



**THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

FRANCE'S INTERVENTION ON IVORY COAST (2002-2011): A CASE OF NEO-COLONIALISM

Master's Thesis

Mohamed Mahfouz AKADIRY NZAMBA

Political Sciences

April 2023



**THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

FRANCE’S INTERVENTION ON IVORY COAST (2002-2011): A CASE OF NEO-COLONIALISM

Master’s Thesis

Mohamed Mahfouz AKADIRY NZAMBA

Asst. Prof. Dr. Filiz Tutku AYDIN BEZİKOĞLU

Political Sciences

April 2023

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank the Almighty God for giving me the inspiration and strength to see the end of the tunnel.

I would like also to thank my family and most especially my beloved wife who supported me endlessly and fueling me the courage and determination I needed to achieve this thesis.

And special thanks to my dear adviser, Asst. Prof. Dr. Filiz Tutku Aydin Bezikoglu, for her priceless advices and guidance during the writing of this thesis, that I would always be grateful for accepting me as one of her students.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vi
LIST OF TABLES	vii
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Research Question	3
1.2. Main Argument	4
1.3. Method	5
1.4. Limitations of the Thesis	6
1.5. Plan of the Thesis	6
CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: COLONIALISM, POST-COLONIALISM AND MILITARY CONFLICTS IN AFRICA	7
2.1. French Rule in Colonized Africa	7
2.2. France's African Policy in the Post-Colonial Period	9
2.3. The Economic Dependence of Francophone Africa in the Post-Colonial Period	11
2.4. The Absence of Sovereignty and True Democracy in French-Speaking Africa in the Post-Colonial Era	15
2.5. The Crisis of Governance in Post-Colonial French-Speaking Africa	17
2.6. The Social and Political Classes and Weak Nationalism in Francophone Africa	18
2.7. The Military Conflicts in Post-Colonial Africa	20
CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: MILITARY INTERVENTION AS A FORM OF NEOCOLONIALISM	27
3.1. Definition of Military Intervention	27
3.2. International Intervention in International Law	28
3.3. Literature Review on French Intervention in Africa	29
3.4. Ethics and Politics of Intervention	31
3.5. French Neocolonialism in the Framework of Political Economy	35
3.6. Cultural Politics of French Neocolonialism	37

3.6.1. Françafrique as a Tool of Neocolonialism.....	38
3.6.2. The Problem of CFA Franc.....	40
3.6.3. Exploitation of National Resources	43
3.6.4. Political and Military Agreements	44
3.6.5. The Presence of the French Military in Ivory Coast and Francophone Africa	46
3.6.6. Interfering in Politics Through the Françafrique Organization	50
3.6.7. Cause of Continuation of Neocolonialism: The Armed Interventions	54
3.6.8. Cause of Continuation of Neocolonialism: The Role of the Elites.....	55
3.6.9. Cause of Continuation of Neocolonialism: The Ethnical and Regional Divide of the Population Through the Concept of Ivoirité.....	56
3.6.10. Cause of Continuation of Colonialism: The Economic Benefits of Ivory Coast for France.....	59
3.6.11. The role of Local Leaders in Facilitating French Neocolonialism	62
3.6.12. International Community's Support vis à vis French Hegemonic Behaviour.....	63
CHAPTER 4: THE CASES OF FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN IVORY COAST: 2002 COUP ATTEMPT AND 2010 POST-ELECTORAL CONFLICT	65
4.1. The Case of the 2002 Coup Attempt.....	65
4.2. The Case of 2010 Post-Electoral Conflict.....	68
4.3. France's use of Military Agreements as a Legitimation for Both Interventions.....	70
4.4. France Obtaining Advantages in Post-Crisis Politico-Military Relations Between Ivory Coast and the Former French Colonial Power Due to Interventions	71
4.5. The Strengthening of the Military Dependence of Ivory Coast on France in the Post-Intervention Period	74
4.6. The Deepening of Economic Dependence of Ivory Coast to France	75
4.7. The Reform of French-Ivorian Relations: A Necessity	76
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.....	78
5.1. Paternalism as the French Traditional Foreign Policy Tradition in Africa.....	78
5.2. The African leaders' Instrumentalization in Perpetuating Neocolonialism.....	79
REFERENCES.....	84

ABSTRACT

A decade of crises has seen France's permanent and multifaceted interferences in the Ivory Coast, which it considers the showcase of Françafrique and the remainder of its neocolonial power. We want to investigate the causes, nature and consequences of French intervention, why it creates an anti-French backlash in society and whether it contributes to conflict resolution in the country. We will also explore how the Ivory Coast-France relationship can be reshaped. After conducting a case study of French intervention in the Ivory Coast between 2000 and 2011 and drawing comparisons from other French interventionisms, we have found that France interferes on behalf of its own economic and geostrategic interests under its strategy of maintaining domination in the former colonies. French intervention neither resolves nor transforms conflict nor contributes democratization and sustainable development of these countries, perpetuating neocolonial dependence on France. We suggest that the international community must not endorse French intervention. A multinational organization must intervene if necessary, and the French role in former colonies must be limited to soft power rather than hard power.

Keywords: Intervention, International Intervention, Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism, Paternalism, Françafrique, Civil conflict, Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty, Occupation, International Law, Dependency.

ÖZET

FRANSA'NIN FİLDİŞİ SAHİLİ MÜDAHALESİ (2002-2011): BİR YENİ SÖMÜRGEÇİLİK ÖRNEĞİ

Son yarım asır, Fransa'nın, Françafrique'in vitrini ve yeni sömürgeci gücünün geri kalanı olarak gördüğü Fildişi Sahili'ne kalıcı ve çok yönlü müdahalelerine tanık oldu. Bu çalışmadan, Fransız müdahalesinin nedenlerini, doğasını ve sonuçlarını, neden toplumda Fransız karşıtı bir tepki yarattığını ve ülkedeki çatışmaların çözümüne gerçekten katkıda bulunup bulunmadığını araştırılmakta ve Fildişi Sahili-Fransa ilişkisinin nasıl yeniden şekillenebileceğini de sorgulamayı hedeflenmektedir. Bu amaçla, 2000 ve 2011 yılları arasında Fildişi Sahili'ndeki Fransız müdahalesi vakası Fransa'nın diğer müdahaleleriyle yer yer karşılaştırmalar da yapılarak çalışılmıştır. Bu tezde Fransa'nın Fildişi Sahili özelinde ama diğer Afrika ülkelerine genellenebilecek şekilde kendi ekonomik ve jeostratejik çıkarları adına ve kendi hakimiyetini sürdürme stratejisine uygun olarak eski sömürgelerine müdahale ettiğini savunulmaktadır. Fransa'nın Afrika'daki askeri çatışmaları çözmediği ya da dönüştürmediği gibi, Fransa'ya neokolonyal bağımlılığı perçinleyen ve bu ülkelerin demokratikleşmesine ve sürdürülebilir kalkınmasına da olumsuz yönde etki eden bir politika izlediği tespit edilmiştir. Fransız müdahalesinin uluslararası toplum tarafından onaylanmaması gerektiğini öneriyoruz. Bu sebeple, Afrika'daki çatışmalara Fransa'nın rolünün sert güç yerine yumuşak güçle sınırlandırılması ve gerekirse çok uluslu bir örgütün çatışmalara müdahale etmesinin daha yerinde olacağının altı çizilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler : Müdahale, Uluslararası Müdahale, Sömürgecilik, Neo Sömürgecilik, Paternalizm, Françafrique, İç Kargaşa, Toprak Bütünlüğü, Egemenlik, İşgal, Uluslararası Hukuk, Bağımlılık.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFD	: Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency)
AIMF	: Association Internationale des Maires Francophones
APO	: Accord de paix de Ouagadougou (Ouagadougou Peace Agreement)
AUF	: Agence Universitaire Francophone
BEAC	: Banque des États de l'Afrique centrale (Bank of Central African States)
BECAO	: The Central Bank of West African States is an international public institution bringing together eight West African countries members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union. The monetary union is the CFA Franc
C2D	: Debt Reduction and Development Contract
CEDEAO (ECOWAS)	: The Economic Community of West African States is a West African intergovernmental organization created on May 28, 1975. It is the main structure intended to coordinate the actions of West African countries
CFA Franc	: The CFA franc, officially the franc of the African Financial Community, is the name of two common currencies, a vestige of French colonization and used by 14 African countries, part of the franc zone. Originally stood for “Colonies Françaises Africaines”
FAO	: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFCI	: Republican Forces of France
FORCES NOUVELLES	: Former rebels from northern Cote d'Ivoire converted into a political party
FRCI	: Republican Forces of Ivory Coast
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
ODA	: Official Development Assistance
OHCHR	: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPA	: Ouagadougou Peace Agreement.
UN	: United Nations
WB	: World Bank

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: French and British Interventions in Former African Colonies, 1960-2013.....	2
Table 1: Main macro-economic indicators of sub-Saharan Africa	24
Table 1: The primary tool of the French neo-colonial system	38
Table 1: The secondary tool of the French neo-colonial system	38
Table 1: French Military Defense Pacts with African Countries	45
Table 1: The main French Military Interventions in Africa since 1960	49



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Francophone Africa Map	40
Figure 1: CFA Franc zone	41
Figure 1: The French Military Presence in Africa, 2012	48
Figure 1: Dynamics of Ivorian economic growth from 1961-1978	61
Figure 1: Ivorian cocoa exports rate in 1938.....	62



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The socio-political history of Africa has always been punctuated by foreign interference, particularly that of the former colonial powers, because of the colonial history that binds them. Unfortunately, Ivory Coast today presents itself as one of the victims of these interferences, which upset its political and economic stability and made it a reference in terms of development in the 1980s in Africa.

Just after decolonization, the Ivory Coast experienced economic prosperity, called the "Ivorian miracle" due to its cocoa and coffee production and well-connected transportation system and harbours that were developed admittedly due to French colonialism. From the beginning of the 1980s, Ivory Coast entered into an economic crisis caused by the fall in the prices of cocoa and coffee on the international markets, which later turned into a major political crisis that dissolved the former peace between ethnic communities in the Ivory Coast. On September 19, 2002, deserting soldiers from the Ivorian army, refugees in Burkina Faso invaded Ivory Coast by besieging 60% of the national territory led by Guillaume Soro, a Christian civilian from the north of the country. A form of identity conflict between those said to be native Ivorians (indigenous) and those who have acquired Ivorian nationality emerged. After eight years of fighting and negotiations under the mediation of France, the presidential election was organized in October 2010, which was intended to put a definitive end to the crisis; on the contrary, exacerbated tensions and plunged the country once again into a deadly conflict. Consequently, France, with the complicity of the United Nations, after overthrowing, by force of arms, the regime of President Laurent Gbagbo on April 11, 2011, ended up installing Alassane Ouattara in power, just as former President Félix Houphouët-Boigny was installed by Charles De Gaulle.

The precarious situation of Africa and more particularly of French-speaking Africa raises many questions related to civil wars, politico-military crises, dictatorships, leading to almost all cases to poverty, famine, the breakdown of institutions and deficiencies in economic and social development. These conflicts draw their strength from identity disputes, the weakness of state institutions, and the failure of political and social classes which are vying for control of the apparatus of power. Considering colonial legacy, Africans cannot have the sole responsibility for these politico-military crises in Africa. Despite the "official independence" of African states such as Ivory Coast, the imperialist presence of the former colonial powers remains very strong in all aspects of the life of African countries and peoples. The latter remain

dominated at the favor of the geostrategic, diplomatic, socio-political and economic interests of the former Western colonial powers.

Although the number of French soldiers in Africa has decreased since 1960, the volume and frequency of interventions carried out by French military have not dropped (Luckham,1982,55). As former colonial powers, French have been involved in much more conflicts in Africa than the British did as illustrated below:

Table 1: French and British Interventions in Former African Colonies, 1960-2013

French		British	
Invaded Country	Years	Invaded Country	Years
<i>Mauritania</i>	1958-1963	<i>Uganda</i>	1964
<i>Congo-Brazzaville</i>	1963	<i>Tanganyika</i>	1964
<i>Gabon</i>	1964	<i>Sierra Leone</i>	2000
<i>Chad</i>	1968-1972		
<i>Biafra/Nigeria</i>	1969		
<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	1970		
<i>Mauritania/Western Sahara</i>	1977-78		
<i>Djibouti</i>	1977		
<i>Zaire</i>	1977		
<i>Chad</i>	1978		
<i>CAR</i>	1979		
<i>Niger</i>	1981		
<i>Cameroon</i>	1981		
<i>Chad</i>	1983-84		
<i>Togo</i>	1986		
<i>Chad</i>	1989-2007		
<i>Gulf of Guinea</i>	1990		
<i>Comoros</i>	1990-1989		
<i>Rwanda</i>	1990-93		
<i>Gabon</i>	1990		
<i>Togo</i>	1991		
<i>Benin</i>	1991		
<i>Zaire</i>	1991		
<i>Djibouti</i>	1991		
<i>Djibouti</i>	1992-93		
<i>Zaire</i>	1993		
<i>Cameroon</i>	1994		
<i>Rwanda</i>	1994		
<i>Rwanda</i>	1994		
<i>Comoros</i>	1995		
<i>CAR</i>	1996		
<i>Congo-Brazzaville</i>	1997, March		
<i>Congo-Brazzaville</i>	1997, June		
<i>Congo-Brazzaville</i>	1997, June		
<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	2002-2007		
<i>Chad</i>	2006		
<i>CAR</i>	2006		
<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	2011		
<i>Mali</i>	2013		

French State did not only support many dictatorial regimes, but also French actions amount to crimes against humanity. The most controversial case of French involvement is the situation in Rwanda between 1990-1994, during which the French military forces were actively involved in training the Rwandan army. Subsequent civil war and genocide in the region have led to a negative image for France on the international scene. Another event was the French shootings of the *Licorne* force would have caused 57 Ivorian civilian victims and dozens of wounded, according to official figures during the events of the Ivorian hotel in November 2004. Even when we think French interventions decreased compared to the 1980s, conflict resolution in Ivory Coast arguably demonstrated "hybrid operations" in which a former colonial power played a role in both exacerbating and then waiting too long in order to be invited to have the legitimacy of military operation in the eyes of the regional and international actors. Despite the pledges of many French presidents that France will retract, in 2013, during the François Hollande term, a military operation took place in Mali, which was preceded by interventions in Libya during the mandate of Nicolas Sarkozy as President. There are still more than 3,000 French soldiers in the Sahel. Therefore, French military presence is still a substantial reality in Africa. While American and Russian interventionism has been under scrutiny, perhaps French interventionism has not been equally so. This thesis is an effort towards filling this gap.

Despite many interventions in France in the crises, why does not violence and conflict cease in Western Africa? Why is former British Africa, with which Britain does not often interfere, more peaceful than French Africa? Given the increasingly heightened demands of civil society in Ivory Coast and in French-speaking Africa for more development, good governance and more freedom and sovereignty vis-à-vis the former French colonial power, it is appropriate to question the future of post-colonial political practices and norms, including the multifaceted interferences carried out in French-speaking Africa by the former French colonial tutor. In this thesis, we would like to investigate the causes and consequences of French interventions.

1.1. Research Question

We aim to answer the following questions in this thesis:

- (i) Why does France interfere in political crises in Ivory Coast militarily? How can we characterize and understand French intervention in Ivory Coast? Can the French interventions in Africa, specifically the Ivory Coast, be considered neocolonialism?
- (ii) What are the military, political and economic consequences of French interventionism for the Ivory Coast? Does France's interference facilitate the

resolution of political crises or exacerbate them? Why do these interventions create resentment in the native population?

- (iii) How can the partnership between France and Ivory Coast and other African former French colonies be reshaped and reimagined?

1.2. Main Argument

The thesis argues that

- (i) France interferes on behalf of its own economic and geostrategic interests and supports primarily non-democratic military and political leaders and elites of the countries in conflict who want to take over or stay in power continually in return for a guarantee for the supply of raw materials. These interventions are facilitated by the colonial legacy representing substantial leverage favouring France in maintaining domination in the former colonies. The African armies' military dependency, particularly that of Ivory Coast, whose foundations were erected by the pre-colonial and colonial agreements, appear today as unfavourable from the view of sovereignty and democracy required by each independent State for its sustainable development. We suggest that there is a strong connection between French interventionism and neo-colonialism because of political interference, economic influence, financial dependence, military presence and cultural hegemony (based on *Francophonie*).
- (ii) Secondly, we argue that France creates or exacerbates conflict rather than resolves them due to its need to maintain hegemony. French interventions are made normatively acceptable by disguising their neocolonialism under the pretension of multilateralism. The French state forces other countries to comply with its intervention exacerbating the violent situation. These undemocratic interventions were facilitated by traditional paternalistic policy towards Africa, the elitist nature of both African and French political systems, and corrupt inter-elite networks like *Françafrique*. France's interventions decelerate both nation and state-building processes, democratization and governance in these countries, creating resentment in the Ivory Coast.
- (iii) Future military intervention in African conflicts must be considered within the specific historical context of conflict in order not to cause new problems that perpetuate conflict. The international community cannot rely on former colonial

powers to carry out military interventions but instead must resolve the conflicts through an organization, preferably an African organization.

In addition, the Ivorian economy, which is dependent on international and mainly French aid, needs structural reforms to be sovereign and robust to avoid potential foreign interventions.

1.3. Method

For this thesis, a case study of French military intervention in the 2002-2011 political crises of the Ivory Coast was conducted to develop an in-depth understanding of the conflict. As French military interventions on the continent, one can better comprehend the forms of colonial legacies that influence French decision-making by using the lens of Ivory Coast, knowing that two of the more notable interventions throughout the past twenty years occurred in this French African State. Ivory Coast also represents the face of the "Françafrique" settled to preserve French interests in Francophone Africa. More than any other Francophone nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ivory Coast caught France's attention due to its close post-colonial ties, beyond rhetoric about safeguarding democracy, promoting development or preventing humanitarian catastrophes. Colonial legacies provided France with vital interests in Ivory Coast that were impossible to ignore when challenged.

France relies on Ivory Coast to reinforce its African policy in Africa. It is also the country where the term *Françafrique* was born as an underground organization to serve African and French elites. French considers it an African country where the French colonial administration was a success due to its economic prowess. The conflicts in Ivory Coast are also relevant because French intervention caused strong French anti-sentiment. Because of this illustrative value, we chose to focus on this case.

We conducted a documental and historical analysis by scrutinizing historical documents linking French Africa and France, military and politicians statements in France and Ivory Coast, statistical reports, media and second-hand literature in English, French and Turkish. We employed content analysis to analyze the presence, significance, and connections of critical documents, themes, and concepts. Our methodology helped present a detailed Ivory Coast case history.

Our previous observations and experiences in Ivory Coast also contribute to understanding the topic from an insider's point of view. Although the generalizability of case studies is limited, we drew many comparisons with other African countries colonized by the French. It attempted to solve the problem raised with the possibility of generalizing the case.

1.4. Limitations of the Thesis

Due to the lack of financial resources, we could not conduct interviews or participant observation in Ivory Coast. However, state websites, NGO reports, media, and our previous observation of this country offered the capacity to compensate for the lack of interviews.

1.5. Plan of the Thesis

Our thesis is structured into four major parts. First, in Chapter 2, the political structure of post-colonial Africa and Ivory Coast is explained with a focus on the legacy of colonialism, post-colonialism and domestic and external causes of the political and military crises in French Africa and Ivory Coast.

The second part deals with the conceptual framework by looking at how French military interventions are explained in international relations and comparative politics literature and developing an empirical explanation of how multifaceted aspects of (neo)colonialism lead to military intervention.

The third part analyzes French military interventions from 2002 to 2011 in Ivory Coast. It emphasizes how Ivorian dependency and French neocolonialism influenced the exacerbation of the conflict and the lack of positive peace as violence ended. As a result, however, the country's democracy, governance and independence took a hit.

In conclusion, this thesis reveals the primary outcomes of French interventions in France and the Ivory Coast regarding politics, economics and military. It then explores alternative means of cooperation devoid of vestiges of neo-colonialism.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: COLONIALISM, POST-COLONIALISM AND MILITARY CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

2.1. French Rule in Colonized Africa

Unlike other states, the relations of France with Africa, which started during colonialism, have been maintained till today without interruption in its sphere of influence, so-called *pré carré* under the form of post-colonialism. Since the 1600s, the French have been present in West Africa, most notably in Senegal, where a critical port was used to transport enslaved people to the New World (Mulayim, 2017). The industrial revolution created a need for raw materials, a workforce, and new markets in the European world. Consequently, the leading European states such as France, Britain and Germany decided to hold a conference in 1884 to lead upon colonization of African territories to rule them as colonial empires. As a result, by 1900, Europeans led under direct control more than 90% of the African continent against only 10% at the end of the 1870s. Therefore, with the scramble for Africa, around 16 countries are considered former French African colonies today, but those countries still have strong relations with France for various reasons (Mulayim, 2017). British African colonies also significantly stretched from Cairo to Cape and Nigeria to Kenya.

Both France and Britain had distinct approaches to the colonial empire. For the French, the colonial administration was characterized by a centralized, standardized, and dirigiste system based on direct rule. It was a hybrid combination of traders, planters, and missionaries. French colonial Power had a vague plan to colonize its territories since its colonial administration was varied throughout regions with the only ambition to assimilate colonial people forcing them to put aside their local traditions and values. On the ideological level, the French Revolution in 1789 catalyzed to export of French ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. This move was an imperial way to root and foster French assimilation in their respective colonies (Bade, 2013).

In contrast to French colonization, British efforts were concentrated primarily on settler colonies with a Christian moral aim. Behind this approach, the British empire in Africa was focused on indirect rule towards a mix of mercantile and strategic interests driven by

paternalism that was frequently more words from London than deeds carried out by local settlers or indigenous who did not need lofty ideals. For imperial theorists like John Stuart Mill, British liberalism was vital to instilling British civilization among colonies through capitalism and moral progress. Moreover, to do so, it was necessary to maintain colonized territories under the influence of Christianity as means of subjugation of people (Bade,2013).

The policy of indirect rule can be defined as a colonial system of government exercised in the British African and Indian Empires. The primary feature of this form of British colonial domination resided in imposing tribal chiefs to rule the subject population instead of administering directly to the colonies. Even if the entire British colonies were not under indirect rule like in Northern America, most British colonies were administered and dominated by proxy (Simpson,2011). The British vision of colonialism in Africa was not only economic but also to establish local self-administering centres since the final goal was to set up local self-governments indirectly managed by Britain (Murray,1973). In colonial Nigeria, for example, being faced with a complex set of traditions and native customs, the British colonists had two alternatives. Either practising indirect rule where some Nigerians would be appointed as chiefs and expected to inform their tribe of the reforms proposed by the colonists, or direct rule that included military force to achieve the objective through brutality and strict restrictions.

British colonists saw an indirect rule policy as a more effective way to maintain their domination without trying to abolish local traditions since one of their people was interacting with tribal chiefs. This also resolved the language problem, which would be a barrier for the colonists (Babu & Chaudhary, 2022). Therefore, "The Dual Mandate" in British Tropical Africa, written by Lord Frederick Lugard, who served as the governor of Hong Kong and later Nigeria, established Curzon's administration concepts. He popularized "indirect rule," which was based on the notion that Britain had not the ability or will to directly administer its vast possessions and required a workable substitute in the Muslim parts of northern Nigeria. Similar to the princely system of government in India, Lugard based British authority on the legitimacy of the local people by using chiefs to run local affairs. He argued that Africans should be permitted to rule themselves inside the British system rather than trying to make them European like the French did through assimilation.

In contrast to the British, the French did not respect native customs and then regarded native leaders as direct representatives of the French State. Furthermore, the French were adamant about assimilating colonial peoples into their legal system and believed Roman law could be applied wherever they settled as colonizers (Bade,2013). However, over time, this French approach was revealed to be a mistake judging by today's growing anti-French sentiment

throughout many African countries where African awareness vis-à-vis French historical deeds in Africa is becoming increasingly fervent.

The age-old tactic of "divide and rule" and balkanization reflected paternalism of French policy in Africa. According to Kwame Nkrumah, post-colonial Africa is founded on "splitting up former major united colonial holdings into a series of little non-viable republics, which are incapable of independent growth. Hence, Western foreign policy and especially France's foreign policy contributed to the "Balkanisation" in Africa in order to maintain their dominance by infusing into African consciousness the fact that African states are not mature enough and robust to govern themselves so they need a state like France to become developed and enlightened states (Martin,1985, p.191).

2.2. France's African Policy in the Post-Colonial Period

Years after African independencies, former colonial powers are still present on the continent, but this is much more true for the case of France than Britain. France does preserve a close tie with its former colonies in political, military, economic and financial areas, while Britain only does uphold economic and financial ties (Haag,2011). Although the presence of the two former colonial powers is unequal, they both continue to have economic, political, financial, and advisory roles. France substantially exerts direct control around the monetary system settled during colonialism. At the same time, Britain lays on its post-colonial infrastructures and accounting profession by letting the United States take the lead through the Breton Woods international financial institutions. Conceptually, the British strategy is described as soft-neo-colonialism, while the French strategy is described as coercive-neo-colonialism (Lassou et al.,2019). For France, this link with former colonies was essential because of the necessity to be fueled with resources and maintain a specific world-class leadership, even to the detriment of those colonies. France never wanted to relinquish her dominance in the area throughout the colonial era, even more today in the context of post-colonialism.

The nation-liberation movements in the 1960s in Africa granted a semblance of autonomy to the newly independent countries to manage their states. Nevertheless, the historical events proved that these independencies were simply a deceit settled by the former French colonial Power. France's desire to keep close ties with its former colonies in Africa led to geopolitics in the post-colonialism area, allowing France to influence its former colonies strongly. France could not quit its *"pré carré africain"* which would mean losing its privileged position in world politics. President François Mitterrand spoke about the relationship between

France and Africa and declared that "Without Africa, there would be no history in France in the 21st century", which only serves as evidence that French political elites today understand the value of preserving close ties with African nations (Krupova, & Cech, 2020, 291-317). In this regard, *neocolonialism* may be defined as a modernized version of classical colonialism; it focuses on the strategies used by the former colonial powers in their interactions with the former colonies that have become independent states. Through such strategies, the former colonial powers kept political and economic ties to preserve, perpetuate, and re-establish some influence over their former territories. As a result, the new states have legal and political sovereignty but are still heavily dependent on the previous metropolitan Power in terms of economy, finance, and defence.

On the eve of independencies, General De Gaulle, the first President under the Fifth Republic, engaged himself on an African tour to explain the merits of establishing a Franco-African community. According to De Gaulle, this community stands for the betterment of human beings and Franco-African relations. Nevertheless, many scholars and leaders saw in his speech a manifest willingness to maintain former colonies under France's dominance through an official but deceitful discourse of community of interests and everyday tasks (Harshe, 1980). Since then, several African leaders such as Leopold Senghor, Houphouët Roigny, Gabriel Lisette and Philibert Tsiranana applauded this approach. The community became an instrument of colonial Power in a new form to preserve the French strategic geopolitical interests in its "*pré carré français*". The leadership that emerged in French Africa recognized French leadership and institutions that France supported, such as the French Union or French Community. In most nations, the desire for independence from France was covert and not overt. Decolonization revealed the remains of assimilation and association, which were policies of economic exploitation, political and military control of the French colonies in Africa and principles on which the governance of the French colonial empire was based. As a result, the African subjects desired to adopt French customs, become French citizens and participate in metropolitan politics. Because of this, the French and African leaders created a political, military, and economic cooperation network between France and the African governments during the transition of Power, which one later named the *françafrique* network. This new form of relation symbolized the continuation of Franco-African relations and that of the colonial era as neocolonialism in a more sophisticated form (Harshe, 1980).

French neocolonialism, by taking a new appearance aimed at camouflaging neocolonialism in French Black Africa, whose advocator was De Gaulle. He was brought back to Power in 1958. He received assistance from France's militarist and capitalist establishment's

most conservative members to promote and maintain French financial interests in the future former French colonies. It was essential to locate a historical figure with a spotless reputation in Black Africa (Wauthier,1972,p.23). This quiet operation of disguise led to the implementation of neocolonial vestiges such as the CFA Franc. Subsequently, France's African allies in the French franc zone were never consulted in matters of real significance. In 1969, when Paris devalued the franc by 12.5%, the related decision was made without prior notice. All of the zone's African members were required to depreciate the CFA franc.

This situation was a great sign of the continuation of the French colonial and imperialist approach (Wauthier, 1972, p. 24). Moreover, the Gaullist legacy of neo-colonialism is rooted in political and socio-economic arrangements between France and its post-colonial periphery. By sending a sizable number of cooperators, technical assistance and pro-consuls to Africa, France aimed to create a complex network that would be difficult for any African nation to escape. As a result, after the 1960s, the metropolitan Power did not disengage from some areas of influence as expected; instead, we saw significant growth in its economic solidification and in the restructuring of the periphery economies to serve its own interests (Joseph,1976, pp. 4-13).

Over the last few years, French interventionism in Africa has seen a decline on the African continent. This fall is firstly explained by President Chirac's decision in 1996 to reduce military personnel in foreign operations and to concentrate more on interventions with higher economic and geostrategic stakes for France. There was also the French government's will to reduce the army's budget for domestic affairs. Secondly, the imperatives of democratization in French Africa in the 1990s were promoted by France to symbolize the image of a State of freedom and justice in former colonies. Lastly, the imperatives of multilateralism were also one of the causes of the French intervention's decline. It was notably displayed because of the Rwanda genocide, in which France was involved, and its image was seriously tarnished across Africa (Vallin, 2015, pp. 79-91).

Despite this decline, French interventions in Africa never disappeared. Instead, they were framed under the UN and European mandates. This allowed France to continue playing a decisive role in African conflicts in recent years, such as in Ivory Coast, Lybia, Mali and Central African Republic (Vallin,2015, pp. 95-96).

2.3. The Economic Dependence of Francophone Africa in the Post-Colonial Period

Economic dependence is one of the leading causes of foreign interference in francophone Africa, mainly French interference in the vast majority of African states. This is

due to ineffective national economic development strategies and economic policies imposed by the international community (the Breton Woods institutions: IMF, WB) and foreign powers such as France, whose influence is profound, particularly in French-speaking states such as Ivory Coast.

For example, foreign powers make and control policies to improve the productivity, processing, marketing, and distribution of African products on the continent and the international market (Hugon, 2006, pp. 37-38). Additionally, there is demanding access to capital markets for reasons of insolvency of African countries, which is a situation created by foreign powers themselves to limit their negotiating Power (Dadzie, 1988, p. 647).

Similarly, Western protectionism is an unequal and harmful system for the States of French-speaking Africa. It presents itself in three practical aspects: The non-respect of international agreements by foreign powers concerning the stabilization of the prices of natural resources; the high rates of taxes imposed on mineral and petroleum products; and finally, the tariffs of exorbitant customs duties on products from African countries for Europe (Dadzie, 1988, p. 648). These restrictive barriers make these African States economically dependent and, therefore, vulnerable to foreign interference, particularly that of France, which remains one of the leading donors to the countries of French Africa. Moreover, since these States very often find themselves in debt or without financial means to finance their development programs, France very often represents their source of financing for them. Such practices thus maintain these countries' systemic dependence, preventing them from promoting research and development activities, improving productivity, diversifying the economy, and commercializing (Dadzie, 1988, p. 650).

Additionally, *Franafrigue* as a system governing post-colonial Franco-African relations has made it possible to strengthen the mechanisms of economic dependence, in particular with the establishment of the CFA Franc, making the African countries of the French-speaking zone extremely dependent and economically dominated by the decisions of the French authorities. Knowing that currency is a factor of sovereignty and independence, the CFA franc presents itself as a currency of enslavement and exploitation since France, which owns it, has the right to decide on the monetary and economic policies to be undertaken in French-speaking African countries (Agbohohou, 2000, pp. 13-14). Thanks to unfavourable monetary strategies vis-à-vis African countries, France ensures its influence and influence in Africa (Agbohohou, 2000, p. 17). Finally, it should be noted that in international economic conditions, African States do not have the means of negotiation to stabilize their internal markets. As McGowan and Smith describe it, this dependence presents as "an asymmetrical system in the form of a relationship

of domination and exploitation... "(McGowan & Smith, 1978, pp. 179-180). Thus, all these injustices are potential triggers that lead to societal crises.

Foreign aid as a factor perpetuating African dependence

Upon gaining independence, Official Development Assistance (ODA) was institutionalized by the most industrialized countries to help underdeveloped countries, in other words, "the former colonies", to finance their development. The objectives of this aid mechanism were to strengthen public development policies and clean up the Francophone States' public finances in Africa. However, the mechanisms for allocating and managing this aid need more transparency, which is the subject of much criticism for its inefficiency in African economies (Bigot, 2015). This ineffectiveness of ODA is characterized by several essential elements marked below, which affect the countries of the Francophone zone of Africa:

- ⊗ A tool for enriching national and international leaders and civil servants to the detriment of meeting the real needs of African populations.
- ⊗ An instrument of pseudo-international solidarity of domination of France over French-speaking countries in Africa.
- ⊗ A foreign policy tool allowing France to retain influence over its former colonies through political and economic interference.

More clearly, France, a former colonial power, divided its development aid into two parts: Bilateral aid paid directly to the beneficiary country and multilateral aid paid by France to international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN), the European Development Fund (EDF) which then redistributes it to underdeveloped countries, primarily African. However, according to impact studies, this aid is being managed by the opaque diplomacy of the donor countries. They have only contributed for more than fifty years to the imposition of the neo-liberal system in the countries of the South, which did not have the structures necessary to deal with the ravages of capitalism, which has created severe social injustices favouring political, religious and identity divisions (Bigot, 2015). This aid has been "accused of having caused the dilapidation of the education and health systems, the overexploitation of natural resources to export abroad, the rise in unemployment, Etc. (Verschave, 2008, pp.1-32)." According to the various impacts caused in each French-speaking country in Africa by this situation, cyclical economic, socio-political and politico-military crises broke out to the detriment of the populations.

In addition, it should be noted that public aid for the development from France is granted only to countries representing geostrategic and commercial interests, such as states exporting raw materials, almost all of which are former French colonies. This aims to ensure unlimited supplies (Toussaint, 2004, pp. 1-10). Given all these facts, it should be emphasized that the main objective of public development aid, which is to help these African countries to reduce poverty, is very far from being achieved, judging by the deplorable standard of living of the African populations and the resulting conflicts. Moreover, these aids are not only ineffective and useless but also represent an apparatus of political and economic profits for foreign powers like France, facilitating political and military crises within the African countries of the Francophonie (Verschave, 1998, pp. 6-7). As proof, according to a World Bank report published in 2002, the net contribution of public development aid from industrialized countries to African countries represents only one-tenth of capital outflows from African states to industrialized countries. Besides, in 2000, a joint report by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank indicated that the profits made on development aid enabled France to obtain excellent economic results thanks to the solid presence of its businesses in African countries (Toussaint, 2004,1-10). In the same report, the World Bank specifies that 45% of its disbursements to Africa are made in favour of French companies. In other words, public development aid is simply aided by Western countries to their exporting companies present on African soil.

In this frame it crucial to mention the *Agence Francaise de Developpement* (AFD). A political cooperation financial institution of France which promotes the financing of development. It substantially intervenes in Africa to finance development projects. However, French officials wanted to establish and then maintain a dominant dynamic in Franco-African relations. The colonial empire and a hold on French-speaking Africa were both supposed to be maintained through the use of this financial tool. Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, one of the close-knit African leaders, endorsed this proposal .This justifies that the Ivory Coast is one of the main beneficiaries of aid granted by the AFD in Africa (Meimon, 2007, p.5-7). The public assistance is linked to a political and bilateral development assistance vision that encourages the economic dependency of the developing countries (Cohen et.,2006). The media Canard enchaîné revealed that The French Development Agency (AFD) makes money off the (neo) French colonies, which have been impoverished by authoritarian governments that the French State has long supported (Le blog sam la touch, 2016). It emphasizes the desire of the French rulers to keep the former colonies economically dependent through the loans they obtain from the AFD. The goal would be to keep them from freeing themselves from (neo)colonial power's tutelage (Le blog sam la touch, 2016).

2.4. The Absence of Sovereignty and True Democracy in French-Speaking Africa in the Post-Colonial Era

The African peoples have seen their territories disorganized and despoiled because of the unilateral decisions of an imperialist nature by the countries of the North. This is because the Berlin conference organized by Chancellor Bismarck in February 1885 arbitrarily decided on the territorial division of the continent by the European powers while ignoring the notion of a nation. Thus, this European decision condemned the African territories' different ethnic groups and social and political systems for living together, causing the split of ethnic groups of the exact origins (Boulada, 2017, pp. 4-5).

This sociological and anthropological upheaval, combined with the centralization of Power imported by the colonial administration, caused the disappearance of the decentralized system that prevailed in the African territories. This decentralized system facilitated social cohesion and favoured dialogue in clans and villages to avoid inter-clan and territorial conflicts as much as possible. However, it is clear that the transposition in French-speaking Africa of French-style Western democracy, manifested by centralized and planned management of the State and the economy, did not consider the hierarchical principles that characterized the exercise of African Power in the pre-colonial period. This situation has favoured authoritarian behaviours leading today to crises of alternation of political Power with leaders who drag on in Power as in Congo with Denis Sassou Nguéssou, in Cameroon with Paul Biya, the late Omar Bongo in Gabon or even Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. , the homogeneity of ethnic groups and clans, which ensured peace and stability in the territories deconstructed by the colonizing missions, strongly favoured a destabilization of the social and ethnic foundations of the African territories, which until today provoked armed conflicts and political crises. As the table below shows, before the advent of colonization, many politically and socially organized societies in black Africa worked not only to organize community life but also to resolve community disputes peacefully and fairly. Pre-colonial political systems acting as traditional governments were essentially based on the customs and conventions of indigenous peoples, unanimously accepted for decision-making. In other words, the pre-colonial socio-political power structure was in itself a guarantee of community peace and stability.

The causes of the absence of sovereignty and democracy reflect the existence of diversities and complexities linked to historical and contemporary dynamics. In the case of Francophone Africa, this reality almost always leads to politico-military crises favoured by bad governance and the bankruptcy of the socio-political classes of States in conflict. Historically,

the sovereignty of the countries of French-speaking Africa on the political, social and economic level has been a fiction despite the independence-acquired thanks solely to the will of the former colonial powers except for a few rare countries such as Algeria, which fought against French troops to win its liberation.

The first problem related to the question of the sovereignty of African countries can be summarized through the conditions for granting independence. To obtain their "sovereignty", the future African states of the French-speaking zone signed agreements that imprison them until today, thus making them dependent on the decisions taken by the former colonial powers (Granvaud, 2009, pp. 57-62). For example, these secret agreements often take the form of a technical convention, a cooperation agreement or military assistance. General De Gaulle, having estimated that the former colonies were not ripe to face democracy, set up an emergency aid office to prevent and fight against untimely putschist threats to save the presidents dubbed by France. This office, headed by Jacques Foccart, has put in place texts entitled "Agreements and conventions for the maintenance of order in the African and Malagasy colonies" (Servenay, 2016), which specify the process of the intervention of the French army in the event of an internal or external threat. Among the points contained in these agreements, we can cite a few, such as the right of France to intervene militarily, but has no obligation to do so and only the President of the French Republic is empowered to make this decision. The other point relates to the request of the African Head of State, who expresses the wish for intervention in a dire situation. However, the terms remain sufficiently vague to justify any request for intervention. The last point that one notes in these agreements and seems to us just as important refers to the command of local troops and the use of fire which are transferred to French military officers sent to African countries in conflict (Servaney, 2016).

This secret agreement mechanism makes it possible to understand many slippages that have taken place in Africa. For example, the poorly considered shootings in the Ivorian crowd in 2004, the February 1964 putsch in Gabon, passing through the uninformed military intervention in Rwanda in 1994 or even the fierce repression of the riots of Port-Gentil in Gabon in 1990. This provision provides that the French commanders have full Power to "restore and maintain order", specifying that the local civil authority is the only skill to prescribe the use of arms. In most cases, it uses this provision to serve these personal interests. These binding agreements make it difficult for former colonies that aspire to the necessary renewal and development to consolidate their sovereignty by establishing a true democracy.

The failure to respect democratic values and principles, such as human rights, promising political and economic governance, and the primacy of fair justice, has contributed to degrading institutions' functioning and generating animosities within the populations. Consequently, this absence of democracy and sovereignty manifests itself within African States through corruption, coercion, ethnic and religious discrimination, including the use of force as a mode of governance and the monopolization of Power thanks to the military support brought by foreign powers like France (Verschave, 2008, pp. 11-15). Consequently, when a government is no longer able to fulfil its sovereign responsibilities of access to basic services, maintenance of public order and security for its population, the State is faced with a situation of conflict, that is to say, the political instability that leads to politico-military crises (Ochinya, 2017,1-6).

Since democracy is a universal value, it responds to two essential principles. First, the principle of accepting disagreement or diversity of opinion. Second, there is the principle that all authority (state power) can only be exercised with the majority vote of the people. Knowing that these two principles are not incompatible with the social and political order in a State, there is a permanent violation of these values in African countries and more particularly in French-speaking African States (Boulada, 2017, pp. 4-5). Thus, in a relationship of cause and effect, the aggrieved populations being in a posture of a legitimate claim for more social justice, create chaos which represents an opportunity for separatist and ethnic groups as well as a chance for foreign military interventions (Ochinya, 2017,1-6). In addition, it should be stated that there is no democracy without sovereignty, no sovereignty without nation and no nation without a real state whose populations share the same values, traditions and cultures.

2.5. The Crisis of Governance in Post-Colonial French-Speaking Africa

The crisis of governance is one of the essential factors that lead to socio-political and economic instability and the facilitation of foreign interference in the States of French-speaking Africa. It is a crisis of leadership, which highlights **the permanent fragility** of institutions in African states in the French-speaking area due to the inability to manage, regulate, control, direct, or anticipate the strategies of political and social organizations. All this contributes to a fundamental weakness in governance. This is because, the extreme corruption in the public administration and the security forces, the economic policies unsuited to the real needs of the States and the confiscation of political power, putting aside the national diversities accentuated by the foreign interferences of France are so many explanatory factors that lead to national security issues and politico-military crises. Similarly, particularly in French-speaking Africa, the mode of "centralization" of State power being of an authoritarian and individualistic nature

imported by the French colonizer to the detriment of "decentralization" (a mechanism for the redistribution of roles and development) strongly undermined the codes and rules that existed in traditional African societies of the pre-colonial period (Tegera, 2014, pp.121-123). Because in current African societies, the relationship between the rulers and the ruled has been seriously tested by the non-respect of the rule of law, the permanent violation of democratic rules, and the economic and social precariousness leading to crises of popular confidence, which have highlighted the inability of rulers to govern. Also, the failure to take into account the opinion of the population in the process of developing rules for the organization of society, accentuated by the non-existence of mechanisms for consultation and monitoring of the management of power by the State, undoubtedly represents the causes of the persistence of governance crises in African states. And the consequences are notably the use of violence and national or foreign military interventions against populations claiming their rights (Tegera, 2014, pp.75-81). Thus, the question of sovereignty in African countries arises acutely when the failure of power is noted and when foreign forces take the decisions instead of the rulers of the countries in conflict.

2.6. The Social and Political Classes and Weak Nationalism in Francophone Africa

The situation of socio-political classes in Francophone Africa is deeply linked to the crisis of governance because it is quite simply the result that probably led to a weak nationalism in certain former French colonies. The destruction of the foundations of a state such as political authority, ethnic and religious identities, territories and natural resources looting, either through dysfunctions and internal attacks or through multifaceted foreign interference, gave rise to various failures in those societies (Hugon, 2006, pp.35- 36). It must be understood that, in African societies, communities of individuals belong to different cultural and linguistic sensitivities, each of which corresponds to well-defined ethnic identities with sometimes very different ideologies, interests and objectives. Therefore, when different interests coexist in the same human space, conflicts arise because each ethnic community wants to defend its survival or show its superiority. More clearly, the failure of the social and political classes results from the frontal opposition between the concept of "Nation" and that of the "State" diffused according to Western thought (Tshiyembe, 2002, pp.10-11). The nation is considered here as the set of ethnic identities having the will to live together in respect of differences and sharing power. The State, for its part, is based on centralized management of power without consulting citizens.

Consequently, most African countries, characterized simultaneously by these two models confusing within the political elites, are potential hotbeds of belligerent tensions for the

benefit of separatist groups or rebellions creating sectarian ideologies. Those groups use this loophole to advance their anti-national causes, which benefit France and its Western allies since they find the opportunity to deploy military interventions and interfere in the political sphere of the countries in conflict to maintain their influence. Thus, the instrumentation of ethnic groups to plunder natural resources or take control of political power is an undeniably harmful factor in building a sovereign state on the essential foundations of a national or patriotic feeling. It should be noted that the absence of sovereign states in Francophone Africa gives rise to the inability of countries to manage social order, regulate security forces and provide essential public services to citizens (Tshiyembe, 2002, pp.10-11). In addition, mechanisms for promoting an inclusive mode of citizens in state management entities to prevent inequalities and ethnicity are not encouraged. Therefore, this conjunction of the abovementioned factors leads to politico-military crises known in French-speaking Africa. However, it should also be noted that the system of social and political classes modelled on the colonial-Western model has made it possible to introduce into the African States an institutional and legal apparatus that is binding and difficult to use by contemporary African leaders because of ethnic diversities (Tshiyembe, 2001, pp.10-11). , the colonial political model based on violence, exploitation, exclusion and submission was relayed by the heirs of post-colonization, who were the leaders of French-speaking Africa placed in power by France. Through maintaining this political system, France wants to preserve and guarantee its interests in its former colonies,. The only difference is that one sees no longer France at the forefront, although its involvement is evident. Because the African leaders now use their people as the tools of violence, exploitation and submission bequeathed by the colonizer to benefit France and their particular interests. It is a situation that essentially justifies the bankruptcy of social and political classes that manifests itself in the crisis of institutions, poorly managed electoral processes, coups, ethnic discrimination, corruption and increased dependence on vis-à-vis France and other foreign powers negatively affecting the development of these French-speaking countries (Chevrier, 1975, p.20).

A blame was imputed to the post-colonial African political elites who ruled the newly independent states. Dieth asserts that they were part of the causes of social and political breakdown and fracture in African societies. Because of their acculturation through Western education based on analytical reason, which confers the concept of domination, the power to submit and divide, the African elites have been transformed into agents of the colonial system whose continuity after independence had to be ensured (Dieth, 2012). Thus, instead of being innovators and promoters of a sovereign Francophone Africa based on both traditional African values and modern Western standards of justice, respect for institutions, rights and public

freedoms, they used their Western knowledge to become generators of division, cleavages, disruption of the African social link and conflicts in the service of the former colonial powers. They are forces of repression, stagnation and regression for the African States and peoples to whom they continue to transmit from generation to generation their Western knowledge of domination and exploitation by instrumentalizing the populations through the ethnicization of politics and sectarian manipulation. As a result, this situation prevents a lively and instantaneous nationalism that should fuel every African aspiring to absolute freedom and having the right to make his own choices without any external pressure. Then, this deficit of nationalism in some African countries causes social injustice within the different socio-political groups of States and generates political instability that manifests itself in the use of force and demonstrations of violence that become politico-military crises (Dieth, 2012).

2.7. The Military Conflicts in Post-Colonial Africa

The causes of African conflicts are many and varied, most of them with identical motivations and interests.

Structural Causes of Conflict

According to the strategic-pomological approach supported by Mwayila Tshiyembe and other specialists in international relations, internal armed conflicts in Africa should be considered from three angles of theorization, which are geo-economics, ethnic identities and the Cold War (Tshiyembe, 2002, pp.27-34).

(i) Geoeconomy as a cause of conflict

Concerning the first paradigm, which is the **geo-economy**, was born from the "realistic theory according to which humanity faces the impossibility of satisfying its needs in natural resources, finding its origins in the distribution unequal" (Tshiyembe, 2002, pp.5-23). In other words, this scenario occurs when states without natural resources and can persuade by force are forced to obtain them for survival. Far from constituting a free trade market where commercial relations should be fair and without violence, particularly in French-speaking Africa, a fundamental link was established between natural resources and wars. The growing interest in natural resources because of their usefulness in the process of creating goods and services encouraged Western companies, particularly French ones, to take hold of agricultural and mineral wealth such as coffee, cocoa and timber from the Ivory Coast, uranium from Mali, oil from Gabon and the Congo to cite just a few examples. The main objective was to develop

extractive activities to benefit the former colonial powers and their industries without worrying about the consequences.

When a third state seizes by force the resources of another state or by political interference, this act is considered illegal and is condemned by the charter of the United Nations (United Nations Organization, 1945, p.4). In its article 2 paragraph 4 which says: "The Members of the Organization shall refrain, in their international relations, from resorting to the threat or use of force, either against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations". The victim State, therefore, has the right of self-defence, which generally results in armed conflicts and the political instability of States.

(ii) *Ethnic identities as causes of conflict*

The second paradigm is inherent in ethnic identities. From the historical point of view, it is the struggle against the nation-state model symbolized by Western culture as a legacy of colonization (Tshiyembe, 2002, pp.11-12). It is, in fact, the combination of a civic impulse exacerbated by foreign influences, the disintegration of rural communities, social injustices, the transformation of the socio-political structures of cities, misunderstood or poorly defined values and symbols, as well as individual or collective behaviours affecting progress which are at the origin of ethnic conflicts (Tshiyembe, 2002, pp.11-12).

(iii) *Cold War or proxy wars as a cause of conflict*

The third paradigm is related to the cold war or proxy wars. It is based on the linkage theory (Crump, 2005, pp.2-18) highlighted after the Second World War by the imperialist powers, such as the United States, the USSR, Communist China and France. It aimed to restrict their rivalries in the Third World and particularly in French-speaking and English-speaking Africa. These proxy wars were intended to allow foreign powers not only to access natural resources (economic war) but also to widen the range of ideological alliances (ideological war) (Tshiyembe, 2002, p.10). This is because, conflicts in Africa are almost all strategic-geopolitical wars reflecting the division of the world into two opposing ideological blocs under the impetus of two hegemonic powers: the United States and the USSR. Although Francophone Africa is not the only receptacle of conflicts, the entropy and omnipresence of political-military crises on the continent lead to questions about the role of natural resources and ethnic identities in forming or exacerbating these internal conflicts in Africa. More precisely, the combined use of natural resources, territories and the instrumentalization of ethnic identities is very often perceived by insurgent citizens (rebel groups) against the central State as a means of serving the conquest of power (Luttwak, 1989, p.13) which manifests itself in the formation of an armed

force fueled by divisions and the withdrawal of identity. Moreover, these proxy wars are very often characterized by coups accepted or favoured by the international community (France, the United States, the United Nations Organization), thanks to military interventions and material or political support from non-African foreign powers (Verschave, 1998, pp.6-10).

Thus, several factors contribute to the explosion of conflicts resulting from a foreign influence or an internal social fact. But whatever the type of factors, they generally lead to land expropriation from local communities, forcing them to move in sometimes catastrophic conditions. Among these sulphurous factors, there are, in particular, the social discrimination of a section of the population, the destruction of the means of subsistence and the way of life of the population. Likewise the job promises not kept by the political leaders who seek power, lack of respect for fundamental rights, environmental degradation causing drought and the unequal distribution of state wealth (Luttwak, 2005, p.13).

Conflicts arising from the governance of natural resources result from the "mining syndrome" (Diouf-Mignane, 2007), which set many African countries on fire, such as Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola or Sierra Leone, manifesting political instability due to opaque state management. This instability can begin with a simple popular insurrection to turn into armed conflicts led by separatist groups, as in the case of the OGONI Movement in the River States in Nigeria or that of the Tuareg in northern Mali. In Africa, political instability is also revealed through overthrowing a political regime that no longer serves the interests of foreign powers. A destabilization takes place with the political and logistical support of the latter. The examples of the Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) exist to remind us of this. According to the analysis of several geo-politicians, the regions where poor governance of natural resources prevails suffer the most from politico-military crises. In West Africa, there is a strong presence of French Western power in the crises. This existence is either marked by passive or active engagement or by taking advantage of the chaos caused by these conflicts to consolidate and develop the factors of power of its hegemony.

Proximate causes of conflict in Africa

There are two types of conflict observed in Africa. First, a simple revolt of local populations who feel robbed of their wealth can become an armed revolt with separatist looks, such as the Tuareg movement in northern Mali. The other primary reality put in place by foreign powers, particularly France, is linked to the strategy of destabilising or overthrowing African governments which show signs of autonomy or non-submission (Verschave, 1998, pp.6-21).

The discussions around the causes of politico-military crises in Francophone Africa inevitably suggest two complementary approaches.

(i) Domestic causes of conflict in post-colonial Africa

The main internal factors of these conflicts are essentially linked to the attitudes and human decisions of the political, ethnic or religious leaders of the country in crisis. They are reflected in particular by political, economic and social inequalities, poverty, economic stagnation, poor quality of public services, high unemployment, corruption, nepotism, environmental degradation, and ethnically unequal access to power and resources (Ochinya, 2007, pp.1-3). In other words, the responsibility for states' political, social and economic instability in conflict rests primarily with those who hold power.

Since the accession to independence without absolute sovereignty, the notion of power in Africa, generally, has been based essentially on the "legitimacy of arms" and the support of foreign powers such as France. The lack of the permanent deprivation of political power, state resources, and essential social services constitute, in several cases, the primary source of internal conflicts, for example, in Ivory Coast, Mali or again from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Inequalities within social groups of the same State undoubtedly feed resentment and hatred, which gradually turn into civil war through the instrumentation of religion, ethnicity or even a youth frustrated by the broken political promises and poor state governance. Moreover, when the State cannot provide security and guarantee fair justice for citizens, the latter considers the power in place illegitimate. This situation of disavowal vis-à-vis the State leads to a breakdown of social order leading to violence between opposing factions, as was the case in Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during the reign of dictator Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko.

Another essential factor, a source of conflict, is linked to the control of natural resources (oil, minerals). It has been observed that African countries possessing these mineral riches are the most exposed to the risks of armed conflicts and political crises (Hugon, 2006, pp.33-34). We can cite Nigeria, Sierra Leone or the DRC in this category. Thus, the lack of control and sovereignty over the mining resources managed by foreign companies is a gateway to conflict for countries whose revenues from mining are not equitably distributed.

To this must be added the lack of financial and economic freedom of certain African countries that do not have their currency and are therefore forced to manage their economy. Because the effective economic programs intended for their development are subject to the diktat of foreign powers like France about the countries of the CFA Franc zone. Finally, on the socio-economic level, poverty, extreme social injustices between individuals, and foreign

military interventions on the grounds of maintaining stability and preserving human rights, which have been observed since decolonization, push people to claim their rights. , the African economy is primarily based on a system of rents from agricultural, mining and petroleum products contributing to a low rate of investment and poor use of capital which are unfavourable factors for the diversification of production and, therefore, for shared economic prosperity. The model of exporting primary raw products and importing manufactured products inherited from the former colonial powers does not allow African countries to create wealth for the populations (Hugon, 2003, pp. 107-118). The table below through the leading macroeconomic indicators collected between 1960 and 2000.

Table 2: Main macro-economic indicators of sub-Saharan Africa (growth rate in %)

	1960-1970	1970-1980	1980-1990	1990-2000
Population	2,4	2,9	3,1	2,6
Gross National Product (GNP)	4,6	3,0	2,1	2,5
Industry	10,1	8,2	0,6	0,2
Agriculture	2,5	1,9	2,5	1,5
Gross investment	15,0	20,6	16,0	16,0

Source: Philippe Hugon, The economy of Africa, Paris, La Découverte, 2001, p.8.

All the situations mentioned above constitute mainly domestic sources of conflicts in African states (Loembe, 2017,p.1). An example would be Ethiopia. Major changes such as economic recession or the rapid growth of demography which no longer corresponds to the existing environmental capacities, can contribute to a severe reduction in resources causing inequalities and then violence, like the events of 1974, which led to the fall of Haile Selassie's government in an Ethiopia that was facing famine (Ochinya, 2007, pp. 1-3).

(ii) External causes of military conflicts in post-colonial Africa

The external factors of politico-military crises are linked to foreign interference in the internal affairs of an African state. In reality, internal factors serve as a pretext for external factors.

Historically, the first external factors of armed conflicts in Africa indeed stem from the sharing in 1885 in Berlin of African territories between the colonial powers. This resulted from a compromise which aimed to restrict the conflicts between the Western powers to promote peace and development on the European continent while continuing to exert their influence on the African continent: this is the theory of "linkage ". After independence in the 1960s, African countries inherited colonial borders and related problems. The issue of nationalism and territorial integrity involves differences of opinion and injustices leading to violence between ethnic groups because the territorial divisions carried out by colonial powers such as France

have led to uniting unrelated groups. Some groups that do not share the same cultural and political values use identity withdrawal, rejection of others and violence as means of expression (Boulada, 2017, pp. 2-19).

The common point of conflicts in Africa, particularly in French-speaking Africa, is the conquest of power, which is very often characterized by three major elements: the use of arms, coups and the illegal modification of the constitution with the official or unofficial complicity of foreign powers. Consequently, a power conquered employing arms seeks to protect and perpetuate its survival by setting up a system of repression of the population and political adversaries inherited from the colonial period about the violence exercised by the French colonial administration. (Fall, 1998, 329-336). This system consequently causes poor governance, clan-based and patronage management of the country. Similarly, some studies on the external causes of conflicts in Africa affirm that the French authorities support repressive African regimes, hence the multiplication of violent seizures of power. As a result, the French support given to repressive regimes is sometimes a determining factor for the population deciding to choose violence as the only recourse to claim their rights (Loembe, 2017). This is because a population that feels perpetually frustrated, attacked, and then wronged will create popular anti-power demonstrations in the streets or set up an armed rebellion. This has been the case for several French-speaking African countries over the past sixty years, knowing that the risk of resumption or the outbreak of politico-military conflicts remains high in certain regions.

In parallel, the political and defence agreements signed between French-speaking African countries and France in exchange for their independence are based in several cases on the maintenance of foreign military bases whose official mission is to assist independent states (Granvaud, 2009, pp. 3-74). However, with the cooperation of foreign embassies, particularly that of France, the primary objective of this military presence on African soil is to monitor power and all the political, economic and cultural elites, then to ensure, when is necessary, the control and monopoly of mineral and oil resources through military intervention. This situation of control over natural resources and the African economy, particularly which of the French-speaking zone of the CFA Franc, has created a climate of impoverishment (Verschave, 1998, pp. 6-17), often leading to internal widespread protests led by young people. These populations are desperate and frustrated by injustices, as one saw in Ivory Coast during the political-military crisis of 2002 and the unfortunate events of the "Hotel Ivoire" in November 2004 (Konan, 2016), when French soldiers fired on a crowd of unarmed demonstrators demanding the departure of French troops from Ivorian territory. As a result, these protests can become violent social demands or armed rebellions, causing chaos in the country. In this destabilization

strategy, the armed groups are often supported logistically by the French authorities, who supply them with weapons to create anarchy and organize the looting of the country's natural resources in conflict. Although these rebellions sometimes have their separatist ambitions or the conquest of central power, it seems evident that many of them were born because of French interference and acted directly or indirectly in the service of the French authorities to destabilize governments.

In general, foreign powers use the pretext of the existence of a rebellion which they were sometimes at the origin of, to intervene militarily in African countries to safeguard peace. As evidence, Colonel Burgaud of the French Force in the Ivory Coast declared in 2005 that "The rebels remain, and will remain a rebellion. We, the French, have installed them over time and made them friendly people" (Loembe, 2017).

In the next section we will analyze how literature explains French intervention in Africa and suggest an empirical model of neocolonialism to explain interventions in conflicts.

CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: MILITARY INTERVENTION AS A FORM OF NEOCOLONIALISM

3.1. Definition of Military Intervention

As defined by Pearson and Baumann, external military intervention is "the movement of troops or military forces by one independent country (or a group of countries in concert) across the border of another independent country (or colony of an independent country), or action by troops already stationed in the target country" (Pearson & Baumann, pp. 1974, 273). The issue of external intervention in international relations has been predominantly discussed around two significant concepts. On the one hand, the logic of the conventional international framework emphasizes the international theory of intervention and gives rise to interventional behaviour. On the other hand, this approach developed by George Modelski is based on the rules of the international political system, which entails that the internal belligerents will inevitably appeal to external parties for assistance. Because of the rules of the international political system, the external parties will be compelled to intervene to satisfy the interventional behaviour, even at the risk of an increasing cycle of interventions and counter-interventions.

Mitchell, who is fundamentally focused on transnational linkages, rejects Modelski's view. According to him, internal conflicts and international politics do not lead the parties in conflict to appeal for external assistance. Here, what matters is the nature of the transnational linkages that tie internal groups in a conflict referred to as belligerents with external parties. Knowing that transitional systems are generated through linkages between groups across national boundaries, inevitably, all sorts of linkages between political authorities and social groups on both sides are formed, highlighting the determining factors or the reasons why external parties become further involved in internal conflicts. Those ties can be described as transactional linkages implying economic, political, military and educational transactions. They also consist of religious, ideological, ethnic, family and racial ties, giving rise to different degrees of commitment between related groups. Consequently, if any part of these groups gets involved in an internal conflict, the affiliated groups may be pushed into the conflict. That is why Mitchell states that intervention is simply an extension of existing commitments (Eley, 1972, pp. 245-248).

Defining the scope of intervention always reveals the political stakes and potential motives of the intervener state whose armed forces are deemed to influence either internal disputes or political conditions in their favour in the target state. Pearson and Baumann explained how external intervention may aggravate or trigger civil strife: "Conceptually, all wars-ie. interventions precede persistent bilateral combat, but not all become wars" (Pearson & Baumann,1988,p.173). Theoretically, a military intervention implies foreign troops using force or becoming involved in field operations and the transport of any belligerent. Though it does not include troops concentrated in bases, in transit, transporting material or acting as advisors, these may be perceived as a diplomatic or logistical intervention in a sovereign political system. Nevertheless, if military advisors or training staff respond to or initiate fire, it is considered a military intervention (Pearson & Baumann,1988,p.174).

3.2. International Intervention in International Law

Foreign intervention may be characterized by three main patterns: military use of force, peaceful settlement and coercive acts. The military use of force is primarily seen as a vital sign of a change in how sovereignty is perceived. It represents an effort on the part of the intervenor to arrange, modify, or transfer power from one authority to another in the intervening state's authority structure or policy. It implies peaceful settlement that refers to the tradition of non-violent intervention by international peacekeeping or non-military organizations that work on resolutions to internal conflicts.

Peaceful settlement characterization is meant to follow the United Nations Charter, focusing on resolution techniques, mediation, preventive diplomacy, and deployment. As coercive acts, it is an intervention related in which a government has no choice but to obey external orders, mainly in the economic field. Therefore, using economic rather than military power might be a more deft and successful strategy to intervene in a state's domestic affairs. According to Johan Galtung's theory, non-military controls over periphery nations are equivalent to "structural violence" because they entail coercion (Pugh, 1994, pp.1-9). In the end, a distinction is made between unilateral, multilateral, and interventions carried out with the support of an international organization. If the intervention forces are not combined under a single command, all interventions are considered unilateral (separate coding for each intervenor). They are referred to as multilateral or global organizations if they merge. In international relations, a distinction is also established between different intervenors' intentions when several interventions are going on or even a single one (Pearson & Baumann, 1988, pp.273-279).

According to international law, military intervention may be authorized under a humanitarian mandate from the United Nations Security Council. This decision is taken with scrupulous respect for international law. It is not based on the will of individuals or any State that wishes to preserve its interests.

Since 1987, France has been campaigning within the United Nations for the development of the legal framework allowing humanitarian intervention in countries in conflict without the indispensable agreement of the latter, which possibly opens the way to an intervention military which is thus similar to interference concerning the principle of territorial sovereignty (Latty, 2015,p.13). It is within the framework of the evolution of the right to intervene humanitarian or militarily in a sovereign State in the conflict that the concept of the "Responsibility to Protect" appears. It stipulates that a sovereign State's responsibility is to protect its population. When the latter fails in this responsibility, it is up to the Security Council to initiate the collective security mechanism. In other words, the United Nations Security Council reserves the right to pass a resolution to intervene militarily in a sovereign state (Latty,2015,p.14). This was the case in Ivory Coast in 2011 through the 1975 resolution allowing the Licorne force of the French army to intervene militarily on Ivorian soil.

3.3. Literature Review on French Intervention in Africa

While the negative impact of French military interventionism on conflict, democracy and development was widely questioned in the media and public opinion in the 1970s and 1980s, it is fallen out of the radar in the 1990s and 2000s. It is true that French interventionism peaked in the 1980s and has been declining since then in numbers, but the main reason for the neglect of the topics seems to be the actual and academic dominance of certain paradigms.

Realist IR Theory and military intervention

In International Relations theory, realism explained French interventionism with economic interest, geopolitical power, security and prestige. The pattern of interventions by big nations differs from those of minor powers. While lesser powers have interfered in localized territorial disputes, social grievances, regional ideology, or the security of close border areas, major power interventions typically aim for strategic power balances and ideological, economic, diplomatic, and military interests. Moreover, major power interest in regional conflicts is likely to be constrained short of the threshold of direct military intervention if an incumbent favourable government is not immediately endangered; if diplomatic, military, or economic facilities are not in danger (Pearson & Baumann, 1974, p.277). However, on the whole, realist approaches generally suggest refraining from intervention as interventions in

domestic affairs and unstable settings can "multiply and amplify the factors of turmoil (instead of insulating them)" (Hoffman, 1995, p.34) and can take the country far off from national interest. Only in the case of weapons of mass destruction interventions are recommended.

Liberal IR Theory and military intervention

The liberal approach to IR underlined France's and European countries' interventions in Africa aim to show a humanitarian face to the world. Liberal accounts also confirm the EU's official account of the European trade partnerships with Africa as fulfilling the development needs of the former colonies (Rivkin 1966; Zartman 1970; Gruhn 1976). They predicted that French interventionism would decline because France's greater involvement in NATO structures and European integration processes would inevitably lead to lower public spending and greater transparency, thereby decreasing France's ability to enter opaque deals with dictatorial African elites (Krupova & Cech, 2020, p.309). They also suggest focusing on African elites to explain the different outcomes of French interventionism. (Krupova & Cech, 2020, p.311) The weakest strand of this theory is the doomsday scenario that if France leaves, French Africa will be unable to resolve its conflicts and fall into bloodshed because no other organization will step in to mediate (Krupova & Cech, 2020, p.311).

The debate in liberal theory whether self-government and self-determination can be reasons for intervention by force (an instrument of power that Liberalism aims at curbing) has been going on for two centuries with no clear solution. (Hoffman, 1995, p.34) Walzer, trying to find the middle ground, justified intervention with self-determination, genocide (Hoffman, 1995, p.34), and protecting human beings from intolerable evils such as violating their fundamental rights to life and security. (Hoffman, 1995, p.35) *Liberalism* is the approach which welcomes interventionism most.

Constructivist approaches underline feelings of fear and insecurity, and identity to explain French motives for military intervention in Africa. All "mainstream" IR theories emphasize that French foreign policy in Africa is moving away from neo-colonialism. However, the IR theories, focusing on current events, neglect both the historical legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism and the persistence of structures, institutions and networks that reinforce it and provide increasing returns.. This requires us to turn to the critical schools, which criticize the trade partnership, economic relations and military intervention by bringing in neo-colonialism (in the 1960s), dependency theory (in the 1970s-1990s), and critique of (neo) liberalism (Wall, 1975, p.152).

Nevertheless, we do not reinforce a deterministic neocolonial theory. It is essential to consider the agency or complicity of African elites in neocolonial structures, institutions and

networks, perpetuating the vicious circle. Similarly, US, British, Russian and French neocolonialism differs based on different historical traditions and identities. In the French case, elitist and dirigiste foreign policy traditions overshadow the colonial relations in France and Africa, and unofficial French-African networks perpetuate hegemonic structures. The neo-colonial framework does not mean French policy is clear, coherent, self-maximizing, and always rational or it does not mean it is unchanging. Rather, it emphasizes resilient structural factors and historical legacies. While neocolonialism is resilient, African youth is more conscious of neocolonial patterns, and African civil society and nationalism are stronger than ever. Ultimate democratization of French foreign policy and foreign policymaking and civil society movements in African countries can question and dismantle these colonial patterns.

Previously Kristina Krupova and L'Ubomir Cech took up French intervention in the conflict of 2002-2011. However, they focused mostly on security and military relations between the two countries. They did not focus on economic, cultural, or institutional aspects of neocolonialism, though they pointed out that these spheres must also be examined.

In this part, we will first review the ethics of French interventions; secondly, we will examine how the dependency and world systems theory and post-colonial theory would contribute to explaining French interventions and persisting conflict in Africa. Next, we will outline an empirical explanation of how French neocolonialism works and how it shapes conflict (Gegout 2018, pp. 265-288)

3.4. Ethics and Politics of Intervention

The concept of military intervention in international relations and its consequences may vary regarding the extent of significant power involvement, duration of involvement, and goals. In the general case, the goals of the external intervener are described as follows:

1. Territorial appropriation or domain;
2. Defence of social groups within the target, including irredentist claims;
3. Defence of economic interests within the target, including business ventures or natural resources;
4. Defense of diplomatic or military interests within the target, such as military bases, embassies, or diplomats;
5. Ideology, involving organized belief systems or doctrines; and
6. Regional power balances. (Pearson & Baumann, 1974, pp.273-274).

There are several concerns regarding the legitimacy of interventions that have substantial philosophic and ethical implications, even leaving aside numerous issues of analytic

jurisprudence and whether international law forms a legitimate legal system, assuming there is such a thing as international law. More precisely, for legal positivists, even though every state should uphold, defend, and protect human rights, appropriate international law texts do not establish a legal foundation for either unauthorized or authorized interventions, not even as a means of preventing a state from going against its international commitments by physically abusing its citizens. Legal positivists contend that even in a humanitarian emergency, there are ethical and legal obligations to refrain from militarily interfering with a state's internal affairs (Hoag, 2015). Then, disagreements about the interpretation of legal texts around the issue of humanitarian intervention gave rise to disputes among scholars. On the one hand, some of them reject the idea that original intent is demonstrative, giving present attitudes, views, and norms concerning interventions a much more prominent role or making use of political morality that is inferred from legal texts and their interpretation history.

On the other hand, issues of extra-textual sources of law, or what is referred to as "customary international law," constitute a second area of legal debate. In short, among the scholars, some argue that the right of humanitarian intervention considering moral and ethical practices should be settled. In contrast, others maintain that the legal system of the UN Charter supplants any alleged customary rule.

In addition, conventional peacekeeping or the peaceful deployment of unarmed or lightly armed troops and analysts with the full and consistent permission of the parties to a conflict is not covered by the use of force definition. Peacekeepers intervene within states to promote stability or enter buffer zones to patrol and monitor interstate ceasefires. These initiatives lay between the UN Charter's Chapters VI (peaceful resolution of disputes) and VII (enforcement initiatives). Peacekeepers are a diplomatic representation of fairness between disputing parties. That said, the Resolution 1975 adopted by the UN Security Council at its 6508th meeting on 30 March 2011 under the lobbying of France, a permanent member of the Council, proves that the latter was not neutral in the Ivorian conflict. It showed us that the most powerful states might decide the future of less powerful or small states. The resolution taken by the Security Council condemned and jailed one belligerent under the pretext that he incited hatred and violence and protected the other, the supposedly elected president, and made sure he reached power. According to many experts, the UN Security Council has exceeded its prerogatives as a peacekeeper entity by taking sides and openly supporting one of the belligerents whose partisans also committed abuses, as reported by some journalists and Ivorian politics experts (Pugh, 1994).

Theoretically, the issue of selectivity is also a problem that compromises the impartiality of international humanitarian interventions under the UN Charter. The issue is that only some humanitarian catastrophes receive military intervention from nations or other international bodies. So why interfere in certain states and not others if humanitarianism is the problem? How does one crisis require an armed intervention while another does not? How is it morally acceptable that only some situations are chosen for armed interventions and that only some people's fundamental human rights are upheld by using military force by others while other emergencies call for others to respond forcefully? Those are essential questions to be answered regarding moral and ethical consistency (Hoag,2015). Though it is not systematic, intervening states are said to selectively interfere based on national self-interest, not based on a warrant or justification from humanitarian concerns. Intervening State governments decide which situations among those that are morally justifiable to intervene in to do so (Hoag,2015). The UN Security Council should be impartial to the parties while being neutral to the law, but it is apparent that it is not always how it is supposed to be. One of the most critical limits of the UN Security Council is that the permanent members cannot commit to using their veto in situations where their national interests are affected, even if a humanitarian emergency is declared (Corell,2014). Besides, in the case of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a lack of transparency in statements about the conflict by Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has been noticed. He first mentioned violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, potential war crimes, and the demand for accountability" in his statement from May. Then, he expressed his grave concern over the claims of human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law in his statement from August. Finally, he referred to the findings of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) as "a catalogue of cruelty" in his statement from September without identifying the perpetrator of such cruelty.

On the contrary, without losing sight of the gravity of Russia's aggression or the larger amount of one party's guilt for the loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property, OHCHR has been extremely clear about holding each side accountable for its violations and by doing so, it prevented any possible speculations. From this view, it seems crucial to question how mandates are assigned. Why is a mandate assigned to one state member and not to another? These questions must be asked to show how the so-called humanitarian interventions are conducted to guarantee lasting peace in the country under conflict.

Several concomitant analyses, showed the evidence that the argument of the existence of weapons of mass destruction and humanitarian crimes served as a pretext for France to obtain the approval of the international community. This endorsement gave way to France to interfere

in a sovereign state without resorting to the right of veto which derives from the Legal Framework of the United Nations Security Council. In reality, the case of the Ivorian crisis is broadly expressive of the instrumentalization of which the United Nations Security the whole institution. This is because Ban ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations in 2011, did not play the role of impartial arbiter but immediately took sides based on the allegations made by France and its representative in Ivory Coast. Thus, it is clear that the neutrality, which was to guide the Secretary General of the United Nations, has been corrupted. The decision for military intervention may have ended the post-election crisis, but insecurity and disorganization within the army (Yebouet, 2011, p. 22) were heightened after the French intervention. In short, France's goal, whether for Ivory Coast or for any other country where it exercises its influence, is to work on the fringes of the legal Framework of military intervention. As a result, France campaigns for self-limitation of members of the Security Council that would give up their right of veto to eliminate the mechanisms of blocking military or political interference (Latty, 2015, p. 16).

Moreover, if the United Nations Security Council judges that a specific issue poses a "threat to international peace and security," it may apply coercive measures and disregard the general norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. However, many states are hesitant about what the Security Council identifies as "threats to international peace and security" before deciding whether to impose economic sanctions or launch military actions so that such actions won't be taken for purely political ends. Whether using force in the circumstances other than those covered by the UN Charter is legal is at the centre of the discussion surrounding humanitarian intervention. The various legal schools of thinking are discussed in this argument. Additionally, it is governed by state practices and declaratory policies, which frequently conflict with one another. Moreover, most legal experts and governments agree that the UN Charter generally forbids the use of force. Article 2(4) includes this prohibition: "All member shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" (De Jonge Oudraat, 2000, p. 4).

It must be noted that there are just two exceptions to this rule of the Charter, according to academicians and governments in general. It can be launched in reaction to a violent attack (Article 51), or the Security Council may authorize using force to preserve or reestablish international peace and security (Article 42). The second case seems to be used in the Ivory Coast case. But this decision from UN Security Council was perceived as controversial among Ivorians and by many experts in Ivorian politics since it involved the French colonial army,

which was already illegitimate in the country (De Jonge Oudraat, 2000, p.5). Moreover in response to the responsibility to intervene, the concept of "humanitarian intervention" appeared in the 1990s and refers to as the use of armed force by nations or international organizations. Such an intervention is allowed in reaction to atrocities committed against people by their governments. Genocides "ethnic cleansing," and other atrocities, served as an argument for many foreign countries and most powerful ones to intervene militarily in sovereign states for various reasons under the mandate of the UN or not (Hoag, 2015).

Although Ivory Coast's independence, the Franco-Ivorian crisis in 2004 revealed that France has been a real military occupation force in Ivory Coast, highlighting France's unequally privileged relations in this country. Certain studies recognized that most contemporary crises or conflicts in French Africa occur in countries with extensive experience of colonial rules (Féron & Rosoux, 2014, pp.7-15), such as the Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo or the Central African Republic. In addition, France is omnipresent more than any other former colonial power in its former colonies. For instance, they may quickly intervene politically or militarily in case of internal tensions involving violent opposition to the ruling regime favoured by French authorities. Féron and Rosoux argued that the latter might equally destabilize or interfere with former colonies, showing themselves as the potential saviour with political, financial and military capacities needed to solve the crisis like in the case of Ivory Coast. This situation is related to a post-colonial relationship, as the scholars stated. Below we present our theoretical framework demonstrating how French neocolonialism exacerbates conflict.

3.5. French Neocolonialism in the Framework of Political Economy

Marx argued that capitalism, with the rise of modern industry, met the external world life and imposed itself on the territories in an earlier stage of economic development. (Brewer, 1990, pp. 47-48). Lenin also specified European imperialism worldwide as a definite and very high stage of its development of capitalism and inter-imperialist rivalry (Lenin, 1999). Based on Marxism, dependency theory first gained prominence as a way to explain the underdevelopment of Latin American economies in the 1960s, which persisted because highly developed countries dominated underdeveloped economies by paying low prices for agricultural products and flooding those economies with cheap manufactured goods. This resulted in an increasingly unfavourable balance of payments that prevented underdeveloped countries from becoming competitive in the global marketplace. (Langan, 2018, 253; Rodney 2018: 316). Neo-colonial theorists, therefore, proclaimed that economies based on the production of cash crops such as cocoa could not hope to develop because the world system

imposes a veritable ceiling on the revenue that can be accrued from their production. (Rodney, 2018).

Wallerstein proposed the World-System Theory in which he identified capitalism as a network of exchange relations, on a world scale, that channel surplus from satellite (periphery) to metropolis (core). The capitalist world system is divided into three tiers of states, the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery. (Brewer, 1990, p.176) He argued that their place as a whole primarily determines the internal structure and development of different parts of the world economy and that the production organization at a lower level (enterprise, sector, nation-state) is secondary. He added that development and underdevelopment are opposite sides of the coin, resulting from the other. (Brewer, 1990, p.198) A 'world' system does not necessarily have to cover the whole globe. In this vein, French-African relations can be construed as one world system, with a single division of labour and multiple cultural systems. The "core-periphery division is maintained by the ability of the core states to manipulate the workings of the system as a whole to suit their needs" (Brewer, 1990, p.176).

The core states "deliberately weaken peripheral states or eliminate them by conquest, and also alter the workings of markets by imposing monopolistic restrictions, protecting their industries, forbidding corresponding protection in the periphery, and so on". (Brewer, 1990, p.178) Less developed nations are exploited because global Capitalism makes them reliant on wealthy nations that set up exploitative trade and production standards. Primary goods from poor countries were exported to affluent countries, which made manufactured products out of them and sold them back to the poorer ones more expensive. Furthermore, Marxist theorists saw capitalism exploitation as the cause of the ongoing poverty in the third world (Zulkifli, 2010, p.5). Brewer criticizes that the World-System Theory does not specify precisely how and under what conditions the structure produces the results claimed for. (Brewer, 1990, p.178)

Dependency theorists are criticized for not connecting their general statements and particular historical cases. The theory also cannot explain the burst of industrialization and development in the so-called periphery in the decades since the Second World War, nor can it account for the uneven and changing nature of capitalist development in the Third World (Brewer, 1990, p.198). However, we can still build on this theory for most African countries, especially French Africa like Ivory Coast, by identifying political, economic, military, and aid dependency sources.

3.6. Cultural Politics of French Neocolonialism

Said's *Orientalism* (1979) have demonstrated how, in the modern imperial age, the Europeans viewed non-Europeans through distorting, flawed lenses, shaping our understanding of, and interaction with, the Middle East. Eastern and Southern cultures were locked in a specific place and time, frozen as unchanging and eternal. It installs stereotypes of the periphery in the core and erases other cultures and languages. Opposing universalist theories such as Marxism or dependency, the post-colonial theory inspired by Said, Fanon, Foucault and others aims to bring about the subjectivities of colonial agencies by analyzing colonial discourses. This approach aims to uncover historic relationships arising out of subordination and colonization, of expansion, centuries of linkages and lineages that were created through the empire, unequal and hierarchical relationships entrenched in the empire, collective amnesia, asymmetric colonial systems, racialized hierarchies and global orders. Xenophobia and chauvinism of nationalist-colonial discourses reproduce hierarchies and asymmetries between peoples and spaces, similar to those that supported colonialism. According to post-colonialism, epistemic violence can be harsh as physical violence. Lack of recognition can be oppressive (Ancelevici & Dupuis-Déri.F, 1998). The French army in World War II was two-thirds African, yet neither their role in the liberation of France nor the defeat of Nazism was recognized, nor were they offered French army pensions (Demir, 2022, p.4).

Despite providing insights into cultural hegemony and imperialism, Post-Colonial Theory cannot provide a satisfactory political or economic account of post-colonial or imperialist processes. Rao notes that "Globalization," "late capitalism," and "neocolonialism" are "buzzwords that post-colonial theorists regularly invoke" (Rao, 2000, 166). Consequently, they cannot explain the "workings" of neocolonialism as well as they claim to, offering many "generalities" (Rao, 2000, p.167) and ahistorical accounts. It is important to identify neo-colonial concepts, such as *La Francophonie*, as "a specific type of identity building", which implies the inclusion of people outside France in the culture of France itself (Martin, 1985, pp.189-208). It has a tremendous impact on how cultural and political systems in former French colonies are influenced to preserve *la grandeur* of France (Faye & Faye, 2021). By making the French influence unbreakable throughout francophone Africa, *la Francophonie* promoted a colonial policy of assimilation through language (Ndiaye, 2022). Likewise, *Agence Universitaire Francophone* (AUF) is one the institutions which allegedly nourishes neo-colonialism. It is a multilateral organization that promotes cooperation and solidarity among French-speaking universities and institutions (New african, 2022). *France Médias Monde*, TV5

and Association Internationale des Maires Francophones (AIMF) are all institutions that coordinate France's cultural influence strategy in Francophone Africa (Ndiaye, 2022). As their parent organization (*La Francophonie*), they are reportedly deemed to be an instrument serving the French culturel hegemony through post-colonial discourse (Canut, 2010, 141,158). Therefore, post-colonialism proves helpful in understanding the cultural underpinnings of neo-colonialism.

3.6.1. Françafrique as a Tool of Neocolonialism

The term "Françafrique" refers to the continuation of the cooperation system between France and its former colonies established at the dawn of the Fifth French Republic, whose first president was General De Gaulle. It puts forward France's influence over these newly independent African states on a political, military, and economic level. Although, this would be expressed by the extension of the former metropole's colonial dominance of francophone Africa (Beucher, 1990, p.2). It is like an iceberg, with a visible side: aid to Africa and the "promotion of human rights" and a much more significant invisible side: interferences, crimes, and predation. It is an alliance between the leaders of France and the co-opted African Heads of State, who are just concerned with their demands and interests (Verschave, 1998).

Table 3: The primary tool of the French neo-colonial system

The primary tool of the French neo-colonial system	
Françafrique or French pré-carré (Backyard)	France's sphere of influence. It refers to a relationship described as neo-colonial between France and former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa on the economic, monetary, diplomatic or military levels. Largely diffused in 1960s.

Table 4: The secondary tool of the French neo-colonial system

The secondary tools and actors of the French neo-colonial system	
Francophonie	Created in 1970 and gathers 88 states and governments sharing French language or French values. It holds a significant impact in influencing cultural and educational systems in French Africa.
CFA Franc	On December 26, 1945, France signed the Bretton Woods Agreements and submitted its initial parity declaration to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which led to the creation of the CFA franc. " Franc of the French Colonies of Africa " was the name's original meaning.
Military bases	Present in several French former African colonies thanks to the military agreements signed in 1960s. They are considered as a central vestige of the French neo-colonial influence.
Agence Française de Developpement (AFD)	French Development Agency. In collaboration with IMF and WB, it contributed to impose on African Sub-Saharan countries structural adjustment policies from which French firms benefited.

Table 4: (con'd)

The secondary tools and actors of the French neo-colonial system	
Agence Universitaire Francophone (AUF)	Direct operator of the Francophonie aims at intensifying cultural and technical cooperation in the educational field.
TV5	Audiovisual channel. Direct operator of the Francophonie specializing in cooperation council.
France Médias Monde (France 24, RFI)	Audiovisual Media Group promoting French image under the Quai d'Orsay (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
Association Internationale des Maires Francophones (AIMF)	A Francophonie cooperation adviser. A network of mayors and officials from capitals and major cities in 48 countries where French is official language.
French National companies	AREVA, BOLLORE etc. They have developed intimacy with some French African countries' leaders to foster French trade in Africa since 1960s.

Françafrique is the result of a botched decolonization. According to an article named " *Mais en fait c'est quoi la Françafrique* ", published by the Survie association in 2016, it is believed to be a political and institutional framework that permits networks specific to France to maintain control over its former colonies to ensure its access to raw materials and to preserve its dominance in the world politics. France has developed and deployed its neocolonial practices throughout the shared history of the 5th Republic with French-speaking Africa, with the complicity of numerous African heads of state, including Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Ivory Coast), Omar Bongo Ondimba (Gabon), Paul Biya (Cameroon), and Blaise Compaore (Burkina Faso), who are known as "friends of France." Some practices are opaque depending on interactions between the State (France) and individuals (Co-opted African Leaders). Raw material looting, corruption, the misappropriation of development aid, support for repressive regimes, trafficking, and military operations are examples of behaviours that continue. Even while France claims to have ended these tactics, as with the Ivory Coast, France continues to meddle in its former colonies. Under the guise of the economic crisis and the struggle against terrorism in the Sahel, looting and warfare are trivialized. Because Françafrique is founded on the upkeep of tyrannical, oppressive, and predatory regimes that thwart the establishment of democratic and economic systems, it is apparent that France is a brake on democracy and human rights in Africa (Borrel, et., 2021). The top echelons of the French and African States make choices arising from the Françafrique networks in complete secrecy, without consultation, parliamentary oversight, or public scrutiny. Below is an illustration of the Françafrique logic.



Figure 1: Francophone Africa Map

Source: <https://ndjonisango.com/2021/09/09/afrique-et-si-la-france-avait-pousse-la-francafrique-a-lextreme/>

The post-African independence system of cooperation aimed to "institutionalize" the former Metropol's political dominance and, especially, its economic, monetary and cultural dominance. On July 15, 1960, French Prime Minister Michel Debre sent a letter to the President of the Republic of Gabon Leon Mba. He declared that France: *"grants independence on condition that the State, once independent, undertakes to respect the cooperation agreements signed previously. Two systems come into effect simultaneously: independence and cooperation agreements. One does not go without the other"*.

Consequently, Technical assistants who were prevalent in significant numbers in African administrations and power centres were long employed by France in its former colonies in Africa. This presence is also made clear by the French military's permanent stationing at vital strategic locations crucial for controlling these nations' economies and financial systems, ensuring a monopoly over retail outlets and access to raw commodities. Creating a sizable monetary zone surrounding the CFA franc supported this financial control (Bourgi, 2009, pp. 2-14). Even though, during this last decade, France's influence over Francophone Africa is declining due to the presence of new foreign partners such as Russia, China, Türkiye and India, its dominance is still very established and determinant on the continent.

3.6.2. The Problem of CFA Franc

In 1939, before granting facade political independencies to its African colonies, France, to increase its economic and political influence over the ex-colonized African nations, constructed the franc zone, a monetary system. The West African CFA franc and the Central African CFA franc are the two currencies that make up the CFA franc zone. The French Treasury guarantees a constant exchange rate between currencies and the Euro. Moreover, France assumed control of the currency and financial policies in its former colonies through its African monetary system. Ivory Coast is one of the 14 African nations using French currency. France devaluated approximately 50% of the CFA

franc in 1994. As a result, the devaluation severely harmed Franco-African monetary cooperation and caused considerable challenges in Franco-African relations (Sıradağ,2014,p.104). The action also significantly exacerbated the economic instability in Francophone Africa, compelling those nations to implement structural reforms from the IMF, the World Bank, and France. This economic instability led to political crises and civil wars in several cases. Following the rules of the new neoliberal order imposed by the Bretton Woods organizations, the French Treasury enabled Francophone countries using the currency to violate the CFA franc zone's monetary regulations by giving them the option of rapid loans to cover their deficits. Since France did permit it as a sign of its friendship with the heads of state, incumbent regimes frequently took this money, and France was powerless to stop it (Profant, 2010, pp. 50-51). CFA franc is an instrument of neocolonialism as part of the Françafrique unofficial organization. The cooperation agreements negotiated with France upon becoming independent comprised the broad principles controlling the operation of this monetary system. One of the principles is that France effectively has a veto on the boards of the two central banks in the CFA franc zone. Massive capital outflows are also encouraged by the CFA currency. In addition to this, France was able to prevent and restrict member states' purchases from non-franc zone countries for a long time thanks to the French Treasury holding their monetary reserves, and they were forced to create annual import plans that were legally submitted to France for authorization (Yates,2018, p. 8). The value of the CFA franc has been largely criticized as being too high for local companies and populations. As indicated by some critics, 11 of the franc zone's 15 member nations are categorized as least-developed countries worldwide and belonging to the franc zone is equivalent to unemployment and poverty (Yates, 2018, p. 8).




Figure 2: CFA Franc zone

Source: <https://www.banque-france.fr/economie/relation-internationales/partenariats-afrique-france/cooperations-monetaires-afrique-france>

Furthermore, a franc zone (CFA) whose parity was tied to the French franc and later the Euro is perpetuated by the cooperation agreements struck in exchange for independence. Due to this monetary connection, France can monitor the signatory governments' economic policies. These agreements also benefit big French businesses by giving them a monopoly-like position in a few key markets. For instance, in Ivory Coast, the development of the Bolloré group, owner of the management of the nation's only railway line and ports, was made possible by the privileged connections between the former metropolis and its former "model" colony. In addition to Hachette's presence in the publishing industry and, more specifically, in the written press, Bouygues also has a protected market in the building industry. One also observes the existence of French oil or mining firms in the country that benefit from implementing this monetary system (Beucher, 1990, p.23). In the same vein, the foreign exchange currencies acquired by the Franc Zone are centralized in France under the French Treasury as per the monetary accord. Additionally, the Francophone African banks must deposit their currency reserves with the Bank of France. Three major inconveniences may be drawn from this monetary agreement in this frame. First, during the first two decades following decolonization, the bulk of African trade was directed toward France, and Francophone Africa is still paying a high price for it now. Being a part of the Franc Zone made trading with France considerably more straightforward, but in a manner that prevented them from diversifying their product lines (Harsche, 1980, pp.167-168). For instance, due to France's aid to development and other trade-distorting political and cultural barriers, the price of French imports has increased for decades and durably affected African economies. (Kohnert, 2022, p.18). Second, except for the Bank of France, the currencies issued by the Zone's central banks have no value outside of the Zone. This means that all international transactions involving countries in the Franc Zone must use the Euro as a medium of exchange. The foreign money they earn through exports is deposited with the French Treasury, making a valuable addition to France's liquid assets. Third, France used to control both of the Central Banks. In BCEAO, one-third and BEAC, roughly half of the members of the Council of Administration were French. France nonetheless maintains control over the flow of money and the awarding of credits in the Franc Zone, notwithstanding the shift in management personnel (Harsche, 1980, pp. 167-168).

Francophone Africa is still largely influenced by French colonial rule's political, economic, and cultural legacies. As noted before, unlike Great Britain's "indirect" colonial hegemony, France exercised more autocratic "direct rule" over its ex-colonies. The CFA franc, which remained the only form of currency, was essential for protecting French interests. (Kohnert, 2022, p.18).

3.6.3. Exploitation of National Resources

The post-colonial cooperation agreements were largely imbalanced and in favour of France because they provided the latter with the first right to purchase any natural resources found on the soil of its former colonies at a low price. According to an article published by the Italian author Giorgio Spagnol in 2019, "Is France still exploiting Africa", he stated that African nations are prohibited from openly seeking out other business partners because French interests and firms are given preference in the public procurement sector. Africa is home to some of the world's most significant natural resource deposits, including deposits of bauxite, coltan, diamonds, gold, timber, oil, gas, and other materials. The funds generated from their exploitation could not have funded the required development. Even if they are not the only factor, post-colonial agreements have played a significant role in the underdevelopment of countries in Francophone Africa, as France has benefited most from the national resources of its former colonies because of these agreements.

As previously mentioned, French colonialism in francophone Africa ended with the arrival of independence. For more than 300 years, France has used various techniques to exploit the area's natural resources and people. In other words, the French administration used the colonies to build the French economy. In the post-colonial era, France could develop its economic system within the scope of the exploiter-exploited relationship by preserving its relationships with its former colonies. Typically, the colonies are nations that export raw resources away from significant industrial networks. As a result of the fact that these colonies were still viewed as a "market" after their independence, this arrangement created a system that benefits capitalist nations like France, as corroborated by Cemre Çağla ATAMER in her article "France, West Africa, New Colonialism and Competition". In connection with the aforementioned, Paul Kennedy, a political scientist at Yale, argued in "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" that a great power's long-term ascendancy is strongly correlated with its economic strength and resource base. Military expansionism and relative decline are the constant threats facing powers whose ambitions and security needs are more significant than their resource base can provide. Therefore, French interventions most likely serve as a means of preserving France's status as a superpower in the international order and its reputation as a country still capable of projecting power on the continent of Africa. (Yates,2018,p.13).

3.6.4. Political and Military Agreements

The cooperation agreements constitute a central axis of France's influence policy in French Africa. So, throughout the post-colonial era, France maintained its ties with Africa through "cooperation agreements," "military operations," and "financial assistance measures." Some academics claim that France used the strategy of cooperation with African states as a continuation of its colonial policies. After the African governments attained independence, France's economic and political interests-based foreign policy in Africa did not change (Siradağ,2014, p.104). The facts have shown how much these agreements nurtured African dependence on France. French Africa signed military agreements with France after independence which encompassed initial transfers of men and units of troops by France and a basic grant of equipment and vehicles. These accords foresee fixed installations to national authorities like military bases. They involve French assistance in the development of military training and regular provision of military equipment at no cost or with favourable terms. French assistance to allies in putting down a movement supported by radical forces or rebels; France's initiatives to foster client states among French non-colonial African nations; Direct military aid in the internal and external defence of African territories upon request (Harsche,1980, pp.72-174). More specific agreements also prevailed like the personal protection and the evacuation abroad of the dictators and leaders considered friends of France in case of people unrest. These agreements have allowed them to sustain dictatorial regimes and staged coups under French military interventions. From this view, the French army has influenced the armies of African republics ever since the end of colonialism. Military technical Agreements, Defense, and Military Assistance Agreements have been significant vehicles for achieving this, as shown in the table below. French advisors have served in African armies while training African officers in France. Close cooperation guaranteed French influence in times of crisis and justified local troops purchasing French weaponry and technology. The arms trade provides insight onto the actual dependence as well as how France continues to benefit from its influence in African nations. The most significant aspect of French weapon exports is the requirement that France continues to produce more weapons than it consumes to fund research and be ready to begin creating additional weapons for its use if necessary. These priorities are of utmost significance and serve as the primary justification for continuing trade arms, regardless of the possible adverse effects on African countries. (Siradağ, 2014, pp.100-119).

Table 5: French Military Defense Pacts with African Countries

Partners	Year	Partners	Year
Benin	1975	Malawi	1980
Burkina Faso	1961	Mali	1985
Burundi	1969	Mauritius	1979
Cameron	1974	Mauritania	1986
Central Africa	1960	Morocco	1994
Chad	1976	Nigeria	1977
Comoros	1978	Rwanda	1975
Congo(Brazzaville)	1974	Senegal	1974
Congo(Kinshasa)	1974	Seychelles	1979
Djibouti	1977	Togo	1963
Equatorial Guinea	1985	Tunisia	1973
Gabon	1960	Zimbabwe	1992
Guinea	1985	Madagascar	1966
Ivory Coast	1961		

Source: Degang, S. and Zoubir, Y., 2011. Sentry Box in the Backyard: Analysis of French Military Bases in Africa. *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)*, Vol. 5, No., 3, p. 90.

Furthermore, Adem Kilic, in his article "The System of Western Exploitation in Africa and the Case of France", written in 2021, pointed out the principal axes of the signed decolonization agreements:

- The newly independent states had to pay for the infrastructure that France built in the country during colonialism (the colonial tax);
- African states must deposit their national monetary resources, including foreign currencies, in the Bank of France. In this way, France holds the national resources of 14 African countries.

Following the agreement's provisions, Central Banks in Francophone Africa are constrained to keep at least 65% of France's foreign exchange reserves to repay their financial debts to France. In addition, these African states must deposit more than 80% of their foreign exchange reserves in "transaction accounts" controlled by the French Treasury.

- Preference must be given to France in purchasing all natural resources of its ex-colonies.
- French businesses must be given preference in public tenders. As a result, French settlers control the most prominent businesses and underground resource operations in these nations.
- Due to a complex system of scholarships and grants connected to the colonization treaties, Africans were required to send their senior educational officers to France or French military facilities.

- France has the right to intervene militarily in African nations and to station troops there permanently under the terms of the signed decolonisation agreement.
- These nations must adopt French as their official language and the medium of teaching under the terms of the decolonization agreement.
- According to the agreements, these nations must also use the CFA Franc.
- Under the agreements, these nations are required to form an alliance with France in the case of a world war or other disaster.

Today, in the context of the growing anti-French sentiment and the increasing demands for diversifying foreign partners in strategic fields. Countries like Mali and Burkina Faso are opting to cooperate much more with other world powers such as Russia and China, while countries like Ivory Coast and Chad reinforce their partnerships with France. This proves that these cooperation agreements threaten France's influence in Francophone Africa based on the logic of new colonialism that current African civil societies want to end.

3.6.5. The Presence of the French Military in Ivory Coast and Francophone Africa

French soldiers intervened in Ivory Coast twice in the twenty-first century after claiming in the 1990s that "Françafrique" was ended. In 2002 France intervened to end a civil war, and in 2011 it overthrew President Laurent Gbagbo after he refused to acknowledge the 2010 presidential election. This shows enough of the continued French interests in the Ivory Coast and, more generally, to comprehend the origin of the contemporary French military interventions on the continent (Bade,2013). More than any other Francophone nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ivory Coast attracted France's attention due to its post-colonial solid ties, despite rhetoric about safeguarding democracy or preventing humanitarian disasters. Even if the interventions of France in Ivory Coast were partly motivated by the desire to protect French expatriates and militaries during the first crisis in 2002 and the second that occurred in 2010, many scholars would concur in asserting that the French highly wanted to preserve and flourish their personal, business and political assets with Ivory Coast. Given the close relationship between French and Ivorian leaders, and regarding the military capabilities of France on Ivoirian soil, the international community opted for the most straightforward solution but not the most reasonable one by allowing France to intervene militarily in its former colony. Faced with the threat that a crisis in one of its most prestigious former colonies may jeopardize its historical position on the world scale, France never hesitated to launch military interventions in Ivory Coast (Bade,2013). As a result, the claims about the death of Francafrigue were void since

no French president of the contemporary time would take the risk of not being in line with French interests in former colonies.

The pretext of humanitarian or peacekeeping missions has always been the argument put forward by France for intervening militarily on the African continent (Granvaud, 2009, p.67). However, despite the official statement based on protecting its nationals and guaranteeing stability in Ivory Coast, the nature of the military interventions clearly shows that it was about the protection of French interests leading to interference, which was at stake. Like some African countries in the 1960s, Ivory Coast signed military and defence cooperation agreements with France in return for its independence (Granvaud, 2009, pp. 57-61). These cooperation agreements were based on a set of defence conventions and technical military assistance, which have enabled France to ensure the defence of the French-speaking States in Africa, the training and equipment of their national armies and intervene militarily in the event of internal disturbances. However, these military interventions have very often been the subject of numerous criticisms because it is noted that they primarily aim to preserve French interests (Domergue, 1998, pp.117-134).

Although the number of French soldiers has decreased since 1960, the volume and frequency of interventions have increased considerably, including covert or clandestine operations carried out by mercenaries under the orders of the French authorities to support dictatorial regimes or organize coups. State (Granvaud, 2009, pp.57-61). Furthermore, it should be said that the role of the French army in Ivory Coast was very ambiguous insofar as France refused to enforce, at the request of President Gbagbo, the defence agreements which the French State had with the Ivorian State by intervening and facilitating the sanctuary of the rebellion in the north of the country. Moreover, in November 2004, after the mysterious bombardment of a French base in the rebel zone in the north of the Ivory Coast by a Slavic pilot whom the French authorities released without any charge, France ordered the destruction of the Ivorian military fleet. This act caused legitimate patriotic demonstrations by Ivorians in retaliation against French nationals. However, although no French casualties were reported, dozens of unarmed Ivorian civilians were killed by French troops leaving thousands injured (Marshall, 2005, pp.21-41).

These abuses have never been the subject of an investigation to judge the French soldiers at the origin of these shootings under the pretext that they were acting under the mandate of the United Nations. Moreover, the French military intervention in the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011 has been described by some observers as having the main aim of putting at the head of Ivory Coast, a person who will be able to serve the interests of France like Alassane Ouattara. While it is true that the decade of politico-military crisis experienced by the Ivory Coast was

essentially due to the irresponsibility and negligence of Ivorian political actors, French interventionism has contributed significantly to the aggravation of this crisis (Marshall, 2005, p. 24). As a result, the French troops had become a belligerent force in this conflict because they were no longer neutral or credible in the eyes of part of the Ivorian population. In this regard, the former president of the Ivorian National Assembly, Mamadou Koulibaly affirmed in 2004 that: "We know that this war is a war to perpetuate the enslavement of Ivory Coast to the interests of the high French finance..." (Marshall, 2005,p.24). This is because, during the shooting of the Ivorian hotel in November 2004, the French shootings of the Licorne force would have caused 57 Ivorian civilian victims and dozens of wounded, according to official figures (Kouassi, 2004). These military interventions heavily discredit the French presence in Ivory Coast, which was already suffering from the painful colonial past. They have revived the sulphurous themes of neocolonialism, paternalism and the humanitarian interference planned by France, which is not always a guarantee of legitimacy but symbolizes, above all, in the case of Ivory Coast, deprivation of independence and right to enjoy its sovereignty.




Figure 3: The French Military Presence in Africa, 2012

Source: <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2678p036-037.xml0/>

Table 6: The main French Military Interventions in Africa since 1960

Year	Country	Aim
1964	Gabon	restoring the president following a coup
1968-1972	Chad	to stop the northern uprising
1978-80	Chad	to protect the government from insurgents
1978	Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo)	to rescue European hostages from insurgents
1979	Central African Republic	to depose the Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa
1983-84	Chad	to defend the government from insurgents
1986	Chad	to protect the government from insurgents
1986	Togo	restoring the president following a coup
1989	Comoros	to overthrow a coup
1990	Gabon	to assist the government of President Omar Bongo and remove foreigners from unstable cities
1990-1993	Rwanda	to transport French and other Europeans out of the country after insurgents attacked it
1991	Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo)	to aid Mobutu Sese Seko's government
1992-94	Somalia	to collaborate with the US on the "Restore Hope" effort
1994	Rwanda	for the purpose of "Opération Turquoise"
1995	Comoros	to prevent a coup and defend the government
1996-7	Central African Republic	to keep the peace after a coup
1997	Republic of Congo	to remove foreigners from the country when the civil war was raging
1996	Cameroon	the provision of military support to Cameroon
1998	Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo)	to remove foreigners from the country
2002-present	Ivory Coast	for the purpose of "Operation Licorne"
2003	Democratic Republic of Congo	to uphold law and order in the DRC's Ituri region's northeast
2008	Chad	to maintain the government while removing foreigners amid the unrest
2011	Libya	to depose the regime of Muammar Gaddafi
2011	Ivory Coast	for the purpose of "Licorne operation" and to depose the regime of Laurent Gbagbo
2013	Mali	to fight the rebels while assisting the country's regime

Source: http://www.expatica.com/fr/news/french-news/france-africa-a-long-history-of-military-intervention_142434.html

The map above shows how French military presence is essential in West, Central and East Africa, giving France the power to settle absolute domination and control over Francophone Africa, including Ivory Coast. The table above illustrates the frequency of the French interventions in Africa since 1960s with specific missions in each country. Therefore, the two interventions in Ivory Coast revealed two essential facts: Firstly, French interventions are made more normatively acceptable by disguising their neocolonialism in multilateralism. Secondly, France can interfere knowing that its interventions are justified by delaying action until the situation is deemed critical inciting the international community to support it (Bade,2013).

Ivory Coast, as a showcase for France in Africa, has always sheltered French troops on its soil who are clearly both a source of intimidation against opponents of the regime in place also a means of securing raw materials and the maintenance of its diplomatic power in French-speaking Africa through Ivory Coast (Granvaud, 2009, p.67). There is a blatant reality regarding the number of military interventions the French carried out on African soil compared to the British, as shown below.

The primary objective of this work is to reveal how much colonial legacies play a direct role in determining military and political interventions in former colonies. Through its network of "Françafrique," neocolonial links and legacies have a significant and expected impact on France. However, their effects on Britain are more subdued since the "Commonwealth" has been more a political instrument for the British to keep relative control of their former colonies than something else. Moreover, history demonstrates that Britain valued its African colonies less than France, so it intervened less. Consequently, the ongoing thesis also argued that the international community could not rely on former colonial powers to carry out military interventions in former colonies through the "Buck-passing" procedure because it may be more inappropriate and unproductive than efficient considering historical grounds (Bade, 2013).

3.6.6. Interfering in Politics Through the Françafrique Organization

The official discourse of the French authorities has been to show the need to guarantee the military protection and political stability of the Ivory Coast within the framework of the historic defence and military cooperation agreements signed with this country under the Françafrique system. This argument chanted in the eyes of the world and particularly at the United Nations Council, was one of the leading causes of France's involvement in the internal affairs of Ivory Coast during the long period of conflicts ranging from 2002 to 2011. However, behind this goodwill action, France sought the sustainability of its supplies of raw materials and the guarantee of the monopoly of coffee and cocoa exports to France and course, safeguarding its geostrategic influence in this area of Africa (Dulin, 2005, pp.9-23). Thus, thanks to the networks of Françafrique and the unofficial support of the French State, Henri Konan Bédié, as President of the Republic, wishes to continue the underground policy led by Houphouët-Boigny who died on December 7, 1993. He received the help of France in its struggle for power (Verschave, 1998, pp.3-5). However, a struggle resulted in 1999 in the coup organized by General Robert Guéï, which aimed to denounce the ethnic management of power exercised by Henri Konan Bédié. Consequently, the seizure of power by force by General Robert Guéï created the beginning of a politico-military crisis which would last ten years.

As explained by François-Xavier Verschave, the networks of Françafrique contributed to the destabilization of the Ivory Coast (Verschave, 1998, pp.6-9) because "they throughout the reign of Houphouët Boigny supported the hunt for opponents, including Laurent Gbagbo for a long time, who have experienced repression, imprisonment and sometimes massacres. President Houphouët Boigny sharpened the antagonisms between his potential successors, under the benevolent gaze of France and Françafrique, leaving at his death a sick country leading to the crises that Ivory Coast has experienced" (Hofnung, 2005, pp.27-39). Historically, it should be recalled that before the 1999 coup, Ivory Coast was France's third largest trading partner on the African continent after South Africa and Nigeria. However, with the growing security instability in the country, French investments have dropped considerably, but the French military presence has remained strong. Thus, the French army, through the "Force Licorne" (Guinant, 2013, p.53), which had already been deployed in 1999 on Ivorian territory, once again has the opportunity to play a decisive role in the political-military crisis raging in Ivory Coast. This new crisis triggered by the attempted coup of September 19, 2002, by a rebel group led by Guillaume Soro, who is said to have committed himself to fight against injustice social and discrimination of the peoples of the North presenting himself as the Secretary General of this rebel movement called "Forces Nouvelles".

This crisis effectively marks the beginning of a decade of conflict. In this context of the politico-military crisis, on September 26, 2002, France called in its military contingent, the Licorne force, to ensure the safety of French nationals in the rebel areas of Bouaké and Korhogo located in the North of the country. , thanks to a decision by ECOWAS and the United Nations at the end of 2002, the Licorne Force was tasked with supporting the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to ensure stability and compliance with ceasefire agreements signed on October 17, 2002, between President Laurent Gbagbo and the rebels of the "Forces Nouvelles" (Guinant, 2013, p. 53). Although the mediation of the ECOWAS failed in trying to get Laurent Gbagbo to sign an agreement in which the rebels demanded the reintegration of soldiers forced into exile following the coup attempt of 2002 (Gouëset, 2011), the cessation of hostilities agreement carried out under the aegis of France was respected for a while. However, a few days later two new rebel groups, named the Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO) and the Mouvement for Justice and Peace took possession of the regions of Man and Danané in the East of the country. This triggered deadly clashes between French soldiers and rebels during the evacuation of foreign nationals. From January 2003, once again mediating France intervened within the framework of the signing of the Marcoussis agreement, which provides for the maintenance of President Laurent Gbagbo in power and the integration into the

government of all political tendencies, including the rebels (Gouëset, 2011). However, the already existing anti-French demonstrations organized by pro-Gbagbo took violent turns intending to protest against the decisions made by France consisting in integrating the rebels into the government. In this environment of tension, an agreement providing for political reforms and the disarmament of the rebels was ratified in Accra on July 30, 2004. But the rebels believed that the bombardments by Laurent Gbagbo's loyalist armed forces on their bases in Bouaké and of Korhogo constituted a violation of the Accra agreement and, therefore, a breach of that agreement (Gouëset, 2011).

On March 1, 2006, the main actors in the crisis met to prepare for the presidential elections of October 31, 2006. Laurent Gbagbo, Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny, Alassane Ouattara, Henri Konan Bédié and the rebellion's leader Guillaume Soro are meeting to end the crisis Yamoussoukro, but this will be interrupted because of the gaps observed by the rebels on the modifications regarding the registration of voters. Following this failure, the Ouagadougou peace negotiations led to the signing of an agreement in March 2007 between Laurent Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro, providing for forming a new government of which Guillaume Soro is the Prime Minister as well as the departure to a term of UN forces and French soldiers. In addition, the two men agreed on dismantling the buffer zone in the North of the country and disarmament the rebels. Unfortunately, in 2009, a UN report deplored the rearmament in the North of the country, and the presidential elections were again postponed for 2010.

On February 12, 2010, President Laurent Gbagbo dissolved the Government and the Independent Electoral Commission, causing clashes and deaths among the population. To ease tensions, Prime Minister Guillaume Soro announced that presidential elections would finally take place on October 31, 2010. However, the refusal of the results of these elections in December 2010 by Laurent Gbagbo in favour of Alassane Ouattara, deemed the candidate of France, led to the birth of two governments in Ivory Coast, in particular that of Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. It was a chaotic situation which marked the beginning of the post-electoral crisis, which ended with the arrest on April 11, 2011, of President Laurent Gbagbo and his wife Simone Gbagbo, carried out thanks to the armed intervention of the French Licorne forces and UNOCI (United Nations Forces for Ivory Coast) (Gouëset, 2011). In addition, during the first inter-Ivorian crisis, another significant fact confirms France's interference in the Ivory Coast's internal affairs. , on November 6, 2004, on the orders of France, the Ivorian military air fleet was destroyed by French forces in retaliation for an error committed by the Ivorian government causing the death of nine French soldiers (Hofnung, 2005,p.113).

Subsequently, French interference will be much more visible in 2010 with the absence of neutrality displayed by the French authorities in managing the post-electoral crisis. This is because they decided to support militarily and diplomatically the candidate Ouattara considered capable of consolidating French interests in Côte d'Ivoire, to the detriment of the candidate Gbagbo who became harmful to their interests (Hofnung, 2005,p.150). Gbagbo, having launched a campaign to reform politico-economic relations with France, was seen as threatening French interests in Ivory Coast. Thus, by emphasizing the rapprochement of his country with Russia and China, or even by not hiding his desire to leave the West African economic zone of the CFA Franc considered as a colonial currency which does not benefit local African economies, he, therefore, posed a danger to the French authorities. On the contrary, Allassane Ouattara has held high positions at the IMF. This international institution has allowed him to rub shoulders with the greatest of this world, including Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy, both former presidents French in office during the decade of Ivorian conflict whose affinities were particularly more pronounced with Nicolas Sarkozy.

Consequently, two opposing visions of politics in the Ivory Coast emerged. A socialist and pan-African vision carried by Laurent Gbagbo, who wants a change in relations with France, and a more capitalist vision supported by Western countries such as France, which sees in Allassane Ouattara an ally who shares their position in economic and political matters. Thus, the interference of France in the politico-military crisis in Ivory Coast is motivated by the fear of losing its strategic position on the economic level as well as its diplomatic clientele on the political level in the region. Because Laurent Gbagbo, who came to power in 2000, wished to diversify the economic partners of the Ivory Coast, advocating the opening of the Ivorian market to Anglo-Saxon companies. France, which held the monopoly of the Ivorian economy, considered that these changes were likely to endanger its economic and geostrategic interests not only in Ivory Coast but also in the West African region.

Consequently, the mafia networks of Françafrique were activated to provide military and diplomatic support to the Ivory Coast, divided by an armed rebellion (the Forces Nouvelles) supported by Allassane Dramane Ouattara, the current president, who received the approval of France to take power in place of Laurent Gbagbo considered too anti-French (Hofnung,2005,p.150). In short, it might be observed that the involvement of France is genuine in the Ivorian politico-military crisis. Many experts in French defence issues confirmed that France played in this crisis its image of great power in the last space of influence and politics, an economic and military partnership where it still holds the monopoly (Dulin, 2005, pp. 74-75). Through this interference, it seems evident that France's ambition is to maintain its

influence in Ivory Coast and the region so that its voice is heard and respected internationally because it was crucial not to lose face (Dulin, 2005, pp.29-37). From the above, the historical and immediate causes of French interference in the Ivory Coast may be understood as essentially economic and geopolitical. In the following lines, we will discuss the multiple causes of the continuation of neo-colonial system and its implications for both sides.

3.6.7. Cause of Continuation of Neocolonialism: The Armed Interventions

The Ivorian population have always poorly perceived the presence of French forces maintained in Ivory Coast despite independence because it symbolizes a certain continuity of colonization. This because, after the 2002 coup attempt, the French forces present in Ivory Coast through the 43rd Marine Infantry Battalion (BIMA) were mandated by the United Nations for the first time to restore stability. However, in 2004, according to some media, French troops exceeded their mandate by directing their armoured vehicles towards the Presidency of the Republic (Galy, 2005, p. 796), a behaviour that foreshadowed a coup attempt that France would sponsor and add to that the bombardment of the Ivorian military installations of Bouaké located in the North of the country. Moreover, with the adoption of the United Nations Charter, international law legally frames military interventions on foreign territories in two ways, first on a bilateral basis through a defence agreement or a multilateral basis through authorization from the United Nations (Latty, 2015, p.13). Although international law has provided a legal framework for military interventions for humanitarian reasons, the main objective of States like France, sitting on the United Nations Security Council, is perpetually to consolidate its power. The intention to restore peace in developing countries in conflict is very questionable. Throughout the ongoing work, this reality will be demonstrated.

In the case of the Ivorian political-military conflict, France, through its military and diplomatic actions, gave the image of a former colonial and paternalistic power which continues to decide the future of the Ivory Coast. Although the French authorities have received the support of international public opinion and international legality, the existence of French troops on Ivorian territory for a long time has never been legitimized by the population because they are considered occupying troops in the service of France (Boniface, 2008, pp.55-57). Knowing that no external military operation is possible when it is likely to lead to the reluctance of the populations concerned (Boniface, 2008, pp.55-57), the French forces, which had already faced hostilities from the populations during the first Ivorian crisis of 2002-2004, should not have interfered militarily again in the post-electoral crisis of 2010. This would have made it possible to avoid the escalation of tensions with the populations.

Consequently, this situation has thus provoked massacres because of the aid provided by France to the "Forces Nouvelles" (the rebels of the North of the country) having taken power which in reality support Allasane Ouatarra. A moral deficit has been noted at this level of international law, knowing that it does not consider the international force's popular legitimacy, which must be engaged in the event of the need for external military intervention. International law through the United Nations Security Council, when authorizing military interference or intervention in a sovereign State, even if acting within a legal framework, must be able to put a point of honour on the legitimacy of this intervention. It seems essential that the legal and multinational framework must be respected. However, it must also consider the legitimacy of national public opinion (Boniface, 2008, pp.55-57), which was not the case in Ivory Coast. In such a situation, the periods before, during and after military intervention must be regarded with extreme care for durable peacekeeping purposes. To conclude, France occasionally violates international rules of non-intervention by first deploying forces and then cloaking them post hoc in legality with UN Security Council decisions. France invests too much in such operations, incurring significant "opportunity costs" that endanger its security regarding geopolitics and raw materials procurement (Yates, 2018, pp.1-2).

3.6.8. Cause of Continuation of Neocolonialism: The Role of the Elites

Every successive French government know that France's standing as one of the world's superpowers continues to be significantly influenced by its political, economic, military, and cultural presence in Africa. Additionally, some of the most infamous autocrats of francophone Africa benefited from this unique alliance with France's "African friends." Some of them, such as Paul Biya, Omar Bongo, and Eyadéma Gnassingbé, openly brag about their relationships with French heads of state. The post-colonial system of the clandestine, unofficial, and occasionally even criminal network known as "Françafrique" persisted despite numerous declarations to the contrary from French leaders (Kohnert, 2002, p.5). To maintain "la grandeur de la France" in world politics, as stated by General De Gaulle, the security of strategic supplies has always played a crucial role in French strategy towards Africa. Even the declaration of President François Mitterrand corroborated how much French elites need to maintain relations with African countries in the present day when he said that "Without Africa, there would be no history in France in the 21st century" (Krupova & Cech, 2020, pp.292-293).

The substantial quantities of iron and copper ore, gold, uranium and oil found in West and Central Africa in the 1950s are evidence of France's strong desire to maintain till now a sphere of influence in Africa. These were vital raw minerals for France and other post-war

nations controlling these regions. Consequently, through French companies that expanded their clientele to the sub-Saharan region of Africa, France sought to obtain exclusive access to these strategic raw minerals. Agriculture, particularly the production and processing of peanuts, was also important. Coffee and cocoa were Ivory Coast's principal exports being world-leading producers, which displayed France's keen desire to exert significant economic and political influence in this nation (Krupova & Cech, 2020, p. 297). On a geopolitical level, by establishing a network of allies as "Client states" that, together with France, could play a significant role in world affairs, France also hoped to maintain the integrity of its colonial territory and its status as a significant world player. Hence the importance of maintaining its colonial ties with former colonies through the FrancAfrique network as a tool of neo-colonialism. In addition, French authorities recognized that the presence of their military in African countries is crucial for promoting and protecting French economic and political interests (Krupova & Cech, 2020, p. 297).

In the same vein, the strength of France's diplomacy in world politics and notably in the UN system is also primarily due to the African countries that considerably support France's vision and proposals upon international matters. For some scholars, African votes guarantee the ranking of France as a superpower at the international level. President Macron established the Presidential Council for Africa, which comprises French and African members of civil society and the African diaspora to offer expert guidance on France-Africa ties to perpetuate the vital ties with African countries. In reality, until now, this council only served to polish the deteriorated French image in Africa and the rest of the world since no significant decisions have been made to mark the change of policy towards Africa that French elites have been marketizing. Most Africa-France summits have been focused on economic and financial aid, where France gives injunctions and priority to its interests by protecting and expanding its *pré carré* on the continent. At the same time, Africa can barely act as an actor in these meetings (Kohnert, 2002, p.5). Finally, the causes of the continuation of French neocolonialism in French Africa are multiple and related to geopolitical, economic, military and cultural paradigms.

3.6.9. Cause of Continuation of Neocolonialism: The Ethnical and Regional Divide of the Population Through the Concept of Ivoirité

In response to the backdrop of the economic crisis and widespread protests, Henri Konan Bédié thought he had found a remedy to strengthen his power and thus remove his competitors from the political arena. In this context, the concept of Ivoirité appeared in its most legal and divisive form, endangering national cohesion (Hofnung, 2005, p. 11). Economic and

social contrasts characterized the opposition between North and South. In the South, for example, there are large plantations of coffee, cocoa, rubber, and oil palm which made the Ivory Coast an economic power in West Africa in the 1980s (Jolivet, 2003, pp. 11-35). While in the North, there are only annual crops such as cotton and peanuts, whose incomes are marginal compared to those in the South. It was, therefore, a disadvantaged region (Jolivet, 2003, pp. 31-35). The Southern part of the country concentrated 90% of the economic activities until the beginning of the 2000s. These were essentially generated by the Muslim populations of the North who had been encouraged by the regime of Houphouët-Boigny. The President encouraged them to settle in the South of the country in the aim of creating national cohesion by allowing a natural integration of these populations with the Christian populations of the South. However, Christian populations have consistently rejected the populations of the North, believing that "the Ivorian people must first assert their sovereignty and their authority regarding the threats of dispossession and subjugation: whether it was immigration or economic and political power (Curdiphe, 1996, pp. 20-21). These premises saw the birth of anti-foreign sentiment in Ivory Coast, which has taken the abstract form of *Ivoirité*. In 1994, Henri Konan Bédié, having taken power after the death of Houphouët-Boigny, initiated reforms to eliminate political adversaries and economic actors from immigrant backgrounds (Vidjannangni, 2011, pp. 47-48). With the complicity of CURDIPHE (University Unit for Research and Dissemination of Ideas and Actions of President Henri Konan Bédié) and under the benevolent gaze of France, he, therefore, initiated a new electoral code and a law on nationality. These acts stipulated that anyone not of Ivorian descent and not belonging to an indigenous ethnic group cannot run for the post of President of the Republic (Vidjannangni, 2011, pp. 16-22). Also, he established another land law reform, which aimed at excluding and expropriating land for all Ivorians of immigrant origin mostly from Burkina Faso and Mali. (Curdiphe, 1996, pp. 65-69). As a result, in 2000, more than 20,000 Ivorians were expropriated from their land.

Ivoirité then became a xenophobic concept based on the systematic rejection of Ivorians of foreign origin. It was also a concept with an ethnic connotation because it was based on Ivorian ancestry and belonged to an indigenous ethnic group. Finally, it was a regionalist and religious concept, considering that it separated the populations of the North, mainly Muslims, from those of the South, who are Catholic. In reality, the idea of *ivoirité* was truly born when Félix Houphouët-Boigny was no longer alive to ensure social balance through the Pan-Africanism he wished to establish in Ivory Coast between different peoples. The nationalist excesses encouraged by France (Hofnung, 2005, pp. 18-45) on behalf of its interests have therefore been revealed through certain political parties such as Laurent Gbagbo's Front

Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) and other ultra-nationalist political parties which took part in the conflicts. These political parties campaigned to prevent non-indigenous Ivorian politicians from participating in the elections and, among other things, from becoming President of the Republic (Kouakou, 2006, pp. 11-17). Alassane Dramane Ouattara, president of the political party Rassemblement des Démocrates Républicains (RDR), whose majority of the electorate is concentrated in the North where he is from was directly concerned. In the application of the discriminatory electoral code, he was banned from running for president twice, first in 1995 and then in 2000.

On the death of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the country was politically and socio-economically weakened. Politically, the succession of power had not been prepared in such a way as to avoid ambiguities that could lead to a struggle for power. Moreover, the political and legal institutions of the time were characterized by real weakness to the point of being unable to ensure a democratic and peaceful transition within the norms. Socio-economically, the structural adjustment programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The devaluation of the CFA franc currency by France and the fall in cocoa and coffee prices on the international market, have led to an increase in the unemployment rate and a significant drop in the standard of living of the populations (Chauveau & Dozon, 2020). This economic crisis has had significant consequences: the population division between natives and immigrants who have acquired Ivorian nationality. This division resulted in five key points that led to the political and military crises in Ivory Coast:

The conceptualization and formalization of the concept of ivoirité;

The adoption of a new electoral code in 1994;

The reform of the land;

The birth of the rebellion of the pro-Ouattara Forces Nouvelles;

The interference of the French Army in the internal affairs of Ivory Coast.

Moreover, within the framework of the propaganda of the concept of ivoirité, there were also identity entrepreneurs (Kouakou, 2006, pp. 15-35) who found in these reforms the opportunity to exclude trade competitors, that is to say, Ivorian businessmen with an immigrant background to obtain better market shares. Finally, the formalization and instrumentalization of this identity discrimination received the help of the French Army and the French media to some extent, who favoured the concept of *Ivoirité* by presenting the pro-Ouattara rebels as the victims of the concept of *Ivoirité*. The reason for this absence of neutrality displayed by France in this ethnic conflict is apparent. The French authorities found in this concept a source of economic and geostrategic opportunities to continue to exert their influence in the Ivory Coast.

They believed that their influence was threatened by the arrival of Laurent Gbagbo in office who wanted to renegotiate the agreements signed with France in the post-colonial era. But it was challenged by the growing influence of other foreign powers such as China and Russia (Granvaud, 2009, pp. 57-62).

3.6.10. Cause of Continuation of Colonialism: The Economic Benefits of Ivory Coast for France

The first president Félix Houphouët-Boigny, despite his enlightened vision of the economic development of the Ivory Coast, made two significant errors which could be considered as the precursor factors of the outbreak of the Ivorian crises of 2002 and 2010. On the one hand, the failure to prepare his succession before he died in 1993 caused political chaos among the various suitors, knowing that Ivory Coast, a young democracy, barely knew the experience of a multiparty system and was, therefore, fragile to any attempt at political destabilization. On the other hand, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, by agreeing to continue the policy of massive immigration supported by the former French colonial administration (Hofnung, 2001, pp. 9-11), was unable to provide the country with infrastructures for the transformation of raw materials. This could have been used to create jobs, to avoid the worsening of the economic crisis and the popular uprisings that led to the division of Ivorian society. Houphouët Boigny preferred to keep the colonial economic standard which imposes an interventionist development model subject to the rules of the international market (Hofnung, 2001, pp.9-11). The country enjoyed economic stability inherited from the colonial period because it benefited from colonial agro-industrial infrastructures based on large coffee and cocoa plantations mostly exported to France, which until today constitute the country's primary resources (Hofnung, 2001, pp. 18-45). However, the agricultural and economic policy implemented by the French colonial administration did not last because of ethnic tensions and the social injustices caused by this policy. To enhance the territory and develop the plantation economy on a large scale, the Houphouët-Boigny regime called in 1960s on foreign capital and foreign labour consisting mainly of Burkinabe, Malians and Guineans (Konan, 2012, pp. 121-146). This contributed to the strengthening of the economic dynamic making the Ivory Coast the first economy in West Africa between 1960 and 1980, weighing 40 % of the Gross Domestic Product of WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union). France supported this policy because the economic results were satisfying its national companies in Ivory Coast. Economists have called this economic upturn an "Ivorian Miracle". However, the Ivorian economy, based mainly

on the exploitation of cocoa, could not compete on the international market, causing a severe political and economic crisis affecting almost all sectors.

Thus, the intervention of France in the Ivorian crises through its soldiers of the Licorne force appeared as a necessity in the eyes of the French authorities. Given the political and economic interests, it was essential to perpetuate the French achievements in the only region where it still had influence. This because, according to the economic mission of the French embassy in Ivory Coast, a long and deadly civil war would endanger its multiple interests knowing that 50% of foreign investments in Ivory Coast were French (Hofnung, 2005, pp. 11-26).

Furthermore, maintaining the Ivory Coast in the French zone of influence had a double objective. On the one hand, on the economic level, France wants to guarantee the security of the colossal profits drawn from the cultivation of coffee and cocoa, of which Ivory Coast is one of the leading producers in the world (Hofnung, 2005, pp. 11-20). Then, it wants to secure to its advantage the exploitation and marketing of other raw materials such as gold, ivory and palm oil (Dulin, 2005, pp. 11-16). On the other hand, on the political level, bilateral Franco-Ivorian relations before and after independence were marked by the desire of Felix Houphouët-Boigny to maintain historical ties with the former French colonial power. The unwavering support to France of the first president of independent Ivory Coast allowed the drafting of the Ivorian constitution under the model of the French constitution (Hofnung, 2005, pp. 15-20), thus excluding the consideration of the different customs and traditions specific to Ivory Coast by endangering the lasting social and economic stability of the country. Admittedly, Ivory Coast experienced a considerable economic boom in its agricultural production through its flagship crops during the colonial period and the first years of its independence. According to FAO statistics, between 1947-1960, cocoa exports increased from 28,048 tons to 109,000 tons. Those of coffee from 42,667 tons to 188,000 tons. Thus, thanks to the aid of France, Ivory Coast experienced strong economic growth of around 10% from 1960 to 1975. (Illustration Chart 4 below).




Figure 4: Dynamics of Ivorian economic growth from 1961-1978 (GDP)

Source: World Development Indicators.

Apart from the shortfall recorded in 1965, Ivorian economic growth was maintained on the rise from 1961 to 1978 between 9% and 10%, thanks to the increase in cocoa prices on the international market.

Experts say Ivory Coast ranks first among cocoa producers, with more than 2 million tons (Shahbandeh, 2022). However, it seemed apparent that the development of road infrastructure was a priority for the colonial administration, in the sense that it should make it possible to extract from the agricultural production zones the primary resources of the colony (cocoa, coffee) to export them to the French metropolis as shown in the diagram below. The strict and accelerated development of cocoa cultivation in the Ivory Coast during the pre-colonial period underlines the interest of this culture, which characterizes a type of colonization considering the Ivory Coast as an exploitation colony. It should be noted that France remained the first trading partner of the Ivory Coast until 2017, and today second behind China (source: Trésor économie France).




Figure 5: Ivorian cocoa exports rate in 1938

Source : Xavier de Planhol, 'Le cacao en Côte d'Ivoire : étude de géographie régionale', *L'information géographique*, Cilt 11, No 2, 1947, p. 54-57.

Moreover, French interference in Ivorian economic policy has enabled France to sign economic, monetary and military cooperation agreements with Ivory Coast to have the right to act unilaterally in this country or other French-speaking African countries, sometimes with the complicity of the international community (Verschave, 1998, pp. 22-26). Ivorian economic policy has served as a strategic platform to unite almost all West African countries in a standard monetary zone: the West African Monetary Union (WAMU). Following the example of the Central African Monetary Union (UMAC), the WAMU was created by the leaders of West African countries under the leadership of the Ivory Coast. This initiative was encouraged and supported by France, whose main objective was to protect and develop its economic and geostrategic interests in this region of Africa, of which French companies and foreign policy are the driving force. Furthermore, as Antoine Dulin points out in his book, this French politico-military and economic presence also thwarted the African ambitions of Western powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom or China (Dulin, 2005, pp. 13-16).

3.6.11. The role of Local Leaders in Facilitating French Neocolonialism

Security links between France and Africa significantly influenced the development of economic and political ties between France and Francophone Africa. According to this perspective, African political elites have encouraged and signed defence agreements, such as those involving military-technical assistance, training for African commanders, the establishment of French military bases in Francophone nations, and the sale of arms, to further

their interests as well as those of the former colonial power. By 1990, France possessed military outposts in 22 African nations, including Djibouti, Senegal, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Gabon, and the Ivory Coast, all of which have oppressive and staunchly pro-French governments. In the event of domestic and external dangers, French military have to defend governments with which France has defence agreements. France's security approach to Africa has focused on two key objectives. First, to safeguard French economic and political interests by protecting "friendly governments" against domestic attack. Then, in case of external threats, these governments must also be protected (Siradağ, 2014, p. 107). One of the essential methods of French foreign policy in Africa was establishing personal ties with Francophone leaders. To enhance ties with France, all heads of Francophone African states were elected to the French Parliament between 1946 and 1958.

Ivory Coast and Senegal, in particular, have close political ties to French political history. For instance, between 1956 and 1959, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the President of the Ivory Coast, worked as a minister in the French government. Similarly, between 1955 and 1956, Léopold Sédar Senghor served as President of Senegal and a minister in the French government. In addition, he presided over Senegal for 14 years while serving in the French National Assembly. Likewise, Modibo Keita, the first president of Mali, and Ahmed Sékou Touré, the first president of Guinea, were both heavily involved in French politics between 1958 and 1984 and held important positions there (Siradağ, 2014, 110). Thus, all of these African leaders were coopted by France to be educated in the metropolis later to serve the French interests back in their countries. This strategy was also valid for African militaries going to France for training. As a result, political leaders who developed a particular friendship with France were more likely to request French interventions whenever they believed it was necessary to comply with the cooperation agreements. Today, this way of thinking from some African leaders is still present.

3.6.12. International Community's Support vis à vis French Hegemonic Behaviour

In recent years, France based its foreign policy towards Africa on international cooperation to be endorsed by other world state powers and international organizations. The main arguments brandished by France to obtain international support to intervene are the maintenance of peace and stability, security, struggle against terrorism, good governance, democratization, and illegal immigration. Therefore, French policy towards Africa shifted from a unilateralism policy to a multilateralism policy since the former colonizer understood that unilateralism had been so expensive and then tarnished France's image (Siradağ, 2014, p. 114). Moreover, France is one of the nations providing the most support to the UN peacekeeping

missions in Africa. It is vital in bolstering those operations' military and financial capabilities. One recognizes that France has benefited much from the military multilateralism policy since it elevates France's stature internationally and gives its military operations in Africa legitimacy.

In the same vein, France founded 1998 the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) in cooperation with the United States and England to increase the military capacities of the African countries (Siradağ, 2014, p. 114). However, the multilateralism displayed by France under international community and cooperation has the only goal of maintaining its influence over Francophone Africa against the growing leverage of China and Russia (Siradağ, 2014, pp. 113-115). Moreover, since Britain left the EU, Brexit has opened vast paths for France to become the supreme power regarding European Union (EU)-Africa relations. This was a new opportunity for France to strengthen and blend its *"pré carré"* of the famous *"messieurs Afrique"* as France's friends by influencing all the EU decisions towards Africa because France has been historically considered by its pairs as the legitimate world power able to control and influence a vast amount of African countries (Kohnert, 2022, pp. 2-3). Therefore, France was implicitly allowed or recognized as the African states' voice in world politics.

As many scholars stated, one may understand that France has been trying to utilize United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions to enforce its national agenda. However, as a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, France has favoured the realist principle of "non-intervention" over the "responsibility to protect," according to particular academics. As such, French peacekeeping interventions have preeminence in UN Security Council decisions concerning African states. In addition, for international law scholars, the French military has sometimes intervened illegally by deploying their troops and covering their actions using UN Security Council resolutions (Yates, 2018, pp. 1-2). Finally, the tragic events that precipitated the Ivorian crisis and deteriorated French-Ivorian relations, such as the bombing of a French military outpost in Bouaké on November 6, 2004, and the French army's deadly shootings of young Ivorian protesters massed outside the Hotel Ivoire in Abidjan three days later have given the French intervention a particular focus. This opinion was supported by France's critical stance toward Laurent Gbagbo's Ivorian government, which was reflected in the several resolutions adopted at the Council of Security, including those passed in 2005 (Resolution 1633) and 2006 (Resolution 1721) at France's instigation (Bourgi, 2009, p. 10).

The following chapter details the application of the above empirical explanation to the military crises from 2000 to 2010 in the Ivory Coast.

CHAPTER 4

THE CASES OF FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN IVORY COAST: 2002 COUP ATTEMPT AND 2010 POST-ELECTORAL CONFLICT

The French military has lately intervened in Ivory Coast twice after declaring in the 1990s that "Françafrique" was ended. France first intervened to end a civil war in 2002, and then after President Laurent Gbagbo refused to accept the results of the 2010 election, France intervened to have him removed in 2011. Concerning the contemporary history of French-speaking Africa, the two politico-military crises in Ivory Coast can be considered to have brought together all the ingredients of neocolonialism.

4.1. The Case of the 2002 Coup Attempt

To understand the role of France in the politico-military crisis in Ivory Coast, it is essential to evoke the historical context, particularly the coup attempt perpetrated in 2002, which divided the country into two regions, plunging it into a decade of conflicts. Given the disorganization of the army and the mistreatment of soldiers who demanded better living and working conditions within a country in economic crisis and lacking in ethnocultural references, General Robert Guei (Hofnung, 2005, pp. 18-45) staged a coup in 1999 to remove President Henri Konan Bédié from office. This disastrous politico-military transition that gave rise to the chaotic election of Laurent Gbagbo in 2000, generating deep divergences within the population. Moreover, the L. Gbagbo regime openly encouraged ethnonationalism radicalization, marginalizing part of the army with an immigrant background that it planned to demobilize to benefit its Bété ethnic group (Dulin, 2005, pp. 28-29). This discrimination was to manifest itself in a structural discontent of the Ivorian army, instrumentalized then transformed into a rebellion to organize a coup on September 19, 2002. Even if this coup attempt fomented by disgruntled soldiers (Banegas & Losch, 2002, pp. 139-145) can be described as a "true false coup" because having failed to overthrow the power in place, the fact remains that it caused the split between the North and South of the country.

Thus, the northern and central regions of the country (Khorogo, Bouaké) were occupied by the rebels named Forces Nouvelles supported by Allassane Ouattara while the South remained under the control of the loyalist forces of President L.Gbagbo (Dulin, 2005, p.5). France deployed its military forces from the beginning of the hostilities of the rebel movement on the territory to ensure, according to their statement, the protection of their nationals. The

main argument for the engagement of the former colonial power into the politico-military crisis of 2002 was officially linked to securing the strong community of French expatriates, whose number amounted to nearly 17,000 nationals at that period (Dulin, 2005, pp. 28-29). However, by launching Operation Licorne, France was aware that protecting the French was not its only motivation. Ivory Coast has been the showcase country of France in Africa during the colonial period and decolonization, representing the French authorities an assurance of the maintenance of their geostrategic power in this region of the world.

According to several political analysts, destabilising this region starting from the Ivory Coast would be synonymous with the decline of French power in the international arena to benefit Anglo-Saxon powers such as the United States and England (Guinant, 2013, p. 53). Therefore, French troops were deployed as an interposition force under the mandate of the UN and the ECOWAS. They had the mission to secure the status quo between the North and the South, and impose the application of the Linas-Marcoussis agreements facilitated by Paris on January 24, 2003, for Ivorian national reconciliation.

Under the exclusive direction of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, negotiations were organized between the main actors of this political and military crisis of 2002 to define the sharing of power with a Prime Minister of consensus who will have to form a government with representatives of each of the delegations that took part in these peace negotiations. However, the agreements provided for Laurent Gbagbo to remain President of the Republic until October 2005, the date of the new presidential elections. However, faced with the failure of these agreements due to the unwillingness of the main protagonists to apply them, namely Laurent Gbagbo, Henri Konan Bédié, Alassane Ouattara, and Guillaume Soro, France maintained its military forces deployed on Ivorian territory. However, Operation Licorne, launched by France, was seriously bogged down by the bombardment of the French military base in Bouaké on November 7, 2004, and the drama of the shooting at the Hôtel Ivoire on November 9 of the same year. This is because these two events revealed once again the reality of the parallel diplomacy between France and its former colony based on the opaque networks of *Françafrique*.

Regarding the bombardment of Bouaké, having killed nine French soldiers, L. Gbagbo would have warned the French authorities several days before that his loyalist forces would launch an offensive against the rebels to regain control of the northern region. Despite their knowledge of the situation, it seemed that no security measures had been taken to avoid this bombardment. In retaliation, France ordered the destruction of the Ivorian air fleet and the French military's takeover of the capital Abidjan. According to some analysts, France, having

failed to react to avoid the massacre of its soldiers, was looking for an alibi to foment a coup against the troublesome regime of Laurent Gbagbo (Granvaud & Mauger, 2018, pp. 18-35). Despite the denial of the French authorities, some military officials of the French army at the head of Operation Licorne declared that this bombardment would be a set-up to trap President L. Gbagbo. According to the remarks reported by the French newspaper "Médiapart" on November 29, 2011, General Poncet, who commanded the French army in Ivory Coast, raised the possibility of a "manipulated blunder" for the benefit of the French interests (Granvaud & Mauger, 2014). In addition, General Malaussène, also in command of Operation Licorne, affirmed on November 12, 2013, through the magazine "Jeune Afrique" that there was a political project to put Ouattara in place and knock out Gbagbo". According to him, L. Gbagbo's regime has fallen into a trap.

Therefore, in protest against the French military presence suspected of wanting to stage a coup against Gbagbo judging by the armoured vehicles of the French army, which were surrounding the residence of President L. Gbagbo, the "young "patriots" favourable to the regime, organized a campaign of unarmed intimidation of French nationals, which was strongly repressed. Several dozen Ivorians were killed in these shootings at the Hotel Ivoire carried out by the soldiers of Operation Licorne. From this tragic event, several concordant sources from French and Ivorian journalists affirmed that the shots were fired by snipers from the Special Operations Command of the French Army position on the sixth floor of the Hotel Ivoire at the time of the tragedy (Granvaud & Mauger, 2018, pp.1-4).

Furthermore, the results of an investigation carried out by a South African police forensic laboratory into the Hotel Ivoire shootings maintained that all the shots that were fired were from the positions described as being held by the French towards the positions of the civilians.

(Report of the investigation into the shootings at the Hôtel Ivoire in November 2004, 2005, pp.35-80). Through the recorded testimonies and the clear evidence of the South African investigation, it appeared that the desire of the French authorities to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ivory Coast was natural and undermined the sovereignty of this African country. Moreover, France's interference in the politico-military crisis of 2002 drove its involvement in the 2010 crisis. The French authorities' permanent presence since 1999 in stabilizing the political climate in Ivory Coast through the peace mission embodied by the Licorne force contributed to its lack of neutrality to the aggravation of the post-electoral crisis in 2010. Besides, the series of fruitless peace negotiations led by France, the United Nations and African regional organizations to relaunch the peace process led to the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement

(OPA) signed in March 2007. This agreement will constitute a real hope for peace in Ivory Coast since the repeated failures of previous agreements. Although facilitated by Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré and the United Nations, the OPA was the first peace agreement based on direct dialogue between Ivorian political actors without intermediaries and falling within the framework of resolution 1721 adopted by the Council of the United Nations on November 1, 2006, for peace in Ivory Coast. This agreement enabled the appointment of Guillaume Soro as Prime Minister, the entry of the rebels called Forces Nouvelles into the government of Laurent Gbagbo's regime and the disarmament of the latter (Rapport Afrique, 2007, pp. 1-7). Thus, the political contingencies of this crisis resulting from the coup attempt favoured the official integration of a heterogeneous group of combatants into the political and security apparatus of the State by transforming the Forces Nouvelles into the Republican Forces of Ivory Coast. These transformations within the Ivorian army revealed decisive changes in the political sphere that led to the 2010 crisis.

4.2. The Case of 2010 Post-Electoral Conflict

The post-electoral crisis of November 2010, which ended in April 2011 thanks to the French military intervention resulting in the arrest of President Laurent Gbagbo, later transferred to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, thus led to the seizure of power by President Alassane Ouattara at the head of the country (RAIDH, 2013, pp.27-29). , the OPA aimed to organize presidential elections in 2010, which had been postponed several times since the country split between rebels and Laurent Gbagbo's regime. However, the post-electoral crisis of October 2010 with allegations of fraud resulting from the refusal of the hypothetical defeat of Laurent Gbagbo, who was opposed to the second round to Alassane Ouattara, ended in April 2011, after several months of violence and clashes between the supporters of Laurent Gbagbo and those of Alassane Ouattara. The French forces and the French political authorities that allowed his installation into office as President during the same year (Savès, 2018) supported Ouattara. While Ouattara's supporters rejoiced that French and international forces had ousted Laurent Gbagbo's regime from power, L.Gbagbo's supporters saw this interference as "France's war against Ivory Coast" and a blatant confirmation of France's neo-colonialist interests in the ten-year Ivory Coast conflict (Banégas, 2017, p. 291).

The Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) head, Youssouf Bakayoko, declared Alassane Ouattara the winner on December 2 with 54.10 per cent of the vote versus Laurent Gbagbo's 45.90 per cent, with an 81.1% turnout. According to the Constitutional Council, the announcement of the results had been repeatedly delayed and would have happened after the

deadline. The fact that this statement took place at the Hotel du Golf, which UNOCI soldiers guarded, astonished the media. According to reports, Bakayoko stated in the hotel that Ouattara, one of the two leading contenders, chose as his campaign headquarters because he wanted to take advantage of the UN forces' protection, including the French military. In the same frame, the head of the Constitutional Council, Paul Yao N'Dre, who was rumoured to be close to Simone Gbagbo the first lady and was nominated by the President on August 8, 2009, claimed that the results were illegitimate since the CEI was no longer authorized to disclose them because the time had passed. N'Dre asserted that the Constitutional Council alone has the authority to declare the results following the deadline; this body must decide, if necessary, the electoral lawsuit and proclaim the results of the ballot." The military then locked the country's borders after making this declaration. As a result, the anti-colonialist discourse expanded tenfold in April 2011 when President Sarkozy decided to bomb Laurent Gbagbo's loyalist army positions, which were encamped in his Cocody bunker (Banégas, 2017, pp. 290-295).

Moreover, Raphaël Granvaud and David Mauger gave an interview to the magazine *Billets d'Afrique* on October 25, 2018, in which they stated that this French intervention led to Alassane Ouattara's ascension to power in 2011 marked a genuine restoration of the previous system. Unlike L.Gbagbo becoming so anti-french, this former prime minister of Houphouët, a staunch supporter of the CFA Franc and glad to have seen the military base of Port-Bout continue as one of the French army's most technologically advanced operational bases in Africa, today brought happiness to French diplomacy, which only looked at the growth rate demonstrated and the contracts obtained. However, Ouattara's "Emergence 2020" will not be more of a reality than Houphouët's "Ivorian Miracle". Besides, the former first lady Simone Gbagbo during her trial in which she was accused of perpetrating genocide in the tragic events of the post-election crisis, declared that France's interference exacerbated the post-election crisis. "The action of the former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, combined with that of the international community, through the decision to put Ivory Coast under an economic embargo has contributed to destabilizing the country." According to her, the French army's military action was also deemed premature because it occurred without a UN Security Council resolution at that particular time.

Furthermore, beyond this humanitarian and superficial aspect of French interference, as stated by French authorities, genuinely more economical and geostrategic reasons motivated this decision to intervene. This is because, Raphaël Granvaud, co-author of the book "Un Pompier Pyromane" published by Agones, affirmed that during the Gbagbo years in power, France did not intervene in Ivory Coast to resolve the crisis, but in otherwise to make it worse.

According to him, France instead of being a neutral arbiter was rather a very committed actor with its desire to oust the Gbagbo regime while bolstering its proven links with the rebellion documented by the indications of complicity, which have been reported. And all of this allows for the continuity of the Françafrique system (Boisbouvier,2019).

4.3. France's use of Military Agreements as a Legitimation for Both Interventions

Implementing the defence agreements between France and the newly independent African States resulted in a French military network in Africa, which was summed up in a strategic binomial: "presence and intervention," which led to several decades of cooperation referred to as the "Françafrique" relations. To maintain control over the African states, its influence on the continent, and some advantages over the signatory States of these agreements, the unique French military system in French Africa has used the legal guarantee of defence and technical assistance agreements. Thus, these advantages are measured by superiority in status, equipment, and freedom of action and decision-making. According to the French government, the goals of France's defence strategy in Africa are to protect its interests, whether they be strategic or consequential, to support its African allies militarily in the event of an invasion or subversion, and to permit an ultra-quick intervention when the situation calls for it (Houénou, 2021,pp.128-135). Because of its influence derived from the agreements over its African allies, France can choose whether an armed intervention is wise based on its interests and the situation. This is made feasible by the defence agreements' secrecy and obscurity, the interpretation of which is left entirely up to France. This freedom of action by France toward the African States made legal by the agreements exposes the lack of transparency and, in particular, the enormous imbalance in the military relationship between France and Africa. It also shows that the African leaders cannot object to specific military decisions made by France in Africa (Houénou,2021, pp. 128-139).

Furthermore, French military interventions in Africa, particularly in Ivory Coast, have often been controversial because of their legal basis or organic link with the United Nations (Bourgi, 2009,p.10). In an article published on November 7, 2002, by Radio France Internationale (RFI), it is written that at least seven military agreements, including a general defence pact from April 1961, a covert agreement governing the upkeep of law and order in Ivorian territory, and five technical agreements signed between 1965 and 1998, bind France and Ivory Coast. President Houphouët has always seen these accords as an "umbrella" assuring the nation's security without overspending on building an Ivorian army, along with the deployment of permanent French forces in Port Bouët and technical military aid. The defence

agreements signed between France and the Ivory Coast in April 1961 gave France the power to intervene as it wished, mainly through Articles 6 and 10. In Article 6, "The French Republic undertakes to provide the Republic of Ivory Coast, the Republic of Dahomey and the Republic of Niger with the assistance necessary for the formation of their armed forces". Article 10, "The Republic of Ivory Coast undertakes to respect the existing easements of the military installations of the French armed forces and to allow the modification of these easements in the event of technical necessity." More clearly, one may understand by "the assistance necessary" the opportunity to install military outposts in a newly independent and sovereign state. And by "easements" one may understand subjection and constraints to durably accept along with the conditions bequeathed by the colonial era.

Moreover, the author Wyss largely sustained in his book the argument that the defence agreement between France and Ivory Coast signed in 1961 represented a security tool for the former colonial power to maintain its influence in the country. France used this security role as leverage to bring the Ivory Coast into cooperation agreements after independence to perpetuate the colonial stranglehold on the country by ensuring to protect of its strategic interests in West Africa (Wyss, 2021, pp. 62-90). The framework, goals, and methods of French military assistance to the Ivory Coast were outlined in the Defence Agreement and the Technical Military Aid Agreement. This aid allowed France to maintain its political influence as the primary State to represent Ivory Coast in international organizations when the latter could not. Consequently, Ivorian Army was placed under France's military leadership by thus granting France the opportunity to intervene in Ivory Coast whenever it judges necessary. The exceptionally close relations between General Charles de Gaulle and Félix Houphouët-Boigny mostly facilitated the French interferences in the Ivorian domestic issues during the post-colonial period (Banga, 2022, pp. 1-5). The French-African post-colonial history showed us that the spirit of the defence agreements passed with the Ivory Coast was also valid for all the other former colonies having signed cooperation agreements with France.

4.4. France Obtaining Advantages in Post-Crisis Politico-Military Relations Between Ivory Coast and the Former French Colonial Power Due to Interventions

The concluding part will focus on the consequences of the interventions, including the post-conflict relations between France and the regime of Alassane Ouattara on the political, economic and security levels as well as their implications for a more enlightened Ivorian society.

At the end of the decade of politico-military crises in Ivory Coast marked by the end of the post- electoral crisis in 2011, the new regime led by Allassane Dramane Ouattara and the former rebels converted into the Forces Nouvelles worked for peace and reconciliation. They also contributed to the revival of the economy by signing new agreements on defence and economic cooperation with France. For example, **the French construction company Bouygues obtained the building permit for the third bridge over the lagoon of Abidjan.** Also, according to Colonel Frédéric Gauthier, commander of the French forces in Ivory Coast, an adjustment of the defence agreement was mentioned with a view, it seemed, **to strengthening the defence capacities of the Ivorian forces.** On the other hand, the new Ivorian authorities were facing enormous security challenges, mainly because of the exile of pro-Bgagbo soldiers in Liberia and Ghana, which was a concern. In addition, it should also be noted that the heterogeneous recomposition of the Republican Forces of Ivory Coast (FRCI), whose lack of organization and hierarchy threatened the lives of the populations and the Ivorian economy, remained a significant security challenge which required help notably from France (Yebouet, 2011, p.22).

At the same time, it should be emphasized that the confidence granted to the French authorities to rebuild the Ivory Coast looked like a thank you, knowing that the French military and political interventions have been a precious help for the new regime resulting from the rebellion. , the year 2002, which marked the birth of the rebellion, benefited from French support through the act of confirmation of a no-crossing zone, giving the rebels the right to divide the country in two by besieging the areas of north, centre and west of Ivory Coast (Yebouet, 2011, pp.22-32). This mark of recognition displayed by the new Ivorian authorities towards France brought up again the question of foreign interference, which was one of the main problems of the politico-military crisis in Ivory Coast. French political and military interference in Ivory Coast still raises questions today. France hastened to take, side in favour of one of the protagonists, in particular that of the rebels and the current President Allassane Ouattara, without having taken care to study all the options for a peaceful resolution. French intervention has carried out under the pretext of the need to protect civilian populations and prevent the use of heavy weapons. However, according to several experts in Ivorian politics, France's objectives are clear: to regain the economic and geopolitical control that was gradually slipping away from their influence in the Ivory Coast and the West African sub-region because of the growing presence of China, the United States and other emerging countries. Through this Ivorian politico-military crisis, France saw the opportunity to reshuffle the cards of its area of influence in its favour by allowing Ivorian political leaders likely to accommodate French

policy to gain power. (Yebouet, 2011, p.23). Thus, since Alassane Ouattara took office in 2011, bilateral relations between Ivory Coast and France have evolved considerably, particularly in economic and military cooperation.

A substantial business delegation led by Prime Minister François Fillon travelled to Abidjan in July 2011 to relaunch trade and cooperation between the two nations, a few months after the arrest of President Gbagbo and the installation of President Ouattara. President Nicolas Sarkozy, a close friend of President Ouattara, invited him to a sumptuous state visit in Paris in January 2012 to turn the page on the crisis years and reestablish strong ties. In July 2014, François Hollande was officially welcomed at the shores of the Ebrie Lagoon. In March 2017, just a few months after leaving the Elysée, he welcomed his Ivorian counterpart to Paris. Moreover, France's military intervention did not just assist Alassane Ouattara in gaining power. It strongly backed up its actions with enormous resources. , France granted Ivory Coast the largest C2D (Debt Reduction and Development Contract) ever signed by the French cooperation in support of the country's reconstruction amounted to more than 2.5 billion euros. Nearly all areas of public action, including infrastructure, youth, education, agriculture, and transportation, benefitted from this support from France and other European countries. The French military was also heavily involved in the reform of the Ivory Coast's democratic forces. Military interference and bilateral tensions were forgotten (Banégas, 2017, pp. 307-308).

With the fall of Laurent Gbagbo in April 2011, the Ivorian regime returned to the hands of supporters of France. Thus, to mark its enthusiasm for the warming of relations with the Ivory Coast after a decade of troubled relations with the regime of Laurent Gbagbo, France has decided to cancel a significant part of the Ivorian foreign debt. At the same time, François Fillon Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy granted government financial aid to the new Ivorian government as support for salary payments of Ivorian civil servants (Adingra, 2019). Furthermore, during his visit to Ivory Coast in 2012, François Fillon announced the need for cooperation in security and defence by mentioning strategies for the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former rebels. Moreover, he firmly demanded from the Ouattara regime "the end of the reign of the zone commanders of the former Forces Nouvelles rebellion who constitute an obstacle to security and economic development and proposes to President Ouattara to appoint the French General Claude Reglat to take care of his side of the Refoundation of the new Ivorian armed forces ".

However, the technical, financial and qualified personnel support announced by the French authorities for the reconstruction process in Ivory Coast was seen as a strategy for France to strengthen its economic influence in this country, referring to significant contracts it

benefitted in several sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure and telecommunications. France also wanted to ensure the continuity of its diplomatic influence in the region of West Africa, even if the official discourse promotes an emerging, sovereign Ivory Coast while making it a model of a north-south relationship of which it would be the standard bearer (Adingra, 2019). This is because, throughout the politico-military crisis in Ivory Coast, French interference in the political, economic and military domains was a reality. As advantage, intervening on the Ivory Coast enabled France to safeguard its influence in the region (Dulin, 2005, p. 32). France succeeded in retaining its military bases and securing its economic networks despite the objections against its presence. Thus, the Ivorian debt has been relieved under the restructuring mechanism implemented by the AFD. Through the Debt Reduction and Development Contract (C2D), France wished to relaunch its bilateral cooperation through an exceptional financial commitment to develop education, vocational training and infrastructure (Bony, 2018). Finally, in its quest for strategic repositioning in Ivory Coast, France understands the importance of a **reform of the defence agreements**. But whose fundamental principles will allow **the maintenance of a French military presence on Ivorian soil** and, therefore, the possibility of continued interference (Larcher, 2012).

4.5. The Strengthening of the Military Dependence of Ivory Coast on France in the Post-Intervention Period

Despite the French authorities' promise to end systematic military interventions and dismantle their military bases in Africa, French troops still have a strong presence, particularly on the Ivory Coast. Thus, in the wake of the first presidential decrees promulgated by Alassane Dramane Ouattara, apart from the one which constituted the former rebel troops into the Republican Forces of Ivory Coast, there was also the one that put an end to Operation Licorne and created the French Forces of Ivory Coast (FFCI) under a new defence agreement. Thus, concerning the content of this defence partnership signed a few months after the end of the post-election crisis on January 26, 2012, France demonstrated in a less ostensible but asserted way its desire to remain in Ivory Coast. In reality, the clauses of the first defence agreement signed between Ivory Coast and France on April 24, 1961, do not present any significant differences with the new agreement. On the contrary, the two agreements formalize the presence of French troops in the Ivory Coast (Kouadio, 2018) and display solid signs of a lack of reciprocity, inequality, subjugation and French interference in the internal affairs of the Ivory Coast (Kouadio, 2018). Thanks to this new agreement, to maintain was an opportunity to maintain less than 300 French soldiers on Ivorian soil and dismantle the military base.

However, in 2014, the French authorities under François Hollande found the pretext of the crises in Mali and the Central African Republic, not only to exploit the port and airport infrastructures of Ivory Coast but also to increase the number of French soldiers to 900, to ensure the logistics flow to these two countries (Lagneau, 2017). In other words, the speeches of the intention of the French leaders have never been followed by facts since they continue, thanks to the French Forces in Ivory Coast (FFCI) stationed in the country to interfere militarily, politically and economically with the interior affairs. This is because, according to the General Directorate of the French Treasury, since the end of the crisis, France remained the leading investor in Ivory Coast, whose companies account for around 30% of the country's gross domestic product. It is, therefore, evident that France continues to exercise control over the general policy of Ivory Coast through the FFCIs, which are a tool of deterrence and pressure in the service of French political and geostrategic interests, whose mission is also to guarantee the obtaining of public contracts in Ivory Coast.

President Emmanuel Macron, following the same African policy of France as his predecessors, declared during an official meeting with President Allassane Ouattara in 2017 that France will again strengthen in the coming weeks and months in a very concrete way its partnerships in terms of military cooperation, intelligence and military training with Ivory Coast. This declaration proves that the French presence and its interference in Ivory Coast continue to exist. Thus, this interference jeopardizes the sovereignty of the Ivorian State and, consequently, its social and political stability (Pennetier, 2017). Finally, although the mutual assistance clause has been removed from the new defence agreement, it nevertheless reserves the freedom for the French party to provide assistance to a partner for its external defence, and to include this support in the framework of the collective security systems of the United Nations and the African Union (Leboeuf, 2017, pp. 14-36). This additional strategy allows France to maintain its military troops in Ivory Coast.

4.6. The Deepening of Economic Dependence of Ivory Coast to France

Economic relations between Ivory Coast and France since the end of the crisis in 2011 have been increasingly strong. , according to the general management of the French treasury: "France is the leading investor in Ivory Coast both in terms of flow (50 million Euros in 2018 according to the Banque de France) and stock (1.6 billion euros). [...] More than 90% of the stock of French investments is directed towards several strategic sectors of activity such as finance, the hotel industry, and the agricultural, mining and oil industries. By establishing 700 French companies including nearly 200 subsidiaries, France is clearly in a position of

permanent strength since it exercises control over the Ivorian economy. For example, in 2015, French companies contributed 50% to the tax revenues of the Ivorian State and represented 30% of the country's gross domestic product (Rapport Trésor Français, 2018).

According to some French and Ivorian journalists, the economic dependence of Ivory Coast vis-à-vis France is based on an essential factor relating to the institutionalization of the C2D mechanism mentioned above. This development strategy aims to reduce poverty in the Ivory Coast by converting its debt into subsidies to finance development projects (Bony, 2018). But in reality, the AFD, the main operator, chooses the development projects. In other words, France, in its historically paternalistic and imperialist role, continues to exert its influence on the future of the Ivory Coast, interfering in its development policies, thus having the power to decide on what should be done or not. Consequently, this consolidation of economic Cooperation with France is akin to economic interference, as Claude Quémard evokes in his article "La dette cachée illégitime de Mozambique ". The French authorities use this C2D method to manage bilateral debt relief according to their own rules with the aim of favouring French companies in the Ivory Coast (Quémard, 2017).

4.7. The Reform of French-Ivorian Relations: A Necessity

Over the past twenty years, the common Franco-Ivorian history has suffered from several obstacles, the worst of which have led to military interventions and socio-political crises in the Ivory Coast. As a result, it seems inevitable to raise the question of the omnipresence of the former colonial power and its influence in the highest decision-making spheres of Ivorian power since the Houphouët Boigny regime. This is because Ivory Coast was considered by France as an example of the success of French colonization in Africa, thanks to the infrastructural and agricultural transformations carried out by the colonial administrative authorities and their successors. According to the successive post-colonial French authorities, this heritage must be maintained in the region because of the absolute preservation of France's geostrategic, diplomatic and economic influence, whose objective has always been to maintain its status as a great power worldwide.

However, the preservation at all costs of this influence has resulted in interference by France in the internal affairs of the Ivory Coast. Interferences were sometimes illegal, as some would say, illegitimate or unjust, as others would say, vis-à-vis a sovereign State. They are reminiscent of the mode of management during the period of the French colonial administration. The massacres perpetrated by the Licorne force in 2004 (Guessan, 2006, pp.66-80) against the Ivorian population represent one of the tangible proofs of the confirmation of the rupture

claimed by the Ivorian populations, like young people who want true independence from France (Guessan, 2006, pp.66-93). Hence, the need to reform Franco-Ivorian relations on a fairer, healthier basis and more respectful of the principles that characterize a sovereign state such as Ivory Coast, particularly the principle of non-interference, which should not be the object of any manipulation or even of a geostrategic stake. Given the events that occurred mainly during the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011, it should be noted that the principle of non-interference was flouted to the detriment of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ivory Coast under the well-publicized pretext of humanitarian reason. Nevertheless, noting how France managed this crisis, it seemed evident that the French interventions aimed at other objectives, as substantiated above, corresponded with the French interests in Ivory Coast.

As previously mentioned in this work, international law through the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the principle of non-interference, which protects the sovereignty (Latty, 2015, pp.7-16) of States. In the case of Ivory Coast, this principle of the United Nations Charter has been circumvented by highlighting the Responsibility to Protect. However, given that the burdens of the colonial past persist and that French influence on Ivorian politics and economics remains strongly present within Ivorian society, French interventions inevitably constitute a risk to the stability of the Ivory Coast. Hence, reforming the Ivorian army by diversifying its partners is also essential. It is precisely within the framework of the Franco-Ivorian bilateral reforms to be implemented that the the "Livre Blanc" on national defence and security published in 2008 was updated after the post-electoral crisis of 2011, presenting the will of the French government to reduce the contingent of French soldiers in Ivory Coast and to redefine their missions. Although the prerogatives of these soldiers must be limited solely to the protection of French nationals and to the training of the Ivorian army within the framework of the reform of its security sector, the fact remains that these measures remain insufficient to avoid the resurgence of ultranationalist and anticolonialist tendencies. Especially since these decisions have not been fully respected today (Koepf, 2020). Thus, the reform of Franco-Ivorian relations to be effective and sustainable should resolutely promote the opening towards stronger and independent cooperation with other national and international actors. Moreover, the colonial and neo-colonial economic, political and military agreements must be renegotiated as equal partners without paternalist or neo-colonialist behaviour.

In light of the above, these reforms must also consider restoring and reinforcing national cultural identity and psychological repair through collective memory work to deconstruct the psychological structures of neo-colonialism that created harmful dependency towards former French colonial power.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1. Paternalism as the French Traditional Foreign Policy Tradition in Africa

Paternalism is described as the interference by one State upon another state regardless of the interfered State's will and recognizing that this State cannot govern its people as it is deemed ineffective to do so. Furthermore, it implies treating people as if they were not free since they are viewed as "human material" (Hanson, 2022, p. 16). Western countries, especially France, have manifested this paternalist attitude, where this supremacist behaviour became an institution along with the last-lasting colonial legacy. Such a superior attitude helped foster the neocolonial strategy to perpetuate the status quo that benefits France's conservative interests (Martin, 1985, pp.189-190).

According to Guy Martin, French paternalism over Francophone Africa is centred on four major features and its foreign policy towards Africa. First, racism from a paternalist view is based on the idea that black people are inferior, incapable, and dependent and the paternalist State sees itself as generous. Second national chauvinism correlates with France's interests as a nation in terms of politics, strategy, economy, or culture. Although there are claims about Cooperation with French Africa, France's approach to Africa has been consistently driven only by nationalistic concerns. It flagrantly ignores the needs and interests of the continent. Former President Giscard d'Estaing stated, "I am dealing with African affairs, namely with France's interests in Africa" (Martin, 1985, p.193). Third, hypocrisy is characterized by the discrepancy between French officially declared policies and those that are actually put into practice in Africa. As a result, France publicly and regularly declares that it would never interfere in the internal affairs of an African state and actively pushes the phrase "Africa for the Africans."

Nonetheless, between 1963 and 1983, France intervened militarily in nearly 20 different African republics, blatantly violating the sacred "non-interference" ideal (Martin, 1985, p.194). French interventions in Ivory Coast also showed that France's narrative and approach towards Africa have never changed. French military presence remains a reality in many African countries even today despite France's discourse of disengagement. Last, is continuity, an essential feature of France's African policy. The successive governments, from General Charles De Gaulle to the current one, have managed to maintain French historical interests through economic, political, and strategic constraints (Martin, 1985, p.196).

France provides military assistance to unreliable governments still playing the Franco-African alliance's cards or, in the case of "passive interventions," it disapproves of leaders who would otherwise sever ties to the alliance. One can look at the 2011 military intervention in Ivory Coast, for instance, to forcibly remove former President Laurent Gbagbo, who had become hostile to French influence in Ivory Coast, in order to replace him with Allassane Ouattara, the current President, who is devoted to the cause of France (Houénou, 2021, pp.128-139). A policy of interference led former French President Jacques Chirac to declare, "We must help African presidents to win elections; otherwise, they will no longer organize them" (Alyos Tegera, 2014, p.28). With such remarks, why be surprised to see Ivorian leaders placed under the protection of France, sacrificing their population for their interests? France has always acted paternalistically, thinking that Ivory Coast and the rest of the former French colonies are not mature enough to enjoy the values of freedom, democracy and human rights on their own.

5.2. The African leaders' Instrumentalization in Perpetuating Neocolonialism

The foundation of Franco-African relations has always manifested France's superiority and Africa's inferiority across all spheres. Regarding African nations and their leaders, France has consistently adopted a controversial and ambiguous policy, favouring some while destabilizing others to serve their interests. From the beginning of French intervention in the 2010's post-election crisis in Ivory Coast, the French objective was not to challenge the impudence or excesses of the Gbagbo's regime. Instead, to use pretexts to manipulate international opinion in order to militarily intervene and install a French ally, Allasane Ouattara, into power. Otherwise, France would have had to make simultaneous, similar interventions against most of the regimes in its former colonies. Nonetheless, it sees nothing wrong with the most heinous dictators as long as France could have them instrumentalized to favour its interests in their respective countries. As a result, Gbagbo was precluded for not having delivered the guarantees required to maintain and protect French economic and strategic interests in the Ivory Coast (Desgranges, 2018).

Furthermore, it is crucial to mention that the instrumentalization of the African leaders and their states is mainly orchestrated under three paradigms. First is the CFA Franc paradigm, the currency used in fourteen francophone nations guaranteed by the French government and tied to the euro currency, as described above. While France claims that doing so ensures economic stability, its detractors claim that it allows France to manipulate the economy of those nations which use it. All of the CFA Franc reserves from the Western and Central African governments during the first years of its establishment and a half today were deposited in the

French Central Bank. This circumstance also makes it abundantly evident that several of the presidents who wished to leave the CFA zone, including Sylvanus Olympio and Sékou Touré, respectively the first presidents of newly independent Togo and Guinea republics, were assassinated or destabilized by armed forces backed by France. Again in recent years, there has been talking of the governments in the CFA region giving aside the heritage of colonial currency in favour of the "Eco," the continent's official currency decided by the ECOWAS, which was slated to be used in 2020. Unfortunately, despite all the efforts made by African governments to create this new currency, it was reported that Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Gambia, Ghana, and Guinea refused to use the "Eco" as their currency because they learned that France intended to use it and attempt to implement a new colonial type of system (Devecioglu, 2020).

Second, the military paradigm because even though President Macron insists that the presence of the French military in the region as part of the operations is merely for the safety of Africa, it is not hard to understand that France is manipulating and repressing the concerned countries in a carrot-and-stick relationship. In doing so, it hopes to maintain the economic benefits from the region's valuable resources. In order to defend and uphold the legitimacy of its presence in the region, particularly in the military realm, France attempted to take advantage of the terrorist-related activities in Africa. This situation shows how flagrantly France breached the neighbouring states' security, stability, and sovereignty.

Last, the development aid paradigm represents a tremendous tool for the instrumentalization of the African states and especially the former French colonies. This aid is essentially granted accompanied by organizational constraints imposed on African states. As a result, France has a right to control on public policies of the African states and that of enforcing reforms and structural adjustments in local governments (Jacquemot, 2011, pp.43-57). This is because the development cooperation initiated by France after African independence in the 1960s has been the cornerstone of French policy in Africa for several decades. It was established to preserve tight connections with the continent after decolonization. However, instead of producing real economic leverage for African states' development, African leaders and their states have undergone a series of structural compromises and budget constraints. Aid was seen as a hegemonic tool to deploy French policy in Africa to protect France's strategic interests. For France, the aid must be granted based on specific criteria such as the recipient's quality of governance, freedom rate, including respect for civil liberties. Very often, the conditions to obtain this aid were so high that some African states were obliged to sell off or barter their most valuable resources, plunging most of the time the recipient's country into a status quo since the

aid did not serve the actual needs. As the writer, Zambian Dambisa Moyo stated "Aid, as an object of greed, encourages corruption and undermines power." French aid has always been controversial because it put African leaders in a situation where they cannot effectively and freely decide for their own states' development. Over time, France's approach to development came to be seen as a paternalistic stance towards still-evolving African states that can manipulate African leaders and influence local policies (Jacquemot, 2011, pp.43-57).

Last words

Through this work, we have discussed and demonstrated the motivations and impacts of French interference, which is multifaceted in the Ivory Coast. Although the two main political-military crises (2002 and 2011) stem from internal ethnoreligious tensions, particularly with the institutionalization and promotion of "Ivoirité", French interventions have aggravated the already precarious situation and sometimes creating it, as we have seen throughout this work. In reality, the politico-judicial conflict on the absurd and dangerous question of "Ivoirité" reflects the inability of the Ivorian neocolonial political class to resolve the economic, social and political crisis born of the liberal dictates of the IMF and the international institutions. In general, the neocolonial system brought a succession of military or civil dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s, the "multiparty system of managers and technocrats" in the 1980s and 1990s under the orders of France, then now the "multiparty system ethnic, religious and/or regionalist".

The French socialist Guy Labertit sustains that: "the concept of "Ivoirité" came from certain international institutions which found this sadly brilliant formula to respond to a situation of the economic crisis in the Ivory Coast. In support of this assertion, the French employers' newspaper Les Echos of 27/12/1999 showed the total overlap between the interests of Françafrique and the internal contradictions in Ivory Coast to explain the coup d'etat of "Christmas 1999" of General Gueï, including many other political instabilities. The newspaper states: "Like General Gueï, Paris had nevertheless contributed to installing Henri Konan Bédié in the vacant chair of Félix Houphouët-Boigny because he risked smashing the "showcase" of its "pré-carré in Africa".

Furthermore, the legal framework of French interventions in Africa rarely provides legitimacy dubbed by the people in countries in crisis, particularly in the present case of the Ivory Coast, which should be the subject of a crucial debate at the international level. This is to redefine without ambiguity the rules of military interventions in sovereign countries by making a point of honour on the legitimacy of these interventions. The UN Security Council decisions

did not reflect fairness in terms of legitimacy and the right of the Ivorian people to decide for a neutral intervener State free of colonial ties. The tendency to systematically assigning France to intervene in a Francophone African conflict may be considered awkward, even dangerous today, considering the growing claims from civil societies and youth demanding true independence.

It seems necessary for Ivory Coast and the former French colonies, in general, to reform their armies and economies to be stronger and more sovereign to avoid being continuously under foreign assistance, which constitutes a risk of foreign interference. This work shed light on the need to rebuild African independence, particularly that of the Ivory Coast. State foundations were built on pre-colonial, colonial and neo-colonial agreements in various domains of the state. Today, those agreements appear unbearable to the population regarding the international values of sovereignty and democracy demanded by each state. Similarly, the Ivorian economy depending on international aid, particularly French aid, needs structural reforms to stand sovereign and strong enough to avoid potential foreign interventions liable to weaken it or exacerbate the situation.

This study made the case that there is a strong and evident link between neo-colonialism and French interventionism based on the patterns of dependency. The fact that most foreign interventions took place in French Africa over the last fifty years may explain French neo-colonialism's maintenance as a tool of dominance and dependency, enabling the former colonial power to preserve its exploitation policy over former colonies. It also sustains that the colonial legacy has played and continues to play a crucial role in politico-military crises in French Africa. Then, the Ivoirians and, more broadly, the African peoples are the only ones who can claim their political and military independence and the right to freely benefit from their natural resources through sovereign governance and political leadership freed from all colonial inclinations.

The French rhetorical narrative claiming to end Francafrique and its dependency ties has not come to reality. Therefore, the international community must question French propaganda arguing to bring peace and security to Africa since its military interventions have yielded few positive results. Today, the role of social media within a globalized African youth, diasporas and the rise of awareness among civil society constitute a turning point for neo-decolonization by promoting civic nationalism through African values-centred education and putting an end to the unhealthy elitist relationships between France and Francophone Africa.

However, the most recent development of French policy towards Africa suggests that a change in the rhetoric of the current presidential administration, as well as a decreasing military

presence, could represent a real turn in mutual relations. French President Emmanuel Macron pledge education support and infrastructure development than on active military engagement on the African continent, thereby building a new phase of Franco-African relations. It seems to offer a potential in transforming previous pattern of relations.



REFERENCES

- Adingra, J.E. (2011, July 16). Relation bilatérale France-Côte d'Ivoire, plus de 655 milliards de fcsfa de dette immédiatement annulés. *Abidjan.net*. <http://news.abidjan.net/h/404686.html>
- Agbohoun, N. (2000). *Le franc CFA et l'Euro contre l'Afrique*. Editions Solidarité Mondiale.
- Ancelovici, M., & Dupuis-Déri, F. (1998). Interview with professor Charles Taylor. *Citizenship Studies*, 2:2, 247-256, DOI: 10.1080/13621029808420681
- Babu, J., & Chaudhary, S. (2022). Rules of Doom: Analysing the Policy of Indirect Rule as observed in Chinua Achebe's *Arrow of God*. *Journal of Emerging Technologies and Innovative Research*. <https://www.jetir.org/papers/JETIR2203397.pdf>
- Bade, S. (2013). *The British Aren't COMING Why the French Intervene in their Former African Colonies and the British Do Not* [Master's thesis, Center for International Security and Cooperation,
- Bakong, P.E. (2015). *Les déterminants de la violence organisée en Afrique: Analyse comparée des conflits armés en Côte-d'Ivoire et en République Démocratique du Congo*. Publibook.
- Banégas, R. & Losch, B. (2002). La Côte d'Ivoire au bord de l'implosion. *Politique africaine*, 87(3). <https://doi.org/10.3917/polaf.087.0139>
- Banégas, R. (2017). La politique d'intervention de la France en Afrique vue d'en bas: Réflexions à partir du cas de la Côte d'Ivoire. *Les Temps Modernes*, 693-694, 288-310. <https://doi.org/10.3917/ltm.693.0288>
- Banga, A. (2022). Civic Service and the Question of Extra-Military Missions of the Army in Franco-Ivorian Military Relations (1960-1970) *International Journal of Military History and Historiography*.
- Beucher, B. (1990). *La « Françafrique »: entre mythe et réalité*. Fayard.
- Bigot, L. (2015, December 14). L'aide publique au développement n'aide pas l'Afrique. *Le Monde*. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/12/14/l-aide-publique-au-developpement-n-aide-pas-l-afrique_4831732_3212.htm
- Boisbouvier, C. (2018, September 24). La France avait une volonté très ferme d'en finir avec le régime de Gbagbo. *RFI*. <http://www.Rfi.fr/emission/20180924-cote-ivoire-france-avait-une-volonte-tres-ferme-finir-le-regime-gbagbo>
- Boniface, P. (2008). Les opérations militaires extérieures. *Pouvoirs*, 125, 55-67. <https://doi.org/10.3917/pouv.125.0055>
- Bony, F.D. (2018, July, 18). Contrat de désendettement et de développement: Ces chiffres énormes investis en Côte d'Ivoire en 5 ans pour le bonheur des populations. *Linfodrome*. <http://www.linfodrome.com/economie/40392-contrat-de-desendettement-et-de-developpement-ces-chiffres-enormes-investis-en-cote-d-ivoire-en-5-ans-pour-le-bonheur-des-populations>
- Borrel, T., et al. (2021). *L'empire qui ne veut pas mourir: Une histoire de la Françafrique*. Seuil.
- Boulada, J.P. (2019, November 19). *Conflits armés en Afrique: Classification, Causes, Alternatives*. [Presentation] http://survie67.free.fr/Manifestations/G8_evian/JPBoulada_conflits_africains.PDF
- Bourgi, A. (2009). Aux Racines de la Francafrrique: La Dégradation de l'image de la France en Afrique. *Centre Thucydide – Analyse et recherche en relations internationales*, 10, 2-14. https://www.afri-ct.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Article_Bourgi.pdf
- Brewer, A. (1990). *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A critical survey*. (2nd Ed.), Taylor & Francis.

- Canut, C. (2010). « À bas la francophonie ! » De la mission civilisatrice du français en Afrique à sa mise en discours postcoloniale. *Langue française*, 167, 141-158. <https://doi.org/10.3917/lf.167.0141>
- Chauveau, J.P., & Dozon, J.P. (1987). Au coeur des ethnies Ivoiriennes...L'État. *ResearchGate*. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/32984730>
- Chevrier, J. (1975, August). Crise des Institutions, Coups d'Etat, Dependance accrue: L'échec des systèmes politiques africains. *Le Monde diplomatique*. <https://www.mondediplomatique.fr/1975/08/CHEVRIER/33319>
- Cohen, D. et al. (2006). *La France et l'aide publique au développement*. [Rapport]. La Documentation française.
- Corell, H. (2014). The Mandate of the United Nations Security Council in a Changing World. *International Law and Changing Perceptions of Security*. DOI:10.1163/9789004274587_004
- Crump, L. (2005). Concurrently linked negotiations and negotiation theory: An examination of bilateral trade negotiations In Australia, Singapore and United States. *Griffith University, Department of International Business and Asian Studies*. https://conf.sabanciuniv.edu/sites/conf.sabanciuniv.edu/files/concurrently_linked_negotiationsand_negotiation_theory.pdf
- Dadzie, K. (1988). La dépendance économique de l'Afrique vis-à-vis de l'exportation des produits de base. *Politique Étrangère*, 53(3), 647-666. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42675070>
- De Jonge Oudraat, C. (2000, August 10). Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Legal and Political Conundrums. *Carnegie Endowment*. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2000/08/10/intervention-in-internal-conflicts-legal-and-political-conundrums-pub-379>
- Demir, I. (2022). *Diaspora as Translation and Decolonisation*. Manchester University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2022.2112741>
- Desgranges, G. (2018, October 25). L'ingérence Française en Côte d'Ivoire. *Agone*. <https://agone.org/aujourd'hui/une-interview-des-auteurs-d>
- Devecioglu, K. (2020, January 31). Analysis-France tries new tactics after losing influence in West Africa. *Anadolu Agency*. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/analysis-france-tries-new-tactics-after-losing-influence-in-west-africa/1720306>
- Dieth, A. (2012, March 31). La faillite des élites en Afrique subsaharienne. *Afrik*. <https://www.afrik.com/la-faillite-des-elites-en-afrique-subsaharienne>
- Diouf-Mignane, M. (2014, Octobre 18). Crises et conflits en Afrique de l'ouest: quelle politique sécuritaire face aux menaces?. *Friedrich Ebert Dakar-Sénégal*. <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/senegal/11465.pdf>
- Domergue, D. (1998). COOPÉRATION ET INTERVENTIONS MILITAIRES EN AFRIQUE: LA FIN D'UNE AVENTURE AMBIGUË? *Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains*, 191, 117-134. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25732522>
- Dulin, A. (2005). *La gestion par la France de la crise en Côte d'Ivoire, de Septembre 2002 à Avril* Institut d'Etudes Politiques.
- Eley, J. W. (1972). Toward a Theory of Intervention: The Limitations and Advantages of a Transnational Perspective. *International Studies Quarterly*, 16(2), 245-256. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013982>
- FALL, B. (1993). LE TRAVAIL FORCE EN AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE FRANCAISE (1900-1946). *Civilisations*, 41(1/2), 329-336. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41229837>
- Faye M., & Faye.A.C. (2021, June 2021). Francophonie et Commonwealth : qu'apportent-ils aux pays africains ?. <https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-57558656>

- Féron, É., & Rosoux, V. (2014). Introduction: Far Away and yet so close Former Colonial Powers and The Management of Political Crises in their Former Colonies. *European Review of International Studies*, 1(3), 7–15. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26593309>
- Galy, M. (2005). Qui gouverne la Côte-d'Ivoire ? Internalisation et internationalisation d'une crise politico-militaire. *Politique Étrangère*, 70(4), 795–807. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42716620>
- Gegout, C. (2018). Realism, Neocolonialism and European Military Intervention in Africa. In Roberto Belloni.R & Viotti.V.D.S.P (Eds.), *Fear and Uncertainty in Europe* (pp.265–288). Global Issues. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-91965-2_13
- Gouëset, C. (2011, December 8). Chronologie de la Côte d'Ivoire (1958-2011). *L'express*. https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/chronologie-de-la-cote-d-ivoire-1958-2011_910836.html
- Granvaud, R. (2009). *Que fait l'armée française en Afrique subsaharienne? Héritage colonial et Stratégies de domination*. Agone.
- Gruhn, I. (1976). The Lomé Convention: Inching towards interdependence. *International Organization*, 30(2), 241-262. doi:10.1017/S0020818300018269
- Guessan, K. (2006). LA CRISE FRANCO-IVOIRIENNE DE NOVEMBRE 2004. *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell'Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente*, 61(1), 66–93. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40761839>
- Guinant, P. (2013). *La politique de la France en Afrique subsaharienne après les indépendances*. [Published master's thesis]. Institut des Études Politiques de Toulouse.
- Haag, D. (2011). Mechanisms of Neo-colonialism Current French and British influence in Cameroon and Ghana. *Institut Català Internacional*, 6/8-21. DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2033138
- Hanson, M. (2000). *Paternalism and Bilateral Aid Assistance: The Case of France and its Former Colonies in the Sahel Region of Africa in Hollande and Macron's Mandates*. [Published master's thesis]. Liège University, Faculté de Droit, de Science Politique et de Criminologie.
- Harshe, R. (1980). FRENCH NEO-COLONIALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. *India Quarterly*, 36(2), 159–178. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45071476>
- Hoag, R. (2015). Military Intervention, Humanitarian. *Philpapers*. <https://philpapers.org/rec/AUTMIH>
- Hoffmann, S. (1995). The politics and ethics of military intervention. *Survival*, 37(4), 29–51. doi:10.1080/00396339508442814
- Hofnung, T. (2001). *La crise ivoirienne de Félix Houphouët-Boigny à la chute de Laurent Gbagbo*. La Découverte.
- Hofnung, T. (2005). *La crise en Côte d'Ivoire: Dix clés pour comprendre*. La Découverte.
- Houénou, A.S. (2021). Les accords de défense et de coopération militaire : instruments d'une politique dédiée à l'influence de la France en Afrique. In K. Lamko, A. Niang, N.S. Sylla, L. Zevounou, *De Brazzaville À Montpellier. Regards critiques sur le néocolonialisme français. Collectif pour le Renouveau Africain – CORA Éditions*. <https://corafrika.org/chapitres/les-accords-de-defense-et-de-cooperation-militaire-instruments-dune-politique-dediee-a-linfluence-de-la-france-en-afrique/>
- Hugon, P. (2003). La Côte d'Ivoire: plusieurs lectures pour une crise annoncée. *Afrique contemporaine*, 206, 105-127. <https://doi.org/10.3917/afco.206.0105>
- Hugon, P. (2006). Conflits armés, insécurité et trappes à pauvreté en Afrique. *Afrique contemporaine*, 218, 33-47. <https://doi.org/10.3917/afco.218.47>
- International Crisis Group.(2007). *Côte d'Ivoire: Faut-il croire à l'accord de Ouagadougou?*. (Report No. 127). Rapport Afrique. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/west-africa/c%C3%B4te-divoire/cote-d-ivoire-can-ouagadougou-agreement-bring-peace>

- International Security Studies]. <https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:hw045ys8900/Bade-The%20British%20Aren't%20Coming.pdf>
- Jacquemot, P. (2011). Fifty Years of French Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview (Part 1). *Afrique contemporaine*, 238, 43-57. <https://doi.org/10.3917/afco.238.0043>
- Jolivet, E. (2003). *L'ivoirité: de la conceptualisation à la manipulation de l'identité ivoirienne d'Ivoire*. [Unpublished master's thesis]. Institut d'études politiques.
- Joseph, R. (1976). The Gaullist legacy: Patterns of French Neocolonialism. *Review of African Political Economy*, 3(6), 4-13. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056247608703286>
- Katz, C. (1954). *Dependency Theory After Fifty* (Vol.207). Brill. <https://lccn.loc.gov/2021050140>
- Koepf, T. (2011). Quel avenir pour la présence militaire de la France en Côte d'Ivoire?. *IFRI*. <https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/enotes/avenir-presence-militaire-de-france-cote-divoire>
- Kohnert, D. (2022). French domination of markets in Francophone Africa: Post-colonialism at its finest?. *Institute of African Affairs*. <https://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/112024/>
- Konan, A.S. (2016, November 10). Massacres de l'Hôtel Ivoire: Retour sur un crime de la France vite oublié en Côte d'Ivoire. *Andresilverkonan*. <https://www.andresilverkonan.com/2016/11/10/massacres-de-lhotel-ivoire-retour-crime-francais-vite-oublie-cote-divoire/>
- Konan, Y. (2012). Insertion économique, pauvreté et conflits en Côte d'Ivoire: Une analyse différentielle de la communauté burkinabé. *Migrations Société*, 144, 121-146. <https://doi.org/10.3917/migra.144.0121>
- Kouadio, T. (2012, January 26). France-Côte d'Ivoire : Quel accord de défense pour des relations plus stables. *Ivoire Business*. <https://www.ivoirebusiness.net/articles/france-cote-divoire-quel-accord-de-defense-pour-des-relations-plus-stables>
- Kouakou, K.G. (2006). *Le peuple n'aime pas le peuple. La guerre civile en Côte d'Ivoire*. Gallimard.
- Kouassi, C. (2017, Septembre 9). 9 novembre 2004 -Tirs français à l'hôtel Ivoire : les ivoiriens se souviennent. *African News*. <http://fr.africanews.com/2017/11/09/9-novembre-2004-tirs-francais-a-l-hotel-ivoire-les-ivoiriens-se-souviennent/>
- Krupova, K., & Cech, L. (2020). A Neo-colonialist French Foreign Policy in Africa? Insights from Côte d'Ivoire. *Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review*, 20(2), 291-317. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-69916-3>
- Lagneau, L. (2017, June 12). La France et la Côte d'Ivoire vont renforcer de manière concrète leur partenariat militaire. *Opex360*. <http://www.opex360.com/2017/06/12/la-france-et-la-cote-divoire-vont-renforcer-de-maniere-concrete-leur-partenariat-militaire/>
- Langan, M. (2018). *Neo-Colonialism and the Poverty of "Development" in Africa*. Sahle.E.N.(Eds.). Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-58571-0
- Larcher, L. (12, January 26). Côte d'Ivoire, un nouvel accord de défense avec la France. *Lacroix*. https://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/Cote-d-Ivoire-un-nouvel-accord-de-defense-avec-la-France-_NG_-2012-01-26-762384
- Lassou, P. J. C., et al. (2019). Varieties of neo-colonialism: Government accounting reforms in Anglophone and Francophone Africa – Benin and Ghana compared. *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, 65, 102071. doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2019.01.003
- Latty, F. (2015, January 19). L'ingérence. *Fondation Res Publica*. https://www.fondation-res-publica.org/L-ingerence_r118.html
- Le-Blog-Sam-La-Touch.over-blog. (2016, November 20). Le Canard enchaîné révèle comment l'AFD fait son beurre sur le dos des (néo)colonies françaises. <http://le-blog-sam-la-touch.over-blog.com/2016/11/le-canard-enchaine-revele-comment-l-afd-fait-son-beurre-sur-le-dos-des-neocolonies-francaises.html>

- Leboeuf, A. (2017). Coopérer avec les armées africaines. *Focus Stratégique IFRI*, 37, 4-36. <https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/etudes-de-lifri/focus-strategique/cooperer-armees-africaines>
- Lenin. (1999). *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Resistance Books.
- L'ivoirité, ou l'esprit du nouveau contrat social du Président H. K. Bédié: (extraits). (2000). *Politique africaine*, 78, 65-69. <https://doi.org/10.3917/polaf.078.0065>
- Loembe,A. (2015, October 8). Causes et effets des conflits en Afrique et de l'Emigration qui en découle. Babilown.<https://babilown.com/2015/10/08/causes-et-effets-des-conflits-en-afrique-et-de-lemigration-qui-en-decoule/>
- Luckham, R. (1982). French militarism in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*, 9(24), 55–84. doi:10.1080/03056248208703499
- Luttwak,E. (1989). *Le Paradoxe de la stratégie*.Odile Jacob.
- Marshall, R. (2005). *La France en Côte d'Ivoire:L'interventionnisme à l'épreuve des faits*. Karthala.
- Martin, G. (1985). The Historical, Economic, and Political Bases of France's African Policy. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23(2), 189–208. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X000001489>
- Martin, G. (1986). The Franc Zone, Underdevelopment and Dependency in Francophone Africa. *Third World Quarterly*, 8(1), 205–235. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3991568>
- Mauger,D., & Granvaud, R. (2014,November 5). Du bombardement de Bouaké au massacre de l'hôtel Ivoire: 10 ans de mensonges et d'impunité. *Survie*, 240(4794),1-6.<https://survie.org/billets-d-afrique/2014/240-novembre-2014/article/du-bombardement-de-bouake-au-4794>
- Mauger,D., & Granvaud, R. (2018). *Un Pompier Pyromane: L'ingérence française en Côte d'Ivoire d'Houphouët-Boigny à Ouattara*. Agone.
- McGowan, P. J., & Smith, D. L. (1978). Economic Dependency in Black Africa: An Analysis of Competing Theories. *International Organization*, 32(1), 179–235. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706199>
- Meimon,J.(2007). L'invention de l'aide française au développement: Discours, instruments et pratiques d'une dynamique hégémonique. *Questions de recherche / Research in question*. 21, <http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/publica/qdr.htm>
- Mouffe, C. (1979). *Hegemony and ideology in Gramsci*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315794396>
- Moyo, D. (2009). *L'aide fatale: Les ravages d'une aide inutile et de nouvelles solutions pour l'Afrique*. Editions JC Lattès.
- Mulayim,R. (2017, May 7). French Influence in Africa. *Geopolitics & Great Power Politics, Research, Terrorism, Conflict and War*. <https://behorizon.org/french-influence-in-africa-colonial-period/>
- Murray,L.M. (1973). *Indirect Rule-Lugardian Style*. [Published master's thesis]. Morehead State University, The Faculty of the School of Social Science.
- Ndiaye,K. (2022, November 22). Francophonie. Quand la France déploie son empire linguistique. <https://afriquexxi.info/Francophonie-Quand-la-France-deploie-son-empire-linguistique>
- New African. (2022, September 9). AUF: Promoting education and skills across the French-speaking world.<https://newafricanmagazine.com/28530/>
- Nubukpo, K. (2017, July 26). Franc CFA: un vestige de la colonisation à abolir. *Liberation*.https://www.liberetion.fr/debats/2017/07/26/franc-cfa-un-vestige-de-la-colonisation-a-abolir_1586379
- Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft Power. *Foreign Policy*, 80, 153–171. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580>

- Ochinya, O.O. (2007, December 11 -13). *Exploration des causes et de la dynamique des conflits armés en Afrique*. [Réunion de la Commission de l ASSECAA pour la Paix et la Résolution des conflits]. Abuja. <http://docplayer.fr/23918680-Exploration-des-causes-et-de-la-dynamique-des-conflits-armes-en-afrique.html>
- Odijie. M.E. (2022). Unintentional neo-colonialism? Three generations of trade and development relationship between EU and West Africa. *Journal of European Integration*, 44:3, 347-363, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2021.1902318
- Pearson, F.S., & Baumann, R.A. (1988). International military interventions: Identification and classification. *International Interactions*, 14, 173-180.
- Pearson, F.S., & Baumann, R.A. (1974). Foreign Military Intervention by Large and Small Powers. *International Interactions*, 1, 273-278.
- Pennetier, M. (2017, June 11). La France va renforcer son partenariat militaire avec Abidjan. *Capital*. <https://www.capital.fr/economie-politique/la-france-va-renforcer-son-partenariat-militaire-avec-abidjan-1231905>
- Profant, T. (2010). French geopolitics in Africa: From neocolonialism to identity. *Review of International Affairs Perspectives*, 18, 46.
- Pugh, M.C. (1994). International Intervention. *Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems*, 2, 2-9.
- Quantin, P. (2002). Les élections en Afrique: entre rejet et institutionnalisation. *Centre d'étude d'Afrique Noire*, 8-9. <http://polis.sciencespobordeaux.fr/vol9ns/quantin1.pdf>
- Quémar, C. (2017, August 30). La dette cachée illégitime du Mozambique. *CADTM*. <http://www.cadtm.org/La-dette-cachee-illegitime-du>
- RAIDH. (2013). *Rapport sur les violations des droits humains en Côte d'Ivoire de septembre 2002 à mai 2011*. Coalition Ivoirienne des Défenseurs des Droits Humains. <https://www.ciddh.org/267/>
- Rao, N. (2000). "Neocolonialism" or "Globalization"?: Postcolonial Theory and the Demands of Political Economy. *Interdisciplinary Literary Studies*, 1(2), 165–184. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41209050>
- Ripstein, A. (2014). Kant's Juridical Theory of Colonialism. In K. Flikschuh & L. Ypi (Eds.), *Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives* (Oxford, 2014; online ed). Oxford Academic. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669622.003.0007>
- Rivkin, A. (1966). Africa and the European Economic Community. *Finance & Development*, 3, 002; 10.5089/9781616352820.022.A006
- Rodney, W. (2018). *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* ([edition unavailable]). Verso. Retrieved from <https://www.perlego.com/book/834174/how-europe-underdeveloped-africa-pdf> (Original work published 2018)
- Said, E.W. (1979). *Orientalism*. Vintage Books.
- Savès, J. (2020, January 7). 24 Décembre 1999, Coup d'État en Côte d'Ivoire. *Herodote*. https://herodote.net/24_decembre_1999-evenement-19991224.php
- Servenay, D. (2016, November 2). Les accords secrets avec l'Afrique: encore d'époque?. *L'Obs*. <https://www.nouvelobs.com/rue89/rue89-politique/20070726.RUE1127/les-accords-secrets-avec-l-afrique-encore-d-epoque.html>
- Shahbandeh, M. (2023, March 27). Cocoa bean production worldwide. *Statista*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/263855/cocoa-bean-production-worldwide-by-region/>
- Simpson, T. (2011). Indirect Rule in South Africa: Tradition, Modernity, and the Costuming of Political Power. *African Historical Review*, 43, 84-86.
- Sıradağ, A. (2014). Understanding French Foreign and Security Policy towards Africa: Pragmatism or Altruism. *Eurasian Studies Journal*, 3, 104-109.
- Sonntag, H. R. (2001). Dependency Theory. *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 3501–3505. doi:10.1016/b0-08-043076-7/01890-8

- Tegera,A., et al. (2014, July 1-4). *Que font les armées étrangères en afrique? Réflexions autour des interventions militaires internationales dans les pays africains en crise: Cas de la Centrafrique, de la Côte d'Ivoire, du Mali,du Nigéria,de la RDC, de la Somalie et du Soudan du Sud* [Colloque international]. Pole Institute, Collection Cultures et Mémoires Vivantes de Goma, RDC.
- The LibreTexts Libraries.(2021, February 20).*Colonialism and Neocolonialism* (Ref.1246120). [https://socialsci.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Sociology/Introduction_to_Sociology/Book%3A_Sociology_\(Boundless\)/08%3A_Global_Stratification_and_Inequality/8.03%3A_Stratification_in_the_World_System/8.3A%3A_Colonialism_and_Neocolonialism](https://socialsci.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Sociology/Introduction_to_Sociology/Book%3A_Sociology_(Boundless)/08%3A_Global_Stratification_and_Inequality/8.03%3A_Stratification_in_the_World_System/8.3A%3A_Colonialism_and_Neocolonialism)
- Toussaint, E. (2004. April). À qui profite réellement l'aide Publique au Développement?.CADTM. <http://www.cadtm.org/A-qui-profite-l-Aide-Publique-au>
- Tshiyembe, M. (2002). *Etat multinational et démocratie africaine: Sociologie de la renaissance politique*. L'Harmattan.
- UKEssays. (November 2018). Marxist View Of The Colonialism History Essay. Retrieved from <https://www.ukessays.com/essays/history/marxist-view-of-the-colonialism-history-essay.php?vref=1>
- Uzoigwe, G.N. (2019).Neocolonialism Is Dead: Long Live Neocolonialism. *Journal of Global South Studies*, 36(1), 59–87. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48519445>
- Vallin, V.-M. (2015). France as the Gendarme of Africa, 1960-2014. *Political Science Quarterly*, 130(1), 79–101. doi:10.1002/polq.12289
- Verschave, F. X. (1998). *La Françafrique, le plus long scandale de la République* . Stock.
- Verschave, F.X. (2008, March). Que fait la France en Afrique, La Françafrique, ou la face cachée de la politique française en Afrique. *Le Tamis Info*. <https://www.le-tamis.info-uploads-textes>
- Vidjannangni, A. (2011). *La complexité de la question identitaire en Côte d'Ivoire* [Unpublished master's thesis]. Université de Québec, Institut de Science politique.
- Wall, G. (1975). The Concept of Interest in Politics. *Politics & Society*, 5(4), 487–510. <https://doi.org/10.1177/003232927500500405>
- Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Perlego, 2018
- Wauthier, C. (1972). France and Africa: “Long Live Neo-Colonialism.” *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 2(1), 23–26. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1166640>
- Wyss, M. (2021). The Franco-Ivorian Cooperation Agreements. In Wyss, M. (eds.), *Postcolonial Security: Britain, France, and West Africa's Cold War* (online edn,pp.62-90). Oxford Academic. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198843023.003.0003>
- Yates, D. (2018). France and Africa. In Nagar.D & Mutasa.C. (Eds), *Africa and the World* (1st ed.,pp. 95-118).Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62590-4_5
- Yebouet, H. (2011). La Côte d’Ivoire au lendemain de la crise post-électorale : entre sortie de crise politique et défis sécuritaires. *Sécurité et stratégie*, 7, 22-32. <https://doi.org/10.3917/sestr.007.0022>
- Zartman.W. (1970). I.William Zartman collection. *Hoover Institution Library and Archives*. <http://www.hoover.org/library-and-archives>
- Zulkafli,N.B.(2010). Marxism and the Theory of Dependency. *ResearchGate*. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.34090.93125