

Framing Negotiations

How international mass media frame international-multilateral negotiations

by

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A Dissertation Submitted to the
Graduate School of Social Sciences and
Humanities in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for
the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science and International Relations



KOÇ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

December , 2023

ABSTRACT

Framing negotiations:

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This dissertation investigated the international news media's coverage of international multilateral negotiations. The research mainly analyzed news framing in news stories. The aim was understanding how the media utilized frames and if the topics and time impacted the news stories' framing. Based on Semetko and Valkenburg's work, the current study used MAXQDA to analyze 738 news stories from the CNN, Euronews, CGTN, and Press TV websites. The study chose two agreements reached through long-term negotiations between multiple players: Iran's nuclear deal, also called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and the Paris Climate Agreement. Twenty-three questions were distributed in five frames, including attribution of responsibility, conflict, economic consequences, human interest, and morality, to analyze every news story on the abovementioned issues.

The main result suggests that the media focused on state players, and none gave significant weight to non-state actors in the two studied issues. The conflict frame was the most dominant in overall coverage. The responsibility frame followed only by a small margin. In either case, the framing process paid insufficient attention to human elements. The economic effect of the issues on ordinary people was underreported, and the humane aspects of the stories were almost ignored. The economy frame came third. Morality and human interests were the least used frames, respectively. However, the dominance of particular frames changed according to the topic and time period. Although differences were found between media outlets, their general approach to frame use was noticeably similar. The study suggests that differences in ideology and ownership did not significantly affect how the media framed the negotiations and events.

As a result, despite the different players and interests, the media saw the negotiations and diplomatic interactions mainly through frames of conflict and responsibility rather than the economy, human experiences, and morality.

A classic case of international security, such as nuclear proliferation in Iran's case, did not get a significantly different treatment from a newcomer to the international relations arena like the environmental issue. Despite differences in framing based on topics, studied media generally treated both topics similarly by implying conflict and responsibility of the state players as the dominant frames.



ÖZETÇE

Çerçeveleme müzakereleri:

Uluslararası kitle iletişim araçları uluslararası çok taraflı müzakereleri nasıl çerçeveleyiyor

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Aralık 2023

Bu tezde, uluslararası haber medyasının uluslararası çok taraflı müzakerelere ilişkin haberleri araştırılmıştır. Araştırmada esas olarak haber öykülerindeki haber çerçevesi analiz edilmiştir. Bu tez, medyanın çerçeveleri nasıl kullandığını, konuların ve zamanın haberlerin çerçevelenmesini etkileyip etkilemediğini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Semetko ve Valkenburg'un çalışmasına dayanan bu çalışmada CNN, Euronews, CGTN ve Press TV web sitelerinden 738 haber öyküsünü analiz etmek için MAXQDA kullanılmıştır. Çalışma, birden fazla oyuncu arasındaki uzun vadeli müzakereler yoluyla varılan iki anlaşmayı seçmiştir. Anlaşmalardan biri İran'ın Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı (JCPOA) olarak da adlandırılan nükleer anlaşmasıdır. Diğerisi ise Paris İklim Anlaşması'dır. Yukarıda belirtilen konulara ilişkin her haber öyküsünü analiz etmek için sorumluluğun atfedilmesi, çatışma, ekonomik sonuçlar, insani çıkar ve ahlak dahil olmak üzere yirmi üç soru beş çerçeveye dağıtılmıştır.

Esas sonuç, medyanın devlet aktörlerine odaklandığını ve incelenen iki konuda hiçbirinin devlet dışı aktörlere önemli bir ağırlık vermediğini göstermektedir. Çatışma çerçevesi genel haberde en baskın çerçeve olarak görülmektedir. Sorumluluk çerçevesi yalnızca küçük bir farkla takip edilmiştir. Her iki durumda da çerçeveleme sürecinde insan unsurlarına yeterince önem verilmemiştir. Konuların sıradan insanlar üzerindeki ekonomik etkisi yeterince aktarılmamıştır ve hikayelerin insani yönleri neredeyse göz ardı edilmiştir. Ekonomi çerçevesi üçüncü sıradadır. Ahlak ve insani çıkarlar sırasıyla en az kullanılan çerçevelerdir. Ancak belirli karelerin hakimiyeti konuya ve döneme göre değişiklik göstermektedir. Medya kuruluşları arasında farklılıklar bulunsa da, çerçeve kullanımına genel yaklaşımları gözle görülür derecede benzerlik göstermektedir. Çalışma, ideoloji ve sahiplenmedeki

farklılıkların, medyanın müzakereleri ve olayları nasıl çerçevelediğini önemli ölçüde etkilemediğini öne sürmektedir.

Sonuç olarak medya, farklı aktörlere ve çıkarlara rağmen müzakereleri ve diplomatik etkileşimleri ekonomi, insan deneyimleri ve ahlaktan ziyade çatışma ve sorumluluk çerçevesinde değerlendirmiştir. İran örneğindeki nükleer silahların yayılması gibi klasik bir uluslararası güvenlik vakası, uluslararası ilişkiler arenasına yeni giren bir kişi tarafından çevre sorunu gibi önemli ölçüde farklı bir muameleye maruz kalmamıştır. Konulara dayalı çerçevelemedeki farklılıklara rağmen, incelenen medya genellikle çatışmayı ve devlet aktörlerinin sorumluluğunu baskın çerçeveler olarak ima ederek her iki konuyu da benzer şekilde ele almıştır.



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my profound gratitude to my esteemed supervisor, Dr. Reşat Bayer, for his invaluable guidance, unflinching support, and patience throughout the duration of my doctoral studies. His extensive knowledge and experience have been a constant source of inspiration and encouragement in both my academic research and daily life. Additionally, I extend my heartfelt appreciation to my Ph.D. thesis committee members, Dr. Ziya Oniş, Dr. Asli Tunc, Dr. Şuhnaz Yılmaz, and Dr. Banu Akdenizli, for their invaluable time, effort, insightful feedback, and thought-provoking questions, which have significantly enriched the quality of my work. I also extend my sincere appreciation to the Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities at Koç University for their years of generous assistance.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my loved ones, including my family and my fiancé, Meliha. Without their tremendous understanding and unwavering support over the past few years, it would have been impossible for me to complete my studies. My thanks also go out to my cousin, Soheila, and my friends, whose encouragement and assistance have been invaluable throughout my studies.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AIPAC	American-Israel Public Affairs Committee
APTN	Associated Press Television News
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asia Nations
BP	British Petroleum
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCTV	China Central Television
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CEP	Circular Error Probable
CFC	Chlorofluorocarbons
CFT	Financing of Terrorism
CGTN	China Global Television Network
CGTN	China Global Television Network
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNFI	Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran
CNN	Cable News Network

CNR	China National Radio
CO ₂	Carbon Dioxide
COP	Parties Conference
CRI	China Radio International
CTT	Conservative Think Tanks
CVD	Cardiovascular Diseases
DDG-SG	Deputy Director-General for Safeguards
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOE	Department of Environment
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
FAGIA	Foreign Aid and Government-sponsored Investment Activities
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
GCC	Global Climate Coalition
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GHG	Greenhouse Gases
HCFC	Hydro Chlorofluorocarbons
HEU	Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

INSTEX	Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRIB	Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
ISIS	Science and International Security
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
LEU	Low-Enriched Uranium
MKO	Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCCPC	National Congress of the Communist Party of China
NCD	Non-Communicable Diseases
NCRI	National Council of Resistance of Iran
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Ofcom	Office of Communications par Diffusion Gazeuse)
PCAP	US Climate Action Plan
PSYOPS	Psychological Operation Group
RT	Russia Today
SARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SARFT	State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television
SCC	Supreme Council of Cyberspace
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SLV	Space-Launch Vehicles
SOFIDIF	Société Franco-Iranienne pour l'Enrichissement de l'Uranium
TNRC	Tehran Nuclear Research Center
TRR	Tehran Research Reactor
UF6	Uranium Hexafluoride Gas
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council
USDOS	United States Department of State
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WSJ	Wall Street Journal
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Framing the News

It has been suggested that the media frame reality by framing the news. Frames are created to profile “what matters” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 6). They create regular patterns to understand “apparently scattered and diverse events” (Norris et al., 2003, p. 11) and structure the “chaotic and confusing world” (Van Gorp, 2005, p. 487). The mass media and their presentation of information to the public have changed the nature of diplomacy (Archetti, 2012). Covered by the international media and broadcast to the public, diplomacy faces new rules and managing techniques that influence all the players and interests (O’Heffernan, 1993; Hindell, 1995; Taylor, 1997; Archetti, 2012; Adesina, 2017). Gamson and Modigliani (1987) argue that media frames generally imply “a policy direction or implicit answers to what should be done” about the issues (p. 144). This makes finding and analyzing media frames an integral part of examining public policy, particularly considering that various actors promote frames in their favor (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Birkland & Lawrence, 2009). As Nye (2014) argues, “in today’s global information age, victory may sometimes depend not on whose army wins, but on whose story wins” (p. 20).

While framing analysis has been used in different scientific fields, including psychology, sociology, and linguistics (Goffman, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Lakoff & Johnson, 2017), the theory has been frequently studied in the field of the media (Weaver, 2007). In Entman’s (1993) view, framing has four functions: defining the problem, showing the cause of the problem, evaluating morality related to the issue, and prescribing solutions. The framing process can be intentional or unintentional. However, various actors promote their positions on controversial issues, making framing intentionality clearer (Pan & Kosick, 1993; Birkland & Lawrence, 2009). This

consideration can lead to a better understanding of the news coverage of negotiations. Although the media are not present in every stage of negotiations, their coverage and framing are influential in representing the reality of negotiations, when they are involved. Defending agreements will be challenging if the countries cannot ratify them in their parliaments, or sell them to the public through the media. Meanwhile, the media also exemplify soft power, by influencing other states' public opinion, which makes studying international media even more important, for an understanding of the dynamics of international negotiations and agreements. Politicians usually refer to government mouthpieces or media which are close to the negotiators (Herman, 1983).

Whether intentional or unintentional, once the frames shape the news, various groups and individuals focus on them and embolden them. The current study focuses on the dominant frames, and compares them in various media outlets during state negotiations.

1.2 Specific Aims and Research Questions

The present study examines the framing of news stories in CNN, CGTN, Euronews, and Press TV. Media framing effects do not stop at audience feelings and cognitive responses. The frames also point out the direction of policy and future action (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Iyengar, 1991; Scheufele, 2000). Furthermore, studies show that media presentation and framing influence the views of both the negotiators and the public (Entman, 2004; Rahat & Sheafer, 2007; Baun & Potter, 2008).

The current study has the potential to provide useful information, for researchers to identify and examine news frames in media coverage. The analysis of frames here illuminates the narratives that the international media corresponding to each negotiator's position is trying to make. The resulting insight can then help in better understanding the states' stance and public policy agenda, alongside the context in which the public understands the issues and negotiation process. This study is congruent with previous findings, showing that the media framing approaches already studied are not isolated phenomena. As such, the contribution of the current thesis can be a strengthening of the theoretical and empirical frameworks of public policy, political communications, and

international relations. By examining the areas of communications and international relations, the current study has the potential to deepen the understanding of public diplomacy, and the way the public is exposed to the negotiated issues. The result will provide insights into media narratives and future policy-making regarding the negotiations. At the same time, the divergence of some results from the common thread in media literacy helps to boost marginal approaches in media studies, by diluting the traditional boundaries between ‘free’ and ‘not free’ media in democracies and non-democracies.

Iran's nuclear issue has been an important example of negotiations over proliferation in recent years. With Israel already nuclear, and rivalries between Iran and some Arab countries in the unstable Middle East, Iran's possession of the bomb would push the whole region to a new level of instability and into an arms race. The West particularly does not want to see another nuclear ‘rogue state’ like North Korea, while knowing that restraining Iran through military operations would be hard to sell to the world's public and likely would be futile and costly, as the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan showed. Years of harsh sanctions and direct attacks on its nuclear scientists and facilities did not derail Iran's nuclear program, which made finding a diplomatic solution to the issue even more critical. Protracted negotiations involving all of the UN Security Council permanent members (plus Germany) provides a good opportunity to study the media coverage from major powers' positions, with different approaches to a key security issue in international relations.

Media coverage and framing have not been comprehensively studied in the case of Iran's nuclear deal (and the Paris Agreement). Until 2022, there were few or no comparative studies on Iran's nuclear deal, considering the media coverage of all parties. Especially about the Iran nuclear deal, few studies have compared the non-Western media with others. For instance, Ahmadian and Farahani (2014) compared the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Tehran Times*' coverage of the Iran nuclear program, but did not consider others like the Chinese or Russian media. Besides the issue of negotiations, the choice of media types selected make the current study more interesting. Three different media types are included in the current study: CNN as a commercial, market-based media, Euronews as a combination of a government-backed identity-oriented approach and market-based

media, and finally, government-controlled media in non-democracies. Common sense infers that political and media systems significantly affect media coverage.

By choosing different media, the current study puts this familiar belief to the test. Analyzing and comparing the different media is extremely valuable, because it helps us understand the similarities and differences between them. This process can also help us improve our understanding of the concept of the media framing of covering negotiations. Unfortunately, much literature about media framing tends to focus on one country or comparisons between limited countries, presenting it as if this model is universal. This approach can lead to misunderstandings about the media and the approaches seen in other countries. Analyzing the coverage of Press TV can prove to be insightful in drawing comparisons between media coverage of dominant and marginalized states that have a stake in negotiations. Although Russia Today (RT) is omitted from the initial stage of the current study, it is still a helpful study to bring the media of the rest of the nation-states' players under one umbrella.

Climate change has entered international politics as a security issue and a threat, decades after the emergence of classic security cases like that of nuclear proliferation, but it has grabbed increasing attention in recent years (McDonald, 2013). Despite decades-long attempts at international negotiations on climate change, there remains a long way to go before the introduction of a concrete mechanism to control climate change and reverse greenhouse gas emissions. Media coverage of climate conferences has also been criticized for airing 'too little politics.' (Gunster & Fraser, 2011). The mainstream media pay relatively little attention to international climate summits and negotiations. For instance, *USA Today* and *The New York Times* published only 14 and 17 stories respectively during the 2011 Durban climate summit (Russell, 2013). Although some studies examine the time before and after the climate change negotiations, analyses are focused on Western countries and their primarily national media (Wolling & Alrt, 2017).

The countries (in the EU as a whole) engaging in the Iran nuclear negotiations are also among the top 10 emitters in the world. This provides a good opportunity to study the media behavior regarding these two important issues in international politics, with the same negotiators and the media close to or belonging to them. Again, one key aspect here is a comprehensive study of different countries with different approaches. The study of

Press TV should be particularly illuminating, because not much research has focused on Iran's international environmental policies compared to other big polluters through the lens of media framing. The current study tries to fill the gaps in the shortcomings mentioned above. Studying and comparing international media from different countries and perspectives helps better scrutinize and monitor negotiators' public policies. International media like CGTN, Euronews, and Press TV were created as rivals to CNN, and were supposed to represent different news values and coverage (Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010; Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012; Wastnidge, 2015; Jones & Newlee, 2019). Moreover, if the media are effective soft power tools (Nye, 2004; Nye, 2014; Peterson & Katz, 2018; Siddiqui, 2018), analyzing and comparing media coverage from the perspective of the beneficiaries of international events and processes can help us better understand the countries' policies. For instance, the current study suggests that despite the strategic alliance between Europe and the US, Euronews was a fierce critic of the US withdrawal from the Iran deal, and Press TV was more cautious than expected in representing the pre-withdrawal US position.

The study also compares the media coverage before and after the US withdrawal, shedding light on the post-agreement period. Scholars argue that the "post-agreement" phase can accurately depict the era regarding parties' obligations and their ways of dealing with the agreements (Zartman, 2003; Kasten et al., 2013). Most of the time, the negotiated issues are related to other issues, and the approaches of the engaged parties may differ over time. This change can occur even after the signing of the agreements. The media's influence continues after agreements are sealed, especially if one or more players change their positions dramatically. In both examples in the current study, the post-agreement phase turned out to be contrary to the initial agreements. This issue makes the cases studied particularly interesting. The study examines the post-agreement media coverage by allies, rivals, and enemies in terms of two important international political issues. The current study tries to put the relationship between the political system's public policies and their mass media to the test, considering different media from diverse political systems. The results can inform interdisciplinary studies of media and politics. The theoretical interest here is to compare the use of frames in various news outlets, to consider whether significant differences exist between them. Common sense dictates that

media coverage is different between democratic and non-democratic countries. Media systems and censorship in non-democratic countries leave little space to represent the world freely, and suppression and censorship force journalists to act according to the will of the state they represent, or at least not to cross red lines. Moreover, the government mainly controls media ownership in non-democratic states, so the control is almost complete. In comparison, the media in democratic countries are supposed to be able to choose their issues and approaches freely. With minimum censorship and intervention by the state, journalists should be able to represent the world according to their objective standards and values, without fear of persecution.

The media are not present in every type of negotiation. However, media coverage and framing are vitally influential in representing the “reality” of negotiations when they are involved. Therefore, studying media coverage and how they frame the issues can help better understand public diplomacy in different regimes, and construct the reality of international relations for the audience of various media.

The current study attempts to answer three questions:

RQ1: How does the use of frames vary significantly by outlet?

Answering this question helps us analyze the relationship between international relations and international media during international negotiations. For example, should we expect different approaches and framing by the different media systems or, no matter which state(s) the media belong to or are close to, do they more or less see the reality of the international negotiations from similar windows and news values?

The second goal of this study is to compare the use of frames in the reporting of different topics (the Paris climate agreements and the Iran nuclear deal). Therefore, the second research question is:

RQ2: How does the use of frames vary significantly by topic?

Do the media approach topics differently? Do they frame the negotiations and international relations through different framing approaches? All news stories covering the Paris Agreement and Iran deal from the chosen outlets were included regarding the

coding data. In total, the study analyzed 738 news stories: *CNN* ($n = 176$), *CGTN* ($n = 167$), *Euronews* ($n = 101$), and *Press TV* ($n = 294$).

RQ3: Does the use of frames change in the media over time?

International relations and negotiations are dynamic issues that can change over time. Do the media approach their change accordingly, or, no matter what happens, do they follow their framing approach and preconceived standards for their audiences?

Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) have identified five major frames that frequently occur in the media: the responsibility frame, conflict frame, economic consequences frame, human interest frame, and morality frame. The current study aims to investigate the prevalence of these five frames, which can be applied to various topics across different media sources (de Vreese et al., 2011). Twenty-three questions distributed in five frames have been created, to measure the possible news frame(s) in every news story (see Table 7.1). Although identifying the presence of frames is not always straightforward, this measurement method allows us to identify and observe multiple frames in news stories.

1.3 Cases to be Studied: The Iran Nuclear Deal

As a diplomatic success story, and a case of cooperation in international relations (Serim, 2015; Blockmans & Viaud, 2017; Sherman, 2017), the Iran nuclear deal, or as it is officially called, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was considered a breakthrough in problem-solving and international diplomacy.

Emboldened by the windfall of the 1970s' petrodollars, Iran's nuclear program started before the 1979 revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. The Shah, Iran's ruler, began Iran's nuclear program, helped by Western countries like the US, Germany, and France. Although the West, and particularly the US, had concerns, the program developed until the 1979 revolution. Doubts about Iran's theocracy and the Iran-Iraq war finally stopped Iran's nuclear activities, only for them to be resumed after a couple of years. This time, Iran's regime tried to elicit help from unconventional channels,

mainly through a Pakistani scientist, Abdul Qadeer Kahn, a source that made Western countries even more suspicious. In 1996, the US Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, also known as the Iran Sanctions Act, penalizing American and foreign investments in Iran's energy industry.

The Iran Sanctions Act was the beginning of the long list of sanctions imposed on Iran in the years to come. Other players became more fully engaged in 2002, when the National Council of Resistance on Iran, the political wing of the terrorist organization Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO), revealed Iran's previously unannounced nuclear activities near Natanz and Arak. In September 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) asked Iran to declare all of its nuclear programs, and in October 2003, Iran and European foreign ministers struck a deal for greater control over the country's nuclear program. However, the interactions and negotiations between Iran and others, mainly the IAEA, and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) + Germany, did not stop at that point. Between the 2003 deal and the JCPOA, the UNSC adopted four resolutions, mainly against Iran's nuclear activities in 2006 (Resolution no. 1737), 2007 (Resolution no. 1747), 2008 (Resolution no. 1803), and 2010 (Resolution no. 1929). In addition, the US and EU also sanctioned Iranian individuals and entities unilaterally. In all these years, interactions and direct or indirect negotiations between Iran and other players continued until the 2015 breakthrough.

Despite the time-to-time rejection of the IAEA, the Western powers were suspicious about the military purpose of the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities from the beginning. Nevertheless, it took years of negotiations and carrot and stick policy to close the gaps between the players. In 2015, the more than decade-long efforts finally bore fruit, and five members of the UNSC plus Germany (5+1) reached an agreement with Iran over its nuclear activities. According to the JCPOA, Iran would limit its nuclear program, in return for the lifting of sanctions on the country. The JCPOA faced little opposition worldwide, but all parties were worried about the influence of the US bipartisan domestic politics on the deal. While every side sought assurance about the deal implementation, Iran particularly tried to secure the deal against the reluctance of the Republicans (Lee, 2015; O'Connor, 2015). The negotiators even emphasized their primary concern in the

JCPOA text, mentioning that the US side should “take appropriate steps” in case of opposition against the JCPOA’s implementation (JCPOA, 2015, art. 25). When Trump’s US walked away from the deal and imposed unilateral sanctions on Iran, countries around the world (particularly the 5+1 players) and the UN reacted strongly to the issue, along with the international media. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres said he was ‘deeply concerned’ (Bender et al., 2018), while Russia and China announced ‘disappointment’ and their ‘commitments’ to the deal (Teslova, 2018; Lo, 2018). Even the US’s European allies called Trump’s action ‘very, very, disappointing,’ expressing their ‘regret and concern.’ (Fox, 2018; Gearan & DeYoung, 2018).

The current study examines selected media coverage of Iran’s deal, not only during the negotiations and before the striking of the deal but also after it, and the US withdrawal and unilateral sanctions.

1.3.1 Media Coverage of Iran’s Nuclear Program

The Western mainstream media’s coverage has tagged along with their politicians. In their study, Izadi & Saghaye-Biria, (2007) showed that *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *The Wall Street Journal* represented the Iran nuclear program negatively, covering the issue in the context of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ For the media, ‘they’ knew too much about a dangerous technology only ‘we’ could be trusted with. On the European side, the media coverage was not significantly different. For instance, Koosha & Shams (2005) recognized the same pattern in *The Telegraph*, *Daily Mail*, *The Guardian*, *The Mirror*, *The Times*, and *The Independent*. They showed that the studied media’s themes and topics of “cover-up, defiance, deviance, concession seeking, fear and crisis” helped to depict Iran and its nuclear program as an imminent threat, and put more pressure on the latter country (p. 115). In the conflict with ‘irresponsible’ Iran, the media put all the burden on Iran’s shoulders, suggesting that the future developments entirely depended on (not very trustworthy) Iran’s behavior. Shortly after the UN vote on UNSCR 1929, in June 2010, the *New York Times* quoted then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton over Iran’s

nuclear program, referring to Iran's "pursuit of nuclear weapons" (Siegel & Barforush, 2013, p. 14).

In their extended studies of the US and UK media, Siegel & Barforush (2013) showed the US and UK media from different political perspectives (including *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Post*, *The Financial Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Independent*) did not mention two essential facts related to Iran's nuclear program. They did not mention Iran's acceptance of the nuclear non-proliferation requirements and of IAEA monitoring. Moreover, the Iranian people were absent from the media coverage. Others also reached the same conclusions about omitting the Iranian people from the Western media coverage. Rashidi & Rashti (2012) showed that the Iranian people, the main target of sanctions, were almost entirely excluded from the Western mass media (including *The Economist*, *Daily Express*, *The Washington Post*, and *The New York Times*) coverage of Iran's nuclear issues and sanctions against the country (p. 5). The mass media coverage helped create a "homogeneous, consensual group" image from the rational West and Western governments, which led to the imposition of stricter penalties on Iran (Rashidi & Rashti, 2012, p. 7).

The media do not always support governments unconditionally. For instance, the US right-wing media amplified the downside of the anti-Iran deal, while Obama was close to finalizing it. For example, Rupert Murdoch's media, from Fox News to the *Wall Street Journal*, were propaganda batteries against President Obama's 'bad deal' and 'false choices.' (Shank, 2015, p. 8). The Obama administration sometimes preferred to avoid even the liberal media. Secretary Clinton preferred secret talks with Iran in Oman in 2013, because any news coverage could lead to "another circus with lots of posturing for the press." (Clinton, 2014, p. 436). Media avoidance was not only for the Americans. During the Oman negotiations, in one case, for instance, Ali Akbar Velayati, Khamenei's consultant and a key conservative figure, assured the press that the supreme leader never allowed "a lawful negotiation [between Iran and the US]" (Bastani, 2018, para. 6).

1.4 Cases to be Studied: The Paris Agreement

Natural causes cannot explain away climate change (also called the climate emergency or climate crisis). Instead, human activities are overwhelmingly causing global warming, mainly by the emission of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs). However, not all state leaders and policy-makers accept the reality of human-made climate change.

In the 1980s, global environmental issues like climate change found their way onto the international agenda (Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001). Following a series of scientific and political conferences, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. Nevertheless, it only was in 1995 that the famous IPCC report suggested that there was ‘discernible human influence’ on the global climate. Climate change became more important after the end of the Cold War with its traditional security problems.

The United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) treaty was opened for signature in 1992, and later became the parent treaty of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, the UNFCCC gave the states room to maneuver, and particularly met US policies halfway (Mintzer & Leonard, 1994). The Parties Conference (COP) represents all UNFCCC member states, and its annual meetings aim at climate decision-making. However, decision-making by COPs is difficult, due to states’ different approaches toward climate change, and due to mitigations, and implications. The Kyoto Protocol did not achieve much. The US did not join it in the first place, and other major players, like Canada, withdrew from it. Moreover, China, which passed the US as the biggest GHG emitter in 2006, was not obliged to make emission reductions. Another weak point of the Protocol was counting too much on the “goodwill and willingness of the market.” (Gupta, 2010, p. 645).

By the time of the Paris Agreement, states accepted that a single agreement should cover all parties (Bodansky, 2016). Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which was binding only on developed countries, it is binding on all developed and developing countries. Each party determined its own GHG emitting level. Meanwhile, the parties adopted 2 degrees

Celsius global mean temperature increase as the upper limit. The Paris Agreement did the impossible for some, and mandated significant powers to cut their emissions. As a result, an international agreement was reached over climate. It has been suggested that the Paris Agreement was a considerable diplomatic success, because the UNFCCC shifted its approach from establishing mandatory emission reduction to paying attention to the states' decisions and plans (Christoff, 2016; Falkner, 2016). In 2015 and during the Conference of the Parties (COP) 21 in Paris, international negotiations and efforts finally reached breaking point and a consensus that almost every state agreed upon. The agreement aimed to limit the devastating effects of climate change and tap global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. However, initial hopes turned to doubts, notably when the US announced its withdrawal from the agreement, igniting widespread reactions worldwide.

The powerful states' influence and free-roaming tendencies appeared when the US under Trump walked away from the agreement, despite unanimous worldwide opposition from many bodies, ranging from other states to non-state organizations and even some US states and cities (Zhang et al., 2017; Jacobo, 2017; Kontorovich, 2019). The US withdrawal was an exception (although an influential one), but other major emitters also committed only to their own terms, and disregarded the situation of vulnerable developing states (Christoff, 2016). National and regional priorities affected the Paris Agreement's ability to tackle the climate emergency, making some critics believe it was the "triumph of wishful thinking over facts." (Bodansky, 2016a, p. 316).

1.4.1 Media Coverage of Climate Issues

Worldwide, the media are paying more attention to climate change, increasing the coverage of related international political events and activities (Schafer et al., 2012; Wozniak et al., 2015). The mass media are vital in linking people's lives to science and policy-making (Boykoff, 2013). They help climate change increasingly penetrate the public discourse (Moser, 2010), shaping the climate issue as a threat, problem, opportunity, and so on (Hulme, 2009, as cited in Boykoff, 2013, p. 809). Comprehensive

survey data show that media coverage can affect the public's views toward the legitimacy and salience of climate change even more than the extreme weather conditions (Carmichael & Brulle, 2017).

News media that usually simplify the issues, to tell engaging stories to the public face challenges if they cover climate change as a “long-term, multi-faced, and largely unobtrusive” issue (Wozniak et al., 2015, p. 469). Climate change usually does not fit in with the logic of newsworthiness, but international climate events like COP summits grab the media attention (Boykoff & Mansfield, 2008; Gordon et al., 2010; Painter, 2011). Climate concerns need political mobilization by the elites and advocacy groups to become influential, and the media is a crucial tool to bring it to public attention (Carmichael & Brulle, 2017). However, media coverage of climate change heavily relies on authoritative voices (Boykoff, 2011), and the media usually follow “the extent and range of opinions” of officials and elites (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; Carmichael & Brulle, 2017, p. 232).

Studies show that established and emerging powers influence media frames on climate negotiations significantly (Pen et al., 2019). In fact, every state tries to have this influence, leading to ‘national-based realism’ as the dominant discourse on climate summit media coverage (Eide & Kunelius, 2010). However, the media's way of framing climate issues is not much different. For example, Pandey and Kurian (2017) find that different media from various countries use similar frames. In addition, coverage tends to use particular frames more than others. For instance, Pirikx and Gelders (2010) show that between 2001 and 2007, during COPs summits, responsibility and conflict frames were used more commonly than others, similar to the current study's findings.

The current study examines media coverage of the Paris Climate Agreement. It looks at the media belonging to and operating from the world's top polluters with different approaches to international climate policy.

1.5 Preview

While this short chapter has provided an overview of the study's purpose, aims, and questions, chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework for framing. It also explains how the media covers and frames public diplomacy issues and negotiations. Chapter 3 goes on to highlight the general approach toward climate policy, and the negotiations leading to the Paris Agreement. It also provides an overview of climate change news coverage in the mass media and shows how the media cover climate-related issues, including climate negotiations. Chapter 4 provides examples of each studied entity's policies (China, the EU, Iran, and the US) toward climate change and the Paris Agreement. Chapter 5 focuses on the background to Iran's nuclear program, and the players' interactions that led to the JCPOA. A short introduction to Iran's domestic politics also helps the reader better understand Iran's policy dynamic. Chapter 6 introduces the studied news media. A short history of their political positions, ownership, and routines, facilitates an understanding of their work atmosphere and news coverage. Chapter 7 describes the research approach, data collection, and analysis. Finally, chapters 8 and 9 discuss the research findings and conclusions.

CHAPTER 2

FRAMING THE NEWS

2.1 *Framing*

In his influential book *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (1974), Erving Goffman introduced the concept of framing. However, Goffman did not pay enough attention to framing in mass media communication, as we experience it (Gamson, 1985). While the roots of framing are to be found in different fields of science, including psychology, sociology, and linguistics (Goffman, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Lakoff & Johnson, 2017), the theory has been one of the most frequently studied in the field of media (Weaver, 2007). Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin (1980) were among the first scholars who used Goffman's frame analysis to analyze political communications. Since then, framing analysis has been used in many studies (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Iyengar, 1991; Entman, 1991; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; D'Angelo, 2002; Pan & Kosicki, 2003; Entman, 2007; Matthes, 2009; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).

Scholars disagree on the definition of framing (Weaver, 2007; Entman et al., 2009). However, some definitions have frequently been applied. Matthes and Kohring (2008) note that Entman's (1993) definition of media framing has been detailed and widely accepted. Entman (1993) suggests that

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman 1993, as cited in Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p. 264).

So, in Entman's view, framing has four functions: It 1) defines what the problem is; 2) shows what the cause of the problem is; 3) evaluates what is moral or immoral related to the issue; and 4) prescribes solutions.

One approach in media studies suggests that the mainstream news media frame the news and the reality through that. They provide "contextual cues, giving meaning and

order to complex problems, actions, and events, by slotting the new into familiar categories or storyline ‘pegs.’” (Norris et al., 2003, p. 4). In other words, the news media “structure the chaotic and confusing world” unavoidably (Van Gorp, 2005, p. 487), creating regular patterns to understand “apparently scattered and diverse events” (Norris et al., 2003, p. 11). Entman (2008) suggests that framing is “selecting and highlighting some aspects of a situation to promote a particular interpretation” (p. 90). Therefore, frames are “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation” created to profile “what matters” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 6). Furthermore, news frames reinforce specific ways of interpreting developments through this packaged world when they “bundle key concepts, stock phrases, and iconic images” (Norris et al., 2003, pp. 1-10). Determining “what is selected, what is excluded, [and] what is emphasized” not only grasps and explains the world but also makes its own “natural” world (Gamson, 1985, p. 618). In a constructed world, the interpretation of facts and not the fact themselves would matter (Dorman & Farhang, 1987, p. 44).

Media framing affects audiences’ feelings and “cognitive responses,” shaping their views toward the agents responsible for processes or events (Iyengar, 1991; Scheufele, 2000). However, media frames do not stop at shaping our understanding of the world. Gamson and Modigliani (1987) argue that media frames “generally imply a policy direction or implicit answer as to what should be done” about an issue (p. 144), which makes analyzing media framing even more important and tangible. Researchers examine both frame-building and frame-setting processes. De Vreese (2005) describes frame building as the factors that “influence the structural qualities of news frames,” while frame-setting refers to “the interaction between media frames and individuals’ prior knowledge and predispositions” (p. 52). Although it has been said that journalists determine what information people would have access to (Entman, 2005), scholars also give it a pivotal role in the context in which the journalist works. Dorman and Farhang (1987) believe that context and emphasis in journalism are powerful determinants, transforming “literal truths into reassuring and legitimate acts in one instance, or threatening and illegitimate behavior in another” (p. 44).

Both internal and external factors explain how journalists frame issues (Zhou & Moy, 2007). Examples of internal factors are “individual characteristics, ideological or political orientations, professional values, journalistic routines, and organizational

constraints” (Zhou & Moy, 2007, p. 81). External factors influence news framing by journalists as well. “Cultural resonances and sponsor activities, political culture and social values, prevailing ideology, governmental stances, and national interest” have been named as external factors (Zhou & Moy, 2007, p. 81). While frame building focuses on social and structural factors, frame setting is focused on the influence of media framing on audiences’ interpretations and views (de Vreese, 2005; Zhou & Moy, 2007).

The framing process can be intentional or unintentional. However, in controversial issues, media framing’s intentionality is clearer, because various actors promote frames in their favor (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Birkland & Lawrence, 2009). The same considerations can be applied through negotiations, particularly multilateral ones. As Birkland (1997) mentions, media producers imply that frames operate by selecting and emphasizing specific elements of the story. However, not all scholars believe biased media insiders are to blame for the framing. Some not only reiterate that framing can be unintentional but suggest that framing is, in fact, inevitable. Journalists are forced to make complicated issues simple for the masses, and are pressured by time and space limitations in the media routine (Gitlin, 1980; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Shaping and selecting frames can be intentional or unintentional, but once it shapes, various groups and individuals focus on them and it even emboldens some of them (Birkland & Lawrence, 2009).

Some believe that there are scientific methods that enable journalists to negate any “personal subjectivity” through “professional objectivity” (Johnson-Cartee, 2005, p. 112). However, the concept of an objective professional and so-called news reporting formula is considered self-deception rather than a tool for impartiality:

The journalistic reporting formula of ‘who, what, when, where, why, and how’ provides further evidence of their emphasis on facts...they believe they simply report the fact as they see them. Such views are classic examples of consummate self-deception, yet they remain widespread throughout the profession (Johnson-Cartee, 2005, p. 76).

True or false, fact or deception, for scholars like Entman (2004), framing is inescapable. According to scholars like him, although prior beliefs and interpersonal communication, and the media’s words and images shape individuals’ “schemas and interpretations,” there would still be “no escape from framing” (p. 124). Inescapable media framing makes the role of the mass media crucial in people’s living experiences.

Large media organizations usually determine the issues and events, and other media outlets follow their leads (Berkman & Kitch, 1986). News frames “make the world natural,” but there is not anything “natural” about the framing process (Gamson, 1985). Audiences can organize, interpret, and label information (Goffman, 1974), although it is not easy. Nevertheless, framing is so commonplace that it is considered a part of a journalist’s routine (Scheufele, 2000). Scholars are clear that pinpointing frames is not an easy task, and framing could illustrate (and make) socially constructed realities as “natural” and “objective” realities that reporters “merely reflect” (Gamson, 1985, p. 618). This routine process can be deeply embedded in the framing nature and function. Gitlin broadens the frame’s definition to the ideology and value arena and does not stop at individuals’ and journalists’ personal and professional experiences (Werder, 2002).

2.2 Framing: Types and Implementations

News frames can be recognized in two forms: thematically or episodically. Callaghan and Schnell (2005) explain that thematic articles “place political issues or events in a context” while episodic articles, which are more common, “focus on a particular event or person” (p. 4). In other words, thematic articles focus more on the structural causes of news stories. In contrast, episodic articles mainly focus on specific events and do not explain structural causes or the motivations behind the issues (Iyengar & Simon, 1997). Studying thematic or episodic frames can be seen in another aspect — studies have focused on frame building and those examining the frame setting process. The frame-building process focuses on social and structural elements influencing media frame selections (de Vreese, 2005). These items are in two categories: internal and external; Internal factors such as the individual characteristics of a journalist and organizational boundaries influence the reporters’ performances, and external factors such as interest groups, elite, and government influences (Zhou & Moy, 2007).

Through the frame-building process, journalists and news networks use governments, essential individuals, and organizational sources because they are considered more accessible and credible (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). On the other hand, frame-setting researchers pursue a different path; they focus on audiences’ opinions and interpretations

of particular issues (de Vreese, 2005). Different focuses lead to different audience assessments. For example, Valkenburg et al. (1999) show that episodic articles depict social problems through individuals, while thematic articles employ social contexts to explain social problems. However, one should keep in mind that even thematic framing is not an in-depth case study, and changing the facts is part of the framing technique.

Generalization is a critical factor in media framing. Media frames help to create a mental shortcut for understanding and analyzing news stories. In other words, frames help the audience process information quickly without knowing all the related facts (Callaghan & Schnell, 2005). Surveys usually show “public responsiveness to the dominant frames in the news” (Entman, 2004, p. 126). As a result, due to the dynamics of media coverage, people in democratic countries can be more vulnerable to policymakers’ framings than those in countries where the media are controlled. Different groups influence the news, like interest groups and policymakers in more open countries (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). De Vries (2004) elaborates how, through “misframing,” officials can dodge the blame for disasters, and can frame either policies or individuals. Entman (2008) models the cascading foreign policy frames from the White House to the American media, the international communication process, and then through to the public audience. He infers that the highest-ranked politicians, like presidents, “often enjoy substantial success in controlling frames of foreign policy in US media” (p. 89). In Dorman’s (1986) words, among the US’s “more dangerous self-delusion is the notion that because its press is vigorous, privately-owned, officially non-ideological, and free of overt government control, Americans get a clear, unhindered view of the world” (p. 419). As Dorman (1986) notices, even when audiences in democratic countries feel some media bias, they assume it is a checking mechanism against government influences.

Despite various ideas on framing and its functions, scholars still do not know how precisely the “frames become embedded within and make themselves manifest in a text” (Entman, 1993, p. 51). Tuchman (1978) posits that media audiences mainly assess events based on frames the media set for them. For Tuchman (1978), a frame is an “essential feature of news” that organizes everyday reality, and the news frame is part and parcel of everyday reality (p. 193). This trend is ascending, which means more sources seen as more credible have more influence as sources (Druckman, 2001).

2.3 Approaches Toward Frame Analysis

There are a variety of approaches to frame analysis, including qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods. Matthes and Kohring (2008) categorize five of the essential conventional scholarly approaches in frame analysis as “a hermeneutic approach, a linguistic approach, a manual holistic approach, a computer-assisted approach, and a deductive approach” (p. 259). However, they add that there is overlap in the approaches. For Matthes and Kohring (2008), the hermeneutic and linguistic approaches are relatively similar. A hermeneutic approach is qualitative and does not use quantification (Matthes & Kohring, 2008). The method instead uses in-depth studies on relatively small samples. A sophisticated linguistic approach considers linguistic elements to find the frames: “the selection, placement, and structure of specific words and sentences in a text” (Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p. 260). Finally, the manual-holistic approach studies frame differently. Here, scholars generate frames through “a qualitative analysis of some news texts”, and then code them through manual content analysis. Although scholars claim clarity in reviewing documents and definitions in their codebooks to code articles, Matthes and Kohring (2008) note that, at least in some studies, “it remains unclear how researchers determine their frames” (p. 260). Compared to the manual-holistic approach, a computer-based approach does not code texts or find the frames manually. Instead, computed content analysis is used (Matthes & Kohring, 2008).

Apart from the above-mentioned differences between framing approaches, an important characteristic separates the fifth approach from the rest. Until now, all approaches were inductive, meaning analysis, not a priori assumption, finds frames (de Vreese, 2005). In contrast, the last approach is described by Matthes and Kohring (2008) as a deductive approach that derives frames from the literature before analyzing the text (de Vreese et al., 2001; Ewart & McLean, 2015). The current study has borrowed heavily from a widely cited deductive study by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000). They used five a priori generic frames to study television and newspaper stories through content analysis techniques. Having prior knowledge of news frames in the literature is necessary to ensure the researcher recognizes established frames in the related literature. The deductive approach has some advantages over the inductive one, and its use is rising, although using

mixed methods as combinations of qualitative and quantitative approaches is another option (Matthes, 2009). Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) argue that the deductive approach is more comfortable in replicating findings, works better with large samples, and analyzes differences better in media framing over time.

2.3.1 Generic (General) and Issue-specific Frames

Generic frames (also called general frames) are not limited to a particular issue and can be applied so as to find frames covering different issues (Matthes, 2009; de Vreese, 2005). This flexibility allows the generic framing method to compare and analyze media coverage across various topics and media (de Vreese et al., 2001). In contrast, issue-specific frames emphasize that every specific issue has different frames mainly developed for that issue (Matthes, 2009). While a specific-issue frame study has the advantage of more precision and detail, it is harder to generalize and compare results (de Vreese et al., 2001).

Thematic articles highlight structural causes and reasons for events and are less frequent in media than episodic news reports (Iyengar & Simon, 1997). Instead, episodic articles emphasize specific events and do not focus on the motivation and causes behind the stories. However, Iyengar and Simon (1997) add that the thematic articles are longer than the episodic ones, and the media can only include a few due to their time and space limitations. Scholars see thematic news framing as “more objective, in-depth and analytic”, while Episodic framing is “fast-paced, attention-grabbing and achieves ‘objectivity’ via focusing on the ‘hard’ news.” (Werder, 2002, p. 222). Meanwhile, Werder (2002) states that thematic frames are “dull and slow,” more prone to be biased, and are not as popular in the media as episodic ones (Iyengar & Simon, 1997; Werder, 2002). Whether episodic or thematic, media reports influence audiences’ interpretations of the issues accordingly. For instance, the television news format encourages people to have individual-level explanations for social problems. This would be achieved by covering an issue or problem in terms of an event, instance, or individual (episodically)

rather than in terms of the larger historical, social context (thematically) (Valkenburg et al., 1999, p. 553).

The current study defines the frame's function as emphasizing "different aspects of topics" (de Vreese, 2005, p. 53). Furthermore, as Entman (1993) suggests, the study will focus on finding and explaining aspects of framing, including "problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (p. 52). Despite the boom in social media, people still prefer to get their news from traditional and more credible media like online newspapers (Schultz et al., 2011; Utz et al., 2013). The current study assesses how the international mass media in different countries can cover the process of multilateral negotiations. It mainly focuses on dominant frames and compares them in various media across the negotiator countries. Examining the media presentation of players' images, the causes of the current situation, and their solutions for managing the crisis is seen as fundamental. The study contributes explicitly to media studies on framing multilateral-international negotiations.

2.3.2 *Other Similar Approaches*

Framing is not the only way the media influence audiences. For example, agenda setting is the process that suggests to the public which issue is essential (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Fahmy & Johnson, 2007). Fahmy and Johnson (2007) suggest that the agenda-setting function's central idea is that "the more an issue is covered, the more the public perceives it as important" (p. 25). In other words, agenda-setting sets the importance of the issues for the public (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) and has a powerful capacity "to shape the public's...priorities" (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, p. 21).

Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) summarize the differentiation between agenda-setting and framing as agenda-setting explaining "whether we think about an issue," and framing tells us "how we think about it" (p. 14). However, some scholars elaborate on this idea and emphasize the similarity between second-level agenda-setting and framing. Unlike the first-level agenda-setting (as the traditional one), second-level agenda-setting influences how we think (Wanta et al., 2004). In this case, the agenda-setting function would be similar to framing in Scheufele and Tewksbury's (2007) definition. Entman

(2007) believes that agenda-setting can be seen as “another name for successfully performing the first function of framing,” which is “defining problems worthy of public and government attention” (p. 164). Entman adds that second-level agenda-setting or “attribute” level of agenda-setting has the core idea of framing: “to highlight the causes of problems, to encourage moral judgments (and associated effective responses), and to promote favored policies (pp. 164–5). Second-level agenda-setting and framing appear concerned with “ways of thinking rather than objects of thinking.” (Weaver, 2007, p. 146). However, some scholars have chosen to look at framing, due to it covering a broader range of cognitive processes such as “moral evaluations, causal reasoning, appeals to principles, and recommendations for treatment of problems” (Weaver, 2007, p. 146).

2.4 The Media, Policies, and Negotiations

2.4.1 Policy-making In the Age of the Mass Media

The mass media and their presentation of information to the public have changed the entire nature of diplomacy, based mostly on formal procedures between institutions and/or individuals in the past (Archetti, 2012). Gilboa (2001) introduces three conceptual models for media-based studies on diplomacy: public diplomacy, media diplomacy, and media-broker diplomacy. In public diplomacy, state and non-state actors use the media and other communication channels “to influence public opinion in foreign societies.” In media diplomacy, officials use the media “to communicate with players and to promote conflict resolution,”; and in media-broker diplomacy, “journalists temporarily assume the role of diplomats and serve as mediators in international negotiations” (p. 1). This categorization shows how the media are present at all policy-making and political process levels.

There is a close link between the workings of diplomats and the news reported through the media. Years before the Internet and the invention of new interactive social media, it was suggested that the media were the “eyes and ears” of diplomats and “the most important links between Congress, the White House, and the bureaucracy” (Davison, 1974, p. 181). Some believe that the revolution in communications has taken

politics to a different level, with the dominant power of the new media. David Gergen (1990) has even called this phenomenon “teledemocracy.” The presence of 24/7 news media creates an endless flow of information, which puts pressure on decision-making. The resulting accelerant effect damages both the gathering of information and reactions to it (Hoge, 1994, p. 137).

Scholars have noticed that the elite and decision-makers may even lose their control of the media, specifically during a crisis, when they are forced to react to the media relatively passively rather than controlling situations (Hoge, 1994; Jakobsen, 1996; Livingston, 1997; Robinson, 1999; Gilboa, 2005; Jin et al., 2014; Roselle et al., 2014). The dilemma for decision-makers is that they either react to the media immediately, and take the risk of making mistakes and having premature reactions, or they react after consideration (which is not fast enough according to the media standards) or do not react at all, which can be interpreted as confusion and lack of ability to control processes and issues (Hoge, 1994, pp. 136-137). Considering the media dilemma for politicians, some argue that US officials prioritize public opinion over reasoning. Gergen (1990) believes “successful policies must first and foremost please the Great God of Public Opinion” (p. 48). However, not only politicians but also public opinion itself could said to be under the media’s influence. Studies have shown how the media present and frame events like negotiations, and influence negotiators’ and public views (Entman, 2004; Rahat & Sheafer, 2007; Baum & Potter, 2008).

Alongside the powerful media approach, some scholars do not believe in the domination of the media in diplomacy. They suggest that the media are not usually the initiator of political events and are more likely to “react to events” than to “initiate them” (Wolfsfeld & Sheafer, 2006, p. 334). Moreover, decision-makers are not entirely passive in response to the media, and have agendas using the media to achieve them. As a result, the mass media “are not and never have been independent in their foreign policy news framing” (Bahador, 2011, p. 45). Herman (1993) shows how the mass media “serve mainly as a supportive arm of the state and dominant elites” (p. 25). His study shows that in foreign policy, “the US media have frequently allowed themselves to be mobilized to serve the government’s agenda and foreign policy goals.” (p. 30). Even in the case of some media effects on political outcomes, their effect needs to be understood “within the confines of power, not outside it.” (Bahador, 2011, p. 48). One understands this approach

better if one notices that the same mass media content is “the most likely source of over-time changes” in individuals’ foreign policy preferences (Soroka, 2003, p. 28).

2.4.2 *The Media and Soft Power*

The influence of politics on the public (especially the public in other countries) is a crucial part of a relatively new political approach and concept of power. ‘Soft power’ is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2008, p. 94). This “attractive power” has become a more important factor in foreign policy, at the expense of more traditional concepts of powers (Nye, 2008; Roselle et al., 2014). The status of nations in the international environment depends not only on military and/or economic power. Relatively new characteristics, like the images of nation-states and their leaders (which have been heavily influenced by the media), have established themselves in this manner (Mowlana, 1993; Nye, 2004). As Nye (2014) argues the point, “in today’s global information age, victory may sometimes depend not on whose army wins, but on whose story wins” (p. 20).

Mass communications allow (traditionally speaking) relatively weak countries to play the soft power game as well. For instance, an increasing number of countries with poor images rely on public relations companies, the mass media, and even academics to repair their images, which have been presented to the public and politicians in Western countries (Peterson & Katz, 2018; Siddiqui, 2018). Observing soft power implemented during the negotiations helps us to analyze negotiations more accurately. Scholars have worked on the international media's role in international negotiations, but mainly dealt with “limited aspects of the subject” (Gilboa, 2000, p. 545). Even Gilboa (2000) mainly focuses on technical issues and mechanical aspects of covering (or not covering) the negotiations, rather than more qualitative aspects of the media’s roles like framing events. The current study is among the works that focus on how the media present (and frame) the events rather than emphasizing whether the media report an event at all. However, omitting or reporting “the news” is also part of the framing process. Lance Bennett explains the influence of omission in the mass media, stating that “people cannot interpret

what they don't see, and what they don't see in the news are the results of effective press management" (Bennett, 2001, p. 145).

2.4.3 *Public Diplomacy, the Mass Media, and Negotiations*

Some argue that it is reasonable to assume that foreign policy "will represent the particular interests of those who design it" (Burchill, 2005, p. 65). This issue shows the mechanism of interactions during the negotiations, and the influence of agents' and institutions' media framing. Studying this view of national interests helps us to analyze the media framing of foreign policy and negotiations with other countries. Media frame complicates issues, including negotiations, and also makes them simple. Apart from the planned framing of the news, time and space limitations are inherited in the media. The way of allocating them inevitably ends up with framed and simplified information (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). For instance, Gergen (1990) believes that television inevitably simplifies the complex world by its very nature, arguing that "in a report of 80 seconds - 150 words at most - a television reporter cannot provide context or backgrounds" (p. 50).

The relation between media framing and public opinion is not simple, meaning the public is not merely receiving media material and words from the mouthpieces of politicians. Sometimes media framing and manipulation need to omit information rather than changing and representing it in a specific way (Yang, 2003). After all, an Ignorant and uninformed audience is ideal for powerful leaders (Chomsky, 1991). Rosati (1993) shows how far public knowledge can be inaccurate and misleading. He noticed that, for instance, most Americans could not even locate the Persian Gulf (where the US troops were in ongoing wars) on the map. The passing of time and explosion of access to information in the digital age could not improve the situation of public knowledge, as seen in Rosati's studies. In 2014, while the US was highly engaged in developments in Ukraine, a *Washington Post* national opinion poll (fielded via Survey Sampling International Inc., or SSI) showed that the median American located the country "about 1,800 miles off" (Dropp et al., 2014), and according to the Pew Research Center in 2017, only 44 percent of Americans knew the name of the country's secretary of state ("From Brexit to Zika," 2017).

Despite the flood of information by the mass media, the public's "right to know" has been a vital issue in public diplomacy and the media, and is considered an essential part of the shape of the new policy. The openness of diplomacy has been a controversial issue from the beginning of related debates. Some scholars have suggested that "public diplomacy" is a contradictory and even impossible term (Claude, 1965; Ledeen, 1990). Even the contents of international negotiations and, sometimes, their results have been kept secret by diplomats and leaders of democratic countries (Colaesi & Jensen, 2015; Johnson, 2015). Regardless of all the studies which argue that the mass media frame the news in favor of political interests, some scholars suggest that negotiations would be more successful without media presence and coverage. Leaving aside those who find open diplomacy "impossible" (e.g., Ledeen, 1990); some believe that secret negotiations reduce the audience and voter pressure on the negotiators, and help them to be more flexible and ready to make concessions during the secret negotiations (Druckman, 1995; Druckman & Druckman, 1996; Brown, 2014). For instance, Herbert Kelman (1997) recognizes the essential role that secrecy played in the success of the Oslo peace process, because participants were not under pressure and could enjoy a "noncommittal exploration" (p. 189). Former US Secretary of State John Kerry, in his book *Every Day is Extra*, writes that (at least at first) he preferred to solve the issues with his Iranian counterpart through private talks (Kerry, 2019).

Secret diplomacy is characterized by the "total exclusion of the media and the public from negotiations and related policy-making" (Gilboa, 2001, p. 546). It has been increasingly difficult for policymakers in the more democratic and linked-up world to keep traditional secret diplomacy intact. After all, politicians' political costs regarding failures in open diplomacy are likely to be grave (Gilboa, 2000; Brown, 2014). Audience cost affects autocratic states and leaders as well. Brown and Marcum (2011) even suggest that autocratic leaders may face a more significant audience cost related to public diplomacy and negotiations. Gilboa (2000) formulates the intention of secrecy in negotiations thus: "The greater the significance of the talks and the more they are designed to break an impasse, the greater is the motivation of officials to maintain a closed-door environment" (p. 548). Policymakers prefer other options than open diplomacy when they cannot keep the diplomacy secret. They see closed-door diplomacy as a solution in the

absence of secret diplomacy, because they can still relatively control the media coverage and the flow of information outside closed doors (Gilboa, 2001).

Both closed-door and open diplomacy allow the public to know where, when, and by whom negotiation occurs. However, even in the open diplomacy model, negotiators prefer to keep specific cards close to their chests. Moreover, sometimes the secrecy goes on too long, even after reaching an agreement through public diplomacy. For instance, the US did not announce the withdrawal of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) from Türkiye as a part of the agreement with the Soviet Union to end the Cuban Missile Crisis. In a 2012 *Foreign Policy* article, William Burr, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive, expressed the pointlessness of hiding an open secret. He wrote that the fact that:

The Jupiters (IRBMs) played a central role in the crisis is a fact available to any college freshman...Yet from the perspective of Pentagon officials who review documents for release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),...that cannot be disclosed even today (para. 1).

The policymakers' intentions behind the secrecy are not always the same. Sometimes they even deliberately leak the information through the media as an effective strategy amongst officials "in the struggle for political advantage" (Rittberger & Goetz, 2018, p. 839).

2.5 *International Negotiations and the Media*

Negotiation is broadly defined as "any interaction among representatives of two or more countries in search of agreement." (Davison, 1974, p. 174). International multilateral negotiations have been considered through the regulatory domain's perspective to "harmonize legislation and/or create rules that can be applied by and to states." However, the outcome solutions are usually shaped by Western powers (Downie, 2017, p. 335). International negotiations are not a new phenomenon. Negotiation has been a "tool in the management of international relations" throughout the history of the international system (Winham, 1980, p. 1). Almost 100 years ago, the Great War victors negotiated the new world map, drawing in or removing countries from the map, and then replicating this in the real world. However, international-multilateral negotiations have thrived since the 1980s, mostly linked to regulatory fields to "harmonise legislation and/or to create rules

that can be applied by and to states.” (Downie, 2017, p. 323). Over time, communications and the media have affected international negotiations (Archetti, 2012).

Covered by the international media and broadcast to the public, diplomacy faces new rules and managing techniques that influence all players and interests, from the public to politicians to journalists (O’Heffernan, 1993; Hindell, 1995; Taylor, 1997; Archetti, 2012; Adesina, 2017). Gilboa (2000) introduces three diplomatic negotiation models based on media engagement: secret, closed-door, and open. The secret level does not include the media and the public at all, so they do not know anything about the events. Closed-door diplomacy partially includes the public and media; in open diplomacy, negotiations are much more accessible to the public and media coverage. Any international negotiation has three levels of communication: between diplomats, diplomats and their states’ officials, and between governments and the states’ populations (Davison, 1974, p. 179). These communication levels can be open to the media, entirely exclude the media, or only partially engage the media.

The media are not present in every type of negotiation. However, media coverage and framing are extremely influential in representing the “reality” of negotiations when they are involved. Diplomats who try to estimate public reactions to domestic politics in advance and to stay informed find mass media and communications a handy instrument (Davison, 1974; Grant, 2004). Media coverage not only affects the public view but also can directly influence negotiators’ state of psychology. It may give “courage” to politicians to deal with the issues or make them obsessed, depressed, or agitated (Davison, 1974, pp. 183-187). While the conventional wisdom in the past was to separate the people from the problem during the negotiations, studies show that “effective negotiators or mediators” should take into account “the emotional tenor of themselves as well as that of all of the parties.” (Kelly & Kaminskienè, 2016, p. 55). Davison (1974) quotes a diplomat after finishing a closed-door meeting: “What could I do? The press was sitting outside the door when we came out. If I did not say anything, the journalists would start to speculate” (p. 178). Diplomats who prefer secrecy consider at least three variables significantly affecting media engagement in international negotiations. Studying these variables helps us understand why the media are not present at different levels of negotiations.

Purpose: The more significant the negotiation and urgency to produce a result, the higher the motivation for secrecy. *Legitimacy:* The more the connections between the

sides are forbidden, the higher the intention for confidentiality. *Controllability*: The fewer players and politicians engaged, the less chance there is to leak the information to the public (especially through the mass media). The media influence all of these factors (Gilboa, 2000, pp. 548-549). Agreements will be worthless if the negotiators cannot ratify them in their countries' parliament or sell them to the public, primarily through the media. When the results of negotiations are unfavorable or the talks fail, the public will likely consider secrecy a particular reason (Gilboa, 2000, p. 551). While the media's presence and reporting of the negotiation process are vital to understanding negotiations and the media's role in them, the current study focuses on news framing and mainly emphasizes the news stories already reported.

States, including democratic states, do not only consider selling the issues to their public. They also imply soft power by selling the negotiations to the public on the other side, and the international media are a suitable tool. Despite officials' vulnerabilities, particularly in democratic countries, they are not underdogs in all media coverage of negotiations, even when it seems that the media has "leaked" some confidential information. In fact, leaks can be used as "policy tools" and "trial balloons" (Reich & Barnoy, 2016, p. 3). Lukov (1985) notices the constant irresistible temptation for some negotiators to win the public over to "our side" by "deliberately leaking information" during the negotiation process. Leaks are most of the time "targeted." Leaks can spoil other governments' efforts to positively frame the agreements, ratifying and selling them to the public in their domestic political arena (Castle & Pelc, 2019, p. 1150). Quandt (1975) explains how Kissinger was deeply concerned about the negotiations between Israel and Egypt because "both parties had been guilty in the past of leaking information to suit their purpose" (p. 41). The media do more open favors for politicians, and help to coordinate the work of representatives. Politicians usually refer to specific media, basically the government's mouthpiece or those close to the negotiators (Herman, 1983).

Negotiations in open diplomacy are accessible to the media and the public. Direct and comprehensive media coverage usually leads to press conferences, interviews, and briefings by negotiators, and media commentators' views on them. Diplomats follow the international press closely, and officials from the different camps are usually forced to react to the media reports (McCloskey, 1990). During the negotiations, the players try to self-publicize through the international media. Grant (2004) points out that one can see

“the fight to be heard and to influence” in the “attention given to public diplomacy by many foreign ministers” (p. 25). Even relatively isolated Iran tries to do some “charm-offensive” work. For instance, by publishing an article in *The New York Times*, foreign minister Zarif tried to explain Iran’s nuclear negotiation position. The title was straightforward: *A Message from Iran* (Zarif, 2015). In another case, Minister Zarif’s gesture went viral when he talked to reporters from the balcony of the *Palais Coburg* Hotel, where the Iran nuclear talks meetings were being held in Vienna (Hafezi & Mohammed, 2015; Borger, 2015).

Scholars consider the mass media not as the initiator but as an influential factor in bringing external issues to the negotiation table. According to Zartman (2003), external factors influence the negotiation processes, out of the negotiators’ control. A shock can potentially transform the international negotiation contexts. Mass media can precisely capture and dramatize these shocks (for instance, information leaks); after all, the public is under the control of the media narrative. Such public reactions can force the policymakers to react to the public debate shifts, trying to satisfy the public, meaning likely shifts in states’ behaviors during international multilateral negotiations (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Castle & Pelc, 2019). The public and officials can be engaged in the negotiated issue alongside the media, even after agreements have been made.

Zartman and Berman (1982) identify three principal phases in the negotiation process: every party moves through these phases from a diagnostic phase to a formula phase and, finally, to a details phase. In the last step, parties try to manage details and end the negotiations within a time frame. Scholars also suggest that the negotiation process does not come to an end after the details phase. Instead, they argue that the “post-agreement” or “compliance bargaining” phase can depict the negotiations’ post-agreement era regarding parties’ obligations and their ways of dealing with the agreements (Zartman, 2003; Kasten et al., 2013). Most of the time, negotiated issues are related to other issues, and parties may have different approaches. This interference can happen even after the signing of the agreements. For example, in Iran’s nuclear case, the Trump administration insisted on bringing issues like Iran’s ballistic missile developments to the negotiation table, even after the conclusion of the agreement (Landler, 2018).

Media's influence continues after agreements are sealed, especially if one or more players change their positions dramatically. In both examples of the current study, post-agreement turned out to be contrary to the initial agreements. However, during long-term, protracted negotiations, changing player positions are not unusual. After all, pushing some actors for a deal engages other actors against it (Spector, 2003; Castle & Pelc, 2019). For instance, during the years of climate change negotiation, the US and the EU changed their positions and, consequently, ended up signing agreements. While the US and the EU first agreed to the Berlin Mandate (and not to use the emissions trading market) later in 1997, both parties agreed on the Kyoto Protocol, which favored the emission trading market, and the market-based solution mechanism (Downie, 2017).

2.5.1 How the Media Frame Negotiations

Sheafer and Dvir-Gvirsman (2010) identify two indicators the public uses to search for information related to ongoing negotiations: real-world indicators and media framing (p. 206). Although the media usually do not initiate political events like international negotiations, scholars argue that they play the part of both actors and mediators (Wolfsfeld & Sheafer, 2006). They can play an essential role during political negotiations by influencing the public, policymakers, and negotiators (Wolfsfeld, 2004; Entman, 2004; Rahat & Sheafer, 2007). The media influence as an "indicator" of the information would be more likely to be noticed without public policies. Without hard news during closed-door diplomacy, the public's reaction and understanding would be based mainly on trusting the leaders and policymakers. Closed-door negotiation coverage is challenging work for the media. Without access to hard news, the media mostly use "background news" and some speculations like, using phrases like "they were close on some of the issues, but they still do not have a deal" (Gilboa, 2000, p. 556). This situation will provide even more fertile soil for media framing.

While high trust in the players can decrease public worries about the process and outcome of the negotiations, a low level of trust can instead create public criticism and dissatisfaction (Gilboa, 2000, p. 557). Trusting the players may lead to better acceptance of policies, especially policy involving fear and hate. Information and images will likely

increase public support for a hawkish foreign policy. Scholars have suggested that people exposed to intimidating information and images are more likely to support aggressive foreign policies (Shamir & Shamir, 2000; Huddy et al., 2003; Berrebi & Klor, 2006). People are especially vulnerable to foreign reporting when there are few sources on the ground in other countries, making the audiences reliant on the international mass media (Wolfe, 2008).

The media can indicate where and when the situation adds up to a crisis, followed by the public's expectation of action. Former Secretary of State James Baker explains TV's (as the dominant mass media) role in defining crises and the reaction to them:

All too often, television is what determines what a crisis is. Television concluded the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The fighting in the Balkans was a crisis...And so the Clinton administration (was left) to find a way to do something. (Yet) they did not do that in Rwanda where the excesses were every bit as bad, if not worse" (Livingston, 1997, p. 6).

Some scholars further explain how the media and political rhetoric are transformed by the media, "creating" the enemy. Herbert Marcuse (1969) explains that: "this creation is not the Enemy as he really is but rather as he must be in order to perform his function for the Establishment" (pp. 52-53). Thanks to the "linguistic defamation" which frames the enemy: "the end now does justify the means" against the enemy, and "actions cease to be crimes if they serve to preserve and extend the Free World." This "a priori linguistic defamation" first hits the enemy abroad (p. 52). By the same token, policymakers and the media can frame a policy toward other players in negotiations, and later refer to the public "rights" and decisions, demanding action. In 2003, the US administration rejected Iraq's desperate calls for negotiations and compromise. Meanwhile, 72 percent of Americans thought attacking Iraq was a good decision, while the publication of fabricated and distorted information about Iraq's possession of WMDs later became a well-known textbook example (Borger et al., 2003; Rosenstiel, 2008).

States are aware of the increasing influence of civil society (Putnam, 1988). Promoting the role of participatory democracy considering and then ratifying foreign policy through a referendum would be essential in negotiations. The state may use this issue as bargaining power by decreasing the "win-set." In some views, the media language is "indexed to the positions articulated in elite debate" (Hayes & Guardino, 2010, p. 60). Here, the media can play an essential role by influencing (and framing) public opinion

into favoring particular policies. The “substantive framing” media evaluate the reasoning and rationality behind government policies (Robinson, 2012). This constant evaluation would be understood better in looking at extended negotiations, when a process and its players would be assessed. Evaluating issues through framing would inevitably include positive and negative frames.

Apart from the general effect of framing, people’s response to negative media framing is more robust than to positive media framing (Levin et al., 1998). This issue may hurt negotiations. As both independent actors and state agents, the media could spoil negotiations’ outcomes through their effects on public opinion. Media framing can influence people’s views about the negotiations. Studies show that affective and cognitive aspects play a role when the audience processes the information (Marcus et al., 2008; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). By the same token, emotions influence the cognitive processing of information. As mentioned, negative information mainly affects the audience (Marcus et al., 2008). Therefore, players should be more worried about negative framing. However, why is negative framing stronger than positive framing?

The primary explanation for this negativity bias in individuals (and consequently, the public) is that losses are more significant than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Individuals are sensitive to situations’ positive or negative directions, rather than the issue itself (Boettcher, 2004). This effect can be traced to media framing (Geva et al., 1996; Mintz & Geva, 1997). However, the phenomenon is not, particularly in media framing studies. Disciplines like political communication and psychology have largely used this idea (Maoz, 2006; Althaus & Kim, 2006; Sheaffer, 2007; Marcus et al., 2008). This situation seems related to the prospect theory, which argues that people are more sensitive to their losses than their gains (Levy, 2003, p. 223). Graber (2007) suggests that the media’s negativity bias may stimulate cognitive analysis as a precondition for information analysis. The effect of negative media framing on actors in negotiations and public opinion is a sensitive issue viewed by studying the media representation of international negotiations. Measuring positive, negative, and neutral tones of the news related to negotiations have been operationalized before (Soroka, 2006; Althaus & Kim, 2006). However, they have their limitations. For instance, they code news with mixed positive and negative tones as neutral (Sheaffer & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2010), which seems to mainly

deal with the operationalization aspect rather than understanding the media frames themselves.

The media can frame the negotiation procedure either as backward or forward. While the backward emphasizes the reconstruction of past injustices, the forward-looking frame tries to establish a peaceful future. Zartman and Kremenjuk (2005) argue that negotiations' political rhetoric can be understood by studying backward or forward statements (p. 124). Backward statements emphasize the symptoms of conflict and pass the responsibility to another party which is supposed to show more concessions. On the other hand, the backward statements represent and solidify competitiveness and disruptions during the negotiation processes (Donohue & Druckman, 2009).

In contrast, forward-looking statements try to identify the underlying causes of conflicts rather than their symptoms and establish a practical future framework. Instead of buck-passing, mutual responsibilities, similarities, and "an awareness of the underlying reasons for the conflict" distinguish the forward-looking statements (Donohue & Druckman, 2009, p. 124). Donohue & Druckman (2009) explain backward and forward statements in the context of peace negotiations. However, the same mechanism can be imagined in extensive negotiations when relative or joint gains are reached. Scholars characterize distribution bargaining and problem-solving approaches (Neale & Bazerman, 1992; Hopemann, 1995) as connected to backward forward-looking framing, which are common models to explain negotiation processes.

Framing is more robust on future expectations than current reactions (Sheafer & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2010). When individuals assess future expectations, they rely on media information more than in cases when they try to find out what is happening at the current time (Shamir, 1995; Shamir & Shamir, 2000; Nerlich & Halliday, 2007). This issue emphasizes the role of the media and their framing of the events, specifically related to long-term international negotiations, when various public views in different countries can be influenced and consequently influence the whole negotiations process and the outcomes. Noticeably, studies show that the media from multiple countries worldwide are commonly orientated to the future, particularly in their headlines (Jaworski et al., 2003).

There are not only governments and official negotiators who can influence negotiations through manipulations in communications. Particularly during the

complicated long-lasting international negotiations, non-governmental actors who network well can affect state actions and consequently international negotiations through “making strategic choices at the domestic, international or transnational level to mobilize other actors, establish coalitions, manipulate government leaders’ preferences and, in turn, shape international negotiation outcomes” (Downie, 2017, p. 332). The mass media are a valuable tool for this effective management. For instance, Price (1998) explains how non-governmental groups influenced international negotiations for the banning of anti-personnel mines through different tactics, including mass media propaganda. The following chapter examines the relationship between the media and climate change, hoping to understand better media coverage in presenting the issue.

CHAPTER 3

CLIMATE CHANGE: POLICY AND THE MEDIA

3.1 *The Climate is Changing*

Scientists have pieced together a record of the Earth's climate for hundreds of thousands of years. The Earth's climate record shows that global climate patterns vary naturally over various time scales. However, natural causes do not explain most of the temperature increase in recent history, particularly since the mid-20th century. Instead, human activities have been overwhelmingly causing global warming, mainly by the emission of greenhouse gases, including methane, nitrous oxide, and particularly carbon dioxide (CO₂) (Philander, 2012; Houghton et al., 2013). The current scientific understanding is that climate change (now widely dubbed as climate emergency) has already undermined many species' life support systems and now directly threatens humans. While the world countries are struggling to reach a comprise and design a "name-and-shame" system of global peer pressure to handle climate change (Davenport, 2015), the Great Barrier Reef has lost half of its corals since 1995, and Homo Technologicus' activities have wiped out nearly 70 percent of the world wildlife populations since 1970 (Almond et al., 2020). Nowadays, climate change is one of the most concerning human issues. However, even among state leaders, 'shameless people' still use distorted scientific facts or merely false claims to persuade and manipulate their followers about the urgency of climate change (Moser, 2010).

The climate change problem was recognized in the 19th century, but it was only in 1979 that it became a uniformly global issue. In 1979, the first World Climate Conference took place. Then, after a series of scientific and political conferences, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set up in 1988 by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (Gupta, 2010, p. 3). Following the IPCC and the second World Climate Conference calling for a global treaty on climate change, United Nations General Assembly negotiations on a framework convention started in 1990.

3.2 *The Science, Actors, and Coalitions*

Scientists understood the fundamental physics of greenhouse warming more than a century ago (Zillman, 2009). In 1896, Svante Arrhe published his first estimate of a human-made global temperature change in a Swedish journal, reiterating that greenhouse gas concentrations could extend sufficiently to lead to global warming. (Rodhe et al., 1997, p. 2). Decades later, during and after the International Geophysical Year in 1959, Arrhe's concerns were amplified through intense research into the Earth's climate system (Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001). The first attempt to coordinate scientific cooperation on the climate change issue came about through the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) (Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001). Initially, the climate-related political emphasis was mainly on local and regional pollution problems. For instance, Luterbacher and Sprinz (2001) notice that the international 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment was primarily focused on local or regional environmental issues such as "a particular river basin, a lake, a confined sea, or coastal area." (p. 14). It was only in 1980 that global environmental issues like climate change "came to the forefront of the international agenda" (Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001, p. 14).

The first IPCC report in 1990 suggested that to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at 1990 levels, human-made global CO₂ emissions needed to be reduced by more than 60% over time. The reduction required to be imposed on other gases, including methane by 15–20%, nitrous oxide and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) between 70 and 85%, and hydro chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) by 40-50% (IPCC, 1990, p. xviii). At the international level, the IPCC report recommended public education and information, technology development and transfer, economic and financial, and legal and institutional mechanisms (IPCC, 1990). In 1995, the IPCC report made its famous statement that "the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate." However, the report reiterated that the ability to quantify the human influence on global climate was "currently limited." (IPCC, 1995, p. 27). The IPCC did not report in a vacuum, and even a few years before the report, scientists discovered that the environmental system was "not highly stable" as had been believed

before, connecting environmental degradation to domestic and international conflicts (Homer-Dixon, 1991).

The ending of the Cold War reduced the importance of traditional international security problems, and brought climate change under the world spotlight. As a result, a general sense of political optimism and expectations grew, in the hope that previous military and arms race resources could be redirected to environmental and global climate issues. Global environmental change and sustainable development were the two main themes of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. Further development of these topics would be seen in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001, pp. 14-15; Gupta, 2010, p. 639).

3.3 Negotiations and Agreements Before Paris

IPCC reports gave comprehensive information to individual countries, and enabled them to adopt a new treaty at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. The United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) treaty was opened for signature along with its sister Rio Conventions, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification. With a near-universal membership (197 Parties), UNFCCC was the parent treaty of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The ultimate aim of all three agreements under the UNFCCC is “to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system” (“About the Secretariat,” 2021). Moreover, the UNFCCC saw the implementations “within a timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally” (Mintzer & Leonard, 1994, p. 188). Nevertheless, this wording was flexible enough to give all parties “considerable room to maneuver” and specifically coincide with US policies (Mintzer & Leonard, 1994).

The Parties Conference (COP) is the Convention's supreme decision-making body, representing all UNFCCC member states. The annual COP meetings were devised to “adopt and take decisions necessary” to promote the Convention’s effective implementation (“Conference of the Parties,” n.d.). Despite some positive results, international climate change negotiations and decision-making have proven difficult. UNFCCC's time-consuming negotiations are confronted with countries’ refusal to accept

binding agreements, and its decision-making is under pressure from countries' conflicting interests and their 'climate change bandwagoning' in a time of increasingly fragmented international relations (Zelli & Asselt, 2013). As a result, non-state institutions and UN agencies like the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) have played "increasingly marginal" roles in the IPCC's scheme of things. Instead, the US influenced the IPCC through its scientists and bureaucrats (Agrawala, 1998, p. 623). Moreover, the IPCC process was under pressure from many oil-exporting countries and the US fossil fuel lobby (Agrawala, 1998; Depledge, 2008). Neorealism also suggests that as the relative gains theory explains, states are less likely to cooperate over the climate change issue than over other international issues like international trade (Grundig, 2006).

On June 30, 1988, more than 300 scientists and policy-makers gathered at the Toronto Conference, calling on the United Nations, national governments, and non-governmental players "to take specific actions to reduce the impending crisis caused by the pollution of the atmosphere" (Zillman, 2009, p. 145). Considering a market-friendly middle ground, at the 1995 Berlin COP1, a market mechanism (called 'activities implemented jointly' or AIJ) was initiated, to direct developed country investors to invest in emission reduction projects in other countries (United Nations, 1995). However, by 1996, it had become clear that separating economic growth and climate action would not be easy, and the post-Cold-War optimism turned into pessimism. Against this pessimism, there was the hope that an agreement at COP3 in Kyoto would be a clear step in the right direction. The protocol called for developed countries to reduce their use of six GHGs (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and three new gases, HFC, SF₆, and PFCs) by 5.2% by 2008–2012.

The Kyoto Protocol was adopted on December 11, 1997, but actually came into force in 2005, after a complex ratification process. It only requires industrialized countries to reduce their GHGs under Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) programs (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2008). The protocol allows developing countries to reduce their GHG emissions voluntarily. In contrast, during the first commitment period (2008-2012), 37 industrialized countries and economies in transition, and the European Community committed to reducing GHG emissions by an average of five percent against 1990 levels (Bravo et al., 2017, p. 153). The parties committed to reducing GHG emissions to at least 18 percent below 1990 levels in the

eight years from 2013 to 2020. Under the initiative Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), developed countries could fund projects in developing countries, leading to “real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change” (Kyoto Protocol 1997, Article 12 (5)(b)), and the emissions reductions accruing from these projects would contribute to the “developed countries’ abatement targets” (Wiegandt, 2001, p. 138; Shishlov et al., 2016). Internal bargaining among countries led to different targets: the EU-15 adopted a -8% target, the United States a -7% target, and Canada, Japan, Poland, and Hungary a 6% target, whereas Norway, Australia, and Iceland negotiated for $+1$, $+8$, and $+10\%$ respectively (Gupta, 2010, p. 644).

The Kyoto Protocol has been praised as a significant achievement in reducing GHGs through a binding mechanism. However, one of its most significant setbacks was only including developed countries, and different countries setting their own targets thanks to internal bargaining. Critics notice that developing countries’ definitions and emission levels have changed since the Kyoto Agreement. However, countries like Qatar and South Korea were still not included as developed countries, and China became the biggest emitter, overtaking the US emission total in 2006, and was still off the hook of obligatory emission cuts (Shishlov et al., 2016; Bodansky, 2016a; Hilton & Kerr, 2017). Furthermore, the protocol set its targets too low. For instance, it excluded bunker fuels (fuel oils used on ships) and allowed offsetting reduction by the purchase of emission credits from other countries (Gupta, 2010).

Critics also notice that the protocol “focused too much on the goodwill and willingness of the market” to solve the problem (Gupta, 2010, p. 645). The withdrawal of some key industrialized countries from the Kyoto Agreement (let alone the US, which did not even join the agreement in the first place) further damaged its usefulness. The efforts to reengage the US into the Kyoto Protocol (at that time, the biggest GHG emitter) faced setbacks when, in 2011, Canada withdrew from the protocol, and then Russia, Japan, and New Zealand decided to end their participation beyond the end of the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (Christoff, 2016, p. 768; Falkner, 2016). On December 8, 2012, the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was adopted for a second commitment period, starting in 2013 and lasting until 2020, but it was never implemented.

Despite the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and instruments such as the Clean Development Mechanism, the main production of GHGs rose steadily. By the end of the first Kyoto

Protocol commitment period, not many domestic emissions-cut policies were reported by countries (Falkner, 2016, p. 1107; Shishlov et al., 2016). It appeared that implementing a binding agreement was not an easy task. At the follow-up conference in Buenos Aires, little progress was made on some controversial issues raised by the Kyoto Protocol (Wiegandt, 2001). While developing countries tended to keep to the Kyoto system, others with Kyoto emission targets were reluctant, especially when the US and China were not involved in the commitments. Countries pursued two parallel tracks in the following years. One was to seek a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, and the other to promote ‘long-term cooperative action’ under the UNFCCC. Both tracks were concluded at the 2009 COP 15 in Copenhagen (Bodansky, 2016a, p. 292).

Following the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, the multilateral climate regime was labeled ‘gridlocked.’ A 2009 climate change summit in Copenhagen had collapsed in “acrimonious failure” after the countries failed to agree on a deal (Gupta, 2010; Davenport, 2015; Falkner, 2016). Despite the participation of representatives from the broad groups of states, countries simply persisted in their positions ‘meeting after meeting.’ The result was one hundred fifty pages of heavily bracketed text, making any agreement impossible (Bodansky, 2010, p. 5). The accord was political rather than legal, and criticized by some as “inadequate or worse” (Bodansky, 2010, p. 10; Bodansky, 2016a). Dovie and Lwasa (2017) notice that instead of multilateralism, minilateralism prevailed in Copenhagen, which means “negotiation involving few blocks based on their power and influence” (p. 2). The accord could not specify any global mitigation targets and goals, although it did mention 1.5 °C as an “aspirational limit.” (Christoff, 2016, p. 767). Unable to produce a legally binding agreement with quantitative emission reduction targets for GHG emissions, states adopted weak voluntary pledges instead (Bäckstrand & Kuyper, 2017, p. 764).

Besides the Copenhagen Summit’s failure to reach an agreement, COP15 was plagued with other issues that breached the “confidence in IPCC science” (Gupta, 2010). Just prior to and post-Copenhagen, IPCC’s scientific credentials came under fire due to a so-called ‘climate gate.’ In November 2009, several email messages and electronic documents were leaked from scientists at the University of East Anglia (UK) 's Climatic Research Unit. Perhaps the most controversial email was written by the director of the center, Phil Jones, who was in charge of crucial sets of data, used by the IPCC (Monbiot, 2010) to draw up its reports: “I’ve just completed Mike’s Nature trick of adding in the

real temps to each series for the last 20 years (e.g., from 1981 onwards) and from 1961 for Keith's to hide the decline" (Leon & Erviti, 2011, p. 48). The emails had been hacked, and the information from Professor Jones was found by parliamentary investigations to have been taken out of context. He was completely exonerated. But climate sceptics made the most of the scandal to damage the cause of climate change.

The IPCC's attempts to reestablish its image were unsuccessful. The damage was done, and even led to the question of the "integrity of the scientific work" in some national parliaments (Gupta, 2010, p. 648). Nevertheless, despite the disappointing result of COP15, the Copenhagen Declaration noticed that global warming was increasing faster than currently held beliefs, and "there was not much time left for the world to act." (Dovie & Lwasa, 2017, p. 3).

Copenhagen may not have successfully fought climate change, but climate diplomacy faced a fundamental shift in the Copenhagen Accord, when centralized bargaining was replaced by national plans aligned with varying state interests (Bäckstrand & Kuyper, 2017). Until Copenhagen, the strategy for addressing climate change was a top-down 'targets and timetable' approach, representing the UNFCCC's approach as administered through the Kyoto Protocol. The Copenhagen Accord's gridlock paved the way for a bottom-up 'pledge-and-review' process, in which developed countries submitted their Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, pledging climate mitigation (Bäckstrand & Kuyper, 2017, p. 772). In contrast to the setting of targets through international negotiations like the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Summit's bottom-up architecture allowed Annex I parties (developed countries) to define their targets, base year, and actions, and submit them for compilation by the UNFCCC Secretariat (Bodansky, 2010, p. 7). The Copenhagen Summit was also a breakthrough in developing countries' participation. China, India, Brazil, and other emerging economies offered their national emission limitation pledges for the first time, reorienting the rigid Kyoto regime toward the more comprehensive Paris Accord (Falkner, 2016). The Copenhagen bottom-up approach was reinforced at subsequent UN climate summits in Cancun (2010), Durban (2011), Warsaw (2013), and Lima (2014), becoming the "bedrock" of the Paris Agreement (Bäckstrand & Kuyper, 2017).

Following the Copenhagen Accord, the 2010 Cancun COP16 incorporated the Copenhagen Accord's main elements into the UNFCCC regime, including countries' pledges to reduce emissions. The UN welcomed the result as "the largest collective effort

the world has ever seen to reduce emissions in a mutually accountable way” (UNFCCC, 2011, para. 3). However, the agreement left two main issues unsolved. Cancun's pledges covered only the period through 2020, and did not say anything about the later period. Moreover, the Cancun summit could not decide whether to extend the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012. These issues were resolved at the next COP summit in Durban (Bodansky, 2016a, p. 293). On the Durban platform, the parties agreed that from 2020 onwards, a new international agreement, to be adopted by 2015, should enter into force and be “applicable to all Parties” (Moncel & van Asselt, 2012, p. 165; Christoff, 2016). The Durban platform is seen as “a shift in the context for negotiations”, by supporting rather than impeding an agreement (Christoff, 2016, p. 768).

Some countries, especially developing ones, still favored the Kyoto Protocol regime for the climate, and hoped to extend the Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen. Even in Durban, they agreed to begin the negotiations for Paris under the condition of adopting a second Kyoto commitment period. However, no decision was ever made on the issue, and by the time of the Paris Conference, everyone seemed to have accepted that the future of the climate change regime would be a single agreement covering all parties (Bodansky, 2016a, p. 318).

3.4 The Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement has been hailed as a “landmark” (Davenport, 2015), a “turning point in the battle against climate change” (Simon-Lewis, 2017, para. 4), and “historic.” (UNFCCC, 2015). It involved “virtually every aspect” of states’ domestic policies. However, it sought a magical solution that was “neither too strong (and hence unacceptable to key states) nor too weak (and hence ineffective)” (Bodansky, 2016a, p. 289). To prevent the repetition of the Copenhagen “emotional rollercoaster,” the French presidency sought to keep expectations “comparatively low” (Falkner, 2016, p. 1113). By November 2020, 195 Parties had signed, and 189 had ratified the Paris Agreement (Jordans & Borenstein, 2020), which is binding on all developed and developing countries, unlike the Kyoto Protocol. The agreement resulted from a separate instrument from the Kyoto Protocol and the Doha amendment on the second commitment of the Kyoto Protocol (Dovie & Lwasa, 2017).

The Paris Agreement asks all parties to reduce their GHGs, according to the target level that each country determines. Reaching agreement over mitigation was a crucial question before the Paris accord. While the EU and smaller developing countries wanted a legally binding mitigation agreement, the US and the emerging economies only wanted some rules and non-binding INDCs (Christof, 2016, p. 773). At COP21 in Paris, the parties adopted 2 °C as the upper limit for global temperature increment, while still keeping the desire to limit it to 1.5 °C on the table. However, the agreed 2 °C limit above pre-industrial levels was introduced before COP21, and had entered the world of international politics when adopted by the European Union's Council of Ministers in 1996, the G8 in 2008, and the UN in 2010 (Titley, 2017).

The Paris Agreement recognized that forcing significant powers to cut their emissions was impossible. The issue has been called arguably "one of the biggest barriers to international cooperation" (Falkner, 2016, p. 1108). Furthermore, removing it helped reach an international agreement over climate change (Falkner, 2016). In contrast to Copenhagen's failure in 2009, the Paris negotiations have been described as a significant diplomatic success which "regenerated faith" in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and welcomed in multilateralism (Christoff, 2016, p. 765). COP 21 abandoned UNFCCC's long-term focus on establishing mandatory emissions reductions. Some believe the negotiations were successful because, instead of the "misguided" mandatory approach, countries' domestic politics got attention, and the countries could set their own targets, considering their own abilities and limitations. Internationally, those goals should be scrutinized and compared to others, while increasing global ambitions through the 'naming the shaming' process (Falkner, 2016, p. 1107). Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which was undecided about the future, the Paris Agreement extended its horizons, and signaled the possible global financial and clean energy shift toward zero-carbon energy sources. Therefore, arguably, the Paris Agreement successfully established a long-time framework, enabling plans and the transformation of the climate change narrative from that of an "economic burden" to a "story of opportunity" (Hilton & Kerr, 2017, p. 48).

Some believe the Paris Accord is important because it institutionalized "a new paradigm," leading to a more vigorous fight against climate change. Bodansky (2016a) lists eight achievements of the Paris Accord that support this idea: a) It is legally binding (although it has many non-binding parts), b) it is global and applies to both developed

and non-developed countries, c) it defines the same core obligations for all countries, d) it establishes “a long-term, durable architecture,” unlike the previous attempts in Copenhagen or Kyoto, e) its long-term institutionalized “iterative process” implements five-year periods of emission reduction plans, f) “it sets an expectation of progressively stronger action over time,” g) it establishes an “enhanced transparency and accountability framework” to put peer pressure on countries which violate their NDC targets, and h) it is (nearly) universally accepted (pp. 290-291). Besides the Paris Agreements, the Paris Conference was tremendously “visible” and engaged non-state actors. The conference involved more than 19,000 government participants (including 150 heads of state), more than 6,000 representatives of NGOs and businesses, including many CEOs, and roughly 2,800 members of the press (Bodansky, 2016a, p. 291).

Although the title “Paris Agreement,” rather than “Paris Protocol” or “Paris Implementing Agreement,” does not affect the agreement’s status as a treaty, the choice of “agreement” rather than “protocol” or “implementing agreement” may reflect the reluctance of some states to accept the agreement as a subordinate to the UNFCCC (Bodansky, 2016a, p. 296). As Michael Levi, an expert on energy and climate change policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, notes, “Whether or not this becomes a true turning point for the world, though, depends critically on how seriously countries follow through” (Davenport, 2015. Para. 12). As a result, it is unclear whether the Paris Agreement will be able to reconcile decarbonization and the global economy (Falkner, 2016).

3.5 Some Unpopular Facts in the Paris Agreement

Not everyone was satisfied with the final language of the accord. Developing countries in particular expressed their discontent. Poor countries pushed for a minimum of \$100 billion a year of aid from rich countries, to mitigate and adapt to climate change’s devastating effects on their countries. In the final deal, despite all the efforts of the coalition known as the Least Developed Countries, that money appeared only in a “preamble” and not as a legally binding part of the agreement (Davenport, 2015). Moreover, the much-needed funds were far more than \$100 billion anyway (Calliari et al., 2016, para. 14). Despite all the praise for the Paris Accord, its success still depends heavily on international peer pressure and future governments actions (Davenport, 2015).

Apparently, concern for the Paris Accord implementations proved to be legitimate when the US under Donald Trump simply withdrew from the accord despite all of the opposition from states, international non-state actors, and even some of the US states and cities (Zhang et al., 2017a; Jacobo, 2017; Kontorovich, 2019). There are no legal requirements establishing the means and amount of countries' emission cuts, as parties' NDC achievements are not legally binding (United Nations Paris Agreement, 2015). In fact, almost all the parties had already communicated their NDCs even before the Paris conference started, making the COP21 results "prefabricated." The only thing COP21 to secure was a minimum positive outcome accepting the countries' NDCs (Christoff, 2016, p. 772).

Even the UNFCCC is not over-ambitious about the Paris Accord. Different organizations estimated temperature increases above pre-industrial levels in 2100 values which range from 3.5°C to more optimistic scenarios as low as 2.6/2.7 °C (European Environment Agency, 2016; Calliari et al., 2016; Christoff, 2016). It seems that the only instrument the Paris Accord holds to ensure it meets its objectives is the periodic review of progress, along with the concept of "progression over time" toward the "highest possible ambition" (Calliari et al., 2016, para. 7). This wordiness and the precisely selected ambiguous words show that the parties have been so careful in using language to avoid any strict obligation. Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement requires parties to "pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objective of [their] contributions" (United Nations Paris Agreement, 2015). The first part of the sentence reiterates the obligation in Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC to take corresponding measures to adopt national policies, while the second part of the sentence, after the comma, links these measures to parties' NDCs. The result is what some describe as an "obligation to pursue measures in good faith, in contrast to an obligation to implement" (Bodansky, 2016a, p. 304).

In a famous case of language scrutiny, the United States "worked so hard" in Paris to make a provision read 'shoulds' rather than 'shalls' (Bodansky, 2016b, p. 149). As the final plenary session began, the US discovered that in Article 4 of the penultimate draft agreement, in a phrase about future NDCs, 'should' had been replaced by 'shall.' In the lingo of UN climate agreements, "shall" implies legal obligation, and "should" does not (Restuccia, 2015). This would turn the provision of targets into a legal requirement (Christoff, 2015, p. 783; Bodansky, 2016b), and the Republican (GOP)-led chamber

“would kill it on sight.” (Restuccia, 2015). In the end, after hours of intense talks, the French host changed the word. There is little rationale to oblige states to adopt the Paris Accord, because states adopted it according to their self-interest. The only adaptation commitment in the Paris Accord is “to engage in adaptation planning processes and implementation.” Even this part is modified “as appropriate” (United Nations Paris Agreement, 2015, art. 7.9; Bodansky, 2016a, p. 308). The heavyweight standing of states has constituted an inseparable part of UNFCCC’s platforms. The Copenhagen conference was a turning point that brought NGOs and the private sector to “global climate governance” (Bäckstrand et al., 2017). However, non-state actors faced setbacks to the comprehensiveness of the Paris Agreement. For instance, Lima’s conference failed to reference non-state actors, and nearly all of the references to cities and the private sector “were stripped from the text on the last night of negotiations” (Hale, 2016, p. 16).

During the stages of the Paris Agreement, the French presidency reached out to a “wide range of actors — governments, business leaders, and NGOs” in the preparatory meetings for COP-21 (Falkner, 2016, p. 1114). For a while, it seemed that the Copenhagen starting point bore fruit in the Paris Accord as “one of the four pillars of COP21 (along with the agreement itself, Parties’ intended nationally determined contributions, and finance and technology)” (Asselt, 2016, p. 96). This rhetoric raised some hopes about non-state actors’ roles early in the COP21 process. However, the “by nature conservative” UNFCCC process gave little weight to the non-state actors. Instead, the only mention in the Paris Agreement of non-state actors came out in the preamble, recognizing “the importance of the engagements of . . . various actors . . . in addressing climate change” (Bodansky, 2016a, p. 315).

The heavyweight status of some countries, and their resulting ability to maneuver can be understood through the familiar paradox that remained valid in COP21 and its legal debates: “strong legally binding agreements seem to weaken parties’ ambition” (Christoff, 2016, p. 775). Major emitters committed to nothing more than their own terms, disregarding small, vulnerable developing countries or even future generations in their own countries (Christoff, 2016, p. 782). Although the Paris text was described as ‘global and multiparty,’ it is more sensitive to national and regional circumstances and parties, making the Paris Agreement insufficient to tackle the climate emergency (Dovie & Lwasa, 2017). The serious shortcomings of the Paris Agreement make one doubtful that the Paris Agreement is “the most successful climate change conference ever” (Kinley,

2016, p. 9) or, as one critic said, the “triumph of wishes over facts” (Bodansky, 2016a, p. 316).

3.6 The Media and Climate: How are the Media Important?

Climate change/emergency is one of the most worrying issues of our time. We are surrounded by communicators who try to convince us about the seriousness of the issue, or else manipulate us into believing the baselessness of claims about this new anthropogenic era’s influence on climate change (Moser, 2010, p. 31). The linked-up public interest in a specific topic like climate change can easily extend beyond national borders, and the mass media play a vital role in this process (Nanz & Steffek, 2004). A comprehensive study shows that, on average, climate change coverage accounted for 0.62% of all articles published between 1997 and 2009 in 37 newspapers from 27 countries worldwide (Schäfer et al., 2012, p. 18). The attention to climate change has also grown in all countries’ newspapers, increasingly covering international political events and activities (Schäfer et al., 2012; Wozniak et al., 2015). The coverage’s magnitude and structure are derived from both “synchronous global trends and national particularities” (Wozniak et al., 2015, p. 473).

The substantial increase in public attention to climate change and climate policy has triggered intense debate about the role of the mass media as political communicator and player (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Shehata & Hopmann, 2012). The mass media represent and visualize risks, making “simultaneity, shared involvement and shared suffering,” thereby creating “the relevance for a global public” (Beck, 2010, p. 260). Furthermore, world-wide events and global risks like climate change are highly mediatized, which shows that the “political explosiveness of global risks” represents a considerable point of interest as a function of their “(re-)presentation” in the mass media (Beck, 2010, p. 260). Media representations play a crucial role as the link between “people’s everyday realities and experiences,” showing how these are “discussed at a distance among science, policy, and public actors” (Boykoff, 2013, p. 802). In this regard, the mass media have helped the climate issue penetrate the public discourse a great deal more than only a few years ago (Moser, 2010).

In fact, media outlets try to “shape political discourse” according to their purposes (Habel, 2012, p. 25). Although climate issues are the basis for media reporting, the media

shape the conceptions of the climate change issue as a ‘threat,’ ‘problem,’ or ‘opportunity,’ and so on (Hulme, 2009 as cited in Boykoff, 2013, p. 809). The media’s attempts to shape the audiences’ conceptions remind us that the media and their coverage cannot be independently studied, or separated from the power discourse. Power “is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault, 1976, p. 93). Considering this defused and discursive interpretation of the meaning of power, Boykoff (2013) believes that the mass media play the role of robust and essential “interpreters of climate science and policy information,” giving a voice to climate change:

The cultural politics of climate change lurk in a multitude of spaces (recreational centers, neighborhoods, pubs, workplaces, schools, and town centers)...Mass media link these varied spaces together as powerful and important interpreters of climate science and policy information...Thus, mass media give voice to climate change itself by articulating it via selected “experts,” “claims makers,” or “authorized definers” (p. 801)

Once climate change is interpreted through the media, it can be expanded to cover a variety of concerns. For example, US National Security Strategy has repeatedly grouped climate change with terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, pandemic disease, and economic instability as security threats that require strength at home and international cooperation to tackle them.¹ Moser (2010) suggests that the mass media can frame the climate change issue as an essential threat to national security and a “high-stakes issue”:

Describing climate change as a threat bigger than terrorism, showing side by side images of destruction from the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, and using former US Central Intelligence Agency Director, James Woolsey, as a spokesperson, frames climate change as a violent issue, a threat to national security (p.39).

The power of the media’s interpretations of climate change cannot be totally objective and impartial, but do we need somebody to interpret and frame climate change? Some scholars think we do. These scholars believe that our mental model leads to “persistent errors and biases in complex dynamic systems”, while restricting our “boundaries and focus” to the short term (Sterman, 2011, p. 811). Factors like the “inherent difficulty of understanding climate change, the limitations of personal experience, and inappropriate mental models” are leading to a limitation of people’s understandings of climate change

¹ The reports’ approach to climate change changed under the Trump administration. For instance, compared to the 2015 report, the 2017 report did not mention the words climate change (or even words such as global warming) at all, compared to 14 times in the 2015 report. See the reports here: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>

science and policies (Carmichael & Brulle, 2017, p. 234). These difficulties in understanding climate change issues should first survive the public's 'finite pool of worry.' Weber (2006) suggests that individuals have a limit to the number of issues they can worry about, and increasing concern over issues like economics or terrorism, and so on, decreases the amount of attention which can be paid to other issues like climate change.

Preoccupied with the more immediate problems, nations generally do not pay enough attention to climate change, and cannot mobilize and pursue the needed political will to reduce GHG emissions. Their various orientations have "balkanized" the global climate change discourse, and drained energy from global climate negotiations (Broadbent et al., 2016). Considering this effect, the media can play an important agenda-setting and framing role, particularly in regard to climate change, which most people only learn about through media reporting. This dynamic likely influences public opinion "when the quantity and quality of media coverage changes" (Leiserowitz et al., 2013, p. 830). In fact, media coverage of climate change directly affects public concern. More media coverage of climate change means higher public concern about the issue (Brulle et al., 2012; Carmichael & Brulle, 2017). Using data from 74 separate surveys between January 2002 and December 2013, Carmichael & Brulle (2017) suggest that media coverage influences the legitimacy and salience of climate change in the public eye. They find that media coverage is a strong positive predictor of public concern about climate change and, for instance, the magnitude of the influence of media coverage (largely driven by political cues) was over six times greater than that of extreme weather (Carmichael & Brulle, 2017, p. 245).

Scholars believe that mass communications' coverage of climate change should pursue at least three goals: informing and educating individuals about climate change, achieving some type and level of social engagement and action, and, even more profoundly, bringing about changes in social norms and cultural values (Moser, 2010, p. 38). Regardless of their intentions, the media have some valuable tools they can use to pursue their aims. For example, frames can be triggered by "words, imagery, symbols, and non-verbal cues such as messengers, music, tone of voice, and gestures" (Moser, 2010, p. 39). Nevertheless, frames are unavoidable communication elements that help people understand the world.

Climate change as a “long-term, multi-faceted, and largely unobtrusive” issue is a challenging case for the news media that usually reduce the world’s complexity to a minimum, by telling engaging stories to a broad public (Wozniak et al., 2015, p. 469). Because most members of the public do not have direct access to the political elite or scientific research, knowledge of climate change has to pass through the media to reach them (Carmichael & Brulle, 2017). Like any other global issue, climate change is communicated through filtering processes at different gatekeeping levels within the flow of international information. The filters influence “the amount of media attention devoted to global warming (agenda building)” and the way that “global warming is framed in the news media (frame building)” (Shehata & Hopmann, 2012, p. 176). The communicator can emphasize relevant climate change considerations through the frames, like environmental, economic, political, and health implications. In Entman’s (1993) prominent definition, framing in this manner will “select some aspects of reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). As a result, frames become potent tools for maneuvering audiences toward particular climate agendas (Bolsen & Shapiro, 2018, p. 149).

Media frames can show us the actions that society and the political system are likely to take on climate change issues. During and after COP15, developing countries realized they needed to be more involved in the future global climate regime. Thus, they started to organize debates in their countries, and their media made the climate change risk visible (Broadbent et al., 2016). Organizing debates and setting agendas can help politicians get the needed public support. After analyzing newspapers from 17 countries from various continents with different development levels, Broadbent et al. (2016) suggest that countries are more likely to reduce emissions when “their newspaper frames accept IPCC-type science, orient to the global level of climate politics and ecological risks, and support mitigation policies” (p. 11). However, not every framing attempt gains public support for climate policies and actions. While framing in more international, cosmopolitan, and pro-climate science shows the existence of the positive cultural build-up towards ecological sustainability, inward framing of climate change focuses on national interests and industrial gains. It gives skeptics visibility and raises concrete cultural barriers against climate action (Broadbent et al., 2016, p. 13).

Hart (2011) has demonstrated that news media audiences exposed to a thematic frame support climate policy more than those exposed to an episodic frame. Despite the stronger impact of thematic frames, the media generally prefer episodic frames because of habitual, bureaucratic, and economic issues. Even the approach of the more prestigious press toward climate change is episodic and event-driven (Hart, 2011), and is likely to remain episodic (Leiserowitz et al., 2013). This way of reporting climate change and particularly coverage of climate change victims would be directly connected to the public discourse and people's support for the government's climate policies. However, focusing on episodic frames has its own problems. Analyzing four daily tabloid newspapers in the UK, Boykoff (2008a) shows that news articles on climate change were "predominantly framed through weather events, charismatic megafauna and the movements of political actors and rhetoric." At the same time, the same media paid little attention to climate justice and risk (p. 549). Focusing only on news values and narrowed-down climate-related issues makes framing divisive and unlikely to lead to positive climate actions. There is little media attention to the causes of climate change, and climate science is related to consequences and policies. Analyzing the Dutch print media, Ganzevles (2010) shows that only 7% of news reporting was about climate science compared to the consequences of climate change (33%) and possible solutions (20%). Policies implemented constituted 22% in Ganzevles's study, while they are nearly divided into half by the presence of skeptic and alarmist views. The event, conflict, and drama-oriented episodic framing can be traced vividly during the reporting of scandals. The Paris climate change summit and agreement analyzed here could be seen as newsworthy: influential people and countries play their part in a significant environmental field, making the relevant outcomes and effects on audiences' lives (Gans, 1980; Harcup & O'Neill, 2001).

Various events grab the media's attention relating to climate change. In October 2006 (shortly before November's COP 12 in Nairobi), former Vice-President Al Gore's documentary *An Inconvenient Truth* generated significant media attention. Possible climate scandals like the so-called Climate Gate or Himalaya Gate² also got excessive amounts of attention from the mass media (Ganzevles, 2010, p. 64). The episodic media

² In 2010, the IPCC admitted that a claim made in its 2007 report - that Himalayan glaciers could melt away by 2035 - was unfounded. See: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/jan/20/ipcc-himalayan-glaciers-mistake>

framing explains why there are attention cycles and greater attention close to the IPCC summit's major events. Events like the "disappointing" 2009 Copenhagen Summit provide good opportunities for both the media and the "denial machine" to pursue their agendas (Grundmann & Scott, 2014). Media attention and coverage swiftly shifted toward "climate gate" and how it would damage the COP negotiations. "Climate gate" continued to supply "news hooks" for ongoing climate change media coverage, even after the exoneration of the scientists involved (Boykoff, 2013, p. 798). In fact, as Collins and Nerlich (2016) notice, after "Climate Gate" and the Copenhagen Summit, uncertainty and doubt about climate science, for a while became "a dominant discussion point in climate change debates" (p. 4). The number of skeptical articles was still high, even in the context of the upcoming Cancun meeting (Wolling & Arlt, 2017).

The so-called "climate gate" was just the latest part of the continuous decades-long campaign to convince the people that there is no such thing as anthropogenic climate change (Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Leiserowitz et al., 2013). Skeptics used various mass media to prove that climate change was a hoax, while even the prestigious media let down the science (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). In July 2010, it was revealed that IPCC chair Rajendra Pachauri circulated an email to the UN IPCC Fifth Assessment Report authors, reiterating that "my sincere advice would be that you keep a distance from the media," and included documents produced by the group "Resource Media" which provided IPCC with "tips for responding to the media" (Boykoff, 2013, pp. 799-800).

Scholars suggest that scandals like "climate gate" have a "significant impact" on public opinion, negatively influencing people's views on climate science and scientists (Leiserowitz et al., 2013). National surveys in 2008 and 2010 showed significant declines in Americans' beliefs in climate change, risk perceptions, and trust in scientists, due to "climate gate" and its media coverage (Leiserowitz et al., 2013). However, the effect was noticeably varied among the audience, and mainly affected those people who were already ideologically skeptical of climate change, and had a "strong individualistic worldview or politically conservative ideology" (Leiserowitz et al., 2013, p. 818). Research into selective exposure and cognitive dissonance suggests that people are more inclined to accept information that validates their previously held views (Donsbach, 1991; Claussen, 2004; Metzger et al., 2020).

Feldman et al.'s (2017) content analysis of a sample of 642 articles appearing in *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal* (WSJ), *The Washington Post*, and *USA Today*

on climate change between 2006 and 2011 reveal that leading US newspapers discuss climate change “in ways that have the potential to leave readers feeling unconcerned about climate change, disempowered, or both” (p. 19). The media have tended to provide information about climate change’s impacts without information about how to reduce those impacts. Even so, less than half of the coverage discussed the impacts of climate change, and an even smaller percentage represented climate change as an immediate threat to the public (Feldman et al., 2017, p. 20). Even when audiences are informed of actions that can be taken to address climate change, the media will remove the “context to appreciate why those actions are needed” (Feldman et al., 2017, p. 20).

Ambitious climate policies and agreements are bound up with the citizens’ understanding of climate change science and its implications. This understanding and debate about climate change is “as much a cultural debate as it is a scientific debate” (Hoffman, 2011, p. 20). There is strong support for the argument that “values shape people’s beliefs about the fundamentals of global warming” (Bolsen et al., 2015, p. 286). Even more alarmingly, as people become more knowledgeable or scientifically literate, their tendency to “pursue a directional goal rather than an accuracy goal” on this issue becomes higher (Bolsen et al., 2015, p. 286; Bolsen & Shapiro, 2018, p. 155; Kahan et al., 2011). Having confirmation bias, audiences seek specific information or other people with similar views on climate change compatible with them (Bolsen & Shapiro, 2018, p. 155).

Recognizing that “framing is not an elixir” is crucial, and many attempts at framing would fail to produce the expected learning outcome (Druckman & Lupia, 2017, p. 7). The media framing can be a double-edged sword as the “skillful use of responsibility, economic conservatism, uncertainty, and related frames” enabled climate contrarians (particularly in the US) to advocate no action and create doubt about the importance and urgency of the issue (Moser, 2010, p. 39). Even worse, as Hart & Nisbet (2012) show, a ‘boomerang effect’ may cause a backlash and undesirable results. For instance, Schultz et al. (2007) find that asking for more energy efficiency from households that were low in their base rates of energy consumption led to a “destructive boomerang effect” and actually increased energy consumption among them (p. 432).

The media do not act in isolation. A broad range of actors within the system are involved in selecting, reinterpreting, and amplifying scientific, economic, and political issues. Actors like “scientists and scientific institutions, special interest groups, the

private sector, government officials, reporters, the mass media, and the public” all play critical roles in both amplifying and decreasing trust or uncertainty about climate change (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; Good, 2008; Leiserowitz et al., 2013, pp. 820-821). Climate change concerns require political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups in order to become influential, and the media constitute a perfect tool to link them to the public and to public opinion (Carmichael & Brulle, 2017). Scholars believe that studying public discourse cannot be separated from an assessment of the news media. However, the media are not alone in this matter. Interest groups and politicians, the environmental movement, and advocacy groups all select and transfer the frames through the media to influence public discourse over climate change (Carmichael et al., 2012; Carmichael & Brulle, 2017; Bolsen & Shapiro, 2018). Habel (2012, p. 271) showed that while the media coverage “largely is reactive to the statements of political elites,” the coverage has minimal effect on them. This pattern has been recognized in climate change media coverage (Carmichael & Brulle, 2017).

The media usually significantly rely on authorities’ voices concerning climate change issues in media coverage (Boykoff, 2011). Carmichael and Brulle (2017) point out that while media coverage has a significant influence, it is itself mainly “a function of elite cues and economic factors” (p. 232). Media coverage enables the public to identify political elites through their party and ideological stance, and to assess the trusted elites’ positions (Carmichael & Brulle, 2017). Due to the dependency of the media on government and official sources of information, the emphasis and framing of particular issues like climate change and climate policy usually follow “the extent and range of opinions” of official and elite circles (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; Carmichael & Brulle, 2017, p. 235). Economic factors also have a significant impact on media coverage. It appears that when the economy is growing (GDP is rising and unemployment is low) and the media is less concerned about the poor economic indicators, the focus of media coverage is shifted to other issues, including climate change (Carmichael & Brulle, 2017).

We can pinpoint the discourse shift and the interests behind them, which manipulate the public through the media, particularly in the US, as an excellent example of the relationship between power, the media, and climate change. Different sectors of societies participate in climate discourse, claiming their own approaches, despite advocates’ dominance over skeptical voices in many major countries. Media coverage also shows noticeable differences (Grundmann & Scott, 2014). For instance, comparing the press in

various countries, Grundmann and Scott (2014) notice that the US press give space to climate skeptics nine times more than the German press, and four times more than the UK press. Grundmann (2007) also compares the US and German print media and finds that the IPCC gets far more coverage in the German media, while climate skeptics get almost no coverage in Germany. Compared to other developed and emerging countries, the issue of climate change is strongly disputed in Anglo-Saxon countries (Wolling & Arlt, 2017). In a media analysis of the UK, U.S., France, Brazil, China, and India, Painter and Ashe (2012) find that news coverage of climate change skepticism is “mostly limited” to the USA and the UK (p. 1). These differences between the US and other countries’ media would be noteworthy because the serious media coverage of climate change in the US started in the absence of opponents.

Anthropogenic climate change appeared on the public agenda in the second half of the 1980s, although at first it was mainly focused on scientific findings and synthesis reports (Moser, 2010, p. 32). The mass media first reported climate change news mainly through their ‘balancing’ norms, giving space to the ‘battle’ of climate change proponents and opponents. However, they intended to reflect scientific consensus on climate change (Boykoff, 2007; Moser, 2010). Initially, the climate change issue was identified and communicated through the mass media as a question of science as seen by scientists. As a result, the mass media were incapable of “retail communication,” and lacked “communications expertise among messengers” (Moser, 2010, p. 39). The media coverage, particularly in the US, has changed over time. Its quality peaked in 1988 before its early 1990s decline (Bolsen & Shapiro, 2018, p. 151). In 1988 and 1989, the US media mainly referenced climate advocates. This was primarily due to NASA scientist James Hansen’s famous testimony at the US Congress hearing, saying he was “99% certain that global warming was real” (Grundmann, 2007, p. 419). However, the US media coverage changed to disproportionately covering skeptics later on (Grundmann, 2007).

Maintaining a balance in reporting the climate change debate continued during the late 1990s and early 2000s. By giving time and space to the frame of the uncertainty of climate science, media coverage rendered the minority of climate deniers, skeptics, and contrarians visible and valid. Moreover, the US media showed that its appetite for drama to be much greater than its will to publicize legitimate climate science. Using discursive traction through the mass media, outlier views against climate change have generally influenced cultural politics and gained access to decision-makers access (Boykoff, 2011,

p. 34). By analyzing 15 years' climate change coverage of major US newspapers, Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) showed that most newspapers gave almost the same amount of coverage to both sides of the climate change debate, giving the opposing minorities the same media weight as the mainstream climate science. The result was "a significant divergence of popular discourse from scientific discourse" (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004, p. 125).

The shifting climate discourse was not only the result of journalistic norms and the media's routine news values. During the 1990s, numerous climate change skeptics started challenging climate change evidence. Prominently, a now-defunct organization called the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) was assembled in late 1989 by a consortium of carbon-based industry interests, including ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum (now BP), Texaco, General Motors, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, the Aluminum Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Petroleum Institute and others (Hoggan & Littlemore, 2010; McCright & Dunlap, 2010). For over a decade, ending in 2002, this coalition spent millions of dollars on disinformation and lobbying campaigns, particularly placing the conflict debates over climate change at center stage (Boykoff, 2011, p. 111). Organizations like the GCC publicly questioned the validity of anthropogenic climate change science and the wisdom of climate change policy-making (McCright & Dunlap, 2010). The aim was to "manufacture uncertainty" and convince public officials, specifically, and the public generally, that climate change was not proven, and that mitigating action was unnecessary (Hoggan & Littlemore, 2010, p. 12; Dunlap, 2013).

Dunlap (2013) found that conservative think tanks (CTTs) were publishing an increasing number of books that espoused climate change denial. Most books were linked to a CTT via either author or editor affiliations or publication by a CTT press (Dunlap, 2013, p. 693). The think tanks were also producing large numbers of the above-mentioned books in other countries, notably the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia (Dunlap, 2013). The CTTs are hand in hand with conservative politicians and media. For example, in a strategy memo, Republican consultant Frank Luntz recommended that climate change be framed as a scientifically uncertain issue that unfairly burdens the national interest and economy. The aim was to prevent major climate change proposals, and adaptation of the Kyoto Protocol. The denial machine effectively implied this strategy

and was “incorporated into talking points, speeches, white papers, and advertisements by conservative think tanks and members of Congress” (Bolsen & Shapiro, 2018, p. 151).

Analyzing 14 CTTs and 224 of their produced and/or circulated documents, McCright and Dunlap (2003) showed that the US’s failure to apply a significant climate policy and adopt the Kyoto Protocol was heavily influenced by the successful campaign of the conservative movement in challenging the legitimacy of climate change as a social problem. They used various activities, like flooding the media with “brief press releases, sponsored policy forums, public speeches, and press conferences” (p. 357). In the US, the campaign for the Senate to ratify the Kyoto Protocol boosted media coverage significantly. The coverage more than doubled in newspapers, and exploded tenfold in TV coverage. The media coverage mainly used political conflict frames, and juxtaposed leading Democrats who supported scientific debates with Republican leaders on the skeptic and denier side, using uncertainty frames (Bolsen & Shapiro, 2018, p. 152). Broadbent et al. (2016) showed that media rejection of consensus climate change science was strong in the US, Canada, and the UK (p. 9). Media analysis of the situation in the US reflects the strong inward-looking framing of climate change, privileging national politics and interests over the international ways of framing the issue (Broadbent et al., 2016, p. 10). Generally speaking, media coverage has had a crucial role in negative climate change representation, but partisan media did most of the work here. Full of climate denier individuals, the US conservative media is part of a denial machine that plays a crucial part in the so-called climate change debate in the United States (Dunlap & McCright, 2011; Dunlap, 2013). The denial machine has other components. Dunlap (2013) notices that besides the media, it contains a loose coalition of industries (particularly the fossil fuel industry), conservative politicians, foundations and think tanks, and contrarian scientists (p. 692).

Boykoff (2011) has found that the US and UK media spread far more doubt and denial of climate change than those of other developed countries. However, there is a significant gap between the skeptical news coverage of climate change among the right-wing and left-wing media (Gavin, 2009; Painter, 2011; Painter & Ashe, 2012).

Conservative media outlets have vastly overrepresented the viewpoint of the denial machine and climate skepticism/denial, in the name of balance (Boykoff, 2013). In their analysis of four major US newspapers, Feldman et al. (2017) find that the conservative media presented more negative representation to the audiences regarding climate change

coverage. They employed frames of more negative economic consequences, negative political conflict, and negative response efficacy (i.e., lack of potential or actual success in actions or policies). Habel (2012) found an “echo chamber” among ideological media (p. 260), which helps the conservative media concretize their position as climate change opponents. This approach is part of the conservative media’s daily routine. In September 2020, Rush Limbaugh, one of the most popular conservative radio hosts in America for decades (Pasley, 2020), declared, “man-made global warming is not a scientific certainty. It cannot be proven, nor has it ever been” (Limbaugh, 2020, para. 1). Other conservative media are no different. Fox News and *The Wall Street Journal*, owned by media mogul Rupert Murdoch and News Corp, have become prominent outlets in the denial machine arsenal to create uncertainty (Painter & Ashe, 2012; Dunlap, 2013). In September 2020, Fox News host Tucker Carlson claimed, “in the hands of Democratic politicians, climate change is like systemic racism in the sky. You can’t see it, but rest assured, it’s everywhere, and it’s deadly” (Graziosi, 2020, para. 3).

Homans (2010) shows that people can have a noticeable trust in television on the topic of climate change. For example, in one survey, 66 percent of the respondents said they trust TV weather reporters on climate change issues more than they trust religious leaders, corporations, or Vice-President-turned-climate-activist Al Gore. Meanwhile, as Kris Wilson, an Emory University journalism lecturer and a former TV news director and weatherman, found through his survey, 29 percent of the 121 meteorologists who replied believed that the anthropogenic climate change was not unproven or unlikely, but rather a scam. In comparison, only 24 percent believed in human causes of climate change. In addition, barely half of them had a college degree in meteorology or another atmospheric science, and only 17 percent had received a graduate degree (Homans, 2010).

Hart and Feldman (2014) conducted an in-depth study on the major US TV networks - ABC, CBS, and NBC - between January 1, 2005, and June 30, 2011. They studied “how threat and efficacy information was discussed and how impacts and actions were framed” (p. 341). The results showed that TV news mainly discussed the impacts of climate change and the actions that may be taken independently. The climate change threat focused on the present-day impacts, particularly on the US. Hart and Feldman (2014) also found that the news broadcasts emphasized political conflicts in the implications of climate actions rather than the benefits of such actions (pp. 341-342). Political conflict frames particularly should be seen in the context of the polarized US society. According

to a survey released in April 2016 by Yale and George Mason universities, liberal Democrats ranked climate change the sixth most important issue facing the US out of a list of 23 problems, while liberal and moderate Republicans listed climate change close to the end, at 21st of 23 critical issues. Conservative Republicans ranked it as the very last one (Lehmann, 2016). This means the public is sharply divided in terms of climate change and climate policy and actions, at least in the US. A 2020 Pew study of 30 US news sources showed that Republicans and GOP leaners distrusted most non-conservative outlets while 75% of them trusted conservative outlets like Fox News (Gramlich, 2020). The high rate of trust in media outlets like Fox News which openly deny anthropogenic climate change might explain why conservatives see climate change as unimportant.

Evidence from a contents analysis of climate change coverage on Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC during 2007 and 2008 provides “strong evidence” that cable news use is associated with divergent views on global climate change. Fox News coverage was associated with a decreasing belief in anthropogenic climate change. Conversely, frequent CNN and MSNBC viewing was associated with increasing acceptance of global warming (Feldman et al., 2012). Feldman et al.’s study also showed that Republicans who watched CNN and MSNBC were more worried about climate change than Republicans who routinely watched Fox News (Feldman et al., 2012). The US media coverage was mostly about climate change in general. The current study focuses particularly on news coverage of climate negotiations, aiming to broaden climate change policies and effects.

3.7 Climate Negotiations and News Coverage

Climate negotiations have been increasingly engaged with global power relations. They are essentially “more associated with economy, politics, and nations than with science” (Pan et al., 2019, p. 522). The COP negotiations are inseparable parts of global diplomacy, affecting nation-states as involving primary players and policymakers (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2017). Political actors at the COPs do not discuss climate science and uncertainty; they negotiate “agreements and contracts concerning climate policies” (Wolling & Arlt, 2017, p. 20). Becoming rather “political events,” the COPs gather together “scientists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governmental representatives from all over the world, in particular ministers and even many heads of state and presidents” (Wolling & Arlt, 2017, p. 6). Climate change usually does not fit

with the broadcast news's newsworthiness logic, but international climate events like COP summits help meet the media's demands for news selection. On the occasion of COPs, the political agenda and the media make climate change a relatively hot topic, and an excellent opportunity to examine media coverage of climate change and climate policy-making. Researchers have shown that media attention to climate change is more intense during COP conferences (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007; Boykoff, 2007; Boykoff & Mansfield, 2008; Gordon et al., 2010; Painter, 2011). However, this intensity has its limitations.

Studies suggest that established and emerging powers significantly influence media frames of climate negotiations (Pan et al., 2019). National politics are more potent than international policy-making, even during international negotiations and summits dealing with a global problem like climate change. Brossard, Shanahan, and McComas (2004) compared French and US climate coverage between 1988 and 1997, and suggested that research into media coverage of global environmental issues needs to go beyond the national level and so as to understand how different "news regimes" could affect public opinion, comparisons of the media in different countries and players is essential. Eide and Kunelius (2010) conducted one of few studies about the transnational public sphere by analyzing media coverage of the Bali and Copenhagen climate summits in 18 countries, including some developing countries like Brazil and China. They found that "nationally-based realism" was the dominant discourse on the journalism in media coverage. Eide and Kunelius (2010) believe this effect could be a double-edged sword. While it can bring transnational issues and debates into domestic politics and on a local scale, it can also "misframe" international issues based on national logic, excluding certain players from the debates and processes. Examining Canadian media coverage of the Copenhagen summit, Gunster and Fraser (2011) reiterate that the media represent political players as seekers of the national interest, dismissing international solutions as naïve. Analysis that combines coverage of the Copenhagen and Durban summits shows that 43 percent of people quoted in both *The New York Times* and *USA Today* were US government officials, 19 percent were scientists or other experts, and 17 percent were members of civil society. Only 8 percent of quotes came from political officials outside the USA (Russell, 2013, p. 906).

One central question in studying the framing of climate negotiations is how the media frame climate change and the negotiations. Some scholars like Pandey and Kurian (2017)

have examined policy news frames of climate negotiations, using Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) model, including attribution of responsibility, frames of conflict, human interest, economic consequences, and morality. Their content analysis from the media of the US, UK, China, and India suggests that while the news media studied used "similar frames" in their coverage, their frames "were deployed differently to communicate different messages" (p. 80). Nisbet (2009) categorizes the typology of frames applicable to climate change as social progress, economic development and competitiveness, morality and ethics, scientific and technical uncertainty, Pandora's box/Frankenstein's monster/runaway science, public accountability and governance, middle way/alternative path, and conflict and strategy (p. 18). Others studied specific frames related to climate change. For instance, Foust and Murphy (2009) examined the apocalyptic tragedy frame; Weathers and Kendall (2016) studied the Framing of Climate Change as a Public Health Issue, and economic loss and gain were studied by Manzo and Padfield (2016). Studying the attribution of responsibility (Liang et al., 2014) and ethical framing of climate change (Laksa, 2014) are other examples of implementing a framing analysis approach in order to examine climate negotiations.

Examining Swedish and US newspaper coverage in the context of the Kyoto and Bali climate summits, Shehata and Hopmann (2012) found that the media framed anthropogenic climate change mainly as a social problem, compared to frames like the economic consequences of climate uncertainty. Dirikx and Gelders (2010) studied Dutch and French newspapers between 2001 and 2007 during COP summits. Using Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) model, they found that consequences, responsibility, and conflict ranked in first to third place, respectively. Many researchers focus on the state players during the negotiations, but the essential elements omitted from the media coverage are one of the objectives of some studies. For example, Eide et al. (2010) showed that countries cover civil society actors differently. While Northern European countries paid close attention to these actors, others like El Salvador, Pakistan, and Israel almost ignored them in the context of the Copenhagen Summit. They suggested that countries with reporters on the ground knew of and covered civil society activities.

Despite some studies (including the above-mentioned), research analyzing the media coverage of the political process and negotiations during and in the context of the COP climate conferences "is quite rare" (Wolling & Arlt, 2017). Media coverage of climate conferences has been criticized for being focused on climate science at the expense of

climate politics, and as Gunster and Fraser (2011) notice, “the problem...is too little politics” (p. 497). Even during international summits, the mainstream media do not pay significant attention to the negotiations. For instance, Russell (2013) showed that *USA Today* and *The New York Times* published only 14 and 17 stories, respectively, during the entire Durban summit. Moreover, *USA Today* did not mention the protests inside and outside the summit. Furthermore, *The Times* ignored “the occupation of the corridors of the conference center or the ejection of hundreds of delegates from the summit,” among them Kumi Naidoo, Greenpeace Executive Director, whom “the paper had profiled just days before” (Russell, 2013, p. 912).

There are more shortcomings in studying climate change negotiations. Although the time before, during, and after the events were analyzed by several studies, the different phases were not compared (Wolling & Arlt, 2017, p. 15). Research into the COPs is “dominated by studies that analyze media coverage in Western countries,” particularly the North American and European media (Wolling & Arlt, 2017, p. 20), and most scholars focus on the national media (mainly the quality printed press), rather than international ones (Wolling & Arlt, 2017).

The current study fills the gaps in some of the above-mentioned shortcomings. It tries to compare the international media by considering both developed and developing countries from very different perspectives in their policy-making, and to compare the coverage in different phases before, during, and after the COP21 event. Besides, the study examines the irregularity of the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, and seeks the other players’ reactions to this breach of acceptable behavior from US allies, rivals, and enemies.

CHAPTER 4

COUNTRIES' APPROACHES TOWARD CLIMATE CHANGE

4.1 Iran

Iran was the 15th biggest GHG emitter in the first years after the revolution, but became the 7th in 2018 (11th per capita) (Crippa et al., 2020). This trend is ongoing, and the country's GHG emissions increased by 20 percent between 2015 and 2020 (Ritchie & Roser, 2020). Iran has its own air quality problem inside the country, and deteriorated air quality has directly affected Iran's society. Studies show that air pollution has increased non-communicable diseases (NCDs), e.g., cardiovascular diseases (CVDs), respiratory diseases, and cancer in Iran (Mousavi et al., 2020, p. 2). According to the government newspaper, *Iran*, 21 thousand Iranians die yearly because of air pollution, and environmental issues cost the country 30 billion dollars just in 2016 (Yasini, 2017). The effects of climate change in Iran are more severe than in the rest of the Middle East region. Most studies predict a dryer climate and less precipitation for the future Iran. The forecast is for a 2.6 °C increase in mean temperatures, and a 35% decline in precipitation in the following decades (Daneshvar et al., 2019, p. 1). Over the past ten years, the "programmable water of the country" dropped from 130 billion m³ to 90 m³, with predictions of a further decrease to half that amount by 2030 (Sobouti, 2018, p. 112).

Iran has been a member of the UNFCCC since 1996, and the Department of Environment (DOE) of Iran has been the country's representative in the UNFCCC (Sobouti, 2018, p. 112). The country ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 as a non-Annex I country, without announcing a quantitative goal (Piri, 2018). Although Iran's Five-Year Development Plans considered UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol issues, studies show that the country has one of the lowest adaptations to the Kyoto Protocol (Alizadeh et al., 2014, p. 853). In fact, Iran's problem could be even more severe than reported. A 2018 report

by Iran's Parliament Research Center reiterated that the country had problems monitoring and measuring GHG emissions according to global standards (Haghshenas, 2018).

Iran signed the Paris Agreement on 22 April 2016. However, the country has still not ratified the agreement. The parliament approved the Paris Agreement enactment's generalities and details in public session on 14 November 2016. Out of 290 members, 204 MPs were present, approving the bill based on 149 agreed, and six opposed (Islamic Parliament Research Center of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2016). Nevertheless, the conservative Guardian Council rejected the bill, and referred it to the parliament to fix problems with it. The Guardian Council's reasons only made the situation more complicated. According to the Department of Environment (DOE) of Iran, they asked for non-existent annexes and attachments (Qarehgozlou, 2018; Zandi et al., 2019, p. 278; Fakhkhar, 2020). The Guardian Council's opposition to the 10th legislature of the Islamic Republic of Iran (27 May 2016 – 26 May 2020), especially over international agreements and conventions, was no surprise. For instance, the Guardian Council's blocking of parliamentary bills to join the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (also called the Palermo Convention), and the Financial Action Task Force (on Money Laundering) (FATF), triggered hot debates in domestic politics ("Struggle between," 2021). In Iran's 10th legislative elections, the reformists and moderates had a successful outcome and, as the biggest fraction, controlled 41% of the seats, compared to a shaky conservative alliance with 29%. It was the first time in the Islamic Republic that the parliament had more women than clerics (Ghazi, 2016; Nourmohammadian, 2016). Except that around four years later, in 2020, the Guardian Council disqualified 90 MPs of Iran's 10th legislature for the 11th legislative elections ("Kadkhodai: 90 members," 2020).

In the Paris Agreement, Iran pledged, considering as the reference year 2010, a 4% reduction of its GHGs by 2030 (the final year of Iran's 8th development program, 1409). The 4% plan, in fact, was a translation of a national plan to fight environmental pollution, which was sent to the UNFCCC as Iran's INDC, only a few days after approval in Iran's cabinet ("What are," 2018). As a former DOE official told Iran's *Hamshahri* newspaper, the government even notified the UNFCCC secretariat that Iran would voluntarily reduce 4% of its GHGs emission before ratifying the agreement in the event of the removal of sanctions (Fakhkhar, 2020). Iran also notified that it would cut 8% more if sanctions

against the country were removed and it received technological support (Piri, 2018; Sobuti, 2018; Zandi et al., 2019). Ratification of the Paris Agreement has fueled disputes between the conservatives, who are generally against the agreement, and reformists and moderates, who mostly agree with it. They discuss the issue from many aspects, like those of science, security, economy, and religion (Zandi et al., 2019, p. 281). Some of these aspects will be mentioned in the following section.³

4.1.1 Opponents

Joining the Paris Agreement faced conservative opposition from the very start. They used various justifications, from legal to economic and security issues. They even accused pro-agreement MPs of being “representatives of foreigners” (“What are,” 2018). Conservatives like Ebrahim Karkhanei, a member of the energy committee and the head of the nuclear committee in the ninth legislature, still could not understand “why some are worried about global warming instead of being worried about the country’s industry” (Karkhanei, 2018, para. 7).

Taking the issues one by one:

Science: Those opposed to the agreement, mainly conservatives, repeatedly refer to the work of skeptics and deniers, particularly Frederick Seitz, to claim that the advocates are scientifically wrong about climate change. Frederick Seitz, the former chairman of the United States National Sciences Academy, suggests that 95% of the existing hothouse gases in the atmosphere are water-produced steam, compared to only 4% of carbon dioxide. The “human-made carbon dioxide ratio is 5%, so, human share in producing this gas out of hothouse gasses is only 0.2%.” (Zandi et al., 2019, p. 279). Seitz collected more than 13 thousand signatures from specialists and climatology scientists to support his claim (“Iran’s joining,” 2017).

Security: Conservatives’ deep mistrust of the West is reflected in their opposition to international agreements. After rejecting the science behind the agreement, opponents are hanging onto conspiracy theories, to reject the Paris Agreement. For instance, some believe that the European countries (and Western countries in general) developed the Paris Agreement plan to control the world’s energy supplies. According to the news

³ Parts of Chapter 4 have been used in an article accepted for publication by the journal *Uluslararası İlişkiler* (International Relations).

agency close to the Revolutionary Guards, *Mashregh*, the European countries do not have enough fossil fuels, but are equipped with top-notch alternative energy technologies. The Paris Agreement called for reduced fossil fuel consumption, forcing the oil producers and the world to depend on them for (now more affordable) new energy technologies that only they possess ("Why Europeans," 2019). Even the signature of the NPT and limiting Iran's nuclear capability are explained through the Western countries' supposed plan to dominate the world's energy (Karkhanei, 2018).

The opponents believe that "international organizations under imperialist powers' pressures" cause many troubles for Iran in the international arena, as in the nuclear case ("Iran's joining," 2017, para. 37). Even releasing the GHG emissions data of "strategic industries" can put a country's security in danger in their view ("Iran's joining," 2017). Tasnim news agency, with strong ties to the Revolutionary Guards, warns about "environmental spies" who can gather information about the country under the cover of international climate organizations ("What are," 2018). The agency refers to Kavous Seyed-Emami as an environmental spy. Seyed-Emami was a Canadian-Persian conservationist and academic accused of spying under cover of environmental activities, and he died in 2018 in Tehran's notorious Evin prison. The official cause of his death was announced as suicide, which many doubted (Lister, 2018; Schmunk, 2019; Nissenbaum, 2018). However, that was not an isolated case of persecution of environmentalists. In a controversial case in 2019, the conservative judiciary system sentenced six Iranian environmentalists to between six and ten years in prison. They were found guilty of "collaborating with the hostile government of America" (Vahdat, 2020, para. 7) and spying on military bases in the guise of environmentalists, while Rouhani's government insisted that they were not spies (Cunningham & Guarino, 2019).

Economy: Conservatives imply that the Paris Agreement is "self-sanctioning" (Karkhanei, 2018). It is against Iran's "Resistive economy," which heavily focuses on developing the oil and natural gas industries and exploring potential new oil and gas resources (Roknabadi, 2017). For opponents, it is "natural" for a developing country to work with the total capacity of its "polluting industries" like cement, steel, and oil, considering a GHG cap an "obstacle" against development ("What are," 2018). Opponents claim that a 4% cut in GHG emissions would cost the country 1.12% of its economy, and a 12 percent reduction in GHGs would cause a loss of around 7.2% of the economy ("Iran's joining," 2017). Especially after the US withdrawal from the

agreement, joining the Paris Agreement was unjustifiable for Iran because “if the Paris Agreement were good, the US would stay in it.” (“The wandering of,” 2018, para. 35).

Legal: The opponents suggest the Paris Agreement is against the Islamic Republic's constitution. They usually refer to article 3, item 5: “the complete rejection of colonialism and the prevention of foreign influence,” article 43, item 8: “preventing the economic dominance of foreigners in the national economy,” and article 152: “the rejection of any kind of domination, both its exercise and submission to it” (Zandi et al., 2019, pp. 280-281; Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran). In this regard, the Paris Agreement is not only against the constitution but is also “haram”, according to Nafye Sabil's (rejection of foreign nonbelievers' influence) jurisprudential rule (“Iran's joining,” 2017), which is essential for the Shiite and Sunnite judiciary (Narimani, 2008).

4.1.2 Pro-agreements

It seems that apart from conservatives and hardliners, almost everybody else is pro-agreement in Iran. In the political arena, reformists and moderates defend the idea of joining the agreement. They disagree with the conservatives in every aspect mentioned above. Unlike the opponents, those pro-agreement believe that joining international agreements and conventions can meet the country's demands, particularly regarding technology and financial investment (Zandi et al., 2019). In its famous 2018 report, Iran's parliament emphasized that Iran's INDC does not have any inconsistency with the national development plan and even favors it. The report also reiterates that only old technology industries and officials who fear their failures in terms of GHGs emissions oppose Iran's INDC. The report mocks “some officials” who want to hide the country's emissions from other countries while their satellite technologies reveal “our amount of emission well.” (Haghshenas, 2018).

Rouhani's government has tried to push for joining the Paris Agreement issue from the beginning. Even cabinet members separately released statements in favor of the agreement. For instance, the foreign minister Zarif and the oil minister Zangeneh asked to speed up the ratification process in separate open letters. Zarif even warned that climate change is an important international issue; if the UN Security Council enters into the matter, it could negatively affect Iran (“Struggle in,” 2018). Unlike the opponents who claim that the oil industry could face negative impacts from the agreement, Rouhani's oil

minister believed that regardless of Iran's position, the world would go on its way, shifting to renewable energy. Iran would be even more isolated by not joining the Paris Agreement, losing its position and effectiveness in OPEC ("The wandering of," 2018). In the pro-agreement view, joining the agreement improves "Iran's international image not only among states but also in the eyes of the world's people" (Haghshenas, 2018, p. 10). It is not just a matter of potential and image building. Those pro-agreement try to show that the agreement is not against domestic laws and plans either. They refer to Article 50 of the constitution, which states:

In the Islamic Republic, it is considered a public duty to preserve the environment where the present and the future generations may have an improved social life. Consequently, any activity, economic or other, that leads to the pollution of the environment or its irreparable damage will be forbidden (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran).

Therefore, uncontrolled GHG emissions and dodging international initiatives are unjustified and even against the law. Insisting on their correct views, those pro-agreement also refer to other documents, including the General Strategies of Environment that the Supreme Leader released in November 2015. The Supreme Leader reiterated many policies and actions consistent with the Paris Agreement, like encouraging a green economy and low-carbon industries or developing environmental policies through international cooperation (Tasnim, 2015).

The pro-agreement camp notice that Iran could easily meet the Paris Agreement's goals if the country could manage the energy sector. Researchers at Sharif Energy Research Institute (SERI) and elsewhere in the country suggest that with good management, Iran can cut GHG emissions by about 40% by 2050 (Sobouti, 2018). Even enhancing the efficiency of fossil-fuelled power plants to 46% by the 2026–2030 period (48% by 2030), besides curbing routine gas flaring up to 90%, could easily cover Iran's conditional 12% GHG emission cut compared to the business-as-usual scenario (Ghadaksaz & Saboohi, 2020, p. 9). Rouhani's government had ambitious plans to reform Iran's fossil-fuelled industries and strongly boost renewable energy production. However, a significant obstacle was out of the government's control: the US sanctions.

Iran planned to produce 5 to 7 GW of renewable electricity until 2020 but could not reach even 10% of it (Khatinoglou, 2020). The main focus of Iran was solar energy, and the country secured a noticeable amount of foreign investment during a short window of opportunity between the JCPOA enforcement and the US withdrawal and sanctions. The

country “is potentially one of the best regions for solar energy utilization...with 300 sunny days per year on $\frac{2}{3}$ of its land area.” (Aguilar et al., 2016, p. 33). Shortly after lifting the sanctions, foreign companies rushed to invest in Iran’s untapped 80-million people market. A few months after JCPOA, three Italian and one German company signed agreements with Iran to build solar power plants, increasing Iran’s solar energy capacity to more than 1000MW (Adesnik & Ghasseminejad, 2018). Iran’s solar power capacity was only 32MW in 2015 (Dudley, 2017).

During 2017, Iran attracted more companies with more extensive plans for solar energy. In September 2017, Iran signed a \$570 million agreement with the UK-based Quercus to produce 600MW of solar electricity in 3 years eventually. Quercus would build Iran's world's sixth-largest solar power plant (Karagiannopoulos, 2018; Shokri-Kalehsar, 2018). Norway’s Saga Energy signed a \$2.9 billion deal in October 2017 to build solar power plants to generate up to 2GW over the next five years (Dudley, 2017). In comparison, Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant produces 915 MW of energy (World Nuclear Association, 2021). A consortium of Iranian, Indian, and South Korean companies also aimed to set up an energy park in the Khuzestan province in a \$10 billion project consisting of 1 GW of solar power capacity. Among many more projects, these examples were a part of Tehran’s (futile) ambitious plans to generate renewable energy (Adesnik & Ghasseminejad, 2018).

The sanctions especially put the pro-agreement side on the defensive, as they could not justify embracing the international initiative. The government saw that its plans for restructuring the energy sector (and other plans) had vanished into thin air. Rouhani showed frustration in a speech to a cabinet meeting on 12 December 2018 when he stated, “we put ourselves in trouble” by supporting the Paris Agreement. He added, “regarding the GHGs, they violate it...there are recommendations in the world that we should pay attention, but it is not necessary to imply them precisely. They are not the Quran’s verses after all” (“The wandering of,” 2018, para. 3).

Although the (at that time international and now uniquely) US sanctions have been the main obstacles against green development and the of cutting GHG emissions, Iran faces other issues like having a “bureaucratic administration, and lack of discipline in industrial productions” as well (Sobouti, 2018, p. 113). Besides, the country needs strong legal action against the breaking of environmental rules. For instance, the environmental fines are so low that individuals and companies “prefer to pay the fine rather than

removing the pollution because the fine is less than the price of removing the pollution” (Haghshenas, 2018, p. 20).

4.2 China

4.2.1 Polluted Development

China's development style has caused severe environmental problems, and there were fears it would jeopardize the achievement of decades of economic growth and the rise of relatively widespread social welfare. Environmental degradation became a concern in China in the late 1970s, but economic development was too important to be slowed down because of the environment (Edmonds, 1999). From the second half of the 1990s onward, there was a growing amount of journalistic and scholarly work, alarmed about the human and environmental costs of the fast-growth economic strategy, and increasing awareness within the Chinese leadership of the issue (Li, 2016, p. 51). However, in the 1990s, in the view of China's leadership, environmental degradation was a necessary price to pay to fight widespread poverty. As a result, China did not prioritize green energy or the reduction of GHGs. The country's leaders were also cautious about the possible attempts by foreign powers to interfere in China's domestic politics, on the pretext of environmental protection (Li, 2016, p. 49). However, the flip side of China's development gradually came to the surface.

Rapid urbanization caused rising urban-rural inequality in the country. Moreover, the growth was disproportionately concentrated in the eastern coastal cities (and later in the central regions). Besides, the health impacts of pollution and environmental degradation led to social pressure for change (Green & Stern, 2017, p. 426). Dangerously low air quality and dense smog caused frequent shutdowns of coal-fired power stations (Rathi, 2017). Poor air quality even led to an attractive rising market for canned air (Barhat, 2017; Roxburgh, 2018). Other resources were in no better condition. For instance, according to China's official sources, nearly two-thirds of China's underground water was polluted in 2014, and only 3% of the country's urban groundwater could be classified as “clean” in 2013 (Kaiman, 2014). The conditions gradually became so bad that the Chinese public's reaction was one of alarm, reflected in increasing public protests against polluting projects across the country. The Xiamen “PX Incident” (2007), the Guangdong “Anti-Nansha Petrochemical Project” (2009), the protest against a waste project in Qidong (2012), and

many more such incidents all showed that Chinese citizens were becoming increasingly environmentally concerned and active, organizing protests against anticipated pollution (Deng & Yang, 2013; McCulloch, 2015). According to media reports, Chinese villagers “almost invariably” turned into “violent insurgents” when pollution threatened their livelihoods (Deng & Yang, 2013, p. 322). However, Chinese environmentalism “has matured” enough to focus only on the environment, and to avoid larger concerns about democratization (McCulloch, 2015, p. 81).

The Chinese government’s reaction to the consequences of its development, and the increasing public awareness and pressure was late but steady. As early as 2004, China started measures to promote energy efficiency. In the 2005 renewable energy law, the country set binding national targets on energy intensity, and introduced a plan for reducing significant polluters in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) (Hilton & Kerr, 2017, p. 49). Nevertheless, in Copenhagen, China was still careful not to link its domestic climate policy and actions to “any presumptions of international obligation,” rejecting any binding emission targets which could “potentially serve as a constraint on development” (Hilton & Kerr, 2017, pp. 48-49). Not surprisingly, in 2009, China still positioned itself as a “primarily innocent victim of climate change” and a “poor country,” defending the interests of other developing (non-Annex I) countries (Hilton & Kerr, 2017, p. 50).

4.2.2 *From a Poor Victim to a Strong Actor*

At COP 15, China was accused of blocking a more substantial agreement (Li, 2016, p. 50). The US and European media and politicians tended to blame China (and, to some extent, the US) for “sabotaging” and “holding the world to ransom” (McCarthy, 2009; Rapp et al., 2010). In China’s view, rich countries like the US, the EU, and Japan, not the developing and less prosperous ones, were historically responsible for the rise in GHGs. For many years, China refused to cap GHG emissions, arguing that rich countries should reduce their emissions more, and help developing countries mitigate theirs (Schreurs, 2016).

China gradually became more active in international climate change policies after the 2009 Copenhagen deadlock. The change in China’s climate policy seemed mainly caused

by the country's 'new normal' economic development initiative. The new normal was a development model focused on structural changes to achieve better quality growth, emphasizing four sub-themes: "services, innovation, reduced inequality, and environmental sustainability" (Olivier et al., 2015, p. 10; Hilton & Kerr, 2017; Green & Stern, 2017). Beginning with the 12th Five-Year Plan Period (2011–2015), China shifted from development based on the energy-intensive industries like heavy industry, export, and investment, to a more balanced economy characterized by "slower growth, an increasing role for services and domestic consumption, and a focus on innovation and low-carbon technologies" (Olivier et al. 2015; Hilton & Kerr, 2017, p. 48).

China's development policy was a big boost to its environmental situation. In 2014, China invested in renewable energy more than any other country (Ming et al., 2014). In 2015, the country was the largest producer and consumer of solar water heaters in the world, which accounted for 50% of the global production, and 65% of total global installation; it supplied 30% of the world's Photovoltaic (PV) panels, and ranked second in wind power production (Hua et al., 2016, p. 1048). By 2020, China was the world's biggest wind power producer, making more than twice as much as the second-largest generator, the United States.

Alongside the development shift, China wanted to be recognized as a major international climate policy actor. The United States and China's joint announcement on climate change in November 2014 signaled greater cooperation between the world's two biggest polluters, and showed the will for positive development in the negotiations. Beforehand, cooperation between the two countries was not on the horizon, because the US believed China was getting out of emission cuts, putting an unfair burden on the US's shoulders. Instead, China saw the US's position as an effort to hammer China's "legitimate development." These two different views brought international efforts like the Copenhagen summit to a deadlock, only broken later by China's economic policy shift in the 12th Five-Year Plan (Hilton & Kerr, 2017).

Shortly before the Paris Summit, in September 2015, the US and Chinese presidential joint statement reiterated the optimism about the positive path of the negotiations process (Bodansky, 2016, p. 293). The cooperation between the two countries followed at sub-national and non-state levels. For instance, 11 Chinese provinces and cities collaborated with 18 cities in the US to devise an action plan for carbon emission reduction before the Paris talks. China even opened the country up to international billionaires like Bill Gates

to invest in research on clean energy (Li, 2016, p. 50). Moreover, the fact of there being no strict limit on emission cuts imposed on China from the outside led to the removing of obstacles against China's cooperation (Hilton & Kerr, 2017).

China brought in its own plan as a significant player and on a par with the other major players, cooperating with the US over global climate change policy. Although the action was praised as a positive development and the two countries were even dubbed as "G2", some scholars had their own "sufficient uncertainty," mainly because of US domestic politics (Marcu, 2014, p. 6), which turned out to be justified later. As for the Paris Agreement, Xie Zhenhua, the senior Chinese climate change negotiator, thought the agreement was "fair and just, comprehensive and balanced, highly ambitious, enduring and effective" (Davenport, 2015, para. 19). He also believed that the agreement was "not perfect" and needed some "improvements" (Davenport, 2015). Later, China expressed its "regret" over the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, but Trump's action only concretized China's position among world leaders. Following Trump's withdrawal, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson told reporters that standing firm on the Paris deal was a "responsibility shouldered by China as a responsible major country," and added that the country would "earnestly implement" its obligations (DW Persian, 2017, para. 25).

Although the will of China's leadership was crucial to shift the country's climate policy, international factors and outside pressure also influenced China's policy shift. Within the developing world, pressure on Brazil, China, and India increased in the post-Kyoto period. These countries, notably China, appeared to move forward fast, and would no longer fit in Kyoto's Appendix II list of developing countries without any obligation to cut emissions. Since 2006, China has been the biggest GHG emitter, surpassing the US. Moreover, it became more difficult for China to use per capita emission logic compared to the richer countries (Wiener, 2008; Hilton & Kerr, 2017). In 1990, the baseline year for the Kyoto Protocol, the US emitted 22% of the world's CO₂, the EU 19%, and China only 1% (Christoff, 2016, p. 770). By 2015, China's emissions contributed 30% of the global total, two times more than the US as the second polluter (Olivier et al., 2015; Schreurs, 2016). China's per capita GHG emissions exploded from 2.1 tons in 1990 to 7.1 tons in 2016, which was still well behind the US (15.5 tons) but already more than richer countries like France (4.6 tons) or the UK (5.8 tons) (World Bank, 2021). There is a growing tendency for China to be considered in the club of the great powers. Playing a pivotal role with the US and EU in international climate policy

and the Paris negotiations was symbolically crucial for China, and incompatible with its previous status as a developing country (Schreurs, 2016).

China's 12th Five-Year Plan mainly considered the use of renewable energy and environmental issues, boosting investment in low-carbon industries, R&D, and reducing coal dependency (Zhang, 2015). The Plan's target was reducing the economic growth rate to 7% per year and giving services 47% of value added by 2015, increasing from 43% in 2010. Prior to the Paris Summit, the effects of the Chinese new normal were recognizable. Official figures showed that the GDP growth declined to 7.3% in 2014, 6.9% in 2015, and 6% in 2021, a noticeable result compared to the double-digit growth rate a decade before. In the same year, steel output, cement production, and new construction dropped by 2.2%, 5.3%, and 14%, respectively (Hilton & Kerr, 2017, pp. 51-52; Myllyvirta, 2021). It has been argued that China was undergoing "large-scale, rapid and multidimensional changes in economic structure" while its energy supply was diversifying (Green & Stern, 2017, p. 435). Scholars suggested that adjustments in 2014 and 2015 could be signs of a new normal trend rather than an anomaly in China's development plan (Hilton & Kerr, 2017), indicating that China is a part of the solution in fighting climate change rather than a part of the problem. Following the previous economic plans, China's 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) surpassed its goals, and non-fossil fuel energy increased to 15.9% of its energy production. China aimed for a 20% non-fossil fuel share in its 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) and has pledged to make the country carbon neutral by 2060 (Pike, 2021).

China continued to work on its development shift over environmental issues. The Chinese government has committed China internationally to 'achieve the peaking of carbon dioxide emissions around 2030' and make its 'best efforts to peak early.' Indeed, scholars estimate that the country will reach its goal before 2030 (Green & Stern, 2017, p. 424). China's massive investments in renewables, depositing 0.9% of its GDP into the sector in 2015, made it the third-highest globally, only after Chile and South Africa, which each invested 1.4% of GDP (O'Meara, 2020). Moreover, the country did not limit itself to hard material achievements. In 2019, China published 30,469 papers in green and sustainable science and technology, energy, and fuels, a 138% increase from 2016. In comparison, the US published only 19,503 papers in the same field (O'Meara, 2020). Inger Anderson, executive director of the United Nations Environment Program, apparently had enough reason to believe that China "has had a tremendous success in demonstrating climate leadership in recent years" (Bosu, 2019, para. 14).

4.3 The EU as a Prominent International Player

4.3.1 International Player

EU is considered a player in international climate negotiations, although it is neither a state nor a regular international organization. Nevertheless, the European Union has established itself as an essential player in developing an international climate change regime (Fischer & Geden, 2015; Rayner & Jordan, 2016; Schreurs, 2016), setting “the pace for others to follow” (Schreurs, 2016, p. 219). The EU had strong motivations to be active in tackling climate change. First, the public takes climate change seriously. In 2015, 91 percent of respondents to one Eurobarometer poll said they took climate change seriously or very seriously (Schreurs, 2016, p. 219). In comparison, a Gallup poll in 2016 showed that, at an eight-year high, only 64 percent of US adults said they were worried “a great deal” or “a fair amount” about global warming (Saad & Jones, 2016). Moreover, the EU countries have limited fossil fuel supplies and are dependent on importing fossil fuels from non-EU countries, which constituted 54 percent of the union’s consumption in 2016 (European Environment Agency, 2020). This factor explains the Energy Union’s establishment in 2015, focusing on five policy areas: supply security, an integrated internal energy market, energy efficiency, climate change, and research and innovation for low-carbon technologies (Schreurs, 2016, p. 220).

Since the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has tried to lead climate change discussions and international negotiations. The union felt a historical responsibility for success, particularly after the United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol and rejected the opportunity of playing a constructive role in international climate negotiations during George W. Bush’s presidency (Gupta, 2010; Fischer & Geden, 2015). Determined to keep the US on board, the European negotiators even fruitlessly “swallowed their opposition” to measures that were suspected of providing a means for the United States, in particular, to “evade domestic emission reductions” (Rayner & Jordan, 2016, p. 5). Consequently, major EU leaders, such as the United Kingdom’s Tony Blair and Germany’s Angela Merkel allowed the union to distance itself from the US's unpopular climate policies (Rayner & Jordan, 2016, p. 8).

The EU also tried to secure the climate agreement through a deal with other players. After the US withdrawal in 2001, the EU secured the Kyoto Protocol’s Russian

ratification in 2004, allowing it to enter into force. Because of the implication that the Kyoto Protocol needed 55 ratifications and accounted for no less than 55 percent of developed world carbon dioxide emissions, the EU engaged in an intense diplomatic effort to secure the Protocol. Russia became particularly a key player whose ratification was needed to surpass the 55% obstacle. As a quid pro quo, the EU supported Russia's World Trade Organization membership, and facilitated the export of Russian gas to the European Single Market (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p. 104). Inside the union, an agreement among 15 EU members moved beyond the "symbolic" policy toward a "burden-sharing" agreement that allowed less affluent members to grow economically. Simultaneously, the more prosperous states would commit to significantly reducing their emissions, planning to reduce their overall emissions by 15% by 2012 from the 1990 level (Rayner & Jordan, 2016, p. 5). The EU directly confronted US climate policies by ratifying and supporting the Kyoto Protocol, and even creating its own carbon emission trading system. Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol "in the teeth of US opposition" has been interpreted as a part of a broader transatlantic discourse, aiming to establish the union as an actor in world politics "worth listening to" (Volger & Bretherton, 2006, p. 1).

Up to COP15 in Copenhagen, the union pursued the course of leading by example. Europeans even took important decisions on unilateral mitigation measures in advance of the international treaty, to demonstrate their commitment to international climate policy (Fischer & Geden, 2015). During the Copenhagen summit preparations, EU leaders agreed to an 80-95 percent emission cut by 2050; a target seemed necessary to keep the temperature increase under 2°C. However, the countries' conditions depended on other players' actions, while the union members worried about others' relative gains and free riding. Therefore, the "aspiration and the yardstick to establish mid-term goals" objective could be possible "in the context of necessary reductions according to the IPCC by developed countries as a group" (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 3).

The Copenhagen failure made European members skeptical of the Union's approach. When the new Climate Commissioner Connie Hedegaard pushed for a unilateral 30 percent emission cut target, despite the Copenhagen dead-lock, East European member states and other countries, ravaged by the economic crisis, rejected it. Even Germany had its doubts. The disappointing outcome of COP 15 was one of several reasons why the EU changed its position on international climate negotiations and faced opposition to the union's 'frontrunner' strategy from the EU's central actors (Fischer & Geden, 2015).

Climate policy has been among a few policy fields where the EU could take a consistent position as a single voice (Fischer & Geden, 2015). However, the EU still could not lead without compromise. At Warsaw (COP 19) and Lima (COP 20), the EU and the Small Island States put effort into applying legal force on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), arguing it would lead to a higher level of commitment from the main players. However, this initiative faced opposition from the US, China, and many other major developing countries. Finally, making the agreement reachable, the EU agreed that the final document determined the NDCs were not legally binding, although binding provisions (Art. 4) “govern their content, timing, and revision” (Christoff, 2016, P. 777).

The international lack of will to tackle climate change echoed inside the union, and made it more challenging to pursue climate ambitions. Criticism was raised against the union's 2014 proposal for an emissions cut target in 2030, as it contained a binding 40 percent GHG emission reduction target (relative to 1990 levels), a renewable energy target of 27 percent, and a minimum energy efficiency improvement of 27 percent. Unlike in 2008, when the EU announced its 2020 target, the union could not determine criteria on how countries were supposed to reach the target (Schreurs, 2016, P. 220). On the one hand, progressive states and non-state actors like NGOs and Northern and Western member states objected to the lack of ambition of the 40 percent emission reduction by 2030, and on the other hand, Poland and other Visegrád countries were against these “far-reaching decisions” as long as the outcome of the international climate negotiations was not clear (Fischer & Geden, 2015, p. 4).

After long debates, in October 2014, the European Council determined on at least a 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 (Council of the European Union, 2014, p. 1). The Council also encouraged some member states with a GDP per capita below 60% of the EU average by making them “opt to continue to give free allowances to the energy sector up to 2030” (Council of the European Union, 2014, p. 2). Later, in December 2020, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the EU would cut carbon emissions to 55% of 1990 levels within a decade. The increase was proposed by the European Commission in September 2020 but met some EU countries' resistance, becoming law in April 2021 only after protracted and “wrangling” negotiations (Abnett, 2021).

In Paris, the EU tried to take the initiative, and fill the gap between developed and developing countries. Since the beginning of climate negotiations, the European Union

has tried to lead the mitigation policies worldwide. The creation of the 'Ambition Coalition' (later renamed the 'Coalition of High Ambition') aimed to ally the two groups as mentioned above. The coalition led by Marshall Islands Foreign Minister, Tony de Brum, held its first meeting in Berlin in May 2015. Ministers and representatives from Angola, the Marshall Islands, Germany, Grenada, Peru, Santa Lucia, the UK, Gambia, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Switzerland, were labeled "the progressives" (Cañete, 2015). The coalition developed an agenda for Paris that included a long-term goal, five-year reviews to ramp up ambition, and significant finance (Cañete, 2015) – many elements of their agenda were included in the final agreement (Christoff, 2016, p. 772). EU Climate Action and Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete described the Paris Agreement as an event in which "Europe and its allies managed to put pressure on the big emitters," thus making history (Cañete, 2015, para. 18). The agreement would be more highly prized in the context of "them and us" compared with previous negotiations.

4.3.2 *Difficulties at Home*

While emissions in the rest of the world continued to grow apace, the EU met its commitment to reduce GHG emissions by 8% under the Kyoto Protocol. By 2015, levels were down by 23% from 1990 levels, even though the European economy grew over 46% between 1990 and 2014 (Delbeke & Vis, 2016; Rayner & Jordan, 2016, p. 13). However, the EU countries have not agreed on the best way to fight climate change all the time. For instance, while Germany pushed for relatively ambitious climate targets during the EU 2030 emission target negotiations, Poland was worried about its coal-dominated economy, opposing too much EU burden-sharing. Great Britain was also more interested in investing in nuclear energy than was compatible with Germany's ambitions over the more significant renewable targets (Schreurs, 2016). The disagreement between EU members has not been easy to resolve. Even before the Paris Agreement, the "constructive ambiguity" of the European Council conclusions was needed to "bridge the widening gap between climate policy ambitions inside the EU" (Fischer & Geden, 2015, p. 5). While the Western European countries framed the EU 2030 energy and climate framework as a "chance to raise the EU's climate ambitions after 2015", the Central and Eastern European countries were sending the message that "nothing had been decided

conclusively and that the review after Paris could lead to a reduction in ambitions” (Fischer & Geden, 2015, p. 5).

Moreover, non-state actors like sub-national governmental players in countries such as Italy, France, and the Netherlands, and industries like the British and French chemical industries imposed extra constraints on the EU climate policy (Volger & Bretherton, 2006, p. 2; Gupta, 2010, p. 647). The fossil fuel industry also put tremendous pressure on politicians, while environmental interests were not equally divided among the union members (Schreurs, 2016, p. 220). As a result of different priorities among member states, use of renewable energy has grown in some EU countries, while other parts of the union have tried to block climate efforts (Schreurs, 2016, p. 220). Besides, the EU has to handle the growing challenge of far-right populist parties right across Europe. Public frustration over economic inequalities, political alienation, and fears of globalization and immigration, feed the narrative of the far-right parties, who represent themselves as “the ‘true representatives of the people’ in contrast to ‘the untrustworthy political classes,’ perceived by them as having failed” (Wodak, 2019, p. 26). The EU far-right generally do not support EU initiatives to tackle climate change (Forchtner et al., 2018; Forchtner, 2019). Elsewhere in Europe, the union has not been successful in exercising its climate policy, where the Energy Community Treaty has so far failed to catalyze investments in climate-friendly, renewable energy and energy efficiency projects in its “backyard” (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova, and Ukraine). On average, the Western Balkans still produce about half their primary energy from coal (Mileusnic, 2015).

The EU is still among the big polluters, and in 2015, the Union (EU-28, 10 percent), the US (15 percent), and China (30 percent) were responsible for more than half of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions (Schreurs, 2016). However, critics say the problem with the EU is not merely political or even economic. It goes further, touching on people’s lifestyle and becoming a part of a ‘one-dimensional man’ life where the “distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is its...overwhelming need for the production and consumption of waste” (Marcuse, 2002, p. 9). In fact, if everyone worldwide shares the same lifestyle that people enjoy in the EU, 2.8 Earths would be needed to sustain the demand for natural resources required by such a lifestyle (World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 2019). For a comparison, the average Briton emitted more carbon in the first two weeks of 2020 than the citizens of seven African nations (including Rwanda,

Madagascar, Malawi, Ethiopia, Uganda, Guinea, and Burkina Faso) emit in an entire year (OXFAM, 2020).

Some suggest that the EU's relative lack of economic power, particularly in comparison to the US and China, means the EU "has concentrated on offering directional leadership in terms of developing innovative instruments and setting ambitious goals for itself" (Rayner & Jordan, 2016, p. 13). It seems that the EU should modify its ambitions, because we cannot afford to cater for 2.8 Earths.

4.4 The United States

"The world has come together around an agreement that will empower us to chart a new path for our planet" (Davenport, 2015, para. 18). This was how Secretary of State John Kerry reiterated the multilateral characteristic of the Paris Agreement. However, it seemed the US was at the center of this multilateral world. The Paris Agreement's legal structure is mainly designed considering the United States' political reality (Davenport, 2015; Kienast, 2015). The US is the second-largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world after China (EPA, 2017). The country is also the world's largest oil producer and oil consumer. The US produced 20% of the world's oil in 2020, and consumed 20% of the world's oil in 2018 (EIA, 2021), making the US oil and gas industry one of the most profitable industries in the US (Haqqi, 2020). The influential US fossil fuel industry spends tremendous amounts of money lobbying and influencing US policies. In the 2017-2018 election cycle, the oil, gas and coal industries alone spent around \$360 million on lobbying and campaign donations (Kirk, 2020). The fossil fuel industry is not the only one lobbying against environmental regulations. Over \$2billion was spent on climate change legislation in the US Congress from 2000 to 2016 (Brulle, 2018, p. 289). It is no accident that even pre-1990, the US (along with Türkiye) was the only major OECD country without a domestic emissions target (Gupta, 2010, p. 640).

In 1996, the US government accepted the need for emission-cut targets in the COP2 Geneva Ministerial Declaration, although the fossil fuel industries were against climate change measures (Gupta, 2010). There was even stronger opposition in the US against climate change agreements. Prior to the Kyoto Protocol, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution was adopted in the United States in 1997, 'taking negotiations hostage' (Kienast, 2015, p. 314). The resolution obliged the US not to accept any future binding emission-cut targets

until and unless the key developing countries agreed to participate meaningfully (Gupta, 2010, p. 643; Dovie & Iwasa, 2017, p. 2). The Byrd-Hagel Resolution and the US's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol weakened the idea of the developed countries' participation and leadership in the fight against climate change. The US justified its unconstructive position by arguing that implementing climate agreements would harm the US and the world economy (Gupta, 2010, p. 645). The US signed the Kyoto Protocol against all odds, but the protocol was never ratified at home, and in the end, the country withdrew from it in 2001. By 2012, half of the climate-related bills in Congress were aimed at hindering or blocking climate actions (Kienast, 2015, p. 317; Bodansky, 2016).

In the US, domestic party politics significantly impact climate change policy. On the question of climate change, a majority of adherents to one of the two main political parties openly questions the science of climate change, making national and international climate change action limited or impossible. Republicans are consistently more skeptical of climate change regimes and policies. They overwhelmingly rejected the already signed declarations in Kyoto and Paris, under the George Bush and Donald Trump administrations. The Republican leader of the Senate, Mitch McConnell, who was against Obama's climate change policies such as signing the Paris Agreement, made his opposition clear:

Before his international partners pop the champagne, they should remember that this is an unattainable deal based on a domestic energy plan that is likely illegal, that half the states have sued to halt, and that Congress has already voted to reject (Chomsky, 2016, p. 232).

The legal procedures accepting the Paris Agreement were incredibly delicate, due to the peculiar character of the US domestic treaty approval process. The signing of the Paris Climate Accord generated lengthy debates over submitting it to the Senate for ratification as a treaty (Kontorovich, 2019, p. 103). The US Constitution requires two-thirds of the Senate votes to ratify the treaty. However, most US international agreements do not meet the Constitutional requirements. Instead, they go through two kinds of procedures: 'Congressional executive agreements' and 'sole executive agreements.' In Congressional executive agreements, legislative authorization following the president's request will be enough to bypass the Senate's two-thirds approval, and in the sole executive agreement, the president does not even need to have Congress's consent. Such agreements are typically justified by the "president's invocation of his inherent constitutional powers, such as recognition and foreign relations, or as commander-in-chief" (Kontorovich, 2019, pp. 106-107; Bodansky, 2016). Nevertheless, some scholars notice that even the Senate

ratification could not guarantee a treaty such as the Paris Agreement at the end of the day. For instance, in 1978, President Jimmy Carter gave notice that the United States was going to withdraw from its 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan; In 2001, President George W. Bush informed Russian President Vladimir Putin that the United States would withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and in 2019 the US formally withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) with Russia, which the two countries had signed in 1987 (Rudalevige, 2018).

Meanwhile, no more distracted by the twin domestic issues of the economic crash and Obamacare, President Obama saw the climate policy as an achievement and legacy. In 2013, Obama announced the US Climate Action Plan (PCAP), setting EPA standards, and limiting the new and existing power plants' carbon pollution through executive action (Kienast, 2015, p. 316). For the first time, the US could represent a positive image of the country as an upbeat actor at home, and a leader in international climate negotiations. The presence of US leadership over climate issues became noticeable when the country finally joined what then became the 'Coalition of High Ambition,' and other parties swiftly followed the path-building, ultimately more than 100 member states strong (Christoff, 2016, pp. 771-774; Goodman & CSIS, 2017, p. 93). Obama also pursued "an aggressive bilateral agenda", to boost China's cooperation on climate change and clean energy (Goodman & CSIS, 2017, p. 93). In 2014, three weeks before the Lima COP began, Presidents Xi Jinping and Obama jointly announced their mitigation commitments in Beijing, suggesting support for a new UN climate agreement. The US proposed a 26–28% emissions cut below the 2005 level by 2025 (Christoff, 2016; Goodman & CSIS, 2017). For the first time, China offered an "absolute emission-reduction target," pledging to reach its emissions peak by 2030 (Christoff, 2016, p. 772; Goodman & CSIS, 2017).

Since the Obama administration was sure about the Senate or Congress's rejection of the Paris Agreement as a treaty, US negotiators were very cautious about any legally binding treaty. Before the Paris negotiations, Secretary of State John Kerry went on record as saying that the new climate instrument "is definitively not going to be a treaty," and that there were "not going to be legally binding reduction targets" (Kienast, 2015, p. 318). After all, by "undermining alternatives" and driving other parties to an "acceptance of its preferences and requirements," the US had helped to create a 'treaty' that affects only "processes for participation" rather than "creating legal obligations" (Christoff, 2016, pp. 775-781). Some scholars suggest that the Paris Agreement's four-year withdrawal period

was not accidental. Instead, the aim was particularly to block the US exit in the event of a possible Republican presidential victory in 2016 (Kontorovich, pp. 109-110). As a result, Donald Trump could only officially withdraw from the accord on 4 November 2020, a day after the US presidential election (Friedman, 2020). Almost immediately after sitting behind the Resolute Desk, Joe Biden reversed Trump's decision (Milman, 2021).

On 1 June 2017, President Donald Trump announced that the US would withdraw from the Paris Agreement and immediately cease implementing the agreement, including implementing the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and financial contributions (Zhang et al., 2017, p. 220). The opposition of Trump to measures against climate change was not a secret. He claimed that global warming was “a hoax concocted by China to weaken the US’s competitive industrial power” (Chao et al., 2017, p. 213). Trump took any chance to serve a reminder of his ideas about climate change as “mythical,” “nonexistent,” or “an expensive hoax” (Cheung, 2020). Until January 2020, he had already tweeted more than 120 posts, questioning or making light of climate change (Cheung, 2020).

However, Trump’s opposition to the idea of climate change was not merely personal. The Trump Administration had close ties with the fossil fuel industry. Reportedly, Trump himself, vice-president Pence and former Trump EPA administrator Pruitt were closely associated with the petrochemical mogul Koch Industries (Zhang et al., 2017, p. 220). In addition, the Trump EPA’s administrator Andrew Wheeler, a former coal industry lobbyist, was described as a “nemesis of environmental groups” (Phillips, 2019, para. 3). Trump also enjoyed the support of policymakers, mainly Republicans. On 25 May 2017, twenty-two Republican senators wrote a letter to the president urging him to leave the agreement. It is reported that the oil, gas and coal industries have paid more than US\$10 million into their campaigns since 2012 (Zhang et al., 2017, p. 220).

Once he took office as president, Trump proposed the America First Energy Plan to boost the fossil energy industry. Besides, he completely dismantled Obama’s climate policies, canceled the Clean Power Plan, and issued the Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth (Zhang et al., 2017, p. 214). Trump’s actions were not limited to the environmental issue; he went on an “all-out assault on the Obama legacy,” from climate change to criminal justice to international relations (Smith, 2018, para. 3). As a result, the EPA faced the largest budget cut in its history, carried out by the Trump administration, amounting to some US\$2.6 billion, or 31.4% of the whole budget

(Zhang et al., 2017, p. 217). The situation for the US international climate plan was even worse. After the USAID budget cut, spending on initiatives related to the environment shrank to roughly 70 percent of the typical Obama-era spending. Trump moved to eliminate all funding for climate-related or environmental projects across African countries, including Senegal, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, and cut funding for the environmental project in Indonesia from \$23.3 to only seven million dollars in 2019 (Meade, 2018).

Considering the dependency of international climate research on US funding, the Trump administration's severe budget cuts for climate research affected the US's climate science, and ultimately undermined IPCC reports and future international climate negotiations (Zhang et al., 2017, p. 220). The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement also put the developing countries in a difficult situation. The US was the largest contributor to the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Many developing countries have counted on the developed countries' support to make their NDCs, and Trump's "America First" policy could not be a good sign for them. The lack of the promised money could encourage developing countries to free-ride or simply drop out of their commitments. However, the money problem made at the same time for an opportunity for others like the EU and China to fill the gap and improve their international positions, reiterating that the US cannot single-handedly dismantle the world's climate policy (Kemp, 2017, p. 459; Hilton & Kerr, 2017).

CHAPTER 5

IRAN'S NUCLEAR DEAL

5.1 The Beginning of Iran's Nuclear Program

Iran's nuclear plans started in the 1950s under the "Atoms for Peace" program and with US assistance (Alvandi, 2016). The program aimed to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and would not be used for "atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purposes" (Alvandi, 2016, p. 130). In the first step, Iran signed the 'Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy' with the United States in April 1957. According to the agreement, the US provided Iran with technical assistance and several kilograms of enriched uranium (Sergi, 2017). Later, in 1967, the 5MW Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), built by a subsidiary of the General Dynamics Corporation, went online, fuelled with highly enriched uranium (HEU). Iran procured the right to have up to six kilograms of enriched uranium as fuel for the reactor, implemented at the recently established Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) at Tehran University (Nikou, 2018; Sergi, 2017).

The research reactor enabled Iran to produce up to 600 grams of military-grade plutonium per year in spent fuel through 'nuclear reprocessing' (Sergi, 2017, p. 145). However, the country put the nuclear program under the strict control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition to ratifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970, Iran signed the NPT's Safeguards Agreement In 1974, which allowed inspections, to verify that "nuclear enrichment for peaceful nuclear energy is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (Hamblin, 2014; Nikou, 2018, p. 1). Iran's ruler, Shah Pahlavi, also considered the relationship with the US so vital that he did not want to undermine it by pursuing nuclear developments (Patrikarakos, 2012).

The Shah saw the nuclear industry as very promising, and soon, he also found his financial accelerator to take a great leap forward, including in the nuclear field.

Following the Arab oil boycott and the Shah's refusal to join the embargo, Iran faced a flood of oil money, which substantiated his ambitious plans. The country's oil export revenue jumped from \$2.8 billion in 1972/73 to \$4.6 billion in 1973/74, and sky-rocketed to \$17.8 billion for 1974/5 (Cooper, 2008, p. 570). Pahlavi invested the windfall petrodollars, inviting eager Western investors to participate in his ambitious nuclear technology developments. In his March 1974 *Nowruz* (Iranian new year) message, the Shah announced that the country would quickly "enter the age of using the atom and other sources of energy" (Alvandi, 2016, p. 132). In March 1974, he announced his plans to establish 23,000 MW(e) nuclear power capacity "as soon as possible" (Kibaroğlu, 2007, p. 229). By building nuclear power plants right across the country, by 2000 Iran was supposed to have its electricity grid "firmly anchored in nuclear power" (Hamblin, 2014, p. 1114).

Dedicated to bringing nuclear technology to Iran, the Shah established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974, which quickly built up to be a bureaucracy with more than 1,000 employees and over a \$1billion annual budget (Alvandi, 2016, p. 133; Kibaroğlu, 2007). In November 1974, Iran and Kraftwerk Union, a subsidiary of the German firm Siemens, agreed to build two 1200MW light water reactors (terminated in 1979). Framatome of France also signed a preliminary agreement to build two 900MW reactors on the Karun River by 1983 and 1984 (Joyner, 2016; Nikou, 2018), but the French side first asked for a considerable loan to build a gaseous diffusion plant in France. Iran agreed in 1974 to spend some \$1billion to build an enrichment facility. The country would possess a partial stake of the Franco-Iranian company called SOFIDIF (Société Franco-Iranienne pour l'Enrichissement de l'Uranium par Diffusion Gazeuse) and the right to buy some of the enriched uranium (Hamblin, 2014, p. 1124). SOFIDIF was part of EURODIF ("dif" for gaseous diffusion), a European stockholder consortium. Consequently, Iran's share decreased to only 10 percent, despite its substantial investment in the diffusion plant (Hamblin, 2014, p. 1125; Joyner, 2016).

The US was another beneficiary of the Shah's nuclear electricity. On March 3, 1975, Iran and the United States signed a 15-billion-dollar agreement to construct eight nuclear power reactors, with a total capacity of 8,000MW. Further to that, Iran proposed a \$2.75 billion investment in a uranium enrichment facility in the US (Kibaroğlu, 2007, p. 229). Iran even sought uranium ore in a "variety of African countries," and signed "a secret agreement" with South Africa in October 1975, to buy enriched uranium (Alvandi, 2016,

p. 133). The Shah knew that others (even the US) were still unsure about Iran's nuclear program. A report prepared by the US intelligence community in August 1974 assessed that Iran's nuclear program was "entirely in the planning stage." However, the report also mentioned the Shah's "ambition to make Iran a power to be reckoned with" (Alvandi, 2016, p. 139). There were even some alarms in Congress about Iran's nuclear program, particularly after India's 1974 nuclear test (Alvandi, 2016). Therefore, Iran campaigned hard to convince opponents to export nuclear technology to the country. Nevertheless, Iran found some supporters like Secretary Kissinger, who assured Iranians about the US's "strong support" for their program (Alvandi, 2016, p. 140).

Despite strong ties with Iran, the US's concerns about Iran's nuclear issue had not completely dissipated. Even Kissinger was firm on the reprocessing of nuclear fuel by Iran. The Shah was not satisfied with the developments over controlling reprocessing. In 1975, the newspaper *Business Week* released an interview with the Shah in which he claimed that the safeguards asked by the US were "incompatible" with Iranian sovereignty (Sergi, 2017, p. 150). In May 1978, the State Department finally sent a draft agreement to the U.S. Embassy in Teheran. However, disagreements remained, and up until 1978, neither President Carter nor the Shah had signed it. The last diplomatic document on US-Iran cooperation with the possibility of a nuclear agreement on September 21, 1978, indicated the resignation of Dr. Akbar Etemad as chief of the AEOI and reiterated that "Nuclear activity [...] has come to a halt" (Sergi, 2017, p. 158). Iran's ambitious nuclear plans faced severe setbacks after the 1979 revolution, which replaced the Shah's regime with a fundamentally different one.

5.2 The Revolution and Nuclear Program Developments

Hardliner Khomeini's supporters neutralized their former allies (nationalists and leftists) and started to pursue their ideologically-based foreign policy shortly after the revolution. A crossing of the threshold in Iran's shifting foreign policy toward the US happened when Islamist students occupied the US embassy in Tehran and took 52 American diplomats hostage for 444 days. Following the hostage-taking, Iran's moderate nationalist Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, resigned, which opened the political arena up to hard-core Islamists even more. The US obsession with Iran was stirred up by the 1983 suicide attack on its military barricade in Beirut, killing 241 US marines. The US accused Iran of being

the real power behind it (Simon & Stevenson, 2018). Despite signs of pragmatism, the Iranian leadership's foreign policy has since been mainly based on "revolutionary idealism" and confronting the US dominance in the Middle East (Sariolghalam, 2004, p. 69). The United States regards Iran's security doctrine as unfriendly and hostile, which makes the US determined to contain Iran's Middle East power projection, as implied by the country's direct actions or its proxy groups (Kagan, 2012; Cordesman & Khazai, 2013; Cordesman et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 2016; Hokayem & Roberts, 2016).

A few years after the revolution, Iran re-started its nuclear program. Up until the revolution, the first reactor (Bushehr I) was 85 percent complete (on schedule for its 1981 completion date), and the second (Bushehr II) was partially complete (Patrikarakos, 2012, p. 38; Joyner, 2016). The German company Kraftwerk Union signed a new agreement with Iran to complete the plant, and German engineers returned to Iran in 1984 to do a "feasibility study" and assess how to finish the Bushehr power plant. However, they announced they would "only complete the plant when the war ended" (Patrikarakos, 2012, p. 108, Nikou, 2018). The German side finally grounded the Bushehr nuclear power plant project after Iraq's airstrikes in 1984 (Patrikarakos, 2012; Nikou, 2018).

The abandoned Bushehr nuclear project was not the end of Iran's quest for nuclear technology.⁴ Tehran was suspicious of the West, and contended that Western countries wanted to "keep Iran dependent on the industrial powers and to impede the country's economic and industrial progress" (Mousavian, 2012, p. 195). On the other hand, Western countries, mainly the US, have been suspicious of Iran's nuclear plans since the revolution. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report in 1985 assessed Iran as a "potential threat," suggesting it was "interested in developing facilities that ... could eventually produce fissile material that could be used in a [nuclear] weapon" (Kerr, 2018, p. 1). However, the report added that Iran needed "at least a decade" to do that (Kerr, 2018, p. 1). A decade later, Iran still did not have a nuclear weapon. However, the CIA report in 1995 suggested Iran was "devoting significant resources to its nuclear program" and "aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability" (CIA, 1995, p. 12). The report surmised that with "significant foreign assistance," Tehran could produce a weapon by the end of the decade (p. 12). Nevertheless, not all US organizations agreed with the CIA assessment. For instance, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reported that

⁴ Iran and Russia signed a contract in 1992 to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which went into operation in 2011 after years of delays.

“Iran’s rudimentary program” had “apparently met with limited success” (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 1997, p. 74).

Based on the US agencies’ assessments, the Clinton administration opposed Iran’s nuclear energy program, arguing that an oil and gas-rich country like Iran does not need nuclear produced electricity. In 2000, President Clinton signed the Iran Non-proliferation Act, which allowed the United States to “take punitive action against individuals or organizations known to be providing material aid to weapons of mass destruction programs in Iran” (Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation, 2000, para. 13). Although exaggerated, the US agency’s reports were not entirely baseless. In its 2015 report, the IAEA mentioned that “in the early 1990s, Iran may have received design information for a nuclear explosive device from a clandestine nuclear supply network” (IAEA, 2015, p. 7). However, the report concludes:

Based on all the information available to it, the Agency has found no indications of Iran having conducted activities which can be directly traced to the ‘uranium metal document’ or to design information for a nuclear explosive device from the clandestine nuclear supply network (p. 8).

In 2002, Iran’s nuclear program entered a new phase after revelations from exiled opposition groups about the country’s under-construction nuclear facilities.

5.3 Nuclear Revelations and Negotiations

In 2002 and 2003, the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO), a group that operates under the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), leaked information about the Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz (uranium enrichment) and Arak (heavy water production) (Squassoni, 2007; Goulka et al., 2009; Garduno, 2014). However, knowledgeable former officials said the US had been aware of “at least some of these activities” (Kerr, 2018, p. 6). The Mujahedin-e Khalq (meaning the People’s Holy Warriors) was an exiled Iranian “dissident cult group” based (primarily) in Iraq at that time (Goulka et al., 2009, p. xi). Founded in 1965, the MEK combined elements of Marxism and Islam, and became active against the Shah’s regime, Western targets, and (after a short honeymoon period) the Islamic Republic. Some MEK members found sanctuary and military support in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, after fleeing the Islamic Republic’s persecution. Armed with heavy weapons, they even conducted military operations against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war (Goulka et al., 2009; Patrikarakos, 2012;

Cronberg, 2017). In 1997, the US government listed the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization (Goulka et al., 2009).

Accordingly, Iran was said to need less than one year to finalize a nuclear weapon (Garduno, 2014). After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK desperately needed US support and hoped to get it through providing information (Garduno, 2014). Following these revelations, the group enjoyed a resurgence of political support. For instance, at a 2005 press conference, President George W. Bush stated that the world had discovered Iran's concealed nuclear program "because a dissident group pointed it out to the world" (Goulka et al., 2009, p. 66). President Bush mentioned MEK's assistance, while the group was only removed from the EU terrorist list in 2009 (Goulka et al., 2009). The US did the same even later, in 2012 (Shane, 2012; Cronberg, 2017). The MEK has had a good relationship with some hawks in Washington in the last few years. For instance, John Bolton is estimated to have received over \$180,000 to speak at multiple MEK events (Dehghan, 2018).

Iran denied any wrongdoing regarding the MEK claims. The country emphasized that according to code 3.1.4 of the NPT Safeguard Agreement, Iran had time to report its activities up to 180 days "before the first receipt of nuclear material at the facility" (Vishwanathan, 2016, p. 15; IAEA, 1974, p. 6).⁵ Iran could not reassure others about its nuclear plans. At the September 2002 regular session of the IAEA General Conference, the Director-General asked Iran's representative, Aghazadeh, about Iran's discovered nuclear facilities. Aghazadeh "provided some information on Iran's intentions to develop further its nuclear fuel cycle, and agreed on a visit to the two sites later in 2002 by the Director-General, accompanied by safeguards experts" (IAEA, 2003, p. 1). The visit to Iran took place from February 21 to 22, 2003, by the Director-General accompanied by the Deputy Director-General for Safeguards (DDG-SG) and the Director of the Division of Safeguards Operations (IAEA, 2003, p. 2). An IAEA report on June 19 "did not find Iran in violation of the NPT," but added that Iran should have been more forthcoming about the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and the Arak heavy water production plant (Nikou, 2018, p. 4). Later, on November 12, the IAEA concluded that "there was no evidence of a secret nuclear weapons program in Iran" (Nikou, 2018, p. 5). However, the

⁵ Since the JCPOA, Iran has accepted the implementation of the modified code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangement. As a result, Iran agreed to inform the IAEA about its new nuclear facilities from the beginning of the project (JCPOA, 2015; Soltanieh, 2018; Vishwanathan, 2016).

IAEA was unconvinced about traces of highly enriched uranium and plutonium found in Iran's Kalaye Electric Company facilities. In the case of the uranium, Iran admitted that their centrifuges' contaminated components "had been imported from other countries...a claim later proved correct" (Joyner, 2016, p. 24). Besides that, President Khatami claimed that the plutonium was used for "manufacturing pharmaceuticals, and the small amount produced by Iran could not make a nuclear bomb" (Nikou, 2018, p. 5). The suspicion towards Iran did not fade after the IAEA's 2003 visits. According to the US, Iran was "unquestionably seeking a nuclear bomb" (Patrikarakos, 2012, p. 184).

The Western mass media further cemented the US's strict approach toward Iran. They covered Iran's nuclear program negatively, and in the context of "us" and "them." The problem was that "they" knew too much and had access to technology that only "we" could be trusted with (Izadi & Saghaye-Biria, 2007, p. 157). Izadi & Saghaye-Biria (2007) showed that the US media (including *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wall Street Journal*) depicted Iran as an untrustworthy threat. Therefore, they stressed that Iran should be excluded from nuclear knowledge and technology. Examples include *The Wall Street Journal* headlines "The Mullah's Nukes" (2003) and "The Mullah's Bomb" (2004), *The Washington Post* headline "Iran's Bomb" (2003), and *The New York Times* headline "One More Round on Iran's Nukes" (2004) (p. 156). This media coverage would solidify the US government's claims about Iran's "nuclear ambitions" over making nuclear weapons.

On the European side, Koosha & Shams (2005) recognized the same pattern in *The Telegraph*, *Daily Mail*, *The Guardian*, *The Mirror*, *The Times*, and *The Independent*. They showed that between 2003 and 2006, selected British newspapers with different political affiliations crystallized themes or topics of "cover-up, defiance, deviance, concession seeking, fear and crisis," depicting Iran as a perceived threat (p. 115). The same media, though, represented the EU as Iran's antithesis, with themes such as "power, crisis solving, and world-protection," so the savior EU could counter Iran's real threat (Koosha & Shams, 2005, p. 116). In addition, according to Koosha & Shams (2005), the British media used words such as "accuse" or "charge" to describe Iran's position, which undermined Iran's statements and reduced them to the level of claims and accusations.

Some hawks, particularly a faction in the US headed by the US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, John Bolton, held a rigid position toward Iran and "overestimate[d] the value of sticks" (Patrikarakos, 2012, p. 184). The US called

for nothing less than a complete shutdown of Iran's enrichment program, sending the Iran nuclear issue to the UN Security Council. Also, the military option was always on the table for the US (Partikarakos, 2012; Cronberg, 2017). The US had already attacked Iraq, and on May 1, 2003, President Bush announced the end of (relatively short) successful military operations. Iran (like Iraq) was part of Bush's "axis of evil," and EU countries were worried about the US attack on Iran to "delay or derail" Iran's nuclear program (Cronberg, 2017; Meier, 2013).

Some days before President Bush declared "Mission Accomplished" on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, Tehran made one last attempt to reach out to Washington. The US attack on Iraq was an alarming sign for Iran. Tehran put every card it had on the negotiation table, from Hezbollah and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (including Hamas and Islamic Jihad) to Iran's nuclear program. However, the US showed no sign of interest (Parsi, 2006; Farmanfarmaian, 2010). Hawks in the Pentagon and Vice President Dick Cheney's office rejected Iran's proposal out of hand. They had a simple but destructive argument. They interpreted Iran's move as out of desperation and suggested that the US could get whatever it wanted by simply overthrowing the Islamic regime instead of offering anything through a deal. As a result, they emphasized that they "don't speak to evil" (Parsi, 2006, p. 14). In Tehran, the American move strengthened hardliners' positions against the moderate president Khatami. They questioned the Americans' trustworthiness, reiterating, "If you give in, if you help from a position of weakness, then you get negative results" (Parsi, 2006, p. 13; Joyner, 2016, p. 21).

Meanwhile, the IAEA and Western countries wanted to see more concrete actions by Iran. The EU tried to find a compromise solution between the US's aggressive approach and Iran's belief in fulfilling its "inalienable right" to enrichment. In October 2003, the foreign ministers of the UK, France, and Germany (later dubbed the E-3) paid official visits to Iran. The E-3 joint action could also close the gap between the UK, France, and Germany caused by the UK's support for the invasion of Iraq (Cronberg, 2017; Wright, 2019). In Sa'd Abaad palace, the E-3 foreign ministers and Iran agreed on Iran's cooperation with the IAEA, ratifying the NPT's additional protocols, and voluntarily suspending enrichment (Meier, 2013; Wright, 2019, p. 200). Not all of the EU members agreed with the lead taken by the E3. They became more supportive when, in November 2004, Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, officially

joined or, as some called it, built his way. Once this happened, the E-3 received formal approval from the EU as a whole (Meier, 2013, p. 4).

On November 14, 2004, following the negotiations in Paris, Iran accepted the Paris agreement with the E-3. According to the agreement, Iran froze all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, and pledged not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz power plant during the E-3 talks (Patrikarakos, 2012; Soltanieh, 2018). However, Iran had no legal obligation to stop its uranium enrichment activities, which were guaranteed in article 4 (1) of NPT, as mentioned in IAEA documents:

Iran reaffirms that, in accordance with Article II of the NPT, it does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. It commits itself to full cooperation and transparency with the IAEA. Iran will continue implementing voluntarily the Additional Protocol pending ratification (IAEA, 2004, p. 3).

The E-3, in return, acknowledged Iran's right to a "peaceful nuclear program and promised to oppose the referral of Iran to the Security Council" (Cronberg, 2017, p. 19). The European side also proposed cooperation in "fighting terrorism as well as in integration of Iran to the global economy" (Cronberg, 2017, p. 19).

This positive development was the first step in a long, bumpy road of negotiations leading to the JCPOA. The negotiations constructively engaged international organizations, powerful countries, and the ambitious but less-powerful Iran. At first, the US did not agree with the EU, and intended to refer Iran's nuclear issue to the UN Security Council (UNSC). However, the US policy seemed to be slightly altered later. In March 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced support for the EU efforts. Furthermore, although the US rejected direct talks with Iran, it agreed to drop its objections to Iran's World Trade Organization membership, and sell commercial airplane spare parts to the country. According to the National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, the US did that in response to an EU request (Kerr, 2005). In return, the E-3 pledged they would report Iran to the UNSC in case of Iran's non-cooperation and suspension of the Paris Agreement (Cronberg, 2017). However, Iran's cooperation soon ended when hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad started his presidency in 2005. He called the Iranian negotiators over the Paris Agreement traitors and, in 2006, announced that Iran would resume its enrichment program at the Natanz facilities (Hadley, 2010).

In May 2006, Secretary Rice announced that the US would join E3 in talks with Iran If Iran suspended all of its enrichment activities (Hadley, 2010). In a month, negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (five permanent U.N. Security Council members, plus

Germany) started (Patrikarakos, 2012; Meier, 2013). Ali Larijani from Iran and Javier Solana, representing the EU, had a series of fruitless meetings before Larijani's resignation in 2007. Larijani, who was known as a rational (although conservative) negotiator in the West, gave up his position to the hardliner Said Jalili who had a strong bond with Ahmadinejad ("Ali Larijani," 2007). Meanwhile, Iran was disappointed because, two and half years after Iran's voluntary enrichment suspension, there was still no sign of commitments from the E-3 (Soltanieh, 2018). Following the unwanted result of the Paris Agreement, Ali Larijani famously said, "We gave [them] a precious pearl and got a candy [instead]" (Ghorbanoghli, 2013, para. 6). Iran's next step was to inform the IAEA about removing the seals from the Isfahan facilities and starting enrichment again (Patrikarakos, 2012). The worst result for Iran was that the same E-U3 group proposed a resolution against Iran, "conveying the issue to the UNSC after Iran suspended its voluntary suspension" (Soltanieh, 2018, p. 10).

Ahmadinejad held a challenging position in relation to the nuclear program, and later even repeatedly called UNSC resolutions against Iran "useless piece(s) of paper" ("Ahmadinejad again defends," 2013). Iran's rigid stand on its nuclear plan pushed Russia and China closer to Europe and the US. Previously, Russia and China did not agree to bring Iran's nuclear program to the UNSC and "increase Iran's belligerence" (Cronberg, 2017, p. 22). On February 28, 2005 (only a few months before the beginning of Ahmadinejad's presidency on August 1), Russia even tried to reduce tensions through a nuclear supply agreement with Iran, offering Iran the choice to buy the Bushehr nuclear power plant's fuel from Russia instead of domestic enrichment (and to send spent fuel back to Russia) (Patrikarakos, 2012; Cronberg, 2017; Nikou, 2018). The Paris Agreement died after Iran re-started nuclear enrichment, paving the way to discussions over Iran's nuclear agreement being dealt with in the UNSC.

5.4 Iran's Nuclear Program Goes to the UNSC

In September 2005, the IAEA adopted a resolution stating, "Iran's policy of concealment has resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with its Safeguards Agreement" (IAEA, 2005, p. 2). Considering there were no signs of change in Iran's activities, the foreign ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US, and the High Representative of the EU met in London in January 2006, over Iran's nuclear

developments. Following the meeting, UK Foreign Minister Jack Straw, announced on behalf of the ministers' meeting:

Ministers... agreed that this week's Extraordinary IAEA Board meeting should report to the Security Council its decision on the steps required from Iran, and should also report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue (IAEA, 2006, para. 4).

Six months after Straw's statement, the first UNSC resolution on Iran's nuclear program was issued in July 2006. Resolution 1696 was adopted by a vote of 14 - 1 (Qatar) (United Nations, 2006). The resolution "called upon Iran without further delay" to "take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors" and "suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development" (UNSC 1696, 2006a, art. 1). Iran rejected the resolution. As a result, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1737 in December 2006 ("Resolution 1737 adopted," 2006).

Resolution 1737 contained a big difference from the previous one. Resolution 1696 had acted under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. According to Article 40, the UNSC still hopes to solve the issues without any force. It tries "to prevent an aggravation of the situation" before "making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures," by calling upon "the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable" (United Nations, 1946, p. 9). While Article 1 in Resolution 1696 "called upon" Iran to "take steps" (UNSC 1696, 2006a, art. 1), and was not imposing any actions on Iran, resolution 1737 changed the tone under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, (UNSCR 1737, 2006b, art. 1) saying Iran "shall take the steps." According to Article 41, the UNSC may "call upon" the members to impose punitive actions against the targeted country. The actions under Article 41 "may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations" (United Nations, 1946, p. 9). Consequently, for the first time, international (UNSC-backed) sanctions were officially initiated on individuals and entities involved in Iran's nuclear program, missile program, or both (UNSCR 1737, 2006b). The "motivating power of sanctions" (Perkovich, 2017, p. 5) in UNSCR 1737 was interpreted differently by Iran, which considered sanctions as a way to prevent the country from achieving economic and technological progress (Mousavian, 2012).

5.5 Back to Negotiations

In 2008, Barack Obama won the US presidential elections, with US diplomacy toward Iran at the top of his election campaign priorities. In August 2009, the US State Department announced its wish for direct talks with Iran through 5+1 negotiations (Patrikarakos, 2012). However, this willingness came after a series of setbacks in Iran's bumpy nuclear issue road. Even before Obama, in July 2008, the Bush administration's Undersecretary of State, William Burns, joined a meeting with Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, sending signals to Iran over the US's flexible position (Farhi, 2009, p. 3). Jalili was ideologically close to Ahmadinejad, and became Iran's chief negotiator after Larijani's unprecedented resignation, only three days before his planned meeting with Javier Solana over Iran's nuclear issue ("Ali Larijani has resigned," 2007).

Larijani's resignation was a sign of the complicated Iranian domestic politics, which haunted the negotiations for a long time. Apparently, Larijani had some "unsolvable differences" with the president (Patrikarakos, 2012). Sometimes these differences were too clear to be denied. In one case, in October 2007, President Putin met Iran's Supreme Leader, Khamenei. Khamenei clearly mentioned Putin's nuclear offer, saying, "We will think it over." The day after, Larijani also talked about Putin's suggestion and said: "We are studying it" ("Ali Larijani," 2007). However, Ahmadinejad immediately rejected Larijani's statement and denied there had been any suggestion by Russia. It has been said that Russia's plan involved the suspension of enrichment, while Ahmadinejad was firmly against any suspension in the enriching process ("Ali Larijani," 2007). Larijani's resignation sent a strong negative signal to the West, and emboldened the hardliners' take on Iran's nuclear issue. In fact, the Secretary of State, Rice, was waiting to meet Larijani and his delegation of 300 during the 2007 UN General Assembly in New York. The plan was that "Iran would temporarily suspend enrichment, and the West would suspend sanctions," but neither the delegation nor Larijani showed up (Patrikarakos, 2012, p. 233). He had lost the battle with the hardliners. Only a few days after Larijani's resignation, the *Iran* newspaper, the government's official newspaper, wrote: "this resignation was not only due to Larijani's desire and the president has decided to make nuclear diplomacy dynamic" ("Six years was," 2013).

Disappointed with Iran's position, the UNSC passed resolution 1803 in March 2008, with 14 votes in favor and none against (one country, Indonesia, abstained) (United States Department of State (USDOS), 2008). Resolution 1803 added new sanctions on Iran. It required the UN members to increase their efforts "to prevent Iran from acquiring sensitive nuclear or missile technology," and also added 13 persons and seven entities to the UN blacklist (UNSCR 1803, 2008; Davenport, 2019, p. 4). The resolution also banned the sale of dual-use items to Iran (UNSCR 1803, 2008), which widened the relevant sanctioned materials list. UNSC adopted another resolution (UNSCR 1835, 2008) on September 26, 2008, reaffirming three previous rounds of sanctions (UNSCR 1835, 2008, art. 1). This time, there were no new sanctions, due to Russia and China's objections (Nikou, 2018, p. 9). It became clear that Russia and China would not follow the US sanction plan further than that. Obama tried to break the ice when he contacted Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei through two personal letters in 2009, marking a huge step on the diplomatic path after 30 years of diplomatic cut-off (Patrikarakos, 2012; Meier, 2013; Cronberg, 2017). The US was convinced that the previous administration's policy over zero enrichment by Iran was unrealistic. This assessment was supported by the actual developments in Iran's nuclear issue. By early 2009, Iran produced around one tonne of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), using 3000 centrifuges in the expanding Natanz facilities (Meier, 2013).

Some European partners did not welcome the US policy shift. France particularly took a demanding position against Obama's "going soft on Iran" approach, and insisted on a zero-enrichment policy (Parsi, 2013, p. 12). The French players felt some resentment about the US taking charge of the process, and also feared that Iran would outwit the Obama administration. In French eyes, the more restricted position would increase "Europe's leverage and relevance." (Parsi, 2013, p. 12; Meier, 2013). Besides, the UK threatened Iran with "a much tougher position on sanctions" if Iran did not comply (Meier, 2013, p. 12). Iran's domestic political developments also added more complications to international developments, particularly during 2009.

In the 2009 presidential elections, Ahmadinejad defeated Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Iran's popular wartime prime minister, in the first run. However, there were widespread accusations of election fraud. As a result, millions of Iranians took to the streets across the country, causing the most challenging situation for the Islamic Republic (Farhi, 2009; Hurst, 2016). Until then, the nuclear negotiations were framed as a national issue beyond

the factions' competition. Even the reformist Mousavi (who is still under house arrest following the post-2009 election protests) emphasized Iran's right to enrich uranium (Barzegar, 2009). However, the nuclear narration changed after the 2009 post-election crisis. The government used an iron fist against the protesters and reformist activists, blaming foreign interference for the post-election turmoil. The post-election policy shifting was relayed in a polarized domestic atmosphere, and external conflicts limited the room for cooperation with "others" over the nuclear issue (Farhi, 2009; Barzegar, 2009).

The negotiation process after Iran's post-election crisis was tested in October 2009. The process was becoming more complicated by revelation of the Fordow uranium enrichment facilities around the holy city of Qom, which reduced the already eroded trust between the negotiators. On September 25, 2009, United States President Obama, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that Iran had been constructing a uranium-enrichment facility, Fordow, deep inside the mountains around Qom. The Fordow case became twisted when IAEA spokesman Marc Vidricaire said, "Iran informed the agency September 21 about the existence of the facility." However, the US intelligence officials rejected the IAEA report and claimed, "Iran offered the confirmation only after learning that the United States had discovered it" (Davenport, 2019, p. 4; Clinton, 2014).

In the eyes of the Americans and their international partners, the Fordow facilities were "too small to be viable for production of fuel for a nuclear power reactor, but may be well-suited for a military purpose" ("Public Points for Qom," 2009). Iranian representatives introduced the Fordow facilities as a backup plant while the Natanz facilities were under military threat by the US and Israel. The Fordow project was therefore for both practical and political purposes. Iran told the world that the country was determined in its nuclear program, and could resume the process even after military attacks. According to Iran's Ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh:

[...] this new site at Fordow has a political message: we are saying to the world that even the threat of military attack will not stop enrichment - we have a contingency plan. Enrichment in Iran will not be stopped or suspended at any price. It has not been done by sanctions or resolutions; it won't be done by force. If Natanz is attacked, this site will continue enrichment (Patrikarakos, 2012, p. 253).

The IAEA, 5+1 countries, and Iran met in Geneva on October 1, to discuss a swap deal over Iran's enriched uranium, while Iran was still in hot water due to the Fordow issue.

Along with the Western governments, coverage of the Fordow revelation by the Western media helped put more pressure on Iran. The media put all the burden on Iran's shoulders, suggesting that the situation and following negotiations depended on (not very trustworthy) Iran's behavior entirely. They also ignored the turbulent history of past negotiations and the current context (Seigel & Barforush, 2012). A September 26 *Guardian* article explained how US and European leaders saw the Fordow revelation as an opportunity to "demand" that Iran take "concrete steps to restore confidence and transparency" (Seigel & Barforush, 2012, p. 27). According to the Geneva talks, Iran would send 1200 kg of its low-enriched uranium to a third country for more enrichment. Russia would enrich the uranium as a first step, and then France would turn the enriched uranium into fuel rods for the reactor, sending it back to Iran. The enriched uranium would be suitable for Iran's research reactor and difficult to change into weapon-grade materials (Fitzpatrick, 2011; Patrikarakos, 2012; Meier, 2013; Cronberg, 2017).

The agreement failed because of opposition in Iran. Hardliners, emboldened by post-election events, were unsatisfied with the Geneva talks, and saw the meetings as happening alongside Iran's post-election crisis. For them, the West was "miscalculating" Iran's negotiation powers due to an ongoing crisis, and trying to use the Geneva talks to "weaken Iran" (Shariatmadari, 2009; Nouraldini, 2014). Reformists were also not happy about the agreement. As a reformist leader and Ahmadinejad's rival in the 2009 disputed elections, Mousavi called the agreement "bowing to the US" ("Mir Hossein Mousavi criticized," 2009) and "not even safeguarding the undeniable rights of our people" (Hurst, 2016, p. 548). However, some suggest that the reformists' motives for attacking the deal mainly damaged Ahmadinejad rather than rejecting the deal's contents (Hurst, 2016). News coverage of the 2009 Geneva negotiations could make Iran's hardliners more suspicious of the Western negotiators. The coverage was focused on the US and Western European states' idea of an acceptable outcome: Iran's concessions in every demand (Seigel & Barforush, 2013). As an example, a September 27, 2009, *Washington Post* article reported that if Iran did not respond "seriously by year's end," the United States and its allies could begin "to push for crippling sanctions" (Seigel & Barforush, 2013, p. 18).

5.6 Others Join the Negotiations

Following Iran's rejection and Russia's failed attempt to offer a flexible deal, the collapse of the Geneva talks encouraged other countries to fill the void and come up with a solution. Western leaders were surprised when, on May 17, Iran gave up insistence on a simultaneous exchange of LEU on Iran's soil. This time, unlike the Geneva Agreement, Iran had no strong domestic opposition against the "Joint Declaration by Iran, Türkiye, and Brazil on Nuclear Fuel." Brazil and Türkiye emphasized that Iran "had agreed on quantity, place and time of the transfer," resembling everything Obama had asked for in his letter to Lula da Silva, Brazil's president (Fitzpatrick, 2011, p. 36). In a three-page letter to da Silva, Obama also questioned Iran's willingness to accept "the IAEA's fair and balanced" plan. For the US, the Iranian side was only playing at being nice, as Obama emphasized in his letter to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva:

We have observed Iran convey hints of flexibility to you and others, but formally reiterate an unacceptable position...I believe that this raises real questions about Iran's nuclear intentions, if Iran is unwilling to accept an offer to demonstrate that its LEU is for peaceful, civilian purposes ("Letter by Barack Obama," 2010, para. 7).

Following increasing regional tensions over Iran's nuclear program, Türkiye supported Iran's right to have a peaceful nuclear program, and slammed Israel for its nuclear stockpile (Barkey, 2011). Brazil and Türkiye's plan was revealed when Western countries' efforts to tighten sanctions against Iran were becoming fruitful. As a result, the first and only major deal with Iran on its nuclear issue by non-5+1 countries was doomed to failure.

The Turks feared that further escalation in the region could end up in military conflict. The result would be more destabilization, while the Iraq and Afghanistan wars still were open wounds. The ruling AKP party had heavily invested in domestic support, due to its economic successes, and more chaos in the country's backyard was the last thing the party wanted to see in the region (Barkey, 2011). Türkiye's position as an independent mediator was not surprising. In 2008, Türkiye's Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, offered to mediate between Iran and Obama's administration, who seemed eager to talk with Iran about its nuclear plan. Erdoğan even said Iran had already asked for "Turkey's help in improving relations between Iran and the United States" under the Bush administration (Warnaar, 2013, p. 131).

Türkiye (like Brazil) was eager to influence “political and discursive” arenas on the world scale, which is usually left to Western powers (Ozkan, 2010, p. 29). Besides, Ankara and Brasilia saw no significant difference between their plan and the American position. In early 2010, President Lula da Silva met Ahmadinejad in Tehran to discuss Iran’s nuclear issue and try to find a diplomatic solution. Iran embraced Brazil’s efforts, and “Both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad praised Lula for his mediating role” (Warnaar, 2013, p. 131). Brazil wanted to “consolidate Brazil’s position as a strong player in resolving disputes to raise its status in the eyes of the international community” (Santos, 2011, p. 62). In Türkiye and Brazil’s eyes, they did not talk to Iran “through the power hierarchy of the existing international system,” and considered their Iranian counterparts ‘equal’ (Ozkan, 2010, p. 28).

Brazil’s foreign minister, Celso Amorim, explained the great powers’ cold shoulders on the deal as

The fact that Brazil and Türkiye ventured into a subject that would be typically handled by the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) _and, more importantly, were successful in doing so disturbed the status quo (Santos, 2011, p. 64).

Moreover, Brazil’s economic relationship with Iran was on the rise, as they ranked eighth among Iran’s major import partners in 2011 (Warnaar, 2013). Avoiding sanctions against Iran would protect Brazil’s commercial interests, a particularly new opportunity for a “deal with oil exploration and providing ethanol” (Santos, 2011, p. 64). Türkiye and Brazil did not consider that the US could finally bring China and Russia’s position close to the West in the UNSC and did not want to miss this rare opportunity to pressure Iran (Barkey, 2011; Santos, 2011; Patrikarakos, 2012). This development was also a key reason Iran was willing to sign an agreement, to avoid the UNSC’s new sanctions (Barkey, 2011). Türkiye and Brazil believed that the deal would drum up international support. After all, some leaders and authorities in African, Asian, and Latin American developing countries and even UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed their deal with Iran (Santos, 2011; Barkey, 2011).

Iran promised to send the 1,200 kg of its LEU stockpile to Türkiye and wait one year to receive fuel rods for its research reactor. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the agreement as “too little too late” and emphasized that Iran had 1,600 kg of LEU at that time and had already started enriching fuel to 20 percent (Fitzpatrick, 2011; Santos, 2011; Cronberg, 2017, p. 25). Russia and China voted for the harsh UNSC

resolution against Iran after Türkiye and Brazil's failed attempt. China finally voted against Iran while it "timidly welcomed the [Brazil and Türkiye's] deal as a step in the direction of a peaceful solution" (Santos, 2011, p. 61), and even in early March 2010, announced, "sanctions would not solve the Iran nuclear issue" (Ozkan, 2010, p. 27). Meanwhile, Russia rejected "any link between the deal and the sanctions resolution against Iran" (Santos, 2011, p. 61) while emphasizing that the "proposal [by Brazil and Türkiye] was not sufficient" (Santos, 2011, p. 66).

Only one day after Brazil and Türkiye announced the agreement with Iran, the permanent members of the UNSC circulated a draft resolution among other UNSC members on sanctioning Iran. The UNSC resolution needed 9 out of 15 members' votes to be adopted (besides avoiding a veto of the permanent members). This issue made even insignificant UNSC members important. As Secretary Clinton pointed out, this was the logic as to why she spent time over her four years "courting nations that didn't normally play a big role in international affairs, such as Togo, but whose votes I knew we would need at pivotal times" (Clinton, 2014, p. 427). Clinton even met Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni only one day before Ahmadinejad visited him, to thwart Iran's "diplomatic counter-attack" and get Museveni's vote in favor as a UNSC member, for resolution 1929 (Clinton, 2014).

Clinton's counter-attack enjoyed wide media coverage. As the debates on new rounds of punitive sanctions against Iran were going on in the UNSC, media coverage of Iran's nuclear issue was in line with the position of US officials. The media expanded the government's arguments, and reiterated their pro-sanction position, without mentioning the context. As Seigel & Barforush (2012) show, the US and UK media, from different political perspectives (including *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Post*, *The Financial Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Independent*) did not mention two essential facts related to Iran's nuclear program. They did not mention that Iran widely accepted the nuclear non-proliferation requirements, and that its nuclear program was under the strict monitoring of the IAEA (p. 8). The media also failed to mention the Iranian people as the main actors. Rashidi & Rashti (2012) show that the Iranian people, the main target of sanctions, were almost entirely excluded from the Western mass media (including *The Economist*, *Daily Express*, *The Washington Post*, and *The New York Times*) coverage of Iran's nuclear issues and sanctions against the country (p. 5). Positions like forcing Iran back to negotiations through "more stringent sanctions"

over its nuclear program — which the United States and its Western allies suspected was “meant to create a weapon” (Landler, 2009) — aligned the media with their governments.

Resolution 1929 passed 12 in favor, two against (Türkiye and Brazil), and one abstention (Lebanon) on June 9, 2010 (Ozkan, 2010; Patrikarakos, 2012; Cronberg, 2017), and imposed the “strictest sanctions in history on Iran” (Clinton, 2014, p. 429). However, it emphasized that “once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program is restored,” the UNSC will treat Iran like “any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (UNSCR 1929, 2010, p. 3). Meanwhile, article 9 of the resolution noted that “Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons,” and other states “shall take all necessary measures” to stop Iran (UNSCR 1929, 2010, p. 5). The “all necessary measures” part could indirectly refer to article 42 of the UN charter for a military operation against Iran. The resolution was the harshest up until then, and in addition to nuclear and ballistic missile programs, oil, transport, and the insurance sector were targeted (UNSCR 1929, 2010).

The mass media followed their pre-resolution approaches after UNSCR 1929. Allegations about pursuing nuclear weapons by Iran spread by (particularly) the US media concurred with the views of the US officials. Shortly after the UN vote on June 20, 2010, the *New York Times* quoted then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton over Iran’s nuclear program, referring to Iran’s “pursuit of nuclear weapons” (Seigel & Barforush, 2013, p. 14). Clinton listed her allegations among some of Iran’s well-documented human rights abuses and meddling in international security “as if to suggest that you can’t question one without also questioning another” (Seigel & Barforush, 2013, p. 14). The Trump administration followed this approach and, for instance, made 12 demands for removing the US unilateral sanctions against Iran, mentioning Iran’s “malign activities.” The US government later added another demand (human rights) to the others to “support Iranian voices” (Annan, 2018).

The EU, reluctant to impose punitive measures on Iran besides the UN sanctions, changed its position and, alongside the US, introduced harsh unilateral sanctions on Iran in late 2011 and 2012. These measures consisted of “restrictions on trade in several goods” (included but not limited to prohibition to import crude oil, natural gas, petrochemical, and petroleum products from Iran), “restrictions in the financial sector” (included but not limited to freezing the assets of the Central Bank of Iran and major

Iranian commercial banks), “measures in the transport sector,” and “travel restrictions and asset freeze” (European Council, 2019).

Two separate issues may have helped the EU to go tough on Iran. First, in November 2011, the IAEA released its report listing, “outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program and actions required of Iran to resolve these” (IAEA, 2011, p. 7; Cronberg, 2017). In another development, in December 2011, “Hundreds of protesters attacked the UK embassy in Tehran,” while, despite Iran’s denial, the UK government believed that this “had the support of the state” (“Attack on UK embassy,” 2011). The incident was described as a “blow[ing] struck in a long-running battle of wits over Iran’s nuclear program” (Borger & Dehghan, 2011, para. 15), which followed a report by the UN’s nuclear watchdog that said Iran had carried out tests “relevant to the development of a nuclear device” (“Attack on UK embassy,” 2011, para. 30). At this point, it seemed multilateralism did not work, and the negotiations with the P5+1 would come to a dead-end. However, there were still hopes for positive developments through the Iran and US bilateral negotiations. So, Iran and the US decided to sit around the negotiation table (this time secretly). The two countries had no direct connections, and the new development needed a mediator. Here, Oman took the initiative.

5.7 The Omani Connection

The next resolution, UNSCR 1929, followed by EU and US unilateral sanctions, alongside Iran’s domestic political complications, brought the negotiations to a deadlock. Although the P5+1 and Iran had four rounds of meetings in Istanbul, Baghdad, Moscow, and Alma-Ata between April 2012 and April 2013, the two sides stuck to their proposals. Iran asked for its rights under the NPT, removing Iran’s nuclear issue from the UNSC and ending the sanctions. In return, the P5+1 demanded Iran suspend 20% enrichment, and offered some technical assistance but no sanction relief (Davenport et al., 2015; Hurst, 2016; Cronberg, 2017).

Ali Akbar Salehi, Ahmadinejad’s foreign minister, believed that the P5+1 countries were not serious about finding a solution to Iran’s nuclear issue. In an interview on August 4, 2015, Salehi pointed out that in Iran’s eyes:

This group [the negotiators] was not negotiating under one country’s leadership. Mrs. [Catherine] Ashton was participating as the EU representative while three EU member negotiators, including the UK, France, and Germany (EU3), considered themselves as a separated group from E3, including the

US, China, and Russia...even one country's disagreement would complicate the situation ("Salehi's untold story," 2015, para. 4-5).

The negotiation came to a dead-end when Qaboos bin Said Al Said, Sultan of Oman, offered to the Americans his mediation. He was respected by both the Americans and Iranians, and had successfully carried out mediation in the case of the imprisoned American hikers in 2009 (Clinton, 2014).

According to Salehi, Iran initially received a hand-written letter but insisted on an official one. After receiving an official letter from Sultan Qaboos, Salehi convinced the skeptical supreme leader to accept bilateral negotiations. It was not an easy task when Khamenei initially responded: "we cannot trust the Americans...they have never kept their promises" ("Salehi's untold story," 2015, para. 17). At the same time, Khamenei was under heavy pressure to do something about the nuclear issue. After severe international and unilateral sanctions, following the UNSC resolution 1929, even hard-liner Ahmadinejad told Khamenei that "we are at the end of the line and considering the UNSC resolutions on nuclear energy, we should sign (accept) them...otherwise, I cannot accept the responsibility of the nuclear dossier anymore" ("Ahmadinejad gave a report," 2016, para. 7).

Khamenei took total responsibility for the nuclear issue into his hands after Ahmadinejad was convinced that there was no way out of the nuclear stalemate ("Ahmadinejad gave a report," 2016). In March 2013, only a few weeks after the first rounds of (still secret) negotiations in Oman, Khamenei showed signs of compromise, when he accepted that the new round of sanctions was hurting: "Americans happily said that John Doe (Khamenei) confessed that the sanctions had had effects. Yes, the sanctions were not ineffective; they want to be happy, [let them] be happy (I do not give a damn)" (Bastani, 2016, para. 35). Khamenei was right. In fact, the latest round of sanctions badly hurt the regime's economy, along with its nuclear program's justification and legitimacy. The "indispensable" sanctions reduced Iran's oil exports from 2.5 million barrels per day to 1.1 million barrels between 2011 and 2013, reducing Iran's oil revenue from \$100 billion to \$35 billion. Iranian blacklisted banks could not even transfer money through SWIFT (Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications), and the inflation rate skyrocketed to between 50% and 70% (Perkovich, 2017, p. 5).

Both sides preferred secret negotiations in Oman "to prevent hard-liners on all sides from derailing talks before they had a chance to get going" and (specifically for the

Americans) to prevent “another circus with lots of posturing for the press” (Clinton, 2014, p. 436). High-ranked officials in Iran denied the existence of the Oman negotiations. In one case, for instance, Ali Akbar Velayati, Khamenei’s consultant and a key conservative figure, assured the press that “there has never been a lawful negotiation [between Iran and the US] allowed by the Supreme Leader” (Bastani, 2018, para. 6). In March 2013, Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and Vice President Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan traveled to Oman for secret talks with Iran. The Iran delegation was led by Ali Asghar Khaji, Deputy Foreign Minister for European and American Affairs (“Salehi’s untold story,” 2015).

The talks involved at least five meetings; the last four were under Hassan Rouhani’s administration. In November 2013, the two countries revealed the Oman secret negotiations were going on, and promised to move toward a comprehensive agreement (Perkovich, 2017, p. 6). However, the US never abandoned its pressure on Iran, even during the Oman negotiations, as Secretary Clinton reiterated: “even as we pursued this secret avenue of engagement, we worked steadily to increase international pressure on the Iranian regime and counter its aggressive ambitions” (Clinton, 2014, p. 438).

5.8 Rouhani and Resuming the Negotiations

Rouhani’s presidency after the June 14 2013 elections brought the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 to a new era. His ‘prudence and hope’ government message was “about saving the economy, reviving ethics and interactions with the world” (George, 2013, para. 12). The Western mainstream media described Rouhani as a moderate and pragmatic president (Dehghan, 2013; Hosseinian & Torbati, 2013; Fassihi, 2013; Nasr, 2017; Wright, 2017; Cunningham, 2017). Rouhani was calculating enough to see cooperation, and the need for urgent action might lead to a comprehensive agreement among UNSC permanent members to put pressure on Iran over its nuclear program. Mass media coverage helped make a “homogeneous, consensual group” image from the ‘rational’ West and Western governments, setting stricter penalties on Iran (Rashidi & Rashti, 2012).

Consequently, countries with different approaches agreed on the same tough position toward Iran through the UNSC resolutions (in the case of the EU and the US, unilateral

extra sanctions). This (uncommon) agreement among world powers made it difficult for Iran to use divide and conquer maneuvers. France had the most uncompromising position among the Western countries, even harsher than the US. Russia wanted to continue expanding its cooperation with Iran, particularly in nuclear and arms areas, but also believed Iran's nuclear activities should be limited. Even China, which wanted to continue expanding its trade with Iran, voted for tough economic sanctions (Perkovich, 2017, p. 5).

Russia and China's votes were particularly important. Thanks to the Western media, Russia and China have been depicted as separate countries "associated with the West" whenever Russia and China cooperate with the West to put pressure on Iran (particularly over sanctions). In contrast, when the two countries have challenged the West in dealing with the Iran issue, they are represented as "dissociated countries with the West and associated with each other as a group with common goals" (Rashidi & Rashti, 2012, p. 8). This pattern of association-dissociation has imaged Russia and China as "traitors or, at the very least, time servers" (Rashidi & Rashti, 2012, p. 8). Russia and China's votes in favor of the US initiative showed how hard the US tried to gain the countries' consent. The US could never repeat its achievement after its withdrawal from the JCPOA, even in the case of European countries, let alone over Russia and China.

At home, Rouhani promised to tackle Iran's economic crisis, deepened by crippling sanctions, by easing social and political restrictions. Rouhani's position on the economy was clear. In Rouhani's eyes, after eight years of Ahmadinejad's mismanagement and aggressive policies, economic improvement could come only "through an easing of international sanctions" (Juneau, 2014, p. 101). One week before the 2013 elections, Rouhani slammed Ahmadinejad and the conservatives for the country's economic problems in the final televised debate. "We should look broadly. Once people live under economic hardships, their dignity is undermined. It is very good to see (nuclear) centrifuges rotating but only when people could make ends meet and when factories and industry could run smoothly," Rouhani said. He added, "all our problems (under Ahmadinejad) are because all efforts were not made to prevent the (nuclear) dossier from being sent to the Security Council" (Dareini, 2013, para. 6).

On the other side of the spectrum, among the candidates was Said Jalili, Iran's negotiator in Ahmadinejad's era, whose supporters chanted, "negotiation with Satan (the US) is a betrayal to Quran" during his campaign gatherings ("Rouhani 92,"

2019). Meanwhile, some talks during the final debate grabbed the audience's attention even more than Rouhani's criticisms. Ali Akbar Velayati, the prominent conservative figure, and Khamenei's consultant, openly questioned Jalili's competence in the nuclear talks. Velayati was Khamenei's hand-picked head of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, as most likely to accomplish tasks such as "participation in major decision-making," "showing the new horizons in foreign relations," and "utilizing elites' opinions" ("What are the responsibilities," 2018). His positions were interpreted as close to Khamenei's. Velayati attacked Jalili as an unqualified candidate and negotiator:

Look, mister! Diplomatic discussion is not [like] a philosophy class. People see you have been responsible for the nuclear dossier for several years, and we have not taken even one step forward; sanctions have been harsher, and their burdens on people's shoulders are on the rise every day...it is clear that you do not want to do progress in your task when [as a negotiator] (you) ask for 100 steps from the other side while taking three steps ("Velayati: The result of," 2013).

Rouhani was not Khamenei's preferred candidate, but this time there was no sign of vast election fraud like in the 2009 elections (Bastani, 2013). The regime's popular legitimacy had decreased, particularly after the widespread post-election turmoil in 2009. As the primary balancer, Khamenei prioritized the regime's stability by supporting a relatively popular president and his plans for the nuclear deal "without decisively alienating any key political faction or domestic constituency" (Hurst, 2016, p. 548). Rouhani won the election in the first run against the unpopular fractured conservatives and hard-liners (Bastani, 2014). On August 6, only three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for "serious negotiations" with the P5+1 on Iran's nuclear issue (Davenport, 2019).

The nuclear negotiations seemed back on track during Rouhani's presidency. On the eve of Rouhani and foreign minister Zarif's departure for the annual UN General Assembly meeting in September 2013, Khamenei clearly signaled to the P5+1 about Iran's new approach by emphasizing "heroic flexibility" in diplomacy:

We are not against proper and rational diplomatic moves, be it in the diplomatic sphere or the sphere of domestic politics ...Your (Iranian people) servant believes in what was coined years ago: 'heroic flexibility.' Flexibility is necessary on certain occasions. It is very beneficial ("Iran: Hello diplomacy," 2013, para. 1).

The P5+1 countries welcomed the new signals from Iran, and particularly the US was about to experience the highest level of contact with its (hopefully) "willing partner" since Iran's 1979 revolution (Williams, 2013).

The 15 minutes long “historic phone call” happened when Obama called Rouhani during his September visit to New York. The phone call was a good start. Obama emphasized how he made clear that the US “respects the right of the Iranian people to access peaceful nuclear energy,” and Rouhani indicated that “Iran will never develop nuclear weapons” (Mason & Charbonneau, 2013, para. 20-21). Rouhani also emphasized their mutual political will to “rapidly solve” the nuclear issue (Mason & Charbonneau, 2013). Western countries had previously worked with Rouhani (Iran’s chief negotiator). He was the head of Iran’s negotiators in the talks that led to the Sa’d Abaad agreement in 2003. Rouhani was proud of his achievements in Sa’d Abaad, and praised the agreement as a “honorific piece of Iran’s political history” (“Hassan Rouhani’s office,” 2012).

Rouhani was confident this time due to the Supreme Leader’s green light and tremendous public support (Bastani, 2014). Now, he was harshly criticizing opponents of his nuclear policy, calling them “profiteers from the sanctions” and “uneducated” (Bastani, 2014, p. 3). Surveys conducted shortly after Rouhani’s presidency showed that 49.6% of people were confident, and 29.7% were, to some extent, confident that Rouhani would be able to solve the nuclear-related problems. In comparison, according to a survey conducted in Tehran, in May 2010, only 22.1% of people thought Ahmadinejad was successful, and 14.8% of them assessed Ahmadinejad’s record as, to some extent, successful in the management of Iran’s nuclear issue (Fazeli & Janadeleh, 2013).

After weeks of negotiations, Iran (with a new negotiations team headed by Foreign Minister Zarif) and the P5+1 reached an interim agreement that outlined a broad framework for discussions. On 24 November, Foreign Minister Zarif and Catherine Ashton, head of the P5+1 negotiating team, signed the proposal, known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). Alongside a series of commitments, Iran pledged to halt production of the near-20% enriched uranium hexafluoride gas (UF₆) and committed to only enrich up to 5% (Arms Control Association, 2020). In addition, the country had to provide additional information to the IAEA, including “access to facilities not normally covered by the existing safeguards agreement” (Cronberg, 2017, p. 28; Davenport et al., 2015). The P5+1 promised “limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible relief on sanctions” (Cronberg, 2017, p. 28; Davenport et al., 2015), enabling the repatriation of \$4.2 billion of Iranian revenue held abroad (Arms Control Association, 2020). The JPOA aimed “to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful” (Abtahi, 2014, p. 736).

5.9 The JCOPA

Formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear deal with Iran became a reality after months of intense negotiations between the P5+1 countries and Iran. The negotiators agreed on a framework for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 2 April 2015 and finalized it on 14 July 2015. The deal started to be implemented on 16 January 2016. With implementation, all of the previous Security Council resolutions over Iran's nuclear program were terminated (JCPOA, 2015, para. 18). Iran's nuclear program was supposed to work inside the legal framework of the NPT and UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (Kerr, 2018). The deal would ensure that "Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue...under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons" (JCPOA, 2015, preface). Instead, the major powers pledged the "comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy" (JCPOA, 2015, preface).

One of the most important results of the JCPOA was that Iran started applying the IAEA Additional Protocol on the implementation day of 16 January 2016. Accordingly, Iran pledged to fully implement modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement (JCPOA, 2015). By fully applying modified Code 3.1, Iran had to inform the IAEA about any new facilities as soon as they decided to build them, instead of up to six months before introducing nuclear materials into the facilities. Iran would also be obliged to share any design changes on existing nuclear facilities with the IAEA in advance (Davenport et al., 2015, p. 30). Iran was supposed to apply the modified code 3.1 at least until October 2023 (8 years after the Adoption Day) to see the EU and the US lifting "the second tranche of sanctions," including some restrictions over Iran's ballistic missile program (JCPOA, 2015, para 34, iv; Vishwanathan, 2016, p. 15).

Through timelines like the one for safeguard implementations, Iran wanted to secure itself against "any changes in American foreign policy toward Iran and the nuclear agreement," following the US Presidential elections in 2016 (Vishwanathan, 2016, p. 15). After all, the negotiators could see the rise of strong opposition against the agreements among Republicans in US domestic politics (Lee, 2015; O'Connor, 2015). Considering

the uncertainties on the US part, paragraph 25 of the JCPOA underlies that in case of opposition against the JCPOA implementation “at the state or local level in the United States,” the US should “take appropriate steps, taking into account all available authorities” (JCPOA, 2015, art. 25). Iran’s obligations under the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol would not be a part of JCPOA. Instead, Iran would have to apply the restrictions under the NPT, monitored by the IAEA. Consequently, criticizing the JCPOA’s short-term effects on the safeguard measurements was baseless (Tertrais, 2015, p. 70). The NPT obligations will remain in order while Iran is a member of the IAEA. Systematic IAEA monitoring “will ensure that the IAEA continues to monitor and verify Iran’s nuclear activities and declarations under its safeguards agreements even after the JCPOA expires” (Vishwanathan, 2016, p. 15).

Both sides needed strong assurances because (mainly) the US and Iran did not trust each other. Obama found the carrot and stick policy valuable, and mentioned the approach on various occasions. In an interview with NPR on 7 April 2015 (5 days after Iran and the P5+1 announced an agreement on a general framework), President Obama emphasized that “Iran would not be entering into any deal, I assume, if, in fact, their economy was not under significant pressure” (“Transcript: President Obama’s” 2015, para. 29). Apparently, the US did not (explicitly) trust Russia and China either. The US wanted to deal with the snap-back sanctions against Iran outside the UNSC. As Obama pointed out, the US did not want to leave the subject to the “typical Security Council where one country can hold out, and you can’t get this done” (“Transcript: President Obama’s” 2015, para. 41).

Only two days after Obama’s NPR interview, Khamenei repeated his suspicions about the Americans, during his first speech after the preliminary agreement:

I have told the officials not to trust the opposing side, not to be fooled by their smiles, and not to trust their promises because when they have achieved their objectives, they will laugh at you.... After every round of talks, they make public comments that they then tell us in private were meant to save face in their own country and to counter their opponents, but this is their problem and has nothing to do with us (Serjoie, 2015, para. 2).

This was not the only time Khamenei reflected his suspicions during the new round of negotiations after the JPOA agreement. For instance, in an official letter, answering Rouhani’s letter in July 2015, he repeated his familiar position: “You [Rouhani] know well that some of the six other [negotiator] countries are not trustworthy at all” (“Response to the President’s,” 2015).

As Wendy Sherman, US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs under the Obama administration and a high-ranking JCPOA negotiator, said, the JCPOA was a historic moment for engaged countries and, particularly in the major power's view, was the "best possible assurance" to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (Sherman, 2018). However, she also admits that one side could not be the sole winner during the negotiations, emphasizing that "the Iran deal was not perfect; no deal ever is" (Sherman, 2018, para. 2). Sherman was right because, in multilateral diplomatic negotiations like the case of Iran, the "best possible agreement" is just not possible (Vishwanathan, 2016, p. 4). Obama inherited the nuclear negotiations from President Bush, and as Bush decided, Iran's negotiation stance focused on its nuclear program and had nothing to do with its overall attitude as a "rogue state." However, Obama hoped the nuclear agreement would make Iran's regional foreign policy less belligerent, by changing the country's factional domestic politics. The US, under Obama, tried to take sides in Iran's domestic politics as Obama emphasized: "it is possible that if we sign this nuclear deal, we strengthen the hand of those more moderate forces inside of Iran" ("Transcript: President Obama's" 2015, para. 15).

For the US, the deal was apparently still a deal with a "rogue state." Understandably, the US's message on the occasion of the signing of the JCPOA was not as friendly as that of the other P5+1 countries. In his relatively lengthy statement, President Obama, instead of praising this joint achievement, mainly explained how the American "strength" and "leadership" had served the "national interest" through the JCPOA, and prevented Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, while warning Iran about any wrong-doing:

This deal demonstrates that American diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change...this deal is also in line with a tradition of American leadership...today because America negotiated from a position of strength and principle, we have stopped the spread of nuclear weapons in this region...so there's a very clear incentive for Iran to follow through, and there are very real consequences for a violation ("Text of President Obama's," 2015, para. 2-4).

The US's European allies were more optimistic, at least in official statements. In the joint statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif on 14 July 2015, the contracting parties reiterated that the JCPOA became possible "with courage, political will, mutual respect, and leadership" ("Joint statement of EU," 2015, para. 2) of all parties and emphasized that the deal was "not only a deal but a good deal. And a good deal for all sides" ("Joint statement of EU," 2015, para. 13).

Khamenei's official reaction to the signing of the JCPOA differed in what the foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif told his European negotiation partners. In an official letter, Khamenei approved the JCPOA after it passed detailed scrutiny in the Majlis (Parliament), special commission and other commissions, and the Supreme National Security Council. However, Khamenei still had his ongoing suspicions about the US:

All indications are that the US entered the nuclear negotiations fraudulently, not with the intention of a just solution but to advance its aggressive goals towards the Islamic Republic...however, the product of the negotiations that have taken place in the form of Barjam (the Persian acronym for the JCPOA) suffers from points of ambiguity and structural weaknesses and numerous cases that can lead to significant damage to the present and future in the absence of careful and momentary care of the country ("Letter from the Leader," 2015, para. 3-4).

In January 2016, oil and financial sanctions on Iran were lifted, and the country gained roughly 100 billion dollars of frozen assets, after IAEA inspectors concluded that the country had "followed through on promises to dismantle large sections of its nuclear program" (Katzman & Kerr, 2016; Sanger, 2016, para. 1).

5.10 US Withdrawal: Trump Keeps His Promise

Despite the negotiation deadlock and heavy sanctions, IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano had reiterated in his 2012 interview that the agency "did not say that Iran made a decision" to obtain nuclear weapons ("An interview with IAEA's," 2012). The JCPOA was supposed to assure (still) doubtful world powers that Iran's nuclear plans were peaceful. The deal failed to achieve the purpose, at least in the US case, despite the IAEA's "really high levels of assurance" (House of Lords, 2019, p. 68). Donald Trump officially pulled the US out of the deal he used to call "the worst deal ever" (Torbat, 2016; Gladstone, 2019) on 8 May 2018. The move was totally unilateral, and forced the US's frustrated European allies to remind America that the nuclear deal with Iran was the result of "12 years of diplomacy" and belonged to the "entire international community" (White, 2018). Months after the US withdrawal, its Western partners still believed that the JCPOA was a "good deal" and the best way to contain Iran. The German Minister of State, Niels Annen, emphasized in February 2019 that the JCPOA effectively prevented Iran from "acquiring a nuclear weapon for as long as the agreement stands" (Kerr, p. 3). However, the EU's hopes were fading, as could be spotted from the June 2019 EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini's press conference, when she said the EU's objective was

"to keep the nuclear deal in place" but she emphasized, "It is not easy, and we have made no secret of that" ("Mogherini: Keeping Iran," 2019, para. 9).

Donald Trump was fiercely against the deal, even before being elected. Meanwhile, he was not the only US person who opposed the deal. The JCPOA's faith was caught in the middle of partisan American domestic politics. There had been strong opposition to the Iran nuclear deal long before the signing of the JCOPA. Almost every Republican representative in Congress and the Senate, alongside the GOP 2016 presidential hopefuls, was against the Iran nuclear deal (Lee, 2015; Fallows, 2015). The formidable opposition against "Obama's deal" was based on money and an ideological approach that gathered together a combination of "pro-Likud lobbies, Republican kingmakers, and members of Congress," who were aligned with "Christian evangelicals" and advised by "neoconservative think tanks with overlapping boards of directors" (Shank, 2015, p. 7). Presidential candidates like Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Donald Trump were just a few of the names among vocal opponents of the Iran deal (Altman, 2015; Rogers, 2015). These opponents' views coincided with Benjamin Netanyahu's extreme position against the Iran deal. Some figures like Republican presidential candidate Mike Huckabee went so far as to accuse Obama of marching Israelis "to the door of the oven" (Heller, 2015).

The GOP political figures' opposition went along with pro-Likud groups like Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran (CNFI), the non-profit organization backed by the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which raised around \$30 million to run ads against the Iran nuclear deal across 40 states in the US (Kampeas, 2015). AIPAC's "unprecedented" efforts to torpedo the Iran deal included but were not limited to "flooding the airwaves with television spots; buying full-page newspaper ads, [and] arranging fly-ins of AIPAC members to Washington" (Rosenberg, 2015, para. 2). These actions were paralleled by AIPAC's moves at the legislative level, like organizing demonstrations at the offices of AIPAC-friendly members of Congress who "were believed to be wavering," and ensuring that "precisely the right donors" officially warned the "problematic legislators" (Rosenberg, 2015).

The right-wing media also amplified the anti-Iran deal drum-beats alongside other entities. For instance, Rupert Murdoch's media, from *Fox News* to *The Wall Street Journal*, were propaganda batteries against Obama's 'bad deal' and 'false choices' (Shank, 2015, p. 8). There have even been programs that directly targeted Persian language

speakers inside Iran, like Murdoch's News Corp-backed network *Farsi 1*, which broadcasted into Iran via Dubai, United Arab Emirates (Shank, 2015, p. 8). When on the verge of signing the JCPOA, Obama was not facing a positive atmosphere in his country. A poll result released by the PEW Research Center one week after the signing of the JCPOA showed that among the 79% of Americans who had heard about the agreement, just 38% approved, while 48% disapproved of the deal (14% did not offer an opinion) ("Iran Nuclear Agreement," 2015). The poll results in Iran were dramatically different: A survey conducted by Iran Poll for the University of Maryland showed that in September 2015, 43% of people strongly and 33% somewhat approved of the JCPOA. Meanwhile, Rouhani's approval rate jumped to 88% from 51% in July 2014 ("Iranian public opinion," 2015).

"When I make promises, I keep them," Trump told the nation, while announcing the end of the Iran nuclear deal (Mitchell, 2018). Nevertheless, many asked Trump not to scrap the deal, including "a group of Nobel laureates, veteran nuclear weapon scientists, former White House science advisers, and the chief executive of the world's largest society of scientists" (Cronberg, 2017, p. 116). There were even some unprecedented moves, like when over 500 members of parliament from the E3 countries publicly called on their American counterparts to do what they could to "sustain the nuclear agreement" (European Leadership Network, 2018). However, Trump's decision was not only reflecting his own desire. As the PEW Research Center's survey in May 2018 showed, more Americans said they disapproved (40%) than approved (32%) of the agreement, with about a quarter (28%) offering no opinion ("Public is skeptical," 2018).

Although encouraged by his domestic support, Trump did not receive any support for scrapping the Iran deal from the world powers.

5.11 The Unhappy Powers

5.11.1 Europe

Even the US's European allies were not happy about Trump's move. The E3 leaders pursued active diplomacy to change Trump's decision over Iran's nuclear deal, and even met Trump in Washington to plead with him face-to-face. The E3 countries' leaders released a joint statement on the same day as Trump's withdrawal, reiterating their "regret

and concern" about Trump's move (Johnson, 2018; Mallin, 2018). Disagreeing with Trump, the Europeans were worried about their credibility as global players and their economic investments in Iran, as High Representative Federica Mogherini noted in a conclusive response to Trump's 8 May announcement: "the European Union is determined to act in accordance with its security interests and to protect its economic investments" ("Iran deal: EU remains," 2018, para. 4). Trump's "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran made "any sort of waivers or exemptions for US allies with regards to investing in Iran" impossible (Hellman & Batmanghelidj, 2018, p. 3).

Europe was seen as a "paper tiger," abandoned by its ally, and unable to protect the "flagship achievement" of the EU's foreign policy (Czulda, 2018). However, the EU was determined to keep the JCPOA alive, with the help of other negotiators, as Mogherini addressed to the Iranians: "to the Iranian citizens and leaders. To each and every one of them. Do not let anyone dismantle this agreement. It is one of the biggest achievements diplomacy has ever delivered" ("Iran deal: EU remains," 2018, para. 9). France, Britain, and Germany sought greater European financial independence from the US and (after discussions with Russia and China) initiated a particular purpose vehicle named INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges), to bypass sanctions against Iran and allow European companies to do business with it (Davenport, 2019). The EU went even further and threatened to sanction European companies that stopped doing business with Iran over Trump's sanctions (Bruton et al., 2018). However, the EU showed it was toothless against US pressure and big European businesses. All the major European companies left Iran, and the futile INSTEX, dissolved in March 2023, had its first (and only) success 15 months after it was proposed, exporting some "medical aid" to Iran through an undisclosed third party (Brzozowski, 2020; Spencer, 2020). Almost two years after introducing INSTEX, due to the US sanctions, Iran lost crucial time in paying for COVID-19 vaccines through the WHO's Covax program, while facing the worst coronavirus outbreak in the Middle East (Berger, 2020; Saul et al., 2020; Motevalli, 2020; Motamedi, 2020). Iran finally found a way to secure its vaccine payments in late December 2020, through two unidentified European and Turkish banks and a domestic bank (Sykes & Haghdooost, 2020). The country received its first COVID-19 vaccines through the Covax facility in April 2021 (Yeganehfar, 2021).

5.11.2 China and Russia

China and Russia also announced their disagreement with Trump's decision, although the international community's attention was mainly focused on France, Germany, and the UK, collectively known as the E3 (Aslan, 2018, p. 12). After a meeting in late April 2018 between their two foreign ministers, Moscow and Beijing announced that they would try to block any US "attempt to sabotage" the Iran nuclear deal ("Russia, China to obstruct," 2018).

Since the beginning of the Ahmadinejad presidency, Iran (mainly) had eyes on the East. The country joined collective organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SARC), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation (Rezai, 2019, p. 53). Iran's approach and position allowed China to expand its influence. China considered itself a "broker" and supporter of the Iran deal. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA was a blow to China. Some believe Iran was another factor in China's growing bilateral problems with the US (House of Lords, 2019). More than one year after Trump's withdrawal, Chinese rhetoric over the deal was unchanged. In July 2019, Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang described the US as the root of the problem in implementing the JCPOA, emphasizing it was "better for the one who made the trouble to fix it" ("Europeans brainstorm," 2019, para. 17).

Regarding the economic aspect, China had invested heavily in Iran, and did not want to see its investments in vain. A 2013 RAND study showed Iran was the second-largest recipient of China's cumulative pledged foreign aid and government-sponsored investment activities (FAGIA) in the 2001-2011 period, with a total of \$89 billion (Wolf et al., 2013, p. 50). Moreover, Iran was a part of China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative and needed to be a stable country to receive China's massive future investments. China particularly held high hopes for Iran after the JCPOA implementation. In 2016, China and Iran signed an unprecedented \$400 billion outline agreement between the two countries, boosting Iran's sanction-torn economy (Cohen, 2019; Spencer, 2019).

Russia (like the other powers) was against the US's unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, and showed its disagreement from time to time. The country had a good relationship with Iran, and Rouhani and Putin met several times on different occasions

while the P5+1 and Iran were negotiating the nuclear deal (Rezai, 2019). During the short period of easing sanctions, Russia and Iran's bilateral trade increased from 1.2 billion US dollars in 2015 to almost 2 billion in 2016. Besides, the two countries planned hefty economic cooperation, including an impressive total of \$40 billion in a Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) on dozens of industrial projects (Wheeler & Desai, 2016). Iran hoped to buy advanced Russian weapons like Sukhoi 30 fighter jets and T90 main battle tanks, after signing the JCPOA (Oliphant, 2016; "Iran to buy SU-30," 2016). The country had already received the long-promised Russian S300 advanced defense system in 2016, which boosted its hopes of modernizing its aged military equipment (Roth, 2016; Taleblu, 2016).

On 18 October 2020, a decades-long UN arms embargo on Iran expired, under the terms of Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 JCPOA. As a result, Iran could buy and sell conventional heavy weapons under international law and routine, despite US objections. However, the US threatened to sanction anyone who contributed to the sale of arms to or bought arms from Iran, and was involved in financing arms trades or training for use of weapons systems, related to Iran (Davenport & Masterson, 2020). Scholars suggest that countries would not be eager to trade arms with Iran because of the US threat (Fitzpatrick, 2020). They may be right because, up until May 2022, there was no news about any significant arms deal with Iran.

5.12 The Fate of the Deal

Despite E3, Russia, and China's rhetoric and initiatives, until October 2019, neither the INSTEX nor other agreements with Iran successfully challenged the US's unilateral sanctions against Iran (Baier-Allen, 2019). A 2019 Human Rights Watch report showed that the US's "maximum pressure" policy was harming Iranians' "right to health," and Iran's government could not even provide lifesaving medicine for the people due to the US sanctions (Human Rights Watch, 2019). However, the medicine shortage was not Iran's biggest problem. In July 2019, the country's oil exports (Iran's primary revenue) dropped to 100,000 bpd from 2.5 million bpd in April 2018 (Lawler, 2019). Rouhani's government was pressured to do something about the US withdrawal. Conservatives reacted to Trump's move harshly. Some even called on Rouhani to resign ("Rouhani: Anyone who thinks," 2018). In a sharply worded speech after the US withdrawal,

Khamenei accused the US of entering the deal in bad faith, and reiterated: “He lied maybe up to 10 times, and he threatened the state and the nation. I tell him on behalf of the Iranian nation: Mr. Trump, you cannot do a damn thing!” (Serjoie, 2018, para. 4).

The country's top military commanders welcomed the United States' withdrawal from the JCPOA. In this regard, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated:

I congratulate the evil departure of the United States from Barjam, which had no previous credibility...the withdrawal of the United States from Barjam showed the issue of nuclear enrichment was an excuse, and their issue is Iran's military and missile power and its influence in the region and regional resistance (“The military's reaction,” 2018, para. 4).

Disappointed by other signatories' performances and under heavy pressure from Iran's conservatives and hardliners, more than one year after implementing the JCPOA (IAEA, 2019), Rouhani started to reduce Iran's commitments to the deal gradually. In fact, the JCPOA itself preempted a dispute resolution mechanism in case of agreement violations. According to paragraph 36 of JCPOA, if the complaining participant saw no progress in the disputed issue, then it “could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council” (JCPOA, 2015, par, 36).

Trump's successor, Joe Biden, seemed optimistic about re-joining the nuclear deal with Iran. During his election campaign against Trump, he was “proud of” the “landmark multilateral deal” that “blocked Iran from getting a nuclear weapon” (Biden, 2020a). Biden stated that he would offer Tehran “a credible path back to diplomacy” because he saw dealing with Iran's nuclear program as the “best way to achieve getting some stability” in the region (Biden, 2020b). However, the job is easier said than done. Biden has emphasized that the US “will not unilaterally lift sanctions” (“Iran nuclear deal,” 2021). This position made the JCPOA hard to restore because the deal was already on life support, precisely due to the US unilateral sanctions. Some scholars predicted the US would agree to a “Goldilocks-style deal”: removing some sanctions just enough to bring Iran back to the deal but limited enough to dodge hardliner attacks at home (Hirsh, 2021). Iran insisted that before the re-implementation of the JCPOA, the Biden administration should take the first step by “unconditionally removing, with full effect, all sanctions imposed, reimposed, or relabelled since Trump took office” (Zarif, 2021, para. 12).

In April 2021, the JCPOA signatories gathered in Vienna to discuss the deal. As Russian delegate Mikhail Ulyanov tweeted, the delegations seemed “to be ready to stay

in Vienna as long as necessary to achieve the goal” (Rising & Jenne, 2021, para. 3). Russia’s hopes seemed inconsistent with minister Zarif’s recently leaked audiotape that caused a political earthquake in Iran. Apparently, the three-hour audiotape, which reached news outlets abroad, was an excerpt from a seven-hour interview conducted in March 2021 as part of an oral history project covering President Rouhani’s two terms in office (Naji, 2021). The leak also came at the time of the Vienna talks. Regarding nuclear policy, Zarif criticized the IRGC’s strong influence on the country’s policies and surprised the public and scholars over the country’s relationship with Russia. Zarif claimed that Russia was not on Iran’s side over the JCPOA and had even tried to derail the nuclear deal. Zarif reiterated, “the Russians’ goal was not to reach a nuclear deal.” According to Mr. Zarif, “when they [the Russians] saw that we were reaching an agreement, they started to create obstacles” (“Release of Zarif audio,” 2021). Russia’s official answer to Zarif’s claims came after four days, when Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated: “We know very well all those who would like to manipulate them [relations between Russia and Iran]...On the whole, we invariably rely on Tehran’s official stance that has been expressed more than once” (“In relations with Iran,” 2021, para. 2).

Alongside years of negotiations, many issues and incidents have helped to create the images and perceptions of the players in others’ eyes. The Trump withdrawal and Biden’s hesitation in rejoining the nuclear deal brought the old disputes to the surface, once the countries moved on from them in an attempt to make a deal. Two connected key disputed issues that caused chronic mistrust among the nuclear negotiators were Iran’s military activities, and the sabotaging of its nuclear program. Knowing the story behind these issues helps to better understand the negotiators’ positions, particularly in the cases of the US and Iran.

5.13 Non-diplomatic Ways to Deal with Iran’s Ambitions

5.13.1 Iran’s Missile Program

The Islamic Republic started to obtain ballistic missiles to retaliate against Iraqi missile attacks on Iranian cities during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Missiles have remained a “cornerstone of Iran’s deterrence and defense posture” ever since (Elleman, 2017, p. 27). After years of investment, the country has built up “the largest and most diverse missile force” in the Middle East (Einhorn & Van Diepen, 2019, p. 1). The US has always insisted

that Iran should end its “proliferation of ballistic missiles,” and stop its “further launching or development of nuclear-capable missiles” (Einhorn & Van Diepen, 2019, p. 2). The US argument over Iran’s missile program is misleading. Regarding the nuclear-capable missiles, according to UNSCR 2231 (and previous resolutions), Iran is banned from pursuing them. The prohibition is also reiterated in the JCPOA (UNSCR 2231, 2015; JCPOA, 2015). However, UNSCR 2231 and the JCPOA included no objections to Iran’s conventional missile program (Arms Control Association, 2015).

One major US objection to the JCPOA is failure to mention Iran’s (conventional) missile program. The US accuses Iran of pursuing its plan to make (eventually nuclear-capable) ICBMs, particularly under cover of Space-launch vehicles (Elleman & Fitzpatrick, 2017; Bahgat, 2019). Although US officials call Iran’s Space-launch vehicles (SLV) launches a violation of agreements with the international community & UNSCR 2231, scholars note that Iran’s SLV launches are neither a violation of UNSC 2231 nor ICBM tests in disguise (Elleman, 2017; Hickey, 2020). In fact, the technical and logistical differences between SLVs and ICBMs are so significant that “no country has converted a satellite launcher into a [ICBM] missile” until now (Elleman, 2017, p. 28). Regarding non-ballistic nuclear-capable weapons, Iran has obtained six Russian air-launched KH-55/AS-15 cruise missiles and has made two different models of its own cruise missiles (Meshkat and Sumar) based on them. The KH-55 was initially designed to carry a nuclear warhead for 2800+ km. However, the missiles obtained from Ukraine were not equipped with warheads, and Iran’s copies are not considered nuclear-capable (Einhorn & Van Diepen, 2019). The US media sometimes introduce “medium-range” ballistic missiles (with a range of between 1,000 km and 3,500 km) as “long-range” missiles (with a range of between 3,500 km and 5,500 km) (Erdbrink, 2015; Hume, 2015; Keller, 2018; Ensor & Millward, 2019; “Iran fires long-range missiles,” 2021), while Iran’s ballistic missiles have a range of 2000 km at best (US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 2019; Orion, 2021; Elleman, 2021). This confusing of missile range can exaggerate and boost Iran’s supposed threat.

Sabotaging a crucial defense plan like Iran’s missile program has eroded trust between Iran and the US (and some of its allies). The US never stopped “sabotaging” Iran’s missile programs during the nuclear negotiations. It has been reported that, for several years, the United States has sought to sabotage Iran’s missile program by “slipping faulty parts and materials into Iran’s aerospace supply chains” (Bahgat, 2019, p. 38). These efforts started

under the Bush administration, eased (but did not stop) under Obama, and “accelerated” under Trump (Sanger & Broad, 2019). Although Iran’s military claimed it was aware of these efforts, two of the latest rocket failures, one that Iran announced on 15 January 2019 and the other, an unacknowledged attempt on 5 February, showed something was (still) wrong. During the past 11 years, 67 percent of Iranian orbital launches have failed, a highly unusual rate compared to a 5 percent failure rate worldwide for similar space launches (Sanger & Broad, 2019). The US’s close ally, Israel, was also (allegedly) another active saboteur of Iran’s missile program. For instance, in 2011, IRGC Maj. Gen. Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, dubbed the father of Iran’s missile industry, was killed in an explosion attributed to Israel. TIME magazine even cited a “Western intelligence source,” saying other sabotages were planned, adding, “There are more bullets in the magazine” (Vick, 2011).

The JCPOA changed Iran’s missile program’s focus. In late 2017, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said Iran would not develop ballistic missiles “with a range exceeding 2,000 km” (Gambrell, 2017). Since then, the country has focused mainly on improving the accuracy of its missiles, instead of increasing their range (Bahgat, 2019). This development is essential because nuclear-armed missiles do not need high accuracy due to their tremendous destructive power. For instance, the most updated version of the LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBM has more than 200m CEP (Circular Error Probable) (Chant, 2013).

5.13.2 Attack on the Nuclear Program

Examples of sabotage go back for years. In one “well-documented” case in 2000, the CIA used a Russian national to provide Iran with “flawed blueprints for a device designed to trigger a nuclear explosion” (Kerr, 2018, p. 34). However, maybe one of the most significant cases of damage was done by the (reportedly) 2010 US and Israel cyber-attack against Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities, using the Stuxnet computer worm (Patrikarakos, 2012; Kenney, 2015; Shank, 2015; Perkovich, 2017; Kerr, 2018). David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, considers that “it is hard to believe Germany was not involved” because the US and Israel needed technical information about the German-made (by e.g. Siemens) equipment in Natanz facilities (Khalaf et al., 2011). The Stuxnet attack is significant

because the Natanz facility could be reached only from the inside, meaning somebody must have attached a hand-held USB drive to the equipment (Patrikarakos, 2012; Kenney, 2015; Shank, 2015).

Stuxnet was part of a broader US cyber-warfare program dating back to 2006, called “the Olympic Games”, and at that time, the US was the only country that had the expertise and resources to conduct such a sophisticated attack (Patrikarakos, 2012; Kenney, 2015; Shank, 2015; Joyner, 2016). The Stuxnet attack delayed Iran’s enrichment program for months or even years (Kenney, 2015; Joyner, 2016). There were estimates that the Stuxnet attack damaged about 1,000 centrifuges out of the 8,000 centrifuges used to enrich uranium in the Natanz facilities, and even forced Iran to temporarily close down the facility (Khalaf et al., 2011; Kenney, 2015). The Stuxnet cyber-attack marked “a watershed in cyber-warfare,” because it revealed that the physical destruction of computer code could be equivalent to “kinetic bombing and physical sabotage” (Kenney, 2015, p. 117). It also sent a clear message to Iran that “cyberwarfare is here to stay” (Joyner, 2016, p. 59).

Apparently, targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities is an ongoing project. The latest major attack happened in the Natanz facilities in April 2021. In an interview with Iran’s Fars News, Fereydoun Abbasi, the head of the parliament’s energy commission, revealed that the attack was the fifth “major attack” on Natanz in the last 15 years (Vanaei, 2021). Abbasi, a nuclear scientist, also survived an assassination attempt attributed to Mossad in 2010 (Dehghan & Siddique, 2010). The attributed sabotage by Israel on Natanz damaged some centrifuges and caused a blackout in the facilities (Bergman et al., 2021; Motamedi, 2021; Zetter, 2021). Iranian sources admitted that the attack was an inside job, and that the perpetrator had fled the country before the explosion (“Suspect of Natanz sabotaging,” 2021).

The saboteur countries did not limit themselves to cyber-warfare and damaging facilities. They have also eliminated Iran’s nuclear scientists. Between 2007 and 2020, five Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated inside the country (Joyner, 2016; “Identifying assassinated Iranian scientists,” 2020). US officials have mainly responded to these killings “with approval and with insensitivity to Iranian concerns” (Joyner, 2016, p. 58). In November 2020, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the sixth, and one of Iran’s “most prominent and well-guarded nuclear scientists,” was assassinated near Tehran, in an act most likely committed by Israel (Fahim et al., 2020, para. 1; Farrell, 2021; Holmes, 2020).

Only a few days after the assassination, an unnamed Israeli official told *The New York Times* that “the world should thank Israel” for killing Fakhrizadeh (Kirkpatrick et al., 2020). Targeting Iran’s nuclear scientists inside the country needs the capacity of at least one intelligence service to “identify, track, and target” those key technical leaders (Perkovich, 2017, p. 9). According to the British weekly *The Jewish Chronicle*, a 20-plus spy team, including Israeli and Iranian nationals, smuggled a one-tonne hyper-accurate gun into the country piece by piece, and ambushed Fakhrizadeh, after eight months of surveillance (Simons, 2021).

5.14 Political Factions in Iran

5.14.1 The Supreme Leader

All the developments in Iran’s domestic and international nuclear and environmental policies cannot be fully understood without knowing basic information about the country’s unique domestic faction politics, which constitutes the stage for the Iranian players over the studied issues.

Under Iran’s constitution, the powers are independent, as noted: “the powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers” (Article 57). The country has a popularly elected president, an elected legislature (even local elections to choose mayors and city councils), and a powerful judiciary. However, these powers are “functioning under the supervision” of the Supreme Leader (Article 57). Among the Supreme Leader’s powers are appointing or dismissing key players like the supreme judicial authority of the country, the head of the national radio and television, the chief of the joint staff, the chief commander of the IRGC, and the Expediency Council members (who should arbitrate between the parliament and the Guardian Council when the former is not able to meet the latter’s demands over bills) (Iran constitution, articles 110 and 112).

5.14.2 Political Factions

The Iran nuclear deal and Paris Agreement ratification have fuelled disputes among the Iranian factions. Beneath the surface of the figure of Iran’s current Supreme Leader,

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, his office, and representatives, there is a pluralistic political system with its own internal struggles (Green et al., 2009) and activists (Rivetti, 2017). Three main overlapping factions can be identified: conservatives, reformists, and centrists/pragmatists (Green et al., 2009; Buchta, 2000; Bakhash, 2013). Facing a nearly bankrupt economy and an impoverished population, the different approaches that Ayatollah Khomeini had held together with his influence and weight, fragmented fast after he died in 1989 (Ehsani, 2009, p. 28). The factions which emerged fought power struggles in various arenas: from parliament and consultative forums to government agencies, and from Friday prayer sermons to the mass media. Intra-elite leadership competition further exacerbates the situation, partly due to the Shia clergy's pluralistic structure, characterized by diverse opinions and schools of thought (Buchta, 2000, p. 10).

Centrists/Pragmatists The centrists/pragmatists were initially affiliated with the fourth President of Iran from 1989 to 1997, Hashemi Rafsanjani, who stood between the reformists and conservatives. Despite lacking democratic intent (Gheisari & Nasr, 2006, p. 153), there was a promise of change in domestic and foreign policies. In terms of the economy, Rafsanjani and his fellows, many of them gathered in the Executives of Construction of Iran Party (*Hezb-e Kārgozārān-e Sāzandegi-ye Irān*), believed in a more liberal and privatized system; 80 percent of the country's economy was state-controlled when Rafsanjani started his presidency (IBP, 2018). Rafsanjani also sought to depoliticize the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which morphed from a small voluntary-based force after the revolution into a massive military and economic power, by offering financial advantages, and he later tried to limit the IRGC's excessive economic power (Rezaei & Khodaei, 2018). In the post-Rafsanjani era, the economy became increasingly government-private (*Khosulati*), allowing governments to maintain control over companies that, on paper, are not government-owned. In addition, charitable trusts (*Bonyads*) have also become much more significant; most are not under the control of the government and do not pay taxes. In foreign policy, the centrists/pragmatists sought an improved political and economic relationship with the outside world (Brumberg, 2001; Gheisari & Nasr, 2006; Ehsani, 2009), and the confrontation with the West, particularly the USA, was approached more instrumentally. Nonetheless, Iran was internationally isolated by the end of Rafsanjani's presidency in 1997.

In post-revolution Iran, until 1997, the monolithic political system planned all aspects of social life and activities, allowing almost no room for environmental NGOs or civil

activities. Environmental issues were overlooked under Rafsanjani's administration (1989-1997) due to his concentration on post-Iran-Iraq war economic rebuilding (Hashemi et al., 2019). As a result, only a handful of environmental groups, like the Women's Society for the Campaign against Environmental Pollution, and the Mountain Environmental Protection Association, existed in Iran in the early 1990s (Fadaee, 2011). Nonetheless, the reformist candidate Khatami owed his landslide electoral victory in 1997 partly to Rafsanjani backing the underdog reformist candidate; later, the Guardian Council disqualified Rafsanjani from running for the 2013 Presidential Elections. The reform movement and Khatami's presidency transformed the political structure.

Reformists Within a decade of the Iran-Iraq war, a substantial urban middle class emerged in Iran. Many young, educated Iranians with limited memories of the 1979 revolution demanded civil society, bureaucracy, and marketplace reform. This group of middle class young people propelled the reformist leader Mohammad Khatami to win a landslide presidential election in 1997 (Ehsani, 2009; Gheisari & Nasr, 2006, p. 129). This broad faction's members are united around ideals like pluralism, freedom of speech, and open civil society. Reformists fundamentally disagree with the conservative position of consolidating power in the theocratic regime's clerical bodies (Gheisari & Nasr, 2006). However, the reformists' path has not been smooth in the Khatami and post-Khatami eras. They have found their candidates barred from running for the legislature, newspapers closed, and grassroots movements curtailed and student demonstrations dispersed (Ansari, 2019).

Post-Ahmadinejad developments and the rise of the moderates The term moderate has become an umbrella term, usually used by Western sources to cover almost everybody in the centrist/pragmatist and reformist camps. In recent years, the pragmatists and reformists came closer to each other, focusing on reconciliation in foreign policy and more open domestic politics, by supporting Hasan Rouhani, a close fellow of both Rafsanjani and Khamenei. Rouhani brought technocrats to senior positions, and tried to lessen Iran's global isolation, particularly by reaching a nuclear agreement with the world powers. Although the supreme leader and powerful conservative institutions like the Guardian Council take precedence over the president, a moderate president can still outmaneuver the conservatives occasionally by appealing to popular sentiment; Rouhani tried to use this tactic, particularly in the Iran nuclear deal, by channeling the public discontent and assigning responsibility to the conservatives. While Rouhani's

government thought the US would not easily abrogate the 2015 nuclear deal because of the international guarantees (Fars News, 2021), conservatives, particularly the IRGC, saw it differently. They insisted that Iran could trust neither the US and Western countries nor international agreements. Moreover, the increased US sanctions boosted the conservative IRGC's political and especially economic power, making it even more influential. The IRGC's networks were needed to get around the international banking networks, to sell the country's oil and bring back revenues to Iran.

Following Iran's 10th legislative elections, the reformists and moderates became the biggest faction, controlling 41% of the seats between 27 May 2016 – 26 May 2020, compared to a conservative alliance with 29%, with the rest registering as independents. It was the first time in the Islamic Republic that the parliament had more women than clerics in it (Ghazi, 2016; Nourmohammadian, 2016). The Guardian Council's opposition to the 10th legislature surfaced, especially over international agreements and conventions. For instance, the Guardian Council's blocking of parliamentary bills to join the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (also called the Palermo Convention), and the Financial Action Task Force (on Money Laundering) (FATF), triggered hot debates in domestic politics (IRNA, 2021). In 2020, The Guardian Council disqualified 90 MPs of Iran's 10th legislature for the 11th legislative election (IRNA, 2020).

Alongside reducing tensions with the West, Rouhani tried to improve domestic environmental conditions, and to foster participation in international environmental policies like the Paris Agreement. He called his first administration "the government of environment," and was successful in some aspects, like stopping some harmful projects that remained from the days of the conservative administrations, passing some environmentally friendly bills, and bringing scholars into environmental policy making ("The 11th government," 2017).

Rouhani had his failures to fulfill environmental goals. A number of his administration's bills were stuck in parliament (Khosravifard, 2021), and he could not homogenize his associates regarding the environmental policies, and some technocrats, including some ministers, acted, in fact, against the administration's announced environmental policies (Ghasemi, 2018). Moreover, the sanctions put pressure on the

Rouhani government and forced it to sacrifice the environment in order to handle the country's day-to-day management.

Conservatives and the environmental policies The conservatives are concentrated around Khamenei, the supreme leader, and some conservative clerics. Their bases have traditionally been among Islamic members of the IRGC, some bazaaries (the merchant class and workers of the traditional marketplaces) (Green et al., 2009; Keshavarzian, 2007), the lower middle class, the rural population, lower-ranking preachers, and certain radical clerical figures (Green et al., 2009, p. 25). The more radical conservatives, identified as hardliners in the Western media, are dominated by IRGC-related figures and institutions. The conservatives' main principles and approaches have broadly remained intact since the revolution, including a patriarchal Islamic government, consolidating the revolution's results, protecting a traditional lifestyle, self-sufficiency, and cultural purity. In foreign policy, the conservatives are committed to Islamic and anti-western activism against cultural imperialism and American hegemony. The USA is seen as aiming for regime change in Iran through economic sanctions, direct invasion, and/or 'cultural invasion' (Relman, 2020). Skepticism and conspiracy theory have shaped the conservatives' views toward the West, influencing their actions, from foreign policy to human rights (especially freedom of speech and the media), and from cultural aspects to environmental policy.

With the conservatives gaining more power and eliminating their rivals, the situation after Rouhani got worse. In the 2021 presidential elections, conservative Raisi emphasized the people's economic hardship and Rouhani's undelivered economic promises. However, the turnout for the 2021 presidential election was just 48.8% (only 26% in the capital city Tehran), which was a record low in Islamic Republic history (Sinaiee, 2020) due in part to voter disapproval of the massive disqualification of non-conservative candidates.

The Raisi administration's approach proved to be unpopular. In December 2022, Iran was facing ongoing widespread protests against the regime. One of the Islamic Republic's most significant challenges emerged when a young girl, Mahsa Amini, died in the infamous morality police's custody in Tehran, after being arrested for her "bad hijab." In response, protests quickly spread across the country and shifted their targets from women's and human rights to the very existence of the Islamic Republic (Askew, 2022), indifferent to its factions. By late November 2022, at least 300 people had died, and

around 14,000 were arrested during the protests (“High Commissioner for Human Rights,” 2022). Regarding environmental issues, the Raisi government seems less eager to prioritize environmental topics. In April 2022, Somaye Rafi’ee, the conservative head of the parliamentary environment commission, reiterated that Raisi’s government had not allocated any budget to fight the significant dust problem in the country (“Member of Parliament,” 2022).

In Iran, those labeled as conservatives and hardliners are generally seen as against international environmental agreements like the Paris Accords, and the reformists and moderates are seen as most in favor of them. Areas of contention include science, security, economy, and religion (Zandi et al., 2019, p. 281). However, Raisi’s administration has reiterated that sanctions removal will lead to Iran’s active participation in international environmental policies (McGrath, 2021).

CHAPTER 6

MEDIA CHARACTERISTICS

6.1 PRESS TV

6.1.1 Introduction

Press TV is a satellite news channel based in Tehran. It is the first Iranian channel that broadcasts entirely in English. Press TV, launched in July 2007, started off by airing two hours of daily news and documentaries. The channel initially broadcast live from studios in Tehran, Washington, New York, London, Beirut, and Damascus. According to official Iranian sources, in July 2017, Press TV had 400 employees in Iran and 26 reporters worldwide. The channel claims to enjoy international popularity among professionals, such as working with moviemakers from 20 countries to make documentaries for the channel (“Press TV is,” 2019). Initially, Press TV was supposed to target European and US audiences. However, later, it expanded its coverage and found that most of its audience was in the UK, the US, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia (“Press TV shines,” 2017; Barzegar, 2020). Press TV declares one of its main objectives as speaking for “the often neglected voices and perspectives of a great portion of the world” (“About Press TV,” 2020, para. 4). It is supposed to introduce a third way of presenting the world, an alternative for the ‘global media dominance’ of international outlets like CNN International, BBC World, and Aljazeera English (Wastnidge, 2015; Jones & Newlee, 2019).

One can mention some similarities in Iran, Russia, and China’s approaches to seeking “improvement in their public image(s)” through government media (Wastnidge, 2015, p. 366). Like CGTN, Press TV was established by the regime, and the Iranian government oversees Press TV according to Iran’s media laws. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran also puts radio and television under the control of the supreme leader, who, for instance, “appoints and removes” the head of the IRIB (the Islamic Republic of

Iran Broadcasting) (Alikhani, 2018, p.6; Jones & Newlee, 2019). The constitution even puts more limitations on the media when it emphasizes that “Freedom of expression and dissemination of ideas must be granted through the mass media of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with due observance of Islamic criteria and the welfare of the country” (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Article 175). Press TV operators insist that the outlet is not (and will not be) the “government mouthpiece” or like an official spokesperson of “a particular institution” (“Everything about Press TV,” 2007). However, the channel and officials reiterate that Press TV sees the issues from an Iran view, facing a “soft war” between Iran and Western media’s “Iran phobia” and “Islamophobia” (Salavati, 2018; “More than 220,” 2019). Western observers believe that the Press TV editorial’s perspective and criteria reflect the Iranian regime’s view of the world and priority topics (Price, 2012).

Despite facing a considerable lack of facilities and staff, Press TV has managed to deploy its reporters in both traditional political power centers and positions considered less exciting by the mainstream international media, establishing its bureaus in places like Damascus and Gaza City (O’Loughlin, 2008). Expanding, however, has been a challenging task for Press TV, particularly in recent years. Iran believes restrictions against its international media are due to the country’s approach toward the media. The deputy of IRIB foreign broadcasting, Peyman Jebelli, explained Press TV’s obstacles in an interview with Iran’s Tasnim Agency, “Regarding new media, (western) powers control the playground. We should accept this reality...as a result, we should either accept their playing rules or face the consequences of swimming against the current” (Barzegar, 2020, para. 31).

As a matter of fact, there have been some consequences for Press TV. In 2012, the UK Office of Communications (Ofcom) revoked Press TV’s license for breaching the “Communications Act” (Sweeney, 2012). Only one year before, Ofcom fined the channel some 100,000 pounds sterling for airing an interview with Maziar Bahari, an imprisoned Newsweek journalist, that had been “conducted under duress” (Sweeney, 2012). In 2013, Press TV (and other Iranian international channels like Spanish language Hispan TV) was removed from some satellite platforms in Europe and America “as a result of sanctions” against Iran (Wastnidge, 2015; Jukes et al., 2018). In April 2019, Google blocked Press TV (and Hispan TV) from YouTube and Gmail. It was the fourth time that Google had blocked Press TV since 2009. Iran claimed that Google refused to provide any explanation for disabling Press TV’s account. Press TV condemned Google’s action, and

emphasized that the channel was paying the price for being the “voice of the voiceless” (“Head of Press TV,” 2019).

On other platforms like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram, IRIB stations have fewer followers and subscribers, suggesting it has “less social media reach” around the world compared to well-established international media like CNN International and Aljazeera English (Jones & Newlee, 2019, p. 5). Although the Iran regime’s low credibility in public opinion makes it hard for Iran to compete for Western soft power (Newlee, 2019, p. 8), the country’s efforts have been widespread. Some analyses, like a 2019 assessment by the cybersecurity company FireEye describe Iran’s influence as “significant” and intended to “shape the political discourse” (Revelli & Foster, 2019).

6.1.2 *Soft Power and Soft War*

Iran started international radio broadcasts in the 1950s under the Pahlavi regime. Following in the Pahlavi regime’s footsteps, the Islamic Republic heavily invested in developing international media, like Press TV, as the “ideological vehicles” of the country (Sreberny, 2013). The Islamic Republic has been familiar with how to exploit media propaganda from the beginning. Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, gave more than 100 interviews to the media in France, where he was in exile. His networks also smuggled audiotapes of his sermons into Iran. Khomeini’s belief that “[p]ropaganda can bring down a mountain” (Danesh & Ansari, 2011, p. 55) is, therefore, no surprise.

The soft power approach could be suitable for Iran in international relations. The lack of economic power and its weak military capabilities make soft power a practical way to spread the country’s influence around the region and even throughout the world. Following Iran’s 1979 revolution, the country’s focus on foreign policy shifted from civilization and national-cultural to Islam and revolutionary independence. Ayatollah Khomeini’s famous motto ‘neither East nor West but the Islamic Republic’ became Iran’s soft power priority. Later (specifically in President Khatami’s era), culture and dialogue among civilizations were highlighted in Iran’s approach to soft power. However, still, the country did not (or could not) back away from some of its red lines. As a result, when interviewed by Iran’s Fars news agency, Nye noted that despite some enhancement in

Iran's soft power among Muslim countries, its overall grip on soft power had been "harmed more widely" due to its position regarding Israel (Wastnidge, 2015).

Iran, however, continued its efforts in the fields of soft power and 'soft war'. The idea of 'soft war' came after that of 'soft power' and entered Iran's foreign policy lexicon during President Ahmadinejad's terms as an analytical tool and foreign policy principle (Wastnidge, 2015, p. 371). The media have always been critical of Iran's soft war doctrine.

A high-rank Basij (militia) official, Nai'ni, highlights the role of the media in 'soft war' as

We must increase our media, cultural, and propaganda power, and our ability to persuade others to engage in producing movements and strengthening our defensive psychological operations. We must define the field of play in the Soft War, and we must get out of our present defensive mood. We must make good use of media capabilities and cyber opportunities (Price, 2015, p. 149).

Communication technology has gained a key role in socio-political developments in the Middle East (Khatib, 2009; Alikhah, 2018), making the media a crucial factor of soft power for the Islamic Republic. By March 2020, the IRIB was broadcasting 14 international news channels (Barzegar, 2019). Iran has also expanded its footprint in cyberspace more broadly as part of the 'soft war' strategy (Wastnidge, 2015). The country has even tried to broadcast its international channels using domestically made and launched satellites. As former IRGC commander Yahya Rahim Safavi described it, the plan was meant to block the "enemy's cultural onslaught by using our own culture" (Price, 2012, p. 2408). However, up until now, Iran has not been able to broadcast any international channel through an Iran-made satellite.

Iran's first round-the-clock foreign language channel, *Al-Alam*, started broadcasting on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. This Arab language channel aimed initially to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis (Eisenstadt et al., 2011) by adopting "an active media policy vis-à-vis the West's one-sided news imperialism" (Al-Alam, 2020, para. 2). Although the channel was initially aimed at Iraqi audiences, it covered Lebanon, Palestine, part of Africa, and Iran. The IRIB also provides programs for Hezbollah's TV station, Al-Manar, to reach wider audiences (Wastnidge, 2015, p. 372). Derived from Iran's nuclear program and activities in the region, the United States has continued to "mount a concerted campaign" against Iran's media sphere (Price, 2012, p. 2398). The US and others have tried to subvert the Islamic Republic by using "extensive funds and new communications technologies" (Sreberny, 2013, p. 801). Besides regular pressure

tools like sanctions and proxy wars, the Islamic Republic assumes that the West (particularly the US and Israel) are engaged in “heavy information warfare” against Iran, to change the public’s cultural and political mindset (Brooking & Kianpour, 2020). As Khamenei’s website reiterates, in the Islamic Republic’s eyes, the West’s “very dangerous weapon” is the media, particularly “recently emerged media” (“Soft war,” 2018). Understandably, Khamenei believes that “today, [the media networks] are tools and instruments for cultural infiltration. Today, they are the enemy’s tools for cultural domination” (Jones & Newlee, 2019, p. 9).

The Iranian authorities look to the Chinese model for “shaping the discourse” in the media, specifically through cyberspace (Vatanka, 2015). Khamenei’s direct order created the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) in 2012, to block unpleasant online material. Filtering the internet has been a matter of controversial positions and factional disputes in Iran. For instance, in 2014, President Rouhani reiterated that building walls around the problems would not solve them, adding: “When you make [Internet] filters, they will make filter-breakers” (Vatanka, 2015, p. 67). The regime’s approach toward information and media control became more homogenized in Rouhani’s second term. In November 2019, Iran almost shut off the country’s internet entirely for several days, amid widespread anti-regime protests across the country (Fasihi, 2019; Newman, 2019). It was not clear whether cutting the country off from the world would be the new approach of Iran’s regime toward the news cycle of international media. At the launch of Press TV, President Ahmadinejad reiterated that the channel’s critical goal was to refute ‘counter-propaganda of western media’ (Burkeman et al., 2007). Ahmadinejad, however, did not say anything new or exceptional about the media. According to Iran’s press laws, the press’s missions include “resisting against the symbols of colonial’s culture...and promotion and propagation of pure Islamic culture and spreading the ethical perfections” and “protection and solidifying the neither East nor West policy” (Iran’s press law, article 2).

Iran’s conservatives are particularly proud of the country’s international media, like Press TV, calling it the “reputation of the regime” (Salavati, 2018). The regime assesses that every country with a powerful media “can present its position as (the only) right one or even present its wrong position as the right one...this is because of media’s intrinsic power” (“The situation of,” 2019, para. 3). The media for the Islamic Republic is “as important as food, national and defensive security for countries” (“The situation of,” 2019, para. 4). Officials like Ahmad Salek Kashani, vice-chairman of Iran’s

parliamentary cultural commission, (similar to many other officials) believe that Iran is in the middle of a war between Islam and (Western) hegemony (In Persian: Estekbar), which highlights the vital role of Press TV to “introduce just and unjust” (“Overseas networks,” 2019). The international media are so crucial for the Islamic Republic that the deputy of the IRIB world service insists that even one day’s pause in sending messages abroad is a “loss” for the country (Barzegar, 2019).

Despite emphasizing the importance of the media, there has been a narrow interpretation and implication of the ‘good use of media capabilities’ to draw lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’, even in Iran’s domestic politics. Due to a lack of political party activities, various factions in Iran’s domestic politics use the media as their mouthpiece. The powerful conservatives control national radio and television and some of the press, making media one of the most critical competition fields between moderate and conservative forces (Alikhah, 2018). Unlike the moderates, the conservative media usually enjoy the support of the judiciary system in Iran, and as President Rouhani once said, are protected by a “steel fortress” (“Some presses,” 2014). Despite the full support of the conservatives, and substantial investment in the IRIB, it seems that the organization has not been able to grab (at least) the Iranian people’s attention and is somehow losing the soft war.

The regime has long realized its soft power inside Iran was on shaky ground. President Rouhani’s government (particularly in his first term) tried to acknowledge this, and use people’s dissatisfaction (particularly) with the regime’s cultural policy against his conservative rivals. In 2014, Iran’s culture minister, Ali Janati, reiterated that 4 million Iranians were Facebook members, and that completely filtering Facebook was impossible and fruitless: “Four million Iranians are on Facebook, and we have restricted it. We cannot restrict the advance [of such technology] under the pretext of protecting Islamic values,” Jannati said (“Iran’s culture minister,” 2014, para. 5). In 2014, Ali Jannati cited that 71 percent of Tehran residents have satellite dishes and watch foreign television. He added that “this means that millions in the capital are committing a crime every evening” (“Iran’s culture minister,” 2014, para. 7). The 71 percent satellite dish penetration would be more noticeable when we realize that Iran’s parliament enacted a law prohibiting the acquisition of satellite dishes in 1995 (Semati, 2007). The law even obliged the police force or Basij Resistance Force (a pro-regime militia) to confiscate satellite receivers (Semati, 2007, p. 96; Alikhah, 2018, p. 5). Although the regime seizes satellite

dishes from time to time, they have become part of ordinary Iranian life in the absence of IRIB alternatives.

The regime's setbacks in winning the hearts and minds of the people did not demotivate the conservatives in the field of soft power. Radical ideas were recognizable among the highest managerial ranks of Iran's international media, like Press TV, from the very beginning. Mohammad Sarafraz, the former head of the IRIB and Press TV, described the environment that Press TV was born into as follows:

We analyzed the regional atmosphere at that time. It was the time that George Bush was the president of the US. Then, the 9/11 incident happened, and the Americans' story from the attack on the twin towers seemed suspicious...could you believe that a 19-year-old Al-Qaeda member sits in a super automatic-digital plane (cabin) and crashes it to the twin towers?... [then] the US invented the "war on terror" slogan, and the CNN became (the media) ringleader of it!... Nevertheless, on the other side, Aljazeera had the role of Al-Qaeda advocate (Arta, 2019, para. 15-19).

In March 2019, Iran started a new phase of its international broadcasting, with the Syrian branch of the Arab language "Al-Alam" (Arabic: the universe). Unlike Iran's previous international channels, all central employees and offices of Al-Alam Syria are located in Syria, and the "A to Z" of its productions are made in the same country ("On the pretext," 2020). Iran has also already invested (particularly in Ahmadinejad's era) in media broadcasting in Latin America, as the backyard of the US. It was interpreted as one aspect of Iran's soft power, which reflected the ties between Iran and Latin American states, notably Venezuela and Cuba. In January 2012, Iran launched Hispan TV, the Middle East's first 24-7 Spanish TV channel. Some officials participated in the inauguration, including Iran's foreign minister and the ambassadors of Cuba, Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia to Iran (Barzegar, 2020). Scholars see future threats against the US as "hybrid threats," in which the battle of perceptions is a part of it (Snyder, 2009).

Regarding the issue, Iran and its proxies in the region use the media, reaching "well beyond" the immediate targets under their political control (Snyder, 2009). Some scholars reiterate that the best offense against the Islamic Republic regime "may not be just using military, financial, or diplomatic instruments — but soft power" (Newlee, 2019, p. 10).

6.1.3 *How Does Press TV Work?*

Who Works for Press TV?

Before establishing the channel, the IRIB published an ad in the Guardian newspaper and sent a “trustee” to London to recruit qualified applicants (“Everything about Press TV,” 2007). To train Tehran headquarters journalists, an instructor from the BBC was invited (“Everything about Press TV,” 2007). However, Press TV’s ability to hire foreign correspondents and journalists was restricted because of “limitations” and “sanctions,” as Mohammad Sarafraz, the former head of the IRIB and Press TV, noticed. Consequently, Press TV mostly hired freelance journalists, and used third parties to sign contracts with foreign reporters (Arta, 2019). Despite all of the obstacles, some Press TV programs are hosted by professional foreign (many of them British) journalists, with prominent guests from the fields of journalism, academia, and elsewhere. Among them, maybe the controversial former Labour Party MP, George Galloway, grabbed most attention, particularly his tone when speaking about Israel, leading to accusations over Galloway’s anti-Israel bias by Ofcom in 2009 (Sweney, 2009). Galloway, however, remained defiant and lost his job in other media outlets for his controversial statements (Embury-Dennis, 2019). Press TV hired other famous and rebellious figures like British journalist Yvonne Ridley. Before joining Press TV, she worked for outlets like the BBC and Aljazeera and was chief reporter on the Sunday Express. After being captured by the Taliban and converting to Islam, Ridley became “close to a celebrity in the Islamic world” (Cooke, 2008). She has been outspoken against Western hegemony, and attacked the war on terror as a “war on Islam” (Cooke, 2008). Ken Livingstone, a former mayor of London, and Jeremy Corbyn, former Labour Party leader, were also prominent figures who appeared on Press TV (Hill, 2011; Payne, 2016).

What Contents Does Press TV Broadcast?

Press TV programs defend Iran’s policies and its allies, while criticizing Western policies. Critiques include “pervasive questioning” of international norms over political and human rights issues (Vatanka, 2015, p. 68). Challenging others means the channel has to be where others usually are not, and saying things that others generally do not. For instance, Press TV was among the few international media to broadcast live from Gaza

during the 2009 Israel attack on the area (Snyder, 2009), giving it the power to swim against the tide. However, clarity and factual correctness are not the case all the time. The channel is not shy about giving the stage even to extremists and conspiracy theorists to prove their points. As a result, there have been claims without factual clarifications on Press TV. Despite denying any wrongdoing, the channel has faced much criticism for unbalanced coverage and constant “anti-Zionist imagery” (Townend, 2009; Jaspal, 2013). For instance, Press TV broadcast the opinions of Michael Harris, a ‘US fascist,’ who claimed the Sandy Hook mass shooting was a “Zionist plot” in response to the UN’s recognition of Palestine’s statehood (Sreberny, 2013, p. 804).

Besides accusations over anti-Western and anti-Israel contents, critics notice that Press TV has not represented Iran’s domestic politics and atmosphere fairly. The outlet was biased against the widespread protests following Iran’s post-2009 presidential election (Townend, 2009), calling the protesters ‘rioters’ who ‘insulted Islamic religious beliefs’ (Jalali, 2019). Ten years later, when people took to the streets to protest against a surprise rise in the petrol price, Press TV echoed voices calling the protesters “trained saboteurs” who exploited people’s discontent (“Intelligence report,” 2019). Iranian scholars (living in Iran) also criticize Press TV for being ‘non-critical and non-analytical’ (Bashir & Rahmani, 2018). Bashir and Rahmani (2018) suggest that Press TV’s contents are merely reactions to the international mainstream media, and can be explained through the ‘psychology of fear’ to prioritize removing the media threats (p. 48). Content analysis of Press TV shows that most of the news coverage of the outlet is about Western countries and “North” rather than “South” countries. Afkhami (2012) showed that not only was Press TV coverage focused on Western countries, but its coverage of the Muslim world was more negative than that on the global North. Afkhami (2012) suggests at least two reasons that could lead to this unprecedented situation: the way that journalists are educated and thus learned how to look at the world according to the hegemonic Western approach, and the role of “media institutions” and “government’s foreign policy” in choosing and covering the news (pp. 178-181). It seems that Iran’s rivalry with some Arab and Muslim countries leads to negative coverage of Muslim countries’ regimes and developments (Afkhami, 2012).

Iranian scholars also believe that the IRIB did not apply all of its capacity to support the government’s nuclear policy. Doagouian (2013) showed that the IRIB’s lack of attention to the analytical approach toward Iran’s nuclear issue caused Iranian audiences to consume foreign international media. Sarafaraz’s reiteration later supported

Doagouian's suggestion that the IRIB, under his management, faced "challenges" with the Rouhani government over covering Iran's nuclear issues. Giving the stage to anti-JCPOA hardliners in national broadcasts dissatisfied Rouhani's government (Arta, 2019).

6.1.4 *What is Next?*

Besides the financial burden, Tehran also suffered a diplomatic cost because of its international broadcasts, from Press TV being banned in the UK by Ofcom for breaching broadcasting codes, to assaults on Al Alam's offices in Egypt, to being accused of sectarian incitement by the Bahraini authorities, and accusations of warmongering in the Middle East (Vatanka, 2015; Snyder, 2009). Nevertheless, the regime has clearly concluded that Iran should keep broadcasting its alternative views and values against the "West" and its 'soft war' opposition to the regime and Islam (Vatanka, 2015). Press TV was under heavy pressure during the Trump administration. Besides sanctions that made it difficult for Press TV to pay its employees' salaries, the US government directly confronted the channel's staff. However, these actions go back before Trump's presidency. In 2013, alongside the US, EU countries sanctioned the IRIB and Press TV head Muhammad Sarafraz (Katz, 2020).

The Trump administration doubled down on already existing actions against the IRIB and Press TV. In May 2018, the US Treasury Department accused the Director-General of the IRIB, Abdulali Ali-Asgari, of "restricting or denying the free flow of information to or from the Iranian people" (Jones & Newlee, 2019, p. 3). In 2019, the FBI arrested a US citizen, Press TV reporter Marzieh Hashemi (Born Melanie Franklin), on US soil on "unspecified charges." Hashemi was in custody for nine days before her release on 23 January 2019. She reiterated that she was treated like a criminal and restrained, even denied proper food (Waterson, 2019; "US arrests journalist," 2019). The budget limitation caused by Trump's 'maximum pressure' has also negatively impacted Iran's media aspect of soft power. Besides budget cuts for the current channels, further developments and establishing new channels faced severe obstacles. In 2019, the IRIB was still waiting for a budget to establish a new French language channel, and the satellite broadcasting of a Russian language channel (Barzegar, 2020). The US pressure on Press TV has been tremendous, but it was not the only source of the pressure.

Sarafraz, who resigned on 29 April 2016 after less than half of his tenure in the IRIB, also complained about obstacles inside Iran. Some of the current and former Press TV journalists describe Sarafraz's years as a "golden era" for Press TV, partly because of the "new thinking" he tried to bring in and the "lavish salaries" it paid at some point (Behraves, 2019). Sarafraz emphasized that he could not keep working while "security organizations" interfered in Press TV's hiring and productions (Arta, 2019). In the most famous example of this interference, Shahrzad Mirgholikhan, an IRIB inspector and close associate of Sarafraz, was forced to resign and leave the country. Before joining IRIB and Press TV, she served five years of a jail sentence in the US for trying to bypass sanctions and sending military-grade night-vision goggles to Iran (Behraves, 2019). Sarafraz believed that because Mirgholikhan was battling corruption in Press TV and IRIB, some intelligence organizations (likely her IRGC associates) pulled the rug out from under her. It seems that the IRIB under Sarafraz had problems with both moderates and conservatives. Sarafraz unprecedentedly criticized Iran's regime in an interview after his resignation: "My understanding is that the majority of people are unhappy with how the country is run and believe the authorities are either incompetent or corrupt or simply indifferent" (Behraves, 2019).

Press TV and Rouhani's government were at odds, particularly over foreign policy issues. Press TV takes some different positions than the government regarding Iran's foreign relations. For instance, in July 2019, the head of Press TV, Peyman Jebelli, emphasized that the channel did not plan to interview Mike Pompeo. He answered Rouhani's spokesperson, who said that Marzieh Hashemi (an American Press TV reporter) could interview Pompeo if his claim to talk to the Iranians was genuine ("Head of Press TV," 2019). Future domestic and international developments will determine whether Press TV can survive various pressures (particularly economic hardship) while the channel is becoming "more and more defenseless against enemies' propaganda" ("Press TV, Al-Alam," 2020).

6.2 CCTV and CGTN

6.2.1 Launching and Thriving

On May 1, 1958, Peking (Beijing) Television, China's first television station, was established in its capital city, and broadcast its first TV program four months later. In

1978, when China entered the reform era, the station was renamed China Central Television (CCTV) (Hong, 2002; Hong et al., 2009, p. 28; Chen, 2010). Following the establishment of a department for external communication in CCTV, the channel launched its first program for foreign audiences, *English News*, in 1986. After this move, CCTV broadcast other English language programs like *Focus*, a popular interview show, and some entertainment programs like *Hello Beijing* and *Cultural Lounge*. Developing CCTV did not have not a fast track at first. It could add only one channel to the network between 1958 and 1986. However, later on, CCTV faced dramatic expansion from two to sixteen channels from 1986 to 2004 (Hong et al., 2009, p. 46).

In 1992, only three years after the Tiananmen Square incident, CCTV aired a one-hour program in English and Chinese through New Century TV in Chicago. Therefore, North America could be updated with China's daily news (Chen, 2010). China took a significant step further in October 1992, when it launched CCTV-4. The channel was broadcast via the Asia I satellite, covering more than 80 countries in Australia, Eastern Europe, East Asia, and North Africa. By 1996, CCTV-4 was available in 98% of countries worldwide, broadcasting mainly Chinese language programs in different genres, from current affairs and economics to entertainment and children's programs (Chen, 2010; Scotton & Hachten, 2010). CCTV-9 went on air in 2000. With the slogan "your window on China," this 24-hour channel sought foreign language audiences in the first place. CCTV-9 used platforms like Rupert Murdoch's Sky satellite and Fox services in the United States to broadcast various genres across the globe (Cull, 2009; Chen, 2010). In September 2003, CCTV-9 was ordered to be restructured as a "rolling news" service (a 24-hour, continuously updated news service on radio or television) (Jirik, 2010). Following the order, CCTV International launched in 2004, airing a hybrid of live and repeat broadcasts (Jirik, 2010). The channel even started to recruit foreign professionals "to emulate the Western TV style and also aims to communicate with English-speaking viewers more effectively" (Scotton & Hachten, 2010, p. 188).

CCTV-9, also known as CCTV International, was renamed CCTV News in 2010, and later in 2016 introduced as CGTN (a part of China Global Television Network) (Hu et al., 2018). By 2010, CCTV News was already broadcasting in all official UN languages, including English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, and Chinese (Jirik, 2016; Hu et al., 2018). In 2012, CCTV opened broadcasting centers in Washington DC and Nairobi (Jirik, 2016, p. 3543). In addition, the London center opened in 2018 ("About us," n.d.). Alongside the channel's foreign expansion, CCTV remained an important

information source (mainly) in mainland China (Zhu, 2012, p. 7) thanks to some privileges like the exclusive coverage of national events, or Chinese Communist Party (CCP) information (Zhu, 2012).

CGTN launched on December 31, 2016, to “consolidate” Chinese media’s “worldwide reach” (Ye & Alboronz, 2018, p. 84). It is a multilingual and multi-platform media group that launches programs in six languages (including the main 24-hour English language news channel CGTN-English, CGTN Spanish, French, Arabic, Russian, and CGTN Documentary). During the 13th National People’s Congress in 2018, China’s media structure faced noticeable changes, and CGTN became a part of a brand-new media group created by merging leading Chinese media, called The China Media Group. The China Media Group (CMG, literally called “The Voice of China” in Chinese) was constructed by merging “China Central Television (CCTV), China Global Television Network (CGTN), China National Radio (CNR), and China Radio International (CRI)” (Sun, 2018, p. 1).

In 2009, *The South China Morning Post* reported, “CCTV says its channels reach 838 million overseas subscribers in 137 nations” (Nelson, 2013, p. 22). In comparison, only one year after launching CGTN (in December 2017), officials claimed its TV channels’ programs were available in 170 countries and regions worldwide, with 387 million viewers (“Full text of,” 2017). Besides, CGTN claimed its various digital media platforms had 87 million global subscribers, including 52.69 million Facebook subscribers, “more than any other media organization in the world” (“Full text of,” 2017, para. 11). CGTN launched its mobile news app (perusing its “mobile-first” strategy) with the TV channel simultaneously. After opening the app, a user sees the channel’s slogan, ‘See the difference’ (Li & Wu, 2018, pp. 41-42). By December 2017, the app had been downloaded over 3.1 million times; 95 percent originated outside China (“Full text of,” 2017).

Critics, however, notice that despite official statistics, “reaching subscribers” does not mean the same number of viewers (Nelson, 2013). For instance, based on an audience feedback study, Liu (2014) showed that “CCTV America reached some Chinese students and a small number of scholars interested in China issues, while channel recognition among its intended audience was low” (Liu, 2014, p. 9, cited in Jirik, 2016, p. 3544). In January 2015, Howard W. French, author of *China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa*, and a former *New York Times* correspondent in Africa and China, told *The New York Times* that during his summer trip to Africa, he had talked to people in several countries and found that not only did they

not watch Chinese TV, but they generally did not even know others who did either (Feng, 2017).

Critics also noticed that CGTN's Facebook follower numbers may sound robust (with more than Al Jazeera and the BBC combined), but it is thought that two-thirds of the network's traffic is coming from China (Mantesso & Zhou, 2019). Furthermore, it has been claimed that CGTN America's YouTube videos often attract fewer than 1,000 viewers, which is remarkably low compared to media like the BBC, with more than 5,000 viewers (Mantesso & Zhou, 2019). After all, CGTN's branding emphasized increasing the channel's presence on social media platforms like YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook, all of which are banned in China (Ylp, 2018). Despite the criticism, it seems that, at least among journalists, CGTN is popular. According to *The Guardian*, in 2018, almost 6,000 people applied for just 90 job offers by the outlet during the channel's recruitment for its London headquarters (Lim & Bergin, 2018). CGTN trying to reach foreign audiences is only a part of China's plan to boost its soft power.

6.2.2 *The Media and China's Soft Power Strategy*

Globally, there are different positive and negative views of China. While people in some countries are worried about China's rising power, others embrace China's expanding influence. A 2005 Pew Research Center study showed that people in countries including Türkiye, Pakistan, Indonesia, Lebanon, Jordan, and India see an assertive China as a positive and beneficial thing (Cho & Jeong, 2008, p. 454). Years later, in 2018, the world still has mixed feelings about China. While majorities or pluralities in 12 countries (mainly in Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia) "give China positive marks," only 38% of US people "have a favorable opinion" about China (Devlin, 2018). It seems that although China could prove itself as an economic power and main player in the world's public opinion, the country has fallen short of winning people's hearts and minds at the same level. While a Pew Research Center's survey showed, in 2018, a global median of 70% said "China plays a more important role in the world than it did 10 years ago", the same survey showed that a median of 66% across 25 countries say "the Chinese government does not respect the personal freedoms of its people" (Devlin, 2018, para. 3-6).

Joseph Nye conceptualized soft power as the ability of one country to get 'other countries to want what it wants' (Nye, 1990, p. 167). He argued that other states "will more willingly follow" a state if the state's "culture and ideology are attractive" (p. 167). Otherwise, "if the content of a country's culture, values, and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that 'broadcasts' them cannot produce soft power" (Nye, 2008, p. 95). Introduced into China by Wang Huning, a professor and later a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in 1993, the concept of soft power "has penetrated into the Chinese political and academic lexicon as deeply and broadly as no other term of international relations ever has" (Ye & Alboronz, 2018, p.83; Jirik, 2016). Bandurski (2009) believes that the idea of soft power in China became "an obsession" not only in the international relations field but also in the journalism and mass communications arena (Bandurski, 2009). Attacking the Four Olds - old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits - during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) made China "a dangerously anti-traditional and xenophobic place" (Ding, 2008, p. 67). As a result, China's cultural soft power declined sharply and started rising only after the Deng Xiaoping reforms (Ding, 2008). Scholars argue that China's approach to soft power has its own characteristics. While Nye recommended soft power for non-state actors like Hollywood and pop culture, the Chinese version does not primarily rely on civil society and seems to have a national soft power strategy "bolstering exports in its media, cultural, and creative industries" (Flew, 2016, p. 284).

Culture has been a vital element in China's soft power policy. At the Seventeenth Congress of the CCP in October 2007, President Hu emphasized that the party should "enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to guarantee better the people's basic cultural rights and interests" (Lai, 2012, p.12). *Xinhua*, on December 28, 2007, published Hu Jintao's article with the title *Raise National Culture's Soft Strength*, which emphasized gaining soft power in the "informatized" world: "Especially in today's informatized society, every country that has advanced propaganda methods and strong propaganda capabilities can widely spread its cultural ideals and value concepts, and it can grasp the speaking power to influence the world and popular feeling" (Cull, 2009, p. 10). The rapid economic growth of China, and its determination to advertise China's culture and viewpoints, made the country a potential rival even to the United States (Cho & Jeong, 2008, p. 453).

China has promoted its soft power in different dimensions, like establishing the international media, attracting foreign talent, and promoting Chinese culture abroad

through institutions like the Confucius Institute (Cho & Jeong, 2008). However, the country has emphasized a “comprehensive” approach to soft power, meaning that culture works hand in hand with economic and political elements. As Jiang Zemin, China’s president of the time, said at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (NCCPC) In 2002, “in today’s world, culture intertwines with economics and politics, demonstrating a more prominent position and role in the competition for comprehensive national power” (Palit, 2010, p. 4). The international media are crucial in China’s plan to boost its “national power.” The country has tried to send its voice through the media and, if possible, do it through its own international media worldwide (Wang, 2010). According to a report released by the Pentagon between 2009 and 2011, *Xinhua* News Agency launched 40 new foreign bureaus and doubled its number of overseas correspondents. *Xinhua* had a total of 162 foreign bureaus in 2017, and aimed to reach 200 by 2020 (US Department of Defense, 2018, p. 16).

Chinese policymakers are aware of the media’s multiplier effects on how others imagine the modern nation (Sinclair et al., 1996). Scholars argue that Images of China have been shaped by “dominant western assumptions” (Cao, 2007). This dominant image has penetrated China’s society. For example, Lei (2011) showed that “people in China who relied on the Internet for news are more likely to have differing views from the government” (Lei, 2011, as cited in Loh & Loh, 2017). The expansion of China’s media activity in the international arena has been considered a “charm offensive” (because of attempting “to use the media to make that country more appealing to international audiences”) or “charm defensive, i.e., a reaction against the negative stereotyping of China in the global media and an attempt to rectify misrepresentations” (Wasserman, 2013, p. 1). However, China’s soft power strategy is not merely launching a ‘charm offensive’ or reaction to others. Above all, China tries to reach “equality of discourse with the West” (Marsh, 2018, p. 144), combating what it sees as decades of unchallenged Western media imperialism (Lim & Bergin, 2018).

China’s joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 accelerated the country’s integration into the international arena. As a result, China’s leaders became even more sensitive about the country’s presence and image in the global media. By launching CCTV-9 in 2000, China’s media could get the party and government’s message faster and more functionally to the world (Bequelin, 2009). China hoped to boost its political influence on international society by using multi-language international media like CCTV. Integration in the world economy had a remarkable effect on China’s media

policy. Besides launching its own media, some have used the Chinese expression of ‘borrowing the boat to get to the sea’ to describe how China’s government disseminates its message by acquiring local media worldwide. According to an investigation conducted by *Reuters*, in 2015, at least 33 radio stations across 14 countries were part of a global radio web structured to obscure its majority shareholder, which was the state-run China Radio International (CRI) (US Department of Defense, 2018; Mantesso & Zhou, 2019).

The expansion of CCTV-9 showed the importance of the English language in China. The English language was a key to successful “global commerce and communication,” and to provide Chinese public diplomacy with a global audience (Thussu, 2010, p. 72). The 2008 Summer Olympics being in Beijing bolstered this needed change (Ye & Alboronz, 2018). China’s efforts to improve the country’s image abroad and “counterbalance negative news coverage” was recognizable from coverage of the Olympics to a promotional film projected in New York City’s Times Square (Hu & Ji, 2012, p. 32). However, Western mainstream media and military institutions saw China’s counterbalancing act as a transparent way to “shape” and “influence” global public opinion (US Department of Defense, 2018) that served “the ideological aims” of the CCP (Mantesso & Zhou, 2019).

In an assessment of China and Russia’s policies on soft power, Joseph Nye (2013) argues that Chinese leaders are suffering from a “poverty of thought” and cannot understand that:

In today’s world, information is not scarce, but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda is not propaganda. For all the efforts to turn *Xinhua* and China Central Television into competitors to CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for brittle propaganda (Cited in Jirik, 2016, p. 3547).

In some scholars’ views, have to serve the CCP and China’s government is precisely the Achilles’ heel of China’s media. Xie and Boyd-Barrett (2015) question CCTV America’s ability to grab the Western audiences’ attention, as they tend to believe in long-embedded “impartiality,” “objectivity,” and “independence” in an Anglo-American journalistic ideology (p. 75). CCTV America would be “unacceptable, or even repulsive, to US audiences” who believe in “free” American media “despite widespread evidence of complicity of private U.S. media with US foreign policy objectives” (Xie & Boyd-Barrett, 2015, p. 75). Critics, however, believe that (although not very successful), CCTV’s attitude in China’s favor is not unusual and they point out that as the “nation-

state still matters in a globalized world,” national interests are a crucial factor in international news coverage among international news agencies (Dai & Hyun, 2010).

6.2.3 *The Evolving of China's Media Policy*

Since China's reforms in the late 1970s, its media has experienced dramatic changes to keep up with the new path of globalization. China experienced explosive growth in its media, particularly after the initiation of reforms. For instance, television networks increased from 52 in 1983 to 2,000 in 2003. By 2005, CCTV could reach 1.2 billion people across the country, while in 1958, there was only one channel and around 200 TV sets (Jirik, 2008). The combination of liberalism and authoritarianism, or as Donald and Keane (2002) call it, “authoritarian liberalism,” marks the implementation of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which means “to construct a form of state-manipulated market economy that delivered spectacular economic growth” (Harvey, 2005, p. 122; Sun, 2018). Dramatic changes in China's power politics also influenced the country's media. A new “power bloc” in China's media system emerged, which consisted of “the bureaucratic capitalists of a reformed party state, transnational corporate capital, and an emerging urban middle class” (Zhao, 2003, p. 53).

Opening Chinese media's door to capital made financial factors vitally important. Commercial activities became so crucial that they were seen “as just as important as Party journalism, if not more so” (Xin, 2012, p. 136). In 2010, the media became China's fourth most profitable industry (Ke, 2010). Unlike Western countries' experiences, China's post-Mao commercial revolution in the press, forced on it by cutting off the state subsidies, “was neither politically calculated nor had it led to the decline of the party organs”; Instead, the party-state “spearheaded the process of commercialization, adopting and containing the market mechanisms within the existing structure” (Zhao, 2012, p. 157). As Tunstall (2008) explains, the media in China became “aggressively capitalist,” seeking out commercials and audiences while continuing to be “Marxist and Communist in terms of ideology and control” (p. 191). Maybe this continuation of “control” is why China's government still invests in the country's media. Despite the lack of information about investments in its international media, reports from 2009 show that China was prepared to spend up to 6 billion US dollars on this field during the next few years (Hu & Ji, 2012; Jirik, 2016; Ye & Alboronz, 2018).

This change in China media's approach was not hidden from global capital's eyes. In a speech to the 2009 World Media Summit in Beijing, *Time Warner* executive Steve Marcopoto illustrated the relationship between the global media industry and the Chinese approach to information when he said, "China's global development will benefit from ties that would create a dynamic international media industry, and fully adhering to the country's broadcasting code" ("Time Warner eyes," 2009). According to a 2012 *New York Times* report, international executives who wanted to introduce their plans or products in China could secure an interview with CCTV by paying 4,000 US dollars per minute. For "a flattering article" about your company in the *Workers' Daily*, the Communist Party's propaganda newspaper, you had to spend about \$1 per Chinese character (Barboza, 2012). China's media became profitable after the reforms, but pursuing soft power through the media was more than just opening their doors to globalization and capital. China's discourse should "go out" to the world.

Jiang Zemin first publicly used the phrase "go out" during his visit to Hebei province in June 1996, but the term "going out" did not enter top-level policy discourse until 2000, when it was included in the CCP Central Committee's proposal for the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) (Jiang, 2014, cited in Jirik, 2016, p. 3538). China's media "going out" is rooted in its economic "going out," which was initiated in October 2000 at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the CCP. The going out policy marked a policy shift in favor of overseas investment by Chinese companies (Ye & Alboronz, 2018, p. 83). In 2001, Xu Guangchun, deputy head of the Central Publicity Department and head of the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), launched the project "going-out," aiming to take the PRC's voice to the world. China's media funding model changed dramatically after introducing the "going-out and soft power projects" in the early 2000s (Jirik, 2016, p. 3545). The going-out policy aimed to "bridge the gap" between the country's robust economic condition and its "still weak media influence" in the international arena (Xin, 2012, p. 2).

As Kurlantzick (2007) shows, changing the country's image and China's threat scenario became crucial to its foreign policy and media campaign. Jiang Zemin was thinking about "wooing" and not "intimidating" when he said, "We should . . . establish a publicity capacity to exert an influence on world opinion that is as strong as China's international standing" (p. 39). Regarding TV programs, the going-out aimed to consolidate a full range of China's TV programs, particularly in North America and Western Europe, during the first five years, and then to establish global multilingual

services. China's foreign-language media even started to avoid the word "propaganda" for non-Chinese audiences. Instead, they use a whole spectrum of words like "publicity," "information," "public relations," "cross-cultural communication," and "public diplomacy" about activities that are still categorized as "foreign propaganda" (*waixuan*) in the Chinese language (Brady, 2009, p. 33).

For critics like Xin (2012), the "going abroad" policy was "the reinforcement of state intervention," as an outcome of "the parallel processes of marketization and globalization" (p. 2). The policy (at least on the media side) was not welcomed in the West. Western observers saw the combination of China's economic and discursive power as a danger to the "free world." Hu & Ji (2012) showed that the two keywords used by US mainstream media to depict the policy were "social control and empire" (p. 35). Despite the skepticism, China's media after these reforms experienced some changes, becoming something other than merely the Party's mouthpieces. In October 1998, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji met the *Focus* TV show's editors and reporters and expressed his hope to see the program provide "public supervision [functioning as] people's mouthpiece, government's mirror, and vanguard of reform" (Kang, 2015, p. 325). Kang (2015) notices that changing from "CCP's mouthpiece" to "people's mouthpiece" was a significant shift, at least in rhetoric. Even the CIA's assessment of the Chinese media suggests that they became more autonomous, diverse, assertive, and skeptical of official authority (Hazelbarth, 1997). Media producers in China could now enjoy more flexibility.

Scholars suggest that the 1990s financial and bureaucratic reforms differentiated the Chinese media (including CCTV) from previously state mouthpieces (Hong et al., 2009). The producer system has been used for the commercial media system experienced in the country, leading to cuts in state-media subsidies. Although common in the West, China's production system was a noticeable change. For decades, the Communist Party managed TV production in China and handpicked almost all the officials in TV stations. The producer system broke the tradition, and gave the TV stations "the power to design programs, make decisions concerning program content, control the raising and spending of money, and oversee production and program management" (Hong et al., 2009, pp. 41-42). Producer-driven models loosened China's media from being "a pedagogical tool of the party-state apparatus," and enabled them to "interact more complexly with the market economy and ideas of public participation" (Berry, 2009, p. 71). However, the Government's hegemony and media control did not wither away in China.

6.2.4 Chinese Communism and Media Control

Lee (2005) categorizes three models in China's journalism history. Confucian Liberalism (the 1900s-1940s), Maoism (1949-present), and Communist capitalism (After the 1980s, especially after 1992) (p. 18). Despite the oppressive heavy-handed government, scholars suggest that Chinese journalists share many values with their Western counterparts, and try to bring objectivity into their government-controlled newsrooms (Sun, 2001; Jirik, 2004). However, journalists, even if they wanted to, have little means to raise their voices. News articles about sensitive issues must be verified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other relevant government departments, and in many cases, only *Xinhua* is allowed to report the issue. Others simply repeat whatever *Xinhua* reports (Brady, 2009). In an interview with ABC, Cedric Alviani, director of *Reporters Without Borders'* East Asia bureau, told ABC News, "In China ... it's almost impossible for professional journalists to publish anything that would not be in line with the Party's views" (Mantesso & Zhou, 2019, para. 31).

Zhang (2011) presents three methods of censorship in China, even after the more relaxed policy toward the media: "(i) licensing, (ii) the annual review system for the newspaper, broadcast, and film and television program production license holders, and (iii) the certification of journalists" (p. 114). These tactics, which imply pre- and post-productions, force media productions to favor the government and Party (Zhang, 2011). Pressures on journalists could be more direct. For instance, Xinhua reporter Mark Bourrie resigned after being asked to cover a visit by the Dalai Lama to Ottawa in 2012 only to "find out what had happened in a closed-door meeting with the then prime minister, Stephen Harper." The report was supposed to be sent directly to Beijing and not be published (Lim & Bergin, 2018, para. 21). It seems that despite some changes in Chinese media management, still "under all circumstances, the media should adhere to the party leadership and should adhere to the principle of acting in the party spirit" Lin (2004, p. 188). The awkwardness in Chinese journalism is rooted in the clash between being the "watchdog" for the public and dealing with the Party's tight control. This is the confusion that Zhao (2008) calls "watchdogs on party leashes" (p. 253). Party "leashes" are not only for the traditional media. Although technically complicated, China has the tightest control over the internet and social media in the world. By figuring out what kind of service the

user is trying to connect to, the Great Firewall can block website names, misdirect traffic, and even shut off encrypted communications (Yang, 2019).

China has also started to crack down on VPN services since January 2017 (Solon, 2017). In late 2017, China Telecom's Shanghai office even sent letters to customers asking them to register for access to specific ports used for email and file sharing (Lin & Kubota, 2018). While the party-state "has been compelled to rule with more subtlety, and even to 'negotiate' with media organizations," CCTV and other media have been forced to practice "tightrope walking" between CCP policy and audience satisfaction (Zhang, 2011, p. 142).

6.2.5 *How CGTN (then CCTV) Keeps up*

CCTV

CCTV aimed to be "a global, 24-hour, English-language service...strengthening governance, including foreign policy, through media" and "help with the government's policymaking" (Jirik, 2016, p. 3539). CCTV was not the only international government-funded media operation in the world. However, China transformed its state media into a market-based media company, trying to "develop a Chinese version of civic journalism that can operate with credibility in a global news arena" (Thussu, 2008, p. 6). Like other Chinese media, CCTV had no choice but to seek advertising money, after China abandoned the state-funding model and embraced the marketization of the media (Feng et al., 2008). Zhu and Berry (2009) indicate that commercials have become "CCTV's bread and butter" and "routine" in now "rich" CCTV (p. 44). The channel could even contribute about \$150 million to the government in tax money in the late 1990s (Zhu & Berry, 2009, p. 44; Hong et al., 2009). In 2000, CCTV raised 5.5 billion yuan (RMB) or US \$662.65 million from commercials, while the government contributed only 30 million yuan or US\$3.61 million (Xiaoping, 2002, pp. 18-19). The channel's contribution reached RMB8 billion (about US\$1 billion) in 2003 and 2004, taking up almost a third of all the money spent on television advertising in China (Hong et al., 2009).

CCTV has been successful in attracting foreign companies as well as domestic ones. Familiar advertisers such as Proctor & Gamble and Volkswagen used the medium of CCTV to reach China's market (Nelson, 2013). The international advertisement was part of 2.5 billion US Dollars in CCTV's ad revenue in 2012 (Nelson, 2013). However, in

recent years, CCTV has lost some of its advertising market shares to online platforms like the giant Chinese search engine Baidu. From 2012 to 2013, Baidu's online advertising revenue increased by 43%, compared to an 11% increase for CCTV in primetime advertising revenue (Jirik, 2016, p. 3545). Alongside the financial shift, CCTV experienced some changes in its production contents. Hong, Lü and Zou (2009) believe that CCTV passed through two phases of reform. The first phase was between 1978 and 1993, in which changes were "gradual and mostly involved professional, administrative, and technical areas" (p. 41). In the second phase, which started in the 1990s, CCTV faced "more substantial and comprehensive changes," and "became more audience-oriented thanks to the first phase reforms." In the second phase, the "producer system" started in CCTV. CCTV's *Focus* could be a good example to depict the second phase and its boundaries in China's media.

Focus was one of the few CCTV programs that attracted both ordinary audiences and government officials (Hong et al., 2009). The program aimed to address topics that "concerned the public and to serve as a public watchdog by directly criticizing the bureaucracy and the wrongdoings of the party and government officials" (Hong et al., 2009, p. 43). *Focus* attracted substantial public attention and ranked second only to *Evening News*, the program watched by about 300 million viewers. *Focus* was also popular among high-ranking party officials. Hong, Lu and Zou (2009) notice that Jiang Zemin, former premiers Li Peng and Zhu Rongji, and the former party secretary-general Hu Jintao "all made phone calls to relevant state agencies to solve problems they saw exposed on the program" (p. 43). Despite the initial success, China's system limited critical and audience-oriented programs. Strict regulations and government interference finally affected CCTV's critical programs. As a result, the proportion of programs with critical content, such as *Focus*, radically declined "from 47 percent of CCTV's programs in 1998 to only 17.5 percent in 2002" (Hong et al., 2009, p. 49).

CCTV (and later CGTN) always had an identity dilemma. Being under the party's control and recognized as a credible international media simultaneously confused the channel (Winfield & Peng, 2005; Flew, 2016; Jirik, 2016; Fearon & Rodrigues, 2019). Western media have raised questions about the contradiction between China's strict control of the media and China's media, like CCTV, having the ability to report events similarly to the major Western media ("Chinese state TV," 2012). Despite an "unprecedented level of responsiveness to audience demand and interest," the media still experience "state-orchestrated ideological indoctrination" (Tai & Sun, 2011, p. 681). For

example, Tai & Sun (2011) explain that during the SARS crisis in 2003, rumors thrived among Chinese audiences because a "deeply ingrained authoritarian impulse to maintain secrecy," combined with "an obsession with development and stability" prevented the media from reporting the developments honestly (p. 682). This structure leads to Chinese media's "inevitable failure" in cases like the SARS crisis (Knobler, 2004).

Critics like John Jirik, a former CCTV-9 consultant, argue that the relative editorial autonomy gives production centers "some leeway to decide what to cover and how" (Jirik, 2016, p. 3539). However, the last word always remains with the government and party. For instance, even foreign headquarters' signals from Washington and Nairobi have to pass through Beijing before going on air (Jirik, 2016). Absolute prohibitions still existed in 2016 when Jirik (2016) mentioned some typical examples from CCTV operations:

Do not discuss the families of the leadership unless they are legitimately in the news; do not report any story related to the leadership that *Xinhua* (China's state news agency) has not reported; use *Xinhua* as an editorial guide; only report negatively on the Dalai Lama; do not report on the Catholic Pope; ignore Taiwan unless the report is apolitical or serves China's interests; do not question China's foreign policy; do not report positively about Japan unless so doing enhanced China's interests; and so on. (p. 3540).

The regime's "coercive power and institutional control" has forced journalists to develop 'self-discipline' and use the 'right' vocabulary in their works. In other words, they have matured their "professional intuition" (Pan & Lu, 2003, p. 219). At CCTV, a prestigious 1995 Fan Changjiang Award winner told Pan & Lu (2003) how he could not include "many stories of poverty and official corruption," adding in a self-mocking way that he was a "Party propagandist" (p. 219). China's media control was different in the case of foreign professionals. As Jirik (2016) notes, nationality played a crucial role in access to information. Accordingly, "foreigners were excluded from more than consultative power at the apex of the news editorial system" (p. 3542).

Not all scholars agree with the structural failure and extraordinary censorship in CCTV. In a 2012 interview with C-Span, Executive Consultant for CCTV, Jim Laurie challenged criticism of the channel's editorial independence, and emphasized that the government's control of CCTV was no tighter than other state-funded news outlets like Aljazeera, RT, or France 24 ("Chinese state TV," 2012). Some journalists had similar views, even when they no longer worked for the channel. Former BBC correspondent Daniel Schweimler, who later joined Al-Jazeera, said his experience of two years working for CCTV America was fun and relatively trouble-free (Lim & Bergin, 2018). In an interview with *The Guardian*, Schweimler accepted that CCTV was a "soft propaganda

tool," but not to any greater extent than for the BBC or Al-Jazeera, and "certainly nothing like RT" (Lim & Bergin, 2018). The Central Publicity Department wanted to make CCTV "China's CNN, only cleverer" (Jirik, 2016, p. 3548). However, the Chinese government decided to establish CGTN as CCTV's successor. In one interview, the Controller of CGTN-English, Liu Cong, said CGTN adopts a more open and inclusive attitude, comparing the channel to CCTV. Cong, however, also emphasized that this openness was limited by the national security interest (Li & Wu, 2018, p. 43).

CGTN

CGTN has struggled to develop CCTV's position and reputation as a Chinese international medium, with the slogan "see the difference." It seems that the channel is seeking a new approach, according to CGTN Controller Jiang Heping:

In the past, the slogans we used for CCTV9 and CCTV NEWS included "Your window on China and the World," "Your link to Asia," and then "Your link to the world." However, now the new slogan does not distinguish between China, Asia, and the world...we now underscore a shared future for mankind. We would like to provide a platform for different, or I'd like to use the phrase "a variety of" voices, not just voice of China, but also voices of other Asian countries, of African countries and of Latin American nations (cited in Li & Wu, 2018, p. 42).

CGTN's integrated communication strategy has made resource-sharing easier for the channel. Compared to CCTV, CGTN has access to more than the real-time TV and digital media content generated by CCTV. CGTN also enjoys information provided by more than 25,000 global internet outlets and 70 of the world's leading media organizations (Li & Wu, 2018, p. 43). CGTN's officials point out that one significant distinction between CGTN and CCTV is in their audiences. The channel goes so far as to call its audience "God" ("Full text of," 2017). CGTN's ambitions are not limited to everyday people. The channel tries to make its footprint felt in the international community. In December 2017, the CGTN Global Media Summit and the Seventh Global Video Media Forum were held in Sanya, China. Overall, 387 representatives from nearly 100 media organizations and 45 countries and regions attended the summit. The summit's theme was "A shared future." This was the concept that CGTN tried to present before participants such as Reuters, AP, RT, and Al Jazeera (Li & Wu, 2018, p. 44).

CGTN pursues a "localization strategy" by hiring local international staff who are well-reputed and familiar with the native culture (Sun, 2018, p. 4). Meanwhile, the channel tries to keep up its professionalism by using figures who have previously worked for leading news organizations (Sun, 2018; Fearon & Rodrigues, 2019). For instance, the host of *Americas Now*, Elaine Reyes, previously worked for NBC and covered major news events for American networks, including MSNBC, FOX News, CBS, and CNN ("Elaine Reyes," n.d.). In another case, CGTN America hired "five-time Emmy award-winning broadcast journalist" Mike Walter, who served CBS and *USA Today* before joining CGTN (Sun, 2018) ("Mike Walter," n.d.). Furthermore, CGTN pursues the same policy at its other outlets. CGTN Africa, for instance, hired Beatrice Marshall, the host of *Talk Africa* and a Chief Anchor on Kenya's leading television network (KTN) (Sun, 2018, p. 4).

The Chinese public sphere's structural transformations have led to a shift in propaganda policy "from a suppressive to a more proactive approach" in recent years in China (Steinhardt, 2015, p. 119). As a result, even "a wide spectrum of livelihood-centered protests" found their way into China's media headlines (Steinhardt, 2015, p. 131). CGTN tried to demonstrate a new approach, by airing some sensitive issues. CGTN America's Director-General, Ma Jing, believes "the importance of 'traditional journalistic values' including 'accuracy, objectivity, truthfulness, and public accountability'" is the key characteristic of the channel (Fearon & Rodrigues, 2019, p. 107). During the 2017 'two sessions' (the plenary sessions of the National People's Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) period, CGTN covered issues like "vote-buying in Liaoning Province, the shortage of pediatricians and the second child dilemma, endangered animals and environmental protection" in addition to "LGBT rights" (Li & Wu, 2018, p. 44). In July 2017, CGTN-English even reported that somebody had put a black over the Bauhinia sculpture on Golden Bauhinia Square – a symbol of Hong Kong's return to China (Li & Wu, 2018, p. 44). Sun (2018) notices that (unlike CCTV), all the CGTN produced news is real-time, meaning it goes directly on air instead of going through Beijing headquarters censorship. The channel tries to report more dynamically and comprehensively. For example, it reported the famine in Africa alongside progress like the boosting of internet access or launching of a satellite in South Africa. This approach seems different from the "history of distorted reporting of Africa" by the dominant Western media (Li & Wu, 2018, p. 45).

When CCTV was rebranded as CGTN in 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping urged the media organization to "make use of abundant information, with a distinct Chinese perspective and global vision" (Fearon & Rodrigues, 2019, p. 107) to "spread China's voice" (Mantesso & Zhou, 2019). However, scholars are skeptical about CGTN's openness policy, and notice that the channel launched by CCTV had an "identity problem internationally," and was sought as a "propaganda arm of the Chinese party-state" (Flew, 2017). Unsurprisingly, CGTN was also assumed to be an instrument of soft power used by the CCP to foster "state-led public diplomacy" ("The baffling makeover," 2017).

In response to critics, in 2017, CGTN aired a series of interviews with ten Chinese journalists who were also Communist Party members, reflecting their views on the country and its major issues (Yan, 2017). In the program, *My Life, My China*, Chinese journalists challenged some fundamental ideas of Western journalism. CGTN's Pan Deng explained how many practitioners were "brainwashed" by "Western values of journalism." He emphasized that this kind of "ideal journalism" is actually a "utopian fantasy" (Yan, 2017). In one part of the program, Ma Zechen, a host for the French channel of CGTN, explained that journalists' responsibilities are to guide public discourse toward a "positive and constructive outlook," while it has to be in line with the "fundamental interests" of the nation and its people (Yan, 2017). This approach to journalism seems to sit well alongside the Party's policy to image China positively. In 2016, President Xi told journalists that all the party media's work "must reflect the party's will, safeguard the party's authority, and safeguard the party's unity" (Xu & Albert, 2017, para. 3). Another host, introduced as the Xinhua News Agency Senior Political Correspondent, elaborated the difference between Chinese journalism and western journalism when reporting the toppling of Mubarak in Egypt. He reiterated that while the Western media had reported stories of "revolution" and "the people's victory," the priority for the Chinese perspective was "social order."

Apparently, CGTN and the Chinese state media generally could not convince the West about their objectivity and professionalism. In 2018, the US government ordered CGTN (and Xinhua) to register as a foreign agent, fearing the outlet could be used as a tool of political interference, despite Beijing's official complaint (Mantesso & Zhou, 2019). Donald Trump has blamed China for propaganda and interfering in US policies. For instance, in September 2018, Trump claimed that Chinese media were spreading 'propaganda ads' in US newspapers, to damage his prospects in the midterm elections because the US was 'beating them' on trade (Collins, 2018). CGTN sought to explain and

defend China's policies. One particularly challenging case was economic policy, including directly challenging their American counterparts. In May 2019, Trish Regan, a host on Fox Business Network, chatted with Liu Xin of CGTN about trade and technology against "the backdrop of the escalating US-China trade war" (Hui, 2019). CGTN's troubles are not limited to the US. In 2020, the UK media regulator, Ofcom, put the channel off air. Ofcom is required by law to prevent bodies with mainly political aims from becoming or remaining TV license holders, and CGTN is simply considered under the CCP's control. Ofcom also accused CGTN of impartiality over Hong Kong's 2019-2020 protest coverage (Seal, 2021). In 2020, Ofcom also found CGTN had "breached fairness and privacy rules" in the case of Peter Humphrey, a British corporate investigator. Mr. Humphrey accused the channel of airing his forced confession (Seal, 2021).

China's Central Publicity Department wanted to make CCTV "China's CNN, only cleverer" (Jirik, 2016, p. 3548). Critics note that CCTV and its successor have not been successful in propaganda, even compared to Russia Today (RT). While RT has a solid anti-west tone, it has been more successful than CGTN in providing newsworthy materials and bringing famous (and controversial) figures on air (Ylp, 2018). Allegedly, CCTV and CGTN were not clever enough, at least in terms of propaganda.

6.3 CNN

Ted Turner established CNN (Cable News Network) in 1980 as the first all-news TV network in the US. In 1996, the giant media corporation Time Warner became the owner of CNN (Biagi, 2017). According to a Pew Research Center study in 2014, CNN was the most trusted main news outlet among American adults (54 percent) (Mitchell, 2014), and web traffic data company, Alexa, was recorded in May 2021, CNN.com was ranked 30th among the most visited websites in the United States, and ranked 97th in the world ("Overview," 2021). One of the most significant changes CNN has made to the news industry is its 24-hour news style. The channel has been described as "the godfather of global television news reporting to audiences around the world" (McPhail, 2014, p. 199). Pioneering communication technologies and satellites, alongside cable networks and websites, helped CNN reach every corner of the world. Satellite technology has played a significant role in CNN's success, as it did with other CNN competitors like France 24, Euronews, and Aljazeera (McPhail, 2014).

Nowadays, CNN's news and information services are available in seven different languages across all major TV, digital and mobile platforms, reaching more than 370 million households and hotel rooms worldwide, and 90 million households in the US. In addition, CNN partners with over 1,000 local and international news organizations worldwide, using around 3,000 employees worldwide ("CNN worldwide," 2021). Some years ago, scholars noted that CNN had become the "eyes and ears of the world" (Miladi, 2003, p. 149). Besides the Iraq Wars (Robinson, 1999; Thussu, 2002; Robinson, 2005; Gilboa, 2005; Bahador, 2011; McPhail, 2014), CNN flourished by reporting on "controversy, breaking news stories, coups, and earthquakes, and stories that go on for days, or even weeks", like the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean which devastated parts of Indonesia (McPhail, 2014, p. 198).

6.3.1 *CNN and CNNI*

CNN International (CNNI) went on air in 1985. The rise in international news led to a new news channel called CNNI, dedicated to international affairs and with more of an international audience (Medina, 2003). As Shoemaker and Reese (1996) emphasize, "the simultaneous transmission of news from many countries has often made CNN the quickest way to get information about what's happening around the world" (p. 48). Then, by the same token, CNNI faced competition from other international news networks. The original CNN resumed its work as CNN-US. However, CNNI has been identical to CNN for the international audience.

CNN's popularity flourished explicitly after the first Persian Gulf War. One around-the-clock transnational news channel with access to both sides of the war was an extraordinary phenomenon that led to CNN's commercial breakthrough (Nohrstedt, 2009, p. 95). As Thussu & Freedman (2003) suggest, CNN's coverage of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, "for the first time in history, brought military conflict into living rooms across the globe" (p. 124). The network's experience in close work with the government, and its exclusive access to military developments, made it "a global actor in international relations" (Gilboa, 2005, p. 27; Robinson, 1999). However, not all scholars approve of CNN's way of working. For instance, Solomon (2006) suggests that CNN presented a distorted view of the Iraq war, using retired military commentators. He adds that CNN's Eason Jordan even had his own list of FBI-approved commentators. CNN introduces itself

as a global network and news provider and as a model of an effective news network (McChesney, 2001). In fact, some believe that CNN has been so influential that the so-called CNN effect was explicitly coined because of the network's impact on foreign policy (Robinson, 1999).

6.3.2 *The CNN Effect*

Some scholars believe that CNN's style of instantaneous collecting, reporting, and repetition of news stories can make fertile soil to "bypass, substantiate, identify or create" crises (Flynn, 1996, p. 4). Others go even further and argue that the CNN effect has been instrumental in vast fields of human life in societies, including "global communications and international relations, such as technology, economics, culture, law, public opinion, politics, and diplomacy, as well as warfare, terrorism, human rights, environmental degradation, refugees, and health" (Gilboa, 2005, p. 28). First, however, what is the CNN effect?

The core of the idea of the CNN effect comprised two claims: The first one assumed the news media to be an "important and influential element of foreign-policy formulation and world politics," and the second claimed that the media were independent of the "establishment" in their own "driving and influencing policy formulation" (Robinson, 2011, p. 3). Livingston (2011) believes that the CNN effect is not simply "a matter of realignment among nation-states" anymore and can affect "realignment between the type, scope, and scale of actors" on a global scale (p. 20). Independent media coverage of the state's foreign policy has been crucial to the so-called CNN effect (Bahador, 2011, p. 37). However, as has famously been said, "theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose" (Cox, 1981, p. 128), and the issue of the CNN effect should be discussed within the media and power debate (Robinson, 2011). The media effect has been far more "partial and conditional" than assumed by proponents of the CNN effect (Robinson, 2011, p. 6). Some scholars believe that governments and elites are dominant players in the relationship between the media and power (McChesney, 2001; Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Thussu, 2002; Bahador, 2011). However, others still believe in media effects on governmental (mainly foreign) policies (McPhail, 2014). Another group of scholars choose a middle way, and believe that the media have limited effects on governments and elites under certain conditions (Entman, 2003; Robinson, 2005; Robinson, 2011).

There is little sign to show that “media-driven policy” can change unified officials’ decisions. Instead, there is substantial evidence that the media are becoming “submissive” before governments and the elite (Robinson, 2011, p. 6). Robinson suggests that media effects vary between different policies, and media effects would be only marginal in “substantive-level policy issues” (Robinson, 2002; Robinson, 2005; Robinson, 2011, p. 6). The relationship between CNN and governments is a controversial topic in media studies. Some scholars believe in CNN’s quest for “timely, unbiased, and in-depth news reporting” (McPhail, 2014, p. 201). However, there are substantial critiques of CNN’s reporting approach. The next segment will briefly examine CNN’s records related to power and the elite.

The CNN Effect in Action

Crises (especially if they are not directly threatening the Western countries' security) such as the Kosovo War or the Iraq War are ideal for the mass media. The media can particularly sell the dramatic aspects of human suffering (Perry & Carter, 1998) and, at the same time, satisfy governments or elements of the power structure (Bahador, 2011). The first Persian Gulf War was brought into the American living rooms through “high-tech, bloodless, almost surreal visualization of war, cockpit videos of ‘precision bombings’ of Iraqi targets” (Thussu, 2002, p. 204). Pentagon-supplied news network materials changed the whole picture of the war. Edward Said (1994) described this distortion of reality as “a painless Nintendo exercise, and the image of the American as a virtuous, clean warrior” (p. 300).

During NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, CNN’s news coverage reproduced the United States agenda, and helped to “mould public opinion in support of the war” (Thussu, 2002, p. 204). Chomsky (1999) elaborates on how the “general support of media and broad range of commentary” helped the (illegal) ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the Kosovo War (p. 73). CNN routinely uses military advisers as commentators in its news coverage (Barstow, 2008). The cooperation between the military and CNN goes further than just using commentators, and the channel directly puts its boots on the grounds. While some scholars believe that embedding journalists in war can bring “the factual story, good or bad,” before others spread “disinformation and distortions” (Tumber & Palmer, 2004, p. 16), at least since the Kosovo War, U.S. and U.K. military and

transnational media have been cooperating to coordinate national information actions (Robinson, 2005, p. 347).

During the 2003 Iraq War, the US media, including CNN, “largely ignored any anti-war sentiment, especially in the form of protests and dissenters” (Aday et al., 2005, p. 17) and downplayed Iraqi casualties (Kellner, 2004). CNN’s embedded journalism, which was supposed to provide more access, actually placed the journalists under military control (Solomon, 2006). The U.S. Army’s 4th Psychological Operation Group (PSYOPS) worked for CNN during NATO’S Kosovo War. The same group applied propaganda in the U.S. media in favor of the Reagan administration’s Central American policies (Foerstel, 2001). In February 2000, Colonel Christopher St. John, commander of the 4th PSYOPS, called for “greater cooperation” between the military and the mass media, and revealed that during several weeks of cooperation, PSYOPS personnel “helped in the production of some news stories for the network” (Foerstel, 2001, p. 108). As Bahador (2011) writes, media effects should be understood within “the confines of power” and “the existing foreign policy decision-making apparatus” (p. 48).

There was no CNN effect in forgotten conflicts like the Rwanda War in the post-Cold War era (Thussu, 2002; Robinson, 2005; Bahador, 2011; Robinson, 2011). The most recent example of the ineffective CNN effect is the Yemen war, which the Western media have underreported (Bonnefoy, 2018; Elayah et al., 2017). In fact, the (Western) international media were simply absent when Western troops were not involved, or the political elite did not push for intervention (Bahador, 2011). The fertile condition of the 1990s, which is what it is claimed caused the CNN effect to happen (at least in some cases), no longer exists (Robinson, 2005, p. 348). If so, how should we access the CNN effect concept?

The Reverse CNN Effect

Parenti (2010) debunks the “myth” of “objective, free and independent” media, which in his view, means that the US media “pretty much accept what the national security state does in the world” (p. 1). A leaked memo shows that in 2001, CNN chairman, Walter Isaacson, told his staff to accompany any grim Afghan civilian casualties with the message that the Taliban were hosting terrorists (Solomon, 2006, p. 142). This approach is compatible with CNN’s policy to “consider guidance from appropriate authorities,”

specifically in the case of war reporting (Solomon, 2006, p. 127; Dimaggio, 2008). Apparently, as Isaacson pointed out, CNN has intentionally followed this policy to ensure that the network would not be used as a “propaganda platform” (Kurtz, 2001). The voices which cannot pass through the direct control and censorship of government in the case of networks like RT can be marginalized and rendered ineffective by “complex processes incorporated into the [propaganda] model,” protecting the elite’s interests “naturally” and without using “overt conspiracy” (Herman, 2018). However, Herman notices that the division of the ruling class can provide some space “within which journalists can work” (Klaehn, 2018, p. 97).

The reverse CNN effect is not always affected by ideological views directly and openly. Even using regular official sources, or as Shoemaker and Reese (1996) say, the “regular flow of authoritative information” (p. 125) for news, can influence the final product. Hawkins (2002) argues that through a phenomenon he calls the “reverse CNN factor,” despite media influence on governments’ policies, governments gain more and more power in “choosing what will or will not become news” and “spin on the news” (Hawkins, 2002, p. 225). The reverse CNN effect happens due to low budgets and the need for ‘protection against inaccurate reports.’ The media report many stories on foreign policy from their domestic capitals, using official sources (Hawkins, 2002, p. 225). The same process happens to “cash-strapped news corporations,” which prefer to use a significant amount of the war information and video images which the officials provide during the daily press conferences (Hawkins, 2002, p. 227).

As a property of Time Warner Corporation, CNN has not been so successful in the corporate world. The channel has recently lost market share, particularly to Fox News and MSNBC (McPhail, 2014, p. 199; Sago, 2018). It seems that CNN is also vulnerable to the budget-based reverse CNN effect. The channel has been pressured by Time Warner to make more profit and achieve higher ratings (McPhail, 2014).

6.4 Euronews

Euronews is a multilingual television news channel broadcasting in twelve languages (Euronews, 2020), to cover stories from a “European perspective” (Garcia-Blanco & Cushion, 2010; Valdeón, 2009; Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010; Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012;

McPhail, 2014). On 1 January 1993, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU)-funded Euronews was finally launched. Eleven European public broadcasters supported the channel (at that time broadcast in five languages). It aimed to become “the first TV news channel conceived for a European public by a European,” shaping “a more inclusive European identity” (Garcia-Blanco & Cushion, 2010, p. 393). Euronews started to air programs in six languages (German, English, Spanish, French, Italian, and Portuguese) at the beginning of the 2000s (Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010, p. 1).

The idea of a multilingual pan-European TV channel was born in the EU Parliament in 1980 (Garcia-Blanco & Cushion, 2010). Later on, the European Commission joined the program, pledging financial support. It was not the first time European institutions have tried to create a European TV channel; several attempts were made to establish a European media outlet. Two earlier initiatives were *Eurikon TV* and *Europa TV*, in which many EBU members participated but which failed after a few years and shut down (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p.110; Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010). Although initially funded by the European Union (EU), Euronews has tried to reach beyond the continent’s borders. Today, the channel claims to reach more than 400 million homes across 160 countries, and consequently presents itself as “Europe’s leading international news channel” (Euronews, 2020, para. 1). Referring to the channel’s work, Euronews proudly emphasizes that it provides “unfiltered, unbiased, fact-based journalism,” and actively resists “the temptation to bait clicks or views through bias, outrage, or sensationalism” (Euro News, 2020, para. 3). This “laboratory of Europe” (Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010) has over 400 journalists from 30 different countries (Euro News, 2020). However, with an annual budget of 75 million Euros in 2017 (Dembek, 2016; European Parliament, 2017), the channel looked minuscule compared to, for instance, CNN’s 1.2 billion dollars in revenue (Mitchell & Holcomb, 2016).

6.4.1 *Euronews as a Counterweight to CNN’s News Hegemony*

Euronews was conceived as a challenge to the American news channel CNN, which became a global hegemon (Casero, 2001; Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010; Garcia-Blanco & Cushion, 2010; Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012; McPhail, 2014). At least at the level of discourse, Euronews was constructed “against American, or even Anglo-Saxon

domination” (Machill, 1998: 428 – 429, cited in Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010, p. 5). Directors of Euronews have tried to distance themselves from the Anglo-Saxon and/or American concept of news and be “a new voice in the American-dominated global information sphere” (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 106). Euronews' creation occurred specifically after the Persian Gulf War, which showed CNN's supremacy in news footage (Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010; McPhail, 2014).

From the 1970s and 1980s onwards, Europeans sought the ‘European soul’ through the international media landscape (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 108). Herbert Schiller's book *Mass Communication and the American Empire* reignited this concept widely, kindling discussion of the ‘cultural imperialism’ concept and worldwide American media domination (Schiller, 1992). More than two decades later, the superiority of the American media/culture sphere remained “intact, if not more secure than ever” (Schiller, 1992, p. 1). The notions of imperialism and the capitalist empire still gain currency in critical globalization studies (Fuchs, 2008).

At the UNESCO conference in 1970, developing countries under India's leadership called for a “balanced and regulated” flow of information, which faced US and Western European opposition (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 109). Subsequently, Western Europe itself faced rising US domination in the mass media and cultural production during the 1980s. So, the one-time imperialists felt threatened by the US, and joined the developing countries to express concerns about their own culture and identity (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 109). In 1995, the deficit in the audio-visual market between the European Union and the US was \$4.8 billion. It almost doubled in 2013 (McPhail, 2014, p. 168). The Europeans' argument now became “Europeans should be the ones to decide how Europe is seen and understood – not Disney, or CNN, or Hollywood” (McPhail, 2014, p. 165). The US is dominant in audio-visual production and tries to impose its hegemony on European policy-makers regarding the issue's technological aspects (Atwood & Gaouette, 2019; Peel et al., 2020).

6.4.2 *European Identity and National/Professional Factors*

Identity is a concept to construct “community and feelings of cohesion and holism,” giving individuals the impression of equality in the “imagined community” (Strath, 2002, p. 387). This constructed identity then gives people the idea about “who they are” and

how they “relate to others and to the world” (Woodward 1997, pp. 1-2, cited in Valdeón, 2009, p. 2). Euronews was established to offer a European viewpoint during the post-Cold War political transition. Sergio Cantone, Euronews programming manager at the Brussels office, explains that the channel was brought to life when the “Maastricht Treaty was just signed, the Euro and Schengen were in the pipeline, and the Cold War was over, or just over” (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 111). Euronews stories were thus supposed to play a role in the “homogenization and the articulation” of a will for the construction of a “desired social order” (Schlesinger, 1990, p. 203).

The promised “social order” was in jeopardy. Following the low turnout in the 1984 European elections, the European Council conducted a study, which proposed (among other suggestions) measures to “reinforce and promote” the identity and image of the European community for its citizens and the rest of the world (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 107). This aim was initially pursued by creating a ‘truly European’ TV channel. However, policymakers quickly realized that ‘cultural barriers’ would not vanish as easily as economic obstacles in the European community (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012).

In the early 1990s, The EU Commission defined ‘European identity’ based on values including “the rejection of war, the fight against poverty and unemployment, protection of the environment; Human Rights, freedom and democracy; the wealth and diversity of European culture” (De Clercq, 1993, p. 2). However, the same report noted on the same page that there were few feelings of belonging to Europe among its people, and the idea of a European identity was not “ingrained in people’s minds.” Euronews tries to promote a European narrative, representing the continent as a devotee to the struggle for “human rights, multiculturalism, multilingualism, and tolerance” (Valdeón, 2009, p. 14). Euronews’s particular objective was creating a ‘common European identity’ amongst the people in the continent (Casero, 2001, p. 1). The result was supposed to be further “integration of the various peoples involved” (Casero, 2001, p. 1). The channel’s goal was aligned with plans like the Lisbon Agenda, which aimed to make the EU “the world’s most dynamic knowledge-based economy” (McPhail, 2014, p. 169). The EU supported the audio-visual industry, spending \$1.4 billion on it between 2007 and 2013 (McPhail, 2014, p. 169). Euronews has been seen as a crucial tool to “restore public confidence” in the European Union (McPhail, 2014, p. 171). Despite all efforts, the EU is still suffering from a problem that McPhail (2014) calls a ‘democratic deficit.’

Euronews’s primary audio-visual sources have been APTN (Associated Press Television News) and Reuters Television. The channel has also used leading global or

national print-based news agencies for its commentaries (Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010). However, Euronews has had its unique priorities from the beginning. The channel's journalists have learned to avoid "drawing upon explicitly national references" or "overly idiomatic expressions," which could be hard to understand for audiences outside the country of origin (Abélès, 1992, p. 364). Since joining the NBC channel, Euronews has tried to combine its previous 'taking,' 'cutting,' and 're-cutting' (Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010, p. 10) style with the expertise of NBC in "making the real productions" (Burrell, 2017). Baisnee and Marchetti (2010) note that journalists even have to 'unlearn' some of their old professional habits and routines (p. 27). In this context, one part of the news story may pass through various revisions to be ready to air (Mahadi & Monsefi, 2017).

Fariba Mavaddat, from Euronews Persian, explains her journalistic routine as "we are free to cover whatever stories we like, from whatever regions we like" (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 112). However, Mavaddat also emphasizes the Euro-centric part of her job: "but we are supposed to cover stories that are more relevant to the day-to-day life of the Europeans and European governments, the European citizen" (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 112). According to Polonska-Kimunguyi (2012), 70 percent of Euronews's news content was Europe-related. The figure goes even higher during the summits of the European (EU) heads of states (p. 112).

Hallin & Mancini (2004) recognize three different European media systems: 'The Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model,' 'the North/Central European or democratic corporatist model,' and 'the North Atlantic or liberal model.' Although Hallin & Mancini (2004) believe that judging media systems through 'standard abstracted' narrations of their historical conditions is not an accurate method, they differentiate these three models' characteristics; the North Atlantic or liberal model is similar to what is dominant in the US, England, Ireland, and within the free market system. The North/Central European or democratic corporatist model is characterized by the market and public systems' coexistence, with more involvement of the state and civil society. Countries like Germany and Sweden follow this model. Finally, Hallin & Mancini (2004) characterized the Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model through solid party politics and a different level of news objectivity. Countries like France and Italy use this tradition. All these models exist in Europe and could be used (and overlapped) by Euronews journalists.

Euronews experienced an extreme makeover in 2008. McPhail (2014) suggests that the changes affected the channel's identity. He summarizes the channel's changes thus: "[Euronews] got rid of the blue and gold EU color scheme, toned down the European

perspective and toned up the global take on the news, went in for more aggressive marketing, and tapped into new delivery modes” (p. 174). Maybe one of the biggest challenges facing the channel is avoiding partiality and a single national viewpoint (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 113). For example, there are differences between journalists from the Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean states’ backgrounds regarding objectivity in news reporting. We should add new recruits’ differences from Eastern Europe and the Arab world to Euronews’s challenges (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012). By the same token, “different amounts of background information” are required for different audiences. Different treatment of “the key actors, events, and statements is also apparent” (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 113).

One of the people in charge of the editorial board has described Euronews’s stances by taking the example of the Kosovo War. He explains that while all the national and international channels, like the BBC and CNN, took sides with the Western camps, Euronews remained impartial. He reiterated, “One year later, we saw that we had been right in being a little skeptical about this conflict” (Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010, p. 19). It is difficult for Euronews to stay impartial regarding its journalists’ and audience’s backgrounds. As Sergio Cantone, editor in charge of the Brussels office, said in the middle of the Libyan uprising, the channel’s journalists should concern themselves with their audiences. However, the channel tried to “make sure that the Italian section does not say that the French are there to get the oil” (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 113).

6.4.3 *Ownership Matters*

Unlike other channels in the current study, which are clearly funded by governments or created by private sectors, Euronews has its unique management style. Elaborating on Euronews’s ownership could be illuminating to understanding its coverage better. Although the channel’s headquarters is in Lyon, France, 24 public shareholders and the local authorities have been among its shareholders. In 2018, 85 percent of shares belonged to two principal shareholders: Media Globe Networks (60%) and Universal Studios Limited (NBC News) (25%). However, European institutions still assessed Euronews’s approach as “continuing to perform a mission of general EU interest” (Dembek, 2016, p. 9). Euronews has faced several changes of ownership. Some of the essential examples happened in 1995, 2015, and 2017. In 1995, the French company Alcatel, a subsidiary of Générale Occidentale, bought 49% of the shares, and Euronews became “semi-

privatized” (Casero, 2001). However, since April 2003, the channel has backed the original ownership model and become “100% held” by 19 partnering public channels (Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010, p. 9).

Euronews became privatized in 2015 when an Egyptian billionaire, Naguib Sawiris, bought 53 percent of the channel’s shares (Dziadul, 2015). In 2017, NBC News bought 25 percent of the remaining shares (Clarke, 2017), to reduce all the public shareholders’ and local authorities’ shares to only 15 percent. Media Globe Networks bought NBC’s shares in 2020, giving them 88% ownership of Euronews. In July 2020, it was owned by 25 shareholders as follows: Média Globe Network (88%), public broadcasters and local authorities (12%): CT (Czech Republic), CyBC (Cyprus), ENTV (Algeria), ERT (Greece), TT (Tunisia), NMA (Egypt), France Télévisions (France), PBCU (Ukraine), PBS (Malta), RAI (Italy), RTBF (Belgium), RTE (Ireland), RTP (Portugal), RTR (Russia), RTVSLO (Slovenia), SNRT (Morocco), SSR (Switzerland), TVR (Romania), TV4 (Sweden), YLE (Finland), Métropole de Lyon, Département du Rhône, Région Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, and ADMIC (Abu Dhabi) (Euronews, 2020).

The privatization of Euronews casts doubts on the European Union’s will to create a European political identity to reflect European institutions. In fact, ironically, (now privatized) Euronews’s managers “really hope to get rid of the dependence on the European Commission” (Burrell, 2017, para. 22). More than 80 percent of Euronews’ shares belong to Egyptian billionaire Naguib Sawiris. Free press advocates notice that Sawiris is not a simple businessman. He has already been the owner of several major national media outlets (including the Ten and ONTV channels) and is “a major player on the national political stage” (Reporters Without Border (RSF), 2016, p. 45). Sawiris founded a liberal-secular party in 2011, the Free Egyptians Party, which was openly against the Muslim Brotherhood and “overtly supportive of Sisi” (Dunne, 2015) and aimed to “counter the perceived popularity of Islamist and Salafist parties” in Egypt (Sharp, 2011). Sawiris’s political standpoint did not face significant opposition among the public broadcaster shareholders. The only exception was the Turkish public broadcaster (TRT), which questioned ‘his involvement in politics’ and voted against ‘the takeover’ (RSF, 2016). Sawiris, who does not want to “clash with the [al-Sisi] regime” but instead wants “to be heard” and “advise the regime” (RSF, 2016, p. 45), is also outspoken about his (controversial) ideas on other countries and international affairs. For instance, in an interview with Fox News, he supported Trump’s stance on trade with China (Fox Business, 2018), and told CNBC that countries are “justified in their

concerns” that Chinese telecommunications equipment maker Huawei could be a “security risk” (Rosenfeld, 2019).

The Euronews managers want to stop the dependency on European institutions like the European Commission because “dependence on one client is a big risk for the future” (Burrell, 2017, para. 22). However, the same figures insist Sawiris “has never interfered in editorial policy” (Burrell, 2017, para. 20), and the deal with NBC did not affect the channel because they are “committed to telling European stories” (Heath, 2017, para. 15). Euronews “like most other global broadcasters – is under-researched” (McPhail, 2014, p. 175). There is a need for more studies to scrutinize Euronews activities, particularly those related to privatization.

6.4.4 *Euronews in Action, What Critics Say*

Euronews coverage has not been without objections. Critics remark that even the interpretation of Europe differs across the continent and is related to national, cultural, and political backgrounds (Krzyzanowski, 2009). Others believe that the European media cannot have coherent coverage because of the different characteristics of journalistic routines among European countries (Baisnee & Marchetti, 2006). Multilingualism is one of the key characteristics of Euronews. The channel’s coverage is basically the translation of materials into reporters’ mother tongues, and syncing the texts to whatever visual materials the channel provides (Baisnee & Marchetti, 2006). Linguistic problems of journalistic routines are not essential players in Euronews coverage, compared to the national weighting problem. A study by Garcia-Blanco & Cushion (2010) showed that Euronews’s primary coverage was “made up of the most powerful EU members” (including France, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Germany) and some non-EU members like the US, China, and Russia (p. 400). In comparison, Garcia-Blanco and Cushion did not find even a single mention of smaller EU members, including Finland, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia, across their four-week sample periods (Garcia-Blanco & Cushion, 2010).

The same study by Garcia-Blanco and Cushion showed that despite the highly significant political coverage of the channel, Euronews’ political coverage was “overwhelmingly informed by national rather than European-level representatives” (p. 404). Garcia-Blanco and Cushion (2010) also found that even when items involved EU

states, only a third of the stories referred to the EU (p. 407). Some national governments seem essential players in the “European media game” (McPhail, 2014). Adding to this the low coverage of European citizens by Euronews (Garcia-Blanco & Cushion, 2010), Euronews has not been successful, at least in becoming a European channel. McPhail (2014) writes that despite a significant amount of news reporting on the European Union and European issues, only four percent of them “convey to the viewers a feeling of identification with the European Union, with Europe, or with other Europeans” (p. 175). Perhaps Euronews’s disappointing demography was due to this lack of connection to the ordinary European citizen. Overall, 73 percent of Euronews viewers are “men with high salaries, liquid stock investments, opinion leaders, and frequent fliers” (McPhail, 2014, p. 174). These are the audiences who usually show more interest in the idea of the European Union as a body (McPhail, 2014).

Euronews struggles with a structural problem. While it avoids airing national views, significant parts of its stories come from the national media. Even more complicated, its journalists do not stay with the channel for long, so no ‘Euro journalist’ generation has been created. The problem of tension between the national and the European has still not been solved for Euronews, and maybe as Polonska-Kimunguyi (2012) says, it “is caught in-between a vaguely defined European identity and the many national linguistic, cultural and professional contexts that contribute to its output” (p. 116). In some scholars’ ideas, these contradictions lead to the inability of the channel to generate topics from a “sociological point of view” (Machill, 1997, quoted in Casero, 2001).

Although Euronews claims it delivers “trusted news and information in a non-partisan and in-depth way,” there are serious questions about how the channel meets its aims, even among its own staff. For instance, in 2016, the channel’s staff in its headquarters went on strike against Euronews’ “flagrant violation” of journalistic ethics. The strike was also against “the management’s plans to slash jobs and change working conditions” (Mulholland, 2016, para. 3). Another criticism of Euronews is that it adopts “an extremely neutral tone” for its news reports (Casero, 2001, p. 4). One explanation could be the channel’s struggle to avoid reflecting tensions among European countries, but avoiding problems caused by social-cultural differences has weakened the already “watered-down journalism” of the channel (Schlesinger, 1996 quoted in Casero 2001) to becoming “monotonous, boring and tiresome for viewers,” reminding viewers “more of a legal treatise than of a news report” (Casero, 2001, p. 4).

In 1989, former French president François Mitterrand said: “Europe does not have a common language yet ... Television can be that common language” (McPhail, 2014, p. 175).⁶ Despite its drawbacks, Euronews has become a popular news channel in Europe and inspired others like Telesur, a Venezuelan-funded channel aimed at representing the Latin-American perspective in the news (Valdeón, 2009, p. 28).



⁶ In the book, Mitterrand is introduced as a “former French Prime Minister” mistakenly.

CHAPTER 7

METHODOLOGY

7.1 Analysis: Code implications

News media and individuals rely on news frames to “convey, interpret and evaluate information” (Neuman et al., 1992, p. 60), making the news frames “invaluable tools for presenting relatively complex issues” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 12) as in cases like climate change or nuclear proliferation. In addition, news media frames help audiences to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” the information from the “real world” around them (Goffman, 1974, p. 21), narrowing possible and preferable political alternatives (Tuchman, 1978, p. 156).

After reviewing the literature on framing, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) found the recurrence of five major frames: the responsibility frame, conflict frame, economic consequences frame, human interest frame, and morality frame. The current study investigates the prevalence of the mentioned five frames. These frames can be applied to study various topics across different media sources (de Vreese et al., 2011). Twenty-three questions distributed in five frames have constituted a straightforward way to measure the possible news frame(s) in every news story (see Table 7.1). While the presence of the frames is usually not a straightforward process, the above-mentioned type of measurement allows us to find and observe more than one frame in the news stories.

Table 7.1: Frames and questions defining them

Attribution of responsibility frame	
Attribution of responsibility frame\ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	
Attribution of responsibility frame\the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	

Attribution of responsibility frame\the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem
Attribution of responsibility frame\ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for the issue
Attribution of responsibility frame\requirement of urgent action
Attribution of responsibility frame\suggesting solution(s)
Conflict frame
Conflict frame\political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action
Conflict frame\referring to two or more than two sides' positions/views
Conflict frame\referring to winners or losers
Conflict frame\referring to winners or losers\only winner(s) or loser(s)
Conflict frame\referring to winners or losers\lose-lose
Conflict frame\referring to winners or losers\win-lose
Conflict frame\referring to winners or losers\win-win
Conflict frame\reflecting disagreements between actors
Conflict frame\reproaching parties-ind.-groups to another
Economic frame
Economic frame\economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action
Economic frame\mention of financial losses or gains now or in the future
Economic frame\mention of the costs/degree of expense involved
Human interest frame
Human interest frame\employing adjectives to generate personal feelings
Human interest frame\containing visual information to generate feelings
Human interest frame\emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected
Human interest frame\going to private or personal life of actors
Human interest frame\human example or human face for the issue
Morality frame
Morality frame\containing any moral message
Morality frame\offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave
Morality frame\referring to morality, God, religions, or ideologies

7.2 Media Frame Types

Responsibility frame: This common frame places responsibility or accusations on individuals, groups, or states, as the cause or solution of issues, and emphasizes that the problem requires urgent actions. The responsibility frame is essentially related to *who* or *what* is to blame (Kitzinger, 1999). Shaping the public understanding of problems and proposing solutions is one of the most critical aspects of media framing, and the previously mentioned news outlets are no exceptions.

Conflict frame: This frame emphasizes conflicts between institutions, groups, and individuals, to capture the audience's attention. The point stresses the divergence between actors and creating winners or losers. Like the responsibility frame, the conflict frame is among the most common frames in the media, particularly in the US media (Neuman et al., 1992), mainly reducing complex issues to simple conflict (Patterson, 1993). The current study seeks to find the visibility of the conflict frame (like the other frames) during the covering of international negotiations. Both Iran's nuclear deal and climate change issues have been matters of protracted disagreements and different national interests, and this study attempts to find whether there are any differences between various news outlets' coverage.

Economic consequences frame. The economic frame considers the economic consequences of events, problems, and issues within regions, countries, institutions, groups, and individuals. The frame emphasizes financial losses and gains that affect actors and people, by pursuing or not pursuing actions. It is among the commonest frames because broad impacts on audiences, like economic consequences, make issues worthy of media coverage.

Human interest frame. The human interest frame, or as Neuman et al. (1992) call it "human impact" frame, is another common frame in the news. This frame attempts to attach human emotions to the news, to personalize and dramatize an issue, presenting it from a more emotional point of view (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Dirikx & Gelders, 2010). Considering the high competition among the media to grab the audience's attention, this frame is a usual way to keep up with market demand but has also become a standard component of news coverage among non-market-based media outlets as well.

Morality frame. This frame sees events, issues, or problems from a moral perspective. However, due to respecting objectivity, journalists do not use it directly and usually mention it indirectly and let someone else raise questions in this context, using quotations or inferences (Neuman et al., 1992). Although it can mainly be formed in audiences' minds (Neuman, 1992), it has been seen among several common frames in news coverage. Despite being powerful in covering some issues, the morality frame is not referred to in the same way as other frames. Since its primary focus is morality, religion, and God, giving moral messages objectively while covering negotiations is challenging.

7.3 Method

The current study involves a textual frame analysis of news stories⁷ through sampling and coding the relevant articles, from 738 news stories in four news outlets: CGTN, CNN, Euronews, and Press TV. The news outlets' webpages were used to extract the news stories, using search terms like Iran, JCPOA, Iran deal, Iran nuclear program, nuclear negotiations, Iran nuclear deal, Paris Agreement, Paris Accord, COP 21, and Paris climate agreement. The news stories were gathered three months before and after the initial agreements, and again three months before and after the US withdrawal from the agreements. Duplicated stories were removed to prevent repetition. Each news story was uploaded to MAXQDA, a software tool specified for qualitative and mix method data analysis. To identify the frames within the contents and in the context, the researcher should read through all the gathered texts, finding any such cases. Scholars suggest that it is necessary for the researcher to re-examine the contents during the processes, to ensure that their interpretations remain consistent (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Overall, the results show that news outlets most commonly used the conflict frame (N=625 / 84.7%). Responsibility (N=615 / 83.3%), economy (N=270 / 36.6%), morality (N=66 / 8.9%), and human interest (N=62 / 8.4%) filled the other places, respectively.

⁷The current study examined only news stories, which differ significantly from news features. To find the difference between news stories and news features, see Table 7.2.

7.3.1 *Research Questions*

The theoretical interest here is to compare the use of frames in various news outlets, to consider whether significant differences exist between them. Therefore, the first research question is:

RQ1: Does the use of frames vary significantly by outlet?

The second goal of this study is to compare the use of frames in the reporting of different topics (The Paris climate agreements and the Iran nuclear deal). Therefore, the second research question is:

RQ2: Does the use of frames vary significantly by topic?

This study examined 738 news stories from CNN (176), CGTN (167), Euronews (101), and Press TV (294), including all coverage related to the Paris Agreement and Iran deal. The study analyzed two 6-month periods for each outlet, to determine if there were any differences in news coverage. The third question addressed in the study is:

RQ3: Does the use of frames change in the media over time?

7.3.2 *Framing Measures*

Using mainly Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) study, each story was coded using the five frames, with 23 questions. Each question measured one of five news frames: attribution of responsibility, conflict, economic consequences, human interest, and morality. These were questions such as "does the article reflect disagreement between actors?" (conflict), "does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected?" (human interest), "does the story suggest that the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem?" (attribution of responsibility), "does the story contain any moral message?" (morality), and "is there a mention of financial losses or gains now or in the future?" (economic). To measure each frame, a minimum of three questions were used. Although inductive studies may show some other frames in the texts, their subjective nature, problems with replications, and the (usually) small samples make them unfit for the current study.

Two coders content-analyzed selected news stories, checking each frame question in twenty randomly selected news stories from each news outlet. The intercoder reliability was between 85% and 90%. Following Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), the unit of

analysis was the whole article, and the study focused primarily on the key framing indicators used in the stories. Theoretically, the current article's method can be used for smaller units like single paragraphs. However, many previous researchers coded whole articles (Matthes, 2009), mainly because this unit is easy to define. Reading the whole article as a unit may also help researchers and coders find the basic frame idea behind the text more easily, by understanding the microstructure, including the interconnectivity and coherence in the whole text (Van Dijk, 1980).

As mentioned, the responsibility frame occurred most across all outlets, narrowly followed by the conflict frame. The economy was less frequently used, whereas human interest and morality hardly played a role (see Table 8.7). This result indicates that the media follow almost the same pattern throughout the overall sample, emphasizing particular frames. Although the framing pattern is similar across the media, there are apparent differences in framing before and after the US withdrawal, mainly in naming and blaming the irresponsible actor, and in the disagreements between the players. There are exceptions, like when CNN emphasizes conflict noticeably more than the responsible frame after the US withdrew from the Paris Agreement (94.3% compared to 65.7%), diverting the attention from US responsibility to conflicts between all the participants (see Table 8.4).

Another example is Press TV coverage of the Paris Agreement before the US withdrawal with a much lower responsibility frame (16.7%) than that of conflict (66.7%), which focuses on reporting disagreements among the actors rather than blaming a particular actor (see Table 6). In comparison, Press TV coverage of the Paris Agreement after the US withdrawal has 100 percent in both responsibility and conflict frames, mainly blaming the US. This coverage becomes more meaningful when we notice that the signing of the Paris Agreement and the final stages of Iran's negotiations with the 5+1 powers were happening in the same period when the responsibility and conflict frames were meaningfully lower than in the US withdrawal period (81.1 and 63.33 percent before the US withdrawal, compared to 94.3 and 98.4 percent).

Such an analysis is essential in determining how the international media portrays climate policies, nuclear policies, and international negotiations. Particularly in the case of the Iran deal, all the parties except Iran are armed with nuclear weapons (Germany, as a NATO member, hosts US nuclear weapons on its territory), and the aim of the

negotiations agreed on unanimously was to prevent Iran from reaching the bomb. Another issue that makes both of the current case studies unique is that one of the main participants in both agreements later withdrew from the agreement (and sanctioned Iran in the nuclear case), which allowed the opportunity to study post-agreement news coverage not long after the agreements were signed.

However, as widely mentioned, some levels of subjectivity would be inevitable, and researchers could only be relatively neutral in recognizing and measuring the frames (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; van Grop, 2010). Furthermore, like in every deductive approach, this study's deductive approach to framing analysis is limited to already established frames. Therefore, there could be other frames in the texts which might have been overlooked. Nevertheless, high subjectivity and their limitation to the relatively small samples make the inductive approach unfit for this study.

Table 7.2: News story and news feature

	News Story	Feature
Content	Recent or breaking news	Any issue: could be news-related or human interest
Intro	Summarises the story in a nutshell	Often has a human focus or tells an anecdote
Sources and Angle	Can, but doesn't always, contain more than one source and angle	Always contains a variety of sources and angles
Structure	Inverted pyramid	More flexible: can take linear or a non-linear structure/ include story-telling. Conclusion is important

	News Story	Feature
Length	Around 400 words	Up to 2,000 words
Language	Simple and factual	Uses more description and colourful language; can take a more personal tone; uses anecdotes
Production	Written as fast as possible within a tight deadline: sticks to the facts	More time is spent on research and analysis
Presentation	Information is most important. Often, but not always, accompanied by a relevant photograph or illustration	Is designed to be attractive and usually includes more than one original photograph or illustration

CHAPTER 8

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

8.1 Research Findings and Discussion

Framing is a frequently utilized technique in the discourse of international relations and foreign policy (Mintz & Redd, 2003). It focuses attention on “specific dimensions (explanations) for understanding issues” and highlights “connections between issues and particular considerations” (Feldman, 1995, p. 267). When the audience thinks about the issue, the likelihood of retrieving the considerations would be increased (Feldman, 1995). For instance, the current study shows that media coverage is mainly focused on conflict frames more than on others. This result agrees with the previous research that showed conflict frame was a common frame in international relations (Neuman et al., 1992). This means that the audience may consider the whole process of negotiations and post-negotiations as a matter of conflict and disagreements among players, more than a matter of, for instance, the consequences for the people or the economy. This issue is particularly important in international relations, since political leaders and players tend to manipulate their audience, and often, their attempts depend on “whether the media agrees or disagrees with the proposed frame” (Mintz & Redd, 2003, p. 194). After all, media using framing techniques may strategically shape public perceptions.

Framing involves defining the issues, assessing negotiability, and ordering them by importance or their stakes in the matter (Druckman & Wagner, 2021). For instance, too much focus on the conflict frame, as the current study shows, may not represent the issues as very ‘negotiable’, while concentrating on the state players can dilute the role of the non-state actors. The current study shows that regarding the Iran nuclear deal, the media were focused on the 5+1 states rather than the UN and IAEA (see Table 8.1). Meanwhile,

the UN and NGOs like Greenpeace were not mentioned as much as the states in the case of the Paris climate conference.

The following statistical analysis largely depends on Semetko & Valkenburg (2000). The five clusters with 3 to 5 questions (variables in MAXQDA) helped systematize the data analysis compiling.

8.1.1 Conflict Frame

The Conflict Frame In Covering the Iran Nuclear Deal

The conflict frame has been adapted to 5 questions, primarily based on Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) (see Table 1). The questions tried to recognize a reflection of the contention, “Trump has long been critical of the accord,” (McKenzie, 2018, on CNN); political consequences: “Ted Cruz suggested the U.S. might have to kill the Iranian ayatollah if Iran tries to acquire a nuclear weapon” (Schleifer, 2015 on CNN); players reproaching each other: “The fiery rhetoric by both presidents comes against the backdrop of increasingly adversarial actions between the two nations... The Trump administration appears to have launched a concerted verbal assault on Iran” (Duchon & Williams, 2018 on Euronews); or mentioning winners and losers, “Iran continues the talks ‘without giving in to the negotiating partners’ excessive demands,’ he said, adding that the Iranian nation will be the winner in the negotiations.” (“Iran after,” 2015, on Press TV). The study changed the winner or loser frames to 4 sub-frames, to cover any mention of any player winning or losing.

Like the responsibility frame, the conflict frame focused on the relations between states as players, rather than on non-state groups and organizations or grassroots movements, particularly over Iran’s nuclear issue. States have been dominant in all media coverage about both the JCPOA and Paris Agreement. For instance, the word Iran or the Islamic Republic of Iran appeared in 100 percent of the news stories about Iran’s nuclear deal (n=567). The numbers for the US (US, U.S., U.S., United States, America, American) were 555 (97.88%), for China (PRC, P.R.C, P.R.C., Chinese) 337 (59.43%), and for Europe and/or EU negotiators (E.U, E.U., EU, Europe, European Union, Europeans, France, French, Germany, German, UK, U.K, U.K., Britain, British, England, United Kingdom) 426 (75.13%). In comparison, only 239 (42.15%) news stories somehow mentioned the UN or its organizations (UN, U.N., United Nations, UN Security Council,

UNSC, IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency) (see Table 8.1). The lack of non-governmental elements' presence is particularly noticeable in the case of the Paris Agreement, when environmental activists and organizations like Greenpeace and WWF, or even UN-related organizations actively tried to express their positions ("Climate protesters," 2021).

Press TV understandably tried to represent the United Nations and its organizations as legal authorities and decision-makers, not limiting itself to covering only a handful of powerful countries. CGTN mentioned the UN or its organizations less than Press TV but higher than the others. China also preferred to represent itself as an influential mediator by considering the international mechanism rather than focusing on only small, powerful countries, which could be in the minority compared to the US and its allies. CNN and Euronews, show little interest in framing the whole process and negotiations outside the arena of the powerful states. In this regard, a pattern is recognizable. Although none of the media studied mentioned the UN significantly, there exists a significant difference between the approach of Western and non-Western media towards the UN (see Table 8.1).

The media in China and Iran place significant value on the UN as an international reference and player. In contrast, the two Western media outlets marginalize the UN's role as an international authority and mediator and disregard China as a partner. CNN, for instance, ranked China lower than the UN (16.40% compared to 19.53% for the UN). This behavior by CNN and Euronews aligns with their respective nations' stance on recognizing and emphasizing the status quo powers and Western-centric approach to global issues. Conversely, China and Iran seek alternative voices to Western hegemony and view other powers and international organizations like the UN as balancing forces against dominant Western powers and narratives. Regarding the state-centric position, the only different outlet was CNN, which over both issues prioritized partisan domestic political conflicts rather than conflict between the states, particularly over Iran's nuclear issue. This approach is dominant throughout the CNN framing behavior, especially in the case of the responsibility and conflict frames.

Table 8.1: Representing state and non-state actors in Iran's nuclear deal coverage

	US	EU	China	Iran	UN
CGTN*	94.59%/n=105	88.28% / n=98	93.69%/n=104	100% / n=111	42.34% / n=47
CNN**	100% / n=128	32.03% / n=41	16.40% / n=21	100% / n=128	19.53% / n=25
Euronews** *	91.30% / n=42	65.21% / n=30	26.08% / n=12	100% / n=46	19.56% / n=9
Press TV****	99.29%/n=280	91.13%/n=257	70.92%/n=200	100% / n=282	56.02 / n=158

* Overall, 111 news stories on the Iran deal in 2 pre- and post-agreement document groups

** Overall, 128 news stories on the Iran deal in 2 pre- and post-agreement document groups

*** Overall, 46 news stories on the Iran deal in 2 pre- and post-agreement document groups

**** Overall, 282 news stories on the Iran deal in 2 pre- and post-agreement document groups

The conflict frame fits well with the news media's approach to seeing the political world "as an ongoing series of contests" (de Vreese, 2005, p. 56). In agreement with de Vreese et al. (2001) and Semetko & Valkenburg (2000), the conflict frame was among the most common frames in news stories. However, the news outlets used the conflict frame more significantly after the US withdrew from the deal over Iran's nuclear program and the Paris Agreement (see Table 8.3 and Table 8.4). The exception is again CNN, which used the conflict frame almost the same amount before and after the US withdrawal (95.1% and 95.7%, respectively). However, even with the same amount of the conflict frame, CNN used framing combinations differently before and after the US withdrawal. For example, the channel mentioned 'reflecting disagreement between actors' at 80.50% and 87% and 'the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem' at 46.7% and 78.3%, respectively. As a result, while CNN emphasized the conflict between the players, it placed the blame on the players, mainly Donald Trump (see Table 8.2 and Appendix A), after the US withdrawal. Other analyzed media also exhibit a comparable pattern.

The news outlets shifted from emphasizing responsibility and the role of the countries in the possible agreement to conflict and emphasizing the disagreements among the players (see appendixes A and B). The exception was CNN, which used the conflict frame before and after the US withdrawal almost to the same degree. CNN focused on US

partisan politics, while the other news outlets mainly covered state players' disagreements: "In any case, we are united by the attitude that we do not want to put this agreement in question," said Merkel" (Armstrong, 2018, on Euronews); "We are convinced that the decision by the US to leave the Paris Agreement is a big mistake," Tusk added" ("EU and China," 2017 on Euronews); "China sticks to Paris Agreement despite Trump's policy shift... Whether other countries will still be committed to this goal or not, China, as a responsible developing country, is resolute in its goals and actions", Lu responded" (Yuting, 2018 on CGTN); "Former President Barack Obama on Tuesday criticized President Donald Trump's decision to exit the Iran deal, a pillar of Obama's legacy on foreign policy (Watkins, 2018, on CNN).

Table 8.2: The ratio between the frequent conflict and responsibility subcodes in Iran's nuclear deal coverage

News Media	Reflecting disagreements between actors	The authority is responsible for the issue/problem
CNN	Before US withdrawal: 80.50% After US withdrawal: 87%	Before US withdrawal: 46.7% After US withdrawal: 78.3%
CGTN	Before US withdrawal: 41.67% After US withdrawal: 58.62%	Before US withdrawal: 12.50% After US withdrawal: 60.92%
Euronews	Before US withdrawal: 70.59% After US withdrawal: 93.10%	Before US withdrawal: 35.29% After US withdrawal: 86.21%
Press TV	Before US withdrawal: 26.67% After US withdrawal: 93.75%	Before US withdrawal: 21.11% After US withdrawal: 91.67%

Like the responsibility frame, the conflict frame is used significantly by all the news outlets, disregarding their country of origin and government or private sector affiliation.

Table 8.3: Conflict frame in Iran's nuclear deal coverage

	Before US withdrawal	After US withdrawal
CGTN	19 (79.2%) N=24	74 (81.6%) N=87
CNN	78 (95.1%) N=82	44 (95.7%) N=46
Euronews	15 (88.2%) N=17	28 (96.6%) N=29
Press TV	57 (63.3%) N=90	189 (98.4%) N=192

Conflict Frame on Covering the Paris Agreement

While the conflict frame was overall the most used in media coverage, it became the second most frequent frame after the responsibility frame in Paris Agreement coverage, particularly before the US withdrawal. CNN, Euronews, and CGTN used the conflict frame significantly less than the responsibility frame in this period (see Table 8.4 and Table 8.7). The news outlets generally covered the Paris Agreement less than the Iran nuclear deal (except Euronews before the US withdrawal period) and were not focused on the conflicts between the players. While the conflict frame is the most used in media coverage overall, in the relatively positive media atmosphere before the agreement, the media emphasized conflict significantly less than the responsibility frame, and even in using the responsibility frame, the ability 'to alleviate the problem' was the most used sub code (see Appendix B).

Table 8.4: Conflict and responsibility frames in Paris Agreement news coverage

	Frames	Paris Agreement before the US withdrawal	Paris Agreement after the US withdrawal
CNN	Responsibility frame	10 (79.6%) - n=13	23 (65.7%) - n=35
	Conflict frame	8 (61.5%) - n=13	33 (94.3%) - n=35
CGTN	Responsibility frame	14 (77.8%) - n=18	32 (84.2%) - n=38
	Conflict frame	8 (44.4%) - n=18	32 (84.2%) - n=38
Euronews	Responsibility frame	25 (73.5%) - n=34	7 (33.3%) - n=21
	Conflict frame	16 (47%) - n=34	17 (81%) - n=21
Press TV	Responsibility frame	1 (16.7%) - n=6	6 (100%) - n=6
	Conflict frame	4 (66.7%) - n=6	6 (100%) - n=6

Press TV was the only news outlet that used the conflict frame significantly more than other frames, even before the US withdrawal. Considering the Press TV approach, it is not unusual to see the conflict frame dominant. In fact, it was unexpected when this news outlet used the conflict frame less than others in Iran's nuclear deal issue in the period before the US withdrawal. The media studied focused on representing the conflict and disagreements among the states after the US withdrawal, and the conflict frame became the top-used frame in this period (see Table 8.4). Comparing the topics and periods of studied media coverage, both the time periods and a crucial after-agreement issue (the US withdrawal) are essential elements in the media framing approach.

8.1.2 Responsibility Frame

The Responsibility Frame in Covering the Iran Nuclear Deal

The 'attribution of responsibility' frame incorporated five questions (variables in MAXQDA) (see Table 7.1). The questions are related to framing the news stories in a way that implies a government or some level of government could solve the issue and deal with the issue by pursuing the right policy or through their action/reaction. They also can frame the cause of the issues. More than just introducing positive or negative players, the cluster can imply suggestions to fix the issue and the necessity of the action (see Table 7.1). The study attempted to measure the non-authority actor framing as well. A total of 83.3% of the documents (N=615) used this frame through at least one determined question. However, most of the responsibility-framed documents related to the authorities

responsible for the issue/problem (55.4%, N=409) or being able to alleviate the issue/problem (44%, N=325). The responsibility cluster is not limited to the regimes and governments, although non-state players are under-mentioned. The least used sub-frames were those noticing individuals, groups, or organizations in society responsible for the issue/problem (2.8%, N=21); “Congress has been under pressure from Israeli interest groups to reject the agreement” (Gill, 2015 on Euronews); or “the boss of the largest private UDS coal miner said it’s wonderful Trump followed through on his campaign promise to ditch the Paris accord...Murray’s effuse praise for Trump shows how the mood in coal country has improved under Trump, who received enormous support in last November’s election from Rust Belt communities”(Egan, 2017 on CNN). The sub-frame of ‘Individuals, groups or organizations in society are able to alleviate the issue/problem’ is only mentioned in 1.6% (N=12) like “on Thursday, (Michael) Bloomberg said mayors, governors, and business leaders from both political parties were “signing onto a statement of support that we will submit to the UN -- and together, we will reach the emission reduction goals the US made in Paris in 2015” (“Michael Bloomberg from,” 2017 on CGTN).

The result shows that the responsibility and conflict frames are the most prominent across media outlets both before and after the US withdrawal. The findings are in agreement with previous studies that found the attribution of responsibility frame was often dominant in media and news coverage (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; de Vreese, 2005; Ben-Porath & Shaker, 2010; Collistra, 2010; Hasler & Greuter, 2010; Kuttschreuter et al., 2011; Ochieng, 2022). However, after the US withdrawal, conflict frame usage surged, showing that post-US withdrawal, the media were focused on covering conflicts rather than mostly blaming one side or the other for failure.

The responsibility frame initially indicates who and what to blame (Kitzinger, 1999; Hasler & Greuter, 2010). Although the responsibility frame was the second most prominent in the current study, it was not used by the media with the same emphasis. In the Iran nuclear deal, all the outlets used the frame after the US withdrawal period more than before the withdrawal (see Table 8.6). This could be because the general approach during the negotiations and after the agreement was more optimistic than after the US unilateral withdrawal and sanctions. Interestingly, CNN and Press TV used the responsibility frame less than the others before the US withdrawal. In CNN’s case, the responsibility frame was the second most used frame (79.3% of documents), significantly behind the conflict frame in the pre-US withdrawal period (95.1% of documents) (see

Table 8.7). It seems that the media outlets in Iran and the US were more in line with their negotiators, which reminds us of the media's tendency to serve the interests of political elites (Robinson, 2011). CNN can be considered close to the Democrats' foreign policies (Groseclose & Milyo, 2005; Stroud, 2007; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009), and Press TV appears to have tried not to weaken the general agreements among factions and the supreme leader's position, considering its anti-US characteristics. The harmony of CNN and Press TV with their negotiators and governments can be recognized in the post-US withdrawal period. The two outlets had the most increase in responsibility frame usage (CNN 9.8% and Press TV 13.2%), reflecting their authorities' positions of blaming the other side for the failure.

CNN was no exception in blaming Trump for leaving the Iran deal:

"President Donald Trump quit the Iran nuclear deal last month and reimposed US sanctions. He slammed the agreement, which included France, the United Kingdom, Germany, China, and Russia, as a 'horrible one-sided deal.'... European political leaders are scrambling to save the deal with Iran in a bid to keep the country's nuclear ambitions in check" (Petroff, 2018).

Press TV also frequently blamed the US and Trump for the Iran deal failure: "The senior Iranian lawmaker pointed to US President Donald Trump's stonewalling attempts targeting the deal... Trump has been trying to weaken the agreement in numerous ways, including by advising Europe not to resume its post-JCPOA economic transactions with Iran" ("Europe Backs Removal," 2018). Press TV was cautious about attacking America's allies in Europe. However, it changed its strategy to blame Europe when Iran lost hope of reviving the deal under Trump: "Iran's top security official has criticized Europe for trying to appease US President Donald Trump who has threatened to scuttle a 2015 nuclear deal" ("Europe policy of appeasing," 2018).

Another interesting issue is a noticeable difference in Euronews's responsibility frame usage. While responsibility was used higher than CNN and Press TV before the US withdrawal (88.2%), the outlet used the highest percentage of the responsibility frame after the withdrawal (96.6%) (see Table 8.6). Europe was invested in the JCPOA agreement, and European companies poured money into Iran after the JCPOA signing, despite the ambiguous US position. Moreover, Europeans considered the JCPOA agreement 'one of the biggest achievements diplomacy has ever delivered' ("Iran deal: EU remains," 2018, para. 9), highlighting a significant foreign policy achievement for the European Union, and thus pushing the Union a bit out of the US's shadow. The European

leaders' frustration with the US policies was well echoed in Euronews's usage of the responsibility frame:

The European Union is reviewing its options after President Donald Trump's threats to impose sanctions on companies doing business with Iran ("European Union looks at," 2018);

European leaders have set to work on keeping the Iran nuclear deal alive, following Donald Trump's decision to pull out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA...these include protecting European companies dealing with Iran from US sanctions, which in practice would be very difficult ("European Leaders Step Up," 2018).

The CGTN took a different approach than Euronews. While the outlet used a higher percentage of the responsibility frame than CNN and Press TV before the US withdrawal (83.3%, compared to CNN 79.3% and Press TV 81.1%), it contained the least percentage of the frame among the four outlets (85.1%) after the US withdrawal (see Table 8.6). The CGTN approach can be interpreted as concerning China's approach to be credited as a fixer and broker rather than a blamer and escalator. Although China blamed the US for the JCPOA failure, it still held some hopes of boosting China's position as a world player that could fix the differences rather than escalate the situation:

China firmly supports multilateralism and international agreements, and the Iran nuclear deal is one of the achievements of multilateral negotiation that contributes to Middle East peace and stability, the Chinese top diplomat said. China made great efforts in forging and finally closing the deal in 2015, and it will continue to maintain the deal, he added ("China denies rejection," 2015 on CCTV). In fact, China has been maturing its policy of "smart diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" related to Iran's nuclear issue in recent years (Sun & Zoubir, 2018, p. 231).

The media studied have primarily focused on states as players and decision-makers rather than non-state actors. Even the UN and its agency responsible for the Iran nuclear issue did not get much coverage. However, the coverage shows meaningful differences between Press TV and CGTN on the one hand and CNN and Euronews on the other.

The time period effects not only the responsibility frame but also the sub-codes would be similarly affected. Before the JCPOA the media were more positive about the negotiation and the subcode 'the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem' was the most mentioned responsibility frame sub-code. This pattern changed after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. All of media studied became focused on the conflict and changed their previous optimistic tones. The responsibility frame was still in the second place after the conflict one but this time all media emphasized on 'the authority(s) is

responsible for the issue/problem', bolder the blame game rather than the possibility of cooperation and alleviation of the issue (see Table 8.5).

Table 8.5: Frequency of the responsibility frame sub-codes in Iran's nuclear deal coverage

	Before the US withdrawal	After the US withdrawal
CGTN	The authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem: 12.50%	The authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem: 60.92%
	The authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem: 58.33%	The authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem: 44.83%
CNN	The authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem: 47.56%	The authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem: 78.26%
	The authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem: 47.56%	The authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem: 19.57%
Euronews	The authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem: 32.59%	The authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem: 86.21%
	The authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem: 41.18%	The authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem: 44.83%
Press TV	The authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem: 21.11%	The authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem: 91.67%
	The authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem: 67.78%	The authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem: 41.67%




Figure 8.1: News framing on the Iran nuclear deal before the US withdrawal




Figure 8.2: News framing on the Iran nuclear deal after the US withdrawal

Table 8.6: Responsibility frame in Iran's nuclear deal coverage

	Before US withdrawal	After US withdrawal
CGTN	20 (83.3%) N=24	74 (85.1%) N=87
CNN	65 (79.3%) N=82	41 (89.1%) N=46
Euronews	15 (88.2%) N=17	28 (96.6%) N=29
Press TV	73 (81.1%) N=90	181 (94.3%) N=192

Responsibility Frame on Covering the Paris Agreement

The responsibility frame was the most prominent in covering the Paris Agreement before the US withdrawal across the news outlets except for Press TV (see Table 8.7). This way of framing climate change emphasizes the relationship between the history of over-consumed atmospheric space, the current emissions share, and the responsibility to act (Friman & Hjerpe, 2015). However, most news outlets saw the issue as a common problem that all parties are involved in, while they can also alleviate it (see the Annex B document with codes). One difference between the use of the responsibility frame in the Iran deal and the Paris Agreement is that in the previous one, the emphasis was mainly on the responsibility of the players for the failure, and in the latter, the frame's emphasis was on the players' ability to alleviate the issue. The emphasis was on responsibility and fixing the problem rather than concentrating on the conflict among the different parties over reducing and stabilizing the carbon emissions. Needless to say, all of the respective entities are among the top 10 world polluters.

White House deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes said in a briefing last Week: "I think the two leaders meeting at the beginning of this process, as the two largest emitters, sends a strong message to the world about their shared commitment to combat climate change and to achieve an ambitious agreement" (Mullen, 2015 on CNN).

The only exception among the outlets was Press TV, which primarily focused on the conflict in reporting the issue. For Press TV, particularly, the US's interests and policies sharply contrasted with those of the rest of the world. Iran is itself one of the world's top carbon emitters, so it is understandable not to wish to focus on the responsible players. However, the environment is not a crucial issue like the nuclear program, so the supreme leader does not directly intervene in policymaking. This situation gives the freedom of maneuver to faction politics. Furthermore, Press TV ignored the Paris Agreement, which was in line with the conservatives' view of climate change. It was not an important issue to them. For instance, Press TV had six news stories pre-US withdrawal, and six post-US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, compared to 34 and 21 news stories on Euronews, respectively. The pre-US withdrawal coverage on Press TV was mainly about the big picture, like the rich and poor countries' interests:

The poorest countries of the world, including Ethiopia, Zambia, Yemen, and Pacific Island nations, are suffering from the most devastating effects of climate change, such as intensifying droughts, floods, and crumbling coastlines, while they just produce a tiny fraction of the planet-warming gases that drive climate change ("48 poorest nations," 2015 on Press TV).

Alternatively, explaining Iran's position rather than directly blaming others:

The Iranian official further highlighted the general environmental policies outlined by Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei last month, adding the policies are a forward-looking manifesto for sustainable development and a strong sign of solidarity with the international community to protect the Earth ("Any agreement on climate," 2015 on Press TV).

Therefore, the conservative backed Press TV criticized the US and Trump, mainly after the US withdrawal.

Other outlets also had the conflict frame as the second most used frame after the responsibility frame (see Table 8.7, Figure 8.3, and Figure 8.4). The outlets' frame use implies that although they recognize the responsibilities (governments' and general non-specific responsibilities like the way of living), they have been generally positive toward the negotiations. Instead of focusing on disagreements and tensions among the countries, the outlets emphasized the talks and the possibility and will for fixing the issue that everybody has something to do with. The pattern of the frames changed significantly after the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. While Press TV's framing did not change significantly, CNN shifted from the responsibility to the conflict frame as the dominant frame. The framing percentage reduced from 79.6 before the US withdrawal to 65.7 percent, while the conflict frame for CNN increased from 61.5 to 94.3 percent. After the US withdrawal, CNN clearly saw the issue as more a conflict of interests than an issue

with US responsibility. This approach was similar to Euronews's framing behavior. While Euronews, before the US withdrawal, was mainly focused on governments' responsibilities and their abilities to alleviate the problem, "hopes rise of climate deal as EU forms new alliance" ("Hopes Rise Of," 2015), after the withdrawal the outlet emphasized both responsibility and conflict, "earlier in a defiant speech to parliament, German Chancellor Merkel stressed the importance of tackling climate change and slammed isolationism and protectionism in what was seen as a swipe at the US leader" ("EU Leaders United," 2017).

Compared to Euronews's approach to the Iran nuclear deal and the US withdrawal, it seems Euronews intended to see the failure due to US behavior in the Iran nuclear case as at a much higher level than the environmental issues and the Paris Agreement. CGTN's framing approach also changed before and after the US withdrawal. While before the US withdrawal, the outlet was in line with CNN and Euronews, in focusing on responsibility mainly not directed at a specific country, after the withdrawal, CGTN emphasized both responsibility and conflict at a high level, focusing on the US failure to secure the agreement as a top polluter: "with no science adviser, Trump turns his back to climate change...Trump signed an executive order to nix Obama's climate change policies and re-fuel the coal industry" ("With no science adviser," 2017); "We are not going to backslide even if the United States at the moment... is backsliding from its previous commitments" ("China, Europe still," 2017).




Figure 8.3: News framing on the Paris Agreement before the US withdrawal




Figure 8.4: News framing on the Paris Agreement after the US withdrawal

One significant element absent from all the media coverage was a non-governmental player(s). The state-centric approach in the news coverage did not give room for civil society or international organizations, particularly the IAEA, which was supposed to be an active part of the development of the issue. For example, in the Paris Agreement case, although the entire talks were parts of the UN initiative, the UN got little coverage compared to the states as the leading players.

8.1.3 *Economic Consequences Frame*

This frame incorporated three attributes (see Table 7.1). News stories were examined to find contents that implied economic consequences now or in the future, e.g., phrases like “economic hardship” or “economic pressure.” Previous studies suggested that the economic and conflict frames are among the most used frames in political news (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; de Vreese et al., 2011). In the current study, although all the news outlets widely used the conflict frame, the economic frame did not meet expectations. In the case of the Iran deal, CNN and Euronews used the economic frame more than Press TV and CGTN (see Table 8.4, Figure 8.1, and Figure 8.2): “when pressed on the fact that sanctions against Iran were successful because the regime was squeezed not just by the US, but by other countries around the world,” (Bash, 2015 on CNN); “as the deal was agreed, the Security Council warned sanctions can be reimposed if Tehran breaches the agreement within the next decade” (Tylor, 2015 on Euronews). The same outlet used the conflict frame more than two others. CGTN, and particularly Press TV, preferred not to emphasize conflict and disagreements or the economic side of the issue, especially before the US withdrew from the nuclear agreement. This approach is especially interesting in the Press TV case.

Iran has been under heavy sanctions because of its alleged nuclear activities and ambitions, which puts enormous pressure on ordinary people’s shoulders. One explanation could be related to Iran’s factional politics. Press TV is dominated by the conservative faction, which has always emphasized self-sufficiency and de-emphasized foreign sanctions’ effect on Iran’s economy. This view can explain lower Press TV economic frame usage even after the US withdrawal. After all, underplaying and excluding other versions of social reality is another way that the media frame the news (Gitlin, 1980). CGTN also used the economic frame less than Western news outlets, both

in the pre- and post-US withdrawal period, while the responsibility and conflict issues were the most used frames by the outlet before and after the US withdrawal.

China's trade volume was much lower with Iran than with the US and European countries. In 2015, China exported 17.8 billion USD of goods to Iran and imported 17.2 billion USD from Iran (OECA, 2020). In the same year, China's exports to the USA were worth 430 billion USD, while it imported only 118 billion USD worth from the US (OECb, 2020). The idea of being marginalized from the world powers' club and the US's unilateralism was more critical for China and CGTN than losing a small portion of its foreign trade. Like other outlets, CGTN was not focused on economic issues in covering the Paris Agreement (see Table 8.7, Figure 8.3, and Figure 8.4). However, the outlet used the economic frame more after the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. CGTN, at least partly, saw the problem as related to the responsibility frame, when western governments gave the green light to "Trump's reform policies...to retain businesses."

The economy was emphasized more on CNN and Euronews than on CGTN and Press TV. However, in all the outlets, the economic frame came after the responsibility and conflict frames. This distinction kept going in the post-US withdrawal period as well. The discourse of the Western powers and media toward Iran's nuclear deal has long been based on suspicions and dismissing Iran's doubtful ambitions. However, economic pressure and leverage were a prominent part of the West's discourse, including during the negotiations. Therefore, on CNN, companies and people are "charged with violating US sanctions on Iran" even if they are from friendly countries like Taiwan and Türkiye, to prevent Iran's "ambition to develop nuclear arms" (Melvin, 2015). The sanctions leverage remains after the deal. For instance, Euronews reminds us that Iran deal 'supporters' say that "sanctions could be reimposed within a matter of days" (Gill, 2015).

It is shown that exposure to the economic frame, no matter whether negative or positive, can increase the economy's position as a tool for judging the situation (De Verse et al., 2011). However, the media outlets studied prioritized the conflict and responsibility frames more than the economy one, although they put more emphasis on the economy than the morality and human interest frames.

8.1.4 *Human Interest Frame*

The ‘human interest’ frame included five attributes related to reporting the ‘human aspects of the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris Agreement (see Table 7.1). Again, the news outlets used this frame at different rates, but they have been almost the same in using this frame for both topics and in the pre- or post-US withdrawal period.

The news stories invoked this frame, aimed to trigger an emotional effect in the audience with concern, sympathy, and empathy. This was constructed by employing ‘strong’ adjectives, e.g., “the best thing to do” or “historic Iran deal”; by using the personal life information of the actors, e.g., “Sherman is a veteran US negotiator, known as ‘The Silver Fox’ by her colleagues” (Gretener, 2018 on CNN) or by emphasizing how people are affected, e.g., “by the end of the century, it’s estimated two out of three people living in Europe will be affected by heat waves, coastal flooding, and other weather-related disasters” (“US officially tells,” 2017). Frame usage can be deduced from Table 9 regarding each news outlet and topic. The outlets do not use the frame much; it comes only after the responsibility, conflict, and economic frames. There is no significant difference between the Western-private media and non-Western government media in using this frame in reporting the Iran nuclear deal. However, Press TV used this frame in its Paris Agreement coverage noticeably more than the other outlets (see Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.4). This begs the question of why the outlet used this frame more than over the Iran nuclear issue. One answer could be related to the Iran conservatives’ narratives about the nuclear issue and related sanctions. As mentioned, the conservative narrative in Iran has focused on economic self-sufficiency and their resistance economy. Therefore, emphasizing the US responsibility and conflict between the countries’ interests is more understandable for Press TV than concentrating on the economic consequences for the country or depicting how ordinary Iranians are affected by the nuclear-related sanctions.

Over the Paris Agreement, Press TV focused on the impact on the world’s population in general (and developing countries particularly) rather than on Iran, e.g., “especially in West Asia, including excessive rise in temperature, vast economic and social damage, drought, dust storm, newly-emerging diseases, displacement, and immigration” (“Paris deal withdrawal,” 2017 on Press TV). This line of narrative went along with Iran’s attempt to define itself as an advocate of the South against the global North, while the country is among the top 10 world polluters. However, Iranian conservatives are not

advocating climate-changing actions in general, particularly when needing vital petrodollars in the sanctions era. This view could be at odds with advocating for the global South against the North in the Paris Agreement.

Two issues should be explained here. First, the low overall coverage of the Paris Agreement by Press TV (only six stories pre- and six stories post-US withdrawal compared to, for instance, 34 stories of Euronews only for the pre-US withdrawal period), and second, the discourse which Iran's conservative national radio and TV, including Press TV, are part of. As elaborated before, Iranian conservatives see the idea of a climate change agreement and cooperation through non-environmental and ideological lenses. Therefore, the Paris Agreement is seen as mostly either an opportunity to seek to promote Iran's international position, or leverage to remove international and unilateral sanctions against the country. As a result, the Paris Agreement developments were either absent from Press TV coverage or were not the main topic and brought up partly related to other issues like sanctions and anti-American pieces.

8.1.5 *Morality Frame*

The 'morality frame' included three attributes related to reporting the moral and ethical aspects of the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris Agreement, e.g., "It made us human" or "United States hears you. The United States supports you. The United States is with you" (Duchon & Williams, 2018, on Euronews). This finding agrees with previous frame studies' results, which suggest that the 'morality' frame is the least visible frame in media contents (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), making this frame a frame effect in the audience's mind rather than an effective media frame. In addition, the current study agrees with previous studies that, compared to the other three frames, the human interest and morality frames are not frequently used in news coverage overall (An & Gower, 2009).

Table 8.7 Documents with frames

		Iran deal before US withdrawal	Iran deal after US withdrawal	Paris Agreement before US withdrawal	Paris Agreement after US withdrawal
CNN	Responsibility frame	65 (79.3%) - n=82	41 (89.1%) - n=46	10 (76.9%) - n=13	23 (65.7%) - n=35
	Conflict frame	78 (95.1%) - n=82	44 (95.7%) - n=46	8 (61.5%) - n=13	33 (94.3%) - n=35
	Economic frame	33 (40.2%) - n=82	29 (63.0%) - n=46	3 (23.1%) - n=13	5 (14.3%) - n=35
	Human interests frame	18 (22.0%) - n=82	4 (8.7%) - n=46	1 (7.7%) - n=13	5 (14.3%) - n=35
	Morality frame	12 (14.6%) - n=82	3 (6.5%) - n=46	2 (15.4%) - n=13	5 (14.3%) - n=35
CGTN	Responsibility frame	20 (83.3%) - n=24	74 (85.1%) - n=87	14 (77.8%) - n=18	32 (84.2%) - n=38
	Conflict frame	19 (79.2%) - n=24	71 (81.6%) - n=87	8 (44.4%) - n=18	32 (84.2%) - n=38
	Economic frame	7 (29.2%) - n=24	42 (48.3%) - n=87	1 (5.6%) - n=18	6 (15.8%) - n=38
	Human interests frame	0	2 (2.3%) - n=87	0	3 (7.9%) - n=38
	Morality frame	0	5 (5.7%) - n=87	5 (27.8%) - n=18	3 (7.9%) - n=38
Euronews	Responsibility frame	15 (88.2%) - n=17	28 (96.6%) - n=29	25 (73.5%) - n=34	7 (33.3%) - n=21
	Conflict frame	15 (88.2%) - n=17	28 (96.6%) - n=29	16 (47.0%) - n=34	17 (81.0%) - n=21
	Economic frame	9 (52.9%) - n=17	17 (58.6%) - n=29	2 (5.9%) - n=34	4 (19.0%) - n=21
	Human interests frame	1 (5.9%) - n=17	3 (10.3%) - n=29	5 (14.7%) - n=34	5 (23.8%) - n=21
	Morality frame	1 (5.9%) - n=17	5 (17.2%) - n=29	1 (2.9%) - n=34	4 (19.0%) - n=21
Press TV	Responsibility frame	73 (81.1%) - n=90	181 (94.3%) - n=192	1 (16.7%) - n=6	6 (100%) - n=6
	Conflict frame	57 (63.3%) - n=90	189 (98.4%) - n=192	4 (66.7%) - n=6	6 (100%) - n=6
	Economic frame	27 (30%) - n=90	83 (43.2%) - n=192	1 (16.7%) - n=6	1 (16.7%) - n=6
	Human interests frame	4 (4.4%) - n=90	7 (3.6%) - n=192	3 (50.0%) - n=6	1 (16.7%) - n=6
	Morality frame	7 (7.8%) - n=90	13 (6.8%) - n=192	0	0

8.2 Comparing Media Systems

The current study analyzed the coverage across various media from different countries. There are different approaches used to study and compare media. One crucial contribution of this study is examining the heterogeneous media under one umbrella. Earlier, the contexts that media are working within have been explained. To follow, different approaches of comparing the media will be briefly mentioned.

Historically, scholars have identified two main models of the press: the authoritarian model and the libertarian model. The authoritarian media is controlled in its functions and operations by an organized society through an external institution, typically the government, while the libertarian model provides relative freedom in functions and operations. These predominant models are used as the framework for communication research. However, later, there have been two additional models in modern times: The social responsibility model and the Soviet communist model. They are not entirely new models, but rather developments and modifications of the authoritarian and libertarian models (Siebert, 1956). Liberal and free media as opposed to the not-free media is the most basic model to study media coverage which provides a base for the common-sense view of media activities. However, there are different communication theories to explain whether and to what extent the different media in different countries may be similar or dissimilar. Regarding, three approaches can be referred to help us to analyse the current study's results.

Country-specific reporting: This approach is characterized by the influence of the national context on media coverage. Shoemaker and Cohen (2006) suggest that the national system is essential to studying journalism by comparing news values among ten countries. In this view, a social system concludes subsystems such as political, economic, cultural, and mass communication (Shoemaker & Reese, 2013). Shoemaker and Reese (1996) developed a model to systematize the influential domestic factors on media coverage. They strengthen their 'Hierarchical Influences Model' in the 2013 edition of their initial work, considering five levels of analysis: through individuals, routine practices, media organizations, social institutions, and social systems (p. 9). The model examines these factors working in whose interests, which brings questions of "value, interests, and ultimately power." (Shoemaker & Reese, 2013, p. 66). News organizations

and their employees must function “within the ideological boundaries set by the larger society” (Reese, 2007, p. 31).

It is assumed that countries are different in terms of their characteristics and the relevance of these factors which shape the news coverage of the media toward international issues. National subsystems in countries like China have tremendous effects on news coverage, questioning globalization in the media field (Chang et al., 2009; Hleft & Barboza, 2010). The same effect can be assumed for Iran’s media with the significant difference in social, political, economic, and cultural aspects with, particularly, Western countries.

Scholars of this approach base their assessments on both micro and macro levels. However, the idea is that the influence of the higher levels does not eliminate the influence of the lower level. Studies are trying to find out how individuals, i.e., “attitudes, training, and background of the media workers,” shape the media coverage at the micro level while interested in countries’ socio-cultural contexts, which affect individual practices at a macro level (Reese, 2001, p. 179; Reese, 2007).

The current study extensively examined the dynamic of the media studied and tried to show the contextual conditions that each media worked within it. Interestingly, the current study shows that while the media allocated their main coverage to the states as the leading players during the international negotiations, they more or less ignored the individual states’ populations.

Regional patterns in reporting: Some scholars suggest that regional differences influence media reporting. There are variants of this approach emphasizing the structural patterns and differences among various media. One approach is rooted in Samuel Huntington’s famous idea about the clash of civilizations, to compare the media from different countries, particularly Western countries, with those of the Islamic world and China. It is assumed that clashes between civilizations can occur in ways other than through armed conflicts, including between perspectives which would be crystalized in the information flow and media coverage (Seib, 2004; Bantimaroudis, & Kampanellou, 2007). For instance, Seib (2004) found meaningful differences in the coverage of Aljazeera with that of Western media on terrorist attacks. With this token, the current study found that there were no significant differences between an example of the news

media from Islamic Iran, from the Chinese media, and the Christian-dominated Western countries' media.

Today, many comparative journalism and political communication studies use Hallin and Mancini's three models of media systems as a reference point: the Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model, North/Central Europe or democratic corporatist model, and North Atlantic or liberal model (Esser et al., 2012; Voltmer, 2013; Brüggemann et al., 2014). However, all three models are related to democratic systems, and critics discuss whether Hallin and Mancini's models should be extended to other parts of the worlds rather than limited to Western countries (Brüggemann et al., 2014). The use of Press TV and CGTN in the current study helps in an examination of the media outside of the common Western-oriented study frameworks.

Others, like Hanitzsch et al. (2011), have classified the role of countries into different groups: a) countries with a Western journalistic culture, like Austria, Australia, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States; b) countries with a so-called Western peripheral journalistic culture like: Brazil, Bulgaria, Israel, Mexico, and Romania; and c) non-democratic or democratic transition countries such as: Chile, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Russia, Türkiye and Uganda. While groups a and b share many common characteristics, group c includes a large number of countries with heterogeneous characteristics. Although comparing regional and cultural media systems illuminates some convergences and divergences, there are scholars that only focus on the standardization of media operations and coverages.

Global standardization: In contrast to country or regional-based theories, some scholars emphasize the similarities among media constructions across the globe, and relate these to globalization (Herman & McChesney, 2000; Thompson, 2000). Globalization has worried some scholars about "exporting and imposing a single social imagery" (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 27). Technological innovations, particularly the Internet, have questioned nation-states as the public sphere (Castells, 2007). Thus, there are ideological and normative issues that cannot be easily tracked in national contexts. In fact, journalists within media organizations may have more in common with other countries' journalists than their compatriots (Reese, 2007, p. 40). As journalism research becomes "more international and globally oriented," this approach becomes more important (Reese, 2007, p. 29). Many scholars believe there should be an "international standard of journalistic professionalism with basic shared values" (Reese, 2001, p. 73).

The increase in “formal and informal links” is binding the international, national, and regional news media with each other, and helps to create a global news system (Swanson, 2003, p. 56) or a “global news arena” (Reese, 2007, p.40). In most cases, professional Western practices are attributed to similarities that penetrate the rest of the world. Scholars have criticized “the self-absorption and parochialism of much Western media theory” within the discourse about globalization, media, power, and society, pointing out the “American and Eurocentric approaches” in the mentioned fields (Grüne & Ulrich, 2012, p. 1). Today, the so-called “globalized journalism” and “global character of the journalistic culture” have spread around the globe, placing North America and Europe as epicenters of the whole world, particularly thanks to technological advances (Alonso & Ibáñez, 2013, p. 44).

This is not a new phenomenon, and for decades scholars have been speculating about a “transnational news-value culture” (Cohen et al., 1990) that suggests what should be news and how it should be reported (Swanson, 2003). The global standardization is particularly strong in reporting about global problems (Krotz, 2005, cited in Gerhards & Schäfer, 2014). Nuclear proliferation and (more recently) climate change have been two global issues for decades, making them considerable issues to report.

While common sense suggests a clear difference between the mainstream media in democracies (with minimum control of the media) and non-democracies (with maximum control of the media), the current study has found the borderline between above-mentioned media to be less apparent. These results could be explained in some ways as follows:

First: The media in democracies are influenced by governments and elites, even determining their tools in covering foreign policy news (Herman, 1993; Bennett et al., 2008; Entman, 2008; Bahador, 2011). Non-democracies also use the media as soft power tools, which brings them even closer to their foreign policy approaches. In the current study’s cases, the players sought to reach an agreement through negotiations, while maintaining their interests and disagreements. These concerns are represented in media outlets’ state-centric coverages. Accordingly, the players could not hide their disappointments and objections after the US withdrawal, represented in the news coverage, particularly in the case of the Iran nuclear deal. Democrat-leaning CNN’s position may play a role in its relatively similar framing to other media approaches toward Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal. The closeness of media coverage to official

foreign policy may explain Press TV's unexpectedly low emphasis on the conflict frame before the US withdrawal, and then jumping the frame after the US withdrawal. The same pattern can be seen in Press TV's low implementation of the responsibility frame in the Paris Agreement coverage. Iran is one of the world's top ten carbon emitters, and has done little to improve its position. Understandably, states were not interested in emphasizing ordinary Iranians' economic hardship because of the sanctions, and the devastating effects of the punitive policies against Iran. Media outlets' coverage aligned with the states' approach while seeing the common conflict and responsibility frames as suitable to present the issues.

Second: Traditional explanations and models about the stark differences between media systems and coverages are losing steam. On the one hand, the media in democratic countries are becoming more confirmative (Schudson, 2002), and routinely ignore their objectivity and truth-telling values (Dorman, 1986; Bennett et al., 2008; Bahador, 2011), and on the other hand, media practice in non-democracies is sometimes becoming closer to that of democratic countries. For instance, research has shown 'blurry lines' between media practices in democracies and in non-democracies like China (Repnikova, 2015) and "considerable similarities between Chinese and Western 'news value theories.'" (Guo, 2012, p. 26). Some notice that a "global news system" (Swanson, 2003, as cited in Gerhards and Schafer, 2014. p.5) affects international news media coverage and at least dilutes their differences.

Third: education in journalism has become more standardized than before (Deuze, 2006; Lynch & Galtung, 2010). The mindset of journalists and their understanding of news values and audience expectations are being increasingly widespread across the globe. Meanwhile, countries at the bottom of the press freedom indexes accept Western-style journalism in their media. The current study has noticed that even Chinese and Iranian media use Western-educated and veteran Western journalists for their international programs. Some scholars note that Journalists may have shared understandings about events' newsworthiness, and how prominent events should be covered (Lee, 2009). It is worth pointing out that all of the media studied try to reach international English-speaking audiences who can be more homogenized target audiences under the influence of American-style journalism, disseminated years before other countries started introducing their international alternatives.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Study Questions

The current study attempts to answer three main questions:

- Does the use of frames vary significantly by outlet?
- Does the use of frames vary significantly by topic?
- Does the use of frames change in the media over time?

Question One: Does the use of frames vary significantly by outlet?

Data derived from the examined media outlets, CNN, CGTN, Euronews, and Press TV, on news coverage of the Iran nuclear deal and Paris Agreement in the study period, showed that news coverage was primarily framed in terms of conflict and responsibility frames. This result agrees with previous studies. Considering world issues as ongoing contests makes the conflict frame among the most common frames in news stories (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; de Vreese, 2005). The economic frame came as a secondary frame, and human interest and morality frames generally did not feature significantly. The findings agree with the previous studies' results, which show that the attribution of responsibility and conflict are the most commonly used frames in the news media (Kuttschreuter et al., 2011; de Vreese, 2005), followed by economic consequences frames (de Vreese, 2005).

Using Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) five news frames and a qualitative approach, some scholars show that news frames depend on the media's political orientation. For instance, Colistra (2010) indicates that conflict/attribution of responsibility frames are dominant in progressive newspapers compared to conservative newspapers, while in the current study, the responsibility and conflict frames used by the outlets at a high level

disregard their ownership and ideological viewpoints. It seems that the organizational and ideological elements do not significantly affect how the media use the frames. While CNN is run by the private sector, Press TV and CGTN work under government supervision, and act as a tool for their governments' soft power aims. Meanwhile, Euronews is influenced by both governments and the private sector. On the one hand, it is supposed to be an alternative to CNN and pays special attention to European integration; on the other hand, it has been run by the private sector with market rules and priorities, claiming to be independent of governments and their instructions.

Comparing the four media mentioned above shows their usage of frames more or less follows the same pattern. It is worth mentioning that although the amount of framing was not significantly different among the news outlets, the number of dedicated news stories was noticeably different. Although covering or not covering an issue is traditionally more related to agenda setting, it shows the issue's importance for the media framing it. In this regard, the number of news stories about the Iran nuclear deal on CNN and Press TV was much higher than Euronews and CGTN, particularly before the US withdrawal. This sharp difference was not apparent in covering the Paris Agreement, except for the meager amount of news coverage of the Paris Agreement on Press TV (only six news stories in both periods studied).

The standard approach to newsworthiness and framing the issues was common among all the media studied, regardless of affiliations and ownership. One reason could be the way journalists are educated and practiced in their professional life. There have been increasing levels of professionalization, formalization, and standardization worldwide (Deuze, 2006, p. 22), and no matter what geographic area or sociopolitical context, "journalism educators and media professionals have had to come to terms with the same problems" (Gaunt, 1992, p. 2). Education and professionalism will be seen as more significant when we notice that even Press TV and CGTN have used Western journalists. There are theorized standards for the newsworthiness of media coverage that international non-Western media cannot simply disregard if they want to reach audiences worldwide (Lee, 2009). Some scholars suggest that to establish alternative international media instead of giants like CNN, journalists should even 'unlearn' some of their old professional habits and routines (Baisnee & Marchetti, 2010, p. 27).

Moreover, one can discuss that some worldwide 'normative assessments' can make news coverage similar in terms of not framing in a particular way. For example, Norris et al. (2003) argue that in the event of a terrorist attack, every leader, even those who may

secretly support terrorism, condemns the act. In the current study's cases, no media outlet directly rejected the priority of certain climate actions, or the very idea of climate change. Even Press TV did not deny climate change, while Iran's conservatives in fact mainly either reject climate change or are doubtful about it. Likewise, when Donald Trump declared his decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, the media took up a predictable position in condemning it unanimously. The same issue can be observed in terms of the Iran nuclear issue. While some scholars famously believed Iran, in fact, "should get the bomb" (Waltz, 2012) or Iranian leaders "were foolish not to develop a nuclear deterrent in the early 2000s" (Mearsheimer, 2019, para. 2), Press TV did not mention Iran's 'right' to build up atomic deterrence, and every news outlet agreed on the necessity of the nuclear negotiations. Donald Trump's decision to withdraw from the JCPOA was, of course, predictably condemned (more or less) by every news outlet, but even Press TV was cautious in blaming Trump instead of the people who elected him, because some unwanted interpretation could have always come up with a condemnation of the ordinary people.

The media studied were not only similar in their use of the frames; they were also similar in not using the frames. While the economic frame constituted the secondary frame after conflict and responsibility (see Table 9), human interest and morality frames usage were insignificant compared to the frequent frames. It is worth noting that the pattern repeatedly disregards the topics. The expectation was that climate change could be covered more related to the daily life of populations and people's ethical and moral roles in protecting the well-being of human societies and the planet. However, the much smaller usage of human interest and morality frames showed that the media saw both topics as state issues that needed to be discussed and solved at state levels, almost unrelated to the lives of the ordinary people who would be affected by the policies.

Question two: Does the use of frames vary significantly by topic?

The media studied saw the Iran nuclear deal and Paris Agreement through almost the same lens. The conflict frame was used significantly more in the Iran nuclear and Paris Agreement topics. This means that the media saw the issues as matters of state interaction and negotiations over both topics, the matter of contests first and foremost. The media outlets saw the issue as a question of conflict much more than one of morality, economics, or even consequences for the people. However, the responsibility frame was neck and

neck with the conflict frame, which showed it was not enough to show the conflict among players; they were also viewed as responsible for the issue. The current study's two topics have been considered as state-level issues assumed to be solvable by states. The Iran nuclear issue was a matter of negotiating between UNSC members (plus Germany) and Iran, despite the direct responsibility of the IAEA in such issues. The IAEA was not even a reference point for some players' positions, and its objections and clarifications were frequently overlooked, particularly by the US. It was not only the IAEA's role that was overlooked. States were also not equally treated, and non-5+1 countries were sidelined. State-centric media coverage predictably gave more weight to macroeconomics than human interest, morality, and economic frame usage, which ranked well below the conflict and responsibility frames.

The environmental issue and climate emergency framing was not significantly different from that of the Iran nuclear issue, and the same pattern of framing weighting happened in Paris Agreement coverage. State-centric news coverage sidelined small countries and non-state actors, and focused on conflict, responsibility, and to some extent, the economy. The only exception was Euronews, which prioritized human interest over the economic frame. The Europeans have tried to introduce their environmental policies as a dynamic alternative approach that matches Euronews's view of Europeans and their issues. The Europeans are sensitive about environmental issues and policies, and it seems Euronews considers this aspect, while remaining primarily focused on conflict and responsibility, like the other outlets.

Question three: Does the use of frames change in the media over time?

The use of frames in the studied media noticeably changed over time. In fact, time per se was not the critical element, and the change in coverage/framing was recognizable before and after a major development of the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris Agreement. Every news outlet except CNN used the conflict frame significantly more after the US withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris Agreement. CNN's usage of the conflict frame increased by less than 1 percent (95.1% before the US withdrawal increased to 95.7%), which shows the heavy weighting of the conflict frame in CNN coverage disregarded the main developments in the negotiations.

There have always been contrasts and disagreements among states during the extended time of negotiations and policy making, but increasing the usage of the conflict

frame after the US withdrawal showed a negative twist in the negotiation results, interpreted as increased conflict between the state players. The responsibility frame also increased in the coverage of all the news outlets after the US withdrawal, showing that finding responsibility and presenting conflicts between players go hand in hand with media coverage. This issue was not the case for the Paris Agreement coverage. While the conflict frame rose in every news outlet after the US withdrawal, the responsibility frame increased only in Press TV and CGTN coverage. In fact, the responsibility frame decreased significantly in CNN and Euronews coverage after the US withdrawal (see Table 9). The Western media (CNN and Euronews) seemed not to look as closely for responsibility as their non-Western counterparts. The Europeans, who were furious about Trump's position over the JCPOA, did not put the same energy into attacking the US and Trump's irresponsible actions. In fact, while the other media decreased their hopes of finding players to alleviate the situation, Euronews held the same hopes after the US withdrawal (see Appendix 2).

Press TV's news coverage also demonstrated a noticeable difference between the two topics. While the news outlet was fundamentally against the Western countries, particularly the US, it did not emphasize the conflict frame and used it significantly less than the other media before the US withdrawal. For instance, before the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Press TV used the conflict frame in 63.3% of its stories compared to 95.1% by CNN, 79.2% by CGTN, and 88.2% by Euronews. The news outlet changed its path after the US withdrawal and used the conflict frame in 98.4% of its coverage. The Iran regime's positivity and hopes for an agreement seemed to have outweighed the long-term hostility and the newsworthiness of the conflict, softening the Press TV coverage. This behavior was not repeated in the case of the Paris Agreement, and in fact, Press TV showed the highest usage of the conflict frame before the US withdrawal. The environmental issue was not as important as the nuclear one for the regime and Supreme leader, so the Iranian factions had their chance to represent themselves. Iran's conservative national radio and television expectedly was relatively harsh in reproaching the West, particularly the US.

Despite some differences, it seems that all news outlets more or less have the same patterns and priorities in covering negotiations. Study limitations

9.2 *Study Limitation*

When interpreting the study results, some limitations should be noticed. First, the five pre-set news frames may not provide the best study framework for news outlets. Some inductive framing could be considered along with the deductive approach, and particularly presenting good, bad, or neutral framing could help in understanding the possible framing effects on general audiences and negotiators. Another limitation of the current study has been removing Russia Today from the research. RT's website did not include news stories for the demanded periods, and contacting RT to provide the needed stories proved unsuccessful. Including RT in the media studied could have helped us better understand and analyze the framing behaviors of various other media. The next limitation of the current study is that it does not cover non-text materials like images, graphics, photos, and videos. Examining these materials could have helped the researcher to study more framing sources, and find more comprehensive results.

9.3 *Suggestions*

The current study examined only news stories. News features are an inseparable part of the mainstream media. Finding and studying frames in news stories is more complex than in news features because news stories are more direct event bases, and shorter than news features. However, studying news features can make research richer.

Although the mainstream media are still influential and an essential part of understanding the socialization of societies, carrying out public diplomacy and applying soft power, new media (particularly social platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram) are becoming more and more important in the field of political communications, media studies, and international relations. Studies have already examined the new media framing of the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris Agreement (Manor, 2015; Hopke & Hestres, 2018; Motahar et al., 2021). However, there is a need for more studies in this field, and particularly comparative studies between the traditional mass media and new media can teach us about the potential and effects of the various types of media.

The framing study in the current work has been focused on media behavior regarding the international English language audience. However, studies examining the same media framing for domestic audiences and comparing them to the international versions can help bring about a better understanding of media coverage regarding the target audience, particularly when examining media's effects on the audience.

The issue of the Iran deal did not lose steam after the US withdrawal and re-introduction of sanctions against Iran. In Iran's domestic politics, the regime faced its most serious challenge since the revolution when months of widespread protests rocked the country, following the death of young Mahsa Amini in morality police custody. The uprising made the regime more vulnerable. In foreign policy, while Iran tried to keep its distance from Russia's attack on Ukraine, it sought diplomatic normalization with its arch-regional rival Saudi Arabia. At the same time, there were hopes of revitalizing the near-dead Iran nuclear negotiations. These post-agreement developments require a comprehensive study of the media coverage, to better understand the media framing and the effects of these crucial developments on media behavior.

Finally, the current study found noticeable similarities between democratic and non-democratic media framing. While the reason(s) for the findings requires a whole new study, this dissertation can be used for research into different media system.

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
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
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APPENDIX A

DOCUMENTS WITH CODES IN IRAN'S NUCLEAR DEAL






CNN - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	106	82.81	82.81
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	84	65.63	65.63
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	75	58.59	58.59
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	54	42.19	42.19
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	53	41.41	41.41

the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	48	37.50	37.50
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	46	35.94	35.94
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	32	25.00	25.00
suggesting solution	21	16.41	16.41
win-lose	19	14.84	14.84
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	17	13.28	13.28
human example or human face for the issue	13	10.16	10.16
going to private or personal life of actors	9	7.03	7.03
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	8	6.25	6.25
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	7	5.47	5.47
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	7	5.47	5.47
containing any moral message	5	3.91	3.91
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	5	3.91	3.91
win-win	5	3.91	3.91
requirement of urgent action	4	3.13	3.13
containing visual information to generate feelings	3	2.34	2.34
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	3	2.34	2.34


emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	2	1.56	1.56
lose-lose	1	0.78	0.78
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
only winner(s) or loser(s)	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	128	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	128	100.00	-



CNN - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal before US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	66	80.49	80.49
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	56	68.29	68.29
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	39	47.56	47.56
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	39	47.56	47.56
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	35	42.68	42.68
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	34	41.46	41.46
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	28	34.15	34.15
suggesting solution	18	21.95	21.95
win-lose	17	20.73	20.73
human example or human face for the issue	11	13.41	13.41
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	10	12.20	12.20
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	8	9.76	9.76
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	7	8.54	8.54
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	7	8.54	8.54
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	7	8.54	8.54
going to private or personal life of actors	6	7.32	7.32

win-win	5	6.10	6.10
containing visual information to generate feelings	3	3.66	3.66
containing any moral message	3	3.66	3.66
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	3	3.66	3.66
requirement of urgent action	3	3.66	3.66
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	1	1.22	1.22
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
only winner(s) or loser(s)	0	0.00	0.00
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	82	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	82	100.00	-




CNN - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal after US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	40	86.96	86.96
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	36	78.26	78.26
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	28	60.87	60.87
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	22	47.83	47.83
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	19	41.30	41.30
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	19	41.30	41.30
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	18	39.13	39.13

the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	9	19.57	19.57
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	9	19.57	19.57
suggesting solution	3	6.52	6.52
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	3	6.52	6.52
going to private or personal life of actors	3	6.52	6.52
win-lose	2	4.35	4.35
human example or human face for the issue	2	4.35	4.35
containing any moral message	2	4.35	4.35
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	2	4.35	4.35
requirement of urgent action	1	2.17	2.17
lose-lose	1	2.17	2.17
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	1	2.17	2.17
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	1	2.17	2.17
win-win	0	0.00	0.00
containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
only winner(s) or loser(s)	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	46	100.00	100.00

DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	46	100.00	-




CGTN - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	61	54.95	54.95
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	56	50.45	50.45
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	53	47.75	47.75
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	51	45.95	45.95

economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	36	32.43	32.43
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	35	31.53	31.53
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	30	27.03	27.03
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	17	15.32	15.32
requirement of urgent action	10	9.01	9.01
only winner(s) or loser(s)	8	7.21	7.21
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	7	6.31	6.31
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	5	4.50	4.50
suggesting solution	5	4.50	4.50
win-win	4	3.60	3.60
containing any moral message	3	2.70	2.70
human example or human face for the issue	2	1.80	1.80
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	2	1.80	1.80
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	2	1.80	1.80
lose-lose	1	0.90	0.90
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	1	0.90	0.90
containing visual information to generate feelings	1	0.90	0.90
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00

win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	111	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	111	100.00	-




CGTN - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal before US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	14	58.33	58.33
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	12	50.00	50.00
reflecting disagreements between actors	10	41.67	41.67

mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	7	29.17	29.17
win-win	4	16.67	16.67
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	3	12.50	12.50
requirement of urgent action	3	12.50	12.50
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	3	12.50	12.50
only winner(s) or loser(s)	2	8.33	8.33
suggesting solution	2	8.33	8.33
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	1	4.17	4.17
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	1	4.17	4.17
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	0	0.00	0.00
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	0	0.00	0.00
containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00

human example or human face for the issue	0	0.00	0.00
containing any moral message	0	0.00	0.00
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	24	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	24	100.00	-




CGTN - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal after US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	53	60.92	60.92

reflecting disagreements between actors	51	58.62	58.62
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	39	44.83	44.83
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	39	44.83	44.83
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	35	40.23	40.23
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	34	39.08	39.08
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	23	26.44	26.44
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	17	19.54	19.54
requirement of urgent action	7	8.05	8.05
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	7	8.05	8.05
only winner(s) or loser(s)	6	6.90	6.90
suggesting solution	3	3.45	3.45
containing any moral message	3	3.45	3.45
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	2	2.30	2.30
human example or human face for the issue	2	2.30	2.30
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	2	2.30	2.30
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	2	2.30	2.30
lose-lose	1	1.15	1.15
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	1	1.15	1.15
containing visual information to generate feelings	1	1.15	1.15


win-win	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	87	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	87	100.00	-



Euronews - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	39	84.78	84.78
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	31	67.39	67.39
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	29	63.04	63.04
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	24	52.17	52.17
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	20	43.48	43.48
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	19	41.30	41.30
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	14	30.43	30.43
suggesting solution	6	13.04	13.04
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	6	13.04	13.04
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	6	13.04	13.04
containing any moral message	6	13.04	13.04
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	3	6.52	6.52
lose-lose	2	4.35	4.35
win-win	2	4.35	4.35
requirement of urgent action	2	4.35	4.35
win-lose	1	2.17	2.17
containing visual information to generate feelings	1	2.17	2.17

ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	1	2.17	2.17
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	1	2.17	2.17
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
only winner(s) or loser(s)	0	0.00	0.00
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
human example or human face for the issue	0	0.00	0.00
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	46	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	46	100.00	-




Euronews - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal before US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	12	70.59	70.59
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	9	52.94	52.94
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	9	52.94	52.94
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	9	52.94	52.94
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	7	41.18	41.18
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	6	35.29	35.29
suggesting solution	2	11.76	11.76
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	2	11.76	11.76

win-win	2	11.76	11.76
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	2	11.76	11.76
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	1	5.88	5.88
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	1	5.88	5.88
requirement of urgent action	1	5.88	5.88
win-lose	1	5.88	5.88
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	1	5.88	5.88
containing visual information to generate feelings	1	5.88	5.88
containing any moral message	1	5.88	5.88
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
human example or human face for the issue	0	0.00	0.00
only winner(s) or loser(s)	0	0.00	0.00
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	17	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-

ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	17	100.00	-
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


Euronews - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal after US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	27	93.10	93.10
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	25	86.21	86.21
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	20	68.97	68.97
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	15	51.72	51.72
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	13	44.83	44.83

economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	12	41.38	41.38
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	10	34.48	34.48
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	5	17.24	17.24
containing any moral message	5	17.24	17.24
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	4	13.79	13.79
suggesting solution	4	13.79	13.79
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	3	10.34	10.34
lose-lose	2	6.90	6.90
requirement of urgent action	1	3.45	3.45
win-win	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
only winner(s) or loser(s)	0	0.00	0.00
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	0	0.00	0.00
containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
human example or human face for the issue	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00

offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	29	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	29	100.00	-




Euronews - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal after US withdrawal)

Press TV - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	204	72.34	72.34
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	195	69.15	69.15
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	192	68.09	68.09

the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	141	50.00	50.00
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	99	35.11	35.11
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	93	32.98	32.98
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	40	14.18	14.18
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	40	14.18	14.18
containing any moral message	14	4.96	4.96
win-lose	13	4.61	4.61
requirement of urgent action	12	4.26	4.26
win-win	11	3.90	3.90
suggesting solution	9	3.19	3.19
lose-lose	8	2.84	2.84
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	7	2.48	2.48
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	6	2.13	2.13
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	6	2.13	2.13
only winner(s) or loser(s)	4	1.42	1.42
containing visual information to generate feelings	3	1.06	1.06
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	2	0.71	0.71
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	1	0.35	0.35

human example or human face for the issue	1	0.35	0.35
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	282	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	282	100.00	-




Press TV - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal before US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	61	67.78	67.78
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	32	35.56	35.56
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	26	28.89	28.89
reflecting disagreements between actors	24	26.67	26.67
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	19	21.11	21.11
requirement of urgent action	6	6.67	6.67
win-lose	6	6.67	6.67

political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	5	5.56	5.56
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	5	5.56	5.56
win-win	5	5.56	5.56
containing any moral message	5	5.56	5.56
containing visual information to generate feelings	3	3.33	3.33
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	2	2.22	2.22
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	2	2.22	2.22
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	1	1.11	1.11
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	1	1.11	1.11
only winner(s) or loser(s)	1	1.11	1.11
lose-lose	1	1.11	1.11
suggesting solution	0	0.00	0.00
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
human example or human face for the issue	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	0	0.00	0.00

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DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	90	100.00	-




Press TV - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal after US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	180	93.75	93.75
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	176	91.67	91.67
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	160	83.33	83.33
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	94	48.96	48.96

the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	80	41.67	41.67
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	67	34.90	34.90
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	39	20.31	20.31
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	35	18.23	18.23
suggesting solution	9	4.69	4.69
containing any moral message	9	4.69	4.69
win-lose	7	3.65	3.65
lose-lose	7	3.65	3.65
win-win	6	3.13	3.13
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	6	3.13	3.13
requirement of urgent action	6	3.13	3.13
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	4	2.08	2.08
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	4	2.08	2.08
only winner(s) or loser(s)	3	1.56	1.56
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	2	1.04	1.04
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	1	0.52	0.52
human example or human face for the issue	1	0.52	0.52
containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00


ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	192	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	192	100.00	-




Press TV - Documents with code (Iran nuclear deal after US withdrawal)

APPENDIX B

DOCUMENTS WITH CODES IN PARIS AGREEMENT






CNN - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	40	83.33	83.33
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	25	52.08	52.08
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	23	47.92	47.92
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	16	33.33	33.33
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	12	25.00	25.00
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	10	20.83	20.83
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	6	12.50	12.50
containing any moral message	5	10.42	10.42

ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	3	6.25	6.25
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	2	4.17	4.17
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	2	4.17	4.17
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	2	4.17	4.17
human example or human face for the issue	2	4.17	4.17
only winner(s) or loser(s)	2	4.17	4.17
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	2	4.17	4.17
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	1	2.08	2.08
containing visual information to generate feelings	1	2.08	2.08
suggesting solution	1	2.08	2.08
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	0	0.00	0.00
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-win	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
requirement of urgent action	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	48	100.00	100.00

DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	48	100.00	-




CNN - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement before US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	7	53.85	53.85
reflecting disagreements between actors	7	53.85	53.85
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	6	46.15	46.15
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	4	30.77	30.77

political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	4	30.77	30.77
only winner(s) or loser(s)	2	15.38	15.38
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	2	15.38	15.38
containing any moral message	2	15.38	15.38
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	1	7.69	7.69
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	1	7.69	7.69
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	1	7.69	7.69
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	1	7.69	7.69
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-win	0	0.00	0.00
suggesting solution	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	0	0.00	0.00
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	0	0.00	0.00
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	0	0.00	0.00
containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
human example or human face for the issue	0	0.00	0.00

requirement of urgent action	0	0.00	0.00
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	13	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	13	100.00	-




CNN - Documents with code (Paris agreement after US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	33	94.29	94.29
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	19	54.29	54.29

the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	19	54.29	54.29
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	11	31.43	31.43
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	9	25.71	25.71
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	6	17.14	17.14
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	4	11.43	11.43
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	3	8.57	8.57
containing any moral message	3	8.57	8.57
human example or human face for the issue	2	5.71	5.71
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	2	5.71	5.71
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	1	2.86	2.86
containing visual information to generate feelings	1	2.86	2.86
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	1	2.86	2.86
suggesting solution	1	2.86	2.86
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	1	2.86	2.86
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	1	2.86	2.86
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	0	0.00	0.00
only winner(s) or loser(s)	0	0.00	0.00


lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
win-win	0	0.00	0.00
requirement of urgent action	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	35	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	35	100.00	-



CGTN - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	26	46.43	46.43
reflecting disagreements between actors	26	46.43	46.43
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	16	28.57	28.57
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	6	10.71	10.71
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	5	8.93	8.93
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	5	8.93	8.93
containing any moral message	5	8.93	8.93
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	4	7.14	7.14
only winner(s) or loser(s)	4	7.14	7.14
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	3	5.36	5.36
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	3	5.36	5.36
win-win	3	5.36	5.36
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	3	5.36	5.36
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	2	3.57	3.57
suggesting solution	2	3.57	3.57

requirement of urgent action	1	1.79	1.79
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	1	1.79	1.79
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
human example or human face for the issue	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	56	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	56	100.00	-




CGTN - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement before US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	12	66.67	66.67
containing any moral message	4	22.22	22.22
win-win	3	16.67	16.67
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	3	16.67	16.67
only winner(s) or loser(s)	1	5.56	5.56
suggesting solution	1	5.56	5.56
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	1	5.56	5.56

mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	1	5.56	5.56
requirement of urgent action	1	5.56	5.56
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	1	5.56	5.56
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	0	0.00	0.00
reflecting disagreements between actors	0	0.00	0.00
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	0	0.00	0.00
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	0	0.00	0.00
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	0	0.00	0.00
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	0	0.00	0.00
containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
human example or human face for the issue	0	0.00	0.00
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	0	0.00	0.00

referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	18	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	18	100.00	-




CGTN - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement after US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	26	68.42	68.42
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	16	42.11	42.11
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	14	36.84	36.84

political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	5	13.16	13.16
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	5	13.16	13.16
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	4	10.53	10.53
only winner(s) or loser(s)	3	7.89	7.89
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	3	7.89	7.89
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	2	5.26	5.26
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	2	5.26	5.26
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	2	5.26	5.26
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	2	5.26	5.26
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	1	2.63	2.63
containing any moral message	1	2.63	2.63
suggesting solution	1	2.63	2.63
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
requirement of urgent action	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00

human example or human face for the issue	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-win	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	38	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	38	100.00	-




CGTN - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement after US withdrawal)

Euronews - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	32	58.18	58.18
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	20	36.36	36.36
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	13	23.64	23.64
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	7	12.73	12.73
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	6	10.91	10.91
requirement of urgent action	5	9.09	9.09
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	5	9.09	9.09
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	5	9.09	9.09
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	4	7.27	7.27
suggesting solution	3	5.45	5.45
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	3	5.45	5.45
human example or human face for the issue	3	5.45	5.45
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	3	5.45	5.45
containing any moral message	2	3.64	3.64
only winner(s) or loser(s)	2	3.64	3.64
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	1	1.82	1.82

containing visual information to generate feelings	1	1.82	1.82
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	1	1.82	1.82
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	0	0.00	0.00
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-win	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	55	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	55	100.00	-




Euronews - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement before US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	15	44.12	44.12
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	14	41.18	41.18
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	6	17.65	17.65
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	5	14.71	14.71
requirement of urgent action	5	14.71	14.71
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	4	11.76	11.76

human example or human face for the issue	3	8.82	8.82
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	2	5.88	5.88
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	2	5.88	5.88
suggesting solution	2	5.88	5.88
only winner(s) or loser(s)	1	2.94	2.94
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	1	2.94	2.94
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	1	2.94	2.94
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-win	0	0.00	0.00
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	0	0.00	0.00
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	0	0.00	0.00
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	0	0.00	0.00
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	0	0.00	0.00
containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
containing any moral message	0	0.00	0.00
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00

referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	34	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	34	100.00	-




Euronews - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement after US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	180	93.75	93.75
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	176	91.67	91.67

referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	160	83.33	83.33
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	94	48.96	48.96
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	80	41.67	41.67
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	67	34.90	34.90
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	39	20.31	20.31
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	35	18.23	18.23
suggesting solution	9	4.69	4.69
containing any moral message	9	4.69	4.69
win-lose	7	3.65	3.65
lose-lose	7	3.65	3.65
win-win	6	3.13	3.13
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	6	3.13	3.13
requirement of urgent action	6	3.13	3.13
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	4	2.08	2.08
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	4	2.08	2.08
only winner(s) or loser(s)	3	1.56	1.56
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	2	1.04	1.04
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	1	0.52	0.52
human example or human face for the issue	1	0.52	0.52

containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	192	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	192	100.00	-




Euronews - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement after US withdrawal)

Press TV - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	9	75.00	75.00
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	7	58.33	58.33
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	6	50.00	50.00
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	4	33.33	33.33
human example or human face for the issue	3	25.00	25.00
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	2	16.67	16.67
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	1	8.33	8.33
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	1	8.33	8.33
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	1	8.33	8.33
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	1	8.33	8.33
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	1	8.33	8.33
only winner(s) or loser(s)	0	0.00	0.00
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-win	0	0.00	0.00
requirement of urgent action	0	0.00	0.00

suggesting solution	0	0.00	0.00
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	0	0.00	0.00
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	0	0.00	0.00
containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
containing any moral message	0	0.00	0.00
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	12	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	12	100.00	-




Press TV - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement before US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
reflecting disagreements between actors	4	66.67	66.67
human example or human face for the issue	3	50.00	50.00
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	2	33.33	33.33
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	1	16.67	16.67
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	1	16.67	16.67
requirement of urgent action	0	0.00	0.00

suggesting solution	0	0.00	0.00
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
only winner(s) or loser(s)	0	0.00	0.00
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-win	0	0.00	0.00
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	0	0.00	0.00
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	0	0.00	0.00
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	0	0.00	0.00
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	0	0.00	0.00
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	0	0.00	0.00
containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	0	0.00	0.00
going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
containing any moral message	0	0.00	0.00
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	0	0.00	0.00

referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	6	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	6	100.00	-




Press TV - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement after US withdrawal)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
the authority(s) is responsible for the issue/problem	6	100.00	100.00
referring to two or more than two side's positions/views	5	83.33	83.33

reflecting disagreements between actors	5	83.33	83.33
political consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	4	66.67	66.67
reproaching parties-ind.s-groups to another	2	33.33	33.33
ind. groups, organizations in society are able to alleviate	1	16.67	16.67
mentioning of financial losses or gains now or in the future	1	16.67	16.67
emphasizing on how ind.s or groups are affected	1	16.67	16.67
the authority(s) is able to alleviate the problem	0	0.00	0.00
referring to winners or losers	0	0.00	0.00
only winner(s) or loser(s)	0	0.00	0.00
lose-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-lose	0	0.00	0.00
win-win	0	0.00	0.00
ind. groups, organizations in society are responsible for issue	0	0.00	0.00
requirement of urgent action	0	0.00	0.00
economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing an action	0	0.00	0.00
suggesting solution	0	0.00	0.00
mentioning of the costs/degree of expense involved	0	0.00	0.00
employing adjectives to generate personal feelings	0	0.00	0.00
containing visual information to generate feelings	0	0.00	0.00

going to private or personal life of actors	0	0.00	0.00
human example or human face for the issue	0	0.00	0.00
containing any moral message	0	0.00	0.00
offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave	0	0.00	0.00
referring to morality, God, religious, or ideologies	0	0.00	0.00
DOCUMENTS with code(s)	6	100.00	100.00
DOCUMENTS without code(s)	0	0.00	-
ANALYZED DOCUMENTS	6	100.00	-



Press TV - Documents with code (Paris climate agreement after US withdrawal)