

GÖKSEL BAŞ

BEYOND CONQUEST: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE OTTOMAN
WESTERN FRONTIER (FROM THE LATE 15TH TO MID-16TH CENTURY)

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
GÖKSEL BAŞ

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Department of
History
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
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The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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by

GÖKSEL BAŞ

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By Göksel Baş

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Evgeni R. Radushev
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Mehmet Kalpaklı
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Mehmet Öz
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Kayhan Orbay
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Ömer Gezer
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Refet S. Gürkaynak
Director

ABSTRACT

BEYOND CONQUEST: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE OTTOMAN WESTERN FRONTIER (FROM THE LATE 15TH TO MID-16TH CENTURY)

Baş, Göksel

Ph. D., Department of History

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Evgeni R. Radushev

June 2024

This thesis examines the evolution and financial structure of the Ottoman frontier organisation from the late 15th to mid-16th centuries, focusing on its military and fiscal strategies. The research emphasises institutional continuity during this period, filling a scholarly gap between the extensively studied 16th and 17th century Ottoman military history and frontier studies. While the existing literature predominantly addresses military aspects post-Mohács, this study particularly examines the pre-Mohács Ottoman frontier structure and its network of fortresses spanning Bosnia, Croatia, Srem, and Hungary. It highlights numerous fortresses and their garrisons, revealing a substantial financial system established in the 1470s to sustain military outposts. Key findings reveal the Ottoman territorial expansion and development of frontier organization and financing mechanisms. This study traces the capture and utilisation of fortresses, elucidating their strategic importance, and the Ottoman Empire's systematic reorganisation of conquered territories into a cohesive defensive hinterland. In contrast to previous studies overlooking financial pressures on Ottoman

frontier administration, this thesis explores mechanisms such as the havale method, timar allocations, and subsidies from central treasury utilized to support frontier fortresses. Drawing on newly uncovered archival documents, this research analyses the emergence of frontier power holders and the growth of the sipahi cavalry in maintaining Ottoman military dominance in its western frontier. It examines how financial strategies evolved alongside military exigencies, enabling sustained expansion and defence.

Keywords: Ottoman Balkans, Ottoman Financial History, Ottoman Frontier Organization, Ottoman Military History, Timariot Army

ÖZET

FETİHTEN SONRA: OSMANLI BATI SERHADDİNDE DEVAMLILIK VE DÖNÜŞÜM (GEÇ 15. YÜZYILDAN 16. YÜZYIL ORTALARINA)

Baş, Göksel

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü

Danışman: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Evgeni R. Radushev

Haziran 2024

Bu tez, Osmanlı serhad teşkilatının askeri ve mali stratejileri odağında, 15. yüzyılın sonlarından 16. yüzyılın ortalarına kadar olan dönüşümünü incelemektedir. Bu dönemdeki kurumsal devamlılığa vurgu yapan çalışma, daha önce kapsamlı bir şekilde incelenen 16. ve 17. yüzyıl Osmanlı askeri tarihi ve serhad çalışmaları alanındaki bilimsel boşluğu doldurmaktadır. Mevcut literatür Mohaç Savaşı sonrası askeri hususlara ağırlık verirken, bu çalışma özellikle Mohaç Savaşı öncesi Osmanlı serhad yapısı ve Bosna, Hırvatistan, Srem ve Macaristan'ı kapsayan kale ağını mercek altına almaktadır. Bu çalışma, bölgedeki kale ağını ve garnizon askerlerini incelemekte ve bu ağın varlığını sürdürmek üzere 1470'lerde kurulan finansal sistemi ortaya koymaktadır. Osmanlı ilerleyişi, serhad organizasyonu ve finansman mekanizmalarının gelişimini incelenmektedir. Diğer yandan bu tez, ele geçirilen kalelerin stratejik önemini ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun fethedilen toprakları sistematik bir savunma hinterlandına dönüştürme sürecine ışık tutmaktadır. Osmanlı

serhad organizasyonunun mali k lfetini g z ard  eden  nceki  alıřmaların aksine, bu tez serhad garnizonlarının finansmanı i in bařvurulan havale y ntemi, tımar tevcihleri ve merkezi hazine s bvansiyonları gibi mekanizmaları arařtırıyor. Daha evvel kullanılmamıř arřiv belgelerinden yararlanan bu arařtırma, Osmanlılar'ın batı serhaddindeki askeri  st nl ğ n n idamesinde yeni sancakbeyi tipolojisinin ortaya  ıkıřı ve tımarlı sipahi saflarının kalabalıklařmasına odaklanmaktadır. Bu  alıřma, mali stratejilerin askeri zorunluluklarla birlikte nasıl geliřtiğini, s rekli geniřleme ve savunmayı nasıl m mk n kıldıđını analiz etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı Askeri Tarihi, Osmanlı Balkanları, Osmanlı Mali Tarihi, Osmanlı Serhad Organizasyonu, Tımarlı Ordusu

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim and Scope of the Thesis

Although Ottoman military history has been the subject of considerable interest among scholars, particularly in the context of frontier studies, researchers have largely focused their attention on developments from the mid-16th century onwards. Regarding the 16th and 17th centuries, scholars have been particularly interested in examining the Ottoman-Habsburg Wars and the military organisation and transformation on both sides in relation to the Hungarian military development and political change. Some scholars posit that the Ottomans established the first frontier organisation by incorporating a network of fortresses with thousands of salaried garrison troops only after the fall of the Hungarian kingdom to the Ottoman control. However, Ottoman military history in the 15th and 16th centuries, particularly in regard to frontier organisation, remains understudied and holds minimal interest for historians. The overarching objective of this doctoral dissertation is to address the following core questions: How did the Ottomans establish a frontier (*serhad*) organisation in the Western Balkans to provide effective protection against their strongest opponents in the West, Hungarians, and later the Habsburgs, particularly between the 1470s and the 1540s? In addition, it is necessary to consider how the

Ottomans developed a multi-layered organisation to maintain the continuity of this system. Secondly, it is crucial to elaborate on how the Ottomans established a new line of defence in the Lower Danube between 1521 and 1541. Thirdly, it would be beneficial to ascertain how the long-established multi-layered organisations in the old frontier, which existed prior to the annexation of Hungary, lost their importance and transformed into a hinterland (*iç il, memâlik-i mahrûse*).

In response to the initial query, the Ottomans established a well-running frontier organisation in the Balkans, following the conquests of Serbia and Bosnia. The chain of fortresses established by Ottomans along the Danube frontier had to be adequately supplied and remunerated. Based on the archival sources of the period, the Ottomans also developed persistent and regular payment methods by allocating mukataa revenue to the fortresses as payments. The evolution of this payment method, the introduction of new applications over time, and the impact of these changes on the Ottoman treasury (*hazine-i amire*) will be analysed within the specified period. Furthermore, the military units stationed in the fortresses and the main human resources are explained and analysed.

The answer to the second question forms a significant part of this dissertation. Following a period of stability with Hungarians between the 1470s and 1521, the Ottoman conquests in the west between 1521 and 1541 were pivotal. With the capture of all major fortresses, in addition to the southern parts of the Hungarian Kingdom and the establishment of the Buda province, the borders shifted westwards. This resulted in the Ottomans establishing a new network of fortresses against their new neighbour, the Austrian Habsburgs. In addition to deploying thousands of salaried guards in newly acquired fortresses, timar-holder sipahis, akıncıs, Vlachs, and voynuks retained their

primary importance in defending this serhad. Subsequently, the old serhad regions of Vidin, Semendria, Zvornik, and Bosnia lost their strategic importance. Consequently, the fortress guards in those fortresses were relocated to the newly-acquired fortresses in the newly established sancaks in Lower Danube (Srem, Požega, Pakrac, Segedin, Mohács). The number of garrisons on the old frontier was reduced by 60 or 70 per cent within 10 years.

Furthermore, one of the principal conclusions of the thesis is that the Ottomans did not utilise every fortress that they acquired. Those fortresses that they deemed necessary were utilised, while the others were demolished. A significant number of fortresses on the Hungarian defensive line, which had been constructed in defence of the country against the Ottoman Empire, were subsequently dismantled by the Ottomans. This was due to the fact that the fortresses had already been captured by the Ottomans and subsequently lost their strategic importance. By the 1530s, the defence line in the Srem region, which had withstood Ottoman attacks for years, would become a fortress graveyard.

In conclusion, this thesis offers valuable insight into the ways in which the Ottomans transformed the region. These new conquests brought administrative and financial burden to the state treasury. The financing of fortress guards, whose numbers had reached at least 10,000 on the new frontier, became an acute problem for the state. This problem was attempted to be solved by allocating more revenue from the mukataa or poll-tax revenues in Rumelia, or by allocating salary timars to garrison soldiers especially as a common practice in the 1540s. In light of these novel changes, the financing methods of the Ottomans in the frontiers and their transformation until the mid-16th century will be subjected to a comprehensive analysis. While the findings in

this thesis indicate that the financing methods of the Ottomans remained largely unchanged throughout the period, one of the only discernible changes was perhaps the financial burden placed on the state treasury.

1.2. Sources and Historiography

It was not feasible to provide a comprehensive list of archival sources during the preparation of this thesis. However, it is essential to assess the quality of these materials. A wide range of primary sources of archives, both in Turkey and Austria, has been used for this study, some of which have not been yet used by researchers. timar and roll-call registers between the 1470s and 1541 provide the number of military personnel in the frontier regions, their status, and many other related research questions. By examining these registers, the transformation of the status of other military groups can also be examined. Among these registers, the first detailed (*mufassal*) or summary (*icmal*) registers of the newly conquered regions occupy a significant portion of the guide regarding what had changed after the Ottoman conquests. Owing to the existence of consecutive registers of these regions, it is possible to construct a general picture of the era.

As a supplementary source, timar allocation (*tevcih*) registers, four of which are between the years 1512 and 1553, has also been of value in analysing how the Ottomans redistributed timar revenues in the newly acquired regions. Moreover, by inspecting these sources, we can see the network of households of frontier governors and the way they distributed their revenues among men under their service. Apart from the importance of detailed and summary tahrir and timar allocation registers for the study of population and production, they also play a crucial role in understanding the prosopography and network relations of the timariot sipahi class in the frontier regions.

On the other side, only by systematically analysing the same type of archival sources on the same region over several decades can we comprehend how the Ottoman frontier regions were transformed. In the tahrir registers, which were compiled at a time when the frontiers were consistently expanding, significant pieces of information (including marginalia and annotations) permitted the tracing of both the general chronology and the overall strategy of the Ottoman advance in the region and of the fortresses that existed or were destroyed. The first chapter demonstrates how Ottoman conquests were chronologically ordered using these registers.

In particular, the undated letters and the roll-call registers containing general totals on the Ottoman army and treasury both in the Topkapı Palace (TSMA) and State Archives (BOA) catalogue are among the archival sources that have been consulted extensively in this thesis. The greatest challenge in utilising this type of documents is the necessity to date it precisely. Fortunately, through a process of close reading and comparison with a multitude of other primary sources from this period, this type of archival material has been reliably and usefully dated. A pattern can be discerned in the undated documents in the TSMA catalogue. In general, if there is no date in the document, it can be assumed that the majority of the documents dated to AH 905, 918, 974, 1008, and 1255 are undated. It is of utmost importance that researchers and readers exercise caution in this regard. Prior to utilising these documents in this thesis, the reader will be able to ascertain the methodological approach employed in dating these documents in footnotes.

With regard to their potential as a source of Ottoman military history, mukataa registers have not yet attracted sufficient attention from researchers. In this thesis, mukataa sources are among the most important sources consulted in the context of the

Ottoman frontier organisation, especially from the 1470s to the 1540s. Since the payments of salaried fortress guards were sent by mukataa sources, it is possible to calculate the changing trend in payments over time, its burden on the hazine-i amire, and changes in the general revenues of mukataa sources, if any. Since not all Ottoman budgets include the money transfers made through mukataas, we are unable to see the whole budget expenses. Thus, by looking at the mukataa sources, we can calculate the hidden financial burden of fortress defences on the Ottoman treasury. The preliminary sources show that the payments for the guards in the frontiers were nearly equal to 40 per cent of the general revenues collected from Rumelia between the 1470s and the 1530s. By using the mukataa registers, one of the most significant sources of revenue for the central treasury, I attempt to demonstrate how the Ottomans financed garrison troops during the period covered in this thesis. To gain an understanding of the financing of frontier fortresses and the changing borders resulting from conquests, it is necessary to examine and analyse the mukataa sources mentioned above. This will enable the phenomenon we call 'serhad' to be presented to the reader in a clear and coherent manner.

All relevant information on the appointments of sancakbeyi, major expenditures during the campaigns, information on the janissary troops left in the fortresses during the conquests, and especially the subsidies made from the central treasury for the garrisons in the province of Buda in the period after 1541 were obtained from the campaign and treasury account registers, which appear more frequently after the 1530s. In particular, the comparative use of these registers both for Western and Eastern campaigns allows for a comparison of the burden of large-scale military operations on the Ottoman treasury as well as the expenditures of contemporary European states on campaigns.

In the course of writing this thesis, it was necessary to consult archives located outside Turkey. Although the Austrian National Library, Catalogue of Manuscripts/Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Türkische Handschriften (ÖNB) contains archival material from the period after 1541, several important archival sources, including the one or two covered by this thesis, provide data that can be used to project Ottoman garrisons in Srem, Požega, and Semendire in 1541. Similarly, the mid-16th-century Ottoman timar allocation registers of Buda province, kept in the Austrian State Archives/Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), provided data that enabled me to draw significant conclusions about the administrative and military system established by the Ottomans following their annexation of Buda and its establishment as an independent province.

Consequently, a single type of archival material is not relied upon when researching the subject of this thesis. Instead, I employed a comparative approach, utilising all relevant archival materials to analyse the issues. These rich archival sources, which offer a multifaceted and wide-ranging perspective on the subject, have enabled me to present the questions explored and answered in this thesis thoroughly and in-depth.

Overall, this study demonstrates that the Ottoman financing methods that appeared to have been established during the 1470s continued to be employed well after the annexation of Hungary in 1541. The experiences gained between the 1470s and the 1540s enabled the Ottomans to establish a new frontier. Consequently, studying this era, which can be regarded as a *tabula rasa* for Ottoman frontier studies, will help fill an important gap in our understanding of the efficiency of the Ottoman state mechanism and its function during westward expansions. This work also attempts

to contribute new approaches, analysis, and conclusion to the study of Ottoman frontier history in terms of military finance and new socio-economic circumstances in the context of the late 15th and mid-16th centuries when the Ottomans shared a relatively stable frontier zone with the Hungarians in the Balkans. Moreover, the Ottomans had already established a comprehensive frontier policy long before the conquest of the Hungarian Kingdom and the subsequent establishment of a new border periphery with the Habsburg Empire. Thus, this thesis covers the late 15th and mid-16th century Ottoman frontier organisation and its transformation over time as well with an attempt to complete the Ottoman frontiers in the 15th and 16th centuries with those in the 17th century, coupled with the general developments and transformations in a comprehensive way.

A substantial body of literature already exists on the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans and the military and administrative organisations established in this region. If we take into consideration the military and financial history in particular, it would be accurate to state that the majority of studies focus on the mid-16th century and later. In light of the impossibility of listing all existing works on Ottoman military history, it would be more reasonable to draw a general framework by grouping the literature that has already been written on issues related to the topic of this thesis, which will be touched upon throughout the thesis.

In the secondary literature on the Ottoman expansion covering the period between the late fifteenth and the second half of the 16th century, a number of scholars who analysed the Ottoman conquests and military-financial organisation in the North-western Balkans, and eventually Central Hungary, are worth mentioning. Edited by Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe:*

*The military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*¹ contain valuable and pioneering articles analysing Medieval Hungary, Ottoman, and Habsburg military affairs in terms of policy, economy, and military history. It is also pertinent to mention a recent study edited by Pál Fodor, titled *The Battle for Central Europe*². The book contains a number of articles which provide detailed analyses of the different aspects of the Ottoman-Habsburg military and political and economic developments during the 16th century. Klára Hegyi's three volume-work, written in Hungarian and later translated in English, titled *A török hódoltság várai és várkatonasága*³ is monumental and essential reference source for everyone who are dealing with the Ottoman fortresses in the provinces of Buda and Temesvár. Based on the Ottoman roll-call and payment registers, Hegyi's work provides detailed information on the organisation of the Ottoman frontier, the number of garrison troops, and payments between 1541 and the end of the 17th century.

Gábor Ágoston⁴ has taken Ottoman military history to a new level, situating Ottoman military history within the broader context of the military revolution debate,⁵

¹ Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, eds., *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe. The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2000).

² Pál Fodor, ed., *The Battle for Central Europe: The Siege of Szigetvár and the Death of Süleyman the Magnificent and Nicholas Zrínyi (1566)* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2019).

³ Klára Hegyi, *A török hódoltság várai és várkatonasága I-III: Oszmán védelmi rendszer Magyarországon - A budai vilájet várainak adattára - A temesvári, győri, pápai, egri, kanizsai, váradi és újbírói vilájet várainak adattára* (Budapest: História-MTA Történettudományi Intézete, 2007); *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary: Fortresses, Fortress Garrisons and Finances* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2018).

⁴ Gábor Ágoston, "Habsburgs and Ottomans: Defense, Military Change and Shifts in Power," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22:1 (1998): 126–141; Ágoston, "Ottoman Conquest and the Ottoman Military Frontier in Hungary," in *A Millennium of Hungarian Military History [War and Society in East Europe vol. XXXVII.; Atlantic Studies on Society in Change No. 114.]*, eds., Béla K. Király and László Veszprémy, (Boulder Co., 2002): 85–110; Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Ágoston, "Firearms and Military Adaption: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450-1800," *Journal of World History* 25:1 (2014): 85–124; Ágoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest: The Ottoman Empire and Its Wars in Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021).

⁵ On the general concepts of the military revolution debate, see: Clifford J. Rogers, ed., *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995). In addition to the works of Ágoston, a comprehensive examination of the military revolution debate and its significance within the Ottoman historiography can be found in the

a concept that has long been a central focus of studies on early modern European warfare. The author, who has an extensive body of work on Ottoman military technology, the Ottoman army, and comparative Ottoman-Habsburg military history, with a particular focus on Hungary, concentrates on the period from the mid-16th century to the first quarter of the 18th century.

Apart from scholars whose studies are based mainly on Ottoman archival documents, other researchers have conducted extensive studies on the other side of the frontier which enabled us to make valuable comparisons. Edited by János M. Bak and Béla K. Király, *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary*⁶ contains essential articles, focusing on the military organization in the late Medieval and early modern Hungary. A considerable number of articles in this book focuses on the Hungarian frontier organisation, especially in the 14th and early 16th centuries. Ive Mažuran's well-known work, titled *Hrvati i Osmansko Carstvo*,⁷ is used in almost every study on the Ottoman expansion in Croatia and Slavonia in the 16th century. Based on the Croatian, Hungarian, and Habsburg archival documents, Mažuran's work gives chronology of the events on the Ottoman-Croatian clashes in the region and the organisation of the Croatian later Habsburg frontier organisation against the Ottoman Empire between the 1520s and late 18th centuries. In a broader context, it is also necessary to mention Géza Pálffy,⁸

following source: Özgür Kolçak, *Ok, Tüfek ve At: 16. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Askerî Devrimi*. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2023), especially chapter I and II.

⁶ János M. Bak and Béla K. Király, eds., *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary* (Brooklyn: Brooklyn College Press, 1982).

⁷ Ive Mažuran, *Hrvati i Osmansko Carstvo*. (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1998).

⁸ Géza Pálffy, "The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary (Up to the Early Eighteenth Century)," in *Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, eds., Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2000): 3–70; *The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); "Hungary, Vienna and the Defence System against the Ottomans in the Age of Süleyman," in *The Battle for Central Europe: The Siege of Szigetvár and the Death of Süleyman the Magnificent and Nicholas Zrínyi (1566)*, ed., Pál

who conducted extensive research on the military, economic, and political influence of the Austrian Habsburgs in Hungary and the development of the military organisation of the Habsburg against the Ottomans in the latter half of the 16th to the 17th centuries. One of Pállfy's principal arguments is that from the end of the 16th century onwards, the Habsburgs emerged as a dominant power in Central Europe thanks to the financial, military, and political reforms they implemented. These reforms were driven by Habsburgs' constant exposure to Ottoman threats.

It is also worth mentioning other studies on the general terms of Ottoman military history in the sixteenth century. Although written in the 1970s, Gyula Káldy-Nagy's article titled *The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization*⁹ is still among the first works referenced by scholars dealing with the Ottoman army, especially on the timariot sipahis. Focusing mostly on the 17th century and the military developments in the Eastern front, Rhoads Murphey's book titled *Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700*¹⁰ analyses the evolution of the Ottoman military organisation and its subsequent effect on Ottoman society. As for the timariot army, the list is becoming increasingly lengthy. A substantial corpus of literature exists on the administrative and economic aspects and functioning of the timar system as well as important studies on its military nature. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor analyzed the structure of the timariot army, tracking its transformation between 16th to 17th centuries in their joint article titled *Changes in the Structures and Strength of the Timariot Army from the Early Sixteenth to the end of the Seventeenth Century*.¹¹ In determining the number of sipahi

Fodor (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2019): 321–337; *Hungary Between Two Empires 1526–1711* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2021).

⁹ Gyula Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 31 (1977): 147–183.

¹⁰ Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700* (London: UCL Press, 1999).

¹¹ Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, "Changes in the Structures and Strength of the Timariot Army from the Early Sixteenth to the end of the Seventeenth Century," *Eurasian Studies* 4:2 (2005): 157–188.

armies, most studies provide estimates of certain proportions only. In the context of the 16th century, the data from Barkan's budget is typically used as a baseline for calculating the sipahi army.¹² An exception may be the recent work of Soyudođan. He combined numerous undated fragments of sipahi roll calls from the Topkapı Palace archive, discovering that these registers were prepared during the 1532 campaign. This study provides information on the composition of the sipahi army in the 1530s, including the number of sipahi, their retainers, and the retinue of sancakbeyis.¹³

It is also necessary to mention the studies on mukataa resources, which constitute the most important source of income for the financing of fortresses in frontier regions. Ömer Lütfi Barkan,¹⁴ Halil Sahilliođlu,¹⁵ Mehmet Genç,¹⁶ Erol Özvar¹⁷ and Baki Çakır¹⁸ have conducted significant research on state budgets and

¹² Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait Bir Bütçe Örneđi," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 15:1-4 (1954-55): 277-332; Barkan, "Timar," *İslâm Ansiklopedisi (İA)* vol. XII/1, 286-333; Pál Fodor, "Ottoman Warfare, 1300-1453," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Byzantium to Turkey 1071-1453*, vol. I, ed. Kate Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 192-226; Géza Dávid, "Ottoman Armies and Warfare, 1453-1603," *The Cambridge History of Turkey: The Ottoman Empire as a World Power 1453-1603*, vol. II., eds. Suraiya Faroqhi and Kate Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 276-319; Halil İnalcık, "Timar," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (TDV) Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 41 (2012): 168-173; Gábor Ágoston, "War Winning Weapons? On the Decisiveness of Ottoman Firearms from the Siege of Constantinople (1453) to the Battle of Mohács (1526)," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 39 (2013): 129-143; Ágoston, "Ottoman and Habsburg Military Affairs in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent," *The Battle for Central Europe: The Siege of Szigetvár and the Death of Süleyman the Magnificent and Nicholas Zrinyi (1566)*, ed. Pál Fodor (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2019): 287-308; Pál Fodor, "The Military Organization and Army of the Ottoman Empire (1500-1530)," *On the Verge of a New Era: The Armies of Europe at the Time of the Battle of Mohács*, eds. Pál Fodor and János B. Szabó (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, 2021): 91-116.

¹³ Muhsin Soyudođan, "Cebelülerin Toplumsal Kökenleri Üzerine," *Alinteri Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 5:2 (2021): 139-169.

¹⁴ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait Bir Bütçe Örneđi: 277-332; "H. 954-955 (1547-1548) Malî Yılına Ait Bir Osmanlı Bütçesi," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 19: 1-4.

¹⁵ Halil Sahilliođlu, "Bir Mültezimin Zimem Defterine Göre XV. Yüzyıl Sonunda Osmanlı Darphane Mukataaları," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 23: 1-2 (1962-63): 145-218; "1524-1525 Osmanlı Bütçesi," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 41: 1-4 (1985): 415-449.

¹⁶ Mehmet Genç, "Mukataa," *TDV* 31 (2020): 129-132; *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi*. (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2002).

¹⁷ Mehmet Genç and Erol Özvar, eds., *Osmanlı Maliyesi Kurumlar ve Bütçeler I-II*. (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006); Erol Özvar and Gábor Ágoston, "Transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a Military-Fiscal State: Reconsidering the Financing of War from a Global Perspective" *The Battle for Central Europe: The Siege of Szigetvár and the Death of Süleyman the Magnificent and Nicholas Zrinyi (1566)*, ed. Pál Fodor (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2019): 21-64.

¹⁸ Baki Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi (XVI-XVIII. Yüzyıl)* (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2003).

fiscal organization in general. To date, there has only been one monograph on mukataa, one of the most important sources of state revenue offices, especially in the context of the 15th and 16th centuries. In his work *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi (XVI-XVIII. Yüzyıl)*, Çakır analyses the phases of the mukataa system from the 15th to the 18th century. Nevertheless, the paucity of independent studies on the sources of mukataa and financing of serhad fortresses demonstrates the need for further research in this field.

It is regrettable that only two campaign registers kept during the military campaigns undertaken by Sultan Suleiman until his death in 1566 survived: those of 1543 and 1548-49. The registers of these two campaigns were also analysed. In his article on the 1543 Estergon campaign, Mehmet İpçioğlu¹⁹ presented several significant findings regarding Ottoman campaign expenditures. Although significant calculation errors exist, as demonstrated in this thesis, the findings are of general importance. In his unpublished PhD thesis titled *Kanûni Sultan Süleyman'ın İkinci İran Seferi (1548-1549)*, Hasan Yapıcı conducted a comprehensive analysis of the treasury book kept during the Van campaign of 1548-49.²⁰ The general expenditures of these two campaigns provide valuable insights into the overall financial operations of the Ottoman army during the mid-16th centuries. In the context of this study, one of the provincial budget books was one of the most frequently consulted sources. The book entitled *Rechnungsbücher türkischer Finanzstellen in Buda (Ofen) 1550-1580*, edited by Lajos Fekete and Gyula Káldy-Nagy contains the accounts of the Buda treasury. This book is an important source of information for anybody researching the

¹⁹ Mehmet İpçioğlu, “Kanunî Sultan Süleyman’ın Estergon (Esztergom) Seferi 1543,” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* X (1990): 137–161.

²⁰ Hasan Yapıcı, *Kanûni Sultan Süleyman’ın İkinci İran Seferi (1548-1549)* (Unpublished PhD diss., Marmara University, 2023).

Buda province in the 16th century, as it provides information about the province's income and expenses in the 1550s, as well as details about garrison forces.²¹

Additionally, a sizable corpus of tahrir registers and provincial accounts can be considered as an invaluable source of information regarding the period and topic of this thesis. The effort to publish tahrir registers from the 1520s to the 1530s began in the late 1990s by the General Directorate of State Archives. Consequently, several studies have been conducted on this topic. The publication series offers comprehensive data on several important facets of the Ottoman Empire, such as its population, mining, agricultural output, trade and industry, administrative system, and military organisation. Tahrir registers from the early 1530s were used in this thesis to gather general information on the sancaks of Herzegovina, Bosnia, Zvornik, and Semendira.

In addition to the tahrir and province account register publications of the General Directorate of State Archives, it is worth mentioning a few tahrir studies in the region. In the field of Ottoman Balkan historiography, tahrir registers represent a group of sources that have been the subject of extensive study for many years.²² Based on the surveys of Srem, Požega, and the regions that subsequently became part of the

²¹ Lajos Fekete and Gyula Káldy-Nagy, *Rechnungsbücher türkischer Finanzstellen in Buda (Ofen) 1550-1580. Türkischer Text* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1962).

²² For the mid-15th century see: Hazim Šabanović, *Krajište Isa-bega Ishakovića: Zbirni katastarski popis iz 1455. Godine. Uvod, turski tekst, prijevod i komentari* (Sarajevo: Orijentalni Institut, 1964); Dušanka Bojanič-Lukač, *Vidin i Vidinskijat sandžak prez 15-16 vek: Dokumenti ot archivite na Carigrad i Ankara*, ed. Vera Mutaščieva and Mihaila Stajnova (Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo, 1975); Momčilo Stojaković, *Braničevski Tefter* (Beograd: Istorijski Institut, 1987); Behija Zlata, *Opširni Popis Kliš Sandžaka iz 1550. Godine* (Sarajevo: Orijentalni Institut, 2007); Ahmed S. Aličić, *Sumarni popis sandžaka Bosna iz 1468/69. Godine* (Mostar: Islamski kulturni centar, 2008); Halil İnalçık, Evgeni Radushev, and Uğur Altuğ, *Fatih Sultan Mehmed Döneminde Tuna Boyunda Osmanlı Düzeni: Niğbolu, Vidin ve Braniçeva Tahrir Defterleri. Metin ve Index* (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, 2018).

province of Buda, Lajos Fekete²³, Gyula Káldy-Nagy²⁴, Bruce W. McGowan²⁵, Nenad Moačanin²⁶, and Géza Dávid²⁷ wrote the important works.

The task of studying the nearly 1,000-kilometer-long Ottoman-Hungarian, and later the Ottoman-Habsburg frontier stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the banks of the Danube poses a formidable challenge for historians. These vast and entangled frontier regions have remained largely unexplored as a cohesive whole in existing scholarly literature. Most contemporary research has adopted a narrower focus, zeroing in on specific regional fragments, thereby obscuring broader patterns and variations in Ottoman frontier governance and practices across this expansive domain. These localised studies often fail to transcend the confines of modern national boundaries, which inevitably constrains our understanding of the historical complexities that pervade the frontier.

A striking illustration of this limitation can be found in the work of eminent historian, Klara Hegyi. Her seminal reference to Ottoman fortresses and administrative structures in Hungary notably excludes the regions of Srem and Požega, which lie south of Drava River. Similarly, Nenad Moačanin's scholarly enquiries remain confined to the borders of present-day Croatia. Gábor Ágoston's research on the Ottoman military presence along the comparative Ottoman-Habsburg frontier during the 16th and 17th centuries also exhibits a limited scope. His calculations encompass

²³ Lajos Fekete, *Buda and Pest under Turkish Rule* (Studia Turco-Hungarica III, Budapest, 1976).

²⁴ Gyula Káldy-Nagy, *Kanuni Devri Budin Tahrir Defteri 1546-1562* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1971); *A Budai Szandzsák 1559. évi összeírása* (Budapest: Pest Megyei Levéltár, 1977).

²⁵ Bruce W. McGowan, *Srem Sancağı Mufasssal Tahrir Defteri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983).

²⁶ Nenad Moačanin, *Požega i Požeština u sklopu Osmanlijskoga carstva (1537.-1691.)* (Jastrebarsko: Naklada Slap, 2003); *Town and Country on the Middle Danube 1526-1690* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2006).

²⁷ Géza Dávid, *Osmanlı Macaristan'ında Toplum, Ekonomi ve Yönetim: 16. Yüzyılda Simontornya Sancağı* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998).

only the fortresses of Buda and Temešvar, omitting the strategically significant Srem and Požega regions, whereas his data on the Habsburg side, derived from Géza Pálffy's works, comprehensively accounts for garrisons across Croatia and Slavonia.

This discrepancy in the breadth of research between the Ottoman and Habsburg frontiers underscores the critical lacuna of frontier studies. While Pálffy adopts an inclusive approach to quantifying Habsburg military strength, Ágoston's exclusion of the chain of fortresses, such as in the sancaks of Bosnia, Klis, and Požega, conceals a complete understanding of comparative military dynamics along this complex frontier.

Following Hazim Šabanović's pioneering studies in 1959-60,²⁸ the historiography of the Ottoman military frontier in Bosnia witnessed a notable renaissance after a protracted period of dormancy. This groundbreaking work laid the foundations for future research but was followed by a two-decade lull until Adem Handžić²⁹ revitalised the field with two seminal articles in 1988 and 1989. Subsequently, Husić's studies on fortresses and garrisons in the sancaks of Bosnia and Klis further invigorated Bosnian historiography, expanding our understanding of Ottoman military and administrative structures in these regions.³⁰

In marked contrast to the aforementioned scholars, Bosnian historians have not confined their enquiries to the modern borders between Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their research, grounded in extensive archival sources, embraces a broader historical canvas

²⁸ Hazim Šabanović, *Bosanski Pašaluk: Potanaki Upravna Podjela* (Sarajevo: 1959); Šabanović, "Vojno uređenje Bosne od 1463. godine do kraja 16. stoljeća," *Godišnjak Društva istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine* XI (1960): 173–224.

²⁹ Adem Handžić, "O organizaciji krajine Bosanskog ejaleta u XVIII stoleću-sjeverna i sjeverozapadna granica," in *Vojne krajine u jugoslovenskim zemljama u novom veku do Karlovačkog mira 1699: Zbornik radova sa naučnog skupa održanog 24. i 25. aprila 1986* (Beograd: Srpska Akad. Nauka i Umetnosti, 1989), 77–90.

³⁰ Aladin Husić, "Tvrđave Bosanskog sandžaka i njihove posade 1530. godine," *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju* 49 (2000): 189-229; Husić, "Vojne Prilike u Splitsko-Zadarskom Zaleđu u 16. Stoljeću (Osmanski Serhat 1530-1573)," *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju* 56 (2006): 125–144.

reflecting the vast territorial expansion of the Ottoman frontier. This methodological approach offers a more nuanced understanding of the frontier's complexities, illustrating how archival evidence illuminates the historical realities that transcend contemporary geopolitical boundaries.

The limitations inherent in region-specific studies underscore the pressing need for a more integrative approach to the Ottoman frontier research. By transcending the constraints of modern national borders and embracing a broader temporal and spatial framework, scholars can uncover significant parallels and distinctions between the Ottoman frontier governance and military practices across this expansive domain. Such an approach would not only enhance our understanding of the multifaceted Ottoman-Habsburg frontier but also contribute to a more holistic view of Ottoman imperial dynamics.

In essence, the study of the Ottoman-Hungarian and later Ottoman-Habsburg frontier demands a comprehensive approach that integrates diverse regional perspectives and extensive archival research. By overcoming the constraints of contemporary national boundaries and focusing on the frontier as a dynamic and interconnected space, historians can gain deeper insights into the complexities of Ottoman frontier administration and its intricate interactions with neighbouring powers. This broader perspective is essential to advancing our understanding of the historical significance of the Ottoman frontier and its enduring impact on the region's historical trajectory.

This study aims to provide a comprehensive overview of Ottoman frontier organisations from the Adriatic coast to the banks of the Danube, which evolved continuously over time while maintaining institutional continuity. It emphasises that

the structures institutionalised in the 1470s and the experience gained by the Ottomans in this region were maintained in the same form for years. Therefore, this study does not focus on historical ups and downs or critical moments, but on the slow development of institutional continuity over many years. Undoubtedly, the study of the frontier organisation in the period from the late fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth century, a period of little research, will bridge the gap between the extensively written 16th and 17th century Ottoman military history and frontier studies.



CHAPTER 2

OTTOMAN CONQUESTS IN THE WEST: A HISTORICAL PERIODIZATION (1470s–1543)

2.1. A Historical Background

This chapter presents an overview of the Ottoman expansion in Bosnia, Croatia, Srem (Szerémség/Srem), and eventually Central Hungary during the late 15th and first half of the 16th centuries. The focus is on the formation and phases of frontier organization, the transformation of fortress organization, and financing, which are examined in detail. This text provides detailed information on the capture of numerous fortresses during the aforementioned period. Mapping the Ottoman conquests with the capture of numerous fortresses will also help to clarify the progress of the Ottoman Empire during this period.

This chapter also analyses the reorganization of the former Hungarian defensive network into a hinterland by the empire between 1521 and 1543, which coincided with significant territorial gains in the west. The Ottomans captured numerous fortifications in Syrmium, Bosnia, and Croatia, but did not retain all of them. Following the conquest, the Ottomans restored and utilized only those fortifications that they deemed significant. The Ottomans destroyed most of the fortifications that were considered necessary, except for those in critical areas where they stationed

sufficient garrisons. It is worth noting that no new fortresses were constructed in the region during this period; instead, old fortresses were refurbished or modernised. This reuse probably did not cause financial difficulties for the Ottomans.

The Hungarian Kingdom became aware of the Ottoman threat in the Balkans during the second half of the 14th century. To address this rather novel threat, they supported Crusades, including the disastrous Nicopolis Campaign in 1396 and the “long campaign” led by János Hunyadi in 1443–44. Although the latter came close to success, this endeavour ultimately ended in failure due to various setbacks and challenges. The Ottomans achieved a decisive victory at Varna in 1444, causing the unified European military campaign against them to fail. Hungary responded by adopting two main defence strategies: establishing buffer states and constructing new fortresses along the Lower Danube.³¹ Despite their initial success, many of those buffer states fell under the Ottoman control by the second half of the 15th century. King Sigismund of Luxemburg – the King of Hungary and the future Holy Roman Emperor – played a pivotal role in developing a new defence system. He transferred fortresses in the Lower Danube to royals and constructed new ones stretching from Severin/Szörény to Belgrade.³² Matthias Corvinus, son of Hunyadi János, further

³¹ Pál Fodor, *The Unbearable Weight of Empire: The Ottomans in Central Europe – A Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy (1390-1566)* (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, 2016), 49–53. For the detailed and chronological history of the Ottoman- Hungarian warfare see: Tamás Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács*. (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2018). On detailed studies on the Battle of Varna, see Colin Imber, *The Crusade of Varna, 1443–45* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006); John Jefferson, *The Holy Wars of King Wladislas and Sultan Murad. The Ottoman-Christian Conflict from 1438-1444* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012).

³² Erik Fügedi, “Medieval Hungarian Castles in Existence at the Start of the Ottoman Advance,” in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi : War and Society in the Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary*, eds. János M. Bak and Béla J. Király (Brooklyn: Brooklyn College Press, 1982), 61–62; Géza Pálffy, “The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary (Up to the Early Eighteenth Century)” in *Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, eds. in Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Leiden – Boston – Köln: Brill, 2000), 7–10; Tamás Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács: A History of Ottoman-Hungarian Warfare, 1389-1526* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2018), 23–25.

improved the defence system in the southern part of the Kingdom of Hungary.³³ As the buffer states fell, Hungary and the Ottoman Empire came to share a permanent territorial frontier, leading to a period of relative ‘peace’ characterized by unofficial clashes and local troop confrontations.³⁴ Matthias Corvinus shifted his focus to Central Europe, while the Ottomans were engaged in conflicts with Venice in the Aegean and Adriatic Seas. Furthermore, the balance of power was stabilised along the *de facto* 800-km long frontier because the Hungarians and later the Ottomans developed a chain of fortresses that housed thousands of salaried garrison soldiers. By the time that Matthias died, both sides had had around 15,000 troops stationed in garrisons and a high density of fortresses. These numbers were significantly large for the time.³⁵

Although the Ottomans and Hungarians frequently signed truces and long-lasting peace treaties, looting and raiding activities involving military groups on both

³³ Ferenc Szakály, “The Hungarian-Croatian Border Defense System and Its Collapse,” in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: War and Society in the Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary*, eds. János M. Bak and Béla J. Király (Booklyn: Brooklyn College Press, 1982), 142–143; Pálffy, “The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary,” 10–13. Also, for a more recent study on the Hungarian frontier organization in the second half of the 15th century especially in Bosnia and Croatia see: Davor Salihović, *Definition, Extent, and Administration of the Hungarian Frontier Toward the Ottoman Empire in the Reign of King Matthias Corvinus, 1458-1490*, (unpublished PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 2019).

³⁴ On a detailed analysis of Ottoman-Hungarian frontier and peace negotiations, see: Davor Salihović, “The Process of Bordering at the Late Fifteenth-Century Hungarian-Ottoman Frontier,” *History in Flux* 1 (2019): 93–120.

³⁵ Determining the total number of garrisons on the Hungarian side for these dates is challenging. However, fragmentary documents from 1504, 1511, and 1513–14 suggest that the Hungarians had a force of approximately 6,000–8,000 along the Ottoman border. The annual cost of salary payments for garrison soldiers alone was 130,178 florins (6,899,434 akçe). Ferenc Szakály, “The Hungarian-Croatian Border Defense System and Its Collapse,” 145–149; András Kubinyi, “The Battle of Szávaszentdemeter-Nagyolaszi (1523), Ottoman Advance and Hungarian Defence on the Eve of Mohács,” in *Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, eds. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Leiden – Boston – Köln: Brill, 2000), 73. Assuming that Hungary had a better capacity for tax collection and military organization 20 years prior, we can infer that the same number of military forces were present in the fortresses on the Ottoman borders. Similarly, in 1491 there were 8,632 paid soldiers stationed, with over half of them (54,8 per cent) stationed in fortresses located along the Hungarian Kingdom's borders with the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans had approximately 5,000 garrison soldiers if we include those who received their payment with timar. In 1491, the total cost of all salaried fortress troops along the Hungarian border was 7,423,008 akçe, equivalent to 148,461 Hungarian florins. Göksel Baş, *Ottoman Serhad Organization in the Balkans (1450s to 1503)* (unpublished Master thesis, Bilkent University, 2017), 39–48; Göksel Baş, “XV. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Balkanlarda Osmanlı Serhad Organizasyonunun Oluşumu: Kaleler Ağı, Askeri Personel, Finansman ve Mali Külfet,” *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 33 (2018): 154–158 and 168–179.

sides always continued. This phenomenon was known as *Kleinkrieg* and was the dominant feature of the Ottoman–Hungarian frontiers. It is worth noting that these low-intensity battles did not result in significant territorial changes along the Ottoman–Hungarian border. From the late 1470s until 1512, the Hungarians lost only a few fortresses in Bosnia: Teočak (Ott. Telçak) before 1490³⁶, Vinac (Hun. Koszorúvár) in 1491³⁷ and Komotin in 1498.³⁸ The Ottomans’ greatest loss in the region was Šabac³⁹ (Ott. Bögürdelen) in 1476.

The period between 1476 and 1479 was a critical time for the Ottomans, particularly on the Danube front. Following the fall of Šabac, Corvinus aimed to capture Semendria, the key Ottoman garrison on the Danube. In order to blockade Semendria, three small wooden fortresses were constructed around the fortress. However, Mehmed II destroyed these fortresses during the Winter Campaign after the return of the Bogdan Campaign.⁴⁰ In 1481, Davud Paşa, the governor-general (*beylerbeyi*) of Rumelia, reported to the sultan that Pál Kinizsi had constructed two fortresses in Keve and Haram. He also informed the Sultan that Semendria was under blockade and requested immediate authorization to destroy these fortresses.⁴¹ Again, probably around late 1482, Mihaloğlu Ali had suggested in his letter to the sultan

³⁶ The fortress was in the possession of Ūjlaki until his death in 1477. Salihović, *Definition, Extent, and Administration of the Hungarian Frontier*, 102. However, the fortress should have been captured by the Ottoman before 1491 since 68 garrison soldier at the fortress and their one quarter payments (‘ulûfe) for May–August 1491 were paid with the money sent from the Srebrenica Mines. Baş, “XV. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında,” 168.

³⁷ Göksel Baş, *Ottoman Serhad Organization in the Balkans (1450s to 1503)*, 22.

³⁸ Tamás Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács*, 300.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 253.

⁴⁰ Ottoman chronicles mentions three fortresses without naming them. The location of one fortress was certain. It was erected where Morava and Danube meets: Kulič. Hoca Sadettin Efendi, *Tacü’t-tevarih*, vol. III, ed. İsmet Parmaksızoğlu (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1979), 158; Ibn Kemal, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, vol. VII, ed. Şerafeddin Turan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991), 414. The other one was probably was on the island on the Danube in front of the Semendria (Mod. Smederevska Ada), the last one was probably Keve.

⁴¹ “Bundan akdem Knaz Pavli melâ’in hayli çeri ile gelüb Kofunun (Keve/Kovin) üzerine konub bünyâd urub yapa durduğı vâzih u layihâdır...İmdi Semendire ucu bir dürlü uc olmuşdır ...İmdi kal’a-i Kofun yapılub tamâm olursa Semendire hemân kapanur kalur ...” TSMA e. 752/41.

Bayezid II that three new fortresses (Kulič, Ram, Veliko Gradište) should be built between Semendria and Golubac to create an effective defense network against the Hungarians since Pál Kinizsi had already erected two fortresses in Keve and Haram and started to build another one in Pojejena:

Hazret-i sultânım;

Bu hâk-i pâydân ol ziyâdesiyle cihân-penâh-i 'âlem yahşi ayağı toprağına 'arz olunur ki şimdiki halde İskender Beğ kulunuzla (Mihaloğlu İskender Bey) Semendireye varub Havalenün (Avala/Žrnov) ve Gügercinlükün (Golubac) azuğı ve 'ulûfesin ilettük. Kofinün (Kovin) ve Hramun (Haram) üzerine geçtük. Knaz Pavel (Pál Kinizsi, Captain-General of the Lower Parts) mel'ün Kovini ve Hramı ma'mûr hisârlar eylemiş. Gügercinlik mukâbilinde ve Pojajanda (Pojejena) bir hisâr yapmak tedârikindedir. Mecmû' Tunayı alub kendinün edüb bizüm yakayı(a) öte üç günlük yol Alacahisar (Kruševac) tevâbi'nden dahi bir nice köyler harâb olmuştır. Semendire ve Branicevo (Braničevo) vilâyeti harâb olub ancak yukarı Morava kenârında Eflahlar ve içinde birkaç Serf köyleri kalmıştır. Anlar dahi bihâne bihâne olmuşlar, gitmeğe bahâne isterler. Hramdan Temişfara (Temeşvar) giderken alındı bir kâfir, dahi Belgrad kâfirlerinden alındı. Kral haberin şöyle virdiler ki çesardan "Budine dört göç yerde karâr eyledi. Kâfir atlara koduğı gün Budine gelse gerekdir" didiler. Çerisinde bile olan beğleri ve voyvodaları yerine geldi. İmre despot oğlu (Imre Dóci) Sreme (Srem) geldi. Hastadır. Despot elçisi dahi "kral Budine geldi" dedi. Bunun üzerine haber virdi ve "çerisi be-gâyet za'yıf geldi. Ekseri yayan geldi" didi. Eğer devletlü hüdâvendigâr devletle bu tarafa müteveccih olursa, Allahü tebârek ve te'âla nusret ve fırsat erzânî kıla, geçüb onı başına yıkayuz ve eğer devletle bir gayri tarafa maslahat olursa ben kuluna cem'î Rumilinün akıncısın ve yarar sancak beğlerin koşa. Geçeyüz, segirdeyüz. Emindir ki hakk-i te'âla yüz akluğın vire ve bu ilün nizâm(ı) için Morava Koylucunda (Kulič) bir hisâr ve Hram (Ram) mukâbilinde bir hisâr ve Pojajan mukâbilinde İpek (Pek River) Koylucunda (Veliko Gradište) bir hisâr yapmağa mühimmat oluna. Geçidleri müstemid olub ne vakit gerekse çerisi ve harâmîsi geçmeye. Semendirenin ve Gügercinlikin yolları açıla. Kârbân varub gelür ola. Yalnız Semendire'de on bin mikdarı ve Gügercinlik'de üç bin mikdarı boğaz var. Etrafında il-gûn olmazsa sürgünle iç-il dahi bile incinür ve Belgraddan gelen dil "Cem çesara geldi" deyü haber virdi. Bâkî haberi dilden teftîş oluna. İşde dilleri hâmil varaka-i 'ubudiyet Bolvan subaşı Ahmed Beğ kulunuzla ayağınız toprağına vardı. Bu vilâyetün ahvâlini anlardan dahi teftîş idesiz. Biz bendenüze her ne vechile olursa hafıyyen sultânımın bir kağıdcuğı mühimmat oluna. Bâkî emr-i fermân ol 'âlem-penâhîndir ve e'd-du'a

Hakir kimesne

'Ali⁴²

Bayezid II's first military campaign was directed towards the Morava region with the aim of constructing two new fortresses, as proposed by Mihaloğlu Ali Bey.

⁴² TSMA e. 566/47. Kinizsi managed to push his army 150 kilometres inland to Kruševac. Again, as Mihaloğlu Bey stated in the above letter, there were only a few Vlach households and Serbs left in the Upper Morava and Braničevo. The region was devastated for twelve days, 50,000 local people were forcefully dislocated: Tamás Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács*, 276.

This resulted in the Ottomans having a militarily efficient defence system against the Hungarians, at least on the Danube line.⁴³ This action set in place the Ottoman-Hungarian power equilibrium with the Danube as their mutual natural border. Within a year of King Matthias' death in 1490, the Ottomans had established a seemingly well-functioning chain of fortresses along the Hungarian border, which remained steadfast for another 25 years to come (See Map I-II):

Vidin and its four surrounding castles in the sancak were formed on the eastern bank of the Ottoman border defense system against the Hungarian Kingdom. The center and the key line of the fortress system was protected by 15 castles in the sancaks of Smederevo and Zvornik. Smederevo, Ram, Kulič, and Golubac formed the first line of defense along the Danube River to Vidin. Avala (Žrnov), Soko Grad, Užice, Maglič, Ostrovica [sic!], and Resava set up the second and the inner line of the defense system in the sancak. The Western side of the chain continued to be lined up with five castles in the Zvornik region where four of them were clustered around the center of the sancak, Zvornik, along with the passages and the Drina River. Among them, Perin and Teočak undertook the duty of the outpost position, and Srebrenica and Kušlat protected the southern region of the sanjak. The eastern bank of the chain, which was Bosnia, stretched from Teočak and ended at the Adriatic coast. The first line of this defense section was protected by the fortresses whose garrison troops were paid in cash. These fortresses were, Vrh-Belice, Doboy [sic!], Ključ, Kamengrad, Vranduk, Kaštel, Travnik, Toričan, Vinac, Prusac, Livno, Ljubuški, Klobuk, Rog, Imotski, Beograd, and Počitelj. Travnik and Prusac were the centers of the chain that made up the first line of defense in Bosnia. Behind this first line in the region, the chain which made the second line of defense was spread out throughout Bosnia. Also, these fortresses that formed the second line were *timârlı*.⁴⁴

⁴³ It seems that all fortresses built in 1483 were wooden structures (*ağaç hisâr/palanka*). During the summer of the same year, the Ottoman army constructed two fortresses: Ram and Kulič. Ali Bey Mihaloğlu also initiated the construction of another fortress, Gradište, around the same time. The fortress of Ram and was to be rebuilt into strong stone fortresses in 1491. Particularly on Ram, see Machiel Kiel, "The Ottoman Castle of Ram (Haram) in Serbia and the Accounts of Its Construction, 1491," in *State and Society in the Balkans Before and After Establishment of Ottoman Rule*, eds. Srđan Rudić and Selim Aslantaş (Beograd: Institut za Istoriju & Yunus Emre Enstitüsü Turkish Cultural Centre Belgrade, 2017), 165–190. It is unclear, however, whether Kulič was rebuilt of stone, despite existence of registers on extensive repair (D.M.d. 36806, 431–443) of the fortress in the same year. If we rely on the letter of Sinan Paşa from around 1512, the fortress was only built of stone in that year: "... cerehor geldüğinden asl murâd Koyluc kal'asın taşla yapmaktır ...". TSMA e. 534/25. It is certain that the fortification in Gradište was made of earthwork and timber. A passage in tahrir register of Semendria sancak from 1516 records that the fortress (*kaştel* in the text) was built by the initiative of Mihaloğlu Ali Bey at the location where Pek river meets the Danube: "*karye-i Gradište der nâhiyet-i Braniçeva: İpek suyu Tuna'ya koyulduğu yerde karavul bekliyecek yer olub gerekli geçid olmağın Mihaloğlu Ali Beg bir kaştel yapıdırıb muhâfazasıyçün martoloslar komuş imiş ...*". Total 49 martoloses and 76 tax-exempted Christian households (*gebrân-i müselleman*) were serving at the fortress. TT d. 1007, 331–333. Stretched from Semendria to Golubac, the fortresses on the Danube (Semendria, Kulič, Ram and Golubac) formed the strongest Ottoman defense line on the Hungarian frontier. There was total 2,428 paid garrison soldiers in these fortresses by the mid 1491 (Semendria: 1,681, Golubac: 250, Ram: 248, Kulič: 250). Baş, "XV. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Balkanlarda Osmanlı Serhad Organizasyonunun Oluşumu," 178.

⁴⁴ Baş, *Ottoman Serhad Organization in the Balkans (1450s to 1503)*, 47–48; Ibid., "XV. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Balkanlarda Osmanlı Serhad Organizasyonunun Oluşumu," 159–160.

2.2. Hungarian Defences Tested (1502–1519)

The Ottoman–Venetian War started in 1499 and resulted in significant losses for Venice in Mora (the Peloponnese) and the Adriatic region. The Ottomans adopted a defensive policy against the Hungarian adversary. The governors of Vidin, Semendria, Zvornik, and Bosnia were instructed to prepare their armed forces in case of a Hungarian assault. Sultan Bayezid II also ordered the nearby governors to combine their forces to protect Semendria.⁴⁵ After the start of the war in 1499, Venice attempted to form a military alliance with Hungary against the Ottomans. In 1502, after strenuous efforts by Venice and the Papacy, Hungary joined the war with promises of financial aid in return.⁴⁶

The Ottoman–Hungarian War of 1502-1503 did not yield any benefits for the Hungarians. The Hungarian military had underestimated the capabilities of the Ottoman troops in the frontier region, and their military endeavours in the region did not go beyond a few successful raids.⁴⁷ The Ottomans also observed the weakened state of Hungarian military power in Bosnia and Croatia, which was of secondary importance to the Hungarian defence line in the south.⁴⁸ The Hungarian defences weakened with strong and capable governors now present in Bosnia. Thus, the Hungarians found themselves at a disadvantage in the shifting power dynamics of the region. İskender Paşa successfully carried out military operations in Bosnia with only

⁴⁵ “...Alacahisâr ve Vulçitrın ve Prizren sancağı beylerine ve sofya subaşalarına ve sipâhilerine hükm-i hümayûn gönderdim ki sancaklarına müte'allik olan sipâhileriyle ve subaşalarıyla varup anda Semendire'de durup muhâfazat edeler.” Feridun M. Emecen and İlhan Şahin, *II. Bayezid Dönemi Ahkâm Defterleri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2021), 239.

⁴⁶ Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács*, 301–304.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 322.

⁴⁸ Although the Hungarians kept 9–10,000 permanent troops on the Ottoman frontier in the 1510s, the cost of maintaining them reached 170–180,000 Hungarian Florin per year, which was still not enough to resist the Ottoman expansion. The Hungarians also had fewer troops in the Croatian and Bosnian sections, which made these zones secondary in importance. Szabolcs Varga, *Europe's Leonidas: Miklós Zrínyi, Defender of Szigetvár (1508-1566)* (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2016), 79–80.

local forces, which appears to have significantly impacted the Hungarian military situation in the region. Jajce, the most significant Hungarian stronghold in Bosnia and under constant Ottoman pressure, grew in importance during this period. In the north, Levać (Ott. Lefçe) was captured by a surprise Ottoman attack with a considerably small force (2,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry) in 1502.⁴⁹ Levać was where ammunition and food supplies for Jajce were stored. According to İskender Paşa's report to Bayezid II, the fortress was captured and destroyed. Additionally, the troops of Bosnia, led by Ferhad voyvoda, one of the servants of İskender Paşa, burned down twelve small fortifications (referred to as *kaştel* in the report) in the same region.⁵⁰ The Ottomans did not utilise these fortresses as they were deemed untenable. Additionally, during the same period, the sultan was informed that certain Hungarian fortresses in the area were vulnerable enough to capture.⁵¹

The peace treaties signed with Venice and Hungary in 1503 marked the end of Venetian military and political presence in the Peloponnese.⁵² The treaty preserved the *status quo* on the Ottoman-Hungarian frontier, as demonstrated by the list of fortresses owned by both parties. In contrast to the 1491 map, the Ottomans stationed troops only

⁴⁹ The numbers are disputable. According to Hungarian chronicles, there were 4,000 cavalry and 3,000 foot soldiers, while Ottoman chronicles report 2,000 cavalry and 1,000 foot soldiers. Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács*, 310-311; Ibn Kemâl, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân*, 224-225.

⁵⁰ "... bundan evvel bendenüz hizmetkârlarından Ferhad nam kulun olanca yoldaşı (ile varub) Kamengrad ve Kluç kal'alarına (karib) ba'zı kastellerin üzerine varup sâbıkâ Lofça alınmağın ol tarafda olan kastellerin kâfirleri hayf olup bi-inâyeti'llâhi te'ala on iki kastel kimi ceng ile alınıp kimi ihtiyâtlarından koyup gidüp ve ikisini tapup ve zikr olan kastelleri yakup yıkmışlardır...". Emecen-Şahin, *II. Bayezid Dönemi Ahkâm Defterleri*, 239.

⁵¹ The fortress was Sokol (Sokolač). İskender Paşa reports that the fortress was made of stone and located in a strategic location where the road heading to Ključ and Kamengrad. Ibid., 242.

⁵² Naturally, this prize came at a price. The Ottomans left considerable garrison troops in the fortresses they had taken from Venice in the Peloponnese and Adriatic. In the four most important fortresses in the Peloponnese, Methone (Ott. Moton), Coroni (Ott. Coroni), Lepanto (Ott. İnebahtı) and Navarino (Ott. Navarin), a total of 3,417 men were left as garrison troops. Together with the janissaries, this number reached 4,000. The annual expenses for these troops amounted to 3,810,205 akçe (approximately 71,891 Venetian ducats). Baş, "XV. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Balkanlarda Osmanlı Serhad Organizasyonunun Oluşumu," 170 and 179.

at the Komotin fortress, which they had seized in 1498, prior to the Ottoman-Hungarian war.⁵³

The peace agreement came to an end after seven years. When the Ottoman-Hungarian peace negotiations were ongoing, mobilization had been already set off along the border. However, with Sultan Selim ascended to the throne, his focus shifted to a fraternal rivalry, his brother Ahmed. While Selim was busy in Anatolia to defeat his brother, the sancakbeyis of Bosnia and Semendria then carried out successful military operations in the Western front.

In the interim period, Firuz Bey, the sancakbeyi of Bosnia, had just passed away and Yunus Paşa had taken his stead. Notably, Yunus Paşa had previously served as the commander of the Janissary Corps (ağa). In 1511, he was appointed as governor-general of Anatolia following Karagöz Paşa's demise at the hand of the Şahkulu Rebels. A year later, he was the governor-general of Rumelia.⁵⁴ Alongside Yunus Paşa, Sinan Paşa was named the new governor of Semendria. With the appointments of two

⁵³ List of Ottoman fortresses in the sancaks which were neighbor to the Hungarian Kingdom according to treaty of 1503: Sancak of Herzegovina: Prolosacz (Proložac), Ymoczky (Imotski), Bog (Rog), Jerogwcz (Vrgorac), Lywbcsna (Ljubuški), Mozthar (Mostar), Pockyeel (Počitelj), Blagay, Nowy (Herceg Novi), Ryzna (Risan), Klywch (Ključ), Zomobor (Samapor), Mileresowa (Mileševo). Sancak of Bosnia: Kamengrad, Kywch (Ključ), Hlewna (Livno), Belgrad (Glamoč), Wenchacz (Vinac), Komothyn (Komotin), Wrathnyk (Vranduk), Jerbelycza (Vrh Bilica), Thrawnyk (Travnik), Dobowy (Doboj), Maglay (Maglaj), Belgrad (Prusac, Ott. Akhisar), Zwled (Sused), Thorychan (Toričan), Fewerlak (Kaštel), Prozor, Bobowacz (Bobovac), Dwbrownyk (Dubrovnik). Sancak of Zvornik: Only Zvornik was listed in the treaty. However, it is implied that the fortresses in the sancak were under Ottoman rule. (*una cum civitatibus et oppidis et item cum castro Zwonyk, et cum eorumdem pertinentiis/* together with the cities and towns, and also with the fortress of Zwonyk, and with their belongings). These fortresses were Srebrenica, Perin Grad, Kušlat and Teočak. Sancak of Semendria: Hawal (Avala/Žrnov, Ott. Güzelce), Kwyych (Kulič), Hram (Ram), Golwbacz (Golubac, Ott. Güğercinlik). The fortresses in the sancaks of Vidin, Nicopolis and Silistre are not included here. For the Latin and Ottoman Turkish copies of the treaty see Joseph von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol II (Pest: C.A. Hartleben's Verlage, 1828), 616–620; Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor*, Vol. 2, Part 1: 1451–1575 (Bucarest, 1891), 20–23; Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Korvin Mathias (Mátyás)' in Bayezid II.e Mektupları Tercümeleri ve 1503 (909) Osmanlı-Macar Muahedesinin Türkçe Metni," *Belleten* XXII (1958): 369–81 and 382–90. Also compare the place names with: Hazım Şabanović, *Bosanski Pašaluk: Potanaki Upravna Podjela* (Sarajevo: 1959), 55. Also, for a recent study on the Turkish copy of Ottoman-Hungarian Peace Treaty of 1503, see Büşra Aytaş Kütükçü, "Osmanlı-Macar Ahidnameleri Bağlamında Osmanlı-Macaristan İlişkilerinin Gelişimi ve II. Bayezid Dönemine Ait Türkçe Macaristan Ahidnameleri Üzerine İncelemeler," *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi* 47 (2022): 41–90.

⁵⁴ V. L. Ménage, "An Ottoman Manual of Provincial Correspondence," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 68 (1976), 36–38.

powerful governors with significant *hass* allocations, Selim I was able to focus on the Ottoman eastern border without the risk of leaving the western frontier unsecured. Both governors had substantial income with their yearly salaries almost matching that of a governor-general. At a time when a typical provincial governor's annual *hass* income ranged between 200,000 and 400,000 akçe, Yunus Paşa received 700,000 akçe while Sinan Paşa was granted 800,000 akçe. The reason for their high revenues was to ensure that they had as many armed men (*cebelü*) in their retinue as possible.⁵⁵

In July 1512, Selim departed for Anatolia to confront his brother Ahmed. Rumours spread throughout Hungary that Selim had even took along the garrison soldiers from the border fortresses to fight against his brother, as he was desperate for fighting men.⁵⁶ The Hungarian government viewed it as an opportunity and planned a large offensive along the border, particularly on Bosnia and Semendria. Sinan Paşa's first letter mentions dispatching spies to Hungary, who confirmed that the Hungarians shared similar thoughts. They believed it was an opportune time to launch an attack on Semendria. In his letter, he reports the presence of 300 janissaries and 700 azebs in Semendria. Paşa suggests sending an additional 1,000 janissaries, 30 artillerymen, and 300 *kıyye* (367,5 kg) of gunpowder for defence of the fortress. He also recommends dispatching 400 voynuks for fortress repair and as a reserve force in case of a siege:

... Devletlû Âsitâneye mahfî olmaya kim sâbıkâ bu hareketleri istima' olundukda hakikât haber bilmek için casus gönderilmiş idi. Şimdiki halde gelüb şöyle haber verdi kim mübâlağa çeri yarağın ve toplar ve top otun ve ziyâde gemi kaydın görüb böyle esbâb görmekden maksûdları "şimdi Türk, çerisini 'Arab diyârına teveccüh ediyorur, hemân 'avretleri kalmuşdır. Bunun gibi fırsat elümüze girmez deyü öte taraflarıyla mesâlih edüb orak vaktinde gelüb Semendireye üşmek tedârikünü iderler ve çeri seçüb göndere kim Alacahisarı ve Nişi yakub harâb ideler deyü takrîr etdi ... Böyle olıcak bu uclarda olan kal'aların yarağın şimdiden görmek vâcib ve lazımdır. Âsitâne-i Sa'âdete mahfî olmya kim Semendire kal'ası dört bin beden olub ve merhûm Sultân Mehmed tâbe serâhu zamanında binâ olmuş üç köşesinde ve bir

⁵⁵ "İvâ-i Bosna der tasarruf-i Yunus Paşa mezkûra ba-emr-i pâdişâh Semendire sancağı virilüb bu sancak dahi Semendire beği Sinan Paşaya virilmeğin berât-i hümayûn için tezkire virildi, hasıl: elinden giden bedel 800,585 (akçe). Tahriren fî 23 Recebî'l-mürecceb sene 919 (24.9.1513)". MAD 7, 379a. Yunus Paşa's *hass* income in 7 March 1514 was 700,000 akçe. Ibid., 382b.

⁵⁶ Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács*, 335.

dahi kapusunda fi'l-cümle dört âli birgozlar vardır kim düşman gelüb savaş olıcak her birine yüzer yoldaş ancak kifâyet ider. Kal'anun dahi yoldaşı yedi yüz azeb ve üç yüz yeniçeridir. Eğer vecd görülürse dahi bin yeniçeri ve otuz topçu ve üç yüz kıyye top otu himmet oluna. Yoldaş ziyâde olsa hoz dahi evlâyidi ki her bedene üçer veya ikişer adem olmayıcak akalli beden başına hîn-i muhârebede birer adem olaydı ve bir yarar sancak beğ(i) hisar içinde olup biri dahi taşra il üzerinde olmak gerekdir kim vilâyet kaydın görüb her ne kazıyye olursa Bâb-i Devlete 'arz ide. Bundan evvel ihtiyât olundukça şöyle olunurmuş ve hisâra üşüb topla döğmelü olacak içinden çatma itmek gerekdir. Semendire dizdârı kulunuz hayli müddetten bu yere dizdâr olup gereği gibi maslahat başarur bendenüzdür. Şeylece vecd gördüğüm anın gibi cenk olıcak hisar eri hem cenk edüb ve hacet olan yerlere çatma yapmağa müşgildir. Sofya ve Filibe voynuklarından kim kavimli kabileli olalar dört yüz voynuk gelse çatma ve her mesâlihe gâyet de yardım idi. Anları hisâr-beççede dahi saklamağ asân olurdu deyüb eydür eğer vecd görülürse Sofya'da bir cemi'yyet oluna kim işidilüb bu etrâfları hâlî tasavvur etmeye ...⁵⁷

However, the Hungarian forces did not anticipate the swift mobilisation of the Ottoman forces. In addition, several governors arrived with their sipahi forces to reinforce the governor of Bosnia, including Hüsrev Bey, who was then the governor of İskenderiye (Shkodër) and would later become the renowned governor of Bosnia. The Ottoman forces had already captured Sokol, Tešanj, and Srebrenik while the Hungarian forces were still gathering in Slavonia.⁵⁸ It was Mustafa Bey, governor of Zvornik, that captured Srebrenik by surprise on 11 October 1512.⁵⁹ Sokol was also taken following a skirmish that erupted after the ambush of the garrison forces that left the fortress while the Paşa routinely supplied Kamengrad and Ključ with munitions and food. The Ottomans killed the defeated Sokol garrison soldiers before they were able to return to the fortress. The defenceless garrison proved an easy target for the Ottomans. In the letter he wrote to the sultan, Yunus Paşa claimed that the fortress was captured on January 8, 1513, and immediately after, garrison soldiers were replaced within.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ TSMA e. 745/43.

⁵⁸ Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács*, 336.

⁵⁹ Ménage, *Ottoman Historical Documents*, 66.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 67; Ménage, "An Ottoman Manual of Provincial Correspondence," 43–44. Hazim Šabanović indicates that Srebrenik was taken by Firuz Beg in 1512. Šabanović, *Bosanski Pašaluk*, 56. However, he held the governor position until 18 August 1511. İlhan Gök, "İnamat Defteri'ndeki Verilere Göre 16. Yüzyılın İlk Çeyreğinde Osmanlı Eyalet ve Sancak Yöneticileri," *Mavi Atlas* 9:1 (2021): 183. Firuz

In the same year, Hadım Sinan Paşa repelled another offensive against Semendria led by István Bátori, the newly appointed ispán of Temes. Paşa informed the sultan in his letters that he had taken measures to prepare for the attack. According to the letter dated November 6, 1512, István Bátori, (Natır İřpanođlu in the text) began moving from Belgrade to Semendria with a force of 12,000 armoured soldiers, 4,000 soldiers armed with arquebuses or crossbows, 6,000 unarmoured soldiers, and 2,000 wagons. He established his headquarters in Godomin field, near Semendria on December 13, 1512. Certain that the Hungarians had arrived to conquer the entire city, Sinan Paşa had made all the necessary preparations well in advance. The first step was to order the re-excavation of the fortress trenches. Following this, wooden towers were constructed in front of the trenches and equipped with artillery and firearms. In preparation for a possible siege, armour and weapons were distributed to both the Muslim and Christian residents of the city. Realizing that the fortress was already readied against a siege, the Hungarian forces abandoned their efforts and moved to plunder the neighbouring areas in the Lomnice sub-district (*nahiye*). Nevertheless, Sinan Paşa pursued them with a force of 4,000 men and engaged in harassment tactics. The Hungarians were forced to evacuate their fortified camp (*tabur* in the text) after three days due to food and water shortages. After three days of weariness and constant pursuit by the Ottomans, The Hungarians managed to enter Belgrade:

... řimdiki halde Natır İřpanođlu (István Bátori) dimekle ma'rûf la'yin kendüden gayri on sekiz ban edinüb on iki bin cebelü kâfir ve dört bin tüfek ve zenberek atar piyâde ve altı bin seđirdümcü cebesiz kâfir ve iki bin 'araba ile sene semân ü 'aşere ve tis'a-mi'e řa'bânının yirmi altıncı günü ki Cuma' günüydü (6.11.1512) Belgrada üç yerden iskele urub sekiz gün leyl-i (ü) nehâr geçüb sene-i mezbûre Ramazanının dördüncü günü ki řembe günüydü (13.12.1512) Belgraddan göçüb memâlik-i mahrûseye dâhil olub Semendire mukâbelesinde Godomin nâm sahranın üzerine konub kal'a-i Semendire'nin semtini tâlân idüb ihrâk itmek kasd eyledi ... řehr-i mezbûrun handakın kazdırub ve beř altı yerde ağaçdan kulleler yapıdırub toplar ve tüfekler ve darbzenler peydâ itdirüb kendü nefsümle řehirde durub

Bey was in his deathbed for two months and died on 8 June 1512. Hedda Reindl, *Männer um Bâyezîd: eine prosopographische Studie über die Epoche Sultan Bâyezîds II. (1481-1512)* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), 198–199. Ménage, *Ottoman Historical Documents*, 66.

ne kadar Müselmân kâfir varise yarağ ve cebe cevşene koyub cenk-i ‘azim yarakında olucak ol mel’ûnlar dahi iki gün zikrolan sahrâda durub şehir üzerine gelüb hasâret kasdın itdiğünden muhibbinizün keyfiyyet-i hâline ve cenk-i ‘azime durduğumızı bilüb ihtiyât idüb şehre ulaşmayub Braniçeva nâm vilâyeti harâb itmeğe ‘azim eyledi. Bu kasıdlarına dahi vâkıf olıcak dört bin mikdârı yoldaşla Semendireden çıkub Morava nam nehrün geçidlerinden ki Braniçeva yollarıdır, geçidleri alub durduk. Ol mel’ûnlar dahi geçidlerün halin bilicek Braniçevadan vâzgelüb Lumnice nâm nâhiyenin üzerine yürüdiler. Muhibbiniz dahi nehr-i mezbûrî geçüb ardına dolaşub her yerine ‘azm itdiler. Eli ardından yanlarından önünden amân vermeyüb her cânibinden atlu piyâde ulaşıdırı taburundan taşra bir ferdin çıkartmadım. Hatta azuğ ve suya varmağdan kadr-i mecâlleri olmayub fûru-mânde kalıcak, Semendireden top ‘arabaların getürdüb ve ne kadar ‘azebistan varise yanımıza getürdüb gece ile taburun basmak kasd olundukda berü cânibden bir kâfir kaçub haber virüb ilk ahşamdan geldikleri yoldan kaçub Belgraddan yana ‘azm eylediler. Haliyâ nısfü’l-leylede muhibbinize haber olub ardlarına koşub sabaha değin kovub Havale kal’asından berüye yakın ‘ale’s-sabâh yetişüb dündarın basub fazl-i ilahi ve devlet-i padişâhî birle otuz mikdârı baş kesilüb ve sekiz diri kâfir alınub gereği bigi (gibi) mecâletle ‘avdet idüb üç gün üç gece kendüleri ve atları su içmeyüb cân-i habîslerini Belgrada güçle iledebildiler ...⁶¹

The military developments observed between 1512 and 1513 indicate that although Sultan Selim was engaged in a fraternal struggle for the throne in Anatolia with the entire mobilizable forces at his disposal, only three sancaks in the western frontiers, supported by timariot sipahis (estimated at around 2,000–3,000) along with governors’ entourage and retainers, garrison troops, newly formed *akıncı* units in Bosnia⁶², and janissaries numbering no more than 500, were sufficient to challenge the Hungarians across the entire frontier. Moreover, the consecutive capture of fortresses in Bosnia not only caused irreparable damage to the southern network of defence but also gave the Ottomans an opportunity to test the true strength of the Hungarians.

⁶¹ TSMA c. 850/33.

⁶² This military unit was established with the initiative of Yunus Paşa when he was the governor of Bosnia (1512–1513/1515–1516) in response to the need for military personnel due to accelerated military operations in the frontiers and the fact that the majority of the Rumelian troops was largely went for the Selim’s campaigns in Asia. The unit consisted of 1,000 *akıncı*s who served on a rotational basis. When necessary, 500 of them were assigned to escort the sipahis to the fortresses to bring in supplies or to guard the borders: “Padişah-ı zıllullâh hazretlerinin ferman-ı âlişan-ı vâcib-ül-iz’ânları ile Yunus Paşa ma’rifetile Bosna vilâyetinde bin nefer *akıncı* yazılmış ki, diyâr-ı islâmın dâiresin hüfzedüb ve kal’arına zahire varmalu olsa sipahiler ile hizmeti bile edâ ederler. İhtiyat olmaduğı yerde beşyüzi bir nevbette varub ve beşyüzi bir nevbet-i âharda edâ-i hizmet eyleyeler ...”. Ahmed Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukukî Tahlilleri: Yavuz Sultan Selim Devri Kanunnâmeleri*, vol. III (Istanbul: Fey Vakfı Yayınları, 1991), 378.

Situated only 20 km north of Klis (Clissa), the fortress of Sinj (Ott. Sin) was successfully taken by the Ottoman forces under the command of Yunus Paşa. Although they suffered a few defeats in Bosnia, the most significant event was the Battle of Dubica, where the Ottoman raiding army was dealt a substantial blow by Peter Berislavić, Ivan of Korbavia (Karlović), and Miklós Zrínyi.⁶³ Although previous research claims that the fortress of Sinj was captured in 1518 and that Yunus Paşa was killed in a siege in 1512, this information is incorrect.⁶⁴ Based on the available information at hand, the Ottomans took control of the fortress without laying siege to it. Pavel, the commander (*porkulab*) of Sinj fortress, surrendered the fortress in 1513 in return for a timar worth 6,000 akçe.⁶⁵

Sinan Paşa replaced Yunus Paşa on 24 September 1513. He was to serve as the governor of Bosnia until March 1514.⁶⁶ On 7th March 1514, Sultan Selim appointed Hadım Sinan Paşa as the governor-general of Anatolia before his expedition against the Safavids. The vacant position was immediately filled by Yunus Paşa, the governor of Semendria.⁶⁷ As for the vacancy left open by Yunus Paşa's appointment, Bali Bey, the son of Yahya Paşa would take over the role of governor of Semendria.

Throughout the year, there were sporadic battles in Bosnia, but none in the Semendria region. However, in 1515, the Ottoman troops achieved further victories in Bosnia by taking control of Kotor and Bočac –two small but strategically important

⁶³ Varga, *Europe's Leonidas*, 89.

⁶⁴ Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács*, 350. At the very least, Yunus Paşa would be executed much later, in 1517, by the order of Selim I upon his return from the campaign in Egypt, while serving as the Grand Vizier. Feridun M. Emecen, "Yunus Paşa," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (TDV) Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 43 (2013), 608–610.

⁶⁵ "Timar-i Şirmerd. Mezûrdan işbu timar bilâ-sebeb alınub timar tasarruf itmeyenlerden Sin kal'asın viren Pavli nâm kâfire Dergâh-i Mu'âlla'dan altı bin akçelik timar emr olunmağın virilüb berât-i hümayûn için tezkere virildi, eşer ... tahriren fî 16 Cemâziyelevvel sene 919 (19.08.1513)". MAD 7, p. 378. Regarding Pavli's fate, according to Yunus Paşa's letter, Pavli had "betrayed and disappeared" only 1 year and 8 months later (1.4.1515): "... Pavli dahi hayîn olub gıybet eyledi deyü Yunus Paşa 'arz itmeğın ...". Ibid, 378.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 379.

⁶⁷ Hoca Sadeddin Efendi, *Tâcü't-tevârih*, vol. VI, 176: MAD 7, 382b.

fortresses north of Jajce.⁶⁸ It would prove to be challenging in the near future to provide Jajce with food and munitions due to the loss of Bočac, which was a gateway between Banja and Jajce located on the Vrbas River.

Although the exact date is unknown, the Ottomans advanced in the vicinity of Knin and Kilis between 1514 and 1515. They captured the fortresses of Cačvina and Nutjak in the south of Sinj as well as Vrlika, Drniš, and Nečven in the north. Owned by Ivan Karlović, the Lika region would influence the course of the potential Ottoman expansion in the near future, especially given the weakening of the military defence network in that area.

The most crucial event in the year of 1515 on the Ottoman-Hungarian frontier was perhaps the siege of Avala (Žrnov/ Ott. Güzelce) by the Hungarian army, led by the voevode Janos Szapolyai, supported by the forces of the bans of Belgrade, Šabac, and some southern lords such as Jakšić and Szakolyi. Contemporary Hungarian sources do not provide information on the number of soldiers in the Hungarian army. However, according to Bali Bey's letter, the Hungarians arrived with 20,000 armoured cavalry. As for the Ottoman side, Bali Bey's troops were joined by garrison soldiers from Semendria, as well as timariot sipahi forces from Vidin, Kruševac (Alacahisar), Zvornik, and Prizren. Therefore, the number of Ottoman troops may have been around 5,000 to 6,000. The Ottomans caught the besiegers completely off guard after a quick assembly. The surprise attack resulted in the defeat of the Hungarian army, with several leaders being either killed or taken captive, including the ban of Belgrade Mihály Paksi. The Ottomans also captured the entire camp, artillery, and remaining equipment.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács*, 353.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 351–353. For the report of Prince Süleyman to the paşas of the divan regarding the Battle of Avala, see Fodor, "Wolf on the Border," 77–79.

After Mustafa Paşa was ousted as the vizier, Yunus Paşa was named in its place at the conclusion of the year. Following this period, the Ottoman advance in Bosnia appears to have slowed. However, there were still small-scale skirmishes in Bosnia, and in the beginning of 1518, the Ottomans captured Jezero (Göhlisar), which was barely 20 kilometres away from Jajce.

An Ottoman-Hungarian peace treaty was signed in 1519. It listed the fortresses that belonged to each party, same as in the treaty of 1503. It should be noted that the treaty did not include all of the fortresses; there were many other Ottoman fortresses that seem to have been captured between 1512 and 1519.⁷⁰ The lost fortresses in the treaty indicate that the Hungarian southern defences were easily breached between 1503 and 1519, solely on the initiative of the local governors. The following is how the treaty placed the Ottoman fortresses neighbouring the Hungarian frontier: Novi, Risan, Sokol, Ključ, Proložac, Imotski, Vrgorac, Rog, Vrgorac, Čačvina, Nutjak, Ljubuški, Mostar, Počitelj, Blagaj, Samabor and Mileševo were in the Herzegovina sancak, forming the defence network in the Adriatic region. On the more vulnerable Bosnian section, the Ottoman fortresses were distributed as follows: The central region of Bosnia was fortified with Ključ and Kamengrad fortresses, which were located outside the usual borders (*memâlik-i mahrûse*) by 3–4 days' travel. In addition, Sokol, Bočac, Komotin, Kotor, and Vinac surrounded the most important Hungarian garrison

⁷⁰ According to the 1519 Ottoman-Hungarian peace agreement, the fortresses that remained under Ottoman control after 1503 and were accepted by the Hungarians: Chachwyna (Čačvina), Lywthyak (Nutjak), Szokol (Sokograd), Cyn (Sinj), Tesanj, Verhrika (Vrlika), Bochach (Bočac), Kotor, Sokolac and Srebrenitsa (Srebrenik). Numan Yekeler et al., *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türk-Macar İlişkileri* (Istanbul: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2016), 13–18. In total, ten fortresses captured between 1512–1518 were listed as Ottoman fortresses. However, captured in the last year, Jezero was not listed either the Ottoman or Hungarian fortress. Another copy of the treaty did not mention any of the recently captured fortresses: Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor*, Vol. 2, Part 3: 1510–1530 (Bucarest, 1892), 303–307. Based on an apostil from the tax register of Bosnia, it is evident that the Ottoman troops had already taken control of the Jezero fortress before the summer of 1519. This is supported by the fact that one of the timar holder sipahi failed to attend the repair work of the fortress on 25 July 1519 (H. 27 Receb 925). TT d. 57, 119.

in the area, Jajce. The central Bosnia fortress defense network comprised of Travnik, Prusac (Ott. Akhisar), Kaštel (Ott. Burgaz Fenarlık), Prepolycza, Toričan, Vranduk, Prozor, Susjed, Kreševo, Vrhbilica, Hodidjed, Dubrovnik, Samapor, Dobrun, Višegrad, Kličevac and Bobovac. The fortresses of Glamoč (Ott. Belgrad), Livno, Vrlika and Sinj were located to the left of the fortress network. On the right flank, up to the sancak border of Zvornik, were the fortresses of Maglaj, Tešanj, Dobož, Sokol, and Srebrenik. The sancak of Zvornik comprised four fortresses, with Zvornik as the center. The fortresses of Perin, Kušlat, and Srebrenica were in the southern part of the sancak, while Teočak in the north constituted the northernmost border. The sancak of Semendria had fewer fortifications, but it formed the backbone of the Ottoman defence network due to the high number of soldiers in the fortress. The most significant fortress in the Danube area was Semendria. Kulič, Ram and Golubac, located along the Danube to the east, formed the first defense network. The second defense network was further south, with the fortresses of Resava, Maglič, Užice, Ostrvica (Ott. Sivricehisar) and Sokol. The fortress of Avala/Žrnov (Ott. Güzelce), which was situated only 20 km west of Semendria and near Belgrade, served as a significant outpost.

The treaty includes almost all Ottoman fortresses, but only specific Hungarian fortresses are mentioned. For instance, in Bosnia, only Jajce, Banja Luka, Zvečaj, and Vrbaška fortresses are listed. Similarly, in Croatia, the treaty omits several fortresses, particularly in Skradin, Ostrovica, Vrana, Benkovac, Karin, Zrmanja, Zvonigrad, Obrovac, Lika, and Udbina regions, which are mostly owned by the Corbavia family, and Klis.⁷¹ The list includes Šabac, Barič, Barka, Árki (modern Jarak), Belgrade, Zemun, Salankamen, Titel, Severin (Szörény), Orșova, Miháld, and Péc in the Sava,

⁷¹ Ivan Karlović, also referred as Johannes Torquatus in Latin texts, was one of the top aristocratic members in Croatia. The estates of his family in Lika County stretched as far as the fortress of Knin. A total of 24 fortresses were Ivan's property most of which were small fortifications. Varga, *Europe's Leonidas*, 104.

Danube, and Syrmia (Szerém/Srem) region. It is important to note that this list is not exhaustive and there are many other significant fortresses in the area that are not mentioned.

A tangible and comprehensive picture of the Ottoman fortresses could be observed by examining the fortresses listed in the Ottoman–Hungarian peace treaties of 1503 and 1519. Yet, there are many fortresses missing on the Hungarian side. The existence of these fortresses can be cross-checked with the Ottoman archival sources.

In conclusion, between 1502 and 1519, the Ottomans assessed the military capabilities of the Hungarians before making long-term conquests. The relative balance on the Ottoman-Hungarian frontier, which had been in place since the 1470s, eventually broke down. Although the Hungarian military position on the Danube and the Eastern Sava remained intact, they suffered a significant defeat in the Bosnian area, which had been mostly ignored. Especially the fall of minor fortifications around Jajce, namely Bočac, and Jezero, caused a huge pressure on the Jajce. Knowing this, one of the first articles formulated in the nobles assembly at Tolna in 25 July 1518 was to recover these lost fortresses, which would never materialize:

... especially Bočac and Jezero, have fallen into the hands of the Turks, [while] Jajce with Banja Luka remain entirely unprotected and will fall into the hands of those Turks unless they are soon refortified and supplied with men and victuals; should Jajce fall into the hands of the enemy—which the glorious Lord may avert—then the same will happen to Vukovar and Požega in the realm of Slavonia, upon which perils the internal body of the kingdom will also be exposed to similar danger and suffering; moreover, Carinthia, Austria, and a great part of Germany and Dalmatia will be in the jaws of the enemies and become their prey.⁷²

Because of the complicated position of Jajce, the Lika region became vulnerable to repeated Ottoman raids after the fall of Sinj. At least briefly and

⁷² János M. Bak, *Online Decreta Regni Mediaevalis Hungariae. The Laws of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary* (Utah: USU Libraries, 2019), 1075.

temporarily, the Ottomans were prevented from crossing into Syrmium and Slavonia by the Hungarians, who also controlled several crucial fortifications such as Jajce, Banja Luka, Zvečaj, Dobor, Gradačac, Sabač, Barič, Barka, Árki (modern Jarak), Mitrovica and Belgrade. It is evident that the balance of power on the border region was disrupted, given that all the military achievements during that time period were accomplished exclusively by the sipahi forces of only three or four Ottoman sancaks along the frontier as well as garrison soldiers, raiders (*akıncı*), and the personal retinues of the governors. Selim's singular focus on the protracted wars of conquest in the east may have spared Hungary from experiencing further defeat and possible loss of territory.

2.3. Hungarian Defences Collapsed (1521–1526)

Upon ascending the throne, Sultan Süleyman expressed his intention to expand towards the West. In the winter of 1520, he ordered military and logistical preparations for a campaign in that direction. It is unclear whether Sultan Süleyman's primary objective in the first campaign was to march to Buda or to capture the most important Hungarian fortification in the south. However, his policy towards Hungary ultimately led to a prolonged Ottoman–Habsburg rivalry throughout the 16th and 17th centuries.⁷³

⁷³ For some general studies on the subject see János M. Bak and Béla K. Király, eds., *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi*; Pál Fodor, "Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary, 1520-1541," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 45:2–3 (1991): 271–345; Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, eds., *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent* (Budapest: Loránd Eötvös University, 1994); Ferenc Szakály, *Ludovico Gritti in Hungary, 1529-1534: A Historical Insight into the Beginnings of Turco-Habsburgian Rivalry* (Budapest: Studia Historica, 1995); Gábor Ágoston, "Habsburg and Ottomans: Defense, Military Change and Shifts in Power," *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22:1 (1998): 126–141; Ágoston, "Ottoman Conquest and the Ottoman Military Frontier in Hungary," in *A Millennium of Hungarian Military History* [War and Society in East Europe vol. XXXVII.; Atlantic Studies on Society in Change No. 114.] eds. Béla K. Király and László Veszprémy (Bolulder Co., 2002), 85–110; Géza David and Pál Fodor, eds., *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe*; Pál Fodor, ed., *The Battle for Central Europe*; Géza Pálffy, *The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century*; Pál Fodor, *The Unbearable Weight of Empire: The Ottomans in Central Europe – A Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy (1390–1566)* (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities (HAS), 2016); Klára Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*; Gábor Ágoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest*.

By the spring of 1521, the Ottoman army had completed its preparations. Even before reaching Belgrade, the frontier sancakbeyis (Semendria and Bosnia) had laid siege to the fortress. Hüsrev Bey, the governor of Semendria, wrote in a letter dated 7 July 1521, that he had already landed at Kriegsinsel (mod. Veliko ratno ostrvo) together with by transferring the janissaries, azebs, and martoloses via waterway from Semendria. Furthermore, 12 ships (*şayka*) had besieged the fortress from the Sava side. According to Hüsrev Bey, the outskirts of both the city and Zemun, which was located next to Belgrade, were burned down. The city was also completely under siege for four days.⁷⁴ Hüsrev Bey sent another letter with information from a Hungarian prisoner captured in Belgrade. The prisoner reported that there were only 200 infantry, 100 cavalry, 30 artillerymen, and 50 cannons in Belgrade. Additionally, the prisoner stated that the fortress personnel had not been paid for two months.⁷⁵ The numbers given by the prisoner might not have reflected the truth, but these are still likely to provide an accurate representation. The largest garrison in the southern region of the Hungarian Kingdom lacked sufficient defence.⁷⁶ Ahmed Paşa, who previously besieged Šabac

⁷⁴ "...emr-i pâdişâhî mûcibince Receb ayının yirmi yedinci gününden berü (3.7.1521) bu 'abd-i bi-mikdâr kal'a-i Belgradı ihâta edüb ve adaya gemileriyle yeniçeri bendeleri ve 'azeb ve martalosani Semendire idhâl olunub ve pâdişâh-i 'âlem-penâhın eyyâm-i devletinden Sava cânibine on iki pare şayka ile adem geçürüb Tuna canibinden ve Sava tarafından ve kırı tarafından kal'a-i mezbûre ihâta olunub ve Belgrad mukâbelesinde Srem cânibinde vâkî' olan Becanye nam varoş ki kal'a-i mezbûrenin kürekçileri sâkin olur külliye ihrâk olunub ve Zemun kal'asının varoşu dahi ihrâk olundu bi'l-fi'l kal'a-yi Belgradı bu bende-i sehif gelüb ihâta edelü dört gündür ki kapısı kapanub bugünkü güne değin hâricden yardım gelüb girmede...". TSMA e. 755/28.

⁷⁵ "... Belgradın iki yüz hisar erisi var ve yüz atlısı var ve elli mikdar topı var ve otuz mikdarı topçısı var ve iki hisar eri ulufe maslahatı için Budin'e gideli iki ay mikdarı oldu haberleri gelmedi...". TSMA e. 754/76.

⁷⁶ During the siege there were said to be only 700 garrison soldiers and some civilians in the fortress. János B. Szabó, "The Ottoman Conquest in Hungary: Decisive Events (Belgrade 1521, Mohács 1526, Vienna 1529, Buda 1541)," in *The Battle for Central Europe: The Siege of Szigetvár and the Death of Süleyman the Magnificent and Nicholas Zrínyi (1566)*, ed. Pál Fodor (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 267. It should be noted that there is no available information about the *naszád* (flotilla) troops, who were previously assigned to the river fleet in Belgrade and numbered over 1,000. It is possible that those who resided in nearby villages and fortresses may not have been able to gather and aid Belgrade. At the start of the siege, the area around the Belgrade rowers (*kürekçi*) was burned down, as reported by Hüsrev Bey: "Srem cânibinde vâkî' olan Becanye nam varoş ki kal'a-i mezbûrenin kürekçileri sâkin olur külliye ihrâk olunub." TSMA e. 754/56. The absence of these troops allowed the Ottomans to easily besiege the city from the river, ultimately resulting in catastrophic consequences for Belgrade. Ferenc

with the Rumelian army, managed to capture the fortress on July 7. On August 1, Sultan Süleyman arrived in Belgrade and set up his tent on elevated ground. After an intensified siege, the fortress was eventually captured on August 29, 1521.⁷⁷ Following the capture of Belgrade, the southern Hungarian defence network collapsed, leaving no significant fortifications to impede further Ottoman attacks towards Srem. Consequently, the Hungarians promptly fortified Ilok and Petrovaradin along the Danube to the best of their ability. Additionally, Belgrade was not made a separate sancak, but was instead attached to the sancak of Semendria. After the siege, the fortress was repaired, and a strong garrison was stationed within. Belgrade now became a military and logistical base for operations against Hungary.

Following the capture of Belgrade, the Ottoman offensive in the region intensified. However, the newly appointed governor of Semendria, Ferhad Paşa, suffered a heavy defeat by the Hungarians in the Battle of Szávaszentdemeter-Nagyolaszi in 1523.⁷⁸ Up until the Mohács campaign in 1526, the Hungarian army effectively held Srem region against further Ottoman conquest. Although the Ottomans were unsuccessful in the Srem region, Bali Bey, son of Yahya Paşa captured Orşova and Pécs in 1522 and Severin in 1524.⁷⁹ Consequently, the Danube region to the east of Belgrade had no Hungarian fortresses left. This turned the Danube into a significant waterway that could be navigated easily and safely from Istanbul to Belgrade, thereby increasing the Ottoman logistical capacity. Bali Bey destroyed the fortresses on the opposite side of the ruined Severin fortress and began building the

Szakály, "The Hungarian-Croatian Border Defense System and Its Collapse," 148; András Kubinyi, "The Battle of Szávaszentdemeter-Nagyolaszi (1523)," 83.

⁷⁷ Feridun M. Emecen, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Zamanı* (Ankara: TTK, 2022), 124.

⁷⁸ For more detail on the battle see András Kubinyi, "The Battle of Szávaszentdemeter-Nagyolaszi (1523)," 71–162.

⁷⁹ Ferenc Szakály, "The Hungarian-Croatian Border Defense System and Its Collapse," 152; Adrian Magina, "Border and Periphery. The Southern Frontier of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary Between Belgrade and Severin (14th-16th Centuries)," *Initial. A Review of Medieval Studies* 4 (2016): 151–154.

Kladovo (Fethislam) fortress, which was supported by polygonal artillery towers that were popular at the time.

Compared to these recent military developments on the Danube front, Bosnia saw a considerably speedier Ottoman advance. As had his predecessor Yunus Paşa, Hüsrev Bey, who became the governor of the Bosnia immediately after the capture of Belgrade, directed his conquests towards the fortifications south of the Krka River in southern Croatia held by Ivan Karlović. Following brief sieges, the fortresses of Knin, Dirniš and Skradin were captured in 1522.⁸⁰ In mid-1523, Damjan, the commander of Kličevica, a fortress located just 16 kilometres west of Ostrovica, surrendered it directly to the Ottomans. Damjan was also a key figure in the capture of Ostrovica, Karlović's most significant fortress in the region, at the end of 1523.⁸¹ As it would later become evident not all Ottoman conquests in the region were violent sieges. While written sources make no mention, it is probable that numerous fortress commanders (*porkulab*) surrendered their fortresses to the Ottomans. Additionally, Nečven, located only 20 km northeast of Skradin, was likely to be captured in the same year.

Out of all the military confrontations the Ottomans and Hungarians had, the Battle of Mohaács particularly stands distinguished. In 1526, five years after the capture of Belgrade, Sultan Süleyman led a sizable army on a military campaign against

⁸⁰ Mažuran, *Hrvati i Osmansko Carstvo*, 59.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 61. The first information on Damjan voyvoda and his brother Juraj is from 5 February 1524. He was awarded with 8,000 akçe upon his bravery during the succesful siege of Ostrovica, while his brother Juraj also received 4,000 akçe: "...ve kal'a-i mezbûre (Ostrovica) fethinde yoldaşlık iden Damyan voyvoda karındaşı Yuray(a) 4,000 akçelik timar ve mezkûr Damyan voyvodaya sekiz (bin) akçelik timar ... fi 29 Rebiyyülevvel sene 930 (5.2.1524)", TT d. 91, 9. Damjan voyvoda later converted to Islam and took upon the name Mahmud. Also, he was awarded with zeamet 20,000 akçe worth on 7 February 1538 for his successes in the battles against the Venetian army besieging the fortresses of Obrovac and Solin. He held the position of *azeb ağalığı*, the commander of the infantry troops within a fortress. The name of the fortress is not specified in the text: "...Damyan voyvoda Solin ve Obrovac kal'alarında yoldaşlık (itmeğin) ve Dergâh-i Mu'allâda İslâma gelüb Mahmud ismiyle tesmiye olunub 20,000 akçelik ze'âmet idesiz deyü hükm-i hümâyûn irâd itmeğin virildi, 'azeb ağalığın ider fi 7 Ramâzan 944 (7.2.1538)". KK d. 282, 29b. Mahmud did not stay in this position for long since he would pass away within the same year (5.11.1538). *Ibid.*, 29b. For more detail on his family and holdings as çiftlik in later period see: Fazileta Hafizović, "Različite refleksije osmanskog osvajanja srednjodalmatinskog zaleđa," *Anali Gazi Husrev-begove biblioteke* 42:34 (2013): 109–112.

Hungary. The majority of the household troops (*kapıkulu*), along with a significant portion of the timariot forces of Rumelia and Anatolia, participated in this campaign. The army also included the auxiliary azeb forces numbered between 60,000 to 70,000. On 23 April 1526, the sultan and the army departed from İstanbul. On 2 May, they joined the Anatolian troops under the command of Behram Paşa, who had been waiting for their arrival. The Ottoman army was joined by the Rumelian timariot army waiting in Sofia and became fully assembled on that location. As all Hungarian fortifications on the Danube had been captured by Bali Bey between 1522 and 1524, a small contingent of the Ottoman fleet was also sent from Istanbul as additional support. The river fleet built in Nicopolis, Vidin, Semendria, and Zvornik also assembled in Belgrade.⁸²

In early July, just before the sultan's arrival in Belgrade, İbrahim Paşa was ordered to cross to Srem with the Rumelian forces. His primary objective was to capture all the fortresses *en route* to Srem and ensure the smooth crossing of Ottoman forces into the Hungarian plains. Upon the approach of a large Ottoman army, several small fortress garrisons surrendered their fortresses without resistance. On 8 July, while İbrahim Paşa was preparing to lay siege to Petrovaradin, Hüsrev Bey reported the conquest of the Irig. Petrovaradin, the strongest Hungarian fortification on the Danube after the loss of Belgrade, fell after only 19 days of siege on 27 July. After capturing the most important fortification in the region, the Ottoman forces proceeded to besiege the Ilok fortress, which fell after a 9-day siege. Concurrently, several other fortresses in the region, including Grgurevci, Vrdnik, Berkasovo (Ott. Bırkacık), Mitrovica (mod. Sremska Mitrovica), Čerević, Sotin, Vukovar, Rača and Erdut, surrendered to the Ottoman forces. A month and a half after crossing to the Srem side,

⁸² Bostan Çelebi, *Kitâb*, 80b.

the Ottoman army captured the fortress of Osijek and destroyed it. On 21 August, the army crossed the bridge in front of Osijek and advanced to the Pannonia plains.⁸³

The Battle of Mohács on 26 August 1526 saw the medieval Hungarian kingdom destroyed in just two hours. The Sultan and his army waited on the battlefield for several days before finally reaching Buda on 11 September. The Ottoman army then retreated, leaving the sacked Hungarian capital in flames. The reason why the Ottomans did not conquer Hungary outright is debated to this day. It is possible that Sultan Süleyman was following a reactive policy of ‘gradual conquest’, which the Ottomans had successfully implemented in the Balkans earlier in the century. However, Ottoman grand strategy deserves further study on a broader scale. Although the Ottomans did not conquer all of Hungary, they demonstrated their active interest in the region by leaving permanent garrisons in the fortresses they captured during the campaign. The Ottomans fortified many strategically important fortresses in the narrow corridor between the Sava and the Danube, stationing a considerable force of janissaries and their guards inside. This strong Ottoman military presence served as a base for future military operations in Hungary and beyond. After the Battle of Mohács, the Ottomans and the Habsburgs engaged in a protracted struggle to become the dominant power in Central Europe.

2.4. Post-Mohács (1526–1538)

After the Battle of Mohács, Hungary faced a great disaster with the death of King Louis II, who had no heir. Choosing a new king was a difficult task for the remaining Hungarian nobles. Two candidates for the Hungarian crown emerged: Janos

⁸³ “...ol esnâda Gragoriçe ve Brkaso ve Dimitrofçe ve Nogay ve Sotin ve Vilkovar ve Raça ve Erdud nâm kulâ’un keferesi dahi ba’zıları müsâdeme-i ‘asâkir-i Nusret şî’ârdan firâr eyleyüb ve ba’zıları dahi inkiyâd ve itâ’at gösterüb kal’aların virüb...”. Ibid., 87.

Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania, who had fresh military resources at his disposal but had not participated in the Battle of Mohács, and Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, brother of Queen Mary, the wife of the deceased Hungarian king. On 11 November 1526, Szapolyai was elected King of Hungary at the Diet of Székesfehérvár. Meanwhile, Ferdinand believed that he was the rightful heir to Hungary and Bohemia under the Treaty of Succession of 1515. In October, the Diet of Prague elected him King of Bohemia, while the pro-Habsburg Diet of Pozsony elected him King of Hungary. On the other hand, in January 1527 the Croatian nobility, led by Miklós Zrínyi, Ivan Karlović and Stephan Blagay, recognized Ferdinand as king at their meeting in Cetin.⁸⁴

After being defeated by Ferdinand's forces at Tokaj in 1527, Janos Szapolyai realized that he needed to ally with the Ottomans to regain control of Hungary. He sent Hieronymus Laski to Constantinople to secure military and political support from the Ottomans. However, he was unsuccessful in his attempt to reclaim the fortresses lost during the Mohács campaign.⁸⁵ Despite the apparent support of Janos Szapolyai by Yahyapaşazade Mehmed Bey, governor of Semendria, the capture of the Hungarian throne of Buda by Ferdinand's forces in 1528 prompted the Sultan to launch a third Hungarian campaign. In the 1529 campaign, the Ottomans successfully captured Buda on 8 September, but failed to take Vienna despite besieging it. The Ottoman army suffered significant losses due to the end of their logistical capabilities and seasonal conditions. The restoration of Szapolyai to the Hungarian crown by the Ottomans did not turn the civil war in Szapolyai's favour. As the Ottomans retreated, they refortified Osijek, the main gateway to the Hungarian plains, which had been destroyed in the

⁸⁴ Géza Pálffy, *The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century*, 42–43; Varga, *Europe's Leonidas*, 92–95.

⁸⁵ Fodor, "Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary," 297.

campaign of 1526. 3,000 garrison soldiers were stationed there. The Ottoman military presence in Srem continued to grow.

Between 1528 and 1530, the Ottomans continued to expand their military presence in Srem, capturing the fortress of Morović (Hun. Marot)⁸⁶ and the fortress of Berkasovo (Ott. Birkas) in May 1529. While some chronicles suggest that the fortresses of Brčko, Nocaj and Novigrad on the Sava were surrendered to the Ottomans during the Mohács campaign of 1526, this claim seems unlikely. It is more likely that these fortresses were ultimately captured by the Ottomans in mid-1529.⁸⁷

Meanwhile, in Bosnia and Croatia, Hüsrev Bey made rapid and effective conquests with the support of the sipahi forces of the sub-provinces of Zvornik and Herzegovina. Although the Croatian nobility recognized Ferdinand as king in Cetin in 1526, Ferdinand's military and financial support for the Croatian nobles was not at the desired level; thus, they remained vulnerable to direct Ottoman attacks.

During the year of Mohács campaign, the Bosnian front remained quiet. Yet, the following year, Hüsrev Bey, together with Bosnian forces supported by sipahis of Herzegovina sancak, formed a small invasion army of between 3,000 and 5,000 men and besieged the fortresses in the Lika region that belonged to Ivan Karlović. On 3 March 1527, after a very short siege, the fortress of Obrovac was taken by Hüsrev Bey's steward (*kethüda*) Murad. Only a month later, the Ottomans captured the fortresses of Udbina, the family stronghold of Ivan Karlovic, Mrsinj and Komić. The Ottomans also destroyed all the small fortresses between Udbina and Obrovac,

⁸⁶ The fortress capitulated on 30 July 1529. Feridun Bey, *Münşeat*, 568. The fortress had already a dizdâr (fortress commander) in early 1530. KK d. 1764, 99.

⁸⁷ The commander of Berkasovo yielded the fortress on early 1528 and received timar 3,000 akçe worth: "Srem kal'alarından Brkas nam kal'anın porkolabı olub itâ'at iden Mihale Dergâh-i Mu'alladan 3.000 akçelik timar emr olunub hükm-i hümâyûn virildi, eşer fi 27 Şa'bân sene 934 (17.05.1528)". TT d. 57, 104.

including Gračac, Zvonigrad, Vranik, Lukavec, Lovinac and Sveti Rok, rendering them useless.

The most significant event of the year was the final conquest of the repeatedly besieged fortress of Jajce in October 1527. Jajce had functioned as the centre of the Bosnian Banate until 1527, and together with the other Hungarian fortresses clustered around, was the most important obstacle preventing the Ottomans from extending their physical dominance north of the Sava River. In the early 16th century, the Ottomans captured the Hungarian garrisons surrounding Jajce one by one. Providing troops, money, and food to the besieged Jajce became increasingly difficult for the Croatian and Hungarian nobles in the region. Eventually, Ottoman pressure proved successful, and the fortress yielded to a surprise attack. After the fall of Jajce, Krupa (Greben), Banja Luka, Zvečaj, Vrbaška, and Levač (Ott. Lefçe) along the Vrbas River surrendered to the Ottomans. This marked the first time that the Ottomans extended their control along the Vrbas valley on the Bosnian frontier and reached directly to the Sava River. As a result, Slavonia became vulnerable to possible Ottoman attacks in the future. In 1530, the Ottomans began constructing a fortress at Kobaš to serve as a bridgehead.⁸⁸

After the Mohács campaign in 1526, the Ottomans gained control of Srem and made significant advances in Bosnia. However, after the unsuccessful campaigns of 1529 and 1532, Sultan Süleyman and his officials realized that the complete subjugation of Hungary could not be achieved with single military campaigns. The Ottomans also wanted to shift their focus to the east, which led to the signing of the first Ottoman-Habsburg peace treaty in 1533. As a result, the Ottoman-Habsburg conflicts came to an end, at least temporarily.

⁸⁸ “*kal’a-i Kobaş der kenâr-i âb-i Sava der mukabele-i Islavin ki hâliyâ binâ ve hâdis şüd*”. MAD 540, 219.

Although the Ottoman-Habsburg armistice came into force in 1533, the Croatian nobility in Croatia had reached an agreement with the Ottomans much earlier.⁸⁹ They kept losing their lands due to constant Ottoman attacks. In the early 1530s, an agreement was reached to pay the Ottomans an annual tribute in exchange for leaving the Blagajski, Zrínji and Karlović territories untouched by the Ottomans. The tribute was led by Ivan Karlović, the Ban of Croatia, who had lost many fortresses and estates in Croatia between 1522 and 1527. He informed the sultan through Hüsrev Bey that he would pay an annual tribute of 1,200 florins, following the example of Moldavia and Wallachia.⁹⁰ Already in April 1530, Miklós III Zrínyi's men had come to Constantinople to pay the annual tribute of 700 florins.⁹¹ On the other hand, during the expedition of 1532, when the Ottoman army was on the Syrmium, the Serbian Despot Stephen Berislavić Grabarski, also a former supporter of Ferdinand, declared his allegiance to the Ottomans. This enabled Berislavić to protect his property in the Srem as well as his possessions along the Sava.⁹²

A mukataa register dated 10 March 1533 records which Croatian nobles was to pay how much tribute to the Ottomans. The register recorded the taxes that these nobles were obliged to pay for three years. Accordingly, Krsto Svetacki⁹³ promised to

⁸⁹ Varga, *Europe's Leonidas*, 110.

⁹⁰ Ménage, *Ottoman Historical Documents*, 167.

⁹¹ KK d. 1764, 102. Between 1530 and 1534, Miklós Zrínyi regularly paid tribute to the Ottomans. On 14 September 1533, Kemal voyvoda, one of Hüsrev Bey's men, brought the 700 florins of tribute that Zrínyi was obligated to pay to İstanbul for the year 1532. It seems that Zrínyi failed to pay his tribute in time: "*İzrinski mir der vilâyet-i Darü'l-harb der nezd-i Bosna 'an cizye-i vilâyet-i hod 'an evvel-i Nevruz el-vâki' fi Şa'bân sene 938 (11 March 1532) ber-mûcib-i mektub-i Hüsrev Beğ mirlivâ-i Bosna 'an yed-i Kemal, voyvoda-i hod: 700 sikke*". KK d. 1863, 21.

⁹² On 2 August 1532, while the Ottoman army was in Osijek, Berislavić came to declare his allegiance to Sultan Süleyman in order not to lose any more possessions, as he had already lost the fortress of Njemci in June 1532. Feridun Bey, *Münşeât*, 589. He was given a gift (*in 'âm*) of 5,000 akçe: "*in 'âm be-veled-i Despot 'an mirân-i Hırvat*". KK d. 1764, 172. Similarly, on 13 October 1532, at the end of the campaign, Berislavić was among those who received gifts. Ibid, 179. On the same day, Peter Perenyi, who also owned large estates in Syrmium and Valpo, sent envoys to the Sultan in Osijek: "*merdumân-i Perim Petri mîr-i sâbık-i vilâyet-i Srem ki pişkeş averdend*". Ibid, 172.

⁹³ "*der 'uhde-i veled-i Kostorfor mir 'an evvel-i Nevruz el-vâki' fi 13 Şa'bân sene 939 ilâ evvel-i Nevruz el-vâki' fi 24 Şa'bân sene 940 (10 March 1533 – 10 March 1534). Fi el-asl fi sene hasene-i Ungurisiye 1300 sikke, fi sülüs sinîn: hasene-i Ungurusiye 390 sikke fi 55 21,450 (akçe)*". MAD 468, 101. The

pay 130 Hungarian florins per year, Stjepan Blagajski and Juraj III Frankopan Slunjski⁹⁴ together 600 florins, Miklós III Zrínyi⁹⁵ 700 florins per year, and another Croatian nobleman 300 florins per year.⁹⁶

After the Treaty of 1533, there was a general cessation of hostilities on the Sava and Danube regions. The estates and fortresses of the Croatian nobles were left untouched by the Ottomans for some time. However, in 1536, when the two-year long eastern campaign (*Irakeyn*) ended with the successful capture of Bağdat and its establishment as a province, the conflicts in the west resumed. The centre of the conflicts was to be the territory of Stjepan Berislavić, who had already tried to defect to Ferdinand's side after the peace of 1533. In 1535, conflicts broke out between Hüsrev Bey and Berislavić over the surrender of the fortresses of Kobaš and Brod on the Sava, which previously belonged to the lords who supported Ferdinand to the Ottomans. After the assassination of Berislavić in 1535, Hüsrev Bey from the south and Mehmed Bey from the east launched coordinated attacks on his estates and fortresses. The commander of Dobor, the sole fortress south of the Sava under Berislavić's control, capitulated to the Ottomans without resistance.⁹⁷ Likewise,

Ottomans opted to use the Latin version of Krsto Svetački, also known as Christophorus de Zemphey. In 1540, Krsto Svetacki joined the Ottomans with his son Stephan and became a zeamet owner, and Ottoman register call him "Kostofor": "İstapan veled-i Kostofor". MAD 34, 497. For a detailed study on him see: Dino Mujadžević, "Obitelj Svetački u Osmanskoj službi", *Povijesni Prilozi* 42:65 (2023): 107–134.

⁹⁴ "an mahsûl-i cizye-i gebrân-i kal'a-i Petreša tâbi'-i livâ-i Bosna der 'uhde-i mezkûrîn: der 'uhde-i Yulyak (?) mir 'an evvel-i Nevruz el-vâki' fî 13 Şa'bân sene 939 ilâ evvel-i Nevruz el-vâki' fî 24 Şa'bân sene 940 (10 March 1533 – 10 March 1534). Fî el-asl fî sene hasene-i Ungurisiye 300 sikke, fî sülûs sinîn: hasene-i Ungurusiye 900 sikke fî 55 49,500 (akçe)". MAD 468, 101.

⁹⁵ "der 'uhde-i Mikloş mir-i vilâyet-i Zrinski 'an Darü'l-harb der nezd-i vilâyet-i Bosna 'an cizye-i hod 'an evvel-i Nevruz el-vâki' fî 14 Şa'bân sene 939 ilâ evvel-i Nevruz el-vâki' fî 24 Şa'bân sene 940 (11 March 1533 – 10 March 1534). Fî el-asl fî sene hasene-i Ungurisiye 700 sikke, fî sülûs sinîn: hasene-i Ungurusiye 2,100 sikke fî 55 115,500 (akçe)". Ibid., 102.

⁹⁶ "der 'uhde-i Blagajski İstefan ve İslunski Yuray mirân tâbi'-i vilâyet-i Bosna 'an evvel-i Nevruz el-vâki' fî 24 Şa'bân sene 940 (10 March 1534). Fî el-asl fî sene hasene-i Ungurisiye 600 sikke, fî sülûs sinîn: hasene-i Ungurusiye 1,800 sikke fî 55 99,000 (akçe)". Ibid., 101.

⁹⁷ The commander of Dobor, Petke, received a timar 10,000 akçe worth after yielding the fortress to the Ottomans: "... Dergâh-i Mu'allâdan Dobor kal'asının porkolabı olub 10,000 akçelik timar emr olub hükm-i hümayûn irâd iden Petke nâm kâfire virildi eşer fî 3 Cemâziyelaahir sene 943 (17.11.1536)". KK d. 282, 46a.

Gradiška fell into the hands of Hüsrev Bey without any opposition.⁹⁸ The Ottomans immediately fortified Gradiška, establishing a bridgehead for operations across the Sava. By August 1536, they had already captured and garrisoned Brod (Slavonski Brod), Gradiška, Jaruge, Skirevci, Novigrad, Garčin, and Platernica. Kobaš, Gradiška with Brod particularly heavily garrisoned. On the other hand, the neighbouring towns of Vinica, Vratna, and Babina Greda were destroyed beyond use.⁹⁹ By the end of the year, the entire Sava coast from Gradiška to Belgrade was under Ottoman control, and ready to be used as logistic route for the Ottoman river fleet.

In the same year, governor of Semendria Mehmed Bey launched strong attacks on Berislavić's lands and other districts in the Požega region. By the middle of September 1536, it was reported that 13 fortresses had been captured. By the end of the year, the Ottomans had captured Đakovo, Gorjani, Podgorač, Palina, Levanjska Varoš (Nevna), Sedlak, Subolica (Zombathel), Gradište and the fortified town of Korog.¹⁰⁰ The rapid Ottoman advance, which began at the end of 1535 and lasted until the end of 1536, and which can be described as a kind of early modern *Blitzkrieg*, resulted in the Ottoman military presence, which for years had been confined to a narrow corridor along the Danube–Drava line, penetrating westwards into Slavonia.

The year 1537 can be considered as one of the most critical for the fate of Slavonia and Croatia. On the Croatian front, the forces of Murad Kethüda backed by the forces of the Herzegovina sancak, finally took control of the fortress of Klis on 10 March 1537. The fortress had been repeatedly besieged but had been successfully

⁹⁸ The commander of Gradiška, Petri, received a timar 10,000 akçe worth after yielding the fortress to the Ottomans: "*timar-i Yeniçeri Hasan, mezkûr için Solin kal'ası muhâfazası hizmetine gelmedi deyü Dergâh-i Mu'allâdan Gradiški nâm kal'anın banı olub 10,000 akçelik timar emr olub hükm-i hümayûn irâd iden Breşovrik Petri ile sancağibeği i'lâm itmeğin virildi eşer fî 22 Muharrem sene 944 (1.7.1537)*". A. {DFE.d. 21, 220b.

⁹⁹ Mažuran, *Hrvati i Osmansko Carstvo*, 81–82. For a detailed study on Berislavić, see Marija Karbić, "Hrvatsko pleinstvo u borbi protiv Osmanlija. Primjer obitelji Berislavića Grabarskih iz Slavonije," *Povijesni prilozi* 31 (2006): 71–85.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 82–83.

defended by its commander Petar Kružić despite being blockaded by the Ottomans for years.¹⁰¹ On the Sava front, the Ottoman advance of 1536 continued at full speed. Požega and its fortresses were taken by Yahyapaşazade Mehmet Bey in February 1537. On the other hand, the troops of Hüsrev Bey managed to take Dubica. However, this fortress was soon retaken by the Croats.

When the Ottoman-Venetian War began in 1537, the entire Ottoman army was busy besieging the fortress of Corfu on the Adriatic, while the governors of Bosnia and Semendria, who had been on the offensive since 1536, remained in a defensive posture and set about organizing the administrative and military organization of the territory they had so quickly conquered. As the Ottoman army was occupied with the siege of Corfu, King Ferdinand of Austria commissioned General Hans Katzianer (Ott. Koçıyan), commander-in-chief of Hungary, to lead a major military expedition to regain the lost territories of Slavonia and, if possible, take Osijek and end the Ottoman military presence in the region. The Habsburg army of 16,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry besieged Osijek, but lifted the siege when they learned of Mehmed Bey's approaching forces.¹⁰² Constantly harassed by the Ottoman troops, the Habsburg army retreated southwards and took up defensive positions in Gorjani. Sufficiently reinforced by sipahi troops from Bosnia, Zvornik, and Kruševac (Alacahisar), Mehmed Bey finally attacked the Habsburg army on 9 October 1537. The result was

¹⁰¹ James D. Tracy, *Balkan Wars: Habsburg Croatia, Ottoman Bosnia and Venetian Dalmatia, 1499–1617* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 101.

¹⁰² Poor logistic organization and diseases within the army also affected their overall situation. The Habsburg forces participating in the battle were reported to be 24–25,000. Ágoston, *Last Muslim Conquest*, 195–186; Varga, *Europe's Leonidas*, 131. For a detailed description of the battle, see Mažuran, *Hrvati i Osmansko Carstvo*, 89–90; Tracy, *Balkan Wars*, 120–122. Estimating the number of Ottoman forces in the battle is challenging. However, it is highly probable that the number of sipahi forces with retainers, along with entourage under the mentioned beys, would be around 5–6,000. It is also worth noting that part of the garrison forces in Srem participated in the battle, which suggests that over 10,000 soldiers were present on the battlefield. Mehmed Zaim in his *Câmi 'ü't-tevârih* gives the number of Ottoman troops in Gorjani as 10,000. Ayşe Nur Sır, *Mehmed Za'im Câmi 'ü't-tevârih*. Vol I. (Unpublished PhD diss., Marmara University, 2009), 362–363.

a total defeat for the Habsburgs. Most of the Habsburg soldiers were either killed or captured. News of the victory at Gorjani reached the Sultan in Manastır on his return from the failed Corfu campaign on 20 October 1537.¹⁰³ Hüsrev Bey and Mehmed Bey, who had shown merit in the battle, received valuable cloth and jewelry as well as cash gifts of 100,000 akçe each, while Zvornik governor Cafer Bey and Ahmed Bey, the brother of Mehmed Bey, and the governor of Kruševac, who had also participated in the campaign, received gifts of 20,000 akçe each.¹⁰⁴

The Battle of Gorjani made permanent the Ottoman conquests in Slavonia that had taken place between 1536 and 1537. As a result of this major blow to Habsburg military power, the Ottomans had a free hand in the region. Indeed, essential fortresses in the region came under Ottoman rule in the following years. In April 1538, the Ottomans captured Dubica on the Una River, just 13 km southwest of Jasenovac, where the Ottomans had built a wooden fortress the previous year, but it was later captured by the Croats.¹⁰⁵ In the south, the Venetian army besieging the fortress of Obrovac was defeated and the two important Venetian fortresses of Vrana and Nadin were captured by the troops of Hüsrev Bey in June 1538.¹⁰⁶ In 1538, the conquered

¹⁰³ MAD 17837, 23. It seems that news was brought by Hüsrev Bey's men: Nasuh (*voyvoda*), Celal (*serbevvâbîn*) and Murad *voyvoda* (*kethüda*). Ibid, 23.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 23. Taken from Emecen, *Sultan Süleyman ve Zamanı*, 283. While Emecen mentions the gifts given to the aforementioned sancakbeyis, he does not state that it was on the occasion of the Battle of Gorjani and concludes by writing that they were given only as a result of successful raids.

¹⁰⁵ Mažuran, *Hrvati i Osmansko Carstvo*, 94. Varga, *Europe's Leonidas*, 135; Tracy, *Balkan Wars*, 122–123. There were familiar faces among the Ottoman forces defeated in front of Jasenovac who fell captive to the Croats: Hazem wayda (Hasan *voyvoda*, from Hüsrev Bey's entourage), Saffer Kobchich (Safer Kopčić), Hazen zubasa (Hasan subaşı) and Maskoch wayda (Malkoç *voyvoda*, from Hüsrev bey's entourage). Emilij Laszowski, *Monumenta Habsburgica Regni Croatiae Dalmatiae Slavoniae*, II. vol. (Zagreb: 1916), 329–330. It seems that the fortress was captured again by the Ottomans in 1538. In fact, Borko, the commander of Jasenovac, had made a deal with the Ottomans and surrendered the fortress to them. In return, he received a timar of 10,000 akçe: "... *Yasenofça nâm kal'anın porkolab(ı) Borko nâm kâfire 10,000 akçelik timar idesiz deyü hükm-i hümayûn irâd itmeğın virildi fi 4 Safer sene 945 (2.7.1538)*". KK d. 282, 39.

¹⁰⁶ The Ottoman relief army gathering in Knin to confront Venetian army was estimated 20,000, which is obviously exaggeration. Tracy, *Balkan Wars*, 106–107. Bostan Çelebi claims that the number of Venetian troops besieging Obrovac was 15,000. The Ottoman troops that Hüsrev Bey had his disposal was 3,000. Bostan Çelebi, *Kitâb* (Vienna copy), 276b–279b.

lands on the Venetian–Croatian border and in Slavonia were integrated into the Ottoman military and administrative system with the establishment of two new sancaks. The sancak of Požega was established in early 1538. Although it is not known when he was appointed, the first sancakbeyi of Požega was Arslan Bey, son of Yahyapaşazade Mehmed Bey, who commanded the Ottoman forces in the Battle of Gorjani.¹⁰⁷ In the middle of 1538, Murad voyvoda, steward of Hüsrev Bey, who brought the news of the conquests of Vrana and Nadin to Istanbul, was appointed the first governor of the newly established sancak of Klis.¹⁰⁸

2.5. Establishment of Budin Vilayet and Ottoman Chain of Fortresses (1541–1543)

After the death of Janos Szapolya, King Ferdinand sent an army led by von Roggendorf to Buda in the spring of 1541 to take the crown of Hungary as agreed. When Sultan Süleyman heard of the siege, he immediately set out from Constantinople. Before his departure, he had already sent the governors along the frontier and the Rumelian sipahi army, under the command of the third vizier Sofu Mehmed Paşa, to help Buda. The Ottoman army intervened in time to save Buda from the Habsburg threat. Sultan Süleyman and the main household army did not arrive in

¹⁰⁷ Although Požega was indeed conquered in early 1537, it seems that its establishment as a sancak occurred only in the early months of 1538. Géza Dávid, “The Sancakbegis of Pozsega (Požega, Pojege) in the 16th Century,” in *Life on the Ottoman Border Essays in Honour of Nenad Močanin*, ed. Vjeran Kursar (Zagreb: FF Press, 2022), 32–33. Bostan Çelebi mentions that after the victory, the captured prisoners were sent to Istanbul at the end of 1537, including Mehmed Bey’s son, Arslan Bey. Following this event, it is mentioned that Arslan Bey was appointed as the bey of Požega. Although we may not know the exact date of the establishment of the sancak, it seems certain that it occurred months after the conquest of Požega.

¹⁰⁸ Nor was the sancak of Klis established immediately after its conquest in early 1537. The sancak was established only in the middle of 1538. The first governor of Klis was Murad Bey, Hüsrev Bey’s steward, who brought the news of the conquest of Vrana and Nadin to Istanbul in June 1538. Bostan details this event in his chronicle: “*livâ-i Bosna hudûdunda Venedik melâ’inine tâbi’ olan kılâ’-i metînden İvrana ve Nadin nâm mu’teber kal’alar ve nice kılâ’ dahi Bosna beği Hüsrev Beğ’in mesâ’i-i cemîlesiyle feth olunub bu fütûhun haberin isâl için Murad voyvoda nâm yarar adamın ulağla gönderüb haber-i fütûhu getürdikde timâr-i eyâletine terakkî olub mezkûr Murad voyvodaya dahi sancak virildi.*” Bostan Çelebi, *Kitâb* (Viyana copy), 279a–b.

Buda until the end of August. At the beginning of September, it was decided to make Buda a distinct province, and Hadım Süleyman Paşa, who had been the governor-general of Anatolia, was appointed as the first governor-general of Buda. Before withdrawing, the army stored the necessary ammunition in the fortress of Buda. An unknown number of kapıkulu soldiers were left here and garrison troops were transferred from the fortresses of Srem and Semendria.¹⁰⁹ In addition, a total of 12,000,000 akçe was left in Buda for the repair of the badly damaged Buda fortress and to cover the one-year salaries of the garrison soldiers.¹¹⁰

The province of Buda was initially established as a network of defences, with a few fortresses controlling the narrow corridor along the Danube. The majority of the defenders, numbering almost 7,000 to 8,000 men, were stationed in the fortresses of Buda and Pest. Between Osijek and Buda, only the fortresses of Baranvar, and possibly Szekszárd (Ott. Seksar) and Szekcző (Ott. Sekçöy), were manned.¹¹¹ The governors and timariot sipahis from the sancaks of Bosnia, Semendire, Požega, Izvornik, Alacahisar, Vidin and Kyustendil¹¹² were assigned to defend Buda. This was due to the difficulty of defending the area and the possibility of a new attack by Ferdinand the following year. In addition to the garrison soldiers, a substantial Ottoman army

¹⁰⁹ According to a pay register compiled during the Süleyman Paşa's governorship (between September 1541–January 1542), out of 7,763 soldiers only 5,893 men were present in Buda and Pest. Agoston, "The Costs of the Ottoman Fortress-System in Hungary in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," 197; Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 334–335.

¹¹⁰ "ve Budim kal'asında yüz yirmi yük (12,000,000) akçe konulmak lazımdır. Yirmi yüki (2,000,000 akçe) binâ için ve yüz yüki (10,000,000) mevâcib için". TSMA d. 9619, 2.

¹¹¹ Seksar had been captured before the annexation of Buda on 24 February 1541. Géza David, "An Ottoman Military Career on the Hungarian Borders Kasım Voyvoda, Bey, and Pasha," in *Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, eds. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Leiden – Boston – Köln: Brill, 2000), 272; Klára Hegyi, "The Ottoman Network of Fortresses in Hungary," in *Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, eds. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Leiden–Boston–Köln: Brill, 2000), 164.

¹¹² Mehmed Zaim and Peçevi indicates that the sancakbeyi of Kyustendil, Hızır Bey and the sancak sipahis were also left Buda. Mehmed Zaim, *Câmi 'ü't-tevârih*, 364–365; *Târih-i Peçevî*, 235. It seems true since many sipahis from Kyustendil failed to take part in this mission and their timars were taken away by the sultan's order: "timâr-i Piri b. Şirmerd. Mezkûr için hâliyâ vâki' olan Peşte hıdmetine gelmedi deyü ... fî 13 Şa'bân sene 949 (22.11.1542)". MAD d. 34, 273a.

was assigned to protect the recently established province. The troops ultimately demonstrated their value. The Austrian armies besieged Pest the following year but fell back without achieving any results.

The province of Buda, which was recently established, required financial support from the central government and military assistance from the sipahis in Rumelia. After the province was established, the sancaks of Semendire, Požega, Kruševac, Izvornik, Vulčitrin, which were previously under the province of Rumelia, were included in the new province.¹¹³ With the support of the timariot sipahis, the governor-general of Buda had a significant cavalry force for future military campaigns. In early 1542, the sancak of Mohačs¹¹⁴ was established, followed by the establishment of the sancak of Segedin in October, with the fortified Segedin as its centre.¹¹⁵ The timar system had not yet been implemented in these recently established sancaks. The only military presence of the Ottomans in the region consisted of the garrison soldiers in the fortresses and the retinue of the sancakbeyis.

While the administrative system was gradually forming in newly established Buda province, the Ottoman advance continued on the Slavonian front. On 18 September 1541, Murad Bey was appointed as the new governor of Požega in place of Arslan Bey and captured Rahovice five months later after a short siege.¹¹⁶ Around the

¹¹³ Ágoston, "The Costs of the Ottoman Fortress-System," 196.

¹¹⁴ The first sancakbeyi of this sancak was famous Kasım Bey. Dávid, "An Ottoman Military Career on the Hungarian Borders," 273; Géza Dávid, "Mohač", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (TDV) Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 38, 2020, 231–232.

¹¹⁵ The first sancakbeyi of Segedin was Süleyman Bey. Fóti Miklós, "Szeged 16. századi szandzsákbégjei," *Aetas* 38:4 (2023), 6. Süleyman Bey seems to have remained in this position for 8 months. Former captain of the Danube River (*kapudan-i âb-i Tuna*) Derviş Bey, the son of Bali Pasha, was appointed the sancakbeyi of Segedin on 28 October 1542: "*be-cihet-i âdet-i elviye berây-i Derviş Beğ veled-i Bali Beğ mirliva-i Segedin şüd*". D.BRZ.d. 20614, 22.

¹¹⁶ One of the late Hüsrev Bey's servants, Saver voyvoda, received a raise (*terakki*) worth 1,000 akçe for his services during the capture of the fortress. His total prebend was 11,193 akçe with the raise. It is noteworthy to say that lots of servants from the household of Hüsrev Bey later became the servants of Murad Bey, who was once the steward (*kethüda*) of Hüsrev Bey: "*timâr-i Saver voyvoda mezkûr İvrahovice kal'asında yoldaşlık edüb 1,000 akçe terakki emr olunub hükm-i hümayûn irâd itmeğin ... tezkire virildi eşer ... tahriren fî 4 Şa'bân el-mu'azzam sene 949 (13.11.1542)*". MAD 34, 484.

same time, the Ottomans captured the fortress of Mikleuš (Ott. İsveti Mikloş), Našice (Ott. Yasenicka), and Drenovac.¹¹⁷ The fortresses were quickly garrisoned. As a result, a second network of fortresses was established in Požega sancak, to the north of the line of Kamengrad, Velika, Kaptol, Vethi, Kutjevo and Gradište.

One of the main goals of Sultan Süleyman's fifth Hungarian expedition, also known as the Campaign of Estergom, was to capture significant fortifications in the surrounding area to expand the area of control of the Buda province, which formed a narrow corridor on the Danube in 1543. The Esztergom expedition was a defensive military campaign. On 7 June, while the main Ottoman army was still in Belgrade, Murad Bey of Požega, Kasım Bey of Mohács, and Ulama Paşa of Bosnia had already made significant progress in Slavonia.¹¹⁸ On 1 April 1543, the fortress of Voćin had already been captured.¹¹⁹ Valpovo fortress was besieged and eventually surrendered on 21 June 1543, with the Rumeli army joining the siege. Meanwhile, the Sultan was Osijek.¹²⁰ On 25 June 1543, the commander of Kisdér (Ott. Gijder) ceded the fortress to Kasım Bey.¹²¹ On 29 June 1543, the Ottomans also gained control of Pécs (Ott. Peçuy) fortress. The fortress commander, Velinik Istvan, received a gift on the same

¹¹⁷ Varga, *Europe's Leonidas*, 170.

¹¹⁸ Emecen, *Kanuni ve Zamani*, 354.

¹¹⁹ D.BRZ.d. 20614, 75. The commander of the fortress (*porkulab*) Marko yielded the fortress: "*in'âm be-Marko porkolab-i kal'a-i Vukin tabi'-i livâ-i Pojega ki kal'a dâde*". It seems that Murad Bey was one of the key figures in this conquest, he was also able to convince 600 households in the area to become Ottoman subjects, so he received 17,000 akçe raise (*terakki*) to add to his annual hass income: "*Müşârinileyhe Vukin nâm kal'ayı feth id[üb] ve Dârü'l-harbdan altı yüz haneyi itâ'at itdirüb on yedi bin akçe dahi terakki buyrulub [zıkr olan terakkisin ol gelen hanelerden] sene 949 Zilhiccesinin evâ[sıtında] hükm-i şerîf (virilmeğin ber-mûcib-i fermân-i hümayûn deftere kayd olundu) fi 3 Şa'bân sene 950 (1.11.1543)*". TT d. 203, 41.

¹²⁰ D.BRZ.d. 20614, p. 89: "*in'âm be-gebrân-i kal'a-i Valpova ki haber-i itâ'at averde*". Also, 3 days later the commander and the steward of the fortress received gift upon yielding the fortress: "*in'âm be-pokolab ve kethüdâ-i kal'a-i Valpova ki kal'a teslim kerde be-ma'rifet-i hazret-i Süleyman Paşa dâmet me'alihu*". Ibid., 89.

¹²¹ "*be-porkolab-i kal'a-i Gujdar ki Kasım Beg mirlivâ-i Mohaç fersitade el-vâki fi 22 minh*". KK d. 1765, 9b. The fortress commander, Velinik Istvan, received a gift on the same day. D.BRZ.d. 20614, p. 91. Two days later, 1 July 1543, the commander and his 2 men received other gifts upon the yielding the fortress on 29.6.1543: "*be-porkolab-i kal'a-i Peçuy ma' merdumân-i hod ki itâ'at kerdend el-vâki' fi 26 minh*". KK d. 1765, 11a.

day. Following the capture of Valpovo, the Ottomans laid siege to Siklós. The commander of the fortress surrendered it to the Ottomans on 6 July 1543 after a brief siege.¹²²

The fortress of Esterгон, strategically located just 30 km north-west of Buda, was besieged as its capture was imperative for the defense of the fortress of Buda. Defending by German, Italian and Spanish troops, heavily fortified Esterгон was besieged on 29 July and the commander of the fortress ceded the fortress on 10 August 1543 after a very difficult siege.¹²³ Following the conquest of the fortress, the strategically important Székesfehérvár (Ott. Ístolni Belgrad), situated just east of Lake Balaton, was besieged. The fortress was captured on 4 September 1543 after a difficult siege.¹²⁴ The two captured fortresses were of great strategic value. They housed thousands of janissaries and garrison soldiers. In addition, the Ístolni Belgrad was established as the centre of a new sancak. Ahmed Bey, the governor of İnebahtı, was appointed the first governor of the Ístolni Belgrad on 15 September 1543.¹²⁵

It seems that Esterгон did not become an independent sancak immediately after the conquest. There is no record in the campaign register or in the chronicles that Esterгон was immediately established as an independent sancak. Therefore, this expedition increased the total number of sancaks in Buda province to eight.¹²⁶ The

¹²² D.BRZ. d. 20614, 93: “*be-porkolab-i kal’a-i Sikloş ki haber-i itâ’at averde*”. 1765, 13b: “*in’âm be-pokolab ve ba’zı ümerâ-i kal’a-i Sikloş ki kal’a-i mezbûre teslim kerdend*”.

¹²³ Emecen, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Zamanı*, 357–358. The register indicates that the commander of the Tata yielded the fortress after the conquest of Esztergom on 16 August 1543. However, the fortress was not manned with garrison. D.BRZ.d. 20614, p. 104: “*in’âm be-mirân-i kal’a-i Tata ki itâ’at kerde be-ma’rifet-i hazret-i Süleyman Paşa ‘an yed-i Ahmed Çelebi rüznâme ve Bali beg çavuş*”.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 106.

¹²⁵ The vacant position for İnebahtı was filled with Cafer Agha. Ibid., 108.

¹²⁶ The list of governor-general, sancakbeyis, and other high officials in Buda vilayet immediately after the campaign: Mehmed Paşa son of Yahya Paşa–Governor-general, Mehmed Bey (Dukaginzade)–Semendria, Hayreddin Bey–Zvornik, Murad Bey–Osijek and Požega, Murad Bey–Alacahisar, Arslan Bey son of Mehmed Paşa Yahyapaşazade–Vulçitrin, Ahmed Bey son of Yahya Paşa–İstolni Belgrad, Derviş Bey son of Bali Paşa Yahyapaşazade–Segedin, Kasım Bey–Mohaács, Süleyman Bey–kethüda-i Budin, Mehmed Çelebi (son of Hayredin Bey)–Defterdâr-i Budin. KK d. 1765, 30a; D. BRZ. d. 20614, 112, 119. Note that Osijek and Požega was single sancak at the time.

Yahyapaşazades not only transferred their established power base from Rumelia to the newly conquered province of Buda but also expanded it. Governor General Mehmed Paşa's brother, Ahmed Bey, became the governor of the newly established sancak of İstolni Belgrad, while Mehmed Paşa's son, Arslan Bey, was in charge of another sancak (Vulçitrin) in the province of Buda. Derviş Bey, also from the same family and the son of Bali Paşa, the second governor-general of Buda, held the sancak of Segedin. Kasım Bey served the Yahyalı family for many years and quickly rose through the ranks to become ruler of the sancak of Mohaács. Meanwhile, Murad Bey, who was the steward of Hüsrev Bey, governed Požega. A detailed analysis of these power holders in the frontier regions will be covered in the next chapter.

The table presents a comparative analysis of contemporary literature on the Ottoman-Hungarian conflicts and Ottoman and Habsburg archival sources. It indicates which fortresses were captured after the Ottoman conquests in the region, which were subsequently reused, and which were demolished.

Table I: List of Fortresses Along the Hungarian Frontier Taken and Newly Built Between 1512–1543¹²⁷

Fortress	Mod. Name	Date of Conquest	Status
Sokol	Soko	Late 1512	Garrisoned
Srebrenik	-	11.10.1512	Garrisoned ¹²⁸
Tešanj	-	Late 1512	Garrisoned
Sin	Sinj	Mid. 1513	Garrisoned ¹²⁹
Sokol	Sokolac	Mid 1513	Garrisoned ¹³⁰
Bočac	-	May 1515	Garrisoned ¹³¹
Kotor	-	May 1515	Garrisoned
Nutjak	-	1515	Garrisoned
Cačvina	-	1515	Garrisoned
Vrh-reka	Vrlika	1515	Garrisoned
Drniš	-	1515	Garrisoned
Göhlisar	Jezero	Mid. 1518	Garrisoned ¹³²
Böğürdelen	Šabac	July 1521	Garrisoned
Belgrad	Belgrade	29.8.1521	Garrisoned
Zemun	Zimony	August 1521	destroyed
Bariç	Barič	August 1521	destroyed
Arki	Jarak	August 1521	destroyed
Kupinik	Kupinovo	August 1521	Destroyed, later refortified

¹²⁷ The information presented is derived from direct archival material or comparative studies based on archival material. The capture of fortresses by the Ottomans is well-documented, but determining which fortresses were used or destroyed requires consultation of Ottoman archival sources. For the early 16th century, Ottoman-Hungarian peace treaties and Ottoman archival sources were utilized. For the period after 1526, particularly for the fortresses in Slavonia, Géza Pálffy's study based on the Habsburg report of 1556 was utilised. For the article see Géza Pálffy, "Egy rendkívüli forrás a magyar politikai elit 16. századi földrajzi ismereteiről. Az 1526 és 1556 között török kézbe került magyarországi városok, várak és kastélyok összeírása a német-római Birodalom rendjei számára (A unique source on the geographical knowledge of the political elite of the Kingdom of Hungary in the sixteenth century: a register compiled for the estates of the Holy Roman Empire of the towns, fortresses, and castles in Hungary and Slavonia occupied by the Ottomans between 1526 and 1556)," in *Várak Nyomában: Tanulmányok a 60 éves Feld István tiszteletére*, eds. Terei György et al. (Budapest: Castrum Bene Egyesület–Civertan Grafikai Stúdió, 2011), 177–194. References and additional information have been added to the table where necessary. Also, some of the fortresses that the Ottomans already captured and use in Bosnia before 1512 were later destroyed before 1540. I have not added them to the list, they are the following: Zvečan, Jeleč, Kličevac, Bobovac, Vrh-Belice, Toričan, Komotin, Sused and Jezero. MAD 540; Hatice Oruç, "1528/30 Tarihi Mücmel Tahrir Defterine Göre Bosna Sancağında Mustahfiz Timarları," in *Perspectives on Ottoman Studies: Papers from the 18th Symposium of the International Committee of Pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Studies (CIEPO) at the University of Zagreb*, eds. Ekrem Čaušević and Nenad Moacanin (Berlin: LIT Verlag Münster, 2010), 745–746. Although two fortress, Sused and Jezero, were mentioned as destroyed in 1540, it seems that they were rebuilt and used since there were still garrison troops in these fortresses in 1550. Fazileta Hafizović, *Opširni popis timara mustahiza u tvrđavama Kliškog sandžaka iz 1550. godine* (Sarajevo: Naučnoistraživački institut "Ibn Sina" Sarajevo, 2014), 109–144 and 289–312.

¹²⁸ Ménage, *Ottoman Historical Documents*, 66.

¹²⁹ MAD 7, 378.

¹³⁰ Ménage, "An Ottoman Manual of Provincial Correspondence," 43–44.

¹³¹ KK d. 2546, p. 33. Bočac, Kotor and Cačvina were under repair in mid 1515.

¹³² Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács*, 364.

Salankamen	-	August 1521	Destroyed, refortified before 1541 ¹³³
Orşova	-	Early 1522	destroyed ¹³⁴
Peç	Peth	1522	destroyed ¹³⁵
Martin Brod	-	1522	destroyed ¹³⁶
Knin	-	1522	garrisoned
Skradin	-	1522	garrisoned
Kliçofçe	Kličevica	1523	Garrisoned, destroyed before 1550 ¹³⁷
Kliçovic	Ključica	1523	destroyed ¹³⁸
Nečven	-	1523	Garrisoned
Ostrovica	-	1523	Garrisoned
Benkoviç	Benković	1523	destroyed ¹³⁹
Severin	Szöreny	October 1524	destroyed ¹⁴⁰
Fethislam	Kladovo	1524	Newly built
Gradçaç	Gradačac	1524	Garrisoned ¹⁴¹
Petrovaradin	-	28.7.1526	Garrisoned
İlok	Ujlak	8.8.1526	Garrisoned
Ösek	Osijek	Mid August 1526	Destroyed, fortified in late 1529
Mandelos	Mandelos	August 1526	destroyed
Grgorovac	Grgurevci	August 1526	destroyed
Ireg	Irig	August 1526	Garrisoned, destroyed before 1530 ¹⁴²
Sotin	-	August 1526	destroyed

¹³³ The fortress of Salankamen and Zemun referred as in ruin (*Slan Camen et Semun ruinato*) in the Habsburg intelligent report from April 1529. Laszowski, *Documenta Habsburgica*, vol I, 151.

¹³⁴ Adrian Magina, "As the Turks Moved on them... New Documents on Severin and the Lower Parts of the Hungarian Kingdom Before the Battle of Mohács," *Politics and Society in Central and South-East Europe: Life Under the Shadow of the Ottoman Empire's Expansion (15th–16th Centuries)*, ed. Zsuzsanna Kopeczny (Cluj: Mega Publishing House, 2021), 95.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 95.

¹³⁶ Varga, *Europe's Leonidas*, 312.

¹³⁷ There were still garrison troops in the fortress in 1540. TT d. 201, 282. However, the fortress referred as ruin (*harâbe*) in 1550. TT d. 284, 428. Also, another source indicates that the fortress was destroyed (*bozulub*) and the garrison soldiers in the fortress were transferred to other fortresses: "... *mezbur Kliçofçe kal'ası sonradan bozulub müstahfizları aher kal'aya ihrâc olunub*..." TT d. 440, 283.

¹³⁸ The fortress referred as ruin (*harâbe*) in TT d. 157, 1057 and 1067; TT d. 284, 119.

¹³⁹ It was a sub-district (*nahiye*) mostly settled by the Vlachs in in 1530. TT d. 164, 44. It was also referred as fortress but clearly there were no guards in it. A. {DFE.d. 21, 205.

¹⁴⁰ Magina, "As the Turks Moved on Them," 96.

¹⁴¹ A certain Hasan, one of the servants of Zvornik governor Sinan Bey received a raise to his timar prebend for his accomplishments during the conquest of the fortress: "...*İzvornik beği Sinan Beğle Gračanice nâm kal'a feth oldukda bile olub yoldaşlık iden Hasan ... fî 17 Receb el-mürecceb sene 930 (21.5.1524)*". KK d. 281, 12.

¹⁴² There were garrison soldiers in the fortress according to a Habsburg intelligence report from April 1529. Laszowski, *Documenta Habsburgica*, vol. I, 151. The fortress was not listed in the sancak register in 1530. MAD 506.

Vilkovar	Vukovar	August 1526	Garrisoned after 1530
Vrdnik	-	August 1526	Garrisoned
Erdevit	Erdut	August 1526	Garrisoned
Čarevik	Čerević	August 1526	garrisoned
Manastir	Bonostor	August 1526	destroyed
Atya	Šarengard (Voćin)	August 1526	Garrisoned, destroyed before 1530 ¹⁴³
Boroh	Borovo	August 1526	Destroyed
Dimitrofçe	Sremska Mitrovica	August 1526	Garrisoned
Rača	Rača	August 1526	Garrisoned
İlic	Ilača	August 1526	destroyed
Titel	-	Late 1526	Garrisoned
Obrovac	-	3.3.1527	Garrisoned ¹⁴⁴
Udobina	Udbina	April 1527	Garrisoned
Mrsinј	-	April 1527	Destroyed
Komić	-	April 1527	Destroyed
Kamičak	-	1527	destroyed ¹⁴⁵
Gračac	-	1527	Destroyed ¹⁴⁶
Zvonigrad	-	1527	Destroyed, refortified in 1540s ¹⁴⁷
Hoton	-	1527	Destroyed
Rakovnik	-	1527	Destroyed
Plavno	-	1527	Destroyed
Zelengrad	-	1527	Destroyed
Vranik	-	1527	Destroyed ¹⁴⁸
Lovinac	-	1527	Destroyed
Sveti Rok	-	1527	Destroyed
Lukavec	-	1527	Destroyed
Yayçe	Jajce	October 1527	Garrisoned
Greben (Vrh Krupa)	-	October 1527	Destroyed
Zveçay	Zvecaj	October 1527	Garrisoned
Banja Luka	-	October 1527	Garrisoned
Vrbaska	Vrbaškigrad	Late 1527	Destroyed
Lefçe	Levac	Late 1527	Destroyed
Sanski Most	-	1527	Destroyed
Obrovac	-	1527	Destroyed
Kozarac	-	1527	Destroyed

¹⁴³ There were around 200 garrison soldiers in the fortress according to same intelligent report. Laszowski, *Documenta Habsburgica*, vol. I, 151. The fortress was not listed in the sancak register in 1530. MAD 506.

¹⁴⁴ Mažuran, *Hrvati i Osmansko Carstvo*, 71.

¹⁴⁵ "Ruined fortress called Kamenic around Kuluç (Ključ)". TT d. 284, 299; TT d. 411, 95b.

¹⁴⁶ "kal'a-i Gradçaç" in TT d. 164, 367; ruined fortress of Gradçaç in TT 284, 234.

¹⁴⁷ TT d. 440, 174: "Zvonigrad beşlileri ağası Mustafa Ağa".

¹⁴⁸ "Ruined fortress called Vranik", TT d. 164, 464; TTd. 284, 430.

Martin Brod	-	1527	destroyed
Brkas	Berkasovo	Late 1528	garrisoned, destroyed before 1530 ¹⁴⁹
Morovik	Morović	30.7.1529	garrisoned ¹⁵⁰
Birkacik	Brčko	1529	garrisoned ¹⁵¹
Nova	-	1529	garrisoned
Nogay	Noćaj	1529	newly erected
Blay	Blelaj	1529-1530	garrisoned
Karin	-	1529-1530	garrisoned
Novigrad	-	1529-1530	garrisoned
Kobaš	Slavonski Kobaš	1530	newly erected in 1530, refortified in 1536 ¹⁵² , destroyed before 1550 ¹⁵³
Nemči	Njemci	27.06.1532 ¹⁵⁴	garrisoned
Brod	Slavonski Brod	August 1536	garrisoned
Nova	Novi Grad	August 1536	destroyed before 1540 ¹⁵⁵
Viškovci	-	1536	destroyed ¹⁵⁶
Skirevci	-	1536	destroyed ¹⁵⁷
Diyakova	Đakovo	1536	garrisoned
Goryan	Gorjani	1536	garrisoned
Gradiška	-	1536	garrisoned
Dobor	-	1536	garrisoned ¹⁵⁸
Graniča	Gračanica	1536	garrisoned
Potgrač	Podgorač	Before August 1538	garrisoned
Palina	Paljevina	1536	destroyed
Sedlak	-	1536	Destroyed
Trnjani	-	1536	destroyed
Korođvar	-	1536	destroyed
Ivankovo	-	1536	destroyed
Dubovac	-	1536	destroyed
Giletinci	-	1536	destroyed
Radovanje	-	1536	destroyed

¹⁴⁹ Laszowski, *Documenta Habsburgica*, vol I, 164 –165. The fortress might be lost immediately in late 1528 and recaptured in early 1529. A roll-call register indicates that 116 garrison soldiers transferred from Ilok to Brkas on 28 March 1529. ĪE. AS 1/19. The fortress was not listed in the sancak register in 1530. MAD 506.

¹⁵⁰ Morović was under siege in June 1529. Mažuran, *Hrvati i Osmansko Carstvo*, 76. The fortress capitulated on 30 July 1529. Feridun Bey, *Münşeat*, 568.

¹⁵¹ ĪE. AS 1/19.

¹⁵² Hüsrev Bey's report on the construction of the fortress dated 7.7.1536, MAD 523, 75.

¹⁵³ Oruç, "Administrative Division of the Bosnian Sandjak in the 16th Century," 130.

¹⁵⁴ *Münşeat*, 583.

¹⁵⁵ TT d. 204, 50. The fortress was demolished by the order sultan order.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 48.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 50: The fortress was demolished by the order sultan order.

¹⁵⁸ KK 282, 46. 17.11.1536.

Herman	-	1536	destroyed
Dubočac	-	1536	Destroyed before 1540 ¹⁵⁹
Šamac	Slavonski Šamac	1536	Destroyed before 1540 ¹⁶⁰
Nivne	Levanjska Varoš	1536	Destroyed ¹⁶¹
Stari Slatinik	-	1536	destroyed
Zapolje	-	1536	destroyed
Brčin	-	1536	destroyed
Zeglak	-	1536	destroyed
Zdenci	Zdenci Brodski	1536	destroyed
Klis	-	12.03.1537	garrisoned
Nadin	-	1538	garrisoned
Vrana	-	1538	garrisoned
Yasenofče	Jasenovac	1538	garrisoned ¹⁶²
Dubica	-	April 1538	garrisoned
Cernik	-	Late 1539	garrisoned
Boraca Varošu	Boracs	Before 1540	Newly built
Dobre Varošu	Dobra	Before 1540	Newly built
Britvicsina	-	1540	destroyed
Novska	-	1540	destroyed
Subocki Grad	-	1540	destroyed ¹⁶³
Budin	Buda	29.08.1541	garrisoned
Pešte	Pest	29.08.1541	garrisoned
Segedin	Szeged	February 1542	garrisoned
İvrahovice	Rahovica	February 1542	garrisoned
Drenofče	Drenovac	Early 1542	garrisoned
Yasenička	Nasice	Early 1542	garrisoned
İsveti Mikloš	Mikleus	Early 1542	garrisoned
Vukin	Vocin	1.4.1543	garrisoned
Valpova	Valpovo	21.06.1543	garrisoned
Peçuy	Pec	29.06.1543	garrisoned
Sikloš	Siklos	06.07.1543	garrisoned
Estergon	Esztergom	10.08.1543	garrisoned

¹⁵⁹ The fortress was demolished by the sultan's order. As the location of the fort was strategic and it was on an important road, the people living in the suburb (varoş) of the former fort were assigned the duty of *derbendçi*, who protected the road in return for certain tax exemptions: “*Nivne nâm hisâr emr-i pâdişâhî ile tahrib olunub ... yol üstünde olub hisâr bozulmak ile derbend olub hıfz ü hırâseti lâzım olub karye-i mezbûre ahâlisi aslında kal’a-i mezbûr varoş(ı) olub zikr olan derbendin hıfzına voyvodalar hıdmetinden mu’âfiyet ile mültezimûn olub defter-i cedîdde derbendçi kayd olunduğı karye-i mezkûrî işlendirüb kayd olunan rûsûmdan ziyâde resm vormeyeler...*”. TT d. 204, 50.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 50.

¹⁶¹ TT d. 203, 33.

¹⁶² The commander of the fortress received timar 10,000 akçe worth upon yielding the fortress: “... *Yasenofça nâm kal’a porkolabı Borko nâm kâfire 10,000 akçelik timar idesiz deyü hükm-i hümayûn irâd imeğın virildi fi 4 Safer sene 945 (2.7.1538)*”. KK d. 282, 39.

¹⁶³ Britvicsina, Novska and Subocki Grad belonged to Krsto Svetacki. The fortresses were destroyed after he changed side with the Ottomans. Dino Mujadžević, “Obitelj Svetački u Osmanskoj službi,” 116.

İstolni Belgrad	Stuhlweisenburg	04.09.1543	garrisoned
Bac	-	October 1543	garrisoned
Sombor	-	October 1543	garrisoned



CHAPTER 3

REDEFINING OTTOMAN MILITARY POWER: OTTOMAN TIMARIOT ARMY AND MILITARY DYNAMICS IN THE OTTOMAN–HUNGARIAN FRONTIER AFTER THE BATTLE OF MOHÁCS

3.1. Timariot Army in Late Fifteenth to Early Sixteenth Centuries

The timariot army, also known as the provincial cavalry, formed the backbone of the Ottoman army during military campaigns for centuries, especially between the late 14th and mid-17th centuries. Constituting almost 70 per cent of the main army, the *sipahis* played a crucial role in the Ottomans' numerous victories over their adversaries. In the second half of the 15th century, the Ottoman war machine slightly altered its typical battle formation, supported by artillery units in the centre and the janissaries armed with firearms. Over time, both the sultan's household troops (*kapıkulu*) and the timariot army grew in numbers. The Ottomans had theoretically between 60 to 70 000 potential fighters by the 16th century, with at least 70 per cent being timariot sipahis.

The literature focused on identifying the number of sipahis in the military campaigns exist, as well as the potential number of their retainers (*cebelü*, *gulam*), but those are only estimations. This is partly due to the practice of the Ottoman bookkeeping. The sole information recorded in both detailed (*mufassal*) and summary (*icmal*) registers is on the sipahi or *zeamet* holders' nominal income. Records from the

15th century also show how many retainers, servants, and slaves (*gulam*) that sipahi, zeamet owners and governors were obliged to maintain for a military campaign. However, this bookkeeping practice was later abandoned. Consequently, the only remaining source of assessment available to historians is the centralized timar regulations (*timar kanunnameleri*), which date back to the reign of Bayezid II. By comparing the sipahi incomes in the timar registers with the data in the timar regulations, several scholars have calculated the size of the potential timariot army.¹⁶⁴

One particular and earliest estimation belongs to Iacopo de Promontorio de Campis. He assessed the forces available to Mehmed II in 1475–76 as 79,000 projecting the general state of the Ottoman finances and military forces that could be mustered for a military campaign. He estimated that 22,000 men from Rumelia's 17 sancaks, including retainers, and a total of 17,000 sipahi from the sancaks of Anatolia, could be mobilized. If we exclude the other components of the army, the provincial cavalry of about 40,000 men nominally constituted the largest unit of the Ottoman army as the main force in the campaigns of Mehmed II.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait Bir Bütçe Örneği,"; Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization,"; Barkan, "Timar,"; Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700*; Dávid-Fodor, "Changes in the Structures and Strength of the Timariot Army from the Early Sixteenth to the end of the Seventeenth Century,"; Fodor, "Ottoman Warfare, 1300-1453"; Dávid, "Ottoman Armies and Warfare, 1453-1603,"; İnalcık, "Timar,"; Ágoston, "War Winning Weapons? On the Decisiveness of Ottoman Firearms from the Siege of Constantinople (1453) to the Battle of Mohács (1526),"; Ágoston, "Ottoman and Habsburg Military Affairs in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent,"; Pál Fodor, "The Military Organization and Army of the Ottoman Empire (1500-1530),".

¹⁶⁵ Ménage, *Ottoman Historical Documents*, 57-60 and 126-127. Promontorio's account of the finances of the Ottoman Empire parallels several archival documents of the period. So, it is very likely that Promontorio had at least access to the budgets prepared by the treasurer (*defterdar*) of the time. He estimated the *de facto* treasury revenues of the Ottoman Empire at 1,800,000 ducats. *Ibid.*, 126. Considering that one ducat was equivalent to approximately 45 akçe during that time, the revenues would have amounted to 81,000,000 akçe. Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 46. A letter presented to Bayezid II by the chief treasurer (*baş defterdar*) stated that the annual revenues during the late period of Mehmed II's reign were 85,000,000 akçe. TSMA e. 757/79. The document is dated as Hijri 918 in the catalogue (1512/13), but its content suggests it should be dated between 1482-84. This is because the chief treasurer compares the revenues and expenditures between the reign of Bayezid II and the reign of Mehmed II, referring to Karamani Mehmed Paşa (as Mevlevi Paşa in the text), the grand vizier of the period who was killed by the janissaries in 1481.

Bayezid II's reign was a period of reorganization and financial restructure in all branches of the Ottoman army. The size of the sultan's household army was increased. And now equipped with arquebuses, a significant portion of the janissaries, the elite infantry component of the palace army, improved their combat effectiveness.¹⁶⁶ Though it appears that the system's nucleus seems to have been established by the middle of the 15th century, the earliest collective texts of the instructions controlling the organization of the timar holders were compiled during the reign of Bayezid II. The codes for the number of retainers (*cebelü*), servants, (*gulam*) and other components that sipahis, zeamet holders, and governors had to bring with them on a campaign, according to their income categories, remained almost unchanged until the middle of Süleyman's reign.¹⁶⁷ As a result of the successful military operations against the Safavids and Mamluks in the east (1514–1517), the Ottoman Empire gained enormous territory along with the establishment of two new provinces (*beylerbeyilik*),

¹⁶⁶ Feridun M. Emecen, *Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş* (İstanbul: Timaş, 2010), 38–39. The number of janissaries and palace cavalry appears to have significantly increased within a year or two. Looking at the chief treasurer's letter from 1482–84 (TSMA e. 757/79), 5,770 janissaries and 3,983 palace cavalries were listed, totaling 9,573. He also recommended an increase of 11,000, which was apparently achieved by 1484, with 7,841 janissaries and 4,306 palace cavalries, totaling 12,147. Ağoston, "Firearms and Military Adaption: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450-1800," 113. The number of janissary novices (*gılman-i yeniçeriyân-i acemiyan*) in similar years can also be found. Total 4,823 novices in Istanbul were listed in December 1477. If we include squad commanders (*serbölük*) and chiefs of infantry squadrons (*ser-piyadegan*), the total number was 5,354. D.M.d. 36805, 462–468. Also, another group of novices was stationed at Gallipoli. Their number was 794 in December 1478. MAD 176, 419b.

¹⁶⁷ For every 1,000 akçe income a timar holder had to go to war themselves, those with 2,000 akçe had to bring a young servant, those drawing 3,000 had to bring an armored retainer plus a young servant, those with 6,000 with two retainers and a tent, and an additional retainer for every 3,000 akçe. Zeamet holders and sancakbeyis had to provide one retainer for every 5,000 akçe. Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries," 152–153; Dávid – Fodor, "Changes," 185; Fodor, "Ottoman Warfare," 200–201. Dávid and Fodor states that minimum portion of income for which the timar holder had to bring a *cebelü* with him, rose from 3,000 or 4,000 akçe to 6,000 akçe as early as in the first half of the 16th century. Dávid – Fodor, "Changes," 169–170. At least the rule of bringing one armed retainer for every 3,000 akçe was still in force in 1532. For instance, Hüseyin, who held 3,000 akçe timar in the sub-province of Semendria, was reported to have brought no *cebelü* in the 1532 roll-call. The missing retainers were also mentioned collectively in the sancaks' roll-call total: "*El-noksân 'an cebelüyân-i ba'zı sipâhiyân-i livâ-i Semendire ber-müceb-i kânun-i pâdişâhi neferen 132.*" TSMA d. 2204, 69a. See also Table 3.

Diyarbakir and Şam. These areas where the timar system was introduced would also supply the Ottomans with a sizeable contingent of sipahi soldiers.¹⁶⁸

The accession of Sultan Süleyman and his first target, Belgrade, marked the beginning of the long Ottoman–Habsburg struggle in the West. Two powerful monarchies would be locked in a protracted struggle for supremacy in central Europe after the Battle of Mohács in 1526.¹⁶⁹ The capture of Buda by Ferdinand’s troops compelled the Ottomans to undertake a second expedition into Hungary in 1529. Following the successful capture of Buda, the Ottoman forces advanced towards Vienna despite the late season; however, their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. This expedition put a challenging test for the Ottomans’ military and logistical capabilities, marking a pivotal moment in their history.¹⁷⁰ During their retreat, the Ottoman army not only reinforced the fortresses captured in Srem

¹⁶⁸ Although it had been only 15 years since these two provinces was established, a total 12,661 sipahi with retainers were ready to be mobilized at least on paper in 1530 (See Appendix I).

¹⁶⁹ For some general studies on the subject, see Gyula Káldy-Nagy, “Suleimans Angriff auf Europa,” *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 28 (1974): 163–212; Bak –Király, eds., *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary*; Pál Fodor, “Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary, 1520-1541,”; Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, “Hungarian-Ottoman Peace Negotiations in 1512-1514,” in *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent*, eds. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Budapest: Loránd Eötvös University, 1994), 9–45; Ferenc Szakály, *Ludovico Gritti in Hungary, 1529-1534: A Historical Insight into the Beginnings of Turco-Habsburgian Rivalry* (Budapest: Studia Historica, 1995); Ágoston, “Habsburg and Ottomans: Defense, Military Change and Shifts in Power,”; Dávid and Fodor, eds, *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe. The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest.*; Gábor Ágoston, “Ottoman Conquest and the Ottoman Military Frontier in Hungary,”; Fodor, “Wolf on the Border”; Pálffy, *The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century*; Fodor, *The Unbearable Weight of Empire: The Ottomans in Central Europe – A Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy (1390–1566)*; Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*; Ágoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest.*

¹⁷⁰ Káldy-Nagy, “The First Centuries,” 180–181; Fodor, “Ottoman Policy,” 298; Fodor, *The Unbearable Weight*, 81–93; János B. Szabó, “The Ottoman Conquest in Hungary: Decisive Events (Belgrade 1521, Mohács 1526, Vienna 1529, Buda 1541) and Results,” in *The Battle for Central Europe: The Siege of Szigetvár and the Death of Süleyman the Magnificent and Nicholas Zrínyi (1566)*, ed. Pál Fodor (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2019), 271–272; Emecen, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Zamanı*, 177–183. Bostan Çelebi, the Ottoman chronicler, provides a detailed account of the Ottoman army’s food shortage (*kaht u gala*) during the campaign. He reports that many soldiers died on the return from Buda to Varadin (Pétrovarad/Petrovaradin) due to lack of food. He attributes this shortage to the fact that the Ottomans had earlier conducted two expeditions in the region (1521 and 1526), which had depopulated it and left no food available: “*ammâ ‘asâkir-i İslâmın iki def’a müsâdemesinden Ungurus vilâyetinin her cânîbi harâb olub nehr-i Tuna kurbında şenlik ve abâdânlık olmayub nüzul dahi kalmayub.*” Bostan Çelebi, *Kitâb-i Gazâvât-i Sultân Süleymân* (Süleymaniye Copy. No: 3317), 115b–116b. For the diary of this campaign, see Feridun Bey, *Münşeâtü’s-selâtîn*. vol. I–II. İstanbul, 1857–58, 566–577.

(Szerém/Srem/Srem) region four years prior but also firmly rebuilt the strategically vital fortress of Ösek (Eszék/Osijek), which stood as the gateway to the Pannonian Plain, and stationed a 3,000-strong garrison there.¹⁷¹ To counter the emerging Habsburg threat, the Ottomans deployed a 9,000-strong garrison in Semendria (Semendria/Szendrő) sancak alone, as well as 1,100 janissaries and sipahis of three entire sub-provinces (Semendria, İzvornik [Zvornik], and Bosnia) led by two powerful sancakbeyis, Mehmed Bey and Hüsrev Bey, assigned to carry out periodic raids into the Hungarian territories under the Habsburg protection. By the end of 1530, the Ottomans were paying 16,192,650 akçe (289,154 Venetian ducat) each year only for the garrison soldiers stationed at twenty-two fortresses in the sub-province of Semendria.¹⁷² This comparison puts this significant shift into perspective: thirty years ago, 8,000 soldiers sufficed to defend all the fortresses in Rumelia.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Bostan Çelebi, *Kitâb*, 117a–b. Bostan Çelebi seems to have correctly stated the number of garrisoned soldiers at Osijek. Records from the following year show that the Ottomans amassed a substantial garrison of 3,203 men in the fortress, with the majority of the soldiers being mobile troops. 757 cavalymen (*'ulufeciyan-i süvari*), supported by 943 *martolos*, were indispensable for quick raids and counter offensives. One-third of the total Ottoman military force on the Hungarian frontier was stationed at this fortress alone (622 *müstahfiz*, 881 *azeb*, 757 cavalry, and 943 *martolos*). MAD 506, 44.

¹⁷² 2,806 *müstahfiz*es, 2,634 *martolos*es, 2,781 *azeb*s and 1,259 cavalry (9,480 total). MAD 506, 5, 16, 20, 27–29, 41–45. Compare to Ágoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest*, 431. Including the paid garrison soldiers in Bosnia the total number of paid soldiers along the Hungarian border was 11,309. Aladin Husić, “Trđave Bosanskog Sandžaka i Njihove Posade 1530. Godine,” 227; Oruç, “1528/30 Tarihli Mücmel Tahrir Defterine Göre Bosna Sancağında Mustahfiz Timarları,” 745–746. No data on salaried garrison troops in the sub-province of İzvornik is available for this year, so that the total should be higher. The garrison duty in border fortresses was one of the routine assignments of the janissaries. After Belgrade’s capture in 1521, 485 janissaries were left there. Ágoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest*, 156. Between the Battle of Mohács in 1526 and the famous campaign of 1532, the number of janissaries placed in the fortresses in Srem region ranged from 800 to 1,100. These fortresses were Ilok (Újlak/Ilok), Varadin (Pétervárad/Petrovaradin), Kupinik (Kölpény/Kupinovo), Raça (Rácsa/Rača) Dimitrofçe (Szávaszetdemeter/Sremska Mitrovica). KK d. 1764, pp. 51, 163, 180. Only 600 of them were serving at Varadin.

¹⁷³ Baş, “XV. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Balkanlarda Osmanlı Serhad Organizasyonunun Oluşumu,” 177–179. Moreover, according to the budget of 1527–28, 58 per cent of all garrison soldiers in the empire served in the Rumelian territories (24,000 out of 41,000 persons). Dávid, “Ottoman Armies,” 298. In addition, 17,487 of these 24,000 troops were paid in cash (*ulufeli*), which means at least 65 per cent of all the salaried garrison soldiers in Rumelia were in the border fortresses in Semendria and Bosnia. The rest received timars. In 1528, the Ottomans paid 2,800,000 akçe in quarter year for the garrisons in Srem region. Fodor, “Ottoman Policy,” 285. The fortress of Osijek had not been fortified when the 1527–28 balance was drawn up. The strongest fortress in the region was Ilok according to a Habsburg intelligence report from April 1529. It was under the control of the Ottomans, with a garrison comprising 2,480 soldiers. This included 500 cavalymen, 1,000 *azeb*s, 80 artillerymen, 400 *martolos*es, and 500 janissaries. Furthermore, the report states that the total count of soldiers stationed at the

3.2. The Strength of the Provincial Cavalry in early 1530s

Beside the garrison soldiers that constituted the post-Mohács Ottoman military presence on the Hungarian frontier, the Ottoman timariot army was another complimentary military presence. In the 1530s timariot forces, particularly in Semendria and Bosnia, grew in numbers. Provincial account books (*muhasabe-i vilayet*) compiled between 1527 and 1530 mention *kılıç timars*, the non-divisible smallest unit of timar.¹⁷⁴ The 1527–28 budget, examined and published by Ömer Lütfi Barkan, is a notable example of this occurrence. This budget contains a plethora of detailed information on the precise number of timars allocated in the regions where the timar system was strictly implemented.¹⁷⁵

The budget book published by Barkan lists a total of 28,088 sipahi and zeamet holders in the provinces of Rumelia, Anatolia, Rum, Karaman–Dulkadir, Damascus, and Diyarbekir, where the timar system was applied. Almost 50 per cent of the total Ottoman income was allocated as *hass* (to the governors) and timar (to the ordinary prebend holders). Rumelia, which ranked first in terms of the number of sipahi, had a

garrisons in Srem and Semendria amounted to 9,468 men. I have calculated that the annual payment (*mevacib*) received by these soldiers was valued at 315,644 ducat (17,991,739 akçe, 1 Venetian ducat = 57 akçe). These figures surprisingly align with Ottoman records compiled a year later, reporting 9,326 men and 15,951,840 akçe. (The fortresses of Maglič, Resava, Sokol, Užice, Ostrvica [Sivricehisar], Gradište and Güzelcehisar [Žrnov/Avala] were excluded since they were not listed in the intelligence report. With these fortresses the total garrison number in Semendria was 9,480 with 16,192,650 akçe.) The lack of change in troop numbers following the fortification and garrisoning of Osijek with 3,000 soldiers, indicates that those stationed at Osijek were likely relocated from existing forts in Srem. It is also probable that all cavalry and azeb forces previously located at Ilok fortress had been transferred to Osijek, given the absence of these forces in the 1530 census for Ilok. Laszowski, *Monumenta Habsburgica: Regni Croatiae Dalmatiae Slavoniae*. Vol. I., 150–152. Focusing on what is today modern Serbia, Olga Zirojević only identified garrison numbers for Belgrade, Güğercinlik (Golubac/Galambóc), Kulić (Kulič), and Ram. Olga Zirojević, *Tursko vojno uređenje u Srbiji (1459–1683)* (Belgrade, 1974), 114–148.

¹⁷⁴ The *kılıç* means ‘sword’; as a technical term it refers to the indivisible core portion of the revenues of each timar. They were two types: certified (*tezkereli*) and non-certified (*tezkeresiz*). Certified one was given by the Ottoman central government in Istanbul, upon the recommendation of the governor-general (*beylerbeyi*), or if in frontier sub-provinces, governors (*sancakbeyi*). Non-certified timar was given directly by the *beylerbeyi* on his own authority. Douglas A. Howard, “From Manual to Literature: Two Texts on the Ottoman Timar System,” *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 61 (2008), 97.

¹⁷⁵ Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait,” 251–329.

total of 10,668 sipahi and zeamet holders, with revenue allocated to them amounting to 82,452,427 akçe.¹⁷⁶ These numbers beg the question as to why the Ottomans deemed it necessary to ascertain the exact number of sipahi and their retainers during this period. While there is no conclusive answer to this question, the most plausible explanation is that the Ottoman court needed to assess its military and financial strength before embarking on the protracted post-Mohács struggle against the Austrian Habsburgs.

Historians studying the 16th-century Ottoman military, particularly the Ottoman timariot army, have attempted to estimate its total size based on the kılıç timars mentioned in Barkan's budget. However, after having dated several undated documents in the Ottoman archives, it becomes evident how many sipahis and armed retainers were at the disposal of the Ottoman government between 1530 and 1532. This chapter examines a few undated documents that shed light on the actual size of the Ottoman timariot army between 1530 and 1532. The first of these registers, kept in the Topkapı Palace Archives (TSMA d. 9439),¹⁷⁷ serves as a valuable source that lists the total number of sipahis along with their retainers and their annual revenues across the empire. Primarily, this register essentially presents a summary of the accounts from the six provinces, as they were prepared in 1530. The correlation between the data found in the account book of the Anatolian provinces, compiled in late 1530, and the data in the undated register lends more credence to this conclusion; it also provides a thorough record of the total number of sipahis across the empire and details the number of sipahis in Barkan's budget.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 281–285.

¹⁷⁷ It appears that most of the undated documents in the TSMA catalogue were enumerated casually. The dates of these documents are 905, 918, 974, 1008, and 1255 H. Therefore, researchers need to exercise greater caution when using these documents.

The mentioned undated register (TSMA d. 9439) serves as the primary source for this comprehensive overview. It appears that the information in this source was extracted from the provincial account books (*muhassebe-i vilayet*) compiled towards the end of 1530, situated between two significant Ottoman military campaigns aimed at Vienna (*sefer-i Beç* in 1529 and *sefer-i Alaman* in 1532). The timing of these summaries is remarkable, as it seems the Ottomans sought to assess the mobilizable strength of timariot forces, along with their retainers, for large-scale campaigns against the Austrians in the West and later, the Safavids in the East. It is important to note that during the campaigns against the Habsburgs, the Ottomans solely mobilized the timariot forces of two provinces, Rumelia and Anatolia. The document's insights provide a valuable understanding of the Ottoman military preparations during this period, shedding light on the organization and strength of their forces for both western and eastern campaigns. Indeed, the remaining provinces did not participate in the western campaigns. Instead, their primary responsibility was to safeguard the eastern provinces from any potential threat posed by the Safavids.¹⁷⁸

Table II: Total Strength of the Timariot Army circa 1530 (see Appendix I) Size and Administrative Structure of Empire, ca. 1530

Name of the Province	Number of sancaks
Rumeli	29
Anadolu	15

¹⁷⁸ Considering that the province of Dulkadir had not yet been established before the first months of 1531, the exact date of TSMA d. 9439 should be between late 1530 and early 1531. Although the province account book (*muhassebe-i vilayet*) of 1530 shows Arab (Şam) and Dulkadir provinces as two separate entities, there was only one beylerbeyi, who was the governor-general of Şam. Ahmet Özkılınç et. al., 998 *Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Diyar-i Bekr ve Arab ve Zül-kadriyye Defteri: Şam, Gazze, Salt-‘Aclûn, Haleb, Hama-Humus, Trablus, ‘Ayntâb, Birecik, Adana, ‘Üzeyr, Tarsus, Sis, Mar‘aş ve Boz-ok Livâları (937/1530)*. Vol. II. Index and Facsimile (Ankara: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1999), 28; İsmail Altınöz, *Dulkadir Eyaletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesi* (Kahramanmaraş: Kahramanmaraş Belediyesi, 1995), 82; Hasan Arslan, “Osmanlı Hakimiyetinde Maraş’ın İdari Yapısı (1531-1848),” in *Maraş Araştırmaları*. Vol I. ed. İbrahim Solak (Konya: Palet Yayıncılık, 2020), 33–34. The province of Dulkadir must have been established before July 1531, as one of the servants of Süleyman Paşa, the governor-general of Maraş (Dulkadir), was present at the palace that month. KK. d 1764, p. 145. For more details and comparison of the data between TSMA d. 9439 and the account books of Anatolia, Karaman, Şam and Diyarbakir from 1530, see Appendix I.

Yaya and Müsellems of Anatolia	16
Karaman and Dulkadir	8
Rum	10
Diyarbekir	12
Kurdish Beys in Diyarbekir	17
Şam	13

Troop figures on the above-listed provincial division

Province	Governors	Kılıç timars and zeamets	cebelüs (retainers)	Yaya and müsellem
Total (With governor-general and governors)				
Rumili	29	10,698	22,113	
32,840				
Anadolu	15+16	7,506	10,708	10,457
18,245				
Karaman and Dulkadir	8	4,049	4,106	-
8,163				
Rum	10	3,744	5,696	-
9,450				
Diyarbekir	12+17	1,100	3,882	-
5,011				
Şam	13	2,262	5,375	-
7,650				
TOTALS				
81,359	120	29,359	51,880	10,457 ¹⁷⁹
With yaya and müsellem: 91,816				

¹⁷⁹ *Müsellems of Anatolia* (4 sancaks): 3,164. *Piyades (yaya) of Anatolia* (12 sancaks): 7,293. There were 2,584 müsellem and 7,668 yaya in 1521. Gyula Káldy-Nagy, "The Conscription of Müsellem and Yaya Corps in 1540," in *Hungaro-Turcica: Studies in Honour of Julius Németh*, eds. Gyula Káldy-Nagy (Budapest: Loránd Eötvös University, 1976), footnote 10. Unfortunately, this register does not provide information on the yaya and müsellem troops in Rumelia. However, after checking the tahrir registers, it can be concluded that their number was in the thousands. The sub-provinces of Çingane, Müsellemân-ı Kızılca, Çirmen, Vize and Silistre alone had 4,369 auxiliary forces obliged to join the campaigns, including 833 müsellem, 2,163 voynuk, and 1,373 yörük and Tatars in 1530. MAD 370; Ahmet Özkılınç et. al., *370 Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Rûm-ili Defteri: Çirmen, Müsellemân-ı Çingâne, Müsellemân-ı Kızılca, Silistre, Keçe, Niğbolu ve Vidin Livâları, Çirmen ve Vize Müsellemeleri, Yörük ve Tatar Cemâatleri ile Voynugân-ı İstabl-ı Âmire ve Kıbtîyân-ı Vilâyet-i Rûm-ili (937/1530)*. Vol. II. Index and Facsimile. (Ankara: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2002), 6–9. Also, for the numbers of yörüks and Tatars, see Tayyib Gökbilgin, *Rumeli'de Yürükler, Tatarlar ve Evlâd-i Fâtihân* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1957). Therefore, on paper, up to 15,000 auxiliary forces from Anatolia and Rumelia, including yaya and müsellem troops could be mobilized. Compare: Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries," 172–173; Fodor, "The Military Organization," 104–107.

A careful examination of the table reveals that Rumelia accounted for 40 per cent of the total potential sipahi forces across the empire, while Anatolian forces comprised 28,5 per cent of the expeditionary forces, including the auxiliary corps, *yaya*, and *müsellem*, that were obligated to participate in the military campaigns. Shortly before the eastern campaigns of the 16th century and the escalation of hostilities in the Mediterranean, the Ottomans were able to mobilize 65 per cent of their total provincial cavalry forces for the western campaigns.¹⁸⁰ In other words, at least on paper, the Ottomans could mobilize no more than 45–50,000 sipahis, including their retainers, for campaigns in the West during the first half of the 16th century.¹⁸¹ There are also several other sources available for verification. Firstly, it appears that almost all the Rumelian sancak troops were called up for the 1521 campaign against Belgrade. On the other hand, the mobilization of troops from Anatolia was rather limited.¹⁸² However, five years later the situation appeared to have altered considerably, during the Mohács campaign. The Ottomans had deployed all their sub-provinces from Rumelia to join in. The Ottoman army also included 10 out of the 15 Anatolian sub-provinces as well as two *yaya*–*müsellem* sancaks.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ Ágoston, “War Winning Weapons?,” 140–141 and note 41.

¹⁸¹ For the most recent studies on the structure of all elements of the Ottoman army and its size when mobilized in the sixteenth century, see Ágoston, “Ottoman and Habsburg Military Affairs,” 287–308; Fodor, “The Military Organization,” 91–116.

¹⁸² MAD d. 499, p. 33. Only Behram Bey, the governor of Bursa was present in the campaign. It seems that only the mobilization of the central household troops (*kapıkulu*) and the sipahi army and other auxiliary troops (voynuk, *müsellem* etc.) in Rumelia was considered sufficient for the Belgrade campaign. The exact number of sipahis mobilized for this expedition is unfortunately unknown. However, the number can be calculated by looking at the wheat and barley rations (*nüzul*) given to palace army and auxiliary forces from Rumelia. The sultan’s household troops consisted of 12,959 men: 5,953 of them were janissaries and 4,187 were from six cavalry regiments. The campaign was supported by a total of 2,503 auxiliary forces, consisting of 1,375 *müsellems* and *yörüks*, and 1,128 voynuks. The known and calculable total force that participated in the Belgrad campaign was 15,452. Even if we assume that the entire timariot force and azeb troops were mobilized in Rumelia, the Ottoman army in front of the Belgrade walls did not exceed 55,000. MAD 499, pp. 29–33. There are no accurate records on the number of azeb troops except for the chronicles of the period, which generally provided round and exaggerated numbers. Káldy-Nagy states that 20,000 azeb troops participated in the Belgrade campaign. Note that *akıncı* troops are not included. Káldy-Nagy, “The First Centuries,” 163.

¹⁸³ Emecen, *Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş*, 211–212.

In the Battle of Mohács, which can be considered as Süleyman I's first large-scale ground military campaign, almost 90 per cent of the mobilized forces from Rumelia and Anatolia were on the field. Three years later, the Ottomans seemed to have maximized their military capacity during the Vienna campaign, which saw an even more extensive mobilization of soldiers than the Mohács campaign. Among the Ottoman military forces that reclaimed Buda, which had been captured by Ferdinand's army a year before, were 21 sub-provinces from Rumelia and 13 from Anatolia.¹⁸⁴

The roll-call register containing the names of troops mobilized from Rumelia for the 1532 campaign have survived to the present day. Combining these fragmented books in the TSMA reveals numerous intriguing aspects of the Rumelian sipahi army during the 1530s. Notably, unlike the 16th-century roll-call registers, this one includes records of both the retainers of the governors, timar and zeamet holders, as well as the details of absent retainers and sipahis during the roll-call.

¹⁸⁴ KK d. 1764, 84–86. A thorough examination of the campaign diary of this expedition would be helpful to learn more about this numerical growth. Behram Paşa–governor-general of Anatolia, Hayreddin Bey–Menteşe, İskender Bey–Bursa (Beğ), Ali Bey–Aydın, Musa Bey–Bolu, Ferhad Bey–Saruhan, Mehmed Şah Bey (son of Piri Mehmed Paşa)–Ankara, Sinan Bey–Hamid, Mehmed Bey–Karesi, İbrahim Bey–Koca-ili, Mustafa Bey–Kangırı (mod. Çankırı), Sunullah Bey–Kastamonu, Abdussamed Bey–Alaiye.

Table III: The First Roll-Call Register of the Rumelian Sipahi Army under the Command of Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa on the Drava Bridge (20–22 July 1532)¹⁸⁵

Sancak	Sancakbeyi*	Revenue	Retainers and servants	Zeamet holders	Retainers	Sipahis	Retainers	Absent	Deficient retainers acc. to law	Roll-call total
Ohri ¹⁸⁶	Mehmed Bey (son of Ahmed Ağa) ¹⁸⁷	340,000	200	9	72	343 (57 tezkereli, 218 tezkeresiz)	291	40	63	915 ¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵* I obtained the information within the parentheses on sancakbeyis from various archival sources.

The data in the table was compiled by combining 18 undated documents from the TSMA archive. After crosschecking the daybook (KK d. 1764) and undated TSMA documents, I am certain that this roll-call was conducted during the river crossing process, which took place between 20 and 22 July 1532. Moreover, the names of the sancakbeyis who received gifts (*inam*) after the capture of Kőszeg (Güns) fortress match those in the undated TSMA registers. Unfortunately, we lack the second roll-call register of the Rumelian army, which was held on 13 October 1532, at the end of the campaign. Therefore, it is currently not possible to determine the potential loss of lives among the sipahis during the campaign. Some portions of these registers have been previously used by researchers. In his article, Ahmed Aličić used an unfinished portion of the roll-call of the Bosnian sancak (TSMA d. 4175) and misidentified a certain İskender as a governor (*mirliva*) leading him to date this document to around 1526. Ahmed S. Aličić, “Popis Bosanske Vojske Pred Bitku Na Mohaču 1526. Godine,” *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju* 25 (1976): 171–202. However, in 1530, Hüsrev Bey held this position, while İskender was, in fact, *miralay* (second in rank in the whole sub-province) and held a zeamet both in 1530 (TT d. 164, 64) and during the 1532 campaign. During my research, I came across two articles that reference these registers. Additionally, Mariya Kiprovska used some parts of this register (TSMA d. 2204) in her article. Her work elaborates on the renowned Ottoman frontier family, Mihaloğulları, and their extensive household in the Niğbolu (Nicopol) region. However, in her assessment, she erroneously dated this document as early as 1524. Mariya Kiprovska, “Agents of Conquest: Frontier Lords’ Extended Households as Actors in the Ottoman Conquest of the Balkans,” *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes* LIX (2021): 79–104. The confusion arose from her mixing up Bali Bey, the governor of Vidin (also known as Küçük Bali Bey), who was a relative of Yahya Paşa and the second governor-general of Budin vilayet, with another Bali Bey (famous Bali Bey, the son of Yahya Paşa, who passed away in early 1527). Also, for Bali Bey (Büyük), see Fodor, “Wolf on the Border,” 57–87. The analysis of the most comprehensive version of these registers was published by Muhsin Soyudoğan. He correctly located fourteen parts of the roll-call and accurately determined the date of the document as 26 June 1532. In addition to his findings, I have discovered three more previously lost fragments of the roll-call (TSMA e. 1106/36, TSMA e. 1145/1, TSMA d. 2206), which contributed to update and complete the data. See and compare the table in Soyudoğan’s article: Muhsin Soyudoğan, “Cebelülerin Toplumsal Kökenleri Üzerine,” *Alinteri Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 5:2 (2021): 139–169. For the campaign diary and routes: Feridun Bey, *Münşe’ât*, 579; Celalzâde Salih Çelebi, *Târih-i Sefer-i Zafer-i Alaman*. Fatma Kaytaz (ed.) (İstanbul: Çamlıca, 2016); Mehmet Akif Erdoğan, “Kanuni Sultan Süleyman’ın 1532 Tarihli Alman Seferi Ruznâmesi,” *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* 29:1 (2014): 167–187; Erdem Kabadayi–Piet Gerrits and Grigor Boykov, “Geospatial Mapping of a 16th Century Transport Corridor for Southeast Europe,” *Digital Scholarship in the Humanities* 37:3 (2022): 788–812.

¹⁸⁶ TSMA d. 2204, 9b–22b.

¹⁸⁷ He was the sancakbeyi of Köstendil (Kyustendil) between 1527–32. TSMA d. 5246, 2b; Metin Kunt, *The Sultan’s Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government (1550–1650)* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 105; TSMA d. 8303, 1.

¹⁸⁸ Total is 916 in TSMA d. 2204, 22b.

Vulçitrin ¹⁸⁹	Ali Bey, son of İskender Paşa (Bostani ¹⁹⁰)	230,000	115	4	37	270 (52 tezkereli, 218 tezkeresiz)	293	16	59	719
Gelibolu ¹⁹¹	Ahmed Bey, admiral (former <i>emir-i alem</i>) ¹⁹²	450,000	-	-	-	19 (7 tezkereli, 12 tezkeresiz)	21	6	5	40
Eğriboz ¹⁹³	Mehmed Bey	400,099	312	8	126	169 (48 tezkereli, 121 tezkeresiz)	226	27	37	841 ¹⁹⁴
Semendire ¹⁹⁵	Mehmed Bey, son of Yahya Paşa	650,000	782	22	337	702 (121 tezkereli, 581 tezkeresiz)	862	-	132	2,705 ¹⁹⁶
Bosna ¹⁹⁷	Hüsrev Bey (son of Ferhad Ağa) ¹⁹⁸	655,000	1.040	16	213	643 (112 tezkereli, 529 tezkeresiz)	1,204	81 126 ¹⁹⁹	-	3,116
Niğbolu ²⁰⁰	Mehmed Bey, son of Ali Bey (Mihaloğlu)	656,000	410	21	456	304 (62 tezkereli, 242 tezkereli)	369	12	53	1,560 ²⁰¹
Mora ²⁰²	Süleyman Bey	504,000	254	30	274	686 (136 tezkereli, 550 tezkeresiz)	602	121	464	1,846

¹⁸⁹ TSMA d. 2204, 24b–35a.

¹⁹⁰ TSMA d. 8303, 1.

¹⁹¹ TSMA d. 2204, 35b–36a. Ahmed Bey sailed with the imperial navy (*donanma-i hümayun*) as captain along with his retainers and servants. The sipahi army of Gelibolu, on the other hand, joined the Rumelian troops.

¹⁹² Chief of imperial band (*mehter*). He was appointed as governor of Gelibolu (*kapudan-i derya*) on 28 August 1531. KK d. 1764, 145 and 148.

¹⁹³ TSMA d. 2204, 1a–b, 50a–56a; TSMA d. 2206, 21a–b; TSMA d. 10645, 29a–30b.

¹⁹⁴ Total 850 person in TSMA d. 2204, 56a.

¹⁹⁵ TSMA d. 2204, 38b–49b, 58a–69a.

¹⁹⁶ Total 2,730 person in TSMA d. 2204, 69a.

¹⁹⁷ TSMA d. 6807, 2b; TSMA d. 4175, 1a–16b; TSMA d. 5535, 1a–9b.

¹⁹⁸ Kunt, *Sultans Servants*, 105.

¹⁹⁹ 126 timar holders in Bosnia were left for the protection of the sub-province. TSMA d. 4175, 4a–6b.

²⁰⁰ TSMA d. 2204, 69b–82b.

²⁰¹ The number is 1,567 in TSMA d. 2204, 82a.

²⁰² TSMA d. 2204, 83b–113a.

Vidin ²⁰³	Bali Bey (Küçük, ²⁰⁴ son of Hamza ²⁰⁵)	301,965	403	9	163	334 (40 tezkereli, 294 tezkeresiz)	392	16	34	1,301
İskenderiye ²⁰⁶	Ahmed Bey	475,000	273	9	106	202 (40 tezkereli, 162 tezkeresiz)	209	26	71	799 ²⁰⁷
Yanya ²⁰⁸	Lütfi Bey (former <i>emir-i alem</i>) ²⁰⁹	503,629	230	8	82	424 (90 tezkereli, 335 tezkeresiz)	450	30	34	1,194 ²¹⁰
Köstendil ²¹¹	Toygun Bey (former <i>ser-zevvakın</i>) ²¹²	350,000	167	29	264	939 (198 tezkereli, 741 tezkeresiz)	805	36	307	2,204 ²¹³
İzvornik ²¹⁴	Ahmed Bey, son of Yahya Paşa	220,000	— ²¹⁵	-	-	120 (17 tezkereli, 103 tezkeresiz)	95	-	39	215 ²¹⁶

²⁰³ TSMA d. 2204, 113b–128b.

²⁰⁴ TSMA d. 8303, 2.

²⁰⁵ Claudia Römer identified Bali Bey's (later Paşa) father's name as Hamza, based on his seal. Claudia Römer, "Einige Urkunden zur Militärverwaltung Ungarns zur Zeit Süleymāns des Prächtigen," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum* 43 (1989), 24. I have also found his seal from an earlier period. The roll-call register lists the garrison soldiers of the fortresses Brčko and Gradačac in the sub-province of İzvornik from 6 August to 2 November 1529. The seal of Bali Bey is clearly visible ("el-'abd el-fakîr el-hakîr Bâlî bin Hamza"). İE. AS. 19/2. During the specified period, Bali Bey held the position of governor of İzvornik. TSMA d. 8303; KK.d 1764, 82–83. Hamza should be one of the relatives of Yahya Paşa. There is no information about him. But Bali was mentioned as relative (*hiş*) of Yahya Paşa and held the highest zeamet income in Semendria worth 84,712 akçe in 1516. TT d. 1007, 165–173. He was also mentioned as Küçük Bali in 1514, holding a zeamet worth 56,000 akçe. MAD 7, 362a; Aleksandar Fotić, "Yahyapaşa-oğlu Mehmed Pasha's *Evkaf* in Belgrade," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 54:4 (2001), 438–439.

²⁰⁶ TSMA d. 2204, 129b–140b.

²⁰⁷ 800 in TSMA d 2204, 140a.

²⁰⁸ TSMA d. 2204, 141b–153b.

²⁰⁹ Chief of imperial band. He was the sancakbeyi of Aydın in 1527. TSMA d. 5246, 3b; Kunt, *Sultans Servants*, 106.

²¹⁰ 1,195 in TSMA d. 2204, 152b.

²¹¹ TSMA d. 2204, 155b–179a.

²¹² Chief of the tasters to the sultan. He was appointed as the governor of Köstendil (Kyustendil) on 3 January 1532. KK d. 1764, 157.

²¹³ TSMA d. 2204, 178b: 2,205.

²¹⁴ TSMA d. 2204, 179b–182a.

²¹⁵ "Aforementioned Ahmed Beğ is assigned to serve on the ships on the Danube along with his men." TSMA d. 2204, 179b.

²¹⁶ TSMA d. 2204, 182a: the script records 254 people.

Çingane ²¹⁷	İskender Bey, son of Yahya Paşa	150,000	102	-	-	4 (2 tezkereli, 2 tezkeresiz)	6	-	5	112
Avlonya ²¹⁸	Ahmed Bey, brother of Ayas Paşa (former <i>ağa-yi ebna-i sipahiyan</i>) ²¹⁹	350,000	235	15	136	599 (144 tezkereli, 455 tezkeresiz)	755	63	137	1,740
Silistre ²²⁰	Şüca Bey (former <i>ser-bevvabin</i>) ²²¹	400,000	193	6	81	155 (33 tezkereli, 122 tezkeresiz)	99	36	22	534 ²²²
Angelo Kasrı (Karlı İli) ²²³	Kayıtbay Bey (<i>el-cündî</i>) ²²⁴	203,000	139	7	48	121 (31 tezkereli, 90 tezkeresiz)	161	6	20	476
Tırhala ²²⁵	Zeynel Paşa	606,000	228	29	308	727 (155 tezkereli, 572 tezkeresiz)	792	-	110	2,084

²¹⁷ TSMA d. 2204, 182b–183a

²¹⁸ TSMA d. 2204, 185b–201a.

²¹⁹ Commander of the salaried sipahi regiment, largest palace cavalry unit among the six cavalry regiments (*altı bölük halkı*). TSMA d. 7843, 2.

²²⁰ TSMA d. 2204, 2a–9a, 56b–57b.

²²¹ Commander of the doorkeepers in Topkapı Palace. He was appointed as the district governor of Silistre on 3 January 1532. KK d. 1764, 157.

²²² 677 in TSMA d. 2204, 8a.

²²³ TSMA d. 10645, 19a–24b.

²²⁴ TSMA d. 5246, 2b; Kunt, *Sultans Servants*, 105.

²²⁵ TSMA d. 10645, 2b–3b, 8b–12b, 25a–28b; TSMA d. 5532, 4a–5b; TSMA d. 6811, 1a–8b; TSMA d. 4431, 10a–11b. Data on Tırhala is not complete. There were total 912 timar and zeamet prebends in Tırhala sancak in 1533. Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait,” 301.

Paşa Sancağı ²²⁶	(Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa)	1,606,025 ²²⁷	575 ²²⁸	122	1.786	1.910 (590 tezkereli, 1,320 tezkeresiz)	3,008	88	314	6,826 (7,401)
Vize ²²⁹	Hacı Hasan Bey	200,000	87	1	7	72 (15 tezkereli, 57 tezkeresiz)	86	8	13	253
Kızılca Müsellem (Kırkkilise) ²³⁰	Mehmed Bey ²³¹ (son of Dukaginzade Ahmed Paşa) ²³²	140,000	122	-	-	6 (3 tezkereli, 3 tezkeresiz)	11	3	4	139
Çirmen ²³³	Ahmed Bey, son of Faik Paşa	200,000	- ²³⁴	4	20	94 (26 tezkereli, 68 tezkeresiz)	93	15	42	211
Alacahisar ²³⁵	Piri Bey, son of Balta	410,000	156	9	112	321	576	-	82	1,174

²²⁶ TSMA d. 10645, 1a, 5a–8a, 13a–18b; TSMA d. 4431, 1a–10b, 12a–12b. Sub-districts (*nahiye*) in Paşa Sancağı are as follows: Edirne, Dimetoka, Ferecik, İpsala, Keşan, Eskişehir-i Zagra, Kızılağaç, Filibe, Tatarpazarı, Üsküp, Kalkandelen, Kırçova, Köprülü, Pirlepe, Manastır, Gümölcine, Yenice-i Karasu, Drama, Zihne, Siroz, Nevrekop, Timurhisar, Avrethisarı, Selanik, Yenice-i Vardar, Karaferiye, Serfice, İştîp, Kastorya, Vılkaşın, Görice, Sofya, Şehirköy, Berkofça. Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait,” 302.

²²⁷ Soyudoğan, “Cebelülerin Toplumsal Kökenleri,” 146. 1,606,259 akçe in Osman Taşkın and Ersin Kırca, “Pargalı İbrahim Paşa’nın Müsadere Olunan Muhallefatı ve Mal Varlığına Ait Kaynaklar”, *History Studies* 13:3 (2021): 1031–1032. The data on Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa’s hasses were from the year 1530. Probably his total hasses were higher in 1532 since he also held the position of governor-general of Rumelia. Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi states in his *Tabakâtü’l-Memâlik ve Derecâtü’l-Mesâlik* that İbrahim Paşa received an additional 1,000,000 akçe increase, bringing his total hass to 3,000,000 akçe in early 1529. Funda Demirtaş, *Celâl-zâde Mustafa Çelebi, Tabakâtü’l-Memâlik ve Derecâtü’l-Mesâlik*. (Unpublished PhD diss., Erciyes University, 2009), 246. İbrahim Paşa was also granted with cash (*inam*) from the central treasury during the 1532 campaign. In April 1532, he received 400,000 akçe and an additional 200,000 akçe when the campaign ended in October. KK d. 1764, 166 and 179.

²²⁸ TSMA d. 5531. Data is incomplete.

²²⁹ TSMA d. 4927, 1b–4a.

²³⁰ TSMA d. 7506, 2a–b.

²³¹ Data is taken from KK d. 1764, 178.

²³² He was appointed as the district governor of Kırkkilise on 15 January 1530. *Ibid.*, p. 91: “*Mehmed Beğ veled-i Dukagin ki mirlivâ-i Müsellemân-i Kırkkilisâ şüd*”. Former sancakbeyi of this sub-province was Mehmed son of Todor Mujak in mid-1529. TSMA d. 8303, 2.

²³³ TSMA d. 4927, 4b; TSMA d. 4195, 2a–b; TSMA d. 7506, 4a.

²³⁴ “*Aforementioned Ahmed Bey was assigned to join the imperial navy setting sail to the sea. His sipahis joined the imperial campaign on land.*” TSMA d. 4927, 4b.

²³⁵ TSMA d. 7506, 1a–b, 3b; TSMA d. 4199, 1a–8b; TSMA d. 6807, 1a–b. Data on Alacahisar (Kruševac) sancak is not complete. There was total 691 timar and zeamet prebends in 1533. Also, the number was 15 zeamet and 632 timar holdings in 1530; see TT d. 167; Murat Yüzbaşıoğlu et. al., *167 Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Rûm-ili Defteri*, vol. II, 450. The actual number of timars and retainers should be higher than the data presented above. According to my calculations, the

Hersek ²³⁶	Yahşi Bey, son of Mihal (<i>veled-i Mihal</i> ²³⁷)	400,000	145	4	38	398 (63 tezkereli, 335 tezkeresiz)	342	48	133	927
Elbasan ²³⁸	Mehmed Bey	215,000	48	1	4	123	120	-	-	296
25 sancaks	-	10,615,718	6,216	363	4,670	9,685	11,868	678	2,180	32,802
			10,048 timar and zeamet holders, 16,538 retainers + 6,216 retainers of governors		Total mustered soldiers: 32,802		678 timar and zeamet prebends were absent. The number of retainers fallen short of the muster-call according to sultan's order: 2,180			

total number may be between 2,000 and 2,200, if we take the numbers from the register of sipahis and zeamet holders in 1533. Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait,” 301.

²³⁶ TSMA e. 1145/1, p.1; TSMA d. 4755, 1a–8b; TSMA d. 4195, 1a–b; TSMA d. 10645, 4b–5a; TSMA e. 1106/36, 1–2.

²³⁷ It is clearly stated in a list of sancakbeyis dated 1527 that he was a member of the Mihaloğlu family. He was also the sancakbeyi of Vidin (“*livâ-i Vidin be-nâm-i Yahşi Beğ veled-i Mihal hâsıl dört yüz bin*”). Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*, 105.

²³⁸ TSMA d. 2204, 201b. The data on Elbasan is not complete. There were 125 zeamet and timar prebends in 1533: Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait,” 301. According to the tahrir register of 1530, there were a total of 111 zeamet and timar prebends. Ahmet Özkılınç et. al., *367 Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Rûm-ili Defteri* Vol. IV, 452.

The roll of the Rumelian sipahi army that crossed the Belgrade bridge to the Srem region with *serasker* İbrahim Paşa on 20–22 July 1532, holds great significance as it provides essential details. Although the roll-call does not include the forces of one or two sancaks that participated in the expedition, it reveals that at least 32,802 men crossed the bridge in three days. This figure indicates that almost 95 per cent of the sipahi forces in Rumelia were actively engaged in the campaign. The detailed documentation of servants (*cebelü*, *gulams*, and others), who served the governors, is one of the most crucial aspects of this registry. These servants, along with other components, played an important role in the overall sipahi army. They comprise about 17 to 20 per cent of the whole sipahi army. To offer a conclusive interpretation on this matter, one-fifth of the potential 50,000-strong sipahi army, which could be mobilized for a western campaign, comprised the retinues of the governors, including the province of Anatolia, at the beginning of the 1530s. Of course, not all the sancakbeyis' retinue may have been cavalry. Save for *cebelüs*, the rest of the servants were probably infantry and did not play an active role in the battle. Despite having access only to the total number of sipahis in Anatolia, we can estimate the participation of sipahis in each sancak by comparing the undated register MAD 152 (see, table III) with the summary registers for 1530 (which list *zeamet* and *timar* holders in the province of Anatolia). For instance, Halil, son of Şah Veli Bey, received a *timar* worth 10,000 akçe in the Saruhan sancak on 7 May 1530 (TT d. 72, p. 105) and is also listed in the undated MAD 152 register. Also, a certain Arslan were given *timar* 5,380 akçe worth in summary *timar* register (*mücmel*) on 17 April 1530 (TT d. 152, p. 8). The same Arslan was also listed in MAD 152 register (p. 3b). The examples can be multiplied. MAD 152 must have been prepared after May 1530, based on the account book of the province of Anatolia (*defter-i muhasebe-i vilayet-i Anadolu*). These records have been

utilized by researchers before, but they have incorrectly been dated to the time of Sultan Bayezid II.²³⁹ Additionally, this register lacks information regarding the number of retainers that sancakbeyis were obligated to bring along to military campaigns. Consequently, there is a disparity of around 5,000 retainers between the two records (MAD 152 and TSMA d. 9439). A comparison of these records has unveiled a surprising result: the retainers required to accompany sancakbeyis on campaigns constituted 28–30 per cent of the total sipahi army in the province of Anatolia.²⁴⁰ Considering the available information, we see that the number of mobilizable Anatolian forces was around 18,000. All sancaks from Rumelia participated in the campaign of 1532, the penultimate major Austrian military operation before the annexation of Buda in 1541, mirroring the situation in the 1529 campaign. However, only 8 of the 15 sancaks in the Anatolian province took part in the campaign with their governor-general Hüsrev Paşa.²⁴¹ Taking into account the number of sipahis in these sancaks, 65 per cent of the Anatolian sub-provinces was mobilized for the 1532 campaign (see table 4).

Table IV: The Timariot Forces (including retainers) of Anadolu Province in mid-1530 (MAD 152)

Sub-province	Timars and zeamet	Cebelüs (armed retainers)	Mobilizable troops ²⁴²	Total
Kütahya	873	589	1,356	1,462
Saruhan	600	531	1,120	1,131
Beğ (Hüdavendigâr)	721	520	1,158	1,241
Aydın	630	770	1,389	1,400

²³⁹ Feridun M. Emecen, *XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası* (Ankara: TTK, 1989), 280–284; Mustafa Çetin Varlık, “Anadolu Eyaleti,” *Türk Diyanet Vakfı (TDV) Ansiklopedisi*, vol. III (1991), 143–144; Feridun M. Emecen, “Cebelü,” *Türk Diyanet Vakfı (TDV) Ansiklopedisi*, vol. VII (1993), 188–189.

²⁴⁰ Dávid and Fodor also found similar ratio in Rumelia. Dávid and Fodor, “Changes,” 171 and 186.

²⁴¹ Kütahya (with Hüsrev Paşa), İsa Paşa (Aydın), Mehmed Bey (Menteşe), Hayreddin Bey (Ankara), Musa Bey (Bolu), Sunullah Bey (Kastamonu), İsa Bey (Kangırı), Elvend Bey (Hamid) and Sinan Bey (Karesi). KK d. 1764, 180.

²⁴² Some of the sipahis held collective timars (*müşterek*), and only a certain number of these sipahis took part in the campaign on a rotating basis (*be-nevbet*).

Menteşe	592	586	1,178	1,178
Bolu	482	319	767	801
Hamid	748	319	984	1,067
Ankara	200	167	349	367
Kangırı (Çankırı)	380	251	600	631
Kastamonu	614	304	886	918
Karahisar (-i Sahib)	734	180	727	914
Teke	260	273	533	533
Kocaili	170	112	266	282
Alaiye	110	70	180	180
Biga	224	104	320	328
Karesi	144	204	328	348
Sultanönü	147	73	207	220
TOTALS	7,629	5,372	12,348	13,001²⁴³

The most notable feature of the table 3 is that the majority of these governors, particularly those who had served for many years in the frontier regions, hailed from family clans, other than the well-known *akıncı* dynasties such as the Mihaloğlus, Malkoçoğlus, and Evrenosoğlus. They relatively had more household troops and retainers than the other governors. Among the sancakbeyis who served in the regions of Herzegovina, Bosnia, Zvornik, Semendria, and Vidin on the northwestern frontier of the empire, three were from the Yahyalı clan, one from the Mihaloğlu clan, and the other was Hüsrev Bey, Bayezid II's grandson. Historians seem to have overlooked the Yahyapaşazade clan's emergence as a new type of frontier family in the early 16th century. Yet, delving into how the Yahyalı family maintained its presence in the

²⁴³ There is a discrepancy between the totals on the first page of the register and the totals under the sub-provinces. The number of zeamet, timar and collective timar holders, as well as the number of retainers remain the same with overall number unchanged. The total number of the timariot sipahis is calculated to be 13,001 while the register records it as 13,003. The number of timariot sipahis with retainers is 12,975 in the register, however it is 12,348 in actuality. This disparity in the number of sipahis could be attributed to a scribal error or a later update.

northwestern Balkans for such a lengthy period poses a notable research question worthy of deeper exploration.²⁴⁴

3.3. Growth of Timariot Army in Frontier Regions

After analysing all these lists, particular attention should be given to the sipahis in the frontier sancaks. While the number of kılıç timars remained relatively consistent throughout Rumelia until the late 1520s, only two sancaks witnessed a substantial surge in the number of sipahi after 1529, coinciding with the year of the unsuccessful Vienna campaign: Bosnia and Semendria.²⁴⁵ One reason for this may have been the formation of a compact model army capable of direct intervention in Hungary. Between 1526 and 1532, coupled with thousands of paid garrison troops (*ulufeli*) and janissaries stationed in the fortresses along the Danube and Bosnia, the number of timariot sipahis in Bosnia and Semendria had doubled. By adopting this approach, the Ottomans ensured that they possessed a formidable military force on their western borders when embarking on long military campaigns both in the East and the Mediterranean. In the year of Bali Bey's death, the sub-province of Semendria had 13 zeamets and 241 sipahis. Within just four years, these numbers rose significantly to 22 zeamets and 702 sipahis, indicating a remarkable 188 per cent increase. Similarly, the

²⁴⁴ In total, five members of Yahyalı family held sancakbeyi position in 1532: Mehmed Bey, son of Yahya Paşa, Ahmed Bey, son of Yahya Paşa, İskender Bey, son of Yahya Paşa and Küçük Bali Bey. The last member of this family is Sinan, son of Yahya Paşa. He participated in this campaign as the sancakbeyi of Karesi in Anatolia province (KK d. 1764, 180). His sancakbeyi career began in July 1527 after the death of Bali Bey the Elder. He was the governor of Sis in Karaman province (KK d. 1764, 25). He participated in the Vienna campaign in 1529, but held no position (dismissed governor of Sis, KK d. 1764, 85). On December 1534 he was the governor of Karesi (İE HLT 1/2, 3b). Especially for Bali Bey the Elder, see Fodor, "Wolf on the Border," 57–88. For the other members of Yahyalı family in Hungary, see Géza Dávid, "Macaristan'da Yönetici Osmanlı Aileleri," *OTAM* 38 (2015): 13–30.

²⁴⁵ By analyzing the 200-year history of the timar and timariot sipahis in detail, Dávid and Fodor have indeed found that the number of kılıç timars remained largely stable between the early 16th and late 17th centuries. Dávid–Fodor, "Changes," 157–188. The sancak of Vidin also saw an increase in the number of timar holders in 1531, but it did not last. After a few years, their number decreased to a certain level. Muhsin Soyudoğan, *Reassessing the Timar System: The Case Study of Vidin (1455–1693)* (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Bilkent University, 2012), 195–196 and Appendix XI.

increase in the number of timar prebends in Bosnia over fifteen years is notable. Between 1516 and 1532, the number of sipahis in Bosnia increased by 105 per cent, a rate unrivaled among other Rumelian sancaks. In fact, it was only in these two sub-provinces that the number of kılıç timars, which remained relatively stable for many years, experienced such dramatic growth. How did creating new financial resources raise the number of sipahis, which had stayed static for years? Who constituted the majority of these new sipahis and their candidates? Were they volunteers, members of the governors' retinue, or others?

One might assume that the allocation of new revenues to the newly appointed sipahis in the conquered territories was the primary cause for the significant increase in the number of sipahis. However, a comparison of two Bosnian summary (timar) registers (1516–1530) reveals that the timar revenues from the newly acquired territories were relatively moderate. Despite the swift capture of the vast territory south of the Sava River, economic recovery would take several decades. Consequently, the timar prebends in these areas had only diminished revenues. Only 30–40 sipahis in these regions lived off these timar revenues. The same can be said of Semendria. Beside the capture of Belgrade and its surroundings in 1521, the sancak borders of Semendria did not expand. Although the Srem region was conquered between 1526 and 1530, it seems that the timar system was not introduced in the region for a considerable duration.²⁴⁶ Srem's revenues were allocated to Mehmed Bey, son of Yahya Paşa, as his official hassas totaling 100,000 akçe a year, in a lump sum (*ber-vech-i nakid maktu*).²⁴⁷ Yet again, the increase in the number of sipahi in the region was unaffected by this change. Thus, it seems that two important sources of income

²⁴⁶ Although there is no known early tahrir in Srem region, there was already a *kadı* in Ösek (Eszék/Osijek) by the name of Mevlana Sinan in January 1534. KK d. 1863, 98a.

²⁴⁷ MAD 506, 18.

were created in the region, contributing to the growth in the number of sipahi and the amount of timar revenues transferred to these soldiers. The status of the Vlachs and voynuks, who numbered in thousands of households and had previously paid a fixed amount of tax under a special military status, clearly shifted. In return for their military service, these groups were granted special tax exemptions (*resm-i Eflakiye*), yet their military status would be revoked upon the issuance of an imperial order (known as *mensuh* or *ref*). They would then become regular tax-paying subjects, identical to the rest of the *reaya*. However, only a few Vlach and voynuk leaders were granted timars, which were of very low value (between 500 and 1,500 akçe) and maintained their military status.²⁴⁸ Known as *knez*, *lagator*, *voyvoda* and *katunar* they were obligated to accompany officials in collecting poll-tax (*cizye*) and providing internal security in times of campaigns when the sipahi army was on the frontier.²⁴⁹ As a result, new land taxes (tithes) were imposed on the Vlachs, and the revenue from these taxes was distributed to new sipahis as timar income or as a reward (*terakki*) to existing sipahis. Meanwhile, the transformation of groups such as the Vlachs and voynuks into reaya can be seen as a general phenomenon of the period. The military status of the thousands

²⁴⁸ Some of the knezes, on the other hand, held substantial timars. Knez Mujak and Rayan had 10,000 akçe, and Knez Voyn Velimir had 6,000 akçe timar income in 1532. TSMA d. 2204, 47b.

²⁴⁹ Ema Miljković, “The Timar System in the Serbian Lands From 1450 to 1550: With a Special Survey on the Timar System in the Sanjak of Smederevo,” *Osmanlı Mirası Araştırmaları Dergisi* I (2014), pp. 42–46; Vjeran Kursar, “Being an Ottoman Vlach: On Vlach Identity (İes), Role and Status in Western Parts of the Ottoman Balkans (15th – 18th Centuries),” *OTAM* 34 (2013), 131. An undated and likely incomplete document, probably from the early 1530, lists the Christians of various origins who received “knez timars” in Semendria. Among them were martolos, lagators (voynuk commanders), primikürs and even ordinary taxpayers (*harac-güzar*): “*Defter-i esâmî-yi gebrân-i vilâyet-i Semendire, mezbûr kâfirler kimi lagator ve kimi primikür ve kimi harâc-güzâr iken knez edebine timar verilmiştir ki zikr olunur.*” TSMA e. 521. Since the names mentioned in this document appear in the 1532 roll-call but not in the 1528 icmal register, the date of the document must fall between 1528 and 1532 (TSMA e. 521: Miloş veled-i Milak, Rudnik nâhiyesi, 1,400 akçe; TSMA d. 2204: Miloş veled-i Milak, Rudnik nâhiyesi, 1,400 akçe or Vasil in Belgrad nâhiyesi with 1,400 akçe and the same Vasil in the same nâhiye in 1532 roll-call register). A significant proportion of Semendria and Bosnia’s Christian timar holders were known as knezes. Thirty-three knezes held timar in Bosnia in 1532, while in Semendria, knez timar holders constituted almost half of all Christian sipahis (48 of 107). For the related law regulations and changing military status of these group, see Ahmet Özkılınç et. al., *174 Numaralı Hersek Livâsı İcmâl Eflakân ve Voynugân Tahrîr Defteri (939/1533)*; Kursar, ‘Being an Ottoman Vlach’, 151–161.

of voynuks in the sub-provinces of Köstendil (Kyustendil), Vulçitrin (Vuçitrin), and Alacahisar (Kruševac) was gradually abolished in the 1530s. It appears that more than 50 per cent of the total voynuks in Rumelia became ordinary tax-payers before the 1540s. The rest had already lost their combatant status and were responsible for grooming horses in the imperial stables (*ıstabl-i amire*).²⁵⁰ New tax-farming units (*mukataa*) were set up to collect the revenues levied on the former voynuk households and transfer them directly to the central treasury (*hazine-i amire*). To some extent, this phenomenon can be viewed as a manifestation of the breakdown of the earlier negotiation process that the Ottomans had initiated with these local military groups during their expansion in the Balkans, starting as early as the 14th and extending into the first half of the 16th century.²⁵¹ As the frontiers expanded westwards, the military groups that the Ottomans had initially relied on for military purposes gradually transformed into ordinary tax-paying reayas. Consequently, although the Balkan military institutions that had existed before the Ottoman conquests gradually disappeared, we can observe a more homogeneous Ottoman army that underwent

²⁵⁰ By using the available tahrir registers of the regions in the Balkans from the 1520s, Barkan calculated the tax-exempted Christian population (Vlachs, martoloses and voynuks) who enjoyed military status of over 80,000 households, of whom 7,851 were voynuks. Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *İstila Devirlerinin Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri (Nüfus ve İskan Meselelerine Dair Toplu Çalışmalar)* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2020), 432–436. Considering that he did not include the voynuks of Semendria and Bosnia, their numbers were even higher. However, most of the voynuks in inner regions, except of those in Eastern Balkans, became ordinary tax-paying subjects. Whole voynuks in Köstendil, 5,643 individuals, became ordinary reaya, and new levies were imposed on them. Ali Coşkun et. al., *167 Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Rûm-ili Defteri: Paşa Livâsı Solkol Kazaları (Gümülcine, Yenice-i Karasu, Drama, Zihne, Nevrekop, Timurhisarı, Siroz, Selanik, Sidrekapsi, Avrathisarı, Yenice-i Vardar, Karaverye, Serfiçe, İştin, Kestorya, Bihlişte, Görice, Florina) ve Köstendil Livâsı (937/1530)* Vol. I. Index and Facsimile. (Ankara: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2003), 244–292; Evgeni Radushev and Göksel Baş, *Early Ottoman Military and Administrative Order in the Balkans: A Muster Roll of the Voynuk Corps (Defter-i Esâmî-i Voynugân) in the Western Balkans from 1487* (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, 2020), 22–23. The number of voynuks in Semendria was 2,695 and 915 in Alacahisar in 1530. Of these, 565 in Semendria and 159 in Alacahisar were obliged to take part in the military campaigns. These groups also shared the same fate in the late 1530s. MAD 506, 25, 34, 45; MAD 167, 365–366, 450.

²⁵¹ For a detailed analysis of the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans and the integration of military institutions in the region into the Ottoman system, see Mariya Kiprovsk, “Ferocious Invasion or Smooth Incorporation? Merging the Established Balkan Military System into the Ottoman Army,” in *The Ottoman Conquest of the Balkans*, ed. Oliver Jens Schmitt (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2016): 79–102.

military transformation in favour of the timariot sipahi both in inner and frontier areas.²⁵²

The allocation of the incomes of the farms (*çiftlik*), which were at the disposal of the military class in Bosnia as timar income, was another key new revenue source for the increase in the number of sipahi. Military *çiftlik*s existed in the classical period, and most sipahis held *çiftlik*s for providing extra income in addition to their regular timar profits. Even some sipahis had more than 4 or 5 separate *çiftlik*s in disparate locations. The status of these *çiftlik*s was called *mukataalı* (tax-farm) and their holders paid their taxes to the central treasury (*hazine-i amire*) annually in a lump sum (*ber-vech-i maktu*).²⁵³ The total income from the *çiftlik*s must be substantial, as evidenced by the fact that between 300,000 and 400,000 akçe were sent to the central treasury annually from Bosnia alone. In 1523–24, the revenue office in Constantinople expected (*ber-vech-i tahmin*) to collect 420,000 akçe minimum from the *çiftlik*s in Bosnia.²⁵⁴ The mukataa status of all the *çiftlik*s in Bosnia was later abolished in 1530, as corroborated by the provincial law code. Subsequently, *çiftlik* holders, including sipahis, were subjected to levies, especially tithe (*öşr*).²⁵⁵ This additional revenue was transferred to sipahis to supply their prebends or, more commonly, to new sipahi candidates (followers of governors, sons of deceased sipahis, volunteers, etc.) who had

²⁵² During the late 1450s and 1460s, the proportion of Christian sipahis in the sub-provinces of Tırhala, Vulçitrın, Hersek, Bosnia and Semendria was high. However, their proportion gradually decreased over time and became marginal. Halil İnalçık, *Fatih Devri Üzerine Tetkikler ve Vesikalar I*. 5th edition (Ankara: TTK, 2014), 169–171; Miljković, “The Timar System,” 39–46.

²⁵³ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *XV ve XVI ncı Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ziraî Ekonominin Hukukî ve Malî Esasları*. Vol. I. Hüseyin Özdeğer (ed.) (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2001), pp. 396–401; Halil İnalçık, *Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: 1300–1600*, Vol. I. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 108–117.

²⁵⁴ “*mukata’ât-i çiftlikhâ-yi livâ-i Bosna vâcib-i sene 930 ki ber-vech-i emânet zabt kerde: teslimât ber-vech-i tahmin fî sene dört yüz yirmi bin akçe*”. TSMA d. 2200, 10a. There were over 1,000 *çiftlik*s in Bosnia owned by the military class, most of whom were timariot sipahis.

²⁵⁵ Barkan, *XV ve XVI ncı Asırlarda*, 399–401. Only few *çiftlik*s were exempted in Bosnia, most of them were either private property (*mülk*) or vaqf lands. MAD 164; Ahmet Özkılınç et. al., 91, 164, MAD 540 ve 173 Numaralı Hersek, Bosna ve İzvornik Livâları İcmâl Tahrîr Defterleri, 372–376.

been in eager anticipation to join the sipahi ranks. Subsequently, the Ottomans waived part of its past incomes in order to generate new revenues for additional sipahi. The sipahi forces' numerical increase in the Semendria and Bosnia sancaks was not the result of continual conquests. Instead, the Ottomans created fresh revenue streams for timar prebends by doing away with tax exemptions on Vlachs and voynuks or by allocating çiftlik revenues to the sipahis. This rise in timar income allotted to the sipahis is apparent in Semendria between 1528 and 1532.

3.4. A New Typology of 'Uc beyi'

Who were the new sipahis in those two provinces, and how were the individuals, who followed sancakbeyis, integrated into the timar system? Exploring these questions may give insight into the 'serhad soldier' typology. The first and most numerous groups were the dismissed (*mazul*) sipahis and the sons of sipahis (*sipahizadegan*). By law, the latter were entitled to timar upon the death of their fathers. Only a few received timars while their fathers were still alive, and many had to wait for a long time to become sipahis. For the mazuls, the process was more challenging. Their numbers appear to be substantial, and they continuously sought to acquire new timar. As mazul, they were required to participate in campaigns in order to be bestowed a new timar. However, if their comradeship (*yoldaşlık*) in the campaigns was recognized, they were eligible to become sipahi with a timar once again. If a person who was previously a mazul or son of a sipahi did not receive a timar again within a certain period of time, they risked losing their military status and becoming a reaya, as stipulated by the timar laws.²⁵⁶ Their numbers were undeniably large, and as expected, there was a so-called

²⁵⁶ Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Kanûnî Sultan Süleyman'ın Timar ve Zeamet Tevcîhi ile İlgili Fermanları," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi* 17:22 (1967): 38–42; Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries," 155–158; Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 201–206.

“population pressure” on the timar system from those eagerly waiting to join the ranks of the sipahi army. To alleviate this pressure, mainly at the sancak level, the majority of the sipahis in the recently acquired regions of Bosnia were chosen from the mazul and *sipahizades*.²⁵⁷ This “pressure”, which we can observe to have existed within the timar system as early as the first half of the 16th century, seems to have gone down, at least for a while, by way of creating new resources in Bosnia and Semendria. Perhaps this is why, for a long time, the sipahizades settled for timar shares well below 3,000 akçe, since timar sources were lacking and they did not want to wait long for their initial timar (*ibtida timarı*), which was 3,000 akçe. In 1530, only one of the 60 sipahis who received new timars in Bosnia had a prebend worth more than 3,000 akçe.

The people (*merdum*) that clustered around the sancakbeyis on the frontier were the second group eager to join the sipahi ranks. These large groups, which mostly participated in raids alongside the governors of Bosnia and Semendria, constituted an imperative potential military force on the Ottoman frontiers. Before discussing the status of the hundreds of people who accompanied the sancakbeyis, it would be fitting to mention a new “frontier policy” that began to take shape in the middle of the Bayezid II period, as well as the typology of sancakbeyis this policy created. Even in the second half of the 16th century, the Ottoman frontiers were still referred to as ‘*uc*’, although the meaning of the term had changed drastically over a century before. The

²⁵⁷ The number of mazul sipahis in Bosnia who received timar in these regions was 89. The number of sipahizades was also 60. In comparison with the previous tahrir register of Bosnia, it is obvious that half of the ranks of the sipahi in Bosnia were filled by these two groups. As Linda Darling states almost half of the timars went to sons of timar holders during the reign of Sultan Süleyman. Linda T. Darling, “Historicizing the Ottoman Timar System: Identities of Timar-Holders, Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries,” *Turkish Historical Review* 8:2 (2017): 145–173. For the percentage of timar bestowals to sipahizades and its transformation over time, see *ibid.*, 145–173. The remaining groups were likely volunteers (*gönüllü*) seeking timar and booty in these parts of the empire. This group, which can be considered a broad umbrella term, also comprised mazuls, sipahizades and other individuals who could not secure a position in the bey’s retinue. Pál Fodor, “Making a Living on the Frontiers: Volunteers in the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Army,” in *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Age of Ottoman Conquest*, ed. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2000), 233–247.

functions and power of the established frontier (*akıncı*) beys operating in three major regions, appeared to be waning as the Ottomans increased their influence in the Balkans, particularly during the middle of Bayezid II's reign. Mihaloğlu and Malkoçoğlu, who continued to serve as sancakbeyis and akıncı commanders during regular Ottoman campaigns, operated in eastern Rumelia, while their counterparts, the Evrenosoğlu, were active in Albania and Dalmatia. In contrast, the governors operating in Bosnia, İzvornik, and Semendria, three sub-provinces adjacent to the Hungarians, the Ottomans' most formidable adversary in the west, presented a stark contrast to the well-known raiding beys mentioned earlier.

Here is the emergence of a new typology of '*uc beyi*', mainly of servant (*kul*) background themselves or their fathers and directly descended from the palace lineage, and often related to the sultan through marriage. Given the length of their tenure, scope of their activities, and massive *hass* revenues roughly equivalent to those of a governor-general, this new typology of *uc beyi* can be viewed as the earliest instance of what would characterize the following century.²⁵⁸ Hadım Yakup Paşa, İskender Paşa, Firuz Bey, Yunus Paşa, Hadım Sinan Paşa, and subsequently Hüsrev Bey, established a precedent for Bosnia. On the other hand, Yahya Paşa, his sons, and relatives (namely Büyük Bali Bey, Mehmed Bey, Ahmed Bey, Küçük Bali Bey), served as the sancakbeyis of Semendria and İzvornik, establishing another power centre in the region.²⁵⁹ The Hüsrev Bey and Yahyalı clans were instrumental in

²⁵⁸ Fodor, "Wolf on the Border," 57–58.

²⁵⁹ For Yahya Paşa, see Hedda Reindl, *Männer um Bāyezīd*, pp. 336–345. Although it is certain that Yahya Paşa was of *devşirme* origin, the family is shown as a branch of Malkoçoğulları. Fahameddin Başar, "Malkoçoğulları," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (TDV) Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 27 (2003), 537–538; Levent Kayapınar, "Malkoçoğlu Bali Bey Vakfı ve Bayezid Baba Âsitânesi," *Alevilik-Bektaşilik Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1 (2009): 105–115. Also, his son Bali Bey (d. 1527) is often confused in the literature with contemporary Malkoçoğlu Bali Bey (d. 1503). This gives the false impression that the Yahyalı family was a branch of the Malkoçoğulları family. Fodor and Tapan offer the most current explanations of this issue: Fodor, "Wolf on the Border," 58–59; Filiz Tapan, "Rumeli Uç Ailesi Malkoçoğulları'nın Kökeni Hakkında Tartışmalar ve Yeni Bir İddia," *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 16:32 (2023): 110–115. Güneş Işıksel posits that the execution of Yahyalı Arslan Pasha in 1566 was a turning point for the marcher lords

implementing the Ottoman rulers' new frontier policy, replacing the conventional approach of direct raids with a strategy of settlement through conquest. It could be argued that these groups have formed a “*serhad* lobby” with the ability to influence the Hungarian policy of the centre.²⁶⁰

It is essential to trace the activities and transformation of the new type frontier bey mentioned above further back, especially during the reign of Selim I (1512–1520) which can be described as a period of unceasing wars and conquests in the East. While Selim I focused all his attention on the east, a conflict of reduced intensity existed on the Ottoman–Hungarian border.²⁶¹ Despite the peace treaties between the Ottomans and the Hungarians, border raids between the two sides continued to escalate. Interestingly, while the borders of İzvornik and Semendria remained unchanged, the Ottomans had already begun to acquire new territories in Bosnia in the early 16th century. The Hungarians agreed to relinquish the control of fortresses previously captured by the Bosnian governors Firuz Bey, Sinan and Yunus Paşas in the Ottoman–Hungarian peace treaty of 1519. With these alterations in place, the Ottomans advanced north to the Sava River. The Hungarians, on the other hand, lost all their Dalmatian fortresses, except for Klis. Following the Ottoman capture of Sokol and Tesanj, the strategic position of Jajce, the main Bosnian fortress, became vulnerable.²⁶²

(*akıncı beyleri*), the result was the gradual transfer of sizeable revenues managed by the last scions of the marcher lords to the *devşirme* elite. However, Işıksel did not differentiate between the governors of Bosnia and Semendria and the classical *akıncı* families in the early 16th century. Işıksel, ‘Ottoman Power Holders in the Balkans (1353–1580): A Case of Upward and Downward Elite Mobility’, in *Medieval Bosnia and South-East European Relations: Political, Religious and Cultural Life at the Adriatic Crossroads*, eds. Dženan Dautović, Emir O. Filipović and Neven Isailović (Leeds: Arc Humanities Press, 2019), 94–95. In particular, on the change in the position of the *ucbeyis* and the changing nature of the frontier, see Işıksel, ‘Rumeli’nin Üç Halkası (1354–1580)’, *Doğu Batı* 90 (2019): 41–50.

²⁶⁰ Fodor calls this group, led by Bali Bey, the “Rumelian lobby”: Fodor, *The Unbearable Weight*, 72–74; Fodor, “Wolf on the Border,” 64–67.

²⁶¹ In 1513, military operations were being conducted on both sides of the border while peace negotiations were ongoing. Dávid and Fodor, “Hungarian–Ottoman Peace,” 25–26.

²⁶² Both the 1503 and 1519 Ottoman–Hungarian peace treaties list the frontier fortresses belonging to both states. These fortresses are the ones that the Hungarians lost to the Ottomans and ultimately indicate

The Rumelian timariot army was also mobilized during Selim's eastern campaigns. Furthermore, the governors and sipahis of the border sancaks of Bosnia, İzvornik and Semendria were consistently exempted from participating in the expeditions to Anatolia. As a result, the sipahis from these three sub-provinces were always mentioned separately in the mobilization orders and registers prepared just before the campaign.²⁶³ Although the register is undated, the number of kılıç timars suggests that it was compiled prior to one of Selim's campaigns, and it indicates that 10,431 out of the 11,126 zeamet and timar holders in the 27 sancaks of the Rumelia province were required to go on a military expedition. 695 sipahis in the sancaks of Semendria, Bosnia, İzvornik, and Gallipoli, on the other hand, did not take part in the campaign. Since these sipahis were not deployed, their primary responsibilities revolved around guarding border fortresses, repelling potential counterattacks, delivering salaries (*mevacib*), food, and ammunition to the frontier fortresses every six months²⁶⁴ as well as organizing direct raids into enemy territory. Furthermore,

the beginning of the collapse of the Hungarian defense network in the region: Srebrenik, Sokol, Tesanj, Kotor, Bočac, Jezero, the other Sokol (Sokograd), Čačvina, Nutjak, Sinj and Vrlika. For the Latin text of the peace treaty in 1503, see Joseph von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. II, 616–620; Lajos Thallóczy and Sándor Horváth, *Magyarország melléktartományainak oklevéltára 4. Jajcza (bánság, vár és város) törnéte 1450–1527* (Budapest: 1915), 167–170. For the copy of this treaty written in Ottoman Turkish, see Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Korvin Mathias (Mátyás)’ın Bayezid II’e Mektupları, Tercümeleri ve 1503 (909) Osmanlı-Macar Muahedesinin Türkçe Metni,” *Belleten* 87 (1958): 369–381; Kütükçü, “Osmanlı-Macar Ahidnameleri Bağlamında Osmanlı-Macaristan İlişkilerinin Gelişimi ve II. Bayezid Dönemine Ait Türkçe Macaristan Ahidnameleri Üzerine İncelemeler,” 41–90. Also, for the Latin copy of the 1519 treaty and its Turkish translation, see Numan Yekeler et. al., *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türk-Macar İlişkileri*, 12–18.

²⁶³ “*Ve sefere eşmeyen sancaklar ki Bosna ve Semendire ve İzvornik ve Geliboludur.*” TSMA e. 731/17.

²⁶⁴ One of the most important duties of the governors of Bosnia was indeed to transfer salaries (*mevacib*), ammunition, and victuals, escorting them with sancak sipahis every six months to the two most important fortresses on the border of Jajce: Ključ and Kamengrad. In an order of June 1502, Bayezid II reminded the Bosnian governor İskender Paşa that the supply of food to the fortresses of Ključ and Kamengrad was more important than any other work and ordered it to be done as soon as possible. Feridun M. Emecen and İlhan Şahin, *II. Bayezid Dönemi Ahkâm Defterleri*, 277. Even for this simple operation, hundreds of sipahis had to be mobilized to counter a possible ambush or raid on the way. Yunus Paşa reported that he needed between 2,000 and 3,000 men to carry out this mission in a letter written probably in 1513. Ménage, *Ottoman Historical Documents*, 67. Mihaloğlu Mehmed Bey, the sancakbeyi of Bosnia, explained why he could not come to Istanbul to congratulate Sultan Süleyman after his accession to the throne: “...bundan akdem bab-i sa’âdetden Kamengrad ve Kılıç kal’alarına prangılar ve sâ’ir yarak cinsi irsâl olunub ve livâ-i Bosnada top taşlar[ı] ve el değirmenleri ve kırk kantar mismâr kesdirilüb ve anlardan gayri beşlü yazılub Kamengrada iledüb ... Bab-i sa’âdetden irsâl

sancakbeyis were able to dismiss sipahis through letters upon the failure of a mission.²⁶⁵ Moreover, the candidates in the letters of recommendation (*tezkere*) they sent to the beylerbeyi for vacant positions (*mahlul*), most of whom were from their men, were very likely to get these positions after the approval of the beylerbeyi or imperial diploma of appointment (*berat-i hümayun*).²⁶⁶ Hence, the sancakbeyis in the frontier areas had a higher number of their own men enjoying timar compared to any other sancak. While a large majority of the Ottoman army was engaged in conflicts against the Mamluks or Safavids in the east, the remaining sancak sipahis, alongside the governor's personal retinue and retainers and fortress guards, managed to take numerous minor fortresses in Bosnia within a short span of time. These forces were

olunan yarağı ve bunda kesilen top taşları ve el değirmenleri ve mismâr kendü adamlarımızın ve yâhud da hâzır bulunan sipâhilerin bârgirlerine yükledüb kal'a müstahfizlarının mevâcibleri ile iledüb zikrolan kal'alara irsâl olunsa gerekdir ... şöylece ma'lûm ola ki Kamengrad ve Kılıç kal'aları devletli pâdişâhımın memâlik-i mahrûsesinden hâric beş altı günlük yerde Dârü'l-harb içinde vâki' olmuştur ... livâ-i Bosna feth-i evvelinden ta bu müddete değin Bosna sancağıbeğleri bilâ-icâzet sancağını koyub der-devlete varmış değildir. Zîrâ ki Bosna sâ'ir sancaklara benzemez memleketden taşra vâki' olmuştur. Bir tarafı Frenk ve bir tarafı Çesar ve bir tarafı Ungurus memleketidir. Şöyle ki Bosna sancağıbeğleri emr olunmadan Bosnayı hâlî koyub gitseler küffâr melâ'ini etrafından hücum edüb memleketi yıkub yakub kal'alar elden gider. İmdi hazretinizün ma'lûm[ı]dır ki ben devletli pâdişâhımın kemîne kulu ve du'âcısıyım. Hâk-pây-i şeriflerine yüz sürmeğe bilâ-icâzet varmadığımıza sebep bu vâki' olmuştur." TSMA e. 856/60. Upon the death of Mustafa Paşa, Mehmed Bey became the governor of Bosnia on 29 January 1520 and remained in this position until 21 February 1521. His successor was Bali Bey (son of Yahya Paşa), former governor of İskenderiye. TT d. 57, 1. Although the letter is undated, it was certainly written after September 1520. Sultan Süleyman ascended the throne on 30 September 1520. Emecen, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Zamanı*, 48–49.

²⁶⁵ For instance: "*Nahiye-i Niş der liva-i Semendire. Timar-i İlyas, mezkûr için sancağıbeği Sinan Paşa Güzelce Kal'ası hizmetine gelmedi deyü 'arz itmeğin Prizren sancağında beş bin iki yüz yirmi akçelik timardan ma'zûl olup üç bin akçe ziyâdeye hükm-i hümayûni olan Mahmûd voyvodaya ba-emr-i padişâh virildi, eşer ... İşbu Mahmûd Semendire beği Sinan Paşa hazretlerinin ademisidir.*" In fact, fifteen sipahis who did not take part in the service of the fortress of Güzelcehisar (Avala/Žrnov/Zsarnó) were dismissed with a letter from Sinan Paşa, the sancakbeyi of Semendria at that time. What is even more striking is that all those who took up these posts were again Sinan Paşa's men. MAD 7, 348b–356b (15 December 1512–23 September 1513).

²⁶⁶ Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*, 28; MAD 7, 387a: "*Nâhiye-i Vişegrad der livâ-i Bosna, timar-i Aydın, mezkûr için Kamengrad kal'ası hizmetine gelmedi deyü Yunus Paşa 'arz itmeğin mahlûl olup ve bundan gayri yine bu timar ifrâzından Ali'den mahlul olan bin yedi yüz altmış akçe yazar hisse dahi gene bu timara ilhâk olup cümle on bin beş yüz altmış akçeye yetiştirilib sâbıkâ yine bu timara bu yazı ile mutasarrıf olup ma'zûl vâki' olan Kike voyvoda taleb olmağın eğerçi ki min-ba'd sancakbeğleri mektûbî mücebince sipâhilerin timarları alınmaya ve sefer-i hümayûna eşmeyen ma'zûllere timar virilmeye deyü bu bendeye emr-i 'âli olmuş idi Bosna ve Semendire sancakları kenâr sancaklar olup kadîmden bu sancaklar sefer-i zafer-peykere eşe gelmeyüb bunların hizmeti kenâr muhâfazası olduğuyçün bi'z-zarûrî beğleri mektûbına 'amel olunub sadaka olunmak ümmidine tezkire virildi ... tahrîren fi 17 Zilhicce sene 920" (2 February 1515). "Kike nâm zimmi" in MAD 7, 368b.*

more than sufficient in safeguarding a vast 800-km-long frontier region. By carefully examining the summary of timar registers (*icmal*) and timar grants (*tevcih*) registers during the reign of Selim I and the first quarter of Süleyman I's reign, one can learn more about how and to what extent the sancakbeyis incorporated their own affiliates into the border provinces' timar system. The proportion of voyvodas, stewards (*kethüda*), and other subordinates within the retinue of a sancakbeyi carries significance in terms of hierarchy. In the inner circle of the bey, consisting of *kethüda*, voyvodas, and servants (*gulam*) it was common to receive timar and even zeamet. However, these records represent only the tip of the iceberg.

As a result, we can only observe individuals who were part of a bey's household and later received a timar in the timar allocation registers. In contrast, it is extremely rare to find voyvodas, salaried members (*ulufeci*), or slaves who did not hold timar but were directly under the bey. A case in point is Hüsrev Bey, who had more men in his retinue than any other governor in the Balkans. His entourage totaled 1,040 men, yet only 10 of them (1 general deputy/*kethüda*, 4 voyvodas, 2 commanders of the doorkeepers/*kapıcıbaşı*, 3 others) held zeamet or timar.²⁶⁷ However, this important group, comprising 33 per cent of the military forces in Bosnia, did not possess any timar or zeamet holdings. Instead, they either depended on the hass revenues granted to Hüsrev Bey, which was evidently insufficient to pay all of them,

²⁶⁷ Hüsrev Bey had a total of sixteen voyvodas, who formed the military command and directed the raids (*akın*) on the frontier. They were all headed by the Murad, general deputy (*kethüda*) of Hüsrev Bey (later the first sancakbeyi of Klis) who also had the largest retinue (102 men) among the voyvodas. It is possible to say that a total of 376 individuals under the command of these voyvodas and doorkeepers (*kapıcı*) constituted the core staff of the sancakbeyi. The situation is somewhat different in a summary timar register of Semendria from 1528. People related to the Yahyalı family held 29 out of 254 zeamet and timar. Three of them who held zeamet were either relatives or followers of the late Yahya Paşa (Rüstem, Mustafa voyvoda, Çanşigir/chief taster Hüseyin, Hasan, brother of Rüstem). Nine of them were the men of the recently deceased Bali Bey, son of Yahya Paşa. The others were the men of Mehmed Bey, son of Yahya Paşa. TT d. 135. Since we do not have a summary register for Semendria in 1530, we cannot find an answer to the question of how many sipahis were related to the Yahyalı family in the 1532 roll-call. However, some members of the clan appeared in the 1532 roll-call.

or on the profits obtained from selling captives seized during the frontier raids to maintain their livelihoods.²⁶⁸ Furthermore, these individuals were not static; instead, they formed a mobile group that moved with the bey during each appointment period. This characteristic is also reflected in the timar allocation registers, which state that those, who were previously assigned to another sancak, accompanied the bey to the new region and requested new timars there.²⁶⁹ It should also be highlighted that in times of peace, the sancakbeyi's entourage is composed of only a small percentage of these large groups. Moreover, numerous volunteers and dismissed (*mazul*) sipahis participated in military campaigns under the sancakbeyi's banner. Some of them would later become part of the permanent entourage of the sancakbeyi.²⁷⁰ When a governor died, the individuals who were part of his household and held timar, were often placed under the authority of another sancakbeyi. This practice is particularly evident in the regions of Bosnia and Semendria. This group, characterized as fluid and transient

²⁶⁸ The sancakbeyis received the majority of their prebends (*hass*) for the purpose of feeding their retinue. In his *Asafname*, Lütü Paşa affirms that most of the revenue allocated to him as *hass* was used to pay his servants (*kul*) and kitchen expenditures. Lütü Paşa, *Asafname*. Ahmet Uğur (ed.) (İstanbul: Büyüyen Ay, 2017), 14–15. Hüsrev Bey, in 1532, was bestowed a *hass* sum totaling 655,000 akçe for a year. Even if this was the highest income a sancakbeyi could receive, it was inadequate to maintain such a large retinue. This will become clearer when we consider that Mehmed Bey, son of Yahya Paşa, received the closest *hass* to Hüsrev Bey, amounting to 650,000 akçe, and had a retinue of 782. In contrast, Mihaloğlu Mehmed Bey had a retinue of 410 despite having higher income than Hüsrev Bey at 656,000 akçe; see Table 3.

²⁶⁹ On 24 September 1513, Hadım Sinan Paşa, the governor of Semendria, was appointed as the governor of Bosnia with a substantial revenue of 800,585 akçe. MAD 7, 379b–382b. Following his tenure, his successor, Yunus Paşa, who served as the sancakbeyi of Bosnia, took over Semendria with 700,585 akçe. The men of the paşas who held *zeamet* and timar in these sancaks also renounced their prebends (“*timarından ferâgat itmeğin*”) and then went with their lords (“*[merdum-i Sinan Paşa/Yunus Paşa] Mezkûr paşa ile Bosna'ya/Semendire'ye bile gidüb*”). Afterwards, they received new timars. MAD 7, 356b–380a.

²⁷⁰ In his *Târîh-i Sefer-i Zafer-Rehber-i Alaman*, Celalzade Salih Çelebi mentions that numerous volunteers took part in the 1532 campaign as servants of the sancakbeyis: “*Her biri bir mîr kolına tâbi olup kulına nökerine lâhık olurdu.*” Celalzâde Salih Çelebi, *Târîh*, 19. For the volunteers, see Fodor, “Making a Living,” 229–263. Mustafa Âli tells us the story of Hacı Mehmed, dizdar of Požega, whom he met in Požega in 1575, which gives us a good example on this matter. Hacı Mehmed, a ninety-year-old man, joined the 1532 campaign under the banner of Mehmed Bey, son of Yahya Paşa, and gained a place among the retinue of Mehmed Bey. He had been appointed as fortress commander of Požega in 1537 with the favour of Mehmed Bey. Nenad Močanin, *Town and Country on the Middle Danube 1526-1690* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2006), 158–169. Here, the story of Hacı Mehmed which begins in 1532 (a fortuitous coincidence with Celalzâde Salih Çelebi's 1532 narrative) provides important insight into the making of households.

households, additionally served as the new and experienced entourage for the newly appointed sancakbeyis in the region. We may draw an analogy between this and the accumulation of different layers of soil in a riverbed overtime. As such, when we examine the household of one governor, we can see many individuals who previously served other sancakbeyis in that region. For instance, in the 1530s, numerous individuals comprising the seemingly extensive households of Hüsrev Bey and Yahyapaşaoğlu Mehmed Bey had once served under their successors, namely Yahya Paşa, Bali Bey, Yunus Paşa, Sinan Paşa, and Firuz Bey. In this regard, the individuals in those sancaks, who were well aware of *modus operandi* of the frontiers, can be regarded as a bequest handed down to the new beys from the venerable sancakbeyis who had long served in the region.

3.5. Feeding a Large Household: Raids and Slave-based Economy

Now we know that the number of kılıç timars doubled in two sancaks in the 1530s and that some of the sancakbeyis' deputies were incorporated into the timar system, it is also necessary to examine how the governors provided financial support to their households, which were made up of hundreds of armed men and did not benefit from the timar system, as well as how these troops were essential to the Ottoman military campaigns. First and foremost, the financial gains made from the raiding activities of the sipahi, garrison soldiers, and the household soldiers of the sancakbeyis were of great importance. All those engaged in military operations along the frontier, be they retainers of a governor, sipahi with timar, fortress guards or retainers, found the slave-based economy to be an alluring system. This economic model served as an incentive for the sancakbeyis to support and promote their military base. For this reason, many who were desperate for money and a place in the military class, clustered around the

governors on the frontiers, seeking the potential riches to be gained through participation in looting (*akın*).

Although it would be an overstatement that this system alone supported the entire Ottoman finances, it is plausible to deem it as a structure that provided support to the raiding individuals on the frontier. Put differently, the existence of tens of thousands of captives cannot be justified to exist solely based on evidence from narrative sources and Venetian reports, which do not always offer complete and reliable information. Not even in the Corfu campaign of 1537, in which the central army participated, did the total number of prisoners exceed 5,000–8,000.²⁷¹ Moreover, in the early 16th century, slave traffic was more intense in the Mediterranean and Black Sea than in the Balkans. A mukataa register dated between November 1523 and June 1524 shows us that the Istanbul and Gelibolu *pencik mukataası* (tax-farming of one-fifth tax from the war captives) were sold differently for a three-year term at the price of 2,530,000 akçe (46,000 ducats). On the other hand, *pencik mukataası* of the entire Rumelia was sold for a three-year term at the price of 660,000 akçe. The state officials anticipated that the *pencik* revenues from the raids in Rumelia would generate 220,000 akçe annually (average 1400-1500 captives).²⁷² Therefore, no more than 200-300 prisoners were

²⁷¹ In the Corfu expedition of 1537, Lütü Paşa had crossed over to the Italian mainland with the Rumelian army supported by some Anatolian troops and carried out extensive raids. In his *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, Lütü Paşa states that he sent the prisoners captured during these raids to Sultan Süleyman. Kayhan Atik (ed.), *Lütü Paşa ve Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman* (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001), 278–279; Emecen, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Zamanı*, 280–281. In fact, a register dating back to 1537–38 contains important details about the prisoners taken during the expedition. According to this, the total number of prisoners brought from Corfu and Italian coastal areas was 6,328. The one-fifth income (*pençik*) from the sale of these captives alone was 493,400 akçe. MAD 523, 1028b–1031a: “*Muhâsebe-i mahsûlât-i penç-yek-i esârî ki ‘an vilâyet-i Pulya ve Korfoz ihrâc bûdend der vakt-i reften hazret-i Lütü Paşa ve Hayreddin Paşa bâ-donanma-yi hümâyûn be-sefer-i Pulya ve Korfoz el-vâki ‘fî sene 944 tahrîren fî 18 Muharrem sene 945*”.

²⁷² TSMA d. 6880, 7b: “*Mukata‘a-i kıst-i iskele-i pençik der Gelibolı ‘an aşer Receb sene 930.*” Ibid., 13b: “*Mukata‘a-i pençik-i esârî-yi deryâ-yi siyah ‘an gurre-i Muharrem sene 930.*” Ibid., 13b: “*Mukata‘a-i pençik-i esârî-yi vilâyet-i Rum-ili ‘an Rebûlâhir sene 930.*”

taken in a single border raid, whether it was directly carried out by the bey himself or by his men (*voyvoda*, *kethüda*).

Another factor to consider is that while these operations are labeled as '*akın*' (raid), those carrying them out do not fit the conventional definition of '*akıncı*' (raiders). Rather, many individuals involved were the followers of the governor, including *zaim* and *sipahi* of the *sancak*, and surprisingly, a significant number of fortress guards would also take part in these activities. Thus, the raiding groups in Bosnia and Semendria deviated significantly from the conventional *akıncı* archetype during the 16th century. This is why, two types of frontier lords grew to prominence: raiding beys (*akıncı beyleri*) and frontier/*serhad* beys during that century.²⁷³

An analysis on individuals who participated in the border raids during the specified time frame, illustrates their traits and motivations. One-fifth tax (*pencik*) records exist, documenting eighteen successive raids that occurred between 1535–1540, and giving details on the leaders (*voyvoda*) of the raids (*akın*, *çete*, *haramilik*), the participants involved, the number of captives, and their one-fifth (*pencik*) value.²⁷⁴ Although all participants in the pillaging activities took captives, the name of their activities differed depending on the type of raid. This variation can be attributed to imperial decrees on *pencik*. A raid was called an *akın* if it was led by a *sancak* or an *akıncı beyi*. Typically, these operations involved the largest numbers of participants. If a raid was not led by the governor but involved more than one hundred participants, it would be referred to

²⁷³ Bostan Çelebi distinguishes between an '*akıncı beyi*' and an '*uc beyi*' in his description of the 1526 Mohács campaign: "*Tuna ve Sava civârında olan uc beglerine gemiler yaptırmak emrolunub 'azez ve kürekçi ihrâcı için etrâf memâlike cihân-muta' hükümler ile yarar kullar gönderilüb ve akıncı beglerine dahi akıncı leşkerin cem' eylemek fermân olunub.*" Bostan Çelebi, *Kitâb*, 75b–76. Apart from the *sancakbeyis* in frontier regions, the term '*akıncı beyi*' appears to have become widely used in Ottoman official documents during the mid-16th century: "*Akıncı beği Süleyman Beğ*" (26 March 1547, KK d. 208, 17), "*Akıncı beğlerinden Turhan Beğ*" (9 April 1553, KK d. 210, 127).

²⁷⁴ On the practice and transformation of the *pençik* tax, see Fodor's recent article: Pál Fodor, "On the Administration of the Ottoman 'One-Fifth Tax' on Prisoners of War (15th to 17th Century)," in, *Buyurdum ki.... The Whole World of Ottomanica and Beyond*, eds. Hülya Çelik, Yavuz Köse, and Gisela Procházka-Eisl (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2023), 355–382.

as *haramilik*. Finally, incursions involving fewer than 100 participants were labeled as *çete*.²⁷⁵ Before analyzing these documents, it is essential to present a comprehensive overview of the pillaging activities that transpired over five years. This will help the reader comprehend the magnitude and scope of border raids.

Table V: Ottoman Raids Towards Croatia (1535–1540)²⁷⁶

Date	Led by	Type	Number of captives	Total value in akçe (<i>resm-i pencik</i>)
October 1535	Murad voyvoda ²⁷⁷	Haramilik	384	33,160
October 1535	Hasan voyvoda ²⁷⁸	Haramilik	86	10,000
02.12.1536	Murad kethüda	Akın	229	19,954
April 1537	Hasan voyvoda	Akın	216	18,445
May 1537	Keyvan (voyvoda) ²⁷⁹	Çete	149	10,015

²⁷⁵ Oliver Jens Schmitt and Mariya Kiprovska, “Ottoman Raiders (*Akıncıs*) as a Driving Force of Early Ottoman Conquest of the Balkans and the Slavery-Based Economy,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient (JESHO)* 65:4 (2022): 497–582; Fodor, “On the Administration,” 358–361.

²⁷⁶ MAD 523, 967a–1026b. Between October 1535 and April 1537, Zaim İbrahim was appointed as the ‘one-fifth commissioner’ (*pençik emini*) responsible for collecting *pençik* taxes from the raiders (*Ibid.*, pp. 971–983). For the remaining raids, it appears that a *pençik emini* was not designated. The register was prepared according to the instructions of Hüsrev Bey, possibly in Sarajevo. Additionally, after the raids, a total of forty male captives were carefully selected and transported to Istanbul through Beşaret voyvoda, one of Hüsrev Bey’s trusted voyvodas (*Ibid.*, pp. 983–1027). The value of these captives varied between 750 and 2,000 akçe. Their total value was 61,310 akçe.

²⁷⁷ Murad voyvoda/kethüda/bey is the same person. The change in his titles is an indication of how fast he climbed the career ladder in just four years. In 1530, he held zeamet worth 20,147 akçe (TT d. 164, 65). He was with Hüsrev Bey during the 1532 campaign, and he had 102 retainers under his command (TSMA d. 6807, 2b). He delivered the news of victory at Gorjani (Gara) whilst Sultan Süleyman was in Kavala on 15 October 1537 (*Murad voyvoda*, MAD 17837, 23). He received a 20,000 akçe increase (*terakki*) on 3 January 1538, for his services at the Battle of Gorjani, and his zeamet had reached 100,000 akçe (KK d. 282, 32). The formation of the sub-province of Kilis (Klis/Klissza) did not take place immediately after the capture of Klis in 1537 as previous studies indicated. see Hazım Şabanović, *Bosanski Pašaluk*, 73 and 204; Behija Zlatar, *Gazi Hüsrev-Beg* (Sarajevo: Orijentalni Institut u Sarajevu, 2010), 56–58. Upon his arrival in Constantinople in June 1538, conveying the news of the conquest of Nadin and Vrana fortresses, he was subsequently bestowed with the title of sancakbeyi of Kilis. Bostan Çelebi, *Kitâb* (Vienna copy), 280; *Târih-i Peçevî*, vol. I, 193. There is archival material to corroborate Peçevi and Bostan. The earliest record indicating that Murad became the sancakbeyi of Kilis, is dated 2 July 1538 (“*der zimmet-i Murad Beg mirlivâ-i Kilis fi 4 Safer sene 945* [2 July 1538], KK d. 282, p. 29). He was appointed as the governor of Požega on 18 September 1541, and died in 1545. Geza Dávid, “The Sancakbegis of Pozsega (Požega, Pojega) in the 16th Century,” 31–60.

²⁷⁸ He was in Hüsrev Bey’s retinue in the roll-call for the 1532 campaign, described as slave (*gulam*) in the document (TSMA d. 4175, 10a).

²⁷⁹ He was in Hüsrev Bey’s retinue in the roll-call for the 1532 campaign, described as Croatian slave (*Hrvat gulam*, TSMA d. 4175, 10b). He was a timar holder in Bosnia in 1542 (MAD 34, 485b).

May 1537	Bayezid Ağa ²⁸⁰ and Arnavud ²⁸¹	Çete	94	8,960
June 1537	Malkoç Bey ²⁸²	Çete	77	5,760
June 1537	Murad kethüda	Akın	40	2,920
March 1537	Beşaret voyvoda ²⁸³	Çete	31	2,040
July 1537	Kubad voyvoda ²⁸⁴	Akın	31	2,390
24.07.1537	Malkoç Bey	Çete	44	4,260
June 1539	Murad Bey	Akın	409	54,126
August 1539	Mahmud voyvoda ²⁸⁵	Çete	39	3,340

²⁸⁰ I have not been able to identify Bayezid Ağa. The term *ağa* was usually used for people who held top positions, such as a fortress commander (*dizdar*), infantry commander (*ağa-yi azeban*) or cavalry commander (*ağa-yi beşliyan/stivari/ulufeciyan*) at fortresses. This particular Bayezid Ağa may have served in the bey's retinue at some point and may have been one of the commanders of specified groups in the fortress.

²⁸¹ The individual in question is probably Memi, who could be one of the founding members of the Memibegović family. His name, along with his brother, relatives, and entourage, occurs frequently in the pages of the *pençik* register. Following the raid in October 1535, led by Murad voyvoda, a person named "Memi Çelebi Arnavudzade" paid the *pençik* tax for three captives (MAD 523, 973a). During the previously mentioned raid, specific individuals with the names Arnavudzade from Brod (*Brodlu Arnavudzâde*) and Hamza Arnavudzade, likely from the same family, were documented in the register. Additionally, a certain Hüseyin from the entourage (*merdüm*) of Arnavudzâde was also documented in the same *pençik* register. It seems that these individuals or those related to them also participated in the raids of April 1537 (*Arnavudoğlu Hamza*, other *Arnavudoğlu*, MAD 523, 987a), May 1537 (*Bali Arnavudoğlu yoldaşı*, *Arnavudoğlu karındaşı*/brother, 989a–990a), June 1539 (*Arnavudoğlu*, *Hamza Arnavud*, 1008–1010), and October 1539 (*Hamza el-Arnavud*, 1022).

²⁸² He was one of the sons of Kara Osman Bey, a well-known figure in Bosnia in the early 16th century. In 1516, his father held a zeamet of 20,364 akçe while he was in possession of a timar worth 4,407 akçe (TT d. 56 and 151). His timar was 9,425 akçe in 1530 (TT d. 164, 310). By 1550, he had the highest zeamet income in the entire Bosnia with 58,982 akçe (TKGM d. 370, 10b). On 25 December 1550 he became *alaybeyi* of Bosnia, the second military rank in Bosnia after the sancakbeyi, following the death of former *alaybeyi* Cafer (KK d. 209, 151). Malkoç's career as a sancakbeyi began on 22 October 1551. He was appointed to the newly established sancak of Çanad (Csanád), Beçey (Becse/Bečej) and Bečkerek (Beckerek/Zrenjanin) in Temeşvar vilayet with an initial hass of 200,000 akçe. Feridun M. Emecen – İlhan Şahin, "Osmanlı Taşra Teşkilatının Kaynaklarından 957–958 (1550–1551) Tarihli Sancak Tevcih Defteri I," *Belgeler* XIX:23 (1998), 64; Dávid, "The Sancakbegis of Pozsega," 39–40. Five months later (7 March 1552), he became the sancakbeyi of Kilis with 251,014 akçe (DFE. RZ. d. 5, 850–854). For more detail on the Karaosmanbegović family, see Behija Zlatar "O nekim muslimanskim feudalnim porodicama u Bosni u XV i XVI stoljeću," *Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju*, 14–15 (1978): 120–121.

²⁸³ He was in Hüsrev Bey's retinue in the roll-call for the 1532 campaign, described as a Croatian slave (*Hrvat gulam*, TSMA d. 4175, 10b), and he held a timar of 5,000 akçe (TSMA d. 5532, 3b). In April 1537 he held timar in Bosnia, and on June 1539 he was awarded with a 3,000 akçe increase (*terakki*) for his services in the frontier (KK d. 283, 16b). By 1550 he had the highest zeamet income in Kilis sancak with 25,001 akçe (TT d. 284, 131–140).

²⁸⁴ He was in Hüsrev Bey's retinue in the roll-call for the 1532 campaign, described as Croatian slave (*Hrvat gulam*, TSMA d. 4175, 11a). He was given a timar after the death of Hüsrev Bey (MAD 34, 470a). He was still a timar holder in 1550 (TKGM d. 370, 142a).

²⁸⁵ He was in Hüsrev Bey's retinue in the roll-call for the 1532 campaign, described as a slave (*gulam*). He had 48 retainers under his command (TSMA d. 4175, 10b). He was a zeamet holder in 1540 with 20,640 akçe (Mahmud in TT d. 201, 46; Mahmud voyvoda in TT d. 211, 747). In 1550 his zeamet was 24,704 akçe (TKGM d. 370, 25a). On 22 May 1553, at the suggestion of the Bosnian governor Mehmed Paşa, he became the first captain of the newly created captaincy of Sava River with 50,000 akçe (*kapudan-i ab-i Sava*), headquartered in Gradiška ("Hâliyâ Bosna sancağı beği Mehmed Paşa mektûb gönderüb bundan akdem Sava suyu üzerinde bir kapudan lâzım olub livâ-i mezbûrda zıkr olan 24,704 akçe ze'âmete mutasarrıf olan mezbûr Mahmud voyvoda için kapudanlık 'uhdesinden gelir kimesnedir

August 1539	No name ²⁸⁶	Çete	36	5,134
October 1539	Mahmud voyvoda	Akın	74	8,040
26.12.1539	Cela ²⁸⁷	Akın	137	17,260
July 1540	Murad Bey	Akın	274	29,440
August 1540	Mahmud voyvoda	Çete	46	5,370
Total			2,396²⁸⁸	240,614

Of the 18 raids conducted in Bosnia between 1535–1540, 15 were carried out by Hüsrev Bey's men. Only one of them was led by Malkoç Bey, the son of Kara Osman Bey, who also held a significant zeamet in Bosnia. Considering that most participants in the raids were either part of the sancakbeyi's entourage or directly affiliated with him, we see how the governors in the frontier regions maintained such large entourages. To be more precise, the retinue of the sancakbeyi accounted for almost 50–60 per cent of the raiders. On the other hand, individuals who held timar or zeamet within the area and participated in such raids could receive additional income beside their prebend earnings. At times, they were fortunate enough to earn more than their timar income. For this reason, sipahis, particularly in the frontier regions, could bring more retainers with them than required by law, even when their income was low. Considering that only the one-fifth tax of the 5-year raids amounted to a considerable 240,610 akçe, we can assume that the total value of the captives alone was over

deyü 'arz eyledikde ... cümle ze'âmeti 50,000 akçelik olub nehr-i Sava'nın kapudanlığıyla mezbura tevcih olunub..." DFE. RZ. d. 5, 857–858). This is not a well-known fact. Until now, the existing literature suggested that the Sava captaincy was established in 1535: Nenad Močanin, "Kapudanságok a bosnyák határvidéken a 16-18. században," *Aetas* 4 (1994): 51–58; Močanin, *Town and Country*, 148.

²⁸⁶ The raid took place around the Kupa River, and the leader of this raid is not mentioned: "*tafsil oldur ki Kupada vâki' olan çetenin esirleri beyânındadır fî mâh-i Rebi'ü'l-evvel fî târih sene 946*" MAD 523, 1011a.

²⁸⁷ He was the commander of the doorkeepers (*serbevvin*) of Hüsrev Bey. He held a timar 3,792 akçe worth in 1530 (TT d. 164, 271). He was in Hüsrev Bey's retinue in the roll-call for the 1532 campaign, described as a slave (*gulam*, TSMA d. 4175, 10b) He was a zeamet holder in 1540 with 20,054 akçe (TT d.201, 47). He died prior to March 1542 (MAD 34, 496b; TT d. 211, 760).

²⁸⁸ Keeping in mind that the captives which were the share of the raid commanders were not included in these lists, the total number should be higher. After a successful raid, a certain number of slaves was given the commanders, middle-ranking officers, and one-fifth commissioner. Fodor, "On the Administration," 358.

1,000,000 akçe. Bearing in mind that those who led and participated in the raids were the same individuals, it becomes evident that all these activities were a substantial source of profit for various military groups in Bosnia. The raiders were a heterogeneous group, notably including fortress commanders (*dizdar*), stewards (*kethüda*), and cavalry or azeb commanders from fortresses in the frontier regions.²⁸⁹ In addition, martolos, voynuks and Vlachs took part in these operations.²⁹⁰

The following chapter serves to analyse the Ottoman frontier organization over time, focusing on the financial mechanisms and methods used for the frontier fortresses. These include the *havale* method (assignees for transporting money) through mukataa sources, timar allocation for the fortress guards, and direct cash allocations via the central treasury. The evolution of these forms will be thoroughly analysed. Historians have overlooked the financial burden of the Ottoman frontier organization following the annexation of Buda. The period between the late 15th century and 1541, during which the Ottomans had to establish a solid defensive chain of fortresses and sustain it on a financial level, has not yet been thoroughly studied. This study aims to provide a comprehensive view of the Ottoman frontier organization throughout the Western frontier during the aforementioned period.

²⁸⁹ In most cases, the high-ranking officials of these fortresses were either the offspring of prominent local families or members of the sancakbeyi's entourage. During Murad Bey's raid on June 1539 (MAD 523, 1008–1011), Hasan Ağa from the İhtiman family, a branch of the famous Mihaloğlu family, served as the fortress commander (*dizdar*) of Gradiška (Gradiška) (MAD d. 34, 631b). Hamza voyvoda, one of the leading voyvodas of Hüsrev Bey, also participated in the raid probably as the commander of the infantry garrison troops (*ağa-yi azeban*) who were stationed in the same fortress. Notably, Hamza voyvoda brought 14 captives. In his correspondence with the Habsburgs in 1540, he was referred to as the voyvoda of Gradiška and castellan of Velika (*Hamza vayvoda de Gradiczka castellano de Velike*). Laszowski, *Monumenta Habsburgica*. Vol. II, 498. In another instance, Cafer, the son of Kasım Kopčić, was present as the cavalry commander (*ağa-yi beşlüyan*) in the fortress of Banja Luka. His father was from the famous Kopčić family and held zeamet with 46,115 akçe in 1530. TT d. 164, 59.

²⁹⁰ Voynuk Pavle, Vlach knez of Bočac, Mrjan martolos, knez Yako, Vlach (*Ulah*) Martin. MAD 523, 985 and 1010.

CHAPTER 4

FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THE FRONTIER ORGANIZATION 1470s–1550s

4.1. Financial Burden of the Ottoman Frontier Organization in the Balkans: An Overview (1470s–1521)

The previous chapters provided a detailed explanation of the expansion and establishment of the Ottoman frontier organization in the Balkans. This chapter will focus on the financing of fortresses, which numbered in the hundreds and contained thousands of garrison soldiers, the financing strategies employed by the Ottomans over a long period of time, and the relationship between fortifications and financing. Although the Ottoman frontier financing in the 16th century has been, it has generally focused only on the Ottoman Hungary after the annexation of Buda.²⁹¹ This chapter will fill in the gaps on these topics prior to 1541, and display how the Ottomans did in fact apply, or at least attempted to apply, a standardised financing mechanism spread over the years.

The reign of Mehmed II (1451–1481) was marked by two significant factors: the rapid expansion of the Ottoman Empire and the constant effort to increase central

²⁹¹ For instance, see Gábor Ágoston, “Habsburgs and Ottomans: Defense, Military Change and Shifts in Power,” 126–141; Ágoston, “Ottoman Conquest and the Ottoman Military Frontier in Hungary,” 85–110; Ágoston, “Ottoman and Habsburg Military Affairs in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent,” 287–308; Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*.

revenues to finance the Ottoman war machinery, which was crucial to this expansion. The expenses incurred by the central army (*kapıkulu*), navy, and the thousands of soldiers stationed in fortresses to maintain newly conquered territories must have placed a significant burden on the Ottoman finances of the period. During the reign of Mehmed II, the financing of the conquests put a strain on the imperial finances. One clear indication of this was the practice of continuous debasement, which was used to overcome the financial effects of the conquests, at least for a short period of time.

After the capture of Constantinople, Mehmed II turned his full attention to Serbia and Bosnia in order to gain control of the rich mining regions in the area. During the 15th century, the mines in Serbia were among the largest silver extraction centres in Europe. It is estimated that Novobrdó alone generated an income of 200,000 ducats from the mines.²⁹² Under Ottoman control, the revenue from the mines must have strengthened Mehmed II's treasury significantly.

However, there is no surviving "budgets" –the balance sheets from the reign of Mehmed II. Foreign envoys and chroniclers of the period made various estimates about the Ottomans' annual income, but there were significant discrepancies between them. Nevertheless, one report indicates that the Ottoman revenues were estimated to be at least close to actuality. The 1476 report by Iacopo Promontorio de Campis provides insight into the treasury revenues and income during the reign of Mehmed II. The report allows us to break down the main revenues from the Balkans, which gives a chance to compare it to the numbers based on Ottoman archival sources:

²⁹² Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History*, 27.

Table VI: Ottoman State Revenues c. 1476 acc. to Iacopo de Promontorio²⁹³**Total Income of the Ottoman Treasury**

From Rumelia	1,479,000
From Anatolia	331,000
Total in ducat	1,810,000
Total in akçe	81,450,000
Incomes from Rumelia	
Pool tax (harac)	850,000 ²⁹⁴
Revenues from Slaves (pençik-i üsera)	50,000 ²⁹⁵
Customs of Constantinople (gümrük ve iskele)	70,000 ²⁹⁶
Customs of Gallipoli	9,000
Salt pans of all Rumelia (memlehâ)	92,000 ²⁹⁷
Mints for silver and gold coins (darbhane)	123,000 ²⁹⁸
Silver mines in Rumelia	120,000 ²⁹⁹
Customs, pool tax and salt pans of Enez	11,000
Customs of Salonica	2,500
Customs of Negroponte	12,500

²⁹³ Hans Georg Majer, “Fatih Sultan Mehmed Zamanında Bir Osmanlı Bütçesi,” *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* III (1987): 115–140; Halil İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, 55–56; Erol Özvar, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Bütçe Harcamaları (1509-1788),” in *Osmanlı Maliyesi Kurumlar ve Bütçeler*, vol I, eds. Mehmed Genç and Erol Özvar (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006), 198–202; Ménage, *Ottoman Historical Documents*, 122–127. Note that tributes of Wallachia, Moldova, Venetians, Ragusa and Chios are excluded.

²⁹⁴ Equivalent to 38,250,000 akçe. Estimation seems to be a bit exaggregation. The total poll-tax income from the whole empire was 30,700,000 akçe in 1488. İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, 66. Moreover, the cizye income from Rumelia was 36,972,966 akçe in 1495/96. Baki Çakır, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Bilinen En Eski (1495-1496) Bütçesi ve 1494-95 Yılı İcmali,” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* XLVII (2016), 125.

²⁹⁵ It seems Promontorio gives here the real value of the slaves, which is equivalent to 2,200,000 akçe. However, only 1/5 (*pencik*) of the value of a slave was collected in these customs. So, the real value should be like 450,000 akçe. Three years income of the mukataa of slaves in İstanbul was 400,000 akçe in 1477. MAD 176, 453b. Since there are no available Ottoman archival documents which covers the whole Rumelia, we cannot verify the figures that Promontorio gives.

²⁹⁶ The custom revenues of Constantinople and Gallipoli were sold together in 1478 for 3 years worth 10,880,513 akçe. Annual income was equivalent to 80,596 ducats. Surprisingly, Promontorio gives very close numbers (79,000 both Constantinople and Gallipoli). MAD 7387, 127.

²⁹⁷ There is available information on the salt pans of Rumelia. The mukataa value of the salt pans in Egea, Black Sea and Danube for 3 years in 1478 was 13,110,000 akçe, which means annual income was 4,370,000 akçe. It was equivalent to 97,111 ducats. Again, Promontorio made a close guess. MAD 176, 264 and 486.

²⁹⁸ The biggest mints in Rumelia were in Constantinople, Edirne, Gallipoli, Skopje, Serres and Novobrd. Mukataa register (MAD 176) does not include the revenues come from these mints. However, there are also other archival sources that shows the incomes from these mints. These mints were sold out in 1481 for three years and their value was 41,400,000 akçe. Then the central treasury was expecting 13,800,000 akçe annually, which was equivalent 306,666 Venetian ducats. However, at the end of three years, the tax farmers (*amil*) were only able to pay 32,741,040 akçe of agreed mukataa price. Halil Sahillioğlu, “Bir Mültezim Zimem Defterine Göre XV. Yüzyıl Sonunda Osmanlı Darphane Mukataaları,” 160–169, 173.

²⁹⁹ An average mukataa value of the whole silver mines in Rumelia is available for 1470s. The mines in Vilk, Belasica, Menlik, Serres, Pirlep, Perin, Srebrenica, Siderokausia (Sidrekapsi), Rudnik, Zeleznik, Janjevo, Zaplanina, Fojnica and Kreševo were sold out for 3 years and their total value was 16,922,400 akçe. Then, annual income was 5,640,800 akçe which was equivalent 125,351 ducats. MAD 176, 2b–10b, 29–31b, 90b–91b, 101, 131b, 139b, 160b, 165b, 168b, 232b–233, 343b, 367, 363b, 343b, 346b, 362–364b. Also compare with the data that İnalcık provided: *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, 59–61.

Customs of Morea	10,500
Revenue from Valona	1,500 ³⁰⁰
Sultans' hasses from Rumelia	20,000
Customs of Sofia	1,000
Customs of Edirne	12,000
Pool tax from gypsies (cizye-i kıptiyan)	9,000
Baths of Rumelia	8,000
Rice fields of whole Rumelia	15,000 ³⁰¹
Tax on animals	10,000
Total in ducat	1,427,000
Total in akçe	64,215,00

A comparison of the figures given by Promontorio and the archival documents shows that more than a third of the annual income of the Ottoman treasury came from these sources, if we take into account the income from salt pans, rice fields, customs and the mines operated through tax farming (mukataa). The table above represents the size of these income groups. Of course, both the Promontorio and the archival sources on mukataa revenues give the total value of a taxable source and thus only the theoretical amount of money that would go into the treasury. In other words, although the amount of money that was supposed to go into the treasury is provided in these registers, with local spending through remittances called *havale*, less of it actually went into the treasury. *Havâle*, a well-established Ottoman financing methods through the late 15th century was the sole payment method especially for the garrison troops in the frontier regions. Since there was so little currency circulation and there was a need for transferring money from the centre to the distant regions of the empire, the payments to the garrison troops were transferred through *havâle* from the nearby mukataa sources. The money that transferred from the mukataa source was then calculated, and

³⁰⁰ The yearly income from the customs of Vlona (Avlonya) in 1477 was 88,333 akçe, equivalent 1,962 ducats. MAD 176, 327.

³⁰¹ Average annual income from the rice fields of Serres, Veria (Karaferiye), Menlik, Drama, Filibe, Tavuslu and Akçakızanlık in late 1470s was around 17,250 Venetian ducats (776,637 akçe). Ibid, 24b–28b, 277.

then deducted from the previously agreed mukataa price. This process was called offsetting (*mahsûb*).³⁰²

But what proportion of the nominal worth of mukataa resources was transferred to the central treasury in actuality? The percentage of remittances in mukataa resources in general, and eventually its burden on the central treasury is possible to calculate. As a case in point, we can use the two largest revenue-generating data groups of the period. In 1481, the sale price of the mints of Istanbul, Edirne and Gallipoli for 3 years was 23,879,700 akçe, while the mints of Serres, Skopje and Novobrdó were sold for 18,369,00 akçe for 3 years, which altogether totals 42,248,700 akçe. An analysis of the accounts of these tax-farmers shows that they were unable to pay 8,658,960 akçe of the total amount they were obliged to pay to the treasury. In other words, it seems that at the end of three years, the central treasury did not receive twenty per cent of the planned payment. On the other hand, 21,594,272 akçe of the remaining 33,589,740 akçe were spent on the salaries of the garrison troops or other transactions without ever reaching the treasury.³⁰³ In the end, after 3 years, only twenty-eight per cent of the revenue from these two groups of mukataa went into the central treasury. This amounts to almost 4,000,000 akçe per year.

Therefore, the nominal value of the revenues in the archival documents only provide us the theoretical revenues of the Ottoman treasury. A very large part of the

³⁰² For mukataa as a tax-farming method see: Halil İnalcık, "Havale," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (TDV) Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 16 (1997), 512–513; Linda T. Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire* (Brill: Leiden, New York, Köln, 1996); Baki Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi (XVI-XVIII. Yüzyıl)* (Kitabevi: İstanbul, 2006); Mehmed Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Mukataa Kavramı," in Mehmed Genç–Erol Özvar (eds.) *Osmanlı Maliyesi Kurumlar ve Bütçeler*, vol. I. (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006), 57–64.

³⁰³ Halil Sahillioğlu, "Bir Mültezim Zimem Defterine Göre XV. Yüzyıl Sonunda Osmanlı Darphane Mukataaları," 173, 184–204.

income that were supposed to go directly to the treasury was spent through remittances.³⁰⁴

What was the annual financial burden of the garrisons in Rumelia and Anatolia after the rapid conquests of Mehmed II? Having established that all the fortresses were financed from mukataa sources, it seems possible to give an aggregated figure. The archival sources available to us show how much the Ottomans spent annually on financing fortresses at the end of the 1470s. In 1478 and 1479, a period in which the Ottomans were still at war with Venice in the Aegean, Adriatic Sea, and Zeta regions, as well as in tense frontier confrontations with the Hungarians in the west, the Ottoman Empire paid 8,945,515 akçe (198,789 ducats) annually for a total of 6,575 garrison soldiers in 46 fortresses in Rumelia. Of these garrison soldiers, 3,985 were stationed in fortresses in the Adriatic, the Peloponnese, the Aegean islands and the straits, while the remaining 2,590 were stationed in fortresses in Herzegovina, Bosnia, Zvornik, Semendria, and on the Wallachian frontier.³⁰⁵ With 1,443 garrison soldiers, Semendria was arguably the Empire's largest garrison. Given the ongoing war with Venice, it stands to reason that so many garrison soldiers were stationed in the Adriatic and the Peloponnese. On the other hand, in the Karaman region, which had been taken under total control only a few years earlier, 748 garrison soldiers in a total of 12 fortresses

³⁰⁴ Here are two additional examples to illustrate the distribution of mukataa revenues. Between 1476-1480, the sale price of the customs of Constantinople and Galata was calculated to be 10,250,000 akçe. However, only 29 per cent of this amount, which is 3,047,329 akçe, directly entered the treasury. The remaining funds were allocated to other expenses such as *mevâcib* (salaries) of the garrison troops, *mübâyâ't* (purchases), and *teslîmât* (delivery) before being deposited into the treasury. MAD 7387, 127. Another example is from the Selanik saltpan between 1490 and 1493. The saltpan was sold to the highest bidder for 5,200,000 akçe for three years. Within 3 years, 2,085,423 akçe of the sale price went directly to the treasury, while 2,968,869 akçe were spent on other expenses (garrison payments, etc.) without going to the treasury. Of this amount, the tax farmers could not pay 109,254 akçe to the state treasury (*bakiyye*). KK d. 4988, 222.

³⁰⁵ MAD 176. Using the same register, the figures above are the updated final version since I have also identified new fortresses. Compare: Baş, "XV. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Balkanlarda Osmanlı Serhad Organizasyonunun Oluşumu," 157-158.

were paid an annual salary of 945,965 akçe (21,021 ducats).³⁰⁶ Unfortunately, we have no information on the number of garrison soldiers in the regions bordering the Akkoyunlus, nor on the garrisons in the Crimea, which was also brought under control during the same period. In any case, towards the end of Mehmed II's reign, between 12,000,000 and 14,000,000 akçe were spent on financing garrisons on all the borders of the empire. This expenditure could be considered as one seventh of the annual income of the state treasury.

Mehmed II implemented a series of new and drastic fiscal measures to address the crucial issue faced by all pre-industrial empires: establishing a central treasury of sufficient size to finance imperial policies. These fiscal policies were the cause of the widespread and violent discontent at the end of his reign.³⁰⁷ Mehmed II's rule was characterized by absolutist logic, which placed great importance on a strong treasury as a source of power and independence for the ruler. Consequently, the state aimed to accumulate significant reserves in the central treasury. Following Mehmed II's death in 1481, the central treasury held 240 million silver akçe and 104 million akçe in gold coins, among other items. These figures represented nearly half of the total currency circulation at that time. Thus, the policy of budget surpluses and reserve accumulation caused a shortage of precious metals in the economy.³⁰⁸ There was also the fact that his son Bayezid II was seen as more moderate after the death of Mehmed II was among the most important factors that ensured his accession to the throne.

Although the treasury reserves seemed to be at its full capacity when Bayezid II ascended to the throne, the annual revenues of the state were decreasing day by day. For this reason, a report submitted to Bayezid II immediately after his accession

³⁰⁶ MAD 176, p. 82, 146, 205b–207b, 211, 401b–402b; MAD 7387, 138, 159, 161, 168.

³⁰⁷ İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, 18.

³⁰⁸ Pamuk, *A Monetary History*, 42.

emphasized the need for a series of fiscal measures to be taken. The report emphasised that the revenues of the treasury at the time of Mehmed II were 85,000,000 akçe; however, there was an annual deficit of 35,000,000 akçe. One noteworthy point in the report was that it was only possible to collect 5,000,000 akçe from the Anatolian region, where three times of this amount was expected to be collected annually.

Sultân Mehmed Hân tâbe-serâhu zamânından hazret-i pâdişâh hilâfet-penâhî zamanında hâsıldan günde yüz bin akçe nakıs olub (35,400,000) ve harc günde yüz bin akçe ziyâde olduğı hâk-pâyınuzâ ‘arz olmışdır. Mezbûr zâyîd vâkî’ olan yüz bin akçe harcın yevmi otuz altı bin akçesi (12,744,000) Âsitâne-i Sa’âdetde mevâcibleri olan kimesnelere virilür ve yevmi kırk bin ak[çesi] (14,160,000) hisâr erenlerine ve ‘azeblere ziyâde virilür ve yevmi yirmi dört bin akçe (8,496,000) dahi sâir ihracâtta ziyâde olmuştır.

Şöyle ki, zikrolan harc ve hâsıl kemâkân mukarrer ola. Bil ki şimdiki halde altı bölük üç bin dokuz yüz seksen üç (3,983) neferden beş bin (5,000) nefer ola ve yeniçeri tâyîfesi beş bin yedi yüz yetmiş (5,770) neferdir; altı bin (6,000) ola. Rumeli mahsulâtından ki bu iki yılda harctan gayri her yıl iki yüz fıçı akçe (10,000,000) ziyâde olmuştır; vaz’ oluna tevzi’-i suret bulur ise. İmdidir ki devletinizde dahi ziyâde ise yılda Anadolu’nun mahsulâtından şimdiye değin yüz kerre yüz bin (10,000,000) akçe zâyî’ görünür. Elli kerre yüz bin (5,000,000) akçesi zabt olmak mümkün gibidir...

Günde yüz bin akçe harc-i zâyid ki yılda üç yüz elli kerre yüz bin (35,000,000) akçe fuçı hesâbı üzere yedi yüz fuçı olur; insâfdan harîcdır dinür olsa, iki vâkî’ yıl içinde ahsen tarikle bölüklerden nakıs olmiya, gerü her bölük temâm ola. Ve hisârlarun ba’zısına timâr ola ve bazı kifâyeti mikdar ‘azebleri ibkâ olub kifâyetten zâyîd olan ihrâc olub ba’zılarının dahi tarîk-i aherle hıdmeti tedârik oluna. Yüz kerre yüz bin (10,000,000) akçe hizâne-i ‘âmiroye kala olur ki her yılda bu dahi iki yüz fuçı olur (10,000,000). Bu takdirce hâsıldan ziyâde vâkî’ olan bâkî üç yüz fıçı (15,000,000) yılda hizâne-i ‘âmiroye her yıl beş yüz fıçı (25,000,000) konsa olur... Eğer Sultân Mehmed tâbe-serâhu zamânındaki hâsıl ve harc mukarrer olsa hizâne-i ‘âmiroye her yıl bin yedi yüz fıçı (85,000,000) akçe konurdu. Hak-pâyınuzâ ma’lumdır ki hesâbda Mevlevî Paşa zamânında yılda sekiz yüz altmış yedi fuçı (43,350,000) akçe vaki olmuştır. Bu takdirce her yıl sekiz yüz otuz üç fuçı (41,650,000) akçe dahi ziyâde olurdu.

Bölüklerin beş bin ve yeniçerilerin altı bin etmek tariki.

Ve ba’dehu ahsen tarikle kapu halkı adedin tamâm olub cihette yılda elli kerre yüz bin hizâne-i ‘âmiroye alınmak tarîki (5,000,000).

Ve yılda elli kerre yüz bin akçe dahi (5,000,000) hisârlardan tahfif olub hizâne-i ‘âmiroye alınmak tarîki ki ‘arz olmuştır, tafsîliyle yazub ‘arz olunmak emrolmuş idi.³⁰⁹

This report was submitted to Bayezid II with the suggestion of increasing revenues. The chief treasurer (*defterdar*) realized that the amount paid to the garrisons in the fortresses was excessive. To address this issue, he made two suggestions. Firstly,

³⁰⁹ TSMA e. 757/79.

he proposed distributing salary timars to some of the salaried personnel in the fortresses. Secondly, he suggested disbanding some of the azeb forces, a large military group stationed in the fortresses. This way the state would be able to transfer approximately 5,000,000 akçe per year from the mukataa resources to the treasury directly, out of the money it should have sent to the garrisons in these fortresses. The defterdar's proposals were received to be very influential and effective so much so that it formed the basis of the Ottoman financing of the western frontier for the next 150 years. Significant changes in financing of the fortresses were to be implemented after Bayezid II ascended to the throne, particularly during the period of relative peace in the Balkans.

Based on a roll-call register from 1491, there were 8,561 garrison soldiers stationed in 54 fortresses throughout the Balkans. The annual salaries paid to these soldiers amounted to 13,881,918 akçe (266,959 ducats). A few important details stand out particularly on a comparison between the fortresses of the late 1470s and those listed in 1491. For instance, there were a dozen fortresses in Bosnia that were not mentioned in the 1470s but were listed in 1491. There were 4 new fortresses listed in 1491 that were not present in the 1470s: Kulič and Ram were constructed in 1483. Akkerman and Kili were captured during Bayezid II's campaign in 1484. In 1491, these four fortresses had a total of 2,152 soldiers with an annual expenditure of 3,378,140 akçe.³¹⁰ The most notable difference between the two periods is that some garrisons in the Morea and Adriatic were not listed. This means that many of the personnel who were salaried in the 1470s were allocated timar instead. During this 10-year period the Ottomans nominally transferred an annual amount of 2,200,000 akçe

³¹⁰ MAD 15334; Baş, "XV. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Balkanlarda Osmanlı Serhad Organizasyonunun Oluşumu", 166–169.

to the treasury or where they would deem necessary. Reducing the size of the garrisons or distributing salary timars to fortress personnel were the only ways to raise the income required by the Ottoman central treasury. The following pages will explain in detail how this process took place.

According to the fiscal report submitted to Bayezid II upon his ascension to the throne, the financing of fortresses appears to have been achieved as desired. Though, the primary intention was to cut down costs, the Ottomans were forced to keep up financing fortress garrisons due to new military campaigns and conquests both in the east and west. As a result, new garrison units were formed and their overall expenses increased, which proved to be a financial burden. The Ottoman military presence in the Balkans, as demonstrated through the experiences of of Kulič, Ram, Akkerman, and Kili, is one instance of this new financial burden. A further illustration can be observed in the garrisons stationed in the fortresses of Çukurova, which were temporarily conquered during the Ottoman–Mamluk War.

A total of 1,433 men were left in seven newly conquered fortresses in Çukurova in 1488. The three-month salary payments for the garrison soldiers in these fortresses amounted to 881,737 akçe.³¹¹ However, further payments did not materialize since on 16 August 1488, the Ottoman army suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the Mamluk army and lost all the fortresses they had previously taken in the region.³¹² If

³¹¹ Number of soldiers in the fortresses: Kevâre: 106, Sis: 413, Küpdere: 53, Feke: 61, Anavarza: 85, Adana: 511, Tarsus: 204. What distinguishes this register from the others is that it includes not only the inventory of weapons in the fortresses, but also the provisions and other food allocated for the sustenance of the soldiers. In total, 71,828,5 bushels (kile) of cereal were left for the fortresses. This was the equivalent of 1,838,809 kilograms in today's weight. It is no coincidence that the forts received such a large amount of cereals, as it seems that the Ottomans regarded the forts as large depots to store the food supplies that the army would need for the next campaign. TSMA d. 10581.

³¹² For the Ottoman–Mamluk Wars and the power struggle over Çukurova region see: Shai Har-El, *Struggle for Domination in the Middle East: The Ottoman-Mamluk War, 1485–1491* (Leiden: Brill, 1991); Cihan Yüksel Muslu, *The Ottomans and the Mamluks: Imperial Diplomacy and Warfare in the Islamic World* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014). It seems to have been a serious problem for the Ottomans to find new employment for the discharged garrison soldiers (*mazul*) in the fortresses that had previously been captured by the Ottomans and returned to the Mamluks by the Ottoman–Mamluk Treaty of 1491.

the Ottomans had been able to hold the Çukurova region, the garrison costs alone would have amounted to around 3,500,000. As with Rumelia, the salaries of the garrisons in these fortresses would have been paid from the mukataa sources from the province of Anatolia.³¹³

The Ottoman-Venetian War of 1499-1503 paved the way for Bayezid II to consolidate the Ottoman naval dominance in the Aegean and Adriatic Seas and even to make the Ottomans one of the most important naval powers in the Mediterranean. Venice, which had no military presence in the Peloponnese except for a few fortresses, was indeed dealt a major military blow. For the Ottomans, however, these new acquisitions and gains were accompanied by a significant financial and military cost. By 1503, the number of garrison forces stationed at Methoni (Ott. Moton), Koroni, Navarino, Santa Maura (Ott. Ayamavra), Lepanto (Ott. İnebahtı), Durres (Ott. Dıraç) and the new fortresses built to control the Gulf of Corinth had reached 4,009.³¹⁴ In addition to the janissaries temporarily stationed in these fortresses, the number of garrison forces in the Morea reached 5,000 men. Considering that there were

In an order dated 22 May 1491, the soldiers discharged from the fortresses in Çukurova region ('*Arab vilâyeti* in the text) were ordered to be transferred to vacant positions in the fortresses in Rumelia. The remarkable detail in the order was that the vacant positions had previously been filled by the sons of servants (*kuloğlu*), but this time the vacant positions were to be given to the aforementioned mazlûs. From this point of view, it is also documented that, as a rule, the staff of the fortress was chosen from among the sons of the servants: "*gurre-i Receb sene 896dan (11.5.1491) 'Arab vilâyet(inde) olan kal'a erenlerini Rumilide olan ba'zı hisârlara kadîm 'ulûfeleriyle kul oğulları yerine yazıla deyü emr olundi el-vâki' fi 11 Receb sene 896 (20.5.1491)*". MC. Yz. 91, 486. Indeed, many garrison soldiers from the fortresses in Çukurova were placed in vacant positions in fortresses in Rumelia. For example, 24 men who had previously served in the fortresses of Sis, Adana, Anavarza, Feke and Bars Bit were placed in vacant positions in the Bosnian fortresses of Toričani, Srebrenica, Travnik, Vranduk and Belgrade (Glamoč). MAD 15334, 5–6, 11–12, 18–20, 23–24. In addition, although M.C. O. 91 and MAD 15334 appear to be different registers, MAD 15334 is a continuation of the other. It is easy to see that there was originally a single register.

³¹³ According to the account register of the Anatolian Province of 19.10.1487–6.10.1488, thirty per cent (7,042,969) of all the mukataa revenue (23,024,527) in Anatolia was spent on the salaries of the fortresses and on other supplies (*be-cihet-i mevâcibât-i kılâ' ve teslîmât-i ümenâ ve gayrihâ*). It can be assumed that most of this amount was spent on the salaries. Payments to fortress guards in Karaman and other districts must also have been included. TSMA d. 9336, 2.

³¹⁴ Baş, "XV. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Balkanlarda Osmanlı Serhad Organizasyonunun Oluşumu," 179.

approximately 8,000 garrison soldiers in all the fortresses in Rumelia during the same period, the high number of these figures becomes more comprehensible. It is also noteworthy that the annual salaries of these garrison forces amounted to 4,615,048 akçe (equivalent to 85,463 ducats).³¹⁵ Once again, the financing of these fortresses came from the available mukataa sources such as the salt pan of Selanik, which could be characterized as a source of financing relatively close to the fortresses in the Peloponnese.

Although the Ottomans' attention shifted to the east following Selim I's ascension to the throne, the western frontier witnessed significant Ottoman advancement, particularly along the Bosnian frontier, as discussed in the previous chapters. At this time, the fortresses along the Vidin–Semendria line were still heavily garrisoned and supported by the janissaries. A balance of power had already been established along this frontier. In Bosnia, however, a dozen fortresses were occupied by the Ottomans and already garrisoned between 1512 and 1521. Unfortunately, we do not have any information regarding the garrisons stationed in the fortresses on the Hungarian frontier during this period. Nevertheless, it is possible to track some continuing trends in the Ottoman policy of financing the frontier fortresses. Firstly, in terms of troop composition, there were significant differences between the fortresses in the sub-province of Semendria and those in Bosnia. Unlike in Semendria, the fortresses in Bosnia did not have azeb troops serving as infantry both in the river fleets and in the fortresses. Another difference was that in Semendria there were cavalry units (*ulufeciyan/ulufeciyan-i süvari/farisan/azeban-i süvari/beşli*)³¹⁶ stationed in the

³¹⁵ Ibid., 170.

³¹⁶ The cavalry units in the fortresses were named differently throughout the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Interestingly, in the late 15th century, cavalry units were recruited from among the azeb units and were called "*azeban-i süvari*". Historically, this also explains the origin of the hired cavalry units in the fortresses. Azeban-i süvari and farisan seem to be used interchangeably, since in 1488 the cavalry units in Semandira were referred to as farisan, 3 years later they were called azeban-i

fortresses; whereas only two fortresses had cavalry forces in Bosnia, and those were not large in number.³¹⁷ In other words, Bosnia was generally homogeneous in the composition of its fortress garrisons. However, especially after the rapid Ottoman advance in Bosnia after 1512, cavalry units in the conquered fortresses were introduced as permanent garrison troops.

Although the main cavalry force of sub-province was composed of timariot sipahis, these troops were not always mobilizable. They could only be mobilised for the seasonal operations of the sancakbeyis. Since the conquered fortresses on the Bosnian frontier were relatively far from the centre of sub-province, it was inevitable that salaried cavalry units would be stationed in these fortresses as well. These groups were usually recruited from among the local population and were paid 1 to 2 akçe more per day than the regular fortress personnel. They were able to carry out raiding and routine outpost duties, as well as to counterattack enemy forces quickly and swiftly in the event of a siege of a fortress.³¹⁸

süvari. Baş, "XV. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Balkanlarda Osmanlı Serhad Organizasyonunun Oluşumu," 160. In the 16th century, the terms ulufeciyan-i süvari, faris and beşli were widely used.

³¹⁷ In 1491, the only cavalry units (ulufeciyan-i süvari) stationed in Bosnia were in the fortress of Prusac (Akhisar). Their total number was 50 with their commander (*ağa*) who had a timar (*bâ-tımâr*). It is also noteworthy that some of the cavalry units in this fortress and in Semendria were called *cündi*, literally meaning rider, but more experienced, and were listed separately: "*ulufeciyan-i süvari-yi azeban ma' cündiyan*". MAD 15334, 5, 89. Their recruitment methods may have been different, as they were also better paid than the standard cavalry in the fortress. Subsequently, cavalry units (referred to as *beşli*, which translates literally as "people who receive 5 akçe a day") were also deployed in Kamengrad, one of the key fortresses in the extreme north of the sancak, in the early 1500s. Ménage, "An Ottoman Manual of Provincial Correspondence," 43–44.

³¹⁸ It is possible to observe the deployment of cavalry units in the fortresses of Bosnia. Given the swift and decisive nature of the conquests, many of these fortresses lost their outpost status, rendering the deployment of cavalry units in these fortresses futile. Consequently, it is challenging to ascertain the composition of the garrison in these fortresses, given the lack of available sources. Nevertheless, an examination of the marginal notes in the summary registers of Bosnia reveals that several fortresses had cavalry units stationed there, as evidenced by the fact that many cavalry commanders received timar. Fortress of Sinj: "... *Hersek sancağında 6,000 akçelik timardan ma'zûl olduktan sonra Sin kal'asında atlu 'ulüfecilerine yevmi on iki akçe ile beşlubaşı olan Mahmuda ... 28 Rebiyyü'l-ahir sene 926 (17.04.1520)*". TT d. 57, 4; Boçac and Kotor: "... *yevmi dokuz akçe ile Bocac ve Kotor nam kal'aların beşlubaşılığından ma'zul ... olan Murad ... fi 21 Rebi'ü'l-ahir sene 933 (14.04.1524)*". Ibid, 176; Gölhisar (Jezero): "... *mezkûr Kara Osman oğlu Ca'fere Gölhisar kal'asının beşlubaşılığın timarı ile tevcih olundu ... fi 22 Muharrem sene 926 (17.01.1520)*". Ibid., 184; Knin: "... *mezkûr Divâne Ca'fer için Knin kal'asında yevmi on iki akçe ile beşlubaşı olan Divâne Ahmed yerine timarı ile beşlubaşılık hizmetin ider fi 27 Şa'bân sene 929 (11.07.1523)*". TT d. 91, 44; Kamengrad: "... *bundan akdem livâ-i*

Due to their proximity to the border, the fortresses on the Bosnian frontier, which remained relatively stable from the 1470s to 1512, had larger garrison forces than those further inland. The salaries of these garrison soldiers were paid in cash, not only because the border regions did not have a vibrant economy based on agricultural production and were consequently sparsely populated, but also because the revenues from the taxable population inland were either allocated to the sipahi in the sancak as timars, zeamet or recorded as imperial hasses. Ultimately, it was easier to pay garrisons in fortresses in cash rather than distributing timars. In the long run, however, reducing the number of garrison soldiers and granting them collective timars must have been seen as a much more effective solution, especially in cases where the borders were constantly expanding and causing more financial burdens. Indeed, not only would the state be able to utilise the cash from the treasury in other areas, but by granting timars to the garrison soldiers, it would at least be able to control agricultural production and the taxable population in these areas.

A comparable transformation was observed in Bosnia throughout the period. This transformation was reflected in the tax registers of the period in question. The summary land register of Bosnia dated 1516 indicates that between 1491 and 1516, the personnel in the five fortresses, whose garrisons were known to be salaried, were now received collective timars.³¹⁹ In the same year a total of 533 garrison soldiers of

Bosnada Kamengrad kal'asında yevmi on iki akçe 'ulûfe ile beşlûbaşı Yusuf ... fî 3 Cemâziye'l-evvel sene 929 (20.03.1523)'. KK d. 281, 46.

³¹⁹ These fortresses were Akhisar (Prusac), Sused, Travnik, Vrh-Belice and Vranduk. The process of granting collective timars to those fortresses seems to be had started in mid 1502. A decree was sent to İskender Paşa, ordering that the personnel in the fortresses of Travnik, Vrh-Belice, Vranduk and Sused be given salary timars instead of cash payments, as had been the practice. This order was met with hesitation, and it was conveyed to the centre that these fortresses were so close to the border that there were no populated settlements nearby that could generate timar income. In a subsequent order from the centre, the personnel in these fortresses were instructed to be allocated timar from nearby regions, regardless of the circumstances. Ultimately, the order was implemented. Emecen-Şahin, *II. Bayezid Dönemi Ahkâm Defterleri*, 277–278. Timar was distributed to the personnel from the neighbouring districts (Brod and Uskopolje) where these fortresses were located. In fact, by 1516, there were a total of 252 garrison soldiers (47 per cent of the total garrison with salary timars in the sancak) in these five

15 fortresses held collective timars, with an annual value of 771,211 akçe. Furthermore, the personnel in the fortresses of Kamengrad, Ključ, Livno, Glamoč, Toričan, Komotin, Vinac, Maglaj and Doboј, which were situated in close proximity to the border, and the newly conquered fortresses of Sinj, Čačvina, Nutjak Vrlika, Sokol, Jezero, Kotor, Tešanj, Sokol and Srebrenik were still receiving cash salaries (ulufe). To ascertain the total number of fortress personnel is difficult, as there are no roll call or salary records from the years in question. However, it can be stated that they were at least three times larger than the timar holding fortress personnel, and their annual remuneration must have been approximately 2,000,000 akçe. Furthermore, in contrast to the fortresses with timars, these fortresses also employed cavalry units.

In conclusion, the expansionist policies of Mehmed II's reign led to the consolidation of Ottoman rule through stationing garrison troops in the newly conquered territories. The financing of these troops, which numbered in thousands, was already a significant strain on the Ottoman treasury, which was already financing wars in many other places. However, the use of mukataa resources for the financing of these fortresses without entering the treasury at all saved the Ottoman treasury from the burden of financing directly from the centre. By allocating 50 per cent of the mukataa revenues that should have come from Rumelia to the financing of fortresses, the Ottomans allocated at least one seventh of the nominal total revenues to the financing of fortresses.³²⁰

fortresses, and 358,009 akçe of timars were distributed to these soldiers. TT d. 56, 215–237. As in the case of Bosnia, a similar process of “timarification” occurred in the Morea region at an earlier point in time and on a more extensive scale. As soon as Bayezid II succeeded to the throne, the process of distributing timars to the fortress personnel in the Peloponnese had already commenced. A second wave of timarification occurred during the reign of Sultan Selim II. By 1514, a total of 1,534 personnel in 17 fortresses in the Peloponnese were receiving salary timars. TT d. 390, 305. The number of individuals present was approximately three times higher than that observed in Bosnia. By 1530, approximately 30 per cent of the revenues allocated as hass, zeamet and timar in the sancak were allocated as salary timars for the fortress personnel (2,258,107 akçe). TT d. 367, vol II., 188–199.

³²⁰ In the budget of 19.11.1495–6.11.1496, the total mukataa revenues from Rumelia entering the treasury was 10,991,876 akçe (27,5 per cent of the whole income into treasury). Çakır, “Osmanlı

The financing of fortresses was not always conducted through cash transfers. Similarly, the number of personnel employed in the fortresses did not always remain constant. In later periods, the abolition of the most expendable azeb forces in the fortresses and the resort to the timar system for financing the other fortress personnel allowed the treasury to transfer money directly either to the treasury or to the newly conquered fortresses than allocating it to the fortress personnel in general.

At least in theory, the Ottomans set themselves a limit for the financing of all fortresses. For many years, they must have considered an annual allocation of 13,000,000 to 18,000,000 akçe as an upper limit for the financing of garrison forces totalling between 8,000–12,000 men in the entire province. As will be seen in the following pages, the Ottomans did not want to keep too many soldiers in garrisons for as long as they could. Similarly, if there was a rapid process of conquest, as was the case in Bosnia, the Ottomans would transfer some of the fortress personnel that had occupied relatively large garrisons in the frontier region to the newly conquered fortresses, while financing the fortresses through timar. From this point of view, a definition of the frontier could be made with the economic logic of the Ottomans: timar versus ulufe. If the personnel in the fortresses received timar instead of ulufe, then this fortress had already lost its status as a frontier fortress.

Devleti'nin Bilinen En Eski (1495-1496) Bütçesi," 133–134. In 1491, the salaries of all the fortresses in Rumelia were paid from mukataa sources and amounted to over 13,000,000 akçe annually. In this case, the budgets should only show the actual income that went into the treasury. On the other hand, perhaps much more (at least 60 per cent) of the total mukataa resources at the end of the 15th century could have been used to finance fortress personnel.

4.2. Post Mohaács: Ottoman Military Presence in Srem and Bosnia 1526–1541

4.2.1. Srem and Semendria

By the time Sultan Selim I died in 1520, the Ottoman Empire had doubled in size and the central Ottoman treasury, with the tax system it had established in the region, was now able to finance military operations in the Mediterranean and Central Europe. Sultan Süleyman turned his attention to the West as soon as he ascended to the throne, relying on the strong financial structure he had inherited from his father's reign and a battle-tested, strong and well-stocked land army and navy.

Table VII: Income and Expenditure of the Ottoman Imperial Treasury (1476–1548)³²¹

Year	Income	Expenditure	In ducat (income)	Difference
1475/76	81,000,000	61,875,000	(1,4 M)	+ 19,125,000
1493/94	51,386,354	56,594,089	(0,9 M)	- 5,207,735
1494/95	63,316,183	59,364,334	(1,2 M)	+ 3,951,849
1495/96	61,290,908	52,798,220	(1,1 M)	+ 8,492,668
1509/10	72,937,945	68,468,298	(1,3 M)	+ 4,669,647
1523/24	116,888,385	118,783,849	(2,1 M)	- 1,895,464
1524/25	141,272,656	126,581,347	(2,5 M)	+ 14,691,411
1527/28	277,244,773	203,201,931	(5 M)	+ 74,042,842
1546/47	241,711,834	171,872,357	(4,2 M)	+ 69,839,577
1547/48	198,887,284	111,997,449	(3,4 M)	+ 86,889,245

On 29 August 1526, after the Battle of Mohaács that ended the medieval Hungarian Kingdom, the Ottomans and Habsburgs were to engage in a protracted military and political struggle that would start in central Europe spreading to the Mediterranean. Aware of the threat and military strength of the Habsburgs, the

³²¹ Ménage, *Ottoman Historical Documents*, 122–129; Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait,” 277–299; Barkan, “H. 954-955 (1547-48) Malî Yılına Ait Bir Osmanlı Bütçesi,” 237–276; Sahillioğlu, “1524-1525 Osmanlı Bütçesi,”; Özvar and Genç, eds., “II. Bayezid Dönemine Ait 1509-10 (H. 914) Tarihli Bütçe,” in *Osmanlı Maliyesi*, II, 22–28; Çakır, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Bilinen En Eski (1495-1496) Bütçesi,” 133.

Ottomans stationed unprecedentedly large and effective troop garrisons in the fortresses they captured at Srem during the campaign of 1526. Moreover, these garrisons were constantly reinforced by janissaries sent from the centre, while the timariot sipahis, together with the sancakbeyis on the Hungarian frontier, formed the backbone of the Ottoman military presence in the region. The Ottomans, who had supported Janos Szapolya against Ferdinand in the struggle in Hungary, had considered intervening directly in Hungary with the military forces they had deployed in the aforementioned narrow corridor. In the period that followed, Ferdinand's capture of Buda in particular, prompted the Ottomans to launch another expedition into Hungary. Although Buda was retaken, the late siege of Vienna ended in failure. In the end, the military campaign of 1529 was a complete fiasco for the Ottomans. Taking the Habsburg threat very seriously, the Ottomans further strengthened the garrisons at Srem during their retreat and chose to increase their military presence in the region by rebuilding Osijek, the gateway to the Pannonia plains, which had been destroyed in the previous campaign.

Beyond all these military and political events, an explanation of the total Ottoman military presence on the Hungarian frontier and the resulting financial burden will help us to see the level of importance the Ottomans attributed to the growing political and military Habsburg influence in Hungary. In January 1528, during the peace negotiations between Szapolya's envoy Laski and İbrahim Paşa, İbrahim Paşa reported that the Ottomans had spent 2,800,000 akçe in just a quarter of a year on personnel salaries in the fortresses they held in Srem.³²² The Ottomans garrisoned only Varadin, Ilok, Irig, Vrdnik, Erdud, Čerević, Voćin, Mitrovica, Rača, and Titel in the Srem region between 1526 and 1528. The annual salaries of the personnel in these 10 fortresses amounted to 11,200,000 akçe. The garrisons in this narrow corridor had a

³²² Fodor, "Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary, 1520–1541," 284–285.

total force of around 6,000 men with these salaries provided. It is unclear whether İbrahim Paşa also included the salaries of the janissaries stationed in the fortresses in his report, yet there were also janissaries in numerous fortresses in Srem during this period. At the end of the 1526 campaign in October, a substantial janissary force was left in Ilok and Petrovaradin.³²³ By 1527, a total of 800 janissaries were regularly stationed in Mitrovica, Rača, Ilok, Varadin, and Duk³²⁴ with their number reaching 1,000 in August 1532.³²⁵

The information provided by Laski in his report offers some insight into the extent of Ottoman military power in Srem. A year later, a Habsburg intelligence report provides detailed information on the composition of Ottoman troops and their salaries in all garrisons in the region:

Table VIII: The Habsburg Intelligence Report on the Strength of Ottoman Garrisons Along the Danube (20 April 1529)³²⁶

Fortress	Mü.	Süv.	Az.	Mar.	Top.	Total	Annual Salary (akçe)
Ilok	500 ³²⁷	500	1,000	400	80	2,480	6,156,000 ³²⁸

³²³ Upon the return of the Mohács campaign, records indicate that the newly conquered fortresses were left with janissaries while the army was in Varadin fortress. While the exact number of janissaries is not recorded, it is known that six senior janissary officers (*serpiyâde*) and four janissary company leaders (*serbölük*) were in charge of the janissaries in Varadin and Ilok fortresses: “...*ser-piyâdegân ve ser-bölükân-i yeniçeriyân-i Dergâh-i ‘Âli ki nevbetçiyân-i kal’a-i Ilok ve Petrovaradin şudend 10 neferen*” KK d. 20611, 2. It can be inferred from subsequent records that the number of janissaries present in the fortresses was proportional to the number of officers. On 8 September 1528, there were senior janissary officers and seven company leaders in four fortresses in Srem (Varadin, Ilok, Rača and Mitrovica), with a total of 800 janissaries serving in these fortresses. KK d. 1764, 42 and 51. It is similarly probable that by the end of 1526, there were between 800-1,000 janissaries in Petrovaradin and Ilok alone.

³²⁴ Ibid., 36.

³²⁵ The record dated 13 October 1532 indicates that there were 1,000 janissaries in the fortresses in Srem, with a total of 1,400 janissaries subsequently dispatched to reinforce fortresses such as Methoni, Navarino and Skoder, as well as the troops assigned to retake the fortress of Koroni in the sancak of Morea, following a surprise attack while the Ottoman army was in Hungary during the campaign (Methoni: 1,000, Navarino: 300, Skoder: 100). Ibid., 180.

³²⁶ Abbreviations for the units: **Mü**: mustahfiz, **süv**: cavalry (*beşli*, *ulufeciyan-i süvari*), **az**: azeb, **mar**: martolos, **top**: artilleryman (*topçu*). Laszowski, *Monumenta Habsburgica*, vol. I, 150–152; Zirojević, *Tursko vojno uređenje u Srbiji (1459–1683)*, 114–148.

³²⁷ The persons who prepared this report probably confused the permanent garrison soldiers (*müstahfiz*) with the janissaries temporarily stationed in the fortresses. In fact, those who should have been *müstahfiz* are recorded as janissaries throughout the report. Therefore, I have recorded the janissaries as *müstahfiz* in the table.

³²⁸ 108,000 ducats in the report.

Voćin	60	50	100	50	10	270	615,600 ³²⁹
Varadin	300	200	300	200	25	1,025	2,057,425 ³³⁰
Čerević	70	50	150	200	10	480	862,344
Titel	150	100	250	200	20	720	1,397,592
Belgrade	400	300	1000	400	50	2,150	3,601,950
Semendria	250	100 ³³¹	700	400	43 ³³²	1,493	2,145,204
Kulič	50	50	60	40	10	210	321,432
Ram	60	50	100	100	10	320	396,480
Golubac	60	50	100	100	10	320	437,712
10 fortresses	1,900	1,450	3,760	2,090	268	9,468	17,991,739³³³

Although the figures presented in this report may be slightly exaggerated, they provide a relatively reliable account of the troops stationed in fortresses on the Danube and in Srem. If we consider the annual salary of the soldiers in the fortresses conquered in 1526 and subsequently deployed by the Ottomans, which was 11,088,961 akçe, we arrive at a figure that is very close to the amount paid by the Ottomans for these fortresses (11,200,000 akçe), as stated by İbrahim Paşa a year earlier. Even if we disregard this discrepancy, the records prepared by the Ottomans a year after this report yield a similar result.

Table IX: The Strength of Ottoman Garrisons in the Sancak of Semendria (1530)³³⁴

Fortress	Mü.+Top.	Süv.	Az.	Mar.	Total	Annual Salary (akçe)
Semendria	253 (404) ³³⁵	101	738	398	1,490 (1,641)	2,109,404
Belgrade	400	200	490	389	1,479	2,189,616

³²⁹ 10,800 ducats in the report.

³³⁰ The report does not mention the annual salaries of the garrisons after Voćin. I calculated the salaries according to the average daily salary of each unit according to Ottoman register which complied one year later (MAD 506) and arrived at the general results (cavalry: 7 akçe, azeb: 6, artillerymen: 7, müstahfiz: 5,5 and martolos: 4).

³³¹ 1,000 in the report. In my opinion, 1,000 was miswritten. Normally the Semendria garrison always had a cavalry unit of only 100 men.

³³² 430 in the text which certainly was miswritten.

³³³ If we also calculate the average daily wages of Ilok and Voćin according to the data based on the Ottoman register the annual wages for the soldiers in Ilok was 4,975,884 akçe, and in Voćin 481,086. The grand total is 16,667,109 akçe.

³³⁴ MAD 506, 5, 16, 27, 28–29, 41–45.

³³⁵ There were also paid Christian arquebusers (*tüfenkçiyân*), crossbowmen (*zemberekçiyân*) and artillerymen (*topçuyân*) in the fortresses which seemingly not counted in the list. Ibid., 5.

Osiyek	622	757	881	943	3,203	6,301,761
Ilok	403	-	-	199	602	1,113,504
Varadin	227	-	226	204	657	1,210,724
Čerević	42	-	52	51	145	264,088
Duk	18	-	-	-	18	49,912
Erdut	84	50	60	100	294	506,008
Vrdnik	73	-	-	-	73	157,883
Mitrovica	66	-	52	-	118	219,624
Titel	117	101	113	100	431	854,352
Ram	97	25	45	48	215	310,492
Kulič	141	-	49	40	230	279,908
Golubac	143	25	45	96	309	384,564
Ostrvica	32	-	30	-	62	94,454
Užice	34	-	-	-	34	44,604
Sokol	31	-	-	10	41	54,594
Avala	23	-	-	-	23	44,956
Gradište	-	-	-	56	56	61,950
19	2,806 (2,946)	1,259	2,781	2,634	9,480 (9,631)	16,192,550

A comparative analysis of the two tables reveals no significant differences, at least in terms of military personnel. The only possible discrepancy is that in Table IX, we can see the fortresses that were in the sancak of Semendria but not in Table VII. From this perspective, the number of soldiers in the first table seems somewhat inflated. Moreover, the most significant change in the Ottoman fortress network on the Danube during this one-year period was undoubtedly the rebuilding of the Osijek on the return of the 1529 campaign and the placement of a considerable garrison of soldiers inside. In fact, the number of garrison soldiers in Osijek alone was equal to one-third of the personnel of all the fortresses in the sancak. It is evident that the substantial garrison of soldiers in Osijek was not a mere coincidence. The fortress served as a gateway to Hungary and, with the mobile forces it housed, it possessed a military force that could intervene directly in Hungary if necessary. A considerably large cavalry force of 757 men, 881 azabs, and 943 martolos, which were infantry troops also able to serving in the river fleet anchored at the fortress harbour, this troop

composition can be considered a substantial military force in their own right. In particular, river fleets and azeb troop commanders (ağa or kapudan) constituted one of the most important elements in the formation of the Ottoman frontier organisation. With these fleets and troops, which significantly increased the logistical capacity of their campaigns in Hungary and were also able to quickly dispatch troops towards Buda, the Ottomans undoubtedly gained logistical superiority in the region.

The Ottomans appear to have primarily deployed existing fortress forces to man fortresses with substantial garrisons, such as Osijek between 1529 and 1530. As the Ottoman defensive line extended, they distributed these concentrated forces to the surrounding fortresses, thereby reinforcing the chain of fortresses. Consequently, with a fixed number of troops at all times, they were able to control a greater number of fortresses and areas in the region, simultaneously maintaining the financial burden of defence at a minimum, which tended to increase year after year. To illustrate, there was a particularly substantial azeb force in Ilok, with Kasım Kapudan at its head between 1528 and 1529. In contrast, there is no record of an azeb force in Ilok in the following year.³³⁶ It is probable that the azebs from Ilok constituted the core of the azebs transferred to Osijek. Thus, other military units were transferred to Osijek from Semendria, Belgrade and Varadin, which had substantial garrisons in the interior part of the fortress chain.³³⁷

³³⁶ İE. AS. 1/20, 1. Kasım Kapudan was the famous Kasım. Later he would become the first sancakbeyi of Mohács. For his career see: Géza David, "An Ottoman Military Career on the Hungarian Borders Kasım Voyvoda, Bey, and Pasha," 65–298.

³³⁷ Similarly, according to the roll call records of 15 March 1529, the recently established garrison of Berkasovo, which had been conquered a few months earlier, consisted of soldiers transferred from Ilok. A total of 116 soldiers were transferred from Ilok to Berkasovo, and their three-month salaries amounted to 57,259 akçe (229,036 akçe per year). İE. AS. 1/19/1.

4.2.2. Zvornik

Although a garrison force of over 9,000 men was concentrated along the Danube on the Hungarian border, this image is far from complete. The Ottoman network of fortresses along the Hungarian frontier extended beyond this region. Additionally, a sizeable Ottoman garrison force and extensive network of fortresses were present in the Srem region, situated along the banks of the Sava up to Kobaš, as well as in the northern Bosnia. The number of garrisons between 1526 and 1530 is not well documented, with the exception of the strategically important fortresses of Rača at the confluence of the Drina and Sava, and Brčko, immediately to the west, within the borders of the sancak of Izvornik. The number of janissaries stationed in Rača during the 1520s is also unknown. However, some fragmentary roll call records from 1529 appear to provide some insight into the presence of fortresses in the region.

In August 1529, a survey conducted under the supervision of Bali Bey (also known as Küçük, later the second governor-general of Budin Province) revealed that the governor of İzvornik had stationed a total of 231 garrison soldiers in Brčko fortress. Of these, 44 were müstahfız and artillerymen, 35 were martolos, 51 were azebs and 101 were cavalry (bešli). The total annual salary of the garrison was 394,356 akçe.³³⁸ A noteworthy aspect of this document is the transfer of all cavalry stationed in the fortress from the two neighbouring fortresses, Srebrenik and Gradačac. This was because the soldiers of all the fortresses in Izvornik, with the exception of Rača and Sabač, including their garrisons, were granted collective timars from nearby regions instead of cash salaries.³³⁹

³³⁸ İE.AS. 1/19/2.

³³⁹ Summary register of Zvornik sancak from 1533 indicates that 330 soldiers in the fortresses of Zvornik, Srebrenica, Kušlat, Srebrenik, Perin Grad, Teočak and Sokol were granted salary timars, valued at 450,350 akçe. It is noteworthy that all garrisons in these fortresses were paid in cash prior to 1521. TT d. 173, 93–177.

4.2.3. Bosnia

In Bosnia, as in Srem, rapid Ottoman conquests took place during the 1520s. This resulted in the usual frontiers being extended approximately 100 kilometres further in each direction. Most of the garrisons, which had been complete frontier fortresses with salaried infantry and cavalry troops, were either transferred to fortresses further west within 10 years or were given collective timars. Until the conquest of Jajce in 1528 and the subsequent collapse of the entire Hungarian defence line in Bosnia, the garrisons on the frontiers were paid in cash. In addition, the fortresses of Sinj, Knin, Novigrad, Bočac, Kotor, Jezero (Göhlisar), Ključ, and Kamengrad had cavalry forces. By 1530 the majority of these fortresses had been granted salary timars. The cavalry stationed in the fortresses were relocated to other fortresses on the frontier.

The relationship between proximity to the border region and the allocation of timars to fortresses can be most effectively analysed in the case of Bosnia. Prepared at the end of the 1530s, the register containing the number of garrison troops with timar in Bosnia, whose salaries were paid in cash, was also listed.³⁴⁰ Although the document begins with a roll of 1,634 müstahfiz and 126 cavalymen in 31 fortress, with annual salaries totalling 2,819,152 akçe, immediately below this piece of information is 17 fortresses listed³⁴¹ with one of them still under construction (Kobaš). In total, there were 1,088 garrison soldiers in the 17 fortresses listed, with an annual salary of 1,788,036 akçe.³⁴² Despite the assertion by researchers who have utilised this record

³⁴⁰ MAD 540; Husić. "Tvrdave Bosanskog Sandžaka i Njihove Posade 1530. Godine," 189–229; Oruç, "1528/30 Tarihli Mücmel Tahrir Defterine Göre Bosna Sancağında Mustahfiz Timarları," 743–761.

³⁴¹ MAD 540, 218–219; Husić. "Tvrdave Bosanskog Sandžaka i Njihove Posade 1530. Godine," 197, 227; Oruç, "1528/30 Tarihli Mücmel Tahrir Defterine Göre Bosna Sancağında Mustahfiz Timarları," 745. Oruç suggests that the garrison troops in fortresses that did not receive salary timars but were paid only in cash may have been janissaries. Ibid., 744. However, this is not true. Unlike in Semendria or Srem, there were no janissary units in any fortress in Bosnia.

³⁴² MAD 540, 218–219.

that it is incomplete and that only 17 of the 31 fortresses had been listed³⁴³, it can be reasonably concluded that the 31 fortresses at the beginning of the document, the soldiers in them and the payment records must belong to the previous years, not to the year of 1530. Furthermore, the numerical data must also belong to 1528 and 1529.

A comparison of the 1516 and 1530 summary timar registers reveals that the fortresses conquered after 1516 were in the status of ulufeli until 1529. However, the payment status of these fourteen fortresses was later changed from ulufeli to timarlı. Between 1528 and 1529, there were precisely 31 fortresses that were in the status of ulufeli. The fortresses of Toričan, Sokol, Komotin, Vinac, Jezero (Göhlisar), Maglaj, Livno, Beograd (Glamoč), Nečven, Sinj, Vrlika, Dirniš, and Jajce, which were known to have received cash salaries at the time the register of 1530 was compiled, were subsequently granted timars a year later. The list comprises 31 fortresses with 17 of them receiving salaries and 14 of them, which had previously received cash payments, now receiving collective timar. Therefore, the register is not incomplete, but rather that the data at the top reflects data from a year earlier, while the fortresses listed below reflects current data. It should be noted that the only information absent from the list is the number of cavalry units stationed in specific fortresses. It is certain that in 1530, cavalry units were present in both the Jajce and Banjaluka fortresses. Cafer,³⁴⁴ son of Kasım Bey Kopčić,³⁴⁵ was a prominent member of the local aristocracy in Bosnia who held a significant zeamet and was the commander of the cavalry units at the Banjaluka,

³⁴³ Husić. "Tvrđave Bosanskog Sandžaka i Njihove Posade 1530. Godine," 197–199.

³⁴⁴ Cafer held a timar worth of 5,500 akçe in 1530. MAD 167, 233.

³⁴⁵ Kasım Bey was holding a zeamet in the district (nahiye) of Osad with 40,072 akçe income in 1516. TT d. 56, 55–56. In 1530 same Kasım Bey held a zeamet 46,115 akçe worth in the nahiye of Brod. MAD 167, 59. In 1532 he was left in Bosnia as commander of the sipahis to defend the sancak, while the rest of the timar holder sipahi troops were mobilised for the famous campaign of 1532: "*ze'âmet be-nâm-i Kasım Beğ Kopçîç, be-muhâfazat-i vilâyet-i Bosna ber-mucîb-i emr-i 'âlf*". TSMA d. 4175, 15b. For the Kopčić family see: Behija Zlatar, "Kopčići and Vilići: Prilog pitanju izučavanja muslimanskih porodica u Bosni i Hercegovini u XVI stoljeću," *Prilozi* 13 (1977): 322–327.

while the cavalry units in Jajce were commanded by Doru, son of İlyas.³⁴⁶ It is also likely that these men commanded cavalry units between 25 and 50, as was the case in the Kamengrad fortress. Consequently, 54 per cent of the mustafizes who were distributed salary timars in the records of 1530, were troops whose salaries had been paid in cash only a year or two earlier.

One might inquire as to the extent of the financial savings achieved by the Ottomans through the distribution of collective timars to the personnel of these fourteen fortresses, which had previously been paid in cash. It would be beneficial to ascertain the value of the timars distributed to these personnel and the methods employed to create new resources. Firstly, by reducing the salaries of personnel in these fortresses, the Ottomans were able to save over 1,000,000 akçe per year. These funds probably came from nearby mukataa sources, which could subsequently be redirected to staffing the reduced number of frontier fortresses or to other areas of expenditure.

The total value of the timars distributed to the aforementioned fortresses whose personnel formerly paid in cash, was 674,811,5 akçe. Collectively, this sum equalled the annual timar value of all the sipahi of a small sancak in the provinces of Anatolia or Rumelia. The Ottomans' measures can be understood as an attempt to create a new pool of resources, in a manner similar to their efforts to increase the number of sipahis in Semendria and Bosnia during the post-Mohács period of 1526. The status of the lump-sum taxes that previously tax-exempt Vlachs, voynuks, and akıncıs were obliged to pay to the central treasury from their farms was changed. Taxes on their crops were distributed as timars to the sipahi or garrison soldiers in the fortresses in question. Additionally, the revenues from the çiftliks that were held by the sipahi class were also

³⁴⁶ He also held a timar 11,000 akçe worth. MAD 167, 249.

distributed as timar income. Although the central treasury experienced a loss of revenue in theory, new timar revenues were created for the sipahi and garrison soldiers in this sancak, resulting in a doubling of the number of sipahi and the distribution of timars to hundreds of garrison soldiers. Between 1530 and 1550, timars allocated to sipahis constituted at least 40 to 50 per cent of total sancak revenues, while timars allocated to fortress garrisons declined from 20 to 12 per cent over this 30-year period. Nevertheless, the number of garrisons with timars remained relatively stable (see chapter 3 for the number of sipahis in Bosnia):

Table X: Total Garrison Forces (Ulufe and Timar) in the Sancak of Bosnia in 1529–30³⁴⁷

Fortress with ulufe	Mü.	Sü.	Total	Annual Payment in <i>akçe</i>
Doboj	50	-	50	83,012
Ključ	46	-	46	98,056
Kamengrad	114	25	139	289,216
Udbina	107	-	107	170,980
Karin	35	-	35	47,788
Obrovac	107	-	107	165,316
Ostrovica	49	-	49 ³⁴⁸	70,800
Skradin	107	-	107	155,404
Knin	38	-	38	62,304
Bočac	57	-	57	91,508
Zvečaj	18	-	18	27,612
Banjaluca	105	- ³⁴⁹	105	169,212
Kotor	29	-	29	48,496
Tesanj	41	-	41	64,428
Novigrad	73	- ³⁵⁰	73	111,864
Bilaj	55	-	55	87,436
Kličevica	32	-	32	44,604
Kobaš ³⁵¹				

³⁴⁷ MAD 540. Compare with: Husić, “Tvrđave Bosanskog Sandžaka i Njihove Posade 1530. Godine,” pp. 189–229; Husić, “Vojne Prilike u Splitsko-Zadarskom Zaleđu u 16. Stoljeću (osmanski serhat 1530–1573),” *Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju*, 56 (2006): 125–144; Oruç, “1528/30 Tarihli Mücmel Tahrir Defterine Göre Bosna Sancağında Mustahfız Timarları,” 743–761.

³⁴⁸ It seems that one of the fortresses in this region, probably Ostrovica, had also azeb units: “*çiftlik-i Tur ‘Ali ağa ve Musa ağa ve bâkî şürekâ ‘an müstahfızân ve ‘azebân*”. MAD 167, 362.

³⁴⁹ MAD 167, 233: “*Cafer b. Kasım Beğ (Kopčić) ser-beşliâyân-i Banyaluka*”.

³⁵⁰ Probably Novigrad had also salaried cavalry units, but it is not certain they have already served in the fortress in early 1530s. However, it is certain that there were cavalry units in the fortress since their commander (*Novigrad kal’asında atlu ‘ulûfeci başılığı*) received timar in 12.06.1537. TT d. 174, 101.

³⁵¹ The fortress was under construction when the register was compiled: “*Kal’a-i Kobaş der kenâr-i âb-i Sava der mukâbele-i Islavin ki hâliyâ binâ ve hâdis şüd*”. MAD 540, 219. It seems that the fortress immediately filled with a garrison since Mustafa, the head of the artillerymen (*topçubaşı*) in Jajce was appointed to Kobaš in 24.04.1531. *Ibid.*, 201.

18 fortresses in 1530 ³⁵²	1,063	25	1,088	1,788,036
31 fortresses in 1529	1,634	126	1,760	2,819,152
Fortress with timar	Mü.	Sü.	Total	Annual Payment in akçe
Zvečan	20		20	31,420
Jeleč	17		17	28,433
Dobrun	20		20	31,924
Višegrad	17		17	33,199
Kličevac	19		19	29,720
Hodidjed	31		31	48,431,5
Dubrovnik	32		32	48,026
Bobovac	25		25	38,569
Vrh Bilice	16		16	26,087
Kaštel	20		20	27,323
Travnik	47		47	72,252
Prozor	17		17	22,905,5
Prusac	58		58	84,921
Susjedi	19		19	29,620
Vranduk	29		29	40,450
Toričani	32		32	50,310
Sokol	20		20	32,183
Komotin	28		28	43,237
Vinac	33		33	45,938
Jezero (Göhlisar)	45		45	69,911
Maglaj	29		29	41,105
Livno	25		25	34,725
Beograd (Glamoč)	13		13	22,240
Nečven	24		24	38,775
Sinđ	45		45	61,950
Vrlika	17		17	27,396
Drniš	9		9	16,455
Jajce	100	³⁵³	100	162,772,5
28 fortresses	807		807	1,240,278,5
Grand Total				
46 fortresses	1,870	25	1,895	3,028,314,5

As evidenced by the accompanying table, despite the considerable size of the Bosnian territory, the total number of garrison forces in this sancak was only one-third of that of the largest garrison in Srem, Osijek in the same year. The relatively small number of garrisons in Bosnia can be attributed to two key factors. Firstly, the military

³⁵² All the fortresses are not listed. Document indicated that there are 31 fortresses with their 1.634 müstahfiz and 126 cavalry (faris). Total annual payment is 2.819.152 akçe.

³⁵³ MAD 167, 249: “Doru b. İlyas ser-beşliyân-i kal’a-i Yayçe”.

potential of the Croatian forces on the other side of the Bosnian frontier was not such that they could pose a threat to the Ottomans in the region. The most prominent members of the Croatian nobility, who already owned estates and fortresses in close proximity to the Ottoman border, sought to protect their taxable subjects in return for annual tribute. This would entail the recognition of Ottoman supremacy. The Croats had encountered significant difficulties in fighting their Ottoman adversaries independently. They were directly dependent on the new troops and financial resources that Ferdinand had promised to send. In terms of numerical strength, the Ottomans may have doubled or tripled the Croatian military forces in this region.

The second factor was that the Bosnian sancak, in addition to the garrison forces, had the largest force of timar holder sipahi in the region. With the addition of the sancakbeyi's retinue, its mobilizable force amounted to 3,000 men on paper. This force alone was sufficient to achieve the desired military objectives in Croatia. It is evident that the considerable territorial gains made in the region throughout the 16th century were made possible by the forces mobilised by the sancak of Bosnia. When we take into account the garrison forces and other military elements in the region, it can be seen that the sancak effectively had a force of 4,000 men. So as to find a solution to this imbalance of military power on the frontiers, a report submitted to Archduke Ferdinand in 1530 recommended that in order to confront the Ottomans in Slavonia, a total of 3,400 troops, consisting of 200 heavy, 200 medium, 1,600 light cavalry, 400 Italian arquebuses and 1,000 martoloses, should be regularly stationed in the region. It was calculated that the salaries of the troops, the allowances to be given to the ban and captains, and other expenses would cost 232,836 florins (13,271,652 akçe) per year.³⁵⁴ This cost was close to the salary payments alone for the Ottoman garrison forces of

³⁵⁴ Laszowski, *Monumenta Habsburgica*, vol. I, 470.

over 9,000 men in the fortresses of Srem for one year. It is difficult to pinpoint whether this number of troops was immediately deployed in Slavonia, but even this number was still very small compared to the Ottoman forces on the Srem and Bosnian frontiers.

The Ottoman frontier expanded westwards very quickly with the conquests, and the number of fortresses changed constantly. Eventually, the vast majority of the fortress garrisons now situated in inner regions were given salary timars. Although the table above only shows the year of 1530, a general overview of the Bosnian frontier between 1516 and 1550 shows that the ultimate aim of the Ottomans was to keep the garrisons in the region stable and to allocate a certain amount of timar income to these soldiers. Almost 90 per cent of the fortresses that were paid in cash in the 1530s had already received timar by 1550 (See appendix V). Only fortresses that formed a narrow corridor very close to the frontier region continued to receive cash payments instead of timars.

In comparison to the process in Bosnia, it was only after the annexation of Buda that the certain garrison groups (mostly *müstahfiz*) on the Srem and Semendria gradually began to receive collective timars. Therefore, focusing only on the garrison soldier paid in cash may prevent us from seeing the changes in the entire frontier and the potential of Ottoman military power. It is imperative to consider both methods of payment in their own context in a combined fashion.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the available tables for 1530: a preliminary examination of the provincial account registers reveals that 65 per cent (10,568) of the 16,039 salaried (*ulufeli*) garrison troops in all the fortresses of Rumelia were stationed in the fortresses of the two sancaks on the Hungarian frontier

(Semendria and Bosnia).³⁵⁵ Similarly, the majority of the janissaries dispatched from the capital to the fortresses were stationed in these Srem fortresses. This ratio remained nearly unchanged until the annexation of Buda in 1541. As will be elaborated in the following pages, the new members of the Buda province fortresses were, in fact, the same troops that had been stationed in the Srem and Semendria fortresses. The majority of these troops were subsequently transferred from the Srem fortresses to those of Buda, Pest as well as a number of smaller garrisons situated along the Danube.

There are no available roll-call registers for the Ottoman garrisons on the Hungarian frontier between 1530 and 1541. Once more, the period between 1530 and 1541 may be regarded as a period of significant Ottoman expansion, with advances being made across the Sava in Bosnia, Croatia, and Slavonia. In contrast to the situation in 1530, the Ottomans established two new sancak centres in the region (Klis and Požega) and garrisoned some of the captured fortresses. In the 1530s, the network of Ottoman fortresses was limited to the narrow corridor at Srem. Consequently, the Ottoman military threat spread throughout Slavonia and across the Sava, posing a serious threat to the Croatian and Hungarian territories under Habsburg rule. The Ottomans held a greater number of fortresses than in the previous period. However, it remains unclear whether there was a numerical increase in the total number of Ottoman garrisons on the frontier. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a projection based on other available archival sources.

³⁵⁵ Sancak of Silistria: 1,212 (TT d. 370, vol II., 399–401); Sancak of Kefe: 966 (TT d. 370, vol. II., 497); Sancak of Vidin: 409 (TT d. 370, vol II., 604); Sancak of Morea: 552 (TT d. 367, vol II., 127–128, 132), Rodos and Miletini: 1,790 (TT d. 367, vol. II., 206–219); Sancak of Elbasan: 435 (TT d. 367, vol IV), 452); Sancak of Avlonya: 107 (TT d. 1078, 10). Total: 5,471, with the troops in Bosnia and Semendria: 16,039. It is noteworthy that in the years 1527–28, the total number of garrison soldiers in Rumelia who were paid in cash was 17,487. It is again evident that over half of the total number of soldiers were deployed in fortresses along the Hungarian frontier, specifically in Bosnia, İzvornik and Semendira. Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Mali Yılına Ait,” 282.

4.3. Situation between 1537 and 1541

After the two-year campaign in Iraq (1533–35), which resulted in the establishment of a new province,³⁵⁶ new developments took place in the Mediterranean, Slavonia, Hungary and Moldavia. While the Ottomans were preoccupied with the land and sea campaigns organised in the aftermath of the Ottoman–Venetian war that broke out in 1537, the clashes between the Ottoman–Venetian and Ottoman–Habsburg local forces in Slavonia and the Adriatic were gaining momentum. Although the Italian mainland was plundered, the Corfu campaign can be regarded as unsuccessful and costly in terms of achieving the Ottomans’ strategic objectives.

On the western front, the Ottomans made lasting conquests in Slavonia beyond the Sava through the initiatives of Yahyapaşazade Mehmed Bey and Hüsrev Bey, while the Habsburg forces under Hans Katzinier, which could be considered the most serious military threat since 1526, suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the aforementioned sancakbeyis. After the Ottoman victory, the Ottomans’ position in the region became permanent, while the Habsburgs lost a significant military force that they had barely amassed. In the end, the Ottomans had a free hand in the region.

The year 1538 saw important developments in the Adriatic. After the Corfu expedition, the Ottoman fortress of Herceg Novi (Ott. Novi) was captured in a surprise attack, after which a large Christian fleet posed a serious threat to the Ottomans in the region. The Christian fleet was eventually defeated at the Battle of Preveza, but it would have to wait until August 1539 to take Herceg Novi. As these developments

³⁵⁶ Also known as Two Iraq Campaign (Irakeyn). For the general context and events on the campaign see: Tayyib Gökbiçin, “Arz ve Raporlarına Göre İbrahim Paşa’nın Irakeyn Seferindeki İlk Tedbirleri ve Fütuhâtı,” *Belleten* XXI, no. 83 (1957): 449–482; Hüseyin Gazi Yurdaydın, ed., *Beyan-ı Menazil-i Sefer-i Irakeyn-i Sultan Süleyman Han* (Ankara: TTK, 2014); Emecen, *Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş*, 217–224; Emecen, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Zamanı*, 216–266.

were taking place in the Mediterranean, the Ottoman land army was preoccupied with the campaign in the Moldavia (Boğdan).³⁵⁷ Thus, the Ottoman armies were heavily engaged on various fronts between 1537 and 1539, which financially strained the state. After all, while the military operations continued, putting a heavy strain on the central treasury, the financing of the fortresses on the Hungarian frontier also had to continue. It was precisely at this time that, probably due to the shortage of funds in the central treasury, various groups of revenues in Rumelia were to be used to finance the frontier.

Financing the Ottoman navy with two successive land expeditions must have increased the cash requirements of the central treasury, as money seems to have been continuously withdrawn from the mukataa sources, a relatively easy source of cash. Especially after the sudden capture of Koroni and Patras (Ott. Balyabadra) by the Habsburg fleet led by Andrea Doria during the campaign of 1532, the Ottoman navy had grown in numbers, which in turn placed an increasing burden on the central treasury.³⁵⁸ The loss of Koroni must have been a serious lesson for the Ottomans. Even

³⁵⁷ For the Boğdan campaign see: Mihail Guboğlu, “Kanuni Sultan Süleyman’ın Boğdan Seferi ve Zaferi,” *Belleten* 50, no. 198 (1986): 727–806.

³⁵⁸ During the 1530s, the Ottoman navy comprised a considerable fleet of between 100 and 150 ships, which was stationed in the Mediterranean. As Sultan Suleiman departed for his expedition in the East, a formidable fleet, under the command of the newly appointed Admiral Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa, was to set sail for the Mediterranean. The size of the Ottoman navy is noteworthy in the record dated May 1534. According to this source, the Ottoman navy consisted of 101 vessels, including 35 bastardas (*başarda*) 52 standart galleys (*kadırga*), 6 galliot (*kalyata*), and 7 boats (*kayık*). With regard to the number of military personnel in the navy, there were 2,335 riggers (*alatçıyân*), 7,130 warrior (*cenkçıyân*) and 14,975 oarsmen (*kürekçıyân*), resulting in a total of 24,440 personnel. After accounting for all other expenses, the salary of the personnel for a period of eight months amounted to 23,703,396 akçe (equivalent to 395,155 ducats). KK d. 1863, 202; İdris Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2015), 51; Emecen, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Zamanı*, 237–238. Additionally, 270 artillerymen (*topçuyân-i Dergâh-i Âlî*) were deployed to serve in the navy. İdris Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa*, 51. In 1539, during the naval expedition to recapture Hercegnovi (Ott. Novi), the Ottoman navy consisted of 155 ships (58 bastardas, 82 galleys, 11 galliots and artillery ships) with a total of 27,204 personnel (352 captains, 805 low-ranked officers, 2,509 riggers and 23,538 oarsmen). When 2,958 janissaries in the navy is taken into account, the total number of men in the Ottoman fleet is 30,162. As the number of timar holder sipahis assigned to the galleys is unknown, it is reasonable to assume that this figure would be considerably higher. The salaries of the 27,204 naval personnel mentioned here amounted to 8,406,648 akçe for a period of only three months. MAD 523, 560–565; Colin Imber, “The Costs of Naval Warfare: The Accounts of Hayreddin Barbarossa’s Herceg Novi Campaign in 1539,” in *Studies in Ottoman History and Law* (New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2010), 79–84. In this state, the salary expenses of the navy, which was at sea for several months, are estimated to have exceeded 20 million akçe.

in 1533, when the Ottoman–Habsburg truce was still in force, 2,450 janissaries remained in key garrisons in the Peloponnese and the Adriatic.³⁵⁹ Only 37 per cent of the Rumeli sipahis were to be mobilised for the campaign in the East. In particular, the sipahis of the coastal sancaks were kept on standby to guard the coasts.³⁶⁰

The redirection of mukataa revenues to the central treasury, formerly allocated to frontier fortress financing, prompted the reallocation of other resources in Rumelia for the same purpose. Revenues from the poll-tax (*cizye*), previously sent directly to the treasury, constituting at least 20 percent of all Ottoman revenues³⁶¹, were utilized for fortress funding during these campaigns. Without access to the *cizye* register from

³⁵⁹ Ağoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest*, 193–194. From the end of 1532, large detachments of janissaries were stationed in fortresses in the Peloponnese and the Adriatic. In September 1533, there were 1,000 janissaries in Moton, 1,000 in Koron, 300 in Navarin, 50 in Draç and 100 in İskenderiye. KK d. 1863, 39b.

³⁶⁰ TSMA d. 10215 (See Appendix VII). Despite the date of the preliminary report on the mobilisable timar holders in Rumelia prepared by Ayas Paşa and submitted to the sultan being given as 8 November 1523 in the archive catalogue, a cross-check of both the total number of sipahis in Rumelia and the information on the sancakbeyis who were present in the campaign later leads to the conclusion that this report was prepared just before the 1534 campaign. In this undated report, the sancakbeyis of Mora, Avlonya, Eğriboz, İnebahtı, Elbasan, Selanik, and Karlili were not to participate in the expedition, but were to protect the coastal area and certain fortresses with a certain number of sipahi. The regions of Semendria, Izvornik and Bosnia had a long-standing tradition of maintaining a presence in the frontier areas, regardless of whether an expedition was underway or not. The rest of the sipahi and sancakbeyis were to be mobilised for the campaign in the east, making up 37 per cent of the total sipahi army in Rumelia (4,270 zeamet and timar holders out of 11,500). Indeed, the mobilisation plan outlined in this report appears to have been followed. The list of sancakbeyis from Rumelia in the campaign treasury account dated 23 November 1534 reveals that the names of the aforementioned sancakbeyis are absent. This indicates that the report was prepared in advance of the 1534 mobilisation. Sancakbeyis from Rumelia present on 23.11.1534: Süleyman Paşa- governor general of Rumelia, Zeynel Paşa-Niğbolu, Mehmed Bey-Tırhala, Mehmed Bey-Köstendil, Kayıtbay Bey-Alacahisar, Ahmed Bey-Çirmen, İskender Bey-Vize, Toygun Bey-Ohri, İbrahim Bey-Prizren, Ali Bey son of İskender Paşa-Vulçitrin. KK d. 1764, 233. Bostan's information for the 1534 campaign is also consistent with this undated report. In the undated report, sipahis with a timar income of less than 3,000 akçe were to be gathered in Sofia. Bostan also confirm this information: "...Rumilinde olan uc beğleri ve sevâhil-i deryâda ve cezâyirde olan ümerâ-yi devlet-ârây taht-ı eyâletlerinde olan sipâh ile hudûd-i memâlikî hıfz ve hırâsetde olub ve vilâyet-i Rumilinin üç binlik sipâhileri dahi mahrûse-i Sofya'da olan sancakbeği yanında cem' olub...". Bostan Çelebi, *Kitâb* (Vienna copy), 209–209b.

³⁶¹ In general, from the end of the fifteenth century to the middle of the sixteenth century, the ratio of poll-tax revenues to total revenue varied, but the nominal poll-tax revenues were generally between 35–40,000,000 akçe per year: 59,5% in 1495–96 with 38,172,621 akçe, 50 % in 1509–10 with 36,898,201 akçe, 25% in 1524–25 with 36,491,459 akçe, 21% in 1527–28 with 42,291,364 akçe, 15% in 1547–48 with 30,949,190 akçe. Barkan, "H. 933–934 (M. 1527–1528) Malî Yılına Ait," 269; Barkan, "H. 954–955 (1547–48) Malî Yılına Ait Bir Osmanlı Bütçesi," 237–238; Çakır, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Bilinen En Eski (1495–1496) Bütçesi," 134.

1539 and 1540, we lack the means to compute the fortresses' annual payments by the late 1530s.

Table XI: Garrison Payments in Whole Rumelia via Poll-Tax Revenues (1539–1540)³⁶²

Fortress	Unit composition	Paid	Period
Belgrade	mü.+az.	584,406	20.2.1539-6.6.1540 (1 year 4 months)
Semendria	az.+top.+mar.	683,566	20.2.1539-6.6.1540 (1 year 4 months)
Vukovar	mü.+az.+mar.	113,133	9.2.1540-2.9.1540 (6 months)
Podgorač	mü.+az.+süv.+mar.	724,178	27.8.1538-2.9.1540 (2 years)
Gradiška	mü.+az.+mar.	281,507	27.8.1538-2.9.1540 (2 years)
Đakovo	mü.+az.+süv.+mar.	830,754	20.2.1539-5.6.1540 (1 year 4 months)
Požega	mü.+az.+süv.+mar.	3,402,751	23.11.1538-31.10.1540 (2 years)
Osijek	mü.+az.+süv.+mar.	3,675,669	30.5.1538-4.8.1540 (2 years 3 months)
Varadin	az.+top.	83,080	8.5.-4.8.1540 (3 months)
Vethi (Vetovo)	mü.+az.+süv.+mar.	350,235	23.11.1538-19.5.1539 (6 months)
Kutjevo	mü.+az.+süv.+mar.	871,841	20.2.1539-3.8.1540. (1 year 6 months)
Kaptol	mü.+az.+süv.	191,001	12.11.1539-3.8.1540 (9 months)
Brod (Slavonski Brod)	mü.	106,025	9.2.1540-3.8.1540 (6 months)
Kamengrad	mü.+az.+süv.+mar.	428,213	19.5.1539-3.8.1540 (1 year 3 months)
Gorjani	mü.+az.+süv.+mar.	901,377	19.5.1539-3.8.1540 (1 year 3 months)
Erdut	mü.+az.+süv.+mar.	57,666	8.5.1540-3.8.1540 (three months)
Titel	mü.+az.+süv.+mar.	474,866	12.11.1539-3.8.1540 (9 months)
Klis	mü.+az.	728,483	20.2.1539-6.5.1540 (1 year 3 months)
Vrana	mü.+az.+süv.	343,806	9.2.-6.5.1540 (3 months)
Nadin	mü.+süv.	233,950	23.11.1538-11.11.1539 (1 year)
Herceg Novi	mü.+az.	353,610	27.5-20.10.1541 (6 months)
Kobaš	mü.	88,923	27.8.1538-18.5.1539 (9 months)

³⁶² MAD 6898.

Cernik	mü.	60,641	12.11.1539-6.5.1540 (9 months)
Methoni	mü.+az.	958,263	12.11.1539-6.5.1540 (6 months)
Koroni	mü.+az.	506,630	12.11.1539-4.8.1540 (9 months)
Burgaz-i Cedid (Rhio)	mü.	100,000	12.11.1539-6.5.1540 (6 months)
Argos	süv.	52,234	16.8.1539-11.11.1539 (3 months)
Baranvar	mü.+süv.+mar.	221,178	1.10.1541-16.1.1542
28 fortresses		16,902,510	30.5.1538-16.1.1542 (3 years 8 months)

According to a poll-tax register for the years 1539 and 1540, the central treasury expected 33,335,258 akçe revenue per year from a total of 683,430 Christian households in Rumelia. Exactly 50 per cent of this revenue, which should have gone directly into the central treasury, was transferred at various times to pay the salaries of garrisons in different parts of Rumelia. It should not be assumed that this list of payments is complete. There must have been other sources of income to finance these fortresses at the same time since many fortresses in Bosnia and Semendria that are known to have large garrisons do not appear in these lists. What is essential is the possibility of making an annual projection, at least for the period between 1539 and 1540, based on the full quarterly payments to the fortresses in Semendria, Srem, and especially the newly conquered Klis. Since most of the quarterly payments to the various troop compositions are fixed, we can calculate what corresponds to an annual payment. On the other hand, by averaging these payments, we can determine how many garrison soldiers were in the fortresses. The daily averages are based on data from the 1530 and 1541 roll calls and summary sancak registers. It is noteworthy that the available roll call and pay registers indicate that over a period of approximately 60 years (from the 1490s to the 1540s), the troops stationed in the garrisons of the fortresses nominally received the same daily pay. The daily salary of a standard

garrison soldier (*müstahfiz*) was 5 akçe, while the salaries of squad leaders (*serbölük*) ranged from 6 to 8 akçe. A comparable implementation can be observed regarding the salaries of the azeb troops stationed in the fortresses. The daily salary of a newly appointed azeb varied between 4 and 5 akçe, depending on the fortress in which he was serving. A company commander (*seroada*) received a salary of 6-8 akçe, while the average salary of the leader (*reis*) comprising three or four companies was 10–12 akçe. Those who commanded all the azeb troops, designated as *ağa* or *kapudan*, received a daily salary between 25 and 100 akçe depending on the size of his garrison. The lowest-paid group in the fortresses were the martoloses. Although there was considerable variation between regions, the daily wage of a standard martolos was 2–3 akçe, while the company leaders received 4 akçe. The head of the martolos units (*sermie*, captain) received a daily wage between 5 and 10 akçe. It is evident that the cavalry units (*ulufeciyan-i süvari*, *faris*, *beşli*) and artillerymen were the highest paid group in the fortresses as a unit. The daily salary of a common cavalryman was between 6 and 7 akçe, while that of a company leader was between 10 and 12 akçe. The remuneration of the ağas who commanded the cavalry companies was dependent upon the number of troops under their command. It ranged from 25 to 100 akçe per day. In contrast, technical classes such as artillerymen and caulkers received a standard salary of 6–7 akçe (see appendix XIV).

The data presented in the table below are derived from the averages of the 1530 register books and the averages of the data in the two 1541 roll call registers (ÖNB Mxt 557 and Mxt 567). The averages of the officers and commanders, who constituted the largest group in the fortresses and whose daily wages fluctuated due to the higher number of individuals receiving basic wages, had a minimal impact on the total. The estimates presented here are in close alignment with the actual figures. To illustrate,

the staff of the fortress of Titel was estimated at 324 individuals, based on the payments documented in the poll-tax records. A year later, the records indicated that there were 353 individuals in the fortress. In this regard, although the precision of these estimates is not exact, they are nevertheless within a 90 per cent margin of accuracy.

Table XII: Supposed Annual Payment and the Estimated Number of Garrison Troops in Semendria, Srem, Bosnia and Klis

Fortress	Supposed payment (1540/41)	Estimated number of garrison soldiers acc. to the annual payment
Požega	2,043,375	1,193
Osijek	2,641,552	1,432
Semendria	976,000	680
Belgrade	1,172,000	803
Vukovar	226,266	120
Podgorač	260,000	195
Đakovo	668,764	363
Varadin	332,320	143
Vethi (Vetovo)	520,470	282
Kutjevo	569,736	309
Kaptol	266,936	145
Brod (Slavonski Brod)	212,050	109
Kamengrad	344,312	187
Gorjani	757,659	627
Erdud	237,664	103
Titel	628,000	324
Gradiška	402,532	252
Cernik	121,282	62
Kobaš	118,564	61
Klis	728,483	368
Vrana	687,612	681
Nadin	464,000	106
22 fortresses	14,379,577	8,545

Although numerous fortresses in Semendria, Srem, Požega and Bosnia are not included in the table, the number of garrison soldiers along the Hungarian border appears to be comparable to that recorded in 1530. It seems probable that garrison soldiers from fortresses such as Osijek, Semendria and Belgrade, which previously had large garrisons, were transferred to fortresses in the Požega region in particular. In

consideration of the scale of the remuneration, Požega and Gorjani were the fortresses with the largest garrisons, second to Osijek. This indicates that the figures presented in the table for 1530 remained largely unchanged by 1540.

While the Ottomans were expanding their dominance in the region and seizing more fortresses, there was no significant increase in the number of garrison forces. The only alteration was the transfer of the garrison's weight from the fortresses in areas that were no longer frontiers to the fortresses in the newly formed network of fortresses. Indeed, this was precisely the process that was to take place with the annexation of Buda in 1541. The incomplete but valuable roll-call register prepared a few months before the establishment of Buda province and the table prepared on the basis of the figures in the poll-tax register allow for the calculation of the total number of guards stationed in the fortresses along the frontier, as well as their annual salaries.

In the roll-call register for April 1541, a total of 17 fortresses in the Semendria and the Srem region had a garrison of 5,169 men. The annual salaries of these soldiers were 8,698,518 akçe. The list does not include the standard garrison troops (*müstahfiz*) in Semendria, Belgrade, and Ilok, which were typically the largest contingent of the entire garrison. The absence of *müstahfiz* in these fortresses, even in later records of payments from mukataa sources, can be explained by a single factor. It is probable that collective salary timars were distributed to the *mustahfizes* in these garrisons at the end of the 1530s.³⁶³ Archival sources on the distribution of these timars are lacking. However, the majority of the taxable land in the Srem region was allocated to these soldiers as a consequence of the initial surveys.

³⁶³ Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 162. Hegyi states that *müstahfiz* were received salary timar in Semendria and Srem region so that they were not on the list (ÖNB Mxt 567). However, many *müstahfiz* in the region, including Osijek were still receiving cash salary up to mid-1540s.

As the list only includes garrisons in Semendria and Srem, it appears that those in Požega are also absent. When these figures are combined with those from the poll-tax register, a more comprehensive picture emerges, as these sources belong to very close time periods. When the data from the poll-tax register is combined with that of 1541, the garrison number 8,500. If the garrison soldiers, who were in the numerous fortresses in Požega, are included, as well as those who were supposed to have received salary timars in the sancak of Semendria, the total garrison on the Hungarian frontier in 1541, just before the annexation of Buda, is estimated to be around 9,000, with an annual payment of over 14,000,000 akçe. These figures also show that the number of garrisons and annual payments remained relatively constant between 1530 and 1541.

Table XIII: Ottoman Garrisons in the Sancak of Semendria (April 1541)³⁶⁴

Fortress	Garrison composition	Total Garrison Soldiers	Annual Payment³⁶⁵
Semendria	393 az. + 42 top. + 333 mar.	768	1,074,213
Kulič	53 az. + 19 mar.	72	98,412
Belgrade	482 az. + 56 top. + 363 mar.	901	1,247,142
Titel	126 mü. + 109 az. + 51 süv. + 67 mar.	353	685,906
Dobre	51 az. + 49 mar.	100	143,016
Boraca	53 az. + 47 mar.	100	141,246
Osijek	286 müs. et. al. + 430 az. + 297 süv. + 533 mar.	1,546	2,292,362
Morović	4 art.	4	10,266
Erdut	33 mü. + 40 az. + 94 mar.	167	344,088
Vukovar	39 mü. + 88 az. + 39 mar.	166	326,034

³⁶⁴ ÖNB Mxt 567. In previous research, Hegyi and Fodor utilized this register, but only provided the total number of soldiers in these fortresses. Upon examination of the same register, Hegyi calculated the total number to be 5,240 men, while Fodor provided rounded figures, such as 5,000, as he had used this register in another context. Compare: Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 275; Fodor, "Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary," 301–302, especially footnote 107; Hegyi, "The Ottoman Network of Fortresses in Hungary," 163.

³⁶⁵ By calculating the daily wages of the soldiers in each fortress and multiplying by 1 Hijri year (354 days), I arrived at the total sum.

Varadin	178 az. + 16 art.	194	373,470
Ilok	20 top. + 133 az. + 76 Mar.	229	411,348
Rača	31 mü. + 50 mar.	81	123,900
Salankamen	13 top. + 63 az.	76	148,149
Nijemci	42 mü. + 98 mar.	140	237,711
Golubac	49 az. et. al. + 21 zem ³⁶⁶ . + 108 mar. ³⁶⁷	178	194,523
Ram	49 az. et. al + 45 mar.	94	146,732
17 fortresses		5,169	8,698,518

4.4. Situation Between 1541 and 1544

In September 1541, the capture of Buda and the subsequent establishment of a new province and its integration into the Ottoman administrative system necessitated the establishment of a new defence network 219 km north of the former north-western Ottoman garrison of Osijek. The defence of this newly established Ottoman province, centred on Buda and situated a mere 230 km from Vienna, constituted the most pressing concern for the Ottoman Empire.³⁶⁸ The only connection between Osijek, the gateway to the plains of Pannonia, and Buda was the river fleet, which could navigate the Danube and a few fortresses on the road to Buda. These fortresses were hastily garrisoned on the return from the campaign. In the immediate aftermath of the Ottoman conquest of the fortresses of Buda and Pest, a garrison of at least 1,000 to 2,000 janissaries was left, accompanied by a smaller contingent of units from six cavalry regiments.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁶ Zemberekçi: crossbowmen.

³⁶⁷ Some of the martoloses in Golubac were assigned to serve in Gradište.

³⁶⁸ Ágoston, "The Costs of the Ottoman Fortress-System in Hungary in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," 196.

³⁶⁹ Emecen, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Zamani*, 339. Bostan Çelebi states that at the end of the expedition, Buda was left with a considerable amount of armoury, provisions and 4,000 troops, comprising müstahfız (*hisar eri*), cavalry, azebs and martoloses, as well as 2,000 janissaries and 1,000 household cavalry, for the purpose of defending the fortress: "...cebehâne-i 'âmireden bî-hesâb tûfeng ve esbâb-i harb ve esbâb-i ceng vaz' olunub zahîre ve sâ'ir mâkûlat konulub ve hisâr erinden 'azebeden ve martolos tâ'ifesinden vazîfe ile dört bin mikdârî adem yazılıb ... ve iki bin nefer nevbetçi yeniçeri ve

A new military contingent of 800 men, called volunteers (*gönüllü*), probably consisting of elite cavalry units, was formed in Egypt and later in Bağdat after the establishment of the province of Bağdat. This new garrison force was also deployed at the Buda. Nevertheless, these numbers were insufficient to ensure the security of the fortified fortresses of Buda and Pest in the event of a potential Habsburg attack. Consequently, the Ottomans transferred 3,060 cavalry (*faris*), azeb, and martolos troops from the fortresses in the sancaks of Požega, Srem and Semendria to the fortresses of Buda and Pest.³⁷⁰ Thus, the number of personnel remaining in the transferred fortresses was reduced by 50 per cent. The soldiers of the new garrison in the province of Buda were veterans of the old frontier. It appears that this figure does not represent the total number of transferred garrison troops. In early 1542, Bali Paşa reported that the garrisons in Buda and Pest had a total of 7,763 men on paper, but only 5,893 of them were present at the roll call, representing a 25 per cent absentee rate (Appendix IX).³⁷¹

Table XIV: The Cavalry (beşli), Azebs and Martoloses in the Fortresses in the sancaks of Semendria and Požega transferred to the fortresses of Buda and Pest (ÖNB Mxt 557)

Fortress	Unit type	Transferred soldier	Total transferred garrison soldier and its ratio to remaining garrison (%) ³⁷²
Osijek	süv.	2 ağa, 20 bölük	200 (% 67)
Titel	süv.+az. +mar.	(süv.: 5 b.), (az.: 6 b.), (mar.: 1 sermie, 6 b.)	168 (%74)
Đakovo	süv.	10 b.	100
Požega	süv.	1 ağa, 10 b.	105
Gorjani	süv.	3 ağa, 20 b.	200
Podgorac	süv.	5 b.	50

bölük halkından dahi bin nefer yarar ve nizedâr atlu nevbetçi kalub...” Bostan Çelebi, *Kitâb* (Vienna copy), 354b–355.

³⁷⁰ Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 334.

³⁷¹ Ágoston, “The Costs of the Ottoman Fortress-System in Hungary in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, 197; Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 334.

³⁷² The comparison was made by checking the register which was prepared in April 1541 (ÖNB Mxt 567). Since there is no information on the garrison troops in Požega, no comparison is made.

Kaptol	süv.	6 b.	50
Kutjevo	süv.	1 ağa, 10 b.	100
Semendria	az.+mar.	(az.: 14 reis, 46 b.), (mar.: 33 b.)	636 (% 87)
Kulič	az.+mar.	(az.: 1 ağa, 1 reis, 5 b.), (mar.: 1 sermie, 3 b.)	66 (% 91)
Belgrade	az.+mar.	(az.: 9 reis, 39 b.), (mar.: 15 b.)	500 (% 59)
Dobre	az.+mar.	(az.: 2 reis, 3 b.), (mar.: 2 b.)	50 (% 50)
Boraca	az.+mar.	(az.: 2 reis, 3 b.), (mar.: 3 b.)	50 (% 50)
Vukovar	az.	1 ağa, 2 reis, 12 b.	92 (% 95)
Varadin	az.	3 reis, 12 b.	100 (% 56)
Ilok	az.+mar.	(az.: 4 reis, 14 b.), (mar.: 6 b.)	156 (% 74)
Salankamen	az.	1 ağa, 1 reis, 7 b.	65 (% 100)
Golubac	az.+mar.	(az.: 1 ağa, 6 b.), (mar.: 8 b.)	101 (% 64)
Ram	az.+mar.	(az. 1 ağa, 5 b.), (3 b.)	76 (% 100)
Nijemci	mar.	5 b.	50 (% 51)
-	Total cavalry	7 ağa, 86 b.	1,000 beşli ³⁷³
-	Total azeb	5 ağa, 38 reis, 158 b.	1,303 azeb ³⁷⁴
-	Total martolos	2 sermie, 87 b.	730 martolos ³⁷⁵
Total transferred to Buda			3,060³⁷⁶

Although a considerable force was transferred from the southern fortresses to Buda, this was insufficient. From the end of 1541 to the end of 1542, the timar holder sipahis with their beys from Bosnia, Semendria, Zvornik, Požega, Alacahisar (Kruševac), and Vidin were also left in the area to counter a possible Habsburg attack

³⁷³ From the fortress of Osijek: 2 ağa, 196 beşli; Titel: 50 beşli; Požega: 1 ağa, 105 beşli; Đakovo: 99 beşli; Gorjani: 3 ağa, 294 beşli; Podgorac: 100 beşli; Kaptol: 50 beşli; Kutjevo: 1 ağa, 99 beşli.

³⁷⁴ From the fortress of Semendria: 389; Kulič with ağa: 47; Belgrade: 350; Titel: 50; Dobre: 25; Boraca: 26; Vukovar with ağa: 92; Varadin: 100; Ilok: 100; Salankamen with ağa: 65; Golubac with ağa: 45; Ram with ağa: 41.

³⁷⁵ From the fortress of Semendria: 247; Kulič: 19; Belgrade: 150; Titel: 68; Dobre: 25; Boraca: 24; Ilok: 56; Nijemci: 50; Golubac: 56; Ram: 35.

³⁷⁶ Furthermore, an order was issued to the relevant authorities that no further vacancies would be filled in these fortresses. Consequently, the Ottomans sought to maintain control over the number of garrison troops stationed at the aforementioned fortresses, which had become relatively less important: “*zıkr olan beşliler ve ‘azebler ve martoloslar ihrâc olundukları kal’alarda gedükleri mahlûl olmuştur deyü kimesneye tevcih olunmaya*”. Ibid., 109.

on Buda.³⁷⁷ The anticipated assault eventually took place towards the end of 1542. The Habsburg army, comprising approximately 55,000 troops under the command of Joachim II, laid siege to Pest from 28 September to 8 October. The Ottoman forces, which were able to transfer troops between the two fortresses with relative ease due to the pontoon bridges on the Danube, were able to repel the continuous attacks of the Habsburg forces. The Habsburg army, which was characterised by a lack of discipline and had not been paid for an extended period, would not remain in the area for much longer and the siege would be lifted. Although it was a complete failure for the Habsburgs, it made a full-scale campaign inevitable for the Ottomans.³⁷⁸

4.4.1. Campaign of Estergon and General Costs (1543)

In contrast to all other campaigns, the 1543 expedition to Estergon was solely an endeavour to extend the network of fortresses surrounding the recently established province of Buda, with the objective of enhancing its defensive capabilities. The nature of the campaign may have ultimately resulted in conquests, but it was essentially an extension of the broader Ottoman strategy of expanding the narrow corridor of dominance along the Danube in order to hold Buda. To gain a deeper insight into the nature of the campaign, it is necessary to examine a distribution of expenditures in the campaign treasury register, which was kept throughout the expedition.

What was the financial outlay of the Ottoman Empire for the Estergon campaign, which spanned 5 months and 20 days between April 1543 and September 1543? What proportion of these expenditures was allocated to the expedition, and is it possible to provide a general proportion of the expenditures made solely for the

³⁷⁷ Emecen, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Zamanı*, 339.

³⁷⁸ Ágoston, “Ottoman and Habsburg Military Affairs”, 301–303; Emecen, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Zamanı*, 350–352.

expedition? Providing answers to these questions and ascertaining the size of the Sultan Süleyman's army deployed in the Esterгон campaign, which was one of the most comprehensive military operations of the period are essential.

4.4.2. Mobilised Forces:

While an exact figures for the number of troops involved in Sultan Süleyman's campaigns between 1521 and 1547 are unknown, the number of mobilised kapukulu troops are available. In any case, it can be reasonably assumed that at least 15,000 of the 27,000-standing army, together with the janissary novices (*acemiyan-i gilman*), were directly mobilised during the campaigns of the 16th century.³⁷⁹ The total number of kapukulu troops with the other components of palace staff in the Esterгон campaign is known. A total of 18,554 household troops participated in the campaign, majority of which were janissaries (8,166) as well as six cavalry regiments (2,674).³⁸⁰

³⁷⁹ For the number of paper strength of the standing army and their other components throughout the 16th century, see: Ágoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest*, 277–280. The “household troops” here refer to the janissaries, six regiments of cavalry, artillerymen, armourers (sing. *cebeci*), artillerymen, gun-carriage drivers, the staff of imperial stables and all the units performing various duties in the palace. In the Belgrade Campaign of 1521, a total of 16,840 members of the sultan's household seem to have been mobilized. Of these, 5,953 were janissaries. MAD 499, 28–34. On the other hand, there is no source other than the chronicles to be used about the kapukulu army that participated in the Mohács campaign. Again, we have no information on how many kapukulu members were mobilized in the 1529 and 1532 campaigns. For the 1529 campaign, it seems only possible to estimate the number of janissaries. According to the record of January 1530 (only a few months after the return of the 1529 campaign), 8,600 janissaries received 90 akçe of aid for their participation in the campaign. KK d. 1764, 89. For the campaign of 1534, it is possible to find some information, although incomplete, on the troops mobilized. Only the numbers of gun carriage drivers and the staff of the imperial stables are missing, but 13,457 members of the household troops took part in the Bağdat campaign (7,851 janissaries, 3,181 cavalry - six cavalry regiments, 316 *cebeci*, 269 artillerymen). KK d. 1764, 223–225. In the campaign of 1541, 15,612 household troops were mobilized (6,362 janissaries, 3,670 from six cavalry regiments). TSMA d. 9619. In the Van Campaign of 1547–48, around 19,500 household troops and other members of the palace were present. Again, the majority of these were janissaries, around 8,000. Yapıcı, “Kanûni Sultan Süleyman'ın İkinci İran Seferi (1548–1549),” 92–93.

³⁸⁰ İpçioğlu, “Kanunî Sultan Süleyman'ın Esterگون (Esztergom) Seferi 1543,” 140. During the campaigns led by Sultan Süleyman, the mobilized kapukulu forces remained relatively constant. Also, while the mobilized household troops remained relatively constant, 20–30 per cent of the janissaries were permanently stationed in temporary positions in fortresses in various parts of the empire, a phenomenon that had not occurred before. This situation became more pronounced after the 1540s. In 1532, 2,606 janissaries were on garrison duty, probably 30 per cent of the total number of janissaries. KK d. 1764, 180. We have more precise figures for early 1533, when 36 per cent of the janissaries (3,110 men out of 9,256 men) were on garrison duty. KK d. 1863, 39b. By 1547, 38 per cent of the janissaries (4,648 men) were on garrison duty. Ágoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest*, 279. For the total

While the campaign account register indicates which sancakbeyis took part in the expedition, it is difficult to determine the number of provincial and their retainers from the sub-provinces they came from. An exception is the roll-call register of the Rumelian provincial army kept during the 1532 campaign.³⁸¹ Between the 1530s and 1560s, when the total number of sipahi remained relatively constant, the Ottomans were able to mobilize 50 per cent of their total sipahi forces in European campaigns (around 50–55,000), while they were also able to mobilise larger numbers of sipahi in eastern campaigns. At least 30 per cent of the sipahi from Rumelia and the majority of those from Anatolia, Rum, Karaman, and Şam participated in the eastern campaigns against the Safevids.³⁸²

number of janissaries and those on the garrison duty in 16th century also see: Abdulkasim Gül, “18. Yüzyılda Yeniçeri Teşkilatı,” (Unpublished PhD diss., Atatürk University, 2020), 158–161, 274–275.

³⁸¹ On the discussion and analysis over mobilizable timar holder sipahis and their retainers in early 1530s, see chapter 3.

³⁸² In the context of the 1534 campaign, 37 per cent of the timar holder sipahis in Rumelia (4,270 men of 11,500) were mobilised. Based on the records from the early 1530s (TSMA d. 9439 and 10215), it can be concluded that a total force of over 12,000 participated in the campaign. When the retinue of the sancakbeyis is included, it can be estimated that the Rumelian forces in the 1534 campaign may have reached approximately 15,000. Unfortunately, the number of forces mobilised from the provinces of Anatolia, Karaman, Rum, Dulkadir (Maraş), Haleb and Diyarbekir is not known with certainty. Nevertheless, the list of sancakbeyis who participated in the campaign indicates that the beys of the sancaks in the aforementioned provinces were present in the campaign. KK d. 1764, 223–228. In 1530, the total number of zeamet and sipahi and retainers of the aforementioned provinces, as recorded in document, was 48,474. TSMA d. 9439. It would be incorrect to assume that all these forces were mobilised for this campaign. However, it can be reasonably assumed that a considerable force participated in this campaign. When considered in conjunction with the forces from Rumelia, the total number of provincial cavalry and retainers (*cebelü*) could be estimated at approximately 50,000 for this campaign. If we consider the Kurdish beys (*mîrân-i Ekrâd*) and the *yaya* and *müsellem* troops that originated from Anatolia, it can be estimated that the number of provincial forces must have exceeded 60,000. Furthermore, data is available on the number of provincial cavalry mobilised from Rumelia during the 1548-49 campaign. On 15 January 1549, a total of 3,739 zeamet and timar holder sipahis were present at the roll call in Mardin. A.{DFE. d. 34. This figure is believed to correspond to approximately 35 or 40 per cent of the total provincial cavalry in Rumelia. It would be illogical to apply this methodology to the number of sipahi in Rumelia at the beginning of 1530, given that the provinces of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid and Buda were established in 1534 and 1541, respectively. This resulted in the transfer of numerous sancaks from the province of Rumelia to these provinces. The total number of sipahi in Rumelia is estimated to have been approximately 9,500 in this year. Finally, in the register dated 26 October 1554, 150,000 gold coins were distributed as loans (*karz*) to a total of 6,784 zeamet and timar holder sipahi who were wintering in Anatolia and were deprived of their timar revenues. MAD 68. One of the reasons for the large number of sipahis from the Rumelia side compared to other campaigns was the mobilisation of one from the province of Buda, two from the province of Temeşvar and finally four from the province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid. Ibid., 20, 54–55b, 60–63b, 64–65, 73–73b, 88b (M). A total of 728 sipahis from the aforementioned sancaks participated in the expedition. If we exclude the sipahis, we can conclude that nearly 50 percent of the Rumelia forces were mobilised for this campaign. Consequently, when the total participation is evaluated, it is evident that the highest

Several sources appear to offer insight into the number of sipahi, who participated in the 1543 campaign. The most useful of these is a roll-call register that was kept during the campaign and lists the timar holder sipahis and zeamet holders from the sancaks of Rumelia that participated in the campaign. A total of 7,420 zeamet and timar holders from 18 sancaks of the Rumeli province took part. Furthermore, timariot forces from the sancak of İnebahtı, which was part of the Province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid, were also present in the campaign. The total number of timar forces present was 7,685, including those from İnebahtı.³⁸³ The sancaks of Semendria, Zvornik, Vučitrn, Kruševac (Alacahisar), Požega, and Srem were not included in the roll-call of the newly established province of Buda. This suggests that the figures represent approximately 80–85 per cent of the total sipahi forces of Rumelia. It can therefore be concluded that between 22,260 and 25,000 sipahis with their retainers from Rumelia were present on the battlefield. Furthermore, the number of sipahis in the sancaks attached to the Buda Province should be included, which would bring the total to approximately 30,000.³⁸⁴

participation for the three aforementioned campaigns was achieved in the 1554–55 campaign. For the sancaks that attached aforementioned provinces see Feridun M. Emecen and İlhan Şahin, “Osmanlı Taşra Teşkilatının Kaynaklarından 957–958 (1550-1551) Tarihli Sancak Teveih Defteri I,” 53–123; İdris Bostan, “Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid Eyaletinin Kuruluşu (1534)” *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi* 38 (2003): 61–77. Also for the sancakbeyi list that participated in the campaign see KK d. 1766, 82 (23.09.1554).

³⁸³ KK d. 285 (Appendix XII).

³⁸⁴ The sancaks in question were Semendria, Srem, Požega, Alacahisar (Kruševac), Zvornik and Vučitrn. In 1534, the total number of zeamet and timar holders from these sancaks was 1,820 (it should be noted that Požega and Srem had not yet been established). Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait,” 301. It seems reasonable to posit that the numbers remained unchanged by 1541. Consequently, when the province of Buda was established, the main provincial cavalry support for the local campaigns of the governor general of Buda came from these sancaks. An incomplete but highly valuable roll-call book provides insight into the number of sipahi present during the operations of the governor general of Buda, Yahyapaşazade Mehmed Paşa, one year after 1543. In the roll call of 24 April 1544, which was likely conducted prior to the Vişegrad campaign, a total of 1,045 zeamet and timar holder cavalry constituted Mehmed Paşa's most significant cavalry force, and likely the largest group within the army. A total of 44 sipahi participated in the expedition and held timar prebends in the districts around Buda and Pest. The remaining 1,001 sipahi came from the southern sancaks of Buda, with 512 from Kruševac, 444 from Semendria and 45 timar holders were çavuşes of Buda. İE. TZ. 17. It is important to note that not all of the sipahi from Semendria, Alacahisar and Zvornik are included in this list. Furthermore, there is no information available regarding the forces in Srem and Požega. It seems probable that some of these troops were engaged in military operations in the vicinity of Tolna

We lack information on the sipahis of the Anatolian Province mobilised for the Estergon campaign due to the absence of available roll-call registers. Nevertheless, it is possible to find the total number of kılıç timars in each sancak from Anatolia, as well as the number of sancakbeyis that were present during the campaign. In the 1530s, the province of Anatolia was estimated to have approximately 18,000 sipahis with retainers ready to be mobilized, as indicated in official records. Not all sipahis were called upon to participate in the campaigns as only a certain percentage of the sipahis were expected to join. Following the establishment of the Province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid, a significant number of sipahis in the sancaks situated in close proximity to the Aegean coast were assigned to naval duty. Given that the campaigns on land and at sea were conducted simultaneously, as was the case in 1543, the participation of Anatolian sipahis in this campaign was more limited. As stated in the campaign diary, ten out of fifteen sancakbeyis from Anatolia were present in the field, likely to be accompanied by a specific number of sipahis.³⁸⁵ It is also noteworthy that four Müsellem and four piyade (infantry) sancaks and azebs that had recruited for the

in conjunction with the bey of Mohács. The combined forces, with the support of personnel from the fortresses, were successful in capturing the fortresses of Vişegrad, Hatvan, Görösgál (Hu. Görösgál), Çoka (Csóka), Endrik, Şimontorna, Ozora, Tomaşin (Tamási) and Döbrekös (Döbrököz) in 1544. Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 83.

³⁸⁵ In the course of years of simultaneous land and naval campaigns, a certain percentage of the Anatolian provincial cavalry either served in the navy or were retained for defensive duty in strategic fortresses in the Aegean Sea. In 1534, when the main Ottoman army was mobilised for the Eastern campaign, 750 sipahi with timar income of less than 6,000 akçe in the neighbouring Anatolian coastal sancaks of Menteşe, Saruhan, Karesi and Aydın were assigned to the defence of the fortresses of Rhodes, Foça-i Cedid and Atik, Midilli and İzmir. TSMA e. 10215. Four years later, sipahis from 19 sancaks in Anatolia joined the navy of Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa. Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, 57 and footnote 95. It seems likely that in 1543, while the Ottoman army was ready to march towards Hungary, Barbarossa's navy sailed to Nice with a significant sipahi force. Sinan Çavuş in his *Süleymanname* indicates that the sancakbeyis of Eğriboz (Rumeli), İçil (Karaman Province), Kastamonu and Ankara with the whole sipahi forces joined the navy. Sinan Çavuş, *Süleymanname Tarih-i Feth-i Sikloş Estergon ve İstol[n]i-Belgrad*, ed. Tülay Duran et al. (İstanbul: Istanbul Center for Historical Research, 1998), 13a–13b. Although not mentioned in the text, it can be assumed that the sancakbeyi of Kangırı (Çankırı) whom name is not mentioned in the records of the 1543 expedition, served in the navy. Káldy-Nagy also indicates that 7 sancaks of Anatolia were not present in the campaign. Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization," 162. For the Joint Ottoman–French Campaign in 1543–44, see Christine Isom-Verhaaren, "‘Barbarossa and His Army Who Came to Succor All of Us’: Ottoman and French Views of their Joint Campaign of 1543–44," *French Historical Studies* 30, no. 3 (2007): 395–425.

campaign, also participated. Consequently, the total participation from Anatolia was considerably high, yet the percentage of timariot sipahis remained relatively low. In conclusion, a total of 40,000 to 45,000 timariot sipahis, along with their retainers, *yaya-müsellem* corps and *azebs* were mobilised for the Estergon campaign.³⁸⁶

Additionally, the Ottomans had another reserve force for this campaign: Crimean Tatars. As the Khan himself and his sons were listed in the campaign diary, the information on the number of participants is not available. It is evident from the available sources that the numbers provided by Ottoman chronicles, such as the figure of 30,000 Tatars,³⁸⁷ are exaggerated and therefore not entirely realistic. So, the participation of Tatars in Ottoman campaigns in the sixteenth century was relatively limited, with an estimate of around 5,000 or 10,000 cavalries at best. Given that the Tatars were regarded as marauders and raiders, their roles during sieges were similarly limited.

Another crucial element in the Ottoman war machine was the river flotilla on Danube, which constructed pontoon bridges across the rivers and transported grain, barley, ammunition, and horses from Rumelia to strategic centres such as Nicopolis,

³⁸⁶ Dávid estimates that the 'regular' forces mobilised for the Esztergom Campaign (provincial cavalry and *kapukulu* army) were approximately 40,000 to 45,000. Dávid, "Ottoman Armies and Warfare," 303. It is not possible to ascertain with certainty the composition of the 4 *piyade* and 4 *müsellem* *sancaks* from Anatolia and the mobilised *azeb* forces. It can be stated with certainty that some of these forces were mobilised, as the names of the men in command of these troops appear in the campaign records. Mustafa Bey, ağa of the *azeb* troops of Anatolia. Additionally, Ömer Bey, Bey of the *Menteşe Müsellems*, Ali Bey, Bey of the *Tekeili Müsellems*, Hüseyin Bey, Bey of the *Kütahya Müsellems*, and Sinan Bey, Bey of the *Hüdavendigar Müsellems*, also participated in the campaign. Also, Sinan Bey, Bey of the *Karahisar piyade* troops, Mehmed Bey, Bey of the *Biga piyade* troops, İskender Bey, Bey of *Sultanönü piyade* troops, and Rüstem Bey, Bey of the *Karesi piyade* troops, participated in the campaign. KK d. 1765, 30–30b. The register prepared in 1530 indicates that 3,164 individuals were required to participate in the campaign each year from the four *müsellem sancaks* in Anatolia. Additionally, 7,293 individuals from the 12 *piyade sancaks* were required to participate in the campaign on an annual basis. TSMA d. 9439, 2b. It seems that all of the *müsellems* were mobilised for this campaign. It is evident that one-third of the *piyade* troops was mobilised. It can be reasonably assumed that approximately 5,000 of these groups were mobilised for this campaign.

³⁸⁷ Sinan Çavuş, *Süleymanname*, 81a; *Rüstem Paşa Tarihi Olarak Bilinen Târih-i Âl-i Osman (Osmanlı Tarihi 699-968/1299-1561)* ed. Göker İnan (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2019), 399.

Silistria, Vidin, Semendria, and Belgrade. Subsequently, the supplies were transported via the Danube up to the Esterгон. Existence of a strong and capable river fleet on the Danube enabled Ottomans to feed their armies during their expeditions towards Hungary in the sixteenth century, although there were exceptions such as the campaign of Vienna in 1529.³⁸⁸

At the beginning of the campaign, Mehmed Bey, the sancakbeyi of Silistria was appointed as the captain of this fleet,³⁸⁹ which had a multi-layered hierarchy of duties and was referred to as the Navy of Danube (*Donanma-i Tuna*).³⁹⁰ Furthermore, one sancakbeyi and miralay of Silistria (second in rank in the sancak) were appointed to oversee the oarsmen on the vessels transporting the fleet's supplies, horses, and weapons. While Ali Bey, sancakbeyi of Bursa, was both responsible for the ships

³⁸⁸ The existence of a substantial river fleet on the Danube, Morava and Sava rivers can be traced back to the 15th century. As early as 1491, the presence of a fleet of 280 ships on the rivers of Nicopolis, Vidin and Morava River demonstrates that the Ottomans had a sizable fleet on these rivers. Of the 200-piece fleet constructed on the Morava, two were artillery carriage ships (*keşti-i top*), 100 were to carry horses (*keşti-i esb*), and the remaining 98 were *şayka*, main river assault ships. At the time, 50 ships were under construction in Vidin, while 30 were being built in Nicopolis. MC. 91, 69b, 241–241b; Baş, “XV. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Balkanlarda Osmanlı Serhad Organizasyonunun Oluşumu,” 171. In 1536–38, 300 ships were constructed in Sava and Danube. MAD 523, 171–210; Yusuf Gülderem, “Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Döneminde (1520-1566) Tuna ve Tuna’ya Akan Diğer Nehirlerdeki Türk Filosu ve Gemilikleri (Tersaneleri),” *X. Türk Tarih Kongresi*, IV (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1993), 1782; Ağoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest*, 297. The Danube fleet was able to supply a considerable quantity of provisions to the garrison troops in Buda and Pest, as well as to a significant contingent of sipahi, primarily came from Bosnia and Semendira, stationed in the fortress in anticipation of a potential Habsburg attack later in the year. Between November 1541 and 1 June 1542, sancakbeyi of Aydın, Vize and the newly appointed captain of the Danube fleet Derviş Bey, son Yahyalı Bali Bey, led the fleet to Buda with 62,857 kile (1,609,139 kg) of provisions (10,381 kile of wheat, 30,470 kile of barley and 22,006 kile of millet) stored in the Ilok fortress. MAD 157, 1b. A noteworthy aspect of the document is that each ship had an average capacity of 16 tons. Furthermore, the captains of the ships were the captains of the azebs or martolos of the fortresses on the Danube. Consequently, in periods when no imperial campaign was undertaken, it is highly probable that the need for rowers on the ships could have been met by the crowded azeb and martolos troops in the fortresses. Particularly evident in the early periods of the Danube navy and its subsequent transformation within the broader historical context see: Colin Imber, “The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent,” *Archivum Ottomanicum* VI (1980): 211-282; Gülderem, “Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Döneminde (1520-1566) Tuna,” 1773–1794; Seyfullah Aslan, “Tuna Donanması’nın Kuruluşu Meselesi,” in *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Dönemi: Yeni Kaynaklar, Yeni Yaklaşımlar*. eds.M. Fatih Çalışır, Suraiya Faroqhi and M. Şakir Yılmaz (İstanbul: İbn Haldun Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2020), 77–104.

³⁸⁹ Aslan, “Tuna Donanması’nın Kuruluşu Meselesi,” 82–83.

³⁹⁰ KK d. 1765, 18b.

(*keştihâ-i zahire*) on Danube³⁹¹ and oxcarts carrying provision by land,³⁹² the governor and miralay of Silistria Hasan Bey were responsible to oversee the ships that carried artillery (*keştihâ-i top*), weapon and ammunition (*yarak*).³⁹³

The oarsmen employed in this river fleet during the campaign were under the command of the head of the doorkeepers (*ser-bevvâbîn-i voyvoda-i Eflak*) of the Wallachian voivode.³⁹⁴ There was also another figure, the captain of Danube River (*kapudan-i âb-i Tuna*), who was based in Belgrade and commanded the river fleet between Buda and Belgrade.³⁹⁵ The provision registers for the campaign of Estergon demonstrate that 7,305 oarsmen were assigned to transport ships en route from Belgrade to Buda, which were laden with materials.³⁹⁶ The figures are indeed considerable, and they also demonstrate the scale of the so-called Danubian Flotilla, which was employed for the expeditions. The entire Ottoman navy in the Mediterranean had approximately 15,000 oarsmen for at least 100 large ships, with the

³⁹¹ KK d. 1765, 7.

³⁹² The total amount of wheat and barley collected from the tax-payer subjects in Rumelia as extraordinary tax (*avarız*) and the purchases of cereals for the army from the surrounding sancaks was 22,368 müd (equivalent to 172,561 kile, or 4,417,561 kg). Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization," 173–174. Ali Bey, the Governor of Bursa, stored 145,449,5 kile (3,723,507 kg) of grain purchased from the surrounding districts in Belgrade and subsequently distributed to the army in the following posts. The value of wheat stored in Belgrade was 207,636 akçe, while barley was valued at 437,238 akçe. The cost of transporting the grain was 851,117 akçe, while the total cost of the operation was 2,012,318 akçe. It is important to note that all of these provisions were for the exclusive use of the sultan's kapukulu army. The provincial cavalry, the largest component of the army, either provided their own food or purchased it from the army or local places on the road during the campaign. MAD 157, 30b; MAD 499, 97–1 (Appendix XI).

³⁹³ KK d. 1765, 14.

³⁹⁴ KK d. 1765, 18b.

³⁹⁵ It is noteworthy that there is no mention of the captain of Danube (*Tuna kapudanı*) in the campaign register of 1543. Nevertheless, there was a man named Sinan Ağa, who held a zeamet in Selanik sancak with 50,500 akçe and was also listed in the campaign roll call. KK d. 285, 18b (*Kapudan-i Tuna* in the text). He was appointed as the captain of Danube river on 5 October 1542. MAD 34, 125 (*kapudan-i Budin* in the text). On 28 October 1542, Derviş Bey, who had previously held the position, was appointed governor of Segedin. D.BRZ. d. 20614, 22b.

³⁹⁶ A total of 404,670 akçe was paid to 7,305 oarsmen on ships between 4 June and 31 August 1543: "*mevâcib-i kürekçiyân-i keştihâ-i zahire ve keştihâ-i tob ve yarak vâcib-i Rebiyülâhir ve Cemâziyelevvel sene 950 7,305 neferen 404,670 (akçe)*". MAD 499, 97-1.

majority of these being galleys.³⁹⁷ Consequently, the Ottomans must have had at least 200 to 300 ships in the Danube for these extensive logistical operations.

It is possible to estimate the total number of personnel who marched into Hungary at approximately 80,000, with only 50,000 of them being combatants. During the sieges, only the janissaries and the timar holder sipahis were actively engaged in combat. Apparently, other forces were not included in the fighting. Many of these individuals should be regarded as reserve or rear service duties, such as the oarsmen who were assigned to transport ships and the *yaya müselleme* corps who were obliged to protect baggage trains via land while the Ottoman army was en route to enemy territories.

4.4.3. Financing the Campaign

It is possible to draw conclusions about the financing of Ottoman campaigns for the 16th century based on the available sources. Although there are no sources on the campaign treasury registers of Süleyman's previous campaigns, the records of the Esterhazy campaign of 1543 allows us to draw some retrospective conclusions. Campaigns in the West were always less expensive than those in the East in the first half of the 16th century for the Ottomans.³⁹⁸ We can propose at least three main reasons for this occurrence. Firstly, the average duration of an Ottoman campaign in the West was approximately one-third that of an Ottoman campaign in the East.³⁹⁹ A campaign

³⁹⁷ For the joint operations planned with the French in the Mediterranean during the campaign of 1543, 15,653 oarsmen and 1,460 riggers drafted in Rumelia and Anadolu for the Ottoman Navy. Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization," 164.

³⁹⁸ A detailed discussion on the Ottoman warfare and logistical capabilities especially in the late 16th and 17th centuries, see Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606* (Wien: VWGO, 1988); Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*. Also, for a detailed critique of the works on Ottoman warfare, see Kahraman Şakul, "Osmanlı Askeri Tarihi Üzerine Bir Literatür Değerlendirmesi," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 1:2 (2003): 529–571.

³⁹⁹ Duration of some Ottoman campaigns both in West and East: Belgrade (18.05.1521 – 19.10.1521 / 5 months 1 month), Mohács (23.04.1526–13.11.1526 / 6 months 21 days). Feridun Bey, *Münşeat*, 507–515, Vienna (10.05.1529–16.12.1529 / 7 months 6 days). *Ibid.*, 566–577. *Sefer-i Alaman* (6.05.1532–

that began in April ended in September, and in most cases, the army was able to disperse without wintering in a particular region.⁴⁰⁰

The total expenditure of the Ottoman army for all components in the period of five to six months was approximately 80–85 million akçe (equivalent to 1,4 million ducats), including the provision of grain (*nüzül*), which was collected from the taxpayers of the whole of Rumelia as an extraordinary tax in kind (*avarız*), the prices for the purchase of grain (*mübaya'a-i zahire*) at market prices (*narh-i carî*) from the neighbouring sub-provinces and their transport costs (*kirâye*).⁴⁰¹ Once again, the two most significant items of expenditure were the salaries of the household troops, which were already paid, regardless of whether they were engaged in a campaign, and the substantial bonuses (*inamat*) paid to them during a campaign.⁴⁰² The fact that the timar holder cavalry constituted the vast majority of the army and that these troops were not paid from the treasury, since they had already had timar incomes, enabled the Ottomans to maintain very large armies for a campaign season at a very low cost

23.11.1532 / 6 months 17 days). *Ibid.*, 577–583. Bağdat (29.10.1533–8.01.1536 / 2 years 2 months 10 days). Yurdaydın, *Beyan-i Menazil*, 40. Estergon (23.04.1543–6.11.1543 / 6 months 14 days). Emecen, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman ve Zamanı*, 353–361. Van (29.03.1548–21.12.1549 / 1 year 8 months 22 days). Yapıcı, *Kanûnî Sultan Süleyman'ın İkinci İran Seferi (1548-1549)*, 26–30, 54–55.

⁴⁰⁰ For the campaigning season and proportion of Ottoman armies' time to spent in rest and march see: Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 20–25.

⁴⁰¹ The grain consisted of wheat and barley collected as an extra-ordinary tax, and its transport costs were organized by the kadıs in the regions to which the orders were sent, and theoretically did not require payment from the central treasury. However, unlike the *nüzül*, the central treasury had to pay for the purchase of grain. The main expense was paying the muleteers who transported it to the front. Lütü Güçer, *XVI-XVII. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler* (İstanbul: Sermet Matbaası, 1964), 70–86, 115–117; Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare*, 136–150. The total amount of *nüzül* grain collected as extraordinary tax during the Mohács campaign was 18,915 müd 5 kile (9,684,608 kilograms). The remaining 3,871 müd 15 kile (1,982,336 kilograms), mostly distributed to the kapıkulu army, was sold to other members of the army (mostly timariot sipahis) for 827,864 akçe during the campaign. In addition to the *nüzül*, 5,742 müd (2,939,904 kilogram) of grain had been purchased from the subject for the army before the expedition. The value of this grain was 455,762 akçe. On the other hand, the main expense was the total amount paid to the muleteers for delivering this grain to the front. The total amount paid to the muleteers was 3,771,800 akçe. MAD 499, 39–43 (Appendix X).

⁴⁰² In 1543, 33,672,616 akçe of the cash expenditures (59,630,309 akçe) were distributed as bonuses to the kapıkulu army or palace staff. İpçioğlu, “Kanunî Süleyman'ın Estergon (Esztergom) Seferi 1543,” 152–154. In the Van expedition of 1548–49, the salaries and bonuses paid to the kapukulu army and palace servants constituted 80 per cent of the total expenditure. Yapıcı, *Kanûnî Sultan Süleyman'ın İkinci İran Seferi (1548-1549)*, 259–260.

compared to their European counterparts. Because of the reliance of most European rulers on mercenary armies, the maintenance of such forces in the field represented a significant financial burden, given the considerable costs associated with their upkeep. The successful campaign of Estergon in 1543 cost the Ottomans approximately 70 million akçe (1,3 million ducats). Additionally, the navy in the Mediterranean under the command of Hayreddin Paşa is estimated to have cost the Ottomans 1,2 million gold coins.⁴⁰³ In contrast, the Emperor Charles's army besieging Metz in 1552 cost him 3,2 million Spanish ducats, while the disastrous Algiers campaign in 1541 is estimated to have cost him 4 million ducats.⁴⁰⁴ In any case, the Ottomans were able to make their military campaigns cheaper.

Campaigns in the east typically lasted at least two years, as evidenced by the Bağdat campaign of 1534–35 and the Van campaign of 1548-49, both of which resulted in a corresponding increase in the overall cost of the campaign. No records on the army treasury of 1534 and 1535 campaign exist. However, the army treasury records for the 1548-49 Van campaign indicate that the Ottomans spent a total of 178,111,904 akçe (nearly 3 million gold ducats) for this campaign, which lasted a year and 9 months.⁴⁰⁵ This figure represents only the cash expenditure of the treasury.

The prolonged nature of the campaign presented a significant challenge for the timariot army. In a regular campaign lasting from April to September, the timariot army did not require any additional financial support from the treasury. However, in years when the campaign season was prolonged or even when it was decided to winter, sipahis had to be sustained by continuous loans from the treasury. Unlike in campaigns conducted in the West, they were unable to return home after the campaign season and

⁴⁰³ Isom-Verhaaren, “ ‘Barbarossa and His Army Who Came to Succor All of Us’,” 410.

⁴⁰⁴ Ágoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest*, 299–300.

⁴⁰⁵ Yapıcı, *Kanûni Sultan Süleyman'ın İkinci İran Seferi (1548-1549)*, 259–260.

were ultimately deprived of the timar revenues distributed to them as income. Consequently, the sipahis were overwintered in Haleb and Mardin after September, which presented a significant challenge. Although these troops were provided with cash loans (*karz*) from the army treasury during this period, the long-term implications of employing these troops for long lasting campaigns in the East were always problematic both for the Ottoman decision makers and the sipahis. If a sipahi from Rumelia or other distant provinces were to be mobilised, it was the policy to call as many sipahi with a timar income of 3,000 akçe or more as possible to the expedition, in order that they might manage for a while on their own income during the long campaign season. Indeed, in the campaigns of 1534–35, 1548–49, and 1554–55, all of the sipahi from Rumelia were those with an income of 3,000 akçe or above. Consequently, only 30 or 40 percent of the entire Rumelian army could be mobilised for the long-distance Eastern campaigns.⁴⁰⁶

In addition, the ease with which the Ottoman armies could collect cereals from the large population in Rumelia, and the storage of these cereals in fortresses such as Belgrade and Ilok, which were located on rivers suitable for river transport such as the Danube and served as army depots, made them more comfortable during the campaigns in the West. Thus, during a favourable campaign season, there were

⁴⁰⁶ Sipahis with minimum 3,000 akçe timar revenues participated the campaign of Bağdat in 1534. TSMA d. 10215. They had also received cash loans during the campaign. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Arz ve Raporlarına Göre İbrahim Paşa’nın İrakeyn Seferindeki İlk Tedbirleri,” 481–482. On 15 January 1549, timar income of a total of 3,739 zeamet and timar holder sipahis which were present at the roll call in Mardin was above 3,000. A. {DFE. d 34. Total 5,502,000 akçe were given these individuals as cash loans. Yapıcı, *Kanûni Sultan Süleyman’ın İkinci İran Seferi (1548-1549)*, 285. Again, on 26 October 1554, majority of 6,784 zeamet and timar holder sipahi, who were wintering in the east, had at least 3,000 timar revenue or more revenues. Total 150,000 gold coins (9,750,000 akçe) were distributed both sancakbeyis, zeamet and timar holders. MAD 68. Apart from the cash loans that sipahis received, some of the sipahis were appointed to collect the tax income generated from the *dirliks* of sipahis when they were on long distance military campaigns. Nil Tekgöl, “Cash Loans to Ottoman Timariots during Military Campaigns (Sixteenth-Seventeenth Centuries),” *The Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 59 (2016): 604.

minimal logistical challenges.⁴⁰⁷ While the land army marched in parallel with the Danube, logistical support could be provided by ships along the river. A third factor was the presence of garrison forces and timar holder cavalry along the frontier sancaks, who could in most cases match the Habsburg forces without the mobilisation of a large army. However, this would still require a significant cash transfer for the salaries of garrison troops. The garrison forces, which numbered over 9,000 during the 1530s, including the timariot sipahi of Bosnia and Semendria, formed a mini-army of 15,000 men.

It was also thanks to these forces that the Ottomans were able to maintain control of the Habsburg frontier while engaged in military operations elsewhere. It is evident that the military successes of 1530 and 1537 were contingent upon the presence of these substantial forces in the region. In terms of garrison forces, the Ottoman military presence on the Hungarian frontier was more substantial than that of the garrisons on all other frontiers of the empire. A brief comparison can be made in this regard. In 1540 and 1541, the garrison forces in the entire province of Bağdat numbered no more than 4,000, while the garrison forces in Požega and Semendria alone were approximately 9,000.⁴⁰⁸

A detailed analysis of the treasury account book kept during the campaign of Estergon reveals important insight into the expedition's expenses. While this topic has been extensively studied by İpçioğlu, it is necessary to revisit his findings to ensure accuracy. To obtain a comprehensive understanding of total expenditures, it is also

⁴⁰⁷ For the later periods see: Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare*. Also, for the logistical problems during the 16th century Gilles Veinstein, "Some Views on Provisioning in the Hungarian Campaigns of Süleyman the Magnificent", *Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte in memoriam Vanco Boskov, Hans Georg Majer* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986): 177–185.

⁴⁰⁸ MAD 127. 27b–35.

essential to consult the records of the inner treasury, sultan's private treasury,⁴⁰⁹ which were contemporaneous with the aforementioned campaign account. This approach will provide a more comprehensive and complete picture.⁴¹⁰ It is evident from İpçioğlu's conclusions regarding the revenues and expenditures of the expedition that, although he does mention the expenditures made during the expedition for the kapıkulu army and the soldiers in the garrisons, he seems to have overlooked the 300,000 gold coins left in Belgrade at the end of the expedition for the salaries of the garrison troops in the province of Buda.⁴¹¹ In this instance, the inclusion of the 300,000 gold coins in the expenditure section has a significant impact on the overall expenditure figure for the campaign.

Table XV: Incomes and Expenditures in Ottoman Campaign Registers (25.04.1543-16.10.1543/ 5 months 21 days)⁴¹²

Income (İrâd)

Akçe: 5,284,614
Sultani: 796,603
Efrençi: 163,813
Ungurisiye: 10,001
Sakız and other: 3,089

⁴⁰⁹ Also known *ceyb-i humâyûn*. The inner treasury (iç hazine) derived its revenue from a variety of sources, in addition to the surpluses of the external treasury (hazine-i amire). Furthermore, it could be designated as the personal treasury of the sultan. In certain instances, cash loans were advanced from this treasury to the state treasury, with repayment scheduled for a later date. Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Osmanlı Mâlî Tarihi* (Dergah: İstanbul, 2016), 278–281. Also see Halil Sahillioğlu, “Ceyb-i Hümâyûn,” *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (TDV) Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 7 (1993), 465–467; Cengiz Orhonlu, “Hazine,” *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (TDV) Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 17 (1998), 130–133; Kaan Doğan, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Dönemine Ait Bir Filori Defteri (Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi No: 1992)* (Harvard: Ottoman Studies Foundation, 2019), 1–2.

⁴¹⁰ Although the records of the campaign register begin here on 2 May 1543, when Sultan in Filibe (Plovdiv) was based on information from the inner treasury, it is possible to start the entry of incomes and expenditures from 9 April 1543. On the same day, 100,000 gold coins were transferred from the inner treasury to the state treasury. A total of 418,003 coins were delivered from the inner treasury to the state treasury between 22 April 1543 and the end of the campaign, as recorded in the register. Of the 418,003 coins mentioned, 366,666 coins appear to have been spent in the campaign register. Doğan, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Dönemine Ait Bir Filori Defteri*, 127, 234; KK d. 1765, 7a, 21b, 24b, 31.

⁴¹¹ KK 1765, 35: “teslîm (be) Mehmed Çelebi defterdâr-i vilâyet-i Budin ve nâzır-i emvâl-i hassa beray-i mevâcibât-i kılâ'-i vilâyet-i Budin 'an emvâl-i mirî ki 'an mahrûse-i İstanbul amed ve der kal'a-i Belgrad nihâde. Hasene-i sultaniye ve efrençi 300,000 sikke, sultani 160,000 sikke, efrençi 140,000 sikke”.

⁴¹² KK d. 1765. It appears that İpçioğlu has omitted to include 300,000 golden coins (equivalent to 18,000,000 akçe) both as income and later expenditure. Consequently, I have recalculated the entire section of income and expenditure. Compare İpçioğlu, “Kanunî Süleyman'ın Estergon (Esztergom) Seferi 1543”.

Total income in akçe: 62,731,972⁴¹³

Expenditures (*Masraf*)

Akçe: 21,657,008

Sultani: 795,043

Efrenç: 161,867

Ungurisiye: 10,001

Sakız and other: 3,515

Total expenditures in akçe: 79,278,169⁴¹⁴

If we focus on the expenditure sections of the table and calculate the expenditures on the Ottoman garrisons on the frontier, an interesting result emerges. Firstly, the 9-month payments for garrison troops in the province of Buda, including overdue payments, were sourced from the campaign treasury. Between 8 January 1543 and 29 September 1543, a total of 11,173,740 akçe was paid for the garrisons in Buda and Pest, as well as for the soldiers in the newly conquered fortresses of Estergon and Istolni Belgrad.⁴¹⁵ However, this was not the only expenditure on fortresses. Specifically, the garrison of 2,127 men in the sancaks of Požega, Srem, and Semendria received 1,050,439 akçe for 3 months. Additionally, 740,477 akçe were allocated for the garrison in the fortresses located in the southern region of the province of Buda during the campaign. Consequently, a total of 12,964,656 akçe was disbursed solely to the garrison soldiers present during the campaign.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹³ Although the campaign account register starts on 2 May, if we start from 9 April, as evidenced by the records of the inner treasury, an additional 100,000 coins may need to be included as income. This equates to 6 million akçe, which would bring the total state treasury revenues to 68,731,972 akçe. Doğan, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Dönemine Ait Bir Filori Defteri*, 127.

⁴¹⁴ As previously stated, on 9 April 1543, 100,000 golden coins were transferred to the state treasury. It is also necessary to consider the coins distributed by the sultan for his personal expenses (gifts, bonuses). In addition to the coins transferred from the sultan's personal treasury to the external treasury, a total of 44,443 gold coins (2,666,580 akçe) were spent from the beginning of the campaign until the end of the campaign account register (7 April Edirne –16 October 1543 Niş). In this instance, the total expenditure of the internal and external treasuries together can be calculated as 81,944,749 akçe (equivalent to 1,365,745 ducats).

⁴¹⁵ KK d. 1765, 4, 16, 21b, 31.

⁴¹⁶ KK d. 1765. 5b, 7,9–9b, 15, 16b–17b, 18b, 24b, 34b. Compare İpçioğlu, “Kanunî Süleyman’ın Estergon (Esztergom) Seferi 1543,” 154 and 156.

Upon closer examination of the table, we see that the cost of garrison payments alone in the province of Buda amounted to around 11,000,000 akçe before increasing by one-third immediately after the conquest of the fortresses of Istolni Belgrad and Esterгон. What further explains this scenario is the fact that upon the army's arrival in Belgrade after the campaign, 300,000 gold coins were allocated—equivalent to 18,000,000 akçe—as salaries for the garrisons for the upcoming period. In essence, the expenditure from the Ottoman army treasury during the campaign on the salaries of the garrison forces alone accounted for almost 40 per cent of the total expenditure. This sets the military expedition in 1543 apart from other Ottoman campaigns.

At the end of the campaign, the highest number of garrisons within the framework of the Ottoman frontier organization was in Hungary. Subsequently, even while conquests persisted, as they did in the 1530s, the garrisons in the province were to be maintained constant, at least in terms of manpower, by transferring troops from the large garrisons in the main fortresses to the newly conquered ones. This practice remained consistent until the establishment of the province of Temeşvar in 1552, ensuring that garrisons and their expenditures in the Hungarian frontiers remained stable. However, this situation is only the visible side of the whole picture.

4.5. Buda Vilayet: Militarily Unity, Economic Disparity

The history of Ottoman Hungary holds a distinctive place in both the Ottoman military history and the specific field of Ottoman frontier studies. From the latter part of the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century, scholars have primarily focused on the Ottoman Empire's expansion into Hungary, the financing of garrisons, taxation, and the military changes during the Ottoman-Habsburg conflicts. Despite the abundance of invaluable research on Ottoman Hungary, particularly regarding fortress

networks, garrison troops, and financial matters, historians often examine this subject solely within the context of modern borders (such as Ottoman Hungary, Ottoman Serbia, Ottoman Bosnia, etc.). This approach limits our understanding of the Ottoman military presence along the entire Western frontiers, leading to incomplete conclusions from studies on Ottoman Hungary.

One of the main challenges faced by researchers investigating fortress networks in Hungary is the constraints imposed by the account books of the Buda treasury, which primarily focus on the Danube north of the Drava. Although these account books detail taxes, revenues, and military expenses in these regions, economic activities, revenues, and expenditures of territories like Srem, Požega, Semendria, Zvornik, Vučitrn, and Alacahisar (Kruševac)—despite being part of the Buda province—seem to have fallen under the general revenue bureau of Rumelia.⁴¹⁷

Additionally, if the financing of all fortresses, especially those in Srem, Požega, Semendria, and most south of Szeged (Ott. Segedin), relied on mukataa revenues in Rumelia, it would be to overlook an extensive organizational structure in the region, involving thousands of individuals and millions of akçe in annual allocations.

⁴¹⁷ The provincial account books of Buda only show the mukataa and other revenue sources in Buda, Segedin, Istolni Belgrad, Estergon and Mohács. The revenues from the other sancaks, namely Srem, Požega, Semendria, Alacahisar, Zvornik and Vučitrn, were under the supervision of the Rumelian revenue bureau. In 1544–45, whole mukataa revenues of the province was 2,332,932 akçe. ÖNB Mxt. 590, 9–18b. On the other hand, the poll tax and all the income from the mukataa in the southern part of the province represented an important group of income. D.BŞM. d 20. As for the income from the poll tax, in 1553 the total income of the provincial treasury of Buda was 8,761,699 akçe, of which 1,857,192 akçe was collected from the taxpaying subjects in the sancaks above the Drava and the Danube. Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization*, p. 186; ÖNB Mxt. 590, 69b–70. The cizye revenues from the sancaks of Srem, Požega, Semandira, Zvornik, Kruševac, Vučitrn, which also belonged to the Buda Province in theory, were sent directly to the central treasury and not to the Buda Province treasury. In 1552–53, a total of 5,431,052 akçe of poll tax revenue was expected from the aforementioned sancaks. MAD 90, 39–41, 44–54. Moreover, of the principal mukataa items in Semendria, Zvornik and Požega, salt pans and customs alone had a three-year income of 3,396,270 akçe. MAD 141, 7b, 14b, 21b, 34, 91.

Therefore, the Ottoman Hungary should be viewed as a military entity as perceived by the Ottomans, rather than simply an administrative region delineated by modern borders. This perspective allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the empire's systematic organization of the frontier against the Habsburgs. Furthermore, integrating the southern garrisons and their financial resources into this broader framework highlights the significant military burden the Ottoman Hungary represented.

Since the establishment of the province of Buda in 1541, the Ottomans had been providing subsidies from the central treasury to pay the garrisons in Hungary. However, this was not the first instance of such a transfer. As early as 1526, the Ottomans were regularly transferring cash from Constantinople to the garrisons in Srem. Although this appears to have changed at the end of the 1530s with the allocation of poll-tax revenues from Rumelia to the garrison soldiers, in fact the sums sent were the same. The 1541 and 1543 campaigns shared a common feature: the financing of the garrisons in Buda was to be carried out entirely through the army treasury. Subsequently, at regular intervals, at least 200,000 gold coins were to be spent annually from the treasury to the garrison soldiers in the province of Buda. These allocations were essentially spent on the garrisons located to the north of the Drava. The mukataa resources were to be used to provide the allocations for all the garrisons on the Drava in accordance with the known method of remittance (*havale*), which had been used since the 1470s. It is also pertinent to consider the general balance of income and expenditure in the province of Buda. Regardless of the method of revenue collection employed, the revenues generated in the province of Buda were insufficient to cover the associated expenses. It would have been necessary to wait at least another 30 years for this process to be completed. In this regard, the province of Buda can be considered

to have the lowest income among the other established provinces. The province of Bağdat, which was established only six years prior to Buda, was able to provide a surplus to the central treasury immediately following its establishment.⁴¹⁸ The same was already true for Halep and Diyarbekir.⁴¹⁹

Table XVI: Ottoman Garrisons in the Province of Buda and Their Annual Expenses

Year	Subsidies from treasury	Payments to Soldiers	Number of Soldiers with janissaries
September 1541-September 1542	11,400,407 ⁴²⁰	11,400,407	7,459 (1,566 janissaries) ⁴²¹
8.1.1543-29.9.1543 (3 quarter)	12,214,257 ⁴²²	12,414,257 (16,514,257 full year) ⁴²³	13,120 (2,550 janissaries) ⁴²⁴
October 1543- October 1544	18,000,000 ⁴²⁵	-	Around 12,500 (janissaries excluded)
March 25 1544-March 25 1545	-	25,227,240 ⁴²⁶	Around 12,500 ⁴²⁷ (janissaries excluded)
15.3.1545-3.3.1546 ⁴²⁸	19,836,180	22,695,859	Around 13,000 (2,242 janissaries)
11.02.1548-29.01.1549	18,677,600 ⁴²⁹	-	Around 13,000 (1,523 janissaries) ⁴³⁰

⁴¹⁸ The revenues of the Bağdat Province between 29 January 1541 and 1 December 1541 were 24,110,281 akçe. It should be noted that this income included 12,185,350 akçe that could not be collected from previous years. Additionally, the revenues of the same vilayet between 21 November 1549 and 10 November 1550 were 31,764,023 akçe. Of the total sum, 15,102,332 akçe was spent on the garrison payments and the governors' annual cash allocations. AE.SSÜL.I.3/200.

⁴¹⁹ In particular, the treasury of Halep provided important surpluses for the central treasury and could also subsidise other provinces in the east when needed. According to the accounts of the Halep province for 1542-43, 400,921 gold coins were sent to the treasury in Istanbul. TSMA d. 8548. The Diyarbakır treasury was another provincial treasury that gives surpluses. In fact, in addition to 200,000 gold coins from Egypt, 53,946 gold coins from the province of Diyarbekir were sent to the treasury of the Estergon expedition in 1543. KK d. 1765, 7b. On a detailed study on the financial administration of Halep in the second half of the sixteenth century see Yasuhisa Shimizu, "16. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Halep Defterdarlığı," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* LI (2008): 29-61.

⁴²⁰ TSMA d. 6916; MAD 6898, 180; D.HSK.AAG.d. 25935, 9, 35, 95.

⁴²¹ Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization*, 334 – 335, 342 – 343, 348, 374, 392, 420, 437, 439, 440, 448, 454, 496. Also, information about the number of garrisons in the fortresses of Sikloş, and Baranvar taken from KK. 1765, 18b, 24b, 34b.

⁴²² KK d. 1765, 4, 16, 21.

⁴²³ 12,414,257 akçe represents 3 quarter payments.

⁴²⁴ KK d. 1764, 27b, 28b, 29b. Also 80 artillerymen were left in Estergon and İstolni Belgrad. Ibid., 27 and 29b.

⁴²⁵ Ibid., 31.

⁴²⁶ Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 177.

⁴²⁷ Ibid., 160.

⁴²⁸ ÖNB Mxt 581, 47b –56b.

⁴²⁹ D.BRZ d. 20616, 115; D.BRZ. d. 20615 A, 184.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., 90b. Buda: 597, İstolni Belgrad: 490, Estergon: 436. Their quarter payments with *nafaka* were 615,544 akçe.

18.12.1552-6.12.1553	22,073,785 ⁴³¹	17,665,266 ⁴³²	Around 13,000 (including janissaries)
7.12.1553-25.11.1554	14,300,000 ⁴³³	-	Around 13,000 (1,170 janissaries) ⁴³⁴
4.11.1556-23.10.1557	16,996,500 ⁴³⁵	23,209,876 ⁴³⁶	10,402 (no information on janissaries)
24.10.1557-13.10.1558 ⁴³⁷	16,916,945	23,062,862	10,328 (no information on janissaries)
14.10.1558-2.10.1559	18,200,000 ⁴³⁸	23,236,931 ⁴³⁹	11,842 (1,489 janissaries) ⁴⁴⁰
1561	13,000,000	-	

It is first necessary to note that the data in the table do not include the sancaks of Semendria, Osijek, and Požega, which were part of the province of Buda and contained at least 20-30 fortresses. Once this information has been included in the table, a more accurate picture emerges. As previously stated, a total of 5,169 soldiers were registered in the fortresses of Srem and Semendria in an incomplete payment register months before the annexation of Buda.⁴⁴¹ On the other hand, the data derived from the payment records for the fortresses in the Požega sancak indicates that an additional garrison of 3,400 soldiers was in fact serving in the fortresses in Požega.

⁴³¹ Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 177; ÖNB Mxt. 590, 69b. There is also an entry on the aforementioned money sent to Buda. According to the entry, a total 325,000 gold pieces in various type were sent to Buda. D.BRZ. d. 20617, p. 37. The Treasury accounts also shows the money sent for the garrison troops in the new province of Temeşvar. 104,885 gold coins (6,187,525 akçe) were sent to pay the salaries in the garrisons in the province covering the period 18.12.1552–6.12.1553. Ibid., 54.

⁴³² Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 177.

⁴³³ D.BRZ. d. 20617, 158.

⁴³⁴ Ibid. 115. Buda: 471, Esterгон: 372, Istolni Belgrad: 173, Peçuy: 93, Segedin: 61. Also there were other janissaries in the fortresses in the province of Temeşvar. Lipova: 273, Temeşvar: 276, Parkan: 206. Total: 755.

⁴³⁵ Fekete and Káldy-Nagy, *Rechnungsbücher*, p. 423. The total money transferred to Buda was 260,100 gold pieces. The data from the central treasury account book is also available. See: D. BRZ. d. 20618, 68.

⁴³⁶ Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 177.

⁴³⁷ Ibid., 177. Fekete and Káldy-Nagy, *Rechnungsbücher*, 570.

⁴³⁸ Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 177; Fekete and Káldy-Nagy, *Rechnungsbücher*, 674. There is also an entry on the money that was sent to Buda in Ottoman treasury account: “be-cihet-i mevâcibât-i kılâ’-i vilâyet-i Budun vâcib-i Muharremü’l-harâm sene 966 ilâ gâye-i Zi’l-hicce sene-i mezbure: hasene-i mütenevvi’a 280,000 sikke (Sultaniye ve Efrenciye 240,000 sikke, Ungurusıye 34,000 sikke, Sakız 6,000 sikke)”. MAD 492, 10b.

⁴³⁹ Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 177; Fekete and Káldy-Nagy, *Rechnungsbücher*, 425.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 674; MAD 492, 45: Buda: 370, Esterгон: 396, Peçuy: 400, Segedin: 65, Istolni Belgrad: 118, Tata: 140. Also 644 janissaries were stationed at the fortresses in the province of Temeşvar.

⁴⁴¹ ÖNB Mxt 567.

Following the annexation of Buda, the necessity arose for additional forces to be deployed to guard the garrisons. Consequently, the transfer of troops from the southern garrisons to the north commenced. In general, the number of forces transferred to Buda represented a maximum 40 per cent of the number of the fortress guards in previous years.⁴⁴²

Although a considerable number of troops were transferred to the fortresses of Buda and Pest, there does not appear to have been a significant difference in the number of garrisons in the south and those in Buda and Pest. However, following the Esterгон campaign at the end of 1543, the number of garrisons in the fortresses of Buda, Pest, Esterгон and Ístolni Belgrad alone would reach over 10,000.⁴⁴³ The garrisons in Srem continued to decline throughout the 1540s, as troops were transferred to newly conquered fortresses from fortresses south of the province of Buda and those in Srem.⁴⁴⁴

In light of the fragmentary archival sources available after 1541, it is possible to construct a meaningful narrative regarding the size and financing of the garrisons in Požega and Semendria. A review of the 1543 treasury account register of the Esterгон campaign reveals the number of forces deployed in this region. As previously stated, 1,050,439 akçe was paid for three months (6 April 1543 to 3 July 1543) for 2,127 garrison soldiers stationed in fortresses in Srem, Požega, and Semendria during the

⁴⁴² ÖNB Mxt 557.

⁴⁴³ In his 1543 campaign, Sultan Süleyman increased the number of garrison troops to 2,965 in Buda and 1481 in Pest. A total of 4,446 soldiers were stationed in the two fortresses. At the same time, 2,978 soldiers were left as fortress guards in the newly conquered Ístolni Belgrad and 2,275 in Esterгон. Thus, the number of troops in these four fortresses alone reached over 10,000. Ágoston, "The Costs of the Ottoman Fortress-System in Hungary," 197.

⁴⁴⁴ In 1541, it is already known that more than 3,000 garrison soldiers were stationed in the fortresses of Buda and Pest, having been sent from Srem and Požega. Over time, the number of garrison troops in Srem would continue to decline, as would the number of fortresses situated at a considerable distance from the frontier in the sancak of Mohács. On 1 September 1543, a total of 496 fortress personnel from Osijek, Požega, Gorjani, Podgorac, as well as Sekçöy and Seksar in the sancak of Mohács were transferred to Sikloş. KK d. 1765, 24b.

campaign.⁴⁴⁵ However, the records of these payments from the army treasury are incomplete. Furthermore, the records of these payments from the army treasury do not include all the fortresses in the region. Additionally, some garrison groups in the paid fortresses were not paid from the campaign treasury. It is possible to identify these fortresses, which are not included in the records of the campaign treasury, but in the mukataa registers prepared in the same year.

From the 1540s onwards, the Ottomans financed the fortresses in Srem, Semendria, and Bosnia, as well as the fortresses in the south of the sancaks of Segedin and Mohács, through remittances (*havale*) from the mukataa sources in Rumelia, which had particularly high revenues. In particular, the tax-farm revenues of the ports, saltpans, and rice plants were considerable, and these three mukataa groups constituted the most frequently used source of cash for the financing of fortresses. The most significant of these revenue sources was the mukataa unit designated as the “Ports of Danube” (*İskelehâ-i Tuna*), which controlled all port revenues in the region extending from İsakça (Isaccea) to Semendria on the Danube. On 8 August 1546, the three-year revenues of this mukataa group were calculated to be 8,895,000 akçe (approximately 148,250 ducat).⁴⁴⁶ One year prior, the three-year mukataa income of Vidin, Fethislam (Kladovo), Semendria, and Golubac was calculated to be 2,185,000 akçe.⁴⁴⁷ These mukataa items constituted the most significant source of financing for all the fortresses in the southern part of the Buda province, as there were no other sources of income in the region other than mines or mints, and because of their relative proximity to the fortresses to which remittances were to be made.

⁴⁴⁵ KK d. 1765. 5b, 7,9–9b, 15, 16b–17b, 18b, 24b, 34b.

⁴⁴⁶ D. BŞM. d 20, 143.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid., 144.

Another mukataa item, which yielded similar revenues to the ports and was frequently employed to finance fortresses, was salt pans. Among these, salt pan in Ahyolu (Pomorie) was the most significant source of remittances for the financing of fortresses in Slavonia and northern Bosnia during the 1540s. In 1546, approximately 90 per cent of the revenues of this mukataa, which had an annual income of 7,000,000 akçe over a three-year period, were transferred to the financing of fortresses in Srem, Semendira and Požega.⁴⁴⁸

A further group of mukataa, situated in Rumelia, was also used for the financing of the fortresses under discussion. These were rice plants. The annual revenues of the rice plants in Filibe (Plovdiv), the most well-known of these resources, exhibited a fluctuating pattern between the late 1530s and 1550s, with a range of between 400,000 and 1,500,000 million akçe. In 1544, the revenues of the Tatarpazarı (Pazardžik) rice plants sold for three years were calculated at 1,172,400 akçe.⁴⁴⁹ By the end of the following three years, almost 90 per cent of the total revenue (1,003,109 akçe) had been allocated for the salaries of the fortresses. Although the accounting record is relatively late, it shows that in 1555 the revenues of the Filibe rice plants were sold for 1,049,863 akçe for three years.⁴⁵⁰ Out of this total, 715,122 akçe (equivalent to 68 per cent of the total revenue) was allocated for the financing of the fortresses. During the 1560s, the Filibe rice plants were used to finance fortresses with relatively small garrisons in Bosnia, Klis, and Požega. In the 1566 records, 3,026,006 akçe of total 6,850,323 akçe from the revenues of the rice plants of Filibe and Tatarpazarı was allocated to the fortresses (approximately 50 per cent).⁴⁵¹ In

⁴⁴⁸ MAD 7337, 13–18.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., 218b.

⁴⁵⁰ MAD 166, 143b.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid., 214.

conclusion, the three groups of mukataa items generated annual revenues of at least 7-8,000,000 akçe, which enabled them to cover at least 80 per cent of the annual salaries of the garrisons in the fortresses of Srem, Požega and Semendria.

According to the mukataa registers, the amount paid directly from the mukataas and not from the army treasury during the period April to July 1543 (three months) was around 992,000 akçe.⁴⁵² When the sums paid directly from the army treasury and transferred from the mukataa are aggregated, the total amount is 2,042,439 akçe. Consequently, the estimated cost of the fortresses in Srem, Požega, and Semendire is approximately 8,169,756 akçe. Moreover, the fortresses in this region were garrisoned by approximately 3,984 to 4,000 salaried troops.

With the aforementioned considerations, it is now necessary to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the analysis of the Ottoman frontier organization in the province of Buda. As of mid-1543, a garrison of approximately 12,500 men, excluding janissaries, was stationed in Buda and the fortresses in the regions of Pest, Esterгон, Istolni Belgrad, Peçuy, and Segedin. The addition of the garrisons in Požega, Srem, and Semendria would result in a total garrison strength of 16,500 troops for the entire province, rather than the 12,000-13,000 previously estimated by other researchers.⁴⁵³ If we include the janissaries, whose numbers were relatively stable between 2,000 and

⁴⁵² It should be noted that although only one quarter payment was made from the army treasury to the garrison group of the main fortresses in Semendria, Požega and Srem, this does not include all the fortresses and garrison soldiers in the region. The fortresses that were not paid from the army treasury but remitted from other sources of income were as follows: The whole garrison units in the fortresses of Brezovica (Mad 166, 99b) and Erdud (MAD 7337, 111; MAD 166, 81b, 96), as well as all troops in Mikleuš (İstoni Mikloš, MAD 7337, 110, 135), müstahfizes of Drenovac and Požega (MAD 166, 122b; MAD 7337, 68), Voćin and Rahovica cavalry (faris) units (MAD 7337, 13; D.HSK.AAG. d 25935, 73; MAD 7337, 134; D.BMKK d. 22441, 25; MAD 166, 150 and 154), Kamengrad, Kaptol and Podgorac mustahfizes (D.BMKK d. 22441, 44b; D. BŞM. d 20, 143; MAD 166, 122; MAD 7337, 68) all personnel of Titel and Velika fortress (D. BŞM. d 20, 143; MAD 166, 127b), and some guards of Raca, Njemci and Nasiče fortresses (MAD 166, 82, 127b; MAD 7337, 101) were not included in the aforementioned payments.

⁴⁵³ Ágoston, "The Costs of the Ottoman Fortress-System", 197; Ágoston, "Ottoman Conquest and the Ottoman Military Frontier in Hungary"; Ágoston, "Ottoman and Habsburg Military Affairs", 298; Hegyi, "The Ottoman Military Organization", 159–161.

2,500 until the Ottoman-Habsburg peace of 1547, the garrison forces alone reached 18,000. Consequently, the period between 1543 and 1547 may be regarded as a peak period in terms of the number of soldiers whose salaries were paid directly in cash.

Subsequently, the number of garrison soldiers paid in cash declined significantly. Thus, it is necessary to recalculate the payments of garrison soldiers in accordance with the aforementioned table. Although the payments of the garrisons in the province of Buda fluctuated over the years, they appear to have increased in nominal terms until the end of the 1550s. When we examine the period following 1543 particularly, the annual payments of the garrisons in the province of Buda were in excess of 20,000,000 akçe. Furthermore, the annual average of 8,000,000 akçe transferred from mukataa sources to the Ottoman garrisons in Slavonia and Srem proves to be of significance. This would bring the expenditure on the garrison forces alone on the Ottoman-Habsburg frontiers in the mid-1540s to a figure in the range of 20-30,000,000 akçe (equivalent to 383,333-466,666 ducats). By the mid-1540s, the Ottoman military force was estimated to consist of approximately 20,000 men, including the timariot sipahis in the sancaks subordinate to the province of Buda.

4.6. Timarification in the Province of Buda

In the 1540s, the peak in the number of salaried garrison soldiers and the associated increase in financial burden were to some extent offset by a period of fiscal restraint during the 1540s, which can be regarded as a period of “timarification.” This process would become more pronounced in the 1550s. Although it had not yet begun in the province of Buda, with a few exceptions in the fortresses north of the Drava River, many fortresses in Semendria, Srem and Požega, which had previously been paid for in cash, mukataa or transfers from other sources, began to receive collective

timars as a result of new land surveys in the mid-1540s. Initially, the standard garrison troops of the fortresses, the mustahfiz troops, who received a daily wage of 5 akçe per day, were allocated salary timars of 1,400 akçe each. Eventually, the other components of these garrisons, including the artillerymen, caulkers and azeb troops, were also included. The fortresses comprising all military units in terms of troop composition (müstahfiz, azeb, faris and martolos) exhibited a mixed type of financing in terms of the payment method. While the müstahfiz received salary timars, the cavalry units (farisan), martoloses and azebs were to be financed with cash from nearby mukataa sources.

The practice of distributing salary timars to fortress personnel, which had been implemented in Bosnia since the beginning of the 16th century, was extended to the mustahfiz units in Semendria and İzvornik at the end of the 1530s and in the Srem sancak after the 1540s. By the 1550s, there was a tendency to distribute salary timars to all members of the garrisons in some fortresses. As will be demonstrated in the following pages, the mustahfizes who received *gedik timarı* (salary timar) were distinct from the salaried cavalry units (*farisan*) in the fortresses, who were granted *eşkinici timarı*. This timar gave them the status of standard timariot sipahi, obligating them to join campaigns and bring necessary armed retainers according to timar law. The aforementioned faris groups constituted the majority of the new timar holder cavalry forces in the sancaks of the province of Buda.

According to the mukataa and poll-tax registers from the 1530s, which were used to finance the fortresses of Semendria, Belgrade, Golubac, Kulič, and Ram alone, the number of mustahfiz reached 1,000 men, and these troops were already receiving salary timars by 1540. Also, all the müstahfiz troops in the fortresses of the sancak of

Izvornik received timars by the mid-1540s.⁴⁵⁴ A similar phenomenon can be observed in the sancaks of Srem and Požega. In a summary land survey dated 30 June 1546, collective timars were distributed to all mustahfiz and artillery units in the fortresses of Varadin, Rača, Vukovar, Ilok, Salankamen, Morović, and Njemci in the Srem sancak.⁴⁵⁵ Similarly, the payment records in the mukataa sources indicate that collective timars were distributed to the fortifications of Požega, Gorjani, Kamengrad, Nasiče, and Đakovo, which were located in the Požega sancak and were relatively inland, away from the frontier areas.⁴⁵⁶ In point of fact, a decree dated 14 August 1547 was sent to Ulama Paša, sancakbeyi of Požega, which stated that the previous decree granting timars to the azebs in the Požega fortress was valid and that the azebs who did not want timars were ordered to be replaced by others.⁴⁵⁷ In light of these considerations, the financial burden of maintaining the fortresses in the sancak subordinate to Buda must have been a significant challenge in the mid-1540s. This is evidenced by the fact that the phenomenon of timarification, whereby the southern regions of the province were applied first, before spreading northwards, reached its peak in the 1550s. By the end of the 1550s, 62 per cent of the total garrison soldiers (1,315) in the sancak of Semendria were holding salary timar, with a total of 820 soldiers.⁴⁵⁸ A comparison with the 1530s also reveals an important result. A comparison of the garrisons in the aforementioned fortresses with those of 1530 reveals a 60 per cent decrease in the total garrisons in the region.

⁴⁵⁴ Prior to 1530, Zvornik, Srebrenica, Kušlat, Srebrenik, Perin Grad, Teočak and Sokol already received salary timars valued at 450,350 akçe. TT d. 173, 93–177. In 1546, all the remaining fortresses (Brčko, Nova, Gradačac, Noćaj and Sabac/Böğürdelen) received salary timars. TT d. 259.

⁴⁵⁵ TT d. 245, 46–64.

⁴⁵⁶ Upon analysis of the mukataa records from the period between 1540 and 1550, it becomes evident that the müstahfiz groups of the aforementioned fortresses are no longer present in the payment lists. This can be attributed to the fact that the müstahfizes in these fortresses were now being provided with salary timars instead of cash salaries. MAD 166 and MAD 7337.

⁴⁵⁷ KK d. 208, 199.

⁴⁵⁸ TT d. 316, 109–110, 166–177, 178–180, 362–367. At the beginning of 1560, a total of 1,368 müstahfizes in 17 fortresses in Srem and Semandira received salary timars. TT d. 330, 1.

While the process of timarification in the southern sancaks of the Buda province accelerated in the 1540s, as previously stated, there is also evidence that in some of the northern sancaks, this process may have begun in the mid-1540s. In 1546, the müstahfiz troops in Segedin were granted collective timars.⁴⁵⁹ In the province of Buda, the trend towards a more widespread granting of timar to the personnel in the fortresses gained momentum in the mid-1550s.

Prior to an analysis of the timarification trend, it is essential to highlight a distinctive aspect of timar distribution in the province of Buda in comparison to other regions of the empire. Although the presence of timar-holder sipahi in the new sancaks subordinate to Buda was known even before large-scale land censuses (*tahrir*) were conducted for the implementation of the timar system, the number of timariot sipahi in newly conquered regions of Buda was very small in 1546 when the first surveys were conducted. Even at the outset of the surveys of the province of Buda, there were numerous sipahi in the region. A total of 44 individuals received timar or zeamet in the Buda centered *Paşa livâsı* and districts around it in the roll-call register of April 1544.⁴⁶⁰ From the late 1540s onwards, however, the number of sipahi in Buda was to increase significantly. The individuals that filled the rank of timar holder sipahi class in the region were predominantly former members of the salaried garrison troops, particularly those from cavalry (*faris*) and volunteer (*gönüllü*) units. The process of allocating sipahi timar to the salaried garrison members seems to have followed a hierarchical order. Firstly, zeamet or timar were allocated to the fortress commanders

⁴⁵⁹ 146 müstahfizs received salary timars in Segedin in 1546. TT d. 1044, 219 – 232; Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 432.

⁴⁶⁰ The total value of these zeamet and timars was 353,998 akçe. İE.TZ. 17, 18b-19. Even as early as 1542, September, three individuals had been granted timars in Buda. Géza David, “Buda (Budin) Vilayeti’nin İlk Timar Sahipleri,” *Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 12 (1998): 58–60. One of the individuals who received a timars in 1542, Davud, a servant of Süleyman Paşa, was present at the roll call in 1544 and had a timar revenue of 5,999 akçe. İE.TZ. 17, 19.

and stewards (kethüda), then to other troop commanders such as azebs, farises and martoloses in the fortresses, and ultimately to the lower-ranked personnel.⁴⁶¹

The decision to grant timars to these individuals was based on their demonstrated excellence in a campaign or specific battle. However, timars were also distributed widely to those who had performed exceptional services in combat.⁴⁶² Consequently, those who became timar-holder sipahis in the province of Buda were garrison soldiers stationed in the fortresses within the province.⁴⁶³

During this period, two types of timars (mustahfiz-fortress timars and eşkinci/sipahi timars) were distributed to salaried fortress personnel to generate profit for the state.⁴⁶⁴ Typically, fortress personnel received a fixed daily cash payment, but they were allowed to receive up to three-quarters of their annual salary as timar revenue. Standard mustahfiz troops stationed in a fortress were allocated a smaller income from timar, whereas if they were granted a sipahi timar, the nominal timar given to them was higher in proportion to their daily salary. This system had been applied earlier in various parts of the empire. In Bosnia in the 1520s, many fortress personnel with a daily cash salary of 5 akçe collectively received 1,400 akçe each. The same practice was applied to the salaried personnel of the fortresses in the sancaks of the Buda province. Different coefficients were applied to fortress personnel who

⁴⁶¹ The practice of allocating timar or zeamet to the commanders of troops in fortresses whose garrisons were financed by cash payments was also an established tradition. In 1491, the commander of the cavalry in the fortress of Prusac (Akhisar) received a timar. MAD 15334, 5. In 1530, the ağa of beşlis in Kamengrad and Jajca also received timars. In 1532, four of the twenty-two zeamet holders in Semendira were the commanders (ağa) of cavalry units in Belgrade, Semendria and Titel. Similarly, in 1541-42, the practice of granting zeamet or timars to the commanders of troops in fortresses continued: Korkud, ağa of the azeb units in Gorjani (15,000 akçe. MAD 34, 696b); Cafer, ağa of the farisan units in Đakovo (20,000 akçe. Ibid., 626b); Cafer, ağa of the azeb units in Belgrade (25,450 akçe. Ibid., 631); İlyas, ağa of the azebs in Vukovar (10,105 akçe. Ibid., 629); Mustafa, ağa of the azebs in Semendria (25,000 akçe. Ibid., 684); Mehmed son of Kara Mustafa, ağa of the farisan units in Požega (Ibid., 477b).

⁴⁶² Emine Erdoğan Özünlü, "Timar Tevcih Sepepleri Üzerine Bir Kaynak Değerlendirmesi," *OTAM Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* 19, no. 19 (2006): 182–184.

⁴⁶³ Hegyi, *The Ottoman military Organization in Hungary*, 75.

⁴⁶⁴ İnalcık, "Timar," 168 -173.

received initial sipahi timars. Those with higher incomes than the regular detachments had a corresponding price to pay. In addition to the obligation to join campaigns with a horse and armor, they had to provide an armed retainer for every 3,000 akçe of their timar income.⁴⁶⁵

In the mid-1540s, a total of 208 zaim and timar-holders were listed in the first tahrir registers of Buda, Estergon, Novigrad, Hatvan, and Segedin. 25 of the individuals to whom timars or zeamets were distributed were either dizdar or cavalry and azeb commanders in the fortresses. Furthermore, a small number of fortress personnel were also granted timars.⁴⁶⁶ It can be assumed that the practice of distributing zeamet and timar to the commanders in the fortresses must have spread to the lower cadres over time. Although there are no systematic records from after 1546, the central appointment records from this period demonstrate a continuous increase in the process.

This situation can be easily observed in the letters of request submitted to the centre by many sancakbeyis from the province of Buda. After a battle, the sancakbeyis

⁴⁶⁵ For *sülsan* practice and its calculations see: Soyudoğan, *Reassessing the Timar System*, 24–29 and appendix II; Hegyi, *The Ottoman military Organization in Hungary*, 182–184.

⁴⁶⁶ Hegyi, *The Ottoman military Organization in Hungary*, 162; TT d. 1044: Gazanfer Ağa, ağa of the azeb troops in Buda: 47,736 akçe; Burak Ağa, ağa of the salaried cavalry troops (farisan) in Hatvan: 22,500 akçe; Turgud Ağa, ağa of the azeb troops in Estergon: 21,000 akçe; Mehmed b. Bahşi: Head of the martolos troops in Sonda: 9,332 akçe; Hüseyin ağa: ağa of the volunterrs (gönüllü) in Buda: 10,000 akçe (ber-vech-i arpalık); Haydar son of Hızır: Head of the martolos troops in Pest: 10,000 akçe; Arnavud Ali: from the cavalry units (farisan) in Novigrad: 4,000 akçe; Mehmed son of İskender, ağa of the azeb troops in Estergon: 20,000 akçe; Ramazan, ağa of the farisan in Estergon: 21,000 akçe; Mustafa-i sarrac, ağa of the farisan troops in Sikloş: 20,000 akçe; Yusuf, from the ağas of the azeb troops in Estergon: 15,000 akçe; Piri son of Abdullah, from the ağas of the azeb troops in Estergon; Hamza son of Ali, from the cavalry units (farisan) in Buda; Mahmud, from the head (reis) of the azeb companies in Estergon: 10,000 akçe; Ali son of Abdullah, from the cavalry units in Estergon: 3,000 akçe; Ali, ağa of the azeb troops in Ciğerdelen parkany: 6,050; Ferhad, ağa of the cavalry troops in Vac: 20,000 akçe; Hasan Ağa, Head of the martolos troops in Novigrad: 8,000 akçe; Hasan son of Ahmed, from the head of the martolos troops in Novigrad: 6,000 akçe; Piri, from the ağas of the cavalry troops in Novigrad: 11,000 akçe; Câmen (?), from the ağas of the cavalry troops in Novigrad: 15,000 akçe; Bali, from the ağas of the cavalry troops in Novigrad: 21,500 akçe; Bahşi, ağa of the cavalry units in Pest: 26,500 akçe; Yusuf, from the ağas of the cavalry units in Pest: 27,500 akçe; Mehmed, ağa of the cavalry units in Bac: 20,000 akçe. For those senior cadres who held zeamet or timar in the fortresses in later periods, see: Hegyi, *The Ottoman military Organization in Hungary*, 336–492.

or governor general would ask for initial timars as a reward for the ağa, squad leaders, farises, volunteers of Buda, and janissaries in the fortresses whose usefulness and comradeship (*yarar ve yoldaş*) were witnessed in the battle. For the most part, these requests were not refused. Those who were recommended for timars by an order from the centre were usually granted timars immediately. These letters of request sent to the centre often contained requests for initial timar reward for dozens of people or for promotion (*terakki*) for those who already had a timar or zeamet. The names of 5 zeamet holders and 45 sipahis who served as valiantly during the sieges of Füleke, Salgó or later battles were listed in the comradeship letter sent by Toygun Paşa. The orders from the centre provided two thousand akçe each for zeamet holders and five hundred akçe each for sipahis as a reward. On the other hand, a reward was also requested for 64 faris from Hatvan, 12 *garib yiğits* (brave young persons who had no certain revenue either timar or ulufe) and 2 janissaries, who were reported to have been in the battle and were reported to be comrades. From the last group, 25 people were ordered to be given timars based on the two-thirds system (*sülsan*).⁴⁶⁷

An examination of the timar allocation register⁴⁶⁸ (*timar tevcih defteri*) of the province of Buda between 24 April 1553 and 18 September 1557 allows to determine the proportion of timars distributed to salaried personnel in the fortresses. In the sancaks other than Semandira, Zvornik and Vulçitrın, a total of 324 people, excluding dizdars, were granted zeamet or timar for the first time (*ibtida*) during the period. Out of these 324 new sipahis, 204 (62 per cent) were former fortress officials such as ağa, volunteers, odabaşı, faris or azebs. The remaining 120 were first-time timar holders

⁴⁶⁷ KK d. 289, 49 – 51; Serkan Osmanlıoğlu, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Gönüllü Askerlerden Garip yiğitler (XVI. Yüzyıl)*, Unpublished PhD dissertation. (İstanbul: Marmara University, 2023), 46–47.

⁴⁶⁸ Konsularakademie, Krafft 284, 1–470b. Normally, the records comprise 635 pages. The record I have selected as a representational example covers the period from 24 April 1553, when Toygun Paşa became governor-general of Buda, to 18 September 1557, when Kasım Paşa replaced him.

whose father had died a sipahi, men from sancakbeyi or beylerbeyi, garib yiğits who had never held a timar before and were waiting for one for their bravery in battle, and knezes, especially in Segedin, which had a large Vlach population. Furthermore, the register indicates that in the records of Şevval 963 (August 1556), almost all of the dizdars and stewards of the fortresses in the province of Temeşvar were also granted timars.⁴⁶⁹

Of particular interest are the timars, which were largely granted to the salaried cavalry (faris) in the fortresses and to the volunteer troops in Buda. In the same period, sipahi timars were distributed to 204 fortress personnel, the majority of whom were faris (only 67 of them were Buda gönüllüs). The most important source of revenue for all these timars was the estimated income (*ber-vech-i tahmin*) from the taxes of villages in the border regions of the province of Buda that had recently submitted (*itaat üzere olub/haliya itaat edüb*) and had not yet been surveyed for land taxes.⁴⁷⁰ It is

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., 467b–469b.

⁴⁷⁰ Following the Ottoman victory over the Habsburg army besieging Segedin the previous year, the Ottoman army, under the command of Governor-General Hadım Ali Paşa, shifted its military activity to the north of the province in the summer of 1552. Following the capture of the fortresses of Diregel (Hu. Drégely), Siçen (Hu. Szécsény), Holloka (Hollókő) and Buyak (Buják), the Ottoman army encountered the Habsburg army under the command of Erasmus Teuffel (Ördög Mátyás) on the Palast plain. The opposing forces were approximately equal in size, with each side comprising approximately 10,000 men. On 9 August 1552, the Habsburgs suffered a major defeat. Commander Erasmus Teuffel and many others were taken prisoner. For a detailed account of the battle, as reported by Ali Paşa to the sultan, see Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, “Az ország ügye mindenek előtt való” *A szultáni tanács Magyarországra vonatkozó rendeletei (1544–1545, 1552)* (Budapest: História, MTA Történettudományi Intézete, 2005), 615–617. Following this battle, numerous faris and volunteer troops participated in the conflict and were rewarded with timar for their contributions. One of them was Ferhad son of Yakub from the faris units in Vác, who was granted a timar for his success in the battle in the newly conquered Diregel, which had been established as a district. As previously stated, the village allotted to Yusuf as timar income was among the newly subjugated areas. It was estimated that approximately 6,000 akçe would be generated as timar income from this village: “*timar-i Ferhad ‘an fârisân-i kal’a-i Vac ... yekûn ber-vech-i tahmin 6,000 (akçe) ... zikr olan karye hâliyâ feth olan vilâyetden olub itâ’at edüb ber-vech-i tahmin 6,000 akçeye kayd olunub kal’a-i Vac fârislerinden olub yevmi 9 akçeye mutasarrıfken Orduk Matyaş muharebesinde yoldaşlık idüb ibtidâdan 6,000 akçelik timar emr olunub sene 959 Şevvâlinin evâhîrinde hükm-i şerif irâd iden Ferhad b. Ya’kuba tevcih olunub*”. Konsularakademie, Krafft 284, 35b. Furthermore, those who already held timar or zeamets and received a raise were granted an income equal to their raise from the newly conquered regions. Yusuf, ağa of the faris troops in Pest and held a zeamet of 27,500 akçe in Hatvan district, was granted a total of 4,000 akçe of raise for his service in the battles of Segedin and Palast. Once more, the 4,000 akçels were distributed from the villages of the recently annexed Diregel region: “*mezkûr Segedin muharebesinde yoldaşlık edüb 2,000 akçe terakkî emr olunub sene 959 Cemâziyelevvelinin evâyilinde*

frequently the case that the locations which were previously regarded as timar revenues were in fact situated at considerable distances from the nearest Ottoman fortress. Ultimately, the limits of Ottoman taxation in the region extended beyond the areas already under their control.⁴⁷¹

Considering the nominal income of all these prebends, we arrive at a considerable total of more than 1,500,000 akçe. During the initial 15 years following the Ottoman conquest of Buda, the timar system was enhanced in the province through the implementation of continuous surveys. The resources of the timar and zeamet, which were not included in the provincial treasury, were distributed to personnel within the province, particularly those stationed in the fortresses. Therefore, hass, zeamet, and timar revenues collectively accounted for approximately 50 per cent of the total revenue generated in Buda.⁴⁷²

Orduk Matyaş muharebesinde tekrâr yoldaşlık edib 2,000 akçe terakkiye sene 959 Şevvâlinin evâhirinde ahkâm-i şerîfe irâd itmeğin işbu iki kıta' karye hâliyâ feth olunub itâ'at iden kurâlardan olmağın ber-vech-i tahmin 4,000 akçeye kayd olunub ze'âmetiyle birikdirilüb cümle ze'âmeti 31,500 akçelik olmak üzere tevcih olunub ..." Ibid., 38.

⁴⁷¹ Hegyi, *The Ottoman military Organization in Hungary*, 75 – 82. For detailed research and project based on the Ottoman cadastral surveys and the Ottoman taxation limit in the second half of the sixteenth century see: The Project: <https://adatbazisokonline.mnl.gov.hu/adatbazis/oszman/kereses>. Éva Sz. Simon, "Kayıtdışı (Hâric Ez-Defter) ve 'Gayrimeskûn' (Hâli Ez-Raiyyet) Yerlerin Osmanlı Sınır Boylarının Şekillenmesinde Etkisi," *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 24 (2013-2): 1–16; Simon, "A szülejmani béke: A magyarországi oszmán adóösszeírások és a magyar-oszmán békekötések összefüggései" *AETAS* (33), no. 4 (2018): 53–72; Simon et al., "Databases of Cadastral Surveys (Tapu Defteris) of Ottoman Hungary and Its Frontier Zones (16th-17th C.)," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 37 (2020): 259–272. For the condominium or double taxation, which refers to the taxation of villages, especially in the border regions, by both the Hungarians and the Ottomans, see Ágoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest*, 453–459.

⁴⁷² It is, of course, very difficult to determine an exact income. The revenues of governor generals, whose income had previously been subsidised predominantly from the Srem and Semendria sancaks, continued to receive a minor portion of their income from the Buda sancak in the 1550s. In 1556, 60 per cent of the beylerbeyi revenues, which were to be approximately 1,000,000 akçe, were derived from the southern sancaks (Mohaács and Semendria). The revenues from the Buda sancak were still approximately 20 per cent. Géza Dávid, *Studies in Demographic and Administrative History of Ottoman Hungary* (New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2011), 103–106. It can be posited that the combined revenues of all sancakbeyis in the Buda province in the 1550s amounted to approximately 3,000,000 akçe. The most challenging aspect of this analysis is the estimation of revenues derived from zeamet and timars. It can be reasonably assumed that the total revenue exceeded 2,000,000 akçe. When the Buda provincial treasury, which had a total revenue of 8,000,000 in 1553, is added to the land taxes given as hass, zeamet and timars, it can be said that in theory nearly 40 per cent of all revenues of the province were distributed as *dirliks*. For a comprehensive analysis of the sancaks of Buda and Simontornya see: Fekete, *Buda and Pest under Turkish Rule*; Káldy-Nagy, *Kanuni Devri Budin Tahrir Defteri (1546–1562)*; Káldy-Nagy,

In essence, the Ottomans sought to achieve two objectives through this method. Firstly, the Ottomans sought to relieve fortress personnel of the pressure and expectation of a timar by rewarding them –especially those with high daily wages – with a relatively high and fixed timar revenue from the newly conquered regions. In addition, their salaries, which had to be continually paid from the treasury, were also reduced. Secondly, although the province of Buda encompassed between fifteen and twenty sancaks, particularly those situated to the north of the Drava, the reserve of timariot sipahi was relatively limited. As the fortress personnel, the armed retinue of the sancakbeyis, and the timar-holding sipahi of the relatively distant sancaks with more sipahi (Semendria, for example) could not always be ready at hand, a new army of timar-holding sipahi was to be created from the old salaried fortress personnel. Furthermore, these soldiers were responsible for maintaining control and security in the timar lands from which they collected taxes. In the event of a campaign, they brought armed retainers in exchange for the nominal value of the timar they received. Consequently, the Ottomans sought to maintain a substantial sipahi army in conjunction with the garrison forces in the fortresses along the Habsburg frontier, while minimising the expenditure of cash to pay for the garrison troops.⁴⁷³

A Budai Szandzsák 1559. évi összeírása; Dávid, *Osmanlı Macaristan'ında Toplum, Ekonomi ve Yönetim*.

⁴⁷³ In Buda province, ağas in the fortresses who had been granted timar or zeamet were permitted to continue their previous duties in the fortresses. In particular, in instances where the number of sipahi in the region was low, the fortress commanders (dizdars) were integrated into the sipahi cadre. In the border fortresses of Temeşvar, the status of those who had previously held high-valued zeamet or timars and held the posts of fortress commanders was revoked, and they were all ordered to provide retainers in proportion to their zeamet or timar and to join the army when there was a campaign. In their place were appointed those who had relatively less timar income and who were to serve only as the fortress commander: “*Temeşvar beğlerbeğisi Kâsım Paşa mektûb gönderüb ol serhadler ki kal'alarında ze'âmet ve timarıyla olan ağalar ref' olunmağın sefer-i humâyûn vâki' oldukça cebelüler ve cebeleriyle eşmek fermân olunmağın vilâyet-i Temeşvârda on beş bin akçe timarıyla kal'a-i Felnak dizdârı olan İskender ağa ibtidâ-i fetihden berü bu serhadde kalub Gule (Gyula) nâm harbî kal'adan hayli kâfir haydûdı gelüb gece ile nehr-i Moroş (Maroş) geçüb Felnak varoşını basdıkda yarar kâfir başın kesüb ve kendü dahi mecrüh olub bu yoldaşlıkda bulunub gerekli olmağın dizdârlıktan ref' olunub yararlığı mukâbelesinde 'inâyet ricâsına 'arz itmeğın ze'âmet virilmek buyrıldı (2.5.1555)’*”. KK d. 213, 117. Also, for the timar allocations to dizdars and stewards in the province of Temeşvar: Konsularakademie, Krafft 284, 467–470.

No register exists for the number of timariot sipahi in all Buda vilayet for these years. Nevertheless, it can be posited that the practice of bestowing timar upon the faris in the fortresses persisted. A retrospective reading of later years suggests that, with the exception of the sancaks of Semendria, İzvornik, and Srem, at least 30 or 40 percent of the sipahi army in the other sancaks may have consisted of former fortress personnel. As previously stated, the fact that 60 per cent of those who received timar or zeamet for the first time between 1553 and 1557 were fortress personnel, and that this had become a general trend, serves to reinforce this claim. Even in 1566, a year when the timar system was well established and the number of sipahi increased, the total number of them in the aforementioned regions was 883. This figure increases to 40 percent when the tendency to distribute timars to garrison soldiers is taken into account.⁴⁷⁴

In the context of the narrative presented during this period, it is necessary to consider another aspect. In addition to the fortress personnel who received sipahi timar and filled the cadres of the timar holder cavalry army in the province, salary timar continued to be distributed to the standard garrison soldiers *en masse*, numbering in thousands. As mentioned before, this process commenced in Srem, Požega, and Semendria in the mid-1540s. From the outset of the systematic application of land

⁴⁷⁴ The list of zeamet and timar holders present in the campaign of Zigetvar (Szigetvár) the previous year, who received a 200 akçe increase for every 1,000 akçe of timar income, as recorded in the register dated March 1567, provides an indication of the total timariot force of the province of Buda on paper. The total number of zeamet and timar holders in the 17 sancaks subordinate to the province of Buda was 1,657: Paşa Livası (Budin): 87, Estergon and İstolni Belgrad: 201, Simontornya: 18, Mohaç (Mohaács): 164, Kopan (Koppány): 38, Hatvan: 75, Fülek: 70, Novigrad: 36, Segedin (Szeged): 30, Solnok (Szolnok): 48, Siçen (Szécsény): 28, Sekçöy (Szekcső): 11, Požega: 87, Srem: 52, Semendria: 567, and Zvornik: 124. Additionally, there were 21 other individuals with zeamet or timar in the sancaks of Buda, İstolni Belgrad, Kopan, Simontornya, and Mohaç who served with Hamza Bey. Excluding Semendria and Zvornik, there were 966 sipahi in total. Given the continued tendency to grant timars to fortress personnel, the majority of the sipahis, especially in the northern sancaks, were former fortress personnel. The use of the 'two-thirds' method when granting timars to previously salaried personnel, and the frequent repetition of nominal timar values such as 5,333, 6,000, 6,666, 7,333, and 8,000 akçe in the list, strengthens this assertion. KK d. 298.

tahrirs in the sancaks of Buda province, a portion of the land revenues was transferred to the mustahfiz troops stationed within the fortresses. In 1546, this process is observed in the sancak of Segedin, while the distribution of timars to the fortress personnel in the sancak of Simontornya is also recorded in the timar registers in 1552.⁴⁷⁵ However, as no systematic registers survived the 1550s, it is not possible to ascertain with certainty the number of garrison soldiers who were allocated salary timar in fortresses. From the timars assignment registers of 1553-57, the mustahfiz troops of over 30 fortresses in Mohács, Sekçöy, Simontornya, and Segedin were now receiving salary timars.⁴⁷⁶ The same process was initiated in the province of Temeşvar immediately following its conquest.⁴⁷⁷

In conclusion, the garrison soldiers, numbering in excess of 16,000 after 1543 and financed either by cash payments from the center or from mukataa sources, constituted a significant financial burden on the Ottoman Empire. In order to solve this

⁴⁷⁵ Dávid, *Osmanlı Macaristan'ında Toplum, Ekonomi ve Yönetim*, 91, 107–108.

⁴⁷⁶ Konsularakademie, Krafft 284, 4–322; Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary*, 335–512: Tomaşin (Tamási), Osijek (including azebs), Sikloş, Segedin, Göröşgal (Görösgál), Erdut, Donbo (Dombóvár), Ilok, Podgorac (including azebs), Požega (including azebs), Bakic Kulesi (Kula), Sombor, Baç, Sas, Valpovo, Kalaça (Kalocsa), Kamengrad, Parkan-i Baya (Baja), Peçuy (Pécs), Kopan (Koppány), Salankamen, Parkan-i Şelin (Sellye), Batasek (Bátaszék), Drenovac, Kaptol (including azebs), Parkan-i Senmartin (Szentmárton), Sekçöy (Szekcső), Parkan-i Nadajdi (Nadaj), Gorjani, Bobofçe (Babócsa), Kapošvar (Kaposvár).

⁴⁷⁷ Following the conquest of Temeşvar and the subsequent establishment as an independent province, the salaries of the garrisons stationed in the fortresses in the region initially posed a significant financial burden for the Ottomans, although not to the same extent as in Buda. The garrison forces in these fortresses, supported by janissary troops, initially numbered approximately 4,000 men. Ágoston, “The Costs of the Ottoman Fortress-System in Hungary, p. 208. In the period between 1553 and 1554, a total of 755 janissaries were garrisoned in three fortresses (Temeşvar, Parkan, Lipova) in the province. By 1559, this number had decreased to 644. D.BRZ. d 20617, 115; MAD 492, 45. Once again, one year after the conquest, 104,885 gold coins (6,187,525 akçe) were subsidised from the central treasury to the treasury of Temeşvar for the garrison soldiers in the fortresses of the province. D.BRZ. d 20617, p. 54. In particular, following the initial surveys in the province, some of the land revenues were distributed as hass, zeamet or timar. By 1555–56, the total revenues in the only in Temeşvar sancak had reached 3,654,462 akçe. Among these overall revenues, salary timars totalling 714,900 akçe were distributed to 417 müstahfizes in the fortresses. Murat Serdaroğlu, “Tımişvar Sancağı’nda Timar Rejiminin Teşekkülü ve İlk Uygulamalar (1555-1556),” *VAKANÜVİS Uluslararası Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 2, no. 1 (2017): 194–195, 197. By 1557, the majority of fortress commanders in the vilayet received salary timars. Konsularakademie, Krafft 284, 468–470. In contrast to the financial situation in Buda, the treasury of Temeşvar began to generate a surplus towards the end of the 1560s. Some of this surplus was sent to Buda, but in some cases, it was also sent to the central treasury. Pál Fodor, “Das Wilajet von Temeschwar zur Zeit der osmanischen Eroberung,” *Südost-Forschungen* 55 (1996): 31–33.

issue, the Ottomans employed a number of effective methods. The first of these measures was to distribute a portion of the land revenues generated by the systematic surveys carried out after the conquest to the garrison soldiers in the fortresses as salary timars. Following the survey of Srem and Požega in 1546, the majority of the mustahfiz troops stationed in the fortresses of these two sancaks began to receive salary timars. In particular, the land revenues in Srem would constitute the primary source of revenue for the salary timars in the fortresses of Srem, Požega, and Semendria. It should be noted that the salaries of the garrison soldiers in the important fortresses on the frontier in Slavonia continued to be financed from mukataa sources.⁴⁷⁸ Subsequently, in the 1550s, this process of timarification was also applied to the fortresses in the sancaks of Buda. The ağas in the fortresses had already been granted zeamet and timar immediately after the conquest. In contrast to the 1543 borders, the province of Buda had been expanded through the acquisition of new territories, and the garrisons of the fortresses situated in the interior, which were relatively distant from the frontier, were also directly granted salary timar.

The distribution of salary timar became a standard practice among the Ottomans in the 1550s, with the objective of reducing the overall financial burden of the province of Buda. Additionally, the cavalry and volunteers stationed in the fortresses were also bestowed timar from the newly conquered territories, thereby establishing a new army of sipahi with timar. Whereas in the early 1540s the Ottomans

⁴⁷⁸ As late as the mid-1540s, the fortresses in Slavonia continued to receive annual remittances of nearly 2,500,000 akçe from mukataa sources. The fortresses of Bac, Somobor, Martinos, Sekçöy, Valpovo and Sikloş in the sancaks of Segedin and Mohács also received substantial allocations from the mukataa revenues in 1546–47 (MAD 166 and 7337). Furthermore, the network of fortresses established after the Ottoman advance in the north of the Sava west of Požega sancak continued to be financed by these mukata sources. This region, which had previously been part of the Bosnian sancak, was to be established as an independent sancak in the mid-1550s. For a detailed survey on this new sancak on the Habsburg border, see: Okan Büyüktapu, *Ottoman Garrisons in Western Slavonia (1550–1680)*, (Unpublished PhD diss., University of Zagreb, 2022).

were obliged to maintain a garrison of 16,000 men, including Srem and Požega, with cash salaries, they were only paying for a garrison force of 10,500-11,000 men by the end of the 1550s. This implies that at least 3,000-4,000 men, including those from the southern sancaks, were allocated timar from the 1540s to the end of the 1550s.

In order to provide a more accurate comparison, it is necessary to consider the total number of garrisons in the mid-1550s in the two Hungarian provinces of Buda and Temeşvar, in addition to those receiving salary timars. This figure may have been slightly higher than the previous estimates, which suggested a total of around 14,000.⁴⁷⁹ Therefore, it is possible that the actual number of garrisons in the mid-1550s was between 16,000 and 18,000. This discrepancy was due the fact that the previous estimates did not incorporate the Ottoman fortresses in Slavonia and Bosnia, which also encompassed a considerable number of fortresses and garrison soldiers.⁴⁸⁰ These figures appear to correspond with the garrison forces in Habsburg fortresses during the same period. In 1556, the Habsburg garrison troops numbered 16,982 (8,978 infantry and 8,004 cavalry) and were stationed in 50 fortresses extending from Croatia to Transylvania.⁴⁸¹ However, these figures represent only the garrison soldiers. Furthermore, the potential 6,000 to 7,000 sipahi with retainers and the 4,000 Hungarian

⁴⁷⁹ Ágoston, "Ottoman Conquest and the Ottoman Military Frontier in Hungary," 92–93; Ágoston, "The Costs of the Ottoman Fortress-System in Hungary", 208.

⁴⁸⁰ It is possible that the equation should be augmented by the number of garrisons in the nearly 30 fortresses in the sancaks of Bosnia, Klis and Zajasna (Pakric). No archival source exists for the number of garrisons in Bosnia in the mid-1550s. Nevertheless, a roll-call register prepared in 1562 may permit a retrospective commentary. MAD 5413. The aforementioned list indicates that the 36 fortresses in Bosnia, Zajasna and Klis collectively comprised a garrison force of 3,210 men. If we exclude fortresses such as Kostajnica and Novi, which had not yet been captured by the Ottomans until 1556 (in 1562 there were 544 garrison soldiers in these two fortresses alone), we can assume that there were approximately 2,500 garrison soldiers on the Bosnian and Klis frontier. For comparison, in 1556 the Habsburgs had a garrison of 3,150 men on the Croatian and Slavonian frontier (corresponding to Klis, Bosnia, Zajasna and Požega). Pálffy, "The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire," 27; Pálffy, *The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 99. If we consider the Ottoman garrisons in Požega, it appears that the garrison strength of the Habsburgs and Ottomans on this side of the border was approximately equivalent.

⁴⁸¹ Pálffy, "The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire," 27; Pálffy, *The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 99.

soldiers serving in the *banderia* of the Hungarian aristocrats should be added in the equation.⁴⁸² Thus, at the outset of the second half of the sixteenth century, the two powers collectively possessed a military potential of approximately 40,000 troops.

The functioning and financing of the network of Ottoman fortresses was established as a result of the rapid Ottoman conquests from the 1520s onwards, and the methods the Ottomans employed to deal with financial difficulties, ultimately demonstrate a systematic continuity. The primary aim of Ottoman bureaucrats in regard to conquests was to maintain continuity in the region, just as in other provinces, through the implementation of the timar system. Therefore, the Ottoman concept of "frontier" from an economic perspective using the timar system as a lens comes to the forefront.

The frontier was comprised of areas where the timar system was either inapplicable or could not be implemented effectively. From this perspective, it is possible to establish a straightforward financial equation for the 16th century. If the fortresses were staffed by salaried personnel, the region was considered a *serhad*/frontier. However, if they were financed by timar, the region was no longer considered a frontier.

⁴⁸² Ágoston, "Ottoman Conquest and the Ottoman Military Frontier in Hungary," 93.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Most studies on the Ottoman frontier organization concentrate on the military and financial structures of the two powers competing for dominance over Hungary in the post-Mohács period: The Ottomans and Habsburgs. These studies share a common focus on military matters between the 16th and 18th centuries. No research had explored the pre-Mohács Ottoman military structure within its network of fortresses and frontier sancaks. This network included over 30 fortresses with thousands of regular garrison soldiers and a well-established financing system since the 1470s. This research precisely uncovers the state and transformation of the Ottoman frontier organization in the late 15th and early 16th centuries, as well as the financing mechanism and institutional continuity of the new network of fortresses established after the 1540s.

An overview of the Ottoman Empire's expansion in Bosnia, Croatia, Srem (Szerémség/Srem), and eventually Central Hungary during the late 15th and early 16th centuries is provided, focusing on the formation and evolution of frontier organizations, the transformation of fortress structures, and the financing of these endeavors. The capture of numerous fortresses during this period is mapped, illustrating the progress of the Ottoman Empire's expansion. Additionally, the

reorganization of the former Hungarian defensive network into a hinterland by the empire between 1521 and 1543 is analyzed, coinciding with significant territorial gains in the west. The Ottomans captured numerous fortifications in Syrmium, Bosnia, and Croatia, restoring and utilizing only those deemed significant while destroying the majority, except in critical areas where sufficient garrisons were stationed. Notably, no new fortresses were constructed during this period; existing fortresses were refurbished or modernized without causing significant financial difficulties for the Ottomans.

From the 1470s to 1512, the Ottoman-Hungarian frontier saw no territorial gains for either side, resulting in stable borders. The differing military and financial capacities of Hungary and the Ottoman Empire are highlighted, with Hungary facing financial difficulties in maintaining its army and defense network in the south following Matthias Corvinus's death, while the Ottomans sustained their military force on the borders without financial strain. In the 1510s, the southern garrison alone consumed over half of Hungary's national treasury, whereas the Ottomans allocated only one-eighth of central treasury revenues to finance frontier garrisons. The larger and more effective Ottoman military force on the borders was supported by direct land revenue allocations to the sipahis through the timar system.

Following Bayezid II's abdication in favor of his son Selim, the empire's territories doubled due to Selim's brief but decisive eastern campaigns, significantly enlarging the central treasury. State revenues averaged between 70 and 80 million akçe during Bayezid II's reign, increasing up to 130 million akçe by Sultan Selim's death. This expansion transformed the Ottomans into a Mediterranean Empire with the financial capability to conduct uninterrupted military campaigns. After Selim's death,

Sultan Süleyman inherited a sound financial system and a strong army, claiming to be a world emperor.

Between Mehmed II's Bosnian campaign in 1463 and Sultan Suleiman's first expedition to Belgrade in 1521, no Ottoman sultan had led an expedition to Hungary with their central army. The sancakbeyis of Bosnia, Izvornik, and Semandira were responsible for conquests in Bosnia, Croatia, and Srem, except for battles fought between the 1470s and 1512. The Yahyapaşazades in İzvornik and Semendire, as well as Hüsrev Bey's clan in Bosnia, played crucial roles in implementing Ottoman expansionist policy through constant conquests. During Sultan Süleyman's reign, this policy underwent changes. From Sultan Selim's accession to the annexation of Budin in 1541, the sancakbeyis of Bosnia and Semendire, along with their military retinue and timariot sipahis, conquered an area of almost 28,000 km², equivalent to modern-day Albania or Belgium. The geography of these conquests was surrounded by long-standing fortified settlements established by the Hungarians.

The dynamics of the timariot army in the post-Mohács era are examined, with a specific focus on military transformation within the frontier districts of Semendria and Bosnia. The prelude to the Ottoman-Habsburg struggle and the potential Ottoman army available for western campaigns during this period are assessed. Drawing on undated documents from 1530 to 1532, the size of the Rumelian timariot army during the 1532 campaign is analysed, along with the factors contributing to the growth of the timariot army in frontier regions. The emergence of distinct frontier power-holder typologies exemplified by clans such as the Hüsrev Bey and Yahyalı clans is detailed. The study also focuses on the substantial entourage commanded by these governors, their integration into the timar system, their role in raids, and the magnitude of the

slavery-based economy. An overview of the typology of frontier soldiers and leaders of raids in Croatia is provided. Consequently, the raiding groups in Bosnia and Semendria deviated significantly from the conventional *akıncı* archetype during the 16th century.

Newly uncovered archival documents in Istanbul reveal the precise number of timariot sipahis that formed the core of the Ottoman army. While the number of kılıç timars in Rumelia remained stable with the late 1520s, only the sancaks of Bosnia and Semendria experienced a significant rise in the number of sipahis after 1529, coinciding with the failure of the Vienna Campaign. This increase may be explained by the formation of a compact interventionist army in Hungary. The rise in the number of sipahis in Semendria and Bosnia was not due to ongoing conquests but rather new revenue streams for the timar prebends, such as removing tax exemptions for the Vlachs and voynuks or allocating *çiftlik* revenues to the sipahis. Between 1526 and 1532, the number of timariot sipahis in Bosnia and Semendria doubled, supported by thousands of paid garrison troops and janissaries stationed in fortresses along the Danube. This strategy allowed the Ottomans to maintain a formidable military presence along their western frontiers, enabling them to carry out extensive military campaigns across the eastern territories and the Mediterranean region. Various archival sources reveal the rise of new frontier lords and the growth of the sipahi army during the early years of the prolonged Ottoman-Habsburg conflict.

The development of the Ottoman frontier organization from the late 15th to mid 16th century is examined, with a particular focus on the financial systems and methods employed to maintain frontier fortresses. This study elaborates on the havale method, which involves assigning individuals to transfer money through mukataa

sources, timar allocation for fortress guards, and direct cash distribution from the central treasury, investigating the evolution of these methods over time. Historians have often disregarded the financial strain of the Ottoman frontier organization prior to the acquisition of Buda. The period between the late 15th century and 1541, during which the Ottomans established a strong chain of fortresses and incurred substantial expenses, has not been thoroughly explored. This study endeavors to provide a comprehensive understanding of the Ottoman frontier organization during this era.

Unlike earlier research focused on specific regions such as the Ottoman Bosnia or Ottoman Hungary, this study explores how the network of fortifications established after the Ottomans' rapid conquests commencing in the 1520s was funded and managed. The timar system was implemented to preserve continuity in the area, as per the ultimate objective of Ottoman officials. Investigating the Ottoman concept of "frontier" from an economic perspective using the timar system as a lens proves beneficial.

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APPENDICES



APPENDIX I

Paper Strength of Ottoman Provincial Cavalry in all Provinces and Total Timar Allocations ca. 1530⁴⁸³

The Total (Number of timariot forces) in the Well Protected Domains (*memalik-i mahruse*) Excluding the Province of Egypt:

Governor-generals (*beylerbeyis*), governors

(*sancakbeyis*), zeamet holders, sipahis with

the retainers (*cebelü*) 81,359

From:

Governor-generals (*mirmiran*) 6

Governors (*ümera*) 114

- Sipahi governors (*sancakbeyis*) 81

- Governors of Kurds 17

- Müsellem 4

- Piyade 12

Zeamet holders 913

Sipahis 28,446

⁴⁸³ Apart from the number of sipahis and their retainers, the document also includes the number of fortresses and guards with salary timars in four provinces (Rumelia, Anatolia, Karaman and Rum) and piyade-müsellem troops of Anatolia who were required to join the campaigns (TSMA d. 9439, 2b). Fortresses and guards of the mentioned provinces who receive timar: fortresses: 199, fortress commander (*dizdar*): 197, fortress guards with stewards (*kethüda*), artillerymen, etc.: 9,095 (9,292 total); total (annual) revenue: 13,963,489 (akçe). The province of Rumelia: fortress: 130, fortress commander: 130, fortress guards with stewards and cami/mescid employees: 6,249, artillerymen: 153, çiftlik owners, tax-exempted ones and captains: 36, total: 6,568; total (annual) revenue: 10,082,683 (akçe). The province of Anatolia: fortress: 38, fortress commanders: 38, fortress guards with stewards, artillerymen, etc.: 1,664, total: 1,702; total (annual) revenue: 2,340,468 (akçe). The province of Karaman: fortress: 7, fortress commander: 7, fortress guards with stewards, artillerymen, etc.: 463, total: 470; total (annual) revenue: 734,192 (akçe). The province of Rum: fortress: 24, fortress commander (*dizdar*): 22, fortress guards with the others: 530, total: 552; total (annual) revenue: 806,146 (akçe). *Müsellems* of Anatolia (4 sancaks): Obligated to join military campaigns every year: 3,164. *Piyades* of Anatolia (12 sancaks): Obligated to join military campaigns every year: 7,293, total (*piyade* and *müsellem* of Anatolia obligated to join military campaigns every year): 10,457.

Total: Governor-generals, governors, zeamet

holders and sipahis 29,479⁴⁸⁴

- Their retainers (*cebelü*) 51,880

Total revenue: 185,824,727 (akçe)⁴⁸⁵

Province of Rumelia

Governors with governor-general 29

Zeamet holders 387

Sipahis 10,311⁴⁸⁶

Retainers 22,113

Total 32,840

Total revenue 75,044,182 (akçe)⁴⁸⁷

Province of Anatolia

Governors with governor-general 15

Governors of the *piyades* and *müsellems* 16

Zeamet holders: 195

Sipahis: 7,311⁴⁸⁸

Retainers: 10,708⁴⁸⁹

Total: 18,245

⁴⁸⁴ In 1527–28: 28,088. Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait,” 255.

⁴⁸⁵ In 1527–28: 185,625,804 akçe. Ibid., 255.

⁴⁸⁶ Zeamet holders and sipahis in total: 10,698. The total number of zeamets and timars were 10,668 in 1533. Compare Ibid., 281.

⁴⁸⁷ In 1527–28 the total revenues were 82,452,427 akçe. Ibid., 281.

⁴⁸⁸ In 1527–28 total number is 7,536. Ibid., 281. According to the timar roll-call register of the province of Anatolia (MAD 152) in late 1530, the number is 7,629. Lastly, the figures are the same as in the account book of the province of Anatolia, which was compiled in late 1530. See: Ahmet Özkılınç et. al., *438 Numaralı*, 1.

⁴⁸⁹ The number of retainers in 1530 was 5,372. The difference between two registers (TSMA d. 9439 and MAD 152) is 5,336 retainers. The reason for this difference was the register prepared at the end of 1530 did not include the retainers of sancakbeyis and governor-general. In 1530, the total hass allocated to the beylerbeyi and sancakbeyis in the province of Anatolia was 5,265,866 akçe. Ibid., 1.

Total revenue: 37,311,160 (akçe)⁴⁹⁰

The Province of Karaman with the province of Dulkadir⁴⁹¹

Governors with governor-general 8

Zeamet holders 147

Sipahis 3,902

Retainers 4,106

Total 8,163

Total revenue 17,403,044 (akçe)

Province of Rum

Governors with governor-general 10

Zeamet holders 75

Sipahis 3,669

Retainers 5,696

Total: 9,450

Total Revenue: 19,187,327 (akçe)

Province of Diyarbekir⁴⁹²

Governors with governor-general 12

Governors of Kurds 17

Zeamet holders 43

Sipahis 1,057

Retainers 3,882

⁴⁹⁰ In the 1527–28 budget the total revenue was 35,735,733 akçe. Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait,” 281.

⁴⁹¹ In the 1527–28 budget, the number of zeamet holders and sipahis of Karaman, Dulkadir, and Rum were given altogether (6,318). Ibid., 281. Our source, on the other hand, gives a total of 7,793 persons. Also, the total revenues were 33,976,733 akçe in 1527–28. The revenues which were allocated to zeamet and timar holders in Karaman, Dulkadir and Rum was 36,590,371 akçe in 1530.

⁴⁹² The total number of zeamet holders, sipahis with governors and the governor-general in the 1527–28 budget is 1,071. Ibid., 285.

Total	5,011
Total revenue:	16,955,833 (akçe) ⁴⁹³
Province of Şam ⁴⁹⁴	
Governors with governor-general	13
Zeamet holders	66
Sipahis	2,196
Retainers	5,375
Total	7,650
Total revenue	19,902,581 (akçe) ⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹³ In 1527–28 14,291,670 akçe. *Ibid.*, 285. In 1530: 16,231,964 akçe. Özkılınç et. al., *998 Numaralı* 33.

⁴⁹⁴ The numbers in the 1527–28 budget and this register are the same: 2,275. The figures in the list are also same as in 1530. *Ibid.*, 28.

⁴⁹⁵ In the budget of 1527–28 the revenue is 19,169,296 akçe. Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Mali Yılına Ait,” 255. In 1530: 19,112,332 akçe. Özkılınç et. al., *998 Numaralı*, 28.

APPENDIX II

Paper Strength of Ottoman Provincial Cavalry and Garrison Soldiers with Salary Timars in all Provinces and Total Timar Allocations ca. 1530 (Turkish version)

Cem'ân

Der Memâlik-i Mahrûse gayr-i ez-Mısır

Mirmirân ve ümerâ ve zü'emâ ve sipâhiyân ma' cebelüyân-i işân
nefer: seksen bir bin üç yüz elli dokuz (81,359)

Minhâ

Mirmirân, nefer: altı (6)

Ümerâ, yüz on dört (114)

Ümerâ-i süvâri, nefer: seksen bir (81)

Ümerâ-i Ekrâd, nefer: on yedi (17)

Ümerâ-i müselle mân, nefer: dört (4), piyadegân nefer: on iki (12)

Zü'emâ, nefer: dokuz yüz on üç (913)

Sipahiyân, nefer: yirmi sekiz bin dört yüz kırk altı (28,446)

Yekûn

Mirmirân ve ümerâ ve zü'emâ ve sipâhiyân, nefer: yirmi dokuz bin dört yüz yetmiş dokuz (29,479)

Cebelüyân-i işân: elli bir bin sekiz yüz seksen (51,880)

Hâsıl mecmû'en: bin sekiz yüz elli sekiz yük ve yirmi dört bin yedi yüz yirmi yedi akçe (185, 824,727)

Minhâ

Der vilâyet-i Rumili

Ümerâ ma' mirmirân, nefer: yirmi dokuz (29)

Zü'emâ, nefer: üç yüz seksen yedi (387)

Sipâhiyân, nefer: on bin üç yüz on bir (10,311)

Cebelüyân, nefer: yirmi iki bin yüz on üç (22,113)

Yekûn, nefer: otuz iki bin sekiz yüz kırk (32,840)

Hâsıl: yedi yüz elli yük ve kırk dört bin yüz seksen iki akçe (75,044,182)

Der vilâyet-i Anadolu

Ümerâ ma' mirmirân, nefer: on beş (15)

Ümerâ-i müselleme ve piyâde, nefer: on altı (16)

Zü'emâ, nefer: yüz doksan beş (195)

Sipâhiyân, nefer: yedi bin üç yüz on bir (7,311)

Cebelüyân, nefer: on bin yedi yüz sekiz (10,708)

Yekûn, nefer: on sekiz bin iki yüz kırk beş (18,245)

Hâsıl: üç yüz yetmiş üç yük ve on bir bin yüz altmış akçe (37,311,160)

2)

Der vilâyet-i Karaman ma' vilâyet-i Zulkadriye

Ümerâ ma' mirmirân, nefer: sekiz (8)

Zü'emâ, nefer: yüz kırk yedi (147)

Sipâhiyân, nefer: üç bin dokuz yüz iki (3,902)

Cebelüyân, nefer: dört bin yüz altı (4,106)

Yekûn, nefer: sekiz bin yüz altmış üç (8,163)

Hâsıl: Yüz yetmiş dört yük ve üç bin kırk dört akçe (17,403,044)

Der vilâyet-i Rum

Ümerâ ma' mirmirân, nefer: on (10)

Zü'emâ, nefer: yetmiş beş (75)

Sipâhiyân, nefer: üç bin altı yüz altmış dokuz (3,669)

Cebelüyân, nefer: beş bin altı yüz doksan altı (5,696)

Yekûn, nefer: dokuz bin dört yüz elli (9,450)

Hâsıl: yüz doksan bir yük ve seksen yedi bin üç yüz yirmi yedi akçe (19,187,327)

Der vilâyet-i Diyarbekir

Ümerâ-i süvârî ma' mirmirân, nefer: on iki (12)

Ümerâ-i Ekrâd, nefer: on yedi (17)

Zü'emâ, nefer: kırk üç (43)

Sipâhiyân, nefer: bin elli yedi (1,057)

Cebelüyân, nefer: üç bin sekiz yüz seksen iki (3,882)

Yekûn, nefer: beş bin on bir (5,011)

Hâsıl: yüz altmış dokuz yük ve elli beş bin sekiz yüz otuz üç akçe (16,955,833)

Der vilâyet-i Şam

Ümerâ ma' mirmirân, nefer: on üç (13)

Zü'emâ, nefer: altmış altı (66)

Sipâhiyân, nefer: iki bin yüz doksan altı (2,196)

Cebelüyân, nefer: beş bin üç yüz yetmiş beş (5,375)

Yekûn, nefer: yedi bin altı yüz elli (7,650)

Hâsıl: yüz doksan dokuz yük ve yirmi iki bin beş yüz seksen bir akçe (19,902,581)

2b)

Cem'ân

Kılâ' ve müstahfizân-i vilâyet-i mezkûre ki timar tasarruf iderler

Kılâ': yüz doksan dokuz (199) adet

Dizdâr, nefer: 197 (197)

müstahfizân ma' kethüdâ ve topçuyân ve e'imme ve gayrihim: dokuz bin doksan beş nefer (9,095)

Hâsıl: yüz otuz dokuz yüz ve altmış üç bin dört yüz seksen dokuz akçe (13,963,489)

Minhâ

Der vilâyet-i Rumili

Kılâ': yüz otuz (130) adet

Dizdar: yüz otuz (130) nefer

müstahfızân ma' kethüdâ ve e'imme ve hatibâ: altı bin iki yüz kırk dokuz nefer

(6,249)

Yekûn nefer: alt bin beş yüz altmış sekiz nefer (6,568)

Hâsıl: yüz yük ve seksen iki bin altı yüz seksen üç akçe (10,082,683)

Der vilâyet-i Anadolu

Kılâ': otuz sekiz (38) adet

Dizdar: otuz sekiz (38) nefer

müstahfızân ma' kethüdâ ve topçuyân ve e'imme gayrihim: bin altı yüz altmış dört nefer (1,664)

Yekûn, nefer: bin yedi yüz iki (1,702)

Hâsıl: yirmi üç yük ve kırk bin dört yüz altmış sekiz akçe (2,340,468)

Der vilâyet-i Karaman

Kılâ': yedi (7) adet

Dizdar: yedi (7) nefer

müstahfızân ma' kethüdâ ve topçuyân ve gayrihim: dört yüz altmış üç (463) nefer

Yekûn, nefer: dört yüz yetmiş (470)

Hâsıl: yedi yük ve otuz dört bin yüz doksan iki akçe (734,192)

Der vilâyet-i Rum

Kılâ': yirmi dört (24) adet

Dizdar: yirmi iki (22) nefer

müstahfızân ma' sâyire: beş yüz otuz (530) nefer

Yekûn, nefer: beş yüz elli iki (552)

Hâsıl: sekiz yük ve altı bin yüz kırk altı akçe (806,146)

Müsellemân-i vilâyet-i Anadolu ki dört sancaktır

Nevbetlü müsellem, nefer: üç bin yüz altmış dört (3,164)

Piyâdegân-i vilâyet-i Anadolu ki on iki sancaktır

Nevbetlü piyâde: yedi bin iki yüz doksan üç nefer (7,293)

Cem'ân

Nefer: on bin dört yüz elli yedi (10,457)

APPENDIX III

Prebend Holders and Their Retainers' Ratio in whole Provinces (TSMA d. 9439)

Province	Prebend Holders	Retainers	Ratio
Rumelia	10,698	22,113	1:2
Anatolia	7,506	10,708	1:1,4
Karaman & Dulkadir	4,049	4,106	1:1
Rum	3,744	5,696	1: 1,5
Diyarbakir	1,100	3,882	1:3,5
Şam	2,262	5,375	1: 3

APPENDIX IV

The Number of Zeamet and Timar Holders and Total Timar Revenues in the Sancaks of Bosnia and Semendria (1516–1550)**

Semendria***

Year	0–1,999	2,000–2,999	3,000–3,999	4,000–4,999	5,000–5,999	6,000–9,999	10,000–19,999	20,000 and above	Total	Total revenue (akçe)
1516 ⁴⁹⁶	89	45	14	17	16	13	15	5	213	883,928
1528 ⁴⁹⁷	39	46	34	34	40	37	11	13	254	1,431,335
1530 ⁴⁹⁸	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	234	1,408,116
1532 ⁴⁹⁹	86	174	126	87	108	73	49	22	725	3,805,358
1533 ⁵⁰⁰	131	149	115	73	86	73	28	25	680	No data

Bosnia

Year	0–1,999	2,000–2,999	3,000–3,999	4,000–4,999	5,000–5,999	6,000–9,999	10,000–19,999	20,000 and above	Total	Total revenue (akçe)
1516 ⁵⁰¹	69	67	41	26	44	69	31	16	363	2,258,571
1530 ⁵⁰²	137	178	111	72	63	72	25	17	674	3,036,405
1532 ⁵⁰³	110	169	144	95	74	90	34	16	732	3,484,655
1533 ⁵⁰⁴	147	174	166	68	53	76	27	17	728	No data
1540 ⁵⁰⁵	79	193	110	66	60	83	28	13	632	2,906,313
1550 ⁵⁰⁶	63	177	141	62	62	68	20	16	609	2,807,170

** Timars given to judges (*kadı*) and fortress guards are excluded.

*** Collective timars with special category (*baştina*) given to Christians (*timar-i zimmiyan-i cebelüyan*) were also included.

⁴⁹⁶ TT d. 1007. Hasses of Bali Bey, son of Yahya Paşa: 624,773 akçe.

⁴⁹⁷ Hasses of Mehmed Bey, son of Yahya Paşa: 550,840 akçe.

⁴⁹⁸ MAD 506. Hasses of Mehmed Bey, son of Yahya Paşa: 650,840 akçe.

⁴⁹⁹ TSMA d. 2204, 38b–49b, 58a–69a.

⁵⁰⁰ TSMA d. 734/8, 8b. The data was taken from Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait,” 301.

⁵⁰¹ TT d. 56. Hasses of Mustafa Paşa: 739,593 akçe.

⁵⁰² TT d. 164. Hasses of Hüsrev Bey: 643,979 akçe. Also compare with Yardımcı: Mehmed Emin Yardımcı *15. ve 16. Yüzyılda Bir Osmanlı Livası Bosna*. İstanbul, 2006, 125–126, 131 and appendix 3–table 11). He used detailed (*mufassal*) tahrir register for the year 1530 (TT d. 157). Yet, the register seems incomplete since he only listed 209 sipahis based on the register.

⁵⁰³ TSMA d. 6807, 2b; TSMA d. 4175, 1a–16b; TSMA d. 5532, 1a–3b, TSMA d. 5535, 1a–9b. Hasses of Hüsrev Bey: 655,000 akçe.

⁵⁰⁴ TSMA d. 734/8. The data was taken from Barkan, “H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Malî Yılına Ait,” 301.

⁵⁰⁵ TT d. 201. Hasses of Hüsrev Bey: 800,831 akçe.

⁵⁰⁶ TKGM d. 370. Hasses of Ali Bey: 595, 466 akçe. Note that many subdistricts (*nahiye*) were gradually attached to Kilis sancak that was established in 1538. That is why there is a gradual decrease in both the number of sipahis and total timar revenues starting with the year 1550 since old sipahis of Bosnia were now the new timariots of Klis. For the administrative subdivisions of Bosnia and Klis, see Behija Zlatar, *Opširni Popis Kliš Sandžaka iz 1550. Godine*, XIII–XV; Hatice Oruç,

APPENDIX V

Timarification Process of the Fortresses in Bosnia (1516–1550)

Fortress	1516 (number of garrison)	Payment	1530 (number of garrison)	Payment	1540 (number of garrison)	payment	1550 (number of garrison)	payment
Zvečan	20	32,102	20	31,420 (timar)	⁵⁰⁷	-	14	23,531
Jeleč	23	34,210	17	28,433 (timar)	⁵⁰⁸	-	-	-
Dobrun	21	31,730	20	31,924 (timar)	20	30,001 (timar)	20	30,646
Višegrad	21	32,658	17	33,199 (timar)	18	32,752 (timar)	8	15,433
Kličevac	20	30,359	19	29,720 (timar)	⁵⁰⁹	-	-	-
Hodidjed	36	52,455	31	48,431,5 (timar)	32	47,883 (timar)	34	49,748
Dubrovnik	56	82,238	32	48,026 (timar)	26	38,816 (timar)	16	25,602
Bobovac	58	79,047	25	38,569 (timar)	⁵¹⁰	-	-	-

“Administrative Division of the Bosnian Sandjak in the 16th Century,” *OTAM* 25 (2009), 106–107. In 1550, there were 3 zeamet holders and 163 sipahis in Klis and total timar revenue which were allocated to them reached 697,359 akçe: TTd. 284.

⁵⁰⁷ Written as destroyed in 1540 but later shows up in 1550 in the sancak of Bosnia.

⁵⁰⁸ Destroyed.

⁵⁰⁹ Destroyed.

⁵¹⁰ Destroyed

Vrh Bilice	24	37,618	16	26,087 (timar)	⁵¹¹	-	-	-
Travnik	103	142,775	47	72,252 (timar)	37	57,921 (timar)	20	32,356
Prozor	26	38,403	17	22,905,5 (timar)	19	24,559 (timar)	13	15,537
Prusac	61	81,628	58	84,921 (timar)	42	60,545 (timar)	41	60,066
Susjedi	28	41,037	19	29,620 (timar)	⁵¹²	-	16	22,320
Vranduk	36	54,951	29	40,450 (timar)	21	30,424 (timar)	16	21,320
Toričani	unkown	ulufe	32	50,310 (timar)	⁵¹³	-	-	-
Kaštel	unknown	ulufe	20	27,323 (timar)	20	29,931 (timar)	20	26,434
Sokol	unknown	ulufe	20	32,183 (timar)	20	31,519 (timar)	14	23,242
Komotin	unknown	ulufe	28	43,237 (timar)	⁵¹⁴	-	-	-
Vinac	unknown	ulufe	33	45,938 (timar)	23	30,773 (timar)	13	18,114
Jezero (Gölhisar)	not yet taken	ulufe	45	69,911 (timar)	⁵¹⁵	-	10	18,122
Maglaj	unknown	ulufe	29	41,105 (timar)	29	38,051 (timar)	19	24,993

⁵¹¹ Destroyed

⁵¹² Written as destroyed in 1540, but later shows up in 1550 in the sancak of Klis.

⁵¹³ Destroyed

⁵¹⁴ Destroyed.

⁵¹⁵ Written as destroyed in 1540, but later shows up in 1550 in the sancak of Klis.

Livno	unknown	ulufe	25	34,725 (timar)	29	38,300 (timar)	22	37,191
Beograd	unknown	ulufe	13	22,240 (timar)	14	23,434 (timar)	17	19,221
Nečven	unknown	ulufe	24	38,775 (timar)	25	37,981 (timar)	22	32,474
Sinj	unknown	ulufe	45	61,950 (timar)	43	61,863 (timar)	45	58,292
Vrlika	unknown	ulufe	17	27,396 (timar)	18	25,986 (timar)	20	24,626
Drniš	unknown	ulufe	9	16,455 (timar)	11	15,834 (timar)	10	12,192
Jajce	Not yet taken	ulufe	100	162,772,5 (timar)	115	180,341 (timar)	101	148,362
Doboj	unknown	ulufe	50	83,012 (ulufe)	20	32,330 (timar)	11	19,360
Ključ	unknown	ulufe	46	98,056 (ulufe)	ulufe	unknown	ulufe	unknown
Kamengrad	unknown	ulufe	139	289.216 (ulufe)	ulufe	unknown	ulufe	unknown
Kotor	unknown	ulufe	29	48,496 (ulufe)	18	31,987 (timar)	13	21,735
Tesanj	unknown	ulufe	41	64,428 (ulufe)	20	30,386 (timar)	17	23,172
Bočac	unknown	ulufe	57	91,508 (ulufe)	15	23,609 (timar)	16	23,605
Udbina	Not yet taken	-	107	170,980 (ulufe)	ulufe	ulufe	ulufe	unknown
Karin	Not yet taken	-	35	47,788 (ulufe)	ulufe	ulufe	ulufe	unknown

Obrovac	Not yet taken	-	107	165,316 (ulufe)	ulufe	ulufe	ulufe	unknown
Ostrovica	Not yet taken Not yet taken	-	49	70,800 (ulufe)	ulufe	ulufe	ulufe	unknown
Skradin	Not yet taken	-	107	155,404 (ulufe)	ulufe	ulufe	ulufe	unknown
Knin	Not yet taken	-	38	62,304 (ulufe)	39	54,296 (timar)	25	32,909
Zvečaj	Not yet taken	-	18	27,612 (ulufe)	⁵¹⁶	-	-	-
Banja Luka	Not yet taken	-	105	169,212 (ulufe)	41	63,520 (timar)	27	40,940
Novigrad	Not yet taken	-	73	111,864 (ulufe)	unknown	ulufe	unknown	ulufe
Bilaj	Not yet taken	-	55	87,436 (ulufe)	Unkown	Ulufe	Unknown	ulufe
Kličevica	Not yet taken	-	32	44,604 (ulufe)	⁵¹⁷	-	-	-
Kobaš	Not yet taken	-			ulufe		⁵¹⁸	
Dobor	Not yet taken	-	-	-	20	31,417 (timar)	12	20,228 (timar)
Gradiška	Not yet taken	-	-	-	unkown	ulufe	108	154,090 (timar)

⁵¹⁶ The fortress is not listed nor in 1540 neither in 1550. It should be destroyed before 1540.


⁵¹⁷ Destroyed between 1540–1550.

⁵¹⁸ Destroyed before 1550.

Total	533 garrison soldiers with timar (salaried troops with ulufe not spesified)	771,211 akçe (timar)	807 garrison soldiers with timar; 1,088 garrison soldiers with ulufe: 1,895 total	1,240,278,5 akçe timar; 1,788,036 akçe ulufe: total 3,028,314,50 akçe	736 garrison soldiers with timar (salaried troops with cash not spesified)	1,104,459 akçe timar	740 garrison soldiers with timar(salaried troops with cash not spesified)	1,077,861 akçe timar

APPENDIX VI

Distribution of Revenues in the sancak of Bosnia (1516–1550)⁵¹⁹



⁵¹⁹ Data on Klis and Bosnia were taken together for the year 1550.

APPENDIX VII

Course of Action on the Mobilization of Sipahi Troops in Rumelia Suggested to the Sultan by Ayas Paşa Before the Irakeyn Campaign, circa 1533–1534 (TSMA d. 10215)

Vilâyet-i Rumilinin subaşıları ve cümle sipâhîleri on bir bin beş yüz (11,500) neferdir ve bu cümleden **Semendire** ve **Bosna** ve **İzvornik** sancaklarının subaşıları ve sipâhîleri beğleri ile eşegelmeyüb sancakların hıfz ıde gelenler bin beş yüz elli dokuz (1,559) neferdir. Ve bunlardan gayri dââyîma sefer-i humâyûn vâki' oldukda eşegelen subaşılar ve ve sipâhîler beğleri ile cümle dokuz bin dokuz yüz kırk (9,940) neferdir. Ve işbu zikrolan sefer-i humâyûna eşe gelen subaşılarından ve sipâhîlerden hâliyâ muhafazat için alıkonulması lâzım gelen subaşılar ve sipâhîler beş bin altı yüz yetmiş bir (5,671) neferdir. Ve bâkî sefer-i humâyûna eşecek dört bin iki yüz yetmiş (4,270) neferdir.

Kaziyye

Mora vilâyeti muhâfazasıyçün konulacak Mora sancağının subaşıları ve cümle sipâhîleri ile bin dokuz yüz kırk (1,940) neferdir. Mora sancağının subaşıları ve sipâhîleri sekiz yüz otuz dokuz (839) neferdir. **Tırhala** ve **Köstendil** sancaklarının ve **Paşa** sancağının otuz üç kadılığında üç binden aşağı olan sipâhîleri bin yüz bir (1,101) neferdir.

Ve mezkur Mora sancağı beği kendüye mu'âvenete koşulan 'askeriyle hemân Mora sancağı hıfzında olmayub şöyle ki **Yanine** (Yanya) ve **Karlı İli** sancaklarının deryâ kenârında olan kal'alarından birine küffâr-i hâksârın nev'ân teveccühü ve üşmesi ve galebesi istimâ' oluna kendüye koşulan 'askerden kifâyet kadarına bir subaşı baş koşub irsâl eyleye.

Kaziyye

Avlonya vilâyeti muhafazasıyçün ta'yîn olunacak Avlonya sancağının subaşıları ve cümle sipâhîleri ile bin yüz yetmiş (1,170) neferdir.

Avlonya sancağının subaşıları ve sipâhîleri altı yüz seksen altı (686) neferdir.

Ohri ve **Prizren** sancaklarının ve Paşa sancağına tâbi' Filorina kadılığının üç binden aşağı sipâhîleri dört yüz on dokuz (419) neferdir.

Ve mezkûr Avlonya beği dahi kendüye koşulan 'askeriyle hemân Avlonya sancağı hıfzında olmayub etrâfında ve kurbında olan kal'alardan birine küffâr-i hâksârın üşmesi istimâ' oluna kifâyet kadarına bir subaşı baş koşub irsâl eyleye.

Kaziyye

Eğriboz sancağının subaşıları ve sipâhîleri cümle iki yüz (200) neferdir. Zikrolan sancağın ikişer kal'alari deryâ kenârında vâki' olmağın beğleri subaşıları ve sipâhîleri ile eşmeyüb oturub muhâfazada olalar ve kurbında mu'âvenete lâzım gelür yerlere varub mu'âvenet ideler.

Kaziyye

İnebahtı sancağının üç binden aşağı olan sipâhîleri yüz elli sekiz (158) neferdir. İşbu zikrolan sipâhîleri eşmeyüb oturub beğleri ile sancağı muhâfazasında olalar ve bunlardan mâ'ada üç binden yukarı olan sipâhîler ve subaşılar Tırhala sancağı beğiyle sefer-i zafer-rehbere eşeler ve kendülere dahi yoldaş hâcet olursa Mora beğinden talep eyleyeler.

Kaziyye

Hersek sancağının üç binden aşağı olan sipâhîleri yüz elli yedi (157) neferdir ve **İskenderiye** ve **Vılçıtrın** sancaklarının üç binden aşağısı yüz yetmiş sekiz (178) neferdir ki Hersek sancağı sipâhîleri ile cümle üç yüz otuz beş (335) nefer olur. Bunlar Hersek sancağı alaybeği ile oturub Nova kal'ası hıfzında olalar. Ve bu zikrolan üç sancağın bâkî üç binden yukarı olan sipâhîleri ve subaşıları beğleriyle sefer-i

humâyüna eşeler ve kendülere dahi mu'âvenete yoldaş lâzım ve hâcet olursa Sofya'da konılan 'askerden talep ideler.

Kaziyye

İlbasan sancağının subaşıları ve sipâhîleri yüz yirmi dört (124) neferdir. İşbu zikrolan sancak deryâ kenârında mahall-i mahûf olmağın hıfz u hırâsetiyçün sancağı beği sipâhîleri ile oturub Drac kal'ası ve gayri mahûf olan yerlerin hıfzında olalar.

Kaziyye

Selanik sancağının ki Avrethisarı ve Yenice-i Vardar ve Karaferye ile dört kadılıktır. Subaşılarından gayri üç binden yukarı ve aşağı olan sipahileri iki yüz kırk iki (242) neferdir. Bu sancak dahi deryâ kenârında olmağın sancağı beği sipâhîleri ile eşmeyüb oturub muhâfazada olalar. Ammâ yirmi yedi (27) nefer subaşıları sefer-i mübâreke eşeler.

Kaziyye

Yanine sancağının subaşıları ve cümle sipâhîleri dört yüz altmış bir (461) neferdir. İşbu zikrolan subaşılar ve sipâhîler sancağı beğiyle eşmeyüb oturub Preveze ve Narda kal'aları hıfzında olalar ve şöyle ki Mora cânibine mu'âvenet için yoldaş hâcet olub Mora beğinden âdem gelürse zikrolan hisârlara kifâyet kadarı adem ta'yîn ettikten sonra bâkîsiyle sancağı beği varub mu'âvenette ola.

Kaziyye

Karlı İli sancağın subaşıları ve sipâhîleri cümle yüz otuz (130) neferdir. Mezkûrûn subaşılar ve sipâhîler dahi beğleriyle eşmeyüb oturub Ayamavra kal'ası hıfzında olalar ve Mora cânibinden mu'âvenet talep olunursa mezkûr kal'aya kifâyet kadarı âdem ta'yîn ettikten sonra bâkîsiyle sancağı beği varub hıdmetde ve mu'âvenette olalar.

Kaziyye

Vech-i meşrûh üzere sefer-i nusret çâkere eşmeyüb bir baş ve buğ ta'yîn olunmağla Sofyada cem'iiyet idüb etrâf Memâlik-i Mahrûseden kangı tarafa teveccüh lâzım gelürse müteveccih olmaları münâsib görülen sancakların üç binden aşğa timar tasarruf iden sipâhîleri bunlardır:

Niğbolu sancağının yüz yirmi üç (123) neferdir.

Silistre ve **Vize** ve **Çirmen** sancaklarının yüz altmış iki (162) neferdir.

Alacahisar sancağının üç yüz bir (301) neferdir.

Vidin sancağının yüz yetmiş yedi (177) neferdir.

Gelibolu ve **Kızılca Müsellem** ve **Cingane** sancaklarının on sekiz (18) neferdir.

Sofya vilayetinin yüz bir (101) neferdir.

Bu cümle Sofyada cem'iiyet idecek sekiz yüz seksen iki (882) nefer sipâhîler olur.

Kaziyye

Menteşe sancağının tezkiresüz sipâhîlerinden Rodos kal'ası muhâfazasıyçün ta'yîn olunacak iki yüz (200) nefer münâsib görülür.

Kaziyye

Saruhan sancağının tezkiresüz sipâhîlerinden Yenice Foça ve Kadim Foça nâm kal'alar hıfzıyçün konulacak iki yüz (200) nefer münâsib görülür.

Yenice Foçaya 100 nefer Kadim Foçaya 100 nefer

Kaziyye

Karesi sancağının tezkiresüz sipâhîlerinden Midillü kal'ası muhâfazasıyçün ta'yîn olunacak iki yüz elli (250) nefer münâsib görülür.

Kaziyye

Aydın sancağının tezkiresüz sipâhîlerinden İzmir kal'ası hıfzıyçün konulacak yüz (100) nefer münâsib görülür.

Zikr olunan sipâhî tayîfesi vech-i meşrûh üzere ta'yîn olundu. 'İzz-i huzûr fayîz olunur da ma'kûl ve münâsib görölürse imdidir ki emr-i şerîf irsâl olunmasına 'inâyet buyrula ki ana göre tenbîh oluna.



APPENDIX VIII

Number of Kapıkulu Troops who received bonuses (*inam*) 1,000 akçe each for April–June 1541, Financial Status of Campaign Treasury and Other Expenses (TSMA d. 9619)

TSMA d. 9619/1

Hâliyâ sefer-i humâyûnda dokuz yüz kırk sekiz yılında Muharrem, Safer, Rebi'ülevvel (April-June 1541) mevâcibinin mukâbelesinde mevcûd olanlar bunlardır:

Cemâ'at-i yeniçeriyân

Altı bin üç yüz altmış iki nefer (6,362)

Altmış üç kerre yüz bin ve altmış iki bin (6,362,000)

Cemâ'at -i ebnâ-i sipâhiyân:

Bin kırk yedi nefer (1,047)

On kerre yüz bin ve kırk yedi bin (1,047,000)

Cemâ'at -i silahdârân:

Bin altı yüz seksen dört nefer (1,684)

On altı kerre yüz bin ve seksen dört bin (1,684,000)

Cemâ'at -i 'ulûfeciyân-i yemîn ve yesâr:

Beş yüz doksan dört nefer (594)

Beş yüz doksan dört bin (594,000)

Cemâ'at gurebâ-i yemîn ve yesâr:

Üç yüz kırk beş nefer (345)

Üç yüz kırk beş bin (345,000)

Cemâ'at -i bevvâbîn:

İki yüz kırk üç nefer (243)

İki yüz kırk üç bin (243,000)

Cemâ'at -i hayyâtîn-i hâssa ve hil'at:

Altmış beş nefer (65)

Altmış beş bin (65,000)

Cemâ't -i ehl-i hiref:

Altmış iki nefer (62)

Altmış iki bin (62,000)

Cemâ't -i matbah-i 'âmire:

İki yüz otuz nefer (230)

İki yüz otuz bin (230,000)

Cemâ't -i 'arabacıyân-i top:

Beş yüz elli dokuz nefer (559)

Beş yüz elli dokuz bin (559,000)

Cemâ't -i cebeciyân:

Dört yüz on bir nefer (411)

Dört yüz on bir bin (411,000)

Cemâ't -i topçuyân:

Altı yüz doksan yedi nefer (697)

Altı yüz doksan yedi bin (697,000)

Cemâ't-i mehterân-i hayme:

İki yüz otuz yedi nefer (237)

İki yüz otuz yedi bin (237,000)

Cemâ't -i sakayân:

On bir nefer (15)

On beş bin (15,000)

Cemâ't -i mehterân-i 'alem:

Yüz otuz beş nefer (135)

Yüz otuz beş bin (135,000)

Cemâ't -i müşâherehôrân:

Yüz doksan beş nefer (195)

Yüz doksan beş bin (195,000)

Cemâ't -i çakırcıyân:

Elli iki nefer (52)

Elli iki bin (52,000)

Cemâ't -i şahinciyan:

Yirmi dokuz nefer (29)

Yirmi dokuz bin (29.000)

Cemâ't -i atmacacıyan:

Yirmi nefer

Yirmi bin (20.000)

Cemâ't -i Istabl-i 'Âmire:

İki bin altı yüz otuz nefer (2,630)

Yirmi altı kerre yüz ve otuz bin (2,630,000)

Cem'ân:

On beş bin altı yüz on iki nefer (15,612)

yüz elli altı kerre yüz bin ve on iki bin akçe olur

yüz elli altı yük ve on iki bin (15.612.000) akçe

TSMA d. 9619/2

Sefer-i humâyûn harcı için İstanbul hazînesinden getirilen akçedir.

Nakid akçe altmış beş yük (6,500,000 akçe) sultâniye ve eşrefiye ve frengî ve sakız

beş yüz seksen bin sikke, bahâsı üç yüz on yedi yük dahi altmış bin (31,760,000 akçe)

Cem'ân

nakid akçe ve filori bahâsı üç yüz seksen iki yük dahi altmış bin (38,260,000 akçe)

Yolda alınan akçe ve filori bahâsı on dokuz yük dahi elli beş bin iki yüz (1,955,200 akçe)

İstanbul'dan getirilen akçe ile yolda alınan akçeler dört yüz iki yük dahi on beş bin iki yüz (40,215,200) akçe olur

Ve Mehmed Paşa hazretleriyle olan akçeden ve filori bahâsından alınan akçe on sekiz yük dahi altmış yedi bin üç yüz elli iki (1,867,352 akçe)

Bilfi'il hizâne-i 'âmirede mevcûd olan nakid akçe ve filori bahâsı üç yüz on dokuz yük (31,900,000 akçe)

Gelicek 'ulûfeye tahminen yüz yirmi yük (12,000,000) akçe lazımdır ve sâ'ir mesârif için dahi otuz yük (3,000,000) akçe lazımdır, cem'ân yüz elli yük (15.000.000) akçe.

El-bakiyye

Yüz altmış dokuz yük (16,900,000 akçe)

Ve Budim kal'asında yüz yirmi yük (12,000,000) akçe konulmak lâzımdır. Yirmi yük (2,000,000 akçe) binâ için ve yüz yükü (10,000,000 akçe) mevâcib için.

APPENDIX IX

Report of Bali Paşa (Yahyalı), Governor-general of Buda, on the Garrison Soldiers in Buda and Pest (6.10.1541–17.01.1542)

Budin Beğlerbeğisi Bali Paşa kulunuz Budunda olan asker halkının esâmisi defterlerin göndermiştir ki zikr olunur. İşbu sene dokuz yüz kırk sekiz Cemâziyelevvelinin on beşinden Ramazan gâyetine (6.10.1541–17.01.1542) gelince ki dört buçuk aydır, merhûm Süleyman Paşa zamânında bu defterde mevcûd yazılanlara ‘ulûfe virilmiştir.

Semendire kal’asının re’isleri ve ‘azebleri ve topçuları gelen defterde cem’ân dört yüz iki (402) neferdir. Bunlardan:

- ‘Ulûfe virilmiş mevcud iki yüz yetmiş sekiz neferdir.
- Bâkî yüz doksan dört neferin ahvâli nâ-ma’lûmdır defterde beyân olunmamıştır.

Varadin kal’asının re’isleri ve ‘azebleri cem’ân yüz doksan altı (196) neferdir.

-Yüz doksan dokuzı mevcûddır.

-Bâkî altmış yedisi nâ-ma’lûmdır.

Belgrad kal’asının rei’sleri ve ‘azebleri ve topçuları ceman beş yüz bir (501) neferdir.

- İki yüz otuz ikisi mevcûd.

-Bâkî iki yüz altmış dokuzı nâ-ma’lûmdır.

Ösek ve Kutuheva (Kutjevo) ve **Pojega ve Potgrac** (Podgorac) ve **Goryan ve Kaptol** ve **Diyakova** ve **Kamengrad** kal’alarının beşlülere cemâ’ati:

- Cem’ân bin yirmi dört (1,024) neferdir.

- Sekiz yüz yetmiş sekizi mevcûd.

- Bâkî yüz kırk altı nâ-ma’lûm.

Diyakova kal’asının re’isleri ve ‘azebleri ceman elli iki (52) neferdir.

Ösek kal’asının ‘azebleri cem’ân on iki (12) neferdir.

- Dokuzu mevcûd.

- Bâkî üçü nâ-ma'lûm

Dobre varoşunun rei'sleri ve 'azebleri cem'ân elli (50) neferdir.

- Otuz biri mevcûd.

- Bâkî on dokuzu nâ-ma'lûm

Gügercinlik kal'asının 'azebleri cem'ân kırk beş (45) neferdir.

- Otuz ikisi mevcud.

- (Bâkî) on üçü na-ma'lum

Boraça varoşunun rei'sleri ve 'azebleri cem'ân elli üç (53) neferdir.

- Otuz biri mevcûd.

- Bâkî yirmi üçü nâ-ma'lûm.

İlok kal'asının rei'sleri ve 'azebleri cem'ân yüz elli üç (153) neferdir.

- Yetmiş sekizi mevcûd.

- Bâkî yetmiş beş nâ-ma'lûm.

Titel kal'asının rei'sleri ve 'azebleri cem'ân yüz on (110) neferdir.

- Elli dördü mevcûd.

- Bâkî elli altısı nâ-ma'lûm.

Islankamen kal'asının re'isleri ve 'azebleri cem'ân altmış altı (66) neferdir.

- Kırk dördü mevcûd.

- Bâkî yirmi ikisi nâ-ma'lûm.

Koyluç kal'asının 'azebleri ve topçuları ve martolosları cem'ân altmış dört (64) neferdir.

- Otuz dokuzu mevcûd.

- Bâkî otuz beşi na-ma'lum.

Vilkovar kal'asının re'isleri ve 'azebleri cem'ân doksan iki (92) neferdir.

- Elli biri mevcûd.
- Bâkî kırk biri nâ-ma'lûm.

Hram kal'asının 'azebleri ceman elli beş (55) neferdir.

- Yirmi sekizi mevcûd.
- Baki kırk biri nâ-ma'lûm.

Semendire ve **Belgrad** ve **Ösek** ve **Nemçe** ve **Gradiška** varoşı ve **Gügercinlik** ve **İlok** ve **Boraca** ve **Dobre** varoşı ve **Vilkovar** ve **Hram** ve **Titel** kal'alarının martolosları ve yeni martoloslar ceman bin iki yüz kır bir (1,241) neferdir.

- Bin neferi mevcud.
- Bâkî iki yüz kırk biri nâ-ma'lûm.

Cem'ân _____

Bu kal'alardan Budine ta'yîn olunmuş dört bin yüz doksan altı (4,196) neferdir.

- İki bin dokuz yüz elli dördü mevcûddur, 'ulûfe virilmiştir.
- Bâkî bin iki yüz kırk ikisi na-ma'lum.

Budin kal'asının gönüllüleri cem'ân sekiz yüz üç (803) neferdir.

- Yedi yüz otuz ikisi mevcûd.
- Bâkî otuz altısı nâ-ma'lûm.
- Otuz beşi fevt olmuş.

ve **Budin** kal'asının re'isleri ve 'azebleri ceman bin on dört (1,014) neferdir.

- Sekiz yüz yetmiş dokuzu mevcûd.
- Bâkî yüz otuz beşi nâ-ma'lûm.

ve **Budin** kal'asının hisâr erenleri ve cebecileri ve topçıları ve 'arabacıları ve kumbaracıları ve demircileri ve gayri cem'ân sekiz yüz otuz altı (836) neferdir.

- Altı yüz kırk altısı mevcûd.
- Bâkî yüz do

Budin kal'asının neferleri iki bin altı yüz elli üçdür (2,653).

- İki bin üç yüz elli yedisi mevcud.
- Baki üç yüz altmış biri nâ-'malûm
- Otuz beşi dahi fevt olmuştur.

ve **Peşte** kal'asının rei'sleri ve 'azebleri ve topçıları cem'ân üç yüz doksan sekiz (398) neferdir.

- Üç yüz altmış beşi mevcûd.
- Bâkî otuz üçü na-ma'lum.

ve **Peşte** kal'asının martolosları cem'ân beş yüz on altı (516) neferdir.

- Üç yüz on yedisi mevcûd.
- Bâkî doksan dokuzı nâ-ma'lûm.

Cem'ân _____

Peşte kal'asının neferi dokuz yüz on dört (914) neferdir.

- Altı yüz on ikisi mevcûd.
- Baki iki yüz otuz ikisi nâ-ma'lûm.

Cem'ân _____

Bu zikr olunan kal'aların neferleri gelen defterlerde yedi bin yedi yüz altmış üç (7,763) neferdir. Bunların beş bin sekiz yüz doksan üç (5,893) neferine 'ulûfe virülüb mevcûddır. Otuz beş (35) müteveffa, bâkî bin sekiz yüz otuz beş (1,835) neferin ahvâlları defterde zikr olunmamağın nâ-ma'lûmdır.

APPENDIX X

Grain Supply, Purchases, Distributions and Transportation Costs for the Mohács Campaign in 1526 (MAD 499, 39–43)

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İcmâl-i muhâsebe-i tevzî'ât-i nüzûl der sefer-i Budun el-vâki' fî sene 932

Asl-i nüzûl: 18,915 mūd 5 kile (9,684,608 kg)

Dakik: 4,991 mūd 7 kile (2,255,571 kg)

Şa'ir: 13,923 mūd 18 kile (7,129,036 kg)

Minhâ: 16,938 mūd 2 kile

- be-cihet-i yeniçeriyân ve sekbânân ve ser-sekbânân ve kethüdâ-i yeniçeriyân ve kâtib-i mezkûrîn: Dakik 723 mūd 2 kile; şa'ir: 787 mūd 15 kile
- be-cihet-i zahire-i kal'a-i İlok: Dakik 634 mūd 2 kile; şa'ir 3,272 mūd
- be-cihet-i zahire-i kal'a-i Petrovaradin: Dakik 242 mūd; şa'ir 1,166 mūd
- be-cihet-i zahire-i kal'a-i Çerevik (Čarević): Dakik 30 mūd; şa'ir 26 mūd
- be-cihet-i kal'a-i Erdevit (Erdut): Dakik 4 mūd, şa'ir 10 mūd
- be-cihet-i müstahfızân ve rû'esâ ve 'azebân ve 'ulûfeciyân-i süvâri-i kal'a-i İreg (Irig): Dakik 13 mūd 10 kile; şa'ir, 18 mūd
- be-cihet-i ıstabl-i 'âmire ma' kalyatahâ-i hâssa: Şa'ir, 2,640 mūd
- be-cihet-i firûn-i hâssa: Dakik, 157 mūd 18 kile
- be-cihet-i bârgirân-i 'arabahâ-i tob: Şa'ir: 638 mūd
- be-cihet-i zahire-i kal'a-i Belgrad: Dakik 24 mūd 9 kile; şa'ir, 108 mūd 18 kile
- be-cihet-i teslîm-i Hayreddin Beğ emin: Dakik, 62 mūd; şa'ir: 581 mūd
- be-cihet-i hazret-i İbrahim Paşa: Dakik, 18 mūd; şa'ir, 97 mūd
- be-cihet-i hazret-i Mustafa Paşa: Dakik, 39 mūd; şa'ir, 179 mūd
- be-cihet-i Ayas Paşa: Dakik, 29 mūd; şa'ir: 177 mūd

- be-cihet-i Kâdri Çelebi kâdî'asker-i vilâyet-i Anadolu: Dakik 5 müd 14 kile; şa'ir 13 müd
- be-cihet-i Behrâm Paşa mirmirân-i Anadolu: Dakik 11 müd 19 kile; şa'ir 34 müd
- be-cihet-i hazret-i İskender Çelebi defterdâr-i hizâne-i 'âmire: Dakik 18 müd; şa'ir 30 müd
- be-cihet-i Nişâncı Beğ: Dakik 5 müd; şa'ir 12 müd
- be-cihet-i kâtibân-i hizâne-i 'âmire ma' şâkirdân-i işân ve kâtibân-i ahkâm: Dakik 25 müd; şa'ir 93 müd
- be-cihet-i lağımcıyân ve sengtraşân ve haddâdân ve topçıyân-i kılâ' ve gayrihu: Dakik 10 müd 14 kile; şa'ir 10 müd 8 kile

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- be-cihet-i nüzülcıyân ve kürekçıyân ve kalafatçıyân ve gayrihu: Dakik 202 müd 14 kile; şa'ir hâlî
- be-cihet-i yava-i kal'a-i Petrovaradin: Dakik 3 müd 1 kile
- be-cihet-i ma'zûlân ve fakirân ve derziyân ve dânişmendân ve Hacı Bektaş dâde: Dakik 3 müd 10 kile; şa'ir 9 müd 11 kile
- be-cihet-i hıcâ *hullide mülkehu*: Dakik 2 müd, şa'ir 7 müd 5 kile
- be-cihet-i Mustafa Çelebi emin-i nüzül: Dakik 4 müd; şa'ir 15 müd
- be-cihet-i Süleyman Çelebi kâtib-i nüzül: Dakik 1 müd, şa'ir 5 müd
- be-cihet-i Cafer Çelebi ve diğır Cafer Beğ tâbi'-i Paşa: Dakik 9 müd, şa'ir 10 müd
- be-cihet-i zayı'ât der sefine gark şüd ve harâb şüd ve ba'zı zayı'ât ki der cısr-i Drava ve der ceng vâki' şüd: Dakik 82 müd 10 kile, şa'ir 120 müd
- be-cihet-i üsârâ-i hâssa ve yava-i sürgün: Dakik 16 müd 5 kile

Yekun akçesi alınmayan

12,466 müd 7 kile: Dakik 2,400 müd 7 kile; şa'ir 10,066 müd

- be-cihet-i ağayân-i enderûn ve birûn: Dakik 24 mūd 5 kile, şa'ir 81 mūd 12 kile
- be-cihet-i merhûm Abdüsselam Beğ: Dakik 4 mūd; şa'ir 8 mūd
- be-cihet-i Ahmed Ağa hîş-i Ayas Paşa: Dakik 1 mūd; şa'ir 2 mūd
- be-cihet-i imâm efendi: Dakik 3 mūd, şa'ir 8 mūd
- be-cihet-i vazîfe-hôrân-i hâssa: Dakik 2 mūd; şa'ir 4 mūd
- be-cihet-i kâtibân-i divân ve emin-i defter ve emin-i berât ve kâtibân-i kâdî'askerân:
Dakik 11 mūd; şa'ir 28 mūd 19 kile
- be-cihet-i çavuşân: Dakik 17 mūd; şa'ir 40 mūd
- be-cihet-i bevvâbîn: Dakik 15 mūd 16 kile; şa'ir 64 mūd
- be-cihet-i 'asker-i vilâyet-i Rumili ma' mirân ve kethüdâ ve defterderân: Dakik 435 mūd; şa'ir 832 mūd
- be-cihet-i 'asker-i vilâyet-i Anadolu ma' mirân ve gayrihu: Dakik 290 mūd; şa'ir 387 mūd
- be-cihet-i cemâ'at-i ebnâ-i sipâhiyân ma' kethüdâ: Dakik 97 mūd; şa'ir 304 mūd
- be-cihet-i cemâ'at silâhdârân ma' kethüda: Dakik 34,5 mūd; şa'ir 210 mūd
- be-cihet-i 'ulufeciyân-i yemîn ve yesâr: Dakik 70 mūd 14 kile
- be-cihet-i gurebâ-i yemîn ve yesâr: Dakik 23 mūd; şa'ir 75,5 mūd
- be-cihet-i hademe-i ıstabl-i 'âmire ve mirâhôr ve emin-i cev ve kâtib: Dakik 93,5 mūd; şa'ir 48 mūd 16 kile

p. 41

- be-cihet-i cemâ'at müteferrika ve zevvâkîn ve hazînedârân-i birûn ve câme-i sarbân:
Dakik 19 mūd 4 kile; şa'ir 37 mūd 2 kile
- be-cihet-i çakırcıyân ve atmacacıyân ve gayrihu: Dakik 8 mūd; şa'ir 33 mūd
- be-cihet-i hâyyatîn ma' ser-i mezkurîn: Dakik 15 mūd 4 kile; şa'ir 21 mūd 17 kile

- be-cihet-i mehterân-i hayme ve ‘alem ma’ ağayân: Dakik 20 mūd 5 kile; şa’ir 67 mūd 15 kile
- be-cihet-i ba’zı ebnâ-i sipâhiyân ve silâhdârân ve ‘ulûfeciyân ki der zimmet-i İbrahim Paşa bude est: Dakik 10 mūd; şa’ir 27 mūd 8 kile
- be-cihet-i cemâ’at-i ehl-i hiref ma’ postinduzân: Dakik 6 mūd; şa’ir 14 mūd
- be-cihet-i cemâ’at-i etibbâ ve cerrâhîn: Dakik 5 mūd 11 kile; şa’ir 15 mūd 16 kile
- be-cihet-i cebeciyân ve topçıyân: Dakik 29 mūd; şa’ir 43 mūd 16 kile
- be-cihet-i hademe-i matbah: Dakik 15 mūd 11 kile; şa’ir 3 mūd 17 kile
- be-cihet-i cemâ’at-i ‘arabacıyân-i hassa ve tob: Dakik 53 mūd 16 kile
- be-cihet-i sakayân-i dergâh-i ‘âlî ma’ ser-sakayân -i mezkûr: Dakik 11 mūd 16 kile; şa’ir 3 mūd 15 kile
- be-cihet-i çavuşân-i mirmirân-i Rumili ve gayrihu: Dakik 11 mūd 6 kile; şa’ir 5 mūd 4 kile
- be-cihet-i voynugân-i Rumili ma’ mir-i voynugân: Dakik 18 mūd; şa’ir 2 mūd 4 kile

Cem’ân akçe (altı)nmıştır

3,871 mūd 14 kile 3 şinik: Dakik 1,337 mūd 15 kile 3 şinik; Şa’ir 2,533 mūd 14 kile

p. 42

Muhâsebe-i bakiyye-i bahâ-i nüzül-i mezkûr: 904,688 (akçe)

- ‘an bahâ-i nüzül ki fûruhte şûd: 3,871 mūd 15 kile 1 şinik: 827,864 (akçe)

* Dakik: 1,337 mūd 15 kile 3 şinik, beher kile fi 12=321,069 (akçe)

* Şa’ir: 2,533 mūd 19 kile 2 şinik, beher kile fi 10=506,795 (akçe)

- ‘an bahâ-i nüzül-i ba’zı vilâyet-i mezbûre: 76,824 (akçe)

* ‘an kaza-i Vidin: 19,382

* ‘an kaza-i İvraniye: 27,500

* ‘an kaza-i Timurhisar: 20,760

* ‘an ziyâde-i hâne-i Nevrekop: 9,183

Vuzu’a min zâlik: 738,250 (akçe)

- Teslîm-i hazine bi’d-defa’ât: 534,000
- be-cihet-i harc-i meremmât-i kılâ’-i Ungurus ki haliyâ feth şüd: 200,000
- be-cihet-i harc-i sa’ire: 2,250

El-bakiyye: 168,458 akçe

...

Muhâsebe-i zahire-i sefer-i mezkûr: 5,742 mūd

- ‘an kaza-i vilâyet-i Rumili: 5,063 mūd = 455,762 (akçe)
- ‘an yed-i emin-i nüzül: 403 mūd
- ‘an yed-i kadı-i Üsküb ve Kratova: 276 mūd

Minhâ

- be-cihet-i ıstabl-i ‘âmire: 1,940 mūd
- be-cihet-i ‘arabahâ-i tob: 771 mūd 13 kile
- be-cihet-i kal’a-i Varadin ve İlok: 1,276 mūd
- be-cihet-i ıstabl-i hazret-i İbrahim Paşa: 90 mūd
- be-cihet-i ıstabl-i hazret-i Mustafa Paşa: 20 mūd
- be-cihet-i Abdüsselam Beğ: 15 mūd
- be-cihet-i ba’zı keşân ki ber-mucib-i tezkire dâde: 105 mūd
- be-cihet-i zâyî’ât: 240 mūd
- be-cihet-i şatırânân tahmîl kerdend: 20 mūd
- teslîm be-Abdüsselam Beğ der kal’a-i Belgrad: 1,210 mūd

El-bakiyye: 9 mūd 7 kile

p. 43

İcmâl-i muhâsebe-i kirâye-i şotorân-i zahire ma' bahâ zahire ki 'an kaza-i ba'zı vilâyet-i Rumili herîde est berây-i sefer-i Budun be-ma'rifet-i Hayreddin Beğ muhâsebe-i Rumili emin el-vâki' fi 25 Receb sene 932 (7.5.1526)

Asl-i Mâl: 4,309,001 (akçe)

- 'an hizâne-i 'âmire bi'd-defa'ât: 4,293,411

- 'an yed-i şatırbânân ki tahmîl kerde bud 20 müd: 15,590

Vuzu'a min-zâlik: 4,296,208 (akçe)

- be-cihet-i kirâye-i şotorân-i zahire fî 3 def'a: 3,771,800

- def'a-i evvel: 12,854 mehâr beher mehâr fî 100 = 1,285,400 (akçe)

- def'a-i sâni: 12,529 mehâr beher mehâr fî 100 = 1,252,900 (akçe)

- def'a-i sâlis: 12,335 mehâr beher mehâr fî 100 = 1,233,500 (akçe)

- be-cihet-i bahâ-i zahire ki der defter-i zahire-i m(ezbûr) mastûr est: 5,063 müd = 455,762 (akçe)

- be-cihet-i ücret-i neccârân ve bennâyân ve gayrihu beray-i sâhten-i cisirhâ ve gayrihu der râh: 68,640

APPENDIX XI

Grain Supply, Purchases, Distributions and Transportation Costs for the Estergon Campaign in 1543 (MAD 499, 66–67, 87, 97–1)

MAD 499, p. 66-67

Muhâsebe-i icmâl mübâya’-i zahîre-i livâ-i Niğbolu ve Vidin ve Alacahisâr ve Semendire ve Sofya ve Vılçıtrın ve Köstendil ve İzvornik be-ma’rifet-i kudât-i elviye-i mezkûrin ve mübâşeret-i gulâmân-i dergâh-i ‘âli heride budend el-vâki’ fi sene 949

Asl-i mâl: 1,830,137 (akçe)

‘an hizâne-i ‘âmire: 1,427,600 (akçe)

‘an mukâta’ât-i vilâyet-i Rumili: 402,537 (akçe)

Vuzu’a min zâlik

1,607,648 (akçe)

be-cihet-i bahâ-i dakik: 1,971 müd 15,5 kile; 207,636 (akçe)

be-cihet-i bahâ-i şa’ir: 5,900 müd 14 kile; 437,238 (akçe)

be-cihet-i harc-i çuvâl: 44,033 aded; 111,657 (akçe)

be-cihet-i ücret-i kirâcıyân be-cihet-i merden zahire: 851,117 (akçe)

el-bakiyye: 222,489 (akçe)

Minhâ

Teslîm be-hizâne-i ‘âmire ‘an yed-i mezkûrin: 214,748 (akçe)

‘an yed-i ‘Ali Beğ mirlivâ-i Bursa: 177,814 (akçe)

‘an yed-i gulâmân-i dergâh-i ‘alî: 36,934 (akçe)

nısfü’l-bâkî: 7,761 (akçe) ber-mûcib-i Müslihiddin nâyib-i kâdı-i Üsküb

Mezkûr zahireleri mukaddemâ kudât Belgrada getürüb Bursa beği ‘Ali Beğ ma’rifetiyle Belgrad kal’asında der an bâr olunub ba’de sefer-i humâyûn mühimmatıyçün gerü müşârünileyh ‘Ali Beğ ma’rifetiyle sarf olunan zahireyi beyân ıder: *Mezkûr zahire sene 949’da cem’ olunub sene 950de (tev)zî’ olunmuşdır.*

Asl-i mâl-i zahire der an bâr: 7,904 müd 17 kile

Dakik: 1,995 müd 12,5 kile

‘an zahire-i cerehôrân: 26 müd 17 kile

‘an ziyâde-i mezkûr: 1,971 müd 15,5 kile

Şa’ir: 6,506 müd 5 kile

‘an zahire: 5,900 müd 14 kile

ziyâde amed ‘an tevâvût der vakt-i tahmîl kerdn keştihâ: 540 müd 17 kile

‘an nüzül-i Sofya: 14 müd 14 kile

Vuzu’a min zâlik

7,884 müd 17 kile

Dakik: 1,529 müd 4 kile. El-ziyâde ‘an asl: 131 müd 2 kile

Şa’ir: 6,355 müd 13 kile

teslîm be-anbâr-i kal’a-i Budun ber-mûcib-i hükm-i humâyûn ve be-ma’rifet-i

Mevlânâ Muhiddin kâdı-i mahrûse-i mezbûre: 4,437 müd 14 kile

Dakik: 1,267 müd 14 kile

Şa’ir: 3,170 müd

teslîm be-firûn-i ‘âmire ve ıstabl-i ‘âlî ber-mûcib-i hükm-i humâyûn: 3,200 müd 13 kile

Dakik be-firûn: 45 müd

Şa’ir be-ıstabl: 3,185 müd 13 kile

be-cihet-i gilmân-i ‘acemiyân ki ‘an kal’a-i Ostorgon amed ber-mûcib-i hükm-i humâyûn

Dakik: 6 müd 18 kile

be-cihet-i ba’zı martolosân-i kal’a-i Vidin ber-mûcib-i hükm-i şerîf

Dakik: 2 müd 6 kile

be-cihet-i ‘azebân-i cedid-i kal’a-i Belgrad ber-mûcib-i hükm-i humâyûn

Dakik: 4 müd 18 kile

be-cihet-i kürekçiyân-i keştihâ-i zehâyir-i hâssa ki der Belgrad dâde ber-mûcib-i hükm-i humâyûn

Dakik: 26 müd 17 kile

be-cihet-i kürekçiyân-i Müslümânân ve Gebrân der keştihâ-i zehâyir ki ber-mûcib-i hükm-i humâyûn der kal’a-i Budun dâde

Dakik: 166 müd 4 kile

be-cihet-i kürekçiyân-i keştihâ-i tob ve yarak der nezd-i Hasan Beğ miralay-i livâ-i Silistre ber-mûcib-i hükm-i şerîf der kal’a-i Budun dâde

Dakik: 9 müd 7 kile

El-bakiyye

Şa’ir: 151 müd 17 kile

Minhâ

gark şode: 136 müd 17 kile. *Mezkûr gark olmuş arpanın yirmi müddi ıslakıyla 6,054 akçeye fîrûht olub nakid muhâsebesinde mahsûb olmuştur.*

Zâyi’ der vakt-i harâb şode an bârhâ-i zahire

15 müd

MAD 499, p. 87 Nüzül

‘Arz olundu fi 6 Şevval sene 950 (2 Ocak 1544)

Muhâsebe-i icmâl-i nüzûl-i vilâyet-i Rumili el-vâki' fî sene 950

Asl-i nüzûl: elli bir kadılıktır.

Ber-mûcib-i fermân-i şerîf: 15,074 mûd 3 kile 2 şinik

Dakik: 5,024 mûd 1 kile

Şa'ir: 10,050 mûd 2 kile 2 şinik

Ber-mûcib-i defter-i kudât: 14,485 mûd

Dakik: 4,815 mûd 15 kile

Şa'ir: 9,649 mûd 13 kile 1 şinik

El-kûsur 'an tevzî': 608 mûd 15 kile 1 şinik

Dakik: 208 mûd 6 kile

Şa'ir: 400 mûd 3 kile 1 şinik

Asl-i mal 'an bahâ-i nüzûl-i mezbûre: 3,085,712 (akçe)

Minhâ

2,222,100 (akçe) *gayr-i ez anbâr-i Belgrad 1,212,212 (akçe)*

Et-teslîmât: 1,772,059 (akçe)

- Teslîm be-ıstabl-i 'âmire; 690,190 (akçe)

şa'ir: 3,450 mûd 18 kile fî 10

- Teslîm be-firûn-i hâssa; 12,408 (akçe)

dakik: 51 mûd 14 kile fî 12

- Teslîm be-anbâr-i kal'a-i Belgrad; 1,013,888 (akçe)

4,744 mûd 12 kile

Dakik: 1,609 mûd 1 kile fî 12 (akçe)

Şa'ir: 3,138 mûd 11 kile fî 10 (akçe)

- Teslîm be-kal'a-i Ostorgon; 55,572 (akçe)

Dakik: 231 mûd 11 kile

El-tevzî'ât: be-mülâzimân-i dergâh-i 'âlî ve gayrihu

17,431 neferen

454,010 (akçe)

- be-cihet-i yeniçeriyân-i dergâh-i 'âlî, 7,483 neferen: 686 müd 13 kile 3 şinik.

159,325 (akçe) *in 'âm olundu.*

- be-cihet-i ebnâ-i sipâhiyân ve silahdârân ve 'ulûfeciyân-i yemîn ve yesâr ve gurebâ-i yemîn ve yesâr, 5,087 neferen: 753 müd 6 kile. 160,601 (akçe) *resid be-hizâne-i 'âmire*

- be-cihet-i sâ'ire-i müteferrika ve zevvâkîn ve çavuşân ve cema'ât-i ıstabl-i 'âmire ve gayrihu, 4,901 neferen: 528 müd 19 kile 2 şinik. 118,726 (akçe) *resid be-hizâne-i 'âmire*

- be-cihet-i nafaka-i kürekçiyân ve lağımcıyân ve müselleman ve gayrihu: 84 müd 8 kile. 15,358 (akçe)

Cem'ân

teslim be-hizâne-i 'âmire

160,601

118,726

155,715

+ _____

435,042 (akçe)

El-bakiyye

859,612 (akçe)

Min zâlik

El-bâkî

160.119 (akçe)

Teslîm

be-hizâne-i ‘âmire ki der ordu-yı humâyûn fûruhte ma’ bahâ-i nüzûl-i kazâ-i Karaferye
ma’ kirâye-i nüzûl

155,715 (akçe) 303 müd

Der ordu-yı humayun fûruhte ve der râh

79,075

‘an kaza-i Karaferye

76,640

‘an gark şûd der Tuna

4,404

Dakik: 14 müd 12 kile

Şa’ir: 4 müd 10 kile

sahh el-bâkî:

der-‘uhde-i kudât

699,493 (akçe)

Dakik: 1,420 müd 18 kile

Şa’ir: 1,744 müd

MAD 499, 97-1

Bahâ-i dakik ve şa’ir-i zahire-i sefer-i Ostorgon be-ma’ rifet-i ‘Ali Beğ mirlivâ-i Bursa

bahâ-i dakik: 1971 müd 15,5 kile: 207,636 (akçe)

bahâ-i şa’ir: 5,900 müd 14 kile: 437,238 akçe (ber-vech-i tahmîn fî 3,5)

bahâ-i harc-i çuval: 44,033 aded, 111,357 (akçe)

bahâ-i ücret-i kirâciyân ve gayrihu: 851,117 (akçe)

ma’ harc ber-vech-i tahmîn fî 10 akçe 2 pul

gayr-i ez-mevâcib-i kürekçiyân

yekûn:

207,636

437,238

111,657

851,117

+ _____

1,607,648 (akçe)

mevâcib-i kürekçiyân-i keştihâ-i tob ve yarak vâcib-i Rebi'e'l-âhir ve Cemâziyelevvel

sene 950, 7,305 neferen: 404,670 (akçe)

1,607,648

404,670

+ _____

2,012,318 (akçe)

APPENDIX XII

1543 Campaign of Estergon: Rumelian Sipahi Army Roll-Call (KK d. 285)

Sancak	Zeamet	Timar	Total	Sancakbeyi
Paşa	48	1,529	1,577	Ahmed Paşa
Selanik	35	495	530	Abdi Bey
Bosna	11	515+10 ⁵²⁰	536	Ulama Paşa
Mora	20	419	439	Mehmed Han Bey
Silistre	5	143	148	Mehmed Bey
Niğbolu	13	325	338	Toygün Bey
Ohri	7	318	325	Mehmed Bey
Yanya	8	462	470	
Avlonya	11	561	572	Mesih Bey
Köstendil	23	905	928	Hızır Bey
Tırhala	14	485	499	Osman Bey
Vidin	7	172	179	Bali Bey
İskenderiye	7	231	238	Velican Bey
Elbasan	2	116	118	Turhan Bey
Prizren	4	294	298	Hasan Bey
Çingane	1	66	67	Ali Bey
Kırkkilise ⁵²¹	-	49	49	Mahmud Bey
Çirmen	3	106	109	Süleyman Bey
Rumelia	219	7,201	7,420	

Sipahis from Inebahtı Sancak

Sancak	Zeamet	Timar	Total	Sancakbeyi
İnebahtı	9	266	275	Ahmed Bey
Grand total: 7,695				

⁵²⁰ 10 sipahis came from the sancak of Klis.

⁵²¹ Not completed.

APPENDIX XIII

Sipahis from Budin Province 1544 Visegrad Roll-call (İE. TZ. 17)

Sancak	Zeamet	Timar	Absent	Total
Paşa	1	43	-	44
Çavuşes of Budin	-	45	-	45
Alacahisar	- ⁵²²	538	26	512
Semendire	15	488 ⁵²³	44	444
Total	16	1,114	70	1,045

⁵²² Not completed.

⁵²³ Not completed.

APPENDIX XIV: Daily Wages of Different Fortress Personnel Between 1487 and 1541

Unit Type	1487-88	1491	1516	1529-36	1541
Müstahfız	5 ^[1] -6 ^[2]	5 ^[3] -6 ^[4]		5 ^[5]	5 ^[6] - 6 ^[7] -7 ^[8]
Bölükbaşı	6 ^[9] -7 ^[10]	6-7 ^[11]		6-7 ^[12]	7-8 ^[13]
Muslim Artillerymen Commander (Topçubaşı)	11 ^[14] -16 ^[15]	8 ^[16] -16 ^[17]	16 ^[18]	20 ^[19]	15 ^[20] -20 ^[21] - 22 ^[22]
Muslim Artilleryman steward (kethüda)	8 ^[23]	7 ^[24] -8 ^[25]	10 ^[26]	10 ^[27]	10 ^[28]

Muslim Artilleryman	6-7 ^[29]	6-7 ^[30]		7-8 ^[31]	5 ^[32] -6 ^[33] -7 ^[34]
Christian Artillerymen	3-4 ^[35]	3-4 ^[36]			3,5 ^[37]
Christian Crossbowmen commander	5 ^[38]	5 ^[39]	5 ^[40]	5 ^[41]	

Christian crossbowmen bölükbaşı	3 ^[42]	3 ^[43]	3 ^[44]	3 ^[45]	3 ^[46]
Christian crossbowmen	2 ^[47]	2 ^[48] -2,5 ^[49]	2 ^[50]	2 ^[51]	2,5 ^[52]
Christian arquebusers commander	5 ^[53]	5 ^[54]	5 ^[55]	5 ^[56]	

Christian aequebusers bölükbaşı	3 ^[57]	3 ^[58]	3 ^[59]	3 ^[60]	3 ^[61]
Christian arquebusers	2 ^[62]	2 ^[63] -2,5 ^[64]	2 ^[65]	2 ^[66]	2,5 ^[67]
Muslim arquebusers		5 ^[68]			
Muslim Crossbowmen		5 ^[69]			
Azeb	5 ^[70]	4 ^[71] -5 ^[72]		4 ^[73] - 5 ^[74]	4 ^[75] -5 ^[76]
Ser-oda	6 ^[77]	5 ^[78] -6 ^[79]		5 ^[80] -6 ^[81]	5 ^[82] -6 ^[83]

Reis	7 ^[84] -10 ^[85]	6 ^[86] - 7-8 ^[87]		7 ^[88] 9-11 ^[89]	8-15 ^[90]
Faris	6-7 ^[91]	5 ^[92] - 6-7 ^[93]		5 ^[94]	6 ^[95] -7 ^[96]
Faris Bölükbaşı	7 ^[97]	6 ^[98] -7 ^[99]		6 ^[100]	8-10 ^[101]
Martolos	3 ^[102]	2 ^[103] -3 ^[104]	2 -2,5 ^[105] - 3 ^[106]	2 ^[107] - 3 ^[108]	2 ^[109] -3 ^[110] - 3,5 ^[111] -4 ^[112]
Martolos seroda	4 ^[113]	3 ^[114] -4 ^[115]	3 ^[116] - 4 ^[117]	3 ^[118] -4 ^[119]	3 ^[120] -4 ^[121] - 4,5 ^[122] -5 ^[123]
Ser-mie	5 ^[124]	5 ^[125]	5 ^[126]	4 ^[127] -5 ^[128] - 6 ^[129]	5 ^[130] -7 ^[131] - 9 ^[132] - 14 ^[133]

- 1[1] KK d. 4725: Semendria; KK d. 4874: Akkerman.
- 1[2] Ibid.: Avala.
- 1[3] MAD 15334: Prusac, Vranduk, Livno, Herceg Novi, Shkodra, Resava, Golubac, Zvornik, Semendria, Ram, Kulič, Akkirman, Kilia.
- 1[4] Ibid.: Kamengrad, Ključ, Avala.
- 1[5] ĪE: AS. 1/19/1: Berkasovo; ĪE: AS. 1/21/1: Ilok.
- 1[6] Mxt 567: Vukovar; Raca, Njemci.
- 1[7] Ibid.: Titel, Erdut.
- 1[8] Ibid.: Osiyek.
- 1[9] KK d. 4725: Semendria; KK d. 4874: Akkerman.
- 1[10] Ibid.: Avala.
- 1[11] MAD 15334: Kamengrad, Ključ.
- 1[12] ĪE: AS. 1/19/1: Berkasovo; ĪE: AS. 1/21/1: Ilok.
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- 1[13] Mxt 567: Titel; Osiyek; Erdut; Vukovar; Raca.
1[14] KK d. 4874: Akkerman.
1[15] KK d. 4725: Semendria.
1[16] MAD 15334. Skodra.
1[17] Ibid: Semendria.
1[18] TT d. 1007: Semendria.
1[19] ĪE: AS. 1/21/1: Ilok.
1[20] Mxt. 567. Belgrade.
1[21] Ibid.: Semendria.
1[22] Ibid.: Osiyek.
1[23] KK d. 4725: Semendria; KK d. 4874: Akkerman.
1[24] MAD 15334. Semendria.
1[25] Ibid.: Akkerman.
1[26] TT d. 1007: Semendria.
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- 1[27] ĪE: AS. 1/21/1: Ilok.
- 1[28] Mxt 567: Semendria, Belgrade, Osiyek.
- 1[29] KK d. 4725: Semendria; KK d. 4874: Akkerman.
- 1[30] Most of the fortresses in Rumelia.
- 1[31] ĪE: AS. 1/19: Berkasovo; ĪE: AS. 1/21/1: Ilok.
- 1[32] Mxt 567: Semendria, Belgrade.
- 1[33] Ibid.: Osiyek; Varadin.
- 1[34] Ibid.: Ilok; Raca; Salankamen.
- 1[35] KK d. 4725: Semendria.
- 1[36] MAD 15334: Semendria.
- 1[37] Mxt. 567: Salankamen.
- 1[38] KK d. 4725: Semendria.
- 1[39] MAD 15334: Semendria.
- 1[40] TT d. 1007: Semendria
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- 1[41] MAD 506: Semendria.
1[42] KK d. 4725: Semendria
1[43] MAD 15334: Golubac, Semendria, Kulič.
1[44] TT d. 1007: Semendria, Golubac.
1[45] MAD 506: Semendria.
1[46] Mxt 567: Golubac.
1[47] KK d. 4725: Semendria.
1[48] MAD 15334: Vidin, Semendria.Kulič.
1[49] Ibid: Golubac.
1[50] TT d. 1007: Semendria, Golubac.
1[51] MAD 506: Semendria.
1[52] Mxt 567: Golubac.
1[53] KK d. 4725: Semendria
1[54] MAD 15334: Semendria.
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- 1[55] TT d. 1007: Semendria, Golubac.
1[56] MAD 506: Semendria.
1[57] KK d. 4725: Semendria.
1[58] MAD 15334: Golubac, Semendria.
1[59] TT d. 1007: Semendria, Golubac.
1[60] MAD 506: Semendria.
1[61] Mxt 567: Golubac.
1[62] KK d. 4725: Semendria.
1[63] MAD 15334: Semendria, Kulič
1[64] Ibid.: Golubac.
1[65] TT d. 1007: Semendria, Golubac.
1[66] MAD 506: Semendria.
1[67] Mxt 567: Golubac.
1[68] MAD 15334: Zvornik.
-

1[69] Ibid.: Zvornik.

1[70] KK d. 4725: Semendria

1[71] MAD 15334: Kefalonya, Zvornik, Akkerman, Kilia, Kulič, Semendria, Avala, Golubac.

1[72] Ibid.: Avala. Note that those who received 5 akçe per day were listed as cavalry azebs.

1[73] AE.SSÜL.I. 4/246: Belgrade; İE. AS. 1/19/2: Brčko.

1[74] İE: AS.1/20/1: Ilok.

1[75] Mxt. 567: Semandira, Kulič, Belgrade, Dobre, Boraca, Golubac, Ram; Mxt. 557: Semendria, Kulič, Belgrade.

1[76] Mxt 567: Osiyek, Erdut, Vukovar, Varadin, Ilok, Salankamen; Mxt. 557: Titel.

1[77] KK d. 4725: Semendria.

1[78] MAD 15334. Kefalonya, Zvornik, Akkerman, Kulic, Semendria, Golubac.

1[79] Ibid.: Kilia.

1[80] AE.SSÜL.I. 4/246: Belgrade

1[81] İE: AS.1/20/1: Ilok.

1[82] Mxt 567: Semendria; Kulič; Belgrade; Dobre; Boraca; Varadin; Golubac; Ram; Mxt. 557: Semendria, Kulič, Belgrade.

- 1[83] Mxt 567: Osiyek, Erdut, Vukovar, Ilok, Salankamen.
1[84] KK d. 4725: Semendria.
1[85] Ibid.: Semendria.
1[86] MAD 15334: Kefalonya.
1[87] Ibid.: Zvornik, Akkerman, Kilia, Semendria, Avala, Golubac.
1[88] ĪE. AS. 1/19/2: Brčko.
1[89] AE.SSÜL.I. 4/246: Ilok.
1[90] Mxt 567: Semendria, Kulič, Belgrade, Dobro, Boraca, Osiyek, Vukovar, Varadin, Ilok, Salankamen; Mxt. 557: Semendria, Kulič.
1[91] KK d. 4725: Semendria
1[92] MAD 15334: Prusac, Akkerman, Avala.
1[93] Ibid.: Semendria.
1[94] ĪE. AS. 1/19/2: Brčko.
1[95] Mxt 557: Gorjani; Kaptol
1[96] Mxt 567: Titel, Osiyek; Mxt 557: Osiyek, Titel, Diyakova, Pozega, Podgrac, Kaptol, Kuthievo
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- 1[97] KK d. 4725: Semendria.
1[98] MAD 15334: Akkerman.
1[99] Ibid.: Semendria.
1[100] ĪE. AS. 1/19/2: Brčko.
1[101] Mxt 567: Titel, Osiyek, Diyakova; Mxt 557: Diyakova, Pozega; Podgrac, Kaptol, Kuthievo
1[102] KK d. 4725: Semendria.
1[103] MAD 15334: Kulič, Ram,Vidin.
1[104] Ibid.: Semendria.
1[105] TT d. 1007: Golubac.
1[106] TT d. 1007: Semendria.
1[107] MAD 506: Sokol.
1[108] ĪE: AS. 1/19/2: Brčko; MAD 506: Semendria, Gradište; TT 187: Semendria.
1[109] Mxt 567: Kulič,Golubac,Ram.
1[110] Ibid: Semendria, Belgrade, Dobre.
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- 1[111] Mxt 567: Titel, Ilok.
- 1[112] Mxt 567: Osiyek, Erdut, Vukovar, Njemci.
- 1[113] KK d. 4725: Semendria.
- 1[114] MAD 15334: Kulič, Ram, Vidin.
- 1[115] Ibid. Semendria.
- 1[116] TT d. 1007: Ram.
- 1[117] TT d. 1007: Semendria.
- 1[118] MAD 506: Sokol.
- 1[119] ĪE: AS. 1/19/2: Brčko; MAD 506: Semendria, Gradište; TT 187: Semendria.
- 1[120] Mxt 567: Kulič, Golubac, Ram.
- 1[121] Mxt 567: Semandira, Belgrade, Dobre.
- 1[122] Mxt 567: Titel; Ilok.
- 1[123] Mxt 567: Osiyek, Erdut, Njemci.
- 1[124] KK d. 4725: Semendria.
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- 1[125] MAD 15334: Semendria.
1[126] TT d. 1007: Semendria.
1[127] MAD 506: Sokol.
1[128] MAD 506: Semendria, Gradište; TT d. 187: Semendria.
1[129] ĪE: AS. 1/19/2: Brčko.
1[130] Mxt 567: Semandira.
1[131] Ibid: Osiyek, Njemci.
1[132] Ibid.: Belgrade.
1[133] Ibid.: Dobre
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MAPS



Map I: Ottoman–Hungarian Frontier 1477–1481



Map II: Ottoman–Hungarian Frontier, 1491



Map III: Ottoman Conquests (1512–1540)




Map IV: Buda Vilayet, Bosnia and Klis (1543)



Map V: Situation in 1552



Map VI: Ottoman Expansion in the West (1491–1552)



Yellow line: Ottoman border in 1491

Red line: Ottoman border in 1519

Brown Area: Ottoman conquests between 1521-1529


Light Blue: Conquests between 1530-1540

Pink: Conquests between 1541-43

Dark Green: Conquests between 1543-52

Red Spots: Hungarian Fortresses destroyed by the Ottomans

Map VII: Area of Distribution of Salary Timars to the Fortress Garrisons, 1552



FIGURES



Figure I: Anonymous Siege Plan of Belgrade (TSMA e. 9440)



Figure II: Siege of Belgrade by Johann Schreier
Source: Ehrenspegel des Hauses Österreich, Buch VII, München: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek



Figure III: Battle of Mohaács by Johann Schreier
Source: Ehrenspiegel des Hauses Österreich, Buch VII, Münschen: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek




Figure IV: Siege of Buda in 1541 by Erhardt Schön

Source: https://tr.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dosya:Buda_in_1541-by_Erhardt_Schön_from_1542.jpg



Figure V: Siege of Pest by the Habsburg Troops in 1542 (Artist: Enea Vico)

Source: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Buda_es_Pest_ostroma_\(1542\).jpg#/media/File:Buda_es_Pest_ostroma_\(1542\).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Buda_es_Pest_ostroma_(1542).jpg#/media/File:Buda_es_Pest_ostroma_(1542).jpg)




Figure VI: Mukataa Register (MAD 176, 419b-420)




Figure VII: Roll-call register of the fortresses in Rumelia, 1491 (MAD 15334, 43-44)





Figure VIII: Roll-Call Register of Birkas (Berkasovo) from March 1529



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Figure IX: Summary Register of Total Sipahi Forces in the Ottoman Empire (1530)

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
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Figure X: Pençik Register



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Figure XII: Mukataa Register (MAD 7337)




Figure XIII: Account Book of Buda Province 1545–46 (ÖNB Mxt 581, 47b–48)




Figure XIV: Timar Ruznamçe Register of the Buda Vilayet (1553–57, Konsularakademie, Krafft 284, 31b–32)

The image shows a two-page spread of a historical Ottoman register. The right page (top) features a large heading in Ottoman Turkish, followed by a summary line. Below this, there are several rows of text and numbers, organized in columns. The left page (bottom) also has a large heading at the bottom, with rows of text and numbers above it. The handwriting is in a cursive Ottoman script, and the numbers are written in Arabic script. The manuscript is aged and shows some wear.