

**T.C.
MANİSA CELAL BAYAR UNIVERSITY
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL**



**MASTER OF ARTS THESIS
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS**

**THE EUROPEAN UNION’S STRUGGLE WITH HYBRID
THREATS IN AN EMERGING HYBRID WAR
ENVIRONMENT: THE CASE OF RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR**

İsmail Fatih POZAN

**Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Kutay AYTUĞ**

MANİSA–2024

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TAAHHÜTNAME

Bu tezin Manisa Celal Bayar Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalında akademik ve etik kurallara uygun olarak yazıldığını ve kullanılan tüm literatür bilgilerinin referans gösterilerek tezde yer aldığını, tamamen kendi çalışmam olduğunu, her alıntıya kaynak gösterdiğimi, tezin yazımında akademik ve etik kurallara aykırı herhangi bir yapay zekâ ve program kullanmadığımı beyan ederim.

İsmail Fatih POZAN



ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

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Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

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Savaş olgusu, tarihsel süreç içinde devamlı olarak değişime uğramıştır. Günümüz savaş ortamı teknoloji ve küreselleşmenin etkisiyle kuvvet, zaman ve mekân açısından sınırları belli olmayan, düzenli ve düzenli olmayan araç ve yöntemleri da içeren hibrit savaş ortamına dönüşmüştür. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Rusya Ukrayna Savaşı örneği üzerinden, hibrit savaş olgusunun Avrupa Birliği (AB) üzerinde yapmış olduğu etkiyi, liberal hükümetlerarasıcılık kuramı bağlamında incelemektir. Konunun doğası gereği bu çalışmada yöntem olarak yazın taraması kullanılmıştır. Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde liberal hükümetlerarasıcılık kuramı ve hibrit savaş olgusu hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. İkinci bölümde yakın dönem Rusya Ukrayna ilişkileri ve Rusya Ukrayna savaşının nedenleri açıklanmıştır. Üçüncü bölümde AB'nin hibrit tehditlere yanıtı incelenmiştir. Dördüncü bölümde Rusya Ukrayna savaşı bağlamında AB'nin hibrit tehditlerle mücadelesi ele alınmış, Birlik'in belirtilen savaşa yanıtı liberal hükümetlerarasıcılık kuramı çerçevesinde değerlendirilmiştir. Sonuç kısmında elde edilen bulguların tamamının değerlendirilmesi yapılmıştır. Bulgular değerlendirildiğinde, Rusya-Ukrayna savaşı Birlik içerisinde, NATO ve Ukrayna nezdinde iş birliğini hızlandırmıştır. İş birlikleri ele alındığında savaşın ilk safhasında AB içerisinde farklı görüşler olsa da ikinci safhadan itibaren uzlaşmaya varıldığı, hükümetler arası iş birliği arttırıldığı değerlendirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası İlişkiler, Liberal Hükümetlerarasıcılık Kuramı, Hibrit Savaş, Rusya Ukrayna Savaşı, AB'nin hibrit tehditlerle mücadelesi

2024, 202 sayfa

ABSTRACT

M.A. Thesis

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The phenomenon of war has constantly changed in the historical process. Today's war environment, under the influence of technology and globalization, has turned into a hybrid war environment that has no boundaries in terms of force, time, space, and includes regular and non-regular tools and methods. The aim of this study is to examine the impact of the hybrid war phenomenon on the European Union (EU) in the context of liberal intergovernmentalism theory, through the example of the Russia-Ukraine War. Due to the nature of the subject, literature review was used as the method in this study. In the first chapter of the study, information is given about the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism and the phenomenon of hybrid war. In the second chapter, near term Russia-Ukraine relations and the reasons for the Russia-Ukraine war are explained. In the third chapter, the EU's response to hybrid threats is examined. In the fourth chapter, the EU's fight against hybrid threats in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war is discussed and the Union's response to the mentioned war was examined within the framework of liberal intergovernmentalism theory. In the conclusion section, all the findings were evaluated. When the findings are evaluated, Russia-Ukraine war have accelerated the cooperation within the Union, with NATO and Ukraine. Considering the cooperation, it was evaluated that although there were different opinions within the EU, in the first phase of the war, an agreement was reached, and intergovernmental cooperation was increased as of the second phase.

Keywords: International Relations, Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory, Hybrid War, Russia-Ukraine War, EU's struggle with hybrid threats

2024, 201 pages

FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Today's war environment, under the influence of technology and globalization, has turned into a hybrid war environment that has no boundaries in terms of force, time, and space and includes regular and non-regular tools and methods. The aim of this study is to examine the impact of the hybrid war phenomenon on the European Union (EU) in the context of liberal intergovernmentalism theory through the example of the Russia-Ukraine War. In the first part of the study, information will be given about the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism and the phenomenon of hybrid warfare. In the second part, near term Russia-Ukraine relations and the reasons for the Russia-Ukraine war will be explained. In the third part, the EU's response to hybrid threats will be explained. In the fourth section, the EU's fight against hybrid threats in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war will be discussed and the Union's response to the mentioned war will be evaluated within the framework of liberal intergovernmentalism theory. In the conclusion part, all the findings will be evaluated.

I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Kutay AYTUĞ, who supported me at every stage of my study and guided me with his knowledge and experience. I would like to wholeheartedly thank my wife, my daughter, my mother, my father and my family, who supported me morally throughout all the difficult stages of my graduate education and throughout my life.

İsmail Fatih POZAN
Manisa, 2024

ABBREVIATIONS

AB	Avrupa Birliği
BTG	Battalion Tactical Group
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CERT-EU	The Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU Institutions
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COE	Center of Excellence
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DDOS	Distributed Denial of Service
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
EAPC	The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EuvsDisinfo	The EU versus Disinformation
EU4DigitalUA	The EU for Digital Ukraine
ENISA	The European Union Network and Information Security Agency
EU	The European Union
EUMAM	The EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine
FSB	Federal Security Service
GRU	Military Intelligence Unit
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communication
G7	Group of Seven
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IPCR	Integrated Political Crisis Response
ISIS	The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IT	Internet Technology
NACC	The North Atlantic Partnership Council
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PMC	Private Military Company
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RF	The Russian Federation
StratCom	Strategic Communication
SVR	Foreign Intelligence Service
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	The United Nations
UNSC	The United Nations Security Council
USA	The United States of America
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
TDK	Türk Dil Kurumu

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INTRODUCTION

Wars have occurred throughout human history for various reasons, especially political, military, and economic. For these reasons, conflicts of interest have led countries to struggle. Thus, to achieve national interests and political goals, states sometimes preferred the method of using armed force and sometimes tried to solve problems through diplomatic means. Advances in today's technology have brought about changes in the tools, management, and actors used in wars. The struggle for superiority among the party states in the Second World War brought about many technological developments. Since this period, in addition to the conventional weapons developed by states, their nuclear capacities have also increased. Capabilities developed to provide deterrence increase the destructive effect and cost of war. The subsequent change in means of communication and transportation has facilitated the sharing of information between individuals, countries, and internationally.

This situation has made it easier for foreign fighters, private military companies, terrorist organizations, and international criminal organizations to influence the security environment, as well as states that are considered the primary and only security actors. These players are trying to be successful by influencing the security environment at less cost and with less force. Due to these developments, we now live in a hybrid war environment where it is difficult to define fronts, borders, or even separate civilians from combatants.

As the famous philosopher Heraclitus stated, "the only constant thing is change itself." Like every living thing trying to continue its existence, organizations are also affected by changing environmental conditions. To adapt to changing environmental conditions and continue their existence, organizations establish institutions and make regulations within themselves. It cooperates with other countries and international organizations. This situation causes them to re-evaluate their own policies and strategies. In this way, it survives in an environment of change.

In the light of the developments in today's security environment, the purpose of this study is to examine the phenomenon of hybrid war and its effects on the European

Union (EU) in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. The research is important in terms of providing insight into current developments, the defense of the EU as a global actor against hybrid threats, and the effects of the hybrid war environment on the Union. The strategy used in this study will be a literature review. Since the subject is current and changing rapidly, scientific studies, reports and notes of the EU, the Russian Federation, and NATO, will be used to develop the conceptual framework. The Russia-Ukraine war will be used as an example to examine the hybrid war aspects of the issue. The Union's reactions to this development will also be examined. As a limitation of this study, the effects of the Russia-Ukraine War on the security of the European Union have been examined within the framework of the hybrid war phenomenon and liberal intergovernmentalism theory.

In the first chapter of the study, liberal intergovernmentalism theory and the phenomenon of hybrid war will be discussed. In this chapter, firstly the concept of hybrid war is included to ensure conceptual consistency and facilitate the description of today's security environment. The term “hybrid war” in this study refers to the coordinated use of conventional and non-traditional tactics, such as cyber-attacks and terrorist acts, on military, public, and vital information systems by state or non-state actors, including private military companies and/or terrorist groups. These actors have specific goals, such as disrupting vital services such as utilities, energy sources, and financial services. It will also be used to describe unconventional, mixed-method operations that do not constitute officially declared war but have the potential to undermine public trust or exploit social security flaws. Secondly, to evaluate the effects of the Russia-Ukraine War on the European Union, the Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory, one of the theories explaining European integration, was included. Although the theory bases the decision-making process on national governments, it also explains EU integration by including sub-state pressure elements that have an impact on governments in this process. Information will also be given about the source of the theory, its assumptions, the principle of interdependence, partnership agreements, and its impact on the integration process.

In the second chapter of the study, the reasons for the Russia-Ukraine war, the near-term relations between the two countries and in the scope of hybrid war

phenomenon Russia-Ukraine war will be discussed. First, to better evaluate the historical context of the war, we will first look at the development of relations between Russia and Ukraine after the dissolution of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). Secondly, the causes of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine will be investigated from military, social, political, and economic perspectives. Finally, the analysis of the Russia-Ukraine War in terms of hybrid warfare will also be discussed in this section. In this context, the war will be examined under four phases. The first phase of the war will be intelligence operations, the second phase will be psychological operations, the third phase will be unconventional operations, and the fourth phase will be conventional operations.

In the third chapter of the study, the EU's approach to hybrid threats will be explained. This section will explain how the European Union responds to hybrid threats. Although the European Union has always responded to hybrid threats, the pace of this response has accelerated following Russia's annexation of Crimea, and the uncontrolled migration crisis caused by the Syrian Civil War. The joint communication document "Common Framework for Countering Hybrid Threats: European Union Response," released by the EU Commission on April 6, 2016, stressed that the threat environment in the world had changed following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. Member countries were requested to organize and carry out initiatives that include identifying threats, raising awareness, building resilience, prevention, crisis response, and renewal. As a result of the EU's response to hybrid threats, many institutions and practices related to food, energy, health, border control, cyber security, national, regional, and international relations, as well as the military, began to be questioned.

In the fourth chapter, The EU's defense against hybrid threats considering the Russia-Ukraine war will be discussed. In this chapter, the European Union's response to combating hybrid threats will be discussed together with the EU's response in the context of the Russia-Ukraine War. The analysis will be carried out under the following headings: cybersecurity cooperation, strategic communication, situational awareness, and crisis response. Firstly, instead of immediately taking military action in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, the EU adopted a supportive attitude towards Ukraine. The

EU has acted through diplomatic and international assistance, military aid, economic sanctions, and cybersecurity assistance. One of the most important issues right now is cooperation in the field of cybersecurity. Another issue the EU and Ukraine have made cooperation on is strategic communication. The entire information transfer process that allows detailed planning to achieve the long-term goals of the institution is called strategic communication. In the information dimension, which is the invisible face of the operation, attempts are made to provide misinformation through strategic communication. Disinformation is false and misleading information that is deliberately spread with the aim of disrupting public order, benefiting from a worsening economy, and misleading the public. Disinformation distorts the information environment and causes people to doubt their loyalty to the authorities.

In the second part of fourth chapter the EU's situational awareness and crisis respond efforts will be discussed. The EU has made several efforts including political and economic, military, etc. to respond to the crisis. On February 22, 2022, because of Russia's decision to send Russian troops to the Luhansk and Donetsk regions and considering these regions as autonomous, In the beginning of this crisis, on the same date, the EU imposed sanctions against Russia. These decisions included asset freezing, financing bans, and blocking entry to the European Union. According to this decision, it was decided to freeze the assets of more than 351 members of the Russian Parliament (Duma) who supported Russia's action. In addition, more than 27 individuals and organizations that endangered the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine and provided material or financial assistance to the Russian operation were also subject to sanctions. Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the EU has implemented 14 sanctions packages. Sanctions include embargoes on trade in the city of Crimea, Sevastopol, and Ukraine's opposition-controlled Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia oblasts; individual restrictions on a wide range of individuals and entities, such as asset freezes and travel restrictions; and diplomatic measures.

Finally, the reaction of the Union to the war will be evaluated within the framework of liberal intergovernmentalism theory in the evaluation section of fourth chapter. All findings will be evaluated in the conclusion section.

CHAPTER ONE

1. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this part of the study, the concept of hybrid war is discussed to ensure conceptual consistency. Then, information was given about the Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory, which forms the theoretical framework of the study.

1.1. Conceptual Framework

The phenomenon of war, throughout human history has been interpreted in different ways by the intellectuals of the period, such as thinkers, historians, soldiers. The focus of differences in interpretation is that the understanding of war of the period was influenced by the technological, political, economic, and military developments specific to that period. Türk Language Association (TDK) dictionary defines war as a fight between a state in which diplomatic connections have been cut off¹.

Sun Zi (Sun Tzu) is one of the greatest writers of antiquity. In his work "The Art of War," which influenced the military strategies of both Eastern and Western states, he emphasizes the importance of winning without fighting, claiming that war causes great destruction in the country. As for war, "War is the real problem of a country, the place of living and dying, the way of existence or extinction; it cannot be accounted for." he defines it as².

One of the thinkers who studied war and shed light on its period and its aftermath is Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz. He said in his book "The Art of War" which was first published in 1831 and has since been translated into many languages, "War is the continuation of politics by other means"³. In his book, he deals with the philosophical discussion of war in depth, stating that the battlefield is uncertain, and the political goals determined at the beginning may change during the war. Although Clausewitz likes war to be a chameleon that changes its nature a little more in each scenario, he sees war as an unexpected three-dimensional event that includes the nation,

¹Türk Dil Kurumu | Sözlük. (n. d.). Retrieved from <https://sozluk.gov.tr/>.

²Zi, Sun (2020). *Savaş Sanatı*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları p. 1.

³Clausewitz, Carl Von (2019). *Savaş Üzerine*. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları p. 46.

the commander, the army, and the political will. According to him, he defined it as the act of applying force to the opponent to impose our will⁴.

Political, economic, and scientific advancements were brought about by the two poles' pursuit of mutual superiority throughout the Second World War and the Cold War that followed. It is a reality that these advances also influence how war is fought and its tactics. The scientific literature describes modern warfare using many concepts within the scope of this shift. Some writers, however, contend that these concepts are meaningless and are just a matter of language⁵. When a literature review is examined, by using concepts like indirect approach, low-intensity warfare, asymmetric warfare, unconventional warfare, unrestricted warfare, compound warfare, and fourth-generation warfare, most wars that have taken place in the twenty-first century are described in a similar way⁶.

In this context, Boot and Doran describes today's peace time security environment as "political war "to achieve national objectives. According to them, political warfare is the employment of Clausewitz's views to peace time. To realize their aims, states conduct overt and covert operations, political alliances, psychological warfare to friendly, neutral and non-friendly local groups in the hostile country⁷.

Maxwell describes today's security environment by using the term 'unconventional warfare'. He defines unconventional warfare as actions that support resistance or an insurgency in an area to disrupt or remove a government or occupying force using guerrilla, auxiliary, and underground forces. He addresses that political warfare is a form of conflict resolution activities that is under the threshold of war.

⁴Clausewitz, Carl Von (2019). p. 49-50.

⁵Horn, Colonel Bernd (2016). *On Hybrid Warfare*. Ottawa: Ministry of National Defense p.1.

Gök, Ali (2019). *Hibrit Savaşlar: Rusya'nın Afganistan (1979) ve Ukrayna (2014) Askeri Müdahaleleri ile İsrail-Lübnan Savaşları (1982, 2006) Örnek Olayları Işığında Tarihsel-Mukayeseli Bir İnceleme* (Yayımlanmamış Doktora Tezi). Ankara: Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Terörizm Anabilim Dalı

⁶Horn, Colonel Bernd (2016). p. 1.

⁷Boot, Max., & Doran, Michael (2013). *Political Warfare*. New York Council on Foreign Relations p.1-4.

There should be a balance between unconventional warfare and political war in the conduct of operations⁸.

According to Perry, non-linear warfare elements have been used by Russia against Ukraine for carrying out operations in Crimea. He describes "non-linear warfare" encompassing political, economic, and unconventional warfare elements, but its success is contingent upon an information operations that is initially launched and then leveraged by special operations forces (SOF) once it reaches a predetermined destination⁹.

On the subject of 'new wars', two prominent researchers are Münkler¹⁰ and Kaldor¹¹. As mentioned in Münkler's "New Wars" and Kaldor's "New and Old Wars" books, it is emphasized that asymmetric warfare increased, and classical state wars decreased in the New Wars.

In their work titled "Unrestricted Warfare", Liang and Xiangsui state that, with the influence of technology and globalization, war can no longer be called war and has gained a new and uninterrupted dimension. They support their views by giving examples of whether a cyber-attack on a financial institution, economic interventions, and shaping international public opinion through the press and media constitute a state of war¹².

Another researcher who describes today's security environment is Kinross. In his article "Clausewitz and low-intensity conflict," he mentions that the global public came to believe that Clausewitz's "idea that war would be the continuation of politics" would become less relevant in a setting of low-intensity warfare after the conclusion of the Cold War. Contrary to common assumption, Clausewitz's theory is still relevant today because of his comprehension of the nature of war and how it relates to the political

⁸Maxwell, David (2014) *Taking a Spoon to a Gunfight: The West Dealing with Russian Unconventional and Political Warfare in Former Soviet States* Texas National Security. Review Retrieved from <https://warontherocks.com/2014/04/taking-a-spoon-to-a-gunfight/> .

⁹Perry, Bret (2015). *Non-Linear Warfare in Ukraine: The Critical Role of Information Operations and Special Operations*. Small Wars Journal. Retrieved from <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/non-linear-warfare-in-ukraine-the-critical-role-of-information-operations-and-special-opera> .

¹⁰Münkler, Herfried (2010). *Yeni Savaşlar - Die neuen Kriege*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları p.13.

¹¹Kaldor, Mary (2012). *New and Old Wars*. Cambridge: Polity Press p.1.

¹²Liang, Qiao., & Xiangsui, Wang (1999) *Unrestricted Warfare*. Beijing: LA Literature and Arts Publishing House, p.12.

system. For example, it is easy to situate the current War on Terror within Clausewitz's theory of war¹³.

Huber uses the "compound warfare" term to understand today's wars. According to him, compound warfare is the simultaneous use of an irregular or guerilla force and a regular or main force against an opponent. By utilizing conventional and unconventional forces, the commander has greater military advantage¹⁴.

In his thesis "The Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare," William J. Nemeth described Chechen civilization as a hybrid framework constructed based on clan and family relationships that exist between pre-modern and modern governments. Nemeth contended that this hybrid social structure gave rise to a hybrid style of warfare that combined aspects of irregular and regular combat in a highly adaptable and effective way. The Chechen insurgency created this environment, which could serve as a prototype for hybrid warfare¹⁵.

Frank Hoffman and James Mattis published a study in 2005 titled "The Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," which introduced the idea of hybrid warfare as it is currently understood¹⁶. Hoffman and Mattis claim that in the context of hybrid warfare, there has been a decrease in conventional warfare as well as an emergence of a hybrid form of warfare that combines regular and non-regular warfare¹⁷. They used a variety of methods to describe hybrid warfare, including irregular tactics and organization, indiscriminate violence and coercion, terrorist and criminal activities, and a variety of

¹³Kinross, Stuart (2004) *Clausewitz and Low-Intensity Conflict*. Journal of Strategic Studies p. 35-58.

¹⁴Huber, Thomas M. (2002) *Compound Warfare: A Conceptual Framework*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press p. 2.

¹⁵Nemeth, William. J. (2002, June). *Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare*. Master of Arts in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School. California: Naval Postgraduate School.

¹⁶Mattis, James. N.; Hoffman, Frank. (2005). *Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars Remember General Krulak's Three Block War? Are you ready for the Four Block War? You better be, says General James Mattis*. Retrieved from <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2005/november/future-warfare-rise-hybrid-wars>.

Käihkö, Ilmari. (2021). *The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare: Implications for Strategy and the Military Profession*. The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 51(3), p. 115-127.

¹⁷Hoffman, Frank. (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Virginia: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. p. 7.

conventional means and capabilities¹⁸. Researchers studying hybrid warfare, including Wijk¹⁹, Kofman and Rojansky²⁰, Mansoor²¹, Bowers²², and used “Hybrid warfare” term after Hoffmann and Mattis.

On the other hand, defining hybrid warfare is harder than it first appears, according to Jacobs and Lasconjarias. Because many authors use the topic of hybrid warfare without providing a precise conceptualization. Nowadays, the term is used to describe circumstances in which it is difficult to distinguish between military and civilian operations. It also refers to the use of a broad range of instruments, including the employment of military force, technology, criminality, terrorism, economic pressure, the exploitation of humanitarian and religious segregations, intelligence, sabotage, and disinformation²³.

A study conducted by NATO claims that unorthodox tactics have been employed in conflicts throughout history. This study adds another component to war: information. Because hybrid warfare is distinct due to its capacity to disseminate gained knowledge easily and globally through evolving technologies²⁴.

The definition based on hybrid threats was preferred by the European Commission. As per the Commission, the notion of hybrid threats is employed to depict behaviors that encompass a blend of conventional and non-traditional, military and non-military, overt and covert actions. These actions can be employed in concert by state or non-state actors to accomplish goals while staying below the bounds of officially declared war. Rival factions use terrorism, cyberattacks, disinformation, and propaganda

¹⁸Hoffman, Frank. (2007). p. 14.

¹⁹Wijk, Rob. De. (2012). Hybrid Conflict and the Changing Nature of Actors. Y. Boyer, & J. Lindley-French inside, *The Oxford Handbook of War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 358.

²⁰Kofman, Matthew., & Rojansky, Michael. (2015). *A Closer look at Russia's "Hybrid War"*. Kennan Cable, p. 2.

²¹Mansoor, Peter. R. (2012). Hybrid Warfare in History. Williamson. Murray, & P. R. Mansoor inside, *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present* (s. 1-17). New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 2.

²²Bowers, Cristopher. O. (2012). *Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries*. Parameters, p. 39.

²³Jacobs, Andreas., & Lasconjarias, Guillaume. (2015). *NATO's Hybrid Flanks Handling Unconventional Warfare in South and East*. Research Paper (No:112). Roma: Research Division- NATO Defense College.p.2.

²⁴NATO. (2016). *Social Media as A Tool of Hybrid Warfare*. Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.p.10.

campaigns to raise doubt and attack vital points. These actions give rise to impeding prompt and efficient decision-making. For example, cyberattacks on vital information systems may lead to the interruption of vital services like banking or energy, erode public confidence in government agencies, and take advantage of social security flaws. These are all possible objectives of hybrid threats²⁵.

In the scientific literature, the term "hybrid war" is the most frequently used. Though "hybrid war" is a common theme in Turkish literature, "mixed war" (Karma Savaş)²⁶ and "hybrid war" (Melez Savaş)²⁷ are also utilized.

In this research, the term "hybrid war" refers to the coordinated use of conventional and unconventional tactics, such as cyberattacks and acts of terrorism, on vital public and military information systems by state or non-state actors, including private military firms and/or terrorist groups. These players have specific objectives, like disrupting vital services such as public institutions, energy resources, and financial services. Additionally, it will be used to describe non-traditional, mixed-methods operations that fall short of formally declaring war but have the potential to damage public trust or take advantage of social security flaws²⁸.

1.1.1. Historical Background: Evolution of Hybrid Warfare

Examining the human history reveals that only 275 of those years were free from conflict, and even then, these eras did not flow seamlessly into one another. The way that war is conducted has evolved throughout history in response to new technological, political, social, economic, scientific advances. Every era has its own beliefs, forms of warfare, and political, economic, and social structures, according to Clausewitz. The nature of the conflict is equally impacted by these developments. Clausewitz thus

²⁵European Commission. (2016, April 6). FAQ: *Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats*. European Commission - *Fact Sheet*. Brussels: European Commission.p.1.

²⁶Erol, Mehmet. S., & Oğuz, Şafak. (2018). *Karma Savaş Teorisi ve Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı*. Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi, 18(2), 399-415.

Varlık, A. Bilgin. (2013). *Savaşı Tanımlamak: Terminolojik Bir Yaklaşım*. Avrasya Terim Dergisi, 1(2), p. 114-129.

²⁷Karaosmanoğlu, Ali. L. (2015). *Savunma Planlaması ve Stratejik Belirsizlik*. Bilge Strateji, 7(12), p. 23-45.

²⁸Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). *Gelişen Hibrit Savaş Ortamında NATO AB İş Birliği*. Karadeniz Araştırmaları. p.4.

compares war to a chameleon and emphasizes that each period's war will be distinct. Due to this effect wars will inevitably evolve, and that this is also necessary because of the nature of conflicts²⁹.

There are various theoretical assessments and categorizations in the scientific literature when the studies looking at the nature, evolution, and stages of conflict are taken into consideration³⁰. For instance, Martin van Creveld groups the stages of war as the Age of Tools, the Age of Machines, the Age of Systems, and the Age of Automation. In this classification, The Ages of Tools refers to the term before 1500 AD. In this term, simple tools were used as weapons. The tactics of the term depended on hand-to-hand combat. The Age of Machines refers to the term between 1500 and 1830. The development of gunpowder and artillery changes affects the tactics that are used beforehand. The Age of Systems refers to the term between 1830 and 1945. This term experienced facilitation of transportation and production capabilities due to industrialization. In accordance with gaining these capabilities, the concept of mobilization came forward. The Age of Automation refers to the term from 1945 to the present. This term describes gaining capabilities of electronics, the internet, and nuclear energy. These capabilities facilitated the employment of asymmetric tactics used in the war³¹.

Toffler discussed the stages of social development of the human as Agricultural Society, Industrial Society, Information Society³². In the first society, humans began learning about agriculture and utilized crops and settled as farmers. In the second society, humans learned about machinery and began to use it in production lines and transportation. This brought about migrations for working in factories in urban areas. In the third society, due to technological advances and internet technology services, information sharing can be disseminated easily.

²⁹Clausewitz, Carl Von (2019). *Savaş Üzerine*. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları p. 49.

³⁰Gürçan, Metin. (2012). Savaşın Evrimi ve Teorik Yaklaşımlar. A. Sandıklı içinde, *Teoriler Işığında Güvenlik, Savaş, Barış ve Çatışma Çözümleri*. Ankara: Bilgesam Yayınları. p.76.

³¹Creveld, Martin van. (1989). *Technology and War From 2000 BC to Present*. New York: Free Press.

³²Toffler, Alvin. (1993). *War and Anti-war: Survival at the dawn of the 21st Century*. Boston: Little Brown Company.

Liang and Xiangsui discussed the stages of war as limited medieval wars, limited empire and nation-state wars, and unlimited post-modern wars. In limited medieval wars, wars are constrained due to limited resources, and conflict areas are limited due to limitations. In the second stage, when nation states and empires flourished, dispute zones and conflict of interests grew as well. These states and empires needed to establish regular armies to secure their borders. In the third stage, due to developments in technology, war became unlimited, and borders crossed. Actors can engage their rivals by using economic, cyber, political, military, and legal means. Peacetime and wartime have become blurred³³.

The "Generations of War Approach," which was proposed by William S. Lind and colleagues in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, is another study that classifies wars. It divides the war into periods and proposes to examine the historical conflicts in accordance with these phases. According to Lind, modifications in technology and strategy also bring about modifications in warfare. As to Lind's Generations of Warfare model, the first phase comprises pre-nation state battles. The Classical Wars (1648–1830) defined the second phase of first-generation warfare. The Total Industrial Wars (1830–1908) defined the third phase of second-generation warfare. The Maneuver Wars (1918–1948) defined the fourth phase of third-generation warfare. The fifth phase of fourth-generation warfare (from 1948 till now) consists of network-centric warfare covering political, social, and military issues³⁴.

First-generation wars are defined as having a large infantry force moving in a linear formation, using cavalry, aiming for maximum firepower, and having relatively little access to advanced technologies. In these wars, the primary objective was destroying the adversary on the front lines³⁵.

Second-generation wars are those in which advances in technology and the industrial revolution have led to greater machine gun and artillery capabilities. The

³³Liang, Qiao., & Xiangsui, Wang (1999) *Unrestricted Warfare*. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House

³⁴Lind, William. S. (1989). "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation". Marine Corps Gazette. p.22-26.

³⁵Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.5.

expansion of opportunities for marine and rail transportation has led to a shift in forces. One example of this kind of war is the First World War³⁶.

To maintain peace following the devastation caused by the First World War, an atmosphere of international collaboration was being formed during third-generation wars period. But the persistence of interstate conflicts has sparked an arms race that has made preexisting issues even worse. The Second World War started because the post-First World War policies were ineffective. Amidst the Second World War, advancements in the domains of missiles, rockets, aircraft, and maritime warfare, coupled with the extensive deployment of tanks and the creation of nuclear weapons, took place. These developments became more evident on the front lines and resulted in modifications to the armed forces of several nations. These improvements were observed in the nations' war strategies and made it possible to create doctrines like "Lightning Warfare." According to this doctrine, by using armored units in coordination with air and naval forces, the conflicts were sought to conclude quickly. The approach of getting around and eliminating the defense has taken precedence over the strategy of getting close and destroying. Taking initiative in hard times has become more important. One example of a third-generation war is engagements in the Second World War³⁷.

Fourth-generation warfare, which can be an alternative or addition to states' growing conventional might, has gained prominence since the Second World War due to technological advancements. In this term, due to utilizing flexibility and being economical, asymmetric warfare components like cyberwarfare, guerilla warfare, and psychological warfare have become more prevalent. The lines between times of war and peace are blurred in the fourth generation of conflicts. The opposing nation's other capabilities are targeted in addition to its military might. Furthermore, non-state actors and smaller, more effective unions have supplemented larger unions. The media monitors wars, and since populated places can sometimes serve as battlegrounds, it can

³⁶ Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.5.

³⁷ Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.5.

be challenging to make segregation between soldiers and civilians. Furthermore, over-reliance on technology stands out as a drawback in the fourth-generation wars³⁸.

Multi-actors (military units, terrorist elements, foreign fighters, organized crime organizations, etc.) have replaced states as security actors in the post-World War II security environment. In this term, transportation facilities have been realized. Due to technological advancements and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the devastation risk caused by war increased. With the intention of achieving the desired goal in a less expensive and shorter amount of time, it has left a security environment where borders, fronts, and battlefields are unclear. Chinese Colonels Liang and Xiangshui assessed the war's economic aspect and concluded that if governments could accomplish their objectives with less expensive means rather than expensive conventional force, the war ought to be reevaluated³⁹. States thus turned their attention to less expensive techniques in the post-Cold War era rather than the potentially high costs of conventional warfare.

In "The Changing Agenda of Military Security," Barry Buzan highlights that a new form of securitization, which goes beyond traditional state-centered military security issues, emerged in the post-9/11 era. The definition of securitization in the new paradigm extends to non-state entities, encompassing both the civilian and non-civilian sectors of society. This enlarged area contains four distinct violence structures. State vs state, state versus non-civil society, state versus civil society, and civil versus non-civil society are the categories used to group the structures⁴⁰. This approach argues that traditional security measures need to be reevaluated because non-state actors have also become the sources of today's challenges.

Assessing the evolving security landscape in the aftermath of the Cold War, Creveld⁴¹ contended that the Clausewitzian paradigm of states' war capacity in relation to the army, society, and politics will be nearing its end. Due to increasing armament and nuclear capacity, low-intensity conflicts will be on the rise. Low-intensity conflict is becoming more common, and nations will eventually be replaced by various kinds of

³⁸Lind, William. (2004). *Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare*. Military Review. p. 13-14.

³⁹Liang, Qiao., & Xiangsui, Wang (1999). p. 6.

⁴⁰Buzan, Barry. (2008). *Askeri Güvenliğin Değişen Gündemi*. Uluslararası İlişkiler 5(18), p. 107-123.

⁴¹Creveld, Martin van. (1991). *The transformation of war*. New York: The Free Press. p. 216.

warring organizations. The groups that fight war in the future will probably be driven more by fanatical, ideological. These groups, who are currently referred to as terrorists, guerillas, bandits, and thieves, may eventually use more formal titles to identify themselves⁴².

Several scholars and authors have attempted to define today's conflicts by using terms like "Net Wars"⁴³, "New Generation Wars"⁴⁴, "Unlimited Post-modern War"⁴⁵, and "Hybrid War"⁴⁶. This is because military sources have differing conceptualizations of the terms used and the post-Cold War wars in which the United States and its allies participated⁴⁷. The states in question have had to devise new plans in response to the conventional and unconventional challenges that the US and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are facing. Hoffman first used it to explain the war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006⁴⁸. Others have utilized Hoffman's concept of "hybrid war" to describe the conflicts between Russia and Georgia (2008) and Russia and Ukraine (2013).

1.1.2. Changes Brought by Hybrid Warfare

Hoffman asserts that the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict was the most blatant instance of hybrid warfare⁴⁹. This conflict differed from the Arab States and Israel conflicts of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 in that it involved Israel as a state and Hezbollah as a non-state actor instead of an interstate conflict. Using a combination of conventional and unconventional warfare tools, Hezbollah was able to defeat Israel, which had superior military and technological capabilities, in the confrontation⁵⁰.

⁴²Creveld, Martin van. (1991). p.221.

⁴³Arquilla, John. (2005). *Netwar Revisited: The Fight for Future Continues*. In: R. Bunker(eds), *Network Terrorism and Global Insurgency*. New York: Routledge Group.

⁴⁴Kaldor, Mary. (2003). *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*. Cambridge Polity.

⁴⁵Liang, Qiao., & Xiangsui, Wang (1999). p.6.

⁴⁶Hoffman, Frank. (2006). *Lessons From Lebanon: Hezbollah and Hybrid Wars*.

⁴⁷McFate, Montgomery. J. (2006). *The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition*. R. R. Luman inside, *Unrestricted Warfare Symposium: Proceedings on Strategy, Analysis, and Technology*. Johns Hopkins(eds.).

⁴⁸Hoffman, Frank. (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Virginia: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

⁴⁹Hoffman, Frank. (2007). p.35.

⁵⁰Hoffman, Frank. (2007). p.17-34.

The lack of certainty among the combatants is the first alteration brought about by hybrid warfare. Non-state actors, such as foreign fighters, organized crime groups, and terrorist organizations, have entered conflicts even while states remain the primary players in the security environment⁵¹. The issue has become even more complex due to the actions of the actors, who defy both national and international norms. Kaldor claims that the goal of warring actors to create a war economy is one of the reasons they act against accepted norms. In a war zone, these players engage in a wide range of illicit actions, such as robbery, looting, and the seizure of land used for agriculture and oil⁵². The answer of military force alone is inadequate due to the complexity and dimensions of hybrid warfare, which involve political, military, legal, sociological, and psychological components. Instead, a comprehensive approach⁵³ utilizing soft, hard, and smart⁵⁴ power elements is needed to properly handle the issue.

The blurring of the distinction between war and peace is the second alteration brought about by hybrid warfare⁵⁵. The idea of "just war"⁵⁶, in which conflict is justified, is coming under scrutiny as the distinction between war and peacetime becomes less clear. Without a declaration of war, wars continue as low-intensity conflicts. As a result, although there have been more conflicts globally, the number of state-to-state

⁵¹Türkgenç, Yavuz., & Sayat, Haçeri. (2018). Komuta ve Kontrol. Ö. Y. İnaltekin Ertan inside, *Savaşın değişen modeli: Hibrit savaş* p. 64. İstanbul: Milli Savunma Üniversitesi.

⁵²Kaldor, Mary. (2013). *Defence of New Wars*. Stability. Cilt 2/1: 1-16 p. 3

⁵³Comprehensive Approach: It requires integrating military and civilian skills and knowledge into the planning and execution of tasks. In today's security environment, ensuring collaboration and coordination with state agencies, non-governmental organizations, and other public institutions is crucial, particularly during the crisis and operation management phases.

NATO. (2022a). *Comprehensive Approach* Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm .

⁵⁴For nations to accomplish their objectives, smart power is a strategy built on the integration of soft and hard power components.

Armitage, Richard. L., & Nye, Joseph. (2022). *CSIS COMMISSION On Smart Power: A Smarter More Secure America* Carnegie Endowment. <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/csissmartpowerreport.pdf> . p.7.

⁵⁵Gerasimov, Valery. (2013, 5 15). *The Value of Science in the Foresight* (2013). Military Review Retrieved from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/militaryreview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf . p.25.

⁵⁶Just War: It states that going to war must be the last option for it to be justified. It necessitates operating in line with the law of war, separating fighters from non-combatants, and declaring war before it begins. Aker, Fulya Aksu. (2019). *Haklı Savaş*. Güvenlik Portalı. Retrieved from https://trguvenlikportali.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/HakliSavas_FulyaAksuEreker_v.1.pdf . p.1.

conflict declined⁵⁷. Gerasimov claims that because international law is binding. Because of this, modern wars can be fought without the necessity for mobilization and concentration. States will continue to fight by assisting foreign forces and conducting clandestine operations⁵⁸.

The battlefield has changed, which is the third alteration brought about by hybrid warfare. In addition to the land, air, and sea domains where warfare occurs, space and cyberspace have been added with the advancement of communication technologies⁵⁹. Consequently, the development of electronic warfare, network-centric operations, cyber defense and attack capabilities, and information superiority against the adversary have all acquired significance⁶⁰. Cebrowki and Garstka claim that network-centric operations use information technology to handle command and control easily. This situation improves units' capacity to adjust to the commander's aims⁶¹. The First Gulf War is said to have been the first instance of this in the combat arena. The United States of America employed its network-centric skills to quickly win this conflict. States now must defend their rights and interests in cyberspace to keep the opponent from obtaining information dominance and limit its use of network-based capabilities⁶².

Protecting vital infrastructure components, including power plants, banking systems, healthcare, education, and electronic government applications, has grown crucial as internet technology permeates every aspect of society. While the internet has given states more power, it has also given non-state actors new tools to utilize, like the ability to organize more quickly, control large crowds, and attract new members for terrorist groups. Cyberattacks that target the designated infrastructures attempt to

⁵⁷Gürçan, Metin. (2012). *Savaşın Evrimi ve Teorik Yaklaşımlar*. A. Sandıklı inside, *Teoriler Işığında Güvenlik, Savaş, Barış ve Çatışma Çözümleri* Ankara: Bilgesam Yayınları. p. 69-129.

⁵⁸Gerasimov, Valery. (2013, 5 15). p.25.

⁵⁹Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.7.

⁶⁰Network-Centric Operation: This kind of operation links decision makers and implementers with communication networks to increase fighting power and capabilities.

Demirci, Cem. (2022). *Network Centric Warfare*. Naval Post. Retrieved from <https://navalpost.com/what-is-network-centric-warfare/>.

⁶¹Cebrowski, Arthur. K., & Garstka, John. H. (2022, 9 17). *Network-Centric Warfare - Its Origin and Future*. U.S. Naval Institute: Retrieved from <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1998/january/network-centric-warfare-its-origin-and-future>.

⁶²Türkgenç, Yavuz.; Sayat, Hanceri. (2018). p. 65.

destabilize the target societies⁶³. The movement of mass migration because of wars moving into residential areas was another development in the war environment.

The evolution of operation kinds and warfare tactics is the fourth alteration resulting from hybrid warfare⁶⁴. Sun Tzu asserts that although surprise maneuvers and fronts are the two main components of combat, there are an infinite number of ways to combine them⁶⁵. In addition to standard operation types (offensive, defense, withdrawal, etc.), the hybrid conflict environment necessitates the concurrent deployment of additional sorts of operations, such as peace support and humanitarian aid operations, and counterterrorism operations. Asymmetric warfare⁶⁶ tactics have gained prominence, including the use of nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological, and proxy wars⁶⁷, cyberwarfare, economic warfare, psychological warfare, and migrant movements⁶⁸. Today's actors use social media and other media aspects as instruments in the types of operations described above. The media creates a climate of dread and panic; migrant movements are hurt. Psychological warfare tactics are employed to assemble supporters and disseminate propaganda and fan groups' support is bolstered⁶⁹. Information, as General Patreus noted, is a critical component of the modern world. According to Patreus, to win over the public, the United States should prioritize psychological

⁶³Wheatly, Gary. F. (1996). *Information Warfare and Deterrence*. NDU Press Book, p. 6.

⁶⁴Türkgenç, Yavuz., & Sayat, Hanceri. (2018). p.65.

⁶⁵Zi, Sun. (2020). *Savaş Sanatı*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları. p. 20.

⁶⁶Asymmetric War: This kind of warfare seeks to maximize the enemy's losses while minimizing its own by taking advantage of the adversary's weak points. It necessitates employing (asymmetric) tools and strategies that the adversary lacks. Asymmetric warfare includes techniques including propaganda, kidnapping, guerrilla warfare, and terrorist attacks.

Sokullu, Ebru. Canan. (2019). *Savaş Türleri*. Güvenlik Portalı. Retrieved from https://trguvenlikportali.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/SavasTurleri_EbruCananSokullu_v.1.pdf . p.6.

⁶⁷Proxy Wars: It highlights the choice of fighting actors of states, especially global powers. Instead of employing their own armies to fight, these states use mercenaries, allies, passive nations, disjointed structures within the target nation, and partisan elements as an option.

Hoffman, Frank., & Orner, Andrew. (2021) *The Return of Great Power Proxy Wars*. Texas National Security Review. Retrieved from <https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/the-return-of-great-power-proxy-wars/> .

⁶⁸Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.8.

⁶⁹Eker, S. (2015). *Savaş Olgusunun Dönüşümü: Yeni Savaşlar ve Suriye Krizi Örneği*. Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi, Vol. 2, No. 1: 33-66 p. 60-61.

operations and mass media since employing conventional techniques in Iraq and Afghanistan proved to be unsuccessful⁷⁰.

States' perceptions of threat have changed in the context of hybrid warfare because of shifts in force, time, and space. Prioritizing the surveillance of potential state threats was the case prior to the hybrid conflict. Hoffman claims that non-state actors like terrorist groups and criminals are also utilized in the hybrid war environment. In addition to ongoing state threats, non-state threats become part of this environment⁷¹. Non-state actors can utilize asymmetric methods, which are non-military tactics that have consequences comparable to or greater than those of warfare, such as financial instruments, cyberattacks, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials, and deadly gases, beyond the bounds of international law. In this context, it becomes a priority to keep an eye on terrorist acts, border crossings and immigrant smuggling, international crimes, cyberpiracy, and the funding of these activities⁷².

Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov is one of the thinkers who highlights the fact that the nature of war has altered in the modern period. Gerasimov highlighted the significance of science in his piece "The Value of Science in Foresight," which focused on how the army should be ready for the changes in the contemporary warfare environment. He said in his paper that there is no longer a distinction between war and peace. He claimed that both troops and civilians might pursue political objectives in the modern era by using both military and non-military means. He highlighted the advancements in artificial intelligence technology, including robotic applications and UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), and asserted that their combined impact will outweigh that of conventional weaponry⁷³.

In his book "The Art of War," Sun Tzu asserted that the true mark of victory is achieved by nonviolent means⁷⁴. The goal of hybrid warfare is to prevail with little or no

⁷⁰Patreus, David. (2010). *What we Learned in Iraq*. Global Policy, Vol.1, No.1 p.116-117.

⁷¹Hoffman, Frank. (2014, 6 28). *On Not So New Warfare: Political Warfare Vs Hybrid Threats*. Texas Nation Security Review: Retrieved from <https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/> .

⁷²Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.8.

⁷³Gerasimov, Valery. (2013, 5 15). p.24.

⁷⁴Zi, Sun. (2020). *Savaş Sanatı*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları. p. 7.

casualties, or without engaging in combat. Complementary actions are carried out within the strategy to accomplish this goal. First, a variety of sensitivities are used to influence the target country, such as partisan minority components and technological reliance, as demonstrated in the Russia-Estonia crisis and the Russia-Ukraine Wars of 2014 and 2022. This approach is prolonged over time to establish an attrition strategy and to take advantage of the operational environment prior to initiating the conflict.

According to Tchekinov and Bogdanov, hybrid warfare consists of six stages. The first phase is the detection of the domain with intelligence and the creation of the infrastructure. At this stage, intelligence activities are used rather than military activities. These activities include obtaining information resources and using the obtained information as political, economic, and military infrastructure to achieve the desired goal⁷⁵.

The second phase is psychological operations, sabotage, and economic sanctions, and the third phase is public protests. The second and third phases include social action, economic restrictions, and psychological and sabotage actions. Although the main goal in traditional war is to break and destroy the enemy's will to fight, this goal falls behind the political goal in hybrid war. Hybrid warfare strategy thus prioritizes “human-centered” approaches alongside traditional enemy-centered operations to win the war. Although the chosen areas of influence are a military element in themselves, they also have a certain psychological effect. In the process, it can turn into a trigger for violence. Therefore, psychological operations are mainly carried out through cyber-attacks and propaganda, which can be carried out systematically and multidimensionally determined by intelligence, especially by destroying information infrastructures. By using this method, it is possible to weaken the enemy's morale and break his will to fight in the process⁷⁶.

The fourth phase includes irregular operations and terrorism activities. Non-conventional operations include a series of activities such as terrorism, sabotage, raids,

⁷⁵Tchekinov, Sergey., & Bogdanov, Sergey. (2013). *The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War*. Military Thought, p. 12-23.

⁷⁶Gök, Ali (2019). p. 95.

ambushes, etc., carried out by regular, non-regular groups or a combination of both, to break the political and military influence of the target country in the region⁷⁷.

The fifth phase is conventional operations. The main goal of this phase is to carry out operations to achieve the desired target in a short time and with minimal loss by using existing weapons. In this way, the enemy's determination to fight is eliminated. In hybrid warfare, not only regular troops are used, but paramilitary forces, terrorists, and organized crime organizations are also used simultaneously to support conventional operations⁷⁸. The sixth phase is the clearing of the last points of resistance. The remaining resistance points in the last phase of the conventional operation are cleared, and the operation is ended⁷⁹.

Over the past two decades, Russia has pursued a foreign strategy in the international arena that aims to dismantle American unipolarity, create a multipolar system, and secure international actors' acceptance of it⁸⁰. When examples of hybrid warfare are taken into consideration for this reason, Russia's cyberattacks during the Russia-Estonia crisis rendered Estonia's banking system unusable. Russia first used cyberattacks to disable its technology infrastructure to divide South Ossetia and Abkhazia during the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. Subsequently, he claimed that he dispatched his special forces to the area and articulated this operation to protect himself. He dispatched regular forces then. Rather than using land forces, Russia's engagement during the Syrian civil war was centered on the training of local forces, the use of

⁷⁷Headquarters Department of the Army. (2022). *FM 3-0 Operations*. Washington: The USA Army.p.252.

⁷⁸Gürçan, Metin. (2012). Savaşın Evrimi ve Teorik Yaklaşımlar. A. Sandıklı inside, *Teoriler Işığında Güvenlik, Savaş, Barış ve Çatışma Çözümleri* (p. 69-129). Ankara: Bilgesam Yayınları.p.100.

⁷⁹Gök, Ali (2019). p. 102.

⁸⁰Özdal, Habibe. (2021). *Putin Döneminde Rusya'nın Güvenlik Doktrinleri*. Güvenlik Portalı: https://trguvenlikportali.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/PutinRusyasiGuvenlikDoktrinleri_HabibeOzdal_v.1.pdf . p.7

paramilitary organizations⁸¹, and private military corporations. Its objective was to support these forces with air power and intelligence to accomplish national goals⁸².

Cyberattacks during Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea made Ukraine's technological and electrical infrastructure useless. Concurrently, pro-separatist attitudes were supported. A state of chaos made it possible for Russia to successfully annex Crimea.⁸³ In Crimea, annexation followed occupation and invasion. Relations between Russia and Ukraine persisted within the confines of a frozen conflict throughout the time following Russia's invasion of the Crimea and Donbas areas. In the second phase of the intervention, on February 24, 2022, the Russian army attacked the Ukrainian border with the intention of keeping Ukraine's neutral status and preventing NATO from establishing a new defense position on the Russian border⁸⁴. Russia refrained from declaring war on Ukraine in 2022. He said that from the start of the war, he had planned the operation for self-defense. First, special operations personnel were sent, and pro-local factions were encouraged. Later in the process, regular troops began to operate⁸⁵.

International players became more interested in the conflict because of the hybrid warfare methods and strategies employed. The Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory, which serves as the theoretical foundation for the thesis, will be covered in more detail in the following section of the study.

1.2. Theoretical Framework: Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal Intergovernmentalism is included in EU integration theories. While the theory places national governments at the basis of the decision-making mechanism, it

⁸¹Paramilitary Groups: They are occasionally government-established, trained, and organized auxiliary structures to regular armies that perform army functions.
Erkmen, Serhat. (2019). *Silahlı Güçler; Ordular, Para-Militer Yapılar, Özel Askeri Şirketler*. Güvenlik Portalı. https://trguvenlikportali.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/SilahlıGucler_SerhatErkmen_v.1.pdf . p.4.

⁸²Alexander Corbeil (2022, 5 15). *Russia is Learning About Hezbollah*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: <https://carnegieendowment.org/snada/67651> .

⁸³Bıçakçı, Salih. (2019,11). *Hibrit Savaş*. Retrieved from Güvenlik Portalı: https://trguvenlikportali.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/HibritSavas_SalihBicakci_v.1.pdf . p.5.

⁸⁴Kirby, Paul. (2023, 02 24). *Has Putin's war failed and what does Russia want from Ukraine?* Retrieved from BBC: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589> .

⁸⁵Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.9.

also highlights elements such as sub-state pressure groups that influence governments. In this context, in the following section, information will be given about the source of the theory, its assumptions, the principle of interdependence, association agreements, and their effect on the integration process.

1.2.1. Moravcsik and Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Andrew Moravcsik first expressed the concept of liberal intergovernmentalism in his article "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interest and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," published in 1991⁸⁶. In his article, he attaches special importance to the relationship of national institutions with sub-state pressure elements. In the mentioned relationship, it also attaches importance to the factors that determine the domestic policies of the states and the rapprochement and opposition of these actors in the political and economic context. Thus, on the one hand, domestic political developments are discussed in the decision-making process of governments, and on the other hand, it focuses on bargaining and negotiation issues in the reflection of domestic policy on foreign policy⁸⁷.

Moravcsik's article, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalism Approach" talked about the limitations of European integration. In the article, he talked about the shortcomings of the Neofunctionalism theory in explaining integration. He stated that there was a need for a grand theory that could explain integration. According to Moravcsik, Neofunctionalism is incomplete because it does not explain how different demands in domestic politics are handled by governments⁸⁸. Moravcsik proposed to evaluate the regime that developed during the integration process in the context of economic interdependence. According to him,

⁸⁶Moravcsik, Andrew. (1991). *Negotiating the Single European Act: national interest and conventional statecraft in the European Community*. International Organization, p. 20.

Cho.Dong-Woo.(2020). *Güney Kore-AB STA'sı: Liberal Hükümetlerarasıcı Bir Değerlendirme*. Ankara Üniversitesi. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. Avrupa Birliği ve Ekonomik İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı. p.22.

⁸⁷Moravcsik, Andrew. (1991). p 21.

⁸⁸Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993). *Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach*. Journal of Comon Market Studies, p. 474-477.

governments provide coordination in internal and external decision-making mechanisms. The action areas of governments are limited by internal and external dynamics⁸⁹.

To better define the theory, the concepts of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism need to be defined. By including domestic political influences, Liberal intergovernmentalism theory differs from classical intergovernmentalism. Thus, while the relationship between governments in Liberal Intergovernmentalism is revealed, a more comprehensive explanation is presented by including internal dynamics⁹⁰.

Nugent defined the supranationalism concept as "a situation in which states are forced to do things that are contrary to their own preferences because they have no power to prevent them. Therefore, states do not have absolute control over the areas they are said to own. " Therefore, supranationalism can be defined as countries losing their national sovereignty to a certain extent. In the supranational approach, the authority of the EU institutions, their will, and their power in the decision-making process emerge. This situation explains how EU institutions, decision-making, and policy-making function. In the intergovernmental approach, more emphasis is placed on governments authorized on behalf of the states. Thus, in the intergovernmental approach, power remained in the hands of the states, unlike in the supranational approach. In this case, supranational approaches give more importance to supranational institutions, and intergovernmental approaches give more importance to governments⁹¹.

In the liberal intergovernmentalism approach, internal pressure groups and national governments are given a higher role than the EU's institutions. Therefore, the main actors in the integration process, international agreements are national governments⁹².

According to Moravcsik, intergovernmentalism takes precedence over supranationalism, and government-level negotiations are vital in the European

⁸⁹Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993). p. 474.

⁹⁰Öraz, Seçil. (2011). *Andrew Moravcsik ve Liberal Hükümetlerarası Sistem ile Avrupa Bütünleşmesi*. Journal of Turkish Studies, s. 1683.

⁹¹Nugent, Neill. (2017). *The Government and Politics of the European Union*. Durham: Palgrave.p.558.

⁹²Branch, Ann. P., & Ohrgaard, Jakob. C. (1999). *"Trapped in The Supranational-Intergovernmental Dichotomy: A Response to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz*. Journal of European Public Policy, p. 25.

integration and the EU reform processes. At this level, which he describes as “intergovernmental institutionalism,” national governments negotiate in line with self-interest, and reform occurs at the intersection of these negotiations. Moravcsik describes these intersections with the “lowest common denominator.” Integration takes place with the development of reforms⁹³.

1.2.2 Foundations of Liberalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Another dimension of Moravcsik's theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is that it is liberal. Moravcsik depends on the assumptions of liberalism such as the formation of national preferences, the influence of social pressure groups on government decision-making, and interstate relations. This situation distinguishes the Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory from classical intergovernmentalism.

Moravcsik's three basic assumptions of liberalism can be expressed as follows:

a) In liberalism, non-governmental organizations and individuals are involved in decision-making processes. These are actors who can act in their own interests.

b) In liberalism, it is assumed that if equal conditions exist, compromise will be chosen instead of conflict.

c) Although the interest groups represented by governments have the power to influence the foreign policy preferences of the government, increasing development and re-establishing equality can be put into effect to prevent domestic problems⁹⁴.

Moravcsik bases his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism on three main elements. In the first stage, state behavior is discussed from a rational perspective. In the second stage, the formation of national preferences is discussed from a liberal

⁹³Moravcsik, Andrew. (1991). p.25.

⁹⁴Moravcsik, Andrew. (1992). *Liberalism and International Relations Theory*. Harvard University Center for European Studies, p.10.
Cho.Dong-Woo.(2020). p.36.

perspective. In the third stage, negotiations between countries were based on an intergovernmental perspective⁹⁵.

The assumption of rational state behavior is the first of the three basic assumptions of liberal intergovernmental theory. Thus, in the first stage, national interests are determined by sub-state actors in domestic politics. In the second stage, countries exhibit rational behavior in foreign policy according to the requirements of their own interests⁹⁶.

The second element of the liberal theory of intergovernmentalism is the liberal theory regarding the formation of national preferences. Liberal theory addresses the relationship between the state and society in the formation of national preferences and assumes that sub-state groups engage in domestic politics and contribute to the formation of national interests. The fact that national preferences can be variable means that states can choose different policies in international politics. This situation reveals that in interstate relations, changing cooperation may occur within the scope of previously made agreements and negotiation processes⁹⁷.

The third key element of liberal intergovernmental theory is the study of interstate negotiations. The outcome of negotiations between countries is determined by the "bargaining power" of the parties. The party with higher bargaining power makes fewer concessions than the other party. International organizations have a balancing role at this stage. Governments are the most important components that make negotiation possible⁹⁸.

In the liberal intergovernmentalism theory, the main actors are governments. Governments act with economic motivation and a tendency towards cooperation. The basis of cooperation is mutual negotiation. According to Moravcsik, one of the strategies of interstate negotiation is to create a larger partnership by agreeing on the lowest common denominator. Another factor affecting the negotiation process is

⁹⁵Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993). p. 480.

⁹⁶Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993) p.481-482.

⁹⁷Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993). p.483.

⁹⁸Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993). p.497.

interdependence. The difference between interdependence and dependence is that both parties cannot control each other. The decisions have a certain cost for both parties⁹⁹. According to Keohane and Nye, there was an increase in cross-border incidents after the Second World War. This situation has also triggered an increase in the interdependence of states¹⁰⁰.

In Moravcsik's theory, the economy is considered an important issue that can initiate people's preferences and partnerships. While discussing the issue of integration, Moravcsik particularly emphasized political economy. In this case, he stated that international political economy has two purposes. These include mutual market liberalization and ensuring political harmony¹⁰¹.

Economic mutual dependence is obtained through the mutual liberalization of markets. When the restrictions are removed, productivity increases with the increase in foreign investors and new labor competition. In addition, the mutual harmony of policies between states is arranged in a multi-faceted and common way. With the introduction of two purposes, multi-faceted cooperation and integration are accelerated¹⁰². According to Moravcsik, problems may arise from the principle of mutual economic dependence. Although it is assumed that states will act rationally, they may experience conflict in their interests and cooperation. Therefore, cooperation between governments should be established to bring conflicting interests to an end. At the end of mutual dependence, their nations are directed towards compromise and cooperation¹⁰³.

Moravcsik states that the basis of European integration is nation-states and their relative interests. In his theory of the liberal intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik linked the cohesion of the European Community with minor common denominator negotiations, the national preferences of sub-state groups, and intergovernmental negotiations. Governments can compromise with each other on the lowest common denominator, or

⁹⁹Gürkaynak, M., & Yalçiner, S. (2009). *Uluslararası Politikada Karşılıklı Bağımlılık ve Küreselleşme Üzerine Bir İnceleme*. Uluslararası İlişkiler, s. 75.

¹⁰⁰Keohane, Robert. O.; Nye, Joseph. S. (2012). *Power and Interdependence*. Boston: Longman.p.7.

¹⁰¹Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993). p. 480.

¹⁰²Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993) p.486.

¹⁰³Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993) p.487.

they can benefit from more important issues by making some concessions. Thus, during the negotiation phase, governments carry out the negotiation by making mutual concessions and requests¹⁰⁴.

According to Moravcsik, interdependence and integration are interconnected¹⁰⁵. National choices are formed by opportunities and constraints arising from economic interdependence. In the intergovernmental negotiation phase, there is an opportunity to put more pressure on the more dependent side from less dependent side. Thus, less dependent side has a more advantageous position¹⁰⁶.

In his Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory, Moravcsik talks about interdependence not only in the economic sphere but also in the political sphere. Considering state preferences, states must evaluate each other's preferences when making their choices. Considering other states' choices makes interdependence a phenomenon that affects the entire international system¹⁰⁷.

Another issue that liberal intergovernmental theory addresses together with interdependence is states' association agreements.

1.2.3. Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Association Agreements

The liberal intergovernmentalism theory can be used to explain negotiations within the EU and the preference formation processes of national governments and association agreements. It positions national governments at the center. The liberal intergovernmentalism theory helps to understand the integration that is based on association agreements and the foreign policy of these states. States retain their sovereignty, but they can transfer it at their own will. If an international organization is authorized, it may have the authority to limit state sovereignty. Thus, international organizations influence bargaining in international agreements. According to Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory, one of the factors affecting agreements is the threat of

¹⁰⁴Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993) p.500-502.

¹⁰⁵Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993) p.476.

¹⁰⁶Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993) p.500.

¹⁰⁷Moravcsik, Andrew. (1997). *Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics*. International Organization, p. 523.

withdrawal from the agreement¹⁰⁸. The threat of conflict is when one or more parties fail to come up with a better alternative¹⁰⁹. If agreement is not reached, the profits that can be achieved are lost¹¹⁰.

Moravcsik states that at the end of the agreement process, integration occurs because of the voluntariness of the states. For example, the European Union did not integrate because of military sanctions, economic sanctions, etc. Volunteering occurs within the framework of certain interests and international conditions. According to Moravcsik, this situation highlights the role of governments in decision-making mechanisms¹¹¹.

Apart from the voluntary element, social processes that affect the will of governments also takes place within the scope of the liberal intergovernmentalism theory. From the perspective of the liberal intergovernmentalism, the use of the national preference formation process and, the struggles between the dominant social groups within the country and their reconciliation constitute the source of the authority given to the government for integration¹¹².

Liberal intergovernmentalism theory includes the voluntary element and social processes that influence the will of governments. In this respect, in the process of national preference, the struggles and compromises of the dominant social groups in the country are the source of the governments' decision-making processes, intergovernmental negotiations, and the integration process. In this respect, the liberal intergovernmentalism theory will form the theoretical basis of thesis, as it offers a model that examines intergovernmental agreements and how governments make decisions and negotiate in these agreements. As a supranational organization, the policies of the EU during the Russia Ukraine war, will be examined within the scope of the liberal intergovernmentalism theory.

¹⁰⁸Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993). p.499.

¹⁰⁹Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993). p.498.

¹¹⁰ Cho.Dong-Woo.(2020). p.56-57-58.

¹¹¹Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993). p.498.

¹¹²Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993). p.498.

CHAPTER TWO

2. RUSSIA UKRAINE WAR

In this part of the study, information will be given about the Russia-Ukraine War. First, to better evaluate the historical background of the war, the development of Russia-Ukraine relations after the collapse of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) will be examined. Then, the reasons that led Russia and Ukraine to war will be examined from military, social, economic, and political perspectives. Another issue that will be discussed in this section is the examination of the Russia-Ukraine War from the perspective of hybrid warfare. In this context, intelligence activities will be discussed in the first phase of the war, psychological operations activities in the second phase, unconventional operational activities in the third phase, and conventional operational activities in the fourth phase.

2.1. Recent History of Russia-Ukraine Relations

From the past to the present, Ukraine has been seen as an area in the middle of a power struggle by the great powers of Europe. Considering its geopolitical location, European powers started a struggle for influence and wanted to have a say in Ukraine, which is located between the European continent and the Asian continent. In his Heartland theory, Mackinder defined the region in which Ukraine is located as the heart of the world. According to this theory, the state that dominates Eastern European geography, defined as the heart of the world, would gradually dominate the world¹¹³. When evaluated from this perspective, the country's territory forms the border between Asia on one side and the European continent on the other. The word "Ukraine" means "border country" or "edge country"¹¹⁴.

Ukraine's independence was perceived as a temporary loss by Russia¹¹⁵. Because of its geography, it means to have a dominant position over the Black Sea for Russia, which wants to reach the warm seas. Russian tsars called Ukrainians "little Russians"

¹¹³Özey, Ramazan. (2017). *Mackinder'in Heartland Teorisi'nin Düşündürdükleri*. Marmara Coğrafya Dergisi, p.96.

¹¹⁴Bilener, Tolga. (2007). *Ukrayna Dış Politikasını Belirleyen Unsurlar*. Karadeniz Araştırmaları. p.116.

¹¹⁵Torbakov, İgor. (2001). *Rusya'dan Ayır ya da Rusya'nın Bir Parçası Olarak: Ukrayna-Rusya İlişkilerinin Kederli Bir Destanı*. Avrasya Dosyası, p.300.

because they were linguistically and culturally close to them¹¹⁶. According to Russia, Ukraine should be watched over and protected as its little brother¹¹⁷. Ukraine, which was politically, socially, and economically integrated with the Soviet Union, of which it remained a part for nearly 70 years. Ukraine did not engage in a national identity effort until 1989 and relied on the sovereignty of the USSR. With the dissolution of the USSR, pro-independence formations emerged in Ukraine, as in other Union countries. Ukraine gained its independence with the referendum held on December 1, 1991. Even though Ukraine gained independence, it could not develop its understanding of national identity. The lack of free market economic experience and the lack of established institutions, as well as the Russian-speaking communities in the country, especially in the east, caused separation and preference between the West and the East. During this period, Ukraine showed an inclination towards Russia's effort to regain influence under the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For the reasons stated above, Ukraine became a member of the Union¹¹⁸. However, in the following period, Ukraine preferred to follow the policy of transitioning to an EU-oriented market economy rather than the CIS integration policies led by Russia.

In the period from 1991, when it gained independence, to 2002, turmoil occurred in Ukrainian political life. In foreign policy, EU and Russia-centered diplomatic initiatives had been made, but sufficient success had not been achieved in foreign policy. In that period there had been East-West-oriented tides. Although some reforms were tried to be made in the administrative and economic fields, these did not reach the level that would bring prosperity to the people. This period extended to the corruption allegations of Ukrainian President Kuchma, who was previously known to be pro-Russian but later pursued a policy of balance among EU policies. The mentioned incident left its mark on Ukrainian political life as the "Kuchmagate" scandal¹¹⁹.

¹¹⁶Kubicek, Paul. (2008). *History of Ukraine*. London: Greenwood Publishing Group.p.54.

¹¹⁷Soydan, Emrah. (2019). *2014 Ukrayna Krizi Sonrası Ukrayna-Rusya İlişkileri*. Aydın Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı. p.56-57.

¹¹⁸ Yıldırım, Yusuf. (2010). *Rusya Dış Politikasında Ukrayna Faktörü*. Isparta: Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı.p.73.

¹¹⁹ Bingöl, Oktay. (2014). *Ukrayna Krizinin Ulusal, Bölgesel, Küresel Bağlamı ve Gelecek Öngörülleri*. Karadeniz Araştırmaları, p.19.

Between 1991 and 1999, Russia experienced a politically and economically turbulent period and had difficulty controlling the post-Soviet area and its near abroad. During this period, while Russia was trying to keep the states that were left from the USSR under control, the efforts were ineffective because the USSR hosted hundreds of ethnic groups and people. As a result of these factors, Russia has given priority to the near abroad in its foreign policy. The main reason for this was Russia's economic, political, social, and military power capacities. In that period, Russia found it more feasible to keep its internal dynamics and near abroad together rather than becoming a global player.¹²⁰.

The instabilities have created suitable opportunities for the rapid filling of the former Eastern Bloc countries in Europe and the Russian near abroad, especially the Black Sea basin, by the USA and the EU. The USA and the EU have taken steps to remove the former USSR republics from Russia's sphere of influence and include them in NATO and EU security mechanisms. By including Ukraine in the EU and NATO security mechanisms, it was aimed at keeping Russia, the successor state of the USSR, under control. Because the distance between Moscow and Ukraine is 480 km, a section of land with wide plains was relatively easy to capture. This situation caused Russia to react¹²¹.

When the problem areas that emerged between Russia and Ukraine after the Cold War are evaluated,

- Nuclear weapons
- Sharing of the Black Sea Fleet
- Status of Crimea
- The legal status of Russian citizens has come to the fore.

Ukraine, along with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, was among the four countries where nuclear weapons were deployed during the USSR period. With the

¹²⁰Yılmaz, Sait. (2007). *Karadeniz'de Değişen Dengeler ve Türkiye*. Karadeniz Araştırmaları, p.48.

¹²¹Sönmez, A. Sait. Bıçakçı, Harun. ; Yıldırım, Cuma. (2015). *Kırım sorunu bağlamında Rusya-Ukrayna ilişkilerinin analizi*. International Journal of Social Sciences and Education Research, p.665.

Chernobyl nuclear disaster that took place in the country in 1986, a negative trend towards nuclear weapons and facilities began. For this reason, the request from the Russian Federation (RF) to collect nuclear weapons within itself was not rejected but was welcomed positively. The fact that the United States of America (USA) does not want nuclear weapons to spread to different states was also effective in taking this attitude. Thus, the USA supported Russia. With the Minsk agreement in 1991, the USSR countries agreed to transfer nuclear weapons to the RF. Although an agreement was initially reached between Ukraine and Russia on transferring uranium, a disagreement arose due to economic reasons after Russia sold uranium to Western states, and the agreement was suspended. As a result of Ukraine becoming a party to the START 1 treaty in 1992 and the US's diplomatic initiatives to reduce nuclear weapons, Russia agreed to pay compensation to Ukraine and send some uranium to be used in electricity production. Thus, the Ukrainian Parliament approved the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1994. The transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia was completed in 1996¹²².

In 1996, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin met and tried to reach an agreement on the sharing of the Black Sea Fleet, which had been negotiating since the collapse of the USSR. Although the Russian Parliament initially did not accept the sharing of the 600-piece Black Sea Fleet, it was later resolved with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed between the two countries in 1997 and the agreements on sharing the Black Sea Fleet. In addition, Russia was allowed to use the Sevastopol Port in exchange for discount in providing natural gas. Thus, the port of Sevastopol came under Russian control¹²³. With the mentioned agreement, Russia accepted that Sevastopol and Crimea remained under Ukrainian sovereignty¹²⁴.

Another problem that arose between Ukraine and Russia with the dissolution of the USSR was the legal status of the 25 million citizens of Russian origin who remained

¹²²Bilener, Tolga. (2007). p.120-121.

¹²³Soydan, Emrah. (2019). p.40.

¹²⁴Büyükkakıncı, Erhan. (2004). *Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Ukrayna Rusya İlişkileri*. Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi. p.12.

in Ukraine. The population of Russian origin manifests itself in the Crimea region, with Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa, and especially Donetsk and Luhansk cities in the east of the country constituting 22% of the country's population. This situation has made Ukraine a country where local governments dominate, Russian is accepted as the second official language, and the people living here feel close to Russia. With its near-abroad policy, Russia tried to influence the Russian ethnic elements in the region with soft power elements and did not allow the people here to break away from Russia¹²⁵.

Russia's approach to its near abroad actually began to change with the Putin era, starting in 2000. It has begun to be evaluated that Putin will make Russia a great power again, regain its lost prestige, and gain control over its near abroad. In this context, as stated in the Russian National Security Concept, priority is given to protecting Russians living abroad, playing a more active role in the United Nations (UN), and developing the ties with the CIS¹²⁶.

The presidential elections held in Ukraine in 2004 witnessed allegations of irregularities. The election was declared a victory by Yanukovich; the candidate supported by former Ukrainian President Kuchma. While Russia was satisfied with the result, the Western community announced that it would not recognize the election because it was irregular. For this reason, intense protests began to be organized in the country. As a result of the protesters wearing orange clothes, this movement began to be called the "Orange Revolution". Although the issue discussed during the Orange Revolution seemed to be a simple election, what was discussed within the country was the country's choice of East or West. Thus, in the elections held, not only the president of the country was elected but also the side to choose from. In the following period, the Constitutional Court requested the elections be renewed again, and the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko, who aimed to pursue a policy independent from Russia, won the new election. A coalition government was formed under the leadership of Timoschenko, who was known to be pro-Western.

¹²⁵Büyükakıncı, Erhan. (2004). p.13-14.

¹²⁶Özdal, Habibe. (2021). p.2.

During this period, the steps taken in the economic field and the inadequacy of issues such as the fight against corruption have been the subject of criticism. The office of Prime Minister changed hands between Prime Minister Timoschenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych in 2006. As the tension between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych increased, the parliament was dissolved, early elections were decided, and Timoschenko came to power again as Prime Minister in 2007¹²⁷.

Considering the period between 2007 and 2010, people's expectations could not be met in Ukraine, and economic and social unrest continued. Viktor Yanukovych won the subsequent 2010 presidential election. Yanukovych's coming to power did not eliminate the unrest, and it continued to increase until 2013. At the end of 2013, the unrest in the country reached its peak when President Yanukovych did not sign the Association Agreement that would ensure integration with the EU and announced that he would be a party to the Customs Union with Russia. Pro-Western Ukrainians started to take to the streets and protest the government. This event went down in Ukrainian history as the "Euro Maidan" events. As a result of the protests on February 22, 2013, President Yanukovich left Ukraine and went to Russia¹²⁸.

The Euromaidan events were perceived as a blow to the government by the Russian minority in Crimea and the east of the country. Protests took place in Crimea and in cities where Russian minorities live, such as Kharkiv, Odessa, Donetsk, and Luhansk. After Ukraine's Euromaidan events and Yanukovych's departure from the country, Russia invaded and occupied Crimea and supported pro-Russian separatists. A referendum was held in Crimea on March 16, 2014. In the referendum held, it was stated that 96% of the people were in favor of independence and joining Russia. While annexing Crimea, it did not declare war. Russia declared from the beginning that there had been no military presence in the region. According to RF, the Russian minority was protecting itself, and those occupying public buildings were local defense forces, not

¹²⁷Sönmez, A. Sait., Bıçakçı, Harun. & Yıldırım, Cuma. (2015). p.662.

¹²⁸Soydan, Emrah. (2019). p.56-57.

Russian soldiers¹²⁹. On March 18, 2014, Putin declared that Crimea had been taken back. During the annexation of Crimea, Russia's use of low-intensity actions did not amount to war. Its simultaneous use of political, economic, and military elements suggested that Russia was following a "hybrid war" strategy. The reaction to Russia's attitude was immediate from the United Nations General Assembly. On March 27, 2014, this situation was expressed as a violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity. The EU and the USA also stated that they would impose sanctions against Russia's decision¹³⁰.

A short time later, the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, dominated by the Russian minority in the east of Ukraine, declared their independence and were named Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic. This situation has led to increased conflicts within the country¹³¹. The ongoing conflicts in the Donbas region in 2014 were seen as a problem that needed to be solved between the two countries. As a result of the Minsk 1 meeting between Ukraine and Russia, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), the Luhansk People's Republic, and the Donetsk People's Republic, the Minsk protocol was signed, and an agreement was reached on an immediate ceasefire. Minsk 2 meetings were held with the participation of the heads of state of Belarus, France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia. Although the second protocol was signed at the end of the negotiations, these negotiations did not contribute to peace to the desired extent¹³².

In 2018, despite Ukraine's objections, the bridge connecting Russian territory to Crimea via the Kerch Strait was opened by Vladimir Putin. This situation was met with reactions from Ukraine, the EU, and the USA. The bridge, which is 19 km long, is of strategic importance for Russia to support its troops in Crimea logistically. In 2022, the

¹²⁹Chappell, Bill., & Memmott, Mark. (2023, 2 8). *Putin Says Those Aren't Russian Forces in Crimea*. Retrieved from NPR International: <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/03/04/285653335/putin-says-those-arent-russian-forces-in-crimea> .

¹³⁰Soydan, Emrah. (2019). p.60.

¹³¹Sarı, Gözde. (2015). *AB yolunda Ukrayna: Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası ve AB-Ukrayna İlişkileri*. Ankara: Atılım Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü.p.103.

¹³²BBC News Türkçe. (2023a, 2 8). *Minsk Anlaşması nedir, neleri kapsıyor ve tarafları kimler?* Retrieved from BBC: <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-60488784> .

bridge was attacked, and because of the attack, the bridge was damaged and three people died. Russia held the Ukrainian side responsible for the attack¹³³.

Vladimir Zelensky won the presidential elections in Ukraine on April 22, 2019. While evaluating the election results, Russian Prime Minister Medvedev emphasized the importance of revitalizing economic relations between the two countries and stated that this situation would contribute to the improvement of the social structure in Ukraine¹³⁴. On April 24, 2019, Russia announced that Russians living in the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics will be given Russian passports if they request them. Ukraine, the EU, and the USA stated that this situation meant interference in Ukraine's internal affairs and reacted accordingly¹³⁵.

On June 5, 2019, Ukrainian President Zelensky emphasized in Brussels that Ukraine's goals did not change and that they wanted to become full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. However, he stated that they were open to negotiations with Russia¹³⁶. On October 1, 2019, it was announced that the "Steinmeier Formula¹³⁷" would be applied in the period following the withdrawal of troops on both sides to end the ongoing conflicts within the country. It was announced

¹³³Anadolu Ajansı. (2023a, 2 8). *Patlamayla sarsılan Kırım ilhakının sembolü: Kerç Köprüsü*. Retrieved from Anadolu Ajansı: <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/patlamayla-sarsilan-kirim-ilhakinin-sembolu-kerce-koprusu/2706524>.

¹³⁴Euronews. (2023b, 2 8). *Rusya'dan Ukrayna'da seçimi kazanan Zelensky yönetimine sağduyu çağrısı*. Retrieved from Euronews: <https://tr.euronews.com/2019/04/22/rusya-dan-ukrayna-da-secimi-kazanan-zelenskiy-yonetimine-sagduyu-cagrisi>.

¹³⁵Euronews. (2023a, 2 8). *Rusya Ukrayna'yı ilhak edebilir mi? Doğu Ukrayna'da Rus pasaportu dağıtma kararı ne anlama geliyor?* Retrieved from Euronews: <https://tr.euronews.com/2019/04/28/rusya-ukrayna-ilhak-edebilir-mi-dogu-ukrayna-rus-pasaportu-dagitma-ne-anlama-geliyor-kirim>.

¹³⁶Euronews. (2019, 2 8). *Ukrayna Devlet Başkanı Brüksel'de konuştu: Hedefimiz AB ve NATO'ya tam üyelik*. Retrieved from Euronews: <https://tr.euronews.com/2019/06/04/ukrayna-devlet-baskani-bruksel-de-konustu-hedefimiz-ab-ve-nato-ya-tam-uyelik>.

¹³⁷Steinmeier formula: The specified plan was named after the German Foreign Minister of the time, Frank Walter Steinmeier. It was put forward due to the difficulties experienced in the implementation of the Minsk 2 protocol. According to the formula, elections in Ukraine would be renewed under OSCE supervision. If the OSCE determined that the elections were free and fair, they would be implemented. In this context, if Donetsk and Luhansk regions decided to remain under Ukrainian administration, they would remain autonomous regions of Ukraine.

Judas, Everett. (2020). *The 'Steinmeier Formula': A Path to Peace?* Carsten Sander, Christensen inside Analyzing Political Tensions Between Ukraine, Russia, and the EU. p.306.

that autonomy could be granted to the Donbas region after elections were held; however, protests continued¹³⁸.

Ukraine's rapprochement with the EU and especially NATO has disturbed the Russian side. Russia requested a legal commitment from western states that Ukraine would not be included in the NATO missile defense system and not to become a member of these organizations. After its request remained unanswered, it started to build up military forces on the Ukrainian border as of 2021. On February 21, 2022, the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republics were officially recognized by Russia¹³⁹. Meanwhile, Russia said that they had no intention of carrying out a military operation in Ukraine and that the troops stationed on the Ukrainian border were only for exercise purposes¹⁴⁰.

On February 24, 2022, Putin stated that a special military operation was organized against Ukraine. He declared that the military operation was aimed at protecting the people of the region and clearing the area of Neo-Nazis¹⁴¹. This situation was met with reactions in the international environment. Sanctions decisions were taken against Russia by the EU and the USA. With the start of the military operation, the refugee problem arose, and migration from Ukraine to Europe, especially Poland and Moldova, began¹⁴².

As a result of the referendum held on September 23, 2022, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia decided to join the Russian Federation. While the legitimacy of the referendums was questioned, their decision to join Russia was not recognized internationally, and the dominant view was that Ukraine's territorial integrity should be

¹³⁸Miller, Christopher. (2023, 2 8). *What Is the Steinmeier Formula -- And Did Zelenskiy Just Capitulate to Moscow?* Retrieved from Rferl: <https://www.rferl.org/a/what-is-the-steinmeier-formula-and-did-zelenskiy-just-capitulate-to-moscow-/30195593.html>.

¹³⁹Euronews. (2023c, 2 8). *Rusya'nın Ukrayna'daki ayrılıkçı bölgeleri tanıması ne anlama geliyor?* Retrieved from Euronews: <https://tr.euronews.com/2022/02/21/rusya-n-n-ukrayna-daki-ayr-l-kc-bolgeleri-tan-mas-ne-anlama-geliyor>.

¹⁴⁰BBC News Türkçe. (2023d, 2 8). *Ukrayna gerilimi: Rusya ve Belarus, ortak askeri tatbikatlara başladı.* Retrieved from BBC: <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-60329865>.

¹⁴¹Putin, Vladimir. (2023, 2 8). *Rusya Federasyonu Başkanı'ndan Mesaj (24 Şubat 2022)*. Retrieved from <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843>.

¹⁴²UNHCR. (2023, 2 9). *Ukraine Refugee Situation*. Retrieved from UNHCR: <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

protected. On September 30, 2023, Putin approved the decisions of four regions to join the Russian Federation¹⁴³. In the ongoing process, Ukraine has managed to take back important cities, such as those under Russian occupation. According to January 2023 data, because of the war, 18,817¹⁴⁴ civilian casualties occurred, 7,155 of whom were dead, and more than 12,870,000 people migrated¹⁴⁵.

2.2. Reasons: Road to Russia-Ukraine War

When we look at the reasons for the war, the demographic structure of Ukraine, the fact that the people of the region have lived under the rule of the USSR for a long time, Russia's influence on the Russian-speaking population, Russia's relations with the EU, the USA, NATO's and the EU's expansion towards Russia's near abroad stand out as important factors on the road to war in Ukraine. These reasons will be examined below, which is grouped as political, social, military, and economic reasons.

2.2.1. Social Reasons

Since the 1900s, with the increase in the opportunities of international diplomacy, communication, diasporas¹⁴⁶ have begun to play an active role in international politics. Diasporas can shape the domestic and foreign policies of countries in their homelands or in the countries where they are located. It is estimated that there are 30 million Russian diasporas in the world, most of them in the countries of the former USSR¹⁴⁷.

After the collapse of the USSR, the RF, which oscillated between east and west, began to see the former Soviet geography as its sphere of influence within the scope of

¹⁴³Anadolu Ajansı (2023b, 2 9). *Putin, Ukrayna'nın Donetsk, Luhansk, Herson ve Zaporijya bölgelerinin Rusya'ya bağlanmasına yönelik anlaşmaları imzaladı*. Retrieved from Anadolu Ajansı: <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/putin-ukrayna-nin-donetsk-luhansk-herson-ve-zaporijya-bolgelerinin-rusyaya-baglanmasina-yonelik-anlasmalari-imzaladi/2699143>.

¹⁴⁴UNRIC. (2023, 2 9). *The UN and the war in Ukraine: key information*. Retrieved from UNRIC: <https://unric.org/en/the-un-and-the-war-in-ukraine-key-information/>.

¹⁴⁵UNHCR. (2023, 2 9). *Ukraine Refugee Situation*. Retrieved from UNHCR: <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

¹⁴⁶According to the Turkish Language Association dictionary, the word diaspora means "a place where members of any nation or faith live as a minority outside their homeland."

TDK. (2023). *Diaspora*. TDK: Retrieved from <https://sozluk.gov.tr/>.

¹⁴⁷Rferl. (2023, 2 9). *Russians In the Former Soviet Union*. Retrieved from Rferl: <https://www.rferl.org/a/1070573.html>.

its near abroad policy. The main reason for this situation is the presence of ethnic Russians remaining in the former Soviet geography. The Russian Federation, which considers it as its responsibility to protect Russians outside Russia. Russia has tried to achieve significant gains by keeping the situation of minority Russians in other countries on the agenda of its foreign policy. The use of the Russian diaspora in its foreign policy not only contributes to Russia's soft power by creating a positive image in other states but also increases its power to influence the CIS geography, which the country sees as its near abroad.

In the foreign policy concept adopted in 1993, on the one hand, emphasis was placed on increasing cooperation with neighboring countries, ensuring participation in international economic organizations, and reducing the country's foreign debt. On the other hand, it was stated that protecting the rights of Russians living outside Russia, wherever they are, was a priority and one of the foreign policy objectives¹⁴⁸. The "compatriots" term, which until 1999 specifically referred to Russians living outside the RF, changed with the adoption of the law called "State policy towards compatriots living abroad", which was implemented by the Russian Federation in May 1999. Within the framework of this law, the definition of citizenship has been moved to a new dimension. In the specified law, people who have common history, culture and language, or are descendants of people who have this situation are accepted as compatriots. It is stated that the rights of compatriots living outside Russia will also be protected by the mentioned law¹⁴⁹.

Addressing members of parliament in 2003, Putin stated that the CIS region was an area of strategic interest for Russia. He also emphasized that the people living in this region migrated to the RF over time.¹⁵⁰ In his address to MPs in April 2005, he stated

¹⁴⁸Brookings. (2023, 2 9). *An Overview of Russian Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/newrussiandiplomacy_chapter.pdf . p.16.

¹⁴⁹Russian Federation. (1999). *Federal Law of the Russian Federation About state policy of the Russian Federation concerning compatriots abroad*. Retrieved from CIS-Legislation: <https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=1407> .

¹⁵⁰Kremlin. (2003). *Rusya Federasyonu Federal Meclisine Mesaj*. Retrieved from <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21998> .

that the dissolution of the USSR was a geopolitical mistake¹⁵¹. Starting in 2008, when RF's foreign policy concepts were considered, it was emphasized that protecting the rights of RF citizens and compatriots living abroad was a goal¹⁵². Thus, the Russian compatriot element and diaspora constitute an important element in Russia's relations with the countries in its near abroad. In addition, opposing the integration and rapprochement of the countries in the near abroad with the EU and NATO, was among the priorities of its foreign policy.

One of the countries within Russia's near abroad is Ukraine. The main reason for this is that there are Russians and Russian-speaking people in Ukraine. In Ukraine, Ukrainians constitute 77% of the total population, and Russian minorities constitute 17.3%. In terms of languages spoken in Ukraine, Ukrainian constitutes 67.5% and Russian as a regional language constitutes 29.6%. This population is especially concentrated in the Donbas region in the east of the country, including Luhansk and Donetsk, and in the Crimean Peninsula in the south¹⁵³.

In terms of regional characteristics, the Ukrainian population has a distinction between East and West, which affects its domestic and foreign policy. In the east of the country, including oblasts such as Luhansk and Donetsk, Orthodox Russians dominate the population. The economy is based on heavy industrial production and mining. In the west of the country, Catholic ethnic Ukrainians dominate the population. The economy is mostly based on agriculture. In addition to these two regions, Crimea, where 60% of the population is Russian, can be added¹⁵⁴.

Russia uses the Russian and Russian-speaking population in Ukraine as a tool of influence both in directing Ukraine's domestic policy and in directing its own foreign policy. In 2008, before the critical Bucharest summit where the country's NATO membership was evaluated, demonstrations were held against it not being a member of

¹⁵¹Intelros. (2005). *Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin'in Rusya Federasyonu Federal Meclisi'ne hitabı*. Retrieved from <http://www.intelros.org/lib/putin/2005.htm> .

¹⁵²Russian Federation. (2008). *Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation* Retrieved from <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/news/785> .

¹⁵³CIA. (2023). *Ukraine*. *Cia-Factbook*: Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/> .

¹⁵⁴TECER, Ö. Çağrı. (2014). *Jeopolitik Tave Tarihsel Bir Rekabet Sahası Olarak Ukrayna ve Dış Politika Parametreleri*. Manas Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, p. 14.

NATO. In the presidential elections held in 2010, Viktor Yanukovych, who stated that he would make Russian the official language and provided the support of the Russian diaspora, won. In 2012, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine declared that Russian would be used in public services as the regional official language in oblasts where more than %10 population were Russians or Russian speakers¹⁵⁵.

In 2013, Viktor Yanukovych's declaration that he would not sign the EU-Ukraine association agreement, and his pro-Russian stance resulted in an increase in protests throughout the country and the loss of control over Donbas and Crimea. As a result of the referendum held in Crimea with the support of the Russian population, which constitutes nearly 59% of Crimea, the decision led to the independence of Crimea and its subsequent annexation to the RF¹⁵⁶.

In the declaration of independence in the Donbas region and the establishment of the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics, the RF provided the main support from the separatists, ethnic Russians, and Russian speakers in the region. Representatives of these elements were represented as parties in the Minsk talks held for the resolution of the Donbas and Crimea disputes. In April 2019, by decree of the RF President, Russians and Russian speakers in the Donbas region were given the right to obtain Russian passports¹⁵⁷. Thus, the protection of compatriots' rights in this region was protected by RF foreign policy concepts and found its legal place.

In the presidential election held in 2019, won by Volodymyr Zelensky, Yury Boyko, known as a pro-Russian, managed to receive nearly 12% of the votes¹⁵⁸. In the parliamentary elections held in July 2019, Yury Boyko's party received nearly 13% of the votes and stood out as the second party represented in the Ukrainian parliament¹⁵⁹. Considering that Crimea and the Donbas region did not participate in the elections in

¹⁵⁵CIA. (2023).

¹⁵⁶BBC News Türkçe. (2014a). *Kırım referandumunda Rusya'ya 'evet'*. Retrieved from BBC News Türkçe: https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/03/140316_kirim_sonuc .

¹⁵⁷Euronews. (2023a, 2 8).

¹⁵⁸Ukrayna Seçim Komisyonu. (2019). *Ukrayna Cumhurbaşkanı Seçimleri*. Retrieved from Ukrayna Seçim Komisyonu: <https://web.archive.org/web/20190423213729/https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2019/wp300pt001f01=719.html> .

¹⁵⁹BBC News Türkçe. (2019a). *Ukrayna'da erken genel seçimi Devlet Başkanı Zelensky'nin partisi kazandı*. Retrieved from BBC News Türkçe: <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-49067232> .

2019, it can be said that there is still a significant segment of Ukraine that supports and feels close to the RF. This situation makes it easier for the RF to intervene in Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy.

2.2.2. Political Reasons

In this part, political reasons which caused the war will be explained. To examine political reasons in detail, information will be given about main political approaches such as Atlanticism, Eurasianism and Russian foreign policy documents.

2.2.2.1. Approaches and Basic Documents Guiding RF Foreign Policy

Considering the factors affecting Russian foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR, an identity crisis occurred whether it would be part of the West or the East. Since Boris Yeltsin's term as president, RF efforts to develop and modernize the state have accelerated. It has come to the fore whether the modernization and development would be carried out with the Atlanticist approach¹⁶⁰, led by the values of Europe and the USA, or with the Eurasianism approach¹⁶¹, which aims to hold the former Soviet geography together. In fact, these two currents that direct Russian foreign policy were not separate poles from each other. They were able to stand out according to the conditions at the time. In the post-Soviet period, it also manifested itself in the domestic and foreign policies of the RF¹⁶²

Between 1991 and 1993, while RF was taking steps to continue its cooperation with the former Soviet Republics as the successor state of the USSR. On the other hand, it wanted to provide the necessary support from the West to overcome the sensitive

¹⁶⁰ According to the Atlanticist approach, whose roots date back to the 1920s, Russia and Russian culture are both eastern and western. Russian culture consists of a unique synthesis of eastern and western cultures.

Turgutoğlu, Kenan. (2006). *Rusya Federasyonu'nda Putin ve Yeltsin Döneminde İzlenen Dış Politikaların NATO ile ilişkiler Düzleminde Karşılaştırılması*. Retrieved from <https://dSPACE.ankara.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.12575/28576/2625.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> . p.15

¹⁶¹ Kaya, Sezgin. (2008). *Rus Dış Politikasında Gelinekçi-Modernist Unsurların Analizi ve Batı*. Retrieved from Açık erişim Uludağ: <https://acikerisim.uludag.edu.tr/bitstream/11452/4435/1/231162.pdf> . p.4.

¹⁶² Ayan, Burcu. (2007). *Rus Dış Politikasında Sovyet Mirası*. Retrieved from <https://dSPACE.ankara.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.12575/79128/218206.pdf?sequence=1> . p.91

period it was in¹⁶³. The opinion of the state staff, dominated by people who adopted the Atlanticist approach, was the economic, political, and cultural integration of the RF with western society¹⁶⁴. It was depicted as the "Romantic Period" because it brought about softening and cooperation in relations between the RF and the West. President Boris Yeltsin and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev showed pro-Western efforts in their actions. According to Kozyrev, Russia should have cooperated and formed an alliance with the UN, NATO, and other international organizations to overcome the difficult period it was in¹⁶⁵. Thus, the priorities of Russian politics shaped as ensuring the transition to a free market economy, democratic values, and respect for human rights, which were also adopted by the West. During this period, it was evaluated that the external threat to Russia could be from the east rather than the west and that it could be the instabilities in Central Asia, China, and Afghanistan. During this period, relations with countries that gained independence from the Soviets were kept in the background, while relations with the West were kept in the foreground¹⁶⁶.

Those who adopted the Atlanticist approach prioritized cooperation and diplomacy efforts with the West. This was also vitally important for the Western states because the RF, which had nuclear weapons, was still a source of threat to them. The dissolution of Yugoslavia created an opportunity for the RF to demonstrate its Western approach. In this process, he cooperated with the West, did not take opposing attitudes, and gave importance to cooperation. RF supported the decision taken by the United Nations General Assembly on May 30, 1992, regarding the former Federal Republic of

¹⁶³Arbatov, A. (1993). *Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives*. International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall, 1993), p.9.

¹⁶⁴The period between 1991 and 1993, when reformists were dominant, was described as the "Romantic Period" because it brought about softening and cooperation in relations between the Russian Federation and the West.

Turgutoğlu, Kenan. (2006). p.21.

¹⁶⁵Kozyrev, Andrei. (1992). *Russia: A Chance for Survival*. Foreign Affairs, p.12.

¹⁶⁶Turgutoğlu, Kenan. (2006). p.18.

Yugoslavia¹⁶⁷. During this period, it was essential to keep good relations with the West, and various concessions were made according to this situation¹⁶⁸.

The Atlanticist approach has been disapproved of among Russian political elites since 1993 and has led to increased opposition to the government. This situation became even more visible during the Russian constitutional crisis of 1993. The main reason for this was the decrease in the purchasing power of the people while pursuing Western liberal-economic policies and the belief among Russian society that the country could not find economic support from the West.¹⁶⁹ Considering the security reasons, the West's disregard for Russia's objections and its efforts to expand Russia's borders with NATO were perceived as weakening Russia. It caused Boris Yeltsin to lose public support. During this period, Russia endeavored to protect its national interests through its influence in the United Nations Security Council (the UNSC) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the CSCE) against NATO's efforts to expand within Russia's borders¹⁷⁰.

Despite all Western efforts, the desired results in terms of economic, political, and social reform could not be achieved, which led to the Atlanticist movement not being accepted by society and intellectuals. Thus, within the Russian political elite, the emphasis was placed on policies aimed at the near abroad, the protection of the Russian diaspora, and the protection of national interests in relations with the West, based on the country's restoration to its former power¹⁷¹. Although Russia's attitude towards the West began to change after 1993, efforts were made towards cooperation with the West. In 1994, Russia tried to develop relations with the West by engaging in the Partnership for Peace with NATO, the Partnership and Cooperation with the EU, signing free trade

¹⁶⁷NATO. (1992). *UN Resolution 757 (1992)*. NATO. Retrieved from <https://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u920530a.htm>.

¹⁶⁸Özdal, Habibe. (2015b). *Rus Dış Politikasında Ukrayna (1991-2014)*. Retrieved from https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezDetay.jsp?id=78myvo1vVrLY9PtTheTgQ&no= VGzT9wN3a djAW_NeyCX7g.

¹⁶⁹McGill. (2022). *Russian Constitutional Crisis 1993*. Retrieved from McGill: https://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~rwest/wikispeedia/wpcd/wp/r/Russian_constitutional_crisis_of_1993.htm.

¹⁷⁰Özdal, Habibe. (2015b). p.32.

¹⁷¹Özdal, Habibe. (2015b). p.31.

agreements with the EU and the USA, and developing efforts towards becoming a member of the Group of Eight (G8)¹⁷².

The other movement that came to the fore after the collapse of the USSR was the Eurasianism movement. The essence of the Eurasianism movement is the acceptance that the country is not European or Asian and that Russia has its own unique conditions. According to Dugin, one of the leading figures of the Eurasianism movement in the new period,

- Eurasianism is the alternative to Atlanticism.
- It is the antithesis of the unipolar Western-led world order.
- It is the coming together of Russia and Asian countries.
- Development of cooperation between the Middle East and Europe, Russia, and Central Asia and Pacific countries.
- Bringing together the countries that dispersed from the Soviet Union¹⁷³.

Eurasianists advocated pursuing a multifaceted and independent policy against the West's one-sided policy of being dependent on them. According to Dugin, it is essential to ensure the support of Ukraine and Kazakhstan in ensuring unity in Eurasia¹⁷⁴. The understanding of Eurasianism in Russian political life found more space after 1993, when the Western movement began to decline. The main criticism of the Eurasianist movement towards the West is that the West has made Russia more dependent on itself by providing aid and it has benefited from the economic, social, and military sensitivities of Russia¹⁷⁵.

After the internal and external difficulties experienced, the "Great and Powerful State" discourse, spoken through the Eurasianist movement, began to be used more by politicians, including Boris Yeltsin. This discourse also began to be used as an integrative element of the RF. In addition, in Yeltsin's statements, the RF was stated as

¹⁷²Devederov, Aleksandr. (2003). *Rusya Ulusal güvenlik Konsepti ve Rus Amerikan İlişkilerine Etkisi-1991'den günümüze*. <http://nek.istanbul.edu.tr:4444/ekos/TEZ/38967.pdf> . p.17.

¹⁷³Dugin, Aleksandr. (2006). *Nur Sultan Nazarbayev'in Avrasya Misyonu*. Ankara: Yeni Avrasya Yayınları.p.192.

¹⁷⁴Dugin, Aleksandr. (2006). p.226.

¹⁷⁵Turgutoğlu, Kenan. (2006). p.25.

the country that could protect the Soviet geography and the rights of the Russian minority outside the RF. Under the influence of the Eurasianist movement, the former Soviet countries and the CIS borders were protected, and their national interests were brought to the fore. After this period, the Eurasianist movement increased its weight in Russian foreign policy¹⁷⁶.

An example of the reflection of the Eurasianist movement on Russian foreign policy is the Near Abroad Doctrine¹⁷⁷. The Near-Abroad Doctrine was announced by RF Foreign Minister Kozyrev in 1993. According to the doctrine, priority is given to the continuation of relations with the former Soviet republics. This doctrine essentially aims to prevent the influence of global and regional actors, including NATO and the EU, in the former Soviet geography. Ukraine and Belarus formed the center of the near-abroad doctrine. From a historical perspective, the fact that the first Russian state was founded in Kiev makes Ukraine indispensable for Russia. In the former Soviet environment, Russia defined itself as a security actor and stated that the CIS was ready to cooperate with the UN and OSCE in this region. In accordance with this doctrine, the RF has had the opportunity to intervene more in its near abroad and develop closer relations with the CIS since 1993¹⁷⁸.

¹⁷⁶Sönmez, Sait. (2015). *Yakın Çevre Doktrini Bağlamında Yeltsin Dönemi Rusya Federasyonu'nun Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu Ülkeleriyle İlişkileri*. Retrieved from Dergipark: <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/55637>. p.2.

¹⁷⁷ It is possible to classify the foreign policy implemented by the RF towards its near abroad under three headings. Firstly, on a political basis, it is to ensure the continuation of political ties with the former Soviet Republics within the framework of mutual benefit and assistance. The establishment of the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and efforts to integrate with the former republics can be evaluated on this basis. Secondly, on an economic basis, it is aimed at increasing cooperation by ensuring economic unity with the countries in the near abroad. Eurasian Economic Union and Customs Union studies can be evaluated in this context. Thirdly, on a cultural basis, efforts are made to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking Russian minority remaining in the former republics, to spread Russian culture, and to increase soft power.

Hamzaoglu, Halit. (2020). *Rus Dış Politikasında Realist Yaklaşım: Primakov Doktrini ve Yakın Çevre*. Avrasya Uluslararası Araştırmalar Dergisi. p.292.

Rumer, Eugene. (2019). *The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Retrieved from: https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/files_Rumer_PrimakovDoctrine_final1.pdf . p.5.

Shabbir, Muhammad. (2023). *Primakov Doctrine and Russian Foreign Policy*. Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defence University of Pakistan: Retrieved from: <https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/pub/insight/PrimakovDoctrine/PRIMAKOV-DOCTRINE.pdf> . p.1.

¹⁷⁸Tellal, Erel. (2010). *Zümrüdüanka: Rusya Federasyonu'nun Dış Politikası*. Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, p 206

The aims of the Foreign Policy Concept, which was put into effect with the approval of Yeltsin in 1993, are:

- Maintaining the first position of RF among CIS members,
- To ensure the protection of the external borders of the CIS,
- To protect the rights of Russians and Russian speakers in the countries of the former Soviet Union,
- To look after the near abroad and ensure stability,
- It was determined to ensure the security of military bases in former Soviet countries by establishing the country's national security in the near abroad¹⁷⁹.

In this context, it was evaluated that it was interest of the RF to continue economic and military cooperation with the countries that dissolved from the Soviet Union. Russia tried to continue its near-abroad and integration policies with the CIS between 1991 and 1995. In the economic and security fields between 1996 and 1999, integration policies with the CIS continued. In 1996, Yevgeny Primakov was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The Eurasianism approach formed the background of the foreign policy of the Primakov period¹⁸⁰. In foreign policy, he advocated a multipolar world approach instead of a unipolar world. Based on Primakov's Doctrine, which he created,

- RF must cooperate with other power centers as an independent pole,
- Balance should be maintained between East and West,
- RF national interests should be ensured, and cooperation should be established.

When the policies followed during Primakov's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then his Prime Ministry period are evaluated, the basis is to oppose the unipolar domination of the USA over the world, to conduct relations with the West according to

¹⁷⁹RF. (1993). *Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 1993 Year*. Retrieved from <http://uchebnikonline.com/131/1174.html>.

¹⁸⁰Yılmaz, Salih. (2015). *Yeni Avrasyacılık ve Rusya*. Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Araştırmaları Dergisi, p. 115. Retrieve from Dergipark: <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/452480>.

the principles of equality and reciprocity, to ensure balance, and to develop economic and security relations with the CIS. According to Primakov, if the RF wants to maintain its position as a power in the world, it should engage in a multipolar and alternatively active foreign policy with all other geographies. In its foreign policy, keeping the near abroad under control and preventing NATO and other global actors from interfering in this region were prioritized¹⁸¹.

When Putin took over the presidency from Yeltsin in 1999, the Eurasianism-Atlanticism conflict disappeared in Russian domestic and foreign policy. Putin preferred to maintain a balance between Eurasianist and Atlanticist approaches. Putin served as president for two terms, between 2000–2004 and 2004–2008. When Putin came to power, the economic problem, the ongoing problems in Chechnya, and the weakening of the federal structure after the Yeltsin period were the main problems of the country¹⁸². During Putin's first term as president, he aimed at reasserting the country's former power and increasing economic prosperity. In foreign policy, the basis is to ensure multipolarity against the unipolarity of the USA. In this context, while Russia has tried to improve relations with NATO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization¹⁸³ was established in 2001 to develop multilateral policies. The main reason for this was the need for Western support in terms of economic development. On the other hand, Russia needed for multipolar security actors against the expansion policies of the EU and

¹⁸¹Hamzaoglu, Halit. (2020, 12).). *Rus Dış Politikasında Realist Yaklaşım: Primakov Doktrini ve Yakın Çevre*. Avrasya Uluslararası Araştırmalar Dergisi, Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/1416228> . p. 289.

¹⁸²Devederov, Aleksandr. (2003). *Rusya Ulusal güvenlik Konsepti ve Rus Amerikan İlişkilerine Etkisi-1991'den günümüze*. p.44. Retrieved from <http://nek.istanbul.edu.tr:4444/ekos/TEZ/38967.pdf> .

¹⁸³Shanghai Cooperation Organization: It was established in 1996 under the name Shanghai Five by China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia to develop regional cooperation. Within the scope of developments in the international security environment, at the summit held in Shanghai in 2001, the Shanghai Five decided to put forward a more effective fight against terrorism. Accepting the participation of Uzbekistan, the declaration on the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was accepted. In 2002, St. At the St. Petersburg Summit, the purpose, principles, and activities of the organization were revealed. Pakistan and India became members of the organization in 2017, and Iran in 2021. Turkey has been participating in the organization with dialogue partner status since 2017. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were granted dialogue partner status in 2021.

Dışişleri Bakanlığı, (2021). *Şangay İş birliği Örgütü*. Retrieved from <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sanghay-isbirligi-orgutu.tr.mfa> .

NATO¹⁸⁴. During this period, it became clear that the expansion policies of the EU and NATO were against the national interests of the RF¹⁸⁵. Under these conditions, there was a need for renewal in the foreign policy concept. In the 2000 RF Foreign Policy Concept published during Putin's first presidency (2000–2004), the main threats were the unipolar system led by the USA, NATO's desire to expand towards the RF borders, and the UNSC's inability to play an active role in preventing conflicts. In this context, it was aimed,

- To ensure border security for RF,
- To increase the effect of Russian language, Russian culture, and effect in foreign countries, to protect Russian people,
- To create a fair world order by establishing cooperation with neighboring countries¹⁸⁶.

During Putin's second term as president (2004–2008), positive progress was made in eliminating economic problems, ensuring tranquility in Chechnya, and establishing state authority. At the Munich Security Conference held in 2007, Putin criticized the unipolar system led by the USA for causing instability and emphasized that the UN, instead of the EU and NATO, had a balancing role in the protection of international law¹⁸⁷. RF's hand became stronger in the international arena during Putin's eight-year term as president. In 2008, since Putin could not be president for the third time according to the RF Constitution, Dmitry Medvedev was elected president, and Putin was appointed prime minister. During this period, the policy of NATO and the EU

¹⁸⁴Yapıcı, M. İrem. (2015). *Rusya-NATO İlişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü ve Geleceği*. p.1468. Retrieved from AYK: <https://www.ayk.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/YAPICI-Merve-%C4%B0rem-RUSYA-NATO-%C4%B0L%C4%B0%C5%9EK%C4%B0LER%C4%B0N%C4%B0N-D%C3%9CN%C3%9C-BUG%C3%9CN%C3%9C-VE-GELECE%C4%9E%C4%B0.pdf> .

¹⁸⁵Güler, M. Çağatay., & Teke, M. Akif. (2021). *Resmi Belgeler Işığında Rusya'nın Dış Politika Eğilimi*. İstanbul: SETA.p.20.

¹⁸⁶RF. (2000). *Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2000*. Retrieved from: http://www.ng.ru/world/2000-07-11/1_concept.html .

¹⁸⁷Hürriyet. (2007). *Putin'in Münih konuşması Genelkurmay'ın sitesinde*. Retrieved from Hürriyet: <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/putinin-munih-konusmasi-genelkurmayin-sitesinde-5956456> .

was seen and perceived as a threat by the RF¹⁸⁸. According to the new foreign policy concept published in 2008, the objectives are:

- To continue the development of RF,
- To continue cooperation with neighboring states,
- To develop the liberal economy in the country by prioritizing social policies,
- To ensure that RF is a country with an independent foreign policy that gives importance to democratic values¹⁸⁹.

After Medvedev served as President between 2008 and 2012, Vladimir Putin won the RF Presidential elections in 2012. To transform relations with the CIS countries into a more institutional structure, the Eurasian Economic Union was established in 2013 under the leadership of Russia. In 2014, the founding agreement was approved by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has brought to the fore to prevent the instability in Afghanistan from spreading to the Central Asian and Caucasus countries and to further integrate the CIS¹⁹⁰. In addition, since Iran and nuclear armament were on the security agenda of the period, cooperation against nuclear armament and the development of bilateral and multilateral agreements were taken as basis. In this context, the threat of using weapons and sanctions outside the UN was perceived as the main threat. The main objectives in the foreign policy concept renewed in 2013 are:

- Establishing a global, stable international system,
- Increasing the dialogue between civilizations,
- Strengthening the position of RF in the world economic market,
- The development of the RF economy¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁸Güler, M. Çağatay., & Teke, M. Akif. (2021). p.20.

¹⁸⁹RF. (2008). *Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. 2008.* RF: <http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/785> .

¹⁹⁰Güler, M. Çağatay. & Teke, M. Akif. (2021). p.22.

¹⁹¹RF. (2013). *Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013.* Retrieved from RF: <http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/70218094> .

At the beginning of 2010, the Middle East and North Africa witnessed color revolutions, civil wars, and migration movements that started in Syria. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria terrorist organization (ISIS) has become a global threat with its actions. RF also intervened in the crisis, especially in Syria, for its national interests. Since 2014, RF has hardened its stance against the EU and NATO's efforts to draw Ukraine to their side and has made active efforts to protect its near abroad. In this process, the unilateral occupation and annexation of Crimea were completed. With the support of the RF, People's Republics were established in Donetsk and Luhansk. According to the 2016 foreign policy concept approved by Putin in 2016, the objectives are:

- To contribute to peace with other states and international organizations,
- To ensure the establishment of global security,
- To ensure Russia's economic stability and encouraging its growth¹⁹².

When RF's foreign policy concepts are considered, it is seen that the concepts are shaped according to the international situation and threat perceptions. After the collapse of the USSR and until 2000, Russia pursued a pro-Western foreign policy due to the internal and external conditions of the country. During this period, cooperation was made with international organizations and Western states. Especially after 2000, when Putin came to power, the RF increased the importance given to its near abroad. In this term, the RF tried to increase its influence in this region by using the Russian minority and Russian speakers against the efforts of the EU and NATO to expand their borders. In this period, RF foreign policy has been focused more on Eurasia, the CIS, and the Central Asian States. Since 2008, the RF has reflected that the unipolar world order threatens global stability and peace. In this context, he drew attention to the increasing role of the UNSC in ensuring international security. Since 2010, increasing cooperation in economic and security fields with former Soviet and neighboring countries has come to the fore. With the color revolutions taking place in the Middle East, RF has shown that he has a balancing role by actively participating within the framework of its interests in this region. In the process, by using minority elements in the region and

¹⁹²RF. (2016). *Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2016*. www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/2542248.

Crimea without declaring war on the Crimea dispute, the occupation and annexation were completed. Unilaterally recognized Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics were established. In this context, RF has shown that it can engage in an armed struggle and the unilateral actions against Ukraine. With the ongoing disputes between Ukraine and Russia since 2014, policies have been developed to counter NATO and the EU's expansion in Russia's near abroad. Thus, RF has come to the fore as a balancing element against the unipolar world order¹⁹³.

2.2.2.2. Ukraine-EU Relations

Ukraine's relations with the EU began after the dissolution of the USSR. On December 2, 1991, foreign ministers of EU countries approved the EU-Ukraine declaration. In the same year, Ukraine was included in the economic aid program for the development of democracy in the newly established post-Soviet republics. Another development between Ukraine and the EU was the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994. The relevant agreement formed the basis of EU relations with Ukraine from 1994 to 2008. This agreement initiated comprehensive cooperation between Ukraine and the EU on political, commercial, economic and humanitarian issues. Despite Ukraine's willing attitude towards the EU, the EU has chosen to act cautiously, considering its relations with the RF¹⁹⁴.

EU-Ukraine relations improved in 2009 through the Neighboring Countries - Eastern Neighbourhood Policy¹⁹⁵. Within the scope of the stated policy, the development of democracy, ensuring economic development, security, and migration have been determined as priority areas of cooperation¹⁹⁶. The Ukrainian administration, which attaches importance to integration with the Union, has started to take the necessary steps. The Russian President Dmitry Medvedev wanted Ukraine to become a member of the

¹⁹³Güler, M. Çağatay., & Teke, M. Akif. (2021). p.30-31-32.

¹⁹⁴European Union. (1994). *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement*. Retrieved from Eur-Lex: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A21998A0219%2802%29>.

¹⁹⁵EU Neighboring Countries -Eastern Neighborhood Policy includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine

European Commission. (2023b). *European Neighbourhood Policy*. European Commission: Retrieved from https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy_en.

¹⁹⁶European Commission. (2023b).

Eurasian Customs Union, formed by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Ukraine was not in favor of this request, as it could prevent the country from signing a free trade agreement with the EU. However, the agreement could not be realized because Ukraine could not meet the requirements of the free trade agreement with the EU until 2011. This situation caused Ukraine, under the Yanukovich administration, to get closer to Russia¹⁹⁷.

In March 2013, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, following his visit to Moscow, declared that Ukraine's strategic partnership with Russia would continue and steps would be taken to further develop trade¹⁹⁸. The reason of the statement was the decline in Ukraine's commercial relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russia¹⁹⁹. Jose Manuel Barroso stated that if Ukraine became a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, it could not be possible to be included in the EU's free trade agreement. The Ukrainian government decided to suspend the association process with the EU.²⁰⁰

The suspension decision triggered the Ukraine crisis. Demonstrators gathered on Europe Square in Kiev to demand the resumption of relations with the EU. As the protests escalated in the following days, they caused turmoil across the country. While Yanukovich was overthrown in the process that started with the events in the square, unidentified masked individuals began to seize government buildings in Crimea. Russia then unilaterally annexed Crimea. Conflict broke out between government forces and separatists in places in the east of the country where Russian-backed separatists dominate²⁰¹. Despite the crisis in the East and the loss of Crimea, pro-EU parties won

¹⁹⁷Yıldız, Mustafa. (2022). *Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşında Rusya'yı Anlamak: Tek Sorumlu Putin mi?* Akademik Hassasiyetler, p. 156. Retrieved from Dergipark: <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2530470>.

¹⁹⁸The Guardian. (2013). *Ukraine suspends talks on EU trade pact as Putin wins tug of war*. Retrieved from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ukraine-suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact>.

¹⁹⁹Politico-EU. (2013). *Russia-Behind-Ukraine-U-Turn-On-EU*. Retrieved from Politico-EU: <https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-behind-ukraine-u-turn-on-eu/>.

²⁰⁰ The Guardian. (2013). *Ukraine suspends talks on EU trade pact as Putin wins tug of war*. Retrieved from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ukraine-suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact>.

²⁰¹Soydan, Emrah. (2019). p.56-57.

the election. While Yanukovych fled Ukraine, the pro-EU government came to power. Arseniy Yatsenyuk formed the government, and Petro Poroshenko was elected president. The EU process began to be reconsidered²⁰².

In the new period, Prime Minister Yatsenyuk signed the political part of the Association Agreement on March 21, 2014, and President Poroshenko signed the economic part in Brussels on June 27, 2014. In September, the Ukrainian and European parliaments approved the agreement²⁰³.

Russia reacted to Ukraine's orientation towards the EU. The Moscow government insisted that the agreement was against Russia. Russia warned both the EU and the Ukrainian side about the possible economic risks of the agreement with Russia. Therefore, the agreement's entry into force was postponed until January 1, 2016. It was decided to discuss the implementation of the agreement between Russia, Ukraine, and the EU. However, tripartite talks were held, which started on June 11, 2014, and ended on December 21, 2015. No results were obtained from the talks²⁰⁴.

The Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the EU came into effect on January 1, 2016. The relevant agreement was an important step for Ukraine's EU integration. It was aimed at integrating the Ukrainian economy with the EU within 10 years. According to the agreement, it included a reduction in customs tariffs on products and industrial products imported from the EU²⁰⁵. Russia's response to this agreement was immediate. Declared that RF will impose economic sanctions as of January 1, 2016²⁰⁶.

²⁰²Merkez Seçim Komisyonu, (2014). *2014 Ukrayna Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimleri*. NRCU. Retrieved from <http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/en/148/566632/>.

²⁰³Ukraine Government. (2014). *Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine*. Ukraine Government: <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/yevropejska-integraciya/ugoda-pro-asociacyu>.

²⁰⁴European Commission. (2015b). *Trilateral Talks On EU-Ukraine DCFTA*. Retrieved from European Commission: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/december/tradoc_154127.pdf.

²⁰⁵European Commission, (2016a). *EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area*. European Commission. Retrieved from <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/eu-ukraine-deep-and-comprehensive-free-trade-area>.

²⁰⁶BBC News. (2016). *Russia hits Ukraine with trade sanctions over EU deal*. Retrieved from BBC News: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35150755>.

Another important development occurred in 2017. On May 11, 2017, the European Council approved visa exemptions for Ukrainian citizens traveling to the Schengen area. With the agreement, Ukrainian citizens are allowed to travel to Schengen countries without a visa and stay in Schengen countries for 90 days in the same year²⁰⁷.

After the change of government in 2014 and the election of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in 2019, Ukraine's orientation towards the EU continued. RF claimed that Ukraine violated its neutrality between itself and the West. Zelensky signed his country's application for EU membership on February 28, 2022, and Russian forces launched a ground operation against Ukraine on February 24, 2022²⁰⁸.

The European Council received a recommendation from the European Commission for Ukraine's application for EU membership on June 17, 2022. At the EU summit held on June 23, 2022, it was decided that Ukraine would become a "candidate country" with Moldova²⁰⁹. The decision was announced at the EU Summit in Brussels. European Council President Charles Michel and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made statements supporting the membership of the two countries²¹⁰. President Zelensky stated that they were pleased with the decision and that they were getting closer to EU membership. President Putin said that the EU is not a military organization and that they have no objection to Ukraine joining the EU²¹¹.

²⁰⁷European Council. (2017). *Regulation of the European Parliament and of the amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third*. Retrieved from European Council: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-13-2017-INIT/en/pdf>.

²⁰⁸Reuters. (2022b). *Ukrainian president signs formal request to join the European Union*. Reuters: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-president-signs-formal-request-join-european-union-2022-02-28/>.

²⁰⁹European Council. (2022h). *European Council meeting (23 and 24 June 2022)*. Retrieved from European Council: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf>. p.4.

²¹⁰European Integration. (2022). *Ukrayna resmi olarak AB üyeliğine aday statüsü aldı*. Retrieved from European Integration: <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2022/06/23/7141922/>.

²¹¹Trt. (2022). *Putin: Rusya Ukrayna'nın AB üyeliğine karşı değil*. Retrieved from Trt: <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/putin-rusya-ukraynanin-ab-uyeligine-karsi-degil-688773.html>.

2.2.3. Military Reasons

In this part, military reasons which caused the war will be explained. To focus on reasons in detail, information will be given about RF National Security Strategies and Military Doctrines, RF-NATO and Ukraine-NATO relations.

2.2.3.1. RF National Security Strategies and Military Doctrines

With Putin taking office after Boris Yeltsin in Russia, the National Security Concept was adopted on January 10, 2000. When the concept is examined, it is stated that,

- Military power has not lost its importance in the world order.
- Russia's integration with the world economy and cooperation with financial institutions will be ensured
- Sustainability of economic development is taken as a basis to ensure national interests.

The concept also emphasized the relationship between 'equals', and the aim of the concept was to make Russia one of the centers of power in the multipolar world order. Ensuring relations based on equality and mutual benefit with other states and international organizations is a priority²¹².

According to the 2000 National Security Concept, threats were economic vulnerability, inadequacy in state institutions, economic-based disintegration within society, an increase in organized crimes, and ethnic segregation. According to this concept, RF followed to reach the interests of the country's people of different ethnicities. In foreign policy, it was aimed at increasing the weight of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), protecting the rights of the Russian diaspora, and increasing cooperation with the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)²¹³.

²¹²Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Russian Federation. (2000, 1 10). *National Security Concept of the Russian Federation*. p.1. Retrieved from NTI.org: https://media.nti.org/pdfs/28_3.pdf.

²¹³Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Russian Federation. (2000). p.3-4-5.

Considering the political developments at the international level between 2000 and 2008, America intervened in Iraq in 2003, and color revolutions took place in the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Ukraine. Increasing energy prices during this period had a positive impact on the Russian economy. In 2008, Putin handed over the post of president to Dmitri Medvedev due to constitutional restrictions. During this period, Putin assumed the role of Prime Minister. The Georgian War took place during the Medvedev period (2008–2012). Medvedev stated that in the context of this war, the Russian ethnic population living outside Russia's borders would be protected, and friendly and neighboring countries, with which Russia has special historical relations, would be in the primary interest²¹⁴.

In 2009, a document named National Security Strategy replaced the 2000 National Security Concept. In the mentioned document, it is emphasized that ensuring social security and the development of the country's economic potential are linked to ensuring national security. The document states that the development of relations with the CIS and institutional integration projects is important, protecting the rights of Russian citizens outside the RF is also among the priorities²¹⁵.

In 2012, Putin took over the presidency again. Between 2012 and 2020, the Syria crisis, the Arab Spring, and the Ukraine crisis came to the fore. During this period, Russia helped the regime forces in Syria and ensured the continuation of the regime. This situation represented the only example in which Russia was directly involved outside the former Soviet geography. With this intervention, Russia made its influence felt not only in Syria but also in the Middle East. Another development of the period was the Ukraine crisis. The Maidan Square events and nationwide protests in Ukraine were followed by the events caused by pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas region. The events continued until Russia's intervention and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In

²¹⁴Kramer, Andrew. E. (2008, 8 31). *Russia claims 'privileged' sphere of influence*. Retrieved from Star Tribune: <https://www.startribune.com/russia-claims-privileged-sphere-of-influence/27726814/>.

²¹⁵Russian Federation. (2009, 5 12). *Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020*. Committee on International Affairs of the State Duma: Retrieved from <https://interkomitet.com/foreign-policy/basic-documents/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020/>.

this period when the USA and the EU were engaged in different endeavors, Russia has been able to take steps to prioritize its own political and security interests²¹⁶.

In the RF's 2014 military doctrine, NATO's approach to the Russian border was seen as a threat. It has been stated that many frozen conflict zones have formed, including the borders of the country, and that the tendency to resolve the problem through armed conflict continues. In addition, it has been deemed legitimate to protect Russian citizens living outside Russia against armed attack and against an external attack upon the request of another country, if it complies with international law²¹⁷.

The National Security Strategy was adopted in 2015. In the 2015 National Security Strategy, Russia was defined as one of the major problem-solving actors in the international environment. While the 2009 National Security Strategy prioritized economic development, the 2015 National Security Strategy highlighted the expansion policy of NATO and the EU in Russia's near abroad, such as Ukraine. In addition, the 2015 document focused on color revolutions, ultra-nationalist and religious radical groups, and activities that could harm Russia's territorial integrity. In the mentioned document, the threats are international instability, information wars, missile defense systems deployed by the USA against Russia, and NATO's increasing military capacity in the Russian near abroad²¹⁸.

To date, RF has two information security doctrines, adopted in 2000 and in 2016. In the latest document, it is stated that national security depends on information security. These documents constitute RF's strategic road map in the field of information security. In the Information Security Doctrine of 2000, it was pointed out that other states and terrorist organizations wanted to benefit from sensitivities in the field of information technologies and the importance of the struggle in this field. Steps to be taken in this context:

²¹⁶Özdal, Habibe. (2021). p.7-8.

²¹⁷Russian Federation. (2014). *Rusya Federasyonu Askeri Doktrini*. Retrieved from <https://rg.ru/documents/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok.html>.

²¹⁸Russian Federation. (2015, 12 31). *English translation of the 2015 Russian National Security Strategy*. Russian Matters: Retrieved from <https://www.russiamatters.org/node/21421>.

- Determining the basic approach of the state in the field of information security,
- Establishing a national information security system,
- Ensuring participation in international networks through RF information infrastructure²¹⁹.

As information technologies became more prevalent in our lives, the document was updated in 2016. It is stated in the new document that the aim is to protect Russian society and its interests from threats in the field of information technologies. On the one hand, the importance of domestic production in the field of information technologies was emphasized; on the other hand, the role of the state in ensuring security was emphasized. Main areas of struggle in doctrine are;

- Foreign threats,
- Problems encountered in the field of information technologies and cyber-attacks.

It has also been stated that there has been an increase in attacks on critical infrastructures such as finance, banking, the defense industry, and energy²²⁰.

When the national security strategies of the RF are examined since 2000, the priority of the RF foreign policy has been to end American unipolarity and be recognized on the international stage as an important actor. Considering the Georgian War and the annexation of Crimea, foreign policy focuses on the former Soviet geography and reactions to NATO expansion. The Georgia War and the annexation of Crimea were reactions to the possible expansion of NATO, and this caused conflict between Russia and the West²²¹.

²¹⁹Russian Federation. (2000, 9 9). *Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation*. Russian Federation: Retrieved from https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/Russia_2000.pdf .

²²⁰Russian Federation. (2016, 12 5). *Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation (2016)*. Russian Federation: Retrieved from http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/information/DIB_engl/ .

²²¹Özdal, Habibe. (2021). p.8.

2.2.3.2. RF NATO Relations

After the Cold War, NATO-RF relations entered a new era. The balance of power after the Cold War became an important determinant of NATO-RF relations. Especially with the transition from a polarized world to a unipolar world from 1991 to 2008, the West, especially the USA, saw Russia as a regional power rather than a global power. During this period, NATO and Russia cooperation gained momentum during the Yeltsin period. Because Russia moderately welcomed pro-Western policies and wanted to provide economic support from the West²²².

Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. The name of the council was changed to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997. Russia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994. In 1997, NATO and Russia signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Subsequently, NATO and Russia arranged called "NATO+1" within the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The purpose of this was for NATO member countries to meet with Russia for joint decisions. In the following period, the NATO-Russia Council was established in 2002, and Russian officials and NATO members met under equal conditions in the "29+1" arrangement²²³.

During this period, when the balance of power changed in favor of the West, NATO's expansion sparked debates between NATO and Russia. When the former Soviet states wanted to join NATO, the biggest opposition came from Russia. The entry of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO in 1999 caused concern in Moscow. In the same year, NATO's intervention in Kosovo and the military operation against Serbia further increased RF's unrest. Relations between Russia and NATO began to improve after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. However, with the NATO expansion in 2004, it led to the inclusion of Central European

²²²Polikanov, Dmitry. (2004). *NATO – Russia Relations: Present and Future*. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.25, No.3, Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/1352326042000330619?needAccess=true&role=button> . p.483.

²²³Oğuzlu, Tarık. (2019). *NATO-Rusya İlişkiler*. Güvenlik Yazıları: Retrieved from https://trguvenlikportali.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/NATORusyaIliskileri_TarikOguzlu_v.1.pdf . p.3.

and Baltic states, and NATO's proximity to the RF border made relations even more sensitive. On the other hand, the increase in Russia's economic and political power during the Putin period enabled Russia to criticize the West's and NATO's policies more harshly²²⁴.

Since the 2000s, western orientation has increased in former Soviet bloc countries, especially in Ukraine and Georgia. The increase in western tendencies in these countries increased the tension. According to Russia, its near abroad, including the former Soviet countries, should have remained within Russia's sphere of influence. Thus, Russia, which could not intervene in the enlargements in 1999 and 2004, objected to the possible NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia²²⁵.

When NATO members paved the way for Ukraine and Georgia to become members at the Bucharest Summit, Russia used military force and recognized Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions as independent states in 2008. Russia's gains by using armed force have made it one of the major threats to European security. Russia increased its criticism of NATO since this period and announced in 2014 that it had annexed Crimea. Furthermore, its support for separatists living in regions such as Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine led to tense relations between NATO and RF. According to Russia, Ukraine and Russia have historical unity. Ukraine should not have been a member of either the EU or NATO. RF depended on its security to keep Ukraine under its influence²²⁶.

Relations between NATO and Russia became even more tense in 2015, when Russia supported the Assad regime in the civil war in Syria. According to NATO, Russia was restricting its space of action in the Syrian region²²⁷. Russia's increasing military exercises in the Black Sea, Eastern Europe, and the Baltic countries caused serious concerns in NATO, and the alliance began to build its military power in these

²²⁴Yapıcı, M. İrem. (2015). p.1466.

²²⁵TECER, Ö. Çağrı. (2014). *Jeopolitik ve Tarihsel Bir Rekabet Sahası olarak Ukrayna ve Rusya Dış Politika Parametreleri*. Manas Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, p. 114.

²²⁶Oğuzlu, Tarık. (2019). p.5.

²²⁷Ercan, Arda., & Tezcan, R. Levent. (2021). *Rusya'nın Suriye Politikasının Geçmişten Günümüze Etkileri*. Dergipark: Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1787615>. p. 78.

regions. At the end of 2017, with the participation of Russia and Belarus, it carried out the largest military exercise ever in Eastern Europe, called Exercise Zapad-2017²²⁸.

NATO adopted the NATO Readiness Action Plan for the first time in 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea. Since 2016, NATO has deployed multinational forces in Poland and the Baltics. NATO has conducted military exercises in the region. The alliance's relationship with Russia has deteriorated in parallel with the deterioration of US-Russia relations. Russia's military intervention in Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and the Syrian civil war has created dissatisfaction on the part of the West and NATO states²²⁹. On the other hand, NATO's desire to expand nearby Russia and the deployment of military bases in Baltic countries such as Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have increased tension. The acceptance of Montenegro as a member of NATO in 2017 and the Republic of Macedonia in 2020 decreased Russian influence in the Balkan geography. The decrease has caused objections from the RF to Finland and Sweden, which are applying for membership in 2022. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg's statement that "Ukraine's NATO membership can be achieved in the long term" disturbed the RF. These factors make it difficult to normalize NATO-Russia relations in the context of Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

2.2.3.3. Ukraine NATO Relations

Ukraine-NATO relations started in 1992 after the collapse of the USSR. In 1994, Ukraine signed the Partnership for Peace Program²³⁰ framework document²³¹. In 2008, work began on Ukraine's integration with NATO within the framework of the NATO

²²⁸Johnson, Dave. (2017). *ZAPAD 2017 and Euro-Atlantic security*. NATO Review: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2017/12/14/zapad-2017-and-euro-atlantic-security/index.html> .

²²⁹Oğuzlu, Tarık. (2019). p.6.

²³⁰Partnership for Peace Programme: The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is an application of bilateral cooperation between Euro-Atlantic countries and NATO. This allows countries to construct cooperation with NATO, selecting their own cooperation priorities.

NATO. (1994). *Partnership for Peace programme*. NATO: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50349.htm .

NATO. (1994). *Partnership for Peace Programme*. NATO. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50349.htm .

²³¹NATO. (2023b). *Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document* Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm .

Membership Action Plan²³². However, this plan was put on hold following the 2010 elections, in which Viktor Yanukovich, who supported the country's non-alignment rather than NATO, was elected president²³³. The new government, which came to power after Viktor Yanukovich left Ukraine in February 2014 after the Euromaidan demonstrations, said that it had no plans to join NATO. Following the invasion of Crimea and the parliamentary elections in October 2014, joining NATO became a priority. On February 21, 2019, the Constitution of Ukraine and the regulations for Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO were made²³⁴.

NATO leaders stated at the June 2021 Brussels summit that Ukraine's membership process in the Alliance, which was taken at the 2008 Bucharest summit, would be supported. They also stated that Ukraine has the right to determine its future and foreign policy without any external intervention²³⁵. While Ukraine's NATO rapprochement continues, Russia announced that it launched a special military operation against Ukraine on February 22, 2022²³⁶. In 2023, former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg proposed that Ukraine could join NATO, excluding regions occupied by Russia²³⁷.

²³²NATO. (2023a). *Relations with Ukraine* NATO: Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm.

²³³Reuters. (2023). *Yanukovich vows to keep Ukraine out of NATO* Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-election-yanukovich-idUSTRE6062P320100107/>.

²³⁴BBC News Türkçe. (2014b). *Ukrayna NATO'ya üye olmak istiyor* Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/08/140829_ukrayna_nato#:~:text=Ukrayna%20Ba%C5%9Fba kan%C4%B1%20Arseniy%20Yatsenyuk%2C%20%C3%BClkesinin%20hi%C3%A7bir%20blo%C4%9Fa%20%C3%BCye,Ukrayna%20bu%20giri%C5%9Fiminin%20ard%C4%B1ndan%20NATO%27ya%20%C3%BCye%20.

²³⁵NATO. (2021a). *Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021* Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.

²³⁶BBC News. (2022). *Russia launches military attack on Ukraine with reports of explosions and troops crossing border* Retrieved from <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/23/europe/russia-ukraine-putin-military-operation-donbas-intl-hnk/index.html>.

²³⁷The Guardian (2023). *Ex-NATO chief proposes Ukraine joins without Russian-occupied territories* Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/11/ex-nato-chief-proposes-ukraine-joins-without-russian-occupied-territories>.

2.2.4. Economic Reasons

Energy has an important place in Russian-Ukraine economic relations. Ukraine is a bridge between Russia and Europe due to its geopolitical location. This situation puts Ukraine in a key position in terms of energy security. Before Russia intervened in Ukraine in 2022, most of the oil and natural gas extracted in the Caspian basin and Russia were shipped to Europe via Ukraine. In 2020, it was the country that transported the most Russian natural gas and oil to the European market²³⁸. In addition, almost all the natural gas sent from Russia to the European market was shipped through Ukraine, and the energy sector ranked first in commercial relations between the two countries.

Ukraine is a country dependent in Russia for oil and natural gas. Over time, this issue has created problems between the two countries²³⁹. Especially in times of tension, Russia has used natural gas as an important weapon. Russia has made significant increases in natural gas prices, especially during election periods, for RF pro-governments to come to power. For example, natural gas prices were used as leverage in the 2006 Ukrainian Parliament and the 2010 presidential elections. It was planned to increase the gas price (per 1000 cubic meters) from 50 dollars to 230 dollars in 2006 and from 250 dollars to 418 dollars in 2009. Since these price increases were not accepted by Ukraine, a decision was made to stop gas shipments to Ukraine. Thus, Ukrainian citizens were affected before the election, and pro-Russian Yanukovich was ensured to win the election in 2010²⁴⁰.

Another topic of discussion in Russia-Ukraine economic relations is the Crimea region, which controls the Black Sea and trade routes. In terms of its geopolitical location, Crimea is a peninsula in the Black Sea with ports and naval bases²⁴¹. Crimea

²³⁸International Energy Agency. (2020). *Ukraine Energy Profile*. Retrieved from <https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ac51678f-5069-4495-9551-87040cb0c99d/UkraineEnergyProfile.pdf>.

²³⁹Erbil, Yazgan. (2010). *Rusya-Ukrayna Doğalgaz Krizi ve Enerji Güvenliği*. Retrieved from <https://academicrepository.khas.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.12469/2096/YazganErbil.pdf?sequence=1>. p.157-158.

²⁴⁰Sarı, Gözde. (2015). p.83-84.

²⁴¹Özmen, H. Alparslan. (2014). *Enerji Güvenliği Politikaları ve Kırım, (Politics of Energy Security and Crimea)*. Uluslararası Enerji ve Güvenlik Kongresi Bildiriler Kitabı (p. 757-781). İstanbul: Bilgesam.p.760.

remained a part of Russia between 1783 and 1954 and was given to Ukraine by Soviet leader Krushchev in 1954. The reason for this was to reduce anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine and overcome administrative difficulties in the management of Crimea. Since the dissolution of the USSR was not foreseen during this period, Russian society was not disturbed by the administration of Crimea from Ukraine. With the disintegration of the USSR, Russian statesmen and leaders made some attempts to reconnect Crimea to Russia, but they could not realize it due to the unfavorable international situation²⁴².

The main cause of the Crimean problem is the Sevastopol port. Sevastopol is the gateway connecting Russia to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. In pre-Russian Federation periods, the Russian navy was stationed in the port of Sevastopol due to its importance in the Black Sea. Sevastopol port, which came out of Russia's sovereignty after Ukraine left the USSR, remained the most suitable port for the Black Sea navy to be stationed in the post-USSR period²⁴³. For this reason, Russia used the Sevastopol port by leasing. In 2010, an agreement was signed with Ukraine and Russia extending the use of the Russian Naval Base in Crimea for another 25 years, starting in 2017. However, this agreement made during the Yanukovych period created a contradiction in the foreign policy of Ukraine, which applied for NATO membership. This agreement ended with Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014²⁴⁴.

2.3. Russia-Ukraine War with Hybrid War Dimension

In this part, Russia-Ukraine war will be examined with the hybrid war dimension. To see how war developed in detail, information will be given about phase by phase according to hybrid war strategy. In the first phase information will be given about intelligence activities. In the second phase information will be given about psychological operations activities. In the third phase and the fourth phase information will be given about the unconventional operations and conventional operations respectively.

²⁴²Özmen, H. Alparslan. (2014). p.762.

²⁴³Sarı, Gözde. (2015). p.47.

²⁴⁴Sarı, Gözde. (2015). p.85.

2.3.1. First Phase: Intelligence Activities

Russia's intervention in 2022 is a continuation of the process that started in 2014. The Russian army's efforts to shape its operational area date back to before the conflict period. Ukrainian officials stated that Russia was trying to disrupt the balance in Ukraine with cyber-attacks, economic pressure, and new tactics. In the pre-war period that started in 2021, Russian intelligence organizations, FSB (Federal Security Service Unit) ²⁴⁵ and SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) ²⁴⁶, began to carry out intelligence activities to make it easier for Russia to take over and intervene in the region. The main aim at this point was to ensure that the achievement of strategic goals was achieved with the onset of the conflict. The Russian intelligence agency FSB has been responsible for the attitude of the local population towards the Ukrainian administration and Russia. At this point, firstly, identification of local opposition groups supporting the occupation of Ukraine was done. Secondly, during the occupation phase, people who would take part in the local government was identified among those who sympathize with Russia. At the same time, a structure close to the Ukrainian government and capable of transmitting information to the Russian side was created. The connection between unconventional warfare elements and local elements in the pre-conflict period was ensured. During the same period, the SVR trying to organize opposition groups by highlighting local problems such as energy prices, tax reforms, and legal problems²⁴⁷.

During the attack planning phase, Russian intelligence units created a detailed picture of Ukraine, identified those who would work in their favor. Efforts were made to

²⁴⁵The Federal Security Service (FSB) is an executive body of the federal government, controlled by the President of the Russian Federation and authorized to implement government policy in the field of national security. The tasks of the service are counterterrorism and defense of the Russian Federation, protection of the state border of the Russian Federation, internal defense, ensuring Russian data security, coordinating counterintelligence activities.

Russian Government. (2024a). *Federal Security Service*. Russian Government. Retrieved from <http://government.ru/en/department/113/>.

²⁴⁶The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is a part of the national security system, supervised The President of the Russian Federation. Its task is to protect individuals, society, and the country from external threats.

Russian Government (2024b). *Foreign Intelligence Service*. Russian Government. Retrieved from <http://government.ru/en/department/112/>.

²⁴⁷Watling, Jack., & Reynolds, Nick. (2022, 2 15). *The Plot to Destroy Ukraine*. Retrieved from RUSI: <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/plot-destroy-ukraine> . p.10.

ensure that the collaborators were in positions of power. Thus, while their subordinate employees thought they were working for Ukrainian interests, they were unknowingly working for Russian interests. At this stage, Ukrainian officials, state officials, senior figures of intelligence services, political parties, non-governmental organizations, and criminal organizations were used to prepare the environment before the attack²⁴⁸.

By using these people and groups;

- Ukraine's national security system was weakened,
- The country's ability to counterintelligence was reduced,
- Senior military and political leaders were misled against internal and external threats,
- Information was obtained about the defense system in the south of Ukraine,
- In the east of Ukraine, which was under Russian occupation, information about Ukraine's intelligence system, intelligence personnel, and their families was being revealed, and their effectiveness was reduced.

Pressure was put on collaborators and political leaders to give up joining NATO and the EU and to maintain the neutrality of the country. Thus, Russia was disrupting the internal balance of the country before the invasion, government and military functioning, and ensuring that the necessary conditions were created before the invasion²⁴⁹.

With the exercises it carried out in the border region during the pre-conflict period, Russia aimed to make Ukraine accept the situation before the conventional operation and to change its favorable attitude from West. After the conflict, intelligence activities were carried out by the Military Intelligence Unit²⁵⁰ (GRU)²⁵¹. The purpose of

²⁴⁸Inskeep, Steve., & Mann, Brian. (2022, 5 18). *Ukrainian officials fired after probe shows their workers collaborated with Russia*. NPR: Retrieved from <https://www.npr.org/2022/07/18/1111985737/ukrainian-officials-fired-after-probe-shows-their-workers-collaborated-with-russ> .

²⁴⁹Watling, Jack., & Danylyuk, Oleksandr. V., & Reynolds, Nick. (2023, 3 23). *Preliminary Lessons from Russia's Unconventional Operations During the Russo Ukrainian War, February 2022–February 2023*. Royal United Services Institute: Retrieved from <https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf> . p.7-8-9.

²⁵⁰The GRU is an intelligence unit which is controlled by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Its duty is to run intelligence service and maintains its special Units.

the GRU was to support conventional operations and shape the operational environment by increasing pro-Russian views in Ukraine. However, after the failure to achieve the desired goals, many high-level intelligence officers were dismissed from their positions. At the same time, in the Wagner uprising led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Russian domestic intelligence service FSB's failure to inform the Kremlin before the uprising and its failure to take precautions led to its effectiveness in terms of intelligence being questioned²⁵².

2.3.2. Second Phase: Psychological Operations Activities

Psychological operations are mainly carried out systematically and multidimensionally against human domains determined by intelligence, especially by destroying information infrastructures through cyber-attacks (sabotage) and misleading information. By using this method, it is possible to weaken the enemy's morale and break his will to fight in the process²⁵³. At the military level, it is possible to make dysfunctional the command-and-control elements, air defense systems, target marking and strike capacity, and communication systems used within the framework of network-supported operations through cyber-attacks. Weapons and equipment containing the information network can be targeted by cyberattacks²⁵⁴.

Russia's interventions in Estonia, Georgia, and Crimea have revealed Russia's cyberattack capacity. Russia used information operations and cyber operations effectively in the Ukraine war, as it did in the Crimea intervention. RF gave the first signals that it would demonstrate this capacity before the war. For example, according to the statement of the official authorities in Ukraine, there were nearly 300,000

Reuters. (2018). *Fact box - What is Russia's GRU military intelligence agency?* Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-russia-gru-factbox/what-is-russias-gru-military-intelligence-agency-idUSKCN1MF1VK/>.

²⁵¹Bostock, Bill. (2022, 5 10). *Putin sacked the FSB and put the secretive GRU spy agency in charge of Ukraine intelligence after a string of failures, top Russian journalists say.* Business insider: Retrieved from <https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-gru-in-charge-ukraine-intel-after-fsb-failures-report-2022-5>.

²⁵²Soldatov, Andrei., & Borogan, Irina. (2023, 7 6). *The Most Important Lesson of the Wagner Rebellion Is the FSB's Failure.* Foreign Affairs: Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putin-security-crisis-wagner-rebellion>.

²⁵³Gök, Ali. (2019). p.95.

²⁵⁴Arslan, Hasan. (2023, 9 26). *Hibrit Savaş Perspektifinden Rusya'nın 2022 Yılı Ukrayna Müdahalesi.* Savunma Bilimleri Dergisi. p.339.

cyberattacks in 2021. In 2017, Ukrainian systems were infiltrated with the Notpeya virus, and when this virus later spread all over the world, user information system devices became unusable. In January 2022, an attack was carried out against public institutions in Ukraine with Whispergate malware, and an attempt was made to prevent the use of public services²⁵⁵. During the same period, it attempted to render public services inoperable by carrying out a cyber-attack (Distributed Denial of Service, DDOS) ²⁵⁶ on the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. Since March 2022, Ukraine has responded to Russia with cyber-attacks by groups such as Anonymous and the IT Army of Ukraine²⁵⁷.

According to Microsoft's report, cyber-attacks were carried out in coordination with other actions in the information field. Before the occupation, Ukraine had access to internet technology services, financial institutions, energy infrastructure, etc. Attempts were made to make their cyber infrastructure unusable by carrying out malware attacks²⁵⁸. By sharing propaganda messages on the sites they captured, hackers tried to undermine the public's trust in the government and public services. Following increasing Russian cyber-attacks and internet outages at the beginning of the war, Starlink manager Elon Musk was asked to support Ukraine with his satellites²⁵⁹. Thus, doubts were created about whether the government could protect Ukrainian lands.

In addition to cyber-attacks, misinformation has also been used to undermine trust in the Ukrainian government. According to EU data, 13,500 pro-Russian misinformation activities targeting Ukraine have been carried out since 2015. While

²⁵⁵Ringhof, Julian., & Torreblanca, J. Ignacio. (2022, 02 23). *The virtual front line: How EU tech power can help Ukraine*. European Council on Foreign Relations: Retrieved from <https://ecfr.eu/article/the-virtual-front-line-how-eu-tech-power-can-help-ukraine/>.

²⁵⁶Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are sophisticated attacks designed to flood a network with unnecessary traffic. A DDoS attack causes either a reduction in network performance or a direct disruption of critical infrastructure.

²⁵⁷STM Thinktech. (2022, 1 1). *Siber Tehdit Durum Raporu Ocak-Mart 2022*. STM Thinktech: Retrieved from <https://thinktech.stm.com.tr/tr/siber-tehdit-durum-raporu-ocak-mart-2022> . p.29.

²⁵⁸Microsoft. (2022, 4 27). *Special Report: Ukraine*. Microsoft: Retrieved from <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/security-insider/reports/special-reports/special-report-ukraine/> . p.12.

²⁵⁹Browne, Ed. (2022, 3 10). *Ukraine VP Mykhailo Fedorov Thanks Elon Musk as 2nd Starlink Shipment Arrives*. Newsweek: Retrieved from <https://www.newsweek.com/mykhailo-fedorov-ukraine-elon-musk-space-starlink-delivery-1686726> .

almost 40% of misinformation activities directly target Ukraine, the rest have aimed at affecting public support from Western countries that support Ukraine. However, the impact of disinformation activities and cyber-attacks is not limited to the cyber domain. International cooperation in Ukraine's economy has also been limited, as international companies and banks are worried about whether the attacks will affect their own networks. Cyber-attacks and disinformation activities were used by Russia before and during the conflict, thus trying to gain superiority by using information flows as weapons²⁶⁰. Before the conflict period, messages were shared on the mobile phones of Ukrainian soldiers, warning them that Russia would invade Ukraine and not to resist. In addition to this, an electronic warfare system capable of jamming GSM networks was also used²⁶¹.

Ukraine has cooperated with the EU in the field of cyber security since 2013 and in the fight against misinformation since 2015²⁶². In this context, the reason why Russian psychological operations activities did not have as much impact as the intervention in Crimea in 2014, which was the first phase of the war, is the increased awareness of Russia's hybrid warfare tactics in the Ukraine²⁶³. Although Russia was superior in cyber and disinformation activities at the beginning of the war, Ukraine's activity in the information dimension of the war, including on social media, changed the situation²⁶⁴.

2.3.3. Third Phase: Unconventional Operations Strategy

According to the Army Special Operations document, special operations include capability of implementing a combination of lethal and non-lethal operations by specially trained and educated forces. It includes a deep understanding of cultures and

²⁶⁰Ringhof, Julian., & Torreblanca, J. Ignacio. (2022).

²⁶¹Kasapoğlu, Can. (2022, 2 24). *Rusya – Ukrayna Savaşı: Askeri-Sstratejik Değerlendirme*. EDAM: <https://edam.org.tr/acik-kaynakli-istihbarat-ve-savunma-analizleri/rusya-ukrayna-savasi-askeri-stratejik-degerlendirme> .

²⁶²Ringhof, Julian., & Torreblanca, J. Ignacio. (2022).

²⁶³Arslan, Hasan. (2023, 9 26). p.344.

²⁶⁴Mutch, Thomas. (2023, 3 3). *Sound and Fury: Why Russia's Feared 'Hybrid Warfare' Has Failed in Ukraine*. Popular Mechanics: Retrieved from <https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/a42940310/why-russias-hybrid-warfare-failed-in-ukraine/> .

foreign languages, proficiency in small unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside conventional forces in uncertain or hostile environment²⁶⁵.

In the Gerasimov Doctrine, basic forces in the Russian army are considered military actors, while others are non-military actors. Non-regular warfare actors, private military companies (PMC), and foreign fighters that are not in the regular forces are distinguished as non-military actors²⁶⁶.

During the 2014 phase of its intervention in Ukraine, Russia used its private military companies, and special forces to undertake important tasks. At this stage, since the conflicts in the east of Ukraine and the Crimean Island took place in a relatively narrow operational area, they were sufficient to reach the desired final situation. For example, all strategically important airports, ports, television and radio stations, and roads were taken under control by unconventional warfare forces. At the same time, pro-Russian civilian activists in Sevastopol and some parts of Crimea expressed loyalty to Russia and security concerns. Uniformed and armed people, called little green men, seized the Crimean Parliament and Presidency building on February 27, 2014. The occupied parliament decided to hold a referendum on secession from Ukraine and annexation to Russia²⁶⁷.

In the 2022 phase, Spetsnaz (Russian special forces) were used mostly as the vanguard of regular forces. The reason for this is the effort to reduce the number of soldiers in the Russian army and increase the number of professional soldiers. With its military reform in 2008, the Russian army preferred to create its force structure from brigades like the NATO establishment, which can be deployed quickly, mechanized, and with a reduced number of infantries, as it focuses on regional military problems rather than large-scale war²⁶⁸. In addition, the fact that the intervention started in a larger

²⁶⁵The US ARMY. (2024, 1 14). *Army Special Operations (ADP 3-05)*. Army Publications: Retrieved from [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18909_ADAP%203-05%20C1%20FINAL%20WEB\(2\).pdf](https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18909_ADAP%203-05%20C1%20FINAL%20WEB(2).pdf).

²⁶⁶Arslan, Hasan. (2023, 9 26). p.345.

²⁶⁷KAPLAN, Fırat. (2023). “Hibrit Savaş” Teriminin İkinci Lübnan Savaşı ve Rusya’nın Kırım’ı İlhakı Kapsamında İncelenmesi. Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi, p. 408.

²⁶⁸Global security. (2008). *Russian Army - 2008 Serdyukov Reforms*. Global security: Retrieved from <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/army-orbat->

geographic area caused an increase in the need for larger troops. To support conventional operations, special units were assigned tasks such as special reconnaissance and direct mission operations, causing the loss of special units²⁶⁹.

Private military companies have become an alternative to meet Russia's personnel needs. Especially since the summer of 2022, when it became clear that the war would not end soon, Wagner contributed to the Russian army with its new fighters and offered volunteers, including prisoners, the opportunity to join the war. The Wagner group, which first made its name with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its activities in separatist regions in the east of Ukraine, continued its activities in states such as Syria, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Libya. It played an active role in the conflicts by ensuring that Russia captured the city of Bakhmut in the war in 2022. The Wagner leader claimed his own troops were bombed in June 2023 and rejected a contract that would have placed the group under the direct control of the Russian Ministry of Defense. He began to advance to Moscow to force the Russian Defense Minister and Chief of General Staff to resign. The progress was stopped with the mediation of Belarus. Prigozhin's troops agreed to withdraw to Belarus. The remaining elements were allowed to join the regular army²⁷⁰.

Volunteer foreign fighters are also involved in the second phase of the Ukrainian War. Following Ukrainian leader Zelensky's call, 16,000 people from other states applied to fight in the Ukrainian army²⁷¹. In addition, far-right organizations have been established on the pro-Ukrainian side and have developed relations on an international scale. One of the important of these organizations is the Azov Battalion, which has been in the war as part of the Ukrainian National Guard since 2014. Azov Battalion created an office called "Western Outreach Office" to improve its international relations. Office

[2008.htm#:~:text=In%202008%20reforms%20were%20initiated%20by%20Russian%20Defense,was%20borrowed%20from%20the%20NATO%20%2F%20US%20experience](#) .

²⁶⁹Maloletka, Evgeniy. (2022, 10 5). *Elite Russian Intelligence Unit Suffers Major Losses in Ukraine* – BBC. Moscow Times: retrieved from <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/10/05/elite-russian-intelligence-unit-suffers-major-losses-in-ukraine-bbc-a78980> .

²⁷⁰BBC News Türkçe. (2023e, 6 28). *Wagner: 6 soruda Rus paralı asker grubu hakkında bilinenler ve merak edilenler*. BBC Türkçe: Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-66038564> .

²⁷¹Bella, Timothy., & Timsit, Annabelle. (2022, 3 3). *Ukrainian President Zelensky says 16000 foreigners have volunteered to fight for Ukraine*. Retrieved from Washington Post: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/03/zelensky-ukraine-16000-foreign-volunteers-russia/> .

officials operated throughout Europe, recruited foreign fighters and engaged with like-minded extremist individuals and groups²⁷². Looking at the Russian supporters on the other side of the conflict, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu stated that 16,000 people, mostly of Middle Eastern origin, wanted to volunteer to fight in the war in Ukraine. Thus, it is noteworthy that both sides are supported by foreign fighters²⁷³.

2.3.4. Fourth Phase: Conventional Operations

In the second part of the war, Russia started its ground operation on February 24, 2022, to change the regime in Ukraine. Russian President Putin avoided declaring war by stating that the operation was a special military operation. He declared that the political objective of the military operation was to protect the people of the region and to purify the region from Neo-Nazis.²⁷⁴

Military objectives at the strategic level determined to achieve the political goal are;

- To reduce Ukraine's defense capacity by destroying its land, sea, air, and air defense units,
- Defeating the Ukrainian Land Forces in Donbas,
- To break the country's will to defend and resist the RF forces by occupying Ukraine's political and economic facilities,
- It is defined as deceiving the Ukrainian government about the location, time, and level of force of the attack.²⁷⁵

In the first phase of the war, Russian land forces²⁷⁶ attacked from four fronts. On the northern front, the 29th, 35th, and 36th Armies attacked from Belarus to Kiev. On

²⁷²Azani, Eitan., & Koblenz-Stenzler, Liram., & Atiyas-Lvovsky, Lorean., & Ganor, Dan. (2020). *Far-Right Literature Review — Ideology, Modus Operandi and Developmental Trends*. Herzliya: International Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT). International Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT).

²⁷³Euronews. (2022, 3 11). *Putin, Orta Doğulu 'gönüllü savaşçıların Ukrayna'ya gönderilmesine onay verdi*. Retrieved from Euronews: <https://tr.euronews.com/2022/03/11/putin-orta-dogulu-gonullu-savasc-lar-n-ukrayna-ya-gonderilmesine-onay-verdi>.

²⁷⁴Putin, Vladimir. (2023, 2 8). *Rusya Federasyonu Başkanı'ndan Mesaj (24 Şubat 2022)*. Kremlin: Retrieved from <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843>.

²⁷⁵Seth, G. Jones. (2022). *Russia's Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine*. Center For Strategic and International Studies: Retrieved from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare>. p.2.

the northeastern front, the Central Army attacked Kiev from the western direction. On the eastern front, the Western Army attacked in the direction of Kharkov. On the southern front, units from the Southern Army attacked the north of Zaporizhzhia and the east of Mariupol from Crimea and Odessa²⁷⁷. Although the war was calculated to be short by the Russian military decision-makers, it did not last as expected and aim of government change in Ukraine could not be achieved. The war turned into a war of attrition due to the stopping of the Russian advance and the lack of weapons and ammunition on the Russian side. Although the Ukrainian side wanted to recapture the areas it lost with a counterattack, it could not achieve the desired success. In Ukraine's achieving this result, impact of Western states, especially the United States and the EU, sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine to resist Russian attacks should not be ignored²⁷⁸.

In the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, the prominent issues regarding conventional operations will be discussed within the framework of the main functional areas of the battlefield. In the management of conflict and military operations, command, maneuver, survivability, fire support, mobility, intelligence, and logistics management have been determined as the main functional areas of the battlefield. These areas include systems and tasks that are complementary to each other. They are also guiding factors in achieving military goals and completing missions²⁷⁹.

Command is the activity of systematically carrying out activities to achieve the goal. Commanders integrate the art of command with other functional areas. This activity includes decision-making processes, actions, and headquarters personnel assisting the commander by ensuring effective operation plans. It also requires carrying out activities in the cyberspace and electronic environment; In this way, our own

²⁷⁶Russian Land Forces are composed of five military regions: Eastern, Northern, Southern, Western and Central.

²⁷⁷Seth, G. Jones. (2022). p.2.

²⁷⁸Schwartz, Paul. (2023, 7 1). *A War of Attrition Assessing the Impact of Equipment Shortages on Russian Military Operations in Ukraine*. Center For Strategic and International Studies: Retrieved from https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/202307/230731_Schwartz_War_Attrition.pdf?VersionId=uPaY7viz9tAFL.Og_ncrtmAeJ9yb3NcD. p.23.

²⁷⁹The US Army. (2017). *ADP 3-0 Operations*. Washington, The USA.p.15.

information field is protected while the enemy's information field is restricted. These actions contribute to the command-and-control process²⁸⁰.

In the mentioned war, there were dismissals on the RF side at the command level due to the inability to carry out the lightning war to overthrow the Kiev government. Additionally, as more than ten general-level commanders died during the war, disruptions in command and control occurred. Although Generals Aleksandr Dvornikov, Sergey Surovikin, and Valery Gerasimov were appointed by Putin as operational area commanders respectively, the desired goals were not achieved²⁸¹. On the Ukrainian side, dismissals were followed at the political-military level such as Ukrainian Minister of Defense, the Deputy Ministers, the Special Forces Commander, and the Joint Forces Commander²⁸². The mentioned changes in command support the idea that the desired goals were not achieved on both sides.

Both sides used electronic warfare and cyberwarfare in coordination with their conventional capabilities. In this way, while increasing their own capabilities in the electronic domain and cyberspace, they reduced the other party's capabilities. For example, by applying electronic jamming, they attempted to reduce the effectiveness of air defense radars' navigation systems²⁸³. On the other hand, in coordination with conventional operations, civilian and military communication systems and command

²⁸⁰The US Army. (2016). *ADRP 3-0 Operations*. US ARMY: Retrieved from <https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/ADRP%203-0%20OPERATIONS%2011NOV16.pdf> . p.61.

²⁸¹Nechepurenko, I. (2023, 12 1). *Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the new head of Russia's war effort, is the Kremlin's top military commander*. The NY Times: Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/europe/who-is-gerasimov-russia.html> .

²⁸²SFORZA, Lauren. (2023). *Zelensky sacks commander of Ukraine's joint forces*. The Hill: Retrieved from <https://thehill.com/policy/international/3875064-zelensky-sacks-commander-of-ukraines-joint-forces/> .

²⁸³The new voice of Ukraine. (2024). *How electronic warfare can counter Russian drones and missiles – expert interview*. MSN: Retrieved from https://www.yahoo.com/news/electronic-warfare-counter-russian-drones-195000700.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmluZy5jb20v&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAMB_BbyiuQ9YLPkvb4t-NQvb8k7i5eOJG2ZpRhWYE2JBLI2uBvx7SbFcvV4Av7QrdJzsXnTsK2JSGQ7xnmr1TMrLRXuth3aqeRWupNh5zxxz16o4u_15qmKA0CXPL3xmEolwolP9ZvCsKkU53_RX7kOnCJPuchFAvySgQ-4Hv .

and control systems have become the targets of cyberattacks. Companies such as Microsoft and SpaceX supported Ukraine against Russian cyberattacks²⁸⁴.

Movement and manoeuvre are, placing the enemy to a disadvantage a position by using combat power flexibly. In a conventional war, mounted, dismounted and land aviation systems is required to achieve tactical and operative targets. While in asymmetric warfare uses the same systems, it aims to create effects that are not proportional to its power to neutralize the enemy. Manoeuvre is inherently related with direct fire support and close combat while engaging with the enemy in the line of contact. In manoeuvre commanders use shock, surprise, and momentum to defeat the enemy²⁸⁵.

At the beginning of the operation, the Russians did not choose swamps and forests as the axis of advance to create speed and a dominant effect. Since this situation made the advancing force dependent on roads and settlements, it made it easier for the Ukrainian side to detect it. Apart from location detection provided by conventional capabilities, the use of intelligence provided by local people and commercial civilian satellites has provided an advantage to the Ukrainian side. On the Russian side, the force was organized as a Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) from the beginning of the war. With the establishment of the Battalion Tactical Group, combat, combat support, and combat service support elements such as tanks, infantry, engineers, artillery, and maintenance in the Brigade establishment are allocated to the battalion establishment. In this way, while creating self-sufficient units supported by fire and support elements, speed and flexibility are added to the operation. However, the inadequacy of the infantry force for the specified maneuver power caused a weakness in tank-infantry cooperation. In addition, the number of soldiers, which was empirically evaluated as twenty soldiers per thousand people to keep the residential area under control, remained at seven per thousand level in the Russian army. For the above-mentioned reasons, it became

²⁸⁴Smith, Brad. (2022). *Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War*. Microsoft: Retrieved from <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/>.

²⁸⁵The US Army. (2016). p.62.

difficult for the Russian maneuver forces to keep the cities under control, and their losses increased²⁸⁶.

In conventional warfare, mobility capability is considered an element of maneuver to increase friendly mobility and hinder enemy mobility. In this context, duties such as keeping the transportation routes open, mine and counter-mine operations, and combating IEDs (improvised explosive devices) are carried out. In the Russian understanding of operations, two engineering companies are allocated to each brigade. While one company focuses on counter-mine missions, the second company focuses on survivability measures for force protection. During the operation, Russian engineering troops supported the combat troops by carrying out mine and counter-mine operations and creating defensive positions for the defending troops²⁸⁷.

Fire support is an integral element of the maneuver. Fire support includes artillery, mortar, rocket, and missile fire, fire support from aircraft and ships, air and missile defense systems, and target management procedures. Fire support leaves lethal and non-lethal effects on the target in defensive and offensive missions. Fire support units support friendly units with mortar and artillery fire and integrate joint and combined fires²⁸⁸.

Ukraine and Russia have used significant amounts of artillery ammunition to support their own maneuver units since the beginning of the operation. This situation has led to a decrease in ammunition stocks, even in western countries that support Ukraine. Since, Ukraine's weekly artillery ammunition consumption was 40 thousand, it is estimated that western countries supporting Ukraine will complete their artillery ammunition stocks within 15 years²⁸⁹.

Russia used rocket and missile systems to destroy critical military and civilian infrastructure elements in Ukraine. This situation has occasionally brought about

²⁸⁶Seth, G. Jones. (2022, 6 1). p.5-6.

²⁸⁷Watling, Jack., & Danylyuk, Oleksandr. V., & Reynolds, Nick. (2023, 3 23).p.9.

²⁸⁸The US Army. (2016, 12 11). p.63.

²⁸⁹Lopatka, Jan. (2022, 12 5). *Restocking Western ammunition after arming Ukraine will take years - producer*. Reuters: Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-ammunition-csg/restocking-western-ammunition-after-arming-ukraine-will-take-years-producer-idINL8N32R4T9/> .

discussions about civilian casualties. In addition, the RF faced difficulties with the reproduction and supply of the important Iskander missile systems²⁹⁰. However, precision-guided missiles were supplied to the Ukrainian side by Western states, providing the opportunity for precision strikes not only on tactical but also on operational and strategic targets. In addition, the specified ammunition in the inventories of the former Soviet bloc and new NATO member states was transferred to the Ukrainian side, enabling it to be used in a short time²⁹¹.

Both sides received external support in terms of air-fire support. While Russia carried out attacks with Iranian-made Shahed kamikaze drones, Ukraine used Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 armed unmanned aerial vehicles both for target detection and for taking targets under fire. The Netherlands and Denmark have approved the delivery of 37 F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. Western countries, especially England, have also agreed to provide training on pilot training and aircraft maintenance and repair. Regarding air defense systems, Ukraine was given Patriot and S300 high-altitude air defense systems, thus strengthened its air and missile defense capacity²⁹².

Survival is the set of actions taken to protect the force. Commanders protect the force by conducting rescue activities, combating mines and IEDs, medical service support, coordinating air and missile defense, taking security measures by conducting risk analysis, and conducting operations against CBRN and terrorism. In this way, it protects the force against sudden attacks and maintains the maximum force against the enemy²⁹³.

Since the beginning of the operation, Russia has launched attacks against Ukraine's military and critical civilian infrastructure with its air force and missile systems. In the first 21 days of the war, more than 1,100 missiles were fired, targeting fuel facilities, bridges, and Ukrainian army supply and transfer points. Ukraine protected

²⁹⁰Kossov, Igor. (2023, 1 13). *How many missiles does Russia have left?* The KYIV INDEPENDENT: Retrieved from <https://kyivindependent.com/how-many-missiles-does-russia-have-left/>.

²⁹¹BBC News. (2023). *Ukraine weapons: What tanks and other equipment are countries giving?* BBC: Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62002218>.

²⁹²BBC News. (2023).

²⁹³The US Army. (2016, 12 11). p.65.

its airspace against Russia's cruise missiles, aircraft, and helicopters with Stinger and Patriot S300 air defense systems. Therefore, Russia could not achieve air superiority in Ukrainian airspace as it wanted²⁹⁴. A similar situation also occurred on Navy platforms. On April 13, 2022, the flagship of Russia's Black Sea fleet, Moscow, was hit by Ukraine's Neptune anti-ship missiles²⁹⁵. It was also announced that Russia's Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol was hit by Ukrainian missiles on September 22, 2023²⁹⁶.

The intelligence function area provides the commander and decision-makers with information about the terrain, weather, enemy, civilians, and other factors that make up the operational environment. Intelligence includes the tasks of increasing situational awareness, carrying out information acquisition activities, collecting information about the target, and improving and benefiting from the situation. Information collection is achieved by carrying out reconnaissance and surveillance activities. The intelligence gained guides the decision-making process. By ensuring information flow, units are constantly supported by the information provided²⁹⁷.

Russia has been developing C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) systems for many years. The main purpose of the development of these systems is to obtain real-time information, perform target management in the best way, and make strikes with weapons that have precision strike capabilities. Therefore, it is aimed at keeping possible collateral damage to a minimum. Since the beginning of the operation, Ukraine has been benefiting from human intelligence as well as the visual intelligence provided by unmanned aerial vehicles. While the Russian army was passing through Ukrainian cities and villages, local people provided intelligence by providing location and direction

²⁹⁴US Department of Defense. (2022, 3 21). *Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing*. US Department of Defense: <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2973395/senior-defense-official-holds-a-background-briefing/>.

²⁹⁵LAGRONE, Sam. (2022, 5 5). *Warship Moskva was Blind to Ukrainian Missile Attack, Analysis Shows*. USNI NEWS: <https://news.usni.org/2022/05/05/warship-moskva-was-blind-to-ukrainian-missile-attack-analysis-shows>.

²⁹⁶Habertürk. (2023, 9 22). *Kırım'da Rus Karadeniz Donanması'nın karargahına füze saldırısı*. Habertürk: <https://www.haberturk.com/kirim-da-rus-karadeniz-donanmasi-nin-karargahina-fuze-saldirisi-3623798>.

²⁹⁷The US Army. (2016). p.5-4.

information on social media²⁹⁸. Russia and Ukraine effectively use unmanned aerial vehicles to track and direct fire to the target area. In addition to the use of tactical, operative, and strategic unmanned aerial vehicles, micro-unmanned aerial vehicles and kamikaze drones have been used effectively to both detect, direct, and fire targets. In the use of these technologies, the operator follows the target until the last moment with his virtual reality glasses, dives on the target with his precision hit ability, and either releases ammunition or destroys the target with the ammunition within itself²⁹⁹. According to the statement made by Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mikhail Federov on December 20, 2023, 200 Russian vehicles, including 39 tanks, 41 armored vehicles, and 66 trucks, were destroyed by drones within a week. Although Ukraine comes to the fore in the development of the mentioned technology, the Russian side has recently increased its speed in the use and development of this technology³⁰⁰.

Combat service support is of vital importance in ensuring the continuation of the operation and the continuation of the system and missions. Combat service support is a decision point in deciding how long the range of the operation will be. Combat service support includes supply, transportation, maintenance, personnel, and health service support³⁰¹.

No mobilization was declared in what Russia initially called a special military operation. However, during the continuation of the operation on September 21, 2022, partial mobilization of personnel was needed due to Russia's slowdown of the offensive and winter preparations³⁰². Additionally, Russia encountered logistics and maintenance

²⁹⁸Judah, Tim. (2022, 4 10). *How Kyiv was saved by Ukrainian ingenuity as well as Russian blunders*. The Financial Times: Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/e87fdc60-0d5e-4d39-93c6-7cfd22f770e8?sharetype=blocked&fbclid=IwAR3vbE3D6dR1AU-SXp9rVXLm0PcssarcR5udGd-SVKw-zYq7ybFXxO9kQkw>.

²⁹⁹Dysa, Yuliia. & Popeski, Ron. (2023, 12 20). *Ukraine to produce a million FPV drones next year - minister*. Reuters: Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-produce-million-fpv-drones-next-year-minister-2023-12-20/>.

³⁰⁰Ali, Taz. (2023, 11 24). *Russia gains advantage with first-person view drones as Ukraine plays catch up*. Inews: Retrieved from <https://inews.co.uk/news/world/russia-advantage-first-person-drones-ukraine-catch-up-2769987>.

³⁰¹The US Army. (2016). p.63-64.

³⁰²BBC News Türkçe. (2022, 09 21). *Putin Rusya'da kısmi seferberlik ilan etti, AB yeni yaptırımlar getireceğini açıkladı*. BBC: Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c4n0jy1gx81o#:~:text=Rusya%20Devlet%20Ba%C5%9Fkan%C4%>

problems in the operation. Due to the difficulties, especially in the supply of artillery, rockets, and precision guided missiles, domestic production capacity has increased. There have been problems in the domestic production of critical defense technologies, such as tank production, due to the sanctions of Western countries and the inability to procure critical parts. Due to the failure to secure the supply routes of the troops on the line of contact, supply convoys have been exposed to Ukrainian ambushes and attacks. Main supply lines have been rendered unusable by attacks, such as the Kerch bridge, which is of vital importance for Russia and connects Crimea to the Russian mainland³⁰³. There were disruptions in the supply of troops due to the blocking of railway lines and the inability to supply from cities³⁰⁴. Thus, there were problems in delivering supplies such as water, bread, food, fuel, and ammunition to the troops, which could affect the continuation of the operation. On the Ukrainian side, it has experienced problems in the supply of air defense, anti-tank, and artillery ammunition in its inventory because they are of Russian origin. The bottleneck in ammunition supply was tried to be overcome by increasing domestic production capacity and providing support from western countries³⁰⁵.

[B1%20Vladimir%20Putin,yedek%20birlikleri%20de%20g%C3%B6reve%20%C3%A7a%C4%9Fr%C4%B1lacak](https://www.indyturk.com/node/648376/d%C3%BCn%C3%A7a%C4%9Fr%C4%B1lacak) .

³⁰³Independent Türkçe. (2023, 7 18). *Kerç Köprüsü'ne düzenlenen saldırı Ukrayna üstlendi*. Independent Türkçe: Retrieved from <https://www.indyturk.com/node/648376/d%C3%BCn%C3%A7a%C4%9Fr%C4%B1lacak> .

³⁰⁴Vershinin, Alex. (2022, 10 3). *Russia's Logistical Problems may slow down Russia's advance—but they are unlikely to stop it*. Modern War Institute: Retrieved from <https://mwi.usma.edu/russias-logistical-problems-may-slow-down-russias-advance-but-they-are-unlikely-to-stop-it/> .

³⁰⁵ASLAN, Murat. (2023, 3 1). *Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı' nın bir yılı*. İstanbul. Retrieved from <https://setav.org/assets/uploads/2023/03/A384.pdf> .

CHAPTER THREE

3. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S RESPONSE TO HYBRID THREATS

This section will describe how the European Union has responded to hybrid threats. Although the European Union has always responded to hybrid threats, the pace of this response has quickened in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the uncontrolled migration crisis that resulted from the Syrian Civil War. In addition to the military, several institutions and practices related to food, energy, health, border control, cyber security, and national, regional, and international relations have been called into question because of the EU's response to hybrid threats. The planning and execution of initiatives involving threat identification, awareness-building, resilience-building, prevention, crisis response, and renewal was also required of member nations.

3.1. The European Union's Response to Hybrid Threats

While the European Union has always responded to hybrid threats, in recent years it has become more active, particularly considering Russia's annexation of Crimea, the Syrian Civil War's irregular migration crisis, and the rise in the activities of foreign terrorist combatants operating inside the Union³⁰⁶. The world's danger landscape has evolved, as stressed in the joint communication document "Common Framework for Countering Hybrid Threats: European Union Response," which was released by the EU Commission on April 6, 2016³⁰⁷. This text is crucial to comprehending how the EU views the modern hybrid environment and how it takes security measures against potential dangers. This text also mentioned EU-NATO collaboration and said that developments in the Balkans and southern Europe had an impact on European security. It was requested of member nations to organize and carry out projects involving threat identification, raising awareness, building resilience, prevention, crisis management, and

³⁰⁶ Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.9.

³⁰⁷European Commission. (2016b, 4 6). *Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response Preventing, responding to crisis and recovering*. EUR-LEX: Retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016JC0018> .

renewal. First, to detect risks, member nations were requested to do hybrid risk research to expose their vulnerabilities³⁰⁸.

The European Union Hybrid Fusion Cell³⁰⁹, which operates under the European Union Intelligence³¹⁰ and Situation Center³¹¹, was created with the intention of increasing awareness. In this cell, officials from the member nations assessed the open and secret intelligence gathered. As such, intelligence can be used to the multilateral advantage of the member states of the Union. The Hybrid Threat Center of Excellence has also a function of increasing awareness through sharing knowledge and lessons learned. In the areas of energy, cyber security, strategic communication, civil-military collaboration, and the enhancement of crisis response capabilities, this institution supports the European Union³¹².

Resilience building aims to stop hybrid threats by preventing the exploitation of member state supply networks, vital infrastructure, and social vulnerabilities. Strengthening the security of energy networks, nuclear facilities, and land, air, and sea transportation are all part of the effort to protect vital infrastructure³¹³. The goal is to utilize the Galileo observation satellite to always monitor hybrid danger, given that a sensitivity in the space infrastructure might impact numerous sectors. Furthermore, these advances suggest that the Union has recognized the significance of creating new

³⁰⁸European Council. (2016, 5 27). *Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, (Warsaw: 8 July 2016). European Council: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf>.

³⁰⁹The EU Hybrid Fusion Cell: Under the European Union Intelligence and Situation Center, it started operating. By merging hybrid threat data from member nations, it offers early warning and improves situational awareness. The Intelligence and Situation Center transforms the combined data into assessments.

³¹⁰The European Union Intelligence and Situation Center: It was founded on March 12, 2012. Under the European Union External Action Service Presidency, it functions. Its goal is to examine warnings and intelligence in order to jointly establish a threat assessment.

Ray, Catherine. (2022). Eu Intcen. State Watch: Retrived from <https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2016/may/eu-intcen-factsheet.pdf>. p.1.

³¹¹European Union External Action Service. (2018). *A Europe That Protects: Countering Hybrid Threats*. European Union External Action Service: retrieved from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/hybrid_threats_en_final.pdf. p.1.

³¹²Hybrid Coe. (2022). *Hybrid Centre of Excellence*. Retrieved from <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/who-what-and-how/>.

³¹³ Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.10.

technologies to counter hybrid threats. In the context of safeguarding public health and food safety, it is acknowledged that the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials can contaminate the environment. Diseases of animals and plants can be intentionally disseminated, posing a risk to various aspects of life, including food safety³¹⁴.

Digital services are important to the EU in terms of maintaining cyber security. Because hybrid threats have the potential to exert pressure on these services that facilitate the utilization of vital infrastructure. Increasing collaboration and information sharing is necessary to raise member nations' cybersecurity capacities. It is crucial in this situation to adhere to the uniform methodology of the European Union Network and Information Security Agency³¹⁵. It also becomes evident that coordination between the EU institutions' Computer Emergency Response Team and the member nations' Computer Security Incident Response Teams is required³¹⁶. Applications, such as those that explain how to prevent cyberattacks, implement preventative measures, and lessen their impacts, are being created to safeguard energy plants against cyberattacks. Cooperation between domestic and foreign financial institutions using threat information sharing platforms was prioritized since financial organizations might also become targets of cyberattacks. Increasing the resilience of the digital infrastructure of the land, air, and railways is intended to prevent cyberattacks, which also target the transportation sector³¹⁷.

To stop the financing of hybrid threats, unstable places may be established where terrorists can obtain financial assistance. In this regard, information sharing, monitoring

³¹⁴European Commission. (2016). *Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response, Increasing cooperation with NATO*. European Commission: Retrieved from <https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016JC0018> . p.4.

³¹⁵Located in Athens, the European Union Network and Information Security Agency was founded in 2004. Later on, the European Union Agency for Cyber Security became its new name. The institution's responsibilities include developing Union-wide protocols for preventing and responding to cyberthreats, offering advice to member nations, and building cyber security capacities.

ENISA. (2024). *ENISA Mandate and Regulatory Framework* ENISA: Retrieved from <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/about-enisa/regulatory-framework> .

³¹⁶In 2012, the EU institutions formed the Computer Emergency Response Team. It is in charge of guaranteeing the cyber security of institutions and organizations inside the European Union.

³¹⁷CERT-EU. (2022, 8 27). *The Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU institutions*. Retrieved from <https://cert.europa.eu/about-us> .

dubious money transactions, and collaborating with financial intelligence units³¹⁸ have become more crucial³¹⁹.

It is believed that terrorists might radicalize innocent people using social media and other online platforms, which is relevant when discussing how to develop resilience against radicalization and extreme violence. The usage of the Radicalization Awareness Network³²⁰ was highlighted in this context, and it was stressed how important it is to take care to remove illegal content from the internet³²¹.

As the European Neighborhood Policy states, building relationships with neighbors to the south and east is crucial when it comes to cooperating with third parties. In this context, efforts are being made to establish properly functioning institutions. Financial assistance has been made to prevent instability in third countries, while cooperation is being developed to prevent organized crime, terrorism, irregular migration, and illegal light weapons transfer. As a result, domestic threats and potential external instability are avoided for the security of Europe³²².

It is estimated that the European Hybrid Fusion Cell, created in the context of crisis management and response, will bring together hybrid threat assessments at the Union level in one location. Additionally, it expedites the flow of information to bodies that make decisions. In this way, the possibility of a more rapid and unified response to the situation was announced. The necessity of developing civilian crisis response

³¹⁸Financial Intelligence Units: Their purpose is to prevent organized crime organizations and terrorists from laundering money and financing terrorism by monitoring suspicious money transfers. The feature of Financial Intelligence Units is that they can cooperate with equivalent organizations and government institutions in other countries.

³¹⁹Centre of Excellence. (2022, 8 27). *Financial intelligence Units*. Centre of Excellence: Retrieved from <https://www.coe.int/en/web/moneyval/implementation/fiu#:~:text=The%20global%20efforts%20to%20establish,the%20structures%20enforcing%20criminal%20legislation> .

³²⁰The European Union Migration and Internal Relations Commission oversees the Radicalization Awareness Network's operations. The network facilitates information sharing and research on radical prevention by bringing together experts in the fields of academia, science, and practice. European Commission. (2022b). *Radicalisation Awareness Network*. European Commission Website: Retrieved from https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran_en .

³²¹European Commission. (2022b).

³²²European Commission. (2015a). *Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy*. European Commission Website: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2018-12/joint-communication_review-of-the-enp.pdf . p.14.

capabilities against hybrid threats is underlined. Thus, it is ensured that national aspects are coordinated with the European Emergency Response³²³ Coordination Center³²⁴.

Article 222, sometimes known as the Solidarity Article, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides the legal framework for handling and responding to the crisis.³²⁵ Based on the European Council's 2014/415/EU decision, other member nations will be empowered to support a member country if it becomes the victim of terrorist attacks. The Summit's decision won't be postponed if there is a delay in addressing hybrid threats; instead, the Commission and High Representatives will be asked to conduct an assessment³²⁶. The Union countries, most of which are NATO members, have continued to combat against hybrid threats within NATO. It was mentioned during NATO's Wales Summit in 2014 that cyberattacks might be subject to Article 5 action. It was decided during NATO's Brussels Summit in 2021 that Article 5 would be used to retaliate against any attacks on member states in the event of exposure to a hybrid threat.

Creating, outfitting, and preparing military units to counter hybrid threats is part of the military response to the situation. Under the authority of the Common Security and Defense Policy, the following are included: conducting joint civil-military training; providing advisory services to develop security and defense policies in friendly countries; creating emergency plans to build capabilities to detect hybrid threats beforehand; managing border controls in an emergency; and giving special consideration to issues like CBRN and civilian evacuation³²⁷.

³²³The European Union has the authority to take action in the event of a natural disaster through the European Emergency Response Coordination Center. If the UN or other nations request it, this institute has specialist civil protection teams and equipment to provide relief in the event of a natural disaster anywhere.

European Commission. (2022a). *European Emergency Response Coordination Centre*. European Commission: Retrieved from https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordination-centre-ercc_en.

³²⁴European Commission. (2022a).

³²⁵European Union. (2007). *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Solidarity Clause*. European Union Website: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:solidarity_clause.

³²⁶European Commission. (2022a, 8 27).

³²⁷European Commission. (2016). *Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response, Increasing cooperation with NATO*. European Commission: <https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016JC0018>.

The statement regarding enhancing collaboration with NATO highlights that hybrid threats impact not just the security of the Union but also global institutions like the OSCE, UN, and NATO. Considering this, strengthening ties with NATO becomes critical to adequately anticipate and counter hybrid threats³²⁸.

It is evident, the EU's reaction to hybrid threats has prompted questions about a wide range of institutions and practices, including border control, cyber security, food, energy, health, and national, regional, and international relations.

3.2. The EU-NATO Cooperation for Countering Hybrid Threats

The European Union Global Strategy, which was released in June 2016, placed a strong emphasis on collaboration with NATO. In the joint EU-NATO statement released during the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, the following topics were covered as; Extending and adapting operational cooperation, defending against hybrid threats, increasing cyber security and defense sector coordination, establishing defense capabilities that are consistent and complementary, fortifying the defense industry and enhancing exercise coordination, establishing defense and security capacities, bolstering partner nations' resilience. There will reportedly be collaboration in these seven areas³²⁹.

In the joint statement released on December 6, 2016, the EU and NATO committed to supporting the creation of the hybrid center of excellence as part of their ongoing partnership. The center aims to strengthen countries' capacity, conduct training and exercises, and increase their resilience in the fight against hybrid threats. The joint declaration also mentioned that bringing together official institutions, private businesses, civilians, military personnel, and academics will enhance the flow of ideas. The facility was opened on April 11, 2017³³⁰.

The EU and NATO concentrated on four areas in 2016 and 2017 about threatening hybrid threats and collaborating in the realm of cyber security and defense.

³²⁸ European Commission. (2016). p.1.

³²⁹ European Council. (2016, 5 27). *Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, (Warsaw: 8 July 2016). Retrieved from European Council: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf> .

³³⁰Hybrid Coe. (2022). *Hybrid Centre of Excellence*. <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/who-what-and-how/> .

Situational awareness, strategic communication, cyber security, resilience, and defense were important subjects³³¹.

As of May 2017, collaboration was established between the NATO Hybrid Analysis Branch³³² and the European Union Hybrid Analysis Branch to ensure mutual information exchange within the context of situational awareness. A unified situational picture formed because of collaboration across intelligence units, according to the third progress report. Information sharing between the NATO Hybrid Analysis Unit, the European Union Hybrid Fusion Cell, and the Hybrid Center of Excellence was mentioned in the same progress report³³³. The fourth progress report stated that during the drills against hybrid threats, liaison officers from the EU and NATO visited each other's headquarters³³⁴.

Strategic communication is the second area of focus for NATO-EU cooperation against hybrid threats. According to reports, in the process of enhancing strategic communication, the NATO Hybrid Analysis Unit and the Hybrid Fusion Cell are said to have met informally or formally, shared opinions, and established a shared understanding of countering disinformation. Additionally, representatives of NATO and the European Foreign Service inform one another about misinformation targeting their decision-makers³³⁵. There has been an increase in the Hybrid Center of Excellence's

³³¹Zandee Dick., Meer., & Sico van der (2021). *Countering hybrid threats Steps for improving EU-NATO cooperation* Netherlands Institute of International Relations: Retrieved from <https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2021/countering-hybrid-threats/> . p.4.

³³²The NATO Hybrid Analysis Branch: NATO's defense policy against hybrid threats is predicted on defense, deterrence, and preparation. NATO units keep an eye on hybrid operations and forward data to the Joint Intelligence and Security Division connected to NATO headquarters. The NATO Hybrid Analysis Unit analyzes hybrid threat intelligence from allies and provides decision-makers with information relevant to threats.

NATO. (2022b). *NATO's Response to Hybrid Threats*. NATO:Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm?selectedLocale=en .

³³³NATO. (2018). *Third progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017*. NATO Website: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_06/20180608_1 . p.2.

³³⁴NATO. (2019). *Fourth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017* 27.08.2022 tarihinde. NATO Website: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/190617-4th . p.2.

³³⁵The European Union. (2022). *Seventh progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017*. The European Union Website: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57184/eu-nato-progress-rep> . p.2.

collaboration with the Strategic Communication Center and the NATO Strategic Communication Center of Excellence. With the advancement in the Hybrid Center of Excellence's capacity, novel ideas and collaborations in trainings are being produced³³⁶.

The Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) legislation of the European Union falls under the category of Crisis Response and helps decision-making bodies make and carry out decisions in situations with political and military components, such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In the event of a man-made or natural disaster, such as terrorist attacks, the EU units with member states that are impacted, other players, and European organizations to help and find a solution. Thus, by using a more adaptable and thorough strategy, a more accurate solution to the situation can be found³³⁷. Attendance at regular staff meetings at NATO and EU headquarters boosted preparedness for crises. By guaranteeing that the headquarters personnel of both parties participate in high-level meetings, seminars, and briefings, trainings, and exercises, they seek to raise the degree of crisis readiness. With the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the significance of combating disinformation, offering logistical support, and ensuring cyber security has once again become apparent³³⁸.

The significance of enhancing states' security capabilities and removing their current weaknesses is declared under the subject of "increasing resilience." In this instance, the goal is to motivate EU and NATO staff to take part in training³³⁹. Personnel from the EU and NATO engage in scenario-based exercises run by the Hybrid Center of Excellence that help them strengthen their crisis management skills. NATO forces are also involved in EU space cooperation activities, since space studies have emerged as a force multiplier. Research is being done to help both groups improve their defense capabilities. Plans, drills, and training have been created collaboratively so that the

³³⁶ The European Union. (2022). p.4.

³³⁷The Council of the European Union. (2022j, 12 23). *How the Council coordinates the EU response to crises?* The Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/>.

³³⁸NATO. (2021b). *Sixth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017*. NATO Website: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/210603-progress-report-nr6-EU-N. p.5.

³³⁹The European Union. (2022). *Seventh progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017*. The European Union Website: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57184/eu-nato-progress-rep>. p.5.

emergency response units of the two organizations may collaborate as needed³⁴⁰. Research on the defense of vital infrastructure and power plants is examined, and both organizations' civil-military capabilities in the field of health are studied³⁴¹. Furthermore, research was conducted in collaboration with the overseas units of both organizations. As a result, their level of collaboration increases³⁴².

Another important area of discussion in the context of EU and NATO cooperation is cyber security and defense. Briefings, workshops, and meetings are arranged to provide knowledge about cyber threats between persons and institutions as part of the process of creating cyber defense capabilities. Research is done to find out what kind of training both organizations require. To enhance research, development, and innovation in the field of cyber security, studies are conducted in collaboration with the EU, NATO, and NATO's Collaborative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. Technical agreements have been negotiated with the EU and NATO cyber security response teams to guarantee cyber security³⁴³.

³⁴⁰Tania Latici. (2020). *Understanding EU-NATO Cooperation Theory and Practice*, European Parliament Briefing. European Parliamentary Research Service. p.7.

³⁴¹NATO. (2019). *Fourth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017* 27.08.2022 tarihinde. NATO Website: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/190617-4th. p.4.

³⁴²NATO. (2021b). p.10.

³⁴³NATO. (2019). *Fourth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017* NATO Website: Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/190617-4th. p.5.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S STRATEGIES TO FIGHT AGAINST HYBRID THREATS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

In this part, The EU's strategies to fight against hybrid threats in the context of Russia-Ukraine War will be examined within the scope of the European Union's Response to Combat Hybrid Threat. The analysis will be carried out under the headings of situational awareness and crisis response, strategic communication, and cooperation in the field of cyber security.

4.1. Situational Awareness and Crisis Response

Due to Russia's consideration about the Luhansk and Donetsk regions as independent elements and its decision to dispatch Russian troops to these regions. The European Union decided to impose sanctions on Russia's statement on February 22, 2022. According to the sanction decisions, an asset freezing sanction decision was taken against 351 members of the Russian Parliament (Duma) who supported Russia's move. In addition, sanctions were imposed on 27 individuals and entities that threaten the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine and support the Russian operation financially or materially. The specified sanctions decisions include asset freezing and funding bans, as well as blocking their entry into European Union territory. In addition, import and export bans on certain substances and technologies have been imposed in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Council decided on financial bans on the RF, its government, and the Central Bank. The relevant decision was made to prevent Russia's aggressive policies that increase the crisis³⁴⁴.

On February 24, 2022, EU leaders came together against Russia's aggressive attitude and decided to increase sanctions. The sectors that will be affected by sanctions have been determined as finance, energy and transportation, export finance and control,

³⁴⁴The Council of European Union. (2022a, 2 23). *Amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: Retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.LI.2022.042.01.0114.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A0421%3ATOC> . p.1.

visa procedures, and additional sanctions on Russian citizens. In addition, at this meeting, the leaders condemned Belarus for its involvement in the war, stated that they were on Ukraine's side, and said that they would support Ukraine with political, financial, and humanitarian aid. In addition, at this meeting, the importance of relations with international partners such as UN, OSCE, NATO, and G7 was highlighted³⁴⁵.

At the extraordinary Summit meeting on February 24, EU leaders stated that they condemned Russia's intervention, and that this situation harmed Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. They also stated that they condemned Belarus for its involvement in this attack and called for Russia to end the attack³⁴⁶.

On February 25, 2022, the European Union decided to impose a second sanction on the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, the National Security Council of the Russian Federation, and members of the Russian Assembly who supports the recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics. In addition, the second sanction decision aimed to reduce the money traffic transferred from Russia to the EU. This sanction is aimed at affecting 70 percent of state companies, including the Russian banking sector and defense sector. Other sectors affected by the sanctions are the aviation, space, and technology industries, which include the ban on the sale of semiconductor materials that can be used in the defense industry. It was also stated that Russian diplomats would be prevented from benefiting from visa-facilitating regulations³⁴⁷.

The EU Foreign Ministers stated at the extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council meeting on February 25, 2022, that restrictive measures would have dire consequences for Russia. They stated that restrictions on finance, energy, goods for both military and

³⁴⁵European Council. (2022d, 2 24). *European Council conclusions*. European Council: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54495/st00018-en22.pdf> . p.1.

³⁴⁶European Council. (2022g, 2 24). *Joint statement by the members of the European Council*. European council: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/24/joint-statement-by-the-members-of-the-european-council-24-02-2022/> .

³⁴⁷Council of the EU. (2022c, 2 25). *Russia's military aggression against Ukraine: EU imposes sanctions against President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov and adopts wide ranging individual and economic sanctions*. Council of the EU: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/25/russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-imposes-sanctions-against-president-putin-and-foreign-minister-lavrov-and-adopts-wide-ranging-individual-and-economic-sanctions/> .

civilian use, exports and imports would affect the Russian economy. Ministers agreed to increase diplomatic efforts to ensure international condemnation of Russia's attack and to support Ukraine³⁴⁸.

On February 27, 2022, President of the European Council Charles Michel addressed the Ukrainian people and stated that they defend not only the values of Ukraine but also the values of all Europe, such as peace and the rule of law. He also stated that this war is not the war of the Russian people; it is the war of the Kremlin³⁴⁹.

At the extraordinary meeting of the European Union Ministers of Internal Affairs on February 27, 2022, they discussed the provision of humanitarian support, acceptance of refugees, management of external borders, measures against visas, and measures to be taken against hybrid threats. They agreed to activate the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism to provide humanitarian support, health support, supplies, accommodation, and the necessary support to Moldova. It has been stated that security checks and registration duties at the borders have gained importance due to the increasing number of refugees and the management of external borders. It was stated that, in accordance with the visa measures, Russian businesspeople, diplomats, and government officials would not be able to benefit from visa-facilitating regulations. In addition, it was decided to make a regulation regarding the non-recognition of passports issued by Russia and those under Russian occupation. It was decided that member states would develop measures at their own country and union levels against hybrid threats³⁵⁰.

In an unofficial video conference call held on February 27, 2022, EU Foreign Ministers discussed the EU's support of the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the

³⁴⁸Council of the European Union. (2022b, 2 25). *Extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council, 25 February 2022*. Council of the European Union: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2022/02/25/> .

³⁴⁹European Council. (2022e, 2 27). *Address to the Ukrainian people by European Council President Charles Michel*. European Council: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/27/address-to-the-ukrainian-people-by-european-council-president-charles-michel/> .

³⁵⁰Council of the European Union. (2022i, 2 27). *Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council, 27 February 2022*. Council of the European Union: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/jha/2022/02/27/> .

European Peace Facility³⁵¹, the expansion of personal sanctions, the use of EU airspace, and the Swift ban. Additionally, they discussed the issues of leaving Russia alone in the diplomatic arena and banning Sputnik and Russia Today media outlets against disinformation³⁵².

At their meeting on February 28, 2022, EU Defense Ministers declared their intention to provide support to Ukraine. It was discussed to supply lethal and non-lethal materials worth 500 million euros to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility³⁵³.

On February 28, 2022, EU Energy Ministers met to discuss issues related to energy security. Ministers discussed the current situation of energy supply and what alternative measures should be taken for energy security in member countries. They discussed measures to restrict home and workplace over energy uses in member countries. It was also decided to aid the Ukrainian energy infrastructure damaged by Russia's military attacks³⁵⁴.

On February 28, 2022, the EU announced its third sanction decision against the Russian Federation. In accordance with the sanction decision, the following are included: stopping money exchange with the Russian Central Bank, providing 500 million euros worth of weapons and material aid to the Ukrainian Armed Forces,

³⁵¹The European Peace Facility is a tool that strengthens the EU's capacity to support international security. It was founded in March 2021 with the goals of preserving world peace, averting hostilities, and bolstering global security. Through this tool, peacekeeping operations in partner countries can be supported. Its main purpose is to maintain peace and prevent conflicts in the international environment. Through missions and operations, the host country's military and defense needs, infrastructure, and technical support are provided.

European Commission. (2024b). *European Peace Facility*. European Commission: Retrieved from https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/european-peace-facility_en.

³⁵²Council of the European Union. (2022o, 2 27). *Informal video conference of foreign affairs ministers, 27 February 2022*. Council of the European Union: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2022/02/27/>.

³⁵³Council of the European Union. (2022, 2 28). *Extraordinary TTE (Energy) Council Meeting*. Council of the European Union: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54571/en/20220228-final-presidency-summary.pdf>.

³⁵⁴Council of the European Union. (2022, 2 28). p.2.

stopping Russian airlines' access to EU airspace and airports, and taking precautionary measures against 26 people and one asset³⁵⁵.

On March 2, 2022, according to the third sanctions package, seven Russian banks were removed from the international Swift system. Thus, the access of these banks to the international financial sector was reduced, and their operations were harmed on a global scale. In addition, there were bans on investing in the Russian Direct Investment Fund, taking part in possible future projects, or making financial contributions³⁵⁶. In addition, Sputnik and Russia Today broadcasters were suspended because, according to the EU, they were under the influence of Russian Federation state channels and Russian authorities. The disinformation activities of both broadcasting companies and their ability to influence neighboring countries played an important role in this decision³⁵⁷. Belarus intervened in the Ukraine-Russia war by allowing Russia to use its airspace and ensuring the passage of its weapons, fuel, personnel, and ballistic missiles. Therefore, an injunction was issued against 22 high-ranking Belarusian military personnel and trade. In addition, there have been restrictions on the trade of tobacco, wood, cement, iron-steel, and rubber products. In addition, restrictions have been imposed on the import of products for both military and civilian use that will contribute to the development of Belarus in the military, defense, and security fields³⁵⁸. In video conference, EU ministers

³⁵⁵The Council of the European Union. (2022b, 2 28). *Amending Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: Retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R0334&qid=1671710009306> . p.2.

³⁵⁶The Council of the European Union. (2022c, 3 2). *amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.063.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A063%3ATOC . p.2

³⁵⁷The Council of the European Union. (2022c, 3 2). *amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.063.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A063%3ATOC . p.4.

³⁵⁸The Council of the European Union. (2022i, 3 2). *Implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.066.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A066%3ATOC . p.1.

also stated that the agriculture and food sectors are under pressure. Finally, the ministers stated that they are together with Ukraine and that the necessary food and humanitarian aid will be shipped³⁵⁹.

On March 4, the EU predicted that 2.5 to 6.5 million people would be displaced due to the war and seek refuge in the EU. It was estimated that between 1.2 and 3.2 million people would seek international status. As a precaution against intense human migration, it has prepared a draft temporary protection plan for those leaving Ukraine. Thus, it is aimed at providing basic services such as housing, employment, health services, and education to children for those who left the war³⁶⁰.

On March 4, EU ministers held an extraordinary meeting with the participation of the foreign ministers of Ukraine, America, England, Canada, and the NATO General Secretary. At the meeting, the importance of international cooperation was emphasized, and member countries were asked to provide more support to countries such as Poland and Hungary. Since these countries had borders with Ukraine and were more affected by the war. In addition, reducing energy dependence on Russia was discussed³⁶¹.

On March 9, 2022, the EU included Belarus on the sanctions list for cooperation between Belarus and Russia. In this context, it has taken a precautionary decision to prevent Belarusian state companies from using European trade instruments and to prevent the flow of money from Belarus to the EU. In addition, the Council took a precautionary decision to ban the import of marine navigation and radio communication devices to Russia³⁶². On the same day, 14 businesspeople and their families who

³⁵⁹The Council of the European Union. (2022k, 3 2). *Informal video conference of agriculture ministers, 2 March 2022*. The Council of the European Union: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/agrifish/2022/03/02/>.

³⁶⁰The Council of the European Union. (2022l, 3 4). *COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2022/382*. The Council of the European Union: Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.071.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A071%3ATOC.

³⁶¹Council of the European Union. (2022m, 3 4). *Extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council, 4 March 2022*. Council of the European Union: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2022/03/04/>.

³⁶²The Council of the European Union. (2022d, 3 9). *Council Regulation (EU) 2022/398 of 9 March 2022 amending Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: Retrieved

provided financial resources to Russia and took an active role in the metallurgy, pharmaceutical, agriculture, and communication industries were sanctioned. In addition, a total of 160 people, including 146 members of the RF Council, were added to the sanctions list³⁶³. On March 10, 2022, the Council announced that the travel bans and asset freeze sanctions affecting 862 people were extended until September 15, 2022³⁶⁴.

The EU Summit on March 10–11, 2022, stated that Russia's attack on Ukraine was unjust and international law was violated. It was stated that support for Ukraine would continue and that a lawsuit should be filed against Russia in the International Criminal Court. Additionally, a call was made to Russia, and it was stated that the security of nuclear facilities in Ukraine should be ensured. In this context;

- Increasing and continuing the sanctions against RF,
- Continuation of political, economic, diplomatic, and economic support for Ukraine,
- Increasing the EU defense capacity,
- Issues of reducing energy dependency on Russia and increasing investments were discussed³⁶⁵.

On March 14, 2022, EU Ministers (Labor, Social Policies, Health, and Trade Relations) exchanged views on the situation in Ukraine. They decided to provide acceptance and support assistance in the EU countries to displaced people due to the

from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.082.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A082%3ATOC . p.1.

³⁶³The Council of the European Union. (2022i, 3 2). *Implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.066.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A066%3ATOC . p.2

³⁶⁴The Council of the European Union. (2022f, 3 10). *Amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.084.01.0028.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A084%3ATOC . p.1.

³⁶⁵The Council of the European Union. (2022m, 3 10-11). *Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government*. The Council of the European Union: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/timeline-eu-response-ukraine-invasion/> . p.1.2.

conflicts in Ukraine. This assistance is intended to facilitate their finding employment, provide housing opportunities, and provide social support³⁶⁶.

On March 15, 2022, the EU Council announced the fourth sanctions package, which includes economic sanctions. According to this sanctions package, it was decided to ban money transfers for state-owned companies, not to provide credit ratings for individuals and assets, and not to make investments in the Russian energy sector. Trade restrictions for iron and steel and export restrictions for luxury goods have also been put into effect. In addition, it has been decided not to export materials for both civilian and military use for people associated with the Russian defense and industrial sectors. Thus, it was aimed at preventing Russia from developing its defense needs³⁶⁷. On the same day, European Union Ministers of Health stated that they would ensure refugees' access to health services. Ministers stated that they would implement the Temporary Protection Directive. People in need of special expertise will be supported within the scope of the Solidarity Mechanism, and people with chronic and serious diseases will be treated by member states³⁶⁸.

On March 16, 2022, the European Union Ministers of Education stated that Ukrainian children could go to school in the EU and that they were together with the Ukrainian people. They stated that 1.5 million Ukrainian children had left the country since Russia started the war. Coordination was needed among EU countries to ensure their education and member states would help Ukrainian students and teachers in their countries. The experience of distance education methods developed during the COVID-

³⁶⁶The Council of the EU. (2022h, 3 14). *Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council, 14 March 2022*. Council of the European Union: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/epsco/2022/03/14/>.

³⁶⁷The Council of the European Union. (2022i, 3 15). *Council Regulation (EU) 2022/428 of 15 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: Retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.LI.2022.087.01.0013.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A0871%3ATOC>. p.2.

³⁶⁸Council of the European Union. (2022a, 3 15). *Informal video conference of health ministers, 15 March 2022*. Council of the European Union: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/epsco/2022/03/15/>.

19 period should continue³⁶⁹. On the same date, the Council approved the "Cohesion's Action for Refugees in Europe" plan. Thus, financial support was provided for European countries to help people who left Ukraine due to the war³⁷⁰.

On March 17, the Council decided to provide operational support from Frontex, as approximately 300,000 people entered Moldova. Thus, the Moldovan border administration has been able to increase its border management capacity³⁷¹.

On March 21, 2022, the Council discussed the country's agricultural situation with the Ukrainian agriculture minister and exchanged views on the country's needs. They also discussed to what extent the crisis in Ukraine affected the food sector in the European Union. It was emphasized that both the European Union and non-EU countries were affected by this crisis³⁷².

On March 23, 2022, the EU approved a support package worth 500 million euros for the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility. In this context, the territorial integrity and independence of the country and the development of the capacity to protect civilians in a war environment were ensured. The support was aimed at providing financial support for the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, such as equipment, aid materials, and fuel³⁷³.

The situation in Ukraine was discussed at the Tripartite Social Summit on March 23, 2022. The agenda items for this meeting are;

³⁶⁹Council of the European Union. (2022r, 3 16). *Informal video conference of education ministers, 16 March 2022*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/eycs/2022/03/16/> .

³⁷⁰Council of the European Union. (2022p, 3 16). *Ukraine: Council approves swift release of cohesion resources to help refugees*. Eur-Lex: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6993-2022-INIT/en/pdf> .

³⁷¹The Council of the EU. (2022u, 3 17). *Moldova: Council adopts decision to sign agreement for Frontex operational support in light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/17/moldova-council-adopts-decision-to-sign-agreement-for-frontex-operational-support-in-light-of-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine/> .

³⁷²Council of the European Union. (2022h, 3 21). *Agriculture and Fisheries Council, 21 March 2022*. Council of the European Union: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7099-2022-INIT/en/pdf> .

³⁷³The Council of the EU. (2022k). *EU support to Ukraine: Council doubles funding under the European Peace Facility*. Council of the European Union. Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases> .

- How many term investments regarding energy prices, business, and the economy should be made in Europe while countering Russia's aggressive attitudes,
- How to transform businesses to green energy in Europe,
- How to improve working conditions, the European labor market, and how to develop talents in the post-Covid-19 period were discussed³⁷⁴.

On March 24–25, 2022, EU leaders stated that they were with Ukraine against Russian aggression. They would provide support for the restoration of democratic Ukraine, and they had established the Ukrainian Integration Trust Fund. At the meeting, leaders discussed the safety of civilians, support for refugees and host countries, the creation of emergency plans, and the security of energy and nuclear facilities. Leaders emphasized the importance of increasing sanctions until Russia gave up its stance. Another issue of the meeting was rising energy prices and energy security³⁷⁵.

On March 28, 2022, EU and Ukrainian Ministers of Internal Affairs discussed the acceptance of refugees from Ukraine. During the meeting, providing financial and material support to member countries, monitoring and coordinating travel within the EU, accepting refugees by the Republic of Moldova, border control, and security issues were discussed³⁷⁶.

On March 29, 2022, the Commission informed delegates about the health and humanitarian situation in Ukraine. It was stated that steps were taken in this regard for Ukrainian patients, including vaccinating children to protect them from epidemic

³⁷⁴Council of the EU. (2022m, 3 23). *Tripartite Social Summit video conference, 23 March 2022*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2022/03/23/>.

³⁷⁵European Council. (2022a, 3 24-25). *Conclusions 24 and 25 March 2022 The European Council held an exchange of views with the President of the United States on transatlantic cooperation in the context of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine*. European Council: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-1-2022-INIT/en/pdf> . p.2-3.

³⁷⁶The Council of the EU. (2022m, 3 28). *Extraordinary meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, 28 March 2022*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/jha/2022/03/28/> .

diseases and launching initiatives related to mental health. The Ministers of Health stated that they would continue their health support for Ukraine and its people³⁷⁷.

On April 4, 2022, the Council agreed to provide 150 million euros of aid to the Republic of Moldova, with which it has economic relations within the scope of the European Neighborhood Policy and the Union's Eastern Neighborhood Policy. With this aid, it was aimed at contributing to Moldova's resilience and ensuring the balance of payments in the IMF (International Monetary Fund) program³⁷⁸. In another decision taken on the same day, the Council declared that it had allocated 17 billion euros to help refugees from Ukraine³⁷⁹.

On April 4–5, 2022, EU ministers discussed the response to the Ukraine war. In this context, the Ministers of Culture and Media exchanged views on their contributions to Ukraine's culture and media system. Ministers of Education discussed the activities to be carried out by the EU regarding children, youth, and education for those affected by the war. The Ministers of Youth and Sports stated that young people would be pioneers in the development of democratic values and peace³⁸⁰.

On April 6, the Council approved aid worth 3.5 billion euros for countries accepting refugees. Nearly half of the aid (45%) was transferred to countries that accepted refugees, such as Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, and countries bordering Ukraine, such as Hungary, Romania, and Poland. The aid would

³⁷⁷The Council of the EU. (2022g, 3 29). *Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (Health)*, 29 March 2022. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/epsco/2022/03/29/>.

³⁷⁸The European Parliament. (2022, 4 4). *Decision (EU) 2022/ of the European Parliament and of the Council of providing macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Moldova*. The European Parliament: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-9-2022-INIT/en/pdf> . p.2-3.

³⁷⁹Council of the EU. (2022g, 4 4). *Ukraine: €17 billion of EU funds to help refugees*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/04/ukraine-council-unlocks-17-billion-of-eu-funds-to-help-refugees/> .

³⁸⁰Council of the European Union. (2022g, 4 4). *Education, Youth, Culture and Sport Council, 4-5 April 2022*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/eycs/2022/04/04-05/> .

be given to refugees 40 euros per week per person, and the maximum period for which aid could be given is 13 weeks³⁸¹.

The EU Ministers of Agriculture and Food met on April 7, 2022. The Minister of Food and Agriculture of Ukraine also attended the meeting and was asked to provide information about Ukraine's agriculture and food production and to present its requests from the EU. EU ministers discussed the demands of the Ukrainian side and stated that they were on Ukraine's side. They stated that the EU did not suffer from food shortages in its own region, but it needed to contribute to food security both in its own region and on a global scale. They stated that member countries would continue food aid to Ukraine³⁸².

On April 8, the Council announced the fifth sanctions package. In accordance with the relevant sanctions package, it was decided to ban the import of coal and solid fuel from Russia, to restrict the access of Russian ships to EU ports, to ban Russian and Belarusian transportation services from entering the EU territory, and to ban the sale of important products such as jet fuel, software, and computer hardware to Russia. In addition, financial regulations were made, including crypto assets, to prevent financial support for Russia through the banking system³⁸³. In addition, four Russian banks with a 23% market share in Russia, 217 individuals, and 18 more entities were included in the sanctions list. On the same date, EU and Ukrainian Transportation Ministers stated that the ongoing war in Ukraine affected almost all sectors, especially the transportation

³⁸¹Council of the EU. (2022p, 4 6). *Ukraine: Council approves immediate disbursement of €3.5 billion to EU countries welcoming refugees*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/06/ukraine-council-approves-immediate-disbursement-of-3-5-billion-to-eu-countries-welcoming-refugees/>.

³⁸²Council of the European Union. (2022k, 4 7). *Agriculture and Fisheries Council, 7 April 2022*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/agrifish/2022/04/07/>.

³⁸³The Council of the European Union. (2022h, 4 8). *Amending Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.111.01.0067.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A111%3ATOC. p.2.

sector. In this context, measures that should be taken at the member state and union level were discussed³⁸⁴.

On April 13, 2022, the EU announced that to enable the easier transfer of humanitarian aid to war-affected people in Donetsk and Luhansk, these regions are exempt from restrictions for humanitarian purposes. In this way, the international organization that provides humanitarian aid could provide aid more easily in these regions³⁸⁵. On the same day, The Council decided to deliver the third aid package through the European Peace Facility to ensure the territorial integrity of Ukraine, support the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and protect civilians. Thus, the EU would provide aid worth 500 thousand euros, and military aid of 1.5 million euros was provided accordingly³⁸⁶.

On April 13, 2022, the Council assigned the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)³⁸⁷ to support the Ukrainian authorities in their investigations of international crimes³⁸⁸. On the same day, the Council made a recommendation to convert the Ukrainian national currency into the EU euro to support those who took refuge in EU countries due to the war in Ukraine. The

³⁸⁴The Council of the EU. (2022q, 4 8). *Informal video conference of transport ministers, 8 April 2022*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/tte/2022/04/08/>.

³⁸⁵Council of the European Union. (2022y, 4 13). *Council of the European Union*. EU introduces exceptions to restrictive measures to facilitate humanitarian activities in Ukraine: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/13/eu-introduces-exceptions-to-restrictive-measures-to-facilitate-humanitarian-activities-in-ukraine/>.

³⁸⁶The Council of the EU. (2022j, 4 13). *EU support to Ukraine: Council agrees on third tranche of support under the European Peace Facility for total €1.5 billion*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/13/eu-support-to-ukraine-council-agrees-on-third-tranche-of-support-under-the-european-peace-facility-for-total-1-5-billion/>.

³⁸⁷ EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine, EUAM Ukraine: It is a civil, advisory mission by the European Union aimed at creating a sustainable, effective security organization in Ukraine and ensuring the rule of law.

³⁸⁸The Council of the EU. (2022l, 4 13). *EUAM Ukraine: Council further amends the mandate to also provide support in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/13/euam-ukraine-council-further-amends-the-mandate-to-also-provide-support-in-the-investigation-and-prosecution-of-international-crimes/>.

stated recommendation was made to meet humanitarian needs, as EU banks were reluctant due to the risk of sudden changes³⁸⁹.

On May 2, 2022, EU energy ministers called for unity for Ukraine and discussed problems related to gas supply. Disruptions due to Gazprom's suspension of natural gas shipments were evaluated³⁹⁰.

The International Donors Conference for Ukraine was convened on May 5, 2022. The conference was organized by Poland and Sweden. Cooperation with Ukraine is focused on humanitarian aid, material aid, and the reconstruction of Ukraine³⁹¹.

On May 6, 2022, the Council authorized Eurojust (the European Agency for the Enhancement of Judicial Cooperation) to cooperate with the International Criminal Court and preserve evidence related to war crimes. In this way, it was aimed to preserve and store photographs, videos, audio recordings, DNA profiles, and fingerprints related to war crimes³⁹².

On May 11, 2022, the Council prepared a proposal for countries to increase their gas storage capacity. Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, and Austria are the countries with 66% of the EU gas storage capacity. According to the proposal, countries such as Greece, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland that do not have gas storage facilities were provided with the opportunity to store in other countries. It was aimed at least 15%

³⁸⁹Council of the European Union. (2022z, 4 13). *COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION (EU) 2022/...on the conversion of hryvnia banknotes into the currency of host Member*. Council of the European Union: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7880-2022-INIT/en/pdf> . p.2-3.

³⁹⁰Council of the EU. (2022n, 5 2). *TTE (Energy) Council Meeting*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/55871/presidency-summary-extraordinary-energy-council-2-may-2022.pdf> . p.1-2.

³⁹¹European Council. (2022j, 5 5). *Remarks by President Charles Michel at the High-level international donors' conference for Ukraine*. European Council: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/05/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-high-level-international-donors-conference-for-ukraine/> .

³⁹²Council of the European Union. (2022e, 5 6). *amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and the Council, as regards the preservation, analysis and storage of evidence relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes at Eurojust*. Council of the European Union: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8856-2022-INIT/en/pdf> . p.4.

of the amount of natural gas to store they would burn in winter. Thus, it was aimed at ensuring stability in energy prices in all member countries of the Union³⁹³.

On May 19, 2022, EU member states reached an agreement on cooperation in gas supply. The distribution of natural gas stored before winter was based on the spirit of unity. It was aimed at encouraging countries to store 80% of their storage capacity before the winter of 2022-2023 and to increase this capacity to 90% for the following winter periods. It was agreed that the natural gas needs of countries that do not have storage capacity should be met by countries that have storage capacity³⁹⁴.

On May 23, 2022, the Council increased the amount of aid to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility by giving 500 thousand euros to 2 million euros. 490 thousand euros of the 500 thousand euros of aid consist of weapons and equipment, and 10 thousand euros consist of other needed materials such as personal protective equipment and first aid supplies³⁹⁵.

On May 24, 2022, the Council concluded that the war between Russia and Ukraine had consequences not only for the Ukrainian economy but also on a global scale. It was stated that the ongoing war in Ukraine affected food security as it hindered Ukraine's food production capacity. Additionally, Ukraine implemented temporary trade liberalization and other trade concessions to support the Ukrainian economy³⁹⁶.

On May 24, 2022, EU Ministers of Agriculture welcomed the European Union-Ukraine integration action plan prepared by the Commission. EU ministers stated that

³⁹³European Parliament. (2022b, 5 11). *Member states agree on negotiating mandate for gas storage proposal*. Eur-Lex: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022PC0135&qid=1649254861786>.

³⁹⁴The Council of the EU. (2022r, 5 19). *Gas storage: Council and Parliament reach a provisional*. Eur-Lex: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/19/gas-storage-council-and-parliament-reach-a-provisional-agreement/pdf>. p.1.

³⁹⁵Council of the European Union. (2022q, 5 23). *COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2022/809 of 23 May 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2022/338 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility for the supply to the Ukrainian Armed Forces of military equipment, and platforms, designed to deliver lethal force*. Eur-Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.145.01.0040.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A145%3ATOC. p.1.

³⁹⁶Council of the EU. (2022h, 5 24). *Ukraine: Council adopts temporary trade liberalisation with Ukraine*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/24/ukraine-council-adopts-temporary-trade-liberalisation-with-ukraine/pdf>. p.1.

the EU region is a self-sufficient region in terms of food, thanks to the Common Agricultural Policy. Still, the crisis between Ukraine and Russia affects the whole world in terms of food security. They stated that the main concern is ensuring access to food and the increase in input costs for food production³⁹⁷.

On May 25, 2022, the Council introduced new rules regarding Eurojust's retention of evidence obtained in war crimes. In this way, data such as satellite photographs, sound recordings, photographs, and DNA traces could be stored, and it was possible to share this evidence with national or international organizations and courts if desired³⁹⁸.

On May 30-31, 2022, at the summit attended by Vladimir Zelensky via video, EU leaders announced the sixth sanctions package in response to Russia's attack on Ukraine. The package also includes crude oil and petroleum products transferred from Russia to member countries. European leaders also focused on investigating war crimes, continuing financial, political, and military support for Ukraine, providing support to Ukraine's neighboring countries, increasing Europe's security capacity, and ensuring energy and food security³⁹⁹.

On June 2, 2022, EU Transportation Ministers exchanged views on the measures and improvements to be taken in the transportation sector during the Russia-Ukraine War. At the meeting, ministers discussed measures to ensure that Ukrainian wheat can be transported through different route⁴⁰⁰.

On June 3, 2022, the Council implemented the sixth sanctions package over Russia's continuation of war, Belarus' support for Russia, and reports that Russia had

³⁹⁷Council of the European Union. (2022c, 5 24). *Agriculture and Fisheries Council, 24 May 2022*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/agrifish/2022/05/24/> .

³⁹⁸Council of the EU. (2022b, 5 25). *Eurojust: Council adopts new rules allowing the agency to preserve evidence of war crimes*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/25/eurojust-le-conseil-adopte-de-nouvelles-regles-permettant-a-l-agence-de-conserver-des-preuves-de-crimes-de-guerre/pdf> .

³⁹⁹European Council. (2022k, 5 30-31). *Special meeting of the European Council (30 and 31 May 2022)*. European Council: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/56562/2022-05-30-31-euco-conclusions.pdf> . p.2.

⁴⁰⁰Council of the EU. (2022i, 6 2). *Situation in Ukraine*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/tte/2022/06/02/> .

committed war crimes. This package includes a ban on the import of crude oil and petroleum products from Russia, an additional Swift ban on three Russian banks, and a ban on a Belarusian bank. The sanction package also imposed a broadcast ban on three Russian state television channels within the EU. The EU decided to impose additional sanctions on 65 individuals and 18 entities in connection with the crimes allegedly committed in Mariupol and Bucha⁴⁰¹.

On June 9, 2022, the Council implemented “the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child” for the protection of children in situations of crisis and emergency. A strategy has been developed against crimes that may be committed against children. This strategy is based on the protection of children from human trafficking, separation from their families, etc. These issues are defined as to be followed⁴⁰².

On June 13, 2022, EU Ministers of Agriculture stated that the difficulties of the food crisis can be overcome with coordination measures on a global scale. It was stated that the problem of international food supply could be solved by taking the grain stored in Ukraine out of the country. It was stated that this food security will have not only regional but also global-scale consequences⁴⁰³.

On June 20, 2022, the Council adopted the principles of providing initial support and support for accessibility, ensuring sustainable production, supporting Ukraine's food production and exports, and multilateral cooperation with the aim of solving the developing food security crisis. It was also stated that to prevent a global and regional food crisis, there were no EU sanctions against food products produced by Russia⁴⁰⁴.

⁴⁰¹Council of the EU. (2022e, 6 3). *Russia's aggression against Ukraine: EU adopts sixth package of sanctions*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/03/russia-s-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-sixth-package-of-sanctions/pdf> . p.1.

⁴⁰²Council of the European Union. (2022i, 6 9). *Conclusions on the EU Strategy on the rights of the child*. Council of the European Union: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10024-2022-INIT/en/pdf> . p.4-8.

⁴⁰³Council of the EU. (2022j, 6 13). *Situation on agricultural markets, particularly following the invasion of Ukraine*. Council of the European Union: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9789-2022-INIT/en/pdf> . p.1.

⁴⁰⁴Council of the EU. (2022l, 6 20). *Team Europe response to global food insecurity – Council conclusions (20 June 2022)*. Council of the European Union: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10066-2022-INIT/en/pdf> . p.3-4.

On June 23, 2022, the European Council approved the candidate country status of Ukraine and Moldova. They stated that they were ready to approve Georgia's candidate country status. EU leaders stated that they would continue their support for Ukraine and that sanctions against Russia would continue. In addition, it was stated that a common stance should be taken against Russia, including the candidate countries. He also stated that Russia was using the food crisis as a weapon and asked the Russians to end the embargo in the Black Sea and to stop targeting food storage facilities⁴⁰⁵.

On June 27, 2022, the Council entered into force the regulation on energy and gas storage. Although there were interruptions regarding natural gas storage, it was stated that the Union acted in the spirit of integration. It was underlined that natural gas storage operations would be completed before winter and shared with countries that do not have storage facilities⁴⁰⁶. On the same day, the Council published a declaration for migrating children in Ukraine. In the declaration, member states were asked to provide free and lawful health services to children, to inform children who left Ukraine without their parents about children's rights, and to take the necessary measures for the acceptance of children in member countries⁴⁰⁷. On the same day, G7 leaders condemned Russia's war against Ukraine. The G7 countries had provided 2.6 billion euros of humanitarian aid and 28 billion euros of financial support to Ukraine since the beginning of the war. They stated that they strongly supported the restructuring of Ukraine and called that sanctions against Russia would continue to be increased. Leaders also stated that additional measures should have been taken regarding increasing energy costs and energy security⁴⁰⁸.

On June 30, 2022, the Council added violations of sanctions to the list of EU crimes. Thus, the Council created a legal basis for the full implementation of sanctions

⁴⁰⁵European Council. (2022h, 6 24). p.3-4.

⁴⁰⁶Council of the European Union. (2022d, 6 27). *Council adopts regulation on gas storage*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/27/council-adopts-regulation-gas-storage/pdf> .

⁴⁰⁷The Council of the EU. (2022w, 6 29). *Political statement on the protection of displaced children from Ukraine in the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57634/st10827-en22.pdf> . p.6.

⁴⁰⁸G7 Leaders. (2022, 6 27). *G7 Statement on Support for Ukraine*. G7 Leaders: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57537/220627-g7-support-on-ukraine.pdf> . p.2.

against Russia. In the EU region, deterrence was provided against violations of EU sanctions⁴⁰⁹.

On July 7, 2022, the Council and the Parliament agreed to take temporary and urgent measures regarding the traffic licenses of Ukrainian citizens. Thus, the process for Ukrainian citizens to use vehicles within the EU has been facilitated. Ukrainian refugees were allowed to drive more easily within the EU⁴¹⁰.

On July 12, 2022, the Council approved financial aid worth 1 billion EUR to Ukraine. Since the beginning of the war, the Ukrainian economy had been supported with financial aid worth 2.2 billion euros. This aid was intended to develop the Ukrainian economy in terms of humanitarian infrastructure and defense by meeting its urgent needs⁴¹¹.

On July 18, 2022, the Council decided to take temporary liberalization measures for Moldova's agricultural products. In this context, tomatoes, garlic, etc. were exported to the Union from Moldova. Seven agricultural products were given the opportunity to be exempt from tax for one year. In addition, the exported agricultural products were allowed to be doubled⁴¹². Additionally, on the same day, EU Agriculture Ministers discussed the situation of the agricultural sector at the Agriculture and Fisheries Council. During the meeting, it was stated that one of the sectors most affected from the Russia-

⁴⁰⁹Council of the European Union. (2022v, 6 30). *Sanctions: Council requests European Parliament consent to add the violation of restrictive measures to the list of the EU*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/30/sanctions-council-requests-european-parliament-consent-to-add-the-violation-of-sanctions-to-the-list-of-eu-crimes/pdf> . p.1.

⁴¹⁰Council of the EU. (2022d, 7 5). *The Council and the Parliament launch urgent temporary measures for Ukrainian driver documents*. Council of the EU: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10793-2022-INIT/en/pdf> . p.6.

⁴¹¹European Parliament. (2022a, 7 12). *Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council Providing Exceptional Macro-Financial Assistance to Ukraine*. European Parliament: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-43-2022-REV-1/en/pdf> . p.12.

⁴¹²The Council of the EU. (2022v). *Moldovan agricultural products: Council adopts temporary trade liberalisation measures*. Council of the European Union. Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/07/18/moldovan-agricultural-products-council-adopts-temporary-trade-liberalisation-measures/pdf> . p.1.

Ukraine crisis was the agricultural sector. Views were exchanged on measures to take grain products produced in Ukraine out of the country⁴¹³.

On July 20, 2022, the Council prepared a proposal to deal with the economic consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war and provide more support to Ukrainian refugees. In accordance with this proposal, additional aid worth 3.5 billion euros for integration projects, additional aid to newly established refugee support units, and meeting the needs of refugee-related projects were discussed⁴¹⁴.

On July 21, 2022, the Council decided to further tighten economic sanctions against Russia. According to the decision, it was decided to control the sale, import, or transfer of Russian origin jewelry and gold, materials for both military and civilian use. It was also decided to extend the ban on Russian ships from entering EU ports and the sanctions list, which includes 54 people and entities⁴¹⁵.

On August 4, 2022, the Council added former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and his son to the sanctions list in connection with the ongoing war. It was stated that military, financial, political, and economic support for Ukraine would continue. It was called for Russia to comply with international humanitarian law in its actions. It was also stated that Russia should protect civilians, especially children, and allow Ukrainians to return to the country who were forced to migrate to Russia⁴¹⁶.

On September 5, 2022, at the 8th EU Ukraine accession council, it was declared that support would be continued for Ukraine to have a democratic and peaceful future. In this context, it was stated that they were satisfied with Ukraine's progress on the EU

⁴¹³ The Council of the EU. (2022t, 7 18). *Market situation, following the invasion of Ukraine*. Council of the European Union: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11073-2022-INIT/en/pdf> . p.2.

⁴¹⁴The Council of the EU. (2022n, 7 20). *FAST-CARE: Council adopts negotiating mandate on further help for refugees from Ukraine and on addressing the consequences of Russia's aggression*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/07/20/fast-care-council-adopts-negotiating-mandate-on-further-help-for-refugees-from-ukraine-and-on-addressing-the-consequences-of-russia-s-aggression/pdf> . p.1.

⁴¹⁵The Council of the EU. (2022a, 7 21). *Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1269 of 21 July 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions*. Eur-Lex: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:193:FULL&from=EN> . p.3-4.

⁴¹⁶Council of the European Union. (2022w, 8 4). *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1354 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2022:2041:TOC> . p.2.

path. The development of bilateral relations and cooperation in the accession to the EU was emphasized in the access council⁴¹⁷.

On September 9, 2022, the Council suspended the visa facilitation agreement between the EU and Russia. Thus, general visa procedures began to be applied to Russian citizens. There was an increase in visa-obtaining processes and visa fees⁴¹⁸.

On September 20, 2022, the Council approved additional financial assistance worth €5 billion. The aim of the aid was to support the infrastructure, defense, and development needs of Ukraine, which were affected by the war. The aid also supported Ukraine's international financial obligations⁴¹⁹. In addition, the issue of food safety was discussed, and a declaration was published at the summit co-chaired by European Council President Charles Michel. The principles in the declaration were to act in coordination, to respond immediately to humanitarian needs, to make agriculture and food systems resilient to crises, and to improve them⁴²⁰.

On September 23, 2022, the G7 leaders condemned the referendums held by Russia in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions under Russian control and decided not to accept them. It was declared that these actions are contrary to the United Nations Charter and international law. It was stated that Russia should stay away from tension-increasing activities, including the use of nuclear weapons. It was

⁴¹⁷The Council of the EU. (2022s, 9 5). *Joint press release following the 8th Association Council meeting between the EU and Ukraine*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/09/05/joint-press-release-following-the-8th-association-council-meeting-between-the-eu-and-ukraine/pdf> . p.1.

⁴¹⁸Council of the European Union. (2022s, 9 6). *Council Decision on the suspension in whole of the application of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation*. Eur-Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_12039_2022_INIT&from=EN . p.7.

⁴¹⁹The Council of the EU. (2022e, 9 16). *Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, reinforcing the common provisioning fund by guarantees by Member States and by specific provisioning for some financial liabilities relate*. Council of the European Union: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-49-2022-INIT/en/pdf> . p.1.

⁴²⁰The Council of the EU. (2022f, 9 21). *Declaration of Leaders' Summit on Global Food Security*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/09/21/declaration-of-leaders-summit-on-global-food-security/pdf> .

stated that economic sanctions against Russia would continue, and Ukraine would be supported economically, diplomatically, militarily, and politically⁴²¹.

On September 30, 2022, the European Summit condemned Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions and declared that it would not recognize the illegal referendum⁴²². On September 30, 2022, EU Energy Ministers agreed to make an urgent regulation to reduce energy prices. It was stated that the EU was currently in an extraordinary situation and that Russia was using energy as a weapon against the EU. The aim of the regulation was to decrease savings by reducing energy demand and ensuring energy security⁴²³. On October 6, 2022, the Council introduced emergency measures to reduce energy prices⁴²⁴.

On October 6, 2022, it announced the eighth sanction package regarding Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. The sanction package included the imposition of a price ceiling on the transfer of Russian oil to third countries by sea, the import of equipment that will strengthen the Russian armed forces, and the technological development of Russia to the list of restricted materials. There were also additional restrictions on trade and certain service areas, and thirty people and seven entities were included in the sanctions list⁴²⁵.

At the summit held in Prague on October 7, 2022, EU leaders evaluated the ongoing war in Ukraine, handling military training tasks, and providing financial support

⁴²¹The Council of the EU. (2022o, 9 23). *G7 leaders' statement*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/09/23/g7-leaders-statement/pdf>.

⁴²²Council of the EU. (2022k, 9 30). *Statement by the Members of the European Council*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/09/30/statement-by-the-members-of-the-european-council/pdf>.

⁴²³The Council of the EU. (2022x, 9 30). *Proposal for a Council Regulation on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices*. Council of the European Union: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12999-2022-INIT/en/pdf>. p.24.

⁴²⁴Council of the European Union. (2022t, 10 6). *Council formally adopts emergency measures to reduce energy prices*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/06/council-formally-adopts-emergency-measures-to-reduce-energy-prices/pdf>.

⁴²⁵The Council of the EU. (2022b, 10 6). *Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1904 of 6 October 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:259I:FULL&from=EN>. p.4-5.

to develop the Ukrainian army. In addition, it was decided to provide financial support for the reconstruction of the infrastructure damaged by the war⁴²⁶.

On October 13, 2022, the Council gave a positive opinion on allocating more resources within the framework of Cohesion's Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE) plan. Within the framework of the plan, allocate 3.5 billion euros of preliminary resources to the projects to be carried out between 2021 and 2027. This plan also financed nongovernmental organizations needs for refugees⁴²⁷.

On October 17, 2022, under European peacebuilding assistance, the Council decided to aid worth 500 million euros to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Thus, the total value of aid reached 3.1 billion euros. It was aimed at providing the equipment and support materials needed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and making improvements to protect civilian citizens⁴²⁸. In addition, on the same day, it was decided to establish a military aid mission within the framework of the EU Ukraine Assistance Mission (EUMAM Ukraine). It was planned to serve for two years. It was aimed at increasing the operational capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and ensuring that to protect Ukraine's borders and territorial integrity⁴²⁹.

On October 20, 2022, the Council decided to impose sanctions on three Iranian individuals and one entity, including the Iranian Chief of General Staff, over Russia's use of Iranian-origin Mohajer-6 drones and Ababil-2 unmanned aerial vehicles in

⁴²⁶European Council. (2022f, 10 7). *Informal meeting of heads of state or government, Prague, 7 October 2022*. European Council: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2022/10/07/>.

⁴²⁷Council of the European Union. (2022u, 7 13). *Council gives the final go-ahead to further flexibility in the use of cohesion policy funds in response to Russia's war in Ukraine*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/timeline-eu-response-ukraine-invasion/>.

⁴²⁸Council of the EU. (2022o, 10 17). *Ukraine: Council agrees on further support under the European Peace Facility*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/17/ukraine-council-agrees-on-further-support-under-the-european-peace-facility/pdf>.

⁴²⁹Council of the EU. (2022r, 10 17). *Ukraine: EU sets up a military assistance mission to further support the Ukrainian Armed Forces*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/17/ukraine-eu-sets-up-a-military-assistance-mission-to-further-support-the-ukrainian-armed-forces/pdf>.

Ukraine. These individuals and entities were subjected to asset freezes, travel bans, and restrictions on their activities within Europe⁴³⁰.

At the EU summit held on October 21, 2022, the latest developments in the Russia-Ukraine war were evaluated. The establishment of the EU Military Assistance Mission and the support of the Ukrainian Armed Forces against Russia's drone and missile attacks were welcomed. It was stated that they supported the sanctions decision against Iran because of the use of Iranian drones in Kiev and other regions of Ukraine. At the same summit, the global food impact of the war was also brought to the agenda. While it was stated that Russia should not use this issue as a weapon, it was emphasized that the activities of the UN Black Sea Grain Initiative should be continued⁴³¹. At the same summit, leaders discussed solutions about the energy crisis. Additional measures were discussed, taking measures to save natural gas, and introducing ceiling price applications for natural gas for electricity generation⁴³².

On November 10, 2022, the European Parliament and the Council agreed that travel documents for Russian citizens issued in the Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine and the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia separated from Georgia would not be valid. Thus, the EU aimed to prevent unauthorized crossings across all borders by providing a general understanding of border management⁴³³. The Council announced that it would put the practice into effect on December 8, 2022⁴³⁴.

⁴³⁰The Council of the European Union. (2022e, 10 20). *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1985 of 20 October 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine*. The Council of the European Union: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.LI.2022.272.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A272I%3ATOC>. p.2.

⁴³¹European Council. (2022c, 10 21). *European Council meeting (20 and 21 October 2022)*. European Council: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/59728/2022-10-2021-euco-conclusions-en.pdf>. p.3-4.

⁴³²European Council. (2022i, 10 21). *European Council, 20-21 October 2022*. European Council: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2022/10/20-21/>.

⁴³³Council of the EU. (2022a, 11 10). *Council presidency and European Parliament provisionally agree not to accept Russian travel documents issued in Ukraine and Georgia*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/10/council-presidency-and-european-parliament-provisionally-agree-not-to-accept-russian-travel-documents-issued-in-ukraine-and-georgia/pdf>

⁴³⁴Council of the European Union. (2022j, 12 8). *Council adopts decision not to accept Russian documents issued in Ukraine and Georgia*. Council of the European Union:

On November 15, 2022, the Council announced the start of its military aid mission. It was aimed at strengthening the Ukrainian Armed Forces and developing them to protect the country's territorial integrity and independence. It was declared that Ukraine would be provided with the ammunition, military equipment, and weapons it needs within the scope of developing its operational activities, as well as auxiliary materials that will ensure its maintenance⁴³⁵.

On November 28, 2022, the EU announced that non-compliance with the latest sanction decisions would be included in the Union crime list. The Council announced that it had taken the decision unanimously. Following the decision, it was stated that the Commission would prepare a directive proposal for the implementation of the decision⁴³⁶.

On December 3, 2022, the Council decided that the ceiling price of Russian oil would be 60 dollars. In this way, the Council aimed to reduce Russia's income from oil exports by preventing fluctuations in the energy market⁴³⁷.

On December 6, 2022, the EU and Norway signed an agreement for Norway to provide financial support to the EU Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine. In this context, the Norwegian government stated that it would provide 14.5 billion euros of support to the European Peace Facility in the context of supporting the mission. Norway was the first non-EU country to voluntarily provide financial support to the mission⁴³⁸.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/08/council-adopts-decision-not-to-accept-russian-documents-issued-in-ukraine-and-georgia/pdf> .

⁴³⁵Council of the EU. (2022q, 11 15). *Ukraine: EU launches Military Assistance Mission*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/15/ukraine-eu-launches-military-assistance-mission/> .

⁴³⁶The Council of the EU. (2022z, 11 28). *Sanctions: Council adds the violation of restrictive measures to the list of EU crimes*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/28/sanctions-council-adds-the-violation-of-restrictive-measures-to-the-list-of-eu-crimes/pdf> .

⁴³⁷The Council of the EU. (2022c, 12 3). *Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2367 of 3 December 2022 Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine*. Official Journal of the European Union: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:3111:FULL&from=EN> . p.7.

⁴³⁸The Council of the EU. (2022i, 12 6). *EU and Norway sign an agreement in support of EUMAM Ukraine*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/06/eu-and-norway-sign-an-agreement-in-support-of-eumam-ukraine/pdf> .

On December 9, 2022, the Council adopted an injunction to prevent impunity and to investigate regarding the crimes allegedly committed by Russia in Ukraine. Thus, all member states were asked to implement measures against crimes defined in the Rome Statute, to implement trial procedures in accordance with international and domestic law, and to coordinate with the International Criminal Court and the Ukrainian Chief Public Prosecutor's Office⁴³⁹.

On December 10, 2022, the Council agreed to provide 18 billion euros of support to Ukraine in 2023. With the financial assistance provided, Ukraine's short-term financial needs would be met, and the infrastructure damaged in the war would be repaired. By this way, its reconstruction and integration with Europe would be ensured⁴⁴⁰.

On December 12, 2022, the Council decided to impose sanctions on four individuals and entities on the grounds that they enabled the development and use of unmanned aerial vehicles in the Ukrainian war. The decision includes freezing assets, placing travel restrictions, and restricting the use of economic resources and investments within the EU⁴⁴¹.

On December 15, 2022, the European Council made an evaluation regarding the missile attack carried out by Russia in Ukraine. It was stated that the attacks allegedly carried out by Russia also targeted Ukrainian civilians, so an investigation should be carried out by the International Criminal Court. It was also emphasized that conditions should be improved by providing humanitarian aid to civilians living in the country

⁴³⁹Council of the European Union. (2022n, 11 29). *Council conclusions on the fight against impunity regarding crimes committed in connection with Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine - Approval*. Council of the European Union: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15237-2022-INIT/en/pdf> . p.7.

⁴⁴⁰The Council of the EU. (2022y, 12 10). *Regulation (EU) .../...of the European Parliament The European Parliament and of the Council establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +)*. Council of the European Union: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15727-2022-INIT/en/pdf> .

⁴⁴¹Council of the European Union. (2022x, 12 12). *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2428 of 12 December 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran*. Council of the European Union: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:318I:FULL&from=EN> . p.23-24.

during the winter season. It was stated that member countries should comply with the precautionary measures against Russia, investigate war crimes, and put pressure on Russia diplomatically⁴⁴².

On December 16, 2022, the Council announced the 9th sanctions package against Russia. The sanction decision includes preventing the export of critical equipment such as engines that can be used in the construction of unmanned aerial vehicles, stopping the export of materials for both military and civilian use, and cancelling the permission of public and market research companies. In addition, investment restrictions have been imposed on the mining sector, which is Russia's main source of income. Broadcasting permissions for some Russian channels have been suspended. 141 individuals and 49 entities were added to the sanctions list⁴⁴³.

On January 27, 2023, the Council decided to extend economic sanctions against Russia for six months. Currently, commercial, economic, banking technology, transportation, gas, and some petroleum products imported from Russia were banned, and broadcast licenses of some allegedly pro-Russian broadcasting organizations that provide misinformation were suspended⁴⁴⁴.

On February 2, 2023, the Council approved the 7th Support Package under the European Peace Facility, worth 500 million euros, supporting the Ukrainian Armed Forces and aiming to protect civilians. Thus, the aid provided to Ukraine under the name of the mentioned facility reached 3.6 billion euros⁴⁴⁵.

⁴⁴²European Council. (2022b, 12 15). *European Council meeting (15 December 2022)*. European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/60872/2022-12-15-euco-conclusions-en.pdf> . p.1-3.

⁴⁴³The Council of the EU. (2022d, 12 16). *Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2474 of 16 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine*. Eur-Lex: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R2474&from=EN> . p.3-14.

⁴⁴⁴Council of the EU. (2023g, 1 27). *Russia: EU prolongs economic sanctions over Russia's military aggression against Ukraine*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/27/russia-eu-prolongs-economic-sanctions-over-russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine/> .

⁴⁴⁵Council of the EU. (2023i, 2 2). *Ukraine: Council agrees on further military support under the European Peace Facility*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/02/ukraine-council-agrees-on-further-military-support-under-the-european-peace-facility/> .

On February 3, 2023, the EU-Ukraine Summit was held in Kiev. At the summit, leaders discussed Ukraine's EU membership process, the measures taken by the EU against Russia, Ukraine's initiatives in international judicial bodies, cooperation in the fields of energy, communication, and transportation, and global food security⁴⁴⁶.

On February 9, 2023, Ukrainian President Zelensky attended the European Summit in Brussels. European leaders discussed increasing sanctions against Russia and holding those who committed war crimes accountable. They also discussed taking measures for the restructuring and development of Ukraine and Ukraine's EU membership process⁴⁴⁷.

On February 25, 2023, the European Council announced the 10th sanctions package. This sanctions package prohibited the transit of EU-exported materials through Russia that could be used for military and civilian purposes. The export of important technological and industrial materials, the purchase of asphalt and synthetic tires from Russia, and the provision of natural gas storage capacity were handled. In addition to the suspension of broadcasts on the RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic channels, Russian nationals working on these channels was excluded from working in critical EU facilities. An injunction has been imposed on 87 individuals, including military leaders, Wagner leaders, and 34 entities⁴⁴⁸.

On March 13, 2023, the Council decided to extend the restrictive measure against 1473 persons and 205 entities for six months until September 15, 2023⁴⁴⁹. On March 20, 2023, the Council decided to accelerate the supply and transportation of

⁴⁴⁶European Council. (2023d, 2 3). *Joint statement following the 24th EU-Ukraine Summit*. European Council: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/03/joint-statement-following-the-24th-eu-ukraine-summit/>.

⁴⁴⁷European Council. (2023e, 2 9). *Special meeting of the European Council (9 February 2023)*. Brussels. European Council: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-1-2023-INIT/en/pdf>. p.1-2.

⁴⁴⁸Council of the EU. (2023f, 2 25). *One year of Russia's full-scale invasion and war of aggression against Ukraine, EU adopts its 10th package of economic and individual sanctions*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/25/one-year-of-russia-s-full-scale-invasion-and-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-its-10th-package-of-economic-and-individual-sanctions/pdf>. p.1.

⁴⁴⁹Council of the EU. (2023i, 3 13). *Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence: EU renews individual restrictive measures for six months*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/03/13/ukraine-s-territorial-integrity-sovereignty-and-independence-eu-renews-individual-restrictive-measures-for-six-months/>.

artillery ammunition, which Ukraine urgently needs, and approved this decision on April 13, 2023⁴⁵⁰. On March 23, 2023, the Summit discussed the latest developments in Ukraine in its meeting with UN Secretary-General Guterres. The Council's decision to procure and deliver artillery ammunition during the year was welcomed. While it was stated that the war damaged food security, it was decided to support the UN Black Sea Grain Initiative. They exchanged views on additional measure ⁴⁵¹.

On April 13, 2023, a decision was taken to sanction the Wagner private military company and its managers, Dmitry Utkin and Yevgeniy Prigozhin. In addition, the RIA FAN media company, managed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, was also included in the sanctions list for broadcasting pro-Russian propaganda and providing misinformation⁴⁵². At the meeting of Foreign Ministers on April 24, 2023, military support, food security, restrictive measures, Ukraine's peace plan, and the possible consequences of the EU action plan were evaluated⁴⁵³.

At the G7 summit held in Hiroshima on May 19–21, 2023, leaders discussed joint action on restricting the export of important materials needed for defense to Russia. They aimed to restrict the mobility of Russian banks and authorities in the international financial system and restrict energy and mineral trade⁴⁵⁴.

On May 22, 2023, the issue of accelerating military aid to Ukraine was discussed at the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was aimed at continuing the aid provided to the European Peace Facility and increasing the number of soldiers trained within the scope of the European Union Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) to 30 thousand. In

⁴⁵⁰Council of the European Union. (2023d, 3 20). *Speeding up the delivery and joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine*. Council of the European Union: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7632-2023-INIT/en/pdf>.

⁴⁵¹ European Council. (2023f, 3 23). *The European Council held an exchange of views with United Nations Secretary-General Guterres*. European Council: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-4-2023-INIT/en/pdf>. p.3.

⁴⁵²Council of the European Union. (2023a, 4 13). *Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/756 of 13 April 2023*. Eur-Lex: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.LI.2023.100.01.0004.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2023%3A100I%3ATOC>.

⁴⁵³Council of the European Union. (2023a, 4 13).

⁴⁵⁴ G7. (2023, 5 19). *G7 Leaders' Statement on Ukraine*. G7: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/64494/g7-2023-statement-on-ukraine.pdf>. p.2-3.

addition, discussions were held on the ongoing 11th Sanctions Package studies⁴⁵⁵. At the 10th EU-South Korea summit held on the same day, leaders expressed their support for Ukraine⁴⁵⁶. On May 25, 2023, the Council decided to extend the tax exemption provided to Ukraine in the field of defense for one year until June 2024⁴⁵⁷.

On June 23, 2023, the Council implemented the 11th Sanctions Package. With this package, sanction decisions were imposed on 71 people and 33 entities, including information technology companies that support Russia's information war⁴⁵⁸. At the meeting held on June 29–30, 2023, attended by the NATO Secretary General and the President of Ukraine, EU leaders condemned the war and Russia due to the destruction of Kakhovka power plant and dam. They stated that military, civilian, and humanitarian support for the redevelopment of Ukraine would continue⁴⁵⁹.

On July 25, 2023, Norway announced that it had approved the 2nd Aid Package worth 22 million euros for Ukraine through the European Peace Facility. The package also included ammunition and armored vehicle parts needed for Ukraine⁴⁶⁰. On July 28, 2023, a sanction decision was taken against seven individuals and five entities on the grounds that they carried out disinformation activities.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁵Council of the EU. (2023b, 5 22). *Foreign Affairs Council, 22 May 2023*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2023/05/22/> .

⁴⁵⁶ Council of the European Union. (2023c, 5 22). *Joint Statement European Union - Republic of Korea Summit 2023*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/64522/st09590-en23.pdf> . p.3.

⁴⁵⁷Council of the EU. (2023h, 5 25). *Ukraine: Council adopts renewal of temporary trade liberalisation and other trade concessions*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/05/25/ukraine-council-adopts-renewal-of-temporary-trade-liberalisation-and-other-trade-concessions/pdf> .

⁴⁵⁸Council of the EU. (2023d, 6 23). *Eur-Lex*. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217 of 23 June 2023: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.LI.2023.159.01.0451.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2023%3A159I%3ATOC> .

⁴⁵⁹European Council. (2023c, 6 30). *Conclusions – 29 and 30 June 2023*. European Council: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7-2023-INIT/en/pdf> .

⁴⁶⁰Council of the EU. (2023e, 7 25). *Norway: second Norwegian financial contribution to the European Peace Facility*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/25/norway-second-norwegian-financial-contribution-to-the-european-peace-facility/pdf> .

⁴⁶¹Council of the European Union. (2023b, 7 28). *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1563 of 28 July 2023*. Eur-Lex: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.LI.2023.190.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2023%3A190I%3ATOC> .

On September 28, 2023, Union Foreign Ministers decided to extend the temporary protection status of Ukrainian refugees for one year, until March 4, 2025⁴⁶². At the Council of Foreign Ministers held on October 23, 2023, short and long-term actions regarding the Ukrainian war were put on the agenda. Emphasis was placed on continuing military assistance, clearing mined lands, providing support in the field of cyber security, and supporting the Ukrainian defense industry⁴⁶³. At the EU Summit held on October 26–27, 2023, it was emphasized that the humanitarian and military, economic aid provided to Ukraine would continue. It was stated that the ammunition that Ukraine will need to defend itself would be supplied, and training support would continue⁴⁶⁴.

On November 28, 2023, the Council adopted the aid package to develop Ukraine's military training needs within the scope of the European Union Military Assistance Mission-Ukraine. Thus, the financial value of equipment and training support within the scope of the mission reached 255 million euros. 34,000 Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel benefited from these trainings⁴⁶⁵.

On December 18, 2023, Council put the 12th sanctions package into effect. In the specified package, additional sanctions were imposed on substances such as iron, copper, and aluminum. In this context, multilateral cooperation was developed. In addition, sanctions were taken against two entities in the Russian IT sector and broadcasting organizations that spread disinformation on the Russian side⁴⁶⁶.

⁴⁶²Council of the EU. (2023j, 9 28). *Ukrainian refugees: EU member states agree to extend temporary protection*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/09/28/ukrainian-refugees-eu-member-states-agree-to-extend-temporary-protection/pdf> . p.1.

⁴⁶³Council of the EU. (2023c, 10 23). *Foreign Affairs Council, 23 October 2023*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2023/10/23/> .

⁴⁶⁴European Council. (2023b, 10 27). *Conclusions – 26 and 27 October 2023*. European Council: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/67627/20241027-european-council-conclusions.pdf> . p.1.

⁴⁶⁵Council of the EU. (2023a, 11 28). *European Peace Facility: Council greenlights further funding for training of the Ukrainian Armed Forces under EUMAM Ukraine*. Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/11/28/european-peace-facility-council-greenlights-further-funding-for-training-of-the-ukrainian-armed-forces-under-eumam-ukraine/pdf> .

⁴⁶⁶The Council of the European Union. (2023a, 12 18). *Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/287 of 18 December 2023*. Eur-Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202302874 . p.2.

On January 3, 2024, the Council decided to impose sanctions on the Russian diamond producer, Alrosa Company, and its manager. Thus, it was aimed at reducing Russia's income from diamond exports⁴⁶⁷. On January 29, 2024, the Council decided to extend the sanctions decisions taken for six months, starting on January 31, 2024⁴⁶⁸. On the same day, the Council decided to impose sanctions on four people, including judicial personnel, over alleged human rights violations in Russia⁴⁶⁹.

On February 23, 2024, the Council announced the 13th sanctions package. With the new sanctions package, it was decided to impose sanctions on 106 people and 88 entities. The sanctions specifically targeted Russia's unmanned aerial vehicle development efforts and the defense industry⁴⁷⁰.

On March 12, 2024, the Council decided to extend the sanctions decision on persons and assets until September 15, 2024. In this context, sanctions continued to be imposed on more than 2100 people and entities⁴⁷¹. Due to the death of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny in prison and the investigation of human rights violations in his death, sanctions were taken against 33 people and 2 entities on March 22, 2024⁴⁷².

⁴⁶⁷Council of the EU. (2024h). *Russian war of aggression against Ukraine: Council adds 1 person and 1 entity to EU sanctions list*. Council of the EU. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202400195 . p.2

⁴⁶⁸Council of the EU. (2024g). *Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: Council renews economic sanctions for a further 6 months*. Council of the EU. Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/01/29/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-council-renews-economic-sanctions-for-a-further-6-months/> .

⁴⁶⁹Council of the EU, (2024d). *Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime: Council adds four persons and one entity to EU sanctions list*. Council of the EU: Retrieved from https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202400418 .

⁴⁷⁰Council of the EU. (2024c). *COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2024/745 of 23 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine* Council of the EU: Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202400745 .

⁴⁷¹Council of the EU. (2024). *Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: EU individual sanctions over territorial integrity prolonged for a further six months* Council of the EU: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/03/12/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-individual-sanctions-over-territorial-integrity-prolonged-for-a-further-six-months/> .

⁴⁷²Council of the EU. (2024b). *Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/951 of 22 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses*. Council of the EU: Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202400951 .

On May 17, 2024, the Council placed the media outlets Voice of Europe, RIA Novosti, Izvestia, and Rossiyskaya Gazeta on the sanctions list on the grounds that they spread misinformation and propaganda⁴⁷³. On May 21, 2024, the Council allowed the use of additional asset revenues that could not be transferred to Russia due to sanctions as defense assistance to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility⁴⁷⁴. On May 27, 2024, the Voice of Europe media outlet was accused of allegedly carrying out disinformation activities on behalf of Russia. Two more people in connection with that media outlet were added to the sanctions list⁴⁷⁵. On the same day, the Council added 19 persons and 1 entity, including judges, prosecutors, and members of the judiciary, to the sanctions list for alleged human rights violations in Russia⁴⁷⁶.

On June 17, 2024, the Council resolved to extend sanctions until June 23, 2025, the measures imposed by the EU in reaction to the Russian Federation's illegal annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol⁴⁷⁷. On June 24, 2024, the Council decided to implement 14th sanctions package. The new sanctions make it harder to get around EU sanctions and target high-value sectors of the Russian economy like energy, finance, and trade. Among them are:

- a prohibition on the reloading of Russian LNG on the EU soil,

⁴⁷³Council of the EU. (2024f). *Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: Council bans broadcasting activities in the European Union of four more Russia-associated media outlets* Council of the EU: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/17/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-council-bans-broadcasting-activities-in-the-european-union-of-four-more-russia-associated-media-outlets/>.

⁴⁷⁴Council of the EU. (2024). *Extraordinary revenues generated by immobilized Russian assets: Council greenlights the use of net windfall profits to support Ukraine's self-defense and reconstruction*. Council of the EU: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/21/extraordinary-revenues-generated-by-immobilised-russian-assets-council-greenlights-the-use-of-windfall-net-profits-to-support-ukraine-s-self-defence-and-reconstruction/>.

⁴⁷⁵Council of the EU. (2024a). *Information manipulation in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: EU lists two individuals and one entity*. Council of the EU: Retrieved from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/27/information-manipulation-in-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-lists-two-individuals-and-one-entity/>.

⁴⁷⁶Council of the EU. (2024e). *Russia: EU sets up new country-specific framework for restrictive measures against those responsible for human rights violations and lists 20 persons*. Council of the EU: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401488. p.2-3.

⁴⁷⁷ Council of the EU. (2024) *Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol: EU extends sanctions for further year* Council of the EU: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/17/russia-s-illegal-annexation-of-crimea-and-the-city-of-sevastopol-eu-extends-sanctions-for-further-year/>.

- a prohibition on making fresh investments to finish building LNG projects,
- a prohibition on ports and the provision of services to ships fighting alongside Russia,
- a more comprehensive EU flying ban and additional import-export limitations⁴⁷⁸.

On June 28, 2024, the EU places further, targeted sanctions on Russia. Restrictive measures were agreed to be imposed by the Council on two persons and four organizations that were found to have circumvented EU sanctions and materially supported the Russian regime⁴⁷⁹.

On July 22, 2024, the EU reimposes economic penalties on Russia. The Council resolved to extend the restrictive measures for an additional six months, until January 31, 2025, due to Russia's ongoing actions that are destabilizing the situation in Ukraine⁴⁸⁰.

4.2. Cooperation in the Field of Cyber Security

The EU did not directly intervene militarily in the Ukraine-Russia War but rather took on supportive roles for Ukraine. The EU made efforts such as economic sanctions, military aid, support in the field of cyber security, and diplomatic and international support. Cooperation in the field of cyber security has also become one of the most prominent areas.

Steps to improve the country's cyber security capacity were discussed at the EU-Ukraine Cyber Dialogue meeting on June 3, 2021. In the meeting, ensuring the simultaneous development of both the public and civil sectors and ensuring information

⁴⁷⁸The Council of the European Union. (2024, 24, 6). *Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1738*. The Council of the European Union: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401738 .

⁴⁷⁹ The Council of the European Union. (2024, 28, 6). *Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1843* The Council of the European Union: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401843 .

⁴⁸⁰ The Council of the European Union. (2024, 22,7). *Council renews economic sanctions for a further 6 months*. The Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/07/22/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-council-renews-economic-sanctions-for-a-further-6-months/> .

exchange between each other were discussed. It has been agreed that Ukraine will be supported by the EU until it acquires talent in the field of cyber security⁴⁸¹.

With the law published on January 1, 2022, Ukraine's electronic and communication infrastructure harmonized with the EU at the first stage⁴⁸². With the agreement signed between the EU and Ukraine on January 11, 2022, it was fully integrated into the EU within the framework of the EU Digital Single Market⁴⁸³.

On February 21, 2022, after Russia recognized the independence of the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics, the EU Foreign Relations Council announced that the Cyber Rapid Response Team⁴⁸⁴ would protect Ukraine against cyber-attacks. This means that support for Ukraine has moved not only to the physical environment but also to the cyber environment⁴⁸⁵.

With the implementation of the EU4DigitalUA⁴⁸⁶ project, the resources and talent transfer that Ukraine needed regarding cyber security were provided. The project

⁴⁸¹ European Union External Action Service. (2021, 6 3). *Cyberspace: EU and Ukraine launch dialogue on cyber security*. European Union External Action Service: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/cyberspace-eu-and-ukraine-launch-dialogue-cyber-security_en.

⁴⁸²Schegol, Glib. (2021, 12 3). *Opening the borders: why Ukraine's integration into the EU digital single market is under threat*. BRDO: <https://brdo.com.ua/en/analytics/vidkryty-kordony-chomu-integratsiya-ukrayiny-v-yedynyj-tsyfrovyj-rynok-yes-pid-zagrozoju-2/>.

⁴⁸³EU digital single market aims to integrate digitally EU countries. It allows people and society to use digital space fully and eliminates the barriers between member states legislations. Eur-Lex. (2024). *Digital single market*. Eur-Lex: Retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/31.html#:~:text=Digital%20single%20market%20Under%20the%20Treaty%20on%20the%20single%20market%20fit%20for%20the%20digital%20age>.

⁴⁸⁴Cyber Rapid Response Teams (CRRT) allow EU countries to help each other by building cyber resilience and responding cyber incidents. CRRT assist other EU countries, EU institutions and partners. CRRT uses cyber tools developed to detect, identify, and mitigate cyber threats. PESCO. (2024). *CYBER RAPID RESPONSE TEAMS AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CYBER SECURITY (CRRT)*. PESCO: Retrieved from <https://www.pesco.europa.eu/project/cyber-rapid-response-teams-and-mutual-assistance-in-cyber-security/#:~:text=Cyber%20Rapid%20Response%20Teams%20%28CRRTs%29%20will%20allow%20the%20EU%20Institutions%20C%20CSDP%20operations%20as%20well%20as%20partners>.

⁴⁸⁵European Union External Action Service. (2022, 2 21). *Foreign Affairs Council: Press remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell after the meeting*. European Union External Action Service: Retrieved from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-after-meeting_en.

⁴⁸⁶EU4DigitalUA (EU for Digital Ukraine) is an EU funded project which aims to support digital transformation of Ukraine. With the project Ukraine's digital transformation in governance, cyber security and data protection issues will be improved.

laid the groundwork for the legal infrastructure of cyber security, data security, and awareness. With the transition to EU directives on cyber security, it is expected that Ukraine will be jointly defended against cyber-attacks and use available efforts more effectively⁴⁸⁷.

The second EU-Ukraine Cybersecurity Dialogue Meeting was held between Ukraine and the EU on September 29, 2022. At the meeting, it was emphasized that EU countries support Ukraine in the cyber field and that Russia should put an end to its attacks. It was stated that it was important to stop Russia's attacks on the country's important infrastructure and to provide EU and international support in the field of cyber security. It was stated that the EU allocated 29 million euros to develop the country's cyber security infrastructure; 10 million euros of this amount would be used to purchase materials and equipment for cyber security; and 19 million euros would be used for infrastructure development works that will increase the country's cyber security resilience. Ukraine's 2021–2025 cyber security strategy was considered an important step in the country's harmonization efforts and accession to the EU⁴⁸⁸.

On December 2, 2022, the EU announced that the Cyber Laboratory would be opened in Kiev. With the opening of the laboratory, improvements in the field of cyber security needed by the Ukrainian army and state and the ability to resist cyber-attacks have increased. With this laboratory, the ability to provide training and carry out exercises, including virtual and real scenarios, has been gained⁴⁸⁹.

With the Enhanced EU-Ukraine Cyber Security Cooperation on December 8, 2023, it was aimed for institutions to cooperate closely in the field of cyber security between the Union and Ukraine. Thus, it was aimed at gaining skills such as increasing

EU4Digital. (2019). *EU launches new EU4Digital Programme in Ukraine targeting better online services*. Retrieved from <https://eufordigital.eu/eu-launches-new-eu4digital-programme-in-ukraine-targeting-better-online-services/>.

⁴⁸⁷EU4DigitalUA. (2024b, 1 30). *Cyber security (eGA) and data protection (FIIAPP)*. EU4DigitalUA: Retrieved from <https://eu4digitalua.eu/en/areas/cyber-security-ega-and-data-protection-fiiapp/>.

⁴⁸⁸European Cyber Security Competence Centre. (2022, 2 29). *Ukraine and EU held the second round of the UA-EU Cybersecurity Dialogue*. European Cyber Security Competence Centre: <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/ECCC/items/762738/>.

⁴⁸⁹EU4Ukraine. (2022, 12 2). *EU opens a cyber lab for the Ukrainian Armed Forces*. EU4Ukraine: <https://eu4ukraine.eu/en/media-en/eu-opens-a-cyber-lab-for-the-ukrainian-armed-forces-en.html>.

cyber awareness, developing skills applications, and sharing the information⁴⁹⁰. In addition, in the 2030 Digital Compass⁴⁹¹ published by the EU, it stated that it intends to cooperate with countries in the cyber field that have adopted the same principles⁴⁹². The EU4Tech4Ukraine initiative has been launched as part of the 2030 Digital Compass. This initiative provides support for Ukrainian digital infrastructure and equipment damaged by the war. Damage is minimized by providing improvements to public services such as education and health⁴⁹³.

On December 18, 2023, it was announced that Ukrainian citizens would be able to access more than 130 e-government services with the "Diia" (Digital State and Me) application⁴⁹⁴. On December 19, 2023, within the scope of EU4DigitalUA's sub-project "Oberih," military service attendance and registration processes were transferred to the digital environment⁴⁹⁵. Within the scope of the project, studies continue in public administration areas such as education and health.

4.3. Cooperation in the Field of Strategic Communication

Strategic communication is the whole process of information transmission that enables detailed planning to achieve the long-term interests of the organization⁴⁹⁶.

⁴⁹⁰Network, E. C. (2023, 12 8). *Enhanced EU-Ukraine cooperation in Cybersecurity*. European Cybersecurity Competence Centre and Network: https://cybersecurity-centre.europa.eu/news/enhanced-eu-ukraine-cooperation-cybersecurity-2023-12-08_en.

⁴⁹¹The Digital Compass 2030 is a strategy which directs actions of the EU in relation with digital. Its aim is to have digitally skilled people and professionals, secure critical infrastructures, transformation of businesses and public services to digital throughout the EU.

European Commission. (2024c). *Europe's Digital Decade*. European Commission: Retrieved from <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/europes-digital-decade>.

⁴⁹²European Commission. (2021, 3 9). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions 2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade*. European Commission: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021DC0118>.

⁴⁹³European Commission. (2024d, 1 31). *Eutech4Ukraine*. European Commission: <https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/en/digital-compass/eutech4ukraine/pages/about>.

⁴⁹⁴EU4Digital. (2023, 12 18). *New digital services for Ukraine: Diia Summit 2023*. EU4Digital: Retrieved from <https://eufordigital.eu/new-digital-services-for-ukraine-diia-summit-2023/>.

⁴⁹⁵EU4Digital. (2024a, 1 25). *EU4DigitalUA assists Ukraine 'Oberih' military register modernization*. EU4Digital: Retrieved from <https://eufordigital.eu/eu4digitalua-assists-ukraine-oberih-military-register-modernisation/>.

⁴⁹⁶Bockstette, Carsten (2008). *Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Management Techniques*. Marshall Center European Center for Security Studies: :

Through strategic communication, efforts are made to combat disinformation in the information dimension, which is the invisible face of the operation. Disinformation is misleading and verifiable false information that is deliberately spread to deceive the public, harm public order, and gain economic benefit. Disinformation blurs the information environment, makes the public question their loyalty to official authority⁴⁹⁷.

Since the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine has tried to deal with Russia's disinformation and cyberattacks. Within the scope of combating disinformation, the Council authorized the High Representative to prepare an action plan with member states and EU institutions on March 19–20, 2015⁴⁹⁸.

In 2015, the EU Foreign Affairs Service established the Eastern Strategic Communication Task Force (East StratCom Task Force)⁴⁹⁹, which included Ukraine, to detect and prevent Russia's disinformation activities. The objectives of the Task Force are;

- To strengthen the effective communication and unity policies of the eastern neighbors,
- Strengthening independent media and media freedom in members and eastern neighbors,
- Being able to counter disinformation activities of the Russian Federation⁵⁰⁰.

https://web.archive.org/web/20110719063732/http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_20-en.pdf . p.9.

⁴⁹⁷Council of the European Union. (2018, 12 5). *Action Plan against Disinformation*. Council of the European Union: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/action_plan_against_disinformation.pdf . p.1.

⁴⁹⁸Council of the European Union. (2015, 3 20). *European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) Conclusions*. Council of the European Union: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21888/european-council-conclusions-19-20-march-2015-en.pdf> . p.5.

⁴⁹⁹The Task Force was set up to address disinformation campaigns. In March 2015, High Representative runs the cooperation of EU institutions and countries in accordance with the action plan about strategic Communication.

European Union External Action Service. (2024). Questions and Answers about the East StratCom Task Force. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/questions-and-answers-about-east-stratcom-task-force_en#11232 .

⁵⁰⁰Council of the European Union. (2018, 12 5). *Action Plan against Disinformation*. Council of the European Union: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/action_plan_against_disinformation.pdf . p.4.

By the task force, "false information" published by Russia on Eastern Europe is detected, and "real news" is provided with "correct information." The Task Force's EUvsDisinfo⁵⁰¹ project was launched in the same year. The main purpose of the project is to fight against disinformation by increasing the awareness of Eastern European countries. Media outlets in different languages are followed, the news is analyzed, and the content of pro-Russian news is published to enlighten the public. In addition, the compiled news is recorded in the database and serves as a resource for researchers. In addition to compiled news, articles are created about disinformation sources and methods. Awareness is increased by sharing the data obtained with governments, non-governmental organizations, public officials, and EU institutions⁵⁰².

The Action Plan Against Disinformation prepared by the Commission entered into force on December 5, 2018. In the action plan, it is stated that the Union will contribute to the maintenance of the democratic system and the fight against disinformation. In the action plan, the fight against disinformation is created under four headings. These are;

- Increasing the ability of EU institutions to identify, analyze, and respond to disinformation.
- Ability to respond to disinformation in a coordinated manner,
- Increasing the capabilities of the civil sector in the fight against disinformation,
- Increasing awareness in society about combating disinformation⁵⁰³.

Another document published by the Commission in 2020 on combating disinformation is the European Democracy Action Plan. In the action plan, it is stated that the EU was founded on democratic foundations and that democracy should be

⁵⁰¹EUvsDisinfo (The European Union versus Disinformation) is the main project of the East StratCom Task Force. EUvsDisinfo's main goal is to raise public awareness and respond to the Russia's disinformation operations and inform EU citizens about media manipulations and disinformation. EUvsDisinfo. (2024). *About EUvsDisinfo*. <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/about/> .

⁵⁰²EUvsDisinfo. (2015). *About EUvsDisinfo*. EUvsDisinfo: <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/about/#> .

⁵⁰³Council of the European Union. (2018, 12 5). *Action Plan against Disinformation*. Council of the European Union: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/action_plan_against_disinformation.pdf . p.5.

strengthened in member and neighboring countries. Strengthening democracy and ensuring free expression, ensuring freedom of publication, and combating disinformation are the important parts of the action plan⁵⁰⁴.

4.4 Evaluation of the Effects of the Russia-Ukraine War on the EU

After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia and Ukraine, which have historical and cultural closeness, created their own road maps. Russia aimed to bring the former USSR countries together and under its control within the scope of its near-abroad policy. However, Ukraine has started to follow a policy closer to NATO and the EU. This situation shows the importance of national preferences, even though Russia and Ukraine have common historical roots. As stated above, according to the Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory, national preferences are variable, so international politics may change depending on the states.

Due to its geopolitical location, Ukraine is dependent on Russia for energy resources. On the other hand, Russia is dependent on Ukraine in terms of delivering the mentioned resources to the European market in the shortest way possible. As mentioned above, interdependence and integration are interconnected. In this context, national preferences are expressed by governments within the framework of economic interdependence. In the intergovernmental negotiation phase, there is the opportunity to put more pressure on the less dependent side. Thus, this situation consists of a more advantageous position to less dependent side in conducting negotiations. This situation reveals the reason why Russia, which is economically strong, can impose its demands on the Ukrainian side and influence Ukraine through the prices of energy resources.

In late 2013, President Yanukovich's refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU and his turn towards pro-Russian policy increased the unrest in the country and paved the way for the "Euro Maidan" events. Since its own internal dynamics were

⁵⁰⁴European Commission. (2020, 12 3). *European Democracy Action plan*. European Commission: https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2020-12/edap_factsheet8.pdf . p.1-2.

not considered when making this decision, Euromaidan events occurred in the country⁵⁰⁵.

To ensure a permanent ceasefire in the Donbas region in 2014, the Minsk protocol was signed because of the Minsk 1 meeting. Minsk 2 meetings were held. Although the second protocol was signed because of the negotiations, these negotiations did not contribute to peace to the desired extent. This situation reveals Russia's will to achieve its political goal. According to the Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory, "bargaining power" gains importance in negotiations between countries. The party with superior bargaining power makes fewer concessions to the weaker party. Although international organizations and other actors have a role in the negotiation phase, governments are the most important actors that make the negotiation possible and affect the outcome. Although mediator states intervened in these negotiations for the purpose of reconciliation, no result was achieved.

The first phase of the Russia-Ukraine war started with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the second phase took place in 2022 with Russia's intervention in Ukraine. The war has not only become a regional problem with thousands of people flocking to the European border; it has also become a global problem as international food and energy supplies are endangered. The EU, a global actor, tries to keep up with the changing security environment by cooperating with international actors. The Union keeps up with the changing security environment through global, regional, and national cooperation. The Union has entered high-level cooperation with the Ukraine and NATO in the context of the Ukrainian war. As many theorists, such as Moravcsik, state, EU integration is shaped by crises that are environmental factors⁵⁰⁶.

Political and military developments and conflicts on the European continent, such as Russia's interventions in Georgia and Ukraine and Britain's Brexit decision from the Union, have led to questions about security perceptions on the continent⁵⁰⁷. In this process, the existence of NATO and establishing an independent EU army are discussed

⁵⁰⁵Özdal, Habibe. (2015a). *İç-Bölgesel-Küresel Dinamikler Bağlamında Ukrayna Krizi*. Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika. p.69-102.

⁵⁰⁶Anghel, Veronica; Jones, Erik. (2023). *Is Europe really forged through crisis? Pandemic EU and the Russia-Ukraine war*. Journal of European Public Policy. p.766-786.

⁵⁰⁷Nuhut, Özgür. (2022). *AB ordusu kurma çabaları nereye evrildi ve NATO'yla birlikte nereye evrilebilir?* Cappadocia Journal of Area Studies p.114.

among EU member states, such as France and Germany. During this period, French President Macron pointed to NATO and said that NATO's brain death had occurred⁵⁰⁸.

The European Union's (EU) reaction to hybrid threats is not new, but it has escalated after Russia's annexation of Crimea, the Syrian Civil War's irregular migrant crisis, and the rise in the activities of foreign terrorist fighters inside the Union. The joint communication document "Common Framework for Countering Hybrid Threats: European Union Response," released by the EU Commission on April 6, 2016, stressed that the threat environment in the world had changed following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, accepted as the starting point of the Russia-Ukraine war. The text is crucial to comprehending how the EU views the modern hybrid environment and how it takes security measures against potential dangers⁵⁰⁹. The document explains how the security of the European continent is impacted by events in the Balkans and the southern part of the continent. The collaboration of NATO and the steps that member nations must take to counter hybrid threats were mentioned. It was requested of member nations to carry out initiatives aimed at recognizing risks, increasing consciousness, fostering adaptability, averting and managing emergencies, and revitalizing.

Cooperation was highlighted in the joint EU-NATO declaration released at the July 2016 NATO summit. There have been eight published progress reports in this regard. According to these reports;

It was mentioned in the first progress report that combating hybrid threats is now more crucial than ever. The Political and Security Committee of the Union and the North Atlantic Council of NATO held reciprocal briefings. Both groups would help create the Hybrid Center of Excellence and take part in its creation. It was said that this was the first time the Union and NATO had carried out a hybrid-based scenario exercise⁵¹⁰.

⁵⁰⁸BBC News Türkçe. (2019a). *Fransa Cumhurbaşkanı Macron: NATO'nun beyin ölümü gerçekleşti*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-50342428>.

⁵⁰⁹European Commission. (2016b, 4 6).

⁵¹⁰NATO. (2017a, 06 14). *First Progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016*. NATO: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_06/20170619_170614-Joint-progress-report-EU-NATO-EN.pdf. p.3-4.

Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.14.

The second progress report indicated that both short-term and longer-term efforts were required to achieve tangible outcomes for strengthening cooperation. According to the report, the first joint intelligence analysis study was finished, and the next one was scheduled⁵¹¹.

According to the third progress report, intelligence units were able to coordinate, allowing for the creation of a shared situational picture. Information sharing between the NATO Hybrid Analysis Unit, the European Union Hybrid Fusion Cell, and the Hybrid Center of Excellence was mentioned in the same progress report⁵¹².

The fourth progress report stated that during the drills against hybrid threats, liaison officers from the EU and NATO collaborated and exchanged their views⁵¹³.

Two organizations came together to cooperate in strategic communication, as stated in the fifth progress report. Since the start of 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic erupted, collaboration was created in the areas of relief delivery, combating black propaganda and misinformation, cyber security, and lessening the crisis' effects⁵¹⁴.

As per the sixth progress report, the global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was acknowledged. Officials from NATO and the EU convened to discuss strategies for battling misinformation and thwarting cyberattacks in this context. Discussions on

⁵¹¹NATO. (2017b, 11 29). *Second progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016*. NATO: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_11/171129-2nd-Joint-progress-report-EU-NATO-eng.pdf . p.2.

Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.15.

⁵¹²NATO. (2018). *Third progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017*. NATO Website: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_06/20180608_1 . p.2.

Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.15.

⁵¹³NATO. (2019). *Fourth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017* 27.08.2022 tarihinde. NATO Website: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/190617-4th . p.2.

Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.15.

⁵¹⁴NATO. (2020, 06 16). *Fifth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017*. NATO: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/6/pdf/200615-progress-report-nr5-EU-NATO-eng.pdf . p.2.

Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.15.

thwarting hybrid attacks in an epidemic setting were undertaken by the officials of these organizations⁵¹⁵.

The seventh progress report said that following Russia's engagement in Ukraine, political discourse against hybrid threats was formed. There was an increase in cooperation between the North Atlantic Council of NATO and the Union's Political and Security Committee. Furthermore, the two organizations' cooperation should improve over time to fully counter hybrid threats at the appropriate level⁵¹⁶.

In the eighth progress report, it was stated that Euro-Atlantic security faced one of the biggest tests in recent times with Russia's intervention in Ukraine. It was emphasized that NATO and the EU would continue their efforts to increase defense capacities of countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Tunisia, Jordan, and Mauritania. In the context of countering hybrid threats;

- Operational cooperation in maritime studies has been increased,
- Support was provided to Ukraine on cyber security and defense issues, and joint exercises were carried out,
- Development of defense capabilities and research and development studies are carried out,
- Joint exercises were carried out,
- It was stated that political dialogue has been increased⁵¹⁷.

Moravcsik linked the EU's cohesion to minor common denominator negotiations, the national preferences of sub-state groups, and intergovernmental negotiations. According to him, although governments may have some reservations, they can choose to compromise in line with common goals, or they can choose to make concessions on unimportant issues and maximize the benefits they will obtain on more important issues. Thus, governments make mutual concessions and requests while conducting

⁵¹⁵NATO. (2021b). p.2.

Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.15.

⁵¹⁶European Commission. (2023a, 06 16). *Eighth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017*. European Commission: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/65080/230616-progress-report-nr8-eu-nato.pdf> . p.13.

⁵¹⁷European Commission. (2023a, 06 16). p.14.

negotiations. In this context, it is possible to see these reservations and acceptances in the decisions taken by the Union against Russia and in the developing cooperation with NATO-EU and Ukraine.

First, member states of NATO and the EU have the right to veto decisions according to decision-making processes. Decision-making is therefore influenced by the bilateral and multilateral ties between the member nations of both organizations. It is more difficult for the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, Turkey, and the USA members of a single organization to influence the significant decisions of both organizations. However, it is easier for the member countries of both organizations to achieve their political goals within both organizations. A single organization member's political gains are impacted by slower engagement and less awareness of changes in the other organization⁵¹⁸.

The existence of Union members who have close cooperation with the United States of America in defense is the second reservation. Due to national interests, Sweden, Finland, and other nations in Central and Eastern Europe favor defense cooperation policies inside the EU and NATO. However, especially France and Germany want to pursue an independent defense strategy from the USA⁵¹⁹.

The third concern is that army capabilities that demand funding cannot be divided between two distinct organizations. Nearly two-thirds of NATO members are also EU members⁵²⁰. This sensitivity has led to the development of the idea of smart defense⁵²¹. By working together on cooperative initiatives, member nations want to

⁵¹⁸Ewers-Peters, Nele Marianne. (2022). Positioning member states in EU-NATO security cooperation: towards a typology. *European Security*, p.9.

Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.15.

⁵¹⁹Ewers-Peters, Nele Marianne (2022). p.13.

Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). *Gelişen Hibrit Savaş Ortamında NATO AB İş Birliği*. Karadeniz Araştırmaları. p.16.

⁵²⁰Papaioannou, Alexandros. (2022, 5 27). *Güçlenen AB NATO İş birliği*. NATO Dergisi: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/tr/articles/2019/07/16/gueclenen-ab-nato-iliskileri/index.html> .

Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.16.

⁵²¹Smart Defense prevents countries from spending separately on the same issues and ensures that they act jointly. Thus, it aims to develop more defense capabilities by allocating less resources to defense needs. Grand, Camille. (2012). *Smart Defense and The Future of NATO*. Chicago Council on Global Affairs p.45.

increase defense capabilities while utilizing fewer financial resources. Member states commit to transferring monies to the European Defense Fund so that it can be utilized for research and development in cooperative military initiatives⁵²².

The fourth objection relates to historical differences that exist between NATO and EU members, including Turkey and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus. The Cyprus problem between Turkey, a NATO member but not an EU member, and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, an EU member but not a NATO member, could make it difficult for the two organizations to cooperate militarily and fully share information⁵²³.

After the first phase of the war, although the Union took decisions against Russia during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, countries within the EU put forward their views and policies in line with their own interests. The USA, UK, Germany, Poland, Baltic countries, Denmark, and Finland fully support EU sanctions. France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Croatia advocated sanctions due to their economic relations with Russia but opposed their tightening. During the specified period, there were contradictory statements by the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria against the sanction decisions of the EU. While some of the people in these countries see Russia as a threat, others see it as an economic partner. Italy, Hungary, Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, and Austria opposed the sanctions decision for energy sector and social reasons. Austria and Hungary are almost completely dependent on Russia in terms of natural gas. Ireland, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Malta remained neutral about sanction decisions. This situation is related to the lack of mutual economic relations with Russia and the distance of their mainland from Russia⁵²⁴.

⁵²²Raik, Kristi., & Järvenpää, Pauli. (2017). *A New Era of EU-NATO Cooperation How to Make the Best of a Marriage of Necessity*. International Centre for Defence and Security, p.19.

⁵²³Lindstrom, Gustav., & Tardy, Thierry. (2019). *NATO and the EU, "The essential partners*. NATO Defense College, p.12.

Aytuğ, H. Kutay., & Pozan, İ. Fatih (2023). p.16.

⁵²⁴Shagina, Maria. (2017). *Friend or Foe? Mapping the positions of EU Member States on Russia sanctions*. European Leadership: Retrieved from <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/friend-or-foe-mapping-the-positions-of-eu-member-states-on-russia-sanctions/> .

In the same period, there were differences of opinion between the two leading countries of the Union, France and Germany, against the Union sanctions. France showed a security-based attitude, while Germany showed an attitude based on its interests in the energy sector within the economic framework⁵²⁵. France is committed to maintaining constructive diplomatic channels, while Germany supports the weakening of the Russian side's power through economic and diplomatic sanctions. This attitude of France was described as rewarding and criticized, especially by Ukraine and the Baltic countries⁵²⁶.

After the second phase, the Union condemned Russia's unjust war against Ukraine and made a more holistic effort to end the war. The hesitations of member countries were turned in favor of Ukraine. In this period, as after the first period, the USA, England, Germany, Poland, the Baltic countries, Denmark, and Finland fully supported the sanctions against Russia. With Russia's war against Ukraine, Germany and France changed their stated stance in favor of Ukraine and signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement with this country⁵²⁷. The issue of Sweden and Finland's membership in NATO has come to the fore due to the ongoing war on their borders. While Finland's membership was accepted, Sweden's membership issue was suspended due to the vetoes of Turkey and Hungary. In the following period, his candidacy was accepted after both countries lifted their vetoes⁵²⁸.

While France, Spain, and Portugal support sanctions against Russia, they have taken action to break their energy dependence. Within the scope of the project initiated under the name H2MED, hydrogen will be transported from the Iberian Peninsula to the French port of Marseille via a submarine pipeline. Germany was also included in the project. In the project, which is aimed at being operational by 2030, 20% of the EU

⁵²⁵Marangé, Céline; Stewart, Susan. (2021). *French and German approaches to Russia*. p.11 Chathamhouse: Retrieved from <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/2021-11-30-french-german-approaches-russia-marange-and-stewart.pdf> .

⁵²⁶Reuters. (2022a). *Some EU states formally express concerns to France over Macron Russia comments - diplomats*. Reuters: Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/some-eu-states-formally-express-concerns-france-over-macron-russia-comments-2022-12-12/> .

⁵²⁷Jackson, Jon. (2024). *Ukraine Signs Key Security Pacts with Germany and France*. Newsweek: Retrieved from <https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-security-pacts-germany-france-1870883>

⁵²⁸NATO. (2024). *Enlargement and Article 10*. NATO: Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm .

energy needs will be met through nitrogen by 2050. In this context, it is aimed at reducing the energy dependence of the four countries involved in the project, as well as other European countries⁵²⁹.

Netherlands and Croatia acted to continue the sanctions within the unity of the Union. To effectively impose sanctions on Russia, the Netherlands has initiated a criminal investigation into companies that carry out suspicious activities regarding products exported to countries neighboring Russia⁵³⁰. In addition, the Netherlands and Denmark have decided to take the lead in providing F16 fighter jets and training pilots and maintenance crews to develop Ukraine's air power and increase its endurance⁵³¹.

Italy, Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Malta, on the one hand, supported the steps to reduce energy dependence on Russia, and on the other hand, they took steps to implement EU sanctions as a union and to discourage Russia from fighting. Hungary claimed that the Hungarian minority living in Ukraine had been deprived of their right to education in Hungarian for 10–15 years. Thus, he rejected the military and economic aid package to Ukraine. However, he lifted his veto due to the possibility of political sanctions and the cutoff of financial aid that should have been given to him by the EU a year ago. Then, European Summit President Charles Michel announced that the member states agreed, and that 50 billion euros worth of aid would be provided to the Ukraine Facility⁵³².

In the second phase of the war, after Russia's military intervention in Ukraine in 2022, the increased cooperation between the Union and Ukraine reached its highest

⁵²⁹Moncloa, La. (2023). *Official website of the president of the Government of Spain and the Council of Ministers*. Retrieved from https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/gobierno/news/Paginas/2023/20230122_h2med-project.aspx.

⁵³⁰BBC News Türkçe. (2023c). *Rusya'ya yaptırımları ihlal gerekçesiyle 45 Hollandalı şirkete soruşturma*. BBC Türkçe: Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c3gz45qlnnlo>.

⁵³¹Government of the Netherlands. (2023). *Statement on strengthening of the Ukrainian Air force – Donation of F16*. Government of the Netherlands: Retrieved from <https://www.government.nl/documents/diplomatic-statements/2023/08/20/statement-on-strengthening-of-the-ukrainian-air-force---donation-of-f16>.

⁵³²European Council. (2024b). *Remarks by President Charles Michel at the press conference of the Special European Council*. European Council: Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/01/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-press-conference-of-the-special-meeting-of-the-european-council/>.

level, and member countries changed their attitudes in favor of Ukraine. In the following process;

- Support for the Ukrainian economy,
 - Establishment of EU-Ukraine integration lines in the context of food security,
 - Delivery of humanitarian aid and civil protection aid to Ukraine,
 - Aid to Ukrainian schoolchildren, support of civil society, and cybersecurity,
 - Holding Russia accountable in the context of international law and ensuring judicial initiatives,
 - Military equipment and training support for Ukraine,
 - Accepting immigrants from Ukraine,
- supports were provided to Ukraine⁵³³.

Since 2014, the Union has been imposing sanctions against Russia for the annexation of Crimea, declaring war on Ukraine, and recognizing the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. In the period between February 2022 and June 2024, the Union decided on fourteen sanctions packages. The aim of the sanctions was to weaken the Russian economy and reduce its resilience. In this context, sanctions have been imposed on 1950 people and entities since 2014. Among the people are President Putin, Russian parliamentarians, bureaucrats, and high-level commanders. The assets include media organizations that support the war, banks, media organizations, and the Wagner private military company⁵³⁴.

Economic sanctions targeted the Russian banking, trade, energy, transportation, defense, and technology sectors. Restrictions on money transfers have been imposed on ten Russian banks in the commercial sector and the Russian Central Bank. In the energy

⁵³³European Commission. (2024e, 1 24). *Factsheet: EU solidarity with Ukraine*. European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/FS_22_3862 . p.1-4.

⁵³⁴European Commission. (2024). *EU adopts 13th package of sanctions against Russia after two years of its war of aggression against Ukraine* European Commission: Retrieved from https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-13th-package-sanctions-against-russia-after-two-years-its-war-aggression-against-ukraine-2024-02-23_en .

sector, bans have been imposed on oil, coal, and minerals exported from Russia to the Union. By introducing a price ceiling for crude oil, it was aimed at reducing the income obtained from exported oil. In the transportation sector, EU airspace, ports, and highways are closed to Russian transportation vehicles. An export ban has been imposed on materials for civilian and military use in the defense sector, as well as important materials such as processors and navigation devices used in military equipment. In the services sector, bans have been introduced in sectors such as software, crypto assets, IT services, and market and public opinion research services⁵³⁵.

The Union's sanctions did not remain only within itself but also entered a policy of deterring and isolating Russia in the international arena. For example, instead of the G8 summit being held in Sochi in 2014, the G7 summit was held in Brussels. In addition, various sanctions decisions were taken against Belarus and Iran, which support Russia. In February 2022, the visa exemption for Russian diplomats was abolished, and in September 2022, the Russian visa facilitation agreement was suspended. The Council also decided to impose regional sanctions on imports, exports, and consultancy services to Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson⁵³⁶.

In the first phase of the war, different views about sanctions came to the fore among the Union member countries due to historical, economic, social, and political reasons. Under the leadership of France and Germany, discussions such as the necessity of NATO and the establishment of the EU army took place. Starting in the second phase, member countries have preferred to stay together against hybrid threats originating from Russia. Because, although member states have veto power, they have not chosen this path in sanctions and other decisions taken by the EU. As stated by Moravcsik in his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, by negotiating governments achieve greater gains by finding some common ground and making some concessions. Because the failure of member states to reach an agreement will fuel the threat of conflict and may

⁵³⁵European Commission. (2024f, 2 1). *Sanctions adopted following Russia's military aggression against Ukraine*. European Commission: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine_en .

⁵³⁶European Council. (2024a, 2 1). *EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine (since 2014)*. European Council: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/> .

prevent the gains they can achieve individually and wholly. Undoubtedly, the greatest of these gains is the common protection of their own countries against an external threat.



CONCLUSION

The major European powers have long viewed Ukraine as a region caught in a fight for dominance. The power vacuum that resulted from the fall of the USSR has made this fight more intense. Following the referendum on December 1, 1991, Ukraine became an independent state. Russia saw Ukraine's independence as a temporary setback because it is a "border country" with both Russia and the Western alliance, NATO, and the EU. The fact that Ukraine was unable to grow its national identity; the absence of established governmental institutions and experience with free market economies; and the presence of Russian-speaking populations throughout the nation caused west and east separation within the country. Despite exiting the USSR, Ukraine maintained its ties with Russia for the previously mentioned purposes and joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Nevertheless, in the ensuing years, Ukraine chose to adopt a market-oriented economic transformation strategy over Russia's CIS integration objectives.

Ukraine's political life was turbulent between 1991, when it obtained independence, and 2002. There have been East-West-oriented tides in foreign policy, despite diplomatic initiatives focusing on the EU and Russia, but not enough progress has been attained in this regard. During a period of political and economic unrest from 1991 to 1999, Russia struggled to maintain authority over the post-Soviet region and its near surroundings. As a result, frozen conflict zones like inside the Russia and its near abroad have seen crises and instability. This reason has made it possible for the USA and the EU to quickly influence former Eastern Bloc countries in Europe and the near abroad of Russia, particularly the Black Sea area. Beginning in 2000, Russia's strategy toward its near abroad gained importance, specifically in the Putin administration. It was predicted that Putin would restore Russia to its former status, restore its lost dignity, and establish control over its near abroad as a major power.

When President Yanukovich declared that he would be a party to the Customs Union with Russia and refused to sign the Cooperation Agreement with the EU. This decision caused dissatisfaction in the nation and reached an upsurge in late 2013, known

as the "Euro Maidan" events. President Yanukovich fled Ukraine and sought safety in Russia following the demonstrations on February 22, 2013.

Following the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine and Yanukovich's exit from the nation, Russia invaded, seized, and assisted pro-Russia rebels in Crimea. On March 16, 2014, a referendum was held in Crimea. Putin declared that Crimea had been taken back on March 18, 2014. International actors considered Russia as pursuing a "hybrid war" strategy during the annexation of Crimea due to its simultaneous employment of political, economic, and military elements in addition to low intensity activities that did not amount to war.

Additionally, the USA and the EU declared that they would impose sanctions on Russia for its decision. Soon after, the Russian minority-dominated cities of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine declared their independence as the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic. Conflicts within the country have exacerbated because of this circumstance. In 2014, the prolonged hostilities in the Donbas area were perceived as an issue that required resolution between the two states. Following the Minsk 1 summit between the OSCE, the Luhansk People's Republic, the Donetsk People's Republic, and Ukraine, the Minsk protocol was signed, and an immediate ceasefire was agreed upon. The chiefs of state of Belarus, France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia attended the Minsk 2 meetings. The negotiations resulted in the signing of the second protocol, but they would not have the impact of bringing about peace.

President Zelensky of Ukraine underlined in Brussels on June 5, 2019, that his country's objectives remain unchanged and that it aspires to join the EU and NATO as a full member. However, they declared themselves willing to engage in talks with Russia. To put a stop to the ongoing hostilities, it was stated on October 1, 2019, that the "Steinmeier Formula" would be implemented after both sides withdrew their soldiers. It was also announced that the Donbas region might receive autonomy following elections. Protests over this proclamation persisted, nonetheless.

Russia is alienated with Ukraine's rapprochement with the EU and, more specifically, NATO. Russia required a formal promise from the western nations that

Ukraine would not join NATO or be a part of the missile defense system. As of 2021, he began amassing armed units along the Ukrainian border after his plea was not met. The Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics received formal recognition from Russia on February 21, 2022. Russia stated that the forces positioned on the Ukrainian border were there only for training purposes and that they had no plans to launch a military action against Ukraine.

Putin announced on February 24, 2022, that a special military operation had been planned. The military operation's goals were to rid the area of Neo-Nazis and protect the local population. The international community reacted to this circumstance. The sanctions against Russia were tightened by the West, particularly by the USA and the EU. In the aftermath of the commencement of the conflict, a refugee crisis and a migration from Ukraine to Europe started to roll in, particularly targeting Poland and Moldova.

Following the referendum on September 23, 2022, the people of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia chose to become part of the Russian Federation. Although there were doubts about the validity of the referendums, the decision of Ukraine to join Russia was not accepted globally. The prevailing opinion was that Ukraine's territorial integrity ought to be preserved. Putin gave his approval to four regions' decisions to join the Russian Federation on September 30, 2023.

One can enumerate the social, political, military, and economic causes of war. The Russian minority residing in Ukraine and Russia's compatriot policy are the main social causes of the war. Acceptance of the "State policy towards compatriots living abroad" statute in May 1999 brought about a shift in Russia's foreign policy. By this token, Russia legalized the authority of influencing other countries where the compatriots live abroad.

The ethnic, cultural, and economic divisions between the east and west of Ukraine are the underlying causes of Russia's military invasion of that country in 2022 and the annexation of Crimea. In the east of Ukraine, more people speak Russian. The region is more heavily influenced by Russia. The compatriot policy has a strong foundation thanks to the mentioned circumstance. With Russia's help, topics that might

appear to be domestic to Ukraine can be discussed regionally and internationally. This problem leaves Ukraine vulnerable to Russian manipulation from the outside.

Russia's Near Abroad Doctrine is the primary political reason behind the war. The year of 1993 saw the announcement of the Near Abroad Doctrine by Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. According to doctrine, maintaining relations with the former Soviet Republics is granted top priority. The goal of this doctrine is to keep regional and international organizations like NATO and the EU from gaining sway over the former Soviet territory. The core countries of the doctrine are Belarus and Ukraine. Since Kiev was the site of the founding of the first Russian state, Ukraine has historical ties with Russia.

The goal of RF's foreign policy was to maintain its standing as a global power. A multipolar and alternative active foreign policy was also attempted to be pursued with all other geographies. Maintaining control over the near abroad and deterring NATO and other international actors from intervening in this region were given top priority. In this regard, Russia has actively worked to defend its near abroad since 2014 and has tightened its stance against the EU and NATO's attempts to influence Ukraine. The annexation and unilateral occupation of Crimea were accomplished by this procedure. Following 2014, with the continued tensions between Russia and Ukraine, NATO and the EU prepared countermeasures and actively opposed Russia's expansionary operations into its near abroad. Eventually, RF tried to act as a counterbalance to the unipolar global order focused on the US.

The military reason is Ukraine maintains closer ties to NATO, the Western Bloc's security agency. Examining the RF's national security strategies since 2000, ending US unipolarity and advancing the RF's importance as a major player on the global scene have been the top priorities of the RF's foreign policy. It is evident that foreign policy responds to NATO expansion and concentrates on the former Soviet geography considering the Georgian War, the acquisition of Crimea, and the assistance provided to the current administration in the Syrian civil war. The war between Russia and the West grew more intense because of the Georgian War and the acquisition of Crimea, which were responses to potential NATO expansion.

One of the economic causes of the conflict is the significance of energy in Russia-Ukraine ties. Ukraine's geopolitical location makes it a bridge connecting Europe and Russia. Ukraine is in an indispensable position in terms of energy security. Most of the natural gas and oil extracted in Russia and the Caspian Sea were transported to Europe via Ukraine before Russian intervention in that country in 2022. In 2020, Ukraine was the nation that shipped the most oil and natural gas from Russia to the European market. In terms of trade relations between the two nations, the energy industry came in first.

In 2014, Russia initiated its first phase of intervention in the country when it annexed Crimea. In 2022, it resumed its intervention under the pretext of a special military operation, but without declaring war on Ukraine. The regular forces of the Russian and Ukrainian sides were among the soft and hard power aspects of the nations that were deployed in the conflict. International enterprises like Microsoft and Starlink, as well as private military firms like Wagner and foreign warriors, all contributed to the war effort.

In the relevant war;

- The blurring of the boundaries between conflict and peace (the Russian Federation did not issue an official declaration of war),
- The all-out conflict involving elements of hard and soft power as well as state institutions,
- The coordinated and simultaneous performance of conventional and non-conventional operations, cyber operations, psychological operations, disinformation operations, and intelligence operations,
- Along with conventional forces, the use of special forces, private military firms, proxy forces, hackers, private companies have been used in the conduct of operations in a multi-actor environment,
- The importance of asymmetric operations and indirect attitudes in the execution of operations and target selection,

- The prominence of artificial intelligence technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles and robotic applications as force multipliers in war reveals that the war is being waged in a hybrid war strategy.

The refugee crisis resulting from the Syrian civil war, the Ukrainian conflict, and Russia's annexation of Crimea have all contributed to the acceleration of the European Union's struggle against hybrid threats. In 2016, following the initial phase of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the Commission released a document titled "Common Framework for Countering Hybrid Threats: European Union Response." According to this document, European security has been impacted by changes in the global security environment. Both the actions that member nations must take and the significance of working with NATO were underlined in this context.

Cooperation was stressed, and advancements were made in this area in the joint EU-NATO declaration released during the July 2016 NATO summit. Situational awareness, strategic communication, crisis intervention and resilience, cyber security, and defense were all emphasized as areas of cooperation. There have been eight published progress reports in this regard. In the eight-progress report, it was emphasized that it was Russia's engagement in Ukraine presented one of the largest tests to Euro-Atlantic security in recent memory. Key headings of the progress report are,

- To combat hybrid threats, the NATO and EU intelligence units collaborate on joint studies,
- Operational cooperation in maritime studies has increased,
- Ukraine has received support on cyber security and defense issues,
- The NATO-EU joint exercises are conducted; research and development studies are conducted to enhance defense capabilities,
- Political dialogue between the NATO-EU has increased.

Considering the developments since February 2022, which Russia described as a special military operation, the Union is based on respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. In the following period, sanctions were taken against Russia, aiming to reduce or stop its development in the banking, trade, energy, defense, transportation, and service sectors. Since the specified period, a policy of isolating and deterring Russia in

the international arena has been pursued by cooperating with member states within the Union, NATO, Ukraine, and international organizations. Cooperation with Ukraine developed as the EU's fight against hybrid threats originating from Russia, and cooperation was achieved in the fields of strategic communication, combating disinformation, crisis response, increasing resilience, cyber security, and defense.

The Union's increased cooperation with Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea reached its highest level after declaring war on Ukraine in 2022. In the following process;

- Support for the Ukrainian economy,
- Establishment of EU-Ukraine integration lines in the context of food security,
- Delivery of humanitarian aid and civil protection aid to Ukraine,
- Aid to Ukrainian schoolchildren, support of civil society, and cybersecurity,
- Holding Russia accountability in the context of international law and ensuring judicial initiatives,
- Military equipment and training support for Ukraine,
- Accepting immigrants from Ukraine were provided to Ukraine.

EU leaders declared that they had established the Ukrainian Facility to give 50 billion euros in support to the Ukrainian economy until 2027. Therefore, it aims to assist Ukraine's self-defense, maintain public spending, and provide essential public services. The Union helped beyond its financial capacity. The annexation of Crimea and Russia's successful use of the information dimension at this point led to an upsurge in on the information dimension of the war. It was mentioned during the 2014 NATO summit in Wales that cyberattacks might be covered by Article 5 action. It was decided during NATO's Brussels Summit in 2021 that Article 5 would be used to take countermeasures if a member state was attacked while engaging in hybrid warfare. Considering this requirement, the Union additionally helped Ukraine in hybrid warfare's information dimension. In terms of the information component, talent transfer was given to Ukraine,

and a cooperative defense was developed in the areas of strategic communication, cyber security, and disinformation warfare.

Due to Russia's annexation of Crimea, military action in Ukraine, and recognition of the regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia, the Union has been applying sanctions against the country since 2014. The Union decided on fourteen packages of sanctions between February 2022 and July 2024. The sanctions were intended to lessen the resilience and erode the strength of the Russian economy. In this regard, since 2014, more than 1950 individuals and organizations have been subject to sanctions. President Putin, members of the Russian parliament, officials, and senior commanders are among the individuals. Among the assets are banks, media outlets, and the private military firm Wagner that backs the war effort.

The Russian banking, trade, energy, transportation, defense, and technology industries were the focus of economic sanctions. Ten Russian banks and the Russian Central Bank have restrictions on their ability to transfer money in the trade sector. In the energy sector, exports of coal and oil from Russian mines to the EU are prohibited. The goal of setting a price cap on crude oil was to lower the revenue from oil exports. Russian cars are prohibited from using EU airspace, ports, and highways in the transportation sector. Important resources like processors and navigation devices used in military equipment, as well as items for civilian and military usage in the defense sector, are prohibited from being exported. Bans have been implemented in the services industry in areas like software, cryptocurrency assets, IT services, and market and public opinion research.

The sanctions imposed by the Union extended beyond its borders and became part of a strategy to isolate and discourage Russia internationally. For instance, the G7 summit was held in Brussels in 2014 rather than the G8 meeting, which was scheduled for Sochi. Furthermore, several sanctions resolutions were made against Russia-supporting Belarus and Iran. The Russian visa facilitation arrangement was stopped in September 2022, and visa exemptions for Russian diplomats were eliminated in February 2022. Sanctions on imports, exports, and consultation services to Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia were decided upon by the Council.

The first phase of Russia intervention in Ukraine began with the invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2022 marked the commencement of the second phase of the war, which began with Russia's engagement in Ukraine. With thousands of people swarming to the European border, the war has not only grown to be a regional issue but also a worldwide one due to the threat to global food and energy supplies. As a global player, the EU works with other international players to adapt to the shifting security landscape. The Union uses international, regional, and domestic collaboration to stay abreast of the rapidly evolving security landscape. In the context of the Ukrainian war, Union has established high-level collaboration within itself, Ukraine, and NATO. Crises, which are environmental forces, form EU integration as many theorists, like Moravcsik, claim. European security perceptions have been questioned because of political and military events and conflicts, such as Russia's actions in Georgia and Ukraine and Britain's choice to leave the European Union. Some EU members, including France, have expressed their opinions about creating an autonomous EU force and the questioning of NATO's very existence.

Moravcsik connected intergovernmental negotiations, national preferences of sub-state groups, and small common denominator negotiations of the national governments within the EU. In his view, governments should choose to compromise to achieve shared objectives. During discussions, governments make requests and concessions to one another. In some conditions, governments may opt to give in on trivial matters to maximize their advantages. Thus, they may receive higher gains on matters of greater importance. In this perspective, by accepting some concessions, even though member states have different views about sanctions against Russia, they opt to choose collaboration with the EU, NATO, and Ukraine.

Even if the Union made judgments against Russia during the first phase of the war, member states of the EU presented their opinions and policies based on their respective interests. Due to their economic ties with Russia, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Croatia supported sanctions but opposed their strengthening, whereas the USA, UK, Germany, Poland, Baltic nations, Denmark, and Finland completely support EU sanctions. In opposition to the EU's sanctions resolutions, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria made conflicting remarks during this period.

Russia is viewed as an economic partner by some European countries, but it is also seen as a threat by others. For social and economic grounds, Italy, Hungary, Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, and Austria opposed the imposition of the sanctions. In terms of natural gas, Austria and Hungary are virtually entirely dependent on Russia. Malta, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Ireland abstain from voting on sanctions. This different situation is a result of the changing economic ties and their countries' distance from Russia.

At the first phase of the war, from Germany and France side, there was different approaches. France and Germany, the two dominant nations in the Union, held differing views toward the Union sanctions. Germany displayed an attitude focused on its interests in the energy industry from an economic framework, but France displayed a security-oriented approach. Germany is in favor of using diplomatic and economic sanctions to reduce the strength of the Russian side, while France is dedicated to upholding positive diplomatic channels. This led to criticism, particularly by the Baltic countries and Ukraine, and was termed rewarding.

Following the second phase of the war, EU member states shifted to support Ukraine. During this time, the Union launched a more comprehensive effort to put an end to the war and denounced Russia's intervention against Ukraine. Following the second phase of the war, Ukraine was able to remove the hesitations that the member nations had felt during the first phase. The United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, the Baltic states, Denmark, and Finland fully backed the sanctions against Russia. Germany and France announced a shift in support for Ukraine in response to Russia's intervention, and they also signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement with it.

In the early stages of the conflict, divergent opinions regarding sanctions against Russia for historical, economic, social, and political grounds emerged among the member states of the Union. The EU army and the necessity of NATO were discussed, with France and Germany serving as the leaders of the discussions. From the second phase onwards, member nations have opted to remain united in the face of Russian hybrid threats. Despite having veto power, member states have not opted for this course

of action when it comes to the EU's sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine. As Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism theory emphasizes, governments that engage in negotiations tend to obtain higher benefits by compromising and reaching a common benefit. Member states' inability to come to an agreement could hinder their ability to advance both individually and collectively. Thus, it may deepen the likelihood of the conflict in the Union. The collective defense of their own nations against an outside danger, without a doubt, is the biggest benefit.

Consequently, the shift brought about by hybrid warfare has exposed the Union's advantages and disadvantages. It has expanded the Union's collaboration with Ukraine and NATO. Taking cooperation into account, it was determined divergent views existed during the first phase of the war within the Union, particularly regarding decisions about sanctions. However, in the second phase, a consensus was reached against Russian hybrid threats, and intergovernmental cooperation increased.

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2024