

SEARCHING FOR POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE
RESOLUTION OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF KURDISH CONFLICT
IN TURKEY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by


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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

SEARCHING FOR POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE RESOLUTION OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF KURDISH CONFLICT IN TURKEY

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Utilizing mixed-method design and multiple data sources (primarily three nationwide public opinion surveys and 113 semi-structured elite interviews), this study examines the power-sharing perspectives in the context of Turkey's Kurdish conflict. It raises two main sets of questions at both elite and mass levels: Who and to what extent does support power sharing arrangements in a multi-ethnic country? Which factors can explain the variance in ethnic group members' and ethno-political elites' varying support for power-sharing arrangements?

This study shows that Turks and Kurds' understandings of and interest-formulations with regard to the power-sharing remain irreconcilable both at the mass and elite levels. At the mass-level, the Turks' opposition to the Kurds' ever-growing power-sharing demands remain strong and constant across years. Regarding Kurdish mass

support for power sharing, the findings of the multivariate analyses support the main propositions of the grievance theory, whereas they disprove the merits of ‘Muslim brotherhood’ – i.e., sharing an overarching religious identity - and socio-economic approaches. At the elite level, the Kurdish elites remain divided in terms of their outlook to the power-sharing arrangements due to their competing interest-formulations. Challenging the unitary actor assumption of the power-sharing theory, this study advocates that the devolution of power creates winners and losers within the peripheral ethnic groups and, thereby fosters intra-ethnic infighting. This thesis proposes a bi-dimensional re-formulation of power-sharing as a conflict-management tool: vertical dimension, overhauling the power structure between the central government and peripheral groups; and horizontal dimension, regulating the power structure between competing co-ethnic segments within the peripheral group. This thesis concludes that under current conditions power-sharing governance remains infeasible in the resolution of the Turkey's Kurdish conflict.

Keywords: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Infighting, Kurdish Problem, Power-Sharing, Religion

ÖZET

ETNİK ÇATIŞMALARIN ÇÖZÜMÜNDE GÜÇ-PAYLAŞIMI DÜZENLEMELERİ: KÜRT SORUNU VAKASI

Fazlıoğlu, Ömer

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Bu çalışma, karışık metot ve çoklu veri kaynaklarından –öncelikli olarak 3 ülke genelinde uygulanmış kamuoyu anketi ve 113 siyasi seçkin ile gerçekleştirilmiş yarı yapılandırılmış görüşme - istifade ederek, Kürt sorunu bağlamında güç paylaşımı perspektifini incelemektedir. Çalışma, seçkin ve kitle düzeylerinde iki temel soru setini incelemektedir: Çok-etnili bir ülkede, kim(ler) ve ne ölçüde güç paylaşımı düzenlemelerini destekler? Hangi faktörler etnik grup mensuplarının ve etnik siyasi elitlerin güç paylaşımı düzenlemelerine yönelik desteğini açıklayabilir?

Bu çalışma, hem elit hem kitle düzeyinde Türk ve Kürtlerin, güç paylaşımına dair anlayışlarının ve çıkar hesaplamalarının uzlaşmaz olduğunu göstermektedir. Kitle düzeyinde, çoklu regresyon analizleri sonuçları, Görelî Mahrumiyet Teorisi’nin temel savlarını desteklerken, “Müslüman Kardeşlik” ve etnik çatışmaların çözümünde sosyo-ekonomik yaklaşımların savlarının aksini kanıtlamaktadır. Elit

düzeyinde, Kürt elitleri kendi içlerindeki çıkar çatışmaları nedeniyle güç paylaşımına bakışları açısından bölünmüş durumdadırlar. Bu noktadan hareketle, bu çalışma, güç paylaşımı teorisinin tekil aktör varsayımını sorgulayarak, etnik gruplara güç devrinin yerel düzlemde kazananlar ve kaybedenler oluşturduğunu ve böylece grup-içi bölünmelere yol açtığını savunmaktadır. Bu tez, bir çatışma-yönetimi bağlamında güç paylaşımına iki-eksenli bir yeniden formülleştirme önermektedir: Merkezi hükümet ve çevresel gruplar arasındaki güç ilişkisini revize eden dikey güç paylaşırma ve aynı etnik çevresel grup içerisinde rekabet içerisinde bulunan kesimler arasındaki güç ilişkisinin düzenlemesi. Bu gözlemler ışığında, bu tez Kürt sorunun çözümü için geniş bir güç paylaşımı yönetişimin şu aşamada mümkün olmayacağı sonucuna varmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Din, Etnik Çatışma, Güç Paylaşımı, Etnik Grup-içi Çatışma
Kürt Sorunu

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“The establishment of stable democratic governments in divided places necessitates two key elements: autonomy and consociational power-sharing”

– Lijphart (1969, 215)

"Majorities in multi-ethnic countries are reluctant to surrender power to a consociational regime, so too are they sorely tempted to abandon the consociational scheme".

– Horowitz (2000, 440)

The Lijphart – Horowitz debate on power-sharing reflects the state-of-play in the intractable Kurdish conflict in Turkey. After decades-long vicious cycles of violence, the politico-military stalemate still persists. The gist of the stalemate at hand is as follows: The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)-led ethno-nationalist insurgency has defiantly challenged the anti-ethnic, power-concentrating system of Turkey with ardent power-sharing demands through violent and non-violent propaganda. Turkish governments, on the other hand, remain intrinsically unwilling to share their authority with Kurdish ethno-nationalists. Following the failure of the recent peace process, the parties to the conflict have adopted policies contributing to the

persistence of the stalemate. On the one hand, the PKK-led Kurdish ethno-nationalist insurgency has re-escalated violence in a country, where its affiliated political outlets have proven to attain a potential to become a coalition-building power in electoral politics. On the other hand, the consecutive Turkish governments have initiated yet another wave of heavy-handed military campaign and judicial activism targeting the Kurdish ethno-nationalist front, which repeatedly prove to be ineffective in suppressing the insurgency. Aiming to articulate on the persistent stalemate from the power-sharing theory's perspective, this study raises two main sets of questions at both elite and mass levels: Who and to what extent does support power sharing arrangements in a multi-ethnic country? Which factors can explain the variance in ethnic group members' and ethno-political elites' varying support for power-sharing arrangements?

This single-case study inquires the power-sharing perspectives of the intractable Kurdish conflict in Turkey. It is a multi-level study encompassing both elite and mass perspectives of power-sharing in the conflict. I formulate two sets of interrelated research questions for my thesis study. At the elite level, I examine the Turkish and Kurdish political elites' understandings of and interest-formulations on power-sharing by using semi-structured elite interviews. At the mass level, I examine who and for what reasons support a power-sharing deal by using an original and comprehensive survey data. In this introductory chapter, I, first, discuss the increasing prevalence of both intra-state conflicts and proliferation of the power-sharing accords aiming to accommodate these conflicts. Secondly, I briefly discuss the onset, evolving positions of the parties and key characteristics of the intractable Kurdish conflict. While providing this brief account, I specifically present the

specific objectives of the parties to the conflict in the intermittent Kurdish peace process. Thirdly, I present the relevance of the power-sharing approach in the Kurdish conflict. Fourthly, I present the structure of the thesis and highlight the main findings of the chapters.

1.1. Proliferation of Power-Sharing Arrangements In The Accommodation of Ethnic Conflicts

Today, the majority of contemporary violent conflicts, unsurprisingly, remain as intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010; Sarkees, Wayman and Singer 2003). The prevalence of ethno-religious conflicts is an ever-growing historical trend: While intra-state conflicts amounted to only about 20 per cent of the armed struggles between the Congress of Vienna (1814) and the Treaty of Versailles (1919), this share, first, rose to 45 per cent by 2011 and reached to 75 per cent since the end of the cold-War (Wimmer and Min, 2006). Today, this historical trend spikes: Only one - the conflict between India and Pakistan- out of 40 active conflicts across the globe, is inter-state, while the remaining 39 conflicts are fought within states (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015)

Given the spike in the number of intra-state conflicts, peaceful accommodation of inter-ethnic tensions in multi-ethnic countries remains as one of the major challenges of modern democracies. A large body of scholarly literature acknowledges that ethnic cleavages may lead to conflict and adversely affect democracy (Przeworski, 2000; Kaufmann, 1996; Reilly, 2001). Several influential empirical works also claim neither democratization nor the expansion of civil liberties appears to reduce civil

war onsets. Two contemporary historical trends also support these empirical findings: The first historical trend is the significant increase in the number of ethnic conflicts in the aftermath of the third wave of democratization since 1974 (Scherrer, 2002; Gurr, 1993). The second trend is the decline in the proportion of liberal democracies after 1992 –mostly due to the expansion of democracy in Eastern Europe - resulting a decrease in the number of ethnic conflict onsets (Gurr, 2000; Diamond, 1996, Wimmer *et al.*, 2009). These apparent trends, backed by some influential empirical findings, have diminished the scholarly influence of recommending the conventional Westminster model of democracy and individual liberties as a standalone panacea to ethnic conflicts, and motivated further research on onset and termination of intra-state ethnic conflicts in democracies (Saideman et al., 2002).

In corollary to the rise of ethnic conflicts, democracies equipped with power-sharing arrangements have been proliferated to accommodate ethno-religious conflicts. Almost all the peace deals achieved in the post-Cold War era includes a power-sharing feature in one form or another (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2005). Recent examples of power-sharing accords abound in Colombia, Cyprus, Iraq, Bosnia and South Africa. Power-sharing Event Dataset (PSED) finds out 111 post-conflict power-sharing agreements between government and rebel dyads in 41 countries during the period between 1989 and 2006. Power-sharing, thus, becomes the policy-makers' generic blanket remedy for conflict resolution and democracy-building in post-conflict settings (Roeder, 2005). However, the track record of post-conflict power-sharing arrangements remains mixed: Out of the 111 cases, power-sharing accords relapse and violence re-escalates in 55 conflicts. (Kreutz, 2010: 246).

1.2. Turkey's Kurdish Conflict

Turkey is not immune from the prevalence of ethnic conflicts. Violent Kurdish ethno-nationalist insurgency-led by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) in Turkey, has persisted almost over the last four decades and, thus, considered to be one of the most resilient active ethnic conflicts in the post-World War II period. Among the 31 on-going intra-state conflicts, according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, only two conflicts (only the insurgencies in Sudan and Colombia) lasted longer than the intractable Kurdish conflict in Turkey (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Tezcür, 2015). The conflict has evolved into a paramount political and socio-economic challenge for Turkey, which severely undermines domestic and foreign policy-making considerations, and also arguably impedes further democratization and economic growth of the country.

Turkey is an ethnically mixed and diverse country. In O'Leary's terms, Turkey is, arguably, a divided place,¹ particularly along ethnic lines (O'Leary, 2005). The Kurds, who comprise between 15% to 20% of the population, according to various estimates, constitute the second largest ethnic group in Turkey.² Most of the Kurds in Turkey are strongly aware that they belong to a distinct ethnic group other than the Turks, Arabs and other Muslim communities. Kurdish language remains focal for Kurdish identity (Bruinessen, 2000). Bruinessen delineates Kurds as native Zaza and

¹ O'Leary (2005:31) expresses that "places" is a more explanatory expression than "societies" because it would be simplistic to simply assume that a divided place contains only one society; that may be a disputable issue, and a deeply divided place may be defined by different societies, be they opposing, parallel, or segregated ones. Those places are, as the term implies, spots where an ethnic conflict does or is likely to take place. They are where ethnic cleansing or coercive assimilation are likely to occur, or have taken place. Power-sharing is often recommended for such places.

² It should be noted that the Kurds legally are not recognized as a minority. The official government line is well-known: "The Lausanne Treaty only recognizes the non-Muslims as minorities."

Kurmanji speakers, as well as those Turkish-speaking persons who still consider themselves as Kurds (Al, 2014; Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 65). In terms of religion, most Kurds and Turks are Sunni Muslims. Divergent from the vast majority of the Sunni Turks and Arabs, who are followers of the Hanefi *mazhab*, the majority of the Sunni Kurds – about 70 per cent according to the surveys used in this research- are followers of the Shafii *mazhab*. In territorial terms, the Kurds are both clustered in the Southeastern part of Turkey and dispersed across various regions of the country. Again about 70 per cent of the Kurds are geographically clustered and outnumber any other ethnic groups in the South-eastern region - most notably in the provinces such as Batman, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Şırnak, Van, etc. - of the country (Mutlu, 1996; İçduygu et al., 1999). However, they are also dispersed and quite intermingled with other ethnic groups, mainly with the Turks and Arabs, in other parts of the country consequent to the economic migration and several instances of forced internal displacement to western parts of the country. A considerable level of ethnic fractionalization and inter-ethnic social contact between the Turks and Kurds occur consequent to the demographic mobility. At the societal level, in spite of the intensification of the Kurdish conflict, inter-ethnic heterogamy – i.e. marriages among Kurds and Turks - has increased particularly from 1990s onwards with the intensification of the domestic migration (Gunduz-Hosgör and Smits, 2002). Despite the presence of overarching religious and confessional cleavages, there remains an ethnic divide between the Turks and Kurds (Sarigil and Karakoç, 2016).

Kurds are not a monolithic ethnic group; rather they portray a fragmented societal structure with strong tribal, sectarian, confessional and linguistic divisions (Bruinessen, 1984, 1992; McDowall, 2014; Houston, 2001; Yavuz and Özcan, 2006;

Al, 2014). Ethnic identity does not merely determine political allegiance of the Kurds. Not all the Kurds support the ethno-nationalist insurgency, which has inherent limitations in its appeal. Consequent to the above-mentioned sociological divisions, the Kurds are also divided across partisan and ideological lines (Yavuz, 1998, pp. 9–18). In a very broad typology, the Kurds can be categorized in three hypothetical groups, for the sake of analysis, in terms of their ideological outlook (Yavuz and Özcan, 2006). The first category is comprised of the Kurdish ethno-nationalists, who sympathize with the PKK-led ethno-nationalist insurgency and support political outlets endorsed by the PKK leadership. The defining characteristics of this category include *inter alia* ethnic nationalism, secularism and anti-traditionalism – i.e., opposing the traditional patriarchal and tribal system particularly vibrant in the Southeastern Turkey. The second category, the Islamist Kurds, prioritize Islamic (read: Sunni) values and identify themselves primarily with religion rather than ethnicity. They tend to see the abrupt secularization in the early republican era as the root cause of the Kurdish conflict. The Islamist Kurds tends to support the conservative (Turkish) parties, lately the AKP, vis-à-vis the ethno-nationalist parties³. However, the Islamist and conservative Kurds, particularly the ones living in the South-eastern Turkey, have increasingly developed an ethnic awareness in the last decades and also established a new political party, the Free Cause Party -*Hür Dava Partisi*-, putting more emphasis on Kurdish ethnic identity. The third category, the integrated Kurds, are the ones who migrate to the western parts of the country, acculturated and blend into the superordinate Turkish

³ This does not mean that there are no conservative Kurds among supporters of the PKK-led Kurdish ethno-political movement. Especially in the last years, the Kurdish ethno-political movement has appealed a considerable level of support from the conservative Kurdish circles.

citizenship. They tend to have no political allegiance related to their ethnic identity (Yavuz and Özcan, 2006; Kutlay, 2002).

Despite the existence of a considerable ethnic diversity, the Turkish state has been an archetypical power-concentrating regime, in Norris' conceptualization,⁴ in terms of legal and institutional architecture (Norris, 2008). Power-concentrating characteristics of Turkey include *inter alia* unitary form of the state, extremely centralized governance – i.e., envisaging tutelary administrative powers of the central government over elected local political bodies - election law with the highest electoral threshold in the world. In addition to these power-concentrating features, Turkish state has an anti-ethnic citizenship regime, which does not recognize institutional expression of any ethnicity and limit citizenship rights to a specific ethnic group (Aktürk, 2012).⁵ According to Aktürk's tripartite typology, anti-ethnic regimes, similar to the mono-ethnic ones, neither recognize and support minority languages, nor give any territorial autonomy for minority ethnic groups, and draw no distinctions for them in identification documents (Aktürk, 2012; Nathans, 2014). Instead of recognizing ethnic identities, the Turkish state imposes a superordinate Turkish citizenship to all regardless of their ethnic origin (Aktürk, 2012; İçduygu et al, 2006; Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997; Bora, 2003; Yeğen, 2011).

The historical process through which the political system has been configured in Turkey severely restricts Kurds' access to political power, inclusion and public

⁴ Norris conceptualizes power-sharing regimes, as opposed to the power-concentrating ones, based on four institutional characteristics - the electoral system, the executive structure, the state system, and the independence of the media (Norris, 2008).

⁵ Aktürk's typology on ethnicity regimes bases on whether citizenship is defined in relation to ethnicity and whether other ethnic communities are institutionally recognized.

expression of their ethnic identity. The Turkish state, successor of the Ottoman Empire, was founded by former Ottoman military officers, who share a collective memory comprised of traumatic decay of multi-religious and multi-ethnic Ottoman polity (Rustow, 1959, 1988; Yavuz & Blumi, 2013). As a historical legacy, Turkish political elites attribute the traumatic dissolution of this multi-national order to competing ethno-religious nationalisms and hold an intrinsic suspicion towards the remaining ethnic groups in the first decades following the foundation of the new Republic in 1923 (Mango, 1999; Somer and Liaras, 2010). Both in the late Ottoman and early Republican eras, the Kurds remained as a traditional source of opposition to centralized authority in the Southeastern region (Özoğlu, 2004; Mango, 1999). Feeling threatened by a possible Kurdish uprising, especially after the 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion, generations of Turkish elites perceived a threat from the Kurds, perceived a potential Kurdish ethno-religious mobilization as potentially divisive and, therefore strived to repress any collective expression of Kurdishness, alongside other ethnic and religious groups (Mango, 1999; Somer, 2005; Çağaptay, 2009; Somer and Liaras, 2010). In such a power-concentrating, anti-ethnic institutional set up, the Kurdish ethnic identity was historically securitized and Kurds have been subjected to discrimination and exclusion on various instances by the Turkish state (Bozarslan, 2001; Barkey & Fuller, 1998; Çağaptay, 2009; Yeğen, 2011; Gunter, 1990; Somer, 2005). These exclusionary policies included *inter alia* the non-recognition of Kurds' ethnic distinctivity, bans on the use of the Kurdish language in education and broadcasting as well as prohibition of their ethnic symbols in public space (Bruinessen, 1992; Olson 1989; Öktem 2004; Romano, 2006; McDowall, 2014; Gürses, 2015).

Kurdish dissent has a long-pedigree. Some scholars trace the origins of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey to the late Ottoman era (Bruinessen, 2003; McDowall, 2014; Olson, 1989; Klein, 2007). However another thread of the literature regard the Kurdish rebellions in late Ottoman and early Republican era's reactionary mobilizations to the centralization of authority and abrupt secularization (Natali, 2004; Jwaideh, 2006; Özoğlu, 2004). During the early Republican and multi-party periods, Kurdish political elites – i.e., mostly local notables; tribal leaders, religious figures, etc. - co-opted primarily with mainstream political parties. Consequent to this co-optation, ethnic Kurds were well-represented in Turkish party politics as long as they downplayed their Kurdish identity in public (Watts, 2010). As a result of this tacit agreement, a vast majority of Kurdish politicians, who took office in local and national parliaments, considered their ethnic identity politically irrelevant during their service in Turkish parties. (Watts, 2010; Bruinessen, 1992).

From the late 1960s onwards, Kurdish activists established numerous, small Kurdish political organizations, which articulated Kurdish identity and demands within the Marxist discourse. (Güneş, 2012; Öktem, 2006) In line with their ideological outlook, Kurdish political activists of the time portrayed the Kurdish question as a transnational liberation movement, which sought a revolutionary movement led by the Kurdish working class to end the Kurds' oppression by the state and Kurdish feudal elites (Güneş, 2012). However, these organizations remained marginal, could not garner supporters and do not qualify as an ethno-political movement. According to Esman (1994), an ethno-political movement is a political challenger that aims to influence ethnically-inspired collective interests on the agenda of the central governments. Recalling this definition, I argue that a pro-Kurdish ethnic mobilization, which garners mass-level support from the Kurdish ethnic

constituency, realizes only after the advent of the violent ethno-nationalist insurgency-led by PKK. Whereas early Kurdish political activism with a Marxist outlook between 1960 and 1980 was characterized by organizational disunity, fragmentation and limited popular support, the PKK established an ideological hegemony over time (see also Tezcür, 2015). From 1991 onwards, Kurdish ethno-nationalists have competed in the local and parliamentary elections with their own ethnic parties. These parties' electoral gains –i.e., electoral offices won by them at the local level and parliamentary representation - have allowed the Kurdish ethno-nationalists to challenge the official state rhetoric and policies and to legitimize and promote their political struggle (Watts, 2010). In line with the anti-ethnic, power-concentrating traits of the Turkish state, the Turkish Constitutional Court banned seven successive Kurdish ethnic parties on grounds of constitutional provisions enshrining the unity of the state and nation (Watts, 2010).

1.3. The PKK-led ethno-nationalist Kurdish insurgency

The conceptualization of the PKK-led ethno-nationalist movement remains controversial in the literature. Some regard the PKK merely as a terrorist organization (Laçiner & Bal, 2004), while others conceptualize it as an ethno-nationalist insurgency (see Barkey and Fuller, 1998; Özcan, 1999; Marcus, 2007; Watts, 2010). Defining characteristics of an insurgency include *inter alia* (1) pursuit of a political goal (mostly in the form of territorial claim, secession or regime change) challenging the incumbent regime; (2) a violent challenge against the legitimacy of the existing political authority; (3) popular (active, passive, and also tacit) support at the mass-level; (4) political violence targeting the state authorities –

i.e., the security forces. On the other hand, terrorism is merely a tool to achieve a political goal. It does not necessarily have to have active and tacit support from a large population, nor does it directly target government forces (Ünal, 2013). The examination of its characteristics below also reveals that the PKK should be conceptualized as an ethno-nationalist insurgency adopting both terrorism and guerrilla tactics in order to achieve its political goals.

The PKK, established in 1978 as a Marxist/Leninist organization, initially targeted, in a sporadic fashion, traditional power-houses in the Southeastern Turkey –i.e., Kurdish tribal leaders and some rival Kurdish organizations (Özcan, 1999; Ökem, 2006). From 1984 onwards, the PKK has initiated a Maoist protracted guerrilla war against the Turkish state (Özcan, 1999, Ünal, 2013). In terms of politico-military goals, the PKK, initially, envisaged building a social control over the Kurds, liberating a permanent territory in the South-eastern Turkey, and, then, establishing an independent socialist Kurdistan (Özcan, 1999; Ünal, 2013) over the previously demarcated territory. While the PKK-led insurgency adhered to the original goal of "liberating territory" and establishing an independent Kurdistan until 1995, consecutive Turkish governments, on the other hand, strived to suppress the insurgency by military means and judicial activism. Consequent to the armed conflict, most of the provinces in the southeastern and eastern Turkey remained under emergency rule until 2002. Along with intense military action, Turkish governments established a provisional village guard system – i.e., the first one was established in 1985-, according to which volunteer villagers – mostly coming from conservative Kurdish tribes - receive armed training to guard their villages against the PKK militants. Between 1990 and 1999, the Turkish security forces also forcibly

evacuated the inhabitants of remote Kurdish villages and resettled them in larger villages for better control of the region. During the emergency rule and intense military action of both sides, Kurds inhabiting in these regions suffered serious setback in terms of serious restrictions over their fundamental rights, and subjected to arbitrary detention, arrest, torture (Ensaroğlu, Kurban, 2010; Watts, 2010).

The PKK modified its ideological outlook and political objective in time. In terms of ideological outlook, the Marxist / Leninist references have diminished in the post-Cold War era, and the organization has increasingly portrayed itself as an ethno-nationalist liberation struggle (Özcan, 1999; Ünal, 2013). Due to military and political developments, the PKK also modified its politico-military goals and strategy in mid-1990s. The insurgency's leadership acknowledged the military defeat –i.e., due to the failure of permanently liberating a territory- vis-à-vis the Turkish army in 1994 and renounced the goal of secession (Tezcür, 2015; Ünal, 2013). The insurgency also suffered a significant set-back when the founding leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was caught and imprisoned in 1999. Following his arrest, the PKK declared a temporary cease-fire, put more emphasis on political activities and aimed to reach a power-sharing accord with the Turkish state (Özcan, 2005: 247). In the post-1999 period, the PKK has resorted to violence to deflect the state power, and, thus, to force the governments to re-negotiate the power-concentrating institutional set up and unitary constitutional character of the Turkish state (Ünal, 2013). In line with the revised political goals, the PKK attributed significance to increase political mobilization and social control –i.e., through legal and illegal organizations' violent and non-violent propaganda - in order to become a *de facto* political power in the Southeastern region by replacing the Turkish state's authority (Özcan, 2005; Ünal,

2013). Despite the failure in realizing the initial military goal, the PKK succeeded in becoming the hegemonic Kurdish ethno-nationalist organization and secured a considerable social control over a loyal ethnic constituency (Tezcür, 2015; Gunes, 2012).

Albeit relative democratization of Turkey in the EU axis in late 1990s, the Kurdish issue still remains as an archetypical intractable ethnic conflict, which is struggled over perceived important political goals, involves inter-ethnic disquiet and vicious cycles of violence (Bar-Tal, 2003; Kriesberg, 1982). Alike other intractable ethnic conflicts, vicious cycles of violence have persisted, albeit implementation of truce in 1994, 1999, 2003, 2009 and 2013. The accounts on the overall death toll of the Kurdish conflict are controversial due to prevailing inconsistencies between various sources. Since the onset of the PKK-led insurgency, 9481 civilians, 7.918 security personnel and 22.000 PKK insurgents, according to the report of the *ad hoc* parliamentary Inquiry Commission for Societal Peace and Assessment of the Settlement Process, were killed between 1984 and 2012.⁶ Turkish Police's statistics for the period between 1984 and 2013 provide a slightly different account: 39,476 fatalities of which 26,774 PKK militants, 5478 were civilian citizens, and 6764 were members of the security apparatus (Ünal, 2015).⁷

Similar to other protracted conflicts, the Kurdish conflict occupies a salient place in the lives of the society members and impacts *inter alia* the voting behavior. This is

⁶ The *ad hoc* Parliamentary Inquiry Commission for Societal Peace and Assessment of the Settlement Process was established in May 2013 with inter-party participation. For the Commission's report: http://tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/cozum_sureci/docs/cozum_kom_raporu.pdf Accessed on 20 February 2014.

⁷ There are inconsistencies between various sources indicating the level of violence and fatality statistics, therefore I refer to the official statistics provided by the government sources.

particularly the case for Kurds' living in the Southeastern Turkey. As an archetypical ethno-nationalist insurgent organization, the PKK leadership portrays the ethno-nationalist insurgency as the sole representative of all Kurds. Although the PKK garners a substantial level of support among the Kurds, particularly the conservative and integrated Kurds, with reference to an above-discussed broad typology, do not support the insurgency. The voting behavior of the Kurds, particularly the ones living in the Southeastern region, also reflects the centrality of the protracted Kurdish conflict in their lives. The voting behavior of the Kurds living in the Southeastern Turkey represents a polarized structure: The vast majority either votes for the conservative Turkish political parties (such as the AKP) or, to a much lesser extent, recently established Kurdish Islamic party (such as the Hür Dava Partisi) or Kurdish ethnic parties.




Figure 1: Electoral competition in the Kurdish-majority provinces

Notes: Conservative parties (AKP, Felicity and Virtue Parties); Center right parties (Motherland and True Path Parties) Center Left Parties (Republican People's Party and Demoratic Left Party). Turkish Nationalist Party (MHP). Kurdish majority provinces: Batman, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sanliurfa, Sirnak, Van.

Figure 1.2 below represents the growing electoral appeal of the Kurdish ethnic parties across Turkey from 1995 onwards. Throughout the 1990s, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists' electoral support has not significantly changed regardless of the violence

exerted by the PKK. Despite the electoral strongholds in the Southeastern Turkey, the ten per cent electoral threshold impeded the Kurdish ethno-nationalists' representation as a party bloc in the legislature until 2011.⁸ However, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists have enjoyed an incremental electoral support pattern in both local and parliamentary elections since 2009. They, for the first time, surpassed the threshold by nominating independent candidates and gained 36 seats in the legislature in 2011. In June 2015 elections, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists pulled off a game-changer electoral victory when the pro-Kurdish party received 13.12 per cent of the votes and achieved a coalition-building power with 80 parliamentary seats.




Figure 2: Votes of pro-Kurdish parties across Turkey (1995-2015)

Although the electoral politics have provided, in theory, coalition-building power for the Kurdish parties after the recent electoral victories, the ballot box has never replaced the political violence partly because of the existing institutional barriers for elected offices and rebel flank's tutelage over the political front. The institutional design of the electoral system has aggravated the Kurds' ethnic exclusion. The 10 per cent threshold prevented the Kurdish ethno-nationalists representation in the

⁸ In addition to the threshold, judicial activism also hinders the Kurdish political front's representation. The Constitutional Court banned seven consecutive Kurdish ethnic political parties - on the grounds that they violated the constitutional provision enshrining the Turkish unity - since the establishment of the first one in 1989.

parliament as a political party group until 2007. The Kurdish ethno-nationalists managed to form parliamentary groups only through independent candidates in the 2007 and 2011 elections. Additionally, traditional Turkish judicial activism either ruled for the closures of the pro-Kurdish parties or individually targeted leaders, deputies and executives of the pro-Kurdish parties. On the other hand, the PKK, as a first-generation organization, whose founding rebel leadership is still alive and dictates the strategic decisions of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement, has left very limited representation role for the Kurdish political parties. Given the PKK leadership's over-weening eminence in the insurgency, the legal political wing of the Kurdish ethno-nationalists acquiesced vis-à-vis the armed flank of the Kurdish ethno-nationalists. For instance, Öcalan and PKK rebels, throughout the peace process, hoped to benefit rebel inclusion provisions – i.e., as enjoyed by other secessionist guerilla -movements such as the ETA in Spain and the IRA in Northern Ireland - of an eventual power-sharing deal. However, unlike the ETA or the IRA leadership, Öcalan and PKK leadership never positioned the leadership of the legal pro-Kurdish party as a political interlocutor vis-à-vis the Turkish government. Consequent to the pressures from the Turkish state and the PKK, electoral politics never totally replaced armed struggle pursued by the PKK (Watts, 2010).

Disquiet in inter-ethnic relations is one of the central elements of the protracted ethnic conflicts. The Kurdish conflict is believed to be an atypical case. Although at least one generation of the Turks and Kurds in Turkey has not witnessed a peaceful political climate and grown up in the midst of a violent conflict, the country did not experience a mass-scale inter-communal violence even during the peak of the armed clashes. The conflict between the PKK rebels and Turkish security forces does not

expand to community-level tensions between ordinary Turkish and Kurdish citizens (Blum and Çelik 2007; Gambetti 2007). Nevertheless, negative attitudes and discourse targeting Kurds exist in certain segments of the society and sporadic episodes of violence in urban areas occasionally occur (Bora, 2003; Saracoglu, 2009; Sarigil and Karakoc, 2016).

Similar to other intractable conflicts, parties to the Kurdish conflict perceive their causes as existential, and show reluctance to make certain compromises for a political solution (Kriesberg, 1982; Bar-Tal, 2003). This becomes apparent particularly in the last decade when an intermittent peace process failed despite political conditions conducive for an eventual resolution. While the Turkish governments still perceive constitutionally-backed power-concentrating and anti-ethnic features (such as the unitary character of the Turkish state, citizenship definition, etc.) as existential, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists, on the other hand, still aspire to achieve what they somewhat ambiguously term as ‘democratic autonomy’ as the ultimate political objective. Therefore, the political objectives as well as electoral calculations and regional aspirations of the parties to the Kurdish conflict still remain irrevocable.

1.4. A Gradual Paradigm Change: Democratization in the EU axis, the anti-establishment AKP governments, and an intermittent peace process

From the late-1990s onwards, the Kurdish conflict has involved a paradigm shift. While the PKK-led ethno-nationalists renounced the goal of secession and prioritized political propaganda over violence, a more reconciliatory government-response

gradually replaced the security-oriented old paradigm in the early 2000s (Tezcür, 2009; Yavuz and Özcan, 2015). The diminishing threat perception caused by the Kurdish ethno-nationalist insurgency after Öcalan's capture, the conservative AKP's exponential advent to power in 2002 and ardent democratization in the EU context fundamentally changed the political and security context of the Kurdish conflict (Somer, 2005).

Scholars highlight three principal reasons for this paradigmatic change: First reason pertains to the country's overall relative democratization in the EU axis in the aftermath of the EU's granting of the candidacy status to Turkey in 1997. The European Union's political conditionality moderated the consecutive Turkish governments' response towards a reconciliatory approach in the Kurdish conflict (Ozdemir, Sarigil, 2015; Diez et al, 2005; Cengiz & Hoffman, 2013). The second critical juncture contributing to this paradigmatic change is the PKK's unilateral ceasefire following the capture of Öcalan. The Southeastern Turkey experienced a relative improvement in the security climate with the PKK's cease-fire and lifting of the emergency rule in 2002. In this relative democratization era, the Turkish governments adopted conditional and partial amnesty laws – i.e., the first one is known as “the Returning Home Bill,” implemented between January 2003 to January 2004; and the second one is known as “the active repentance law,” implemented 2005 onwards- providing a legal shelter for the PKK militants, who lay down arms and surrender. Last, but definitely not the least, reason for the paradigm change is the exponential advent of the conservative and anti-establishment Justice and Development Party's (AKP) to power in 2002 (Somer and Liaras, 2010). The AKP, which initially portrayed itself as a reformist political challenge to the military-

dominated Turkish political establishment, brought together diverse social groups, including the conservative Kurds. Conservative Kurds were well-positioned in the AKP's leadership cadres, especially during the early AKP governments' terms. In line with the traditional Islamist thinking, the AKP leadership viewed the Turkish establishment's repressive policies towards the Kurds as the principal root cause of the conflict. (Yavuz and Özcan, 2006) Moreover, the AKP leadership, albeit not consistently, used a political discourse acknowledging the ethno-political essence of the Kurdish conflict. For instance, founding leader of the AKP, Erdoğan, acknowledged "the Kurdish question" and claimed that 'the Turkish state had made mistakes in the past and promised to resolve it by means of more democracy, more citizenship law, and more prosperity' in his historic speech made in Diyarbakır in 2005 (cited in Yeğen, 2011).⁹

This paradigm shift also occurred consequent to the parties' gradual recognition of a mutually hurting stalemate in the conflict. Given the unlikelihood of either sides' decisive victory, the discussions around the Kurdish conflict shifted to the ripeness of conflict or relative merits of a negotiated settlement in late 2000s. While the consecutive Turkish governments, after decades-long denial and exclusion, lost faith in suppressing the ethno-nationalist insurgency by military means and somewhat recognized the ethno-political nature of the problem, the PKK-led Kurdish ethno-nationalists, on the other hand, renounced the goal of secession, aimed to compel the Turkish government a negotiated settlement, albeit could not force any of them to grant core power-sharing concessions (Bila 2010; Yavuz and Ozcan (2006, p. 103)).

With these considerations in mind, the government and PKK leadership committed

⁹ See "Erdoğan'dan Diyarbakır'da tarihi konuşma: Hataları yok sayamayız", in Milliyet, 12 August 2005, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/08/12/son/sonsiy08.html>

themselves to an intermittent peace process to reach a negotiated settlement between 2008 and 2015.

A brief analysis of the failed Kurdish peace process contributes to our understanding of parties' negotiating positions and limits of potential power-sharing deal between a traditional power-concentrating regime and a power-sharing seeking ethno-nationalist insurgency group. The intermittent peace process can be divided into three periods, between which violence re-escalated during the breaks of peace talks. The first round of the peace process, which is widely known as the "Oslo talks," took place secretly between Turkish intelligence officials, imprisoned PKK leader, Öcalan, and top figures of the PKK's diaspora flank reportedly in 2008 and 2009 under the auspices of at least one third country in different European countries (Yeğen, 2011). In this round of talks, Öcalan submitted a three-phased road-map for advancing the peace talks. Öcalan pledged for the PKK's unilateral inaction in terms of armed activities in the first stage. The second phase envisaged the PKK rebels' withdrawal from Turkish territories under international supervision. In exchange, he asked for the establishment of an inter-party parliamentary commission sponsoring necessary legislative pieces required during the peace process and also requested the release of the political prisoners convicted for PKK-related terrorism charges. In the third phase, he envisaged overhauling the constitution in a way to set up a Kurdish self-rule in the Southeastern Turkey and to grant collective rights to the Kurds (Yeğen, 2011; Öcalan, 1999).

The second round of the peace process, which is widely known as the 'Kurdish opening', took place between 2010 and 2011. In this round, different from the Oslo talks, the AKP government of the time assumed a political ownership, portrayed the

‘Kurdish opening’ as an overall democratization move in order to garner support for the process. (Yeğen, 2011) The final round of the process, known as the Settlement Process, lasted between 2013 and 2015. Öcalan, in his Newroz message in March 2013, denounced armed struggle and calls the PKK cadres to withdraw from Turkish territories. In response, the AKP-government, in March 2013, introduced a democratization package granting inter alia political campaigning, education in private, but not state, schools, and radio and TV broadcasting in non-Turkish languages (read: Kurdish) - to address Kurdish demands in the field of cultural rights. The prospects for an eventual peace spiked on 28 February 2015, when an HDP delegation read a ten-point peace plan, which was written by Öcalan, in the presence of relevant government ministers and security officials leading the peace talks. In his plan, later called as the Dolmabahce consensus, Öcalan again denounced armed struggle; called for a cease-fire, disarmament and withdrawal of PKK rebels from Turkish territory. In exchange, he demanded a constitutional overhaul, envisaged providing legal and constitutional guarantees for the recognition of a pluralistic understanding of identity and emphasized a democratic republic and common homeland¹⁰ (Hurriyet Daily News, 2013).

Despite raising hopes for an eventual resolution, the peace process collapsed for good in 2015 in the aftermath of the June parliamentary elections. The government and Kurdish ethno-nationalists have contrasting accounts of how the peace process collapsed. I see three principal reasons for the collapse of the peace process. The first reason is the irrevocable negotiating positions of the parties. Significant differences

¹⁰ Kurdish peace call made amid row on security bill, accessed at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/kurdish-peace-call-made-amid-row-on-security-bill.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78999&NewsCatID=338>, 12.19.2016

separate what the AKP government was ready to deliver and what the Kurdish insurgency would minimally consent for initiating a withdrawal, disarmament and demobilization process. The PKK's leadership had its own stakes –i.e., amnesty, rebel inclusion provisions, etc. - that would not be met by political power-sharing reforms alone. In the absence of a clear vision for breakthrough and legal guarantees envisaging rebel inclusion, there remained no stake for the PKK leadership to disarm and withdraw from Turkey unless the government consented them to transform their military power into a political power (Tezcür, 2013). Besides the disarmament and rebel inclusion dimension, irrevocable positions also remained between parties in terms of an eventual peace. As the ultimate political objective, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists envisaged overhauling of the power-concentrating and anti-ethnic features of the Turkish constitution in order to provide a basis for what they ambiguously term as 'democratic autonomy' i.e., granting of Kurdish collective rights and self-rule. Given a negotiated settlement would inevitably involve devolution of powers enjoyed by the central government to popularly elected local authorities, the AKP governments remained intrinsically unwilling to give up their authority (Tezcür, 2013).

The second reason for the collapse of the peace process pertains to the conflicting electoral calculations of the Kurdish ethno-nationalists, incumbent AKP, and President Erdoğan. While the AKP, for the first time, could not reach to a necessary majority to establish a single-party government in June 2015 parliamentary elections, the pro-Kurdish bloc reached to a historic-high 13 per cent of votes with a bold campaign opposing President Erdoğan's ultimate political ambition of introducing a presidential system. The election results, for the first time, gave the pro-Kurdish

camp a coalition-building power. A hypothetical electoral deal would be possible between the Kurdish ethno-nationalists and AKP government: Erdogan would give the Kurdish movement what it wanted (i.e., recognizing Kurdish identity in the constitution, self-rule, etc.), and in return, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists would support a presidential system. However, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists' persistent opposition to President Erdoğan's ambitions of introducing a presidential system led the latter to lose his electoral incentives for the peace process. Given the losses from the Kurdish electorates in consecutive parliamentary, presidential and local elections, the peace process proved to be electorally costly for the President and AKP governments.

The third major reason pertains to the transnational nature of the Kurdish conflict – i.e., the Kurds disperse across the regional countries, particularly Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The PKK's significant involvement in the Syrian conflict further complicated the peace process in Turkey. The Kurds and Turkish establishment had existentially conflicting political objectives in Syria. The Syrian Kurds-led by the PKK's off-shoot, PYD, aspired to establish a self-ruled Kurdish region in the northern part of Syria. From the Turkish security establishment's perspective, the last thing that Ankara would wish to see in Syria is the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region in its southern flank. The parties' conflicting interests in Syria also overshadowed the initial political commitment for the peace process in Turkey.

Following the demise of the peace process in 2015, the clashes flared up between the security forces and PKK and the conflict entered into one of the most violent episodes of its history. The government declared curfews in south-eastern districts to

ensure security forces' control over areas where Kurdish ethno-nationalists-held municipalities previously announced autonomous self-rule, and where allegedly the presence of the PKK surged. A significant security melt-down resulted in 2481 confirmed deaths (including PKK and security forces members as well as civilians) between June 2015 and September 2016 (ICG, Open-source casualty database, 2016). In 2016, traditional Turkish judicial activism also targeted the pro-Kurdish politicians, including the co-chairs of the HDP, who extended support for the establishment of *de facto* self-rules – i.e., the HDP-controlled municipalities' mayors announced democratic autonomy - following the fall of the process. In such a stalemated context, this thesis questions the feasibility of the power-sharing approach, which mostly overlaps with the Kurdish ethno-nationalists' key demands, for an eventual resolution of the Kurdish conflict.

1.5. The Relevance of the Power-Sharing Approach

Turkey's protracted Kurdish conflict poses an extremely relevant case-study for studying power-sharing literature for three main reasons. The first and foremost reason for this relevance is the on-going "mutually hurting stalemate" and "ripeness" of the conflict. Zartman argues that there is a point of equilibrium in conflicts where none of the parties can further its position in order to achieve its main political objective, and, instead, they come to understand that the costs of continuation of fighting outweighs its benefits. This stage of a conflict is called "mutually hurting stalemate," which is usually assessed as the period of ripeness for the introduction of proposals for the resolution (1989). Hartzell & Hoddie (2007) argue that a power-sharing accord depends partly on a mutual hurting stalemate in which parties to the

conflict realize their inability to achieve their goals by military means. Zartman proposes that if the parties to a conflict perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and see a negotiated solution as a desirable option, the confrontation is, then, ripe for resolution (Zartman, 1989, p.183). In line with Zartman's reflections, both the Turkish state and the PKK-led Kurdish insurgency are stalemated and ripe for a solution. As discussed above, the PKK-led ethno-nationalist movement, albeit succeeds in securing a considerable support from its ethnic constituency and becomes a hegemonic pro-Kurdish movement, fails in forcing, through violent and non-violent means, Turkish governments to give concessions on granting Kurdish autonomy and collective rights. The Turkish state, on the other hand, fails both in suppressing the PKK-led Kurdish ethno-nationalist insurgency with various military campaigns and gradually starts to recognize the Kurdish identity (Yeğen, 2011).

However, the Turkish governments' recent reconciliatory steps merely recognize cultural rights of the Kurds in a limited fashion and do not suffice to satisfy the Kurdish ethno-nationalists' key power-sharing demands. In such a stalemated politico-military situation, one can argue, in line with Zartman's (1989) reasoning, that both Turkey and pro-Kurdish political elites should reach a mutual understanding to negotiate over sharing the political power in order to accommodate the Kurdish ethno-nationalist demands in a non-violent manner.

The second reason of the power-sharing approach's relevance is the elite-driven characteristics of the conflict. The Kurdish conflict in Turkey is highly elite-driven. In line with the seminal works of Lecours (2000) and Brass (1991), the rebel leaders of the PKK and new generation Kurdish political leaders play an over-weening role in identity construction, ethnic mobilization, interest definition for their ethnic

constituencies. Relatively speaking, they are more organized and active than in the past, and increasingly capable of articulating common Kurdish demands. On the other hand, Turkish elites, partly due to the leader-centric political parties and weak intra-party opposition, are also able to spur their voters in line with the party preferences. For instance, the AKP leadership proves to be successful in garnering support for the intermittent Kurdish peace process from its conservative and nationalist constituency.

The third reason pertains to the Kurdish demands which necessitate overhauling of the Turkish state's institutional architecture. The literature on the Kurdish conflict acknowledges that power-concentrating institutional architecture (such as: centralized governance, tutelary powers of the central administration, electoral threshold, etc.) in Turkey systematically disfavors the Kurds and breeds the conflict (Yeğen, 2011; Watts 2010). Consequently, several Kurdish and Turkish elites argue that the Turkish state needs to provide an institutional design, which guarantees power-sharing features to accommodate the Kurdish ethno-nationalist demands in a non-violent way. As discussed above, the key demands of the Kurdish ethno-nationalists –i.e., including granting of territorial autonomy, constitutional recognition of the collective Kurdish identity, overhaul of the electoral system, granting of official status to the Kurdish language, etc. - also envisages overhauling of the Turkish state's institutional and constitutional set up. Besides the failed peace process, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists also raised their demands in an inter-party constitutional reform commission established within the Parliament in 2011. In their written proposal, the pro-Kurdish party called for a constitution providing a legal basis for a “multi-cultural, multi-identity, multi-faith and multi-lingual structure of

Turkey.” Equal citizenship and democratic autonomy across Turkey (with regional parliaments and elected local administrators, including governors) stood out as key components of the pro-Kurdish party’s proposals for a new constitution.¹¹ The transformation of the Turkish state into what pro-Kurdish elites have ambiguously termed at various times as “democratic autonomy” or “democratic confederalism” can only be achieved with the political and territorial power-sharing features.

1.6. Findings, Arguments and Contributions of the Thesis

At the mass level - i.e., the Kurds’ and Turks’ views on power sharing -, empirical analyses based on the survey data affirmed the elite-driven nature of the Kurdish conflict. The Turks and Kurds’ attitudes towards the power-sharing arrangements, which overlaps with Turkis and Kurdish elite positions, remained irrevocable and irreconcilable across years. Aiming to explain the variance in the Kurds' support for different features of power-sharing, I tested three hypotheses derived from relative deprivation, modernization and superordinate religious identity theories. The multivariate findings affirm the relevance of grievance theory and disprove the significance of religiosity and socio-economic factors in explaining the variance of the support towards power-sharing among the Kurds.

At the elite level, the perspectives of the (ethno-)political elites on power-sharing remained irrevocable and irreconcilable. The Kurdish ethno-nationalists’ understanding of power-sharing was comprehensive calling for a broad institutional repertoire, comprising an extra-territorial asymmetric autonomy, constitutionally-

¹¹ See the HDP’s constitutional overhaul proposal submitted to the Parliament: <http://t24.com.tr/haber/dort-partinin-kismi-anayasa-taslaklarinin-tam-metni,227180>

embedded cultural protectionism and rebel inclusion pillars. The Kurdish Islamist elites remained hesitant to support rebel inclusion provision due to their security concerns –i.e., the PKK’s possible score-settling with them after receiving legal shelters for inclusion-.

On the Turkish front, the incorporation strategy – i.e., subduing the distinctive Kurdish identity either to the overarching *ummah*, Turkish citizenship or Turkish nation categories - remained the main tool for all of the segments. Fearing a possible ethnically-inspired disaccord within their overarching loyalties, the Turkish elites remained reluctant to accept politico-territorial power-sharing claims. The Turkish Islamist elites’ outlook to power-sharing was torn between two of their Islamic ideological predicaments: The first recognizing a distinct Kurdish ethnicity; and, the second one, subordinating distinct ethnic collectivities under overarching *ummah*. Positioning themselves as veto players, CHP and MHP affiliated and like-minded elites understandings tended to see power-sharing pillars as being potentially divisive, rebel-legitimizing and rebel-strengthening. Lacking a common partisan background, Turkish establishment elites’ narratives were diverse; nevertheless most of them also view power-sharing as divisive, rebel-strengthening and rebel-legitimizing.

This thesis makes important theoretical and analytical contributions to the power-sharing literature and our scholarly understandings of the Kurdish conflict. First, it integrates theoretical insights from the power-sharing research to the literature on the Kurdish conflict. Despite its relevance discussed above, the power-sharing perspectives of the Kurdish conflict remain untouched. This study, therefore, aims to

narrow a gap with particular emphasis on mass support towards power sharing and differing elite understandings of power sharing. Second, the current literature on ethnic power-sharing mainly focuses on cross-country empirical works. It generalizes across regime types, regions, institutional set up of the host countries and elite behaviors, etc. Thus, the existing literature does not take into account detailed case-by-case knowledge, especially the elite behavior in a power-sharing context. My single case-study therefore contributes to a gap in providing a detailed analysis of a conflict case with specific reference to the conflict's characteristics, host country's institutional set up and elite behavior. Thirdly, this thesis, empirically, fills an important gap by observing the determinants of power-sharing at the mass-level. Fourthly, the thesis refines existing assumptions on the causal link between the elite and mass attitudes towards power-sharing. In doing so, this study paves the way for outstanding areas of future research and provides significant policy-relevant findings.

1.7. The Structure of the Thesis

Following this introduction chapter, the thesis proceeds as follows: The second chapter discusses the conceptual and theoretical aspects of power-sharing literature with reference to the Kurdish conflict. The third chapter presents the hypotheses – about the mass-level support for power-sharing arrangements - i.e., derived from the relative deprivation, "Islamic peace" (superordinate religious identity theory) and modernization theories (socio-economic approaches) – to be tested within the context of the Kurdish conflict. The fourth chapter discusses the survey data and presents the multi-variate empirical findings. The fifth chapter presents the elite theory, Turkish and Kurdish elites' perspectives on power-sharing in the Kurdish conflict. Lastly, I

review the main findings from the empirical chapters and discuss the theoretical contributions of the study.



CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

2.1. Ethnic Conflicts and Power-Sharing Arrangements: Situating the Turkey's Kurdish Conflict

This chapter discusses the theoretical foundations of power-sharing arrangements with specific reference to the Turkey's protracted Kurdish conflict. Throughout this theoretical discussion, I, first of all, provide a brief overview of the institutionalist approach on the onset and accommodation of ethnic conflicts. Secondly, I examine differing and even conflicting conceptualizations and causal mechanisms of the power-sharing research. Thirdly, I elaborate major theoretical shortcomings of the power-sharing literature. Last but not least, I propose a broad conceptualization of power-sharing with reference both to the widely agreed features of the post-conflict power sharing governance in the literature and characteristics of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. Instead of having a separate descriptive chapter on the Kurdish conflict, I situate my case into the scholarly debates of the power-sharing literature throughout this theoretical chapter. In doing so, I also discuss the relevance of the power-sharing perspectives in the peaceful accommodation of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.

A large body of literature acknowledges that the presence of ethnic cleavages may lead to conflict and affects democracy adversely (Przeworski, 2000; Geertz, 1973; Kaufmann, 1996; Reilly, 2001). Accommodation of these ethnic cleavages remains as a principal challenge for multi-ethnic countries' leadership. Several studies suggest that political institutions matter in the accommodation of cross-communal ethno-political tensions in divided places (Lijphart 1977, 1984; Horowitz, 1985; McGarry and O'Leary, 2005; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005; Noel, 2005; Norris, 2008).

The basic premise of the institutionalists contends that the democratic governance of divided places presents certain challenges, therefore, necessitates political institutions distinct from the ones found in rather homogenous societies. Hence, the institutionalist approach to ethnic conflict claims that institutional design is a primary factor in explaining why some multi-ethnic societies have violence, while others remain relatively peaceful. (Lijphart, 1977, 1984, 2002; Horowitz, 2000; McGarry and O'Leary, 2005; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005; Noel, 2005; Norris, 2008; Theuerkauf, 2010; Kanbur et al, 2002).

Exclusion of ethnic groups from political power and decision-making is one of the main reasons why dissenting groups resort to collective action in violent and non-violent forms (Birbir et al, 2015; Robinson et al, 2013). Similarly, according to institutionalists, one of the key motivations for the onset of ethnic conflicts is grievances deriving from the institutional context which leads to exclusion of and discrimination against disadvantaged ethnic groups (Gurr 1970, 2000; Collier 2000; Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010, Cederman, Gleditsch, Buhaug 2013). Figure 2.1 below illustrates ethnic groups' power relations with central governments from an

institutionalist perspective. Cederman *et al* (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010) distinguish between social groups in relation to their outreach to central government powers: While the first sort of social group is the one that accesses the central government (the inner circle in grey), the second type of group are those who are left out from the government, yet still have citizenship of the country (the next circle in white). The third group is the one located outside geographical boundaries of the state. Thus, three types of boundaries define each ethno-political group of power is: The first one pertains to the territorial boundaries of a state which determines whether an ethnic community is a legitimate part of a state's citizenry. The second one is the boundary of inclusion separating those who participate in the government from those who do not have access to the government power. The third and last boundary is the division of power and the number of ethnic cleavages between the included segments of the population (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010).

Any of these boundaries can be at the center of an ethno-political conflict depending on inclusion or exclusion of certain ethnic communities from the government, the division of economic and political power between ethnic elites and their constituencies, and the debates on which ethnic communities should be governed by a state. Wimmer *et al* thus categorize ethnic conflicts into three different groups based on the boundary at stake and the challenging actor. In this regard, a conflict is conceptualized as *rebellion* for political inclusion when excluded ethnic groups struggle to expand the boundaries of inclusion. A conflict is conceptualized as *infighting* when it takes place between ethnic elites in power for expanding their outreach to central government powers. Finally, a conflict is conceptualized as *secession* when the excluded party with an aim of independence sets a target of

changing the territorial boundaries of the state (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010). In their ethno-political constellation, the key claim is that the likelihood of secessionist violence and infighting increase as political power concentrates in the hands of fewer ethnic groups and as larger portions of the people are excluded from power due to their ethnic background (Cederman, Gleditsch, Buhaug 2013).




Figure 3: Ethno-political Constellation

The ethno-political constellation above shows a key motivation for ethnic conflicts are grievances that derive from the institutional architecture creating unequal treatment, exclusion or outright discrimination of ethnic groups. They argue that exclusion based on ethnic background from and struggle over having access to state power fuels conflict. (Cederman, Gleditsch, Buhaug 2013) Inclusive political institutions reducing the number of excluded groups, thus, broaden the remit and

scope of government identity. When multiple political actors have a stake in decision-making processes, the government probably includes politicians sympathetic to the rebels and their claims. Political inclusion blurs government identity to such an extent that the risk of a cross-communal strife decreases. (Cederman, Gleditsch, Buhaug 2013) The grievance-based explanations of ethnic violence contend that political institutions not allowing fair political representation increase the chances of occurrence of an ethnic violence. Such exclusionary institutions, according to the grievance theory, prevent political representation, which has an intrinsic value and an impact on the distribution of resources and access to power and, thereby, they affect social groups' threat perceptions. (Theuerkauf, 2010, Cederman, Gleditsch, Buhaug 2013) Institutionalists, therefore, study and recommend a set of institutional arrangements systematically favouring disadvantaged ethnic groups and guaranteeing their inclusion in order to accommodate protracted intra-state conflicts. (Belmont, Mainwaring, Reynolds 2002; Cederman, Gleditsch, Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010; Lijphart, 1977, 1985, 2002; Horowitz, 2000; Norris, 2008;)

Reflecting upon these theoretical considerations, one can argue that the Kurds' ethnic exclusion in Turkish state's power-concentrating institutional setup and anti-ethnic regime constitutes one of the principal causes for the onset of the conflict. The literature on the Kurdish conflict acknowledges that anti-ethnic, power-concentrating institutional architecture in Turkey systematically disfavors the Kurds and breeds the conflict (Yeğen, 2011; Watts, 2010). As Mason (2014) argues, the Turkish political system neither provides the Kurds with an opportunity of being included in an executive coalition nor gives them institutional and constitutional safeguards

securing the survival of their ethnic identity. Consequently, several Kurdish and Turkish elites argue that the Turkish state needs to provide an inclusive institutional design, which permits the Kurds to access to power in order to accommodate their demands in a non-violent way.

2.2. Classical Power-sharing: Definition and Fundamental Conceptualizations

Starting with Lijphart's pioneering works, the power-sharing institutions have been subject to increasing scholarly attention in the last couple of decades. In parallel to the institutionalist logic, the power-sharing approach calls for institutional arrangements, which provide ethnic minorities with guarantees of representation and empower those groups in controlling their own affairs by devolution of powers to subnational or local authorities in order to foster the prospects of peace and democracy in divided places. While some scholars see power-sharing arrangements fostering peace and democracy in complex multi-ethnic contexts, others consider them deeply problematic and contradict the former claims. While there is a certain extent of agreement that power-sharing institutions matter in accommodating ethnic grievances; the existing literature does not offer a consensual view on what power-sharing is and how power should be shared among competing ethnic groups?

Power-sharing is a broad concept and frequently misunderstood. Semantically, power is defined as the ability to generate a planned effect. Yet, power has more meanings. It also means authority, control and command, the capacity to persuade, jurisdiction, in addition to induce, constrain, oblige, or force. Accordingly, power-sharing is basically defined as spreading the access of persons or groups to power.

Conventionally, power also has the meaning of a possession, held by those with authority over others, especially public officials, governments or establishments by those in authority, particularly governments, establishments or public officials. (McEvoy and O’Leary, 2013). Power-sharing, hence, implies widening access to the capacity for getting things done. Among others, "coalition" or "cooperative" government and "consensual" and "inclusive" decision-making are positive meanings usually associated with the synonyms for power-sharing. These semantic considerations lead O’Leary to broadly define power-sharing as: “Any set of institutional arrangements that prevent one agent, or collective agency, from being the ‘winner who holds all critical power,’ whether temporarily or permanently” (McEvoy and O’Leary, 2013). There are plenty of similar definitions of power-sharing. For the purpose of this dissertation, power-sharing can be taken as a broad concept as in Esman’s following definition: “Power-sharing is an inherently accommodative set of attitudes, processes, and institutions, in which the art of governance becomes a matter of bargaining, conciliating, and compromising the aspirations and grievances of its ethnic communities...” (Esman, 2004). In a similar vein, Norris contends that power-sharing governments are "those states which are characterized by formal institutional rules which give multiple political elites a stake in the decision-making process” (Norris, 2008).

Critics of power-sharing rightly suggest that these definitions are too broad and do not specify how power is shared among relevant parties. Aiming to respond to these criticisms, I refer to fundamentals of the power-sharing research with reference to classical pioneering works. The term power-sharing brings to mind Lijphart’s works and more recently McGarry and O’Leary’s ones. Lijphart’s works provide the

earliest examination of power-sharing approach for the accommodation of cross-communal relations in democracies such as Netherlands, Belgium and the Austria. For Lijphart, democracy in divided multi-ethnic societies is viable only if and when power is distributed rather than monopolized, devolved or delegated instead of concentrated. His consociational power-sharing democracy suggests a type of governing system, which includes multiple ethnic elites representing their constituencies, in decision-making processes at various governing levels for peaceful co-existence of divided societies (Lijphart, 1977, 1984). In Lijphart's consociational democracy, power-sharing is featured by four institutional components facilitating cooperation and compromise among elites: (i) grand coalition, (ii) proportional representation system, (iii) segmental autonomy and (iv) mutual veto (Lijphart, 1977).

Lijphart's grand coalition basically refers to that executive power be shared in an executive branch selected as per the principles of representative government. It postulates that all leaders of significant societal segments, which represent major social groups, should rule together, in search of a compromise and consensus (Lijphart 1977, 1985). The grand coalition can occur in various models "such as that of a grand coalition cabinet in parliamentary systems, a grand coalition of a president and other top officeholders in presidential systems, and broadly inclusive councils or committees with important advisory and coordinating functions" (Lijphart, 1985).

Lijphart further builds his consociational democracy on a proportional distribution of influence (Lijphart, 1977). Proportionality refers to each social group's proportional representation in key public institutions; i.e. proportional representation in the

legislatures, proportional possession of public resources and expenditures and proportional representation in civil service appointments (judiciary, military, police, etc.) (Lijphart, 1977, 1985; Schneckener, 2002: 205).

The third component of Lijphart's idea of power sharing, segmental autonomy or self-government, refers to each community's entitlement of autonomy to some extent, especially self-government in the field of culture. The rationale of segmental autonomy arrangements is to provide groups with control over their identity.

Envisaging the principle of asymmetric devolution of powers, it visualizes possibilities for some self-ruling entities to have more command in the fields of *inter alia* religion, language, education, etc. depending on the preferences of their ethnic constituency (Lijphart, 1977, 1985).

The last component of Lijphart's understanding of power sharing is mutual veto. The mutual veto is a tool used for guaranteeing political protection of minorities by enabling them to hinder political decisions. It does not have to be final; instead a mutual veto can be a delaying veto employed as a tactic to take more time to clarify all aspects of the issue at hand. A mutual veto also does not have to be direct, that is to say that the number of coalition members agreeing to a decision has to exceed a threshold for it to be approved (Binningsbø, 2013). Lijphart argues that mutual veto leads each party to safeguard the system's stability (since it benefits inter-group peace), and thus to concede sometimes in order to avoid a constitutional change or conflict (Lijphart, 1977, 1985).

In his later works, Lijphart matures his consociational power-sharing theory inductively. He revises his original theory substantively, suggesting that grand coalition government and segmental autonomy are primary components of his conceptualization while proportionality and minority veto are only of secondary importance to his conceptualization (Lijphart 2002, 39). All the typical examples of consociationalism, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Fiji, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, more or less obviously, show these characteristics advocated by Lijphart. While some of these consociations prove to be successful in accommodating cross-communal relations, such as the ones in several European countries, others around the world, such as Lebanon, Cyprus, Fiji, and Malaysia, fail. In light of his observations on various cases, Lijphart also discusses which conditions are favorable in order for a consociational democracy to flourish. In this vein, Lijphart argues that there should be overarching loyalties among segments; each segment should have a small number of political parties; the size of segments' populations should be roughly equal; and there should exist some crosscutting splits within segments. He additionally emphasizes that the small size of the territory and the existence of a culture of compromise among political elites enhance the stability of the consociational settlements (Lijphart, 1977:53 - 103).

Subsequent writings of O'Leary and McGarry, in both their individual and collaborative works, also contribute to the conceptual and theoretical refinement of the power-sharing literature. Their underlying assumption remains the same: Representation along with participation assure ethnic segments that they can achieve their political objectives, and protect their interests by political means without recourse to violence (McGarry and O'Leary, 2005).

In addition to the Lijphart's classical theory, McGarry and O'Leary make three important refinements to the power-sharing theory. Departing from the Lijphart's original conceptualization, they suggest that protection of self-determined (instead of predetermined) segments by means of guaranteeing their participation and representation in the policy-making processes in the legislative branch and government plays a key role in consociational institutional setup in divided places. The segmental autonomy feature of Lijphart is based on demographic clustering on a certain territory. This is problematic within a federal framework given the fact that some groups are not territorially concentrated and this dispersed residence should not deprive members of a social group from the opportunity for autonomous action. While Lijphart sees the segments involved in the consociational arrangement known prior to implementation, McGarry and O'Leary advocate a process whereby ethnic groups are granted the opportunity of identifying themselves through the electoral process in the post-implementation period. Nevertheless, official assurances for the representation of the parties tend to be predetermined, or at a minimum, are pre-assumed. Given the initial criticisms challenging the consociationalism's dependence on a primordial conception of ethnicity, the emphasis on the non-ascriptive and self-determining quality is an important refinement of power-sharing theory.

Second contribution of the McGarry and O'Leary's understanding of power-sharing is the emphasis on constitutionally recognized collective rights for all segments within the society. Here, they claim that the communal cultural rights (i.e. language, schooling, anti-discrimination legislation, etc.) of the minority communities are best assured in consociational systems as long as its essential features are protected by the legal framework and as long as the constitution is upheld by "an independent and

representative constitutional court whose verdicts are legally binding for the legislature and government". (O'Leary 2005:55–58) Other scholars also acknowledge this contribution and regard the foundation of a comprehensive bill of human rights which leaves "key decisions to the private sphere and civil society" as one of the key institutional features of the power-sharing governance (Roeder and Rothchild 2005:15).

As the last contribution, McGarry and O'Leary also illustrate how the Lijphart's power-sharing model is too narrowly concerned with the design of political institutions in a multi-ethnic democracy and fails to respond to the increasingly complicated nature of conflict settlements. According to them, in such complex settlements, consociational arrangements need to be complemented with specific arrangements to be able to address the questions of "the design of the police, demilitarization, the return of exiles to their homes, the management of prisoners, education reform, economic policy, and the promotion of language and other group rights" (McGarry and O'Leary, 2005:13).

2.3. Contemporary power-sharing literature: Conceptualization and Causal Chain

Despite the seminal works of Lijphart and subsequent conceptual refinements offered by McGarry and O'Leary, the existing literature does not offer a consensual view on power sharing among the competing groups and how it casually works. Since researchers examine their own distinct conceptualizations of power sharing, there is a variety of differing power-sharing understandings. Scholarly works on power-sharing, therefore, reach such divergent causal conclusions in the absence of a

common conceptualization and casual mechanism (Binningsbø, 2013). This section aims at clarifying these divergent conceptualizations and causal mechanisms in the power-sharing literature. I discuss a set of questions on conceptualization and causal chain of the power-sharing research: How do scholars conceptualize power-sharing? Through which causal mechanisms is power sharing linked to peace and democracy? What are the theoretical and practical shortcomings of the power-sharing?

There exists a lack of conceptual agreement on what power-sharing is and how its causal chain operates (Binningsbø, 2013). Aiming to summarize a very large and non-consensual literature, I distinguish conceptualizations of power-sharing enshrined in the literature both as regulatory goals and specific institutional arrangements. It is evident in the literature that power-sharing is broadly studied, recommended, and executed with the regulatory goals of democracy and peace in mind. (Jarstad, 2001; Binningsbø 2013) The first one pertains to the design of political institutions to avoid the concentration of power, permanent or temporary, in the hands of a single group in the areas of execution, legislation, judiciary, bureaucracy, military, or culture in multi-ethnic democracies. This approach considers democratization as the primary regulatory goal. The second regulatory goal of the power-sharing focuses on peaceful accommodation of inter-ethnic strife in conflict-ridden contexts. Here, the primary focus of the regulatory goal is the termination of the conflict, and peace whereas democracy is relegated to a secondary position. These two regulatory goals are not mutually exclusive and power-sharing is originally crafted to combine democratic norms with the pressing need of peaceful conflict settlement in deeply divided places (Sisk, 2008). Not surprisingly, most recent academic works see provisions in peace arrangements as a part of thriving

literature on post-conflict power sharing. (Mukherjee, 2006; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2009)

2.3.1. Conceptualization of Power-sharing in the Literature

In terms of specific institutional arrangements, I depict four principal sets of institutional arrangements, which are extensively enshrined in the literature to accomplish above-mentioned regulatory goals of fostering democracy and peace. Four principal sets of institutional arrangements as follows: *inclusive political arrangements, security bodies, economic policies and a collective rights regime.*

The first set of institutional arrangements are evidently political institutions of execution, legislation, judiciary, and administration established to assure both "shared rule" at the central level and also a possible "self-rule" at the local level among the competing and/or even conflicting ethnic groups. These political arrangements may have communal (consociational) and/or territorial (federal) characteristics. (McGarry and O'Leary, 2005) There are quite a few ethnic territorial conflicts in which geographically-clustered rebels fight to obtain (more) autonomy, or independence for a certain region. Addressing such demands can be accomplished by including territorial power-sharing provisions into peace arrangements. Parallel to Lijphart's segmental autonomy feature, these political power-sharing arrangements assure some regions of more power in the decision-making process on issues at local level (Binningsbø, 2013). This type of power sharing is seen when ethnic communities are granted opportunities for self-rule in a certain region. However, such arrangements do not go as far as establishing an independent state.

The second common set of institutional arrangements discussed in the power-sharing literature pertains to the rebel inclusion in the post-conflict contexts. The rebel inclusion aims to provide rebel representatives with access to government power in order to prevent them reverting to violence (Jarstad, 2008; Walter, 2002; McEvoy and O'Leary, 2013). Political power-sharing in a post-conflict context generally include provisions that guarantee rebel representatives' representation in the post-conflict governments and access to governmental powers (Jarstad, 2008; Walter, 2002; Mukherjee, 2006) Mukherjee defines even peace settlements in which former rebels are presented with the opportunity of transforming into a political party and contesting elections as power-sharing. In addition to a cabinet, rebels can take part in the legislature or other governing bodies. In this regard, the concept of political power-sharing in post-conflict analyses is similar to Lijphart's consociational grand coalition (Binningsbø, 2013). The means of rebel inclusion is twofold: The first one envisages provision of certain legal shelters (such as amnesty, immunity for past crimes, etc.) in exchange for rebels' disarmament and de-mobilization and re-integration arrangements for them. The second aspect relates to the stability of the post-conflict political architecture and occurs in the form of political participation in all relevant domains of power, i.e. executive, legislative, etc. either at the central or local levels (McGarry and O'Leary, 2005).

The third set of institutional arrangements, which are extensively discussed in the literature, is the military power-sharing and security sector reform overhauling composition and competences of militaries, police, and intelligence agencies —those authorized to use coercive force. Addressing issues on the coercive capacity of the post-conflict state is one of the key issues dealt with by power-sharing arrangements.

Therefore, peace agreements envisaging power-sharing governance mostly include provisions defining what role rebel forces will play in the post-conflict state's security forces. The most prevalent method in peace arrangements on military power-sharing is the integration of either the leadership of rebels, or a certain proportion of rebel fighters, into the security apparatus (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007: 33).

The fourth set of institutional arrangements is economic policies. These provisions are included in the peace arrangements, recognizing that economic grievances have an important role in triggering the conflict. Economic power sharing can appear in different forms of market interventions, including redistribution of income or giving access to control of natural resources. Such provisions are expected to narrow the wealth gap between competing groups. (Hartzell, Hoddie, 2007:36) As resource-related conflicts draw more attention from relevant circles, resource management is also increasingly considered a method of solving such conflicts (Binningsbø, Rustad, 2010; Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner, 2009; Lujala & Rustad, 2011; Le Billon & Nicholls, 2007).

The fifth set of institutional arrangements is "cultural protectionism" policies and practices that preserve cultural pluralism by preventing the coercive assimilation of minority ethnic groups' cultures within the society. In modern power-sharing systems, the overall power-sharing arrangements may bolster a comprehensive all-encompassing public identity shared by all segments, however such an identity must be complementary instead of encroaching on previously existing ethnic cultures. Contemporary power-sharing systems provides institutional guarantees promoting

the coexistence of cultures and allows the parties to the political arrangements to have the power of governing their own cultures autonomously. This cultural protectionism may also take the form of a comprehensive rights regime, which includes explicit laws on language rights, separate schooling and the protection of religious and cultural practices. (McEvoy and O'Leary, 2013: 89-93)

Five sets of institutional arrangements represent the main components of mainstream power-sharing conceptualizations offered in the literature. While some scholars narrowly conceptualize power-sharing with one particular (set of) institutional arrangement(s) –i.e., proportionally representative electoral systems, rebel inclusion, federalism or autonomy, etc. - (Mukherjee, 2006; Reilly, 2005; Reynolds, 1999), others study a broader conceptualization and do not limit their conceptualizations to a single (set of) power-sharing arrangement(s). Thus, the power-sharing conceptualizations vary from a broad understanding of power-sharing in the form of an inclusive government complemented by military and economic power-sharing arrangements (i.e., Bogaards, 2000; Norris, 2008, O'Leary, 2005), to a narrow understanding of power-sharing looking only at a small number of other particular institutions, most notably the proportional representation and merely including rebel representatives in post-conflict executive and/or legislative governing bodies (Reynal-Querol, 2002, Jarstad, 2008). As a text-book example of a broader conceptualization, Norris conceptualizes power-sharing regimes in terms of four formal institutional features: proportional electoral system, parliamentarism, federalism and an independent mass media (Norris, 2008: 5). On the other hand, employing political power sharing in its narrowest meaning, Walter only requires a

political settlement in which rebels are assured participation in the governing bodies (Walter, 2002).

In the absence of a consensus on how the power-sharing governance should be conceptualized, I aim to formulate a broad, multi-dimensional conceptualization matching the root causes and characteristics of my case study with the menu of power-sharing arrangements. In doing so, I remain loyal to the main power-sharing features proposed for the post-conflict power-sharing pacts and envisage three broad sets of institutional arrangements (rebel inclusion, cultural recognition and politico-territorial power-sharing arrangements) to accommodate the specific demands, fears and grievances of the Kurds in Turkey.

2.3.2. Causal chain between Power-sharing, Peace and Democracy

Partly due to the differing conceptualizations of power-sharing, there remains substantial disagreement over the effect of the power-sharing agreements on the prospects of peace and democracy in ethnically divided places (Ottman and Vullers, 2014). While some scholars view power-sharing solutions as peace-strengthening and democratic in accommodating ethnic conflicts (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Lijphart, 1977; Mukherjee, 2006; Norris, 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013; Gates et al, 2016), others find them either useless or deeply problematic and contradict the formers' claims. (Horowitz, 2000; Rothchild & Roeder, 2005; Spears, 2000; Sriram & Zahar, 2009 oft, 2010; Selway & Templeman, 2012)

As the impact of power-sharing arrangements can be either positive or negative on democracy and peace; theoretically speaking, there are four possible scenarios: peace or armed conflict; democracy or non-democracy. Various scholars have indeed proposed theories about the causal links relating power-sharing and these four potential results, and proved their hypothesis with empirical data (Binningsbø 2013). Aiming to clarify this complex debate, I provide an overview of the main causal mechanisms between power-sharing, democracy and peace proposed in the literature. The discussion about this causal relationship revolves around five broad questions:

- (1) Does power-sharing promote inclusion and accommodate ethnic minority demands or not?
- (2) Does elite-driven power-sharing agreement eventually close the divide between ethnic groups or does it merely institutionalize the gap?
- (3) Does power-sharing encourage rebel inclusion and prevent conflict, or does it merely appease war-lords?
- (4) Does power-sharing decrease mass support for insurgents and thus provide incentives to give concessions or does it declare them victors in the eyes of their ethnic constituencies?
- (5) Does segmental autonomy (territorial power-sharing; i.e., federalism, autonomy, etc.) mitigate secessionist pressures or does it empower secessionist forces?

The first major debate on the causal-chain front develops over the power-sharing's ability to accommodate ethno-political strife through inclusion. The most fundamental premise of the power-sharing research is that majoritarian power-

concentrating regimes fail to incorporate ethnic minority groups into the political architecture of divided societies (Lijphart, 1977; Norris, 2008). In this logical corollary, the exclusion of the minority groups leads them to resort to violent means – ranging from protest to rebellion - to express their identity-based claims. Several researchers argue that inclusive power-sharing arrangements (i.e., parliamentary system, elections with PR election rules, formal checks and balances, etc.) promote ethnic groups' inclusion through political representation and access to power and, hence, accommodate conflicts. (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Lijphart, 1977; McGarry and O'Leary, 2005; Mukherjee, 2006; Norris, 2008; Walter, 2002) Norris (2008), likewise, argues that as long as groups are provided with the opportunity of proportional representation in the legislative bodies, they have a major motivation for negotiation and cooperation in order to access political power. According to her, governing parties' dependence on support from ethnic parties represented in the parliament encourages inter-group cooperation and strengthening representation of minorities in the decision-making organs. Therefore, PR election systems enhance inter-ethnic elite cooperation, and this eventually trickles down to their ethnic constituencies. Consequently, the risk of violent conflict decreases (Binningsbø, 2013).

Given that their marginalization and exclusion constitutes one of the major motivation for rebel groups to keep fighting, Hartzell and Hoddie argue that democratic institutions providing access to political power through inclusion of multiple political actors can decrease rebels' motivation to resurge conflict. According to their argument, power-sharing institutions with a broad base of legitimacy answer rebel claims of representation and therefore, diminish the rebel

groups' incentive for resuming armed conflict. (Binningsbø 2013; Hartzell & Hoddie 2003) Furthermore, inclusion approach argues that power-sharing arrangements mitigate ethnic groups' - in particular former rebels' - security concerns and, thus, overcome the commitment problems in a social contract or peace process. When inclusion is secured via democratic electoral rules and formal checks and balances, rebels and their ethnic constituencies do not need to fear for being marginalized in the new political architecture of the post-conflict state (Wolff, 2011).

Critiques of power-sharing, on the other hand, find this causal chain – power-sharing ensures minority representation and, thus, creates incentives to cooperate – quite thin. Rothchild and Roeder (2005: 39), for instance, claiming that power-sharing creates “motives and means for the ethnic elites empowered by power-sharing to escalate the conflict.” In a similar way, Snyder (2000) claims that during the initial phases of democratization process, some politicians might fuel animosity, hatred and chauvinism to strengthen their popular base. From this point of view, protection of collective ethnic rights may reduce inducements for elite compromise, thereby making it harder to establish cooperation among ethnic segments by electorally disincentivizing elite compromise. Implementation of PR electoral systems lowering the electoral threshold, especially, may result in return of political parties and politicians to power based on popular support from only one ethnic group instead of votes of multiple segments of society (Norris, 2008). In addition to these, Walter also challenges the power-sharing's ability to ensure rebel inclusion. She argues that peace agreements which “offer combatants merely the chance to compete in elections will not convince them to sign and implement peace agreements.”

According to her, dissenting minority groups' executive participation has to be guaranteed in order to reach enduring peace. (Walter, 2002: 28)

The second contested issue in the power-sharing literature revolves around the of the power-sharing arrangements' intrinsic elitism, which allegedly adversely impact on the cross-communal relationship at the mass-level. Here, researchers debate whether the power-sharing agreements bridge the divide between ethnic groups or they merely institutionalize the gap. Classical elite-centrist consociationalist accounts presuppose that power-sharing institutions facilitate cooperation among elites of ethnic communities and lead them to adopt policies which are acceptable to all sides. Although Lijphart fails to elaborate on the causal mechanism, he suggests that cooperation among elites will gradually have a positive impact on the cooperation among masses. Consequently there might be no need for rigid consociational arrangements over time since power-sharing arrangement will manage to surmount the divisions between segments in society (Lijphart, 1977: 228). Furthermore Mukherjee (2006) also advocates power-sharing arrangements' ability to cement inter-group relations in a rather harmonious manner.

The third controversy related to the casual chain pertains to the relationship between rebel inclusion provision of the power-sharing and its impact on conflict termination. Rebel inclusion is portrayed as the key feature for the most of the post-conflict power-sharing arrangements in the literature. The rebel inclusion aims to provide rebel representatives with guarantees of accessing to power in order to prevent them reverting to violence (Jarstad, 2008; Walter, 2002, Hartzell & Hoddie 2007). Hoddie and Hartzell (2005) claim that both territorial and military power-sharing have a

positive impact in fostering post-conflict peace because these arrangements assure former enemies about their interests in the context of the post-conflict situation. McGarry and O'Leary (2005) and Walter (2002) further underline the need for rebel-specific complementary assurances considering that a security dilemma between former belligerents may arise in power-sharing arrangements and, consequently, the parties may violate the provisions of the post-conflict arrangements. While McGarry and O'Leary (2005) advocate that specific arrangements should address the issues of "the design of the police, demilitarization, the return of exiles to their homes, the management of prisoners, education reform, economic policy, and the promotion of language and other group rights," Walter (2002) further claims for specific provisions –i.e., must be addressed with certain power-sharing arrangements, such as quotas for representation in parliament and government, some reserved seats in public offices and higher judiciary and proportionality in the security apparatus, etc.- to deal with rebels' longer-term concern that they will gradually be removed from post-conflict political architecture.

Although Jarstad principally acknowledges power-sharing' positive impact on inclusion of competing social groups, she claims that determining which groups should be included or not is not straight-forward. If hard-liners are excluded, there is a risk they will act as peace-spoilers. If they instead are included it can be viewed as rewarding violence – and inspire other groups to take up arms to get access to power. However, as previously assumed, an inclusive government most likely includes politicians sympathetic to the rebels, and perhaps even the rebels themselves. This makes it reasonable to expect that the common 'rebel identity' diminishes. On the other hand, if the rebel group and/or rebel sympathizers are not included in post-

conflict government, the feeling of being an excluded group may be even stronger than the one during war, thus increasing the risk of recurrence of war. Therefore, from the perspective of the former rebels political inclusion can reduce the risk of resumption of identity-based violence. (Jarsdtad, 2008)

However, several critics challenge the rebel inclusion provisions and claim that they merely appease war-lords and even impede the prospects for a lasting peace. For instance, Spears (2002: 127) portrays rebel inclusion in a post-conflict environment as a "deal with the devil." Licklider (1995: 681) also expresses that "the cooperating partner in a post-conflict society is not an 'ordinary' political opponent as in a stable democracy, but it is an enemy... An enemy that has killed its opponents 'with considerable enthusiasm and success.'"

The fourth point of disagreement among scholars revolves around the inquiry asking whether power-sharing provisions can weaken rebels' support base and motivation to use violence. The literature acknowledges that it is the ultimate political objective for rebels to ensure its survival (Crenshaw, 2007; Siqueira, 2005). Survival for most rebels can, most of all, be guaranteed through building a loyal support base (Weinstein, 2005; Fearon & Laitin, 2000). However, this very same support base can also be a constraining factor for rebel groups. At this point, Mukherjee (2006) advocates that power-sharing arrangements weaken mass support for insurgents and consequently provide incentives for insurgents to agree on a compromise since power sharing clearly shows supporters that their demands are legitimate in the eyes of the government. In this sense, power-sharing can influence rebel capacity through reducing the rebel support base. If members of an ethnic group sympathetic to the

rebel demands feel their interests are represented in broad and inclusive political institutions, there will be less support for violent opposition. Mukherjee (2006) claims this is exactly the motive governments have when suggesting power-sharing, knowing that granting power-sharing arrangements will diminish the legitimacy of rebel claims and reduce rebel support. Consequently, rebel leaders may feel less inclined towards using violence as a means to have their voices heard when they can speak out through normal political channels. Mukherjee (2006:490) expresses that "if insurgent leaders choose to fight even after their demands are met, they will risk alienating their civilian supporters. This is because fighting is costly and civilian supporters of the insurgent group often face the brunt of the costs of fighting the government."

Contrary to Mukherjee's arguments, critics of power-sharing claim that granting power-sharing concessions provides rebel groups with legitimacy and increase loyalty and motivation at the rebel camp (Neumann 2007; Toros 2008). According to these critical views, power-sharing concessions also legitimize political violence they use. Scholars have voiced concern that negotiating with rebel groups that choose terrorism as a strategy is likely to incentivize political violence and promote other extremist splinters (Wilkinson 2001; Neumann 2007; Toros 2008).

The last point of discussion among scholars is the question of whether the provisions of territorial power-sharing drain secessionist pressures or further empower secessionist forces. Some scholars (Norris, 2008; Jarstad, 2008; O'Leary, 2005) maintain that vertical power sharing arrangements envisaging decentralized governance promote social stability, democracy and peace. Delegating central

policy-making power to locally elected subnational governments increases citizens' access points to the polity (Norris, 2008), and expands the opportunity for political participation (Cohen, 1997). Cohen (1997) further claims that vertical power-sharing dilutes the intensity of ethnic demands by redirecting them to sub-national centers instead of one; and, thus diminishes rebel motive and opportunity to recur violence.

Some critiques of power-sharing theory, on the other hand, strongly argue that establishment of autonomous, federal, or any other forms of self-governing entities, contributes to secessionism by enabling rebel groups to extract political means they require to mobilize their supporters and fight separatist struggle. This literature reflect state elites' concern that granting a form of self-rule to regionally concentrated groups would promote secessionism (Cornell 2002; Hale 2000; Roeder 1991). Tull and Mehler (2005) also argue that political and territorial power-sharing are perceived as rewarding violence; and thus create incentives for rebel groups aiming to access to power to fuel violence in insurgency.

2.4. Shortcomings of Theoretical Foundations of the Power-sharing Theory

In corollary to the advent of power-sharing governance as a standard recommendation for conflict-ridden multi-ethnic societies, scholarly skepticism about the conceptualization of the power-sharing, and its causal relationship with peace and democracy grow. Although scholarly debates on the conceptualization and causal-chain result in some clarification in the theoretical discussions of the power-sharing literature, there still remains some fundamental criticisms and weaknesses

that need to be further elaborated. In this section, I discuss the increasing scholarly unease with the power-sharing under four shortcomings.

The first shortcoming pertains to the intrinsically elite-centered nature of the power-sharing theory. It is, no doubt, true that since Lijphart's consociational model of democracy, the power-sharing theory builds on the "government by elite cooperation" (Lijphart, 1977) to "avert the danger of mutual destruction" (Horowitz, 2002: 20). Criticizing this elite-centrism, Brass comments that although consociationalists acclaim the elites' prudence, these very elites are the ones having vested interests in exploiting collective hostilities between different groups. Moreover, power-sharing, according to Brass (1991), merely reinforces the elites' respective dominance within their own ethnic communities; and power-sharing at an elite level may fall short of remedying ordinary people's concerns about having a say in decision-making. Consociational systems provide the elites with incentives to continue to employ rhetoric of hatred, be it ethnic, religious or racial, and to hamper the rise of overarching political parties and inclusive politics. Therefore, consociational arrangements reward political representatives of the communities (Reynolds, 2005). The elite theory furthermore fails to consider "why ethnic publics follow leaders down paths that seem to serve elite power interests most of all" (Fearon & Laitin, 2000: 5) Although the existing literature is replete with cases showing the elites' manipulation of their ethnic constituencies for their own survival or gain, the literature mostly speculates on why the masses follow elite's lead. (Fearon & Laitin, 2000)

On the interaction between elite and mass levels, Jarstad (2001) criticizes Lijphart (1977) for not being clear on how this causal chain functions. Andeweg (2000: 520) argues something similar when he indicates that arguing “elite cooperation leads to political stability” is nearly redundant. However, such a cross-cutting integration is unlikely to take place in a consociational power-sharing architecture, which minimizes inter-group contact and leads members of each ethnic community to segregate as much as possible within their own groups. At the mass level, this shortcoming is also acknowledged, albeit tacitly, by Lijphart as follows: “Good fences make good neighbors” (Lijphart 1969: 219).

The second major criticism related to the power-sharing theory is the blurred causal mechanisms between the power-sharing arrangements, peace and most notably democracy. Central in the debate about power-sharing is the question about how democratic such a power-sharing governance system is. Inherent in the concept of democracy is rule by the people, organized through frequent elections. Those with decision-making power are given this power through elections by the people. Hence, the power-sharing governance’s intrinsic elitist nature and its incompatibility with democratic premises of people’s participation is well-founded (Andeweg, 2000; O’Leary, 2005; Van Schendelen, 1984). Participation at mass level is seen as a possible spoiler to the precarious power-sharing deals which keeps multi-ethnic, multi-confessional democracies working and protects social peace in divided places (Lijphart, 1977). Therefore, many critics oppose power-sharing governance, considering that it is an elitist form of democracy which lacks mass-level legitimization. Due to these limitations, critics consider power sharing a type of “constrained democracy” (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005: 7).

The democratic deficit of the power-sharing arrangements is a source of disagreement not only among researchers whose main concern is democracy in divided societies, but also among researchers mainly interested in post-conflict peace (Jarstad, 2008; Sriram, 2008; Sriram & Zahar, 2009). In this regard, Sisk (2003: 141) states that “while power-sharing may be desirable, and necessary, as an immediate exit to deadly ethnic wars, power-sharing is not a viable long-term solution to managing uncertainty in ethnically divided societies.” In post-conflict power sharing agreements, the decision-making power is given to the elites or rebel leaders, regardless of their level of popular support among their ethnic constituency. As the results of the Annan Plan's referendum held in Cyprus in 2004 and the Brexit referendum of 2016 demonstrate, political participation can even jeopardize weak elite power-sharing agreements in the absence of mass-level legitimization (Milne, 2003). The dilemma is well-formulated by Lusztig (1994: 748): “the requirements of mass input into and legitimization of constitutional bargaining in deeply divided societies are incompatible with successful constitution making.”

Thirdly, the students of power-sharing do not clarify when and where power-sharing is relevant. Even in Lijphart's works, it is not clear which societies consociationalism is designed for (Andeweg, 2000). Given the cases' distinct characteristics, power-sharing recipes should logically differ to accommodate ethno-political strife in Rwanda, Cyprus, Bosnia and Belgium. Horowitz (1991, 2000) argues, for example, it is not easy to compare heterogeneous societies in Europe with deeply divided African, Middle Eastern, and Asian polities. Therefore adapting western consociational democracy into those countries is difficult since the animosity between the groups runs deeper than that in the European democracies.

Researchers also disagree on whether power sharing should be applicable in all post-conflict contexts (Mukherjee, 2006; Walter, 2002) or only applicable to negotiated settlements (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Mattes & Savun, 2009). Additionally, such researchers do not explain why the different dimensions of power sharing would be equally applicable in all forms of internal armed conflicts. Why should territorial power sharing be equally relevant for Iraq, Cyprus and Bosnia and as for Rwanda and the Philippines? According to most of the theories about power-sharing agreements, territorial power-sharing will increase the likelihood of peace similarly in all of these four countries. These theories do not group causes and characteristics to their formulations and do not discuss if, for example, territorial power-sharing is conducive in addressing politico-territorial grievances or resource-driven power-sharing is more relevant for greed-driven conflicts (Binningsbø 2013).

2.5. Matching Problems to Solutions: Power-sharing perspectives in the Turkey's Intractable Kurdish Conflict

In the absence of an agreement on the conceptualization, scholars and practitioners should match the root causes and characteristics - i.e., the intensity of hostility between the conflicting ethnic parties, trajectory of inter-ethnic violence, main demands of the parties, and phase of negotiations between representative elites, etc. – of their cases with the menu of power-sharing arrangements in order to formulate their conceptualization of power-sharing. Bearing these considerations in mind, power sharing in the end is an institutional response to ethnically-inspired politico-territorial demands. Since different groups might have different demands, the overall design of the power-sharing architecture might diverge across cases. The making up

of the institutional pillars of a power-sharing design requires a thorough consideration on which institutions can deal with the root causes of the conflicts and cross-communal grievances because the necessary institutional response can differ from one case to another. For instance, the inter-ethnic enmity and cross-communal fear require a different institutional response than deprivation, exclusion or greed. Similarly, a power-seeking ethnic group resorting to violence needs to be responded with different institutional panaceas than those who fear the loss of their indigenous language and cultures. I discuss a broad conceptualization of power-sharing with reference both to the widely agreed institutional features of the post-conflict power-sharing pacts and also to the root causes, characteristics and, most importantly, mass-level perceptions of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. While doing so, I remain loyal to the fundamental conceptualizations and theoretical reflections of the power-sharing literature in order to refrain from - what Sartori (1970) called - conceptual stretching. Aiming to propose power-sharing conceptualization for my single case-study, I, first, discuss the root causes, main characteristics and dynamics of the Kurdish conflict with reference to the ethnic conflict literature. Afterwards, I propose a power-sharing approach which envisages three broad sets of institutional arrangements (rebel inclusion, cultural recognition and politico-territorial power-sharing arrangements) to accommodate the specific demands, fears and grievances of the Kurds in Turkey. These power-sharing arrangements deal with three broad sets of issues. The first category of common institutional arrangements relates to the territorial re-organization and overhauling of the administrative architecture of the state in the post-conflict era. Originally based on the same principles as Lijphart's (1977) segmental autonomy feature, the host state's territorial form and administrative design is extensively debated in the power-sharing literature: Although unitary and

federal systems are usually seen as the main options, there are other hybrid variations – i.e., devolution of certain powers to local governments, autonomy, confederalism, etc. - within these two main categories. This feature is of particular importance for Turkey's Kurdish conflict. Although the PKK-led ethno-nationalist Kurdish insurgency renounced the goal of secession, it still aspires for territorial re-organization of the Turkish state - into a federal or confederal form granting self-rule (*özerklik, özyönetim*) in autonomous Kurdish areas - with overhauling its political system. While establishment of autonomous regional government, in which Kurds' self-rule would be granted, can be an effective tool to appease the Kurdish demands, the Turkish government, on the other hand, does not have to give way to its greatest fears about losing complete control over territory, but retains the border of the state. The second feature of my conceptualization envisages setting up institutional mechanisms for the rebel inclusion of the PKK cadres in a post-conflict context in order to prevent them reverting to violence. This feature basically provides certain legal shelters (such as amnesty, impunity for past crimes, etc.) in exchange for rebels' disarmament and de-mobilization and re-integration arrangements for them. The third set of issues concerns the recognition and protection of ethnic groups' collective culture and language. In divided places, like Turkey, the minority groups perceive that their cultures are threatened particularly by the dominant groups. Contemporary power-sharing systems, through implementation of extensive minority rights legislation and cultural protectionism, provide the parties to the political settlement with the power to control their own cultures. Rather than dictating a superordinate blanket Turkish identity, power-sharing arrangements need to ensure recognition and preservation of Kurdish language, ethnic traditions, religions and madhabs, customs, and the ethos of Kurdish people. Therefore, my conceptualization

of power-sharing also pertains to the institutional guarantees preserving identity groups' cultural rights, their recognition and preservation by the state.

Although I elaborate three sets of institutional features of my power-sharing conceptualization separately, these institutional arrangements envisaging cultural, political, territorial power-sharing and rebel inclusion would work as a package. Therefore, what really matters is, again, the right package of power-sharing arrangements in combination, rather than individual sets of institutional features.



CHAPTER 3

HYPOTHESES

The scholarly literature on the Kurdish conflict acknowledges the role of a wide range of ethno-political, socio-economic and psychological factors in the onset, persistence and eventual resolution of the conflict. However, the factors and variables impacting the mass-level support for power-sharing remain untouched in these scholarly debates. In this section, building upon the existing literature, I discuss the theoretical arguments of three testable hypotheses and their proposed causal relationship on the Kurdish conflict. In doing so, I also relate these theoretical discussions and key assumptions of these hypotheses with the power-sharing perspectives of the Kurdish conflict. Deriving from the theoretical debates of modernization theory, relative deprivation theory and superordinate religious identification approach, I test the following hypotheses in the following empirical chapter of my thesis:

3.1. Modernization Theory: Socio-economic Factors and Ethnic Conflicts

Few questions in the field of ethnic conflicts are studied as extensively as the causal relationship between the level of socio-economic development and ethnic conflicts. The modernization theory's main theoretical question, for the sake of my research,

can be summarized as follows: Are socio-economically disadvantaged ethnic groups more likely to mobilize with ethno-nationalist references and demand ethno-political power-sharing arrangements compared to their socio-economically better-off counterparts? In response to this question, the modernization theory would prioritize the role of socio-economic factors, such as education, urbanization, income, industrial development, literacy, etc., in the development of ethno-nationalist orientations, conflict onset and power-sharing demands. (Gellner, 1983; Hechter, 1975; Horowitz, 2000; Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Davies, 1997; Stewart, 2009; Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011) According to the modernization theory, an ethno-nationalist mobilization and conflict onset are more likely to occur in socio-economically disadvantaged regions (Østby, Nordås, & Rød, 2009; Horowitz, 1981, 1985). Modernists claim that socio-economic development would weaken the primordial ethnic identification and curb ethno-nationalist mobilization among co-ethnics (Bates, 1971; Weber, 1976, cited in Sarıgil & Karakoç, 2016). In this logical corollary, socio-economic disadvantages and inequalities are expected to foster ethno-nationalism among relatively worse-off group, and thus to increase the level of support for power-sharing.

Existing empirical research on the relationship between socio-economic differences, perceived inequality and ethnic conflict onset produces mixed results. In recent studies, some empirical researches (see for instance Huber & Mayoral; 2012 and Østby, Nordås & Rød; 2009) find a causal relationship between inter-group inequality and conflict onset and, thus, argue that conflict onset is more likely in socio-economically underdeveloped regions, especially in countries with deep intra-regional inequalities. However, a plethora of quantitative studies find no robust

correlation between economic inequality and conflict onset (Midlarsky 1988; Lichbach 1989). On the contrary, some scholars even advocate that socio-economic development, especially the income and industrial development, promote ethno-nationalism rather than curbing it (Hale, 2000; Hagendoorn et al, 2008). Hale (2000) claims that socio-economically better-off ethnic groups also mobilize with ethno-nationalist demands, with reference to the Croats and Basques. In the same vein, Gurr et al. (1993: 82) argues that “Spanish Basques, Quebecois, Armenians, Ukrainians, and Slovenes all were separatist in the 1980s despite regional prosperity, limited autonomy, and significant national political influence” (Cited in Sarıgil & Karakoç, 2016).

The literature on the Kurdish conflict also reflects the disagreement over the impact of socio-economic factors on ethnic conflicts. It is indeed the case that the southeastern Turkey is the least developed region in Turkey in terms of income per capita, industrialization, schooling, unemployment and several other development indicators, (Icduygu et al. 1999: 1002–6; Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997; White, 1998). Therefore, several government officials as well as scholars assume that this socio-economic underdevelopment constitutes the driving force behind the Kurdish ethno-nationalism and, thus, improving socio-economic conditions of the Kurds would contain ethno-nationalist power-sharing demands.

Several scholars, in line with the above-discussed socio-economic conditions of the Kurds and modernists’ theoretical premises, highlight the significance of the socio-economic variables - i.e., the Kurds as the most disadvantaged ethnic group overwhelmingly living in the least developed region in Turkey - in the onset and

persistence of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist awakening in the lead of the PKK's insurgency (Entessar, 1992; Hechter, 1975; McDowall, 2014). Gunes-Ayata and Ayata (2002: 143), for example, argue that "socioeconomic development has a profound impact on ethnic identity and voting behavior: It tends to reduce ethno-nationalist sentiments and fosters more diversified political loyalties." In a similar vein, Icduygu et al. (1999) also claim that socio-economically disadvantaged status would lead to a feeling of material and non-material insecurity; this in turn, will promote ethnic mobilization among Turkey's Kurds.

In line with these considerations, the modernization approach has the most profound impact on Turkish state's stance on the Kurdish issue. Consecutive Turkish governments simply disregarded ethno-nationalist essence of the Kurdish conflict until the 2000s (Sarigül & Karakoç, 2016). According to Yegen (1996: 216, cited in Sarigil and Fazlıoğlu, 2014), the Turkish state discourse remains reticent in acknowledging the ethno-political essence, the Kurdishness, of the Kurdish question: "Whenever the Kurdish question was mentioned in Turkish state discourse, it was in terms of reactionary politics, tribal resistance or regional backwardness, but never as an ethno-political question. Instead, the governments consider that socio-economic backwardness, terrorism and banditry remain at the heart of the issue (Cornell 2001; Ergil, 2000; Loizides, 2010; Lundgren, 2007; Yeğen, 1999, 2004). In the same vein, Cornell (2001: 31–2) notes that Turkish governments believe that "there [was] no Kurdish problem, but rather a socioeconomic problem in the southeastern region and a problem of terrorism that [was] dependent on external support from states aiming at weakening Turkey." Aydınli (2002: 217) also contend that the long-held belief of

the state is that “. . . eliminating poverty would eliminate the PKK, since the PKK’s fighting ranks are peopled strictly by those with no economic alternatives.”

The over-weaning emphasis on the socio-economic disadvantages of the Kurds often overshadows the ethno-political essence of the Kurdish conflict in Turkish political elites’ rhetoric. For instance, former Prime Minister (2003 – 2014), incumbent President Erdoğan expressed, on 24 February 2004, that

Ethnicity or even politics are not the main issue lying at the root of the problem. The main issue is economy. Economic constraints are becoming the main instrument of politics in the Southeast. Politics built on the Kurdish ideology would not pay off. Currently Kurdish citizens are asking us how we will address unemployment. You need to ensure their livelihood first, then you will see whether the problem there still persists or not.

In a similar vein, former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s (1999–2002) position on the issue clearly shows this approach:

Turkey does not have a Kurdish problem. There is socio-economic underdevelopment in the region. By abusing this, several external actors such as neighboring and some European countries have promoted Kurdish terrorism/separatism in the region to destabilize and divide the Turkish Republic (cited in Sarigil, 2010).

The modernization approach also has its own strong supporters among intellectuals, writers and business people (Sarigil & Fazlioglu, 2014). During my interview, Taha Akyol, on 16 October 2014, expressed that

Historically, the primary reason for the social-economic underdevelopment of the Southeast is the mountainous geography. The geography in the region has not allowed for any business other than livestock breeding and has strengthened feudality. At this point, if economy, industry and entrepreneur class in the region can be developed, this would contribute to turning the PKK-driven violent and conflictual political atmosphere into a rational and democratic one. People in the region, however, believe that the state has deliberately left the region

underdeveloped... Therefore the root of the Kurdish issue is the prevention of the development of an industrial culture and economy in the Southeast by the PKK. (Author's interview, April 2015)

As a result of this modernist diagnosis, Turkish governments have implemented several economic packages and projects to foster socio-economic development in the Southeastern Turkey (see Ergin 2000; Yegen 2011). Many Turkish political elites have expected that an improvement in social and economic situation in the region would contain ethno-nationalist mobilization among the Kurds, and, thus, curb their power-sharing demands. Moving onwards from the modernists' theoretical premises, one can assume that uneven socio-economic development and ethnic exclusion provide a fertile ground for the rise of ethno-nationalist sentiment, and, thus, lead members of underprivileged ethnic group to support power-sharing. Thus, the economic-peace hypothesis, derived from the modernization theory, would assume that the higher socio-economic status (e.g. high levels of income and education) the Kurds have the less likely they are to have ethno-nationalist orientations (Sarigil & Fazlioglu, 2014). To test the impact of socio-economic factors on the Kurds' mass-level support towards power-sharing arrangements, I posit the following hypothesis:

H₁: Individuals with high socio-economic status (i.e. a high level of income and education) should be less likely to support power-sharing.

3.2. Relative Deprivation Theory

The alleged causal relationship between inequality, discrimination and conflict onset still remains at the center of the existing literature on ethnic conflicts. Proponents of this argument contend that injustices, discrimination and exclusion leads to politically-inspired violence. In terms of the causal relationship, the key variable

linking inequality to ethno-political strife is relative deprivation, which highlights the gap between people's expectations about what they should achieve and their actual achievements (Gurr, 1970). Discontent, frustration or grievance caused by perception of unjust deprivation; in return, increase the likelihood of ethnic mobilization in various forms, including violent mobilization (Gurr, 1970; Gurr et al. 1993). Relative deprivation, thus, leads to frustration and aggression, which motivate individuals to participate in rebellion (Gurr, 1970; Davies, 1962). The main reason for ethnic mobilization and conflict onset pertains to the relative deprivation perception and grievances (e.g., Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Davies 1997) both at the individual and group level (e.g., Stewart 2009; Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch 2011). The greater the level of relative deprivation, the stronger the motivational base for political violence, and the greater the magnitude of violence (Gurr, 1970). The relative deprivation theory, thus, assumes that the key motivation for the ethno-nationalist conflicts is the grievances that derive from outright discrimination and exclusion of ethnic groups from political power (Kuhn & Weidman, 2015). Putting emphasis on the 'perception' of deprivation, the relative deprivation theory claims that deprivation might be completely subjective. In this regard, Gurr (1970: 24) states that ". . . people may be subjectively deprived with reference to their expectations even though an objective observer might not judge them to be in want." The relative deprivation theory, in the context of an ethno-nationalist conflict, suggests that grievance formed in response to non-realized expectations foster rebellious collection action (read: ethno-nationalist mobilization) and even produce violence through the motivation to redress the perceived inequity, exclusion and discrimination (Gurr, 1970; see also Davies, 1962; Huntington, 1968; Muller & Seligson, 1987).

The perception of deprivation may differ across cases. One of the most prevalent forms is economic and political discrimination, in which the politically dominant group – or the state - systematically discriminates and excludes other segments' access to power in economic and political sense (Gurr, 1993). The relative deprivation theory contends that social groups' exclusion and discrimination trigger antagonism towards the dominant groups and governments and, thus remain as the major factors leading to grievance and frustration (Gurr & Harff 1994; Sarıgil & Karakoç, 2016). Perception of deprivation, alongside ethnic polarization, inter-ethnic inequalities, also strengthens ethnic entrepreneurs to spark an ethno-political struggle (Davies, 1962). Thus, the grievance hypothesis postulates that people perceiving discrimination remain more likely to join ethno-nationalist mobilization and demand ethno-political power-sharing arrangements.

Several empirical studies examine the relationship between political and economic grievances and onset and persistence of conflicts (e.g., see Gurr, 1970; Fearon & Latitin, 2001; Davies, 1997; Sambanis, 2005) In fact, some of the most influential quantitative studies of civil war outright reject grievance-based explanations, based on the lack of a statistically significant correlation between country-level measures of individual wealth distributions and conflict (e.g., Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). On the other hand, some other studies find a strong relationship between political discrimination and ethnic conflicts. These studies claim that exclusion from central governmental power and political discrimination foster frustration and grievances and, thus, increase the likelihood of an ethnic group to mobilize along ethnic lines (e.g., Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013; Regan & Norton, 2005; Walter, 2006)

Discrimination against the Kurds in Turkey is extensively discussed in the literature (Jongerden, 2005; Ülker, 2008; Yeğen, 1999). The Turkish state restrained the Kurds from expressing their identity publicly until the early 2000s. In this regard, for instance, use of Kurdish language in public sphere was strictly banned and pro-Kurdish political parties were consecutively banned (Aktürk, 2011; Yavuz, 1998; Tezcür, 2009). Discrimination and exclusion is institutionalized with the constitutional provisions and administrative set up of the Turkish state - i.e., selective and disproportionate implementation of the anti-terror laws against the Kurds, closure of pro-Kurdish political parties, 10 per cent threshold hindering Kurdish representation in the Parliament, etc. In response, plenty of primary sources reveal construction of a negative psychological repertoire against these discriminatory and repressive state policies among the Kurds (e.g., Anter 1999: 31-34, 361; Cemal 2003: 15-34, 373-379; Ekinçi 2004: 94-97; Kaya 2003: 24-39, 143-150).) Consequently, Turkish state's anti-ethnic, power-concentrating institutional set up fetters Kurds' political and cultural aspirations.

Exposure to the state violence, exclusion and discrimination is the main reason behind ordinary people's participation in insurgencies in many a political conflict (Ganguly 1996; Goodwin 2001: 235). Under these circumstances, it might be expected that the sense of grievance for the state's suppression of political and cultural rights of the Kurds would have promoted their political and ethnic awareness (Tezcur 2010). Hence the grievance hypothesis derived from the relative deprivation theory expects that Kurds perceiving discrimination are more likely to support the key ethno-political power-sharing demands. I, thus, test the following hypothesis:

H2: Members of an ethnic group who perceives discrimination by the state are more likely to support the ethno-political power-sharing arrangements.

3.3. Superordinate religious (Islamic) Identification Theory

The nexus between ethnicity, religion and conflict onset is a complex relationship. Both ethnicity and religion are widely shared collective identities, which may potentially trigger people to mobilize for political purposes, including violent conflicts (Kriesberg, 2003). However, the literature contains limited, as well as differing views on the influence of religiosity on people's attitude towards the ethno-nationalist mobilization. Some scholars argue that the presence of a superordinate religious identity fosters stronger loyalty and commitment than other (such as ethnic, confessional, etc.) identities, and, thus, strengthens inter-group harmony and reduces the likelihood of ethno-political mobilization and inter-ethnic hostility (Collier et al., 2004; Fox, 2004; Juergensmeyer, 1993; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Roeder, 2005; Rummel, 1997; Walter, 1997) For instance, Hindriks, Verkuyten, and Coenders (2014: 56) consider in an inter-minority context – i.e., the Turkish and Moroccan minorities in Holland - that “when individuals identify more strongly with their religious group, they can be expected to regard those who have the same faith more strongly as in-group members” (Sarigil & Karakoç, 2016). The proponents of superordinate religious identification approach assume that attachment to an overarching religious identity would contribute to the harmony of the inter-ethnic relations, and, thus, diminish the likelihood of rival ethno-nationalist mobilizations. On the other side of the coin, in multi-ethnic countries where members of ethnic groups observe different confessions or religions, they are more likely to be

mobilized with religious motivations; and this may further fuel an ethno-religious strife (Hodson, Sekulic & Massey 1994; Sarigil & Karakoç, 2016; Stouffer 1955).

Empirical studies, albeit being quite limited, highlight the significance of religiosity in the making of people's (negative) attitude towards out-group members. For instance, three surveys, conducted in the eve of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, consistently find religiosity as the greatest factor in the respondents' negative attitudes towards their out-group members (see Hodson, Sekulic, & Massey 1994).

Similarly, several empirical works show that church attendance is statistically linked to negative attitudes towards minorities in the United States (see Beatty and Walter 1984; Nunn et al., 1978; Stouffer, 1955). However, when it comes to the relationship between religiosity and support towards violent ethno-political movements, the empirical studies do not propose a consistent finding. For instance, Hayes and McAllister (2001) demonstrate that people attending church are less likely to support ethnic violence in Northern Ireland. In a similar vein, Zaidise et al. (2007) state that religiosity diminishes support for political violence in Israel for both Muslims and Jews, however socio-economic deprivation inverts that trend (cited in Sarigil & Karakoç, 2016). There also remain conflicting empirical studies on the relationship between religiosity and ethno-nationalism in the context of the Kurdish conflict: While Sarigil (2010) finds no statistically significant relationship between religiosity and ethno-nationalist tendencies, Ekmekci (2011) suggests that Islam has a restraining role on Kurdish ethno-nationalism. In a more recent study, however, Sarigil and Fazlioglu (2013, 2014) prove that religiosity does not curb ethno-nationalism at the individual level. This thesis aims to test the superordinate religious identification hypothesis by using a more comprehensive data-set.

Given that the vast majority of the Turks and Kurds are Muslims, the existing literature extensively discusses the nexus between religiosity and ethno-nationalism and also allows researcher to test superordinate overarching religious identification hypothesis in case of the Kurdish conflict. In line with the superordinate religious identification theory, the Islamist and conservative circles in Turkey highlight the significance of Islam as a factor cementing the relationship between the Turks and Kurds. As Ataman (2003) notes, this pro-Islamic approach supposes that Islam attaches primary importance to the encompassing idea of ‘Islamic brotherhood’ and ‘ummah’ (the worldwide community of Muslim believers) instead of rejecting different cultures and ethnicities (Ataman, 2003; see also Sakallioğlu, 1998). The pro-Islamic approach alleges that ethno-nationalist mobilizations run counter to the Islamic understanding of unity of God and *ummah*. Islamists in Turkey have long blamed the overwhelming emphasis on the secular – i.e., they rather use anti-Islamic-character of the Turkish Republic as the root cause of the Kurdish conflict. As Sakallioğlu (1998: 79) rightly observes that many Islamists believe that demolition of the common bond of Islamic brotherhood between the Turks and Kurds by the modernization and secularization policies of the early Republic facilitated the rise of Kurdish ethno-nationalism. This becomes evident when Necmettin Erbakan, former prime minister (1996 - 1997) and the founder of Turkey’s first Islamist political party, expressed in 1994 that:

...the children of this country have started the school day citing the *besmele* (in the name of God). What did you replace it with? ‘I am Turkish, I am righteous, I am

diligent.’ ... It became rightful for our Muslim child of Kurdish origin to say “I am Kurdish, I am righteous, and I am more diligent.”¹²

Still, the Islamists offer putting emphasis on the shared Islamic brotherhood as the remaining common denominator between two ethnic groups to solve the Kurdish issue (Sakallıoğlu, 1998; Somer & Glöpker-Kesebir; 2016; Beriker-Atiyas 1997). As Houston (2001: 157) states:

Islamist discourse on the Kurdish problem gives its assent to the existence and equality of Kurds as a kavim (people/nation) and to Kurdish as a language, but calls for the subordination of such an identity to an Islamic one... Islamist discourse stakes a claim to be an ethnically neutral political actor: in the new social contract posited by Islamism, ethnic irons are withdrawn from the fire in the name of a more universalistic identity [ummah] (see also Sakallıoğlu 1998; Ataman 2003; Aktürk 2011; Gurses 2015).

Thus, proponents of this approach contend that promoting Islamic awareness and values would shrink the role of ethnicity in self-identification and consequently curb ethno-nationalist and separatist inclinations (Sarıgil & Karakoç, 2016). In the same vein, Yavuz (1998: 12) observes that “. . . the Islamic layer of identity could be useful in terms of containing ethnic tensions and finding a peaceful solution.” In their understanding, Islam furnishes them with an overarching identity, exceeding the limits of, inter alia, ethnic identities; therefore would curb ethno-nationalist inclinations (see also Yavuz and Özcan 2006: 103–12). As Houston (1999: 91) also observes “for Islamist discourse ... *kardeşlik* [Muslim brotherhood] implies the cessation of separatist claims in the name of Muslim unity ... and the subordination

¹² See ‘*Erbakan cezaevine iyice yaklaştı*’, Ntvmsnbc, 6 August 2000, available at: <http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/15680.asp> (accessed 22 March 2015).

of Kurdishness to a “higher identity” (*üst kimlik*)” (cited in Sarıgil & Fazlıoğlu, 2013).

The superordinate religious identification approach receives strong support and endorsed by several conservative Turkish political elites. Similarly, the leadership of the ruling AKP views 'Islam as cement'; fostering the inter-ethnic relations between the Kurds and Turks. Founding leader of the AKP and President, Erdoğan, for instance, who, Doğan and Yavuz argue, (2009) views the world through the lens of religion, frequently highlights religious identity. He once stated that “whenever someone inquiries about your identity, you should simply reply: ‘Thank God’ [*Elhamdulillah*] I am a Muslim!’ That is enough” (Gürses, 2015). In addition to the recurrent references to the notion of Islamic brotherhood, Erdoğan often put emphasis on common Ottoman-Islamic ancestry between the Turks and Kurds. He, for instance once expressed that:

We are all descendants of the great soldiers of the great leader Selahaddin Eyyubi [a historical Kurdish-Muslim commander who battled against the Crusaders and founded the Ayyubid dynasty] who conquered Palestine and Jerusalem. . . . I am against both Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms. All the Kurds and Turks are my brothers. . . . We turn our faces towards the same qibla [the Kaaba in Mecca, the holiest place of Islam].¹³

On several instances, members of the AKP leadership also use the notion of Islamic brotherhood between the Turks and Kurds in order to delegitimize the Kurdish ethno-nationalists. For instance, Erdoğan once addressed conservative Kurds as follows:

¹³ AK Party (2011), 1 Haziran Diyarbakır Mitingi konuşmasının tam metni (full text of the speech in the June 1 rally), <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/1-hazirandiyarbakir-mitingi-konusmasinin-tam-metni/8230>.

Those who perform namaz [salah] and those who say ‘La ilahe illallah’ [believing in and praying for only Allah] and those who have the love of Allah in their hearts cannot take sides with the terrorist organization. This land has a history shaped by ezan [adhan, the call to prayer], the Koran, and namaz. My religious, Muslim, Kurdish brother! When will you be aware of this conspiracy? You are the grandsons of Selahaddin Eyyubi and it is time for you to say ‘Enough!’ to this conspiracy. There cannot be any connection or relationship between you and the terrorist organization that does not pray to Allah or turn to the same qibla [the Caaba in Mecca, the holiest place of Islam] as you.¹⁴

In a similar vein, in one of his statements, Bekir Bozdag, the then deputy prime minister responsible for Diyanet (the Directorate of Religious Affairs), said the following:

If a son of a Muslim husband and wife goes to the mountains and joins the terrorist organization [the PKK] to kill innocent people, it is because our men of religion do not really do their duty. If we could teach people Islam very well and if our officials, imams and Koran instructors do their duty properly, no terrorist organization would be able to recruit terrorists among the Muslims... Thus, if there are still people joining the terrorist organization, it is partly because of the failure of our men of religion.¹⁵

In response to these challenges, the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement, whose defining tenets include anti-traditionalism and secularism, has surprisingly adopted a more lenient approach toward Islam in the last decade in order to achieve political gains against rising conservative actors in the Southeastern region (i.e., the AKP and religious orders, in particular the pro-Turkish Gulen movement). They have increasingly included Islamic references in their discourse, cooperated with local conservative circles, organized *Sivil Cuma* ‘Civilian Friday Prayer’ ending with

¹⁴ See *Inkar da bitti, asimilasyon da*, *Radikal*, 2 June 2011, available at: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1051453&CategoryID=78> (accessed 15 March 2015).

¹⁵ See ‘*Din adamlarimizin hatasi var*’, *Haber Turk*, 21 January 2012, available at: <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/708246-din-adamlarimizin-hatasi-var> (accessed 22 March 2015).

Kurdish sermons –i.e., boycotts Friday prayers at state-controlled Religious Affairs’ Directorate’s mosques -, and nominated conservative Kurds in elections. In the end, competing Turkish and Kurdish nationalists not only instrumentalize religion to legitimize their political messages and positions but also try to delegitimize their opponents. Taking into consideration all the above, the superordinate religious identity hypothesis expects that: H3: As religiosity increases, the likelihood of ethno-nationalist tendencies; and, thus, support for power-sharing decreases.



CHAPTER 4

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this empirical chapter, I first described the data, which was derived from three public opinion surveys, and provided some major descriptive statistics on the mass-level support for power-sharing. Secondly, I discussed the dependent and explanatory variables used in the quantitative analyses. Last but not least, I presented the estimation technique and multivariate empirical results explaining the factors leading to variance at the mass-level support for power-sharing arrangements.

4.1. Data

The data was gathered from three public opinion surveys, which were carried out in November 2011, April 2013 and April 2015. The surveys were fully funded by the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) and commissioned to the A&G Research Company for implementation. The survey data has not been made public by TEPAV. The surveys were mainly designed to examine respondents' attitudes and behaviors towards *inter alia* the Kurds' political demands, the PKK-led insurgency, inter-communal relations between the Turks and Kurds as well as government policies on the Kurdish conflict. The dataset also provided original data on a range of indicators such as ideology, partisanship, socio-economic status, gender, ethnic and religious identity, personal finance, etc. The dataset was original

and comprehensive. The survey questions were solely designed to examine various aspects of the Kurdish conflict. Each of the three surveys were administered with country-representative samples. I, under the supervision of my thesis advisor, took part in various stages – i.e., the development and revision of the survey questionnaires, accompanying the pilots on the site, and data analysis – of the surveys' preparation, implementation and analysis.

4.1.1. Questionnaire's development

In drafting the survey questionnaire, we aimed to measure the respondents' take on various socio-economic, political and psychological debates – i.e., the relationship between the Kurdish ethno-nationalism and religion, perception of discrimination, partisanship, ideology, socio-economic status, etc. - found in the existing literature on the Kurdish conflict. After reflecting these scholarly debates into the questionnaire, we further interviewed a plenty of experts and activists living in Ankara, Diyarbakır and Istanbul to refine the questionnaire. Aiming to improve the quality and the clarity of the questionnaire, a number of meetings and workshops with the attendance of A&G and TEPAV researchers were also organized in late 2010. As a result, the first draft of the survey questionnaire, which was used during the pilots, was finalized in early 2011.

Pilot surveys, which aimed to test the respondents' reaction and responsiveness to the survey questions and to find out outstanding caveats of the questionnaire, were conducted in late February 2011 in Ankara, Diyarbakır, Istanbul, Malatya, and Mersin. After the pilots, the A&G polling company organized a workshop in

November 2011 in Ankara with the participation of their regional leaders' of their field staff. This workshop provided an opportunity to present the objective of the survey to the field leaders and to receive their feedback on the questionnaire. One of the major feedbacks received from the research team pertains to the participants' reluctance and reticence to report their attitudes and behaviors towards some of the politically sensitive questions. As the survey questions inquired several sensitive issues (i.e. one's attitude towards the PKK, Öcalan, Kurds' autonomy and secession), some participants reportedly showed reluctance and/or reticence to answer these controversial questions. Considering that this reluctance might lead participants to refrain from revealing their true opinions due to the social desirability bias and other possible concerns, organizational modifications were introduced to the questionnaire and some of the sensitive questions were removed as well.

One of the main anecdotal observations of the field teams during the pilots was the Kurdish respondents' relative comfort and responsiveness when a Kurdish-speaking female interviewer interviewed them. As a result of this feedback, we asked A&G to work with female Kurdish enumerators in Kurdish-inhabited provinces. We further decided to exclude two politically sensitive questions inquiring the respondents' views on the PKK cadres' amnesty and whether the respondents have a close relative who has joined the PKK's guerrilla cadres.

In addition to these, a number of enumerators also encountered the law enforcement's interference during the implementation of the pilots and surveys. In some incidents, enumerators were taken into custody upon complaint of interviewees, whereas others were interfered by the police during interviews and

asked to leave the neighborhood. As a precaution, the A&G provided a copy of an administrative decree signed by the Minister of Interior, to the field teams. This decree served the purpose to remind law-enforcement that such academic surveys were not subject to prior administrative permissions and asked local authorities not to intervene the implementation of the surveys.

After incorporating the feedbacks received from the pilots, the final version of the survey questionnaire was crafted and this version of the survey was conducted in late November 2011. The same set of questions with slight adjustments in line with the changing political conjunctures was used for the 2013 and 2015 edition of the surveys. However, we did not feel the need to have a pilot survey in the last two surveys because the data analysis of the first survey had already provided significant insights on the quality of the questions.

From 2011 to 2013 and 2015, there were two major changes introduced to the original questionnaire. The first major change pertained to the question(s) on the PKK's disarmament and inclusion. In the 2011 survey, the question about the PKK's disarmament and inclusion was asked in one single question. The question was formulated as follows: "Should the PKK lay down arms and participate in politics?" During the data analysis, we realized that this question could not provide us with the data on the share of the respondents who support the PKK's disarmament, while opposing its inclusion into the party politics. This was why we re-formulated the question in 2013 and 2015 surveys and asked the disarmament and inclusion in two separate questions. The questions were as follows: "Should the PKK lay down the arms and end the armed struggle?" and "Should the PKK found a political party with

the same name and join politics?” By separating the PKK’s disarmament and inclusion questions, we could measure the respondents’ attitude on these issues separately.

The second major change in the questionnaire was related to the question again on the PKK’s inclusion with granting an amnesty. Due to the relatively tense political climate and law enforcement’s intervention during the pilots, we decided to remove the amnesty question from the questionnaire. However, we added the question inquiring the respondents’ attitudes towards an amnesty for the PKK cadres in 2013 and 2015 surveys. The question that was asked in 2013 and 2015 surveys was as follows: “Should there be a general amnesty for all PKK members including the executives?”

4.1.2. Sampling

The dataset was derived from a nationally representative sample for Turkish citizens, aged 18 and above, for each year. In all of the surveys, a multi-stage, stratified cluster-sampling procedure with age and gender quotas was followed in the selection of respondents. Even though a nation-level representative sample for Turkey could be made with about 2000 respondents (with a lower confidence level), the sample was expanded primarily due to our wish to maximize the number of Kurdish respondents to the questionnaire. In 2011, the survey was implemented by means of face-to-face interviews with 6516 respondents in 48 provinces¹⁶ and 369 districts and

¹⁶ These provinces are Adana, Adıyaman, Afyon, Ağrı, Amasya, Ankara, Antalya, Aydın, Balıkesir, Batman, Bingöl, Burdur, Bursa, Çankırı, Çorum, Denizli, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Edirne, Erzurum, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, Giresun, Hatay, Isparta, İçel, İstanbul, İzmir, Kayseri, Kırklareli, Kocaeli,

villages in seven regions. In 2013, the sample was comprised of 7103 participants, aged 18 and above, in 50 provinces¹⁷ and 398 districts and villages in seven regions in 2013. The last survey was implemented in 2015 with a sample of 7101 participants, aged 18 and above, 50 provinces and 398 districts and villages in seven regions. In the making up of the samples, very few changes were made in the provinces and sub-provinces' selection for the purposes of validity and reliability. The changes in the sampling were minimal and occurred due to logistical necessities and/or security concerns.

Given that the main research aimed to understand and explain variance in Kurds' support for power sharing, I mostly focused my analysis on the sub-population that identify themselves as Kurds throughout my thesis. Aiming to identify the ethnic origins of the respondents, the questionnaire included a question directly asking the respondents ethnic identity. I defined the sub-samples of ethnic identity according to reported ethnic origins. In Table 4.2 the distribution of 2011, 2013 and 2015 samples in terms of self-identified ethnicity is presented. While 14 per cent of the participants identified themselves as ethnic Kurds in 2011, this reached to 17.5 per cent in 2013 and 16.6 in 2015. I believed that this increase is not due to any demographic jump or systematic sampling error given that there is no significant change in the survey's ethnic identity sub-samples. One possible explanation of this significant increase in the percentile of the Kurds across years was the relatively positive political environment that emerged in the aftermath of what the government called as

Konya, Malatya, Manisa, Maraş, Mardin, Muş, Niğde, Ordu, Osmaniye, Rize, Sakarya, Samsun, Sivas, Trabzon, Şanlıurfa, Uşak ve Zonguldak.

¹⁷ Apart from the provinces in 2011 sample, Van province was added to the samples for the surveys conducted in 2013 and 2015. The survey could not be carried out in Van in 2011 due to an earthquake.

"settlement process" in early 2013. The existing positive political atmosphere of the time may have emboldened the Kurds to be relatively more outspoken about their ethnic identity. Aiming to explain this statistical jump, the distribution of the sample in terms of ethnicity and regions is presented in Table 4.2. Accordingly, I only considered southeastern part of Turkey as a separate region and aggregated rest of the regions. Although the regarding jump from 2011 to 2013 could be seen in all regions, it was clearly more pronounced in the southeastern part of Turkey. While 58 per cent of the participants defined themselves as ethnic Kurds in 2011, this reached to 73 percent in 2013 and 64 in 2015. The regarding increase seemed to be only marginal for the rest of the regions.

Table 1: Ethnicity Distribution of the Dataset (Percentage)

	Turkish	Kurdsih	Other
2011	75.2	14.0	10.8
2013	76.3	17.5	6.2
2015	76.2	16.6	7.2

Table 2: Ethnicity Distribution of the Dataset with respect to Regions (Percentage)

Southeast Region			
	Turkish	Kurdish	Others
2011	28.4	57.6	14.0
2013	15.3	73.0	11.7
2015	25.8	63.8	10.3
Other Regions			
	Turkish	Kurdish	Others
2011	79.36	10.13	10.51
2013	81.17	13.08	5.75
2015	80.09	12.94	6.97

4.2. Dependent Variables

The dependent variable of my research design is the mass-level support for power-sharing among the members of an ethnic group. As discussed in the theoretical chapter above, power-sharing is a multi-dimensional concept, which may take several institutional forms varying from territorial and political re-organization of the state (i.e., federalism, confederalism, autonomy, etc.) to institutional arrangements in order to re-integrate rebel leaders (i.e., amnesty, reserved executive and parliamentary seats, etc.) as well as institutional arrangement of mere collective cultural protectionism (i.e., mother-tongue education).

In the absence of a uniform theoretical conceptualization, measuring the support for power-sharing is a complex task. In line with my theoretical conceptualization of power-sharing, which comprises of three common sets of institutional features – namely, territorial re-organization of the state, recognition of collective ethnic identity and rebel inclusion -, I defined three different dependent variables (DVs) as follows: (i) Mass-level support for the territorial re-organization of the state; (ii) Mass-level support for the recognition of collective ethnic identity; (iii) Mass-level support for the Rebel Inclusion. In the following section, I discussed conceptualization and operationalization of these DVs (see also Appendix A for the operationalization of all variables).

4.2.1. DV1: Mass-level support for the territorial re-organization of the state

The host state's overall territorial form and administrative design is extensively discussed in the power-sharing literature. Particularly in conflict-ridden contexts, one of the most salient institutional arrangements pertains to the territorial re-organization and overhauling of the administrative architecture of the state in the post-conflict era. Although the principal choice is often between unitary and federal systems, there is a plenty of hybrid governance forms –i.e., devolution of certain powers to local governments, autonomy, confederalism, etc- within these two main categories. This territorial power-sharing feature is of particular significance in Turkey's Kurdish conflict. Although the PKK-led ethno-nationalist insurgency renounced the goal of secession, it still aspires to a territorial re-organization of the Turkish state - into a federal or confederal form granting self-rule (*özerklik*, *özyönetim*) in autonomous Kurdish areas. Such a territorial power-sharing arrangement can be a compromise solution both for the Turkish government and the Kurds. While establishment of autonomous regional government, in which Kurds' self-rule would be granted, can be an effective tool to appease the Kurdish demands, the Turkish government, on the other hand, does not have to give way to its greatest fears about losing complete control over territory, but retains the border of the state. In line with these considerations, the first dependent variable in my research design is the mass-level support for the territorial re-organization of the state.

As regards the operationalization of popular support for territorial power-sharing in the Kurdish conflict, I referred to the survey questions asking respondents whether they support: (i) establishment of an autonomous Kurdish administration; (ii)

establishment of local Kurdish assemblies; (iii) devolution of powers to local governments, and (iv) use of local Kurdish flags. The survey questions, which sought the responses given as “Yes” or “No”, were as follows:

- (i) Like in Northern Iraq, should an autonomous administration or a federation be adopted also in Turkey for the Kurds and in other words should self-governance of Kurds but remaining within Turkey be accepted?
- (ii) Should Kurds have a local or regional institutions such as assembly or parliament?
- (iii) Should there be a local, regional flag belonging to the Kurds?

After re-coding these questions, I took the additive mean of the answers to the above-listed questions. By this way, the first dependent variable of my research design, which had three components, varied between 0 and 1 - i.e., calculating by taking the additive mean, I normalized this variable to 1. Finally, I denoted this dependent variable representing mass support towards territorial re-organization of the state among the members of an ethnic group by “*Territorial_PowerSharing*”. In the following three figures (Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3) the evolution of the components of *Territorial_PowerSharing* according to ethnicity is shown. I have three major observations about the level of support for territorial power-sharing from the figures below. The very first observation is that the support rate towards for territorial features of power-sharing among Kurds were, not surprisingly, very much higher than that of Turks. Between 2011 and 2015, the levels of support remained irrevocable for three of the territorial power-sharing features between the Kurds and Turks. As the second observation, I saw a rapid increase from 2011 to 2013 for all of

the components of Territorial_PowerSharing variable whereas the increase from 2013 to 2015 was only marginal. This pattern was more pronounced for the Kurdish sub-sample than Turks. Thirdly, territorial autonomy received the highest level of support from the Kurds. Figure 4.1 shows that while 56 percent of the Kurds positively answered the autonomy question in 2011, this rate reached to 66.1 percent in 2013 and 68.5 percent in 2015. The remaining components also received close levels of support from the Kurds. The level of support reached to 61.2 percent for the Kurdish regional flag and 67.3 percent for the establishment of a regional Kurdish assembly.



Figure 4: Support for Federation/Autonomy w.r.to Ethnicity (%)




Figure 5: Support for Regional Kurdish Flag w.r.to Ethnicity (%)




Figure 6: Support for Regional Kurdish Parliament w.r.to Ethnicity (%)

In line with the findings presented above, the average value of mass-level support towards territorial power-sharing among Kurds increased rapidly from 0.49 to 0.62 between 2011 and 2013; however the increase – from 0.62 to 0.66 - was relatively small from 2013 to 2015. On the other hand, Turks overwhelmingly rejected territorial power-sharing arrangements. The level of Turks' support and variance of support across years was minimal; therefore, I decided not to further examine the factors and dynamics leading to this minimal variance with statistical analysis.




Figure 7: Average Mass Support Towards Territorial Power-Sharing w.r.to Ethnicity

4.2.2. DV2: Mass-Level Support For The Recognition Of Collective Ethnic Identity

The second major set of questions addressed in the power-sharing literature deals with the relationship between ethnic segments and the state. Institutional design in this field aims at recognition and protection ethnic identities with a sound minority rights legislation (Weller and Wolff, 2005). In line with my power-sharing conceptualization, which comprises the institutional guarantees preserving ethnic

groups' cultural rights, and their recognition and preservation by the state, the second dependent variable of my research design is the mass-level support for the recognition of collective Kurdish ethnic identity.

Regarding the operationalization of popular support for the recognition of collective ethnic identity, I again referred to the survey questions asking respondents' attitudes for adoption of Kurdish as an official language, provision of education and public services in Kurdish language. I utilized the following survey questions, which sought "Yes" or "No" responses from the participants:

- (i) Should Kurdish be adopted as an official language along with Turkish?
- (ii) Should public primary and high schools which offer education in Kurdish be opened?
- (iii) Should elective Kurdish courses be given in public schools? (like English)
- (iv) Should public services be provided in Kurdish in public offices, such as municipalities, hospitals and courthouses?

After recoding these questions, I took the additive mean of the answers to the above-listed questions in order to obtain the second dependent variable. This variable, which had four components, also varied between 0 and 1. The components of this dependent variables were as follows: Support for the adoption of the Kurdish as official language; support for elective Kurdish language courses in public schools,

support for (Kurdish) mother-tongue education and support for public services' provision in Kurdish. Finally, I denoted this dependent variable representing the mass support towards recognition of collective ethnic identity by *Collective_Rights*.

In the following four figures the evolution of the mass-level support for each of the four components of *Collective_Rights* according to ethnicity is shown. From these figures, I again observe three major trends. The first observation is again the significant difference between the support rates of Turks and Kurds for the recognition of the cultural rights. While the Kurds' support for each of the four components consistently increased across years, the majority of Turks opposed the granting cultural rights to the Kurds. The second observation is the relatively higher levels of support - in comparison to their overwhelming rejection of the territorial power-sharing- among Turks for the granting of the cultural rights to the Kurds. Compared to the components of the territorial power-sharing, the support level was higher among Turkish respondents when it came to granting of cultural rights to the Kurds. Compared to the 5.3% of support in territorial power-sharing, the level of average support reached to 20.9% among Turks for granting cultural rights to the Kurds. As the third observation, I noticed a similar trend with the *Territorial_PowerSharing* in terms of the changes in Kurds' support for cultural recognition. In fact, the graphs below reveal a rapid increase from year 2011 to 2013 for all of the components of the variable whereas the increase from 2013 to 2015 was only marginal. Again, this pattern was more pronounced for the Kurdish sub-sample than Turks. For instance, according to Figure 4.5, while only 55.54 percent of Kurds agreed that Kurdish should be adopted as an official language in 2011 survey, this reached to 73.64 percent in 2013 and to 78.33 percent in 2015.




Figure 8: Support for Kurdish as Official Language w.r.to Ethnicity




Figure 9: Support for Elective Kurdish Language Courses w.r.to Ethnicity




Figure 10: Support for Mother Tongue Education w.r.to Ethnicity




Figure 11: Support for Public Service Provision in Kurdish w.r.to Ethnicity

Evolution of the average mass-level support for the recognition of collective Kurdish ethnic identity is shown in Figure 4.9. In accordance with the movements of its components in time, the level of support for Kurdish collective rights increased over

time. The level of increase was higher from 2011 to 2013 compared to the increase between 2013 and 2015 for both of the ethnic groups. While the Kurds' average support for the recognition of collective rights significantly increased - from 0.71 to 0.82- from 2011 and 2013, the average support level reached 0.87 with a relatively smaller increase in 2015. Among Turks, the level of support rose from 0.14 to about 0.21 in 2013 and 2015.




Figure 12: Average Mass Support for the Recognition of Collective Kurdish Ethnic Identity w.r.to Ethnicity

4.2.3. DV 3: Mass Level Support for the Rebel Inclusion

The third set of questions included in the survey related to the rebel inclusion as part of the post-conflict institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements of rebel inclusion ranges from providing representatives of the rebel group with access to power (Jarstad, 2008; Walter, 2002, Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007), giving them the opportunity to transform into a political party and competing in elections for power sharing purposes (Mukherjee, 2006). Given the rebel-driven nature of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, the third dependent variable is the mass-level support for the provision of certain institutional shelters (such as amnesty, immunity for past crimes, etc) for rebels' inclusion.

For operationalization of the rebel inclusion dimension of the power-sharing, I again referred to survey questions inquiring respondents' attitudes for the PKK's disarmament, demobilization, re-integration in exchange of certain institutional arrangements – amnesty, access to the legal political realm, etc.-. Again, the respondents' responses were reported as “Yes” or “No” to the following questions:

(i) Should the PKK lay down arms and involve in politics? (N.B. This question was only asked in the 2011 survey.)

(ii) Should the PKK found a political party with the same name and join politics? (N.B. This question was just asked in 2013 & 2015 surveys)

(iii) Should there be a general amnesty for all PKK members including the executives? (This question was just asked in 2013 & 2015 surveys)

(iv) Which of the above-mentioned views do you agree regarding Abdullah Öcalan's status? a) Release, totally free; b) release & house arrest; c) status quo – life imprisonment; d) death penalty to be re-introduced and executed.

(v)

After re-coding the above-mentioned questions, I took the additive mean of the answers to the above-listed questions in order to obtain the third dependent variable, which was denoted as *Rebel_Inclusion*. *Rebel_Inclusion* proxies for the support for rebel inclusion among the members of an ethnic group and it was, again, normalized and varied between 0 and 1.

The operationalization of the Rebel_Inclusion was not straightforward due to the changes made in the questions between 2011, 2013 and 2015. In the 2013 and 2015 surveys, in order to be more specific, we divided the question asking about the PKK's disarmament and transformation into a political party into two parts. – i.e., the question on PKK's disarmament – without any concessions in return was perceived as much desirable, was responded overwhelmingly positively by the Turkish respondents. Therefore, this question was excluded from the index. We also added a new question inquiring the respondents' attitude towards the amnesty of the PKK's rebel cadres. I, therefore, used different questions for the construction of Rebel_Inclusion for 2011, 2013 and 2015. For 2011, I used the additive mean of the first and fourth questions listed above. On the other hand, for 2013 and 2015, I took the additive mean of the second, third and last questions listed above. Rebel_Inclusion had just two components for 2011. These two components pertained to the support for the PKK's disarmament and transformation into a political party, and support for the improvement in the PKK leader Öcalan's conditions.¹⁸ In 2013 and 2015, the Rebel_Inclusion variable had three components. These variables were the support for the PKK's transformation into a political party, support for an amnesty for the PKK's cadres and improvement in Öcalan's conditions.

In the following four figures (Figure 4.10, Figure 4.11, Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13), the evolution of the support levels for the components of Rebel_Inclusion, per ethnicity, is shown. There are four main observations across time from the figures below. Firstly, the Turks and Kurds' take on the disarmament and politicization of

¹⁸ We defined release or home-imprisonment as an improvement in Öcalan's conditions.

the PKK were irrevocable in 2011. While 63.1 percent of Kurds supported the PKK's disarmament and transformation into a political party, only 25.2 percent of Turks supported this trade-off in 2011 (see Figure 4.10).

The second observation is the drop of the level of support for the politicization of the PKK both among Kurds and Turks between 2013 and 2015. In Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12, in contrast with other dependent variables, I observe a drop from year 2013 to 2015 for the support - both among Turks and Kurds - for the PKK's transformation into a political party with the same name as well as the support for amnesty for the PKK's cadres.

The third observation is the continuation of Turks' rejection of the PKK's transformation into a legal actor. On the PKK's legalization through a political party, there was still a significant difference between the support rates for PKK's transformation into a political party with the same name among Turks and Kurds (see Figure 4.11). The fourth observation is the striking difference between Turks and Kurds on Öcalan's condition. Among Kurdish respondents, the support for the betterment of Öcalan's prison conditions or his release reached to 75.6 percent, while the support rate among Turks was barely around 7.7 percent in 2015 (see Figure 4.13).




Figure 13: PKK's Disarmament and Transformation into a Political Party w.r.to Ethnicity (2011)




Figure 14: PKK's transformation into a Political Party with the Same Name w.r.to Ethnicity (2013, 2015)




Figure 15: Support for Amnesty for the PKK's Cadres w.r.to Ethnicity (2013, 2015)




Figure 16: Support for Improvement in Öcalan's Conditions (release or home-imprisonment) w.r.to Ethnicity




Figure 17: Average mass support for rebel inclusion w. r. to ethnicity

Average mass support for rebel inclusion with respect to ethnicity is presented in Figure 4.14. Similar to other dependent variables, the average mass support for rebel inclusion was higher for Kurds with respect to Turks. However, we do not observe the consistent increase in other dependent variables on the contrary I observe a drop for the support for Rebel_Inclusion from 0.68 to 0.66 between 2013 and 2015 among the Kurds.




Figure 18: Average Mass Support for Rebel Inclusion w.r.to Ethnicity

The results are clearer when we look at the evolution of our dependent variables separately for Turks and Kurds across time. Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16 below show Turks and Kurds' support for each one of three dependent variables of my research design. Figure 4.15 shows that the level of support and also variance is relatively low among Turks for each of the dependent variables across years. While Turks

supported the rebel inclusion arrangements the most, their outright rejection was apparent in arrangements envisaging territorial power-sharing components. In concrete terms, Turks' support for rebel inclusion decreased from about 0.14 on average in 2011 to 0.09 in 2015. On average, their support for the recognition of collective rights also increased from 0.13 in 2011 to 0.18 in 2015. However, on average, Turks' support for the territorial power-sharing arrangements, which was around 0.03 in 2011, could barely reach to 0.05 in 2015.

In contrast, there existed a significant level of support for the power-sharing arrangement and a much higher degree of variation in the Kurdish sub-sample. The recognition of collective rights received the highest level of support among Kurds. On average, there was a consistent increase – i.e., increased from 0.67 to 0.80 in 2013 and 0.85 in 2015 - in the collective cultural rights component. In territorial power-sharing and rebel inclusion components, there was a similar trend – i.e., a significant spike between 2011 and 2013; but a minimal increase between 2013 and 2015 - in terms of support levels.




Figure 19: Comparative Observations from the Indexes for Turks




Figure 20: Comparative Observations from the Indexes for Kurds

4.3. Independent and Control Variables:

In the absence of empirical studies, the extant literature portray an inconclusive debate around the impact of the several socio-economic and political factors' –i.e., age, gender, socio-economic factors, religiosity, rural – urban divide, partisanship, ideology, etc. - impact on the Kurdish conflict's onset, duration and termination. Aiming to contribute to these inconclusive debates, I employed several of these socio-economic, political and economic variables as my independent and control variables in my research design. The independent and control variables of my research design include, *inter alia*, age, gender, ethnicity, religious sects, income, employment status, education, self-perception of discrimination and religiosity. In measuring independent variables, I also employed participants' responses to the relevant questions of the survey (see Appendix A for the operationalization of all variables). Aiming to test the modernization theory, which envisages a causal link between the indicators of socio-economic status and support for power-sharing, I used the total amount of monthly income of the household (**Income**) and education levels (**Education**) as the independent variables.

For testing the relative deprivation theory, I used the perception of discrimination among the Kurds as the main independent variable. Regarding the perception of discrimination (**Discrimination**), I referred to the Kurdish participants' answers to the following survey question: "In your opinion, do you think that the state discriminates against Kurds?" Discrimination variable took value 1 if the respondent believes there is discrimination against Kurds and 0 otherwise.

Aiming to test the religiosity approach, which claims a causal relationship between the religiosity and support for power sharing, I employed religiosity as the independent variable. In terms of operationalization, the religiosity was measured with two additive means in order to capture two different dimensions of religiosity: A practice dimension (**Religiosity_Practice**) and an attitude (**Religiosity_Attitude**) dimension. Surveys asked respondents questions on their attitudinal practices (e.g. praying, fasting etc.) and faith-based beliefs on religion (read: Islam). These survey questions, to which respondents were asked to report as "Yes" or "No", are as follows:

- (i) Do you regularly pray, five times a day?
- (ii) Do you fast during the whole Ramadan every year?

The respondents were also asked about their faith related views. The faith-related survey questions asked to the respondents were as follows:

- (i) Should headscarf be free in schools including primary and high schools?
- (ii) Should women civil servants or public employees such as judges, prosecutors, and teachers be allowed to wear headscarves during work time?

I looked into the region in which the respondent lives in order to look into its possible impact on the power-sharing demands. To do so, I defined a dummy

variable, denoted by **Region_SouthEast**, which was coded as 1 if the respondent lives in the southeastern part of Turkey, where Kurds are demographically clustered; and coded as 0 if the respondent lives in other parts of the country.

While testing these hypotheses, this study also controlled for the potential effect of a number of other likely variables. To control the potential impact of the ideological orientation of the respondents, **Ideology** variable was defined. Ideology had three categories: left, center and right. To capture the possible causal effect of rural or urban residence, **Rural_Urban** dummy was created where the dummy took the value of 1 if the respondent lives in rural areas and 0 if she lives in cities. Regarding the employment status, **Unemployment** dummy, which took value 1 if the respondent is unemployed and 0 otherwise, is defined. To see whether sectarian differences among the Kurds (i.e. Hanefi/Shafi) matter in terms of their support for power-sharing, I defined **Religious_Sect_Shafi** variable, which took the value 1 if the respondent is Shafi; and 0 if the respondent reports another sectarian affiliation. Finally, gender (**Gender**) and age (**Age**) variables' impact on the support for power-sharing were controlled.

The summary statistics of the dependent, independent and control variables are presented in Table 4.3. They represent the average of all three years in which the surveys were implemented. As seen in the tables below, the means of the variables change only slightly across years. This also affirms the consistency and comparability of the samples across years.

Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Independent Variables

Turks					
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Income (in logarithms)	14886	7.395	0.597	0	9.2
Education	15569	4.309	1.264	1	7
Discrimination Perception	15505	1.112	0.316	1	2
Religiosity Practice	15440	1.524	0.412	1	2
Religiosity Attitude	15423	1.637	0.446	1	2
Ideology (Left-Right Placement)	15294	3.237	0.871	1	5
Residence (Rural-Urban)	15631	1.663	0.473	1	2
Region (Southeast)	15631	0.023	0.150	0	1
Unemployment	15555	0.066	0.249	0	1
Religious Sect (Shafi)	14787	0.043	0.204	0	1
Gender	15627	1.495	0.500	1	2
Age	15630	39.167	14.004	18	97
Kurds					
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Income (in logarithms)	3095	7.093	0.670	0	9.2
Education	3299	3.587	1.522	1	7
Discrimination Perception	3266	1.535	0.499	1	2
Religiosity Practice	3281	1.653	0.412	1	2
Religiosity Attitude	3279	1.840	0.337	1	2
Ideology (Left-Right Placement)	3189	2.768	0.895	1	5
Residence (Rural-Urban)	3308	1.666	0.472	1	2
Region (Southeast)	3308	0.303	0.460	0	1
Unemployment	3303	0.076	0.266	0	1
Religious Sect (Shafi)	3197	0.583	0.493	0	1
Gender	3306	1.521	0.500	1	2
Age	3308	37.949	13.469	18	86

Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Independent Variables for 2011 Sample

Turks					
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Income (in logarithms)	4548	7.194	0.572	4.6	9.2
Education	4840	4.201	1.253	1	7
Discrimination Perception	4792	1.135	0.341	1	2
Religiosity Practice	4736	1.528	0.389	1	2
Religiosity Attitude	4720	1.614	0.451	1	2
Ideology (Left-Right Placement)	4714	3.246	0.787	1	5
Residence (Rural-Urban)	4857	1.629	0.483	1	2
Region (Southeast)	4857	0.030	0.172	0	1
Unemployment	4830	0.104	0.305	0	1
Religious Sect (Shafi)	4637	0.023	0.149	0	1
Gender	4857	1.499	0.500	1	2
Age	4857	38.053	14.326	18	92
Kurds					
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Income (in logarithms)	812	6.839	0.599	4.6	9.2
Education	898	3.441	1.500	1	7
Discrimination Perception	892	1.466	0.499	1	2
Religiosity Practice	883	1.711	0.376	1	2
Religiosity Attitude	880	1.881	0.300	1	2
Ideology (Left-Right Placement)	847	2.953	0.930	1	5
Residence (Rural-Urban)	901	1.595	0.491	1	2
Region (Southeast)	901	0.333	0.472	0	1
Unemployment	898	0.088	0.283	0	1
Religious Sect (Shafi)	872	0.572	0.495	0	1
Gender	901	1.514	0.500	1	2
Age	901	36.618	13.509	18	86

Table 5: Summary Statistics of the Independent Variables for 2013 Sample

Turks					
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Income (in logarithms)	5124	7.376	0.600	0	9.2
Education	5381	4.283	1.291	1	7
Discrimination Perception	5358	1.091	0.288	1	2
Religiosity Practice	5342	1.532	0.412	1	2
Religiosity Attitude	5344	1.630	0.449	1	2
Ideology (Left-Right Placement)	5244	3.229	0.834	1	5
Residence (Rural-Urban)	5391	1.683	0.465	1	2
Region (Southeast)	5391	0.015	0.121	0	1
Unemployment	5359	0.043	0.204	0	1
Religious Sect (Shafi)	5045	0.041	0.197	0	1
Gender	5387	1.493	0.500	1	2
Age	5390	39.779	13.917	18	90
Kurds					
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Income (in logarithms)	1164	7.019	0.700	0	9.2
Education	1237	3.521	1.571	1	7
Discrimination Perception	1218	1.539	0.499	1	2
Religiosity Practice	1230	1.662	0.416	1	2
Religiosity Attitude	1231	1.846	0.340	1	2
Ideology (Left-Right Placement)	1195	2.767	0.799	1	5
Residence (Rural-Urban)	1237	1.690	0.463	1	2
Region (Southeast)	1237	0.308	0.462	0	1
Unemployment	1236	0.074	0.263	0	1
Religious Sect (Shafi)	1206	0.601	0.490	0	1
Gender	1235	1.527	0.499	1	2
Age	1237	37.640	13.427	18	83

Table 6: Summary Statistics of the Independent Variables for 2015 Sample

Turks					
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Income (in logarithms)	5214	7.588	0.553	2	9.2
Education	5348	4.432	1.237	1	7
Discrimination Perception	5355	1.113	0.317	1	2
Religiosity Practice	5362	1.513	0.433	1	2
Religiosity Attitude	5359	1.664	0.437	1	2
Ideology (Left-Right Placement)	5336	3.236	0.972	1	5
Residence (Rural-Urban)	5383	1.673	0.469	1	2
Region (Southeast)	5383	0.024	0.154	0	1
Unemployment	5366	0.055	0.229	0	1
Religious Sect (Shafi)	5105	0.065	0.247	0	1
Gender	5383	1.495	0.500	1	2
Age	5383	39.559	13.739	18	97
Kurds					
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Income (in logarithms)	1119	7.356	0.592	5	9.2
Education	1164	3.771	1.469	1	7
Discrimination Perception	1156	1.585	0.493	1	2
Religiosity Practice	1168	1.601	0.427	1	2
Religiosity Attitude	1168	1.802	0.355	1	2
Ideology (Left-Right Placement)	1147	2.631	0.937	1	5
Residence (Rural-Urban)	1170	1.694	0.461	1	2
Region (Southeast)	1170	0.274	0.446	0	1
Unemployment	1169	0.069	0.254	0	1
Religious Sect (Shafi)	1119	0.573	0.495	0	1
Gender	1170	1.521	0.500	1	2
Age	1170	39.300	13.373	18	85

4.4. Methodology and Empirical Results

As the dependent variables in the study are categorical, standard linear probability models (LPM) are not appropriate. Making use of ordinary least squares technique (OLS), LPM directly calculates probabilities of the dependent variables. Yet, LPM is troubled by several biases such as non-normality and heteroscedasticity of the error terms, possibility of the estimated value of the dependent variable lying outside 0-1 range and lower R^2 values. Further, LPM assumes constant marginal/incremental effects of each independent variable on probabilities. A more realistic model would

feature the probability to lie between 0 and 1 and vary non-linearly with explanatory variables (Gujarati, 2015). In line with these considerations and other practical reasons, logit models and probit (or normit) models are suggested in the literature, as their cumulative distribution functions (the former is logistic and the latter is normal) are good to represent 0-1 response models.¹⁹ Both Logit and probit models are somewhat the same. The difference is in the distribution as mentioned above and they reveal almost the same results²⁰ (Long, 1977). As my dependent variable is categorical, I preferred to utilize logit methodology in my multi-variate analyses. Furthermore, as the values in each category had a meaningful sequential order where a value was indeed 'higher' than the previous one, I also preferred to use ordinal logit regression with robust standard errors.²¹

Table 4.5 below shows the results of the ordinal logit regression analyses of determinants of Territorial_PowerSharing among Kurds for the years of 2011, 2013 and 2015. While the first two models demonstrate the multi-variate results of the 2011 sample, the models 3 and 4 look into the statistical results of 2013 and the last two models shows the results of the 2015 sample. The summary results of Table 4.5 are highlighted in Table 4.6 where consistently significant variables are listed.

Among the socio-economic indicators, income proved to be not consistently and significantly correlated with Territorial_PowerSharing in all years of observation.

The first two models points out that income had no statistically significant impact on the mass support towards territorial re-organization of the state among Kurds for

¹⁹ Cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of logit and probit models are similar. However, the logistic distribution has a lower peak and fatter tails with regards to the normal distribution.

²⁰ In binary response models, the estimates of a logit model are nearly $\pi/3$ times larger than those of the probit model.

²¹ For more discussion on this technique, see Long, 1977 and Menard, 2000.

2011. However, the multivariate analysis of the 2013 data indicates a positive and statistically significant impact on the support for territorial power-sharing even after controlling for other factors. However, in 2015, I found a negative and statistically significant impact of income on Territorial_PowerSharing. For education's impact on Territorial_PowerSharing, there was no significant relationship for 2011 and 2015 but I found negatively significant results only for 2013. Again, education was not consistently and significantly correlated with the Territorial_PowerSharing. From these results, it was hard to get a unified conclusion about the effect of socio-economic status on the support for territorial power-sharing dimension. Consequent to these observations across time, I concluded that the socio-economic variables, income and education, are not consistently and significantly correlated with the Kurds' support for territorial power-sharing. This refuted the relevance of the modernization theory in the context of Turkey's Kurdish conflict.

Discrimination perception, on the other hand, had consistent, positive and statistically significant impact on support for Territorial_PowerSharing for 2011, 2013 and 2015. Noting that this causal relationship also held in models 2, 4, and 6 that control for a number of other factors and offer a better specification, the multivariate analyses concluded that Kurds, who believe that the state's discrimination is prevalent, are more likely to support territorial power-sharing arrangements. These empirical findings pointed to the significance of perceived ethnic discrimination and, thus, the relevance of the relative deprivation theory in the context of Turkey's Kurdish conflict.

The Religiosity_Practice seemed to reduce the likelihood of support for 2011. I also found some significant effects for 2013 and 2015 but these effects disappeared when controls were included. With regards to the attitudinal dimension of religiosity, I found positively significant effects for 2013 sample and for the rest it remained irrelevant and insignificant. Consequently, the empirical findings did not point out any consistent and significant correlation with the territorial power-sharing. Overall, these findings supported the relative deprivation theory; refuted the modernization theory as well as the religiosity approach.

Among the control variables, ideology made a difference for all years. The coefficient is negatively and statistically significant in all of the models. The statistical analyses affirmed that individuals with left-wing ideological identification are more supportive of Kurdish demands for territorial power-sharing. However, this statistical finding is hardly surprising given the PKK's Marxist/Leninist ideological legacy and the pro-Kurdish HDP's left-winger ideological positioning.

The statistical analyses also affirmed that rural-urban divide and region –i.e., living in the overwhelmingly Kurdish populated Southeastern Anatolia region- also matter. The rural – urban divide also had a statistically significant impact on the support for territorial power-sharing. Apparently, urban places offer more favorable conditions than rural places for the organization and dissemination of ethno-nationalist movements, which eventually fuel the support for power sharing. Kurds living in urban centres are more likely to support Territorial_PowerSharing in 2011, 2013 and 2015. One of the possible reasons for this outcome is forced migration from rural to

urban areas.²² This forced migration may have strengthened an ethnic awareness among internally displaced Kurds, leading them to extend relatively stronger support of Territorial_PowerSharing. In terms of the impact of living in the Southeast, I found a positive and statistically significant relationship in 2013 and 2015, however this turned into a negative and statistically significant relationship between the Region_Southeast and Territorial_PowerSharing in 2015. As a result, while Kurds living in the Southeast of Turkey is more likely to support Territorial_PowerSharing for 2011 and 2013, this relationship was just reversed in 2015.

I observed negatively significant coefficients for age dummies in each year indicating that younger generations appear to be more supportive for Territorial_PowerSharing. Regarding sectarian identification, I found that being a follower of the Shafi madhab did have a positively and statistically significant impact on Territorial_PowerSharing for 2013 and 2015. Finally, there is no statistically significant relationship between unemployment and gender, and supporting more-political ethnic demands.

²² The Turkish state forced a significant number of Kurds to leave their villages for cities in the late 1980s and the 1990, evacuating nearly 3200 villages in eastern and southeastern Turkey as a security measure against the PKK

Table 7: Ordinal-logit regression analysis of Territorial_PowerSharing among Kurds

Dependent Variable: Territorial_PowerSharing						
	2011		2013		2015	
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Income	0.0178 (0.121)	-0.0799 (0.149)	0.161* (0.0877)	0.456*** (0.111)	-0.215* (0.117)	-0.400*** (0.135)
Education	0.0797 (0.0525)	-0.0112 (0.0660)	-0.0382 (0.0444)	- 0.172*** (0.0587)	0.0129 (0.0515)	-0.0612 (0.0654)
Discrimination	2.290*** (0.154)	1.727*** (0.180)	1.453*** (0.122)	1.105*** (0.134)	2.095*** (0.133)	1.800*** (0.147)
Religiosity_Practice	-0.355 (0.217)	-0.422* (0.255)	0.402** (0.166)	0.241 (0.193)	-0.339* (0.177)	-0.0227 (0.195)
Religiosity_Attitude	0.116 (0.226)	-0.227 (0.310)	0.746*** (0.199)	0.561** (0.227)	-0.0530 (0.216)	-0.0754 (0.235)
Control Variables						
Ideology		- 0.978*** (0.110)		- 0.663*** (0.0940)		-0.392*** (0.0833)
Rural_Urban		0.732*** (0.173)		0.467*** (0.144)		0.760*** (0.151)
Region_Southeast		0.255*** (0.0407)		0.164*** (0.0325)		-0.0755** (0.0343)
Unemployment		-0.300 (0.295)		0.340 (0.259)		0.0453 (0.260)
Religious_sect_Shafi		0.123 (0.178)		1.285*** (0.130)		0.262* (0.145)
Gender		0.0580 (0.168)		0.120 (0.133)		0.0758 (0.146)
Age		- 0.0169** (0.00763)		- 0.0118** (0.00559)		-0.0142** (0.00625)
Constant cut1	2.693*** (1.007)	-0.913 (1.433)	4.155*** (0.774)	4.619*** (1.036)	-0.140 (0.984)	-2.235* (1.237)
Constant cut2	3.574*** (1.013)	0.195 (1.431)	4.693*** (0.776)	5.268*** (1.039)	0.437 (0.981)	-1.603 (1.235)
Constant cut3	3.589*** (1.014)	0.204 (1.431)	4.715*** (0.776)	5.296*** (1.039)	0.443 (0.982)	-1.597 (1.234)
Constant cut4	4.244*** (1.017)	0.998 (1.429)	5.231*** (0.779)	5.925*** (1.039)	0.778 (0.978)	-1.257 (1.232)
Observations	778	713	1,139	1,093	1,099	1,041
Pseudo R2	0.1353	0.2357	0.0635	0.1485	0.1279	0.1553
Log pse. likelihood	- 867.1584	- 698.8227 1	-1274.9548	- 110.9391	-1021.9877	-931.4871
Wald chi2(5/12)	238.45	338.63	155.17	328.08	264.22	272.54
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are shown in paranthesis. (2) ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. (3) Stata 12 is used in statistical analysis.						

Table 8: Summary Results of Table 4.4

2011	2013	2015
	Income (+)	Income (-)
	Education (-), not robust	
Discrimination (+)	Discrimination (+)	Discrimination (+)
Religiosity_Practice (-),not robust*	Religiosity_Practice (+),not robust*	Religiosity_Practice (-),not robust*
	Religiosity_Attitude (+)	
Ideology (-)	Ideology (-)	Ideology (-)
Rural_Urban (+)	Rural_Urban (+)	Rural_Urban (+)
Region_Southeast(+)	Region_Southeast(+)	Region_Southeast(-)
	Religious_sect_Shafi (+)	Religious_sect_Shafi (+)
Age (-)	Age (-)	Age (-)
Notes: *, indicates that the regarding variable is significant only in one model for the corresponding year.		

Table 4.7 below provides ordinal logit regression analyses of determinants of recognition of collective Kurdish ethnic identity -Collective_Rights- among Kurds for each year. Similar to Territorial_PowerSharing, first two models show the results of regressions on 2011 sample, the following two models show that of 2013 sample and the remaining are for the 2015 sample. The summary results of Table 4.7 are highlighted in Table 4.8 where consistently significant variables are listed.

Among the socio-economic indicators, income proved to be not consistently and significantly correlated with Collective_Rights for all years. Income had no statistically significant impact on the recognition of collective Kurdish ethnic identity among Kurds for 2011 and 2015. Yet, the multivariate analysis of the 2013 data indicated a positive and statistically significant impact on the support for collective rights only for Model 4 i.e. only after controlling for other factors. In terms of the education's impact on Collective-Rights, there is a negative relationship for all years. Although the coefficient of education is not significant in the first models of 2011 and 2015, the regarding coefficient is statistically significant in the remaining models. In other words, individuals with high-level education are found to be less

likely to support recognition of collective rights. To summarize, again it is hard to get a unified conclusion about the effect of socio-economic status on the support for collective rights dimension. While income indicator refuted the relevance of the modernization theory in the context of Turkey's Kurdish conflict, education indicator is in favor of modernization theory.

Similar to the Territorial_PowerSharing, the perception of discrimination has a consistent, positive and statistically significant impact on support for Collective_Rights for all years. This significant relationship is robust even after controlling for a number of other factors, which provided a more detailed explanation. The multivariate analyses concluded that Kurds, who believed that the state discrimination is prevalent, are more likely to support the recognition of collective rights. These empirical findings point to the significance of perceived ethnic discrimination and, thus, the relevance of the relative deprivation theory in the context of Turkey's Kurdish conflict.

In terms of indicators as regards to religion, Religiosity_Practice proved to be not consistently and significantly correlated with Collective_Rights for all years. The Religiosity_Practice seemed to increase the likelihood of support only for 2013, which did not hold when controls were included. With regards to the attitudinal dimension of religiosity, I found positively significant effects for 2013 sample and the first model of 2011 and for the rest it remained insignificant. Consequently, the empirical findings did not point any consistent and significant correlation of religion with the collective rights. Further, I did not find any support for the religiosity hypothesis claiming that more religious people are less likely to be oriented to power

sharing. Overall, these findings supported the relative deprivation theory and the modernization theory and refutes the religiosity approach.

Among the control variables, ideology was robustly negatively and statistically significant for all years. The statistical analyses affirmed that individuals with left-wing ideological identification are more supportive of Kurdish demands for recognition of collective rights. Again, this statistical finding was hardly surprising given the PKK's Marxist/Leninist ideological legacy and the pro-Kurdish HDP's left-winger ideological positioning.

On the other hand, rural-urban divide and region also matter in the recognition of collective rights. The individuals living in rural areas were found to be more supportive for collective-rights than those living in urban areas. Again this result might have stemmed from the forced migration endorsing an ethnic consciousness among internally displaced Kurds, leading to relatively stronger support of Collective_Rights. In terms of the impact of living in the Southeast, Kurds living in Southeast are more likely to support Collective_Rights in 2011 and 2013. However, the coefficient of the Southeast dummy is insignificant in regressions of 2015. As a result, while Kurds living in the Southeast of Turkey are more likely to support Collective_Rights for 2011 and 2013, this relationship did not hold in 2015. This result may again have stemmed from the Kobane incidents and accompanying security meltdown in the region.

I observe negative coefficients for age dummies in each year - yet they were only significant in 2011 and 2015 regressions - indicating that younger generations appear

to be more supportive for Collective_Rights. With regard to sectarian identification, I found that being a follower of Shafi madhab had a positively and statistically significant impact on Collective_Rights for all years even after controlling for other factors. Finally, in parallel with Territorial_PowerSharing, there was no statistically significant relationship between unemployment and gender, and supporting more-political ethnic demands.



Table 9: Ordinal-logit regression analysis of Collective_Rights among Kurds

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Collective_Rights					
	2011		2013		2015	
Income	-0.157 (0.124)	-0.224 (0.150)	0.150 (0.118)	0.408*** (0.121)	-0.126 (0.141)	-0.202 (0.177)
Education	-0.0793 (0.0523)	- (0.0626)	-0.156*** (0.0483)	-0.271*** (0.0615)	-0.0850 (0.0573)	-0.201** (0.0789)
Discrimination	2.177*** (0.158)	1.618*** (0.186)	1.313*** (0.128)	0.997*** (0.141)	2.172*** (0.163)	1.755*** (0.186)
Religiosity_Practice	-0.292 (0.230)	-0.141 (0.269)	0.310* (0.179)	0.154 (0.208)	-0.0506 (0.207)	0.261 (0.233)
Religiosity_Attitude	0.500* (0.276)	0.425 (0.320)	0.586*** (0.187)	0.442** (0.213)	0.150 (0.241)	0.221 (0.262)
Control Variables						
Ideology		- 0.647*** (0.105)		-0.524*** (0.0921)		-0.468*** (0.0925)
Rural_Urban		0.382** (0.165)		0.341** (0.145)		1.072*** (0.167)
Region_Southeast		0.0617* (0.0367)		0.165*** (0.0342)		0.0194 (0.0379)
Unemployment		-0.0167 (0.270)		0.364 (0.255)		0.0974 (0.376)
Religious_sect_Shafi		0.601*** (0.168)		1.036*** (0.141)		0.280* (0.163)
Gender		0.0898 (0.155)		0.176 (0.143)		0.273 (0.168)
Age		- 0.0179** * (0.00594)		-0.00778 (0.00591)		-0.0139** (0.00709)
Constant cut1	-0.599 (1.043)	3.712*** (1.308)	0.514 (0.879)	1.023 (1.071)	-1.154 (1.176)	-1.623 (1.504)
Constant cut2	0.527 (1.038)	-2.486* (1.286)	1.511* (0.879)	2.046* (1.076)	-0.546 (1.163)	-0.978 (1.491)
Constant cut3	0.554 (1.038)	-2.451* (1.286)	1.535* (0.877)	2.074* (1.074)	0.126 (1.167)	-0.358 (1.496)
Constant cut4	1.481 (1.035)	-1.327 (1.276)	2.634*** (0.888)	3.329*** (1.082)	0.143 (1.168)	-0.337 (1.496)
Constant cut5	1.495 (1.035)	-1.319 (1.276)	2.640*** (0.888)	3.336*** (1.082)	1.212 (1.171)	0.826 (1.497)
Constant cut6	2.654** (1.044)	0.0107 (1.284)	3.506*** (0.891)	4.300*** (1.082)		
Observations	782	716	1,140	1,093	1,102	1,042
Pseudo R2	0.1023	0.1546	0.0533	0.1134	0.1097	0.1434
Log pse. likelihood	1039.502 9	898.0258 8	-1201.6694	-1061.5424	926.0605 2	- 838.65236
Wald chi2(5/12)	196.44	287.75	124.47	236.40	194.73	228.85
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are shown in paranthesis. (2) ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.						

Table 10: Summary Results of Table 4.6

2011	2013	2015
	Income (+),not robust*	
Education (-),not robust*	Education (-)	Education (-), not robust*
Discrimination (+)	Discrimination (+)	Discrimination (+)
	Religiosity_Practice (+)	
Religiosity_Attitude (+),not robust*	Religiosity_Attitude (+)	
Ideology (-)	Ideology (-)	Ideology (-)
Rural_Urban (+)	Rural_Urban (+)	Rural_Urban (+)
Region_Southeast(+)	Region_Southeast(+)	
Religious_sect_Shafi (+)	Religious_sect_Shafi (+)	Religious_sect_Shafi (+)
Age (-)		Age (-)
Notes: *, indicates that the regarding variable is significant only in one model for the corresponding year.		

Table 4.9 below provides regression analyses of determinants of the mass-level support for the provision of certain institutional shelters (such as amnesty, immunity for past crimes, etc) for rebels' inclusion - namely Rebel_Inclusion - among Kurds for each year. Again, first two models show the results of regressions on 2011 sample, the following two models show that of 2013 sample and the remaining are for the 2015 sample. The summary results of Table 4.9 are highlighted in Table 4.10 where consistently significant variables are listed.

Among the socio-economic indicators, income did not support modernization theory where income was not consistently and significantly correlated with Rebel_Inclusion for all years. Although I found a negatively significant coefficient for the first models of 2013, but the sign turned out to be insignificant after controlling for other factors. Unemployment was negatively significant for both models of 2015. In terms of the education's impact on Rebel_Inclusion, I did not find a statistically significant relationship except the second model of 2013 indicating a negative relationship. To summarize, I did not find any effect of socio-economic status on the support for

rebels' inclusion dimension and hence the analysis did not reveal any evidence on modernization theory.

Similar to other power sharing indicators, the perception of discrimination had a consistent, positive and statistically significant impact on support for Rebel_Inclusion for all years. This significant relationship was robust even after controlling for a number of other factors, which provided a more detailed explanation. The multivariate analyses concluded that Kurds, who believe that the discrimination is prevalent, are more likely to support recognition of the provision of certain institutional shelters (such as amnesty, immunity for past crimes, etc.) for rebels' inclusion. These empirical findings pointed to the significance of perceived ethnic discrimination and, thus, the relevance of the relative deprivation theory in the context of Turkey's Kurdish conflict.

In terms of indicators as regards to religion, Religiosity_Practice proved to be not consistently and significantly correlated with Rebel_Inclusion for all years. While Religiosity_Practice seemed to increase the likelihood of support for 2013, it reduced the likelihood of support for 2015. With regards to the attitudinal dimension of religiosity, I found robust positively significant effects for all of the years. Accordingly, the empirical findings did not point any negative and significant correlation of religion with the Rebel_Inclusion in favor of the religiosity hypothesis. To summarize, these findings supported the relative deprivation theory; refuted the modernization theory as well as the religiosity approach.

As regards to the control variables, ideology was robustly negatively and statistically significant for all years, in line with the results for other power sharing indicators. The regression results revealed that individuals with left-wing ideological identification are more supportive of Kurdish demands for recognition of rebels' inclusion. Again, this statistical finding was hardly surprising given the PKK's Marxist/Leninist ideological legacy and the pro-Kurdish HDP's left-winger ideological positioning.

On the other hand, rural-urban divide and region also affected the recognition of collective rights. The individuals living in the rural areas were found to be more supportive for collective-rights than those living in the urban areas for 2013 and 2015. Again this result might have stemmed from the forced migration. As for the impact of living in the Southeast, Kurds living in Southeast were more likely to support rebels' inclusion for all years even after controlling for other factors.

On sectarian identification, I found that being a follower of the Shafi *madhab* did have a positively and statistically significant impact on Rebel_Inclusion for all years. Finally, in parallel with other power sharing indicators there was no statistically significant relationship between gender and supporting more-political ethnic demands. While age dummy was negatively significant only for 2015, unemployment was insignificant for all years. Thus, it was hard to make inferences on age and unemployment's impact on Rebel_Inclusion.

Table 11: Ordinal-logit regression analysis of Rebel_Inclusion among Kurds

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Rebel_Inclusion					
	2013		2015		2017	
Income	-0.215 (0.131)	-0.0239 (0.167)	-0.259** (0.110)	0.220** (0.112)	- (0.116)	-0.239* (0.141)
Education	0.000334 (0.0518)	0.0310 (0.0690)	-0.0490 (0.0464)	-0.171*** (0.0580)	-0.0101 (0.0445)	-0.0649 (0.0621)
Discrimination	1.499*** (0.145)	1.044*** (0.180)	1.559*** (0.122)	1.279*** (0.139)	2.055*** (0.132)	1.717*** (0.157)
Religiosity_Practice	-0.156 (0.203)	-0.373 (0.252)	0.396** (0.164)	0.0678 (0.185)	- (0.156)	-0.299* (0.173)
Religiosity_Attitude	1.139*** (0.221)	0.726** (0.284)	0.795*** (0.180)	0.974*** (0.235)	0.828*** (0.181)	0.677*** (0.203)
Control Variables						
Ideology		- 0.419*** (0.0884)		-0.788*** (0.0964)		-0.539*** (0.0872)
Rural_Urban		0.0123 (0.172)		0.500*** (0.155)		0.969*** (0.142)
Region_Southeast		0.318*** (0.0412)		0.382*** (0.0350)		0.191*** (0.0311)
Unemployment		0.0240 (0.251)		0.303 (0.250)		-0.373 (0.243)
Religious_sect_Shafi		1.049*** (0.175)		0.749*** (0.134)		0.612*** (0.133)
Gender		0.0565 (0.163)		0.0763 (0.137)		-0.0670 (0.142)
Age		0.00524 (0.00691)		-0.00547 (0.00581)		- (0.00615)
Constant cut1	1.156 (1.037)	1.654 (1.346)	0.782 (0.826)	3.371*** (1.002)	-0.142 (0.916)	-0.00964 (1.187)
Constant cut2	2.798*** (1.042)	3.669*** (1.361)	1.581* (0.827)	4.347*** (1.007)	0.700 (0.921)	0.974 (1.190)
Constant cut3			1.610* (0.827)	4.386*** (1.007)	0.755 (0.920)	1.014 (1.190)
Constant cut4			2.467*** (0.827)	5.503*** (1.010)	1.792* (0.923)	2.236* (1.191)
Observations	774	713	1,139	1,092	1,100	1,040
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are shown in paranthesis. (2) ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.						

Table 12: Summary Results of Table 4.8

2011	2013	2015
	Income (-),(+) not robust*	Income (-)
	Education (-), not robust*	
Discrimination (+)	Discrimination (+)	Discrimination (+)
	Religiosity_Practice (+), not robust*	Religiosity_Practice (-), not robust*
Religiosity_Attitude (+)	Religiosity_Attitude (+)	Religiosity_Attitude (+)
Ideology (-)	Ideology (-)	Ideology (-)
Rural_Urban (+)	Rural_Urban (+)	Rural_Urban (+)
Region_Southeast(+)	Region_Southeast(+)	Region_Southeast(+)
Religious_sect_Shafi (+)	Religious_sect_Shafi (+)	Religious_sect_Shafi (+)
		Age (-)
Notes: *, indicates that the variable is significant only in one model for the corresponding year.		

In conclusion, the multivariate analyses showed three broad conclusions, which proved to be relevant in all models across years. Firstly, the socio-economic factors did not necessarily constrain power-sharing demands among Turkey's Kurds. This went also in line with the As McGarry's (1995: 137) observation claiming that "economic growth alone, without a political settlement which seeks to address the political aspirations of the warring ethnonational groups, will have little effect upon ethnonational conflict." Consequently, the proponents of the modernist approaches assuming that provision of better schooling, employment opportunities, and income generation, etc. would not really produce the desired outcome in the context of the Kurdish problem.

Secondly, the multivariate analyses supported the argument that overarching religious cleavages did not necessarily contain ethno-political claims. In our models, religiosity did not necessarily fetter the Kurds' aspirations for power-sharing in Turkey. Thus, promoting the overarching religious identity would not cement Turks and Kurds to each other as the Turkish Islamist circles in Turkey have alleged for decades. This also supported Sarıgil and Fazlıoğlu's (2015:450) conclusion: "the

policy of promoting Islamic values and consciousness to suppress Kurdish ethno-nationalism would not really produce the desired outcome." On the contrary of the Turkish Islamists' traditional thinking, the *Hanafi-Shafi* divide –i.e., majority of the Kurds observe the *Shafi madhab* whereas most of the Turks observe the Hanafi jurisprudence - proved to be linked with Kurds' politico-territorial power-sharing aspirations.

Thirdly, the most robust empirical findings were that the grievances – i.e., about half of the Kurds perceive that the Turkish state discriminates against them - and rural-urban divide – i.e., Kurds' living the rural areas are more supportive of ethno-nationalist power-sharing claims – and ideology – i.e., leftist Kurds are more supportive of the power-sharing- proved to be fostering the Kurds' power-sharing demands.

CHAPTER 5

ELITE PERSPECTIVES ON POWER-SHARING

This chapter aims to inquire various Turkish and Kurdish elite circles' understandings of the main pillars of power-sharing, their differing interest formulations, and inter-elite interactions with each other. This section, first, reviews the theoretical discussions on the ethno-political elites' role in ethno-nationalist mobilization and power-sharing governance. Secondly, I present the process of qualitative data collection –i.e., selection of interviewees, interviewing method, etc. - through semi-structured elite interviews. Thirdly, I discuss various ethno-political elite segments' power-sharing perspectives in the Kurdish conflict with reference to the semi-structured interviews conducted. In doing so, I intend to highlight the major recurrent themes in these elite's differing understandings and interest-formulations of power-sharing in relation to the Kurdish conflict.

5.1. Elites' Role In The Ethno-Nationalist Mobilization And Power-Sharing Accords

Some scholars tend to assume ethnic groups as unitary actors and ascribe agency to the ethnic groups as a whole regardless of highly possible intra-group - linguistic, confessional, ideological - diversities (Lijphart, 1977: 142–158; Gurr et al. 1993, 4–5; Gurr, 2000, 6). However, this unitary actor assumption fails to recognize that

ethnic boundaries are not fixed, but rather permeable and porous (Brubaker, 2004; Barth: 1969, 9). Indeed, most of the ethnic groups are fragmented due to overarching cleavages, such as religion, ideology, socio-economic factors, etc. Individuals may also feel belonging to multiple social groups especially due to these overarching identities. Additionally, individuals can even align with other groups, not necessarily comprised of their co-ethnics, in their interest-formulation (Barth, 1969:7). Due to these overarching cleavages and interest formulations, individuals may well defect from their co-ethnics in their interest formulation, ideological, and partisan choices (Kalyvas, 2003, 2008; Staniland, 2012; Rabushka & Shepsle, 2008:27). Several empirical works also proved that ethnic identity does not determine political allegiance and choices as well as interest-formulation (Dunning & Nilekani, 2013; Horowitz, 2000:85) Due to these limitations, the unitary actor assumption also fails to comprehend the complexities of protracted ethnic conflicts, like the Kurdish problem in Turkey.

Despite the insufficiency of the unitary actor assumption with regard to the ethnic collectivities; ethnic identity and ethnic entrepreneurs do significantly matter, particularly under conflictual conditions (Bates, 1974; Horowitz, 2000; Bormann, 2014; Gurr, 2000). Lecours (2000) advocates that political elites have a key role in ethno-nationalist mobilization as well as in the identity formation and interest-formulation. (Lecours 2000: 118; see also Haymes 1997 cited in Sarıgil and Fazlıoğlu, 2013) The ethno-political entrepreneurs are often of central importance in deeply divided places, especially where, according to grievance-based theories, categorical inequalities exist along ethnic lines. Additionally, ethnic collectivities, unsurprisingly, remain policy-relevant agencies in conflict-ridden countries.

Especially in conflict cases, individuals are more likely to follow ethno-political elites' lead in their interest-formulation and political positioning (Horowitz, 2000; Bormann, 2014; Gurr, 2000) In case of inter-ethnic competition and ethnic conflicts, individuals tend to depend on their co-ethnics and follow the lead of their ethnic elites (Wimmer, 1997: 641; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013: 23).

Elite considerations have a particular significance for my research due to their influence in post-conflict power-sharing accords. Their role in the making of a power-sharing deal is widely acknowledged in the literature (Lijphart, 1977, 1985; Wimmer, 1997:641; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013:23; Lecours, 2000). Lijphart (1977, 1985) even claimed that power-sharing governance is basically an elite-bargaining process. The cooperation of ethnic elites “is a *conditio sine qua non* for achieving an agreement in the first place” and the extent of their commitment determines the durability of any peace accord (Nordlinger, 1972; Schneckener, 2004). The basic argument of the proponents of power-sharing theory claims that elite behavior can be captured and manipulated to achieve peace with the right kind of institutional rules (Lijphart, 1977, 1985; Wimmer, 1997: 641; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013:23).

Turkey's Kurdish conflict is not an exception in terms of elite-centrism in ethno-political conflicts. The extant literature agreed that the Kurdish ethno-nationalist and Islamist leaders have played substantial roles in identity construction, interest definition, and politicization and mobilization of the Kurds (Houston, 2001; Sarıgil and Fazlıoğlu, 2013). A similar elite-driven pattern has been apparent on the Turkish front as well. Various Turkish political and bureaucratic elites' opposition against the

Kurds' cultural and political-territorial demands has also seemingly shaped their segments' political positioning; and, thus, led to an overwhelming opposition to power-sharing arrangements at the mass-level. A complicated redux of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic elite exchanges have developed and become a determining factor in the protracted Kurdish conflict. In the presence of strong overarching loyalties and various competing (ethno-)political elites, the unitary actor assumption has proved to be insufficient to comprehend the complexities of the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Going beyond the unitary actor assumption –i.e., instead of a common dichotomous portrayal of “the Turks vs Kurds”; or “the Turkish state vs. Kurds”-, I aim to inquire the following questions in this chapter: How and why do ethnic elites diverge in their understandings and perceptions of power-sharing? And how do ethnic elites interact (compete, confront, and cooperate) in bargaining features of a power-sharing accord?

5.1.1. Elite Interviews

The qualitative data were derived from 113 semi-structured interviews. The set of semi-structured interviews was undertaken over a period of 32 months, between November 2014 and May 2017, with various Turkish and Kurdish political elites in Ankara, İstanbul, Mersin, Ağrı, İzmir, Bodrum, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Siirt, Hakkari, Şırnak, and Van. The master questionnaire inquired the interviewees' understanding on the various features of power-sharing governance as well as their take on various socio-economic, political and psychological debates seen in the existing literature on the Kurdish conflict. In the openings of the interviews, I provided brief information about the purpose of my research, the topic of the questions, the final publication process, and also seek interviewees' consent for potential disclosure of their views.

In most of the interviews, I presented very brief information about the basic functioning of power-sharing democracies in order to reduce the conceptual gap with the interviewees. Twenty-nine of the interviewees, most of whom are Kurdish ethno-nationalists or retired/active duty public officials, requested confidentiality and non-disclosure of their names due to their personal security concerns as well as legal (post-)employment restrictions.

Aiming to overcome the deficiencies of the unitary actor assumption of ethnic identities, I employed triangulation technique in the collection of qualitative data. Employing the triangulation technique enabled me to inquire multiple data sources – i.e., representing (ethno-)political segments in my case- ensuring corroboration. To this end, I employed rough categorizations to group ethno-political elites. For the Turkish elites, I used political party affiliation for triangulation purposes. For the Kurdish elites, I refer to the tripartite typology – i.e., the ethno-nationalists, pro-Islamic and conservative Kurds, and integrated Kurds - described extensively in the Chapter 1. Acknowledging that these are imperfect categories, such a triangulation of elites, nevertheless, provided me a better picture in terms of illustrating their understandings and interest-formulations with regard to the power-sharing arrangements. On the Turkish front, I also interviewed non-partisan, civilian and bureaucratic elites –i.e., presidents, members of high judiciary, high-ranking state officials, etc. – in order to reflect the Turkish establishment's views on the power-sharing. Despite my efforts to encompass as many diverse views as possible, certain political groups' –such as the liberals, socialists, etc. - were not covered in my triangulation. After 10 interviews from each (Kurdish or Turkish) cohort, I felt that additional will not make any significant contribution to the emerging understanding

on interviewee cohorts' understanding of power-sharing. Therefore, I conducted at least ten interviews from representatives of each of these cohorts in order to make sure that I heard divergent views and to prevent possible personal biases.

5.2. Power-sharing Perspectives of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist elites: “... *a social contract to share the sovereignty between the Kurds and the Republic of Turkey.*”

My interviews with Kurdish ethno-nationalist elites unveiled their comprehensive understanding of power-sharing, which was equipped with a broad institutional repertoire. They often expressed their understanding of power-sharing with reference to what they somewhat ambiguously term as ‘democratic autonomy.’ Their democratic autonomy model is a broad political design encompassing all major institutional pillars of power-sharing governance – with the exception of economic power-sharing, such as arrangements of natural resource's revenue-sharing. Their power-sharing narratives put emphasis on the establishment of an autonomous region, constitutionally-embedded collective rights, as well as security sector reform and rebel inclusion, etc. Despite their consistent reference to the 'democratic autonomy model,' the Kurdish ethno-nationalist interviewees' understandings on various institutional arrangements of power-sharing differed. Throughout my interviews, I, therefore, aimed to clarify what the Kurdish ethno-nationalists specifically understand from power-sharing and what type of institutional repertoire they demand to achieve what they see as power-sharing.

Throughout the interviews, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists portrayed the democratic autonomy as their ultimate political objective and the only viable way to resolve the

conflict. One of the most recurrent themes in their understanding of power-sharing was the autonomy, expressed in the form of self-rule [*özyönetim*] in terms of terminology. Describing the gist of his understanding of power-sharing as 'sharing of executive and legislative powers between autonomous regions and central government', the co-chair of the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), Hatip Dicle, further expressed that

... [D]emocratic autonomy recognizes the existence of different communities within Turkey as well as their right for an autonomous self-rule. We propose democratic autonomy and self-rule not only for the Kurds, but also for the whole of Turkey. According to our [democratic autonomy] model, Turkey will be composed of about twenty regions by bringing together the cities which are similar in terms of their demographic, economic and cultural characteristics in a region... Each autonomous region is vested with broad legislative and executive powers to govern their own cultural and political matters. Everyone, even the government representatives, admits that Turkey is too big and diverse to be governed from one single center. We need to rationalize this unwieldy governance system. Our [democratic autonomy] model addresses this problem through sharing of executive and legislative powers between these autonomous regions and central government. (Author's interview, November 2014)

In addition to the delegation of certain executive and legislative powers to the regional bodies, another view among the Kurdish ethno-nationalist elites put emphasis on overhauling the election system – i.e., the narrow district system was specifically emphasized - and, thereby, strengthening the autonomous regions' representation in the legislative branch. In that sense, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists expressed their demands for "sharing of executive and legislative powers both at the central and regional levels." For instance, Sebahat Tuncel, vice co-chair of the Democratic Society Congress, expressed that

[In democratic autonomy model] self-governance organs of an autonomous region shall be composed within the regional parliaments that are elected through regional elections. This aims to eliminate all forms of tutelage mechanisms [of the central government] over the elected legislative and executive organs of autonomous regions. Additionally, the will of the people in the autonomous

regions must also be represented at the Turkish Grand National Assembly and central government through a better-crafted election system, such as the narrow district election system [dar bölge seçim sistemi]. In that sense, our model envisages delegating and sharing of certain executive powers of the central government with the autonomous administrations both at the central and regional level. This also makes the central government more participatory and inclusive. (Author's interview, April 2014)

Clarifying the symbolism aspect –i.e., flag, anthem, etc. - of the autonomy, HDP spokesperson Osman Baydemir, seemingly inspired from the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraqi federation, stated that

... [In the democratic autonomy project,] There will be an Autonomous Kurdistan of Democratic Turkey. Turkish Grand National Assembly will definitely be maintained. We also have no objections to that. The Parliament may even be stronger, more inclusive with high representative power with the representatives coming from autonomous regions. The National Anthem will be maintained. Turkish flag will continue to fly in the autonomous regions in Turkey. We do not have any objections to it as well. Yet in the autonomous region there will also be a regional parliament. One of the regional parliaments will be the Kurdistan Regional Parliament. Next to the Turkish flag, the flag of the Kurdish people with local colors will also fly in the skies. This will also symbolize the joint will of our nations to co-exist. (Author's interview, February, 2016)

Although Dicle, Tuncel and Baydemir portrayed the Kurdish self-rule as sharing of executive and legislative powers, HDP deputies Hişyar Özsoy, Ferhat Encü, and Sırrı Süreyya Önder, and pro-Kurdish human rights activist Öztürk Türkdoğan specifically emphasized sharing sovereignty in their accounts of power-sharing. They argued that the Kurdish self-rule would inevitably bring about 'sharing sovereignty' between the autonomous region and central government. Hişyar Özsoy, HDP's vice-chair, claimed that

... the most important one [demand] for me – is that Kurds have a demand for political status in this region. This demand translates into the concept of sovereignty in the political science. In other words it is not just a matter of cultural rights. I mean it is not a matter of Circassians, Georgians, Laz people,

and other cultural groups. Kurdish issue is first and foremost a matter of sovereignty. It is an issue stemming from the usurpation of Kurds' sovereignty. To what extent will the Kurds be entitled to decide about their economy, education, health, security and rights in their own region? All these policies should be planned and executed by the Kurds themselves. This is what I mean by sovereignty. It is imperative to conclude a social contract to share the sovereignty between the Kurds and the Republic of Turkey. (Author's interview, June 2016)

Defining the Kurdish self-rule as sharing sovereignty between the central and regional governments, Sırrı Süreyya Önder expressed his understanding of the Kurdish self-rule as such: *"The Turkish State has been usurping the sovereignty of the Kurds. Kurds are very well aware of what they are missing. It is their sovereignty. The Congress [the Democratic Society Congress] has developed the idea of the Kurdish self-rule in order to sustain the Kurds' existence as sovereign in Kurdistan."* (Author's interview, November 2016) Similarly, Leyla Zana, HDP deputy, claimed that *"The proposed democratic autonomy model entails sharing sovereignty between the Turkish state and the autonomous self-governing entities. This sharing would not be based on territory. The gist of the democratic autonomy is to make all Kurds able to say 'I am a Kurd' in Kurdish everywhere in the country and to experience living as a Kurd."* (Authors' 2nd interview, October, 2016)

In response to my direct question on differing understandings of the Kurdish self-rule –i.e., whether it entails sharing sovereignty or legislative and executive powers between regional and central governments –, Meral Daniş Beştaş, HDP deputy, argued that

...the self-rule does not entail taking the sovereignty from the Turkish state. Actually, the sovereignty again resides in a single state, which would be comprised of autonomous regions. These autonomous regions should have the authority to govern their cultural, social and political affairs independently provided that it does not contravene constitutional norms... Of course; the

division of powers and competences between the autonomous regions and central government needs to be re-designed in a new constitution. It [the new constitution] should spell out the boundaries of the [Turkish] state intervention in autonomous regions as well as how the autonomous region will be represented in Ankara.

Our [democratic autonomy] model does not merely aim at having sovereignty in an autonomous Kurdish region. This would be an old-fashioned approach. More important than these, the biggest novelty of the democratic autonomy model is about introduction of communal liberties to citizens regardless of the regional and demographic limitations. I mean, both a Kurd in Diyarbakır and one in İstanbul will be able to practice their own culture, language and receive mother-tongue education according to the democratic autonomy model. Otherwise, if we merely seek a regional autonomy, this would create results just in a certain region. (Author's interview, June 2016)

The extra-territorial nature of the Kurdish self-rule that was emphasized by Beştaş above was also another theme in the Kurdish ethno-nationalist elites' understanding of power-sharing. Their narratives consistently emphasized community-based power-sharing arrangements, rather than a territory-based one. Underlining the extra-territorial nature of their power-sharing aspiration, Hişyar Özsoy, commented that *"The autonomous region, in our model, is not determined based on ethnic composition of a territory... a self-rule in cultural matters, based on communal demands, needs to be formulated for the Kurds living in the western provinces. Otherwise, how can a Kurd living in İstanbul can enjoy her communal rights?"* (Author's 2nd interview, March, 2017)

Most of the Kurdish ethno-nationalists agreed that the Kurdish self-rule enshrined in the democratic autonomy model precludes secession. For instance, HDP's vice-chair İdris Balüken said that: *"It [a Kurdish self-rule] has nothing to do with achieving an independent Kurdish state. We aim to materialize democratic self-rule on the basis of Turkey's territorial unity and the shared future of Turkish and Kurdish peoples. Hence, the Kurdish self-rule is the only way to get rid of these secessionist fears of*

the Turks." (Author's interview, February 2014) Similarly, Kamuran Yüksek, co-chair of the DBP, claimed that *"None of the components of the Kurdish political movement, neither the PKK nor the HDP, ever regarded the Kurdish question as a mere problem of ethnicity or nationhood. Our struggle does not entail seceding from Turkey and founding of a Kurdish state."* (Author's interview, December 2015)

Having a different take on the question of secession, HDP's former Mardin mayor Ahmet Türk argued that secession can be an option unless Turkish state reciprocates their key demands of autonomy and cultural protectionism. His remarks are as follows:

With the steering of HDP and DTK, Kurds memorized by heart the expression "Türkiyelileşme [becoming of Turkey, Turkey-zation]" in the course of the settlement process; in fact however, they could not internalize it. Inside the Kurds, inside all of us, there is still the prevailing question 'why should not there be a Kurdistan?', 'why should I not have an independent state and a flag?' The heart of the Kurds still asks for a Kurdistan. To put it another way, Kurdistan, for us, is an imaginary and emotional geography. Türkiyelileşme was a mutual thing. The State had to hand in their rights to the Kurds so that the Kurds could feel a belonging for this State... (Author's interview, May, 2014)

Throughout the interviews, a strong sense of self-entitlement for an autonomous Kurdish self-rule became apparent in Kurdish ethno-nationalist elites' narratives. Their narratives also revealed that this belief of self-entitlement was apparently driven by their historical grievances – i.e., mostly expressed as 'unkept promises of autonomy after the Independence War.' This feeling of self-entitlement dominated their narratives and constituted an integral part of the collective memory of the conflict from a pro-Kurdish perspective. Several of the interviewees reflected this feeling of self-entitlement with historical accounts. Claiming that *"The Kurds deserved to have an autonomous status back in early 1920's,"* Ahmet Türk, for

instance, reflected the sense of self-entitlement to an autonomous Kurdish region as follows:

Kurds still strive to reach our autonomous legal status guaranteed in the 1921 constitution. The 1924 Constitution established an autocratic political system and denied Kurdish identity despite the fact that the Kurds were crucial for the success of the Independence War. Kurds, now, demand that this injustice should be redressed by the enactment of a new constitution that recognizes an autonomous Kurdish self-rule (Author's interview, May 2014).

Similarly, Aysel Tuğluk, HDP deputy co-chair, revealed her feeling of self-entitlement to an autonomous Kurdish region, as follows:

After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of World War I, Mustafa Kemal realized the importance of allying with the Kurds. Turkey won the War of Independence and the Republic of Turkey was established with the sacrifices of the Kurds... Mustafa Kemal's idea to grant autonomy to Kurdistan and the first assembly's decision of February 1922 to this effect were the result of honoring his previous pledges. Although the Kurds seriously suffered from the Ottoman Empire's policies in the last period of the empire, unlike some other groups, the Kurds have not opted for separation and decided to stay with the Turks while maintaining a certain level autonomy. However, the promises made to the Kurds have not been kept after achieving the independence (Author's interview, August 2016).

The recognition of a distinctive Kurdish identity and granting of constitutionally-embedded collective rights were the second recurrent themes in Kurdish ethno-nationalists' understanding of power-sharing. In line with their understanding of community-based extra-territorial autonomy, HDP deputy Pervin Buldan expressed that *"The state has to acknowledge that Kurds are a distinct nation, and that they have collective rights. Kurds are not dumb! They see Turkey says, 'In Cyprus, federation is not enough, let there be a confederation,' or 'Greece has to respect the collective rights of the Turks of the Western Thrace.' Why should they be entitled to communal rights but I shall not?"* (Author's interview, October, 2014)

In terms of cultural protection pillar of power-sharing, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists demands particularly included *inter alia* education in mother-tongue, access to and provision of services in mother tongue, and to exercise other social-cultural rights without any restrictions. Among all these issues, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists' narrative prioritized the right to education in mother-tongue as the most notable demand. In terms of the modality and scope of the education in mother-tongue, HDP deputy Ayhan Bilgen specifically highlighted that "*...recognition of Kurdish language aside from Turkish as an official language is necessary... Since they say we are equal citizens, Kurds, too, must be able to enjoy the right to education in mother tongue from elementary school until the graduation from the university, and in public services, just like a Turk can in Turkish*" (Author's interview, November 2016). On the right to education in mother-tongue, some of the interviewees again referred to the democratic autonomy model. For instance, HDP's former Van mayor Bekir Kaya noted that "*Our autonomy proposal envisages leaving education, at all levels, starting from the pre-school to the hands of the self-rule administration.*" (Author's interview, August 2015)

Commenting on their opposition to the existing definition of citizenship of the Turkish state, Leyla Zana expressed that

In the mindset of the state, 'Citizen' means Turk, Sunni and Hanafi. The rest, be it Kurd, Alevi, Shafi, Assyrian, or Armenian is either suppressed or assimilated into the "Turkish" sub-set. Our insistence on the Kurds' rights runs parallel to the concept of multi-cultural society envisaged in our understanding of democratic autonomy. Our struggle is to secure that the Kurdish people will no longer be forced to live as a non-status people under an administration that threatens their existence.... One of our biggest objections to the existing constitution is the definition of citizenship, which makes an ethnic reference to the Turkishness. Let me put it bluntly: No Kurd would wish to say, "I am a Turk" with a comfort in his heart. Our demand is a guarantee for the existence of the Kurds, a safeguard for

the Kurdish identity in the constitutional text. Only if the definition of citizenship would be revised as such, then the Kurds may make peace with the concept of "citizen of the Republic of Turkey (Author's interview, January, 2016).

The interviews with Kurdish ethno-nationalists demonstrated that they view constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity –i.e., at least repealing the bans over such a recognition- and constitutionally-preserved collective rights as an integral part of a power-sharing deal. Their demands of cultural protectionism was again claimed in an extra-territorial fashion so that the Kurds across Turkey – i.e., not just the ones in an autonomous region - can be eligible to enjoy these collective cultural recognition and rights.

The third main power-sharing arrangement highlighted by the Kurdish ethno-nationalists pertains to the rebel inclusion. The rebel inclusion remains as an integral part of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist circles' power-sharing narratives due to the leading role of the PKK in their movement. This is why most of the Kurdish ethno-nationalists interviewees see the rebel inclusion as *sine qua non* for an eventual power-sharing arrangement. Aiming to highlight the significance of the rebel inclusion in the eyes of the Kurds, pro-Kurdish artist, İrfan Aktan claimed that

Believe me, if tomorrow the state of Turkey declares democratic autonomy for Kurds, declares that Kurdish education will begin from primary school, that they can fly their own flag next to the flag of Turkey, these would not satisfy the people here because they seek the answers to two questions: What will happen to the organization (those in the mountains)? What will happen to the Leader [Abdullah Öcalan]? The Kurds here consider the PKK as people who have sacrificed their lives for them. They feel indebted to them. Kurdish people have this feeling of fidelity. They will not desert those in the mountains. As long as they do not see anyone coming down the mountains and as long as the situation of the person they consider as they are "leader" remains in prison, no other solution would satisfy these people (Author's interview, January, 2017).

The Kurdish ethno-nationalist elites often legitimized the PKK-incited violence with reference to the alleged heavy-handed military oppression of the Turkish state. Their categorical rejection of viewing the PKK as a terrorist organization shaped their narratives about rebel inclusion pillar of their power-sharing demands. Claiming that *"the PKK is a political organization that had to opt for violent means because the democratic channels are not open for the Kurds"* and Turkish state's military-oriented approach to the issue *"leaves no room for non-violent Kurdish politics,"* Ferhat Encü, HDP deputy, further noted that *"I do not accept the statist jargon labelling the PKK as a terrorist organization. How can you see a party, which has millions of sympathizers and integrated with the people and found a place in the world's agenda, as a terrorist? ... The PKK's struggle and sacrifices brought our national pride back."* (Author's interview, September 2016)

The HDP co-chair Demirtaş viewed *"a comprehensive amnesty program and arrangements for the release of political prisoners"* as part of the rebel inclusion. Demirtaş also noted that *"Certainly Mr Öcalan should be free in view of reinstating peace in this country. The same also goes for the PKK cadres"* and, further continued as follows:

Öcalan [...] has the sole power on the PKK to convince it [to] disarm. As HDP, we cannot make PKK lay down arms. We have tried numerous times yet failed because there's no hierarchy nor any organic bonds between us and the PKK. He is considered to be the people's leader by a significant part of the Kurdish people. This weight should be recognized and considered as an opportunity for the settlement process. Therefore it is imperative that negotiations are held directly with him... You cannot confer such a vital burden on Mr Öcalan yet expect him to pursue the rest of his life in a state of isolation... What do you expect from these people [PKK members at large]? Do you really believe that they will surrender only to go into prison for decades? This is not realistic (Author's interview, March, 2014).

On the security sector reform, while the Kurdish ethno-nationalists' narratives underlined a deep mistrust towards the Turkish security apparatus, they portrayed the PKK as the legitimate security provider for the Kurds in the South-eastern turkey. For instance, Nazmi Gür, former deputy co-chair of the HDP, highlighted that "*the Kurds have been a target of ISIS as well as its collaborators in Turkey's Kurdistan [Türkiye Kürdistanı]*" and the Kurds' "*depend[ing] on the PKK and YDGH for their security*". Gür further claimed that

ISIS and similar groups consider the Kurds as the number one enemy in the Middle East... Anti-Kurdism [Kürt karşıtlığı] defined Turkey's Syrian policy. Based on the understanding that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, AKP government has supported ISIS and other Salafi groups hostile against Kurds. We all know that the Turkish state has extended indirect support to attacks by ISIS and other Salafi organizations against our people. At least it has condoned such attacks. Kurds do not rely on the Turkish state that it would ensure their security against ISIS and other gangs (Author's interview, February, 2016).

Similarly, Besime Konca, HDP deputy, advocated for the need of "a regional defense unit from among the Kurds" to defend the Kurdish autonomous region. Legitimizing her views with reference to the Kurds' existing security complex, she claimed that

One of the most important issues related to democratic autonomy is self-defense. Kurds do not trust; and do not willingly take part in the Turkish military or police structure. Instead, the Kurdish youth establish their self-defense units in the cities... How will Kurds protect themselves, how will they guarantee their security in case of a settlement? The only way to protect the autonomous region enshrined in our autonomy proposal issue is to form a regional defense unit from among the Kurds (Author's interview, December 2014).

Adopting relatively a softer tone, HDP, co-chair Demirtaş, limited his comments about the rebel inclusion dimension with legal remedies. Responding to my direct question inquiring about a possible role of the PKK cadres in security provision of the demanded autonomous rule, Demirtaş replied as follows: "*This is a delicate*

issue; we are aware. A general amnesty could hurt the public... Nevertheless, amnesty is one of the key demands of the Qandil that we cannot overlook. Eventually we need to prepare the legal framework for the political prisoners, exiles and guerilla in order to help them to be integrated into social and political life" (Author's interview, October 2015).

In terms of inter-elite interaction, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists, and Turkish Islamists and bureaucratic elites' views on the rebel inclusion significantly contravened. With reference to the recent peace process, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists alleged that "the AKP government and Turkish state reduced the Kurdish problem merely down to the disarmament and demobilization of the PKK," according to Bedia Özgökçe, HDP's Van deputy. She further claimed that:

For the Turkish state's mediocre mentality, the only way to get rid of the Kurdish problem is to make the PKK lay down the arms, in one way or another. Yet this would not happen in the absence of a comprehensive settlement. Let me tell you why? After a long struggle, the PKK, for the first time for a Kurdish organization, has succeeded in garnering Kurdish people's unequivocal support. The Turkish state also acknowledged the PKK's strength and negotiated with the leadership (read: Öcalan) during the process (read: settlement process). After this point, I do not see any reason for the PKK to lay down arms without securing the Kurds' legitimate demands. As long as the Kurdish issue persists the PKK would not lay down arms (Author's interview, August 2016).

As a result, the Kurdish ethno-nationalist elites had a broad understanding of power-sharing. Their understandings also diverged on certain issues –i.e., whether the power-sharing arrangements envisage sharing of executive and legislative power or sovereignty with the central government-. Their narratives underlined the same, broad institutional repertoire to achieve power-sharing governance. Partly due to their apparent sense of grievance-based self-entitlement, they unequivocally viewed

an autonomous Kurdish self-rule as the most important institutional pillar of power-sharing governance. Cultural protectionism and rebel inclusion pillars again remained in the core of their reflections about power-sharing. The Kurdish ethno-nationalist elites' understanding of power-sharing included both community-based, extra-territorial, as well as territorial features. This hybrid understanding was the result of their interest-formulation: Basically they aspired to enjoy territorial power-sharing arrangements in the Southeastern Turkey where their Kurdish ethnic constituency is primarily clustered. In addition to this, they tended to seek for community-based, extra-territorial cultural protectionism arrangements for the rest of their ethnic constituency dispersed across western parts of Turkey. Acknowledging the fact that their power-sharing demands would not be possible within the existing power-concentrating constitutional architecture of Turkey, most of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist interviewees called for a constitutional overhaul that would recognize the Kurdish collectivity, repeal the bans on their cultural rights as well as grant an autonomous rule.

5.3. Power-sharing Perspectives of the Kurdish Islamists: *“We do not want to be Muslim brothers; we want to be equal, again.”*

The discursive repertoire of the Kurdish Islamist elites on the power-sharing perspectives remained ambivalent and shallow in the absence of any in-depth considerations about any of the institutional pillars of power-sharing. The narratives affirmed that their Islamist ideological predicament shaped their understanding of and attitude towards the power-sharing arrangements. Compared to their ethno-nationalist co-ethnics, the Kurdish Islamist elites' understanding of power-sharing

was relatively narrow; comprising of cultural protectionism and territorial power-sharing pillars –i.e., albeit, not a well-elaborated one- without mentioning rebel inclusion dimension. Despite sharing their ethno-nationalist co-ethnics' identity-related grievances and often referring them for legitimization purposes, their understanding of cultural and territorial power-sharing differed from that of ethno-nationalist Kurds' perception.

In the absence of a single reference point – such as the "democratic autonomy" concept enshrined in ethno-nationalist Kurds' narratives -, the Kurdish Islamists drew the boundaries of their understanding of power-sharing with reference to Islamic or historical texts. They often referred to two historical texts, the 'Dohuk Document' (*Dohuk Vesikası*)²³ and Medina Charter (*Medine Sözleşmesi*)²⁴ in order to justify their power-sharing claims. Modelling the Medina Charter as a mean to accommodate societal cleavages, Altan Tan, the HDP deputy, expressed that

In the resolution of the Kurdish problem, a societal consensus such as the Medina Charter that our Prophet Muhammad got prepared must be taken as basis. Only a new framework inspired from the Medina Charter, which advocates for pluralism instead of the Turkish state's monistic approach, can ensure that differences can co-exist on an egalitarian basis in Turkey. In fact, in the Medina Charter, societal groups that differ from one another, ethnically, religiously, linguistically and creed-wise...had been assigned rights and responsibilities; and everyone had been left free in terms of their religion and faith. Most important of all, pursuant to the Medina Charter, these groups which were living under the same roof had been granted autonomy in the management of their own culture, faith, business. As set forth under Article 1 of the Medina Charter, the "ummah" has a multi-identity, multi-language, and multi-faith connotation. The Turkish State must take

²³ Dohuk Document is a joint petition, signed by Kurdish notables (mostly tribal and religious leaders) in the lead of Abdusselam Barzanî and sent to the Ottoman Sultan, Abdulhamid II in 1907. The petition, comprised of seven articles, asked broadly for Kurdish cultural protectionism.

²⁴ The Medina Charter was drafted by the Prophet Muhammed in 622 CE. The charter formed the basis of a multi-faith state in Medina. It aimed to end the fighting between the rival clans in Medina and to maintain peace and co-operation among all Medinan groups.

into consideration that the ummah living on this soil comprises different religions, sects, faiths, and ethnic groups. The institutionalization and legal guaranteeing of justice, egalitarianism and a freedom-based understanding of the use of fundamental rights and liberties, and the self-expression of societies and individuals, are an Islamic-must (Author's interview, March 2015).

In a similar vein, commenting on the Kurdish Islamists' aspirations for power-sharing, former mayor and deputy, Seyyit Haşim Haşimi, referred to a rather long historical contextualization of the Kurdish struggle. In my interview, Haşimi put his aspirations for power-sharing in a historical context as follows:

Kurds have been chasing the very same political objectives of today for more than hundred years. Abdusselam Barzanî has launched efforts among the Kurdish tribes in order to acquire Kurdish rights. In 1907, they sent the "Dohuk Document" [Dohuk Vesikası] to the Ottoman Sultan to demand Kurdish rights. Hundred years ago, they demanded recognition of Kurdish language as an official language in districts such as İmadiye, Akra, Dohuk, Zaho and Sinjar... They demanded education in Kurdish language... appointment of officials to [Kurdish] districts from among Kurds. They also asked specifically for the consideration of the fact that Kurds are Shafiis. These demands caused extreme discontent among the Unionists (İttihatçılar). In 1908, the Unionists declared war against Abdusselam Barzanî and the Kurds. You see that nothing has changed for 110 years. Demands are the same. The reaction is more or less the same. The fight among those demanding the rights of the Kurds and the Unionists of today still persists (Author's interview, January, 2017).

Tan and Haşimi's historical accounts provided a good overview on the scope of Kurdish Islamists' understanding of power-sharing. Evident in both of their remarks, the first and foremost feature underlined in the Kurdish Islamists' broad understanding of power-sharing pertained to the recognition of a distinctive Kurdish ethnic identity and granting of certain collective rights by the Turkish state.

Although the Kurdish Islamists seemingly shared their ethno-nationalist co-ethnics' aspiration for the acknowledgement of a distinct Kurdish identity and granting of collective cultural rights, what they understand from the Kurdish identity, collective

rights as well as how they legitimize their claim differ in line with their ideological outlook. As the most salient difference, the Islamist Kurds referred to Islam, instead of secular, rights-based narratives of ethno-nationalist Kurds' narrative, as a medium through which they legitimize their aspirations for power-sharing. Broadly-speaking, their narratives viewed the ethnic groups as divinely created; and needed to be recognized and preserved from an Islamic point of view. For instance, Süleyman Çevik, owner of the Kurdish Islamic *Nübihar* journal, argued that *"Our religion recognizes the ascribed differences among tribes [kavim]... Kurds just want the Turkish state to recognize what almighty God had ascribed to us. Our identity, language, culture..."* (Author's interview, December 2016) Kurdish Islamists often referred to Islamic texts, hadiths and verses of the Quran emphasizing the "Godly-ascribed" – [*Allah tarafından bahşedilen*] ethnic diversity in defending their claims on cultural protectionism." For instance, originally a Kurdish Islamist, HDP MP, Hüda Kaya, with Islamic references, argued that *"All forms of racism and assimilation that the Turkish state has committed throughout the republican era contravened the will and word of Almighty God. The deprivation of the Kurds from these legitimate rights is religiously unacceptable."*, and further noted that

'The difference of your languages and colours is among the ayah of Allah' reads the (Rum/22) section of the Quran, thus, from the Islamic stand-point, Godly-ascribed peculiarities, such as color, identity, and notably the use of the language, have been taken under guarantee. The Turkish state has never acknowledged the Kurds as a different people, as a nation. The Kurds, like the Arabs, like the Persians, are a different nation. They have a right to learn their mother tongue, govern their own social, cultural and religious affairs. It is a godly-ascribed divine right of the Kurds to enjoy their languages, cultures and differences freely (Author's interview, May 2016).

Similarly, *mele* Nimetullah Erdoğan, HDP deputy, argued that *"All languages, including Kurdish language and its dialects, are the words of Allah, they should all*

be set free," and, further continued as follows: "In a land of so-called Islam, such as Turkey, where a vast majority of 20 million Kurds are Muslims, the fact that the language of these people [Kurds] is still not a medium of education, is banned, and is short of being official. These are all hanging as a responsibility on our necks as Muslims." (Author's interview, May 2016)

Similar to their ethno-nationalist co-ethnics, the Kurdish Islamist narrative also revealed a strong sense of grievance-driven self-entitlement for cultural recognition. Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu, chair of the Hûda-Par, a Kurdish Islamist political party, claimed that

In the War of Independence, the Kurds fought together with the Turks and the other elements and fell martyr in the same fronts, side by side with them. The Kurds and the Turks are the fundamental founding elements of this State. This was mentioned as such in the 1921 constitution as well. However, they were cast away after 1923 and excluded from the system. After 1923, the Turkish state's mind-set saw Kurds as a minority to be governed; or at best, a younger sibling. The big brother who controls government affairs and money can act as it wishes; it can beat the younger sibling or give pocket change to the younger sibling, who has no say in anything anyway. But this cannot go on like that. The younger sibling has grown and became a man. Now the Kurds want to feel as equal citizens once again. They want their identity, language, culture, madhab to be officially recognized (Author's interview, April, 2015).

In addition to the grievance-led feeling of self-entitlement, the Kurdish Islamists also highlighted their concerns over extinction of the Kurdish identity, culture, and language. For instance, Sıddık Şeyhanzade, former president of the Kurdish Nur group, Med-Zehra, expressed that

Take a walk on the side streets of Sur, Kayapınar, Nusaybin, Yüksekova, Tatvan.... Watch the children playing in front of their homes. Listen to the language they speak while playing, joking around, fighting... They mostly speak Turkish. Certainly it is a major issue that Kurdish children are unable to read and write in Kurdish. Therefore the demand for education in Kurdish is a matter of survival for the Kurdish identity (Author's interview, April, 2015).

Reflections of the Kurdish Islamist interviewees revealed that the debates around the rigid secularism, which provides a strong state control and scrutiny over religion in Turkey, heavily influenced their perspectives on power-sharing. Traditionally diagnosing the Kurdish problem as a consequence of the abrupt imposition of Turkish nationalism and secularism in the early Republican era, the Kurdish Islamist elites' narratives remained highly critical of the state control over religion through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*). In addition to this, the Kurdish Islamist elites' narratives underlined the *Shafi* madhab as a distinctive feature of the Kurdish identity. While perceiving the *Hanafi* madhab as the official Islamic jurisprudence that the Turkish state and majority of the Turks follow, the Kurdish Islamists emphasized their observance of the *Shafi* madhab in order to crystallize their understanding of the Kurdish identity in line with their ideological outlook. For instance, Ömer Faruk Ünsal, former head of Mazlum-Der and AKP deputy, claimed that

The Hanafi madhab is historically the state's official madhab. It was as such in the Ottoman era; and still is in the Republic. The Kurds observe the Shafi madhab. This is why the Kurds has not trusted the Diyanet [the Directorate of Religious Affairs], which has interpreted Islam in line with the Turkish state's preferences. In conformity with their historical traditions, the Kurds, instead, have aspired to render faith and worship duties in line with the Shafi conviction [itikat – in Turkish] in their own religious institutions such as community mosques [cemaat camiileri] and madrasas, which would be independent from the state (Author's interview, October 2016).

Repealing the Turkish state's control over religion through the *Diyanet* constituted a salient place in Kurdish Islamists' understanding of power-sharing. Claiming that

"the Diyanet is the puppet of the Turkish state. It imposes a statist, Turkish chauvinist version of Islam over us [the Kurds]. They cannot not even tolerate our language and madhab differences, let alone recognizing them" Altan Tan, further criticized the Diyanet as follows: "The Diyanet wanted to teach the madhab that we observe and the language in which we speak with God. It says, you cannot

sermon in a language other than Turkish. Why is that so? Does almighty God not understand the languages he himself created? This is treason to the religion of Islam and ummah." (Author's 2nd interview, June 2016)

Similarly, claiming that *"Muslim Kurds do not accept the Diyanet's monopoly over religion and creeds. Religious teaching and education must be left to the madrasahs..."* a *mele* (Kurdish for mullahs), who preferred to remain anonymous, argued

Quran's Surah Hud reads: 'If Allah had pleased so; he would have created you as a single ummah.' God Almighty does not see any harm in differing madhabs and ethnicities, right? This is loud and clear. In the presence of God's ayah, a Muslim, Turk or Kurd, cannot accept the Turkish State's compulsion towards a specific line of jurisprudence. We observe the Shafi madhab, its convictions [itikat] and practices for centuries... We shall not desert our thousands-of-year-old traditions and convictions just because the civil servants at the Diyanet of the Turkish State desire so (Author's interview, May, 2016).

In terms of inter-elite interaction on power-sharing, the Kurdish Islamists were mostly critical of Turkish Islamist elite circles due to their alleged indifference vis-à-vis their "fellow Muslim brothers' sufferings merely because of their Godly-ascribed identity." Altan Tan, HDP deputy, argued that *"The Kurds are double-roasted victims -çifte kavrulmuş mağdur. We have been discriminated and oppressed for both being Kurd and Muslim. I wonder how Muslim Turks would ask for our blessing - helallik istemek - for their silence and apathetic attitude when their Muslim brothers suffered. This is a big sin – büyük vebal - on their necks."* (Author's interview, June 2016) Alleging that Turkish Islamists have been instrumentalizing Islam to repress the Kurds' legitimate demands, the HDP deputy, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, further expressed that

My grandfather's father was a decorated veteran, who fought in the War of Independence. In his memoirs, it was evident that his inspiration was to defend the sultan, caliphate and land of Islam (İslam Diyari). He partook in the War with

pure Islamic sensitivities. However, the Kemalist cadres had forgotten their sacrifices and turned their backs both to Islam and the Kurds after the War of Independence... Now, there has been a government coming from a conservative, religious background in the last fifteen years. Nothing has changed, though. They remembered Islam merely to suppress the legitimate claims of the Kurds. Through instrumentalization of Islam... they used the Kurds' sincere attachments to the ideas of "Ummah consciousness" and "Islamic brotherhood" without shame. There cannot be any brotherhood as long as equality is not provided (Auhtor's interview, December 2015).

The second power-sharing feature that became apparent in the Kurdish Islamists' narrative pertains to the territorial autonomy. In terms of definition, they categorically rejected to see territorial power-sharing arrangements as a matter of sovereignty. They, rather, viewed power-sharing, in the context of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, as re-claiming of a Godly-delegated authority to govern their own affairs. Again, they referred to Islam for legitimizing their claims for territorial power-sharing arrangements. However, the Islamist Kurds, compared to their ethno-nationalist co-ethnics, remained quite ambivalent in articulating which specific territorial power-sharing arrangements they demand. For instance, a *Mele* (Kurdish Molla), who wanted to remain anonymous, commented that

*The sole orphan of the Islamic world and the Islamic ummah are the Kurds. Have a look at the Islamic world... I mean the Middle East... The Turks, Arabs, Persians... They all have an independent state. The Kurds, on the other hand, have no state and, until recently, no autonomous region. Even more tragically, the other so-called Muslim communities are trying to kill the Kurdish culture and language. The Turks, Arabs, and Persians... They all instrumentalized Islam to oppress the Kurds. If even a single person is not allowed to speak his own language, then one cannot talk about Islam or Muslims in that place. This is why Sheikh Said revolted against the Kemalist regime. Not for land, not for independence. Turkey's Kurdistan [*Türkiye Kürdistanı*] needs to be governed by a regional Kurdish government. Again, not for the sake of acquiring land and power; but to preserve the Kurdish language, culture and faith that Allah had created and ordered (Author's interview, March 2015).*

Arguing, from an Islamic point of view, that "Muslim Kurds have the legitimate right to defy the Turkish state's authority", Mehmet Ballı, known as *Mele Shafii* in the pro-Kurdish circles, argued that

The understanding of justice in Islam is above all political considerations. Autonomy, federation, confederation... They are all humane considerations. According to a Muslim, the sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah alone. States, merely exercise the authority, which is originally delegated by Allah, through entrusted subjects [kullar]. Here, the primary criterion in exercising this delegated authority should be observing the God's justice. Muslims are only obliged to acquiesce vis-à-vis the entrusted governments as long as they govern in a just, benevolent fashion as Islam ordered them to do so... So the key question with regard to the Kurdish problem is as follows: Whether Muslims in Kurdistan are able to pursue their lives in accordance with Islamic requirements and teachings as set out in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The response to my question is, of course, no. The Kurds have finally started to realize that they are the most religious in the world of Islam; and, yet, they are also the most wretched ones under oppression of their fellow Muslims in Turkey. As long as the justice of God is not observed both by the Turkish state and by the Turks, the Muslim Kurds have all the legitimate right to demand their own rule [yönetim]. They should unite and establish their own autonomy in order to observe true Islam as ordered by Allah (Author's interview – December, 2016).

Instrumentalization of religion was quite apparent in the Kurdish Islamists' narratives. Referring to their interest formulations and Islamist ideological predicaments, the Kurdish Islamist elites' narratives legitimized their territorial power-sharing aspirations with reference to Islam and the Quran. For instance, Muhammed Sıddık Dursun, former President of the *Med Zehra* Foundation (an influential Kurdish *Nur* group), called for territorial power-sharing "for the sake of living true Islam." He expressed that: "*The Kemalist Republic's seizure of Kurdistan's autonomy created the Kurdish problem... This can take autonomy or federation. This is not a matter of land, ethnic pride or statehood for us. For us, we also lost the chance to live true Islam with dignity, with our traditions and folklore in 1923*" (Author's interview, August 2015). The religious legitimization –i.e.,

demanding territorial power-sharing for the sake of “observing true Islam” or “for preserving the Godly-ascribed Kurdish identity, language and culture” – of their politico-territorial claims was recurrently highlighted in their narratives both for supporting their interests as well as delegitimizing the Turkish governments’ refusal to accommodate their demands.

As a result of the intra-ethnic rift between the Kurdish Islamists and ethno-nationalists, an intra-ethnic outbidding was quite evident in terms of their outlook to the territorial power-sharing. Aiming to defy the PKK's alleged pioneering role in the Kurds' politico-territorial demands, AKP's Diyarbakır chair, Muhammed Akar, put emphasis on the historicity of the Kurds' territorial aspirations for power-sharing as follows:

Kurds’ demand for self-rule is not also something new. It has not started with the PKK as some claim. Since the advent of the Ottoman Tanzimat’s centralization idea, Kurds’ preference for their self-rule has been evident in history. Self-rule and autonomy has been a historical ideal for Kurds. Grandfather Barzani [Dede Barzani], Sheikh Said, other notable figures and religious ulama have kept this flame alive throughout history... Still today, albeit all our rivalry and infighting, [setting up] an autonomous Kurdistan within Turkey has remained as a unifying objective. However, this ideal cannot be achieved by making autonomy declarations and digging trenches as the organization [PKK] did. Self-rule, above everything else, is an authority sharing with Ankara and this can only be achieved in the Turkish Parliament (Author’s interview, May, 2016).

The Kurdish Islamists' attitude towards territorial power-sharing arrangements did not seem to be immune from their partisan affiliation. Throughout the interviews, some of the Islamist Kurdish elites from the ranks of the incumbent AKP government reflected their opposition to the Kurdish self-rule, which, in their perception, was a PKK project envisaging an ethnic federation. Although their opposition might well be related with their possible reluctance to contradict the

governing party's official policy-line, they mostly highlighted the practical problems (such as dispersed Kurdish population) and their threat perception due to the PKK's possible abuses of territorial power-sharing arrangements. Highlighting the practical difficulties of territorial power-sharing, Abdurrahman Kurt, former AKP deputy, argued that

Forget about their flamboyant, fancy words [implying the democratic autonomy]. They originally want an ethnic federation so that they can seize the control in the region. An ethnic federation is not conducive for the sociology of Turkey. İstanbul has become the biggest Kurdish city. There are Kurds in almost every province across Turkey. We need to find more creative models and focus more on identity matters for solving the problem (Author's interview, April 2015).

The Kurdish Islamist elites' narratives diverged on the rebel inclusion pillar of power-sharing. The vast majority of them perceived rebel inclusion as rebel-specific assurances –amnesty, betterment of Öcalan's conditions- without mentioning politicization prospects of the PKK. Again most of them reflected either a deep-rooted security concerns or a personal grudge against the PKK, and thereby opposed re-integration perspectives. While reflecting this threat perception, Mehdi Eker, AKP vice-chair, claimed *"They killed seven of my fellow party members in the last year. These were innocent, unarmed and defenseless people... Such a step [amnesty] would legitimize the Organization's ruthless violence against the Kurdish people."* (Author's interview, March 2017) This threat perception was again reflected by Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu, who commented that *"If murderers in Qandil would be allowed to come down from the mountain, they will first point their guns at Muslim Kurds and terrorize the whole region"* (Author's interview).

In a similar vein, Şehmus Tanrıkulu, Hüda-Par's Diyarbakır provincial chair, expressed that *"These godless [Allahsız] terrorists killed our dear friends during the*

so-called Kobane protests. We cannot accept the PKK terrorists to live together with us... If the government abandons us to the mercy of the PKK infidels, we, then, will take care of ourselves." (Author's interview, May 2016) The narratives of the above-mentioned Kurdish Islamists – particularly the Hûda-Par front, which has a troubled history with the Kurdish ethno-nationalists - unveiled the level of their feeling of insecurity and threat perception of the PKK. More importantly, these interviews demonstrated that their understanding of rebel inclusion was quite a narrow pillar; merely concentrating on the amnesty dimension, rather than a broader political inclusion prospect.

Rebel inclusion, nevertheless received support from some of the Kurdish Islamists, who perceived this pillar as a must to resolve the Kurdish conflict. Criticizing some of the Turkish and Kurdish Islamists' opposition to granting of amnesty with Islamic references, Muhammed Akar, argued that "Islam cannot be interpreted in a way to prevent the halting of bloodshed in the Kurdish issue. First and foremost, almighty Allah has ordered peace to us, his vassals. Here, the main task for the Muslims, and especially the Ulema, is the establishment of peace. Islam should be interpreted in such a way..." Akar, further supported rebel inclusion arrangements as follows:

If it is going to stop terror, conflict or death in this country; then the political transformation of the PKK should be provided for that sake. How will the people in the mountains return? How are you going to open up channels for them to engage in politics? You should do these things in a way so that these people will be able to express their ideas and demands without feeling the need to resort to terrorism. Timing is crucial: if you bring PKK members down from the mountains without letting them politicize, they will burn the cities. They may be restless, perhaps they will put pressure on us nevertheless we still need to do this (Author's 2nd interview, February, 2017).

Similar to Akar's comments, Galip Ensarioğlu, AKP deputy, also perceived the rebel inclusion pillar as a broad set of arrangements for the socio-political inclusion of the

PKK. Claiming that "*A formula must be introduced for integration of the PKK in social and political life*", Ensarioğlu expressed that

We have to acknowledge that if we want to resolve this problem, it is necessary to make regulations for those in the mountains and the political inmates. First an environment of confidence should be built. It can be done gradually based on certain criteria. There can be regulations for those who have not participated in acts [of aggression], and for children, elderly and sick prisoners (Author's interview, November, 2015).

The interviews showed that the Kurdish Islamist elites' were torn. Most of them exclusively perceived rebel inclusion as the PKK's return to the cities. Only a few of them showed a broader understanding comprising the political inclusion dimension. Their opposition against the rebel inclusion arrangements mostly motivated by their fears of a possible score-settling of the returned PKK members. This might, as well, be related to their possible loss of influence and political power in case of a rebel inclusion accord.

5.4. Power-sharing Perspectives of the Integrated Kurds: *"Federation, autonomy whatsoever... I would be the first one to stand against it."*

As discussed extensively in Chapter 1, the social boundaries between the dominant ethnic group, the Turks, and the second-largest ethnic group, the Kurds, are permeable in Turkey (Sarigil and Karakoç, 2017). Additionally, the ethnically-blind constitutional architecture allowing upward social mobility fostered the Kurds socio-economic and political inclusion in Turkey. The interviews with the integrated Kurdish elites revealed that they have no limited ethnically-motivated political allegiances and interest-formulations. Besides recognition of a distinctive Kurdish identity and granting of Kurdish cultural and language rights, they remained extremely reluctant to extend support their co-ethnics' demands of power-sharing.

The integrated Kurdish elites had diverging views on their co-ethnics' claims of ethnic discrimination and exclusion. Contrary to their Islamist and ethno-nationalist co-ethnics' emphasis on identity-related grievances, a majority of the interviewed integrated Kurds underlined the opportunities for upward social mobility in the ethnically-blind nature of the Turkish constitutional and political system. For instance, Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek said that *“Which discrimination are they talking about? I am a living proof of equality of opportunity in Turkey. I worked hard during my career. I have never hidden that I am a Kurd... I became the Minister of Finance at the age of forty-two.”* (Author's interview, January 2016). Likewise, Hikmet Çetin, former Speaker of the Parliament, expressed that

I am of Kurdish origin, of which I am proud. While I was growing up in Lice, everyone used to speak in their mother tongue. Back in the 1950s, there was no distinction based on identity... I, without even seeing Diyarbakır, came to Ankara from Lice to study at the secondary school. I never felt my Kurdishness there; never experienced a problem due to my identity. I conducted politics for years; served as a minister, speaker of the parliament and an international diplomat. My identity has never been a problem against me during my service (Author's interview, July, 2016).

In a similar vein, the President of the Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen Bendeve Palandöken claimed that

Look, a Kurd from Malatya has come and is sitting at the helm of one of Turkey's business organizations with the broadest base. I have not felt any discrimination in this country. Those, who discriminate, are the ones involved in ethnic politics... Otherwise, there is no such discrimination amongst the citizens or the businesspeople. I scratched my way up to here. How did I do that? Studying at the schools of the Turkish state; with the efforts of the Turkish teachers...with the loan that I got from the Turkish bank... Would I cast aside all these efforts spared in this country for me? I have never felt myself a black Turk or Kurd. I am a first class citizen of this country (Author's interview, February 2017).

At odds with the majority of their cohort, a few of the integrated Kurdish elites claimed that an ethnic intolerance and discrimination against the Kurds has persisted. They argued that denial and negligence of Kurdish distinctive identity undermine the social cohesiveness and erode sense of belonging of the Kurds towards the Turkish state. Claiming that *"Kurds have been unable to speak our language freely"*, Abdulkadir Aksu, former minister of Interior, argued that

.... Fedon has sung in Greek and others pop stars in English for years. Yet when Kurds sing songs and ballads, it becomes a serious trouble. Ahmet Kaya, İbrahim Tatlıses have become targets for singing in Kurdish. Why have Kurds been treated as such? They are citizens of this, as well. I do not call discrimination but there is intolerance. Whenever we learn tolerating such diversities as a country, our societal peace and tranquility will consolidate (Author's interview, March 2015).

In a similar vein, Kamran İnan, former minister, exemplified the discrimination against the Kurds with a personal anecdote from his political career, when he expressed that

I lost a congress twice against Demirel. Following his triumph in the Congress, Demirel said right in front of me; "We have always held Kurds in our grasp. We will continue to do so."... Although my life has passed in the service of the state, the state had suspicions about me, because of my ethnic roots. I was about to be named as the foreign minister, back in 1977. I even accepted my fellow party colleagues' congratulations the day before the announcement of the cabinet. But the state prevented me from becoming the foreign minister. Why? Because I am a Kurd (Author's interview, January 2015).

In addition to claiming discrimination, some of the integrated Kurdish elites told that they intentionally downplay their ethnic identity and language in order to shelter themselves from possible negative reactions. Additionally, some interviewees also admitted that they prevent their kids to discover their ethnic identity and language. For instance, Edip Safer Gaydalı, former minister, said that

We did not speak Kurdish at home. If there was a matter, which we did not want children to comprehend, then we shifted to another room and speak Kurdish. Hence my kids have not learnt any Kurdish... I do not regret for this. Yet still, if there had not been limitations before the Kurdish language; then I would not have prevented them from learning Kurdish (Author's interview, November 2016).

Faik Yavuz, President of Ankara Commodity Exchanges, expressed concern over inter-generational loss of the Kurdish culture in his family when he told me that “*My grandchildren barely know that they are Kurds. Their parents have intentionally given them nothing about Kurdishness. If I take them to our village for the Eid, they would not even be able to communicate with her peers and relatives. This is how an identity vanishes...*” (Author's interview)

In terms of inter-elite interaction, the Kurdish Islamist and ethno-nationalist circles are quite critical of integrated Kurdish elites' perceived co-optation and domestication in Turkey. In the words of Doğan Erbaş, HDP's İstanbul provincial chair,

They [integrated Kurds] prevent their children from developing a political awareness and being a part of the Kurdish struggle. They send them to expensive colleges, universities hoping that one day their kids will be accepted in this country and forget about their [Kurdish] identity if they find a well-paid job. A Kurd can be everything in this country. President, Prime Minister, Chief of General Staff... Only if they forgo their ethnic identity. Yes, you can occupy these posts; yet, by no means, you can be a Kurd in these posts (Author's interview, March 2017).

Succinctly illustrating the criticisms against the integrated Kurdish elites' alleged co-optation and domestication, Tarık Ziya Ekinçi expressed that:

I call these colleagues [integrated Kurds] the "bourgeoisified" Kurds. For instance, Kamran İnan became ambassador, then minister. He, shamelessly, spent his whole life alleging that the Kurdish problem was a foreign plot. Hikmet [Çetin] was the chairperson of a political party; served as Foreign Minister as well as Speaker of the Parliament. Hikmet [Çetin] was a classmate of my brother and he could not speak Turkish without an accent when he began university. The current Minister of Finance, Mehmet Şimşek could not speak any Turkish either when he was going to primary school. Yet now he says; "the Republic of Turkey, the state has given me these opportunities. There is no discrimination."... They constitute a significant barrier before the solution. Hikmet Çetin, Mehmet Şimşek or Mehdi Eker, are bourgeoisified Kurds. Currently, they are in a position where they hinder the solution of the problem because they are all dependent on the state for preserving their own privileged positions (Author's interview, October 2015).

Integrated Kurdish elites' understanding is merely delimited with cultural protectionism. They expressed support for the recognition of the Kurdish identity and repealing of the limitations over the Kurdish cultural and language rights. Kamran İnan stated that

Anatolia is a rose garden. There is no single color in the rose garden. Anatolia is very diverse just like the nature. In this garden, the Turks, Laz, Caucasian, Assyrians, Arabs, and Kurds each represent a color. Instead of denying this diversity, our politicians and statesmen should see it as our wealth. The Kurds should be free in their culture, language, folklore, etc.... If we want to reach the desired democratic level, we first and foremost need to accommodate the legitimate demands of the Kurds, especially the mother-tongue. Then, the PKK would have been left with no space as the flag-holder of these things (Author's interview, January 2015).

Claiming that "the state position of defending; 'Kurds do not exist,' 'there is no Kurdish language' has led to an immense trauma," Yılmaz Erdoğan, well-known actor, further noted that "We need an approach to the Kurdish issue on the basis of 'full democracy' and 'cultural pluralism.' A significant majority of the Kurdish people demand that their culture be developed, and language be taught in schools. These will not divide; but rather enrich us as a nation." (Author's interview, August 2016)

The integrated Kurdish elites' views on the modality of cultural protectionism remained ambivalent. Instead of a constitutionally-embedded collective rights' regime, they rather emphasized de-collectivizing the cultural rights. Mehmet Şimşek, for instance, explained his take by arguing that *“the Kurds should be able to live and flourish their identity, culture and language. But I have certain hesitations about the modality [modalite, he said]. Singling exclusively the Kurds out is a bad idea. A specific reform privileging the Kurds exclusively would create resentment across the larger Turkish society.”* (Author's interview, January 2016) Expressing that *“Instead of ethnic references, ‘How Happy Is the One Who Says, I Am equal!’ should be our motto,”* Atilla Kart, former CHP deputy, further noted:

I started the primary school without knowing a single Turkish word. No children should ever experience the traumatic experience that I had gone through. In such a diverse country, our priority should be ensuring equality among all citizens. Yes, I fully support the steps enabling Kurds to enrich their own culture and language. But, the state has to retain the Turkish language as a bridge in-between... HDP's proposal to build an optional bi-lingual education system from scratch seems extremely difficult and sociologically dangerous. Instead, we should better address this issue from the perspective of individual rights. For instance, all families should be able to send their children to Kurdish language courses. I mean private courses. These courses should even be subsidized by the state. However, bilingual public education is not realistic, as I said. Such a move might create a divide between Turkish and Kurdish students and stir tension within the society (Author's interview, March 2016).

Viewing territorial power-sharing arrangements as disruptive in terms of inter-ethnic cohesion and fostering ethnic segregation, the integrated Kurd interviewees unequivocally disassociated themselves from their co-ethnics politico-territorial claims. One of the recurrent themes in their dissention was their concerns over a possible Turkish disquiet and negative reaction against them in response to the realization of territorial power-sharing arrangements. For instance, Faik Yavuz,

president of the Ankara Commodity Exchanges Union, claimed that "*Federation, autonomy whatsoever... I would be the first one to stand against it. These ideas would harm our unity, fraternity. Let me tell you what would happen after autonomy. Those who have not excluded us, until now, for being a Kurd would start seeing us as an 'other' for being a Kurd. Dissolution starts within the society.*" (Author's interview, May 2017).

Viewing their co-ethnics' claim of power-sharing as detrimental to their interest-formulation, they aimed to disassociate, at least narratively, themselves from their co-ethnics' politico-territorial claims. Commenting on the territorial power-sharing arrangements, Abdulkadir Aksu stated that "*Federation, autonomy, etc... These are only verbiage. According to our constitution, such divisive acts are not possible. These are the PKK's demands, which are not endorsed by our honorable Kurdish citizens. Their [PKK's] aim is to pit two brothers against one another.*" (Author's interview, March 2015). In the same line, Musa Işın, governor, raised his concerns over a possible ethnic segregation, when he argued that "*The idea of setting up of an autonomous Kurdish region is defended by marginal Kurdist [Kürtçü] elements... Concerns have risen amongst the Turkish nation because of these demands. God forbid such marginal demands would lead to a Turkish problem and something bad happens between communities.*" (Author's interview, April 2017).

On the rebel inclusion pillar, the integrated Kurds again unequivocally disassociated themselves from the Kurdish ethno-nationalists. Rejecting the legitimacy of rebel inclusion arrangements, they highlighted the PKK's own vested interests relating to the rebel inclusion pillar. Kamran İnan, for instance, argued that

The job of Kurds like ourselves, who have benefited from the riches of this country, is a tough one. Our minds are confused, in a sense. We both want education in mother-tongue, recognition of the Kurdish culture, identity, language; but also, we want to get rid of the PKK. Yes, I wish to see the abolishment of fetters before the Kurdish identity, language, culture. Yet, this is not a thing to carry out with the PKK. Pointing to the PKK as the representative of the Kurds would be a big error. If you start to negotiate legitimate Kurdish demands with them, then you eventually need to free Öcalan, accept their terrorists to return to cities. Because the PKK indexes the entire policy over the release of Abdullah Öcalan and return of their terrorists with a general amnesty. Mandela example is in the minds of both the organization [PKK] and the HDP constituency. They believe that it is feasible. However, it is not. If you say that Öcalan is the Mandela of the Kurds, the very next day, Kurds, who remained loyal to the Turkish state, would be compelled to leave their hometowns in the southeast (Author's interview, January 2015).

Again distancing themselves from their ethno-nationalist co-ethnics' narrative, they also opposed amnesty and other legal privileges' for the PKK members. Only one of the interviews expressed a slightly different view. Commenting on the rebel inclusion feature of power-sharing, Hikmet Çetin stated that

It is unheard of anywhere across the world that rights, liberties are gained by means of terrorism. The PKK has to end violence and the state need to seek reconciliation. This is loud and clear. But, sitting down at the negotiating table with Öcalan as if he is the rightful representative of the Kurds in Turkey was not a right first step. You can discuss the specific issues relating to the PKK aspect with Öcalan. I can understand that. But this should not have been the starting point... There is a severe need for mutual trust. We need a bold move; a game-changer [said in English] as we say in the diplomatic jargon. In diplomatic jargon, a game-changer. For example: The PKK's announcement of truce and withdrawal without expecting a return from the state. At this point, an amnesty would incite the Turkish people. If a climate of peace and mutual trust is ensured, legal arrangements can be made afterwards (Authors' interview, July 2016).

In sum, the integrated Kurds elites' understanding of power-sharing, which solely envisaged recognition of the Kurdish identity and granting of certain cultural rights, went against their co-ethnics' broader design. Even their cultural protectionism demand was framed in de-collectivized fashion, in the form of individual rights.

Moreover, the integrated Kurds co-optation with the dominant ethnic group seemingly shaped their interest formulation. Fearing from a possible backlash from the dominant ethnic groups, the integrated Kurdish elites' deliberately disassociated themselves from their co-ethnics' understanding and demands on the politico-territorial and rebel inclusion pillars of power-sharing.

5.5. Power-sharing Perspectives of the Turkish Islamists: “*it is a different thing to govern a country and to diagnose an injustice*”

The Turkish Islamist elites' understanding of power-sharing was torn. Their constant reference to the overarching Islamic identity, namely the *ummah*, and conventional Islamic assent of collective distinctivity of ethnic identities inevitably perplexed their attitude towards power-sharing. As a result, their narratives acknowledged the distinct Kurdish ethnic identity, yet downplayed its significance as an ethnic marker vis-à-vis the overarching Islamic supra-identity (*ummah*). Consequently, their understanding of power-sharing highlighted cultural protectionism, albeit with a limited scope –i.e., the boundary of cultural recognition was again delimited by the greater good of the Turkish nation and (Muslim) *ummah* -, and excluded politico-territorial and rebel inclusion arrangements.

The Turkish Islamist elites tended to diagnose the Kurdish conflict as an ethno-religious – more of a religious than ethnic, though - outburst that occurred as a result of the Turkish republic's abrupt imposition of secular Turkish nationalism in the state-building process of the early Republican era. According to them, secularism and nationalism rendered a divisive function, and thereby, weakening the

overarching collective Islamic identity of the Turks and Kurds. When diagnosing causes of the onset of the conflict, Yusuf Kaplan, a prominent Turkish Islamist columnist, claimed that

The unfortunate secularism and nationalism projects of the republic dictated on a Muslim community, which was the remainder of an empire and comprised of more than 30 ethnic elements, resulted in an oppressive order aiming to create a mediocre, monolithic nation... The origin of the Kurdish problem lies in the invention and imposition of an artificial, secular Turkish identity over these diverse groups, whose only common denominator was the Islamic consciousness. In time, as the society secularized, the consciousness of ethnic identity eroded the common Islamic identity and became more prominent as compared to the Islamic identity and Islamic sensitivities (Author's interview, January 2015).

Throughout the interviews, the Turkish Islamists repeatedly underlined the significance of their understanding of *ummah*, which sees all Muslims regardless of their ethnic differences as a faith-based single community, and thereby, providing an overarching Islamic collective identification. In line with his understanding of overarching *ummah*, Turkish Islamist intellectual, Ali Bulaç argued that

Secular and nationalist concepts and ideas have torn our unity apart and will continue to erode our unity if we insist in this Kemalist straightjacket. Today it has become apparent that the idea and narrative of nationalism, which currently dominate main axes of the debates about the Kurdish problem, cannot hold the Turks and Kurds together. In order to preserve the unity of the ummah, we need to establish an inclusive Union of Islam –İttihad-ı İslam- with the participation of all Muslim tribes (kavim) and madhabs of the ummah (Author's interview, January 2015).

On the cultural protectionism pillar, the Turkish Islamists' understanding of *ummah* as an overarching collective identity comprising all Muslims has shaped their outlook to the recognition of the collective cultural rights for the Kurds in Turkey. Fearing of possible divisive function of ethnic loyalties within the *ummah*, they remained puzzled in terms of their outlook to the granting cultural protectionism in

the context of a power-sharing deal. On the one hand, their Islamic convictions have urged them to fully recognize a distinctive Kurdish identity; on the other hand, they expressed certain reservations on recognition of a distinct Kurdish identity due to their fears of ethnic disintegration and disruption of their collective *ummah* identification consequent to an ethnic awakening within Muslims.

Acknowledging the Kurdish distinctive collectivity, yet downplaying its significance as an ethnic markers vis-à-vis his understanding of overarching *ummah*, Mehmet Görmez, the President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs – *Diyanet* -, claimed that "the Quran sees all languages as the *ayahs* of Allah. Denying sanctity of languages is no different from denying *ayah* of Allah. Excluding, or being disdainful, of a race, or language is an offense against Allah. Nevertheless, there is, undoubtedly, primacy of piety over ethnicity in our religion" (Author's interview, September 2016). The same line of argument became apparent in my interview with Hayrettin Karaman, a prominent Turkish theologian, who stated that

In terms of law, humanitarian values, [and] social status, Muslims of all races and colors are of equal standing... The Quran reads in al-Hujurat surah: "O mankind, we have created you male and female, and appointed you races and tribes, so that you may know one another. Surely the noblest among you in the sight of God is the most god-fearing of you." (49.13) But the Quran also describes the ummah as "the best community ever brought forth to men" (3:106), and hence as the central focus of loyalty and affiliation for a believer. The primacy of religious affiliation lay in the central discipline of Islamic law, which made no legal distinctions based on ethnicity or race. No distinction, discrimination exclusion can be made among Muslims based on ethnic origin. However, the primacy of the religious bond over that of linguistic, ethnic, territorial differences is undisputable according to our conviction (Author's interview, December, 2016).

Fears of a possible disintegration among the understanding of the overarching *ummah* became apparent in my exchanges with politicians from the Turkish Islamist

front. Sharing the same ideological predicament, a former deputy prime minister, who commented, under the condition of anonymity, that

We have always see the Kurds as our fellow Muslim brothers, who suffered a lot from the old Turkey's short-sighted, inhumane approaches. We were thinking that the Kurdish question could be tackled with the normalization of the political set up and abolishment of tutelage centres. To admit, we were neglecting, or let's say that we were miscalculating the gravity of the ethnic identity matter... Over the course of our 15-year-long time in power we have realized that it is a different thing to govern a country and to diagnose an injustice [referring to the injustices against the Kurds] ... Unfortunately, the PKK has made progress in damaging the biggest heartfelt ties --the religious brotherhood-- between us and our Kurdish brothers. The Organization has converted the question into an ethnic matter in line with its own ideology. Now, their ultimate aim is to re-invent a Kurdish identity, sterilized from Islam...All their claims relating to the Kurdish identity aims to serve this goal. Just because of that reason, I am much more doubtful about abolishing the bans over the mother-tongue. This would further erode our social cohesion (Author's interview, June 2016).

Their apparent fears of an ethnic divide within the *ummah* and society also led Turkish Islamist elites to limit the boundaries of the recognition of the collective Kurdish cultural rights. This endeavor became apparent in my exchanges with Çağfer Karadaş, member of the Religious Affairs High Council of the Turkish *Diyanet*, who stated that “...we have no problem with the use of Kurdish language from the religious stand-point. However, use of these freedoms cannot contravene with the unity, overall well-being of the whole *ummah*. The limits of exercising Kurdish culture, language and traditions start where the overall well-being and unity of the *ummah* comes at stake” (Author's interview, March 2015). Again emphasizing the perceived supremacy of overarching Islamic loyalties over ethnic bonds, Hayrettin Karaman, delimited the cultural recognition of the Kurds as follows:

Muslims, Turks and Kurds alike, are equal in creation. In terms of identity, it is possible to be "Muslim Turk", "Muslim Kurd", "Muslim Georgian..." and at the same time, to be a part of a whole such as "Islamic ummah, Ottoman, citizen of

the Republic of Turkey" ... However, for the sake of preserving our unity and serenity, it is much more appropriate to say "we are citizens of this country", "we are all Muslim subjects" instead of opting for a clannist [kavimci] approach as Turkism or Kurdism. Just like other peoples, it is also Kurds' fundamental right to learn, improve and use in education their mother tongue. However, there is no doubt that a Muslim's loyalty to ummah and nation must come first. Therefore, it is necessary for Turkish to remain as the official language as a bridge so that Kurds and other ethnic groups aspiring to use their mother tongue can co-exist, establish mutual communication, trade and render public services (Author's interview, December 2016).

In terms of inter-elite exchanges between the Turkish and Kurdish Islamist fronts, there existed a heated debate due to both sides' differing views on how to accommodate the Kurdish distinctivity in a power-sharing accord. According to the Kurdish Islamists, non-recognition and assimilation of a Godly-ascribed ethnic diversity constitute a sin and, therefore, the Turkish Islamists must support accommodation of their collective cultural recognition demands. Even Muhammed Akar, who leads the Diyarbakır branch of the AKP, criticized the Turkish Islamists' discursive emphasis on the "religious brethren of the Turks and Kurds" narrative and argued that it is "originally motivated to overshadow the distinctiveness of the Kurdish identity; rather than emphasizing equality between the Turks and Kurds." (Author's interview, May, 2016) Similarly, Tayyip Elçi, Chair of the MEDAV (Medrese Alimleri Vakfı), claimed that "they [Turkish Islamists] blame us with treachery; so to say we are allegedly dividing the *ummah*... They apparently see *ummah* comprised of the Turks only. Their understanding of religious brotherhood aims to deny our existence. Kurds do not want to be brother anymore; we want to be equal" (Author's interview, January, 2017).

On the politico-territorial pillar of power-sharing, the Turkish Islamists' perception and attitude was, again, fettered by their concerns over an ethnic divide within the

nation. This position went in line with their above-portrayed concerns over that ethnic identities may supersede the idea of the *ummah*. Commenting on the territorial power-sharing perspectives, Ahmet Taşgetiren, Islamist commentator, argued that

The biggest common denominator between the Turks and Kurds, and the insurance of its unity, serenity, and fraternity is Islam and the consciousness of the ummah... We must get rid of these disintegrating ethnic identities, which erode our mutual Islamic identity, and fosters the separatism and division in our country. Autonomy and federation based on ethnicity is against the divine nature [fitrat] of the vassals [kullar] because "we love the created for the creator's sake"; not for her ethnic origin's sake. Today, when you attend a Friday prayer, you may be groveling [secde etmek] next to a Kurd. This is the simplistic way to feel an ummah consciousness [ümmet şuuru]. Federation or autonomy would not just distort our national unity, but the ummah consciousness, as well. Our unitary structure is a guarantee that the Turk and Kurd will not be separated and continues to grovel together..... (Author's interview, February 2017).

Fears of ethnic disintegration consequent to an ethnic awakening triggered by territorial power-sharing arrangements were also present in the Turkish Islamist politicians' narrative. For instance, former deputy Prime Minister, Numan Kurtulmuş claimed that

Separatists, who exploit religion, voice objections to our calls of unity by saying; 'Is there a verse or hadith prohibiting the establishment of a separate state by a Muslim community speaking a certain language.' Let me remind just one of many verses to them: And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided. And remember the favor of Allah upon you - when you were enemies and He brought your hearts together and you became, by His favor, brothers. And you were on the edge of a pit of the Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus Allah makes clear to you His verses that you may be guided. (3/103) By calling for an autonomous or federal Kurdish entity, those separatists apparently aim to divide and disintegrate our nation and the ummah. What they intended to do was tearing apart the ummah consciousness between the Turkish and Kurdish Muslims in this country. We had seen the same scenario a century ago during the dissolution of the [Ottoman] empire (Author's interview, May, 2016).

In their narratives, the Turkish Islamists also aimed to attribute the ownership of the politico-territorial power-sharing claims to the PKK circles, while distancing the

Kurds from these claims. Solely attributing the ownership of the territorial power-sharing claims to the PKK, Hakan Albayrak, Turkish Islamist activist and columnist, argued that “*They want autonomy and federation in order to de-Islamize (İslamsızlaştırma) through intimidation. Why do you think they continuously attack Quran courses and mosques? It [granting of autonomy/federation] is just not a matter of land; but also a matter of protecting Islam and Muslims*” (Author’s interview, April 2016). This line of argument was highlighted by Abdurrahman Dilipak, a Turkish Islamist columnist, when he claimed that:

If we are Muslims, then we should stand against the further division of the ummah and incitement of hostilities amongst them... The division of Turkey under the name of a federal or regional system is the ultimate aim of the PKK infidels. Collaborating with atheists would be non-legitimate from the perspective of religion. It is [religiously] inappropriate to help those who wish to do so, through one's words, deeds, assistance, praising, financing etc.... Such attempt will drag them into a grave sin, such as disrupting the unity of the ummah, and the punishment of those who engage in such attempt will be legitimate (Author’s interview, May 2016).

One of the recurrent themes in the Turkish Islamists' narratives encircled around the Empire’s dissolution process consequent to an ethnic awakening. This historical analogy was repeatedly reflected to legitimize their exaggerated fears of societal and territorial disintegration as a result of territorial power-sharing arrangements. Temel Karamollaoğlu, chair of the Islamist Felicity Party, commented that

We should not forget our recent history. When the Ottomans went into a process of dissolution, separatists operating abroad and within the country stepped in and created many makeshift nation states from a great state. When the unity of the ummah was disrupted after the Ottomans, the newly emerged small makeshift states became the pawns of Western powers. That is how the unity of the Islamic world was undermined. It is not legitimate to fuel separatism in these lands where Muslims lived together with all diversities, and which is the property of the ummah and a reminiscent of the ancestors. Muslims should adopt a stance

against separatism. This is a historical duty for all of us (Author's interview, January 2017).

In terms of inter-elite interaction, the Turkish Islamist elites' constant reference to the Ottoman Empire was also echoed by their Kurdish counterparts. The Kurdish Islamists, on the other hand, referred to the Ottoman millet system in order to legitimize their politico-territorial claims. For instance, Kasım Fırat, one of the Sheikh Said's grandsons, HDP member, claimed that:

They keep talking about their Ottoman ancestors, but when we reminded them the autonomous Kurdish principalities of the Ottoman millet system, they remained silent. Although they keep oppressing my identity, language and culture, they are still talking about greatness, justice and benevolence of the Ottomans without shame. The Ottoman millet system was a multi-lingual and multi-religious model, in which every subject of the Sultan can enjoy his identity freely. I would wish they truly inspired from the Ottoman model (Author's interview, March, 2017).

On the rebel inclusion dimension of power-sharing, Turkish Islamists' understanding reflects a one-sided view expecting decommissioning of the PKK and withdrawal of the members from Turkish territories in the absence of a judicial shelter and prospects for re-integration. They rather viewed a broader democratization agenda should suffice for the Kurdish ethno-nationalist flank to move ahead in decommissioning. For instance, Bülent Arınç, former Speaker of the Parliament, expressed that

...the Organization [PKK] abused our good-will during the (settlement) process. Back then, our government prepared a road-map; comprising of a plenty of legal and constitutional amendments to address our Kurdish citizens' legitimate claims. Our President was the Prime Minister of the time. He has also given consent to go along with the HDP. Our preparations inter alia included overhauling the legislative framework on mother-tongue [education], citizenship and local governments. However, the HDP and PKK's priority have never been the democratization aspect of the process. They never came to an understanding of sorting this problem out without guns. They constantly brought the issue back to

their own problems: Amnesty, prisons, Öcalan's fate... Unfortunately, these planned steps toward democratization were put on hold when we realized that they would exploit these steps for developing fitnah among our citizens (Author's interview, January 2016).

Commenting on the rebel inclusion, Yalçın Akdoğan, former deputy Prime Minister, stated that *“Why the peace process has failed? Instead of laying down their arms and leaving the country, the Organization [PKK] piled up weapons and armament in the cities. They tried to fool us. Our services revealed that their ultimate plan was to spark a wave of violent uprisings in the cities by using their infiltrated terrorist cadres and piled armament. They sought a fait accompli to replace the state's authority in the region [South-east]. This is what they understand from laying down arms. Of course, we will never condone such a thing”* (Author's interview, August, 2016).

Another recurrent theme that was highlighted in defence of their rejection of an amnesty was a predicament of the retribution derived from the Islamic law. Some of the interviewees viewed this predicament as a hindrance for granting a legal shelter to the PKK members. For instance, Mustafa İslamoğlu, a Turkish theologian, expressed that:

From an Islamic perspective, granting an amnesty for the PKK terrorists, who killed our soldiers and police, is not possible. Retribution [kisas] constitutes the backbone of the Islamic law. “You who have believed, prescribed for you is legal retribution for those murdered - the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female...This is an alleviation from your Lord and a mercy” (2/178-179). The state cannot totally ignore the retribution right of a victim's family. This will create bigger hostilities and distort social harmony. How would families of our martyrs react? Therefore, the state can only over-ride retribution if the family of the deceased makes peace, forgives the murderer (Author's interview, November 2016).

Again highlighting the retribution as a barrier towards granting amnesty including PKK cadres, theologian Raşit Küçük claimed that: “*The state may forgive those who have not been involved in any armed activity. They can be granted amnesty for their crimes committed against the public and state; but for the rest, it [granting of amnesty] should depend on the consent of the martyrs’ families*” (Author’s interview, November 2016).

In sum, the Turkish Islamist elites’ outlook to power-sharing was torn between two of their Islamic ideological predicaments: The first recognizing a distinct Kurdish ethnicity; and, the second, on the other hand, subordinating distinct ethnic collectivities under overarching *ummah* and Muslim brotherhood. Consequently, their understanding of power-sharing was delimited merely with cultural protectionism, albeit with a narrow scope. Fearing a possible ethnically-inspired disaccord within the *ummah* and nation, the Turkish Islamists viewed politico-territorial power-sharing and rebel inclusion arrangements as divisive. Their narratives also defied rebel-specific inclusion assurances –such as amnesty, re-integration, politicization, etc. – as these arrangements would contravene the retribution principle of the Islamic law.

Power-sharing Perspectives of the CHP: “*as distant as British Labour and French Socialist to the Kurds*”

The interviewed Republican People’s Party (CHP) and like-minded elites traditionally represents the left-leaning, secular people, who have strong attachment to the founding republican values. The CHP elites were conventionally strong

adherents of secularism and Kemalist nationalism – i.e., a rather civic version of nationalism with strong emphasis on positivism. The track record of the party is quite often criticized by liberal, left and pro-Kurdish circles due to the party cadres' alleged reticence to seek a genuine democratization in relation to the Kurdish problem. Defining the party's positioning on the Kurdish problem, Faruk Loğoğlu, former CHP vice-chair expressed that *“we are as social democrat as the British Labour [party] and as modern as the French Socialist... And, admittedly, as distant as them to the Kurds and the Kurdish issue”* (Author's interview, June 2016). Indeed, the CHP-affiliated and like-minded elites, has shown a rigid attitude against the Kurdish demands, and, thereby, acting as one of the veto players on the issue until recently. In corollary, they revealed their extremely narrow interpretation of the main institutional pillars of power-sharing. While their understanding, with very few expectations, was delimited with cultural protectionism within the individual rights perspective, they, almost unequivocally, precluded the politico-territorial and rebel inclusion pillars.

On the cultural protectionism dimension of power-sharing, the CHP-affiliated and like-minded elites, albeit having a narrative accommodating cultural plurality and recognizing the distinctive Kurdish identity; they tended to perceive a constitutionally-embedded collective rights' regime as divisive. Their narratives often underlined a possible disruptive impact of a collective rights regime on the “inclusive and egalitarian” constitutional definition of Turkish citizenship. In their narratives, they often highlighted “republican egalitarianism” as an engine for the Kurds' upward social mobility. For instance Deniz Baykal, former CHP leader, argued that

The Republic project imagined a new citizenry and citizen. This project has transformed former subjects of the Ottoman Sultan into citizens in modern sense. People were enabled to become a rational, secular, modern individual unfettered from her religious, ethnic, tribal ties... Ours [republic project] is an inclusive project, from which all citizens regardless of ethnic, religious and tribal roots have benefited. This is valid for the Turks and Kurds alike. There used to be a severe poverty and socio-economic backwardness in the region [South-east] in the first decades of the republic. Now the grandchildren of those people are in places in Ankara, İstanbul and across the world which were once unimaginable for their forefathers... No one asks them about their ethnic origins... They owe all these achievements to the egalitarian nature of the republic (Author's interview, August 2016).

In addition to the republican egalitarianism, another recurrent theme in the CHP's elites was the inclusive Turkish citizenship category, which, in their understanding, has no ethnic connotation and, thus, can accommodate diversities. For instance, CHP vice-chair, Akif Hamzaçebi, claimed that *"Turkish citizenship should not offend our Kurdish citizens. Here it [Turkishness] does not rely on ethnicity; but it rather means a shared commitment to our beautiful country. All citizens, regardless of their ethnic identity, are equal according to our constitution and before the law. It is a guarantee for co-existence of ethnic groups peacefully.* (Author's interview, June 2014) In a similar vein, Emine Ülker Tarhan, former deputy of the Party, put emphasis on the equality dimension of Turkish citizenship as follows: *"The definition of our citizenship does not privilege any ethnic groups; that is to say, the Turks are not privileged at the expense of the Kurds or other communities in Turkey. It rather provides equality for our Kurdish citizens."* (Author's interview, May 2017). On the collective cultural protectionism dimension of power-sharing, the CHP elites' understanding broadly went in line with their subordination strategy – i.e., subordinating the Kurdish identity to their understanding of overarching Turkish citizenship. They often rejected the granting a constitutionally-embedded collective rights regime for the Kurds on grounds of preserving the social cohesiveness and

inter-ethnic harmony. Highlighting the risks of an ethnic disintegration in case of granting of collective rights, Emre Kongar, a pro-CHP academic and commentator, expressed that

Our model, more or less, aligns with the American type of constitutional citizenship, which is based on an inclusive political identity, citizenship, equal rights. For instance, the American citizenship or Turkish citizenship are political identities and constitute the supra-identities of the whole nation. Some of the politicians from the AKP and HDP have portrayed our constitution's reference to the "Turkishness" as an ethnic emphasis. No, this is a reference to our political identity as Turkish citizens. Contrary to their portrayal, religion, race, ethnicity do not matter in the constitutional citizenship model... Ethnic, micro-nationalisms are dangerous for nation-states. They, as it is the case in Turkey, seek for diversified legal systems and communal arrangements for their own groups. As we have seen in the case of Yugoslavia's disintegration, ethnic micro-nationalism movements are disruptive of nation-states' social fabric. Pursuing ethnic nationalism has always resulted in bloodshed in our history. We also have an Ottoman experience in our close history (Author's interview, May 2015).

In addition to their obvious preference for de-collectivization of the cultural protectionism, another recurrent theme in their rejection of granting group rights to the Kurds was related to their concerns over an inter-ethnic disquiet. Portraying the Kurdish problem as being "nourished from deficient democracy and severe violations of individual rights and liberties." CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, opposed collective cultural protectionism as follows:

Addressing the matter merely as an ethnic issue is fundamentally wrong. Look at the situation in the South-east right now. It is apparent that neither the [settlement] process nor specific openings for our Kurdish citizens have not brought any benefit to them. Giving group rights exclusively to our Kurdish citizens would stir resentment among the non-Kurdish segments of the Turkish nation... In general terms the problem stems from a deficient democracy. What we should do is to launch a comprehensive democratic development rather than granting specific ethnicity-based rights to our Kurdish citizens (Author's interview, July 2016).

Although the CHP elites overwhelmingly rejected granting of collective rights, most of them supported repealing of the bans against the Kurdish identity and culture in a de-collectivized fashion. Exemplifying his take with reference to the debates over the mother-tongue, the CHP deputy, İlhan Cihaner argued that *“Abolishing the bans on learning mother-tongue is totally different than passing to a bi-lingual public education system. The former would foster our democracy; the latter would do more harm than good in terms of keeping our social fabric intact”* (Author’s interview, March 2017).

Claiming that *“All barriers before learning and using the mother tongue, in addition to the common language of Turkish, should be eliminated”*, Rıza Türmen, former CHP deputy, additionally noted the need for keeping the Turkish as a bridge language between the Turks and Kurds. He further underlined that *“Turkish is our common language and need to remain as the education language; otherwise next generations cannot discuss their issues like we can today”* (Author’s interview, August 2015). Highlighting the Kurds’ upward social-mobility prospects, Faik Öztrak, former vice-chair of the party, argued that *“...if mother-tongue education is allowed, how can the Kurdish youth educated in Kurdish find a decent job in Ankara, İstanbul or do business with the rest of the country?”* (Author’s interview, September 2016).

In terms of elite interaction, the CHP elites were extremely critical on the Turkish Islamists’ portrayal of religion (read: Islam) as the overarching bound between the Turks and Kurds. Rejecting the Turkish Islamists’ understanding of religion as a common bond between the Turks and Kurds, Deniz Baykal claimed that

Our supra-identity, the common roof [ortak çatı] of this country is the citizenship of the Republic. It is not Islam, being Muslim or religious brotherhood - like the AKP is dreaming of - that unite us... If they insist on that pan-Islamist mentality, ultimately 'Arabs would find an Arab and Kurds would find a Kurd as a sheikh. Then Erdoğan would be left only with a small minority. Try to envision the historical conditions of the 1920s... An empire was lost, national unity was lost... Our only remaining common denominator was – and still is – the republican values and Turkish citizenship... what else could bring our nation together? Atatürk and his friends made the correct choice (Author's interview, August 2016).

On the territorial features of power-sharing, the CHP elites unsurprisingly positioned themselves as veto players. They criticized the politico-territorial claims with reference to ideological and practical grounds. Directing specific criticisms to the Kurdish ethno-nationalists' self-rule understanding, Metin Feyzioğlu, the head of Turkish Bar Association, argued that “sovereignty is not --and cannot—divided”, and further noted:

Self-rule, self-defence, a new foreign policy for trans-national neighbors, what else? Autonomy model defended by them [HDP] refers to taking the sovereignty of the Turkish nation-state over. They don't even know what they are talking about... Look at the federal cases of Belgium, Spain, Austria, Quebec... Even in the federation, confederations in the West, they share political power with autonomous units, not the sovereignty. Be it federation or confederation, sovereignty belongs to the state everywhere in the world. Autonomy is a relationship of status established with the sovereign state, it does not divide or break up the sovereignty of the state, on the contrary it considers it given and a new relationship is defined over this given between the sovereign state and the autonomous region. From an academic perspective, their [HDP] claim is not different than a secessionist claim (Author's interview, July 2017).

Another thread of argument was portrayed by Kılıçdaroğlu, who supported the devolution of powers to the local authorities, albeit portraying his vision as an administrative rather than a political decentralization. He expressed that “we need devolving more powers to local governments. Our approach on this issue is based on

the Council of Europe's local governments' charter and has nothing to do with the HDP's understanding of self-rule. While they are seeking an ethnic autonomy, our vision is to empower local democracy" (Author's interview, July 2016). Muharrem İnce, former vice-chair of the party, on the other hand, highlighted the well-known practical difficulties arising from the dispersed Kurdish population, as another impediment before territorial power-sharing in Turkey. He noted that *"the sociological realities of Turkey render impossible the implementation of autonomy. The situation of those regions where Kurds and Turks are intertwined, and that at least one fold of the Kurdish population in the east are in the west demonstrate the impracticalities of the thesis of autonomy"* (Author's interview, May 2016).

On the rebel inclusion pillar, the CHP elites, again, presented a rigid stance towards any institutional arrangements. Viewing the rebel inclusion pillar as being rebel-strengthening and rebel-legitimizing, they recurrently highlighted marginalization of the rebels through cutting its social support base. Categorically rejecting the merits of rebel inclusion arrangements, Kılıçdaroğlu, for instance, advocated the idea of marginalizing the PKK terrorism by eradicating its social base. He further continued as follows:

We would not negotiate with terrorists. Political negotiations and such legal steps [amnesty] would provide legitimacy to the PKK. Instead, we need to undertake a comprehensive effort, including social and political reforms, to win Kurdish people's hearts and minds so that the PKK would lose its support base in the region. As long as they [PKK] receive support from the region, they would not surrender (Author's interview, July 2016).

Again categorically rejecting merits of the rebel inclusion arrangements, Mustafa Balbay, CHP deputy, portrayed such steps as "rebel-legitimizing" when he claimed

that *“You cannot control the issue of terror if you kneel before the terrorists. Taking Öcalan as your counterpart would legitimize him and the PKK as the representative of the Kurds in this country. If you legitimize them [PKK], they would normally retain their arms.* (Author’s interview, October 2016).

Some of the interviewees also viewed the rebel inclusion as rebel-strengthening provisions. For instance, referring to the Kurdish peace process, Umut Oran, former CHP vice-chair, highlighted that *“During the peace process, the PKK asked the AKP government to keep the military in their stations so that they would allegedly be leaving the country. Instead, they abused the military’s inaction and extend their control there. All these negotiations and military’s retreat created a perception among our Kurdish citizens that the Turkish state has left the region to the terrorists”* (Author’s interview, January 2017).

The CHP elites’ narratives also revealed a perceived risk of inter-ethnic confrontation in the implementation of the rebel inclusion arrangements. Responding to a direct question on amnesty, Rıza Türmen said *“I regret that a comprehensive amnesty is not possible. Such a move would dynamite our societal peace. Also, no politician can dare to give a pardon to the PKK members due to electoral considerations. Therefore, there is a need for an issue-based inter-party coalition to tackle these issues”* (Author’s interview, July 2017).

In sum, the CHP elites tended to see the cultural protectionism and territorial power-sharing pillars as potentially divisive. Similar to the Turkish Islamists’ tendency to see the Kurdish ethnic distinctivity, the CHP elites’ narrative aimed to frame it

under an allegedly broader category of Turkish citizenship. In terms of cultural protectionism, their de-collectivization of the Kurdish cultural claims aimed to accommodate these demands merely by granting of individual rights. In their narratives the rebel inclusion arrangements were portrayed as rebel-legitimizing, rebel-strengthening, and again as potentially divisive.

Power-sharing Perspectives of the Turkish Nationalists: “*Not mosaic, Turkey is still a marble*”

The Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) has been the major political party representing the Turkish nationalism. The Party has always been, more or less, a single-issue political movement. While the single-issue was to fight against the ‘communist threat’ in the pre-1980 coup period in Turkey, the party has mainly positioned itself as the ultimate veto-player against the Kurdish ethno-nationalist demands in the post-coup period. Consequently, their narratives on the power-sharing reflected their relentless rejection, fear and anger. They framed the power-sharing as potentially divisive and rebel-strengthening.

The MHP-affiliated and like-minded elites’ perceptions on power-sharing were heavily influenced from their understanding of Turkishness. Broadly-speaking, two different narratives were observed on the perspectives of power-sharing in the context of the Kurdish question. The first narrative, which denied the existence of a distinct Kurdish identity, and alleged “*all of the ethnic tribes of Eastern and South-eastern Turkey, including the Kurds, are descendants of Turkoman of Central Asian origin. The politicized Kurdish identity was artificially constructed as a result of*

imperialists' social engineering project" (Author's interview with Atila Kaya, former vice-chair, April, 2016).

The second one was the dominant narrative, according to which the MHP elites recognize the distinctive Kurdish ethnic identity, albeit subdued it to the overarching "Turk" or "Turkish nation" as a constitutive part. Reflecting on his understanding of the Turks, Kurds and nation, MHP chair, Devlet Bahçeli expressed that *"The Turk is the name of the body of a colossal and almighty plane tree. The Gokturks, Uyghurs, Oghuz, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Kurds and others are the branches of this colossal and almighty Turkish plane tree... The Kurds, too, are one of those branches that compose the great Turkish nation..."* (Author's interview, January 2015) According to this mainstream view among the MHP elites, *"Turkishness does not exclude, or deny our Kurdish citizens' ethnic roots and dialects. If Turkishness as a concept would resemble a huge garden full of different scents and colors, the Kurds will be one of the unique colors in our garden"* (Author's interview, Abdulhaluk Mehmet Çay, former MHP vice-chair, November 2015). In terms of the definition of Turkishness, there has remained a vivid inter-elite debate between the Turkish Islamists and nationalists. On this diverging understandings, Ruhsar Demirel, MHP deputy, expressed that *"He [President Erdoğan] portrays Turkishness merely as an ethnic identity. Degrading Turkishness into a mere ethnic identity is a fatal error. Insistence in this error would lead Turkey towards Balkanization or Iraqization."* (Author's interview, April 2016)

On the cultural protectionism pillar, the MHP elites' narratives, unsurprisingly, defied the recognition of Kurdish collective cultural rights. Instead, their narratives

put an overwhelming emphasis on the inclusive nature of the Turkish identity, shared values and the collective culture of the Turkish nation. As a proponent of this view, Süleyman Servet Sazak, former vice-chair of MHP, argued that *“Today, is there any difference between the fundamental rights and liberties of my brothers in Isparta and my brothers in Şırnak? Aren’t denizens of Yozgat and of Hakkari equal before law? My citizens of Turkish origin are not above or below my citizens of Kurdish origin... How come a separate legal ground is sought for our Kurdish citizens?”* (Author’s interview, August 2016). Likewise, Ruhi Ersoy, vice-chair of the party, expressed [with chuckles] that *“we believe that Turkey is still a marble. Our cultural diversities do not necessitate introducing an exclusive legal framework for all of these cultures living in this country. This will lead us to dissolution”* (Author’s interview, April 2016).

Viewing the recognition of Kurdish cultural demands as a stepping stone for political and territorial ones, the Turkish nationalist elites recurrently expressed their concerns over possible creeping segregation between the Kurds and the rest of the nation. This was vividly exemplified by nationalist columnist Servet Avcı, who expressed that *“Group rights, I assumed that you mean education, broadcasting in mother-tongue, etc., would damage the current grounds of equality enjoyed by our Kurdish citizens...None of these legal regulations will make us democratic; but they will only strengthen the PKK’s secessionist agenda.”* (Author’s interview, January, 2017).

Voicing his concerns over a possible segregation in case of granting of Kurdish cultural rights, Semih Yalçın, MHP vice-chair, argued that:

...Can you imagine how a school providing education in Kurdish would look like in Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa or Diyarbakır? Kurdish children would talk in Kurdish

with each other; Arabs in Arabic with each other; and Turks in Turkish... There would be groupings, disquiet and eventually segregation due to their ethnic differences. If this is not separatism, what is it? This is what exactly the terror organization wants to achieve: First dividing our nation; and then dividing our land (Author's interview, December 2016).

The same concerns for disintegration were also recurred in the Turkish nationalists' narratives in their rejection of territorial power-sharing arrangements. The MHP elites' narratives unequivocally rejected politico-territorial claims. For instance, Tuğrul Türkeş, former vice-chair of the party, argued that “*Our Kurdish brothers have a state; that is Turkey*” (Author's interview, December 2016). One of the recurrent themes in their opposition against the territorial power-sharing was the traumatic disintegration of the Ottoman Empire consequent to ethnic revival. This was vividly expressed by Oktay Vural, former vice-chair and deputy of the Party, when he argued that

Our unitary structure cannot even be a matter of discussion. This state was established with the remnants of a collapsed empire. Turkish nation originally receded to Anatolia from the Balkans, the Caucasus and created a homeland together. Anatolia is the last castle for the Turkish nation... There is no other place to go. Therefore, the Turkish nation shows uttermost sensitivity on our indivisible territorial integrity. They will never forgo from saying ‘one nation, one state, one flag’ (Author's interview, December 2016).

The MHP elites' narratives revealed the rebel inclusion arrangements as rebel legitimating and rebel-strengthening and as a risk for security melt-down in the south-eastern Turkey. Believing the possibility of a military defeat of the PKK, Tunca Toskay, former vice-chair of the Party, stated that

[During the settlement process] the PKK had been taken as a political interlocutor and treated as if it is representative of our Kurdish citizens. Our army had been consciously weakened, and its capability to combat terrorism had been limited. In spite of all of these, during the course of the process, the PKK

kept the option of terror at its hand, and got concessions from the AKP government which could be taken through armed struggle. The end game of the PKK is to remove the security forces of the Turkish State from the region. They want the police, army, and the village guards to be rendered passive in the region. In its own settlement model, the PKK plans to become the national army and police of the autonomous regions under the name of 'self-defense' (Author's interview, December 2015).

In addition to their security-oriented outlook to the problem, their emotions – especially vengeance and retribution - became also apparent in their reactions to the rebel inclusion prospects. For instance, Devlet Bahçeli claimed that

Look... sitting in that seat, I saw off many Turkish nationalist youth to military, police service duties, as they were heading off to their duty stations in the South East. Many of them have fallen martyrs in defence of the motherland. These monstrous terrorists have on their hands the blood of those young friends of mine. With no shame, some say, let's declare amnesty for the PKK so that this terror menace ends... Even if the Earth rotates in the opposite direction, I will never allow for those monstrous terrorists to return back to the Turkish land, under the guise of 'freedom fighters.' Whatever the cost might be: the fight against terror must continue until the very last terrorist is annihilated (Author's interview, January 2015).

Power-sharing Perspectives of the Turkish establishment: “Vote for Horse, At’a Oy Verin!”

In addition to the mainstream political views represented in the Turkish Parliament, public officials, military and civilian bureaucratic elites – such as presidents, military top brass, members of high judiciary, etc. - have also influenced the policy-making within the Turkish political establishment. Their influence is of particularly visible with regard to the Kurdish problem. I, therefore, intended to reflect their understandings and perspectives of power-sharing arrangements in Turkey's Kurdish conflict. Traditionally, the Turkish establishment has been associated with the

securitization of the Kurdish problem and known as one of the major veto players against the Kurdish ethno-nationalist demands. Indeed, the interviews revealed their recognition of the ethno-political essence of the problem, yet reticence to accommodate the Kurds' power-sharing demands due to their exaggerated fears of ethnic disintegration. Diagnosing the PKK as 'an insurgency aiming to usurp the authority of the state in the South-east,' their narratives revealed that their understanding of power-sharing were delimited with a partial cultural protectionism – i.e., within the individual rights perspective –, and they, almost unequivocally, precluded the politico-territorial and rebel inclusion pillars. They tended to perceive territorial power-sharing as being divisive and rebel inclusion as rebel-legitimizing.

For most of the interviewed bureaucratic elite, the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement constituted, in former governor Ünal Erkan's words, "*a direct challenge to the authority of the state in the region [South-east Turkey]*" (Author's interview, March, 2015). This view was largely shared by former Chief of General Staff, İlker Başbuğ, who stated that: "*The PKK was not a simple terrorism issue. A terrorist organization does not aim to replace the state's authority in a specific territory; rather it tries to influence your policy by means of terrorism... I have diagnosed our problem [referring to the PKK problem], long ago, as an armed insurgency, which, unfortunately, garnered a societal support in the region*" (Author's interview, June 2016). This diagnosis – i.e., viewing the PKK's ultimate aim as sharing of state authority apparently has shaped most of the interviewed bureaucratic elites' understanding and attitude towards the Kurds' power-sharing claims. Alleging that the PKK's objective is to be accorded as the "*rightful representative of the Kurds,*" and to "*take over the state's authority in the region,*" Murat Başesgioğlu, former

minister, further expressed that *“The Organization [PKK], at the height of its power in early 1990s, was committed to break off the people of Kurdish origin and territory from Turkey. Our state authority had been seriously compromised”* (Author’s interview, March 2017). Claiming that the Kurdish ethno-nationalists aim to “profess [to carry out] the primary functions of the state” and *“to accord recognition of its authority not just over a certain territory; but also over the Kurdish people,”* former President Süleyman Demirel further noted that:

Think as follows: The primary duties of a state are comprised of providing security, justice, social policy, education, infrastructure investments etc. The PKK and its political wing have already been professing all these fundamental state functions. The PKK professes that it provides security, right? It professes to distribute justice through its courts, right? Social policy and infrastructure are taken care of via their municipalities. What is outstanding? Education. This is the reason for their insistence in mother-tongue [education]. They ultimately want to replace the Turkish state in the region (Author’s interview, December 2014).

This threat perception – i.e., the PKK’s alleged intention to replace the state authority - apparently clouded the Turkish bureaucratic elites’ understanding and attitude towards the main institutional pillars of power-sharing. Their narratives revealed that they acknowledged the Kurds’ as a distinct ethnic group; yet they remained reluctant on granting a constitutionally-embedded collective rights due to their exaggerated fears of inter-ethnic disquiet. Some of them further perceived the collective rights as a stepping stone for the politico-territorial claims. Arguing that granting of group rights would lead to an “ethnic avalanche,” Uğur Ziyal, former undersecretary of Foreign Ministry, claimed that *“Such a mistake would reinforce ethnically-inspired tensions within the society. Yes, the duality of our democracy needs to be increased. But not just for the citizens of Kurdish origin. We should better address this issue as an overall democratization increasing the individual liberties for the whole society”*

(Author's interview, February 2015). Likewise, Haşım Kılıç, former President of the Constitutional Court, also supported de-collectivizing the Kurdish demands for cultural protectionism, when he argued that *"If one talks of democratization, democratization is a must for everyone... Not that it can be granted to the Kurds or to the Georgian. Neither Turks nor Kurds can have a superiority or a privilege according to our constitution. With this mindset, may god spare, you would place our national unity and integrity in danger."* (Author's interview, February 2017)

Complementing this view, Recep Kömürcü, member of the Constitutional Court, argued that *"[If realized] Constitutionality [anayasallığı/anayasaya uygunluğu] would be least of your concerns. Such a wrongdoing will damage our societal harmony"* (Author's interview, February, 2017).

De-collectivization of cultural strategy became also apparent in some of the Turkish establishment representatives' views. For instance, Sami Selçuk, former Minister of Justice, argued that *"Democracies should be blind in terms of ethnicity, color, or race; in democracies, there are no Turks, Kurds, Albanians, but just citizens, who are equal before the law... Providing privileges to a certain ethnic group would contradict equality principle of our constitution"* (Author's interview, November 2014). Sami Selçuk further complemented that *"...if one day, we can raise the standards of our democracy in real terms; then those who want to open a school, providing education in mother-tongue can be allowed. But as a private entrepreneur. These are individual preferences and liberties. The state should be out of this separate schooling business."* (Author's interview, June 2015)

Remaining critical of “constitutionalization of the Kurdish identity [*Kürt kimliğinin anayasallaştırılması*]”, former President Demirel, instead offered a sort of de facto recognition of the Kurdish cultural distinctivity with reference to his own personal experiences:

Why are you obsessed with constitutional arrangements? Instead, democracies can sort out identity differences with informal political moves. There is no need to come up with major constitutional arrangements that can stir a big reaction. Constitutions are not makeshift documents... I know party politics well. Elections, party congresses, they are all won by paying due regard to local sensitivities. I also paid due regard to my Kurdish brothers' culture, language and customs during my political career as a party leader. Whenever I went to the South-east for a rally before elections, I always opened and closed my speeches with some Kurdish remarks that I memorized in advance. They responded me with 'youyous' [zılgıt]. In my campaigns there [south-east], I saluted my Kurdish brothers over a party bus, which had a big banner, reading “Vote for Horse [Ata Oy Verin]” in Kurdish in front of it. At dinner invitations, I ate with them at a floor table [yer sofrası] in line with their traditions... I always reserved the best seats in the party boards for my Kurdish members. I always included them in my cabinets. All these gestures tell them [Kurds] that I recognize them, respect them and pay due regard to their local sensitivities (Author's interview, December 2014).

On territorial power-sharing, the Turkish establishment narratives, without few exceptions, reflected their understanding of these features as being divisive and peace-endangering. Their risk perception was often highlighted with reference to the Ottoman Empire's disintegration. For instance, former President Sezer argued that

Our unitary structure was not a matter of preference. It was the outcome of the historical process that Atatürk and his friends experienced during the dissolution of the [Ottoman] Empire. This historical trauma was reflected in all of our constitutions in the republican period. Consequently, according to our Constitution, the Republic of Turkey is an indispensable unity with its country and nation. ...Under the democratization veil, the separatists still aim what they could not achieve through arms. A regional autonomy means usurping state authority, which runs counter to our constitution's unamendable articles. Autonomy, whichever form it takes, would be a violation of constitution and, more importantly, it endangers our unity (Author's interview, April 2015).

The Turkish establishment elites' narratives reflected their understanding equating territorial power-sharing with the PKK's inevitable seizure of control in the region. In corollary, they tended to see politico-territorial power-sharing arrangements detrimental to the inter-ethnic relations due to their concerns over a possible backlash coming from the Turks. This was exemplified in a Murat Başesgioğlu's remarks as follows: *"Most of our citizens do not know, do not care about the ethnic origins of others. But...The day you give autonomy to the South-east and leave the region to the PKK, you will be sowing the seeds of animosity between the Turks and the Kurds in the West. In such case, when the Turks get angry, they will turn to the Kurds and say: 'Go and live in your own Kurdish region'"* (Author's interview, August 2016).

On the rebel inclusion, the narratives of the interviewed representatives of the Turkish establishment revealed that their understanding is quite comprehensive. They covered holding talks and negotiations with the PKK, amnesty, integration programs and politicization of the PKK. Albeit having a negative attitude towards most of the arrangements, they viewed rebel inclusion as being comprised of legal privileges, amnesty, and politicization of the PKK. Alleging that "the PKK problem and the Kurdish issue is intermingled, cannot be separated, and in order to solve this issue, you first need to propose a way out for the ones in the mountains [PKK members]," a retired high-ranking civil servant, who wanted to remain anonymous, claimed that

There is no retirement but death on the mountains, and they are aware of that. Those who went up to the mountains on those days are now old, most of them are sick and tired. I talked to these guys face-to-face, and I can openly state the reason [for their concerns] as follows: 'What will happen to us? If we return to Turkey after the solution process, we will be arrested. What else can we do?' They want an exit; they expect a rapprochement. We need to provide them with a

proper road map for their impunity, re-integration. The legal basis does not permit such extra-ordinary moves that we need to take. More important than all of these bottlenecks, how to do all these without creating a social backlash (Author's interview, September, 2016).

Turkish establishment's narratives also emphasized the politicization prospects for the PKK. Demirel claimed that *"Some claimed that 'the [PKK's] engagement in politics in the plains is better off than holding arms in the mountains.' I agree with the underlying logic of this approach. However, the locus of the engaging politics process should be the Grand National Assembly, not a prison island."* However, instead of a comprehensive constitutional and institutional overhaul, Demirel put emphasis on *"[the Kurdish ethno-nationalists'] partaking in a coalition government"* in terms of their re-integration and inclusion. He further noted:

Forget about the laws and constitution. These are difficult to change in the absence of societal support. The key is politics, here. Coalitions, in which the HDP is included, can solve your problems. Let me also tell you the biggest mistake of the HDP: They are solely focused on their own Kurdish agenda. They need to start thinking about country's issues and feel the burden of being in the responsibility post [sorumluluk makamı]. This can occur if they partake in a coalition and start to chew over unemployment, economy, foreign relations... This is what I understand from 'the engagement in politics in the plains.' The things that you mentioned [politicization of the PKK] are not feasible. Besides these legitimate political venues, those terrorists that you are asking cannot come back and engage in politics. This is Ahmet's [Türk] and Baydemir's job (Author's interview, December 2014).

Some of the interviewees – particularly the ones with military background - see the rebel inclusion as rebel-legitimizing. Pointing to a possible risk of "forced demographic changes" and "ethnic homogenization in the region through intimidation and violence," İlker Başbuğ objected territorial power-sharing as follows: *"... the PKK will embark a demographic engineering in the region. It will force to emigrate all other ethnic and political groups in the region, which are in a*

dissenting position [vis-à-vis the PKK]. 5 years later, they will not let a single Arab, Zaza and village guard to live in the region.” (Author’s interview, August 2016).

Raising another security concern with regard to the rebel inclusion provisions, Celalettin Lekesiz, former Director General of the Turkish National Police, argued that the PKK would “replace the state’s legitimacy of coercion monopoly [*meşru şiddet kullanma tekeli*]” in case of rebel inclusion. He further noted that

The terrorists have always aspired to be perceived as the protector, security-provider, police, and army in the eyes of the people of the region. This is the reason of their relentless attacks against our village guards. This is the reason why they organized their so-called youth groups for policing in the neighborhoods. You probably have not even heard. Their urban wing carry out traffic-checks to regulate the traffic; or carry out busts to capture drug dealers. Because they wanted to be seen as the police in the cities. They could not have been able to replace the authority in our [Turkish military] presence. Now, they are trying to achieve this legitimacy [legitimacy of coercive power] through the so-called settlement process (Author’s interview, May 2017).

Opposing rebel inclusion from a legalistic perspective, Ahmet Necdet Sezer argued that “*The state has to hold accountable those who have committed murders.*

(Author’s interview, April 2015). In a similar vein, Haşim Kılıç opposed the amnesty prospects from the legal perspective, as follows: “*First they [PKK members] need to surrender. Then, it is legally necessary to make the distinction between the one who has only committed a crime against the public and the one who has killed our police, soldier. You may pardon the offences against the state, but you cannot let go a murderer just like that.*” (Author’s interview, April 2016).

In sum, the elites of the Turkish establishment viewed the power-sharing as an authority take-over by the Kurdish ethno-nationalists in the South-eastern Turkey. For most of them, the power-sharing arrangements are potentially divisive, rebel-

strengthening/legitimizing. However, especially interviewees' who took active duties in the settlement process acknowledged the need for rebel inclusion and politicization. A novel view among them also highlighted "informal power-sharing arrangements" without constitutionally-embedding power-sharing arrangements – i.e., reserved (executive) seats, veto-powers as a consequence of coalition-making with the Kurdish ethno-nationalists-.

Overall, the elite-level analyses provided both theoretical and policy-relevant implications. The narratives of both Turkish and Kurdish (ethno-)political elites revealed a diverse set of competing understandings, interest formulations, and conflictual inter-elite interactions on the main pillars of power-sharing. For most of the Turkish elites, the power-sharing arrangements have remained as unacceptable, whereas the Kurdish elites remained divided regarding their perspectives of power-sharing due to strong intra-ethnic divisions and their competing stakes and self-interests. On the Turkish front, the elites dismissed power-sharing arrangements mostly due their ideological predicaments – i.e., Turkish nationalism calling for unity of the nation and the state and/or Islamic commitment on unity of the *ummah* -. The incorporation strategy –i.e., subduing the Kurdish distinctivity either to the overarching *ummah*, Turkish citizenship or Turkish nation categories- remained the main tool for all of the Turkish elite segments. They often perceived power-sharing governance as a "deal with the devil" and portrayed various power-sharing arrangements as being divisive and rebel-strengthening. On the Kurdish front, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists and Islamists' demand for power-sharing as well as their diverging understandings and competing interest formulations became apparent. While they both portrayed themselves as the pioneers of the Kurdish ethno-political

struggle and employed intra-ethnic outbidding in the context of the power-sharing debates, the integrated Kurds remained disassociated from their co-ethnics' narratives. In such a complex web of interactions and interest-formulations, the (ethno-)political elites outlook to the power-sharing governance remained irreconcilable. Consequently, a power-sharing governance, which principally seeks an inter-elite consensus, remained infeasible to implement in the resolution of the Kurdish conflict.

The elite-level analyses have some major theoretical implications. The Turkish and, more apparently, Kurdish elites' diverse set of power-sharing understandings and interest-formulations constitute a major challenge for the unitary actor assumption of the power-sharing theory, which treats ethnic groups as collective unitary actors with common political objectives. Indeed, most of the literature on power-sharing, following the lead of the Lijphart's works, assumed ethnic groups as unitary actors and ascribed agency to the ethnic groups as a whole regardless of highly possible intra-group - linguistic, confessional, ideological – diversities. However, this unitary actor assumption, defined as “groupism” by Brubaker resulted in the “tendency to represent the social and cultural world as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome ethnic, racial and cultural blocks” (2004: 167). Due to the groupism fallacy, the power-sharing theory viewed ethnic segments as homogenous and unitary actors in pursuit of ethnically-exclusive objectives. Given that ethnic groups are not homogenous actors, this “ethnic common sense” assumption is fundamentally wrong (Brubaker, 2004; Barth: 1969). Indeed, most of the ethnic groups are fragmented due to overarching cleavages, such as religion, ideology, socio-economic factors, etc. Individuals may also feel belonging to multiple social groups especially due to these

overarching identities. Additionally, individuals can even align with other groups, not necessarily comprised of their co-ethnics, in their interest-formulation (Barth, 1969:7). Due to these overarching cleavages and interest formulations, individuals may well defect from their co-ethnics in their interest formulation, ideological, and partisan choices (Kalyvas, 2003, 2008; Staniland, 2012; Rabushka & Shepsle, 2008:27).

In contrast to the power-sharing theory's principal assumptions – i.e., ethnic elites seek a compromise to form a “government by elite cooperation” to prevent mutual losses’ (Lijphart, 1977) -, ethnic elites are also power-maximizing, interest-driven actors. The power-sharing theory basically overlooked that the parties to an ethnic conflict principally aspire to achieve hegemonic influence - or at least extend their relative influence - over the ethnic constituency through employing intra-ethnic outbidding strategy and, thus, tend to see other co-ethnic segments’ losses as their own gains (Horowitz, 2000). In corollary, this study, again challenging the major presumptions of the power-sharing theory, claimed that devolution of powers to peripheral ethnic groups via the power-sharing arrangements does not equally empower various rival groups within the periphery, but it rather creates winners and losers, and, thereby foster intra-ethnic infightings. The intra-ethnic divide between the Kurdish ethno-nationalists and Kurdish Islamists and their fundamentally diverging interest-calculations also supported this claim. Therefore, the power-sharing theory, especially when employed as a conflict-management tool, needs to be re-considered in two dimensions: firstly, as the vertical power-sharing, re-defining the power structure between the central government and peripheral groups; and

secondly, as the horizontal power-sharing between competing co-ethnic segments among the peripheral group.



CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The starting point of this research project was to inquire the perspectives of power-sharing in the Turkey's protracted Kurdish conflict. Therefore, the main concluding message should, first of all, highlight that implementing broad, constitutionally-embedded institutional politico-territorial power-sharing governance seem to be infeasible in Turkey. Both the elites' narratives and mass-level data revealed that Turkey is torn between irrevocable and irreconcilable understandings, attitudes and interest-calculations of the dominant ethnic group, the Turks, and the second-largest ethnic group, the Kurds. In addition to this inter-ethnic standoff, there exists intra-ethnic divisions on both fronts – i.e., a more confrontational one remains in the the Kurdish front - between secular and conservative segments. Consequently, a power-sharing democracy, which inherently seeks a mass-legitimized inter-ethnic elite consensus, proves to be politically-costly to pursue within the current political context of Turkey.

Besides that, this thesis has made important theoretical contributions to the power-sharing literature and our scholarly understandings of the Kurdish conflict. This study contributed in enhancing the scholarly understanding of the nexus between power-sharing, religion and ethno-politics in the context of a Muslim society. It

integrated theoretical insights from the power-sharing research to the literature on the Kurdish conflict. Such an attempt was one of the precursors of its kind. To my knowledge, no other scholarly work examined the Kurdish conflict in Turkey from the perspective of the power-sharing theory with a mixed method design. Moreover, the extant literature on power-sharing has primarily studied elite considerations in power-sharing theory has also left the mass understudied. This thesis, empirically, has narrowed an important gap by observing the determinants of power-sharing at the mass-level as well.

This concluding chapter wraps up the major findings, which support the above-mentioned claim, under four headings: Firstly, I summarized the main theoretical arguments, empirical results and elite exchanges on the power-sharing perspectives in Turkey's Kurdish conflict. Secondly, I discuss the main theoretical implications. Thirdly, I noted the shortcomings and unanswered questions. Fourth and finally, I highlight the policy-relevant findings and observations.

Summary of the main findings

The gist of my thesis' main observations and findings were as follows: (1) the Kurdish ethno-nationalists' key demands called for a constitutionally-embedded power-sharing arrangements, i.e., the recognition of collective cultural rights, territorial power-sharing and rebel inclusion ; (2) yet, both at the elite and mass levels, the Turks' and Kurds' understandings, attitudes, interest formulations remained irreconcilable on these institutional pillars of power-sharing; (iii) The empirical scrutiny affirmed the significance of the grievance theory - i.e., Kurds

having a perception of discrimination are likely to support the power-sharing arrangements - and urban – rural divide –i.e., Kurds living in rural areas tend to support power-sharing arrangements more- and ideology – Leftist Kurds are more supportive of power-sharing arrangements -. The statistical analyses disproved the socio-economic perspectives and “Islamic brotherhood” approach, whereas observing the *Shafi madhab* proved to matter in Kurds’ support for power-sharing – i.e, *Shafi Kurds* are more likely to support (territorial dimension and rebel inclusion dimensions of power-sharing; (4) Turkish and Kurdish (ethno-)political elites' understandings, attitudes and interest-calculations remained irreconcilable. Inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic squabbles run deep; (5) In the absence of elite and mass level support, power-sharing is not feasible for the accommodation of the Kurdish problem in Turkey.

Chapter 1 discussed the PKK-led Kurdish ethno-nationalist movements’ comprehensive power-sharing demands in the power-concentrating and anti-ethnic regime in Turkey. With reference to the intensity of violence, ripeness and elite-driven characteristics of the conflict as well as relevance of the key Kurdish demands, I argued that the intractable Kurdish conflict is an extremely interesting case study for the students of the power-sharing theory. Thus, I problematized my single case study as follows: a violent ethno-nationalist movements' power-sharing challenge in a power-concentrating, anti-ethnic polity.

In Chapter 2, in the absence of an agreement on the conceptualization, I matched the root causes – i.e., Kurds’ exclusion in the power-concentrating, anti-ethnic Turkish polity - and characteristics - i.e., the level of violence, inter-ethnic relations, main demands of the parties, and track record of previous negotiations between elites, etc.

– of the Kurdish conflict with the menu of power-sharing arrangements. I formulated my conceptualization with reference to three broad sets of power-sharing arrangements, comprising of *cultural protectionism*, *politico-territorial power-sharing* and *rebel inclusion*.

Chapter 3 and 4 showed the elite-driven nature of the Kurdish conflict with reference to the survey data. Both the Turks and Kurds' attitudes towards various features of power-sharing aligned with their political elites' positioning across years. At the mass level, the survey data showed that the Turks and Kurds' attitudes towards the power-sharing arrangements remained irreconcilable across the years. While the Kurds' demands for power-sharing spiked during the peace process, the Turks' opposition persisted. Aiming to explain the variance in the Kurds' support for different features of power-sharing, I tested three hypotheses derived from relative deprivation, modernization and superordinate religious identity theories. The most robust empirical findings were that the grievances –i.e., about half of the Kurds alleged that the Turkish state discriminates against the Kurds and they remained more supportive of power-sharing arrangements - and rural-urban divide –i.e., Kurds' living the rural areas are more supportive of ethno-nationalist claims – and ideology - i.e., the left-leaning Kurds are more likely to support power-sharing arrangements - proved to be fostering the Kurds' power-sharing demands. The multivariate findings affirmed the relevance of grievance theory whereas disproved the merits of religiosity – i.e., Muslim brotherhood between the Turks and Kurds - and socio-economic factors in explaining the variance of the support towards power-sharing among Kurds.

Chapter 5 discussed the power-sharing perspectives of the (ethno-)political elites in the Kurdish conflict. The elite narratives affirmed that the Kurdish ethno-nationalists pioneered and set the agenda in the power-sharing debates in Turkey. Their understanding of power-sharing was comprehensive calling for a broad institutional repertoire, comprising an extra-territorial asymmetric autonomy, constitutionally-embedded cultural protectionism and rebel inclusion pillars. Within the Kurdish front, an intra-ethnic outbidding aiming to defy the pioneering role of their ethno-nationalist co-ethnics in the articulation of the power-sharing demands was quite evident. The Kurdish Islamist elites remained hesitant to support rebel inclusion provision due to their security concerns –i.e., the PKK’s possible score-settling with them after receiving legal shelters for inclusion-. Fearing from a possible inter-ethnic strife, the integrated Kurdish elites, merely aimed to disassociate their political allegiance and narratives from their co-ethnics’ territorial power-sharing and rebel inclusion demands. In terms of theoretical implications, this chapter criticized the “groupism” fallacy of the power-sharing theory, which treated ethnic groups as unitary actors pursuing the same ethnically-inspired political objectives (Brubaker, 2004). Instead, acknowledging the heterogeneous nature of the ethnic groups, this study proposed treating ethno-political elites’ of the peripheral ethnic groups as power-maximizing, interest-driven actors, who principally aspire to achieve hegemonic influence - or at least extend their relative influence - over the ethnic constituency through employing intra-ethnic outbidding strategy (Horowitz, 2000).

On the Turkish front, the incorporation strategy –i.e., subduing the Kurdish distinctivity either to the overarching ummah, Turkish citizenship or Turkish nation categories- showed up as the main tool for all of the segments. Fearing a possible

ethnically-inspired disaccord within their overarching loyalties, the Turkish elites have remained reluctant to accept any of the politico-territorial power-sharing claims. The Turkish Islamist elites' outlook to power-sharing was torn between two of their Islamic ideological predicaments: they recognized "the Godly-ascribed distinct Kurdish distinctivity" in line with their religious beliefs whereas they tended to subordinate this distinct ethnic collectivity under overarching Islamic *ummah*. On the other hand, CHP and MHP affiliated and like-minded elites, on the other hand, positioned themselves as veto players and did not reflect any meaningful power-sharing understanding. Their understandings' tended to see power-sharing pillars as being potentially divisive, rebel-legitimizing and rebel-strengthening.

Theoretical Implications

This thesis has offered some theoretical refinements to the classical power-sharing theory. It, first of all, challenged the unitary actor assumption of the power-sharing theory. This unitary actor assumption, defined as "groupism" by Brubaker, resulted in the power-sharing theory to view ethnic segments as unitary actors in pursuit of ethnically-exclusive political objectives (Brubaker, 2004; Barth, 1969). With reference to the parties to the Kurdish conflict, this thesis re-affirmed that ethnic groups are fragmented due to overarching cleavages, such as religion, ideology, socio-economic factors, etc. As it was the case in the integrated Kurdish elites' dissociation from their co-ethnics, members of an ethnic group may well defect from their co-ethnics in their interest formulation, ideological, and partisan choices due to these overarching cleavages and interest formulations (Kalyvas, 2003, 2008; Staniland, 2012; Rabushka & Shepsle, 2008:27). In contrast to the power-sharing theory's principal assumptions – i.e., ethnic elites seek a compromise to form a

“government by elite cooperation” to prevent mutual losses’ (Lijphart, 1977) -, this thesis further showed that (ethno-)political elites are power-maximizing, interest-driven actors, who principally aspire to achieve hegemonic influence - or at least extend their relative influence - over the ethnic constituency through employing intra-ethnic outbidding strategy (Horowitz, 2000). Most notably, this study, again challenging the major presumptions of the power-sharing theory, claimed that devolution of powers to peripheral ethnic groups via power-sharing arrangements does not equally empower various rival groups within the periphery, but it rather creates winners and losers, and, thereby foster intra-ethnic infightings. The intra-ethnic divide between the Kurdish ethno-nationalists and Islamists and their fundamentally diverging interest-calculations also supported this claim. Therefore, the power-sharing theory, especially when employed as a conflict-management tool, needs to be re-considered in two dimensions: firstly, as the vertical power-sharing, re-defining the power structure between the central government and peripheral groups; and secondly, as the horizontal power-sharing between competing co-ethnic segments among the peripheral group. This bi-dimensional re-formulation, I believe, would contribute refining the scholarly understandings of power-sharing as a conflict-management tool.

Outstanding issues and unanswered questions

Three intriguing and complex questions have left unanswered due to the limitations of data or scope of this project. The first unanswered question pertained to the greed – grievance debate in the context of the power-sharing perspectives in the Kurdish conflict. The multi-variate analyses, which showed both grievance theory and rural-

urban divide's significance in the Kurds' support for power-sharing, in fact, left me at the cross-roads of a wider theoretical debate: whether ethnic conflicts are triggered by genuine grievances or they are the outcomes of conducive environments, in which insurgencies can flourish. In Collier and Hoeffler's (2004: 563) words, the debate is formulated as follows: "Rebellion may be explained by atypically severe grievances, such as high inequality, a lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions in society. Alternatively, it might be explained by atypical opportunities for building a rebel organization." Challenging the grievance theory with their incentive and opportunity-based explanations, Collier and Hoeffler contend that the presence of rebel-conducive physical and political condition (terrain, presence of resources, weak states, etc.) is the main onset reasons for rebellion onsets. Adapting this debate to my multivariate results: whether genuine grievances explain the Kurds' support for power-sharing or their exposure to the Kurdish ethno-nationalists' social control in rural areas –i.e., the PKK and affiliated political outlets' propaganda and deterrence opportunities over the remote Kurdish villages where the Turkish security forces have relatively weaker presence is higher - explain the Kurds' perception of grievances and power-sharing demands. This question remained unanswered. The second unanswered question pertained to the causal relationship between the support towards power-sharing at the elite and mass levels. The power-sharing theory also lacks a sound theoretical explanation uncovering how elite agreements trickle down to cooperation at the mass level. Due to scope limitations, this thesis also has not commented on how, through which mechanisms and under what conditions the (ethno-)political elites' (can) induce the masses in terms of their perspectives of power-sharing.

The last outstanding questions relates to the transnational dimension of the Kurdish problem. The Kurdish issue is undoubtedly of transnational nature –i.e., Kurds disperse across the regional countries, particularly Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria-. Furthermore, the transnational nature of the conflict has even attained significance with the PKK's heavy engagement in Syrian civil war in order to establish a self-ruled Kurdish region in the northern part of Syria. Turkish government and the Kurdish ethno-nationalists are now at odds also because of their fundamentally opposite political objectives in Syria. From the Turkish security establishment's perspective, the last thing that Ankara would wish to see in Syria is the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region in its southern flank. Despite this burning confrontation, at the elite-level, this thesis has said very little on how these geo-strategic considerations influenced the (ethno-)political elites' outlook to the power-sharing in Turkey. More importantly, at the mass level, this thesis left the likely impact of having cross-border kinships on Kurds' support towards power-sharing unanswered.

Policy-relevant observations

I highlighted six policy-relevant findings. First of all, the first observation pertains to the failed peace process. The elite-level analysis showed that the failed peace process due to the irreconcilable and irrevocable interest formulations of the parties on all major features of a power-sharing accord. Still, paramount differences separated what the Turkish political elites are keen to accept and what the Kurdish ethno-nationalist elites would minimally consent for in the context of a power-sharing accord. The armed flank of the Kurdish ethno-nationalists' interest-formulation

singled out certain organizational stakes – i.e., amnesty, rebel inclusion provisions, politicization, etc. – that cannot be met by politico-territorial power-sharing features alone. In the absence of a clear vision for settlement and legal shelters envisaging rebel inclusion, the armed flank of the Kurdish ethno-nationalists lack concrete incentives to support a political power-sharing accord. Besides the decommissioning and rebel inclusion dimension, irrevocable positions also remained between parties in terms of an eventual peace. The ultimate political objective of the Kurdish ethno-nationalists aims overhauling of the constitutionally-embedded power-concentrating and anti-ethnic features of the Turkish constitution in order to attain a comprehensive, extra-territorial power-sharing governance. Given a negotiated settlement would inevitably involve devolution of powers enjoyed by the central government to popularly elected local authorities, the Turkish political elites remain intrinsically unwilling to give up their authority (Tezcür, 2013). The underlying interest-formulation of the Turkish elites' in their defiant attitude was reflected by Horowitz as follows: "But why should majority-group leaders, with the ability to gain all of political power in a majoritarian democracy, be so self-abnegating as to give some of it away to minority-group leaders?" (Horowitz (2002, 20)

Second policy-relevant observation pertains to the significance of Kurds' grievances. The perception of discrimination -genuine or not- was one of the most recurring themes among the Kurds. All elite segments within the Kurdish front also highlighted their widespread perceptions of discrimination. At the mass-level, the multivariate analyses also demonstrated that identity-related grievances led the Kurds to support politico-territorial power-sharing claims. This observation went against the traditional Turkish government response envisaging the suppression of

the Kurdish ethno-nationalism with a heavy-handed military response and judicial activism. These government responses may well be increasing the perceived discrimination and exclusion among the Kurds, and, thus, would be leaving a fertile ground for the Kurdish ethno-nationalists' to extend their legitimacy and level of support within the Kurdish ethnic constituency.

Thirdly, the multivariate analyses demonstrated that promoting Islam as the overarching religious identity would not cement Turks and Kurds to each other as the Turkish Islamist circles in Turkey have alleged for decades. At this point, the overarching Islamic identity cannot supersede the Kurds' ethnic allegiances; and, thus, would not necessarily fetter their aspirations for power-sharing. By using the same data, this finding was previously highlighted and expressed by Sarıgil and Fazlıoğlu (2015:450) as follows: "the policy of promoting Islamic values and consciousness to suppress Kurdish ethno-nationalism would not really produce the desired outcome." On the contrary of the Turkish Islamists' traditional thinking, the *Hanafi-Shafi* divide—i.e., majority of the Kurds observe the *Shafi madhab* whereas most of the Turks observe the Hanafi jurisprudence—proved to be linked with Kurds' politico-territorial power-sharing aspirations.

Fourthly, like-wise, addressing the Kurdish problem with socio-economic measures—i.e., provision of better schooling, employment opportunities, and income generation, etc. - would not really produce the desired outcome in the context of the Kurdish problem. The statistical analyses disproved the socio-economic factors' constraining impact on power-sharing demands of Turkey's Kurds. This went also in line with the As McGarry's (1995:137) observation claiming that "economic growth

alone, without a political settlement which seeks to address the political aspirations of the warring ethnonational groups, will have little effect upon ethnonational conflict" (cited in Sarıgil, Karakoç, 2017)

The fifth policy-relevant observation was related to the time dimension. Time is on the side of the Kurdish-ethno-nationalists' because non-action has proven to be cost-increasing for the central governments. The level of support towards power-sharing arrangements has spiked across time. For instance, while 56 percent of the Kurds demanded autonomy in 2011, this rate reached to 66.1 percent in 2013 and to 68.5 percent in 2015. All other components showed a similar trend of steady increase. Apparently, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists have succeeded in extending their influence, at least on the ideational basis, over the Kurdish ethnic constituency across time in the absence of any solid government response. If the governments do not act now, Kurdish politico-territorial claims highly likely to become less containable and more costly in terms of concessions due to the spike in the power-sharing demands.

Sixth and the lastly, the inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic (Kurdish) divide has grown across time. While there is a spike in the Kurds' power-sharing demands, Turks' opposition to power-sharing arrangements remains constant across years. On the Kurdish front, the situation is even more complex. Due to the Kurds' regional security complex –i.e., their narratives alleged that Daesh, supported by the Turkish state and local Islamist networks principally target them both in Northern Syria and in Turkey - and the Kurdish Islamists' growing threat perception from the PKK –i.e., especially after the killing some of their members during the so-called Kobane protests in October 2014-. The elite interviews also revealed the intra-ethnic

competition for attaining ethnic constituency' support resulted in a discursive outbidding. For instance, while the Kurdish Islamists' aimed to portray themselves as the real pioneers of the Kurds' politico-territorial claims, the ethno-nationalist flank approached to the "Kurdish Islam". Combined with the existing threat perceptions from each other, this discursive outbidding has further expanded the rift between co-ethnics. The rivalry between Kurdish Islamists and ethno-nationalist flanks and their constant outbidding may end up in a PLO-ification (see Aydınli & Özcan, 2011), and, thus there may eventually be a need for an intra-ethnic power-sharing arrangement a well.

These policy-relevant observations implied that the conventional Turkish government response – i.e., primarily prioritizing heavy-handed military suppression and selective judicial activism targeting Kurdish ethno-nationalists, socio-economic approaches and over-arching Islamic identity between Kurds and Turks - have proven to be defunct. The Turkish political elites need a policy-reset and to develop a new policy tool-box primarily to address the Kurds' grievances.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Variables and Measurement: Operationalization of Variables

Variables	Relevant survey question (translated version)	Coding	Re-coding
Dependent variables			
Territorial_PowerSharing <i>DV model 1 (territorial organization of the state)</i> Collective_Rights <i>DV model 2 (Recognition of collective ethnic identity)</i> Rebel_Inclusion <i>DV model 3 (Rebel Inclusion):</i>	Q1: Like in Northern Iraq, should an autonomous administration or a federation be adopted also in Turkey for the Kurds and in other words should self-governance of Kurds but remaining within Turkey be accepted? Q2: Should Kurds have a local, regional parliament or assembly? Q3: Should there be a local, regional flag belonging to the Kurds? Q1: Should Kurdish be adopted as an official language along with Turkish? Q2: Should public primary and high schools that give education in Kurdish be opened? Q3: Should elective Kurdish courses be given in public schools? (like English) Q4: Should public services be provided in Kurdish in public offices, such as municipalities, hospitals and courthouses? Q1: Should the PKK lay down arms and involve in politics? (This question was	1: Yes 2: No	➤ Variables are first re-coded as: 1: No; 2: Yes. ➤ Then, an additive mean was constructed out of these survey items. ➤ 'No answer' is excluded

	only asked in the 2011 survey.) Q2: Should the PKK lay down the arms and end the armed struggle? (This question was asked in 2013 and 2015 surveys) Q3: Should the PKK found a political party with the same name and join politics? (This question was just asked in 2013 & 2015 surveys) Q4: Should there be a general amnesty for all PKK members including the executives? (This question was just asked in 2013 & 2015 surveys) Q5: Which of the above-mentioned views do you agree regarding Abdullah Öcalan's status? a) Release, totally free; b) release & house arrest; c) status quo – life imprisonment; d) death penalty to be re-introduced and executed.		
<i>Independent variables</i>			
<i>Income</i>	Including everyone's income, what is the total amount of monthly income of your household?		Logarithm of income is taken.
<i>Education</i>	The school that you graduated?	1) Illiterate 2) Literate without a diploma 3) Primary 4) Secondary 5) High school 6) Undergraduate 7) Graduate	
<i>Discrimination Perception</i>	In your opinion, do you think that Kurds in Turkey face with discrimination in public service?	1: Yes 2: No	Variable is re-coded as follows: 1: No 2: Yes

<i>Religiosity Practice</i>	Q1: Do you regularly pray, five times a day? Q2: Do you fast each day of Ramadan every year?	1: Yes 2: No	➤ Variable s are first re-coded as follows: 1: No; 2: Yes. ➤ Then, an additive mean was constructed out of these survey items.
<i>Religiosity Attitude</i>	Q3: Should headscarf be free in schools including primary and high schools? Q4: Should women civil servants or public employees such as judges, prosecutors, and teachers be allowed to wear headscarves during work time?	1: Yes 2: No	➤ Variable s are first re-coded as follows: 1: No; 2: Yes. ➤ Then, an additive mean was constructed out of these survey items.
<i>Control Variables</i>			
<i>Ideology (left-right)</i>	In terms of ideological orientation, there has been a tradition of right – left – center in Turkey. Ideologically, how would you define yourself in this chart?	1) Left of the left 2) Left 3) Center 4) Right 5) Right of the right	
<i>Place of residence</i>	The place where the respondent lives	1) Metropolis 2) City 3) Rural	1: Rural 2: Urban (Metropolis and City)
<i>Region (southeast)</i>	Being from the south-eastern part of Turkey, mostly inhabited by Kurds		0: Other 1: Southeast
<i>Unemployment</i>	Are you employed? What is your current job?		0: Employed 1: Unemployed
<i>Religious sect (Shafi)</i>	How would you define yourself in terms of religion?	1) Sunni-Hanefi 2) Sunni-Shafi 3) Alevi 4) Bektashi 5) Shia-Caferi 6) Other	0) Other 1) Shafi
<i>Gender</i>	Respondent's sex	1: Female 2: Male	
<i>Age</i>	How old are you?		

Appendix B: List of Interviewees

No	Surname	Name	Position/Background	Interview Date(s)
1	Akar	Muhammed	AKP's Diyarbakır Chair	May 28, 2016 February 19, 2017
2	Akdoğan	Yalçın	Former deputy Prime Minister	August 13, 2016
3	Aksu	Abdülkadir	Former Minister of Interior Affairs	March 4, 2015
4	Aktan	İrfan	Pro-Kurdish artist	January 19, 2017
5	Albayrak	Hakan	Turkish Islamist activist and columnist	April 5, 2016
6	Anonymous	Kurdish mele	informal religious authority	16 June, 2016
7	Anonymous	Kurdish mele	informal religious authority	March 25, 2015
9	Anonymous		Retired high-ranking civil servant	August, 21, 2016
10	Arınç	Bülent	Former Speaker of the Parliament	January 7, 2016
11	Avcı	Servet	Nationalist columnist	October 23, 2015
12	Bahçeli	Devlet	MHP chair	January 15, 2015
13	Balbay	Mustafa	CHP depuy	October 13, 2016
14	Ballı	Mehmet	Pro-Kurdish Mele Shafii	January 21, 2016
15	Balüken	İdris	HDP's vicechair	February 12, 2014
16	Başbuğ	İlker	Former Chief of Staff	June 5, 2016
17	Başesgioğlu	Murat	Former Minister	June 2, 2016 March 22, 2017
18	Baydemir	Osman	HDP Spokesperson	February 3, 2016
19	Baykal	Deniz	Former CHP chair	August 28, 2016
20	Bilgen	Ayhan	HDP deputy	November 22, 2016
21	Bulaç	Ali	Journalist January 12, 2015	
22	Buldan	Pervin	HDP deputy	October 2, 2014
23	Cihaner	İlhan	CHP deputy	March 21,

				2017
24	Çay	Abdulhaluk	Former Minister November 12, 2015	
25	Çetin	Hikmet	Former Speaker of the Parliament	July 2, 2016
26	Çevik	Süleyman	Owner of the Kurdish Islamic Nubihar Journal	December 21, 2016
27	Danış Beştaş	Meral	HDP deputy	June 15, 2016
28	Demirel	Ruhsar	MHP deputy	April 27, 2016
29	Demirel	Süleyman	Former President	December 4, 2014
30	Demirtaş	Selahattin	HDP's co-chair	March 29, 2014 October 17, 2015
31	Dicle	Hatip	Co-Chair of the Democratic Society Congress (DTK)	November 12, 2014
32	Dilipak	Abdurrahman	Turkish Islamist columnist	May 14, 2016
33	Dursun	Muhammed Sıddık	Former President of the Med Zehra Foundation	August 2, 2015
34	Eker	Mehdi	APK vice-chair	March 6, 2017
35	Ekinci	Tarık Ziya	Kurdish politician	17 December 2015
36	Elçi	Tayyip	Chair of the MEDAV (Medrese Alimleri Vakfı)	
37	Encü	Ferhat	HDP deputy	September 4, 2016
38	Ensarioğlu	Galip	AKP deputy	November 3, 2015
39	Erbaş	Doğan	HDP's İstanbul provincial chair	March 12, 2017
40	Erdoğan	Yılmaz	Kurdish actor, scenarist	August 11, 2016
41	Erdoğan	Nimetullah	HDP deputy, mele	
42	Erkan	Ünal	Former governor	
43	Ersoy	Ruhi	Vice-chair of MHP	April 9, 2016
44	Feyzioğlu	Metin	Head of Turkish Bar Association	July 19, 2017
45	Fırat	Dengir Mir Mehmet	HDP deputy	12 December 2016
46	Fırat	Kasım	Sheikh Said's	March 14,

			grandson, HDP member	2017
47	Gaydalı	Edip Safter	Former Minister November 21, 2016	
48	Görmez	Mehmet	President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs	September 5, 2016
49	Gür	Nazmi	HDP's former deputy co-chair	February 23, 2016
50	Hamzaçebi	Akif	CHP vice chair	June 19, 2014
51	Haşimi	Seyyit Haşim	January 10, 2017	
52	Işın	Musa	Governor	April 2, 2017
53	İnan	Kamran	Former Minister of Interior Affairs	January 9, 2015
54	İnce	Muharrem	Former vice-chair of CHP	May 16, 2016
55	İslamoğlu	Mustafa	Theologian	November 4, 2016
56	Kaplan	Yusuf	Journalist January 11, 2015	
57	Karadaş	Cağfer	Member of the Religious Affairs High Council	March 5, 2015
58	Karaman	Hayrettin	Turkish theologian	December 13, 2016
59	Karamollaoğlu	Temel	Chair of the Islamist Felicity Party	January 17, 2017
60	Kart	Atilla	Former CHP deputy	March 11, 2016
61	Kaya	Bekir	Former Van Mayor August 18, 2015	
62	Kaya	Hüda	HDP deputy	16 November 2016
63	Kaya	Atila	MHP vice-chair April 12, 2016	
64	Kılıç	Haşim	Former President of the Constitutional Court	21 May 2017
65	Kılıçdaroğlu	Kemal	CHP chair	July 4, 2016
66	Konca	Besime	HDP deputy	December 9, 2014
67	Kongar	Emre	Pro-CHP academic and commentator	May 12, 2015
68	Kömürcü	Recep	A member of the Constitutional Court	February 16, 2017
69	Kurt	Abdurrahman	Former AKP deputy	April 14, 2015
70	Kurtulmuş	Numan	Former deputy Prime	May 13,

			Minister	2016
71	Küçük	Raşit	Turkish theologian	November 5, 2016
72	Lekesiz	Celalettin	Former Director General of the Turkish National Police	May 25, 2017
73	Loğoğlu	Faruk	Former CHP vice-chair	June 12, 2016
74	Oran	Umut	Former CHP vice-chair	January 23, 2017
75	Önder	Sırrı Süreyya	HDP deputy	November 25, 2016
76	Özgökçe	Bedia	HDP's Van deputy	August 13, 2016
77	Özsoy	Hişyar	HDP's vicechair	June 18, 2016 March 4, 2017
78	Öztrak	Faik	Former vice-chair of CHP	September 12, 2016
79	Palandöken	Bendevi	President of the Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen	February 2, 2017
80	Sazak	Süleyman Servet	Former MHP vice-chair August 23, 2016	
81	Selçuk	Sami	Former Minister of Justice	November 2, 2014 June 17, 2015
82	Sezer	Ahmet Necdet	Former President	April 7, 2015
83	Şeyhanzade	Sıddık	Former president of the Kurdish Nur group Med-Zehra	16 April, 2016
84	Şimşek	Mehmet	Finance Minister	January 5, 2016
85	Tan	Altan	HDP deputy	March 3, 2015 June 17, 2016
86	Tanrıkulu	Şehmus	Hüda-Par's Diyarbakır provincial chair	May 4, 2016
87	Tarhan	Emine Ülker	Former deputy of CHP	May 8, 2017
88	Taşgetiren	Ahmet	Islamist comentator	February 21, 2017
89	Toskay	Tunca	Former vice-chair of MHP	December 11, 2015

90	Tuğluk	Aysel	HDP deputy co-chair	August 24, 2016
91	Tuncel	Sebahat	Co-Chair of the Democratic Society Congress (DTK)	April 8, 2014
92	Türk	Ahmet	HDP's former Mardin mayor	May 27, 2014
93	Türkeş	Tuğrul	MHP vice-chair	December 20, 2015
94	Türmen	Rıza	Former CHP deputy	August 4, 2015 July 19, 2017
95	Ünsal	Ömer Faruk	Former head of Mazlum-Der and AKP deputy	11 April, 2015
96	Vural	Oktay	Former vice-chair and deputy of MHP	December 20, 2016
97	Yalçın	Semih	MHP vice-chair	December 19, 2016
98	Yapıcıoğlu	Zekeriya	Hüda-Par's chair	23 October, 2016
99	Yavuz	Faik	President of Ankara Commodity Exchanges	May 5, 2017
100	Yüksek	Kamuran	DBP's co-chair	December 12, 2015
101	Zana	Leyla	HDP deputy	January 8, 2016 October 15, 2016
102	Ziyal	Uğur	Former undersecretary of Foreign Ministry	February 4, 2015
103	Akar	Muhammed	AKP's Diyarbakır Chair	May 28, 2016 February 19, 2017

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