

FOREIGN POLICY AS A TOOL IN CONSTRUCTING NATIONAL IDENTITY:
A CASE STUDY OF GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

A Master's Thesis

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of

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

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ABSTRACT

FOREIGN POLICY AS A TOOL IN CONSTRUCTING NATIONAL IDENTITY: A CASE STUDY OF GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

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Orthodox foreign policy studies take states as given in international politics. As the principal actor in international politics, the state has a distinct character different from the outside. Orthodox Turkish foreign policy studies postulate that Turkey has been the member of the Westphalian nation state order and it has had a set of policies and actions oriented towards the external world. This thesis is a post-structural foreign policy study that problematizes the orthodox literature. It will be argued that the state is not given, the Turkish national identity is neither homogenous nor stable, and Turkish foreign policy is an identity productive discursive practice. The study scrutinizes the annual presidential statements on Gallipoli Campaign in order to demonstrate the way in which Turkish foreign policy discourses produce and reproduce the national identity. The analysis focuses on two different periods. The first period under the scope is between the years of 2001 and 2007 and the second period is between the years of 2015 and 2017. The study argues that the presidential statements on the battle aim to create the Turkish self in each period. Gallipoli Campaign is the source of the other in the present. Thus, the discursive authority of the presidential statements constitutes the Turkish self.

Keywords: Foreign policy, orthodox foreign policy studies, post-structuralism, Gallipoli Campaign

ÖZET

ULUSAL KİMLİĞİN İNŞASINDA BİR ARAÇ OLARAK DIŞ POLİTİKA: ÇANAKKALE SAVAŞI ÖRNEĞİ

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Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Nasuh USLU

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Geleneksel dış politika çalışmaları uluslararası politikada devletleri verili olarak kabul eder. Uluslararası politikanın başat aktörü olarak devlet, dış dünyadan farklı olarak belirgin bir karaktere sahiptir. Geleneksel Türk dış politikası çalışmaları, Türkiye'nin Westfalyan ulus devlet düzeninin bir üyesi olduğunu ve dış dünyaya yönelik bir takım siyaseti ve eylemleri olduğunu öne sürer. Bu tez geleneksel literatürü sorunsallaştıran post-yapısalcı bir dış politika çalışmasıdır. Devletlerin verili olmadığı, Türk ulusal kimliğinin ne homojen ne de istikrarlı olduğu, ve Türk dış politikasının kimlik üreten söylemsel bir pratik olduğu tartışılacaktır. Bu çalışma, Türk dış politikası söylemlerinin ulusal kimliği tekrar tekrar ürettiğini ortaya koymak adına, Gelibolu Harekatı üzerine yıllık Cumhurbaşkanlığı açıklamalarını irdelemektedir. Analiz iki farklı döneme odaklanmaktadır. İncelenen ilk dönem 2001 ve 2007 yıllarını, ikinci dönem ise 2015 ve 2017 yıllarını kapsamaktadır. Çalışma, hareket üzerine yapılan Cumhurbaşkanlığı açıklamalarının her bir dönemde Türk kimliğini oluşturmaya amaçladığını tartışmaktadır. Günümüzde Gelibolu Harekatı ötekinin kaynağıdır. Dolayısıyla, Cumhurbaşkanlığı açıklamalarının söylemsel otoritesi Türk kimliğini oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dış politika, geleneksel dış politika çalışmaları, post-yapısalcılık, Gelibolu Harekatı

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As a student in the field of international relations, I believe in timeless wisdom of realism in international politics. I also believe that realism is only a flashlight in a dark and wide room. Thus, social scientists need other theories to explain the complex social world. When I first decided to study on Gallipoli Campaign in the context of the field of international relations during the first year of my graduate education, I tried to explain the result of the battle based on the realist theory of offense-defense balance thanks to the professor of the International Security graduate course. Then, political messages of Turkish state leaders on Gallipoli Campaign attracted attention of me. I thought that state leaders have different understandings of the battle because of their different views of the world and their foreign policy messages given over the battle reflect the state leaders' ideological interpretation of international politics. However, I figured out that the post-structural assumption that there is no causal relationship between identity and foreign policy is the best intellectual and theoretical ground to study the political statements on the battle since the second period I analyzed in this study does not adopt an Islamist foreign policy orientation. As a realist, I do not hesitate to scrutinize the presidential statements in a post-structural point of view. Hence, I beg pardon from the students of post-structuralism for this humble thesis.

I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Nasuh USLU for his intellectual guidance and patience. Besides his academic posture, his personality inspired me in the first years of my academic life.

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INTRODUCTION

Writing history is as important as making history. If the writer does not remain true to the maker, then the unchangeable reality transforms into a confusing matter for humanity.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1931).

History is the discourse of power, the discourse of the obligations power uses to subjugate; it is also the dazzling discourse that power uses to fascinate, terrorize, and immobilize.

Michel Foucault (2003: 68).

This thesis is a post-structural study on Turkish foreign policy. It is an attempt to understand the identity productive Turkish foreign policy through discourses of Turkish state leaders on Gallipoli Campaign. It embraces the post-structural approach that foreign policy is an identity productive discursive practice. The study does set forth the hypothesis that Turkish national identity has been instable from the birth of the republic and the ultimate aim of Turkish state leaders is to build a homogenous and stable inside up until now.

Orthodox foreign policy studies “regard foreign policy as policies and actions of national governments oriented towards the external world outside their own political jurisdictions” (Ashley, 1987a: 51). The state is taken as the principal actor in international relations. Its intentions and actions towards the external world generate the central focus of foreign policy analysis (Gerner, 1995: 18). There is a clear distinction between the inside and the outside. Hence, the state is taken as sovereign. Post-structuralism expostulates that distinction between the inside and the outside is not given. Rather, the distinction is constructed and reconstructed. Post-structural foreign policy studies hold the view that this construction is a continuous process. The ultimate aim of state leaders is to build a homogenous inside. The outside is an arena to be represented in this endeavor. This representation is a kind of political performance. Foreign policy is a specific sort of boundary producing political performance (Ashley, 1987a: 51). The state is not given by nature and sovereignty is a myth. The state is constructed via represented threats originated from the outside. The role of danger and difference in constituting a homogenous identity is decisive. Foreign policy practices and discourses create values, norms, and identities to reach a

stable and homogenous identity. Thus, post-structuralism analyzes foreign policy as an identity producing discursive practice.

In general, the study problematizes orthodox foreign policy studies. It aims to demonstrate that there is a co-constitutive link between identity and foreign policy. Foreign policy practices and discourses have a role on constituting the inside. In particular, the study problematizes orthodox Turkish foreign policy assumptions. It will be argued that Turkish national identity is neither homogenous nor stable and there is no pre-given distinction between the inside and the outside. Rather, Turkish foreign policy is taken as a discursive practice in which a Turkish self is created and recreated.

The study analyzes the annual presidential statements on Gallipoli Campaign in order to demonstrate the way in which Turkish foreign policy discourses produce the Turkish self. The analysis focuses on two different periods. The first period under the scope is between the years of 2001 and 2007 and the second period is between the years of 2015 and 2017. Ahmet Necdet Sezer was the president of the state in the first period while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been the president in the second period. In the first period, there are seven different presidential statements on the battle. The second period also have seven presidential statements. It will be argued that each presidential statement aimed to create and recreate the Turkish self through constituting the nation, making the state, and producing the boundaries. The statements aimed to define the other and homogenize the inside. The presidential statements on Gallipoli Campaign narrated that the Turkish self is the source of security in the face of the threat coming from the outside. It will be also argued the statements utilized Kemalist and Islamist interpretations of the battle respectively in order to create the Turkish self. While the presidential statements in the first period imagined a Kemalist Turkish self, the presidential statements in the second period imagined an Islamist Turkish self to counter the Kemalist establishment in domestic politics. Thus, a comparative analysis of the presidential statements in two different period reveals the role of foreign policy discourses on constituting and reconstituting the Turkish self.

Historically, Kemalism and Islamism have been main contenders of Turkish national identity (Kösebalan, 2008: 11). The literatures of political science and international relations have produced many academic pieces on Kemalism and Islamism. However, conceptualizing Kemalism and Islamism is a difficult endeavor.

In an edited book on Kemalism, it is argued that Kemalism as a political ideology has many faces: “Kemalism, like many political thoughts, cannot be explained by a single definition or cannot identified with a single understanding. For this reason, it is true to speak of Kemalisms. These Kemalisms are articulated with rightist or leftist Kemalism, statist or liberal Kemalism, conservative or reformist Kemalism” (İnsel, 2009: 14). Focusing on the literature of Kemalism is out of scope of the thesis. This thesis offers a general definition of Kemalism. Kemalism is a political ideology that places the state to the centre of the political life in Turkey. The state is characterized as secular and modern in Kemalism. Kemalism envisions a society which has a homogenous structure. Thus, religion, social class, and ethnic identities are to be prevented to be apparent in public sphere since they constitute a threat to the continuity of the state. (İnsel, 2009: 18). The state and the society are based on the principles found by Atatürk. Westernization of the state and the society has been the central aim of Kemalism. In politics, Kemalism gives a role to the military. Accordingly, the military internalizes the Kemalist ideology. The military has a role on protecting the principles of the republic. In this context, military coups had had a purpose of securing the principles (Belge, 2009: 14). Islamism is also a difficult concept to define. In Turkey, it is stressed that many Islamic movements do not embrace the Islamic label to themselves (Aktay, 2005: 16). Many of them oppose to be characterized as an Islamist. Islamists are those who perceive the world divided into two: the house of Islam and the house of unbelief. In the context of the thesis, Islamists believe that their distinct identity embroils them in a dispute with the West in general and with the Christians in particular.

There are four reasons lies behind choosing Gallipoli Campaign as a case study. Firstly, there is no homogenous and stable inside in Turkey. The study considered the past as an arena where domestic power struggle is experienced in the present. Turkey does not have a homogenous and stable inside and the battle has not been historicized yet. Thus, the contending understandings of the battle support the idea that there is no homogenous and stable inside in Turkey. Secondly, the battle is coded as an important historical event in Turkey and rival political groups continually tried to impose their own understandings of the battle to prove their political causes. Post-structuralism argues that states have their own autobiographies in international relations and Gallipoli Campaign has been used as an autobiography in Turkey. Autobiographies

are stories that states tell about themselves to provide explanations on why states do what they do (Subotic, 2015: 2). Autobiographies are useful to secure the ontology of the state and Gallipoli Campaign offers this kind of security in Turkey. For instance, the Kemalist military establishment gave political messages over the battle. The Chief of the General Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı commemorated the battle and told that the military was on the ground against all kinds of threats in 1997 (Sabah, 1997). In 2007, the Chief of the General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt also commemorated the battle and underlined the role of the military on the protection of the constitutive principles of the state (Sabah, 2007). The messages aimed to naturalize the privileged position of the Kemalist military establishment in domestic politics. In the case of the official statements on the battle, the national identity has often been disciplined by rhetoric associated with nationalism, homeland, and unity and solidarity. Thirdly, Gallipoli Campaign is also coded as an important historical event in international stage. Turkey organizes annual ceremonies to commemorate the lives who lost in the battle and foreign state leaders attend to share the sorrow. Thus, the presidential statements have an international audience. This makes the presidential statements a tool in international relations for Turkey. Finally, there has been a hot debate on whether Turkey has an Islamist foreign policy agenda in international relations. The debate has inspired most analysts to argue that the political messages given over the battle in the second period demonstrates the so-called Islamist Turkish foreign policy orientation (Arango, 2014; Cook, 2015). The presidential statements have become even more important since Erdoğan's strong anti-Western rhetoric has frustrated the Western states. For instance, from time to time, Erdoğan has referred to the European Union as a "Christians' club" and called upon Muslim countries "to unite and defeat the successors of Lawrence of Arabia" (Hanioğlu, 2017).

The basic research question of the study is "In what ways do the annual presidential statements on Gallipoli Campaign and the constitution of the inside relate with each other?". The question is organized to scrutinize the non-causal relationship between identity and foreign policy. Analyzing the presidential statements on the battle makes the study unique. While post-structural Turkish foreign policy analyses concentrate on current international issues such as Cyprus (Kaliber, 2005; Özkan, 2015) and the Northern Iraq (Balci, 2015a), this study focuses on the battle fought more than 100 years ago. In other words, this study demonstrates that even the past is

central to the identity formation battle in the present. The study aims to build a bridge between Turkish foreign policy and Gallipoli Campaign. It will be argued that the past has been resorted to define the other and create the inside in the present. Gallipoli Campaign is an important historical moment for the Turks because of the fact that the enemy came to the shores of the homeland and tried to capture the capital. The battle reminds the Turks that the other, the enemy in other words, was real in the past and it is real in the present.

The study will use a mix methodology of quantitative content analysis and a qualitative discourse analysis in order to analyze the annual presidential statements on the battle. Firstly, the study will use Hansen's (2006) research design to determine the number of selves, the intertextual model, the temporal perspective, and the number of events. Secondly, a quantitative content analysis of the annual presidential statements will be presented to demonstrate that the battle has been narrated to create a Turkish self. Nabers (2009) analyzes the discursive construction of the American identity based on the quantitative analysis of speeches by President Bush that included the word "terror," "terrorism," or "terrorists" from 2001 to 2003. Ceydilek (2012) also use a mix methodology of quantitative content analysis and a qualitative discourse analysis to understand the role of foreign policy discourses on distant humanitarian crises on the constitution of the Turkish self. The study defines 9 signifiers which have been deliberately used in the statements to build a homogenous and stable identity in Turkey. It will be argued that the quantitative analysis concentrated on the signifiers sheds light on the central aim of the annual presidential statements. Thirdly, the study will scrutinize the presidential statements in more detail to understand whether Kemalist-Islamist identity formation battle is on the ground.

The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter focuses on orthodox and post-structural international relations and foreign policy studies. The first section of the chapter focuses on the methodological debate in the field of international relations. The second section of the chapter concentrates on orthodox foreign policy studies in the field. The mainstream international relations theories, namely realism, liberalism, and constructivism, constitute the orthodox literature. The section also examines orthodox Turkish foreign policy literature. The third section of the chapter scrutinizes post-structural foreign policy studies in the field. The section also focuses on post-structural Turkish foreign policy literature.

The second chapter focuses on the ideological narratives of Gallipoli Campaign. The first section of the chapter presents a brief history of the battle. The second section concentrates on the ideological interpretations of the battle. It will be argued that Gallipoli Campaign is a symbolic battleground in Turkey. Post-structuralism argues that same events can be presented in markedly different ways with significantly different effects (Campbell, 1998: 33). Narrative is central not just to understand an event, but in constituting that event (Devetak, 2005: 164). Kemalism and Islamism have continually narrated the battle in contested ways. Remembrance of the battle is full of contrasting ideologies, politics, motivations, and contradictions (Uyar, 2016: 16). The ideological narratives have a potential to make identical inside the state. Gallipoli Campaign is a performative historical heritage in Turkish identity formation battle.

The third chapter presents the Kemalist and Islamist tension in the Turkish identity formation battle. It will be argued that the Turkish identity has been instable. Kemalism had been the dominant ideology on the identity formation process in Turkey. The military establishment had played a crucial role on setting foreign policy agenda in the Kemalist camp. Islamism has been destitute of having a seat on the military establishment and only political parties have had a voice on the identity formation battle in the Islamic camp. The first two sections respectively focus on Kemalism in domestic and foreign policy. The third and the fourth sections scrutinize the role of Islamism in domestic and foreign policy.

The final chapter analyzes the annual presidential statements on the battle in order to demonstrate the identity productive Turkish foreign policy discourses. The first section of the chapter introduces the research design of the study. Hansen's (2006) research design is applied to ground the analysis on an organized research design. The second section presents a quantitative content analysis of the annual presidential statements. The study defines 9 different signifiers which the presidential statements consciously refer to constitute the Turkish self. It will be argued that the presidential statements are discursive practices which aim to create a homogenous and stable inside. The third section is organized in order to understand whether Kemalist or Islamist interpretation of the battle has been utilized in Turkish identity formation battle. It will be argued that while the first period embraces the Kemalist Turkish self,

the second period utilizes the Islamist Turkish self to counter the Kemalist establishment in domestic politics.

The conclusion summarizes the findings of the study. It also presents the limits of the study and suggest a number of ways for further post-structural Turkish foreign policy studies.



CHAPTER I

FOREIGN AND ‘FOREIGN’ POLICY STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

This thesis makes an explicit distinction between orthodox and post-structural studies in international relations in general and foreign policy studies in particular. Orthodox studies embrace the state-centric approach to explain international politics. This approach has dominated the field of international relations. The state is taken as a territorial and sovereign political unit. It exists in a world composed of the other which is similarly characterized (Brown and Ainley, 2005: 64). The social organization of the inside and outside environment of the state is different in a fundamental way. The external environment is seen as a strategic arena and the state is considered as acting on the basis of cold national interest calculation. The late 1980s experienced a post-structural approach on the mainstream explanation of international politics. The state-centric approach is argued to be outdated as new circumstances have come to on the scene.

This chapter concentrates on the orthodox international relations theories, namely realism, liberalism, and constructivism and post-structural approach. It will be argued that realism, liberalism, and constructivism fail to explain the identity productive Turkish foreign policy. Turkish state leaders aim to construct a stable national identity in Turkey. Thus, the outside is to be represented as the other to tame any possible opposition and build a homogenous inside in Turkey. Foreign policy is considered as a discursive practice. The first section of the chapter aims to sketch the modern and postmodern ontological positions of science. The modern ontology underpins the orthodox international relations and foreign policy studies. The postmodern ontology is the basis of post-structural approach. The second section concentrates on the orthodox literature in international relations theories and Turkish foreign policy studies respectively. The last section scrutinizes the post-structural literature in the field of international relations and Turkish foreign policy studies. Post-structuralism is a burgeoning approach on Turkish foreign policy literature. It shakes the myths of the orthodox literature in international relations and Turkish foreign policy.

1.1. Positivism and Beyond

The very foundation of the distinction between orthodox and post-structural international relations and foreign policy studies lies on the different understanding of what science is. A brief sketch of the modern and postmodern ontological positions of science reveals that distinction. On the one hand, the modern view holds the position that human perception is not flawed (Moore, 2001: 4). Scientific realism is the contemporary modern philosophy of science and it “holds the view that there is a real world out there and that humans may come to know it via science” (Moore, 2001: 4). In this view, observation process is not problematic. On the other hand, the postmodern ontological position holds the view that “human create understanding of the world, and that different humans create different understandings of the world” (Moore, 2001: 4). While the former argues that the world is consisted of material realities and irrepressible natural facts that human can observe it in an objective manner, the latter argues that there are distinct interpretations of the world. Positivists claim that regularities and general laws can be explored through the instrument of systemic observation. In this regard, reality is out there and it can be observed. Post-structuralism objects to that approach. It argues that “every way of understanding international politics depends upon abstraction, representation, and interpretation” (Campbell, 2013: 223).

The debate revolves around positivism and post-positivism is central to the fourth debate in the field of international relations emerged in the mid-1980s. The fourth debate could be characterized as a debate between explaining and understanding, between positivism and post-positivism, or between rationalism and reflectivism. The debate is about the different understanding on the epistemology, ontology, and methodology of the scientific inquiry in the field of international relations. Thus, it is safe to argue that all theoretical assumptions are dependent upon particular assumptions about ontology, epistemology, and methodology (Kurki and Wight, 2013: 15). The differences between the orthodox and post-structural understanding of international relations revolve around different epistemological, ontological, and methodological approaches. Post-structuralism has traditionally not focused on methodology in the field of international relations. For instance, post-structuralists such as Derrida declared that methodology is intimately tied to positivist

forms of science (Hansen, 2009: 1). However, this section aims to demonstrate that post-structuralism has a response to the criticisms mentioned below.

1.1.1. Rationalist Challenge

The orthodox literature of international relations and foreign policy studies has criticized post-structuralism in four points. First of all, it is argued that post-structuralism has no research program. In 1998, Robert Keohane made a distinction between rationalist and reflectivist theories. Rationalism claims the essence of the world could be captured in an empirically justifiable way. It has been argued that rationalism has a research program to understand the world around us. As an advocator of rationalism, Keohane criticized the reflectivist position of science “because of its lack of a research program”. It has been argued that rationalism is more accurate than reflectivist position of science since it has a systematic scientific approach. Post-structuralism has been criticized that it has no systematic scientific research approach and research program. Accordingly, it has been argued that reflectivist scholars needed to develop testable theories to evaluate their research program. Since post-structuralism do not share a commitment to the form of foundational positivism found in rationalist approaches, they have been even dismissed by leading rationalist scholars for not being legitimate social science (Smith, 2010: 5).

Secondly, rationalists argue that post-structuralism does not engage in real life problems in the field. Rationalists argue that a scientific research project should satisfy two criteria. The first criteria is that “*a research project should pose a question that is ‘important’ in the real world*” (King *et al.* 1994: 15, italics in original). Post-structuralism has been criticized for lack of its connection with real life problems and only dealing with metatheoretical issues in a philosophical manner (Ceydilek, 2012: 45). The epistemological and ontological position of post-structuralism is not accepted as capable of providing real or proper knowledge. For instance, Katzenstein *et al.* argue that “postmodernism falls clearly outside of the social science enterprise and in international relations research it risks becoming self-referential and disengaged from the world” (Katzenstein *et al.*, 1998, quoted in Ceydilek, 2012: 45).

Thirdly, post-structuralism has been criticized for lacking an identifiable scholarly literature “*by increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific*

explanations of some aspect of the world” (King *et al.* 1994: 15, italics in original). The problem is about the demarcation problem. The demarcation problem is a long-lasting issue in the philosophy of science. The purpose of the demarcation has been to find a set of objective criteria, which will solve the questions of what should be considered as science and what should not (Ceydilek, 2012: 41). The orthodox studies have been considered as the sole authority to determine which method and theory in the field is scientific. For instance, Walt (1998) criticized the deconstructionist approach. Walt argued that deconstructionist scholars “focused initially on criticizing the mainstream paradigms but did not offer positive alternatives to them, they remained a self-consciously dissident minority for the most of the 1980s” (Walt, 1998: 34).

Finally, the orthodox understanding of international relations argues that causality is an important element in a social inquiry. In the field of international relations, an analysis without causal inference is incomplete (King *et al.* 1994: 75). Causality requires two different types of variables; a dependent variable and independent variable(s). Post-structuralism has been criticized for the absence of the causal epistemology. “Critics of poststructuralism and discourse analysis have often portrayed this absence of causal epistemology as the road to theoretical, methodological, and political anarchy” (Hansen, 2009: 1). It has been argued that post-structuralism need to formulate causal hypotheses and subject them to rigorous testing to assess their capability.

1.1.2. A Post-Structuralist Response

Post-structuralism focuses on the historically specific conditions in which knowledge is generated. There is no truth in the world given exogenously; rather it is dependent on underlying power structures. This approach is the epistemological basis of post-structuralism. Thus, deconstruction of a specific cultural and historical setting of thinking and writing is the central aim of post-structuralism. The one who aims to understand the world around us is not an actor who has an objective and scientific research capability. Rather, “the knower is always caught up in a language and mode of thinking which, far from interpreting a world, instead constructs it” (Smith, 2008:

30). Thus, post-structuralism is skeptical of the validity of social knowledge claims. It rejects the idea that science produce anything like true knowledge.

The aforementioned criticisms have been responded by post-structuralists. First of all, post-structuralists argue that there is an evolving research program for discourse scholars. For instance, Milliken (1999: 228) argued that discourse scholarship has a research program:

That programme may be different from others in its commitments to studying the politics of representation, but it is not otherwise all that exotic or foreign a mode of collective intellectual labour. Like other research programmes, its adherents attend to, cite and follow up on the work of knowledge producers socially acknowledged as important for the research programme.

Hansen (2009) argues that most of what has been said about post-structuralism is misleading at best. Accordingly, post-structuralism has a research program that speaks directly to the conduct of foreign policy. Post-structuralism “pursues a particular set of research questions, centered on *the constitutive significance of representations of identity for formulating and debating foreign policy, and it argues that adopting a non-causal epistemology does not imply an abandonment of theoretically rigorous frameworks, empirical analyses of real world relevance, or systematic assessments of data and methodology*” (Hansen, 2009: 4, italics in original). It is safe to argue that the study of discourse in the field of international relations is not just a project of metatheoretical critique, it has also become a vibrant research program that deserves to be further advanced (Milliken, 1999: 248).

Secondly, post-structuralism is related with real-life problems. Post-structuralism has an alternative epistemology. Post-structuralism as a post-positivist approach opens up space for other ways of thinking about international relations and for other international realities different from the orthodox approaches. Post-structuralism does not share a commitment to the form of foundational positivism found in rationalist approaches (Smith, 2010: 5). It postulates that there is no objectivism and naturalism in social sciences. Objectivism refers to the view that objective knowledge of the world is possible and naturalism means that there is a single scientific method which can analyze the natural and the social world. Post-structuralism argues that there is no objectivism and naturalism. Rather, the orthodox theoretical assumptions shape what could we say about international politics. Objectivism is an illusion and knowledge is always constituted in reflection of

interests. The discursive practices that encompass us in different time and space are the real-life problems for post-structuralists. Post-structuralism tries to demonstrate that security is a political discourse that legitimizes the exercise of power. The post-structural literature has focused on case studies to demonstrate that the study of discourse concentrates on real life problems. For instance, Campbell (1992) scrutinized the discourses and practices which created enemies and secured the boundaries of the United States during the Cold War. Nabers (2009) analyzed the discursive construction of the American identity through the speeches by President Bush from 2001 to 2003. Hansen (2009) deconstructed the Western discourses on the Bosnian War to demonstrate how security discourses during the war constituted the Western identity. Post-structuralism is concerned with ‘real life problems’ since “policies are dependent upon representations of the threat, country, security problem, or crisis they seek to address” (Hansen, 2006: 5).

Thirdly, post-structuralism argues that there is an identifiable scholarly literature which increases our collective ability to construct verified scientific explanations of some aspect of the world. The critique is directly related with the fourth critique of post-structuralism which is about the lack of causality in the post-structural literature. In this point, rationalists privilege causal epistemological research projects. Post-structuralism analyzes co-constitution of identity and foreign policy. There is no causal relationship between identity and foreign policy. Post-structuralists argue that foreign policy relies upon representations of identity, but it is also through the formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced and reproduced. States do not have an identity independent from the discursive practices mobilized in presenting and implementing foreign policy. Thus, it is “impossible to define identity as a variable that is causally separate from foreign policy” (Hansen, 2009: 1).

Finally, the orthodox understanding of social sciences in general and international relations in particular is also challenged by critical approaches. Robert Cox published an influential article that problematized the scientific foundation of rationalism in 1981. He argued that there were two distinct purposes of theory. Theory guiding to solve problems is termed as problem-solving theory (Cox, 1981: 128). It “takes the world as it finds, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized” (Cox, 1981: 129). A theory which stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about is critical theory.

It “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox, 1981: 129). The distinction between problem-solving theory and critical theory based on the assumption that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981: 128). All theoretical assumptions “are located in space, time, culture, and history” (Smith, 2013: 9). Hence, the social world we live in is not real entities, but constructed social orders.

The thesis has a post-structuralist understanding of Turkish foreign policy. First of all, the post-structural Turkish foreign policy literature has a research program that adopts theoretical frameworks and systematically analyzes data (Balci, 2015a; Balci, 2015b). Secondly, the literature focuses on the conduct of Turkish foreign policy practices and discourses. For instance, the literature concentrates on case studies to demonstrate the identity productive practices and discourses (Kaliber, 2005; Özcan, 2009). Thirdly, post-structuralism is a burgeoning approach on Turkish foreign policy literature (İçduygu and Kaygusuz, 2004; Ceydilek, 2012). Finally, the study argues that a scientific inquiry does not have to adopt a causal epistemology since identity and foreign policy is co-constitutive. The analysis of the presidential statements aims to demonstrate the co-constitutive role of the Turkish self and the discourses.

1.2. Orthodox Foreign Policy Studies

International relations theories are “a collection of stories about international politics” and it “relies on international relations myths” (Weber, 2005: 2). The basic assumption of the orthodox international relations studies is that the state is the principal agent in international politics. Schmitt argues that “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts” (Schmitt, 2014: 41). The state is given and it is unquestionable in international relations. The other principal assumption is that there is a clear distinction between the inside and the outside. It is argued that while the inside is centralized and hierarchic, the outside is decentralized and anarchic. The state is assumed to have boundaries. The two assumptions are the basis of the orthodox foreign policy studies.

In social life, human decision makers acting singly or in groups act in tandem with a set of beliefs and theories. What we think about events around us and what we can

do about them depends in a fundamental sense on how we think about them (Smith *et al.*, 2008: 1). Even foreign policy decision makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images (Jervis, 1968: 455). It is misleading to assume that human decision makers act in a theory vacuum. Theories not only help us explain or predict international phenomena, but also tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention (Smith, 2008: 13). As mentioned above, theories are located in space, time, culture, and history. Thus, a foreign policy analysis is always theoretically informed. Pure empiricism is impossible. However, orthodox foreign policy literature embraces the idea that the state is the principal actor and there is a clear distinction between the inside and the outside in international politics. It is assumed that observation process is not flawed in a scientific inquiry. The concept of foreign policy is defined in the subfield of foreign policy analysis. Accordingly, foreign policy is “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor in international relations” (Smith, 2012: 2). It is a “strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its international relations with external entities” (Hudson, 2012: 14). According to Gerner, “the central focus of foreign policy analysis is on the intentions, statements, and actions of an actor-often, but not always, a state-directed toward the external world and the response of other actors to these intentions” (Gerner, 1995: 18). The traditional foreign policy approach “regard foreign policy as policies and actions of national governments oriented toward the external world outside their political jurisdictions” (Ashley, 1987a: 51). These foreign policy definitions above embrace the orthodox understanding of international relations in general and foreign policy in particular. What is common in these definitions is the assumption that the state is the central actor in international politics and its actions toward the external world is the subject of foreign policy analyses. In this study, foreign policy is considered “as the continuous attempt by governments to assume the role of a representative of the nation, thereby creating identity and social order” (Nabers, 2009: 192). Foreign policy is a discursive practice that attempts to produce the state and nation.

1.2.1. Realism

Realism has been the dominant theory of international relations. It is even argued that realism has a timeless wisdom (Dunne and Schmidt, 2008). The realist mindset of international politics finds its roots even from the ancient times. Thucydides was the historian of the Peloponnesian War and his explanation of the underlying cause of the war, the growth of the Athenian power and the fear that caused in Sparta, has been the textbook case of the realist understanding of international politics (Dunne and Schmidt, 2008: 96). Realism argues that power politics rules international relations. The infamous Melian dialogue between Athens and Melians gives the logic of power politics. Accordingly, the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.

Classical realists argue that international politics is driven by an endless struggle for power and human nature has been the root cause of this phenomenon (Dunne and Schmidt, 2008: 96). Morgenthau (1948) argues that international politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. Accordingly, international politics is a struggle for power. Morgenthau emphasizes that both domestic and international politics are a struggle for power (Morgenthau, 1948: 17). However, he underlines the fact that different conditions rule domestic and international politics in a different way. In domestic politics, institutions and norms direct the struggle for power into ritualized channel; in international politics, the struggle cannot so readily be tamed. Morgenthau states that there are basic principles in international politics. The first principle implies the role of human nature in power politics. Accordingly, “political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Donnelly, 2004: 16). He also argues that universal moral principles have no role in international politics. “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states” and the political sphere has its autonomy (Donnelly, 2004: 16).

Classical realism holds the view that human nature contains an ineradicable core of egoistic passions that characterize the central problem of politics. Human nature is constant and it is not different from the ancient times. Hobbes finds three principal causes of quarrel in the nature of man: competition, difference, and glory (Hobbes, 2016: 101). He argues that the natural condition of man is a state of war.

Thus, human life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (Hobbes, 2016: 102). To eliminate the insecurity and change the condition of the poor, nasty, brutish, and short human life, a common power to fear is required. Hobbes concludes that the state is the common power to be feared. He argues that the task of politics is to replace anarchy with hierarchy. However, international politics is the domain of anarchy and kings are in the state and posture of gladiators: having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another (Hobbes, 2016: 102). Another classical realist, Machiavelli, argues that it is better to be feared than to be loved for a prince since it is difficult to combine them. When the prince treats his subjects well, they would shed their blood for him; when the prince is in danger, people turn against him (Machiavelli, 2015: 64). Human is ungrateful, fickle, liar, and deceiver (Machiavelli, 2015: 64). To sum up, the classical realist theory finds the roots of war in human nature.

Neorealism is another branch of the realist school and it argues that anarchic structure of international system is to be studied to understand international politics. Kenneth Waltz is the founding father of neorealism (Waltz, 1979). Before his influential study, *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz finds out three images to understand origins of war and peace in 1954 (Waltz, 2001). The first image is human nature which claims that wars result from selfishness, misdirected aggressive impulses, and stupidity (Waltz, 2001: 16). The second image is internal structure of states. The occurrence or nonoccurrence of wars is explained by looking at internal structure of states (Waltz, 2001: 81). The final image is international level. In international anarchy, sovereign states act like individuals in the state of nature (Waltz, 2001: 163).

Waltz (1979) argues that international level is the most scientific one to study international politics. There is a system in international politics and its structure has three distinct features. Firstly, the ordering principle of international politics is anarchy. While domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic, international systems are decentralized and anarchic (Waltz, 1979: 81). “National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation” (Waltz, 1979: 113). The absence of a central authority is the decisive character of the international system. Secondly, states are alike agents in the system. Each state is a sovereign political entity. No matter what type of government they adopt and how much power they have, “all states in international

politics are assumed to be sovereign” (Weber, 2005: 14). The ultimate aim of the state is to survive. Lastly, in the anarchic international politics, states are differently placed by their powers (Waltz, 1979: 97). The differentiation between states is made according to their capabilities. Neorealism assumes that states are like billiard balls:

In defining international political structures, we take states with whatever traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may have. We do not ask whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic. We abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities (Waltz, 1979: 99).

The international structure is constructed on the fact that the state of nature is a state of war and the presence of the state of war directs states to maximize their security. Security is the highest end. It is important to note that Waltz is a defensive realist. Defensive realism argues that states aim to maximize their securities; not their powers. Accordingly, gaining more power may not bring more security to home; but it may bring more insecurity.

Mearsheimer is another important neorealist. He argues that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business (Mearsheimer, 2001: 2). Since there is no overarching international authority which can sustain international security and stimulate international peace, great powers fear each other and they always compete for power (Mearsheimer, 2001: 2). He argues that domestic politics has no role on international politics. Whether a state is democrat or autocrat will have little effect on its behavior. He argues that both democracies and non-democracies only care about security in the anarchic structure of the international system. Mearsheimer stresses the fact that great powers have the largest impact on what happens in international politics (Mearsheimer, 2001: 5). He is an offensive neorealist and offensive neorealism argues that states need to gain more power to be secure in the anarchic realm of international politics. States should maximize their powers and their ultimate goal is to be a global hegemon. Offensive realism has bedrock assumptions on international politics (Mearsheimer, 2001: 30). Firstly, it is assumed that the international system is anarchic. There is no central authority at the international stage. Secondly, great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability. It means that great powers are able to hurt and destroy each other (Mearsheimer, 2001: 30). Thirdly, states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. In other words, states do not have friends in international politics. Fourthly, survival is the primary goal of

great powers. Maintaining territorial integrity and autonomy of their domestic political order are the primary goals of states (Mearsheimer, 2001: 31). Finally, states are rational actors. States calculate the external environment strategically. These five assumptions constitute the origin of offensive realism.

To sum up, realism holds the view that there are some determinant facts (human nature and anarchy) in international relations and states must learn the rules of the game to survive in international politics. Domestic politics is irrelevant and national interest is predetermined. The world is an arena where states compete for advantage.

1.2.2. Liberalism

Liberalism has an optimistic point of view on human nature and international relations. It has been argued that the natural order between states had been corrupted by undemocratic state leaders and outdated politics such as balance of power (Folker, 2013: 116). Liberalism argues that liberal states are reasonable, trustworthy, and predictable. Liberals underline the fact that there has been no war between liberal states for almost two hundred years (Owen, 1994). Thus, liberal states tend to construct peaceful relations between each other. It is assumed that liberal states trust each other and they pacify their mutual relations. The reason behind the democratic peace is the unwillingness of citizens on such poor games, namely wars. A liberal state is constructed on individual rights, free speech, private property, and elected representation and it is peaceful toward another liberal state (Doyle, 1986). Liberalism finds its roots from the 18th century. Accordingly, Kant argues that “if consent of citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared, nothing is more natural that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game” (Owen, 1986: 1160). In liberal democratic countries, citizens are aware of possible burden of war and they are not eager to fulfill the necessities of the dangerous game. These citizens have freedom of speech and they could evaluate alternative foreign policy choices. If the blame is put on statesmen because of their misguided foreign policy choices, they may be changed in a coming election.

Liberalism acknowledges that there have been wars between states but it treats wars as an illness to be cured. It has been argued that democratic government, economic interdependence, international law, and international organizations are

means to overcome the security dilemma in international relations. The construction of the League of Nations was the peak point of liberal understanding of international politics before the World War II. “Galvanized by the failure of balance of power diplomacy to prevent devastating war, liberals were committed to using human reason and organizational ingenuity to replace the old order of national interests with a new order of common interests” (Donnelly, 2004: 26). It had been argued that the international organization has the capability to facilitate peaceful change. Liberalism argues that formation of an international organization is the key to facilitate peaceful change, disarmament, arbitration, and enforcement in international relations today.

The break of the World War II was the end of the liberal understanding of international politics. Liberal politics prior to the war were denounced as utopian. It has been argued that power politics is to be superior to all considerations of morality and ethics. However, the end of the World War II and the increasing role of international institutions paved the way for neoliberal understanding of international relations. The pluralist literature in the 1960s and early 1970s challenged realism that transnational relations characterized the increasingly extensive cross-national interactions occurring between states (Folker, 2013: 116). It has been argued that states have capability to overcome anarchy and facilitate international cooperation.

It is important to note that neoliberalism considers states as the most important agents of international politics. Both neorealism and neoliberalism have their roots in a utilitarian view of the world and they take states as rational actors (Keohane and Nye, 1987). States are the main actors in international politics. The international structure is taken as anarchic. There is no overarching government to enforce rules and cheating and deception are endemic (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). However, neoliberalism argues that international institutions have capability to overcome these problems originating from anarchy. While neorealism argues that states take relative gain into consideration and international cooperation is not desirable because of that reason, neoliberalism argues that states are in favor of absolute gain. States are less concerned with gains or advantages achieved by other states.

Neoliberalism argues that international organizations are key to understand international politics. However, neorealism evaluates international organizations as a reflection of states’ selfish interests and states cooperates only then their relative gain

is higher than other states (Mearsheimer, 1995: 7). Neoliberalism argues that states are rational actors and they seek to further their gains via international organizations. States construct and shape these organizations to advance their goals. International organizations are the result of rational and purposive interactions among states (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001). This is the rational design of international institutions by the hands of states. Neoliberalism embraces the functionalist approach on international organizations. They are rationally negotiated responses to the problems states face. While neorealism argues that states consider relative gain, neoliberalism argues that states take absolute gain into account.

Neoliberal critique on neorealism has three points in general (Nye, 2007). Firstly, states are not the only significant actors but transnational actors are also major players of international relations. It is argued that international politics is more complex and different actors have a voice in international relations. Secondly, military force is not the only significant instrument but economic manipulation and the use of international institutions are another major instrument. Lastly, security is not the only goal; welfare is another major goal for states.

To sum up, neoliberalism admits that the international system is anarchic. Still, international interdependence enhances the number of international cooperation between states. Neoliberalism is concerned with economic welfare and other non-military areas such as international environmental concerns. International cooperation is desirable and achievable under anarchy and international institutions and regimes facilitate welfare for all states by virtue of the principle of absolute gain.

1.2.3. Constructivism

The very basic assumption of constructivism is the idea that structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces. In other words, identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature (Wendt, 1999: 1). The end of the Cold War was the watershed for the revival of constructivism. It emphasizes social dimensions of international relations and possibility of change (Fierke, 2013: 188). Both neorealism and neoliberalism is criticized for failing to grasp the change that bring the end of the Cold War. Neorealism and neoliberalism take political identities for granted but

constructivism argues that international actors have changing identities (Katzenstein, 1997: 31).

Constructivism concentrates on the process that reality of international politics is generated by states. While neorealism and neoliberalism argue that there is a predetermined reality of international politics, constructivism holds the view that “reality is not out there to be discovered; instead, historically produced and culturally bound knowledge enables individuals to construct and give meaning to reality” (Barnett, 2008: 163). States know what they know because they have been in the business of systematically knowing more for a long time. States do not act in a dark world; they act according to a series of presumed certain acts of others. For instance, neorealism and neoliberalism argue that anarchy is given in international relations. Constructivism opposes this idea and it argues that there is no logic of anarchy apart from the practices that create a structure of identities. Anarchy is not a given law of international relations, but “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992).

Constructivism focuses on the question of how interests are formulated. Constructivists argue that states do not have a certain of predetermined interests. Rather, interests are products of social interpretive process. States have particular identities and these identities provide actors with a particular role in international relations. In other words, states have intersubjective identities in a socially constructed world. Identities tell states who they are and who others are. By this way, identities imply a particular set of interests (Hopf, 1998: 175). Social practices produce and reproduce intersubjective meanings and this is the only way that actors attribute a certain meaning to material domain encompassing themselves. In other words, people act toward objects on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them in the constructivist social theory. For instance, military capability that the United States obtains has different meanings for Cuba and Canada, and vice versa.

It is important to note that constructivism considers states as the principal agents of international relations. For example, Wendt (1999) argues that states are at the center of the international system. He acknowledges the determinant role of states in international politics. Constructivism underlines the fact that states recognize each other as the sole legitimate bearers of organized violence (Wendt, 1999: 9). It is a

cognitive process rather than a fact that given by nature. However, from this perspective, constructivism has a common point with neorealism and neoliberalism.

Constructivism also focuses on norms. It is argued that states do not act in a normative vacuum. The difference between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness demonstrates that states take normative concerns into account in international politics. The textbook case of the normative approach is the nonuse of nuclear weapons. It has been argued that there is a normative prohibition against use of nuclear weapons and it is called as nuclear taboo. It is a de facto prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald, 1999: 436). Constructivism criticizes the neorealist and neoliberal assumption that states are rational actors through problematizing the nonuse of nuclear weapons. Although use of nuclear weapons would have been profitable at the beginning of the Cold War, it was the normative prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons that the United States considered.

Constructivism also argues that domestic structures of states are major determinants of policy preferences. For example, Japan has its security politics determined by the structure of the state and the context of its social and legal norms (Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993: 86). Accordingly, an autonomous and powerful military establishment in Japan is impossible to emerge because of the aforementioned reasons. The normative context of the Japanese security understanding is shaped by the historical lessons of the World War II (Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993: 104). While neorealism overlooks the domestic establishment of states, neoliberalism and constructivism pay attention to the organizational structure of states.

To sum up, constructivism problematizes the assumption that interests are exogenously given. States have interests that are determined by beliefs and expectations that they have about each other (Wendt, 1999: 20). Ideas determine the direction in which a state mobilizes its material power. The social world in which states interact with each other produces and reproduces states' interests.

1.2.4. Orthodox Turkish Foreign Policy Studies

This section aims to present orthodox Turkish foreign policy studies. It is safe to argue that orthodox understanding of Turkish foreign policy has been the dominant

theoretical ground. However, poststructural approach on Turkish foreign policy is a burgeoning scientific inquiry among students of the subject.

Realism has been the dominant theoretical framework for academic endeavors to understand Turkish foreign policy for decades. Neorealism postulates that states act in the international system which has quasi-mechanistic features. The international system has a structure that it compels states to adopt a set of politics based on survival. States seek security in the anarchic realm of international relations. Neorealism finds the answer to the question of how Turkish foreign policy has been formulated in the feature of the anarchic structure of international relations. Realists argue that Turkey, as a middle power, has a limited capability and survival has been the ultimate aim of Turkish foreign policy decision makers in the anarchic realm of international politics.

Neorealism categorizes states per their capabilities such as small powers, middle powers, and great powers. Turkey is positioned as a middle power in the anarchic international system. Middle powers have ability to resist pressures from great powers and to influence policies of small powers (Hale, 2002: 1). If a medium power faces a threat coming from a stronger state or alliance, the medium power has only two options: bandwagoning or balancing. Hale categorizes Turkey as a middle power and analyzes Turkish foreign policy in a historical process. He detects four systemic changes and argues that the nature of the international system has determined the direction of Turkish foreign policy in all four cases (Hale, 2002: 2). The first international system was determined by the five great powers during the nineteenth century. The second one was the intense rivalry between the two major alliances from 1890s to 1914. The third international system was determined by the conditions of the World War II. The last one was the period of the Cold War between 1945 and the late 1980s. Hale argues that all the systemic factors determined the orientation of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey, as a middle power, had to fit its foreign policy calculations to the necessities of the international relations.

In a realist context, Turkey is also categorized as a regional power. Regional powers can bargain with great powers and change their policies in some degree if they take advantage of political conjuncture. For instance, neorealist analyses argue that states are mostly forced by the structure of the bipolar system to choose a side during

the Cold War era. Aron Paradigm assumes that maintaining a neutral policy is not realistic and possible for middle powers in a bipolar system (Oran *et al.*, 2009: 30).

Aktürk (2013) presents a realist assessment of Turkish-Russian relations from 2002 to 2012. He focuses on the gross the data articulated from the states' domestic product, population, and active manpower in the army in order to measure the change in the balance of military and economic power between Turkey and Russia. Aktürk concludes that Turkey and Russia were brought together by their weakness in the late 1990s and early 2000s, whereas they later separated once again due to the significant and steady resurgence of their military and economic power (2013: 58).

In short, neorealism concentrates on the systemic factors that exogenously shape foreign policy orientation of states. States are differentiated based on their capabilities. Turkey is contextualized as a middle power in the international system. Realists assessment of Turkish foreign policy do not take into account domestic politics and identity of Turkey.

Neoliberalism argues that states are inclined to provide international cooperation through international institutions even under anarchy. International institutions have a capability to mediate disputes between states and decrease the likelihood of conflicts between members of any institution (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). International institutions can eliminate lack of confidence between their member states. States adopt international politics based on cooperation under favor of the mutual trust provided by international institutions.

Neoliberal assessments of Turkish foreign policy argue that Turkey has been an adherent member of international institutions. Turkey is a founding member of some international institutions such as United Nations. Besides its role on international institutions, Turkey has also soft power. Soft power is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments" (Nye, 2004: x). Thus, neoliberal literature stresses the role of the international institutions and the impact of soft power Turkey has. Kalın (2011) argues that Turkey has been playing a major role in such international platforms as the G-20, the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, the European Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Turkey has also a capacity to build multilateral

relations based on its soft power in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus (Kalin, 2011).

It is also argued that Turkey has a demonstrative effect in the Middle East owing to its success at trade, its democratization experience, and the positive image it has as a secular Muslim country (Kirişçi, 2011: 43). The structure of the domestic politics of Turkey is taken into account, inspired by the liberal assumption that democratic states are dovish, reliable, and inclined to cooperation, and it is argued that Turkey has a soft power in the region.

Constructivism investigates the causal relationship between ideational factors and foreign policy interests to explain Turkish foreign policy. It has been argued that Turkey has an identity, or contested identities, which drives its foreign policy. In other words, Turkey has contested national identities and the contested national identities shape the foreign policy orientation of Turkey (Kösebalan, 2008). Accordingly, the contested nature of its national identity is explicit on issues regarding the relations with the West and the Middle East (Kösebalan, 2008: 6). As each domestic group have their own understanding of international politics and distinct portfolios of perceptions and interests, Turkey is expected to shift its foreign policy orientation on the basis of victorious actors in domestic politics.

Constructivism acknowledges that the state is hardly a unitary actor in international relations. Constructivism argues that national identity and interests “does not emerge only out of state-to-state interactions in international system, but rather from a clash of competing interpretations of such interactions at the domestic level” (Kösebalan, 2008: 10). For instance, while Kemalists propagate that Turkey is a western country and its foreign policy orientation should be directed to the West, Islamists claim that Muslim countries in the Middle East are the prior destinations in Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. Constructivist elaborations on Turkish foreign policy argue that a sense of confusion about Turkey reigns in external appearances and in the deep-rooted convictions of its people (Aydın, 1999: 153). It has been discussed whether the state should be oriented in the eastern ideal or in the western ideal. Aydın argues that Atatürk put forward an ideological framework by which the pursuit of Turkish foreign policy could be achieved (Aydın, 1999: 170). The ideological framework is the establishment and preservation of a national state with complete

independence and the promotion of Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization. Aydın puts emphasize on the fact that Atatürk's foreign policy principles represented a break with the past. The imperial Ottoman Empire heritage, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turanism were denounced (Aydın, 1999: 171).

A constructivist discussion on Turkish foreign policy has been galvanized in the Ahmet Davutoğlu era with the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring. It is argued that Davutoğlu had embraced a pan-Islamist imagination and Turkish foreign policy was oriented to realize the rule of Islam in the Middle East. Özkan (2014) argues that Davutoğlu was convinced that Turkey finds the chance to implement the pan-Islamist foreign policy with the upheaval that began in Tunisia in 2010. Oran (2013) also argues that Erdoğan elaborated the upheaval as a watershed for the region and he aimed to construct regimes similar to the ideology of his ruling party in Turkey.

To sum up, the orthodox Turkish foreign policy fails to analyze the role of foreign policy practices and discourses on construction of the inside. Post-structuralism argues that foreign policy practices and discourses aim to bind a society together and politically articulate different identities to reach a homogenous and stable inside in Turkey.

1.3. Post-structuralism

Post-structuralism concentrates on the question of how social meaning is constructed and contested through language (Steans *et al.*, 2010: 130). The social world we live in is constructed through language and discourse. Language is not an objective way of understanding the social world. Rather, it "is an irreducible constitutive part of social life" (Nabers, 2009: 193). As Campbell (1992: 6) puts it, "the world exists independently of language, but we can never know that, because the existence of the world is literally inconceivable outside of language and our traditions of interpretation". Post-structuralism investigates the ways in which power operates in the discourses and practices of international politics (Steans *et al.*, 2010: 134). It aims to deconstruct the constructed world via analyzing the language and discourse of the power. Language and discourse generate a particular knowledge. In this regard, what we know is tied to our particular discursive contexts (Steans *et al.*, 2010: 138). Thus, a post-structural social research can be based on the analysis of language.

Orthodox foreign policy studies take the state and its boundaries as given. In contrary, post-structuralism argues that foreign policy is a specific sort of boundary producing political performance (Ashley, 1987a: 51). Post-structuralism argues that it takes a great deal of time and effort to make a state (Steans *et al.*, 2010: 144). The state is constituted and reconstituted through discursive practices of its statecraft. Boundaries are to be drawn and redrawn through foreign policy discourses and practices. Thus, the state is a subject constituted in discursive practices and foreign policy is not so much behavior across boundaries. This approach implies a clear break with the assumption that underlies the most orthodox foreign policy analyses that the state is a rational actor or subject given prior to foreign policy practices (Hansen, 2012: 99).

Post-structuralism opposes the assumption that there is a causal relation between ideas and materials in international politics. However, it adopts a non-causal epistemology (Hansen, 2006). It is argued that foreign policy relies upon representation of identities. In other words, identities are produced and reproduced through foreign policy discursive practices. Identities and materiality are inseparable, “neither ideas nor materiality have a meaningful presence separate from each other” (Hansen, 2006: 19).

Post-structuralism argues that states have a discursive authority. Statesmen are continuously involved in the process of construction of the nation. Discursive practices attempt to fix meanings that enable the differentiation to be made between the inside and the outside. For instance, Foucault concentrates on the productive dimension of power and he argues that power has a positive role as a creative and constitutive force (Shinko, 2006). He reveals the fact that power is intertwined with truth and truths are productions of power (Shinko, 2006: 170). Post-structuralism argues that social life is about the practices of competing wills to subdue or to resist the other in order to impose their meanings and interpretations on events (Shinko, 2006: 113). Thus, the production of knowledge is a normative and political manner (Devetak, 2005: 162).

David Campbell (1992; 1998) is one of the leading scholars in the post-structural literature in international relations. In his seminal book, *Writing Security*, Campbell investigates the discourses and practices which create enemies and secure the boundaries of the United States. According to Campbell, danger is not an objective

condition for the United States; rather, it is a thing that is continually interpreted to define the inside and the outside of the country (1992: 1). Foreign policy is an interpretive practice that state leaders resort to secure the ontology of the United States. Interpretation and representation of danger and difference play a crucial role in constituting the identity of the United States. Campbell aims to reveal the foreign policy discourses and practices that constitutes the state through deconstructing the conventional political discourse of American state leaders. According to him, American “foreign policy can be understood as a political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of American political identity” (1992: 7). In this context, identity is not given; it is constituted and reconstituted in relation to difference.

Campbell problematizes the orthodox foreign policy assumption that the state is given and it is the central actor in international politics:

I want to suggest that we can understand the state as having ‘no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitutes its reality’; that its status as the sovereign presence in world politics is produced by ‘discourse of primary and stable identity’; and that identity of any particular state should be understood as ‘tenuously constituted in time...through a stylized repetition of acts’, and achieved, ‘not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition’ (1992: 9).

Campbell emphasizes the constitutive role of interpretation of danger on the United States’ identity during the Cold War. Danger waiting at the outside is not a threat to the existence of the state, but it is its condition of possibility (Campbell, 1992: 12). As Ashley (1987a) does, Campbell emphasizes the fact that foreign policy is a discursive practice that prevents the boundaries between the inside and the outside from blurring. While the orthodox foreign policy studies take foreign policy as a “state-centric phenomenon in which there is an internally mediated response to an externally induced situation of ideological, military, and economic threats”, post-structuralism concerns “with the establishment of the boundaries that constitute, at one and the same time, the state and the international system” (Campbell, 1992: 69).

The role of American foreign policy discourses on the constitution of the identity is also studied after the 9/11. Nabers (2009) analyzes American foreign policy between 2001 and 2003 and he emphasizes the link between foreign policy and identity change in the United States. Nabers argues that “the discourse on the war on terror can

be characterized as a continuous process of deliberately re-imagining America and international security” (2009: 203). It is argued that foreign policy is about filling the empty places of identity. In other words, it transforms an heterogeneous inside into a homogenous one.

Foreign policy is a social practice that makes certain events and actors ‘foreign’. It helps state leaders to impose a certain interpretation of events and actors in international politics. The imposition of a certain interpretation paves the way to the emergence of state identity. A foreign policy discourse disciplines the inside and excludes the other and defines the outside. State leaders interpret international events to secure the ontology of the state.

Post-structuralism scrutinizes the practices in which identity drives its meanings. Foucault emphasizes that he aims to write the history of the present rather than to write the history of the past from the perspective of the present (Ceydilek, 2012: 30). Campbell puts the same argument differently that “same events can be represented in markedly different ways with significantly different effects” (Campbell, 1998: 33). In this logic, narrative does not only help us to understand the event, it also constructs the event. Deconstruction of a narrative demonstrates that the past is constituted in the present and that “history” is a resource in the contemporary power struggle (Campbell, 1998: 84).

A post-structural analysis of foreign policy discourses and practices concentrates on the actions that produce meanings attached to various social subjects. Thus, a foreign policy analysis “should ask not whether statements are true or not, but which values, norms, and identities are being created in language” (Hansen, 2012: 95). In this regard, foreign policy is a kind of social practice that produces social order in which individual and collective subjects are produced and reproduced (Doty, 1993: 301). Social subjects exist only if they are produced in particular discourses. Foreign policy is a discursive practice that constructs tamed subjects. Doty explains the role of discursive practices:

Statements rarely speak for themselves. Even the most straightforward and ostensibly clear statements bring with them all sorts of presuppositions or background knowledge that is taken to be true. Presupposition is an important textual mechanism that creates background knowledge and in doing so constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognized as true (Doty, 1993: 301).

A post-structural foreign policy analysis underlines the fact that states, so-called principal actors in international relations, have unstable national identities and boundaries. To secure the existence of the state, “practitioners of statecraft are ardently and continuously involved in the construction of the nation” and “national identity is never a finished product; it is always in the process of being constructed and reconstructed” (Doty, 1996: 123). The state has a discursive authority and the discursive practices construct the inside and the outside. It continually attempts to fix meanings that enable the differentiation to be made.

Studying geopolitics is a textbook case that demonstrates the relation between the production of knowledge and the will to power. Critical geopolitical studies reveal that geopolitics is “a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft spatialize international politics and represent it as a world characterized by particular types of places, peoples, and dramas” (Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 190). In classical geopolitical studies, physical environment is taken as given and it is argued that the environment obliges all states to implement predetermined politics in international relations. The nature has a decisive role over international politics. Critical geopolitics objects the idea that natural facts determine which actions could be taken and it argues that “the study of geopolitics is the study of the spatialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states” (Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 192).

Critical geopolitics embraces the idea that the way we describe the world and the words we use shape how we see the world and how we decide to act (Kaldor, 1990, quoted in Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 190). In this context, geopolitics is re-conceptualized as a discursive practice. While the orthodox understanding of geopolitics analyzes international politics in the light of ‘objective facts’, the critical geopolitics unveils the interrelation between the production of knowledge and implementation of political power. It argues that geopolitics is an ideological and politicized form of analysis.

Post-structuralism poses a radical challenge to the orthodox international relations and foreign policy studies. It problematizes ontology of the state. Even the basic knowledges that the literature of international relations produced are questioned. Post-structuralism argues that international relations in general and Turkish foreign policy in particular has no *a priori* facts.

1.3.1. Poststructural Turkish Foreign Policy Studies

Post-structural Turkish foreign policy literature argues that state leaders in Turkey implement national security and foreign policy practices to create and recreate a distinct national citizenship identity (İçduygu and Kaygusuz, 2004; Ceydilek, 2012). Turkey has never had a fixed identity which supposes a certain set of interests in international relations. State leaders have to secure the ontology of the state and perpetuate it. Thus, it is essential to build a homogenous inside through creating values, norms, and identities. The literature demonstrates the impact of foreign policy practices and discourses in the building process of national citizenship. Foreign policy is taken as an integral part of citizenship formation (İçduygu and Kaygusuz, 2004: 29).

Schmitt argues that “sovereign is who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, 2014: 13). The sovereign constructs national identity and determines the inside and the outside through foreign policy practices. The Kemalist military establishment had been the sovereign in Turkish domestic and foreign policy. Beginning from the 1960 military coup, the military gained the privilege to decide on the exception on foreign policy issues. The creation of the National Security Council institutionalized its role in politics at home and at the outside. The resolutions taken there had decided the exception for decades. The National Security Council was responsible for preserving a very broadly defined concept of internal and external national security. From Schmitt’s definition, the exception has been the national security of the state that is directly related to domestic and foreign policy issues. The military had propagated that Turkey was located in a strategic geography; therefore, it had imminent national security threats. The political had been put aside by the sovereign on foreign policy issues.

The role of the Kemalist military establishment has paved the way for critical and post-structural foreign policy studies in Turkey (Kaliber, 2005; Özcan, 2009; Aktay, 2010; Yeşiltaş, Dursun, and Bilgin, eds., 2015; Balcı, 2015a; Balcı, 2015b). It is argued that the political has been put on the edge of main issues concerning Turkish foreign policy. Aktay (2010: 61) argues that “the main issues facing the country have been considered almost as constitutive elements of Turkish national existence” and the political is abstained from being participated to the main issues. The Kemalist military establishment had have a long-standing role that dominated national security issues.

The political was out of the “high walls of the establishment” and the latter was “protected against any free, human initiative by dogmatic presumptions and ideologies” (Aktay, 2010: 61). The military had silenced the political in Turkey. It propagated that the country was surrounded by enemies and the national security was taken as most vital. Aktay argues that the Justice and Development Party era is the primary architect of the paradigm shift. The era implies the return of the politics at home.

The theoretical approach mentioned above has formed a basis for case studies to understand the identity productive Turkish foreign policy discourses and practices. For instance, the post-structural Turkish foreign policy literature has studied the Cyprus issue and the region of the Northern Iraq to understand the identity productive foreign policy practices and discourses. It is argued that the Cyprus issue is exploited by the Kemalist military establishment to impose a distinction between the inside and the outside (Kaliber, 2005; Özkan, 2015). Kaliber (2005: 319) argues that “the Cyprus issue has turned out to be the main discursive battlefield of the polarization” among Kemalist and Islamist elites. Özkan (2015) argues that the Cyprus issue is taken from the context that Turkey has no Cyprus problem to the context that Cyprus is an existential issue for Turkey. The underlying reason behind the paradigm shift is the rational design that uses the issue to build the inside in Turkey. The Cyprus issue demonstrates that states can survive if only a threat survives. Balcı (2015a) studies Turkish’s policy towards the Kurdish entity in the Northern Iraq to demonstrate the fierce battle between the Kemalist secular block and the ruling party, the Justice and Development Party, in domestic politics between 2006 and 2008. The case study, Balcı argues, demonstrates “how foreign policy produces, maintains, and reproduces the state and its identity by practicing and consolidating the artificial border between inside and outside” (2015a: 71).

The Cyprus issue and the Northern Iraq have been narrated that they have a strategic importance for Turkish national security. The sovereign utilized the international issues to narrate that Turkish national security is under threat in the face of the enemies. Ceydilek (2012) argues that even strategically unimportant and distant crises constitute the Turkish self. Ceydilek takes foreign policy “as the sum of discourses and practices in all levels of social interaction which has the capability of constituting and re-constituting identities” (Ceydilek, 2012: 7). He analyzes the

identity productive role of Turkish foreign policy through deconstructing official statements on three distant natural disasters. The study argues that identity is never complete and the Turkish self is constituted in a continuous process.

Critical geopolitical studies also emphasize the exceptional role of the Kemalist military establishment on setting foreign policy agenda for decades. The discursive foreign policy practices over the geography in that Turkey is located helped the military to tame the inside and build a homogenous citizenship in the country (Yeşiltaş, Dursun, and Bilgin, eds., 2015). The Kemalist military block had been the sovereign for decades and it embraced the orthodox geopolitical understanding that geopolitics ruled the politics and the politics had to be restricted to some extent for the sake of the country. The concept of the border was the source of enemies and Turkey was surrounded by enemies. The Kemalist geopolitical mindset had been narrated to establish the military centered powerful state paradigm (Yeşiltaş, 2015). The narrative emphasizes the fact that unity inside the country is vital. For instance, in 1935, Recep Peker discussed that Turkey must stay firm in the wake of threats coming from the north, east, south, and west of the country (Özcan, 2015: 123).

Post-structural Turkish foreign policy analyses argue that Turkish national identity has been unstable and the ultimate aim of foreign policy decision makers is the construction of the inside via the threats coming from the outside. Turkey has contending ideological groups and these groups struggle with each other to impose their ideological agenda within the state. Foreign policy becomes an arena that the sovereign consolidates its power through drawing boundaries between the inside and the outside. In Turkish foreign policy practices and discourses, the task for the outsiders is to homogenize the inside.

CHAPTER II

GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN AND NARRATIVIZING OF REALITY

This chapter argues that Gallipoli Campaign is a contested historical legacy in Turkey. Its meaning has never been a fixed one as each political group is continually generating its own narrative of the battle. There is no historical experience existing objectively out of the subjective interpretation. Ideological background of rival political groups make them to narrate the past in a contested way. Gallipoli Campaign as a historical heritage is far from being objectively internalized into a single national identity. It has been filtered through the subjective interpretation of both Kemalists and Islamists. This chapter demonstrates that Gallipoli Campaign is a symbolic battleground in Turkish identity formation battle between Kemalism and Islamism. The battle is what Kemalists and Islamists make of it. It is a historical heritage that is always under construction.

The first section of the chapter presents a brief history of the battle. The battle was one of the fronts of the Great War and the Ottoman Empire defeated the enemy only in the Gallipoli front. The second section argues that Gallipoli Campaign is a contested historical heritage in Turkey. It is what the political groups, namely Kemalists and Islamists, make of it. The section will ask three questions to reveal the ideological interpretations of the battle. The first question is “Who was the enemy?”. The second one is “How did the Ottomans win the battle?”. The last one is “What is the importance of the battle today?”. These questions help the study to understand the archetypal Kemalist and Islamist interpretations of the battle. The study resorts to popular Islamist books on Gallipoli Campaign to answer the questions below. These books shed the light on the Kemalist and Islamist interpretations of the battle.

2.1. A Brief History of the Battle

The Great War broke out between the allied powers and the central powers in 1914. In that war, the Ottoman Empire participated in as one of the central powers. The Ottoman Empire had fought in many fronts during the war and the empire stood as the

victorious only in the Gallipoli peninsula. It has been argued that the root cause of Gallipoli Campaign was the fact that the Western allies locked in a stagnant trench warfare in Europe. The costly stalemate emerged in the western front urged the allies to break the deadlock with a new plan. The Russians in the east was also in a difficult situation because of the Ottoman offensive operation in the Caucasia and the allied response to the Ottomans in the west would lighten up the burden the Tsar shouldered.

The allies came to the shores of the Ottoman Empire, “the sick man of Europe”, to seize Istanbul, the capital of the empire, and knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war. Defeating the Ottoman Empire would help the allies to reach the tsarist Russia via the sea route and make the latter stay firm in the war against Germany. The victory against the Ottomans would also change the indecisive Balkan states’ mind. It was the false optimism of war that misled the allies to launch the offensive attack to the Gallipoli peninsula. The allies did not have the power to foretell the future of the policies they adopted and it was “the illusion of cheap wars” that “invites leaders to risk or launch wars” (Evera, 1999: 14). The literature on the history of the battle demonstrates that it was the mission of impossible (Hart, 2011).

The naval operation on the straits of Dardanelles was based on the assumption that the Ottomans were weak and not capable enough to defend the Straits (Hart, 2011: 22). The allies envisioned that the Ottomans would be intimidated when they saw the lethal weapons of the allied navy. The Ottomans “were not regarded as a European enemy in the terminology of the time” and the British officers thought that they “could take risks that they would not have attempted against the German army” (Hart, 2011: 68). Winston Churchill even planned to hire the Ottomans as mercenary to the British army after the foreseen victory (Prior, 2012: 91).

The first offensive action of the allied naval campaign on the strait of Dardanelles was launched on 19 February 1915. The navy consisted of seven battleships (Cornwallis, Inflexible, Triumph, Vengeance, Suffren, Gaulois, and Bouvet) attacked the Ottoman fortifications but the first day of the offensive operation was inefficient; only six Ottoman soldiers were killed and not any Ottoman cannon was destroyed (Prior, 2012: 63). The second attack on 25 February was a bit successful and four long-range Ottoman cannons were destroyed (Prior, 2012: 67). 18 March was the day of the biggest naval operation on the Strait. Under the leadership of Admiral

de Robeck, the allied navy bombarded the defensive lines of the Ottoman Empire. The operation was a disaster for the allies; Bouvet, Ocean, and Irresistible were sunk and Inflexible, Gaulois, and Suffren took on heavy damage (Prior, 2012: 82). The first victory for the Ottomans came on March 18, 1915, the day of victory for Turks in the present. The failure of the attack on the Dardanelles on 18 March convinced the allies that another naval attack would be another failure. On 22 March, the allied decision makers decided to switch to combined operations with the land invasion army (Hart, 2011: 45). With the second phase of the battle, Gallipoli Campaign became the first modern amphibious warfare in the military history.

The amphibious land invasion started on 25 April. The peninsula was to be invaded in order to help the navy to force the Strait. The allied invasion army landed at Dardanelles in four places. British troops would land to the south at Cape Helles and advance to higher ground at Achi Baba; while French soldiers would launch a diversionary attack at Kum Kale. Australian and New Zealand units would come ashore on the western side of the Gallipoli peninsula, move across its peaks and take the heights overlooking the Dardanelles at Mal Tepe. The Anzac landing at the north was encountered by the resistance of the Ottomans under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. He told his men to defend to the death:

To my mind there was a more important factor than this tactical situation - that was everybody hurled himself on the enemy to kill and to die. This was no ordinary attack. Everybody was eager to succeed or go forward with the determination to die. Here is the order which I gave verbally to the commanders: 'I don't order you to attack - I order you to die. In this time which passes until we die, other troops and commanders can take our places (Hart, 2011: 97).

At a day following 25 April 1915, he addressed his soldiers:

...we must drive those now in front of us into the sea... There is no need to scheme much to make the enemy run. I do not expect that any of us would not rather die than repeat the shameful story of the Balkan Wars. But if there are any such men among us, we should at once lay hand on them and set them up to the line to be shot (Gawrych, 2013: 45).

Gawrych (2013) argues that these words reflect the mindset and feelings of Mustafa Kemal in those days, but it is safe to say that all the Ottoman soldiers were feeling the same things at that time. The Ottoman Empire lost most of the part of its European lands in the First Balkan War. The enemy even invaded Edirne, the previous capital of

the empire. The Ottomans was defeated in less than 60 days. The Balkan experience was a fiasco for the empire.

The second phase of the campaign lasted for nine months but gave no hope for any success. The allied soldiers had lost faith in the future of the offensive campaign and “all they could do was sit in their trenches and think of what might have been” (Hart, 2011: 387). The allies decided to withdraw. The only successful allied operation was the evacuation launched on December in 1915.

Eurocentric explanations on the result of the battle overlook the role of the Ottoman army. The result of the battle has been explained by the British command failures, friction between the allied army and navy, and inexperienced troops and commanders (Erickson, 2015: 3). The Eurocentric approach treats the Ottoman victory as passive rather than active. Erickson objects to that explanation. Erickson argues that the Ottoman army was more combat effective than the allied armies. Accordingly, the Ottoman army possessed well-developed levels of mobility, the Ottoman planning systems were effective, and the Ottoman command structure operated at much higher levels of effectiveness than the allied command structure (Erickson, 2015: 7). Hart argues that Gallipoli Campaign was a mission impossible and the defeat was the result of the blind optimism of the allies:

There were simply not enough guns at Gallipoli for the Allies to have any chance against Turkish troops that were well dug in, barbed wire, machine guns and artillery support. It was a campaign that needed hundreds of guns that did not exist, fired by gunners not yet trained, using complex artillery techniques that had not yet been invented, firing hundreds of thousands shells not yet manufactured (Hart, 2011: 459).

Gallipoli Campaign became a defining moment in the history of both Australian and New Zealand. Before the Anzac experience, the British Empire was the motherland for both Australians and New Zealanders. Joining the war in the service of the empire was the act of patriotism. Pugsley argues that the battle has played an important role in fostering a sense of national identity in New Zealand (Pugsley, 2015: 8). It was the heroic experience that Australia became consciousness of itself as a nation. The Anzac legend was born on 25 April 1915 and reaffirmed itself in eight months’ fighting on the peninsula with courage, endurance, initiative, discipline, and mateship. Anzac Day is a national day of remembrance in Australia and New Zealand that commemorates the Anzac soldiers on 25 April each year.

2.2. One Front, Many Stories

This section concentrates on the Kemalist and Islamist narratives on Gallipoli Campaign. It embraces the genealogical standpoint that there is no fixed meaning and no secure ground of history; there is only interpretation (Ashley, 1987b: 408). Foucault (2003: 66) explains the genealogical standpoint:

It seems to me that we can understand the discourse of the historian to be a sort of ceremony, oral or written, that must in reality produce both a justification of power and a reinforcement of that power. It also seems to me that the traditional function of history, from the first Roman annalists until the late Middle Ages, and perhaps the seventeenth century or even later, was to speak the right of power and to intensify the luster of power.

There is an explicit relation between the history we read and the power relations we experienced in the present. It is worth to quote again a long sentence from Foucault (2003: 66) to demonstrate the juridical link between the sovereign and power:

The point of recounting history, the history of kings, the mighty sovereigns and their victories (and, if need be, their temporary defeats) was to use the continuity of the law to establish a juridical link between those men and power, because power and its workings were a demonstration of the continuity of the law itself.

Thus, the history we read establishes and perpetuates the juridical link between the sovereign and power. Studying the genealogical function of historical narratives reveals the fact that history is an operator of power, and intensifier of power like rituals, coronations, funerals, ceremonies, and legendary stories (Foucault, 2003: 66).

In this section, it will be argued that history is not a dead past. It will be demonstrated that the past is what political groups make of it. In other words, the changing political context shapes the remembrance of the past. Thus, the understanding of Gallipoli Campaign in the present is not finished, but it is always under construction. Consequently, there is a deep ambivalence about what the victory means.

2.2.1. The Study of the Past

The interpretation of Gallipoli Campaign has changed in the course of Turkish political history. Jenny Macleod emphasizes the decisive role of the changing political context on the remembrance of the past in the present. For instance, she argues that although

Irish units were extensively involved in Gallipoli Campaign, the battle did not provide a promising material for the development of Irish national mythology (Macleod, 2004: 10). Accordingly, being in the service of the British Empire has no place in the nationalist narrative of making of Ireland. The interpretation of the past has always been influenced by the substantial degree of subjectivity of each political group. This is what Anthony Cohen writes on interpretation of the past. Accordingly, each political group oriented to the same historical case is likely to differ from each other in certain respect in its interpretation (Cohen, 1985: 17). Interpretation is influenced by the political group's belief and ideology. David Campbell concentrates on narratives. He argues that same events can be represented in markedly different ways with significantly different effects (Campbell, 1998: 33). This is what he called as the narrativizing of reality. In this regard, narrative is central, not just to understand an event, but in constituting that event.

The contending images of the battle implies the idea that “the past which an historian studies is not a dead past, but a past which in some sense is still living in the present” (Carr, 1987: 22). History is the process of selection and interpretation of facts. The process is deeply imbued with the attitudes and agendas of a historian (Macleod, 2004: 1). The ideological orientation of each political group transmutes the battle into a symbolic battleground in Turkey. The battle is what the political groups make of it. The understanding of the battle is always under construction. Edward Hallet Carr (1987) argues that the historian belongs not to the past but to the present. History is a selective construction of the past. Thus, “it is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past” (Carr, 1987: 30). The historian interprets the past and the political groups resort to the past in accordance with inherent contemporary purposes.

Şükrü Hanioglu (2016) underlines the fact that Lausanne Peace Treaty has not been historicized in Turkey. As a non-historic but an important development, he argues, Lausanne Peace Treaty has been locked up between quandary concepts such as victory or fiasco. These concepts make the peace treaty central to political discussions in Turkey. The same argument could be made on Gallipoli Campaign. The battle has not been historicized yet. However, the battle is coded as an important event. As Mete Tunçoku stresses, “Gallipoli is the place that for the first time, after a century of defeats, the Turks were successful” (Arango, 2014). Yet, there is no consensus even

on the basic understanding of the battle. Political groups have contended on the meaning of Gallipoli Campaign.

The Gallipoli peninsula is a place of memory in Turkey. Places of memory generate social memory, create national consciousness, and perpetuate the social order (Güler, 2012: 311). Places of memory shape collective identities within social groups. Güler emphasizes that once they are constituted, places of memory are subject to change according to political conjuncture (Güler, 2012: 312). Places of memory build a bridge between the past and future for social groups. Gallipoli Campaign as a place of memory helps political groups in Turkey to understand the present world.

In a socially constructed world, social groups make a clear distinction between inside and outside. Bauman implies that social groups are constituted on common beliefs and norms (Bauman, 2015: 51). They are inclined to draw borders between the world they live in and the outside. The outside is full of uncertainty and threat and a social group should be unified in the face of threats coming from the outside. Harari argues that sedentary societies resort to mutual myths to perpetuate their coexistence (Harari, 2015: 113). A sedentary society lives in an imagined order. The mutual myths which are constituted consistently help these societies to perpetuate their coexistence in imagined orders.

Benedict Anderson defines nation as an imagined political community (Anderson, 2014: 20). It is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. Anderson argues that the nation is imagined as limited and no nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind (Anderson, 2014: 21). Members of the imagined community have something in common with each other. Thus, the imagined community implies simultaneously both similarity and difference (Cohen, 1985: 12). Cohen indicates the sense of discrimination in the imagined community. It is the boundary and that boundary marks the beginning and end of the community (Cohen, 1985: 12). The imagined community hinges on consciousness. “Group beliefs are often inscribed in collective memory” and collective memory consisted of the myths, narratives, and traditions (Wendt, 1999: 163). Collective memory constitutes who a group is and how it relates to others (Wendt, 1999: 163). Collective memories have decisive long-term effects; it shapes the understanding of the world of social groups and it is “hard to shake their long-term effects” (Wendt, 1999: 163).

Gallipoli Campaign is a historical heritage in Turkey; it constitutes the collective memory of the Republic of Turkey. This chapter demonstrates the presence of the contending collective memories. Islamists and Kemalists have their own collective memories. They have contending narratives of the battle. The contending narratives on Gallipoli Campaign are self-contained. They disclaim each other both epistemologically and ontologically.

2.2.2. Kemalist and Islamist Narratives on Gallipoli Campaign

Turkey as a torn country has contested images of the past. Gallipoli Campaign as a historical heritage is also narrated in markedly different ways. The battle was once part of the republic's secular founding myth. The secular reading of the battle challenged by the Islamist narrative. The reason of the rival narratives is the ideological interpretation of the past. The underlying reason of why Gallipoli Campaign becomes part of the political agenda is the gradual shift towards a more Islamic perception of the Turkish self. The battle as an important historical experience is an autobiography of the state which both Islamists and Kemalists resort to prove their political cause.

Kemalism relates Gallipoli Campaign to the construction of the secular and modern nation state. Accordingly, the battle has a constitutive effect on the project. It has been narrated that Atatürk took the spirit of the battle and transformed it into the secular and modern nation state. Kemalism frames its bilateral relations with Western states in the Lockean culture of anarchy. In this culture of anarchy, states recognize each other's sovereignty as a right (Wendt, 1999: 208). Accordingly, Kemalist understanding of international relations based on the assumption that states recognize each other's sovereignty. The Lockean culture of anarchy implies the fact that states tend not to conquer each other, rather states are eager to live and let live (Wendt, 1999: 209).

Kemalism denounces the imperial past of the Ottoman Empire and welcomes the Westphalian nation state order in the post-war era. Gallipoli Campaign is considered as a preface of the newborn republic. The battle gave Turks a sense of self-realization. It was the Turkish nationalism that the victory introduced to the newborn republic. Özakman (2016: 1) argues that the battle was the national revival and

harbinger of the republic. The battle proved that the Turks were equal to the “European enemy” in the age of many defeats. The victory gave them a self-confidence.

The Islamist paradigm argues that their distinct identity embroils them in a dispute with the Western communities. Islamism perceives the world divided into two: the house of Islam and the house of unbelief. The Western world is depicted as Christian and relations with the West has been maintained in the Hobbesian culture of anarchy. In this culture of anarchy, security of Islam is competitive and it is based on zero-sum game (Wendt, 1999: 265). Bilateral relations with the Christian communities are inclined to become severe over time.

Islamist understanding of the battle argues that Gallipoli Campaign was another phase of the longstanding clash between Muslims and Christians. The battle was launched by the crusaders. It was considered as a clash of civilization rather than a national struggle (Uyar, 2016: 14). The very existence of Islam was in danger. Accordingly, Muslims defended the house of Islam against the crusaders. Dervishes, prayers, worship in the front, and religious legends played a decisive role on the fate of the battle (Öztan, 2015: 93). The battle proved that the crusaders still set their eyes on the house of Islam. Thus, Muslims all around the world must be on the alert at all time.

2.2.2.1. Who was the enemy?

The Kemalist understanding of the battle concentrates on the imperialist rationale of the enemy to explain the root cause of the battle (Özakman, 2016). Kemalism does not consider the belief system of the enemy and it does not put much emphasis on norms, values, and identities of the enemy. The battle was calculated and launched based on national interest of the enemy motivated by imperialism. Kemalism has a secular reading of the battle. The enemy was the Western imperialism rather than the Christianity. The enemy tried to capture the capital of the empire on the basis of cold national interest calculations. It is argued that the enemy aimed to capture the Straits and open the sea route to the tsarist Russia.

Kemalism argues that the Ottoman Empire was incapable to resist the dynamics of the modern era and the imperialist enemy exploited its weakness. In other words,

the empire failed to catch the zeitgeist of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. It is argued that “the historical dynamics that turned the Ottoman world upside down was the economically advanced, technologically superior, and culturally dominating Western world” (Emrence, 2016: 15). The imperialist enemy aimed to capture Istanbul, control Turkey, and extinguish Turkishness (Karaveli, 2014). Thus, the enemy who was aware of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and aimed to exploit that weakness.

The Islamist reading on the battle depicts the enemy as successors of the crusaders in the past. It is argued that the Christianity motivated the allies to invade Istanbul, the heart of the faith, and extinguish the presence of Islam. In 1516, the Ottoman Sultan Selim I defeated Tuman Bay, the sultan of the Egypt-based Mamluk Sultanate, and sent the caliph to Istanbul (İnalçık, 2016: 143). The Ottoman Empire became the defender of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. The caliphate paved the way for the Ottoman authority to be established in the house of Islam (İnalçık, 2016: 146). From this point of view, the caliphate was under existential threat during the battle. The Crescent fought with the Cross in 1915 (Andı, 2015: 91). The battle is considered as a religious war. The enemy was the crusaders equipped with the most sophisticated weapons of the age.

In 2015, Presidency of Religious Affairs published a book titled “Bir Millet in Yeniden Dirilişı Çanakkale: 100. Yılında Çanakkale Zaferi” (Özdamar *et al.*, 2015). The book problematizes the moral dimension of modernism and it argues that the battle was launched against Muslim values. A prominent Islamist journalist Ahmet Taşgetiren argues that the Gallipoli peninsula was the last castle of Islam (2015: 53). He argues that the enemy was the crusaders. Accordingly, the enemy targeted mosques and madrassas, the very basic symbols of Islam. In other words, the enemy was the Christian communities who aimed to exterminate the Muslim world.

2.2.2.2. How did the Ottomans win the battle?

The Kemalist narrative on the battle argues that it was the homeland consciousness of the Turks that motivated the soldiers to fight and repulse the enemy (Özakman, 2016; Karaveli, 2014). The soldiers under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal fought and defeated the imperialist enemy. They sacrificed their own lives for the sake of the

nation and the homeland. A Kemalist book written for children on the theme of Gallipoli Campaign was written in the early republican era (Öztañ, 2015: 84). The book propagates the ethnic nationalism and military images of the era and it creates an ideal soldier stereotype out of a child (Öztañ, 2015: 86). Thus, the Kemalist understanding of the battle characterizes an ideal citizen and soldier for the nation state. It was the patriotism of the ideal soldier that the enemy was defeated in 1915.

Kemalism also argues that the early administrative genius of Mustafa Kemal shaped the result of the battle. The Kemalist narrative even argues that if Mustafa Kemal was not on the ground, the enemy would win the battle (Atacanlı, 2015: xv). Mustafa Kemal is depicted as the most important commander in the whole battle. Although he was only a lieutenant colonel than a colonel during the battle, the narrative rarely mentioned about his military rank. It is also important to note that Kemalists argue that Atatürk was on the ground rather than Mustafa Kemal at times (Meydan, 2011). It is a deliberate preference that reveals the ideological interpretation. Thus, Kemalism implicitly emphasizes the continuum between the battle and the constitution of the secular and modern nation state under the leadership of Atatürk.

The Kemalist understanding of the battle downgrades the visibility of religion on the victory. It does not put much emphasis on religion. The secular reading uses patriotism and military spirit in explaining the metaphysics of the battle. The central motivation of the ideal soldier was the devotion to the Turkish nation. The Turkish soldier had fought with the national spirit under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal.

Kemalists argue that the Islamist narrative on the battle ignores Mustafa Kemal's role on the battle and it explains the victory over miracles and divine powers (Özakman, 2016: 2). Accordingly, Mustafa Kemal is taken as a low-profile commander. Islamism does not take his role on the battle into consideration. The Islamist understanding of the battle puts forward the story of faithful ordinary soldiers to explain the victory. Accordingly, the faithful soldiers fought for Allah (Uğurluel, 2015: 49). The soldiers defended the Straits to the death because of the fact that the enemy was the crusaders and Islam was under threat. The Muslim soldiers fought for the sake of Islam. No matter what were their ethnic identities, Muslim soldiers were aware of the meaning of the battle: the battle was between the Crescent and the Cross (Taşgetiren, 2015: 54). Islamists interpret the battle as a holy war.

The battle was won by means of the superiority of the faith to the most sophisticated weapons of the age (Vakkasoğlu, 2015). The faithful soldiers defeated the enemy by the will of God (Uzun, 2015: 92). Even General Hamilton was aware of the fact and he confessed that God was with the enemy and the result of the battle was predetermined (Dikici, 2011). Uyar (2016: 14) summarizes the so-called role of divine powers:

During the major struggle between two religions in which thousands of Ottoman soldiers sacrificed themselves, saints, angels, and other holy beings helped the soldiers withstand and repulse the enemy. Holy clouds descending from the heavens destroyed entire enemy battalions and regiments.

An Islamist book for written children on the theme of the battle has the same purpose with the book written in the early republican era. The book creates an ideal Muslim soldier stereotype out of a child (Vakkasoğlu, 2015). Accordingly, Muslim soldiers fought to defend the house of Islam and defeated the enemy equipped with the most sophisticated weapons of the era, thanks to their faith and the will of God. The book does not construct the victory upon Mustafa Kemal. Vakkasoğlu emphasizes the role of the faith on the victory. In this book, a child learns from his grandfather that the enemy was the one who aimed to destroy the existence of Islam (Vakkasoğlu, 2015: 11). The child concludes that the faith was the main impulse motivated the soldiers.

2.2.2.3. What is the importance of the battle today?

Kemalism makes inferences from the battle to strengthen the modern nation state today. Firstly, the battle proved that Turkey was an equal actor in the Lockean culture of anarchy. Atatürk gave two messages to stress the wisdom of international peace and status quo in 1934:

Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives... You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore, rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehments to us where they lie side by side here in this country of ours. You, the mothers who sent their sons from faraway countries, wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well (Daley, 2015).

The landing at Gallipoli on April 25, 1915, and the fighting which took place on the peninsula will never be forgotten. It showed to the world the heroism of all those who shed their blood there. How heartrending for their nations were the losses that this struggle caused (Atacanlı, 2015: 574).

The messages support the idea that Kemalism has no eternal enmity to the nations who had fought against the Turks on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The “heartrending” memories of the battle demonstrates the devastating effects of wars. Atatürk aimed to build an understanding that preserving status quo is preferable in international relations to perpetuate the newborn republic. Secondly, the battle is considered as a preface to the modern nation state. It is argued that the battle was a part of the process of constructing the republic. Gallipoli Campaign and the fight for independency were the two stages of the construction of the republican state (Özakman, 2016: 5). The national spirit in 1915 was transformed into the secular nation state. The nascent republic is presented as a follow up of the battle. There is a deep-seated continuity between the two experiences. The battle in which Mustafa Kemal is given a central role is described as the beginning of the way toward the modern Turkey (Öztan, 2015: 92). Thirdly, the battle proved the administrative genius of Mustafa Kemal. The battle introduced Mustafa Kemal as a leader to the Turkish nation. Kemalists narrate that the nationalist soldiers fought and defeated the enemy under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Mustafa Kemal was the key commander during the battle and his role was the decisive one. Finally, the battle demonstrates that unity and solidarity inside the country is vital to survive in international relations. The victorious experience proves that the Turks can defeat their enemies if they stand together.

Islamists also take some lessons from the battle fought in 1915. Firstly, the battle demonstrates that the crusaders have endless interests in the house of Islam. Thus, the Muslim world should be awake in the face of the imminent threat. The battle is to be remembered to understand the problems Muslims face in the present. For instance, the root cause of the battle is the same with the causes of the present crises in the Middle East (Taşgetiren, 2015). Secondly, the battle cemented the unity and solidarity in the Muslim world in 1915. The same formula is key to survive in the Hobbesian culture of anarchy in international relations. Muslims must be united to overcome the troubles they are facing in the twenty-first century. Thirdly, the ummah successfully defeated the crusaders equipped with the most advanced weapons of the age thanks to the faith. Thus, the battle demonstrates that the faithful Muslim

individual has the capability to resist any kind of threat. Finally, “the Çanakkale spirit” demonstrates that Muslims have a potential to defeat the West again. Modernism is not capable enough to defeat the faith.



CHAPTER III

TURKISH IDENTITY FORMATION BATTLE: KEMALISM AND ISLAMISM

Social trust in Turkey is low. Social trust means that individuals in a social group trust in strangers. In other words, it is the “generalized willingness of individuals to trust their fellow citizen” or “the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm” (Ekmekçi, 2014: 564). Ekmekçi (2014) argues that a level of social trust in a society shapes social and political relations within that society. The contested national identity has fed the distrust in Turkey. The end of the Cold War signaled the emergence of politics of torn countries. Huntington (1993: 42) argues that torn countries have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but they are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization or another. Huntington claims that Turkey is the most obvious and prototypical torn country. There has been a deep-seated social distrust in Turkey. The low social distrust causes low political trust as well (Ekmekçi, 2014: 565). It could be argued that Turkish national identity has been instable.

In Turkey, there has been a Kemalist and Islamist tension which revolved around the understanding of the civilizational process of the country. Bilateral relations between Kemalism and Islamism have been constructed on a mutual distrust. Kemalism assesses Islamism as a threat to the very existence of the secular and Western nation state. Kemalists argue that there are many nations but there is only one civilization. Although Turkey fought the West in the Turkish War of Independence, the state entered into the Western system of society (Aydın, 1999: 175). The Kemalist ideology considers itself as the guardian of the modern and secular republic. In contrast, Islamism evaluates Kemalism as an enslavement to the West. In Islam, religion is not one sector or segment of life; it is concerned with the whole life (Lewis, 1976). The Islamic revival indicates the incomplete process of civilizational identity formation started by Kemalism. The low level of social trust in Turkey has shaped the social and political relations within the society.

Historically, the West has played an important role in domestic politics and identity formation battle in Turkey. In other words, the Turkish identity formation battle between Kemalism and Islamism revolves around the relations with the Western

culture and civilization. Even the Ottoman Empire era had witnessed a firm discussion revolved around the modern reforms which mimicked the Western experience. Dağı (2002: 2) succinctly summarizes the paradox in Turkish domestic politics related with relations with the West:

Thus, the West and westernization have emerged as central concepts, a key to understand Turkish politics in modern times. On the one hand the West with its might was posing a threat to the very existence of the shirking empire, on the other it was the rising civilization with its wealth and power. As the result the Turks were both threatened and attracted by the West. It was both a source of threat and admiration. Thus, the relations of the Turks to the West right from the beginning of the modern times had a double edge of love and hate; admiration and fear.

The chapter analyzes the Kemalist and Islamist identity formation battle in Turkey. The identity formation battle demonstrates that the national identity construction process is not finished yet. There has been an instability of national identity in Turkey. Each political group aims to build a stable and homogenous national identity. The chapter focuses on the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan in the late 1990s and the role of the Justice and Development Party in domestic politics. The increasing role of Necmettin Erbakan as an Islamist politician and the rise of the JDP in the early 2000s increased the tension in Turkey. The discursive authority of the Kemalist establishment in Turkey aimed to denounce that each period had an Islamist agenda to change the modern and secular character of the state. Kemalism had propagated that the military had a role in politics as the guardian of the state. The 1997 military memorandum implied the end of the political Islam in Turkey and the victory of the Kemalist military establishment. However, Islam has been socially embedded in various forms of social life. The rise of the JDP and its current political success in domestic politics implies the declining role of Kemalism in Turkey. Consequently, the discursive battle emerged in politics in each period.

3.1. Kemalism and Domestic Politics

The Kemalist paradigm projected the state in the Western trajectory. It aimed to establish a modern, secular, and Western nation state. Kemalism is an elitist ideology and it has a centralizing mindset impervious to the demands of the periphery (Polat, 2006: 513). Islam was considered as an obstacle in this project. Islam and Islamic

groups had been marginalized by the Kemalist elites. Besides Islamism, Kurdish nationalism also has to be disenfranchised from forming threats to the unity of the nation (Polat, 2006: 513). The ultimate aim of Kemalism was to build a homogenous and stable inside. The nascent republic abandoned the militant expansionist ideology of the Ottoman Empire (Aydın, 1999: 156). The cultural heritage of the imperial past was denounced. Atatürk aimed to create a modern nation state promoted to the level of the contemporary Western civilization.

Kemalism launched a severe nation building process. The state suppressed ethnic and religious groups and exclude them from political process (Bozdañoğlu, 2005: 5). The discursive authority of the regime tried to impose a fixed and stable self. The Kemalist elite even propagated a militant secularism. In 1934, Şükrü Kaya, Minister of Interior, told that “religions have fulfilled their purpose and their functions are exhausted; they are institutions which can no longer renew their organisms or revitalize themselves” (Ahmad, 1991: 8). Kemalism depicted Islam as the other. The depiction of Islam as the other has served to constitute the legitimacy of the secular state.

The Western experience of modernization had been considered as the ultimate paradigm in the newborn republic. Kemalism labeled alternative approaches such as Islamism as a reactionary front and it excluded them as a threat to the existence of the republic. For Atatürk, there were many nations but there was only one civilization. Kemalism sees no difference between modernization and westernization. The urgent task of the nascent republic was to catch up with the modern world (Lewis, 2002: 72). The Kemalist understanding of secularism was the regulation and disciplining of religious life and institutions. Lewis (1968: 412) succinctly characterizes the Kemalist approach toward Islam:

The basis of Kemalist religious policy was laicism, nor irreligion; its purpose was not to destroy Islam, but to disestablish it-to end the power of religion and its exponents in political, social, and cultural affairs, and limit it to matters of belief and worship. In thus reducing Islam to the role of religion in a modern, Western, nation-state, the Kemalists also made some attempt to give their religion a more modern and more national form.

The nascent republic adopted nationalism and secularism in domestic politics based on the centralized authority. The Kemalist reforms began the nation building process. The secularization of the state and the society was the central purpose of the regime.

Kemalism considered any expression of religious identity expression as a threat to the very existence of the state. The nationalism required the Kemalist establishment to suppress any manifestation of Kurdish identity. The regime aimed to westernize and secularize every aspect of social, cultural, and political life to create a modern nation.

Although the necessity of keeping the military out of politics had long been a Kemalist conviction (Kili, 1980), the military establishment had increased its leverage in politics in time. For instance, the National Security Council created after the 1960 military coup had been the most important political mechanism that allowed the military to participate in the decision-making process (Bozdahioğlu, 2008: 137). The military establishment had consolidated its civilian allies, particularly in judiciary, political parties, and the media, to counter the Kurdish and Islamist opposition in domestic politics. For instance, the secular establishment's strategy toward the JDP is shaped entirely by its suspicions about the party's hidden Islamic intentions (Cizre, 2008: 8). Accordingly, Kemalism had argued that Islamist political groups had a hidden agenda in domestic politics. Kemalism articulated the ideological fears of Kurdish separatism and Islamism to secure its tutelage in Turkey (Kuru, 2012: 38). The military used the so-called threats to justify and perpetuate its political role.

3.2. Kemalism and Foreign Policy

After the successful revolution in Turkey began with Mustafa Kemal's organization of a resistance movement in Anatolia after Turkey's surrender to the Allies in 1918, the retention of the territorial integrity of the Turkish homeland has become the central Turkish political purpose (Kili, 1980: 381). Atatürk defined the political agenda of the republic based on the implementation of the modernization process inside the state and the protection of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity in international politics. The new regime abandoned the imperial ambitions of the past and accepted the limitation of the national frontiers. In other words, establishment and preservation of a national state with complete independence, promotion of Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization, and attachment to realistic and peaceful means in foreign policy actions characterized the Kemalist foreign policy orientation (Aydın, 1999: 171).

Kemalism considered international politics as an arena to secure the establishment process of an enduring political structure. Atatürk determined the foreign policy orientation of the state. His foreign policy was clearly an extension of his domestic policies since a peaceful foreign policy was needed in order to achieve the reforms inside Turkey (Aydın, 1999: 171). Kemalism had considered international politics as a mean for its domestic agenda constructed on the externalization of Islamism and Kurdish national identity. The Cold War environment had put aside identity in domestic politics. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the West concentrated on the excluded groups such as Islamists and Kurds. The hegemon role of the Kemalist military establishment in domestic politics had been challenged. The political conjuncture galvanized the Kemalist distrust toward the West. Although Kemalism projected the state in the Western trajectory, the Kemalist understanding of international politics in general and the West in particular has had a skeptical character. The Sevres Syndrome is a useful concept to explain the Kemalist distrust. It is a kind of conspiracy theory Kemalism has used to frame international environment. The concept is defined to describe the paranoia of the Turkish secular bureaucracy and politicians. Accordingly, Kemalism believes that Western powers are bent on dismantling Turkey (Guida, 2008: 38). The skeptical attitude toward the West is grounded on the infamous heritage of the Treaty of Sevres signed in 1920. The treaty abolished the Ottoman Empire and forced the empire to renounce all rights over the Middle Eastern and North African territories. The treaty projected to create new states such as an independent Armenia in the eastern part of Anatolia and an autonomous Kurdistan in the southeast Anatolia. It also aimed to construct a Greek presence in eastern Thrace of the empire. The heartrending memories of the past “has been reinforced by other threats and dangers to Turkey’s national security in the intervening years, ranging from Stalin’s expansionist statements in the mid-1940s, to Armenian and Syrian irredentism, to the bilateral military cooperation of Greece and Syria, to the invasion of Iraq, and finally, to Turkey’s ostracism from the European Union” (Guida, 2008: 38).

The Sevres Syndrome has served as a ground for the conspiracy theories in the contemporary politics in Turkey. Kemalism has been skeptical against political groups such as Islamists and minority groups such as Armenians and Kurds. For instance, the rise of the Justice and Development Party and its victory in the general election of

2002 galvanized a hot debate in Turkey that the West was cooperating with Islamist political groups to divide and rule Turkey. The increasing cooperation with the EU under the rule of the JDP has undermined the privileged position of the Kemalist military establishment in foreign policy making process (Özcan, 2009: 83). Thus, Kemalism propagated that the Turkish armed forces were under attack from the West because of its achievements in defending the state against terrorism and partition (Guida, 2008: 49). In order to perpetuate the privileged position of Kemalism in domestic and foreign policy, the JDP was narrated that it had an Islamist agenda to end the modern and secular character of the state and to create a new state to revive the Islamic rule of the Ottoman Empire (Kuru, 2012). It was argued that the JDP was “cooperating with the West to bring down Kemalism, the only guarantor of Turkish independence and sovereignty” (Guida, 2008: 48). For instance, the Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt argued that Turkey was under threat, but he warned that no power could divide the state or succeed in changing its secular and democratic regime (Hürriyet, 2007). The West and Islamists had the same enemies in common; the Turkish Republic, Atatürk’s principles, national identity, secularism, and populism (Guida, 2008: 48).

In short, the Kemalist paradigm has been suspicious against the West and this suspicion is originated from the Sevres Syndrome. It has been argued that the outside is full of enemies who want to divide and rule the republic. The imperial past of the West and the Treaty of Sevres has been remembered to define the outside and the enemy. The idea that Turkey is surrounded by its enemies has determined the habitus of Turkish foreign relationship (Aktay, 2010: 63). It also has been argued that the inside is full of collaborators who want to end the modern and secular republic. Accordingly, the enemy inside the state cooperates with the enemy outside to partition the state. Political groups such as Islamists and minority groups such as Armenians and Kurds have been labeled as the other inside the state. The discursive practices of the Kemalist military establishment aimed to continue the privileged position of the Kemalist paradigm. The other political groups have been alienated. The inside enemies had been used to keep the establishment untouched (Aktay, 2010: 65). The Kemalist military establishment had originated threats from the outside through foreign policy discourses.

3.3. Islamism and Domestic Politics

Islamism as a political approach has a long tradition in Turkey. The source of the political Islam could be found in the Ottoman Empire era. Pan-Islamism as an ideological commitment was articulated during the second half of the nineteenth century when new humiliations made the Muslim world ready to turn to the Turkish Sultan for protection and leadership (Lewis, 1968: 340). In modern Turkey, Kemalism aimed to bureaucratize the ulama and make Islam as a department of the state. However, the secularization of the state was never complete. The Kemalist project of turning Turkey into a modern, secular, and Western state is an incomplete process (Kösebalan, 2008: 6). The Kemalist elite failed to fully internalize the Western principles. According to Lewis (1952), the secularization of the republic was never complete. He argues that the persistence of popular religion in the form of the cult of dervish sheiks in Anatolia has been strong (Lewis, 1952: 47). Although the urban bureaucratic stratum had undergone an ideological and cultural transformation through imitating the Western experience of modernization, the non-urban elites have maintained their cultural and religious roots and felt a strong sense of continuity with their past (Karpat, 1988: 138).

In general, Islamic political identity was a construction in response to the Western penetration in and domination on the house of Islam and to the resulting humiliation of the Muslims (Dağı, 2002: 2). The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the modern and secular republic implied the defeat of Islamism in Turkey. However, as mentioned above, Islamist groups have continued their presence in the face of the repressive Kemalist practices in domestic politics. While the republican elite has tried to westernize and secularize every aspect of social, cultural, and political life, Islam has remained a depository for regulating day-to-day social life for the masses (Yavuz, 1997: 64). This is an important point that shows the failure of the project of the Kemalist elite to turn the republic into the modern and secular state. This failure paved the way to the identity crisis in Turkey.

The Welfare Party had constituted the most institutionalized opposition to the official identity of the state within the democratic framework (Bozdahoğlu, 2008: 89). The national elections held in 1995 implied the influential existence of the political Islam in Turkey. The WP won 21.1 percent of the vote and 158 seats in the 550 seat

Turkish parliament. The party formed a coalition government with Tansu Çiller of the True Path Party despite the opposition of the secularist Turkish armed forces. For instance, the Chief of the General Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı called politicians to remark the concerns of the military establishment over the possible coalition government with the WP. Yavuz (1997: 63) argues that the coalition government between the pro-Islamic Necmettin Erbakan and the Europhile Tansu Çiller indicates the duality of Turkish identity. For the first time, Turkey had a prime minister whose political philosophy was based on Islam. The party played an important role in the political socialization of Islamic groups by mobilizing them to take part in the political system and thus eased political participation in Turkey (Yavuz, 1997: 66). Under favor of the political success, Islamists started to externalize the Islamic identity.

Erbakan defined the inside as Muslim regardless of class or ethnic divisions and highlighted Islamic solidarity more than ethnic or class solidarities (Yavuz, 1997: 67). It was a kind of a utopic image of society. Islamism creates an alternative paradigm in the societal and political domain in Turkey. Göle (1997: 58) argues that Islamism has a utopian desire to change the society and it is what distinguishes Islamism from other social movements such as feminism and environmentalism, which recognize pluralism and contribute to the strengthening of civil society. Thus, the Islamist paradigm which envisions a complete change in the society threatens Kemalism. Bilateral relations with Kemalism and Islamism is a zero-sum game. Since the WP had an articulate ideology, it tried to constitute and transform its supporters with a new Islamic identity and interest (Yavuz, 1997: 75). During the late 1990s, Islamism portrayed secularism as an alien and divisive ideology for the Muslims. The vision of the political Islam was based on the idea that the emancipation of the Muslims from the chains of the Western values introduced by Kemalism was achievable.

The 28 February Process was the turning point in the late 1990s since the Kemalist military establishment directly targeted the Islamic movement in Turkey. Kemalism aimed to demolish the public visibility of Islam. Duran (2010: 19) summarizes how Kemalism instrumentalizes Islam by employing a two-sided approach:

On the one hand, when it needed to cement its position and act as a mechanism of control for the unity and mobilization of Turkish society, it supported its usage in the public sphere in order to legitimize its own aims. On the other hand, it has continued to maintain that Islam is

responsible for Turkey's backwardness and that is an obstacle to reaching the level of modern civilization.

Since the military establishment instrumentalizes Islam to perpetuate its privileged position in domestic politics, the challenge for the Justice and Development Party has been to refrain from making itself vulnerable to charges of political Islamism (Yıldız, 2008: 43). In the beginning of the 2000s, the JDP came to the political scene in Turkey. The JDP received 34.3 percent and earned 363 of a possible 550 seats in the parliament. The fall of the Felicity Party and the rise of the JDP demonstrates that "Turkish voters tend to adopt religious identity as a social common denominator and therefore distance themselves from political Islam" (Yıldız, 2008: 41). The results also demonstrate that "in doing so, they do not reject the fact that Islam has a public face, but rather prefer that it asserts itself at the individual and social levels, rather than in the political realm" (Yıldız, 2008: 41). The party based on its Islamist heritage introduced a new paradigm in domestic politics. The JDP was created by a group of politicians who was the member of the WP. The group was the younger generation who left the movement to create a new political party. Yavuz argues that the younger generation of the WP did not define democracy on the basis of Islam; rather, they regard Islam as a voice within democracy (Yavuz, 1997: 76). The transformation of Turkish Islamism in the case of the JDP represents not a failure of Islamism but a further politicization (Duran, 2010: 19). Because of the past experience of the late 1990s, the party made revisions to its political image, discourse, membership and transformed its ideology (Yıldız, 2008: 41). Duran argues that a third phase of Islamism has been taking place in Turkey (Duran, 2010: 6). Islamists in Turkey have changed their attitude on democracy and focused on tolerance and pluralism in that period. Duran (2017) succinctly summarizes the party's relation with the political Islam:

However, in its every critical stage of the 16 years political life, the JDP could not avoid from being affiliated with Islamism. And the JDP as the agenda of different intentions and actors has been labeled as if a blind man describes an elephant. In fact, the concept of Islamism has been loudly used to characterize the party in a negative way by the opponents while the proponents silently used it in a positive way.

The party has been defined as Islamic, Islamist, political Islamist, moderate Islamist, Muslim democrat, conservative, democratic, and center-right, however, the party, on the other hand, defines itself as conservative democratic (Yıldız, 2008: 44).

The Kemalist establishment tried to instrumentalize Islam in the early 2000s to challenge the rise of the JDP as the ruling political party. For instance, the military imposed a political pressure on the JDP at the beginning of 2007 over the presidential election. Accordingly, Abdullah Gül was selected as the JDP's candidate for presidency and the Chief of the General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt told that would-be president must be "attached to basic values in republic" (Balcı, 2015a: 70). Even the presidential statement on Gallipoli Campaign in 2007 insisted on the protection of the secular, democrat, and modern character of the republic (Sezer, 2007).

3.4. Islamism and Foreign Policy

It has been argued that the spread of political Islam disturbs the West in general and the United States in particular. The US administration considered the rise of the WP with caution and concern (Robins, 1997: 82). Turkey has been an adherent member of the Western international institutions such as NATO and it has been projected as a stable and pro-Western state located in a tremendous region. In the late 1990s, the central question was whether the Turkish foreign policy orientation would be characterized based on continuity or change. However, Turkish foreign policy under Erbakan has been characterized by continuity. During its first six months in office, the Erbakan-led coalition government had to address a number of controversial foreign policy issues such as relations with Israel, Operation Provide Comfort II towards northern Iraq, the customs union with the EU, and Cyprus (Robins, 1997: 83). In each case, Erbakan continued the Kemalist foreign policy consensus that characterized successive Kemalist governments prior to 1996. It is important to note that, during the period, the paradigm of strong state and weak government was in play in domestic politics. Consequently, there had been an extensive series of domestic checks and balances which helped to inhibit the pursuit of a more revisionist approach to foreign policy (Robins, 1997: 94).

Turkish foreign policy has become an extension of domestic identity crisis and carries the signs of power struggle among different groups (Bozdaloğlu, 2008: 90) such as Kemalists and Islamists. Turkey has experienced an identity crisis and confusion about to which part of the world it belongs. The role of the WP under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan is important to understand the identity formation

battle in foreign policy domain. As an Islamist political leader, Erdogan aimed to turn Turkey into a leader in the Muslim world. He had blamed Zionism and campaigned on the promise to cut ties with Israel before he became prime minister in 1996 (Bozdahoglu, 2008: 90). The WP consistently opposed to the application for membership to the EU. Islamism regards the West and Western institutions as inherently alien to Muslim society. The West has been considered as the other. In Turkey, Islamism aims to achieve greater solidarity with other Islamic countries. For instance, Erdogan and his principal foreign policy staff have travelled only to Islamic countries, or countries with a significant Muslim population during the first six months in power (Robins, 1997: 88). The foreign policy paradigm of the WP was based on the idea that the current world system was in favor of the West. Thus, a unity of Muslims would put an end to the situation. Erdogan firstly visited Iran when he became Prime Minister. In his visit to Libya, Erdogan was subjected to public humiliation by his unpredictable host, Muammar Gaddafi. The Libyan leader accused the Turks of mistreating the Kurds, and said he hoped that ‘an independent Kurdish nation will be established’ (Robins, 1997: 92). These foreign visits had been denounced and criticized by the military establishment.

Erdogan was willing to lead the Muslim world. He argued that “Turkey with its economic strength, geographical location, historical experience is the only country which can lead co-operation among the Muslim countries. Since the Europeans know this very well, they want to accept Turkey into the European Community and thus control not only Turkey but also all Muslim countries” (Dinç, 2006: 7). The WP set out five specific foreign policy goals (Kamrava, 1998: 290). First of all, Islamists tried to establish a United Nation of the Islamic countries in order to create a forum for the resolution of potential problems between various Muslim states. The establishment of an Islamic common market and the introduction of a common Islamic currency were the second and the third purposes respectively. As a fourth foreign policy purpose, Islamists aimed to create a joint Islamic defense force. Finally, the establishment by the Islamic countries of a cultural cooperation organization was another foreign policy purpose of the party.

Erdogan utilized discursive foreign policy practices to build a homogenous inside. Accordingly, the outside was full of enemies who continuously plotted against Turkey. It had been argued that imperialist countries and the Zionist circles were using

foreign intelligence services to provoke wars and international conflicts to find markets for their products. These were the enemies of Turkey which was a candidate to be the center of a new civilization (Dinç, 2006: 9). The representation of the other was a mean to naturalize the domestic politics of the WP.

However, the Kemalist military establishment considered Erbakan's foreign policy orientation as a threat to the modern and secular character of the republic. For instance, as the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Cevik Bir, put it "the Turkish Armed Forces are an integral part of Turkey's foreign policy" (Bozdaloğlu, 2008: 155). Although Erbakan continued his anti-Western and anti-Jewish rhetoric, the Kemalist military establishment insisted on the continuation of the relations with Israel. The Turkish Chief of Staff, General İsmail Hakkı Karadayı visited Israel in 1997 without even bothering to inform the Welfare-led coalition government (Bozdaloğlu, 2008: 156). While the western-oriented Çiller was visiting European states and institutions, Erbakan was heading to such radical Islamist countries as Iran and Libya.

The JDP era in Turkey implied a turn toward the European Union. In this era, Islamists benefited much from the opportunities created by the processes of globalization and integration with the EU (Duran, 2010: 6). The party abandoned the late 1990s anti-European discourse and supported Turkey's integration into Europe. The JDP also developed a new discourse on and practice of Turkish foreign policy based on a new geographic imagination which put an end to the alienation of Turkey's neighbors and Middle Eastern countries. The party advocated for closer links to the state's Muslim-majority neighbors. However, Turkish foreign policy is the extension of the identity formation battle in domestic politics. The identity formation battle urged Islamists to merge a coalition with the power centers outside the state such as the European Union and the United States to challenge the Kemalist establishment in Turkey. The JDP utilized foreign policy issues to counter the military's autonomy in politics (Balci, 2015a: 75).

Despite the fact that the WP foreign policy orientation in the late 1990s based on Islamist anti-Western and anti-American approach, the JDP era implied a pro-Western and pro-American foreign policy orientation in the early 2000s. Even the military establishment had anti-American sentiments in the early 2000s. For instance, the secular establishment was skeptical of the United States grounded on the argument

that the US presence in Iraq provided a safe haven for Iraqi Kurds and the PKK (Yıldız, 2008: 56). The military establishment prevented the JDP government from developing its own distinct foreign policy towards the Northern Iraq (Balçı, 2015a: 70). In another foreign policy issue, the party challenged the established Turkish state policy that viewed the status quo in Cyprus as the most preferable option. The military establishment tried to securitize Cyprus in order to force the government to pursue predetermined policies (Kaliber, 2005: 320). For instance, in the light of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's peace plan, in 2003, the Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök remarked that Turkey's entrapment in Anatolia would have been completed (Kaliber, 2005: 326). The JDP tried to find an internationally accepted solution for the unification of the island while the Kemalist military establishment supported the status quo. The JDP era implied the demilitarization of Turkish foreign policy.

3.5. Turkish Identity Formation Battle and Gallipoli Campaign

The legacy of Gallipoli Campaign has been a major component of contemporary Turkish politics. Even after a century, its legacy is a significant source of reference to many political debates. Most interestingly, how political groups or actors approach to its legacy has changed in the course of contemporary Turkish political history. In a sense, there have been contending images of Gallipoli Campaign. Different groups be they secular or religious have a strategy to dominate the legacy of the battle in a special way to legitimize their political position and their political arguments. This makes the image of the battle a very dynamic one that transforms in history according to differing political and sociological dynamics. Yet, Gallipoli Campaign has become a kind of symbolic battleground of competing political ideologies.

Interestingly, even the Kurdish politics proposed its own narrative on the battle. Selahattin Demirtaş as an important figure in Turkish politics made a public statement during the last anniversary of the battle and noted that the Ottomans were puppets of Germany during the Great War. According to Demirtaş, Ottomans by subjugating to the German imperialism, they became stake holder in causing large scale human tragedies. Demirtaş noted that the battle is the example where different ethnic groups like Kurds and Turks fought together (Hürriyet, 2015). In 1997, the Chief of the General Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı commemorated the battle and noted that the

military establishment was the guardian of the republic in the face of all kinds of threats (Sabah, 1997). In 2017, Erdoğan linked the battle fought in the Gallipoli peninsula to more recent events in Turkish politics, particularly to those who criticized Turkey's expanding international influence (TRT World, 2017):

There has always been such a group of people in our country. A century ago, as our brave soldiers were making life difficult for the enemy in the Çanakkale hills and waters, some people said 'Why is this war necessary?' If they had the opportunity, they would have turned over the key to Istanbul and the country to the enemy with their own hands; their reason had failed them to that extent.

Erdoğan refers to Operation Euphrates Shield, Turkey's ongoing cross-border operation (TRT World, 2017):

Then the parents would send off their boys to Çanakkale saying 'be a martyr, or a veteran.' Now they send them to fight against terrorist organizations in Syria.

In short, the battle has been a stage for the political groups in domestic politics and foreign policy. The final chapter will analyze the annual presidential statements on Gallipoli Campaign in order to demonstrate how the historical legacy of the battle has become a symbolic battleground in Turkish politics.

CHAPTER IV

THE ANALYSIS OF IDENTITY PRODUCTIVE TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY OVER GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

This chapter analyzes the identity productive Turkish foreign policy discourses through the annual presidential statements on Gallipoli Campaign during the period between 2001 and 2007 and the period between 2015 and 2017. Discourses are systems of signification in international relations. Discourses are structures of signification which construct social realities. “Discourse refers to a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, and social relations established” (Campbell, 2013: 235). The presidential statements on the battle are considered as discursive practices in which the Turkish self is constituted.

The basic argument of the study is the fact that the presidential statements in these two periods aim to construct the Turkish self. The deconstruction of the statements reveals the domestic agenda of the presidential statements. The second argument of the study is the fact that while the first period adopts the Kemalist interpretation of the battle, the second period utilizes the Islamist interpretation of the battle to counter the Kemalist establishment in domestic politics. The first argument is supported by quantitative data. The study selects key words to understand whether the presidential statements aim to construct the Turkish self. The key words serve as signifiers. Each of them signifies the Turkish self. The key words are selected in accordance with the terminology used in the orthodox international relations and foreign policy studies literatures in general and Turkish foreign policy studies in particular. The study argues that the key words are deliberately used in the presidential statements to signify the existence of the Turkish self. All the presidential statements aim to perpetuate the nation, the state, and the boundaries. It will be argued that the Turkish self is constructed through constituting the nation, making the state real, and producing the boundaries. In other words, the combination of the nation, the state, and the boundaries constructs the Turkish self. The second argument of the study is developed through analyzing the official statements to understand who was the enemy, how did the Ottomans win the war, and what is the importance of the battle today. The first period answers the questions parallel to the Kemalist interpretation of the battle.

The second period utilizes the Islamist interpretation to counter Kemalism in domestic politics.

The chapter aims to analyze the presidential statements on Gallipoli Campaign in order to understand the discourses in which the Turkish self is created. The analysis will be realized in three steps. Firstly, the study will use Hansen's (2006) research design to determine the number of selves, the intertextual model, the temporal perspective, and the number of events. This research design will help the study to present an organized research design. Secondly, a quantitative content analysis of the presidential statements will be presented. There are 9 different signifiers which have been consciously used in the presidential statements to create and recreate the Turkish self. Thirdly, discourse analysis of the presidential statements will be realized to understand whether Kemalist or Islamist interpretation of the battle is used to create the Turkish self. It will be argued that while the first period has the Kemalist understanding of the battle and the Turkish self, the second period utilizes the Islamist understanding of the battle to counter the Kemalist political establishment in domestic politics.

The chapter is organized in three sections. The first section presents the research design of the study. Hansen's (2006) research design is used to analyze the identity productive Turkish foreign policy. The second section presents a quantitative content analysis of the presidential statements. The quantitative content analysis of the presidential statements will be supported by the discourse analysis of the statements. The analysis of the official statements supports the first finding of the study that the statements aim to create a Turkish self. The last section presents the discourse analysis of the statements in order to understand whether the periods are Kemalist or Islamist.

4.1. Research Design

The study uses Hansen's (2006) research design in order to understand the co-constitutive link between foreign policy and identity in Turkey. Ceydilek (2012) also used the research design to analyze identity productive Turkish foreign policy. The "number of selves" row represents the subject whose identity is constituted. The "intertextual models" row lists four different models in which hegemonic discourses take place. The "temporal perspective" row lists three alternatives related on time. The

“number of events” row lists three alternatives based on number of events. The research design aims to build a rigorous methodological research design to support the idea that a post-structural methodology is possible.

Table 1: Lene Hansen’s Research Design

Number of selves	-Single -Comparison around events or issues -Discursive encounter
Intertextual models	-Official discourse -Wider political debate -Cultural representations -Marginal political discourses
Temporal perspective	-One moment -Comparative moments -Historical development
Number of events	-One -Multiple-related by issue -Multiple-related by time

4.1.1. Research Question

The basic research question is “In what ways do the annual presidential statements on Gallipoli Campaign and the constitution of the inside relate with each other?”. The question scrutinizes the non-causal relationship between identity and foreign policy.

4.1.2. Developing Research Design

The study uses Hansen’s (2006) research design to analyze the co-constitutive link between identity and foreign policy. A single self is under scope. Official statements are picked as the intertextual model. The temporal perspective is the comparison of the presidential statements on the battle in two periods. Number of events are multiple which are related by time. The first period is between 2001 and 2007 and the second period is between 2015 and 2017.

4.1.2.1. Number of Selves

The study analyzes a single self. The Turkish self is created through the presidential statements on the battle. The annual statements are key to ensure the ontological security of the state. The Turkish self is constituted to build a homogenous and stable inside. The presidential statements constitute the Turkish self in three phases. The first phase is the construction of the nation, the second one is the constitution of the state, and the last one is the production of the boundaries. The study uses signifiers to examine the discourses in which the Turkish self is created.

4.1.2.2. Intertextual Models

The study concentrates on the official discourses in order to understand the relation between the presidential statements and the constitution of the Turkish self. There are seven presidential statements in the first period and in the second period. To analyze foreign policy discursive practices, written documents, public speech, ideas and concrete practices, rituals, and institutions can be included in the analysis (Nabers, 2009: 201). This study focuses on the presidential statements on Gallipoli Campaign.

4.1.2.3. Temporal Perspective

The analysis concentrates on two periods. The first period is between 2001 and 2007 and the second period is between 2015 and 2017. Ahmet Necdet Sezer served as a president in the first period. The president in the second period is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. What makes interesting analyzing the two periods is the fact that while Kemalists supported Sezer's presidency during the first period, Islamists celebrated Erdoğan's victory in the last presidential election.

4.1.2.4. Number of Events

There are ten anniversaries during the two period and it makes the number of events multiple related by time. The first period has seven anniversaries while the second period has three anniversaries of the battle. The study presents seven presidential

statements in the first period and in the second period. Total number of the presidential statements is fourteen.

4.1.3. Data Collection

The official website of Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (www.tccb.gov.tr) is used to collect data in order to analyze the identity productive Turkish foreign policy discourses. The website contains official statements made on various issues during the two periods. The study analyzes only the presidential statements released in each year to memorialize the battle.

4.2. Constitution of the Turkish Self

This section analyzes the annual presidential statements on Gallipoli Campaign in the two periods. Post-structural foreign policy analyses take language as “not transparent medium that conveys the empirical world, but rather, it is a kind of practice” (Hansen, 2012: 95). The study presents quantitative content analysis and a qualitative discourse analysis of the presidential statements. It will be argued that the presidential discourses create and recreate the national identity. The constitution of the Turkish self is realized in three stages. The first stage constructs the nation, the second stage makes the state real, and the final stage draws boundaries between the inside and the outside.

The study selects three key words in each stage such as nation, homeland, and state to understand the constitution of the Turkish self. All the key words serve as a signifier. Foreign policy discourses resort to signifiers in order to constitute the inside and exclude the outside. Signifiers assume the role of an empty or a floating signifier. “Empty signifiers are characterized by an indistinct or non-existent signified, that is, terms that have different meanings and can thereby serve to unite disparate social movements” (Nabers, 2009: 196). In contrary, “floating signifiers can assume different meanings for different social groups depending on the nature or topic of the discourse” (Nabers, 2009: 196). This study uses empty signifiers to demonstrate that no matter Kemalist or Islamist, each statement aimed to create the Turkish self. In other words, the presidential statements tried to transform the heterogeneous inside into a

homogenous one. The presidential statements consciously use the key words to signify the existence of the Turkish self.

Turkey has been an adherer member of the Westphalian order of international relations. The Westphalian order is constructed on the accordance of authority, sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship (Caporaso, 2000: 8). These are the key concepts that every nation states are supposed to be bound to survive. The constitution of the Turkish self is compatible with the Westphalian principles above. In other words, the constitution of the Turkish self defines the citizenship and ensures the authority inside the country. It also strengthens sovereignty and territorial integrity in international arena.

In the first period, there are seven presidential statements on the battle. Thus, each year has only one presidential statement. The second period encompasses three years while the first period encompasses seven years. The study increases the number of the presidential statements in the second period in order to equalize the total number of the presidential statements released in each period. In 2015, there are three presidential statements under scope. Both 2016 and 2017 has two different presidential statements. Total number of the presidential statements in each period is seven.

It can be seen from the tables that the second period used more signifiers than the first period. For instance, the first period used 56 signifiers to constitute the Turkish nation while the second period used 63. The state is created by utilizing 27 signifiers in the first period while the second period used 65 signifiers. Finally, the boundaries are drawn by using 32 signifiers in the first period while the second period used 40 signifiers. Total number of the signifiers used to constitute the Turkish self in the first period is 115 while the second period used 168 signifiers. The reason lies behind the difference in the number of the signifiers in the two periods is the fact that the second period rediscovered the past as a tool in the politics. In other words, the past gained popularity in domestic politics in the second period. Although the first period used the past to shape the politics in Turkey, the second period paid more attention to the historical heritages in domestic politics. For instance, the second period also celebrated the centenary of the victory won at Kut'ül Amare. However, it could be argued that the number of the signifiers used in each period is enough to analyze the creation the Turkish self.

4.2.1. Constitution of the Nation

Table 2 demonstrates the signifiers used in the statements to signal the nation. The constitution of the nation is implemented by using the signifiers: *ulus*, *millet*, and *Türk*. Total number of the signifiers is 56 in the first period. The second period has 63 signifiers. Each statement defines the inside in the face of the enemy in 1915. It is argued that the nation resisted the enemy. Gallipoli Campaign serves as a ground to realize the notion that the same Turkish nation exists in the present.

Table 2: Constitution of the Nation

	<i>Ulus</i>	<i>Millet</i>	<i>Türk</i>
2001	8	0	0
2002	6	0	1
2003	0	0	0
2004	3	0	2
2005	8	0	2
2006	6	0	5
2007	7	0	8
2015	0	20	1
2016	0	13	2
2017	0	23	4

Table 2 demonstrates that each period continuously constituted the nation. In general, state leaders utilize every opportunity to create and recreate the self. The presidential statements in the first period created and recreated the Turkish nation. It is argued that the nation was on the ground to resist the enemy. For instance, Ahmet Necdet Sezer argued that the battle is an epic historical case that “our nation” was the hero (Sezer, 2001). Accordingly, the battle generated the national consciousness. Gallipoli Campaign was the battle that the Turkish nation had fought all together. The same nation, thanks to the victory which gave birth to the national consciousness, fought the Turkish War of Independence and created the Republic of Turkey (Sezer, 2002). The presidential statements also characterized the nation. First of all, the

Turkish nation is independent. The desire to protect the independence had motivated the nation in the battle. The Turkish nation is also characterized as patriot. The superior enemy was defeated by means of the independent and patriot character of the nation (Sezer, 2006). The bravery also coded the nation in the statements (Sezer, 2002). The presidential statements set the goal of the nation. The statements narrated that the Turkish nation has constant goals. The battle was the historical experience that the nation achieved its goals. Accordingly, the Turkish nation defended the homeland (Sezer, 2003), protected the territorial integrity (Sezer, 2004), and secured the independency (Sezer, 2006). The narration that the Turkish nation has constant goals creates and recreates the nation. The presidential statements also specified the source of the strength of the nation. The unity and solidarity of the nation is the most important source of the strength. The united Turkish nation has the ability to overcome any obstacles and threats (Sezer, 2002). The battle demonstrated that the Turkish nation can even defeat the superior enemy thanks to its unity and solidarity (Sezer, 2003). Sezer argued that “the resistance against the strongest armies of the era proved the strength of the Turkish nation” (Sezer, 2006). The state is strong in the present since “the sacrifices in the battle make the Turkish nation noble and powerful in every period of the history” (Sezer, 2007).

The presidential statements in the second period aimed to homogenize the nation. The period used 63 signifiers to create and recreate the nation. It is argued that the nation was on the ground against the enemy in 1915 (Erdoğan, 2015a). The nation was united in the face of the enemy. Today, “Gallipoli Campaign is the soul of the nation” (Erdoğan, 2015a). The source of the victory was the unitary character of the nation. The Turkish nation has a glorious history (Erdoğan, 2016a). The source of the strength and the victory was the Turkish nation. The nation who had fought in the front also fought for the independency and created Turkey (Erdoğan, 2015b). Erdoğan argued that “the Turkish nation who fought for the homeland galvanized the determination for the Turkish War of Independence” (Erdoğan, 2016a). Erdoğan (2015c) tried to naturalize the existence of the nation by signaling the existence of other nations. Accordingly, he argued that “other nations fought for their own dreams in the battle” (Erdoğan, 2015c). The Turkish nation proved its strength to the other nations. The battle is one of the most important historical case that our nation was participated as the victorious (Erdoğan, 2017a). The second period also characterized

the nation. Accordingly, the nation is faithful and brave (Erdoğan, 2016a). The victory is the monument of the nation. Thus, “as a nation, we are celebrating the victory with a great vehemence today” (Erdoğan, 2017a).

The nation is also created over the threats from the outside. For instance, terrorism is narrated to recreate the nation. Erdoğan (2016b) argued that “terrorist organizations are united against Turkey”. Erdoğan (2016b) also implied that “Turkey is hosting more than three million refugees today”. Terrorism and refugees are the themes to create the nation, make the state real, and draw the boundaries.

4.2.2. Making the State

Post-structuralism holds the view that the state is not given and state leaders are in a continuous endeavor to perpetuate the presence of the state. Narrating the battle helps the presidents to secure the ontology of the state. The signifiers are *Türkiye*, *cumhuriyet*, and *ülke*. These key words that the statements used to signify the existence of the state. Thus, the battle is the autobiography of the state.

Table 3: Making the State

	<i>Türkiye</i>	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Ülke</i>
2001	3	3	1
2002	0	1	1
2003	2	1	1
2004	1	2	0
2005	1	2	0
2006	0	2	3
2007	1	2	0
2015	7	2	15
2016	10	1	10
2017	9	3	8

Table 3 demonstrates that the first period used 27 signifiers and the second period used 65 signifiers to make the state real. The discursive authority of the presidents has realized the state in each period.

The presidential statements in the first period narrated that the battle was the first step in the construction process of the Republic of Turkey (Sezer, 2002). The existence of the republic in the present has a direct relation with the victory in the battle. The victory has been considered as the monument of the present state. The nation who fought the battle under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal created the republic (Sezer, 2001). The presidential statements also characterized the state in the present. Accordingly, Turkey is one of the stable state in the region thanks to its united nation and strong army (Sezer, 2001; Sezer, 2005). The statements characterized the state. Accordingly, the state is secular (Sezer, 2001), democratic (Sezer, 2007), and modern (Sezer, 2004). The statements also stressed the role of Turkey in providing peace in international arena. Accordingly, it is narrated that Turkey is a reliable partner in this endeavor (Sezer, 2004; Sezer, 2005). The state is taken as the principal actor which provides peace in international arena. Thus, the presidential statements make the state real and naturalize the existence of the state.

Erdoğan (2015b) argued that Turkey has positive relations with other states who participated the battle thanks to the friendship created during the battle. “The state” is normalized through insisting on the friendly relations with the other states. Erdoğan (2015c) argued that international stability and welfare must be supported by the all states around the world. Thus, the Westphalian nation state order has been tried to be naturalized. In other words, it has been narrated that the world is consisted of the states. Turkey is created after a series of enormous struggles such as Gallipoli Campaign and the Turkish War of Independence (Erdoğan, 2015b). The victory was an important step in the process of the creation of the republic (Erdoğan, 2017a). The statements emphasize the historical continuation of the battle, the creation of the state, and the existence of the republic in the present. Erdoğan (2016b) argued that the outside is full of threats and “we must perpetuate the state” to stay firm in the dangerous world. “In the past, we said that nobody could pass the strait of Çanakkale and we eliminated the threats on our state. Today, we will protect our state and make it one of the biggest and strongest one in the present” (Erdoğan, 2016b). “You are the citizens of the mighty and powerful state, you are the citizens of the Republic of

Turkey” (Erdoğan, 2015b). The battle is narrated to imply the perpetual existence of the state. For instance, Erdoğan (2017a) argued that “the battle is a lesson today for those who have a plan or plot on our state”. Erdoğan also recreated the state via terrorist organizations. Accordingly, it is narrated that Turkey is strong in the face of the terrorist organizations (Erdoğan, 2017b).

4.2.3. Producing the Boundaries

It is argued that the ultimate aim of Turkish foreign policy discourses and practices is to make a distinction between the inside and the outside. The presidents tame the inside and exclude the outside in each period. The key words which draw boundaries between the inside and the outside are *vatan*, *yurt*, and *birlik*. These signifiers define the homeland. The first period used 32 signifiers and the second period used 40 signifiers. Each statement narrates the battle that it was fought for the sake of the homeland. The emphasis on the homeland naturalizes the distinction between the inside and the outside. While the outside represents the other and threat, the inside represents the opposition.

The statements continually tried to fix the boundaries between the inside and the outside. The statements in the first period insisted on the unity inside the state (Sezer, 2004). The inside has been constructed on the homogenous self. Thus, the outside has been reflected as the other. The purpose of the battle for the Turks was the protection of the homeland (Sezer, 2001; Sezer, 2002; Sezer, 2003). The homeland is given in the statements. For instance, Sezer argued that the soldiers came from the east, west, north, and south of the homeland (Sezer, 2005). The soldiers from the different part of the homeland fought for the same cause (Sezer, 2007). The homeland consciousness imposes an inclusive purpose to the Turkish self. The statements also depicted the outside. Accordingly, Turkey is located in an instable region. The homeland is the source of the security and stability (Sezer, 2005). Thus, the statements aimed to draw the boundaries of the homeland. The concept of the border is the source of enemies and the homeland is the source of freedom and independency.

The presidential statements in the second period also aimed to fix the boundaries between the inside and the outside. The homeland is defined to make the distinction real. It is narrated that the nation belongs to the identified homeland and

the state has its distinct boundaries. The statements also insisted on the unity within the homeland. The unity inside the homeland is the key to survive in international politics. The battle demonstrated the homeland consciousness in Turkey (Erdoğan, 2015a). The soldiers fought for the independency and the homeland (Erdoğan, 2016a). When the homeland is in danger, the Turkish nation can overcome any obstacles to defend the homeland (Erdoğan, 2017a). The nation is brave to defend the homeland if it is under threat (Erdoğan, 2017b). The outside is also defined to imply the boundaries of the inside. Terrorism is the main theme of the presidential statements to narrate that the outside is full of dangers and the inside is the source of the security for the Turkish self. Thus, “we must protect the unity and the solidarity inside the boundaries” (Erdoğan, 2015a). As mentioned above, the homeland is the source of the security while the outside is the source of instability and danger.

Table 4: Producing the Boundaries

	<i>Vatan</i>	<i>Yurt</i>	<i>Birlik</i>
2001	2	2	1
2002	0	2	1
2003	0	3	1
2004	0	3	1
2005	0	4	1
2006	0	5	1
2007	0	3	2
2015	12	0	7
2016	6	0	3
2017	8	2	2

4.2.4. Combining the Signifiers

The presidential statements aimed to construct the Turkish self in the three stages. The first stage constituted the nation. The nation is created to build a homogenous and stable inside. The second stage made the state real. It is narrated that the state has a perpetual existence. The final stage produced the boundaries. The signifiers are used to stabilize the boundaries between the inside and the outside. Table 5 combines all the signifiers used in each year.

Table 5 supports the first finding of the study that the presidential statements aim to construct the Turkish self. The presidents constructed and reconstructed the Turkish self over the annual statements on Gallipoli Campaign. The signifiers indicate the domestic agenda of the presidential statements. The discursive authority of the presidents defines the inside and excludes the outside. The quantitative finding supports the central hypothesis of the study that the annual presidential statements in each period aimed to create and recreate the Turkish self. The first period used 115 signifiers to create and recreate the Turkish self while the second period used 168 signifiers. The presidential statements in each period aimed to recreate the Turkish self. The presidential statements are political texts in which a homogenous self is envisioned. The battle is the historical experience that the Turkish self faced with the other.

Table 5: Constitution of the Turkish Self

	Constitution of the Turkish Self
2001	20
2002	12
2003	8
2004	12
2005	18
2006	22
2007	23
2015	67
2016	51
2017	50

Post-structuralism argues that the other is the source of danger. Post-structuralism also argues that the self could be constructed only in the face of the other and the danger. Thus, the Turkish self could be constructed in the face of the other in 1915. The statements insisted on the continuation between the battle in 1915 and the construction of the republic. For instance, Sezer (2001) argued that the nation found the strength in

the victory to start the War of Independence. Erdoğan (2015b) also argued that the republic was constructed on the victory of Gallipoli and the War of Independence. The nation who fought the battle in 1915 constructed the republic. The nation defended the homeland (Sezer, 2002; Erdoğan, 2015a) and secured the independency (Sezer, 2002; Erdoğan, 2016a). Each period aimed to characterize the nation. Accordingly, when the homeland is in danger, the Turkish nation can overcome any obstacles to defend the homeland (Sezer, 2005, Erdoğan, 2017a).

4.3. Making Turkey Kemalist or Islamist

As mentioned above, the critical discursive analysis of the presidential statements reveals the fact that the Turkish self has been continuously created and recreated. The number of the signifiers used in each year is presented in Table 5. The second finding of the study indicates that while the presidential statements in the first period is constructed on a Kemalist paradigm, the second period utilizes an Islamist paradigm to counter the Kemalist establishment in Turkey. The comparison of the two periods demonstrates that foreign policy is a mean to produce, maintain, and reproduce the Turkish self. The section concentrates on the Kemalist and Islamist influence on the statements. In order to understand the ideological blueprints, the annual presidential statements will be analyzed over the questions asked in the second chapter.

4.3.1. Who was the enemy?

The Kemalist understanding of the battle concentrates on the rational calculation of the enemy rather than its norms and values. It adopts a secular reading of the battle. The presidential statements in the first period ignore the belief system of the Ottoman Empire and the enemy. Each presidential statement in the first period argues that the enemy was the strongest states of the era. The enemy was characterized according to its military capability (Sezer, 2001; Sezer, 2002; Sezer, 2003; Sezer, 2006). The distinction between the inside and the outside is defined based on the capabilities of the both sides. There is no indication to norms and values of the enemy. The first period also does not problematize relations with the West. The relations with the West is

framed in the Lockean culture of anarchy. The statements recognize other states' sovereignty as given right.

In Chapter II, it is argued that the Islamic understanding of Gallipoli Campaign underlines the ideological and normative causes of the battle. Accordingly, Islamists portrayed the battle as a struggle between the Cross and the Crescent. The civilizational difference between the two sides is highlighted. The presidential statements in the second period also concentrated on the belief system of the enemy. For instance, the battle is narrated that it was a civilizational struggle rather than a single front of the Great War (Erdoğan, 2016a). The soldiers who came from the different parts of the house of Islam already knew that “Çanakkale was the name of one of the biggest civilizational struggle” rather than a single front of the war (Erdoğan, 2016a). The second period also argued that the battle is parallel to the Battle of Badr (Erdoğan, 2016a). The battle was the same with other battles which had been fought for a thousand year (Erdoğan, 2015b). The statements also characterized the inside. Accordingly, the soldiers who fought against the “other civilization” were equipped with faith (Erdoğan, 2015b). The enemy had just the technology of the era (Erdoğan, 2016b). However, the presidential statements in the second period does not envision the relations with the West in the Hobbesian culture of anarchy. As mentioned in Chapter II, Islamists argue that security of Islam is competitive and it is based on zero-sum game. The presidential statements aimed to build bilateral relations with the West based on mutual trust. For instance, Erdoğan (2015b) argued that “today, Turkey has good relations with the states which fought in the battle thanks to the friendship constructed during the battle”. All states should support the global stability and peace (Erdoğan, 2015c).

4.3.2. How did the Ottomans win the battle?

The Kemalist narrative of the battle argues that the role of Atatürk on the fate of the battle is decisive. The soldiers under his leadership fought for the sake of the homeland and defeated the enemy. The presidential statements in the first period emphasizes Atatürk's leadership during the battle. His name is used in 35 times in the first period. “Our nation understood the importance of the leadership, bravery, discipline, patriotism, and the belief in independency and freedom of Mustafa Kemal” (Sezer,

2001). The first period does not take into account any religious explanation on the fate of the battle. The first period argues that the battle was won thanks to the national spirit in addition to Atatürk's role. The soldiers who defended the homeland was the Turkish soldiers who came from different parts of the homeland (Sezer, 2002; Sezer, 2005). The concept of the homeland defined in accordance with the Kemalist understanding of the state. The soldiers came from the eastern, western, northern, and southern parts of the homeland (Sezer, 2005). The character of the soldiers was also based on the Turkish patriotism.

The Islamist approach does not put much emphasis on Atatürk's role and even overlooks his role. The presidential statements in the second period refer his name only once in each statement. Rather, the battle was won thanks to the ordinary soldiers who fought with faith. The victory demonstrated that "the real power is the faith, not technology" (Erdoğan, 2016b). While the first period argues that the soldiers came from Anatolia (Sezer, 2005), the second period argues that the soldiers came from Mosul, Sudan, Tunisia, Bosnia, and Crimea (Erdoğan, 2015b). "They were in Çanakkale for the same purpose and they sacrificed their lives for the same cause" (Erdoğan, 2015b). "Those who want to answer the question of 'Who are we?' must look at Çanakkale" (Erdoğan, 2016a). "Ahmad from Palestine, Saladin from Mosul, Mohammed from Sudan, Ali from Tunisia, Murat from Bosnia, and Kemal from Crimea" were on the ground to fight with the enemy (Erdoğan, 2016a). "We fought for the same cause for a thousand year" (Erdoğan, 2015b). The first period has limited the geography based on Anatolia in order to emphasize the role of the stereotype Kemalist soldier and the second period widens the geography to underline the Muslim character of the soldiers. The ethnic identity of the soldiers is not important for the second period while the first period insists on the Turkishness of the victory.

4.3.3. What is the importance of the battle today?

The presidential statements in each period emphasize the continuity between the battle and constitution of the new state. As stated above, the first period is Kemalist and it embraces the Westphalian nation state order in international relations. Each statement in the first period aims to perpetuate the status quo. The second period also supports the Westphalian order. Although Islamism problematizes the nature of the nation state,

the presidential statements in the second period do not jump on the bandwagon. For instance, Erdoğan (2017b) argued that “the Republic of Turkey is not our first state, rather it is our final state”. The two periods aim to perpetuate the boundaries of the state. The battle is to be remembered to produce and reproduce the inside. However, the second period emphasizes the religious character of the Turkish self to counter the Kemalist understanding of the self. In the first period, the battle is remembered to construct the Turkish self based on the Kemalist paradigm. The second paradigm reproduces the Turkish self to counter the Kemalist establishment in domestic politics. The two periods aim to build a stable and homogenous inside. However, while the first one envisions a Kemalist inside, the latter challenges Kemalism via the Islamist discourse.

The central argument in the section is that the presidential statements in each period aim to imagine the Turkish self to counter the rival political group in domestic politics. The first period imagined the Turkish self over the Kemalist understanding of the battle. The second period utilized the Islamist understanding of the battle to counter Kemalism in domestic politics. The presidential statements in the first period argued that the battle demonstrated the importance of the national values (Sezer, 2001; Sezer, 2002). The national values are based on the principles introduced by Atatürk. For instance, Sezer (2006) argued that “today, we must protect Atatürk’s principles”. The statements aimed to shape the Turkish foreign policy orientation. The foreign policy orientation defended in the first period aimed to legitimize the exercise of the power in domestic politics. The foreign policy paradigm is conceptualized by the principle of “peace at home, peace in the world” (Sezer, 2003). The motto has been considered “a fundamental point of reference for all foreign relations strategies and domestic political matters” (Aktay, 2010: 62). It could be argued that the motto legitimizes the foreign policy establishment in Turkey since the political has been absent from Turkish foreign policy (Aktay, 2010: 61). The statements narrated that the nation was united with the army in the battle. The statements naturalized the role of the army in domestic politics in the present. It is narrated that the army is the source of the strength of the nation. The army is represented as a kind of security umbrella. It protects the nation from the outside. Turkey is a stable in the region thanks to its mighty army (Sezer, 2005). The nation and the army is inseparable (Sezer, 2005). The army is indispensable for the sake of the Turkish self. The statements in the first period

characterized the Turkish state. Accordingly, the state is secular and democratic (Sezer, 2001). Turkey aims to realize its purposes based on the enlightenment and modernization (Sezer, 2003; Sezer, 2004). The protection of the essence of the republic is the ultimate aim of the nation (Sezer, 2005). In other words, the nation has a duty to realize the principles introduced by Atatürk, protect the national values, and perpetuate the republic (Sezer, 2006).

The presidential statements in the second period imply the return of the political. It is argued that the political has been put on the edge of main issues concerning Turkish foreign policy issues (Aktay, 2010). The statements aimed to challenge the Kemalist foreign policy orthodoxies. For instance, Erdoğan argued that “the people who are questioning our foreign policy toward Syria, Iraq, Caucasia, Africa are the same people who questioned our fight in 1915” (Erdoğan, 2017b). “Today, mothers are sending their children to Syria as they sent their children to Çanakkale” (Erdoğan, 2017b). The victory is the source of the strength in the present. Erdoğan argued that Beirut, Aleppo, Gazza, Bosnia, and Crimea sent soldiers to the front. “We are putting up the same fight for a thousand year. Çanakkale remembered us this brotherhood and united us” (Erdoğan, 2015b). “We must protect the unity and the solidarity today” (Erdoğan, 2015a). In short, the second period widens the geography to consolidate the religious sentiments in order to counter the Kemalist establishment.

CONCLUSION

The thesis argued that the orthodox international relations theories fail to analyze the identity productive Turkish foreign policy discursive practices. Post-structuralism problematizes the central hypothesis of realism and liberalism that the state is pre-given. It argues that the state is not given in international relations. Discursive foreign policy practices produce and reproduce the state and its national identity in international relations. Post-structuralism also criticizes constructivism that there is no causal relationship between identity and foreign policy practices. Rather, post-structuralism argues that the variables co-constitute each other. In short, post-structuralism argues that foreign policy is not only oriented toward the external world, but it also aims to construct and reconstruct the inside.

The study analyzed the annual presidential statements on Gallipoli Campaign within the two periods. The study set forth the hypothesis that the ultimate aim of the Turkish state leaders is to build a stable and homogenous inside. It is argued that ‘foreign’ policy produces, maintains, and reproduces the state and its identity. The study has two findings in general. The first finding is the fact that the annual presidential statements on Gallipoli Campaign during the two periods aimed to construct the Turkish self. The statements constituted the nation, made the state real, and produced boundaries to create and recreate the Turkish self. The second finding of the study is the fact that the two periods experienced a domestic power struggle between Kemalism and Islamism. Kemalism imposed a fixed understanding on Gallipoli Campaign via the annual presidential statements in the first period. The statements aimed to create the Turkish self. The second period aimed to recreate the Turkish self to counter Kemalism in domestic politics. The Islamist narrative had been utilized in line with the purpose.

The first chapter of the study focused on the orthodox and post-structural foreign policy studies in the literature of international relations. The chapter also concentrated on the Turkish foreign policy literature in order to demonstrate the weakness of the orthodox foreign policy approach and the strength of the post-structural approach on how foreign policy practices and discourses constitute the state.

The second chapter scrutinized the contending interpretations of the battle. It is argued that Gallipoli Campaign is what Kemalists and Islamists make of it. The political groups narrated the battle in order to prove their political causes. Thus, Gallipoli Campaign has become a symbolic identity formation battleground in Turkey.

The third chapter respectively presented the Kemalist and Islamist orientation in domestic politics and foreign policy. It is argued that the Kemalist paradigm projected the state in the Western trajectory. Kemalism had propagated that Islamism was a threat to the modern and secular character of the republic. Kemalists had argued that Islamists had a hidden political agenda in domestic politics to change the character of the state. The military had played an important role in domestic politics. The Kemalist military establishment had tried to perpetuate its tutelage in Turkish domestic and foreign policy. The chapter argued that Islamism as a political approach has a long tradition in Turkey. Islamists under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan challenged the secular establishment in domestic politics in the late 1990s. Islamism envisioned a complete change in the society in these years. The 28 February Process ended the Islamist political movement in Turkey for a while. The rise of the JDP as a political party in the beginning of the 2000s increased the Islamist voice in domestic politics. Although the party has never defined itself as Islamist, the Kemalist establishment labeled the party as Islamist to increase its leverage in politics.

The methodology of the study and the analysis of the presidential statements are presented in the last chapter. Firstly, the study used Hansen's research design to build a rigorous methodological research design in order to support the idea that a post-structural methodology is possible. A single self is analyzed through official discourses on multiple events in two periods. In other words, the Turkish self is analyzed through the annual presidential statements on the annual remembrances of Gallipoli Campaign during the two periods. Secondly, the study used a quantitative content analysis method in order to demonstrate the identity productive aim of the presidential statements in each period. The study defined 9 signifiers to demonstrate the identity productive discursive practices of Turkish foreign policy during the two periods. The signifiers are used by the state leaders in the process of the discursive construction of the Turkish self. It is argued that each statement deliberately used the signifiers to create and recreate the Turkish self. The quantitative analysis of the statements supported the first finding of the study. The number of the signifiers used in the first

period is 115. The second period used 168 signifiers. Finally, the study analyzed the statements in more detail to understand whether the periods utilized the Kemalist or Islamist understanding of the battle. The intertextual discourse analysis of the presidential statements also supported the second finding of the study. It is argued that while the first period embraced the Kemalist interpretation of the battle, the second period utilized the Islamist narrative to challenge the Kemalist establishment in domestic politics.

A possible criticism the study could face is the argument that the two periods from 2001 to 2007 and from 2015 to 2017 are not long enough to make inferences that the statements aimed to build a Kemalist or Islamist self inside the state. However, it could be argued that the first period is long enough to define the signifiers and make an inference that the period aimed to construct the Turkish self based on Kemalism. Although the study acknowledges that the second period is not long enough contrary to the first period, it could be argued that it is safe enough to analyze the statements in the second period for four reasons. Firstly, the study used seven presidential statements in each period. Although the second period is shorter than the first period, the number of the presidential statements is equal in each period. Secondly, the centenary of the battle was in the second period and it makes the presidential messages important more than ever. Thirdly, the second period also experienced international debates on Turkish foreign policy orientation. Analyses on the subject concentrated on the annual statements and ceremonies and it is argued that the Islamist interpretation on the battle is displacing the secular one. The observation is followed up by the argument that Turkey is becoming an Islamist state and its foreign policy orientation could be changed based on the Islamist interpretation of international relations. Finally, Turkey had experienced a domestic transformation originated from the rivalry between the Kemalist establishment and the Justice and Development Party. The JDP challenged the Kemalist hegemony in domestic politics by utilizing Islamist sentiments inside the state. Although Erdoğan was not the leader of the party during the period, his political agenda, defeating the Kemalist establishment and reproducing the Turkish self inside the state, motivated him to continue the political struggle in his presidential term.

The study has several merits. Firstly, it is argued that foreign policy is a discursive practice that aims to produce a homogenous and stable national identity. Thus, Turkish foreign policy analyses constructed on the political messages given on

Gallipoli Campaign are bound to fail to understand Turkish foreign policy orientation. These analyses miscalculate that Turkey is becoming neo-Ottoman or Islamist in international relations. The analyses overlook the identity productive aspect of Turkish foreign policy messages. Secondly, the study argued that the past is not a dead past and Gallipoli Campaign is what political groups make of it. The past is central to construct the present. Thirdly, it is demonstrated that official statements are political texts since they are used to imagine and reimagine the Turkish self. Finally, most post-structural analyses focus on current international debates and issues to analyze identity productive foreign policy discourses, the study tried to demonstrate that the past is also central to the identity productive endeavors.

A further research on identity productive Turkish foreign policy discourses and practices may analyze official statements of other actors in domestic politics such prime ministers and political party leaders on selected cases. A further study also could analyze official statements on hot debates such as the Syrian civil war and refugees.

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