



**T.C.
GAZI UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**DOCTORAL
THESIS**

**COMPROMISED REVOLUTION: FRAMING
PROCESSES OF THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION
AND ITS IMPACTS ON SUBSEQUENT SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS**


MOHAMMED ENDRİS ALI

**FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES**

JANUARY 2021



**COMPROMISED REVOLUTION: FRAMING PROCESSES OF THE
ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACTS ON SUBSEQUENT
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS**



Mohammed Endris ALI

DOCTORAL THESIS
FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

GAZI UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

JANUARY 2021

ETİK BEYAN

Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimleri Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Kurallarına uygun olarak hazırladığım bu tez çalışmada;

- Tez içinde sunduğum verileri, bilgileri ve dokümanları akademik ve etik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi,
- Tüm bilgi, belge, değerlendirme ve sonuçları bilimsel etik ve ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu,
- Tez çalışmada yararlandığım eserlerin tümüne uygun atıfta bulunarak kaynak gösterdiğimi,
- Kullanılan veriler de herhangi bir değişiklik yapmadığımı,
- Bu tezde sunduğum çalışmanın özgün olduğunu,

bildirir, aksi bir durumda aleyhime doğabilecek tüm hak kayıplarını kabullendiğimi beyan ederim.



MOHAMMED ENDRIS ALI

07/01/2021

FERAGAT EDİLMİŞ DEVRİM: ETİYOPYA DEVRİMİNİN ANLAMDIRILMASI
SÜREÇİ VE MÜTEAKİP SOSYAL HAREKETLER ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

(Doktora Tezi)

Mohammed Endris ALI

GAZİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

Ocak 2021

ÖZET

Etiyopya devrimi, Afrika bağlamında en çok tartışılan ancak en az anlaşılan devrimlerden birisidir. Elli yıldır ülkenin siyasi manzarasını belirleyen üç temel siyasi tartışma alanı-toprakta Tiller'a, milliyetler sorunu ve demokrasi talebi- devrim sürecinde ortaya çıktı. Ancak devrimle ilgili çeşitli açıklamalar, esas olarak devrimin bütününe anlama taahhüdünden yoksun analitik aşırı basitleştirmeden temel aldı. Etiyopya devrimi ile Avrupa ve Asya'daki diğer yerlerdeki devrimler arasındaki benzerlikleri belirlemeye yönelik çoğu bilimsel çalışma, Etiyopya yönetiminin ve devriminin özel ve karmaşık doğasını ortaya çıkarmayı başaramadı. Bu çalışma, önceki açıklama nesnelerinin devrimin nihai açıklayıcı unsurları olarak alınmaması için devrimin bütün resmini çekmenin önemine odaklanmaktadır. Toplumun büyük bir kısmı için şikayet kaynağı olan ve bazı alt grupları diğerlerinden daha aktif devrimci yapan devletin sosyal ve politik değişiklikleri tartışılıyor. Araştırma, karşılaştırmalı tarihsel analiz yaklaşımı temelinde geleneksel ve uzlaşmış yapım faktörleri olarak iki geniş devrimci yapım faktör kategorisini kapsamaktadır. Araştırma, 1974 Etiyopya devriminin ilkel sorunlarını doğrularken, Müslümanların egemen olduğu çevrelerdeki devrimci havzalar ve şehir merkezlerindeki tanınma mücadeleleri tam olarak ele alınmadıkça önceki dönemlerdeki siyasi ve sosyal değişimlerin etkilerinin anlaşılmadığını ortaya koymaktadır. Son olarak, çerçeveleme sürecinin ve çerçeveleme faktörlerinin, altta yatan nedensel faktörleri belirlemede önemli bir rol oynamasının yanında, gerçek yapım faktörlerince devrimci anlatılardan ödün verildiği ve gözden kaçırıldığı sonucuna varmaktadır.

Bilim Kodu : 117101

Anahtar Kelimeler : Devrim, Yapım faktörleri, çerçeveleme, Çevre, Öğrenci hareketler

Sayfa Adedi : 231

Tez Danışmanı : Prof. Dr. Gonca BAYRAKTAR DURGUN

Orcid Kod : 0000-0001-5646-5796

COMPROMISED REVOLUTION: FRAMING PROCESSES OF THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACTS ON SUBSEQUENT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

(Ph. D. Thesis)

Mohammed Endris ALI

GAZI UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

January 2021

ABSTRACT

The Ethiopian revolution is may be among the most debated but least understood revolution in Africa. The three political questions; Land to the Tiller, the question of nationalities and demand for democracy that determined the political landscape of the country for five decades are the result of the revolution. The various explanations about the revolution mainly came from analytic oversimplification which lacks the capacity to give complete sense of the revolution. Most scholarly works engaging on identifying similarities between the Ethiopian revolution and revolutions elsewhere in Europe and Asia failed to unearth the special and complex nature of the Ethiopian polity and their revolution. This study consistently focuses on the importance of taking the whole picture of the revolution so that previous objects of explanation didn't become the ultimate explanatory factors of the revolution. The state social and political changes that were sources of grievances for most part of the society that latter made some sub-groups more active insurrectionary than others are discussed. The research covers the two broad categories of revolutionary making factors as conventional and compromised making factors in a comparative historical analysis approach. The research affirms the primeval problems of 1974 Ethiopian revolution and the impacts of political and social changes of the preceding periods cannot be fully understood unless the revolutionary watersheds in the Muslim dominated peripheries and struggles for recognition in the urban centers are fully addressed. Finally it concluded that the framing process and framing factors played the major role in determining the underlying causative factors while the actual making factors are compromised and missed from the revolutionary narratives.

Science Code	: 117101
Key Words	: Revolution, Making factors, Framing, Periphery, Student movements
Page Number	: 231
Supervisor	: Prof. Dr. Gonca BAYRAKTAR DURGUN
ORCID ID	: 0000-0001-5646-5796

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

First and foremost, praises and thanks to the Almighty Allah for His showers of blessings in the course of my study. I am greatly indebted to my advisor Professor Gonca Bayraktar Durgun, whose enthusiasm, unreserved guidance and encouragement brought this project to its fruition. I cannot imagine this project will come real without her feedback, constructive and insightful comments on each steps and draft chapters. My appreciation goes to Professor Şenol Durgun and Professor Hamit Emrah Beriş for making significant contribution to my proposal and for their insightful comments and suggestions in all my progress reports that helped me finalize the last stage of the dissertation. The Turkish scholarship program and the most humble people of Turkey deserve special thanks for showing me what loving and serving a nation mean. Leaders of the Ethiopian Muslims Peaceful struggle in 2012 were the reason for me to dedicate this dissertation for this subject.

My thanks is to Endris Mekonnen who was always by my side, guided me so positively and who always made me feel confident in my abilities to accomplish this project with all my other engagements. Mekamu Kedir was always on my side; motivating me to join this department and assisting in the course of the study. I owe a debt to all my informants for sharing their knowledge about the subject matter. My indebtedness goes to my Family especially my late brother Mulualem Endris who always dreamed to see me high and successful. My wife Kemer took the largest share in completing my PhD dissertation. Without her, who could deal with our lovely children; Dania, Fatih, Mariya and Asiya and able me to have a successful life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ÖZET	iv
ABSTRACT.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
LIST OF MAPS	xi
ABBREVIATIONS	xii
INTRODUCTION	1

CHAPTER ONE

READING REVOLUTIONS: CONFLICTING NARRATIVES AND ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION

1.1. Categorizing Conflicting Theoretical Narratives on Revolutions	10
1.1.1. Oversimplification of Structuralist Approaches.....	12
1.1.2. Revivalism of Culturalist Theoretical Approaches	21
1.2. Framing Theory and the Ethiopian Revolution	26
1.3. Discoursing old cases in new Perspective	32
1.3.1. Selection of Revolutionary Cases and Revolutionary Situations.....	35
1.3.2. Periodization as Analytical Framework	37
1.3.3. Identifying and Mining the Data	40
1.3.4. Composing the Narratives and Analysing the Data	45
1.3.5. Brief Summary of the Chapter	51

CHAPTER TWO

CONVENTIONAL MAKING FACTORS IN THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION

2.1. The feudal Paradigm and the case in Ethiopia.....	53
2.1.1. Social Structure as a Pretext for Feudalism	55
2.1.2. The North and South as two frontiers	58

Page

2.1.3. Fragmented Authority and Obligation of services	63
2.1.4. Oppressor-Oppressed Relation as Feudalism.....	66
2.2. Socialism as Hindrance to Study the Ethiopian Revolution	71
2.2.1 The Student Movement and the Birth of Socialist Idea	72
2.2.2. Post-revolutionary situation as a making factor	78
2.2.3. Declaration of Socialism	79

CHAPTER THREE**COMPROMISED MAKING FACTORS IN THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION**

3.1. The Revolutionary Secessionist.....	86
3.1.1. The Seed for Eritrean Liberation Movement	90
3.1.2. Religion and the Eritrean Revolutionaries	92
3.1.3. The Eve of the Federation and Eritrean Muslims	98
3.1.4. Eritrean Muslims and the Federation Experience	102
3.2. Liberation Struggles in the Somali-Region.....	107
3.2.1. The Seed for Ogaden Secessionists.....	108
3.2.2. Armed Struggle against Imperial Ethiopia.....	111
3.2.3. Sustenance of Antagonism through Retaliation	115
3.3. Struggle for Self-determination and Autonomy	118
3.3.1. The Bale Rebellion: The longest Peasant Upheaval	120
3.3.2. The Afar question and the Imperial Ethiopia	126
3.4. Struggle for Recognition.....	132
3.4.1. The Resistance of Harari People	133
3.4.2. Breaking the people to challenge their resistance	137
3.5. Brief Summary of the Chapter.....	145

CHAPTER FOUR

FRAMING OF THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION

4.1. Temporal, Spatial, and Agency: The Three Underlying Framing Dimensions	147
4.1.1. The Temporal Dimension of Framing Process	148
4.1.2. Temporal Sequences in Framing the Ethiopian Political Problems	150
4.2. Spatial Factors on Framing	164
4.2.1. Geography led contested Narratives in Bale Rebellion	166
4.2.2. Access to Arab land exposed for Miss Framing	168
4.3. Agency and Organizational Factors Affecting Framing of the Revolution	173
4.3.1. Urban Struggle against State Homogenization Project	178
4.3.2. Agency and structural factors in Struggles for recognition in Urban Centres	179
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION	191
BIBLOGRAPHY	199
APPENDIX	211
APPENDIX-1. I. Letters	212
APPENDIX-2. II. Questions for key informant interview	222
CURRICULUM VITAE	224
INDEKS	227

LIST OF MAPS

Maps	Page
Map 3.1. The Eritrean province in the Ethiopian state before its independence in 1991	92
Map 3.2. The Ogaden Region in the Ethiopian State	110
Map 3.3. A map showing Bale and other localities in the then Ethiopian Administrative boundaries	121
Map 3.4. Afar in the Ethiopian state and the Afar Triangle comprising Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti.....	127
Map 3.5. The Harar city of Ethiopia	134

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations	Explanations
ANLM	Afar National Liberation Movement
BMA	British Military Administration
CHA	Comparative Historical Analysis
ENDR	Ethiopian National Democratic Revolution
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF	Eritrean People Liberation Front
EPRP	The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
ESANA America	Ethiopian Students Association North
ESUNA America	The Ethiopian Students Union in North
ESUE	Ethiopian Students
EUS	Ethiopian University Service
MEISON	The All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement
OAU	Organization for African Unity
OCTI	Ogaden Company for Trade and Industry
OETA	Occupied Enemy Territory Administration
OLF	Ogaden Liberation Front
OPEC	Organization of Petrol Exporting Countries
UCAA	University College of Addis Ababa
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
TPLF	Tigray Peoples Liberation Front

INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia is the only country in Africa successfully resists European colonization but never been free of war of independence, peasant rebellion, mass protests and revolutionary movements to the date. The struggles and movements in the modern state of Ethiopia put significant influences on its boundary and internal politics. However the 1974 revolution that had no parallel anywhere in Africa but least understood one in the world (Clapham, 1988: 12) had significantly shaped this ancient nation of a home for more than 85 ethnic groups with distinct languages and cultures. The Ethiopian revolution was a turning point for Ethiopian politics with its significant influence by bringing a regime change, separation of church and state, politicization of ethnicity and proliferation of various political organizations & armed struggle that continued to this date. The revolution is at the same time an important event that laid the foundation for categorization of political agendas in the country as mainstream and side line issue based on their position during the revolutionary process. However such categorization is criticized as a result of analysing revolutions from top to bottom instead of the most appropriate way of doing it from the bottom up since multiple simultaneous factors can be the actual makers of a revolution (Tilly, 1997: 7-10).

The revolution is least understood in that it has been exposed to various interpretations by local and foreign writers based on the researchers ideological orientation, understanding of the dynamics of revolutionary movements that predate the actual revolution and its outcomes but most importantly due to the gap in identifying the general and the specific picture of the revolution studied in the previous works.. For the then Ethiopian student movement champions and their fellow local and international pro-Marxist intellectuals, the revolution was a genuine social revolution of class struggle for state transition from feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism in a quest for socialist order in Ethiopia (Balsvik, 1985: 265; Clapham, 1988: 4; Tadesse, 1998: 108; Tareke, 2009: 115). Those who tried to explain the revolution based on the autocratic system prevailed and despondent social & political conditions of post-revolution Ethiopia labelled it as a revolution betrayed or failed revolution. The predicament on the success of the Ethiopian revolution also comes from questioning the degree of economic and political achievements that any classical revolution is expected to realize (Assefa, 1993: 119; Michael, 1979; (Messay, 2011: 167). Taking the military junta as the key player in the absence of any political organization in

the process, others considered it as a revolution from above or a garrison socialism movement that became a moment of transformation from an aristocratic to a totalitarian autocracy (Andargachew, 1993: 190; Lefort, 1983: 201; Molyneux and Halliday, 1981: 338). Still significant number of researchers and mainly western diplomats has a firm stand on the direct and indirect intervention of foreign socialist nations and hesitate to legitimise the ideological consistency and magnitude of transformation at the grass root level (Henze, 1990: 8-9; Messay, 2011: 336).

Differences and similarities in understanding Ethiopian revolution mainly emanates from the degree of similarity and difference in attitude researches held about the revolutionary process and outcomes. Though the political correctness and the degree of emphasis given varies; land tenure system in rural parts of Ethiopia which was characterised as feudalism, class struggle in the semi industrialised urban areas demanding the transformation of Ethiopia in to socialist order and thirdly the question of nationalities are the three core agendas that have gained extensive coverage as root causes of the Ethiopian revolution. Likewise it is based on these premises that post-revolutionary Ethiopia's social, economic and political institutions fashioned. However, as it is clearly known, in all social revolutions the need for a cultural transformation has been very important that is no less important in the Ethiopian case for a socialist revolution to be realised. For the supposed feudal culture to be transformed in to socialist order there has to be a mass culture derived from mass values which was not totally existing in the Ethiopian non-neutral church position towards the state and non-secular relationship between all kinds of state policies and various classes of the societies (Negussay, 1983). The issue of feudalism in Ethiopian context also cannot be taken as given in the absence of uniform mode of production in most part of the country that can be called as feudalism rather the relationship was a relation between rulers and farmers distinct from European class relationship (Crummey 1980; Ellis 1976). These made difficult to conclude the three factors commonly attributed as root causes of the Ethiopian revolution are free of the inherent problems of framing process which in turn becomes critically important for re-investigations.

Given the Orthodox Church is predominantly source of a ruling idea and home for a ruling class and most of the newly conquered in the Ethiopian peripheries areas are Muslim dominated, (Ahmed, 2000: 3-4; Tamrat, 1972: 104), perceived ethnic and land tenure problem base of Ethiopian revolution had religion at its core. Therefore the researcher

argues that those causes entertained most in previous works as root causes of the revolution are selective or simply symptoms of the central problem where the Ethiopian revolution framed only with recent past manifestations not with the real root causes.

What makes this argument politically more important is the proliferation of successive revolutionary movements and liberation fronts in all directions of the country during the last emperor (1936-1974) followed by the actual revolution and the predominantly religious nature of these movements. Although naming the political core as “the centre” made the rest of the country generally “the periphery”, it is still important to understand the “peripheries” where dozens of revolutionary struggles happened need special focus as “little known and, even more significantly, because this region poses a critical test for the nation-state building project.” (Markakis, 2013).

Among the potentially organized movements that weaken the imperial regime and created a fertile ground for the revolution; the Eritrean Liberation movement, the Bale peasant rebellion, the Oromo liberation movement, the Ogaden Liberation movement, the urban privileged and unprivileged class confrontations have critical importance as all have mainly or at least considerably religious base. The "Hannolato movement and the kulub insurrection" of the harari people in 1940 and 1950s had also their own impact on the negative state-Muslims interaction in Eastern part of Ethiopia (Abdellah, 1994; Hiwot, 1975). The religious repression in Gondar that creates another hot spot and the continuous struggle of Muslims in the north against religious based discrimination were among the pushing factors in raising angers and frustrations used as a catalyst for the revolution. Most importantly, the student movements, the main campaigner and the most organized one which sustained until the actual revolution were also misrepresented in the revolution studies. Looking back to the emergence and development of the student movement and the adoption of the leading agendas of the revolution, one can understand how the framing process of the revolution was much important than the actual problems on the ground. And this triggers a question why and where in the framing process religion was omitted from the agendas with all its potential to prevail.

The dominance of major paradox in the Ethiopian revolution studies which is a contradiction between real & perceived causes of the revolution, led emerging active political societies to take it as a compromised revolution. The revolution is compromised if

not intentionally manipulated to drop the basic social problems of pre revolution Ethiopia that had a major share among the making factors putting its significance in the allocation of social, political and economic resources in the contemporary Ethiopia. This study consistently focuses on the importance of taking the whole picture of the revolution so that previous objects of explanation didn't become the ultimate explanatory factors of the revolution. This research will also challenge prior belief on the causes of Ethiopian revolution through comparative historical analysis of the pre revolution Ethiopian social, political and economic conditions.

The biasness in the framing process of the Ethiopian revolution emanates from the efforts to squeeze various but interrelated casual factors in to a single agenda to the interest of the actors. However, the relevance of casual explanation for a certain historical phenomena like a revolution doesn't necessarily mean that the event is a product of single set of condition. Likewise, as it is difficult to provide general theorization of all revolutions, it is also improbable that one distinct set of conditions to cause a given revolution. Likewise in social and comparative historical studies it is very common to have a single outcome as a result of varied and different combinations and levels of causes (Ritter, 2014: 98-101).

Having the Ethiopian revolution as a common denominator for all, it is an interesting research agenda to look for the source of obsession of researchers to their own set of conditions as sufficient explanatory factor without showing interest to thoroughly understand the similarity, difference or interrelationship between various factors that have equivalent explanatory variable for the same revolution. The fact that the question of nationalities, the issue of land reform and the quest for socialist order have gained predominance in the revolution studies made them neither the only explanatory factors nor exclusively independent variables. Nonetheless, the difference in the political importance of various causes cannot be considered as an excuse for the academic tribalism observed in the study of Ethiopian revolution. Therefore, the influence of like-minded researchers in the Ethiopian revolution study and the total rejection of strong historical factors that brought the revolution calls for re-investigation that make this study highly significant and the first in its kind to approach the subject from new perspective.

With this historical background and present revolutionary studies the main objective of this research is to investigate how and why the framing process of the Ethiopian revolution

compromised the Ethiopian socio-political problems that produces most of revolutionary movements in Muslim dominated periphery areas and the impact of this omission on the nature of subsequent political movements. In line with this objective examining the degree of compatibility between the prior beliefs taken as causes of the Ethiopian revolution and the social context of the time, analysing the type and degree of religious based revolutionary movements as making factors of the Ethiopian revolution and in doing so investigating the framing process of the student movement that finally shaped the Ethiopian revolution with the impact of this framing on the nature of subsequent political movements are the main target of this research.

To have a more objective analytical approach the revolutionary cases are composed based on four basic questions Timothy proposed as a litmus test to check whether any revolution study answers them or not. What are the sources of grievances in the population? What makes population (sub-) groups actively insurrectionary? Which societies experience more revolutionary movement and which do not? And finally what explains the similarities and differences in state policies and social changes following the revolutionary seizure of power? (2005: 44-45). Answering the four questions has important implications to understand how different theories and researches define grievance, mobilization, movement leadership and revolt. And therefore, the main objective of this research is to investigate how and why the framing process of the Ethiopian revolution compromised the religious base of the Ethiopian socio-political problems that produced dozens of revolutionary movements. The research specifically analyse; first, the degree of compatibility between the prior belief taken as causes of the Ethiopian revolution and the social context of the time. And secondly the research focuses on the framing process of the Ethiopian student movement and the Ethiopian revolution to identify the impact of this framing process on the nature of subsequent social movements and political participation.

In the interest of time and the scope of the research, international factors that drag the revolutionaries into a wave of ideological war and radicalism couldn't be discussed in detail. In order to focus into the more organised revolutionary struggles, those less organised and fragmented cases in most parts of the country are also less represented in this research.

This might play partly in the inexorable weakness the present work could bear. Delimiting the working space, primarily, within the modern state of Ethiopia, helped achieve addressing the intricacies of the only revolution that occurred in the country's modern political history. Doing so introduced plausible factors that prevalent works on the Ethiopian revolution eschewed which underlie a complete explanation and understanding of the transformative change. Achieving this, however, was not possible without becoming more local and less international. The Ethiopian revolution holds significant relevance in the African continent but notably falls into the bulk of several other significantly relevant similar revolutions across the world. Had there been extended coverage to comparatively analyse the world-wide similar cases the present work would, undoubtedly, have become quite ground-breaking and more empirically valid. Notwithstanding, the weakness that arises from such a convincing delimitation in terms of time and scope the validity of this research stands which attributes a sound strength to the research.

Two intimately related aspects compound, further, the strength of this research. Firstly, it shades new light to the over studied Ethiopian revolution by presenting major challenges to the traditional scholarship. To put it differently, this work epitomises a peculiar undertaking to understanding the Ethiopian revolution *de novo*. Secondly, the present work's strength dwells well in the deployment of largely unutilized primary sources that underpin its central argument which aims to open genuine scholarly debate on the prevalent discourse representing the Ethiopian revolution.

This research envisages contributing to both the on-going discussions that broadly focus on revolutions at the theoretical level within the academia and the processes of reconciling historical wrongs in Ethiopia at the practical level within the polarized political spectrum. As far as the contribution tied to the scholarship is concerned the present research joins the discussion by laying a formidable ground to re-examine the established insights that the prevalent literature has taken for granted *vis-à-vis* the Ethiopian revolution. Anchored to this, the other side of the contribution aims to practically connect the empirical findings this research underscores to the maturing political complexity in Ethiopia. The state formation processes could, henceforth, be understood more in an all-inclusive manner by acknowledging the indispensable contributions of the largely marginalized segment of contemporary Ethiopia's polity. This unity in theory and practice, foreign to the previous

works on the Ethiopian revolution, is the single most important contribution of the research in question.

The first chapter covers an integrated presentation of revolutions and theoretical background in reading revolutions. Brief review of major world revolutions and the Ethiopian revolutions are discussed under two major categories of theorizing revolution studies; structuralist and culturalist. In doing so the theoretical approach to study the Ethiopian revolution from new perspective is discussed under this chapter. A detail discussion on methodological aspects of the research is done in this chapter of the thesis. The conventional making factors of the Ethiopian revolution is the second chapter of this thesis which covers the feudal paradigm, the quest for socialist order and questions of nationalities through critical analysis of the then Ethiopian social structure and the politics of the time locally and globally. The main themes for this research are presented in the last two chapters analysing the actual making factors of the Ethiopian revolutions that brought the beginning of revolutionary struggles all over the country and the end of the monarchical regime. Secessionist movements, struggle for self-determination, struggle for autonomy and recognition are covered under the third chapter while the framing process and the spatial, temporal and agency factors affecting the narrative of compromised making factors in relation to the conventional ones are discussed in the last chapter. Although independent revolutionary making factors are discussed independently, this research will also challenge prior belief on the causes of Ethiopian revolution through comparative historical analysis of the pre revolution Ethiopian social, political and economic conditions. And therefore, the prime focus and what this study consistently argued is on the importance of taking the whole picture of the revolution so that previous objects of explanation didn't become the ultimate explanatory factors of the revolution.



CHAPTER ONE

READING REVOLUTIONS: CONFLICTING NARRATIVES AND ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION

The inconsistency in dynamics of various social revolutions in the world made researchers skeptical on the applicability of a given theory in revolution study for different revolutions. In the comparative analysis of revolutions in France, Russia and China; Theda Skopkol argued this skepticisms as “Social-scientific categorizations of a given society as "traditional" or "feudal" or explaining the causes of revolutions in a country could only be understood by looking at the specific interrelations of class and state structures and the complex interplay over time of domestic and international developments” (1979: xiii). Before setting theoretical framework for this study and categorizing; generally revolutionary studies and specifically the Ethiopian revolution in theoretical perspectives, it is necessary to review some of the most important theoretical approaches that have been shaping the common and scholarly understanding of revolution and revolutionary movements.

The aim of discussing theoretical background in this study is not to develop a totalizing theory that accounts for every potential variable, but to derive a model which can answer the foundational questions related to the specific aspects of the revolutionary movements under this study. This is mainly for two reasons; one, any particular theory in collective action research is incapable of accurately depicting all dimensions of a given revolutionary movement and there should be either synthesizing different theories or selecting the most appropriate theoretical approach for the specific dimension the researcher wants to cover. Second, discussing these theoretical approaches have also profound role to understand on what theoretical assumptions previous works about the Ethiopian revolution went through and came to the conclusion they forwarded. Because, due to their action and reactionary nature, revolutionary movements have also been considered differently in different time and contexts and this is an important case to consider while analyzing the convergence and divergence of research findings on the same movement.

In order to understand the relative importance of the theoretical framework selected for this research, two major categories of theoretical explanation for revolutionary studies are

presented and the two categories further elaborated by integrating with the relevant literatures on the revolutions in general and specifically with Ethiopian revolution and how these works framed their theoretical approaches. Though we do have vast literatures on theoretical approaches to social and revolutionary movements, this section put separate theoretical approaches within two categories based on their common characteristics. Setting the two broad categories is basically done based on mapping the whole theoretical terrain in revolution study through comparison of social structural theories with cultural and agency-based theories (Timothy, 2005: 38).

1.1. Categorizing Conflicting Theoretical Narratives on Revolutions

Theoretical approaches in collective actions and revolutionary movements fundamentally changed with time, types of revolutionary movements and actors in collective actions for social change. In the mid of the 20th century the dominant structural orientation in revolutionary studies challenged by social psychology and collective behavior theories a decade later in 1960s. Social structural theory was a fruit of these period significantly influenced revolutionary studies during the 1970s. Constructivism also reshaped revolutionary studies towards discourse analysis in 1980s and 1990s. A dynamic shift also observed in 1990s referring to conceptual gaps in the previous approaches and bringing framing concepts to collective action studies.

The study of all continuous politics and mainly revolutionary studies showed major shift from the once Marxist based thought of grievance and purely structural perspective to framing, the discourse, and the emotions in collective action. Although more recent scholarly works seems to bring new perspectives in the study of revolution, all can be recalled to Marx in the case of uprising against manipulative or inefficient state structures or to Lenin's organization theory when the center of the debate is based on what mobilization strategies and for what movement incentives individuals and groups participate in collective action. Whereas, the new turn in the last two decades that transform the focus of revolutionary movements from structural factors to the framing and the discourse which is again a birth of constructivists and culturally sensitive work in the 1980s and 1990s is connected with Gramsci's interest in culture (Sidney and Tarrow, 2011: 25). And therefore, latest developments and categorization of revolutionary studies to one

or another theoretical framework are more or less derivatives of these conceptions of revolution.

With all the difficulties in making explicit parallel, major theories in social and revolutionary movement studies can be categorized in either of the structuralist or constructivist approaches. Although Marxist understanding of revolution was predominantly focused on the supposed endemic structural contradiction within the capitalist system that makes revolution inevitable; state and system centric analysis of revolution in the latter times like that of modernization school of thought are also typically structuralists by their nature. There are also other approaches apparently different from the structuralists but share major features with them especially in their attitude towards undermining the role of agency in revolutionary movements and outcomes. Still by softening Marx's fixation on class and Lenin's belief in an elite vanguard; collective behaviour and resource mobilization theorists are of structuralist in their understanding of revolutionary movements.

Specific types of theories like those with individualistic accounts (Blumer, 1969: 9-11) that have tended to view collective action as the product of the psychological differences of individuals are not far from this structuralist perspective since their main target is to find out the structural and psychological incentives that trigger individuals to participate in revolutionary movements (Hjelmar, 1996: 170-171). The study of revolutions is therefore can be said entered a period in which older theoretical assumptions have been partly undone and no consensus yet exists about the relative importance of new theoretical approach to capture revolution studies. While the social structure theory is the landmark contribution in the study of revolution at state level of analysis, cultural and agency-based approaches is practically the cutting age of revolution studies that brought ideas, actors and their conceptions to center stage in the study of revolution at system level of analysis (Foran, 2005: 4-6). In this way, reading revolutions in general and the literature review on the Ethiopian revolution in particular is discussed based on their alignment to either of the two frameworks. However the discussion will be a critical observation of major revolutionary studies and the Ethiopian revolution to show how oversimplified attachment with structural factors and selective adoption of cultural analytical tools distorted the actual essence of a given revolution.

1.1.1. Oversimplification of Structuralist Approaches

There is no any single group that represents the 'structure' in structuralist perspective of revolution. The structure can be the bigger world order or inter-state relations. It can also be class-state relation or specific classes such as economic, ethnic, and religious or any other form of organization (Timothy, 2005: 37).

By social structuralist here it is an umbrella of various theories holding state centre, structural and social structure theory of revolutions. State centred theories are one side of the story in structuralists' perception of a revolution. For instance, it includes several variants like theories of state-autonomy that enables to produce its own interest and identity on the polity, the state-capacity basically known as state's infrastructure; the political opportunity comes from the permeability of state structures that provide incentives for revolutionary movements. What can simply be described as state-constructivist approaches in which state produce its identities on non-state actors in which the combination of all these shape, enable, or constrain organized struggles to seize or alter power are important elements (Goodwin, 2001: 9). On the other side of the continuum there exists structural theory literally speaking focusing on the relationships between crucial social classes or units in theorizing revolution (Timothy, 2005: 36).

The structural opportunities for state centric analysts are either the openness or closeness of the state system to be challenged by popular uprising (McAdam, 1982: 2-17). However state centred approaches to revolution are challenged for they neglect the fact that societies affect states as strong as states affect societies in which societies do not necessarily depend on state weakness to revolt. But the most important element this approach criticized is it pushed culture, resource and networks in the periphery of making factors as separate variables and ignore the cultural dimension of social action that brought revolution (Goodwin, 2001: 28).

Following this line of theoretical approaches the historical cases of France, Russia and China, the unfolding of social revolution was depended "upon the emergence of revolutionary crises occasioned by the incapacitation of administrative and military organizations. That incapacitation, in turn, is best explained not as a function of mass discontent and mobilization, but as a function of a combination of pressures on state

institutions from more modernized countries abroad, and built-in structural incapacities to mobilize increased resources in response to those pressures” (Skocpol, 1997: 138). However the fixation on structures and institutions could not answer why revolutionary movements in Europe, Southeast Asia, later in Latin America countries and in Africa differ from one another other and from countries with similar socioeconomic conditions. Still the distinctiveness of Latin America phenomenon in which neither the revolutionaries nor the government could prevail nor more peculiar upheaval in Eastern Europe couldn't be analyzed and compared with that of Latin America and South East Asia only in structural theoretical orientation (Goodwin, 2001: 102).

The modernization schools are not far from the structural interpretation of revolution. Revolution under this theory is a temporal pattern that comes between the transitions from traditional society to the modern one (Almond, 1973: 57). These views of modernisation theory consider the ultimate conflict between traditional authority holders and the modernising state as a revolutionary situation. Modernisation alter the traditional social structure, networks, values and privileges that automatically contradict with the interest of the traditional leaders who want to hang on power to maintain their benefit from the cultural and hereditary social structures. The second and most common modernization theory of revolution focused on the quest for modern state and modernized social, economic and political systems by the societies that might become out of the interest or capacity of the old regime and therefore the discontent will result in popular uprisings and revolutionary movements (Huntington, 1973: 34).

Similar to the way how the Marx's argument that discontents due to the economic changes in the capitalist system assumption to create working class revolution found not a sufficient condition in the absence of change in value and structure that create a total social disruption which is not limited to economy. Scholars also extend this theory in that the contention as a result of social disruption must be accompanied by effective mobilization by movement leaders to acquire power so that modernization could lead to revolution (Huntington, 1973: 37; (Tilly, 1997: 3-45).

The modernization schools in revolution study builds up on two important premises; either the presence of change resistant traditional society and nobility or the absence of modern state in the face of rapidly changing world and societies demanding for a modern state and

livelihood. However the Ethiopian case is taken as a result of the inability of the state to maintain the extremely expensive expenses of the modernizing military and civilian bureaucracy (Andargachew, 1995: 11). However, this is still more of a naturalist perspective of the crumbling of the state as a result of natural decay of its structures that can no more generate the necessary political ideas and expand socio-economic system to maintain the changing system.

Still in the same school of thought, Gebru Tareke is among the leading scholar who is worse to mention in his attempt to narrate the Ethiopian revolution as a revolution of peasant rebellion against a modernization effort of the monarch. In his view the revolution is partially a result of discontents by frustrated landed, in fact the then political forces, against the agrarian reforms and effort to modernise the autocratic Hilesilasse's regime that latter disrupt the social and economic relations Tareke (1991: 19-20) explained this phenomenon as:

“Modernizing autocracy was unresponsive to the problems and needs of rural Ethiopia. Subsistence farming remained virtually unaltered. The augmentation in the obligations of the population was not offset by improvements in the techniques and organization of production. The economic conditions of the peasantry steadily worsened. This agrarian crisis was the cumulative result of physical limitations, technical backwardness, a grossly inequitable system of landholding, and insufficient capital investment in the agricultural sector that provided for more than 85 percent of employment and more than 90 percent of exports.”

Modernization theory faces two major criticisms. First, since different paths existed for states in their process of modernization, the theorization of modernization in revolutionary study is far from providing a tool that can be generalized as a research framework (Moore, 1974: 159-160). Similarly in the presence of smooth transition to modernization and the possibility of observing revolution with no sign of modernization as it happened in Latin America and some parts of Africa, modernization found to lack a direct relation with revolution.

Among the state centre understanding of revolution, Tocquevillean perspective of collective action covers two important dimensions. The first is the structural opportunities for revolutionary movements where the state and its structures became defenceless from being continuously altered through popular political pressures and uprisings. The second is the public awareness that arise from the loss of confidence on the state and their sentiment

on how much opportunity existed for organised protest (Tocqueville, 1985: 15). Even revolution is not the fate of only weak states but, Goodwin argued, strong states may prompt revolutionary movements through indirect ways such as Exclusion of mobilized groups from state power or resources that become fertile ground for organized opposition movement or due to indiscriminate violence against protesters which makes all radical at the same time (Goodwin, 2001: 18). The idea here is it is not only the structural weakness that can precipitate a revolution or the popular perception of opportunity to revolt, but it is the effective combination of these two objective and subjective opportunities that can determine the degree of success or failure of a given revolution. And any mismatch between the two opportunities has series implication on revolutionary study both at process and outcome level. At process level the mismatch will result either in the emergence of revolutionary movements before the revolutionary situations get ripen enough and consequently in the total collapse or over prolonged and costly revolutionary movements. Similarly in terms of revolutionary outcomes the significance of the revolution will be interpreted taking one side of the story as a leading factor whereby significantly affecting post-revolutionary socio-political and economic status of the societies.

Within the structuralist domain there exists another perspective known as the natural history of revolution. The main point under this school is although prior to a revolution all section of the society might protest and struggle against the regime, the fall of the old regime will be mainly due to its natural (structural) problem to address some of the acute problems such as economic, social, political problems. In this sense it is meant that old regime always die of a biological death due to the biological decay of its structures and policies (Miller, 2011: 5,10). However the major critique commonly aimed at this theory is that “they merely describe the process of revolution; they do not explain why revolutions occur” (Foran, 2005: 8).

The natural history of revolution approaches revolution from the procedural perspectives from ‘prior to revolutions’ to ‘re-emergence of moderate forces to power’ while taking the phenomenon in between; various reforms, outbreaks, conflicts and state crisis within revolutionaries and confiscation of powers by different actors as a default processes to any revolutions. Radicalization of revolutionary elements as a result of coercive measures by actors in power in post revolution countries also considered as a natural order until

“Eventually things settle down and pragmatic moderates regain power” so that stable state transformation achieved (Goldstone, 2003: 56; Foran, 2005: 8-9).

The natural history assumption in the Ethiopian revolution applied by scholars is not to legitimize the uprisings as a legitimate move against the already decaying monarchical structure rather contrary to this the theory is used to discredit the magnitude of the revolutionary movements and attribute the fall of the old regime only as a result of its crisis. It has been argued that the internal and external factors couldn't bring the desired change had Haile Selassie's autocracy not rocked at its head where the monarch become continuously failing to employ even his old skills and the available structures which finally the total monopoly of power by the Monarch left the total collapse of the regime without any successor (Andargachew, 1995: 57-59; Messay, 2011: 173).

In the Ethiopian context, the justification for structuralists' oversimplification was not only a matter of describing the revolution based on their Marxist understanding of Ethiopian social structure but further went to legitimize the brutal action of the military junta in post-revolutionary Ethiopia as a natural phenomenon comes from the immature revolutionary classes and the necessary evil for the realization of socialism (Hiwot, 1975: 92). Once the struggle was to make sure the sustenance of socialist structure on the death of the feudal one, the post revolution military government was considered as a genuine socialist and authors excuse the junta as 'he was obliged to use force against the left' (Harbeson, 1977: 233).

Among the reasons for the radicalization of the student movement was the structuralists have not been willing to incorporate any new culturalist interpretation of the revolution. What the Ethiopian revolution for them was a structural failure of bureaucratic capitalism that produced various class strata enough to create the ultimate class conflict. Beyond this any religious and national agendas are side line issues that can be entertained after the socialist revolution was realised. The structuralists defend their approach as it is the only path to take the revolution in a way that cannot be molded to the actors' purposes but focused on the goals of the revolution itself. In this way the movement actors in one way pushed off agendas other than the agenda of their own as something personal, sectarian and incapable to be integrated with in the revolution and in the other way they amplify the way

they frame the revolution as the only true frame that can be given (Hiwot 1976, Molyneux and Halliday 1981).

The breakthrough in revolution study in 1970s and 80s by Theda Skocpol's work brought new version of structural approach to revolution study which is called Social-Structural theory. This theory expand the previous two structural approaches; discontent created by reforms in the process of modernization and the presence of movement actors to mobilize the mass using such discontents by adding a third factor which Skocpol called it international pressure from a more advanced state or states. Not leaving the structural line of thought Skocpol argued that in addition to the pressure from the international community there must be political and economic elite to resist state led reforms and traditional or formal organization to mobilize the peasants for any successful revolution to happen. According to this theory the absence of anyone of these factors makes the situation less revolutionary (Skocpol, 1979: 15). In a self-contradiction theorization of revolutions, what is commonly termed as 'Third world revolution' explain the cause of revolutions in the third world not a natural process of state fragmentation like the natural history but that of experiences of growth and modernization in the countries followed by negative repercussions for specific groups and classes (Foran, 2005: 19).

But the social structural theory was strongly challenged at the end of the twentieth century by the emergence of multiple revolutions with total or partial deviation from what Skocpol proposed as the three revolutionary conditions. Revolutions in Iran that happened despite the absence of any pressure and with the presence of a strong support from the United States were open deviation from this proposition. The revolutions in Iran and Philippines that has happened even in the absence of peasant rebellion and other deviations made social structural theory no more the guiding framework in revolution studies (Goldstone, 2003: 66). Again in another work Goldstone (2001) forwarded structural response for Skocpol structural theory in that the role of pressures from other powerful nations can bring revolution only when the states are already internally weak as a result of their fiscal policies. The issue of elite challenge in social structure theory was also strongly refuted by the fact that strong state can also resist or even suppress elites influence. Besides the necessity of some form of organization to mobilize peasants taken as important but not necessary condition for revolution as there no formal organization could exist to mobilize the mass in a variety of ways during the revolutionary process.

Aligning to one or another theoretical category with a structuralist orientation, the Ethiopian revolution and the social forces behind the overthrow of the monarch mostly considered as spearheaded by the Ethiopian working class, students, and an assortment of petty-bourgeois elements for a democratic future devoid of feudal backwardness and oppression. This is mainly because of the attachment with the structural theoretical orientation emphasizing the need for some form of elites or organizations to lead revolutionaries where the peasants in Ethiopia couldn't have it. The ultimate objective of the revolution was also wrongly narrated as a power struggle on determining which social class shall wield state power (Andargachew, 1995: 56-59; Clapham, 1989: 4; Michael, 1979: 359).

For the Ethiopian Marxists the reason why decades long rebels and struggles in the periphery remains localized both geographically and politically is lack of political program to make their struggle coherent and conscious in line with the revolutionary theory-in this case Marxism. The rebellion in Bale and Gojam were considered as 'revolutionary uprisings' but not against the system but an aspect of the system only (EPRP, 1981: 3). In this case the system is the already overemphasized feudalism and the rebels are taken as struggling part of the feudal system but not the system itself due to the level of their class struggle and therefore they are not a full scale revolutionary movements.

With all the disparities in their nature, structuralists in the Ethiopian revolution study have made two miscalculations. On the one hand the absence of class based societal stratification and class struggle that existed in revolutions in Europe can be taken as one potential indicator for the structuralists oversimplification of the Ethiopian revolution. However, from state power perspective the state was not also vulnerable at that time to such kinds of pressures as power was typically consolidated on the monarch and the military. Those classes supposed to bring the revolution also used to believe the coercive force of the state was intact. Second it was the struggles mainly from peripheries which was not a class based struggle that started to weaken the political and material status of the state whereby leading to the emergence of revolutionary situations.

The other noticeable oversimplification of the structuralist is their overt enumeration of structural factors such as military defeat or defect, internal split, economic downturns, excessive state debt or fiscal strain as conditions that brought the state weakness naturally without focusing on the causes that produce them. The military defect or weakness by itself had root causes that directly related with peasant rebellions and armed struggles by liberation fronts; the internal split is also emanates from the emergence of internal opposition due to the erratic or excessive repression by rulers on one or another areas and society in a selective manner. The oversimplification here tends to ignore may be the most important factors in casual analysis in the study of the revolution.

Fixation on the structural measurement of the Ethiopian revolution was one of the main causes for the disintegration of the leftist opposition parties on the agenda of characterizing the Dergue. Not considering the major transformation Dergue was bringing in all dimensions, the main leftist opposition and major player in the revolutionary process, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), radically rejected the socialist revolutionary characteristics of the Derg and continuously endorsed the counterrevolutionary role of the Dergue (Mesay, 2001: 7). Same counterrevolutionary character was also given for the Dergue due to the excessive monopolization of power and extreme brutality to the extent the regimes was termed as a fascist regime (Markakis, 1979: 10), (EPRP, 1981: 4). The decision by MEISON was different only in form while it was similar in its essence. MEISON was committed to work with the Dergue despite their strategic difference. However the basic assumption MEISON held was Derg is ideologically a socialist regime but need assistance in the restructuring process of the class relationship. And later the emergence of the conflict which MEISON face the fate of other leftist oppositions in the face of Dergue's brutality was partly resulted from their opposition of Dergue's Policies due to the structural way examination on every policies to be implemented. The same is true for the terrible conflicts within the EPRP. The internal struggle was more of for power competition and structural framing of every Ethiopian situation in which some tried to give reality based proposals while others fix on the structural framing that latter ends up in internal strife (Tefferu, 2012: 421).

Extreme attachment with classes also found in another work where the alliance that was crucial to dissolve the imperial regime and still necessary at the stage where the development of the revolution is too infant was constrained by the narrow class interest of

the petty bourgeoisie (Warr, 1981: 122). Here by petty bourgeoisie it is meant the radical left student movement that latter gave birth EPRP. Though radical in their move the main campaign of the leftist were the immediate establishment of the government of the people and genuine implementation of socialism. However like the pre-revolutionary movements were characterized solely as a class struggle here too new class differentiation attributed for two radical groups of the same class. While the red terror was Dergue's brutality against civilians, Michel presented it as a struggle of antagonistic forms of opposing class interests and all names given for the brutality was mere propaganda.

The structuralists also take the Ethiopian revolution as a matter of only series of urban uprisings of different sections of the community over the first six months of 1974 and detach what has been happening in the periphery out of the revolutionary movements. Andargachew is among this category and detach the decades long struggles by the peasants and nomads from the mainstream revolutionary movement that directly contributed to the decline of the both the ancient regime and the monarch on account of spatial and temporal differences from that of urban uprisings. It is true that the first six months of 1974 was the peak hour of the Ethiopian revolution (Andargachew, 1995: 55). Nevertheless, it was part of the structuralists oversimplification of what a revolution is and who the actors in the revolutionary movements.

The other approach the structuralists followed to externalize the revolts and rebellions out of the revolutionary movement are giving the revolution urban characteristics and only the matters of few enlighten urban dwellers. As a matter of time, the political consciousness of the intellectuals that are expected to give scientific analysis for the class struggles were not there in the 1940's and emerged only after 1960s. The effort to evaluate the decade's long rebels with Marxist theory can neither reflect the real essence of the struggles nor made Marxism the right choice to analyze them. Andargachew (1995: 55-56) presents a good summary of who the urban revolutionaries are. Accordingly, being an urban uprising, the 1974 revolution was not more than the issue of 3 million urban residents out of the 32 million total populations of the then Ethiopia. This figure is further narrowed when dissecting the exact participants of strikes and protests as uprisings of 100,000 civil servants including teachers that can form unions, 55, 000 army members including territorial armies and the police force, 70,000 enrolled in schools and 6,000 university

students totally can account maximum of 300,000 section of the community. In fact it is this simplicity that structuralists always take the right social issues to their wrong direction.

In all cases the challenge for the structuralists in Ethiopian revolution didn't arise only from their inability to link what happened in Ethiopia with the theoretical aspect but from their failure to establish a linkage or at least show similar characteristics of the revolutions in Europe & Asia and the one happening in Ethiopia. The existence of proletariat, the emergence of working class and the possibility of organized urban struggles on the basis of class division as preconditions for the development of successful socialist revolution was not existed or could not be developed to full scale socialist revolutionary conditions in Ethiopia. The presence of feudal land lords was not also a national phenomenon and Muslims were more affected by the ruler-ruled relationship that emanated from the center not by the class division within the society. For the revolutionaries Muslims were not conducive to organize under class struggle since the issues of religious freedom transcend both class and ethnicity. It was this crucial aspect of religious based struggles that made the revolutionaries to ignore it while framing the revolution agendas. In fact it was completely against the objective and strategy of the supposed socialist revolution since classless Muslim society cannot be considered as revolutionary force from their perspective of a revolution.

1.1.2. Revivalism of Culturalist Theoretical Approaches

At the end of the twentieth century revolutionary studies almost absorbed or blended with social movement studies and the latter contributed much on new converging approaches to revolution and social movement studies as single revolutionary-movement study. New and emergent approaches prevailed where Culturalists and constructivists call for incorporation of culture, ideology and framing but neither for their structural implications to make the revolution nor based on their effect in post revolution power relation following the collapse of the old regime, rather as what they are by themselves for their irreducible role in overall revolutionary study (Tilly, 1997: 42; Timothy, 2005: 36-37). Culturalists focus not only on how to make revolution but also to entangle factors that give us our prior image of revolutions and the role of ideologies and framing in the process. This new approach is at the same time a significant deviation in understanding causes of revolutions in an effort to demonstrate the structuralist way of simply listing conditions for revolution didn't work

since there must be some mechanisms to investigate how different causes concatenate each other and find out the cause-effect relationship in revolution study (Goldstone, 2003: 77).

By cultural approach it is to mean the sociological and anthropological base of a certain movement where local contexts; religion is one crucial factor, can be considered as key role players in understanding the bigger movement. More importantly the denial of proper focus for cultural base of the revolution became the basic reason for the over centralisation of revolutionary agendas by century old conception of revolution. Given its grounding on a country's history and culture, the culturalist version is more sensitive to the nuances of the political process that alienate certain cultures while supporting the other. However as a result of the dominance of state-centred analysis on the Ethiopian revolution, cultural approaches have been less visible in the academic circle. The need for the integration of cultural component in to the narration of Ethiopian revolution is not to elevate sectarian agenda like religious ideology by suspending underlying structural conditions but to demonstrate how the revolution differ in terms of its process and perception of the outcome by looking from different perspective .

In the 1960s and a decade before, social psychology mainly collective behaviour theorists dominated the intellectual arena in shaping understandings of social and revolutionary movements. Collective behaviourists view revolutionary movements as non-routine forms of collective action geared toward social change. Since it primarily focuses on collective actions, its main role in revolutionary movement study is to identify the origins of movements at individual level (Morris & Herring, 1984: 12).

This theory has powerful elements that can help to describe how individuals mobilised and struggled collectively at the grass root level. The theory also emphasized the role of social isolation, marginalization and relative deprivation to facilitate individual recruitment into social movement activity and the emergence of a movement (Bosi, 2007: 40). Be it class contradiction between the proletarian and capitalist, the peasant and the landlord, a contradiction between privileged and less privileged societies or frustrated urban mass; sense of marginalization and deprivation are at the heart of all forms of contradiction that made collective behaviour theory a good choice for this study. However, by considering revolutionary movements as a non-routine action, the theory is handicapped when it comes to social problems with viscous circles nature and especially movements that continued for

decades due to many but totally interrelated causes. The basic limitation of this theory is it considers movement participants as crowds of aggregated individuals and attribute movements with amorphous and poorly organized actions (Turner & Killian, 1957:279). This aspect of the theory is similar with that of relative deprivation theory which parallels collective actions with mass societies' response for blockade of legitimate feelings of deprivation by an external power especially by political authorities (Flynn, 2011). The relative deprivation theory is important to examine the genesis of political violence but do not focus on the dynamics of such violence and which aspect of the violence help or hinder the emergence of movements. Its focus on political violence while not analysing other forms of political protest will make this theory too narrow to talk with larger movements similar to our case (Morris & Herring, 1984: 6).

Resource mobilization theory shifts the attention of researchers from why movements occur to the how part with strong rejection of the collective behaviour theorists' argument. Frustration and feelings of deprivation can play big role for movement participation but portraying revolutionary movements as irrational crowd actions which depends on discontents only is far from the reality of revolutions (Flynn, 2011). According to this theory participants are intentionally deciding by their own, not by crowd behaviour, to participate for the collective goods and incentives to gain by participating. The theory challenges the traditional social psychology approach of collective behaviour in revolutionary movement and build on the centrality of various types of resources including money, organizations, manpower, technology, means of communication, mass media; and non-material resource like legitimacy and charismatic leader both for participant mobilization and for the movement itself to be realised (Fuchs, 2006). Nonetheless, theorization of revolutionary movements merely as a collective action and pushing factors for participation like resources unable to capture the real essence of complex movements and of the Ethiopian nature. Because revolutionary movements in Ethiopia have different dimensions with their unique formal, semi-formal, and informal structures sometimes with clandestine nature of organization and participation of diverse societies at national level. These movements also vary in their degree of organizations and the period of time went through struggle. The movements' relationship with the political system and historical facts in the country make them difficult to study them using this theoretical approach.

A dynamic shift from the once resolutely structuralist field of revolutionary studies happened when culturally sensitive work came out in the 1980s and 1990s. This shift has two basic aspects; one like Gramsci, framing and collective identity theorists of the 1980s and 1990s focused on the sources of consensus in revolutionary movements. Second political process theorists followed Tilly's lead in focusing on the political opportunities and constraints that structure contentious politics since 1970s (Sidney & Tarrow, 2011: 22). As a result there were potential influences to shift study of collective action from structural interpretation.

The concept of "moral economy" by James Scott Thompson taking laborers' revolt as one example was one "cultural turn" from class perspectives of revolts. Laborers do not revolt only as a result of their economic grievance but due to the sense of injustice they felt as a result of discriminatory laws and the minimum wage (1976: 135). The same shift is observed in the studies of Latin American Revolutions. Revolutionary movements, however, are not simply or exclusively a response to economic exploitation or inequality, but also and directly a response to political oppression and violence, typically of brutal and indiscriminate (Goodwin, 2001: 3). Such practical shifts in interpretation of revolts and revolutionary movements can be considered as a major cultural turn in revolutionary studies which is termed here as constructivist turn. Erving Goffman's concept of framing and attribution of movements more of from emotion-laden ideological views than mere grievances have a profound effect on the knowledge accumulation of this new turn in revolutionary study (Benford 1994; Goffman, 1974: 113).

For political opportunity and framing theorists, it is not only grievance and resource needed for a revolutionary movement but so is the framing of grievances in to forms of injustice and opportunity to bring the feelings on board. The political opportunity coupled with the framing process has wide acceptance and taken as crucial necessity that make the emergence of revolutionary movements possible (Kriese, 1995: 168). For the political opportunity theorists there must be a political signal and atmosphere which either encourage or discourage actors for the emergence and continuity of a movement. But these opportunities may not necessarily be permanent or prevalent at national level (Tarrow, 1996). Authors specially consider the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system and the presence of elite allies during the revolutionary process as crucial for integration or abandoning of a certain agenda in to the agendas of a given revolution

(Kriese, 1995: 171). Depending on these dimensions, the scholarly debate on the applicability of this theory is continued.

In democratic system the political openness; numerous institutional locations such as legislatures, judiciaries, executives, and bureaucracies, access to policy-makers may be considered as part of the political opportunities for revolutionary movements (Flynn, 2011). On the other hand the relation between an oppressive state policy and the strength of movement mobilizes toward standing up to state repression that can upset the power balance considered as a political opportunity for motivation and mobilization of social and revolutionary movements in non-democratic countries (McAdam & Scott, 2005: 11). Therefore, political opportunities vary in democratic and non-democratic countries critically but don't necessarily mean that one gives more opportunity than the other. Political opportunity theory seems more important to this particular study as it can describe the internal and external dynamics in movement formulation. Moreover political opportunity is a significant factor for actors to shape their goals, timing and strategies before and in the process of the movement.

It's clear that political opportunity theory provides comprehensive understanding of revolutionary movements and the communities that they foster. It can also navigate the micro-, meso-, and macro-analytical levels in the movement formation. However, similar to early theories of collective action and resource mobilization which focused on broad social conditions that thought to produce revolutionary movements, political opportunity is also focused more of on external dimensions of movements. Therefore, this theory alone cannot do the job that we want to deal with under this study. And even what we call it political opportunities are subject to interpretation and are often matters of controversy among actors. The other main complaint against political opportunity theory is that political opportunity concepts are not consistently defined, due to its excessive privilege for political system and structures it often neglects agency (Gamson & Meyer, 1996: 4-5). But more importantly this theory has more of explanatory values that lack analytic and predictive power which are critical to this study (Flynn, 2011).

The then socialist & revolutionary political ideology, political opportunities as a result of similar student movements globally, the various class contradictions and the weakening of the imperial regime as a result of these confrontations are important political opportunities

for all movements in that time. But with this theory we cannot proceed beyond analysing the existing political opportunities and how they affect the revolutionary movements. For the movement agendas and the process of incorporation in to the actual revolution need additional perspectives. There were various political opportunities for the emergence and survival of revolutionary movements as a result of the national oppression against Muslim societies in all aspects. However, the Ethiopian revolution couldn't happen to include this important variable in their main agenda since framing process is much important than the mobilizing factors and the political opportunity to mobilise. The question of how and why the existing religious oppression externalised from being main concern of the movement actors of the Ethiopian revolution can best be addressed with combined application of political opportunity with a framing theory.

1.2. Framing Theory and the Ethiopian Revolution

One of the challenges in studying revolutions is the multivocality of theories and approaches followed by analysts of revolutionary movements towards similar phenomenon. While social movement analysts stressed on the origins, social bases and dynamics of the phenomena that can generally be called revolutionary situations, revolution studies focused mainly on the structural-underpinnings of origin and outcomes of a macro movement with lesser emphasis on the dynamics of individual movements that brought the revolution (Sidney & Tarrow, 2011: 133). But such methodological dichotomy is creating a huge gap in grasping the whole picture of a revolution because as a result of their interest in substantive specialization, students of social movements and of revolutions have failed to recognize that both of these belong on the same causal continuum (Morris & Herring, 1984: 66).

Casual inferences about the Ethiopian revolution and such engagements on macro-level structures and processes generally required careful selection of finite set of cases from the numerous possible cases that can explain the revolution. In order to do this standardized sampling procedures taking the revolution as dependent variables and causes as independent variables will not be fruitful. The inapplicability of mere sampling and the effectiveness of rigorous examination of selected in revolution studies give the initially selected cases a potential variable to define the revolution itself (Goldstone, 2003: 51). As case selection is primarily important in revolution studies, researchers should have

theoretically grounded arguments to justify their case selections, including their own theoretical frameworks (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003: 18). The main concern here in selecting cases is how far I can convincingly explain the relevance of these cases to give new insight about the revolution in line with the objective of the study and in comparison with the dominantly entertained cases as main causes of the Ethiopian revolution.

There is a growing misunderstanding on the cases that can be chosen for comparative purposes in revolution studies due to the fact that comparative historical analysis in revolution studies is widely used by scholars to revolutions in comparative approach across nations within one or more than one continents (Moore, 1974: 485; Skocpol, 1979: 41). However case selection within this method is usually corresponding to the subject matter and problem formulation of the researcher (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003: 14). The subject matter for such studies are also need not to take nation states as the ultimate units of analysis or limited on cases based on mere geographic boundaries, may be in terms of federal states or other forms to make cases as qualified unit of analysis since the "cases" chosen for comparison can vary greatly (Gamson 1994). Even classic researchers studied large-scale contention and social & revolutionary movements using comparative historical methods but they never base their case selection on territory rather considered socially constructed and those culturally delineated groups as their element of comparison. There are also studies specifically focused on a specific geographic unit but follow more systematic comparison of cases selected based on their temporal sequences (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2002: 193; Tilly 1975).

Contradictory narrations about a certain revolution which is not unique for Ethiopian revolution are a result of developments of theoretical explanation of what a revolution is and the level of analysis changing with time producing different explanations for a single revolution. By the time violence against authorities was the only option to resist and change the system, any level of change in values, institutions and societies were found less explanatory for what a revolution is. The French revolution of 1789 and more of the Russian revolution of 1917 contributed for such type of images of a revolution taking sudden changes of a government through violence and popular uprisings as a revolution. Besides, the multiple theories employed in studying revolutions contributed for these diverse narratives (Goldstone, 2003: 52; Foran, 2005: 252; Morris and Herring, 1984: 66-68; Skocpol, 1994: 311)

In this way social revolutions during the earlier world-historical phases of modernization in agrarian community or in those economically modern nations started to lack the legitimacy of having a common name as revolution. In every post revolution phases of a given country the debate on the cause, process and outcome of that specific revolution is became diverse to the extent of denying the occurrence of the revolution itself. It is common to see what many historians called the British Revolution is at the same time termed as the English Civil War, a rebellion, a political crisis that got out of hand whereas the same revolution also called the first true revolution in world history (Richards, 2004: 11). The English revolution of 1640 was successful in bringing the monopoly of the Church of England and House of Lords to end as a significant institutional transformation but since they were all restored and keep their power later and the debate on the nature and success of the English revolution remained controversial. Similarly with their potential attributes to be taken as revolutionary movements, most of the guerrilla movements in Latin America were not successful to transform the system and their society (Goldstone, 2003: 54). It is from this same narrative divergence that the major social revolutions of France, Russia and China are attributed as developments of various conjunctures; the collapse or incapacitation of central administrative and military machineries, widespread peasant rebellions and marginal elite political movements (Skocpol, 1994: 138) .

However since more government changes and popular uprisings started to become abundant, the dominant orientation towards defining revolutions started to change and incorporated new elements like dramatic or progressive change in a society's values and institutions and mass active participation (Huntington, 1973: 32). And therefore the trend becomes evaluating how far a revolution brought permanent transformation on the institutions and societies or otherwise questioning the revolutions themselves. Reading a revolution is not therefore an objective presentation of the causative factors and process of a given revolution but the continuous process of narrative production based on the theoretical framework and the approach a researcher followed. Reading the Ethiopian revolution in essence cannot be free of these narrative problems out of theoretical assumption in studying the revolution and actors' role in the process.

The accumulated knowledge in the study of revolution is at the same time accumulated evidences for the continuous changes in understanding and defining what a revolution is over time. A new understanding may be a breakthrough, in perceiving what is and is not a

revolution therefore comes as a challenge for the previous approaches. This new perspective define revolution as an effort to undermine the existing political authority and bring institutional transformation through mobilised mass irrespective of their success but that effort shouldn't necessarily be institutionalised one (Goldstone, 2003: 142). This way of understanding a revolution encompass both successful and unsuccessful revolutions within the scope of revolutionary study as long as the efforts are based on mass mobilization and targeted on changing political authority and their institutions. What is equally important in this approach is it brought the vast majority of revolutionary movements those taking forms of social movements and guerrilla war against the political authority within the scope of revolutionary study and become the bridging line between revolutionary and social movement studies under a common name, revolutionary movements as one form of collective action. Riot, rebellions, social movements and revolution in which actors aimed at changing or claiming a change on other actors with an intention to affect the interest of both sides as a result of the collective struggle also considered as collective action in revolutionary movement (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2002: 4)

During the decade of the 1990s, in search of alternatives to fill a conceptual void in the study of social and revolutionary movements, there has been an almost meteoric acceleration in the conceptual and empirical scholarship on revolutionary movements referring to framing process (Benford & Snow, 1998). Framing theory brought the social constructivist analysis to movement theories emphasizing that meanings given to movements we knew did not necessarily reflect the realities of that time since realities are not fixed, but are interoperated. It also attempts to describe how collective action doesn't mean people's action on their own belief system by acknowledging the fact that revolutionary movements and people's participation is bound within a social and political system that shapes their reality (Lindekilde, 2014: 201).

Framing theory is a useful analytical tool to easily understand how and why movements coalesce. By this theory we are able to understand the nature of movements and illuminate processes of popular consensus and popular support for different ideas and policies. Like that of the political opportunity theory, it helps to explain how social movements illustrate, shape and take advantage of popular sentiments and also shaped by them. By effectively using framing theory we can explain how movement activists successfully mobilize their

mass by giving their agenda an image of well diagnosed problem with proper solution the movement can bring (ibid 2011: 215). This theory clearly transcends the boundaries that limited other theories from moving beyond the description of movements and their tendency to treat meanings or ideas as given, as if there is an isomorphic relationship between the nature of any particular set of conditions or events and the meanings attached to them. Framing theory sought to bring some dynamism to a rather static conceptualization of social movement by earlier theories and help to understand revolutionary movement as an interactive process by which frames are socially constructed, sustained, contested, and altered, the phenomenological and infrastructural constraints on those processes, and the consequences of these processes for aspects of mobilization. In doing so framing theory went further to help analytical tasks of examining the production of meanings no matter what the existing condition is or the relationship between the movement and the conditions at that time (Benford & Snow, 1998).

In an effort to show how movement entrepreneurs use framing theory there is a concept of 'master frame' which explains how movement activists "turn the heads" of movement participants and convince them to see issues a certain way. Based on this premises movement participants draw upon master frames to portray their perceived injustice in ways that fit the tenor of the times and the psychology of the participants. The master frame determines the movement entrepreneurs strategically use frame resonance to link the movement's frame to existing belief systems and cultural values. This is a critically important aspect of the frame theory as it enables to address soft part of social organization like culture and dominant cultural values and their relation with social movements (Benford and Snow 2000; Oliver and Johnston 2000; Snow, et al. 1986).

For a wide range of reasons, the residents of the Ethiopian empire- state long have struggled against the rulers and their system of government. Most analyses of the Ethiopian "problems" that gave rise to the events of February 1974, focus on the immediate grievances of the urban workers, the famine in the north, the student discontent, the balance of international affairs, etc.- all of which played important roles. Too often, there is only passing mention of the unceasing resistance by the nations and nationalities to the efforts to maintain a repressive colonial regime. Outbreaks or uprisings among each of these groups were put down by various means, from military and police force to outright concessions. However, as the situation in the countryside became uncontrollable, the ruling

class became more repressive, which made the masses hit back harder (Ibssa, 1980-81: 81). This is basically not due to lack of evidence to entertain these revolutionary struggles but how the framing of the revolution shaped the presentation of facts of equal importance on the same revolution.

Particularly with respect to the case we are going to analyse, framing theory can be used to explain two significant but conflicting natures of revolutionary movements. Framing theory is crucial to link the movement agenda with the existing culture and dominant ideology. This is specially aimed at convincing the injustice is what that dominant culture accepts as an injustice and the movement goal as a goal in line with the prevailing ideology. By doing so, movement activists will lead the framing process and effectively manipulate the existing system and attitudes. Quite contrary to this, framing theory is the only theory in social and revolutionary movement studies that can expose what aspects of social realities endorsed as movement agenda and what aspects externalised in the name of incompatibility with the existing culture and ideology. Through critical investigation on the framing process researchers can identify the real and perceived causes of revolutionary movements and how those perceived causes got prominence in the process while other real causes are marginalized.

With all its important dimensions and explanatory potential of framing theory, it can never be free of limitation and criticisms. The tendency of framing theory to take ideology as a master frame and tries to merge the earliest and broad concept of ideology with that of frame is strongly criticized. The particular criticism goes to the perceived idea of equating frames and ideology and opponents of this view argue that ideologies are worthy of study in their own right, and that studying ideologies as ideologies involves different questions and different kinds of research than studying them as frames (Oliver & Johnston, 2000). However this charge by itself is partly a sign how far the framing perspective clearly provides analytic leverage in revolutionary movement study.

Framing theory doesn't totally substitute ideology with frame but recognize the fact that earlier literatures on ideology treated ideology in a highly descriptive and relatively static and non-dynamic fashion. How ideology comes into existence and is appropriated by movement actors used to be taken as given which gave wrong perception on the importance of ideology as crucial variable. By taking ideology as one aspect of frame, not

representing it as frame, framing theory gives alternatives to use ideology as important determinant of the kinds of processes and outcomes that movement analysts have sought to explain (Benford & Snow, 1998).

Framing theory gives a wider opportunity to investigate revolutionary movements and is typical for this specific research from various perspectives. It will help to understand how the framing process went at the discursive process level where meanings created and communicated. Strategic process where frames are created purposefully in line with the existing condition and participant attitude can also be identified by employing this theory. And finally as contested process this theory will help us how different stake holders have been contested in the framing process and why. The theory is unique to analyse the basic framing tasks from articulating the master frame to injustice frames and prognostic framing. Determination of how a given movement is characterised by the entrepreneurs and participants and also articulation of a proposed solution to the problem movement entrepreneurs committed to change through the struggle can be done with framing theory.

Therefore this study aims at critically analysing the paradox between the real making factors of the Ethiopian revolution and the framing process that give the revolution what is commonly known as a socialist revolution. The discussion so far was to trigger a discussion on why and how multiple scholarly works evaluated the Ethiopian revolution differently based on their preference to study the revolution. Generally speaking what is known about the Ethiopian revolution has never been free of the popular understanding of revolution based on the developments mainly in Europe and Soviet Unions.

1.3. Discoursing old cases in new Perspective

Revolutions as historical junctures of a given country are highly exposed for reinterpretations as a result of comparative presentation of casual factors of pre-revolutionary situations with that of post-revolutionary phenomenon. And therefore, historical analysis on revolutions usually uncover and challenge what may be considered as the most dominant and historically most important prior belief about causes or casual relationships of the event. Because, prior belief on the cause of the revolution which is shaped by actors involved in it or the politics of the time will not be a guarantee to explain that revolution only within that framework. It is from this perspective that French

revolution, one of the most historically important and most imitated one as a model for Marxist revolution to this date, strikingly interpreted as a revolution realised by lawyers, notaries, military officers, government officials, and recently ennobled aristocrats quite contrary to the strong prior belief of Marxist scholars who explained the French revolution as a revolution of class conflict with capitalists and their supporters as key actors against agrarian monarchies. The 1977–79 revolution in Iran at the same time had been labelled as Islamic revolution while it as considered as a revolution “waged against an autocratic ruler deemed responsible for Iran’s economic and social decay, but also in the name of national autonomy with many Iranians despising the country’s servitude to the West” (Goldstone, 2003: 53; Ritter, 2015: 180)

The effort to categorize three distinct revolution; French, Russian and China revolutions, in one category of ‘revolutions whose state and class structures had not been altered under colonial domination’ is a kind of presenting the pre and post revolution status of state and its structure as important determinant of the revolution. However, Ethiopia with no history of colonization didn’t follow the path of these three countries and the fate of the post revolution Ethiopia is completely different from them. Still having a history free of colonization doesn’t make the French revolution free from labelling as pre-twentieth-century European bourgeois-capitalist or liberal-democratic in nature. Similarly absolutist or proletarian communist revolution was a name given to the Russian revolution whereas the Chinese revolution was totally left out of these two and categorised as third world national-liberation revolution (Skopkol, 1979: xiii)

Deliberation of revolutions as successful or failed revolution or even determination of a given revolution as true social revolution, for structuralists, is based on the specific classes supposed to bring the revolution. The fact that the twentieth century revolutions in France, Russia in 1917, china in 1949 and Cuba in 1959 believed to be with undisputed success while the revolution that overthrew Haile Selassie in Ethiopia in 1974, Afghan Marxists who seized power in 1978, the anti-colonial movements in Algeria, Mozambique and Angola were considered as movements not against internal despots but external usurpers or a revolution made by a handful of military men. This is mainly due to the excessive attachment of revolutions with class and post revolution class based power distribution (Foran, 2005: 32-33).

Besides, what is commonly known as the Arab revolutions between 1920s and 1960s; Egyptian revolutions of 1919 and 1952, the Iraqi revolutions of 1920 and 1958, the Syrian revolutions of 1925-27 and 1963, the Palestinian popular upheaval of 1936-39, the Algerian revolution of 1954-1962, the Libyan revolution of 1969 are important examples from social revolution miss presented as revolution of structural nature. While the religious, ethnic and radical parties emerged out of these cultural dynamics were the major actors playing in the revolution; structural discordances and the resulted conflict between classes that suffered and those who benefited from the processes in the international market resting on large-scale industry in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are considered as the causative agents of these revolutions (Batatu, 1983: 2). Let alone the structural factors, cultural similarities among the Arab countries couldn't be attributed to similar making factors in their path to revolutions.

What framing of revolution, be it in Europe or Asia or that of in the Arab world tells us beyond the current images revolutions took in literatures, studying causes of revolution with in the historical comparative analysis framework needs the researcher's "longer" understanding of the selected cases than the time frame addressed in the study. If the product of a research project covers the 50 years leading up to a given set of revolutions, the researcher should be familiar with the hundreds of years preceding which is still challenging to fix the temporal boundaries due to the potentially never-ending search for the original cause since every cause must have a cause of its own' (Ritter, 2014: 106)

The Ethiopian revolution is may be among the most debated but least understood revolution in Africa. The various explanations about the revolution mainly came from analytic oversimplification which lacks the capacity to give complete sense of the revolution. Most scholarly works engaging on identifying similarities between the Ethiopian revolution and revolutions elsewhere in Europe and Asia forgot to unearth the special and complex nature of the Ethiopian polity and their revolution. The major critics on the Ethiopian revolutions for instance arise from paralleling the revolution with military coup as changes in many of the Afro-Asian countries comes through the considerable involvement of the state superstructures themselves without significant involvement of the mass. Only by 1975 more than 20 of the 46 African states were under the rule of military regimes (Ulyanovsky, 1980: 33).

The basic reason for the presence of various but conflicting interpretation of the Ethiopian revolution is the fact that many of the scholarly works didn't show clear distinction between the general and the particular movements and even scholars didn't specify which aspects of the revolution they are trying to study. Specifying the dimension a given study wants to focus from the complex process of a revolution study has a paramount importance to delineate theoretical frameworks and also specify the nature of conclusion about those phenomena. In searching for more particular and concrete aspect of the revolution, it doesn't mean that such dimension is the most important or the dwarfed aspect but it is alternative way of approaching revolutionary studies. This research is therefore interested in discoursing existing revolutionary cases in new perspectives and reviewing previous literatures both for their content and the paradigm they looked the Ethiopia revolution to come up with the conclusion they forwarded.

1.3.1. Selection of Revolutionary Cases and Revolutionary Situations

The despair, conflicts and wars in Ethiopia was not for a single purpose but for autonomy, freedom, dignity, and an unfettered future depending on the time and the people who were struggling (Tareke, 2009: 1). The different in the purpose for why people feel grievance and struggle for reflected on the way every conflicts shape the political situation and later the revolutionary situation. Therefore different conflicting political sentiments needs separate attention to learn the effect they put on the Ethiopian revolution.

First, focusing on the intent to solve an intriguing puzzle that forced out religion from the framing process with its significant prevalence and continuous influence, cases are selected based on previous works and theoretically grounded arguments. Given the difficulty of generalizing all causes of the Ethiopian revolution, in this study the focus is only on thematically important cases with reasonable relevance for the intended analysis distancing from the group of diverse possible temporal or geographical explanations regarding the same event.

Six revolutionary cases have critical importance to understand the historical injustice made in Ethiopia on three important revolutionary situations. These cases are selected based on a combination of socially constructed groups and temporal sequences of events. Cases selected under these categories are not necessarily among those one can trace them on the

eve of the actual revolution as immediate making factor but by considering them among the precursors of the revolution. Moreover maximum care is taken not to astray from the fact that many social processes are slow-moving in their nature and can cause a social change at macro-level only through developments that happened within a much extended period of time and quite gradually (Pierson, 2003: 192).

Usually comparative historical researchers are trapped into and blamed for determinism and probabilistic explanation of cases (Mahoney, 2003: 340). However, the six cases selected here are purely depending on their continuity in the Ethiopian history and their significant role within the social fabric. The cases are meant only to be taken as explanatory factor of the religious element of Ethiopian political history in general and the Ethiopian revolution in particular. At the same time the intention here is not to give more casual significance to the selected cases than others and determine the Ethiopian revolution as the revolution of religious movements in Ethiopia but to explore the compromised aspects of the revolution in the academic works and popular understanding about the revolution so far.

And therefore, the cases with religious elements are categorized in to three revolutionary situations depending on their nature, geographic location and their degree of attachment with the revolution. The first category is made to incorporate liberation movements and revolts in the north and north eastern part of the country. The Eritrean Liberation Movement with its equivalent history with that of the history of Eritrea and among the major making factor of the Ethiopian revolution is one potential case selected under this category. Other movements in the North like the Raya and Wollo Revolts are selected for their historical significance for century old struggle of Muslims and iconic role of student movements in the region within the larger revolutionary movement. The role of Afar people's revolutionary movements in northern east part of the country is also discussed for their separate role and joint impact together with other movements in the north.

Rebel Groups and religious based movements in the east are important historical phenomenon with in the history of Islam in Ethiopia and are among the major making factors of the revolution. As the region is dominantly Muslim dominated and incorporated to the Ethiopian territory only at the end of the 19th century, struggles and movements in the area have mainly religious base. There are also various types of religious movements

ranging from Islamic political parties to liberation movements that laid significant effect on the emergence of the Ethiopian revolution. The Bale Peasant Rebellion is one important case taken as unit of comparison in which the root cause is originally linked to the history of the Ethiopian state formation and diversity management policy during the process and in the aftermath. Ogaden Liberation Movement that has deep rooted historical causes especially during the time of the last emperor is selected for its significance both to explain the Ethiopian revolution and its continuing importance in the Ethiopian politics to this date. The Kulub-Hannolato Movement around Harar region and political parties around that area that are totally the result of the state diversity management policy towards Muslims in Eastern Ethiopia are also grouped in this category.

Religious based movements in the urban centers with special emphasis on the capital city and other major cities are also selected for their significance in explaining how the framing process of the Ethiopian revolution went the other way despite the existence of major movements at the heart of urban areas. Besides these movements are important since they are the only movements that could get the attention of few scholars as part of the immediate causes of the revolution misrepresented though. Religious Oppression in Southern Ethiopia, a more general case which can otherwise be called supplementary case, is taken as the last group in this category.

The second group comprised of three cases, correctly speaking three issues, which have received the greater emphasis as mainstream formative factors of the Ethiopian revolution since the birth of academic works on the Ethiopian revolution. These are; feudal mode of production, questions of nationalities and the quest for socialist order.

1.3.2. Periodization as Analytical Framework

The profoundly historical nature of comparative historical analysis makes all the procedures within this research prone to the effect of periodization and the critical historical junctures found in the period delineated for the study to cover. In revolution study, given the product of a research project intended to cover a period of half a century back from the actual revolution, the researcher is expected to be familiar with additional one century or more years preceding that revolution (Ritter, 2014: 106). And therefore researchers will exert greater intellectual effort to find a critical juncture potentially

determinant for the study from the never-ending regression of causes. In a period of more than a century, certainly there are multiple historical junctures with different level of attachment with the revolution that can be selected only depending on the subject matter and the theoretical framework of the research.

Katznelson (2003: 4) describe this fact as follows:

“However periodization is not just an ordinary human preference rather an intellectual activity with knowledge of long term historical phenomenon and theoretical foundations on the macro and micro foundations of events with respect to the outcome. This can be partially done through locating actors, as well as categories and networks of actors, in time and space. Periodization didn’t also solely depend on history, but theories of history that probe relations among concepts, cases, and moments are at its very center. Because it is not the action in history that determine its role in the bigger social change but the cases and moments are interrelated in time to be taken as a causative factors.”

Previous works generally on Ethiopian history and specifically on the revolution tends to follow a periodization of events in a way making sure that the advantages of the status quo is unbroken. This approach sometimes build in such a way that some narrations secure absolute legitimacy as the narration of historical phenomenon and limit other societies from bringing alternative narratives that can change the way the outcome is perceived. In this way events are given a strong image of some sort of continuity for the ‘mainstream’ Ethiopian history and legitimacy for the flow of events as conventional way of historiography in Ethiopia. As Katznelson (2003: 29) puts it

“The intense focus on the sources of long and enduring patterns and moments; how the sovereign state was made; how particular regime-types were forged; why particular kinds of bureaucracies were fashioned; why the scope of governmental responsibilities dramatically altered has tended to make subsequent sequences and behaviors seem rather too automatic and derivative.”

Unless there is a new approach towards the subject, the decade’s long tradition of presenting all issues in the old fashion will not be helping in solving new problems.

Given the fundamental role framing played with in the Ethiopian history, the quest for more relevant historical phenomenon for the periodization of the Ethiopian revolution is not a simple task. Especially as every cause have its own cause by itself and value laden framing of these causes in Ethiopian political history are more important that the actual

history, conducting academically genuine selection of historical junctures is critically important.

The same is true what is happened in the Ethiopian revolution studies. Once macro level historical phenomenon set as important juncture within the boundary of the statuesque, the relevance of other events and agencies are analyzed only in reference to these junctures. Therefore despite the great diversity in topics, studies in Ethiopian revolution couldn't yield alternative understandings for the causes and the outcome. However by limiting this study from inexhaustible historical phenomenon and efforts to trace sequential relationship among these phenomenons, I have selected the 1960 coup attempt as the critical juncture for the framing of the Ethiopian revolution for its catalyst role in inspiring the generation that revolution. 1960 is considered as the most decisive moment in Ethiopian political transformation (Messay, 2011: 2).

Although it failed to upset the status quo, the coup attempt was the first soldiers' direct interference in state politics undermining the declaration of the emperor's constitution that used to protect the emperor's person sacred and his authority inviolable. But more importantly this juncture is the starting point of social activism and popular politics (Tareke, 2009: 13). By juncture here, it is to mean that revolutionary movements are discussed in terms of their degree of attachment with the revolution taking 1960 as benchmark and frame of reference.

Analyzing the Ethiopian revolution based on this periodization is built on categorizing pre and post 1960 coup attempt as a moment that give distinguishable scenario for the revolutionary movement. The terms "settled time" and "unsettled time" are used for the demarcation of the development of the revolutionary movements especially the student movement before and after this juncture. In this research the pre coup era generally taken as the unsettled moment of the Ethiopian revolution not because of instability in terms of political leadership and structures but in terms of framing of political agendas and the rapid change in the role of actors in the process. During the pre-coup period most of social and revolutionary movements including rebellion and secessionist movements were fragmented with no strong linkage amongst themselves and no common goal at all. As a result the role of one movement within the wider Ethiopian politics was a matter of its objective and strength to pursuit its goal. Again this period was a period of leadership vacuum as there

was no any group claiming for central leadership of the revolutionary movement at the center.

During the post-coup era the Ethiopian student movement grown much stronger and central leadership evolved gradually so that formal framing of agendas and actors become prominent resulted in centralizing discourses and selective integration or marginalization of revolutionary movements and their agendas in the periphery. Besides those rebel movements that persist within their original goal both during the settled and unsettled time able to create different outcome in the Ethiopian politics than those totally or partially incorporated with in the revolutionary movement during the settled time. This settled time is at the same time a time of 'incorporation period' (Collier & Collier, 1991: 29), where organized movements against the imperial regime started in the centre and movement leaders started to emerge incorporating these revolutionary movements within the framework of the Ethiopian revolutionary movements. This study gives special emphasis for this period of incorporation to understand how individual revolutionary movements have the potential to become parts of the revolutionary movement despite the fact that they are not formally endorsed by the revolutionaries in the centre.

Periodization in terms of changing the task of incorporation or externalization of revolutionary movement and their agenda taking the coup attempt as important juncture also ease the burden of tracing sequences of causes with in the ever ending links to the unknown past for every revolutionary movement. This way is also more objective that reduce the subjectivity and manipulation that can be made by signifying certain culturally or religiously bounded period over the other. More importantly since the main objective of this study is analyzing the framing process of the Ethiopian revolution, this period is much convenient to discuss framing of ideas and the role of movement actors since this time.

1.3.3. Identifying and Mining the Data

Research on revolutionary and social movements has used very different methods, bridging qualitative and quantitative methodologies due to the fact that the scope of these movements as a discipline by itself is wide and needs broad frameworks to capture their full dynamics (DelaPorta, 2014: 228-229). The origin of this methodological dynamism comes from the nature of these movement studies as it emerged through the bridging of

different disciplinary approaches from symbolic interactions to organizational sociology, from sociological theory to political science. Given research for every individual discipline requires various research techniques, it is clear that the toolkit of concepts and research questions in revolutionary movement studies will be constructed by combination and cross-fertilization of methods used for its constituent disciplines. Therefore such nature of revolutionary movement studies has made them more open in methodological terms and the range of methodological debates is broad, endowed with several cleavages with peculiar emphasis on data collection techniques (DelaPorta, 2014: 233; Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2004: 3).

Combination of various data collection techniques was also applied for this study to escape from the limitations set by lack of reliable databases in most revolutionary movements. Besides, the research at hand requires various data collection techniques since it aims to investigate an area which is broad, hardly documented and covering a period of nearly five decades with various but interrelated social and revolutionary movements at national level. Therefore, following more of pragmatic approaches in data collection, deep interviews and the meticulous works done by historians and area specialists are used as main data sources.

Pragmatism allows the researcher to “study what interests and is of value to the research question (Abbas & Charles, 1998: 21). To substantiate more, a pragmatic perspective draws on employing “what works,” using diverse approaches, giving primacy to the importance of the research problem and question, and valuing both objective and subjective knowledge (Morgan, 2007). Coming to the process tracing method, the selection of data and data sources will not be a matter of random sampling rather it must be done based on the nature of the evidence that is best suited the researcher to handle the research and it is usually theory driven (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 132). Based on this premises, in addressing the basic research questions, I employed combination of methods to systematically collect data through different tools. Therefore the variation in data collection is believed to lead to greater validity and was important to triangulate the data collected via different means.

Both primary and secondary data sources are utilised during the data collection process. Eye witness accounts and documents produced by participants in one or more revolutionary movements are among the major primary sources. Already existing

evidences in the works of historians, movement leaders, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, diplomats and journalists are the main source of data for this research. Since the main target of the research is to provide new interpretation about the Ethiopian revolution using old evidences; extensive review of previous works largely employed. Considering the fact that reading is by itself a typical data collection process in comparative historical analysis, rigorous review of previous works done in order to have an “insight or piece of data that provides information about the context or mechanism and contributes a different kind of leverage in causal inference”-which is commonly called casual process observation (Collier, Brady, & Seawright, 2010: 184). From case selection to composition of narratives in the analysis part, data gathered in this way are efficiently used. In the absence of previous works on the specific topic under consideration, bibliography was built from other bibliographies to identify the most accurate data sources for every section of the research.

The availability and the content of every possible evidence critically identified in the process of data collection. However the types of evidence collected is found to greatly vary and therefore every distinguishable type of evidences are collected based on its relevance in the analysis. Accordingly patterns in every evidence was recorded to predict the mechanisms how cases have relations with outcome. Temporal and spatial chronologies of events are also carefully identified within and among cases to conduct sequence analysis of the selected cases.

Secondary sources; which can be classified in to three categories as country texts, topic texts, and cause texts are used depending on the type of data to look into from each category (Ritter, 2014: 108-109). These include research reports, different media outlets of the then regime and leftist political parties, various wings of student movements are critically reviewed. Letters, memos and memorandum of understandings with in different actors of a given movement or between different movements are analysed to understand how the framing process was handled. Besides speeches by movement activists and minutes of their meeting are evaluated to analyse how they endorse one aspect of social problems while compromising another. Reports by governments and international organizations are also used together with journal articles, books and thesis/dissertations which are relevant to the study.

Interview, more specifically deep interview, constitutes a fundamental technique used for gathering information for this study. Interviewees were stimulated to provide certain types of information depending on their areas of specialization and their direct or indirect role in one or more revolutionary movements. Similar open ended questioners were prepared for all interviewee in an effort to guide the discussion. Integrating the theoretical framework in all levels of the research was also taken in to consideration while formulating the interview questions. Because the decision on the orientation and content of the question should depend on the approach adopted since while neo-positivist scholars believe interview question should aim to collect original knowledge on real events, whereas constructivists consider it as mutually constructed depending on the narration the researcher wants to build based on the possible evidences one can collect (Silverman, 2006: 119).

The in-depth interview is prioritized as it allows detecting human agency and generating original information about the specific subject by minimizing the biasness of the researcher and escaping from the dominance of narratives in previous works. Like any qualitative interviews review, in preparing the interview questions relevant previous studies and researcher's knowledge of the field played greater role. Besides, after drafting the guiding questions in order to check the formulation of the questions and also adjust the size of the discussion in terms of time and order, one mock interview is tested with a friend of similar profession and one pilot interview with one respondent.

Although similar questions were prepared for all interviewees, what is happening in the process of the interview was much important than the actual content of the questions. This is mainly for two reasons. First, participants for the key informant interview were purposefully selected based on the theoretical model selected and the feasibility with respect to access to the subjects to make sure they can represent all important cases in the research. In the selection process special emphasis is given for leaders of Ethiopian student movement, executive members of EPRP, members/leaders of liberation movement like OLF, EPLF, TPLF, leaders or activists in the on-going civil right movements and other prominent figures. The selection of the informants is critically made so that to encompass people who are uniquely able to explain the case under study due to their expertise in the area and/or those who were privileged witnesses of the case selected.

In order to concentrate on issues of certain nature at a time, the interview was conducted based on the type of key informants selected from four different groups. As there is no magic number exists concerning the number of interviews for in-depth interview in comparative historical analysis a total of twenty informants are selected in four groups and a total of ten guiding questions were presented for all. The first group comprised of five writers who have book or books related to the Ethiopian revolution, revolutionary situations and revolution outcomes. The second group is a combination of ten revolutionary movements' leaders and activists representing the ten cases selected for the comparative study. The third and fourth group of interviewees are comprised of three leaders from the on-going Muslim civil right movements and two from the ruling & opposition political parties respectively. As the composition indicated the interviewees have been selected purposefully and each interviewee followed his way of storytelling about specific events and general information on the revolution based on their own experience. And therefore the questioners were used as a discussion triggering instrument than as a tool looking for specific answers.

The second reason for why the process was determinant than the question was the type of information required from the informants. This study is the first in its kind and it was hard to gather direct information about how the framing process treated religion and movements for religious freedom since there is already a dominant narration about both the revolutionary situations and outcomes as a result of extensive works conducted before. And therefore, probing was more helpful to gather specific information from mobilization to the movement dynamics than direct question and answer approach which is hardly helpful to entangle every little evidences in the middle of the discussion. This technique is a common tradition in a constructivist perspective, the perspective this research is built on, in which interview is considered as an interactional event that questions are triggering instruments for data collection but cannot be seen as neutral invitations to speak and the researcher does not seek to simply "gather" data, but to produce it from the interview platform in which cultural knowledge is deployed (DelaPorta, 2014: 244).

For all the interview sessions three similar but interdependent phases of discussions conducted. The initial phase was for introduction of the subject and collecting basic socio-biological data of the interviewee. In this stage both the researcher and the respondent came to the same platform and specially the researcher able to have a clue on how to

organize the upcoming discussion based on the specific background of the respondent and the interviewee came to know he is not asking just for his opinion but the researcher has an interest on the subject raised. On the second phase substantive questions raised in more general and non-directive manner so that interviewees are made to give their own narration for the cases under discussion. The last session was more of interactive session in which casual relations, contrasts of different narrations, concepts and perspectives, process tracing and respondent's attitude towards the available narrations about the Ethiopian revolution with respect to the subject under study was elaborated. Some interpretations have been offered for the respondent to reflect on, few hypothetical questions forwarded and ideal explanations asked about the Ethiopian revolution in order to understand the respondents' attitude without putting available interpretation as a barrier. However as the interviews were totally interactive events there were no hard and fast principles to limit the discussion from oscillating back and forth. For data analysis and selected verbatim coding all the interviews are recorded and transcribed. And finally separate chapters are dedicated for comparison of cases based on the theoretical foundation and methods of comparative historical analysis.

1.3.4. Composing the Narratives and Analysing the Data

What framing impacts a given revolution comes from the way revolutionary cases are composed to give an intended narrative no matter what the previously presented fact is. Accordingly and in line with the nature of the revolutionary cases to be discussed, the compromised making factors of the Ethiopian revolution and the conventionally presented causes are composed based on the principles of comparative historical analysis. By composing the two broad making factors, this research will bring the impact of framing in the Ethiopian revolution. Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA) as the three words in its name indicates it is a research method based on comparative analysis of historical phenomenon. More specifically it emphasized on historically contextualized causal relationships within a comparative framework to unearth the mechanisms that tie hypothesized causes and outcomes of a certain macro level historical phenomenon like state formation, revolution and national economic development (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003: 14).

Ritter (2014: 98) explains how CHA works for revolution researchers:

“CHA has become the preferred method of revolution scholars. Nearly every important empirical contribution to the study of revolution produced in the past four decades has employed CHA..... Fascinated as they are by the big (not to say huge) picture, comparative historical analysts tend to seek answers to questions like “What are the causes of revolutions?” rather than try to describe the day-to-day activities and strategies of revolutionary movements.”

The focus of CHA on macro level analysis makes it difficult to employ quantitative analysis since big scale historical phenomenon like revolution seldom hold data base of the movement and the number of observations of the macro-phenomenon under investigation may be small to begin with. In addition to the difficulty of accessing statistical database and limited number of possible observation, the objective in comparative historical analysis itself is to establish causal chains rather than correlations between variables. For such reasons quantitative analysis is ill suited for the types of research questions CHA scholars tend to ask (*ibid* 2014:101,106).

Comparative historical analysis on the Ethiopian revolution cannot be done with casual explanation on some specific moment of history rather needs to address the long term historical trajectories embedded in the history of the state itself which has a significant share in the emergence of the revolution. If putting a reference is necessary, 1270 can be considered as the critical moment that made religion to persist until the creation of modern Ethiopia at a time when land or ethnicity were not an issue at all. By the time king Yikuno Amlak, a ruler of Shoa, struggled to overtake the central power from the last king of Zagwe dynasty, he promised to declare the church's freedom to own resources specially one-third of the land under the state in return to the church's alliance (Marcus 2002; Tadesse 1972). This became a cultural power for Yikuno Amlak to legitimise his kingship and the church played critical role by preaching Yikuno Amlak as a true inheritor of the Solomonic dynasty¹ despite the fact that both are members of the same church. The

¹Solomonic Dynasty is among the oldest but widely believed legends producing the oldest monarchy in Africa that dominated the political history of Ethiopia from the beginning of the empire of Axum in the first century until the Ethiopian revolution in 1974. ‘Solomonic’ is a myth and mental construction produced by Christian elites to made the imperial family of Ethiopia only from the offspring of Minilik I, whose father is told to be king Solomon of Israel. With this myth, except with few interruptions by the zagwe dynasty, YezuOromos and Muslim Sultanates, Ethiopia has been ruled by kings claimed their genealogy to Queen of Sheba and her son Minilik I until the 225th king Imperial Hilesillasie overthrown with popular revolution in 1974.

manipulation of the church by the king ended up with a marriage between the church and the state that brought long lasting influence on Ethiopian political history which is strong enough to maintain its direct influence for more than 700 years until the last self-claimed 225th Solomonic king overthrown by the popular revolution.

This spiritual and material marriage creates a strong bond between the two parties to the extent historians used church and state interchangeably (Taddesse, 1972). It was from this perspective that the subsequent expansion of the Shoa Kingdome to the south was mainly church led invasion as the church was the triggering force of invasion for its benefit. Because, for every success of the expansion of the Kingdome, the church used to expand its share of productive land resources and power over the people in the area. The expansion was also accompanied by mass settlement of Christian settlers in newly conquered areas mainly dominated by Muslim and other traditional religion followers making the inhabitants as serf for the new settlers (Bahru, 2014: 118-129). Therefore the trial to claim 'land to the tiller' issue of the Ethiopian revolution as anti-feudal socialist agenda of class struggle was issues prone to critical historical analysis as there was religion at the centre of every conflict instead of economic based class relationships.

This aspect of the study can best be captured by employing CHA. Besides, this research neither totally focused on the dynamics and organization of the revolution nor limited on the historical context of revolutionary movements before the actual revolution. Rather equal weight is given for the issue how the long term historical discourses influenced the nature of revolutionary movements that in turn determined the actual revolution. In such studies of revolutions of long-term processes comparative historical analysis together with social movement study theoretical frameworks will be an ideal approach.

Since the basic interest in this study is not only to address the dynamics of the Ethiopian revolution, employing ethnographic methods will not also be helpful. Rather how the larger historical context in which various movements and armed struggles brought the revolution needs comparative historical analysis. Such understandings and approach is an opportunity for alternative explanation on the causes and casual relationships of the Ethiopian revolution and the Ethiopian history in general different from that of the previous which predominantly occupied with the layers of time believed to give partial image of the historical phenomenon. Integrating the tangible and intangible manifestations

of the revolution thereby allowing the role of other societies other than the predominantly entertained one in to the mainstream historical narration is also possible with this approach. As part of the comparative historical analysis, process tracing technique in the latter section of the research used as an appropriate tool in order to make deductions about how the thematically grouped events are linked with predominantly analysed causes of the revolution over time in framing the revolution. Procedurally in this research the following four consecutive but also flexible steps of comparative historical analysis are followed.

In a research that its main target is to investigate revolutionary situations through the method of comparative historical analysis, there are wide ranges of strategies of casual assessment and relations or chains among the causations. Similarly there is no single basic approach that limits the researcher from using additional strategies on conditions of applying one or more other strategies. Data analysis in comparative historical analysis can be done in two levels where analyzing processes that take place within individual cases is the first and simplest one but juxtaposing cases with one another can also be done in a single research and even this is what actually gave comparative research its name (Mahoney, 2003: 337). However comparative historical analysis as a methodology is not limited to comparison of cases but searching for linkages between certain hypothesized factor and an outcome of interest (Ritter, 2014: 109). Likewise, the purpose of applying comparative historical analysis methodology in analyzing selected cases in Ethiopian revolution is not necessarily to ascertain whether or not the selected cases are actual cause of the revolution or to rank various possible causes but rather to understand what role played by those factors in the making of the revolution and how strong the linkage is. That is to say how far the selected cases were revolutionary situations and what correlations do the cases have with the revolution which was not interpreted in such a manner in the popular belief and scholarly works is the main target.

For the data analysis two broad methods of comparative historical analysis research methods have been applied. The first one is what John Stuart Mill termed “Method of agreement.” This method is applied in two stages; one where causative factors commonly argued as major causes of the Ethiopian revolution discussed separately based on the theoretical framework and the constructivist approach set for this study. The three causes; feudal mode of economic system, questions of Nationalities and the quest for socialist order in Ethiopia are discussed in separate sub topics by contrasting with the socio-

economic and political situation of the time, the social structure of the society and the main assumptions scholars used to argue these three factors as the primary cause of the revolution. By doing so, the convergence and divergence of prior beliefs about the primary causes of the revolution is reinterpreted based on the methodology of constructivist qualitative interpretation. Second, the same method is applied for cases hypothesized as ‘compromised causes of the Ethiopian revolution’. In this section all the ten cases are discussed independently by connecting with the positive or negative relation observed during the data collection process. Again in this section reporting data that has been interviewed and collected from other sources is not a concern but themes was prioritized in order to test the convergence and divergence of the cases from the theme formulated.

The very logic behind these two sections is identifying what attachments do exist between the cases and the dependent variable (the Ethiopian revolution) and which attributes are existed in common. All cases are discussed not as ordinary factors but based on the elements that create lineage with the revolution. In these two chapters all similar features of the two broad cases in relation with the Ethiopian revolution weaved together to be discussed latter in order to analyse the possibility that they can have similar attributes to be casual factors for the Ethiopian revolution although they significantly vary with other relevant characteristics.

Although the way the two chapters dedicated for casual analysis may differ in their approach of handling the cases, the composition of comparative-historical narratives bring all cases on to similar stage in the next most important section of the research analysis where neither cases are independently discussed nor theories are applied for individual cases in order to check their compatibility. Historical facts and data produced during the data collection process here weaved together with theory by prioritizing themes over cases and analysing how far the theme is arguably compatible with the subject. The application of theory in this section made the discussion back and forth in order to show the factual interconnectedness and logical flow of arguments throughout the research and discover explanations in light of available evidences. Here a separate but interrelated method is applied.

The method applied in composing the narration is what is known as process tracing. Though this process tracing method is usually applied to eliminate or accept selected

casual factors in relation with a certain outcome (Mahoney, 2003: 365). The same method is equally applied to support intellectually proposed or theoretically argued explanation about a given phenomenon by tracing its trajectory over time (Collier and Collier, 1991: 745; Goldstone, 2003: 48; Mahoney, 2003: 351)). Process tracing has additional three highly important benefits in comparative historical research situation; it can be used in theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining historically puzzling outcome by providing a minimum sufficient explanation for that puzzling outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 69).

Although Process tracing is widely used both for cross-case analysis and within-case analysis, here the technique is not applied to make a cross-case comparison between conventional causes and compromised ones rather it is used to conduct a with-in case analysis so that a conclusion about the presence or absence of casual mechanisms is reached from in-depth analysis of the status of a given case with respect to selected points of reference. Particularly this method is used while discussing the framing process of the Ethiopian revolution and the way how the conventional causative factors for the Ethiopian revolution we know so far ascend to the front line whereas others are presupposed to be compromised.

The process tracing technique has been applied in to three stages since this method is more appropriate for step-by-step analysis of casual relations (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 5). However all stages are within the post-critical juncture period that is argued for this particular research. First it has been applied to analyze the status of the broad category called, compromised causes, when the issue of land to the tiller was raised for the first time by framing it as a revolutionary agenda. Second this method is used to discuss the process of adopting the questions of nationalities as a pure ethnic agenda of the revolution while at the same time discussing the status of the compromised cause in the process. Similarly the quest for socialist order in the Ethiopian revolution and its process of ascending to revolutionary agenda is discussed by tracing the process of integrating the social structure of the country with the socialist ideology. In other words the analysis in this section is intended to answer the following basic question; how, when and how the three conventional causes ascend to this popularity and what was the status of compromised cause during these processes.

1.3.5. Brief Summary of the Chapter

Approaching the project at hand using framing theory as the best theoretical framework and comparative historical analysis as important approach of data gathering and analysis, the data collection and analysis of this project was conducted in accordance with the framework and the assumption selected. Investigating an area which is totally new, hardly documented and covering a period of nearly five decades with various but interrelated revolutionary struggles at national level various data collection techniques employed by being pragmatic in data collection. To substantiate more, a pragmatic perspective draws on employing “what works,” using diverse approaches, giving primacy to the importance of the research problem and question, and valuing both objective and subjective knowledge (Morgan, 2007). Accordingly, a mixed research approach of data gathering in which semi-structured questionnaire, key informant interview and site observations of significantly important historical places related with the project at hand employed. In addition, key informant interviews using oral history analysis and timeline & trends analysis conducted to gain an understanding of stakeholders’ views on the nature and evolution of the movements, the relationship with other revolutionary movements in the country and any changes with time and socio-political conditions. Data collected through primary data collection means complemented with secondary data sources.

Falling within the scope of this project individuals who participated in one or many social movements prior to the Ethiopian revolution considered as target population of this project. Through a snowballing approach movement activists in exile, government officials in previous and current regimes, historians and researchers were important target group for this study. And therefore, in selecting the research participants three specific criterions applied. The informants were participants in one or more revolutionary movements with in the period of time this research covered. They are writers, mediators or witness on the issue at hand and finally special focus was given to select a participant with a direct or indirect decision making role at any stage of a given movement and in any institutions or groups related with movements. Considering the time and resources and the availability of high profile individuals, the key informants selected purposefully.

As important instrument of data gathering, semi structured interviews conducted with key informant movement participants and activists from various revolutionary movements,

leaders of Ethiopian student movement, executive members of EPRP, and members of liberation movement like OLF, EPLF, and TPLF, prominent figures with direct or indirect relations with the topic across the period. Secondary sources that include research reports, different media outlets of the then regime and leftist political parties, various wings of student movements critically reviewed. Letters and memorandum of understandings with in different actors of a given revolutionary struggle or between different struggles analyzed to understand how the framing process was handled. Besides speeches by movement activists and minutes of their meeting evaluated to analyze how they endorse one aspect of societal problems while ignoring another. Together with journal articles, books and thesis/dissertations which are relevant to the study, reports by governments and international organizations are also used. Some field observations also conducted to observe important places for various movements. The data analysis was purely qualitative in type and conducted based on the theoretical and methodological principles of interpretation. Verbatim quoting also used in order to present the respondents' actual expressions. Besides, cases and explanation built for some issues presented. Data obtained through key informants' interview carefully checked for completeness and consistency before analyzing.

CHAPTER TWO

CONVENTIONAL MAKING FACTORS IN THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION

The conventional making factors that enjoyed extensive coverage in the Ethiopian revolution study are partially a result of an arbitrary treatment of the pre-revolutionary situation and lack of clarity in using basic terms as feudalism, capitalism and the quest for socialist order. There has been a clear but inconsistent inclination in applying these terms in the Ethiopian social structure by researchers in which the consequence was lack of consistent analytical tool for the subject and no room for alternative narration due to the fixation on those arguments. Once again the application of major ideological jargons came from the post-revolutionary situation analysis not from inherent characteristics of the pre-revolutionary situation and the revolution itself. All these demands further engagement on the subject to put a more realistic position of the supposedly believed as orthodox making factors of the Ethiopian revolution both in the revolution study and in the Ethiopian history in general.

2.1. The feudal Paradigm and the case in Ethiopia

Feudal as an order or law might appear first in the medieval Europe but feudalism as a society has continued to exist in the world with its own unique characteristics in respective countries as Egyptian feudalism, Achaean feudalism, Chinese feudalism, Japanese feudalism and other forms (Bloch, 1962: 162). Nevertheless characterizing a given society as feudal is a debating issue if not historically source of conflicts and disorder due to the misuse of the term in reference to its conformity with the medieval Europe's type. The concept of feudalism in the Ethiopian revolution has also been referred in a very narrow perspective taking a single or few elements which are existed in feudal society without analysing the whole system in relation to the complete feudal paradigm. And therefore the paradigm became the main hindrance for proper representation of all causative factors for the Ethiopian revolution in the revolutionary studies (Ellis, 1976: 295).

Among the first European scholars it was Allan Hoben who can be taken as a pioneer in supporting the applicability of March Blochs's criterion for the presence of feudal order in

a given society and the applicability of the model for the Ethiopian traditional society. In fact it is known that what we call it feudal Europe was not all feudalized in the same degree and no any specific area which was completely feudalized (Bloch, 1962: 166). The Ethiopian feudalism is also vague explanation for the complex Ethiopian social order but commonly taken as the typical feudal nature of the Ethiopian order. Together with an increase in the knowledge production in the area, critiques are also common arguing the significant difference between the Ethiopian social structure and European feudalism experience and the inapplicability of feudal parading in the Ethiopian context in its generality (Crummey 1980; Ellis, 1976: 276; Perham, 1969: 278,281; Markakis, 1997).

Feudalism was the Ethiopian reality for Hiwot (1975, 70) both at political and socio-economic level that ends at socio-economic level when nationalization of all lands proclamation effected whereas its failure at political level is achieved with the collapse of feudal institutions following the revolution. The Ethiopian revolution and its explanation based on the struggle against feudalism cannot be taken for grant unless we use a very loose framework of feudalism (Hiwot, 1976: 68). As what Genne Ellis (1976: 295) explained "The Ethiopian case is out of the classical feudalism paradigm. The paradigm fails to describe the situation in its entirety and does not highlight the dynamic of either the political or the land tenure system - indeed, they are erroneously held to be synonymous. Predictions based on the feudal paradigm miss the mark. Its use leads us to neglect the actual study of the political system and how it works, the land-tenure system, and how it works." It is imperative to analyse the ethiopian case based on the established description and classification of social classes in a feudal society and their applicability in ethiopia.

The Ethiopian revolution is mainly studied based on the scholars' classification of the social structure of the country in a linear schema that Ethiopian mode of production and social structure was typical feudal model and therefore the revolution is anti-feudal socialist revolution which is however "the Ethiopian social structure is a mess neither thoroughly understood nor can simply explained to precisely understand which category it falls into" (Asres, 1990: 43). In practice, social structure is as any historical phenomenon is a matter of the wider societal feature in time and within a certain environment (Bloch, 1962: 167). Discussing the social structure is therefore dependent on the time and the specific environment we are dealing with. Feudalism as system is not different from this and the presence or absence of feudalism will be a matter of the social structure of that

time not the historical background long before or the political reality followed. The social structure during the mid-twentieth century of Ethiopian history shall also be analyzed based on the time and environment of that era.

However, most researchers and writers in the Ethiopian context arguing for the presence of feudalism and its characteristics predominantly celebrated the compatibility of feudal characters explained by Bloch (1962) to the Ethiopian society. Bloch (1962: xiii) discussed the major elements in a feudal society as:

“A subject peasantry; widespread use of the service tenement (i.e. the fief) instead of a salary, which was out of the question; the supremacy of a class of specialized warriors; ties of obedience and protection which bind man to man and, within the warrior class, assume the distinctive form called vassalage; fragmentation of authority—leading inevitably to disorder; and, in the midst of all this, the survival of other forms of association, family and State, of which the latter, during the second feudal age, was to acquire renewed strength—such then seem to be the fundamental features of European feudalism.”

March's Proposition on the feudal elements which are at the same time the pillar taken to convince feudalism was the Ethiopian situation are overgeneralized if not misquoted in the literatures. Considering the significance and the continued influence on the understanding of the Ethiopian revolution the topic needs further clarification pertaining to the applicability of the theory to the then Ethiopian reality.

2.1.1. Social Structure as a Pretext for Feudalism

Land, as is the case in most African countries, is of supreme social, economic, political significance and most importantly a matter of identity in the Ethiopian history. Although the 'land to the tiller' question was the most fundamental agenda of the Ethiopian revolution, it was widely taken as a matter of anti-feudalism and re organizing the social structure of feudal system in Ethiopia but through arbitrary use of the term feudalism with insufficient investigation of the social structure and feudal character of the then Ethiopia.

Huberman describes the social structure in a feudal society as consisting of three social classes, “the prayers, the fighters, and the workers, with men who worked providing for both the church class and the military class.” (Huberman, 1963: 1) Under the Ethiopian context there existed more than these three social classes and the role of these classes are

also not clearly delineated. Asafa Asres made a good deal reviews on academic literatures and forward four important classes of the Ethiopian social structure. The Imperial, in which the emperor is the centre; the Nobility, who owns the land; the Clergy, which the church and the most powerful institution and finally the peasant, comprising 90 present of the population made to represent the social structure (Assefa, 1993) and these are the elements whose interaction determine the class relation and the presence or absence of feudal order during the imperial period. In the Ethiopian history the church was powerful institution in defining, articulating, and interpreting the cultural myths of society and the heritage of its rulers with strong influence to make and unmake the Emperor. The Aristocracy; both with the royal blood and acquired through service has the net strong influence on the political position of the Monarch (Edmond, 1981).

Allan Hoben also creates a parallel between the customary and legal land tenure system in Ethiopia and the European feudal order where the aristocracy, higher clergy and officials comprised the higher hierarchy of the social structure. In his seminal work Hoben analyzed what is known as *gult* rights as that of 'fief holding right' of medieval Europe where the fief has the power to collect tribute, entitled for judicial, administrative and military mobilization over its constituents whereas the *rist* is referred to 'land use right' where the cultivator can use the land with certain arrangements (Hoben, 1995).

Ibssa (1980:81, 80) use radically different classification of the Ethiopian class relationship but in this way not based on the relation of production. For Ibssa the Ethiopian society or nation may be classified in four categories: the colonized nations, the oppressed nations and nationalities, the annexed nations and nationalities, and finally the oppressor or colonizer nation. The classification here focused on the vertical relationship of oppressed and oppressors that is a matter of ruler and ruled relationship which is the central theme under this sub topic.

The country's social structure for the student movement and Marxist intellectual is formulated by emphasising the disintegration of feudalism or the rise of capitalism which is exclusively structuralist perspective. The handbook for elementary revolution and organization of the student movement presented the varies classes in the Ethiopian society as the working class, without it and its Marxist-Leninist ideology no revolution can achieve its goal; the peasantry which is the main force of agrarian revolution to dismantle the

regime but if only lead by the working class party; the urban petty bourgeoisie who is submissive to the Hilesillasse regime and appealing to reform it; the national bourgeoisie who is weak and has dual nature in its relation to the proletariat and the regime and finally the ruling class who has the oppressive power on its hand and the Orthodox church is part of it for its vested interest and its historical legitimacy (ESUNA, 1972: 5-7). Based on this premises the pre-1974 mode of production is taken as a mixture of feudal, petty bourgeoisie and capitalist mode whereas the feudal mode of production produce political relationship that latter abolish the feudal system itself which represent the absolutist monarch (Alemu, 1980: 13). Desalegn Rahmeto in July 1970 issue of *challenge* identified three major classes in rural Ethiopia: the landed aristocracy, the local gentry and the peasantry. On the same article he categorised the existing production system as feudal and commercial agriculture and concluded the Ethiopian feudalism resembles the medieval Europe type as characterised by Marc Bloch. On the same article HalileMenkorios described the Ethiopian land tenure system especially in the north as the extended family system and the village system whereas the case in the south cannot be called a land tenure system but that of slavery (Challenge, 1966).

The November issue of *Challenge* in 1971 presented Eshetu Chole's classification of the production system as feudalism and capitalism (Challenge, 1971). The 9th congress of ESUE in 1969 also argued feudalism as the main bottleneck for low level of industrialization but not based on studying the country's production system or the presence of feudal character in the society rather based on a survey of a commission delegated to study the status of trade and industry in Ethiopia. And therefore, besides the ideological background that pushed the Marxist students to define the Ethiopian production system in such a manner it is well known and as discussed in detail below with all the resolutions in the various student association congresses declaring Ethiopia as a feudal state, still the associations acknowledge the fact that the feudal order in the country was not closed, harmonious and smoothly operated (Challenge, 1966). And hence such a theoretical approach cannot explain the Ethiopian class relationship let alone the wider social structure and that was the principal cause of post 1974 revolution crisis.

All the debate on the class relation in the imperial Ethiopia is based on the feudal stage of the then Ethiopia and any effort to examine the class relationship needs to go through the question of how feudalism was the Ethiopian reality. The feudal paradigm in Ethiopian

history is widely used as the Ethiopian stunted reality by European scholars, travelers and local writers (Ambaye, 2015: 29; Crummey 1980; Hoben 1995; Negussay 1983)). Mode of production in the then Ethiopia was also considered in a social transformation between feudal mode of production where it is built on the relation between peasant & land lord and the capitalist mode of production that built on the relation between labor and capital. This was again based on the conviction that mode of production in Ethiopia already passed the slave mode of production which is based on the relation between slave and masters.

2.1.2. The North and South as two frontiers

The North and the South in Ethiopian politics are not only geographical or historical distinction. More importantly they are two classes with distinct historical trajectories whose political significance still intact. The popular culture, land tenure system, the relationship between the ruler and ruled are all different in these two areas (Markakis & Nega, 1997: 21). Historically feudalism was mainly an issue of land and a matter of peoples' livelihood in relation to the land which is directly related to land tenure system. Land tenure as a system is a complex relationship between land and the people both at the individual and group level. This relationship is a matter of ownership, benefit and power to transfer.

By generalising the Abyssinian case as an Ethiopian reality, subject peasantry is wrongly taken as a national phenomenon in which cultivator in the south and north supposed to fit virtually all definitions of a peasant. In the north peasants had a direct access to their land through various ways including hereditary and the relationship was a peasant (*gebbar*-parallel to tax payer) and tax receiver (Crummey, 1980: 122; Edmond 1981). However the situation in the south was quite different and the locals own neither their land nor their private life. Their condition was even worse than slavery which is a reflection of the opposite reality of peasantry in the north and the newly conquest south (Ellis, 1976).

The land tenure and the production system in the northern highland had its own features and serfdom also non-existent. The continuous struggle for power between the emperor and the nobles and the will of the winner in the allocation of land resource as a reward for the warlords predominantly determined the land ownership and the tenure system (Ellis, 1976: 278) (Perham, 1969: 69,71). However without altering the ultimate power relation

all farmers used to access their farm land except those the system considered as caste groups, slaves, and aliens which is still the hierarchy within the society is critical from landownership. The percentage of the excluded groups from the total population in the specific area can vary from 10 per cent for example in Dega Damot in Gojam to 90 per cent in the south (Hoben, 1995).

Despite the numerous and totally different application from province to province, Ambaye (2015) argued, the land tenure system in pre 1975 Ethiopia was commonly referred to as feudal as land was believed to be under the control of the state and the lords where citizens use the land through various arrangements. However all arrangements in relation to the land including the *gult* are a matter of public administration instead of land right since land was distributed based on the emperor's wishes not through inheritance or sale. Likewise the *rist* system despite its resemblance to private land use right with the authority given to the peasant to use and pass as inheritance, still selling is prohibited and the peasant is subjected to every kind of taxes and sometimes tributes and service. More striking is such a system had never been known in the south and together with its clear departure from the feudal order of medieval Europe and its uneven application, land tenure system in Ethiopia will not be a good reference to discuss feudalism in Ethiopia as even at province level let alone as a nation.

In the south, based on the ideological philosophy of land in case of newly conquered area, the land and the people are the properties of the conqueror and the land became ultimately the land of the government. And therefore in the south the land tenure system which was practiced in the north didn't work and land was distributed to soldiers, priests, local administrators, judges, and state servants at various levels as remuneration for their service. The land distribution could have different names and forms but the system remains similar giving the Monarch the ultimate authority to give and take all lands at any time. For instance *riste-gult/iso-gult* was a name for land given to *malkagna* or *balabat* who is a local gentry; *Maderia* was a land granted to government officials, war veterans, and other patriots; *Ginde-bel* was a name for land given to persons who maintain government works of various types, such as soldiery, those who look after government mules and horses, those who work in the production of quarry for the construction of palaces, those who carry and transport guns and cannons to battle front, those who plant trees and others in the

compound of the royal palace, those who transport mails and posts and other government positions (Ambaye, 2015: 43).

Peasants in the highlands were not serf and the system cannot be a kind of full-fledged feudalism. Family relationship between the peasant and the lord and intermarriages in the north narrow the gap between the two and allocation of land resource that makes the land tenure system quite different from that the feudal paradigm. Peasants as member of the same religion and culture mainly the Semitic language with the lords had also the right to take their case to the court though the judiciary was another land lord and the freedom was partially circumscribed. The church had also a mediating role between peasant and landlords as both are members of the same religion.

Quite contrary to the north in the newly conquered south the results of the conquest were a demoralised people, forced to dwell as tenants on land that was once theirs. Huge estates were allocated to high officials of the conquerors, and soldiers were given good-size plots of land. In the south one may predict the feudal system with a subject peasantry as a result of the cultural distance between conquerors and vanquished. Here again, the most important factor might be that feudal authority did not exist; the lack of feudal ties of service and obligation between the conquerors and the vanquished peasants made the tenure one of occupation rather than over lordship. The conquered lands were split up into 80 to 100 acres and distributed for soldiers, governors, the church and loyal local leaders. While the local leaders receive one-third of the conquered land the rest two-third was owned by officials and the church. Unlike to the peasants in the north, the land holders again own the peasants as slaves (Perham, 1969: 296-97).

The situation in the southern, south eastern and south western provinces of Ethiopia was a direct proof for the fallacy on the claim for the presence of well-defined land tenure system and feudal order in the country. Being incorporated into the modern day Ethiopia at the end of the 19th century, land in those provinces expropriated for settlers from the north, soldiers and local chiefs those submitted voluntarily to the Minlik rule. Land in the southern region divided in two three equal parts traditionally called *siso* where two third is for the state one third for indigenous people mainly for local chiefs who are used indirectly to maintain the order of the monarch. The state distributed the state land for warrior aristocracy and warlords where an individual received a minimum of 40 hectares of land that further

distribute his new landholding for relatives and dependents from the north. The church and monasteries received their share which is one-third of the state land. The previous owners of the land then became subject of their owner with no right to cultivate their land even with tax agreement. And therefore peasants under soldiers are subject of soldiers; those under the church land became subject of the church despite their difference in religion and language and the remaining became cultivators under the local chiefs or landless slaves. It was in such situation that peasants preferred to be a subject for one or another master than became free man with no protection at all (Bekelle, 1995).

The peasant was completely dispossessed of his land and became permanent properties of the soldiers, local lords and absentee landlords or the governors can sell off them for a considerable profit (Negussay, 1983). Unlike to the peasants in the north where religion and culture enabled to reinforce homogenous socio-economic system, the cultural distance couldn't allow the south to take their case to the court and more critically the lords and governors by themselves were not permanent that can be replaced anytime which made the exploitation of the peasant sever. The relationship between peasant and landlords who are at the same time soldiers and army chiefs made the system a military government not that of feudalism. For the privilege the military life gives to soldiers, being member of the army by itself was an honour. And therefore in both the political south and north the medieval Europe style of feudalism was absent (Ellis, 1976: 284).

The government reports explain the number of tenant farmers in the country... of the size of tenant holding ... of the conditions of tenancy, particularly conditions relating to the amount of rent, the manner of payment, and the services other than payment of rent which are still demanded from tenants by some land-lords" in other words nothing at all of any significance is known about landlord-tenant relationship in Ethiopia (Challenge, 1965). Scholars who entirely base their arguments on government report deny the relationship between tenant and land lords and the tenancy condition as well to escape from political questions. On the other hand those who entirely rely on class relationship took the case to Marxist ideology and ignore the actual situation.

The governing principle that is near to the truth for the pre 1974 revolution is all land was in principle a government land where the monarch has an absolute power in its distribution and re-distribution. One thing unique from all other arrangements both in its privilege and

size in land expropriation was the church land in which historical records amounted to be one-third of the total land nationally. From the beginning of the Axum Kingdome in the 4th century to the last emperor Hilesillasse, church has continuously enjoyed this privilege besides its legal and cultural dominance in the overall state affairs. Section 40, No. 1540 cum. 1541 of *Fitha Nagast* (1968) which is also known as Law of the Kings, the laws the Monarchical regime use as the document as the binding legal document parallel to the present day constitution stated the church's privilege in land ownership as follows:

“Let the king give honor to the order of the clergy, as did Constantine the Elect, faithful and righteous king; and as did others who followed him. Let the king be generous with his wealth. Let he give to each of them according to their ranks. First of all, the king shall give presents to the bishops; then to the priests, next to the deacons, and then to those who are below them. He shall exempt them from tributes, presents, and the other favors to be paid to the rulers. Let him assign something to the churches for the maintenance of the widows, the orphans and the poor, so that they may entreat God to reaffirm the true faith with the benefit in the Holy Trinity.”

In this way church has been granted one-third of the land permanently and more importantly without any tax and tribute. While payment of one form or another is imposed on land to government officials, soldiers or local lords, church to the reverse entitled the right to tax cultivators who use land under the church. By being a priest or anyone who served the church directly or through proxy has also a privilege to pass his land to his children until the service line doesn't interrupt or enter other forms of agreement with the church (Markakis, 1974). In this was a class commonly taken as a peasant in Ethiopian context even was not a homogenous peasant in land holding, use and transfer right which is in contradiction with most structural explanation for peasant rebellions. Throughout the Imperial period this privileged has continued except the right to tax has annulled in 1942 by Decree for the Administration of all Church Lands that decreed the church shall be taxed for its land holdings (Decree No. 2 of 1942). The revocation of the right to tax however didn't bring any change in the land tenure system since the proportion of the land remained under the church and the cultural tributes cultivators gave to the clergy continued in different ways.

In support of the argument above a speech on November 2, 1961 by the majesty only one year after the 1960 coup attempt gives more clear sense of the paradox:

“The fruits of the farmer’s labor must be enjoyed by him whose toil has produced the crop. The essence of land reform is, while fully respecting the principle of private ownership, that landless people must have the opportunity to possess their own land It is our aim that every Ethiopian owns his own land.”

However which land the majesty was talking about is not clear. Land was a political power under his direct control and the church. The continuous land grant order after the Italian war and especially after the coup attempt already made 70 percent of arable land in the hands of 1 percent of the population and transfer and empower few aristocrats over the marginalised mass where religious motivated land allocation made the society more victims and the relationship between oppressor and those oppressed.

The land reform efforts and limited effort to redistribute the land has also institutionalised the already existing inequality by providing private ownership for peasants in the north and land lords in the south. The benevolence in redistribution was from “the greatest landlords to the lesser landlords” not to every Ethiopians (Challenge, 1966: 7).

2.1.3. Fragmented Authority and Obligation of services

Had the revolution was against the kings before Emperor Hilesillasse, fragmented authority would be a good analogy between Europe and Ethiopia. However during the era of Hilesillasse, power was extremely centralised, the administration was beaurocratized and there was rapid reshuffling of local administrators. Even if there was fragmentation in social and economic activities the political authority was totally under the direct rule of the one rule monarch which is against the Bloch’s model. For the French revolutionaries the name feudal is always connected with the nobility but this class is characterized by two main features; first the class must have extensive power over its subjects and second, the status should be based on hereditary than simple social privilege or other advantages (Bloch, 1962: 2). The landlords in the Ethiopian south have never been inherited from fathers to fathers as the lords are outsiders and the authority is distributed from above which is from the Monarch himself.

When Hilesillasse ascend to the throne it was clear that the system was dominantly controlled by local lords and efforts were made to modernize the nation and the administrative system. Through gradual efforts of power consolidation and modernization, the growing beurocratization replaced local chiefs administrative role, series of tax reforms

made the tax system directly for the government, the judicial role of local lords was also reduced and finally the military centralized with modern weapon that makes local chiefs in a desperate condition leaving most of their privilege (Hoben, 1995). The centralized authority and the enduring ability of the king to exercise control over the lords and their *gult* has led a number of leading researchers to reject the application of the feudal paradigm (Ellis, 1976). Primarily land right as any other right in the pre-1974 Ethiopia emanated from the king as a benevolent gift as an exchange for services and for the church since the king had absolute power over the people and its objects. The very unique feature related to land is the complete ownership of land by the monarch. Even in the north with all the relative freedom to use their land, land holders had never been free to pass it as hereditary since the monarch can give it for anyone and anytime. Land was the main resource to keep the power balance between the rulers and ruled and it was a source of power than means of production (Perham, 1969: 294,301; Markakis and Nega, 1997). Markakis further noted that during the post Second World War Ethiopia the advent of the capitalist mode of production, the conversions of land lords' privilege in to modern right of property, the centralization of state power and bureaucratization of its process with in the orbit of the absolute monarch makes the little feudal elements less workable to argue the revolution is anti-feudalist. The role of the traditional leaders was also weakened in the process.

The Hilesillasse government didn't allow transfer of nobility through hereditary and self-made military leaders, minor court officials, abbots of monasteries had equal chance of being assigned as a local lord although there were chances for sons of local lords to become lords again. In all cases local land lord were not independent to exercise their power over their subjects and the right for nobility was dependent on the willingness of the king that makes offering and rescinding authority and status in all hierarchies fully on the hands of the monarch which is again a reality that makes feudal paradigm less workable to describe the Ethiopian situation (Perham, 1969: 299,316; Markakis and Nega, 1997).

The idea of obligation based on kinship and blood relationship as one part of the feudal character didn't exist in its generality in Ethiopia as the society in south which is predominantly explained as a feudal society was mainly a relationship of natives and new comer highlanders where the latter was the lord on the land of the former. Of course land was granted in the south as an exchange to service mainly for soldiers. This class of

warriors were specially organised and created their own level within the society with extensive power over the peasants. However lack of protective capacity or weakening of the state as a feudal character was not the case in Ethiopia as the oppressor was the state itself and the local lords are neither permanent nor detached from the state authority. The obligation of peasants was a consequence of the monarchical system and as Crummey (1980: 124) explained the ritual associated with horizontal and vertical ties to the highest hierarchy of the monarch in the name of *ej-mensha* (which is a parallel for tribute) was a typical ritual even refusal is taken as a rebellion but the end of the hierarchy was not the lords and soldiers but peasants are subjected to pay taxes for the government and the church.

John Markakis consider the impression of researchers by their supposedly argued feudal nature of the Ethiopian production system as misunderstanding of the traditional social structure of the Ethiopian polity. In his study of the traditional social structure of the Amhara and Tigrie people, the relationship of the nobility, the priests and the peasants with the land is not only a matter of division of labor but a classic trinity that had been existed since earlier times and more or less continued until now (Markakis: 1974). Similarly in the medieval north Ethiopia it was not only the production system but cultivators are at the same time *rist*-holders with full right to pass them on to their heirs or selling their land though this is not commonly practiced as a result of the fact that the cultivator will not have any other means of survival without his farm land. The right of the *rist*-holders over his land but the lesser practice of selling it creates a misconception for many not to acknowledge the form of surplus appropriation in the area was only a tribute known as a *gait* (fief) (Andargachew, 1995: 8).

AdisHiwot forwarded harsh criticism against such conclusions as ‘original sin’ not to acknowledge the feudal nature of the Ethiopian society. She further concludes this original sin is the source of all contradiction in analyzing the Ethiopian social structure whether it is for academic or political reasons. And therefore contradiction with the central argument that the Ethiopian polity is a typical European feudal society is considered as total rejection of feudal heritage elsewhere in Europe (Hiwot, 1975: 11). This level of assertion on the feudal mode of production in Ethiopian polity didn’t tolerate any level of alternative analysis of the case and didn’t differentiate between mode of production in the case of landless tenants who only till for the landlords and in those cases where the farmers own

lands but give tribute to the land lords based on the rationale that it is only a matter of degree not a difference in form.

2.1.4. Oppressor-Oppressed Relation as Feudalism

The idea behind social structure and mode of production was principally built on the land resource and land share among the societies. In fact land issue in Ethiopia is more of political than means of production and the social structure is a political structure in its real sense. In the newly conquered south and south east, the land holders had never cultivated all what they own and on the importance of land to the ruling class we can say “land receives far more care and attention than the people who farm it” (Challenge, 1965).

The immediate perception of peasants about the land tenure or the social structure was not also a matter of feudalism; imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism as the revolutionary forces usually indoctrinate them as the enemy of the revolution. What they know in reality was newly settled northerner who exploits their land and their labor by the special privilege they got from the oppressor class whereas the native peasants oppressed for being different in their identity and social status. According to my informant during the land reform program of the Dergue time peasants in Harerge province used the same logic while a cadre tried to indoctrinate them about the revolution and its enemies.

Various political and economic reforms were undertaken during the Hilesillasse regime which is enough to explain feudalism was not the case. Two consecutive effort of establishing a constitutional monarchy in 1931 and 1955 were the most important political reforms in strengthening the royal absolutism despite the resistance from landed aristocracies and local administrations. The tax law between 1941-1955 which aimed at increasing the extractive capabilities and the one between 1965 and 1967 threatened the landholders and increased tensions between them and the Crown. Specifically, the tax Proclamation of 1966 which abolished rist-gult landholding rights which made both landlord and tenant pay taxes directly to the state and “in effect, this reform eliminated the last traditional forms of politically derived land-holding rights” (Edmond J., 1981). These reforms made peasants in the north totally free of any previous feudal elements with the removal of the only existing obligatory service system. Whereas in the south peasants’ landholdings remain in the hands of the state and aristocrats but the aristocracy, which in

the past had possessed a sound economic base “confined to parasitic, absentee landowner” (Markakis, 1974). From this perspective the anti-feudalism conception of the Ethiopian revolution was more of misquoting the ruler-ruled relationship between the monarch and the peasant.

The politics of the Emperor’s survival on power was its royal absolutism where power is too centralized. The provincial administration was under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, the power of aristocrats was continuously reduced through a gradual process of demarcating boundaries and commercialization and more importantly the unrestricted powers of local governors were curtailed where fragmentation of authority was unthinkable. Fragmentation of authority which is one of the basic features of feudal society is therefore contradictory with the royal absolutist Hilesillasse regime’s behavior. Quite contrary to this, it is the Absolutist ruling system caused further fragmentation of authority and the rise of rebellion and question of nationalities which latter end the monarchical rule. On the question of land, in principle all land belonged to the emperor and tax was collected since 1941 directly by the government but only from cultivated land that makes the poor peasants most vulnerable and put them under direct control of the monarchical system itself; the combined effect of all these tells the authority over land distribution and usage was not a matter of landlordism and feudalism (Edmond J., 1981: 18).

Approaching the Ethiopian agrarian from feudal socio-political system therefore had little benefit to study the Ethiopian social structure unless to describe some feudal elements where the northern socio-economic order was introduced only after Menelik's conquests at the end of the nineteenth century. But still contrary to the feudal socio-economic system the relationship between agrarians in the political south, animal-rearing communities, the nomadic peoples who inhabited the vast expanses of the arid and semi-arid lowlands along the Red Sea coast and Somali frontier only incorporated to the modern Ethiopia during the conquest was more of a relationship between ruler and ruled not that of tenant-landlord. Because in the south the newly conquered land entitled to the gentry and the nobility mainly state functionaries and warriors commonly called *neftegna*. The *neftegnas* entitled the land for their service as warriors and used to consider the peasants as their private soldiers during the time of war and as cultivators in normal circumstances (Andargachew, 1995: 8-9).

And therefore the most appropriate justification for the attribution of some sort of feudal characteristics of the Imperial Ethiopia is not feudalism as a system but just the effect of the manorial system the pre Minilik era left and the social order survived only with slow changes. Otherwise the obligatory service was more of a matter of cultural dynamics of the polity in the north (Markakis, 1974), that was transplanted to the south during the Minilik invasion where the implementation was not based on kinship and no defined relationship between the lord and the peasant to give it a sense of ordered feudalism. The specialised warriors were already centralised and no significant resistance from the armed lords rather peasants raised arms to resist mainly the centre that put multiple imposition directly and through its extension apparatus locally. Besides no feudal element at all in the pastoral areas which covers more than 60 percent of the national land which is another fallacy for the national feudal order thesis.

The anti-feudalism attributes of the Ethiopian revolution and the process of land nationalization was also taken as an anti-feudal measure based on the premises of feudal character of the pre 1975 society and the revolutionaries' demand of 'Land to the Tiller'. The pre-1975 Ethiopia was in real sense a country where 1 percent of the societies, the majorities are members of the ruling class own 70 percent of the arable land. Even the land grant to loyalist and servants during the period the country was believed to undertake various land reforms and in a transitional period from feudal mode of production was 150-175,000 hectare per year showing significant growth from what it was 60-70,000 hectares in the pre Italian war period. On the same token "only 60 of the top ruling elements of the Imperial regime including the church had monopolized the urban land in the capital that could have accommodated 60,000 urban dwellers at 500 square meters per person" but the revolution was taken to target crushing the feudal system (Negussay, 1983). The government continued move to parcel out government land as gifts had seldom included landless peasants and peasants' land was not directly taken by the new landholders. In reality it was not the issue of landlordism but ruler-ruled relation that explain best the situation.

The irregularities in land ownership and grant from province to province were another point of interest for researchers to entangle the reason. The absolutist government owned large size of land as state land which locally termed as '*ye mengistmeret*'. For instance based on the official report in 1969; 79% of the total arable land in Harerge, 75 in Sidmo

and almost all land in the low land are considered as state land where the government had free hand to grant to its ruling members and sometimes allocated to commercialization. The pro-commercialization development policy in the agricultural sector during the Haile-Selassie regime had little effect on the highland since land was mainly private property and the land was with less commercial capacity and accessibility. Whereas the south and southeast were the most affected parts and these areas were in fact the major areas where peasant rebellion and resistances against occupation of their land, eviction of tenants, settlement of members of the ruling class on the native's land, over taxation of the already few local land owners and the consequent frequent famines continuously erupted until the fall of the imperial regime.

The question of land to the tiller might be thought to attract the attention of the student movement in its early stage as most students came from the rural area where they witnessed the condition of the peasantry. However until 1964 there was no any document on the land issue and no well documented report yet existed on how the demonstration that first raises the land to the tiller issue occurred (Zewde, 2014: 119). What is known is a short story by Berhane Meskel Reda about an ordinary peasant condition and the July 1964 issue of *Tataq* on how the landlords impedes the development of the nation which was followed by a bigger meeting where UCU president Baro Tumsa urged the student to take the land issue as a matter of scarifying oneself for the betterment of the society. Even although the monumental demonstration of 'Land to the tiller' happened in February 1965 followed by the rejection of the tenancy reform by seventy four members from the total eighty eight, there was no any series study on land problem in Ethiopia until 1970.

The crocodiles have played an important role in identifying the land to the tiller slogan for demonstration as the very fundamental issue of the nation and in fact the first major issue for the student movement in challenging the regime. Obviously this helped the crocodiles to consolidate their power which was challenged both by the university administration and other students (Zewde, 2014: 122). In fact the land to the tiller and other pressing issues in the student movements were not integrated into the student movement agendas based on theoretical background or their practical reality rather their importance to push forward the pressure on the regime. The student movement perceive the movement wouldn't progress unless it raised series societal grievances and the Land to the Tiller, is poverty a crime, US Imperialism out of Ethiopia and other agendas started to be formulated and the newsletter

disseminate timely agitational propaganda and leadership both for university students and society out of the campus (Forward, 1977).

The strong critiques by observers and the reality from the entire political system and measures of the military junta regarding the land issue also proved the other way. Primarily followed and influenced by the politics of the time Dergue has approached the nationalization issue from the angle of Marxist class struggle. As the successor of the old regime through revolution, it was also politically important to follow the path of the revolutionaries though the military junta had neither the background nor the knowledge of Marxism (Tadesse, 1998: 289-291). Dergue has ousted the land lords but with no intention to convert the vast areas of land in to the capitalist system like other post feudal societies or transferring to peasants within the private land tenure framework. Under the guise of economic development Dergue preferred nationalization of all rural and urban lands with no sign of transformation to post feudalism. In fact blaming Hilesillasse by Mengistu was for the direct influence of the monarchical system on the peasants not a matter of class relationship. The December 1974 issue of *democracia* also criticized such emphasis as an effort to deny class relationship in Ethiopia.

The post revolution settlement of the land issue should be either through the “Prussian way” where 'feudalists' conserving their big estates and converting them to capitalist ones or in a « peasant way » where the spread of petty production based on private property which both fall within the framework of capitalism. Dergue was pressured by the revolutionaries when it applied the less *coherently thought-out* strategy dictated by class interests to manage the land issue. The popular slogans of the revolution “Land to the tiller” and the general belief on the importance of the complete abolition of feudalism by the revolutionaries were practical challenge for the junta which by itself needs endorsement of its authority by the mass. And therefore it was a radical revolutionary and political decision from the top to declare nationalization of all rural land; subjectively to win the sympathy from the mass struggle as a show up of responding the top-priority agenda of the revolutionaries and objectively based on the conviction that to strengthen the state economically and politically the act of nationalization was found important (Alemu, 1980: 29).

The local manifestation of feudal type order was therefore a matter of what Markakis (2011) quoted “a dog may know his master but doesn’t know the master of his master” that explains the essence of fragmentation of authority is hard to take for grant especially in its political sense. The Imperial parliament was made of primarily the landlords who were against any change that disrupt the system not for land *per se* but the statuesque of the century old state mentality. Similarly the resistance to change was not through fragmented rebellion of different lords as well known in feudal society but through the strong central legislative body under the direct authority of the monarch where not a single decision has been made without the consent of the king. The bill about the condition of the peasants first presented to the imperial parliament in January 1963 with the aim of reducing the rent from the previous 75 to 30 percent and ending the compulsory labour service. However despite the bill was approved with ministerial cabinets on June 1964 the seventy four members from the eighty eight senators rejected the bill and the monumental demonstration of ‘Land to the tiller’ happened in February the same year. The failure of the monarch to lift the tenancy was not in fact a matter of capacity but unwillingness since the king was also part of the system. In its February 1965 issue *challenge* presented a very strong critique on the tenancy reform of the monarchical Ethiopia by Hagos GebreYesus. Hagos argued the symbolic reform effort was only hypocritical obeisance of the king to the world and quoted “When one desires to cut down a tree, one doesn’t usually request the tree to supply the axe” (Challenge, 1965). The article may present the imperial parliament as part of the feudal system but at the same time it was an evidence for the relationship between the peasant and the landlords was not provincial issue but that of ruler and the ruled. The survived tenant-lord relationships that resemble a feudal order like serfdom was again part of the monarchical centralised administration to effectively benefit from the hierarchy of dependence which is hard to manage otherwise. On top of that the church has a firm hand on the system and the highest interest in the prevailed order. The discussion in this section taking Bloch's conception of a feudal society as a reference makes the Ethiopian 'feudalism' only a misnomer (Ellis, 1976: 286).

2.2. Socialism as Hindrance to Study the Ethiopian Revolution

Despite the general consensus on the existence of a revolution in Ethiopia; the question of whether the revolution was a popular revolution, socialist revolution or a social revolution is still a research agenda. Haliday and Molyneux (1981: 283) describes the revolution as

"Africa's first social revolution" whereas what some scholars accepted as the Ethiopian socialism is praised as "the most sustained attempt by any African state to create a Marxist-Leninist structure of government" (Clapham, 1989: 3). Similarly the revolution is presented in the literatures of the socialist countries particularly in the U.S.S.R. as one of socialist orientations through a non-capitalist transformational path. Still for many local intellectuals and the foreigners who echo them, the quest for socialist solution to the Ethiopian obstinate problems was may be the most accepted making factor and leading agenda of the 1974 revolution ((Ottaway, 1978; Clapham, 1989: 13-14). Overstated explanation of socialism in Ethiopia is also common as if Ethiopia jumped in to socialism with a rocket-like speed without following the normal developmental stages (Negussay, 1983: 57). The claim for this form of socialist transformation exposed the socialist nature for further criticisms as (Michael, 1979) puts it Dergue undergone capitalist socialism in the name of Marxism.

Critics against the socialist character of the revolution based on the excessive engagement of the military junta and its failure due to the radical approach of using force for all problems was even attached to the limitation of the Leninist theory itself and secondly due to regional resistance movements otherwise Dergue has argued to follow a path the revolutions elsewhere in Europe. There still who argued Dergue has established a vanguard party on strictly Leninist lines to institutionalise the program but differs only from other revolutions in France and China in that Dergue was not autocratic enough to implement effective political representation to the grass root level (Clapham, 1989; Ottaway, 1978). The over dependence on socialism to study the Ethiopian revolution is however becoming a growing hindrance suppressing alternative narrations from the culturalists' perspective.

2.2.1 The Student Movement and the Birth of Socialist Idea

The socialist character of the Ethiopian revolution was being given two sceptical faces; one from the emergence of the ideology during the student movement whereas the second usually bases on the declaration of socialism as new ideology of the new post-revolutionary regime and the perceived commitment of the Dergue for its implementation. In fact the ideological and organisational pedigree of both the left organisations and the cadres of the one-party state cannot be traced outside the history of the student movement (Hiwot, 1984: 45). And therefore while discussing the nature of socialism in the Ethiopian

revolution it is imperative to deal with both perspectives. The dominant academic and eye witness written materials however dedicated much on the process of the adoption of socialism both by the student movement and the Dergue regime not the content while socialism has to be approached as a new order of new society that came through gradual transformation in the production system and class relation within that system. While socialism is the “end product of a fundamental structural change in a society and the result of development through transformation of productive forces and production relations” (Ibssa, 1980-81), well-established arguments on how the productive forces has transformed to give birth socialism didn’t exist in the majority of materials on the revolution and the already available are also found to be obscured by the pre occupation by the belief socialism is the only solution for the ill nation and trying to justify what they already believed. And therefore a close follow up on how the socialist ideology emerged in the revolutionary movements should be the primary job for the revolution study.

Early in the 1960s and even at the end of the decade socialism was not an agenda in the student associations and protests both locally and internationally. Even what is believed as more sharp critic of the regime than the students in Ethiopia, in the resolution of the 13th annual conference of Ethiopian Students Association in North America between September 6 and 12 in 1965 has officially declared “the regime in Ethiopia is a feudal establishment” but nowhere in the resolution was socialism proposed as a solution for the Ethiopian problem. Civil rights and liberty issues were discussed in their pure liberal forms and the aspired change in political order to the advantage of the mass which was stated to be violated by the one man rule and the church that kept the Ethiopian mass in perpetual ignorance. Even in the 19 articles under the economic reform envisaged by ESUNA there were mainly a general agrarian reform, industrialization and foreign direct investment articulated with no attachment to quest socialism (Challenge, 1966).

Although the young intellectuals and university students had better exposure to socialist principles, even the leadership of the student movement has not been occupied by any organised political thought or ideology. The very few enlighten one on ideological matter has only inclined to Marxist or Maoist solutions for the Ethiopian problems. Similarly, within the three very condensed but powerful slogans took by a group calling itself the “organ of the Ethiopian Revolutionary Organization and the Ethiopian People’s Movement

Council” which is centred in Amsterdam neither socialism nor its elements existed. Feudalism, Imperialism and revolution were the main theme (Ann, 1977: 82).

The students’ interest in socialism was therefore developed gradually as an ideological alternative to manage the Ethiopian problems. The land distribution issue which was later took the slogan ‘Land to the Tiller’ and the status of various ethnic groups in the Ethiopian state latter framed as ‘the questions of nationalities’ based on Leninist principle were the driving force for the adoption of socialism as a revolutionary ideology. Even the socialist model was a strong debating issue among various groups of the student movement. Among the radical student movement leaders there was a considerable consensus on the Chinese system of agricultural development whereas the same group has radically differed on the soviet model of managing the question of nationalities (Ann, 1977: 74-75). The socialist path by itself is not a point of consensus even among the researchers arguing its presence. Being convinced on the reforming and modernizing role of Hilesillasse, Ethiopia has been taken as already experiencing capitalist mode of production especially in the post war and post-1960 period. Based on this fixation the country passed through normal path from feudalism to capitalism and then the socialism as a result of the revolution (Haliday and Molyneux, 1981; Hiwot, 1984: 42).

Aspiration to change, resistance to injustice and Nationalism are the major issues in the student movement until the mid-1960 where the latter was the dominant. Taxonomy based on ideological orientations was rare as what ideology is by itself has been known little. For instance, Alemseged Tesfaye categorized the students of the mid 1960s into four groups as reasonable, radicals, jolly-jacks and neutralists mainly based on their orientation towards change. The reasonable are presented as critical observers of the situation and proponents of peaceful resolution for problems in a gradual manner while the radicals are change seekers but in a more radical way prioritizing revolutionary actions and following reactionary consequences. The last two are fun lovers and unconcerned on all what is happening respectively (News-and-Views, 1963).

Quite contrary to this, the socialist ideology in Ethiopian revolution was taken first as the radicalization of the student movement as a result of cultural dislocation and second as the best tool for the military junta to consolidate its power, struggle with nationalist movements and end the monarchy’s system and structures despite it was not genuinely

committed for the ideology (Messay, 2008). And therefore though praising the Ethiopian revolution as the only one in its kind in Africa heralded by many, the counterrevolution arguments are not less significant too. What is central for all is whether the revolution is a socialist revolution or not ranks the first frame of reference to argue for and against leaving other potential explanatory factors of the revolution being compromised which at the same time makes the Ethiopian revolution as the least understood one.

It is plain truth that academic literatures on the socialist face of the Ethiopian revolution are dominated by the Marxist-Leninist ideological background. But the way this ideology adopted in the process of the revolution is controversial. The dominance of the ideology didn't emerge as the ultimate solution for the Ethiopian problem but as a matter of debating issue among the leaders of the student movement only as an alternative model together with the western democracy. Only in 1961 there were two major debates one an oratorical contest on 'Capitalism and Communism have to exist together if man is to made rapid progress towards his aspiration' and the second debate on 'Western Democracy cannot exist in Africa at Present' but still the debate was within the leadership and most active members of the student movement (Zewde, 2014: 127). The debates and contests continued with no significant support to any kind of ideology even at idea level let alone at movement level. Previously debates used to be highly competitive in which the winner won with only slight difference. In 1962 Gebreselassie Gebre Mariam won oratorical contest opposing the debating point 'That Africa's True Salvation depends on Communism' with a significant difference which was a proof communism had no place during that time in the student movement. Materials in the university library were not accessible even those sympathetic used other means to read materials on communism. The challenge was not only the availability of the materials but those who were going to the Russian Embassy frequently summoned to the security offices as their move was always reported.

The 'crocodiles' therefore becomes the first Marxist group in the student movement openly express themselves in 1964 as Marxist after series of debates and discussions and they were the major source of Marxism-Leninism ideas since the emergence of the ideology as a debating issue. Ideas developed in a gradual manner through debates, study circles under the secret group reading groups of the crocodiles and latter through newsletters of the student movement where finally became the leading ideology of the Ethiopian student

movement and the revolution in general. Nevertheless socialism could not be reached by choosing one from the debating table or based on the output of intellectuals' philosophy. Such ideal and abstract approach to claim socialism latter became the main obstacle for other potential problems not to surface as revolutionary agenda and therefore how revolutionary situation were really socialist is important issue to discuss.

In this way except internal debates and general premises, the Ethiopian student movement had little capacity to comprehend the practicability of socialist ideology in the society and intense discussion was started very late in 1970s. Even the absence of theoretical knowledge and practical experience on the possible role of student movement in a social transformation led the movement irregular and made the students victims of irrational actions and sometimes chauvinism. It was in 1972, for that matter, the first well organized compiled elementary handbook of revolution and organization prepared by ESUNA to supplement the discussions on the nature and tasks of the student movement.

The search for ideology was therefore necessitated mainly not through a critical analysis of the Ethiopian situation but after the adoption of anti-feudal rhetoric with the Marxist conception of feudalism both as a stage of human development next to savagery and slave owning system while the movement leaders describe the situation in the southern Ethiopia more than slavery. The major theoretical fallacy in this way of characterising the Ethiopian mode of production is the revolutionaries' anti-feudal, socialist claim of the Ethiopian revolution. Once mode of production expressed in this way; the ultimate revolution is not expected to be out of a bourgeois anti-feudalism revolution towards capitalist mode which in Ethiopian case neither the revolutionaries were bourgeoisie nor do they claim capitalism. The revolution meant a socialist revolution, which is a non-capitalist revolution, but no theoretical and practical explanation fit, such dynamics of the Ethiopian revolution.

Marxism was also referred in the student newsletters to debate the stage and nature of anti-feudalism struggled during the mid-1960s. However still the July 1971 issue of *challenge* described the then developmental stage of the movement not even transformed to the level of youth movement let alone a full-fledged anti-feudalism socialist revolutionary movement (Challenge, 1971: 2). In 1972, the ESUNA handbook also listed three core groups as the enemy of the Ethiopian society and the main target to abolish through a

socialist revolution; the feudalist which is the royal family, the big bourgeoisie and finally the imperialists (ESUNA, 1972). It is with this premises the Ethiopian revolution framed as anti-feudalist and anti-imperialist revolution though many preferred to accept it for grant with no further testing their condition in the Ethiopian context. In the previous section we have seen how feudalism is overrepresented in the revolution literatures while the actual reality was more of feudal elements in a non-feudal society.

Still the justification for the presence of imperialism was more of the result of Marxist ideological alignment than the reflection of the reality. The 15th congress of ESANA in 1967 reinforce the challenge of imperialism in Ethiopia while the economic penetration of the west at that time was too insignificant and their involvement was more of politico-military and culture (Zewde, 2014: 133). Marina Ottaway estimates as of 1975 a total of 5,000 large commercial farms covering perhaps only 750,000 hectares out of more than 8 million hectares of arable land in Ethiopia but no significant foreign presence in the sector (Ottaway, 1978). Of course a government report in 1967 disclosed the dominance of commercial and industrial enterprises under foreigners' control. Based on the report out of 489 big industrial firms 385 were owned by foreigners mainly Italians, Greek, Indians and to some extent Americans. Similarly May be the first more researched analysis of the condition of imperialism in Ethiopia was published years after the adoption of the notion. The January 1971 issue of *challenge* discussed the issue and concluded US economic penetration and imperialism are part of the feudal system interest but in the name of protecting the country from the colonial state and therefore the anti-feudal and anti-imperialism revolutionary movement should follow the Marxist line (Challenge, 1971).

The 16th ESANA congress was the most important shift in indoctrination of Marxism to the student. The resolution of the congress went further by listing essential reading materials most of them were by radical Marxist authors from the west, African-America, Russians, the classic Marxist and new left radicals with special full recommendation of General Giap and Frantz Fanon. Study groups, inner and outer circles started to become the core for dissemination of Marxist ideas (Zewde, 2014). The overall process of adoption of Marxism by the student movement was aggressive effort of producing radical Marxist revolutionaries and militants but there were few theoreticians who can interpret the Ethiopian reality and convinced on the applicability of Marxist theory to the social condition. In fact the analysis of the Ethiopian condition based on the Marxist-Leninist

perspective was not only as a result of the radical attachment of Ethiopian university student which was by itself a “cultural dislocation” but there was also a global trend in the 1960s and early 1970s where most university campuses in the world were engrossed by socialist revolutionary ideas (Messay, 2008: 161). Although it is hard to argue all the process of the adoption Marxism simply as cultural dislocation as Messay expressed, it is clear that the process was from the top to down in search of some sort of ideological basket so that the students can collect all what happened in Ethiopia within it. It is also clear that the quest for socialist Ethiopia was neither the primary objective of the revolutionary movement nor the structural and social conditions of the then Ethiopia were as simple as to categorize based the dogma of orthodox Marxist tradition.

2.2.2. Post-revolutionary situation as a making factor

The quest for socialist order as a conventional making factor of the Ethiopian revolution partially built based on the post revolution move of ‘socialist Dergue’ regime. However scholars’ argument on the pure socialist ideology of Dergue and its commitment to implement most of socialist reformation in Ethiopia cannot be taken for grant to justify socialist character of both the revolution and the regime. In Africa many regimes claimed to be a socialist regime despite the fact that they assumed power without a socialist revolution and little or no element of socialism in their policies.

In the Ethiopian context the socialist left was in a clear doubt among various and complex scenarios. The left was unable to come out of formalism to suggest a simple solution that all revolutionary forces can understand the next step a socialist revolution they pretend should move on. The military junta was also bravely proceed to use the leftist’s slogans and the left who claimed to struggle for socialist Ethiopia for decades found itself between frustration and collaborating the junta on power where some faction of the left did the latter (EPRP, 1981: 5). In terms of ideological declaration revolutionary socialism was the political move of the Dergue to claim legitimacy by showing off itself as responsive for the popular demand of the progressive forces in the revolutionary process. The conceptual confusion within the army itself, the practical move Dergue went through however became a debating point for whether it was certain that Dergue was a socialist regime or it pretend to be so to control the power and survive the opposition of the left forces and multiple class contradictions.

The socialist ideology of Dergue, for some, shouldn't be understood only based on its political program but the reflection on the dismantled old regime (Harbeson, 1977: 233). In this way socialism was an issue of how Dergue defined the struggle with Hilesillasse not the actual socialist order it envisioned to implement. This was a response for those who challenged both the presence of the necessary conditions for socialist Ethiopia and the argument of a totally new system Dergue has brought which cannot be considered as transformation of the old political regime. This can be further understood in two ways; first socialism should be studied based on the social structure and transformations in mode of production during the Monarchical period. Second, it meant to be as long as the framing of the old regime was feudalist and imperialist and the struggle was termed as anti-feudalist revolution for socialist order, the actual program of the incumbent regime will be less significant. Since the process of the disintegration of the old regime discussed in the previous section how the post revolution political situation influenced the framing of the Ethiopian revolution as a socialist revolution remain for further discussion. In any of the cases the post-revolutionary situation as an indicator of socialist revolution revolves around two important points. First, on the intent of the initial pronouncement of socialism by the Dergue whereas the second on the real socialist character of the regime.

2.2.3. Declaration of Socialism

Paul Henth, though Senior US diplomat with ideological opposition with USSR and Strategic alliance with the emperor, identified few mythologies in the narrations of the Ethiopian revolution. One of them is Dergue's attachment with Marxism-Leninism while the social structure of the society was unfit to this system an indicator for lack of genuineness on the dergue side as a socialist political force. According to this view Marxism-Leninism was not the ideology of all and even most of the intellectuals were well aware of the alternative path for rapid social and economic changes beyond socialism but Dergue's approach to maintain Marxist rhetoric even as it was eliminating Marxists was more of a systematic way of consolidating its power through manipulation of the radical leftists who strongly back socialism and secure economic support from socialist countries of Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and perhaps China (Michael, 1979: 378) (Paul B., 1989: 3).

It is hard to be sure Paul as a US diplomat was not free of prejudice on this stance. Paul was suspicious on the path for economic and political development of the post-revolution Ethiopia since there were some hints Dergue will move opposite to the great number of African states economic and social development models which was typically built on Western development assistance, know-how, and investment capital towards industrialised society (Palmberg, 1978). The general fact in Africa was existential threats in Ethiopia too. During Hilesillasse, all the universities were administered by westerners and companies are co-owned by the elites from the ruling class and the westerners and this was partially the seed for students' inclination for socialism in the name of anti-imperialism movement. And therefore Dergue's rejection of the west model and its alliance with USSR and other socialist countries like Cuba was a source of frustration for western scholars to discredit all what has happened in the Dergue's Ethiopia.

The first declaration of the Ethiopian socialism on the Ethiopian Herald on December 28 1974 presented as if socialism is the Ethiopian class structure reality and a long lasting solution for Ethiopian problems from the Ethiopian soil which is also a best bridge for Ethiopia with the rest of Africa and socialist countries. However on the same declaration the need for official declaration was an indication that the Monarchical system was totally collapsed and Dergue was a new regime with new political ideology. The need to contemplate new socialist revolutionary order was expressed by Harbeson (1977: 217) as a means to "struggle to eradicate traditions of autocracy, inequality, and subjugation that it associates in particular with the regime of Haile Selassie I". Out of the dominant Ethiopian intellectuals and the foreign writers who echoed them there are revisionists who claimed the "Red Star", a common name for Dergue, is the just a new symbol for the incumbent just a star of Solomon was the imperial symbol in the old days with no different in approach except that the color has changed (Ibssa, 1980-81: 78).

One of the most pronounced justifications for the declaration of socialism was the one summarized by Harbeson which is "Two distinct, partially antagonistic philosophic streams, one stream emphasized Marxist analysis, stressing the inadequacies and inequities of capitalism and state ownership of the means of production as a remedy. Whereas, the other one dwelt upon more nationalistic themes and the importance of commitment to Ethiopian people themselves to exemplify true needs" (Harbeson, 1977: 225-26).

Mesay criticized such dichotomy between socialism and nationalism as the leaders of the student movement were well aware that the socialist ideology will serve their best nationalist interest and unified nation building which is in the real sense the main reason behind adopting the notion (Mesay, 2001: 7). It is also true that although the student movement has adopted socialism as the ideology of the revolutionary movement and Dergue assumed power in the name of the revolution, the endorsement of socialism didn't happen immediately. Dergue declared 'Ethiopian Socialism' as the political and economic program 20 December 1974 almost 10 months after the February revolution which was again built based on the 'Ethiopia First-Ethiopia Tikdem' nationalist interpretation. However what Mesay has missed in his analysis is the process and stages the student movement went through to adopt socialism as an ideology of the revolution. More importantly the student movement was a typical nationalist movement before socialism came both as a debating idea and a full-fledged alternative ideology for the revolution. In fact the third issue of *struggle* in October 1967 put the absence of any ideological attachment of the student movement more overtly rejecting all ISMs except nationalism (Struggle, 1967). By 1967 the critical shift in the student movement was not about ideology but the level of their struggle which turned the case to anti-feudalism not that of reform of the imperial regime. The January issue of *Tateq* and the 15th congress of ESUE and ESANA in August 1967 unequivocally declared the struggle is a struggle of changing the whole system with no specific ideological attachment except general vision of socialization of land. Again until this time the question of nationalities hasn't won the heart of the students and the same congress showed its commitment to combat all influences of tribalism, factionalism and regionalism. And therefore, had socialism was nationalism in another form it would be adopted long before those debates and contests but it came to the revolutionaries as a separate ideology.

On the civilian left side, though all the organized movements claimed to be socialist, they had never a common ground to work together in their supposedly socialist transformation. The clearest indicator of this might be the ideological debate between the pro-Derg "Voice of the Masses"-later became a clandestine party under the name of "All-Ethiopian Socialist Union" or MEISON and "Democracia" which emerged as a party under the name of Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party. My exhaustive investigation on the documentations of these two outlets is enough to conclude their difference is not only the implementation strategy but on the essence of being a socialist by itself. The final decision

of MEISON to work with the military regime in crafting policies, organizing a political party & indoctrinating the bureaucrats about socialism and the fierce rejection of the EPRP in the name of betraying socialism was the absence of clarity on the socialism they were struggling for. And the brutality of the Dergue on all “socialist” civilian including MEISON additional, may be the most historical evidence, for the argument so far.

The type of socialism was another controversy among the political left and some resisted to acknowledge Dergue as a socialist regime. While the debate continued on the possibility the adoption socialism before the creation a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party which was not existing in Ethiopia, a prominent newsletter at that time, *Voice of the Mass*, forward on its January 1975 issue a sharp criticism on ‘Ethiopian socialism’ on the premise that socialism can be drawn only and only from the scientific Marxist-Leninist ideology. On the same manner the *Democracia* also challenged Dergue’s commitment to socialism on its December 1974 issue for the reason that declaring the term socialism will not make the government truly a socialist regime and that may make the Ethiopian case problematic like other African socialism in Kenya, Tunisia and elsewhere (*Democracia*, 1974). The radicalization of the Dergue to extent of eliminating the civilian left who were the source of the socialist ideology and the nucleus of social transformation with in the Dergue itself was not simple political antagonism but the fallacy of Ethiopian socialism and Dergue’s approach to use socialism to cover-up its dictatorship in consolidating the power.

Marina Ottaway presented an excellent illustrations of the ideological contradiction in the civilian left by analysing the political debate in early 1976 on the Ethiopian Amharic language daily, *Addis Zemen*, in the form of a mock debate between *Democracia* and *The Voice of the Masses*. Ottaway concluded the radically opposite position of the two civilian left while both claimed to follow “scientific socialism” and used Marxist terminology was the effort to publicise the ideological and political conflict which had been going on for several years among Ethiopian student activists at Haile Selassie University and abroad (Ottaway, 1978: 20).

The debate on nature of socialism Dergue has declared was not an issue the level of implementation of the socialist reform but that of clarity and consistency on consecutive declaration of one form over the other which is a gain a source for conflict between the civilian left on the issue of supporting and opposing the regime. A proof of this

inconsistency is found in the manner the Dergue converted to socialism. It first came up with a nationalist slogan, 'Ethiopia First' (Ethiopia Tikdem), which was basically against the question of nationalities the student movement, has been struggling for and latter incorporated into their political program (Markakis, 1979: 7). Understanding the long distance the question of nationalities has gone and its irreversibility in the upcoming political struggle and resistance movements, Dergue was obliged to redefine its ideology and brought the concept of 'Ethiopian socialism'. The Ethiopian socialism was neither a socialism nor a pure nationalism but declared as an Ethiopian brand in opposition to the foreign socialism of students and a nationalist ideology against the secessionist movements which was again has failed to work and the regime came up with a white Marxism–Leninism and radical socialism (Messay, 2008: 161).

As Markakis (1979: 7) puts it, 'though hardly familiar with ideological notions, the masses instinctively supported the radical initiative, thus making it the dominant orientation of their movement'. At the same time the adoption of the radical Marxist-Leninist ideology had two purposes for the Military junta. The first and may be the real motive can be considered as dergue was well aware that it couldn't capture power without the support of the civilian left and their socialist ideology and therefore there was no option than adopting it. But more importantly Degue targeted creating confusion on the civilian left on its orientation towards the ideology and therefore made the left to remain in conflict and divided with no united power to emerge as a potential threat (Markarkis, 1979: 7; Messay, 2008).

More academic stances are also abundant extending the issue beyond the intention of th declaration of socialism but the content of what has declared. Michael Chege, very sharp critiques of Dergue, is convinced that the hope of the social forces that brought the revolution and the future for democratization in Ethiopia were aborted when the Dergue betrayed the ideals of the revolution, which was a socialist transformation. However for him the issue of whether the social forces could possibly lead the revolution to a socialist transformation in the absence of the military intervention (Michael, 1979: 378). This is on contrary to the idea of the proponents of the socialist revolution in Ethiopia that justified the military role as gap filler which is a vanguard working class party in the Marxist tradition (Ayele, 1983: 42-43).

Messay was not convinced on the idea that the revolution was stolen from the social forces. He further argues neither it was the objective conditions that made Dergue to assume socialism and radicalized nor it was a push from few radical officers that made Dergue to take the revolution to that end. The main Reason, Messay (2008: 179-80) quoted:

“...the fact that socialism appeared as the position of the majority of modern educated Ethiopians, the prestige of Marxism as the dominant ideology of the time, all these factors helped students popularize the socialist ideology. The socialism of students and intellectuals has indeed influenced the Dergue, but the question is to know why the Dergue was influenceable by that specific ideology. The answer to the question is found in the nature of the Dergue. Students and intellectuals were able to influence it because the Dergue saw how fittingly the ideology professed by them could be used to justify its rule.”

The Dergue regime was even taken as anti-socialist by significant number of scholars. Ibssa (1980-81, 82) explained “before the revolt of 1974, committees (dergues), were part and parcel of the state; they were the defenders of the old feudo-comprador, bourgeois state” the military was neither interested nor has a prior knowledge about socialism as an ideology when it comes to the front. In this argument it can simply be said that Dergue was more of anti-socialist than socialist in practice. All the process Dergue went through in the name of socialism was actually against the Marxist proposition of a socialist transformation which is without organized working class and united revolutionary forces. The brutality towards the civilian left was also a critical reference when it comes to the anti-socialist justification of the regime.

Such notions made part of the left unable to recognise the reality that Dergue is already on power. Once the revolution was assumed to be a socialist one and Dergue represent neither the mass revolutionary forces who lacked the means and organization nor the bourgeois who is weak, it laid the ground for labelling of the military rule as fascism and justifying all sorts of struggle against the new rulers as legitimate cause of saving the revolution. Nationalisation of private means of production undertake in the name of socialism.

The major premises for the socialist nature of the Ethiopian revolution were in the actual sense overstated characterization of a popular revolution. The discussion so far has also brought new insight to question the legitimacy of this characterization and open the door for further analysis on the making factor of the revolution beyond these significant conventional making factors.

CHAPTER THREE

COMPROMISED MAKING FACTORS IN THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION

The revolutionary movements in the periphery long before the urban struggles and the student movements across the nation were pioneers of change in the long march for freedom. The nature and degree of rebellion were dependent on the mode of inclusion of these peripheries into the Ethiopian state during Emperor Minilik and the succeeding degree of marginalization and oppression by the subsequent Imperial regime. Of course, the historical relationship between the centre and some peripheries are also determinant factors for the nature of the rebellion like the case in Eritrea. The global politics and political developments in the neighbouring countries especially the Sudan and Somalia were also an important factor in the nature of the rebellions.

Those who fought obstinately and lost everything they have including their dignity and identity latter enter a new phase of the struggle for identity and dignity including for secession. Whereas those provinces submitted willingly or after experiencing relative defeat and overwhelmed by the force of the King enjoyed relative authority in their province and struggles and rebellions from such provinces have their own unique features. Considering these factors, the revolutionary movements in Ethiopia are categorized analytically into three broad sorts and discussed in this chapter.

Although no account of Ethiopian history can be taken as a proof to consider the history of the ruling class as the history of a particular nation, the account of compromised making factors for the Ethiopian revolutionary can be narrated within this polarised view of the history of nations. The origins of revolutionary struggles for secession and those of for self-determination and recognition can be fully understood if they can be seen in the light of the revolutionary situation in those different situations.

The relationship; vertically between the rulers and ruled whereas horizontally between different nations, is always a point contention. Revolutionaries and the revolutionary situation in the periphery are found to be explained in a radically opposite perspective on the accounts of mainstream Ethiopian writers and that of advocates of an independent

nation from the history of imperial Ethiopia. One of the most ardent opponents of the mainstream historical narration of the Ethiopian revolution categorised the pre-revolution Ethiopian society or nation as: “the colonized nations, the oppressed nations and nationalities, the annexed nations and nationalities, the oppressor or colonizer nation” (Ibssa, 1980-81).

A movement which absorbs the mass segment of a certain polity and the national impact and social aspect of revolutionary, historical observations indicate, are related dialectically. While the maturity of the uprising is reflected in particular on the conceivable level to the mass segment of a polity is truly taking part both in the cause and subsequent actions, it also is reflected in the energetic vitality and consequences. And that, broadly shared objective circumstances that have a determining role of the mass’s objective condition and their subjective maturity are key in significantly governing the mass’s historical role (Maherdel, 1984: 2).

Out of plenty of contradictions on the Ethiopian revolution, a single agreed-upon narrative may be the fact that the revolution was bigger than the urban movements and a result of series of attempts by dozens of revolutionary movements. Before the student movements in the urban centers, the country was continuously challenged by resistance movements from the periphery. These movements were mainly peasant rebellion and armed resistance struggles that were considered as ill-bred resistance for the intended Imperial modernization process. Sahlesillase imaginatively expressed how the centres of the revolutionary movements were as chaotic and spiral wind to puff covering entire Ethiopia: “from its southern part, Bale, to its north, Eritrea; from its east, Harar, to the west, Kaffa, the revolutionary wind spirally blew, rendering the dust to rise heavily” (Adera, 1996).

3.1. The Revolutionary Secessionist

Secessionist movements in Eritrea and Ogaden are integral parts of the Ethiopian revolution and it is impossible to talk of the revolution if these movements are ignored or deemphasized because the importance of those struggles in the peripherals and the contribution they made to regime changes Ethiopia is evident since the emergence of the modern Ethiopia (Meckelburg, 2012). Hiwot pointed out that “the only ‘formidable-nationalist-regionalist’ movement until 1974 confronting the imperial state was that of

Eritrea and to some extent Somalia irredentism” (Hiwot, 1976: 44). Although many of the armed struggles in the periphery shared similar characteristics, the Emperor’s wrong justification to simplify integration of Eritrea to Ethiopia as simple as that of Bale or parts of Somali province and lack of any special strategy to manage that special problem led to full scale armed struggle. The interrelationships between them range from social to economic, from home politics to diplomacy and ultimately from the destiny of Eritrean nationhood to the Ethiopian future statehood. These struggles need to be addressed in both ways that how the policies of the Emperor affected these movements and in turn how the struggles affected the revolution and finally brought the century-old monarchy to its unceremonious end.

The peasants and nomads in the periphery were as revolutionary as the urban if not more revolutionary than all. The kinds of literature on the Ethiopian revolution were not generous to peasants and nomads when it comes to giving the revolutionary qualifications. The armed struggle between the center and the nomads in Eritrea, Ogaden, and Bale were prevalent since the ever centralization of the Ethiopian state and religion and identity-based marginalization state apparatus deployed in those areas in the name of modernization and *Ethiopianization*. And the main aspect of struggles in those areas can best be described as an identity-based struggle to revolutionize the ancient regime to an inclusive Ethiopian state. To this regard Andargachew (1995: 55) quoted:

“The nomads of the Sahel plains in Eritrea and those of the Ogaden had, since about 1960, been involved in armed resistance against the ancient regime. Like the Oromos of Bale, the resistance of these nomads was primarily based on religious and ethnic considerations and was led by [an] organized elite with substantial international support. Though the general literature on the revolutionary potential of nomads leaves a lot to be desired, the Ethiopian experience seems to suggest that the nomads can be as revolutionary as the peasants if not more.”

Although Andargachew addressed the possible role of peasants and nomads as revolutionary movements, the credential was not assertive to acknowledge the role of these movements in the 1974 Ethiopian revolution and the decline of the ancient regime. Furthermore, exceptional to other pieces of literature he even combined both the peasants of the north and south as passive political agents that didn’t act as an organized political movement in the uprising of 1974.

The economic or political elites from these periphery areas had both the relevant soft power and urban networks to resist state-led oppressions. They were able to create; on the one hand internal political crisis within the system, and on the other hand they had the grass-root networks to mobilize the peasants and pastoralists for the cause. The level of their grass root networks varies in their degree of organizations, mode of institutionalization, and actual capacity to participate in the popular uprisings and guerilla fighting. However, the best way to settle the debate on the revolutionary credentials of struggles by the peasants and pastoralists is either analyzing the underlying theoretical characteristics of Ethiopian revolution which is discussed in the previous sections or detail assessment of local variations in each revolutionary movement that may give the context-specific factors that made those struggles revolutionaries.

The historical route and the developmental trajectories that transform parts of the Ethiopian region into secessionist movement made these areas politically potent that sometimes created an autonomous, occasionally offensive to the centre. The secessionist movements remained very strong and independent enough from the centre to spur a radical revolution from below. As Clapham expressed their political importance lies largely in the separatist tendencies of the Somalis and peoples of western Eritrea (Clapham, 1969: 3).

These separatist movements had various forms mainly depending on their cause and types of relationships with the center. The Eritrean case is usually presented in its structural contradiction with the Ethiopian polity and politics. The contradiction is basically taken as the feudal political arrangement of the Ethiopian empire was not compatible with the supposedly capitalist system in Eritrea. With this structural projection of the Eritrean case, the Eritrean political question in Ethiopia and the struggle for the Eritrean liberation is a tale of two distinct forms of governance that has no room for compromization except separation (Hiwot, 1976: 36).

The secessionist movements also have a regional political dynamic in line with post colonized African nations' politics and the politics of post Second World War geopolitics. To this regard the attachment of the Ethiopian revolution to external factors mainly the Second World War has its own reality except excessively externalize internal failure of the monarch in areas where external powers can manipulate. Ellington precisely noted how the external factors mingled into the secessionist movement that have revolutionary trends. He

observed, accordingly, that for example Britain's move to bring the Beja-speaking tribes of the Sudanese and Eritrean into a unity. The real intention behind this lies in Britain's ambition to find easier access for its colony Sudan to the Red Sea rather than seeing the actual unity of the tribes. The United States on the other hand, as an unrivaled post- WWII power, exercised its might to consolidate its presence in Ethiopia through establishing military bases. Growing rivalry brought the Soviets to the region tending to support the disintegration of Western Europe's colonial hold marked by its move to declaring to support that Eritrea first to become a temporary trust followed by its eminent independence. France on its part but also in a similar fashion Italy both sought to secure their individual interests around trade and other economic activities in the region. The interaction of all these external powers in the region was not without an impact on the nature of the revolutionary movements (*ibid*, 1984).

However, the most legitimate cause of these secessionist movements can be categorized under the question of nationalities within the Ethiopian political context than irredentism. The question of nationalities which is of course the historical headache of the Haile Selassie regime received relatively greater emphasis within this perspective but it obscures other multiple dimensions. Still from the national questions, Eritrea was a central focus as the major, legitimate and democratic nationalist movement of the oppressed nationalities until 1974 that was the result of the disastrous policy of the regime that has forced the nationalists into armed dissidence.

However, separatism was also central in these regionalist movements not only as an Ethiopian context but as a global and regional cause declaring the demand for regional autonomy, independence, and irredentism as a public political right. Considering the proportion of nationalities that can be categorised as an oppressed class, ungoverned diversity of the Ethiopian people and to some extent, the historical claim for 'independence' by the people of Eritrea and Somali; the secessionist struggle in these areas had significant implications for the Ethiopian Revolution. The implications were far-reaching from becoming the main factor to increase the popular resistance against the regime and also the major point of conflict among various wings of revolutionaries in the urban centers and abroad. The degree of recognition of the question of nationalities once became the dividing line among revolutionaries that pushed secessionists to believe the on-

going struggles could never accommodate their interest unless they peruse the struggle for secession (Alem, 1990; Bahru, 2014; Hiwot, 1984: 44)

It is for this very fact that although the Emperor was aware of the fact that by respecting the Eritrean question, he would lead other national movements for recognition into full-scale annexation and therefore he preferred to downplay the case. If there was a difference, at the initial stage, between the revolutionaries, it was on the degree of autonomy struggling for. For the case of Eritrea, for instance, those who thought federation was more advantageous for Eritrea used to campaign for unification with Ethiopia and others for independent Eritrea through federation with Ethiopia. Separatism was a reactionary movement in the latter stages. But the struggle initiated by the minority Eritreans who, from the beginning, suspicious of the Emperor's policy, latter won the support of the majority and led to the revolution.

The revolutionary struggle for the people of Eritrea, Somali, and parts of Oromia especially in the rural side was primarily a strategic identity-based struggle against the dominant class whereas for the majority of members of the student movement in urban areas and abroad, the question of nationality was more of tactical and secondary. The major cause for a split happened in the latter stage of the movements and polarization of post-revolution Ethiopia also this dichotomy on the position of the question of nationalities. It is also this very reason that pushed the Eritrean guerrilla fighters to choose the guns over peaceful struggles in the absence of tolerance both by the regime and other wings of revolutionaries. This armed struggle finally became the model for other nationalities and led to the erosion of the legitimacy of the emperor.


3.1.1. The Seed for Eritrean Liberation Movement

A central concern for hundreds of years has been the Ethiopian (Christian) fear of being "an island in a Moslem sea." The Ethiopian fear that the Red Sea will become an "Arab lake" is only intensified by the substantial assistance that Eritrean revolutionaries have received from Arab countries. The Ethiopian government, speaking through the government-controlled press, regularly stated that the present Eritrean war was Arab instigated and that without Arab money there would be no fighting in Eritrea. Historically, the Ethiopians have feared what they perceived to be a three-pronged Islamic threat. The

Ethiopian highland core has traditionally resisted Islam and the associated Arab culture. Secondly, Ethiopia breaks the solid continuity of Islam from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. The third prong has to do with the perception held against Islam itself and particularly on "its propensity to be militant and political with the jihad or holy war as its potent means" (Sherman, 1979: 56-57). It is also important to recognize the Eritrean secessionist movement started through a long historical memory of *de facto* independent Eritrean state and the contemporary political struggle of the oppressed people to be discussed below.

Leaving the long historical perspective aside, the recent past that determined the Eritreans' position towards the degree of their independence from that of the Ethiopian state can be traced back and linked to the Minilik era especially the time when various treaties were accorded with Italy. Since treaties were considered as legal acts of the Ethiopian state, it is not strange if they considered as the legitimate cause of the nationalities. Three important occasions mentioned by the nationalists as historical background for their secessionist movements. The first one is the Wuchalli treaty of May 2, 1889. The problem of the Wuchalli treaty regarding the Eritrean question was despite the spectacular victory of Ethiopia during Adwa against the European scramble for Africa, Minilik did not push the Italians out from Mereb Melash (Eritrea) after his victory. Such paradoxes also existed even before Minilik. During AtseYohanis Ethiopia was not interested to push the invader; Egyptian force, at the battle of Gundet (1875) and at the battle of Gura (1876) out of the Eritrean region despite their psychological advantage and military capacity.

The Adwa victory was an African victory that gave a significant negotiation power for Ethiopia not only as an independent state but as an African state. However, during the treaty in Addis Ababa signed in October 1896 following the victory of Adwa reaffirmed the protector position of Italy over significant areas of Eritrea, about 200,000 square km (80,000 square miles). And therefore, before the actual separatist movement as a result of the Haile Selassie regime's oppression against the selected areas and identities, the sentiment of the *de facto* political entity of the Eritreans state as a result of the various treaties Ethiopia signed were already on the minds of the Eritrean people.



Map 3.1. The Eritrean province in the Ethiopian state before its independence in 1991

3.1.2. Religion and the Eritrean Revolutionaries

As the question of Eritrea is inseparable from the Ethiopian revolution we can have two types narratives; the one focusing how the internal conflict within the Eritrean fighters give advantages for the center and the second one which is the main focus of this section is what kind of attitudes the Ethiopian regime had towards Eritrea and the Eritrea question and subsequent policies of the center that made Eritreans a strong revolutionary force (Lefort, 1981: 40).

However, the most critical moment for the revolutionary movement in Eritrea as it was to other revolutionary struggles was the time when the Emperor returned to the throne in May 1941 five years of exile. During the Italian short-lived occupation period, the traditional regional leaders weakened and these declines in the power of the nobilities created the fertile ground for the Emperor to consolidate his power and further repress regional forces; be it nationalist, class-based or religious. Article 4 of the Imperial Constitution (1955)

describes the Emperor's power: "By virtue of His Imperial Blood, as well as by the anointing which He has received, the person of the Emperor is sacred, His dignity is inviolable and His power indisputable. He is, consequently, entitled to all the honours due to him in accordance with tradition and the present Constitution" (Constitution, 1955). This trend of extreme power accumulation and intent of centralization led to continuous repression of any regional movements. In this way, the emperor aimed at supporting irredentist movements in Eritrea and Somali with the interest of incorporating parts of the areas colonized by Italy in this region. This support for the irredentist movements however became the era of intensification of the identity-based division of the society and marginalization.

The "patriotic" association in Eritrea, "*Mahbara fiqri hager Eritra*" (Society for the love of the land of Eritrea) established in April 1941 in Asmara and the one established in February 1944 by the name "The Society for the Unification of Ethiopia and Eritrea" with the almost similar program was the first initiatives to instigate division between the highland Christian dominated Eritreans and the Muslim dominated lowlands. By its de-facto legal name "Unionist Party", the association was the extension of the Emperor's unitary state attitude in Eritrea. At the same time, the association was an informal school for what they called 'love of the Ethiopian nation' though purely based on identity blind sense of the nation. Due to their exposure to the European administration, Eritreans were skeptical of the Ethiopian 'feudal' system and consciously follow every move of the Emperor in Eritrean. In this aspect of the Eritrean affairs, no division has existed between the highland and lowland, the Muslims and Christians, the pro-unity and the independent seekers. There used to be a secret discussion between Christians and Muslims on how to maintain the Eritrean unity with their diverse identity and interest early in 1939 before Haile Selassie reinstated in 1941.

The unionist party has become the cause of conflict between the various parties as it has gradually fully adopted the unification of Eritrea with Ethiopia without questioning the Eritreans social, political and economic status and more importantly how the unification will manage diversity which is the center of the Eritrean question in the entire struggle. Especially, following a conference held at Bete Ghiorgis, the division between the Muslims and Christians became certain. The Muslim group led by Abdulkadir Kabire forced to leave the secret discussion platform. This time forward Eritreans began to split

and organize themselves in multiple fronts. The first organized movement in a separatist sentiment can be said the one started in Keren in December 1946 by the name Muslim League also known as Shaban al-Muslim in Arabic.

Clear enough as the cause of their separation, most of the leadership and members of this new party come from the Muslim dominated areas of Eritrea more specifically from the Western province of Massawa and the Red Sea districts. Although the new party is a Muslim League by its name, still small numbers of Christians were also members of this new party due to their shared aspiration for an inclusive and independent Eritrea.

Organized struggle for independence became the norm of the time and only in one-year time together with the Muslim League four parties laid the ground for organized resistance against the unification. National Muslim Party of Massawa by its Arabic name '*HizbelWatani*', the New Eritrean Pro-Italy Party and the Eritrean Liberal Progressive Party were established and able to secure huge support from the people. Although the first three parties had predominantly Muslim bases with minority Christian participation, the Liberal Progressive Party on the other hand can be said a Christian party opposing the union of Eritrea with Ethiopia.

The predominantly Muslim base of separatist movement was not a coincidence, rather, an indication of how religion was at the center of mobilization both in the unionist and separatist camps. The Orthodox Church; as the only strong institution parallel to the state collecting one-third of the nation's land, exempted from paying taxes but allowed to collect tax from tenants, was the epicenter of the Emperor's ambition of unifying Eritrea with the unitary state of Ethiopia. Early in the 1940s and throughout the unification process the Orthodox Church openly favor unification despite the reservation of the rest of Eritreans on the process. Despite the significant role of the church for social integration and unity, the priests were the primary pushing factors pressuring their followers to support their cause. The strategic support of the Church in this process was not limited to preaching for unity but propaganda, collection of petitions, allocation of a significant amount of resources directly financed by the Emperor, and even warns their co-religionists in the name of religious scriptures. To this regard Abune Markos, the archbishop for Eritrea and Tigrai once organized five thousand signature petitions using His church apparatus and religious ceremonies.

Similar to this, the Orthodox Church used to publish various notices and sometimes regulations regarding the status of those refusing unification. On these publications especially those Unionist columns, the Church announced services like baptism, marriage, burial, communion, and absolution services will be nullified for pro-separatist movement members and their families. Since most of these services are related to Eritrean Christians demanding independence, there were various impositions for Muslims without a member of the Unionist party especially ejected by the Ethiopian authorities when they move from one area to another and on checkpoints crossing to Ethiopia (Treavaskis, 1960: 60).

Religion was also the central mobilizing force of the Emperor even in Addis Ababa. With His full sponsorship of various demonstrations organized and a number of associations established in Addis Ababa. Making the Emperor's minister of pen, Tsahafe Tezaz Woldghiorgis a founder, the Emperor worked to establish an organization called "*NetsaHammasen*" (Free Hamassen) misleading the public by giving an impression that the struggle in Eritrea is a struggle to return Eritrea from colonial powers. However, as the activities of this organization since its inception on February 27, 1944, until its peak time of mobilization in 1945, Churches were the center of their movement and Muslim Eritreans were the target. For instance, one of the biggest demonstrations in Addis Ababa organized on 25 September 1945 by "*NetsaHammasen*" was started not with a nationalist call or Anthem rather by prayer in St Ghiorgis Church.

Both camps had or pretended to have historical roots for their articulation of Eritrean identity in terms of politicization of religion. The Orthodox Church considered the pre-colonial historical connectedness of highland Eritrea with Ethiopia through Tewahado Church as a historical right over Eritrea. On the other hand, the unique status of Eritrea during the Eritrean colonial period and the comparative advantage of religious freedom compared to the Ethiopian Muslims in the then Ethiopia was a source of competing definition of Eritrean Muslim identity. In any of the cases, religion was at the heart of Eritrean nationalism and especially Muslims were more assertive of their unique identity from that of Ethiopia.

The ultra-nationalist unionist led by the then Ethiopian Orthodox Church patriarch Abune Markos and the then head of the unionist party and the would-be executive of the federation TedelaBairu did their level best to drag religion into the debate between

unconditional union and independence. The secret meeting in BeteGhiorgis also ended up with failure as a result of religious-based verbal attack on the *de facto* spokesperson of the Muslim League, Ibrahim Sultan, by a member of unionist camp as “*Muslim herders are only to follow the decision of Christian elders*” (Woldemariam, 1987).

Indeed, for those Eritreans who are committed to use the cultural and historical links between Ethiopia and Eritrea for their nationalist movement made the Tigrinya-speaking Christian residents in the highlands more radical towards their Muslim Eritreans brothers in the central and lowland parts. Supported by the Ethiopian government, the already strong institutional relationship between the Eritrean Tewahado Coptic Church and Ethiopian religious authorities had a strong impact for the expansion of religious based unionist movement in 1940s. in this way and through the action-reaction interaction of the two parts in politicizing religion to define the concept of being an Eritrean, it has been developed institutional antagonism on both sides.

Once the dividing line in the Eritrean struggle took a religious dimension with the interference of the Emperor, the various Muslim parties started a joint demonstration against the Emperor’s move and the church’s appeal for religious-affiliated unification. The secessionist movement laid its ground in a historic demonstration with unprecedented support of the great majority of Eritreans on June 10, 1947. As the religiously motivated unification was a call for all Muslim Eritreans, this historic demonstration was organized jointly by almost all branches of Muslims’ organizations and parties irrespective of their difference in religious tradition and political view. The moment was a point where the urban and rural Eritreans came together in almost all cities and towns to protest against a threat to their religion and identity in the name of unification. This was again a time where religious leaders take a lead in the nationalist movement that used to be considered as political. In other words, this time was a moment that religion significantly influenced the emergence of a wider Eritrean nationalism to the extent of articulation of the ‘Islamic Identity of Eritrea’ as a counter-reaction for Christianity rooted unification trial. The critical question of ‘what does it mean to be an Eritrean’ that emerged in the post Italian period also took shapes from a nationalistic perspective and became the leading agenda of the subsequent national movements and armed struggles. The very concept of Islamic identity shaped Eritrean nationalism worked not only in its nationalism perspective but

religious right, the role of religion in the public sphere and state-religion interaction were also major debating points of the various factions.

Starting with this mass support and religious tone, the Eritrean Muslim League that established in 1946 became the leading organization bringing together all clan chiefs, customary institutions, small groups of traders, influential traditional and modern Islamic clerics, and more importantly, the League presented itself as a voice of the voiceless highland peasants, pastoralists in the lowland and urban-based weakly organized civil servants. In this way, the secessionist movement became the movement of diverse groups of Eritreans and the agendas for the struggle became the agenda of the mass.

The significance of the 1947 demonstration was in fact the result of successive efforts to mobilize the Eritrean Muslims especially since 1941. When disagreements between Christians and Muslims grew in urban areas pro-independence groups started to face multi-dimensional challenges.

One of the main challenges for the internal peace and stability of Eritrea at the end of the Italian period was *Shifta* activities initially believed targeting the four power's commission's activity and Italian settlers. However, the *Shiftas* equally attacked pro-independence groups and their properties. Only between January and March 1948, there were dozens of attacks on Members of Muslim Youth Association, Muslim league officials, and villages like Keren, Agordat, and Ad-Sherraf that are believed to be the harbor for pro-independence activists. However, the most critical challenge in the struggle was the endless demand to prove themselves how truly Eritrean they are despite the Eritrean nationhood concept itself intellectually articulation mainly in the course of their struggle to convince local and international actors.

In addition to this, despite the pressure from the federal authority and attacks from pro-union groups, pro-independence camps were always committed to being a source of unity for all Eritreans during all the efforts to flame sectarianism. Pro-unionist groups considered attacking the pro-independence camp; instead of struggling based on the underlying principles of freedom, autonomy, and nationhood as their main strategy. While the Muslim League portrayed as an extension of foreign powers mainly that of Sudan, during the SDF attack the city's Islamic leaders, ward chiefs, and most influential merchants

supported the Federal government Chief Administrator's decision to remove SDF forces both from the city and throughout the Hamasien Plateau.

As riots and confrontations between the two became a fashion of the time as a result of lack of trust in the Emperor's idea of unification, Muslim community leaders made their focus on the rural areas and traditional leaders. There were two important meetings; one on 3 December 1946 where leaders and community representatives at Keren gathered to consider Eritrea's political future and elect their leaders. As a result, Said Abebaker El Mirghani was elected as the president of the Muslim League, and Ibrahim Sultan was voted secretary-general at this meeting.

Having the support of the community leaders in Keren and electing formal leaders of the Muslim League, the next big event was held again at Keren on 20 and 21 January of 1947. This meeting was the most critical of all in the nationalist movement both in terms of the several thousand attendees and the adoption of the idea of emancipation as Eritrea's future. Summarized, the composition of the various groups' and their stand about the decision on that meeting could be quoted as:

“The Tigray and the Baria, of western province, the Maria from Keren and Beni Amer chiefs and the kunamas choose the way for independence ... the Saho from the Red Sea, the damahoita of the Danakil Afar also supported the Moslem league program. All in all Eritrean Muslims can be said to have chosen independence mainly from Ethiopia and if it doesn't work even from the highland Eritrea.” (Yasin 2016)

From this time onward the Muslim League, despite some differences among the leaders in terms of timing and strategy, adopted the issue of independence as its political program.

3.1.3. The Eve of the Federation and Eritrean Muslims

The four powers commission comprising Great Britain, France, USA, and USSR were the main decision-making organ in Eritrean affairs, and all parties either ally with or complain to for the success of their cause. Following the proposal of these four countries commissioned for the unification of highland Eritrea with Ethiopia and trustee for ten years for the remaining part; dominantly Muslim areas, the Muslim League addressed the commission presenting itself as a legitimate representative of Eritreans even at

international level. The Muslim League has prepared a memorandum for the commission to legitimize the adoption of complete independence from Ethiopia. In the article, the League argued that Ethiopia is “Feudal” and incapable of managing the Eritrean affairs. The League complained about the Ethiopian government having its backward government system that led its own people to a state of disorganization, ignorance, and backwardness facing chronic poverty despite the fertility of the land and privilege of independence. Again, in relation to religion, the League was more critical of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the government for Ethiopia’s historic marginalization of the Ethiopian Muslims themselves in their own country. The league blamed the power commission or any other organ pushing for the unification to a county where Muslims do not have the right to be equal to Copt in their own land.²

The League’s underestimation of Ethiopia’s ability to guide Eritrea was further elaborated in a memorandum to the commission on 16 December 1947 reads that:

“Is it just that a still barbaric and primitive nation such as the Ethiopians-whose government is unable to improve a lot of its own people should come into possession of a territory which is far more disciplined, advance and civilized than Abyssinia?” (Mohammad, 2013: 65).

Right after the UN’s passage of Resolution 390-A in December 1950 and especially after the official transfer of power from British to Federal Authority in mid-September 1952, the various branches of nationalists mainly the Muslims started to suffer from political repression and systematic eradication of their communication platforms. The shift in the core values struggling for and sense of urgency they had set also radically changed. During the first two years of the federation, the Muslim League and other Muslim based organizations decided to try every opportunity they might get from the federal arrangement and prefer to stick only to religious issues of protecting the right to have free religious institutions, strong Islamic and Arabic educational system and preservation of the important role of Islamic clerics and Ulamas. This shift in priority is; in one way a pragmatic move to go with the politics of the time but in the other sense, it is a strategic move to look for alternative mobilization agendas for the Muslim constituent in case time

²The four-power commission report in August 1948 showed that the Unionist party cause had not attracted a majority. The combined figures for those political parties opposing union (675, 000) were approximately twenty-three percent greater than that in favour (547, 000). (UNGA, Official Reports, 3rd Session, pt.2, 1st Committee Annexes A/c. 1/466.)

would come to resist against the federation. Successful in their effort, the Muslim clerics emerged as a center of unification for all Muslims. ‘Ulama Front’ was also established in Asmara on May 19, 1951, comprising all regional clerics; Islamic scholars, jurists, and community leaders, including several members of the League’s Executive Council.

From the strategic and nationalism point of view, in fact, the League was on the verge of collapsing due to its incapability to struggle for complete independence by articulating coherent inclusive nationalist mobilizing agenda together with internal factions and challenges from the unionist camp supported by the Ethiopian government. And therefore, the political pressure by the authority of the federal arrangement can be said more of religiously motivated targeting these priorities.

The onset of the federation brought an unintended opportunity for the secessionists making the pro-union Muslim and Christian Eritreans together curious of every move of the Federal Assembly and the Emperor. In this way, the Muslim’s League and Muslim clerics had to only play with the failure of the federal authority in respecting the arrangement. At the same time, it does not take long for the Assembly to breach the Eritrean sovereignty, political repressive measures, underrepresentation of Muslims in civil service, closure of free media, and acting as only the rubber stamp of the Emperor against the federation arrangement.

The process and timing of abolishing the federation arrangement were self-evident proving dismantling was only a matter of time for the Emperor. The federation was formulated from the beginning in a way giving a legitimate cause for Eritreans, especially for Muslim dominated western and coastal areas. The Eritrean assembly was formulated making eighty percent of its members from the highland Christians, most of them former members of the unionist party, while half of the population of Eritrea were Muslims. The first chief executive of the Assembly was Dejatch Tedla Bairu. Dejatch Tedla was the secretary-general of the unionist party that had been the Emperor’s proxy institution for the unification. The crown’s representative in the assembly also used to deliver a speech at the beginning and end of the Assembly based on the right granted by article thirteen of the constitution. Most of the time the speeches were made in Amharic that a significant number of members especially the lowland Muslims’ representatives couldn’t understand it.

Having Dejach Tedla as a leader and absolute majority of the seats in the assembly the highland Eritreans were hopeful the civil and democratic constitution of federated Eritrea could end their decade's long march for freedom. Initially, the highlanders were not in favor of annexation though curious about developments in the federation system. However, besides the gradual replacement of the democratic constitution of the federation with a feudal legacy of the monarch in all activities of the federation between 1952 and 1962, those 10 years at the same time were a period of escalated Ethiopianization of the Eritrean government. In the process, the incompatibility of the feudal monarch and the civil Eritrean constitution became visible immediately after the announcement of the federation. Communication between Ethiopia and Eritrea was not easy and almost every letter from the federal government started to be returned with letters requesting an explanation. While Article 4 of the federal arrangement gave the government of Eritrea the power to exercise legislative, executive, and judicial powers with respect to matters within its jurisdiction, through time proclamations decreed to abolish or at least reduce selected acts of the federal arrangements (Eritrean-Constitution, 1950). Aiming to limit the freedom of the Assembly and increasing the bureaucratic power of the Emperor, On 30 September 1952 a federal judiciary proclamation decreed and three of the eleven sections (section four, seven and eight) abolished a major act in the federal arrangement and gave no right for the Eritrean court; a right to appeal to the federal court. In this way a royal decision or the decision of the Assembly dominated by the Emperor's person will remain valid even the court wanted to appeal against. And finally, this leads to the resignation of Tedla Bahiru in 1955 which again made the Eritrean affairs be handled under the direct order of Bitwoded Andargachew Messai.

In addition to the limitation of the assembly's power and the rapid regress in democratic principles, the excessive social and economic imposition made ordinary Eritreans suffer from a continuous increase in the cost of living as a result of the thirty percent import tariff imposition. This in turn made students and Eritreans of all ages to protest and revolt against the federation and more directly the Emperor. The first year of the federation and months right after were full of demonstrations. The demonstrations between January 1952 and October 1952 were highly threatening for the Emperor in proving his incompatibility for democratic federation and establishment of an inclusive Eritrean federal government in the face of ordinary Eritreans and the international community. And therefore, the Emperor sometimes used the security apparatus but usually through instigating internal divisions

and conflicts amongst demonstrators to combat the growing challenges. The security apparatus harshly repressed every free media and political institutions as the norm in imperial Ethiopia was. From the dozens of free newsletters and magazines, the last opposition media to be closed was Dimtsi Ertra (The voice of Eritrea) in March 1953.

3.1.4. Eritrean Muslims and the Federation Experience

The struggle of the Eritrean Muslims for their religious freedom and later for independence was far more than the struggle of one segment of the Eritrean nation but a struggle for the principle of democracy and freedom in Eritrea, which is the ultimate goal of the Eritrean struggle. And therefore, the history of the struggle for independence will only be meaningful with a thorough understanding of the period between the end of Italian colonization and the beginning of the organised armed struggle (1941-1961) that Eritrean Muslims led the struggle for their religious freedom and presenting the Eritrean identity. In this sense, both the colonial periods of the 1920s and 1930s unorganised movements and the post-colonial organised struggles in the form of civil societies, political parties, and media institutions bringing Muslimness as shared religio-cultural and socio-political experiences is imperative to an in-depth analysis.

Eritrea's constitution in principle granted freedom of religion and the right for a religious institution. Despite this, the authorities were in series violations of such constitutional provisions aiming to control every aspect of religious affairs and silence the Muslims' visibility in public spheres. By 1952 Sawt al-rabita, the media wing of the Muslim nationalist intellectuals essential to shaping their discourse was closed. Similarly, in May 1953 the newsletter, Sawt al-iriritria (The Eritrean Voice), known for its critics on the abrogation of the constitution is temporarily banned. Despite the editors won the Asmara district court issue and obtained the district's permission to resume printing, it is permanently closed in August 1954 (Sawt al-iriritiya, 1954: 4).

In line with the rapid deterioration of the economic condition, the labor market could no more support as many labor force and the authorities started their own mechanisms to decide who should be hired. Excessive language criteria, illegal requirements to carry identity cards of the federal government and sometimes membership in the unionist parties used to systematically marginalize the Muslim labor forces.

With the growing discontent on the federal authority, the League and Mufti continuously complained to the UN and the Assembly but without a result. One month after the League availed memorandum to the Assembly documenting detailed grievances on the deprivation of Muslims' civil and religious rights, they presented the same memorandum directly to the Ethiopian government. Unsurprisingly, the response for their complaint was sentencing Sultan, Muhammad Umar Kadi and National Party Secretary-General Ahmed Abdelkadir Beshir from three to ten years term on multiple charges of treason against the government (Clark, 1956).

The waqf system was purely managed by the religious authority even in the pre-colonial period of the Turkish and Egypt presence in the area and continued in the same fashion during the Italian period. Alien period due to the critical intermediary role religious leaders between the administration and the people, Italia provided a special article in their constitution and guaranteed "payments to Mosques and monthly salaries to the leaders of the Muslim community and approved shari'a courts' independence in issues of individual status, household and inheritance. The Eritrean constitution also declared the complete authority of the religious institutions to manage the waqf system. However, since the intrusion of the federal authority into the internal affairs of Eritrean Muslims emanates from the Emperor's interest to control all dimensions of Muslims' life to silence the continuous resistance the Emperor is facing from them, in 1952 the authority unconcealed intrusion into the waqf system effected through complete interference in the collection, distribution, and administration of the collected resource. Through the gradual implementation of this intrusion, in August 1954 the government ordered qadi of Asseb to transfer the waqf resources to the government. The aggression went further to the day-to-day religious practices and holidays which were purely the duties of the religious leaders. In 1956 a special proclamation decreed to give a mandate for the government to restrict Eid-prayers in the name of rain, a threat, or aggression. In the same year, a restriction was imposed on foreign religious teachers, which was a norm in Eritrea³

As years went on, the ultimate aim behind restricting the very basic civil and religious rights of the Muslims and step by step annulment of the federal arrangement revealed later

³Ibrahim al-Mukhtar, "The mufti's Letter to the President of the Assembly in Protest at Interference in the Matter of 'Eid Prayer.'" http://www.mukhtar.ca/contentN.php?type=viewarticle&id=116&category=letters_mukhtar (accessed December 14, 2008).

in the final years of the 1950s. And again, as the struggle for independence was basically the “Muslims’ project as a response to an imminent threat”, the immediate victim of the violation of the federal arrangement was also this part of the community in Eritrea. As soon as the new chief of the Assembly AsfahaWoldemikael assigned replacing BahiruTedla in 1955, series of proclamations were decreed imposing various restrictions on the Muslims that are parallel to abandoning their citizenship. The proclamation to exclude the Arabic language from education and work language was the first to this step. Arabic is the most spoken language in Western Eritrea and significantly used in other parts mainly by Muslims. The Muslim elites receive their education in Arabic. The first generation of Eritrean intellectuals is those either from Sudan or Cairo. The labor force from the Muslim community is dominantly Arabic speakers and thousands of civil servants and teachers also used Arabic as it is the official language guaranteed by the constitution since the colonial period. And therefore, the immediate impact of removing Arabic from the official language is removing thousands of Muslims from their job, administration, and most importantly from politics that determine the fate of hundreds of thousands from their future ownership of their motherland. Most of the schools that use Arabic as a medium of instruction come to closure due to intentional budget restriction and lack of staff⁴.

In 1957 and 1958 the speedy erosion of the federation and extreme abuse of the civil and religious rights of Muslims reached the level that pro-union Eritreans couldn’t even circumvent it. The pro-unionist, in fact, did not share the concern had it not been the federation arrangement eroded enough to abandon their right to practice their constitutional authority within the federation and finally pushed them off out of the system. Ironically, many of members of the assembly who used to pass bills to silence free media, denying rights to education and religion finally came to know the excessive abuse of Muslims right was only the beginning to complete dismantling of the federation. The replacement of TedlaBairu, the first chief executive of the federation, by AsfahaWoldemikael was the birth of his late consciousness about his puppet status in the federation acting only as a rubber stamp for the Emperor without any actual authority and autonomy as granted in the arrangement.

⁴United Nations, Resolution 390 (V) and Ministry of Education, Folder A/187, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Education, February 12, 1948.

The revolutionary condition was ripening more at a time when the grievances of the pro-independence coupled with pro-unionists' late consciousness on the inevitability of the breakdown of the federal arrangement. The autonomy of Eritrea and the economic condition were the two important common agendas for both Muslims and Christian Eritreans since the onset of the federation. However, the chronic unemployment, increase in living cost, and the overall control of the Assembly's decision by the emperor in late 1957 became a source of broad anti-government, more importantly, an anti-Emperor alliance of all Eritreans (Killion, 1997: 26). Political unrest and instabilities engulfed all the cities as a result of labor activists' joint mobilization. The joint mobilization was the new beginning of Eritrean nationalism resentment that started late but helped the urban unrest continue and the later grown to the long-lasting armed struggle.

The highest level of cooperation between Muslims and Christians, the rural and urban, highland and lowland Eritreans happened in 1958 series of demonstrations that finally created the great March 1958 unrest that nearly paralyzed all cities. Before the March demonstration, early in February Muslims protest after jumaa (Friday) prayer asked for freedom of religion and association while at the same time presented their letter of protest for the representative of the federal authority. Between the February protest in Asmara and the huge demonstration in March, again demonstrations continued in various cities. The uprising was stronger in the first weeks of March, especially in the Muslim dominated western province. The federal government response was also harsher to the protests in these areas. For instance, hundreds of protestors arrested and dozens injured when police crackdown a huge protest in Keren during the first week of March. The government responses for the peaceful demonstrations stirred waves of anger across all Eritreans that led urban Eritreans to close shops for four days and boycott any government and private works (Moore 1958: 3). With the strong moral and coordination support of the religious class the wind of unrest that finally blown to all urban Eritreans and resulted in the unprecedented huge protest in Asmara on March that hundreds of thousands jointly protested with significant impact on the city and administration nearly paralyzing the whole city (Richey, 1958: 21-22).

The course of the nationalist movement that used to be an action-reactionary struggle as a result of the federal authority selective abuse of religious rights finally extended to all sections of the community. Once the uprising became the agenda of all Eritreans, mass

uprisings disrupted the social, political, and economic system of the country and this was the politics of Eritrea between 1958 and 1961 until the puppet federal authority uncovered its mask and engages in all forms of political intimidations. The Emperor controlled all powers of the Assembly through AsfahaWoldemikael and he has been provided with extraordinary power to detain without charge and eradicate any form of political institutions unconditionally. The aftermath of the March 1958 political activity inside Eritrea ended either with arrest and death of activists or forced exile that gradually transferred the struggle for independence; a full scale armed struggle from abroad with hit and hide strategy from border areas led by ELF until EPLF and other actors joined.

The role of external powers especially the emerging crisis between Ethiopia and the international powerful states mainly US and British also gave priority in the Ethiopian structural analysis of the revolution. This went to even externalize the major sources of the revolutionary movements in the name of external factors. In reality, Ethiopia had a mutual and friendly relationship with the British following the end of the Italian occupation and the Second World War. When the world power shifted towards the United States, Pentagon became the major allies of the nation for its strategic interest both in the Horn of Africa and its interest to strengthen the southern block targeting to tackle the influence of USSR expansion in Africa and the Middle East. This has been done first through controlling the communication facilities Italia installed in its previous Eritrean colony and integrating Ethiopia with what is commonly known as the anti-Arab coalition jointly established by Ethiopia, Turkey, Iran, and Israel. In exchange, Ethiopia received continuous economic and military support making the country the main shareholder amounted more than half of the total US military support to Africa between the years of 1952-1974. The strong relations with the US most importantly helped the country to secure another strategic interest by federating Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1952 due to the influence of the US over the United Nations general assembly (Andargachew, 1995). The strong relationship persisted until the fall of the monarch in 1974 and the revolution was a genuine revolution despite the strong support from the western power. This paradox made western affiliated academicians and diplomats to ignore generally the revolution in Ethiopia (Clapham C. , 1987) and specifically the presence of genuine causations except for the radicalism of Ethiopian student movement and the interference of socialist ideology from abroad (Mesay, 2001: 336; Henze, 1985: 27)

3.2. Liberation Struggles in the Somali-Region

Among the several groups engaged in armed struggle against imperial Ethiopia, the various factions of insurgency and secessionist movements of the Somali people are worth discussing for the impact they implied on the regime. By Somali-region we are implying not the geographical territory currently known as region five of the Ethiopian state but the then active battlefield of liberation fronts, especially the Ogaden area.

Like that of the case of secessionist struggle in Eritrea, the victory of Adwa is a critical juncture to analyse how the state-led imperfect integration of the peripheries proliferated armed groups. The Adwa victory gave the momentum for Emperor Minilik to create the boundaries of sovereign Ethiopia which almost exists now. However, the war for expansion to Somaliland was not only a matter of incorporation of the area to the Ethiopian state but a difficult diplomatic mission to legitimize the Ethiopian boundaries in those frontiers competing with the already existing colonial powers of Britain, Italy, and France who had drawn the border between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1890 among themselves without the consultation of historically the most connected and politically more legitimate country, Ethiopia.⁵ Although the general mode of incorporating the new territories is a kind of state expansion as part of creating the Ethiopian state, the mode of struggle with the alien people and the interaction with the colonial powers there gave it some form of forceful conquest by an outsider conqueror. And therefore, the general attitude of the local people in Ogaden that later gave birth to the liberation struggles shaped by the political interaction of the colonial power especially the Britain that aimed at unifying Ogaden with other parts of Somalis to establish the “Greater Somalia” and the Ethiopian response to that both during the Minilik and Haile Selassie era.

From this perspective, the insurgency and counter-insurgency between the Somali clans and the four powers in the region including Ethiopia were existed since as early as in 1899. The armed struggle waged between 1899 and 1920 by the Bah Gerri sub-clan of the Ogaden clan leader, Sayyid Mahammad Abdille Hassan, against these four powers was the prominent indicator that the Somali people were not only against the Ethiopian new

⁵The three major European powers, France, Britain-and Italy, had already been engaged in fierce rivalries to divide up the entire Somali territories into their respective spheres of influence. The French were consolidating their hold over Djibouti, and Britain was expanding its influence over what was known as British Somaliland, centred in the town of Hargesa. The Italians were holding firm to what was known as the Italian Somaliland, based in the town of Mogadishu.

encroachment in the area but any policy against the people and the resource that persisted until the fall of the Emperor in 1974.

Similarly, it can be argued that the complex problems Ethiopia had faced in Ogaden were tied to its mismanagement of this situation. The outcomes of this mismanagement caused the various Somali clan to organize clandestine movements recruiting the youths early in the 1920 and 1930s. However, the independence of the Somalia government in 1960 at the same time marked the apex of Somali nationalism all over the Somali-speaking people and resistance against the Ethiopian Government. However, it will be misleading to argue the emergence of Somali nationalism as a by-product of the newly independent state of Somalia. Critical analysis of the political development and chronological aspect of the growth of nationalism may even give the opposite result.

3.2.1. The Seed for Ogaden Secessionists

The area traditionally used to be known as ‘Somali-land’ was inhabited by the Somali-speaking people but owned by the colonial administrations of Britain, Italy, and France. By the time Ethiopia emerged as ‘the fourth foreign actor’ in the region only time could tell how Ethiopia would be different for the Somali people in Ogaden from that of the colonial powers. As soon as Ethiopia annexed and incorporated Ogaden to its territory, it was also forced to join the power politics in the region to free parts of the ‘Somali-land’ from Italy. As a result, there was tactical cooperation with that of the British Administration. Accepting the invitation of the British administration was in the continued effort to revert Somaliland territory what back then was called British Somaliland which was invaded by Italy during World War II. And therefore, the independence of the Ogaden area from Italia was a joint struggle by British and Ethiopia.

People in Ogden were hopeful that the end of Italian colonization will bring them regional autonomy. However, their independent fighter Ethiopia let the Ogaden and Haud on the hands of the new colonizer, Britain, in the name of Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) through Anglo- Ethiopian treaty in 1942 and again 1944. This agreement was the beginning of the British administration of Ogaden as part of ‘Reserved Areas’ including Harar, Jigjiga, Dire Dawa, and other parts of North Eastern Harerge. However, this so-called reserved area was neither a safe British Military administration nor


Ethiopian civil administration. Rather the area became a harbor for various garrisons and *shiftas* using 'hit and run' strategies to attack the Ethiopian government structures in nearby areas. Gerri-Jarso-Somali frequently attacked the areas Qocher, Gursum, and advanced to Harar with the indirect support they enjoyed from British. The British administration, at least, allowed the reserved area as a shelter for these forces despite Ethiopia's complaint that it's out of the agreement.

The British Military Administration (BMA) in the Ogaden was a climax period for Somali nationalism. During this period clan leaders in Ogaden had a clandestine movement organizing themselves under a political organization called Nasrallah. The Somali youths had also another organization named Ogaden Company for Trade and Industry (OCTI) also called Somali Youth League which was established in 1943 in Mogadishu but opened its branch in Jigjiga in 1946. The level of organizations of the rebels and the extent of their existence deep inside the various areas of Ethiopian owned Somali cities gave moral superiority for the groups and a message of the Emperor's weakness to secure even its own territories. In this way, this nationalist sentiment hit its apex the moment Somalia gained independence in July 1960.

The position of the Haile Selassie government concerning Ogaden was precarious. While he frequently complains about the position of British administration, in a practical sense, he always ended up surrendering to their will despite the illegitimate demand of the British to retain Ogaden as a military base. This reluctance if not failure, of Haile Selassie, finally sealed by the second Anglo-Ethiopian agreement in December 1944 officially granting the administration of Ogaden and reserved area to Britain that remained so until 1948. Although the 1944 agreement politically acknowledged these areas as integral parts of Ethiopia and the British administration in the area only with the will of the Ethiopian government, the final result was the cause of all destabilization not only in Ogaden but across the region.

In whatever forms of administration, the intention of the British government became clear early in 1946 with the pronouncement of the idea of "Greater Somalia." The administration used the growing discontent between the local Somali people and representatives of the 'shoan kingdom' as fertile ground for its claim. Before the official pronouncement of this idea by the British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, detailed political

and cultural justification for the unification of all parts of territories inhabited by the Somali people was articulated in the form of a memorandum. Accordingly, the Ethiopian government again presented as illegitimate to administer the relatively civilized areas of Ogaden as the 'feudal' form of the Hilessillase government could never accommodate the culture, demand of the people, and the legacy they gained from consecutive colonial Administrations.



Map 3.2. The Ogaden Region in the Ethiopian State

The internal political situation of Haile Selassie especially his treatment of the Muslims at home was also the main issue on the table, as it was the case in Eritrea, to justify Ethiopia's incapability to administer Muslim dominated Ogaden area. The Ethiopian government in fact always gave reasons for people in the Muslim dominated periphery to revolt. With all the frustration and complaints on the British move in Ogaden, Haile Selassie's approach to the issue always raised the anger of the local people as it was a pure sense of territorial ownership not that of belongingness of the citizens. In a letter addressed to BilataAyele, governor of the HarergeAwraja, Haile Selassie's prime concern was the land, the border security for the empire, and the pasture in Ahud area. In the letter, the Emperor mentioned

“no house will be safe without a fence and the fence of Ethiopia is Somali and the desert” representing the area as a fence with no national, historical or cultural intent to make the people feel Ethiopian.⁶

Ogaden was only the center not the whole of the regional issue. Britain was demanding Ogaden and the rich pasture of Haud to realize its dream of the “Greater Somalia” merging Harar and Jigjijga with its reserved area. Similarly, Ogaden was not the center of the issue for the Emperor as long as he could secure access to the sea in whatever arrangements possible. Had it not been for the failure by the British side and other regional political dynamics, Haile Selassie was always ready to compromise the Ogaden area if there is a chance to secure access to the sea. He was in a secret deal with Britain to access the French-owned Zeila port through corridors within the British reserved area as an exchange of leaving Ogaden for Britain. Britain was also consciously lobbying the Emperor to leave Ogaden so that Britain will help Ethiopia to gain Eritrea achieving its dream for a seaport. In all of these cases, Ogaden and the people there were subjects open for compromise and this gave the community sense of political alienation and independence from Ethiopia. Together with the sense of cultural attachment and the long years of political manipulation of Britain to make the people feel more attached to other parts of Somalia than Ethiopia, the seed for the secessionist struggle was existing since then, at least, as militant pan-Somali movements.

3.2.2. Armed Struggle against Imperial Ethiopia

Insurgency and liberation movements in Ogaden resulted from multiple but consistent state-led repression that persisted from 1890 to 1974. However, the continuity of the repression is strikingly similar to what Hagman (2014: 729) pointed out:

“In spite of changing geopolitical and conflict rationales in the Ethiopian Ogaden, government responses to armed revolt in the Somali periphery have been strikingly similar. A brief comparison of counterinsurgency campaigns by the imperial army against the al-jaysh in the 1960s and by ENDF troops against the ONLF some four decades later illustrates this observation.”

⁶As far as the ruling classes of both Somalia and Ethiopia are concerned, the issue is not the liberation of the Ogaden Somalis from political oppression and economic exploitation. It is rather a territorial question. These governments seek either to bring the territory and the people under new class domination, or to maintain them under the existing class rule. Hence, the issue is clearly and unequivocally the acquisition of the Ogaden territory that put the two regimes on a collision course.

In another major reporting to the same historical occurrence, the main media outlet of the revolutionaries in urban centers and abroad, (Editorial, 1977, p. 3) mentioned the continuity of the state-led oppression in Ogaden on its special edition as:

“.....The regime continued the national oppression policy of Haile Selassie and the Somali nationality in the Ogaden has been subjected to extremely barbarous national oppression. For this reason, the oppressed people of the Ogaden have revolted against this oppression. To that extent it is legitimate, just and democratic. The political support rendered to the revolt of the Somali people of the Ogaden by the world democratic and revolutionary forces is correct.”

This resistance struggle that can basically be categorized as the struggle of the oppressed people against the oppressor empire has changed its dynamics and scope depending on internal and external actors' interest and engagement. The nomads' uprising was clearly a struggle of the oppressed against the oppressor. As the struggle grew in scope, however, the liberation front turned it into a struggle of Somalis against Ethiopians and created an opportunity for Somalia's intervention. Beyond the ethnic and cultural connection of the Ogaden people with the Somalia government, the oil reach area of Ogaden, and fertile lands there were additional economic causes to fight for Ogaden. Ethiopia's ruling class, anxious to see internal class struggle stifled, similarly and deliberately orchestrated nationalist hysteria to mobilize the rest of the country against the Ogaden Somalis (Asseged, 1982: 280).

The nomadic resistance that continuously challenged later becomes more organized especially with the independence of Somalia in 1960. In the Ogaden, Somalis who had briefly been united with the other parts of the Somali nation under British tutelage after World War II had engaged in guerrilla resistance against Ethiopia since the British returned the area to the Emperor in 1942. Such opposition escalated after the Marxist regime of Mohamed Siad Barre came to power in Somalia in 1969 (Edmond, 1981: 325-326). The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was formed in Mogadishu (the capital city of the Republic of Somalia) in 1960, the year when the Republic became independent.⁷ Once came into existence, the organization established a military camp in

⁷Nomadic resistance to Ethiopian intrusion in their way of life dates back to the end of the nineteenth century. But this resistance had lacked organization and leadership. Such organized leadership came in the 1960s, when the discontented Somali urban petty bourgeoisie organized and proclaimed itself the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF).

Mogadishu where its militants were receiving pieces of training. It subsequently emerged active in involving consecutive skirmishes against the Ethiopian government in the Ogaden and Bale regions. It continued its rebellion attacks even after the failure of the 1963-1965 Bale revolt, which it had pressed, and conducted raids in Hararge and Bale territories of Oromo until 1972 (Asseged, 1982: 157). The forerunners of this front and other liberation fronts like OLF which later became ONLF are members of the previous political organizations like Hizbullah and Nasrallah.

On the other hand, Britain was insistent that the Somali inhabited regions of the Ogaden and Haud which she had brought under her control should be treated as enemy-occupied territories, a fact Ethiopia was made to recognize by treaty in 1942. After a lot of protests on the part of Ethiopia, another Anglo- Ethiopian treaty was concluded in 1944. That treaty recognized Ethiopia's sovereignty over the Ogaden and Haud subject to their continued British administration since Britain insisted that they were necessary for the prosecution of World War II. However, the Ogaden was not returned to Ethiopia until 1948 and the Haud area until 1955, three years and ten years after the end of the war respectively (Andargachew, 1995: 7).

There were also massive settlement programs around the fertile lands of the WabiShebele river. The settlement program and subsequent military engagement of the emperor was not only a wrong move but also during the most critical time that helped the pan-Greater Somalia militants to use this advantage to regain their base in Ethiopia. Especially the transfer of Haud on November 29, 1954, the large fertile grazing land commonly used by pastoralists from Italia, British and Ethiopian Somaliland; created common cause for Somalis where the Haile Selassie government had already given them a cause to unite. With the return of Haud, militants escalated their military activity including seeking support from foreign countries, mainly Arab nations that the effect doesn't limit to Haud but made the Ogaden area base for various clandestine political organizations. The political organizations like Hizbullah (Soldiers of Allah), Haqqullah (True Sons of Allah), Nasrallah (victorious of Allah's Din) were operating in most parts of Harerge and supported by Arab countries especially Egypt. As a result of such multiple factors as; the 1948 UN decision to retain the former Italian Somaliland with the trusteeship of Italia itself, Ethiopian diplomatic success to win the support of the US and the unmanageable level of militancy by the Somali youth league frustrating the British Administration itself

the British administration finally gave up its dream of “Greater Somalia” and Ogaden returned to Ethiopia with great turmoil and a handful of militant organizations threatening the peace and stability of the region.

Despite the presence of militant activities in the area, the return of Ogaden to Ethiopia could be a great opportunity for Ethiopia to regain the trust of the people through peaceful administration and development projects. However, the various miscalculated political and economic measures implemented made Ethiopia have a hard and non-inclusive effort of state-building in that part of the region. In fact, it was the same mistake that the Haile Selassie regime made as soon as granted with the federation arrangement in Eritrea that caused the secessionist struggles.

For instance, a resettlement program around the Wabi Shebelle river in 1951 replacing the local community with farmers from the central and highland Ethiopia had created anger causing revolts and uprising. Assuring the absence of any significant foreign power in the area, Haile Selassie ordered a massive resettlement program especially around the Gridida fertile area where the local people used to farm in the area both during the Italian and British period. The livestock tax imposed by the Haile Selassie government in February 1963 also created popular frustrations the act of which finally led to an armed rebellion led by MakthalDahir, chief of the RerIsaaqOgaden⁸ subclan using a collective force mobilized from Somali Youth League leaders and activists of the 1949 Jijiga revolt. The rebel groups called themselves *al-Jeysh* also known as the Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF) that had popular support because of the highly popular leadership who were also former leaders and members of Nasrallah, the OCTI and major clan chiefs. The brutal response of the military force to all these uprisings finally led hundreds to die and shift the center of the uprising to Ogaden for the total liberation of Ogaden from Ethiopia.

Ogaden and the reserved areas became a safe-haven for any militant activities against Ethiopia wherever their main base and whoever their supporter are. Almost all of the militant movements that had their base in Mogadishu were allowed by Britain to operate in Ogaden as a proxy to challenge Ethiopia. Although the reason is unknown from a

⁸“MakthalDahir had been a founder of the SYL branch in Harar in 1946 and one of the leaders of the 1949 Jijiga revolt before exiling himself to Somalia. British colonialists handed him over to the Haile Selassie Government, which condemned him to death, then pardoned and imprisoned him for 10 years in Addis Ababa before appointing him as the district commissioner of Degehabur in 1962” (Hagman, 2014)

diplomatic perspective, the British administration was always in support of these movements while marches and demonstrations by the League, most of the time, disrespected the Ethiopian sovereignty including the flag. One of the most critical challenges for the Emperor was the militant activities and demonstrations in Jigjiga used to target business and investment activities of Ethiopian or foreign owners. Big companies like the American oil refinery company made intentionally frustrated to leave the area making the Ethiopian government feel desperate about the situation.

3.2.3. Sustenance of Antagonism through Retaliation

The post-Italian Fascism period in Ethiopia had altered the socio-political condition of the country in multiple ways notably the orientation of separatists, rebel groups and marginalized societies towards the Absolutist Haile Selassie regime is turned to worst and at the same time, the state repression against such movements climaxed both in scale and technique. Relying on the structural and military infrastructures inherited from the Fascist Italia and the all-round support as a result of the Anglo-American treaty; Haile Selassie waged continuous repression against every movement. The bilateral agreement with British followed by the assignment of British advisers almost in all government sectors including the army and the police even in some peripheral regions enabled the regime to become more organized in running the state affairs and repress oppositions, especially the Weyanes and Ogaden revolts that latter turned to full-scale liberation movements (Hiwot, 1975).

The clan-based armed struggles and Somali government-sponsored secessionist movements initially were not a major threat for the Emperor had it not been the retaliation of the imperial force turned most Somalis into militants in the later stages. Although the clandestine armed groups operated in some areas of the Somali inhabited areas like Degehabur, Wardheer, Quabridehar, Fiq, Godey, and Kelafo; in the early 1960s, the collective capacity of the rebels were less than 3000 with weak structure and weaponry. The strategies employed were also a hit and run attack on selected government structures like police stations and conveys. However, irrespective of the scale of the armed struggle, the imperial army responded with harsh retaliation. A surviving elder member of al-Jaysh who currently is living in Addis Ababa expressed the level of retaliation in his home town Degehabur:

“In August 1963 few of our members attacked a military convoy in Degehabur and a week after this attack while we were in a Mosque, we heard huge artillery of the Imperial army is arriving at Degehabur and everyone made an indiscriminate attack on our members and civilians killing several hundred including my family members.”

The trauma of the causality was to meet the objective behind the indiscriminate attack which was discouraging the people from supporting armed struggles. The army used to decapitate leaders of the rebel groups in the middle of mass gathering sometimes waiting the end of prayer times. However, leaders of the rebel immediately waged series of propaganda against the Emperor and his attitude towards Muslims both in Ogaden and other parts of Ethiopia. Gradually the concentration of rebel fighters increased in Ogaden partly due to the exile from other cities fearing mass revenge for every little attack the rebel fighters causing and partly due to the aggressive recruitment of the armed groups. The new trend of exile was not exceptional to fighters. Those who attended their primary and secondary education fled to Mogadishu and some Arab countries to peruse their education. These educated Somalis in exile later returned as leaders of the upcoming resistance struggle which was quite different from the previous hit and run attacks (Hagmann, 2014: 730).

The Emperor's attitude towards the Somali people and their religion was a potential source of support for the militant activities to mobilize many of their supporters deep in the Ethiopian territory. Haile Selassie's intolerance of the Muslim society was always a gateway for invaders or perpetrators. Even before the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, it is the kings' mistreatment of the Muslims in Ogaden and other peripheries that was taken as an important entry point (Trimingham, 1952: 114). Both Italia and proponents of the “Greater Somalia” were aware of the fact that Muslims and other oppressed people of Ethiopia endured the oppression of Haile Selassie identity-based marginalization with the help of the Church and they considered this resentment might make the oppressed people support any power that could rescue them from Haile Selassie.

The militants knew how the local people were relatively empowered during the colonization period by Italy and Britain and their current status under Haile Selassie. In Italy territory of Somaliland, for instance, the administrative structure was formulated in a way to unite and empower Muslims. Muslim chiefs also were elected as governors. The Ogaden people also received development aid and well-drilling projects for their cattle.

The building, restoring and, expanding undertakings of a religious institution and education were also the other major supports the people of the area received from Italy as part of securing support against Haile Selassie.

Although leaders of the militant groups knew the good treatment of Muslims under the Italian and British administration was not a matter of good intent but a political measure to mobilize the Somali people against Haile Selassie and at the same time create good relation with Arab countries, the Haile Selassie regime made them glorify their colonizers. Countries of the Middle East were also active first, there emerged regional movements in the Ogaden, Bale, and Eritrea which were opposed to the central government on religious, linguistic, and political grounds. These movements which were based among the predominantly Islamic communities of those regions were able to receive material and diplomatic support from the countries of the Middle East which sought to liberate their co-religionists from the Christian Ethiopian state.

One informant, leader of armed struggle back then, recounted:

“Our condition in the post-Italian period under Haile Selassie was not only a restoration of Anti-Muslim sentiment of Haile Selassie, but we also suffered from acts of revenge for the only reason the colonial powers dug water wells and constructed Mosques for us. We had been denied access to official positions within the administrative structures and exile and execution of Muslim activists became a daily norm.”

The series of the Emperor's administrative failures in the area coupled with the danger from the militants compelled the Emperor to pay to visit the area and sat with the clan chiefs. The temporary success of the 1956 meeting of the Emperor with the clan leaders was practical evidence proving the mismanagement of the Ogaden issue led the area to be a safe zone for political agitators. During the discussion, the Emperor promised to work for true national unity, equitable resource and development projects distribution and create a sense of brotherhood with all Ethiopians through his historic expression all Ethiopians are people drinking from the same great river. Ogaden, despite the relative stability it gained and a better institutional approach to administer, the weak response of the government for basic development issues of health, education, veterinary services, and religious institutions; made the area to continue as the center of contention and focus of militants.

As a result, besides the disorientation of the overall internal affairs and external relation of the Emperor; at the end of the 1960s and the first two years of 1970s, the resistance struggle in the Somali-land had a strong military impact on Ethiopia. During the 1972 probing of Ogaden oil and natural gas deposit by the Somalia government and the 1973 military confrontation between Somalia and the Imperial army, the management of the Emperor for internal Ogaden affairs gave a gateway for external interference. And therefore, on the eve of the Ethiopian revolution, the resistance struggles in the form of liberation front had already challenged the Emperor both on the military front and diplomatically affecting every aspect of the regime. Although those areas were known for their active challenge in armed struggle significantly weakened on the eve of the revolution due to the critical draught that took thousands of lives especially in Degehabur and adjacent areas; as this same impact was the result of lack of meaningful development intervention it in turn used for counter-propaganda and attack on the Emperor both politically and militarily. Parallel to the Wollo draught at the eve of the revolution which had been significantly used by revolutionaries in the urban center and the North, the draught in Ogaden was one of the major pushing factors to bring the imperial era to its fatal end (EthiopianHerald, 1974).

3.3. Struggle for Self-determination and Autonomy

In a region where conflict is a common variable for most parts of the geographical or social groups, the knowledge production on the cause and impact of struggles will be limited to those radical in their agenda and more deadly in their effect. Regarding those pre-revolutionary struggles the pieces of literature focused on; either secessionist struggles that directly challenged the territorial integrity of the state or those semi-organized movements in the urban centers that affected the day to day politics of the government. This is more common when it comes to the study of the Ethiopian revolution. Among the compromised making factors that remained both uncovered and unrewarded are those struggles for regional autonomy within the Ethiopian state and those spontaneous and semi-organized movements demanding more recognition pertaining to their size, history, or political significance. This section will deal with struggles of this nature categorizing them into two broad topics: organized rebel struggles for autonomy and spontaneous movements for recognition.

Organized rebel struggles in Ethiopia varied from highly organized one with extended internal networks & more formal type external linkages to those specific groups struggled their local authorities with minimum engagement with the state system. Although the distinction between rebel struggles for secession and autonomy is sometimes hard to delimit when it comes to their level of organization and external linkage, in order to have a working definition of rebel struggle for this context the definition Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) gave for rebel organization is employed. According to this definition of rebel organization; the four most critical issues to measure whether an organization is a rebel organization or not are when the organization is a nongovernmental group of people having announced a name for their group, those using armed force to influence the outcome of a stated incompatibility, those with planned political campaigns rather than spontaneous violence and finally those involved in a military event resulting in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths (Sundberg, Eck, & Kreutz, 2012). Based on the extensive review of the available literature and data collected for this research liberation movements of the Afar people and rebel struggle of the Bale people are qualified to be discussed under this category.

The problem arising from territorial issues in modern Ethiopia is partly a colonial legacy as it is everywhere else in Africa. However, the quest for regional autonomy in the post-colonization era is especially the political consequence of the last to Emperors' rule. In the process of extending the territorial element and political influence of Ethiopia in the Ethiopian region, Minilik carried out a series of expeditions. Only, between 1882 and 1886, Emperor Minilik had conducted eight military attacks against the rebel group in the Bale area to defeat the rebellion there demanding their regional autonomy. Such expeditions were aggressively conducted to other neighbouring regions that used to be neither an independent state nor a fully part of imperial Ethiopia. The Afar semi-autonomous Sultanate and Hara were among these newly incorporated regions.

The struggle for regional autonomy was not only a territorial issue that made the newly incorporated areas to revolt against the Ethiopian state to declare the separation. The defeat they had experienced and acknowledging the historical relationships of those territories with the Ethiopian state, their struggle was against the new forms of administration the Emperor followed. Their new rulers became military generals directly appointed by the Emperor and the new cities established were almost garrison villages with no cultural

relationship with the local people or modernising effect. Besides, the new towns established following the incorporation made to have new names that were against the history, culture, and interests of the local people. And, despite the taxes and tributes collected from the people the areas remained ignored in terms of social and economic developments.


But more importantly, the imperial policy towards generally the pastoralists and specifically the Afar area was a matter of ‘discourses of risk’. The spatial and temporal difference in the applicability of the policies was a strategic choice between ‘areas at risk’ that needs the intervention of the centre to protect the area for the safety of the center and the crown or the discourse of ‘areas of risk’ which needs a special policy to contain the risk emanates from these territories affecting the Ethiopian state. In both cases, neither the area nor the people inhabited there are of concern for imperial Ethiopia.

It is with such imperial policies of complete denial of regional autonomy in all walks of life that created resentment on the local people Haile Sillasecame to power in 1930.

3.3.1. The Bale Rebellion: The longest Peasant Upheaval

Although frequent challenges to unseat the emperor by the noblemen, provincial rulers and resistance movements leaders was not strange, after his power is consolidated back from exile the church and the nobility started to take the emperor as the only protector from any future attack and the only internal challenge came from rebels and resistance movements (Margery: 1969, 405). According to John Young accounts, Bale rebellion is a response to the socio-political impact of imperial Ethiopia’s ‘introduction of Christian settlers from the north among largely Moslem peasants and nomads’ (Young, 1997: 55). The settlement programs effected in a way deploying people from central and highland Ethiopia creating pressure on local people to migrate to less fertile areas leaving their productive farmlands for the new settlers (McClellan, 1994). The fate of those who didn’t migrate was either deprived of their means of survival and looked for the minimum wage as a tenant on their owned land now controlled by the settlers or stayed as observers of the new development trajectories that helped newcomer Ethiopians to develop at the expense of the indigenous local people. The resentment of the indigenous people cannot be simply characterized based on the economic relationship between the settlers and those removed from their

lands. However, the deep-seated “we-they” attitudes were mainly as a result the Church led Christians settlement on the lands of Muslim local people and this was considered by the people as a state-led religious-based extension into their resource (Henze, 1985: 13-15).



Map 3.3. A map showing Bale and other localities in the then Ethiopian Administrative boundaries

The dichotomy in the indigenous vs. newcomers further has implicated in religious and administrative institution's distribution and management. Based on the data from the provincial handbook, (Baxter, 1978) summarized the disparities in religious institutions in the area as:

“The Provincial Handbook, for example, listed 216 Churches but only 59 Mosques in an area in which almost every settlement had a hut reserved as a Mosque. The Churches and priests had land and tenants granted to them and received donations from the state; mosques did not.”

By the same token, the administrative hierarchies in the province were another source of contradiction where let alone on senior official status, the low-level government officials that could be managed by the local people controlled by highlanders. Only in Kofele district about 5 of the 30 or so low-level government employees were from the local people.

Economic pressure was another source of frustration for the remaining local people struggling to stay in the agriculture sector and service areas. Despite the absence of a

formal tax collecting system, once it is collected the tax levied from the local people was both un-proportional and mainly used for infrastructure development developing the Church areas. Most importantly, failure to pay the amount ordered will result in the confiscation of lands only on the hands of the local people not that of the settlers and the Church. According to Tadesse, due to uncollected taxes of three years period between 1952 to 1957 amounted 3 million USD, a total of 336,000 hectares of land were confiscated from four localities of the bale area; Wabe, Dolo, Goba, and Ganale. Land confiscation was not a simple act of punishment for the local people but a total denial of their means of survival that ultimately made them tenants for landlords. At the end of this period and early 1960s, more than 40 percent of the people in the seven provinces lost their only means of survival and forced to work for landlords (Tadesse, 1993: 35-41).

The religious dimension of this oppression was not only implicitly expressed within other forms of oppression. However, direct enforcement of religious conversion was a method the Emperor employed through His Bishops as a means of 'civilizing the nomads' so that they can resist less. Blatengeta Heruy Walda-Sellase who became ministry of foreign affairs in 1930 and at the same time he was one of the only two active ministers and Ras Teferi's most trusted counciler. Heruy Walda-Selassie was a churchman by training and this had greatly influenced his administration as governor of Arusi when the emperor used him as a scapegoat against anything wrong and dismissed him from the central government in 1955 (Christophor, 1969: 17) (Margery, 1969: 407)

One of my informers explained how the local chiefs were pushed to convert to Christianity, have a Godfather from the highland settlers so as to baptize their followers as:

“All the problems you are facing are because of the clash of your belief with modernity. If you get baptized for sure you will have no confrontation with your landlords and administrations. The best way out for your entire social and economic problems including the land issue is religious conversion.”

In fact, the Emperor addressed the bishop a letter expressing his plan to give access for Bahaullah religion in the area although the request from the religious figures was to preach in the northern part of the country.

The Bale rebellion was a rebellion of a generation that was once free on its land and culture but automatically changed to a tenant and oppressed people in terms of dignity,

identity, and culture. The leaders of the rebellion were also members of this generation directly affected by the humiliation and took the responsibility to fight against the oppressor to reclaim the right of their people on their own land. General WaaqoGuutuu was one of these leaders who organized the scattered and spontaneous peasant resistances in Bale. Realizing the deep-rooted problems in Bale and the lack of hope for the improvement of the situation in the near future, the general launched an armed struggle to fight for freedom and autonomy. In one of the speeches quoted in (Tareke, 1991), he made, the general explained the cause of the armed struggle as:

“Our people remember. Don’t ever forget that you are a people with history and honor and that you are richly endowed with human and material resources.....remember how many times you have been denied justice in the courts of law; and you Muslims, remember that your religion has been abused and that you have no equal rights. Innumerable crimes that have not been committed by the European colonialists on the African peoples have been perpetrated upon you. It is today you can liberate yourself from the shackles of oppression.... Rise up and arm yourself to destroy the oppressive rule of Haile Sillasse.”

The emergence of the leadership of WaaqooGuutuu changed the nature of the relationship between the highly spontaneous resistance efforts and the harsh anti-insurgent reaction of the Emperor. Those local chiefs and oppression born self-appointed leaders of small groups of armed men immediately stepped up their attack on selected bases of Haile Sillasse. General Waaqo Guutuu also expanded his span of leadership to local level clandestine organizations uniting them into a strong rebel group that brought what history remembered as the longest and bloodiest rebellion in Ethiopia, the Bale rebellion.

During the initial stage of this collective struggle still there was no central politico-military leadership except the common cause of their struggle and the hit-and-run attack strategy on selected imperial targets. The forerunners of these struggles were also those groups who were excessively marginalized due to; in addition to the common land confiscation case of all oppressed people, their religion, and the establishment of new religious institutions on their land and huts. This could be, in fact, witnessed in all aspects of the struggle including the speeches of the leaders and the composition of the armed group leaders.

One of the informers described the legitimacy of the leaders at that time basically came from their religious background and the level of emphasis they gave for this religious cause. He further recounted that:

“The pioneers of the Bale rebellion leaders who later joined WaaqoGuutuu are mainly from the frustrated Muslim segment of the society. My father, who was an imam, closely knew the two brothers; Ali Butta and Aliye Butta, both before they raise an arm and after they joined the rebellion. We also know the history of other top leaders like Adam Jilo, Hussein Buna, Mohammed Gulichu, and Mohammed Adan Jillo and how they used to benefit from spiritual resources to mobilize their followers.”

The Bale rebellion, especially under the leadership of General WaaqoGuutuu's influence on the Emperor was not limited to the rebel fighting in Bale but the broader Oromo struggles across Ethiopia. During the 50th year commemoration of the Bale rebellion, Dr. Mohammed Hassen (2013), a renowned historian and who personally met Waaqu Guutuu described the influence of the General as:

“It was tribute to his leadership that Oromo fighters were able to control three fourth of the large province of Bale by 1966. Only few besieged towns including the provincial capital of Goba remained under Ethiopian control. By then the armed struggle had spread to the region of Sidamo, Arsi and western Hararghe. The armed struggle in Bale attracted Oromo nationalists such as Jarra Abba Gada and the martyred Mulis Abba Gada. Jarra Abba Gada, who started armed struggle in Hararghe in 1975, was trained under General WaaqooGuutuu in 1967. General WaaqooGuutuu did not limit his activities only to the armed struggle. As early as 1965 he established secret contact with the leadership of the Macha and Tullama Association in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa). His goal was to broaden the base of the struggle, raise Oromo political awareness, and galvanize them for collective action against the brutal regime.”

The Bale rebellion was not only the longest and bloodiest one but maybe the only struggle for regional autonomy in the then Ethiopia with the highest level of influence on the Emperor. Three to five years after the commencement of the rebel fighting, three-fifth of the area was under the control of the rebel groups and the government was confined to selected urban towns despite the under armed rebel groups incomparable to the military force of Haile Sillasse (Assefa, 1993; Tareke, 1991: 160-193). Mid 1966 was a year of the rebel groups and many sub-provinces on the hands of the rebel and their governors killed. This compromised the effectiveness of the Haile Sillasse government in the highland towns. Goba, the provincial capital was attacked twice and the rebel fighters in Bale and nearby areas almost controlled Borana, Dalo, Genale, Wabe, and El Kere which sent a signal that not only the provinces but Addis Ababa was no longer safe and it was immediately the Emperor declared martial law in Bale in December 1966 (Henze, 1985: 31).

The post-1966 struggle was different in its approach and scale on both sides. The rebel group mobilized 12,000 to 15,000 fighters that may be the maximum force ever achieved in their history. The cruelty of the imperial army also increased the moral superiority of the warriors to the extent that the minister of defence expressed the manner of the rebel groups and how they took their performance in the armed struggle as a religion. Similarly, the imperial military force acted in a different way ever since it engaged local rebel fighters. In the prior period, the Emperor couldn't deploy strong forces in the area due to the pressure in Eritrea. However, the continuous attack and increasing loss of control of the provinces, the Emperor became determined to use his maximum forces in addition to the locally trained Oromo fighters led by General Jagama Kello. And therefore, 1969 was a year for the maximum pressure the guerrilla fighters brought to the Emperor and at the same time, it was a year of declining momentum as a result of bombardment of the rebel bases through aerial attacks that finally made General Waaqo Guttuu to negotiate with the Emperor (Henze, 1985: 32-33)


The convergence of the decline of the rebel struggle in the 1970s and the coup conducted in Somalia considered are directly related phenomena, for had it not been for the establishment of an independent Somalia in 1960, the insurgency would have been unlikely in the Bale region (Henze, 1985: 29-30). It is understandable that the independence of Somalia through the support of the Soviet government perhaps made Western-oriented writers gave the cause and credit of the Bale insurgency to have a direct consequential linkage to external support denying the local context. Of course, a movement, which had the aim of liberating the Muslim Oromos of Bale, was established at about the same time with that of the Ogaden movements. And the two movements had a close relationship and collaboration in terms of financial and military assistance which they both got from the Somalia government. Especially as the grievance in Bale and its similarity with that of the people in Ogaden, between 1966 to 1970 they had the maximum to struggle against the Emperor. However, it is important to understand that externalizing religious base of movements was the fashion of the time in order to hide the narrative of religious-based discriminatory administration of the Emperor and at the same time it is essential to categorically understand the nature of rebellion in Bale and other parts of Oromia in the Western part of Ethiopia.

Although the government fought the specific rebel groups with all possible military capacity, the ten years rebel fight caused greater damage for the government in terms of financial and military losses. It is the cumulative effect of such fragmented in structure but unified with their goal that weakened the strength of the Emperor until the eve of the February revolution. The termination of this phase of the Bale rebellion also was the beginning of the next phase within and beyond the territory. It is the Bale rebellion and the leaders that inspired most of the Oromo Liberation Front founders and leaders to raise their political consciousness and organize to struggle for their rights.

3.3.2. The Afar question and the Imperial Ethiopia

The case of 'The Afar question' is least understood in Ethiopian politics and it is hard to get consistent narratives on the actual process of the incorporation to the Ethiopian state and people's memory of the impact. This is conceivably due to the strategic geographical location that forced to leave the Emperors to have minimal interference in the internal affairs of the semi-autonomous sultanate of the Afar. Also, in the latter stage, Haile Sillasse was more strategic in approaching the Afar securing his legitimacy through his good relationships with the 13th sultan of the Afar, Sultan Ali Mirah. Armed struggles in Afar couldn't be responded like that of the Bale or in the Ogaden since the Afar area is at the heart of the two most critical conflicts; the Eritrea and Djibouti. What is more critical is the Afars are an integral part of the political system and armed struggle in both regions.

Haile Sillasse's approach to the Afar nationalism was a substitute to soften for nationalities question challenging the Emperor in other parts of the country. Although the inherent nature of the question of nationalities in Eritrea and Ogaden was not different from that of the Afar, Haile Sillasse's approach was rather quite different. Understanding the Afar issue is untouchable due to the significant negative impact in a politically unstable Red Sea Territory, Haile Sillasse was more conscious to accept the autonomous status of the Afar people in its political sense while at the same time pretend to be diversity tolerant and of the question of nationalities.



Map 3.4. Afar in the Ethiopian state and the Afar Triangle comprising Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti

The revolutionary struggles of the Afar people were from multiple fronts stretching from the Eritrean lowlands which are the bases for the Eritrean struggle for independence to the French colony of Djibouti. In fact, this area is the home for the Adal sultanate, the kingdoms of Dankali and Ankala, and most importantly the Sultanate of Bidu that finally became the father of the modern times afar revolutionaries. At the same time, this area in Eritrea inhabited by the Afars was a stronghold of Turkey, Egypt, and finally Italia. The Italian period in this part of the Eritrean territory was full of confrontation due to the fact that the Afar are less interested in complete separation from the Ethiopian state which is against the interest of Italy. During the 1949 UN conference on the Eritrean issue, the Afar was represented by Fitawrari Yasin Mohamoda who voted for the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia (Yasin Y. M., 2008).

As a result, Italy was deep inside the internal affairs of the Afars which created resentment that finally led to the armed resistance of the Afar people led by the Sultan of Bidu, Yasin Haysma in the 1920s. And therefore, the revolutionary struggle of the Afar people emanated both from their bravery in the anti-colonial struggle and from their demand for

regional autonomy. The beginning of this armed struggle at the same time can be considered as the seed of the Afar nationalism which the Afar youth flagged it until the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, and even to this date.

While the official representatives of the Afars voted in favour of the federation at the UN conference significant proportion of the Afars in Eritrea was part of the Muslim dominated Eritrean Liberation Front that struggled against the Emperor for an independent Eritrea.⁹ Although Haile Sillasse was relatively tolerant of the autonomy of the Afar in Ethiopia, he was totally reluctant for their demand for full self-determination. As a result, desperate Afars, due to the reluctance of the Emperor, were aggressively recruited by ELF; in its Afar name ‘jebeha’ since 1960. As a result, if the struggle for Eritrean struggle for independence challenged the Emperor, the role of Afar was very significant.

The Afars were always in a complex situation that made them sided neither to separatists nor to the Ethiopian state. On one side the decision of the Afar representative during the UN conference, on the other hand, the geographical based historical legacy of the leadership position within ELF created a conflict between western Muslims and those of the coastal. The Afar in coastal line blamed their marginalization from the leadership position, and through time, they came to conclude that the interest behind their recruitment in ELF was only to legitimise the ELF’s ownership of the coastal line. In this way, the pro-unity strategy of Afar that made them struggle only for regional autonomy didn’t secure them from the Ethiopian regimes and never been the support of other revolutionaries that quest for aright independence. What is more unfortunate is the revolutionary role of the Afar people never credited by the mainstream revolutionary academia.

One of the informers described how they were pushed off from the ELF structure and threatened their life even:

“Our pro-unity notion was a threat for the Eritrean independent fighters whether they are from highland Eritrea or the lowland, whether they are Muslims or Christians.

⁹As the interview conducted with one of the many informants indicated, Afars were strong partner for the struggle in Eritrea where some of them favour independence Muhammed Omar Akito, an Afar, who was a representative from Assab in the Eritrean General Assembly, refused to cast his vote (as did one other member, also) in favour of the Union with Ethiopia. Personal interview.

Being a Muslim couldn't help us to survive from alienation by ELF and finally losing many of our prominent leaders by assassination.”

The alienation of the Afar fighters and frequent assassination became a challenge for Eritrean fighters losing their ground in Afar territory both for training purposes and smuggling of arms through the border. This same issue, however, was an opportunity for the Afar people to start their own struggle for self-determination that later became a new front and a new challenge for imperial Ethiopia.

The economic relationship between the Emperor and the Afar in the middle valley was a kind of ‘unsettled feudalism’ where the former controlled the land through his remotely controlled relatives and tribesmen. Development projects had also a very crucial role in strengthening the control of the area. During the twenty years between 1950 and 1970 that the area saw the maximum intrusion in the name of development projects, more than 50,000 hectares of land was owned by local and international private and public enterprises.¹⁰ The unmanaged intrusion of the emperor created resentment in the local community and led to the creation of Awash Valley Authority in 1962 to manage both the development projects and local community interest on the projects (Shehim, 1985: 57). For this economic interest of the emperor and his family, the Afars were treated less harshly compared to other parts of the eastern and south-eastern newly incorporated areas.

There is a political argument that tried to cover the strategic intrusion of the Emperor into the Afar territory by presenting the role of local chiefs especially the 13th Sultan of the Awsa, Sultan Ali Mirah.¹¹ The role of Sultan Ali Mirah in the imperial rule of Ethiopia is unquestionable considering his unprecedented support for the Emperor and in return securing official position in the Emperor's parliament and traditional landlord position in Afar. However, the process whereby the Sultan attained his Sultanate, in the presence of

¹⁰Hailesillasse realised that the commercialisation of agriculture would promote economic growth and increase state revenue, and therefore enlisted the help of foreign capital and technical assistance. Ethiopians with the financial ability and the technical know-how were also encouraged to pursue agricultural ventures, many of which were established on the lands of the Afar, the Somalis, and the Oromo of south-eastern Ethiopia.

¹¹Ali Mirah Hanfare (1941-73), the 13th Sultan of Awsa, whose authority was revered throughout the Afar triangle. His power and prestige was recognised by the Ethiopian Government, and on many occasions the Sultan led Afar spokesmen to the Emperor's court to voice their grievances. Ali Mirah saw the possibility that foreign concessions might endanger his own semi-independent status unless their growth was checked, and therefore decided to compete against them by becoming directly involved in agriculture.

inescapable expansionist Emperor monopolising the Afar land through his family members and big development projects, the Sultan could only control as much land as possible and motivate his people to engage in agricultural farming as a mechanism to limit further expansion of the emperor.

It is from this economic dimension and the role of the local chiefs in the process that made the Afar people and the struggle within the Afar land less represented in the narratives of the Ethiopian revolution. If it were discussed it may be from the conceptualization of land issues and land reforms not that of the political economy of the intrusion which was the root cause of resentments of the people. Such misperception of the pastoral issue was in fact century-old Ethiopian political faults that made the country lose its development opportunities and peace and security in the Horn of Africa.

The situation both in the Eritrean side of the Afar and that of the middle valley was always a matter of Afar's regional autonomy and the people were in a continuous demand towards that. For the condition in Awsa and the middle valley the people repeatedly petitioned their plight for the Emperor for many years. The prestigious Sultan Ali Mirah who had a strong influence both locally and regionally was the Afar's 'principal advocate' to present the grievance for the Ethiopian government and often times the case heard on the Emperor's court (Yasin, 2008). Similarly, there was a strong struggle to determine the fate of the Afar land in Eritrean and Ethiopian in relation to the issue of regional autonomy, according to Yasin who noted that: "all the Afar political movements for half a century have a common denominator that is the realisation of Afar self-determination in all the states they inhabit. They are united in trying to send the following messages: no more domination via assimilation, and no more symbolic self-determination" (Yasin, 2008: 55-57).

According to Redo's prison note from AlemBekagn cited in (Yasin Y. M., 2008); following the official abolition of the federation arrangement, there were two critical conferences in Ti'o in 1961 and Asab in 1963 on the fate of the 'Afar Question'. While the consensus of 55 Afar tribal chieftains on the Ti'O conference to reassert the need to bring those Afar people in living in Hararge, Shoa, Wallo, Tigray, and Eritrea to form an independent Afar region within Ethiopia; the Asab conference pushed the issue further by delegating one of the forerunners of the issue, Sheikh Yasin Mohamoda to collect the

petition of all the clan and religious leaders of the Afar people to try the unsuccessful trial of presenting the question to the emperor's court in 1964 (Redo, 1998).

The failure of the petition through renowned Afar elders who were also recognised by the Emperor made the Afar youth to follow their way in achieving the unity of the Afar and the autonomous status of their region. In this way, the birth of institutionalised approach towards the Afar question by the Afar students had begun and the Afar Student Association was initiated by Afar students residing in Addis Ababa. Although the initial objective of the association was to create a sense of unity and preservation of the identity of the students especially through various cultural and religious ceremonies, the association later became the centre for all students of Afar origins. And therefore, despite the psychological and political dispersion in four provinces of Ethiopia; Harar, Shoa, Wallo, Tigray, and their significant role in Eritrean and Djibouti, the student association helped the Afars from all territories to reassert the renaissance of the Afar National identity both at home and abroad. While the Afar questions became the center of mobilization for the Afar young and students in Ethiopia and abroad, it started to challenge imperial Ethiopia's attitude towards the Afar land and the local clan chiefs who resisted reforms that could threaten their traditional authority and land ownership. The youth, motivated by the activities of the student movements all over Ethiopia, has started their own mobilization especially through members of the Afar Student Association who went to Cairo for education. To this end, Afar students in Cairo formed the Afar KoborihAngoyya (AKA) (The Afar Mobilization Movement) on 2 November 1972.

In the final years of the pre-revolution Ethiopia, Afar KoborihAngoyya (AKA) was the main organ to represent the Afar people in major meetings and events concerning revolutionary movements and resistance struggles. With the credit it received in the process, AKA remained a strong alliance of revolutionary forces in the region and able to present itself in various critical international stages as an important rebel group with the help of the Sultan cordial relation with Arab countries and their strong ally elsewhere in Africa.

Afar National Liberation Movement and Afar People Democratic Party are all the decedents of these revolutionary movements. Similarly, the common denominator for all pre and post-1974 Afar revolutionary movements, which is regional autonomy, remained

to be the determining factor for any Afar rebel organization was the prospect of attaining this grand goal. This can be understood from the decision of the Afar National Liberation Movement (ANLM) to quite their armed resistance following the declaration of self-determination for the Afar people by the political program of the Ethiopian National Democratic Revolution (ENDR). Accordingly, after the Munich Conference of ANLM in August 1976, the organization announced the termination of its armed struggle and decided to join the mainstream political struggle led by ENDR (ANLM, 1976).

3.4. Struggle for Recognition

The center-periphery nexus of the Ethiopian Muslims with respect to the revolutionary struggle is a paradoxical truth sort. Compared to the history of Islam in Ethiopia and its strong bases in urban cities of the time, the influence of the religion on the socio-political and economic conditions of urban cities and urban Muslims' role in the struggle to abolish the ancient regime is made less visible than the peripheries at least on the produced knowledge level. In this sense, politically speaking, the urban cities are the peripheral segment of Ethiopian Muslims. This situation can be explained in two ways.

Historically the struggle between the Solomonic dynasty and the Muslim sultanates was not a matter of survival but that of power monopoly on the 'Ethiopian region'. And therefore, the result of the power struggle that lasted until LijEyasu significantly shaped the position of Muslims' in the center; demographically and politically. On the other hand, on the recent past of the Ethiopian revolution; it is critically important how necessary conditions were ripened generally for all revolutionary forces in urban centers and specifically for 'invisible Muslims'. Besides the relationship between Muslims in the urban centers and those in geographically, periphery areas was an important factor. And therefore, the discussion in this section will focus on these two important dimensions of revolutionary struggles in the urban centers.

The struggles in urban centers had two vital dimensions. The entire revolutionary struggles of every form; the secessionist, self-determination, regional autonomy, and movements for recognition, were not struggles completely detached from the politics in the center. They had a strong relationship with their respective constituency in the centers. On the other hand, the urban centers were the last resorts for all revolutionary struggles either when they

succeed to be organized and capable to continue the struggle of the time or seeking a hide after their defeat by the imperial army on the fronts. While the struggles in the peripheries tend to have territorial, ethnic, or religious nationalism as their defining characteristics; the determining factor for the struggles remained constant. It is the same identity and the challenge of lack of accommodation. Likewise, the urban struggles as an extension of peripheral struggles maintained the same principles but in different contexts. More importantly, urban centers were practically ideal for the collective struggles of various actors towards a similar and more critical goal.

On the other hand, the urban centers were the center for all sections of Ethiopians with the relative advantage of education, business, and bureaucratic positions. At the same time, urban centers were the last resort for leaders and activists of organized struggle in the peripheries. Despite their minority status in terms of numbers, the role they played to shape the urban struggle and the influence exerted on the emperor was significant.

All the informal and formal organizations, community groups, clandestine movements that were the epicenter of intellectual framing of the various movements were in the centers. If the struggle against the emperor weakening the financial and military capacity were on the various fronts, the political struggles that perish the legitimacy of the emperor were the struggle of the center. This is true for compromised making factors of the Ethiopian revolution. Similarly, the complete picture of those fragmented struggles in every corner of the country can be obtained from the political articulation and collective struggle in the center irrespective of their ethnic and class differences on the fronts.

3.4.1. The Resistance of Harari People

Hararis, people with a celebrated past as the owner of the most respected Islamic history in East Africa, never had an easy time since the official incorporation of Harar into the Ethiopian state in 1887 following the defeat of Amir Abdullahi in the battle of Chelenqo by Minilik. Although being part of the Ethiopian state was the result of century-old expansion and contraction of Ethiopia's border in order to keep the territorial integrity of the country competing with the Italian, British and French colonial powers, state and church encroachments in Harar could not be mere political incorporation but always a matter of survival of the religion, culture, and dignity of the people.



Map 3.5. The Harar city of Ethiopia

Summarized documents of several incidents in Harar reveal several intriguing cases of the time that underpin the aforementioned claim. The Ethiopian State and the Church shared a cognitive spatial authority in monitoring Islamic activities, suppressing freedom of religion, and ensuring the State's notable identity remained Christian. The Church never shied away from openly expressing the then widely held common sense that reflected the inextricably intimated link it had with the State. In one of the letters with ref. number 6287/9 1938 (E.C) addressed to the Regent (አንደራሴ) of the district of Harar the example is unequivocal.

ለክቡር የሐረር አውራጃ ጠቅላይ ገዥ አንደራሴ

በሀረር ከተማ ውስጥ ከሚገኘው ከደብረገነት መድኃኔዓለም ቤተክርስቲያን አቅራቢያ ከአሥር ሜትር ከማይርቅ ቦታ ላይ በሃይማኖት የተለዩ ሰዎች መኖሪያ ሆኖ በዚሁ ቤት ውስጥ የሚያዘጋጁት የሆቴል ጥብስ ከቤተክርስቲያኑ እንደዕጣን ማዕዛውን የሚያበረክትና በቅዳሴ ምግብ ፀጥታን የሚጥስ በመሆኑና ካህናቱና መእመናኑ መቸገራቸውን የሐረርን አውራጃ ቤተካህናት ለመጎብኘት የላክናቸው የመስሪያቤታችን የክፍል ሹም አቶ አሥራተገብረዮሐንስ ስለገለጸልን...

የመንግስት ሃይማኖት እንደመሆኑ መጠን የኢትዮጵያ ኦርቶዶክስ ቤተክርስቲያን በምትቸገርበት ሁሉ የመንግስት ባለስልጣኖች ሊረዱትና ችግሯን ሊያቃልሉላት አስፈላጊ በመሆኑ ክቡርነትዎ በጉዳዩ አጥብቆ አስቦበት ይህ የሆቴል መስሪያና በሃይማኖት ልዩ የሆኑ ሰዎች...

To: The Honorable Regent of the Governor of Harar District

In around 10-meter distance from the Church of *DeberegenetMedhane'alemin* Harar city is located a residence and hotel at once that belongs to adherents of another religion. The smell of *tibs* (sautéed meat chunks) they cook for the hotel spreads into the Church like the smoke from burning incense used at Masses. It comes in while liturgical services are being underway and disturbs Church services. Our staff member AtoAsratGebreyohannes whom we sent out for visiting the Harar district's Churches explained to us that, the Clergies and service attendees are complaining about the situation.

In light of this development and because religion is part of the state it is important that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church should be helped out by the state officials. And, that the problems it currently faces should be alleviated, we hereby would like to seek your kind attention that the issue comes to your greater concern that this hotel and the people adherent to another religion...¹²

In the above letter the mentioning of “የመንግስት ሃይማኖት እንደመሆኑ መጠን የኢትዮጵያ ኦርቶዶክስ ቤተክርስቲያን...” which equivalently is translated as “[The Ethiopian Orthodox Church] religion is part of the state...” demonstrates that the Church is emphatically invoking the organic bond that integrates the Church and the State. More on that, the Church's invocation implies, given the indicated level of correspondence, that the Church is granted unfettered access to higher ranks in the hierarchy of authority. This shows that concern to the Church is seen as a concern of one of the State's apparatus that needs to be addressed through exercising the relevantly deserved official method that is equivalent to the Church's designated position.

The letter as well shows the degree of the State apparatuses' vigilance manifested in being well-equipped to repress religion in the wider area of the province, and Islam and Muslims are the key targets. As indicated in the letter the Church is located in the specified proximity to the residential area. Seemingly, the main topic seems on the bothering smell of a particular type of food that reaches to the Church. The later used a not inadvertent derogatory identification of the society living in the nearby that target their religion, which is Islam. Given the widely spread and commonly practiced policy to identify the religion of Islam and Muslim citizens as threats to the security of the State and the Church by the State such offensive adds to that. It helps the actors keep a constant understanding, watching, and a subsequent ill-intended treating of Muslim citizens in the wider Harar. To achieve this, Muslim residents of the province should have been discouraged not to

¹²Letter sent to the Regent (አንደራሴ) of the District of Harar

exercise their religious rights that would, in the long run, result in a less practicing faith community. This subsequently would make the State-sponsored mass conversion of the Muslims into Christianity inevitable or imposing other less threatening religion on them. The par excellent instance of such a systematically designed measure is stated in the ensuing two (three) documented letters.

ለክቡር ሌ/ኮሎኔል ታምራት ይዝተ
የሐረርጌ ጠቅላይ ግዛት እንደራሴ
ሐረርጌ፤
ክቡርሆይ፤

ግንቦት 21 ቀን 54 ዓ.ም. በቁጥር 1/2245/2566 የጻፉልን ደብዳቤ ከነአባሪው ደርሶናል።
ይህ ባሕሪ የተባለው ሃይማኖት በሃ.አ-ላህ በተባለ ነቢይ አስተማሪነት የተጀመረ ሲሆን፤ በኋላም
በልጁ በአብደልበሃይ አስተማሪነት የቀጠለና ፓሊስታይን ውስጥ ካርሜል በተባለ ሥፍራ ዋና
መሥሪያቤቱን ያደረገው ሻኔ አፈንዲ ሥራውን ያስኬዳል። ይህ ሃይማኖት በመላው ዓለም
ከሁለት ሚሊዮን በላይ ተከታዮች ያሉትና አብዛኛዎቹም አሜሪካኖች ሲሆኑ፤ በአሜሪካን አገር
ቺካጎ ትልቅ መቅደስ ያለው ሃይማኖት ነው።

በሃይማኖት በኩል ላለው ፖለቲካችን ጉዳትን ሊሰጥ ይችላል ተብሎ የሚገመት ቢሆንም
ሱማሌዎች/አስላሞች/ ይህንን ሃይማኖት ቢቀበሉ ከእስልምና ይልቅ ለኛ መልካም መሆኑን
እየገለጹን፤ የሚያደርገው እርምጃ በየጊዜው እንዲገለጽልን ይደረግ ዘንድ በማክበር
እናሳስባለን፤-----

To: Honorable L. Colonel TamratYigezu
The Regent of Hararge Province,
Harar,

Your Excellency,
Your letter of 21st May 1954 (E.C) with ref. number 1/2245/2566 reached us along with the attachment.
This religion referred to as Baha'i was started by a prophet named Baha'u'llah. Later, it continued its teaching by Abdul Baha'i and its activities with headquarters at Carmel in Palestine headed by Shogi Effendi. This religion has a record of more than two million followers all over the world; most of the adherents are American nationals. The religion possesses a grand sanctuary in the city of Chicago, the United State.
Despite our anticipation that it might do harm to our politics vis-à-vis religion, we would like to express that it is better for us to see the Somalis/Muslims/ embrace this

religion than they remained adherents of Islam. We kindly remind you to keep us updated on the progress concerning this undertaking from time to time.

This particular correspondence reveals what the chains of State measures would ultimately envisage achieving in the region. It is an inherent continuation of the state capacitated anti-Islam and Muslim policy of the politics. In connection to the point mentioned earlier this represented an overriding measure of Muslims' oppression through a forceful imposition of another religion on them. As the letter made it clear for the Chief of the security apparatus, converting the Muslims into Baha'ism is a systematically integrated policy of the State. As such it reminded the security body to undertake such responsibility along with other oppressing measures entrusted with such as depriving them of places to teach and learn about their religion.

This, however, enlightens, more than just that. Three intimately related points could analytically be adumbrated. Firstly; it is politics but quite carefully played out one. Suppressing religion incorporated the legitimization of the nobles' politics that evolved over the years in imperial Ethiopia. While the Church stands powerfully as an independent key player other State instruments carry a particular-mandated mission that targets religion other than Orthodox Christianity. The Church's outright subjugation, open mass baptizing, and other measures are acknowledged as an independent authorized mechanism of protecting the State and the Church. The State's actions, nonetheless, should be carried out in ways that do not openly contradict standards of politics' playbook both at the state and global levels. As such, the Ethiopian State welcomes a mechanism that imposes a better religion over another religion but measured cares. Second, this has long been a well-practiced trend and is a hitherto continued one. The State, under the absolute control of a particular religious group, deployed its capacity to transform the society into a religiously homogeneous polity before and after the constitutional monarchy as well as in the post-1991. Third, it is not religion that poses danger and that has to be treated as such. It is Islam and Muslim citizens; in particular, the State and its repressive policies are targeting.

3.4.2. Breaking the people to challenge their resistance

Unlike other newly incorporated areas of the Ethiopian regions during the Minilik era, Harar had a comparative advantage of running the civil administration of the city by its own people. In fact, given the Sultan Abdullahi had fought obstinately with Minilik,

leaving the civil administration was not the imperial generosity for the people but a condition that the comparative superiority of the people in terms of education and administration over the newly settled army bureaucrats. Tibebu compared the civilization of the Hareri people and the newly emerged ‘Shoan’ as: “*the contrast was between agrarian, orthodox Christian parochialism and urban, Muslim cosmopolitanism*” (Tibebu, 1995). Unless for lack of educated manpower the Emperor would not allow those people to run the state affairs. Understanding their relative advancement in education and civilization the reason why a Harai minister was appointed for the first time in Ethiopia was in 1957 can be solid proof for the above argument (Clapham C. , 1969).

And therefore, despite they are forcefully conquered since Hararis were more educated and civilized than the newcomers, Harari used to be administered by Harais until things had changed in Haile Sillasse period that the Emperor gradually replaced the Arabic language with Amharic and those literate teachers and civil servants became automatically illiterate jobless (Caulk, 1975). In fact, Ras Mekonnen, the father of Emperor Haile Sillasse was the governor of Harar during the Minilik time and he was the one to begin all atrocities against the people and their religion including replacing the biggest Mosque in the town into a church naming it ‘Harar Medhaniale Church’.

Although the grievance of the people dates back to their time of incorporation in 1887 no organized effort was documented until the regime enhanced its repression especially after the consolidation of power by Haile Sillasse in the post Italian period. Like other parts of oppressed people in the peripheries, Hararis suffered a lot in the hands of Haile Sillasse after his restoration in the post-Italy period. Contradictory enough, Haile Sillasse avenged those people including, not limited to that, forceful payment of the full cost for the rebuilding of demolished churches by Italia during the 5 years occupation (Fisseha, 2001: 179). And therefore, the struggle against Haile Sillasse immediately started in 1941. At that time a well-known Islamic cleric Sheikh Ibrahim Gatur had struggled against the Emperor army ¹³ Later on the policy of the Emperor, especially his language policy and religious intent of educational expansion frustrated most of the Hararis. The idea of organized

¹³Both Somalis and Harari consider Ibrahim Gatur as their own Hero of anti-colonialism struggle with colonial power and later with Ethiopia

peaceful resistance proliferated following the challenge of these policies on access to education and freedom of their religion.

The first systematic effort to mobilize the Harari activists and youths was the establishment of schools and informal associations to work together against their common challenge. In fact, establishing a full-fledged Islamic school was not an immediate solution that the Harari people designed. They have been struggling to maintain Arabic as a medium of instruction in state schools or to have a separate section for the Arabic language. In one of the correspondences between the regional authorities, such efforts of maintaining their tradition were reported as a big threat to the education system and the Emperor. The letter from the region's Public Security Protection to the Regions Deputy Governor addressed:

ከክፍለሀገሩ ህዝብ ደህንነት ጥበቃ

ለክፍለሀገሩ ም/ዋና አስተዳደር

በከምቦልሻ መንገድ በሚገኘው ድሬጠያራ አየተባለ ከሚጠራው ሥፍራ ላይ የ1ኛ ደረጃ ት/ቤት መኖሩ ይታወሳል፡ በዚህም ት/ቤት አካባቢ የሚኖሩት የገበሬ ልጆች አንዱን ክፍል የእስልምና ትምህርት መስጫ ያደረጉትና ይህንንም ትምሕርት እንዲቀጥል የሚያደርጉና ምናልባትም ቢከለከሉል ጆቻቸውን ወደዚህ ት/ቤት የማይልኩ መሆናቸውን የመምህራኖቹ ተጠሪ ላውራጃው ት/ቤቶች ሥራ አስኪያጅ ሪፖርት ባደረገው መሠረት ያውራጃው ት/ቤቶች ሥራ አስኪያጅ በ2/2/69 ሥፍራው ተገኝተው የተያዘውን ክፍል ለማስለቀቅ የሚያነጋግሩ መሆኑ ስለተሰማ ያውቁት ዘንድ አቅርበናል፡፡-

From: The Region's Public Security Protection

To: the Region's Deputy Governor

It is remembered that an elementary school is located on the road to Kombolsha on the site called Dire Teyyara.

The representative of the school's teachers reported to the district's school manager that one of the rooms of the school has been made a classroom for teaching Islamic education by children of the Farmers in the area. In addition to this, the representative report stated that they insist that they will let the teaching carry on and they will not send their children for attending regular classes if they are forced to stop doing this. In accordance with this report, we would like to let your office know that there is information that the district's school manager will be arriving in the area and contacting them to free the occupied room.

As the Muslim citizens faced systematic encroachment and denied access to self-organized means of exercising their religious practices and resorted to the only available ones, the above letter illustrated that, the State would come swiftly after them. The measure seems to follow a legal act, for the school was intended to provide an exclusively non-religious education and this has reportedly been violated. The curtailed veracity that the letter exposed is that the measure is broad that aimed to see practicing Muslim citizens exit the religion *en masse* succumbed to the likes of such strategy.

Learning from their past and being committed to their future, some of the active individuals initiated the idea of establishing a new school naming it JamiyalKhetriyaIslamiya but in short, they call it Jamiya. A Harari elder informant residing in Addis Ababa said:

“Haile Sillasse was not as such negative towards the Harar people unless the people openly challenged him. Initially, he even used to cooperate on some of the development activities, especially in education. It is believed that he contributed a few thousands of birr during the establishment of Jamiyal Kheyriya Islamiya.”

On the account of this informant, the establishment of the school that later became the source of future Harari resistant had the blessing of the Emperor until it became one of the very few Islamic schools that became the central agenda of the education board together with the school in Addis Ababa as an ‘Islamic threat to Christian Ethiopia’. However, considering the pragmatic leadership skill of Haile Sillasse it is easy to connect his contribution to establishing this school with a strategic decision to soften the frustrated Hararis in the language policy of the regime in the state schools denying the people alternatives and the possible consequence of resisting the establishment of the school.

The birth of a more organized and strong resistant movement can be considered as an extension of this consciousness both in terms of time and goal. During the mid of 1940s, Harari youth established an association called ‘Watani’. The term equivalently represents ‘nation’ and indigenous people’ referring the people of Harar who used to sustain as historically known ‘nation’. In between the establishment of the ‘Jamiya’ and ‘Watani’, there were only five years and the idea of establishing the association was partly a fruit of youth consciousness learning their history and understanding the mistreatment of their people by the regime.

The beginning of the ‘Watani movement’ was primarily focused on the fighting against increasing state encroachment in the internal affairs of the Harari people pushing the Harari intellectuals, civil servants, and merchants. During the first years after established in 1947, the movement was purely a kind of peaceful civil right movement under the Ethiopian led by a sense of ‘Ethiopian-ness’. The movement was not a political party as well and members struggle for their right that can be considered as a struggle for recognition otherwise a question of self-assertion. Abdella’s thesis extends the objective of this movement as a struggle to maintain the agreement between King Abdullahi and Emperor Minilik that used to be as a governing principle on the administration of Harar by Harari civil servant that was breached by Haile Sillasse (Abdellah, 1994; Shumburo, 1992).

However, it was clear that the idea behind forming such an association and movements in a region with glorious past and current excessive repression would go far to challenge the legitimacy of the authoritarian imperial regime. As a result, any level legality or loyalty to the Ethiopian state could not rescue from being considered as a threat. Meetings, religious gatherings, movements of activists, and distribution of any kind of written materials were a matter of security for the regime. As a matter of fact, fear of the expansion of Islam and any development of a sense of a unified religious community by the people of the region was under strict security follow up. The exchange of letters long before the establishment of organized movement explained the level of fear and control. A letter to the Harar province stated:

ለሐረር ጠቅላይ ግዛት ጽ/ቤት፡

ሐረር፡

የእስላም ወንድማማቾች በሚል አርእስት ሶሪያ ላይ በአረብኛ የተጻፈ መጽሐፍ በኢትዮጵያ ግዛት እንዲገባ የማይፈለግ መሆኑን በመግለጽ መጽሐፉ በዘዴ እየተፈለገ እንዲሰበሰብ በማለት በቁጥር 1/1024/97/2929 ታህሳሥ 8/60 ዓ.ም. የተጻፈውን እናስታውሳለን _____

በዚሁ ትዕዛዝ መሠረት ይፈጸም ዘንድ ለአግባቡ ክፍል አስተላልፈን ስለነበር፤ ከዚያም ትዕዛዙ ከደረሰን ቀን ጀምሮ ባደረግነው ብርቱ መከታተል ምንም አላጋጠመንም፤ የወደፊት መከታተሉን ባለማቋረጥ የምንደርስበትን ግኚ በጊዜው እናስታውቃለን ለማለት የተጻፈውን ስለሆነ ይኸንኑ ጠ/ግዛቱ እንዲያውቀው እንገልጻለን፡፡ _____



To: The office of Harar Province

Harar

We remember a letter dated November 8/60 (E.C.) with ref. number 1/1024/97/2929 and written to our office which stated that an Arabic book titled “Islamic Brotherhood” written in Syria should be prevented from reaching into the territory of Ethiopia. The letter directed an order that the books need to be searched and collected intelligently.

We had passed this on to the relevant department for the order to be executed in light of this direction. As we continued the follow up seriously, we have not encountered any such occurrence that showed the book is being distributed. We would like to let the office of the Province know that, our office received a letter from the officials of the relevant department that informs us that they keep on eyes to pursue the matter and report our findings without any delay.

The Ethiopian nationalism represented by its flag couldn’t prove the Ethiopian-ness of the movement members. My informant stated that: “the Haile Sillasse government was rude enough to give us even a few reasons to consider ourselves as Ethiopians. Police used to arrest those people who used the Ethiopian national flag on religious festivals organized by the association.”

The Watani movement was the source of inspiration for members and the center of excellence for leaders for a wider movement. However, the combined effect of two important interrelated factors made the watani movement to transform into another totally different and violent form of regional struggle against the Ethiopian state. Frustrated by a lack of trust on the Ethiopian side and growing change in the geopolitics of Somalia border with Ethiopia, members of the Watani movement gradually recruited by a separatist movement of the Somali people called ‘KulubHannolato.’ It makes a good deal of sense to take the geopolitical factor on the merger between the two movements than the compatibility of their political program since the unification was only a strategic partnership against a common enemy, not that of towards a common goal.

The establishment of the United Nation that gave rise to a lot of separatist movements and quest for UN trusteeship, members of Kulubhannolato movements considered the advantage of unifying with movements in Ethiopia so that the UN commission to the region would recognize their demand for annexation. Established in Mogadesho in 1946, the KulubHannolato aggressively operated deep inside Ethiopia opening more than 172 offices in Harar, Arsi, Bale, and Hararge. Negligence of the government to these critical

political developments in the region also helped the kulub leaders to propagate their agenda and recruit more members. As a result, during the four powers commission hearing in 1948 in Mogadesho, four leaders from the Watani movement represented in a delegation of 12 members together with kulub leaders.¹⁴

At this time the government had harshly reacted and wind of arrest, intimidation, and migration blown over the sky of the city of Harar. According to Abdella, in January 1948 the government arrested more than 700 prisoners, 81 active members of the Watani movement sent to other places (Jima, Gore, and Gojjam) 36 shops closed 36 by arresting their owners and until the end of 1948, there was almost a curfew banning any travel from and to Harar until the end of 1948 (Abdellah, 1994).

Although members of the movement, their family, and the entire community had suffered a lot; the government's response to the internal challenge was only a short-term remedy but later on, opened a more strategic challenge for the Emperor. By the time the delegation went to Mogadesho the news of the arrest of their members at home reached Mogadesho and the delegation moved to Saudi and then to Cairo directly from Mogadishu. This is even before the Eritrean liberation leaders had established a strong relationship and bases in foreign countries. Little known about what actually the delegation did in Cairo but it was documented that they established a network with Arab League countries and other Islamic movements (Shumburo, 1992). Once the decision of mass arrest became counterproductive and the suffering of the community continued, an organized negotiation had started to release the 81 prisoners as an exchange of bringing back the delegation from Cairo with amnesty. The son of one of the prisoners explained the situation:

“I was young when three Harari merchants came to our village and organize ladies (mainly wives or sisters of the 81 prisoners) to prepare gifts for the emperor to demand amnesty. The merchants promised the negotiation is already done and only the emperor wanted to make it this way. Soon my father got released together with others after more than 15 months of imprisonment and there were rumors that three elders from Addis Ababa sent to Cairo to bring back the Watani leaders.”

¹⁴Haji Omar, Widato Haji Ibrahim, Gato Mohammed Yusuf, Ismael Yusuf Abdurahman

The resistance struggle in Harar had both an urban struggle for recognition and a peripheral one for self-assertion. The struggle for self-assertion had faced various complexities due to the politics of the time in that part of the Ethiopian border and the influence of the colonial power through Somalia. However, the struggle for recognition had continued until 1974 in the form of religious movements, educational activities, and being part of the Ethiopian student movement in Harar, Addis Ababa, and abroad where the student movement became the successor of struggles in the periphery to finally abolish imperial Ethiopia.

3.5. Brief Summary of the Chapter

The impact of dozens of struggles in all parts of the country since 1930s was very strong; both in shaping the attitude of multiple revolutionary struggles emerged later and challenging the ancient regime. The constitution, policies and institutions of the imperial Ethiopia were in a complete denial of the Ethiopian citizens in these territories that made a struggle is an inevitable means to change the regime. Depending on the geographical, social and political dynamics of these territories, people had been struggling to bring a regime change through struggle for self- determination or equal recognition. The reaction of the ancient regime towards some of these struggles; Eritrea and Ogaden, pushed the revolutionaries towards a more radical struggle, struggle for secession. All forms of the struggles are; in one way the result of the treatment of the imperial Ethiopia of its subjects and on the other hand they are the foundation and front runner of the Ethiopian revolution. These revolutionary struggles are the real making factor of the Ethiopian revolution both as by challenging the all aspect of the imperial Ethiopia that finally exposed it for strong opposition by other revolutionary struggles mainly the Ethiopian student movement.



CHAPTER FOUR

FRAMING OF THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION

Framing process of the Ethiopian revolution is neither a pre-revolutionary project to articulate the goal of the revolution nor it is an independent post revolution reflection on its political significance. Rather it is the process how the Ethiopian revolution is perceived by the intelligentsia finally shaping the political orientation of the post revolution Ethiopia. And therefore, framing is not just a theoretical analysis of the revolution or casual analysis of actual revolutionary movements. The historical facts and evidence derived from the study of the revolutionary struggles will only get their shape from how they are framed and understanding the factors influencing this framing process. And therefore, as (Benford & Snow, 1998) explained studying the framing of a revolution usually focuses on the production of meanings no matter what the actual existing condition at that time bringing some dynamism to fixed conceptualization of revolution.

It is with this premises that the essence of framing a revolution prioritize themes over cases to analyze how far the available narratives are arguably compatible with the fact. Again, it is with this background, that theories, factual presentations and interpretations of processes and timings must be employed back and forth for successful analysis of framing processes. This process tracing of intellectually proposed or conventionally argued explanation about a revolutionary movement in a back and forth mechanism need to be done by tracing its trajectory over time and space (Goldstone, 2003: 43); (Mahoney, 2003: 348)).

4.1. Temporal, Spatial, and Agency: The Three Underlying Framing Dimensions

The framing process of the Ethiopian revolution with all its casual factors and dynamics of the revolutionary situations was a result of temporal, spatial and agency factors of the then imperial Ethiopia. Framing is bounded with time and space. The process is a product of elites within the specific time. The temporal, spatial and agency factors tells us how the final image of the Ethiopian revolution is constructed and sustained that finally made revolutionaries and researchers perceived revolutionary situations of the time and the outcome of the revolutionary struggles. The actual and perceived making factors of a

revolution therefore can only be understood through exhaustive comparative investigation of events, processes and the role of agencies and institutions in the process.

The temporal aspect of the framing process of Ethiopian revolution can be analyzed in two important perspectives. First, the temporal relationship between revolutionary struggles in the periphery and the emergence of new revolutionary fronts in the urban with the beginning of modern education and elite politics is an important dimension. The second one is the sequential aspect of adoption of revolutionary agendas in the framing of the revolution. Likewise the spatial dimension has two perspective; one with respect to the spatial differences on various revolutionary struggles whereas the second one in relation to places where actually the framing was done. This second aspect is mainly related to the fact that the various motions on important matter of the revolution was passed from multiple front both at home and abroad. Finally the role of the intelligentsia, their cultural & political background and their concept of the type of reform the imperial Ethiopia needed is the agency factor that shaped the framing process.

4.1.1. The Temporal Dimension of Framing Process

The periodization in the framing process of revolutionary struggles in Ethiopian can be broadly categorized into two important periods; revolutionary process before 1960 and those after it. Of course, there are sub time clusters within these two periods that have crucial role in determining the direction of the revolutionary agendas.

Long before the emergence of modern education in Ethiopia there were struggles in different parts of the country. Especially there can be two important categories in terms of time to review all the important events towards the Ethiopian revolution. The pre 1960 coup is the first category where no significant urban movements and even no important difference between the ruling class and the elites at all level. Whereas, the post 1960 coup was a significant step towards bringing the urban elites into an open opposition with the regime that can be considered as the convergence of the revolutionary struggle in the urban and peripheries although those in the peripheries were still peripherized in terms of agenda setting.

The political conditions right after Hilesillasse ascended to power the onset of revolutionary struggles in the periphery whereas the center was highly hopeful for the beginning of modernization of the ancient regime. Political passivity was the characteristics of pre 1960 imperial Ethiopia when it comes to political struggles in the center. There are three important periods in the framing process of struggles against the emperor. The period between 1930-1935 was considered as the emergence of the modernization project of Hilesillasse. During this period there was a relative sense of unity between the ruling elite and the first generation of Ethiopian intellectuals. Ethiopia was keen to borrow models of modernization from the European countries and this brought tremendous support from foreign elites. Children of the ruling class got the opportunity for scholarship in various European countries and they were extremely eager to lead the path to modernization their fathers had wished to realize. At the same time, this period a period of rapprochement with the European country while open antagonism was visible with that of countries in the Muslim world. As a result, the framing process of political events of the time was shaped by a combination of these factors.

The political elites during this period were mainly members of the ruling class and their interest is a reform within the monarchical system. This kind of reform by nature couldn't accommodate the interest of the periphery as those interests are not the interest of the ruling class. And therefore any level of reform efforts couldn't establish ideal or physical relationship with that of the struggles in the periphery.

Despite various cases of internal resistance and to some extent criticism against the emperor, the center at that time was generally optimistic on the outcome of the modernization efforts that imported from abroad both in idea and practice. There was no room to accommodate local concerns and every political situation used to be analyzed in line with the imported modernization principles. Grievances and resistance movements were highly attached, either with backwardness and anti-modernization or agents of Ethiopian enemies. In such completely different political situation it is hard to consider the possibility of the presence of uniform revolutionary condition in all areas. While the leading political actors were those in the center, grievances in the periphery couldn't get the chance to be framed as national question that needs national solutions.

In addition to the political establishment, knowledge production was a prime factor in determining the position one political agenda with respect to the other one within the Ethiopian political spectrum. Most of the framing processes of the political discourses are directly related with the beginning of modern education in Ethiopia and the result of the first generation of intellectuals. Since the first modern primary school was opened in 1908 in Addis Ababa, it takes more than forty years for Ethiopia to have its first higher education at university level. As most of the framing process of the Ethiopian politics in general and especially the Ethiopian revolution is related with the student movements, the temporal difference between the late beginning of higher education and earlier revolutionary struggles in the periphery is a major factor for those revolutionary agendas to be compromised in the framing process.

The global and local political situations before the conceptualization of revolutionary agendas in Ethiopia were the leading factor causing revolutionary struggles in the periphery. The then Ethiopia was typical of imperial with official religion. Understanding these movements was not an easy task for the new intelligentsia. The pressing issue by the time Ethiopian student movement and during the emergence of struggles for secession, self-determination and recognition is quite different.

4.1.2. Temporal Sequences in Framing the Ethiopian Political Problems

In a long term history that is unbounded to any particular time and space, periodization of specific political trajectories is the only alternative to have proper mapping of historical phenomenon. Likewise in an effort to mine data on the process of framing the Ethiopian revolution periodization is an important tool to grasp the complete image of a specific political event within the bigger historical timeline. However, by periodization of selective political phenomenon, it is a complex intellectual activity based on the long term historical phenomenon in big social and political relations of various actors (Katznelson, 2003).

The historical and political significance of Ethiopian revolutions derived from the political agenda setting process in various periods. Taking the recent past as important historical moment, the coronation of Hilessilase and the first years of his rule between 1917 and 1935 were critically detrimental on the fate of Ethiopian political agenda framing during his half a century rule. The 1931 constitution, the first written constitution of Ethiopia that

laid the foundation of legalized state religion against the principle of modernization the emperor claimed to bring, was the result of this period. Important political agendas, the relation between the center and periphery, the attitudes of elites of this period are important analytical frameworks on the centralization and peripherization of political agendas. The constitution was not only a legal document but a source of political discourses that shaped the orientation of political elites towards events and issues. The academia couldn't be an exception to this aspect.

The knowledge production process and prioritized areas in the then Ethiopian socio political and economic condition were potential indicators for the temporal effect of agenda setting. Bahru Zewde expressed the kind of agendas in the academia during the period 1963 to 1992 as “character analysis is deemed more important than social analysis.” (Zewde, 2008: 2). The remaining studies on Ethiopian history and politics can be simply said the studies of the central Ethiopian highland empire that doesn't include the people and their socio-political situation, historical trajectories and institutions in the periphery (Meckelburg, 2012: 294). By the time the country was stressed with separatists, struggles for self-determination and recognition, the fact that the academia focusing on biographical topics more importantly about the emperor tells much about what is political agenda and what is not.

Ethiopian elites with reformist mind-set had already the belief that the essence of Ethiopian independence is meaningless unless it is accompanied by development, modernization and self-sufficiency. To this regard elites of two generation; the generation of late Minilik and early Hilesillasse period and the generation of late 1960s of the Hilesillasse era, mutually agreed on the hollowness of independence while Ethiopia is far behind even the newly decolonized African countries. This intellectual agreement of the two generation is reflected on the writings of Gabra-Heywot Baykadagn in 1924 and the 1960 coup proclamation and policy declaration of the Garmame Naway's generation (Zewde, 2008: 241). And therefore, it is not strange if Ethiopia ignores the political questions of the periphery and return ignored by people struggling from that portion of the country.

A striking fact Gabra Heywot explored in his book was being independent from colonialism doesn't make Ethiopia really a free and independent country. Although his focus was on the general backwardness of the country, his powerful expression “How can

really we Ethiopian say that we are independent. Having a government of one's own doesn't entitle a nation to be independent as actual independence needs to be accompanied with self-sufficiency which Ethiopia is far from achieving it. Had Gabra-Heywot was generous enough to explore the actual condition of the Ethiopian people in his time from Eritrea to Ogaden and the rest of the country in the periphery, he would be more critical of the Ethiopian state and more assertive in his proposal. The only challenge in doing so was not lack of information or logistics but the mind set in discussing the Ethiopian problems and solution that, by default, doesn't include the peripheries. Like all other state centered view of the Ethiopian society and Ethiopian problem, Gabra-Heywot was Thus Gabra-Heywat was "loyal and dedicated servant of the state" (ibid 2008: 247) although he was courageously critical of many of the imperial Ethiopia.

The internal debate between reformists and defenders of the emperor was essentially on the effective implementation of the imperial constitution. The reformists and their idea of Ethiopian transformation had no idea of transforming the conflict and integrating the people in those areas. In fact decade before the coronation of Hilesillase there were multiple efforts of state transformation by various intelligentsias. GabraHiywot Baykedagn was among the pioneers of these intellectuals well equipped with transformative ideas based on the western path to modernization. In his historical contribution that got a wide acceptance as the most organized state transformation proposal of the time known as 'Ye Hizbena Ye Mengist Astedader' literally meaning 'Public and Government Administration'. The book packed with courageous proposals in ... chapters explored the entire debating issues of his time related with the problems in Ethiopian social and political administration and brought the attention of the intelligentsia to new perspectives on the Ethiopian problems with western remedies.

The seventh edition of 'Challenge' (1967: 2) described the fundamental assumptions of reformists and reactionaries as:

"...the reactionaries conclude that the prevailing system must not be allowed to change because to do so would automatically mean the end of organic unity of Ethiopia. The "reformists" agree with this position with a slight modification. The system, they say, is an on-going one, and its continuance is absolutely necessary for Ethiopia. But in order to deal with unforeseen contingencies, it has to undergo, and can be made to undergo, minor reforms from the inside. They convince the

reactionaries that this technique of manipulation, by hiding underlying strains and tensions strengthen the system rather than weaken it.”

The debate of the ‘reformists’ by itself was problematic when it comes to following new perspectives for old problems of the country. For instance, while religion was the potential motivating factors in maintaining the ancient regime and struggling against it, the dilemma of the reformists was very strong when it comes to the possibility of reform in the Ethiopian Orthodox church, which is the leading institution challenging accommodation of other religions. Kassa (1965: 14-15) wrote in the journal of Ethiopian Students Association in North America discussed this dilemma in 1965 in this way:

“In the context of modernization, one may list a host of institutions in Ethiopia which may require special attention and honest analysis. One of these institutions is the Ethiopian orthodox church with its uique position amidst the complex of pseudo-modernity of the new front.....Regarding the role of the Church in the process of modernizing the country, one may raise several pertinent questions. Will the church remain aloof and detached from the mainstream of modernity? Will it enter the race of progress? How long can it hold its followers and the young clergy within its sphere of influence. How fast can the government move the masses without the help of the church?”

Had the question was what should be the role of the church in the fate of the Ethiopian state considering its historical attachment with the state and its legacy; it would be quite obvious and understandable however , now the question is how far church should be authorized to alienate others to monopoly the state and its future.

Although the post 1960 revolutionary struggles emerged out of the political analysis of these circumstances and by rejecting the strategy of choosing between those two ‘weak alternatives’ to transform Ethiopia, what they claimed a full-fledged revolutionary political movement was still blind the actual political problems in the country. The new political frame of reference of the emerging radical reformists was not new enough when it comes to the capacity and willingness to endorse some political struggles as appropriate struggles the Ethiopian political situations made it to happen that needs an Ethiopian solution.

As a matter of fact the Ethiopian elites of this generation couldn’t have the access to know the Ethiopian problem and it was the Ethiopian University Service (EUS) launched by the government making mandatory one year services at province level for all university

students. On the role EUS in creating the opportunity for elites of the time to know their country and its political problem Lemma (1979).explained:

“Introduced in 1964, this program made it mandatory for Ethiopian Students to work one year in the provinces, generally after the junior years of studies. EUS participants, who numbered 132 in 1964, 262 in 1966-67 and 590 in 1971-72 mainly served as teachers..... Not only the movement thus extended to the provinces and the lower levels, also many EUS participants and ex-participants contributed articles to university student papers about their experiences in the rural areas and smaller towns, where the feudal status quo was most visible.”

Taking the number of schools in the country and the spatial distribution in the highland center and the peripheries, the mandatory student service couldn't help the university students to come into contact with actual problems of the country that led dozens of revolutionary struggles to fight to abolish the monarchical regime.

Even among the emerging radical revolutionaries of the post 1960 coup, their perception on the nature of revolutionary struggles was controversial and this in return challenged their framing of the political questions in the Ethiopian revolution. Among the most important debates on the characteristics of the Eritrean struggle was the leading factors for Eritreans to fight against the imperial Ethiopia and their possible end result. Senay Like (1977: 16), one of the prominent leaders of the Ethiopian student movement abroad explained the controversies as:

“The so called liberation fronts have shown major vacillations in the formulation of the Eritrean problem. One says that it is a nationality question as well as a question of religion. Another says that it is a colonial question-Ethiopia being the colonizer of Eritrea. It is so clear that even a rapid glance at the Eritrean region, at the various nationalities inhabiting it, at the various religions obtaining in it and at its history will show that the Eritrean problem is not as stated by the reactionary secessionists.”

From this perspective the pre 1960 period was a peculiar period in terms of political situations of two polities of one country. A revolutionary situation was already ripened and while most of the peripheries stood against the establishment, political elites in the center were working for the continuity of the political order except little efforts to transfer in line with the politics of the time. The polity in the political south were in a struggle that can be considered as a matter of survival but their cause had denied the access to the knowledge system in the academia.

This period was a period with no higher education institutions in Ethiopia and insignificant contact with the external world for the younger generation. With lack of higher education institutions and underdeveloped industrialization, young Ethiopians didn't have the access to network themselves and experience the lives of the periphery or even share what is happening in the Ethiopian politics amongst themselves. With the beginning of modern education as well, children of the pastoralists and peasants in the periphery couldn't have the chance to attend school and their existing realities in their periphery remained a hidden flame. The already existing elites didn't have the capacity to analyze the Ethiopian polity and existing social structures. What all their analysis relied is on nobles and their political structure ruling the country.

Even after the establishment of modern education, the curriculum of these new institutions and their foreigner's administrators was strong factors that determined the role of higher education in shaping the attitudes and activities of university students. The relative uniformity of the first batch of university students, most of them are children of the ruling elites and landlords, their background was a major hindrance to fully understand the Ethiopian polity and political questions. And therefore, what is known as Ethiopian politics and political questions in Ethiopia before the 1960 coup attempt can be said the politics of the monarch and land lords.

In the period before 1935 the entire political south and the rest of political peripheries was unknown for Ethiopian elites except the case in Eritrea. Although they are minimum in their number and not critical in role, the intelligentsias had considerable impact on the framing of political agenda in pre-Italian period. The emperor also had the will to listen to their idea as long as it pursued his monarchical path to Ethiopian modernization under a state religion. The role of the elites had significantly dropped during the Italian five years occupation between 1935 and 1941.

The Italia-Ethiopian war of 1935-1941 was a period that exhibits the maximum decline in the role of the intelligentsia due to the massacre done by Graziani and migration of the remaining elites to abroad. At the same time it was a period of framing the Ethiopian political agenda from abroad based on the established thought of Ethiopia and Ethiopian issues before. And therefore this was a time that can be referred to discuss the impact of time and space on the framing process of political events. In its temporal aspect the five

years occupation brought new ways of understanding the Ethiopian politics vis-à-vis international dynamics. Similarly, the five years period opens new way of administration that made significant proportion of the Ethiopian polity to have new perspectives on Ethiopian politics. This period had also changed the political lines in terms of ethnic and religious affiliation based on the strategy of the Italian administration. Some ethnic and religious groups who were structurally marginalized in the emperor

With respect to the spatial impact, the five years Italian war made the center of political framing outside Ethiopia. Emperor Hilessillasse was leading his royal family from abroad and the international community was addressed not based on the actual situation at home but on the established truth about the imperial Ethiopia. Patriotism, Freedom, National interest and other critical political agendas were determined based on the framing of Ethiopian elites abroad. While the actual patriotism was in Ethiopia fighting the Italian colonizers, the emperor and his like-minded intelligentsia abroad consider themselves as the only care taker of the country. That was the main reason why the emperor immediately dismantle those patriots who used to fight the Italian army courageously as soon as he get back to power after five years in exile. The same is true for issues of political inclusivity and equality. The five years Italian war was not simply years in war but stable administration in most parts of the country including the capital Addis Ababa. Improvements in social and political situations in different sections of the society were taken differently based on the orientation of the political elites. Although there was a mutual consensus on the motive behind why Italia is concerned for the justice and equality among the Ethiopian people and the effort it has been doing to bring a balance between those dominating and marginalized, the framing of this situation by the mainstream political elites were a matter of political alliance with a colonizer. Revolutionary struggles during those five years must prove themselves not to be framed as local extension of colonial political objectives. As a result the progress of those revolutionary struggles that were started before the Italian occupation or those who got ground during the five years period but continued to challenge the emperor after the restoration of power were framed anti-Ethiopian or otherwise not considered as political struggles that born out of the Ethiopian political problems.

The 1941-1960 periods were a significant period on the development of organized political struggles against a well-organized, centralized and bureaucratized Ethiopian state. And

therefore the reference to frame political struggles was with respect to the progress of this centralization and bureaucratization. Ethiopia has experienced most of its institutional frameworks to manage the state homogenizations projects during this important period. The education board has launched many of its initiatives to realize the one language, one religion and one state project in the years between 1941 and 1960. The various task forces, councils, committee works and state homogenization project implementation directives were aggressively working during this time. The history of higher education institution in Ethiopia is by itself the history of this period. University of Addis Ababa later named as Hilesillasse I university was founded in 1950 as the first higher education institution in the country.

Other similar critical developments that shaped the course of political struggles and their position within the Ethiopian politics were happened in this historical period. For instance, the Board of Education, which became the concentrated expression of the regime's homogenization drive was created by Imperial Order in June 1947. Amharic language was declared as a medium of instruction in 1940 by the Ministry of education. It was in October 19, 1954, the board of education ordered to bring a proposal for the establishment of Ministry of religion as a response to the inefficiency of the implementation of constitutional state religion legal provisions and church monopoly of most of the state resources. It was in the same period that more than 210 state schools were transferred to the church in addition to the already thousands of schools in its control. Most importantly, among the fruit of this period was the revised constitution of the 1955 that made the Ethiopian state in its entirety a Christian nation including the fate of this country. The leadership of this county of a diverse nation is supposed to be only on the hands of a Christian leader through the declaration of “national church” that ordered ‘the succeeding line of Ethiopia’s emperors should profess the Orthodox Christian faith’.

As a result of this, the political struggles against the state also were more organized to tackle these highly organized state projects. However, the political elites and academician were in one way or another supportive of these projects that made the path to integration of political questions from the periphery into the issue of the state highly difficult. Most of the political elites used to believe Ethiopia can follow the path to modernization through monarchical system and they were committed to assist this path. If there were few

reformists, they believed only in bringing constitutional monarchy to make the emperor below the rule keeping the statuesque as it was.

Among the prominent reformist of this age, GarmamNaway, was surprisingly a strong supporter of the imperial Ethiopia in its totality until he became convinced that the emperor didn't have the intention and the capacity to create the Ethiopia he thought. In his student days in the United States, Garmame had a strong believe that Hilesillasse is courageous and capable enough to transform Ethiopia. A quotation taken from Garmame's thesis written in 1952 in Greenfield book saying: "As each of us has been wholeheartedly behind His Majesty-each of us to the extent of his individual capacity-it is a short step to stand united in order to make more effective his unceasing efforts for the peaceful progress of Ethiopia (Greenfield, 1965: 352). While the most radical reformist in post 1960 Ethiopia believed in the reforming capacity of the emperor and optimistic view of monarchical system, it is completely impossible to assume the revolutionary struggles in the periphery and their cause could be entertained by the elites in the center. It is with this totally two separate frontiers of political orientation the Ethiopia experienced its first military coup attempt out of grievances by portions of the military junta led by the two brothers GarmameNeway and Mengistu Neway.

Clarity of the political questions in Ethiopia and maturity of reform movements were stronger in the center during the period 1960-1974. Although the critical juncture in this period is the 1960 coup attempt, the predecessor for this attempt was the growing grievance of members of the ruling class themselves out the frustration on the way Hilesillasse leading the country to absolute backwardness through his one man 'God appointed' monarchical ruling system. Such senses of frustrations mainly felt by those governors who were appointed by the emperor to govern areas believed to be, both geographically and politically, periphery. Among these governors was Garmame Naway, governor of the Somali area of jigjiga. Even at this late period of the imperial system, the sense of real belongingness of people in the periphery to Ethiopia was highly challenged due to the ignorance of the center about their case as part of the Ethiopian complex problem that needs radical reforms. Before the advent of the 1960 coup and when Garmame was assigned as a governor of Jigjiga he was passionately and with full commitment trying to understand the political problems in the area with full commitment to work to make the Somali people feel at home with in the Ethiopian state. The degree of

detachment of the people from the Imperial Ethiopia and the sense of belongingness they developed under Garmame's governorship was "the Somali could be said to have felt a genuine sense of belonging to Ethiopia for the second time in their history-the first being at the time of Iyyasu." (Zewde, 2008: 244).

An elder from Hararge witnessed how the grievances in Somale and Hararge areas increased the frustration of Garmame in his time as a governor of Jigjiga. The informant said:

"King Hilesillasse has visited our area and there was a big gathering of local elders, chiefs and farmers to welcome him and forward list of our demand for the emperor. Beyond the quest for development we demand a guarantee from the emperor we could feel equally as Ethiopian as the rest of Ethiopians in the center and the highland. The charismatic king had promised us in a very emotional way telling 'we are people drinking from the same river and will continue to have equal share of our nation'. However, years had passed but instead of positive responses from the palace for our list of demands, security officers detained dozens of people who spoke in front of the emperor. Later we have heard that Garmame Neway referred this meeting of us as one source of his frustration on the emperor."

Although the political framing on the 1960 coup attempt didn't recognize well these facts, the main pushing factor for Garmame was the state led marginalization of selected people and their struggle to end this marginalization. As a result of this and combination of various factors in the center, post 1960 coup attempt was a period of progressive ideas and radical reformists challenged almost every aspect of the ancient regime. Considering the historical legacy the Ethiopian Orthodox Church had in the Ethiopian politics and the strong position at that time too, the ardent opposition on the statuesque was a clear departure from the pre-1960 reformists' spirit. The series of edition of the then Ethiopian student movements' newsletter brought these transformative ideas in to the attention of the public.

To give a humble explanation of this period with respect to articulation of the Ethiopian political questions, it is politically correct to say the revolutionaries in the center had lately understand the political causes that created dozens of struggles in the periphery by the time the center was in a political dead lock with the strong grip of the emperor. Paradoxically, however, revolutionary struggles for these cause were not, and still are not, considered as revolutionary enough believed in bringing the end of the imperial regime.

Congresses of Ethiopian students Associations in North America and Europe were visible indicators on the shift in the understanding of the Ethiopian problem. In addition to the predominantly entertained agenda of placing democratically instituted government abolishing the institutions of absolute monarchy, new kinds of political questions became on board on the discussions and media outlets during the late 1960s. The thirteenth Congress of the Ethiopian Students Association in North America held from September 6 to 12, 1965 debated the absolute monarchy, the powerful economic & political force of the church, the feudal order & myth of Divine monarchy finally passing a very strong resolution challenging the statuesque. On the resolution ESANA demanded “first, state and church be completely separated. Second, the church forfeits its landed property to the people and thirdly the Ethiopian orthodox church or any other religious institution cease amassing wealth through “religious” activity for commercial and exploitive purposes.” (Challenge, 1966: 8).

At the same time the fifth congress of the Union of Ethiopian Students in Europe (UESU) through their journal article challenge (1966: 44)resolved:

“the strict separation of church and State; The abolition of all dogmas, canons, and teachings which, on the pretext of praying and fasting, reduce the days and hours of work, sap and weaken the energy of the people and prevent them from engaging in productive work; and that no Ethiopian be discriminated against on account of his religious faith or by reason of his economic standing brought about by a system not based on equality and cooperation.”

Following the first open resistance of the university students on the “Land to the Tiller” protest of 1965 and the adoption of “National Questions in Ethiopia” as struggle agenda of the revolution, the Ethiopian revolution partially believed to be framed as a revolution of the Ethiopian mass. Also on the idea of reform and its degree, the transition of political elites of the 1940-60s elites can be said a critical departure in concept and practice. By critical departure, however, it doesn’t imply that the struggle of the university student was strong enough to challenge the emperor and can be enough to say the struggle was more apologetic and soft until the end of 1960. Most of the conversations and letters written to

the emperor by the student unions were simple demand for reform and apologies for the little action the government took on students.¹⁵

However in a country where revolutionary struggles against the monarch were very strong since early 1930s in most peripheries, it is very strange for the center to endorse their cause as agendas of the revolution after three decades. The same political elites and activists who had the hope for gradual reform of the imperial Ethiopia radically endorse complete abolishment of the system with all its repressive institutions even through a radical militant approach. One year after ESANA became ESUNA, the organization resolved in its 18th congress held in Washington in 1970 that the immediate task of ESUNA should be preparation for armed struggle (Alem, 1990: 125).

Although this creates the opportunity for political questions of the periphery, still it is essential to analyze the mobilizing power of endorsing those agendas for the activists rather than convincing the existence of full sympathy to the cause. On the final years of peaceful political resistances by student movements and the beginning of armed struggle out of frustration in the beginning of 1970s, still the peripheries were the only option for effective struggle both in terms of space and their experience in revolutionary struggle. Once the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party (EPRP) is established in 1972 site selection was a contested agenda in the congress. An Interview for one of the active member in this process of the struggle documented as: Bahru Zewde quoted the situation based on the interview on participants of the congress and members of EPRP (Zewde, 2010: 107, 149):

“By that time the major ethnic movements were the Eritrea and the one in Bale...the other ethnic movements’ position can be best described as a fermenting process, political in nature For the armed struggle Bale was the first choice because of the following factors: 1) it already had insurgents operating there in the late 1960s; 2) Oromo nationalism was a fertile ground for armed struggle; 3) neighbouring Somalia could be used as a spring-board for conducting cross-border attacks and as a haven for retreat; and 4) the Western Somalia Liberation Front having been supplanted by the “Ethiopian National Liberation Front” it was thought that we could link forces

¹⁵ The President and secretary of USUAA and other student association wrote letters and signed petitions in 1969 to send to Emperor Hileselassie requesting an audience with him to discuss the misunderstanding created between the government and the student union and also to discuss the case of detained and expelled students.

with the organization. However, tentative talk with them in Beirut breaks down. we had reached a point where we were left with no option but to conduct armed struggle, using Eritrea as a rear base.”

The existence of revolutionary struggles in the periphery since the 1920s long before the student movement was actually a good opportunity for the infant armed struggle launched by the student organizations in 1970s. While prior revolutionary struggles were considered as a fertile ground for late coming struggle, they are at the same time witnessing their status of pioneer of struggle challenging the ancient regime, laying the foundation of political resistance for the center and finally toppling the monarch together with other revolutionary struggles in all parts of the country. However, and unfortunately, although this creates the opportunity for political questions of the periphery to be shared by other movements, still it is essential to analyze the mobilizing power of endorsing those agendas for the new activists rather than convincing the existence of full sympathy to the cause.

Meetings and conventions of student associations in the late 1960s were dominantly debated on the question of nationalities, regionalism and the role of student movements in the revolution. The increasing tension between the student movements at home and the government following the declaration of ‘the question of nationalities’ as “Red Line” by the government and the killing of Tilahun Gizaw in 1969 increased the idea of retaliation and militancy forcing the student movement to show solidarity to peasants and link their struggle with other struggles in the periphery.

Eritrean and few Somali members in the student association abroad are active supporters of the revolutionary struggles from the center. Prominent Eritrean liberation movement figures were influential participants in ESUNA until they left due to the disagreement on the issue of self-determination. The little effort to negotiate and understand the Eritrean question more than any other revolutionary struggles in the periphery was not for the strength of the struggle only but for the presence of Eritrean elites in the process. What other revolutionary struggles in the peripheries lack such elites to push their agenda in the mainstream debate. However, still the level of trust and the political capacity of the political elites to comprehend the political questions of various groups was a major barrier for a united struggle. Understanding the struggles in the peripheries was beyond the reading and exposure of the student movement. Their terms of negotiation were based on the little reading they had and little exposure experienced. As a result both the

revolutionary struggle of the peripheries lack coordination and the agendas lack their appropriate place in the Ethiopian revolutionary discourse. On the account of Abdul, a well-known figure on the then Ethiopian student movement and the current Ethiopian politics, “We had only accepted the principle of self-determination and had not yet figured out the next step. Our political education had not prepared us for secession.” (Zewde, 2010: 78-79).

In addition to the political capacity, the issue of trust was another significant factor among revolutionaries to peruse their common goal of regime change in Ethiopia. One of my respondents from the EPRP reflected:

“Had we been successful in winning the trust of the various factions of the Eritrean Liberation Fronts and the Somales to work together to topple the emperor, we could waste no time to fight them back to make sure the indivisible Ethiopian unity.”

On the same token but by another respondent:

“What I understood later after years of exile abroad, those members of student movements and the EPRP that survived the red terror and massacre of the dergue regime were only strategically seemed to endorse the political causes of the peripheries. I am always amazed by the absence of relevant coverage of those struggles in the periphery as part of the revolutionary struggles in the hundreds of articles and books by old revolutionaries.”

Summing up the four important political periods; 1917-1935 of the beginning of centralized state, the 1936-1941 of the Italia-Ethiopian war, the 1941-1960 period of the emergence of political resistance and reform movements in the center and the period of 1960-1974 that brought strategic alliance in terms of political agenda between struggles of the periphery and those in the center exhibit the temporal aspect of the framing of the revolution. However, considering the total number of students abroad; for instance not more than six hundred in North America in the mid-1960s and they were widely dispersed, compared to the struggles in the periphery, their role in the revolution was not also a significant as it dominates the academia. The various congresses of the student associations even in late 1960s was clear on the limited role, only catalytic, role of students in the revolution at home. What the framing of the revolution in the academia and the general public tells however the reverse. Although these periods tells the shift in the political agendas, still the framing of the revolution remained compromised not only due to the gap

in time between the revolutionary struggles in the periphery and the emergence of political resistance in the center by a period of almost two decades but also the agency and organizations factor of these periods.

4.2. Spatial Factors on Framing

Centralization of power and all efforts of modernization by the emperor couldn't create the interconnectedness between the center and the periphery as same part of one country. Not only the physical infrastructures, but also accessing information about any part of the country could only be possible through the state center narrative from government media outlets mainly Addis Zaman press. As a result, had there been humble efforts to understand the grievances in the periphery, access to information were a major barrier due to the spatial differences of these two locations. Especially in the early years of the revolutionary struggles of the center, it was either prison or travelling abroad can give access to elites of the other side to understand their cause. This works mainly for elites from Eritrea, Ogaden and parts of Oromia. Many of the student movement members came in to contact with elites from these areas first in prison places in Ethiopia. Walleign Mekonnen has also met many of those elites in prison called 'AlemBeqagn'¹⁶ It is believed that Walleign was influenced by those prisoners especially from Eritrea and bale that made him later to write his article "On the Question of Nationalities" which is the most controversial and at the same time the most influential article in the history of the Ethiopian student movement and the Ethiopian politics as well.

Initially the influence of Walllign's article was among the various study circles of the student movement. It is not strange that students from the peripheries and Muslims who feel the Ethiopian state didn't accommodate their interest immediately captured by the thesis. Abdul explained this in (Zewde, 2010: 101-102) as:

"Walelign's writing was a subject of warm debate in each and every room of the dormitory. It was most thoroughly discussed. I remember that Mohammed Mafuz, whose home was the venue of the discussion, Bedru Sultan, Tesfu Kidane (he chaired the meeting), Tselote and myself sat down and discussed it. Mohammed Mafuz, who was highly captivated by the article, had memorized it word for word."

¹⁶A name given based on the political history that no one hopes to come out from this prison once detained. Either life time sentence or murder was the fate

Centers of idea articulation and decision making were diverse in the revolutionary struggles of the Ethiopian student movement that ultimately became source of contradiction. The perception of the desirability of some political issues over the other was sometimes quite opposite depending on where the issue is originated and where the final resolution is passed. The extent of the difference of elites in different places was big enough in that student associations in Europe and North America used to debate whether there 'nations' in Ethiopia at all whereas elites of the same movement are struggling for the rights of nations for independence. "The main debate on the conferences abroad that divide the students abroad from those at home and even sometimes those in Africa and somewhere in North America and Europe was the existence of nations."¹⁷

The loose chain of command among the various student association and groups made a consensus on several political questions of Ethiopia very difficult. However, the question of nationalities as an important reflection of the framing of political agenda was the most divisive one that laid the foundation for split of students abroad and at the same time their counterpart at home.

As a matter of fact it was not only the geographical location that created the difference in framing the Ethiopian problem, but the nature of political structure in those countries and the influence on the students' attitude in understanding local problems. For instance students in North America and Europe usually tend to accept most political questions as long as they are democratic but the decision of endorsing as their revolutionary agenda depends on various additional factors. Contrary to this, students in Soviet Union and other Asian countries consider compatibility of local issues with the socialist view of political problems as the first step to be accepted as revolutionary agenda. The political attitude of those students in Algeria, commonly known as 'The Algerian Group' was more radical and most of the time converge with the idea of other radical student members at home. The choice of peaceful struggle or raising arms as a means of struggle was mainly the result of this spatial impact on the students. However, one thing common to all is they might compromise both democracy or armed struggles in order to escape from fully endorse those pertaining issues in revolutionary struggles of the periphery.

¹⁷Eshete, A. (n.d.). The Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia. (S. F. Radio, Interviewer)

4.2.1. Geography led contested Narratives in Bale Rebellion

Southeast Ethiopia has a much-contested narrative both on revolutionary situations that the rebels were struggling against and the counter-insurgency mechanism the Emperor adopted. Although resistance struggles in Bale had been influenced by the geographical proximity of liberation movements in Somalia, the struggle remained to be localized revolt against the Emperor within the Ethiopian state. Despite the kind of resentment people in that part of Ethiopia had experienced was not less than those who forced to struggle for complete independence, due to the geographical proximity with Ogaden could not help to be framed as a struggle within the Ethiopian political problem. In the other parts of the country, people may understand those terms like local landlords or foreign imperialists as two distinct terms of the time. However, the people in Bale had been oppressed by their new administrators enough to miss the difference between foreign invaders and local oppressors. This unique situation was not only influencing the perception of people in the other parts of the county about how truly Ethiopians the members of the Bale rebellions they were but also challenging their own sense of being an Ethiopian. As a result, the Ethiopian revolution was not a matter of hardliner secessionists and ‘Ethiopianist’ core revolutionaries, but other core frontiers forced to show any level of enmity with the imperial state and cooperation with its enemy as long as they can succeed in abolishing the ancient regime to have the full sense of being an Ethiopian. The Bale rebellion is one of its kinds and often time the problem in Bale is framed as ‘The Bale-Ogaden Problem’ to emphasize the similarity of the grievance in those areas. And therefore, the difference and similarity of the Bale rebellion from other struggles in Ethiopia in terms of nationalism perspective are one of the contested narratives we will find.

The second contested narrative is the convergence and divergence of ethnic and religious identity and its role in shaping the cause and process of the struggle. Both aspects of the interconnectedness of the two identities have an important place in the study of the Bale rebellion as it is usually considered part of the Oromo struggle in Ethiopia that predates the rebellion and continued to the date. The dichotomy in terms of identity is also important; on the one hand, when it comes to actors’ role in peasant mobilization in the Bale specific area and the need to create synergy with similar movements in other Muslim dominated areas whereas on the other hand identity in terms of language was important in order to

connect the rebellion with other Oromo struggles and have the support from other parts of similar ethnic-based struggles.

It is this dichotomy, in fact, that made the Bale rebellion a highly contested rebellion in the history of both the Oromo struggle and revolutionary movements in Ethiopia. The alliance of the rebellion with secessionist struggles in Ogaden and radical Somalia expansionists made the rebellion an ‘anti-Ethiopian state’, not that of anti-regime struggle, in the mainstream ‘Ethiopianist’ discourse. Of course, in this case, the religious base of the rebellion was the main reason flagged to label as such. For the mainstream Oromo activists, Bale is just the epicenter of the new age Oromo struggles in between the century-old Oromo movements in the Horn of African region and the creation of imperial Ethiopia at the end of the nineteenth century.

In fact, the debate on the legitimacy to call a certain nation as ‘nation’ is a matter of people newly incorporated into the Ethiopian state while they still feel a sense of independence due to the unique language, culture, religion from their new masters. It is deep in this debate that some struggles for self-determination were sometimes framed as a struggle for an independent nation whereas sometimes a struggle for equal status with other nations of the state.

Abbas GNAMO (2002) pointed out that:

“Oromo nationalism is the antithesis of the Ethiopian state/official nationalism supported by the Orthodox Church. It also demonstrates that Islam is not a driving ideological force of Oromo’s political struggle. Oromo mainstream nationalism is evolving on a secular political trajectory”

This course of analysis is found to be highly generalist denying the geographical variation of the Oromo struggles and the context-specific mode of repression and the response of those repressed people. In its spatial dimension both the strategy of the ancient regime and the response of the people since the incorporation of these new territories; the northeast Oromo territory in 1879, the central area in 1882, the far west in 1886, the east in 1887, the south in 1891, and the southwest in 1897 into imperial Ethiopia greatly varied. Similarly, in its temporal dimension, the Bale rebellion uniquely labeled from a segment of the vision of Greater Somalia to the pan Islamist movement supported by Arab nations to destroy the ‘Christian Ethiopia.’ It can be logical to assert, maybe, mainly the tribalism and narrow

nationalism claim of the mainstream 'Ethiopianist' that made the Bale rebellion under the same category with resentments in other parts of the Oromo people. More importantly, in the presence of the Church-led expansion to incorporate new territories with the huge benefit for the Church itself in terms of a high proportion of land, the authority to collect tax from the serfs, church construction and developments with mandatory labor service of the local manpower, and even the radical changes on the name of places, mountains, and towns into Christian oriented names strange for the local Muslim people, it will be also politically unrealistic to argue the other way (Ibssa, 1980-81).

However, both debates are irrelevant when it comes to the role of the Bale rebellion in the Ethiopian revolution as all witnessed the rebellion was a product of the Haile Sillasse's government that latter put big strains on his regime (Tareke, 1991). Being the second-longest and bloodiest uprising in imperial Ethiopia, the Bale rebellion that waged between 1963 to 1970 was one of the most strong revolutionary struggles that put a strong financial and military challenge on the Emperor, the rebellion was a result of a combined pressure the Emperor put in the cultural, social, economic and political life of the people (Tareke, 2009). However, the legend in the history of Ethiopian revolution bypasses this peasant upheaval only due to its geographical proximity with Ogaden which was by itself considered as Somali Irredentism.

4.2.2. Access to Arab land exposed for Miss Framing

The revolutionary struggles in Eritrea are at the center of Ethiopian political history. History recognizes the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea neither as historically distinct nor united. Various sources would support the Ethiopian claim that Eritrea is both culturally and historically part of the Ethiopian region. On the other hand, the geographical and political singleness of Eritrea from that of Ethiopia was the central argument by some of the separatists presented. However, beyond the political, cultural, territorial and economic complementary nature of Ethiopia and Eritrea; the presence of the Ethiopian state as an important actor in the region in line with the colonial powers could maintain Eritrea and significant parts of Somali at least non-governed province of Ethiopia not that of competing forces against Ethiopia. This happens only due to the perception that Ethiopia considers itself as "an island in a Moslem sea." This paved the way for the beginning of the end in the course ending the Federation and the starting of the armed struggle.

The separatist movements started to gain a wider acceptance throughout Eritrea and abroad rendering the Eritrean questions to become the determining factor in the revolutionary struggles against Ethiopia. This new trend again became the beginning of new foreign relation dynamics among countries in East Africa, the Middle East, America, the USSR, and European countries. The new norm in the foreign dynamic also reached international organizations and when the question came before the General Assembly of the UN in 1948, supporters and opponents of the secessionist movement expose their intent and stand. Although the intent varied from religion to the issue of justice, the basic pushing factor stemmed from the commonly shared national interest of all stakeholders (Ellingson, 1986: 249,257; Sherman, 1979). Keeping the issue of intent and stand of the international actors for further discussion later, the revolutionaries in Eritrea used this new trend of external powers' alliance as an opportunity to intensify their diplomatic pressure against Ethiopia and most importantly as a source of fund and military assistance in terms of direct aid and pieces of training.

During the final years of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, those affected Eritreans started to migrate to neighbouring countries and the Middle East especially to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Thousands of Eritreans who received military training abroad during this period have established the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the first organized militant group in the Ethiopian revolutionary forces, which immediately launched armed struggle early in 1961. ELF was an extension of the already organized revolutionary struggle in Eritrea in those Muslim dominated low lands and therefore it can be referred to as a Muslim dominated front. It took almost 10 years for the Christian highlands to organize themselves in the form of Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF) for a military struggle following the experience of ELF. The formation of EPLF was partly the result of the continuous assault of the Emperor on the Eritrean internal affairs despite the federation status of Eritrea after 1950 (Sherman, 1979). However, despite the fact that all Eritreans were against the Emperor's intention to control all affairs of Eritrea and the encroachment of the 'feudal' tradition in the then civilized Eritrea, the revolutionary struggle can be said more of a lowland based.

Both ELF and EPLF trained and received their significant support mainly from Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Iraq as a proof that external support was mainly based on the national interest of the supporting nations and ideological line of the time. However, it was

crystal clear that due to the predominantly Muslim base of the revolutionary struggle due to the identity-based marginalization of Eritrean Muslims by the Emperor's approach, most Arab countries considered Eritrea as a Muslim country ignoring the fact that nearly half of Eritrean population are non-Muslims. Beyond the religious line, the Arab nations had a political interest in supporting the Eritrean case as a proxy struggle with the Ethiopian state who had a strategic alliance with Israel and since the time they indorsed the Eritrean question and they were the primary source of strategic and practical support for the struggle to the level allowing ELF to attend the Arab League meetings as an observer starting from the final years of the 1960s.

As a result, one aspect of the pressure of the revolutionaries is the challenge Haile Selassie government faced from the Arab countries in His effort to pretend to be the protector of post-Italian colony Eritrea and His effort to champion as Pan African leadership. The diplomatic relation with Israel was the major reason for the Emperor to face the Arab nations' challenge and this was so many times nearly to cost Ethiopia its historical legacy as a founder and headquarter of African Union. The diplomatic crisis Ethiopia originated mainly from the Emperor's approach to manage the Eritrean and Somali questions and this gave the Arab countries to boycott Ethiopia's right to host Organization for African Unity (OAU) as a headquarters. During the 10th anniversary of OAU in 1973, the Arab countries especially Syria and Libya lobbied African countries to support the proposal to move OAU out of Addis Ababa either to Cairo or Libya.

Ethiopia has faced this historical diplomatic crisis at a time when it was considered as the African Pride since the Adwa victory had no other reason except the Emperor's diplomatic failure to accommodate diversity at home and act naively based on religious affiliation with that of Israel and South Sudan instead of political approach with neighbors and Middle East countries. The 10th anniversary of OAU was at the same time the period that Haile Selassie showed his courage of situational leadership by convincing Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Ziyad Barre of Somalia to pursue the original plan of the summit and maintain OAU at Addis. However, this was not happened for free but the beginning of a new diplomatic crisis.

Haile Selassie's stringency was the biggest challenge in the negotiation process with Middle East countries. During the critical period of the 10th Anniversary of OAU, Prime

Minister Aklilu Habtewold understood the upcoming wide-ranging consequence and compromised the Ethiopian position regarding the diplomatic relation with Israel. However, Haile Selassie's charisma didn't work here and he malevolently rejected the decision of the Aklilu's cabinet to end diplomatic relations with Israel. The consequence went further to the extent of losing African nations during the Israel-Arab war despite the grace of Ethiopia in the face of African nations. Following the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 African nations voted to end diplomatic relations with Israel that put Haile Selassie in a critical position and withdrew his vetoed decision of Aklilu's cabinet before (Legum, 1975: 61). Furthermore, the frustration of Arab countries due to their defeat by Israel in the 1967 war, they considered supporting Eritrean rebels as a response to Haile Selassie's friendship to Israel. The anti-Arab sentiment of the Emperor and the Ethiopian membership in the anti-Arab coalition together with Israel was considered as a legitimate reason for the Middle Eastern countries to look every alternative to weakening Ethiopia and they did the same in supporting Eritrean independence struggle.

The Haile Selassie regime had a constant trend both at home and in the country's foreign relations when it comes to identity and religion. The determining factor cannot be said the national interest if national interest is the interest of the nation and the citizens not that of attitude and identity. The determining factor for the support ELF and EPLF enjoyed from Sudan and general Sudan's position to the Eritrean struggle was mainly Ethiopia's position to that of South Sudan's question. Sudan was always ready to close its borders for the Eritrean insurgents as long as Ethiopia ceased its support to South Sudan independence movements. This diffident position of Sudan on the Eritrean insurgents was even against the interest of its strategic allies Arab League countries. In this regard, the four years agreement between Sudan's president Aboud and Haile Selassie to close Sudan's borders for the Eritrean rebel fighters with the highly important national interest of Sudan that used to be threatened by the strong support South Sudan's rebel fighters received from Ethiopia. The agreement lasted for four years between 1960 and 1964 until Aboud was removed from power. The then militarily powerful Somalia was in support of Eritrean question partly in exchange for the Ethiopian approach generally in Somalia and specifically in Ogaden.

The decline of the US and European interest in Ethiopia was also related to this diplomatic crisis. While the phony war of Haile Selassie against the neighbouring and Middle Eastern

countries and the special relationship with Israel remained to be the policy, Arab countries also started to show their diplomatic power on the international arena through their bilateral and multilateral platforms. With rapid developments in Arab countries as a result of petrol and the Organization of Petrol Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Emperor's stagnancy not to change with the politics of the time left the US and European countries in a difficult position. One of the strategic interests of the US and European nations in Ethiopia originated from the Ethiopian legacy in Africa and its potential advantage to secure African nations' support through their support to Ethiopia. However, with the emergence of petrol diplomacy, many African nations enjoyed significant support and indirectly championed the new power polar of the global economy. In this way, the western countries; in one way have found an alternative source of legitimacy in Africa through their positive relationship with the new powerhouses, and in another way, the Arabs have found more power to push the western countries to influence their friend Ethiopia. In any of the cases, Haile Selassie left Ethiopia as a country without grace both to the West and the East. This followed by series of shifts in economic, political, and military relations of Ethiopia with the West especially US military infrastructures found in Eritrea that used to be one of its kind in Africa got removed (Spencer, 1977: 9).

By the early 1960s, the rebel fighters in Eritrea already became more organized and popular. The military power and strategy could be compared to none of the other revolts and revolutionary struggles in other parts of Ethiopia. The advancement of the general condition in Eritrea made the Eritrean revolutionaries one step ahead of the Emperor and the revolutionary situation was ripe in Eritrean than in other parts of Ethiopia. At that time Eritrea was the safe-haven for other opposition and militant organization targeting imperial Ethiopia. The Eritreans' factor in Ethiopia cannot be downplayed to armed struggle even. Thousands of Eritreans were already working in all sectors in Ethiopia. The army, bureaucracy, aviation, political posts, and the economy have a significant proportion of Eritreans compared to their total population. It is estimated that nearly 60% of the political cadres both in the state and the opposition were Eritreans or those with Eritreans root. The rest of the cadres are also highly dependent on Eritreans' cadres and elites for political roadmap and network with Arab countries and the third world political movements. The Addis Ababa policy to Eritrea was therefore at the same time the full-scale state policy of Ethiopia itself. That is the reason which echoed the first shot of ELF fired on 1 September 1961 loud enough to be heard all over Ethiopia and all civil and military sectors.

The abolition of the federation in 1962 was not only the complete annexation of Eritrea but also the period of great retreat for the majority of pro-unification Eritreans leading their way to struggle for full independence. The efforts of those Eritreans to maintain the historical relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea and their keen interest to create an Eritrean province with all uniqueness of being an Eritrean and in line with the democratic principles and modern socio-economic system end nowhere but failure. They have failed not because of the impossible mission of the Eritrean federation but because of the incompatibility of the 'feudal' monarch and federation system. This time was again the critical moment for the expansion of the independence movement from western lowland Eritrean base to urban and highland Eritrean including those highland Christians who had believed in the orthodox Church and the imperial legacy could never betray Eritreans autonomy and freedom. And finally, urban elites and Eritrean students started to join ELF led struggle. In this way the first shot in September 1961 that declared the thirty years of armed struggle in Eritrea and the "Hit and run" military activity of a handful of ELF fighters had led the Eritrean struggle to a full-scale struggle of all Eritreans against annexation (Venosa, 2011: 157-197). Although it was the Emperor's policy towards identity that pushed the Eritreans to the struggle for independence and it's for the diplomatic failure that calls the Arab nations to support this struggle, framing the Eritrean struggle as independent struggle from the Ethiopian revolution is practically futile.

4.3. Agency and Organizational Factors Affecting Framing of the Revolution

Outdated theories that relate inequalities among nations with geography, culture or capability of leaders equally works on the inequality of different localities of a given country. The underlining factor for the inequality is mostly differences in institutions and their role in shaping the path of a particular country (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 49). The framing of the Ethiopian revolution in a context known today is the result of elite's interaction and the role of institutions in a specific period. The differences in the strength of a certain revolutionary movement over the other or the impact of the movements are directly influenced by the leading elites and institutions. Tilly's elite theory gives greater credit for elites in a revolutionary movement. Accordingly revolution is a result of a combination effect of popular discontent with elite's completion for power.

The case in Ethiopia was mainly attached with elite's power competition among ethnic lines Messay (2001: 42) has described this elite's competition as:

“The concept of elite competition accounts for the ethnic dimension and the active role that individuals and groups from disgruntled ethnics, such as Tigreans and Eritreans, played in the Revolution. Only by propagating ethno nationalist claims could these groups successfully vie for power. The positioning for competition over the control of power explains why neither the overthrow of the monarchy nor the Dergue's radical attempt to end class exploitation satisfied ethnicized groups.”

Although this approach to the Ethiopian revolution cannot fully explain the characteristics of the Ethiopian revolution and categorize the student movement as elites contending for power will not be the general truth; those revolutionary struggles without proportionate number of elites who compete for power using their agenda became out of the framing of the revolution and latter from the political agenda and structure. Except the struggles in Eritrea, most of the struggles for autonomy and recognition were weakly organized and lacked active involvement of agencies and institutions for proper framing of their agenda. The power competition by elites from the periphery was not the major issue in the struggle since the struggle was with a common target; the ancient regime.

Beyond the power competition, however, it's the history of the student movement in Ethiopia that tells more about the agency and institutional factor of framing the Ethiopian revolution. Despite the fact that student movements were the principal opposition forces in the imperial Ethiopia, their actual role on the process and the final abolishment of the emperor is a highly contested issue. Renowned scholars in the Ethiopian revolution view the role of student on the overthrow of the Hilesillasse regime very minimal and went further to discard their credit blaming the movement as 'selfishly motivated' (Ottaway, 1978; Ellis, 1976) and radical move of immature elites (Messay, 2011: 239). Nevertheless, leaving the actual role of the student movement and the degree of their impact to abolish the ancient regime for the account of history, the framing process of the Ethiopian revolution was dominantly on the hands of the students, their organizations and media outlets.

And therefore, the agenda setting apparatus in the Ethiopian revolution were various institutional arrangements and their media outlets. Since the early days of the student movements small study circles played the most critical role in shaping the attitudes of the

students and their political frame with respect to the Ethiopian situation. There were also numbers of small 'tea groups' of small size likeminded elites discussing the Ethiopian situation and their proposed way outs. With the beginning of higher education and students enrolment in scholarship abroad, student organizations became the norm of the time and the revolutionary struggles of the center became more organized. It is within these apparatus the framing was done. A total of 832 students studied abroad between 1958 and 1965 out of these the first groups of students consisted of graduates of the first secondary school, Kotebe. And the spatial distribution of university students abroad was dominantly in North America (USA and Canada) followed by Lebanon, Germany, Egypt, Italy and UK (Zewde, 2014: 95).

Keeping the fact that access to education in the then Ethiopian context was for some specific class of the society it is fair to conclude that all or most of these students are children of the aristocrat and nobility. More importantly the state homogenization project of the emperor gave no chance for students from periphery to advance to such level except very few with special links with the nobility. Student movements at home and students abroad specifically were more interested on their education and not vocal of important political issues until 1960. Opposite to this they had strong relationship with the emperor and Hilessiallse attended students' annual events at home and send his special message for events of students abroad. Two important aspect of the pre 1960 student programs abroad were 'know thyself' and 'know thy country' with strict obedience to 'students are free to discuss on everything below sky except and politics' rule of the emperor. Even after the establishment of student associations like ESUE and ESANA in Europe and North America respectively, important developments in their association and their achievements had the privilege to be reported on by the Ethiopian government daily, Addis Zaman until they became vocal after 1960¹⁸. ESANA, for instance, became more vocal only after its 12th congress following the election of more assertive students like Hagos Gebereyesus as president of their print media called 'challenge.' (*ibid*, 2014: 101)

The late political consciousness and their positive attachment with the imperial Ethiopia, it was not expected even for the students to raise one of the most critical political problems in the Ethiopian region. It will be also a wrong if not exaggerated expectation from the

¹⁸Addis Zaman News Paper 6.13.1955 and Addis Zaman 8.12.1956

student to determine as the leading force of the Ethiopian revolution except their catalytic role in the process and later their effective consolidation of the ownership of the framing process in line with their political reading and the politics of the time. Of course, since the background of the elites determine their perception on the Ethiopian problem, it is not strange to omit the questions of the peripheries in the framing of the Ethiopian revolution.

The invisible role of university students in the framing process of Ethiopian revolution later became changed with the emergence of small circle student groups, associations and media outlets. The “Young Ethiopian Party” that was a strong institution working for a reform from within like that of the ‘Young Turks’ in Turkey, the “Black line organization of patriots” in post Italian period, “Haymanoteabew” of the religious association of orthodox college students where GarmameNeway was active member and even mobilized other members for a reform in Ethiopia, “The Crocodiles”, underground Marxist group existed since mid-1960s that is believed to be the secret power behind radicalization of student movement are among the first organizational approach to shape understanding of the students on Ethiopian issues. Later on with the expansion of higher education dozens of student organizations and clubs established in higher educations and umbrella associations established. Similarly student associations abroad followed the same path creating country specific associations and continent based umbrella associations.

However, the development of such student institutions and their commencement of active role in the Ethiopian politics have happened gradually. The first types of student organization were more of an informal social organization locally known as ‘edir’ like ‘Association Mtutualiste des Etudiantsen France’ in 1920. Even during the post Italian period where most of the Ethiopian elites lived in exile, the first post war student association abroad was the ‘Ethiopian Student Society (ESS’ in UK) established on January 1947. And this was four years before the establishment of the University College of Addis Ababa (UCAA), as the first higher education institution in the country. Until 1960 the activities of these organizations were apolitical in nature and supportive of the government. But the assertiveness of student organization and their militancy was a result of a combination of two critical moments; the establishment of Student Union of Addis Ababa (USUAA) in 1967 that led the beginning of radical student movements at home and abroad and the killing of Tilahun Gizaw on the 1969 protest.

USAU and ESANA are the result of these associations later became the most organized institutions in shaping the revolution and gave birth to the first political party in the Ethiopian history called Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party. However, at the beginning the role of these strong associations on the actual framing of revolutionary agenda was very minimal. The first ESUE congress took place in Paris in 1961, the second congress held in Berlin in July 1962 and other congresses mostly focused on "eradication of illiteracy", "education for all", "People standard of living" and other social issues that the emperor could positively heard of them. However Hilessilase was not ready even to listen the minimum reform agendas of the students and in his message as a response to the resolution of these conventions, he said 'sow seeds that bear fruit' to directly warn them from criticizing his policies (Tateq, 1995, s. 2). It's in this gradual process the student movement took a clear stand of complete regime change is necessary. And therefore late 1960s became important period in the fundamental shift in student movement goals. "The 15th congress of ESANA which was held on 25-31 August 1967 in Bloomington, Indiana, has been seen in retrospect as marking the adoption of a clearly anti-feudalist line by the organization." (Zewde, 2014: 129)

When it comes to the political questions in the periphery, such adoption of actual problems on the ground was not only late in time but with no presence of elites from the periphery in these institutions and rare chance of entertaining their cause in their absence, the framing of the Ethiopian revolution continued to ignore these critical national agendas.

The media outlets like "The line club", "Challenge", "News and Views", "Tateq", "Struggle" and others were predominantly occupied on preliminary issues of students on local and global political views. When the issue of socialism induced in to the student movement, these media outlets became the source of socialist ideas and inspirations for the revolutionaries lacking the interest and space to discuss political questions of the peripheries. Revolutionary struggles lacking the means to articulate their agenda in the center finally won't be considered among the core issues of the nation and remain to be compromised making factors of the Ethiopian revolution.

4.3.1. Urban Struggle against State Homogenization Project

The imperial project that transformed the Minilik State to the Haile Sillasse's modern European like Empire carried out under the fundamentally all-inclusive role of the Church. That importantly included providing the overt supreme divine legitimacy the formation process required.¹⁹ The Church's established practice in legitimizing and dethroning could be traced back and linked to the genesis of the Church-State marriage in the 4th Century and remained steadily entrenched tradition up until 1974. The latest quintessential exercising of the practice was seen in the corroborated effort to undermine and later forcefully remove Emperor Eyasu from power in 1916. But equally important also, it included providing the know-how and human capacity. The Church was the only well organized and functional legit structure that could provide this contribution and lead customizing what has been adopted from the West. Ethiopia evolved thus in the image of the Church taking state identity a *sui generis* one that restricted and oppressed the expression of other religions, Islam in particular.

Having taken a fully-fledged state structure like the many states of the then international relations the Abyssinian government should have behaved independently of the Church influence. The Empire stood as a modern a relatively well functioning sovereign actor. In this domain of state-to-state interactions, the Church's self-imposed powerful chore seemed restricted and symbolic. It largely centered on making sure the State's identity is understood and recognized as the island of Christians. Nonetheless, when it comes to Islam and the structural fight against the religion within the territory the Church and the State inextricably conflated. The church plays a grand role in reproducing the state-assumed identity on its right as well as part of the state's apparatuses. Any disappointment the Church might face and complain about was viewed as a challenge to this role. The State and its security apparatus were obliged to provide legal protection for this role to flourish, and the Church was profoundly conscious and eagerly ready to utilize it. Despite the measures to suppress Muslims remained a state-wide policy, Muslim majority regions such as Ogaden, Wollo, and Harar, *inter alia*, were marked as the key targets of attacks.

¹⁹ Back then legitimacy to rule was by far and large sourced, if not only from religion.

4.3.2. Agency and structural factors in Struggles for recognition in Urban Centres

If survival and monopoly of power were the defining characteristics of the political rivalry between the Solomonic dynasty and the Muslims Sultanates at a time when power struggle was inherently organized around religion, a struggle for autonomy and recognition was the typical nature of revolutionary struggles of the urban Muslims during Haile Sillasse. The pre-1926 period was more of a struggle in an amorphous state where the state machinery operated in a loosely defined territorial, legal, and institutional and agency aspects. As a result, the kind of struggles followed the emergence of Haile Sillasse was more of territorial and ethnic nationalism where religion manifested in all aspects. However, the consolidation of power in 1941 in the post Italian period and rapid modernization and urbanization efforts by the Emperor changed the struggling state of Ethiopia into a more organized and institutionalized state in terms of legal and institutional aspects. And therefore, the urban centers became a battleground for all actors struggling to determine the fate of the nation in a period of transition from century-old homogenized state identity to that of the unified state of Ethiopia with diversified identities. These types of struggles in the urban centres were the strong challenging forces demanding for recognition of all Ethiopians.

The struggle for recognition in Ethiopia could be best exemplified in the continuous action-reactionary movements in urban centers. Especially in a country where most of the urban centers established thought the process of state encroachment and military occupation, not that of through peoples' socio-economic interactions; the dominant culture of the state and the military will primarily influence the level of recognition of peoples of various identities. Churches were established wherever the state and the military existed and the state provides financial and security support for the churches. Since the degree of evangelization was not much visible in the urban centers, the level of recognition and incentives in the education and state bureaucracy was an indirect pressure to do so. And, the characteristics of the urban movements were also more principle-based that struggled to challenge the statuesque embedded within the socio-political, cultural, and economic system of the state that manifested itself in the constitution, decrees, laws and institutional arrangements. Besides, the revolutionary struggles in urban centers were matters the fate of the nation and the recognition of all its citizens from a national perspective not that of specific geographic or ethnic groups. And therefore, the revolutionary struggles in these

areas needed to be assessed not necessarily based on the military and financial impact they imposed on the State but from the critical conditions of a revolutionary situation and the articulated national objective of their struggles. These struggles are revolutionary in the sense that their goal is a complete change on the foundation of the Ethiopian state that didn't recognize all its subjects.

Immediately after assuming power in 1930, the major challenge for the consolidation of power is the extremely polarized attitude of various groups towards their Ethiopian-ness. As a result, the Emperor's prime concern was to find a middle ground between maintaining the century-old statuesque and showing a gesture of 'one Ethiopia for all Ethiopian'. In his historical speech on the opening session of the first parliament in 1931, Haile Sillasse assumed a man of National unity than a specific social group or localities. In his speech to the parliament members, he stated that:

“As of today, it is essential for you to know that there are other localities and towns adjoining your homeland and home town. And all these localities together form one big country (Hagar), Ethiopia, and the people who live within it are children of one Ethiopia. It is also imperative for you to know that the Ethiopian people who live together since antiquity are part of a bigger world. Henceforward, it is absolutely essential for you to know that in addition to issues which are important to your homeland, there is a common project which is of equal benefit to every locality and community. The state is the protector of this common benefit and the Negusa-Nagast (the Monarch) is a common institution that sprang from the midst of the Ethiopian people.” (Wolde-Kiyorkis, 1951)²⁰

Literal observation on the content of the speech by itself tells the degree of “We” and “Others” at the heart of the political power that was a challenge to the Emperor to act as a protector of the ‘common interest’. However, this kind of nationhood and common interest was immediately tested in the following years that proved what the Emperor meant in his concept of the Ethiopian state and the ‘common interest’ of its subjects. Although the Emperor verbally seemed to present the Ethiopian state as a territorial entity detached from any specific religious or social class, the practical implementation in terms of policies and

²⁰This same speech was redelivered in 1942 after the emperor restored his power after the five years period of war with Italian in an opening ceremony of the parliament. Although the emperor verbally seems to present the Ethiopian state as a territorial entity detached from any specific religious or social class, the practical implementation in terms of policies and institutions were proving against.

institutions was proving the other way which became the source of frustration and causes for urban revolutionary struggles (Fisseha, 2001: 203-217; Wudu, 2006: 267-275).

It did not take a longer time for the Emperor to jump to the course of homogenizing the state identity through two key regimenting instruments: language and religion. The Amharic language was not introduced just as a national language to strengthen Ethiopian-ness and create a sense of unity among citizens. Rather, the Amharic language was presented as a symbol of the superiority of its users over other languages. Beyond the systematic approach towards language-based homogenization, the Emperor used to verbally express His intent toward the language policy was an issue of imposing superior language, not that of bringing together Ethiopians through language. In his speech in January 1955 on a graduation ceremony at Haile Sillasse I Military, the Emperor mentioned:

“ኢትዮጵያዊ ነኝ ብሎ አማርኛ አለማወቅ አገር የለኝም እናት አባቴንም አላውቅም የማለት ያህል አሳፋሪ ነገር ነው።”

The equivalent translation of this reads as “It is embarrassing for anyone claiming to be an Ethiopian and to say ‘I do not know Amharic’ and this is parallel to mean that ‘I do not have a country and I neither know my mother nor my father’” (Wudu, 2006: 242)

For a country where language and ethnic identity was one of the potential dividing lines among nations, this statement was not the proposal of forging national unity but that of intimidating people with different language and identity. This language policy of Haile Sillasse did not have a clear vision of creating national identity through language. At home, while imposing the Amharic language employed as an instrument to suppress other languages, the government was encouraging the expansion of other foreign language schools to the extent of limiting the already existing few of the available education institutions on language teaching banning their previous curriculums. More paradoxical, the introduction of foreign languages was not based on the political and economic significance of the languages and our diplomatic relations of the speaker nations. While the French language allowed to be taught in higher education, the Arabic language was a highly contested political agenda even at *madrassa* and elementary schools far from the centre (ibid, 241: 42).

All these selective applications of the language policy became a legitimate cause for identity-based struggles both in terms of religion and ethnicity. More critically the country did not have any formal institution for 'Amharic language' education and Amharic teachers were assigned from the Church most of the time their title was not a teacher but 'Yeneta'. For the Islamic schools in Addis Ababa and other urban centers of the country, the imposition of Amharic language was not only a question of medium of instructions but a matter of religion considered as the wider effort to baptize. The people were revolting the imposition of Amharic to protect both their Islamic identity and their local language.

The other deep-seated strategy of the homogenization project was the national religion. Making the Orthodox religion the official religion of the state was conducted as a state-level project declared by the 1955 constitution. In fact, the 1935 constitution had clearly declared this concept of a state religion but for the Emperor who talked about national unity and recognizing all the peoples in the country during the opening ceremony of the parliament both in 1931 and 1942, the constitution drafted after these speeches were expected to be neutral of religious monopoly. However, the revised 1955 constitution presented the Orthodox Church as the "official" religion of the state (Fisseha, 2001: 167).

And therefore, the homogenization projects right after the re-establishment of the Emperorship in 1941 implemented in various state institutions affecting the day to day livelihood of citizens to the lowest administrative levels. Fisseha explained this project under three important categories; religious homogeneity, linguistic uniformity and ethnic intermixing where the first two were aggressively implemented and Education was the main sector where this project was implemented radically (*ibid* 2001: 165).

In 1942 the Church is granted the right to collect taxes from church lands. Considering the technical and operational challenge the Church could face, the Ministry of Finance had been ordered to collect this tax and deposit 80 percent for the Church and the rest 20% in the Emperor's personal account.²¹ The right to collect tax was a highly significant political and economic measure in a country where the Church is the only institution next to the state owning a large proportion of the land in the country. Politically it is much significant when one considers the existing situation of Islamic schools lacking the minimum budget

²¹Ministry of Education, Folder A/3, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Education, September 18, 1948.

to cover salaries for their staff members in a country where the good half of the population was Muslims.²²

The seed for the urban revolutionary struggles could be referred to as this decision of the Emperor. First, the education board was well aware of the fact that there was big resentment among the Muslim communities in all urban areas mainly in Addis Ababa, Harar, Dessie, and Jimma. The board was the nearest government body to impose the various restrictions on Islamic schools in an effort to gradually abolish them all. In an attempt to implement such restrictions the board faced a big challenge from the school leaders and the community. As a result, when the Church asked the ministry of education to allow her to collect tax, the board was afraid of the challenge to come from the Muslims and continuously warned the Emperor. Although the board was the main body working for the monopoly of the Church in all aspects of the nation's affairs and the Church itself was represented in the board to make sure the education system and the state identity is moving in accordance with the interest of the Church, the act of granting this right is considered untimely and politically incorrect with respect to the official narrative that the state is working towards modernizing the education system (Fisseha, 2001). The great majority of taxpayers, especially in Muslim dominated areas, were Muslims and it is crystal clear that allowing the Church to collect taxes from these tax payers for the development of the Church and its development activities while the condition of Mosques and Islamic schools on the same areas were very poor would create open criticism locally and abroad. Abebe Fisseha (2001: 173-174) expressed the influential education board as:

“The Board of Education, which became the concentrated expression of the regime's homogenization drive, was created by Imperial Order in June 1947. Board members were selected on the basis of their faith and their sycophantic loyalty to the regime. Despite the fact that Muslim subjects of the state accounted for about 40% of the total population, the Board never had a Muslim member throughout its thirty-seven years existence (1947-1974). The Board had deliberated on major educational issues, ranging from the structure of the education system to the salary scale of teachers and school graduates. For the most part, however, its policy discussions focused on two major themes: the question of Islamic schools and the role of the Orthodox Church in the regime's homogenization derive.”

With this critical role player authority but hesitant position on the allowance of tax collection right for the Church, the board presented another controversial alternative

²²Regulations for the Administration of the Church, “NagaritGazeta, Decree No. 2 of 1942, November 30, 1942

proposal for the Emperor suggesting to provide the Church direct budget support from the government budget equivalent to the tax expected to be collected. In addition to proposing direct budget support by the government, the board advised not to make this deal public again in an effort to minimize the chance of resistance from the Muslim community.

The national strategy of state homogenization project, especially in the education sector, was primarily challenged by the Muslim community. The decision of the ministry of education in its 23rd meeting of 1940 declaring Amharic language as a medium of instruction at all schools, the Muslim schools in Addis Ababa, Harar, Dessie, and Jimma resisted this decision.²³

The contradiction between the verbal ‘Ethiopian-ness of all Ethiopians’ expressions by the Emperor and his officials and the government led church monopoly in identity setting, knowledge production and economic benefit raised religious cleavage. Muslims in the urban centers waged their struggle in strategic and practical fronts. Strategically they resist the root cause of their problem that is the legal foundation of marginalization embedded in the rules, policies, and institutions. On the practical front, Muslims were strongly challenging every unfair treatment of institutions over the other on the basis of religion.

As the challenge from the Muslim communities increased, the government tried various mechanisms either to divert the direction of the struggles to a convenient way to label as a foreign nation led campaign to destabilize Christian Ethiopia or establish a more systematic platform to continue the homogenization project without being noticed. Those who brought a challenge and mobilize their community against the practical challenge they faced and the long-term impact of the decrees and institutional setups that hampered national unity and religious freedom were reported for conspiring with Arab countries and separatists. The case of Haji Yusuf Abdurehman (director of the school in the grand Anwar mosque in Addis Ababa) and Sheh Ahmed Sadiq (Director of an Islamic school in one of the Muslims dominated urban centers of Ethiopia, Dessie) were presented to the education board and a lot of alternatives to contain their challenge. A judge in the Supreme Court named Qadi Ahmed Abdurahman Elyas was also reported as a collaborator.

²³ Ministry of Education, minutes of the 23rd meeting of the board, Yakkatit 30, 1940 E.C.

Haji Yusuf Abdurahman was a Harari cleric and devoted reformer who had a significant influence on the introduction of modern education to the Muslim community, especially in Harar and Addis Ababa. The government was more concerned on his move due to, both his city of origin Harar is the center of urban struggle and rebellion against the regime and the school he is leading in Addis Ababa is at the heart of the country which is difficult for the Emperor to act in a way he is doing elsewhere. The education board was always divided on the motion proposed about Haji Yusuf. Although personal attacks and other legal cases were some of the alternatives the board discussed, but finally all members of the board unanimously voted to send him to Gojam where he can no longer resist and mobilize as the area is one of the areas where Muslims are critically minority²⁴.

The obsession with very few Islamic schools led the Emperor to ignore the very objective of modern education in Ethiopia and this is usually considered as an impediment of modernization effort of the Emperor by separatists and foreign agents. However, the available shreds of evidence proved the other way. The very foundation and day to day activities of the education board were to implement the state homogenization project using education as a primary instrument. It is against the intent of this project whenever there are people or institutions, whatever their level of strength is, that resisted this move against their identity and the right to education. And it is the primary responsibility of the state apparatus to pass any level of decision as long as the decision is believed to sustain the project even at the expense of the education system itself. One of the most critical impacts of the resistance of Muslim based urban struggle is therefore, they continuously made the Haile Sillasse regime invest against the interest of the state that later threatened his economic and political viability.

The interest of the Church to monopolize the education system for its economic return in terms of education tax and as an effective mechanism to shape the state identity based on its own ontological foundation is therefore the interest of the state itself. As a result, the education system in Ethiopia experienced the biggest shock in its history since its foundation by Minilik II. Only in two years of time between the years 1949 to 1951 from eight provinces 210 state schools were transferred to the church for the purpose of

²⁴ Ministry of Education, Folder A/41, The Vice Minister to the Emperor, June 30, 1949.

strengthening the Church's role at the expense of access to education for all and the chance of modern knowledge production to transform the country.

The education board was still in search of other alternatives to make sure the Emperor's vision of church-led homogenization. In one of its meeting, the board decided a more direct religious order arguing:

“የኢትዮጵያ ቤተክርስቲያን ሃይማኖቷን አስፋፍታ ባለማስተማሩ የእስላም ሃይማኖትና እንዲሁም ደግሞ ሚሲዮናውያን አረመኔውን ህዝብ የክርስቲያን ሃይማኖት እናስተምር ብለው አስፈቅደው የበለጠ ጉዳት...ይህን ሁኔታ ለማሻሻል ቤተክህነት ሃይማኖትን በርትታ ታስተምር”

“Due to the incapability of the church to teach the Christian faith, the expansion of religion of Islam and missionaries' activities became a threat.....to avert this challenge the church should scale up its taught of faith”²⁵

And therefore, the board suggested allocating budget for the Church and the budget code was:

“.....የእስላምና የሚሲዮናውያንን ትምህርት ለመቃወሚያ፣ ለሃይማኖት ትምህርት ማስፋፊያ.....”

literally meaning “for countering Islamic education and Missionary activities, the expansion of religious (Orthodox) education...”²⁶ and the budget is proposed based on the precondition that the curriculum is managed in collaboration with the Church and Ministry of education.

Once the monopoly became clearer, the education system was no more a modernization project of the Haile Sillasse regime. One of the informants stated:

“From the very beginning we were reluctant to attend schools as it compromises our language and religion; however, we had been attending with a strong push from the local administrative and some influential personalities in the area. However, as soon as the schools are transferred to the church the situation became totally changed and we sometimes had one class per day which is Amharic language or Ethics class, teachers for both classes were not graduate of the subject but priests from the church.”

²⁵MOA, The 107th minutes of the meetings of the Board, Hedar 3, 1946 E.C.

²⁶ MOA, minutes of the board, Teqemt 26, 1946, E.C.

Controlling the only knowledge-producing instrument, the regime and the Church even couldn't implement their project and schools started to be closed out of budget constraint and management problem. Only in one of the Muslim dominated Illubabor provinces, thirty-two elementary schools were closed from the available thirty-six schools (Fisseha, 2001, p. 182). However, the debate on the education board was not the impact of school closure on the education right and fate of its 9000 attendees due to this closure but the hypothetical expansion of Islamic schools and missionaries challenging the role of the homogenization project. Despite the continuous collapse of the education system and schools were closed everywhere, the government approved an extra budget of three million Ethiopian birr in 1957. While the state's role to run the state schools became in the hands of the Church and the capacity of the Church to manage the schools deteriorate, the Church was confident enough to ask additional budget of three million in 1960 and a more assertive claim to collect the health tax on its land that was nearly replacing the state itself.

By the time the situation moved from bad to worse, 'the right to education' became the main agenda of revolutionary forces that later became one of the major questions of the Ethiopian student movement that finalized the long years of the struggle in the periphery against Haile Sillasse. The commitment of the Emperor for the homogenization project, however, was strong enough to give a blind eye. Understanding the failure of church-led implementation of this project the Emperor decided to manage directly from his cabinet or an institution accountable to his office. Accordingly, on October 19, 1954, the board of education was ordered to bring an alternative proposal for the establishment of Ministry of Religion for this grand mission of homogenization.²⁷

Without going into details, in a kind of circumstance where church and state are inseparable and Christianity is the religion of the state, the political consequence of establishing a Ministry of religion would be meaningless and therefore in 1957, the new ministry was proposed to be named as Ministry of National and Community Development with the same mission the Ministry of religion aimed to accomplish. The actual role of the Ministry of National Community Development was to uphold the supremacy of the Church

²⁷In addition to the board three high government officials were also appointed to work on this proposal. The officials were; Colonel KefleErgetu-Vice Minister of Security, Brigadier General MulugetaBuli-Commander of the Imperial Bodyguard and QagnAzmachHailemaryamGazmu-from the Ministry of Interior (Kasu, 2006)

and making homogeneous Ethiopian identity. Frustrated by the failure of all these strategies to revitalize the role of the Church homogenize the nation by controlling the expansion of Islam, the Emperor finally decided to establish the Department of Religious Affairs in his Private Cabinet in December 1959 (Wudu, 2006: 222).

However, the desperate move to centralize the revitalization of church-led state identity project was counter-productive at least for three major reasons. Primarily the resistance from the Muslim communities in Addis Ababa, Harar, Dessie, Jimma, and some semi-urban provinces in Hararge southern Ethiopia like in Gurage and Silte renewed with a new spirit and additional claim. The previously fragmented and individual led resistance now became more organized towards a unified goal of secular Ethiopia and recognition of the religion of Islam as a state religion parallel to the Christian faith. This national question rose from all corners of the country through petitions and protests. Now the question was a matter of the legitimacy of the religion-traditional based regime not a separate demand for education and tax.

Muslims in and around Addis Ababa effectively compiled most of the grievances of Muslims in all directions and showing solidarity to all struggles in the peripheries and in urban centres. The final demonstration just on the eve of the 1974 revolution was the first in its kind not only for the Muslims but for the history of the Ethiopian revolution in general. At this time people were protesting not education tax but the root cause of this imbalance caused by the established church status as the only state religion. They were not also demanding proportional recognition but mainly of separation of the state and church which was with far-reaching implication incomparable with the maturity of the politics of the time. It was far-reaching in that the demonstration forced all forms of revolutionary struggles to endorse their articulated demand which finally result in the downfall of the imperial regime through peoples' struggle and laid the foundation for a secular Ethiopia through the first articulation of separation of church and state in the new draft constitution of Ethiopia in 1974. Separation of church and state was finally on the table in most congresses of the student organizations. The 15th congress of ESUE and ESANA expressed its commitment to change the system and realize complete separation of church and state together with socialization of land and collective ownership of industries.

To this regard even the the Thirteenth Congress of ESANA on its journal (Challenge: 1966, 8) explicitly resolves that:

“state and church be completely separated, the church forfeit its landed property to the people, the Ethiopian Orthodox church or any other religious institution cease amassing wealth through “religious” activity for commercial and exploitative purposes, the responsibility of the Church be restricted to the teaching and practices of the principles of its faith provided that its teachings and practices are conducive to the well-being and progress of the Ethiopian people, the rules of the Church which restrict the full utilization of labor and hence are harmful to the economic growth of Ethiopia shall have no sanctions whatsoever.”

The demonstration of hundreds of thousands of Muslims was a mature and well conscious move in separating the church’s role as part of the oppressive regime and the faith of Christianity in Ethiopia and its believers. Christians were openly invited to the grand protest through an officially written letter that had been distributed to churches and other key representative areas. The letter addressed as: “ኢትዮጵያውያን እስላሞች፣ ለክርስቲያን ወንድሞችና እህቶች... ሚያዝያ 1966” meaning “From Ethiopian Muslims to our Christian brothers and sisters, April 1974” (Zewde, 1991).

The second counter-productive result of the emperor’s decision was the gradual loss of his legitimacy on the Church leadership. The centralized effort to strengthen the Church was considered as controlling the monopoly of the Church and sometimes interfering in its internal affairs (Wudu, 2006). As a result, the Church and the palace became in a back-door battle though superficially it seemed they are working in an organized way.

The third and more long-lasting impact of this move was the struggle against state homogenization project and ‘education for all’ finally became the major issues of Ethiopian politics later in the 1960s. The Question of Nationalities first articulated by Walelign in a first attempt to shape the goal of the student movement clearly challenge this homogenization project: “to be a “genuine Ethiopian” one has to speak Amharic, to listen to Amharic music, to accept the Amhara-Tigre religion, Orthodox Christianity In some cases, to be an ‘Ethiopian’, you will even have to change your name.” (Mekonnen, 1969: 2)

Although the question of nationalities emerged both as a radical shift in the Ethiopian revolutionary struggle while at the same time became the dividing line among revolutionaries supporting or standing against the question, the need to align with

revolutionary struggles in the peripheries by accepting them a real struggle for liberation was mutually agreed by all despite the propaganda of the regime against those struggles as separatists and foreign agents. Walelign (1969: 5).stated in his article that:

“We must always guard ourselves against the pseudo-nationalist propaganda of the regime. The revolution can start anywhere. It can even be secessionist to begin with, as long as led by the progressive forces-the peasants and the workers, and has the final aim the liberation of the Ethiopian Mass with due consideration to the economic and cultural independence of all the nationalities.”

The decades-long struggle in the peripheries in all forms of struggle; secessionist, autonomy, and recognition were debated in the process of framing the student movement. During the 1974 revolution the left also believed that habits, traditions and dogmas has never died so that there were many who struggled to drag the revolution to their old conceptions of Ethiopia (EPRP 1981, 5). The Emperor's commitment to the creation of homogeneous state identity neither strategically managed nor secured the trust of the Church but only brought the vision of one-religion Ethiopia and its visionaries to their death in 1974.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Following the political independence of many of African countries from colonization, the expectation was the new states with their own leaders will pave the way for the nations' political stability, economic wellbeing, and social development. It was also expected that the experience in the industrialization of their colonizers, the accumulated capital and infrastructures they invested in host countries, the skills and know-how they left could lead to the "take-off" for African nations. Although Ethiopia is a country with established state tradition and no stable colonization history; the relative advantage of long year's bilateral and multilateral relations as a free state and the few years' Italian administration of some parts of the country could present the successive leaders an opportunity to build a modern and inclusive Ethiopia.

On the other hand, the impact of colonization that left many African countries could perhaps be attributed to a direct cause of internal political fragmentations, ethnic clashes, and border conflicts. The different classes created based on the access to power and resource of the colonizers was also the main factor leading African countries to mess as a result of anger by those marginalised from it. Like the case discussed above Ethiopia had a chance to survive from such internal confrontations due to its success in the anti-colonization struggle. However, the century-old identity-based modes of cooperation and conflict became the immediate ground for wars and conflicts in the Ethiopian region throughout the formation of the Ethiopian state.

The Ethiopian region is an early home for the three monotheistic religions; Judaism, Christianity and Islam that the latter two came to contact with the nation in the fourth and seventh century respectively. However the social and political influence of these religions doesn't parallel the temporal difference they have in Ethiopia due to the fact that the Ethiopian history and social structure were main victims of miss representations that latter affected the political development of the country. Similarly the role of Orthodox Church as the source of monarchical legitimacy is entrenched in history. The religious institutions were not only benefited from the land they acquire and the tax the collected but most importantly from their role in defining, myths of nation and their capacity to make or unmake an Emperor. While the history of the nation is represented by the history of the kings keeping their layers of time as layers of time in the history of the whole nations, the

social structure is also presented in accordance with the advantage it gives for categorizing the political and economic transformations accordingly. Making the emperor, the nobility, the clergy as the well-defined layers of social structure, the Ethiopian revolution was all interpreted in terms of the relationship between these classes. Similarly, studying the Ethiopian revolution Vis-à-vis the actual and perceived making factors tells the fact that the revolution is the most under-studied one compared to its significance in the Ethiopian politics. The revolution in 1974 has removed a monarch which dates back to the thirteenth century and became a decisive moment in transforming the Ethiopian state.

Therefore, the formation of the ever centralized Ethiopian state was not a smooth process of state-building but a process that finally laid the ground for a continuous conflict between the center and the periphery where multiple nationalist and religious movements especially in Eritrea, the Oromo people, the Ogaden of Somali people and some urban centers. In fact, it is the process of the state formation by itself that gave these nationalist movements a grim impression that the modern Ethiopian state is only a continuation of the domination of the ancient regime. Outlying areas have scarcely represented in the government, for they lack ethnic, religious or historical connections with the established core.

The formation of the Imperial Ethiopia and the imperial hangover of the leadership of the modern state and the state affiliated elites almost always consider those friendly with the system as the 'political core' making the rest 'the periphery'. The imperial legacies on the nation's political, social and economic situations of the various sub-groups in the country made some to struggle for the continuation of the imperial legacies whereas lowland peripheries and those marginalized in the urban centres to fight for the death of the monarchical system. The 1974 Ethiopian revolution became a critical juncture in determining the fate of the imperial legacies in the face of wave of changes locally and globally.

As part of the dominant historiography of the Ethiopian state, what the post revolution generation of the Ethiopian people and the outside world know about the Ethiopian revolution sharply differs from the actual story and they are narratives developed through wrongly framed or intentionally omitted making factors. The fact affirms that peasants in

the south, pastoralists in the north east and south east and revolutionaries in the urban centers resisted multiple state homogenization projects and struggled in an organized manner contrary to the established arguments in previous studies about the role of the periphery in the Ethiopian revolution. Those struggles in the Ethiopian periphery that shakes the very base of the imperial regime, mostly bloody, are the untold stories and the sacrifices those people paid remained to be unrecognized and unrewarded. The generation that struggle for dignity and recognition may not come again in the Ethiopian polity but their cause will remain to be one of the defining issues of the Ethiopian politics in the generations to come.

This thesis explored these compromised making factors of the Ethiopian revolution in a comparative narrative against the conventionally accepted making factors. The primeval problems of 1974 and the impacts of political and social changes of the preceding periods cannot be fully understood, let alone addressed, unless the revolutionary watersheds in the Muslim dominated peripheries and struggles for recognition in the urban centers where their struggles compromised while the Ethiopian revolution is framed in the mainstream Ethiopian studies are fully addressed.

Out of plenty of contradictions on the Ethiopian revolution, a single agreed-upon narrative may be the fact that the revolution was bigger than the urban movements and a result of series of attempts by dozens of revolutionary movements. Before the student movements in the urban centers, the country was continuously challenged by resistance movements from the periphery. These movements were mainly peasant rebellion, armed resistance struggles and urban struggles for recognition. Revolutionary struggles in these forms were strong enough to challenge the monarchical regime and independent of the ideological debates that hinder the actual face of the revolution. Sahlesillase imaginatively expressed how the centers of the revolutionary movements were as chaotic and spiral wind to puff covering entire Ethiopia: “from its southern part, Bale, to its north, Eritrea; from its east, Harar, to the west, Kaffa, the revolutionary wind spirally blew, rendering the dust to rise heavily” (Adera, 1996). And therefore the compromised making factors, which are the core focus of this research, are pertinent to take their relevant position in the Ethiopian politics.

In the course of this research; focusing on revolutionary situations, casual assessment and analysis on ranges of chains among causations in the Ethiopian revolution is done through

the method of comparative historical analysis. Beyond the specific dynamics of the Ethiopian revolution that can be traced on the eve of the actual revolution, the larger historical context in which the imperial Ethiopia and imperial legacies in the social, political and economic condition of the country is taken as important explanatory factors for the proliferation of various revolutionary movements in Ethiopia. This imperial legacy became source of grievance for some part of the community making them more active insurrectionary than others. Looking for alternative explanation on the causes and casual relationships of the Ethiopian revolution; the question of nationalities, the issue of land reform and the quest for socialist order that predominantly believed as making factors of the Ethiopian revolution is revisited. In doing so, multiples of compromised revolutionary struggles that have equivalent or more important explanatory relevance for the revolution are given significant representation in the research.

Feudal mode of production, questions of nationalities and the quest for socialist order as a path to democracy are found to be the three potential conventional making factors enjoyed extensive explanation. The hasty generalization on taking feudalism as a political and socio-economic reality of Ethiopia was more of the effect of taking the manorial system the pre Minilik era left and the social order survived. With the presence of extreme irregularities in land ownership and the North and South in Ethiopia had distinct land holding system that made them two separate frontiers, feudalism cannot be the Ethiopian phenomenon in its generality. Feudal elements may exist in some parts of the country with its partial indicators; however, the Ethiopian revolution cannot be anti-feudal revolution unless compromising the actual making factors. Fragmented authority as a measure for feudalism failed to work in the Ethiopian case since the specialized warriors were already centralized and peasants in the political south and peripheries who own neither their land nor their private life raised arms to resist the oppressor-oppressed relation directly with the center not that of the supposed land lords.

The landmark achievement of the Ethiopian student movement in bringing “Land to the Tiller” to forefront of the political struggle was a fundamental Ethiopian political question. However, until 1964 there was no any organized document that articulates the land holding system in Ethiopia as feudalism or some other forms. There was no or few who knew about land tenure, tenant, landlord as a concept or system with all their practical experience they lived with it. Students from rich family background used to live by the service of the

tenants but never frame that system in any form of political relationship. People from poor family background who succeeded to join higher education accepted their families' obligatory service as default and never put it in terms of political dominance of their master while peasants clearly articulated the ruler-ruled relationship of the political system in their locality and consistently struggled against the system. The monumental demonstration of 'Land to the tiller' in February 1965 was also a late response considering the presence of multiple revolutionary struggles by peasants without anti-feudalism by their name long before these developments in the center. As discussing social structures is dependent on the time and the specific environment dealt with, classical feudalism cannot describe the Ethiopian situation and ultimately the revolution.

Socialism, as the ideological alternatives that developed gradually in the Ethiopian student movement was also a mere taxonomy for a non-existent 'socialist foundation' the Ethiopian social structure and that of the Ethiopian revolution. Although the young intellectuals were enthusiastic for socialist path for democracy, aspiration to change and struggle against injustice in Ethiopia, until the eve of the February revolution no significant political organization on socialist principle line and almost all revolutionary struggles in the periphery had no exposure to the socialist principles and practices. The emergence of socialist idea in the student movement and more importantly the declaration of socialism as leading ideology of the post-revolutionary military regime was hindrance to study the actual making factors of the revolution. The assertion of Marxist-Leninist ideological background for the Ethiopian revolution is also contradictory with the process of adoption of the ideology. Socialism didn't emerge as the ultimate solution for the Ethiopian problem in the center and the peripheries but as a matter of debating issue mainly among the leaders of the student movement only as an alternative model together with the western democracy. However the revolutionary struggles in most parts of the country and struggle for recognition in the center were a struggle for survival in post imperial Ethiopia with no room to have ideological appearances. With regard to the question of nationalities, even in the late 1960s, Ethiopian university students less likely mention their ethnic identity and had little experience on the actual problems of their country. Until students from various ethnic groups, dominantly from the Oromo community, joined universities in the 1970s, the question of nationalities was little known in the student movement and if categorization was important students characterize themselves more of by their religion than their ethnicity.

The seed for Insurgency and liberation movements in Eritrea and Ogaden are found to be resulted from multiple but consistent state-led repression and essentially the failure of Hilesillasse regime to accommodate diversity in these parts of the nation. Struggle for Autonomy in Bale and Afar were legitimate in their cause and internal in their nature. However the response for these movements by the government was a litmus test for the incapability of the regime to transform the nation into all-inclusive state especially Muslim segment of the population. The internal political situation of Haile Selassie especially his treatment of the Muslims at home was also the main pushing factor for foreign actors to extend support for secessionists. Growing frustrations across the nation latter became the ultimate cause for the expansion of revolutionary struggles which attracts the attention of the center and intelligentsia.

The monarch and the imperial system was overthrown with popular uprising from all corners of the country but finally realized with the intervention of the military. Considering the fragmented nature of the peasant rebellions and their distance from the center, it was impossible for the revolution to take its final shape unless the military intervened with its sole capacity within the hierarchy of the imperial state. However, the role of the army in the absence of well-organized actors from the revolutionaries will not give the revolutionary credential for the junta. Quite contrary, the military well understood the revolution agendas and in the course of power consolidation series of measures taken and proclamation passed during the first few months of post revolution Ethiopia favoring the revolutionaries and answering their demands.

Dergue started to respond for most of political and economic demands of the revolutionaries in the urban centers and the peripheries. These include the declaration of nationalization all rural lands including lands under the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the church also denied its right to tax lands. Most importantly following the declaration through proclamation of 21 December 1974 on the separation of church and state, Muslims' religious festivities became public holidays equal to the orthodox Christianity holidays and the religious, linguistic and cultural equality of all the nationalities of Ethiopia was further strengthened by the series of proclamations during the first year of the military administration. It is also as part of the fruits of the revolution that the Ethiopian

Supreme Islamic council (EISAC) allowed to be established though with limited legal and operational mandate unparalleled with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church institutional arrangements. These and other actions on the one hand proved the actual making factors of the revolution were practically recognized while the framing and the discourse in the revolution studies denied their proper place in the academia. However and most importantly the revolutionary agendas remained to be only a source of power for the military junta without actual implementation of their causes in the presence of existing imbalances in education, means of production and level of organization to bring the expected social justice. The overall post-revolutionary re-structuring couldn't allow the society to have organized political influence in the state policies, achieve self-determination and autonomy that latter proliferate new forms of liberation struggles in other fronts. This time the struggles were not for religious cause per se but against new form of state centralization the Dergue regime followed in the name of protecting the nation from secessionist movements by various ethnic groups that led the regime towards dictatorship demolishing revolutionary forces. At the same time this was a moment that led the various nations and nationalities whether Dergue was a new regime on the death of the monarch or the just a continuation of the old system with new formula.

In the presence of these strong revolutionary struggles, the Ethiopian revolution remained to be victim of framing process. Framing process of the Ethiopian revolution is neither a pre-revolutionary project to articulate the goal of the revolution nor it is an independent post revolution reflection on its political significance. Rather it is the process how the Ethiopian revolution is perceived by the intelligentsia finally shaping the political orientation of the post revolution Ethiopia. The temporal gap between revolutionary struggles in the periphery and the emergence of new revolutionary fronts in the urban with the beginning of modern education and elite politics exposes the fallacy in the framing of the revolution making the conventional making factors as leading causes of the revolution. The sequential aspect of adoption of revolutionary agendas in the framing of the revolution also tells what we know about the Ethiopian revolution is what framed to us not that of what actual problems led to revolutionary struggles.

It is the framing process and framing factors that played the major role in determining the underlying causative factors while the actual making factors are compromised and missed from the revolutionary narratives. Likewise further researches and contextualised analysis

of the Ethiopian political problems with that of the birth of these problems during the revolutionary process will be an important tool for a more sustainable and inclusive political solution of the contemporary Ethiopian state.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

Key Informants

S/N	Key Informants	Age	Occupation	Interview time and place	Remarks
1	Abdellah Sherif	65	Owner of a Museum	Harar, 2019	Owner of Haji Sherif Museum and resource person in the history of Harar
2	Adil Abdirahman	54	Merchant	Harar	The son of one of the prisoners during the kulub Hannolato movement prisoners
3	Ahmad Robleh	83	Elder	Addis Ababa, 2019	A surviving elder member of al-Jaysh who is currently living in Addis Ababa
4	Fentahun Tiruneh	62	Librarian in the Congress Library, USA	Washington, 2018	Active participant in the Ethiopian student movement, Head of Ethiopian and Middle East section of the Congress Library
5	Haji Hassen Ibrahim		Imam	Addis Ababa, 2019	An elder from Hararge
6	Muhammed Abdalla	87	Elder	Addis Ababa, 2019	One informant, leader of armed struggle back then,
7	Nejib Ababor	65	Senior accountant in WHO	Geneva, 2018	Active participant in the student movement in Jimma, Member of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
8	Obsa Mukhtar		Merchant	Addis Ababa	Personal witness who withdraw from schools in bale due to religious pressure
9	Yusuf Yasin	69	Writer	Ankara, 2017	Author and Analyst in Ethiopian

					politics, participant in the Ethiopian student movement, former ambassador and official in the post-revolutionary government.
10	Taju Mohammed		Public servant	Addis Ababa, 2019	

Books and Journal Articles

- Abbas, T., & Charles, T. (1998). *Mixed methodology: Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches*. (Vol. 46). Sage Publications, Inc.
- Abdellah, R. (1994). The Kulub Hannolato Movement by the Harari 1946-1948, BA Thesis, Department of History. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University.
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*. London: Profile Books Ltd.
- Adera, T. (1996). Ideology in Sahle Sellassie's Firebrands. *Northeast African Studies*, 127-137.
- Ahmed, H. (2000). *Islam in Nineteenth-Century Wallo, Ethiopia : Revival, Reform and Reaction*. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.
- Akocpol, T. (1997). *Social revolutions in the modern world*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- Alem, A. (1990). *History of the Ethiopian Students Movement (in Ethiopia and Northe America)*. University of Maryland.
- Alemu, N. (1980). On the Mode of Production in Ethiopia. In EPRP, *Ethiopian Marxist Review* (pp. 7-42). the Study, Publications and Information Center (APIC) of Ethiopian peopl'e revolutionary party.
- Almond, G. A. (1973). *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Hist01-ical Studies of Political*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Ambaye, D. (2015). *Land Right and Expropritation in Ethiopia*.
- Andargachew, T. (1993). *The Ethiopian Revolution A transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy*. England: Cambridge University Press.
- Andargachew, T. (1995). *The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974-1987: A transformation from an aristocratic to a totalitarian autocracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univercity Press.
- ANLM. (1976). Afar National Liberation Movement general guideline. In: . *Tiglachen*, 4-12.

- Ann, M. (1977). *The Ethiopian Revolution: Group Interaction and Civil-Military Reactions*. Michigan: The George Washington University.
- Asres, A. (1990). *History of the Ethiopian Student Movement (In Ethiopia and North America) Its Impacts on Internal Social Changes: 1960-1974*. University of Maryland College Park.
- Assefa, J. (1993). *Oromia & Ethiopia: State Formation and Ethno national Conflict. 1868-1992*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Asseged, M. (1982). *ETHIOPIA: REVOLUTION AND WAR 1974-1978*. University of Denver.
- Bahru, Z. (2014). *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement 1960-1974*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.
- Balsvik, R. R. (1985). *Haile Selassie's Students: The intellectual and Social Background to revolution, 1952-1977*. Michigan: Michigan State University.
- Batatu, H. (1983, January 25). The Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi Revolutions: Some observations on their underlying causes and social characters. "Inaugural lecture of the Shaykh Sahah al-Salem al-Sahah chair in contemporary Arab studies. Washington: Georgetown University.
- Baxter, P. T. (1978). Ethiopia's Unacknowledged Problem: The Oromo. *African Affairs*, 283-296.
- Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). *Process Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*. United States of America: The University of Michigan Press.
- Bekelle, S. (1995). The Evolution of Land Tenure in the Imperial Era. In S. Bekelle, *An Economic History of Ethiopia: The Imperial Era 1941-1974*. Dakar: CODESRIA.
- Benford, R. D. (1994). Book Review Talking Politics by William A. Gamson. *American Journal of Sociology*, 99(4), 1103-1104.
- Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (1998). Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization. *International Social Movement Research*, 197-217.
- Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). FRAMING PROCESSES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: An Overview and Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 611-639.
- Bloch, M. (1962). *FEUDAL SOCIETY: Social Classes and Political Organization* (Vol. II). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
- Blumer, H. (1969). Social Movements. In B. McLaughlin, *Studies in Social Movements. A social psychological perspective* (pp. 8-29). New York: The Free Press.
- Bosi, L. (2007). *Social Movement Participation and the "Timing" of Involvement: The Case of the Northern Ireland civil Rights Movement*.

- Caulk, R. (1975). *Menilek'e Conquest and Local Leaders in Harar: A paper prepared for a conference on Harari Studies*.
- Challenge. (1965). *Journal of Ethiopian Students in North America*.
- Challenge. (1966). 5th Congress of Ethiopian Students Union in Europe: General World Political Condition. *Journal of Ethiopian Students in North America*, 17-41.
- Challenge. (1966). Challenge. *Journal of Ethiopian Students in North America*.
- Challenge. (1966). Resolutions of the 13th Annual Conference. *Journal of Ethiopian Students Association in North America*, 3-16.
- Challenge. (1967). Beyond and Ideology of Powerlessness. *Journal of Ethiopian Students Association in North America*, 1-8.
- Challenge. (n.d.). 1971. *Journal of Ethiopian Students in North America*.
- Challenge. (1971). Imperialism In Ethiopia. *Challenge- Journal of World Wide Union of Ethiopian Students*.
- Christophor, C. (1969). *Haile-Sellassies's Government*. Newyork : Fredrick A.Praeger .
- Clapham, C. (1969). *Haile Selassie's Government*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
- Clapham, C. (1987). *Revolutionary Socialist Development in Ethiopia*. African Affairs.
- Clapham, C. (1988). *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Clapham, C. (1989). The State and Revolution in Ethiopia. *Review of African Political Economy*, 4-17.
- Clark, E. (1956). *Edward Clark to Secretary of State*. Confidential.
- Collier, D., Brady, H. E., & Seawright, J. (2010). Outdated Views of Qualitative Methods: Time to Move On. *Political Analysis*, 506-512.
- Collier, R. B., & Collier, D. (1991). *Setting the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labour Movement and Regieme Dynamics in Latin America*. New Gercey: Prenceton University Press.
- Constitution, R. (1955). Revised Constitution of Ethiopia.
- Crummey, D. (1980). Abyssinian Feudalism. *The Past and Present Society*, 115-138.
- D.Richards, M. (2004). *Revolutions in World History*. New York: Routledge.
- DelaPorta, D. (2014). In-Depth Interviews. In D. Porta, *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research* (pp. 228-261). United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Democracia. (1974). What Kind of Socialism? *Democracia*, 20(25).

- Editorial. (1977). The War in Ogaden. *Abiyot*, 1-3.
- Edmond J., K. (1981). Ethiopia: Revolution, Class, and the National Question. *African Affairs*, 80(321), 519-549.
- Edmond J., K. (1981). The Revolutionary Transformation of Ethiopia's Twentieth-Century Bureaucratic Empire. *The Journal of modern African Studies*, 19(2), 307-335.
- Ellingson, L. S. (1986). *Eritrea: Separatism and Irridentism 1941-1985*.
- Ellis, G. (1976). The Feudal Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding Ethiopia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1(2), 275-295.
- EPRP. (1981). Ethiopian Marxist Review. In EPRP, *Review, Ethiopian Marxist* (pp. 3-6). Study, Publication and Information center of EPRP.
- Eritrean-Constitution. (1950). Eritrean Constitution .
- Eshete, A. (n.d.). The Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia. (S. F. Radio, Interviewer)
- ESUNA. (1972). *Hand Book on Elementary Note on Revolution and Organization*. ESUNA Excutive council.
- EthiopianHerald. (1974). *Famine Disaster in the Ogaden*. Ethiopian Herald.
- Fetha-Nagast. (1968). *THE FETHA NAGAST: The Law of the King Translated from the Ge'ez ABBA PAULOS TZADUA*. Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press.
- Fisseha, A. (2001). *EDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF THE MODERN ETHIOPIAN STATE, 1896-1974*. Illinois: Urbana.
- Flynn, S. I. (2011). New Social Movement Theory. *Theories of Social Movements*, 88-99.
- Foran, J. (2005). Introduction. In J. Foran, *Theorizing Revolutions* (pp. 1-7). London: Taylor & Francis e-Library.
- Foran, J. (2005). *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Forward. (1977). Junta Recognizes, It is another froud yet. Nesletter of the World Wide Federation of Ethiopian Students 1 (3).
- Fuchs, C. (2006). The Self-Organization of Social Movements. *Systemic Practice and Action Research*, 101-137.
- Gamson, W. A. (1992). *Talking Politics*.
- Gamson, W. A. (1994). Book Review Talking Politics. *American Journal of Sociology*.
- Gamson, W., & Meyer, D. S. (1996). "Framing Political Opportunity.". In D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, & M. N. (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements:*

- Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gnamo, A. H. (2002). Islam, the orthodox Church and Oromo nationalism (Ethiopia). *Cahiers d'Études africaines*, 99-120.
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience*. Harvard University Press.
- Goldstone, J. A. (2001). Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 139-187.
- Goldstone, J. A. (2003). Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolution. In J. Mahoney, & D. Rueschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (pp. 41-90). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Goodwin, J. (2001). *No Other Way out: States and Revolutionary Movement 1945-1991*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goodwin, J. (2005). State-Centered Approaches to Social Revolution: Strengths and Limitations of Theoretical Traditions . In J. Foran, *Theorizing Revolutions* (pp. 9-35). London: Taylor & Francis e-Library.
- Greenfield, R. (1965). *Ethiopia: A New Political History*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Library of African Affairs.
- Hagmann, T. (2014). Punishing the periphery: legacies of state repression in the Ethiopian Ogaden. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*. 8(4). Pp. 37-41.
- Haliday, F., & Molyneux, M. (1981). *The Ethiopian Revolution*. London: Verso Edition.
- Harbeson, J. W. (1977). Socialism, Traditions, and Revolutionary Politics in Contemporary Ethiopia. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 11(2), 217-234.
- Hassen, M. (2013). A Speech By Mohammed Hassen on "Commemorating 50 Years of Oromo Struggle led by General Waqo Gutu" .
- Henze, P. (1985). *Rebel and Separatists in Ethiopia: Regional Resistance to a Marxist Regime*. RAND.
- Henze, P. (1990). The Ethiopian Revolution: Mythology and History. *Northeast African Studies*, 12(2/3), 1-17.
- Hiwot, A. (1975). *Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution*. London.
- Hiwot, A. (1975). *From Autocracy to Bourgeois Dictatorship*. London: Review of African Political Economy.
- Hiwot, A. (1976). *From Autocracy to Bourgeois Dictatorship*. London: Review of African Political Economy.

- Hiwot, A. (1984). Analysing the Ethiopian Revolution. *Review of African Economy*, 32-47.
- Hjelmar, U. (1996). Constructivist Analysis and Movement Organizations: Conceptual Clarifications. *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 169-186.
- Hoben, A. (1995). Land Tenure among the Amhara of Ethiopia. The Dynamics of Cognatic Descent. (p. 273). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Huberman, L. (1963). *Man's Worldly Goods - The Story of The Wealth of Nations*.
- Huntington, S. p. (1973). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. London: Yale University Press.
- Ibssa, S. (1980-81). Red Star on the Emperor's Crown: Pseudo-Revolution in the Ethiopian Empire. *Northeast African Studies*, 2/3(3/1), 77-91.
- James, S. (1976). *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence*. London: Yale University Press.
- Kassa, B. (1965). Unveiling the Paradox. *Journal of Ethiopian Students Association in North America*, 14-18.
- Katznelson, I. (2003). Periodization and Preferences: Reflections on Purposive Action in Comparative Historical Social Science. In J. Mahoney, & D. Rueschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in Social Sciences* (pp. 270-304). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Killion. (1997). *Eritrean Workers' Organization and Early Nationalist Mobilization: 1948-1958*.
- Klandermans, B., & Staggenborg, S. (2004). *Methods of Social Movement Research*. The University of Chicago Press.
- Kriese, H. (1995). The Political Opportunity Structures of New Social Movements: Its Impact on their Mobilization. In J. C. Jenkins, & B. Klanderman, *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements* (pp. 167-198). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lefort, R. (1981). *Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution?* London: Zed Press.
- Lefort, R. (1983). *Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution?* . London: Zed Press.
- Legum, C. (1975). *Ethiopia: The Fall of Haile Selassie's Empire*. London: Rex Collings Ltd.
- Lemma, L. (1979). THE ETHIOPIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT 1960-1974: A CHALLENGE TO THE MONARCHY AND IMPERIALISM IN ETHIOPIA. *Northeast African Studies*, 31-46.
- Like, S. (1977). *The Ethiopian Revolution: Tasks, Achievements, Problems and Prospects*.

- Lindekilde, L. (2014). Discourse and Frame Analysis: In-Depth Analysis of Qualitative data in Social Movement Research. In D. Delaporta, *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research* (pp. 195-227). United Kingdom : Oxford University Press.
- Maherdel, C. (1984). Mass Movements and Popular Revolution in Ethiopia. *School of African and Near East Studies*, 2-4.
- Mahoney, J. (2003). Strategies of Casual Assesment in Comparative Historical Analysis. In J. Mahoney, & D. Rueschemerey, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (pp. 337-372). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mahoney, J., & Rueschemeyer, D. (2003). Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas. In J. Mahoney, & D. Rueschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Science* (pp. 3-40). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Marcus, H. G. (2002). *A History of Ethiopia*. California: University of California Press.
- Margery, P. (1969). *The Government of Ethiopia*.
- Markakis, J. (1974). *Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity*. Clarendon Press: Oxford .
- Markakis, J. (1997). Garrison Socialism: The Case of Ethiopia. *Middle East Research and Information Project, Inc. (MERIP)*, 3-17.
- Markakis, J. (2011). *Ethiopia. The Last Two Frontiers*. Eastern Africa Series.
- Markakis, J. (2013). *Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers*. Eastern Africa Series.
- Markakis, J., & Nega, A. (1997). Class and Revolution in Ethiopia. *Review of African Political Economy*, 4(8), 99-108.
- McAdam, D. (1982). *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*.
- McAdam, D., & Scott, W. R. (2005). Organizations and Movements. In G. F. DAVIS, D. MCADAM, W. R. SCOTT, & M. N. ZALD, *Social Movements and Organization Theory* (pp. 4-40). Cambridge University Press.
- McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, a. C. (2002). *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McAdam, D., Zald, M., & McCarty, J. D. (1996). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*.
- McClellan, W. (1994). Ethiopia: Power and Protest. Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century (Review), *African Economic History*. 22(-). Pp.164-166.
- Meckelburg, A. (2012). John Markakis, The Last Two Frontiers -Review. *Aethiopica*. 15(-). Pp. 294-296.

- Mekonnen, W. (1969). *On the Questions of Nationalities in Ethiopia*. Addis Ababa: Arts IV, HSIU.
- Mesay, K. (2001). *Ideology and Elite Conflicts: Autopsy of the Ethiopian Revolution*. Maryland: Lanham, MD.
- Messay, K. (2008). The Civilian Left and the Radicalization of the Dergue. *Journal of Developing Societies*, 24(159), 160-182.
- Messay, K. (2011). *Ideology and Elite Conflicts: Autopsy of the Ethiopian Revolution*. Lanham: Lanham MD.
- Michael, C. (1979). The Revolution Betrayed: Ethiopia, 1974-9. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 17(3), 359-380.
- Miller, M. A. (2011). *A Natural History of Revolution: Violence and Nature in the French Revolutionary Imagination, 1789–1794*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Mohammad, A. S. (2013). COMPETING IDENTITIES AND THE EMERGENCE OF ERITREAN NATIONALISM BETWEEN 1941 AND 1952. *ECAS 5th European Conference on African Studies* (pp. 1376-1408). Norway: University of Oslo.
- Molyneux, F., & Halliday, M. (1981). *The Ethiopian Revolution*. London: Verso.
- Moore, B. (1974). *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of Modern World*. USA: Penguin University Books.
- Moore, G. C. (1958, March 21). *Office of the Historian*. Retrieved July 21, 2020, from Memorandum of Conversation.” George C. Moore to American Embassy, Addis Ababa: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve06/ch4>
- Morgan, D. L. (2007). Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained: Methodological Implications of Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods. *Journal of Mixed Method Research*, 48-76.
- Morris, A., & Herring, C. (1984). *Theory and Research in Social Movements: A Critical Review*. Michigan: University of Michigan.
- Mukhtar, I. (n.d.). *Ibrahim al “The mufti’s Letter to the President of the Assembly in Protest at Interference in the Matter of ‘Eid Prayer.’”*. Retrieved June 12, 2020, from SemanticScholar: <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Eritrean-Muslim-League-and-Political-during-the-Venosa/043e96fb063f9303abd64f2ef39>
- Negussay, A. (1983). The Ethiopian Revolution. *A Journal of African Studies*, 12(3), 36-66.
- News-and-Views. (1963). Amature Students Versus Professional Students. *News and Views: University College of Addis Ababa*, 1-10.
- Oliver, P. E., & Johnston, H. (2000). What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research. *Mobilization*.

- Ottaway, M. (1978). Democracy and New Democracy: The Ideological Debate in the Ethiopian Revolution. *African Studies Review*, 21(1), 19-31.
- Palmberg, M. (1978). Introduction. *Problems of Socialist Orientation in Africa*, pp. 11-16.
- Paul B., H. (1989). *The Ethiopian Revolution: Mythology and History*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
- Perham, M. (1969). *The Government of Ethiopia*, Oxford Univeristy Press.
- Pierson, P. (2003). Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible: Macro-social Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics. In J. Mahoney, & D. Ruetschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (pp. 177-207). New York: Kambridge University Press.
- Redo, G. A. (1998). Ethiopia between the ebb and the flow of the disintegration tide: with stress on the Afar question. Addis Ababa: Alembekagn Prison Notes.
- Richey, a. J. (1958, March 10). *Office of the Historian*. Retrieved July 21, 2020, from "Summary of Telegram from Keren Members of Moslem League of Eritrea to HIM" Earle J. Richey to American Embassy, Addis Ababa, March, NARA, RG 84, 3/350: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve06/ch4>
- Ritter, D. p. (2014). Comparative Historical Analysis. In D. D. Porta, *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Researche* (pp. 97-116). United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Ritter, D. P. (2015). *The Iron Cage of Liberalism: International Politics and Unarmed Revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa*. United Kigdome: Oxford University Press .
- Sawt al-iritiriya, S. (1954, may). Self determination-how do Eritreans benefit from it?
- Shehim, K. (1985). Ethiopia, Revolution, and the Question of Nationalities: the Case of the Afar. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 23(2). Pp. 331-348.
- Sherman, R. F. (1979). *Eritrea in Revolution*. Massachusetts: BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY.
- Shumburo, M. M. (1992). An Analysis of the Events that led to the Hannolatto Movement and the Club Insurrection and Description of its Aftermath (recent Harari History, circa 1940-1960). NewYork.
- Sidney, & Tarrow. (2011). *Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contenious Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Silverman, D. (2006). *Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analysing Talk, Text, and Interaction*. London: Sage.
- Skocpol, T. (1979). *States and Social Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skocpol, T. (1994). *Social revolutions in the Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Skopkol, T. (1979). *States and Social Revolutions: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND CHINA*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Jr., S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. *American Sociological Review*, 51(4), 464-481.
- Spencer, J. H. (1977). Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa and US Policy. *Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Inc*, 8-9.
- Struggle. (1967). Struggle for Progress. *University Students of Addis Ababa*, 1-18.
- Sundberg, R., Eck, K., & Kreutz, J. (2012). Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 351-362.
- Taddesse, T. (1972). *Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527*. Oxford.
- Tadesse, K. (1993). *The Generation: the History of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party*, Vol. I. . K&S Distributors.
- Tadesse, K. (1998). *The Generation - Part I: Ethiopia Transformation and Conflict: The History of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party*. UPA .
- Tamrat, a. (1972). *Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527*. Oxford University Press.
- Tareke, G. (1991). *Ethiopia: Power and Protest; Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tareke, G. (2009). *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa*. London: Yale University Press.
- Tarrow, S. (1996). Social Movements in Contentious Politics: A Review Article. *The American Political Science Review*, 874-883.
- Tateq. (1995). *Tateq Hamle Edition*.
- Teffer, H. (2012). *Tower in the Sky*.
- Tibebu, T. (1995). *The Making of Modern Ethiopia: 1896-1974*.
- Tilly, C. (1975). *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*.
- Tilly, C. (1997). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Michigan: University of Michigan.
- Timothy, W. (2005). Structural Theories of Revolution. In J. Foran, *Theorizing Revolutions* (pp. 36-70). London: Taylor & Francis e-Library.
- Tocqueville, A. d. (1985). *The Old Regime and the Revolution*. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers.
- Treavaskis, K. (1960). *Eritrea, A Colony in Transition*. Oxford.
- Trimingham, J. S. (1952). *Islam in Ethiopia*.


- Turner, R. H., & Killian, L. M. (1957). *Collective Behavior*.
- Ulyanovsky, P. (1980). *Present Day Problems in Asia and Africa*. Mosco: Progress Publisher.
- Venosa, J. L. (2011). *Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61*. UMI publishing.
- Warr, M. (1981). The Process of Class Conflict in Ethiopia. *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies*, 10(1-2), 116-128.
- Wolde-Kiyorkis, B. M. (1951). *Fre Kenafir Ze Kadamawi Haile Silase Ze Ethiopia*.
- Woldemariam, W. (1987). "Do you Remember?" . 318-321.
- Wudu, T. (2006). *The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian state and the Alexandrian See : indigenizing the episcopacy and forging national identity, 1926--1991*. Cambridge: University of Illinois.
- Yasin, Y. (2016, July 21/07/2016).
- Yasin, Y. M. (2008). Political history of the Afar in Ethiopia and Eritrea. *Afrika Spectrum* , 39-65.
- Young, J. (1997). *Peasant revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975-1991*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zewde, B. (1991). *history of modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974*. Eastern African Studies.
- Zewde, B. (2008). *Society, State, and History: Selected Essays*. Addis Ababa University Press.
- Zewde, B. (2010). *Documenting the Ethiopian Student Movement: An Exercise in Oral History*. Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies.
- Zewde, B. (2014). *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The National Student Movement, c. 1960-1974*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.



APPENDIX


APPENDIX-1. (continues) I. Letters

3. Letter to the Ruler of Gursum Province on ‘Secret Distribution of weapons for Civilian’




APPENDIX-1. (continues) I. Letters

4. Letter Addressed to ‘Chercher Province’ on the Flag observed in Muslim Merchants’ Shop




APPENDIX-1. (continues) I. Letters

6. Letter from Ethiopian Orthodox Church to the Harar Province




APPENDIX-1. (continues) I. Letters

8. Letter to the Deputy Administrator of the province on closing of a separate room in a school that used for Arabic language school by the students



APPENDIX-1. (continues) I. Letters

9. Letter to the State Minister for Peace and Security



APPENDIX-2. II. Questions for key informant interview

1. Would you please briefly tell me about yourself and your role in the process of the Ethiopian revolution
2. What are the major causative socio-economic and political factors that brought the Ethiopian revolution?
3. Can you explain the major issues raised by the revolutionaries at the inception period of the revolution?
4. In your opinion which year or moment was a moment that agendas of the revolution reach level of well-articulated one that clearly known by all stakeholders?
5. Do you think that there was a uniform understanding of what the revolution is and is not? How can you explain the uniformity or difference on how the revolution was framed in different periods?
6. How do you rate the role of movement activists in shaping the movement discourse and giving meanings to movement agenda? If there is a need to mention, what indicators do we have that can show the greater role of movement actors as key players in shaping revolution agendas?
7. Which institutions had direct and indirect role in shaping agendas and process of the revolution? What do you think their interest on the revolution?
8. Do you think that activists and those people who are active in protest have shared cultural meanings? If so what are the major attributes activists shared in common?
9. Do you remember events you have debated on how to frame (coin or conceptualise) an idea, culture, ideology or any socio-political issue to better convince and mobilise the mass? Or debates on the contents of press releases, slogans, media statements or public debates in relation to what the revolution is and is not?
10. Are there any moments that can be called turning points in the process of understanding the revolution? What makes these points really turning points? What are the alternative paths and issues presented on that point? What are the pushing factors that brought those points to the front? How the revolution would have gone if that turning point went the other way than actually happened?

APPENDIX-2. (continues) II. Questions for key informant interview

11. Do you think that movement activists used any direct and indirect strategies to push off sectarian or side line agendas they believe a threat for the revolution from the table?
12. How often the issue of religious freedom a concern in movement activist meetings? In those discussions where religious freedom was a topic, what were the major debating issues and points you agreed on?
13. How do you evaluate the role of rebels and other struggles for religious movement across the country in challenging the regime and made susceptible for other movements that brought the actual revolution?
14. Can you explain the differences and similarities among various movement in the centre and the periphery especially between the religious based movements and those secular nature?
15. How do you evaluate the relationship (in terms of causes, strategies and goals) between movements and rebels in Muslim dominated areas and the Ethiopian revolution in general?
16. Have you ever noticed any communication, exchange of letters, cooperation and conflict between movements in the centre and periphery?
17. What were the main factors that determine the level of state repression against a movement or an individual protest? How the state responses towards various types of protests you have participated differed? Do you believe that protest with religious freedom agenda treated differently than ordinary protests?
18. Looking the post-revolutionary Ethiopia, how do you evaluate the role of the Ethiopian revolution in shaping the political agendas of the current Ethiopia? Which agendas of the revolution becomes mainstream agenda and which agendas still marginalized? How the Ethiopian revolution determine the level of active political participation of different groups; religious or ethnic?
19. Do you think that there is a direct relationship between the on-going Ethiopian Muslims civil right movement and struggles for religious freedom in the pre-revolutionary Ethiopia?
20. Had the revolutionaries incorporated religious freedom as their main agenda of the revolution, how the status of religious freedom in the current Ethiopian state would be different than its existing situation?

CURRICULUM VITAE

Mohammed Endris Ali**Mobile** [REDACTED]**Email:** [REDACTED]**Date of Birth:****Sex:** Male**Marital Status:** Married**Nationality:** Ethiopian**Career Objective**

Graduated in Rural Development with MSc in 2011 and being a PhD candidate in Political and Social Studies, I am keen to achieve further professional development through Politics and development related fields so as to be key actor in the overall development of my country.

Education

2014 to present PhD candidate for Doctorate (PhD): Politics and Social Studies, Gazi University, Turkey

2011 Master of Science (MSc): Rural Development, Haromaya University, Ethiopia

Thesis: “ State-Customary Relation in resource based conflict Management”

2005 BSc: Dry Land Crop Science, Mekelle University, Ethiopia

Additional Training and Certificate (Selected)

2012-2013: Gazi University Turkish Language Learning, Research and Application Center

- Turkish Language Program Under Common European Framework of Reference for Languages C1 Level

25/05/2013: IDP IELTS AUSTRALIA International English Language Testing System

- IELTS exam with overall band score of 7.0

31 January- 3 February and 22-25 November 2010: British Council

- Governance and Leadership Skills
- Community Mobilization

October 12-14/2011, April 2-12/2012 and September 17-19/ 2012: Ministry Finance and Economic Development and Hulla & Co. Human Dynamics KG

- European Development Fund Procedure (EDF)
- Financial and Contractual Procedures in the Framework of the 10th European Development Fund (EDF)

June 4-8/ 2012: Ethiopian Management Institute

- Strategic Planning, Implementations, Monitoring and Evaluation

July 4-9: BDS-Center for Development Research (BDS-CDR)

- Project Cycle Management for Top Management

March 21-31/ 2009: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

- Training of Trainers on Practical Skills (PRA/PLA)
-

Work Experience

**October 2018 to the date: Deputy Director General
Ethiopian Diaspora Agency
Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

**June 2011 –October 2012: *Officer in the office of the Minister*
Ministry of Culture and Tourism**

- Chaired a permanent committee for Donor funded projects management under the direct supervision of the minister
- Initiated various Project proposal design and resource mobilization activities for the ministry
- Designed and delivered trainings on youths and women participation and empowerment in 6 tourist destination area throughout the country
- Developed Gender Mainstreaming guideline and deliver training for top management in the ministry and regional bureaus
- Running day to day activity of the office

March 2007-May 2011: *Expert and then Team Leader*

Ministry of Agriculture/ Afar Pastoral Agriculture and Rural Development/ Rural Capacity Building Project

- Delivered series of customized Rural Development training for regional and district officials
- Designed and delivered Extension training for all district in Afar Regional State Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development; in 2 Higher institutions and 5 Training centres throughout the region
- Participated in the Planning, Piloting and implementation of 5 year World Bank funded Rural Capacity Building Project
- Acted as Agricultural sector and Deputy Bureau head and also Rural Capacity Building Project Focal Person by delegation
- Prepared agricultural statistics and produced Regional Atlas in collaboration with the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development and Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia.
- Running day to day activities of my department

=====

Publications:

- Mohammed Endris. 2011. State-Customary Relation in Pastoral Conflict Management. Book. *Lambert Academic Publishing, Germany*. <http://www.amazon.co.uk/State-Customary-relation-pastoral-conflict-management/dp/3845440325>
- Mohammed Endris, GoncaBayraktar(2020). The Ethiopian Revolution: Perceived and Actual Making Factors Vis-À-Vis the Framing Process. *Journal of Academic Elegance*, 7 (14) , 291-320
- Mohammed, A. (2015). Manipulation of Religious Institutions Regress Democratization: Ethiopian Muslims Civil Right Movement. *Journal of Academic Elegance* 2(3), 1-20.
- Abdulqadir MOHAMMED and Mohammed ALI, New Trends Impacting The Role Of Faith-Based CSOs In Ethiopia: A Look After The 2009 CSO Proclamation. Paper presented on the *Islamic World Civic Society conference*, 2014, Turkey.
- Mohammed Endris. 2012. Ethiopian Government Intervention in Religious Affairs: Causes and Trends. Book. *Unpublished*, Ethiopia.

=====

==

Membership

- Founding Board Member of Mahe Difu Child Care and Development Association, Ethiopia.
- Member of Pro-Development Network-an Umbrella of more than 50 Non-Governmental Charity and Development Organizations, Ethiopia.
- Founding Board Member of Habeshistan Development and Cooperation Association-Non-Governmental Organization Established by Ethiopian Students in Turkey
- Founding Board member of Horn of African Strategic Studies (HASS)

=====

==

Languages

Oral Level

Writing Level

English	Advanced (Fluent)	Advanced (Fluent)
Turkish	Proficient User	Proficient User
Arabic	Average User	Average User
Amharic	Advanced (Fluent)	Advanced (Fluent)

INDEKS

A

Abyssinia 98

Addis Ababa xiii, 90, 94, 113, 114, 123, 130, 140, 144, 149, 155, 156, 169, 171, 175, 180, 181, 182, 183, 186, 196, 197, 198, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208

Addis Zaman 162, 174

Adwa 90, 106, 169

Afar xii, xiii, 35, 97, 118, 119, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 194, 198, 206, 208

Africa v, 1, 12, 13, 33, 45, 70, 73, 74, 77, 79, 90, 105, 118, 129, 130, 132, 163, 167, 170, 204, 205, 206, 207

Aklilu Habtewold 169

Amhara 64, 188, 202

Amharic 81, 99, 138, 156, 179, 180, 182, 185, 188

Arab League 144, 168, 170

B

Bale xii, 3, 17, 85, 86, 112, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 143, 160, 164, 165, 166, 191, 194

British Revolution 27

C

centre 3, 11, 13, 39, 46, 55, 67, 84, 87, 119, 130, 180, 220

Challenge 56, 60, 62, 65, 70, 72, 75, 76, 151, 159, 176, 199

China 8, 11, 27, 32, 71, 78

Conflict xiii, 118, 198, 207, 208

Culturalist 20

D

dergue 78, 82, 162

Dergue 18, 19, 65, 69, 71, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 204

Dessie 181, 182, 183, 186

E

emperor 3, 36, 38, 55, 57, 58, 61, 66, 78, 89, 92, 104, 112, 121, 128, 129, 130, 132, 144, 148, 150, 151, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162, 173, 174, 175, 179, 187

Emperor 55, 62, 66, 84, 86, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144, 155, 159, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 218

EPRP xiii, 17, 18, 19, 42, 77, 81, 160, 161, 162, 197, 200

Eritrea xii, 35, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 113, 116, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 145, 151, 153, 154, 160, 163, 167, 168, 169,

171, 173, 190, 191, 194, 200, 206, 207, 208

Eritrean Liberation Front xiii, 127, 168

Eritrean People Liberation Front xiii, 168

ESANA xiii, 76, 80, 159, 160, 174, 175

Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party 160

Ethiopian revolution v, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 66, 67, 71, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 83, 85, 86, 87, 91, 117, 127, 129, 131, 132, 145, 146, 147, 149, 153, 159, 165, 166, 172, 173, 174, 176, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 209, 219, 220

Ethiopian Students xiii, 72, 152, 153, 159, 197, 199, 201, 202

Ethiopianist 165, 166

F

feudalism 1, 2, 17, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 73, 75, 80, 128, 192

Framing v, 25, 28, 30, 31, 146, 147, 149, 162, 167, 172, 195, 201

framing process v, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 23, 25, 28, 30, 31, 34, 36, 39, 41, 43, 49, 146, 147, 148, 149, 154, 173, 174, 195

France 8, 11, 27, 32, 71, 88, 97, 106, 107, 175

French revolution 26, 32

G

Gabra-Heywot Baykadagn 150

Garmame Naway 150, 157

Gurage 186

H

Hannolato 3, 36, 196, 197

Harar xii, 36, 85, 107, 110, 113, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 177, 181, 182, 183, 186, 191, 196, 199, 210, 214, 215

Hararge 112, 129, 136, 143, 158, 186, 196, 209, 213

Harari 132, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144, 183, 197, 199, 206

Haymanoteabew 175

Hile Sillasie 13

Hilessilase 109, 149, 175

Historical xiii, 44, 48, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206

I

imperial 3, 18, 24, 39, 45, 55, 57, 68, 70, 79, 80, 85, 100, 106, 110, 114, 117, 118, 119, 122, 123, 128, 130, 132, 137, 138, 141, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 165, 166, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 187, 190, 192, 193

Islam 35, 89, 131, 135, 137, 141, 166, 177, 184, 186, 197, 201, 207

Islamic schools 140, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185

Italy 88, 90, 92, 93, 106, 107, 115, 126, 138, 173

Iyyasu 157

J

Jigjiga 107, 108, 113, 114, 157, 158

Jimma 181, 182, 186, 196

Junta 201

K

Kulub 36, 197

L

Land to the Tiller v, 67, 68, 73, 159, 192

M

madrasa 180

Making factors v

Marxist 1, 9, 10, 15, 19, 32, 55, 56, 60, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 111, 175, 193, 197, 200, 202

MEISON xiii, 18, 80

Mengistu Neway 157

Minilik 45, 84, 90, 106, 118, 132, 138, 141, 150, 176, 184, 192

Ministry of Education 103, 181, 182, 183

Ministry of National and Community Development 186

mobilization 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 22, 24, 28, 29, 43, 55, 93, 94, 98, 104, 130, 165

Modernization 13

Mogadisho 143, 144

Monarch 15, 55, 58, 62, 179

Mosque 115, 120, 138

movements 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,

28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 68, 71, 72, 73, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 95, 101, 105, 106, 107, 110, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 124, 129, 130, 131, 132, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 157, 158, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 167, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 178, 190, 191, 192, 194, 220

Muslim v, 2, 5, 20, 25, 35, 43, 45, 46, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 109, 115, 116, 120, 122, 124, 127, 128, 131, 135, 137, 138, 140, 148, 165, 166, 168, 177, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 191, 194, 205, 208, 209, 212, 213, 215, 220

N

Nagarit Gazeta 181

national oppression 25, 111

natural history 14, 15, 16

News and Views 176, 205

O

Ogaden xii, xiii, 3, 36, 85, 86, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 124, 125, 145, 151, 163, 164, 165, 167, 170, 177, 190, 194, 200

Organization for African Unity xiii, 169

Oromia 89, 124, 163, 198

Oromo 3, 112, 123, 124, 125, 128, 160, 165, 166, 190, 198, 201, 202

Oromo liberation 3

Orthodox Church 2, 93, 94, 98, 134, 135, 158, 166, 181, 182, 208, 214

Özet v

P

peasant 1, 3, 13, 16, 18, 21, 27, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 85, 122, 165, 167, 191

peripheries v, 2, 3, 17, 84, 106, 115, 131, 132, 138, 147, 151, 153, 154, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 174, 176, 186, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193

political v, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45, 47, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 62, 64, 65, 66, 69, 71, 72, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116, 117, 118, 123, 125, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 184, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 219, 220

protest 1, 19, 72, 104, 112, 186, 220

Q

question of nationalities v, 2, 4, 66, 73, 80, 82, 88, 89, 125, 161, 164, 188, 192

R

Rebel 35, 202

rebellion 1, 3, 13, 16, 17, 27, 38, 64, 66, 68, 70, 84, 85, 112, 113, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 165, 166, 183, 191

regime 1, 3, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 24, 29, 37, 39, 41, 56, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 106, 111, 113, 114, 116, 117, 123, 131, 138, 140, 141, 144,

147, 148, 152, 153, 156, 158, 160, 161, 162, 165, 166, 170, 173, 176, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 191, 193, 194, 220

Revolution v, xiii, 12, 25, 70, 88, 131, 172, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207

revolutionary v, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 52, 65, 69, 71, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 91, 103, 105, 111, 117, 126, 127, 130, 131, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 185, 187, 188, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 220

Riot 28

Russia 8, 11, 27, 32

S

Senay Like 153

Silte 186

social movements 5, 25, 28

social structure 7, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 47, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 64, 65, 66, 78, 193

Socialism 70, 78, 80, 193, 200, 202, 204

socialist order 1, 2, 4, 7, 36, 47, 49, 52, 77, 78, 192

socio-political 5, 14, 66, 101, 114, 119, 131, 150, 178, 219

Solomonic dynasty 45, 131, 177

Somale 158

State xii, 11, 54, 109, 133, 135, 136,
137, 140, 159, 176, 177, 178, 198, 199,
201, 207, 208, 217

Structuralist 11

Struggle 80, 110, 117, 131, 176,
194, 202, 207

T

Tateq 176, 207

Temporal 41, 146, 147, 149

The Crocodiles 175

The line club 176

Tigray xiii, 97, 129, 130, 208

traditional 6, 8, 12, 16, 22, 46, 53, 63,
64, 65, 91, 96, 97, 129, 130, 186

W

Walleign Mekonnen 163

War 27, 63, 87, 105, 107, 111, 112,
200, 207

Z

Ziyad Barre 169



GAZİLİ OLMAK AYRICALIKTIR..

