

**The European Global Climate Policy: The Analysis of the Interplay
Between Normative and Geopolitical Tools and Objectives**

by

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and Geopolitical Tools and Objectives***

Koç University

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ABSTRACT

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The multipolar turn of world politics in the 21st century created challenges and openings for the traditional powers. The pandemic triggered a new perception of nature, engendering many discussions about sustainable development. The EU, traditionally constructed as a normative power, adjusted its global climate policy to current geopolitical realities. Commission President von der Leyen declared her decision to steer the EU's global policy towards geopolitical thinking in 2019. The ambitions to lead the global direction of sustainable development are reified under the European Green Deal aiming to make Europe the first carbon neutral continent by 2050. This thesis analyses the historical evolution of the geopolitical and normative global climate policy tools and objectives of the EU and their connections with Russian global climate policy under the UN. It analyses the use of these tools and iteration of these objectives under European speeches and statements during COPs and State of the Union Addresses.

ÖZETÇE

Avrupa'nın Küresel İklim Politikaları: Normatif ve Jeopolitik Amaç ve Araçların Etkileşiminin İncelenmesi

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21.yüzyılda dünya siyasetinde yaşanan çok kutupluluğa dönüşüm, geleneksel güçler için hem zorluklar hem de fırsatlar yaratmıştır. Pandemi, doğaya yönelik yeni bir algının oluşmasına ve sürdürülebilir kalkınma hakkında birçok tartışmaya sebebiyet vermiştir. Geleneksel olarak normatif bir güç olarak inşa edilen Avrupa Birliği, küresel iklim politikasını günümüzdeki jeopolitik gerçekliklere uyarlamıştır. Komisyon Başkanı von der Leyen, 2019'da AB'nin küresel politikasını jeopolitik anlayış doğrultusunda yönlendirme kararını açıklamıştır. Avrupa'nın sürdürülebilir kalkınmanın küresel yönünü belirleme isteği 2050 yılına kadar Avrupa'yı ilk karbon nötr kıta yapmayı hedefleyen, Avrupa Yeşil Mutabakatı ile vücut bulmuştur. Bu tez, AB'nin küresel iklim politikasındaki jeopolitik ve normatif araçların ve amaçların tarihsel evrimini ve bunların Birleşmiş Milletler çatısı altında ilerleyen Rusya'nın küresel iklim politikasıyla bağlantılarını incelemektedir. Bu araçların kullanımı ve hedeflerin beyanı, COP zirvelerinde ve Avrupa Komisyonu'nun Birliğin Durumu konuşmaları esnasında yapılan açıklamalar üzerinden analiz edilmektedir.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBAM	Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
CBDR	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
CBDR-RC	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
COP	Conference of Parties
EGD	European Green Deal
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
UNCED	The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Industrial Revolution radically transformed the world, marking the beginning of an unprecedented greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions increase, degrading the environment and modifying the climate. For centuries, the change has been recognised by scientists and for decades the international community meets to find solutions to the climate change process. Within the international community, the EU distinguishes itself through emphasis on the human rights regime, a key pillar of its normative power approach to world politics.

The mainstream global governance institution through which the international community aims to address climate change is the UN. The discussion process is based on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) signed in 1992. The EU has been the most ambitious actor in the international climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC. It proposed and pledged to follow the largest emission reduction targets, global warming caps and most comprehensive domestic mitigation and adaptation policy measures among the UN members. It spearheaded the discussion around climate change and lobbied for two of the most important international agreements on the issue: the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. The EU's global climate ambitions accelerating in the 90s culminated into the European Green Deal initiative in 2019.

The scholarship analysing the process behind the EU's global climate policies built their analysis upon the traditional European normative power approach until the late 2010s. The European policies pursued under the UNFCCC have been dissected through a normative lens by many authors. These works are informed by the historically established values abided by the EU: the protection and promotion of free trade, human rights, citizen wellbeing, rule of law, multilateralism in diplomacy and sustainable development.

As the EU becomes a green international leader especially through domestic reforms; its GHG emissions are dwarfed by American, emerging powers' emission rates. Such a dynamic decreases its bargaining power in the UN by diminishing the value of further emissions reduction pledges. Thus, the exemplary green leadership is disproportionately related to bargaining power. The normative success of the EU as the

exemplary leader among other UN parties results in decreased leverage; increasing the need of a geopolitical approach to analyse and sustain the climate leadership.

This thesis integrates a geopolitical perspective into the study of the EU's global climate policy, which had predominantly followed a normative power approach until the late 2010s. It examines the evolution of normative and geopolitical perspectives in the literature on the EU's policy choices within the global climate regime. The thesis contributes to the research by analyzing how the European approach to global climate governance has evolved throughout the statements and speeches delivered by the EU. In addition, it traces the evolution of normative elements in Russian statements at COPs and their connection to the EU's perspective on the global climate regime.

1.1 The Evolution of the European Approach to the Global Climate Regime

Since its inception in 1992, the UNFCCC process has evolved with geopolitical developments, in an intertwined way. Although the climate change regime has its own platform under the UN, endowing it with a special spotlight; its evolution cannot be separated from geopolitics. The analysis of how geopolitical developments impact the EU's global policy making process within the climate regime enriches the understanding of the tools it uses to advance its goals in the climate change regime. Such analyses have not been incorporated into the literature until 2019. In 2019, the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced her plan to lead a geopolitical Commission, make the EU first climate neutral continent by 2050 and decouple economic growth from resource usage¹ under the Green Deal. The initiative reflects the EU's effort for strategic adaptation to geopolitical realities while designing its global climate policy which aims to create an effective international climate regime and a long term compliance by actors.

The EU hosts 27 member states with various historical backgrounds and economical foundations. Each state has their own climate policy priorities informed by these conditions. Notwithstanding its internal differences, the EU aims to present a unified stance during the COP meetings. It has clear climate policy objectives and persistently uses a specific set of tools since the 1990s. Along with the Green Deal initiative, the climate

¹ https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en

policy shifts towards an even more institutionalised, homogenous and supranational approach. The EU designs various mechanisms to induce compliance in the EU member states and other nations under the EGD.

The cooperation of other states is instrumental for the EU's global climate policy goals. The exemplary domestic leadership with the highest unilateral emission reduction pledges is only one aspect of climate policy. Domestic strategies alone are insufficient to solve a worldwide collective goods problem. They need to be supported with both normative and geopolitical tools to convert others.

The EU aims to induce major economies such as Russia, India, the US and China to decrease their emissions as well. Normatively, their compliance limits global warming and carbon leakage, which in turn protects human rights. The acknowledgement of green industrial and political practices by the major economies legitimizes and mainstreams the EU's developmental narrative. Thus, it also contributes to hybrid goal achievement. Conformity is encouraged by using normative tools such as bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagement.

The EU needs to deal with the repercussions of geopolitics for its global climate approach and vice versa. From a geopolitical and Realist perspective, the EU seeks to create a First Mover Advantage with its climate policy to gain a strategic edge over countries that adopt sustainable development at a later time. It aims to increase its relative power in the global economic interactions and policy decisions, by navigating the global climate regime. By controlling global production and consumption patterns through regulatory mechanisms, the EU aims to control the industrial, legal, political and diplomatic choices of the powers such as the US, China and Russia.

The fading global demand for fossil fuels would limit Russian energy revenues over time, which in turn can contain its ability to invest in military growth. As observed from the instrumentalisation of the EGD for responding to the full scale invasion of Ukraine, how the EU perceives and acts upon geopolitics diverges from other powers' approach. The EU's geopolitical vision is constructed upon a normative lens. In the climate realm, its geopolitical policy tools for inducing green transformation are based on trade connectivity, global aid and rule of law. The overall impact of the Deal on strategic autonomy depends on how much it delinks the EU from Russian energy and whether it becomes dependent on

other powers, especially China². With policies such as the Raw Materials Act, the EU tries to avoid being constrained under Chinese dominance while trying to decrease Russian influence in the region.

The EU's global climate policy is a strategic response to the geopolitical approaches of major powers, highlighting the Union's contrasting values and priorities. The EU's normative and diplomatic approach to international politics represents the antithesis of the American militarist approach in the aftermath of the Cold War. Despite its authoritative tendencies in terms of the emission reduction targets, the multilateral structure of the UN contrasts American unilateral military interventions in world politics. The pursuit of the leadership of the climate change regime carved Europe a special place in the international politics dominated by the US in the early 2000s and the rising powers afterwards (especially after COP 15 in 2009). Thus, the adoption of the normative power approach to global climate politics itself is a geopolitical choice. Geopolitical dynamics inform which norms are best suited for advancing broader European goals within global governance structures led by the US (and more recently, BRICS+).

The normative power approach to the climate change regime coexists with geopolitics; the two policy making perspectives are deeply intertwined. The geopolitics shed light on the relationship between power and territory and the normative power in the climate realm reshapes states' understanding of the territories and redefines inter-state interactions. Global warming melts the zones covered by ice and creates new trade roads (Borrell, 2023)³ that were previously not explored by any state, creating room for competition. The newly revealed soils that were hitherto covered with ice, are conducive to agriculture or energy exploration. The extreme weather events are increasingly prone to create climate refugees due to inhabitability of certain lands such as small island states or hotter regions.

The measures taken to advance resilience against climate change such as developing renewable energy resources simultaneously boosts the EU's energy security through diversification. As the international community phases out fossil fuels; the producers such as Russia, the US or Saudi Arabia are prone to lose long term revenues

² For instance, Chinese sustainable technologies and raw materials may overcrowd the European market in the long run.

³ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/geopolitics-climate-change_en

unless they reform their industrial policies. The geopolitics of climate change are evident in Arctic resource competition, as can be observed from the American strategic interest in Greenland. Thus, the EU's normative approach on climate change spills over to the industrial policies of major powers; pushing them to conform or retaliate in order to remain competitive in the global markets. The change in the EU's production and consumption patterns will be carried through to many parts of the world because of the deeply connected supply chains covering many regions, including key global powers within the multipolar system.

The international community evolves into a multipolar power system with the rise of emerging powers. Despite the EU's traditional normative approach, geopolitics interacts with the decisions taken in COPs and the EU's global climate policy choices; especially as key centers of influence for the climate prioritize a geopolitical approach rather than normative one. The rise of China and its emission rates are critical for the success of the European policy, along with traditional emitters such as the US and Russia.

1.2 The Path Towards a Geopolitical Approach

The concept of geopolitics, while has been analysed by various works, lacks an agreed upon single definition in the literature. A geopolitical perspective shares key parallels with the Realist school of thought. The Defensive Realist perspective sees states as actors who try to increase their relative power to survive in an anarchical system (Waltz, 1979). From a game theory perspective, such endeavors can sometimes embrace a zero-sum game mentality (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Geopolitical actors see the territory, work force, and innovation as strategic resources for enhancing domestic economic, social and military power against other states or non-state actors such as big conglomerates or international organizations.

A geopolitical turn implies a greater willingness to influence or constrain the actions of others; similar to Dahl's (1957) conceptualisation of power⁴. It entails a readiness to shape the preferences without necessarily engaging in cooperative or multilateral processes. The shift towards a unilateral approach for increasing the EU's

⁴ "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957)

relative power, risks alienating the EU from the multilateral engagement. This is more in line with offensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2001). Thus, the geopolitical turn embodies principles from both offensive and defensive Realism.

This thesis investigates how the EU's recently declared geopolitical turn, under von der Leyen since 2019, interacts with its traditional normative power identity in global climate politics since 90s. While the normative power approach facilitated the EU's role as a climate leader in the 1990s and early 2000s, it failed to offer long lasting solutions to various challenges faced by the EU. These developments have accelerated the EU's geopolitical foreign policy approach, inspired by principles underlined by various branches of Realism.

A series of developments underscored the growing need for a robust geopolitical global approach, forming the context behind von der Leyen's announcement in 2019. The crisis environment tested the EU's geopolitical and normative reach and its ability to protect and project its interests. Such an environment informs the nature of the EU's international and domestic role. It explains the climate policy's path towards its integration to the foreign policy.

The EU has been facing energy blackmails from Russia since the 90s and territorial expansionist claims since the 2000s. The enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, the Orange Revolution and the annexation of Crimea were the stepping stones for the full scale invasion of Ukraine. The post-enlargement EU contains various post-communist countries. Their integration to the Union has been transformative in terms of its internal structure, foreign policy design and crisis response strategies.

The old and new members diverged in terms of historical legacies, relations with the neighbouring countries and economic development. The heterogeneity is evident in the different climate policy goals of the member states. The key crises the EU faced include but not limited to the ending process of the Cold War, the ensuing enlargement process during the 2000s, the Eurozone Crisis in 2008, the rise of the East Asian Tigers and China, Russian energy and territorial tensions, Trump presidencies' blunt opposition to post World War 2 Western institutionalisation, the Brexit and the Arab Spring.

The Global Financial Crisis originated in the US reverberated across the European market triggering a prolonged Eurozone crisis and an uneven recovery period, mirroring

the heterogeneous economic and political structures of the post-enlargement EU. The heterogeneity in the inside of the EU was evident with and worsened by various events. First, the Eurozone crisis revealed the diverging economic structures with various energy dependence on outside providers. Second, the Brexit⁵ and the Commission's hold on enlargement to Western Balkans due to problems in the mid-2010s about the absorption capacity and institutional robustness, raised questions on how much the EU is indeed a union.

While the EU was facing several crises, China showcased sustained economic success. It has global political ambitions and is shifting towards an interventionist approach. The rise of Asian Tigers and China along with the post-Cold War powers' remaining influence in world politics engendered a multipolar system from the mid-2010s onwards. The Chinese impact on the EU's economy is evident in the country's dominance in the technology and the critical raw materials needed for the renewable economy⁶. This dynamic challenges the EU's power projection capacity, especially in the terms of economic and political influence in the African region. China capitalizes on climate change for internationalising its growth framework (Qi and Dauvergne, 2022) in the region. Thus, the EU had to adapt to its new place in the world to be able to assert its world view, including in the climate realm. The prioritization of geopolitics by other powers⁷ meant that the EU is now surrounded with power holders that are less inclined to be its normative partners.

As the emerging powers grew, the west was fragmented and gravitated towards different policy preferences. The EU was facing challenges stemming from the American detachment from the western order especially from Trump's first term onwards. Both former and current Trump administrations bluntly challenged the Union, unlike any other American presidents. He called for more European contributions for NATO if the latter were to benefit from its protection. The new American global policy approach highlighted

⁵ “Brexit led the Commission to identify areas where it needed to shore up its interests, including the speedy completion of trade deals and a revival of interest in capital markets” (Baracani and Kassim, 2024)

⁶ The Critical Raw Materials Act proposed in 2023 by von der Leyen aims to counter such influence.
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-deal-industrial-plan/european-critical-raw-materials-act_en;
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/eet/opinion/to-de-risk-from-china-the-eu-should-offer-the-global-south-more/>

⁷ The Iraq War by the US, the creation and use of the coral islands by China, territorial expansion by Russia and India etc.

the importance of alternative international partnerships and self-sufficiency for the EU. Meanwhile, the Arab Spring process showed the shortcomings of the normative power approach in terms of solidifying the EU's geopolitical reach without the US's help.

The prolonged nature of the Syrian Civil War and the subsequent migration crisis during the Juncker era have revealed the multipolar nature of the new world order and diverging preferences among big powers. The refugee crisis was felt directly by the citizens within the territories of some member states. The number of people arriving at the European territory in such a short time has been unprecedented, prompting the need to respond. During that time the Juncker Commission⁸ created “the foundations for the ‘geopolitical Commission’”⁹ (Baracani and Kassim, 2024).

Juncker aimed to respond to various military, political, economic and energy security issues. The Russian gas cuts, the dispute involving Turkey, Greece and Cyprus on drilling activities in the East Mediterranean Sea raised questions about the supply security in the late 2010s. Juncker pursued “restrictive measures” against Russia following the annexation of Crimea. He guarded the EU's trade interests during the enlargement process in the 2000s. He also deepened the ties with NATO by coordinating policy on “counter-terrorism, ... military mobility, cyber security and ..., the defence industry” while the EU introduced “European Defence Action Plan” (2016) and “European Defence Fund” (2017). Von der Leyen built upon these foundations as she advanced her innovative approach towards the Commission's jurisdiction towards security policy (Baracani and Kassim, 2024).

All these developments highlighted above explains what motivates the EU towards adopting a more geopolitical approach. However, there are also supportive institutional changes within the Union that turned the geopolitical motivations into reality. Matthijs and Meunier highlight that the COVID pandemic in 2020 resulted “the European Commission emerge as the guardian of European solidarity after EU leaders agreed to set up a large-scale macroeconomic recovery”. Such solidarity facilitated the path towards a unified European response towards changing geopolitics characterised by “unfair competition and

⁸ 2014-2019

⁹ The 2015 State of the Union Address states that “A lasting solution will only come if we address the root causes, the reasons why we are facing this important refugee crisis. Our European policy must be more assertive.... We can no longer afford to be ignorant, disunited with regard to war or instability right in our neighbourhood.” (Juncker).

aggressive pressure tactics from China and the United States” (2023). Although the EU was willing to steer the direction of many geopolitical disputes since the 1990s, such aims have never been explicitly branded as such and marketed actively by the Commission until 2019.

The full scale invasion of Ukraine was framed as an existential menace to the foundational values of the EU by von der Leyen, prompting a stronger focus on defense and economic sanctions (Baracani and Kassim, 2024). It was instrumentalized by the Commission to expand its reach towards the security and defense realm (Håkansson, 2024). The supranationalisation efforts on the security realm have been prevalent especially since the Juncker era. Thus, the invasion provided an opportunity to realize the accumulating motivating forces empowered by increasing loss of relevance of the EU.

The time of the announcement of the geopolitical Commission and the Green Deal demonstrates the importance of the climate realm for the EU’s increasing geopoliticization. As Schunz (2021) points out, climate politics is an experiment for the EU to become geopolitically relevant again; thus the global climate approach and the EU’s geopolitical focus in foreign policy is deeply connected.

The literature on the EU’s international climate actions credits its adaptiveness to changing dynamics of international relations and its ability to learn from past mistakes made during climate diplomacy and evolve. The increased geopoliticization’s impact on the European global policies have been studied in various policy areas from migration to economics but the global climate aspect has hitherto been constrained within a normative power vacuum. The European global climate policy becomes a tool to address the economic competition especially with China¹⁰, for controlling the global consumption and production patterns and delegitimizing fossil fuel usage (and decreasing Russia’s relative power against Europe). The climate policy’s re-analysis in terms of the newly declared geopolitical turn is vital.

The geopolitical turn of the EU signifies a perspective shift in the internal and external policy making. Such a shift complicates the normative power projection process in the following ways. In contrast to the normative power approach which strives to create

¹⁰ Chinese pseudo green policies introduce “supply side” solutions while ignoring the demand side where unsustainable production and consumption practices are driving the climate crisis (Qi and Dauvergne, 2022). These solutions contradict the efforts to limit the environmental degradation.

ideological and diplomatic partners, the geopolitical European global policy perceives its normative rivals such as Russia and China in a more inimical and antagonistic way. Thus, the recent policy choices are more in line with such philosophy. For instance, prohibitive trade strategies or sanctions aim to coerce other parties to adopt European preferences.

The latest flagship initiative, the European Green Deal includes policies to promote domestic and international sustainable development and to reduce carbon intensive products' entry to the EU. The EU aims to spread carbon markets and level the domestic playing field by adopting the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The CBAM is an external tariff that increases the costs of the carbon intensive products for European consumers, decreasing their competitive advantage within the domestic market. It directly affects producers in Russia, China and the Global South and it has indirect global spillovers through supply chain connectivity.

A viable European global climate policy through the UNFCCC needs to balance diplomatic relations with the key centers of influence within the climate regime such as the US, Russia or China (who speaks on the behalf of the many countries belonging to the Global South). However, the EU's efforts to decrease carbon emissions domestically, keep carbon intensive products out (through CBAM) and enhance its leadership by example, are conducive to damaging its diplomatic relations and mediation capacity with its international partners; causing it to be trapped in a green dilemma.

This thesis offers four important contributions to the research on the EU's global climate policies and its evolving position in the global climate regime. First, it establishes and introduces the conceptual framework on the normative and geopolitical global climate policy tools and objectives (Table 1). Second, it applies the framework to the literature on the EU's global climate policy choices and complements the early works by incorporating geopolitical thinking. The geopolitical perspective necessitates a reinterpretation of the early literature's findings. The research discusses climate policy tools used to pursue geopolitical goals such as energy independence. Third, it conducts an empirical analysis by investigating how the normative and geopolitical aspects of the global climate policy's evolution can be observed in the State of the Union Addresses delivered by the last 3 Commission Presidents and COP speeches on the behalf of the EU.

In the fourth chapter, Russia's rhetorical convergence towards the European preferences during the COP meetings are analysed by tracing the evolution of the normative tools and objectives throughout the COP speeches delivered on the behalf of the Russian Federation. There are many states that are influenced by and shape the European global climate policy tools and objectives such as the US, the Global South countries such as China or India. However, due to time, space and scope constraints this study chooses only one key power, Russia, as an analytical comparison point. Lastly, the concluding remarks suggest future research directions based on the findings of this thesis.

The literature on the international European climate policies heavily studied the normative approach in the UNFCCC and touched upon geopolitical developments. But, the dilemma between the European climate policy's geopolitical leg pertaining to Russia, the decarbonisation process, the need for multilateral support in the UNFCCC and the new geopolitical direction's spillover to the EU's normative actions have never been explored altogether. Given that Russia refused to meet in Central and Eastern Europe for the COP 29 meetings in 2024 and moved the meeting to Baku demonstrates the importance of geopolitics in understanding global climate policy making.

The next section presents a brief overview of the key developments in the climate regime. Then, a model exploring the spectrum of normative and geopolitical global climate policy objectives and tools is presented. This thesis analyses the evolution of the use of normative and geopolitical global climate policy tools and prioritization of such objectives in the analysis of the literature on European global climate policy, the European speeches in COPs and the EU's State of the Union Addresses.

The literature review first brings together the works that analyse the EU's global climate policy from a normative power approach. Then, the works including the geopolitical developments into the global climate policy making are analyzed. The third section reinterprets the literature in the first section by including the geopolitical developments at the time of the analysis and offers complementary explanations. Lastly, a new wave of scholars that rethink both geopolitics and the normative power concepts in light of "non-human" perspectives are summarized.

The ensuing chapter introduces the research methodology. To pinpoint the geopolitical and normative global climate policy tools and objectives; the Green Deal

documents on the European Commission's website, the State of the Union Addresses given by President Barroso, Juncker and von der Leyen, and European and Russian statements made during the Conference of Parties are analyzed. In the concluding chapter the main findings are summarized and future research directions are discussed.

1.3 Key Developments In The Global Climate Regime: A Brief Overview

The EU's environmental policy entered into intergovernmental regulation with the Single European Act in 1987. The act established a legislative basis for collective environmental policy towards protecting nature's quality and resources. With the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992, the environmental policy became part of the majority voting areas of the EU shifting towards supranational regulation. Meanwhile, in 1988 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)¹¹ was established by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to provide global policy makers with scientific advice pertaining to climate issues. In 1992, during the Earth Summit (also known as The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED))¹², the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) within the UN system, was agreed on, establishing the basis of the current global climate regime. The summit aimed to present a general outline for global intervention on matters about the environment and development, guiding global cooperation and policy making in the new millenia (the UN Website).

The UNFCCC is the basis for one of the most comprehensive intergovernmental platforms pertaining to the issue. It is designed to promote an international response to the dangers caused by climate change¹³. The signatories convene each year for the Conference of Parties, the COPs (except, the year of the COVID pandemic). The decisions taken during the COPs rely on the scientific findings of the IPCC. These findings inform the caps on Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission levels, targets for limiting global warming to certain degrees (e.g. 2 or 1.5 celsius degrees) and other adaptation and mitigation measures and goals. The COPs are the Convention's supreme decision making authorities, reviewing

¹¹ <https://www.ipcc.ch/about/history/>

¹² <https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/rio1992>

¹³ <https://unfccc.int/about-us/about-the-secretariat>

progress on established goals, guiding policies and implementation of environmental goals. The nation states themselves are responsible for following these guidelines. The first COP was held in 1995 in Germany. The host country oscillates between Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and other regions recognised under the UN system.

The first major agreement was signed during the 3rd COP in Japan. In 1997, the parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol for limiting emissions, promoting sustainable development, and increasing energy efficiency¹⁴. The Protocol entered into force in 2005 following a ratification crisis which was caused under President George W. Bush in 2001. Russian ratification enabled the Protocol to reach the required percentage of global emitters¹⁵. The implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is guided by the Marrakesh Accords agreed in 2001 during COP 7 guide. The Accords aim to clarify rules for the emission trading systems, the structure of monitoring mechanisms, the details pertaining to the Adaptation Fund¹⁶.

The UNFCCC upholds the principle of “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities And Respective Capabilities” (CBDR) which underlines the differences of capabilities between developing and developed regions in addressing climate change. It acknowledges that, although climate change is the common responsibility of every nation, the ability to contribute to the global solutions are determined by their “respective capabilities”¹⁷. The EU strictly abides by the IPCC authority and bases its climate activism to the findings proposed by the Panel.

The Union hosted the Conference of Parties in 2015, in France advocating for a binding agreement on climate, eventually leading to the signature of the Paris Agreement. The Agreement smoothed the strict distinction between developed and developing countries. Although, nations have differing approaches and contributions to climate change mitigation and adaptation, the CBDR principle still persists. States decide on their own “Nationally Determined Contributions” which detail their actions towards implementing

¹⁴ Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

¹⁵ “This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” (Article 25, Kyoto Protocol)


¹⁶ <https://unfccc.int/Adaptation-Fund>

¹⁷ When the principle was adopted, China was a developing nation.

the Paris Agreement's Goals. As of 2025 it is the last international agreement signed under the UNFCCC. Although the Paris Agreement is presented as a pivotal success for fighting the climate crisis by Europe, it has not been followed by any other major diplomatic agreement. The post-Paris COP process focuses on refining the details for its implementation and enforcement, meanwhile concrete results such as the prevention of global warming beyond 1.5 degrees have not been observed yet.

1.4 Modeling Geopolitical and Normative Policy Tools and Objectives Within the Global Climate Regime

Table 1: Geopolitical and Normative Policy Tools and Objectives



The European global climate policy consists of actions taken by the EU, to develop a scientifically and diplomatically effective climate regime at the global level and to ensure the long term compliance of member states as well as other countries. The EU had hitherto measured the effectiveness of its global climate policies in terms of GHG emission

reductions, adherence to targets on limits on global warming levels and the design and implementation of legally binding international climate change agreements. It crafted its global climate policy towards hitting these targets in the UNFCCC.

The global climate policy options for states fall within a spectrum of normative and geopolitical approaches to global climate politics rather than existing as a strict dichotomy between geopolitics and norms (Table 1). The normative or geopolitical policy objectives are the goals actors aim to achieve and the policy tools are the means used to achieve them. The global climate policy tools are multifaceted and can be connected to policy areas that are not directly related to climate change itself, with the aim of achieving climate goals. The normative tools can be employed to achieve geopolitical goals or vice versa in an interdependent manner.

The early literature on the EU's international climate policy relies heavily on the normative power approach introduced by Manners (2002). Prior to 2019 many authors lay out normative global climate policy tools and objectives, building on the concept of the normative power. In his article published in 2002, Ian Manners put forth the idea that the EU is a normative power. The distinctiveness of the EU's international character gives it the ability to influence ideas, in a way that transcends the limits of civilian or military powers. According to Manners (2002), normative power entails the following aspects. Normative power places the EU outside of the boxes created for the states and gives it the ability to shape the process of perception “with both substantive and symbolic” elements. These cognitive processes aim to overcome the discussions about the EU's resemblance to a nation state by making sense of its inter-state character. Being a normative power enables the EU to introduce itself and establish its legitimacy as representing an entity beyond the mere sum of its components.

Manners argues that not only the EU has a normative structure; but also being a normative power makes Europe inclined to behave normatively in international politics. The EU's international presence is positioned outside of the range of its actions and words; as it is determined by what Europe is. Manners highlights the significance of the historical legacy and institutional context guiding the normative inclination, rejecting the presupposition that normative power necessitates a disposition to strategically employ force for pursuing objectives (2002).

The EU is able to determine and spread the definition of what is normal in international relations and domestic politics of countries, through its diplomatic encounters in bilateral or multilateral fora, international treaties and European institutions. It partners with civil society actors, utilizes membership conditionality and neighborhood policy to shape preferences of other actors and internationalizes the conversation of norms. It normalizes advancing its international agenda via the employment of “legally-binding supranational institutions” by using them itself. The main European norms are democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, social solidarity, anti-discrimination, good governance and sustainable development. They enable the EU to brand itself as a separate entity, not just the aggregation of its parts. Such rebranding is conducive to counter domestic opposition to economic liberalization pursued by the European integration project according to Manners (2002).

Global climate policy increasingly becomes a focal point for policy makers to project the Union’s normative power as the climate crisis intensifies. The objectives of the normative European global climate policy are to protect the rights of the current and future generations, containing global warming below 1.5 Celsius¹⁸, reducing GHG emissions (mitigation), globally mainstreaming the use of sustainable production and consumption and proper navigation of the climate crisis (mitigation and adaptation). A purely normative understanding of policy tools focuses on the ideational and value-based aspects of actions regarding climate change. Derived from the original definition of the term, by Manners (2002), the normative global climate policy shapes other states’ and international institutions’ “cognitive processes, with both substantive and symbolic components” related to their understanding of climate change.

As a normative climate policy tool, the Union shapes the discursive patterns on mitigation, adaptation, responsibility and justice in the context of the climate crisis. The EU sets the norms of global climate politics by pursuing leadership in the global climate regime (mainly in the UN), modeling exemplary domestic and international behavior, and influencing other states’ climate policies through economic incentives and diplomatic socialization. The exemplary behaviour entails adopting highest emission reduction goals and nearest timetables, relying on global scientific authorities; designing and implementing

¹⁸ compared to pre-industrial levels

comprehensive domestic mitigation and adaptation policies and promoting them during COP meetings.

The COP meetings give the EU an opportunity to guide the global discourse on the climate change issue. As an extension of its Human Rights focus, the EU repeatedly underlines the rights of the future generations and the international community's responsibility to protect them by immediately tackling the climate crisis in its speeches throughout the years. Such focus co-exists with the importance given to the rule of law and respect for scientifically informed policy advice. The EU abides by the findings presented by the reputable international authorities on the climate change issue such as the IPCC and encourages that global policy makers follow the same standard.

The normative global climate policy internationalizes European climate policy goals by mainstreaming the use of international legally binding treaties and multilateral discussions, for achieving progress, especially under the UNFCCC system. The platform follows a consensus based logic where the persuasion of the largest emitters is vital for European goal achievement. Thus, the normative approach to climate politics is the extension of three of the EU's norms highlighted by Manners (2002): democracy (consensus based nature of multilateral decisions during COPs), human rights (repeated emphasis on the responsibility to protect the next generations) and rule of law (Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement).

In light of recent changes in global climate (geo)politics, Manners reevaluated his own definition by emphasizing the importance of understanding the interaction between environmental sustainability, conflict and political stability while analyzing normative power. He suggested that the EU's foreign policy cooperation strategies should incorporate non-human perspectives (2023, 2024) alongside conventional strategies that have been hitherto centered around human beings' interests. Thus, the parallels and conflicts between normative and geopolitical global climate policy needs to be explored with the integration of the environmental dynamics for better goal achievement within the international climate regime.

The EU acts as a supranational entity in the global climate regime, however, its nature entails multiple dynamics inherited from the nation-state preventing the Union from acting beyond the limits of state structures. The EU's promotion of sustainable

development and efforts to establish itself as a legitimate, global climate leader, are embedded within and bounded by a specific territory. The normative soul of the EU is hosted in a geographical body, interacting with political entities in its surroundings. Geopolitics is a widely used and defined concept in international relations and political science literatures. Rudolf Kjellén, in 1916, elaborated that geopolitics is the influence of geography on state power. Derived from his definition, the main objective of the geopolitical global climate policy is to impact policy decisions made on the geographies of other actors.

The geopolitical global climate policy objectives consist of reaping any national gains that can be obtained from the climate change process irrespective of the common good. A purely geopolitical climate actor navigates the issue with a zero sum game mindset. It does not have an explicit objective of mitigating climate change, nor assisting domestic or international citizens to adapt to the crisis per se. The increased temperatures and melting of ices represent new agricultural and drilling sites to explore (especially, in the Arctic) and possibilities to extend a nation's reach beyond its own territories rather than threats. The old permafrost zones are increasingly drawing the attention of geopolitical climate actors, such as the US, China or Russia, for economic, political and military opportunities they offer for their national interest.

The geopolitical global climate policy objectives focus on promoting competitiveness on the world stage, reducing dependence on strategic rivals and utilizing climate change for increasing military, political and economic autonomy. The geopolitical global climate policy tools vary from the controlling choice of raw materials, the market values of carbon intensive products, the skills labor force needs to adopt, the information a country is required to disclose pertaining to its export goods or the carbon print in a given (foreign) territory. Rather than using an army to dictate the use of resources, the geopolitical leg of European global climate policy instrumentalizes international political and economic connectedness to achieve its goals. It pursues these objectives by mainstreaming the use of renewable energy sources, creating markets for sustainable products and undercutting fossil fuel market revenues (e.g. Russia) and encouraging others to adopt carbon pricing.

Many states such as China, the US or Russia geopolitically approach climate change; as an opportunity to capitalize on rather than a crisis to be averted. The geopolitical turn in European global policy entails strategic actions to increase the EU's relative power against other poles of the system. Such an approach suggests a willingness to prevent (and adapt to) global warming as long as Europe is in the driver's seat.

Europe is critical about the Chinese domination of electric car markets. Normatively the increasing use of electric cars benefits everyone as it helps to limit global warming. It signals a mainstreaming effect of the sustainable production patterns. The EU's discomfort with the sustainable turn in the Chinese production, reveal the geopolitical nature of its climate objectives. The EU combines its normative goals of limiting global warming and protecting human rights into its geopolitical goals of enhancing strategic autonomy and economically benefiting from the climate crisis. This perspective is evident especially in the response to the full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The climate policy tools are increasingly becoming an economic and diplomatic defense strategy against Russia and increase the EU's status against other key powers.

Geopolitical climate policy tools that have the ultimate purpose of achieving the geopolitical (or normative) climate objectives include: the control of the raw materials needed for the creation and use of sustainable technologies (rare earth minerals), renewable energy technologies (e.g. solar panels, wind turbines) and the use of the global production factors. The geopolitical climate policy objectives are pursued by utilizing various geopolitical tools such as investments in the Arctic region (the Polar Silk Road Project by China), economic, trade and military interest over Greenland (the US) or exploration of new drilling sites and agricultural zones (Russia, China). Foreign aid to climate vulnerable areas is conceptualized as a hybrid of normative and geopolitical global climate policy tools as the underlying motive is more tilted towards increasing control over other countries' territories than facilitating mitigation or adaptation.

A geopolitical global climate policy aims to benefit from global warming because the changing geographical and diplomatic landscapes are offering new opportunities for pursuing the national interest. As the zones that were previously covered with ice melts, new naval trade roads and agricultural sites are opened. These geographical changes interact with the effectiveness of normative policy tools such as promotion of free trade or

green development. States who challenge European normative framework are utilizing these changes to push for alternative normative regimes. China has the “Polar Silk Road” project, in the Arctic region. It uses the sustainable development rhetoric promoted by Europe in its own geopolitical way. The solutions it offers to the problems raised by the EU mirrors the country’s state capitalist and expansionist approach rather than policies promoted by Europe. China *geopolitically* responds and adjusts to the EU’s normative climate policy tools by increasing green investment, contributing to afforestation while also continuing fossil fuel exports, investments in brown projects.

The European global climate policy is increasingly tilting towards geopolitical tools and objectives especially since 2019, matching the broader international political economic conjuncture. The CBAM is conceived as a hybrid normative and geopolitical climate policy tool with the aim of reaching both normative and geopolitical climate objectives. Normative use of CBAM entails spreading market based tools (carbon pricing, ETS) adopted by the EU to other actors and mainstreaming sustainable development models. On the other hand, CBAM is also a geopolitical global climate policy tool because it redirects the domestic production decisions of other actors and controls carbon footprints of other countries while creating a leveling ground for the European firms.

The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism’s name itself contributes to an image that it is the EU who pursues the correct climate change policies and others need to “adjust” themselves to catch up. The “border” metaphorically delineates the exemplary EU domestic industries from others who still use a carbon intensive production pattern. This is part of the EU’s brand as a global green leader. Since CBAM utilizes market mechanisms to shape the production decisions of other states alongside contributing to adaptation and mitigation in climate vulnerable countries with its pledge to utilize the revenues to support the green development at the LDCs¹⁹, the policy is conceptualised as a hybrid tool of both normative and geopolitical climate policy making.

The Union claims that the CBAM is in line with the WTO rules as it applies to all of its trade partners in similar conditions and that the policy aims to counter the negative influence of the Green Deal on domestic firms rather than favoring them per se. However,

¹⁹https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/7abe56cc-4af0-490d-90e1-0a0825aabe37_en?file_name=CBAM%20and%20developing%20countries.pdf

the punitive impact of the tariff pushes trade partners to adopt sustainable development (serving normative objectives) or divert to other partners; opening the way for the EU to have control over the foreign production factors to enhance its domestic interests (serving geopolitical objectives). Regardless of the WTO compatibility rhetoric, many trade partners at the Global South that will be affected from the tax remains sceptical²⁰.

The normative and geopolitical global climate policy tools and goals may undermine each other, creating green dilemmas. First, the EU's success of exemplary leadership decreases the bargaining power of further emission reduction pledges in the UNFCCC. Second, the EU needs to keep its own emissions low as part of its exemplary leadership while inducing others to do the same. But the policies towards protecting its low emission rates are decreasing its ability to convince others to follow its lead.

The CBAM is a complex mechanism that can be used both normatively and geopolitically. Currently, the EU opts for a more geopolitical use of the Mechanism. It becomes a tool to force others to adopt the carbon market, pay the carbon price and decrease their carbon footprint. During the design and implementation process of the CBAM, the diplomatic engagement remains unilateral and mechanisms of developmental aid are insufficient (especially in relation to the Global South). Various developing countries in the Global South are dealing with historical path dependencies. The developmental gap left them unable to develop or operate green technologies in an innovative, fast and a cost effective manner. It is prone to worsen as they have less competitive advantage in the EU market due to carbon pricing.

The CBAM is perceived as “a levy unilaterally settled and perceived as a protectionist measure more than as an environmental policy” (Morone and Alfino, 2025) by the EU's trade partners. The CBAM seems more like a tax that the Global South has to pay, without receiving the redistributive benefits back. Such an approach is very controversial in terms of free trade, climate justice and CBDR-RC principles as the differentiated responsibilities are shouldered by the regions who industrialised very recently. Yet, these are paying the highest price under the CBAM rule. Thus, the policy

²⁰https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safrica-considers-complaining-wto-against-eu-carbon-border-tax-2024-05-22/?utm_source=chatgpt.com;
https://en.sputniknews.africa/20240801/south-africa-slams-eus-green-fee-as-violation-of-wto-norms-1067702158.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

choices to sustain domestic exemplary leadership and geopolitical inducement mechanisms towards global green transformation deteriorate the EU's benevolent image. These dynamics impair the legitimacy of the consensus based, multilateral global climate regime. The EU's leadership further risks losing such an image as the Green Deal serves to decrease the asymmetric dependence on Russian energy resources.

The complicated nature of the CBAM illustrates that the distinction between normative and geopolitical global climate tools and objectives are not always clear cut. The normative and geopolitical global climate policy strategies are tightly intertwined and mutually shape each other. Originally, Manners explained his concept by incorporating geopolitics into his analysis in his article (2002). Norms are informative of human and state relations with nature and how states perceive power in the context of these relations. The geopolitical developments are guided by and understood through the perspective of norms. Norms are formed by historical narratives, guided by institutions and geopolitics; excluding one from another draws an incomplete picture.

Normative global climate policy tools such as the integration of climate friendly development policies into national and international legislation and the normalisation of the discourse around them, have environmental spillovers to citizens' understanding of land's value and use of a country's natural resources. This paves the way for geopolitical goal achievement in many ways. First, green development undercuts revenues of fossil fuel intensive powers who use them to fund military capabilities. The EU itself acknowledges that the Green Deal is a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine²¹. Second, the narrative reconstruction of development gives the EU a first mover/ pioneer advantage for determining what type of domestic policies constitute sustainable practices. Finally, a global sustainable transformation trend increases the revenues of renewable technology exporter countries (China) while improving the response to the climate crisis.

The geographic position of states determines the effectiveness of normative climate policy tools. The sustainable development norm is harder or easier to internalize because of the geographical advantages or disadvantages states have against the climate crisis. The actors who pursue a geopolitical global climate policy objective of increased control over the Arctic resources and routes; may not respond to normative global climate policy tools

²¹ von der Leyen's keynote speech at the Green Deal Summit on September 26th 2023

such as the diplomatic pressures to complete NDCs under the Paris Agreement. States who are closer to the poles are less prone to the negative effects of global warming, countries who have significant land away from the water are protected against water level escalation or small island states are at the risk of extinction. Governments who are able to drill fossil fuels in their geographies have more to lose from embracing sustainable development in the short run.

Europe's geographical position is influential for the effectiveness of its normative and hybrid climate policy tools (e.g. the Neighborhood Policy, exemplary leadership image). The EU needs to first deal with leaks of its surrounding states' and capital flight; to maintain its net zero objective internally. The adoption of sustainable development in countries near European geography is more feasible and beneficial for the EU's green transformation than converting countries that are far away. Currently, the Green Deal's goals are being integrated within the established diplomatic relations, through economic and political agreements²², paving the way for cooperation during the COPs. The external trade policy and membership conditionality are modeled as a hybrid tool because they recreate production patterns in partner countries (especially with CBAM) to better adjust domestic preferences of the actors, resulting in a geopolitical influence. In contrast, the Union's weaker geopolitical reach to countries such as China or the US negatively affects the efficiency of the normative tools.

Climate change is a collective goods issue where cooperation is key for success. The normative and geopolitical global climate policy tools differently target other actors. The normative global climate policy uses ideational partnerships with other states, bottom up actors (civil society) or international organizations; thus, perceives fossil fuel rich countries such as Russia as potential partners that can cooperate with the EU in the UNFCCC, if a proper socialization process is followed.

Normative tools are utilized to pursue both geopolitical and normative objectives. The asymmetric interdependence between Russia and the EU is entangled with geopolitical conflicts and the emphasis on the normative climate objectives coexists with efforts to diverge from Russian natural gas, oil and coal. The European geopolitical global climate policy tools conceptualizes fossil fuel rich countries as obstacles to the success of the

²² https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-neighbourhood-policy_en

European climate policy objectives. The CBAM is a case in point. The geopolitical climate policy instrumentalizes COP meetings to damage international legitimacy of the carbon intensive production processes, undercutting the revenues. The normative climate policy tools such as the mainstreaming and legitimization of sustainable development, or portrayal of fossil fuel rich countries as complicit to the climate change factors, are serving geopolitical objectives of the EU. Understanding the conflicts and parallels of geopolitical and normative global climate policy objectives and tools is crucial for the EU's ability to assert itself in the global climate regime.

As will be demonstrated in the “Literature Review” chapter, the European global climate policy has been academically analyzed through the lens of the normative power approach; resulting in a blindness for the influence of the geopolitical developments in most of the academic analysis on European global climate policy making, until 2019. In the rare cases where geopolitics were taken into account; the literature relied on the normative power approach while interpreting their impact.

In 2019, the EU, which has hitherto perceived and presented itself as a normative power, took an explicit geopolitical turn. Following her election, von der Leyen announced her intention to lead a “geopolitical commission” (2019). The declaration is a turning point in European global (climate) policy which mostly demonstrated poor performance on proving its geopolitical reach and loaded on normative strategies to compensate for it. The announcement of the “geopolitical commission” makes it clear that geopolitics will be an important part of the European Green Deal, the most important leg of the current global climate policy.

This thesis incorporates the alternative and complementary explanations for the EU's global policy moves during COP meetings by shedding light on certain geopolitical developments at the time. It demonstrates that the normative climate policy tools highlighted by the early literature are serving both geopolitical and normative objectives of the Union. And the normative successes highlighted by the EU were pursued by using both geopolitical and normative tools. Such analysis enriches the understanding of past European global climate policies and aims to improve the design of future diplomatic strategies.

Chapter 2

NORMATIVE AND GEOPOLITICAL APPROACHES IN THE LITERATURE ON EU'S GLOBAL CLIMATE POLICY

This chapter details the literature on the European policies in the global climate regime since the 90s. In the first section, the global climate regime (mainly operating through the UN), is analysed in terms of the turning points for the normative European global climate policy. In the second section the works touching upon the geopolitical aspect of the European global climate choices are analysed. The third section incorporates the possible impact of the geopolitical developments during the time of the writing and analysis of the works that mostly focuses on the normative power approach without taking geopolitical developments occurring alongside the COP meetings into consideration. This chapter aims to shed light on the multifaceted nature of the international climate negotiations by demonstrating how the climate policy tools can be used to pursue both normative and geopolitical objectives. Such a perspective offers alternative explanations to the EU's policy choices within the international climate regime. By introducing geopolitics, this thesis aims to broaden the understanding about the global climate policy goals adopted and tools used by the EU.

After synthesising the previous works under a more holistic approach towards the European policies within the international climate regime in the previous sections, the fourth section of the literature review explores a new wave of works criticizing the lack of the incorporation of non-human perspectives into the climate change literature. They redefine both the concept of normative power and geopolitics in the context of climate change, by offering a new perspective that extends beyond anthropocentric ideas, accounting for the intrinsic linkages between human/state behaviour and nature.

2.1 The EU's International Policies on Climate Change: Looking Through the Normative Lens

The UNFCCC is the most comprehensive climate forum bringing the different centers of influence in world politics together. The parties (countries and coalitions formed by different countries such as the African Group or Small Island States) meet and defend their vision of the climate change responses. Historically, the EU claims the leadership seat with its speeches delivered during the Conference of Parties and the exemplary policies it follows domestically. The evolution of the EU's strategies and goals in the UNFCCC is key for understanding its overall actions within the climate regime.

There is agreement in the literature that the EU has been the leader, the building block of the climate regime in the immediate post-Cold War era. Various works explore the normative global climate policy tools the EU used to carve itself a leadership status. Parker and Karlsson, highlight that in the 90s Europe spearheaded a perspective for the influential climate actors such as the emerging powers and the US regarding the measures to be pursued through the UN (2010). Oberthür and Roche Kelly highlight that since the early 90s the EU pursued the most comprehensive measures of mitigation, among other key international players. It coordinated exemplary internal policies such as the Emission Trading System, and crafted a successful external policy²³ (2008). Similarly, Dupont et al highlight that since the 90s the EU improved itself towards having the most advanced climate policy options globally, especially after the Green Deal and achieved significant emission reductions (2024). Such proactive use of the normative policy tools is also recognised by Diz and de Oliveira, who credit the just and effective leadership of the EU accommodating the greatest emitters. The EU's "regulatory" authorities aspired to create a system where the sustainability norm cross cuts and is integrated within all policy areas (2024).

The leadership image in the 90s leaves its place to skepticism in the literature as the EU fails to achieve its global climate goals over time. These works reveal the limitations of normative global climate policy tools and the complex nature of the global climate regime. First, Parker, Karlsson and Hjerpe argue that the EU's own sense of leadership is not

²³ Such a position was reinforced by high energy prices at the time.

matched with its actual impact on and the perceptions of its prospective supporters (2017). In the same vein Münch and Kurze point out that, despite the key influence of regional organisations for the effective implementation of the Green Deal; even the immediate European neighbourhood doesn't properly embrace sustainable development (2023).

There are many factors that undermine the EU's leadership bid. According to Bäckstrand, notwithstanding its unique supranational climate laws, the EU needs to implement strict measures for economic, industrial and energy systems transformation to match the IPCC standards (2022). Burns and Tobin, highlight that economic crises dim the European international ambitions by empowering environmental skepticism from within. Moreover, goal achievement leads to decreased ambitions (2018). They also caution against discrete opportunities stemming from a complex legislation process which are conducive to weakening the climate policy making (2020). These challenges interfere with the use of normative climate policy tools such as having an exemplary domestic environmental policy record among other UN members.

The EU encountered many challenges in the UN in terms of promoting its normative climate goals, and effective use of the normative tools. Von Homeyer, Oberthür and Jordan, the EU, facing several crises internally and externally, has regardless worked to advance its climate goals (2021). Afionis advises that the EU needs to analyse and accept reasons behind its failures; in addition to the improvements in its functioning with institutional reforms on its external climate diplomacy (2010). Thus, it is important to analyse key crises in the European global climate policy in the COP meetings.

The literature on the EU's international climate policies heavily focuses on the process between the crisis behind the Copenhagen Accords in COP 15 (2009) and the challenging path to the second Kyoto period (2013) and the success of the Paris Agreement in COP 21 (2015). The American reluctance to ratify the first period of the Kyoto Protocol and its absence from the second commitment period tested the EU's ability to create coalitions between relevant powers; a policy tool that was vital for the Paris Agreement (2015) process. The COP 15 was a major global policy failure for the EU's ability to deploy its normative policy tools and interpret geopolitical realities at the time. The Paris Agreement, on the other hand, attest to a more successful use of normative tools throughout the process until COP 21 (but moderate goal achievement). These major agreements and

meetings were important strategic learning processes for the EU's global climate policy tools and goals.

The EU's leadership and mediation skills between different powers and platforms was tested when the US President Bush announced that the US will not pursue domestic ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 and did not join the commitment periods. The process was important for the EU to distance itself from American unilateralism (Van Schaik, 2010). In order to reach the necessary emission rates for the Kyoto Protocol's official entry into force, the EU brought Russia into the picture. The EU linked Kyoto Protocol's ratification and Russian membership to the WTO (Vogler (2005); Vogler and Bretherton (2006); Groenleer and Van Schaik (2007); Van Schaik and Schunz (2012). Parker and Karlsson point out the increased price for Russian natural gas in this process (2010). Scheipers and Sicurelli underline that as a result of the ratification, Commission President Prodi, portrayed Russia as a global environmental advocate (2007). The EU deployed its normative climate policy tools such as diplomatic mediation and attempting narrative changes on Russian environmental position and hybrid climate policy tools such as trade connectivity to secure a second commitment period. Nevertheless, in 2012 (COP 18) the impact of the second Kyoto commitment period remained limited given that major countries did not commit (Savorskaya, 2016); resulting in limited normative goal achievement.

There is a consensus in the literature that Europe learned from the failures and upgraded many of its global climate policy tools. The backlash against EU leadership during COP 15 (2009, Copenhagen) serves as a prominent example, and has been heavily studied by the literature. The diverging member state preferences during the COP 15 undermined the EU's overall ability to defend its position in the UN. The member states have different energy mixes and path dependent relationships with external energy suppliers. Thus, their climate policy goals and tools diverge. Moreover, the EU misinterpreted the external context of the negotiations, undermining its diplomatic engagement.

The process between Copenhagen Accords and the Paris Agreement (2015) offers valuable lessons on the application of normative climate policy tools and the complexities of actors' global climate policy goals. In 2009, heading towards COP 15, the EU had

boldly stated goals, but it lacked a proper diplomatic roadmap for achieving them and a solid idea about others' perspectives (Cross, 2020). Despite being the host of the Parties, it failed to advance its own vision, resulting in loss of diplomatic prestige. As Curtin highlights, the Copenhagen Accord was finalized by the US, Brazil, South Africa and China; the President of the European Commission was only notified via a text message. He bluntly observes that “there was a recognition that the EU had been upstaged at best and humiliated at worst, and that a radical new approach is needed” (2010). Following the failure of the European leadership's claim, the tone of the global climate talks shifted from one of hopefulness “to resignation” (Skovgaard, 2014).

Many factors contributed to the EU's failure in COP 15. Groen and Niemann (2013) emphasizes the lack of a coherent internal EU position and challenging external context where the US and China had different climate policy goals than Europe. Different American presidencies' inconsistent climate visions further complicates the diplomatic efforts. Killian and Elgström argue that, although the EU still perceives itself as “the most progressive climate actor”, its role became diffused and less predictable with the inclusion of Chinese and American positions (2010). Aamondt and Boasson also recognize the EU's shortcomings in navigating global climate politics despite its leadership in internal environmental action. The European emphasis on “scientific institutional logic”²⁴ led to the Copenhagen deadlock because it was not a concern for the BASIC group nor the US (2020).

The Copenhagen talks demonstrate that normative climate tools such as exemplary leadership, science-based policy emphasis and multilateral diplomatic engagement failed to deliver the EU's climate policy goals (normative and geopolitical). Recognising the diplomatic failure, the EU improved its use of normative climate policy tools in many ways, after the COP 15. It got outside of legally binding treaty perspective, reformed its conventional policy of relying only on IPCC findings, expanded its advisory body pool and accepted monitoring of targets that are in congruence with the domestic conditions rather than insisting on top-down “coercive compliance mechanisms” (Aamondt and Boasson, 2020). Thus, as Von Lucke recognise the impartiality focus dominating the 90s (the Kyoto

²⁴ “the EU heavily relied on the IPCC's findings and largely sided with the non-Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) G-77 members and environmental NGOs” (Ansari et al, 2013).

era) left its place to “mutual recognition and non-domination²⁵” philosophy throughout the 2000s. Internally, the EU entered a process of “strategic learning and a professionalization”, recognizing different opinions (especially on the legally binding rules) and a diplomatic improvement. The author also highlights that these efforts shaped the international climate regime (2021).

The improvement in European “climate diplomacy” is connected to the diplomatic restructuring between 2010 to 2015, with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. The external representatives actively worked on how the EU was perceived, accommodating alternative perspectives, improving their efforts to influence relevant actors. Such influence was made possible with “a diplomatic logic” rather than scientific one and internal convergence of climate agendas (Aamondt and Boasson, 2020). Unlike the Copenhagen Summit which was held hostage to the inter-EU differences; the Cancun Summit was a success since prior to it Europe managed better coordination (Groen, Niemann and Oberthür, 2013). The EU’s active work on its normative climate policy tools, eventually led to the adoption of the Paris Agreement (Von Lucke, 2021).

The transformative process of the Union’s global climate policy following COP15 has not been without its challenges. Dyrhaug and Kurze caution against the significance of “domestic” circumstances and bottom up requests of member states with divergent perceptions of norms (2023). Reflecting upon the domestic differences’ role in sabotaging the EU’s international policy making capacity in the Copenhagen Summit, Groen and Niemann suggest that when challenges present themselves, the EU lead by pursuing regular communication, by investing in “package deals” between “third parties” before the forthcoming discussions (especially COPs) and by emphasizing connectivity between different issues (2011).

The increased intra-EU coherence on Durban and Cancun led to effective international climate policy making for the EU (Groen and Niemann, 2013). However, a reassessment and proper positioning of its institutional expertise to the political environment created by changing constellations of power has been vital for European success post-2009. The EU's new role in the current multipolar global climate politics is

²⁵ Non-domination refers to the recognition of the central roles states play in global issues. (Von Lucke, 2021)

multifaceted. Backstrand and Elgström, put forth that after Copenhagen, the EU adopted a “mediator” role where it managed to combine leading with mediating between parties for the Durban negotiations (2013). In order to mirror the global dynamics better, the EU adopted a comprehensive diplomatic strategy on climate, beyond the UNFCCC moving “from a heroic to a more humdrum style of leadership²⁶” and improving its “entrepreneurial leadership” (Tobin et al., 2023). These measures extended the EU’s reach towards different negotiation parties and cleared the way for coalitions among reformist actors by repositioning itself as a moderate party (Oberthür and Groen, 2015)²⁷.

The moderation of extremist climate positions increases the European influence in international environmental governance especially when other major players' positions are far away from the European agenda. According to Delreux, in addition to adopting more moderate reformist positions; the EU can also achieve extreme climate goals by first making compromises in light of the external conditions, then pushing a more ambitious agenda in the long run (2014). The adjustment of its positions can be conceptualised as the different use of the normative global climate policy tools. The EU tailors its exemplary leadership image based on the feasibility of the climate policies of other states. Thus it changes its rhetoric (lesser emphasis on science based indicators) and pursues less ambitious normative global climate policy goals (limiting the global warming to 2 celsius degrees rather than 1.5, leaving room for domestic interpretation of the objectives and tools).

The UNFCCC is the most prominent climate change platform, but it is not the only one. Many other interactions in other international institutions such as the WTO, G20 and even NATO impact the climate negotiation outcomes. According to Earsom and Delreux, although the EU adapted well to the burgeoning of different international regime complexes for dealing with climate change, the dissimilar responsiveness between the UNFCCC and other platforms may damage its dynamism and maneuver capacity (2021). As they later investigate their claim in the light of the Paris Agreement they find that the

²⁶ “does not have an explicit, overriding, long-term objective and action is incremental, departing only slightly from existing policies as circumstances require” (Hayward, 2008)

²⁷ As opposed to its previous positions as the extreme goal oriented actor who defended 2 degrees celsius temperature cap on global warming compared to pre-industrial levels and strict legally binding top-down measures and timetables. These changes helped the EU better match the preferences of other important powers.

EU utilized the “the international regime complex on climate change” (such as G20) for classical “multilateral” negotiation techniques, refinement of the solutions to particular matters, establishing political dynamism and securing cooperation across different fora. Depending on the “political” relevance of the negotiators in the forum (for instance the presence of heads of states), the forum’s climate expertise and the depth of the focus granted to the climate issue; the EU strategically chose which one to engage with, in order to reinforce its stance during the COP meetings. The Union compensated for its opaqueness of the UNFCCC with discussions in G7, G20 and UN Secretary General Summits (Earsom and Delreux, 2023). These efforts contributed to the EU’s expertise on using its normative climate policy tools.

Global Climate Change Alliance²⁸ is another global climate policy platform led by the EU. De Roeck, cautions against “the transformative potential of adaptation for development”, of the GCCA’s different facets. He argues that the financial support allocated by GCCA is utilized for the reproduction of the EU as “a climate leader” and to create a steady organizational identity. The organization defines the limits of methods “and actions” considered relevant for the climate change adaptation process, creating European “discursive rationalities”, while hiding the role of the EU in structural causes in the need for climate adaptation (2019).

European normative climate policy tools have been evolving significantly as the Union prepared to lobby for the Paris Agreement. Oberthür and Groen, applies the “mediating” analysis (Backstrand and Elgström, 2013) about the Copenhagen, Second Kyoto and Durban process ; to the Paris process. They stress the importance of the EU’s coalition building role between the developing countries²⁹ and navigating climate assistance to vulnerable parties. Although the previous strict science-based target focus of the EU was relaxed during the process, through this compromise the EU was able to pressure other actors to opt for extreme positions (2018). During this process the EU shifted its preference between different normative policy tools. As exemplary leadership,

²⁸ “The GCCA was established in 2007 to provide climate-related assistance towards the Global South. It is structured around two pillars: policy dialogue and technical/financial support to the implementation of national adaptation policies. ... It operates as complementary to the international climate regime, ... (GCCA, 2015a).” (De Roeck, 2019)

²⁹ Lacasta et al, also highlight the importance of the EU’s bridge building role between developing and developed countries for the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol (2002).

the scientific emphasis and legally binding rule focus failed to deliver results; it focused more heavily towards multilateral diplomatic connectivities and changes in the narratives around moderate climate policy preferences. Oberthür and Groen emphasize that the COP in Durban (2011) and the Paris Agreement (2015) solidified the EU's "mediator" role in global climate politics. Such a role is in line with the multipolarity where the EU is no longer "a climate 'superpower'" (2017).

The improvement of the European global climate policy between Copenhagen and Paris has been met with skepticism by some works in the literature. Çelik, argues that between COP 15 (2009) and COP 21 (2015), the EU addresses different demands by portraying the different facets of itself, employing several "organisational outputs" such as talks, decision-making and "actions". It uses varying "organisational" guises for addressing "the pressures from the actors it engages in its climate diplomacy" (2022). De Roeck's (2019) remarks on the European engagement in the GCCA are supportive of Çelik's (2022) arguments about the EU's different faces and interest structures. Similarly, Lightfoot and Burchell claims that the EU strategically adopts sustainability norm in line with its economic competitiveness³⁰. Thus, the benefits reaped from trade liberalisation and rejection of corporate responsibility complicates the "normative vision" behind "sustainable development" (2005). The different faces the EU shows in different fora (Çelik, 2022; Lightfoot and Burchell, 2005) and the "mediating" concept (Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013) are in line with Killian and Elgström's (2010) prediction of the diffused EU role in the evolving global climate politics.

Fusiek claims that the use of normative power tools depends on "the audience" and "the transmitter". The "internal capabilities and 'domestic' conditions" help the external diffusion of its normative power (2020); highlighting the importance of European efforts to keep its exemplary leadership, the newest one being the EGD. Kreienkamp, Pegram and Coen, dissect the dynamics of the relationship between the UN and the EU in relation to the Green Deal. They conclude that bottom up an "authoritative policy entrepreneur" secures the possible top down international opportunities for creating policies that have a transformative impact. They underline the key role played by the EU's global socialization

³⁰ Thus, contradicting Manner's (2002) remark on the key aspect of a normative interference being the lack of a clear "material" reward. (Lightfoot and Burchell, 2005)

process in transforming its willingness to politically engage with the climate issue. Furthermore, such interaction goes both ways where the EU's willingness to proceed with the process alone if necessary, fuels ambitious policies at the COPs. An even deeper European institutional engagement with the UNFCCC is critical for upcoming political challenges that will be faced by the Green Deal (2022).

The EU has the potential to globally set the standards as, “the novelty of the Green Deal” constitutes “a binding commitment” for a carbon neutral future and a normalization of environmental sensitivity in policy domains (for instance finance). The Deal solidifies the EU's ability to export the internal conduct (Eckert, 2021). Thus, along the lines of Delreux's (2014) observation about the effect of the increased external feasibility of extreme global climate goals, the EU shapes its external conditions with the Green Deal. However, Oberthür and Dupont argue that the EU needs to position its global climate policy within an overarching approach; a “proactive ‘grand climate strategy’” in the context of the Green Deal through better integration of its internal and external politics (2021).

2.2 The EU's International Role on Climate Change: Geopolitical Global Climate Policy Strategies

Until 2019 the EU's normative power focus has been prevalent in its rhetoric during the COP meetings and the analysis by the literature about the EU's global climate policies. Most of the early literature recognizes the influence of competing interests in the overall climate regime but assumes that the EU acts normatively, in an insulated manner. In the event of a reference to the geopolitical events, the interpretation of their significance for the EU's global climate policy is constructed upon the normative power approach. The “geopolitical commission” declaration alongside the announcement of the Green Deal³¹ signals a Europe that aims to proactively invest beyond normative power while heading towards future climate geopolitics. This section synthesises the literature which incorporates the role of geopolitics to the analysis of the European global climate policy.

³¹ to make Europe “the world's first climate-neutral continent by 2050, with net zero greenhouse gas emissions” (2019)

The fight for geopolitical relevance has been shaping the EU's choices between the available normative policy tools and goals since the inception of the UNFCCC process. Parker and Karlsson, also recognize that unilateral American retraction from the global climate regime in the 80s provided Europe with opportunities to fill the vacuum and pursue the leadership role (2010). Oberthür and Roche Kelly highlight that the US' and developing countries' positions have been important for the European leadership bid in the 90s (2008). The Kyoto Protocol process has been valuable for proving the European divergence from the American position (Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007; Van Schaik, 2010) in international (climate) politics³². The EU's aspirations to carve itself a distinct identity are observed in European references on American preferences where "the EU aims to appear as an alternative power" who chooses "multilateralism, a commitment towards international law" contrary to the US who acts unilaterally, and is a laggard (Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007).

The "external opportunity structure" where the end of the Cold War ushered a hopefulness towards "multilateral" liberal order and the US' reluctance to assume environmental leadership, paved the way for the EU (Pavese and Torney, 2012). However, as the EU's policies for creating a net zero economy enhances its leadership by example, they reduce its bargaining power compared to the larger emitters (Oberthür and Roche Kelly, 2008). This dynamic has negative repercussions for the EU's diplomatic leverage in the long run; exposing the limits of overreliance on normative climate policy tools. As Lehne points out, currently the EU possesses about one tenth of the global emissions and it needs to politically and economically pressurize others to reduce emissions as well (2020).

The prevailing normative inclination during international negotiations (e.g. exemplary leadership), keeps Europe from reaching its full potential in terms of global political influence, according to Van Schaik and Schunz. They argue that the EU should separate its normative stance from its "strategy", which should be tailored towards the negotiation environment. As the multipolar climate governance structure demonstrates, the logic of appropriateness is no longer the best approach for projecting the Union's influence (2012). Later, Schunz adds that the EU needs a flexible external climate policy, adaptive to

³² Lightfoot and Burchell (2005), also credit the EU's normative power as opposed to American reluctance to handle opposition in the World Summit on Sustainable Development; and its ability to put pressure on Russia during negotiations.

the changing geopolitical landscape. He highlights the importance of going beyond planning, for proper strategic action (2017). In the same vein, Lightfoot and Burchell mention that the EU strategically molds “norm of the sustainable development” in a way to protect its competitive advantage through “multilateral agreements” (2005).

As Falkner, underlines the interwoven dynamics between the “identity and interests” calls for a more in depth consideration of “political-economic foundations” of the European international climate leadership. Although the “normative intentions may be a motivating force”, they are insufficient to maintain a consistent endeavor “to internationalize domestic policy through environmental diplomacy” (2006). The European normative climate policy goals cannot be separated from broader geopolitical trends. The climate goal achievement is connected to the Union’s efforts to assert its worldview and supranational relevance in the international fora. The emerging powers and the US are pursuing a “club governance” limiting Europe's influence (Delreux, 2012).

In a world where powers such as China and the US impose their own visions for the upcoming systems for energy and influencing partnerships inside and outside of the EU, Europe’s relevance is challenged. These alternative visions are conducive to corroding the “multilateral energy governance” instruments and replacing them with economic disintegration and rivalry on technology and norms (Pastukhova, Pepe and Westphal, 2020). The actors who pursue geopolitical climate objectives and use such tools decrease the effectiveness of European global climate policy tools, especially normative ones.

The fact that sustainability is not just a normative policy objective is demonstrated through the institutional placement of the climate policies in the Union. According to Hardt and de Armiño, the European external climate policy is subsumed under institutional structures allocated for “foreign policies and, mainly, to security, defense and stability”. The EU enlarged its security realm towards environmental concerns. The approach attests to the EU’s traditional security perception where it needs to protect “global security and stability, especially with respect to its own territory and population” (2023).

The existence of competitive visions on the climate and energy issue is reflective of a polycentric system, with various sections making decisions (for instance, “intergovernmental” administrations) with non-hierarchically related and intersecting “jurisdictions” (Van Asselt and Zelli, 2018). Designing European external climate policy

requires navigating considerable polycentric complexities. Despite such complexity the EU manages to reconstruct its global climate policy according to the climate regime's changes. The new roles the EU carves itself out in the changing climate regime, the way it uses its policy tools and how it navigates geopolitical climate challenges determines whether the EU can advance its climate goals.

The normative climate policy tools' role in serving geopolitical goals is detailed by Schunz, who expands Bäckstrand and Elgström's (2013) analysis. He emphasizes that European climate actions goes beyond inward looking exemplary leadership or multilateral "lediating"³³ perspectives. It involves purposeful strategic partnerships formed by a more assertive Europe, adapting to the role of China and the US in current world politics. Therefore, the "climate diplomacy is not (and never has been) simply the external dimension of EU internal climate action." It "is foreign policy unfolding in a context of complex geopolitics." The EU's global climate policies represent an "experiment" about "(re)gaining geopolitical relevance" in a changing world. The climate relations with great powers have the potential to educate the EU about strategically navigating other areas of complicated global politics (2021). The "Lediating" strategy, according to Oberthür and Groen, is in line with the EU's status as "a middle power in multipolar climate geopolitics" (2018).

Von Homeyer, Oberthür and Jordan praise the EU's ability to proceed with its climate vision despite the geopolitical crisis environment and even benefit from it (2021). The crisis environment around the climate change issue is also recognised by Rosamond who highlights the importance of the Eurozone Crisis, Crimean annexation, Syrian refugee crisis, Britain's exit process, the pandemic and the full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 for prompting instant "political responses from the institutions of the EU and its member states" while keeping the climate ambitions (2023). In the same vein, Siddi and Kustova underline that following Russian energy cuts to Ukraine in the 2000s, Europe has adopted a "strategic approach" and increased its focus on climate for supporting its energy security (2021).

³³ the leadership through mediation between multiple relevant actors

The global green transition serves geopolitical climate goals of economically benefiting from the climate change process by adopting and mainstreaming the use of sustainable technologies. The EU's geopolitical climate policy goals are exemplified by Oberthür who recognizes the importance of establishing a powerful base for the EU's place in the geopolitical landscape of climate change in the future with the use of decarbonised new economic models (2016). With the announcement of the Green Deal in 2019, the EU's historical ambition towards global leadership culminated into a clear policy initiative. The climate change issue became to represent a larger part of the EU's overall global policy. Dupont et al highlight that in 2019 the Green Deal accelerated the speed and comprehensiveness of climate action. It transcends past patterns on discussions about emission reduction targets and mitigation, offers "an integrated policy approach" giving weight adaptation (2024).

The use of geopolitical global climate policy tools and focus on geopolitical objectives has repercussions on the EU's identity as a normative power. Naumovski, Apostolovska-Stepanoska and Ognjanovska defend that the EU's normative instruments are its "strongest" characteristic; and that the EU should protect the multilateral approach by "more" notably participating in international organisations (2021). In the same vein, Herranz-Surrallés argues that the adoption of realist and geopolitical perspectives undermines trust on the multilateral institutions and may complicate coalition building efforts with leaders in the renewable sector (2024). Grimm et al., embrace a more contingent approach and defend that the EU should flexibly utilize different leadership types depending on its leverage over different countries and the public opinion towards the EU and climate agenda. They highlight the importance of hybrid global climate policy tools such as "leadership by assistance and through coalitions [that] is an essential part of the EU's ambition to promote" international sustainable development. However, they caution against a coercive leadership style. The CBAM economically and politically endangers not only trade partnership but also overall green cooperation (2022) under the EGD.

In order for the EU to be able to construct a successful Green Deal diplomacy it needs to recognize normative differences among regional actors. Leonard et al. highlight that Europe's decreased fossil fuel dependency may destabilise the economies and politics

of regional partners (2021) after the Green Deal. Münch and Kurze underline the importance of future research on the possible ways of incorporating geopolitical conflicts among international players into normative diplomatic endeavors (2023). Energy is one of the drivers of geopolitical competition. Crowley-Vigneau, Kalyuzhnova and Ketenci, remind that the choice about the transition to renewable energy itself is geopolitically motivated connected to the policies towards energy relations with suppliers such as Russia (2023).

The Green Deal interrupts established “incremental” European policy formation of the past (Rosamond, 2023). The ambitions towards the internationalization of the Green Deal is accompanied by geopolitically motivated green industrial strategy (Eckert, 2021). Herranz-Surrallés argues that such geo-politicization of the energy transition is evident in the green industrial policy, the barriers against the “foreign investment in the energy sector” and the strategic recalibration of the diplomatic approach about “strategic renewable energy projects and technological” partnerships (2024). Such use of hybrid global climate policy tools has spillover effects on the EU’s economic partners. Diz and de Oliveira recognise the impact of normative and strategic actions for ensuring sustainable development that exceeds the member states and falls on to third countries. Emphasis on green values in a potential agreement with MERCOSUR (2024)³⁴ and the following fallout is a case in point for the negative ramifications.

The recent literature on climate change increasingly considers geopolitics along with their normative analysis of the EU’s global climate policies; however, literature before 2019 have turned mostly a blind side towards the geopolitical developments concurring with the analyzed climate policy choices at the time of their writings. The authors who touched upon geopolitics have not properly connected the geopolitical developments to the European policies under the UNFCCC. The next chapter bridges this gap by analyzing the author’s arguments from a new lens of the geopolitical developments’ impact on the EU’s use of its normative and geopolitical climate policy tools for pursuing geopolitical objectives alongside normative ones.


³⁴ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6244

Chapter 3

**BURSTING THE NORMATIVE BUBBLE: HOW DOES
GEOPOLITICS ENRICH THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE
EUROPEAN GLOBAL CLIMATE POLICY?**

The global warming levels and widespread use of fossil fuels years after the Paris Agreement demonstrate that the normative climate policy tools alone may not be sufficient to advance the EU’s climate policy goals. The overreliance on the normative policy tools by the literature and the emphasis of normative objectives, decreases its ability to interpret the EU’s responses to the geopolitical events, throughout the climate regime. In his original analysis, even Manners recognizes the importance of geopolitical developments in shaping the central norms. He states that Europe aimed to normatively position itself as opposed to the communist East after the Cold War. However, he defines the collapse of communism as “the collapse of norms rather than the power of force”, seeing the normative power as the most important form of power (2002).

Table 3.1: Number of Articles Including Geopolitical Developments, by Year



Many articles from the earlier literature on European climate policy analysis share a normative perspective. Although some works mention geopolitical developments within the context of the European global climate policy they are rare and limited in scope. Among the ones that consider geopolitics, 74% of them are written after 2019. Only 27% of the articles written before 2019 include some geopolitical analysis (Graph 1 and Appendix 2). 2019 is chosen as a cutoff point as it coincides with the explicit announcement made by von der Leyen. Her stated objectives are instrumental for predicting the future global climate policy of the Union. The geopolitical Commission announcement and the inception of the Green Deal in 2019 makes the connection between two issues impossible to neglect. This section incorporates geopolitical developments to the earlier literature's analysis for suggesting alternative explanations for the reasoning behind the EU's previous global climate policy choices.

The climate policy goals are intrinsically linked to the energy trade ties of countries. The EU's most significant energy partner is Russia. The energy trade relations between the EU and Russia dates back to the 70s when Western European states wanted to diversify away from oil and provided necessary technology and funds for natural gas pipeline construction projects for the Soviet Union. The shift towards natural gas was fueled by the OPEC embargo resulting in a pursuit of credible energy suppliers. Later, as the Soviet Union dissolved and Putin became the leader of the emerging Russia in the late 90s, weaponization of natural gas against Europe started to accompany the EC's political and economic cooperation efforts in the early 2000s.

Until the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 there was a widespread recognition in the literature that Russia was a rival that could be partnered with for achieving the EU's normative climate policy goals. Despite the Crimean annexation in 2014, increasing monopolization in the Russian gas sector which contrasts European market liberalization or the anti-monopoly investigation against Gazprom, the literature prioritized the normative power approach in their interpretation of global climate politics. This perspective is problematic for interpreting the EU's ability to achieve its climate policy goals; because as the EU's normative compatibility with Russia deteriorates; its goals become harder to be promoted in the region with solely normative policy tools.

In the same way as Europe's diversification away from oil was triggered by a geopolitical crisis, the EU's new found geopolitical emphasis on global climate policy and use of geopolitical and hybrid climate tools are driven by changing geopolitical landscape where Russia, rising powers and Trump administration are demonstrating normative and geopolitical rivalry for the western world order. Geopolitics have always been part of the EU's policy direction regardless of its normative perception of world politics. The EU was reacting rather than proactively instrumentalizing geopolitical developments to accomplish its global climate goals. These developments have not been properly explored by the literature.

2016 represents a slight breaking point for the inclusion of geopolitical considerations to the analysis of the EU's global climate policy, following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Considering the publishing and review time of the articles the impact could be delayed to the works following 2016. However, overall, the literature poorly recognised the geopolitical developments interacting with the choice among climate policy tools and prioritization of different climate policy goals, until 2019. The EU's framing as a normative power does not change the fact that it has been utilizing both geopolitical and normative climate policy tools to pursue geopolitical objectives through COPs way before 2019.

Geopolitics enriches the understanding of the multifaceted goal structures and tools of the parties with which the EU interacts during the international climate negotiations. The combination of both normative and geopolitical global approaches needs to be employed for understanding Europe's place in the UNFCCC regime. The EU's quest for global climate leadership is rooted in the geopolitics of positioning itself as an alternative to the rising powers' and the US's approach to global governance. The Green Deal is a normative and geopolitical tool directly connected with Europe's geopolitical global climate objectives such as overcoming dependence on Russian energy or industrial competition with China and the US.

The early literature includes some references to geopolitical interest into their analysis, but most of these works are not properly addressing the significance of the challenges presented by major powers; until von der Leyen's announcement. Although the announcement in 2019 led to a perspective change in the EU's global climate policy which

is strengthened by full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, previous crises were stepping stones towards the tipping point in 2019 and their geopolitical weight could have been better noticed. This chapter aims to incorporate the geopolitical dynamics left behind the shadows of the earlier literature and demonstrate why their omissions are problematic.

Russia's approach to the global climate regime reflects the EU's normative and geopolitical climate tools' impact on normative and geopolitical goals. As one of the major fossil fuel exporters and consumers, Russian green transformation would contribute to global emission reductions, helping the EU to achieve its normative global climate policy goals. The EU is the strongest advocate of the environmental movement, an exemplary leader in the multilateral fora and a pioneer for sustainable development terminology; the rhetorical use of climate issues by other actors reflects its control of narrative around the issue; showing the effectiveness of normative policy tools. These narratives interact with global consumption and production patterns.

Kuzemko, touches upon the importance of "embedded ideas about energy's socioeconomic role" in Russian politics (2014); such embeddedness is also observable within the geopolitical significance of the European global climate policy. For instance, Russian gas cuts in 2006 have fueled the willingness for transitioning towards renewable energy. The climate change issue presents an opportunity to frame such a transition under environmental rhetoric rather than as a geopolitical response (Van Schaik, 2010) to tensions with various actors. As Russia weaponizes the energy trade against the EU, the increasing focus on sustainable development with the explicitly stated emphasis on decreasing Russian power in the region would have further strained their relationship. Instead, until 2022 the EU discursively highlighted its normative global climate policy goals while subtly using normative, hybrid and geopolitical tools to pursue geopolitical objectives. Thus, the choice among the goals to pursue and tools to use was at times informed by geopolitical relations even if these are framed under a normative power narrative.

The connection between geopolitics and European global climate policy choices intensified following the full scale invasion of Ukraine as the EU instrumentalized all aspects of its global climate policy to respond mainly to Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also to Chinese economic takeoff. However, although such instrumentalisation intensified in the post 2022 era, it has always been present in the EU's climate policy choices during

the Kyoto, Copenhagen and Paris processes. These have hitherto been analysed by using the normative power approach in the early works. This chapter tries to pinpoint the geopolitical objectives pursued during the UNFCCC process with a simultaneous analysis of the EU's shifting policy preferences throughout COP meetings. It explores how the climate policy making process culminated into the Green Deal's instrumentalisation against Russia.

The revival of the Trans-Caspian pipeline project aiming to bring gas to Europe from Caspian states following the Russia- Ukraine gas dispute in 2004 have great parallels to increased focus on international climate change mitigation efforts when considered from energy independence perspective. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict in 2014 increased focus on the climate agenda under "the Energy Union" (Oberthür, 2016). Siddi argues that the EU's drive for a decarbonized economy will simultaneously address the issues of climate change and fossil fuel dependence such as natural gas from Russia (2016). The UNFCCC process coexists with various geopolitical tensions. This section introduces alternative explanations for the conclusion drawn by the authors about the EU's use of global climate policy tools in light of the geopolitical developments influencing the EU's global climate actions.

3.1 Reinterpreting The Kyoto Process

The Euro-Russian normative divide has historical roots. Kropatcheva states that since the late 90s the Russian "documents" antagonistically conceptualises the EU; while noticing isolationist attempts of NATO. For instance, Russia was critical about Yugoslavian interventions' intentions (2012). The normative tensions in the common neighborhood intensified during the EU's and NATO's enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, the Orange Revolution and the Crimean annexation (Wolff, 2015). The economic, political and military western expansion towards Russian neighbourhood contradicts its aim of regional leadership³⁵. These developments form the background of the Kyoto Protocol's ratification, first and second commitment processes.

³⁵ (through organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Union and strategic use of the energy trade)

The Kyoto ratification and first commitment process has been emphasised as a success of the EU's normative climate policy tools in the early literature. First, Lightfoot and Burchell, underscore Putin's reluctance to endanger the Protocol or his relationship with Europe in 2000s; reflecting EU's ability to pressurize others (2005). Second, Groenleer and Van Schaik highlight Russian support alongside Japan and Canada for the durability of the Protocol during the Russian trade talks in 2004 (2007). Third, Scheipers and Sicurelli credit the EU's entrepreneurial capacity while supporting Russia's inclusion in the WTO and guaranteeing the ratification of the Kyoto (2007). Fourth, Parker and Karlsson (2010), emphasize the importance of the WTO carrot and high natural gas prices in EU-Russia trade for Kyoto. Finally, Pavese and Torney (2012) and Van Schaik and Schunz (2012), again highlight the 2004 WTO bargain to secure the Protocol.

In the beginning of the 2000s, despite the fact that there is a fair recognition of the Russian Federation as an outsider to Europe, the country was conceptualized as a partner in literature (Appendix 2). Lightfoot and Burchell (2005) assume that "Putin would be unlikely to jeopardize good relations with the EU and scupper the treaty"; Groenleer and Van Schaik (2007) recognize the strategic aspect of the climate policies for independence from Russian and Middle Eastern energy; but they perceive Russia as a diplomatic partner; Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007) highlight that "Russia's ratification of the Treaty allowed ... Prodi, to declare the EU's 'huge success for the international fight against climate change'."

In his book chapter Douma (also quoted by Van Schaik and Schunz (2012) and Van Schaik (2010)) elaborate on many geopolitical developments that formed the background of the Euro-Russian climate relationship leading up to the Protocol's extension. The common spaces, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement's extension, the enlargement and Russian intervention in Chechnya are determinants of Russian position in the UNFCCC. Douma highlights the importance of the PCA for clauses pertaining to "the environment and the protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants" and the sustainable industrial modernisation through public/private cooperation. The author also reminds that the Kyoto ratification promise by Russia was not materialized (2006)³⁶; showcasing normative goal failure. As an actor who prioritizes geopolitical global climate

³⁶ Russia ratified the Protocol in 2004.

goals; Russia's response to the EU's normative climate policies is geopolitically motivated; thus, the Kyoto Protocol's ratification crisis represents calculations beyond the UNFCCC.

A broader perspective outside the climate regime shows that the external European policy towards the common neighborhood between Russia and Europe can also be conceptualised as a "geopolitical doctrine" entailing "simultaneous dynamics of inclusion and exclusion" (Wesley Scott, 2005). For instance, Russia is included in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement but is completely excluded from the European Neighborhood Policy. Conflicts such as the Second Chechen War, annexation of Crimea; the expiry of the PCA in 2007 or the energy disputes reflect the Russian-European normative and geopolitical divide in the 2000s. According to Kuzemko, within the European discourse after the 2006 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute, "notions of 'us', market liberal EU, versus 'them', unreliable, resource nationalist Russia" was employed to buttress anxiety about the EU's security of supplies. She highlights the importance of balancing short term reliance on fossil fuels, long term green policies and the leadership potential for the EU to guide green transition in Russia (2014).

Despite some recognition of geopolitics, none of the earlier works in the literature on the EU's international climate policies elaborate on the importance of the Central and Eastern European enlargement and economic and political ramifications of an ecological transformation in the region for Russia (specifically for Gazprom's revenues). As the Central and Eastern Europe becomes part of the EU market, the Russian exports were predicted to decrease at the time³⁷. In their research report, Polanski and Winkler, conclude that post-enlargement Europe is the foremost Russian energy trade partner and "according to traditional trade theory," the resulting "trade diversion" from these countries' accession to Europe can be compensated with larger market size (2008). The WTO membership had the potential to provide that market size. The considerations of the long term political economic impact of the enlargement enriches the research on normative and hybrid global climate policy tools.

The European perspective on Russia was apparent when the newly launched European Neighbourhood Policy didn't include Russia during the Kyoto process. Likewise

³⁷ <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/opinion/russia-and-eu-enlargement/>

Russia did not extend the PCA to the new members³⁸. As an actor who prioritizes geopolitical global climate goals; Russia's response to the EU's normative climate policies is geopolitically motivated. Thus, notwithstanding the European aim of climate leadership, WTO membership can also be interpreted as a tool of geopolitical appeasement and economic compensation. These events attest to the importance of analysing geopolitical goals for understanding the use of normative climate policy tools. Given these clashes, the EU's ability to successfully generate multilateral support for the Paris agreement can be appreciated better.

On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the American-European normative divide was deep in the 2000s, during the Kyoto commitment periods. Pavese and Torney (2012), highlight European efforts to fill the vacuum left by the US after the withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. Falkner recognizes the EU's efforts to catch up with the US and constraints faced by the European environmental leadership due to the energy interests (2006). During the Kyoto process, the EU opposed the NATO involvement in Iraq during the Gulf War, diverged from the American definition of terrorism and pursued a pro-Palastinian foreign policy. These triggered a greater emphasis on economic and security relations with Asia by the American and European policy makers. The emphasis on normative climate goals such as the protection of human rights and the normative tools (multilateral engagement) is part of a bigger divide between the EU and the US where sustainable energy represents an alternative to Middle Eastern geopolitical competition for the EU.

The EU's insistence to be an alternative to the US in international climate policy is part of the effort to carve a space for itself where it can counter the American presence in world politics. American refusal to provide environmental leadership supplies the EU with a foreign policy identity (Falkner, 2006). The global green transformation necessitates substantial economic, diplomatic and technical expertise; an area that is easier for the EU to compete with the US compared to American military capabilities. Scheipers and Sicurelli highlight that Europe prioritizes diplomacy and multilateralism over military means (2007) .

³⁸ The political tensions were apparent when Russia did not recognize border agreements between Estonia and Latvia, criticized EU's inability to put a proper commission together after enlargement and postponed the 2004 Europe-Russia summit on these grounds.

The earlier works in the literature on European climate change policies also underemphasize China's importance. Lacasta et al. mentions the importance of Chinese cooperation and the EU's effort of mediation between different actors (2002). Oberthür and Roche Kelly, recognize that the EU's exemplary leadership needs to adjust to the dynamics of the rising powers and they suggest new policies of global "trade and investment," and developmental aid, technology "transfers" and "financial" aid for helping "developing" world to reduce their "emissions" (2008). Lightfoot and Burchell highlight European diplomatic success in encouraging countries like China to gravitate towards ratifying the Kyoto Protocol (2005). Parker and Karlsson, mention the emerging powers' backlash³⁹ on EU's support of the Kyoto Protocol (2010). However, these works do not explain the geopolitical dynamics lying behind why China has such a big seat at the table. With the rise of emerging powers and the fall of output in the aftermath of the 2007/8 crisis, the climate regime started to accommodate multiple key actors, increasing developing countries' bargaining power in COPs.

3.2 Reinterpreting The Copenhagen and The Paris Process

The ability to present a unified policy response supported by 27 member states is one of the advantages of the EU. Such unity is the basis of its normative power. As the established European norms are supported by 27 member states and many candidate states, the European global climate policy choices has the potential to make its way into mainstream policy making in international relations. The different levels of developments, and diverging energy mixes which are rooted in geopolitical path dependencies undercut the normative leadership of the EU during the Conference of Parties in Copenhagen. Thus, geopolitical responses to certain issues can create or dissolve European unity in the multilateral climate fora and impact the guiding capacity of narratives. The COP in Copenhagen is a case in point for demonstrating the importance of geopolitical climate policy tools and objectives for European diplomatic success.

³⁹ Some of the BASIC group members pointed out the poor emission reduction performance of Europe and voiced their priorities of economic growth over "any climate change deal"

Geopolitics have always been defining the internalization of the European norms by European member states. The collapse of communism and European membership of the newly emerging countries have been problematic because of its implications for the Russian influence in the region. Such influence is supported with Russia's strategy of offering different prices for the energy it provides to different European countries. As the EU economically integrates, price differentiation between European countries decreases. The 3rd Energy Package passed in 2009, involved unbundling of production processes (the antithesis of vertical and horizontal integration by Gazprom) and supported supply diversification which have direct negative spillovers to Russian energy revenues from the EU. These developments are influencing the normative global climate tools used under the UN and they form the background of the COP in Copenhagen and later in Paris. During the COP 15 (2009) in Copenhagen, the EU had great ambitions for binding targets of emission reductions, but it failed to reach any of them. Inclusion of the geopolitical climate policy goals and tools offers complementary explanations to the analysis presented by the early literature.

The normative global climate policy tools under the European belt, especially diplomatic engagement within the UNFCCC system and the treaties signed, are serving geopolitical global climate policy goals of energy independence. By utilizing multilateral platforms and a human rights focused narrative the EU disguises the benefits it receives from global sustainable transition. The EU used its diplomatic power over the WTO, a normative global policy tool to pursue its geopolitical objective of appeasing Russia. Understood from this perspective, the EU managed to coordinate its policies outside of the climate realm in a way that leads to geopolitical global climate policy goal achievement within the UNFCCC.

The decisions taken in the COPs are influenced by and spill over to other policy areas. The Russian WTO membership's impact on the Kyoto Protocol was portrayed as a normative goal achievement and successful use of normative tools in the earlier literature. However, it had ramifications for the EU- Russian relationship. In 2012 the Commission launched an anti-monopoly investigation against Gazprom and issued a Statement of Objections in 2015 (Siddi, 2018). Meanwhile in "2014, Russia filed a dispute at the World Trade Organization" against "the Third Energy Package" (Siddi, 2016). It especially

focused on the Trans European Network for Energy Strategy within the Package. The package aims to diversify energy suppliers, enhance collective European response capacity to energy problems, establish a common market resulting in lower gas prices and higher service quality. Such developments are detrimental to the Russian business model that relies on gas export (DaDalt and Park, 2021).

The EU was vocal about its discontent with many of Gazprom's practices including the destinations that were predetermined through contracts hindering the Union's ability to export the leftover energy to other countries, and limiting its flexibility around the energy use and with the different prices offered to different EU countries (Siddi, 2016). The Third Energy Package addresses some of these issues. These policies exemplify the European efforts to curb Gazprom's market power. The normative global climate policy tools the EU employs during COPs such as diplomatic engagement and mainstreaming the use of sustainable energy resources are also serving geopolitical objectives.

The contradictions between the European and Russian energy trade models and the geopolitical competition between them has been persistent throughout the 2000s and 2010s. The Third Energy Package process and the COP 15 in Copenhagen both took place during the same year, in 2009. such a diplomatic environment is rarely conducive for creating fruitful diplomatic relations for EU-Russia cooperation in the UNFCCC. Many of the authors (Groen, Niemann and Oberthür (2013); Bäckstrand and Elgström (2013); Oberthür and Groen (2015); Oberthür and Groen (2018); Aamond and Boasson (2020)) analysing the European policy design during COP 15 do not touch upon the tensions between Russia and the EU and focus shallowly on the BASIC group and the US.

3.3 A New Wave of Scholars Redefining Norms and Geopolitics by Considering The Impact of Human Beings on Earth: the Anthropocene

The discussion of the relation between the normative and geopolitical approaches to climate policy have taken a new turn with the inclusion of environmental perspectives. The works of Proedrou (2020), Schunz (2022) and Manners (2023, 2024) introduce new planetary challenges to the analysis of normative and geopolitical climate policy making. The new focus by the literature on how the environmental dynamics reshape the definitions of normative power and geopolitics enriches the analysis of the normative and geopolitical global climate policy goals and tools. As the climate crisis deteriorates the environment and leads to the extinction of certain living beings the definition of territory and values are changing. Such changes result in the creation of new climate policy tools and inspire new goals.

Schunz points out that the Green Deal redefines growth mentality by enlisting other policy areas for creating the sustainable “human living conditions on earth”. Such policy incorporation enables the Green Deal to reestablish “the human-nature relationship” in a way that harmonizes the relationship between the planet and the economy. It highlights the urgent necessity to act; as there is no need for further scientific evidence. Moreover, it confirms the paradigmatic shift by “discursively” creating pathways for the suitable “action”. Capitalizing on discursive change pertaining to the Green Deal, empowers pro-environmental efforts in the international arena (2022).

Climate change is an external shock that transforms not only nature itself but it recreates the societies’ relation with the territory, with each other and shapes perception of such relations. Proedrou argues that the EU’s adherence to the traditional geopolitical mindset and foreign policy understanding is no longer relevant or comprehensive enough to appreciate threats faced during the Anthropocene. The age is qualitatively different from the traditional geopolitics in terms of having “human-forced ecological processes changing ecological feedback loops and very fast evolving ecosystems”. A new inclusive understanding of security is considered in line with the EU’s preference of multilateral conduct of foreign policy (2020).

The new policies introduced by von der Leyen such as the European Green Deal will spillover to bilateral and multilateral relations with the EU's rivals and partners. Such use of the climate policy as a global policy tool and the new geopolitical focus of the Commission is in line with the new "anthropocene geopolitics" analyzed by Proedrou (2020) who suggested that the understanding of geopolitics should adopt to the threats from changing ecologies whose behavior are disrupted by human actions.

As new dynamics transform geopolitics and foreign policy, such change will eventually spread into the perception of norms. In the same vein with Proedrou (2020), Manners reevaluates his own understanding of the normative power. He highlights a need for a,

"holistic ... understanding [of] international organisations and states, ... in their planetary context. It is only by realising the planetary symbiosis of social (in)justice, economic (in)equality, ecological (un)sustainability, conflict (in)security and political (ir)resilience in terms of an inclusive, contextual and holistic approach",

to define the new normal for the planet (2023). Such understanding is "central to closing" "the distance between status quo international politics" and "equal planetary politics". According to Manners, this is "the agenda of normative power in the planetary organic crisis". The new normative approach to planetary politics in the EU is "located" in a questioning of the notions of what is normal; and to change that it needs the cooperation of the other actors (non-human and non-western perspectives) in the international arena (2024).

Chapter 4

NORMATIVE AND GEOPOLITICAL CONCERNS IN EU STATEMENTS ON GLOBAL CLIMATE POLICY

4.1 Operationalization: Speeches And Reports

The dynamics between normative and geopolitical global climate policy goals and tools is observable through the statements made by key political figures and documents published by the UN and the EU. The omission of geopolitical developments is not limited to the early literature; there is also an overwhelming emphasis on normative goals in early European COP speeches⁴⁰. The operationalization chapter entails the analysis of key statements under the Green Deal section within the European Commission's website and related documents and speeches; State of the Union speeches made by the Commission Presidents Barroso, Juncker and von der Leyen; and the statements made on the behalf of the EU and Russia during the COP meetings. The European documents' analysis looks at the representation of geopolitics by searching for a general reference or references to specific events coinciding with the time of the writing of these documents or the delivery of the speeches. The biases that might be stemming from analyzing Europe from documents crafted by the European institutions checked against the reactions from other significant players in the UNFCCC such as Russia.

Russia is one of the most important actors near European geography and a key fossil fuel exporter to the world. It had the 4th highest CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustions in 2022 after the US, China and India and 3rd highest ones in 1990 after the US and China (Crippa et al., 2023). The country is a geopolitical rival of the EU and the sustainable transformation has great implications for the energy trade relations between them. As the energy trade is highly politicized such changes guide their diplomatic relations. Thus, both in terms of the ramifications on global emissions and the EU's energy and diplomatic relations the Russian perspective on the EU's global climate policy is influential for its normative and geopolitical goal achievement and vice versa.

⁴⁰ The speeches are available from 2008 onwards.

The country explicitly instrumentalizes the climate regime to achieve its geopolitical global climate policy goals. Thus, a normative influence over Russian perception of climate politics would be indicative of the success of European global climate policy. As discussed in the literature review chapter, relations with Russia are important for the EU's global climate policy choices. To understand the impact of the EU's normative climate policy tools, speeches made on the behalf of Russia under the UNFCCC during the COPs are analyzed in the next chapter, based on Russian convergence towards European narratives and objectives. The ensuing section analyzes State of the Union speeches in terms of their use of normative and geopolitical climate policy tools and perception of climate objectives.

4.2 The Analysis of the Conference of Parties Reports and Speeches on the Behalf of the EU under the UNFCCC

The statements made on the behalf of the EU by the EU institutions or the member states during the Conference of Parties under the UNFCCC are available in the UNFCCC's website for the years between 2008 (COP 14) and 2021 (COP26). COP 27, 28 and 29 statements are analyzed through the written transcripts shared in the European Commission's website and audio from Youtube videos on COPs.

One of the major recurring themes in the statements is urgency. Europe repeatedly highlights the urgent need for action, even years after signing the Paris Agreement. During COP 14, Prime Minister of Sweden states that “climate change is no longer a distant threat - it is a current reality.”; Prime Minister of Denmark says “climate change is not going to be less of a problem in the coming years. On the contrary, climate change will only grow stronger, if we do not act now” (2008). During COP 15 Connie Hedegaard says “from grassroots to heads of state; ..., the call has been the same: ACT! NOW! PLEASE!” and “the parties. ... YOU must commit. YOU must deliver – NOW.” (2009). In COP 16 she repeats “it is absolutely imperative that we deliver something, something substantial. Something leading to immediate action. Something that paves the way towards the international agreement that the world needs to tackle climate change effectively” (2010). On COP 18 she and Sofoclis Aletraris again say that “patience is not my middle name. And

we ARE running out of time. ... The reality is that we need to speed up to keep below the two degrees” (2012). During COP 20, Arias Cañete states that “we must move with a greater sense of urgency if we want to secure a global climate change agreement in Paris next year” (2014). In COP 21 Carole DIESCHBOURG and Miguel Arias Cañete state that “enough. Global greenhouse gas emissions are still rising. We need to stop this – and we need to act now!” (2015).

Even years after the Paris Agreement, the calls persist. In COP 22 Laszlo SOLYMOSS states that “we must continue to build on the momentum and implement the Paris Agreement without delay” (2016). COP 24 Miguel Arias Cañete highlights that “recent extreme weather events and new scientific evidence provided by the IPCC Special Report ... have once again underscored the need for urgent action” (2018). During COP 26 von der LEYEN stresses that “Climate change threatens our survival. The beating drum of science ... the facts ... have been loud and clear for some time. But it has taken too long for our ears to hear ... Our time to act ... is short. But it is not too late” (2021).

These persistent calls on urgency point out to the fact that despite the EU being perceived as a green leader, spearheading the milestone Paris Agreement; it fails to advance its normative global climate policy goals. There is also a recurring reference to the Paris Agreement throughout the Green Deal Documents and the UNFCCC speeches. Although it was a major success for the EU, recurring emphasis after 9 years, signals that the agreement is under-delivering (in terms of emission reductions and preventing global warming). Important actors such as China, Russia, and the US under the Biden administration share Europe’s concern in the COPs; however, the lack of progress over the years indicates that such concern remains rhetorical.

The Conference of Parties meetings under the UNFCCC reflect the normative global climate policy goals and tools of the EU with recurring references to the European values such as humanitarian focus on citizen wellbeing rather than the geopolitical realities of the inter-state power struggle, until 2022. The UNFCCC speeches made on the behalf of the EU don't exhibit significant change after the geopolitical tensions between Russia and the EU following the annexation of the Crimea and ensuing gas cuts. In case of a reference to geopolitics such reference remains limited in scope and in depth; and most of these geopolitical developments and issues are not properly tied to the climate change policies.

In terms of references to geopolitical objectives during COP 15 Hedegaard declares that “A global deal will drive energy security!” (2009). During COP 17 she recognizes the role of the emerging powers in the following statement:

“The Convention and the Kyoto Protocol continue to be the foundation of our international regime. However, they were both crafted in the 20th century. ... the reality is that the countries that were industrialised countries back in 1992 account for a rapidly decreasing share of emissions. Therefore, in order to tackle effectively the challenge in the 21st century all major economies need to commit.” (2011)

During COP 18 she makes a reference to the Global Financial Crisis when she says “We can bail out banks. We can bail out states. But no one can bail out the climate”. Nevertheless, such reference remains rhetorical and serves to polish the framing of normative goals such as “a stable climate and equitable access to sustainable development”, rather than offering geopolitical climate policy tool alternatives incorporating the opportunities and challenges presented by the financial crisis.

The EU criticized fossil fuel subsidies by saying that “we can take new steps today in international co-operation initiatives on energy efficiency, renewables, HFC gases and phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies” (2012) but such references are not directly tied to a specific country. During COP 20 in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea, Arias Cañete vaguely stated that “while we recognise the need to respect the principles of the Convention concerning differentiation, we need to apply these principles according to today's economic and geopolitical realities.” These are the only references to geopolitics until 2022. They are not tied to clear geopolitical global climate objectives and are not capitalized as geopolitical policy tools in the speeches given by the EU during COPs, except for a brief reference to energy security.

During COP 14 the EU paved the way for the use of hybrid climate policy tools such as carbon pricing when Fredrik Reinfeldt suggested “let's put a price on CO2 emissions,... globally. ... introduce a cap-and-trade-scheme and establish an international - carbon market. This will also be ... for the innovation, investment, development and distribution of low carbon and clean technology” and highlight the potential for “green growth” while fighting the Global Financial Crisis (2008). During COP 25 the EU further refers to the “market mechanisms [that] create strong incentives to reduce emissions now

and in the future” (2019). During COP 26 von der Leyen states that “we need to agree on a robust framework of rules, for example to make global carbon markets a reality” (2021).

2022 is a breaking point in terms of direct references to Russia and calls for international allies in COP speeches given by the EU. Similar to State of the Union Addresses since 2022 there is an entanglement of normative and geopolitical policy goals in the speeches. During COP 27, (2022) von der Leyen states that:

“In February, in the same week that Russia invaded Ukraine, the IPCC issued a stark warning to the global community. Its message could not have been clearer: the climate is changing faster than our capacity to adapt. So the world must deliver better and faster. The global fossil fuel crisis must be a game changer. ... For Europe, the answer is REPowerEU. We are not just cutting our dependency on Russian fossil fuels – that is good, but that is not enough – but we are massively accelerating the roll-out of renewables. ... renewable sources – like solar and wind, and green hydrogen – is not only good for our climate, but also good for our independence and our security of supply. Here, the Global South has the resources in abundance. ... That is why the European Union is signing new hydrogen partnerships with Egypt, with Namibia and with Kazakhstan. That is why we are supporting partners such as Vietnam and South Africa to decarbonise their economies. We need to reach the Paris goal. And Europe is staying the course.”

She also recognizes the needs of the developing countries for natural gas and fertilizers and states that the Russian invasion of Ukraine made already severe global problems worse, rendering the developing countries more vulnerable (2022). Such a targeted geopolitical approach was not present in the previous COP speeches.

During COP 29 EU press conference, Commissioner Hoekstra refers to the full scale invasion of Ukraine in the speech in the following statement:

“Let's address the elephant in the room right away: yes, if you look at the geopolitical context that is in the back of everyone's' minds, through these negotiations, the context is indeed difficult. ... I truly believe that, despite the grim geopolitical context, we can and should have a good result by the end of this week” (2024)⁴¹.

The early COP speeches demonstrate a prevalent focus on normative goals and normative tools; despite geopolitical crises accompanying the climate regime their instrumentalisation under the UNFCCC has been underexplored. However, analysing the EU's speeches under the COPs draw a limited picture of its global climate policy goals and tools. As a complementary analysis, the next section analyses the State of the Union

⁴¹ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_24_5925

Addresses given by the last 3 Commission Presidents (Barosso, Juncker and von der Leyen) in terms of the evolution of the normative and geopolitical global climate policy goals and tools.

4.3 The evolution of the European Global Climate Policy in the State of the Union Addresses by the European Commission Presidents: From Barroso to von der Leyen

The European Commission presidents started to give a State of the Union Address each year after José Manuel Barroso's first address in 2010, with the aim of stating the EU's priorities and vision for the future. According to the Official Journal of the European Union published in November 20th, 2010⁴²; "each year in the first part-session of September, a State of the Union debate will be held in which the President of the Commission shall deliver an address, taking stock of the current year and looking ahead to priorities for the following years". This section analyzes the evolution of the EU's global climate policy tools and objectives in these Addresses. Although leading the fight against climate change has long been part of the EU's global image; it has never been the main focal point of the Addresses given by Barroso and Juncker; it came to the forefront following von der Leyen's first term.

4.3.1 José Manuel Barroso

The first State of the Union Address by Barroso in 2010, corresponds to the immediate aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. Although, President Barroso's address focuses on overcoming the economic crisis; normative and geopolitical global climate policy goals are also elaborated by the President in the following excerpt where he underlines the EU's need for renewables and environmental and economic sustainability:

"To have the infrastructure for solar and wind energy. ..., a common standard... [for] charging electric car batteries. I myself will travel to the Caspian region later this year to promote the Southern Corridor as a means of enhancing our security of supply. ... our carbon emissions increased 17 times. That means we have to deliver on our climate and energy package, as a core driver for change. ... the biggest challenges ahead, such as global food security, biodiversity loss and the sustainable management of natural resources. (...) All of this will not only strengthen our economy tomorrow: it will provide new openings today. (...) We need sustainable growth" (Barroso, 2010).

⁴² The EUR-Lex website "provides the official and most comprehensive access to EU legal documents".

As the excerpt above demonstrates, although the primary motivation is economic sustainability; he incorporates the normative global climate policy goals such as maximizing the EU's exemplary climate leadership into the agenda. The coupling of the normative climate goals such as sustainable resource management with the Southern Corridor, shows that the speech couples the geopolitical policy objectives with the 2010's domestic normative climate agenda. Barroso highlights other geopolitical ambitions about making the Euro "a major currency of the world", and the Union "a global player, a global leader" and explicitly states that,

"I will present our vision of how we can maximise Europe's role in the world. With the European External Action Service, we have the means to match our aspirations. In our globalized world, the relationships we build with strategic partners determine our prosperity. To be effective on the international stage, we need the weight of the European Union. Size matters, now more than ever. A good example is the fight against climate change. Copenhagen showed that, while others did not match our ambition, we did not help ourselves by not speaking with one voice. I want us to intensify our engagement with international partners to turn their press releases into credible commitments to cut emissions and push forward with faststart funding." (2010)

The President incorporates the need for a unifying European narrative after the economic and political fallout caused by the Eurozone crisis, into climate leadership ambitions. The recognition of COPs attest to the use of normative tools of diplomatic engagement. The perception of the climate policy in the realm of energy security as a complementary option to the Southern corridor for the security of supply signals a focus on geopolitical climate goals.

Barroso underlined the aid given to Africa (2010) in the context of combatting migration but the climate change issue is not explored within the developmental aid issue. On the other hand, hybrid normative global climate policy tools such as potential trade relations with Canada and potentially Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Australia and South American countries are explored in order to promote the EU's "social or environmental standards ,... or food safety requirements"; these strategies are in line with geopolitical global climate policy options.

In the next year, Barroso (2011) further detailed the partnerships the EU aims to pursue. He recognised that "the rapidly-changing world needs a Europe that assumes its responsibilities. (...) A Europe that continues to show the way, ... in ... trade or ... climate

change. ... from Durban to Rio +20, Europe must retain its position of leadership”; focusing on normative tools such as exemplary leadership in the climate regime. He bridged the EU’s external policies to geopolitical developments at the time including the Arab Spring’s impact for European people and the EU’s role “to stand alongside those ... who wanted democracy and freedom” through a “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”. The speech incorporates global leadership aspirations into both normative and geopolitical climate policy goals by connecting the role played by “the Millennium Development Goals”⁴³ for European ability to “exert its influence” as a global power to the key role played by “the Common Foreign and Security Policy”.

In 2011, Barroso drew many connections between sustainable development and geopolitics. But, regardless of geopolitical ambitions in the 2011 State of the Union Speech; a true geopolitical global climate policy focus would have included the emerging powers’ role. A sound climate policy cannot be formed without addressing the growth of Chinese emissions. The speech vaguely touches upon “shifts in the world order” without an outright reference to BRICs. Notwithstanding a clear ambition towards influencing the international climate regime; Barroso’s 2011 speech doesn’t offer a structured and committed geopolitical (and hybrid) global climate policy tool comparable to the European Green Deal and the CBAM.

In the 2012 State of the Union Address, alongside a reflection of the economic outlook, Barroso underlines the existential threats faced by the Union by recognising “even the biggest European countries run the risk of irrelevance in between the global giants like the US or China”. He connects the new world order to economic competitiveness and to geopolitical climate policy goals by recognising the EU’s “need to reduce energy dependence and tap the renewable energy potential” for increased efficiency. He also touches upon normative climate policy goals such as “green growth and ... efficient ... use of resources”.

The 2012 Address reiterates the exemplary leadership ambitions, coupling it with the broader geopolitical goals. Barroso highlights that “the world needs an EU that keeps its leadership ... leads the fight against climate change. ... is capable of deploying military

⁴³ <https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>

missions to help stabilize the situation in crisis areas”. Despite ambitions to lead the course of geopolitical developments at the time (e.g. the Syrian crisis); geopolitics are not integrated within the realm of global climate policy. The speech does not address overt geopolitical climate goals nor present such tools to achieve them. The 2012 speech is similar to the previous one where climate change is rhetorically considered as an important pillar of European global influence. However, the lack of emphasis on the second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol, which was a filed normative global climate policy goal demonstrates that it has not been a prominent pillar of the Union’s global strategy either.

The 2013 State of the Union Address offers a normative response to the “world of geo-economic and geopolitical tectonic changes” based on promotion of European values. Contrary to his previous speeches, in 2013 there is an increased emphasis towards use of geopolitical objectives and normative climate policy tools. In addition to promoting a legally binding agreement by 2015 which was the key normative climate policy tool the EU used during the Paris process, he highlights the “impact of energy prices on competitiveness” and aims to pursue “an active and assertive trade agenda”, securing the EU’s “place in the global supply chain” with a special focus on partners such as the US, Canada and Japan. Thus, the normative tools such as engagement in the UN and hybrid tools such as trade policy are suggested to pursue geopolitical objectives.

The 2013 speech underlines the EU’s independence and strength in world politics. For instance, Barroso mentions that the EU’s aid capabilities for the Eurozone crisis surpasses the Marshall aid during previous crises. Such emphasis is used to reveal the EU’s independence from the US. Additionally, closer relationships with Ukraine and Eastern Partnership countries, based on values, and the contributions made by the EU to the international monetary aid for the resolution of the Syrian conflict is praised. These references signal the European willingness to pursue geopolitical assertiveness; but also a self-differentiation through normative global policy tools. However, these geopolitical dynamics have not been integrated into the climate aspect of the global policy in the 2013 Address. The disconnect between the general geopolitical objectives and the climate leg of the EU’s global policy in the State of the Union Address is also observable in the COP19 speech in 2013 where there are no references to geopolitics.

4.3.2 Jean-Claude Juncker

The State of the Union speech in 2016 delivered by Juncker more deeply connects geopolitical ambitions to the global climate policy goals and tools compared to Barroso's approach. Juncker states that

“international partners — ... the USA and China ... India and Japan — are taking us to task on climate change. The Paris Agreement on climate change is a legally binding global agreement and would not have been reached were it not for the European Union. We were at the forefront, ... to take action. ... The Americans and Chinese are ratifying the agreement. ... I must insist that we have to ratify the Paris Agreement ... Delaying, let alone drawing out the ratification process makes us a laughing stock and damages our international credibility” (2016).

Although these international partners have been recognised by the previous speeches their relevance have not been iterated within the context of the global climate regime. The ratification call for other states is rooted in exemplary leadership which is part of the EU's normative global climate policy tools.

In his 2017 State of the Union Address Junker highlights normative global climate policy goals such as protecting the rights of the next generations and normative tools of exemplary leadership and multilateral legally binding treaties. Juncker states that he wants:

“Europe to be the leader when it comes to the fight against climate change. Last year, we set the global rules of the game with the Paris Agreement ratified here,... against the collapse of ambition in the United States, Europe must ensure we make our planet great again. It is the shared heritage of all of humanity” (2017).

Juncker's further emphasis on defending the EU's interests against state owned foreign companies via screening investments in the aim of protecting European economic and security interests demonstrates the EU's focus on geopolitical goals. He also highlights hybrid climate policy tools such as integrating the environmental standards to external trade policies of the Union by recognising that : “Trade is about exporting our standards, be they social or environmental standards” and touches upon investment controls within the Union to “defend its strategic interests” (2017).

The normative global climate policy tools such as the use of multilateral structures are accompanied by geopolitical global climate policy goals where the EU posits its climate leadership as an opposing leadership structure with references to Trump's unilateral

politics with disregard to climate change. The geopolitical climate goals are evident when Juncker links the decarbonisation to increased industrial competitiveness of the EU. On the other hand, the enlargement is mentioned in the context of exporting European values without consideration of a green conditionality; demonstrating that the climate policies have not yet been an integral part of the EU's overall global approach in 2017.

State of the Union Address in 2018 underlines geopolitical global climate ambitions. Juncker highlights hybrid global climate policy tools as he recognises the importance of the trade agreements for exporting "Europe's high standards for food safety, workers' rights, the environment and consumer rights"; given that the EU is covering the 40% of the world's GDP. In the speech the multilateral, cooperation based normative policy tools coexists with global leadership ambitions, "to become a more sovereign actor in international relations". Such aspirations are pursued through deepening economic connectedness, security cooperation and migration response.

The speech highlights the importance of Africa with whom there will be a "new Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs" consisting of support for employment, education and trade. However, given the importance of migration in many of the State of the Union speeches following the Syrian Civil war; such partnership's primary aim can be interpreted as preventing migration rather than promoting green growth. Moreover, the critique towards Chinese subsidized steel over production is used to highlight the EU's need to further defend itself but the option of domestically subsidizing the green industries as a response to China is not explored.

The 2018 speech is filled with geopolitical intervention pathways for the EU to advance its own presence; but the normative power approach is still dominant. Normative global climate policy tools and goals are emphasized with the EU's efforts to "relentlessly defend the Paris Agreement on climate change. ... to leave a healthier planet behind for those that follow. ... targets for reducing CO₂ emissions by 2030. ... are both scientifically accurate and politically indispensable." The EU "obviously cannot turn a blind eye to the climate challenge" (Juncker, 2018).

The emphasis on the Paris Agreement by President Juncker as opposed to the omission of the second Kyoto commitment period in the speeches of President Barosso signals a deeper focus on the climate aspect of the European global policy making;

however, none of the speeches until von der Leyen, matches the scope of the Green Deal's way of integrating the climate issue into the geopolitical and normative international policy tools and goals of the Union.

4.3.3 Ursula von der Leyen

The State of the Union statement by President von der Leyen in 2019 has generally a normative focus, the greatest threat to Europe is perceived as the health and economic consequences of the pandemic. The international political economic environment at the time, witnessed a multipolar world politics where BRICS+, openly challenging the western norms that are upheld by the EU. She recognizes the need to “revitalise and reform the multilateral system (...). global system has grown into a creeping paralysis. Major powers are either pulling out of institutions or taking them hostage for their own interests” (2019)⁴⁴.

Despite the turn towards multipolarity, the State of the Union speech references the importance of the US with whom the EU is willing to “work together on reforming the international system” they “built together, jointly with like-minded partners” for their “interests and ... the common good” (2019). In the speech there is no expectation that expansionist powers can look at Europe and see the distraction caused by the pandemic as an opportunity to attack. The EU's vulnerability is understood through an economic perspective⁴⁵; in terms of unemployment, vaccines or travel bans.

The speech connects the green leadership with existing European global policies when she states that

⁴⁴ President von der Leyen also touches upon some geopolitical developments signaling European ambitions to be involved in the global conflicts. Even though she states her position on Belarussian elections, Turkey's attempts to “intimidate its neighbours”, Navalny's death or Syrian conflict; her perspective while reflecting on issues is normative. Furthermore, she interprets the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece based on “legitimate sovereignty rights”. However, if the EU had the geopolitical reach to dictate terms in Cyprus it would not feel the need to insist on the importance of the concept of sovereignty. None of these developments are analysed under a perspective on global climate policy.

⁴⁵ For instance she warns against threats pertaining to the internal functioning of the EU by stating that “it is above all a human economy that protects us against the great risks of life - illness, ill-fortune, unemployment or poverty. It offers stability.... opportunity and prosperity by promoting innovation, growth and fair competition”

“The Western Balkans are part of Europe - and not just a stopover on the Silk Road. We will soon present an economic recovery package for the Western Balkans focusing on a number of regional investment initiatives. And we will also be there for the Eastern Partnership countries and our partners in the southern neighbourhood– to help create jobs and kickstart their economies.... visit the African Union ..., because we are not just neighbours, we are natural partners....Africa will be a key partner in building the world we want to live in – whether on climate, digital or trade.”

In the climate realm, the EU is portrayed as the exemplary climate leader in many policy areas such as “green finance”, having “a reliable EU Green Bond Standard”, “a target of 30% of NextGenerationEU's 750 billion euro to be raised through green bonds” and aiming to invest in “hydrogen, renovation and 1 million electric charging points”. Other normative policy tools such as diplomatic engagement with partner countries for protecting the climate in the sensitive regions are mentioned when she declares the EU’s intentions to employ “diplomatic strength and economic clout to broker agreements that make a difference – such as designating maritime protected areas in the Antarctica” and “form high ambition coalitions on ... fighting deforestation – and develop partnerships with all like-minded partners – from Asian democracies to Australia, Africa, the Americas and anyone else who wants to join.” Such actions are framed as “one of the biggest acts of environmental protection in history.”⁴⁶

The speech portrays China as a “negotiating partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival” and emphasizes the “common on issues such as climate change” and touches upon Europe’s expectation on Chinese commitment to the Paris Agreement; showcasing normative policy tool employment. The President also underscores the importance of elections in Belarus, Alexei Navalny’s situation, Russia’s relations with Ukraine and Georgia, and emphasizes that “no pipeline can change that” Russia is meddling with foreign elections, prioritizing geopolitical goals. However, the EGD has not been framed as a tool against geopolitical competition with Russia until the full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Von der Leyen highlights normative climate policy goals under the EGD such as improving “emission trading, boost renewable energy, ... energy efficiency, (...) energy taxation. ... making systemic modernisation across our economy, society and industry. It is

⁴⁶ Such framing is in line with Oberthür and Dupont (2021)’s “grand climate strategy”

about building a stronger world to live in” . The EU aims for “a world served by an economy that cuts emissions, boosts competitiveness, reduces energy poverty, creates rewarding jobs and improves quality of life.... to build a healthier, greener society”. The EGD will make the EU “the first climate-neutral continent by 2050” ; such change will come “in a responsible, evidence-based way”; and the EU aims “to increase the 2030 target for emission reduction to at least 55%”. The speech also touches upon the normative climate policy tools such as the exemplary leadership and pioneering policy making by the EU when she says that :

“While emissions dropped 25% since 1990, our economy grew by more than 60%. The difference is we now have more technology, more expertise and more investment. And we are already embarking towards a circular economy with carbon neutral production. (...) We have more proof that what is good for the climate is good for business and is good for us all.” (2019)

She connects the normative global climate policy tools such as the multilateral legally binding agreements and exemplary leadership, with normative climate policy goals of limits on warming levels by stating that:

“Our impact assessment clearly shows that meeting this target would put the EU firmly on track for climate neutrality by 2050 and for meeting our Paris Agreement obligations. And if others follow our lead, the world will be able to keep warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius.” (2019)

Moreover, the speech also considers geopolitical global climate policy goals such as to decrease “energy import dependency” within the climate realm; and highlights exemplary leadership in “green finance and the largest issuer of green bonds worldwide”, Geopolitical climate policy goals are pursued with hybrid tools such as the “Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.” She argues that “Carbon must have its price (...) This Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism should motivate foreign producers and EU importers to reduce their carbon emissions, while ensuring that we level the playing field in a WTO-compatible way.” As the EU advocates for geopolitical use of the CBAM it’s approach is still anchored to the WTO compatibility, aiming to protect the effectiveness of the normative policy tools as well.

In the 2019 Address the climate realm is more integrated within the broader European global aspirations of financial leadership as opposed to the previous State of the Union Addresses which kept different global ambitions separate from the climate issue. For

instance von der Leyen touches upon the Next Generation EU project by highlighting its importance for the EU's role as an economic global power:

“The historic agreement on NextGenerationEU shows the political backing that it has. We must now use this opportunity to make structural reforms in our economies and complete the Capital Markets Union and the Banking Union. Deep and liquid capital markets are essential to give businesses access to the finance they need to grow to further strengthen the international role of the euro.”

In 2021, von der Leyen's State of the Union opens up with the global health crisis and the importance of the green transition for the future of the young generations. The normative global climate policy goals focus on presenting the natural disasters by using the credibility of the IPCC, diplomatic partnerships, the EU's leadership on the Green transition by being the “first major economy to present comprehensive legislation”. Von der Leyen praises the European success on sustainable production in the EU by also connecting the success to globally established experts on climate changes when she underscores that:

“The UN recently published the IPCC report, It is the authority on the science of climate change. The report leaves no doubt ... More electric vehicles than diesel cars were registered in Germany in the first half of this year. Poland is now the EU's largest exporter of car batteries and electric buses. Or take the New European Bauhaus that led to an explosion of creativity of architects, designers, engineers across our Union. ... And this is what the European Green Deal is all about.”

Thus, she employs both geopolitical policy tools such as aiming to dominate the electric vehicles and batteries market and normative tools such as exemplary leadership and emphasis on IPCC.

Von der Leyen highlights European priorities in “the COP26 in Glasgow” where “major economies – from the US to Japan” needs to complement their “neutrality” pledges with real plans “in time for Glasgow”. The failure of normative goal achievement is evident when she states that “current commitments for 2030 will not keep global warming to 1.5°C within reach. Every country has a responsibility!” and that “Team Europe contributes 25 billion dollars per year. ... we expect the United States and our partners to step up too. Closing the climate finance gap together – the US and the EU – would be a strong signal for global climate leadership. It is time to deliver” (2021).

The climate change issue is incorporated within geopolitical global policy objectives in the speech as it is mentioned alongside economic and military rivalry, among great powers. She states that

“This climate and economic leadership is central to Europe's global and security objectives. It also reflects a wider shift in world affairs at a time of transition towards a new international order. We are entering a new era of hyper-competitiveness. An era in which some stop at nothing to gain influence: from vaccine promises and high-interest loans, to missiles and misinformation. An era of regional rivalries and major powers refocusing their attention towards each other.”

The great power competition with China is mentioned within the complex dynamic of the superiority of European GDP growth but lack of technological competitiveness on chips. She highlights the EU's finance aid under the COP in Glasgow and encourages others (especially China) to join. Thus, despite geopolitical rivalry with China; its cooperation is key for the success of the normative European global climate goal achievement. Despite geopolitical rivalry, China is seen as a partner in the UNFCCC whose efforts to “move away from coal at home and abroad” is key given that “while every country has a responsibility, major economies do have a special duty to the least developed and most vulnerable countries”; in line with the normative power approach.

There are many geopolitical goals subsumed under the normative goal of disseminating green development. Despite the normative perspective towards socializing China, the EU's need for labour and raw materials that does not come from China is recognised. In addition to independence from China, the EU aims to expand its influence by investing “with Africa to create a market for green hydrogen that connects the two shores of the Mediterranean”. The President also recognizes the autocratic influence in the Indopacific region and the EU's need to extend its influence by deepening trade relations (with hybrid global climate policy tools). As the following statement shows, trade and foreign investment connectivities towards encouraging sustainable development are used for increasing the EU's geopolitical reach towards Asia:

“today's new EU - Indo-Pacific strategy is a milestone. It reflects the growing importance of the region to our prosperity and security. But also the fact that autocratic regimes use it to try to expand their influence. Europe needs to be more present and more active in the region. So we will work together to deepen trade links, strengthen global supply chains and develop new investment projects on green and digital technologies” (2021).

The 2021 speech recognizes many changes in geopolitics and proposes policy answers for furthering the European interest; but these answers are taken from a previously established normative toolbox of the EU; the recognition of geopolitics does not boost its geopolitical policy tool kit. For instance, the President underscores the migration issue but isn't referencing climate migration. African states are one of the most vulnerable parties to increasing heat levels; and there are many former European colonies in the region. The citizens of these states have the potential to migrate north to the EU if the heat and water levels make the land inhabitable. Thus, migration policies should be incorporated in the geopolitical global climate policy toolkit⁴⁷.

In 2022, the speech opens up with the democratic autocratic divide, the Russian war in Ukraine, the pandemic's effects and the importance of energy. The normative climate policy goals such as use of renewables are situated in the context of the geopolitical goal of independence from Russia. Von der Leyen states that "friends in the Baltics have worked hard to end their dependency on Russia. They have invested in renewable energy, in LNG dependency on Russian fossil fuels comes at a much higher price." The head-on emphasis on sustainable development's role in the geopolitical rivalry with Russia and supply security is different from previous Presidents in terms of the weight put on geopolitical global climate policy objectives and the use of normative tools for achieving them.

The President further bridges normative and geopolitical objectives of the green transformation by stating that "Russia keeps on actively manipulating our energy market. In addition the climate crisis is heavily weighing on our bills. ... Droughts shut down hydro and nuclear plants. ... gas prices have risen by more than 10 times". Thus, the inflationary pressure caused by the geopolitical crisis is combined with the detrimental effects of the climate crisis and such connection is used to advance the normative climate policy goals. Moreover, the dependence on oil in the 70s and its negative effects on the environment are used as a warning to highlight the need for the green transition today⁴⁸.

⁴⁷ 2023 Address presents a more integrated approach towards climate change and migration

⁴⁸ "we did not get rid of our dependency on oil. ... This was wrong, not just for the climate, but also for ... our independence"

The speech cautions against “foreign autocrats are targeting” European countries, “funding institutes that undermine” western “values” and advises “to expand this core of democracies. ... to deepen our ties and strengthen democracies on our continent.” The climate and health collaboration in Africa is tied up to the broader autocratic/democratic divide where the EU aims to project power through democratic cooperation. Moreover, the EU uses Russian aggression against Ukraine and its instrumentalization of fertilizers to create a dominant narrative (a hybrid global climate policy objective) about the Kremlin as the evil force making global warming worse and rendering the Global South economically and geographically more vulnerable.

The speech touches upon geopolitical global climate policy goals in the context of economic and technological rivalry with China and the EU’s need for competitiveness in chips and security of supply of raw materials. The efforts to be independent from fossil fuel exporters creates dependencies on the critical raw material producers; thus, undermining overall geopolitical global climate policy goal achievement. She states that “by 2030, our demand for those rare earth metals will increase fivefold.... our European Green Deal is moving fast.... – one country dominates the market”. As an alternative she proposes trade partnerships with “like-minded” countries who uphold “workers’ rights and the highest environmental standards” such as Mexico, Chile and New Zealand and the adoption of “European Critical Raw Materials Act” to compensate for it.

Notwithstanding the geopolitical instrumentalisation of normative climate tools and goals in other issue areas, the speech reflects upon the EU’s role in the 27th COP in Egypt from a pure normative policy perspective. Von der Leyen states that “we also need to be better equipped to handle our changing climate. The destructive power of extreme weather is too big for any country to fight on its own”. She highlights the need for “an ambitious global deal for nature” “at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh” (2022). However, a roadmap for the tools towards achieving these goals in the UN is not elaborated.

The 2023 State of the Union Address differs from its previous counterparts because the global climate policy tools and goals are completely entangled within almost every aspect of the Union’s other foreign policy designs. Such an interconnected approach was not present in the previous years. Previous approaches were also more discrete in the climate policy’s role in containing Russia and were tied to the broad energy and planetary

security realm rather than being framed as the direct response. Notwithstanding a clear emphasis on geopolitical global climate policy goals and tools the speech also recognizes normative tools such as prioritizing “the invaluable contribution of the IPCC for climate, a global panel that provides the latest science to policymakers”.

The speech opens up with “the war that rages at” the EU “borders” and the “destructive climate change”. Von der Leyen frames the Russian invasion of Ukraine as “a brutal war on European soil” and touches upon “a geopolitical Union – supporting Ukraine, standing up to Russia's aggression, responding to an assertive China and investing in partnerships” and the EGD is framed as the cornerstone of the geopolitical responses given to other powers. She states that:

“We have started making ourselves more independent in critical sectors, like energy, chips or raw materials. European Green Deal was our answer to the call of history. ... the hottest [year] ever on record in Europe – was a stark reminder of that. The European Green Deal was born out of this necessity to protect our planet. We started this mandate by setting a long-term perspective with the climate law and the 2050 target. We shifted the climate agenda to being an economic one. We are now attracting more investment in clean hydrogen than the US and China combined. The European Green Deal provides the necessary frame, incentives, and investment – but it is the people, the inventors, the engineers who develop the solutions.” (2023)

The EGD is presented as a geopolitical global climate policy tool by providing the EU with renewable energy, investment and skilled labour against American and Chinese competition⁴⁹.

The speech frames Russia and China as normative anti-heroes to green Europe and highlights European dominance on attracting green investment more than China. Such framing is accompanied by geopolitical global climate policy tools against Chinese dominance in the world market. She highlights Chinese unfair practices and European leadership in the world market:

“From wind to steel, from batteries to electric vehicles, our ambition is crystal clear: The future of our clean tech industry has to be made in Europe. ... Too often, our companies are excluded from foreign markets or are victims of predatory practices. ... by competitors benefitting from huge state subsidies. ... China's unfair trade practices affected our solar industry. (...) Many young businesses were pushed out by heavily subsidised Chinese competitors. ... Take the electric vehicles sector. It is

⁴⁹ Supported by the initiatives such as, [the Net-Zero Industry Act](#), the Critical Raw Materials Act. and Clean Transition Dialogues with industry.

a crucial industry for the clean economy, with a huge potential for Europe. But global markets are now flooded with cheaper Chinese electric cars. ... distorting our market. And as we do not accept this from the inside, we do not accept this from the outside.”

She details actions to be taken against unfair Chinese electric car subsidizing by stating that:

“the Commission is launching an anti-subsidy investigation into electric vehicles coming from China. (...) We must defend ourselves against unfair practices. But equally, it is vital to keep open lines of communication and dialogue with China. Because there also are topics, where we can and have to cooperate. De-risk, not decouple – this will be my approach with the Chinese leadership at the EU-China Summit later this year” (2023)

Chile, New Zealand, Kenya, Australia, Japan, the US, Indonesia, Mexico and MERCOSUR countries are considered as alternative allies against “China's export restrictions on gallium and germanium – which are essential for goods like semiconductors and solar panels”.

There are also many normative global climate policy goals listed by the Presidents such as:

“In Northern Europe lies the Wadden Sea, a UNESCO World Heritage site and a unique habitat And with the Baltic Sea, we have the world's largest brackish water sea. ... which remain important allies in combating climate change.... and host unique biodiversity.” (translated from German by the google translate)

However, these goals later are also connected to the geopolitics at the time as she highlights the importance of farmers for the fight against climate change and the protection of the

“independence in food supplies (...). That is what our farmers do.... because the consequences of Russian aggression against Ukraine, climate change with droughts, forest fires and floods, but also new obligations are increasingly shaping the work of farmers ...Many are already committed to more sustainable agriculture. We must overcome these new challenges together ... ensure our food security for the future.”

The speech connects the climate disasters in the African region with possible political disasters that can emerge from Russian involvement to unstable African countries, implicitly bundles the threat perception of natural and political disasters and offers solutions to both of them. There is also a stark recognition that the climate change will cause migration flows in the near future and it is the EU's duty to manage the process⁵⁰.

⁵⁰ “Chaque jour, les conflits, le changement climatique et l'instabilité poussent les populations à chercher refuge ailleurs. J'ai toujours eu la ferme conviction que la migration doit être gérée”, translated as “Every day,

Moreover, the ideational construction of the Russian approach to international relations as a threat to all other emerging economies is tied to the perception that clean development can be an alternative for vulnerable economies to protect themselves.

The speech tries to emulate these countries' vulnerability against climate change and the European vulnerability against Russian aggression into an enmeshed total threat against everyone which can be deflected with sustainable development promoted by the EU. European clean energy is presented as a new global alternative to established links throughout the world when Von der Leyen states that:

“Russia is waging a full-scale war against the founding principles of the UN Charter. This has raised immense concerns in countries from Central Asia to the Indo-Pacific. They are worried that in a lawless world, they might face the same fate as Ukraine. ... there is a deeper unease by many emerging economies about the way institutions and globalisation work for them. ... These emerging economies ... are essential allies in building a cleaner, safer and more prosperous world. ... The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. It will be the most direct connection to date between India, the Arabian Gulf and Europe: ... With an electricity cable and a clean hydrogen pipeline – to foster clean energy trade between Asia, the Middle East and Europe, Latin America, South-East Asia and across Africa – from building a local hydrogen economy with Namibia and Kenya to a digital economy with the Philippines. they are investments in ... prosperity and security in a fast-changing world.”

Overall, the Addresses becomes increasingly focused on the geopolitical aspect of the EU's global climate policy; and the climate realm is incorporated within other policy areas that are designed to enhance European geopolitical reach while the emphasis on normative global climate policy goals and tools becomes less pronounced compared to their geopolitical counterparts.

4.3.4 How are Barroso and Juncker different from von der Leyen?

Despite many geopolitical ambitions of the EU and the global climate policies were mostly constructed through the normative power approach throughout the speeches from 2010 to 2018; the geopolitical global climate policy tools have not been properly explored until the launch of the Green Deal. After the rise of authoritarian emerging powers, the

conflict, climate change, and instability push people to seek refuge elsewhere. I have always firmly believed that migration must be managed.” (von der Leyen, 2023)

Russian invasion of Ukraine and the pandemic's impact of reminding the importance of green growth, sustainable development came to the forefront of the European global policy objectives. The State of the Union Statements by President Barroso and Juncker demonstrates that the "geopolitical union" claim by President von der Leyen has been present in previous Commissions. The EU aimed to be part of global politics by employing its normative global policy options and by keeping the distance between its approach to the global climate regime and other foreign policy designs. However, such ambitions have newly spilled over to the climate change regime where normative and geopolitical global climate tools are actively used to support global policy objectives (increasingly tilting towards geopolitical ones) especially following the full scale invasion of Ukraine.

4.4 The Analysis of Documents and Speeches Pertaining to the Green Deal

The European Commission's website pertaining to the Green Deal contains many advertisement-like content for keeping the citizens informed. The depiction of the new policy includes the meaning of the Green Deal, its significance for the citizens and the possible repercussions of the climate inaction. These are highlighted in the documents titled: “What is the European Green Deal?”, “What’s in it for me?” and “What if we do not act?”. They give the EGD a skeleton-like structure; and represent the EU’s normative climate policy goals. However, the analysis of key speeches from European actors signal the use of the Green Deal as both a normative and geopolitical tool. The next section analyses the evolution of the balance between normative climate policy tools and goals throughout the State of the Union speeches given by the last three European Commission presidents.

4.4.1 The Analysis of Speeches Pertaining to the Launch of the European Green Deal

The “Speech by President von der Leyen in the Plenary of the European Parliament at the debate on the European Green Deal” and “Press remarks by President von der Leyen on the occasion of the adoption of the European Green Deal Communication” December 2019

In December 2019 von der Leyen launched the European Green Deal. She said that “we owe to our children because we do not own this planet” and highlighted the importance of the success of the EGD “for the sake of this planet and life on it” stating the normative global climate policy goals the EGD serves. She underscores the normative policy tools that will be used in COPs such as European leadership by example and protecting the multilateral order, when she states that:

“We – as institutions that serve the Europeans ... have to learn what this change means in our daily life, how to practice sustainability. What does it mean for our buildings, for our waste management, for our travels, for our paper use”

“We want to be as ambitious as we can, and we want to be as realistic as we can. All of this will be ready in time for next year's COP26 in Glasgow. Europe will lead by example, but we also need more ambitious multilateral rules for the whole world. ... the goal must be the same for everyone

and positive change must be rewarded and not hindered” (“Speech by President von der Leyen in the Plenary of the European Parliament at the debate on the European Green Deal”)

She mentions many policy areas where the EU is the pioneer, the exemplary leader: European Climate Law providing “clear rules, so that investors and innovators can plan their long-term investment”, the adoption of Climate Pact⁵¹, European “climate friendly industries”, “clean technologies” and “green financing”.

The norms of sustainable development and human rights are utilized to justify the European geopolitical global climate policy objectives such as creating sustainable production and consumption patterns as “‘Made in Europe’ batteries for electric cars are finally becoming reality”⁵². She framed the Green Deal as the EU’s “man in the moon moment”, foreshadowing the ambitions to spearhead unprecedented global success of a hegemonic actor. Such ambition is in line with the new geopolitical turn. Moreover, sustainable development is coupled with the fossil fuel phase-out process, serving the EU’s energy independence. She states that:

“I am convinced that the old growth-model that is based on fossil-fuels and pollution is out of date, and it is out of touch with our planet. The European Green Deal is our new growth strategy – it is a strategy for growth that gives more back than it takes away.”

She praises the transition from fossil fuels to sustainable development during COP24 in Katowice which “was a capital of coal” but now “became the global capital of climate action”.

She introduces hybrid global climate policy tools such as the carbon pricing in the speech while also highlighting WTO compliance, protecting the effectiveness of the normative policy tools such as respect for multilateral rule based regimes. The EGD needs to overcome the capital flight where firms can move their production processes abroad, and carbon leakage, the carbon intensive products’ entry into the EU. To do so, the EGD involves a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism putting tariffs on such products. She introduces the mechanism by stating that:

⁵¹ https://climate-pact.europa.eu/index_en

⁵² The controversial aspect of the electric car subsidies by the Chinese government reveals the geopolitical aspect of the car industry for the EU; because the production and the use of cheap electric cars would overall serve to protect the environment regardless of the producing country. The fact that the EU wants itself to lead the market attests to geopolitical ambitions.

“We welcome the change in production procedures. If companies invest in clean technologies, if they respect our environment, it cannot be that they face unfair competition from heavy polluters. And that is when we will apply a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, in full compliance with WTO rules.”

4.4.2 Keynote speech by President von der Leyen at the Green Deal Summit in 26 September 2023

The “Keynote speech by President von der Leyen at the Green Deal Summit” on September 26, 2023 opens up with historical narratives reminiscent of the post-Cold War era and ties these memories to the climate crisis. Compared to State of the Union speeches and the launch speech, the 2023 speech, portrays a deeper enmeshment between geopolitical and normative global climate policy goals as can be observed from the following quote:

“It was the beginning of November of 1989, when a young student from Bohemia took to the streets to protest against the Communist regime because the air in his hometown was simply unbreathable. It was the first spark of the Velvet Revolution. Now, 35 years on, we all understand that fossil fuels are poison for both our individual health and for our climate. Just one month ago, I was in Greece, as the country was ravaged by the worst wildfires in Europe in living memory. And only a few weeks later, the same country was hit by three years' worth of rainfall in just three days. And the same is happening from Libya to Slovenia, from Spain to the Philippines. That is the reality of a boiling planet.”

The opening with the Velvet revolution enables von der Leyen to position the Green Deal within the larger historical context. The intertwined description of traditional political and economic issues and new climate challenges in the anthropocene endows the green policies with a historical depth, a present urgency and a future vision.

The reference to the Velvet revolution⁵³, is connected to the “unbreathable” air in the country, reminding the important role played by the environmentalists at the time against the communist rule. Then, she bridges the detriments of the current fossil fuel usage to the collapse of communism and western success at the end of the Cold War. Despite the summit being about the Green Deal, such opening foreshadows the EGD’s employment as

⁵³ which put a peaceful end to the decades of one party Communist regime’s rule in Czechoslovakia in 1989

a geopolitical global climate policy tool serving geopolitical policy objectives such as energy security and hybrid objectives such as creating a dominant narrative about the climate and its role with the foreign policy towards the East. The speech also touches upon exemplary leadership of the EU who “reduced greenhouse gas emissions while growing” the “economy”.

Von der Leyen mentioned geopolitical issues such as the Russian threat, problems posed by the Chinese subsidies for European competitiveness and normative global climate policy goals such as present and future prosperity. Portrayal of the Green Deal as the European response to Putin's “blackmail”⁵⁴ by gas cuts and the hostile tone against Chinese subsidized electric cars underscores that the global climate policy tools are used to pursue broader geopolitical objectives rather than the normative policy objective of sustainable development per se.

If the Green Deal was solely a normative climate policy tool serving normative objectives, the outright rejection of any cooperation between Chinese car industry and European customers would be counter-intuitive. Because the Chinese electric car industry's success serves the EU's normative global climate policy goals such as reducing GHG emissions, citizen wellbeing and preventing further global warming. Von der Leyen also highlights these geopolitical global climate policy goals in the speech : “if the share of renewables in our energy mix continues to rise at the current pace, we will soon be protected against the high prices of imported fossil fuels because renewables are so much cheaper.”

The evolution of the speeches analysed in these chapters shows an increased geopolitical weight given to the climate policies and a deeper interwoven use of normative and geopolitical policy tools, for advancing geopolitical and hybrid climate policy goals especially following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The next section analyses Russian speeches during the COP meetings based on their convergence or divergence from European normative policy goals and responses to EU's policy tools based on the COP speeches on the behalf of the Russian Federation.

⁵⁴ “We all remember when Putin tried to use natural gas to blackmail us, Europe's answer was the European Green Deal.” (von der Leyen, 2023)

Chapter 5

KREMLIN SOUNDS LIKE BRUSSELS DURING COPS: EVIDENCE OF EUROPEAN NORMATIVE SUCCESS?

The EU's overall global climate policies pursued in the UN interact with geopolitics co-existing with its framing as a normative power. Russia is one of the key normative and geopolitical rivals of the EU; given its geographical size, proximity to Europe and fossil fuel driven economy, it is a major actor that needs to be converted (or pressured) for normative and geopolitical climate policy goal achievement for the EU.

Russia does not possess a clear claim of leadership in the UNFCCC⁵⁵, the country perceives itself as a follower in the system judging by its speeches made on COPs. It pledges to adopt carbon neutrality until 2060, 10 years later than the European pledge. Thus, it subtly constructs its approach in the UNFCCC based on behavioral precedents and discursive patterns set by the EU.

In this section, the evolution of Russian perception of the climate change issue (especially normatively) is analysed through the speeches during COP meetings. The analysis aims to understand the effectiveness of European normative and geopolitical global climate policy tools towards achieving the EU's goals. Europe is the main actor who pioneers and promotes climate terminology, establishes targets on global warming caps and prioritizes scientific institutions such as IPCC while choosing targets. Thus, the reiteration of these concepts in Russian speeches, and pledges to adopt any of the European climate objectives contributes to the EU's goal achievement (such as creating a dominant narrative).

The analysis is conducted with Russian speeches and statements available in the UNFCCC's official website on COPs (from COP 16 in 2010 to COP 27 in 2022)⁵⁶. COP 15 speech is on Youtube. COP 28 speech is taken from the Kremlin's website⁵⁷. Some of the speeches in the official UNFCCC website are submitted in Russian. All Russian speeches

⁵⁵ Except for some offers of technical energy guidance in COP 21.

⁵⁶ The UNFCCC website does not contain speeches or statements on the behalf of the Russian Federation for COP 19 and COP 20.

⁵⁷ <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/administration/72940>

are translated to English using DeepL⁵⁸, Yandex⁵⁹ and ChatGPT; the use of 3 translators aims to minimize translation error by allowing for comparison between different translations.

The extent to which Russian pledges under the UNFCCC reflect its actual economic, political and diplomatic preferences is limited, given the lack of transparency and auditing mechanisms. However, the way the climate issue is framed by Russia is informative for observing the degree of the EU's influence pertaining to the global perception of climate change. If such framing contains European normative policy goals and tools, it signals that the EU controls the dominant narrative embraced during the COP meetings.

The COP 26 statement ensures that “Russia will remain a reliable supplier of energy to international markets and consumers” (2021). Russian energy weaponization disapproves of the accuracy of the statement. The analysis in this chapter however, focuses on the recognition of “consumers” which is similar to the EU's discourse on protecting the rights of citizens by fighting climate change. Russia's need to publicly reaffirm its reliability as a supplier at the UNFCCC is a sign of hybrid global climate policy goal achievement for the EU.

The European normative climate goals are perceived as legitimate global targets to follow by Russian speeches. The country could have chosen to lobby for the natural gas and coal based global supply chains during COPs. Instead, it opts to follow the European lead in the UNFCCC regime with less ambitious climate goals. Even on the issues where Russia diverges from the mainstream narrative, it opposes the European targets on the reductions or the timetables rather than the notion of putting a cap on the emissions itself. For instance, rather than refusing to limit its emissions it repeatedly emphasizes its vast carbon capture capacity (due to large forests).

Despite differing normative positions among actors, the fact that the disaccord is expressed under the multilateral structure of the UNFCCC framework, is itself an employment of normative global climate policy tool (especially for pursuing normative goals). When Russia wants to oppose or propose alternatives to policy frameworks and

⁵⁸ <https://www.deepl.com/tr/translator>

⁵⁹ <https://translate.yandex.com/>

climate norms, it has to present its position under the diplomatic structure provided by the UN. There is no alternative international organization centered on the climate issue that matches the comprehensiveness and the prestige of the UNFCCC regime, through which Russia can independently advance any alternative global climate vision. Such path dependence constrains the international climate policy options for non-western actors, creates and sustains a dominant narrative around the climate change issue. The EU's ability to dictate UNFCCC terms is constrained by its geopolitical reach and normative divergence between relevant poles of the multipolar system. Russian capacity to influence the international climate regime is also constrained by Western institutionalization.

Russia has a vested interest in global business models centered on fossil fuels. There are no proper external auditing mechanisms for measuring its NDC. As sustainable energy substitutes gas, oil and coal, the country would lose significant global market share. Moreover, a possible green transformation in its industry would incur economic, political and diplomatic costs for the Kremlin. Despite all these factors, it chooses to follow the European discursive patterns on the climate issue even when it pursues the exact opposite geopolitical goals. This is the reflection of the EU's control over the dominant global narrative on the climate issue and legitimate channels of communication.

Russia uses the UNFCCC as a geopolitical tool to pursue its objectives outside of the climate realm. Such use is constrained by the multilateral nature of the UNFCCC meetings. For instance, even when Russia voices its discontent about the meeting place, it still participates. After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the COP29's meeting place became controversial. It was Eastern Europe's turn to host the Parties but Russia opposed such a choice, on the ground of its doubts about the region's impartiality. Consequently, the meeting was moved to Baku, Azerbaijan⁶⁰.

The full scale invasion of Ukraine strengthens the European potential for the transition to clean energy supplies and fossil fuel phase-outs, contributing to energy's perception as a geopolitical security issue (Kuzemko et. al, 2022). It is important to analyse how Russia responds to the normative and geopolitical policy tools used by the EU and the impact of Russian position in the UN for policy goals of the EU.

⁶⁰ <https://unfccc.int/cop29>

5.1 The evolution of the normative convergence and divergence areas with the EU's goals

There is a clear convergence between Russia and the EU in terms of embracing multilateralism, market mechanisms and the need for robust scientific basis for dealing with the climate change issue; pointing to normative global climate policy goal advancement. During COP 16, while rejecting a second Kyoto commitment period, Russia embraced the market mechanisms under a possible new agreement: “Russia will not participate in the Second Commitment Period However, we do believe that it would be judicious to continue to use Kyoto Protocol market mechanisms” (Bedritsky, 2011). Notwithstanding the questionable sincerity of its involvement, Russian socialization through the UNFCCC process had domestic spillovers. According to Gusev the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol was an impetus for incorporating the climate concerns “into the Russian government’s political agenda” (2016).

Moreover, during COP 18, Russia underscores:

“The practical achievements of the Kyoto Protocol in terms of monitoring and accountability procedures, compliance, and market mechanisms Russia, ..., is interested in gaining more experience, bilaterally or as part of a multilateral initiative, in how to best use market mechanisms to reduce humanity’s impact on the environment and the climate system.”

The introduction of such mechanisms were also mentioned in the COP 14 speech on the behalf of the EU (2008) who already had launched ETS at the time. Thus, the planned use of the market demonstrates that the EU shapes the way through which other countries create their own sustainable development tools. It recognizes the bilateral and multilateral efforts for its roadmap; reflecting the European preference of diplomatic engagement. Multilateral policy making creates more opportunities for the Union to steer the direction of climate measures globally by strategically engaging with different poles. Additionally, during COP 18 Russia states that “ in 2013 we will begin to realize the emissions-reduction goal we announced in Copenhagen and confirmed in Cancun ...; namely, an up to 25% reduction in emissions by 2020. ... in concert with other developing countries.” (Bedritsky, 2012).

Russia also showcases normative convergence with the EU in their respect for international institutions such as the UN for supporting aid to developing countries' green growth strategies, forming legally binding rules, and proposing the formation of a scientific forum under the UN. During COP 21, Russia states that they "believe that it is essential that the new climate agreement be based on the principles of the UNFCCC and be legally binding, with both developed and developing countries participating" which will take the place of the "Kyoto Protocol". Similarly following the adoption of the Paris Agreement it states that: "The Russian Federation welcomes the entry into force of the Paris Agreement and considers it a reliable international legal foundation for long-term climate regulation"; the Paris Programme will "serve as the best evidence of our shared commitment to ... accelerated operationalization" (Putin, 2015). During COP 23 Russia states that it intends to work actively towards making Russian development climate resilient while they state that:

"The Russian Federation confirms the unconditional fulfillment of the commitments made to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 to 75% of the 1990 base year emissions.... the fulfillment of commitments by all countries ... will determine the success of the Paris Agreement and the achievement of the goal of limiting the global temperature increase." (Bedritsky, 2017).

The benchmarks for timelines and emission reduction numbers discursively embraced by Russia are mirroring the European preferences. The Paris Agreement which was a key diplomatic achievement associated with the EU is rhetorically endorsed by the speech.

Despite goal convergence between Russian and European COP statements, Russia interprets and capitalizes on these norms based on its own geopolitical interests. It tailors the normative goals and tools towards its own agenda. For instance during COP 23 (2017) while it recognizes the Paris commitments, it criticizes the political instrumentalization of social and "economic cooperation" in the environmental policy where "the imposition of economic sanctions" "hinders the successful implementation of measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in these countries."

In its COP 24 speech Russia recognizes climate change as the basis of the future economic development and calls for international cooperation pertaining to the issue. It

touches upon the climate threat, the need for multilateral action under international rules, the importance of the Paris Agreement and reiterates many normative global climate policy goals defended by the EU. It states that :

“Climate change is one of the major challenges of our time. This Conference, ... the 2016 Marrakech Accords, is an important milestone in ... the Paris Program of Action. In order to strengthen mutual trust, to achieve the objective ... of the Paris Agreement, we would focus on the universality of the rules (...). ... to ensure a single legal format for the implementation” (Edelgeriev, 2018)⁶¹.

Edelgeriev refers to the “Marrakech Accords”, the “Paris Agreement” and “Paris Program of Action”. The recognition of these documents reflects the EU’s approach that prioritizes rule-of-law and consensus based approach to the UNFCCC regime.

During COP 24 Russia references the IPCC report and states that:

“The introduction of environmental technologies, ... high environmental standards, and the consideration of climate change factors are the basis of our national development for the future. Russia is interested ... in developing international cooperation ... Russian business structures are restructuring ... establishing internal environmental and climate strategies and goals, and presenting corporate reports on ... emissions.” (2018).

Russia instrumentalizes the global climate fora to advance its interests in other fields such as constructing the sanctions between states as hampering the potential for green technology innovation or presenting the natural gas as the cleanest fossil fuel aiming to increase its demand (COP 25, 2019). The framing of natural gas as a potential transition fuel between fossil fuel based and green industrialisation signals the country’s expectation that many key exporters will adopt sustainable development. Moreover, during COP 25 , Russia states that

“the Russian Federation shares ... responsibility for climate protection. ... the Paris Agreement can and should become the main instrument ... In our opinion, absolutely necessary, ... coordinated action by the entire world community ... achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement to stabilize the climate system, the Russian Federation considers the issues of deepening cooperation between countries in this area to be a priority. Russia supports ... the Green Climate Fund on the implementation of climate projects”⁶² (2019).

⁶¹ DEEPL translation is used

⁶² DEEPL translation

It also introduces its nation-wide green project “Ecology”. The COP 25 speech recognizes the need for scientific assessment, the importance of international organizations, mirroring European respect for science based on IPCC findings’ value for policy making.

During COP 26 and COP 27, Russia accepts carbon trade as an important mechanism for the fight against the climate crisis. Edelgeriev states that “international efforts are also critical for enhancing cooperation in areas of ecosystem management, developing and improving monitoring and reporting emission and absorption practices as well as measuring progress in meeting climate goals. It is critical to develop common fair and transparent rules for carbon pricing measurement and ensure their multilateral recognition and comparability between countries” (COP 26, 2021). Again during COP 27 (2022) he states that “our country has developed a broad set of tools to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” and highlights “an experiment on the formation of a carbon market launched in one of Russia's regions” that “has made it possible to introduce carbon pricing for greenhouse gas emissions and to provide additional financial impetus for their reduction”. The Russian efforts “include measures for decarbonization of the energy sector, hydrogen generation, electrification of transport and energy efficiency.”

In its COP 27 statement, Russia contextualizes its technological improvements under the framework of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement while also criticizing the EU for falsely utilizing geopolitical issues for changing previously established climate goals⁶³. These references demonstrate the permeation of European norms into the discursive construction of the climate change issue by Russia. Russia has very few incentives for channeling economic and diplomatic resources for the prevention of climate change. The potential of natural gas as a transition fuel between coal and renewable energies due to its less polluting nature is one of them. The UNFCCC is a platform through which Russia promotes natural gas as a relatively clean energy source (COP 25).

Despite the convergent discourse between Russian and European UNFCCC statements, European goal achievement is lagging behind in terms of its normative policy

⁶³ During the same meeting the EU directly opens up its speech with the Russian invasion of Ukraine by tying the issue of changing geographical climate to the new political climate: “In February, in the same week that Russia invaded Ukraine, the IPCC issued a stark warning to the global community. Its message could not have been clearer: the climate is changing faster than our capacity to adapt.” (Statement by President von der Leyen at the COP27 plenary meeting, 2022)

objectives of disseminating sustainable production and consumption patterns, limiting global warming below 2 celsius degrees (even 1.5) . As it is highlighted in the COP 16 statement in 2010, “the second commitment under the Kyoto Protocol ... would be neither scientifically, economically nor politically effective” according to Russia.

Following 2022, Russia diverged further from policies promoted by the EU, depicting the European Green Deal as a geopolitical tool rather than normative one. On COP 27 the country hardly criticizes “regional associations”, the EU for its global climate policies:

“We express serious concern at any plans by certain states and regional associations to revise previous commitments under the pretext of a difficult geopolitical situation. Russia has warned of the negative consequences of the ‘race to climate ambition’ when the declaration of carbon neutrality was made without proper strategy and resource and financial support. Parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement have the right to choose their own means of achieving climate goals.” (Edelgeriev, 2022)

During COP 28 Russia reiterated its commitment to Paris goals for a net zero economy until 2060, working on carbon markets including domestic experiments for trading emissions in certain regions. These experiments are expected to contribute to better methodological and regulatory practices. However, it calls the EU’s global warming caps unreachable and argues that the “investments” needed for green technology are impossible to attain.

Russia uses the COP meetings as an opportunity to voice its dissent, to paint the Green Deal as a geopolitical move to win the climate change “race”. This suggests that the country perceives the multilateral engagement fora (preferred by the EU) as legitimate. Thus, it embraces both the European rhetoric and multilateralism under the UNFCCC regime. Notwithstanding its critical approach towards the instrumentalisation of climate change, the acknowledgement of the crisis itself is different from the climate denial embraced during the Kyoto process. Although not officially available, in the UNFCCC website, various sources claim that Putin stated that “an increase of two or three degrees wouldn’t be so bad for a northern country like Russia. We could spend less on fur coats,

and the grain harvest would go up”⁶⁴ and refused the claim that global warming is caused by humans in 2003.

Compared to his approach in 2003, even after the normative divergence in COP speeches delivered following the invasion of Ukraine and the Green Deal; the Russian approach overall shows better rhetorical convergence towards the EU’s normative policy tools and goals compared to 2003. The available Russian UNFCCC statements have consistent normative policy goals in terms of less ambitious time tables and utilisation of vast natural resources like forests as proposals to contain emissions rather than an explicit and credible commitment to phase out fossil fuels.

⁶⁴ <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/bleeding-curse-melting-permafrost-russian-arctic/>

Chapter 6

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH PATHS

Global climate policy increasingly becomes an important aspect of states' and international organisations' foreign policy structures, especially as its consequences spread in scope and range. This thesis introduced a framework on the normative and geopolitical global climate policy tools and objectives for the analysis of the European global climate policy. It applied the framework to the literature on the European global climate policy making, the European and Russian COP speeches and statements and to the State of the Union speeches delivered by the Commission Presidents. It incorporated alternative explanations to the analysis of the EU's international climate policy choices that relied on normative policy tools for following normative goals and broadened the normative power approach for the past policy choices of the Union.

The climate policy is designed within a complex geopolitical environment. Climate change increasingly changes the perception of geopolitics. The transformations on earth create new areas of contention and cooperation. Even when the EU uses normative global climate policy tools or pursues normative objectives, it responds to changing climate geopolitics. The choice of the normative power approach in global policy is itself geopolitical. The normative goals and the tools are contextualised in an environment where Europe risks losing its geopolitical relevance both internally and externally. The Green Deal gives the EU an identity, an overarching purpose; while simultaneously responding to geopolitical crises.

The geopolitical perspective is vital for the climate policy design. The success of the GHG emissions reductions, increasingly complicates further employment of normative tools. It reduces the EU's bargaining power in the UNFCCC. The EU's ability to keep its exemplary leadership and create international compliance depends on proper navigation of the geopolitical goals and tools. The underperformance of the Paris Agreement attests to the need for robust geopolitical inducement mechanisms. However, the unilateral employment of such mechanisms (e.g. CBAM) can erode the region's benevolent image and thin out the distinction between normative and geopolitical goals.

There is an increased fusion of geopolitical and normative policy goals and tools in the State of the Union Addresses delivered by von der Leyen compared to previous speeches following the full scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. To understand how the EU's normative and geopolitical climate policy tools impacted other states, Russia is chosen as an analytical comparison point. This thesis finds that, on the contrary to European State of the Union Addresses that showcase increased geopoliticization, Russian COP statements do not show increased normative convergence following the Green Deal, in fact the convergence deteriorates especially with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Based on the Russian UNFCCC statements, the EU performs better in hybrid global climate policy goals such as controlling the dominant narrative; compared to normative global policy goals such as advocating for capping global warming 1.5 Celsius, decreasing emissions and reaching climate neutrality as soon as possible. However, given the novelty of the Green Deal the hybrid climate policy tools such as CBAM had yet to demonstrate its impact on global climate goals.

There are various future directions that may be followed after this research based on the interaction of geopolitical and normative global climate policy tools and goals. The normative and geopolitical global climate policy tools shape each other in an intertwined way. Such interaction can cause many repercussions for the EU's ability to project power. The first scenario is that; since norms are unspoken rules of conduct, they can tilt the EU's global climate policy choices towards an aspired idea of acceptable behavior but the geopolitical developments play an important role in determining which norms are the most effective tools for climate objectives. European aspiration of green leadership cannot be separated from multipolar turn in international relations. As the world becomes more multipolar, the multilateral UNFCCC is a convenient forum to project power for the EU who is more accustomed to multilateral intergovernmental structures but lacks unilateral military strength.

Given its expertise in green transition the EU can use the UNFCCC as a platform for influencing the direction of the new "anthropocene geopolitics" (Proedrou, 2023). It can utilize its governance expertise as a supranational entity and a diplomatic actor to respond to potential migration issues especially from the Global South and Small Island States. By capitalizing on the new threats caused by climate change it can establish itself as an

anthropocene geopolitical actor. Thus, normative and geopolitical climate policy tools and objectives can complement each other.

Another scenario is that; utilizing geopolitical climate policy tools to pursue global climate policy objectives is a double edged sword. If there are solutions available to the policymakers to pursue geopolitical global climate policy goals that are not in line with the normative underpinnings of the EU, these can be adopted. This view is in line with the conclusion drawn by Herranz-Surrallés (2024) about the erosion of trust to multilateralism. Such friction slowly erodes Europe's credibility and prestige as a normative actor in the international arena, decreasing the effectiveness of normative tools. Global South's reactions towards the CBAM is a case in point. Although, the respect for multilateral institutional structure is established with the emphasis that the CBAM will be applied in accordance with WTO rules; it still is not perceived as a fair practice especially by the Global South. The impact of CBAM on the EU's normative climate policy goal achievement is conflicting because it is a clear violation of free trade rules but it also creates incentive for its trade partners to adopt sustainable development.

On the other hand, the need to protect the effectiveness of normative tools can prevent the use of geopolitical tools within the European institutions, undermining the power projection capacity. The EU has limited manpower and economic funding, the human and physical capital; investing in normative policy tools, decreases the resources for the geopolitical global policy making, creating an opportunity cost. Such clashing tendencies are detrimental to the EU's goal achievement in the climate regime; and may undercut the EU's ability to capitalize on the multipolar world politics.

The full scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is one of the most important external shocks that the EU faced. The policy responses to the invasion and ensuing energy crisis⁶⁵ which are aimed at increasing internal coherence and resilience have the potential to boost European success in the UNFCCC. As highlighted by Ursula von der Leyen the Green Deal is a response for Russia, the environment is presented as the secondary concern in her keynote speech at the Green Deal Summit on September 26th 2023; such geopolitical use of the EGD overshadows the EU's credibility as the benevolent green leader. Thus, the

⁶⁵https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/eu-action-address-energy-crisis_en

geopolitical global climate policy tools and goals can have negative repercussions for the use of normative global climate policy tools.

After the invasion and the ensuing energy crisis, some of the natural gas shortages were covered with coal and trade with non democratic energy suppliers or Russian LNG. The EU responded by strongly leaning on the Green Deal which is a simultaneous solution for climate change and dependence on Russia; endowing the project with both normative and geopolitical goals with different policy tools. Further research can delve more into future direction the geopolitical and normative global climate policy objectives and tools of the EU will take.

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Appendix 1: Times And Places Of Conference Of Parties under the UNFCCC

COP	year	City, Country	Key Result
1	1995	Berlin, Germany	
2	1996	Geneva, Switzerland	
3	1997	Kyoto, Japan	Kyoto Protocol
4	1998	Buenos Aires, Argentina	
5	1999	Bonn, Germany	
6	2000/1	Hague, the Netherlands; Bonn, Germany	
7	2001	Marrakech, Morocco	
8	2002	New Delhi, India	
9	2003	Milan, Italy	
10	2004	Buenos Aires, Argentina	
11	2005	Montreal, Canada	
12	2006	Nairobi, Kenya	
13	2007	Bali, Indonesia	
14	2008	Poznań, Poland	
15	2009	Copenhagen, Denmark	Copenhagen Accord
16	2010	Cancún, Mexico	
17	2011	Durban, South Africa	
18	2012	Doha, Qatar	End of the 1st Kyoto Protocol commitment period
19	2013	Warsaw, Poland	Beginning of the 2nd Commitment Period under Kyoto
20	2014	Lima, Peru	
21	2015	Paris, France	Paris Agreement

22	2016	Marrakech, Morocco	Marrakesh Accords
23	2017	Bonn, Germany	
24	2018	Katowice, Poland	
25	2019	Madrid, Spain	
2020 - The COVID Pandemic- End of the 2nd Commitment Period under Kyoto Protocol			
26	2021	Glasgow, the UK	
27	2022	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	The Loss and Damage Fund
28	2023	Dubai, United Arab Emirates	
29	2024	Baku, Azerbaijan	
30	2025	Belém, Brazil	

Appendix 2: The Categorization of the Literature According to Normative and Geopolitical Frameworks

				RUSSIA			
Author	Year	Norm	Geopol	"+"	"-"	PRTCTNSM	CTAX
Manners	2002	1	0	1	1	0	0
Lacasta et al	2002	0	0	1	0	0	1
		1	0	2	1	0	1
Lightfoot and Burchell	2005	1	0	1	1	0	0
Vogler	2005	1	0	1	0	0	1
		2	0	2	1	0	1
Vogler and Bretherton	2006	1	0	1	0	0	1
Falkner	2006	1	0	0	0	0	0
		2	0	1	0	0	1
Groenleer and Van Schaik	2007	1	0	1	1	0	0
S Scheipers, D Sicurelli	2007	1	0	1	0	0	0
		2	0	2	1	0	0
Oberthür and Roche Kelly	2008	1	0	0	1	0	1
		1	0	0	1	0	1
Parker and Karlsson	2010	1	0	1	0	0	1
Van Schaik	2010	1	1	0	1	1	0
Curtin	2010	0	1	0	1	0	1
Killian and Elgström	2010	1	0	0	1	0	0
		3	2	1	3	1	2
Afionis	2011	0	0	1	0	0	1

Groen and Niemann	2011	1	0	1	0	0	0
		1	0	2	0	0	1
Van Schaik and Schunz	2012	1	1	1	1	0	0
Pavese and Torney	2012	0	0	1	0	0	1
Delreux	2012	1	0	1	0	0	0
		2	1	3	1	0	1
Ansari et al	2013	0	0	0	0	0	0
Groen and Niemann	2013	1	0	0	0	0	0
Backstrand and Elgstrom	2013	1	1	1	1	0	0
Groen, Niemann and Oberthür	2013	1	0	0	0	0	0
		3	1	1	1	0	0
Skovgaard	2014	1	0	0	0	0	0
Delreux	2014	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1	0	0	0	0	0
Oberthür and Groen	2015	1	0	0	0	0	0
		1	0	0	0	0	0
Oberthür	2016	0	1	0	1	0	0
Savorskaya	2016	1	0	1	1	0	1
		1	1	1	2	0	1
Parker, Karlsson and Hjerpe	2017	0	1	1	0	0	0
Oberthür and Groen	2017	0	0	0	0	0	0
Schunz	2017	1	1	0	1	0	0
		0	2	1	0	0	0
Burns and Tobin	2018	1	0	0	1	0	0
Oberthür and Groen	2018	1	1	0	0	0	0
		2	1	0	1	0	0

De Roeck	2019	1	1	0	0	0	0
		2	1	0	1	0	0
Pre- geopolitical commission announcement		24	9	16	13	1	9
Lehne	2020	1	1	1	1	0	0
Pastukhova, Pepe, Jacopo and Westphal	2020	1	1	1	0	0	0
Burns and Tobin	2020	0	0	0	1	0	0
Cross	2020	1	1	0	0	0	1
Aamond and Boasson	2020	1	1	0	0	0	0
Fusiek	2020	1	1	1	0	0	0
Proedrou	2020	1	1	1	0	0	1
		7	6	5	2	1	3
Earsom and Delreux	2021	0	0	0	0	0	0
Von Homeyer, Oberthür and Jordan	2021	1	1	0	1	1	1
Von Lucke	2021	1	0	0	0	0	1
Siddi and Kustova	2021	1	1	0	1	1	0
Schunz	2021	1	1	0	0	0	0
Oberthür and Dupond	2021	1	1	0	0	0	1
Eckert	2021	1	1	0	0	1	1
Leonard et al	2021	1	1	1	1	1	1
Naumovski, Apostolovska-Stepanoska and Ognjanovska	2021	1	1	0	1	0	0
		8	7	1	4	4	5

Kreienkamp, Pegram and Coen	2022	1	0	0	0	0	0
Çelik	2022	1	1	0	0	0	0
Bäckstrand	2022	1	1	0	1	0	1
Grimm et al	2022	1	1	0	1	1	1
Schunz	2022	1	0	0	0	0	0
Von homeyer , Oberthür and Dupond	2022	0	1	?	1	1	1
		5	4	0	3	2	3
Rosamond	2023	1	1	0	1	1	1
Crowley-Vigneau, Kalyuzhnova and Ketenci	2023	1	0	0	1	0	0
Earsom and Delreux	2023	0	0	0	0	0	0
		2	1	0	2	1	1
Dyrhaug and Kurze	2023	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tobin et al	2023	1	1	0	1	0	0
Hardt and de Armino	2023	1	1	1	0	0	0
Manners	2023	1	1	0	1	0	0
		4	4	2	3	1	1
Münch and Kurze	2024	1	1	1	1	0	0
Diz and de Oliveira	2024	1	0	0	1	0	0
Herranz-Surrallés	2024	1	1	0	1	1	1
Manners	2024	1	1	0	1	0	0
Dupond et al	2024	0	1	0	1	0	1
		4	4	1	5	1	2
post geopolitical commission announcement		30.00	26.00	9.00	19.00	10.00	15.00
post/ total		0.56	0.74	0.36	0.59	0.91	0.63

Pre/total		0.44	0.26	0.64	0.41	0.09	0.38
TOTAL		54.00	35.00	25.00	32.00	11.00	24.00

The table presents the evolution of the literature on the European international climate policy analysis based on the normative and geopolitical references within the authors' main arguments and analytical perspectives. The "norm" column is assigned 1 if the authors adopt a normative power approach while investigating the European climate policies, 0 if there is no reference to the normative power. The "geop" column is assigned 1 if the author mentions (and analyses) the geopolitical developments while dissecting the EU's global climate policy, 0 if there are no geopolitical developments mentioned and there is no reference to the geopolitics.

The "R+" column is assigned 1 if the authors highlight the cooperative aspect of the Euro-Russian relations where Russia is constructed as a partner. The 1s in the "R-" column indicates that the relationship involves friction and animosity between the two powers. Given the complex interest structure shaping global climate politics, these dynamics are not mutually exclusive and the authors may highlight both cooperative and competitive aspects of Russia-EU relations. For instance, Van Schaik and Schunz (2012) refers to the country as a "reluctant partner". The "Protectionism" column is assigned 1 if there is any mention of the protectionist aspect of the climate policies and the "Carbon Tax" column is assigned 1 if there is any mention of carbon taxes in the analysis.