

**MIGRATION AND SECURITY:
HISTORY, PRACTICE AND THEORY**

A Master's Thesis

by

NAZLI SİNEM ASLAN

**Department of
International Relations**

**Bilkent University
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**MIGRATION AND SECURITY:
HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY**

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NAZLI SİNEM ASLAN

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the Master of Arts in International Relations.

Associate Professor Pınar Bilgin
Thesis Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the Master of Arts in International Relations.

Assistant Professor Nil Seda Şatana
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the Master of Arts in International Relations.

Assistant Professor Saime Özçürümez
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel
Director

ABSTRACT

MIGRATION AND SECURITY: HISTORY, PRACTICE AND THEORY

Aslan, Nazlı Sinem
M.A., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Pınar Bilgin
June 2010

Receiving states viewed international migration as a means of economic development well until late 20th century. Since then policy makers around the world have increasingly associated migration to security and sought to meet this ‘threat’ through ‘control’. In the 21st century, the significance of international migration increased further as migration flows increased and took on new forms affecting the world as a whole. This thesis looks at the emergence of migration as a security issue in the practices of world actors within a historical and contextual framework and highlights the politics of associating migration with security. In doing so, it does not take as pre-given a relationship between migration and security. Two interrelated arguments are made. First, migration’s association with security has been context-bound. Second, whether migration is a security issue or not changes according to actors (in the policy and scholarly worlds). Critical approaches to security, focusing on the role of state and societal actors in associating migration to security, and stressing security of not only states but also individuals, offer a fuller account of migration. Whereas objectivist approaches to security take migration as a ‘real’ threat, and fundamentally in relation to state security and national interest.

Keywords: International Migration, Immigrant, Security, Threat, Receiving State, Critical Security

ÖZET

GÖÇ VE GÜVENLİK: TARİH, PRATİK VE TEORİ

Aslan, Nazlı Sinem
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Göç alan ülkeler 20.yy'ın sonlarına dek uluslararası göçü ekonomik gelişme için bir araç olarak gördüler. Sonraki dönemlerde, gittikçe artarak ve varsayılan tehlikeyi kontrol etme çabasıyla, göç ve güvenlik arasında ilişkilendirme kurdular. 21.yy'da uluslararası göçün önemi göç akımlarının çoğalması ve yeni şekiller almasıyla birlikte tüm dünya milletlerini etkileyecek biçimde arttı. Bu tez, göç ve güvenlik arasında bir ilişkinin varlığını önceden varsaymadan göçün bazı aktörlerin uygulamalarında güvenlikleştirilmesini tarihsel ve bağlamsal bir çerçevede incelemekte ve göçü güvenlikle ilişkilendirmenin siyasiliğini vurgulamaktadır. Birbiriyle ilişkili iki sav sunulmaktadır. İlk olarak, göçün güvenlikle ilişkilendirilmesi bağlamsal olarak gerçekleşmiştir. İkinci olarak, göçün bir güvenlik meselesi olarak tanımlanıp tanımlanmaması aktörlere (siyaset ve akademi) göre değişmektedir. Güvenliğe eleştirel bakan yaklaşımlar göçün güvenlikle ilişkilendirilmesinde devletin ve toplumsal aktörlerin rolüne işaret ederek ve sadece devletin değil bireylerin güvenliğini de vurgulayarak göç ve güvenlik konusuna bütünsel açıklamalar getirmektedirler. Güvenliğe geleneksel bakan yaklaşımlar ise devlet güvenliğini vurgulayarak göç konusunu devlete ve ulusal çıkarlara gerçek bir tehdit olarak açıklamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Göç, Göçmen, Güvenlik, Tehdit, Göç Alan Ülke, Eleştirel Güvenlik

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Problem

By the end of 2010, the number of international immigrants is expected to reach 210 million.¹ 20 million of these are expected to be refugees and asylum seekers in need of assistance or protection.² This estimated number of immigrants accounts for almost 4 percent of the world population. In other words, almost 4 percent of all peoples of the world live as immigrants. The desire for better living standards is the motivation behind the act of migration. The issues that lead to migration of people range from economic problems to social disorder and political violence.

In the second half of the 20th century, international migration emerged as one of the primary factors affecting politics, economy, and social transformation

¹ “Trends in International Immigrant Stock: The 2008 Revision.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Available at <http://esa.un.org/migration/p2k0data.asp> (Accessed on May 27, 2010)

² “Trends in International Immigrant Stock: The 2008 Revision.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Available at <http://esa.un.org/migration/p2k0data.asp> (Accessed on May 27, 2010)

around the world. With the sudden collapse of the Cold War system that provided a political division of peoples, the world moved from a period characterized by boundaries, identities, a centrally organized globe with impenetrable boundaries to one in which territorial, ideological, and issue boundaries became less important (Jowitt, 1995: 20). The most serious challenges to security in the twenty-first century world are affecting not only the individual states, but the world as one. These challenges range from the nuclear fallout that encircled the world after the Chernobyl meltdown in 1986 and increased migration flows, to the global warming that increasingly threatens the ecosystem giving rise to forced migration. In the twenty-first century, the significance of international migration increased further as migration flows took on new forms and increased in volume affecting the world nations as a whole (Castles, 2000: 269).

At a time when nation states remain the dominant unit of international relations in the world with each state forming a territorially based cultural and social system (Zolberg, 1981: 6), the issue of migration has moved to the top of the security agenda of migration receiving countries. Increasingly, policy makers in the United States, Europe, and around the world are making links between security and migration policy, and 'control' is assigned as the sole means to meet this threat (Adamson, 2006: 165). Initially, international migration was viewed by receiving states as a method of economic development. As the thesis will show, this has not always been the case. Since the end of the 20th century, international migration flows have become to be seen as a source of economic, societal as well as political security problems by receiving countries. As a result, migration has

turned into a phenomenon that is problematized vis-à-vis security by many receiving states.

Interest in migration in security terms emerged first in the policy world, as will be shown. The second half of the 20th century not only experienced an increase in migration flows, it also refocused the security debate away from the more conventional security issues, which have concerned governments toward other issues considered to be threats to security (Poku and Graham, 1998: 12). National media and political debate in developed countries has increasingly focused on threats from refugees, asylum seekers, and other migrations originating in developing countries. This is now seen as a major component in international relations. The arrival of 1,200 Kurdish refugees in Italy in early 1998, and the murder of 300 people from the Indian subcontinent in the Mediterranean in 1996 are some of the many instances that demonstrate the unprecedented growth in human flows and the receiving states' view of these flows as a threat to their security at individual, social and state levels (Poku and Graham, 1998: 13). However, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the management of migration has become a top security priority for the states affected by migration flows. The driving force for policy change in migration receiving countries, therefore, has gained a direction of further control and restriction (Hollifield, 2004: 899).

1.2 Question and Structure

This thesis looks at the emergence of migration as a security issue in the practices of world actors within a historical and contextual framework. In this way, the thesis goes beyond pursuing remedial measures such as strengthening border controls against migration, and highlights the politics of associating migration with security. In doing so, it does not take as pre-given a relationship between migration and security. The contribution of this thesis to the international relations literature is that this thesis is a product of a comprehensive literature review on migration and security with an effort to trace the historical, practical as well as theoretical bases of politicization of migration into a security issue, at the same time. For this purpose, this thesis first examines historical background of migration and security dynamics, then the evolution of migration into a security issue in practice, and finally theoretical views on migration as a security issue or vice versa. In this regard, the thesis is presented in three chapters. Chapter 1 looks at migration dynamics and presents the evolution of its relationship to security throughout history. The chapter looks at four periods: ‘the period until the 1960s’, ‘the 1960s and the 1970s’, ‘the 1980s’, and ‘from the 1990s up to the present’. For each time period, the thesis will identify changes in the volume of migration flows, the motivations of immigrants to move, and the reasoning of receiving states to accept or prevent these flows. This will be followed by an analysis of whether a relationship between migration and security was established by the migration receiving countries in each period. The main purpose of presenting this historical background in Chapter 1 is to identify those time periods when

migration was seen as related to security and those periods when no such relationship was established. This chapter also constitutes a background for the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3. The historical background of migration and its association to security will be presented in the form of a table in the Conclusion part of the thesis.

Chapter 2 looks at how the relationship between migration and security has emerged through the practices of three major international actors, namely, the United Nations, the European Union and the United States. The reason for selecting these three actors is that the United States and the European Union are the primary countries of attraction for immigrants in the world. The United Nations, on the other hand, deals with the issue of migration through the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In this chapter, the thesis traces how migration receiving states have come to associate migration with their security throughout the 20th century.

Taken together, these two chapters show that migration has not always been associated with security, and that such association in policy practices of actors has been context-bound. Such a conclusion, in turn, points to the need for contextualizing an approach that is sensitive to historical and political contexts in the study of migration and security, as opposed to taking such an association for granted and seeking to secure states and/or societies against migration.

Chapter 3 looks at how the literature has studied migration and security. The chapter presents how a relationship between migration and security has been studied by traditional approaches on the one hand, and critical approaches on the other. Traditional approaches, namely the Realist tradition has an objectivist approach to security, and it has taken the problem of migration as pre-given. The Paris School, the Copenhagen School, and the Aberystwyth School are critical security approaches to security, and focus on the social construction of migration as a security problem or not. The presentation of each theoretical approach will begin with an overview of their respective security conception. This will be followed by presentation of each tradition's approach to migration and security. Whereas objectivist approaches see migration as an issue that should be studied through security lenses, critical approaches question this linkage in theory and in practice.

1.3 Definition of Key Terms

There are numerous definitions of migration. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, "everyone has the right to freedom of movement [...] the right to leave any country, including his own, and return to his country."³ This right of freedom of movement is restricted by Article 12 of the same declaration that reads, "This absolute right can be limited by states for security and public order

³ "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights." 1948. United Nations General Assembly. Available at <<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>> (Accessed on June 7, 2010)

reasons.”⁴ This article means that immigrants have to comply with the migration regulations of receiving countries in order to be accepted as immigrants.

For the United Nations, international migration refers to the act of “those who have lived outside of their country of nationality or birth for more than one year,” (UN, 1997). The Council of Europe Development Bank provides a more circumstantial account of migration than that of the United Nations. For the Council of Europe Development Bank, “migration is the movement of people from one geographical area to another, resulting from demographic, social, political or ecological disequilibria, and facilitated by innovations in transport and communication technology.”⁵ The International Organization for Migration, on the other hand, provides a limited definition of migration that “should be understood as covering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of personal choice and without intervention of an external compelling factor.”⁶

According to Stephen Castles, a researcher on multicultural societies, migration and development, such variations in definitions of migration draw attention to the fact that it is not possible to be objective about definitions of migration, which is “the result of state policies, introduced in response to political

⁴ “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 1948. United Nations General Assembly. Available at <<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>> (Accessed on June 7, 2010)

⁵ “Migration in Europe: The C.E.B.’s Experience.” 2008. Council of Europe Development Bank. Available at <http://www.coebank.org/upload/infocentre/Brochure/en/Migration_CEB_experience.pdf> (Accessed on June 7, 2010)

⁶ “Perspectives on Migration and Development.” International Organization for Migration. Available at <<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/537>> (Accessed on June 7, 2010)

and economic goals and public attitudes,” (2000: 270). Jacqueline Bhabha, a scholar studying on citizenship and rights of immigrants, agrees. According to Bhabha, every person might be an immigrant during his or her lifetime depending on where he/she is and the way he/she is met (2005: 29). She explains as follows:

[...] immigrants may be citizens if naturalized, they may be born in the country if second generation, they may be documented or undocumented, short-term or long-term, they may be visitors, students, business people or workers; they may be second generation long settled populations, they may be asylum seekers, refugees, entrepreneurs, seasonal workers, they may come from neighboring countries or across the globe, they may intend to stay indefinitely or return ‘home’ to retire. They may thus be ‘foreigners’ or not, they may be ‘illegal’ or not, they may even be ‘non-nationals’ or not (Bhabha, 2005: 29).

Because of the fact that a person may become an immigrant due to many different reasons, Bhabha suggests that labeling a person as an immigrant is ‘futile’ (2005: 29).

Besides such variations in definitions of migration, the social meaning of migration also varies depending on the context based on how states develop control over migration (Castles, 2000: 270). One of the ways of controlling migration by states has been one of dividing international immigrants into categories such as temporary labor immigrants, highly skilled and business immigrants, irregular/illegal immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, forced immigrants, family members and return immigrants. (Castles, 2000: 270). These categorical divisions, according to Castles, do not depend on any criteria concerning race, ethnicity, or origin of immigrants, but on the purposes of immigrants to leave and receiving states’ willingness to accept them (2000: 271). The thesis concerns itself with the following categories of international

immigrants: Irregular/illegal immigrants, labor immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers and forced immigrants.

•Irregular immigrants refer to people who move into another country without the required documents and permits, mostly searching for employment (Castles, 2000: 270). •Labor immigrants are the people who have the necessary documents and permits. Irregular migration, in some cases, is tolerated by receiving states as it contributes to the mobilization of labor without social costs for protection of immigrants (Castles, 2000: 270).

Two related key terms of the thesis are ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum seeker’. •A refugee, for the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, is a person who seeks refuge in a country other than his or her own, and is unable or reluctant to return because of a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”⁷ According to the United Nations Convention, refugees are to be allowed entry for protection, and are given temporary or permanent residence status by the signatory states. •An asylum seeker, on the other hand, is “a person who says he/she is a refugee, but whose claim has not yet been definitely evaluated.”⁸ A person is referred to as an asylum seeker until his/her request for a refuge is accepted by the national asylum system of the receiving country. Only after the receiving state’s recognition of his/her need to be protected, he/she

⁷ “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.” Geneva, 1951, p. 6. Available at <<http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html>> (Accessed on May 20, 2010)

⁸ “Asylum Seekers.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Available at <<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html>> (Accessed on May 20, 2010)

officially becomes a refugee, and holds certain rights as well as obligations as a refugee depending on the legislation of the receiving country.

•Forced immigrant refers to refugees, asylum seekers, and other people who are forced to move as a result of environmental disasters (Castles, 2000: 271). That said it is not easy in developing countries to distinguish between movements due to individual persecution and movements due to the devastation of economic and social infrastructure (Castles, 2000: 271). The reason for this, according to Aristide Zolberg (1983: 27), an internationally renowned expert on migration, ethnicity, and citizenship, is that developed countries associate both political and economic motivations for migration with continual violence in home countries caused by speedy practices of decolonization and globalization.

This thesis specifically focuses on ‘international migration’, which refers to a person’s move from the boundary of a political or administrative unit to another (Castles, 2000: 269). This is because “international migration is the result of a world divided into nation states, in which remaining in the country of birth is still seen as a norm and moving to another country as a deviation,” (Castles, 2000: 270). Viewed from this perspective, which is also the backbone of the United Nations’ view of migration, international migration is regarded as problematic, therefore something to be controlled.

CHAPTER 2

MIGRATION AND SECURITY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The main objective of Chapter 1 is to present the historical background of international migratory movements, and accordingly analyze the relationship of these movements to security understanding and policies of the receiving countries. The chapter looks at those historical periods in which receiving countries did not consider it to be a security threat, and those when migration and security came to be linked by receiving states. The aim of this chapter is to find out how migration and security have come to be viewed as linked over time. For this purpose, the chapter is organized chronologically into four periods beginning with the 1960s and ending in the early 2000s.

2.1 Until the 1960s

Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, international migration was ‘relatively simple’ (Boyle, Halfacree, and Robinson, 1998: 60). Better economic

conditions were the primary motivation for immigrants. Cheap fertile land in countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand combined with poverty, famine, and high population growth rates at home were the main reasons why people migrated to those lands. The Western European countries and the United States were eager receiving countries as the newcomers served their economic and nation-building purposes (Collins, 1991: 78). In addition, the United States and Europe were the key destinations for international immigrants as only they had the technology and political power to relocate large numbers of people over very long distances for economic purposes.

During this period, receiving countries viewed international migration as primarily an economic phenomenon since the growing economies of these industrial countries were willing to welcome immigrants. In the 1950s and the early 1960s, Western European countries imported several million workers from North Africa and Southern Europe to meet the labor demands of their rapidly growing economies (Weiner, 1995: 4). The United States followed a policy of intake in the 1950s, and drew immigrants from Asia and Latin America (Weiner, 1995: 4). In the late 1950s, Australia ended its 'white Australia' (London, 1970: 120) policy and invited immigrants from Asia and the Middle East. Western European countries even tried to promote migration by 'permissive migration policy' due to the need for extra labor (Huysmans, 2006: 65). So long as their economies were growing, industrial countries demanded and were eager to receive immigrants. During this period, migration was regarded as beneficial to both the sending and receiving countries. It provided a solution for reducing

unemployment in sending countries, and a solution to labor shortages in receiving countries. Migration was seen by both sending and receiving countries as essential for redrawing boundaries, exchange of populations, and what was then called nation-building (Weiner, 1995: 5).

Before the 1960s, Europe had centrality in the movement of refugees who were political exiles or rebels. Since many of these refugees were from wealthy families they tended not to be economic burdens on their adopted countries, and governments were therefore not concerned with regulating the flow of such people (Porter, 1979: 81). In the pre-World War II period, the geographical extent of the refugee issue was widened by the flood of refugees fleeing civil war and the communist regime in Russia, the forced eviction of Jews from Austria, the retreat of ethnic Germans to the newly defined postwar Germany. Still, the settlement of these refugees did not constitute either a security or an economic problem for the receiving countries since Europe was suffering population loss due to the world wars and had enough colonial possessions as alternative resettlement destinations (Robinson, 1998: 69).

Up until the 1960s, then, the problem of what to do with labor immigrants and refugees was essentially viewed as a humanitarian issue for the migration receiving countries best addressed through international cooperation and burden-sharing (Weiner, 1995: 135). In the aftermath of World War II, the task of resettling some 14 million refugees and 11 million labor immigrants prompted the creation of supranational institutions the first of which was the United Nations

Relief and Rehabilitation Agency founded in 1947 (Robinson, 1998: 70). This was then replaced by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in 1951. The UNHCR remains to be the core agency for the repatriation and dispersal of refugees to this day. The immigrants offered few challenging problems of resettlement and assimilation for those countries that accepted them.

2.2 The 1960s and 1970s

The period beginning from the early 1960s to the late 1970s saw a radical shift in the volume, form, and direction of labor as well as refugee migration. The formation of the 21st century population compositions, according to Myron Weiner, can be found in the migratory flows of the 1960s and the 1970s. During this period, Islam became a ‘new force’ in Europe; South Eastern Asians became a dominant non-Arab element in Middle East; Latinos became the largest minority in the United States (1995: 80). This radical change in international migration in the 1960s and the 1970s, and its consequent impact on both world population distribution as well as the response of receiving countries are the reasons why this thesis takes the 1960s and the early 1970s as its primary point of departure.

The economic needs at this time of postwar reconstruction led industrial countries to prefer cheap labor that could be provided by labor immigrants. In Germany, for example, the guest-worker system was adopted, in which workers from Turkey, Yugoslavia, or North Africa were encouraged to enter the country and to work (Castles, Booth, and Wallace, 1984: 45). In the United States, too,

economic growth and postwar recovery demanded extra labor. Therefore workers were drawn from labor markets such as Mexico either as legal immigrants or as ‘tolerated illegals’ in an encouraging way through a system of quota enlargement (Robinson, 1998: 72).

On the part of the sending countries, capital flows that were generated through remittances of immigrants sent back to their home countries were an encouraging factor for migration to take place. The Third World countries in this period were primarily concerned with the flow of remittances, which significantly contributed to economic development of sending countries (Weiner, 1985: 452). The amount of remittances began to grow increasingly beginning with the 1970s, and was estimated to be \$3 billion in this period (Adamson, 2006: 187).

As international migration experienced considerable increase in both the demand for labor immigrants in receiving countries and in the number of labor immigrants, the same was also the case for refugee migration in the early 1970s. The growing number and intensity of regional conflicts between the regional proxies of the United States and the Soviet Union produced a significant increase in the number of refugees originating from the Third World (Robinson, 1998: 73). According to Zolberg (1983: 30), a second factor responsible for this extensive increase in the number of world refugees was the demise of multiethnic European empires, and decolonization. As a result of these, two groups of people emerged that Zolberg defines as such (1983: 30):

The dissolution of multiethnic empires created ‘minorities’, who were the people of one identity that found themselves in a country with a different

identity, and who, therefore, were stripped of their full rights and legal protection. Another group of people created was the 'stateless' group, whose identity did not correspond to that of any established nation-state or minority due to either history or deliberate legal exclusion. Both groups eventually became refugees, with the stateless being expelled and minorities being persecuted until they chose to leave.

The 1970s witnessed both of these processes at work, with newly emerging nations encouraging native settlers to return to their homelands, and expelling colonial racial minorities (Zlotnik, 1996: 332).

As the nature and size of the refugee population changed in the 1970s, so did the way in which international immigrants, including labor immigrants, were viewed and defined by the receiving countries. Such Western countries as the United States, France, Canada, Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom still carried out the resettlement of immigrants as a humanitarian gesture. From 1975 until the early 1980s, 2 million labor immigrants and refugees were resettled in developed countries (Robinson, 1998: 76). According to Vaughan Robinson, an expert on international migration, internal migration and geography, this demonstrates that at the time international migration flows continued to be regarded as assets (1998: 76). The experience of the oil crisis of 1973 created some unease especially for oil consumer Europe in accepting immigrants since resettlement of incoming immigrants would add to the economic burden of the crisis. However, this unease was due to economic concerns of the receiving countries, rather than security reasons (Castles, Booth, and Wallace, 1984: 46). As such, by the end of the 1970s migration policy was still based on humanitarian principles. Immigrants were a problem in economic terms.

Beginning from the late 1970s, the economic motivation for migration became less significant when refugee migrations reached unreasonable levels and immigrants became clearly visible social groups within the receiving societies. Although labor migration flows were intended to be temporary by the receiving countries, namely the United States, Western European countries, and the oil producing Middle Eastern countries, many immigrants have become permanent in the receiving country, changing the ethnic and religious features of receiving societies. During this period, illegal entries from the Third World countries to developing countries increased so much that the movement of people across borders has become less acceptable to developing countries. There were clear indications that the issue of migration, in terms of relationship to security dynamics, was getting more closely associated with international security. Jan Niessen (1994: 580), a scholar working on international migration, anti-racism and human rights, explains that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, beginning from 1975, deliberately linked the three baskets of economic cooperation, protection of human rights, and political and security issues. He explains that the observance of the Soviet bloc to Western norms of human rights was efficiently bought through economic cooperation. From this period onwards, developing countries, without distinguishing labor immigrants from refugees, have begun to associate international migration with security, and a politicization of migration as a threat to restrain from has followed (Weiner, 1995: 136).

2.3 The 1980s

The 1980s experienced an explosion in the volume of international migration (Castles and Miller, 1993: 60). This change was caused by the development of cheap international air travel and new information technology, which permitted the global spread of information on migration opportunities. As income disparities between the developed and developing countries increased, the pressure for migration to the developed Western countries also increased, regardless of rising unemployment levels in such countries as Australia, Canada, and the United States (Robinson, 1998: 77). The difference of the 1980s from the earlier periods, however, was that labor immigrants seeking new lives abroad had to meet stricter eligibility criteria based more on wealth and labor market skills. Despite this eligibility criteria adopted by the developed countries, the flow of legal as well as undocumented immigrants continued (Hugo, 1995: 399). By the close of the 1980s there were few countries in the world not affected by migration (Robinson, 1998: 78). By the end of the 1980s, migration truly became a globalized phenomenon.

The 1980s marked an important change in refugee movement as well. The number of refugees in the world began to grow sharply from the mid-1970s onwards, and reached its peak in the 1980s. This was because more refugees were being generated by the Third World poverty rather than by political persecution exercised in the East (Robinson, 1998: 78). There was another very important factor that encouraged refugee flows in this period. The first legal definition of a

refugee expressed in 1951 in the Convention by the United Nations refers to any person who,

[...] owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (UNHCR, 1995: 163).

According to this Convention status, a person had to cross an international political boundary to become a refugee. As a result of the increase in the number of independent states in the 1980s, migration flows that were previously within the boundaries of one state became international flows. These immigrants, therefore, became eligible for the Convention status to be named as refugees by receiving states (Ferris, 1985: 16).

During the 1980s, for the first time migration and immigrants became associated in the minds of the public and key policy makers of receiving countries with security (Robinson, 1998: 78). In many of the migration receiving countries, the early attempts to accept and assimilate immigrant groups in Australia and the United Kingdom, or ignore and exclude them in West Germany had by the 1980s become to be considered unworkable. Integration and multiculturalism/pluralism began to be favored in place of assimilation in Western nations. However, while multiculturalism welcomed cultural and ethnic diversity, it also drew attention to differences and to the fact that certain ethnic groups simply could not be integrated either because they did not wish to be or because the cultural differences were too great to overcome (Robinson, 1998: 78). The immigrant

receiving countries believed that the continuing flows of migration sharpened the divide between ‘them’ and ‘us’, and the break of civil disorder boosted the perception that ‘different’ might also indicate ‘threatening’ (Hargreaves, 1996: 610). Migration and immigrants became security issues within receiving countries with the economic arguments for the free movement of labor being beset by observations of immigrants as cultural, political, economic, and security threats (Hargreaves, 1996: 611).

In the 1980s, the policy response of receiving countries to migration began to develop towards exclusionism and utilitarianism rather than humanitarianism, with immigrants increasingly being admitted only if they served a purpose (Robinson, 1998: 79). Joanne van Selm, a researcher on migration and refugee issues, explains this change in receiving countries’ response to migration as follows (2005: 25),

What constitutes a threat is a matter of perception, which differs from one society to another and from a period of time to another. Whether migration is viewed with contentment or as a discontent depends on who is moving, where they are moving from and to, and who is watching them move.


The news media and governments of the Western countries as well as the United States began to draw little distinction between labor immigrants and refugees. Accordingly, they offered refugee status to all as a justification for introducing tougher policies of exclusion (Webber, 1991: 14). Receiving government policies increasingly sought to deny access to immigrants. Airlines were fined if they carried wrong immigrants with wrong visas (Feller, 1989: 55). Receiving governments sought to deter applicants by resorting to less generous definitions of

eligibility for asylum, and countries such as the United Kingdom applied aggressive deterrence by housing immigrants in prison-like conditions (Feller, 1989: 55). On the other hand, some countries with labor and population shortages, such as Australia, continued to accept ‘selected’ refugees (Robinson, 1998: 79). The West went on to accept refugees fleeing from Communism (Robinson, 1998: 79).

2.4 From the 1990s to the Present

The 1990s saw an intensification of international migration flows and new migration flows developed. The figures beginning from the 1960 until the end of 2005 are indicated in the following table:

Figure 1. Number of international immigrants in the world, 1960-2005




Data from: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2006. “Trends in Total Immigrant Stock: The 2005 Revision.” Available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/UN_Immigrant_Stock_Documentation_2005.pdf (Accessed on June 8, 2010)

In addition, the nature of international migration changed (Castles and Miller, 1993: 61). That is, for Western nations, migration flows that would be caused by the demise of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of Cold War constituted a fear that immigrants would flood across the newly opened frontiers in the West. This was considered to be a security threat for the West (Robinson, 1998: 81). The Yugoslavian civil war had generated 556,000 immigrants who crossed an international boundary (King, 1993: 185). Further, ethnic migrations into the West as a result of ethnic nationalism in the former Soviet Union, and the inability of the newly democratized and independent countries of the East, such as Hungary, Poland, or the Czech Republic to house, feed, or employ new waves of immigrants were seen as security threats by migration receiving countries in the 1990s (King, 1993: 185).

The intensification in migration flows was met by exclusionary migration policies in the West in the 1990s, which had already begun in the 1980s. Italy declared migration a social emergency and introduced the Martelli Law of 1990 to stop migration flows into the country (Campani, 1993: 511). Portugal, Spain, Italy, and France made diplomatic attempts to slow migration from North African countries by offering preferential trade deals and investment (Campani, 1993: 515). These policies, in turn, forced many prospective labor immigrants to seek clandestine means of migration (Robinson, 1998: 81). Mark Miller, an expert on migration studies and comparative politics, states that in 1990 there were as many as 5.5 million illegal immigrants in the United States most of whom had come from Mexico (1995: 530).

Another significant feature of migration in the 1990s was that international migration became increasingly dominated by illegal migration driven by political, religious, or ethnic persecution. As much as 20 percent of all international immigrants that amounted to almost 170 million in the late 1990s was made up of refugees (Robinson, 1998: 81) as shown in the following table:

Figure 2. Number of refugees, asylum seekers and other displaced persons in millions, 2000



Data from: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). "Trends in International Immigrant Stock: The 2008 Revision (United Nations Database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008) Available at <http://esa.un.org/migration/p2k0data.asp> (Accessed on June 8, 2010)

International migration was associated with security in the 1990s more than it was in the 1980s. In the 1990s, an increasing number of receiving governments began to consider themselves as surrounded by migration threats (Robinson, 1998: 83). As a result, according to Karen Jacobsen, a researcher on migration and asylum issues, there were three sources of pressure on governments when they were determining policy: The international migration regime, the local community which would be most affected by admission and resettlement, and the

immigrants themselves (Jacobsen, 1996: 661). Jacobsen explains that these pressures were set against national security in the following way (1996: 674):

At various points in the policy making process, the government weighs the costs and benefits of accepting international assistance, assesses relations with the sending country, makes political calculations about the local community's absorption capacity and most importantly, factors in national security considerations.

The policy response of receiving countries to the growth in numbers of legal and illegal immigrants ranged from exclusion to discouragement based on the fact that immigrants were considered to threaten national security, national homogeneity, economic security, and environmental security (Jacobsen, 1996: 674). The United States reversed open-admission policy for immigrants fleeing the Soviet Union and imposed quotas in 1989 (Robinson, 1998: 84). The Dublin Convention in 1990 ensured that asylum seekers could make only one application for asylum in Europe (Robinson, 1998: 84). Such Western countries as Germany altered welfare systems in the mid-1990s so as to reduce benefits for refugees (Robinson, 1998: 84). These are the most noteworthy instances of government policies of exclusion and discouragement in this period. Furthermore, repatriation was adopted to return immigrants and discourage the others from applying. Switzerland turned back over 100,000 immigrants in 1992; Italy returned 24,000 Albanians in 1991; and 2.83 million Afghans returned home between 1990 and 1995 (Robinson, 1998: 85). All of them received only limited assistance from the UNHCR (Robinson, 1998: 85).

All these policy responses were carried out on the premise that international migration flows constituted a security threat to the receiving countries. According to Myron Weiner, an expert on internal and international migration, ethnic conflict, political demography and development, none of these responses had a humanitarian facet (1995: 158). As a result, these policy responses in turn took the form of a security threat for the immigrants because their will to move was rejected, returning them to the conditions they were escaping from (1995: 158).

Since the late 1990s until the early 2000s, the United States, the European Union countries, Canada, and Australia have been the main destinations for both labor and involuntary immigrants from the third world countries, especially from Middle East, Africa, Asia Pacific, and the Balkans (Bali, 2008: 479). Afghanistan, Somalia, Sri-Lanka, China, and ex-Soviet Union states have been the major countries which produce immigrants (Joppke, 2001: 7). In addition to economic motivations, internal civil conflicts within some of these countries are the leading factors on the movement of their populations. The chief characteristic of international migration in the early 2000s is that there is a general decline of legal migration while the amount of illegal immigrants has increased as an unintended result of restrictive state policies of the 1990s (Joppke, 2001: 7). The tendency on the part of migration receiving countries to see international migration as ‘an issue of discontentment’ has continued till the early 2000s (Van Selm, 2005: 11).

In the 2000s, migration is increasingly associated with issues of domestic and international security. This understanding is prevalent especially in the European Union countries where cooperation among member countries on migration affairs is carried out within the context of struggle against international crime, terrorism, safeguarding external borders as well as coping with unemployment. According to Christian Joppke, a researcher on migration and citizenship, there is ‘a simple reason’ for associating migration with security. He explains as such (2001: 15):

[...] to the degree that migration is unwanted, and migration policy becomes a ‘control policy’, migration is likely to be addressed in negative terms, as a ‘threat’ to the receiving society.

Addressing migration in such negative terms, according to Ole Wæver, has become more common in the post-Cold War world, “where the concerns about military security are being replaced by concerns about societal security, in which migration is the key,” (1993: 19).

In the 2000s, migration is linked to military security due to receiving states’ concerns about several security problems. These problems include drug trafficking, organized crime, global mafias, international money laundering, urban violence, Islamic radicalism, terrorism supported by immigrant sending countries, huge influxes of refugees, delinquency and incivility, and attacks on national identity due to the presence of ‘alternative behaviors’ of immigrants (Bigo, 2001: 122). In addition, the declarations of migration receiving Western countries include trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and nuclear crime among these security problems (Bigo, 2001: 122). The security threat exposed by each of these

instances lead migration receiving countries to associate their security with immigrants who are deemed guilty (Bigo, 2001: 125).

The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001 have reinforced the relationship between migration and security on the part of migration receiving countries at the start of the 21st century. Although the connection of international migration to security predate 2001 (Huysmans, 2006: 143), this incident has brought with it a reconsideration of security risks related to migration for states. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Western European and North American governments have toughened not only external controls but also internal controls of non-citizens (Faist, 2002: 8). The fact that all of the 19 terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks were non United States citizens, who took advantage of ‘loopholes in migration legislation of the United States’ to get into the country, led receiving countries, especially the United States and European countries, to view migration as a policy area strongly affected by the new concern with terrorism (Hampshire, 2008: 109).

According to Thomas Faist, an expert on migration, ethnic relations, and social policy, the connection between international migration and security has already been established in the 1980s by migration receiving countries by characterizing the immigrants as ‘other’ and ‘stranger’ as a source of security threat to ‘our’ borders, jobs, housing as well as states’ borders, values, collective identities, and cultural homogeneity (2002: 7). With the terrorist attacks of September 11, international migration took on another security dimension, which

is terrorism (Faist, 2002: 12), and the term immigrant has become synonymous with ‘suspect’ and ‘potentially hostile foreigner’ (Bigo, 2005: 66).

2.5 Conclusion

The main objective of Chapter 1 was to present the historical background of international migration flows, and accordingly analyze the relationship of these flows to security conception and policy of receiving countries. At the beginning of the age of migration until the 1960s, international migration was defined in terms of economic motivations on the part of both immigrants and the sending and receiving countries. The decision whether to allow entry to immigrants was shaped in accordance with the economic needs of receiving countries in the post World War II reconstruction period. The admission of refugees and labor immigrants was not associated with broader migration policy and it was not considered in relation to security by the receiving countries. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the world experienced a great increase in the amount of labor immigrants whose benefit to the economy of receiving countries led these countries to accept migration flows. However, the increase in the amount of illegal immigrants as much as that of labor immigrants in this period made economic motivations for accepting immigrants less significant in the receiving countries, and the issue of migration began to be associated with ‘societal security’ of the receiving countries. The concern of the receiving countries with illegal migration brought about restrictive state policies in the 1980s that were put into practice without distinction between legal and illegal immigrants. The linkage between migration

and security concerns of receiving countries was established through state policies. Since the 1990s, the view of migration as a security threat to receiving countries and exclusionary migration policies by state actors have strengthened. The increase in the demand of people to move, receiving states' concern with unemployment, and the terrorist attacks in the mid-1990s as well as in the early 2000s reinforced the already established link between security concerns of migration receiving countries and international migration.

This historical overview of the evolution of international migration and its association, by receiving countries, with various concerns of economic, societal, and military security has clarified how migration and security have had a context-bound relationship. Whereas previously migration was viewed as a solution to economic problems of receiving states, it then came to be viewed as an economic problem by these states. While previously it helped with nation-building, it then came to be viewed as a threat to societal security. And finally from the 1990s onwards, a firm relationship was established by receiving countries through linking migration to military/police security. Chapters 2 and 3 will look at how the strengthening of this linkage between security and migration was further developed in practice (Chapter 2), and is studied in the literature (Chapter 3).

CHAPTER 3

MIGRATION AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IN PRACTICE

The first part of this chapter looks at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' stance on migration. The next two parts of this chapter explore the ways in which migration has been associated with security in practices of two actors, the European Union and the United States. The reason for making a distinction between the United States and the European Union on the one hand, and the United Nations on the other, is because while the European Union and the United States have viewed migration as a security issue since the early 1990s, the United Nations has looked at migration as both a security and a human rights issue.

3.1 Migration Policy and the United Nations

The United Nations' efforts to deal with international migration began shortly before the end of the Second World War with the creation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency in order to facilitate the resettlement of refugees

displaced by the war. In 1947, it was replaced by the International Refugee Organization, which was then changed into the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1951. The effort of the United Nations to tackle the issue of migration, since the creation of the UNHCR, has focused on rehabilitation and relocation of victims of forced migration, namely refugees and asylum seekers. This was firstly because the United Nations undertook the humanitarian mission as a priority (Weiner, 1995: 150). Secondly, it was because labor migration was not considered as problematic as forced migration (Weiner, 1995: 150). The United Nations preferred to deal with migration in accordance with the economic needs of each individual state (Weiner, 1995: 150).

The late 1980s and the early 1990s, which is the end of the Cold War, brought about new opportunities for handling migration crises as well as new conditions generating displacement, as a result leading to a change in the United Nations working environment (Weiner, 1995: 154). Beginning from the late 1980s, European states have tried to prevent immigrants from entering their borders. The reason for this is that immigrants, including refugees, were no longer seen as contributing to national workforces, were no longer strategically important for the West in its opposition to communism (Hammerstad, 2000: 393). Moreover, rising xenophobia and hostility against other cultures contributed to electoral successes of anti-migration (Hammerstad, 2000: 393). The UNHCR, aware of the emergence of more restrictive and hostile attitudes towards refugees in Western Europe beginning from the late 1980s, has carried out international

humanitarian operations to prevent refugee flows or control them within their countries of origin.

Currently, the UNHCR is the leading international institution with the responsibility to provide protection for immigrants, in particular illegal immigrants, around the world. The decisions of the UNHCR, however, are non-binding. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees provides the UNHCR with guidance for permanent solutions to migration problems defining a refugee as a person who,

[...] owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.⁹

In addition to this definition of a refugee, the UNHCR adopts the principle of non-refoulement under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This principle is as follows:

No contracting state shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.¹⁰

In consistency with this norm, the UNHCR declares that all who seek asylum fall under the protection of the country whose borders they have entered and not be repatriated while their cases are being watched (Weiner, 1995: 154).

⁹ “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.” Geneva, 1951, p. 6. Available at <<http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html>> (Accessed on February 24, 2010)

¹⁰ “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.” Geneva, 1951, p. 8. Available at <<http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html>> (Accessed on February 24, 2010)

The primary focus of the UNHCR, since the early 1990s, is on large scale humanitarian operations for war affected populations, internally displaced persons and refugees alike (Helton, 1994: 1). The then head of the UNHCR, Sadako Ogata, stated that the United Nations responded to the refugee hostile environment by transforming its practical policies as well as its language:

Responses to complex movements of people which focus primarily on the entry into and the conditions of stay in the receiving country are far from adequate. We all realize that while large scale forced population movement is caused by political insecurity, it also impacts on the stability of countries and regions.¹¹

This has been done by the Security Council. The Security Council authorized coercive action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter declaring, “Non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.”¹² As a result of the preventive approach taken by migration receiving countries (Hammerstad, 2000: 393), the United Nations has become more preoccupied with economic, societal, and political security concerns in tackling the issue of migration (UNHCR, 2000: 19).

Security concerns on the part of states experiencing large migration flows, combined with the UNHCR’s’ increased involvement in migration crises, have led to the emergence of a ‘security discussion’ within the United Nations since the 1990s (Hammerstad, 2000: 395). A debate over the meaning of security and more inclusive definitions of security followed (Hammerstad, 2000: 395). The UNHCR

¹¹ Sadako Ogata. “Statement on the Occasion of the Intergovernmental Consultation on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia.” The Hague, 17-18 November 1994. Available at <<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/hcspeech/menu.htm>> (Accessed on February 27, 2010)

¹² Security Council Summit Meeting S/23500. New York, 31 January 1992. Available at <<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9746.doc.htm>> (Accessed on February 27, 2010)

has then become concerned not only with the security of receiving states and communities but with all aspects of the human security of individuals. Although a concern with human security has never completely replaced the traditional concerns of the United Nations (Hammerstad, 2000: 396), today, the United Nations attends to the idea of human security. This idea has a vital position within the security discourse of the UNHCR. In an article of the High Commission's Policy Research Unit, security is redefined in terms of human security as such:

There is a broader definition of human security, not just the absence of war or military protection. It is the kind of security which ensures a meaningful life, a decent economic living, protection of one's human rights and the rule of law (UNHCR, 1998: xi).

The UNHCR takes its definition of security from the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Report, and addresses security as the privilege of first the individual, and associates security to ideas of human rights and relief of human suffering (UNDP, 1994: 22).

At an intergovernmental conference on human security in 1999, the High Commissioner redefined the United Nations' goal of maintaining international peace and security as the objective of human security, and presented refugees as a 'significant symptom' of the insecurities of post Cold War world.¹³ In practice, all of the funds of the UNHCR come from voluntary contributions, over 95 percent of which come from the Western European states, Australia, North America, and Japan (UNHCR, 2000: 37). Therefore, the UNHCR views security and migration relationship within the context of its everlasting pursuit of the right balance

¹³ Sadako Ogata. "Human Security: A Refugee Perspective." Norway, 19 May 1999. Available at <<http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&DocId=1003888>> (Accessed on February 27, 2010)

between serving the interests of contributor states, on which the agency *depends*, and protecting and assisting refugees, for which the agency exists (Goodwin-Gill, 1999: 222). The High Commissioner's speech of 1999 is as follows:

The events of this decade, and indeed, those of the past year, indicate very clearly that refugee issues cannot be discussed without reference to security. This is true in different contexts: security of refugees and refugee operations; security of states, jeopardized by mass population movements of a mixed nature; and security of humanitarian staff... Today's refugee crises in fact concern all dimensions of security. Measures to address this problem have become an imperative necessity.¹⁴

Evident in the speech of the High Commissioner, the UNHCR takes not only the immigrants but also the states and its own personnel as the parties affected by migration flows while establishing a relationship between migration and security. This is due to the impact of refugee influxes on states ranging from presence of militarized refugee camps in unstable border regions to impacts on economy, ethnic balances, and environment (Hammerstad, 2000: 397). That is, the UNHCR's view of migration as a security issue is based on the idea that refugee flows must be prevented and reversed due to the security threats such flows create for the humanitarian workers and the refugees themselves, as well as to social cohesion, political integrity and economic welfare of receiving states, and regional and international stability (Hammerstad, 2000: 396).

That the September 11 terrorist attacks have brought a terrorism dimension to the issue of migration has become an unease for the UNHCR. The statement of the report of the High Commissioner of November 2001 is as follows:

¹⁴ Sadako Ogata. "Statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to the Third Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations." New York, 12 November 1999. Available at <<http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68fc01c.html>> (Accessed on February 27, 2010)

Current anxieties about international terrorism risk fueling a growing trend towards the criminalization of asylum seekers and refugees. They increasingly have a difficult time in a number of states, either accessing procedures or overcoming presumptions about the validity of their claims, which stem from their ethnicity, or their mode of arrival. UNHCR appreciates that states may wish to strengthen border controls as one way of identifying security threats. However, profiling and screening solely on the basis of national, religious, or racial characteristics would be discriminatory and inappropriate. All persons have the right to seek asylum and to undergo individual refugee status determination (UNHCR, 2001: 2).

After the attacks, the UNHCR, faced with the security threat of terrorism added to that of migration on the part of states, still emphasizes the necessity of prevention and containment of refugee flows, and supports reconstruction, refugee repatriation, criminal law enforcement, and combating racism and xenophobia as the best solution to migration crises (UNHCR, 2001: 6). On the other hand, the United Nations Secretary General stated on September 24, 2001, “No people and no region should be condemned because of the unspeakable acts of a few individuals,” (UNHCR, 2001: 7). The reason for this unease is that any association of immigrants with terrorism by receiving states runs against the human security concern of the UNHCR.

3.2 Migration Policy of the European Union

Until the mid-1970s, the European Community tended to act in accordance with the migration policy of the United Nations, which favored economic well being of migration receiving states and human rights of immigrants (Weiner, 1995: 158). However, the United Nations’ direct focus on humanitarian assistance and in-country protection of immigrants began to run contrary to the demands of Western

European countries beginning with the late 1970s. There are several reasons for this. One of them was the high flow of immigrants into Western European countries, especially refugees and asylum seekers, from Eastern European and Third World countries. As the receiving countries viewed this amount of immigrants as more than tolerable, the economic cost of providing the immigrants with relief rather than humanitarian help became the primary concern for Western European countries (Weiner, 1995:158). From then onwards, Western European countries have taken measures to address migration outside of the United Nations framework (Weiner, 1995: 162).

Another reason that led the European Community to decide on acting outside of the United Nations framework on migration issues was that the concern of the UNHCR, the United Nations' arm to deal with international migration (Weiner, 1995: 161), was the flow of refugees. Unlike the European Community, the United Nations was not concerned with labor migration unless a real serious security threat to the individuals migrating for labor purposes took place (Weiner, 1995: 163). On the other hand, increasing flow of labor migration had already become a concern for the European Community countries in the late 1970s due to large amounts of people fleeing into these countries, and their demand to be housed. Consequently, the European Community members no longer regarded migration and refugee policies as distinct, with the former based on utilitarian concerns of receiving countries and the latter based on the needs of exposed individuals in need of safeguard against persecution and violence (Weiner, 1995: 163).

In addition, that large numbers of individuals in the 1970s were using the refugee claims to migrate for labor purposes added to the growth of conviction among the Community countries that,

Mass displacements of people are a great threat to regional and global security and peace because it is no more possible to distinguish between who is coming for labor and who is an escapee. States are being left totally out of control of people's movements (Widgren, 1987: 30).

Therefore, the refugee influx in the European Community was viewed in terms of political consequences of unwanted migration flows (Weiner, 1995: 164).

While migration in the European context was an issue defined in terms of economic development until the 1970s, it has become an economic and societal security question on the part of the European countries since the mid-1970s. Jef Huysmans, a scholar working on securitization of migration and asylum in Europe, (2000: 751) explains this stating that the huge amount of migration flows into Western Europe in the late 1970s were seen to bring with it destabilizing effects on economy and public order. Immigrants were no longer considered as assisting national economy, but were viewed as threatening it in the 1980s (Hammerstad, 2000: 393). In the late 1980s, they were no longer viewed as significant in strategic terms for Europe to oppose communism (Hammerstad, 2000: 393). Furthermore, growing xenophobia and hostility against other cultures in Western European countries led calls for anti-migration to gain electoral success (Hammerstad, 2000: 393). The result within Western European countries has been the 'social construction of migration' into both an economic and a

societal security question, followed by the development of a restrictive migration policy beginning from the late 1970s (Huysmans, 2000: 751). Since then, Western European countries have established a relationship between security and migration, in accordance with their economic and societal security concerns.

As a result of these concerns, a tendency has developed within the European Union, which is a collection of states in the field of migration, to set the principles in dealing with migration as a threat to economic and societal security, and several steps were taken to decide upon a migration policy in constitutional terms. Establishment of the Trevi Group (Terrorism, Radicalism, and Extreme Violence International) in 1975 was prompted by several terrorist acts, particularly the hostage taking and the following massacre during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. It had a wide area of concern including organized crime, illegal migration, and drug trafficking. The Trevi Group is important in European migration policy as being one of the first attempts to link migration to security (Monar, 2001: 748). The next initiative was the formation of the 'Ad Hoc Group on Migration' in 1986 to ease intergovernmental cooperation among the Community members in migration related fields. The group brought restrictions to the admission of migration flows as well as asylum applications to prevent fake documentation and promote intelligence exchange (Dearden, 2009: 26). The Schengen Agreement of 1985 brought the elimination of border checks among Community members calling for common data bases, exchange of good practices, and a common visa policy between Schengen member countries (Bigo and Guild, 2005: 233). The abolishment of internal border controls created the need to

strengthen external border controls for which judicial and police cooperation was improved. The police and related departments were incorporated into the Ministry of Home Affairs (Huysmans, 2000: 757). This was accompanied by a prominent role in regulation of migration as a defining practice of the Schengen Agreement to make migration a security problem (Huysmans, 2000: 757). The Article 9 of the Schengen Acquis called for cooperation among the Schengen members on the following issues:

The Parties shall reinforce cooperation between their customs and police authorities, notably in combating crime, particularly illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and arms, the unauthorized entry and residence of persons, customs and tax fraud and smuggling.¹⁵

This statement of the Schengen Acquis mentions all kinds of unauthorized entry together with transnational crimes, and therefore migration is associated with terrorism, transnational crime, and border control (Bigo and Guild, 2005: 236).

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992, in its Title VI, addressed migration as a matter of common interest together with the fight against drugs and fraud, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, customs cooperation and police in the fight against terrorism, drugs and trafficking and other forms of international crime.¹⁶ That is, migration and asylum issues were mentioned together with other criminal matters again in the Maastricht Treaty. Accordingly, common migration and asylum policy were made into one of the pillars of the European Union.

¹⁵ General Secretariat of the European Council. 1999. "The Schengen Acquis: Integrated into the European Union." Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/SCH.ACQUIS-EN.pdf> (Accessed on February 19, 2010)

¹⁶ European Council. 1992. "Treaty of Maastricht on European Union." Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html> (Accessed on February 19, 2010)

Another important aspect of the Maastricht Treaty was the creation of the European citizenship concept that sharpened the differentiation of third country nationals and citizens of member states (Geddes, 2003: 68).

In the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, migration and asylum policy of the European Union was transferred to the First Pillar. With this move, the European Commission gained the ability to propose binding measures to the European Council, and migration and asylum policy were carried into the policy area dealt on a supranational basis (Bigo, 2009: 579). The responsibility for migration flows including all visa applications, legal and illegal migration policies were transferred from the Justice and Home Affairs to the European Community with the Amsterdam Treaty. The treaty aimed at promoting societal security in Europe by restricting visa and asylum practices, and it presented illegal immigrants as a threat to the formation of an area of freedom, security and justice (Peers, 2000: 2).

Throughout the 1990s, then migration rose high on the European Union economic and societal security agenda. The terrorist attacks in New York City in 2001, in Madrid in 2004, and in London in 2005 only added to existing fears regarding the perceived relationship between migration and security in Europe (Adamson, 2006: 165). These bombings created a further shift in policies of restricting migration. In the words of David Bonner, a researcher on terrorism, migration, human rights, and societal security risks (2004: 99),

The European Union climate, never warm for immigrants and even colder for irregular ones, has turned positively icy since September 11. The threat of terrorism has further highlighted the deterrence and restriction aspects

of an already highly ambivalent asylum and migration policy, a steady undermining of the right to asylum.

Following the attacks, the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting declared the Common Position to Combat Terrorism, calling for an increase in the effectiveness of border controls and of issuance of identity papers as well as travel documents (2001/930/CFSP). Fiona Adamson, a scholar working on international security, migration, identity movements, and globalization, argues that the European Union has been eager to strengthen external border controls to stop illegal migration since the 1980s, and the then current terrorist attacks became justifications for the union for its ongoing migration process (2006: 196).

Apart from consideration of migration in the European Union countries as a security threat to the well processing of the nation state after the terrorist attacks of 2000s (Boswell, 2007: 592), immigrants are also formulated as ‘bearers of multiple social threats’ (Tsoukala, 2005: 163). According to Tsoukala, addressing immigrants as such is formulated by politicians, officials, and the media, as a result of which immigrants became transformed into a threat to societal security (2005: 163). The then leader of Conservative Party, Michael Howard, stated in 2005 that,

While our duties to our citizens include the duty to protect our welfare and benefit budgets and our housing system at a time of economic stringency, we face a real threat in Britain today- a threat to our safety, to our way of life, and to our liberties. Our migration system is being abused, and with it Britain’s generosity. But we have absolutely no idea who is coming into or leaving our country.¹⁷

¹⁷ “Border Police Planned by Tories” Published: 2005/03/29 18:00:17 GMT. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4389761.stm> (Accessed on February 22, 2010)

Migration in the European Union is addressed through political discourses as a threat to internal security, demographic balance, identity and interests of the receiving societies (Tsoukala, 2005: 164).

Following September 11 attacks, the previously adopted measures on migration have become linked to terrorism related security concerns. Didier Bigo, an expert on critical approaches to security working on migration, international relations and sociology, states (2009: 588) that moves in Europe to associate security with migration and migration with terrorism go back further than September 11. As with Adamson, Bigo explains the role of September 11 terrorist attacks on the European migration policy as follows:

[...] However, the decision of the United States of September 13, 2001 about emergency powers plainly sped up such procedures in Europe, and was grist to the mill of all those who were already calling for a proactive approach based on prevention. The fight against terrorism has clearly served as a justification for strengthening control mechanisms (2009: 588).

In the early aftermath of September 11 attacks, European Union migration policies are characterized by the constant reinforcement of border controls, the hardening of the clauses of entry as well as of the deportation measures, the declining of the legal status of asylum seekers, the application of migration controls, the imposition of visa issuing and of penalties on carriers transporting illegal immigrants, the strengthening of cooperation with third countries, and the expansion of identity checks within the European Union countries' territory (Tsoukala, 2005: 161).

3.3 Migration Policy of the United States

The United States attracted 61 percent of the world's immigrants from 1820 to 1930, almost equivalent to all other nations of the world combined. This migration flow contributed to the economic development of the nation to a significant extent. Under the motto *e pluribus unum* (from many, one), Presidents of the United States frequently reminded the people of the unifying influence of migration on individuals from diverse origins to make up a society on the basis of freedom and equality (Rudolph, 2006: 41). In accordance with this motto, a 1994 report by the Urban Institute argued that migration policy of the United States is managed by six broad goals: Economic development, family reunification, increasing standards of living, promotion of human rights, stopping illegal migration, and promoting diversity.¹⁸ This principle of promoting diversity, however, has not been easy to carry out in practice on migration in the United States.

Well until the mid-1990s, the establishment of a relationship between migration and national security was not yet realized in United States policy making (Martin, 2004: 53). Only high rates of migration were considered to be an economic problem due to unemployment concerns, and a societal problem due to differences of languages between immigrants and citizens. The policy adopted was in the form of addressing social fears of migration through accepting migration flows as much as the society and the economy of the country tolerated

¹⁸ "Migration and Imimmigrants," Urban Institute Report, 1994. Available at <<http://www.urban.org/Publications/305184.html>> (Accessed on February 20, 2010)

(Forest, 2006: 18). That is, maintenance of societal security and economic national interest for the continuance of liberal economic structure were predominant in adoption of migration policies (Forest, 2006: 18). For instance, when the Migration and Reform Control Act was passed in 1986 under the administration of Ronald Reagan, 2.8 million illegal immigrants were rewarded with a legal status as they were considered fit to serve for the purpose of economic development (Weiner, 1995: 143).

The 1995 bombings of the Paris metro system by Algeria's Armed Islamic Group affiliated with Islamic Salvation Front, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party terrorist attacks in several Western European states in the 1990s occurred as the initial incidents to raise concerns of not only Europe but also the United States regarding a link between security and migration (Adamson, 2006: 166). This was because of a fear in the United States that it could also face such terrorist attacks in the future. These incidents led to a fear in the United States of potential future attacks, and therefore brought a military/police security aspect to the migration policy of the United States (Adamson, 2006: 167). Bill Clinton, the then president of the United States, pointed to security concerns regarding migration as follows (Migration Enforcement Improvements Act of 1995, May 3, 1995):

We are a nation of immigrants. But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our migration laws we have seen in recent years, and we must do more to stop it.

The United States Congress responded with legislative changes. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was passed. This act allowed

for expedited removal of foreigners who sought asylum in the United States without proper documentation. The Illegal Migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 called for enforcement of further border controls. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 made legal immigrants arriving after August 22, 1996 ineligible for welfare benefits, setting a sharp distinction between United States citizens and immigrants (Martin, 2004: 66).

The main migration relationship of the United States is with Mexico. By 2000, there were 9 million Mexican citizens who migrated to and were living in the United States. In the early 1990s, the migration policy discussion in the United States mainly included the legalization of Mexicans who entered the country illegally to make them able to work legally (Martin, 2004: 83). However, the aforementioned terrorist attacks of the mid-1990s in Western Europe and the following attacks on World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001 led the United States government to no longer consider implementing the legalization of unauthorized Mexican immigrants. In that year the Mexican President Vicente Fox raised his concerns regarding the United States' decision not to adopt this process of legalization as follows¹⁹:

We must, and we can, reach an agreement on migration before the end of this very year so that there are no Mexicans who have not entered the United States legally, and that those Mexicans who come into the country do so with proper documents.

¹⁹ "Mexico: Bush, Fox Meet." 2001. *Migration News* 8 (3). Available at <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2318_0_2_0> (Accessed on March 10, 2010)

The September 11, 2001 attacks reinforced the concerns of the United States, already raised as a result of the terrorist attacks in mid-1990s, regarding security. The United States' migration policy began to undergo a change. Instead of the legalization program towards the Mexicans, the United States administration started on a key effort to position, detain, and prosecute or expel unauthorized foreigners, no matter where they were coming from (Martin, 2004: 83).

Beginning with the early 1990s, the question of what to do about migration increasingly began to be shaped by terrorism related concerns. As a result, migration became not only an economic and societal security concern for the United States, but also a military security issue (Adamson, 2006: 167). In the words of Philip L. Martin, a researcher on migration and development (2004: 84),

Legal and unauthorized immigrants were generally considered to be hardworking newcomers seeking the American dream. [...] After the continuing terrorist attacks since the 1990s, and among them 9/11 had the most striking effect, it was recognized that some foreigners were intent on killing Americans and that they should be kept out of the United States.

According to Martin, this new concern over terrorism raised two options for the United States: Remain open to migration and take steps to observe foreigners more carefully, or try to limit migration and in this way limit the entry of terrorists. The United States has opted for the latter (Martin, 2004: 84).

Immediately after the September 11 attacks the issue of migration took center stage in the security agenda of the United States. A direct relationship between security and migration was established by the United States' government. In order to avoid possible future attacks, several policies were carried out (Stock,

2006: 124). The 9/11 National Commission Report on Terrorist Attacks (2004) pointed to the loopholes in the American system of migration and border control that was exploited by the September 11 terrorists. The hijackers were foreigners and all had entered the United States by applying for visas at United States' consulates overseas, boarding commercial aircraft, and passing inspection by United States migration agents at different airports (Stock, 2006: 119).

In the aftermath of the incident, the most obvious way to prevent such future events was viewed to be to crack down on migration (Stock, 2006: 119). New security checks, export controls, tracking systems for foreigners, halting the flow of refugees have been among the most immediate safety measures. The immense pressure on the United States government to do something led to immediate changes in United States migration policy.

The most significant policy developments of the post September 11 period include the United States of America Patriot Act of October 2001, and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of May 2002. The Patriot Act called for fortifying the northern border, increasing law enforcement forces for surveillance and detention, and increasing inadmissibility for entry by expanding the legal definition of terrorist activities to include support for terrorists and terrorist organizations (Rudolph, 2006: 79). The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act increased the number of restrictions calling for increased scrutiny of visa applications, requiring the United States universities to more carefully account for foreign students, and the creation of a new national

security registration system to monitor the entry of foreigners (Rudolph, 2006: 80).

Other than the policy makers, the United States' public too came to associate the events of 2001 with the issue of migration. A poll taken in November 2001 by the conservative media outlet Fox News concluded that 65 percent of the respondents expressed preference for an absolute termination of all migration into the United States because they did not feel secure (Rudolph, 2003: 608). On the other hand, there has been little focus on how the immigrant community of the United States could be suited to help in the effort to advance security (Stock, 2006: 125). According to American sociologist Douglas Massey, the implications of a crackdown on the immigrants living in the United States were not adequately considered (2008: 17). He explains as follows:

Policies in the United States have been largely symbolic, signaling to angry or fearful citizens and workers that their concerns are being addressed while marginalizing immigrants socially and geographically to make them less visible to the public (2008: 17).

From then on, the United States has been following a policy of 'keeping people out' (Stock, 2006: 118) in order to protect the United States' citizens (Adamson, 2006: 169).

What is threatening for the United States after September 11 attacks is the fear of entry of new terrorists into the country through migration (Rudolph, 2006: 79). This is because of the fact that the intent to migrate as a labor immigrant or a refugee might be used to make the terrorist intention invisible (Rudolph, 2006:

79). Since then, the entry of immigrants is a military security concern for the United States over and above economic and societal security dimensions.

3.4 Conclusion

The aim of Chapter 2 was to trace how migration has come to be associated with security in the practices of three actors, the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States. The experiences of these actors with migration flows and their policy response to these flows were analyzed. In the United Nations, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees is the actor that has associated movement of refugees and asylum seekers with security since the early 1990s. Differently from the other two actors, the UNHCR considers migration from not only a security but also a human rights perspective, with a responsibility for balancing between the needs of states and immigrants. However, as an intergovernmental organization dependent upon the member states' approval for its existence but concerned with human rights at the same time, the UNHCR views international migration issue as a security threat only when the migratory movements are illegally carried out and constitute a threat to the receiving states.

In the European Union, high amounts of labor immigrant as well as refugee flows of the late 1970s made migration an economic and a societal security concern leading to the distancing of member countries from the humanitarian migration policy framework of the United Nations. The European Union countries responded through strengthened control policies. The migration

policy of the European Union became further restrictive following the terrorist activities of the 1990s in Western Europe, in 2001 in the United States, in Madrid in 2004, and in London in 2005.

In the United States, international migration was considered within a framework of economic development and diversity promotion until the late 1960s. Migration policy until then was in the form of tolerance as long as it served economic and social security. Beginning with the terrorist attacks in the 1990s and particularly in 2001, the United States has viewed migration into the country as an economic, social, and a military security threat. Legislative changes in migration policy of the country followed. The management of international migration flows is seen as a major challenge by the United States and the European Union countries as the receiving countries. The main point of concern for these states has been the increasing possibility of illegal entries for purposes of terrorism after September 11, 2001. The response of the United States and the European countries has been nationwide in the form of increasing border controls and restrictive admission measures. The European Union still injects a concern with justice and liberty and security whereas the United States does not shy away from prioritizing national security. Chapter 2 aimed at arguing that view of migration as a security issue or not changes according to actors.

CHAPTER 4

MIGRATION AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IN THEORY

The main objective of Chapter 3 is to analyze how different theoretical traditions approach the relationship emerging in practice between migration and security. For this purpose, this chapter looks at the objectivist approaches, in particular Realism, and critical security studies approaches, in particular Paris, Copenhagen, and Aberystwyth Schools. The first part of this chapter presents a brief overview of how objectivist approaches in general, and realism in particular view security vis-à-vis migration. The second part of the chapter looks at critical security studies approaches to security vis-à-vis migration. In this second part, analyses of each school of thought's approach to migration will follow brief information about each school's theoretical foundation and conceptualization of security.

4.1 Objectivist Approaches to Migration and Security

The starting point of objectivist approaches to security studies is that threats are given, and they can be known in an objective manner. From this perspective, threats exist independently from knowledge, procedures, and discourses of security agents. Objectivist approaches emphasize that the nature of threats need to be taken seriously as pre-given dangers. In the words of Arnold Wolfers, a Realist scholar who worked on security, military and strategic studies, “there exist real threats that present themselves as an external given,” (1962: 151). Objectivist approaches regard security studies as being interested in defining what the real threats are, and the ways of actors to deal with them (Walt, 1998: 31).

The state is the one to speak of objective security for its society, and therefore to intervene and carry out security policy as a reaction to objectively given threats because it is the political process within a state to transform an issue from non-security into a security question (Frankel, 1997: 99). The objectivist framework is based on the idea that the state and its responsibility to control both security and migration as a threat to its security are self-evident and subjects of objective truth (Guild, 2009: 3).

In the field of migration studies, Myron Weiner, among others, adopts an objectivist approach in studying issues about migration as a ‘real threat’ and fundamentally in relation to state security and national interest. From this respect regardless of perception and interpretation the movement of individuals represents

a primary threat to states. What follows is the Realist approach to security, and its analysis on how migration and security is presented.

4.1.1 What is Security according to Realism?

According to the Realist point of view, the term ‘national interest’ expresses the long term, collective, vital security objectives of the state (Walt, 1998: 31). The objectivist aspect of Realism defines national security as the objective interest of a state that needs to be protected against real threats. In this regard, security for Realism is about defining the real threats and adopting security policies to manage them.

The core assumptions of realism are the prominence of the state, anarchy of the international system, power, and security (Walt, 1997: 932). Externally, the state needs to be strong as it is placed within the anarchical nature of the international system in which it confronts other strong states. The result, according to Kenneth Waltz (1979: 35), one of the founders of neo-realism, is a ‘decentralized system’ where conflict is prevalent and security is managed by self-help. In this environment, each state has to provide for its own security the way of which is primarily through military means. Economic considerations are less significant than military considerations because economy requires cooperation that is fragile for egotistical reasons (Poku and Graham, 1998: 5). The Realist world is a world of no permanent friendships but of constantly changing alliances dictated by the reason of state due to the Realist view that each state aims for its

own security, meaning survival and power (Waltz, 1979: 51). Accordingly, security in Realist tradition is about war, the ability to fight wars, and the external threats to the state which might give rise to them (Wolfers, 1962: 63).

4.1.2 Migration and Security according to Realism

In the Cold War period, security focused on war and external threats that could bring war, therefore the referent object of security was the state. On the issue of migration, security was viewed as coming from citizenship while insecurity was caused by citizens of other states (Miller, 1998: 24). The state was therefore portrayed as the citizens' protector against any aggressive intentions of other states. According to Keith Krause and Michael Williams (1997: 43),

[...] these threats from other states were seen as being 'directed toward individuals qua citizens' meaning 'toward their states', and the study of security accordingly strived to mitigate these threats through concerted action by the representatives of the citizenry.

Within this context, societal security was played down, or studied specifically in the context of the legitimacy of the governing makeup of any particular state. Therefore, such issues as environmental protection, human security, and migration were either not taken into consideration or dismissed as domestic political matters that do not fall under Realist understanding of what constitutes threats (Poku, Renwick and Glenn, 2000: 12).

The 're-definition' (Baldwin, 1997: 20), 're-theorization' (Booth, 1991: 315), and/or 're-examination' (Buzan, 1993: 42) of the meaning of security after

the end of the Cold War has allowed previously domestic political issues such as migration to be considered within security studies. As the understanding of security has then taken on a new dimension after the Cold War, it was argued that “states can be made insecure by factors other than the threat of a war,” (Weiner, 1993: xix). Among these factors is unwanted migration which is a matter of ‘high international politics’ as a concern for defense, internal security as well as external relations (Weiner, 1993: 2).

The starting point of the Realist assessment of migration’s relationship to security is to what extent migration constitutes a threat to the national security of states. In this assessment, the determinant factors for the Realist tradition to name migration as a security threat are as follows: The intensity of migration flows, and the ability and/or willingness of receiving countries to accept or reject these flows on the basis of their interests. According to David T. Graham (2000: 187), a researcher on security studies and migration, the Realist approach to migration persists to pay attention to national security interests of states as referents of security. For Realism, since the referent of security is the state that decides on what a real threat is, taking national security interest as the objectivist basis of defining a threat makes migration a threat.

From a realist perspective, the threat of migration intensifies, and becomes an official and security policy concern “when the immigrants come from very different political and ideological systems and in very large amounts” (Skeldon, 1998: 37). This was the case, according to Weiner, with the Western European

countries beginning from the 1980s when migration flows from Middle Eastern countries and the Soviet Union republics into Europe increased (1995: 163). Here, what the Realist approach considers in evaluating migration is the possible impact of these flows on public order and therefore the state authority. According to Realism, the state authority appears to be under threat and weakened by the transnational immigrant groups (Skeldon, 1998: 37). The reasoning behind this idea is that states face the risk of losing control of their boundaries, that government policies become ineffectual in the face of increasing migrations, and that this entire situation does not serve the national interests of a state (Weiner, 1995: 151).

From a Realist perspective, there are several security implications of migration for the state. As part of the Realist concern with national interest, Realism addresses immigrants as a security threat due to possible opposition of these new comers to the receiving country, its regime, or its social cohesion. According to Weiner, this opposition may result in the emergence of xenophobic sentiments within the receiving society towards the new comer ethnic communities due to their opposition, emergence of conflicts between the receiving country citizens and immigrants, and the possibility of a conflict between the sending and receiving countries (Weiner, 1992: 92-94). The concern is that while the receiving country accepts a migration flow allowing them access to the media and permits them to send information as well as money back home, the home country of the immigrants may well take the advantage of this situation by taking on a right of interference with domestic affairs of the receiving country

(Weiner, 1993: 11). Such circumstances may turn into a more serious trouble for the receiving state if the migration flow has a large amount, and if it is from a country hostile to the receiving one due to economic, political, or cultural reasons. Therefore the Realist approach suggests restriction and/or ban to migration flows.

From a Realist perspective, secondly, refugees and immigrants might constitute a societal and political security threat to the receiving country. Migration receiving governments are often concerned that the immigrants given protection by the receiving state might well ally with the existing domestic opposition within the receiving state and encourage separatist activity against receiving government policies (Weiner, 1995: 139). In this case, the Realist concern is that such an alliance would strengthen the opposition within the country, lead to social disorder, and last in loss of state authority. According to Realism, such a security risk erodes receiving governments' willingness to admit migration, and therefore brings with it the necessity to establish barriers to migration flows.

Thirdly, the Realist approach to migration is concerned with the cultural dimension. According to Weiner, the cultural norms of a country determine whom the receiving people allows in, what rights are granted to those let enter, and whether the receiving culture is ready to accept immigrants as prospective citizens (1995: 140). Realist approach to migration observes any violation to this cultural integrity, and regards movement of new peoples as threatening the integrity, thus as a threat to national security. The fear of the receiving countries is that

migration from a different culture might lead to xenophobic sentiments within the receiving society and to the increase of anti-immigrant political parties that could weaken the state authority and threaten the regime (Weiner, 1993: 15). Therefore, for Realism, migration receiving countries need to adopt anti-migration policies in such circumstances for the protection of state authority and avoidance from public reactions (Miller, 2002: 22).

According to the Realist tradition, economic dimension of the settlement of immigrants is another concern for the receiving countries. The will to provide immigrants with protection in the receiving country comes with economic costs as well as gains, which leads the receiving societies as well as governments to react to immigrants depending on their economic situation (Weiner, 1995: 142). Immigrants create a substantial economic burden by straining such services of education, housing, transportation, all of which are likely to generate local resentment and a substantial damage to the government budget (Weiner, 1995: 142). If, on the other hand, the receiving country does provide good conditions for the immigrants, the risk is the possible arrival of larger flows as well as increasing requests for asylum (Miller, 2002: 25). This, in turn, forms the basis of a security threat to the receiving society and state according to Realist arguments as the economic burden would not be bearable for the receiving government (Hollifield, 2004: 887). According to James F. Hollifield, most importantly the legitimacy of the government and the sovereignty of the state will be undermined first by its own society and then by the external powers due to lack of economic power (2004: 888).

The Realist perspective on migration takes the interests of receiving states as the basis of its view of migration as a security issue for states. This perspective considers possible outcomes of migratory flows on deterioration of inter-state relations, state authority, social integrity and economic well being of the receiving state. Therefore, the Realist perspective views that migration can become a threat to national security (Weiner, 1993: 26), and requires migration attracting countries to follow a path of closure (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, 2004: 9).

4.2 Critical Security Studies Approaches to Migration and Security

The shared assumption of critical security approaches is that security is a social construction the meaning of which differs depending on different contexts and social interaction between actors (McDonald, 2008: 61). As such, critical security studies do not have an effort to gather different schools within it to agree on a shared definition of security. What unites critical security approaches is their ‘commitment to keep away from universal and abstract definitions of security’ (McDonald, 2008: 61).

On the issue of international migration, such critical concerns of migration as recognition, basic needs, protection, individual security, and government practices that may or may not turn migration into a security issue are the points of emphasis of different critical security studies approaches. They take an extensive interest in migration-security relationship, and take account of identities and

interests of international actors as central factors in this relationship. These approaches explore the ways through which the social construction of interests transforms ‘individuals’ into ‘foreigners’ (Wæver, 1993: 23). Belonging and exclusion are the points that critical security studies approaches the question of migration (Guild, 2009: 5). In the study of migration and security, the focus of critical approaches is on the relationship of the individual with power and authority, and on the role of individuals in resisting the state actors (Guild, 2009: 5).

In this part of the chapter, the approaches of the Paris School, the Copenhagen School, and the Aberystwyth School to security and migration are analyzed. These three approaches “have certainly different backgrounds [...] and have explored different societal practice fields from interstate power relations to migration, social exclusion and freedom of movement,” (Bigo, 2008: 117). They have dealt with such different subjects as management of security and insecurity for the Paris School, societal security and securitization for the Copenhagen School, and human security and emancipation for the Aberystwyth School. However, the common point of view of these critical approaches is that they reject the objectivism of traditional approaches in taking threats as given.

4.2.1 The Paris School of Critical Security Studies

The Paris School has its roots in political theory and sociology of migration and policing in Europe, rather than mainstream international relations (C.A.S.E.

Collective, 2006: 446). The Paris School has a wide range of research area including criminology, political sociology, law, and international relations. In the study of security, the Paris School is more oriented towards internal security and its relation to external security, than towards international security (Bigo, 2008: 126). The school concerns itself with bureaucratic decisions of everyday politics, security professionals, governmental rationality of security, and political organization of security technologies and knowledge through databases and exchange of information. The Paris School is mostly inspired by Pierre Bourdieu & Michel Foucault. Didier Bigo is the main scholar of this school (*"When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitizations in Europe"* 2000, *"Migration and Security"* 2001, *"Security and Migration: Towards a Governmentality of Unease"* 2001, *"Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe"* 2005, *"Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies"* 2005, *"International Political Sociology"* 2008, *"Migration Controls and Free Movement in Europe"* 2009). Jef Huysmans is another scholar who has written on the assumptions and implications of the Paris School approach (*"Immigrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of Securitizing Societal Issues"* 1995, *"Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe"* 1998, *"The European Union and the Securitization of Migration"* 2000, *"The Politics of Insecurity"* 2006).

4.2.1.1 What is Security for the Paris School?

The Paris School, aware of the definitional problems about security (Guild, 2009: 8), attempts at a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of security than that of the Realist understanding. According to one of the leading authors of this school, Didier Bigo, the question of what security is may well be unanswerable in the abstract because it entails a negative, the lack of something rather than a positive state of situation or affairs (Guild, 2008: 9).

In defining security, the Paris School is less oriented to the official policies and discourses of states, but more interested in practices and ‘visible threat images’ (Bigo, 2008: 123). The Paris School goes into depths of the issue to seize the effect of this process in a rather micro level. According to Bigo (2008: 123), “Security is freedom from [...] unwilling death, threat of death by an enemy, fear of death by unexpected accidents. Security is not restricted to survival. Security is economic. Security is social.” For this school of thought, security does not only mean escaping from an ‘unwilling form of death’, but security has to do with the management of life as well as social and structural conditions of life (Bigo, 2008: 123). The Paris School draws attention to the need to consider who needs to survive or be protected and from what, and who is sacrificed. The assumption here is that security cannot be ‘global or for all’ (Bigo, 2002: 70). That is, the practice of securing someone is at the same time ‘the practice of in-securing some others’ (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 457). In addition, security is always limited

and involves politics at the center of its definition. Bigo explains the role of political agents in framing security as follows (2002: 70):

The definition of what is security in relation to what is insecurity is a political struggle between the actors who have the capacity to declare with some authority whose security is important, whose security can be sacrificed, and why their own violence may be read as a form of protection when the violence of the others is seen as a form of aggression and sign of insecurity.

That is why the Paris School is interested in practices in understanding security.

The meanings of security, for this School, are dependant on politics as well as the legitimization practices of governing actors. The Paris School very frequently recalls the following quotation from Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it,” (1992: 410) paraphrasing it as “Security is what the professionals of unease management make of it,” (Bigo, 2002: 79).

For the Paris School, then, there are two factors to be taken into account in explaining security and insecurity. The first of them is that the opposite of security is not insecurity because the way security is defined determines what is considered as insecurity, be it a threat or a risk. Therefore, managing insecurity is a ‘means of governmentality through defining the lines of fear and unease at collective and individual levels’ (Huysmans, 2006: 13). Second is the role of professional networks of security agencies that attempt to determine what a security concern is (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 457). The point made here by the Paris School is that conceptualization of security is carried out through the capability to manage threats, to control borders, and to define identities at danger by governments because the Paris School treats security as a ‘technique of

government' (by Foucault, 1994 cited in C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 457). In its emphasis on governmentality, the Paris School emphasizes the role of audiences, practices, and contexts that have either restrictive or encouraging impact on the conduct of policies (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002: 29). Accordingly, this approach argues that whether an issue is made a security issue depends on the acting of institutions and groups that empower themselves to do so, thus that are empowered to say what security is (Bigo, 2000: 195).

4.2.1.2 Migration and Security Relationship for the Paris School

The scholars of the Paris School observe that migration is increasingly managed as a security problem (Bigo, 2002: 63; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002: 21). The School concerns itself with the practice of making migration a security problem in everyday politics by those whom Bigo calls 'professionals in the management of unease' (2002: 64). He explains who the professionals in the management of unease are as follows:

This field of professionals includes on one hand political actors, the media, and private corporations and organizations dealing with the control of access to the welfare state, and on the other hand, intelligence services and some military people seeking a new role after the end of the Cold War, ... responding to many groups of people who are identified as risk or just as a source of unease (2002: 64).

How security is defined with respect to migration is directly related to such immediate interests of these 'professionals in the management of unease' as competition for budgets and missions (Bigo, 2002: 64). That is, labeling migration a security issue is affected by power struggles among these actors because,

according to this approach, making an issue one of security starts at the individual level and is nourished only by the fears of individuals (Guild and Bigo, 2005: 34). Therefore, the focus of the Paris School approach is on ‘visible threat images’ connected to migration by these professionals and its negative connotations that ‘feed into their fear’ (Bigo, 2008: 123).

In addition to its interest in who turns migration into a security threat, the Paris School concerns itself with the reasons of continuing framing of migration in affiliation with crime, terrorism, unemployment, religious fanaticism, racism, social exclusion and poverty. The Paris School is interested in the reasons why migration is not framed in relation to new opportunities for the receiving countries, for freedom of travel, and for new understandings of citizenship, but rather has negative connotations (Bigo, 2002: 64).

This approach identifies four ways through which migration is made into a security issue (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002: 24): 1. From a socioeconomic perspective, migration is linked to unemployment, deterioration of the welfare state, and thus economic insecurity. 2. From a state/military security perspective, migration is associated with loss of sovereignty, borders, internal and external security. 3. From an identity perspective, immigrants are viewed as a threat to receiving societies’ national identity. 4. From a political perspective, anti-immigrant discourses are used for the cause of facilitating political benefits. Depending on these threat and risk calculations, migration is securitized through state policies and is tried to be prevented (Guild and Bigo, 2005: 61).

The Paris School takes on a critical stance against such policies as border control practices of securitization of migration, and argues that these practices in fact reflect the role of security agencies in limiting understandings of who is an immigrant and who is a citizen (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002: 35). These understandings are not givens but socially constructed (Bigo, 2002: 68).

Whereas the state policies on migration aim at preserving the social integrity through making migration a security issue, the Paris School approach argues that these policies put the social cohesion of receiving countries in danger and directly make social integration vulnerable. The reason for this is that following such a 'securitarian discourse' generates 'amalgams' between immigrants and criminals, legal immigrants and illegal immigrants, and between immigrants and citizens of a different origin (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002: 36). This situation dominates the contemporary migration policies in all Western countries (Guild, 2009: 179). What follows is, on the one hand, rationalization as well as reinforcement of discriminations against the already marginalized immigrants, and on the other hand, unease in the receiving societies (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002: 36).

4.2.2 The Copenhagen School of Critical Security Studies

The Copenhagen School refers to the collective research agenda of several scholars affiliated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute in Denmark

(McDonald, 2008: 68), namely, Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan. The name of this approach as the 'Copenhagen School' was first coined by Bill McSweeney. The Copenhagen School has its roots in political theory, international relations theory debates, peace research, and strategic studies (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 446). The school principally concerns itself with how security works and is given meaning in world politics. The work of the Copenhagen School is centered around three core concepts: Securitization, sectors, and security complexes. Barry Buzan (*"Societal Security, State Security and Internationalization"* 1993, *"Security: A New Framework for Analysis"* 1998), Ole Wæver (*"Europe and Its Nations: Political and Cultural Identities"* 1993, *"Securitization and Desecuritization"* 1995, *"Concepts of Security"* 1997, *"Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and the Origins between Core and Periphery"* 2004) and Jaap de Wilde are the primary scholars of this school.

4.2.2.1 What is Security for the Copenhagen School?

The scholars of the Copenhagen School are not in an attempt to develop a framework for how security should be defined (McDonald, 2008: 68). Rather, the Copenhagen School concentrates on how inter-subjective processes give meaning to the term security, and what kind of political impacts these constructions of security have (Wæver, 2004: 2). Ole Wæver, a scholar of the Copenhagen School, suggests that an approach to security should reflect on the aforementioned core concepts. Sectors are defined, building on the work of Barry Buzan (*et al.*, 1998: 196), to include military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors.

Considering them is ‘deemed essential for understanding security’ because the Copenhagen School is in the view that these sectors identify different relationships between actors and the referent objects (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 196). As the major aim of this part is to explore the viewpoint of the Copenhagen School on migration and security, securitization as one of the School’s central concepts is to be analyzed.

Wæver argues that, in the study of security, the central questions are who is to securitize what, and under what conditions (1997: 27). According to Wæver, security is a ‘speech act’ meaning “labeling something a security issue that it becomes one. It is a securitizing move,” (2004: 13). From this perspective, security and insecurity are the results of a process called ‘securitization’ (Wæver, 2004: 13). Securitization refers to the ‘construction of threat in a discursive manner’ (Wæver, 1995: 47). In specific terms, securitization is a process in which an actor pronounces a particular issue or actor to be an existential threat to a referent object. Accordingly, the idea of securitization describes processes in which a politically and socially successful speech act of labeling an issue as a security issue takes it away from the arena of ‘normal day politics’ (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 453), and turns it into an ‘existential threat’ which in turn demands and justifies extreme measures (Williams, 1998: 435). Since the effect of securitization is the suspension of the normal rules, the Copenhagen School views securitization as a form of emergency and/or panic politics (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 1998: 34).

The characteristic feature of the Copenhagen School is its skepticism towards security as practice (Wæver, 1995: 47). This approach views security as a failure to handle an issue in normal day politics. Therefore, de-securitization is the aim in this approach to security. De-securitization is to take an issue out of the security realm and to bring it back to the 'normal haggling of politics' (Wæver, Buzan, and Wilde, 1998: 29). Jef Huysmans defines de-securitization as the unmaking of an existential threat (1998: 481).

Security, for the Copenhagen approach, is an inter-subjective practice in which an issue becomes securitized not necessarily because of the existence of a 'real' threat, but because the issue is presented by the authorities as such. The School studies securitization as carried out by elites through speech acts. The elites, in Wæver's words, refer to "political leaders, in a position of authority, that claim to be speaking on behalf of the state or the nation and command public attention and enact emergency measures," (1995: 47). Moreover, an issue can be securitized only if and when the society accepts it (Wæver, 1995: 49). In this regard, security is a 'site of negotiation' between speakers and audiences, in which the speaker enjoys a position of authority (McDonald, 2008: 69). Wæver explains the reason why the Copenhagen approach prioritizes the role of political leaders in securitization as follows, "at the heart of the security concept we still find something to do with defense and the state," (1995: 47).

4.2.2.2 Migration and Security Relationship for the Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School studies migration within the context of ‘societal security’, and argues for the de-securitization of migration. Barry Buzan *et al.* define societal security as follows (1993: 45):

Societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible and actual threats ... More specifically it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions, for evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.

Copenhagen School argues that the feeling in a society of a violation of main components of their identity turns a change into a societal security threat. Migration is viewed to be such a violation that leads to a feeling of ‘them’ among ‘us’. According to this approach, the contemporary securitization of migration is both the reason and the result of this division between ‘we’ versus ‘them’, and therefore, needs to be de-securitized (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, 1998: 42). The securitization of migration, for the Copenhagen School, is an identity related securitization, therefore it invokes such emotions of societies as stability and unity (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 453).

For the Copenhagen School, migration is securitized in the receiving societies due to their view that immigrants are seen to present threats to societal security, not directly of a military kind. Huysmans explains this through a reference to the state actors involved in securitization process. According to him, it is not the first time that different people are being perceived as disturbance, but

it is the first time that they are portrayed as endangering a collective way of life that defines a community of people (Huysmans, 1995: 55).

According to Wæver (1995: 64), the act of securitization may often lead to ‘over-securitization’, and therefore the creation of ‘fear societies’. For the Copenhagen School, this fear of the other creates a context of inclusion and exclusion, as a result of which integration within these societies appears as the elimination of the other (Huysmans, 1995: 60). At the root of this dead end lies securitization of migration, as a result of which every component of the other, the immigrant, is seen as dangerous (Wæver and Kelstrup, 1993: 66). The expressed preference of the Copenhagen School on the issue of migration is, therefore, for the removal of migration from the realm of security, namely de-securitization (Wæver, 1995: 56).

4.2.3 The Aberystwyth School of Critical Security Studies

The Aberystwyth School is also referred to as Critical Security Studies. The school has developed under the influence of works of Robert W. Cox and Max Horkheimer on critical theory as opposed to ‘problem-solving theory’ or ‘traditional theory’ (Bilgin, 2008: 92). The Aberystwyth School concerns itself with opening up the statist and military-oriented assumptions of traditional security studies in order to introduce a greater theoretical analysis and a broader range of issues to the field of security studies (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 448). The primary point of emphasis of this school is decentralization of the state in

security studies as well as practice, and the inclusion of referents other than the state. Critical Security Studies view security in terms of emancipation of individuals. The primary scholars of the Aberystwyth School are Ken Booth (*“Security and Emancipation”* 1991, *“A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations”* 1994, *“Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist”* 1997, *“Critical Security Studies and World Politics”* 2005, *“Theory of World Security”* 2007, *“Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism”* 1995), Richard Wyn Jones (*“Message in a Bottle? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies”* 1989, *“Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory”* 1999) and Pinar Bilgin (*“Security Studies: Theory/Practice”* 1999, *“Critical Theory”* 2008).

4.2.3.1 What is Security for the Aberystwyth School?

The Aberystwyth School considers security to have a culture bound character (Bilgin, 2008: 91), and as a ‘derivative concept’ meaning that what security stands for according to a particular understanding comes from a political and philosophical worldview (Booth, 1997: 84). Therefore, this approach argues that security does not have a single, common, universal definition. According to Booth, who is the pioneering theorist of the Aberystwyth School, security has an instrumental significance because the human beings are in need of security; security gives them the chance to avoid ‘life-determining constraints’ (2005: 22). Booth explains these constraints as follows (1991: 319):

Emancipation is the freeing of people from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to

do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, and political oppression and so on. Security means the absence of these threats.

Security then, for Booth, is ‘one side of the coin while emancipation is the other side’ (1991: 319). Wyn Jones states that this approach to security argues for a struggle for emancipation, and that security as the absence of any involuntary threat is a fundamental aspect of this struggle (1999: 126).

The Aberystwyth School concentrates on decentralizing state in the study of security, and on consideration of referent objects other than the state. Contrary to traditional approaches to security, the Aberystwyth School is critical of the emphasis on a state-centric point of view on security. Ken Booth explains this concern of the approach as follows (1994: 4):

If security is conceived in terms of a wide variety of threats to human life and well being then it is necessary to consider not just the threats relevant at the state level, but at all levels appropriate for individual and group living.

The scholars of this approach regard the state as a means rather than the ends of security studies as well as security policy (Booth, 1991: 321). Therefore, according to Pinar Bilgin, a critical security studies scholar working on globalization and security, foreign and security policies of Turkey, and regional security in the Middle East, to deepen the understanding of security by decentralizing the state and considering referent objects other than the state is the first analytical move of the Aberystwyth School (2008: 98). The School calls for shifting the focus of security studies from states towards such other referent objects as social movements, international and nongovernmental organizations, and individuals (Bilgin, 1999: 38).

Broadening the understanding of security is the second move of this approach in order to be able to observe ‘multiple insecurities’ of referents other than the state (Bilgin, 2008: 98). What the Aberystwyth School means by broadening is not adding more issues to security agendas, but the ‘opening up’ of security to include all such issues as social, political, physical, and military, that bring insecurity (Bilgin, 1999: 32). The point with this second move is that the Aberystwyth School expresses preference for not securitizing issues but ‘politicizing security’ (Booth, 2005: 23). In the words of Bilgin, security is to be used for revealing and handling the concerns of referents other than the state (2008: 98). For this approach, one of the insecurities is one the source of which is the state itself. Nicholas J. Wheeler calls them ‘gangster states’ that restrain the rights of its own citizens and therefore become a source of insecurity for them (1996: 129). The Aberystwyth School argues that stable security is the one which is maintained not at the expense of some others’ insecurity (by Boulding, 1978 cited in Bilgin, 1999: 33), therefore such insecurities need to be highlighted and addressed.

4.2.3.2 Migration and Security Relationship for the Aberystwyth School

As for the content and purpose of security studies, the Aberystwyth School considers far more real and immediate threats to security by placing the disadvantaged, the poor, the under-represented, the voiceless, and the powerless at the core of agendas (Poku, Renwick and Glenn, 2000: 21). For the School, the

movement of people is among these real and immediate threats to not state security but individual security. That is, this school of thought differentiates between the referent objects of security, namely the state and the ones other than the state in its approach to migration. On the issue of migration, the Aberystwyth School adopts an individual security approach concerning itself with the individual migrating, and the resultant conditions of life for the immigrant as a result of the act of migration. The school takes an interest in such critical concerns of migration as basic needs, protection, recognition, and individual security.

Security, for the Aberystwyth School, is about achieving the social, political, environmental, and economic conditions that are contributing to a life of free will and self-respect for the individual (Booth, 1991: 325). As individuals are living within states, their security is dependent upon what the state provides them with. According to his study on security in South Africa, Booth explains that state security was directly in opposition with the security of majority of the South African population during the apartheid period because state security referred to security of the ruling minority (2007: 239). That is, South Africa as a state was a source of insecurity for its own citizens. Since 1994, South Africa is not a source of insecurity for its citizens in the sense that it was during apartheid. On the contrary, South Africa has been adopting a policy of repatriation in dealing with large flows of immigrants who wish to move to the industrial cities (Booth and Vale, 1995: 286). The reason for South African effort to prevent migration was its concern that new comers would lead to misery and instability for South African people (Booth and Vale, 1995: 286). For the Aberystwyth School, this change of

South African state's tendency towards its citizens is a change for the better in security understanding of South Africa.

On the other hand, that the South African security policy requires repatriation of immigrants from its borders is a point of concern for the Aberystwyth approach because the state provides its own citizens with security without consideration of security of immigrants. Here, the Aberystwyth School asks "in whose interest is security policy?" (Booth and Vale, 1995: 295). According to this approach, "no security policy can erase all of life's threats," (Booth and Vale, 1995: 296). Accordingly, this approach suggests that security policy should be balanced (Booth and Vale, 1995: 296). In addition, priority rating of threats should be done through a political process so as to produce less intimidating living conditions for individuals (Booth and Vale, 1995: 296). In the case of South Africa, this means that the state, while looking after the security of its own people, should protect the security of immigrants as well. While doing this, the state should not follow a narrow security agenda in which security issues are dealt with by 'military security specialists' and 'hidden from the public eye,' (Booth and Vale, 1995: 296).

According to the Aberystwyth School, even when security of the state is equal with that of individuals within that state (Betts, 2009: 70), this comes with a price of insecurity for the individuals of other states (Wyn Jones, 1989: 311). Therefore, the Aberystwyth School expressly states an emphasis on emancipation of the marginalized, in this case the immigrants, and favoring 'not only a

deconstruction but also a re-construction' of the process (Bilgin, 2008: 96), seeks to place their security at the core of its security agenda. The re-construction of the processes refers to emancipation, for the success of which theoretical ideas are not enough. "It is important to engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs," (by Booth, 1997 cited in Bilgin, 1999: 37). For the achievement of such emancipation of immigrants, therefore, the Aberystwyth approach calls for re-conceptualizing security both in theory and in practice through considering opportunities for change, and for alternative practices (Bilgin, 1999: 37).

That this approach is concerned with alternative practices is its difference from other critical security studies approaches (Bilgin, 1999: 37). The school, therefore, views the issue of migration concerning itself with "placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security, at the centre of our agenda," (Wyn Jones, 1989: 309) in order to first raise the causes of insecurity for immigrants, and then address them in practice.

4.3 Conclusion

Chapter 3 sought to analyze migration and security from two different theoretical traditions: Realism as an objectivist approach, and Paris, Copenhagen, and

Aberystwyth Schools as critical security studies approaches. In order to analyze the approaches of these traditions to migration and security, an assessment of their understanding of security was presented. Chapter 3 looked at theoretical studies that have or have not established a relationship, depending on what these theoretical frameworks consider or not consider as a security issue, and thus how they prefer to study this relationship. The conception of threat by the objectivist approach of Realist tradition as given, and its conception of security in terms of national security interests of the state were explained to argue that Realism views migration as a security threat for the state. In this regard, the Realist approach views migration as a security threat for the state depending on possibilities of interstate conflict, deterioration of economy and internal disorder to result in declining state authority.

The conception of security by critical security studies approaches, on the other hand, showed that the three schools of thought, Paris, Copenhagen, and Aberystwyth, in common consider the impact of structural practices, and politicization of societal insecurities on the analysis of migration and security. These three critical approaches reject objectivism in the study of migration and security. The Paris and Copenhagen Schools view migration as an issue securitized by different actors, and argue for its desecuritization in theory as well as in practice. The Aberystwyth School, on the other hand, considers migration within an individual and social group security framework. The School argues that immigrants should be taken as referents of security, and the life-constraining conditions of immigrants during the act of migration should be addressed. Chapter

3 aimed at showing that migration in security terms is studied in different ways: Through objectivism of Realism, and through critical security studies approaches that reject objectivism. The chapter also aimed at showing that there is an agency in viewing migration and security.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The second half of the 20th century is the time period when international migration turned out to be problematic on the part of the receiving states. Until the 1960s migration was considered to be an economic issue for the receiving states. Their approach towards migration flows was in the form of admission for economic benefits.

The issue of migration began to be viewed as a security concern by receiving states beginning from the 1960s and 1970s. This was because, as the amount of illegal immigrants seriously increased in the 1960s and 1970s, economic motivations of receiving states for accepting immigrants became less significant while the economic and societal security of receiving societies became their primary concern. This concern for illegal migration within receiving countries led these countries to adopt restrictive state policies towards migration in the 1980s. These policies were put into practice without discriminating between legal and illegal immigrants. A linkage between migration and security concerns

of receiving countries became visible in receiving societies' attitudes as well as state policies. From the 1990s onwards, the view of migration as a security threat to receiving countries and the consequent tendency towards exclusion of immigrants has strengthened among receiving societies as well as state actors. One of the reasons for this was the increase in the amount of people demanding to move. In addition, immigrants, due to their increasing amount within host societies, were viewed as a threat to identity, and therefore to societal security, in the European Union. Lastly, the terrorist attacks in Paris and various Western European States in the mid-1990s, in New York City in 2001, in Madrid in 2004, and in London in 2005 led migration receiving states to directly associate migration with security, and adopt exclusionary migration policies. The shift in the migration policies of the United States and European Union, in particular, constitute evidence for this strengthening of the view of migration as a security concern throughout time. The departure of the European Union countries from the humanitarian framework of the United Nations in dealing with international migration was because of unreasonable amount of labor and illegal immigrants flowing into European countries in the late 1960s and 1970s. From then on, migration became to be viewed as an economic and a social security threat to Europe. The response of the European Union turned from admission into control, and became further restrictive. The same was true for the United States as well. The United States considered migration within economic development and diversity promotion frameworks until the late 1960s. Migration became to be viewed as an economic security concern due to the increase in the flow of labor immigrants. The same increase in the flow of illegals added a societal security

concern for the United States. That the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were carried out by foreigners who had entered the United States by applying for visas at United States' consulates overseas and passing inspection by United States migration agents led the United States to revise its migration policy. This, in turn, led the issue of migration to be viewed as not only an economic and societal security concern, but also a military security threat by the United States.

The UNHCR, on the other hand, has continued to view migration from not only a security but also a human rights perspective, with a responsibility for balancing between states' interests and immigrants' rights. As an intergovernmental organization, the United Nations is dependent upon the member states' approval for its existence but at the same time is concerned with human rights of immigrants. Therefore, the UNHCR has taken international migration issue as a security threat as long as the migratory movements are illegally carried out to constitute a security threat to the receiving states.

From the perspective of the European Union and the United States, the management of international migration is seen as a major challenge. Since the 1960s, the primary point of concern for both the European Union and the United States has become the security risk posed by illegal entries, which is seen more probable after their experiences of terrorist attacks. The resulting response of the United States and the European countries has been one of increasing border controls and adopting more restrictive admission measures. The common point of the views of the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations on

migration is that they associate migration with security, and increasingly military security. The European Union and the United States practice accordingly when they consider the national security interests of the state under threat. Differently, the UNHCR observes the rights of immigrants during the act of migration and in practices of receiving states. The mission of the UNHCR is to protect the rights of immigrants if and when they are violated by receiving states, and to protect the interests of receiving states at the same time.

Different actors have different views of migration and security, in practice. As such, those who studied migration and security dynamics provided different analyses. The objectivist approaches of mainstream studies have so far reflected the views of the United States and the European Union on migration as a threat to security. This is in line with the objectivism of the Realist tradition that calls for taking threats as given, and views security in terms of national security interests of states, defined as the objective interest. The Realist perspective takes migration as a 'real threat', and fundamentally in relation to state security and national interest. In this assessment, Realism considers as the determinant factors the intensity of migration flows and the ability and/or willingness of receiving states to allow or prevent these flows depending on their national interests. According to the Realist perspective, migration flows put state authority under threat because migration receiving states are viewed to encounter the following risks: Losing control of their boundaries, decreasing efficiency of state policies, deteriorating relations with the sending countries, emerging conflicts between host country citizens and immigrant groups due to xenophobic sentiments, social disorder, deformation of

cultural integrity, decreasing economic power due to immigrants as burdens to the budget. Depending on these security concerns of receiving states with migration flows, the Realist tradition views migration as a threat to state security, and therefore prefers studying migration through associating it with security.

Critical security studies approaches, namely Paris, Copenhagen, and Aberystwyth Schools, on the other hand, are critical of the objectivist approach of the Realist tradition. The common point of these three critical approaches is that they reject objectivism. According to them, observing threats as given is misleading because perceptions of threat differ depending on who and/or what is threatened and who and/or what the threat is. Therefore, critical security studies approaches prefer de-linking the issue of migration from state security as with the Copenhagen School and the Paris School, or re-focusing on migration as a threat to the security of individuals and social groups. These schools of thought in common consider structural practices, and politicization of societal insecurities in the analysis of migration and security relationship. Both the Paris School and the Copenhagen School view migration as an issue securitized, and they both argue that migration should be desecuritized, meaning that migration should not be seen as a security issue. While for the Copenhagen School securitization is made through speech acts, according to the Paris School, not only political speech acts, but also bureaucratic decisions of everyday politics that provide the processing of communication and observation have a role in this process. For the Paris School, speech acts are not limited to political actors as the Copenhagen School argues, but they are set in society. The Aberystwyth School, on the other hand, views

migration within an individual security framework. The reason for this is that the Aberystwyth approach views security as emancipation from physical and human constraints. Therefore, the Aberystwyth School does not take a pre-given relationship between security and migration for granted. The Aberystwyth School calls for taking immigrants as referents of security, and addressing the life-constraining conditions of immigrants during the act of migration.

The conclusion of this thesis for our understanding of migration in relation to security is that migration's association with security (security threat or not, and if yes what kind) has been context-bound. The following table shows how the view of migration in terms of security has changed in different periods of time:

Periodization

	Before the 1960s	The 1960s and 1970s	The 1980s	The 1990s and after
Economy	<i>positive</i>	<i>positive</i>	<i>towards negative</i>	<i>negative</i>
Culture and Identity	<i>assimilation</i>	<i>assimilation</i>	<i>multi-culturalism</i>	<i>failure of multi-culturalism</i>
Military/Police	--	--	<i>some association</i>	<i>direct association</i>

Before the 1960s and in the 1960s and 1970s, migration was viewed to have a positive effect on economic development of states. Assimilation was the tendency of receiving states towards immigrants in these periods. States had no military/police security concerns in accepting migration flows. In the 1980s, migration began to be viewed as a security concern in economic terms and to be

associated with military/police security by receiving societies and states. A tendency towards multiculturalism developed in receiving countries. From the 1990s onwards, migration has been viewed to negatively affect economic security concerns of receiving states. This period witnessed the failure of multiculturalism as immigrants within receiving countries have been viewed to constitute a threat to culture and identity of societies. In this period, receiving states have directly associated migration to their military/police security concerns.

Whether migration is a security issue or not changes according to actors. The United States, the European Union, and the United Nations differ in their views of and responses to migration. The migration receiving states' needs and interests, rather than that of immigrants, has been the primary factor to determine the state response to migration. Whether the act of migration takes place within a legal framework is the other factor that determines how a state may view migration, as a security threat or not. The contribution of the chapter on theory was to show that we (practitioners, scholars) have an agency in viewing migration and security. From a Realist perspective the linkage between migration and security has become stronger along the 50 year period of time as migration flows are seen as more explicitly threatening social integrity and state authority. On the other hand, critical security studies approaches offer a fuller account of a relationship between migration and security focusing on the role of state and societal actors in the establishment of such relationship. Instead of taking the conception of threat as fixed and given, critical approaches question the way it is constructed. Further, critical approaches are concerned not only with security of

the state, but also with security of individuals. That migration is an issue affected by the acts of individual, and affects the individual, critical approaches' view of migration in relation with individual security provides a more comprehensive insight on migration's relation to security.

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