

**REPUPLIC OF TURKEY
ÇUKUROVA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**EU'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN
REGION: THE CASE OF LIBYA**

SEDA ÇATAK

MASTER THESIS

ADANA/2022

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MASTER THESIS

ADANA/2022

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ABSTRACT**EU'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN
REGION: THE CASE OF LIBYA****SEDA ÇATAK****Master Thesis, Department of Political Science and International Relations****Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Marella Bodur Ün****May 2022, 139 pages**

This thesis analyzes the Europeanization of the European Union's foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region, adopting a bottom-up Europeanization approach which stresses the impact and role of member states on the EU's foreign and security policy and the uploading process of national foreign policy preferences driven by national interests to the EU level. On this basis, the thesis examines the degree of the Europeanization of European foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region in the light of the case of Libya in the post-Lisbon era. The thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter presents an overview of "Europeanization" as a conceptual and theoretical framework, focusing on different conceptualizations, perspectives, dimensions, and scopes of Europeanization and explains the Europeanization perspective adopted in this study. The second chapter focuses on the political integration of Europe and the EU foreign policy developments and discusses the process of Europeanization in the foreign policy area. It also examines the key dimensions of the EU's engagement with the Southern Mediterranean region, explaining the main initiatives and their consequences. In the third chapter, the thesis analyzes the case of Libya, focusing on the EU policies and responses in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. In conclusion, in the light of the Libya case, the thesis presents how "bottom-up Europeanization" gained ground in the EU foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region and discuss the degrees, limits and prospects of the Europeanization of EU foreign policy.

Keywords: Europeanization, European Foreign Policy, Southern Mediterranean Region, Arab Spring, Libya

ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN GÜNEY AKDENİZ BÖLGESİNE YÖNELİK DIŞ POLİTİKASI: LİBYA ÖRNEĞİ

SEDA ÇATAK

Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı

Danışman: Doç. Dr. Marella Bodur Ün

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Bu çalışma Avrupa Birliği'nin dış politika alanındaki Avrupalılaşma sürecine odaklanarak Avrupa Birliği'nin Güney Akdeniz Bölgesi'ne yönelik dış politikasını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda bölgede, AB dış politika alanının revize edildiği Lisbon Anlaşması sonrası dönemde meydana gelen ve Arap Baharı olarak adlandırılan süreçte ortaya çıkan Libya krizi vaka çalışması olarak ele alınarak, dış politika alanında üye devletlerin rolüne ve etkisine önem veren “Aşağıdan-Yukarı Avrupalılaşma” yaklaşımı çerçevesinde AB'nin dış politikası analiz edilecektir.

Bu çalışma üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölümde Avrupalılaşma sürecinin kavramsal ve teorik çerçevesi verilerek, anlamı, araştırma alanları, türleri, boyutları ve teorileri açıklanacaktır. İkinci bölümde, dış politika alanında Avrupalılaşma süreci ele alınarak, AB dış politika alanının gelişimi ve özellikleri, AB'nin Güney Akdeniz Bölgesi'ne yönelik dış politikası ve bölgesel gelişmeler tarihsel bir çerçevede sunulacaktır. Üçüncü bölümde ise Libya örneği ele alınarak, AB'nin Libya Krizi ve sonrası dönemdeki dış politikasının ne derecede Avrupalılaştığı ortaya koyulacaktır. Sonuç kısmında ise, Libya örneği ışığında AB'nin bölgeye yönelik dış politikasında “Aşağıdan Yukarı Avrupalılaşma” yaklaşımının öne çıkan durumu ortaya koyularak, AB dış politikasının mevcut durumuna ve geleceğine dair değerlendirmelere yer verilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupalılaşma, Avrupa Birliği Dış Politikası, Güney Akdeniz Bölgesi, Arap Baharı, Libya



To my beloved father, Hadi ÇATAK...

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ABBREVIATIONS

BT Europeanization Bottom-up Europeanization

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

EEAS European External Action Service

EU European Union

EUGS European Union Global Strategy

ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

GNA Government of National Accord

GNC General National Congress

GNU Government of National Unity

HOR House of Representatives

HR/VP High Representative and Vice-President

LNA Libyan National Army

MENA Middle East and North Africa

NTC National Transitional Council

R2P Responsibility to Protect

TD Europeanization Top-down Europeanization

UfM Union for Mediterranean

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INTRODUCTION

The desire to achieve a common foreign policy with the intention of gaining a political dimension in European integration is not a recent fact for the EU. The political integration of Europe started with the European Political Cooperation in 1970s. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was created with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and it was reformed by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the Lisbon Treaty, a new system was created in the areas of foreign, security and defence policy, which includes High Representative (HR) for foreign affairs and security policy, supporting sub-institutions and the European External Action Service (EEAS). With these new bodies, a highly institutionalized EU entered a new period which includes expectations on a consistent and coherent foreign policy and hopes on having more active foreign policy and effective actorness on the world stage.

After a short time from the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, protests, and revolutionary movements, called as *the Arab Spring*, started in the Southern Mediterranean region, which has been one of the most important regions for the EU in terms of geopolitics, history, security, and strategic reasons. The EU has developed considerable policy initiatives for years towards the region including the *Global Mediterranean Policy* (1972), the *Barcelona Process* (1995), the *Renewed Mediterranean Policy* (1992 – 1995), the *European Neighbourhood Policy* (2004) and the *Union for Mediterranean* (2008). Therefore, the Arab Spring protests, starting in the early 2010s, became the “first test bench” of the EU in the case of foreign policy after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.

However, the EU did not put forward a consistent and efficient foreign policy towards the region and the Arab Spring. Conversely, these events in the Southern Mediterranean neighbours revealed the weaknesses of the EU and caused more fragmentation in the foreign, security and defence policy area rather than consistency and coherency, even if the EU had reformed its foreign policy area with the Lisbon Treaty. This situation has revealed a problem that is analyzed in this study.

1- The Research Problem and the Subject of the Thesis

In most countries in the Southern Mediterranean region, there were small-scale protests, but in others these uprisings turned into civil wars and caused turmoil. The EU pursued different foreign policies for different states in the region, which were highly visible both in the foreign policy of the EU towards the Southern Mediterranean region as a whole and its foreign policy towards different states in the region. Relative to the other crises during the Arab-Spring protests, the crisis of Libya has become the initial out-standing crisis in the region not only for the EU but also for the international system.

In Libya, the EU has passed through three important stages which are the indicators of the state of the EU foreign policy in Libya and the degree of the EU CFSP. The first one is about the fragmentation and inconsistency in the EU foreign policy due to the adoption of different national foreign policies by the member states. The fragmentation and inconsistency were evident in the following three responses to the crisis: the EU member states got fragmented in the matter of taking sides during the crisis, in the matter of deciding on military/humanitarian intervention or of arming the belligerents in the country and managing the problems after the crisis, such as the problems relating to border security and displaced refugees and migrants. In all these, the member states preferred to act according to their own national foreign policy concerns, or they agreed on acting together in a very limited way, that is when their national interests converged.

The second stage involves a higher level of division and conflict among member states, in which member states compete with each other for their own foreign policies and non-EU level preferences without regarding the EU-level/common EU foreign policy. In this stage, Libya turned into a battleground of national foreign policies due to conflictual interests between member states, especially between Italy and France. With the aim of uploading their own foreign policies to the EU, several conferences were organized and led by Italy, France and lastly by Germany. In the third stage, with the impact of UN-backed Berlin process which started in 2020, closer relations and forced cooperation have been seen among the leading member states, namely France, Germany, and Italy. This stage was a result of convergence of national interests among the member states with the impacts of internal factors and other regional or external powers in Libya. Therefore, the Libyan crisis shed light on the European foreign policy towards the region and the impact of the member states on the EU in the foreign policy area.

Most of the literature analyzes these developments and evaluates their impact on the EU foreign policy area, discussing whether the EU has a CSFP or not or simply applying the classical integration theories in their analyses. However, this issue should be analyzed adopting a more comprehensive approach and theoretical framework which explores why the EU has different policies in terms of regions and states. This exploration requires an inclusive logic which evaluates both the EU level and national (member state) level and role different from the classical integration approaches that focuses on just the EU level. This thesis aims to adopt a comprehensive theory to analyze the responses of the EU and the EU member states to the crisis in the Mediterranean region. It, thus, employs the concept of Europeanization, which has become a widely-used key concept in the EU studies since the 1990s, in order to provide a comprehensive and proper conceptual and theoretical framework in analyzing the EU in the area of foreign policy. Europeanization as a concept has been understood through two main dimensions which are “Bottom-up Europeanization” (refers to the role and impact of member states on the EU) and “Top-down Europeanization” (refers to the role and impact of the EU on the member states). Thus, the thesis aims to present a perspective for the area of foreign policy, adopting a two-way process considering both member state and the EU levels. However, it is important to state that we should not expect an exaggerated EU impact upon the member states in the foreign policy area, instead a process of Bottom-up Europeanization seems to be more dominant in this area. In addition, as opposed to the classical integration theories, the concept of Europeanization offers the possibility of using more than one theory, synthesizing theories to better analyse different issues related to the Europeanization process. Thus, in theorizing the foreign policy area, the thesis uses the Bottom-up Europeanization dimension theories due to its member-state-led structure and its focus on intergovernmental decision-making process. Moreover, as Europeanization is a dynamic process, it does not depend on a simple logic that refers to what “is Europeanized” or “not Europeanized”. Instead, through the concept of Europeanization, the process is evaluated and presented focusing on the “degrees of Europeanization”.

To sum up, this thesis explores Europeanization in the foreign policy area and focuses on the EU’s foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region. It examines how the member states and the convergence of their interests shape European foreign policy and analyses the degree of the Europeanization of European foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region in the light of the Libyan case.

2- Purpose of the Thesis

As stated above, this thesis aims to examine the impact of the Europeanization on the EU's foreign policy area and analyze EU's foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region with a focus on the Libyan case. More specifically, it focuses on the EU's reactions and responses to the Libyan crisis in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the degree of consistency and coherency in the CFSP towards Libya.

The thesis emphasizes the importance of the Bottom-up Europeanization type/dimension for providing a more comprehensive theoretical framework. Underlining the importance of interest representation, competing interests and political divergence in the EU, the thesis aims to examine the impact of the member states on the EU in the foreign policy area and aims to show that the member states which are pursuing their own interests are still important in the analysis of the Europeanization of the EU foreign policy, even after the institutionalized and revised foreign policy structure by the Lisbon Treaty. In this context, questions like “what is the impact of the Europeanization on the EU foreign policy area and EU's foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region” and “to what extent has the EU foreign policy towards the region Europeanized?” are aimed to be answered throughout the analysis. Therefore, the thesis has two main hypotheses:

- First, the thesis accepts that the Europeanization in the area of foreign policy is a two-way process which means that both bottom-up and top-down Europeanization take place, but defends that the bottom-up Europeanization is relatively more dominant. The bottom-up Europeanization has gained ground in the foreign policy area of the EU and shaped the EU's foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region.
- Second, and related to this, the thesis argues that the area of foreign policy is in the hands of “member states” due to multi-level EU foreign policy system and intergovernmental structure of the EU foreign policy. Therefore, the degree of Europeanization in the foreign policy area depends on the interest convergence of the member states.

3- Research Gap and Significance of the Thesis

Although there is a range of previous research in the field of Europeanization, the area of EU foreign policy has been less analysed than the other policy areas and it has not been extensively studied through the lens of Europeanization. The studies in this area started after 2000s, so it is a newly developing area. In this respect, it is significant to analyse the Europeanization in the area of foreign policy, evaluating the dynamics of the Europeanization process in this developing area of study.

The thesis is significant as it adopts a more bottom-up approach as opposed to the dominant top-down Europeanization approach adopted extensively in the relevant literature. Taking into consideration the policies of member states, the recent important developments inside the EU and the Southern Mediterranean region, the thesis draws attention to the need for more comprehensive research of the Europeanization of foreign policy. Thus, it adopts bottom-up Europeanization as a theoretical framework to highlight both the role and impact of member states on the EU's foreign policy.

In addition, the thesis highlights the current issues and evaluates the events affecting both sides of the Mediterranean coast. Considering the political turmoil in the Arab world, the European response to the problems, ongoing crisis of Libya, divisions in the EU member states, the thesis examines the Europeanization of the European common foreign and security policy towards the region. In this respect, the thesis contributes to the recent literature dealing with the contemporary developments and important issues related to the region.

4- Assumptions, Scope and Limitations of the Thesis

The thesis firstly accepts that Europeanization is a process and assumes that despite the integration and Europeanization processes are inter-related and inter-connected, Europeanization is a different and broader process than the integration process.

Secondly, as the Europeanization process has two main types/dimensions known as top-down and bottom-up Europeanization, the thesis analyzes the Europeanization of foreign policy area accepting that the foreign policy of the EU has both of them. With this

in mind, the thesis highlights the dominance of the bottom-up Europeanization in analyzing the EU's foreign policy.

Thirdly, in the thesis it is assumed that the EU has different foreign policies towards different regions in terms of geographical position of the regions, their relations with the EU and EU member states' interests, and the EU's foreign policy toward the Southern Mediterranean is shaped by these relations.

When it comes to the scope and limitations of the thesis, the Europeanization process is often analyzed in three different areas: inside Europe which focuses on the member states, in the near abroad of Europe which refers to the EU impact on the candidate and potential candidate countries, and beyond Europe which is the impact of the Europeanization process on the third countries. This thesis examines the first area that refers to the EU and its member states and it focuses only on the EU foreign policy area. This is the first limitation of the thesis. Secondly, as a region, the thesis analyzes the EU's foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region and the thesis is limited with analyzing Libya as its case study. The thesis focuses on the EU's foreign policy towards Libya in the post-Arab Spring era. In this regard, the scope of the thesis is limited to a certain region, certain time-period, and a specific case (of Libya).

5- Research Methodology and Theoretical Framework of the Thesis

In this thesis, I conduct a content analysis as a research method. Books and articles concerning the subject are examined as the main sources. In addition, official websites of the EU institutions, special EU reports, and related documents are analyzed. Moreover, the analysis covers an evaluation of the EU joint statements, press releases, official speeches of the EU and member states' leaders and outcomes of related intergovernmental or international meetings and conferences.

As a theoretical framework, the bottom-up Europeanization approach is used in the thesis with its both rationalist and constructivist models of explanation to analyze the EU's foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region. The thesis adopts a bottom-up perspective versus a top-down perspective due to the nature and structure of the EU foreign policy, even if the EU foreign policy has both top-down and bottom-up Europeanization processes. While doing so, the thesis draws on both rationalist (conventional intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism) and constructivist

theories (constructivist and ideational intergovernmentalism) of bottom-up Europeanization (Bicchi, 2007; Börzel and Panke, 2016).

The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter presents an overview of Europeanization as a conceptual and theoretical framework. It explains the concept of Europeanization in relation to the integration process. It also focuses on its different definitions and meanings, and research areas with their scopes and types/dimensions. To draw a theoretical framework, the thesis examines the theoretical perspectives of Europeanization and adopts the bottom-up Europeanization approach, examining both its rationalist and constructivist model of explanations.

In the second chapter, the thesis focuses on Europeanization in the area of foreign policy and EU's foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region. First, it explains the political dimension of the European integration and discusses the evolution of the EU foreign policy. Then, it presents an overview of the EU foreign policy developments within the historical framework considering pre-Lisbon process, the Lisbon Treaty, which created a new architecture of the EU Foreign Policy, and the post-Lisbon developments. It also explains the types/dimensions, mechanisms, and outcomes of Europeanization in the EU foreign policy. With the aim of pointing out how the bottom-up approach gained ground and how the member states shape the EU, it analyzes the impact of Europeanization on the member states' national policies and interest representation in the EU. Lastly the scopes, degrees, and limits of the Europeanization of foreign policy process are presented. The last section of this chapter also examines the EU's foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region until the Arab Spring. It first explains the EU's regional foreign policies and the importance of the Southern Mediterranean region. Then, it focuses on the key dimensions of the EU's engagement with the region and presents the main initiatives of the EU over the region, which were introduced in 1970s, and their consequences within a historical framework.

In the third chapter, the EU's foreign policy towards Libya is examined. The chapter first presents an overview of the history and importance of Libya, the period of Qaddafi rule and the EU relations with Libya until the Arab Spring. Then, it explains the Arab Spring and the EU-Med Relations as the first test area of the EU's foreign policy in the post-Lisbon era. Then the Libyan Civil War (2011), the current situation in Libya, the EU's response and reactions against the Libyan crisis are examined.

In the light of the Libyan case, the chapter analyzes the Europeanization of the EU Foreign Policy by underlining two indicator periods: the period of emerging divisions in

the EU foreign policy and then the period turning Libya into a battleground of EU member states' national foreign policies. For the first period, the analysis focuses on the issue of taking sides during the crisis, the issue of military intervention and arming different belligerent groups in Libya, and the issue of managing the problems after the Libyan crisis such as the refugees and the migration crisis. To analyze the second period, the study focuses on the Paris Conference on Libya led by France, the Palermo Conference on Libya led by Italy and the Berlin Conference on Libya led by Germany as well as the UN-led Geneva Meetings, the Second Berlin Conference and the International Paris Conference for Libya hosted by France and the declared Rome Conference on Libya that will be hosted by Italy in 2022.

The thesis focuses on how the Libyan crisis turned into an internationalized civil war and examines the current situation of Libya and the Europeanization of the EU Foreign Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region in the light of the Libyan case, highlighting how the member states upload their own foreign policies to the EU level or acting through their own national policies driven by their national interests. In addition, the current situation in Libya and the prospects for the future process of the EU's foreign policy Europeanization are assessed.

In the concluding section, the thesis argues that the Libyan case demonstrates that the bottom-up Europeanization is dominant in the European foreign policy area, highlighting the importance of member states and interest convergence for achieving a higher degree of Europeanization. The degrees and limits of Europeanization, prospects to ensure convergence and coherence in the area of foreign policy, the main challenges of Europeanization of the EU foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region, issues of de-Europeanization and re-Nationalization are also discussed with respect to the evaluations and findings of the Libyan case.

CHAPTER I

AN OVERVIEW OF EUROPEANIZATION AS A CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter aims to present a comprehensive conceptual and theoretical framework for the analysis of the Europeanization process. In this respect, the first two parts of the chapter present an overview of the concept of Europeanization by considering its various definitions, different meanings, different areas of scope, and its relation with the European integration. In addition, the chapter examines the developments and dimensions/types of the Europeanization process in the existing literature. The last two sections of the chapter examine theoretical perspectives examining Europeanization in order to draw a theoretical framework for the purposes of this study and adopts the bottom-up Europeanization approach with both its rationalist and constructivist model of explanations.

1.1. The Concept of Europeanization

The concept of Europeanization has become a widely-used pivotal concept in the EU studies. Since the 1990s, it has become such a preferred-concept that the studies on the concept have engendered a new research area in the literature. According to Graziano and Vink (2007, p.3), this new research area, primarily inspired by European integration and European politics, offers a new method to connect the EU studies, international relations and comparative politics. With the impact of the increasing interest on the concept of Europeanization and increasing frequency of Europeanization-based studies, this new research area has caused “an academic growth industry” (Olsen, 2002; Graziano and Vink, 2007; Bulmer, 2007, p.46).

Although the concept of Europeanization started to become popular in the EU studies since the mid of the 1990s and reached its peak point of popularity after the 2000s (Quaglia, Neuvonen, Miyakoshi and Cini, 2007, p. 408), in fact, before the 1990s it had already existed and used in the other fields of the social sciences such as history,

sociology, politics, law, anthropology, and economics (Featherstone, 2003, p.3; Conway and Patel, 2010, p.2). Thus, the concept of Europeanization is not a new concept but an inter-disciplinary concept which has been used in different fields for years (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003, Flockhart, 2008). With the interests of the political scientists on the “domestic consequences of European integration”, the Europeanization concept-based studies gained ground and that became a new research area (Radaelli, 2004, p.2). Many scholars started to conduct research on the relations between the EU and member states, and analyze “the EU factor on the member states” with the intention to explain changes in member states in terms of the EU (Ladrech, 2010, pp.7-10).

There were two factors that had affected the increasing rate of usage of the term after the years of 1990s: the developments in the political science and deepening and widening processes of the EU. Bulmer (2007) points out that political scientists were concerned about the Europeanization concept because theoretically the growth of institutionalism in the political science area transformed this field (p.64). In other words, the EU gained importance as an international organization and the issues such as relations between the EU and its member states and the EU’s normative impact on members became the main issues for the researchers. Just like Bulmer, Ladrech emphasizes that due to the focus on these issues, the EU studies turned into Europeanization studies (Ladrech, 2010, pp. 8-9). As Ladrech (2010) observes, the development of the Europeanization research area was fast-going from the mid of 1990s when Europeanization emerged as a key concept to explain impact of the EU and changes at the national level in the member states.

Institutionalism’s theoretical influence aside, the integration process itself, which was developed with the European Single Market, the Maastricht Treaty and the enlargement process of the EU especially after the Cold War period, became the second driving factor of the Europeanization process in the EU research area (Bulmer, 2007). As Bulmer and Lequesne claim (2013), thanks to the Europeanization process a new term started in the EU studies, which is more comprehensive than the classical integration approaches.

When we look at how the concept of Europeanization is examined and used in the literature, it is seen that its inter-disciplinary feature affects the usage of the term. Conway and Patel (2010) point out that the Europeanization process should be evaluated both in historical and geographical terms. In parallel with that, in her studies Flockhart argues that the Europeanization concept has cultural and ideational dimensions as well as

geographical and historical ones (Conway and Patel, 2010; Flockhart, 2010, p.795; Flockhart, 2008, p.21-30). In addition, Gülmez argues that the Europeanization process can not be regarded as independent from the global context, offering a broader analysis by evaluating the Europeanization process in terms of current global political and economic developments and their impacts on the Europe in all aspects (Gülmez, 2017, pp.1-15).

In *Politics of Europeanization*, Featherstone examined the number of academic articles referring to Europeanization published between 1981 and 2000, and he found that the number of the studies accelerated after 1999 (Featherstone, 2003, p.5). In the 2000s, the concept has been used for a wide ranging research topics in the EU studies, which is categorized by Bache et al (2015) as the studies that explain member state dimensions, specific policy areas, institutional impacts, parts of Europe, etc. (Bache, Bulmer, George and Parker, 2014, p.50). Thus, the concept of Europeanization has become a common concept in the literature and the interest on the concept is likely to continue at an increasing rate in the future.

When it comes to make a general evaluation about the usage of the concept in the literature, in the Europeanization research area there are three important problems: conceptualizing, theorizing and measuring the degree and outcomes of the Europeanization process (Vink and Graziano, 2007, p.7). These are the main parameters that should be set properly and analyzed carefully in the Europeanization studies. Thus, this chapter aims to examine the conceptualization and theorization of the Europeanization process. Having briefly discussed the concept of Europeanization in the literature, this chapter now focuses on the different definitions of Europeanization in order to provide a comprehensive conceptual framework.

1.1.1. Defining Europeanization

Defining Europeanization is one of the most crucial and hardest part of the Europeanization research area because there is no common or shared definition of Europeanization in the existing literature (Ladrech, 2010, p.21). To explain what Europeanization is with one definition is not easy, possible, and adequate. This concept is used in a great variety of study areas, so its definitions vary in terms of the discipline in which the term is used, authors' theoretical approaches, and the areas and dimensions analyzed (Quaglia et al, 2007, p. 406). In this sense Olsen (2002, p. 921) emphasizes that

it is a “contested” concept as well as it is popular, due to the definitional controversies in the literature. Radaelli (2000, p.4) describes the problem of the concept’s wide range of usage as a “conceptual stretching” and underlines that this is a general problem in the literature.

Before focusing on the definitions of the concept, it is important to look at two important controversial points about the perception of Europeanization. Within the existing literature, the first controversial issue is on the “word” of Europeanization. As it is seen, the term of Europeanization which refers to “becoming European” is a combination of “Europe” and “suffix of -eanization” (Biechelt, 2008). The problem is that there is a distinction between EU-ization and Europeanization. According to Smith (2013), EU-ization refers to the EU level impact whereas Europeanization refers to whole Europe (pp.1-6). According to Flockhart (2008), while EU-ization refers to “limited to political encounters”, Europeanization is used to mean “limited to cultural encounters” (p. 6). All taken together, in this thesis, the term of Europeanization is used. Although the thesis looks at the EU and Europeanization of its foreign policy area, it does not use the term “EU-ization” to avoid using a narrow perspective.

The second controversial issue relates to the relation of the EU and European integration and confusing these two terms with each other. The end of the Cold War and the enlargement process of the EU have affected the EU studies in a way that the attention shifted from integration studies to the studies on the Europeanization process, which focuses on the EU impact on membership and adaptation issues. Therefore, the concept of Europeanization is defined in relation to the integration process of new member states and their adaptation processes (Ladrech, 2010, pp.1-8). In this respect, it can be said that there are three different approaches in the existing literature.

The first approach is adopted by a group of authors who see Europeanization as synonymous with the European integration (e.g. Magnette, 2005, p.12). The second approach is adopted by a group of scholars who see the European integration on a linear time line and the Europeanization as its latest stage, which means Europeanization and European integration have a nested and also mutually affecting order (e.g. Schmidt, 2009, pp.194-195; Caporaso, 2007, p.23). The third approach is adopted by a group of scholars who view Europeanization and European integration as different processes that should be analyzed as such (e.g. Gross, 2009, p.19; Howell, 2002, p.6; Olsen, 2002, p.940 and Radaelli, 2003).

This thesis supports the last approach and views Europeanization and European integration as different, yet also inter-related and inter-connected processes. As Howell (2002, p. 20) points out, there is a source-result debate based on whether Europeanization or the integration is source of change. On the basis of this discussion it can be said that the incremental integration process has positive impact on the Europeanization process and vice versa that is, increasing Europeanization has a favorable impact on integration. Yet, one may also argue that Europeanization is a broader, multiple-sided and less procedural process, whereas integration is a process limited to integration areas and has more procedural/formal sides. Likewise

Therefore, the thesis disregards the views that accept Europeanization and integration are synonymous and in so doing, it takes and develops a position between the second and third views. More detail on the relationship between Europeanization and integration is provided in the following parts of the chapter, since it is necessary to grasp it in conjunction with different dimensional and theoretical characteristics of Europeanization.

1.1.1.1. Different Usages and Meanings of Europeanization

While there has been no consensus on the definition of Europeanization, in general it is perceived as the “impact of the EU” and fundamentally known as an adaptation process to the EU norms, rules, practices, institutions, regulations and policies (Graziano and Vink, 2007). It is based on the logic of change and a process depends on –ization of something under the impact of the EU.

According to Ladrech (1994, 2010), one of the first scholars that contributed to the literature in 1994 by using the concept of Europeanization, the main point is “Europe” and the aim is to “become more European alike” or “become a part of the EU”. He describes Europeanization as “an incremental process, reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that European Community political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (p.69). Europeanization is evaluated as “the change within the member states” or “the impact of the EU on domestic change” with change meaning adaptational change (Ladrech, 2010, p.2), or by the words of Jurje (2013, p.16) “domestic impact of the EU integration”.

As Ladrech (2010) argued, the period until the 1990s the concentration was on the European integration itself and its consequences. Thus there was a logic of “dependent

variable” in these analyses. Subsequently, the integration process developed into a broader context due to its both deepening and widening processes after the 1990s and as a result of that the EU became an “independent variable”. The main focus turned to the EU itself and internal or domestic impact of the EU, namely the domestic change (Ladrech, 2010, pp.1-4).

Similarly, according to Bache et al. (2015, p. 44), Europeanization is “a process through which domestic politics and polities are changed by their engagement with the EU”. Europeanization refers to the impact of the EU on the member states’ national political systems, parties, policies, domestic institutions, governments, administrations, parliaments and courts (Quaglia et al, 2007, p. 414).

Some scholars simply define Europeanization with a single word, such as a research agenda (Vink and Graziano, 2007), as a theory-based concept (Bache, 2014), as an impact (Jurje, 2013; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2013), as an outcome (Howell, 2004), as a process (Ladrech, 1994; Radaelli, 2000) and as a phenomenon (Magnette, 2005). However, more commonly it is viewed as a process or a theory-based concept. In addition, some scholars describe it with using a cause and effect relation. While some scholars see “European integration as the source of change and Europeanization as the outcome of this change”, others view “Europeanization as the source of change” (Howell, 2004, pp.55-57).

Still other scholars define Europeanization as covering more than one process. One of the most prominent definition comes from Radaelli (2003, p.30), who understands Europeanization as “a) construction b) diffusion c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic, domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”.

In a broader perspective, the most outstanding definition was presented by Olsen (2002) in his famous study *Many Faces of Europeanization*, which focuses on how many meanings Europeanization has. According to him there are five titles which define what the Europeanization process means: “changes in external boundaries, developing institutions at the European level, central penetration of national systems of governance, exporting forms of political organization, and a political unification project” (Olsen 2002, pp. 923-924).

In addition, Diez, Agnantopoulos and Kaliber (2005), argue that there are four different forms of Europeanization: “Policy-Europeanization which refers to European policies in a policy area and situation of member states and applicant countries in this domestic change, Political Europeanization which looks at the impact of the integration on national administrations, structures and political actors like political parties, Societal Europeanization which deals with European norms, identity and ideas and Discursive Europeanization which focuses on public discourses and their context”. In a similar way, Featherstone (2003, pp. 6-12) observes that there are “fourfold typology” in the Europeanization literature. According to him, Europeanization is a research trend in four types of areas in which Europeanization is perceived as an “historic phenomenon, transnational cultural diffusion, institutional adaptation, and adaptation of policies and policy processes”.

Lastly, the broadest categorization about the usages of Europeanization in the literature is developed by Harmsen and Wilson (2000), who claim that there are eight different usages of the term. In this respect, Europeanization is used as “a) the emergence of new forms of European governance, b) as national adaptation, c) as policy isomorphism, d) as problem and opportunity for domestic political management, e) as modernization, f) as joining Europe, g) as reconstruction of identities and f) as transnationalism and cultural integration” (pp. 14-18). As seen, there is a wide-range of definitions and usages of Europeanization in the literature. Like De Flers and Müller (2012) argue that there is “no one size fits all concept”, so it needs to be understood with its different categories (pp.19-35).

The latest definition of the term Europeanization is developed by Börzel and Panke (2016) as follows:

- a) “The EU effect on member states policy and process
- b) Member states effect on the EU policy and process
- c) The EU effect on third country policy and process” (Börzel and Panke, 2016, p.110-112).

While considering all definitions as relevant and important for exploring Europeanization, this thesis adopts the second definition as it is more useful in explaining the Europeanization of foreign policy area by emphasizing the significance of the member states’ roles and impacts on the EU foreign policy.


If all the definitions and categorizations presented before are considered, it can be said that each of these refers to one of the three Europeanization dimensions below. In

terms of the influenced actors, these definitions point out that there is a process of Europeanization not only inside the EU, but also in the third parties whether they are candidates, neighbours or other third states and regions, which will be presented in a table in the subsequent part.

1.1.1.2. Dimensions and Scopes of Europeanization Research Areas in terms of the Impact of Europeanization

With respect to all these categorizations explained before and usages stated by three scopes, a table is drawn to clarify the dimensions and scopes of the Europeanization research areas in terms of the impact of Europeanization. This study aims to illustrate how these various definitions and meanings of Europeanization can be distinguished and where they stand in the table. Thus, it provides a significant table in which the studies from the Europeanization research literature could be found in terms of the dimensions and assessed in terms of their scopes.

Table 1: Dimensions and Scopes of Europeanization research areas in terms Europeanization impact



Source: Prepared by the author, from the literature given with the explanations below.

There are three dimensional areas and four dimensions of Europeanization impact in the table. The dimensional areas are the core, the peripheral area which contains both semi-periphery area and periphery area and the external area. Although there are three dimensions, peripheral areas are divided as semi-peripheral and peripheral areas because of their different features, so they are evaluated separately under the name of peripheral dimension. Thus, it is shown and assessed with four parts in the table. The general issues of the dimensions and subject matters are presented below of each part, giving their related scopes. In this manner, it can be seen how the Europeanization is recognized regarding these dimensions and scopes it has.

Inspired from world system approach developed by Immanuel Wallerstein and his logic of “core-periphery” notions, this table is created and categorized by applying his logic to the concept of Europeanization. In his studies, Wallerstein used this logic in order to explain the world economic system and the relations between the countries, but in this thesis his logic is used to explain the concept of Europeanization’s impact area in the world. As he claims, there are four different categories: core, semi-periphery, periphery and external, which explains that all the regions in the world is located on with respect to these areas and describes each of the regions’ significance in terms of their positions (Wallerstein, 1976). With this in mind, this logic is adopted to the impact areas of the Europeanization process in the world as shown in the table.

The first dimension is presented as “core”, because it refers to the area inside of the EU, in other words, it looks at the Europeanization process in the EU and the relations between the member states and the EU. Related to this, there is a process of internal Europeanization in this dimension, which focuses on the member states. When we look at the impact of Europeanization in this area, it refers to the changes in policies, politics and politics in the EU member states and the situation at national levels. Therefore, the first dimension means Europeanization of processes, domestic policy, polity, and politics in the literature as described by Börzel and Risse (2000, pp.3-4). Börzel and Risse explained these three areas with a table named *the domestic effect of Europeanization* in their study in detail (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.60). Yet, at the same time, their study consists of the member-states’ impact on the policy, politics, polities and processes of the EU, due to the fact that the Europeanization involves (ya da includes) a reciprocal relation of member states and the EU (Börzel and Panke, 2016, p. 110-112).

Besides the Europeanization of policy, politics and polities, there are also Europeanization of social identities and public discourse (Diez et al., 2005). In the literature this difference is also discussed as the EU-ization/Europeanization issue (Flockhart, 2010; Smith, 2013). Clustered Europeanization is defined as the different Europeanization degrees among the EU member states relative to their regions, examined by the two variables of “territory” and “temporality” (Goetz, 2006, pp.1-8). To sum up, in this first dimension the studies focus on the EU member states and their change in terms of the Europeanization process.

The second dimension is the peripheral areas in the table, ‘semi-periphery (near Europe) and periphery (out of Europe)’. This dimension is divided into two areas and each of them is explained separately due to their different scopes. The difference between periphery and semi-periphery areas is the possibility of membership. The semi-periphery dimension, focuses on the candidate and potential candidate countries’ Europeanization. Here the domestic changes in these countries means adaptational change as a result of the EU’s conditionality impacts. In this area, the studies evaluate the Europeanization of these countries’ policy, politics, polities, societies, and discourses and other elements, with the titles of Pre-Accession Europeanization and Post-Accession Europeanization approach (Sedelmeier, 2011).

In the periphery area, which refers to the area out of Europe, there are no possibility of the EU membership, adaptation pressure and the EU accession-conditionality impact on the countries. Rather, the periphery area looks at the relations with non-EU countries in the context of the EU’s all political, social, economic and also strategic interests and policies. In this regard, titles of Neighbourhood Europeanization (Gawrich, Melnykovska and Schweickert, 2010), and the Europeanization as Transformation urging the near states for “market liberalization, democracy, human rights and good governance” and “socio-economic and political reforms” (Börzel and Panke, 2016, p.119; Grabbe, 2005; Sedelmeier and Schimmelfenning, 2004) should also be considered in this dimension.

The third dimension is the “external area”, which refers to the Europeanization impact area beyond Europe. This dimension focuses on the external level impact of the EU, its external relations and the issues concerning Europe as a whole region. The EU has various relations at different levels with different countries, regions or parts in the world. It has special arrangements, cooperations, partnerships and agreements with the third countries and regions.

Existing studies also examine issues of Westernization/Americanization versus Europeanization, Euro-Asianism or Middle-Easternism versus Europeanization, Sovietization/Easternization versus Europeanization, or Balkanization versus Europeanization (Dimitrova, 2002; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009; Kochtcheeva, 2010; Chi, 2017). Issues of Europeanization versus Globalization (Narayanan, 2005; Wallace, 2000; Ladi, 2006; Tsarouhas and Ladi, 2013), the EU norms, global actorness of the EU, Europeanization as modernization and the EU's normative influence on other parts of the world are also considerable research areas on this dimension of Europeanization's external impact.

To sum up, by giving this table, the thesis presented a comprehensive perspective showing all dimensions and scopes, and also provided a better understanding about which dimension the thesis focuses on and what its scope. All taken together, this thesis contributes to the studies placed on the first dimension. It focuses on the first dimension of core (in Europe) refers to the member states of the EU, in other words, to internal Europeanization and its impact on the EU's foreign policy area. Also, at the end, analysis in the thesis provides explanations about external Europeanization indirectly.

Now that we have overviewed the concept of Europeanization and given the dimension and scope of the Europeanization impact, the next part will present the types of the Europeanization process in order to complete the aim of providing a comprehensive conceptual framework.

1.1.2. Dimensions/Types of Europeanization


Europeanization process is a sui generis and complex process, thus for a better understanding, it is necessary to analyse the nature of this process and directions of its impact in its own. Mostly, Europeanization is understood as basically a one-way and as the EU-engendered/induced transformation process, but there are two sides mutually interacting in the process - member states and the EU. Thus, in terms of these different sides and interactions between them, the process is conceptualized into different types. In the existing literature 'dimensions/types' are used synonymously and this thesis employs the same terminology. In the literature, the interactions between member state and the EU are also conceptualized as "perspectives, approaches, versions, models or forms" of Europeanization. Here, the differentiating point is formulated looking at the sides of the

member states and the EU, together with their roles and influence directions in the process.

In the literature, Europeanization is generally identified as having two main dimension/types, top-down and bottom-up Europeanization. Top-down Europeanization concentrates on how the EU affects the member states or candidates and third countries. Thus, this type of Europeanization looks at the EU side, impact of the EU level policies, regulations and the EU institutions and focuses on how the EU induces a change in the member states or in other candidate or third countries (Börzel and Panke, 2013, p. 406-411). It is also known as “the downloading process” because, as Ladrech (2010, p. 22) points out, it refers to a Europeanization process “from supranational EU level down to the individual member state level.” For instance, European Commission’s annual reports on the application of European law in its member states are one of the indicator points of top-down Europeanization (Börzel and Panke, p. 417).

Other main type, the Bottom-up Europeanization, concentrates on how the member states affect the EU. It looks at the member states’ level and how the member states or other non-members impact the EU level policies and regulations, focussing on the member state roles, preferences and power. It is also known as “the uploading process” which describes member states as uploaders to the EU level. For instance, the decision-making process and preparation of EU policies are one of the indicator points of the bottom-up Europeanization. This type of Europeanization focuses on the way “the member states trigger changes in the EU” (Börzel and Panke, 2013, p. 412-417). These two types/dimensions of Europeanization and the direction of the EU and member states’ influences are shown in the table as follows:

Figure 1: Europeanization process and interaction between European and National Levels



Source: Adopted from Major, 2005, p.182 and Gross, 2009, p.16.

At the table, member states are stated at the bottom line while the EU is stated at the top line with respect to their level. If the direction of influence goes from the member states to the EU level, it shows the uploading process. If it goes from the EU level to the member states, then it shows downloading process. These processes are described in terms of the direction of influence. As seen in the table, in the bottom-up Europeanization, there are “shaping” and “projection” processes by the member states in terms of their interests and values, whereas there is a reception and taking process from the EU level in the top-down Europeanization type.

Until the 1980s, studies explained Europeanization with the integration process (Börzel, 2003; Schmidt, 2009). With the impact of historical developments in Europe after the 1980s and especially 1990s, when the EU reached a unique level as an economic-political supranational organization, a new stage in the integration process explained as Europeanization which puts importance of the EU level influence on the member states (Schmidt, 2009, p.194-195). On this point, Caporaso (2007, pp. 24-27) notes that because of the impact of different waves of the integration, in the first stages the studies used a bottom-up Europeanization perspective, but second stage studies, which refer to post-1990s, used a top-down Europeanization perspective (also see Börzel, 2003).

In this way, different types of Europeanization gradually developed over time. Especially after the 2000s, while some studies adopted either top-down or bottom-up approach, others started linking both approaches (e.g. Börzel, 2003; Dyson and Goetz 2003). However, the exaggeration of the EU level impact on the member states, in other words the Top-down Europeanization, was criticized by the studies which argued that the national level is not an inactive and ineffective side, underlining that “member states aren’t just a passive recipient of pressure coming from the EU level” (Major, 2005, p. 181). Therefore a new, two-fold vision considering importance of the bottom-up approach was adopted by the studies of the Europeanization process. In the studies on Europeanization, Europeanization is now seen as “a two-way process” (Börzel, 2002, p.193) and “dual nature of Europeanization” is examined (Zatezalo, 2007) and the bottom-up and top-down types of the process are studied as “mutually constitutive” processes (Gross, 2009, p.18).

After the emergence of these two main types, a third type of Europeanization started to be formed which is called as integrated/circular/crossloading/sequential approach in the literature. In the table, it is stated as cross-loading in terms of its direction and illustrated with a triangle in relation with both members and the EU sides at the centre because this type of Europeanization is a synthesis of the two types of Europeanization, in other words, it is a combination of both uploading and the downloading direction in the Europeanization process. Thus, this integrated approach uses this direction of influences together and analyzes the interaction between them (Börzel and Panke, 2013, p. 414-415).

Apart from these fundamental types, there are also a front-loading approach which focuses on the impact of the European norms on non-member states, and a re-loading approach which deals with the interactions among the member states with respect to European norms and their implications (Hakeem Smith, 2013).

In the current literature, there is a relative dominance of the top-down Europeanization approach. Because, firstly most of the studies examine the membership issue and the membership process is driven by the EU conditionality. In these studies the EU is perceived as an independent variable whereas the states as actors under the pressure of adaptation and under the obligation of fulfillment and implementation. Secondly, the issue chosen for analysing the Europeanization process is related to a supranational in the union not to an intergovernmental structure, for instance environment, agriculture or energy policies of member states.

There is too much criticism about the dominant top-down perspective. There are studies that strongly reject the analyses based just on the top-down perspective by criticizing the top-down perspective's ignorance of the importance of the role of member states (Börzel, 2003; Olsen, 2002; Radaelli, 2004), pointing to the exaggeration of the downloading direction of influence of the EU (Bölükbaşı, Ertugal and Özçürümez, 2011; Hang, 2011; Yazgan, 2012), regarding Europeanization as "usage" as well as "pressure" (Radaelli, 2004, p.11) and underlining the importance of the capacity of shaping and taking EU policies (Börzel, 2003).

In this thesis, the Europeanization process is viewed as a two-way process, that is having both bottom-up and top-down dimensions. However, the thesis argues that the bottom-up approach has gained ground in recent years and it has dominance over the foreign policy area of the EU. This thesis also adopts a bottom-up Europeanization approach, putting importance on the uploading process and member states' impact on the EU.

There are two reasons behind that. The first one is related to internal and external developments of the EU and its current situation, which is different than the 1990s, which placed importance on the transformative-downloading impact of the EU. Due to the internal and external problems such as the European financial crisis, migration and refugee crisis after the southern migration waves, the controversial Brexit issue, the rise of populism and political fragmentation, the EU is now faced with different challenges. All of these challenges have weakened the European integration, and influence and prestige of Europe. Thus, generally, it is not possible to consider an exaggerated EU impact upon the member states and after the 2010s, a new generation of Europeanization studies adopting a bottom-up perspective emerged.

Secondly, the choice in the thesis is directly related to the Europeanization research area and the issue chosen. The research area of this thesis is the first research area in the table, which refers to the EU member states, and focuses on Europeanization in the area of foreign policy in which states have important role, control and a shaping position due to intergovernmentalism.

Thus, this study, accepting Europeanization as a two way process and without ignoring the EU level influence (both its institutions, policies and norms), uses a Bottom-up approach to analyze foreign policy Europeanization. The study looks at the influence of the member states (national) level on the EU, in order to show how the bottom-up Europeanization is dominant in the foreign policy area; at the same time it also looks at

the influence of the EU level on the member states, in order to demonstrate how the top-down Europeanization dimension is weak and inefficient.

1.1.3. Theorizing Europeanization

There is no one single theory of Europeanization (Olsen, 2002 p. 944; Quaglia et al, 2007, p. 410; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2013). Theorizing Europeanization has emerged as a result of inefficiency of classical integration theories and the need for a more comprehensive and in-depth explanatory framework in the EU studies (Müller and Flers, 2009). As Europeanization considers both the EU level and its member states and other third states, it offers a more useful and efficient approach to understand and explain the integration process. The main contribution of the concept of Europeanization to the EU studies indeed is the theorizing side of it.

The theory of the Europeanization process benefits from integration theories, theories of International Relations (IR) and comparative politics as far as the top-down and bottom-up Europeanization types are concerned. This lack of one single/or common theory of Europeanization is the main feature of theorizing Europeanization that should be taken into account.

As explained earlier, the starting point of the Europeanization studies was the aim to explain the domestic impact of the EU and the changes resulting from the downloading process, but in time these studies have come to cover all sides of the integration, both the EU and member states levels, with an emphasis on both uploading and downloading directions of influence.

The theories of European integration started with the establishment of the EU as a project aiming to bring peace and prosperity to Europe after the WWII, but it has intellectual background even in the pre-union times. The first outstanding approaches were federalism (Altiero Spinelli), which sought the creation of a European federation in order to ensure peace, and functionalism approach (David Mitrany) which puts importance on the idea of creating separate international functional agencies instead of a federation, with the aim of avoiding war and providing closer ties among nations. Subsequently, federal-functionalism approach emerged as a synthesis of Jean Monnet, which focused on building supranational institutions and dependency via economy-based common policies, like coal and steel as in the basis of the EU, in order to prevent wars (Bache, Bulmer, George and Parker, 2014, pp.5-9).

In 1950s and 1960s, the first debate emerged among the theories. After functionalism, neo-functionalism emerged (Ernest Haas) as a theory which sees integration process as a supranational process without ignoring the role of the nation states. Intergovernmentalism, in contrast, highlights the role and power of nation states in the integration process. Thus, theories are separated into two camps. On the one side, as a successor of functionalism, neo-functionalism claims the importance of non-state actors and interests groups, and “spill-over effect”, instead of similar “ramification process” supported by functionalism, which means integration in one area leads to integration in another one. After neo-functionalism, supranational governance (Sandholtz and Sweet), which is associated with global governance, a post-structuralist theory of European integration (Hooghe and Marks), which refers to multi-level governance, and new institutionalist theories, which include rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and ideational/discursive institutionalisms are developed in parallel of that side in the 1970s and 80s (Bache et al, 2014; Börzel and Panke, 2010; Schmidt, 2008).

As a successor to intergovernmentalism and as a critique of neo-functionalists, liberal intergovernmentalism was developed by Andrew Moravcsik in the 1990s, which emphasizes the importance of nation-states, adding a liberal version to intergovernmentalism. This line of the theory was followed by new kinds of intergovernmentalism, i.e. the ideational intergovernmentalism and new intergovernmentalism approaches (Moravcsik, 1998; Bicchi, 2007; Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter, 2015).

These two different lines of theories represent the supranational and intergovernmental debate, and when it is adopted to analyze the Europeanization process, it brings to the debate between the top-down and bottom-up Europeanization. With respect to these, in order to theorize Europeanization, theories are separated in accordance with types of Europeanization approaches namely bottom-up and top-down Europeanization and supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.

1.1.4. Perspective: Uploading (Bottom-up) Approach versus Downloading (Top-down) Approach

The perspective adopted in this thesis chosen due to the area of analysis of the Europeanization process – the EU foreign policy. Due to the nature and structure of the

EU foreign policy, the thesis adopts a bottom-up perspective rather than a top-down perspective. Now, we will turn to the literature on the bottom-up Europeanization.

As noted before, in the Europeanization literature, the top-down approach based studies have become prominent and dominant. The theories that were developed under the top-down Europeanization are known as the “new institutionalist” theories, which have three variants in the literature: Rational Choice Institutionalism, Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism, as shown in the table below (Bache et al, 2015, p. 30). These theories have been frequently used in analyzing the Europeanization process and Europeanization has been perceived as something that has been characterized with them. The dominance of the top-down Europeanization is, then, can be viewed as the outcome of the new institutionalism studies. But, since the thesis focuses on the bottom-up Europeanization dimension, it employs intergovernmental bottom-up theories disregarding new institutional theories and other supranational top-down ones.

Börzel and Panke (2010, pp. 405-420) presented a theoretical framework of the concept of Europeanization in terms of its bottom-up and top-down dimensions/types (also see Börzel, 2002). In their theoretical evaluation of Europeanization, they use a rationalist/constructivist distinction in order to categorize the theories of top-down and bottom-up Europeanization. This thesis adopts this framework in theorizing Europeanization, and also add complementary theories to strengthen the bottom-up Europeanization theoretical stand.

Table 2 is designed in the light of Börzel and Panke’s framework and the prominent studies on Europeanization in the literature to show main aspects and principles of theories of Europeanization.

Table 2: Theories of Europeanization

	Bottom-up Europeanization Approach (Intergovernmentalism based)	Top-down Europeanization Approach/ (Institutionalism based)
Rationalist	Rational Intergovernmental approaches: (Intergovernmentalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism)	Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI)
		Historical Institutionalism (HI)
Constructivist	Constructivist Intergovernmental approaches: (Constructivist Intergovernmentalism and Ideational Intergovernmentalism)	Sociological Institutionalism (SI)

Source: Developed from Moravcsik, 1993; Pollack, 2009; Bicchi, 2007; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Hoffmann, 1966; Börzel and Panke, 2013 and Börzel and Panke, 2016.

Firstly, the table is divided into two columns with respect to bottom-up and top-down Europeanization. Secondly, these two dimensions are categorized in terms of rationalism and constructivism rows. The bottom-up Europeanization dimension includes rationalist intergovernmental theories (Intergovernmentalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism), and constructivist intergovernmental theories (Constructivist and Ideational Intergovernmentalism), whereas the top-down Europeanization dimension includes rationalist top-down theory (Rational Choice Institutionalism), constructivist top-down theory (Sociological Institutionalism), and (Historical Institutionalism) which is in-between rational and constructivist top-down theories.

As seen in the table, the bottom-up Europeanization theories are associated with intergovernmentalism while the top-down Europeanization theories are associated with supranationalism/institutionalism. Because the bottom-up Europeanization theories focus on the role and the power of the nation- states, the member states of the EU, whereas the top-down Europeanization theories emphasize the role and power of the supranational

institutions of the EU. This thesis employs intergovernmentalism, and thus, a bottom-up theoretical approach with its both rationalist and constructivist versions as a theoretical framework to analyze EU's foreign policy.

In the top-down Europeanization dimension, the Europeanization process has been mostly studied with the new institutionalist theories' scale, but these institutionalist theories have been insufficient to explain the real essence of the Europeanization process as well as non-functional institutions and disintegration points.

The rational choice institutionalism, which is a rational top-down theory, assumes that institutions are changeable, and actors seek to use institutions for their desired outcomes by making cost-benefit calculations. In fact, theories of intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and rational choice institutionalism have a common ground, they all depend on rationalism. Yet, rational choice institutionalism is also based on an institutionalist approach which supports and underlines the importance of the European institutions.

Historical institutionalism deals with the time factor underlining "path dependency", which means former policies determine future ones, so history is determinative. Since it has both rational and constructivist features, it is located between rationalist and constructivist row (Börzel and Panke, 2016, p.114-116; Bulmer, 2007, p.50).

Sociological institutionalism, which is a constructivist top-down theory, is concerned with all aspects of ideas, norms, and socialization process in the institutions. Its main logic is "logic of appropriateness", developed by March and Olsen in 1984 (as cited in Sauruggerr, 2014), which means that decisions are based on appropriate and shared rules, and this is the counter-argument to rationalist "logic of consequences", which means that calculations on consequences are the main determinants for state decisions (Sauruggerr, 2014, p.147).

All considered, these three new institutionalism theories are inefficient; because they depend on either unobservable factors-based calculation without regarding the possibility of unintended results, or historical dependencies of which impact or continuity is controversial, or social norms that is seen as if they are shared by all. More importantly, all of them focus on the institutions and the supranational EU level rather than the member state level. In this way, they differ from intergovernmentalist approaches. Thus, instead of new institutionalist theories, this thesis uses intergovernmentalist theories which are theorized under the bottom-up Europeanization. In this regard, both rationalist and

constructivist intergovernmentalist theories of bottom-up Europeanization, will be explained in the thesis, respectively.

1.1.4.1. Rationalist Bottom-up Europeanization Approach

The EU is a sui-generis international organization which has both supranational and intergovernmental aspects. It has supranational institutions, and member states whose decisions are negotiated intergovernmentally. Intergovernmentalism refers to member states' role and the cooperation fact at the inter-governmental level, and presents an integration process in which states remain in control. Supranationalism presents an integration process with supranational institutions, and refers to delegating institutions and transferring some of states' power and sovereignty to them. In this respect, there is co-existency of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in the EU.

Yet, understanding the difference between these two aspects is not only related to the structure of the EU and its politics but also to the type of decision-making in the EU (Cini, 2010, p.88). Thus, what makes the EU intergovernmental or supranational depends on its decision-making process. Majority voting system, in which states are under the impact of the outcomes of the decisions, is associated with supranationalism; whereas unanimous voting system with which states impact the outcomes of the decisions is associated with intergovernmentalism.

When it comes to the Europeanization process, regarding these aspects of the EU and the dimensions of Europeanization, it can be said that the bottom-up Europeanization is a "*state-driven process*" (intergovernmental), but top-down Europeanization is an "*institutions-driven process*" (supranational) (Sepos, 2008, pp.3-4). Since the thesis adopts a bottom-up point of view which is a state-driven process, in this part, it is important to focus on the bottom-up Europeanization approach and its rationalist and constructivist versions respectively.

The rationalist bottom-up Europeanization approach is theoretically based on intergovernmentalism, and accordingly, it is evaluated by two different integration theories: Conventional Intergovernmentalism and Contemporary Intergovernmentalism, which is also known as Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Saurugger, 2014, p. 56). Conventional intergovernmentalism is an integration theory which was developed by Stanley Hoffmann in mid 1960s as a criticism of neo-functionalist theory of the European integration (Bache et al, 2015, p.13). Its criticism point is the fact that the power and role

of the states in the integration process are more than of which neo-functionalism assumes. That's why, it claims a stronger view of state in all aspects in the integration process.

Its core feature is *state-centrism* which is a view that see the states as the main actors in the international system and, thus, states are the central actors in the European integration process. The states and their national interests are seen as the shapers of the integration process (Saurugger, 2014, pp. 55-56). Intergovernmentalism draws theoretically from realist and neo-realist IR theories. It shares the main principles of realism in general, known as *3S's of realism* which refers to statism, survival and self-help. All these are taken into consideration within the framework of integration in Europe (Cini, 2010, pp.87-88; Saurugger, 2014, pp.56-62).

Hoffmann emphasizes that governments of the states have a key role in the integration process because the governments have both "legal sovereignty" in their countries and "political legitimacy" resulting from democratic elections. Thus, for Hoffmann, if the power of supranational institutions increases because national governments created these institutions for their national interests (Bache et al, 2015, p.14). The integration process is seen as an inter-governmental process, in which national concerns, state preferences and bargainings with the aim of "protecting and promoting" national interests are key points (Bache et al, 2015, p.14). In fact, intergovernmentalism can be explained both as a "theory" and, a "method" which refers to unanimous voting that requires consensus on a decision (Cini, 2010, p.88). In other words, it emphasizes not only the role of states and governments but also voting models in the EU. Thus, intergovernmentalism became an outstanding theory as opposed to neo-functionalism as a result of two factors. The first factor is the Cold War period which was based on the state-centered order, and the second one is the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965, which was an institutional crisis due to France's boycott of the qualified majority voting system and institutions, as a result of its national concerns (Cini, 2010, p.90; Saurugger, 2014, p.54).

As far as the integration process is concerned, firstly, Intergovernmentalism argues that states do not lose their sovereignty in the integration process, instead, they still have their "power, authority, independence and sovereignty" despite the European institutions and "pooling or sharing sovereignty" in the EU. The control of the integration belongs to the states, because they decide to what extend they share/pool their sovereignty and delegate them to the EU institutions in the areas that they want (Cini, 2010, pp.89-90). Secondly, for Intergovernmentalism, integration process offered a new structure to nation states, which was viewed as "a new political consensus" by Saurugger and as "the

European rescue of the nation state” by Milward (as cited in Cini, 2010, p. 89; and in Saurugger, 2014, p.59). In the same line with Milward, Hoffmann viewed “European integration as saviour of state sovereignty” because he thought that with the European integration project, the EU countries were saved from destruction after 1945 in Europe (Saurugger, p.59). Thirdly, Intergovernmentalism sees European integration as European cooperation of sovereign states, in other words “institutionalized form of inter-state cooperation” (Cini, 2010, pp.88-89). In cooperations, states make cost-benefit calculations, considering their interests and bargains with respect to them, so integration is seen as totally rational and utilitarian.

Another basic approach of Intergovernmentalism focuses on the “global context” because it sees the European integration process as a regional union within the global international system. It focuses on both “domestic concerns” and “state’s position in the international system”, by putting importance on structural, ideological and procedural variables of states (Cini, 2010, p.91; Saurugger, 2014, pp.58-59). This focus comes from the neo-realist perspective. As cited in Bache et al (2015), Hoffmann argues that although the states are sovereign, Intergovernmentalism takes into account the global context in which the “*position*” of the states is critical for the governments as a restrictive factor (Bache et al, 2015, pp.13-14).

Another assumption is that “common interests” and “preference/interest convergence” are essential factors for integration. Because, when the state preferences/interests fit into one another, governments act in the way for further integration (Bache et al, 2015, p.13; Cini, 2010, p.91). Related to that, intergovernmentalism underlines the distinction between *high* politics (e.g. security and defence issues) and *low* politics (e.g. social and economic issues), and claims that while it is possible to integrate policies in the realm of the low politics, there is no possibility of integration in the high politics sphere due to the fact that such common policies may constrain the sovereignty of the states and impact state autonomy and identity (Cini, 2010, p.93; Saurugger, 2014, p.58). For this reason, Intergovernmentalism rejects the spreading impact of economic integration to the political integration area, and the expected-situation of *continuum* between them (Saurugger, p.58).

The last assumption of Intergovernmentalism relates to “lowest common denominator”. There are various member states with different features, and diverging and competing interests in the EU, so each state acts in terms of its own domestic concerns/national interests and bargains in the line of them rationally. Thus, the decisions

taken and the agreements reached at the level of the EU can only be seen as the most basic shared interest, known as “the lowest common denominator” that is relevant for all states. Considering that, common position of the states in the EU depends on the states’ positions which are adjusted by this way of thinking and bargaining in the EU decision-making process (Cini, 2010, p.97; Saurugger, 2014, p.66).

Another rationalist bottom-up Europeanization theory is Contemporary Intergovernmentalism (Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI)), developed by Andrew Moravcsik in the 1990s. It is presented as a counter theory to neo-functionalism in the European integration. The developments such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and also the emergence of neo-liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s had impacted the integration process after the intergovernmentalist approach of the 1960s. Thus, Moravcsik reconstructed intergovernmentalism by adding a neo-liberal variant to the integration process, and created a new intergovernmentalist theory (Moravcsik, 1993; Saurugger, 2014, pp.66-67).

LI accepts the main assumptions of conventional Intergovernmentalism. It underlines states as unitary, sovereign and rational actors, views state interests as the key factor behind the integration process, and sees the bargaining power of the states as the shaper of the integration process. Like Intergovernmentalism, it points out that state interests, preferences and powers are important fundamentally, not the interests or guidance of institutions of the EU (Bache et al, 2015, p.15; Cini, 2010, pp.96-97).

Yet, it differs from Intergovernmentalism on some points. Firstly, due to its liberal perspective, it emphasizes domestic politics and claims that the pressures come from the domestic actors (social groups, institutions and leaders), which impact the policy preference formation, and the results of these pressures determine the international positions of states. According to Moravcsik (1993, p.481), firstly with the impact of domestic/national interests policy preferences are formed, then states start to bargain with each other for their own preferences formed by these interests during the intergovernmental negotiations. Thus for LI, “preference formation” of governments at the domestic level is important (Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 482-483; Cini, 2010, p.97). Secondly, while conventional Intergovernmentalism looks at the political actors that govern the state (i.e. leaders, ministers and other politicians), LI focuses on “state-society relations”, providing a more comprehensive perspective (Cini, 2020, p.98).

More specifically, LI employs the notion of “issue-specific interests” in explaining push factors for state preferences in the process of integration (Moravcsik and

Shimmelfenning, 2019, pp. 66-70). According to LI, the main/core interests of the states are *economic interests*, and the preference formation is shaped by these economic interests. Thus, the economic interests and their convergence point are the main trigger factor behind the process of integration (Cini, 2010, p.97; Bache et al, 2015, p.15; Moravcsik, 1993, pp.482-483; Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning, 2019, p.66) and states act as mainly “economically rational actors” (Saurugger, 2014, p.67). Although there are mainly economic interests, Moravcsik also stresses *geopolitical interests* and *ideological interests*, because each state has its own ideological and geopolitical “visions and concerns” (Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 25-27 and pp. 66-67; Saurugger, 2014, p.69).

In the same line with Intergovernmentalism’s focus on the global context, LI goes one step further by adopting the “Two-Level Game” approach, which is developed by Putnam (1988), who puts forward that states play two games firstly at an internal level/national and secondly at an international level, which interact with each other. This is why states are labelled as “chef negotiators” over “two tables” (as cited in Saurugger, 2014, pp.63-64).

Moravcsik puts special importance on the *relative power of states* and *bargaining* in the inter-state/government negotiation phases, because this power of states determines and shapes the end results of the negotiations (1993, p.496-497). For him, the interests of states can be “compatible or conflicting”, but the fundamental stage that forms the final situation is the bargaining among the states (Moravcsik, 1998). The bargaining is the crucial aspect in inter-state/governmental negotiations in order to gain/or partly achieve what the national interests aspire to, so states play a two-level game, at national (“lower-level”) and inter-national (“upper-level”), compatible with each other (Saurugger, 2014, pp.70-71). Thus, states can act individually, make coalitions or create counter groups (Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 496-500; Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning, 2019, p.67). In addition, states use the ways of “package deals” and “side-payments” in order to convince other states or promote its own position to the others, in favour of the expected outcomes through cooperation (Börzel and Panke, 2016, pp.117-118).

As far as the interstate bargaining and negotiations are concerned, Moravcsik points out three causal factor of inter-state bargaining power:

- a) Unilateral policy alternatives (governments have “threats of non-agreement”)
- b) Alternative Coalitions (governments have “threats of exclusion”)
- c) The potential for compromise and linkage (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 499).

In this process, the size and efficiency of the states are important (such as the difference between *big states and small states* as well as their *strategies and techniques* in the way of forming the results (Saurugger, 2014, pp.70-71; Cini, 2010, p.98).

According to Moravcsik, institutional developments seen in the EU are the indicators of compromises that stem from rational behaviours of state/governments. Thus, Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning (2019) point out that there can be restrictions and opportunities for states, but if the interests converge (this is rare but not impossible), after inter-state bargainings/negotiations, this comes to a conclusion point of delegation of supranational institution in the EU (pp.65-69).

In his famous book *Choice for Europe* Moravcsik examines the European integration process with five stages which started from Treaty of Rome to Maastricht Treaty (1998, pp. 86-472). He has a rationalist framework for the international cooperation in the integration process, and he defines all these EU level formations as the “choices” of the EU member states. In addition, he underlines that they are the consequences of states’ governments choices that serve their national interests, not the institutional choices (Moravcsik, 1998, p.19). Therefore, according to Moravcsik (1993), international cooperation is based on a rationalist negotiation period which consists of “preference formation, bargaining and creating institutions”. According to this, there are “three stages” respectively in the European integration process for LI:

- a) Forming preferences, “National preference formation” (determined by issue-specific and mainly economic interests, or geopolitical interersts)
- b) Reaching substantive bargain, “Interstate bargaining” (relative powers of states depend on “asymmetrical interdependence” between states)
- c) Creating Regional Institutions, “Institutional choice” (means the delegation of the EU institutions) (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 24; Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning, 2019, pp.66-70; Saurugger, 2014, p.55 and p.72; Cini, 2010, p.102).

The last important point regarding LI is about the Lowest Common Denominator (LCD) point. Like conventional Intergovernmentalism, LI deals with this, but its assumption is different. LI claims that, in general, the outcomes of the negotiations are determined when the states agreed on the lowest common denominator. However, this does not mean that the agreements/outcomes are always based on this ground. Rather, sometimes agreements can be less or sometimes more than the lowest common denominator points. In this regard, LI keeps the door open to the possibility of reaching more than the LCD.

Related to that, LI puts forward that “preference shifts” can be seen after bargainings and negotiations, because, despite the fact that national interests are specific and apparent, the preferences are not “fixed” (Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 20-23; Saurugger, 2014, p.69). Therefore, the positions and expectations of the states do not remain constant, but can alter. In the words of Moravcsik, “State preferences need not necessarily uniform across issues, countries or long periods of time. They vary in response to exogenous change in economic, ideological and geopolitical environment within which European integration takes place” (1998, p. 23).

1.1.4.2. Constructivist Bottom-up Europeanization Approach

The second type of the bottom-up Europeanization is the constructivist bottom-up approach which combines a constructivist theory of the integration and intergovernmental framework while examining the Europeanization process. Its first theory is Constructivist Intergovernmentalism. Like conventional Intergovernmentalism and LI, it strongly defends that states are the main sovereign and rational actors in the integration process, relative to institutions. It also underlines the importance of national interests, priorities, decisions, national and international positions and powers and motivation of states in inter-governmental negotiations. These it gets from Intergovernmentalism.

It also adopts the basic assumptions of constructivism. Constructivist theory, developed in the 1980s, became an outstanding theory in 1990s in the EU politics after the period of the Cold War. It is known as a middle ground theory between rationalist and reflectivist/interpretive theories (Fierke, 2007, pp.166-168; Torun, 2016, pp.168-169).

The key assumption of constructivism, contrary to what the rationalist IR theories claim, is that there is no line between human beings and social reality. Human beings are inside the borders of social reality and they construct it. Thus, there is a *socially constructed* world, which is constructed as a result of a *mutual interaction* between agents (states or other actors) and the structure. Since international relations are also a social construction rather than a pre-defined or already existed *human actions and meanings*, there is a possibility of *change* in this social structure due to the social construction process. This is the distinguishing characteristic of constructivism. Most importantly, it offers a deeper understanding because adds a *social dimension* besides the material assumptions, and it puts great emphasis on the roles of *ideas, values, norms, rules*,

identities, language, interpretations and discourses as the factors that influence social construction (Fierke, 2007, pp.168-169; Saurugger, 2014, pp. 145-146).

Taking into account these features, there are three constructivist principles:

- a) Contextualization, which means individuals/states behave as “social agents” as well as they behave rationally depending on cost-benefit calculations
- b) Co-constitution, which means both agents/actors form structure and structure forms them.
- c) Endogenous construction of interests, which means preferences and interests of agents/actors are constructed by the social structure; they are not seen as fixed or exogenously defined (Saurugger, 2014, pp. 146-148).

Before discussing how constructivism views the EU, it is important to state that there are two different versions of constructivism. The first one is developed by Nicholas G. Onuf (1989), who paid attention to the “process of interaction” between agents and structure, and described international relations as “world of our making” (Onuf, 1989). The second one is developed by Alexander Wendt (1992), who stated that “anarchy is what states make of it” claiming that there is no separation of facts and the position on of states (1992, p. 394). For constructivism, anarchy means a situation which is preferred and constructed by states.

Constructivists explore the agent and structure relation between member states and the EU, and dynamics in this process. Major (2008), for instance, asserts that “Europe is what member states make of it” underlining the interaction between member states and the EU. Therefore, in the case of the EU, the integration process, its degree of progress and consequences are under the impact of the relations between member states and the EU (Major, 2008). When it comes to how the constructivist bottom-up Europeanization looks at the integration process, the picture that emerged is explained as follows:

Constructivist Bottom-up Europeanization deals with the national level/states or representatives of them (as agents) and the EU level/European institutions (as structure), which are engaged in mutual constitution, and underlines the role of states, their actions within the structure and social factors that are both shaping and are being shaped in this constructive process. Secondly, it accepts that social and ideational factors such as norms, values, rules and shared understandings are the forces that influence the states’ interests (Torun, 2016, pp.170- 171). While the shared values and norms facilitate the EU, they are also utilized by states to formulate their interests and to make basis for their actions at the

EU level. For the EU, promoting European norms and values are the efficient way to make the member states be Europeanized, but for the member states the same is valid for realizing their interests at the EU level, owing to the projection process to the EU and shaping the EU in accordance with their national interests.

Especially, in the foreign policy area, the norms, ideas and values are fundamental and considerable factors that impact member states' interests and policies (De Flers and Müller, 2012; Saurugger, 2014, p.150 and p.156). The states can use these social and ideational factors as justifications of their adopted positions and with the aim of gaining acceptance and respect from the others at the international level (Saurugger, 2014, p.159; De Flers, 2012).

Thirdly, according to the Constructivist Bottom-up Europeanization approach, the preferences and the positions of states are not *fixed* and stable, but have the possibility of change. During the process of interactions and at the negotiations, the decisions can be affected by the arguments (Börzel and Panke, 2016, p.118). States have an idea and a position before the negotiation stage, but at the negotiations there is possibility of persuading states to adopt a new position; or more generally, if an argument emerges that fits well with all the actors' interests, then the decisions and policies are affected by that. Thus, state interests and preferences are open to debate and discussion and this is called as "power of argument" (p.118). In the same manner, De Flers and Müller point out that this is a part of strategic behaviour of states with the aim of pursuing their own interests and this depends on the *strategic socialization*, and thus they label this as *arguing style of decision-making* and *arguing mode of interest mediation* (2012, pp.3, 5, 24).

Fourthly, the Constructivist Bottom-up Europeanization approach concentrates on the mechanisms behind the changeability of preferences and interests. "Socialization and social learning" are the two main mechanisms that cause changes in states' preferences and interests (De Flers & Müller, 2012; p.3; Saurugger, 2014, p. 152; Torun, 2016, p.181). States mask their interests with common norms and shared values in favour of their arguments, which is different from the bargaining way. Socialization refers to internalization of norms and values that determine the interests. EU institutions are the grounds where the negotiations occur and the representatives take place, whereas learning refers to participation in these negotiations and getting information about the others' preferences and common points in order to promote change. (De Flers & Müller, 2012; pp.14- 15; Saurugger, 2014, pp.152-154).

The last point is about the identity issue which is a *socio-cultural factor*, that is socially constructed. Here the issue is the national identities and the constructed European identity, and the compatibility between them. In addition, identity-based policies, the construction of the European identity, institutions, and re-construction of member states' identity over the EU identity are among the important issues (Torun, 2016, pp. 165-170).

"Ideational Intergovernmentalism", another variant of Constructivist Bottom-up Europeanization approach, developed by Federica Bicchì (2007), combines intergovernmentalism and constructivist accounts. Bicchì (2007) focuses on the European Union foreign policy toward the Mediterranean region. Since the thesis focuses on the very same issue, it also draws on ideational intergovernmentalism while forming a theoretical framework. Starting with confirming the basic assumptions of Moravcsik's LI, Bicchì examines foreign policy and interests of member states within an intergovernmentalist framework but considering not only the rational but also constructivist/ideational factors. According to ideational intergovernmentalism, besides the material factors, ideational factors have an important role in shaping both member states' decision-making process, positions and policies, and the EU level policies are the results of a construction process under the impact of ideational factors (Bicchì, 2007; Tocci, 2008). The matters such as the possibility of joint responses and normative power of Europe are related to this account.

Bicchì (2007) claims that EU foreign policy is based on ideational intergovernmentalism, and she points out that Ideational intergovernmentalism depends on three stages as follow:

- a) The first stage is the existence of *cognitive uncertainty*, which occurs when the states are faced with new challenges caused by the international system, other states or regions. This situation makes the states re-think and calculate their interests and positions. After this, the process of "deconstruction of national preferences" or ex-policy stands starts in order to provide certainty again. Here, the extent to which and the aims for which the national interests can change, and the construction of the EU level policies that serve to national interests are important.
- b) *Policy entrepreneur* stage refers to a stage in which member states (the entrepreneurs) take initiative to carry the issues to the EU ground, and then define a common/shared European interest. This means *re-construction* process at the EU level, and formulation a policy in the name of European interest.

- c) Lastly in the *EU foreign policy development* stage, due to the result of the “interactions” between policy entrepreneurs and other actors (other states and EU institutions) that the European foreign policy is created. In this stage, there are three points respectively: “*naming, framing and bargaining*” (Bicchi, 2003, pp.3-11; 2007)

In conclusion, on the differences between rationalist and constructivist types of bottom-up Europeanization, Börzel and Panke argue that:

- a) Rationalist Bottom-up approach (conventional intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism) refer to *fixed interests* despite changeability in preferences, and symbolize “*bargaining power*”
- b) Constructivist Bottom-up approach (constructivist intergovernmentalism and ideational intergovernmentalism) refer to *flexible interests* because of possibility of change, and symbolize “*power of argument*” (2016, pp.116-119).

To sum up, all the bottom-up approaches support that the member states are the primary, sovereign, and rational actors in the integration process. The national interests and preferences of member states have leading role, they shape and determine the degrees and outcomes of integration. Although there are differences in their understanding and interpreting driving factors behind the interests and policy making in the EU level, they are complementing each other. That is why, all of them are considered in this thesis.

CHAPTER II

EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY AND THE EU'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION

This chapter applies the concept of Europeanization to the area of foreign policy and, thus, analyses the EU foreign policy. In the first part, it presents the main principles and objectives of the EU foreign policy, provides a historical overview of the European foreign policy developments, assesses the effect of the bottom-up Europeanization in the foreign policy area and the degree, scope, and limits of the impact of Europeanization on national foreign policies of the member states.

In the second part, the EU's foreign policy towards the Mediterranean Region is examined and the importance of the Mediterranean region among the other EU regional policies, the key engagement dimensions of the EU and main initiatives on the region and consequences of them are analyzed.

Lastly, the third part of the chapter concludes with an evaluation of the EU and member states in terms of Europeanization of foreign policy in the area in light of the previous two chapters.

2.1. Europeanization in the Area of Foreign Policy

The foreign policy area of the European Union is a complex and multi-dimensional policy area and, thus, one of the most difficult areas to analyse the process of Europeanization. While the other policy areas have been studied at an increasing rate, the area of foreign policy was not studied in the 1990s (Müller and De Flers, 2009).

Although there were studies in the 1980s and 1990s about the Europeanization and foreign policy, in the 2000s, as Wong and Hill (2011) point out that the main prominent study which applied the concept of Europeanization to the foreign policy area belongs to Ben Tonra. In his famous study, Tonra (2001) evaluated the EU impact on Dutch, Danish and Irish foreign policies. After the 2000s, this area of study started to be

developed by scholars both in theoretical and empirical terms (Wong and Hill, 2011, p.1 and p.6; Tonra, 2001).

Europeanization of foreign policy means, in plain words, the impact of the EU on the member states' foreign policies. It refers to what extent the member states' foreign policies are created and conducted in accordance with the EU policy principles, norms and objectives, and at the same time it means achieving a coherent and consistent common foreign policy at the EU level (Wong, 2017, p.144).

In this area, an analysis of Europeanization sheds lights on the roles of European institutions and the member states and on the issue of which of these actors are more prominent in shaping and pursuing the European foreign policy and processes. According to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, "the relationship and interacting processes of foreign policy on the national level and foreign policy on the EU level are often labelled as Europeanization." (2008, p.142).

At first glance, it seems that the same logic can be applied in the Europeanization process of all the policy areas, but Europeanization of the foreign policy area is totally different from the other policy areas in the EU. As explained before (in the table of dimensions and scopes of Europeanization research), in the first dimension (the core/inside of the EU) the main titles of analysis are the Europeanization of member states' policy, polity and politics. These are the main themes for the member states in the Europeanization process (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.60). Foreign policy is one of the main areas under the title of "policy", as illustrated in the table of dimensions and scopes of Europeanization research.

The EU has various policy areas such as agriculture, trade, enlargement, energy, health, human rights, environment, foreign and security policy and every year numerous policy decisions, directives and regulations are produced in these areas, so all of them affect the member states. Some policy areas have their own common policy framework, strategy, and regimes at the EU level. In this respect, the field of foreign policy is distinctive as the union has a common foreign security and defence policy at the EU level. Therefore, Europeanization's main focus lies on the Common Foreign and Security (CFSP) of the EU. For Aggestam, "what has become notably Europeanized in foreign policy is the means to fulfil foreign policy goals." (2004, p.97).

As Börzel and Risse (2003) put forward, three areas, namely policy, polity and politics, are accepted as "domestic effect" of Europeanization (p.60). If one studies the Europeanization process for the member states, it is expected to focus her/his analysis on

these areas. Yet, when we look at the domestic politics and foreign policy areas, these are different matters of analysing for the Europeanization process.

In analysing the domestic impacts of the EU, the logic is notion and action of “change”. Thus, domestic influences of Europeanization depend on how it affects member states in the way of change. Europeanization requires a “domestic change” in the states. Accordingly, there are three terms in that process: *fit*, *misfit* and *goodness of fit* (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Ladrech, 2010, p.31; Schmidt, 2009, p.209). Basically, Europeanization seeks to achieve a point of “fit” between the EU and member states’ national policies. First, there should be a “misfit”, which is seen as a necessary factor and a driving force behind the domestic change. Then, the process of “goodness of fit”, developed by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001), emerges, which means “casual mechanism for change or EU pressure” (Ladrech, 2010, p.31; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001). It also can be perceived as the willingness or tendency on the adaptation.

All three terms, which were considered under the EU influence and the logic of change explained by them, were mostly evaluated using the Top-down Europeanization approach. Because the issue of change refers to an effect which was “generated” by the EU (Ladrech, 2010, p.21). Thus, it is reasonable to say that foreign policy area is a distinct area in the process of Europeanization. There are briefly two reasons behind it:

- The structure of the European Union Foreign Policy
- The nature of decision-making in the European Union Foreign Policy

Firstly, in the area of foreign policy, there are both the European level EU foreign policy (CFSP and CSDP) and national level member states’ foreign policies. Secondly, European foreign policy decisions are taken unanimously, which means there is a requirement for consensus among all the member states. Therefore, it is not appropriate to apply the same logic to the Europeanization of foreign policy area. In the foreign policy area, there are roles and effects of individual member states as well as the EU, thus, this is not a one-way process that the EU generates. Rather, it is a process where there is no pressure for members to “fit”, instead, the member states are sovereign in their foreign policies. In this area it is not appropriate to argue a “goodness of fit” assumption for the Europeanization process, because each state has veto power and acts independently, there is no pressure or imposition (Müller and De Flers, 2009).

There are two important points that should be regarded in an analysis of Europeanization. The first point is related to “the subject” who is under the effect of Europeanization (this can be member states, candidates, applicants, potential candidates or third countries), and “area” which is under the effect (this can be any policy area of the EU). The degree of Europeanization differs in terms of the status of the subject and supranational or intergovernmental nature of the area in research (Yazgan, 2012, p.128). The second point is related to the dimensions/types, mechanisms, and outcomes of the Europeanization (Börzel and Risse, 2007), which will be explained in this chapter. But firstly, it is important to present a historical development of the foreign policy of the EU.

2.1.1. Political Dimension of the European Integration and European Foreign Policy

More than a century after its establishment, the EU is still one of the main important economic and political international organizations, with its distinctive supranational feature, and is a visible actor in the international arena. Through almost the 70 years of its integration process, it has grown both in “size and scope”. Although there had been ideas and motivation on the issues of peace, prosperity, and a union for Europe for long years, the European integration process began after 1945. After the conflictual climate of the Second World War, it was created due to the concerns of peace and security for the continent. An economic cooperation was seen as a way of providing and sustaining peace and security for the continent (European Union, 2022).

Thus, the European integration began as an economic integration and was later developed into political integration. Economic integration started with the Treaty of Paris which was signed by Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg and Netherlands and the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community (ECSC) were established in the 1951 as the first stage because ending and controlling the coal and steel production were seen a solution to conflictual relations between European states. Although there is a pooling sovereignty logic between the member states and the union, in fact that was pooling of production of coal and steel (Nelson and Stubb, 2003, p.14).

In 1957, with the Rome Treaty, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were established and with the Merger Treaty in 1965 all these three communities were combined. The first enlargement


process started in 1970s and the integration process continued not only with the logic of deepening but also with the logic of widening.

In the 1980s with the impact of the Single European Act and in the 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty in the post-Cold war period, the integration process developed into a broader stage and gained a political dimension. With the Maastricht Treaty Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established, with the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the Nice Treaty (2000) and lastly with the Lisbon Treaty (2009), a reformed version of European foreign policy developed (European External Action Service, 2022).

In order to better understand European foreign policy, it is important to focus on its structure and nature. As it is seen in the European foreign policy figure 2, European foreign policy considers European member states, European institutions and the presence of international system and society. In this regard, we can describe the European foreign policy as sum of:

1. “Individual foreign policies of the member states
2. The foreign policy of the Union (CFSP)
3. The foreign economic policy of ‘external relations’ of the European Community” (White, 2001).

Figure 2: European Foreign Policy



Source: Jorgensen, 2004, p.34

This figure shows the structure of the European foreign policy, emphasizing that even if there is a European common foreign policy area, each member state also has their

own national foreign policies. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) Art. 29 (Ex:15) states that “Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the Union positions” (TEU, Art.29).

When it comes to the nature of European foreign policy, it depends on the decision-making style in the area of foreign policy, which is unanimity. Related to that, in TEU Art. 31 (Ex:23), it is stated that “Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise” (TEU, Art.31).

2.1.2. Historical Overview of the EU Foreign Policy

The evolution of the EU from economic integration to deeper political integration involved a difficult and troubled time of period. In the aftermath of the World War II, there were several important events and developments that pushed Europe towards integration: the Marshall Plan of 1947, which was an economic aid program supplied by the U.S. to Europe, and the creation of NATO in 1949 as a military organization with the U.S. and Canada (Keukeliere, 2008, pp. 35-38). Due to the situation and political climate of those years, the relation with the U.S. was indispensable and crucial for the Europeans. This was related to security-based dependency of the EU. Therefore, as a union, the EU wanted to have its own structures in the political and military issues.

Although the integration process was inside the EU, it is not independent from the effects of the external actors, dynamics and order. Thus, the process also should be considered in relation to the international system dynamics and the relations with the EU and other actors. In this respect, according to Howorth, there are five key periods for the European foreign policy:

- “The period of the First World War and views of politicians and intellectuals on Europe and their objectives that “could save Europe from itself”
- The period of the Second World War and post-war period that labelled as “never war again”
- The Cold War period that includes relations with the US, NATO and SU and concerns for security
- The End of the Cold War period that caused the establishment of CSFP

- The events of 11 September 2001 which forced to draw a new security strategy for Europe” (Howorth, 2009, pp. 128-131).

In addition to these periods, the later developments and key periods can be presented as the European debt crisis, the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa, the refugee crisis, the Brexit crisis, relations with other global actors especially with the U.S. during the presidency of Donald Trump and other multi-dimensional relations in the international system. The next section provides a historical overview of the European foreign policy, focusing on three periods.

2.1.2.1. Pre-Lisbon Treaty Period

The European states attempted to develop a political dimension-in the union (European economic Community), but they failed, for this reason they had not achieved a political integration formally until signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1990s. After the Treaty of Paris in 1951 (creation of ECSC), the 1952 European Defence Community (EDC) was proposed due to the particular security concerns for Europe despite the existence of NATO, but its treaty was not ratified by the French National Assembly and failed in 1954. As a component of both ECSC and EDC, there was also a European Political Community (EPC) proposal, but that also failed together with the refusal of EPC by France. Subsequently, the Western European Union (WEU) was created (later, it was transferred and ended in 2011).

After the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the Fouchet Plan was prepared by France in 1961 as an intergovernmentalism-based new defense structure that was based on Franco-German axis disregarding Britain, but at the end it was rejected by the Netherlands. In the 1970s, during détente of the Cold War, in the summit of Hague the member states compromised on the political cooperation and in 1970 the European Political Cooperation (EPC) started with the approvals of Luxemburg reports by the member states. In line with the logic of CFSP, the aim was to have a system of foreign affairs and to gain more efficiency on the international arena owing to the coherency inside of the EU (Arbuthnott and Edwards, 1989). That was the first attempt that was realized. Although the EPC presented an intergovernmental basis for cooperation among the member states, it did not refer to a common foreign policy meaning, instead it aimed to develop “a process of

information, consultation and common action” in foreign policy (EPC text, 1998). Alongside of EPC, another important development in the 1970s was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCP) which was developed into an institutional structure with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1990. That was related to security and defence dimension for Europe, which was known as the first step for multilateral cooperation on these issues.

In the 1980s, with the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 the EPC gained basis and was linked to the EC Treaties (Keukeleire, 2008, pp. 45-46). The SEA contained amendments to EEC and the Euratom Treaty, and the establishment of political cooperation, as well as it presented the creation of an internal market by 1993 without borders, but with “freedom of goods, services, capital and persons”. It has a preamble and 4 titles. Title 1 covers the “rules common to political cooperation and European Community” and Title 3 covers “European cooperation in the field of foreign policy.” Lastly, related to the foreign policy structure, the European Council, which is known as the summit of European leaders, was established (European Union, SEA).

The 1990s, saw the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the break-up of former Yugoslavia. In this political climate, in 1992 Maastricht Treaty, that is the Treaty on European Union (TEU), was signed by the 12 member states (six founders, U.K., Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain) and came into force in November 1993. “European Economic Community” ended with the start of “European Community” (EC). The treaty includes former treaty amendments and “Provisions on a common foreign and security policy” in Title V. With this treaty, Common Foreign and Security Policy was established formally, and single currency and citizenship were created.

In Article J.1., The objectives of the common foreign and security policy are stated as:

- “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter
- to promote international cooperation
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (European Union, Maastricht Treaty).

The new key feature of this Treaty was that it created a Pillar system: the first pillar contains European Community policies which are mainly economic policies, the second pillar contains the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the third pillar contains cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). While the first pillar is supranational, second and third pillars are stated under intergovernmentalism, which means that all CFSP decisions are taken by unanimity of member states. Lastly, the Treaty underlines adaptation on “common positions” and “joint actions” (European Union, Maastricht Treaty).

After NATO’s Brussels summit in 1994, with the impact of the security concerns after the end of the Cold War, the concept of European security identity was discussed on basis of providing European-led security, and with NATO meetings in Brussels and Berlin in 1996, European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was developed in the organization. After St. Malo Summit in 1998, in 1999 ESDI was changed as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (NATO, Relations with the EU). ESDP was accepted as an “integral part” of the CSFP, which was stated in Art. 42-46 of the TEU (European Union, ESDP).

In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty was signed and came into force in 1999, and it made amendments on the CFSP. The ESDP added to the second pillar and High Representative (HR) to the CSFP was created. In the Part One, in Art. J. 1, it stated that the objectives of the EU are:

- “Defining the principles of and general guidelines for the CFSP
 - Deciding on common strategies
 - Adopting joint actions
 - Adopting common positions
 - Strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy”
- (European Union, Amsterdam Treaty). Thus, “common strategies” were added to the common positions and joint actions, which were stated in the Maastricht Treaty (Morillas, 2019, p.44).

In 2001, the Treaty of Nice was signed and came into force in 2003. Institutional amendments and new provisions on the foreign policy area included humanitarian, rescue and peace-keeping tasks with Art. 17 and 25, and establishment of Political and Security Committee (PSC) (Europa, Nice Treaty). In 2001, the first EU-NATO meeting of foreign ministers held on issues including logic of common threats and interests. In 2003, the first ESDP mission started in North Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia),

the Iraqi War was an outstanding event of that year, and due to its impact European Strategy was introduced (Gross, 2009, p.2).

In 2004, with the enlargement the EU had 25 member states. In the same year, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed but it was not ratified by France and the Netherlands in 2005. After two years on failed constitutional treaty, a new treaty, the Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007, yet it came into force at the end of 2009 due to Ireland's second ratification and the Czech Republic's late signature.

2.1.2.2. Lisbon Treaty: A new architecture of the EU Foreign Policy

The Lisbon Treaty, which is called as the “Reform Treaty”, both amended the previous treaties (Treaty of Maastricht (TEU) and Treaty of Rome (TFEU)) without replacing them and established new laws stating provisions on institutions and on several issues including democratic principles, enhanced cooperation and CFSP. Although it was created as a constitutional project previously, due to the failure of the constitutional treaty, it was developed after several discussions in 2007 and two years later was signed by all 27 member states.

With the Lisbon Treaty a new term started for the EU, the concept of European Community replaced by “the Union”, the three-pillar system in the foreign policy ended, it provided a new foreign policy architecture for the EU with the aim of further integration and gaining more efficient image on the world stage as a foreign actor (European Union, Lisbon Treaty). In Article 25 (Ex. 12 in TEU), it is stated that:

“The Union shall conduct the common foreign and security policy by:

- (a) defining the general guidelines
- (b) adopting decisions defining: (i) actions to be undertaken by the Union; (ii) positions to be taken by the Union; (iii) arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in points (i) and (ii); and by
- (c) strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.” (Europa, Lisbon Treaty). Different from the previous definitions, the Lisbon Treaty just referred to “decisions” instead of common strategies, position and actions as noted before in the part of the Amsterdam Treaty, so it signifies that the “decisions” contains other ones.

As a latest version of the EU foreign policy structure, the Lisbon Treaty established two important things: First, a new position in the foreign policy area: High

Representative (HR), who is to act as representative for foreign affairs and security policy, and at the same time as vice-president of the Commission. After the period of Javier Solana as High Representative/Secretary General of the Council of the EU, in the new term following the creation of the High Representative/ Vice President (HR/VP) position with the Amsterdam Treaty, Catherine Ashton (from the United Kingdom) became the first HR/VP between 2009 and 2014. After her, Federica Mogherini (from Italy) held this job for five years, and when her five-year tenure ended in 2019, Josep Borrell (from Spain) who currently holds this position, was elected as HR/VP of the EU. The role of the HR is briefly defined as to “conduct the Union’s CFSP”, which includes coordinating the EU foreign policy area, responding to the crises, providing coherence in foreign policy, consistency in the EU activities in the world and consensus among 27 member states, representing the EU in the international arena and heading European External Action Service (EEAS), European Defence Agency (EDA) and other institutions and delegations. Because of these responsibilities, s/he called as “chief diplomat” of the EU (Europa, Lisbon Treaty). On the official website of EEAS, it is stated that HR/VP “shapes the standing of the EU on global stage” (EEAS, 2022).

Secondly, it created the European External Action Service, also labelled as “EU’s Diplomatic Corps” or “EU’s Diplomatic Service”; currently the EU has more than 140 delegations in the world (European Union, Foreign and Security Policy at EU level; European Union, Foreign and Security Policy).

In the Lisbon Treaty, the European Security and Defence Policy is named officially as Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and considered as the part of CSFP. The European Council was specified as an EU institution, and the 18-month three-state presidential system was regulated by a six-month rotation mechanism.

The new HR role, EEAS and the CSDP are the three changes for the EU CFSP. Other changes are: with Article 50, it provides a possibility of withdrawal from the EU, which was used by U.K. in the process of Brexit, and with other articles it regulated the European Court and strengthened the position of the European Parliament (EU Fact Sheet, Treaty of Lisbon).

When it comes to the continuities, this strongly refers to the decision-making in the area of the European foreign policy. In Article 24 (Ex 11 in TEU) it is stated that: “The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting

unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise.” In TEU Article 31 (Ex:23), this is also underlined (European Union, Lisbon Treaty).

2.1.2.3. Post-Lisbon Period

In the post-Lisbon period, there were three important developments for the EU. The first one was the European Global Strategy, which was prepared by HR/VP Federica Mogherini and presented in 2016. In fact, it was not the first strategy document. The first one, the European Security Strategy, was presented by J. Solana in 2003 in the aftermath of the September 11 events and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and under the influence of the new enlargement process of Europe (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, pp.57-59). The second strategy document was also shaped by the political developments inside and outside of the union in the same manner. These can be explained as refugees and migration crises, the issue of withdrawal of Britain from the EU, and other challenges that EU witnessed in the international area. It is formally presented as *A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, and its subtitle was given as *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*. The document includes four basic parts: *A global strategy to promote our citizens' interests, principles guiding external action, priorities of external action and from vision to action*. In the part of principles guiding external action, principles of “multilateralism” (basically with the UN) and “principled pragmatism” were stated strongly. In the part of the EU foreign policy priorities, the document listed five priorities as follow:

- “The security of the Union
- State and societal resilience to our East and South
- An integrated approach to conflicts
- Cooperative regional orders
- Global governance for the 21st century.” (EEAS, EUGS).

The second development is the document of “White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025” which was presented by European Commission in 2017. It has five scenarios on the basis of expected member states' choices in the years ahead:

- “Scenario 1: Carry on
- Scenario 2: Nothing but the Single Market

- Scenario 3: Those who want more do more
- Scenario 4: Doing less more efficiently
- Scenario 5: Doing much more together” (EEAS, EUGS).

The third development is the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) by the Council at the end of 2017. PESCO depends on cooperation in the security and defence area, so it is stated under the CSDP of the EU. In relation to that, at the end of the 2018, France and Germany agreed on the idea of “a European Army”. On this issue, French President Emmanuel Macron, who is the initiator of this idea, said that “We need a Europe which defends itself better alone, without just depending on the United States, in a more sovereign way”, whereas German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that “We should work on a vision to create a real European army one day” (Bennhold and Erlanger, 2018). Yet, HR/VP made statements against this idea. However, in January 2019, with the Aachen Treaty between Germany and France, the two countries declared “efficiency, coherence and credibility of Europe in the military field” (Economist, 2019). In addition, in 2021, European Peace Facility (EPF) was established as a financial mechanism which funds external actions under the EU CFSP. Its ultimate goal is explained as to improve the EU’s capability to prevent conflict, maintain peace, and support international stability and security. Over the period 2021-2027, it will be supported about 5 billion Euro by contributions from EU member states in line with these goals (The Council of the EU, EPF).

2.1.3. Types/Dimensions, Mechanisms and Outcomes of Europeanization in the EU foreign policy

As explained in the previous chapter, there are three types/dimensions of the Europeanization process. When these types were adopted to the area of foreign policy, we can see three different types/dimensions of the Europeanization in national foreign policy. The first dimension is the bottom-up Europeanization which refers to *National Projection* and called as “uploading” because national foreign policy “preferences, priorities, objectives and approaches” are uploaded to the EU level. Member states seek to influence and shape the EU foreign policy and the foreign policies of other Member States (Müller and De Flers, 2009; Keukeleire, 2008, p. 144). For Wong (2017), as far as

this dimension is concerned, member states' national foreign policies impact European foreign policy and the situation of national foreign policies can be explained as follows:

- "States uses the EU as cover/umbrella
- National foreign policy uses the EU level as influence multiplier
- State attempts to influence foreign policies of other states
- State attempts to increase national influence in the world" (Wong, 2017, p.151).

The second dimension is the top-down Europeanization which refers to *National Adaptation* and called as "downloading" because policy models and ideas are downloaded from the EU, the CFSP to the national level. Member states are subject to the influences from the EU. In other words, "national foreign policies, decision-making structures and processes" are changed due to the EU impact (Müller and De Flers, 2009; Keukeleire, 2008, p. 142).

According to Wong (2017), in this dimension there are *convergence, harmonization and transformation* with the influence of membership. Thus, the situation of national foreign policies can be explained as follows:

- "Increasing salience of European political agenda
- Adherence to common objectives
- Common policy obligations taking priority over national domains reserves
- Internalization of EU membership and its integration process
- Procedural change in national bureaucracies" (Wong, 2017, p.151).

Lastly, there is also a third dimension which is presented as *Identity Reconstruction*, which refers to "crossloading" Europeanization type, including the outcomes of previous two dimensions". The situation can be explained as:

- "Emergence of shared norms/values among policy-making elites in relation to international politics, i.e socialization
- Shared definitions of European and national interests
- Coordination reflex and pendulum effect where extreme national and EU position is reconciled over time" (Wong, 2017, p.151).

In addition to the issue of dimensions of Europeanization in foreign policy, Keukeleire points out that besides the national adaptation and national projection, there are also processes of *Multilateralization and Socialization* (Keukeleire, 2008, pp. 145-6). Therefore, it can be said that the relations among the member states and socialization of them in the area of foreign policy refer to dimension of socialization, while the relations of member states with other organizations such as NATO and UN, and adaptation in their

context, not only in the EU, refer to dimension of multilateralization. In this respect, both these internal and external perspectives should be taken into account.

As it is seen, in the dimensions issue, bottom-up and top-down Europeanization models applied to the member states and the EU level. Gross (2009, p. 18) and Müller and de Flers (2009) point out that there are both top-down and bottom-up dimensions in the Europeanization of foreign policy area. This is important for considering both national and EU level interactions. However, as opposed to other policy areas, the foreign policy area is still in the hand of the states, and it depends on their interests and preferences. In the words of Wong, “the CFSP is dominated by a bottom-up process” due to the decision-making structure (2017, p.155-56).

If we look at why the foreign policy area is evaluated in terms of the bottom-up and top-down Europeanization models, we can see two reasons: the subject and area of the matter. Firstly, in the foreign policy area, the bottom-up Europeanization has a dominant ground, because the notion of change/or compatibility with the goals of EU common foreign policy is not about EU-induced adaptation or EU dictation or imposition, instead, the interests have a leading and shaping role. Accordingly, in the case of member states’ foreign policy there is no adaptation pressure such as the one we see in the case of the candidate states and EU relations. In general, the studies on the accession process tend to adopt a top-down Europeanization approach. Secondly, the first pillar policies, known as EC policies in the ex-Maastricht pillar system, are mainly identified with top-down dimension, but the EU foreign policy (CFSP and CSDP) which is in the second pillar, is identified with bottom-up dimension because of intergovernmental basis (Wong, 2007, p.321- 337; Ladrech, 2010; Wong and Hill, 2011, p.11; Wong, 2017, p.156). In the current structure of the EU foreign policy there is no three-pillar system; it was abolished by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Nevertheless, the foreign policy area strongly retains its intergovernmental nature still.

The bottom-up Europeanization is dominant in the foreign policy Europeanization because of the structure and nature of European foreign policy. Europeanization of foreign policy area has a ground for both EU-level foreign policy and individual foreign policies, at the same time due to its intergovernmental nature, all decisions need consensus. Therefore, it mainly depends on the member states’ role and control, not the European institutions.

When it comes to explaining mechanisms of Europeanization in the foreign policy area, Müller and de Flers (2009) argue that there are two main mechanisms that trigger the Europeanization process in the foreign policy area. The first one is *socialization*, which refers to interactions and negotiations of national officials with each other and with EU officials (Wong, 2017, p.147). In the socialization process actors share their ideas and positions. The process considers inter-state interactions and interactions “between states’ representatives in CFSP committees and working groups”. Both in the national projection (uploading) and national adaptation (downloading) dimensions, socialization takes part as a mechanism behind the Europeanization process.

Secondly, *learning* which means getting informed about other actors’ ideas and positions, expects change in the general view and reaching a common point in terms of the EU norms and values. This mechanism works in the national adaptation dimension (Müller and de Flers, 2009).

These two mechanisms, socialization and learning, refer to a constructivist perspective to the Europeanization process. Thus, they are accepted as different from inter-state bargaining (Aggestam, 2004). But, they seem to have little impact with relative to bargaining and interest promoting. The officials/political elites of each state have different culture, value and interests, and also leading powerful states they have low degree of willingness for socialization with each other (Keukelieire, 2008, p.146). Since cooperation in the foreign policy area constrained until achieving a consensus among the member states, and a common decision depends on the possibility of interest convergence, it is reasonable to say that the main mechanism is bargaining, and secondary mechanisms are socialization and learning. In this sense, theoretically, the first one is supported by the rationalist bottom-up Europeanization approach, while the second one is explained by the constructivist bottom-up Europeanization approach.

In addition, Magnette puts forwards that there are uneven vectors of Europeanization: *External pressures*, which come from global level, *convergence of ideas of governments* and *the mediation of institutions*” (2005, pp.23-28). Moreover, there are other factors to consider, such as political will and the capacity of member states (Keukelieire, 2008, pp.136-140; Schmidt, 2009, p.208).

Lastly, when it comes to explain the outcomes of Europeanization in the EU foreign policy, first of all, on the consequences of the issue of domestic change, a basic perspective should be presented. In terms of domestic change, the results are determined by the member states’ responses to the process of domestic change and how they react to

the influence of Europeanization. In this respect, Börzel and Risse (2007) claim that there can be five different outcomes of domestic change which caused by Europeanization: *inertia, retrenchment, absorption, accommodation and transformation*". The first two result indicates a low degree of the EU impact. Inertia means "no change", retrenchment means "resistance to change" (Börzel and Risse, 2007).

If the result is absorption, then it means low degree of domestic change, because although member states act in accordance with the process of Europeanization, they protect their own structures and substantial presence. Accommodation refers to equable degree of domestic change, because member states can change themselves in terms of adaptation, by owning their old presence still. And lastly, transformation refers to high degree domestic change due to the fact that member states adapt new policy, polity and processes in total (Börzel and Risse, 2007).

In the area of foreign policy, the outcomes are defined with national projection and national adaptation. If the member states upload their national foreign policies to the EU level, the outcome is policy projection. If the EU downloads its foreign policy to the member states, then the outcome is policy adaptation (Müller and de Flers, 2009, p.12; Schmidt, 2009, p.208).

2.1.4. The Impact of Europeanization on the Member States' National Policies and Interest Representation in the EU

In the Europeanization of foreign policy area, the crucial factor is the interests of member states. As a matter of this fact, the EU has 28 different member states with 28 different national policy preferences, ideas and objectives, and this leads to an environment in which many possibilities and complexities exist. In his work Keukeleire (2008) examined EU foreign policy and national foreign policies, arguing that there are several factors that determine the position of member states in the decision-making: "constitutional set-up and foreign policy making mechanisms of states (mean diplomatic and bureaucratic level)" as internal factors; and "interests, power, capacity, world view, role conception, identity, strategic culture and political will" as the other factors (2008, pp.125-130).

The factors that foster the Europeanization of national foreign policies are: "Institutions and treaties, Socialisation, Leadership, External federators, Politics of scale,

Legitimation of global role, Geo-cultural identity” (Hill and Wong, 2011).

Besides these factors, if we focus on the member states, which are the main actors that shape foreign policy and processes, it is possible to say that there are four important points. First, in the case of interests, states have diverging and competing interests and each state tries to promote and defend its own national foreign policy interests.

Second, in terms of their power and influence, some of these states are called as “Big 3 (France, Germany, and UK)” in the EU (Cini and Borragan, 2016; Bache et al, 2015; Gross, 2009, p.6; Lehne, 2012). If we consider Italy and Spain, these states are called as “Big 4” and “Big 5” in the literature. According to Lehne (2012), these big states have prominent roles in the EU because they have global influence due to “demographics, economic power, weight, diplomatic capacity and military capacity”. Furthermore, their distinguishing features are stated as “drivers of policy, not tied to the EU, and capable acting independently” (Lehne, 2012). In addition, membership in the other international organizations such as NATO, UN, nuclear capacity and having a permanent seat at the UNSC (UN Security Council) are also among the factors which show the power and influence of these states (Ladrech, 2010; Keukeleire, 2008). This second point indicates that states have different weight and power in relation to one another.

Third, the member states have geographical strategy, identity, and positions (e.g. Baltic countries, Visegrad, Benelux, Western/Eastern or Mediterranean countries). This point underlines that geographic location also has considerable effect for states. Lastly, as noted in the previous chapter, there is a logic of two-level game. In this respect, the states act in terms of both national and international level conditions and dynamics. This is stated more comprehensively by four levels: sub-national, national, EU and global level (Schmidt, 2009, p.211). This point stresses that some states have multi-level approaches and directions.

Related to all these points, the member states in the European foreign policy and processes can be viewed as “agenda setters, founders/late entrants, neutrals, side-liners, shapers or takers”. In this respect, Börzel (2002), identifies the member states in terms of their responses and strategies to Europeanization as: “*pace-setters* (called as leaders, pioneers, firstcomers), *foot-draggers* (called as laggards, latecomers), and *fence-sitters* (called as neutrals)”. With these in mind, member states have five choices in relation to European foreign policy:

1- “To ignore what is being done collectively and proceed on the basis of traditional

diplomatic independence.

2- To actively oppose or obstruct the attempt to create common positions.

3- To attempt to use European foreign policy to promote specific national purposes- i.e. uploading.

4- To take cues from the emergence of a majority consensus through institutional policy-making – i.e. downloading.

5- To take cues from the interplay with EU partners, whether as a whole or through various groups and bilateral relationships – i.e. cross-loading” (Wong and Hill, 2011).

To conclude, in the matter of interest representation, the member states can:

- Act individually if there is no room for realizing their interests at the EU level
- Upload their policies to the EU level, as an initiator or bargaining power
- Use the EU in terms of cost- benefit analysis, as savior or influential complement
- Impact others’ preferences and positions or make alliances inside the EU
- Act in alliances outside of the EU in terms of interests

2.1.5. The Degrees, Scopes and Limits of Europeanization of Foreign Policy

In general, when we look at Europeanization in the area of foreign policy, we see that there are two stages in the relationship between the EU and member states. If we ignore other scenarios such as direct coincide or co-occurrence of interests without the need for bargaining or arguing, states initially upload their preferences and interests to the EU level, which influence the union’s policies, and then states act in a competitive or cooperative manner to design the union’s policies. After that, in terms of the results at the EU level, as a second stage the downloading starts. In this process, policies are downloaded to the states, and they act in a manner of being part of European common policies (Börzel and Panke, 2016, pp.111-115).

But, even after the downloading process, the implementation or internalization processes of member states differ from one another. On this issue, Börzel and Panke (2016) emphasize that the downloading dimension of Europeanization of foreign policy is not *uniform* in the European member states. Rather, it has a *differential* effect across the members (p.116). This differential impact shows that each member state has distinct

process inside of them, which is related to what extent they are in compliance with the EU policy (Ladrech, 2010, pp.30-31).

With this in mind, measuring and deciding on the EU impact on the members and the Europeanization of foreign policy depend on the above-mentioned stages. Since Europeanization is a process, it is not appropriate to describe an issue as “it is Europeanized” or “it is not Europeanized”. Instead, it should be evaluated and presented with “degrees of Europeanization”.

According to Wong (2017), there are seven degrees of the Europeanization in the area of foreign policy:

1. “Significantly Europeanized
2. Willing to Europeanize, but still partial or slow process
3. Erratic/Unpredictable in the degree of Europeanization, either over time or between issue areas (or both): no cumulative effects visible
4. Consistently instrumental in the approach to Europeanization
5. Resistant to Europeanization – though may still display some degree of change
6. De- europeanizing- i.e. positively attempting to rid itself of any perceived restraints imposed by European foreign policy
7. Never significantly Europeanized” (Wong, 2017).

When it comes to the scope of Europeanization, this depends on the issue area in foreign policy, that is, whether it is a high or low policy matter. In the low politics matters of foreign policy, it is easier to reach common positions and to take common decisions, which indicates high degree of Europeanization. There is low degree of Europeanization in high politics issues due to the reasons of low possibility of convergence of interests among the member states.


Lastly, the limits of Europeanization in foreign policy are based on the possibility and capacity of the common policies. If the EU and its institutions are efficient in the area of foreign policy, it has a considerable way to pursue, but if not, it has limitations in its foreign policy creations and activities in all aspects. According to Magnette (2005), member states control the processes of EU foreign policy, so the ability of the union is not independent from member state governments. In this regard, states give priority to their own policies, the EU is not their initial preference, it is preferred when those states face their own limitations and so the EU level is used for national foreign policies as a

complement (Magnette, 2005, p.12). Thus, if the convergence point is not achieved by the EU, the Europeanization process is locked at that point. As a result, the limits of Europeanization are directly related to possibilities in convergence of interests of member states; in other words, interests determine the constraints.

2.2. The EU's Foreign Policy towards the Mediterranean Region

This section of the thesis defines the Mediterranean region and aims to explain the EU's regional foreign policies and the key dimensions of the Union's engagement with the region. In a historical overview, it presents the EU's main initiatives in relation to the Mediterranean region and consequences of them. Lastly, it assesses EU's foreign policy towards the region.

Figure 3: The Map of the EU and Mediterranean Region



Source: Created with mapchart.net

The Mediterranean region get its name from the sea on which it lies, known as the “the sea between the lands, inter-continental sea, that stretches from the Atlantic Ocean on the west to Asia on the east and separates Europe from Africa” (Salah and Boxer, 2019). From the perspective of the sea at the core, the European countries locate

on the northern coasts, whereas the countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East locate on the southern coast of the region.

Mediterranean member states of the EU include France, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, Greece and Croatia, Cyprus and Malta islands. Other European states in the region are Monaco, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina and Turkey. The region also includes Magreb countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, and Mashreg countries: Syria, Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. While there is a EU membership possibility for the countries in Europe, southern side of the region does not have this possibility. Albania, Montenegro and Turkey are among the candidate countries of the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential candidate (Europa, Countries). In addition, there is also a categorization of the states as European Mediterranean states, which refers to member states from the Mediterranean, and Mediterranean non-Member states (MNC), which refers to non-members (European Commission, Press Release).

The Mediterranean region is one of the most prominent and valuable regions for the EU not only for geographical reasons but also for historical, economic and strategic reasons. Europe, especially considering France, U.K., Spain and Italy, has considerable colonization history in the North Africa and Middle Eastern parts of the Mediterranean region. In fact, the colonization process in the Mediterranean region had begun in the latest years of the 18th century and lasted until the de-colonization period in the 1950s and 1960s (Borutta and Gekas, 2012). Therefore, this region has been under the effect of the past colonial experiences of Europe and thus even if the countries of that region gained their interdependence they are still viewed as periphery countries, as noted before they are seen as a periphery region for Europe in Table 1.

2.2.1. The EU's Regional Foreign Policies and Key Dimensions of the EU's Engagement with the Mediterranean Region

On the homepage of official website of EEAS, the regions and regional policies are presented under the title of *the EU in the World*. Under the part of the “*regions*”, it considers Africa, Europe and Central Asia, Asia, North America, Latin America and Caribbean, Pacific, Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In the part of *regional policies*, it covers “Black Sea Synergy, EU Arctic Policy, European Economic Area, Northern Dimension, EU facilitated dialogue: Belgrade-Pristina relations, Middle East

Peace Process, Eastern Partnership and European Neighbourhood Policy” (Europa, EEAS). Among them, MENA as a region and the Middle East Process and European Neighbourhood Policy as regional policies, are related to the relations between the EU and Mediterranean states.

Although the EU has different relations with different regions in the world, the Mediterranean region has different importance for the EU. The differences of the Southern Mediterranean region from the other regions can be explained with historical reasons, referring to the impact of colonialism and the value of the region for the interests of member states, geographical reasons, which consider the region’s location near to Europe and peripheral and economic relations, and lastly political-strategic reasons, relating to the member states’ policies to pursue their interests.

Regarding the policy adapted by the EU, EEAS states that “The policy of the European Union towards the North African and Middle Eastern countries seeks to encourage political and economic reform in each individual country in due respect for its specific features and regional cooperation among the countries of the region themselves and with the EU.” (EEAS, MENA).

When it comes to the key dimensions of relations with the region, these are related to the issues such as economic issues, trade issues, political and strategic issues, environment, culture, energy health and migration. In this respect, according to Pierros, Meunier and Abrams (2018), there are three key reasons to develop a Mediterranean policy for the EU:

- Economic reasons, trade cooperation, economic demands and dependencies
- Problems such as security based migration, environmental pollution
- US effect, balancing or conducting independent policies on the region (Pierros, Meunier and Abrams, 2018).

2.2.2. Historical Developments of the EU-MED Relations: Main Initiatives and Consequences

The relations between the EU (EEC) and the region started in the 1960s with the agreements with the Mediterranean states. The first was the association agreements with Greece and Turkey, and trade agreements with Israel. In the early years of the 1970s, the EU developed a regional dimension for the Mediterranean region and Global

Mediterranean Policy, Renewed Mediterranean Policy, Barcelona Process, European Neighbourhood Policy and Union for the Mediterranean.

2.2.2.1. The Global Mediterranean Policy (1972-1992)

After the term of bilateral agreements with the Mediterranean states in the decolonization years of 1960s and early 1970s, EEC came to the point of developing a uniform policy towards the region. Although the EEC-Med relations started in 1960s, in the words of Bicchi (2007), the Mediterranean region was “invented” by the Community in the 1970s within the logic of “union”. Different from the bilateral relations with the countries of the region, the EU wanted to develop a united and uniform policy which would include all the EEC members with the aims of economic and trade cooperation. In this regard, the European Commission and the Council developed the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) in 1972, and the first step of the new term of EU-Med relations started (European Commission, MEMO/94/74).

There were basically two reasons behind this motivation: a more comprehensive economic cooperation which would be in favour of the EEC in trade and other areas, and strategically creating an international role under the identity of EEC towards the Mediterranean region. According to the Commission, objectives of these agreements “Mediterranean non-member states” were:

- “free access for industrial goods on the Community markets
- preferential access for agricultural products
- economic, technical and financial co-operation”

In addition to these, the Commission pointed out that “financial protocols for development projects and economic cooperation in the fields of environment, scientific co-operation, industrial co-operation and training and technical assistance” were included in the Global Mediterranean Policy (European Commission, MEMO/94/74).

When we look at the international context at that time, the Cold War confrontation, impact of the years of detente, Arab-Israeli conflicts and oil crisis in 1973 were the main events that influenced the EEC-Med relations. In those times, due to the conflicts in the Middle East (ME) the attention of the community was on the Arab countries, thus this policy period mainly depended on the economic relations with these states. The policy was shaped mainly with the impact of France, in the aim of pursuing

its ME interests, and with the first enlargement process of the EEC, when the UK became member state, it started to play second shaper role in the region again for its national foreign policy interests of that times (Seeberg, 2011, p.4).

In the 1980s, the policy entered a passive term, because the focus of the attention was not on the Mediterranean region, but on the Euro-Arab relations due to the economic and political reasons, and there was no European country that would lead the policy towards the region. With the second enlargement process in 1981 (Greece) and 1986 (Spain and Portugal) new Med states entered the policy area as new actors that had interests in the Mediterranean region. However, Germany and its Eastern policies in Europe were more dominant in the Community. In addition, the period of end of the Cold War affected the EEC as well as the whole world, so relations with the Mediterranean region lost its motivation and momentum (Khader, 2013, p.14; European Commission, MEMO/94/74; Pierros et al, 2018).

To sum up, the first attempt in the Euro-Med policies was labelled as unsuccessful, because:

- It was based on economic- trade cooperation but only in favour of the Community not the Med states due to lack of agricultural framework
- The policy was presented as “global”, the Med region was seen as a whole region, but Albania and Libya were not included in this policy
- Lastly, the inequalities between the two regions and also the differences among the EEC states adaptation to this policy. The policy did not reduce the gap between the two sides of the Med (Khader, 2013, p.14; European Commission, MEMO/94/74).

2.2.2.2. Renewed/Redirected Mediterranean Policy (1992 – 1995)

Taking the Global Mediterranean Policy as a point of departure, the EU developed “Renewed Mediterranean Policy (RMP)” in 1992 with the European Commission’s proposal to the Council. It is also known as “Redirected Mediterranean Policy” in the formal documents. This had more comprehensive framework and new dimensions were added to the relations with the Mediterranean region (European Commission, MEMO/94/74). According to Commission, this policy included:

- “further limited concessions for agricultural exports covered by agreements (reduction to zero of duties within tariff quotas to be reached in 1993 instead of 1995; a 3 to 5 % annual increase in tariff quotas over the 1992-1995 period)
- a renewal of the Financial Protocols with Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries amounting to around 2 billion ECU (1 ECU = approx. 1.2 USD) in grants from the Community budget and European Investment Bank loans for the 1992-96 period; as well as two innovative elements
- a special financial envelope destined to support structural adjustment operations in these countries (300 million ECU for the 1992-96 period)
- special funds to cater for horizontal co-operation, co-operation activities of interest to all MNC (Mediterranean non-member countries) (1,8 billion ECU in EIB loans as well as substantial budget funds: approx. 300-350 million ECU over the 1992-96 period) activities of a regional nature and environmental projects have priority.” In addition, several cooperation programs with municipalities, institutions, enterprises, media, universities, and students and were adopted such as (MED-URBS), (MED-CAMPUS), (MED-INVEST) and (MED-MEDIA) European Commission, Press Release). Moreover, cooperation on environmental pollution and human rights issues and with civil society were the other different areas of this policy (Khader, 2013, p.15).

When we look at the international developments during this new policy initiative, new international system after the end of the Cold War, the Balkan Wars and the Gulf Crisis were the main issues that affected the EU's Med policy. In this period, the driven factor in the regional relations was security concerns, thus new priorities of the EU were declared as “stability and prosperity” in the Med region. Because, As Grougel and Hout (1999) underline, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean region means stability and prosperity in Europe. However, in the post-Cold war era, the focus of attention was on the enlargement process with the Central and Eastern Europe countries, thus importance of the Med policies declined again (Grougel and Hout 1999).

2.2.2.3. Barcelona Declaration and Barcelona Process

In 1992, the Council decided to develop a new policy structure for the relations with Mediterranean countries. Due to this motivation, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference was organized in November 1995, and as a result of this conference

Barcelona Declaration was launched. This time, the new policy framework was named as “partnership” which would be depended on “political, security, economic, cultural, social and human affairs”. Therefore, the new process is known as the “Barcelona Process” and as the “Euro-Med Partnership” (European Commission, International Cooperation) began.

When we look at the critical events at the international context at that time, the continuing effects of the end of the Cold War, the enlargement process in Europe, wars in the Balkans and the developments in the Middle East are among the important developments. The new partnership structure was organized as the Euro-Magreb Partnership considering Magreb countries, but due to the events in the Middle East, the EU had to contain Mashreg countries and several other ones. As a conclusion, the Barcelona Process considered: 15 EU member states, 3 Magreb states (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), Mashreg states (Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Lebanon and Syria, Israel and Malta, Cyprus and Turkey (Khader, 2013).

According to the Declaration, the countries agreed on these objectives stated as “to establish a comprehensive partnership among the participants the EuroMediterranean partnership through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension, these being the three aspects of the EuroMediterranean partnership” (Barcelona Declaration). Thus, three areas of partnership were explained:

- 1- “Political & security partnership: Establishing a common area of peace & stability and strengthening dialog for conflicts
- 2- Economic & financial partnership: Creating an area of shared prosperity, and establishing a free trade zone
- 3- Partnership in social, cultural and Human affairs: Developing human ressources, promoting understanding between cultures & exchanges between civil societies” (Barcelona Declaration).

In this period, the main active European state was Spain due to its geographical and historical links with the region (Holden, 2009). Spain had the leader position among the other member states. When it came to the years of 2000, the developments of September 11 terrorist attacks, the war in Afghanistan, the Iraq War in 2003, and the Palestine-Israel conflicts affected the Euro-Med relations and the attention of focus turned to other areas. In addition, all the ideals declared and agreed on did not have successful ends (Khader, 2013). They stayed on the papers and as ideals.

2.2.2.4. The European Neighbourhood Policy

In the beginning of the 2000s, the focus point of the EU was on the Central and Eastern European countries, because of the enlargement process. As noted, in 2003 when the first European Strategy document presented, “neighbourhood” was among the three key areas together with “motivation and multilateralism”. In parallel with these, the EU was in search of finding a new way to adopt the forthcoming process with the new members and new borders. In 2004, ten countries that include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Hungary, Czech R., Poland, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta, became the EU member states as a result of the biggest enlargement in the EU. Afterwards, the European Commission presented the European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper in 2004 underlying the 2003 Strategy paper and depending on its Communication “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A new Framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” (European Commission, Neighbourhood Strategy Paper).

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was adopted in 2004, it considers Eastern Neighbour countries (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and Southern Neighbour countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Israel, Palestine A., Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Syria). The aim of the ENP is defined briefly as “possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration” (EEAS, ENP).

The logic behind the neighbourhood policy was at the ground of common interests of the whole union considering economic and security concerns. It should be noted that this policy was developed with regards to the countries that do not have a possibility of membership to the EU but have crucial natural resources or transition locations. When we look at the member states, in the ENP process the leading state was Germany due to its certain interests in Eastern European countries. France and the U.K. are also other EU member states that have interests first in the Southern and then Eastern European countries.

Thus, the reasons of consideration for both Eastern and South-Eastern countries depended on counter-balancing Germany (Copsey, 2008). The main interests of Germany are “free trade with ENP countries, cooperation on energy issues, migration control, fight against organised crime, strengthening of cross-sectoral topics and political dialogue through involvement of civil society”; whereas the interests of France are “energy supply,

migration control, fight against crime” and UK has similar economic interests (Lippert, 2008, p.10).

The ENP was revised in 2011 and then 2015 after the events of the Arab Spring and the developments in the neighbours. Depending on values of “democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights”, this policy aims “prosperity, stability and security” of all countries, and after the revisions it presents its key priorities as “economic development for stabilisation; the security dimension and migration and mobility” (European Commission, ENP). Following the ENP, additional regional initiatives such as Eastern Partnership (2008), Black Sea Synergy (2007) and Union for Mediterranean (2008) were formed (EEAS, ENP).

2.2.2.5. Union for Mediterranean

The Barcelona process of 1995 was launched again as “Union for Mediterranean” in 2008 at the Summit in Paris. Union of Mediterranean was established as an intergovernmental organization which contains 28 member states and 15 Mediterranean countries. Libya has observer status, and Syria has been suspended since 2011 (UfM Secretariat). It was previously designed as the “Mediterranean Union” by the then French presidential candidate Nicholas Sarkozy, considering only Mediterranean EU member states and Southern Mediterranean countries (Khader, 2013). But, because of the conflicts between member states on the containment of this initiative, a bargaining process started mainly between Germany and France. As a result of that, the policy reorganized and named as the “Union for Mediterranean” considering all EU member states and Southern Mediterranean countries. It has several projects in the areas of “economy, environment, energy, health, migration, education and social relations” (EEAS, UfM). Its main cooperation areas were defined as:

- a) “De-pollution for the Mediterranean
- b) The security and safety of maritime and land highways
- c) Civil protection
- d) Alternative energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan
- e) Higher education and research, Euro-Mediterranean University

- f) Mediterranean Business development initiative” (European Commission, International Cooperation).

At the 10th anniversary of the Union for the Mediterranean, HR for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini declared that:

This is a unique space for dialogue among actors that sometimes have this as the only and unique opportunity to talk among themselves, about our common interests and common objectives - security, human development - and to work and focus on common, concrete projects, ... We all want to find political solutions to the crises we are facing in Syria, in Libya, in the Middle East (EEAS, Ten Years of Action Oriented Agenda within UfM).

It has gained a more institutionalized structure with the UfM secretariat established in 2010, which has a co- presidency system between north and south. It considers all the areas and objectives of the Barcelona process and also has more comprehensive cooperation areas. However, due to the lack of will on the attendance and political conflicts in the Arab world, it has been inefficient than expected.

2.3. Assessment of the EU’s Foreign Policy towards the Mediterranean Region

After de-colonization, the EU member states started to make bilateral agreements with the Southern Mediterranean countries in 1960s. With the beginning of the 1970s, the union decided to develop a more holistic perspective for its relations with the Med region and the first initiative, the Global Mediterranean Policy, was established and until the end of the 2000s, the European regional policy towards the Med region developed to the policy of Union for Mediterranean. From the first one to the last policy, there are three common points in the formulation and implementation of these policies: convergence on the common interests, expectations and preferences, external developments and international context, and bargaining and shaping of the policies.

With respect to all policies that were developed, there are three indicator points to understand the EU foreign regional policy towards the Med region. The first one relates to the European regional policy creation and member states decisions. When we look at

all these policies explained before, all of them are the products of the union as a whole, i.e. they are the products of the convergence of interests. They were all in the interests of the member states in several aspects, but more importantly they were adopted due to the reasons of common threats, problems and opportunities. For this reason, member states utilized the union in their decisions as a second image/identity and benefited from its normative significance. Creating regional policy for another region, the EU lead inter-regional relations and realize both union-level and individual member state level interests. Thus, these policy creations are referred to as “saviour” for Hoffman, “policy formation and institutional choice” for Moravcsik, “normative power” for constructivism and “ideational inter-governmentalism” for Bicchi.

The second point is the impact of geographical regions in the EU. The member state motivations were based on their geographical locations and positions. Spain, for instance, as a Med country was an active player in the Barcelona process; Germany was outstanding state due to its Eastern relations in the Neighbourhood policy, and France was a policy entrepreneur in the Union for Mediterranean policy. Thus, geographical location of EU members is a determinant factor in the EU foreign policies.

The third point is bargaining between states and formulation of the policies. The Global Mediterranean Policy was mainly under the impact of the Euro-Arab relations but at the end of the policy formulation it was declared as global. In the Neighbourhood Policy, there was Eastern Mediterranean neighbours-Southern Mediterranean neighbours division in its content, but at the end the policy was established covering both sides. Lastly, in the UfM, firstly it was created considering only Med European states, but after the bargaining process between France and mainly Germany, it was declared as the Union for Mediterranean considering all EU states as one part.

Furthermore, as Euro-Med relations do not have a membership perspective for the Med countries, the EU conducted a different policy with the Med region compared to the others such as Western Balkans. However, in the same line of conditionality logic the EU used economic-social prosperity commitments and further cooperation packets as political instruments, which refers to soft-power and low policy concepts. In these policy periods, it is appropriate to say that both material and ideational factors were important. The EU underlined the values and promoted principles of democracy, human rights and rule of law as well as pursued its economic, security and strategic interests. Moreover, as explained in each policy period, the states acted in terms of both their internal preferences

and external international events and periods. This refers to the “two level game” logic that consider national and international areas.

According to Bicchi (2007), there were two up and two down periods in the EU-Med relations. The Global Mediterranean Policy was the first up period, then it turned to a period of down. The Barcelona process in 1990s is the second up period but then again, the period downed. In addition to Bicchi’s evaluation, the period after the Arab Spring events and the migration crisis in 2010s can be accepted as the third up period for the EU-Med relations. This new period will be explained in the next chapter evaluating the Libyan case.



CHAPTER III

THE CASE OF LIBYA

This chapter, first, provides a brief overview of the history of Libya and the period of the rule under Qaddafi. Then, it focuses on the origins of the so-called Arab Spring events and the EU-Med relations as these events served as the first litmus test for the EU foreign policy in its reformed form as a result of the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, it assesses the Europeanization of EU foreign policy towards Libya by examining the situation in Libya and the Libyan internationalized-civil war, considering both the member states and the EU level.

Figure 4: Map of Libya



Source: CIA world fact book, Libya

3.1. A Brief Overview of the History of Libya

Libya is one of the most important and largest countries in Africa, with its almost 1.8 million square kilometers. As a North African country, as it is seen on the map of Libya above, Libya is located in the Maghreb region, bordering Tunisia and Algeria on the east, countries of the Sahel region such as Niger, Chad, and Sudan on the south, and Egypt on the east. Although, it has considerably a long coastline (1,770 km) along the Mediterranean Sea, over 90% of the country's land area is desert or semi-desert. Because of that, the distribution of the country's population concentrates mostly on the coastal side of the country. According to the estimated numbers of 2018, in terms of land using, agricultural land rate is 8.8%, and the forest rate is just 0.1% over total of its lands. 81.3% of the total population is urban population, and capital city of Tripoli, Benghazi and Misratah are the main urban areas (The World Fact Book- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2022; UN-Habitat, 2022).

In comparison to other Southern Mediterranean countries, Libya holds a more significant and strategic position for the EU due to historical, geographical, and geopolitical reasons. One of the main importance of Libya for the EU depends on its location, because it is very close to the EU states on the southern coastal of the EU such as Italy, the Italian island of Lampedusa, Greece and Malta. This feature is known as “geographical proximity” in official documents of the EU, e.g. in the context of ENP, and Libya's proximity to the EU includes not only the EU's concerns on bilateral relations with Libya, economic concerns and sharings in the Mediterranean basin, but also covers the EU's security concerns and relations with other African and Middle Eastern countries. Thus, the proximity plays an important role on Libya's transit country position in migration issue and other security-based problems, as well as its position as a market for the EU member states and commercial relations with them.

Libya is important for the EU as Libya has great reserves of natural resources such as petroleum, natural gas and gypsum (CIA, 2022). With the greatest proven oil reserves in Africa and the ninth-largest in the world, Libya is a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 1962 and all of these makes the oil reserves as the driving force of the country (Aljazeera, 2011a). Moreover, due to its natural gas reserves, Libya is ranked 21st in the world. Therefore, the oil and gas industry accounts for over 60% of total country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and and more than 70% of government revenues (CIA, 2022; Aljazeera, 2011a).

Prior to the discovery of oil in the late 1950s, Libya was thought to be lacking of natural resources and constrained by its desert land. To keep its economy functioning, the country was basically reliant on foreign aid and imports, but, the discovery of petroleum altered everything. As Barltrop (2019, p. 9) points out, after the first discovery in 1959, exports started in 1961, and production rates changed in relation to the political situation in the country and its foreign policy between 1965 and 2018. As he indicated in his study, there was an acceleration in rates of daily output up to the 3 million barrels per day (mb/d), and a sharp decrease happened after 1970s. Between 1980 and 2010, there was relatively stable production rates which refers to 1.5 mb/d, but the 2011 Libyan crisis decreased the rates under 500b/d, as well as the rates of natural gas production (pp.9-14). In addition, he underlined that there were a lot of foreign firms in Libya, namely “BP, Chevron, CNPC, Eni, Marathon, Occidental, OMV, Repsol, Shell, Statoil, Total, and Wintershall” and they belong to European states (Barltrop, 2019).

Figure 5: Regions and Major oil and gas pipelines of Libya



Source: Oxford Analytica

The history of Libya dates back to the ancient times. As seen in the map above, it has three historical provinces namely Tripolitania in the west, Cyrenaica in the east and

Fezzan in the south. As the regions reflect former borders, the colors on flag of Libya reflect the country's three main regions: red denotes Fezzan, black denotes Cyrenaica, and green denotes Tripolitania; and Islam, the country's major religion, is represented with a crescent and a star (CIA, 2022; BBC, 2021). The regions and locations of Libyan resources can help us understand the current situation in Libya, as they are the indicators of why the struggling powers are located on certain areas and why the country was split up in terms of conflicting interests in these regions.

The Imazighen (Berbers) are thought to have been the first people to settle in Libya, in the 7th century BC Phoenicians and then Charthage ruled the Tripolitania. After the period of Greeks, it was conquered by Romans in 74 BC and by Arabs in AD 643. The Ottoman period began in the 16th century and ended in 1911, after which the Italian period began in Libya. Throughout World War I, there was ongoing resistance to the Italian occupation. The period of Italian colonization lasted until the Italian defeat in the Second World War; then France and UK hold the territories. Finally, under the rule of King Idris Al-Sanusi, Libya became independent in 1951 as a United Kingdom of Libya (BBC, 2021; Aljazeera, 2011a).

As of 2021, Libya's population is estimated to be about 7 million, with nearly 60% of the population being Libyans, 13.8% Bedouins, 7.7% Egyptians, 6.8% Berbers and others. Sunni Muslims make up the majority of the population, which refers to 96.6%, who primarily follow Arabic culture. Nearly 3% of the population is Christian, with the remaining 0.7 percent belonging to other faiths including Buddhist, Hindu and Jewish (Data.un.org, 2022; Britannica, 2021). However, tribal identities of the country, including mainly Berbers, Arabs and other African tribes such as Tubu and Tuareg, cause a fragmented structure in Libya, having a constant impact on the Libyan state and causing instability and conflictual divisions. As a result, Libya's tribal structure has played an essential role in the country's political situation throughout its history. As stated, giving Libya contains around 140 tribes, but only 30 of them are influential (Brittanica, 2021; Apps, 2011)

In the history of Libya, colonialism is an undeniable fact and in order to understand and explain the policies of the EU member states regarding Libya, colonialism should be taken into consideration. As generally known, colonialism is divided into two waves, the first of which had begun in the 15th century and focused on America, and the second of which had begun in the 19th century and focused on Asia and Africa. In the first one, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Britain and France were the main players, and in

the second new actors entered the game as new players such as Germany and Italy after their political unification. Thus, De Souza (1986) explains colonialism by using “core and periphery” approach, which refers to colonizer and colonized sides respectively, underlining that the imperial expansion of European states escalated in Africa after 1880, and in 1914 nearly 96% of Africa’s land were colonized (pp.14-19).

In the context of Libya, Italy was the main European colonizer who called Mediterranean Sea as “mare nostrum/ our sea”. In addition, after the defeat of Italy in World War II, Britain and France played were the other colonizers in Libya. When we compare the two, France has a stronger stake in Libya due to its wholistic African politics and economic interests. With its limited interests and lack of need for African states to support its position at the UN, as well as its solid connections with the United States, the United Kingdom differs from France (Gegout, 2017, p.87). Moreover, apart from the European powers, the Soviet Union and the United States were other important powers struggling on Libya until it became an independent state (O’Sullivan, 2018). On this historical basis, all these countries have appeared as parties involved in the recent Libyan conflict, as we will discuss in the following sections. According to O’Sullivan (2018, p.88), Libya is a country which emerged from “power struggles and colonial rivalries” of European states, thus its history should be always taken into account to understand today’s conflicts in the country.

While the colonial era came to an end gradually after the WWII and the decolonization period ended in 1975, there are discussions about if it really ended or not. For instance, Gegout (2017), in her book titled *Why Europe Intervenes in Africa: Security, Prestige and Legacy of Colonialism* focuses on the roles of European powers in wars in the African continent and how their interests and norms are utilized in these interventions, criticizing the dichotomy between norms and interests. She adopts a realist, constructivist, and neo-colonialist approach, arguing that the main motives behind these interventions are European states’ interests including security, economic, prestige and humanitarianism, and also their norms of legality, Eurocentrism and neo-colonialism (pp.3-15).

To sum up, there are two factors that makes Libya an important country: its geography and natural resources, and these factors directly match with economic and security-based interests of the European member states. The EU is the main trade partner of Libya, so the trade is among the important part of the Libya relations. As stated before, although Libya is not included or participated in the first Euro-Mediterranean policies,

except its observer status in the Union for Mediterranean (UfM), and does not have an association agreement with the EU, but the country is significant and unignorable part of the EU-Med relations (European Commission, Libya).

3.2. Libya under Gaddafi Rule and the EU Relations with Libya until the Arab Spring

In Libya, King Idris Al-Sanusi was overthrown by the so-called bloodless military coup by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in 1969, and the Libyan Arab Republic was declared. With the end of the monarchy, a new era began in Libya under Gaddafi's rule, which would continue for 42 years until the 2011 Libyan civil war. During Gaddafi's authoritarian rule other political parties were prohibited. He developed a strategy and governing model considering both "Islamic socialism" and "Arab nationalism". In order to defend these, he stripped Libya away foreign military bases, including the American and the British ones. As a way of supporting socialism, he nationalized country's own resources which mainly refer to the oil sector. He also deported native Italian and other foreign communities in 1970. He declared his idea of the "Arab Socialist Union", and pursued policies to bring Libya and other Arab states, mainly Egypt and Syria, together on common grounds, however he did not succeed. In 1975, he wrote his *Green Book* in which he explained his ideology and his solutions to the problems of Libya. In 1977, "people's revolution" was declared and Libya officially became "The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" (Britannica, 2021; Aljazeera, 2011a; CIA, 2022).

While 1970s witnessed positive agendas and new policy declarations of Gaddafi, in the 1980s problems started to emerge for Libya due to its foreign relations and policies. Gaddafi had a position against imperialism and he struggled to create an Arab union. Yet, at the same time, he used oil resources and wealth of the country as a political tool in the country's foreign relations. By using the revenues of resources, on the one hand, he promoted his policies inside Libya, which was beneficial for the Libyans in terms of the prosperity levels; on the other hand, he pursued policies such as providing support to terrorist activities by financing terrorist groups in other countries. Libya's involvement of Chad civil war, several bombing events and downing of airplanes in different states were outstanding issues of the 1980s. Because of the accusations of Libya's involvement of terrorist attacks, in 1988, known as the Lockerbie plane bombing, the US imposed an

oil embargo and the UNSC imposed sanctions with several resolutions between 1992 and 1996. With these sanctions, an isolation period began for Libya and Gaddafi, which had negative effects on both Libya's politics and economy (CIA, 2022; Asser, 2011).

In 2001, Libya took responsibility of the bombings, by sending a letter to the UN. As a result of that, in 2003 the UN lifted the sanctions, and Libya paid compensations not only for Lockerbie events but also for other events, such as the Berlin bombings, to the families of the people who had been killed. Owing to this "accepted responsibility", Libya became active in the international arena again and diplomatic relations started with the US and European states (Britannica, 2021; Aljazeera, 2011a). The arms agreements with France and cooperation on a migration agreement with Italy were among them. As Perrin (2018) underlines, migration issue was another political tool for Gaddafi, so he used Libya's transit country position to bargain with European states, and the agreements he made determined the impact of migration issue. In the normalization process with the Western states, Gaddafi's renunciation of WMD's (weapons of mass destruction) was another important factor (Aljazeera, 2011b). In addition to these, bilateral diplomatic visits started with European states, Prime Minister of Italy apologized for the past colonization process and \$5billion compensation agreement was signed between Libya and Italy (BBC, 2021).

In 2009, Gaddafi became the president of the African Union (AU), and he gave his first speech, which lasted an hour and a half, at the 64th UN General Assembly meeting that year. He started his speech criticizing the veto rights of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, inequality between states, lack of efficiency of the UN against 65 wars that have happened since the beginning of UNSC, and invalidity of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Referring to the permanent members Gaddafi said: "No country, therefore, has the right to interfere in the affairs of any Government, be it democratic or dictatorial, socialist or capitalist, reactionary or progressive... Those Powers never use any resolutions against themselves. They are, however, used against us. Such use... has generated wars and violations of the sovereignty of independent States. It has led to war crimes and genocides." (Africanews, 2017). In addition, he emphasized that Libya prevented migration flows to Italy and that Libya put Al-Qaida members in Libyan jails, after Italian prime minister apologized and committed paying 20 years-compensation. In his long speech, he also demanded a seat for the African Union at the UNSC, and he said that "Colonization should be punished"

and compensations should be paid to “Third World countries”, mainly to Africa (Africanews, 2017).

In a nutshell, the Gaddafi era has two distinct dimensions. During his rule, Libya saw its prosperous and most affluent period in history, and he had noteworthy and well-founded criticisms about colonialism, injustice and structure of the international system. In fact, observing the reality in Libya after Gaddafi, one could understand how his attitudes and assertions may have made sense in a variety of circumstances. However, his ties with terrorism, human rights crimes, as well as the consequences of an aggressive foreign policy and pursuing autocratic rule, earned him the title of 42-year dictator and Libya the title of “maverick state.” (BBC, 2011). The study explains how Libya, an oil-rich maverick state, has become a war-torn conflictual state in the following sections.

3.3. The Arab Spring Events and the EU-Med Relations: The First Test Area of the EU’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Lisbon Process

A series of protests and anti-government movements that began in the late of 2010s in MENA countries, also known as the EU neighbour Southern Mediterranean region, were called as the Arab Spring. Given the importance of the region for the EU in terms of geopolitics, history, security, and strategic reasons, the uprisings in the countries of the region have also affected the EU policies. The Arab Spring started just after the Lisbon Treaty, which was a reform treaty for the EU’s foreign policy, and the Arab Spring emerged as an issue that needed to be tackled by the EU immediately. Thus, the Arab Spring became the first test bench for the EU foreign policy in the post-Lisbon era.

In fact, the EU was caught by surprise with these uprisings because, as mentioned before, its entire motivation, which based on economic assistance and reform policies, were developed with the goal of ensuring the security, stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean region. The unexpected new situation in the region has been the indicator of inefficiency and insufficiency of the past initiatives and projections of the Euro-Med relationship despite the institutionalist structure and encouraging mechanisms for the countries of the region. The emergence of uprisings was due mainly to economic problems and social injustice, which had been critical features of the EU’s policies and perceptions of the region prior to the uprisings. Indeed, according to Hollis (2012), these

uprisings emerged as a result of the EU policies, because these policies helped autocratic rulers instead of the people of these countries.

The first protests began in Tunisia in December 2010 when a man named Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire with the intention to protest the government, and then the waves of protests spread to other countries including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Morocco, Kuwait, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania and Sudan. The anti-government reaction that started in Tunisia became an inspiration point for the following protests in these countries. Initially, events began as series of protestor movements and demonstrations in the Arab countries. The EU perceived them as peaceful resistance movements and, as Dandashly (2014) points out, “as a window for democracy”, as their intention was to demonstrate against the existing system with economic problems and against the injustice of authoritarian regimes. In the European Commission’s official document on the EU’s response to the Arab Spring in December 2011, the driving factors of these uprisings were stated as “dignity, democracy and social justice” (EU Commission, 2011).

Yet, in time, these demonstrations caused political turmoil in the MENA countries. While these events were viewed initially as revolutionary waves of freedoms, democracy and human rights, government overthrows and civil wars resulting from violent responses from the governments caused disappointment. Then, these uprisings, or as Börzel et al (2014) points out “Arabellions”, became a crucial problem for both the region and the EU.

Following the uprising in Tunisia, also known as the “Jasmine Revolution”, which was against Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime, similar protests against Hosni Mubarak’s regime began in Egypt due to the problems of poverty and political restrictions. In both cases, the EU waited a long time and could not speak with one voice. Following the overthrow of their leaders, the EU began engaging with these countries. In the case of Tunisia, as a result of the escalation of the demonstrations that had started in December 2010, Ben Ali had to resign and flee to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011. Eventually, on January 17, the EU High Representative Cathrine Ashton and Commissioner for ENP Stefan Füle issued a joint statement on the situation in Tunisia, stating that the EU condemned the violent repression of protests and supported a peaceful democratic transition (Aljazeera, 2021; Börzel, Dandashly and Risse, 2015; European Council, 2011).

In the case of Egypt, a joint statement was made by the leaders of France, Britain and Germany, expressing “deep concerns” on the uprisings and stressing an urgent need for economic and political reform process. This statement was interpreted as the EU’s inability to show a united response, despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 required it (Dempsey, 2011). It was followed by a statement by the HR Cathrine Ashton on the situation in Egypt, which expressed concerns about political turmoil and violent responses, calling for democratic transition by reforms and fair elections on February 3 2011 (European Council, 2011). Similarly, only after the resignation of Hosni Mubarak and after the country was taken over by a military council on February 11, 2011 that the EU began to engage with Egypt with increased funds and financial instruments (European Commission, 2011).

While some EU member countries were ignoring what was the happening during these crises, others played active roles due to their national interests and bilateral relations with the MENA countries. France was one of the EU countries that supported authoritarian leaders in these countries, including Tunisia and Egypt. Thus, France was criticized for its close relations with the dictators. An EU official argued that this was related to the logic of “better the dictator you know than the dictator you don’t”. Besides France, the UK and Italy were accused for having close relations with “friendly dictators”, disregarding EU values and policy aims for the region. Another point of criticism in this regard has been about the EU-US relationship, which claims that there was an implicit accord between the EU and the US, which prefers to have an authoritarian regime in the countries of the region, rather than a possibly fragile democracy (Traynor and Willsher, 2011; Knight and Mudge, 2011).

In the uprisings in both Tunisia and Egypt, the EU member states, on the one hand, joined the EU level on common grounds and gave the image of unity by declaring deep concerns and imposing economic sanctions. On the other hand, they maintained close bilateral relations with these countries, whether they were under a dictatorship or not, for the sake of their national interests. This refers to two-level games and prioritizing national interests. This dualism between norms and interests of the EU member states towards the MENA region is criticized by Roccu and Voltolini (2018). For Roccu and Voltolini (2018), the EU foreign policy towards the region has always viewed a connection between security and stability; in other words, the EU promotes the political stability of the region’s countries in order to ensure its own security. For that reason, democracy

promotion has been the triggering factor of the EU's security and stability dimension (Dandashly, 2018). Thus, the EU has two modes of participation: material engagement, which includes all forms of financial assistance, and discursive engagement, which includes democracy promotion, norms, and socialization. These are critical in understanding why the EU urges the countries for reform and emphasizes democracy concerns. Related to this, the EU uses positive and negative conditionality in both of its engagement modes (Dandashly, 2018; Roccu and Voltolini, 2018). For instance, in Tunisia, both engagement methods were applied, however in Egypt, only material engagement found application. Egypt was evaluated as a different case by the EU, because it has never been faced with negative conditionality, instead financial assistance was given. Thus, another aspect of EU foreign policy that has been criticized is the execution of differing policies for different countries (Dandashly, 2018).

At the end of 2011, as the EU's response to Arab Spring, the Commission pointed to constructing "deep democracy" and providing "sustainable economic development and growth" as the main challenges in the region and explained its policies with regards to different countries (European Commission MEMO/11/918, 2011). The first cases of the Arab uprisings were experienced in Tunisia and then Egypt and they both shared similarities, such as leaders' stepping down at the end, and differences due to each country's different internal dynamics. The Libyan case has been the more different case when compared to Tunisian and Egyptian cases, as relatively a different picture emerged when it came to the Libya uprisings.

3.4. The Libyan Uprisings, the Civil War and the EU's Responses

Following the events in Tunisia and Egypt, the so-called Arab Spring uprisings spread to Libya in early 2011, with protests and demonstrations against Muammar Gaddafi's rule beginning on February 15th in Benghazi. Initially, protests in Benghazi were small-scale, and demonstrators were referred to as "pro-democracy warriors", while Gaddafi called them as "armed gangsters" (Aljazeera, 2011b). After a short time, anti-Gaddafi events spread throughout Tripoli, Libya's capital, and due to the desire for change, internal and international pressures began on Gaddafi, urging him to step down.

By the time tensions escalated, and because the Gaddafi regime responded violently to the demonstrators and used force against them, the situation in Libya turned into a civil war. Gaddafi was strongly criticized and accused of human rights abuses and

killing of innocent civilians. Violence in the country escalated and humanitarian situation worsened, international community handled this with the intention of protecting Libyan citizens (BBC, Libya Timeline, 2011, CNN, 2011).

When it comes to the responses to the Libyan crisis, on February 20th, 2011, HR/VP Catherine Ashton declared her deep concerns and condemned violence in Libya (European Union, Declaration by HR Catherine Ashton). In the context of member states, the first and the most outstanding response came from France. On February 23rd, 2011, France called for economic sanctions and on February 25th French President Nicholas Sarkozy said that “Mr. Gaddafi must leave” (Reuters, 2011). The US and the UK also supported France. The first international reaction was about freezing assets of Gaddafi, which came from the US on February 25th. Then, on February 26th, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1970 was adopted unanimously by permanent members and non-permanent European members including Germany and Portugal, and sanctions containing “arms embargo, travel ban and assets freeze” were imposed on Libya. With the UNSC Resolution 1970, Libya was also referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Some of the main statements of the Resolution 1970 (2011) as follows:

- “Expressing grave concern at the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and condemning the violence and use of force against civilians,
- Expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians,
- Welcoming the condemnation by the Arab League, the African Union, and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
- Recalling the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population” (UNSC, Res.1970, 2011).

In accordance with the Resolution 1970, on February 28th, the EU imposed sanctions including arms embargo and freezing assets. On February 28th, the UK declared a need for no-fly zone, and on March 10th, British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicholas Sarkozy sent a letter to the EU Council President Herman van Rompuy, requesting additional sanctions against Gaddafi in support of Libyans who suffered as a result of the ongoing crisis and to ensure the country’s stability (The Guardian, 2011). The special international summit on the Libyan crisis ended with no

approval for Britain's and France's requests for no-fly zone, military presence and use of force in Libya on March 11th. In a press conference President Herman Van Rompuy said that "we do not live in a colonial era anymore where foreign powers intervene where they like" (Louati, 2011; Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012, Rettman, 2021).

Yet, on March 12th, the Arab League called for no-fly zone (NFZ) over Libya. Then immediately, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 was adopted on March 17th, which imposed sanctions including arms embargo, asset freezing and ban on flights, and imposed "no-fly zone" different from the previous resolution, underlining protection of the Libyan people and ceasefire. Member states of the UN were authorized to "take all necessary measures", "acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements", under its title of protection of civilians and no fly zone (UNSC Resolution 1973, 2011).

This decision was associated with humanitarian intervention, referring to the principle of Responsibility to Protect which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005. In the UNSC, there was no veto; ten countries voted in favour: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, and South Africa, while five countries abstained: Brazil, China, India, Russia, and Germany (UNSC Resolution 1973, 2011).

On March 11th, France and then the United States and the United Kingdom launched the "Operation Odyssey Dawn" to impose a no-fly zone. On March 18th, the Libyan Foreign Minister said that "We decided on an immediate ceasefire and on an immediate stop to all military operations," he said, adding "(Libya) takes great interest in protecting civilians". That was an announcement of ceasefire, yet the fighting continued (Aljazeera, 2011c). On March 19th France and then the UK and the US started air strikes. NATO took command of the mission on March 24th, and NATO-led "Operation Unified Protector (OUP)" started. OUP included:

- "the enforcement of an arms embargo on the high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent the transfer of arms, related material and mercenaries to Libya,
- the enforcement of a no-fly-zone in order to prevent any aircraft from bombing civilian targets; and
- air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas" (NATO, Operations and Missions: past

and future, 2021). As a result of the military intervention to Libya, in October 2011, Gaddafi was killed and the UNSC ended military intervention, and the OUP was completed on October 27th.

As far as the EU is concerned, in terms of the Resolution 1970, the Council of the EU imposed sanctions, including visa bans, freezing assets and economic resources of listed persons and government. Also following the UNSC Resolution 1973, the EU decided to impose additional sanctions (Kroll, 2015). In 2011, the EU decided on EUFOR Libya “European Union military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya” (European Council decision 011/210/CFSP, 2011), but due to the lack of UN approval it could not be launched (EEAS, EUFOR Libya). After NATO’s take over, the Libyan crisis was tried to be solved through the UN activities. In September 2011, United Nations Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL) was created by the UNSC resolution 2009 (2011), and by the UNSC resolution 2629 (2022) its mandate is extended until July 2022 (UNMSIL, Security Council Resolutions and Statements, 2022).

To sum up, the military/humanitarian intervention in Libya in 2011, the first and last case among the Arab Spring uprisings, was one of the fundamental facts of the EU’s foreign policy toward Libya. Regarding the intervention, the EU was criticized with three arguments: first, the CSDP was criticized arguing that it died owing to a lack of operational capability and NATO’s takeover. Second, Germany’s abstention in the UNSC highlighted the divisions within the EU and inconsistency of the European foreign policy. That was the second important division after the 2003 Iraq decision, in which France and Germany voted against whereas the UK voted in favour. Lastly, on the issue of Responsibility to Protect the EU was criticized for the reasons, timing, implementation, and consequences of the Libyan intervention. It could be argued that in order to justify and legitimize national interests the humanitarian reasons were used by European countries. Furthermore, the timing and execution of the attacks were questioned, and at the end the intervention did not prevent violence or solve the crisis (Abomo, 2019; Gottwald, 2012; Gözen Ercan and Günay 2019; Kelleci and Bodur Ün, 2017; Louati, 2011; O’Sullivan, 2018; Laatikainen and Smith, 2006).

3.5. Europeanization of the EU Foreign Policy in the Case of Libya

Even after the 2011 Libyan intervention, which revealed disagreements among the EU member states, the member states continued to pursue their own national foreign policies regarding the Libyan crisis. However, at the same time, at the EU level, several initiatives and new instruments were launched, which supported reform processes and transition to democracy in the countries of Southern Mediterranean region in accordance with the EU security and stability context mentioned before.

In this regard, the EU presented three new initiatives as a response to the Arab Spring:

- a) “A joint communication which was the EU’s first response to the Arab Spring events”, proposed in March 2011 by the European Commission, titled “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, also labelled as 3Ms policy which means money, markets and mobility in the region.
- b) The second joint communication was presented in May 2011 titled “A New Response to Changing Neighbourhood”. In this respect, the EU offered financial assistance, supported reforms and democratic transformations in social and economic spheres.
- c) The *SPRING* (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) Program was started as a continuation of the former joint communication policy in September 2011. It committed more than €18.1 billion to 16 partner countries of the Neighbourhood for the period of 2014-2020 (European Commission, 2011).

The first one was recognized as the first common EU response to the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, however, neither that nor the subsequent efforts outlined achieved the desired results. As Bremberg (2016) argues, these were the repetition of the prior attempts and the same with the past policies towards the region. In other words, all of these new initiatives are described using the logic of “old wine in the new bottles” (Kınacıoğlu, 2015; Othman, 2015) because they were the same policies as those discussed in previous chapter of this thesis.

Regarding these policies, Teti (2012) points to the EU’s insistence on liberal model for democratic transition and prosperity, Othman (2015) highlights “stronger political conditionality and differentiation” of implication in terms of states, and views

3Ms policy as a new tool of democracy promotion (p.604). Also, Othman (2015) criticizes the EU for the gap between creation and implementation of its initiatives, and stresses that these policies were perceived as a kind of new colonialism. Moreover, in general, these new initiatives created after the Arab Spring failed to achieve expected results, as well as the EU has not played an active role in realization of what it offered and encouraged to the countries of the region (Balkır, 2018, Dandashly, 201).

3.5.1. Divisions in the EU Foreign Policy

The EU has been confronted with three basic decisions during the Libyan crisis. The first one was on “the matter of taking side in the crisis”, which refers to both the initial events and the subsequent situation in the country. The second one was on “the matter of military intervention or arming the belligerents in the country”. The third one was on “the matter of managing the problems left after the crisis”, including illegal migration, refugee problem and terrorism.

3.5.1.1. Issue of taking sides during the crisis

The main problem with this decision was related to determining the party or parties to be supported, such as the government, anti-government forces, tribal powers, other opposition groups and third armed forces in the country, and then having a joint decision and position as a union in the international arena. Because of the different choices of the European member states in terms of their national interests, instead of adopting a common EU stance, “taking sides” has been one of the most critical issues for the EU foreign policy.

On March 5th, 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC), an interim government established by anti-Gaddafi forces in Benghazi, was established and continued until the elections in 2012 in Libya. Prior to NTC, there was a struggle between Gaddafi forces and anti-Gaddafi forces, but with the new political situation after Gaddafi new sides and conflicting groups emerged in Libya. Regarding the NTC, the problem started with political recognition, France became the first EU member state that recognized the NTC, while others were still thinking on the position that should be taken.

On this decision, German Foreign Minister Goido Westewelle said that “We do not want to get embroiled in a North African War”. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said that “I think it’s better for us to listen to the stance of the entire European community.” The British Foreign Office spokesman regarded the NTC as “valid interlocutors with whom we wish to work closely”. (Jacinto, 2011).

The immediate recognition of the NTC as the only legitimate representative in Libya was evaluated by Jorgensen Aarstand, Drieskens, Laatikainen and Tonra (2015, p.304) as inconsistency for the EU foreign policy. In August 2012, after the elections in Libya, the General National Congress (GNC), that is the elected parliament, took power from the NTC. This was labelled as the “peaceful transition of power”, but the crisis continued in the country. According to the Strategy Paper of European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) -2014-2016 on Libya, there are two main competing groups, known as the “Islamist” and “Nationalist” camps, basically equivalent to “Libya Dawn” and “Libya Dignity”, accordingly (CIA World Fact Book Libya, 2022; EEAS, ENI Strategy Paper-2014-2016).

Due to the instability and political turmoil in Libya, the opposition forces established a second parliament in Tobruk in order to replace the GNC in 2014, namely the House of Representatives (HOR). Both of these parliaments had their own armed forces, and the Libyan National Army (LNA) was linked to HOR in Tobruk. A violent struggle started between the HOR which refers to Libya Dignity and the GNC which refers to Libya Dawn. In the same year, General Khalifa Haftar returned to Libya as an anti-Gaddafi commander and became the commander of HOR, and the conflict in the country deteriorated. Thus, this term in 2014 is named as the Second Libyan War which lasted until the ceasefire in 2020. In 2015, as a result of the UN-led Skhirat Agreement signed in December 2015 in Morocco, namely the Libyan Political Agreement, the Government of National Accord (GNA) was established. Again, the confrontation continued between then GNA, and LNA and HOR (CIA World Fact Book Libya, 2022; EEAS, ENI Strategy Paper- 2014-2016; Fredriksen and Tziarras, 2020).

During this period, there was also differences between the EU member states both in terms of deciding whether or not to recognise the struggling sides and supporting them. For instance, while France has supported LNA and General Haftar in terms of economic interests, other countries of the EU have supported the UN-led GNA. In addition, Italy was criticized for its close relations with Haftar, and other member states also recognized Haftar implicitly, even if at the institutional EU level, they have declared support for the

UN-led process and the GNA in Libya. Therefore, there has been no strong consensus among the European member states in the political situation of Libya.

3.5.1.2. Issue of military intervention, supporting belligerent groups and military involvement

In the case of Libya, the discussions on the choice of military intervention and supporting the belligerent groups politically, economically, and militarily have been another issue for the EU foreign policy scale. On the issue of military intervention, as seen in the UNSC Resolution 1973 voting process in 2011, in which Germany abstained while France and the UK voted in favour supporting the intervention, the EU member states acted differently. Even after the 2011 military/humanitarian intervention in Libya, the military intervention option was a subject of contention among member states.

Apart from the military intervention issue, supporting the warring parties in Libya, directly or indirectly, through neighboring countries or third powers, has been a critical issue, as it might have led to a deeper conflict. According to Strategy Paper of European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the condition in Libya is described as “multi-polar power struggle, multi-dimensional and multi-layered situation” underlining all actors, including local rival powers, allied militias, tribal forces, terrorist groups, regional or neighbouring powers, great powers (the US and Russia), proxy armed forces and other third groups, which pursue their own interests and objectives (ENI Strategy Paper-2014-2016).

Figure 6: Map of areas of control in Libya, 2019



Source: (The Economist, 2019)

Regarding Libya's complex conflict zone structure and interests of the competing powers, the main significant point is that the areas controlled by conflicting forces, as seen in the map, overlap with the country's oil regions. Other key point is that the EU member states have backed different groups in the Libyan conflict, UN-backed powers or LNA-Haftar powers, while at the EU level HR/VP have strongly supported the UN-backed policies and legitimate actors. Similarly, regarding the impact of foreign powers, HR/VP, Josep Borrell Fontelles said in his book that "Foreign interference has multiplied in recent months: the conflict parties continue to receive arms, mercenaries and financial support, and some countries even sent troops... As EU, we want Libya to preserve its territorial integrity and Libyans to decide their own future, free from external interference" (2021, pp.189-191). While this statement reflects the EU's stand on the Libyan conflict, the EU member states have acted on their own ways.

According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), France, the UK and Germany were among the 10 largest importers of arms and their main suppliers between 2015-2019 (2020, p. 56). In addition, France raised its arms exports by 44% and reported as 8.2% of global arms exports in between 2016 and 2020, while Germany raised its arms exports by 21% between 2011–15 and 2016-2020. Egypt was among the first three exporter countries from France, and Algeria, and Egypt were the top three markets for German arms exports (SIPRI, 2021). Moreover, according to SIPRI 2021 Yearbook summary, France, Germany, the UK, Spain, and Italy were in the top 10

arms exporters and importers in 2016-2020, respectively. When we look at the imports of arms by region, Africa ranked as third region, following Asia-Oceania and Middle East regions, with 7.3% of global share in 2016-2020 (p.15). These are important indicators for the region and the EU countries.

When it comes to military involvement, in 2016 France declared that the so-called special French forces were killed in Libya while fighting against terrorism. This was the first formal explanation made by France (Aljazeera, 2016), which also shows that how the states use the discourse of “fight against terrorism” alongside democracy and humanitarian purposes. As another example of policies of the member states, Italy declared that it ordered a halt to arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, expressing concern that the weapons may be used in Yemen’s ongoing civil war in 2021 (Amante, 2021). The Italian declaration shows that if the member states want, they can act individually, selling arms and getting involved in ongoing civil wars or conflicts in other countries.

3.5.1.3. Issue of managing the problems after the Libyan crisis

Although terrorism and irregular migration have not been new threats for the EU in the context of Libya, after the Arab Spring the EU has faced these threats even more significantly. Due to the uprisings in many countries in 2011, an “unprecedented” irregular migration wave towards Europe started. In this period, the most impacted countries were Italy, Malta, and Greece, with Italian island of Lampedusa and Sicily, because of their proximity to the Southern Med region. In April 2011, four months after the Arab Spring upheavals, nearly 25,000 North African migrants arrived Lampedusa and the Lampedusa migration crisis began for Italy. One of the reasons behind of that was suspending of Italy- Libya agreement in 2008 which considers migration issue between two countries (Perrin, 2018; Deutsche Welle, 2011).


Although Italy asked Europe for support in tackling this problem, it could not get an answer. The issue became a question of whether or not it is a European problem. In this regard, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said that this was “not an Italian problem but a European problem” and emphasizing that this should not be “geographical misfortune” of southern countries (The Local De, 2011). As an answer, German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich said that “Italy had to solve its own problems” and “not

force them on other countries” (Deutsche Welle, 2011; The Local De, 2011). France also supported Germany during this period.

When we look at the EU level, in the meeting of Interior ministers in Luxembourg, EU Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said that “It is a test of EU solidarity” about the migration problem, but the member states acted in their own way and increased border controls (Deutsche Welle, 2011). As a way of solution, Italy acted its own way alone, Berlusconi firstly made an agreement with Tunisia and then gave Tunisian migrants “permits of temporary residence” which provide free movement in the Schengen area in Europe. This caused great disputes between Italy and other member states, especially France and Germany. Interior Minister of the southern German state of Bavaria, Joachim Herrmann said that “We will not accept that the Italian government simply declares that the Tunisian migrants are tourists and uses this to push them into other countries” (Deutsche Welle, 2011). Lampedusa crisis was the initial part of the divisions of member states, despite the warnings of EU level actors.

With the year of 2015, worse situations emerged due to the changing dynamics. On the one hand, due to the power and security vacuums, terrorist activities escalated in Libya and the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL also known as ISIS) started to gain control over several regions. On the other hand, as the civil war deteriorated in Syria, millions of people had to flee the country and tried to reach European borders. This situation has led to the greatest migration crisis since the World War II and has become one of the main challenges the EU member states have faced. In this process, different routes, namely Western routes, the Central Mediterranean route and the Eastern Mediterranean route, were used by migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. But many of them used the the Central Mediterranean route, where Libya is the main transit country because of its proximity to Europe (The Council of the EU, EU Migration Policy).

Figure 7: Central Mediterranean Migrant Routes



Source: UNESCO as cited in BBC

At the EU level, according to the Council's official website, the EU has funded € 700 million to Libya since 2015, for border management, community stabilization and protection, and states that the EU actions concentrates on:

- “training of coast guards
- protecting and assisting migrants and refugees
- supporting local communities
- improving border management”. It also states that over 88 000 migrants were rescued thanks to the financial assistance provided to the Libyan coast guards (The Council of the EU, EU Migration Policy).

The EU allocated several financial and humanitarian aids under different instruments, but apart from these, in the issue of migration the EU launched operations and missions. The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya, including 15 member states, was established under the CSDP missions and operations in 2013 (EEAS, EUBAM Libya, 2022). In 2015, the EU started the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) Operation Sophia, which was established under CSDP, in order to control migration flows. After it was suspended in 2019, as a new operation, the Operation IRINI, which means “peace” in Greek, was established in 2020, which included 24 member states. Its primary mission is to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya using aerial, satellite, and marine capabilities (EUNAVFOR IRINI,

2022). Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, which was established in 2004, and it was renewed in 2016 and 2019. Also related to migration, in 2015 the EU renewed ENP and created the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa at the Valletta Summit it shared responsibility with African states on migration issue (The Council of the EU, EU Migration Policy).

In fact, the migration issue has centered on the matters of “reception of refugees and their distribution in Europe” (Wagner, 2015). At the member states level, alongside the discussions about the Schengen area, Dublin regulations and the quota system, there were several issues that reflected the conflicts and differences among the member states. In general assessment, Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Austria are main countries received asylum applications (The Council of the EU, EU Migration Policy), Germany, Sweden and Austria are outstanding destination countries and Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Czech Republic are against quota system and accepting refugees.

The migration crisis has been a test of solidarity, responsibility and cooperation for the EU member states. Yet, instead of acting with respect to these as well as EU norms and values, the member states have pursued their national policies in terms of their interests and concerns. The migration issue has been turned into processes of securitization (Huysmans, 2000), instrumentalization and lastly externalization. It is difficult to say that the EU has a common migration policy in reality and shared humanitarian values in practice.

The EU used the way of cooperation with third countries, especially the key transit countries. In the Parliament document evaluated the EU approach on migration in the Mediterranean, EU- Turkey Deal in 2016, EU-Libya agreement in 2017 and engagement with Niger were explained as important examples. Because of these, after 2017 the numbers of the irregular migration started to decrease on the routes of migration (European Parliament, 2021).

Although activating the missions and operations for the Mediterranean region and Libya illustrated as a positive step for the CSDP, it did not have a shared approach and position due to the conflicting interests and lack of cooperation between states. There were many different conflicts since the beginning of Operation Sophia, but some of them was more significant. For instance, in 2019, Germany decided to withdraw its ships from the Operation Sophia as a result of the German-Italian conflict on the migration issue. Because Italy refused to open its ports to rescued migrants from the sea. At that times, Germany, Italy and Spain were actively contributing to the mission. However, Italy

objected to the mission, claiming that “all the rescued refugees were sent to Italy”. Threatening with closing its ports, Interior Minister of Italy, Matteo Salvini, said that “If someone wants to withdraw from it, then that's certainly no problem for us” (Knight, 2019). In fact, this was a dispute of distribution of the migrants and burden sharing again.

After the mission was suspended in 2019, Austria and Hungary refused to re-launch the Operation Sophia. Besides them, Italy and Greece also made explanations about their concerns, and thus a new plan for renewing the operation collapsed. It should be noted that one of the reasons behind these objections was that the four states were under impact and pressure of right-wing parties at that time (Douglas, 2020).

Similarly, in the context of operation IRINI, Malta decided to withdraw from the operation in May 2020, as a reaction to France and the EU. In addition, Malta informed that it would veto the decisions about financing and extension plans for the mission (LibyaObserver, 2020).

Lastly, about the efficiency of the operation, it can be said that it has not meet its objectives on migration issue because of “political weakness brought about by the heterogeneous priorities set by the EU countries and limited military capability”. Also, the “lack of control on the land, air and sea routes” together and “absence of jurisdictional framework for states to operate in Libya” in order to control and prevent weapon supplying are one of the main problems of the operation (Bertolotti, 2020). When it comes to humanitarian situation of the migration crisis, there is not so much to say, the tragedy of thousands of people continues, none of the efforts and operations prevent or end it, unfortunately.

3.5.2. Battleground of National Foreign Policies

Due to the migration crisis and competing interests between Italy and France, which included economic concerns based on energy policies and security concerns, Libya became a battleground for them. Especially in 2018 and 2019, the relations between the two EU member states, the former colonial powers in Libya, deteriorated and political and diplomatic conflicts arose. In 2018, for the fact that Italy restricted its ports to a ship carrying more than half a thousand of migrants, French President Emanuel Macron accused Italy of “irresponsibility” on the migration crisis and having a motivation purely based on self- interests (Salam, 2018).

Former Italian far-right Interior Minister Matteo Salvini said that “France has no interest in making Libya a better place. Paris is interested in taking control of the oil there. And their interests are opposed to the Italian ones. I’m proud to govern a generous country. We don’t take lessons on humanity from France.” (The Guardian, 2019).

In 2019, Italy accused France of colonizing Africa and forcibly displacing Africans and declared that migration flows as a result of “French neo-colonialism” on the region. The reaction of France started a diplomatic crisis again between two European states, because Italian ambassador was summoned (Euroactiv, 2019).

During this process, both Italy and France wanted to have a leading role in the Libyan crisis. Firstly, France took initiative, and an international peace conference on Libya was organized in Paris, on May 29, 2018. However, Italy did not receive an invitation from France (Fetouri, 2018).

France brought together the two rival powers, UN-backed GNA/ Fayez Al-Sarraj and LNA/ Khalifa Haftar, in Libya, and many countries attended the Paris Conference, including the UNSC permanent members, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Italy (France24, 2018). In the conference, the rival parties came to the point of compromise for making elections, but it did not last long, and the conflict remained in Libya.


Following this, another international conference on Libya was organized in Palermo, with the aim of ensuring the conditions for making elections. The Palermo conference, according to Tarek Megerisi, a Libya specialist at the European Council for Foreign Relations, “has to be seen primarily as a power play by the Italians against the French. They hoped to make it larger than the Paris summit.” (Wintour and Tondo, 2018). As a result of Haftar leaving the conference after attending the initial part, it could not be concluded with a significant end.

A new and more comprehensive and profound international conference on Libya was organized on January 19, 2020. Germany hosted the Berlin conference on Libya and at the end of the conference participants agreed on several issues considering “ceasefire, arms embargo, return to political process, security sector reform and respect for international humanitarian law and human rights”. One of the key outcomes of the conference was creation of 5+5 Joint Military Committee suggested by UNSMIL and compromise of two delegations of the warring parties in Libya on the committee, despite the fact that Haftar did not attend and signed the ceasefire agreement at the conference’s conclusion (UNSMIL, Berlin Conference on Libya; Deutsche Welle, n.d.).

3.6. Current Situation of Libya: An Internationalized Crisis and Forced Cooperation

Since the intervention in 2011 and Gaddafi was removed from power, Libya has been in a process of civil war and political turmoil. As previously noted, the conflict in Libya has never been an internal war constrained by an internal fight between the Libyan groups. Instead, the situation of the country has evolved into an internationalized crisis due to the foreign interference, proxy wars of competing actors and warring sides backing from external powers. Some form of them includes Russia, the US, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, France, Italy, and the UK. Currently the power struggle between the belligerent groups and foreign interference continue in the country, as seen in the map given below, despite the UN-backed government the rival side has more control areas in Libya.

Figure 8: The Map of Areas of Control in Libya, 2022



Source: The Economist

In 2020, as the number and impact of international interventions increased, the political, economic, and humanitarian situation deteriorated. In this respect, the UN Special Envoy on Libya Gahssan Salame called on “foreign powers to stop interfering in Libya’s civil war”, and also called on “international powers to stop supporting local proxy groups with mercenaries, arms, financing, and direct military support” (BBC, 2020). When the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020, the situation exacerbated as it was all over the world. Eventhough the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said

that “I am calling for an immediate global ceasefire in all corners of the world. It is time to put armed conflict on lockdown and focus together on the true fight of our lives.” for the sake of solidarity against a common threat for all the world, his calling did not make any impact on the conflict zones such as Libyan crisis (United Nations, Academic Impact).

Eventually, on 23 October 2020, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the warring sides in Libya, as a result of Berlin process and meetings between the rival sides. After a short time, the two rival governments in Western and Eastern Libya got united in March 2021. The Government of National Unity (GNU) was established as a new interim unified government, the UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum selected Abdul Hamid Mohammed DDebibah as Prime Minister, and Mohammed al-Menfi as chairman of the presidential council (Aljazeera, 2021).

The second Berlin Conference was organized on June 23, 2021, and elections scheduled for 24 December 2021. After this conference, in November 2021, again France took initiative, and the Paris International Conference for Libya was organized. However, due to the legal, technical, and security problems the elections were cancelled, and a new date has not been set, yet (UN News, 2021).

As a consequence of the fact that Eastern side parliament elected a different prime minister as the legitimate one disregarding the current one after the postponed elections, so Fathi Bashagha has become one of the two prime ministers in Libya. Therefore, the political instability continues in the country (Reuters, 2022).

As far as the EU is concerned, we can say that after the Berlin process, the first Berlin Conference in 2020, a new period for the European member states has started. Because the leading 3 powers of the EU, namely Germany, France and Italy began to meet on the same grounds on the issue of the Libyan crisis at the EU level. In addition, they stand together with the UK and the US in the international level. For instance, a joint statement was released by the governments of these five states after the Berlin Process, expressing unified support for Libya’s new situation (Zaptia, 2021).

Similarly, at the EU level, member states were affected by the changing power dynamics and situation in the Mediterranean and Libya, mainly depending on policies of Turkey and Russia. In the context of Turkey which is a formal candidate country despite the frozen membership process, an important regional power, and has historical ties with Libya, the EU member states had challenges over their conflicting interests. The problems with Turkey mainly refer to issues related to Libya, such as Turkey-Libya Maritime Deal signed in 2019, Turkey’s close relations with western side government of Libya and

Turkey's military presence, noted as depending on given consent, in Libya. The problems also refer to the issues related to Eastern Mediterranean for the reasons of Turkey's activities of gas drilling and exploring energy resources in the Mediterranean Sea. In this regard, taking initiative by France, a meeting called as "Med-7" was organized in Corsica to deal with Turkey, considering France and six European states, namely Greece, Italy, Spain, Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration), Malta and Portugal (Momtaz, 2020).

After this, France undertook coordinated military exercises at the Med Sea with Greece, Italy, and Cyprus to send a message to Turkey. Also, to counter the country, a "Pax Mediterranea" has been proposed by Macron (Wintour, 2020). Thus, the conflicts with Turkey compelled the member states, but mainly France and Italy, to join forces in the region (Tanchum, 2020).

In the context of Russia which is one of the great powers in the international system, the EU has conflicts because of the Russian policies on Libya. One of the main foreign mercenaries in Libyan crisis is Wagner Group which is a Russian mercenary group recruits and send foreign fighters to the conflict zones. In fact, the Wagner Group firstly was seen in Ukraine in 2014, and its appearance began in Libya in April 2019 among the forces of Haftar. Almost 1,000 foreign fighters were sent to Libya to join Haftar's forces between 2019 and 2020 (Barabanov and Ibrahim, 2021). Thus, the presence of this mercenary group has become an important part of changing power struggle and instability in Libya.

As a response by the EU, a set of different sanctions imposed on Wagner Group in December 2021, accusing them of human rights violations in different conflict areas such as Libya, Syria, Central Africa, Ukraine, and Sahel Region (The Council of the EU, Press Release, 2021). With the decision of the sanctions, the EU has created a "united front against Russia" (Euronews, 2021).

After these, the Quirinale Treaty was signed between Italy and France, two rival powers in Libya, in November 2021. According to France, the Treaty "will promote the convergence of French and Italian positions, as well as the coordination of the two countries in matters of European and foreign policy, security and defence, migration policy, economy, education, research, culture and cross-border cooperation." (Amiel, 2021). It can be said that there two reasons behind these new united positions. Internal reasons relate to the situation of the EU after the Brexit and the political change in Germany after the departure of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The Franco-Italy cooperation aims the fill the power vacuum in Europe. The other reason has an external

dimension because it depends on external actors that are seen as rivals or challengers in Libya, such as Turkey and Russia. A former Italian undersecretary for European Affairs said this about the treaty: “Economic ties between the two countries are very strong, especially in terms of trade... Libya was a lesson. Because of the competition and disagreement [between Paris and Rome] everyone lost out, the Russians and Turks came in.” (Roberts and Leali, 2021). Therefore, the EU member states have been forced to act together and stood against them on the same ground in foreign policy area.

This new situation in the EU is critically important because it is proven that the EU member states can act together on common grounds when their vested interests converged in terms of the change in the situations. Thus, the current period should be taken into consideration for the Europeanization of foreign policy in the Libyan case.

Yet, it should be noted that it does not mean the full degree of Europeanization signal alone, in terms of the EU level. Instead of that, it refers to two-level game logic as explained before, because at the same time the member states continue to pursue their own policies. Within the context of taking initiatives, Italy seems to be taking its second round, like France with the second Paris Conference in 2021. According to the latest news, Italy will organize an international conference on Libya in Rome in 2022 (Assad, 2022; The Libya Update, 2022).

3.7. Evaluations on the Europeanization of the EU Foreign Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean Region in the light of the Libya Case

The crisis of Libya has been one of the significant cases for the EU after the Arab Spring as it has highlighted the positions of both the EU level and member states level in the foreign policy area. As argued in the first chapter, given that Europeanization is a two-way process, we should consider both member states and EU level to analyze the European foreign policy. Regarding the case of Libya, we can evaluate the EU foreign policy referring to five aspects:

First, although the EU level and particularly High Representative were criticized for being “weak, slow and uncoordinated” in their reactions to Libyan crisis and for lack of strong leadership profile in conducting the union’s foreign policy (Koenig, 2011); the EU member states did not wait too long and observed the situation in Libya, in comparison with the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. This was because of two reasons:

member states had certain and clear interests in Libya, especially members such as France, the UK and Italy, and Gaddafi was not a friendly dictator, as mentioned before, for European member states. Thus, on the one hand the EU condemned the Libyan government and expressed its deep concerns on the worsening situation in Libya, on the other hand the member states were calling Gaddafi to step down and leave Libya urgently.

Second, the EU's first response to the Libyan crisis was mainly economy-based responses, including both economic sanctions and financial assistance for humanitarian aids and reform process in 2011. These economy-based responses were also observed in the two former cases of Tunisia and Egypt. Thus, the main common ground in the EU was created on the basis of economic responses. However, these efforts and policy tools of the EU failed in all these cases. As mentioned before, the main purposes of the EU were to provide stability and prosperity for the countries, and in this way the EU developed political and economic transition support policies. But, instead, as Bicchi (2014) described, the EU got "lost in transition" in the region, in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. In addition, these policies, known as low politics, were inefficient because they were the same policies as the past ones; they were not based on a regional approach to the Southern Mediterranean but depended on bilateral relations of different member states, and they imposed more conditionality in practice.

Third, different from the other cases, a humanitarian/military intervention took place in Libya. After only a few weeks of protests, the UNSC decision was taken by giving a reference to R2P principle and then NATO attacks started. This was the first important phase for the EU in terms of three reasons. The case of Libya was the only one case in which a humanitarian/military intervention was made during the Arab Spring uprisings. The voting in the UNSC and the different voting of Germany, France and the UK revealed the divisions among the member states. Lastly, criticisms about using the principle of R2P as a reason for intervention as well as its failures caused re-thinking of whether the EU considers EU values and norms in reality.

Fourth, after the 2011 intervention, the EU faced critical problems in Libya including backing same sides in the country, deciding on military involvement, giving military supports to belligerent groups and managing terrorism and migration issues. Among them, the migration issue was the second important one for the EU. Especially after 2015, the migration issue has turned into one of the major crises of Europe. Although there were different routes to Europe, Libya was the main transit country on the Central Mediterranean route with significantly higher rates. In this crisis, each member state acted

in line with its own interests and responded with its own policies without regarding neither a common approach nor policies in accordance with EU norms and values. In 2015 ENP was renewed, and in 2021 renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood was established as a new agenda for the Southern Mediterranean region at a period that corresponds to both ten years after the Arab Spring and twenty-five years after the Barcelona Declaration, in other words Euro- Med partnership (EEAS, Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood), but Libya could not get efficient amounts of funding and had no association agreement like most of the other countries in the region (European Commission Libya, 2022).

With the aim of shifting responsibility in the migration issue, in 2015 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was created with African countries. With respect to multilateralism, the Libya Quartet was created by EU, UN, the Arab League and Africa Union in 2016, and in the same year the EU Global Strategy paper underlined multilateralism, with the same old purposes such as “peace and prosperity” for Libya (European Commission Libya, 2022). But most of the efforts and declarations remained on paper or symbolic.

At the EU level, under CSDP the EU activated two mechanisms: EUBAM Libya (in 2013) and EUNAVFOR (Operation Sophia of 2015 and Operation Irini of 2020) to control borders and implement UN’s arms embargo in Libya, respectively. These mechanisms refer to high politics, that is security-based issues, and thus show the common grounds the EU reached in security-based responses. However, as mentioned before, none of these includes all 27 member states. Instead, EUBAM has 15 and EUNAVFOR has 24 member states. In addition, as a result of disagreements between states, Germany, Austria and Malta withdrew from these mechanisms. Moreover, there is too much criticism about their implementation and violations of human rights. Thus, it can be said that on the migration issue, the EU started to contradict EU norms and values.

Fifth, after the divisions among the member states in many areas, the EU was faced with two different processes in the Libyan crisis. In the first one, Libya became a battleground of two leading states, namely France and Italy, due to their competing and conflicting interests in Libya. This was one of the critical phases for the EU. While the EU called for speaking with one voice and standing on common grounds, member states clearly diverged, and a political crisis occurred between them.

After the Berlin process, which began with the Berlin conference in 2020, a change in the member states’ approaches and positions have been seen at the EU level.

Due to the convergence of interests of the main member states, France, Germany and Italy, and the UK and the US, joint statements and shared policy explanations began to be made. For this reason, the latest situation has been an indication of both the possibility of the conflict of interests and convergence of interests at the EU level. Therefore, it can be said that in the case of Libya, even at the EU level member states are the main actors shaping the European foreign policy. The picture that emerged has been viewed as a cooperation, but it can change with a new situation in Libya, depending on the interests of the member states.



CONCLUSION

The Southern Mediterranean region has always been one of the important regions for the EU in many aspects, especially for economic and security reasons, but it has become more crucial since the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring uprisings in the region became the first test bench of the EU and its new foreign policy structure in the post-Lisbon process. The changes happened in the Southern Neighbours directly affected the EU and urged it to reform the existing foreign policies towards the Southern Mediterranean region. However, the policies towards the region have not reached the expected and desired results, due to the conflicting and divergent interests of the member states. Therefore, the EU foreign policy remained mainly inconsistent and incoherent, and the Libyan crisis has been the basic indicator case of it. The thesis, thus analyzed the Libyan crisis as case study to shed light on the European foreign policy towards the region and the impact of the member states on the EU in the foreign policy area.

The main significance and distinct feature of the thesis is that it analyzes Europeanization in the area of foreign policy, and it uses the theoretical framework of bottom-up Europeanization approach to examine Southern Mediterranean region and Libya case. The thesis mainly contributes to the literature in the area of Europeanization of foreign policy, a newly developing area, and to a disregarded approach, bottom-up Europeanization studies. In the thesis, both rational bottom-up (intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism) and constructivist bottom-up (constructivist intergovernmentalism and ideational intergovernmentalism) Europeanization theories were considered under the title of intergovernmentalism, because in the foreign policy area these theories complete each other. While they include economic and security concerns, internal and external factors, identities, norms, bargaining and socialization; as their common points, all they put importance on key impact and role of the member states, their interests and processes shaped by them.

As the research questions: the impact of the Europeanization on the EU foreign policy area and EU's foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region, and the degree of Europeanization in the EU foreign policy towards the region were analyzed. In this respect, the study was divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, a conceptual and theoretical overview of Europeanization was presented. To understand Europeanization, the thesis focused on different meanings, types, and dimensions of

Europeanization and focusing on these different perspectives, the thesis views Europeanization not only as the EU effect on the member states' policy and process but also as the effect of member states on the EU's policy and processes. Regarding both member states level and the EU level, the thesis underlined that bottom-up Europeanization refers to uploading and shaping process of member states, and top-down Europeanization refers to downloading process of the EU impact and policies.

Lastly, considering bottom-up and top-down Europeanization, a theoretical framework was designed in terms of the difference between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. To make a comprehensive and strong analysis, the thesis adopted and explained both rational intergovernmental and constructivist intergovernmental theories of bottom-up Europeanization.

In the second chapter, the features of the Europeanization of foreign policy area and the EU's policies towards the Southern Mediterranean region were summarized. In the foreign policy area, explaining the two-way process of Europeanization which includes bottom-up and top-down dimensions, the thesis put forward the dominance of bottom-up Europeanization due to the impact of member states. Focussing on the degrees of Europeanization, it also explained how the degree of Europeanization depends on member states and convergence of interests in the foreign policy area. In the second part, all the initiative and policies of the EU towards the Southern Mediterranean region were examined through the theoretical perspective, and it was concluded that all of them were great signals of bottom-up Europeanization process.

In the third chapter, the Libyan crisis was examined as the case study, underlining the fragmentation and inconsistency in the EU foreign policy due to the adoption of different national foreign policies by the member states. To explain the importance of Libya for the interests of the European member states, initially the thesis gave an overview of Libya's history, underlining economic, geographical, and security-based concerns of the EU.

When it comes to key findings of the third chapter, the Arab Spring uprisings and the Libyan intervention were examined as the first outstanding event for the EU foreign policy towards Libya, shedding light on divergent policies and decisions of the member states. Despite the more institutionalized new version of foreign policy, the HR/VP could not take a leadership role and the CSDP mechanisms were not able to be activated at the EU level; instead, France and the UK were the leading actors. Also the intervention neither stopped the crisis nor paved way for a humanitarian solution.

After the intervention in 2011, the thesis explained how the EU were faced with three different stages. In the first, divisions in the EU foreign policy were seen on the matter of taking side in the crisis on the matter of military intervention, involvement or supporting the belligerents in the country, and on the matter of managing the problems left after the crisis, such as the migration issue. In all of these issues, the EU has not had a consensus and a common position in the area of foreign policy. Each states supported different belligerent sides in Libya and pursued different strategies and policies about the military involvement and migration issues.

Secondly, Libya was seen as the battleground of two rival member states, namely France and Italy. In this period, the tensions raised between these members due their competing and conflicting interests. In the conferences, they took initiatives and tried to shape the EU level in terms of their preferences. Thus, after the NATO intervention, France and Italy have become the leading actors in Libya. With the Berlin process, Germany has also become significant actor in the EU foreign policy level.

And lastly, due to the internal and external factors that affected the member states, a forced cooperation process began among France, Germany, and Italy in the foreign policy area due to the internal and external factors. In this period, impact of bargaining process and socialization can be seen both at the EU and international level. The change in the situations highlights the importance of member states and relations among them as well as possibility of both divergence and convergence of interests.

As a result, in the context of EU's foreign policy towards Libya, the EU response began with expressions of deep concerns and condemnation about the situation in Libya. The first common policies became the economy-based policies, including both sanctions such as arms embargo, asset freezing and travel bans, and financial assistances and allocation of funds for economic reforms. These can also be evaluated as the lowest common denominators. In the area of CFSP, UNSC voting on the intervention to Libya and divisions of Germany, France, and the UK and then NATO takeover showed the weaknesses and incoherency of the EU in the foreign policy area. In the area of CSDP, the EU organized EUBAM and EUNAVFOR in Libya, but these were inefficient, did not include all member states, and faced with withdrawals because of conflicts among the member states. After the Berlin process, the main member states began to meet on common grounds due to the convergence of interests, but their two-level games continue.

All taken into consideration, Europeanization in the foreign policy area is seen in limited forms and in particular areas. The EU does not have great impact on the member

states but faces significant challenges for organizing a common, coherent, and consistent foreign policy. Thus, it does not mean that the EU has a strong level of top-down Europeanization. Instead, bottom-up Europeanization is more apparent due to the member states' shaping and uploading policies and actions in the area of foreign policy. From the beginning of the Euro-Med relations, the member states pursued their own foreign policies, wanted to make interest representation at the EU level and upload their priorities to the EU level. Among the member states, France, Italy, and Germany were the leading member states, together with the UK, always took initiatives and affected the EU level foreign policies. All of their policies mainly depend on uploading process to the EU level and interest representation, which refer to as "national projection" not "national reception" (Wong, 2017). In addition, they can be called as "shapers" in Börzel's (2002) approach. The member states were shaped by economic and security-based interests, and domestic concerns and international positions also affected states. All these are referred to arguments of Moravcsik (1993), Hoffmann (1966) and Bicchi (2007).

In the respect of Börzel's (2002) categorization of states in terms of being "pace-setters foot-draggers, and fence-sitters", France, Germany and Italy can be seen as agenda setters, considering Paris, Berlin and Palermo international conferences on Libya. Policies of France and the UK in the 2011 intervention, and policies of Italy and France in situation of Libya can be evaluated as pace-setters. In the issue of migration, Visegrad countries can be seen as foot-draggers whereas some Nordic and Baltic countries as fence-sitters.

Geographical proximity and identities have also played important role on the policies of the member states. Situations of Italy, Greece, Malta in the migration problem, and roles of France, Italy and Spain in Mediterranean conferences, such as Med-7 can be seen as examples. In addition, the member states used the EU norms and values in their discourses as a justification and legitimization tools for EU foreign policy. "Humanitarian reasons" and "protecting civilians" discourse for the military intervention of 2011 in Libya, "peace and prosperity" and "democratic transition" for the region are one of the main indicator examples. Socialization process impact the relations of member states and caused changes in their policies such as conflict and cooperation between France and Italy. These identity factor, norms-based discourses and socialization process are referred to constructivist bottom-up theories of Bicchi (2007) and Börzel and Panke (2016).

Bargaining processes also had great importance for the member states, when they had challenges and conflicts with the EU or other states, acted on their own ways, such as France and the UK utilized from their UNSC positions and due to their rejected demands of no-fly zone and military operation by other members at the EU level, they started air operations via their coalition with the US. Similarly, in the migration crisis in Lampedusa, due to the lack of supportive attitudes of other member states, Italy acted its own way, applied policies gave Schengen visa permits to the migrants. Other examples are the withdrawals of Germany and Malta from the naval operations for Libya. Lastly, they played two-level games, pursuing interests both in the EU level and in their own national foreign policy areas. In the case of Libya, the member states united at the point where their interests coincided but divided and acted individually when their interests conflicted.

All of these are in accordance with the rational and constructivist intergovernmental theories of the bottom-up Europeanization. Therefore, the member states' policies and actions in the case of Libya demonstrate how bottom-up Europeanization gained ground in the EU foreign policy relative to top-down Europeanization. However, in terms of the degrees of Europeanization we could not say that the EU is "never significantly Europeanized" which refers to seventh degree, or on the contrary "significantly Europeanized" for Wong (2017). Instead of these, the degrees of Europeanization change in terms of the members and situations between the degrees of 3 to 5, and degree of 6 which means de-Europeanization is also an option for the member states in the foreign policy area, means at the same time re-nationalization.

To achieve the meaningful degree of Europeanization, there should be three principles in my opinion. The first one is "political will", which is the main condition discussed in the literature in many different areas, because, common policies depend on willingness of the member states. Second one is "internalization" which refers to that member states should internalize the EU values and interests, and then pursue policies are in line with the union's stance. Third one is "consistency and sustainability", because the policies need to be long-term and be compatible with other policies of the states.

The study focused on the EU's foreign policy towards the Southern Mediterranean, analyzing the Libya case. In terms of the findings, Libya has become both theoretical and empirical evidence for the impact of Europeanization on the foreign policy. In this regard, the theoretical framework and the analysis stages can be applied not only to other countries in the Southern Mediterranean region such as Syria, Palestine,

Egypt and Tunisia but also to other region countries such as Eastern countries of ENP, especially Ukraine. Backing different sides in the conflict zones, pursuing different national policies and tackling the problems such as migration in terms of interests could be the valid analysis points for all of them.

When it comes to look at the current literature and evaluate the case in terms of the recent developments, we see that in the literature, studies on intergovernmentalism have been gaining ground in the Europeanization of foreign policy area (Thomas, 2021). There are many reasons behind that, but the main important one is that the crises faced by the EU in the last decade, such as the financial crisis, Brexit, the refugee crisis, and lastly the Coronavirus pandemic crisis. Due to the conflicts of member states and the EU level and blocking EU common policy and positions by member states, a new crisis has been discussed, namely “illiberal crisis” (Gürkan and Brack, 2021; Hooghe and Marks, 2019).

It is also important to say that as well as Differentiated Integration (DI) studies, de-Europeanization studies continue at an increasing rate not only for the EU member states (Smith, 2021; Müller, Pomorska and Tonra, 2021), but also for the candidate countries such as Turkey (Bodur Ün and Arıkan, 2021).

In the context of Libya, given the complexity of multi-dimensional crisis, foreign interference, proxy wars and growing uncertainty, it is hard to say that Libya is likely to have silver linings about the political stability in the foreseeable future. However, it should be noted that, it will always remain its importance for the EU as Borrell Fontelles (2021) said that “Libya is a key actor for the stability of the Mediterranean, the North of Africa and the Sahel. Our security and our prosperity are clearly interlinked: what is good for Libya is good for Europe.”

In conclusion, it is very reasonable to say that the hypotheses of this study have been proven by the case of Libya. First, the Libyan case strongly indicated that the Europeanization of foreign policy area is a two-way process, including both the bottom-up and top-down Europeanization types, but due to the dominant role and impact of member states on the EU, Europeanization of foreign policy area mostly depends on bottom-up Europeanization. Secondly, and relatedly, the degree of Europeanization in the foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region depends on the interest convergence of the member states. Therefore, the degree of Europeanization will be changed by the impact of member states’ roles and policies in terms of their interest dynamics.

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