinary people of lower socioeconomic status. Yet, all the petitions written by the relatives about ransoming their family members from Christian lands often arrived at the Palace. When their writing styles and vocabularies were examined, the earliest samples of these petitions in the Ottoman Archives were dated late 15th century.¹⁰²

Captives brought to the city were usually kept together in order to be ready in case of a need for exchange. However, most of them fell into the hands of civilians until the peace treaty was signed. On these occasions, if captives were scattered to various places,

¹⁰¹ Halil Sahillioğlu, "Slaves in the Social and Economic Life of Bursa in the late 15th and early 16th Centuries", *Turcica*, XVII (1985), 43-112, 47.

¹⁰² BOA., TS.MA.e., 759 / 104 (4 Rabi al-awwal 886 / 3 May 1481).

the government sometimes issued a general order to offer partial payment on condition that these captives were recollectd from their owners. As a rule, once he became a Muslim, a slave was never turned back. Release of government's war captives did not constitute a problem as long as they stayed Christians. Captives were sometimes employed in houses of pashas' as servants.¹⁰³ The government tried to prevent this kind of abuses, paid strict attention to keep these captives together, as they had the potential of being exchanged, and required these captives to be treated well until the date of the exchange.¹⁰⁴

2.5 Ottoman Reaction to Redemptionists

The reign of Selim II following the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, who controlled everything from bureaucracy to economy until the last years of his life to the greatest extent possible, was quite advantageous for the Catholics, especially for the Venetians. Against the Grand Vizier (*Sadrizam*) Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, who kept his power for a long time during the reign of the new Sultan as well and who was close to the French, the group of Nurbanû Sultan, the wife of the Sultan, who wanted to increase the Venetian interests, would gradually ascend.

This conflict still did not prevent the French from increasing their liberties on the Ottoman lands with the capitulations of 1569. With this treaty, the Ottoman State became France's most important ally. In addition to securing extensive commercial concessions, the French

¹⁰³ BOA., D.BŞM.d., 40847 (22 Jumada al-thani 1094 /19 May 1683).

¹⁰⁴ Pálffy, "Ransom Slavery" 35-84; Heberer, *Osmanlıda Bir Köle*, 136; Takats, *Macaristan*, 65, 67.

could also worship freely now. From then on, the French could send missionaries that would provide religious service to Catholic merchants and diplomats on the Ottoman lands.

The fact that the Ottomans let the French become this close to them was undoubtedly an effort to prevent the emergence of a Christian alliance that would exacerbate the Habsburg threat. Charles A. Frazee stated that Cyprus campaign was also carried out for this end. Until the last quarter of the 16th century, there was little tolerance for other Catholic religious structures, apart from the two known orders in the Ottoman capital, the Dominicans¹⁰⁵ and the Franciscans¹⁰⁶. Apart from these two orders, known to have operated in the city since the 13th century, the efforts of other orders to operate often seemed frustrating. The arrival of the Christian communities to Ottoman lands after having received religious permission as a result of the Ottoman policy of fueling competition between France and the other European states did not take place at once. For this end, the Catholics who wanted to raise Greek students through the Greek school that was founded in Rome in 1576 wanted to visit the eastern churches one by one in time and directly communicate with the local religious officials in these churches.¹⁰⁷

Although the population of the Catholics in Galata appeared to have decreased during this period, the number of war captives that were brought to the city after Cyprus Campaign was quite high. While a substantial portion of the merchants in Galata set their course toward Atlantic, there were around 500 Catholics and as many manumitted slaves

¹⁰⁵ Vanessa R. de Obaldía, *A Legal and Historical Study of Latin Catholic Church Properties in Istanbul from the Ottoman Conquest of 1453 until 1740*, (Unpublished doctoral Thesis, Aix-Marseille Université, 2018), 107-109.

¹⁰⁶ Charles A. Frazee, *Catholics and Sultans: The Church and The Ottoman Empire 1453-1923* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 5-9; Robert Lee Wolff, "The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Franciscans", *Traditio*, 1944, v. 2 (1944), 213-237.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 69, 70;

in the city. In addition to these, Frazee stated that there were approximately 2000 slaves, a number which he relayed to us from Pietro Cedulini who was in Istanbul between January 1580-April 1581 upon being appointed by the Pope.¹⁰⁸

Various difficulties awaited the missionaries who were trying to be organized so that they could serve the Catholics in the city. Even though the Ottoman capital was the largest commercial port of the period, the people were prejudiced against the European Christians. The Jesuits and Capuchins, who were new in the city, met the reaction of both the Muslim people and also the resistance of the Christians whose numbers were quite high in the city and of their communities. When the Jesuit group that came to the city for the first time in 1583 died due to the plague that broke out in the city that year, the first Jesuit initiative in Istanbul ended and they remained inactive in the city until 1609. The plight of the Capuchins was even more tragic. Two of the four priests who came to the city and settled there under the tutelage of French embassy in 1587 died of the plague and the other two priests were imprisoned due to public's reaction. One of the priests, who was imprisoned, was kept on a slightly burning fire for a few days and he was then released on condition that he would leave the city with his friends.¹⁰⁹

In such an atmosphere, it is obvious why the religious pious foundations, which were founded in much earlier times to 'save pious Christian captives from infidel lands' and remained mostly inactive in the time that elapsed but once again became active in the first half of the 16th century, could not become organized in the Ottoman capital.

¹⁰⁸ Frazee, *Catholics and Sultans*, 72; Fariba Zarinebaf, *Mediterranean Encounters: Trade and Pluralism in Early Modern Galata* (California University of California Press, 2018), 56, 57.

¹⁰⁹ Marmara, *İstanbul Deniz Zindanı*, 16, 17.

The situation of the captives, who were transferred to the city to meet the needs of the city's population and state mechanisms, was also very much affected by the ongoing Protestant-Catholic conflict in Europe. In addition to the ransom foundations that could not become organized, sectarian strife was also quite effective on the possibility of the captives' liberation. The ambassador of a Catholic country generally preferred to send a Catholics or people who served for Catholic state back to his country rather than rescuing a Protestant captive.¹¹⁰

Republic of Venice, on the other hand, developed an approach going beyond all these reservations and sensitivities. For the Republic, the priority was not the religion of the captive but his/her ties with and his/her use for the Republic. For this reason, Republic of Venice developed and maintained this policy in those places that it governed or was a representative in the Mediterranean since quite early times.¹¹¹ This attitude also manifested itself on Ottoman lands, especially in Istanbul. It did just not manifest itself but became increasingly professional through an institutional but clandestinely operating structure for the symbolic rescue of the Catholic European captives in the city.

While the slavery of the captives of war was maintained for many years, slave trade from Africa, Caucasus and Northern steppes also continued to supply the need for slave manpower in the capital city. As the number of wars, conquests and piracy decreased gradually, slave trade became the only source for the slave supply.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Heberer, *Osmanlı'da Bir Köle*, 260, 261.

¹¹¹ Joshua M. White, *Piracy and Law in the Ottoman Mediterranean* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2017), 42, 108, 118, 119, 132.

¹¹² BOA., İE.BH., 4.339 (28 Muharram 1012 / 28 May 1604); BOA., İE.BH., 5.405. 1v (20 Şaban 1101 / 29 May 1690); BOA., İE.BH., 5.429 (27 Ramadan 1104 / 3 June 1693); BOA., AE.SAMD.III., 80.8065 (29 Zuhijjah 1136 / 18 September 1724).

In conclusion, while the slaves fed the Ottoman Slavery Institution from the times of beydom to the end of the 19th century and the number of the war captives brought to the Ottoman land gradually decreased. The supply system was kept under record by various methods. Although so little has been written in Western historiography regarding slavery in the Ottoman empire, there is extensive information in a vast array of sources that sheds light on the Ottoman slavery as an integral institution for both the state and the society. The gathered records in diversified sources in different languages helps to contribute not only to the Ottoman Historiography but also to the historiography of Mediterranean region by underlining the captivity life of those captives in Ottomans lands, their living conditions and the process they went through to gain back their freedom.

CHAPTER III: VENETIANS



*“Nuova area di Noe.
New Ark of Noah! When the cruel scourge
Of that barbarian tyrant like a wave
Went over Italy, thou then didst save
The seed of just men on the weltering surge.
Here, still by discord and foul servitude
Untainted, thou a hero brood dost raise,
Powerful and prudent. Due to thee their praise
Of maiden pure, of teeming motherhood!
Thou wonder of the world, Rome’s loyal heir,
Thou pride and strong support of Italy,
Dial of princes, school of all things wise!
Thou like Arcturus steadfast in the skies,
With tardy sense guidest thy kingdom fair,
Bearing alone the load of liberty.”
(Tommaso Campanella, Sonnets, 29, To Venice)¹¹³*

Conscious and proud of their city, the Venetians produced images regarding the city’s unique roots, values, and its special place in the history starting almost simultaneously with the foundation of the city. The origins of this multi-layered myth known as Venetian myth frequently occupied the minds of historians. Having first emerged as a stable and effective representation of the city at the end of the Middle Ages, this myth depicts Venice as an ideal republic, a powerful sea empire, and as a virtuous, independent state where the nobility dedicated themselves to humanism and its citizens

¹¹³ *The Sonnets of Michael Angelo Buonarroti and Tommaso Campanella*, trans. by John Addington Symonds (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1878), 147.

worked hard although her dependencies on external powers as Eastern Roman Empire. When required, new elements were constantly added to this myth. For example, Theodore of Amaseia, the first patron of the city, was gradually turned into the winged San Marco lion representing a powerful state.¹¹⁴

The anti-myth that was developed against this myth had its own foundations: The Republic was a secret oligarchy run by a group of oppressive people from the nobility. In their timeless study compiled on the historiography of the Republic, John Jeffries Martin and Dennis Romano maintain that Venice came to being toward the end of the 15th century when it began to expand its *Terreferma* and northern-eastern territories beyond the island. In a letter that Machiavelli wrote to the government of Florence in 1503¹¹⁵, he made a statement regarding the Venetians saying that ‘there is a universal hatred for them’ by implying that he, himself and a lot of people during his time was of the same opinion.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Gherardo Ortalli, *Venezia inventata: Verità e leggenda della Serenissima* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2021), 11, 12, 35, 41-47, 131-145; James S. Grubb, “When Myths Lose Power: Four Decades of Venetian Historiography”, *The Journal of Modern History*, V. 58, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), 43-94; Ersie C. Burke, *The Greeks of Venice, 1498-1600: Immigration, Settlement, and Integration* (Turnhout: Brepols N.V., 2017), 6; Myron Gilmore, “Myth and Reality in Venetian Political Theory”, *Renaissance Venice*, ed. by J. R. Hale (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 431-444.

¹¹⁵ It was no surprise that such a reaction occurred in Florence. The structure of Venice's state organs came to the fore whenever there was an administrative problem in Florence, which was dominated by sectarian politics. The fact that the negotiating and executive organs of the Republic were not in the hands of a single family and the electoral policy could have been a solution for Florence. Thus, in both 1494 and 1502, elements of the Venetian constitution, such as the Grand Council and Duchy, were imitated. On the other hand, the often-self-sacrificing myth of Venice's government was dismissed as a fabrication by the Florentines like Machiavelli. It was not a surprise that these discussions were held after the French occupation in 1494. According to Machiavelli, who believed in God's providence and divine hierarchy, Venice survived this process with minor damage, not by military and political virtù, but by chance. Because this occupation was not a success for the French but a sign of the moral and military bankruptcy of the Italians. See. Stephen D. Bowd, “The Republics of Ideas - Venice, Florence and the Defence of Liberty, 1525–1530”, *History*, v. 85, Issue 279, (Jul 2000), 405, 406, 425; Gilmore, “Myth and Reality”, 434-437.

¹¹⁶ Edward Muir, *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 13-61; Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant: The Horizons of a Myth* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press: 1999), 1-46; John Jeffries Martin and Dennis Romano, “Reconsidering Venice”, *Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297–1797* ed. by John Martin and Dennis Romano (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 1-3.

Venice had not only overseas colonies but also had a vital commercial dominance in the Mediterranean region. Most of her colonies were located on the coast of the Aegean Sea, the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea. To protect her dominance and network, Venice pursued an active role, both diplomatically and militarily. In the beginning, the appearance of the Ottomans as a land principality had not threatened Venetians directly. Nevertheless, the territorial extension of the Ottomans, towards the western coasts of Anatolia or —particularly—upon Gallipoli by crossing the Strait of Dardanelles, made Ottomans an enemy that should be stopped or defeated by military power. After joining the various alliance against the Turks, the situation clearly changed when the Ottomans crossed the Strait of Dardanelles and became a commercial threat for the Venetian colonies. Until then, the Ottomans were still viewed as a relatively minor problem compared to the Emirate of Monteshe or the Emirate of Aydin. While Venice could easily find allies against the Ottomans at the beginning, the situation changed over time. For instance, in 1362, Venice tried to form an anti-Ottoman coalition, but disagreements between Venice, Genoa¹¹⁷ and Byzantium hindered the realization of this plan.¹¹⁸ In the long term, as the Ottoman dominance in the region becoming unstoppable, the Republic of Venice accepted the status quo and reluctantly adapted to the new circumstances to protect her commercial profits in the area.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Yet, Ottomans wished to shift the commercial power of Venice to her weaker rivals, first Genoese, and later on the Florentines and Ragusans. For instance, they tried to co-operate with Genoa by granting extensive commercial privileges as early as 1352 and giving them a long-term monopoly over alum production in the area of Magnesia due to the anti-Venetian policy. See. Halil İnalcık, “An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations”, *Venezia: Centro di mediazione tra oriente e occidente (secoli XV-XVI): Aspetti e problemi*, ed by. Hans-Georg Beck, Manoussos Manoussacas, and Agostino Pertusi, Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1977, v. 1, 85.

¹¹⁸ Imber, *Ottoman*, 21-26; Frederic C. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime History* (Baltimore: JHUP, 1973), 235-237; John Julius Norwich, *A History of Venice* (New York: Knop, 1982), 342-358.

¹¹⁹ İnalcık, “An Outline”, 89, 90.

This adaptation, on the other hand, had tarnished Venice's image and reputation among European states. Antonio Giustinian, the Venetian ambassador in Rome from 1502 to 1505, reported that according to Pope Pius II, Venetians did not care about God or Christianity and only cared about their own state and use God's name for their own interests. French envoy to Holy Roman Empire, Rinaldo Fulin, reported in 1510 that Venetians ally themselves with the Ottomans to vassalize the European kingdoms. After the Venetians rejected his offer for alliance in 1532, Pope Clement VII declared them as a faithless, lawless and selfish people. Therefore, while Venice was trying to protect her trade gains in the East, she turns into an internal enemy in the West, who is allied to the infidel.¹²⁰

As long as she had a profitable relationship with the Ottomans, The Republic of Venice already became avoider from the war. She preferred to take a diplomatic position concerning Empire to protect and evolve her commercial bounds. Besides the commercial activities, Venice quickly collected the news from her merchants and consuls in Istanbul and Acre, Aleppo, Beirut, and the other cities in the Levant.

3.1 The Concept of Patrizi, Cittadini, Popoli

Over time, three different groups emerged in Venice. These three groups included *popolani*, ordinary people who made up the most crowded part, the citizens who were referred to as *cittadini originarii* with certain privileges even though they were not from

¹²⁰ Robert Finlay, *Venice Besieged: Politics and Diplomacy in the Italian Wars, 1494-1534* (Burlington: Routledge, 2008), I, 937-1943.

the high class, and the noble people, recorded in Marino Sanuto's diary¹²¹ in 1493 as *zentilhomeni*, patricians. During Venetian Renaissance, the number of these groups increased to five: nobility, clergymen, citizens, public, and slaves. Apart from the public (*popolani*), the other four groups' legal statuses and limits were definite. The patricians consisted 4-5% of the population, the citizens 5-8% and the rest of the 90% included the public, slaves, and the clergymen.¹²²

Since male members of patrician families had the advantage of their inherited "estate of birth", when they became adults, they became rulers in any body of the republic as representatives of the state. They were also natural-born members of the Great Council of the Republic. Involving to the state administration from the top would seem tempting but protecting the gained inherited status was not easy as read as from the history books. Their duties were not always representing their families in the Council. They had to go where ever the Republic sent them as governor and had to be successful in the name of the Republic and against the other competitor noble families.¹²³

Patricians took a position in various high-rank administration organs of the Republic. On the other hand, new political agendas generate this social class by forcing them to encounter with Ottomans. For instance, among the measures taken against the Portuguese threat of the Republic was the establishment of *V Savi alla Mercanzi* in 1506.

¹²¹ *I Diarii di Marino Sanuto*, ed. by Federico Stefani, Guglielmo Berchet, Nicolò Barozzi, Rinaldo Fulin, Marco Allegri (Venice: M. Visentini, 1879-1903).

¹²² Dennis Romano, *Patricians and Popolani: The Social Foundation of Venetian Renaissance* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987), 29; Karen-edis Barzman, *The Limits of Identity Early Modern Venice, Dalmatia, and the Representation of Difference* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 3.

¹²³ Barzman, *The Limits of Identity*, 32, 37; Stanley Chojnacki, "Identity and Ideology in Renaissance Venice: The Third Serrata", *Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297-1797* ed. by John Martin and Dennis Romano (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 268.

This trade board was responsible for developing the trade within the borders of the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁴

The Venetian nobility began to lean not only toward commerce but also toward investments such as real estate and local agriculture in *Terraferma*.¹²⁵ This change was a sign that international commerce could not remain under the monopoly of the nobility any longer and that Venetians from lower ranks could also be commercial actors. These new actors began to appear as merchants on the Ottoman lands. Some nobles who once held monopoly on the commerce in Levant started to invest in agriculture as the difficulties in food supply became even more visible after the plagues. After the famine, the income of the Republic was not sufficient for the payment of salaries and led people to buy import wheat at quite a high price.¹²⁶

The policy of self-sustaining agriculture in *Terraferma* had previously been thought of in the 1540s and 1550s. Prominent families such as the Cornaros, who owned sugar plantations in Cyprus, realized that the already difficult trade in the Levant would be much more challenging with the ever-expanding geographical explorations. This decision which was taken after a period that saw the loss of Egypt in 1517, the loss of Peloponnese in 1540, and the Ottoman-Venetian War of 1537-41, was not a coincidence. Wheat from the region was replaced by imported wheat from Central and Northern Europe

¹²⁴ Eric R. Dursteler, "The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps", *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 16:2, (2001), 22.

¹²⁵ *Terraferma: or Stato di Terra*. Venetian lands or possessions on the mainland.

¹²⁶ Brian Pullan, "The Occupations and the Investments of the Venetian Nobility in the Middle and Late Sixteenth Century" *Renaissance Venice*, ed. by John Hale (London, Faber, 1973), 379-408; Ugo Tucci, "The Psychology of the Venetian Merchant in the Sixteenth Century" *Renaissance Venice*, ed. by John Hale (London: Faber, 1973), 364-6; Stephen Ortega, "Across Religious and Ethnic Boundaries: Ottoman Networks and Spaces in Early Modern Venice", *Mediterranean Studies*, V. 18 (2009), 66; Ioanna Iordanou, "Pestilence, poverty, and Provision: Re-evaluating the Role of the Popolani in Early Modern Venice", *Economic History Review*, 69, 3 (2016), 805, 806.

and homegrown wheat. However, the events during the War of the Cambrai League had an adverse effect on wheat production in *Terraferma*.¹²⁷

As the Italian wars ended and troubles broke out between Flanders and France, the Mediterranean regained its position as a trade center again. Venice dominated the Levant trade between 1559-64. In such a positive atmosphere, no one could foresee the loss of Cyprus. During this period, families such as Sanudo and Priuli looked to develop alternative income sources in trade. This was not a prevalent attitude. As the profits from risky and costly maritime trade diminished in contrast to profits made from agriculture in *Terraferma*, more families shifted their investments to agriculture.¹²⁸

Cittadini class consisted of people positioned among the people from nobility and ordinary people and whose social statuses were approved hereditarily. The first class of this group, *cittadini originari*, with the Venetian origin but they took certain jobs in bureaucracy. The highest position they could be promoted to was grand chancellor, which offered the chance to audit the senate. Although posts such as being Doge and San Marco procuratorship changed frequently, these officials continued to be a part of the bureaucracy. In addition to their duties concerning official documents and protocol, they were also experts in assisting with sensitive diplomatic duties. Many physicians and surgeons, notaries, priests, teachers and tutors in the city belonged to this class. The people remaining outside of *cittadini originarii* formed a small group that became the citizens of

¹²⁷ Stuart J. Woolf, "Venice and the Terraferma: Problems of the Change from Commercial to Landed Activities", *Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. by Brian Pullan (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1968), 191.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, 193.

the Republic after some time with the thought that they could contribute to the Republic and after they met certain conditions. They generally consisted of merchants.¹²⁹

Even though the clergymen were counted among citizens, they formed a group that was caught in the middle. The reason for this was the fact that Venice bowed down to Vatican less compared to other city-states. Even the cardinal of the city was elected from the clergymen generally coming from patrician families, but in this election the priority was given to the interests of the Republic. The conflict between the church and the Republic that was palpable during almost the entire Middle Ages and early modern period of Venice made the clergymen in the city having less autonomy compared to other cities of Italy. Yet, particularly in 16th century, the representatives of the Papacy in the city were always from Venetian patrician families, and usually laymen with no previous ecclesiastical experience. While their population was between 300 and 450 in Venetian Renaissance, when the monks living in the surrounding monasteries were added, the number amounted to around 1500 clergymen in Florence.¹³⁰

The ordinary people were separated into two groups as *popolo grande* and *popolo minute*. They were banned from political life and from occupying senior ranks. However, they could participate in religious, social, and commercial activities of the society. *Popolo 67minute*, whether skilled or not, worked in road building, textile works, glass works, barbering, running inns and taverns, bakery, ports, fleets, and maritime duties. *Popolo*

¹²⁹ Romano, *Patricians and Popolani*, 29, 30.

¹³⁰ Nicholas S. Davidson, "The Clergy of Venice in the Sixteenth Century", *Bulletin of the Society of Renaissance Studies*, 2, n/a, (1978), 19; Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 218; Romano, *Patricians and Popolani*, 29, 32.

grande worked in ateliers; they employed workers or worked as headworkers or galley masters in shipyards.¹³¹

As a sea empire, the Republic of Venice had a huge demand for the manpower though she was interested selectively in acquiring territories that that did not serve its commercial, maritime, and security priorities. She adopted different model than the previous empires, Romans and Byzantine to accelerate the commercial income. It exercised its authority over the most important port cities along the Dalmatian, Albanian, and Greek coastlines. It controlled the most strategic islands in the eastern Mediterranean and the Ionian Sea.¹³²

The subjects who occupied as shipwrights, caulkers, makers of masts, pulleys, and gun carriages gained a privileged position in Venice and the Barbary Coast and Ottoman Empire cities. They were dependent on seafaring, while the number of talented shipbuilders was relatively fewer than the demand. Losing the craftsmen as captive to the infidel lands usually meant impossibility to retrieve them due to their skills to their new masters.¹³³

Among all these groups, Venetian *patrizi* and *cittadini* were the first to be helped if they were captured. The ranking to raise and use ransom money was made according to the political or social priorities and financial resources of the Republic. The probability and the number of the enslavement for the *popoli* were high while the *patrizi* and

¹³¹ Burke, *The Greeks of Venice*, 8, 12; James S. Grubb, "Elite Citizens", *Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297-1797*, ed. by John Martin and Dennis Romano (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 340.

¹³² Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 84.

¹³³ Robert C. Davis, "Slave redemption in Venice 1585-1797". *Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State 1297-1797*, ed. by John Jeffries Martin and Dennis Romano (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 461.

cittadini's were not. Therefore, it was normal to prioritize the privileged persons of the Republic. While *popoli* was in third place, the Greek population's request for help in the dominions of the Republic was often ignored.¹³⁴

3.2 Shipbuilding and Shipbuilders as Source of Captive

Before 1460's, the Venetian navy consisted of relatively small ships that were generally transformed from merchant ships. Between 1460 and 1537, the navy had 50 ships, 30 of which were battleships, and the number of battleships was increased to 50 on the eve of the Ottoman-Venetian War of 1537. During this time period, neither the commercial ships nor the battleships admitted any crewmembers from lagoons. In the ships of the Republic, the Slavs and Greeks who came from Dalmatia, Albania or Greek islands worked and a ship was fitted out at Crete every time they went there.¹³⁵

The War of Cyprus, the loss of the dominions in *Stato da Mar*¹³⁶ to the Ottomans, the rise of piracy, and the plague that broke out in 1575 led to radical changes in the Republic. Venice continued to remain an important commercial center since 1574 and was slowly transformed. Instead of building ships, Venice replenished the ships that it took from the Ottomans and used them. The craftsmen whose expertise lied in designing and

¹³⁴ Eric R. Dursteler, "Portare San Marco nel Nuore". Strategie di Integrazione all'Interno Della Nazione Veneziana a Istanbul", *Il Commonwealth Veneziano tra 1204 e La Fine della Repubblica Identità e Peculiarità*, ed. by., Gherardo Ortalli, Jens Schmitt Oliver, Ermanno Orlando (Venezia: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2015), 464.

¹³⁵ Frederic C. Lane, "Wages and Recruitment of Venetian Galeotti, 1470-1580" *Studies in Venetian Social and Economic History*, ed. by Benjamin G. Kohl and Reinhold C. Mueller (London: Variorum Reprint, 1987), X-18.

¹³⁶ *Stato da Mar*: or *Domini da Mar*, maritime and overseas possessions of Republic of Venice between 1000's and 1797.

building ships (*Arsenalotti*)¹³⁷ were encouraged to look for jobs in some other places.¹³⁸ At the end of the century, the caulkers from Arsenal did the same thing. As procuring timber became more expensive, the building of new ships in the shipyard became difficult. The salaries of these shipyard workers controlled by the state were lower compared to independent carpenters. They received half of what the carpenters made. Considering the vacations and the low performance of the shipyard, an experienced shipyard worker made 29 soldi a day on average by working 5 days a week for 250 days and it amounted to 60 ducats annually. Given that one could buy 4.3 kg bread with 24 soldi in 1570s, it is understood that it was really a low amount.¹³⁹

3.3 Mariners

The government applied to them for warships both during the wars between 1499-1540 and also between 1570-1573. This was not only because of their skills as mariners but also due to the fact that they acceded to be recruited to military for a lower salary. The seafaring was arduous and dangerous. Many of them lost their lives or fell captive. It was the mariners' duty to protect the ships and what was inside. If they were to be taken with their ships, they generally fell captive after their cargo was delivered to pirates or the enemy.¹⁴⁰ They were rarely manumitted. These captives, mostly men, were imprisoned

¹³⁷ For the detailed information on this community see. Robert C. Davis, *Shipbuilders of the Venetian Arsenal: Workers and Workplace in the Preindustrial City* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 83-117.

¹³⁸ Frederic C. Lane, *Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 184; Davis, *Shipbuilders*, 113.

¹³⁹ Iordanou, "Pestilence, poverty", 807.

¹⁴⁰ Alethea Wiel, *The Navy of Venice, E.P. Dutton and Company* (New York: 1910), 314, 315.

and enslaved for years while their families collected the manumission money. The death of a family elder who provided for a mariner family or his enslavement was a horrible thing for their families. In case of captivity, the mariner's family applied to the state for support and they looked for jobs for themselves or some other people from the family. For this reason, when mariners were hired by the state, they generally ensured that their children were also employed. The state usually did not provide a sufficient amount. For this reason, the families of the other mariners acted in solidarity and tried to collect the required money. The penny banks that were put in Venetian churches and to which people were expected to put alms for the manumission of captives were generally fuller in Castello.¹⁴¹

When they retired, the state granted them privileges so that they could earn money in some other way. Mariners and their families purchased free housing at *Case della Marinarezza in Riva degli Schiavoni* and ill mariners were able to receive treatment at *Ospedale di Ges. Cristo di Sant' Antonio*. When they died and asked the mariners' guild and scuola members to accompany the coffin, it was accepted as a sign of high respect.¹⁴²

The employment of those people who were not free in the Venetian navy began quite late considering the history of the Republic.¹⁴³ According to Frederic C. Lane, all throughout the 1400s, the crewmembers were free, and they were technically volunteers and received salaries. A new system was developed in the 16th century. In the previous centuries, strong and powerful men were registered as mariners from each neighborhood

¹⁴¹ Burke, *The Greeks of Venice*, 75-76; Davis, *Shipbuilders*, 101; ASVe., *Ospedali e luoghi pii*, busta 101, the statements of the churches that have donation boxes for the slaves dated 1780.

¹⁴² *Ibid*, 75.

¹⁴³ Géraud Poumarède, *L'Empire de Venise et les Turcs: XVIe-XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2020), 333.

on a voluntary basis and they were then grouped. The volunteer mariner received 1 lira from the mariner who made him register to the fleet and 5 liras from the government. According to Marino Sanuto, the income of a mariner was 8 lire a month while an oarsman made 6.5 lire¹⁴⁴ (a lire contains 15.5-19.4 grams of silver).¹⁴⁵ When these fees, which were regulated in accordance with the inflation, began to remain low during the century, everyone who worked in a ship was allowed to carry commercial goods up to a certain weight. However, this system collapsed after the great plague and the listers could not convince people to work in ships despite introducing new incentives and offering better wages. Serving as five charitable institutions, the *Scuole Grandi* were tasked with collecting 100 mariners each. Another measure that was taken during the Venetian-Ottoman War that took place between 1499-1502 was the obligatory recruitment of the gondoliers in the city, who were under 40 or 50 years old, to the navy. In 1530s, it became crystal clear that the Republic was in need of more galleys and crewmembers.¹⁴⁶

Lane is of the opinion that even though the Venetian society was not very egalitarian, the way they organized their sea power was relatively democratic. Many travelling merchants were considered equal to galley masters in terms of wealth, social prestige, and experience. And there was no sharp class distinction between mariners and other merchants and galley masters. Some galley masters could be on a ship in the capacity of a mariner. As long as a mariner carried a certain number of commodities on a small-

¹⁴⁴ Brian Pullan, "Wage-Earners and the Venetian Economy: 150-1630", *Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventh Centuries*, ed. by Brian Pullan (Oxford: Routledge, 2006), 146-174; Frederic C. Lane, "Naval Actions and Fleet Organization 1499-1502", *Renaissance Venice*, ed. by John R. Hale. (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 146-173.

¹⁴⁵ Lane, *Venetian Ships*, 56-59.

¹⁴⁶ Lane, "Wages and Recruitment", X-19; Frederic C. Lane, "Venetian Seamen in the Nautical Revolution of the Middle Ages", ed. by Agostino Pertusi, *Venezia e il Levante fino al secolo XV*, Florence: Olschki, 1973, v. 1, 424; Davis, *Shipbuilders*, 47, 60, 61.

scale, it was normal for him to be a merchant. The crewmembers had the same rights with the merchants on the ship. They had their own chests, beds, and food supply. They also had to procure their own weapons. This balance was tipped in favor of galley masters and merchants with a law passed in 1255. As commercial activities became busier and destination points stretched farther away, the difference between galley masters and mariners further increased. The change in the ship styles and the requirement of keeping the ships constantly armed also had an effect on the number of the crewmembers.¹⁴⁷

Apart from being seamen, the crewmembers also had to be armored oarsmen. Therefore, the oarsmen had to continue to be reliable and experienced. It was the galley masters who were to supply these armors to the mariners. Because of this supply system, mariners became dependent on galley masters. The social status regarding mariners and oarsmen gradually changed. The status of oarsmen descended to waged slavery or debt slavery in time. The penalty that was to be paid in case of escaping from the ship generally amounted to a sum that was impossible to pay for these people with low income. Nevertheless, the punishment of fugitive mariners was addressed more carefully in case of battleships but this was not usually practiced in commercial ships due to the fact that the fugitive mariner generally showed an acquaintance as his witness, legitimized his escape with a conceivable reason, and thereby beat the charge. Besides, it was impossible for an imprisoned mariner to pay his debt while in prison. It was prohibited to demand this debt of the imprisoned mariners from their families.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Lane, "Venetian Seamen", 406-413; Lane, *Venetian Ships*, 13, 15; W. Carew Hazlitt, *The Venetian Republic, Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall* (London: 1915), 566, 714.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 416-420.

The lack of oarsmen also prevented the galley masters to exercise a certain discipline over the crewmembers. The mariners were also aware of the need felt for them. The confidence they had for knowing that they could always find work at times nourished their cruelty, and this could culminate in many mutinies. Although Venice did not witness great munitities like the ones in Barcelona, Thessaloniki, and Genoa, the restlessness of the mariners was well known. There were two types of mariners on a ship: Debt slave or lower-class crewmember and Venetians from high class.¹⁴⁹

Venice's search for 'accredited and reliable' people to recruit as crewmembers by paying attention to its old traditions led to serious problems during this process. In condottiere system, even though the state was not directly engaged with the people recruited by the company, the loyalty of the companies was of great importance. On the other hand, within a state structure that always highlighted the importance of being a Venetian and expected its subjects to always prove their loyalty to the Republic when required, not many volunteers stepped forward as mercenaries. The reluctance of the people of *Terraferma* for military service made it necessary to fulfill this need from the outside sources and through companies. The state did not trust these people and limited the elbowroom of these groups in accordance with the wishes of the republic. In brief, the Venice expected people to be always ready to fight during wartime but remain meek as a sheep during peacetime; however, this did not seem very plausible for the groups surviving within the war sector.

Due to these reservations, out of 109 thousand applications to the recruitment advert, which was issued before the War of Cyprus, 11,800 applications were accepted by

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 427, 428.

the *Collegio* on the grounds that they were deemed ‘reliable.’ The salaries were increased as an incentive; the punishments were pardoned; tax exemptions were provided but these also fell short of delivering the desired outcome. John Hale maintains that it was because people were afraid of being taken captive by the Turks rather than of fighting. For this reason, they did not have the courage to work at sea. A contemporary writer, Giulio Savorgnan wrote down his thoughts about why Italians wanted to be soldiers during the years when the Ottoman-Venetian War continued in 1572. Savorgnan thought that the primary goal of the Italians was to escape. Majority of people resorted to this way in order to avoid being a craftsman, working at the same place for a lifetime or being punished. Only a few people wanted to be soldiers for being honored or for adventure. The remaining ones preferred this way in order to feed themselves and survive.¹⁵⁰

In such an environment, it was impossible for the Republic, who looked for loyalty in its subjects at every situation, to find many people who were highly reliable, skillful, seasoned, faithful, and loyal to the Republic. And it had to reassure the ones it found that they would be able to return to their country¹⁵¹ even if they were taken as captives, in this way, the Republic would be able to fill their places more easily. However, during the three years of the War of Cyprus, this was not possible at all. Not only in *Terraferma* and dominions, but also in other regions of Italy, the fear of being taken captive as crowded groups for a long time took root in people’s minds. Let alone loyalty, for those who were taken captive after having been recruited for very different reasons, the Ottoman lands

¹⁵⁰ ASVe., Senate, Terra. reg. 48 passim; Collegio, Notatorio, reg. 38 passim; ASVe., Annali, s.a., 61-4; BCV., ms. Gradenigo 187, 93-93V; ASVe., Senate, Mar. reg. 39, 149V (4 Apr.) cited in Michael Mallett and John. R. Hale, *The Military Organisation of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 323.

¹⁵¹ ASVe., Senato, Deliberazioni, Registri, Costantinopoli, Reg. 4, 12r, 12v (19 March 1569).

where aristocracy did not rule marked interesting beginnings. Those who were able to perform a craft were able to hold on to life much faster; ones who escaped punishment could start a new life, the adventure seekers could find what they looked for, and those who worked for peanuts would go on to live a similar life. In such a state, the mariner/maritime administrators and states that also dealt with the losses incurred by illnesses should make mariners feel like loyalty was not one-sided and keep the appearance that they were making efforts for the release of the Christians who fell captive to the enemy.

This was actually a vicious circle with many losses. The subjects whose trust was betrayed did not want to carry out their civic duty and because of this, they were not deemed proper citizens and when they were not deemed proper citizens, the Republic did not care about them. It was the Ottomans and the Moors who benefited from this. Many people who fell captive within this vicious circle were put to work in Moorish and Ottoman cities. The qualified ones, especially the mariners, were awarded so as to keep them. The new lives of some of them on the Ottoman territories must have been heard in their countries and left question marks in their public, especially in those people who were within the administrative ranks. Some of these captives would return to Christian lands as Muslims and engaged in diplomatic or commercial activities there as Ottoman subjects. These people who convertor to Islam were referred to as '*rinnagato*', a derogatory term used in the texts written about them, led to disgust in the people of their former countries. These people were able to take care of their business easily since they knew the language and geography; and it was found disgusting since their existence on both Christian lands and in Venice demonstrated their new lives.

On the other hand, it was quite possible for the former slaves who returned to their countries after long years of separation not to be welcomed by their families or run into inheritances that had been shared in the past, fiancées or wives that died or were with someone else or got married. For this reason, one might think that many slaves accepted the situation in which they found themselves and built a world that they could live in to the best of their abilities. Converts were generally the people who chose this way.¹⁵²

It was obvious that the rescue operations were generally carried out for the people from nobility, merchants, and skilled soldiers during the War of Cyprus. The situation was not very different for the Ottomans. During the peace negotiations, nearly all the Ottomans whose names were mentioned for exchange were from the military. However, as different from the Christians, the Ottomans already had certain practical practices in place for captive rescue operations and they had a ransom budget at hand. These practices were implemented both during this process and in its aftermath.

3.4 The Existence of the Slaves in Venice

According to the notary records in Venice, it is documented that there were slaves in the social life of the city since the 11th century. The 1095 record included a slave named Zoeta among the records of members of the Baro family. At this time, it is not recorded where Zoate came from, but according to the manumission record 30 years later, Zoeta was no longer a slave. The word slave was first recorded in the notary registers as the

¹⁵² Suraiya Faruqi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2000), 90.

Latin “*sclavus*” in 1197, but it did not come from Venice but from the semi-autonomous Tire of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. In the said document, the slaves mentioned in the debt deed of 4 Venetian nobles showed them as collateral if the debt was not paid.¹⁵³

Notary records of slavery in the second half of the 12th century are almost nonexistent. However, it is seen that Dubrovnik compensates for this deficit. It should also be noted that the slave trade from the Black Sea has not yet reached Venice as strongly as it did in the 14th and 15th centuries. It is known that a considerable number of slaves from the Slavic hinterland came to Venice in their trade with the lagoon and the Dalmatian coast.¹⁵⁴

As Danuta Quirini-Popławska stated that even though studies were conducted on the presence of slaves in Genoa starting from 1960s, the same thing has not been done for Venice. The Venetians actually continued to actively engage in slave trade between 13th and 15th centuries in their settlements on the northern, western, and southern shores of Black Sea. During this time, the price of the slaves was not exorbitant and not only the wealthy but also ordinary Venetian citizens could buy a slave.¹⁵⁵ This tradition went on during the Middle Ages. Both male and female slaves were purchased by the doge of the Republic, its religious and secular governors, monasteries, hospitals, nobility, and citizens.

¹⁵³ Charles Verlinden, *L' esclavage dans l'Europe médiévale v.2, Italie, colonies italiennes du Levant, Levant latin, empire byzantin* (Ghent: Rijksuniversiteit te Gent, 1977), 150-152.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 153.

¹⁵⁵ The slave prices in Venice were floating due to not only the physical properties and sex but also the political developments in the Mediterranean, Dalmatia, and the Black Sea. For instance, in 1312, Greek women were worth 4.8, 12 ducats in 1315, and 10 to 12 ducats in 1318. In 1365, on the other hand, a man was worth 30 ducats, and in 1385, a young girl of 14 was worth 50 ducats. Between 1360 and 1364, the price for young female Tatar slaves was from 17 to 40 ducats, while the price for the young male slaves was from 15 to 34 ducats. *Ibid*, 555-559 For the list of the years between 1360 and 1469, see 575-584, 588-598, 604-611 625-636; Danuta Quirini-Popławska, “The Venetian Involvement in the Black Sea Slave Trade (Fourteenth to Fifteenth Centuries”, *Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean (c. 1000–1500 CE)* ed. by Reuven Amitai and Christoph Cluse. (Turnhout: Brepols N.V., 2018), 255-257.

80% of these people who were imported from the East were female. They were generally young and put to domestic service. Only a few of them were able to protect themselves from sexual abuse. The male slaves were also put to domestic service and worked as craftsmen, agricultural workers or oarsmen at ships.¹⁵⁶ These slaves who were generally given Christian names were sometimes manumitted under certain circumstances with a will after the death of their owners. As the documents including the arrangements of the period showed, a slave attempting to escape was heavily punished.¹⁵⁷

According to the predictions of Verlinden and Balard, the slaves consisted 4% of the population in Genoa, Florence, and Naples. The rate in Venice should be more or less similar. The existence of the slaves in Venice can be deduced from the notary land titles, travelogues of the galley masters and merchants, the decrees of the Senate, Maggior Consiglio, and Quarantii. These slaves generally came from Black Sea, the steppes close to the Caspian Sea, and Caucasia. Before the arrival of the Italians, slave trade was active in Black Sea and Sudak (Soldaia) was included in the Venetian commerce network and it is known that the Venetian consul here received 150 aspers per slave. The slaves could also be purchased from a merchant marine. For this reason, there was a notary in each ship who also served as the priest of the ship. These notaries would record the slave sales that were made while seafaring or during transition.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ The Republic generally avoided using captive oarsmen in the navy. When possible, it preferred to have free and salaried oarsmen on the ships. However, since this preference did not yield favorable outcomes in the two major wars of 1540 and 1570, this tradition began to change gradually. See, Andrea Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare l'aria tranquilla. Venezia e il riscatto degli schiavi in età moderna* (Venice: Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti, 2013), 19.

¹⁵⁷ Quirini-Popławska, “*The Venetian Involvement*”, 257; Georg Christ, “Differentiated Legality: Venetian Slave Trade in Alexandria”, *Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean (c. 1000–1500 CE)* ed. by Reuven Amitai and Christoph Cluse. (Turnhout: Brepols N.V., 2018), 302, 303.

¹⁵⁸ Quirini-Popławska, “*The Venetian Involvement*”, 265.

Dubrovnik was another active harbor that met the demand of Italians for slaves since Roman times. The slaves brought to the city were generally from Bosnia and Serbia. The reason for the large number of enslaved Bosnians was that Catholics saw the Bogomil faith of Bosnians as a legitimate reason to enslave them, and slaves from Serbia originally came from Russia, Hungary, and Romania. Most of the female slaves were young girls sold in the city as concubines, while others were for domestic service or agriculture. The city itself used enslaved men for shipbuilding and maritime services. The average prices for the Bosnian slaves were 1-2 ducats in the 1350s. This rate increased to 35-40 ducats by the end of the century. The price rise continued consistently in the 1400s while the prices varied. The Italian merchants may pay between 20 and 1600 ducats per slave. In the mid-15th century, enslaving Bosnians declined¹⁵⁹ due to the Western opposition¹⁶⁰ and the protest of the Bosnian government for the enslavement of its own people rather than from prohibitive measures by the Turkish authorities.¹⁶¹

From the end of the 15th century, most of the slaves in the city were those who came from the Balkans and Africa. The slaves who tried to run away although they were advised on the contrary received harsh punishments. And when they wanted to escape, they were caught due to their skin colors and the geographical characteristic of the city of Venice. With a decision taken in the Senate in 1489, the slaves who attempted to escape and who were caught would be exhibited from San Marco to Rialto by being lashed, those

¹⁵⁹ For the detailed lists of slaves bought in Dubrovnik and brought to Venice between 1388 and 1398 see. Bariša Krekić, "Contributo allo studio degli schiavi levantini e balcanici a Venezia (1388-1398)", *Dubrovnik, Italy, and the Balkans in the Late Middle Ages* (London: Variorum, 1980), VII- 379-394.

¹⁶⁰ The Senate reiterated a prohibition against buying Muslims or other subjects of the sultan in 1419 and 1420. See. Christ, "Differentiated Legality", 303.

¹⁶¹ Francis W. Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classical City-state* (London: Seminar Press, 1972), 239, 242, 269.

who reported the fugitive slaves would be awarded¹⁶² and those who helped them would be sentenced to one year of imprisonment. In 18th century, the city still had a slave population and since all the supply roads of Venice from Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Black Sea were closed, these slaves were generally ‘Moors’, from North Africa.¹⁶³

3.5 Ottomans in Venice

In the city, besides the slaves, there were always few Ottoman subjects who had an allowance to stay. Certainly, they were generally Ottoman official or merchants. We can understand that the Ottoman Muslims who came to Venice for various reasons were not pressured to stay in a single place on the basis of the information that the negotiations for establishing such a place only began in the second half of the 16th century. The Ottomans in the city actually wanted a place in the city that was just for them. A fixed place belonging to them would serve as a place where they could store their products and live safely. If such a place was to be founded, a Venetian Greek named Lettino requested to run it and gave a petition concerning it. According to him, the places where Turks stayed in a dispersed manner were frequently robbed. They were at times exposed to various violent acts, threats, and insults in the Castello region where people from the Levant and

¹⁶² Reinhold C. Mueller, “Venezia e i primi schiavi neri”, *Archivio Veneto*, 5th ser., 113 (1979), 139–42; Georg Christ, *Trading Conflicts: Venetian Merchants and Mamluk Officials in Late Medieval Alexandria* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 124, 125; Salvatore Bono, “Neri Africani Schiavi in Europa: dalla Circumnavigazione Dell’Africa Alla Proibizione della Tratta (1444-1815)”, *Il Politico*, Maggio-Agosto 2013, Vol. 78, No. 2 (233) (Maggio-Agosto 2013), 217,

¹⁶³ Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 170.

Balkans were in the majority. After the Battle of Lepanto, some Ottoman merchants even locked themselves at their houses due to the fear of being attacked.¹⁶⁴

Thanks to Maria Pia Pedani, we learn about what happened to Hasan and Mustafa, who came to the city as the men of Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha over Dubrovnik¹⁶⁵ after their road safety was ensured in March 1574 in order to negotiate the exchange of Cyprus and Lepanto captives. The two Ottomans citizens staying in an inn named La Corona close to San Marco stated in their submitted petition that while they were watching the outside scenery from the window, some people screamed at them saying ‘*becco, cornuto, giudio et cane*’ (horned, Jewish, and dog). The 4-5 people who came inside with their daggers and swords were soldiers. The brave reaction of Hacı Mustafa who screamed ‘*bre can!*’ by drawing his machete also drew the attention of the people outside. In this way, they were able to save their lives. Venetian authorities on learning what happened to Hasan and Mustafa, who could carry a firearm on them since they were Ottoman officers, were clearly concerned. They notified the local governors and relevant authorities that these people should not be touched and in case anything might befall them, the responsible people would be punished.¹⁶⁶

These inns and mansions that Ottomans stayed during their time in Venice also provided interaction for the captives with Ottoman origins. Lettino testified in court with regard to a fugitive captive; the slaves of other merchants came to his inn in order to mingle with the Turks coming here. The Christian slaves of the Muslims who stayed there

¹⁶⁴ Ortega, “Across Religious”. 71.

¹⁶⁵ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 23 / 578 (13 Shavval 981 / 5 February 1574).

¹⁶⁶ Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, “Between Diplomacy and Trade: Ottoman merchants in Venice”, *Merchants in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Suraiya Faruqi and Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Peeters, 2008), 17.

would also be with them. Venetians, who were accustomed to all types of slavery in the Levant, were generally uncomfortable with something like this. First of all, the over-socialization of those who were allowed to be in the city for commercial or any other purposes with the Christians was a striking source of uneasiness for people. In 1591, when a slave named Pietr who was christened in Russia came to the city with his Muslim owner, he told the inquisition authorities that he tried to run away from his master over and over again in order to live as a Christian again.¹⁶⁷

In another case, with the help of the state officers, the Church took Armenian Gregorio who stayed with Hüseyin from his side and asked him to write a petition explaining the situation. In the petition, Hüseyin stated that Gregorio actually belonged to someone called Ahmed who came to the city and that he bought him for 20 ducats. Hüseyin wanted to give Gregorio back to his owner have some capital. Even though Gregorio said that he was a Christian, there was a chance that he was a Muslim and in accordance with the treaty between the two states, he could not be detained. Besides, Hüseyin had the right over Gregorio as his owner and the authorities could not change that.¹⁶⁸

As in Ottomans, it was useful to distinguish between private and public slaves in Venice as well. Just like in the Ottomans, the house owners thought that it was better for the slaves to convert to their religion so that they could be better integrated to the family. However, conversion was not encouraged in public slaves like in the Ottomans. It was because when a slave converted into the formal religion of the society in which he was

¹⁶⁷ ASVe., Sant'Ufficio, busta 35, 9 September 1573; busta 67, 15 January 1591 cited in Ortega, "Across Religious", 75.

¹⁶⁸ ASVe., Sant'Ufficio, busta, 47, 30 December 1581 cited in *ibid*, 76.

kept captive, it meant that he was detained and forced to work by his co-religionists and this was not appropriate in both religious teachings. If the slave were to be freed after changing his/her religion, there would be a loss of labor in the industry.¹⁶⁹

While the need for oarsmen in the Venetian navy was met with volunteers and mercenary mariners up until 16th century, things changed in this century. While these free people patrolled the places under the rule of the Ottomans, they did not want to be taken as captives but the Republic whose army depended on its navy also needed oarsmen. In this way, the need for oarsmen was met through captives. Compared with other states, the number of captive oarsmen that Venice had was quite few in number. The reason for this was the treaties signed with the Ottomans, the borders of which covered nearly the entire Mediterranean. Especially in the treaty of 1540, Venice promised to return back all the Turkish captives including the pirates. The Republic tried to fill this vacuum with the captives coming from the Balkans and Dalmatia.¹⁷⁰

But despite all the articles and bans in the treaties, how come Turks were still oarsmen in the Venetian navy? Salvatore Bono states that the sources were silent on this issue and the research also approved this silence.¹⁷¹ The Venetians hid the existence of the Turks (Muslim-Ottoman subjects) whom they employed as oarsmen in Venetian galleys as best as they could.

We can catch some clues from the archival documents, memoirs, or letters about the secret employment of Ottoman subjects in the Venetian galley. For instance, Antonio

¹⁶⁹ Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 12.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 19.

¹⁷¹ Bono, *Yeniçağ İtalya'sında*, 21-31.

Bragadin, who plundered the sunken ship in Cairo in 1557, mentioned the slaves in his galley. The boat was going to Istanbul to bring Egypt's annual tax. He got many weapons and slaves and brought them to Cyprus along with the treasure. According to the testimony of some Ottoman subjects, there were Muslim rowers in chains on the Venetian galleys, which was absolutely against the ahidname. In fact, Mansur, an Ottoman citizen from the town of Tire agreed to 50 ducats to redeem his cousins among those rowers, but his cousins were not there. The qadı of Tripoli called those on the Venetian galley to deepen the investigation but got no response. Captain Antonio Dona and the bailo's secretary, Battista, denied the accusations.¹⁷²

According to Andrea Pelizza, there was a game of showing these oarsmen as slaves who converted to Christianity and thereby the articles of the treaty were avoided. The reason as to why the Turkish oarsmen were insistently requested was the fact that they were fit to do so. While Venice used 2000 of the 3486 captives that were caught in the Battle of Lepanto¹⁷³ (this issue will be addressed in more detail in another chapter), this number was limited to 25 in 1609. However, it was highlighted that these people were not put to the oars and were treated nicely. In 1651, the number was around 352 but they were mostly North Africans Ottoman subjects.¹⁷⁴

The fastest escape route from the south of Italy was to pass over to North Africa while it was through Venice from the north. As Gerlach recorded that, in 1570's, one who

¹⁷² Maria Pia Pedani, *Inventory of the of the "Lettere e scritture Turchesche" of the Venetian State Archives* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 24.

¹⁷³ In Turkish, *İnebahtı Deniz Savaşı* and in the Ottoman documents it was named as *Donanma Muharebesi*.

¹⁷⁴ Bono, *Yeniçağ İtalya'sında*, 223-225; Tayyip Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu ve Bizimle İlgili Diğer Belgeler", *Belleten*, v. V-VIII, nr. 9-12 (1968-1971), 29, 30, Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 21, 22.

set out from Venice could if at a suitable opportunity, take a boat to Alexandria and Cairo for five ducats. This journey could sometimes cost ten ducats. Thus, the boat owner also covers the passengers' food and beverage expenses and provides their accommodation and various needs. It took more than 370 miles to get there from here.¹⁷⁵

In southern Italy, islands such as Giannutri and Lampedusa were a shelter for the fugitive slaves in the Mediterranean. The island of Lampedusa in particular, which was situated among Tunisia, Malta and Italy was the place that functioned as a place for making a non-verbal contract both for Christians and Muslims. In a cave on this island, there was an altar and shrine dedicated to the Virgin Mary and people left food and money there. Legend has it that a saint lived here and he would turn a light on in order to show the road to the island at nights. This saint who introduced himself as a Muslim to Muslims and as a Christian to Christians and who talked in Sicilian dialect was also the source of inspiration for the concept of '*hermit di Lampedusa*', which means one with double faith.¹⁷⁶

For the slaves who wanted to escape from the north, the porous land borders of Venice with the Ottomans and their ships going to the Levant presented them a chance to return to their countries. Venice was also the only Italian state that had borders on the east with the Ottoman territories. In addition, as stipulated in the treaties, Venice was liable to lend help to the Ottoman subjects who escaped. The story of Sciaba Domenico, who came from other cities of Italia and wanted to return to his country through Venice and whose

¹⁷⁵ Stephan Gerlach, *Türkiye Günlüğü 1573-1576*, trans. by Türkis Noyan (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi 2017), v. II, 602.

¹⁷⁶ Lucetta Scaraffia, *Rinnegati: Per una storia dell'identità occidentale* (Roma: Laterza, 1993), 15-18; Bono, *Yeniçağ İtalya'sında*, 551.

story was recorded in detail thanks to the inquisition court, shows the importance of the naval route.

In March 1584, the Holy Office (Sant'Uffizio) officer Girolama Vitriario heard the case of Domenico Sciaba born in Modon. Domenico Sciaba came under the radar of the Inquisition in order to ascertain his religion. It was understood during the court hearing that Domenico's story was quite complicated. Domenico from Modon was 37-38 years old. He was taken captive when he was a soldier in a Turkish ship (*io era soldato in una galera del turcho*). It was not certain when he was taken captive. However, he stated that he was the captive of Papacy. He said that he was born to a Muslim family (*nato de turcha*) and he used to be a Muslim and added that his name was Sciaba. This name was actually a variation of the Arabic Saba and Hebrew Shabbat. We do not know whether Domenico's parents were from the Jewish community in Modon. He said that his father's name was Morat. When the Inquisition officer Vitriario asked Domenico what his religion was, he said that he was a Christian. The officer approached Domenico with suspicion because Turks were not dressed like him. He added that he received the name Domenego/Domenico when he was christened in Christmas during that year in St. Pietro Cathedral in Rome. A few months after the christening, Domenico was captured in Venice. In the court, he said that he left Rome to find a job. The officer sent him to jail in order to further investigate his situation.

Domenico wanted to cross into the Ottoman territories with a ship and to that end, he asked the help of some people living in the city. The common characteristic of these people, among whom there were converts and Armenians, was that they all had a past in or contact with the Ottoman lands. Greek Domenico and former Muslim Tommaso

d'Angori (he must be from Ankara¹⁷⁷), the witnesses of the case, verified that there was an incongruity in Domenico's answers due to his clothing. Considering that one's clothing and hair directly referred to his/her religion during that period, this was quite normal. One of the witnesses Tommaso d'Angori stated that the Turks who helped Domenico in Venice until a suitable ship was found told him to cut his hair and beard off. Two other witnesses, Armenians d'Andonna and Giorgio said that Domenico asked for help from Turks 7-8 days before in front of San Marco Church in order to return to his country. In the end, the court did not believe in Domenico and decided that he was a convert. As a punishment, he was sent to pull oars.¹⁷⁸

3.6 Venetian Slave Trade

There were attempts to ban slavery and slave trade at various periods in Venetia as of 10th century. The underlying rationale of these successive decisions was the wish to ban trade with Muslims of those commodities that benefited them and the uneasiness that Vatican felt for the enslavement of people from the Eastern Churches.¹⁷⁹ However, these

¹⁷⁷ Venice was familiar with Ottoman merchants from Ankara. Due to the popularity of mohair / sof in Europe. It was accepted as a high-luxury item in the 1600s and 1700s and produced only in Central Anatolia until the 19th century. The Ottoman merchants came to the city frequently to sell this cloth. For further information see, Suraiya Faroqhi, "Honour and Hurt Feelings: Complaints addressed to an Ottoman merchant trading in Venice", *Merchants in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Suraiya Faroqhi and Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Peeters, 2008), 63-80.

¹⁷⁸ Georgios Plakotos, "The Venetian Inquisition and aspects of "otherness" - Judaizers, Muslim and Christian converts (16th-17th century)" (Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Glasgow, 2004), 155-164.

¹⁷⁹ The briefs/bulls of the Pope affected other Venetians as well. For example, according to Marino Sanuto the Elder, blocking trade with Muslims, with Mamelukes in particular, would not only enable the recapture of the Holy Lands but also lead to the collapse of the Byzantine Empire. See. Johannes Pahlitzsch, "Slavery and The Slave Trade in Byzantium in the Palaeologan Period", *Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean (c. 1000–1500 CE)* ed. by Reuven Amitai and Christoph Cluse (Turnhout: Brepols N.V., 2018), 171.

bans came to nothing in practice like the ones that came after them. Slave trade was quite profitable. Provided that the slaves arrived in the market port in good health, they occupied much less space on the ship compared to other commercial commodities. They were easy to transfer. The slaves who were put to use in industrial services in the city or in domestic services made life easier for their owners as they did throughout history and they at times turned a profit. In 876 and 945, the Republic attempted to ban the slave trade. Slave trade and this time, slavery were officially and again banned by doge Giovanni Molino in 945 and by doge Pietro Candiano IV and Grado patriarch Buono in 960.¹⁸⁰

Actually, the prohibitions of 876 and 960 were related to the Venetian economic rival with Byzantine Empire. Byzantium had precisely the same activity in the same period on the eastern front and would like to reduce the slave trade activities of the Republic. As a reaction, the Republic promulgated the edicts against the slave trade. Then, Empire had to change its strategy by using customs and fiscal authority instead of blocking Venetian merchants with the edicts.¹⁸¹

In 1366, *Quarantia Criminale* banned the selling of slaves by auction in Rialto Market. The decree dated June 13, 1412 banned the captains of commerce ships from collecting slaves on their ships and introduced a fine of 50 ducats in case they did so. For this reason, one cannot find many slave registers in ships after this date. One of the solutions developed to break the ban was to give a commission of 100 ducats, which was double the amount of this fine, to the galley master. In this way, the slave costs on average increased as well. When Maggior Consiglio banned slave trade for merchants after 6 years,

¹⁸⁰ Youval Rotman, "Medieval Slavery in a New Geopolitical Space", *Critical Readings on Global Slavery*, ed. by Damian Alan Pargas and Felicia Roşu (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 638, 639, 662.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*, 663.

it was understood in 1419 that the Venetians paid no attention to this ban because it was seen that the senior officers of the galleons sold slaves and transferred them to Venice in the same year. In 1423, Senate introduced a fixed fee for those who imported slaves for their own sake.¹⁸²

In 1434, all the slaves were obliged to go from Black Sea to Europe through Theodosia. It was because the bishop of Theodosia checked whether there were Christian slaves who were forcibly enslaved among the slaves who would be transferred. This uneasiness was also evident in the decree of 1455 as the decree stated that those who brought Slavic and Albanian (*schiaivoni* and *albanesi*) children to the city as slaves would be punished with a fine of 100 ducats and would be banned from doing so. Another reason underlying the ban was the possibility that the ships carrying these slaves might fall captive to Moorish, Catalan, or Turkish pirates.¹⁸³ The circumstances were not as favorable as they were during 13th and 14th centuries. While the Ottoman expansion in the region put the Orthodox population under protection, who were granted *emân*¹⁸⁴ after the conquests, those who attacked the people carrying these slaves regarded them as people who carried the people with *emân* in the waters of Dar-al Islam. But this trade was still so profitable that the Venetian merchants began to insure these ‘merchandise’ that they brought from the East in order to minimize the loss of life and property.

¹⁸² Quirini-Popławska, “The Venetian Involvement”, 270; Christ, “Differentiated Legality”, 312.

¹⁸³ Annika Stello, “Caffa and the Slave Trade during the First Half of the Fifteenth Century”, *Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean (c. 1000–1500 CE)* ed. by Reuven Amitai and Christoph Cluse (Turnhout: Brepols N.V., 2018), 376, 377; Quirini-Popławska, “The Venetian Involvement”, 271.

¹⁸⁴ *Āmān*: or *emân*, literally means safety, security, guarantee, protection, safeguard, asylum, or the promise or assurance of security, quarter, or clemency to be granted to enemies during battle. For further reading see. Joseph Schacht, “Amān”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition (EI2), v. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 429, 430.

On the other hand, the travelogue Pero Tafur, who was in Theodosia during 1430s, considered another factor to be confusing regarding this issue. Tafur stated that the merchants engaged in slave trade had the permission from Papacy allowing them to keep the eastern Christians as permanent captives in order to prevent them from being caught by the Muslims.¹⁸⁵ If we accept that Tafur's statements are accurate, the Muslims he mentions are Mamelukes and since each slave that the Mamelukes get their hands on runs the risk of fighting against the Christians in the coming years, such a decision shows the predicament of the Christian world as well. The presence of a bishop checking whether the slaves coming to the city during the years when Tafur was in Theodosia were Christians or not led to an increase in the number of the captives who were made to wait as such and the to the problem of dealing with them.

Merchants came up with a solution for every ban as required by the occasion. For instance, selling the slaves they bought from Black Sea on their route was another solution. The merchant ships of the Republic generally arrived in Venice after passing through Straits, Aegean and Ionian Seas, and Adriatic. Before that, they could cast anchor in Crete, Cyprus, and Rhodes and sell the merchandise that they bought from the Levant at a profit before reaching to Venice. One of the solutions found particularly for the transfer of the enslaved Christians was to set sail toward Anatolian ports rather than İstanbul. From there, these slaves were taken to the southern ports of Syria and Anatolia by land with the intention of reaching to Egypt even though this was costly and risky.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ Pero Tafur, *Travels and Adventures 1435-1439* (Oxford: Routledge, 2004), 133.

¹⁸⁶ Quirini-Popławska, "The Venetian Involvement", 271; Stello, "Caffa and the Slave Trade", 389, 390.

One of the most important buyers of these slaves had been Bahrî Mamelukes at first and then Burcî Mamelukes for approximately three centuries. The Mameluke sultans did everything they could in order to keep the supply channels of the slaves flowing through Caucasia, Black Sea. To that end, they at times made express and secret agreements with the Byzantine Emperor and Italian merchants. For example, when the Ilkhanids blocked the passing of slaves from their own lands due to the tensions between the two states, the Mameluke Sultan signed agreement with the Byzantine Emperor in 1281. The agreement particularly referred to the ships coming from the port of Sudak. The only exception in this agreement was the requirement that the slaves should not be Christians. When this was the case, the Byzantines reserved the right to block the passing of the ships on the basis of a religious reason.¹⁸⁷ Besides in case a subject of the Mameluke Sultan attempted to sell a slave, who was a subject of the Empire, to an ambassador of the Empire, this would be condoned. Venice was well aware of the relations between the two states and continued to do its best in its capacity as a state by carrying out its part in the supply chain in order to benefit from this for long years.¹⁸⁸ Riccardo Predelli's *I Libri Commemoriali Della Repubblica di Venezia* in which he compiled the letters of Venetian doges is a significant source that enable us to keep track of this tripartite relationship. The compilation includes a plethora of information such as the participation of the Greek merchants, who unlike the Venetians were normally not slave traders but who took advantage of the situation regarding the slave trade, the abduction of free people and their

¹⁸⁷ At least, any monotheistic religions did not allow to the enslavement of their own coreligionist. For the similarities and differences of the monotheistic religions on enslavement, see. Rotman, "Medieval Slavery", 588-664; Christoph Cluse and Reuven Amitai, "Introduction", *Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean (C. 1000–1500 Ce)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 11-27.

¹⁸⁸ Pahlitzsch, "Slavery and The Slave Trade", 168, 171.

enslavement, and the potential buyers of these slaves, namely Greek monasteries and monks.¹⁸⁹

Thanks to these registers that the historians used after centuries, we can see that Venice sustained this relationship underhandedly on the state level despite the express order of the Catholic Church. For example, the Senate did not want to get on the bad side of the Mameluke Sultan and took another decision in 1420 that would have a negative effect on the income Venice made from the slave trade: The citizens, subjects, and people of the Republic and the merchants travelling to Sultan's lands were not allowed to buy Sultan's subjects and those people referred to as Saracens.¹⁹⁰ This ban somehow excluded the Saracens and black people who were bought 'according to custom'. Even though Venetians acted more carefully considering the harsh punishments that Mamelukes would inflict after this arrangement, they still resorted to various tricks in order to supply slaves. For example, they showed the slave not as newly purchased but as already their own. As the Venetians were able to continue to buy Egyptian Christians and Saharan and Sub-Saharan slaves, this ban did not affect them much at the beginning but led to a change in the demography of the slaves within the city throughout decades.¹⁹¹

Despite the frequently introduced bans and the discourse exalting the liberation of slaves (of course only if the slave was a coreligionist or s/he was christened), it was not preferred much to restrict the use of slaves in Venice. In situations such as illness, there

¹⁸⁹ *I libri commemoriali della Repubblica di Venezia: Regesti, Monumenti storici pubblicati dalla R. Deputazione veneta di storia patria*, ed. by Riccardo Predelli Venice: Deputazione Veneta di Storia Patria, 1876–1914.

¹⁹⁰ This term was used by Europeans to define Muslims, first Arabs, but also Turks and Persians during the Medieval times.

¹⁹¹ Christ, "Differentiated Legality", 304, 313.

was always need for more slaves in order to prevent the loss of labor. The following situation gradually emerged: While only a few Greek/Pontus slaves came to the city as registered, they were generally taken to Egypt. Nearly all the merchants who, on average, took thousand slaves each year to Egypt were Italians. In some memoirs and records, these merchants were referred to as ‘bad Christians’ and they kept doing this in order to ensure the continuity of their income. Those who came to Venice were slaves brought from Russian steppes, Caucasia and its surrounding regions. The male slaves whose customer was Mameluke Sultanate were generally taken to Egypt and female slaves were taken to Western European markets.¹⁹²

The situation was more different and complicated in the Balkans. The Slavic and Greek settlements that remained within the Ottoman borders were at times attacked by the militia of the Venetian colonies and as a result of these attacks not only the Muslims, but also Orthodox and Catholic Christians were taken captive. Andrea Pelizza mentions that these slaves were not considered Christians in the eyes of the buyers in Rome and Naples. Most of the time, they were given a fake Muslim identity and called Muslim names. The same thing also happened on the Ottoman side. The same people were sold as ‘Venetian infidels’ by the Ottoman captive merchants. Although clergymen and missionaries reported this situation to Venetian Senate and Vatican many times, their complaints were not effective.¹⁹³

Byzantine İstanbul was one of the slave supply-centers for Venice. Giacomo Badoer, who was in the city as a merchant between 1436-1440, bought many slaves here.

¹⁹² *Ibid*, 303; Stello, “Caffa and the Slave Trade”, 390.

¹⁹³ For some cases in the Balkans see. White, *Piracy and*, 48, 57, 67, 257; Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 16, 17.

Most of these slaves, who were generally recorded with their previous and new Christian names, were Tatars, Ruthenians. The other nationalities in descending order were Circassians, Bulgarians, Abkhaz people, Turks, Mingrelians, Vlachs, Greeks, and Ossetians. According to Tana records, the average price for a female slave was 44 ducats and the average age was 25 while the average price for a male slave was 42 ducats and the average age was 15. Their age, where they came from, their physical appearances and bodily flaws, if they had any, their body structures, skin color, and health condition were also recorded. The slaves who were recorded as *balabani* in their records were generally male slaves who were purchased to be sold to the Mamelukes. New clothes were provided for the slaves who were usually tied up with chains during their travels. This was not out of the generosity of the slave owners but in order to ensure that the slaves would not stand out in the ship and in the new place that they arrived and look better as can be especially understood from the cap and a sort of overcoat given to female captives.¹⁹⁴

Even though the practice of slavery was common in social life, Byzantines abstained from enslaving their own coreligionists. If they took Orthodox people captive, they claimed that they would release them only with their pants on after taking their armor. A captive could only be enslaved in case s/he were a barbarian who did not believe in Jesus Christ. During the late period, these Barbarians would generally indicate the Turks. In 1296, after the Byzantine general Alexios Philanthropenos took back Menderes, he enslaved many Turkish women and children. When the male relatives of these slaves wanted them back, he told them that the exchange could only take place in exchange for

¹⁹⁴ Quirini-Popławska, "The Venetian Involvement", 268, 269, 271; Charles Verlinden, "Venezia e il commercio degli schiavi provenienti dalle coste orientali del Mediterraneo", *Venezia e il Levante fino al secolo XV*, ed. by Agostino Pertusi (Florence: Olschki, 1973), v.1, 918.

the same number of female slaves. Byzantine Empire's stance of insisting upon the same number of slaves in slave exchange can also be traced from the later sources as well. In the exchange with Mameluke Sultan in 1349, this term of equal numbers was implemented.¹⁹⁵

However, it is understood that the sensitivity toward the enslavement of Orthodox people in the 14th century was on the decrease since the Turks, supporters of Kantekuzenos in the civil war, fell into the habit of selling the Christian captives as slaves. As the possibility of winning the war slowly waned for Byzantine Empire, the Byzantine people ran a higher risk of falling captive. Out of 39 slave records that the notary in Cyprus named Nicolas de Boateris kept between 1360-62, 28 of them belonged to Greek slaves. According to the records of the notary Manoli Bresciano that were kept between 1381-88, 29% of the 406 sales was made up of Greek slaves. However, the sale of Greek people in the Island had come to a complete halt in the 15th century. There were two main reasons for this. Even though Crete came under the Ottoman rule at quite a later date, the region itself and Black Sea came under the control of the Ottomans, and Venice's political approach toward the Greeks in its colonies changed over time.¹⁹⁶ In the end, slave trade was made up of a web of relations in which the states of the 14th century Mediterranean participated in by considering the political, religious, and economic factors and that they formed an order for better or for worse. This order was completely reshaped with the appearance of the Ottoman State.

¹⁹⁵ Pahlitzsch, "Slavery and The Slave Trade", 164, 165.

¹⁹⁶ Verlinden, "Venezia e il commercio", 915, 917; Pahlitzsch, "Slavery and The Slave Trade 167; Burke, *The Greeks of Venice*, 5-7.

3.7 Transformation of Captivity Tradition

The growing Turkish force until the loss of Eğriboz / Negroponte / Euboea did not bother the Venetians greatly. Venetians actually did not notice the aggressiveness of the Turkish army until Eğriboz took place. According to Venetian sources, the reason as to why the Sultan was so angry at Eğriboz was due to the attack in Enez in 1469 given that the Sultan attacked Eğriboz precisely one year after on the same day. According to the 4-page letter that Nicolò da Canal wrote to the doge, the city was looted for five hours and Venice took 2000 captives during this attack. More than 80 of these captives were from rich families described as people wearing silk clothes and 16 of them were women from the families of the Ottoman administrators. Another source records that almost 200 Greek female captives were taken to Negroponte¹⁹⁷ in the aftermath of the attack. All the janissaries in the city were killed through mutilation. As Canal describes in his report in a detailed manner, Venetian forces were able to enter Enez in approximately one hour. Enez is placed at the entrance of Dardanelles, close to Istanbul by land and was placed quite inland considering the continental shelf. In the time period that it would take the messengers to set out and ask for help after hearing about the attack on the city, the attack had to be completed and Canal did exactly this. Such a quick attack to an Ottoman city in such a position also shook the authority of the center.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ On Venice's commercial route to Istanbul, Coron and Modon were the most important ports for supply. Commodities and supplies came from Crete, Euboea, and the Greek islands. At the beginning of the 1500s, Venetian ships going to Trabzon and Tana stopped by Eğriboz and Istanbul for resupply, see. Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 87.

¹⁹⁸ Alberto Tenenti, "The Sense of Space and Time in the Venetian World", *Renaissance Venice*, ed. by John R. Hale (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 24; Reinhold C. Mueller, "War and Beatitude: The Ottoman

Girolamo Longo, one of the Venetian commanders, depicted the appearance of the enemy army and his own reaction against this as follows: ‘Sea is like a forest; it seems incredible to hear it but the incredible thing is actually seeing it.’ When the Ottomans took Eğriboz, roughly 800 men were gathered and beheaded. Among the women and young people, those under 18 were enslaved. The attack that began on July 8 ended on July 14 when Sultan entered the city. Sultan returned to İstanbul on July 15 leaving the city to itself. The news regarding the fall of Negroponte reached to Venice on August 8. Eğriboz was the first scene where Venetians were enslaved in masses. Many women and children who fell captive during the Turkish raids and managed to escape began to come to Venice. The list of the widows and orphans for whom a ransom was to be paid was so long in 1471 that there was no room left on the parchment of the Senate. The rest of the names were recorded on a different paper. The benefactors in the city began to use their dowries or inheritances for these poor people. Even 5 years after Eğriboz, 15 of these people submitted a petition to the Senate stating their plight and asking for help. They described themselves as from the nobility of Eğriboz who fell captive after their sons, husbands, and relatives were dismembered by the Turks and who luckily managed to save themselves from captivity and returned to the Republic. These women also lived in destitution after they returned to the Republic.¹⁹⁹

Conquest of Negroponte (1470) and the Founding of the Venetian Convent of the Holy Sepulchre”, *Warfare and Politics Cities and Government in Renaissance Tuscany and Venice*, ed. by Humfrey Butters and Gabriele Neher (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020), 69.

¹⁹⁹ Tenenti, “The Sense of Space”, 24; Mueller, “War and Beatitude”, 72.

3.8 Old School: Condottieri

The army regulations from 1430s included a plethora of information such as the organization of the troops, their materials and staff members, the oath that the army and navy members took stating that they would remain loyal to Venice, abide by the rules, not cooperate with the enemy, not cause internal turmoil, not pass through the cities unauthorized, and not misuse the guarantees. The state of the captives as spoils of war was also mentioned in these regulations.²⁰⁰ Apart from the clearly stated exceptions, the captives that were captured and spoils of the war during a military expedition belonged to war contractors called *condottiere*.²⁰¹ The state charged 10% tax from these companies for those captives who were taken as spoils of war. In case the captive or captives that were captured were important, they were required to be handed over to the state. People who rebelled to the state in war time, the dynasty members or governors of the enemy state, senior commanders or captains were handed over to the state after they were caught in exchange for a certain amount of ransom.²⁰²

The fate of a war captive depended on his social and economic condition. In the mercenary system, neither the companies nor the states had the suitable facilities to accommodate high number of captives. The captives that were suitable candidates for ransom demand were sold to *condottieri*, who had the facilities to accommodate a certain number of captives. Since the accommodation of the captives did not yield the expected profit, the ordinary soldiers were manumitted after their weapons and horses were taken.

²⁰⁰ Lane, “Wages and Recruitment”, X-19; Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 114.

²⁰¹ Condottiere: A professional leader of a mercenary company from 14th-century Italy and later in other parts of Europe.

²⁰² Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 143.

The real goal was actually to force the enemy to recuperate and ensure that it kept fighting rather than to deprive it from potential labor force. In this way, these companies would be able to sustain their existence. There was no sense in killing or maiming the captives. With the exception of the specially trained fighters such as artillerymen or riflemen, this was not something that the companies wanted because it ran the risk of retaliatory action.²⁰³

When captive negotiations took a long time, condottiere would hand over the captive to the state. The daily costs of the captive would be deducted from the share of condottiere in the ransom received as a result of negotiations. The inmates in the prison of Ducal Palace mostly consisted of these war captives. The difference between the war captives of the state and the war captives of condottieri was clearly understood during the manumission process of the captives. The captives belonging to the condottieri could be manumitted in exchange for ransom as long as they promised that they would remain in the city. In line with a fairly common practice in Italy, the warriors who were war captives belonging to the state was forced to take an oath stating that they would not fight against Venice for a stipulated period of time. Someone who broke this oath would not be treated well in case he was captured again. When Venetian condottieri made such a promise and were released in exchange for ransom, they were retired for some, time though with a low salary, until the stipulated period of time passed.²⁰⁴

Although the state of Venice did not pay the ransom money of the condottieri, it acted as a middleman in exchange and ransom negotiations. If the ransom money of the condottiere had been paid, the condottiere was expected to make a discount to the state in

²⁰³ *Ibid*, 143.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 144.

future charges in order to account for this money. Even though the condottieri of Venice were generally from *Terraferma*, the Republic sometimes received service from companies that were the subjects of other states and paid their ransom if required. For example, Giovanni Altoni, a Florentine condottiere who served in Zara and Sibenik between 1568-69 was set free after three years of captivity in İstanbul after a payment of 600 zecchini as ransom money by the ambassador and bailo Andrea Bodoer was made.²⁰⁵

All these rules certainly applied to the conflicts the Republic had with other Italian and European states having similar military and political norms. The system of condottiere, in a sense, was a system of chivalry and these companies made money out of war and conflict. For the companies that were generally run by a single family, investing in a new war also meant that their families would continue to exist. While the condottiere system provided the states with the possibility of going into war without concerning the logistics, its undesirable result was prolonged wars that could not exceed a certain level of intensity. When one went outside of the wars and conflicts with the Christian world, the situation was much more different. Both the Republic and condottieri had to abandon most of the rules that they had to abide by when they fought with their enemies on the continent. It was because the troops fighting against them had a much more different law of war.

Even though it was not as complicated and challenging as the period after 1500s, Venice had various laws and arrangements in place so as to rescue its captives prior to this period. In case the reciprocal release of the captives was not indicated in peace treaties, money must be collected as ransom. However, the family of the captive or his/her

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 144, 392.

acquittances did not always have this money. For this reason, for the people who lost their freedom while working at the service of the Republic, a sum called *ob Dei reverentiam* was reserved in the budget of *Commune Veneciarum*. This practice was implemented in Venice at quite an early date compared to other Christian states. However, these other states, with the exception of Genoa, did not have many citizens that worked regularly and for a long time on its overseas dominions. For example, when Timur occupied Tana and took a great many Venetians captive, *Maggior consiglio* acceded to pay money for rescuing his noble and loyal subjects at the hands of Timur (Zamberlano). Although the Republic did not directly participate in the Crusades, it also acted on behalf of his subjects who were taken captive. The noble Jacopo Vallaresso, who was sent to Tunisia as an ambassador, added to the treaty of commerce signed with the local governments in 1317 the article that the subjects caught in the sea would be returned as well. At first, 34 Venetians whose whereabouts were ascertained were released and Vallaresso spent 420 ducats for these Venetians.²⁰⁶

3.9 Consiglio dei Dieci

There were three main reasons why the Venetian intelligence was so effective: it even intimidated the Ottomans despite the latter having an effective intelligence. The first reason was that Venice had a variety of intelligence sources thanks to her active and widespread commercial network. Venetian network was always very active compared to

²⁰⁶ Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 28.

the commercial networks of other feudal states. It was not only needed during political crisis or wars. The second reason was that the borders between the two states were disputed and had a complex dynamic. The third reason was that in case of relations with the Ottomans, Venice could have personal connections with high-ranking officials within the Ottoman state.²⁰⁷ The Republic could be informed of Turkish state affairs through letters.²⁰⁸

One may assume that other Western states who had relations -belligerent or otherwise- with the Ottomans had their own intelligence system targeting the Ottomans. But most of those states did not attempt to establish such a system due to difficulties caused mostly by their geographical distance to the Ottoman capital. The states who did try to establish an intelligence network in the Ottoman lands could never match the Venetians.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Hans J. Kissling, “Venezia come Centro di Informazioni sui Turchi”, *Venezia: Centro di mediazione tra oriente e occidente (secoli XV-XVI): Aspetti e problemi*, ed. by Hans-Georg Beck, Manoussos Manoussacas, and Agostino Pertusi (Florence: Leo S. Olsch, 1977), 97-109, pp. 100-102.

²⁰⁸ Venice developed an effective information network and a postal system which she maintained over centuries. Other European states, including the Papacy, could not match the effectiveness of such Venetian institutions. The news was a commodity that costed more than its weight in gold. The representative of the Duchy of Ferrara in Venice complained that “no courier accepted a fee less than a ducat per letter .” Governments and banks could only cover such costs. In 1514, the postal fee of a letter sent by the bailo to Venice was 40 ducats, while it usually costed around 10-12 ducats to send a letter from Venice to Rome and vice versa. In 1560, a letter sent from Chartres by the Spanish ambassador in France arrived in Toledo after passing through 179 postal processing stations and costed a total of 355 ducats. By contrast, the letters sent by merchants were delivered much more quickly. The bailo in İstanbul used three different routes for his letters to Venice. The first route was from Adrianople to Dubrovnik via Maritsa, Plovdiv, Skopje, Kosovo, P iština, Montenegro, Albanian Alps. The second one was from Tekirdağ and Kavala to Dubrovnik via Thessaloniki, Ioannina, and Corfu. The third was a sea route via Dardanelles, Cos, Peloponnese, Zakynthos, Cephalonia, and Corfu. Letters delivered by land routes covered about 50 kilometers a day, while they generally arrived at their destinations in about 40 days if the sea route delivered them. See. Braudel, Fernand. *The Mediterranean v. 1*, 361, 367, 368-370; Chiara Palazzo, “The Venetian News Network in the Early Sixteenth Century: The Battle of Chaldiran”, *News Networks in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Joad Raymond and Noah Moxham (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 853-855.

²⁰⁹ Peter Sebastian, “Ottoman government officials and their relations with the Republic of Venice in the early sixteenth century”, *Studies in Ottoman History in honour of Professor V.L. Ménage*, ed. by Colin Heywood and Colin Imber (New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2010), 333; Christopher Andrews, *The Secret World: A History of Intelligence*, Londra, 2018, 30; Ioanna Iordanou, *Venice’s Secret Service: Organizing Intelligence in the Renaissance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 171. 173.

Venetian subjects who lived in foreign realms did everything they could to support the Republic. The renegades, who were former citizens, merchants, slaves, pirates, former subjects banished from Venice, artists, and artisans invited to the Ottoman lands, gathered politically important intelligence and had it delivered to the Doge's Palace. This intelligence was classified according to priorities. The diaries of Marino Sanuto, a member of *Maggior Consiglio* and a diarist who had permission to read the letters which arrived at Doge's Palace and a diarist in the Doge's Palace, offer a fine example of different kinds of information received from overseas every day. All sorts of information, that varied from arms to maritime activities, arrived in the Republic.²¹⁰ Intelligence activities became only more straightforward, with the Venetian subjects establishing relationships with Ottoman subjects during their travels to the Ottoman lands or maintaining contact with their relatives residing in the Ottoman lands.²¹¹

During all these processes, *Consiglio dei Dieci* (or *Consiglio dei X*) had a great effect. Consiglio dei Dieci made sure that the technology remained inside *Terraferma* by forming a monopoly over artillery and ammunition and over artillery unit (*scoula*) for public safety and it also worked actively during wartime in order to ensure political safety. For example, the protection of the major fortifications around the lagoons also fell within the duties of Consiglio dei Dieci. During wartime, the distinction between public safety and military issues became blurred. The possibility of occupation was a matter of state

²¹⁰ Kissling, "Venezia come Centro", 103-107; Eleanor A. Congdon, "Datini and Venice: News from the Mediterranean Trade Network", ed. by Dionisius A. Agius and Ian Richard Netton in *Across the Mediterranean Frontiers Trade, Politics and Religion, 650-1450* (Turnhout: Brepols 1997), 158, 159, 169.

²¹¹ Kissling, "Venezia come Centro", 104.

security and the Council thereby intervened at this point in the name of public safety and became involved with issues such as recruiting soldiers, distribution of the recruits to garrisons, battalion leaves, control of the prisons, assessment of the information coming from the spies and informants, and the release or exchange of war captives.²¹²

The Republic's organs on the mainland and on its dominions would send their letters as three copies to doge, to *Tre Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci* and to the members (*Savi*) of the administrative board (*Collegio*) of the Senate as a precautionary tradition. Since military crises increased the bureaucratic and economic power of Consiglio dei Dieci, the Council would assess the correspondences and reports coming from rectors, proveditors, military governors, senior officers, merchants, agent, and spies beforehand.²¹³ The council could hide the name of the letter's author or its contents and could write back to the source of the letter without informing the other units. It would transfer the selected letters, recommendations, and orders to *Collegio*. It also exchanged recommendations with the Senate. Receiving the relevant orders from the Council regarding the subject at hand, Collegio made appropriate returns to the units that were the source of the communication. Even though it sometimes informed the Senate in a delayed manner due to special occasions, sooner or later it had to carry out this duty of providing information. Feeling uneasy that the military secrets were carelessly talked about in Piazza San Marco,

²¹² Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 249.

²¹³ Venice has been familiar with working with the "information pool system" since her first timest. Gathering and recording the experience of people and institutions that have experienced a situation for the future was valuable for the city, which was constantly thinking about what to do in troubles such as *Aqua Alta*. This situation became a state reflex over time. The news from the Republic, the East, Germany, the Italian peninsula, and the dominions were already crucial for the markets in Rialto. After gathering these news, they used it for political and economic reasons if necessary. According to Christopher Andrews, the basis of this interest of the Venetians was that the discovery of lost classical texts gave birth to Renaissance humanism and an unprecedented intellectual curiosity in Europe in the process that followed. For detailed information see. Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 42, 43, 92; Poumarède, *L'Empire de Venise*, 262; Andrews, *The Secret World*, 128.

the Council did not learn toward the idea of practicing censor by Collegio and Senato when required.²¹⁴

The role of Consiglio dei Dieci drew much more interest than the other institutions of the Republic probably for the first and last time during the Venetian-Ottoman War that took place between 1570-1573. Up until then, all the troop contracts were negotiated in Collegio with the approval of the senate. The council put an end to this for the sake of public safety while the military plans were approved by the senate. The Council informed the senate only when there was a disruption in the daily functioning of military processes. It carried out extraordinary activities such as investigating those who acted against the Republic for economic or other reasons in a way that would serve to the interests of the enemy, investigating, upon the proposal of the senate, the reason as to why Cyprus was lost, ensuring that all the important Turkish captives were secretly and prudently killed after the Battle of Lepanto.²¹⁵

During the war, the letters sent to the bailo of Constantinople, Marcantonio Barbaro, were generally signed by Andrea Gradenigo, a father-in-law of the bailo and member of the Council's *Zonta*²¹⁶, a commission. The providers of the Corfu and Kotor were responsible for organizing and financing the carriers between the two cities. Between

²¹⁴ Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 250-251.

²¹⁵ Giacomo Fassina, "Factiousness, fractiousness or unity? The reform of Council of Ten in 1582-1583", *Studi Veneziani*, v. LIV n.s., (2007), 103; Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 259; (ASVe., Consiglio dei Dieci, Comune, reg. 29, 190v-191 (11 Dec. 1570), ASVe., Consiglio dei Dieci, Criminal, reg. 91 (15 Dec 1570) and Senate, Terra, reg. 48, 126v-127 (9 Aug. 1571) ASVe., Senate, Secrata. reg. 78, 21; Consiglio dei Dieci, Secreta, reg. 9, 196v (4 December 1571)).

²¹⁶ Zonta: Venetian version of *aggiunta*/addition, extraordinary commission of the Council. Its members were nobles and also members of the Senate. See. Iordanou, *Venice's Secret Service*, 13.

1570 and 1573, Marcantonio Barbaro conducted the peace negotiations, not on behalf of the Senate but the Council of Ten.²¹⁷

What happened in Dalmatia justified the suspicions of the Council. The issues concerning the loyalty of Venetian subjects to the Republic such as lax proveditors, unreliable castle guards, restless sea captains, the need to encourage paramilitary activities, organization of fifth column activities in Turkish garrison towns, and conducting negotiations with captains whose loyalties were uncertain were within the realm of authority of the council and the council made great attempts to handle these. Just after the Battle of Lepanto in December 1571, the fact that the attack to be made to Castenuova with the support of Sebastiano Venier ended in failure after it was heard in the city and lagoon demonstrated how right the Council was in its sensitivity regarding confidentiality. The council also continued to have negotiations with the Austrian archduke and other allies no matter how unstable these negotiations were. It acted as required by the occasion by being active both on land and sea at the same time and organizing the needs of the navy for the year, and by assessing the information at hand from a center without losing time. According to John Hale, the Republic was able to get out of the heavy bureaucracy among the holy alliance and managed to bring about peace in March 1573.²¹⁸

After having taken the responsibility of the artillery unit (*Provveditore sopra l'artigleria*) for a little longer after the war (until 1588), the Council transferred this responsibility to the senate once again while its duties such as making policies between

²¹⁷ Poumarède, *L'Empire de Venise*, 262, 263.

²¹⁸ Fassina, "Factiousness, fractiousness, 105; Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 236, 259, 260; (ASVe., Senate, Terra, reg. 48,74v (24 Jan.); ASVe., Senate, Secrata, reg. 77,73v-74 (13 March.); ASVe., Consiglio dei Dieci, Secrata, reg. 9, 132v-136 (7-12 February 1571); ASVe., Commemoriali, 23, 193-4v.)

the government and military units went on as required by public safety. Although the council wanted to transfer the unit regarding castle fortification and safety (*Provveditori alle Fortezze* or *Magistrato Alle Fortezze*), this was not accepted right away. The senate took on this duty within a few decades. In this way, the council, having an extraordinary communication network during the war, continued to use this network actively and quickly for a little longer after the war.²¹⁹

The council continued to keep this network, deployed during wartime, active for a long time to follow the news about those who fell captive on the lands under the administration of these two states after the war, the activities of the Ottoman spies and merchants. Sustaining the communication helped contribute to the inclusion of ordinary people in this network and mentioning them in the documents under the pretext of reporting. In order to avoid going through something like the three-year war, the Council continued to remain alert in the name of the Republic. This active attitude was useful in emphasizing the existence of those who lived as captives and whose number was quite high in both sides and who looked for ways to be free. As information about these people reached to the center, the motivation of the state, people, and institutions that wanted to do something for them increased. This high motivation led to the emergence of new or updated institutions or systems.²²⁰

²¹⁹ Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 161.

²²⁰ Dursteler, "The Bailo in Constantinople", 2-4.

CHAPTER IV: SURVIVING CAPTIVITY, REDEMPTION

PRACTICES AND DIPLOMACY

*“Once did She hold the gorgeous east in fee;
And was the safeguard of the west: the worth
Of Venice did not fall below her birth,
Venice, the eldest Child of Liberty.
She was a maiden City, bright and free;
No guile seduced, no force could violate;
And, when she took unto herself a Mate
She must espouse the everlasting Sea.”
And what if she had seen those glories fade,
Those titles vanish, and that strength decay;
Yet shall some tribute of regret be paid
When her long life hath reached its final day:
Men are we, and must grieve when even the Shade
Of that which once was great is passed away”*

(William Wordsworth, *On the Extinction of the Venetian Republic*)

The territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire into coastal regions of Anatolia and Balkans²²¹ in the 14th Century, forced Venice to take diplomatic and military measures to protect its colonies and commercial interests in the region. As the initial military measures failed to stop the Ottoman expansion and the Ottoman bid for establishing dominance in the Mediterranean Sea became extremely threatening, the Venetians sought to secure their interests through diplomatic means. Venetian diplomatic efforts resulted with unilateral privilege texts (*Ahd-Names*), granted to them by the

²²¹ Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 77-82.

Ottoman sultans, that regulated and secured their trade networks and welfare of its citizens in the Ottoman-dominated regions.²²²

One of the overlooked aspects of these texts is their part in resolving captivity issues between both states. Since the Ottomans, either during battles or frequent naval raids, captured a great number of Venetian subjects, the issue of captive Venetian citizens is regularly mentioned in these documents. Venice was particularly concerned about the welfare of their captive citizens in the Ottoman Empire, both because most of them being of Venetian noble descent and their importance in operating their trade routes²²³; thus, the Venetian diplomats took every opportunity to negotiate their release. One other issue that caused the Venetians to reiterate this issue frequently in these documents is the possibility of the Venetian captives providing Ottomans with the Venetian state secrets, offering them their services or converting to Islam.

This chapter will try to observe the transformation of the captivity issue in the privilege texts --or the copies of texts in Ottoman Turkish, Italian, Latin and rarely in Venetian Dialect-- granted by the Ottomans to the Venetians. A detailed research on the specific subject of captivity through these documents is still absent in historiography. Thus, this chapter will be a first of its kind and serve as a preliminary study that may guide further studies on the subject.

The treaties between Venetians and the Ottomans, specifically the *Ahd-Names* (privilege texts granted by Ottomans to Venetians), produced numerous documents and

²²² İnalcık, “An Outline”, 83, 84.

²²³ Francisco Apellániz, “Venetian Trading Networks in the Medieval Mediterranean”, *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, v. 44, No. 2 (Autumn 2013), 158.

rich content about captivity.²²⁴ This chapter is going to examine the process, outcomes and some specific cases, which the articles of treaties provided historians the chance to overview the captivity issue between these two states. The careful examination of the *ahd-names* shows that the articles on the political situation of the war captives changed over the centuries. Yet, it is essential to examine those texts from the Venetian point of view to observe the transformation that they had.

The treaties called *Ahd-Names* or *İmtiyazat* had a different form from the usual diplomatic treaties. The origin of the *ahd-name* goes back to the time of the Turkish emirates in Anatolia. This tradition is most likely based on pre-Ottoman practice since there are many indications that the emirates and the Seljukids concluded treaties with foreign states (especially vassal states) in the same way. They were accepted as privilege texts granted by the Ottoman Sultan and the terms of such agreements were limited to the sultans' reign. This situation meant, for the Venetians, to negotiate and keep a diplomatic balance, every time they initiated a new agreement process. In the succession of each new sultan, they had to be renewed. They were granted *ex parte*, unilateral. Besides, the Sultan informed the whole relevant Ottoman officials (kadis, beglerbegis, etc.) and ordered them to honor those articles.²²⁵ The first form of these texts generally dealt with commercial issues, as the Venetians used to create diplomatic links with the other or former states in the region with whom they established a trade network.

²²⁴ For further information on the captive supply system and labor system in Ottoman Empire; Nalçacı, "Inherited institution", 39-50.

²²⁵ Further Information about *İmtiyazat*; Halil İnalçık, "*İmtiyâzat*", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition (EI2), v. 3, (Leiden: Brill, 1979) 1179-89; Alexander H. De Groot, "The Historical Development of the Capitulatory Regime in the Ottoman Middle East from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century", *Oriente moderno*, Nuova serie, Anno 22 (83), Nr. 3, 575-604, Mübahat Kütükoğlu, "*Ahidname*", DIA, v. 1. (Ankara: TDV, 1988), 536-540.

By the help of survived documents and secondary publications, it is possible to observe the evolution of the relationship between the Ottomans and the Venetians.²²⁶ These documents were recorded in Ottoman Turkish, Italian, Latin and sometimes in Venetian dialect. In the Ottoman archives, there are 33 survived *ahd-name* texts while the Venetian state archive holds some as well. Alongside the original texts of the *ahd-names* in both archives, the sources like the journal articles and books publicizing the copies or translations of the early forms are also the supplementary references for the secondary researches. The supplementary references respectively are, documents in the State Archive of Venice, *Acta et Diplomata Res Graecas Italasque Illustrantia*, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig*, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300-1415)*, *Storia Documentata di Venezia*, and *Diplomatarium veneto - Levantinum, I "Documenti Turchi" Dell'Archivio di Stato di Venezia*, *Venedik Arşivindeki Türkçe Metinler*²²⁷. The primary scholars who researched and produced secondary sources on the *ahd-names*, such as Şakiroğlu, Mahmut, Irene Melikoff, Luigi Bonelli, Maria Pia Pedani, Alessio Bombaci,

²²⁶ For further information on Ottoman-Venetian Relations; Sirlol Davies, and, Jack L. Davis, "Greeks, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire", *Hesperia Supplements*, Between Venice and Istanbul: Colonial Landscapes in Early Modern Greece, v. 40, (2007), 25-31; İnalçık, "An Outline", 89-90; Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Venetian presence in the Ottoman Empire (1600 – 1630)", *The Journal of European Economic History*, v. 15, nr. 2(1986), 345-384.

²²⁷ Franz Miklosich and Joseph Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Res Graecas Italasque Illustrantia*: e tabulariis anconitano, florentino, melitensi, neapolitano, veneto, (vindobonensi edita) (Aalen: Scientia, 1968); Gottlieb Lucas Friedrich Tafel and Georg Martin Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2012); Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin. (1300-1415)* (Venice, Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies, 1983); Samuele Romanin, *Storia Documentata di Venezia* (Venice: Naratovich, 1853-1860); Georg Martin Thomas and Riccardo Predelli, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum, sive, Acta et diplomata res Venetas Graecas atque Levantis illustrantia*, Venice: Sumptibus Societatis, 1890); Maria Pia Pedani Fabris and Alessio Bombaci, *I "Documenti Turchi" Dell'Archivio di Stato di Venezia*, Rome: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali. Ufficio Centrale per i Beni Archivistici, 1994; Tayyip Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu ve Bizimle İlgili Diğer Belgeler" *Belleten*, v. V-VIII, nr. 9-12 (1968-1971), 1-152.

Serap Mumcu, Mikhail Acıpınar, contributed to the diplomacy literature through examining the texts by focusing on their own general form.²²⁸ Hans Theunissen has a remarkable work on Ottoman *ahd-names*, which contains every version of the texts and was put together by examining all previous scholarly works on the subject. His work helped me to make a quick textual comparison and an easy overview just focusing the captivity issue.²²⁹ The works of Maria Pia Pedani and Eric R. Dursteler were also informative for me to understand the view of Venetian bureaucracy toward Pre-Ottomans states and the Ottomans, while Şerafettin Turan provided a wide picture of the geography of the two states and beyond.²³⁰

The timespan of this chapter is limited between 1207, Seljukid-Kingdom of Cyprus treaty, and 1575. In 1575, by the *ahd-name* given to Venetians, the textual form of captivity documentation became quite perfect and clear for both sides and continued to maintain its form. The timespan may be seen unconventionally long, however, the aim to observe the transformation of the text contents impelled me to extend the period. Commercial privilege documents, granted to the Venetians by the Mamelukes between

²²⁸ Mahmut Şakiroğlu, “II. Selim’in Venedik Cumhuriyetine Verdiği 1567 ve 1573 Tarihli Ahidnâmeler”, *Erdem*, v. II, nr.5 (1986), 527-553; Mahmut Şakiroğlu, “1521 Tarihli Osmanlı-Venedik Andlaşmasının Aslı Metni”, *İÜEF Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, v. XII, M. Tayyib Gökbilgin Hatıra Sayısı, (1982), 387-404; Mahmut Şakiroğlu, “1503 Tarihli Türk-Venedik Andlaşması”, *TTK Bildiriler*, v. VII, Ankara (1983), 1559-1569; Luigi Bonelli, “Il trattato turco-veneto del 1540”, *Centenario della nascita di Michele Amari...*, ed. by Michele Amari, v.2, Palermo: 1910, 332-363, Alessi Bombaci, “Due Clausole del Trattato in Greco fra Maometto II e Venezia, del 1446”, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, v.43, nr.2, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, v.43, nr.2, (1949), 267-271; Mikail Acıpınar, “Ahidnâmeler Çerçevesinde Karadeniz’de Ticaret Ve Yabancı Tüccarların Durumu (XV-XVII. Yüzyıllar)”, *ODÜ Sosyal Bilimler Araştırmaları Dergisi*, (2015), v. 5, nr. 12, 319-336.

²²⁹ Hans Peter Alexander Theunissen, “Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The Ahd- names. The Historical Background and the Development of a Category of Political-Commercial Instruments together with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Document”, *EJOS*, v.I, nr. 2 (1998), 1-698.

²³⁰ Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, *Doğu’nun Kapısı Venedik* (İstanbul: Küre, 2015); Eric R. Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006); Şerafettin Turan, *Türkiye-İtalya İlişkileri I* (Ankara, Kültür Bakanlığı, 2000).

1254-1517 and by other Mediterranean states, which may be considered as predecessors or equivalent to the *ahd-names* that are the central subject of this chapter have been excluded from this study.²³¹ This study is limited to the documents produced during the political and commercial interaction between Venice and pre-Ottoman political entities in Asia Minor and, of course, during the interaction between Venice and the Ottomans. Though all the treaties and the *ahd-names* that are available have been considered, only the ones that contain the issue of captivity are included in this study, in accordance with the political context.

The evaluation of *ahd-names* in case of captivity could be tracked by the help of survived texts and copies which were granted to Venetians from the pre-Ottoman beydoms and the states. The *ahd-name*, granted to the Venetians by the Seljukids in 1220, is a predecessor in its form for the ones, which were to be granted by the Ottomans to the Venetians in the coming centuries. While the text was compiled almost entirely for the regulations of trade relations, articles concerning the release of the Venetian subjects who were captured during trade missions and returning their possessions imply that the Venetians were prepared for the misfortunes that would befall their people.²³²

Venice continued to expand its commercial network between 12th and 14th centuries. With the treaty of commerce signed with Ilkhanids in 1306, it acquired the right to freely and safely engage in commerce within the borders of the state. On the other hand,

²³¹ For the detailed summary on the Mamluk-Venetian commercial relations see, Georg Crist, *Trading Conflicts Venetian Merchants and Mamluk Officials in Late Medieval Alexandria*, (Leiden: Brill, 2012); John Wansbrough, "Venice and Florence in the Mamluk Commercial Privileges", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 1965, v.28, No. 3 (1965), 483-523; Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats", 24-50.

²³² Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels*, 221-225.

a Venetian colony in Tabriz emerged. Venice was able keep doing business in its gradually decreasing colonies in the Black Sea after the Ottomans until 1460. With the privilege acquired from Shayk Uways Jalayir in 1263, the Venetian caravans would safely arrive in Trabzon, where there was a consul since 1326, from Baghdad over Erzurum (this was not very effective in practice).²³³

Having acquired the right to freely do business and settle in Black Sea, İstanbul, Thessaloniki, and İzmir in 1268 from the Byzantine Emperor, the Republic strengthened its position with the agreements made in 1277 and 1285. The Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos (1282-1328) also granted them the right to establish a colony in İstanbul. After 1306, Venice received the right to establish a church in İstanbul from Vatican. Although there was political turmoil at times, doge Francesco Dandolo ensured that the Venetians reacquired their right to stay in İstanbul and safely do business in 1332 and in addition to that the old place of residence near St. Mark and St. Mary churches were then put under the administration of the bailo. The bailo also became the representative of the Venetians in those cases that concerned the Empire while he also made people accept his position as a judge and governor of the Venetians.²³⁴

4.1 Venetian captives at the Hands of Turkish Emirates

The situation was different during the period of Turkish emirates of whose economies were mostly depended on *gazâ* income. For example, while the Emirate of

²³³ Quirini-Popławska, "The Venetian Involvement", 260-261.

²³⁴ *Ibid*, 258, 259.

Menteshe, who ruled in a region that had ports with a high trade volume, tried to remain loyal to the treaties; the Emirate of Aydin remained as a problem for the lives and prosperity of the Venetians because of their constant raids on neighboring Venetian territories. The Emirate of Aydin, which ruled in a close proximity of İzmir that was economically dominated by Genoa, displayed its discontent, in every opportunity, its discontent for being unable to take its share from the trade income of this port. Aydinoglu Umur Beg's raid on İzmir, in which he took a large number of captives, was launched for this very reason.

Various reports written to reveal other varying captivity stories. For instance, the letter of the *doge* of Crete, Nicolai Zane, reports the raids by the Turks and the captivity issue of a Venetian noble in 1317. This captured Venetian noble, Andree Barozi was the son of Jakob Barozi, who recaptured the Island of Santorini from the Byzantine and his family consisted of people who held prominent government positions since the war that took place between Venice and Pisa in 1192.²³⁵

Still, the Turkish emirates launched these raids not to settle in those territories but to collect spoils of war. The political and commercial balance in the region was dramatically transformed when the Ottomans, who pursued a policy of territorial expansion, started to launch raids. The distress that caused by these raids was not only the damage over the commercial goods; but also a large number of human population was captured as prisoners.²³⁶

²³⁵ Thomas and Predelli, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levanticum*, v.1, nr. 61, p.107.

²³⁶ Stephen Ortega, *Negotiating Transcultural Relations in the Early Modern Mediterranean Ottoman-Venetian Encounters* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 18.

While the initial texts reflected negotiations on nobles having commercial and political influence and on the commercial goods, unfolding of the events in following centuries transformed this concern of security and negotiations into securing the welfare of all their subjects, first by the Venetians and then by the Turks. For instance, the bailo of Constantinople and the member of a patrician family Phillippi Belegno, wrote a detailed report about the Turks in the context of the treaty with Catalans in 1331. The texts contain the attacks of the Turks, and the people who were faithful Catholics that had relations with them.²³⁷ Meanwhile, Ottomans were still expanding their territories around Bursa and Nicaea, quite far away from the naval territories and the Venetian colonies. In 1332, the alliance became more complex, with the Venetians, Byzantine Emperor and the Order of the Knights Hospitalers organizing a super union against the ‘wicked and impious Turks’ who attacked parts of the Empire and some islands, forcing the inhabitants to flee from their lands.²³⁸

4.2 Ottoman Era

The dominance of the Ottomans in the region have not created a new or even a modified form and content of treaties. The primary motivation of the early versions of the treaties were clearly to protect the trade network of Venice, not only in Mediterranean coast but also in the inner parts of the Asia Minor. The Ottoman expansion forced both sides to add the articles on the laws of war and captivity to the treaties while early forms of which had merely commercial content. The contrast between the *ahd-names* and the

²³⁷ Thomas and Predelli, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum*, v.1, nr. 108, pp. 215-217.

²³⁸ *Ibid*, nr. 116, pp. 225-227.

early forms of those texts is clearly visible in not only the correspondence between Venetians and Ottomans, but also in the treaties between Venice and the Emirates of Monteshe or Aydinoglu or the Ilkhanids, or between the Seljukids and the Kingdom of Cyprus.

With the ascendancy of the Ottomans, the tidal relations evolved into a mutual policy of forcing the opposite to yield to the other's will. As it is stated previously, the Venetians started to see the Ottomans as a threat to be reckoned, following their crossing of the Strait of Dardanelles and gaining a foothold on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The idea of the captivity of the faithful people who should not perish in infidel realms was one of the reasons for the Venetians to take necessary measures to protect her subjects. In 1384, during the reign of Sultan Murad I. The Ottomans already became the controllers of the Strait of Dardanelles, the main route for Venetians to reach the grain crops of the Black Sea region.²³⁹ The tone in the Latin text about Turks was also dramatically transformed from "wicked and infidel" into "beloved and friendly ally".²⁴⁰ Capturing a noble Venetian merchant or an envoy would mean to capture a member of a prominent family in the *Collegio*.

Returning to the historical development of the texts, the first known encounter between the Ottomans and the Venetians took place in 1360. After the Ottoman landing in Gallipoli, the Venetians were in a constant state of vigilance regarding how to plan their strategy against the developments in the East. Accepting the Ottoman military power in

²³⁹ Angeliki E. Laiou, "Monopoly and Privileged Free Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean (8th-14th century)", *Chemins D'outre-Mer: Études d'histoire sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard*, ed. by Damien Coulon, Catherine Otten-Froux, Paule Pagès and Dominique Valérian (Paris: Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2016), 535.

²⁴⁰ Thomas and Predelli, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levanticum*, v.2, nr. 116, pp.193-196.

the region, they closely watched the political developments of the Ottomans in order to shape their own presence in the region. For example, following the death of Murad I, the *Doge* compiled a letter to be delivered to the new sultan. However, two copies of the same letter were written and it would only be delivered to the son that ascends to the Ottoman throne.

Venice was put in a difficult position during the reign of Bayezid I. Constantinople was held against seven years of Ottoman siege with the help from Venice. Right at this difficult moment, came an event that brought certain relief to the Byzantine Empire and all the other states who were fearful of a Turkish capture of Constantinople: The Battle of Ankara. Up until that moment, there were no treaties nor *ahd-names* signed between the sides. While an interregnum period and a civil war between the Ottoman princes raged on after the Battle of Ankara, Venice, calculating that the frontier regions would eventually change hands, renewed its former treaties with Menteshe and Aydin. The Venetians also did not neglect paying their respect to Prince Suleyman. But the treaty between Venice and the Ottomans had not been ratified by Prince Suleyman but Prince Musa, who allowed the Venetians, in 1411, free passage through the straits to conduct trade in the Black Sea.

After Mehmed I ascended the Ottoman throne, the Venetians hoped to sign with him the same treaty that they had had with Musa but their efforts ended with frustration. The Ottomans got aware of the Venetian intentions when the Venetians took an extremely long time to send an emissary to Mehmed I; while they demanded to be excused of the various taxes, they agreed to pay the Ottomans, they waited for the anti-Ottoman alliance (*lega*) to form. A naval battle took place between Venice and the Ottomans in 1416, in which the Ottomans were defeated. This time the Turks sent an emissary to negotiate the

release of the captives taken during this battle. Later, Mehmed I who wished to intimidate Venice and to delay the forming of the lega which was slowly but steadily developing against the Ottomans, attacked Evia (Euboea in Turkish Eğriboz) and captured 1500 Evians. Such high number of captives brought a shock to the Venetian Senate. In 1416, the Senate sent a letter to the Evian administration, saying that the captives would be freed after the negotiations with the Sultan.²⁴¹

On the other hand, Mehmed I replied all the requests of Venetians with a superior tone in 1419. He allows Venetians to cross the Dardanelles to reach their colonies and in return, he expects that Venetians pay their regular taxes. Except Gallipoli, he reminds other castles, which were held by Venetians and says that they were sufficient for their commercial network. This text is also unique, in terms of mentioning captivity as well. The sultan refuses freeing the captives and adds that he “never wants to hear about that issue ever again”.²⁴²

Following the death of Mehmed I, negotiations resumed with Murad II; but the relations, though appeared to improve, were worsened by the siege of Thessaloniki in 1422. In 1423, Venice acquired the Byzantine city of Thessaloniki, which had been under an Ottoman blockade since 1422. Meanwhile, the siege of the city continued and although the Venetians were better able to undertake the city's defense, the Venetians were desperately pressed into finding a solution, either militarily or diplomatically. In February 1424, they sent Nicolò Zorzi to Sultan Murad I for negotiations. In March, Zorzi was imprisoned by the Ottomans. As a member of a noble family, Zorzi's captivity shook the

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, v.2, nr. 164, pp. 302-304; Turan, *Türkiye-İtalya*, 395-397.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, v.2, nr. 172, pp. 318-319.

Venetian Senate. The war between Venice and the Ottomans dragged on and Thessaloniki remained under siege. In the beginning of 1429, the Venetian Senate apparently no longer expecting that an agreement could be reached by negotiation and ordered reinforcements to the Aegean region. In March 1429, the Venetian ambassador Dandolo was imprisoned by Murad; he eventually died in prison. Though the Venetian fleet attacked continuously, the Ottomans emerged victorious; thus forcing Venice to recognize Ottoman rule in Thessaloniki while paying an annual tribute to the Ottomans.²⁴³ A treaty was signed after the siege in 1430, but the relationship between both sides fluctuated in 1444 when a Catholic league was formed against the Ottomans. But Venice, more cautious this time, provides only logistic support to the league. After the dethronement by his father and settling in Manisa region, young Sultan Mehmed II also surprisingly organized raids to Venetian cities like Khalki and Nauplia for three years. This once Murad II had to send his envoy to Venice to compensate the damage, and as an act of kindness he released the captivated people.²⁴⁴

After the fall of Constantinople to Ottoman forces in 1453, during three-day-and-night pillaging, thousands killed or sold people into slavery -among them, there were many Venetians-- and the Venetian bailo Girolamo Minotto were executed; yet, Venice was still eager to regain her commercial privileges as soon as possible and on 17th July of the same year, she instructed Bartolomeo Marcello to negotiate peace with Mehmed II, on the basis of treaties concluded earlier with the Ottomans and the Byzantines. These kind of imprisonment, captivity and execution problems endured in the form and the content

²⁴³ İnalçık, İnalçık, *Fatih Sultan Mehmed Han* (İstanbul: İş Bankası, 2019), 107-109.

²⁴⁴ İnalçık, *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar I* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), 105; Thomas and Predelli, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levanticum*, v.2, nr. 203, pp. 371-372.

of the treaty texts about the captivity issue.²⁴⁵ But, the Ottoman raids on Friuli in Northern Italy between 1470-1480 drastically changed the situation. From that point on, the Turks were no longer an overseas enemy but a threat that reached the coast of the lagoon and was able to capture people. After the Thessaloniki experience, Friuli raids caused Venetians took a new stance against the Ottomans.²⁴⁶

When examined in this context, the *Ahd-name* of 1482, differing from the previous ones, seems not to be negotiated for the security of certain individuals but all Venetian subjects in case of their capture by the Ottomans. The *Ahd-name* of 1482 is preserved in two different languages: Greek and Ottoman Turkish. The original document preserved in the Archivio di Stato di Venezia. The text of this document was published by Tayyip Gökbilgin in 1972.²⁴⁷ At the beginning of the text, Sultan Bayezid II, the son of Mehmed II, reconfirms her fathers' previous decisions and allowances about captivity. In the text, it is recorded that if a slave escapes from Venetian territories and arrives in Ottoman lands and becomes Muslim, his or her owner should be paid 1,000 *akçes*. If one was still with Christian faith, Ottomans had to restitute the slave to the owner. The obligation was not mutual. The agreement also issued the returns of the Venetian subjects captured in Venetian territories to their homelands, and any Ottoman official who dared to capture them would be punished appropriately.²⁴⁸

Among the terms of this *ahd-name*, the ones regarding the bureaucrats in every corner of the empire to be informed about the agreement and compelling them to honor

²⁴⁵ Romanin, *Storia*, v. IV, 260, 529-531.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 260.

²⁴⁷ ASVe., Documenti Turchi, busta 1, nr. 26; Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki", 39-42.

²⁴⁸ Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats", 372, 374-376.

these terms or they would be held responsible reminds the *ahd-name* of 1320, granted to the Venetians by the Ilkhanids, which had also compelled the administrators and customs officials to protect and help all Venetian merchants in every region of the Ilkhanid realm.²⁴⁹ This similarity shows the development of the texts not only by the permanent presence of the Ottomans in the region, but also by the previous diplomatic texts produced by the Venetians during their relationship with other states.

By the 16th Century, while The Republic of Venice was fighting naval battles against the Ottoman Empire there was a growing hostility against Venice that resulted in the formation Cambrian League.²⁵⁰ Even though Venice considered inviting the Turks to its lands in order to get rid of the allies of the Cambria League, it did not attempt to do so since it knew very well that Turks would not return and might have entered the other Venetian territories in the Levant. Although the Republic was certain that the Ottomans would banish the armies of the alliance and humiliate the stubborn Pope Julius II, it still did not attempt to do this. Venice instead began to present itself to other states as a primary factor to be supported so as to be protected from the malice of the Turks.²⁵¹ The war of the League of Cambrai ended Venetian defeat and in 1503, Venice signed a treaty with the Ottomans. Venice, after forming an alliance with Hungary and Poland, started its attack on the Ottoman navy, which marked the beginning of new naval battles. Still, Bayezid II, who wished to move on Asia Minor, did not desire a war in the West and to

²⁴⁹ Thomas and Predelli, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levanticum*, v.1, nr. 85, pp. 173-176.

²⁵⁰ In the beginning of the century, Venice, expanding its territory and its wealth, caused concern to other European rulers. A league, supported by Pope Julius II was formed against it. Venice suffered a defeat against this league at Agnadello in 1509. Though the Venetian senate sent two envoys to Istanbul, to ask for help from their mortal enemies, the Ottomans, the indecisiveness of the senate went on. Meanwhile, Bayezid II welcomes the envoys and offers help. This offer was held in the senate for a long time. For further information see. Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 390-403.

²⁵¹ Tenenti, "The Sense of Space", 28.

display his intention to achieve peace with Venice, he frees the Venetians that were held captive (1502). The *Ahd-name* of 1503 was signed after negotiations and lasted for a year and a half. This treaty was signed after a turbulent period. It was not like other treaties that were used to be signed between the ascensions to the throne. The relationship between the two states during the reign of Bayezid II was unsteady because of the Friuli raids, the crisis of Prince Djem and the naval war that broke out. A number of different drafts of the treaty is an indication that the negotiations lasted a long time.²⁵²

The Ottoman-Venetian *instrumentum reciprocum* of 1503 consists of the Ottoman *ahd-name* which is preserved in an Ottoman-Turkish and a Greek original, and the Venetian document which was given to the Ottomans. The Ottoman-Turkish text is based upon the original document in the Archivio di Stato di Venezia was published by Mahmut Şakiroğlu.²⁵³ According to these texts the captivity issue had faced a new problem due to a newly added term: If the captive becomes Muslim and the representative of his or her owner comes to take the captive back, 1,000 akçes would also be paid to him. And mutually, if any Muslim escapes from Ottoman lands, Venetian officials ought to follow the same procedure Ottomans bound to. The new add-on appeared in the article about the proxies of the slave owners. The Venetian slave owner could have sent his proxy to get the escaped slaves or the money on behalf of the owner.²⁵⁴

Another significant term of this *ahd-name* is about the compensation of the damages if a merchant vessel was to be affected by bad weather. It is significant because

²⁵² Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats", 147-148; Şakiroğlu, "1503 Tarihli", 1559-1569; Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 383, 385, 440; Finlay, *Venice Besieged*, V-61.

²⁵³ Şakiroğlu, "1503 Tarihli", 1559-1569; ASVe., Documenti Turchi, busta 1, nr. 97.

²⁵⁴ Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats", 383.

of its similarity to a certain term in an *ahd-name* granted by the Seljuks to the Venetians in 1220. The issue of compensating the damages on the ship and on the cargo, was resolved in elaborate detail.²⁵⁵ In the *Ahd-name* of 1320, granted to Venice by the Ilkhanids who were a landlocked empire, was concerning the security of the trade routes. For example, it was agreed that any merchant affected by bad weather would be given free access to a pasture for three days.²⁵⁶ These terms, which can be assumed as the predecessors of the similar term in the *ahd-name* of 1503, show that the Latins, including the Venetians, made such negotiations long before the Ottomans.

The last two differences between *ahd-names* of 1482 and 1503 upon captivity were status of the war captives and their provisions when they were released until their departure to their home. In the *ahd-name* of 1482, the article consists that not only the whole Venetian war captives should be released after the peace but also Venetians who were captured and hold in Ottoman territories from the reign of Murad II, father of Mehmed I. Moreover, their manumission documents for the safe-conduct, provisions and cloth before they travel would going to be supplied by the Ottoman authorities.²⁵⁷ After the Venetian war between 1499 and 1503, when the Venetian war captives were released, the Ottoman authorities must have thought that the article about releasing war captives might cause possible new problems in the future. Hence, they cancelled the article in the *ahd-name* of 1503. The article of *ahd-name* of 1482 on the provision case was also deleted in the *ahd-name* of 1503.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels*, 221-225.

²⁵⁶ Thomas and Predelli, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levanticum*, v.1, nr. 85, pp. 173-176.

²⁵⁷ Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats", 374-376.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 377-387.

Venice received an *ahd-name* from Selim I in 1513. The text of that *ahd-name* of 1513 had same context as that of 1503 in terms of captivity. During his reign, Selim I, focused on campaigns in the East while preferring to deal with the West by signing *ahd-names* with Venice and Hungary to resolve problems at sea and on land respectively. During the negotiations, the Ottomans demanded to use Venetian ports in Cyprus; and contrary to their reply to the very same demand during the Ottoman-Mameluke War between 1481-1491, the Venetians accepted the term. Reaching an agreement with Venice, who had a strong commercial relationship with the Mamelukes, strengthened Selim's hand prior to his campaign against the Mamelukes and the Safevids. The *ahd-name* terms about captives were again about the merchants and the passengers on vessels that would be affected by bad weather. Soon after the Sultan's entry in the Mameluke capital, Cairo, the Venetian consul general in Alexandria immediately requested an *ahd-name* for commercial privileges in Egypt and Syria. The request was accepted by the Ottomans.²⁵⁹

The *ahd-name* of 1517 was sign after the military campaigns of Syria and Egypt. Between 1514 and 1516, the status of Venetians in the region was quite arduous due to the war. The merchants had to follow the Mamluk rules on trade but it was obvious that the Ottomans would most likely win. While the Venetian merchants felt themselves insecure under the Mamluk authority, they started to negotiate with the Ottomans under the table. In the end, the Venetians ambassadors Bartholomio Contarini and Alvise Mocenogo requested the new agreements from the sultan by appearing before him in

²⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 153-155.

Egypt in 1517.²⁶⁰ It was totally commercial privileges about the new commercial position Republic of Venice in the newly conquered regions by the Ottomans. All the other articles of the previous *ahd-name* were still valid except the article about the captives of the both sides.²⁶¹

A new turning point came in 1530s between the Venetians and the Ottomans. Uskoks, the infamous pirates, appeared in the Mediterranean. Following the Ottoman victories, the mercenaries who were displaced from their lands because of the Ottoman conquest in the Balkans, established their base of operations first in Klis Castle and then in Seng Castle, began their attacks on the Ottomans both at the sea and on land. The Uskoks, hailed as the defenders of Christianity and supported by the Habsburgs, the Papacy and a number of duchies, caused serious damage on Dalmatian ports and the sea trade in the Adriatic. Though, at the beginning, Venice acted with the Ottomans against the Uskok threat and established a naval command (*Provveditore Contra Uscocchi*) to direct operations; but gradually started to help the Uskoks when its relationship with the Ottomans deteriorated. The serious damage caused by the Uskoks can be understood from a great number of letters in the archives sent by the Ottomans, upon which they were the complainant and demanding compensation this time. Encouraged by Venice, Uskoks initially started to attack Ottoman merchants on islands and coasts belong to Venice and gradually started to attack Ottoman vessels at sea, to capture their cargo and imprison Ottoman merchants. For Venice, this was a preferable situation, redirecting trade towards its own ports. However, with the support of the Habsburgs, the Uskoks started to ignore

²⁶⁰ Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 48, 84.

²⁶¹ Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats", 400-406.

the Republic of Venice, which found the balance tipped against itself. In time, the Venetians started to reply angry letters from the Ottoman Sultan with a calming attitude and started to take harsh measures to compensate the looted cargo and to free Turkish prisoners from the Uskoks. The Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire started to act together and became allies to deal with the Uskok problem, and that was a significant turning point in bilateral relations.²⁶²

The Uskoks, who became a serious nuisance for both sides in the Adriatic for more than a century and dubbed as "*harami*" (pirate) in *ahd-name* texts, were one of the main reasons for the elaboration of captivity issue in those treaties. Even the *ahd-name* of 1521 was altered in some ways due to the Uskoks threat and their various form though it was signed by Suleyman I in the first year of his reign. In that *ahd-name*, harsh sanctions were added about the destruction of ships of both Ottomans and Venetians. The possibility of the breaking the agreement was firstly and clearly mentioned in this *ahd-name*. The article underlined that "if the treaty was to be ever broken and the pirates and *levends* attack Venetian vessels, people who were captured alive on those vessels were to be safely transported to Istanbul".²⁶³ While the Ottomans considered it was usual for the pirates and the *levends* to act thus, they were still thinking that it was appropriate to decide the fates of the captives just in Constantinople and sure that not feel responsible for the loss of the pirates. As stated in the previous texts, *levends* who attack those ships and the islands were also to be punished. This obligation might have been added to the *ahd-name* as a dissuading prohibition. The This text may be interpreted as an indication that the

²⁶² "Uskok'lar", Şakiroğlu, Mahmut, *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, v. 33, 101; Catherine Wendy Bracewell, *The Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry and Holy War in the Sixteenth-Century Adriatic* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011).

²⁶³ Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats", 422.

relationship between the Ottomans and the Venetians were in favorable terms until the death of Ibrahim Pasha in 1536.²⁶⁴

The *ahd-name* of 1521 also was the first text that informing about the Ottoman subjects who sold²⁶⁵ the Venetians both Anatolia and Rumelia as soon as possible after they trespassed to the Venetians borders and captured the Venetians. According to the article of this *ahd-name*, those Venetians should have been found even if they were sold and the capturers should have been investigated. If the capturer would be an Ottoman official, he should be punished harshly. If the slave was Christian, he or she should be sent to Venice directly and as soon as possible. If he or she was Muslim the slave also must have been released. If the buyer was not clear, the slave must have sent to Constantinople to be investigated. If he or she was Christian, the slave must be given up to the bailo.²⁶⁶

The *Ahd-name* of 1540 was the post-agreement after the Venetian-Ottoman War between 1537-1540 and a text marking a serious problem for Venice. Suleyman I still was the Sultan. With the death of Ibrahim Pasha and the appearance of Hayreddin Barbarossa, in 1530s, a new struggle for balance appeared in the Mediterranean. The Ottoman-Venetian War started in 1537, after repeated violations of the *ahd-name* by both sides for various reasons. Following the attacks on Corfu and Creta by the Ottoman Navy, only the Aegean Islands were captured by the Ottomans. Things got complicated when the Holy League, organized by the Pope, declared its support to Venice. The league suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the Ottomans in the Battle of Preveza in 1539.

²⁶⁴ ASVe., Documenti Turchi, busta 1, nr. 188.

²⁶⁵ Selling the people who were captured though they had mobility guarantee in the Ottoman lands was a problem since the early 1500s. BOA., TS.MA.e., 750 / 80 (29 Jumada al-awwal 905 / 1 January 1500).

²⁶⁶ Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats", 425-428.

Venice, immediately started negotiations for a new *ahd-name* and used the *Ahd-name* of 1521 as a sample form. In this *ahd-name*, the Black Sea ports were removed from the list of the ports where Venice continued to have commercial privileges. This *ahd-name* agrees on the punishment of pirates and *levends* if they ever attack and damage Venetian ships while it was also a harsh answer against the hypocritical policy of Venice who was involved in Uskok raids and Christian leagues. Apart from heavy tributes, the loss of Aegean Islands except Tinos and the end of the commercial privileges in the Black Sea, marks the beginning of a distressing period for Venice as an overseas colonial empire.²⁶⁷

The *ahd-name* of 1540 had a draft version which was edited due to the circumstances. Some articles of the text were changed according to the post-war agenda. For instance, while the Ottomans previously guaranteed to compensate the payment of the escaped slave if he or she had become Muslim to the owner by 1,000 akçes, the draft version had no mention about this amount of money.²⁶⁸

The significant difference of the *ahd-name* of 1540 is the obligation about the escaped slaves from the Ottoman territories. The article about their return policy was extended by adding their possible religious conversion. If the escaped slave became a Christian when he or she managed to trespass the border, the slave must be given to the Ottomans back as Muslim slaves.²⁶⁹ The extension of the article shows that the frequent religious re-conversions among the slaves and their acceptance in their homelands increased in these decades. Those people were ex-Christians who held by Ottomans for

²⁶⁷ Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki”, 99; ASVe., Documenti Turchi, busta 3, nr. 426.

²⁶⁸ Theunissen, “Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats”, 442.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 478.

years and probably became a Muslim to improve their physical or economic conditions in the Islamic world.

The *ahd-name* of 1540 has no article about the status of war captives captured in the last war. This decision made by the Ottomans unperceivedly caused something which affected the diplomatic relations between the two states in the long term. Many of those war captives held by Ottomans in various positions of the imperial body became remarkable statemen, officials, and even sultanas. Ottomans who had Venetian descents or citizenships and had influential roles in the years between the 1570s and 1590s were quite a number, and their population was higher than ever before. Those people whose records reflected today is going to take a part on the next chapter detailly.

One of the most essential articles involved for the first time to the *ahd-name* of 1540 was about the alliance of the Venetian Navy with the armadas of the other Christian states. Ottomans banned Venetians from allowing these ships to join their fleets, help them or subsidize them.²⁷⁰ The ban must be related about the support of the Holy League to Venice after the war between 1537 and 1540, when the League felt the Ottoman menace again against the Christian world and the controlling the naval activities of the Republic by isolating her possible alliance against the Ottomans.

The *Ahd-name* of 1567, which was renewed when Selim II ascended to the throne, was signed at the end of a period of calm that had been going on for 30 years. The mutual complaints of both sides during this period were mainly about pirate attacks and enslaved citizens. Selim II, signed this *ahd-name* not to alarm the Venetians while he was preparing

²⁷⁰ Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats", 441.

to attack Cyprus (August 1571). The Venetians, on the other hand, paid attention to the rumors that reached the lagoon and made preparations for the defense of Cyprus.²⁷¹

The *ahd-name* issued all the previous articles involved to the *ahd-name* of 1567 but some additional obligations were added due to the needs of the two state. In case of captivity for instance, the Ottoman central authority well learnt that some officials and *levends* neglected their duties who had to bring the captives to the capital after the soldiers with the corsair ships. The article warns them to punish harshly if they continue not to obey this royal order.²⁷²

Immediately after the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, the Christian League became successful in breaking Ottoman naval supremacy: Lepanto (October 1571). Until 1570's, Venice managed to regain her supremacy in Levant trade though long and devastating Ottomans-Venetian wars yet such factors as the Dutch and English competition became quite fiercer for the Venice as a leading Levantine trader. By this motivation, in 1573, Venetian ambassador arrived in Istanbul to conclude the negotiations which already started in 1571 and broke down due to the war. By the accession of Murad III, the *ahd-name* was renewed in 1575.²⁷³

The *ahd-name* of 1575 was the first agreement after the Venetian-Ottoman war 1570-1573. The situation of the war captives of both sides seemed like a heavy scene. While the absence of the article on the war captives in the peace agreement of 1573, their contextualization in the *ahd-name* of 1575 appeared worse. The war captives who became

²⁷¹ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1977), v. 3, 9-11

²⁷² Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats", 489.

²⁷³ *Ibid*, 172.

slave in time were out of the question. The Ottoman sultan did not allow to release them as normal Venetian subjects who were captured and held in peacetime and had a guarantee upon the *ahd-name*. The war captive could be released if his or her owner would like to sell or give back to Venice. The decision of their fate was totally belonged to the owners of the slave.²⁷⁴

The Uskok problem was detailed widely in the *ahd-name* of 1575. Meanwhile, the land borders problem continued to increase gradually even after the war time for the both side and the extraordinary ambassador, Jacopo Soranzo arrived to Constantinople to renegotiate the territorial problems in 1576. The *ahd-name* of 1576 was signed after adding some articles related about the problems. Not only the *ahd-names* of 1575 and 1576 but also the previous texts had no mention about the situation of the Ottomans who would be captured transborder on at sea by Venetians while they contain the article about the Venetians. The subjects of the Republic had to be given back to Venice as soon as possible while there was no mutual obligation to the Venice for the Ottoman subject. This nonreciprocal positions of the captives from both sides became another unexpected disadvantage for the Ottomans subjects in the long term.²⁷⁵

Until the Candian War in 1645, Venetian-Ottoman relations remained stable despite various violations of the treaties by both states. In case of captivity, the evaluation of the *ahd-name* form concluded and reached its most stable level to regulate the mutual relations.²⁷⁶ The texts of these *ahd-names* contain various clues that the Ottomans knew well about the structure of the Venetian state structure. For instance, writing the sentence

²⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 529.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 479, 552.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 177.

“the doge, the nobles, their subjects, places and the dominions belong to them and their subjects and their castles and border towers and the islands” (*duka ile ve sayir begleriyle ve anların ademleri ile ve anlara müte’allık olan yerleri ve vilayetlerin halkı ile ve kal’alarıyla ve burguzlarıyla ve adalarıyla*) indicates that the Ottomans were aware that the Senate ruled the Republic with the doge by the help of the other subjects. Besides, the Republic had various places where some of them directly had a micro-Venetian governing structure while the others were just border. The people of those places took a place after the subjects of the Republic as they had the same rank in eye of the Republic. While the concepts of the castle and the tower were removed in 1521, the concept of the island had already been removed from the text in 1503. The phrase of “everywhere the flag of St. Marco waves” also was removed in 1540.²⁷⁷ The free mobility and the sharpness of the Venetian borders were gradually decreased in time.

One may surely inquire how many of the terms in *ahd-names*, regarding the captives were properly observed. Obviously, the Ottoman Empire had ruled a vast territory, and thus, it cannot be said that each ordinance taken in Istanbul was precisely followed in every regions of the empire. This can be inferred clearly from the responsive letters in the Venetian archives written by the Ottomans to numerous letters of complaint. For example, in a letter sent by the Sultan to Venice in 1486, it was told that the Ottoman officials act against the pirates that took over Venetian vessels and the *Doge* may send a representative for the event. Shortly after the *Ahd-name* of 1503, the Venetian *bailo* sent a letter to İskender Pasha, the Sanjak Beg of Bosnia: "Despite the *ahd-name* terms, Turks had captured many Venetians in the city of Sibenik and that the Sultan had sent a *chaoush*

²⁷⁷ Theunissen, “Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats”, 372, 387, 395, 401, 418, 450, 472, 500,

named Kasım to the region to prevent the abuse of Venetians and all captives should be released upon the arrival of the *chaoush* (envoy).” In a letter to the Sanjak Beg of Bosnia, written in 1530, the Venetian *bailo* was telling that a group of *martolos* and *azabs* had attacked Venetian territory despite the terms of *ahd-name* and requesting the Sultan put an end to those attacks and ensure the release of the captives.²⁷⁸

Of course, the subjects of the correspondences were not always Venetian captives. For example, in a letter written to the *Doge* from İstanbul in 1504, it was told that the merchant son of a certain Ömer Beg, who was an Ottoman subject, had been abducted by a *fusta*²⁷⁹ from Skiathos while returning to İstanbul in his vessel. His cargo worth 150.000 aspers was looted, two of the four janissaries in his company were sold as slaves and were still imprisoned. In this letter written in Greek, the Sultan told the *Doge* that this was against the terms of the *ahd-name* and concludes that this could be considered as an act of war. He demanded the rectification of the situation and the responsible ones to be punished.²⁸⁰

Captivity issue continued and changed in form after the ship building technology. Especially, the massive needs of armadas for rowers decreased gradually in Mediterranean region. Therefore, between Venice and the Ottomans, the issues transformed

²⁷⁸ ASVe., Documenti Turchi, busta 1, nr. 33; ASVe., Documenti Turchi, busta 1, nr. 133; ASVe., Documenti Turchi, busta 2, nr. 251.

²⁷⁹ *Fusta*: (pl. *fuste*) a smaller version of the galley and galeotta. According to instructions left by a Venetian galley-builder of the mid-sixteenth century, a Venetian *fusta* was then app. 88 feet long from stem to sternpost, 13 feet wide and feet deep from freeboard to keel. The corresponding measurements for a light galley were 131 feet, app. 16 feet and feet. See, B. Landstrom, *The ship: An Illustrated History* (London: Doubleday & Co&, 1961), 132-3. According to Tenenti, Barbary *fuste* had on average about fifteen ranks of rowers, with two galleots to an oar. For further information see. Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice 1580-1615*, trans. by Janet Pullan, Brian Pullan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 154.

²⁸⁰ ASVe., Documenti Turchi, busta 1, nr. 145.

exceptionally. The captivity issue between Venetians and the Ottomans transformed in time due to the changing circumstances and it could be observed in detail in the archived documents, as well as the secondary sources which can be easily accessed today via the internet or other technological means. For hundreds of years, all the archives and sources were on their shelves; although numerous modern historiographic studies had been produced, they were far from being cohesive. That's why it was seriously difficult to access to a significant number of sources sufficing for comprising evaluations and write on a specific topic such as captivity. This chapter is a first form of its kind in that respect, and the research on the issue will be continued and expanded.

4.3 Saving Venetians

As a policy of the state, Venice was considerably sensitive about her citizens who were held in the infidel lands. Venice appointed the members of Venetian noble families and her privileged citizens to control her diplomatic and economic network in the region. The number of these officials was not sufficient compared to the latitude of its network. Therefore, the state intensively endeavored to release its captured or imprisoned officials. Though the solution to settle the issue was to use force previously, the Ottoman factor compelled the Venetian bureaucracy to replace such hardline measures with softer diplomatic language and encounters.²⁸¹

Since the Crusades, there were two solid religious orders which concentrated on freeing Christian captives: Trinitarians (the Order of the Most Holy Trinity for the

²⁸¹ Lane, *A Maritime History*, 236, 242, 245; Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 330, 371.

Redemption of the Captives) and Mercedarians (Order of Our Lady of Mercy and the Redemption of the Captives). Yet, due to the high tension of the political and military agendas, they became incapable of operating sufficiently in the 16th century. At this point, some states took matters into their own hands. In 1548, the *Real Casa della Redentione* was founded in Naples. Similar bodies followed the new directories in Bologna, Venice, Palermo, Rome and Genoa.²⁸² Though various fraternities devoted themselves to redeeming captives from the hands of infidels, the redemption formation of the Republic for the Venetian captives was quite different.

In 1560 and 1561, the Senate underlined the importance of the emancipation of the Venetian enslaved people in Ottoman lands and reminded the bailo in Constantinople he should have paid attention to the liberation operations. According to the senate records, the Senate also regulated the amount of payment the bailo should spend for the captives.²⁸³ If they did not want to go back to their homes, they could live in Galata as a freed slave and earn their lives without converting. The lack of skilled people who were experts in maritime craftsmanship as shipbuilding, sailing, and other related artisanries, was also a common problem in the Mediterranean and Ottoman capital readily welcomed those people in any case.

In 1561, the Senate approved establishing a permanent judiciary called “*Provveditori sopra Ospedali e Luoghi Pii e al Riscatto degli Schiavi*” (Inspectors of

²⁸² Gennaro Varriale, “Redimere anime: La Santa Casa della Redenzione dei cattivi a Napoli, 1548–1599”, *I Tatti Studies in the Italian Renaissance*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 2015), 237, 238; Davis, “Slave Redemption”, 456; Eric R. Dursteler and Monique O'Connell, *The Mediterranean World: From the Fall of Rome to the Rise of Napoleon* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 249.

²⁸³ Andrea Pelizza, “‘Restituirsì in Libertà et alla Patria’: Riscatti di Schiavi a Venezia tra XVI e XVIII Secolo’, *Quaderni Storici*, Nuova Serie, V. 47, No. 140 (2), Riscatto, Scambio, Fuga (Agosto 2012), 346–347.

Hospitals and Pious Places) to organize the liberation operations of the Venetian subjects in infidel lands. Until that time, Venice's state body was active and sensitive, but various religious orders also intended to find and liberate the Christians from the infidel lands. Yet, being unfortunate and poor and Christian was a definite norm for these orders, the motivation of the Republic was completely different. As a subject, citizen or civil servant, any Venetian should be liberated from the Islamic lands as soon as possible.²⁸⁴

Apart from saving the good Christians from the infidel lands,²⁸⁵ there was another reason for Venice to organize the ransoming process of Venetians in the Ottoman lands. Libby Lester frames the motivation Republic of Venice about the freedom operations as a “perfect balance between liberty and order and for the harmonization of competing class interests”, and all those operations were staged in a vast military slave camp in which all distinctions of birth were abolished in a common servitude, Ottoman society.²⁸⁶ As rogue citizens of Venice who were dismissed from *Stato da Mar* and *Stato de Terra* came to Constantinople as captives, prisoners, slaves and ransomed ones, they could pose a threat to the security of the Republic: especially the artisans, ship makers, brokers etc. Since they were from the Republic, they would receive an offer from Ottoman authorities to use their talents or professions.²⁸⁷

In most cases, a slave who won his freedom wished to escape from the Ottoman realm and reach his home country. On the other hand, despite all these efforts, a considerable amount of ordinary people who were enslaved before, wanted to stay in the

²⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 343.

²⁸⁵ Thomas and Predelli, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levanticum*, v.1, nr. 28, p. 54.

²⁸⁶ J. Libby Jr. Lester, “Venetian Views of the Ottoman Empire from the Peace of 1503 to the War of Cyprus”, *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, v. 9, No. 4, (1978), Central Renaissance Conference, 120.

²⁸⁷ Plakotos, “The Venetian Inquisition”, 181.

Ottoman capital because of the city's economic and social opportunities. The imprisoned or enslaved often decided -or were forced- to convert to Islam in order to save themselves from their desperate conditions. On the other hand, some of those converted to Islam because of the internal troubles in the West, or to start a new life or solely to embark on an adventure. Antonio Fabris aptly summarizes the varied motivations for conversion: *“We are dealing with artisans driven by a yearning for income, with Europeans, slaves of Muslims, desirous of a better life, with men greedy for adventure or in search of a power precluded them in the West...”*²⁸⁸ This flexible perspective offers a stark contrast with the rhetoric of the Catholic Union, which employed fierce propaganda techniques in order to encourage their citizens and believers.

Specifically, the arsenal industry and the espionage network welcomed them as valuable instruments. Due to the same reason, freed people sometimes preferred to stay in the Ottoman capital and continued to work as free merchants, artisans etc. Eric Dursteler narrates an account where a Papal visitor in the 1580s found five hundred freed slaves living in Galata and sixty more in Constantinople proper, a number that was approximately achieved by a similar survey in 1630. A visitor reported these people often married and set up houses throughout greater Constantinople. “They live as subjects of the Turk, and some are very comfortable working in industry and commerce,” as was the case with a group of *Libertini* who began trading wine after their release. In addition, when thought of in terms of ransom fees, all were valuable captives. The primary motivation for the raids conducted in the Friuli region between 1470 and 1495 was such high amounts of ransom fees. However, the Venetian envoy to the Mehmed I was instructed not to accept

²⁸⁸ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, 113, 114.

any demands of ransom for the 1500 Evians who were held captive by the Sultan. Compared to the zealous efforts of the Venetians to free their merchants and nobles, it may very well be assumed that these 1500 people were not of any significance or worth to the Republic.²⁸⁹

Gathering the intelligence was the other unbidden and sider motivation to organize the ransoming process of Venetians. The ex-captives kept in Ottoman lands, especially close to the warfare locations like the Ottoman arsenal or the primary harbors, would become useful for the Venetian officials. The observations they had or the rumors they narrated about the Ottoman army or the possible next step of the Sultan would generate the policy of the Republic instantaneously. Therefore, such as the diary collection of the Venetian senator Marino Sanuto consists of numerous minor dispatches of the ex-captives.²⁹⁰

The ambassadors in the other European states and the bailo in the Ottoman capital, Constantinople, frequently recorded in *relazioni*²⁹¹, the number of ex-prisoners they had managed to release. The primary fear of the Venetians was the possibility of freed slaves passing on crucial information, or offering their services to the Ottomans or converting to Islam. The potential of apostasy among the captives increased during long-term

²⁸⁹ Dursteler and O'Connell, *The Mediterranean World*, 76; Pedani Fabris, *Doğu'nun Kapısı*, 63-65; Turan, *Türkiye-İtalya*, 398.

²⁹⁰ For some dispatch samples; *I Diarii di Marino Sanuto*, ed. by Federico Stefani, Guglielmo Berchet, Nicolò Barozzi, Rinaldo Fulin, Marco Allegri (Venice: M. Visentini, 1879-1903).

²⁹¹ *Relazioni*: detailed and final reports which were presented by the ambassadors of the Republic to the senate after they complete their diplomatic mission and arrived back to Venice. For further information see. Gino Benzioni, "Ranke's Favorite Source: The Relazioni of the Venetian Ambassadors" *The Counter*, 22, 1., 1987, 11-26; Filippo De Vivo, "How to Read Venetian "Relazioni"", *Renaissance and Reformation*, 34, 1/2, 2011, 25-59; Eric R. Dursteler, "Describing or Distorting the 'Turk'? The Relazioni of the Venetian Ambassadors in Constantinople as Historical Source", *Acta Histriae*, 19, (2001), 231-248.

enslavement and was particularly more common in cases involving young slaves.²⁹² In 1588, the estimated number of freed slaves was at least 2,500, of whose release consumed much time and budget. Piero Bragadin, in 1525, reported that though he already had managed to free sixty-four slaves, he hoped to free another three hundred by the end of his service. Forty years later, Daniele Barbarigo freed ninety slaves during his bailate, and Paolo Contarini in 1581, managed to negotiate the release of forty-six slaves, including one Venetian patrician.²⁹³ Besides, the bailo had to be careful and keep a low profile while ransoming the captives and slaves. In 1542, the bailo Girolamo Zane came to the Sultans' attention when he sent several slaves and captives to Venice without the authorization of their Ottoman masters, and the Sultan wrote a *name-i hümayûn* (imperial letter) to Venice to change the bailo.²⁹⁴

Even though the total population of the slaves in Istanbul is not clear, it may be estimated with the help of various sources. The most common sources of information, without a doubt, are the reports of Venetian ambassadors. Through these reports, Halil İnalcık calculates the total population of the slaves, ex-slaves, war captives and spoils just in Istanbul, of which he numbered 60.000 in 1568 and 100.000 in 1609. This number was equivalent to one-fiftieth of the city's total population. War captives' population was by far beneath this number. An apostolic visitor, Pietro Cedulini, estimated eight to nine thousand slaves in Galata alone in 1581. However, this probably refers only to the Christian galley slaves, whose numbers İnalcık puts at ten thousand. In 1588, the Senate estimated the number of Venetian captives in all of the Mediterranean region at more than

²⁹² Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, 76.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, 31.

²⁹⁴ Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki", 100-102.

2,500, a number perhaps still somewhat inflated by the large numbers that had been enslaved in the previous war. Among all these captives, prisoners and household slaves, spotting a Venetian and starting the process of their release was a massive work of the bailo.²⁹⁵

The issue of Venetian citizens who the Turks captured had already been a problem for the Venetian Senate long before the Ottoman naval dominance in the region. Like all the merchants who sailed to *Stato da Mar* for trade, the Venetian merchants mainly feared for their lives and possessions because of the threat posed by the pirates and naval raids. Because of that, they used to set sail from their ports in a convoy²⁹⁶ formation only twice times a year.²⁹⁷ Much of the Mediterranean and the Aegean Coast were ruled by states such as the Byzantine Empire and the Seljukids, who held vast territories and paid importance to trade.

The sources regularly confirmed that the baili, the representatives of Venice, in Istanbul were greatly respected by the Ottoman authorities. Tommaso Bertele relayed that the bailo Matteo Zane, in 1594, carried out the orders coming from his country and he made strenuous efforts to provide public service necessary for his community in the city compared to other representatives.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁵ İnalçik, “Servile Labor”, 40; Mattia Ceracchi, “La comunità latino-cattolica di Istanbul nella prima età ottomana (1453-1696)” in *Eurostudium* 3w, gennaio-marzo 2016, n. 38, 27, 132; Davis, “Slave Redemption”, 454-487.

²⁹⁶ Ships departed to the East were splitting into two. Private ships set off whenever they wanted. On the other hand, those belonging to the state set out in convoy, depending on the economic and political situation at the time the senate decided. All ships had the priority to carry expensive cargo such as spices. The vessels only carried the Venetians. Merchants of other nations could not board the ship. They could only send their trade goods. See. Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 93, 95.

²⁹⁷ Pedani Fabris, *Doğu'nun Kapısı*, 39.

²⁹⁸ Tommaso Bertele, *Venedik ve Kostantiniyye: Tarihte Osmanlı-Venedik İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2015), 158, 159.

One of the important tasks of the baili in Istanbul was to save the captives who were Venetian citizens that were caught by the Turks. The decision of the Venetian Senate dated 1556 required the bailos to ‘provide every sort assistance and effort so as to save the poor Christians, who were Venetian subjects and who were in utter misery in infidel hands.’ It was because these people were not able to pay their own ransom money or save the other Christian captives and it was stated that ‘until a freed captive went to a Christian country, these types of costs would be met by the state of Venice.’²⁹⁹ From the letters that the baili sent to Venice or from the reports that they read in the Senate upon their return, we can learn the number of Venetians that a bailo saved from captivity during their duties.

A portion of the revenue allocated by the Senate for their use and called *cottimo*³⁰⁰ –the amount that the subjects who came to the city for commercial reasons paid to the bailo- was used for paying ransom.³⁰¹ For the bailo, who had an ear close to the ground in everywhere in the city, it was not difficult at all to be aware of the presence of a Venetian captive. The principal duty of the bailo was to subtly conduct the diplomatic relationship between the palace and the Republic and he was in contact with many state officials and city residents in such an atmosphere. Moreover, there were many subjects and former slaves among high-ranking officials, police force, intermediaries who served to the Embassy, and Ottoman subjects.³⁰² It was quite possible to communicate with some of them directly in their mother tongue.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid*, 159.

³⁰⁰ It was 0.75% for the goods that came to Istanbul and 1.25% for the goods that left Istanbul. Lorenzo Bernarda, who became a bailo in 1592, stated that *cottimo* always increased and reached to 5, even 6 thousand zecchinos annually. According to the calculation that the bailo sent, such revenue was sufficient to meet all the expenses of the officials and all the current expenditures that the bailo would encounter.

³⁰¹ Dursteler, “The Bailo in Constantinople”, 8.

³⁰² Gerlach, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, v. II, 676.

In the report that he read in front of the Senate, Antonio Erizzo, who was a bailo during the time of peace when Kanuni was the sultan, recorded that he saved 472 Venetians from captivity. His successor, the bailo Daniele Barbarigo achieved to bring freedom to 122 captives.³⁰³

The bailato in İstanbul had two separate treasuries. The first one directly belonged to the bailo. The main revenue of this treasury called *cottimo* was used for the needs of the commune. This revenue could cover the costs of a merchant's case, the salvage charge of a ship causing problems or the cost of the gifts that were given to the administrators in İstanbul as a sign of goodwill. The second treasury was for the bailato administration, payment of salaries, and for expenses such as rent. The council of twelve was also responsible for auditing these. During the wars waged between 1537-40, these revenues turned out to be insufficient for the bailo. Quite sufficient at the beginning, these incomes proved to be insufficient for the costs following the peace and its aftermath. This situation must have been assessed by the center that the expense items of the bailato between 1541-1556 were reported in the form of charts. This chart must have been related to the decision taken in 1556 that held the baili responsible for all the expenses for the rescue of the captives and other required expenses for their return to their countries. Starting with Antonio Mazzaruo, who began to work as the acting bailo in 1541, and continuing with Alessandro Contarini (1546), Alvise Renier (1547), Bernardo Navagero (1550), Dominico Trevisan (1552) and Antonio Erizzo, the chart included all the expenses belonging to these periods and Tommaso Bertele shared this chart in his study at quite an early date. According to the list, the expenses concerning the captives were elaborated through a few

³⁰³ Bertele, *Venedik ve Kostantiniyye*, 160.

chapters on their clothing, their nourishment until they were returned to their countries following their rescue, their transfers, commissions paid to the middlemen, and ransom amounts. These expenses increased incrementally over the years. For example, the amount reserved for the rescue of a slave in 1541 was 325 units but it skyrocketed to 13476 between 1554-56. The decision taken in 1556 was revised in 1561 due to the fact that the expenses for the rescue of captives accounted for a substantial sum among the expenses of bailato and these expenses went beyond the auditing mechanism of the council of twelve. In accordance with the decision taken in 1561, the ransom money of the rescued captive would be paid only from the bailo's commerce revenues in İstanbul and the expenses of a slave would be paid within a month. For the slaves returning to their countries, 32 asper per day could be spent.³⁰⁴

Not only the cost of rescuing slaves increased but also the expenses such as accommodation and rent rose and there was also another remarkable expense. It was registered as 'the expenses of Janissaries.' In 1541, this expense item was 44 units and in 1556, it rose to 477 units.³⁰⁵ The increase in the number of the janissaries who served as guardians contributed to this. However, the actual reason for this increase must have been the expenses that were made to keep these people content. As a matter of fact, in accordance with the royal court register of 1556, upon the return of the bailo to his country in that year, the number of the janissaries who were given *timar* upon the bailo's favor to the janissaries that served as his law enforcement officers was five. The increase was not so substantial so to speak. Especially during the time of war, the janissaries and agas that

³⁰⁴ Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 87; Bertele, *Venedik ve Kostantiniyye*, 126, table 48.

³⁰⁵ Bertele, *Venedik ve Kostantiniyye*, 126, table 48.

were in charge of protecting the bailato needed to be treated well. Among those officers, the ones who knew Italian were extremely valuable. It was much easier to have an indirect connection with these officers, who were former captives or *devşirmes*, even though they were not Venetians compared to establishing connection with the Janissaries who were from different nationalities. As a matter of fact, the Marquis Giacomo Malatesta³⁰⁶ and French ambassador François de Noailles who visited the notable war captives held in Rumeli Fortress after Goletta and the sergeant who accompanied the translator of the bailato also had a good command of Italian.³⁰⁷

On the eve of the War of Cyprus, the list of the expenses of the bailot³⁰⁸ from January of 1568 (1569) gives pretty exciting information about the high or middle-ranked Ottoman officials, even *kadı*s (judge) and *naibs* (judge's secretary). For instance, besides the payments for *subaşı*, *çavuşs*, and other janissaries, the bailo recorded various costs for kadı like 120, 80, 180, 140 and 240 ducats while 900 ducats for the naib and 180 ducats for the son of kadı. Total payment for the expenses of the bailo in Constantinople was 23,856 ducats.³⁰⁹ The kadı and his men must have been from Galata court as we understand some letters of bailo sent to Consiglio dei Dieci. We will return to this list later

³⁰⁶ After his captivity and freedom Marquis Giacomo Malatesta became a strong supporter for the prominent captives who hold in Black Tower and waited for the exchange. See Chapter 4 and 5.

³⁰⁷ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 2 / 873 (15 Rajab 963 / 25 May 1556) Maria Perla De Fazi, *Narrazione del Capitano Angelo Gatto da Orvieto*, (Supplemento di "Cimbas", 2005), 118.

³⁰⁸ Most of Bailo's separated account books have not survived. But as it is understood from the existing ones (1624-1682), the bailo gifted or made payments (regular or irregular) to Ottoman treasurers, the Janissaries, the Commanders-in-Chief, the provincial judges, the local messengers, the deputies, the customs officers, the sailors, the irregular troops, the guards, the grooms, the porters, the transporters, the slaves and the servants. The books also contained aid and charitable donations to Franciscan priests, clergy members, regional churches, and sects, as well as to Venetians who had been captured and liberated by the Turks. See. E. Natalie Rothman, "Accounting for Gifts: The Poetics and Pragmatics of Material Circulations in Venetian-Ottoman Diplomacy", *Cultures of Empire: Rethinking Venetian Rule, 1400–1700 Essays in Honour of Benjamin Arbel*, ed. by Georg Christ Franz and Franz-Julius Morche. (Leiden: Brill, 2020, 414–454.

³⁰⁹ ASVe., Senato, Secreta, Archivio Proprio Costantinopoli, busta 6, f. 66v-66r.

but it is useful to underline fact that the manumission record in the Galata court dated between 1563 and 1569 are missing.³¹⁰

We can understand from the royal court register how high the number of those who served to the bailo Barbaro or who worked with regard to other captives while he was under house arrest and accompanied the payment coming from the highway from the period that started with the War of Cyprus and lasted till the signing of the treaty. On February 16, 1574, these janissaries and cavalrymen whose term of duty ended returned to their former jobs, as was the custom. If those officers were granted with *timars* or trace licenses, their registrations were removed. While there were only a few registers like these from the previous period, a total of 40 people from this period were promoted upon the favor of the bailo. Out of these 40 people, only 5 people directly served to the bailo. Out of these 40 people, 4 of them were cavalrymen, 4 were feoffees, 4 were soldiers, and 6 of them were *timar* holders. The rest of them were janissaries. These rewards were granted as favors in the form of revenue, initial *timar*, trade licence, and armourer. Mustafa Çavuş, one of these officers who served to the bailo and was tasked with investigating whether the bailo underhandedly purchased slaves or not upon a complaint, was granted initial *timar*. However, Mustafa Çavuş demanded that his right would be passed down to his son after approximately one month.³¹¹ The highness of this number, the fact that the bailo daringly asked for various favors for these officers with the effect of the repaired relations between the two states following the establishment of peace was an indicator of the number of people involved in this process. Only the duties, names of these officers and

³¹⁰ While Judge records volume 13 consists the manumission dated between 1561 and 1563, the following volume, 14 consists between 1570 and 1572.

³¹¹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 25 / 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 667, 928, 3075 (24 Shavval 981 / 16 February 1574, 22 Zulqadah 981 / 15 March 1574).

the awards they received were written in the documents and the names of these officers were unfortunately not included in any other document. For this reason, it is quite difficult to ascertain the help people provided. However, even though we do not know exactly what good he did, Hasan known as Frank Hasan and who was a saddle maker was awarded with an asper per day. One of the awarded names was Mustafa's father Pervane and he was a royal food taster and Mustafa received initial *timar*. We cannot ascertain from the documents what good Mustafa did during this process but the bailo must have definitely considered the fact that Mustafa's father was from the palace.

The bailos who worked in İstanbul had an advantage compared to the bailos working in other states. Due to commercial traffic, they managed to send regular information to Venice and also received news from the captives on Ottoman lands thanks to the networks these commercial activities provided. Following their return after their duty term, which was generally 3 years, they read a report in front of the senate and each bailo talked about the captives they rescued. When notable Venetians from the nobility fell captive, their cases were not only followed closely by the Republic but Ottomans also brought these captives to the center and kept them under close surveillance. If a Venetian had been taken captive during peacetime, it was necessary to ascertain whether s/he was a Venetian subject and identify the pirate from whom the owner bought the captive. This was required in order for the bailo to take the captive back without a charge. If the pirate who took the Venetian captive could not be ascertained, it would be sent to the court for further investigation but this meant that the manumission of the captive was postponed for an indefinite period of time. Ottoman administration requested a witness to prove that a slave was a Venetian subject and generally did not accept the testimony of Christians. This

situation usually put the bailo, who wanted to rescue the slaves that were the subjects of the Republic, in a difficult position. This approach of the Ottomans was a result of the articles included in the treaties. Provided that it was proven that those who attacked the Venetian during peacetime were Ottoman subjects, the bailo's job became easier. However, Ottomans knew about this and did not abstain from creating problems regarding this testimony issue since they did not want to free those people who caused such losses.³¹²

For the captives that were brought to İstanbul after the Campaign of Cyprus, the bailo acted with the merchants and became organized quickly. More than 6000 women, approximately 5000 men, 500 children who were younger than 8 came to İstanbul and most of them were shared among the soldiers as war spoils. The bailo Marcantonio Barbaro watched the arrival of these captives desperately from his window. During the three years until the treaty was signed after the war, Cypriot nobility whose relatives were taken captive, people from bourgeoisie, and sometimes soldiers made an application to Pope for ransom money. The number of these letters, which were classified under *Litterae Hortatoriae*, was around 1200 and even though there were people before who applied to the Pope for similar reasons, the number of applications had never been so high.¹⁰⁵

The state of the captive Venetians was so striking that the François de Noailles, ambassador of France, an ally of the Ottoman State, and the mediator during the peace negotiations. Noailles secretly helped the bailo when he was not allowed to leave his residence and struggled for the rescue of the captives. This attempt of the ambassador was, of course, not futile. On the one hand he considered his king's prestige in İstanbul and on

³¹² Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 23, 30, 86-88.

the other hand looked for ways to rescue the French captives that were still imprisoned in Venice.³¹³

Having acted with the Holy League following the War of Cyprus, Venice started the peace negotiations even though it did not explicitly articulated peace with the Ottomans. Negotiations regarding the captives with the Ottomans were a rather sensitive subject. This issue was also quite ominous before the War of Cyprus took place and in its aftermath. The negotiation regarding any captive could turn into a highly tense political event. For this reason, the bailo had to behave quite carefully during this process. Many sources mention that the bailo Marcantonio Barbaro successfully completed this long and delicate period.³¹⁴

After the peace was established, the new bailo Tiepolo also did everything he could so that the captives could be rescued. At times, he even protected the captives of the Spain with whom the Ottomans were still at war, in his residence. The ransom amounts were still too high even though peace treaty was signed and the money sent from Venice and the cottimo revenue did not suffice for everyone. For this reason, the bailo had to turn down the rescue demands of many Christians. He could spend 15, at most 20 ducats per captive. On the other hand, the bailo Contarini mentioned that the captives who were manumitted here, especially the mariners, began to work at the Ottoman shipyard before going back to Venice. This was not something Venice wanted at all. Adding that a carpenter made 300 sequins and a cauker made 200 sequins at the shipyard, Contarini complained that the Ottomans learned how to build large ships thanks to these craftsmen.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 92.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.* 93, 94.

Therefore, the bailos prioritized the manumission of those craftsmen who were adept at shipbuilding. In the end, these slaves were versed in their craft and they needed to be taken back as the backbone of the Venetian navy as soon as possible. Although these craftsmen were valuable for both parties, they presented a threat for the Ottoman State given the slightest neglect as they knew how to proceed a ship. For instance, the galley slaves who managed to escape from İstanbul through sea and arrived in Gallipoli were, without doubt, mariner captives.³¹⁵

In order to ensure that the slaves were recognized accurately and to follow whether they were really captives or not, the embassy kept regular records of the petitions that the slaves wrote to the bailo and of the source of the bailo's expenditures. Since the time of Lorenzo Bernardo, not only the Venetians but also the ones who served to Venice, those who were not Venetian subjects, and even the ones that the bailo approved began to appear in the documents. The funds were quite limited. In addition to those coming from patrician families or citizens, there were also those who worked in the Venetian navy and army as mariners or soldiers.³¹⁶

The Christian slaves who were able to escape from the Ottoman lands naturally did not have the documents that would protect them during their travels. However, they sometimes tried to escape with the help of an officer, were at times caught and at times achieved to return to their countries. Even though a treaty was signed in 1573 following the War of Cyprus, there were still a lot of Venetian slaves in İstanbul. In 1574, the bailo Antonio Tiepolo helped some slaves escape in a Venetian ship but the slaves were

³¹⁵ *Ibid*, 98-101; Alberi, *Le relazioni*, serie III, v. II, 176-177 (Il 2 febbraio 1575); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 45 / 325 (29 Jumada al-thani 988 / 11 August 1580).

³¹⁶ Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 114.

imprisoned by the Ottoman authorities with the sealed letters of the bailo on them. Instead of handling the situation, the bailo Tiepolo stated that he had the right to do such things since a peace treaty was signed. Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha wrote a letter to Doge and maintained that he disregarded the ‘insolent’ manners of the bailo out of his respect for the Doge. Mehmed Pasha wrote that the slaves had documents approved by the bailo and the ship on which the slaves were taken was not withheld as a token of good will.³¹⁷

House of Catechumens founded in the last quarter of 16th century in Venice became a sort of refuge, a safe space for the return to Christianity for the slaves who escaped in this way. House of Catechumens first emerged in 1543 in Rome as part of the Church’s need for religious modernization. It was an institution where those who came from Spain and converted to Christianity -most of whom were Jews and a few of whom were Muslims- learned the Christian doctrine and various prayers before their christening and stayed for a few weeks or months. In Venice, it was founded in 1557. House of Catechumens of the Republic (*Pia Casa dei Catecumeni*) was a product of the cooperation established among ecclesiastical officials, Jesuits, lay patricians, and colonial administrators and functioned more as a state institution. While the first residents of the House of Catechumens in Venice were mostly Jewish people, this changed after the War of Cyprus and the incident that followed it.³¹⁸

Due to reasons such as the policies in the aftermath of the peace established between two states, easier travelling opportunities between the two states with the relatively long period of peace in place, and the fact that Jesuits also obtained permit to

³¹⁷ Maria Pia Pedani, *The Ottoman-Venetian Border (15th-18th Centuries)*, ed. by Mariateresa Sala, (Venice: Edizioni Ca’ Foscari, 2017), 122; Pedani, *Inventory*, 58.

³¹⁸ Plakotos, “The Venetian Inquisition”, 175.

be active on the Ottoman lands in addition to the Venetian communication network, many former slaves and former Christian Ottoman citizens, generally on the land border, took refuge in this institution. The institution became aware of these people through the Venetian people or clergymen in the Venetian colonies and borders even though some of these colonies came under the Ottoman rule.³¹⁹

After these slaves stayed in the House of Catechumens for a while and were christened, they generally worked as domestic slaves in the houses of the patricians and citizens of the Republic. Provided that the slave of the family demanded to stay there and be christened, s/he continued to work after his/her christening while s/he was supposed to be manumitted. Those who continued to live as servants of the family -they were generally women- sometimes got married and joined society. Those who converted to Christianity received moral and financial support. This support made it easier for the former Muslims or new Christian Greek slaves to join the society. So much so that there were even people who received financial support 20 years after their christening.³²⁰

The House of Catechumens was one of the hopes for the people who became Muslim to improve their economic or social conditions but was disappointed. Indeed, it was confirmed that becoming Muslim could eliminate most of the barriers to social stratification in Ottoman society but not always. Yet, once they became Muslim, reconverting was generally meant to be punished. In addition, if those were out of the Ottoman lands, it was a problem to become Muslim in their homelands. In his diary,

³¹⁹ E. Natalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire Trans-Imperia Subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 31; E. Natalie Rothmann, "Becoming Venetian: Conversion and Transformation in the Seventeenth Century Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Historical Review*, v. 21, n. 1, 2006, 41-42.

³²⁰ Rothmann, "Becoming Venetian, 43, 49; Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 11.

Stephan Gerlach records various ex-Christians who converted to Islam and regretted their decisions. For instance, two pages of the Embassy converted by wishing for a more prosperous life, but they could find what they looked for. After the conversion, they lost their job in the Embassy and fell in the gutter. One of them requested to be a vouch for his fidelity from the ambassador of the Empire if he went to his homeland.³²¹ In these circumstances the House of Catechumens generated by the lenient Venetian way was the escape way.

³²¹ Gerlach, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, v. II, 525, 636, 637.

CHAPTER V: DURING AND AFTER CYPRUS AND LEPANTO



*“Et da poi finido el sacco,
tutta ‘l robba, ori et arzeni,
schiavi et schiave tutti à sbacco
via portavan chelle zenti,
per partir con li Leventi
che havea ‘l fuste in chei distretti.
O Strathiotti puveretti.”³²²*

5.1 Background

Before the Ottomans, being a slave in the Mediterranean was quite complicated, more than known. Various states, ethnicities, and religions continued to produce various types of slavery and slaves. The slave practices were different up to the lands. For instance, in Cyprus of the 13th century, a Greek Orthodox or a Turkish slave could be held by a catholic Venetian owner, or a peasant could be bounded to his master in his entire life while a Muslim owner also had another Greek Orthodox slave. Pragmatism was a keyword for slave-holding societies and helped owners keep their slaves as much as possible. The conversion did not mean to be free and go back home. Freedom regulations served to the

³²² “*And when the sack was over, / Everything, gold, silver, / male and female slaves / were taken away in lots / by those people [who] left with the Levantines / who had ships in those districts. / Oh poor Stratioti*” Konstantinos N. Sathas, *Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au moyen âge publiés sous les auspices de la chambre des députés de Grèce: Documents tirés des archives de Venise (1400-1500)*, v. 9, Paris: Maisonneuve, 1890, 272.

practice but not to the ideal.³²³ As long as the slave market was alive and functioning and the laws were silent, landlords took advantage of its benefits. Merchants were one of the primary figures who acted on the freedom process; while these commercial contacts facilitated the influx of slaves, they also aided their exit from the island. The relative proximity of their places of origin and the fact that these links and networks were functioning and accessible were beneficial factors to some slaves.³²⁴

When Cyprus came under the rule of Venetian administration in 1473, the Republic had already been in contact with the Muslim Levant for long years. Even though the tense relations with the Ottomans continued, Venice's priority in the region was to protect its estates on the colonies and its commercial activities. The Island's closeness to the Anatolian shores was of great significance. The principal goal of the Republic was to avoid war until the last minute- and decide to wage war when required- and provide the best circumstances for the Venetians to derive benefit and honor. After Venice began to rule the Island, it did not pose any threat for the Mamelukes or for the Ottomans. However, the activities of the Christian pirates in the region and the fact that they sometimes found accommodation and food in the Island created tension between the Republic and its Muslim neighbor states. On the other hand, it was known that Religious Order of Saint John had many estates on the Island. All of these were actually used as arguments when the Ottoman state demanded the Island from the Republic in 1570.³²⁵

³²³ Aysu Dincer, "'Enslaving Christians': Greek slaves in late medieval Cyprus", *Mediterranean Historical Review*, v. 31, nr. 1(2016), 1-19; Nicolae Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2005), v. 3, 31.

³²⁴ Dincer, "'Enslaving Christians'", 9.

³²⁵ Benjamin Arbel, "Venetian Cyprus and the Muslim Levant (1473-1570)", *Cyprus, the Franks and Venice: 13th-16th centuries*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2000), 160-165.

The population of Greek community who might have found themselves as having been captured by Venice and other elements at any moment up until 15th century was spared from this threat as Ottoman subjects. On the other hand, religious institutions that provided help to the captives the Ottomans kept as slaves began to appear in the 16th century. For example, in an edict dated 1587, it was stated that the nuns of a monastery for women in Athens hid some odalisques and helped them escape. The local authorities were ordered to prevent this. A lot of former Christians who achieved to run away from Ottoman territories and who were able to apply to the House of Catechumens in Venice settled in these houses generally thanks to the church network and reference. The porousness of the Venetian-Ottoman border in the Balkans made these operations possible.³²⁶

If people encountered a clergyman during their captivity, they always tried to make him write a letter of reference. These captives did not need to be Christians. Although they became Muslims, the number of converts who wanted to receive these letters was quite high. It was because there were people among them who wanted to get out of captivity by changing their physical circumstances and to return their countries; however, they knew that they would be tried in the Inquisition if they returned. The converts hid these letters in the leather pouched that they tied to their waists.³²⁷

When the Ottomans appeared in the Mediterranean, Venice had to resituate itself with regard to many subjects such as war captives, slave trade, and ransom negotiations about which it became accustomed to certain ways throughout the Middle Ages. It was

³²⁶ Faroghi, *Subjects of the Sultan*, 90; Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 11.

³²⁷ William E. Wilson, "A Note on Christian Captives in North Africa", *The Catholic Historical Review*, v. 28, No. 4 (Jan., 1943), 496.

because in this Muslim-Christian jihad, the opposite party was of the opinion that the soldiers and mariners who were recruited to fight in the war should be made slaves, permanently if possible, and that the civilians should be caught in pirate activities or during onslaughts. This party considered these people as manpower that would contribute to the economy on their own lands. They provided cheap labor in state institutions such as shipyards, artilleries, navy, and palace. The soldiers acquired them as *doyumluk*³²⁸ during an expedition or raid. One of the five captives belonged to the national treasury, to the Sultan so to speak, as legitimate share and the national treasury always went after what was theirs.³²⁹ If there was less than five captives, a certain amount of tax was levied for each captive. However, this practice was abused in certain ways. Which is why the limit for five captives was ignored over time even though it was written in the regulation and the tax was levied for each and every captive. The state also levied taxes for the captives to be sold at the market. Certain number of these captives were separated and trained in order to carry out special services within the palace or in the army. This represented only the portion that the state made money over the war captives. While a certain portion of soldiers were already former prisoners of war (janissaries), *158arin* holders had at least one slave that belonged to them. In an anonymous Venetian report about the third Iran expedition of Kanuni, when they unpacked and stopped for a bit on the course of the expedition, it was recorded that even the poorest *158arin* holder had at least three men

³²⁸ Wilson, "A Note on Christian Captives", 496.

³²⁹ For a study in which it is understood how meticulously the part of the inheritance of those who passed away from military-bureaucratic and scientific classes belonging to the state treasury was identified and recorded, please see, Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Edirne Askeri Kassamına Ait Tereke. Defterleri (1545-1659)", *Türk Tarih Kurumu Belgeler*, III/5-6 (Ankara 1968), 1-479.

and one slave beside him. Many of them had four horses and two slaves and a lot of them had six horses and four slaves.³³⁰

In the Ottoman State, the practice of holding captives was in favor of permanent enslavement and while this approach turned war captives into an absolute leverage for political negotiations during wartime, it was perceived as a threat that impelled the opposing party to act more carefully during peacetime. Although this situation was new for Venice, Venice did everything in its power so that the subjects of the Republic would not disappear in Ottoman territories after being taken captive. The old system that Venice was accustomed to depended on maintaining bilateral relations with many states that were also active in the Mediterranean by striking a certain balance in accordance with the situation of the other state. As many of the dominions that Venice once controlled and the lands of other states came under the Ottoman rule, this balance was completely shaken. It was usual for the senate to use its state connections and at times its funds in order to procure the freedom of Venetian citizens and especially the noble commanders of the Republic's naval forces; however, with the enslavement that increased from 1500s onward, Venice had to find new solutions such as finding out the whereabouts of the enslaved Venetian citizens and organizing the process of collecting the ransom required for their release with other city-states. On the other hand, Venice had to come to terms commercially and politically with a single state from Adriatic to Aegean Sea and from Syria to Algeria in order to maintain its commercial activities in the Levant. Venice had a large and porous border with this state on the land. Moreover, Ottoman State had aggressive, belligerent troops on this border that it could always mobilize. In the first

³³⁰ Alberi, *Le relazioni*, serie III, v. I, 255.

peace negotiations that took place between the two states, they gradually achieved to convince the Ottomans to add detailed articles regarding the captives in peace treaties within two centuries by reading the insistence of the Ottomans to not to let go of the captives they had. In time, both states actually turned piracy and slavery into political instruments of their states.³³¹

Juridically, being a subject of Ottoman Empire in the region also meant to be protected from the Ottoman law. By the Ottoman advance, the local people of the conquered lands were recorded after the cadastral survey and gained also a guarantee not to be enslaved not only by enemy but also any Ottoman subject. Though, the Ottoman archives consists numerous document that informs us about the violation case of this guarantee the state organs tried to take an action to solve those kinds of problems. Except Cyprus, Crete and some islands under the Venetian rule, as subjects of Ottoman Empire, eastern Mediterranean inhabitants from any ethnicity and religion were free. In those islands there two types of bounded people apart from the Venetian colonialists. Sally McKee clarifies them as “unfree peasantry peasantry, who resided in and cultural estates throughout the island, constituted the villieins, who were Greek-speaking adherents whose ancestors had once served Byzantine label of *paroikoi*. ” Slaves who brought by merchants and bought were in were to the second type. The Majority of those men and women were Greeks, they were replaced by Tatars, Circassians, Bulgars, Turks, Russians in the second part of century.³³² And during the Ottoman advance, the population of those people remarkable decreased by the abolition of their ex-bounded status.

³³¹ Davis, “Slave Redemption”, 454- 456; Arbel, “Venetian Cyprus, 170.

³³² McKee, “Inherited Status”, 40.

Stato da Mar meant manpower for Venice and the people who lived in these regions were generally Orthodox Greeks and Albanians. Mariners and soldiers for the fleets, workers for the shipyard and various industrial sectors were procured from these places.³³³ The Republic did not take an interest in the regions that did not meet its commercial, maritime, and security-related needs. And it continued to govern its dominions with a political existence shaped by local balances, the continuance of the resources that would provide the required supply, and various rights and privileges that were only accepted within *Stato da Mar* borders.³³⁴

Even though the subjects of the dominions were Greeks, the administrators were Venetian. But it was different in the case of Cyprus. Cyprus was governed by a number of noble Byzantine, Catalan, French, and Venetian families. These Venetian subjects whose languages and religions were different could apply to the court, work at jobs that their classes and skills allowed, and they could live some places else in the Empire and ask for privileges such as compensation and judicial control if need be. On the other hand, they were uncomfortable with obligatory tasks, drudgery, and heavy taxes. When a region from the dominions came under the Ottoman rule, the people there did not prefer to escape. On this matter, the rights given to the Greek churches just like in Cyprus and Crete after occupation were effective.³³⁵ However, given the surface area of Venice, a small city, the

³³³ Due to the plague, the manpower from the Greek colonies and Dalmatia were recruited in the middle of the 14th century. During the expeditions of the 1430s and 1460s, immigration to the city from Dalmatia, Albania, and Western Greece accelerated. Because Venice could not meet its sailor needs from the population in the big city. The seafarers of the immigrants provided the city with cheap labor. After the half of the 15th century, Albanians and Greeks began to be used as light cavalry, stradiots, messengers, and coast guards. Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 73, 88, 89, 146.

³³⁴ Burke, *The Greeks of Venice*, xviii-xix.

³³⁵ Burke, *The Greeks of Venice*, 16.

number of people coming to the city was sufficient to have an effect on the city's population.

Until the Ottoman rule of those islands, there sharp contrast between Greeks and Venetians which affected slave and also the free status. Converting to the Catholicism did not mean to be an accredited citizen as colonial and ruler class of the land. Even two or three generations after conversion, even a member of noble Greek family could not claim to have a sit in the great council even though he his Roman Catholicism and his reserved privileges to gain and hold the land.³³⁶

5.2 War of Cyprus and Battle of Lepanto

In the second part of the 16th century, Cyprus one of the critical political issues between the Ottomans and Venetians. It was a vital hub in the middle of the East Mediterranean and affected the whole military and commercial activities. It was an island that had a great demand and the traffic for slaves particularly in plantation areas and facilities in Morfo (Morphou), Lefka, Aheliye (Akhelia), Kukla (Kouklia), Baf (Paphos), Lapta (Lapithos), and especially Piskopi (Episkopi) and Kolos (Kolossi).³³⁷

The Cyprus War particularly would be read as a distinctive chapter of Mediterranean Slavery with its reasons, process and result. Before, during and after the Cyprus War, not only two states, Republic of Venice and Ottoman Empire boy also the

³³⁶ McKee, "Inherited Status", 39.

³³⁷ Ronald C. Jennings, *Christian and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean world, 1571–1640* (New York University Press, 1993), 19.

societies in the region were generated by changing auld practices and emerging new on slavery.

Although there are various opinions about the motivation of Ottomans to conquest the island, convenient and rational reason quickly appears when we read contemporary and academic sources together. When Selim I conquered Mameluke Egypt, the Republic accepted to pay the annual tax of the island to the Ottoman with delay. During the Suleiman I's reign, the fall of Rhodes in 1522 left Cyprus more isolated in the eastern Mediterranean and the falls of Andros, Naxos, Paros, and Santorini, and the last two Venetian settlements on the Peloponnese in 1538 secured the region in favour of the Ottomans. After two powers concluded the treaty in 1540, the Ottoman Empire fought different wars on multiple fronts, preferred to collect the island's annual tax from Venice and focused on the other wars in two frontiers of the Empire.³³⁸

Nevertheless, Maltese corsairs were remarkably active in the region, and their center was Cyprus. Ottoman chronicler Selanikî Mustafa records that Sultan Selim II was already planning to conquest the island since the corsairs hijacked his personal belongings when he was an heir.³³⁹ According to Stephan Gerlach, the priest who lived in Istanbul as a member of the legation of ambassador David Ungnad von Sonnegg, Ottomans wanted to conquest Cyprus to prevent the operations of Maltese corsairs, Spanish and other captives who used the island as a harbour and attacked the ships to Egypt and Alexandria.³⁴⁰

³³⁸ George Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), v. III, 834-836.

³³⁹ Selânîkî, *Tarih*, v. I, 77.

³⁴⁰ Gerlach, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, v. I, 378; Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats", 154.

Yet, the Sultan sent Kubad Çavuş as an envoy to Venice to warn the Senate and demanded Cyprus to rule, but the Senate naturally rejected the ultimatum and held him in custody until he spoke in the Senate. The interpreter of the Sultan, Mahmud Beg who was on the way to France was also arrested (and held there for three years) in the city.³⁴¹ The vital fatwa was ready to break the peace treaty, claiming that Cyprus belonged to an Islamic state once upon a time and should be ruled again by an Islamic state. This was also the unique case of the broken treaty by the Ottomans during the 16th century.³⁴²

All those hijackings and capturing problems were strongly contrast the Ottoman laws which declared to protect the whole subject of Empire from any treat in its territories. If the state became weaker to be a guarantee upon for the lives and belongings of its subjects it would cause another greater problem: reliability of Ottoman subjects to their state and sovereignty.

How Ottomans broke the treaty by extending over a while can easily be tracked with the documents from both states. On the eve of the siege, on the February of 1570, the Venetian trade ship sank in Schiotos and the crew and the merchants were captured. In such circumstances, the imperial court ordered to release the captives and keep the whole commercial goods favouring Venice upon Ahd-name. Yet this once order consisted of keeping the goods in the Island of Chios and sent the crew directly to the capital.³⁴³ Schiotos was one of the small hubs for the grain trade network from Volos to the various ports in the middle of the Ottoman naval dominion and close to the Archipelago Duchy.

³⁴¹ Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, v. 3, 130; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 884-891; Alessandro Barbero, *Lepanto: La Battaglia dei Tre Imperi*, (Rome: Laterza, 2010), 153.

³⁴² Colin Imber, *Ebu's-Su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1997), 84-85.

³⁴³ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 9 / 61 (22 Ramadan 977 / 28 February 1570).

Those islands were still under the rule of Venice. Their location probably made the attacks from the Christian league to those local ships easier. The second order from the court to the governor of Chios was for the precautions for the possible attacks on local grain transporter ships and ordered to arm the vessel just in case.³⁴⁴ It seems that there were other capturing activities in the region on the eve of the Cyprus campaign. Before five weeks, the Venetian Senate wrote a letter to request the Sultan to release the crew, and the good of the ship sank in Schiatos a year ago.³⁴⁵ We do not know why Venetians waited so long and if the imperial order from the Ottoman court was written knowingly or unknowingly. Yet, the request tells that the Ottoman attacks had been continued for the last two years, and the Senate demanded to do whatever to stop those violations.

According to Daniel Goffman, the Ottomans decided to attack the island to underline the legitimacy and glorious fame of the new Sultan Selim II, the son of the Magnificent Suleyman I, and stop the corsairs attack on Ottoman and Muslim ships.³⁴⁶ By launching this military campaign to Cyprus, the Ottomans also gave up the tribute paid by Venice. Charles A. Frazee considers that in order to add it to the Empire, judging that efforts to save the island for Christendom would collapse over rivalries in Western Europe.³⁴⁷

Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, 19th century-historian, accepts Joseph Nasi, a Jewish and close friend of the Sultan, as a primary reason for the campaign. He describes Nasi as

³⁴⁴ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 284 (20 978 / 15 April 1571).

³⁴⁵ Dökmeci, "İstanbul'daki Venedik" *Dragomanları ve Dil Oğlanları (1551-1797)*, (Unpublished doctoral thesis, Istanbul University, 2018), 269; ASVe., Senato, Deliberazioni, Registri, Costantinopoli, Reg. 4, 36v, (8 March 1571).

³⁴⁶ Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 185.

³⁴⁷ Frazee, *Catholics and Sultans*, 68.

an ambitious merchant who strongly influenced the Sultan and a great demand to be a governor of Cyprus. Zinkeisen underestimates the frontier violations, piracy activities and the other political reasons which led the Sultan to attack the island by sharing the opinions from contemporary European sources as ambassador reports, chronicles and some memoirs. In his history, neither Venetian nor Ottoman documents have existence.³⁴⁸

We can assume that the gradual change of Cyprus's place in the commercial activities in the Levant altered the Ottomans' outlook on Cyprus as well. In his study in which he wrote about the history of Venetian shipping between the years 1453-1571, Renard Gluzman questioned the reasons of this change in detail. According to Gluzman, Fernand Braudel and Frederic C. Lane maintained that the volume of commerce in the Levant decreased due to explorations for reasons that they deemed accurate and it once again increased after the peace established between Ottomans and Venetians in 1540 until 1571. Even though this was partly true, Gluzman objected to Cyprus issue in particular because in 1559, the customs governor of Aleppo complained that the large galleys of Venice did not come to the Syrian ports. Venice came up with a new solution: using Cyprus as the eventual port and transferring the merchandise that would go to nearby ports to smaller ships. Such a transfer system also pointed to a decrease in the volume of the commercial activities. Since these ships, which were owned by private businesses or had skippers, generally had Ottoman subjects and Aleppo customs governor complained about this situation, we can assume that Venice's costs dropped and there was also a decrease in the customs reveue of the Ottomans.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁸ Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* (İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2011), v. 2, 662.

³⁴⁹ Renard Gluzman, *Venetian Shipping from the Days of Glory to Decline, 1453–1571* (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 343, 356-357; Arbel, "Venetian Cyprus, 170.

Despite these measures, it became commercially detrimental for Venetian ships to come to the port of Cyprus. With the intention of ensuring that the ships went to Cyprus instead of following other routes, the state began to offer extra payments to the ship owners, who owned these large-tonnage, costly ships that went to İstanbul or Alexandria and that were produced with the development of shipping industry in 1560s. It was due to the fact that Cyprus was still the largest plantation colony of the Republic and it continued to feed the city the population of which was gradually increasing.³⁵⁰ It was impossible for the central authority to not to notice the change that took place in Cyprus, a place that began to lose its previous characteristics. The presence of such a large island, which had become quite unfunctional within the territorial waters of the state, was in conflict with the expansionist policy of the Ottoman State. The Republic did not bring lucrative freights to the island for sizable shipments after 1571.

In the colonies of the Levant and in places where there was a right to have a consul, in addition to the main representative of the Republic, a council was present in order to resolve the problems of the merchants and mariners in particular.³⁵¹ The Republic formed an administrative schema in its colonies just like the one in the center and the name of this council was council of twelve (*consiglio dei dodici*). Apart from two members, all the remaining members were from Venetian nobility and the council also existed in İstanbul.³⁵² Such a structure meant that there were always a certain number of noble and privileged citizens in those cities that came under the Ottoman rule over time and where

³⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 343, 344, 357.

³⁵¹ For further information on Venetian consular system see Niels Steensgaard, "Consuls and Nations in the Levant from 1570–1650" *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, 15 (1967), 13–53; Maria Pia Pedani, "Venetian Consuls in Egypt and Syria in the Ottoman Age," *Mediterranean World*, 18 (2006), 7–21.

³⁵² Gluzman, *Venetian Shipping*, 45–46; Bruno Simon, "I rappresentanti diplomatici veneziani a Costantinopoli" *Venezia e i Turchi: Scontri e confronti di due civiltà* (Milan: Electa, 1985), 62, 63.

there was a continued engagement in commerce. In case of situations such as the War of Cyprus, the presence of Venetians meant that they could be turned into an advantage for the Ottomans as leverage by being held captive -or in the best-case scenario by being confined to house.

Another aethereal reason for the siege that frequently mentioned by the contemporary sources was the cruelty of the Princes of Cyprus to the people of the island and this cruelty destroyed the kingdom by the hands of Turks.³⁵³ This reason which Gerlach and Brother Angelo Calepio, an enslaved priest mentioned would not be analytical but the motivation of the local Greeks in island to demand the Ottoman rule. In appearance, the people of Cyprus accepted the Ottomans as “*Salvatore*”, which helped them get rid of the cruel Venetians. Even before the campaign, some of the local people of Cyprus who converted to Islam and appealed for the help from the Beg of İçel was already granted for the *istimâlet* / leniency³⁵⁴ after the rule of Ottomans in the island.³⁵⁵ Ottomans were pretty acknew of this expectance and acted consciously as we are going to frame in the following parts of this chapter. They followed different ways towards the rulling class and the local population. They proclaimed that the war had been declared against the “Franks”.³⁵⁶

³⁵³ Claude Delaval Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria; Materials for a History of Cyprus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 142; Gerlach, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, v. I, 240.

³⁵⁴ İstimâlet: The Ottoman policy in conquered and non-Islamic regions in which peoples of these lands were approached with leniency and kindness to attract these peoples to the authority. See Mücteba İlgürel, “İstimâlet”. DIA, v. 23. (İstanbul: TDV, 2001), 262-263.

³⁵⁵ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 9 / 78 (29 Ramadan 977 / 7 March 1570).

³⁵⁶ Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Policy and Administration in Cyprus after the Conquest”, *Milletlerarası Birinci Kıbrıs Tetkikleri Kongresi (14-19 Nisan 1969): Türk Heyeti Tebliğleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1971), 59.

Genoese played one of the most essential roles in slave trade in Cyprus and especially the Famagustans, were playing an active part in this traffic.³⁵⁷ Venice whose colonies were not played an important role for the slave trade as Crete continued to rule the island by previous practices. For the Venetian ruling class, the local population were slaves and obliged to pay to the state a third part of all their income regardless of the type of production in their ground. Every man had to work three days of the week for the state. If they failed to work, they had to pay a fine for their absence. They also had to pay various taxes as salt tax, tax for every child aged 15 and tax for new-born animals. With the help of works George Hill and İnalcık, we had a chance to compare the rates of the taxes both under the Venetian rule and Ottomans. Ottomans abrogated all those three taxes and the weekly bondage labor and regulated the taxes relatively fair.³⁵⁸

There two types of those bounded people: *169arina* or *paroikoi* and *lefteri* or *francmati*. According to division in Frankish rule³⁵⁹, *169arina* were attached to the land under the control of state or seigneur while *lefteri* were not attached to the land of anyone. *Lefteri* were free to move yet if they settled on the land of a lord, they automatically passed into the *parica* category. Both were not allowed to carry weapons or enter the castle if they did not carry any supplies.³⁶⁰ Due to the rough working conditions, *169arina* started to run away from the island even in 1460's. Besides, throughout the Venetian domination, Cyprus was not free from the plagues and natural disasters. This meant that the governors

³⁵⁷ Verlinden, *The Beginnings*, 92.

³⁵⁸ İnalcık, "An Outline", 84.

³⁵⁹ In the code text, "The Bans and Ordinances of the King of Cyprus", the status of these people was clearly stated as "all the villeins, men and women, and the slaves, men and women, and all kinds of beasts." Villeins were not slaves since they were contrasted with the slaves and had to pay a capitation fee. For various cases in Cyprus, recorded in Genoese notary see. Verlinden, *The Beginnings*, 81, 89-91.

³⁶⁰ *Venice and the defense of the Regno di Cipro: Giulio Savorgnan's Unpublished Cyprus Correspondence (1557-1570)*, trans. by Gilles Grivaud (Nicosia: The Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, 2016), 167, 220.

had to repopulate and replace the death people with the new immigrants as serfs of the island.³⁶¹ The rise of Cyprus as a commercial emporium after the fall of other Crusader states in the Levant and the demographic crisis caused by the Black Death both contributed to stimulating the slave trade and the employment of slaves in Cyprus. Including churchmen, even Greeks kept, bought and sold Greek slaves both in Cyprus and in Crete to meet the manpower demand.³⁶²

The number of *170arina* increased under the Venetian rule and as an act the ruling class just tried to recapture the runaways and sometimes emancipate them. The Ottoman pressure on the island, started in 1480's encouraged the *170arina* who knew that Ottomans abolished the forced labor for the previous masters of the conquered lands. Venetian government had to reduce the forced labor to two days to pacify the parica and in some regions they started to be paid for a small wage on those forced labor days. It seems that it did not work as a solution. In 1562, the islanders attempted to rise up against the rule of Venice while they had a secret touch with Iskender Pasha, the Beglerbeg of Anatolia. It was supposed that there were some fifty thousand serfs would gladly join to the Turks.³⁶³

Even when the Ottomans declared the war, Venetians decided to free the all *170arina* but it was too late. When the Turkish army arrived to the island, the Venetians suddenly made a surprise attack to the Greek who started an uprising and slaughtered 400 peasants to prevent the spread of the uprising.³⁶⁴

³⁶¹ Benjamin Arbel, "Cypriot population under Venetian rule [1473-1571]: a demographic study", *Cyprus, the Franks and Venice, 13th-16th centuries* (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2000), 184-185; Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 167.

³⁶² Benjamin Arbel, "Slave Trade and Slave Labor in Frankish and Venetian Cyprus", *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, n.s. 14 (1993), 163, 166.

³⁶³ İnalcık, "Ottoman Policy", 60, 71-73; Arbel, "Cypriot population", 191.

³⁶⁴ Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 961-62.

On the side of Venice, the military preparations for the War of Cyprus began in January 1570 when the letter of the bailo notified the Republic about the intense maritime traffic in the Bosphorus. The threat of war existed almost each year; however, this time it was different in nature. On the one hand the Republic tried to tell the ambassadors in Rome how great the danger was for the Christianity and on the other hand it kept receiving news about the mobility of the navy and crewmembers in İstanbul, the Turkish raids that took place from Zara to Budva, and the difficulties that the Venetian merchants ran into. The Ottomans officially asked for Cyprus in March.³⁶⁵

In January 1570, Marcantonio Barbaro also learnt that Kaptan Pasha and his chiefs had spent a long time with a “vivacious” Cypriot named Iseppo, talking on the map of the island and asking him for information about the ports in Cyprus. This person might have been Josefı Attoni, who was next to the pasha and came with permission to buy columns from the island in 1568 for the mosque that the sultan would build in Edirne. Josefı was a Levantine engineer and sentenced to shovel by the Famagosta administrator.³⁶⁶ If the bailo’s prediction was true, the Ottomans reconnoitered the island months ago.

As in the past, Venice relied on the sultan’s subjects to gain support for her military actions in conflicts with the Ottomans. Before the Cyprus War, he tried to persuade the people of the Ottoman lands across the island of Corfu to the *Venetian victory*. For instance, in March the *Consiglio dei Dieci* gave Sebastien Sebastiano Venier full authority

³⁶⁵ Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 233; ASVe., Collegio, Notatorio, reg. 39, 140 (7 February 1570).

³⁶⁶ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 45, 209.

to contact with the Albanian leaders and 500 ducats for this and in May asked for the support of the Greek patriarch in Istanbul.³⁶⁷

After months elapsed, Vatican and Spain became convinced that an alliance should be established with Venice around June after a part of the Turkish navy left Rhodes for Cyprus. However, even though this decision was taken, it was never made official. For example, Venice still could not recruit any soldiers from the lands of Papacy. When the Siege of Nicosia was about to be completed, Venice could not receive news from Cyprus like it used to. Venice's reinforcements waited for the support of the alliance while the troops of the alliance expected Venice to go first. Venice also had a difficult time in recruiting crewmembers for the ships. Although people were poor due to an epidemic, neither tax exemptions, the cancellation of debts and punishments nor threats or encouragements worked to recruit them. Those people who were tasked with procuring oarsmen in Crete passed from nearly abandoned villages to reach abandoned castles. Generals were aware of this situation and knew very well that they could not build a line of defence or attack in this plight. In this way, Nicosia was lost with grave losses due to being unprepared and unorganized.³⁶⁸

Therefore, the arrival of 12 galleys from Papacy and 49 Spanish galleys on September 4 and having a combat fleet consisting of 126 galliots, 12 galleys, and 20 ships and galleos was not much use. While all this foot dragging took place, thousands of people were taken captive in Nicosia. This turmoil, which was one of the reasons of the chaos in

³⁶⁷ Poumarède, *L'Empire de Venise*, 504.

³⁶⁸ Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 233-235.

Nicosia, culminated in the captivity of nearly everyone in the city and created a serious financial and spiritual burden both for Venice and allied countries in the future.³⁶⁹

They endeavored to send help to Famagusta belatedly; however, this time other problems arose. Some of the generals of the troops wanted to return, the ships could not use efficiently due to the epidemic, and number of people that remained after Venice first eliminated many people due to its security concerns did not seem sufficient after the epidemic and people's reluctance. The ship crewmembers who were told that they would be on land rejected doing so by saying that their duty was at sea not on land and they were all discharged and put to the service of Venier or were left at Corfu. Referring to the qualifications of the people that they were stuck with, the Candia captain Filippo Bragadin said that he had never felt so embarrassed. He referred to those people as sarcastic, who were only there to see their own profit, who were underequipped, and inexperienced.³⁷⁰

Behind all this delay in forming the league, there lied the fact that Venice dragged its feet regarding the heavy terms of the league and the Spanish side was reluctant to make an alliance with Venice. The third power, the Pope somehow convinced the parties and took another step in the direction of controlling Venice, which had avoided the pontifical authority for a long time. John Hale thinks that Venice carried out all the preparations not in order to defend a territory of the Republic under occupation but to enter into a possible negotiation with the Sultan as an independent party and this was one of the factors that contributed to the delay in forging an alliance.³⁷¹

³⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 235.

³⁷⁰ Tenenti, "The Sense of Space, 29. Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 235, 236.

³⁷¹ Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 236.

There are numerous documents sent by both sides and requested the captives upon Ahd-name who should not have been held by the other.³⁷² Sometimes the requests remained unanswered. In April of 1568, the imperial court sent the order to the beglerbeg of Egypt to investigate the case of Ahmed Kethüda (steward), who hold in Malta castle. He was captured four years ago, and though his ransom, 12,000 crones / 2,000 Venetian ducats was paid to the bailo of Egypt, he was not still freed. As a precaution, the bailo was put under house arrest, yet he was released upon *Ahd-name*. If neither bailo nor the other Ottoman officials knew anything about Ahmed, the ransom should withdraw and give to his family.³⁷³

5.3 The Siege

The Ottomans started to siege the island from the southern east coasts. While the Ottomans released the people of Limassol after conquering the town without resistance, Venetians attacked Limassol, slaughtered people and captured women and children. After Limassol, the Ottoman Army sieged Nicosia and faced resistance. The city defended itself during the first three assaults and lost many warriors.³⁷⁴ During the siege of the city, The Ottoman commander, Mustafa Pasha, sent captives who carried heads of notable people

³⁷² BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 7 / 116 (21 Safar 975 / 27 August 1567); 7/862 (13 Shaban 975 / 13 February 1568).

³⁷³ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 7 / 1299 (21 Shavval 975 / 19 April 1568).

³⁷⁴ Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* (İstanbul: Kumsaati Yayınları, 2008), v. 2, 266-270; Wipertus Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons des chrétiens en Méditerranée: 1570-1600: d'après les Litterae Hortatoriae de l'Archivio Segreto Vaticano* (Paris: Léopard d'or, 1987), 45.

to Kerynia and Famagusta. Kerynia surrendered without resistance, and Famagusta decided to surrender after the prolonged blockade.³⁷⁵

During the Cyprus campaign, both sides violated war laws. The violations occurred as a raid, sometimes capturing the people on the roads without any reason.³⁷⁶ The captives to use them as bargaining chips or to obtain from them information about the fleets. Formerly, if they had a piece of helpful information or were themselves useful, the local officials had to send them directly to the Ottoman capital.³⁷⁷ In practice, the raiders sent the noble captives to the capital city while they had captured the whole people who were valuable and killed the rest. The monk Calepio, who was captured during the siege of Nicosia and wrote what he saw with his eyes in Nicosia and then in Constantinople. He records the deaths of many civilians during the sacking of the city: “Babies, women who resisted, old people that no one would buy and the prisoners who tried to escape were killed. Five days after the city fell, the monk he saw corpses deteriorated in the sun for days without arms or head, drowned or gutted, among the guns that were spiked before being abandoned, sacks of scattered wheat, bales of cotton, bottles of olive oil when he passed through the city. Pigs, whose meat was forbidden also slaughtered. After burying their own dead, the Janissaries gathered together the bodies of Christians and animals and burned them.”³⁷⁸ According to a Venetian slave who was brought to Constantinople,

³⁷⁵ Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 987, 988.

³⁷⁶ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 66 (15 Ramadan 978 / 20 February 1571); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 516 (24 ' al-awwal 978 / 26 August 1570); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 16 / 167 (9 ' Rabi' al-awwal 979 / 1 August 1571).

³⁷⁷ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 477 (20 Zulhijjah 978 / 15 May 1571); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 511 (19 Zulhijjah 978 / 14 May 1571); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 517, 520, (23-24 ' al-awwal 978 / 25-26 August 1570); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 16 / 633 (9 ' Rabi' al-awwal 979 / 1 August 1571); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 16 / 640 (23 Jumada al-awwal 979 / 13 October 1571); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 1005 (23 Shavval 979 / 9 March 1572).

³⁷⁸ Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 141, 142.

Mustafa Pasha was sending a message to Famagusta, whose fortifications were better, with the great destruction in Nicosia.³⁷⁹

According to a Genoese informer in Constantinople, the people who tried to flee to the mountains also could not escape from captivity. However, they had a guarantee from the Ottoman Empire. Captives that would previously cost 100 ducats were sold for two, three or four ducats. Sometimes 10-15 prisoners were dragged by a man like a flock of sheep. From the first day, the slave bazaar in Nicosia was set up, and the soldiers started to sell their captives, and the *reises* bought them to compensate for their rowing needs.³⁸⁰ Through this transaction, although the central administration was against freeing the Venetian subjects of the island, some of the captives, either in Nicosia or Famagusta, could quickly gain their freedom just after the conquest. They were from prominent families and undoubtedly capable of paying the ransom as soon as possible. They were also individuals, or the captured members of their families were not high in number to act quickly. Some others also managed to escape from the island during the siege. But after the war, the situation changed conversely. This time, it was easy for the Ottoman captive holders to earn ransom when the family members were together. Nobles taken captive in Nicosia were often kept together in their places.³⁸¹ Therefore, under the table, the Ottoman officials seek to collect family members during the campaign, like the sisters of Monk Calepio.³⁸²

³⁷⁹ Vera Costantini, *Il Sultano e L'isola Contesa: Cipro tra Eredità Veneziana e Potere Ottomano* (Turin: Utet, 2009), 67.

³⁸⁰ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 256; Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 142.

³⁸¹ Vera Costantini; "Destini di guerra. L'inventario Ottomano dei Prigionieri di Nicosia (settembre 1570)" in *Studi Veneziani*, vol. 46, (2003), 234.

³⁸² Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 47, 52.

Selling the captives as soon as possible in the bazaar was the most logical solution if they were for the enlisted warriors. The reward for bringing in a captive alive can be determined by inspecting the books kept during the campaign. When we examine one such book, which is registered under the code “KK 221” in the Ottoman Archives, we can draw an idea about how the Ottoman soldiers were rewarded³⁸³ for their valuable acts during the Cyprus Campaign. These records explain why the warriors rushed to sell the captives they enslaved in the war just after the conquest was completed.

The promotions without a doubt, pleased all the Ottoman soldiers. But the lengthy campaign³⁸⁴ and moving from a conquered settlement to a new one was difficult for the captors. Moving captives from one place to another and feeding them was not an easy task neither for the janissaries nor the *sipahis*. The only logical solution for them was to have their captives registered and then sell them for a relatively low price in the slave markets established in city centers.

The point of origin of this reward practice was the Islamic Martial Law that allowed the Imam/ruler might distribute the award to incentive the warriors. It was called *nafal* in Arabic. The jurists were divided into two groups for the distribution time. While the majority agreed to pay the amount after the war, some, including Hanafi jurists,

³⁸³ To see the forthcoming dissertation on the early samples of these rewards see. Göksel Baş, “Towards A New Serhad: Continuity and Change in the Ottoman Western Frontier (1470s-1540)”.

³⁸⁴ Wintering the army in the middle of a prolonged campaign was challenging for the soldiers - especially the *sipahis* who had to pay for their own expenses- and for the state. I was the same for Cyprus. After the campaigns, the *sipahis* would like to return to their *timar* regions as soon as possible to catch the harvest season. When they spent the winter, the court generally ordered the commanders and judges of the provinces that joined the campaign to collect money (*harçlık*) from the *timar* lands. To receive and deliver money, the soldiers who were sent to *timar* land were called as “*harçlıkçı*”. Abdülkadir Efendi, *Topçular Kâtibi ‘Abdülkadir (Kadri) Efendi Tarihi*, ed. by Ziya Yılmaz (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003), v. I, 26; BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 765 (28 Jumada al-thani 978 / 27 November 1570), 14 / 977 (24 Rajab 978 / 22 December 1570), 14 / 1036 (10 Shaban 978 / 7 January 1571).

insisted on paying just before the battle. Because after the battle, everything would have concluded, and payment would have been meaningless. Besides, the Mâliki and Hanafi jurists agreed that the awards should be paid from the one-fifth state share.³⁸⁵

For instance, during the campaign, a 178arin or a prebend holder was awarded salary promotions (*terâkki*) of 1,000 akçes for a live captive and 2,000 akçes for a live captive together with his horse. If the captive is “an infidel of value” who is of political or military value, the reward was a sum of 2,000 to 5,000 akçes or a new prebend.³⁸⁶ If the soldier who brought the captive was an ordinary young warrior without salary (*garib yiğit*), he was awarded a 178arin that was worth 3,000 or 4,000 akçes; and if he was an advantageous person such as a member of a pasha’s household or a son of a beg, he was awarded a 178arin worth 5,000 akçes.³⁸⁷ An ordinary soldier named Bâlî fought both in Nicosia and Famagusta, brought heads³⁸⁸ of prominent enemy leaders, and captured valuable prisoners, was awarded a 178arin worth 6,000 akçes.³⁸⁹ A janissary infantry officer Cafer who brought the heads of prominent enemy leaders and a valuable captive alive, was awarded a prebend worth 20,000 akçes.

If the captive was an enemy commander and his captor was a prebend holder, the captor was awarded a salary promotion of 7,000 akçes. Sometimes *timars* were promoted to prebend as a reward.³⁹⁰ There are also cases like Hasan, the chief steward (*kethüdâ*) of

³⁸⁵ Khadduri, *War and Peace*, 124; Ahmet Yaman, “Tenfil”, *DİA*, v. 40 (2011), <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/tenfil> [accessed 18 June 2022].

³⁸⁶ BOA., KK., 221, f. 8, 20, 24, 26, 35 ((From June 1570 to February 1571)

³⁸⁷ BOA., KK., 221, f. 26, 36, 50, 94.

³⁸⁸ “Now when you meet [in war] those who are bent on denying the truth, smite their necks until you overcome them fully, and then tighten their bonds; but thereafter [set them free,] either by an act of grace or against ransom, so that the burden of war may be lifted: thus (shall it be).” (Qur’an 47:4).

³⁸⁹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 13 / 1727 (29 Safer 979 / 23 July 1571).

³⁹⁰ BOA., KK., 221, f. 62, 66.

the Aleppo Castle, who was awarded a prebend for bringing in a captive.³⁹¹ The reward for rescuing a captured Ottoman soldier was a *179arin* worth 5,000 akçes. Rıdvan, one of Vizier Mustafa Pasha's men, was rewarded after he stopped a mounted enemy soldier running away with a captured janissary.³⁹²

The departure of large numbers of people from the island was a violation and worried the Ottoman government. First, the decision was to send them back. But then the government changed its mind about using them to pressure the enemy. Besides, it was banned to buy Christians for release until Venetian resistance was broken.³⁹³ Another problem was enslaving the capitulant people from the surrendered cities like Kerynia by the Ottoman soldiers. The Ottoman war court sent the order to ban those kinds of violations in 9th of July of 1570, just after the eight days of the conquest.³⁹⁴ Ali, a *zeâmet* (prebend) holder, valued at 25,000 akçe, committed this violation, and in return, he lost his *zeâmet* to another warrior.³⁹⁵

It is also essential to attach an annotation about the Islamic and Ottoman war laws practiced during the sieges. According to Islamic Martial Law, if the population of the besieged city refused to surrender and continued to resist, the imam of the Islamic army had the right to enslave the people after the conquest. If the besieged population caused military trouble -like loss of lives- the imam also had the right to order to slaughter them.³⁹⁶ Moreover, in the first day of the siege, over 20.000 population of the Nicosia

³⁹¹ BOA., KK., 221, f. 103.

³⁹² BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 8 / 234 /5 Safer 978 / 9 July 1570).

³⁹³ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 267.

³⁹⁴ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 8 / 219 (5 Safar 978 / 9 July 1570).

³⁹⁵ BOA., KK., 221, f. 54.

³⁹⁶ The Hanafi jurists argued that the political authority- imam had three options for war captives: Execution, enslavement and setting them free with the condition that should pay poll tax. See. Khadduri, *War and*, 130, 131; Munir, "Debates on the Rights", 466.

were killed.³⁹⁷ The plunder after the fall of Nicosia continued for three days.³⁹⁸ Though we know that various Nicosians requested *âmân* from the Ottoman authorities before the campaign, it seems that it was hard to discern who were they in Nicosia in the first days of the conquest. As we understood from the sources, many Nicosians helped the Ottomans during the siege or requested *âmân*, which must have been recorded after the conquest.

While those violations occurred, some aristocratic landowners did not suffer the same as others because they surrendered spontaneously. For example, Scipione Carafa, Pier Paolo Singlitico³⁹⁹, who had a task to remove the civilian population from the plain, thought this was unnecessary after a while and surrendered to Mustafa Pasha with “many Greek priests and a large group of peasants” and swore allegiance to the sultan. They were welcomed by the Pasha and dressed in *hilât* (robes of brocade). When the post-war order started to settle down, these people became *180arin* owners, and most became Muslims. Some fled the island and took refuge in Venice or Crete. Yet after a while, they returned to the island and continued their lives on the island by only sending their children to the Greek school in Rome.⁴⁰⁰

Not only from Nicosia but also from Kyrenia and Famagusta, numerous local people helped the Ottomans and gained some privileges after converting to Islam. As it is understood from the archival documents, some were Venetian nobles though they were

³⁹⁷ Some sources give the number of people killed in Nicosia as 40.000 and the total death toll in entire Cyprus as 60.000. Before the Turkish conquest, the total population of the island was 180.000, of which 100.000 lived in Nicosia and 40.000 in Famagosta. See. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 984; *Nunziature di Venezia*, (26 Marzo 1569-21 Maggio 1571), v. 9, ed. by Aldo Stella (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano Per L'età Moderna E Contemporanea, 1972), 192.

³⁹⁸ Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 140; Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 46.

³⁹⁹ About the Singlitico Family see. Benjamin Arbel, “Greek Magnates in Venetian Cyprus: The Case of the Synglitico Family”, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 49 (1995), 325–337.

⁴⁰⁰ Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 97, 107, 141; Barbero, *Lepanto*, 269.

generally Greek local prominent people. The documents referred to them as “*beyzâde*” when they had a noble title. Unfortunately, we cannot trace their lineage due to the general Ottoman recordation system. If someone converted to Islam, the document rarely includes their old non-Muslim name. They existed in the privilege records with their new Muslim name, and according to the description of the documents, they generally became Muslim voluntarily. Their *181 arin* regions were always out of Cyprus.⁴⁰¹ Some of them exceptionally gained the privilege to hold their previous lands and not pay tax for a while due to their help to the Ottomans. But this luckiness endured short when the Ottomans decided to reorganize the land policy after the conquest. For instance, Mahmud, who probably opened the city gate of Kyrenia, lost the privilege he gained just ten months ago.⁴⁰² Some of those people had a place in Italian records as well. In his letter of 20th January of 1751 that the ambassador of the Vatican in Venice sent to Rome to inform about the situation of the island wrote about a man who opened the city gate of Nicosia to the Ottomans in return for 50.000 scudi.⁴⁰³

At this point, it should be noted if a high-ranking officer surrendered, his acceptance of being a Muslim seemed to be a condition for continuing to live and the requirements of Ottoman subjecthood, especially if it came from a place with a lengthy siege like Famagusta. On the other hand, according to Vera Costantini, most of those who surrendered were people of Greek origin on the island. Because these people’s

⁴⁰¹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 8 / 568 (02 Jumada al-awwal 978 / 2 October 1570); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 11 / 365 (3 Jumada al-thani 978 / 2 November 1570), 576 (18 Jumada al-thani 978 / 17 November 1570); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 13 / 58 (29 Shavval 978 / 26 March 1571), 353 (6 Zulhijjah 978 / 1 May 1571), 713 (28 Zulhijjah 978 / 19 May 1571), 290 (29 Zulhijjah 978 / 20 May 1571); 1325 (25 Muharram 979 / 19 June 1571); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 42 / 1760 and 1925 (18 Rabi’ al-thani 984 / 15 July 1576); BOA., KK., 221, f. 50, 104, 126, 132,

⁴⁰² BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 13 / 918 (6 Muharram 979 / 31 May 1571).

⁴⁰³ *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 9, 433.

responsibilities to the Republic and their achievements within the Republic were less than the Venetians. They were not like patricians who saw themselves as guardians of the Republic and Christianity. In the end, the help they had hoped for from the Catholic world could come in a year.⁴⁰⁴

On the other hand, for these people, the Cyprus war had an unexpected socio-political consequence. When these Dominion people, especially who did not have kind of grant given by the Republic, used to be able to stay in *Terraferma* on leave with a smaller population and population with some legal restrictions. Found themselves in Venice after the war, there were rules, and the Venetians were more flexible due to the post-war conditions. Over time, their rights and living conditions were improved as long as they lived in Venice.⁴⁰⁵

After the fall of Nicosia, the Turks occupied the whole island without encountering resistance and made it a sanjak on September 9, 1570. Only Famagusta resisted and was attacked from April 1, 1571; After approximately one year, the commander of Famagusta, Marco Antonio Bragadin, accepted to surrender and demanded protection for his guards. The Chief Commander of the Ottoman army, Lala Mustafa Pasha was generous on the first day of surrender. However, when he and Bragadin started to discuss the 50 Muslim pilgrims executed by Bragadin, the climate of the negotiations suddenly changed, and Pasha ordered to execute him onto the same pole Bragadin usually punished Turkish slaves.⁴⁰⁶ While Hammer skips the scene in which Pasha tortured Bragadin, Zinkeisen

⁴⁰⁴ Gilmore, "Myth and Reality", 431-433; Costantini, *Il Sultano e L'isola*, 69, 70.

⁴⁰⁵ Burke, *The Greeks of Venice*, 97, 197-204.

⁴⁰⁶ Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 118.

records that he was flayed alive and quartered.⁴⁰⁷ John Julius Norwich describes Bragadins' death more detailly.

People who moved to Anatolia from Cyprus during the siege had a state guarantee for their lives, families and belongings.⁴⁰⁸ Yet, thousands of people from Cyprus captured and brought to Ottoman lands. Just after the conquest of administrative center of the Venetian Cyprus, Nicosia, the number of people enslaved was one thousand as Mustafa Paşa stated in his letter.⁴⁰⁹ The amount was so significant that the official of Gallipoli had to request a new prison from the capital due to the lack of are of the old one.⁴¹⁰

Yet, in 1990's, Ronald C. Jennings brings to light the population enslaved after the siege with the help of the Sharia court records of Cyprus. After the conquest of Nicosia, 13,719 newly people were enslaved according to the Sharia register dated 7 October 1570. He adds that no other registers survive. Famagusta did not fall until August 1571 and the amount of enslaved people was much smaller than Nicosia. The names of the people who fell captive in Nicosia were registered in Ottoman archives. These lists in MAD 5471 daybook (*ruznâmçe*) included many names and were kept by Ottoman officers who wrote down the Italian and Greek names as how they heard them. In addition, it also included the number of people enslaved per every day during the siege. The total tax as an income from slaves was 1,786,678 akçe. Many of them directly were sent to Istanbul and hold in varios places as Galata or Black Tower and few managed to be free on payment. While

⁴⁰⁷ Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, 665.

⁴⁰⁸ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 19 (18 Zulqadah 977 / 24 April 1570).

⁴⁰⁹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 686 (2 Rabi' al-thani 978 / 3 September 1570).

⁴¹⁰ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 581 (18 Shavval 978 / 15 March 1571).

2/3 of 1,186,678 akçe was sent to Constantinople, 600,000 akçe was left to Lala Mustafa Pasha.⁴¹¹

It is essential to speak of the daybook (*ruznâmçe*) of Cyprus Campaign numbered MAD 5471 to understand the enslavement and slave bazaar practices during a campaign. As Vera Costantini examined it detailly, the concepts describing the date and place of his captivity, the name of the captor, the real value and the tax value of the recorded captive, and servile categories (like *gulam*, *şirhor*, etc.) which determined according to the usual practice were recorded in the day book. It seems that every Ottoman soldier generally captured at least one prisoner. According to the records, there are 6288 women, 541 children, and 5055 male prisoners. There are very few soldiers among men as they were mostly killed on the battlefield. Most of the males were teenagers or clergies.⁴¹²

The list of janissaries and others were kept separately in the day book. The first group up to page 96 held 11,584 captives, while that of the janissaries was 2135. In addition, 220,198 *akçes* of the total price of 1,186,678 *pençik* tax were taken from the Janissaries. While the average *pençik* tax per captive of the first group was 135 *akçe*, the average *pençik* of the Janissaries was 103. Still, this amount was quite good for a janissary because the price of a captive came to an average of 520 *akçe*, which was more than 100 days to earn.⁴¹³ On the other hand, according to Jennings work, for each slave, the *pencik* tax was averagely 130 *akçe* while the minimum tax rage was 150 *akçe* per a newly

⁴¹¹Hill, *A History of Cyprus* 768, 769; Jennings, *Christian and Muslims*, 7, 274; Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 345; Costantini, “Destini di guerra”, 234.

⁴¹² Costantini, *Il Sultano e L'isola*, 66, 67.

⁴¹³ Costantini, “Destini di guerra”, 235-238.

enslaved one. And it was quite lower than usual as Angelo Calepio, an enslaved priest and was a superior of the Dominican Convent of Nicosia, narrated in his memoirs.⁴¹⁴

The fate of the civilian population of Famagosta was more forgiving when compared to the fate of the people of Nicosia. However, that was not the case with the combatants in the city. The city's bishop recorded that there were more than 500 nobles in the town, but just only 21 of them survived.⁴¹⁵ Of the 3700 Italian soldiers in the city, 600 died of disease, and 2400 died during or after the conflict. A total of 700 soldiers survived, 200 of whom were wounded. 38 of them were commanders. Along with the seven commanders of the Albanians, 200 soldiers were also taken prisoner. Some of them were freed by paying a ransom, thanks to the French trade council in Tripoli. Among the whole captives, those who sat on the oars for Lepanto were released after the war. (Certainly, there were conditions for the commanders who needed rowers for their freedom. In theory, they were free; in practice, they remained to row. Therefore, many of them tried to escape.⁴¹⁶ Vera Costantini also records that the total number of people disappeared in Cyprus was approximately 20.000 by comparing the old and new cadastral records after the conquest.⁴¹⁷

Due to the status of Nicosia, most of the enslaved people from Cyprus War Venetian nobles, citizens or the subjects. The great council of the Republic which was the miniature model of the Great Council was there and the as council members the noble

⁴¹⁴ Calepio records that soldier in slave bazaar sold their slaves for extremely low prices: two, three or for sequins (ducats). Yet, 2 sequins equal to app. 120 akçes and it was enough to pay minimum rage of *pencik* tax to the state. See. Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 142.

⁴¹⁵ *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 9, 433.

⁴¹⁶ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 267, 269, 471.

⁴¹⁷ Vera Costantini, "An Old Location's New Life: Early-Ottoman Lefkoşa", *Studies on Ottoman Nicosia*, ed. by Mehmet Demiryürek (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2019), 28.

families were living in the city. The local Greek folk had an imperial guarantee as new subjects of the Ottoman Empire though various abuses.

According to the book called *Excerpta Cypria* in which the sources about the history of Cyprus were collected and the records of Priest Calepio, who was a captive from Cyprus, many noblemen were taken captive in Cyprus and were brought to Istanbul.⁴¹⁸ Calepio actually found the names of these captives from the manuscript of Nestore Martinengo, who was one of the generals of the Castle and who managed to escape.⁴¹⁹ While his uncle Count Ercole was setting out on his journey to become Mustafa Pasha's slave in Istanbul, Nestore managed to take shelter in a Greek's house in Famagosta when the castle fell. He later successfully negotiated with an Ottoman soldier (who was referred to as banner/sanjak lord in the manuscript) to spare his life in exchange for 500 ducats. He arranged the payment of his ransom through a Jewish physician and managed to arrive in Venice in December 1570.

Though not directly from Cyprus, there were also captives who were captured at other places since the parties were at war with one another. Gian Tommaso Constanzo was one of those captives. He was the son of renowned Venetian condottiere Scipio Constanzo. The line of Costanzo family goes as far back as Frederick Barbarossa. His son Contanzo fell captive to Uluç Ali after a day of conflict at the age of 17 when he was on patrol duty near Corfu with his ship. A week later, he was sent to the Sultan in İstanbul as a gift. According to a letter penned for his rescue, he was forced to become a Muslim during his captivity. He was granted gifts for this; otherwise, he would be beheaded. This

⁴¹⁸ Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 158-159.

⁴¹⁹ Nestore Martinengo, *Il crudelissimo assedio, et noua presa della famosissima fortezza di Famagosta*, (1571), 18.

order was directly given by the Sultan to Mehmed Pasha. The son Costanza, under no circumstances, accepted this and avoided being killed (*I Turchi convertirono il tagliargli la testa in circonciderlo per forza*) by undergoing circumcision. After the circumcision, he was clothed with *khilat*. However, Gian Tommaso tore apart that gold *khilat* and also threw down his turban in an iconic manner as was always mentioned.⁴²⁰

In such a tense atmosphere, we are not sure whether this happened or not. If he wore a *khilat*, he might have become a Muslim at his own will and then regretted it. During his time in İstanbul, it might have been more logical to present his state to his rescuers tragically even though he might have become a Muslim himself. His support in İstanbul was Marquis Giacomo Malatesta. Other family members fell captive in Cyprus. One of these members was Tuzio, who was the share of Mustafa Pasha. The mother wrote a letter to Vatican for his sons.⁴²¹

Father Costanza worked really hard for his son's rescue. However, his efforts took four years to come to fruition. He came to Venice as the guard of the king's ship during the French King's Venice visit in 1574. He had 300 ducats on him, which was the required amount for his son's manumission. Tomasso's rescue took place with an organization of this scale. Having been rescued from captivity at the age of 21, Gian Tomasso died only at the age of 26 in one of the wars waged between the Netherlands and Spain.⁴²²

⁴²⁰ Michele Rosi, "Nuovi documenti relativi alla liberazione dei principali prigionieri turchi presi a Lepanto", *Archivio della Società Romana di Storia Patria*, 24 (1901), 38, 39.

⁴²¹ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 63.

⁴²² Rosi, "Nuovi documenti", 16; Evelyn Korsch, "Diplomatic Gifts on Henri III's Visit to Venice in 1574", *Studies in the Decorative Arts*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Fall–Winter 2007–2008), 99; Irena Radić Rossi, Mariangela Nicolardi, Mauro Bondioli, Katarina Batur, *The Shipwreck at Gnalić: A Mirror to the Renaissance World* (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2021), 117.

The problem was also similar on the side of the Ottomans after Lepanto. Besides, the Ottomans whose relatives were captive at the hands of the Christians, found the way of taking the Christians captive in order to make an exchange. For example, Şehit Kara Hoca, a *Hassa* leader who took Corfu bailo captive in exchange for his brother Abdulkadir Reis, a captive at the hands of the enemy, wanted such an exchange to be made and after his death, action was taken to realize this. This process took around 15 months and the release of the bailo was possible with the release of three more Muslim captives in addition to Abdulkadir Reis and the payment of 1,000 flori to the treasury. These three captives were Ali, who was kept in Messina, Ahmed Çavuş' brother Hızır, and Şaban Pasha's son, who was kept in Rome. Since the release of Ali and the son of Pasha was not possible, it was recommended that effort should be made to save some other captives.⁴²³

5.4 Lepanto

Meanwhile, Venice was engaged in matters such as finding out the losses after the fall of Nicosia, the Turkish assaults along the Dalmatian shores, and measures to be taken against the possible attacks toward Friuli and even Lido. The Holy League was officially established in May 1571, ten months after Venice's call for alliance. Let alone inclining toward the alliance, the Turkish side was at the time active at the sea and was also busy attacking the castles and cities of Venice. At first, Retimo in Crete was taken under siege for a brief period of time; certain places in Suda, which had strong fortifications, and

⁴²³ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 10 / 431 (10 Rajab 979 / 28 November 1571); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d. 19 / 185 (27 Muharram 980 / 9 June 1572); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d. 10 / 230 (29 Ramadan 980 / 2 February 1573); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 21 / 315 (20 Şavval 980 / 23 February 1573).

around 40 ships in the waters of Crete were looted and Aegean side was thereby taken under control. Zante and Kefallonia were cleared to such an extent that they could not provide any crewmembers to Venetian navy. The Kotor-Castelnuova area turned into a substantial field for attacks and onslaughts. At this moment, Dulcigno, Antivari, Lesina, and Budva were captured by the Turks, who had the upper hand in cavalrymen. Curzola was heavily looted. Even though they looted Kotor, they found that the fortification of the city was strong and therefore withdrew their forces. The attacks on Kotor and Zara made it look like Istira was next. According to Venier, ‘the enemy targeted those vitally important places for the Republic.’⁴²⁴

Having come down to south from Dalmatian shores, Turks found themselves at Lepanto. Against the violent and strategic attacks of the Turks, the superiority of the Holy League in firepower and their ingenuity in breaking the lines changed the course of the war. John Hale attributes the great losses that Turks incurred and the many people they lost to captivity to the fact that there were no amicable shores that they might have turned to. This factor also contributed to the great losses that were suffered along with the use of weapons by the Holy League against their bows and arrows and the presence of a shield wall called *pavisades*, which led to less damage during attack.⁴²⁵

After the Battle of Lepanto, the death toll of the Christians amounted to 3000 dead and there were 8000 wounded; however, Venice made a more detailed calculation: The death toll was 4856 including 324 officers and mariners, 925 *scapoli* (employed marines), 2274 *galeotti* (free and non-free rowers –in Venice free ones were known as *galeotti di*

⁴²⁴ Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 236-238.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid*, 237.

liberat) and 1333 soldiers. In this number, 4551 wounded were not included. 294 of the wounded were *190arina* (sailors), 680 were *scapoli*, 2490 rowers, and 1087 soldiers. When the percentage of the death toll and the wounded are calculated, Venice lost 56% of its soldiers, 40% of the *scapoli*, 30% of its rowers, and 18% of its sailors.⁴²⁶

A portion of the 3486 Ottoman captives⁴²⁷ in the hands of the Alliance lost their lives on the ships as they first went to Corfu and then to Sicily. A rough list of the captives was made and sent to the Pope. However, this list was not that long. The important captains of the navy died either during the war or right after the war. It was decided that the captives that could be exchanged with the important Christian captives at the hands of the Ottomans or whose ransom could be high would be separated from the others and receive special treatment. Venetian Admiral Venier wrote that Don Juan sent a Spaniard who stayed in İstanbul to his galley and that this man even took cavalrymen. Don Juan sold 365 captives, his share, to 100 ducats each in Sicily after a year. He chose the captives himself while they were distributed regardless of the ones that already died and the ones who were gifted to him.⁴²⁸

Don Juan's reckless behaviors were not limited to these. He also took two sons of Kaptan Pasha for himself. Don Juan took a close interest in the children of pashas who had their own galleys and caught with their tutors. However, the eldest son passed away in Naples while travelling. Don Juan directly corresponded with their sisters Fatima for

⁴²⁶ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 585.

⁴²⁷ For the report on loot sharing between Venice, Spain and Papacy see. Hüseyin Serdar Tabakoğlu, *Akdeniz'de Savaş: Osmanlı-İspanya Mücadelesi* (İstanbul: Kronik, 2019), 335.

⁴²⁸ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 596-599.

the return of the younger brother and sent the captive to the Ottoman lands with his attendants when the time came.⁴²⁹

Pope Pius V issued a bull in December 1571 to prevent the Lepanto captives from being harmed, protected well. The bull also banned to release these Ottoman war captives with the ransom, or sell. Historian Michele Rosi interprets this as depriving the Turks of their sailors, but this is true but incomplete.⁴³⁰ As soon as Venice heard about the victory, it wanted to prevent the Ottomans from building a new navy. The Ottoman State had no problem in obtaining raw materials; however, Venice did not want to free the qualified people such as captains, pirates, sailors, and masters among the captives in exchange for ransom. A detailed investigation needed to be carried out in order to learn who did what and the Ottoman captives that were considered dangerous should be killed if required. Ambassadors to Rome and Spain did not take a dim view of this idea; however, the Pope and the King did not want to implement this suggestion.⁴³¹ By the bull, the Pope prevented Venice not to harm those who were valuable at this point in the political agenda of the Alliance.

As stated above, Venice did not provide much help to the Alliance in identifying the captives that were suitable for ransom. On the ship that Venier sent to Venice with the letter announcing the victory, he put captives such as Zafer from İstanbul, the Galley Commander, the galley owner Mehmed, the galley owner İbrahim, and caulker Derviş. He sent them to Venice because the number of captives that could be used for ransom was

⁴²⁹ *Ibid*, 600.

⁴³⁰ Michele Rosi, “Alcuni Documenti Relativi alla Liberazione dei Principali Prigionieri Turchi Presi a Lepanto”, *Archivio della Società Romana di Storia Patria*, 21 (1898), 146.

⁴³¹ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 603.

few and there was a hurry for strengthening Venice's hand for the captives from Cyprus that were held in İstanbul.⁴³²

Felipe II still ordered the representatives in Italy that 'significant people and captains should, under no circumstances, be freed.' When Venice failed at this attempt, it made an offer stating that the captives that fell to each state be given to it but this was also not accepted. Consiglio dei Dieci confined itself to secretly strangling the captives that were brought to Corfu.⁴³³ In his December 1571 bull, Pope Pius V complained that Christians were buying or ransom money to buy Lepanto captives. Thus, these mostly-equipped, talented seafaring captives would return to their homelands and continue fighting against Christianity without benefitting the Alliance.⁴³⁴

Venice continued to implement a dual political approach during this process. Even though there were several attacks on Turkish ports in 1572 and the preparations for a new expedition were on the way with the Holy League in February 1573, the Republic also continued to negotiate with the Ottomans for bringing about peace. These negotiations were kept hidden both from the Holy League and from the senior generals of Venice. A treaty was signed between the two states in March 1573.⁴³⁵ The signing of the 1573 peace with the Turks transformed the Republic from Venice, which wanted to have Turkish war captives killed, to Venice, which did its best for peace.⁴³⁶ Venice informed the states of the League on April 3 that their alliance was no longer in place. 'The Republic spent more

⁴³² *Ibid*, 599.

⁴³³ *Ibid*, 604.

⁴³⁴ Rosi, "Alcuni Documenti", 154.

⁴³⁵ Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 239.

⁴³⁶ Rosi, "Alcuni Documenti", 147.

than 12 million gold for this war but what should be done if the enemy approached not only to their bases in Dalmatia and Levant but advanced till Friuli?’⁴³⁷

The Ottoman state was also in favor of signing a peace treaty as soon as possible due to the fact that in addition to the war indemnity to be paid, the state annually made approximately one million ducats from Venice’s commercial activities in İstanbul, Baghdad, Aleppo, and Cairo⁴³⁸ and this was only the official income the Sultan received. In addition to this amount, considering the financial losses that people such as merchants, middlemen, mariners, port officers, and bureaucrats, who were Ottoman subjects and who overtly or covertly made money from these commercial activities, it was quite natural that both the center of the state and those who were affected by the situation asked for peace.

One of Ottoman merchants held in Venice during the war were Cafer Aga from Skopje and his friend. Before the war, the ship with their good from Ancona to Ottoman port, Lezha was captured. Although the merchants were released after the peace, the goods were still abductee.⁴³⁹ Even in this date, the merchants still were trying to rescue their goods in any way.

In the end, about 40 captives were identified though their number was just a few as indicated in Sultan’s order previously.⁴⁴⁰ Three sanjak governors were captured. Among the valuable captives, there was the governor of Euboea Salih Paşazade Mehmed Bey. Both his wealth and his inclusion in the negotiations drew attention. Other captives were not really wealthy but Mehmed Bey’s ransom could be high. He could, after all, pay

⁴³⁷ Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 239.

⁴³⁸ James D. Tracy, *Balkan Wars: Habsburg Croatia, Ottoman Bosnia, and Venetian Dalmatia, 1499–1617* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2016), 208.

⁴³⁹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 24 / 550 (11 Muharram 982 / 3 May 1574).

⁴⁴⁰ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 23 / 355 (22 Rajab 981 / 22 November 1573).

any amount that was asked for. For this reason, Mehmed Bey's ransom was specified as 20.000 scudi while it was 10.000 scudi for Methone Governor Gavur Ali and 6.000 for Şarkikarahisar Governor Ahmed (Scudo: piestra, kurush). The ransom was specified as between 180-1200 scudi for ten cavalymen, 600-1200 scudi for two captains from Pera, 240-480 scudi for three officers and six sailors, and as 240 scudi for Derviş, the fiduciary of shipyard.⁴⁴¹

There were some among the captive Ottomans who tried to show themselves so that they could be chosen for exchange. Originally from Genoa, Mustafa Captain formerly named as Gregorio Breganti was among them. Having fallen captive in the section that Hasan Pasha commanded, Mustafa wrote a letter to the Genovese government from Messina and demanded that it was known that he actually served to Christianity and this was communicated both to the Pope and Don Juan. Mustafa was indeed included in the spy payment list of the Spanish Empire thanks to the information that he provided during his time in İstanbul. In addition, he also made hundreds of ducats annually from the Venetian merchant Aurelio Santa Croce. Mustafa's request was at first satisfied and he was left in Naples after having been added to the list. However, the letter of a clergyman in Naples prevented his dreams from becoming true. The clergyman in question wrote that he read some other letters of Mustafa and that the Genovese captain would take his revenge as soon as he was free. Mustafa told a lie in order to become free and he actually did not care about Christianity. Mustafa was referred to as vice-captain in western news sources. However, we do not know whether this was known during his captivity and if the title of vice-captain corresponded to Patrona captain, Mustafa was really a senior

⁴⁴¹ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 599.

executive. This explains why Mustafa received such a high payment from Spain and Venice.⁴⁴²

The 40 captives that were brought from Rome were harbored first in Borgo district and then in St. Angelo Chateau. Pope began negotiations with the Sultan. Sultan wanted the captives to be sent at one time and in a healthy way; however, some of the captives belonged to Spain and some of them belonged to Venice. Venice wanted to act fast but the approval of Spain was delayed quite a bit. Besides, Philip II, the King of Spain did not want the Venetian captives to be released in exchange for the Turkish captives belonging to Spain, the Emperor added that he would not trust the Pope again if it happened. Moreover, one of the sons of Ali Paşa, a governor of Negroponte, was in Spain as king's share, and the boy's name was in the exchange list. At this point, the Pope took the initiative as a head of the Roman Curia. He had more rights than the others to dispose of Turkish prisoners, who already cost a lot of money to the Curia.⁴⁴³ Furthermore, many other commanders were also taken prisoner in Istanbul. In his letter dated July of 1574, to King of Spain, the Pope states, "of course, he feels sorry for them as well and will do his best to get them released later on, but in the end, they are not very noble." Since they were not nobles, it would be easy to get them back with money.⁴⁴⁴ For this reason, the negotiations lasted almost for 3 years.

In 1575, the bailo Tiepolo finally got approval to exchange captives, but there were several obstacles. The bargain was no longer the same as it was two years ago. Sultan Selim II passed away, and according to the laws, Venice needed a new *ahd-name*. Spain

⁴⁴² *Ibid*, 600.

⁴⁴³ Rosi, "Alcuni Documenti", 159, 169.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 166.

was also defeated in Goletta, and Venice's border violations in border areas such as Bar (Antivari) and Ülgün (Dulcigno / Ulcinj) appeared. In addition, Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha also states that Goletta admiral Serbolloni, a very wealthy person, should not be freed by bartering with only two sanjak begs. But in the end, Tiepolo persuades the pasha to exchange for one-on-one. The bailo still did not trust the Ottomans, and he decided to keep the Ottoman captives waiting on a ship in Dubrovnik until exchange. While dealing with all this, Venice did its best to protect the Republic's interests and prevent Ottoman merchants from entering the borders of the Vatican. For example, on 13 May 1575, the doge ordered the bailo to obtain from the Grand Vizier an "effective commandments for the prohibition that that Sultan's subjects should not go to Ancona" to attract Ottoman trade to Veneto territory. The Doge also wrote to the bailo in secret and asked the bailo to have it enforced in a way that would be shown as an imposition on the Ottomans.⁴⁴⁵ After waiting for a long time, 40 captives were first transferred to Fermo and later to Dubrovnik in exchange for 39 Christian captives.⁴⁴⁶

Derviş was released earlier than the other captives. He was given a receipt for his promise that he would release a Christian captive. This receipt was for some roll of fabric he had and for 1700 ducats and these were retained in Ancona. Thanks to this, Derviş Agha became free. Later on, three bales of bazaar spice that belonged to Derviş Agha's father and were left to Dubrovnik customs as guarantee were included in the negotiations. After Derviş Agha was manumitted, he sent his guarantor (*fideiussare*) to Ancona with 900 ducats. The Grand Vizier wrote to Dubrovnik and stated that the merchandise kept at

⁴⁴⁵ Rosi, "Nuovi documenti", 21.

⁴⁴⁶ Rosi, "Alcuni Documenti", 171,172; Barbero, *Lepanto*, 601.

Ancona should be submitted to Derviş's guarantor before the Christian captives were sent now that the money arrived. Otherwise, Dubrovnik had to pay the price.⁴⁴⁷

During this time, there were no vital mishaps. For example, we learn about one through Cesare Carafa's story. Cesare was one of those captives who fell captive in Golleta and was brought to İstanbul. He went to jail for some time for having participated in a rebellion against the Spanish King in his youth and was later sent to exile in Goletta. He was there when the siege began. He was one of those captives that Spain was not very eager to take back. However, Cesare's family was one of the renowned families of Naples and the network of the family was still too strong despite the existence of the executed cousins following the death of Pope Paul IV, who was a Carafa. When Carafa was a captive in İstanbul, he established contact with the father-in-law of Mehmed Subaşı, one of the Turkish captives. It was because he was the owner of Cesare and hoped to manumit Cesare in exchange for his groom. He even sent one of his men in order to make sure if there was a Mehmed among the captives to be sent back to İstanbul. When he became sure, he became convinced to exchange his son with Cesare.⁴⁴⁸

Such an exchange was also convenient for the Carafa family. However, the events did not unfold as desired. Primarily, the Sultan had a stern attitude: All the captives would be sent to Ragusa together and at one go. In case Mehmed Subaşı was sent separately, then the process of the captives who were waiting to go from Fermo to Ragusa for exchange might have become disturbed and this was not something that they wanted. For

⁴⁴⁷ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 602; BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d, 27 / 666 (21 Zulqadah 983 / 21 February 1576).

⁴⁴⁸ Rosi, "Alcuni Documenti", 174, 175.

this reason, the most senior ones among these captives stated their unwillingness through Bartelameo Bruti, Sanjak Bey of Euboea and Modon.⁴⁴⁹

In the meantime, Cesare's son Pietro came to Fermo to do what was required for the manumission of his father and left the city in order to find money for his ransom. One night, Mehmed Subaşı got into a fight with Gazi Mustafa, a Serbian cavalryman with the nickname Mihaliçi, about how to share the beds. When Mehmed slapped Mustafa, he knifed Mehmed. Upon looking at Mehmed's wound, the barber said that the wound was not serious and he did not receive a serious blow. However, Mehmed's situation deteriorated instead of getting better and he passed away approximately one week later.⁴⁵⁰

The authorities in *Ferma* were quite afraid of Mehmed's death. They attempted to prove that Mehmed was wounded and killed by another captive with the testimonies of six Turks, the Fermo physician, and the barber. We don't know whether the fight that resulted with the death of Mehmed broke out at the moment or it was planned by the other captives who wanted to return to their countries as soon as possible. But in the end Mehmed returned to İstanbul in a coffin while dreaming to be manumitted. This unfortunate event prolonged the captivity of Cesare Carafa, who again returned to İstanbul. Carafa was saved by his family in 1578.⁴⁵¹

Ten years after the war, the Ottoman government heard that there were Lepanto captives in Corfu and made attempts so that they could be sent to İstanbul. Pope's share of captives was put to work in the construction of the Vatican's walls with shackles on

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 195, 205.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 177-179, 205, 206. 209-211.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid*, 206-217; Carla Russo, "Carafa, Cesare", *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 19 (1976) https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/cesare-carafa_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ [accessed 28 March 2022].

their feet. The lucky ones were those who worked at the service of their captors. Two of them worked in the construction of the residence of noble Count Silvio de Porcia, were well liked and christened with a ceremony while a captive who was an imam in the navy was taken to Rome by Paolo Giordano Orsini. When people liked him a lot there, he was gifted to Cardinal Medici. The women who were captured in the galleys but were rarely referred to since they hid out lived as maids either in the houses of the princes or merchants.⁴⁵²

One of the lucky captives, who was able to escape was Hüseyin, the captive of a Spaniard from nobility. Hüseyin was able to escape to İstanbul after spending six years in Madrid and Naples and he was later promoted to sergeancy. Another such captive was Mustafa Baliray who rejected being a Christian for long years and decided to become one upon falling in love with a Genovese woman. Mustafa took shelter in Turkish inn until he ran to Venice with a ship in 1586 but he was eventually caught. Most of the survivors spent their lives as shackled rowers until they were very old or accepted to become a Christian. Precisely 30 years after Lepanto, some people acquired the right to be hospitalized due to old age by the Senate. Of course, these people were all Christians.⁴⁵³

The converts had the most interesting stories among these captives. They were taken captive children and called Murad (alias Giovanni da Vieste), Mahmud from Genoa (alias Stefano da Vento), galley masters or Spanish Moriscos who were looking for an opportunity in the country of the Sultan. 52 of them were brought to trial in the Inquisition Court in Rome, Messina, and Palermo. In the court, the largest of which was in Messina,

⁴⁵² Barbero, *Lepanto*, 604, 605.

⁴⁵³ *Ibid*, 605.

37 converts were tried and four of them were executed by burning for putting up resistance against accepting Christianity. These were Venetian Matteo Curto, Calibrian Guiseppe (Ahmed Captain), pirate Pietro (Cafer), and Morisco Francesco Perez. Perez was a Jewish-Muslim who was once a physician in Spanish galleys. He was caught by the Ottomans in 1560 in Djerba and got married to an Algerian woman as a Muslim. When the talk of war became a current issue in 1571, he decided to become a physician on galleys. After he was caught in Lepanto, he told people around him at every chance he got that Christianity was not the true religion and attempted to cheer the other captives up. He continued to quarrel with the Inquisition judges about the 'inanity of the Christian ceremonies.' Other Moriscos told that they wanted to convert to Christianity to survive; however, they were also kept under the radar for long years.⁴⁵⁴

5.5 Detaining Merchants or Not

In wartime, two sides generally arrested the merchants of each other as a preventive action. However, they tried to be delicate not to harm the merchants' commercial activity while preparing the whole armies for the campaign. On the eve of Venetian – Ottoman war between 1570 and 1573, in July of 1569, the Bailo in Constantinople guaranteed that Muslim merchants in Venice were released and sent to Dubrovnik safely. In return, the Ottomans promised to release the Venetian merchants in Istanbul, Egypt, Aleppo, Damascus and Alexandria.⁴⁵⁵

Therefore, the Ottoman palace asked Venetian merchants in Istanbul to pay collateral. Even after his extended stay in Venice, Kubad Çavuş brought hostile news from

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 606.

⁴⁵⁵ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 10 / 8 (3 Safar 977 / 18 July 1569).

Venice on 5 May 1570. While the Sultan normally met with the sergeants through the Grand Vizier, he directly met with Sergeant Kubad upon his return from Venice by going against the conventions. In the meeting, it was decided to wage a war with the infidels. Up until then, no one had treated the bailo as the representative of an enemy country and thereby attempted to circumscribe his actions. Old documents were examined in the imperial council and the details of how the bailo was treated in the war that took place 30 years ago were studied. While some of the members of the council were in favor of putting the bailo in jail as it was done before⁴⁵⁶, the majority of the members including the Grand Vizier himself were in favor of resorting to more restrained measures. Therefore, Marcantonio Barbaro, his family, and his servants were put under house arrest for 3 years. A sergeant and six janissaries were left as guardians. The sergeant told them that only a servant could go outside to do the grocery shopping. He also added that the bailo should not be sad. The former ambassadors were imprisoned in Yedikule and this treatment was the outcome of the maltreatment of Sergeant Kubad. It was of course difficult for an ordinary sergeant to know about the situation going back 30 years.⁴⁵⁷ Those who made the decision must have made him tell this detail so that the bailo would be at ease.

The situation of the Venetian merchants in İstanbul was much better than the situation of the Ottoman merchants in Venice. The sultan remained Venetian merchants untouched. At first, they were told that they should not appear in public because the people would not be as cold-blooded as the rulers. They also got permission to sell their returned goods. It was not unusual to be treated so tolerantly.⁴⁵⁸ Venetians encountered no sanction

⁴⁵⁶ Bertele, *Venedik ve Kostantiniyye*, 59, 72.

⁴⁵⁷ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 153, 154.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 177

other than the appropriation of their goods and two ships. They even wrote a petition so that their goods would be released by presenting the Grand Vizier 4000 coins and dragoman İbrahim Bey 500 coins. The Grand Vizier accepted the petition gladly and made the merchants prepare a petition so as to give to the Sultan. After reading the petition, the Sultan decided to not to give a difficult time to the merchants. The ban on leaving the country was not lifted for these 23 merchants; however, it was decided that their goods would be returned to them.⁴⁵⁹

Yet, a Jew who managed to escape from Venice to the Porte claimed that the Republic arrested 87 Jews and 75 Muslims. It is unknown that their families were arrested or not. Some of the confiscated capital from Ottoman merchants was used for their daily expenses and the Senate approved to pay 10 ducats per day to all those Ottomans under the lock. The situation of Venetian in Ottoman lands was quite different. As the Bailo confirmed in December of 1570, that the merchants in Constantinople were free to move and trade. The only restriction for them was to go back to Venice, at least as long as war lasted.⁴⁶⁰

The bailo was not aware of the detentions of the Ottoman merchants in Venice when he learnt that the Jewish people started to complain about the detentions. He took risk and said that Ottoman subjects had been released in the meantime. In a week, the bailo received the two petitions from palace which consist clear explanations of the situation in Venice clearly. On the one them the note from the sultan was written and warned the bailo as “If our subjects are suffering in this manner, while these Venetians

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 156, 157; BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 16 / 173 (3 Jumada al-thani 979 / 29 October 1571)

⁴⁶⁰ Arbel, *Trading Nations*, 66, 67.

live here with all their goods, it is not right". Though the sultan had the intent to arrest the merchants in the capital, the bailo Barbaro records that the grand vizier Mehmed Pasha tried to prevent the detentions by asking the opinion of the *Mufti* to gain time.⁴⁶¹

The situation of the Venetian merchants in the other cities of the Empire was not different. For the Aleppo, the court first sent an order about Venetians who were held and kept the list of Venetian merchants in Aleppo. Those merchants should have arrested, banned from trading and deported.⁴⁶² Two new orders from the court may implicate that the opinion of the sultan had changed in a month. The first order was to the chief official of Peja /Kosovo, to hold two local governors who allied with the Republic and two months later second one was to Halep to protect the commercial right of the Venetian merchants in the city. According to the order dated April of 1570, the list of commodities belonged to the Venetian merchant should be created, and all the commercial items should be protected.⁴⁶³

In March of 1571, the Senate requested the Sultan to release her merchants in Istanbul, Aleppo, Damascus, Alexandria and Tripoli.⁴⁶⁴ We do not know who was the first side, to arrest or capture the other side's subjects. But both sides probably tried to avoid disrupting the mutual commercial activities even though the *Ahd-name* was out of function due to the war. At the end of June 1571, the Ottoman court also informed the bailo in Constantinople, that the chief officials of the above-mentioned Ottoman cities were to

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid*, 69-71.

⁴⁶² BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 9 / 60 (23 Ramadan 977 / 1 March 1570).

⁴⁶³ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 9 / 152 (28 Shawwal 977 / 5 April 1570); 199 (26 Ramadan 977 / 4 March 1570); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 15 / 59 (17 Muharram 979 / 11 June 1571).

⁴⁶⁴ Volkan Dökmeci, "İstanbul'daki Venedik", 269; ASVe., Senato, Deliberazioni, Registri, Costantinopoli, Reg. 4, 1569-1575, 36r (3 and 8 March 1571).

release the Venetian merchants in exchange of Venice releasing the Ottoman merchants and delivering them safely to Dubrovnik. The sultan warned the bailo to not to deceive him during the exchange of the detainees and declared that he would personally hold him responsible if the Ottoman merchants or their properties were harmed on their way.⁴⁶⁵ After the merchants were released, the bailo of Aleppo would be free to go back to his home.⁴⁶⁶ The merchants who would like to stay and continue to trade in Istanbul would regain license as long as they inform their activity to Ottoman officials.⁴⁶⁷ In Aleppo, the situation was a little bit different than in Istanbul. The court orders the Qadi of the city to let the Venetian merchants trade freely again while ordering to prevent them from escaping from the city by disguising.⁴⁶⁸

After two months, the court sent an order to Aleppo, not to allow the Venetian merchants to go out the city. The order was related to the dispatch sent by the beg of Clissa / Bosnia and about the possible attacks of the Venetian fleet. The court also decided not to directly involve the problem on the border of Georgia due to the potential attack on the Dalmatian border.⁴⁶⁹ The merchants in Aleppo also were held in the city for a while as a hostage while the Venetian prisoners of the war had the same hit a same stone wall.⁴⁷⁰

After two years, in the middle of wartime, the Ottoman merchants were arrested again in Venice. The court sent the order to the Qadi of Halep just before the conquest of

⁴⁶⁵ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 530 (22 Muharram 1579 / 11 June 1571); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 54 (1 Safar 979 / 25 June 1571).

⁴⁶⁶ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 987 (15 Rabi' al-awwal 979 / 7 August 1571).

⁴⁶⁷ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 10 / 558 (13 Muharram 979 / 7 June 1571); *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 9, 502.

⁴⁶⁸ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 10 / 375 (5 Ramadan 979 / 21 January 1572).

⁴⁶⁹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 1035 (29 Shavval 979 / 15 March 1572).

⁴⁷⁰ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 18 / 100 (22 Ramadan 979 / 7 February 1572); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 1077 (4 Zulqadah 979 / 23 March 1572); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 1102 (8 Zulqadah 979 / 27 March 1572).

Famagusta to release the Cypriot merchants who were in Aleppo in time of the siege, find and liberate their families if there were captured and sold as a slave.⁴⁷¹

Though the Republic was relatively sensitive for her subjects from every social class during the war, the Ottomans were more concerned with liberating their soldiers. For instance, in January 1572, the Ottoman court ordered to find a Christian captive from galleys to be exchanged with an Ottoman soldier who was captured in Lepanto.⁴⁷²

5.6 News from Rialto

Meanwhile, the Ottoman court tried to prevent unofficial communication between the bailo and the Republic during the negotiations. For instance, the court sent an order to both Beg of Skopje and the chief official of Aleppo. The first order was to hold the Venetian people who would carry the letters of Bailo in Constantinople and sent them directly to Istanbul. Yet the beg should have acted carefully while investigating the Venetians to not act in contravention of *Ahd-name* in any case.⁴⁷³

Until the first months of 1570, the bailo was able to receive information about the developments and reply to the cipher messages coming from Venice. He was able to do that thanks to the Jewish physician Saloman Askenazi, who hid the letters in his shoe. The physician achieved to take these letters to Heraklion. Around February 1570, the bailo Barbaro understood that his letters did not reach to Venice and were read from a dialogue

⁴⁷¹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 15 / 59 (17 Muharram / 979 / 11 June 1571, BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 10 / 490 (18 Shaban 979 / 5 January 1572).

⁴⁷² BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 10 / 364 (9 Ramadan 979 / 25 January 1572).

⁴⁷³ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 9 / 97 (28 Shavval 977 / 5 April 1570).

he had with the Grand Vizier. Since the letters that were submitted to the head of janissaries were encrypted, they wanted Alvise Buonrizzo, the secretary to the bailo, to decipher them; however, the friend of Buonrizzo, another Florentine *devşirme* told that such a delicate issue should be reported to the Grand Vizier. The letters were then sent to Sokollu Pasha, and from then on, the letters that the bailo sent were entrusted to two reliable ‘Turks.’ These Turks took the letters to Corfu in exchange for 300 coins; however, after a long journey, they returned upon seeing that two sergeants were checking the passers-by at a mountain pass. The bailo then came up with the solution to send four-five copies of the same letters to Kotor, Dubrovnik, Heraklion, and Corfu, hoping that at least one of them made its way to Venice. Having remained silent at first, Sokollu Pasha later ordered that all the windows of the bailo be shut down with woods following this incident. When it became clear that the bailo was still in contact with the informers despite all these, walls were erected on the balcony of his house. When the bailo complained about the situation of the house where one needed to light a candle even during the day, grates were placed instead of cement on a small portion of the balconies.⁴⁷⁴

On the other hand, there was a language barrier in the İstanbul negotiations. Dragoman İbrahim Bey died of the pestilence, and Mahmud Bey was kept captive in Venice. For this reason, the Grand Vizier was in such a difficult position that he asked the help of his close friend Physician Saloman Askenazi. However, the physician was even a closer friend to the bailo. He showed the physician a bag full of letters found on a Venetian *fusta* that was captured in Heraklion so that he could translate them. These were probably the same letters the physician secretly got out of the bailo’s house. The physician did not

⁴⁷⁴ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 74, 155; Paolo Preto, *I servizi Segreti di Venezia* (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1994), 251.

translate the critical details, and he also kept the encrypted message and replaced the other two cipher letters with the fake ones that the bailo prepared. Actually, the bailo was also in a similar plight. After his leg was cut off due to gangrene, one of the dragomen did not live long and passed away. Another dragoman Matheca Salvago returned to Venice with the ambassador Ragazzani. The last person that remained was Pasquale Naon, who had Levantine parents. Both Sokollu and Barbaro offered a job to this dragoman that the Venetian consul in Alexandria sent in order to facilitate the business of the merchants in the city; however, the dragoman did not incline toward this offer and left the city as soon as possible. The dragoman problem must have been resolved after 1575 because the Sultan sent the letter approving the process of captive exchange in Italian.⁴⁷⁵

Venetians tried to find Venetian-born Ottomans in the Palace in order to have intelligence in any case. Marco Pesaro was one of them. He was an illustrative example of one of those individuals who could not be rescued after s/he fell captive despite being from a patrician family. The bailo made strenuous efforts to rescue Marco before the War of Cyprus took place since the beginning of 1565; however, he could not achieve to do so. It was because Marco entered the Palace as *içoğlanı* (page), and it was practically impossible for him to be manumitted from there. Before the war began in January 1570, the Jewish Rabi Abraham Abensantio, who could talk to the pages when he went to the palace since he was the physician of both the bailo and the Palace, found the chance to communicate with Marco while Sultan was in Edirne. He told him not to forget about his country and help him in this regard. Wishing to obtain information regarding the Cyprus expedition of the Ottoman Army, the physician received the following answer from the

⁴⁷⁵ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 349.

page: ‘Since the Sultan was not in the palace, these issues do not warrant discussion.’ However, the physician was hopeful that Marco would convey this information after the Sultan returned. They even decided on a secret indicator between them. Provided that the navy set out toward Cyprus, Marco would ask for a special concoction from the physician to treat his illness. After a short time, he asked for this concoction.⁴⁷⁶

However, the bailo Marcantonio Barbaro announced with sorrow that Marco was assigned as *çaşnigîr*⁴⁷⁷ in September 1571. Even though such a position meant an irreversible journey, the bailo believed that young people became converts to rise in the Ottoman state hierarchy and live in better conditions. In fact, someone who was a page in the palace was formally a Muslim. Many Europeans, such as the bailo, thought that these captives were there by being a Muslim against their will and that they could return to their former religion if they were persuaded. As the bailo reported, just when Marco was to be sent out of the palace by being promoted as cavalrymen with the favor of Genovese *Silahdar*⁴⁷⁸, a figure that we would later know as Cigalızade Sinan Pasha, Marco began to work in the palace organization and became *çaşnigîr*. News about him kept coming the following year, and the bailo’s letter dated March 1572 indicated that he had passed away.⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁶ Francesca Lucchetta, “Il Medico del Bailaggio di Costantinopoli: fra Terapie e Politica (Secc. Xv—Xvi)”, *Quaderni di Studi Arabi*, 1997, Vol. 15, Supplemento al n. 15. *Veneziani in Levante, Musulmani a Venezia* (1997), 8, 11.

⁴⁷⁷ *Çaşnigîr*: in Persian a title and rank for the official taster of the Sultan. They controlled the food and drinking sultan. The *çaşnigîrs* generally rose from the *Hasoda*. For further information see. Bernard Lewis, “*Çaşnagîr-Bashi*”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition (EI2), v. 2, (Leiden: Brill, 1960–), 15; Aydın Taneri, “*Çaşnigîr*”, *DIA*, v. 8. (Ankara: TDV, 1988), 232.

⁴⁷⁸ *Silâhdâr*: in Persian an arms-bearer, the second-in-command of the Sultan's Privy Chamber. For further information see. Shai Har-El, “*Silâhdâr*”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition (EI2), v. 9, (Leiden: Brill, 1960–), 609, 610.

⁴⁷⁹ Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato, XIV, Costantinopoli, Relazioni inedite (1512-1789)* (Padova: Aldo Ausilio, 1996), 165; Lucchetta, “Il Medico del Bailaggio”, 10, 11; For the letter announcing the death of Peasaro see. ASVe., Senate, Dispacci, Costantinopoli, b. 5, 481v-482r.

Since there were efforts for Marco's rescue during the 1560s, this noble youth might have been kidnapped by the pirates or was taken captive in Djerba. We do not know for sure. Since he was a *çaşnigir* during the 1570s, he must have spent at least a decade in the palace. Even more importantly, considering the period during which he was a captive, it is interesting that this Venetian youth from a patrician family who should not be in the Ottoman lands according to the treaty was in the palace.



CHAPTER VI: DESTINY OF THE CAPTIVES

“Kızıl elmada Papa’nın elinde
Olup dört yıl o küffârın ilinde
‘ibâdet üzre idük kırk müselmân
Bizi hıfz itdi lütfu ile mennân
Ki yazdım anda cümle sergüzeştım
idüp cûş anda deryâ gibi taştım
Sekiz bin beyt-ile yazdım kitâbım
Nasihat idi yârâna hitâbım.”⁴⁸⁰
(Mahmut Müteferrika)⁴⁸¹

6.1 Captives during the War

Indeed, many of the captives with high social status were ransomed or exchanged in the first months of the war. The priest Calepio, for instance, who was the captive of a *reis*, convinced his captor to buy his sister. After Calepio sent a request letter to the Pope for his and his sister's liberation, he received 400 scudi from the head of the Dominican

⁴⁸⁰ “At the Golden Apple 3 in the hand of the Pope, / I was for four years in the land of those Infidel / We were forty Muslims, practising our faith. / In His loving kindness the Beneficent God preserved us / for there I wrote down all my adventures. / I was overflowing (with chagrin) and boiling like the sea / I wrote my book in eight thousand verses.” Translation: G.M. Meredith-Owens, “Traces of a lost autobiographical work by a courtier of Selim II”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 23 (1960), 456-463.

⁴⁸¹ Originally Mahmud Hindî, a poet and Divân-secretary of Selim II. He was captured in the Battle of Lepanto and one of the 40 captives who were listed for the exchange. See, Meredith-Owens, 456; Alessandro Barbero, “Attorno alla Battaglia di Lepanto: Storie di Uomini e Donne Sperduti nel Mediterraneo” (İnbahtı Deniz Savaşı: Akdeniz’de Yitip Giden Kadınların ve Erkeklerin Hikâyeleri), *Storie del Mediterraneo Incontri di Culture tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna (Akdeniz Hikâyeleri Ortaçağ ve Modern Çağ Arasında Kültürlerin Buluşması)* (İstanbul: İtalyan Kültür Merkezi, 2015), 33-47 / 125-138.

Church in Constantinople.⁴⁸² The Christian world took action to free these captives as much as possible. The list sent by the bailo in Constantinople in April 1571 was sent to Venice. For example, the widow of the noble Scipione Podacatora was a captive of Murad Reis with a newborn baby in the galley. The list went on that Giacomo Benedetti, a fiscal advocate, was a prisoner of Sinan Reis, and the mother of Gobbo Pasqualigo was a prisoner of a cavalry.⁴⁸³

After the two wars, it was possible to learn about the stories of many former captives thanks to the sources of the period. Compared to many other societies of the period, Venetians and the other Europeans left behind memoirs, observations, or advices. In these texts, the events that the captives went through were presented to the reader by considering the dynamics of the society and state.

These captives that were recorded in these works were either from nobility or they were generally high-ranking soldiers or engineers. The record of thousands of ordinary people, of course, did not exist and in rescue negotiations, the people that were mentioned above were prioritized.⁴⁸⁴ The ruling class of the island was mostly made up of Latin and the ordinary people of the island who fell captive, especially the Greeks, appeared to have placed their hopes of rescue in Spain. As can be understood from Matthew Lubin's research, these people, who were quite a lot in number and who were good at seafaring, promised to the King of Spain that they would provide their services when they were

⁴⁸² Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 145.

⁴⁸³ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 456, 457; Barbero, *Lepanto*, 267.

⁴⁸⁴ Apart from reports of the ongoing siege, even few years after the war, Italian texts rarely mentioned deathrate or captivity rate of Greeks. They generally focused on the loss of the Italian subjects. For further sample see. ASV. Urb.Lat. 816. pt.1, 110r-137; ASV. Vat.Lat. 855, 349r-356v. Memoirs contains more data about the Greeks during the sieges, see. Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 146-149, 158-160; De Fazi, *Narrazione del Capitano*, 98-104

rescued.⁴⁸⁵ These letters were so many within the other letters of exhortation that were sent that the historian W. H. Rudt de Collenberg called them *Litterae Hortatoriae* and prepared a collection by considering Spain, which took the promises of these Greeks' seriously.

The letters, compiled by Wipertus Rudt de Collenberg and started to find the Pope immediately after the Cyprus War, give us an idea about the post-war fate of hundreds of Cypriots. The Pope would like to redeem the Christians from the hands of infidels, but the number of captives was enormously high. Although he was the head of the Catholic church, he did not question the nationality or nationality of the captive mentioned in the petitions. He cared for everyone equally.⁴⁸⁶ Besides, the whole Christian world understood that it was difficult save the Christians due to the severe measures that the Ottomans took. The Pope decided to create a fond for redeeming. This long-term initiative of the Pope was also a morale booster for the soldiers, who, like their friends, thought that if they were captured, nothing would be done. Considering previous years, the soldiers were not wrong either. Because the heads of states, the strategists constantly concentrated on the liberation of the most necessary or noble captives.⁴⁸⁷

Yet, the first letter owners were those whose relatives were captured and close to the Papal Court (*Curia*)⁴⁸⁸ in the Vatican. In the first months, the information about the

⁴⁸⁵ Matthew Lubin, "Aftermath of War: Cypriot Christians And Mediterranean Geopolitics, 1571-1625", (Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012), 133-135.

⁴⁸⁶ Rosi, "Alcuni Documenti", 155.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 163.

⁴⁸⁸ The captives dealt with by the pope's curia are quite different; one-third of them come from the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1570 and 1571; a third are soldiers captured in the conquest of Tunis's La Goletta in 1574 and in the war against Morocco in 1578 (as well as the capture of Chios in 1566 and the battle of Lepanto in 1571 produced Christian soldiers in captivity); another third is the contingent from racing warfare across the Mediterranean. See. Giovanna Fiume, *Schiavitù mediterranea. Corsari, rinnegati e santi di età moderna*, Milano: Mondadori Bruno, 2009, 26.

captives was questionable and uncontrolled. In the first samples of these letters, which came from the captives' families, data such as how many family members were captured, the bond between the captive and the letter owner, the place where the prisoner was held, and the ransom price were not clear. While in September 1571, the ransom costs and the locations where the captives were held began to become apparent in December 1571. Their locations were recorded most clearly and continuously only between 1574-75. Though the number of letters in 1570 and 1571 was 18 in total (there were two more letters apart from the prisoners of war), 16 letters were sent to Rome in 1573, and the number of letters increased to 43 in 1574 due to the peace in 1573. While it was 29 in 1576, 20 in 1577, 20 in 1578, 17 in 1579 and 24 in 1580, the number of letters decreased to a single digit after 1580.⁴⁸⁹ After the fall of Nicosia in September 1570, the first five letters reached the Vatican between February and May 1571. In November, 24-year-old Astore (Nestor) Martinengo, captured after the siege and known as the first person to be recorded, arrives in Venice.⁴⁹⁰

According to Colleberg's work, most of the captives were in Constantinople (638), and then in Rhodes (25), Hierapolis-Syria (13), Chios (13) and Alger (16). The rest was in various cities of the empire. As indicated social status in the letters, the slaves were generally noble (*nobilis*), layman (*laicus*), citizen (*civis*). While the titles of the religious men were always indicated, soldiers were rarely find place in the letters.⁴⁹¹ As stated previously the absence of some family names in the letters means that they managed to free themselves after the conquest. Beside the Venetian noble families, histories of some

⁴⁸⁹ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 20, 44.

⁴⁹⁰ *Nunziature di Venezia*, (26 Maggio 1571 - 4 Luglio 1573), v. 10, ed. by Aldo Stella (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano Per L'età Moderna E Contemporanea, 1977), 153.

⁴⁹¹ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 53.

European families dated back to Lusignan Era while some had local Greek origin. Lusignan Family, the most prominent family of the Island continued to live in Cyprus even after the war, in 1580's.⁴⁹²

The ransom amounts for those captives were various according to their importance. If the Ottomans knew the value of the captive, they generally charged a high amount to free them. On the other hand, the Papal state followed a similar way for them. If the captive was a noble or important one, the share for ransom the Pope donated was high -the highest was 1,000 ducats- while he just donated 20 ducats per captive. Families who did not lose their whole properties or incomes after the war or have connections with the other Venetian wealthy families generally had to pay more for their freedom than the other captives.⁴⁹³

Most of the letters were sent by former captives who wished to redeem their other family members. Their captures generally released them to go to their homelands and collect the ransom. The number of letters in Collenberg's work written by those people was 251, while 87 free or freed people wrote for relatives.⁴⁹⁴ The fact that the number is so high indicates that a kind of hostage system was quite customary for Ottomans, even in Constantinople. We do not know precisely how many of them were released before the peace though there was a ban on releasing or selling war captives in November 1571.⁴⁹⁵ Yet, we can assume that holding captives with their family members was quite profitable and practical for the captors to use this system. For those captives to be released, it did not

⁴⁹² *Ibid*, 51, 61.

⁴⁹³ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 89, 90, 100-159.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 84.

⁴⁹⁵ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 16 / 587 (16 Jumada al-thani 979 / 5 November 1571).

mean that they could always manage to collect the ransom and redeem their families. Some had to wait for years. For instance, Soffronius Pelligotti, probably a Venetian man who was released in 1571 and wrote to the Pope for ransom. He needed 3500 *écus*, but it seems that he did not collect it because he wrote a letter again in 1578. Some were unluckier than Pelligotti. Lucie Seba waited eleven years, Albertus Cariotus thirteen, and the Benedetti family sixteen before asking for a renewal.⁴⁹⁶

People whose relatives were taken captive began to reach the necessary authorities to rescue their relatives through the merchants. For example, Pietro Muscornio from Cyprus wrote a letter to the Pope for his five sons who were taken captive during the war. 200 ducats were allocated to rescue the captives through merchants. Another Cypriot from nobility Giovanni Tomasini wanted his three sons, sister, brother-in-law, and their two children; and the priest Etienne de Lusignan, the author of the famous chronicle about Cyprus, wanted his sister to be released in exchange for ransom. However, nobody wanted to pay this money.⁴⁹⁷

It is essential to remember the story of a Greek engineer, Giovanni Sozomeno⁴⁹⁸, to understand in such a setting, which was complex and ambiguous. Giovanni Sozomeno, a talented fortification engineer, was in charge of an army corps of engineers in Nicosia

⁴⁹⁶ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 85, 87, 100, 101, 138, 139.

⁴⁹⁷ *Nunziature di Venezia*, (18 giugno 1573-22 dicembre 1576), v. 11, ed. by Adriana Buffardi (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano Per L'età Moderna E Contemporanea, 1972), 47; ASVe., Segr. Stato, Venezia, busta 265, 7r, 27 January 1573; Brunchilde Imhaus, "La minorité chypriote de Venise du XVI^e siècle au début du XVII^e siècle", *Actes du colloque tenu à Lyon*, (1997), 36.

⁴⁹⁸ The sources mentioned his name and surname in various form like Zuan, Zuanne, Sosomeno, Sosomero, Sosomiro, Sasomeno. Giovanni Sozomeno was one of the Greek Cypriot families defined as "cittadini originarii". These families benefited the Republic over time and gained citizenship, and some of their successor generations were able to enter the parliament. Among the families, some had become Catholic. Other members of Sozomeno's family had sought refuge in Famagusta before the siege. See. Burke, *The Greeks of Venice*, 174, 175.

and captured in the city. The sources generally mentioned Sozomeno as a remarkable engineer who contributed to the defense.⁴⁹⁹ Lala Mustafa Pasha detained him due to his technical knowledge. The sources commonly cited Sozomeno as an outstanding engineer who contributed to the defense or his detailed description of the siege in his memories.⁵⁰⁰ Besides himself, his two daughters were captured during the siege. The younger one was among the slaves, sent to Constantinople as a present to the Sultan and the Grand Vizier. A noble Cypriot woman who preferred death to slavery set a fire on the ship, and Sozomeno's daughter died in the ship. Although the Ottoman sources just recorded⁵⁰¹ that gunpowder caught fire accidentally -without mentioning this woman-the Italian sources repeatedly mentioned her as a heroic figure.⁵⁰²

The elder daughter was also enslaved. She was one of the two protagonists of the tragic love story. She was a slave of a handsome Turkish cavalry when she arrived in Famagusta with him and to horses on the 29th of December in 1571.⁵⁰³ The commander of Famagusta, Marco Antonio Bragadin, questioned the cavalry in the presence of the other lords to figure out his aim. The cavalry replied that he killed his rival for his jealousy of the girl and offered his service to fight against the Ottomans. He was born Christian and wanted to reconvert again. After the conversion, the commander gave him an interpreter to teach the Christian faith to the cavalry and help to know the environment. After two weeks, when the interpreter refused to take him to the girl, he killed the interpreter with a

⁴⁹⁹ Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 1004, 1111.

⁵⁰⁰ Giovanni Sozomeno, *Narratione della guerra di Nicosia fatta nel Regno di Cipro da' Turchi V anno 1570* (Bologna: 1571); Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 81-87.

⁵⁰¹ Selânikî, *Tarih*, v. I, 80.

⁵⁰² Giuseppe Cappelletti, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, Venice: Antonelli, 1852, v. 9, 55; Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 86, 87; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 986.

⁵⁰³ Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 149.

knife and was hanged.⁵⁰⁴ When Sozomeno wrote his memoirs, he was sure that his elder daughter was still a slave in the hands of infidels.⁵⁰⁵

After the fall, he again repaired the walls of Nicosia. Mustafa Pasha sent Sozomeno to convince the Venetians in Famagusta to surrender the city. Thus far, everything seems normal when we make a direct reading of the story of Sozomeno. According to Paolo Paruta, a contemporary official historiographer of the Republic and the recruiting officer of the Papal state, Bartolomeo Sereno, primary purpose of the Pasha was that Sozomeno would find the ransom he needed for his freedom in Famagusta.⁵⁰⁶ Paruta also records that Mustafa Pasha forbade selling private slaves after the conquest because he desired to go to Constantinople with the more significant number of slaves to make his most glorious triumph. It was already banned to buy Christians for release until Venetian resistance was broken due to the departure of a large number of people from the island. By helping Sozomeno, Mustafa Pasha was one of the people who surreptitiously helped the Venetian captives who wanted to escape from the islands as soon as possible.⁵⁰⁷ It seems that Pasha contravened the court order. In his memoirs, Sozomeno never mentioned this episode of his captivity. Indeed, Sozomeno finds the ransom and is freed for 1,000 ducats. He did not stay in the city, instead of joining the defense of Famagusta, and when he was free, he went to Venice.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁴ De Fazi, *Narrazione del Capitano*, 27.

⁵⁰⁵ Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 985.

⁵⁰⁶ Paolo Paruta, *Degl'Istorici delle Cose Veneziane*, ed. by Apostolo Zeno (Venice, 1718), 111; Bartolomeo Sereno, *Commentari della Guerra di Cipro e della Lega dei Principi Cristiani contro il Turco*, v. I, (Monte Cassino, 1845), 60.

⁵⁰⁷ Pasha also released Pierre Jerome de Nores, who belonged to one of the most prominent families of the Island in order to be able to collect his ransom for two days. See. Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 61.

⁵⁰⁸ Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 1004.

On the other hand, a document in Ottoman Archives is more confusing for the story's setting. The Sultan sent an order to Mustafa Pasha about a man whose name was recorded as “*Covan Sürmeyük*” on the 12th of May in 1571.⁵⁰⁹ Pasha must have sent Covan, an architect held by Pasha, to Constantinople as soon as possible. If this architect was Giovanni Sozomeno – presumably he was- it means that the Sultan learnt the existence of a talented sapper architect as a slave. When we calculate the naval voyage duration as approximately three weeks from Cyprus to Constantinople, it seems that the news of this architect departed from Cyprus in April and Sozomeno was still on the island in April. Moreover, Sozomeno’s memoirs dated February of 1571⁵¹⁰ as edited and prepared to be published. Some sources claim that he started to write his memoirs after arriving in Italy. Though there was an imperial order, he managed to go to his homeland freely at the time. When we regard that payment for his freedom was a booty income to Pasha, we can assume that he was probably allowed under the table.⁵¹¹ Besides, Sozomeno’s nationality, his Greek roots must have helped him to be free.⁵¹² Therefore, the court approved a safe conduct for the Greek people of the island previously and the pasha may have used this fact to free Sozomeno.

6.2 Captives after the War

⁵⁰⁹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 511 (17 Zulhijjah 978 / 12 May 1571).

⁵¹⁰ The text was put into better shape by Francesco Altomira. See. Emmanuele Antonio Cicogna, *Delle Inscrizioni Veneziane* (Venice: Presso Giuseppe Picotti, 1827), v. II, 379.

⁵¹¹ After his freedom, Sozomeno became a librarian of the Library of St. Mark in Venice and continued to contribute to the humanistic culture in Italy. See. Lubin, “Aftermath of War, 140.

⁵¹² Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571*, v. IV (The Sixteenth Century from Julius III to Pius V) (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1984), 1041.

In the time that elapsed between the War of Cyprus and the signing of the Treaty of 1573, many Venetian citizens and subjects were brought to the city as prisoners of war. The transfer of captives from the battlefield to the capital, as Ottoman government previously did, was an indicator that the captives would be used as leverage in diplomatic negotiations and it was also a way of intimidating the interlocutors through the ambassadors in the city. However, the number of the captives from Cyprus was much higher than usual. Besides, there were too many Venetians from nobility or the ruling class among the captives coming from Famagusta. This interminable period of time that continued with the Battle of Lepanto during which there was no sign of peace pressured the Republic, which had a representative in the city for centuries, to a highly risky resolution. If the bailo had not act fast enough it could have been too late. The Christian captives brought to the capital from the battlefield were sent to places where they would be employed even if they were not high-ranking officers, governors, or important people for other reasons. Some became state captives, and some, especially those in Istanbul, were transferred to slave markets in the cities to become household slaves.

Mustapha Pasha departed from Cyprus on the 22nd of September to Constantinople with 22 galiots and 30 barges, but four barges with cannons and mostly Italian women were lost in the storm. 1350 prisoners were taken from the ships of the pasha who arrived in Istanbul on the 3rd of November and were sent directly to the arsenal dungeon. Commanders like Matteo da Capua were imprisoned in the Yedikule (Seven Towers) dungeon, where they encountered other fellow destinies such as Marquis Giacomo Malatesta, Piero Bertolazzi and Manoli Murmuri, captured in Albania.⁵¹³

⁵¹³ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 472; *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 10, 116-118.

After the transfer to the working places was completed, it was very difficult to trace a captive. Right at this point, the Venetian bailo stepped in. As it happened in the previous Ottoman-Venetian disputes, the bailo Marcantonio Barbaro who was not imprisoned yet, who was able to meet with the Ottoman state officials and who had contact, though limited, with Venice, engaged in an exceedingly risky operation to save these captives surreptitiously. The representatives of the Republic in Istanbul were always engaged in activities to rescue the captives that were Venetian subjects; however, it was really very difficult and costly this time.

On October 28, 1571, some Venetians wrote a long letter to the bailo Barbaro explaining their situation. They reported what had happened to them and to others since the siege of Famogusta as they witnessed them. These captains were among the 400 people who first came to İstanbul with the ship of Mustafa Pasha and around 200 of them stayed at the dungeon of the Grand Vizier (while the other 200 stayed at the dungeon of the shipyard and other places). That might have been the reason as to why they reached to the bailo more easily. The author of the letter was captain Matteo Capua. Since they were completely robbed on their way to İstanbul, they had no money to rescue themselves and they asked the help of the Republic for their rescue. Apart from Matteo de Capua, the letter was penned by captain Camillo Squarzon Vesentino (from Vicenza), captain Hercole Andriani de Perugia, Simon Bagnese da Firenze, captain Tomaso Plessa (condottieri).⁵¹⁴

While almost all the texts that this thesis refers to are the correspondences between authorities, this letter is quite exceptional in this regard. It is a firsthand account told

⁵¹⁴ BibRosi, "Nuovi documenti", 32-38.

directly from the mouths of the captives regarding the very moment they were in very much like the diary that Captain Angelo Gatta de Orvieto kept during the time when he stayed at the dungeon of the shipyard and Rumeli Fortress. It is not something like a memoir that was written after events took place and some time passed in between. The letters that Salihpaşazade wrote during his captivity in Rome and Fermo to negotiate, and later to thank to the Sultan were more like summaries⁵¹⁵ and did not include the details that this letter included. The archives undoubtedly contain other firsthand letters but among the ones that I have found so far, this is the only text that was written at such an early date, as soon as they were brought to İstanbul.

A day after the captives were brought to Constantinople, some captives were sent to work in the arsenal. However, this practice was abandoned when a fire broke out in the arsenal due to arson. When the rumors that the bailo organized this fire spread to the city, the bailo kept his distance from the Cypriot captives. But on the other hand, the bailo received numerous calls for help, especially from the Cypriot nobles. He regretfully reported that he saw a man from the Podocataro family passing by with his child in his arms in front of the residence window during the captive parade, so he wrote this situation to the Senate.⁵¹⁶

Yet, the bailo remained silent until April to send the list to Serenissima and until May to discuss the ransom meeting with the Ottomans. The bailo, on the other hand, sent the first list of captives months after the prisoners arrive in the city. Being so late, according to Vera Costantini, the priority of the bailo was to deliver the detained merchants,

⁵¹⁵ Rosi, “Nuovi documenti”, 44, 45.

⁵¹⁶ Costantini, “Destini di guerra”, 240.

merchant ships, and commercial commodities held in the city. He already states this several times in his letters dated January 1571.⁵¹⁷

We see these three names, Orsato Giustinian, brother of the count of Carpas, Captain Paolo del Vasto, and Giovanni Sanson, on the list that bailo sent to the Senate in April. They were forced to work in the arsenal just the day after they arrived in the city.⁵¹⁸ Like them, some names on this list have the phrase "redeemed himself" next to their names. However, it is confusing that those who have paid the ransom and become free in this period were still on the list.

It seems that Mehmed Pasha wanted to start peace negotiations as soon as possible to end the war and secure the Ottoman merchants in Venice. He suggested to the bailo to send a messenger to Venice to explain the situation in the Ottoman capital. The dragoman Matheca Salvego brought to Venetian territories the proposal of the pasha in name of sultan. Another message which the Council of Ten received was about the Mehmed Pasha's will to start the negotiations. In return, Venice sent a private citizen, Giacomo Ragazzoni to the Porte in the March of 1571. He was appointed to negotiate the exchange of the merchants with the bailo. Ragazzoni stayed in Constantinople a few months and after his departure to Venice, the bailo Marcantonio Barbaro continued negotiating.⁵¹⁹

Actually, the Ottomans released some of the captives in time to show their good intent. Around March 1572, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha asked France, the Ottoman Empire's ally, to release some of the captives during the peace negotiations. In exchange for that,

⁵¹⁷ Costantini; "Destini di guerra", 240, 241.

⁵¹⁸ Costantini, *Il Sultano e L'isola*, 68; Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 457.

⁵¹⁹ Arbel, *Trading Nations*, 74.

the bailo told that he would release French captives given that the captive named Gioan Miches imprisoned in Alexandria was returned.⁵²⁰ The peace treaty had not been signed yet but we know that Gioan was freed. The son of Maykıl Cuvan ‘*Efrençiyül’lasl*, who had sword wounds (*eser-i cerh*) on his right-hand and left-hand fingers with a manumission record in Galata registries was probably this captive because his manumission date was February 12, 1572.⁵²¹ On November 24, 1572, four captives that were released in Istanbul reached to Corfu.⁵²²

In an encoded letter that the bailo Marcantonio Barbaro sent to Consiglio dei Dieci in March 1573, he talked about his meeting with Sokollu Mehmed Pasha on the subject of Cyprus captives. But he actually could not meet with him. In the meeting that would take place in a guesthouse close to Pasha’s own home, many people were ready from the Head of the Troops to Head of the Janissaries but the Grand Vizier did not show up and the bailo was detained there for quite a long time. However, even this instance was proof that the bailo was able to meet with the Ottoman bureaucrats even during the wartime. In this letter, the bailo stated that he would spend the thousand ducats that the Senate sent to him in order to rescue the slaves, who were in a miserable state.⁵²³ This letter predated dhimmi Anton’s letter by eight months, which included the complaint that the bailo spent the money he had to rescue the captives instead of paying his debt to him.

⁵²⁰ *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 10, XXVIII (ASVe., Consiglio dei Dieci, Secreta, Reg. 10, 26v.-27, 30 maggio 1572).

⁵²¹ *İstanbul Kadı Sicilleri Galata Mahkemesi 15 Numaralı Sicil (H. 981-1000 / M. 1573-1591)*, ed. by Rıfat Günelan and Talip Mert (İstanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2012), p. 50, nr. 8

⁵²² *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 10, 178; ASVe., Segr. Stato, Venezia, 9, 168v.-169v

⁵²³ ASVe., Consiglio dei Dieci, Dispacci Costantinopoli, Busta 4, 75r, 76r (7 May 1573).

There were quite a lot of Christian war captives at the hands of Turks, but the Christians did not have as many Turkish captives that would serve as leverage during negotiations. Having heard that Venetian and Spanish fleet was moving around in Dalmatian shores around February and a Crusade Alliance was formed to take back Cyprus in May, the bailo Barbaro met with the Ottoman bureaucrats in such an atmosphere. These months were quite complicated for the Ottomans, who found the chance to separate Venice from the Alliance before, and for Venice, which did not want to lose its superiority in eastern trade and also had to act together with the Alliance for Cyprus.

While Marcantonio Barbaro maintained the negotiations in Istanbul, Nicolò de Ponte was sent to Rome.⁵²⁴ Ponte was actually an interesting figure because he was one of the architects of this alliance on the part of Venice. However, apart from understanding that they would not be able to take back Cyprus, Venetians also understood something else very well. Some Venetian lords whose relatives were still captives at the hands of Turks pressured the Senate.⁵²⁵ This ongoing state of war with the Ottomans led to a serious famine on the eastern territories of the Republic. The people there would have to eat tree roots.⁵²⁶ For Venice, which procured almost all of its grain from the Ottoman lands, this was something that needed to be addressed immediately. Venice finally convinced Vatican about the necessity of rescuing the captives and establishing peace. It also received a financial aid of 500,000 ducats from the Pope to rescue the captives.⁵²⁷

⁵²⁴ Rosi, "Nuovi documenti", 20.

⁵²⁵ *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 10, 350; ASVe., Segr. Stato, Venezia, Busta 12, 142r-146v., 20 December 1572.

⁵²⁶ *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 10, 437; ASVe., Segr. Stato, Venezia, Busta 12, 223r.-225r, 4 april 1573; Mallett and Hale, *The Military Organisation*, 240.

⁵²⁷ *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 10, XXXIV; Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 88.

Until the Lepanto War, people's chance of rescue was slim; however, the war became a new hope for them as the opposing party took almost 3000 Turks as captives. Among these captives there were high-ranking officers, seasoned captains and soldiers. Two sons of the Tripoli Lord Cafer Pasha and Muezzinzade Ali Pasha were also among the captives.⁵²⁸ According to the Venetian records, the war lasted for 17 hours and 20,000 Turks were killed and 6 of the 8 Venetian *sopracomitos* died. Christian oarsmen whose numbers were around 15,000 were released.⁵²⁹ This created quite a troublesome situation for the Ottoman Empire whose navy generally included 200 ships and procurement of oarsmen was an insurmountable problem for all the navies that were active in the Mediterranean.

In 1573, there were still more than 600 captives from Famagusta in Istanbul. Majority of these captives were at the hands of the grand vizier and other top state officials. The pasha alone had more than 100 captives. In the letter written by certain Venetian captains, who were captives in the dungeon of the grand vizier, to the bailo in October 1571, it was recorded that the pasha had around 200 captives. It means that the grand vizier somehow released the captives over time even though they were *harbî* (warrior). Even the captives who remained at the hands of the grand vizier would bring quite a good income and it was obvious that 80,000 ducats including the amount sent from Rome as a gift would be granted to the Grand Vizier and other top state officials for this business.⁵³⁰

⁵²⁸ ASVe., Consiglio dei Dieci, Dispacci Costantinopoli, Busta 4, 180r-184r.

⁵²⁹ *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 10, 117; ASVe., Segr. Stato, Venezia, Busta 10, 236r., 19 Ottobre 1571.

⁵³⁰ Rosi, "Nuovi documenti", 29-32; ASVe., Consiglio dei Dieci, Dispacci Costantinopoli, Busta 4, 75r-77v (7 May 1573).

In addition to the income the Grand Vizier would obtain from the captives, he attached importance to captive exchange also because he was disturbed by the reputation that Lala Mustafa Pasha, the conqueror of Cyprus, acquired after the expedition. In this way, he planned to reinforce his power. However, Mustafa Pasha's objection to this change made things difficult. The conflict between the two pashas was very much like the power conflict between the two great names of the Holy League, namely Don Juan of Austria and Sebastiano Venier. The commander-in-chief of the Holy League Armada, Don Juan and the commander-in-chief of the Venetian navy, Venier was engaged in a power struggle during and after the Lepanto expedition and faced many problems including chain of command and distribution of captives in the form of looting.⁵³¹

In his letter, the bailo stated that the Ax patriarch and ambassador of France, François de Noailles did harm to the bilateral negotiations rather than providing help and he gave an example of this. The patriarch knew about the 30 thousand ducats from Venice which would be given to the grand vizier in addition to the peace negotiations. He shared this information with the other pashas and thereby offended them. Moreover, the patriarch began to act against Mustafa Pasha over time.⁵³²

In the letter, Feridun Ahmed Bey⁵³³, whose *Münşeatü's-Selatin* was frequently used by the historians but who was later understood to be a *devşirme* from the letters of

⁵³¹ Rosi, "Nuovi documenti", 10, 30.

⁵³² *Ibid*, 10, 30.

⁵³³ When Murad III came to İstanbul from Manisa to ascend the throne upon the death of his father, he passed to the opposite shore from Mudanya with Feridun Bey's ice boat. After Lepanto, he built a ship with 22 seats during the mobilization period for the renewal of the navy. Although such actions and his closeness to Sokollu gradually enhanced his position, he was interrogated in 1575 and stood trial in 1576. During the trial days, the sergeant of Gerlach said 'a fish rots from the head down' referring to Feridun Bey. Gerlach also referred to Feridun Bey's penchant for bribery and added that the calligrapher wanted a cup in addition to the 4 pieces of clothing that his master gave him as presents a year ago. In April, his butler was beheaded and he was banned from setting foot in İstanbul after his discharge from the position of court calligrapher.

Khwarazmshah, was also mentioned. Before Sokollu came to office, Feridun Bey was first the head of the chancery (*reisülküttâb*) and record offices of the Imperial Divan and later the court calligrapher(*nişancı*). He was so close to Sokollu that he listened to him. However, this was no good for the Venetians because Feridun Bey, who was at the time the head of the chancery and record offices of the Imperial Divan, raised difficulties for reaching an agreement. The bailo stated that he sent his son Francesco Barbaro to him by describing him as someone who was very much accustomed to taking bribes and was greedy, and that he was even interrogated during that year. The son Barbaro convinced Feridun Bey and he would do what was demanded.⁵³⁴

The score was even now, but Ottomans and Venetians relied on the fact that they might somehow convince the other party based on their previous experiences. After all, the two states' relationship based on self-interest might lead to the dissolution of the great Christian alliance like it did before. Venice stated that it sent an ambassador to Istanbul for the rescue of war captives, but this was actually an attempt in the direction of peace negotiations.⁵³⁵ On the other hand, Venice continued to negotiate with other Christian states and did not want to demonstrate its intention for peace expressly. It wanted to keep using this as leverage while negotiating with the Ottomans.

Letters were also written to Naples for the release of Turkish captives⁵³⁶, but nothing was heard from them for a long time. The silence of Naples, which was under the

He was sent to Samothrace Sanjak. After the passing of Sokollu, he was called back to the position of court calligrapher. See. Gerlach, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, v. I, 30; v. I, 312, 313; Colin Imber, *Studies in Ottoman History of Law* (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 1996), 90; Hans Georg Majer, "Über Urkundenfälschung im Osmanischen Reich", *Living in the Ottoman ecumenical community: Essays in Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi*, ed. by Vera Costantini and Markus Koller (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 45-70.

⁵³⁴ Rosi, "Nuovi documenti", 31.

⁵³⁵ *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 10, XXXIV.

⁵³⁶ *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 10, 294; ASVe., Segr. Stato, Venezia, Busta 12, 81r.-87r, 5 October 1573.

rule of Spain at the time, was understandable because Spain did not want peace. Nevertheless, all the captives in Rome were brought together as much as possible. According to the letter that the son of the bailo Barbaro brought to Venice, the atmosphere in Istanbul was now suitable for the return of the captives. Grand Vizier was also growing impatient for bringing about the captive exchange as soon as possible.⁵³⁷

Fortunately, the peace was accepted by *Consiglio dei Dieci* on the night of April 3, 1573 and it was read in the Senate next day.⁵³⁸ After this date, Venice would gently reject the resolutions that were sought for the revival of the Christian alliance. It is essential to remind that the peace agreement was just a first step to solving the problem of the Christian war captives. The list of captives who would be freed was limited, just to some prominent commanders and warriors from both sides. The rest of the captives had to wait until the new *ahd-name* to be liberated or free themselves via intermediaries under the table.

During the period that is the subject of the research, the bailo Marcantonio Barbaro stayed in Istanbul from 1568 till 1574. While the term of office of a bailo was normally two years, Barbaro completed the duty to which he started during the conflicts between two states that broke out in 1568 as violations of *ahd-name* stated above, only a year after the peace treaty was signed. Contrary to the baili that were imprisoned in Rumeli Fortress during the previous Venetian-Ottoman wars, Barbaro stayed in his own home under the watch of certain Ottoman sergeants. In the meantime, he achieved to send letters to Venice

⁵³⁷ *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 10, 380-382, 455; ASVe., Segr. Stato, Venezia, 13, 30r.-32, 17 January 1573; ASVe., Segr. Stato, Venezia, Busta 12, 237r.-242, 2 March 1573.

⁵³⁸ *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 10, 437; ASVe., Segr. Stato, Venezia, Busta 12, 223r.-225r, 4 April 1573.

and met with high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrats.⁵³⁹ The cautious and patient behaviors of the bailo enabled him to meet with the Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha even after the Lepanto War and do everything in his power for the Republic and its subjects.

6.3 Ransoming Christians in Secret

After the conquest, this unusual captive traffic started to become a new way to gain direct tax for the state. After the campaign, the state immediately created a local and immobile slave bazaar and hired it to the slavers for an amount. The price generally was calculated up to the number of captives and the *Pençik kanunnamesi*. *Pençik kanunnamesi* was a legal code that regulated the taxes of the captives.⁵⁴⁰ This tax was an Islamic tradition that orders one of five from the booty to send to the state treasure. According to the code, every one of five had a tax, and those amounts were definite up to the slave's age, gender, ability, looking etc. In the 17th century, the system had been transformed by collecting this tax for each captive. Yet, there was not the clear sample of this transformation. The number of captives from Cyprus was so tremendous, and the siege was so long the state created a new and mobile *iltizam* (tax farming) of the Cyprus war captives. Most of the captives' taxes were paid, as the *emin* of Galata recorded. But, a considerable number of warriors who was holding the captives as spoil did not pay their *pençik* (one-fifth) taxes. For the rest of the captives, the *iltizam* was hired profitably for

⁵³⁹ Bertele, *Venedik ve Kostantiniyye*, 128.

⁵⁴⁰ Ahmet Akgündüz, *Osmanlı kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri* (İstanbul: Fey Vakfı, 1990), v. 2, 128-135.

25,000 golden florins to official men on the 10th of October in 1570. Probably a war court in Cyprus gave the decree.

The taxman, Mehmed specifically, had a business partner, İbrahim (a *timar* holder) from the Karaman province (Central Anatolia). After the operation had started, the profit of the *iltizam* increased to 31,000 golden florins due to the new partner, Emir Kethüda from Niğde. Emir was not only a *timar* holder in Niğde but also from *Dergâh-ı Âlî Müteferrikaları*.⁵⁴¹ Except Emir, two were middle-rank officers, and the question was where they could find a down payment if they were not the representatives of hidden high-rank officials who should not be involved in the kind of operation.

Those three taxmen were ready to collect the amount on behalf of the central administration. They guaranteed that they were going to find the rest of the captives from all around the island and maybe empire. This amount equals approximately 200,000 akçe and just for Limassol and Nicosia.⁵⁴² Comparing to the normal captive *iltizam* helps to understand how significant an amount of money was. In 1523, the captive *iltizam* of Gallipoli was hired for 1,600,000 akçe⁵⁴³ for three years, and Gallipoli was not only one of the naval hubs but also for the land.

Yet, after 19 days, the imperial order also criticized the decree dated 10 October 1570 by the complaining order directly to the Mustafa Paşa that the amount of *iltizam* was

⁵⁴¹ Müteferrikâ: Originially Arabic, Horse guard, spearmen or archers attending a king when he travels. The small unit attached to the governor's suit. In the Ottoman bureaucracy, attendant in the Ottoman Palace in charge for various duties. Dergâh-ı Âlî Müteferrikas were elite unit chosen by the sons of the rulers of the vassal states, viziers, şeyhülislams (Grand Mufti), mentors of the Sultan, beglerbegs, banner/sanjak lords, defterdars (chief registerers) etc. Francis Joseph Steingass, *Persian-English Dictionary: Including Arabic Words and Phrases in Persian Literature* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 1166; Erhan Afyoncu, "Müteferrika", *DİA*, v. 32 (2006) <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/muteferrika> [accessed 17 June 2022].

⁵⁴² BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 11 / 47 (10 Jumada al-awwal 978 / 10 October 1570).

⁵⁴³ BOA., TS.MA.d., 6880, f. 13b (29 Zulhijjah 929 / 8 November 1523).

unusually too much.⁵⁴⁴ With this amount, the whole people of Cyprus could enslave. The order also not to let to this kind of action and sell the residents of these two cities⁵⁴⁵ After paying 31,000 golden florins to the state, to make profit satiable, the taxmen should have tried hard. Interestingly, the court's assessment appears to be dismissed by the Pasha, or the decree was canceled later. The court was right, and the assessment of the situation came true when we see the number of captives taken just in Nicosia. Interestingly, since problems about the signed iltizam arose after 15 months, the Sultan's direct order appeared to be dismissed by the Pasha, or the order was canceled.

We learn the problem via Dârende Mehmed's petition dated 3rd of the February in 1572 and claimed that he could not receive his share from the whole profit of the iltizam. Besides, the beg of Beyşehir, Güllüzade Mehmed did not pay the pencik share of the state, although he could register numerous captives. He also gave the captive certificates (*temessük*) though he did not received pençük payment of some captives. He listed some titles who involved in this exploitation: Some beglerbegs and banner lords, taxmen, *timar* holders, *alay begs* (military deputy of banner lord) and *ayans* (local notables).⁵⁴⁶

It is also essential to annotate Karaman, the Ottoman province in central Anatolia. Cyprus always had a commercial link with the Vilayet of Karaman. The sanjaks of Konya, Beyşehir, Kırşehir, Akşehir, Aksaray, Kayseri, Niğde and İçel⁵⁴⁷ were affiliated to the Karaman Province. These cities, which were within the borders of the Anatolian Seljuks, were in commercial activity with the Italians for a long time. The road from Sivas, Kayseri,

⁵⁴⁴ The opinion in the decree sent from Constantinople probably belonged to the Grand Vizier, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, who was known as anti-war on the eve of the war and hurried to start negotiations.

⁵⁴⁵ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 799 (29 Jumada al-awwal 978 / 29 October 1570).

⁵⁴⁶ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 10 / 370 and 371 (18 Ramadan 979 / 3 February 1572)

⁵⁴⁷ Sanjak of İçel was affiliated to Province of Cyprus in 1571.

and Karaman converged in Konya and continued to Antalya. Carpets and kilims from Aksaray and Konya; Colorful fabrics from Karaman, woolen fabrics and camlet from Ankara and Maraş, and leather products from Kırşehir were reaching Europe from Antalya, the great port of the Seljuks.⁵⁴⁸

With the agreement signed between the Kingdom of Cyprus (1192-1489) and the Seljuks in 1214 and covering 2.5 years, the subjects of the Kingdom gained commercial freedom under various conditions. This right included third-country ships. These countries were, of course, countries active in Cyprus, such as Venice and Genoa. After 6 years, Venice managed to sign a more comprehensive commercial agreement with the Seljuks. Thus, the bazaars in Byzantine Anatolia, which were closed to Venice after the Seljuk rule in 1204, were reopened to the Republic. Complete trade freedom was provided for Venice, which was the biggest buyer in Europe of goods produced in the Seljuk country or coming by caravans from the Black Sea region and Inner Asia.⁵⁴⁹ From that time, Cyprus was an active handling and transit port for the commercial route for Karaman's commodities brought by Venetian merchants to Europe.

During the Venetian rule, it was known that the Cypriot merchants went to Karaman to obtain wool for samite and camlet that were produced in Nicosia. Due to the disagreements during the rule of Mehmed I, they tried to have an agreement with Karaman Bey İbrahim Bey.⁵⁵⁰ The mobility between the island and Karaman always existed. For instance, the local Armenian merchants of Venetian Cyprus, Nikola, Karcı, and Loş, complained that their 400 gold pieces were confiscated in Konya, Karaman. When the

⁵⁴⁸ Turan, *Türkiye-İtalya*, 140, 149

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 38, 167.

⁵⁵⁰ Arbel, "Venetian Cyprus, 161, 165.

Cyprus Campaign started, they were already in Konya, where they had a commercial activity for many years.⁵⁵¹

Besides, during the Cyprus campaign, the army's grain was supplied from Karaman with Aleppo and Damascus. At the same time, the concentrations were transported from the Finike/Antalya to Cyprus with Constantinople, Gallipoli, Payas, and Tripoli (Syria). Specifically, the concentration from sanjaks Kastamonu, Kocaili (Nicomedia), Bolu, Kütahya, Bolu, Akşehir Beyşehir, Konya, Kayseri and Niğde were transferred to Tuzla via Antalya. When we examine the plan of the siege for Nicosia, one of four major forces that sieged the castle from southern bastions was from Karaman, while beg of Niğde and cavalries of Karaman were on patrol duty in North.⁵⁵²

After the campaign, when the court decided to re-populate the island with Ottoman subjects, the Karaman was the first province chosen to organize the settlement by finding the determined families in the province, forcing them to migrate and transporting them to the island safely.⁵⁵³ In these circumstances, the excessive number of captives taken in Nicosia to seize the objected amount of *Pençik İltizamı* that was hired with the high price and the network between the warriors and taxmen could be meaningful. The longstanding mobility experience volume between Cyprus and the province of Karaman fed and made it easy to organize the logistics of the army and the human trafficking after the conquest.

Another imperial order answers the question that some Non-Muslim subjects of the empire started to buy the war captives of Cyprus according to the list of names

⁵⁵¹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 566 (1 Rabi' al-thani 978 / 2 September 1570.)

⁵⁵² BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 9 / 248 (29 Zulhijjah 977 / 5 June 1570), BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 389 (17 Rabi' al-awwal 978 / 19 august 1570), BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 178 (19 Shawwal 978 / 15 March 1571); Emin Aysan, *Kıbrıs Seferi (1570-1571)*, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1971, p. 77 and chart. 1.

⁵⁵³ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 10 / 378 (5 Ramadan 979 / 21 January 1572).

involved in the tax farming operation. The order was clear. They can neither involve nor buy the captives.⁵⁵⁴ But who did buy all those captives though it was forbidden? The answer was also clear, thanks to an Ottoman Christian citizen's petition to the Divân. He was the Venetian bailo, Marc'antonio Barbaro, who set up a ransom operation secretly in the capital city with the help of some merchants and mediators.

We can assume that Non-Muslim subjects were probably of mediator the European states, especially Venice, to save their captives from Ottoman hands since it was strictly forbidden for centuries by numerous orders to buy a slave for those subjects; we can track them in the Ottoman archives.⁵⁵⁵ After a year, Anton Yorgi, an Ottoman-Greek subjects' petition, clarifies the problem more detailly. The bailo in Constantinopolis became indebted to Anton but pretexted not to pay his debt. Meanwhile, the bailo continued to ransom some Venetian elites or families of some nobility. The imperial court tasked the head of the janissaries to investigate the case by the help of Qadî of Galata and the janissary guard of the Bailo. If Antons' petition was actual, the court also ordered to seclude the bailo.⁵⁵⁶

According to the third order to the grand vizier, the bailo spent 20,000 golden florins as a ransom, but he did not pay the amount directly to the slavers. He lent money as florin to the merchants and other Europeans as florins, and they bought the captives by *dinar/sultanî*. The freed captives had to pay to those merchants when they reached to their homeland. This debt method was not only easier than exchanging the florin to

⁵⁵⁴ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 1237 (3 Shaban 978 / 31 December 1570).

⁵⁵⁵ Nalçacı, *Sultanın Kulları*, 38.

⁵⁵⁶ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 15 / 1440 (17 Jumada al-awwal 979 / 6 November 1571); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 16 / 620 (22 Jumada al-awwal 979 / 11 November 1571).

dinar/sultani or *akçe* unperceivable but also creating a ransoming network from the Ottoman capital to the Europe even on the eye of the central authority. The court also asked for the names of people on the debt (*temessük*) or manumissions and the name officials or other Ottomans involved to the operation by approving those documents.⁵⁵⁷ At least, for a captive it was less than impossible to go out Istanbul without his/her documents and if they went, this means that we face a great redemption operation hidden in Istanbul run by Ottoman subjects, officials, merchants and diplomats.

Another petition by an Ottoman official in the same month reveals one of the perpetrators. Interestingly the petition was dated the same day (the 5th of November) with the order asking for the names of the perpetrators and not put in process in the Divân that week. It was just recorded to the petition books (*Divân Kalemî*). According to the petition owner, Dârende⁵⁵⁸ Mustafa was in Venice to sell three slaves. The slaves were kept in the house where the Dutch merchants also stayed while Mustafa was bargaining on slave in front of the house. At that moment, the slaves ran away. The court ordered Begs of Dubrovnik to investigate the case and find the slaves.⁵⁵⁹

Mustafa was a kind of messenger and managed to arrive in Venice in the middle of the Wartime. As an Ottoman official, he tried to sell slave in Venice though the imperial order banned it. Moreover, the authorities knew that they could ask for help from the bailo in Constantinople. Instead, they sent an order to take care of the case. In addition, the court did not discuss the case that day or week. Mustafa was just an innocent man who followed

⁵⁵⁷ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 16 / 587 (16 Jumada al-thani 979 / 5 November 1571).

⁵⁵⁸ Dârende: Having, holding, keeper, posseser. In this context, a bearer, carrier, messenger. See. Steingass, *A Comprehensive Persian-English*, 497.

⁵⁵⁹ BOA., KK., 78, f. 364, nr. 4 (16 Jumada al-thani 979 / 5 November 1571).

the orders if this was a prearranged act within Sultan's or grand vizier's knowledge. But if not, Mustafa seriously misconducted the order, and some tried to cover the case by not discussing it in court.

After approximately three weeks the state was aware of some other people who underhandedly freed captives without the knowledge of the palace and through the back door during the times when a peace treaty had not been signed since the war and it ordered that they be investigated. After the investigation, it was found out that Ahmed Subaşı (three captives), Ferhad bin Abdullah (one captive) and Ömer bin Nasuh (one captive) freed captives in order to record them in the books or sell them to infidels. They were to be imprisoned for this reason. We find no evidence regarding the fate of these captives named Anton v. Anadir, Françesko v. Bernardi, and Florini bin Flori and Yonadimi v. Simo in the Ottoman documents; however, considering that even the names of the captives were identified, it was certain that the responsible parties were punished.⁵⁶⁰

These imperial orders actually were the preview of the new conflict. This new practice caused troubles as far as we can track from the Ottoman documents. The taxman, Mehmed, who was a state official, sent a petition to the imperial court by complaining about his business partners after sixteen months. According to his two different petitions, his partners and the beglerbegs, governors of sanjaks and regimental commanders raked off by tax farming from captives. Sometimes they disappeared captives by not excising them, or sometimes they excised them without paying. The conflict between the partners probably occurred when Mehmed could not get his share from his partner and the governor

⁵⁶⁰ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 16 / 117 (9 Rajab 979 / 27 November 1571).

of Beyşehir after sixteen months.⁵⁶¹ We could interpret that the long and exhausting siege of the island and the conquest of the Famagusta after months might have caused the administrative disruption to control those tax farming men who played carelessly to increase their profit to the highest level.

As we can follow it from the documents in the Ottoman and Venetian archives, the bailo was able to carry out this task successfully. Even though the bailo was reported, he somehow managed to continue the ransom operations. All of these operations took place in Galata Court. When we examine Galata Court registries and compare them with the routine registries of other courts, we can see the great effort the Venetian bailo made and the ransom market that he formed in Istanbul, which would continue in the coming years.

We can follow the network case with the help of *şer'iyye sicilleri* (Sharia court records). Between 1570 and 1572, there are 23 Cypriot slaves and 33 Frankish in the Galata14/4 court register. According to Nur Sobers-Khan, Cypriot slaves were roughly 20% of the slave population recorded in the Galata 14/4 register, while the earlier the Galata 14/2 register, only one Cypriot slave was present, and with the complete absence of Cypriot slaves in the 14/3 register. They tend to convert less than the other nationalities. The number of Frankish slaves in Galata was 33 in the same years. They also did not care to convert as Cypriots since they had still the expectation of being ransomed. It was easier

⁵⁶¹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 10 / 11 (18 Ramadan 979 / 3 February 1572).

for Frankish slaves to return to their homelands.⁵⁶² They also might know the ransoming network and waited for their freedom silently.

Yet, there was another unusual practice in those Galata records that also seem pretty illegal. A man, ‘Abd al-Jabbār Beg, who came to court twice in two days to declare that status of two slaves, Mimi and Murad, had been mistaken and that they had been wrongly re-enslaved. He also produced four same witnesses: Nabī b. Walī (Veli), Mehmed b. Abdullah, Mehmed b. Ibrahim and Hasan b. Muṣṭafā claimed that they were manumitted before their owner’s death, and the judge concurred with these claims. This unusual practice happened in the December of 1571, just after a month of Antons’ petition. Except for two men, 113 captives were freed from January to December in 1572. Their total ransoms were approximately 245,600⁵⁶³ dirhams, and it equals 1,114,00 akçe and 19,546 golden florins.⁵⁶⁴ The average tax of the captive was 150-250 akçe per captive; the ransoming network probably gained approximately 9,700 akçe per captive.

Right here, it's time to remember the expense list of the bailo in Constantinople in 1568 mentioned previously. It was 23,856 ducats in total, and the borrowed money mentioned in Anton’s petition was roughly the same, 20,000 florins. Besides, the previous bailo should have established a close relationship with the *Kadı* (judge) of Galata and the other people of the court. When Marcantonio Barbaro arrived in Constantinople as a bailo in 1568, he must have taken over this established network.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶² Nur Sobers-Khan, *Slaves Without Shackles: Forced Labour and Manumission in the Galata Court Registers, 1560-1572* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2014), 93, 98-99, 121, 122.

⁵⁶³ Sobers-Khan, *Slaves Without Shackles*, 213-217, 269.

⁵⁶⁴ Pamuk, *A Monetary History*, 63.

⁵⁶⁵ ASVe., Senato, Secreta, Archivio Proprio Costantinopoli, busta 6, 66v-66r; ASVe., Senato, Deliberazioni, Registri, Costantinopoli, Reg. 4, 11v, 12r, 15v, 16r, 17v, 19r, 23r, 24r (19 March 1569-26 March 1570).

In the rulings recorded in Galata registries, it can be observed that Venetians took up a lot of space. In the period of time that we address, the merchants, who came from various places such as France, England, Spain, Ragusa, and Iran and who happened to be in the court, were never as many as the Venetians in number. During the time of war when the two parties halted commercial activities, they continued to fill the registry volumes with their names and captivity statuses. These people who were generally recorded as *Efrenç/Frenk*⁵⁶⁶ but whose names indicated that they were Italians were at times recorded as *Kıbrısî/asl-ı Kıbrıs* after the War of Cyprus.⁵⁶⁷

In the volumes that include the rulings regarding the manumitted captives in Galata Court between 1573-1591, the large number of manumitted captives draws attention. Moreover, the *hüccets* for rescuing captives in Galata registries were more in number and in different formats compared to the registries in other courts. While the registries of manumitted captives did not constitute more than 10% within a given volume, this percentage could be as high as 20% in Galata registries.

It is better to explain the freedom methods according to Islamic law to comprehend those exploitations. When a slave was manumitted, his/her name, his/her father's name, his/her hometown, his/her visible physical properties, the name of the person who manumitted him/her, the date of manumission, the amount if the slave was manumitted through *kitâbe*, and the people who were present at the court were recorded. In case the

⁵⁶⁶ The term *Frenk/Efrenç* was used widely to classify non-Muslims, generally from Europe, from *Dar-al harb*, such as merchants, travelers, and diplomats. It also includes Ragusans. In the texts related to the War of Cyprus, the term refers to a Venetian or Latin and Greek who were banished due to their loyalty to the Republic, see. Vera Costantini, "Old Players and New in the Transition of Cyprus to Ottoman Rule", *Living in the Ottoman Ecumenical Community: Essays in Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi*, ed. by Vera Costantini and Markus Koller (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 377, 378.

⁵⁶⁷ Sobers-Khan, *Slaves Without Shackles*, 92, 95; Zarinebaf, *Mediterranean Encounters*, 58.

owner of the slave, before his death, declared that he would manumit the slave, people who witnessed this declaration were recorded as well. A copy of the ruling, which was registered in the book, was given to the slave so that s/he could demonstrate his/her freedom to authorities while returning to his/her country or travelling within the imperial borders.

A slave can be manumitted through the methods of *itk*, *mukâtebe*, *tedbir*, and *ümmü veled*. *Itk* is when the complete freedom of the slave becomes definite on the part of the slave owner and when it is officially registered by the court. A slave that was manumitted through this method was then as free as any Ottoman subject. S/he could travel, get married, work freely or return to his/her country. On the other hand, when the slave, who could not be an heir when his/her former owner died as required by the sharia, died, the person who manumitted him/her or his family could lay claim to his assets. A slave owner could manumit a slave through *itk* just for the sake of doing a good deed.

Another method, *mukâtebe*, was a method frequently encountered in registries. The slave is freed after serving to his/her master for a certain period of time, generally ranging between 3 to 7 years. Some forms of *mukâtebes* took place for a monthly or a single payment. However, this contract had to be registered in front of a qadi and with the presence of witnesses. A slave with *mukâtebe* ruling could not be sold to anyone else. S/he could work to earn his/her compensation or travel freely. However, a slave with *mukâtebe* contract had to ask for the permission of his/her owner to get married until this period was

completed. Conversion to Islam generally but not always shortened the period of *mukâtebe*.⁵⁶⁸

The third method *tedbir* was applied when the owner of the slave died. Provided that the slave owner promised before his death that he would manumit his slave after his death –this was sometimes 40 days after his death-, this claim was confirmed by witnesses in court and the slave was then freed.⁵⁶⁹

The last method is called *ümmü veled* and it referred to the liberation of a female slave as a result of giving birth to a child from the free slave owner. This method rarely appeared in registries because Galata, in terms of its location, had fewer households compared to the neighbouring districts of Tophane and Kasımpaşa, which were close to the shipyard and commercial port.⁵⁷⁰

This procedure was at times carried out in exchange for a certain amount. The amount was generally quite high for a slave and it was always a question mark as to how a captive slave earned this amount. The slaves who were able to find someone who lent them money were lucky and these debts were included in the registries.⁵⁷¹ To gain one's freedom without incurring any debt or paying a certain amount harbors questions marks with regard to the period, especially when a lot of slaves were quickly and dubiously manumitted on the same day. In that case, one should remember the bailo, who tried to save the Venetians that were captives in Istanbul after the War of Cyprus to the best of his abilities.

⁵⁶⁸ Sobers-Khan, *Slaves Without Shackles*, 74.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 76-77.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 77.

⁵⁷¹ *Galata Mahkemesi, 15 Numaralı Sicil*, p. 3b, nr. 17.

Many slaves in the registries, including the rulings of this period, were manumitted free of charge, for no reason, and generally by state officials. So much so that some state officials also serially manumitted other slaves. As Sobers-Khan calculated, in the registers between 1560 and 1572, %34 / one-hundred and ninety-one of the five-hundred and sixty-nine slaves were belonged to men who officially involved seafaring: *reis*, *reis sultânî*, *reis amîrî*, *kapudan*, or *kapudan sultânî*. When the other officials such as *sipahi*, *silahdar*, *azap*, *odabaşı*, *kethüda*, *bölükbaşı* included, the percentage increases to %50s.⁵⁷²

An order that was sent to Kaptan-ı Derya Kılıç Ali Paşa in March 1575 may provide an idea of how the sailors tampered with the records to release captives by using the vessels called *Pereme*.⁵⁷³ It was a simple type of boat used for short-distance travel, and it also had a larger type used in Aegean and Marmara for shipping cargo. The order received by the *Kaptan-ı Derya* said that European-Frankish captives were “still” being secretly released by some people under the pretense of being employed as rowers on unregistered boats.⁵⁷⁴ This method of misconduct was uncovered by an investigation that was launched after complaints received in November 1564. Some captives were brought to Andros Island near Negroponte, and according to the complaints received from local

⁵⁷² Sobers-Khan, *Slaves Without Shackles*, 160.

⁵⁷³ *Pereme*: *Perme*, *Prama* or *Bereme*, generally used in Constantinople between two sides of Bosphorus, while earlier designs had one rower, later the number increased to two or three. Narrow and fast vehicle, could carry app. 50-60 people. See. Kahane, Kahane and Tietze, “Perama”, *The Lingua Franca*, 558; Wolfgang Müller-Wiener, *Bizans'tan Osmanlı'ya İstanbul Limanı* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 76, 77; Mustafa Gürbüz Beydiz, *Osmanlı Gemi Tasvirleri* (İstanbul: Kabalcı, 2013), 58, 91; Reinhold Lubenau *Seyahatnamesi: Osmanlı Ülkesinde, 1587-1589*, trans. by, Türkis Noyan (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2012), v. II, 481, 506, 507, 525.

⁵⁷⁴ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.ZYLd., 2 / 409 (22 Zulqadah 982 / 5 March 1575).

Greeks, they were smuggled to Europe after they were hidden for a while by the Europeans-Frankish on the island.⁵⁷⁵

Besides, the names of the witnesses present during the manumission procedure were mostly the same. It was as if there was a witness market around Galata Court and certain people regularly testified in there. The captives whose names tell us that they were Italians were generally registered as *Efrenc*, but the number of those registered as Cypriots were also high. However, there were almost no captives that were registered as Venetians. Since the parties were obliged not to free the captives until the Treaty of 1573, this could be understood.

When the Galata Sharia court registry numbered 14/4 is examined carefully, one can observe that there is an intriguing situation between Jumada al-awwal 978 and Jumada al-thani 979 (October 1570-November 1571) in the captive manumission records even though the records in the registry book exhibit a continuity.⁵⁷⁶ Between these dates, nearly no Cypriots or Frank captives were manumitted. So, the bailo must have manumitted these captives by means of other methods without any official records until it was realized in November 1571 that he underhandedly rescued captives. However, we have not been able to identify these methods yet.

In his diaries, Gerlach writes that many Cypriot captives became Muslims in order to make sure that their families were freed. For example, a tailor who lived in Galata and fell captive in Cyprus at some point accepted to become a Muslim in order to be united

⁵⁷⁵ 6 *Numaralı Mühimme Defteri* (6th Imperial Court Record, dated 972 /1564-1565) (Ankara: BOA, 1995), p / nr. 208 / 348, 216-217 / 367.

⁵⁷⁶ Galata Sharia Records, 14/4, 36-40.

with his wife and children. Like this tailor, other Italians and even Spaniards became Muslims for similar reasons while they were slaves and some of them even came to the capital to do that. Some other slaves became Muslims in order to escape later. Other slaves that became Muslims were captives of war who were brought from the front and became Muslims so as not to pull oars.⁵⁷⁷

Such a tendency explains the reason as to why there were so many Frank or Cypriot Muslim slaves in qadi registries. Resorting to this method was a ticket out of the Ottoman territories for the slaves who hoped to become free - for an uncertain period of time- after being manumitted. There was no ransom amount for almost none of these Muslim slaves. Some slave owners manumitted more than one slave successively, which stood out and all of these slaves were Muslims and Cypriots. As the reason of manumission, it was noted down 'for mercy's sake' or nothing was written. For example, İskender b. Abdullah Reis manumitted four of his slaves, two of whom were female. The slave owners were either very well intentioned in this case or the plan that was implemented to flout the ban worked and while money was made from the Cypriot slaves underhandedly, the necessary manumission papers were obtained.⁵⁷⁸

Although the lack of information regarding how the captives who had manumission records in qadi registries became manumitted do not arise suspicion at first glance, we can see that the required amount was charged underhandedly when we compare the sources. For instance, in the letter dated 1576 written for Michael Luisii from Cyprus –his family wanted to rescue him-, we learn that Michael's ransom amount was 300 ducats

⁵⁷⁷ Gerlach, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, v. I, 171, 244, 306, 308, 320, 464; v. II, 525, 683.

⁵⁷⁸ Galata Sharia Records, 14/4, f. 47, r. 1, 2, 3, 4.

with 4 members of his family and 60 ducats of this amount was paid to Michael.⁵⁷⁹ However, there is no explanation in Michael's manumission record dated September 1577 found in Galata registry. The owner of the captive who was short, wheat-skinned, hazel-eyed, and who had a wound (*mecrûh olan*) on his right-hand thumb was Rıdvan Reis and 3 out of the 4 witnesses of this procedure was people from slavery.⁵⁸⁰

Another interesting thing that one can notice in registries is the system of bail. Sometimes other people stood bail for the rescue of the captive who was manumitted in front of qadî. Until this amount was paid, it was obvious that the slave was manumitted through *mukâtebe*. For example, in March 1576, Cuvan (Giovan) v. Harson stood bail for Zamatşe v. Françesko and owed 45 carat gold to Umur Reis b. Abdullah because of this bail. The Cypriot, v. Petrona owed 12.000 coins to Françesko in 1591 in order to be manumitted.⁵⁸¹ Debt of these people who became manumitted through *mukatebe* to the intermediaries gives one the impression that this method was used in ransom operations.

There is an interesting situation regarding the slaves' descriptions. The description part was deployed to take a written photograph of the slaves and if a slave, who obtained his/her *itkname*, travelled and was stopped while doing so, it was questioned whether his/her appearance was congruent with the description provided in this document. In the slave records that were included in the three registries that this study has examined; these descriptions were present but with a substantial difference. When compared with the records in other courts, 58 out of 133 slaves who were manumitted in Galata had a sword

⁵⁷⁹ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 81, 126, 127

⁵⁸⁰ *İstanbul Kadî Sicilleri Galata Mahkemesi 7 Numaralı Sicil (H. 981-1000 / M. 1573-1591)*, ed. by Mehmet Akman And Fethi Gedikli (İstanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2011), p. 62, nr. 64.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 62, nr. 64.

wound (*eser-i cerh*). 43 out of these 58 people were recorded in the registry with their Christian names. One can think that these people did not become Muslims even though they knew that this would make their lives easier and that they had a hope of being rescued. 7 out of this 43 people were freed in 1575, 8 in 1577, 5 in 1590, and 23 in 1581.

In such an atmosphere, it was not very difficult for a bailo to provide patronage or assistance for the Ottomans who were originally Venetians. When the manumitted slaves recorded in Galata Court are examined under this light, an intriguing picture emerges. In case the dispute among the taxmen that collected the farming tax of the captives brought from Cyprus had not been written in a complaint petition, we would not have learned about the corruption in this tax farming. And if the dhimmi Anton petition complaining that the Venetian bailo, who owed him money, spent money to rescue the captives instead of paying his debt to him had not been in the archive, we would not have noticed that this corruption extended over to Istanbul. ‘When the slave manumission rulings in Galata registries kept between 1571-1575 are examined by considering these two complaint petitions, the story reemerges in a very different light. There is considerable diplomatic and economic work beyond these ruling records, which makes the impression that they are unrelated and experienced as part of a general routine within the society when first read.

On the other hand, misconducts continued in various places and time. One of these misconducts was that the slave (captive) traders sold the warring captives during the time of war. Before that, the issue of whether the non-Muslims were allowed to conduct slave trade needs to be elaborated. It has been mentioned above that the Ottoman government did not allow non-Muslims to hold slaves and this was regularly reminded to them on

various occasions. Even though there are different opinions, one can trace the history as to why non-Muslims could not engage in slave trade from Mühimme Records.

According to classical Islam, non-Muslims holding Muslims as slaves was not considered a big issue. But this was not the case in Ottoman society. Haim Gerber argues that the reason for that was pre-Ottoman Islamic societies' limited contact with the outside world. Using slaves as soldiers were also unknown in those societies. This is why slavery was an important institution of the Ottoman Empire and a delicate topic.⁵⁸² Youval Rotman disagrees with Gerber's argument and points out that in Arabic societies, non-Muslims were prohibited from holding Muslim slaves.

On the other hand, the Muslims were allowed to hold Muslim slaves only if they were previously Christians. Citing William Warwick Buckland, Rotman argues that such prohibition was also applied in Byzantine Empire. Non-Christians could not hold slaves, be it Jewish, Samaritan, or pagan.⁵⁸³

It seems that the ownership of the slaves for the non-Muslim was quite delicate and fluctuated position. Robert Mantran states that the Christians were not allowed to purchase Turkish slaves; however, they could do that through a Turkish friend.⁵⁸⁴ In November 1559, Qadi of Istanbul was ordered to take a census. In this census, he listed those people who might hold slaves, among whom there were Jews, various Non-Muslim people and Christians. It was also ordered that every slave that anyone had should be

⁵⁸² Haim Gerber, *Crossing Borders Jews and Muslims in Ottoman Law, Economy and Society* (İstanbul: Isis, 2008), 39.

⁵⁸³ Rotman, "Medieval Slavery", 612, 613; William Warwick Buckland, *The Roman Law of Slavery: The Condition of the Slave in Private Law from Augustus to Justinian* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 605–607.

⁵⁸⁴ Robert Mantran, *XVI. ve XVII Yüzyılda.*, 113.

recorded and while doing so, no one should be treated differently or badly. In the council records, no such census had existed; this was the first time it had ever been carried out. For those dhimmis, who held slaves in defiance of the Sultan's order, another decree was issued approximately two months after this order. According to the census, dhimmis had 32 slaves and 51 old women, former slaves who were later manumitted. These people were to be given to Muslims on the condition that their value was returned to their owners. The decree ended with a stern warning stating that dhimmis should never hold slaves from then on.⁵⁸⁵

The Qadi of Galata also received a similar decree after twenty days; however, the phrase *Freng* was also added to the Christians in addition to Jews as people who were not allowed to hold slaves. In the decree sent to the Qadi of Bursa, the phrase *Frenk* was omitted. We can understand the underlying reason for all of these from a decree written to the qadis of Thessaloniki and Serres. After five years, in May 1565, the Jews would take the captives coming from *dar-al harb*, prevent them from becoming Muslims, and ensured that these captives were freed when their time was completed for their mukâtebe. Provided that any of these captives became Muslims, they sued them by saying that s/he was their 'captive.' According to the investigation of Thessaloniki Lord/Beg and qadi, there were more than 900 such Muslim captives in the city. Since a non-Muslim could not

⁵⁸⁵ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 3 / 525 (21 Safar 967 / 22 November 1559); 684 (10 Rabi' al-awwal 967 / 9 January 1560); In addition, for a study that is in parallel with the provisions found in the *mühimme* and qadi registers, see Yaron Ben-Nach, "Blond, tall, with honey-colored eyes: Jewish ownership of slaves in the Ottoman Empire", *Jew History*, 20 (2006), 315–332.

hold a Muslim slave as pursuant to the Sharia, this misconduct had to be immediately addressed.⁵⁸⁶

Exactly four years after the decree that was sent for the Jews in Thessaloniki and upon the complaint of some people from the Muslim landed proprietors in Caffa/Feodosia, the Jewish and Christian groups were banned from engaging in slave trade after it was established that they sold these slaves at exorbitant prices and employed them after manumitting them.⁵⁸⁷

There was approximately 5,5 years between the first decree and the decree that was sent because of the situation in Thessaloniki. We can assume that the decision that was taken spread in accordance with the situation and necessity. The fluctuated situation of those Non-Muslims citizens of the Empire continued until the next century while some tried to break the ban in legal ways. The slave trade ban for the Non-Muslims continued until a Jewish merchant gained the right to collect the *pençik* taxes of Istanbul in 1589 for 100,000 akçes. The same year, the Divan announced a new decree to remind the ban just for owing a slave for the Non-Muslim merchants but not trade.⁵⁸⁸

In later years, it seems that the ban on holding slaves was also implemented for Jews and Christians that were engaged in slave trade. The council issued decrees about this subject until 1613 at various intervals and the same decree was only issued in 1713 in later years. In addition to the fact that dhimmis continued to engage in this trade clandestinely, there is also the possibility that the bans and sanctions regarding this issue

⁵⁸⁶ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 3 / 744 (2 Jumada al-awwal 967 / 30 January 1560); 887 (28 Jumada al-thani 967 / 26 March 1560); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 3 / 1197 (27 Shavval 972 / 28 May 1565).

⁵⁸⁷ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 9 / 14 (17 Ramadan 977 / 18 February 1570).

⁵⁸⁸ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 43 / 71 (14 Rabi' al-thani 988 / 29 May 1580); Fisher, "The Sale of the Slaves", 102-103; BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 66 / 151 (1 Muharram 998 / 10 November 1589)

might have slackened even though they were strictly implemented during this period of time. In any case, it was obvious that the Jews were quite influential in the slave trade during that period as the visitors such Sir Clausier Du Loir, who came to the city at the side of the French ambassador who was appointed to Istanbul, between 1639-1641 observed.⁵⁸⁹

This ban on slave trade on the part of dhimmis became even more important in the time of war. In the end, the Jewish community had a commerce network in the other ports of the Ottoman territories and in the ports of other European countries, Venice, Spain, and Papacy in particular. Christian merchants, especially the ones described as *Frenk*, were in a similar state. The Ottoman administration sometimes used these merchants as intermediaries for its own captives. However, the captives were not supposed to pass the borders during the time of war and the mercantile class that had connections with the lands beyond the borders posed a risk. Even though the merchants in Istanbul were within sight, we know that there were underhanded attempts to send many captives to their countries by liberating them.

Similar events also took place outside of Istanbul. For example, as can be understood from an order written to the Qadi of Gelibolu, some of the dhimmis in the city purchased the captives that came from Cyprus and freed them. The names of those who freed the captives were identified and they were to become oarsmen because a dhimmi could never buy and liberate the captives brought from *darulharb*.⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁸⁹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 85 / 421 (1 Muharram 1041 / 30 July 1631); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d. 120 / 259 (10 Zulhijjah 1125 / 28 December 1713); Du Loir Seyahatnamesi, trans. by Mustafa Daş, (İstanbul: Yeditep, 2021), 53.

⁵⁹⁰ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 1237 (3 Shaban 978 / 31 December 1570).

There were other types of misconduct as well. While the escape of captives was a troublesome issue, the escape of ‘war’ captives, the people who were the subjects of the country that the Ottoman Empire was at war at the time and who were taken captives, was even more troublesome. In fact, achieving to escape beyond the *dar-al harb* borders of a country, which had such a large surface area, was a considerable success. Especially in rural territories, the possibility of achieving this was next to zero. The places that were most suitable for escape were Istanbul, which opened to the world through its port, or Adriatic and Aegean shores, which were closer to the West.

The last stop of these slaves, who were classified as *Kacgun*, when they came from Anatolia was generally Üsküdar. The slaves, who managed to come here despite various difficulties, had to have something valuable on them in order to cross the city without divulging their identities. This was not enough either. S/he should not be caught till crossing to the other side or the boatman had to get him/her across without asking his/her identity or divulging his/her identity and this was not always possible. For this reason, we see a lot of *kacgun* slave records in Üsküdar Qadi registries. These people who were given a daily wage after they were caught until their owners were found were kept somewhere under the guarantee of the qadi and made to wait so that they would not be sold again.⁵⁹¹

These sorts of attempts generally took place in ports or kavaks in Istanbul. Hiding in ships that were about to leave to go to West was a frequently encountered method, but it was too risky for the captain, the owner, and the crew.

⁵⁹¹ *Üsküdar Mahkemesi 26 Numaralı Sicil*, p. 413, nr. 931, nr. 934, nr. 942.

For example, it was understood that Abidin, who was a translator for Dubrovnik ships that came to the fortresses at Boğaz, was helping to send fugitive captives and the goods whose export was export to the Ottoman boundaries. His testimony was taken and he didn't object to the accusation. Abidin was relieved of his duty as a translator and from then on, a decree was issued stating that the ships would be controlled only by the Muslims.⁵⁹² From the word 'Muslim' in the document, we understand that Abidin was a convert and the captives did not inspire trust even when they were Muslims.

The escaped slave also created an exciting business line in which people with strong networks and skills must operate. Solomon was one of them, a Jewish man who had the fame of recapturing those slaves. Solomon appeared in the Divan record in June of 1583. He informs the court that the escaped state slaves were found -probably- in Çorlu. The court trusted and allowed him to bring the slaves directly to the capital without proofing his claim. On the way, he also had privileges not to be stopped and to use his own horse. Solomon must have been successful. His second appearance in the documents was described as "a famous expert on the identification of the escaped slaves". His second mission was after five months, and he had the same privileges as the previous turn.⁵⁹³

Another issue was that *reaya* wanted to sell the war captives as normal captives. As we learn from an order written to the Kefe/Feodosia Beg, Çana Beg complained that certain war captives that were stolen from his sanjak, some people from his *reaya* and certain merchants were sold as normal slaves. From the word 'war', we understand that they were from the War of Djerba and the names of these captives were not provided.

⁵⁹² BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 31 / 99 (28 Rabi' al-thani 985 / 15 July 1577).

⁵⁹³ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 49 / 316 (17 Jumada al-awwal 991 / 6 June 1583); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 52 / 407 (26 Zulqadah 991 / 11 December 1583).

However, the imprisonment of the perpetrators shows us how serious this sort of misconduct was.⁵⁹⁴

These types of troubles awaited the Venetian bailo, who was trying to rescue the war captives. Rescuing the Venetians, who were brought to Istanbul, clandestinely was not enough. After a manumitted captive was rescued, anything could befall him/her until s/he arrived to safety. The bailo was able to make sure that an unjustly restrained Venetian in accordance with the terms of the peace treaty was freed by means of a letter, but he was bereft of this comfort during the wartime.

Sometimes other Venetians led to problems that would prevent the bailo to act gently and carefully during the wartime. For example, the Venetian called Mesr Payli in Alexandria showed himself as a dhimmi and recorded himself as a taxpayer and registered people from Venetian nobility as his relatives. Such an action during the wartime was quite troublesome. For this reason, not only this Venetian but also a Jew named Samuel Köhne who knew him and who was probably a merchant was imprisoned as well. Just like the Venetian, who was ordered to be sent to Istanbul, Samuel's assets were also recorded on the condition that they were not lost.⁵⁹⁵

We don't know whether these were related, but another decree was issued in the council after 6 days. Before the Cyprus Expedition, Lorenzo, the younger son of Venetian Marko Andoni Pirpoli, one of the great Begs in Nicosia, was at the hands of Pir Ömer, who had prebend in Karaman. After the Cyprus Expedition, all the captives were to be brought to Istanbul, but Pir Ömer kept Lorenzo to himself and attempted to secretly sell

⁵⁹⁴ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 6 / 623 (12 Jumada al-awwal 972 / 15 January 1565).

⁵⁹⁵ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 18 / 93 (22 Ramadan 979 / 4 February 1572).

him to a merchant from Famagosta in exchange for 1,000 flori. For some reason, Pir Ömer was later appointed as Karaman Regimen Beg. His son Kökez was conferred *timar* for 3,000 *akçe*. In the last sentence of the decree, it was ordered that Lorenzo be brought to Istanbul in the company of reliable people and Ömer and his son come to Istanbul for their new duties. From this last sentence, we can assume that Ömer, who committed such a crime during the wartime, and his son, who was an accomplice, were called to Istanbul through such appointments in order not to scare people.⁵⁹⁶

After the Cyprus Expedition, the captives had to be directly sent to Istanbul and even though efforts were made not to take the local Greek people as captives, certain state officials showed some people and their children as false witnesses and attempted to take these people as captives. The ones who tried to show these people as fugitive captives were from the Cyprus troop. Since not just a person but an entire troop is mentioned, this misconduct took place more than once but the people who did this were caught.⁵⁹⁷

Local greeks were not the only ones who were from the Cyprus people and under *âmân* (safety). *Frenk* families, who migrated to the island generations ago, also took advantage from this *âmân*. From these people the security of whose assets and lives were guaranteed, the son of dhimmi Pihero, Zaharya was deceived by someone, brought to Anatolia, and was then caught. Fortunately, the child was sent back to his family through the qadi.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹⁶ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 18 / 160 (27 Ramadan 979 / 10 February 1572).

⁵⁹⁷ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 10 / 462 (23 Jumada al-thani 979 / 12 November 1571).

⁵⁹⁸ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 19 / 639 (7 Rabi' al-thani 980 / 17 August 1572)

The violations by both sides continued in various ways after the peace agreement. Those violations generally came in sight via the angry commanders or warriors who attacked the other side. The losses of both sides were quite heavy due to the two major wars, and the warrior classes were not satisfied as politicians. They were attacking the enemy at every opportunity. For instance, on the 26th of July in 1573, after the peace, the governor of Rodos, Kaya Beg captured a ship to collect information about the other side. In the ship he found 60 *acemioğlans* (novices) and informed Constantinople as soon as possible.⁵⁹⁹ Capturing 60 Ottoman soldiers and forcing them to row in the ship was quite remarkable act for those delicate days of the post-war period.

6.4 Intermediary Networks

From the first days of the Cyprus Campaign, the intermediaries tried to free captives as soon as possible. As stated above, even the commander of the Ottoman army, Lala Mustafa Pasha, helped some prominent Cypriot or Venetian captives to find ransom and free themselves though it was forbidden in Ottoman War Law. The intermediaries played an active role on the Island or in the Ottoman territories to ransom those people. Nevertheless, French consuls were significantly engaged in ransoming while Greek, Jewish, and even Muslim merchants were also involved in those freedom operations.⁶⁰⁰ Indeed, apart from the consulates, the primary purpose of the merchants is to earn commissions via these operations.

⁵⁹⁹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 22 / 308 (26 Rabi' al-awwal 981 / 26 July 1573).

⁶⁰⁰ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 23, 242, 274, 305, 417,

France served as intermediary between the two states during this entire process. In the process starting with the war and lasting until the peace treaty was signed, the Ottoman state addressed France on many issues not only in the context of Venice but also regarding the other European states. Both the consuls in İstanbul and within the Ottoman territories rescued captives on various occasions.⁶⁰¹ After the summer of 1572, the Council of Ten also started to show its interest for French mediation.⁶⁰²

Following the Battle of Lepanto, the patriarch of Ax, François de Noailles went to İstanbul as an ambassador of France⁶⁰³ for a few years without the approval of the Pope. This was an indicator of the good relations between Turks and French and it was not good at all.⁶⁰⁴ The French ambassador took close interest in Marquis Giacomo Malatesta.

Malatesta was one of people who put up a struggle for the liberation of the captives that were brought to İstanbul were themselves taken captive by the Ottomans. By the Republic, he was assigned as the governor to Albania in order to suppress the rebellion in Albania and who went there in April 1571 with his 3000 men was ambushed with a couple of hundreds of soldiers and was sent to İstanbul as captive. For instance, Malatesta was actually a *condottiere*. His son or cousin Ercola also fell captive in Cyprus. We don't know

⁶⁰¹ Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 471.

⁶⁰² Poumarède, *L'Empire de Venise*, 264.

⁶⁰³ Noailles departed from Paris he met with the Ottoman envoy, Hacı Murad, who was in France to inform the King of Constantinople's plans against the Holy League. In October 1571, he traveled disguised and without escorts due to the afraid of a reaction from Spain. In 1540, two French ambassadors were by order of the governor of Milan. The reason was majorly the same. French diplomacy annoyed the King of Spain by signing the treaty of 1540 between the Ottomans and Venetians. His mission in Venice was to convince the Venetian senators to leave the Holy League and begin the peace negotiations with the Ottomans. In Constantinople, he was ordered to act as a mediator between Venice and the Ottomans while working on releasing French captives from the War of Cyprus. He also had to convince the Ottomans to rebuild their forces to continue to fight against Spai. For further information on Noailles's mission see. Güneş Işıksel, "La Diplomatie Ottomane Sous Le Regne de Selim II: Parametres Et Perimetres de l'Empire Ottoman Dans Le Troisieme Quart Du Xvie Siecle" (Belgium: Peeters, 2016), 181-209.

⁶⁰⁴ Rosi, "Alcuni Documenti", 167.

whether Ercola was linked to this or not, but Malatesta who was made a marquis by the Pope before he embarked on his journey was obviously a character that people wanted to become allies with. He remained captive in İstanbul for 11 months. During this period, he was put in Yedikule but also continued to take care of the approximately 40 captains in Rumeli Fortress. His redemption became possible thanks to the French King and Medici family because Malatesta's father returned to Florence in order to work in the service of Medici family after he also fell captive.⁶⁰⁵

After no longer need to certify their paper with notaries, the merchants had the advantage to send their letters faster and cheaper in the 16th century.⁶⁰⁶ During wartime, they were relevantly free to move from somewhere to another or communicate with their agencies. Indeed, they were not Venetians. They were Greek, Armenian, or Jewish. They used their advantages to involve ransoming operations as well.

The most challenging location to ransom captives was Constantinople⁶⁰⁷ until peacetime. As we understand from Anton's petition, the bailo must have paid those merchants for ransoming the Cyprus captives. For instance, Andronikos Cathacosmos, a Greek intermediary, managed to free Mary from the Nores family for 1,000 zechini in 1570-1571 in Constantinople.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰⁵ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 362.

⁶⁰⁶ Francesca Trivellato, "Merchants' Letters Across Geographical and Social Boundaries" *Correspondence and Cultural Exchange in Europe, 1400-1700*, ed. by Francisco Bethencourt and Florike Egmond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 84.

⁶⁰⁷ Specifically, Galata became the operation center of ransoming for well-connected intermediaries in 17th century, for detailed information see Ali Atabey, "Ransom Intermediaries and the Redemption of Ottoman Captives in the Early Modern Mediterranean: A Sociolegal View from Seventeenth-Century Galata", *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association*, v. 8, n. 1, Summer 2021, 261-289.

⁶⁰⁸ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 62.

6.5. Renegades / Rinnegati

According to Lucetta Scaraffia, one can talk about 300,000 renegades during the 16th and 17th centuries (even though this number decreased to a few thousands in the 18th century). Although the majority of these people were slaves who wanted to improve their existing circumstances, it was also known that free people who wanted to improve their economic situation in the Ottoman cities willingly became Muslims.⁶⁰⁹

The prefix '*re-*' meaning to repeat etymologically and Latin *negare* meaning to deny, disclaim, abjure, the word renegade is a reference to the individual refusal of Christianity and abjuration of religion.⁶¹⁰ It was first used for the Christians who became Muslim as a result of their interaction with the Islamic world in Spain and the concept began to be used in the entire Europe during the 16th century. It was actually no coincidence that the former Christians who began to live/operate at the service of the Sultan after converting to Islam were called Renegade (*Rinnegato*) and not *Apostatic* (*Apostata*). Christians considered these people as traitors who not only turned away from their religion but also from their common cause and fellow friends.⁶¹¹

If a document referred to a person as a 'renegade', it meant a lot. If the author of a text wrote renegade about someone, it meant that s/he was someone 'who was once among us but who later accepted the religion and tradition of the infidels' and 'to whom one needed to pay attention since s/he could speak our language and could establish communication on our lands and go unnoticed.' If the nationality of the person was also

⁶⁰⁹ Scaraffia, *Rinnegati*, 4.

⁶¹⁰ <https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/rinnegare> ; Etymology dictionary. 2014 [accessed 5 October 2021]

⁶¹¹ Scaraffia, *Rinnegati*, 161.

added beside the word renegade –*rinnegato Veneziano/Greco/Siciliano/Napoletano*-, it meant that the personal information of that person was known to a certain extent. On the other hand, the Europeans divided the renegades into two. Although those who became Muslims before adulthood after being included in the mechanism as *devşirme* or captive as a child were described with the same term, they were not as strongly hated as the ones who became Muslims during adulthood. Since these people were considered to have become Muslims willingly and generally for their own interests, they aroused repulsion.

For the Ottomans, the fact that this new Muslims were somehow connected to their previous lives did not pose any problems; on the contrary, it was generally used as an advantage.⁶¹² Those people who spoke other languages, had connections with *Dar-al harb*, and were included among the subjects were already put to use within the state mechanism. The rest of the *reaya* thought that the mobility of these people was not much but their survival skills during the travels they made at the service of their masters were quite functional. The vertical transfer that they made by conversion (*ihtidâ*) was a usual and valid act. The vertical transfer opportunities that they had after conversion could also open the doors for a better life for them.⁶¹³

The renegades who worked in European states and the Turkish empire must navigate between different cultures and religions. They appeared as flexible characters, adaptable to the conditions that the contexts propose: they changed clothes, eating habits,

⁶¹² For further information on conversion in Ottoman society see: Tijana Krstić, *Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2011); Tobias P. Graf, *The Sultan's Renegades: Christian-European Converts to Islam and the Making of the Ottoman Elite, 1575–1610* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

⁶¹³ Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, *In nome del Gran Signore. Inviati ottomani a Venezia dalla caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia* (Venice, Deputazione editrice, 1994), 24, 25.

and language. They took foreign wives and had children; they exchanged religious ideas and technical knowledge since the racing navy depended mainly on the supply of material and technology from the West. Their identity was multifaceted. Their multiple belonging - even if from time to time they were called to obedience by religious and political institutions - so much so that they were considered as those who have laid the foundations of a new type of identity, constituting an important moment in the development of modern individualism. They were mediators between cultures and represented what the three monotheistic religions have in common rather than what divides them. They lived on the borders and belonged to several worlds.⁶¹⁴

When the renegade returned or was forced to return to a Christian country with any structure of the Inquisition (Spain, Portugal, Italian states), he had to appear before a court of the Holy Office. Bartolomé and Lucile Bennassar states in the work they examined 1550 cases brought before Inquisitions between 1550 and 1700 that almost four-fifths of the 297 renegade soldiers, 236, were inquired in Sicily and Venice. Of these 234, more than half were in Venice.⁶¹⁵

If the renegade, who had become a true Muslim, was caught perhaps after a bitter sea or land combat, the procedure grew dramatically and could go on for years, even for a decade or more. The tribune persistently sought all possible witnesses, including the Muslims captured with the accused, and appealed to the people who had got to know the "renegade" during his stay in Islam. It is clear that cases of this kind provide the richest

⁶¹⁴ Fiume, *Schiavitù mediterranea*, 100, 101.

⁶¹⁵ Bartolomé and Lucille Bennassar, *I cristiani di Allah* (Milano: Rizzoli, 1991), 141, 182.

and most varied information, but, like the trials of the defaulters, they have the drawback of referring to only one type of renegade.⁶¹⁶

According to Scaraffi who examined the inquisition manuals that were published starting from 1568 till the first years of the 18th century, the conditions for a Christian who was taken captive by the Muslims to become a Christian again were made flexible as a result of considering situations such as being a *devşirme*, being forcibly made a Muslim as a child, being abducted and enslaved as a child, and fighting against the Christians, all of which were serious factors for these people. The intention of the inquired party came to the forefront.

If the renegade returned with his/her own free will and spontaneously presented himself/herself to the Inquisition? The procedure was simplified: the court held the three regulatory hearings but did not always go in search of witnesses; in these kinds of cases, our information is limited. On the other hand, when the renegade, even if he returned voluntarily, tried to reintegrate into Christian society without going to the Holy Office to be inquired about, and later someone denounced him, the investigation was lengthened and was sometimes full of testimonies. Or, if the judges were suspicious of the renegade's role in Islam, the hearings could multiply.⁶¹⁷

During this process, the transformation of the church and the impact of this transformation must be highlighted as well. While the Catholic Church wanted to save as many Christians as possible from the Muslim lands, the states were faced with losing labor force. For example, in 1579 such a conflict took place in Malta. For Malta, a place right

⁶¹⁶ *Ibid.* 16.

⁶¹⁷ *Ibid.* 16.

in the middle of the slave trade of the Mediterranean and drew on the labor of slaves quite a lot, it was unacceptable for slaves to become manumitted after their conversion.⁶¹⁸ However, the Church did not want to accede to the idea that the Christianized person would remain as a slave. In the end, the parties agreed that these sorts of slaves would continue to work for their masters.⁶¹⁹ A similar situation took place in Venice as well. The former Muslims who became Christians after the process at the Catechumens House were still put to service as servants generally in the houses of patricians or state officials.⁶²⁰

When Ottoman world was needed to be addressed, in an environment where people from nobility largely occupied the state administration units, it was both difficult and at times ‘repulsive’ for the Europeans to address people who were both renegades and were generally from lower classes. On the other hand, Venetians interacted with the Muslims more frequently compared to other European states both due to their commercial ties in the East and their colonies. In addition, they were also aware how important it was that they should not frighten the Muslims in order to sustain their commercial activities.⁶²¹

On the other hand, the Republic attached importance to sustain the amicable relations with the Ottomans against the increasing economic competition of the Dutch, French, and British naval forces⁶²² and was therefore more akin to understanding the

⁶¹⁸ For further information on slave holding and public slave in Malta, see. Anne Brogini, “Effective management of public slavery in Hospitallers’ Malta”, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 2021, 64, 51–59.

⁶¹⁹ Scaraffia, *Rinnegati*, 105.

⁶²⁰ Rothmann, “Becoming Venetian”, 43, 49; Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 11.

⁶²¹ Rothman, *Brokering Empire*, 90, 92, 93.

⁶²² Post-Reformation schism, accelerated by Elizabeth's ex-communication by Pope Pius V in 1570, would have isolated Protestant Britons from Catholic Europe but created new political and commercial opportunities, including the abolition of papal taxes on trade with Muslims. Elizabeth and her merchants, seafarers, and investors seeking alternative ports and markets and eager to develop Ottoman trade links with North Africa took advantage of these opportunities to create a strategic diplomatic and commercial presence. During Elizabeth's reign, three of the four royally chartered trading companies involved Christian-Muslim relations: Turkey Company, 1581, renamed Levant Company in 1592; Barber Company, 1585 (to 1597);

conversion dynamics in the Ottoman society compared to other states. Between 1550-1650, an environment that can be described as ‘neutral space’ was created in the Mediterranean thanks to the relations of travelogues, ambassadors, and manumitted slaves upon beginning to see the Ottomans as less dangerous.⁶²³ There were of course various reasons behind this transformation. Venice’s interaction with the Ottomans from 1573 until the Battle of Heraklion was to collect information with good intentions about the state of Italy for the sultan, recruit soldiers from the Balkan peninsula, export wheat and potash alum, and manumit slaves with ransom. For this reason, the Spaniards called Venice *amancebada dei Turchi* (the odalisque of Turks).⁶²⁴

When the faith of the foreign merchants was concerned, Venice tried to practice the policy of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ and whenever possible, it remained silent for having these people within its boundaries for the sake of republic’s political and economic interests. Renegades were also aware of this delicate strategy.⁶²⁵ As can be observed in commercial brokering texts that Natalie Rothmann addresses in her study, provided that the renegade who provided brokering services was formerly a subject of the Republic, one could list not only his/her own former services but also the services of his/her ancestry in the petition knowing that this prove to be beneficial. For example, Giovanni Babin, a

and the East India Company, 1600.10 While negotiations in Morocco were started by Edmund Hogan in 1577, the following year the commercial rights and freedom were granted by the Ottoman Sultan Murad III. See, Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline*, 59-61; Jo-Ann Ezra, “Diplomacy, Piracy and Commerce: Christian-Muslim Relations between North Africa, the Ottoman Empire and Britain c. 1580-1685”, *Christian-Muslim Relations. A Bibliographical History Volume 8. Northern and Eastern Europe (1600-1700)*, (Leiden: Brill, 2016), v. 26, 18, 19.

⁶²³ Scaraffia, *Rinnegati*, 47, 104.

⁶²⁴ Preto, *I servizi Segreti*, 117.

⁶²⁵ Giorgos Plakotos, “Discourses and Practices in the Venetian Inquisition (Sixteenth–Seventeenth Centuries)”, *The Roman Inquisition*, ed. by Katherine Aron-Beller and Christopher Black (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 269.

‘Cypriot nobleman’ gave a petition to the government so as to work as a commissioner in 1590, twenty years after Ottomans took Cyprus from Venice.⁶²⁶

The case of Giovanni Parasceni, a renegade from Corfu, provides a convenient example. Giovanni stood trial in 1582. He was a broker who rescued captives from Turks and he had no fear of the guilt attached to conversion like many other renegades. People like Parasceni could practice the requirements of both religions, such as wearing Muslim clothes or praying occasionally while refraining from eating meat on Saturdays. If they were tried in the Inquisition, with the advantage of being brokers, they would generally receive lighter punishments -in addition to converting back to Christianity- such as praying and invocations instead of capital punishment, which was usually given for such crimes. Such a lenient attitude did not come into being all of a sudden. The effort to rescue devout people from the infidel lands at all events began in the beginning of 1500s and was reinforced with Djerba, Tunisia, and Cyprus and in time became permanent. As part of these efforts, many people including renegades were visibly tolerated in courts.⁶²⁷

The fact that too many war captives continued to remain on Ottoman lands as slaves during the War of Cyprus paved the way for these people to be influential in international commerce or diplomacy in the coming decades. It was possible to see many Ottoman subjects, who were former Christians and slaves, in various places of Europe. The majority of the Muslim Venetians were made up of the Greeks in the Venetian colonies in the Levant. The reasons as to why they became Muslims could be attributed to poverty, dissatisfaction with the Venetian administration or having fallen captive. They

⁶²⁶ Rothman, *Brokering Empire*, 44, 53.

⁶²⁷ Scaraffia, *Rinnegati*, 170.

had the hope of saving themselves from maltreatment and have a better life after they became a Muslim. The criminals who were afraid of being punished also became a Muslim and avoided punishment. At times, clergymen converted.⁶²⁸

Moreover, Venice looked at these people who used to be among its subjects with sympathy. For example, a former slave Ambrosio Babino obtained the license to be a commercial broker between Turks, Jews, Greeks, and Italians in Venice in 1592 on the condition that he rescued his brother Rimondo, who was still a captive.⁶²⁹ As another example, the son of a Muslim (probably an Ottoman soldier) and a Christian Cypriot, Federico, was charged as a broker in 1603. He was captured during the campaign, and then he converted to Catholicism after escaping from his father's house.⁶³⁰

We see renegades during the War of Cyprus and in its aftermath being effective in the ransom operations of the Christians who were captives on the Ottoman lands. It was sometimes considered dangerous that these people wandered around in the Christian world. For example, Sicilian renegade Ali Moro drew the attention of Papacy since he frequently came to Ancona for ransom negotiations. The Vatican ambassador in Venice thought that Ali was a spy and warned the Republic and wanted Ali to be followed.⁶³¹

Mustafa Reis dei Cordovani was also someone that we knew for various reasons during these years. According to Maria Pia Pedani's study on the Ottoman ambassadors and representatives coming to Venice, Mustafa came to Venice twice, first between October-November 1574 and secondly in June-August 1576. The first trip was planned to

⁶²⁸ Preto, *I servizi Segreti*, 348.

⁶²⁹ Rothman, *Brokering Empire*, 55, 57.

⁶³⁰ Poumarède, *L'Empire de Venise*, 262.

⁶³¹ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 248, 272.

save the captives in Florence but it did not take place. However, according to Venetian authorities, it was actually a part of repairing the relationship of Duke of Toscana with the Ottomans, which had been bad since 1530s. Their travel must be facilitated both materially and morally while on the road. Mustafa was also an important spy for Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha. For this reason, Venice thought that Mustafa was a spy and attempted to poison him. However, this attempt failed.⁶³²

Mustafa actually narrowly escaped death. In the fire that broke out in the palace of the doge, the poison prescription/recipe that was known was also gone. For a new recipe, Consiglio dei Dieci went to Prussian Melchior Guilandino, who was an expert in Padova Botanical Garden and fell captive for some time in Algeria during his travels in the Levant to collect herbs. However, the recipe did not work. When he came back in 1576, he was killed by poisoning and it was conveyed to the bailo his death should be announced as he died from the plagues that wreaked havoc on the city at the time.⁶³³

There was a chance that Cordovani's family was merchants. We still do not know his name before he became a Muslim. He might have been from the same family with the consul Zuanne Cordoani, who would be assigned to Cyprus in a couple of years. He might also have been one of the three Cypriots awarded with *timar* grant after the Campaign of Cyprus when he became a Muslim and took the name Mustafa. According to Maria Pia Pedani, his last name indicated that it was possible for him to be a Venetian or Istriali that produced rope. We do not know these since the previous names of those people who were granted with *timar* through conversion were not recorded, but it was obvious that Mustafa

⁶³² Preto, *I servizi Segreti*, 105; Pedani Fabris, *In nome del Gran Signore*, 186; Iordanou, *Venice's Secret Service*, 199, 200.

⁶³³ Preto, *I servizi Segreti*, 342.

still had a convenient and active environment in Italy, an influential family due to his nickname, and was competent at Italian since he could serve as a broker.⁶³⁴

After these people, who were Ottoman subjects, died, they could send their inheritance to Venice. İbrahim Bey from Venice –Francesco Raines- a slave at the shipyard in 1581, sent 3000 coins that he received from another Venetian that died in İstanbul to his mother Angelica living in Venice. When someone became a Muslim, it did not mean that s/he needed to give up his/her wealth in his/her own country. The relatives of the slaves sometimes did business on the Christian lands on behalf of them. This might be merchandise trade but might also be brokering for the manumission of the slaves. For instance, someone named Ali Agha worked together with his brother Battista Flagro from Milan in lending money in order to release slaves.⁶³⁵

Yusuf from Tinos who was a former janissary reported to the bailo that he took Margherita, a captain's daughter, during the war in Cyprus. In 1574 or 1575, Yusuf's sister, Morosina who was in İstanbul sent Margherita to Venice through the bailo's clerk. In 1581, Hüseyin Agha, Girolomo Sanchez from Granada gave 50 ducats to his slave friend. In 1580, Filippino from Corsica took his ransom money from Mustafa (Michel from Marseille). He promised to pay back the money and sent the money to Algeria in order to save his brother Giovanni Antonetti.⁶³⁶

The renegades in the bureaucracy were, of course, more vital for the relations between the two states. The Ottoman state bureaucracy was already made up of renegades

⁶³⁴ Pedani Fabris, *In nome del Gran Signore*, 188, 189, 200.

⁶³⁵ Maria Pia Pedani, "Venetian Slaves in the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern Period", ed. by Stefan Hanß, Juliane Schiel (Hg.), *Mediterranean Slavery revisited (500-1800)* (Zurich: Chromos Verlag, 2014), 317.

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*, 318, 319.

including the envoys sent to foreign states, commanders, sultans and grooms that were included in the Dynasty; however, the movement area of these people during the reign of Suleiman I was limited. Communication with the foreign state officials always drew attention and was problematic depending on the situation. After the reign of Suleiman I ended, this situation became slightly more flexible, but because of the War of Cyprus and the Battle Lepanto, the situation reverted.

The Republic tried to do everything in its capacity in order to get on well with the administrative levels in İstanbul and in the cities where she had representatives prior to the war. The bailo always gave presents to the administrators, attempted to keep the people from lower classes content, and tried to carry out the demands that were conveyed to him for the renegade bureaucrats themselves or for their relatives. Venice received as much help as possible from these renegades during and after the war and managed to turn many Venetian renegades who were not manumitted after the war since it was not stipulated in the peace terms into its own advantage. Among these renegades, there were of course those who managed to use their slavery to achieve a better life.

A Sefarad Jew and renegade Joseph Nasi (Giovanni Miches/João Miches) whose closeness with Selim II was well known and who had spies all over Europe⁶³⁷, of course, used the renegades for these activities. Just like David Passi and Salomon Ashkenazi, Nasi was included in these sorts of activities with the advantage that Jewish merchant families and their networks were widely spread to the entire Mediterranean. When the identities of

⁶³⁷ For further information on Nasi see. Cecil Roth, *The House of Nasi: The Duke of Naxos* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1948).

the renegades were revealed in these sorts of spying operations, they were quickly murdered.⁶³⁸

Renegades who had a language advantage involved to ransom operations like Ali Moro. He was a renegade from Sicily, often came to Ancona to deal with the negotiations of ransoming Christian captives. He drew attention of the Rome and the representative of the Vatican alerted Venice for Ali. Ali would also have been a secret agent and the bailo must have followed him as much as possible.⁶³⁹

In addition to these types of private entities, there were also spies and agents who were directly attached to the Court, Sultan, or Grand Vizier. These people could roam beyond the border either as envoys⁶⁴⁰ or sailors. The names of the Christian captives were at times mentioned in the ransom operations. For example, Albanian convert Memi Reis was one of these people. Memi Reis was one of the voluntary captains of *Garp Ocakları* (North African provinces) and frequently took part in ransom operations. Memi Reis who was promoted to a higher rank in time was also known in Rome and he was counted on for the manumission of the captives on Ottoman lands.⁶⁴¹ When we look at the Ottoman documents, there are many Memi Reis. For this reason, even though one needs to be cautious, it is also possible to distinguish Memi Reis in court records.

⁶³⁸ Preto, *I servizi Segreti*, 51, 164.

⁶³⁹ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 34.

⁶⁴⁰ While the men of the Grand Vizier Hasan and Hacı Mustafa went to a meeting to talk about the captives in 1574, an order was issued from the Council regarding the safety of the envoys on the road. See. BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 23 / 578 (13 Şavval 981 / 5 February 1574).

⁶⁴¹ Wolfgang Kaiser, Guillaume Calafat. "The Economy of Ransoming in the Early Modern Mediterranean: A form of Cross-Cultural Trade Between Southern Europe and the Maghreb (Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries)", *Religion and Trade: Cross-Cultural Exchanges in World History, 1000-1900* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 29, 35, 36.

Dhimmi Ottoman citizens were also active in these sorts of operations. Most of these citizens were merchants and they could find the captives thanks to their travelling experiences and their networks in various cities. When an Ottoman captive was concerned, we have already mentioned that captive operation generally took place through the method of exchange. When it was necessary or the captive had a significant social or economic status, then money was involved. For those who took action to bring a captive with permission from *dar-al harb*, road safety was provided within the imperial borders.⁶⁴²

Being a vouch for a captive or slave was usual for the Christian merchants. When they became vouch, they had to sign bills. For instance, an Ionian Nicolas Steffanus - interestingly a former janissary- became a vouch with his family to four Spanish captives, but he ran away with the bills. His brother Jerome, his uncle Dimitri and his brother-in-law were also responsible for the bills and arrested after his escape.⁶⁴³

In another example, we learn that some of the merchants in Island of Chios freed Muslim captives in *Frenk* territories in exchange for ransom and the Muslims became indebted to these merchants for ransom money but once they were freed and returned to Ottoman lands, they did not pay their debts.⁶⁴⁴

6.6 Jewish Merchants

⁶⁴² BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 4 / 631 (3 Shaban 967 / 20 April 1560), 7 / 2124 (29 Rabi' al-awwal 976 / 21 September 1568).

⁶⁴³ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 384, 391.

⁶⁴⁴ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 23 / 78 (8 Jumada al-Thani 981 / 5 October 1573).

However, the strongest of these intermediaries were Jewish people.⁶⁴⁵ Able to obtain news from everywhere thanks to their familial and commercial ties in the Mediterranean port cities, these intermediaries generally started to work for the Ottomans⁶⁴⁶ in the aftermath of the War Cyprus and the Battle of Lepanto. In the end, the whole region where their commercial activities continued was belonged to the Ottomans. The second reason for this was the turbulent relationship of the Christian world with the Jews after they were banished from Spain and also the sanctions imposed by Venice on the Jews in the city and those who came to the city to engage in commerce.⁶⁴⁷

The relationship between the Jewish community and Venice needs further elaboration. There quite a few studies on this subject. Venice's superiority in trade was a result of personal and public efforts. Venetian merchants had always been supervised and supported by the state, and they always received military or diplomatic assistance in order to sustain their commercial activities. Venetian maritime trade had always been run exclusively by the patricians and certain citizens. Benjamin Arbel argues that the Jewish merchants, who conducted business in the same regions as the Venetian merchants, were not seen as serious competitors by Venice. However, they were rarely allowed to mingle with the city's local population.

Jewish merchants were prominent actors in the Levant trade for several reasons. As a nation, Jewish people were spread throughout the world and therefore maintained a vast network. They had an aptitude for languages, just like their Greek and Armenian

⁶⁴⁵ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, v. 2, 802-826.

⁶⁴⁶ There were certainly some exceptions as Davis Passi and Salomon Askenazi who worked and used their networks for the Republic.

⁶⁴⁷ Arbel, *Trading Nations*, 2, 3.

counterparts. They were able to use Ladino as a language for conducting international business. They were skilled in written correspondence. They provided a cash flow exchange between the Muslim and Christian worlds. And finally, they enjoyed a certain degree of privilege and assurances as the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Foreigners, who traveled to the Ottoman capital, were time and again impressed by the Jewish influence in Ottoman trade activities.⁶⁴⁸

The vast network of Jewish merchants was not entirely new. It was established in earlier times, and though there were intervals in its existence, it remained intact. Vikings from the North, Slav merchants from Bohemia, or the Jewish Radhanites, who established contact between the Khazars and Central Europe, were known to cross paths as early as the 9th century while selling slaves in markets along the Danube. The existence of these merchants shows not only the extent of the slave trade routes but also how certain regions were divided between merchants from different cultures. When the Doge tried to ban the slave trade or to monopolize it under the control of the dogedom in 960, he noticed that the Jews and the Byzantines were heavily involved in the slave trade. The influence of the Jewish community in the slave trade continued throughout the Middle Ages. They were primarily concerned with the release of captive Jews.⁶⁴⁹

With the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century and facing a serious challenge in the Levant, the Republic encountered Jewish merchants under Ottoman

⁶⁴⁸ Arbel, *Trading Nations*, 17; Rothman, *Brokering Empire*, 71.

⁶⁴⁹ Michael McCormick, *Origins of the European Economy: communications and Commerce a.d. 300–900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 763, 768; Rotman, “Medieval Slavery”, 663; Kathryn A. Miller, “Reflections on Reciprocity: A Late Medieval Islamic Perspective on Christian-Muslim Commitment to Captive Exchange”, *Religion and Trade: Cross-Cultural Exchanges in World History, 1000-1900* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 137.

protection. Venetians were used to conducting their trade directly, but now they had to go through these Jewish merchants who acted as middlemen in the region. Numerous city-states in Italy tried to find ways to attract these Jewish merchants. Jewish and Maronite centers in Italy started competing with the Venetian trade in the Levant, and after the War of 1538-1541, they posed a direct threat to her interests. After this war, Venice could never recover the privileges which she previously enjoyed.⁶⁵⁰

After passing a decree on June 2, 1542, the Senate invited Jewish merchants, who were subjects of the Sultan, to the city. They were offered accommodation for a limited time and were allowed to conduct trade. These Levantine merchants were not settled among the local Jewish population. Instead, they gained housing places in the old ghetto, the *Ghetto Vecchio*. They were allowed to bring along their families, but their stay would not exceed four months. Some of them were granted brokering privileges, but none of these Jewish brokers were admitted to the broker's guild on the Rialto. Beginning in 1553, brokering without permission became a punishable offense with a fine of 50 ducats and condemnation to the galleys for three years. Later, the punishment was raised to forced banishment from Venetian territory.⁶⁵¹

Many Venetians were offended by the newly privileged position of the Jews. For them, a major source of Venice's power started to be taken over by a people they despised before. The antisemitic stance of the Italian anti-reformers served only to exacerbate the situation. Attracting Jews to the city for commercial purposes caused an urge to compete

⁶⁵⁰ Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, v. 2, 802, 803; Arbel, *Trading Nations*, 3, 5.

⁶⁵¹ Benjamin Arbel, "Venice and the Jewish Merchants of Istanbul in the Sixteenth Century", *The Mediterranean and the Jews: Finance and International Trade (XVIth-XVIIIth Centuries)* ed. by A. Toaff and S. Schwarzfuchs, (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University, 1989), 45; Rothman, *Brokering Empire*, 71; Cooperman, "Venetian Policy", 72.

with them and a fear of their success. After 1541, this situation started to influence the official policy of the Republic. A major reason for such discontent was the activities of Jewish merchants in İstanbul.⁶⁵²

Between 1547 and 1556, the Jews from the cities of *Terraferma* were barred from practicing usury, and only Christians were allowed to work as usurers. When the Jewish merchants immigrated to Venice, they were settled in Ghetto Novo and were not allowed to conduct international trade.⁶⁵³

The official antisemitism in Venice (though the state policies shifted more rapidly than the public opinion) was not only about anti-reformism⁶⁵⁴ but also about the relations between Venice and the Ottomans. When the relations were calm and stable, Jews were intermediaries between Venice and the Islamic world, and expelling them from the city would involve a severe commercial risk.

None of these efforts resulted in the Republic's expectations. Without Jewish supervision, Venetians could not purchase wool, cotton and silkline from the Levant. Bailo Navagero wrote in 1553 that "these Jews sold their products to whomever they wished and because of their monopoly, they profited as much as the Venetian merchants used to profit before." The bailos Cavalli and Barbarigo wrote similar things in the 1560s.

⁶⁵² Arbel, *Trading Nations*, 18; Arbel, "Venice and the Jewish Merchants", 48; Michael Knapton, "Lo Stato veneziano fra la battaglia di Lepanto e la guerra di Candia (1571-1644)", *Venezia e la difesa del Levante da Lepanto a Candia, 1570-1670* (Venice: Arsenale Editrice, 1986), 235; Bernard Dov Cooperman, "Venetian Policy", 67.

⁶⁵³ Arbel, *Trading Nations*, 9, 11.

⁶⁵⁴ According to the letter written by the Papal representative in Venice, the Jews bear the primary responsibility for the war, and the Doge himself also shared this idea. Because of that, sanctions were imposed on Jews not only in the city but also in the dominions. In August 1570, the Jews of Corcu were barred from leaving the island. Already since 1569, the Jews who had been expelled from the Papal State were being imprisoned if they were encountered at sea. Arbel, *Trading Nations*, 68.

The Jewish merchants also held a monopoly on the export of alum⁶⁵⁵, which was essential in producing Venetian fabric. In 1546, Venice tried to pay 25.000 ducats directly to the Sultan in order to gain monopoly rights on alum, but their efforts failed because of Jewish merchants. In 1569, the Jewish Ottoman citizens had already monopoly on operating the alum reserves in Kütahya.⁶⁵⁶

One of the reasons the Jewish brokers enjoyed such high influence was because high-ranking Ottoman officials were involved in the trade with Venice. The Republic was forced to tolerate their conduct for fear of offending Ottoman officials and damaging relations with the Ottoman Empire. Their concerns were proven to be well founded. On one occasion, in 1563, an export cargo was confiscated by Venice, only to be discovered that the confiscated goods belonged to Sokollu Mehmed Pasha.⁶⁵⁷

The Venetian hostility against the Jews started in the 1530s and lasted for almost 50 years, ending with Venice's adopting peaceful policies against the Jews in the 1580s. The War in Cyprus and the Battle of Lepanto seem to have certainly prolonged this period of hostility. When the possibility of war appeared in the 1560s, the Jews found themselves stuck between two hostile sides. Old ghetto merchants were imprisoned, and their goods were confiscated. The Senate decided to expel Jews from the city for religious and political reasons, but this decision was not implemented.⁶⁵⁸

When the news of the victory at Lepanto arrived in Venice, celebrations reached such a point of ecstasy that even the prisoners were released from prison. The overjoyed

⁶⁵⁵ Suraiya Faruqi, "Alum Production and Alum Trade in the Ottoman Empire (About 1560—1830)", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 1979, v. 71, (1979), 153-175.

⁶⁵⁶ Arbel, *Trading Nations*, 19; BOA., TS.MA.e., 565 / 88 (14 Zulqadah 976 / 30 April 1569).

⁶⁵⁷ Arbel, *Trading Nations*, 20; Arbel, "Venice and the Jewish Merchants", 49.

⁶⁵⁸ Arbel, *Trading Nations*, 23; Arbel, "Venice and the Jewish Merchants", 50.

crowds harassed Levantine Jews who were detained in the city. And when the grim news of the Turkish conquest of Cyprus arrived, this time, angry crowds attacked the Jews. When the Senate was convened to decide the fate of the Jews, many senators believed that it was “about time to get rid of them.” One senator saw the Jews as “the scum of the earth and spies of the Turks” and held them “responsible for the newly started famine in Venice and the recent fire at the Arsenal.” During listing his wild accusations, he uttered the real motivation behind the Senate’s ongoing session by blaming the Jewish usurers for the moral decline of the youth and the impoverishment of noble families.⁶⁵⁹

Another senator reminded attendees in the session that while such these malicious qualities of the Jews could not be denied, they made hefty contributions to the state treasury. He argued that there was always a possibility of these people converting to Christianity in the future, so the Republic had to stick to her old policies. Nevertheless, on December 18, 1571, the Senate ruled to expel Jews from the city. However, in the following days, after calculating the financial contribution of the Jews to the state treasury, this decision was overruled. After a short while, peace negotiations with the Turks started. Eventually, the peace treaty was signed in March 1573, and the following summer, the charter with the Jews was renewed. With the renewal of the charter, the extended period of crisis finally came to an end, and from that day on, the status of the Jews started to improve gradually.⁶⁶⁰

⁶⁵⁹ Brian S. Pullan, “‘A Ship with Two Rudders’: ‘Righetto Marrano’ and the Inquisition in Venice”, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Mar., 1977), 55; Paul F. Grendler, *The Roman Inquisition and the Venetian Press* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 144, 145.

⁶⁶⁰ Cappelletti, *Storia della Repubblica*, 117; Brian S. Pullan *Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice* (Harvard University Press, 1971), 537-540; Paul F. Grendler, *The Roman Inquisition and the Venetian Press* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 144.

The status of the Jews is summarized in such detail to understand the political background of their existence in the region during the campaign in Cyprus. In such a crisis, they were a community stuck between two hostile sides and sought to weather the storm by acting wisely. They were, at times, faced with sanctions from both sides. But compared to Venice, Ottoman sanctions lasted far briefer, and they were far lighter. In the Ottoman society, Jews were granted dhimmi status and accepted as a non-Muslim minority. They were free to practice their beliefs so long as they did not promote them.

Of course, the Ottomans were aware of the vast network of Jewish merchants, and they did not hesitate to use it. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, who had spies in various parts of Europe, and the others in the Ottoman administration used the Jewish information network. These people, who sometimes appear as ransoming intermediaries and sometimes as runaway captive experts, were provided with security during their travels. Moreover, the Ottomans even employed severe diplomatic acts to compensate for their losses had they encountered any troubles while conducting their business abroad.⁶⁶¹

Jewish merchants were already involved in the operations though they were banned from making slave trade during these times. As far as we understand from the ransom request letter written to the Pope, they were generally buying slaves and holding them until the right time. For instance, on June 26, 1573, Gregory XIII wrote to the Grand Duke of Tuscany to request his participation in the ransoming of a Podocataro family member who was in the hand of a Jewish.⁶⁶²

⁶⁶¹ Maria Pia Pedani, *Dalla Frontiera al Confine* (Venice: Herder Editrice: 2002), 105; Arbel, *Trading Nations*, 22.

⁶⁶² Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 67, 68.

The Jews who conducted business not only in the capital or periphery of the Empire but also in far-away provinces could not easily stay away from ransoming operations. Their ability to provide credit through their commercial network spread throughout the Mediterranean offered a serious advantage for such operations. The Jewish merchants already had a very powerful position on trade routes from Florence-controlled Livorno to Algeria and Tunisia. Therefore, they started to act as intermediaries for ransom negotiations.⁶⁶³

By the 1580s, the Jews established such a vital status as intermediaries that some countries were compelled to choose their representatives among them. In the late 16th century, the consul of Dubrovnik to Albania and Algeria were both Jewish. One extraordinary case was of Moshe Israel, who had settled in Algeria in 1590 and was appointed as the consul of the Republic of Venice to Algeria in 1622. Israel's appointment to this post was almost certainly a result of his work as a ransom intermediary in the region.⁶⁶⁴ So, through *Provveditori sopra Ospedali e Luoghi Pii*, which was established as a hybrid institution to liberate Venetians from captivity in 1561 and tasked with appointing consuls to Algeria in 1588, the Jews started to appear in rigid social and political layers of the Republic.

As mentioned earlier, the Jews and other non-Muslim Ottoman subjects were prohibited from holding and selling slaves on different occasions. The reason for this prohibition was the non-Muslim slave owners who didn't emancipate their Muslim slaves or put elderly female Muslim slaves to work. Even though such prohibitions appear in

⁶⁶³ Kaiser and Calafat. "The Economy of Ransoming", 120, 122.

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 124.

documents, Jews and Christians continued to trade slaves secretly. After the end of the war in Cyprus, through their network in the Mediterranean, they intermediated for the release of a large number of captives

It was either the merchants or the couriers who carried messages between both parties during the negotiations for the release of these people. The name Dârende Mustafa appears in a wartime petition of complaint, claiming that his captives escaped while being transported to Venice, where they were to be sold. Though it is not certain if it's the same person or not, the same name appears five years later, this time as an intermediary between a woman named Bağdat and the captors of her son Mehmed, who was held in Napoli.⁶⁶⁵

The cases of dhimmi merchants are also recorded in the Ottoman Archives. While a European-Frenk merchant-bezirgân Alenşe(?) traveled to arrange the release of Fatma Hatun's son Mustafa for 10,000 akçe, another dhimmi named Alavalac(?) set off to set Hatice Hatun's son Mehmed free.⁶⁶⁶

The exchange was a more valid method compared to ransom, and it was not an easy process. Not only the ordinary people but also soldiers and merchants could, after a long time, experience financial difficulties that would prevent them from finding ransom. Yet, if some attempted to free their relative from the hands of infidels, they had to find an enslaved one who was a citizen of the opposite party. Generally, they found a convenient slave by buying them. For example, the Venetian merchants imprisoned in Katina Castle

⁶⁶⁵ BOA., KK. 87, f. 189 (22 Jumada al-thani 984 / 16 September 1576)

⁶⁶⁶ BOA., KK. 87, f. 189 (22 Jumada al-thani 984 / 16 September 1576) and f. 204 (1 Rabi' al-awwal 985 / 19 May 1577).

in Avlona stated that they could not earn freedom since they were poor. For this reason, the center deemed the method of exchange suitable.⁶⁶⁷

One of these merchants, Konstanti Nikola had been engaged in trade for 40 years through Avlona. Yorgi Yani had been a shoemaker for seven years and Yakomo Yani had been a merchant for twenty years. Nikola Petro from the other captives had been a merchant in Venice for 25 years while Françesko had been engaged in trade between Avlona and Corfu for 10 years. The financial destitution of these captives was communicated to Istanbul and the possibility for an exchange through the brother of the captive named Teodor, who was taken captive with them but who passed away, was to be investigated.

Salih Pasha's son and some Muslim captives of Lepanto would be brought from Dubrovnik by a Venetian subject named Covanni Varelli Yovallir after exactly 17 months. We have learned this thanks to a decree written in the council so that nothing would befall them during the journey. We don't whether the intermediary Covanni from Venice was a merchant, but we know that merchants played an effective role during this process. Besides, the name of Bartelameo Bruti, who grew up in Constantinople and spoke Turkish fluently, was mentioned in Italian documents as an intermediary and responsible for bringing the captives to Dubrovnik. Maybe both of them were involved in the operations.⁶⁶⁸

But of course, these were privileged people as we have stated above. At times, ordinary people from the public reached to the Sublime Porte for the rescue of their

⁶⁶⁷ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 19 / 172 (26 Muharram 980 / 8 June 1572).

⁶⁶⁸ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 23 / 355 (22 Rajab 981 / 22 November 1573).

relatives who were taken captive. For example, someone named Hüseyin from İlbasan people, somehow took a Venetian captive within Ottoman territories in order to save his son, who was taken captive by Venetians. Even though he sent this Venetian for exchange, Venetians did not send his son back. This situation was directly communicated to the bailo by the council and the bailo was told to take the necessary action. He was also reminded that Venetians should treat their captives well.⁶⁶⁹



⁶⁶⁹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 27 / 311 (3 Ramadan 983 / 6 December 1575).

CHAPTER VII: AFTER 1575



*“Gli ammonisce quel faggio à parte à parte,
Come la Fe Pagana, è incerta, e lieve:
E mal sicuro pegno; e con qual arte
L'infidi, e i casi avversi homo fuggir deve.
Ma son le sue parole al vento sparte:
Ne consiglio d'homo faggio Amor riceve.
Lor da commiato al fine: e la Donzella
Non aperta al partir l'alba novella.”⁶⁷⁰*

(From *La Gerusalemme Liberata*, book 5, verse 78,⁶⁷¹ written by Torquato Tasso)

When the bailo Barbaro returned to Venice three years after the war, he told the doge that he could have prevented the war if the doge had given him the permission. Doge had unnecessarily provoked the Ottomans with the ambassador that was sent and accelerated a war that could have been prevented if a good negotiation process had been carried out. It is true that the Venetian administration did not give any negotiation task to the bailo for nearly a year. In the end, considering that he lived in İstanbul, he knew best

⁶⁷⁰ “He wisely warns each to be mindful of / the fickle faith of pagans, the low price / of pledges from them; and that to rise above / their wiles and tricks only great skills suffice. / But his words are scattered to the wind, for Love / disdains to act on a sane man’s advice. / At last he bids good-speed. Hot to be gone, / the damsel will not even wait for dawn.” Translation: Torquato Tasso, *The liberation of Jerusalem*, trans. by, Max Wickert (Oxford University Press, 2009), 93.

⁶⁷¹ The poem appeared in 1580 in Venice and narrated the First Crusade, but like the other works of the period, the poem influenced the readers due to the Ottoman advance in Eastern Europe. The verse above is actually on the bits of advice of Godfrey, the protagonist of the story and the commander of the army against the Seljuk army, to his friends, but they ignore his advice.

that neither the Ottoman administration nor the people wanted the war. Sokollu Pasha also directly told the ambassador Ragazzoni during the peace negotiations that began after one year that this vituperative act of Venice was foolish.⁶⁷²

In the 16th century, for the most of the coasts of the East Mediterranean the ethnicities and the religions of the slaves were less complicated due to the Ottoman advance. As Daniel Goffman discusses these two states, Ottoman Empire and The Republic of Venice at the end of his book, two states had interesting similarities, although they both fought each other for centuries in the region. Both the Ottoman Empire and The Republic of Venice had the political flexibility to accord to the new conditions if those conditions were helpful. Venice, unwillingly started to share her frontiers with the Ottomans and had to protect her commercial performance at the ports where the Ottomans began to rule. Unlike the 15th century, the Venetian Empire had no strong naval power to resist Ottoman Armada in the 16th century. Without alliance with the other European states, she avoided fighting with the Ottomans directly and preferred to adapt herself to the Ottomans' rules in the end. She faced just one authority with a few exceptional islands to interact for her political and economic activities. At the same time, previously, they had various supply opportunities by interacting with numerous states in the Mediterranean ports. The Ottomans also generated themselves to adapt to the new political and cultural situations while advancing in the region. The harsh and sharp acts transformed gradually diplomatic reacts by centuries. The structure of the Empire also evolved by the demographic changes by decades when various ethnic and religious groups started to

⁶⁷² Barbero, *Lepanto*, 151, 152.

become subjects of the Empire. This accommodation clearly helped to the state generate itself more flexible on diplomatic and political matters.⁶⁷³

In the meantime, the enslavement of many people in the region led to the formation of a steady ransom economy within the control and knowledge of the state. Ransom operations, particularly concerning Christian slaves, expanded greatly in the 16th century as the Spanish and their dependent states, in particular, came to recognize that the ransom for subjects enslaved was both a religious and a national obligation. Government bodies in Madrid, Milan, Genoa, Florence, Rome, Naples, Venice, and elsewhere, largely with the ingenious help of Christian atonement orders, enthusiastically sought donations from individuals and organizations to expand their religious morality. Ransom operations, aimed to protect the wealthy and well-connected for centuries, have begun to involve even the most ruthless sailors, peasants, and fishermen. These efforts brought tens of thousands of poor captives back to their homes. They made it clear to many Muslim slave owners and traders that such securities were worth acquiring, albeit as a good investment opportunity.⁶⁷⁴

This ransom economy did not develop to the same extent in every region of the Ottoman State. For example, since İstanbul was the center of the state, this economy was more clandestine and flexible while in North Africa, it was more explicit and aggressive. One could see various religious representatives from religious orders that took an active role in the operation of rescuing captives in North Africa. The most accurate reports regarding the number of captives who came to Tunisia and Algeria annually came from

⁶⁷³ Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire*, 230-232.

⁶⁷⁴ Davis, "The Geography of Slaving", 868.

the letters and reports of the clergymen, which were found in monastery archives.⁶⁷⁵ According to these records compiled by Robert C. Davis, from the Battle of Cjerba in 1560 to 1590, despite many deficiencies, the average number of captives who entered the ports of Maghreb was around 20-25 thousand. On the other hand, a priest from the order of Benedikten, Diego Haedo who fell captive in Algeria between 1579-82 recorded that there were approximately 25.000 slaves in Algeria alone. However, bailo Giovanni Moro and bailo Lorenzo Bernardo who succeeded him recorded the number of captives in North Africa as 10.000.⁶⁷⁶

However, as mentioned above, in Robert Davis's seminal article examining the entire North Africa, the numbers are quite different. Davis records that in the Battle of Cjerba, 10.000 captives were taken through pirate activities alone, 4000 in Granada, and thousands of people in Goletta. He also records that from 1578 to 1594, almost 4000 Christians were enslaved. The numbers in Algeria were quite high. Between 1578-1598, there were captive records of 77,000 people. Between 1578-1581, 25,000, in 1587 20,000 and in 1598, approximately 32,000 Christians were already captives in Algeria. There were approximately 4000 captives in Tripoli in 1564 due to the Battle of Djerbe. This number must have decreased due to the Siege of Malta because there were 2200 captive records even after the War of Cyprus, in 1572. In 1584, there were only 700 captives. In 1594, there were approximately 1600 captives in Tunisia.⁶⁷⁷

⁶⁷⁵ Robert C. Davis, "Counting European Slaves on the Barbary Coast" *Past & Present*, Aug., 2001, No. 172 (Aug., 2001), 87-124.

⁶⁷⁶ Relazione del bailo Giovanili Mòro al Senato, 1590, in *Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al Senato, tratte dalle migliori edizioni disponibili e ordinate cronologicamente, XIII, Costantinopoli (1590-1793)*, ed. by Luigi Firpo, (Torino, Bottega d'Erasmus, 1984) 30; Relazione del bailo Lorenzo Bernardo al Senato, 1592, in Pedani Fabris, 76; Fiume, *Schiavitù mediterranea*, 75, 76.

⁶⁷⁷ Davis, "Counting European Slaves", 90, 91, 98, 100.

The priest Jerónimo Gracián who spent his life of captivity in a dungeon, chained in Tunisia mentioned that the Christian captives comfortably performed their religious ceremonies and duties despite all the hunger, misery, and squalidness of their circumstances. While staying with 600 captives in a cave that had a hole only for light and air circulation, there was a room with two altars in this bagnio. Pasha realized that the Christian captives' morale was high when they performed their religious rituals and he thereby acted tolerant toward them regarding these practices and toward those who jabbered about Islam (there was a complaint). So much so that he purchased a Sicilian priest for their ceremonies. For this reason, the captives who were supposed to leave after their ransom was paid rarely became Muslims even though there were less losses of life in this scenario and this was not something that the Muslim governors wished for.⁶⁷⁸

Nevertheless, the captive population in Maghreb cities was renewed up to 24-25% annually. This meant that roughly 8500 captives came to these ports every year. Not all of these captives, of course, became free in exchange for ransom. Some of them died due to the epidemics that spread to the cities or various illnesses or they managed to escape. While the fugitives constituted 3-4 %, the deaths accounted for 17%. Even though the religious orders were not able to rescue a lot of captives in 1500s, they saved 15.573 captives in 1600s. This meant that they rescued 220 captives per travel and this was quite a high number.⁶⁷⁹

For the rescue of a Christian who fell captive in the Ottoman lands, it was generally his family who first took action. After having learned where the captive relative was, the

⁶⁷⁸ Wilson, "A Note on Christian Captives", 493- 496.

⁶⁷⁹ Davis, "Counting European Slaves", 92, 93, 114-118.

family applied either to state or to church. The application actually depended on where the captive was. If the person was taken captive in an area where religious orders for captive rescues operations were active, then people applied to church. North Africa was a good example in that regard. Communication was established with the clergymen who worked there; the amount of the ransom money demanded was learned, and it was then collected and given to the church. The church then arranged an *albarano*.⁶⁸⁰ As Rosita D'Amora stated in the study that she conducted on the rescue and christening documents in the Pio Monte della Misericordia Church in Naples, this document was, in a sense, a bill. It was generally valid for a year but its duration was extended in case the captive was not released. On this *albarano* document, the name of the captive, the amount that the church wanted to pay, date, the approval of the unit if the state had a unit working on rescuing captives, and the members of the church were written. The member of the church began his journey with the *albarani* of the other captives if there were any other captives to be rescued in the same region. While travelling, a commission between 3%-11-14% was paid to the galley master and the middlemen in North Africa. The bargaining process began when the church member reached to where the captive was. The owner of the captive sometimes increased the amount of the ransom. They then waited till the required amount was procured. If the required ransom amount was not complete and the remaining amount was to be brought, the clergyman would stay there himself or leave one of the sect members accompanying him as a hostage. This situation could at times go on for a few years. If the captive passed away after being rescued, this also needed to be documented

⁶⁸⁰ Kaiser and Calafat. "The Economy of Ransoming", 121.

because the amount written in *albarano* could be abused by the middlemen and probably by the clergymen by converting it into money.⁶⁸¹

All of these actually depicted an ideal picture. In practice, everything could change. Indeed, it was easier for clergymen to organize these operations in North Africa rather than state representatives. Upon seeing a formal representative in front of them, Moors whose economy heavily relied on ransom income could increase the price, ask the representative to buy other slaves in addition to the desired one or they might cause other problems. The intervention of clergymen, who were deemed more objective, appeared to appease this problematic aspect of the process but it also led to some other problems. The military and political tensions with North Africa also made the manumission of the slaves difficult or led to an increase in the ransom amount. Taking the ransom money with them could lead to an increase in the amount, robbery, and other mishaps. For this reason, different solutions were developed in time.⁶⁸²

One of these solutions was to make the payment and exchange in a third region. Tabarca Island, which was close to Spanish shores, played such an important role in the ransom operations that took place between North Africa and Europe⁶⁸³. Apart from being an intelligence center for Spain and other Christian states due to its commercial position, the island run by the Genovese Lomelli family was also a place frequented by very different types of people. The ransom operations of the captives to be rescued from North

⁶⁸¹ Rosita D'Amora, "Some Documents Concerning the Manumission of Slaves by The Pio Monte Della Misericordia in Naples (1681-1682)", *Eurasian Studies* 1, no. 1 (2002), 37–76.

⁶⁸² Davis, "Slave Redemption", 459.

⁶⁸³ Braudel, *The Mediterranean* v. 2, 888.

Africa took place here.⁶⁸⁴ Not only the religious orders of Geneva but also the confraternities of other cities sent the ransom money to this island and Lomelli lords transferred the money when the manumission took place and received 3% commission for their services. The same commission was also paid to the Moorish middlemen. Among these middlemen, there were quite a lot of converts. Tabarca Island also played an effective role in captive exchange. The captives were made to wait in Tabarca under the supervision of the governor until the time of exchange arrived.⁶⁸⁵

The entire ransom amount, which generally amounted to 200-300 ducats, was rarely paid by the state in full. When the claim of the slave or his family was proven, a bill from the budget worthy of 10 to 50 ducats depending on the characteristics of the slave such as his profession, social status, and gender was donated. The rest of the amount was expected to be raised by the slave's family or his acquaintances. For this end, there was the Fishermen's Confraternity of San Nicol or some other solidarity institutions of mariners in Venice; however, the desired amount was rarely collected.⁶⁸⁶

In addition to the work of clergymen and direct representatives of the state to enable the manumission procedures of the captives, another possibility was the tradesman middlemen. Italian and Jewish tradesmen would act as middleman in the captive rescue operations, a profitable business, both in North Africa and in the eastern Mediterranean. The commission of the middlemen varied between 11-14%. When the commission of the captain and costs such as the bribe to be paid to the state officials in between were added

⁶⁸⁴ Wolfgang Kaiser, "Una Missione Impossibile? Riscatto e Comunicazione nel Mediterraneo Occidentale (Secc. XVI-XVII)", *Quaderni Storici*, Nuova Serie, Vol. 42, No. 124 (1), (2007), 35.

⁶⁸⁵ Braudel, *The Mediterranean* v. 1, 158; Scaraffia, *Rinnegati*, 21.

⁶⁸⁶ Davis, "Slave Redemption", 458.

to this amount, the ransom cost would go higher and therefore only those captives who could pay this amount or who 'deserved' it were chosen.⁶⁸⁷

The origins of the clergymen who took action in order to rescue captives in North Africa were quite important. While the priests who were from Spanish Inquisition were not treated very well, the Italians were relatively lucky. At the root of the difficulties that the Spanish ran into lied the fact that the number of converts who somehow achieved to escape from Spain and one of whose family members was hurt by the Inquisition was quite high. Some of the incidents that the Priest Jerónimo Gracián, who fell captive while travelling with a ship of the Inquisition to Rome in 1592 and who stayed in Tunisia for 18 months, testified to this fact. The priests on the ship were accused of being members of the Inquisition which sentenced five converts to be burnt at the stake in Spain; however, the pasha who captured them told that Gracián was innocent. The other priests were not so lucky. It is claimed that one of them was related to a member of the Inquisition and he was killed the same way as the victims of the Inquisition did.⁶⁸⁸

In the eastern Mediterranean, only the state representatives and merchants were involved in captive rescue operations till the middle of the 17th century. The religious orders that dedicated themselves to 'rescuing those pious Christian people who fell captive in infidel lands' could not operate in İstanbul and Anatolia, even in Syria as easily as they did in North Africa. We, at least, know that there were no institutions that overtly took on these activities. The main reason for this was that the Ottoman administration controlled and limited the activities of the Catholic Church to a great extent, especially in Istanbul

⁶⁸⁷ Davis, "Slave Redemption", 459.

⁶⁸⁸ Wilson, "A Note on Christian Captives", 496.

and also on its lands that were closer to the center. Considering that most of the Christians in İstanbul, Rumeli, and Anatolia were Orthodox and that Catholicism was very much related to Vatican, Venice, and Spain, this was quite understandable. France had a special place in that regard. France and the Ottoman State were allies and until the efforts of the years following the first attempt in 1580s, the Jesuits and other religious orders came to life with the mediation of the French ambassador.⁶⁸⁹

However, this was not the case in İstanbul. Although Latin religious communities had been present in the city for a long time, they could not openly engage in such activities under the Ottoman rule. Franciscans were active in the city since 1220s, Dominicans⁶⁹⁰ since 1231, Capuchins who emerged during 1520s since 1551, and the Jesuits who had close relations with the Spanish monarchy and carried out the rescue operations of the captives in Venice could not become active in İstanbul for a long time. The most important church of the Latin community in İstanbul (*Magnifica Comunità*)⁶⁹¹ was St. Francesco Monastery, which belonged to the Franciscans.⁶⁹² The leaders of the congregation came together at this monastery and the documents concerning the congregation were kept here. Moreover, it became a mecca for the Latin slaves in the city. Stephan Gerlach who lived

⁶⁸⁹ Marmara, *İstanbul Deniz Zindanı*, 16-18.

⁶⁹⁰ For further information on the Dominicans in Constantinople see. Claudio Monge and Silvia Pedone, *Domenicani a Costantinopoli prima e dopo l'impero ottoman: Storie, immagini e documenti d'archivio* (Florence: Nerbini, 2017).

⁶⁹¹ Eric R. Dursteler, "Latin-Rite Christians in Early Modern Istanbul", *Osmanlı İstanbulu*, ed. by Feridun Emecen, Emrah Safa Gürkan (İstanbul: 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014), 137-146; Sezim Sezer Darnault, *Latin Catholic Buildings in Istanbul: A Historical Perspective (1839-1923)* (New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2010), 51-59; Elisabetta Borromeo, "Les Catholiques à Constantinople. Galata et les églises de rite latin au xviii^e siècle", *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, issue 107-110 (2005), 227-243.

⁶⁹² For further information on the monastery see Gualberto Matteucci, *Un Glorioso Convento Francese sulle Rive del Bosforo, il San Francesco di Galata in Costantinopoli* (Florence: Edizioni Studi Francescani, 1967); Paolo Girardelli, "Between Rome and Istanbul: Architecture and Material Culture of a Franciscan Convent in the Ottoman Capital", *Mediterranean Studies*, issue 19, (2010), 162-188 Muzaffer Özgüleş, "A Missing Royal Mosque in Istanbul that Islamized a Catholic Space- The Galata New", *Muqarnas*, Vol. 34 (2017), 157-195; Hasan Sercan Sağlam, "Transformation and Continuity of Sacred Places: The Case of Galata (Istanbul)", *İdeal Kent*, issue 31, v. 11, 1832-1855.

in İstanbul at the court of Holy Roman Empire's ambassador between 1573-78 shared quite intriguing information about the function of this monastery in his diary. On November 25, 1573, three priests and on January 18, 1574, five Franciscan priests were imprisoned with the charge that they helped some captives escape. The monastery was also the place to intimidate the congregation. Someone who carried letters between Crete and İstanbul after the Battle of Lepanto was put on the stake in front of this monastery. One year before this, a monk from St. Augustin monastery was hanged in front of St. Francesco monastery because he helped some slaves escape. The interesting part was that a convert told on him. The convert who became suspicious of this situation went to the monk under the pretext of confessing his sins so that he could understand what was going on and asked for the help of the monk by saying that he wanted to be a Christian again and return to his country. The monk accepted to help him and told the convert what he needed to do.⁶⁹³

This incident shows us that these sort of operations in İstanbul took place in these churches during that period. St. Francisco Monastery and its clergymen must have been under the radar of the Ottoman administration since the incident also demonstrates the strong reaction of the Ottoman state toward these activities. A verdict recorded in the imperial court directs us to this idea. The former high priest of Frank church, *Antuan*, who had the chance to set out with a number of priests with travel permit for Jerusalem within the knowledge of French ambassador, did not have a travel permit.⁶⁹⁴ The place referred to as Frank Church in the document was probably this monastery. They might have been

⁶⁹³ Gerlach, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, v. I, 108, 118.

⁶⁹⁴ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 776 (28 Jumada al-awwal 978 / 1 November 1570).

frightened that the priest might escape or carry information; however, there is no way of knowing this for sure but the order was given in November 1570 and even though Nicosia in Cyprus was taken, the Siege of Famagusta had not begun yet.

This vacuum that existed in İstanbul regarding the rescue operations for the captives was fulfilled by the formal officials to the extent that the administration allowed it. So much so that when the war ended and peace reigned, the organizers of these operations continued to be the official state representatives in İstanbul. The bailo continued to make attempts to rescue those who came from the Latin world and who were brought to the city after taken captive during the war because this was also a source of prestige in the Christian world for the Republic. Over time, the representatives of the other states in the city helped the return of those captives whose rescue was possible through ransom. But Venice had always been the most effective state in this regard and led the way for others.

Following the war, the Pope began to allocate money for the Christians who were captives at the hands of infidels and this culminated in the beginning of a new period in ransom tradition. If we put aside Venice, the Catholic world tried to save the Catholic captives to the greatest extent possible. We have already stated that Venice's priority in rescuing a captive was whether that captive was at the service of the Republic or not. However, there were a lot of Greeks from the local people among the captives from Cyprus. Among these Greeks, there were people who were at the service of the Republic and other officials in addition to those who had connections with patrician families. Moreover, the Christian world, though belatedly, decided to help Venice for Cyprus and this help included ensuring the freedom of these people.

In this way, looking out for the Orthodox people in captive rescue operations gradually became normalized in the Catholic Christian world. So much so that, as we understand from Collenberg's study, not only the Greeks but also the Armenians wrote letters to Vatican for their captives.⁶⁹⁵ 10-15 years after the war, the records of those who obtained permission –and sometimes ransom- from the Spanish King and collected ransom and strove for their relatives on the Ottoman lands still continued.⁶⁹⁶

However, the most intriguing people who wrote to Vatican and expected ransom for their relatives were undoubtedly the Ottoman soldiers. In addition to the efforts of these soldiers, drafted at a young age either as *devşirmes* or captives, that they initiated for the rescue of their relatives after they somehow escaped to Europe, there are records of their interrogation at the inquisition. For example, since former janissary Petrus Flori Sideropungi was interrogated at the inquisition after his escape to Venice, we can learn his story, at least to the extent of what he told.

Greek Sideropungi from Nicosia was at the age of 12 when he fell captive with his sister in 1570 or 1571. He married with a Christian woman like himself and had children and had his child baptized. At some point, he wanted to escape but he killed two Turks during the process and lost his left hand. When he finally made it to Venice, he was interrogated in the court for a long time and was acquitted. According to the letter he wrote in 1580, Petrus demanded ransom for his wife, daughter, and sister in İstanbul.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁵ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 439, 440, 442.

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid, 64, 66.

⁶⁹⁷ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 84.

Seen from the perspective of the Ottoman world, there are many inconsistencies in Petrus' story. For instance, if he had been trained as a janissary, it is interesting that he became a novice janissary (*ocaklı*) in such a short time, got married, and had a child. If he had been married, how come his family was still captive? It is because a janissary could only get married when he was free and only after some time passed.⁶⁹⁸ If his family was kept captive in İstanbul, it must have been for some other reason, for example due to the fact that he killed two Turks. As a matter of fact, in March of 1571, according to a decree that was issued in the Imperial Council for some reason, it was stated that the families of the people who went to *Daru'l-harb* by religious conversion were not to be touched.⁶⁹⁹ In such a case, the captivity of Petrus' family is not reliable information. On the other hand, Petrus might have decided to escape for having killed these two Turks for some other reason.

Another janissary who wrote to the Pope for the ransom money of his family, Hieronymus (Jerome) Petri told a similar story. The mother, sister and brother of Jerome, who stated that he became a Muslim and janissary at the age of eleven, fell captive between 1570-71 and the janissary ran away to Venice leaving behind his family. Jerome wrote his letter to the Papa in 1581.⁷⁰⁰

⁶⁹⁸ There is a record similar to Petrus' marriage story in Mühimme books. A zimni named Pato/Bato in a village of Yanbolu first became a conscript boy, then served in acemi regiments (*torba*) for three years and became a Christian again, returned to his village, got married, and had two children. Aware of Pato's situation, the Council ordered that this issue be investigated and Pato be imprisoned; there were no such sanctions for anyone from his family. See. BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 1454 (29 Safar 979 / 25 July 1571).

⁶⁹⁹ *12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri* (12th Imperial Court Record, dated 973 /1565-1566), Ankara: BOA: 1996, p. 390, nr. 585. (22 Shavval 978 / 19 March 1571).

⁷⁰⁰ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 83, 147, 148.

Hieronymus and Petrus were probably too young to be janissaries; however, it was a normal age to be a conscripted boy. It was known that these boys travelled depending on the needs. While they were sent to the places where they would be employed, they were transported en masse while going to the guild of janissaries.⁷⁰¹ During or after these transports, there were people who escaped.⁷⁰² Even though some of these escapes resulted from committing petty offenses, the motivation was generally religious conversion.⁷⁰³ Most of the conscripted boys escaped and converted back to their religion once they returned to their villages. Some of them later committed crimes.⁷⁰⁴ Certain *devşirme* villages did not want to turn in these boys to the Ottoman administration at first and this led to problems.⁷⁰⁵ There were even some people who took these boys from İstanbul to their villages and made attempts to ensure that they became Christians again.⁷⁰⁶

Even some state officials or other people from among the subjects of the state abducted these conscripted boys or helped them escape. One time, the news of the escape of a ship's captain and the conscripted boys employed in the ship reached to İstanbul.⁷⁰⁷ Petrus and Hieronymus, who somehow ended up in Venice, might have escaped in this way. These sorts of stories were, of course, necessary for every former Muslim who was

⁷⁰¹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 6 / 401 (15 Rabi' al-thani 972 / 20 November 1564), 9 / 122 (4 Shavval 975 / 2 April 1568), 14 / 482, 734 and 1150 (12 Rabi' al-awwal, 29 Jumada al-awwal and 3 Ramadan 978 / 14 August and 29 October 1570, 29 January 1571).

⁷⁰² BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 3 / 1514 (19 Zulhijjah 967 / 10 September 1560), 6 / 579 (25 Jumada al-awwal 972 / 29 December 1564), 7 / 1258 (13 Shavval 975 / 11 April 1568), 12 / 982 (15 Rabi' al-awwal 979 / 7 August 1571).

⁷⁰³ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 6 / 574 (25 Jumada al-awwal 972 / 29 December 1564), 7 / 2632 (23 Jumada al-thani 976 / 13 December 1568).

⁷⁰⁴ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 109 (14 Muharram 979 / 8 June 1571), 585 (22 Jumada al-awwal 978 / 22 October 1570).

⁷⁰⁵ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 5 / 947, 959, 1197 (19 Rajab 973 / 9 February 1566).

⁷⁰⁶ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 6 / 551 (26 Jumada al-awwal 972 / 30 December 1564), 1070 (18 Ramadan 972 / 19 April 1565).

⁷⁰⁷ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 1066 (15 Ramadan 978 / 10 February 1571).

interrogated in front of the inquisition. However, the important thing here is that we can somehow learn the rest of the stories of those who were captives from Cyprus, made to join the Ottoman military forces, and later achieved to escape.

The procedure that these people were baptized once again through the House of Catechumens even though they stood trial at the inquisition after making it to the Venetian side and their return to the Christian world was observed more frequently after Cyprus. The look at the former Muslims, who were former soldiers, appeared to have become softened both in Vatican and in the other Italian city-states during this process.

Some were not rescued from the hands of Turks and live for years in Ottoman society for years. Giacomo de Nores from nobility who was one when he was caught as a baby with his nanny was found by his family at the age of 18 and rescued. When Giacomo was found, he was the slave of the agha of artillery organization. His mother Maria Podocattaro sent a middleman to İstanbul for the manumission of his son with ransom but this middleman had to wait till Giocamo returned from Iran. When he returned, he was manumitted with only 200 ducats and was entrusted to Ali Captain, the brother of Callisto who was a monk in Venice. Ali Captain accompanied Giocamo until Nauplia. He was later put on a ship going to Venice. Having returned to his country, Giocamo spoke neither Italian nor Greek. He had to learn them from scratch. On the other hand, he spoke Turkish and this ability was so rare in Venice that he became the official dragoman of Signoria.⁷⁰⁸

Not all the nobles who were captured in Cyprus became free. The process of collecting money initiated by Papacy continued until the end of the century. For decades

⁷⁰⁸ Pedani Fabris, "Between Diplomacy", 11.

after the end of the war, the news regarding the return of these people to their countries or their deaths were recorded. For instance, Fiorenza Podacatora who was captured in Cyprus, told her captor that she converted to Islam. Later she married her captor, had children with him and lived in the Ottoman lands for the next 22 years. After her husband passed away, she started to have issues with her husband's relatives. Unable to resolve those issues, Fiorenza was forced to run away to Venice in 1592 to collect her ransom which would free her from captivity. However, her account of events which she provided to the Venetian Inquisition appears to be problematic. If Fiorenza, as she claimed, was a married woman for 22 years, she could not be a slave who needed ransom money and if she was free, she would not need to have escaped to collect ransom.⁷⁰⁹

17-year-old Greek Pietro Cataroti, who had to become a Muslim, was not as lucky as De Nores after he was taken captive in Lepanto. When he said that he was a Christian, Don Juan ordered his release; however, the Genovese captain objected to Don Juan's order. Having been shackled and pulled oars for 17 years, Pietro somehow managed to escape to Spain and asked for his release from Filipe II.⁷¹⁰

Venetians who melted into the Ottoman society by becoming Muslims and subjects of the Ottoman state during the war were not included much in these texts. It was even recorded about some of them that they did not convert but died during the war. Ercole Martinengo was one of these people. Martinengos were a condottiero family from Brescia and Ercole Martinengo had been at the service of Venice since 1550s. When the war broke out, he was the general administrator of the island and he performed the task of fortifying

⁷⁰⁹ ASVe., Sant'Ufficio, b. 69 (22 October 1592.) cited in Ortega, *Negotiating Transcultural*", 100.

⁷¹⁰ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 268.

the Famagusta castle. Ercole was also the uncle of Nestore Martinengo, who was the first person to have managed to escape to Venice among the captives of Cyprus. Ercole was among those who were sent to Mustafa Pasha on August 1, 1571 for peace negotiations.⁷¹¹

Although what has been told so far is very much the same in the sources, the information from here on differs. Ercole, who was in the committee that was clothed with *khilat* after having been well received by the son of Mustafa Pasha, returned to the castle according to some sources. Some other sources argue that he remained captive there, and even went to İstanbul later. In the narratives after the war, there were people reporting that Ercole died.⁷¹²

When Lala Mustafa Pasha killed the castle commander and other soldiers, Ercole was also there. One of Pasha's men hid Ercole from the fury of the Pasha. Some sources argue that this person was the interpreter (*dragoman*) and some others say that it was the eunuch. Later on, Pietro Valderio, one of the administrators of Famagusta who witnessed what happened, stated that Ercole was made to repeat things that he did not understand and that he became a Muslim. However, Valderio stated that Ercole was subjected to this out of his own will.⁷¹³

When we compare the Ottoman sources with the Venetian ones, the situation changes greatly. It was Nejat Göyünç who first drew attention to that.⁷¹⁴ According to the

⁷¹¹ Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 859.

⁷¹² Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, 1037-1040, 1041; Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 1026, 1030.

⁷¹³ Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 1030; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, 1041.

⁷¹⁴ Nejat Göyünç, "Türk Hizmetine giren Bazı Kıbrıs Müdafileri", *Milletlerarası Birinci Kıbrıs Tetkikleri Kongresi (14-19 Nisan 1969): Türk Heyeti Tebliğleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1971), 105-107.

timar daybook record (*ruznâmçe*) dated August 26, 1571 kept during the expedition, Ercole Martinengo was one of those people who came for captive negotiations during the siege. Since it was known that the other one returned to the castle and Ercole stayed, that person must have been Ercole. Moreover, this person who became a Muslim willingly and took the name Mehmed was granted with *timar* worthy of 20.000. The record that he became a Muslim willingly meant that he had not been enslaved.⁷¹⁵

7.1 Republic After the War

One of the solutions that Venice found in order to overcome the financial crisis that began after 1570, to meet its need for more ships, and to ensure the continuity of trade at all events was to open the city harbor to foreign ships. Although this appeared to be a reasonable solution temporarily, it was a decision that inflicted long lasting damage on the Republic and it brought along some other concessions as well. The salt problem that the Republic experienced in 1575 resulted in the decision that granted tax immunity to the salt ships coming from Ibiza and Trapani. In 1581, all the ships that were accepted as foreign no longer paid taxes for *ancoraggio* and *alboraggio*. In 1586, French ships were completely exempted from paying 3% tax and they were treated as ‘Venetians’ together with the Spanish ships. In 1595, Dutch registered ships were exempted from *ancoraggio* and *alboraggio* taxes as long as they were loaded with grains that the Republic always needed.⁷¹⁶

⁷¹⁵ “...Cezire-i Kıbrıs’ta Magosa nam kala keferesi ziyade zebun ve bî-mecal olup yürüyüş yerlerini bend u sedde asla takatleri olmayup bi’z-zaruri vire eyledikleri zamanda rehn için içeriden gönderdikleri kapudan hüsn-i ihtiyarıyla İslam’a gelüp...”, BOA., KK., 221, f. 200.

⁷¹⁶ Gluzman, *Venetian Shipping*, 131-132.

In the 1580s, Venice, which could barely make peace with the Ottomans, got into trouble with the Catholic world this time. After Spain's agreement with Bab-ı Ali ended in 1581, Pope Gregory XIII tried to persuade Venice into a Christian union. According to the Vatican representative in Venice in January 1584, although there were Senato members sympathetic to this idea, the Republic did not accept this offer. The *collegio* declared that a large part of the Christian states should provide financial aid in such a case. In March, the Venetian authorities made it clear that he had decided not to clash with the Turks rather than compensate for the defeat of the past.⁷¹⁷

The greatest transformation in the population of Venice, which had three layers, took place among patricians. The appearance of the Ottoman State also had an indirect effect on the economic and political difficulties that the patrician class underwent in the aftermath of this transformation. Patricians occupied the highest ranks in the state mechanism and in the beginning, Venice was a state that existed without overflowing the bounds of Adriatic, but this gradually changed and the state needed new administrators, captains, and commercial consuls for its new colonies.

Republic, of course, met this need through the patrician gene pool in the beginning. According to Stanley Chojnacki, patrician families did everything they could to raise sons for this system. This expansion reflex gradually went out of control. So much so that the participation to the *Maggior Consiglio*, which only included patrician members, increased to 1200-1400 in 1490s while it was only 500-600 during 1420s. The state had to create new positions for these patricians. The intermarriages between patrician families became

⁷¹⁷ Poumarède, *L'Empire de Venise*, 184, 185.

increasingly more costly. While the dowries of the patrician families' daughters were sufficient for them to marry the sons of other patrician families, the families that had new households with the arrival of new generations in 1500s began to have a hard time in marrying all of their children with people from other patrician families. Since some households could only provide dowry for only one or two of their daughters, the other girls of the family were sent to convents. The sons of the families who were in a similar situation led their lives with extra-marital affairs with women from the public and began to have children who could not be patricians. Some patrician families, the new generation of large families who were less wealthy, resorted to marrying their children with the children of wealthy people (generally merchants) who were *cittadini*.⁷¹⁸

In the middle of the 16th century, there were many family members born out of the marriage of patrician and *cittadini* families who could not take up certain positions. The state attempted to overcome this problem with newly enacted laws. The life of chancery secretary (*Cancelliere Grande*) Antonio Milledonne, who expanded the existing law in 1581 so as to ensure that *cittadini* could take up senior positions and could be assigned to positions in large solidarity institutions of the city (*Scuole Grandi*), actually summarizes this process. Milledonne's maternal grandfather was a patrician, the senator Giacomo Antonio Orio. Orio Family was one of the new dynasties (*case nuove*) that became patricians in the aftermath of the Battle of Chioggia in the 14th century. Milledonne began to work in Ducal Chancellery (*Cancelleria ducale*) as early as 1540 after his grandfather referred to him to that position in an exceptional manner. Milledonne continued his career

⁷¹⁸ Chojnacki, "Identity and Ideology", 268-270; For further information on the unwilling Venetian nuns see. Anne Jacobson Schutte, "Between Venice and Rome: The Dilemma of Involuntary Nuns", *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, Summer 2010, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer 2010), 415-439.

in military, political, and diplomatic organs of the Republic as the secretary of Stefano Tiepolo, the fleet admiral, as an officer at the Consiglio dei Dieci, and as secretary to the Nicolò da Ponte who served as ambassador in Rome. In 1567, he became the secretary of Consiglio dei Dieci. He worked so hard since the beginning of the war in 1570 that his right hand remained paralyzed in 1575. Having occupied such an important position during the entire war period and after the war, Milledonne must have observed the bureaucratic and economic transformation of the Republic during this process and anticipated the required changes accordingly.

It was due to the fact that the number of people like him, who could not take office in the positions pertaining to certain decision-making mechanisms since they were not accredited pursuant to the previous laws although they were partly patrician, increased. During this period, the rights in many fields were updated in accordance with 'being at the service of the Republic or loyal to the Republic rather than being a citizen.' People were assessed in accordance with their references and functions rather than based solely on their origins as the war waged with the Ottomans had radically changed many things. For example, the commercial income of the patrician families, who acquired the bulk of their wealth from the trade they conducted in the Levant region just a year ago and also made their presence felt in the administrative organs of the Republic, decreased. The fact that some of them were kept as captives in the hands of Turks for long years completely shook the financial balance of these families whose lives revolved around trade. Those that could not pull themselves together asked for financial support from the Senate. Majority of them belonged to the branches of large families and still carried the patrician title. The feudal structure in Venice was centered on commerce not on land like in the

other European states. On the other hand, the limited number of patrician families who was active in Cyprus, an island with plantation income, lost this income. Under the rule of Venice, the lands and villages of Cyprus were financially and administratively separated into parts called *Reales*. The income of these parts belonged to the Republic. The rest of the land was separated into estates and these estates were shared among the patrician families, Cypriot aristocrats, and religious orders. For example, although the village of Episkopi seemed to belong to Corner family and the sugar plantation⁷¹⁹ seemed to belong to the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, the plantation was actually at the hands of Corner family. After the war, these revenues were completely lost.⁷²⁰

Although its volume decreased, the trade continued when peace was established and less patrician representatives came to the Ottoman lands as the representatives of the ongoing trade. The wealth of the patrician families decreased compared to the previous century and they did not want be as present in the Levant, the source of their trade-related wealth, as they were before. It was because even though they were later rescued, at least one member of many families had been kept as a captive on the Ottoman lands for quite a long time and the memory of this lingered in the social memories of these families for a long time. This manifested itself especially in Cyprus. Although Venetian merchants began to appear in the Island just after the peace was established, a consul was appointed

⁷¹⁹ While some of the average 2000 slaves who were about to go to Egypt from Caffa went to the Mamluks and Ottomans, others went to the sugar plantations in Cyprus and Crete. Fredrico Cornaro, the first to design sugar plantations in Cyprus in a complex manner, imported slaves to the island and made irrigation canals. Thus, he obtained the highest efficiency possible. These investments paid off handsomely, making the Cornaro family the wealthiest family in Venice. In these sugar plantations, they employed mainly slaves of Arab or Syrian origin, see William H. McNeill, *Venice: The Hinge of Europe, 1081-1797* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 54, 75; Verlinden, *The Beginnings of*, 97.

⁷²⁰ Mueller, "War and Beatitude", 72; Vera Costantini, "Venetian Trade and the Boundaries of Legality in Early Modern Ottoman Cyprus", *Merchants in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Suraiya Faruqi and Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Peeters, 2008), 35; Jennings, *Christian and Muslims*, 298.

to Cyprus, where there had not been one for long years, approximately after ten years. Even more importantly, while the consuls of the Republic on the Ottoman lands were generally from patrician families until 1586, people from *cittadini* began to be selected for these posts starting from this date. Therefore, the judiciary posts in these places were taken from patricians. İstanbul, Aleppo, and Alexandria were accepted as exceptions. As a matter of fact, these bailos were not only the head of the *cittadini* in these cities and the authority that was accountable for them but also the head of the other non-patrician consuls.⁷²¹

It is intriguing that the consuls of Algeria, Dubrovnik, and Albania of the Republic at the end of the 16th century were all Jewish. The fact that the Jews had relatives both at the Ottoman ports and Venice and that they used this network as trade branches provided this sort of revenue for Jews. Issues such as the role of mediation that Dubrovnik assumed between the two states at the Adriatic, Algeria's high volume captive rescue operations, and the grain supply of Jakob Caduta, the consul in Avlonia, from the region during 1570s together with the enslavement of Dubrovnik people by the Avlonian pirates led to the election of Jewish people as consuls. Moshe Israel, who was effective in many captive rescue operations in Maghreb since 1580 and who had a good reputation among Maghrebis, Venetians, and other Christian merchants, became the Venetian consul in Algeria in 1622.⁷²²

The significance of the consuls of Algeria in captive operations led the Republic to take another important decision. Starting from 1588, the consuls here were assigned by

⁷²¹ Maria Pia Pedani, "Consoli veneziani nei porti del Mediterraneo in età moderna" *Mediterraneo in Armi (secc. XV–XVIII)*, ed. by Rossella Cancila, (Palermo: Associazione Mediterranea, 2007), vol. 1, 178.

⁷²² *Ibid.*, 178.

Provveditori sopra Ospedali e Luoghi Pii (Inspectors of Hospitals and Pious Places) charged with the organization of two ransom operations. In this way, the operations in Maghreb and the organization in the city were linked and the Republic, contrary to other city-states, somehow took everyone under its control including the priests who would travel with the funds allocated from these operations in Maghreb.⁷²³

7.2 Charity Feelings

Starting from the 16th century, Venice assumed an increasingly more methodological approach regarding charitable activities and providing help to the poor. Charity, in a way, became a moral obligation both for the state and for the rich patricians who wanted prayers to be said in their names. The distribution of donations was left to charities such as *scuole grandi* and *scuole piccole*. While historians were mainly interested in rich benefactors, they overlooked the role of the *popolani* in these charitable acts. According to the research of Ioanna Iordanou that she carried out with 225 bequest registers, women sometimes donated a part of their dowry to these charities. Women who did not get married but whose dowries were ready could also make such donations. The donations of mariner families were also quite remarkable.⁷²⁴

Dennis Romano thinks that the great pestilence increased people's sense of charity. These donations of the mariner *popolani* to the people other than their family members and to foreigners demonstrate that the *scuoles* were not the only charitable institution in

⁷²³ Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 62-66.

⁷²⁴ Davis, *Shipbuilders*, 101; Iordanou, "Pestilence, poverty", 814.

Venice in the aftermath of the pestilence. Besides, it also shows that the mariners were in solidarity. As St. Bernardino of Siena succinctly expressed ‘the rich are necessary for republics and the poor are necessary for the rich.’⁷²⁵ For this reason, Venetian authorities took an interest in these institutions through a control mechanism so as to ensure that the charities supported the continuity of the system. The incidents that took place during this process confirmed that these organizations were highly needed and helping those in need also became a social duty rather than only a moral duty.⁷²⁶

The transfer of the ransom operations in Venice to *Provveditori sopra Ospedali e Luoghi Pii* (Inspectors of Hospitals and Pious Places), established only 20 years ago in 1586 and whose principal duty was to audit the quality of the hospitals and pious places in the city, was actually the end result of an ongoing process. Although a peace treaty was signed and Venetians were once again assured in line with the terms of the treaty, many Venetians were taken captive and enslaved during their travels or from the shores due to pirating activities. On the other hand, in the same year, in 1586, the bailo in İstanbul told that the Sultan was willing to sell back the Venetians who fell captive during the war of the previous years.⁷²⁷ Sultan’s intense for the political balance due to the war in Persia must have escalated Venetians to increase the funds for saving more Venetian captives in the Ottoman lands. Thanks to this half-civic institution, the Republic would be able to bureaucratize all the ransom operations and provide ransom funds. To that end, the institution even placed penny banks at various places in the city so that benefactors could

⁷²⁵ Dennis Romano, “Aspects of Patronage in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Venice”, *Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Winter, 1993), 719.

⁷²⁶ Iordanou, “Pestilence, poverty”, 816, 817; Romano, *Patricians and Popolani*, 30.

⁷²⁷ ASVe., Senate, Dispacci, Costantinopoli, b. 22, 393r-397r, (dispath dated 5 January 1586); ASVe., Senato, Deliberazioni, Registri, Costantinopoli, Reg. 4, 1585-1590, 28v-29r, (dated 12 February).

donate money for ransom.⁷²⁸ (However, in the 18th century, people only donated to the penny banks in the churches that were generally situated in worker and mariner neighborhoods)⁷²⁹

While slave redemption operations took place under the control of a juridical institution (*Magistrato*) in Italy, other European countries preferred to relegate these operations to Trinitarians and Mercedarians. There was a special condition pertaining to Venice that set it apart from other Italian city-states and European countries. Instead of choosing one of the slaves rescuing religious orders or relying on a semi-public institution for these operations, Venice directly formed an organization that was an amalgam of three structures.⁷³⁰

Andrea Pelizza emphasizes that in this decision, Senate highlighted the fact that it did not forget its citizens, who fell captive with a twist of fate, cloaking them under a protective feeling resembling to that of paternal figure –*provvida paterna carità*– and how it would protect its citizens who dedicated themselves to the Republic. For this reason, all the citizens must continue to serve to the Republic with dedication. The state brought together its concern for public order and stability with the charity that was dispensed to those in need. In this combination, rescuing these captives was actually quite a relevant act of charity. The main goal of the institution was to organize and monitor the process of collecting money; however, it was noticed over time that various funds such as people's wills could be deployed to fund the rescue operations of the captives.⁷³¹

⁷²⁸ Davis, "Slave Redemption", 456, 457;

⁷²⁹ ASVe., Ospedali e luoghi pii, busta 101, the statements of the churches that have donation boxes for the slaves dated 1780.

⁷³⁰ Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 49.

⁷³¹ *Ibid*, 58-61.

After one year, the Senate expanded this institution's sphere of influence to the entire *Terraferma*. Within two years, it held the institution responsible for all the operations and transferred the control of money to the institution. In the beginning, the goal was only to reach to the captives who were from the city, from *Terraferma*, from Greece, and Dalmatia with detailed investigations and in time, this goal was extended to include the people 'who served to the Republic.' In this way, mariners, fishermen, merchants or people from other professions who served to the Republic were also rescued. However, another problem arose at this point. Most of the captives were Orthodox Greeks and could not be rescued with the funds provided by the Catholic Church.⁷³²

Two years after the decision dated 1586, Santa Maria Formosa Church became the center of these operations having been charged with this duty. The neighborhood in which the church was situated was close to both Rialto and San Marco. Besides, Eastern Christians lived here for a very long time. People who were Ottoman subjects and came to the city for conducting trade generally rented a room here as well.⁷³³ Such a geographical position must have allowed the institution to quickly hear the news about the people who fell captive. Thanks to the Church network that travelled to the east, some donations, though below what was expected, were collected. The cash boxes⁷³⁴ that were placed in the churches were at times stolen and at times filled with cheap coins. Even the state itself did not pay the amounts that it guaranteed to pay each Christmas and Easter for decades. There were even some swindlers in other cities of *Terreferma* who told people

⁷³² Davis, "Slave Redemption", 457.

⁷³³ Pedani Fabris, "Between Diplomacy", 5.

⁷³⁴ The number of boxes were 16 in 1586,

that they were in charge of collecting these ransom amounts. In the end, Venice had to tolerate the outcomes of a ransom economy that grew in such a way.⁷³⁵

The institution was first commissioned with captive rescue-ransom operation in 1586 by the Senate. It was desired that this operation was carried out in cooperation with Venetian patriarch and it was actually limited to the act of collecting funds. However, this was not sufficient. Considering the War of Cyprus, and the battles of Lepanto, and Tunisia along with the other pirating activities, thousands of Venetians fell captive to the Ottomans in Maghreb as a result of the wars that took place since 1570 and there were still thousands of people who were not rescued. Besides, the ransom economy of Maghreb did not necessarily need new wars since a steady influx of new captives was maintained by raids conducted regularly. In addition to the hundreds of ducats that Vatican donated during the negotiations of 1573, the financial sources were transferred to the captives to the greatest extent possible and citizens whose acquaintances were held captive must have heard about this that the Senate received many demands pertaining to this. This was also a matter of prestige for the Republic, which lost many of its seasoned free mariners or craftsmen to the Ottoman cities. In brief, when the intensity of captive rescue operations increased, a permanent solution in the form of a reform was developed for this problem.⁷³⁶

As seen in the documents, it was a common practice among the Venetians to help captives in infidel lands through their wills and testaments even before the war. Francesco di Pietro Contarini, the priest of Santa Marina who died in 1545, had drawn his testament

⁷³⁵ Ortega, *Negotiating Transcultural*, 26; Davis, "Slave Redemption", 458.

⁷³⁶ ASVe., Ospedali e luoghi pii, busta 98, Parti et ordini concernenti alla liberatione de' poveri schiavi, 19 February 1586 mv; 3 June 1588. *Parti et ordini concernenti alla liberatione de poveri schiavi*, Pietro Pinelli (Venezia: Stampa Ducale), 3-8 cited in Davis, "Slave Redemption", 457-459; Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 62-65

in 1544 and left money for Venetian-born people who were captured by the enemy.⁷³⁷ It seems that wishing to save other Venetians who were captives in the hands of Infidels became one of the social acts of the Venetians on their deathbeds. Because the records of the people who made donations for redemption captive increased - especially in the 1600s and 1700s - over time. For instance, in 1644, Battista Coderta, a Venetian noble, gave 1.000 ducats to the church for redemption operations.⁷³⁸

7.3 In Costantinople

Constantinople also seemed to be a center for collecting ransoms just after the peace. The the Cyprus-war-slaves, who were not freed even after the peace were collecting money in the streets without any interference. In 1576, Stephan Gerlach records that he donated 20 akçes to a Famagustan slave. The slave's owner was the judge of Bandırma/Bursa, and the slave was in the capital. Due to his bourn injury on his hands and feet, he was probably out of order, and the judge sent him to Constantinople to collect his ransom, 100 thaler.⁷³⁹

After the *ahd-name* dated 1575, it was easy to redeem captives for the Christian community in Constantinople. The merchant became direct mediator if they were asked to involve to ransoming one. We can see various merchant names in the documents asked by both sides. For instance, Beatrice Flatro, Helene Chena and Lucie de Leonibus were

⁷³⁷ ASVe., Ospedali e luoghi pii, busta 101, f., 4, p. 3;

⁷³⁸ *Ibid*, f. 6, p. 4; When we come to the 1750s, we can observe that not all the alms sent for saving the captives were used in the desired way. For instance, see the *Provveditori*'s balance statement belonged to 1753 in the same file.

⁷³⁹ Gerlach, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, v. I, 443.

released by the help of Christian merchants in Constantinople. After they managed to be free, they had to pay their ransom money to those Christian intermediaries. The ransom is stipulated either in ducats, or in ecus, or in sequins, rarely in asper (*akçe*) For captives from Central Europe only, the ransom is fixed in thaler.⁷⁴⁰ Especially after 1580's, to prevent the currency lost due to the debasement.⁷⁴¹ occurred in the Ottoman Empire, the merchants must have chosen to gain the ransom money in those currencies.

An anecdote narrated by Gerlach may provide an idea of how easily the intermediaries adapt to the new regulations only after couple of years the *Ahd-name* was signed. In May of 1578, 5 slave and a Venetian goldsmith decided to escape from Constantinople after they killed another slave. For the slaves in the city, it was common to agree with other slaves to escape and make plans while waiting the rightest time to run away. In Galata, some people used to hide runaway slaves in their homes for three or four weeks, then dressed them in different clothes to allow them to go abroad. Some transported runaway slaves to Ragusa or other safe places in exchange for money. These six slaves also made an agreement with a Venetian. The Venetian promised that if each of the slaves paid him 60 ducats, he would deliver them to the Christian lands. The slaves stole a large amount of money from their masters and prepared for this journey. They stayed in this Venetian's house for days.⁷⁴²

⁷⁴⁰ Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 87, 88.

⁷⁴¹ After the debasement of Ottoman money in 1585, the cost of captive rescue for Europeans decreased for a while. Previously, 1 ducat was worth to 60 akçes, after these years it was worth to 130 akçes. For further information on the monetary crisis on these years see. Şevket Pamuk, "Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33, no. 1 (2001), 69–89; Mehmet Kuru, *Osmanlı'nın Para ile İmtihanı*, Ankara: Fol Kitap, 2022, 98-117.

⁷⁴² Gerlach, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, v. II, 804.

But when one of them changed their mind and wanted to return, they decided to kill him and bury him in the basement of the house where they were hiding. Suspecting the noises coming from the place and a large amount of food and drink entering the house for the past few days, an elderly neighbor woman complained about the situation to a provincial prefect, *Subaşı*. That's how the event came to be. As a result, Gerlach noted that captured slaves were sent to rowing, while a Venetian was sent for the impalement.⁷⁴³

In 1580s, the Venetian representative was more at ease. In 1583, Paolo Contarini stated that he had two assistants at the houses of the grand vizier and the second vizier and this enabled Contarini to maintain his relations with the palace easefully. This was actually not a recent occurrence. As has been stated above, there were quite a lot of subjects and former slaves that were working in and around the palace, so it was not that difficult to establish this interaction. However, the effort that the different cliques in the palace made in order to be somehow more effective on power with the beginning of Selim II's reign was also beneficial for the Venetians. In the previous years, the individual relations were maintained with the gifts that were continually sent and these relations were strengthened thanks to Nurbânu Sultan, the wife of Selim II, who approached Venice with sympathy.

Without wandering off the subject of this study, we should dedicate some paragraphs to address this subject. Unlike the previous sultanas, Nurbânu Sultan became engaged in many interactions with foreign countries and played an effective role in many diplomatic issues during her time as the wife of the sultan and Sultana. During the late period of Kanuni, the daughter of the Sultan and his sisters had effective political roles, but this stemmed from the fact that they were married to high-ranking state bureaucrats.

⁷⁴³ *Ibid*, 805.

The diplomatic interactions of these women, who were essentially free and daughters of the Sultan, were limited. Even a figure like Hürrem Sultan, a former slave and a Sultana who had more power compared to other sultanas, did not engage in diplomatic interactions. This was quite a new period.

Nurbânu Sultan's life story before she came to the palace as an odalisque is quite ambiguous. As Özlem Kumrular and Benjamin Arbel have revealed by examining all the sources, even though it was frequently repeated in the biographies written about her that she was from one of the noble families of Venice and was taken captive, the truth of the matter was different. However, both the sultan and Venice drew advantage from this rumor, which was spread by Nurbânu Sultan herself, to the greatest extent possible.⁷⁴⁴

Venetian bailo Paolo Contarini was one of the people that highlighted how effective Nurbânu Sultan was in state affairs. According to the bailo, Nurbânu Sultan was quite talented at state affairs, so much so that the state was in fact governed by two sultans.⁷⁴⁵ The type of statesmen that objected to sultanas' involvement in state affairs in previous periods was replaced by the type of statesmen who was aware that they needed to be on good terms with the sultanas since they attained their positions thanks to these women.

This relationship based on sympathy between Sultan and Venice manifested itself even more emphatically when his son Murad III ascended the throne. A peace treaty was signed; Venice took back its rights necessary for eastern trade and the Ottomans regained

⁷⁴⁴ Benjamin Arbel, "Nur Banu (c. 1530-1583): A Venetian Sultana?", *Turcica*, 24 (1992), 241-259; Özlem Kumrular, *Haremde Taht Kuran Kadınlar: Nurbanu ve Safiye Sultan* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2017).

⁷⁴⁵ Pinar Kayaalp, *The Empress Nurbanu and Ottoman Politics in the Sixteenth Century Building the Atik Valide*, (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2018), 32.

their revenue deriving from these activities; however, the tie between the Sultan and the Republic was reinforced with mutual gifts and correspondences.⁷⁴⁶ Sultan Murad sometimes ordered to release of his slaves mercifully. For instance, on the 13th of January in 1575, he released 32 Italian and Slav state slaves who were rowers when the Sultan arrived in the capital by boat after his father's death. It was either the day before eid or when the negotiations on the new *ahd-name* were still ongoing.⁷⁴⁷

Sultan, of course, did not meet with the ambassadors directly. She used her intermediaries for this purpose. As these intermediaries met the requirements of both the sultan and the other party, she elevated their welfare levels. When it comes to Sultan, the most famous among these intermediaries was the *kira* of the sultan, Esther Hatun. Both Esther Hatun and many people from her family were involved in these types of operations.⁷⁴⁸

Sultan at times took steps on behalf of the captives that both parties had. She once wrote a letter to the bailo Contarini in 1580 for an Ottoman subject that was taken captive in Palermo. Her writing to the bailo was meaningful as Palermo was then within the borders of the Spanish Kingdom and since the two countries were not at peace, it was highly difficult to directly rescue a captive from there. For this end, Venice presented a unique opportunity. After all, if the Venetian ambassador wanted to be on good terms with the palace, he had to somehow indulge this wish. Another letter was sent to France by Murad III after a year. In the letter, the wish of a mother, who wanted the return of her

⁷⁴⁶ Kumrular, *Haremde Taht Kuran*, 192.

⁷⁴⁷ Gerlach, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, v. I, 166.

⁷⁴⁸ Daria Kovaleva, "The Trope of Kyra as a Jewish Female Intermediary in The Sixteenth Century Ottoman Imperial Harem: Theory and Practice, Fiction and History" (Unpublished master thesis, CEU, Budapest, 2014), 43-44.

daughters that had been enslaved since the period of Kanuni, was repeated. These girls who were taken captive 25 years ago were baptized. One of them served to the Queen and the other one served to the Duchess of Savoy. The efforts to ensure the return of these two Christianized girls were something that could only take place between two palaces.⁷⁴⁹

During this period, there was another important figure, who proved to be beneficial to the Republic of Venice: Gazanfer Aga. This chief harem eunuch, who was originally from Venice and who served to three sultans, stated that ‘he was still a Venetian and that he benefitted from being a Venetian’; however, he showed at every opportunity that he primarily looked out for the interests of the Ottoman State. Nevertheless, he also continued to look after his family in Venice and managed to acquire various privileges for them.⁷⁵⁰ However, toward the end of the period that we address in this study, Gazanfer Ağa was at the peak of his power and for this reason, we will continue without talking about him much.

7.4 Dalmatia and Balkans

When the process is viewed in its entirety, the conflict between the two parties was not resolved immediately; however, ordinary people once again began to easily mobilize along the borders of the two states. Toward the end of the century, the administrators on both sides of the border tried their best to keep the peace. They attempted to resolve any

⁷⁴⁹ Susan A. Skilliter, “The Letters of the Venetian ‘Sultana’ Nur Banu and her Kira to Venice” in *Studia Turcologica Memoriae Alexii Bombaci Dicta. Naples: Herder Distributors* (1982), 515–536; Susan A. Skilliter, “Catherine de’ Medici’s Turkish Ladies-in- Waiting: A Dilemma in Franco-Ottoman Diplomatic Relations”, *Turcica* 7 (1975), 188–204.

⁷⁵⁰ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, 121–123.

issues without their central governments involved.⁷⁵¹ The mobility-related problems emerged due to one major reason. Even though official borders were constantly disputed between the two states, the social borders were already in place, and people had already intermingled along the borderlines. The Catholic world was undoubtedly bothered by this transitional state where people practiced each other's religious rituals, adopted such rituals without giving up their old faiths, or had inter-faith marriages. However, it is also understood that Venetian and Venetian-based clergymen were not so inflexible in their views.⁷⁵²

For example, as Eric R. Dursteler states in his study on renegade women in the context of the Ottoman state and Venice, clergymen, in the first half of the 17th century, were generally of the opinion that the people who had inter-faith marriages lived dishonorably in the presence of God. They should be banned from religious rituals and from entering the church. Since these women gave birth to children, it meant that they consented to the sin they committed. Moreover, it was also argued that they should not be buried with a Christian ritual when they died.⁷⁵³

Maria Gazzadini was one of the women in Dursteler's study who was married to a soldier residing in Milos after being taken as a captive at a young age and who escaped somewhere within Venetian borders with her daughters. Among the people who greatly

⁷⁵¹ Suraiya Faroqhi, *Osmanlı Kültürü ve Gündelik Yaşam: Ortaçağdan 21. Yüzyıla*, trans. by Elif Kılıç (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997), 198; Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, 16, 17.

⁷⁵² Eric R. Dursteler, *Renegade Women: Gender, Identity, and Boundaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 34-40; Braudel, *The Mediterranean* v. 2, 759.

⁷⁵³ Dursteler, *Renegade Women*, 87.

assisted Gazzadini was the Archbishop of Corfu, Benedetto Bragadin who was a member of the Venetian patrician family, the Bragadins.⁷⁵⁴

The eastern shore of the Adriatic, excluding Parga, Ionian Islands, Kotor, Butrinto, Split, and Zara, which were under the rule of Venice, and including the autonomous state, Dubrovnik was under the rule of the Ottomans till the Hungarian border. People who lived in these Venetian port cities and those in the Ottoman territories, which extended just beyond the islands, frequently travelled to these settlements. Given that most of the population was Greek, the administration was Muslim, and they interacted with the Catholics, these transitional borders inevitably led to various problems.

In the Aegean Sea, there was another dynamic involved. Various islands and port cities under the rule of Venice, Genoa, and the Knights of Saint John began to come under the rule of the Ottoman administration in the 14th century. This process gained momentum during the reign of Süleyman I. In 1566, the entire sea was under the rule of the Ottomans, except Crete. On the one hand, this domination eliminated the customs borders in the Aegean region. At the same time, it regulated the mobility of the Greeks, who dominated the local seafaring of the region and who were Ottoman subjects. All the frequented places in the region were Ottoman territories. Someone who was an Ottoman subject with a permit could easily travel within this region.⁷⁵⁵

On the other hand, this mobile network's primary actors were the Venetian dominions' subjects. One way or another, they were right in the middle of the communication network, and human and commercial goods traffic with the West through

⁷⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 85, 86.

⁷⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 114.

the sea, even though this was interrupted during the War of Cyprus. This new situation was advantageous for the mobility of those who wanted to leave the Ottoman territories. The news of the captives, who easily abducted a sea vessel and escaped through the Mediterranean, just like in Northern Africa⁷⁵⁶, reached the Ottoman Court.⁷⁵⁷

In such an atmosphere, Ottoman subjects, regardless of whether they were slaves or free, who were former Christians or belonged to the families of former Christians, crossed the border to become Christians. Their primary destination after crossing the border was Venice. The establishment or the spreading of institutions that accepted these people in Venice seems to have taken place due to these kinds of demands. Venice had a more tolerant structure than the other Catholic states, which might have also played a role in attracting these people. In the end, these two dynamics reinforcing one another created considerable traffic in the region for conversion purposes.

As can be observed in Dizdar Mustafa's case, while it was difficult to present legitimate excuses when a male Ottoman subject from the ruling class was taken captive and was not returned according to the Ahd-name, this did not prove to be a problem when those who escaped went unnoticed and was thereby not declared to the center. However, the women who were Ottoman subjects and took refuge in the Republic of Venice also led to a serious problem. When a Muslim woman went to *Dar-al Harb* and became Christianized, it posed a serious problem for the Ottomans. If her family or the state

⁷⁵⁶ Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, v. 2, 890.

⁷⁵⁷ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 31 / 99 (28 Rabi' al-thani 985 / 15 July 1577); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 31 / 500 (14 Jumada al-awwal 985 / 19 August 1577); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 43 / 325 (29 Jumada al-thani 988 / 11 august 1580); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 36 / 402 (23 Muharram 987 / 22 March 1579).

tracked her down and noticed that she was within the borders of Venice, it then turned into an issue that concerned diplomacy.

Most of these women were generally former slaves or the daughters of former slaves. For this reason, they evoked a considerable sense of mercy across the border. After their escape, some of them went to places such as the House of Catechumens and prepared for Christianity without experiencing any problems. It was common for these women to go to monasteries, where they took the first steps to become nuns. This process presented a practical reason for rendering the prospects of their return next to impossible. Institutions such as *Casa Zitelle*, established to “protect the poor or attractive virgins who risked being caught up in a sinful life” in Guidecca, Venice, in 1559, also gradually began to welcome these women who ran away from the Ottoman territories.⁷⁵⁸ However, their stay in this institution did not protect them completely. The duration that passed between the time that they swore to be a nun and the time that their education began was also risky. Which is why, they had to transfer to monasteries such as *Corpus Domini*, where they would be able to complete this process so that the risk of them being returned could be eliminated. Therefore, the number of these institutions visibly increased.⁷⁵⁹

7.5 Dubrovnik

One of the important ports of Adriatic, Dubrovnik was first under the rule of Byzantine Empire and Venice, and came under the influence of Hungarians for some time

⁷⁵⁸ Dursteler, *Renegade Women*, 47, 48.

⁷⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 54, 55, 74, 94.

and later the Ottomans after 1450s. It was made up of a small city and islands. Governed by approximately 300 patricians, the Republic paid regular tribute to Ottoman state, its largest border country, and was granted commercial concessions within the Ottoman borders in exchange for this. Having a permanent representative in İstanbul, the Republic maintained a balance policy both with the Ottomans and the European states due to its geographical location. Even though the Republic was referred to as a tributary state and *Vilayet of Dubrovnik* in the Ottoman documents and considered among the protected boundaries, Dubrovnik was completely autonomous in its internal affairs. Apart from the two permanent Ottoman officials representing the Bosnia and Herzegovina Beys, no Ottoman officials were allowed to enter into the boundaries of the Republic. The communication between the two administrations took place via Ambassadors from Dubrovnik. Apart from İstanbul, the Republic had representatives in Alexandria, Vlora, and Chios within the Ottoman borders. Since people of Dubrovnik were under protection, they could not be kept as captives or be enslaved. Provided that something like this took place, these people had to be released immediately and people who caused it had to be punished.⁷⁶⁰

After it came under the protection of the Ottomans, the Republic had to abandon the highly lucrative silver export business to the West; however, it was able to engage in free trade in the Ottoman ports⁷⁶¹ and cities with the commercial concessions it obtained from the Ottomans. In addition, it took various mining revenues and began to evade

⁷⁶⁰ Nicolaas Hendrik Biegan, *The Turco-Ragusan Relationship: According to the Firmans of Murad III (1575-1595) Extant in the State Archives of Dubrovnik* (Paris: Mouton, 1967), 22-38, 42, 64, 65, 82, 84, 91; İnalçık, *An Economic and Social History*, 256-265.

⁷⁶¹ Suraiya Faruqi, "In the Year 1618: The City State of Dubrovnik through Ottoman Eyes", *The Ottoman Orient in Renaissance Culture (Papers from the International Conference at the National Museum in Krakow June 26-27, 2015)*, ed. by Robert Born and Michal Dziewulski, Krakow: Pasaz, 2015, 47.

military dangers thanks to the Ottomans. Due to its densely forested landscape which lacked arable lands, the Republic imported grain from the Ottomans when it was in need.⁷⁶²

Given the right to take their own issues to the court on the Ottoman lands since 1442, the representatives of the people of Dubrovnik in the Ottoman cities were not always Ragusan. According to a document that Nicolaas Hendirk Biegman relayed to us from 1577, there was a complaint that the Jewish consul acted in favor of the Ottomans rather than the Republic.⁷⁶³ Nevertheless, the commercial intellect and flexibility of the Republic helped it build an extensive network in the entire Mediterranean. Since Dubrovnik ships could go to many places such as Tunisia, Cyprus, Ancona, and Syria, the Republic made use of this advantage in various fields. Receiving information was one of the most important reasons of this.

Having merged with the Ottomans both politically and commercially, Dubrovnik served as a crucial bridge between Europe and the Ottoman state. For the Ottomans, Dubrovnik was a door opening to Europe, a center for receiving information from Europe.⁷⁶⁴ This continued before and after the War of Cyprus. Depending on the situation, the Republic informed İstanbul about the preparations of European states, the number of ships Venice and Spain had along with the state of their navy. The capital of the Ottoman

⁷⁶² İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History*, 259-261; BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 2 / 1105, 1111, 1705; 3 / 1120; 5 / 37, 106, 322, 400, 561; 6 / 226, 592; 10 / 341.

⁷⁶³ Biegman, *The Turco-Ragusan Relationship*, 40-41.

⁷⁶⁴ İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History*, 264; BOA., TS.MA.e., 716 / 36, 750 / 31 (29 Zulhijjah 940 / 11 July 1534), 759 / 64 (21 Safar 974 / 7 September 1566).

state reviewed the news coming from Dubrovnik and sent the orders to the administrators in relevant places stating what they should do.⁷⁶⁵

The base of the intelligence coming from the Levant was also Dubrovnik after Venice. The government was equally distant to both the Catholic king and the Turks and it tacitly allowed the city to become a permanent intelligence center. The information that came from the spies or informants in İstanbul and from Dubrovnik's own representative returned to the place where the funding of the intelligence came.⁷⁶⁶

It was the Venetians who hated the Dubrovnik people the most. They would use the phrase 'acting like Ragusan people' for them and this phrase referred to treachery and backstabbing. Venice also wanted to include Dubrovnik people in the war; however, Dubrovnik, at the time, sent carpenters to Castelnova for Turks' shipbuilding and helped with the preparation of the new navy.⁷⁶⁷

Dubrovnik had actually provided help for the Ottomans for these sorts of activities for a long time. It provided digging tools for the nearby construction works and procured the required masters for shipbuilding, shared their experiences for shipbuilding in their shipyards at Vlova and Gallipoli. The medicine that the other vassal states needed was at times demanded from Dubrovnik. We know that there was a Ragusan physician in Topkapı Palace in 1579.⁷⁶⁸

⁷⁶⁵ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 7 / 704 (13 Rajab 975 / 13 January 1568); 7 / 1261 (13 Shavval 975 / 11 April 1568), BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 9 / 256 (1 Muharram 977 / 16 June 1569), BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 10 / 8 (3 Safar 977 / 18 July 1569); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 9 / 156 (11 Shavval 977 / 19 March 1570); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 307 (12 Safar 978 / 18 July 1570).

⁷⁶⁶ Nicolaas Hendrik Biegan, "Ragusan Spying for the Ottoman Empire: Some 16th-century Documents from the State Archive at Dubrovnik," *Belleten*, 26/106 (1963), 239; Preto, *I servizi Segreti*, 118.

⁷⁶⁷ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 177.

⁷⁶⁸ Metin Ziya Köse, *Doğu Akdeniz'de Casuslar ve Tacirler: Osmanlı Devleti ve Dubrovnik İlişkileri 1500-1600*, (İstanbul: Giza, 2009), 24, 25.

Although Venice wanted to lay Dubrovnik to waste, the Pope and Spain thought that Dubrovnik had to do these things. One of the things that compelled Dubrovnik to do these things was the fact that the Ottomans wishing to keep the balance with Venice supported Dubrovnik in the region and engaged in trade with Ancona, a Papal territory. The Palace provided assurance for the Ottoman merchants in the city as early as 1510s, but how the merchants were treated in Venice always remained a mystery. Dubrovnik also had good relations with Spain and Britain.⁷⁶⁹ All of these contributed to the fact Dubrovnik maintained a balance for long years and prevented the other parties to attack it. The arrangement persisted into the Napoleonic period.

Dubrovnik informed Vatican as early as January 28, 1570 about Sultan's intentions for Cyprus; however, it was weirdly found guilty on that account. Venice accused Dubrovnik of betrayal and of providing information to Turks. Venice stated that Dubrovnik provided weekly information to the Ottomans regarding the Christian world, which was actually true. Vatican should inflict such a harsh punishment on Dubrovnik that this sickly and repulsive branch of Christianity should be perished. This accusation of Venice toward Dubrovnik was noteworthy because other European states at times accused Venice in the same manner. There were similar statements in Giacomo Malatesta's report from January 1573. So much so that Ragusan were 'the spies like serpents in the viscera of Christianity' (*sono spie come un serpe nelle viscere della Christianita*). Ragusan not only shared every piece of news with the Ottomans, they also sent them weapons.⁷⁷⁰

⁷⁶⁹ Barbero, *Lepanto*, 177; İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History*, 242, 243, 262; Biegman, *The Turco-Ragusan Relationship*, 35, 43, 112, 127, 128.

⁷⁷⁰ Preto, *I servizi Segreti*, 236, 237.

Paolo Preto mentions that it was ironic that the Ottomans also accused the Ragusans. Yet, the letter of bailo sent to Consiglio dei Dieci clarified the situation. One of the prominent Ragusan merchants, Giorgio Ragnina was detained while carrying the letter to Venice after the new ambassador of France François de Noailles informed the Ottomans about him.⁷⁷¹ Between February-May 1571, Dubrovnik did not cooperate, which was reflected in the Ottoman documents. Dubrovnik provided gunpowder and provisions to Venetians. Ahmed's, the clerk of *emin* Hasan and some other Ottoman subjects' money were taken and they were dispossessed. According to the Ottomans, Dubrovnik was a bed of spies. The news that arrived in İstanbul during these months were indeed similar to the previously reported ones. When Dubrovnik was queried on the matter, they wrote that the beys of the Republic wrote that they were not aware of the collaboration that the Pope, Spain, and Venetians established. However, the Imperial Council always knew what took place in Dubrovnik and in its vicinity through other channels.⁷⁷²

Despite all these, Dubrovnik continued to maintain the balance. Following the Battle of Lepanto, it celebrated the League for its victory. It purchased some stuff that the ships might need during the expedition, but it also purchased certain luxury items from Venice that it planned to send as gifts to İstanbul. It kept the captains of the Ottoman navy content with gifts and actually sent the information that it obtained about the Venetian and

⁷⁷¹ ASVe., Consiglio dei Dieci, Dispacci Costantinopoli, Busta 4, 3r, 4v (11 March 1571).

⁷⁷² BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 266 (16 Zulqadah 978 / 11 April 1571); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 14 / 1254 (7 Shaban 978 / 4 January 1571); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 12 / 532 (17 Zulhijjah 978 / 12 May 1571).

Spanish navies to Mehmed Pasha through Herzegovinian sanjak bey.⁷⁷³ The referred sanjak bey must have been Ferhad Pasha, the relative of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha.

One of the two cities that was considered safe for the Ottoman merchants for a long time (the other one was Venice), Dubrovnik became a neutral and safe harbor for both parties during the War of Cyprus as it was during the Venetian-Ottoman Battle of 1538-1540. For this reason, the annual customs income of the city increased 3-4 times compared to the years before and after the war. The merchants of both parties with every kind of merchandise somehow ended up in Dubrovnik during the years of war.⁷⁷⁴ Although the opening of Split to trade as a free port in 1590, the spread of the merchants who were Ottoman subjects to other ports including Venice decreased the commercial volume of Dubrovnik, the Republic made quite a smart move and focused on seafaring and shipping.⁷⁷⁵ In this way, Dubrovnik kept its advantage of receiving news from the port cities of Mediterranean.

For this reason, the War of Cyprus actually enabled Dubrovnik to become a significant place for spy activities once again. It was David Passi who reported the military activities of the Ottomans. Passi, a Jewish merchant, then lived in Dubrovnik. His wife was in Ferrara, his father was in Thessaloniki, and his uncle was in İstanbul. Such a network allowed Passi to cultivate his network of news for very long time.⁷⁷⁶ It was the Jewish Triffon Zaguri from Kotor who sent the information he obtained to the bailo between October 1571-January 1573 when the bailo was under house arrest in İstanbul.

⁷⁷³ Preto, *I servizi Segreti*, 237.

⁷⁷⁴ İnalçık, *An Economic and Social History*, 262.

⁷⁷⁵ Carter, *Dubrovnik*, 364, 365, 388; İnalçık, *An Economic and Social History*, 263.

⁷⁷⁶ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople*, 111.

Zaguri obtained this information from Jewish informants who did not know about one another.⁷⁷⁷

After the treaty was signed, Cardinal Granvelle complained about not being able to find reliable informants in İstanbul on July 12, 1573. Venetian ambassador rubbed his hands and told him that he could find one spy from Corfu and three spies from Dubrovnik.⁷⁷⁸

Spanish ambassador in Venice also collected many spies and informants that would work on Ottoman lands regarding Venice issue. He connected with one of the informants in İstanbul through a senator from Dubrovnik. The fund that Spain sent for intelligence first came from the capital or directly from Madrid or Milano (after 1559) depending on the decision of *Supremo consiglio d'Italia* (Supreme Council of Italy) in Madrid and was later transferred to Naples, and distributed to Venice, Dubrovnik, and Corfu depending on the situation. In addition to professional spies, sailors, merchants, slaves, and travellers also provided spying services. Spanish ambassador and viceroys of Naples and Sicily hired 500 informants in Venice to obtain information about the Turks. Between 1569-70, there were approximately 50 spies in İstanbul, 15 of whom were permanent. And roughly 100 converts provided information. Depending on the type of information that the informants provided, an annual payment ranging from 100 ducats to 5000 ducats was designated, but as the amount paid to the informants was deemed insufficient, problems arose.⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷⁷ Preto, *I servizi Segreti*, 240.

⁷⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 119.

⁷⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 118-120.

The reason as to why all this information was provided about Dubrovnik in this section was due to the fact that this city, which had become an expert in slave trade for centuries⁷⁸⁰, gradually became one of the centers of captive diplomacy and ransom economy. In addition to the high volume of the news that arrived in and left the city in proportion to the volume of its commercial activities, the fact that Dubrovnik was under the protection of the Ottomans and had a strategic position in Adriatic turned it into a port that provided mediation for the return of the captives that the European states kept or the exchange of the captives both parties kept. Besides, the Dubrovnik administrators were quite masterful at this. The Republic also attempted to maintain the delicate balance while carrying out this task that the Ottoman State assigned to them and even though the revenue of this was not much, Dubrovnik underwent some problems because the Ottomans kept Dubrovnik accountable in case the captives kept in Dubrovnik escaped or got lost.⁷⁸¹

Dubrovnik was also designated as the place where the captives from Cyprus and Lepanto would be exchanged. It was no coincidence that Dubrovnik was chosen for this operation. Center of both commerce and intelligence, this republic was an ideal and safe location for such a complicated and tiresome operation.⁷⁸² Goletta's general Serbollini who fell captive in 1574 wrote that Turks would not let Christian captives out of İstanbul before the Turkish captives arrived in Dubrovnik and therefore the Turkish captives should be sent to Dubrovnik as soon as possible.⁷⁸³

⁷⁸⁰ Carter, *Dubrovnik*, 239-242.

⁷⁸¹ Köse, *Doğu Akdeniz'de Casuslar*, 25; BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 3 / 827 (6 Jumada al-thani 967 / 4 March 1560); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 71 / 185 (7 Rabi' al-awwal 1002 / 12 December 1592).

⁷⁸² Biegman, *The Turco-Ragusan Relationship*, 130, 131.

⁷⁸³ Rosi, "Alcuni Documenti", 172, 181; *Nunziature di Venezia* v. 11, 343.

The mediator/intermediary that would accompany the Turkish captives, Bartelameo Bruti learned Turkish in İstanbul just like his older brother who was a *dil oğlanı* and applied to the Pope only at 16 in order to provide his services after the war was a relative of Koca Sinan Pasha.⁷⁸⁴ In a letter he wrote when in Fermo, Bruti mentioned another captive exchange. Knight Condolmiere saying that he was the relative of Grand Masters of the Knights Hospitaller had been brought to Dubrovnik in order to make an exchange with Aviar (?) Mustafa. Mediators from Dubrovnik Beys organized a negotiation here. It is understood that these sorts of processes were usual for Dubrovnik. After Condolmiere was released upon the wish of Mustafa, he had to bring his ransom, which was 150 ducats, within 10 months; otherwise, the servant that he left behind would belong to Mustafa.⁷⁸⁵

After the peace in 1573, Dubrovnik continued to maintain its safe mediator position for the exchange of the captives, not just for diplomatically important ones but also for the ordinary citizens of the Empire. As Metin Ziya Köse traced records in the petition books (*Divân Kalemi*) sent to Divân (the Court), various orders were sent to Dubrovnik to resolve the captivity problems written in the petitions of the Ottoman citizens.

An order was sent to Dubrovnik Beys for the exchange of some captives from İstanbul or their redemption through ransom before the peace treaty was signed. For example, the exchange of Yusuf, the man of Ahmed who was one of the sergeants of the Sublime Port, with Anton, a state slave, took place in Dubrovnik in September 1574.

⁷⁸⁴ *Nunziature di Venezia*, v. 11, 343; Rosi, “Alcuni Documenti”, 172.

⁷⁸⁵ Rosi, “Alcuni Documenti”, 210.

The peace treaty had not been signed yet; however, since there was an order given by the Council, the redemption of this Ottoman captive was obviously crucial. Anton was not directly sent to Dubrovnik. When the Ottoman captive arrived in Dubrovnik, only then Anton was sent to Dubrovnik from where he was held.⁷⁸⁶

Following the peace, Dubrovnik continued to play its intermediary role in captive exchange. It actually became a natural port for such exchanges. So much so that not only the Ottoman or Venetian authorities but also the representatives of other European countries organized the exchange of Christian captives on the Ottoman lands with the Ottoman captives. Since diplomatic relations between the Papacy and Dubrovnik were cordial, the city was also the primary location for exchanging and redeeming the prisoners held by the Papacy. Petitions that arrive years after the war show that families who gathered the ransom money or the Christian prisoner to save their family members were still directed to Dubrovnik. In December 1574, Don Hardegraf (?) of Napoli, who was to be exchanged with Hasbeyi Mehmed Subaşı, was put under the guard of Hamza, a janissary stationed in Istanbul, and sent to Dubrovnik.⁷⁸⁷

In February 1575, Yayabaşı Davud Subaşı's release was agreed upon in exchange of two Christian captives, but later it was written to the begs of Dubrovnik to negotiate and, if possible, arrange the release of an additional Muslim captive together with Davud. The Christian captives were not to be released until the second Muslim captive was found.⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁸⁶ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 26 / 579 (24 Jumada al-awwal 982 / 11 September 1574).

⁷⁸⁷ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.ZYLd., 2 / 79 (4 Ramadan 982 / 18 December 1574).

⁷⁸⁸ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.ZYLd., 2 / 340 (9 Zulqadah 982 / 20 February 1575).

Hüsam Reis's son Ahmed and his brother's son Kasım, who were captured in the Battle of Lepanto, were exchanged with Christians named Karlo and Dumenka.⁷⁸⁹ When the instructions for finalizing the exchange of Ahmed and Kasım were dispatched to Dubrovnik, the war was still going on, and the peace agreement was only to be signed years later. Apparently, despite the Holy League's warnings, there were people in Europe who conducted such negotiations in secret.

In October of 1590, François Savory who was appointed as French ambassador to İstanbul obtained the permission of the Grand Vizier for the exchange of 30 Ottomans in return for 7 knights hospitaller. Grand Vizier tasked Dubrovnik Beys with this. Pasha included a difficult term: In case one of the 7 knights hospitaller escaped, the beys would pay 30.000 gold for each fugitive. In the meantime, Savory went to Rome, Florence, and Malta in order to find 30 Ottoman captives in June 1591; however, he managed to find only 14 captives -one of them for another exchange-but 12 of them died on the road or escaped. Only 3 of these captives managed to arrive in Dubrovnik. Since one of the knights hospitaller died until Turkish captives reached to Dubrovnik, the terms of the agreement changed. Although the ambassador made strenuous efforts to realize the exchange with what he had at hand, Dubrovnik beys told him that they could not do anything before an edict/a *firman* was sent from İstanbul.⁷⁹⁰ Fortunately, in the middle of 1592, the expected edict arrived and Savory obtained the freedom of 6 knights hospitaller in return for 13 Turkish captives.

⁷⁸⁹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.ZYLd., 1 / 167 (15 Safar 980 / 17 June 1572).

⁷⁹⁰ Biegman, *The Turco-Ragusan Relationship*, 131, 147-150; BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 67 / 73 (12 Muharram 999 / 10 November 1590); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 69 / 373 (20 Rabi' al-awwal 1000 / 5 January 1592), 280 and 292 (3 Jumada al-awwal 1000 / 16 February 1592).

These stressful mediation activities of Dubrovnik were on the decrease at the beginning of the 17th century. Diplomats, merchants or middlemen from both sides and from every nation were on the scene then. The two states became accustomed to hand over their captive exchange operations to these middlemen during the relatively long peace period and since a safe space was generally not needed the exchange operations usually took place on Ottoman territories.

7.6 Uskoks

Although classical historiography focuses on the fact that Venice was engaged in maritime activities in order to protect its trade routes, it is now known that Venice supported the activities of the pirates. As Andrea Pelizza states, these sorts of activities can be followed from the contracts found in Venetian archives. These activities, which were at first initiated against the shared enemy of Venice, against Turks and against the Greek Empire, with the intention of supporting the emperor in Constantinople, for the loss of Hungarian king, the Genoese, and its own subjects and believers', actually resulted in bringing a considerable number of captives to the city. Venetian authorities remained silent against these raids and did not pay attention to how the spoils were distributed; however, it asked for the submission of the captives to the administration. This prevented the treatment of these people as war captives or their being subjected to other sorts of abuses. In this way, Venice both controlled the ransom incomes and prevented certain abuses.⁷⁹¹

⁷⁹¹ Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 38, 39.

Arrangements regarding pirating activities were included in the agreements that Venice made with Christian and non-Christian states in the Mediterranean even during the 13th and 14th centuries. Like the other Italian states, Venice continued to grant licenses to the pirates *in the name of the Commune and Signor*. If required, Venice also granted permission to the Byzantines, Genoese, Neapolitans, and Sicilians, who were not citizens of Venice, to engage in these activities. Apart from extremely problematic situations, Venice did not intervene in these activities. At times, Ottoman Sultans also communicated with Venice for the captives that were at the hands of the Venetian pirates. According to an event that Marin Sanuto recorded in 1498, Sultan Bayezid asked for help for the sisters who came to his door and who were kept on the Venetian borders as slaves. These sisters were probably caught by the pirates during the last war and remained as captives till then. We do not know what happened to them.⁷⁹²

After the treaty, the commercial activities between Ottomans and Venetians accelerated until the War of Crete in 1645. A new port, opened in Dalmatia nourished the activities and the numerous new Ottoman merchants and subjects involved to the commerce. Yet, they were frequently were attacked, robbed and taken captive by Uskok pirates in southern Dalmatia while they were escorted by a Venetian armed galley.⁷⁹³ The petitions about the problem to the Port complains about the pirates and the damages raised significantly. They also thought that the Venetians had collaboration with the Uskoks or they failed to protect them. Not only Muslim and Christian Ottomans, but also Venetian merchants also frequently risked becoming the victims of the Uskoks as well. On the other

⁷⁹² *Ibid*, 39, 40.

⁷⁹³ Tommaso Stefani, "Seeking Redress at The Signoria: Ottoman Merchants in Dispute with The Republic of Venice in The Early Modern Era" (Unpublished master thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2013), 69.

hand, the activities of the Turkish pirates were also the other problem between two states in 1590's. Mutual retaliating continued for a while. Initially, Venetian authorities were not fast enough to act against the pirates. They were officially under the Habsburg protection and the base, Senj was in the Habsburg territory. Attacking to the base means to do harm the already-fragile relations with the archduke.⁷⁹⁴ At this point, Ottomans indicated that the Sultan's naval army might take the matter into the hands though Venetians did not prefer this option due to the costs. Between 1580 and 1618, one third of the thirty Ottoman envoys who went to Venice were sent specifically, to complain about the aggressions of the Uskoks and to recover robbed goods.⁷⁹⁵ The baili in Constantinople also tried to avoid any military complication as soon as possible. In the end, the Venetians preferred to fight the Uskoks by re-investing the new war ships in the region around 1590's.

7.7 Barbary Coasts

One of the newly emerging problems for Venice when it began to put things in order in the Ottoman center concerned the pirating activities on the Barbary Coast. With the decision that *provveditori sopra ospedali* took in 1588, a competent consul was appointed to Algeria. In time, *provveditori sopra ospedali* began to take advantage of the Jews' extensive commercial networks for its activities in the Ottoman capital, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli. This community residing in Barbary States situated along the Moorish shore or living in coastal towns such as İstanbul, Marseilles, Toloun or Livorno

⁷⁹⁴ Stefini, "Seeking Redress", 72.

⁷⁹⁵ Suraiya Faruqi, "Ottoman Views on Corsairs and Piracy in the Adriatic", *The Kapudan Pasha. His Office and His Domain*, ed. by Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon: University of Crete Press, 2002), 357-371; Pedani Fabris, *In nome del Gran Signore*, 208, 209.

and hearing about their coreligionists and sustaining their commercial activities with them served as an important mediator for Venice.⁷⁹⁶

The chancery books of the French consulate in Tunisia housed many registers belonging to the Europeans, who were active there. By keeping track of these registers, we get an idea with respect to the methods deployed by those who acted as middlemen for captive rescue operations apart from the clergymen. For example, a Venetian named Andrea Georgia de Franca acted as a middleman for two other Venetians in order to help them rescue Guiseppe de Piedro, who was the slave of *Cait Assain* in 1589. In 1591, Antonio Juannetti and his wife Catarina Dagustina owed 2,000 Spanish ducats to the Pasha of Tunisia, who paid their ransom to the owners Alexi and Mehmed Reis. This amount was quite high for ransom and it can be understood that the Venetian couple had the privilege of the intervention of the Pasha of Tunisia.⁷⁹⁷

In 1593, Constantino Raveda from Chios lent 400 ducats to Giovanni di Matheo from Venice for his ransom. In 1595, the Claude Caulet, a captain from Marseilles, made a pledge for the rescue of Cesare Lanfranchi from Venice, Pier Antonio Bracolo, and Pier Antonio's wife for 500 Spanish ducats. In the same year, Andrea di Francesco Vitali from Venice was manumitted by becoming indebted to Şaban bin Abdullah, a Florentine convert, to the amount of 210 Spanish ducats. In 1597, Genoese governor of Tabarca Island, Nicola Saivago lent 146 Spanish ducats to Simone Talamanti for his manumission. Talamanti promised to return within a month in order to pay his debt. We don't know how the governor of Tabarca, who was engaging in carrying out these operations professionally

⁷⁹⁶ Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 127.

⁷⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 127.

and received his commission accordingly, trusted Talamanti and whether Talamanti kept his promise. In 1599, Zantiot Giorgio Fogazi and Lorenzo Boieri de Marsiglia paid 200 ducats as ransom to Biserta captain Carap (?) Mustafa for the manumission of Domenico di Guiseppe. In the same year, the convert Josuppo from Puglia agreed to be the prisoner of *Asan Bali*, the Biserta captain until Giovanni di Cristoforo, who was manumitted for 160 ducats, went back to his country and brought his ransom money.⁷⁹⁸

As it is understood from these registers, people from every nationality and religion were engaged in this trade and they focused on what really mattered for them -rescuing the captives- by keeping their nationalities and religions in the background. Practices such as lending money, being a prisoner on behalf of the captive, and cashing the *Albarano* bill specific to ransom in the place where the captive was held like the clergymen did in Naples were common in Maghrib.

It was not only in North Africa that the middleman became prisoners. These professional prisoners were also present in the Balkans. The study that Peter Sugar conducted by examining the documents that are currently placed in Batthyány Family Archive in the Hungarian Archives helps us understand how this system worked at the end of the 16th century and throughout the 17th century. Following the relative stabilization experienced in the aftermath of Suleiman the Magnificent's death in 1566 and defined as 'professional imprisonment' by Sugar, a risky way of earning an income appeared. Batthyány family financed these operations. The Count of Batthyány, who had a way of finding those people who fell captive beyond the border and who could pay their ransom,

⁷⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 128; For the detailed list of ransomed captives in Tunis via Tabarca in the years between 1603 and 1683, see Achille Riggio, *Tabarca e il riscatto degli schiavi in Tunisia: da Kara Othmen Dey a Kara Mustapha Dey (1593-1702)* (Genova: Nella sede della R. Deputazione di Storia-Patria per la Liguria, 1938).

reported this to the commanders stationed on the Ottoman borderlines along Buda and Kanizsa. The purchased captives were generally Ottoman subjects who could pay their ransom. We can understand this from the characteristics of the captives and from the highness of the ransom amount. These captives were either the *timar* holders or high-level people from the soldiers on the borderlines. The Count sent his own men to be taken as prisoners to the owner of the captive for his/her manumission. Interestingly, almost all the men of the Count, who was a feudal lord loyal to the Empire, were Muslims. Since the names of these people appeared in other treaties as well, we can make the following assumption: People who performed this professionally were at times hired by the Count and since majority of them belonged to the military class, some of the soldiers stationed on the borders also performed this job regularly. These people who remained as prisoners signed an agreement for the period encompassing the time from the manumission of the slave till his return with the ransom money. The agreement was quite rigid. 10-12 people usually remained as prisoners for a single captive and the entire ransom of the captive was distributed among these people. In addition to cash, other things considered to be in kind in terms of ransom money were also demanded. The captive himself was given a certain amount of time for bringing the ransom money back depending on the distance of place that he went. In case the manumitted captive did not bring back the ransom money, the people who remained behind acknowledged to lose a limb and guaranteed to pay the ransom money in its entirety. One of them was set free so that he could keep looking for the ransom money. In case he did not come back either, then his responsibility also fell on the shoulders of the others. These people who did this on a regular basis, which required

courage, earned the respect of not only the count but also the ones who fell captive and contacted them.⁷⁹⁹

Accounting records of these operations belonging to Batthyány family went as far back as 1587. During these years, the ransom that was earned per captive was recorded and the system became more established in the 17th century and many detailed accounts were kept. Information such as the occupation of the captive, the name and occupation of the prisoners, and the limbs that the prisoners would lose in case the agreement was not observed were written down. In addition to the ransom to be paid, one of the things that was requested was a horse. The horse should be of a good breed, healthy and equipped with its saddlery. Given that getting a horse out of the Ottoman borders without a permit presented a problem at the time and those who could ride a horse were generally from the military class, this was a serious undertaking. The third item was salt. Demanding salt, a quite valuable mine, during that period as ransom was a corollary of being close to those places near the Danube River. The fourth item on the lists was generally fabric. Demanding fabric as ransom in the border region that extended along the Danube River and on the land trade route made more sense when the cash could not be procured.⁸⁰⁰

In his short study, Peter Sugar states that he cannot provide any insight regarding the situation in the Ottoman Empire since he does not know much about the Ottoman sources. There was an article in *muhimme* registers demonstrating the presence of such an

⁷⁹⁹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 3 / 674 (8 Rabi' al-thani - 7 January 1560); 19 / 146, 226, 470 (21 Muharram, 2 Safar, 13 Rabi' al-awwal 980 / 3 and 14 June, 26 July 1572); 36 / 676 (23 Rabi' al-awwal 987 / 20 May 1579); 70 / 61 (7 Zulqadah 1000 / 15 august 1592); Peter F. Sugar, "The Ottoman Professional Prisoner' on the Western Borders of the Empire in the 16th and 17th Centuries", *Etudes Balkaniques* 7/2 (1971), 83, 84, 86.

⁸⁰⁰ Sugar, "The Ottoman Professional Prisoner", 87-91.

operational network and that this system was implemented during 1570s as well. Having fallen captive to an infidel, Bekir was manumitted through ransom. Until he brought back his ransom money, İbrahim Agha, Kurd Agha, and Suleiman Agha remained in the Castle of Zagreb in his place and since Bekir did not return to the Castle, these three people were tortured. An order was sent to both the Bosnian Sanjak governor Ferhad Beg and Čazma Beg on December 16, 1575 from the Imperial Council so that Bekir could be found and handed over to the Castle. We understand that Bekir was not found as six months later, an order was this time sent for the rescue of Fermudezade, who was arranged as the guarantor for Kurd and Suleiman Aghas. Since Bekir was nowhere to be found, Fermudezade was the principal person in charge. The opposing party evidently increased the ransom amount. This was reported to İstanbul. As a result of four correspondences, an order was sent to the begs stating that the desired ransom money should be sent in the form of cash and merchandise and in case there were still problems, they should resolve them by personally going to Zagreb.⁸⁰¹

One understands from these correspondences that the state was well aware that its subjects, especially the soldiers on the borders, were rescued through these sorts of operations and it clearly did not intervene unless it was really required and called out the sanjak begs personally in such situations. In addition to finding out that this method was used at such an early date, it was also verified that the ransom amount was met with other commodities apart from cash. This case, which was resolved through correspondence with İstanbul that went on for over six months, also answers the question as to how these people

⁸⁰¹ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 29 / 60 (25 Ramadan 984 / 16 December 1576; BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 31 / 350 (27 Jumada al-awwal 985 / 12 August 1577); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 31 / 355 (28 Jumada al-awwal 985 / 13 August 1577); BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 31 / 386 (3 Jumada al-thani 985 / 18 August 1577).

who could not put together their ransom money and whose destitution is apparent in the documents⁵ could gather such high amounts of ransom money in cases such as Bekir's disappearance.

Let's speculate a little and look at the two complaints that arrived in İstanbul approximately five weeks after the first letter. According to two orders dated January 21, 1577, some of the Jewish merchants also known to be in charge of weaving haircloth in Thessaloniki were massacred by people that wanted to steal their merchandise near a caravanserai close to Yenipazar. According to what Bosnian sanjak-beg wrote, an extensive investigation was carried out. It was found out that there were cavalrymen, feoffees, and other salaried people among the perpetrators. Not only the Bosnian sanjak-beg but also the begs of Prizren, Herzegovina, and Dukagin were given the order to find the perpetrators who were known to be around these places. We do not know whether these two events were connected or not. The distance between the two crime scenes eliminates this possibility but it also explains as to why fabric was demanded as ransom. The presence of the merchants who particularly came from Thessaloniki and went to various places following the trade route was, of course, known. It is understood both from the *muhimme* register and the ransom amount Batthyány demanded from these people that those engaged in keeping prisoners had such a low income that they performed such a risky job. They were in no position to pay the demanded ransoms with their own income. Considering that the Cash cycle of these people relied only on their salaries, it can then be

understood why these people were forced to pay their ransom in the form of merchandise.⁸⁰²

This type of imprisonment/captivity was quite different from the captivity in North Africa and it was definitely valid for the soldiers who were Ottoman subjects and who frequently fell captive on the porous border. However, it is also the proof of how ransom economy manifested itself in different ways. When we trace these from the Ottoman documents, we can see many registers in which these soldiers somehow fell captive during an expedition and along the border and were returned to their former duties and salaries when they came back from captivity. Those who did not have any duties prior to their captivity were also granted with new gifts upon their return from captivity. Even though these gifts were rarely prebend and *tımar* beforehand, they increased in number after 1560s and took the form of the return of *beşli gedik* (the military duty for which the daily fee was 15 coins for the soldiers on the borderlines), *dirlik* (revenue granted as a living) or *inayet* (monetary assistance). These records demonstrate that the state was familiar with these incidents and that it helped with the financial situation of the former captives by paying them a salary after they paid their ransom money or pledged to pay it.⁸⁰³

We actually realize that this method did not work effectively when Venice was concerned. The story of Mahmud, the brother of Castelnova castle warden illustrates this. Venice did not free Mahmud no matter what; however, all the correspondence and

⁸⁰² BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 29 / 252 and 253 (29 Shawwal 984 / 19 January 1577); Sugar, “‘The Ottoman Professional Prisoner’”, 90, 91.

⁸⁰³ BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 1 / 1430; 2 / 731, 1683; 4 / 501, 943, 1469 (29 Muharram 962 / 22 December 1554); 7 / 574, 1865; 19 / 20; 15 / 165, 216, 375, 448, 684, 1069, 1115, 1663, 1223, 1272, 1330, 2099, 2403, 25 / 219, 1910, 1352, 1896, 3034; 31 / 735; 36 / 147; 37 / 698, 861, 937, 961, 1590, 2963; 41 / 2990; 45 / 1459, 1943, 2697, 4163; 65, 248 (18 Jumada al-thani 975 / 20 December 1567 - 29 Zilhicce 997 / 8 November 1589).

documents demonstrate how Venice treated a Ottoman soldiers captive even during time of peace compared to other states. Neither ransom nor any other merchandise brought about manumission of Mahmud.

Referred to as Dizdar Mahmud in the documents but who was actually the brother of Castelnova (*Herceg Novi*) castle warden, Mahmud was caught by Uskoks in 1575. Countless letters came from İstanbul for the manumission of Mahmud, who was described ‘cunning and callous.’ The first letter belonged to the grand vizier and it was brought from Castelnovo by Mustafa Çelebi in August. The Grand Vizier wrote for the manumission of castle warden Mahmud, a destitute family man unable to pay his ransom who fell captive near Castelnovo close to Herzegovina during the war. Precisely 6 months after this letter, the Senate gave bailo instructions to tell the pasha that the doge could not do anything for Mahmud due to the fact that he gave him to one of the Venetians waiting to exchange him with his captive relatives. In October 1577, the Senate wrote a letter to the grand vizier apologizing that they would not be able to free Mahmud. According to a letter that the governor of Kotor wrote to Consiglio dei Dieci in October 1578, Mahmud somehow managed to write to his brother, who was the castle warden of Castelnovo and told him that the person who could prove to be most effective in rescuing him was the Beglerbeg of Bosnia Ferhad Beg. Ferhad Beg was the cousin of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha. He also sent his wife and children to İstanbul to exert pressure. Bragadin also added that Mahmud was quite a dangerous figure for Christians.⁸⁰⁴

⁸⁰⁴ Vladimir Lamansky, *Secrets d'Etat de Venise: Documents, Extraits, Notices et Etudes Servant a Eclaircir les Rapports de la Seigneurie avec les Grecs, les Slaves et la Port Ottomane a la Fin du XVe et au XVIe Siècle* (Saint Petersburg, 1884), 97-99; Preto, *I servizi Segreti*, 105, 106; Pedani, *Inventory*, 55, 62, 63, 69, 78, 80.

In the March of 1579, the Consiglio dei Dieci wrote to the bailo as follows: ‘Yes, the Grand Vizier wrote repeatedly beforehand but it is not reasonable to free Mahmud, who had been quite bad-tempered toward the Christians.’ In October, the Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was assassinated, but the High Porte did not stop going after Mahmud. Şemsi Ahmed Pasha wrote an admonitory letter to the doge two months after he took office. He asked whether the letters that had been written in the meantime were for nothing adding that considering the manumission of all the Venetian captives, the manumission of Mahmud was a simple act. In his letter to the *Consiglio dei Dieci* written in the April of 1579, the bailo complained that there was all kind of pressure in İstanbul for the manumission of Mahmud. Head of the Janissaries pressured Gabriele Cavazza, the clerk of the bailo. Cavazza told him that it was not up to him. This dispatch was already sent by means of those people who put up a struggle for Mahmud. According to the letter of the bailo dated April of the same year, it is understood that the Sultan also knew about the plight of Mahmud. Bailo stated that the grand vizier told him that the Sultan gave an express order for the manumission of Mahmud. Dispatches were sent to previous bailos as well. Pasha later asked to the Venetians about the captives that they wanted to be manumitted. Mahmud’s manumission was a delicate matter since the Sultan specifically demanded it. There must have been no progress in favor of Mahmud in the meantime because this time the Head of Janissaries İbrahim wrote to the doge for the manumission of Mahmud in February of 1580. In the same month, Castelnuovo castle warden Ahmed demanded that his brother should be put in a better prison. This demand had to be indulged as Ahmed did good for the Republic in the past. One of the things that these letters revealed was this. While the author of the letter blandishes in order to take back his captive, he enables us to catch the details that we cannot observe in formal documents. It is

ambiguous as to what this act of ‘doing good’ meant but for a position like the one in Castelnuovo, a place situated on borderline and open to all sorts of interaction with Venice, one could think of every possibility during the time of war and peace.⁸⁰⁵

The bailo once again wrote to the Consiglio dei Dieci at the beginning of 1582 and upon hearing that a sergeant was sent to Venice, the wives of Mahmud Agha asked the grand vizier to write for the manumission of Mahmud again. Pasha (Koca Sinan) told that he had to write to the bailo due to these insistent women. The letter suggests that the people in İstanbul were also tired of this Mahmud issue. Giacomo Soranzi who was in İstanbul as an ambassador for the circumcision feast of Sultan’s son Mehmed and the bailo Conarini wrote to the Consiglio dei Dieci in August of the same year stating that Koca Sinan Pasha was interested in Mahmud Agha’s fate and offered other slaves for exchange. When Soranzo served as *provveditore generale da Mar* between 1571-74, he knew about the pirating activities during the attacks on the Ottoman fortifications and he was known for underhandedly supporting the pirates in the region. This letter coincided with the period when Soranzo was in İstanbul for the circumcision feast of Sultan’s son Mehmed. For this reason, Venice decided to kill him secretly in 1583 but then postponed doing so till 1586. At the end, they circulated the news that Mahmud died due to a long-lasting infirmity he suffered at the prison.⁸⁰⁶

As can be seen in Mahmud’s story, when the captive Ottoman subjects were concerned, Venice’s stance was clear. In Venice, the elimination of these captives or spies was a frequent practice. These executions were carried out underhandedly if possible and

⁸⁰⁵ Pedani, *Inventory*, 81, 82, 83, 87; Lamansky, *Secrets d'Etat*, 99.

⁸⁰⁶ Pedani, *Inventory*, 94; Lamansky, *Secrets d'Etat*, 99, 100.

were justified by stating that they were carried out for the good of the Republic and Christianity (*per el stato nostro et per la repubblica christiana/dipublico beneficio della Christianità/grande beneficio delle cose nostre, et anco del resto della christianità*). Venice wanted to do a similar thing during the alliance forged for the Lepanto but could not succeed.⁸⁰⁷

While there was a completely different ransom system and economy established on the Habsburg border, the reason as to why captive negotiations were so different in Venice was evident. The framework of the benefits that the two states provided for one another was drawn up over time and professionally with treaties. Both states acted in line with these treaties and in case the circumstances were abused, this was done by not overtly violating the terms of the treaty in question. Above all, a diplomatic language was deployed throughout the process. In unfavorable situations, both parties pretended that they did not understand or realize the terms of the treaty or that they acted late or neglectful so that they would not pay the price stipulated in the treaty. While Venice was convinced that the captives, especially those who were the soldiers, should be killed, there are no records in the Ottoman archives that implies such an intention on the Ottomans' part. Ottoman central administration preferred to keep these captives as long as possible and unless the terms that had been set for their liberation were not met, they intended to include them into the labor system regardless of their social status.

Although following the peace treaty that was signed after the War of Cyprus, the compliance with the treaty between the state mechanisms was always highlighted; the Venetians and Ottomans did not make peace right away. Both parties engaged in behaviors

⁸⁰⁷ Preto, *I servizi Segreti*, 331, Barbero, *Lepanto*, 603; Lamansky, *Secrets d'Etat*, 77, 83, 87, 89, 90.

that could be described as abuses of the treaty. The attacks on the Venetian ships and the people inside especially around Adriatic and Peloponnese was at times reported to the palace by the bailo and at times the Ottoman administration learned about these through internal communication and gave the order for what was needed to be done. Even though these type of ship attacks took the lead in these abuses, withholding the people who could not be taken as captives in accordance with the treaty also took up significant space.⁸⁰⁸

It was no different for Venice. The resentment that stuck in the memories after Cyprus manifested itself in the Republic for a long time with the deficient returns of the Lepanto victory. Venetian commanders and captains also frequently attacked the Ottoman ships. For example, in 1584 –precisely 11 years after the peace-, Gabriele Emò the captain in charge of the ships in which the slaves and criminal oarsmen in the republican navy (*governatore delle galee dei condannati*) were put to work attacked the ship of Djerba governor Mehmed (Memi) Bey, the son of Ramazan Paşa, the governor of Algeria. He murdered Mehmed Bey's mother, wife, children, and odalisques.⁸⁰⁹ Mehmed Bey was at the time taking his family back to İstanbul after his father's passing. Mehmed Bey set out as two galleys (on the other galley, there was a former sanjak bey Hızır) and in addition to his family, he had 75 slaves, 40 servants, and around 150 soldiers with him on the ship.⁸¹⁰

Three Venetian ships surrounded them with the advantage of the wind. According to the *muhimme* (court) record, Emò thought that this ship was a pirate ship and it belonged to the Maltese in the apology letter that the bailo wrote to the Sultan. It is because the ship

⁸⁰⁸ White, *Piracy and Law*, 14, 48, 66. 126-132.

⁸⁰⁹ Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline*, 26, 27.

⁸¹⁰ Pelizza, *Riammessi a respirare*, 37.

did not show trust signal, it raised a war flag and the attack had already begun. However, Mehmed Bey who threw himself to the sea after sustaining an injury to the head introduced himself and asked them why they were doing this upon seeing that they were not pirates. Sufficient amount of time passed in order to establish communication and rectify the misunderstanding. In the end, Mehmed Bey was beheaded as well. His mother and other women were murdered after their breasts were cut off and thrown to the sea. Six *emins* (imperial commissioners) were killed by torture. It was easy to understand from their clothing that these people were not pirates or Christian Hospitaller⁸¹¹, so it actually shows how unfounded the excuse that Emò or Venetian authorities presented to the Ottomans. Moreover, one of the women on the ship was a member of one of the prominent families in Venice, Corners. She was captured in the War of Cyprus in 1570 and became a concubine of Ramazan Paşa, the father of the Memi Beg. According to Wipertus Rudt de Collenberg, although she stated her origin to take advantage of her Venetian citizenship, Emò raped her and finally threw her into the sea.⁸¹²

It might be the case that the fact was realized later on and everyone on the ship was killed in order not to leave any witnesses behind; however, the news reached to İstanbul with a merchant. This news angered the Sultan greatly and after this news, quick action was taken. This incident had quite heavy outcomes compared to other abuses. The Republic paid 60.000/70.000 ducats. Moreover, Gabriele Emò who came from a patrician

⁸¹¹ The dress-code in the sea, where such encounters were common, was the first data to recognize and identify people on the opposite. The approaching ship might have been known, but one had to be sure of that by seeing people on it. It is presumed that identifying one by one's clothes was not something only Ottomans did. Some of the converts and Jews tried in the Inquisition were questioned over such items. For further information see. Stella Mary Newton, *The Dress of the Venetians 1495 – 1525* (Aldershot: Scolar, 1988); For some trial samples in Venetian Inquisition see Plakotos, "The Venetian Inquisition", 5-14, 28, 154-158.

⁸¹² Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons*, 462.

family was executed. For every slave who escaped the ship, 1000 aspri was paid in accordance with the treaty. The goods on the ship were delivered to the Ottoman sergeants in Preveze.⁸¹³

The head of both states worked really hard to keep the peace. Following such an incident, a series of other events took place during the same months, some of which were Uskok attacks and some of which were Ottoman attacks; however, neither of the states wanted to escalate the tension. Instead, they preferred methods such as compensation, apology, and punishment of the perpetrators.

Ottoman State's diplomatic efforts for the prevention of the formation of a Catholic alliance and its breaking up if it did come to being always worked. For example, Venice joined such an alliance only when its own lands were under threat and continued depending on the situation by following the course of the events. It also happened after Lepanto. They did not lose any time to initiate commerce with the Levant after the war. The terms of the peace made one think that Ottomans won the Battle of Lepanto. Ottoman navy quickly recovered after the war and the Republic was in no condition to deal with more conflicts and boycotts. This situation was also considered the main reason of the conflict between Vatican and Venice and it is summarized as 'the reason of the conflict between Venice and Pope is the Republic's perseverance for not severing its ties with the Great Turk' in the bailo's report.⁸¹⁴

⁸¹³ Pedani, *The Ottoman-Venetian*, 40; Pedani Fabris and Bombaci, *I "Documenti Turchi*, 235-237, 240, 241; BOA., A.DVNS.MHM.d., 58 / 14 (29 Rabi' al-thani 993 / 30 April 1585).

⁸¹⁴ Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, 1091; 13. *Calendar of State Papers*, v. X, 449.

7.8 Greeks

After the Cyprus War, some of the people stayed both in Venice and Ottoman lands by generally engaging in commerce. For example, Alessandro Ram who was a merchant from 1550s till his death in 1592 continued his activities from his houses both in Venice and İstanbul.⁸¹⁵ The Greek population, which was presented as between 4000 and 15000 in the Venice of 1580s generally lived in Castello region. These people were known to be skillful mariners and it was no surprise that they settled in Castello. The Greeks who were dispersed in the neighborhoods of the region settled around *San Giorgio dei Greci* church. One of the good things about the Ottoman raids was the fact that the families with a maritime past came from former dominions and settled in the city. While these craftsmen increased the wealth of the Republic with their labor, the continuance of this welfare meant that these new migrants could comfortably live in this city. These people, who were extremely valuable in Mediterranean with their crafts, were kept in the city with privileges such as job security for themselves and their sons, tax advantages, and working in special shipyards for a few months during the year.⁸¹⁶

At the beginning of the 16th century, the Republic was able to control the eastern Mediterranean and Ionian Sea by using its important ports on Dalmatian, Albanian, and Greek shores and it also made an effort to keep the Ottomans away from here through diplomatic means. On the other hand, it was able to defend its mainland against the Papacy, Holy Roman Empire, French and Spanish troops that attacked it with the Cambray Alliance. It was present in the great port cities of the Orient with its merchants, diplomats,

⁸¹⁵ Burke, *The Greeks of Venice*, 16.

⁸¹⁶ Lane, *Venetian Ships*, 17-19, 35, 38, 39, 65, 70, 71, 153, 154; Burke, *The Greeks of Venice*, 20, 65, 66, 71, 72;

and spies and also had many representatives in Europe. However, toward the end of the century, all these balances began to change. All the lands on the Orient except for Crete came under the Ottoman control. The subjects from the former dominions rushed to the city and wanted to settle there. The population of the city continued to increase up until the plague broke out. In time, the Republic also relaxed the subject status of the Greeks - which the Greeks had always felt with a discontent- with various arrangements.⁸¹⁷ The Greeks were allowed to join the guilds or establish their own guilds, and to acquire permit for engaging in commerce. They were also started to be appointed into various official duties even though these duties were not initially in the senior administration ranks. In time, this led to the formation of a new high class in Venice.⁸¹⁸

⁸¹⁷ The Greeks received permission to establish a Greek confraternity in 1489 and a permanent church and cemetery permission of their own in 1514, but their church was completed in 1573. See. Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 147.

⁸¹⁸ Romano, *Patricians and Popolani*, 30-36; Iordanou, "Pestilence, poverty", 802; Burke, *The Greeks of Venice*, 5-7.

CONCLUSION

Following the appearance of the Ottomans on the stage of history, the coping efforts of each state that encountered the Ottoman state, which became famous for posing a challenge to each of them, constituted a separate experience. The experience of the Venetian Republic in that regard, which had both commercial and political connections with Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Black Sea region almost throughout the entire Middle Ages, was undoubtedly one of these diverse experiences.

Having an economy based on maritime commerce, the Republic's relationship with the Ottomans was initially shaped by their self-confidence and the illusion that they were up against a weak rival; however, the Republic later adopted a policy that favored reaching an agreement. In the end, almost all the harbors that provided the primary source of income for the Venetians came under Ottoman rule within 150 years.

Venice's struggle with the Ottomans in the land borders of the Southeastern Europe, in seas, and overseas territories led to many wars, some of which lasted for quite a long time. Since their first encounter, Venice's Ottoman policy aimed to bring the Ottomans to its knees like the other states it had defeated before. However, the 16-year-long war (1463-1479) that took place during the reign of Mehmed II and shook the Republic considerably demonstrated that this goal was not compatible with and beyond the possibilities and capabilities of Venice. Two states fought once again during the reign of Bayezid II (1499-

1503), during which the financial burden of the previous war and its impact on the mercantile class and state institutions had not been overcome yet.

One of the greatest damages inflicted on the Republic during these wars was the dissolution of the social system that had been preserved and made stable in the state organs and social layers for centuries. Having foreseen that the hegemonic struggle it waged against the Ottoman state would continue for long years by gaining momentum, the Venetian Republic engaged in gathering intelligence about its opponent that ruled the entire Mediterranean. Although this reflex of gathering intelligence was common for the bureaucracy of the Republic, which had administrators or representatives almost everywhere in the Mediterranean, the process generally proved to be much less efficient when it came to the Ottomans. The Ottomans' war laws and traditions that they abided by and implemented through combining Islamic law and customary law were entirely different than the previous rivals of the Republic.

Consisting of a system that elected all of its administrators from the patricians and oversaw these administrators employing a more privileged social class (*cittadini*) compared to its citizens, the Venetian state organ had to raise qualified personnel for its overseas dominions and diplomatic representations. The losses incurred by the Republic in the wars that were waged for the existence of such a system that tried to make the most of Venice's limited patrician population led to quite grave consequences, such as bringing the functioning of the state bureaucracy to a standstill.

Venetian administrators were patricians employed for the state interests and individuals who represented their families in the city and were also obliged to look out for the interests of their families. Furthermore, they were obliged to officially avoid engaging

in commerce during their terms of office; however, they were all merchants who were heavily involved in commercial activities with the Levant.

The principal methods that Venice traditionally used to practice in its relations with its rivals were to convince them by granting commercial privileges and to enforce all the possible options within its reach. These options included waging war using its rich treasury when it could not convince these states. One might think that Venice would not opt for war, a method that could have a direct impact on the population, unless it was essential due to the low number of its population and its multi-layered political and social structure where even the people who lived within the borders of the lagoon were divided into classes. The struggle waged against the Ottomans markedly illustrated the destructive effects of the war on the Venetian population. The casualties among the senior administrators, patricians and other privileged classes during the wars Venice waged with other European states were not as high as the casualties incurred in the wars waged with the Ottomans.

The increasing number of casualties in land and sea wars began to unsettle the Republic even more. For this reason, they also began to express this issue during the negotiation meetings regarding the commercial concessions granted to them by the Ottomans. Articles aiming to prevent the Venetians from being taken captive began to be gradually incorporated in the agreement documents as the years went by. The Venetians in question here, of course, usually refer to those citizens with higher social status.

Ordinary Venetian citizens slowly but definitely turned into people who had to be rescued from captivity for the interests of the Republic. It was because the Republic was careful in not recruiting mariners even in its dominions until the middle of the 14th century

and preferred to recruit free people in the ships to the greatest extent possible despite its financial burden. The Black Death, which wreaked havoc on Venice as well, became the primary factor in changing these preferences. However, dispensing with the traditional preferences to sustain a continuous struggle against a powerful rival devoid of any problems regarding recruitment and resources in the East became obligatory.

In the beginning, the Republic compensated for its labor need that it could not procure in *Terraferma* from its dominions, and later this became a permanent order of its functioning. The people who once belonged to the Republic or some other Christian state but who were then used to living in or close to Ottoman borders or within similar territories with the Ottomans began to be advantageous for Venice both in terms of intelligence and labor. They contributed to cheap labor within the lagoon borders within which they wanted to be accepted. Even though they were from the lower layers of the society, they turned into individuals who the enemy should not capture both due to their craftsmanship and also due to their value in the harbors of the Levant and Northern Africa. Therefore, the Republic had to devise solutions to keep them, such as occasionally improving their working conditions or looking out for their rights in the city.

Venice's reflex for not leaving any of its citizens in the hands of the enemy gradually began to include these low-status individuals as well. These individuals, therefore, began to create a heavier bureaucratic burden for the state. Before that, almost all ransom operations were carried out to rescue the captives from privileged classes, with the state overseeing the operations. The ransom was provided easily, sent to the relevant places, and the results were awaited. This situation changed in time. The state started to

provide funds for low-status people and people from poorer classes. Religious institutions also began to ask for more charity to rescue these people.

Although the amount that would be added to the money to be paid for someone whose captivity in the Ottoman State was verified was determined in accordance with his/her social class, such a financial support by official institutions became a source of hope for the mariners who were not able to shake off the feeling that they were left to their own devices.

This benevolence was definitely not peculiar to Venice alone. Similar practices had existed in other city-states for a long time. However, the need for new arrangements emerged with the increase of such demands following the War of 1537-1540 in Venice, which frequently warred against the Ottomans in the Levant and carried out these types of operations within its own bureaucratic system, unlike the other city-states.

When the money collected for the subjects of the Republic who were taken captive in infidel lands began to be misused, the state became involved, and ‘Provveditori sopra Ospedali e Luoghi Pii e al Riscatto degli Schiavi’, a semi-independent institution partly audited by the state, was founded in 1561.

The entire process unfolded in accord with the spirit and pace of the times, but the War of Cyprus and the Battle of Lepanto led to a significant rupture. The Island of Cyprus was one of Venice's most important commercial harbors and supply centers. After a yearlong siege, first, the capital and ultimately, the entire island, with the fall of the strong harbor, came under the rule of the Ottomans.

During the expedition, one-third of the island was either killed or taken captive. The number of captives was predicted to be around 20,000, and this number terrified not only Venice but the entire Christian world. The trauma was so immense that the Republic, which predicted that the War of Cyprus was approaching, only managed to receive the support of the Christian world, a support that was long awaited but did not arrive upon the fall of Nicosia. The fleets of Venice, Spain, and Papacy came together and went into war with the Ottoman fleet in Lepanto and achieved to defeat the Ottomans.

Only a century had passed since the loss of Peloponnese and Euboea, a traumatic experience for the Venetians with a substantial number of people taken captive, even though this number was much higher in Cyprus. In the wars that lasted for more than a century, Ottomans frequently took Venetian captives, but the traumatic losses in which people living in the regions captured by the Ottomans were taken captive in masses occupied people's minds for a long time and caused a disturbance in all the layers of the society. So much so that even the happiness brought by the victory in Lepanto did not last for long.

Ottomans did not observe any class division when taking the Cypriot people captive. The army took captives in such numbers that the center did not approve. On the other hand, even though it was forbidden to free or sell these captives without informing the center, some captives who had the means, especially the ones from wealthy and large families, became free in exchange for ransom. Despite this, a considerable number of people whose families were prepared to pay ransom were kept within the Ottoman borders for long years, and some remained captives until their deaths.

During the Cyprus Expedition and following the sea battle at Lepanto, many Ottoman generals and soldiers were either killed or taken captive. When the number of those who were taken captive as wounded and died later was calculated, the resulting number of 3486 captives were divided among the three states that joined the battle. Requesting the return of some of the captives at Lepanto, the Sultan laid down some conditions to end the war. Even though only the names of 40 captives were on the list that came from İstanbul, these people were generally from the Ottoman ruling class. However, since the captives were divided and shared among the three states, it took approximately three years to meet this requirement.

This period of three years was long enough to understand that nothing would ever be the same again. Within this period, subtle and intense diplomacy continued among the allied states. Wishing to get the trade in the Levant back on the rails as soon as possible, Venice could convince the Pope, but it was not easy to convince Spain. This duty fell on the Pope. Within this time interval when peace was awaited, Venetian representatives who were accustomed to finding the captives at the hands of the Ottomans and manumitting them managed to rescue captives underhandedly and send them to Venice. The number of the Ottomans who were involved in these types of operations despite the Imperial Council's order forbidding the manumission and selling of the captives taken during the War of Cyprus was considerable. These operations that continued underhandedly came to light incidentally due to a dhimmi who made a complaint because the bailo who owed him money did not pay his debt.

As a sign of goodwill, various captives were at times freed so that the negotiations would continue. Especially Sokullu Mehmed Pasha, who was not in favor of the war since

the very beginning but who had the most valuable captives after the Sultan because he was the Grand Vizier, displayed initiative before the peace was established and took steps in that direction.

The ally of the Ottomans during this period and unwilling to give up its income in the trade that took place in the Levant, France frequently helped Venice in the diplomatic negotiations following the war and for the rescue of the captives even though it was not a part of the Christian alliance.

Venice's commercial activities in the Levant were largely suspended during this period. Since no guarantee could be granted regarding the travel of the ships, the Venetian ships were still captured, and the people inside these ships were taken captive.

Even though the Ottomans wanted the establishment of peace deep down, the peace was not established until the conditions stipulated by the Sultan were met. The Ottomans were less distressed about this issue compared to the Venetians due to the fact that the number of the European captives living in the society was high, and the Ottomans were always the advantaged party concerning the manumission of the Ottoman subjects that fell captive to the Europeans. Regardless of whether the operation took place in the care of the state or a private institution, the usually preferred method for the rescue of an Ottoman citizen was exchanging. This method generally worked thanks to the high number of the Christian captives that were kept. For this method, acquiring permission and finding a suitable captive for exchange proved to be sufficient. Based on its previous experiences, the state might have known it would somehow take back the combatants who fell captive at Lepanto.

While the safe and sound arrival of the 40 captives indicated in the list to İstanbul was expected, the commercial boom anticipated by the Ottomans who wanted the revitalization of commerce came from Northern Europe. Generating its commercial income from the exchange that took place in its own harbors, the Ottoman economy, this time, began to gain momentum with the commercial goods brought by the Dutch and British ships. In brief, even though the commercial activities in the Ottoman harbors decreased for a while, they were not interrupted; however, this was not the case for the Venetian harbors. The ships coming from Northern Europe were previously not able to enter the Venetian harbor for commercial purposes, but for the first time, they began to go to the Levant by purchasing goods from Venice.

As the mobility of the Venetian ships decreased, the Republic provided almost the entire grain supply and the bulk of the supply of alum. It was the primary raw material for its world-renowned fabrics, began to undergo difficult times in these areas as well when the first year of the war had just ended, and famine broke out. As a solution, the Republic attempted to underhandedly purchase grains from the Ottoman merchants by paying even more exorbitant sums than the officially fixed price; however, these purchases never met the needs.

Due to the war, some families lost their profits in the Levant trade. As a result of losing Cyprus, they were deprived of the island's agricultural and commercial revenues. They applied to the administrators of the Republic in order to pay the ransom that was required for many family members who were taken captive.

The majority of the captives that were taken during the Cyprus Expedition were the Greek Orthodox people of the island. If it had not been for the traumatic consequences

of the war, the liberation of the Orthodox people from the Catholic world and the liberation of the local people in the dominions of Venice would not have been significant. However, the complaints that the families of these people conveyed to the official authorities and the rhetoric that Venice used in the diplomatic process that it carried out to convince the Pope for captive exchange mobilized the Pope for these captives as well. In the end, the Pope was the head of all the Christians, and the Vatican's role of rescuer might have also produced positive outcomes in the Orthodox world apart from the European and Eastern Churches. The wound that the loss of Cyprus inflicted on the Christian world would thereby heal to some extent.

For this reason, the Pope decided to create a fund for the captives of Cyprus. When it was announced that such a fund was created, the families of the captives bombarded the Vatican with letters. The people who first heard about this were, of course, the privileged classes, and this fund was put to use by considering the social and economic statuses of the captives. The lower classes of the society did not benefit much from this fund. However, even the creation of such a fund by the Pope prevented the lower classes from feeling that they were left to their own devices. Experiencing once again the difficulty of finding a labor force during the war, the allied powers achieved not to offend these people who were at the bottom of the system.

Contrary to the previous treaties, the Ottomans did not accept Venice's request for the manumission of the war captives in the treaties of 1540 and 1575. Unlike the treaty of 1540, the number of the Venetian subjects who were kept as war captives this time was much higher. For this reason, people born in Venice and came from slavery and only seen occasionally in the interim period became much more visible in the Ottoman society after

the 1580s. Some of them, willingly or forcibly, converted to Islam. Some of them reached the high echelons of the bureaucracy. Some of them were recruited in the guild of janissaries. Some of them owned commercial vehicles. The number of those who were Ottoman subjects until the establishment of the relative peace period that would last till the War of Crete (1645-1669) and acted for the benefit of their previous homelands was also considerable.

In ransom negotiations, the Jews who were engaged in captive trade preserved their positions as the most effective intermediaries during and after the war, thanks to their familial connections in the harbors of Europe and the Levant. New actors other than the Jews began to emerge, acting clandestinely and later openly during the war. The Christians in the capital and even the Muslims served as intermediaries in ransoms operations. The most interesting group among these intermediaries was the group of soldiers and mariners who used to be captives but who were later included in the combatant class who converted to Islam. Some of them even went to Rome and made ransom negotiations.

The war economy took its toll not only on Venice but also on the Ottoman state. The economic crisis that reached its zenith with the debasement of 1586 began to show its effects starting from the 1570s. Most of the gold that entered the country from Europe came from Venice. The vacuum that emerged until the treaty of 1575 was signed resulted with the dominance of silver in the market and the dominance of the eastern coins that were accepted to have the same value as the coins of the west even though their silver ratio was lower.

While the Venetian nobility generally earned their income through trade, some people preferred to be in agriculture in the postwar Terraferma. A few banks that financed

the war went bankrupt, and a state-owned bank was founded in Venice for the first time. Noble families began to abstain from sending a family member to serve as the head of the Levant trade. For this reason, Ottoman subjects became more prominent in the Levant trade. And even the Venetian representatives at certain places were appointed among other nationalities.

The captive rescue organization in Venice grew even larger. The fact that the Venetian inquisition was softer compared to the Vatican and other city-states led many convert Ottoman citizens, who were previously Christians, to take refuge in Venice. These newcomers were integrated into the society through the church; some even acted as intermediaries for the commercial activities between the two states.

Centers that were geographically distant from the territories of hostile states, such as Dubrovnik, Tangiers, and Algeria, turned into places of exchange and sales for captive operations. The ransom economy in Northern Africa made up a significant portion of the state revenues. An entirely different order was established in these distant provinces of the Ottoman state.

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