

THE CONCEPT OF VIRTUE IN AL-FARABI



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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ABSTRACT

The concept of virtue as a subject of study of philosophy of ethics has been addressed by many philosophers in the history of philosophy, starting with Socrates. This concept finds an important place for itself in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, the two great philosophers of the ancient world, and later in Neo-Platonism, as well as in the philosophy of Plotinus, one of his important representatives. With the access of important sources of Greek philosophy to the Islamic world, the concept of virtue has also become a notable topic of discussion from the point of view of Islamic philosophy. Our thesis aims to determine the place of the concept of virtue in the thought of Al-Farabi, the founder of Islamic philosophy as an Aristotelian philosopher, to find an answer to whether there is an Aristotelian influence in his philosophy when developing the concept of virtue and to reveal how it was possible for these two philosophers from different cultural and religious circles to meet in a common understanding of virtue if this influence is present. The hypothesis of our thesis is that Farabi coming from a different cultural environment as an Islamic philosopher was influenced by Aristotle's understanding of virtue and that his idea that virtuous religion and analytical philosophy would not contradict and that real philosophers would tell the same truth.

Keywords: Philosophy of Ethics, Virtue, Virtuous Religion, Analytical Philosophy

ÖZET

Ahlak felsefesinin bir araştırma konusu olarak erdem kavramı, felsefe tarihinde Sokrates'ten itibaren pek çok filozof tarafından ele alınmıştır. Bu kavram, antik dünyanın iki büyük filozofu olan Platon ve Aristoteles'in felsefelerinde, daha sonra Yeni-Platonculuk'ta ve onun önemli temsilcilerinden biri olan Plotinos'un felsefesinde kendisine önemli bir yer bulur. Yunan felsefesinin önemli kaynaklarının İslam dünyasına ulaşmasıyla, erdem kavramı, İslam felsefesi açısından da dikkate değer bir tartışma konusu haline gelmiştir. Tezimiz, İslam felsefesinin kurucusu ve Aristotelesçi bir filozof olan Farabi'nin düşüncesinde erdem kavramının yerini belirlemeyi, erdem kavramını geliştirirken felsefesinde Aristoteles etkisi bulunup bulunmadığına yanıt bulmayı, eğer bu etki mevcut ise farklı kültür ve dini çevrelerden gelen bu iki filozofun ortak bir erdem anlayışında buluşmasının nasıl mümkün olduğunu ortaya koymayı amaçlar. Tezimizin hipotezi, Farabi'nin, Aristoteles'in erdem anlayışından etkilenmiş olduğu ve bir İslam filozofu olarak farklı bir kültür çevresinden gelmiş olan bu kavramı sahiplenebilmesine, onun, erdemli din ile burhânî felsefenin çelişmeyeceği ve gerçek filozofların aynı hakikati söyleyeceği şeklindeki düşüncesinin imkan vermiş olduğudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ahlak Felsefesi, Erdem, Erdemli Din, Burhânî Felsefe

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INTRODUCTION

As Socrates correctly identified, virtue is one of the most important problems of philosophy. This importance is evidenced by the fact that, despite the passage of ages, it has not lost its relevance, in addition to the necessity of its research. In Ancient Greece, where the Ancient Greek religion prevailed, or in the Classical Age of Islam, the willingness of philosophers to address the issue of virtue and their emphasis on the necessity of living a virtuous life are obvious. Although the reasons for the desire to achieve virtue have varied, philosophers have always questioned the concept of virtue, explored methods for living a virtuous life, and the concept of virtue has remained an indispensable concept of philosophy.

Our thesis aims to determine the place of the concept of virtue in the thought of Al-Farabi, the founder of Islamic philosophy, to find an answer to whether there is an Aristotelian influence in Al-Farabi's philosophy with respect to his developing the concept of virtue, and to reveal how it is possible for these two philosophers from different cultural and religious circles to meet in a common concept of virtue if this influence is available. Although he was directly or indirectly influenced by many philosophers, the philosopher who has been called the 'Second Master' after Aristotle for his great contribution to the understanding of Aristotle, the philosopher who has influenced him the most in matters of the nature of virtue and the types of virtue. The similarity of the concepts of the virtue of these two philosophers, who have different cultures and religions, is considered a topic worth focusing on. As a feature of the age in which Al-Farabi lived, the conflict of revelation with reason and the need to reconcile religion and philosophy as a need arising from this conflict made it necessary to examine his view of religion and philosophy to determine that al-Farabi, who solved the problem in his own way, took his acceptance of virtue not from the religion to which he belonged, but from philosophy, especially Aristotelian philosophy.

What brings Aristotle and Al-Farabi together in common can be identified, at first glance, as their will to get to the right information and their passion for philosophy, which they see as a means of getting to the right information. A more detailed examination shows that there are two reasons for the possibility of this interaction: Al-Farabi's opinion that virtuous religion, based on evidential philosophy, will not contradict philosophy, and his opinion that there will be no contradiction in the views of real philosophers. The hypothesis of our thesis is that Al-Farabi was influenced by Aristotle's understanding of virtue and that his idea that virtuous religion and evidential philosophy would not contradict and that real philosophers would tell the same truth allowed him to adopt this concept, who came from a different cultural environment as an Islamic philosopher.

In the second part of our thesis, the pre-Farabi philosophers are discussed, the development and change of the concept of virtue from Socrates to Al-Farabi were examined, considering it necessary to start with Socrates, who was the first philosopher to include human factor in philosophy, who made the concept of virtue the main subject of philosophy and whose influence on Plato and Aristotle is undeniable. A detailed review of the views of Plato, one of the important philosophers of Antiquity, and Aristotle, who had a great influence on Al-Farabi in developing the concept of virtue, on the philosophy of Al-Farabi, whose influence was seen in various aspects, is discussed. Another name that is as influential in the philosophical system of Al-Farabi as Plato and Aristotle was Plotinus, who is considered the founder of Neo-Platonism. In particular, this view, put forward by Plotinus, a name that influenced Al-Farabi with the theory of emanation, helped Al-Farabi systematically base the foundations of his understanding of virtue all the way to God. For this reason, the philosophy of Plotinus and his understanding of virtue are also discussed in this part. In the second part of our thesis, which is aimed at revealing the understanding of virtue in Antiquity and the historical background of the concept of virtue, Ahmet Arslan's *History of Ancient Philosophy*

2: *From the Sophists to Plato, The History of Ancient Philosophy* 3: Aristotle, *History of Ancient Philosophy* 4: Plotinus and *New Platonism and Early Christian Philosophy* and Ahmet Cevizci's *Introduction to Ethics* were used.

Al-Farabi is a systems philosopher. For this reason, his understanding of virtue and various branches of his philosophy, such as ontology, epistemology, and psychology, support each other. The purpose of the part in which we consider the ontology of Al-Farabi is to investigate the philosophical basis of the concept of virtue in Al-Farabi's thought. In this part, the philosophical background of the concept of virtue is determined by revealing the place of the human in the universe, the hierarchy of being and its relationship with other beings, and the ontology of Al-Farabi is examined and analyzed in the third part based on primary and secondary sources. As the main primary sources related to the view of the hierarchy of being, which is closely related to Al-Farabi's understanding of virtue, *el-Medinetü'l-Fazıla, es-Siyâsetü'l-Medeniyye*, Yaşar Aydın'ın works entitled *The Relationship between God and Human in Farabi* and work entitled *Farabi* were used as secondary sources.

In the fourth part, where we consider the political philosophy of al-Farabi, the concept of virtue is considered as a political concept. Ethics and political philosophy from ancient Greece continued the idea of closeness, Al-Farabi also suggested that a person can only take virtuous actions in relation to others, that a person can only be virtuous in relation to others, and that it is possible to be virtuous in a virtuous city. Among the primary sources, Al-Farabi's works *el-Medinetü'l-Fazıla, es-Siyâsetü'l-Medeniyye, Tahsilü's-Sa'âde ve Fusûlu'l Medenî*, in which he discussed the concept of virtue in political philosophy, have been identified as the main works. As secondary sources, the work of Şenol Korkut on the *Political Philosophy of Al-Farabi* and Lokman Çilingir's work *Politics of Al-Farabi and Ibn Khaldun* was used to examine Al-Farabi's political philosophy in detail.

In the fifth part, in Al-Farabi's thought, what virtue is, types of virtues, conditions for the realization of virtue, the relationship of virtue and happiness, the relationship of virtue and knowledge, the role of the Active Intellect in achieving virtue are discussed and Al-Farabi's understanding of virtue, especially on the basis of the philosopher's own works, is tried to be analyzed. In this part, in addition to works such as *El-Medinetü'l Fazıla*, *Es-Siyâsetü'l-Medeniyye*, *Tahsilü's-Sa'âde* ve *Fusûlu'l Medenî* where Al-Farabi's concept of virtue is processed in political philosophy and his work *Tenbih Ala Sebili's-Sa'ada* in which he studies the concept of virtue independently of political philosophy is designated as other sources.

In the sixth part, the introduction of the Islamic world to Greek philosophy and the reactions that resulted from this acquaintance, the efforts to reconcile philosophy that came from a foreign source with the Islamic religion were investigated, the possibilities of Al-Farabi's understanding of virtue to be influenced by Aristotle were examined, and the concepts of the virtue of Al-Farabi and Aristotle were compared, similarities were tried to be revealed.

In our research about the history of Islamic philosophy and in order to determine the place of Al-Farabi's system in Islamic philosophy, Mehmet Bayraktar's *Introduction to Islamic Philosophy*, Ahmet Arslan's *History of Islamic Philosophy*, Henry Corbin's *History of Islamic Philosophy*, İlhan Kutluer's *Philosophy in the Classical Era of Islam* and the *Encyclopedia of Islam* were used. In addition, in order to better understand the philosophical understanding and cultural atmosphere of the period, the works of Islamic philosophers such as al-Amiri, al-Kindi, and Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi were examined.

The Book *Kitâb'ül-Mille*, in which Al-Farabi reveals his unique understanding of religion, explains in detail the decency of religion, the process of the emergence of religion, the distinction between religion and virtuous religion, has been one of our important sources for determining the important points in Al-Farabi's view of religion. Al-Farabi's essay

Kitabü'l-Cem' beyne re'yeyi'l-hakimeyn Eflatun el-İlahi and Aristutalis where he discussed the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, contrary to popular belief, these two philosophers that are not fundamentally in conflict, the issues to be seen as a contradiction, however, is superficial and that they do not conflict with the views of the true philosopher of whether the idea of shaped articles revealed in detail has been one of the important reference points in the thesis.

The part of our thesis where we examined Al-Farabi's conception of the virtue in relationship to that of Aristotle, his works entitled *El-Medinetü'l Fazıla, Es-Siyâsetü'l-Medeniyye, Tahsilu's-Sa'âde ve Fusûlu'l Medenî, Tenbîh Alâ Sebili's-Sa'âda* where he examined the concept of virtue and *Nicomachean Ethics* which is one of the most important works of Aristotle's ethics were examined for the determination of similarity.

Since they will help to understand the philosophical thought of our philosopher and the systematic connection of this thought with the understanding of virtue, throughout our work, Al-Farabi's views on various issues that have spread to various works have also been used. These works are: *İhsâu'l-Ulûm, Kitâbu'l-Hurûf, Felsefet Eflâtun, Felsefet Aristutalis ve Kitâbu'l-Burhân*. In addition, articles of Al-Farabi, such as *Risâle Fî Me'âni'l-Akl, Uyûnü'l-Mesâil, Risâle Fimâ Yenbağî En Yukaddeme Kable Te'allumi'l Felsefe* have been examined for the same purpose.

2. CONCEPTION OF VIRTUE FROM SOCRATES TO AL-FARABI

Virtue can be defined as the whole of moral good, which leads a person to spiritual competence, the quality of a person who has directed his will to moral good in his thoughts and actions, the desire for good, the escape from evil (Güçlü, 2003, p.479). Although virtue is an important concept of moral philosophy, it has become the subject of philosophy in Ancient Greece, especially with Socrates, the first philosopher to address human in philosophy. In the ethical insights of ancient Greek philosophers, it is believed that; human existence exhibits a certain structure and a specific purpose and life is formed of regulation goal, good, fair or righteous living, good life and functions and the mind is responsible for regulation, and the person needs his own mind to have a virtuous life, as well as depends on the state of the society in which he lives (Cevizci, 2002, p.34).

Al-Farabi is a philosopher who depended on ancient Greek thought in establishing his philosophy. Therefore, his conception of Virtue also has similarities with ancient Greek philosophers in various respects. In order to better understand these similarities and the aspects in which they are separated, the two most important philosophers of antiquity Plato and Aristotle, Socrates, who are a precursor to their thoughts, and Plotinus, the architect of the emergence theory, which includes al-Farabi's view of hierarchical existence, are given their views on virtue.

2.1. Socrates

Famous Greek philosopher who lived between B.C. 469-399 years and Plato's teacher Socrates didn't leave anything in writing and he spent discussing philosophy all the time especially with young people (Cevizci, 1999, p.782), he enjoyed exhibiting his art similar to his mother's art, in general, in squares, promenades, workshops and everywhere whenever he found a clever face. (Weber, 1993, p.44) Therefore, information about what we can call the philosophical views or teachings of Socrates is mainly related to the dialogues that Plato gave

him the main role, Xenophon's books such as *Socrates' Defense*, *feasting*, *memories*, It is based on Aristophanes' play named *Clouds*, the information Aristotle gives about himself in his books (Arslan, 2006, p.92).

Putting man at the center of philosophy, exploring with of man with himself, his relationship with the universe and society and how should it be, revealed social and moral dimension of human life and another element that makes Socrates, who, important from the point of view of ethical thinking is that he lived a life in accordance with the beliefs and values he espoused, it is because he went to death without hesitation for his beliefs and embodied the values he defended (Cevizci, 2002, p.35). The first theory in the history of ethics, however, is the ethics of happiness of Socrates, who is considered the founder of ethics in western philosophy (Cevizci, 2002, p.34). Socrates asked fundamental philosophical questions in ethics. How do we understand the concepts we use in decision-making and valuation? What is the criterion for the correct implementation of these concepts? Are established customs consistent? And if not, how do we avoid inconsistency? (MacIntyre, 2001, p.30) the main issue of this new moral science that Socrates wants to create is what virtue is, whether it is one or more and whether it can be taught (Arslan, 2006, p.127).

In general, virtue is mainly superiority, perfection. We can also use the word virtue (arete) for all beings, living things, and their bodies that are actually found in nature. For example, in this sense, there is no harm in saying that the virtue of the sword is to cut, the virtue of the horse is to run, and the virtue of the eye is to see. So we can define as its virtue that the nature of a being has what its essence requires, that this thing is in a superior and perfect state in it (Arslan, 2006, p.127). The virtue of human has to be related only to the human mind, which is found in human. Because the use of reason and mind is unique only to man and distinguishes it from other animal species that have a body (Weber, 1993, p.76). The most basic thesis or proposition of Socrates' ethics is that, no doubt, the most important task

or activity of a person is to pay due attention to his soul, or that an unquestioned life is not worth living (Cevizci, 2002, p.38). The way to give due care to the soul is to reveal what man's objective is. What do all people act for, what do they pursue? Socrates' answer to this is in one word: happiness (*eudamonia*). All people want to be happy, they pursue happiness. So happiness is the object of what human nature pursues. The greatest source of happiness or the greatest happiness is "knowledge", and the greatest obstacle to it is "ignorance" about what happiness is. This knowledge, if we put it more clearly, is the knowledge of human nature, of the essence of human, of virtue, and therefore of happiness. Thus emerges Socrates' famous proposition on virtue: virtue is knowledge (Arslan, 2006, p.128-129).

According to Socrates, the only knowledge that allows man to realize his nature and achieve his true goal is knowledge of good and evil, what is good in itself and what is bad in itself. This knowledge, which he calls *sophia* or *phronesis*, is the only true knowledge and wisdom (Cevizci, 2002, p.78). Because all people, by their nature, want to be happy, and knowledge of what is good and what is bad is the only way to happiness by necessity, this knowledge is the knowledge that must be gained for all people (Cevizci, 2002, p.78). Socrates believes that man who has knowledge of virtues will necessarily be virtuous. A virtuous person, on the other hand, is a happy person as someone who acts in accordance with his own essence, determines or defines himself, and therefore performs with himself. (Cevizci, 2002, p.79).

2.2. Plato

Plato (427-347 BC), at the age of twenty, became a student of Socrates (Laertios, 2004, p.133), during the first half of the fourth century, he founded his famous School in Athens, the Academy, a prototype of today's University, and wrote many of his works here. He wrote almost all of these works with different arguments in the form of dialogues that conveyed from the mouths of different characters, one of which was almost always Socrates (Magee, 2000, p.6). Although we have nothing of the texts written by the students of his

lectures at the Academy called ‘agrapha dogmata’ (unwritten dogmas), all of the works he wrote have survived to the present day (Ağaoğlu, 1989, p.136).

Plato’s dialogues are divided into four periods, in chronological terms, in the order of writing. These are the period of youth, the period of transition, the period of maturity, and the period of old age (Ağaoğlu, 1989, p.136). Socratic dialogues, which are works of the youth period, mainly address moral problems, while focusing on virtues and definitions of virtue in essence. These virtues, for example, are measured in piety in *Euthyphro*, courage in *Laches*, friendship in *Lysis*, and *Kharmides* (Akderin, 2014, p.17). In *Meno*, a transitional dialogue, Plato discusses whether virtue is too many or one, whether virtue is in action, whether virtue is teachable, and what makes man virtuous (Akderin, 2013, p.29). In this dialogue, Plato states that there is a common element that makes them all virtues, even if virtues are numerous and diverse, and this is the point that the person who is looking for an answer to the question of what virtue is should pay attention to (P.M., 70a 72d)¹. His views on virtue gain prominence in the state, which is the work of old age.

¹ Plato (2005) *Meno* (trans. by. Robin WATERFIELD) is mentioned as P.M. in this thesis.

The two important pillars of Plato's philosophy, the doctrine of remembrance and ideals, are the thesis that the soul is immortal. Plato, in *Phaedo*, puts it this way:

Spirits are immortal because things that are constantly in motion are immortal. If something is moving something else, or if it is being moved by someone else, death comes when the movement stops. Just because something that moves itself can't stop itself, its movement can never end. And because this thing moves everything else, it's the basic principle of movement. Things that move themselves have a soul, so the soul is immortal (P.P. LVI 108)².

However, the transition to maturity or maturity of Plato's dialogue argued that the work of the spirit, which is considered one of Phaeton negative, however, the state's three-part soul, but not the subject of the idea of philosophical knowledge and immortality, to make possible a simple spiritual spontaneous (Akderin, 2013, p.22). Along with this understanding of the immortal soul, some actions have been put forward that can lead man to God.

Evils, Theodorus, can never pass away; for there must always remain something antagonistic to good. Having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity they hover around the mortal nature, and this earthly sphere. Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy, just, and wise. (P.T., p.87)³

² Plato (1951) *Phaedo* (trans. by. F.J. CHURCH) is mentioned as P.P. in this thesis.

³ Plato (1871) *Theaetetus* (trans. by. Benjamin JOWETT) is mentioned as P.T. in this thesis.

Plato's philosophy is basically about the human problem, aimed at the study of human happiness and the determination of its circumstances. This problem is more political than moral and psychological. More precisely, it is impossible to separate these areas from each other (Ağaoğlu, 1989, p.156). The Socratic ideal was transferred to a new field, the political field, by Plato (Cassier, 1984, p.85). Plato does not make a serious distinction between morality and politics. Both of them are the knowledge of the rules necessary for a virtuous and happy life. But Plato rather wants to reduce morality to politics, or, so to speak, small morality to great morality (Arslan, 2009, p.152). As long as we close ourselves within the boundaries of a person's individual life, we cannot find an appropriate definition of a person. Human nature does not manifest itself within this narrow-angle. What is written in 'small letters' in the human soul, and therefore almost unreadable, if we read it in larger letters in the political and social life of man, it becomes clear and understandable? Plato's starting point is this principle (Cassier, 1984, p.72). Plato, based on this principle, directs his research to the polis. According to him, finding out what makes a polis fair also means discovering what makes a person fair.

According to Plato, the fact that society has a class structure means that justice (righteousness) is realized. The good state has four virtues: wisdom, bravery, moderation, and righteousness. A state established in accordance with nature owes its intelligence to the knowledge of a small community that governs itself. According to Plato, wisdom is unique to rulers (philosophers)." Bravery is the virtue of protectors (soldiers). Although producers must get a share of the measure, in reality, this virtue covers the entire society; more obviously consists of the establishment of a complete order between all citizens (i.e. guardians and producers) under the rule of philosophers. Righteousness (justice) is a general virtue that complements, sustains, the first three virtues. In order for a state to be right, citizens, and classes must remain in their unique place (Ağaoğlu, 1989, p.170). His state design virtues

correspond to different social classes of the site. The wisdom of the site derives from the wisdom of its rulers, the courage of its soldiers, and the devotion of its craftsmen to its rulers. Justice, on the other hand, is the harmony between these three social classes and requires each citizen and social class to do what is best for them (Kenny, 2017, p.296). Plato reveals this situation in the following words:

Meddling among the classes, of which there are three, and exchange with one another is the greatest harm for the city and would most correctly be called extreme evil-doing... Won't you say that the greatest evil-doing against one's own city is injustice?...Then, that's injustice. Again, let's say it this way. The opposite of this-the money-making, auxiliary, and guardian classes doing what's appropriate, each of them minding its own business in a city- would be justice and would make the city just (P.R., 434c-d) ⁴.

For Plato, who adopts a teleological worldview, a purposeful understanding of being, and connects the order that exists in nature to the world of good ideals and ideals, nothing in the world is in vain and haphazard, and every living and inanimate being has a function that it must fulfill. A being that performs its function properly is a successful, competent, adequate, virtuous being with Arete (Cevizci, 2002, p.63). What Plato wants to say in *The Republic* is that the laws of truth or justice are, and should be, whatever they are for individuals, for classes or sites, and according to him, these laws are basically laws of individual morality (Arslan, 2006, p.405). According to Plato, virtue consists of something, a being or an organism performing its own proper function, performing its own task as necessary. This also applies to the soul as a whole and its parts (Cevizci, 2002, p.63). Plato believes that our soul has three parts or three different abilities. These are the soul or skill that allows man to acquire knowledge, i.e. the intelligent soul, the thinking soul; the soul or skill that allows him to eat, drink, mate, and thus continue his species, i.e. the soul that wants, desires, or has an

appetite; finally, sometimes intelligent mind or the soul, or the turning of desire with the desires of the spirit to fulfill his last request sometimes, we have to accept that the request is separate from, out of mind, our anger, outbursts, or the place that we call soul, which is the source of behavior, so brave, or angry spirit (Arslan, 2006, p.416). The three parts of the Soul correspond to the three classes on the site, and the virtues of the soul are also the virtues of the three classes on the site (Kenny, 2017, p.296). Plato, in his work *The Republic*, reveals the similarity of virtue in the city and man as follows:

Then it applies the justice: we shall conclude that a man is just in the same way that a state was just. And we have surely not forgotten that justice in the state meant that each of the three orders in it was doing its own proper work. So we may henceforth bear in mind that each one of us likewise will be a just person, fulfilling his proper function, only if the several parts of our nature fulfill theirs....Justice is produced in the soul, like health in the body, by establishing the elements concerned in their natural relations of control and subordination, whereas injustice is like disease and means that this natural order is inverted....Such turmoil and aberration we shall, I think, identify with injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance, and in a word all wickedness (P.R.,441c, 444d, 444b).

⁴ Plato (1970) *The Republic* (trans. by. Francis Macdonald CORNFORD) is mentioned as P.R in this thesis.

According to Plato, the polis (city) owes its wisdom to the knowledge of a small community that governs itself, that is, the ruling class. That's what we might call wisdom in the polis (P.R. 429a). In humans, wisdom is the phenomenon of caring for the true interests of the holistic soul, taking into account the unity and integrity of the soul. Accordingly, if a person's mind dominates in such a way as to observe the holistic good of the soul, and rules other parts by observing the goal of a person with integrity, that person must be wise (Cevizci, 2002, p.102).

In Plato, courage emerges as both an ethical and political value. Courage is one of the main virtues, both in terms of obtaining and preserving virtues, and in terms of establishing and maintaining an ideal state. It is basically wisdom, moderation, and the way and assurance of justice (Yıldız, 2012, p.237). Courage is a virtue unique to the hearty part of the soul, while moderation is the obedience and devotion of lower elements. Wisdom, on the other hand, is located in the mind, and it takes care of the whole soul and governs it. Justice is the harmony of spiritual elements. 'When each element of our soul does its own work according to its reforms its own proper function.' (Kenny, 2017, p.296). Plato explains what moderation is as follows:

Moderation is not like bravery and wisdom. These two are found in a lonely part of society. It also makes the whole society brave and wise. And the measure extends to the entire society. It establishes complete order among all citizens. Lower, middle, up, strong, powerless, rich, poor all follow the same harmony. Now, that match is moderation (P.R. 432a 5).

Moderation and happiness are closely related. For Plato, happiness (eudaimonia) means inner freedom. This freedom is neither random nor based on external circumstances. He is a man based on harmony and the 'right proportion' in his own existence is freedom.

Reason (phronesis) is the condition of calmness and moderation (*sophrosyne*). Only this moderation gives the right consistency to the person's personality and all his actions (Cassier, 1984, p.84-85).

Plato mentions that justice is the highest virtue in *The Republic* dialogue. A person who performs a virtue called justice in him is the most perfect person who also has all the other virtues. Such a person is the closest to the idea of humanity. True justice can be achieved by having each of these (in the soul) parts perform their duty and never exceed their own limits. This, in turn, is only possible if the mind dominates the other two parts, and these two lower parts of the soul submit to the whole, the mind (Birand, 1958, p.61). When the mind does this, when every part of the soul performs its duty, the fourth virtue that completes the first three virtues comes across as justice. Justice is a state of harmony and balance, whether in the individual or in society; that is, a real state of division of work and harmony in which each part brings to life what it can do best (Cevizci, 2002, p.66). A good, just, or a moral person is a person who, like a doctor, can organize parts of the organism or soul in a way that brings harmonious cooperation to life (Cevizci, 2002, p.62). Human virtue also depends on how his actions bring him closer to the highest good, which is the last goal. The highest good is happiness, which occurs when the virtues of wisdom, moderation, and justice come together in the individual. Just as each being can achieve its own determination only by performing a function that suits it; man can achieve his own determination, that is, the highest good, with these virtues that suit him (Yıldız, 2012, p.224). As a result of health occurs when the organs perform the correct functioning, happiness occurs in the soul as a result of each of the parts of the soul performing its own task. Just as the good of the body is health, the good of man is happiness. A person who has caught this harmony in the soul is a just and virtuous person.

2.3. Aristotle

Aristotle, called the "philosopher" of the medieval Western Christian world, the "First Teacher" of the Islamic world and known as the other greatest philosopher in the entire history of philosophy along with Plato, was born in the city of Stageira, a colony of Ionia in northern Greece. He was born in 384 BC (Arslan, 2007, p.3) after the death of his father, in 367, he immigrated to Athens when he was seventeen years old, and there he was enrolled in years he was a disciple and colleague of Plato (Kenny, 2017, p.89). He separated from him (in terms of thought) when Plato was alive (Ökten, 2007, p.13).

In a way, the history of philosophy came to life between Plato and Aristotle and revealed its existence. Aristotle, who took philosophy from Plato's transcendence of meaning to the level of observation and experience, aimed to reach and reach almost all of the various manifestations of existence, and to convey them with a solid terminology and thinking procedure. He has succeeded in this goal (Ökten, 2014, p.5). Aristotle's research, based on principles, explains the universe, the layers of the universe, and man in terms of its basic elements. Aristotle creates his own vision of the universe with data from the disciplines of philosophical research gathered around the titles of being, knowledge, method, morality, state, and art. The concept of the universe in question, principles, first mover, universe, sky, earth, vitality, spirit, man, mind, knowledge, causes, formation, sciences, living conditions, morality, state, art, problems of purpose can be explained in the context. These listed elements form the backbone of his system of thought (Bıçak, 2017, p.45). Aristotle has left behind an admirable collection as a philosopher of importance that transcends the ages (Ökten, 2007, p.18).

Before revealing Aristotle's understanding of virtue, it should be noted that one of the main determinants of his understanding of ethics is that he does not consider moral behavior only in terms of epistemological and cognitive terms. Perhaps Aristotle's most valuable

contribution to the field of ethics is that he showed the importance of habits (ethos), that is, context and experience, in determining behavior (Oranlı, 2014, p.239). For Aristotle, virtue is not just a process of knowing. For this reason, in *Eudemian Ethics*, the idea that Socrates' virtues are knowledge and that when virtues are known, they will be virtuous has been the subject of criticism by Aristotle. According to Aristotle, the availability of knowledge is valid in theoretical sciences such as astronomy and naturalism. However, in the sciences of creation and existence, the purpose is different from the knowledge itself. Although it is a good thing to know what beautiful things are, it is most important not to know what it is when it comes to virtue, but to know what virtue depends on. A person wants to be healthy rather than knowing what it is to be healthy, to be fit rather than knowing what fitness is, not to know what virtue is, to be virtuous, not to know what justice is, to be fair (E.E. 1216b 5-15)⁵. Then the only purpose of man cannot be to know only what something is, and knowing only what something is not enough to take virtuous actions.

Another conclusion from these words of Aristotle is that he made a distinction in the universe between the field of "what is mandatory" and the field of "what is positive". Science is the field of the first of them, and art and morality is the field of the second. In other words, there is no mention of the scientist being "free" in relation to the field he is investigating. But both in the creations of the artist and in the actions of a person who commits moral behavior and performs an action, it can and should be mentioned that he is "free". Aristotle refers to this point when he says that there is no point in talking about thinking and weighing and calculating things that cannot be otherwise, but, on the other hand, it is meaningful to use these concepts in relation to the other two areas (Arslan, 2007, p.235).

According to Aristotle, man is a political animal (*zoon politikon*). Then ethics separate from the political one cannot be considered. In this direction, ethics and politics are areas that cannot be separated from each other. *Nicomachean Ethics*, a book of ethics, was therefore

considered by Aristotle as a study of politics at the same time. Aristotle, in his said work, reveals that every art, every research, every action, and every choice desires a good, so the good is 'what all things desire'. According to Aristotle, since every knowledge, every choice desires the good, what politics desires, and what is at the very end of all the good is happiness (eudaimonia), as many agree on (N.E. 1095a 15-20)⁶. Aristotle places happiness instead of the ideal of good as the highest goal of ethics (Kenny, 2001, p.105). Because according to him, there is a deep relationship between the virtuous and the happy life.

Good and happiness depend on their way of life. The main forms of life are the life of pleasure, the life of politics, and the life of *theoria*. Pleasure and political life, two of which have no place in achieving happiness. Aristotle states the life of pleasure as a life that people who see pleasure as happiness choose and those who choose it should be called slaves, while politics, where good is considered honor, does not count among the lives that provide happiness because what is considered good depends on the person who bestows honor on it, rather than the person who owns it. In addition, there is a trading life whose purpose is to obtain wealth. But since wealth is not something he wants, Aristotle also counted this lifestyle among lifestyles that will not bring happiness. According to him, it is something that is the best goal

itself. That's happiness. He is never preferred to anything else, but is always preferred to himself, which is the goal. Honor, pleasure, reasons and virtue are both preferred for themselves and preferred in the name of happiness. Honor, pleasure, reason and virtue are both preferred for themselves (N.E. 1095b 15-1096a 5).

⁵ Aristotle (2004) Eudemian Ethics (trans. by. H. RACKHAM) is mentioned as E.E in this thesis.

⁶ Aristotle (1999) Nicomachean Ethics (trans. by. Terence IRWIN) is mentioned as N.E. in this thesis.

Aristotle reveals that happiness is a favored good for itself as follows:

It is most often thought that happiness is such a thing because we prefer it never for anything else, but always for itself; but we prefer honor, pleasure, reason and every virtue both for themselves ... And for the sake of happiness, we prefer it because we think we will be happy through them. However, no one prefers happiness for their sake or anything else in general (N.E. 1097b 5).

Happiness is a self-sufficient good; Aristotle's intention of self-sufficiency is that happiness is not a component of a state of something else, and it is not just a good among other goods. If in a choice between the good, happiness was presented with one good and not with others, the side that this good was placed on the selection scale would always and necessarily outweigh it (MacIntyre, 2001, p.72). Eudaimonia is neither a life of pleasure, nor a temporary mood, nor a condition that happens to us by chance. Moreover, it is not a gift from God. Eudaimonia, which means that the Daimon who accompanies a person throughout his life turns his direction to good, is that a person 'does his job well', 'Lives well', or, to that end, 'the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue'. Eudaimonia is a kind of activity and a way of life, and purpose that is tried to be achieved, both an inherent situation in the process and a goal that needs to be achieved at the end of the process (Kalaycı, 2014, p.257). Thus, the following points are revealed: good for man or happiness for man is reasonable activity, action. Second, this reasonable action or activity should not remain just as an opportunity or action, it should be fulfilled. Third, this action should not remain an activity performed from time to time, it should be an action that exists or is performed continuously throughout a person's life (Arslan, 2007, p.248).

In addition to happiness being self-sufficient good, a person should also be self-sufficient. Happiness is something that only a self-sufficient person can reach. But Aristotle's

self-sufficiency is not self-sufficiency that means a person moving away from friends, family, and social life. As mentioned earlier, for Aristotle, man is above all '*Zoon politikon*'.

Aristotle's main point from calling the human a social or political animal is that society is the basic institution that provides the perfection and happiness possible for man, that is, the good. In other words, for Aristotle, society and politics are not tools of human "Just for Survival", but also, and more important to him as "a good and happy life to live" at the time, coming into existence to fulfill the perfection. Aristotle is of the opinion that a better individual life cannot happen in a flawed state or in a society governed by poorly regulated, bad laws (Arslan, 2007, p. 238). For this reason, a person can first go on the path of living a good life and achieving happiness in the polis, with the place he has acquired in social life and with his relations with other people.

According to Aristotle, polis, that is, political unity is an organic whole that is not a deal, but a natural result of human actions, and it precedes all the parts that make it up. A person can also have full life only in a political union. The reason for this is that the possibility of political unity lies in the fact that man is alive according to the city (*physei zoon politikon*), which are the basic definitions of existence, and that he is alive (*zoon logon ekhon*) to speak (Durmaz, 2017, p.535). Human has *logos*; in other words, because he is a living being who can think/talk, he can go beyond his survival and reproduction instincts and have a good life (*eu zen*). Other animals also live together, but the only being that comes together for a good life is human (Soysal, 2018, p.115).

According to Aristotle, man's work cannot be only to live, because it is a work that man and other living things, plants and animals do jointly. A person's job cannot be a sensation in particular, because the sensation is a common activity in both a person and a horse or ox. Then there is only one thing left: the work of man "is the reasonable activity of the soul." Because the essence of man, his nature, is to be a "smart animal." As the nature or

function of the eye is to see the nature or function of the arm, the work, activity or virtue that is unique to a person in terms of being a person as a whole is to engage in thought, reasonable activity. Since Man's work is a reasonable activity, and it is his virtue to do it well and perfectly, it would be right to define human: as "the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue" (Arslan, 2007, p.248).

In his work *De Anima*, Aristotle definitively describes the soul as the first *entelekheia* of a natural body, that is, an organized body, which is in a state of power life. Entelekheia, on the other hand, is the end performed by movement and no longer contains any formation (A.D.A. 412a 20 412b 5)⁷. To define more clearly, *entelekheia* is the style, form, or essence of being of something whose essence is fully realized in Aristotle's philosophy; operability as opposed to potentiality. Aristotle, who called performance, which has not yet been completed but is on its way to realization, as *Energeia*, described the spirit, which has reached competence or maturity, as the first intellectual of an organic body, with this he wanted to talk about what the body can do when it is active or mobile. The second *entelekheia* consists of doing all these things in real-time (Cevizci, 1999, p.301).

⁷ Aristotle (1986) *De Anima* (trans. by. Hugh LAWSON) is mentioned as A.D.A. in this thesis.

According to Aristotle, there are three kinds of things that happen in the soul. These are influences, possibilities, and habits. Then virtue, which is an activity belonging to the soul, should be one of them (N.E. 1105b 20). Virtues are habits that allow us to have good feelings and do actions in a good way. They are things that we have, things that are within our power, and they are acquired willingly. Virtuous activities are election-based activities. This choice, on the other hand, arises as a result of the ability to desire being guided by reason, practical reason, or practical wisdom. The ability to desire, which is irrational, but has the opportunity to take a share of reason, listen to its command, or resist it, is virtuous when it chooses in accordance with the correct rule of practical wisdom, and when it acts contrary to it, it acquires virtuous habits (Arslan, 2007, p.260).

The soul is mainly divided into two parts: the soul that has reason and the soul that does not have a share of reason. It is also necessary to divide the intelligent soul into two parts: the first is the part or side that it considers with itself "objects whose principles cannot be otherwise", thinks about them; the second is the part or side that the intelligent soul considers "objects whose principles may be otherwise", thinks about them. Aristotle calls the first part, or the scientific side, science. The second part or side is described as the calculation side, the reasoning side, and the work he does as a calculation, checking, and thinking. In contrast to the fact that the subject of the first is the scientific truth, the subject of the second is the truth that corresponds to the right desire (Arslan, 2007, p.233). Aristotle derives the classification of virtues based on his distinction between the mind and the mind in this main sense of the soul, but the irrational part. Accordingly, there are two types of virtues: virtues that arise from the part of the soul that is completely intelligent, that is smart; virtues arising from the part of it that does not have a mind, but in a sense has a share of the mind, that is, the ability to desire or appetite (Arslan, 2007, p.251).

Aristotle distinguishes intellectual virtues from moral virtues in its original sense by making a distinction between virtues or superiorities. Intellectual virtues are virtues that relate entirely to knowledge. Moral virtues, on the other hand, are moral virtues in the narrower sense of people's feelings, attitudes, behavior towards other people (Arslan, 2009, p.155). Since the intelligent part of the human soul has two separate dimensions, such as theoretical and practical reason, it can mention two types of virtues that complement human nature and make it possible for man to best perform his own true function. Theoretical, intellectual, or dianoetic virtues, or *eudaimonic* virtues, or character virtues (Cevizci, 2002, p.70). According to Aristotle, character virtues are a habit, but also middle between two extremes, extremism, and incompleteness. Virtue, then, is a habit of preferences:

Virtue, then, is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it. It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one deficiency. It is a mean for this reason also: Some vices miss what is right because they are excessive, in feelings or in action, whereas virtue finds and chooses what is intermediate (N.E. 1107a 5).

Aristotle defines moral virtue as being in the middle, aiming for the middle, both in relation to emotions and actions. This is called middle-way morality or the "golden mean" rule or opinion in Aristotle's moral philosophy. According to this view, in every emotion or action there are two extremes that represent evil or virtue; overdoing and understate, more than necessary and less than necessary, and a midpoint that represents good and virtue, that is, as much as necessary (Arslan, 2009, p.261). With the help of the virtues of wisdom and common sense thought, through education, by developing a habit it is a medium between excess and

scarcity which character the virtues of generosity, courage, temperance, justice, supreme volunteering, grandeur, humor, truth, and friendship which is similar to virtue is acquired.

Dianoetic virtues are the virtues of the soul determined by theoretical wisdom or *sophia*, engaged in philosophy, science, and art, subject to them eternal objects, highest beings, and first principles. These virtues, which perform man at the highest level, provide him with the greatest happiness, and bring the human being closer to God, who is in absolute contact or contemplative activity, are far superior to moral virtues (Cevizci, 2002, p.70). Aristotle believed that what is 'unique to man' is essentially, and more than anything else, thinking. In other words, Aristotle's mind-one practical, the other theoretical to be of two dimensions, and both of these are important while determining the maximum of those people, a man, what draws him to God even though it was a theoretical mind activity (Cevizci, 2012, p.134). Therefore, it is the virtues of thought gained as a result of the life of theory that leads man to true happiness.

2.4. Plotinus

Plotinus (204-270) was one of the important philosophers of the Hellenistic period. According to his student Porphyrios, who gave information about Plotinus' life, Plotinus was born in Lycopolis in Egypt. At the age of twenty-eight, he became interested in philosophy, and after listening to many thinkers who were teaching in Alexandria at that time, he became an audience of Ammonius Sakkas (Çotuksöken, Babür, 2011, p.39). He went to Rome in 224 and taught philosophy there for twenty-five years (Weber, 1993, p.110). After his death, his works were collected and published by his pupil Porphyrios. These works consist of nine books, each of which consists of six chapters. For this, they are called Enneads, which means 'nines' in Greek (Birand,1958, p.121). The main idea of the Enneads is an emanating pantheism that thinks of the realm as a flow, a degree of reflection of divine life, and as the final purpose of being, it is melting again in God (Weber, 1993, p.110).

Philosophical theology reached its peak in the ancient world with the system of Plotinus (Kenny, 2017, p.347). The Last important philosophical movement that emerged in the Hellenistic-Roman period is Neo-Platonism, founded by Plotinus. Neo-Platonism is a philosophy that is important not only in historical terms but also in terms of its influence on Christian medieval philosophy and Islamic philosophy (Cevizci, 2012, p.160). Plato mixed with Aristotle became widespread after the Hellenistic period, and the relationship between religion and philosophy was tried to be explained by a model of reconciliation as a result of this effect. The most influential part of Plotinus' philosophical system is the thought of emanation, which can be explained as "overflow" from top to bottom within a hierarchy (Heinemann, 2012, p.76).

It is emanation; as a term, means to come out, gush, overflow, occur, derive, occur. In the philosophical literature, it can be defined as the process or process of all derived or secondary things coming out of something more basic or first, coming into existence (Cevizci, 1999, p.423). According to Plotinus, God is the first, 'the one'. This Supreme Being is the greatness itself. Nothing can be said about this highest being, which is above all contrasts and all limited definitions. We can neither determine it fully nor perceive it with concepts. All we can say about greatness is that it is the complete unity of eternal unity. This is the most superior force, but also the best force. The realm consists of this superior force itself. But the emergence of the realm from this superior force does not happen when this force itself is divided into sections or arms. The realm floods and flows from this noble essence, making it emerge. In the meantime, nothing changes from the self and nature of this noble essence. The realm arises from its nature with some kind of obligation (Birand, 1958, p.123).

Plotinus was able to fully and fully explain the arbitrariness of the emergence of beings from God, as well as the traces of these divine forces in the object. He has put all this in a reasonable, logical order that forms a single texture with almost the tightness of the parts (*muhkem*) (Bedevi, 2010, p.106). In Plotinus's understanding of emergence, the steps that

appear from one always depend on the previous one. The previous step is transcendent from the next. Since the previous one does not occur without the next one, the previous one exists as an immanent in the next one. There is no disconnecting in this system of Plotinus. Rather, a continuum prevails. This continuity is time-independent until it descends into nature (Yıldırım, 1994, p.46). Firstly, time is out of the question for the mind and soul. Those who exist in nature, located in time, are also connected to the One through reason and spirit. For this reason, it is possible for a person to reach the One thanks to this continuity. A person who crosses the ladder of spirit and reason rises to the One (Yıldırım, 1994, p.47).

The spread of being out of God occurs with a number of stratification. In this sequence of layers of being, after God himself, who is the first and one, the first layer forms the "nous" mind or "Geist" space. In this layer, the unity that is the essence of God is divided into thought and existence, that is, the subject of consciousness. But in the influence of thinking that belongs to this superior being, thinking with being is the same. Because here the thought is not a study that changes according to the subject, appears from time to time and then disappears from the beginning. Conversely, here the thought is that being which creates its own content. This superior content of thought of being creates a world of ideas. According to Plotinus, there are not only a number of good actions but also an idea of good. Ideas that exist as the ideal example of all things are thoughts that are over time, that is, the thoughts of God (Birand, 1958, p.124). The data of nous after the world of ideas, the layer of Soul. The effect of the soul is that the world of ideas comes into contact and shapes the world of appearances according to this world, that is, by taking Ideas as an example. The soul, nous, is passive in the face. But when you encounter matter, it is an active and effective principle. The soul has two kinds of effects, one with the world of ideas above itself and one with the world of matter below itself. A soul immersed in the theme of ideas is a true soul, a superior soul. It is also the lower soul as a force that shapes matter (Birand, 1958, p.125).

For Plotinus, it is clear that happiness can only be an intellectual thing since the virtue of the soul is to think. Plotinus acknowledges Aristotle's distinction between virtues, in its original sense separating moral virtues or character virtues and intellectual virtues. Accordingly, he also adopts Aristotle's view that intellectual virtues are superior to moral acts. But, unlike Aristotle or going further than him, all kinds of actions reduce life to a life of thought and suggest that it is an inferior form of life of thought (Arslan, 2010, p.226). For Plotinus, there are two parts of the soul, and each of these parts has its own virtues. Moral virtues are the virtues of the lower part of the soul. Their task is to bring limits and measures to the soul, to prevent, suppress, and discipline passions, affections arising from the irrational side of the soul, so that it does not interfere with the activity of its upper part, that is, with the activity of the *noûs*. This is the main function of courage, justice, measure, and they need to be defined in relation to themselves, the spirit's own feelings and affections and passions, not in relation to people's relations with each other. The purified soul or the upper part of the soul, purged by the acquisition of moral virtues in function, can turn its eyes to the mind and have the virtue, the intellectual virtue that will bring about its true happiness (Arslan, 2010, p.227).

According to Plotinus, the goal of human life is to purify the soul and become more and more like a divine being (Weber, 1993, p.110). Plotinus' moral philosophy is a teaching of salvation, and its realization is possible when the spirit reaches one through the mind. Man wants to ascend to the one, the first cause, which may be possible by crossing the steps of the reason with the soul. With purification (*catharsis*), man can only ascend to the reason. In this purification process, the two sides of the soul, the side that receives a share of the mind and the side that does not receive a share (*logos-alogos*) must be purified. It is easy to purify the side that has a share of the mind; the other side gets better from the side that gets its share of the mind, but from time to time it gets wrong. However, the desired full recovery is, for full recovery, the soul must be restrained, just, valiant, sane, and wise. In spirit, this is the main

virtues; but the spirit, however, restrained, brave and fair, while also examining what is dialectics nature of the object, and other objects from which they left, in other words, it is wise to identify the class would have rung us when they are located in (Çotuksöken-Babür, 2011, p.42). In Plotinus's belief, there must be another relationship, another form of contact that allows it to reach perfection and happiness, which is the ultimate goal of perfection and happiness, salvation, and beyond the mind, as well as knowledge and happiness, in the sense that he has the knowledge of all the minds, reaching the mind from which the Soul comes out. Indeed, Plotinus believes in the existence of such a relationship, a form of contact, and believes that we can reach one with another ability, or action that transcends them, although it does not exactly contradict our mind, our mental knowledge. This is defined by Plotinus as our ability to fall in love and desire beauty (Arslan, 2010, p.194).

Since the main goal in Plotinus' philosophy is to approach God through spiritual and mental purification from evil, physical and material, and to experience a mystical union with God, such purification moves a person to the highest moral order. In other words, Plotinus believes that philosophical life in this context is the highest level that can be reached in terms of morale (Saliya, 2016, p.155). According to him, three paths lead to God: music, love, and philosophy; three paths, or rather one path with three stages. The artist searches for the idea in his heard appearances; the loving man seeks him higher, in the human spirit; finally, the philosopher looks for him in the field where he is in a pure state of all kinds of mixtures: in the understandable realm and in God (Weber, 1993, p.118). From a metaphysical point of view, love allows beings to appear; from a knowledge point of view, it allows them to understand the One; from an aesthetic point of view, it allows them to achieve beauty. Because the beauties he sees in nature remind man of his lack and mobilize the soul, feel the divine traces in the world, and thus create a desire in man to reach his true source. According to Plotinus, love is a way of knowing the good. But this is not a way of knowing with reason, but a way of intuition without

tools. It is not like the subject sees the object, it is a life in the sense that it merges with it, that it is one and the same thing, that it melts in it, that it disappears (Pattabanoğlu, 2016, p. 220).

Plotinus sees the ideal of moving away from the world and approaching divinity as the duty of the philosopher. Accordingly, a philosopher should maintain self-discipline in moral and mental terms, stay away from the material world and human tendencies, and make an internal/idealistic journey towards “the absolute degree.” The moment of enlightenment that the philosopher experienced through this spiritual journey is an indescribable moment, as it transcends worldly knowledge. At this time, a distinction in the form of subject-object has disappeared. This is the ultimate in combining contemplation and discovery of the philosopher's desire for the ultimate point (Saliya, 2016, p.153). People, sensory organs that detect the object, on the one hand, intuition is a useful ability to understand the spiritual world, a spiritual eye. However, it creates a moment of attraction to the highest degree of knowledge that a person can reach. This is the moment when a person goes out of his own consciousness and becomes unconscious (Birand, 1958, p.127). There is no longer anything that a person who has ascended to the reasons can do spiritually or mentally; he must leave himself to the love of seeing only one level, the One. In this reaching moment, he can see the One from time to time, or rather, he shows himself to him from time to time. The real situation in which happiness is experienced is this reaching situation in which the Soul performs all its possibilities (Çotuksöken, Babür, 2011, p.42-43).

3. PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONCEPT OF VIRTUE IN AL-FARABÎ

Al-Farabi was born in 873 in Vesich, Farab province of Turkestan (Cevizci, 2001, p.120). His full name was Abu Nasr Muhammad B. Turhan B. Uzun B. Turhan-Al-Farabi-at Turki (Ülken, 1983, p.51). In the Latin Middle Ages, he is called Al-Farabius and Abunaser. There is no information about his family except that his father was the commander of Vesich Castle. In Farab, which is an important educational and Cultural Center under the rule of the Samanid state, it is known that the educational program is religious, the language of education is Arabic, and Farsi is partially taught as a literary language, and in this environment, it is understood that Al-Farabi got a good education.⁸ He learned grammar, philosophy, music, mathematics, astronomy, and other sciences of the time (Bayraktar, 1997, p.174).

From the lists given by medieval authors about his works, it is seen that Al-Farabi's philosophical products are enormous, the number of works attributed to him exceeds one hundred. If these lists are authentic, then only a small fraction of Al-Farabi's works have reached us (Leaman, 2007, p.216). The collection or volume Al-Farabi really quite plump the works of Aristotle into Arabic and Greek philosophy logic transfers, essays, and books describing and interpreting, especially in logic, metaphysics, and political ideas of his own original works in the field of philosophy (Cevizci, 2001, p.121). His great books are mostly those that belong to the explanation of the main works of Aristotle. Aristotle's books are distinguished from other philosophers in that they are combined and annotated in a complete series (Ülken, 1983, p.52). Al-Farabi is a man of science and thought who has earned the title of ‘‘Muallim-i Sani’’ with detailed interpretations and evaluations of Aristotle's works it is thought to bring wisdom to

⁸ Please see. Encyclopedia of Islam, article Farabi.

humanity as a whole and the honor of presenting to humanity this ancient quality of wisdom forgotten for a long time (Topdemir, 2017, p.16)

3.1. The Idea of Hierarchy of Being as the Philosophical Infrastructure of the Concept of Virtue

Al-Farabi's conception of virtue is closely related to his ontology. Al-Farabi's ontology is generally related to the understanding of emergence, which describes a layered descent and explains the relationship of existing ones with each other in this way. Emergence is a system that explains the stages of the occurrence of what is more than one and the arrival of this occurrence. In Al-Farabi's understanding of the universe, there are two different realms: above the moon and below the moon.

3.1.1. Superlunar Sphere

Al-Farabi's accepted design of the universe is largely based on aristocratic-Ptolemaic principles. Accordingly, the universe consists of concentric, intertwined spheres with the world at its center. Located in the outer shell of the universe, the first sky is a sphere of fixed stars and acts with a love and desire for God. The perpetrators of movements in other spheres are the cosmic minds to which they are connected (Aydınlı, 2018, p.88). Al-Farabi, the eternal and the later, the unchanged; one is the famous emergence that came to the Islamic world from Plotinus to explain the relationship between the absolute and the mandatory and the many and the positive, and thus interpret the entire universe in a hierarchical system, or refers to the theory of cosmic minds. According to Al-Farabi, a spiritualist in terms of the theory of being, species, and the universe, built with bricks taken from Aristotle and mortar borrowed from Neo-Platonist philosophy, God as the first reason, through the flood of being, creates the entire order of being in the universe with a "natural obligation" (Cevizci, 1999, p.244).

Al-Farabi puts this idea in *Es-Siyâtetu'l-Medeniyye* as follows:

First, when it has such a mandatory asset, other natural assets must necessarily acquire assets from it (Siyâse, p.55)⁹. From him, it is because someone else gains existence, his existence is overflowing, and someone else's existence comes out of his existence. His being, which gives existence to someone else, is in his essence. His existence, in which he is directly mined in his essence, is the existence from which the existence of others comes out (Siyâse, p.57).

Al-Farabi adds causality in the view of genesis to the causality that Aristotle suggests exists only in terms of movement, identifying causality in terms of existence, which he lacks in terms of Islamic faith, knowing or thinking, and action (Cevizci, 2001, p.132). Because how to establish the relationship of the universe with the Creator God in Islam was an important problem with Aristotle's first conception of reason and architect God and his philosophical approaches. This could be achieved by reconciling the views of these two philosophers with the doctrine of advance /emergence in the context of the knowledge of cosmology of the period (Akyol-Uyanık, 2017, p.88).

Accordingly, God, who is absolute, is also the absolute mind, he knows his own essence, hence he is known by himself. In other words, God is both intelligent and reasoning and reasoned. All three of these concepts express the same thing about God, namely absolute consciousness (Cevizci, 2001, p.132). But the most important is that Al-Farabi describes God as a mind whose main activity is self-understanding, and this view evokes Aristotle's

⁹ Al-Farabi (2012) *Es-Siyâtetu'l-Medeniyye veya Mebâdi'ul-Mevcûdât* (trans. and edited by. Mehmet S. AYDIN, Abdülkadir ŞENER, M. Rami AYAS) is mentioned as *Siyâse* in this thesis.

understanding of God's activity as "thinking about thinking" what bases the role of God as the creator of the realm in Al-Farabi's draft is the mental activity of God (Leaman, 2007, p.226). God or the first reason to think and know its own essence, through his thought of its own essence, derives from him the first mind, or emergence, which in no way has a material existence (Cevizci, 2001, p.132). Al-Farabi describes the realization of the emergence as:

From the first to the second, the existence of the second is overflowing. This second being is also in no way a non-material, and he is not in matter. He thinks of both his own essence and the first one that exists. What he thinks of himself is nothing but his essence. Because he thinks of the first being, he necessarily comes out of the third being. As a result of his dedication to his unique essence, the existence of the first sky emerges from him. (Ârâ, p.51)¹⁰

Al-Farabi and the new Platonists, in general, assumed a series of mediating beings between God and the world in the framework of explaining the exit of what is more than the 'One'. According to this understanding of preserving the transcendence of God, it is unthinkable that multiplicity comes out of God, which is in the first order of the exit process and is the One in the absolute sense. A being that is one in all respects must first come out of an entity that is only substance-free and one, such as itself (Aydınlı, 2018, p.88). The principle that dominates this teaching when Al-Farabi meets is the principle of "only one emerges from one." (Corbin, 2017, p.288). Al-Farabi argues that God is a mandatory, strictly single, and lean being from which only something can be derived. This is something, the first mind to overflowing from God based on his own exquisite knowledge. As soon as God has made the first mind real,

¹⁰ Al-Farabi (2013) *El-Medinetü'l Fâzıla* (trans. and edited by Ahmet ARSLAN) is mentioned as Ârâ in this thesis.

duality comes into existence. The first mind is not a mandatory being like God, but a possible being made real by God. This first dichotomy starts a later creation process (Collinson-Wilkinson, 2000, p.38).

In the process of cosmic exit, the latter becomes the cause of each other's existence in an activity that consists of thinking about God. In other words, every cosmic intellect causes an intellect like itself to emerge from it by thinking of the 'first existing'. On the one hand, thinking about their essence, they cause the obligatory beings of the heavens to overflow from them (Aydınlı, 2018, p.89). The first Divine extracts are the gods represented by the stars on the floor of Aristotle, and the 'absolute minds' on the floor of Al-Farabi (Corbin, 2017, p.288). In Al-Farabi's metaphysics, the second or secondary causes, also called spiritual beings and angels, are considered by their nature to be the causes and movers of the existence of celestial bodies that move around the circle. From each of the latter, the existence of each celestial body necessarily arises (Aydınlı, 2018, p.90). But like God, this second intellect says that he is not related to the activity of self-contemplation, but in addition, he is personally. He must also contemplate God. Through his contemplation of God, he reveals the third intellect; through his contemplation of himself, he reveals the celestial sphere, which corresponds to the first sky. Al-Farabi then repeats this two-element model of emergence for each sphere in cosmology and the intellect corresponding to he, eventually reaching a total of ten intellects other than God (Leaman, 2007, p.227). The first intellect leads to the second intellect, which forms the reality of itself, as well as the first and highest sphere, which has possibilities. The process lasts until there are nine such masses and ten such intellects, whit each intellect producing the next intellect and the mass of the sphere or planet (Collinson, Wilkinson, 2000, p.38). From Allah, the first nine of the ten intellects that emergence from each other are 'secondary causes' and the tenth is 'active reason'. For each of the secondary reasons, when

dominated by Allah, he created a dependent intellect that belonged to him, but when he was dominating himself, he also created a soul, which, when he was his turn, formed space.

(Marquet, 1990, p.203) In this activity of thinking and creation, the order of abstract beings above the moon, consisting of ten minds and nine celestial bodies, is completed. The following celestial beings are formed, respectively, each corresponding to one of the ten intellects: the first sky, the sphere of fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, The Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon. The existence of the first sky from the first intellect, the first beings separate from matter, and the existence of others from the others, necessarily exists within a hierarchy of being and value, and this cosmic exit process continues until the tenth intellect, Active Intellect, and the ninth celestial body, the 'moon' (Aydınlı, 2018, p.90). If we briefly explain the overflow of God's nature, incarnation, celestial bodies, that is, all planets, he reveals a sequence of ten intellects that also make up the stars and Moon (Collinson-Wilkinson, 2000, p.37).

Although not entirely original, he seems that the theory of overflow or emanation has value for Al-Farabi thought in two respects. The first of these is a convenient model for explaining how all beings are formed from the first existing, and from this way he becomes possible to construct man, nature, and the universe in the context of a ladder or hierarchy of being. Second, he is possible to connect the formation of the ladder of being to a form of thinking and thus to imagine a world of mere beings (Topdemir, 2017, p.99).

3.1.1.1. God

Al-Farabi is under the influence of both the Aristotelian-New Platonist tradition of philosophy and the religion to which he is attached, trying to reveal what God is in terms of what he should be (Aydınlı, 1995, p.88). In this field, as in other areas of his philosophy, Al-Farabi, Aristotle, and Neo-Platonist philosophies combined with Islamic thought and revealed a unique philosophical system. In terms of his relationship with the concepts of necessity and

possibility, according to Al-Farabi, the concept of God is a concept that can be clearly sharpened without needing to be proven. In his treatise *Uyûnu 'l-Mesâil* (Basic Issues of Philosophy)¹¹, this understanding was revealed by Al-Farabi.

According to Al-Farabi, some concepts cannot be understood without understanding concepts such as body, height, depth, while there are also concepts that do not need another understanding before he is understood. Al-Farabi stated that this chain of concepts should end in a concept that does not rely on his previous concept; he considers the concepts of necessity, existence, and possibility (possibility) from such concepts. (Uyûn, p.117-118) Al-Farabi, who tries to base the existence of God around the concepts of existence, competence, and necessity, has taken the first steps of the ontological evidence that will be used and developed by Ibn Sina, Saint Anselmus, and Descartes within the framework of their analysis of this concept.

According to Al-Farabi, we find the concepts of ‘being’, ‘necessity’, and ‘possibility’ almost ready in our intellects and understand their meaning directly in a way (Aydınlı, 2018, p.74). Because these concepts do not need a concept that will precede them and surround them. These concepts are clear, accurate, and contained in the intellect (Uyûn, p.117).

According to Al-Farabi, when the possible being is ignored for a moment, this does not lead to impossibility (*muhal*). So his existence is based on a reason. As for a mandatory entity, if his obligation is an obligation that arises relative to someone else, this means that such an entity is inherently possible, mandatory for someone else. He is possible or something that has been going on since time immemorial or has appeared from time to time. However, he is impossible for a possible being to last forever in the chain of reason, and he is impossible for them to last forever in the form of the cycle (tautology).

¹¹ Al-Farabi (2017) *Uyûnu 'l-Mesâil* (trans. and edited by. Mahmut KAYA) is mentioned as Uyûn in this thesis.

So, possible beings must eventually end up in a mandatory being, which is the first being (God) (Uyûn, p.118). The first thing Al-Farabi painstakingly tries to emphasize about the existence of God is the difference in ontic status that he has. Al-Farabi generally tries to base the existence of God on an ontology based on mandatory categories of being-possible being, if we say that the existence of God is different in all respects from the existence of those outside he (Aydınlı, 2000, p.26).

He is impossible to think of the absence of God (the first reason) without contradictions, unlike possible beings whose existence and non-existence are possible, and therefore can be considered both existence and absence. He can be said that existence is mandatory in the conceptual content of the term First Cause. To say that all that exists also carries the possibility of the extinction of the First Cause, which we make a rational explanation of the universe whit itself, contradicts his first being above all (Aydınlı, 2000, p.26). A nature that we can think of as God's mandatory being will be a nature that distinguishes him from all other beings. According to this intuition, which forms the basis of ontological evidence, God has such a nature that his existence cannot be considered separate from his nature. Understanding/knowing what God is enough to understand/know that he exists (Rençber, 2005, p.224). According to Al-Farabi, he is the one who has no reason for his mandatory existence, and he is impossible for his existence to arise from someone else, and he is the first reason for everything that exists.

The first being, the first reason (God) is the Supreme of the beings; he has never existed in the state of possibility like other beings, before and after. He has no substance, no form, and no basis. His existence is independent of matter and form. His existence has no purpose. He is different from everything but himself, he has no opposition. His existence cannot be defined, divided by number, or in any other form, he is the one: in terms of activity,

he is the mind. He is the knower, the known, and the knowledge (Çotuksöken-Babür, 2011, p.130). Al-Farabi sets out his views on God being “the intellect” as follows:

He has no qualities other than his own essence, but he has only reason, only knowledge, the only truth, etc. and he is possible to be pointed out as absolute essence...He is also the source of being who thinks of himself and, as a result of this thinking; the entire universe is necessarily overflowing with him...He is the reason itself in terms of his structure since he is not in the matter and does not have substance in any form. Because he is the substance in which something exists that prevents the image from being a mind and thinking itself (*Ta'akkul*). If something does not need matter in his existence, he becomes a mind itself in terms of his structure. That is the case with the first One. Then he is a wise mind. He is also rational in terms of structure (*Mâ'kul*). Because he thinks of his own essence, he becomes that know (*âkil*) and mind (*akl*), and as a result of his essence falling on himself, he becomes cognitive (Ârâ, p.13).

Al-Farabi states that God does not need an essence that he will think of himself and acquire from outside in order to be wise and smart, on the contrary, he becomes intelligent and rational by thinking of his own essence. Because the thought essence is the thinking essence, and so he is reason in terms of reason. Therefore, he is wise, sane, and smart (Ârâ, p.14). Al-Farabi, following the aristocratic tradition, says that God is reason. According to this understanding, something that does not need matter in his existence becomes an intellect itself in terms of his essence. God is action in the form of reason in terms of his essence, because he is without matter and without the body in all respects. In the same way, God is thinkable in terms of his essence. Even though he is thought, he is an object of his own

thought in terms of being an absolute intellect. In this sense, as God's essence, he is reason, is reasoned and reasoner; in short, he is 'self-thinking thought' (Aydınlı, 2018, p.76).

The God of Al-Farabi, who is at the top of the hierarchy of being, when we consider all the qualities that he has placed on him; material, shape (image), the purpose for existence, reason, and not from non-existence to another, everything is different, equal, and opposite, similar, non-power, non-simple, indivisible, without a recipe, *Akdam*, *Hakim* (wise) *Hak* (Real), *Hayy* (living), Excellent, Glorious, Great, Jalal-Jamal, Bright, Love, Lover, Loved, Intellect, Wisdom, Wise, Reasonable, Afdal, Trustee, the most superior in *kemal*, most beautiful, different than everything, the one and single where all other beings overflow, the first entity, the first cause, and actually is the intellect (Uyûn, p.119).

3.2.1. Sublunary Sphere

Al-Farabi makes a distinction between the final principles of objects and not available in objects in the form of those are not objects and those objects. God has no direct connections to matter, the second and the active mind principles in the first category. The second group of principles, consisting of *nefs* (soul), body and matter, are found in the celestial body, human, animal, plant, mines, and material beings formed by four elements, although they are not corporal (Aydınlı, 2000, p.68). In the sublunary sphere, the model considered for the superlunary sphere is reversed, and the hierarchy of existing ones is depicted in the form of orders that rise from incomplete to perfect (Aydınlı, 2000, p.69). The human is the most perfect being in this order in the sublunary sphere.

3.2.1.1. Human

In Al-Farabi's system, human is the most complex, therefore the most perfect, natural being at the last level of the sublunary sphere of formation, starting with four elements, respectively, mines, plants and finally animals that do not think (Aydınlı, 2000, p.77). Human

appears as a being of matter and soul at the last point of the purposeful functioning of nature. Human is superior to other natural beings both in terms of his natural equipment and in terms of his unique abilities. All the forces that nature has placed on plants, animals and natural objects in general come together in it. A person is equipped with abilities that will potentially bring the powers that have been given to him into the current state and become competent (Aydınlı, 2018, p.102).

In terms of the ethical-political purpose that Al-Farabi has pursued, the man takes his place in the system not as a natural being, but as a thinking being. However, he also seems impossible to achieve a healthy view of his rational dimension without understanding man as a natural being. Therefore, the informational activity necessary for happiness must take into account the person in his entire existence (Aydınlı, 2000, p.79). According to Al-Farabi, man is a bodily being; he is a whole consisting of matter and soul, and in this whole, the existence of the spiritual necessarily stipulates the existence of the material. The soul is a principle of being that cannot perform his competence without a material basis, and he arises in the convenience provided by the appropriate mixture of matter and body (Aydınlı, 2018, p.104).

3.2.1.1.1. Soul

As the principle of life, soul (*nefs*) is one of the principles that make up the existence of bodies and matters and is divided into three: heavenly, human and animal. In Al-Farabi's writings, there are not many explanations of the nature of the soul. He does not give a description of the soul anywhere, but he is sufficiently focused on the abilities of the soul. However, he is understood that Al-Farabi follows the Aristotelian definition (Aydınlı, 2000, p.80). The forces that first appear in it when a human is formed are the nourishing force, the sensory force, the desire force, the imagination force, and finally the mind force, respectively.

A nourishing force is a force that is formed of its assistants and servants. The main nourishing force is found in the heart, while auxiliary and servant forces are found in organs such as the stomach, liver, spleen. All auxiliary and servant forces adapt to the natural purpose of the main force (Ârâ, p.73).

Sensory force: this applies to the nourishing force, as well as to the sensory force of the heart to be the main organ. In addition, his assistants are the five senses, which are scattered in the sensory organs such as the eye and ear. The main force is the main force in which everything perceived by the five senses comes together in itself, while each of the five senses understands its own species (Ârâ, p.73-74).

Imagination Force: imagination force is the force that preserves the senses and controls the senses, saving them. This force separates the senses from each other and sometimes combines them with each other in a way that is appropriate and sometimes contrary to what is perceived by the senses. This force has no auxiliaries distributed to other organs, and its place is the heart (Ârâ, p.74).

Mental force: although mental force does not have assistants and servants scattered around other organs, it commands other forces; the force of imagination, the force of sensation, and the force of nourishment (Ârâ, p.75).

Force of Desire: The Force of desire is the force that creates the will, and it also has a main force and servants. Will is the desire to acquire or avoid something that is understood by sensory perception, imagination, or mental force, and the decision that this thing should be accepted or rejected. IT is

the force of will that makes the will turn to do something, and its servants are the forces that spread across all parts of the body. Main willpower is in the heart (Ârâ, p.75).

Intellectual force: the intellectual force arises from the force found in the action mental force, which allows the desired thing to be achieved when it is desired to know something that has the property of understanding with mental force. Thanks to this force, thinking, measuring and reasoning, careful examination and inference occur (Ârâ, p.75).

Al-Farabi reveals the relationship between the forces of the soul as follows:

The feeding force that is the ruler is the substance of the sensory force that is the ruler, and the sensory force is the image of the nourishing force. The sensory force that is the ruler is the substance of the imagination force, and the imagination force is the image of the sensory force that is the ruler. A force of imagination is the substance of a mental force; a mental force is the image of a mental force without being the substance of another force. The force of reason is the ultimate form of all previous manifestations. As for the force of desire, it is subject to the force of sense, the force of imagination, and the force of reason, which is the commandment, such as the temperature being with fire and the subject of what the fire is with itself (Ârâ, p.76).

According to Al-Farabi, man is a unified and harmonious whole in which the basic and secondary organs corresponding to them with the basic and secondary abilities of the soul work in accordance with a common goal within a hierarchical structure. Each lower skill, along with the organ in which it forms its image, participates in the purpose of the skill above

it and becomes a tool for it. In this process, the mind forms the last goal of each activity of the bodily organs with the abilities of the soul (Aydınlı, 2018, p.107).

3.2.1.1.2. Intellect

In general, in Al-Farabi, the intellect has epistemological, cosmological, and metaphysical functions in relation to each other (Çilingir, 2009, p.48). In his understanding of reason, Al-Farabi, although under the influence of Aristotle, makes a number of determinations, unlike Aristotle. The intellect has certain qualities and definitions, being and knowing; the intellect, on the one hand, shows a goal that man must achieve, and on the other hand, it is a ruling and general principle that connects different worlds. Therefore, the reason is both a thinking ability and a principle (Sarı, 2005, p.87). The intellect, on the one hand, is the first being overflowing from God, the active thought that thinks of itself, and the bridge that provides the transition between worlds, while the intellect and the ability to think, on the other hand, is the one who initially has the ability to isolate and understand the nature and forms of all existing ones separately from their substances. In this case, the intellect is a power that allows a person to rise from the material world to the intangible world, but itself becomes increasingly active and changes content as it becomes active (Sarı, 2005, p.112).

Al-Farabi, in his work titled *Makalat er-Refiafi Usuli Ilmi'i-Tabia*, examines mind, soul and *nefs* extensively. Al-Farabi's first article in this work is about the reason. In the introduction of the article, the philosopher refers to the mind, soul, and *nefs* as the gentle and spiritual three souls that God has placed in man. The mind, the first of the three spiritual souls, is expressed here as an honorable light (Şahin, 2008, p.137). Human delicacy is the source of two basic powers. The first is the force that makes possible actions performed through organs, and the second is the mental force. Al-Farabi discusses the three dimensions of reason connected to each other: God, secondary causes, or celestial essences and human, and puts his system on a sheet of them (Aydınlı, 2018, p.107). Al-Farabi, with a psychological

approach, refers to the powers of a) self-thinking (*en-natika*), b) desire (*en-nuzu'iyye*), c) imagination d) sensation. With the power of thinking, man acquires all kinds of sciences and arts, distinguishes between good and bad from moral behavior, understands what to do and what not to do. The tactical dimension of thinking power, intellect in actuality (*bi'l-fiil*), potential (*bi'l-kuvve*), and acquired intellect (*mustafâd*) stages; his practical dimension involves doing what these stages require (Uysal, 2005, p.163). Al-Farabi examined the various meanings of the concept of reason in his work *Risâle fî me'ani'l-akl*:

The word intellect means many things. First, people say about a person, “he is smart”. Second, It is the intellect that *kalamists* often repeat, saying, ‘this is what the intellect requires or rejects.’ The third is the intellect that Aristotle mentioned in *Kitabu'l al-Burhan*. Fourth, his narrative in Chapter Six of *Kitabu'l al-Ahlak* is the reason. Fifth, it is the mind that he speaks of in the *Kitabu'l al-Nafs*. The sixth is the mind he describes in *Kitabu'l Maba'de't-Tabi'a* (*Risâle fî me'ani'l-akl*, p.127).

Here, what Al-Farabi does is to classify and evaluate the mind in the form of *avami* (common), *Kalami* (theological), *burhani* (analytical), moral (ethical), psychological and epistemological, metaphysical mind (Uysal, 2005, p.159). Al-Farabi seems to focus more and especially on the conceptualizations of the mind contained in Aristotle's *De Anima* and to examine them in detail under the headings *bi'l- kuvve*, *bi'l-fiil*, *mustafad* and active intellect (Topdemir, 2017, p.135). According to Al-Farabi, the reason is divided into theoretical reason and practical reason. The theoretical intellect is also divided into four: potential intellect (*al-Akl bi'l-Kuvve*), actuality intellect (*al-Akl bi'l-fiil*), acquired intellect (*al-Akl al-Mustafad*) and active intellect (*al-Akl al-Fa'al*) (Bayraktar, 1997, p.180). In parallel with Aristotle's *De Anima*, Al-Farabi's *bi'l-kuvve* (potential) needs the help of superior intellect to turn into a *bi'l-fiil* state in which the intellect is understood in itself. The state of this intellect according

to *bi'l-kuvve* intellect is like the state of the sun, which sends its light to the eye. Just as the power of *bi'l-kuvve* vision turns into the action of *bi'l-fiil* vision through light, the active intellect also turns the intellect that is found in a person as *bi'l-kuvve* into a *bi'l-fiil* (Çilingir , 2009, p.48). Although Al-Farabi is not very clear about what *heyulâni* or *bi'l-kuvve* intellect is, like Aristotle, for Al-Farabi it is a power, a simple essence that man has innately accept intangible justifiable substances. On the one hand, he depends on the human self, which obtains copies of small beings through his external senses. In this way, objects become created when their substance can be embroidered into this intellect. This sense of reason makes the sensations difficult in itself, and they are thus *bi'l-fiil* in the mind to have a substance-free existence (Bayraktar, 1997, p.180).

The intellect gradually ascended from the state of *bi'l kuvve* intellect to the *bi'l-fiil* intellect and eventually to the *mustafad* intellect. *Bi'l-kuvve* intellect perceives only audible forms, while *bi'l-fiil* conceals, detains, and comprehends concepts. A *mustafad* intellect rises to the level of ecstasy and inspiration in getting a share. The gradual rise here is not spontaneous. Because its initial stage is maculate and *bi'l-kuvve* intellect. The important thing here is that the transformation from *bi'l-kuvve* to *bi'l-fiil* is only with the active intellect that is in action. Human knowledge is based on enlightenment from abstract intellects (Akyol-Uyanık, 2017, p.185). If the intellect remained in the degree of exceptional, cognitive knowledge, the feeling obtained by the soul, would not be much different from knowledge. Therefore, the human intellect cannot always be sure whether they are correct or not (Bayraktar, 1997, p.181). An exceptional intellect can, in a leap, communicate with an active intellect that has copies of all the beings that exist in it. With such a contact, the human intellect (i.e. the *mustafad* intellect) has the opportunity to check whether the information in it is in compliance with the forms of the active intellects, and eventually understands whether the information he receives from the beings is accurate. This is also Al-Farabi's rational

Sufism (Bayraktar, 1997, p.182). Human achieves the highest level of intellect, acquired (*mustafad*) level of intellect by obtaining all the rational in the world, both sensory and intelligent, which he can understand with the human intellect. *Bi'l-kuvve* intellect is informed by the active intellect; this intellect is heard and justified, and by obtaining information in the world, it turns into the acquired intellect. Having reached this level, the active intellect illuminates the human intellect a second time, which Al-Farabi called Revelation (Çilingir, 2009, p.48).

It would be useful to demonstrate the function of the faculty of imagination (*muhayyile*), which is one of the concepts that have an important place in Al-Farabi's philosophy. The faculty of imagination has an important place in achieving knowledge and therefore a virtuous life and happiness as a result of the relationship that man has established with the active intellect. Among people, the Prophet most often uses this force, thanks to this force, he reaches different levels of knowledge within his own capacity and delivers this knowledge to society. According to Al-Farabi, the faculty of imagination is a medium force located between the force of sense and reason. He refers to the relationship as:

When all the helpers of the sensory force hear and perform their actions, the faculty of imagination (*muhayyile*) is affected by them, engaged in the sensations that the senses bring to them and record them. It is also busy serving the mental force and helping the power of desire....When the sense, imagination, and forces of reason do not perform their actions, the force of imagination, which is constantly freed from new sensory images sent to it by the senses, remains alone with it and also gets rid of serving the forces of reason and desire. For example, such a situation can occur, for example, when you are asleep. In such a case, the force of imagination returns to the images of the senses he retains in itself, taking action or saving on them by

combining or separating these images....Apart from these two, the third verb of the imagination force is imitation (*muhaka*). Thanks to this property, *muhayyile* has the power to imitate the sensations he retains in himself and can imitate the sensations, intellects, nourishing force, or desire force (Ârâ, p.89-90).

The nature of the faculty of imagination is to accept everything he is subjected to, and it has the ability to accept it in the way it comes to him. It also makes this acceptance in two ways: Either he accepts he as he comes to him, or he imitates it with sensations that imitate it. For the rational, the situation is different:

But since his intellect has no power to accept it mentally when the mental force gives him the intellect he has, he cannot accept them in the way they are in the mental force itself; he can only imitate them with the sensory things that are appropriate....The force of imagination also imitates the mental force that this force has by imitating them with things that are suitable for imitating labor. In this way, he imitates the highest-level minds, such as the First Cause, things outside the body, and the heavens, with the highest, most perfect senses, which are beautiful in appearance, with the lowest, lowest-level minds, which are ugly in appearance (Ârâ, p.91-92).

The ability to trust is open to the influence of bodily temperament, senses, ability to desire, ability to think, and finally the active intellect, and this effect accepts everything that comes from sources in accordance with its own nature. From this point of view, the ability to imagine has a limited power of acceptance. However, this limited capacity is in a way boundless by the power provided by the action of reflection (imitation). According to Al-Farabi, imagination performs such acceptance in two ways. It accepts what they are

influenced by, either within their objective reality, as they are, or imitates them with the senses that suit them (Aydınlı,2000, p.140-141).

According to Al-Farabi, the power of imagination is not only associated with the theoretical and the practical reason but also directly with active reason (Aydınlı,2000, p.142). The relationship between the active intellect and the superior man has also been arranged by Al-Farabi. According to Al-Farabi, there are two stages between a person who has reached the superior level of humanity and active intellect. The first stage of these: the individual intellect, which reaches perfection, and of course the delegation-in the form of a merger of matter and image - becomes one thing. Thus, when the individual intellect, which is actually occurring, enters the image of a person, there remains a stage between it and the active intellect. Second, of course, when the delegation-which has become a *bi'l-fiil* intellect - becomes the substance of the individual intellect, and when the individual intellect becomes the substance of the exceptional intellect, and all this is accepted as one thing, then it becomes the active intellect of the superior person (Deniz, 2008, p.101). According to Al-Farabi, the highest level of the faculty of imagination is prophecy:

So it is not impossible for a person whose faculty of imagination is in the last line of perfection to receive and see current and future events or their sensory representations from the active intellect, representations of transcendent intellects, and other honorable beings, while awake. This man can also make prophecy (*nubuvva*) about divine things with the intellect. This is the highest degree that the force of imagination can reach (Ârâ, p.94).

3.2.1.1.3. Imagination

Al-Farabi's emergence system is the most important proof that knowledge in the content of active reason comes from God (Deniz, 2008, p.100). In terms of competence, the active intellect, located in the last ring of the transcendent intellects, makes a person able to understand the intellect in its relationship with the acquired intellect, which forms the last stage of the conceptual intellect. In a way, the active intellect gives a person a metaphysical experience by putting the material into a relationship with the transcendent. But the relationship of a person with an active intellect is not a kind of confusion or union, as in mysticism, but a coming together or contact. Through this relationship, human enters into a relationship with the active intellect, becomes in a similar situation with it, and becomes 'similar to God' (Çilingir, 2009, p.49).

In Al-Farabi's philosophy, revelation does not have a purely religious meaning content. Revelation is the ultimate source not only of religious truth, but also of truth in the absolute sense, and in this respect covers philosophy (Aydınlı, 2000, p.132). From the same source, one of the two people who receive information from the active intellect can be a philosopher with what is moving from the active intellect to the passive intellect, while he can also be a prophet with what is moving from the active intellect to faculty of imagination. The substance of the passive intellect, the passive intellect as the substance of the acquired intellect, and acquired intellect as the substance of the active intellect, and when all this is considered as one and the same thing, this person becomes the person to whom the active intellect descends. When this state appears in both parts of his mental force, i.e. parts of word and deeds, and faculty of imagination, this person becomes the person who comes to him with Revelation, and the Almighty God sends down revelation to him through the active intellect. In this way, the holy and Almighty God passes what is overflowing with the active intellect to the passive mind through the active intellect acquired intellect, and then to the faculty of

imagination. And this person becomes a wise person, a philosopher, a perfect thinker who uses a divine intellect with what is active intellect, a prophet with what is active intellect, a warner who informs the future, a messenger who informs the already existing events (Ârâ, p.103-104).



4. REFLECTION OF THE CONCEPT OF VIRTUE IN AL-FARABI IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

It is possible to say that Al-Farabi was, in various respects, the most important figure of medieval Islamic philosophy. This provision also applies to Islamic political philosophy (Arslan, 2018, ix). According to Al-Farabi, the philosopher who laid the foundations of political philosophy in the thought of Islamic philosophy, politics, and morality are inseparable concepts. According to him, a perfect or complete political life and a perfect political regime constitute the sine qua non-existent condition of a perfect, complete moral life, so to speak, moral regime. Incomplete or imperfect regimes, on the contrary, lead to morally incomplete and imperfect lives (Arslan, 2018, xiii).

Al-Farabi defines political science as something that makes a distinction between the following definitions; volitional actions with the diversity of lifestyles, these actions, their own abilities, and their lifestyle, habits, characters, and characteristics, the purpose they were exercised for, how to design so that they are available in human, and exploring ways to protect them and the actions exercised for the sake of the purposes of the implementation of lifestyle (Ulûm, p.49)¹². Actions, lifestyles, habits, temperament, and volitional faculties investigated in a comprehensive manner by *Ilm-î Medenî* (Political Science); in addition to these types, the happiness and the director of a special profession and the skill is a matter of order among the people and taken under the protection of the profession of the order that is related to the actual source (Ulûm, p.50). For Al-Farabi, political philosophy is a guide on how people who have come together to create a virtuous society that is necessary to

¹² Al-Farabi (2017) *İhsâ'ül-Ulûm* (trans. and edited by Mahmut KAYA) is mentioned as Ulûm in this thesis

distinguish between virtuous and non-virtuous societies, how they can achieve happiness, how they should perform actions for this, how these actions can be maintained, and how they should create a city for a virtuous life.

4.1. The City

Al-Farabi sees people living in a community as a necessary situation to achieve perfection. Man has a creation that needs many things to achieve the highest perfection. He can achieve perfection by coming together with many people who help each other because he cannot achieve what he needs alone. In addition, society needs to continue its existence. For this reason, people have come together to form incomplete, imperfect, or perfect societies (Ârâ, p.97). Al-Farabi classifies “Madinah” according to certain criteria. We see that they are named according to the structure of ideas in states, the understanding of justice, economic structure, the relationship between managers and the people, social life and other measures they follow (Bayraklı, 2015, p.84). Al-Farabi divides these cities, which have many differences in their understanding, primarily into virtuous and non-virtuous cities or perfect and uninformed ones in a way that means the same.

4.1.1. The Virtuous City

Practical philosophy is the weight point of Al-Farabi's system, and practical philosophy is politics. The ultimate goal of all theoretical and practical endeavors in philosophy is to make a person happy. Because happiness is the only purpose of creation. But man is an incomplete being in his natural state. In order for him to be virtuous and thus happy, he needs (philosophical) knowledge, to do the behaviors that this knowledge requires, a virtuous society under the leadership of a virtuous president, in which he can win and reveal these behaviors (Çilingir, 2009, p.45).

According to Al-Farabi, it is possible for the people of a city to come together to achieve good or evil goals. Achieving happiness is not possible in every city. To express the city where happiness and perfection can be achieved, Al-Farabi uses the concept of Madina Fadila, which means a virtuous, perfect city. According to him, the Madina Fadila:

So a city where people aim to help each other for what is achieved with them in a true sense is a virtuous, perfect city (Madina Fadila); a society that helps people to each other to achieve happiness is a virtuous, perfect society. A nation in which all cities help each other for what happiness is achieved with them is a virtuous, perfect nation. In the same way, a virtuous, perfect universal state occurs only when all the nations it contains help each other to achieve happiness (Ârâ, p.98).

When Al-Farabi talks about, excellent (virtuous) societies, the biggest communities coming together of all nations that can occur with a world state that is formed by one large, medium formed by the coming together of a single nation, a nation on the land of the residence of a single town that occurs when society returns the name of the small community of people come together. Smaller societies than the last one, units such as villages or neighborhoods are far from perfect. The ultimate good and perfection are unattainable in a society smaller than the city (Ârâ, p.98). Al-Farabi links the fact that ‘medium’ and large societies can be “Fadil” to the fact that small societies are Fadil. In a sense, from small societies with virtue, a large society with virtue is formed (Bayraklı, 2015, p.84). In Al-Farabi’s theory, the virtuous city, which is considered the smallest unit after the virtuous nation and the virtuous international state, is a model of society in which philosophy is realized through (virtuous) religion, which is an opening at the human-social level, becomes *bi’l-fiil* and finds existence (Korkut, 2018, p.187). According to Al-Farabi, what the people of the virtuous city should know is:

1. Knowing the first reason and its definitions
2. To know things that are independent of matter, the definitions and orders of each of them that are unique to him – until the active mind - and again the actions that are unique to each of them
3. Knowing the celestial essences and the characteristics of each of them
4. The natural bodies beneath them, how they come to exist and go to absence, everything that occurs in them occurs in accordance with the order, perfection, grace, justice, and wisdom; knowing that there is no possibility, lack, or injustice in them in any form
5. Knowing the arrival of man to existence, how the forces of the soul are formed, how the active mind sends and illuminates a light on them in a way that the first mental, will and ability to choose will appear
6. The first ruler and knowing how the revelation occurred
7. Knowing the managers who should replace him if he is not available at any time
8. The virtuous city, its people, the happiness that the souls of these people will reach, the cities that are opposite to the virtuous city, the situations that their souls will encounter after death, the virtuous nations, and the nations that are opposite to them (Ârâ, p.117).

4.1.1.1. The Virtuous Ruler

Al-Farabi first looks for the virtue of the virtuous state in the rulers. As long as the administrators are good, the public will be good. In this regard, Al-Farabi considers ‘unity and togetherness’ among the characteristics of the Fadil State. He even wants it not enough, and

also wants it to be continuous (Bayraklı, 2015, p.85). Al-Farabi likens the virtuous, perfect city to a full and healthy body, where all organs help each other to make the life of the living being complete and to keep it in this state. He mentions a similar hierarchy between the organs of the body and among the people in the city, which he likens to the relationship between the organs of the body, as in his cosmology associated with the hierarchy of being. (Ârâ, p.99) For this reason, Al-Farabi likens the relationship of people and rulers in the virtuous city to the relationship between the organs of the body and the heart. As the heart is the first organ and manager of the body, it is also the reason why other organs occur in the order of being. It is also the reason why the disorder is eliminated when one of these organs is broken. Like this, the city's manager can establish a resemblance to the heart. The ruler of the city also comes to existence first, and he depends on parts of the city, the angels of the will of these parts occur, and their appearance in their own order of being. He's the one who'll fix the disruption that will occur in the part of the city (Ârâ, p.100). Entities that are lower in the entity hierarchy follow the first cause. But since each being can do this in its own capacity, it does so in relation to an entity that is superior to itself. Each order follows one of its own, and in accordance with the order, they all imitate the first cause. Just as they imitate the purpose of the first cause, the virtuous city must imitate the purpose of its first rulers with all parts (Ârâ, p.101). In this respect, it is the first condition of a virtuous ruling city that the city is virtuous. According to Al-Farabi, governing (*riyasa*) is primarily based on two things: a) That person must be appointed to rule in terms of his creation and nature, b) That person must have acquired the will and attitudes about management (Ârâ, p.102). These, on the other hand, will develop and appear in a person who, by their nature, is ready for government.

4.1.1.1.1. Qualities of the Virtuous Ruler

Al-Farabi defines a virtuous ruler as a person who cannot be ruled by another person, has achieved perfection, has become *bi'l-fiil* intellect and *bi'l-fiil* intellect, *muhayyile* force

has reached the last place of perfection, and therefore has become ready to take events and reason from the active mind when he is asleep or awake by his nature (Ârâ, p.102-103).

Because his passive intellect (*akl munfa'il*) understood all the intellects, he reached perfection and became *bi'l-fiil* intellect, *bi'l-fiil* mental. Because any person whose passive intellect perfects as a result of his understanding of all the mental, and thus becomes *bi'l-fiil* intellect and *bi'l-fiil* mental, so much so that the intellect become one and the same thing in him, wins *bi'l-fiil* intellect, which is superior to the passive intellect in order, more perfect than it, more independent of matter. This intellect is called the acquired intellect, and it is at the middle point between the passive intellect and the active intellect. There is nothing else between him and the active intellect. So the passive intellect is like the substance and carrier of the acquired intellect. Of course, the mental force, which is a skill, and the passive intellect, which is a *bi'l-fiil* intellect, acts as the substance that carries it (Ârâ, p.103). According to Al-Farabi, the first order in which a person becomes a person is the emergence of an accepting, receptive, natural talent ready to become a *bi'l-fiil* intellect. There are two orders between this ability and the active intellect, which are common to all humans. These are the fact that the passive intellect is a *bi'l-fiil* intellect and the acquired intellect is formed (Ârâ, p.103).

He defines the person with active intellect as follows:

The substance of the passive intellect, passive intellect substance of acquired intellect, acquired intellect made the active intellect's substance, and all this is treated as the same thing, this person becomes the person to whom the active intellect descends (Ârâ, p.103).

When this situation arises in the parts of theoretical (*nazari*) and practical (*ameli*), two parts of his mental force, and in the faculty of imagination (*muhayyile*), this person becomes the person who comes to him with Revelation, and God sends down revelation to him through the active intellect. What is overflowing from God to the active intellect passes from the

active intellect to the passive intellect through the acquired intellect, and then to the faculty of imagination. Because of what is overflowing from active intellect to passive intellect, man becomes a wise, philosopher, an excellent thinker who uses a divine qualified intellect, while with what is overflowing from active intellect to faculty of imagination, the Prophet becomes a Warner who informs the future and a Warner who informs about the already existing ticks (Ârâ, p.104). According to Al-Farabi, only such a person can be a ruler. At the highest level of humanity and at the highest level of happiness, this person seems to have become one with active intellect. This person is the one who is the foundation for every action that happiness can be achieved with him. Al-Farabi sees this as the first condition of being a ruler. In addition, there must be the power to portray what they know in the best way in the imagination of others. He must have the power to lead people to happiness. For actions related to war, he also has to be solid as a body. According to Al-Farabi, only such a person is the imam, the first president of the virtuous city, the ruler of the virtuous nation, and the ruler of the entire inhabited world (Ârâ, p.104).

One of the qualities that Al-Farabi uses as one of the qualities of both the philosopher-prophet and the philosopher-king is the imam. The content that the philosopher loads on the term imam exceeds the dimensions of the definitions made up to his era, both in religious and political terms; in a way, the philosopher redefines the term imam in terms of his own system (Korkut, 2018, p.311):

As for the meaning of the imam's word in Arabic, he only shows someone who is followed by an example and is well accepted; that is, either his maturity is well accepted, or his purpose is well accepted. If he is not well accepted in all, infinite works, virtues and arts, then he is not really well accepted. Every time he seeks to achieve all other arts, virtues and deeds with his purpose alone, nothing else, his art becomes the strongest art, his

(moral) virtue becomes the strongest virtue, his thought becomes the strongest thought, his knowledge becomes the highest science. Because with all these forces, he will have abused the power of others to fulfill his purpose. This is not possible without the natural sciences, without the greatest of all the virtues of thinking, and without the other things found in the philosopher. It has been explained that the meaning of the philosopher, the supreme president, the king, the lawman and the imam is only one meaning (Tahsîl, p.72-73).

According to Al-Farabi, only a person can achieve this situation by combining the twelve natural characteristics that he has been given at birth in his personality. These twelve features are as follows:

1. Complete and full in terms of organs.
2. He must have the ability to understand and grasp everything that is said by his nature.
3. He must have the ability to keep in his mind what he understands, sees, hears, understands (*Hifz*).
4. He has to be alert and very intelligent, and when he sees the slightest thing about something, he has to grasp that evidence in the direction that evidence points.
5. He must have the ability to speak beautifully, which can allow him to express something in his mind with complete clarity.
6. He must love to learn, get knowledge (*Ta'allum*).

7. By his nature, he must love righteousness (*siddk*) and righteous people and hate lies and liars.

8. He should be someone who by his nature does not pursue food, drink and sexual pleasures, does not desire them, should avoid gambling, and should hate the pleasures arising from such things.

9. He must be high-spirited (*kabir al-nafs*), he must love honor, greatness, his soul must of course against ugly and despicable things, he must rise to the highest of things.

10. Earthly things like silver, gold, and so on must be worthless things in his view.

11. By his nature, he loves justice, and fair people hate oppression and violence and those perform such things, have mercy on people, direct people to be such, pity to people who are exposed to pressure, good, true, noble and support everything in sight, to be fair, when invited to the application of justice not stubborn or reluctant to perform in doing that, on the contrary, when asked to do injustice and evil he resistant, stable and should be willing to the good.

12. He must be determined about what he considers necessary to be done, and perform it boldly without showing fear and weakness (Ârâ, p.105).

Virtuous government has two types: first government and government subject to first government. The first government is the government that turns ignorant forms of life into virtuous forms of life in the city and places virtuous forms of life and angels. The first ruler provides them. The government that is subject to the first is the government that follows the

first government in its actions. The ruler of this government is called the ruler (Reisu's-Sunnah), subject to tradition (Mille, p.46).

In the ruler who comes after the first rulers, that is, in the ruler who is subject to tradition, these twelve characteristics must come together from his birth and childhood, and after he grows up, he must have the following six special themes:

1. He must be a philosopher.
2. He must know, maintain the laws, rules, procedures that the first rulers express for the city and governed the city with themselves, and follow in the footsteps of these rulers in all their actions.
3. In a matter where the laws of the old have not been recorded, new laws must be superior to inference and enacted by following their paths.
4. The first rulers should have the power of reasoning and a superior practical mind (*raviyya*) to make correct judgments about events and things that arise at any time after them when it is not possible for them to make any laws about them.
5. The first rulers should have the superiority to inform the public with words and guide them about the new laws that they have adopted by following their path.
6. Whether a servant or a ruler is involved in martial arts, he must be physically strong to perform acts of war as a master in both (Ârâ, p.106).

Because it is difficult to come across a person with all these characteristics, Al-Farabi says that if such a person is found in the virtuous city and fulfills six of these conditions or

five of them other than the ability to warn people through faculty of imagination, this person will be the ruler. If such a person is not found, he states that if the virtuous city has previously had virtuous rulers who follow each other incessantly, the laws, rules, and Customs established by these rulers should be adopted and maintained (Ârâ, p.106).

4.1.1.1.1. Relationship between Religion and Philosophy in the Creation of The First Ruler's Virtuous Society

There is a close bond between the being virtuous of the first ruler and whether society is virtuous or not. Because, according to Al-Farabi, religion is something conceived by the first ruler. Religion according to Al-Farabi:

Religion/‘mille’ is a set of opinions and actions defined and limited by certain conditions that design them as their first ruler for society. He wants to achieve a certain goal that he foresees by their application, in them or through them (Mille, p.16).

A virtuous religion is formed under the following conditions:

If the first ruler is virtuous, and his rule is virtuous in the true sense, he aims nothing but to bring both himself and those under his rule to the last happiness, which is happiness in the true sense, with what he has designed (as a religion), and this religion becomes a virtuous religion (Mille, s.16).

If the ruler is uninformed, by what he has designed as a religion, society will target one or more false favors such as health, pleasure, honor, wealth, which are considered good and happiness that will not achieve true happiness (Mille, s.17). Al-Farabi, who gave an important place to religion and philosophy in the formation of the virtuous City, explains the connection between religion and philosophy as follows:

Religion becomes an extremely good, correct religion when it is subject to a mature philosophy after all the comparative arts are separated from each other according to the style and order we describe. But if philosophy has not yet become completely precise (burhani), on the contrary, its views have been confirmed by sophistic means, it is not impossible to find views that are all, most or most of them are wrong and not noticed, and it becomes a distorted (zanni) philosophy. If a religion is followed by this philosophy, there are many false views in it. When many of these false views are taken and replaced by their parables - indeed, religion does so in things that are difficult to imagine for the public - this religion becomes a corrupt religion that is further from the truth, but its disorder is not noticed. Even worse, after that, a legislator does not come and take the views in his religion from the philosophy of his time, but rather, he sees the views expressed in the first religion as the truth and takes their examples and teaches these examples to the public....In this case, true religion can only occur in a nation where religion is formed in the first style. A corrupt religion occurs in a nation where religion is formed in the second style. But religion in two styles occurs only after philosophy: either after the exact philosophy that is actually philosophy, or after the distorted philosophy that is supposed to be philosophy, even though it is not actually philosophy (Huruf, p.187-188).

4.1.2. Cities without Virtue

Al-Farabi's theory of virtuous cities follows the line in virtuous city teaching. In a way, the philosopher returns to the fields of ontology, physics and psychology in the name of cities without virtue. This phenomenon allows the philosopher to reconstruct the integrity of philosophy, religion, and Medina in a way with its corrupt derivatives. Corrupt beliefs and

opinions arise from corrupt/false philosophy, from which virtuous actions and societies appear (Korkut, 2018, p.368). Al-Farabi classifies “Madinah” according to certain criteria. We see that they are named according to the structure of ideas in states, understanding of justice, economic structure, relationship between rulers and the people, social life and other measures they follow (Bayraklı, 2015, p.84). The second teacher examined the cities without virtue under four main headings, primarily in the form of ignorant cities, wicked cities, transformed cities(*mubaddala*), and heretical cities (*dalle*); ignorant cities are examined in six titles: city of necessity (*zaruriyye*), city of wealth (*hisse*) or (*beddale/nezzale*) city, city of vulgarity (*hassa*) or fondness (*sukut*), timocracy (*kerramiyye*), tyranny (*tagallub*) and democratic city (*jamaiyye*) (Korkut, 2018, p.367).

4.1.2.1. The Cities of Ignorance

An ignorant city is a city whose people do not know happiness, and will not understand it, even if it is illuminated about happiness. What they know well is that they are apparently good and think they will bring happiness; physical health, wealth, lustful pleasures, freedom to pursue one's own desires, respect, and reputation are things that are considered the purpose of life. For the people of the ignorant city, the greatest happiness is the sum of them. Disease, poverty, lack of pleasure, lack of freedom to pursue desires, and lack of respect and reputation are the evils that are the opposite of them (Ârâ, p.107).

Ignorant cities are divided into six in terms of what their people consider valuable and help each other to achieve. Ignorant cities:

A. The city of necessity is a city where its people are content with the amount of food, drink, clothing, home, and sexual relations that are necessary for the continuation of the existence of their bodies and help each other to achieve this goal.

B. The city of wealth is a city where its people help each other to obtain wealth and richness.

C. The city of vulgarity (*hassa*) and lust (*sukut*), where the purpose of its people is to enjoy food, drink, sexual intercourse, especially things related to the senses and imagination, and to pursue entertainment and games in all forms, in all ways.

D. The city of honor (*karama*), where its people help each other to gain fame among nations, praise, respect with words and deeds, see reputation and gain honor and respect, whether in the eyes of other people or among themselves.

E. The city of power (*tagallub*), whose purpose is to dominate others, to prevent others from dominating themselves, the pleasure they will receive from dominating the city.

F. The city of democracy (*cime'iyya*) city whose purpose is to do what it wants freely without blocking desires in anything (Ârâ, p.108, Siyâse, p.103).

4.1.2.1.1. The Cities of Necessity

Al-Farabi says that there is something in common between this city and the virtuous city. This common point is cooperation. But the things they help are different. The people of the city of necessity help with their mandatory needs, and the people of the city of virtue help to achieve virtue, which is the main necessity in human life. The people of the city of necessity consider the person who is most successful in terms of ability, measures and fulfilling what is necessary to meet their mandatory needs to be the most superior person. And the person they find worthy of being a ruler is someone who knows how to work the people to meet mandatory needs, who manages well, who can protect what is necessary for them, and who generously gives the needs of the people (Siyâse, p.103-104).

4.1.2.1.2. The City of Wealth

According to the people of the city of wealth, the one who has advanced in wealth and is most skilled in obtaining wealth is the one who is the most superior. Their ruler is the one

who governs the people well in the acquisition of wealth and protects their wealth (Siyâse, p.104).

4.1.2.1.3. The City of Depravity and Baseness

The people of the city of vulgarity consider the person who has the most resources for play and pleasure to be the best and most envious. For them, this city is a happy city. They see the purpose of the city as the acquisition of mandatory needs and wealth and the expenditure of these gains (Siyâse, p.104).

4.1.2.1.4. The City of Honor

According to the people of the city of honor, being worthy of honor is the best thing. Being worthy, on the other hand, depends not on virtue, but on wealth, the abundance of resources of pleasure and play, the attainment of the mandatory needs of life, or being useful to others in these three issues. Another important thing is to establish sovereignty over others. In the eyes of their people, being recognized for what he considered to be honorable and supporters held sway over an area of strong and numerous, or all of them together to avoid the domination of others, because they exist, and they don't hurt themselves when he wants someone else to cause harm to someone else. According to the people of this city, a person is worthy of honor with them. However, being noble is also considered an honorable thing because it brings with it these things and because it has ancestors who ignore death or have beautiful or persistent ancestors. In the city of honor, if honor is based on kinship, the lineage of its rulers must be superior to others, and if it is based on wealth, he must be the richest. People who are rich and not noble cannot be a ruler and are not considered honorable (Siyâse, p.106-107).

4.1.2.1.5. The City of Power

A tyrant city is a community in which its people cooperate with each other to obtain sovereignty. Some want sovereignty to shed blood, some to obtain property, and some to make others slaves. Their goal is to defeat others, to humiliate them, and to ensure that those who are defeated have no power. The people of this city are the enemy of everyone but themselves. And their ruler is the one who best works the people to establish sovereignty over others, the most cunning person among them, and the one who has the healthiest views to maintain sovereignty (Siyâse, p.103-104).

Al-Farabi divides this form of the state into three, classifying it according to its goals:

- a. Pleasure State: whether it is half or all of the people of the city of this people; it does not aim to kill someone else and destroy him. Their goal is more than victory. For the sake of this, they may have harmed those he couldn't take advantage of. They aim to achieve pleasure, and they want to triumph over vile things.
- b. Praise State: the people of this state do not care about simple things. Their desire for victory comes from being worthy of praise. And if they achieve that which is to be boasted without suffering, they do not prefer grief.
- c. Tyrant State: the people of this state cannot satisfy their own needs. For this reason, there are changes in their psychology. Changes are also reflected in their behavior (Bayraklı, 2015, p.109-110).

When this state becomes a state of tyrants, the people love greatness, not for their own, but rather to achieve wealth. In order to achieve wealth, he wants someone else to treat him. He desires the submission of the people for the sake of achieving wealth. Now all pleasures and entertainments have been replaced by the passion for wealth. Most want wealth for fun and pleasure (Bayraklı, 2015, p.110).

4.1.2.1.6. The Democratic City

Although a Democratic city is considered among ignorant cities, virtuous people can grow in this city over time because it combines different cultures, different ideas, different forms of education, and upbringing. There may be people who will make up parts of the virtuous city. Compared to other ignorant cities, the highest level of good and evil is found in this city. As the city expands, good and evil multiply to that extent (Siyâse, p.118). Therefore, among the ignorant cities, the state closest to the virtuous city and available to turn into it is the Democratic city (Bayraklı, 2015, p.110).

In a Democratic city, everyone is free to do what they want, and there is no inequality between people. No one is superior to the other in one matter. The moral behavior, desires, and tastes of the people of this city are diverse. People form many communities that are similar and different from each other. Different classes living separately in other cities come together in this city. Although the people do not have what is found in rulers, they have authority over it. There's no difference between a ruler and a ruled (Siyâse, p.117). Al-Farabi states that:

According to them, those who are praised and honored are those who convey the people of the city to freedom and achieve their desires, protect freedom and their changing desires against each other and their external enemies, and are content only with desires related to mandatory needs. These are the honored among them, the Exalted in might, and the obeyed. As for any ruler who is excluded from them, he is either equal to them or inferior to them. If he provides them with what they need and want, he will be equal to them (Siyâse, p.117).

Al-Farabi says that all the efforts and goals of uninformed cities are found in this city in the most competent form and most often. In addition, the most coveted city of all cities is the democratic city. Al-Farabi likens this city to an ornate garment with colorful figures and embroidery on its exterior. Everyone loves this city and wants to live in this city, as there are no desires and wills that are not met for people. Due to migration, the city expands immeasurably (Siyâse, p.117-118).

According to the people of this city, the virtuous ruler is a person who is cautious in fulfilling the various wishes and desires of the people, protects them against enemies, does not touch their property, and is content only with what is mandatory for him. But they do not bring a truly virtuous manager to the presidency, even if somehow such a person is a ruler, he will either be kicked out of his position or killed, or his administration will be shaken. However, compared to other ignorant cities, the city of necessity and democratic cities are more likely to be dominated by a virtuous ruler (Siyâse, p.117-119).

4.1.2.2. The Wicked City

A corrupt city is a city whose actions are the same as the actions of an ignorant city, although their ideas are the same as the ideas of a virtuous city, they know God, second-order sacred beings, active minds, and everything that needs to be known to the people of a virtuous city (Siyâse, p.108). Even if citizens believe in the principles of public assets, believe that happiness is what happiness is and directed towards affairs forwarding them happiness, because they don't cling to these things and want the purpose of any of the uninformed cities, because they directed all their actions to this position, honor, sovereignty, etc. because they desire to achieve any of their goals, they can never achieve happiness (Siyâse, p.122).

4.1.2.3. The Transformed City

According to Al-Farabi's statements, the virtuous city is a type of city that has passed in its place by changing and transforming its beliefs, acts, and laws. Thus, instead of the principles of true happiness, the principles of false happiness prevailed among the members of this city (Korkut, 2018, p.443).

Al-Farabi refers to it as:

A city whose character has changed (*mubaddala*) is a city whose ideas and actions used to be the same as the ideas and actions of a virtuous city, but have changed over time and left their place to different actions and ideas (Siyâse, p.108).

4.1.2.4. The (Deviant) City That Is in the Wrong Views

Al-Farabi leaves this state to the end in the state classification. He didn't do it by chance. When he considers each state according to the ideas and behaviors of its people, he also examines and names that state according to its ideas. His later treatment is that the currents of ideas in other states have become sects in this state. In other words, as of time, this state is formed later (Bayraklı, 2015, p.119). According to Al-Farabi, cities that are ignorant and in the wrong opinion (*dall*) are cities whose religion is born out of the wrong ideas of the ancients (Ârâ, p.121).

The first ruler of the city, who has not found the right path, who is in the wrong opinions (*dalla*), is someone who claims that the revelation has landed on him, even though it is not true. Although they aim for happiness after life on earth, it is a city that has false and useless views, although they treat it as higher beings of the second order, active mind, and symbols of true happiness (*tamassulat*) and imaginations (Siyâse, p.109). Happiness offered to the people of the perverted city is not an imitation of happiness other than true happiness.

They can't achieve happiness with actions and opinions that are correctly presented to them (Siyâse, p.122). According to Al-Farabi, if a religion does not include what makes it possible for a person to achieve precise knowledge either through his person or through evidence, as well as an example of what makes it possible to achieve precise knowledge of an object in one of two ways, theoretical or practical, this religion is heretical (Mille, p.24). The religion believed by the people of the heretical city is also such a religion.



5. THE CONCEPT OF VIRTUE IN AL-FARABI

According to Al-Farabi, man is not created in such a way as to be perfect by birth, but the reason for man's existence is to achieve happiness and to take virtuous actions to achieve it. "The body is for the soul, and the soul is for happiness, which is the last perfection, that is, virtue. So the soul is for wisdom and virtue" (Fusûl, p.124)¹³.

Before revealing what virtue is in Al-Farabi's system of thought, it is worth considering the relationship between philosophy and virtue in order to indicate how much he cares about this issue. In his treatise *Fima yenbağî en yukaddeme kable te'allümi 'l-felsefe* (topics that need to be known before learning philosophy), Al-Farabi draws attention to the need to have theoretical knowledge as well as the need to be morally competent. Al-Farabi, who has studied the views of previous philosophers on this issue, gives an opinion in favor of morality as to which of the topics of geometry, physics, logic and morality should come first before starting to learn philosophy. According to him, "before starting the science of philosophy, it is necessary to improve morality by defeating the lustful feelings of the soul in order for desires and desires to turn only to virtue." (Felsefe, p.113)¹⁴. Stating that the pleasure created by material pleasures or superiority cannot be considered a true virtue, Al-Farabi sees virtue as a concept earned by improving morality and must be revealed not only by word but also by actions. For this reason, a person who wants to start philosophy must first develop his morality and then the power of the mind (Felsefe, p.113). Again, Al-Farabi, who shows the path that one who wants to do philosophy should follow as turning to practice, sees the last goal that needs to be achieved in practice as possible by first correcting one's own morality, and then others, then situation of those in his home and city (Felsefe, p.114). As we understand from here, according to Al-Farabi, a man without virtue cannot walk on the path of knowledge.

According to Al-Farabi, virtue is the state of the self in which a person does good things and beautiful deeds with himself. Virtues are not inherent in man. If it were so, it would be impossible to talk about preference and morality. However, according to Al-Farabi, virtue is closely related to preference. A person must also have a number of abilities to make the right choice. The virtuous person represents the ideal harmony of theoretical and practical competence; he has different types of virtues that will lead him to happiness, which is the goal of life.

5.1. Types of Virtue in Al-Farabi

According to Al-Farabi, as we discussed in the previous chapter (Al-Farabi's political philosophy), there is a close relationship between happiness and virtues. Al-Farabi divides the human things that enable the people of the city and nations to achieve world happiness in this life and the highest happiness in the next. These are: theoretical virtues, intellectual virtues, moral virtues, and practical arts (Arslan, 2018, p.1). Virtues are of two kinds: moral (hulkiyya) and mental (nutkiyye). Mental virtues are related to the mental part of the soul, and such things as intelligence, reason, and perfection of understanding. Moral virtues, on the other hand, are the virtues of the part of the soul associated with desire, and such things as chastity, genealogy, generosity, justice (Fusûl, p.53).

¹³ Al-Farabi (2017) *Fusûl'ül-Medenî* (trans. and edited by. Hanifi ÖZCAN) is mentioned as *Fusûl* in this thesis.

¹⁴ Al-Farabi (2017) *Risâle imâ yenbağî en yukaddeme kable te'allümi'l-felsefe* (trans. and edited by. Mahmut KAYA) is mentioned as *Felsefe* in this thesis.

Al-Farabi says that evil morality is a spiritual disease. The doctor's attempt to protect him when the condition in which the body is healthy, if the body is sick, he tries to eliminate

the disease, and when a person finds good morality in himself, he must resort to the path necessary to eliminate it, when he finds bad morality (Tenbîh, p.155-156). The good or virtuous person represents the ideal harmony of theoretical and practical competence and is in a diametrically opposed position with the uninformed person in this respect (Aydınlı, 2000, p.120).

5.1.1. Mental Virtues

5.1.1.1. Theoretical Virtues and Intellectual Virtues

Al-Farabi defines a person as a being of reason and bases his theory about happiness on this definition (Aydınlı, 2000, p.106). According to Farabi, the powers of the human soul are five: practical thinking, theoretical thinking, desire, imagination and sensation. Happiness, on the other hand, is known only by the power of theoretical thinking (Siyâse, p.85). The soul has a virtue corresponding to each of the theory (*an-nazari*) and thinking (*el-fikri*) parts. The virtue of the theoretical part is the theoretical (theoretical) mind, knowledge and wisdom. The virtue of the intellectual part is practices (practical) reason, wisdom (*et-ta'akkul*), mind, the perfection of ideas and accuracy of opinion (*zan*) (Fusûl, p.70).

According to Al-Farabi, theoretical virtues are sciences whose final goal is to ensure that beings and what they contain are understood only by reason. Some of these sciences are the information that a person has from the very beginning without knowing where it came from. Al-Farabi says that these are the first pieces of information, some of which are acquired through thinking research inference, as well as through teaching and learning. According to Al-Farabi, the first things known are the first predecessors. Some of it is achieved through research, inference, teaching and learning (Fusûl, p.70). When things that are initially vague and want to be achieved by research and teaching are considered by these methods, they turn into a problem, and then into a result when a belief, opinion or knowledge about them is

formed through inference and learning (Tahsîl, p.1-2). Al-Farabi explains the virtues of the theoretical part, the theoretical intellect, knowledge and wisdom as follows:

Theoretical is not by reason, research and comparison, but by birth, principles of the sciences, the complex essential antecedents (*al-muqaddamat*), for example, are larger than the whole piece, the amounts equal to a certain amount are equal to each other, and the exact knowledge of the like is an ability (force) that occurs for him.

Knowledge (*al-Ilm*), the existence and continuation of the entity the existence of entities that are never dependent on human contribution, what each of them is, one of the necessary and complex correct antecedents- it is the formation of certainty in the soul (*al-yakin*) about how to obtain information about them from the evidence consisting of the first principles that have certainty in themselves and are inherent in the mind as knowledge.

Wisdom (*rest*) is the existence of all other beings and the knowledge of distant causes that cause the existence of close causes of things that have a cause. Thanks to the wisdom that enables us to know how the first one and all beings receive being, body reality and unity from him; what each of them has a share in being, reality and together, and the meaning of other things (*Fusûl*, p.70-73).

According to Farabi, intellectual virtue is the virtue that allows a person to have the power to perfectly reveal what is most useful for a virtuous purpose that one or more nations or cities have in common in a state of common necessity (*Fusûl*, p.123). Intellectual virtues are practical intellect, practical wisdom, mind, the perfection of ideas, and correctness of opinion (*zan*). If we briefly consider the types of intellectual virtues, then:

Practical intellect is a trait that is a means for a person to get some antecedents (*al-muqaddamat*) that make it possible for a person to take into account the theory, which should be preferred or avoided in individual things within our power, from the experience of most things and the long observation of things that are felt (*el-eşya'el-mahsusa*).

Practical wisdom (*et-ta'akkul*) whether happiness, something that is necessary to achieve happiness, for a human really big favor, virtuous and honorable purpose of what is being done to bring about the best things uncovering the power of thinking is most perfect and excellent.

The mind is the power to find the right decision on the issue in which the usual views conflict, and the ability to correct them. And this is perfection in extracting the right opinion.

The correct opinion (*ez-zannu's-savab*) is that every time a person observes something, his opinion always finds the correctness of the impossibility of that thing being observed to be otherwise than it is (Siyâse, p.70).

According to Al-Farabi, the soul has a virtue that corresponds to each of the theoretical (*al-nazari*) and intellectual (*al-fikri*) parts. The virtue of the theoretical part is theoretical reason, knowledge and wisdom. The virtue of the intellectual part is the practical intellect, wisdom (*et-Ta'akkul*), mind, the perfection of ideas and the truth of opinion (*zan*) (Siyâse, p.70).

Theoretical is not through reason, research and comparison, but by birth, the precise knowledge of the totally essential predecessors (*Al-muqaddemat*), which are the principles of science, is the force that occurs for it. An example of this is antecedents such as two things that are greater than the whole part, equal to one thing, are equal to each other (Fusûl, p.70).

Al-Farabi says that these are things that man has come to know of other theoretical beings that are in a state of existence, starting with themselves, without making them human. The theoretical intellect sometimes becomes the intellect when these first principles do not occur in themselves. And when they occur in it, they become the intellect itself. These are information that would not otherwise be possible, so it is certain (Fusûl, p.71).

Many things are called knowledge. Al-Farabi puts forward knowledge as the virtue of the theoretical part as follows:

Knowledge, existence and continuation of existence, which is a virtue of the theoretical part, the existence of beings that are never dependent on human contribution; essential from true premises and with whom - found certainty in itself and innate information (*m'alumeten*) in mind first principles proofs of (information about them) how it was obtained about being in certainty (Al-yakin) to you. This information is two parts: the first is information that has certainty about the existence of something, the reason for its existence, and that neither it nor its cause can be different in one way or another. Second, it is the knowledge that has certainty about the existence of something and that it cannot be different, without focusing on the reason for its existence (Fusûl, p.71).

Intellectual virtue is a virtue that is a means for a person to have the power to perfectly reveal what is most useful for a virtuous purpose that one or more nations or cities have jointly in a common state of necessity (Fusûl, p.123).

According to Al-Farabi, practical intellect is a skill (*kuvve*), which is a means of obtaining some antecedents that make it possible for a person to consider theoretical, which

should be preferred or avoided in individual things within our power, from the experience of most things and the long observation of sensed things (Fusûl, p.73). *Bi'l - kuvve* is the intellect unless the action of the mind occurs. When experience is found and remembered, it becomes the *bi'l-fiil* intellect, and this mind increases with the increase of experience in a person's life (Fusûl, p.74).

Al-Farabi defines practical wisdom(*et-ta 'akkul*) whether happiness or something necessary to achieve happiness as an excellent power of thinking for a human as big goodness, virtuous and honorable purpose of what is being done to bring about the best things. He sees intelligence as the power to reveal the most superior and the best as the perfect to achieve some lesser good. Cunning, the wealth that is thought to be good, is the power of right thinking in uncovering what is most perfect and best for a great amount of pleasure or honor to be realized (Fusûl, p.74).

5.1.2. Moral Virtues and Virtuous Moderate

According to Al-Farabi, the competence of the physical body of man is like the competence of morality. A person's bodily competence consists of health. Just as protection of health should be earned when it is not available, good morality should be protected when it is available and earned when it is not available. For example, eating, drinking, fatigue will achieve health when they are in the middle state, and actions that create good morality also create virtue when they are in the middle state. (Tenbîh, p.152)

According to Al-Farabi, actions that are good are moderate and fiduciary actions between two extremes, as one extreme one missing but both bad. Virtues are similar. For example, moderation in food is middle between gluttony, which is too extreme, the other is middle between lack of taste, generosity is middle between stinginess and waste, courage is middle between assertiveness and cowardice, wit is middle between ridicule and stagnation.

Humility is a medium between arrogance and submission, between pride in kindness, between self-superiority and self-humiliation, between soft temper, between extreme anger and not being angry at anything, between shamelessness and boredom and friendship is a medium between sullenness and flattery. (Fusûl, p.58-59)

Al-Farabi says that we should be careful not to fall on the side that looks like the middle, since the middle is between the two ends, and it is possible to find the one that looks like the middle at these ends. Thoughtless rage is like courage, waste is like generosity, clowning is like wit, flattery is like friendship, vulgarity is like humility, contrived is like loyalty. With respect to essence, one should be careful not to move away from the middle since the things that a person is inclined to are located at these ends. (Tenbîh, p.157) The most important thing to avoid is that it turns out that we are prone to it from both ends. Al-Farabi sees as pleasure what we have to use from one end to the other, or as a means that makes it easier for us to be attracted to the middle. (Tenbîh, p.157). Because we think that pleasure is a goal in every action and we seek it in everything we do, it is easy for us to do evil but because of the pleasure we hope to get by doing it, avoiding good comes only when we think about the harm we will see from it (Tenbîh, p.158).

5.1.2.1. Types of Moral Virtues

As mentioned earlier, virtues are of two kinds: moral (*hulkiyya*) and mental (*nutkiyye*). Mental virtues are related to the mental part of the soul, and such things as intelligence, wisdom, and perfection of understanding. (Fusûl, p.53) Moral virtues, on the other hand, are the virtues of the soul's part about desire. These can be sorted as follows:

A- Courage: situations that are the two ends of this good morality, obtained by a situation that is intermediate between performing and avoiding scary things, extremism, lack of thoughtless rage, and cowardice.

B- Generosity: it is a virtue that occurs in the middle situation between storing and spending money. Excessiveness in spending money and lack of spending creates excess in spending and lack in hiding is a waste.

C- Chastity: it is a medium in performing pleasures related to food and sexuality. Excessive pleasure causes gluttony, while lack of pleasure leads to the absence of a sense of pleasure.

D- Sens of humor: it is a virtue that occurs in a situation that is moderate in joking. It is appropriate for a free, cheerful, and kind person to do or say. The excess of this situation and the lack of clowning lead to shyness.

E- Loyalty: this is a virtue that occurs when a person tells the truth about himself and makes a habit of telling himself what belongs to him without exaggerating himself too much. Vulgarly, deceit, and hypocrisy occur when a person makes a habit of describing himself with good traits that do not belong to him.

F- Friendship: this is a virtue that occurs in a situation that is moderate when a person meets someone else with a word and actions that pleases them. Extremism and lack of flattery lead to shyness (Tenbîh, p.154-155).

According to Al-Farabi, all the moral virtues include the following: justice (*al- 'adele*) (Fusûl, p.53), courage (*eş-şecâ 'a*), generosity (*es-sehâ*) chastity (*el- 'iffe*), playfulness (*ez-zarf*), accuracy (*sıdku'l-insân*), friendship (*et-teveddud*) (Tenbîh, p.154-155), humility (*et-tevâzu'*), dignity (*el-hurriyye ve'l-kerem*), gentleness (*e- hilm*), modesty (*al-haya*). (Fusûl, p.59)

5.1.2.2. Moral Virtues and Habit

Al-Farabi says that all moral qualities, good or bad, are acquired later. It is possible that a person becomes virtuous or non-virtuous over time. Habit, that is, with a long and frequent repetition of something being done, a person either wins morality or gets away from it. Good morality and bad morality are the results of habit (Tenbîh, p.151). According to Al-Farabi, moral virtues occur and settle in the nave by repeated and acclimatizing actions born of a certain temperament. If these things that settle in the soul are good, virtue is bad, it is a moral disorder. Al-Farabi likens this situation to the art of writing. When we repeat the verb of writing over and over again, we become accustomed to it, and the art of writing occurs and settles in us. If the writing actions that we make a habit of repeating our bad actions, if we write bad and if they are good actions, then the habit of writing good settles. This is how virtuous or non-virtuous behavior settles (Fusûl, p.54).

A person is not a born weaver or clerk, nor does he have a born with or without virtue. But if there is no external force working in the opposite direction, man will do what is easy for him. It is also possible that some things are naturally easier for a person to come to, that is, prone to virtue or humiliation due to predisposition. However, we cannot talk about the innate tendency towards the action of weaving as weaving, and these natural tendencies are not called virtues. Of course, talent tends to actions related to virtue until there is a situation in which actions related to virtue will occur from itself in the soul, and if these actions become a habit by repeating them, it is possible to refer to this situation as a virtue. Praise and resentment of a person are also due to the situation caused by habit (Fusûl, p.54).

According to Al-Farabi, some of the situations and natural abilities that tend to be virtuous or inferior can be destroyed and replaced by habit by placing opposite situations on them in their place. Some of them can be broken without being destroyed, while others can neither be destroyed, replaced, nor reduced in strength. But a person can resist them by

resisting them until they constantly do the opposite of their actions, and by distracting the soul from their actions (Fusûl, p.56-57).

According to Al-Farabi, the thought of bad things as good things occurs when people's soul is sick. Sick bodies think pain is sweet, sweet is bitter because of the deterioration of the senses, and they imagine something that is harmful to health, something that is beneficial to health, and bad and defective people think that when their souls are sick, bad actions are good, good actions are bad. A virtuous person with moral virtues, on the other hand, always desires goals that are really good and makes them his goal (Fusûl, p.74-75).

5.1.2.3. Virtuous Person and Self-Depriving Person

According to Al-Farabi, evil is driven away either by virtues placed in people's souls or by people's self-deprivation (Fusûl, p.58). A person is in creation that can choose to do good or bad actions, and he can prevent himself from doing bad actions, but although a person can prevent himself from doing bad things, Al-Farabi thinks that there is a difference between a person who prevents himself from doing bad things and a virtuous person. Because the one who detains himself loves bad actions, even though he makes virtuous actions, he desires them, he fights that desire and makes the opposite of what desire encourages himself. This person does good deeds but suffers when he does them (Fusûl, p.58).

The virtuous person obeys in his actions what his condition and desire encourage him to do, and therefore does not feel pain, but does good deeds by enjoying and loving. Al-Farabi likens this situation to the difference between being patient with severe pain that hurts a person and never feels pain. Just like the God-fearing and the one who restrains his soul. A fiduciary person does only what the law requires in matters such as eating, drinking and sexuality, without wanting anything other than what the law requires. And the person who restrains himself has an extreme and contrary desire for these things. He replaces the virtuous

in most places because he does lawful deeds, even though he desires the opposite (Fusûl, p.57). Despite this, the virtuous person is superior to the trusting person in that he does not like bad deeds and does not want them.

5.1.2.4. The Way to Reach Virtuous Moderation and Types of Pleasures

There are two kinds of pleasures: depending on sensible (*al- mahsus*) and understandable (*al-mefhum*). Pleasures received from what is heard, seen, tasted, touched, or smelled depend on what is sensed; some pleasures, such as pleasures received from things such as leadership, dominance, victory, knowledge, depending on what is understood. From the beginning of human existence, he made efforts to achieve pleasures associated with what is heard and saw them as the competence of life and the purpose of life. Some pleasures are mandatory, or the cause of something that is mandatory in the world. For example, it is nutrition that ensures human survival and reproduction that ensures its reproduction. For this reason, people thought they were the purpose of life and happiness. In addition, what is heard is more known to people and more possible to reach it. But these pleasures are an obstacle to removing a person from good things and achieving the greatest thing that allows him to achieve happiness. If a person realizes that he will lose sensory pleasure by doing what is good, he tends to move away from good. According to Al-Farabi, a person gives up these pleasures or approaches a laudable morality when he is able to get the middle one from them (Tenbîh, p.158).

A person must determine whether his bad morality is caused by extremism or lack, and put himself in the middle position. The most important way to do this is to think about the morality that you have. According to Al-Farabi, the way to know if we are revealing our morality is to see if making the action that occurs from extremism is as easy as making the action that comes from lack. If it's the same or near as easy to make them, we know we've reached the middle (Tenbîh, p.157). Al-Farabi says that if bad morality occurs from

extremism, we should familiarize ourselves with actions that occur from deficiency, if they occur due to deficiency, we should familiarize ourselves with actions that occur from extremism. As a result, the morality obtained exceeds the middle and is close to the middle without turning to the opposite, and it is necessary to continue these actions until it reaches the middle (Tenbîh, p.156). In this way, it is possible to reach the virtuous middle.

5.2. Ways to Achieve Happiness and the Power of Distinguishing Good

According to Al-Farabi, happiness is pure good. All that is useful for achieving and attaining this happiness is good; but this goodness is not from their essence, but because they are useful for happiness. Anything that blocks the path to happiness in any way is pure evil. (Siyâse, p.85). One cannot achieve happiness through situations that do not cause praise or resentment. On the contrary, situations that allow a person to achieve happiness are caused by situations that cause him to be praised or resented. A person is praised or condemned for the following three situations: the first is actions that require a person to use his physical organs, the second is things that are inconvenient to the soul, such as lust, pleasure, joy, compassion, jealousy, and the third is to distinguish it from the mind (Tenbîh, p.146).

According to Al-Farabi, bad differentiation consists either of an invalid belief in something that a person wants to know, or a weakness of the power to distinguish it to the extent that it can reach a belief in its accuracy or falsehood in the face of something that he encounters. Good differentiation consists in the fact that a person has reached the right conclusion or has the power to distinguish what he encounters (Tenbîh, p.147). A person performs a good action willingly, prefers good actions because they are good, and ensures that this is the case in everything he does and all his life from start to finish, leading a person to happiness. In addition, good things that are imperfect for the soul also need to be present in a person and have a good power of distinction (Tenbîh, p.148). Intention, action, a distinction must coexist.

Although people can sometimes make good distinctions in a few things by being aware, according to Al-Farabi, this is insufficient to achieve happiness. He reaches happiness from start to finish all his life and when he makes good distinctions, aware of how he distinguishes in everything he distinguishes (Tenbîh, p.148). According to Al-Farabi, every person is equipped with a power that allows their innate actions to be as required by what is wrong with their self and their distinction. Man also does good and bad deeds with this power himself. So man has the opportunity to do evil and the opportunity to do well, and good is separated from evil again by this power (Tenbîh, p.149).

A person cannot achieve the strength that is inherent in him by his effort. But distinction occurs through a person's effort. Mindpower allows a good distinction to occur, while the bad distinction is called mind weakness. The second is called morality, which means that actions or things that fail the soul are good or bad. Morality, which is a means of the occurrence of good actions, is good, and bad morality, which is a means of the occurrence of bad actions (Tenbîh, p.149). When the power of the mind becomes a skill that is difficult to disappear in itself, a good distinction can reach a level that will lead a person to happiness. Thus, good morality and the power of mind together form human virtue. In which two of these occur, man achieves competence in himself and in his actions. Thus man is good and virtuous, and the path he draws in life is virtuous, and all his actions become commendable (Tenbîh, p.150).

5.2.1. Classes of People

Al-Farabi divides people into classes according to their ability to think well and strong will. He calls those who have good thinking and strong willpower truly free people. Some people lack both. Al-Farabi calls these people animal nature and real slaves. Those who have the power to think well, but lack strong willpower, are born slaves. There are also people who lack the power to think well, although some have strong willpower. If such people do not

submit to someone who thinks instead of himself, the animal will be freed from slavery and join the freedom (Tenbîh, p.159-160). This can only be achieved through education and training.

5.2.2. Education and Training

Al-Farabi believes that education and training have an important place in the establishment of the ideal city, hence in the achievement of virtue and happiness. Education is the method of bringing moral virtues and practical arts to existence in nations, while training is the method of bringing theoretical virtues to existence. Education occurs only by word, while training occurs by creating perseverance that drives the people of the city to do actions that are the result of practical habits and these actions. This perseverance can also be infused with words and action. Through education, people must adopt these habits and the actions that arise from them, dominating the souls of people (Tahsîl, p.33).

According to Al-Farabi, theoretical knowledge should be taught to imams and rulers, or to those responsible for maintaining theoretical knowledge. These two groups are primarily pioneers and principles related to all types of theoretical sciences. In addition, they should know the various states and regulations of their predecessors. Al-Farabi states that the young people whose souls have reached this order before them should be educated with appropriate education. They must be used in all logical methods in Theoretical Sciences, follow a curriculum and acquire other habits in accordance with the plan mentioned by Plato from childhood until they reach maturity (Tahsîl, p.33-34).

Al-Farabi refers to the class in which they must undergo such an education as the class of elites (*hassa*), which should not be condemned to what the untested general opinion of the people requires. These people must be taught by persuasion until they acquire theoretical

virtues, and they must understand most theoretical things by imagination. Because theoretical things, such as final and bodily principles, are things that can only be understood with reason after knowing many things. This is because the majority of the people (*amme*) can only comprehend these principles through parables. For this reason, Al-Farabi tells every nation that it is necessary to make a distinction between what should be given to each city's people and what should be given to a special nation, to a special city or a group within a special city and not to others. All this is distinguished by intellectual virtue (Tahsîl, p.34).

Practical virtues and practical arts, on the other hand, must be acquired by the monarch and imams as a habit through persuasion or coercion. Convincing evidence uses practical virtues in the soul and evidence complete enough to arouse the determination to willingly perform actions and states of the arts. Another method, persuasion, is applied against stubborn rebels who do not behave correctly willingly or through convincing evidence from nationalities, or against people who refuse to teach theoretical knowledge to others (Tahsîl, p.35). According to Al-Farabi, the ruler is similar to the situation of the head of the family, who takes care of children and young people, who manage the household. As the head of the family shapes the character of the household, he educates them, the monarch also shapes and trains the character of the nation (Tahsîl, p.35). The other group that will be used to educate nations and cities of their own accord are people with rational virtues and arts. The monarch must seek theoretical means obtained by conclusive evidence and investigate the method of persuasion related to them. After that, examples of theoretical things should be obtained, he should ensure that these examples are dreams of common theoretical things in all nations, and he should give examples to methods of persuasion that will allow them to be accepted, and thus create examples and methods of persuasion that will be shared by all cities and nations. After that, he should determine the actions of the arts with special practical virtues, find

methods of oratory aimed at persuasion that will arouse the determination to turn to such actions in nations and cities (Tahsîl, p.36-37).

Al-Farabi bases his education system on human nature. He tries to determine the methods and purposes of education according to human nature. In this way, he shows a realistic approach to showing the place of nature and the environment in education (Bayraklı, 2015, p.164). We can say that the issue of individual differences, which modern educators also focus on, is the point of movement of Al-Farabi's understanding of education. Human nature is not the same in all individuals. He transforms according to the mental and spiritual characteristics of members (Bayraklı, 2015, p.165).

5.3. The Place of the Active Intellect on The Way to Becoming A Virtuous Person

5.3.1.Virtue, Active Intellect and Happiness

The goal in human existence is to achieve happiness, and happiness is the last competence that possible beings can accept. Happiness is made possible by the fact that the first thoughts that make up the first information are given to a person by the active mind (Siyâse, p.87). At what stage is existential competence, knowledge also has such certainty. The knowledge of the sensory world has the degree of certainty offered by the sense and experiment, while the knowledge of the sensory world (the realm below the moon) reaches the highest degree of certainty with ever-increasing certainty, God, the most competent, most obliging being that everything is overflowing with itself. Therefore, knowledge of happiness is a phenomenon determined primarily by this ontological and epistemological process (Çilingir, 2009, p.47). Al-Farabi considered active intellect as the most important factor that leads a person to happiness:

Just as the power of thinking that makes a person human is not in an action in its essence, the fact that it is a mind itself is not given to it by creation. It

is an active intellect that makes it intellect itself and makes other things think with the power to think. When the power of thinking becomes an intellect itself, this intellect, which is intrinsic at that moment, is again an intrinsic mind and is similar to things separate from matter that knows its essence. It is also the thinker who thinks of them. Then how he thinks becomes an essence that is considered just by being considered. So the one thinks how he thinks, and reason becomes one and the same thing in him. Therefore, he reaches the degree of the active intellect. When a person reaches this degree, his happiness is complete (Siyâse, p.42).

According to Al-Farabi, the process of achieving happiness is as follows:

Man knows happiness by using the principles and first knowledge given to him by the active intellect. He knows happiness and wants with the power of desire, thinks doing necessary things to acquire it with practical power and performs actions by using the tools of the power of desire revealed by acts of imagination and sensation and if his senses and imagination help him to think in his leap towards the actions necessary to achieve happiness, and if he submits, then everything that is made up of a person will be completely good. It is only in this way that willful good emerges (Siyâse, p.86).

According to Al-Farabi, the fact that man reaches the acquired level of reason with active reason also constitutes the last goal and the last state of competence in which the human being exists for himself, and this is the highest happiness (*as-saad al-quswa*) that man can achieve. According to Al-Farabi, happiness is the first and foremost phenomenon related to the rational existence of man, and at the last stage, he predicts the understanding of the ultimate truths about all that exists (Aydınlı, 2000, p.105). The last happiness for a person is

to gain the status of being similar to that of abstract beings, that is, to rise to the order of active reason (Aydın, 2000, p.106).

5.4. Virtuous Man's Attitude Towards Death

A virtuous person's attitude towards death is different from other people's attitudes. Because a virtuous person knows that death will only lose the ability to reproduce actions that are a means of increasing happiness in his life after death, his anxiety about death is different from other people. Other people worry that a great evil will reach them with death, or that they will lose the good that is in them due to death. The concern of a virtuous person is that he cannot continue his actions, which contribute to the increase of happiness. For this reason, he is never afraid of death, but he does not rush to death. He likes to survive to increase these actions. A virtuous person should also look for ways to survive for a long time because of the benefits that he can provide to the people of the city, but if his death will be more useful to the people of the city than his survival, he must run to death. Only the ignorant and ungodly people of the city worry about death. And the righteous man does not worry about it (Fusûl, p.103). Al-Farabi states that when a virtuous person dies, in order to tell the importance of a virtuous person to the people of the city, it is necessary to mourn for the people of the city, not for him (Fusûl, p.103-105).

5.5. Virtue, the Afterlife and the Last Happiness

According to Al-Farabi, happiness is superior to each other in three respects: species, quantity, and quality (Ârâ, p.119). According to Al-Farabi, the greatest and true happiness is the last happiness that will be acquired in the after death life (*as-sa'ade el-kusva*). In order for us to achieve the last happiness in the sense that Al-Farabi designed, we need to break all our bonds of being from the material and gain a competence of being that does not need it

(Aydınlı, 2000, p.107). The more a person repeats virtuous actions that serve to achieve happiness, the more superior and perfect the soul becomes. This continues until it is full of matter in terms of its perfection, and at this point, the soul becomes independent of matter, no longer needing matter to continue its existence (Ârâ, p.114).

The first competence is that a person does not only have virtue but also acts of all virtues. Al-Farabi says that this competence creates a competence that is the last happiness for us (*es-sa'ade el-kusva*), that is, the absolute good. The final competence occurs in the afterlife. Al-Farabi states that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle think that man has two lives, and that the first of these two lives depends on the continuation of existence, nutrition, and what we need today to continue our existence, while the second life is the afterlife, which is self-sufficient for the continuation of its essence, not the need for things other than itself. According to Al-Farabi, the last competence for us does not occur in this life, but in the afterlife after experiencing the first competence in this life (Siyâse, p.65).

6. THE CONCEPT OF VIRTUE IN FARABI AND ARISTOTLE

In our thesis, we searched different religious and cultural environments, which is the subject of a Muslim philosopher Al-Farabi as belonging to Aristotle's understanding of virtue and whether Al-Farabi was influenced by Aristotle's understanding of virtue, who belonged to a different religious and cultural environment and before proceeding to the search for the answer to the question of how it is possible to be influenced, an acquaintance of Islamic culture with the Greek philosophy, the reactions of this acquaintance in Islamic circles, attempts by philosophers to reconcile religion and philosophy and it will be appropriate to briefly look at the necessity of this issued, to understand the atmosphere of the era and how this interaction between two philosophers was possible.

6.1. The Period of Formation of Islamic Philosophy

The Islamic religion that emerged on the Arabian peninsula has spread more widely with the conquests of Muslims in countries neighboring the Islamic geography, and Muslims have met cultures that are foreign to them and more advanced than their own, for example, Hellenic, Indian and Iranian cultures. This cultural exchange, which began in the time of the Umayyads and continued during the Abbasid era, accelerated the acquaintance of the Islamic world with philosophy because foreign scholars were invited to the palaces of monarchs, presence of foreign philosophers with knowledge of philosophy stationed in the palace in the Abbasid state and continued with the establishment of Beytul Hikme and the translation movements. Founded in the Mansur period (754-775), Beytul Hikme served as a library and translation center, especially in its early periods. In this way, the Islamic world has become acquainted with the works of scholars from different cultures, translations made in fields such as chemistry, medicine, astronomy, as well as works belonging to Greek philosophy.¹⁵ These developments have laid the foundation for the birth of a new civilization, the Islamic

civilization. The period that will later be called the Golden Age of Islam or the Classical Age of Islam has started in the light of these developments.

In the Classical Era of Islam, the philosophical current that arose in Islamic geography is called Islamic philosophy. Islamic Philosophy is the contemplation and activity of philosophy developed by Islamic culture in societies dominated by countries belonging to the Islamic Civilization, by Islamic thinkers assimilated cultural values in the 16th century and the last quarter of the 8th century, but most effectively, between the 10th and 12th centuries (Cevizci, 2001, p.95). From a broader point of view, we can say that Islamic philosophy is a nomenclature that includes not only thinkers who embrace Islamic values, but also all thinkers in the geography where Islam was active. Non-Muslim thinkers such as al-Razi and al-Rawandi also form part of the history of Islamic philosophy.

One of the most fundamental problems of Islamic philosophy has been the question of revelation and the rational reconciliation of reason, religion, and philosophy. In the expanding Islamic geography, in this multicultural, multi-religious new cultural environment with the learning of Greek philosophy, some conflicts have also become inevitable. Because with the introduction of Greek philosophy into the Islamic world, two different types of knowledge appeared: philosophy, which takes precedence over reason, religion, which takes precedence over revelation. The most important cultural problem in the Middle Ages, Western, Christian, and eastern Muslim world, in order for both of them to coexist peacefully, faith and reason are more specifically a philosophy based on religion and reason based on revelation and in a narrower sense, the problem of relations between Greek philosophy (Arslan, 2019, p.259). Christian and Muslim conception of the universe is a new problem that has encountered Greek reason and philosophy at a certain point in their history

¹⁵ Please see. Encyclopedia of Islam, article Beytul Hikme.

and, as a result, has never been taken seriously and treated by ancient Greek philosophy, a problem called the problem of relations between religion-based revelation and faith and philosophy based on sensory experience and reason has arisen in terms of its essence (Arslan, 2019, p.261). This situation has led to the view in some religious circles in the Islamic world that philosophy has been alien to their own culture and anti-religious from an early age, and therefore anti-philosophical. The following statement that al-Kindi, the first Islamic philosopher, had to make about philosophy in his work *Kitâb fî 'l-felsefeti 'l-Ûlâ* shows that criticism of philosophy, which is seen as a product of a foreign culture, has existed since early times:

As a matter of right awareness, our duty is not to defame even those who have benefited from them in a simple and small way, let alone those who have benefited greatly from them in real and serious matters. Although they have not been able to see some of the facts, they are considered our ancestors and partners with the products of thought that have passed down to us. Those products have been a path and a means for us to get a lot of information that they do not have access to, their truth (...) Then, aside from those who have brought us the truth to a large extent, we should also be grateful to those who have brought it to a small extent. (...) Wherever he comes from, whether he comes to us from distant and opposite nationalities, we should not be ashamed to embrace the beauty of the truth and own it. Because there is nothing more valuable for the truth seeker. Then it is not appropriate to see the truth incomplete and to underestimate the one who says it and the one who brings it (*Ûlâ*, p.8-9)¹⁶.

¹⁶ Kindî (2017) *Kitâb fî 'l-felsefeti 'l-ûlâ* (trans. and edited by Mahmut KAYA) is mentioned as *Ûlâ* in this thesis.

In the continuation of his work, it is seen that al-Kindi defends philosophy against a number of anti-philosophical religious circles, which he describes as ‘aggressive and cruel enemies’. As can be seen, since the introduction of philosophy to the Islamic world, there have been segments who have opposed philosophy, which is considered a product of a foreign culture and a foreign religion (even irreligion). It is also possible to see examples of these oppositions in the works of other philosophers of the period. Al-Amiri, a philosopher who advocated the reconciliation of religion and philosophy (d.992), In his work *Kitâb al-I'lam bi menakibi al-Islam*, mentions the criticism directed at philosophy, mentions the claim that some people claim that philosophy is contrary to religious sciences, that those who are interested in them and want it to be read will be harmed in the world and the hereafter (İslâm, p.199)¹⁷. In his work *el Emed ale'l-ebed*, al-Amiri also mentions the criticism of the kalamists against the philosophers. The kalamists of the period put forward anti-philosophical views, claiming that philosophers were deniers, defending the passive understanding of God (Emed , p.208)¹⁸. In his work *el-imta ve'l-müanese*, in which the relationship between philosophy and religion is discussed, al-Sijistani, who says that philosophy is the product of reason and religion is the product of revelation (d.1001?), advises those who want to do philosophy not to express a personal opinion about religions and religious people to act impartially about philosophy.

¹⁷ Al-Amiri (2017) *Kitâbü'l- İ'lam bi menâkıbı'l-İslâm* (trans. and edited by Mahmut KAYA) is mentioned as İslâm in this thesis.

¹⁸ Al-Amiri (2017) *Emed ale'l-ebed* (trans. and edited by Mahmut KAYA) is mentioned as Emed in this thesis.

According to him, these two areas, one of which is divine and the other is human, should not be confused with each other (İmtâ, p.244-245)¹⁹. Some Islamic philosophers have faced difficult situations due to attempts to reconcile religion and philosophy. Al-Amiri, one of those who argue that there is a compromise between philosophy and religion, is decried as a mulhid²⁰, as stated in the aforementioned work of Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi (İmtâ, p.241).

An appeal to philosophers is also due to the fact that philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were considered authorities by Muslim philosophers, even though they were not Muslims. It has been criticized that some Islamic philosophers express an opinion in the form of ‘Plato says Socrates says’ instead of ‘Allah says, the angels say’ (İmtâ, p.243).

The reasons for the formation of the Islamic community opposition to wider grounds when viewed philosophy include: - translation-performing the accumulation of foreign prophetic light deprived of the pre-Islamic pagan culture to be laid down in the basins of fact and truth that is present in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, the idea of philosophy like Batiniyya considered harmful currents, such as the idea to become a propaganda tool in the hands of philosophy, dissemination of the opinion that the concept of scientific authority is derived from its position in the philosophical community (Kutluer, 2017, p.22).

¹⁹ Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi (2017) *el-İmtâ ve'l-müânese* (trans. and edited by Mahmut KAYA) is mentioned as İmtâ in this thesis.

²⁰ The term philosophy and kalam in the sense of defending beliefs and opinions that will lead to the result of leaving religion. In the dictionary, the term *ilhad kalam*, which means “to incline and turn, to really deviate, not to do what is ordered, to doubt, to struggle and to argue”, is used in the sense of “to deny the existence or unity of Allah, the basic provisions of religion, to raise doubts about them, to underestimate religious rules”. Anyone who deviates from inspiration is called a mulhid. Please see. Encyclopedia of Islam, article Mulhid.

The first contradiction between Greek philosophy and Islamic culture is the contradiction between the revelation deciphering the prophet of Islam and the set of teachings that were born and developed in a foreign language and in a different intellectual atmosphere. The contradiction that depends on this is the contradiction between tradition and progress (Cevizci, 2001, p. 99). In order to solve this contradiction, it is possible to mention three separate attitudes adopted by philosophers:

1-The view of bringing philosophy closer to religion based on the religion represented by Al Kindi.

2-The view that religion and philosophy, represented by Al-Farabi, are two separate valid ways to achieve the truth and that religion and philosophy will complement each other.

3- The opinion that the religion and philosophy represented by Ibn Rushd are naturally in compromise (Bayraktar, 1997, p.155).

In this environment, where philosophy is considered to be the product of a foreign culture and the idea that it is religiously inappropriate is put forward, philosophers have argued that religion and philosophy are two reconcilable areas on the mentioned grounds, and have tried to answer both the criticisms coming to philosophy and have tried to philosophically base Islam.

6.2. Al-Farabi's View of the Reconcilability of Religion and Philosophy

It is impossible to think of a philosopher independently of the problems of the culture in which he lives and to address his philosophy without being related to these problems. The main problem that preoccupies Al-Farabi both as a philosopher and as a thinker belonging to Islamic culture and is central to the philosophy he has put forward is the problem of the relationship between philosophy and religion (Aydınlı, 2018, p.15). Al-Farabi's philosophical

system derives its color largely from the problem of the relationship between philosophy and religion. This problem, which was also discussed in pre-Islamic times, was addressed by Al-Farabi in his cultural environment, but on a purely philosophical basis, and he expressed the results he had achieved within a system (Aydınlı, 2018, p.10).

Al-Farabi is an Islamic peripatetic²¹ philosopher who follows the Aristotelian tradition. Al-Farabi's system is a rational metaphysics based on Aristotelian logic. Aristotle took the system as a basis, tried to reconcile it with the Islamic faith with the help of the Plotinus view (Ülken, 1983, p.53). Al-Farabi, who believes in the universality of reason and mental principles, considers himself a loyal follower of the philosophy of Aristotle and tries to understand the issues arising from the culture in which he lives in accordance with the demands of this philosophy. In line with this understanding, Al-Farabi considers the philosophy of Aristotle or the philosophical system that he thinks belongs to him to be the only true expression of truth and creates his concept of religion in this framework (Aydınlı, 2018, p.16). According to Al-Farabi, philosophy is the knowledge of beings as beings. The subject of religion, which Farabi considers within the framework of political philosophy, is also closely related to philosophy. According to Al-Farabi, religion is something that was conceived by the first ruler.

Religion/mille is a set of views and deeds that are determined and limited by certain conditions that their first manager designs for society. He wants to achieve a certain goal that He envisions by implementing them, in them, or through them (Mille, p.16).

²¹ Meşşâiyye: Name given to Aristotelianism, Aristotelian philosophy in Islamic thought or philosophy. Among its most important representatives are philosophers such as Al-Kindi, Ibn Sina, Al-Farabi, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Bacce, was based on Islam itself in basic matters, while it took Aristotelian logic or philosophy as a method. It was influenced by Plato and especially Plotinus, and they mostly included his theory of water or my kind in their system. Peripateticism. Please see. Ahmet Cevizci, Dictionary of Philosophy, p.58.

According to Al-Farabi, if philosophy is a philosophy based on the right methods, the religion that arises based on this philosophy will be the virtuous religion. The emergence of corrupted religion is also based on the fallacy of the underlying philosophy.

Religion becomes an extremely good, correct religion when all the comparative arts are separated from each other according to the style and organization we are talking about, and then subject to a mature philosophy. But philosophy has not yet become evidential, which is quite certain, on the contrary, if its opinion has not yet been confirmed by *hatabi*, *cedeli*, or sophistic means, it is not impossible that there are opinions in its entirety, in a large part or in most of them that are completely wrong and have not been realized and it becomes a conjectural or distorted philosophy. If religion is followed by this philosophy, there are many wrong opinions in it. When many of these wrong opinions are taken and their examples are put in their place - as a matter of fact, religion does this in things that are difficult to imagine for the public- that religion is further from the truth and becomes a corrupt religion, but its disorder is not noticed (Hurûf, p.186).

As can be seen, according to Farabi, religion and philosophy have a close relationship. Religion and philosophy may be acceptable or unacceptable according to the methods of philosophizing. From matured philosophy, virtuous religion is formed, from distorted philosophy, corrupt religion is formed. Both religion and philosophy are at the heart of religion, and religion is a form of philosophy that has been reduced to the level of public understanding. Al- Farabi reiterates this opinion in his work titled *Hurûf* 'It is intended that the things revealed in religion and philosophy should be taught to them by persuasion or imagination, or both, in ways that the public can understand' (Hurûf, p.148).

According to Al-Farabi, the purpose of philosophy and religion is the same. This goal is to achieve happiness in this world and in life after death. The way to do this is to know. Knowledge of philosophy, which is the knowledge and endeavor of the elite, consists of grounded knowledge, while knowledge of religion reduces philosophical knowledge to a level appropriate to the understanding of the public through an example. ‘The evidence of theoretical views in religion are in theoretical philosophy, and they are taken as unproven in religion’ (Mille, p.26). The reason for opposing some issues in religion is not to know that they are examples. While these examples are for the people, the knowledge of the philosophical infrastructure of these examples is available for the elites. In this aspect, religion and philosophy are two different ways of expressing the same truth. Thus, religious knowledge and philosophical knowledge are in agreement in this respect, since the truth given to people at different levels has different ways of telling, and it is impossible for them to contradict each. In particular, it is impossible to contradict virtuous religion and spiritual philosophy. This is how Farabi tries to reconcile philosophy, which originated in Pagan culture, and faith, which originated in the religion of Islam.

6.3. Al-Farabi's Opinion That Real Philosophers Are in Compromise

There can be no conflict between virtuous religion and true philosophy, and since evidential philosophy is done by following certain methods, there is no conflict between the views of true philosophers. There is no conflict between religion and true philosophy. According to Al-Farabi, Plato and Aristotle, the two philosophers who founded philosophy, developed principles and methods, and completed them, are the ones who will be trusted and referenced in everything. Since these two names are real philosophers, it is unacceptable that their views are also different. Therefore, he wrote a work titled *Kitabü'l-Cem' beyne re'yeyi'l-hakimeyn Eflatun el-İlahi and Aristutalis* as an attempt to show that there is no difference in the views of these two philosophers. According to Al-Farabi, the goals of these two

philosophers are the same in the philosophy they present, they aimed to present the same philosophy (Tahsîl, p.77). According to Al-Farabi, the thoughts that allegedly differ between real philosophers are just superficial differences, and the opinions of real philosophers do not contradict.

Although he tried to reconcile the views of the two philosophers in many different areas, the issues that Farabi discussed in the *Kitâbü'l-Cem* and claimed that there was a compromise between them is the ethics of Plato and Aristotle. Al-Farabi tries to reconcile the opposing views of Plato and Aristotle on the question of whether morality is innate. Aristotle told in *Nicomachean Ethics* that “Morality in its entirety consists of changing customs. No morality is innate. It is possible to move from any morality that is habitually possessed to another morality’ with the opinion that Plato considers in the State, he considers the view that ‘traits that exist from birth will prevail over habits.’” Al-Farabi tries to show that the two views that are considered to be in contradiction are actually not contradictory. According to him, Aristotle tells about social issues in *Nicomachean Ethics*. Plato, on the other hand, takes into account which of the political theories is more useful or harmful, and which of the political aspects is more acceptable. According to Al-Farabi, the reason for the thoughts that seem to contradict is due to the fact that these philosophers do not think about which branch of science they say these words, considering it only as a problem alone (*Kitâbü'l-Cem*, p.166-167).

To find the truth, there must be many different opinions, various thinkers should think long, multi-faceted research and thesis and antithesis reach a consensus and take into account if according to Al-Farabi, now more powerful than he thought, more accurate, more robust, and thought can't be (*Kitâbü'l-Cem* , p.153). For Al-Farabi, the absence of differences in teachings in philosophy, as well as in religion, is a sign of accuracy (Arslan, 2019, p.36). For this reason, Al-Farabi reconciles the knowledge of revelation with the knowledge of reason, it

was possible for him to follow Aristotle, whom he considered a great philosopher and a great authority while revealing the idea that real philosophers would defend the same truth as his opinion that they were manifestations of a single truth, as well as the understanding of virtue that is the subject of our thesis.

6.4. Aristotle And Al-Farabi's Understanding of Virtue

In ancient Greek philosophy and Islamic philosophy, which is based on its principles, having the virtues necessary for a moral life and the happiness that this life will bring is the purpose of life. In ancient Greece and the Islamic world, various philosophers considered the concept of virtue and made the study of what virtue or virtues are the subject of their philosophy. As a concept of moral philosophy that has reached the Islamic world from ancient Greece, virtue has also found an important place in the thought of the great system philosopher Farabi, who is the subject of our study.

Al-Farabi, a peripatetic philosopher, was influenced by Aristotle on many issues that guided his philosophy. Although the logic of Aristotle is the most influential philosopher who has made many studies on Aristotle's books and written works to explain them, the influence of Aristotle is also seen in moral philosophy. Al-Farabi is under the influence of Aristotle on many issues of moral philosophy, such as the view of the inseparability of ethics and politics, types of virtues, methods of acquiring virtues, happiness as the purpose of living a virtuous life.

6.4.1. The Relationship Between Ethics and Political Philosophy

Aristotle, who considered ethics and politics as inseparable areas, considered his work *Nicomachean Ethics*, which we will examine in the context of his relationship with Al-Farabi, as political research. Following the same path as Aristotle, Al-Farabi discussed the concepts of politics and virtue together in his works such as *El-Medinetü'l Fazıla*, *Tahsîlu's-Sa'âde*,

Fusûlü'l Medeni, Es-Siyâsetü'l-Medeniyye. For both philosophers, ethics cannot be considered separate from political, in other words, ethics and politics are areas that cannot be separated from each other.

According to Aristotle, man is a political animal (*zoon politikon*), social by his natural structure. Happiness can only be achieved in a relationship with other people and in the city. Similarly, according to Al-Farabi, the greatest goodness and the greatest perfection can only be achieved in the city for the first time (Ârâ, p.98). In addition, Al-Farabi approves Aristotle's idea that 'man is a political animal', since he considers the last goal that should be achieved in practice to be possible by first correcting one's morality, and then others, the state of those in his home and city (Felsefe, p.114).

6.4.2. The Relationship of Virtue and Happiness

Aristotle begins by telling *Nicomachean Ethics*, that in his work on ethics, every art, every research, every action and every choice desires good, therefore he reveals 'good' as 'what everything desires'. According to Aristotle, every knowledge, every choice desires a good, just as politics desires and the most important thing of all the good things to be done is happiness (eudaimonia), as many of them agree on (N.E. 1095a 15).

According to Aristotle, the best 'good' is what is the goal itself, which is preferable for itself.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he puts this issue in the following way:

It is never chosen over something else, but always chosen for itself, which is the goal. Honor, pleasure, and virtue are both things that are preferred for themselves and are preferred in the name of happiness are things that are preferred for them and things that are preferred in the name of happiness (N.E. 1095b 25, 1096a 10).

Happiness, according to Aristotle, is something that is desired for oneself. Happiness is not devoid of anything and is self-sufficient. Happiness for Farabi is the most preferred and most competent of good things. Al- Farabi considers happiness to be the most worthy thing to be self-sufficient since when happiness is achieved, nothing else is needed from him along with it. In *Tenbih*, in parallel with Aristotle, he states that every competence and every goal that a person desires is desired only because it is a good one. He states that the best among things, the most preferred among the things, and the most competent of all the goals that a person is oriented towards, is happiness (Tenbîh, p.146-147). For both philosophers, happiness is the most preferred among good things because happiness is the one that is preferred for it; it is the one that is most worthy of being self-sufficient. The way to achieve happiness, which is the greatest goal of man, is to have virtue. Happiness is the virtuous activity of the soul.

6.4.3. The Concept of Virtue

Aristotle begins his research by examining the situations that occur in the soul; experiences, possibilities and habits in order to find out what virtue is. It gives the name of effect to the things that pain commits, such as desire, anger, jealousy, joy. In these, the possibility of what allows us to be affected is called a habit, and the good or bad situation related to the effects is called a habit. According to Aristotle, virtues cannot be influenced because according to virtue we are called good or bad, not according to influence³⁵ and praised or condemned according to the virtues, and those who are afraid or angry are not praised, and a person is not loved just because he is angry. In addition, it is not our choice to be angry or afraid. However, virtues do not come without preference. Virtues cannot be possible because belief is not praised or appreciated just because it has the ability to be influenced. The possibilities are inherent in man, and it is impossible to be good or bad

because of what exists naturally. In this case, it is necessary to say that virtue is a habit, not an influence or an opportunity (N.E. 1150b 20).

Aristotle explains that virtue is a habit as follows:

Every virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state and to perform their functions well. The virtue of eyes, for instance, makes the eyes and their functioning excellent, because it makes us see well; and similarly, the virtue of a horse makes the horse excellent, and thereby good at galloping, at carrying its rider, and at standing steady in the face of the enemy. If this is true in every case, the virtue of human being will likewise be the state that makes a human being good and makes him perform his function well (N.E. 1106a 15).

According to Al-Farabi, ‘The situations in which a person does good things and good deeds with himself are virtues, and the situations in which he does evil and ugly deeds are meanness, deficiency, and inferiority.’ (Fusûl, p.48). Virtues are not available in man from birth. A person cannot be a weaver or a clerk by birth, nor can he have virtue or lack of virtue from the very beginning. But, of course, if a talent turns to virtuous acts in the soul until it gets into a situation where the verbs about virtue itself will get rid of it, and these verbs become a habit, virtue can be mentioned from this situation that settles (Fusûl, p.54). Virtue is a habit established in the soul and requires preference.

6.4.3.1. Types of Virtues

When we look at Aristotle and Al-Farabi, we see that both philosophers have more than one virtue, not one virtue, and they classify these virtues in a similar way. Al-Farabi, following Aristotle's understanding of the soul, thinks that the soul has sides that take a share of the mind and do not take a share of the mind. This understanding of the soul has revealed

the view of two types of virtues that will correspond to both sides of the soul. Both philosophers designate these virtues as virtues of thought and virtues of character (N.E.1103a 15, Fusûl, p.53).

6.4.3.1.1. Theoretical Virtues

Considering Aristotle's definition of a person as an intelligent, thinking being in essence, two (or three) activities of the mind (*theoria*= to know, *praxis*=to act, *poiesis*=to create or create) his separation between the subjects (*theoria* is about obligatory and eternal things that cannot be otherwise than they are, positive things that can be otherwise than they are *praxis* and *poiesis*) the most important and valuable activity of a person is found in *theoria*, hence its virtues related to this activity that is, he holds the virtues of thought superior to other virtues and this is his wisdom about virtues, in other words, we come to the opinion that one should consider theoretical wisdom or philosophical wisdom as the main virtue of human life (Arslan, 2007, p.271).

According to Aristotle, the virtue of man is a habit that allows a person to be good and do his own thing. Man, on the other hand, is separated from other living beings by the presence of his mind. The most suitable activity for him will be to engage in reasonable activities. The number of things that the soul gets right with them when saying yes or no is five: these are art (*tekhnē*), knowledge (*epistēmē*), sanity (*phronēsis*), wisdom (*sophia*) and intellect (*nous*) (N.E. 1139b 15).

In parallel with Aristotle, Al-Farabi reveals the virtues of thought as the virtues of the side of the soul that takes a share of the mind. According to him, theoretical virtues are sciences whose ultimate goal is to ensure that beings and their contents are understood only by reason. These are practical reason (*al-‘aklu’n-nazari*), knowledge (*al-‘ilm*), wisdom. The virtue of the intellectual part is practical intellect (*al-‘aklu’l-‘ameli*), practical wisdom

(*ta'akkul*), mind, perfect thinking (*cevdetu 'r-re 'y*) and right opinion (*savabu'z-zan*) (Fusûl, p.70).

Both philosophers thought that the way to achieve the virtues of character was to have the virtues of thought, but they considered these virtues in their mutual relations and suggested that it would not be possible to achieve the virtues of thought without the virtues of character. As befits a human being who has a mind, to gain the virtues of thought by using the possibilities of his mind, to make reasonable choices, and to take reasonable actions is to achieve virtuous life and happiness in this way.

6.4.3.1.2. Moral Virtues

We have already mentioned that for Aristotle, virtue is not just a matter of knowing. In the sciences related to creating and doing, the goal is different from the knowledge itself. Then the only purpose of man cannot be to know only what a thing is, and knowing only what a thing is not enough to commit virtuous actions. Similarly, Al-Farabi thinks that virtue is not just a matter of knowing, it should be supported by actions. According to Al-Farabi, happiness is a goal that is achieved by virtuous acts. Therefore, taking virtuous actions is one of the conditions of being virtuous. According to both philosophers, virtues are not inherent in us, and if they were, naturally, a person with a trait would not be able to acquire other than them. A person has the opportunity to have virtue. We have character virtues when we develop the possibilities we carry with us through repetition and habit.

Aristotle expresses this opinion as follows:

The virtues arise in us neither by nature nor against nature. Rather, we are by nature able to acquire them, and we are completed through habit. Further, if something arises in us by nature, we first have the capacity for it, and later perform the activity. (N.E.1103a 20-30).

Al-Farabi also has the same opinion on this issue:

Moral virtues and moral inferiority occur and settle in the soul only when the acts born of a certain temperament (al-hulk) are repeated many times at a certain time and become accustomed to it. If these acts are good, there will be a virtue in the soul; if they are bad, there will be inferiority (Fusûl, p.53).

According to Aristotle, we become just people by doing just things, moderate by behaving moderately, and valiant by behaving valiantly. Similarly, being without virtue is also acquired by habit (N.E. 1103a 30). In a similar way to Aristotle, Al-Farabi says that all moral qualities, whether good or bad, are acquired later. It is possible that a person becomes virtuous over time. Habit, that is, with a long and frequent repetition of doing something, a person either acquires morality or moves away from it. Good morals and bad morals occur as a result of habit (Tenbîh, p.151). ‘‘Moral virtues are formed and settled in the soul by repeated repetition of verbs born of a certain temperament and familiarization with it. These things that settle in the soul are virtue if they are good and moral disorder if they are bad.’’ (Fusûl, p.54). According to both philosophers, the virtue of character is a preferred habit and preference. With the help of the virtues of thought, through education, by developing habits, the virtues of character, which are intermediate between the excess and the excess of a disposition, are acquired. In order to achieve happiness, preference, action, good separation must coexist.

According to Aristotle, the virtues of character are generosity, courage, moderation, justice, magnanimity, grandeur, playfulness, truthfulness, and friendship (N.E. 1116a 1137b). according to Al-Farabi, the virtues of character are; courage (*eş-şecâ‘a*), generosity (*es-seha*), chastity (*el-‘iffê*), playfulness (*ez-zarf*), accuracy (*sidku'l-insan*), friendship (*et-teveddud*) (Tenbîh, p.154-155) justice (*Al-‘adale*) (Fusûl, p.53), humility (*et-tevazu*), dignity (*el-hurriyye ve'l-kerem*), gentleness (*el-hilm*), modesty (*al-haya*) (Fusûl, p.59).

6.4.3.1.3. Moral Virtues and Golden Mean

According to Aristotle, it is a habit of character virtues and at the same time a state of finding the middle between two extremes, excess and poles (N.E. 1106b 20). Virtue is the middle of two evils, one of which is excess and the other is a deficiency; evil is the excess or lack of what is necessary for influences and actions, and virtue is finding and choosing the middle. Drinks and meals disrupt health when there is too much or too little, and when it is balanced, it improves and protects health. This is also the case with moderation, valor, and other virtues. The coward, who runs away from everything, is afraid and cannot stand anything; the one who is not afraid of anything becomes the one who dares to go above everything. In the same way, the junkie who tastes every pleasure and stays away from none of them becomes the junkie, and the one who runs away from all of them becomes emotionless. Moderation and valor are also impaired by excess or lack and are maintained by being moderate (N.E. 1104a 20). Al-Farabi expresses the same opinion in his work *Tenbîh*. According to Al-Farabi, what is achieved by health with them, for example, eating, drinking, fatigue, health will be achieved when they are in a moderate state, as well as acts that create good morals create virtue when they are in a moderate state (Tenbîh, p.152). Verbs with goodness are actions that are intermediate and mutated between two extremes, both of which are bad because one is excessive and the other is incomplete. Virtues are also similar to this. They are the middle state and traits of the soul between the other two states, both of which are inferior because one is too extreme and the other is too incomplete (Fusûl, p.58).

6.4.3.1.4. Justice

The concept of justice is a virtue that both philosophers have chosen to study separately from other virtues. The reason for their importance to the concept of justice is that justice is a concept associated not only with the individual but also with society. Aristotle considers the virtue of justice or fairness to be a virtue that is "most self-sufficient" and

includes all other virtues. In contradiction to the fact that other virtues are the private best of a virtuous person, concern themselves, and are directed at them, justice concerns both the person themselves and someone else. As Aristotle especially emphasized, justice is directed to someone else, it is someone else's good, in short, society is good. The result of the justice of a just man is to bring good to someone else: justice is often considered the greatest of virtues, and in Aristotle's own words, "neither the evening star nor the morning star is anything as extraordinary as justice," and again, as the proverb says, "all the virtues coexist in the virtue of justice." It is a perfect virtue in the full sense, because it is the actual embodiment of complete virtue. It is complete because whoever has it, works out the virtue not only in him, but also in relations with other people. "Because most people use virtue in their own work, but does not act virtuously in relation to others" (N.E. 1129a 25-30, Arslan, 2007, p.264).

According to Al-Farabi, a virtuous city is like a complete and healthy body, all the organs of which help each other to make the life of a living being complete and keep it in this state (Ârâ, p.98). Justice is necessary to keep the city that way. Justice is achieved by sharing the affairs that the people of the city have in common, among all of them, and then protecting these things that are divided between them. According to Al-Farabi, these good things are trust, wealth, honor, rank and other things that the people of the city can have in common. It is unfair to the city that each of the city's people has equal rights to what he deserves, that he has less than he deserves to have these things because he has a share in these good things, or that he has more against himself or against the city (Fusûl, p.89). In a general sense, justice means that he uses virtuous acts in relation to others, regardless of what virtue they are (Fusûl, p.91).

6.4.3.1.5. The Highest Happiness

Aristotle defines happiness as an activity that corresponds to virtue and says that it should correspond to the highest virtue. This virtue is wisdom, which is a virtue of thought.

The most beautiful of the activities suitable for virtue is the activity suitable for wisdom. Self-sufficiency is most often found in the activity of *theoria*, because although people are needed for other virtues, the virtue of this activity can be found in the activity of *theoria*, even if a person is on his own. “Reason is a divine thing; life according to reason is also a divine thing. All that a person has to do is to take a share in this life because the happiest life for a person is the life that suits them.” Life in accordance with the virtues of character is in the second place because these virtues are human virtues. According to Aristotle, complete happiness is the life of *theoria*. A person becomes happy as he gets a share of the life of the theory. The life of a person who is engaged in an activity suitable for virtue will be happy (N.E. 1177a 10-1178a 15).

Al-Farabi, unlike Aristotle, because he was a Muslim philosopher, did not consider happiness limited only to this world; he even defended the opinion that the highest happiness will be achieved after death. According to Al-Farabi, Happiness is superior to each other in three respects: in type, quantity and quality (Ârâ, p.119). According to Al-Farabi, the greatest and true happiness is the last happiness to be acquired in the hereafter (*es-sa'ade el-kusva*). The more a person repeats virtuous deeds that serve to achieve happiness, the more superior and perfect the soul will be. This continues until the time when he will be full of matter in terms of perfection, and at this point, the soul becomes independent of matter and no longer needs matter to continue its existence (Ârâ, p.114).

According to Al-Farabi, the way to achieve the highest happiness is possible by reaching the level of Active Intellect. ‘The work that the active mind sees is to see and observe the thinking being and to bring it to the highest of the maturity levels that need to be reached for a person, that is, to the supreme happiness. Thus, a person reaches the level of his active intellect. This is possible only by being independent of objects and constantly in this

state of maturity, without needing anything else, such as an object, matter, and land that are located below itself in its presence (Fusûl, p.38).

The Hereafter is a life that is self-sufficient for the continuation of its essence, does not need things other than it, and continues to exist. According to Al-Farabi, the last competence for us does not occur in this life, but in the hereafter, after we have experienced the first competence in this life (Fusûl, p.65). The condition for achieving this happiness is also to perform virtuous actions, which is the first competence, so that the second and last competence, *es-sa'ade el-kusva* is achieved.



CONCLUSION

Al-Farabi eliminated a major deficiency in the Islamic world and the Christian Middle Ages with his work on the works of Aristotle and deserved the title of Second Teacher. It is seen to what extent he mastered the philosophy of Ancient Greece thanks to the texts that he brought to the Islamic world and then to the philosophy of the Christian Middle Ages. Although Farabi was fed by these texts, he was not their only follower, he managed to put forward his own philosophy with a system that reconciles the religion of Islam and philosophy, and with this feature, he was considered an important system philosopher.

In this study, in which we tried to reveal Farabi's understanding of virtue in relation to Aristotle, we tried to explain the concept of virtue, types of virtue, the relationship of virtue and knowledge, ways to be virtuous, and the purpose of being virtuous in Al-Farabi and Aristotle. In the second chapter of our study, we examined the Ancient Greek philosophers who had important effects on Farabi's understanding of virtue and tried to lay the groundwork for Al-Farabi's connection with these important philosophers before him in his system. In a similar way to the views of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Al-Farabi, who determined the purpose of human life as being happy, met them again in common thought and determined the way to achieve this goal as being virtuous. Al-Farabi disagreed with Socrates' view of the one virtue as wisdom and did not follow Plato's theory of the virtues corresponding to each of the parts of the soul of a fragmentary understanding of the soul as to what virtue is, and took a line closer to Aristotle's understanding of virtue.

The philosophy of ethics of Plotinus, a philosopher who significantly influenced Al-Farabi with the idea of a hierarchy of being, bears traces from Plato and Aristotle. However, He does not accept the idea that happiness, unlike Aristotle, also requires external good. According to him, happiness is only about the soul. Similarly to Al-Farabi, he thought that it

was necessary to purify the soul in this world so he came up with the idea that happiness, which is greater and more real, can be achieved in the next life. According to Plotinus, the virtue of the soul is to think. Therefore, he argued that happiness can be achieved through intellectual activity. However, Plotinus, unlike Al-Farabi, does not accept moral virtues such as courage, moderation, generosity as virtues in a real sense. According to Him, these virtues are the virtues of the lower part of the soul and have less value, while the true virtue is the theoretical virtues.

In the third chapter of our study, we examined Al-Farabi's understanding of virtue in terms of its connection with its ontology and psychology. In Al-Farabi's system, the idea of a hierarchy of being is closely related to the concept of virtue. That Al-Farabi's system starts from the fact that everything starts from God, that God is a self-aware mind and achieving the ultimate happiness by merging with the Active Intellect, although it contains mysticism, on the one hand, the way to unite with the Active Intellect requires an earthly preliminary preparation, happiness, and virtue are based on the knowledge of the intellectuals his mysticism can be defined as an intellectual mysticism since he considers thinking about earthly things rather than escaping from the world and their knowledge as the path to happiness and virtue. In this aspect, he bears a resemblance to Aristotle, who was also a rationalist.

In the fourth chapter, we discussed the relationship between Farabi's political philosophy and his understanding of virtue. Al-Farabi, like Aristotle, considered man to be a social being and virtue as a phenomenon that can only be realized in public life. According to Al-Farabi, the purpose of life is happiness, and happiness is a goal that will be achieved by doing virtuous actions. These virtuous actions can also take place only thanks to a relationship with other people in a city. Therefore, we can say that, as in Aristotle, political philosophy and morality are intertwined in Al-Farabi's thought. A person is a social being; he can realize

himself only by living in a society and achieving his goal. The main purpose of Al-Farabi in studying politics is to reveal the purpose of a person's life, the reason for existence. This is happiness, which is a desired good for oneself and which is the supreme good. Happiness is achieved in social life through the virtues that will appear in the ideal order.

In the fifth chapter of our study, we tried to reveal Al-Farabi's understanding of virtue. Al-Farabi's understanding of virtue is closely related to knowledge. Virtuous and those who live in the city, the existence of God, his attributes, the structure of the universe the creator of the universe, and the force of the inter-hierarchy plays a very important role in the philosophy of Al-Farabi and even knowledge of these topics can be seen as the basis of philosophy, while non-virtue and ignorant societies are ignorant on this issue. Therefore, they also have the wrong idea about happiness and it is not possible for them to be virtuous. Therefore, virtue is, first of all, a matter of knowledge. Besides, virtue is also connected with actions. In addition to the existence of theoretical virtues and intellectual virtues, which Al-Farabi mentioned as the four principles that lead to happiness, moral virtues and practical arts also occupy an important place in his philosophy.

In the last chapter of our thesis, we examined the similarities between Al-Farabi's understanding of virtue and Aristotle's understanding of virtue and Al-Farabi's intellectual infrastructure that allows this similarity. Al-Farabi, being a Muslim philosopher, is, first of all, a rationalist. His view of knowledge, virtue, and religion is also from the frame of mind. Especially when studying religion, his thought structure and philosophical thinking style, which are extremely far from dogmatism, led him to the conclusion that religion and philosophy are not at odds. He did this by evaluating religion and philosophy in different fields and positioning religion under the sciences of politics. Religion contains symbolic information that will lead people to a virtuous life and happiness, while philosophy is a means of achieving happiness for people who are interested in philosophy and whose mind is prone

to understanding philosophical truths. Defining the conflict between philosophy and religion in this way, Al-Farabi also tried to describe the difference between the thoughts of philosophers by trying to reconcile their views. According to Al-Farabi's opinion, philosophical truths have been thought through in detail, their theses and antitheses have been examined and a serious research result has been obtained. In this case, it cannot be expected that real philosophers will also differ in their views. The things that are seen as differences are superficial issues, and according to Al-Farabi, Plato and Aristotle, the two great philosophers, have the same idea on the main issues. From this point of view, we can say that he himself may have thought that he should not contradict these great philosophers. Although he used the views of these two philosophers on various issues, we can say that He was more influenced by Aristotle, especially in the concept of virtue and moral philosophy, which is our research topic.

Reactions and criticisms that have been put forward since the first encounter of the Islamic world with Greek philosophy, it was not effective in Al-Farabi's view of philosophy, he evaluated philosophy as the product of a different cultural environment and considered it a universal method of obtaining knowledge, achieving the truth. Al-Farabi is a philosopher who has defined the relationship between reason and revelation, one of the greatest philosophical problems of the middle ages, in favor of reason. He considered religion and philosophy as two separate styles of expression that reveal the same truth. He valued knowledge as mere knowledge. Thanks to the fact that he did not turn philosophy into a tool and did not consider philosophy to be a servant of theology, he gave philosophy the value it deserved, despite the difficult conditions of his era. Al-Farabi's efforts to reconcile the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle and religion and philosophy can also be seen as a result of the conditions of the period. It was because the point of view of the era was not suitable for accepting a truth other than a religious one. If philosophy is to be considered a significant activity, philosophers

should say the same thing, and what they say should not be incompatible with religion. For this reason, Al-Farabi presented religion and philosophy as two areas that tell the same truth and saw religion as an imitation of philosophy and a field that gives knowledge in philosophy by reducing it to the level of the people with examples. With these methods, Al-Farabi was able to adapt the Ancient Greek philosophical tradition to the century and geography in which he lived and became a carrier of the philosophical tradition.



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