

GUATTARI'S MACHINES AND THE ORIGINAL PERSPECTIVES

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ABSTRACT

GUATTARI'S MACHINES AND THE ORIGINAL PERSPECTIVES

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Although Felix Guattari extensively incorporated the terminology from the Freud-Lacan line of psychoanalysis, he employs those terms in a revolutionary way in his philosophical outlook. Besides central concepts such as desire, libido and Oedipus, he employed the machine as a core concept to form an original perspective. A term reflecting the multiplicity and political novelty, its psychoanalytic background is an indispensable aspect for Guattari's machines' origins, their function and temporal progression. Through Freud's and Lacan's theories, psychoanalytic political line and related criticisms are investigated in this thesis to provide a background for Guattari's machines. Then, the particularities of the machine concept are followed in Guattari's texts to see what kind of problems and original solutions it addresses. Those insights indicate that the machinic approach itself functions in a machinic fashion to develop the multiplicity in the relatively rigid field of psychoanalysis. Additionally, the thesis strives to answer the question "How does Guattari and his machine concept manage to construct an original perspective?" To answer these questions, the final part of the thesis will investigate the theoretical approaches to physics corresponding to Freud's, Lacan's and Guattari's peculiarities along with their views on time and temporality. The ultimate aim of

the study is to discuss the background of philosophically original perspectives brought about by Guattari's machine concept and its machinic function through the field of psychoanalysis.

Keywords: Machine, psychoanalysis, war machines, libido, Oedipus



ÖZ

GUATTARI’NİN MAKİNELERİ VE ÖZGÜN PERSPEKTİFLER

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Terminolojisini Freud-Lacan psikanaliz geleneğinden almış olmasına karşın, Felix Guattari bu terimleri devrimci bir şekilde kullanır. Arzu, libido, Oidipus gibi terimlere ek olarak makine kavramını da kendi özgün bakış açısını oluşturmak için temel bir terim olarak kullanmıştır. Çeşitlilik ve politik çoğulculukla ilişkili bir kavram olarak makinelerin, kaynağı, işlevi ve zamansal değişimini ortaya koymak için psikanalitik arka plan önem arz eder. Bu tez için; Freud ve Lacan’ın teorilerinden ortaya çıkan psikanalitik politik tutum ve bu tutuma yönelik eleştiriler, Guattari’nin makineleri için arka planı oluşturmak üzere incelenecektir. Sonrasında, makine konseptinin kendine has özellikleri Guattari’nin metinleri boyunca şekilde takip edilecektir. Bu bölümlerden edinilen çıktılar makinesel yaklaşımın da psikanalizin nispeten katı alanı boyunca bir analiz ve çoğulculuğu geliştirme yöntemi olarak makinesel işlev gösterdiğini ortaya koymaktadır; diğer yaklaşımlar ile yapılan karşılaştırma da bu iddiayı örnekler. Ek olarak, tez şu soruya da cevap vermeye çalışır: “Guattari ve kendisinin makine kavramı orijinal bir perspektif oluşturmayı nasıl başarmıştır?” Bu soruya cevap verebilmek için, tezin son bölümünde Freud, Lacan ve Guattari’nin özgün görüşlerine karşılık gelen fizik alanındaki teorik yaklaşımlar, düşünürlerin zaman ve zamansallık üzerine görüşleriyle birlikte

tartıřılmaktadır. Tezin nihai amacı, Guattari'nin makine kavramı ve psikanaliz alanındaki makinesel iřlevinin ortaya koyduđu özgün felsefi perspektifi arka planıyla ortaya koymaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Makine, psikanaliz, savař makineleri, libido, Ödipus





To all people who did not have chance to complete their studies

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BwO	Body without organs
D&G	Deleuze and Guattari



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Almost every philosophy reader probably noticed the term machine in a seemingly unrelated context at least once. A capitalist infernal machine¹ for example, might cause people to raise their brows. To grasp the enormous background of the term, one should follow its roots way back in the first days of psychoanalysis. When he first began his studies on hysteria, even Freud himself did not know the crossroad at which he was standing. Marxists, positivists, Darwinists, existentialists, and pragmatists were competing to lead the thinking atmosphere of the second half of the 19th century. For example, phenomenology, the dominant philosophical school in Germany and France in Freud's day, was reformed substantially by Husserl through a separation from psychologism. Persistently rejecting to side with any ongoing philosophical discussion, Freud was affected by the ongoing philosophical discussion as much as he affected his contemporaries and future thinkers. As an intellectual physician, his approach to psychic phenomena and the terms he used to describe his thought were the main features of his influence.

Throughout Freud's life, his psychoanalytical work evolved into a comprehensive body of theories. Starting from an individual psychology inquiry, he extended the scope of his theories into anthropology, religion, and politics. One unchanging characteristic shaped all of his theoretical effort in psychoanalysis: Freud's intention of shaping his theories in a scientific method. Even though the social sciences achieved an abiding status in his day, physics was his model as the proper science. He considered himself as the pioneer of the scientific psychoanalysis resembling physics. He repeatedly contended for the acuity of his new terms

by structuring analogies between the historical development of the terms of physics and the ambiguities resulting from his psychoanalytical terms.²

Even though he explicitly stated that he had to abandon his direct physical and biological explanations early in his career,³ Freud was repeatedly criticized for holding a mechanical perspective on psychological, social, and political issues throughout his life.⁴ As the progression of physics in the late 19th and early 20th century is considered, one is hardly surprised by physics' influence on Freud's perspective. Nevertheless, after his death in 1939, those scientific characteristics were among the main aspects which revised by his commentators. For example, in his extensive "returning to Freud" project, Jacques Lacan shifted the focus of psychoanalysis from a resemblance to physics to structuralism based on linguistics.

Lacan, a contemporary of the final years of phenomenology's dominance in French philosophy, was a prominent figure of the structuralism movement after the '50s. He lectured 27 yearly seminars from 1952 on. Although he never ceased to frequently refer to Freud's texts and case reports throughout his seminars, his early seminars focused directly on Freud's work. Lacan noted that Freud's effort for a scientific metapsychological theory started early, during his correspondence between Wilhelm Fliess, and continued even after his monumental book *Beyond Pleasure Principle*. Lacan divided Freudian psychoanalysis into different periods based on his pivotal texts: the letters to Fliess and the books *Interpretations of Dreams* and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. According to Lacan, Freud essentially modified his views in each phase between the texts, yet he never wholly abandoned his early mechanical-energetic views, and those views continued to influence his ideas.⁵ As a Freudian psychoanalyst, Lacan was heavily influenced by Freud's perspective on psychology, and it might be argued that he also partially retained the mechanical conceptualization in his linguistic approach. The thesis will address this issue further to delineate the ground on which machines began to function.

Another machine-related aspect of Freud's theory of psychoanalysis has been fundamentally important in the following decades of philosophical and political thinking. In addition to his science-centered attitude, Freud was an ardent admirer of ancient Greek texts. His search for a normative description of the influences on the human psyche, his interest in ancient texts, his clinical observations, and his self-analysis culminated in the formulation of the Oedipus complex. After its designation as a central term of psychoanalysis, Freud corroborated it through his case studies, religious commentaries, and political analyses. The Oedipus complex was structured in a family setting with definitive roles for each member of the setting. Those

roles attributed to individuals and the consequent determinism characterized Freudian psychoanalytic theory. The multi-directionality of the Oedipus concept in religion, politics, and determinism later proved an indispensable negative reference for the discussion of machines.

Debates on the Oedipus complex continued after Freud's death; in time, critics gained ground, and alternatives began to replace its central role, especially in the psychotherapy context. Lacan was aware of the philosophical significance of the term and reformed the concept of the Oedipus complex by extending the family roles into symbolic entities. Thus, the roles of individual family members are replaced by the reciprocal relations between the symbolic, non-individual beings. Nevertheless, Lacan maintained normative Oedipal roles and the determinism resulting from them as he restructured the Oedipus complex.

Felix Guattari, the machinist of the machines functioning in philosophy, is a practitioner psychoanalyst who completed his personal analysis under Jacques Lacan's supervision. Via his original machine concept, he directed his criticisms on both the mechanical aspects of the existing psychoanalytical theory and the normative, structural, formalist roles of the Oedipus complex in the early '60s. Along with his main collaborator, Gilles Deleuze, their criticisms of Lacanian psychoanalysis resulted in their magnum opus project: *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*.

Criticisms on the Oedipus complex and psychoanalytical practices were already existent at the time of their first publication. Nevertheless, other than stating the adverse outcomes of the psychoanalytic theory, the other critics struggled with breaking out of the psychoanalytic framework and suggesting a consistent transforming method that is in touch with the social and political relations. Instead, the criticisms either addressed the characteristic problems or assumed psychoanalytic theory and its terms as a complete set and modified them by combining with other perspectives. Guattari and Deleuze (D&G from now on) already set forth the problem as the reproduction of existing structures curbing the possibility of a revolutionary change and the dominance of conservative theoretical features in psychoanalytical politics, which were identified even before their project. Now, it was time to form a transforming, independent method of analysis which was to be arranged on a different set of concepts with adequate analytical potential. *Anti-Oedipus* was the first endeavor to provide this requirement.

From the first pages of the book, D&G employed the concept of the machine in their authentic way. With that concept, they formed a coherent criticism of Oedipus and other influential psychoanalytic concepts such as civilization and analyst analysand setting. Until their work, the social and political criticisms directed to psychoanalysis rarely attempted breaking out of its framework. Thinkers either outright rejected psychoanalytic perspective and its background (e.g., Sartre and Popper), or employed the perspective with modifications to provide ground for their own arguments (e.g., Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse) Machines, grounded directly on the Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, functioned to elicit an original perspective breaking out of psychoanalytic theory with its distinctive approach to physics and philosophy. Hence, the machines became a key concept to reaching beyond the existent criticisms and avoiding the pitfalls psychoanalysis fell into. To delineate their interpretation of the machine concept, authors contrasted it with many conventional aspects assumed by psychoanalysis: for example, the mechanical perspective.

As a substantial element, rather than a mechanical tool or a conventional device, the machine concept was expounded to provide the means for destabilizing the rigid, restrictive plane of Oedipus and its function as a cataclysmic element stemming from psychoanalysis itself. Irregularity, instead of physical theories' precision; antinomy against the structurally defined ways of functioning; and, creating temporary aggregates instead of resorting back to existing patterns: these are machines' characteristics. In a sense, machines do not resemble regularly spaced, well-curbed park trees planted in between cement blocks. Instead, they are similar to the roots of fig trees transversing, cracking the obstacles and destroying the constraining structures to grow and reach beyond the other side of limiting fence.

All throughout the *Anti-Oedipus*, the criticisms on the Oedipal structure have been discussed in detail through machines, yet, in my thesis, I am willing to take another route and develop the argument that the machine concept with its peculiarities functions to radicalize the psychoanalytic context. By the end of this thesis, I am willing to clarify how Guattari's machine concept serves as a common name for infinite possibilities, and itself creates a Guattarian machine with the Freudian - Lacanian psychoanalytic plane. The concept functions as a machine in so far as it stems from the psychoanalytic ground and substitutes the rigidified, self-generating psychoanalytical perspectives and the criticisms aiming to rectify them in the socio-political context, as I note in the next section. I will also show that Guattari's radical machine perspective achieves its remarkable subversive potential through a profoundly different approach to foundational laws of physics compared to psychoanalysis, as the

machinic function addresses profound modifications in the understanding of physical and mechanical frameworks.

To do so, I will first need to discuss the necessary theoretical background on psychoanalysis to describe the relevant concepts and their relations within the context of political criticisms directed to psychoanalysis in connection with Freud and Lacan's texts. The all-pervading concept of lack and the conventional psychoanalytical setting of the analyst and analysand constitutes the subpart of these sections. While expanding on those concepts in detail, I will simultaneously discuss the alleged contribution of psychoanalysis to dominant repressive politics and power structures and their reproduction. The critical effort is mainly directed to stating or rectifying the problematic issues of psychoanalysis. However, machines function in a way, subverting both rigidified theories and their revisionist critics. Since the machines are placed at the heart of psychoanalytic thought to function through their multi-dimensionality, the addressed concepts and relations will provide the foundation for describing the machines in later sections.

With its terms and methods, psychoanalytic theory is often considered a fertile ground for political and social theories, but grounding them on the unnoticed consent to the dominant power structures and their reproduction cripples the analytical potential and sterilizes the psychoanalytical theory. Chapter Two will also investigate the accuracy and relevance of selected criticisms with a selection criterion based on their pertinence for reflecting implicit and explicit repressive political outcomes of psychoanalysis. Selected criticisms exemplify the increased inertia of psychoanalytic methods and rectification attempts without subverting the structure. Therefore, their function provides a ground of reference that does not exhibit a machinic quality in a Guattarian sense.

Through the third chapter, I will elaborate on Guattari's machines and machinic functions, emphasizing their peculiar characteristics. Since psychoanalysis has a strong element of mechanics, a delineation of the machine concept will elucidate its authentic aspects, by which it manages to escape the conventional formations of discussed criticisms. In this endeavor, I will follow a partially chronological method. After discussing Guattari's early texts with relevant content, I will detail the subject through two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* even though there are ten years and numerous other texts in between. The reason behind this decision is that these two volumes are the primary sources in which the various machine concepts, their functions, and surrounding notions are introduced. After an adequate conceptual background, I will introduce Guattari's later texts to exhibit the machinic

aspects emphasizing its transformation. With those specific aspects, a heterogeneous, connective machinic perspective emerges as a consistent subversive system grounded on psychoanalysis disintegrating its concrete ground. Mainly, the schizoanalysis is formed on top of that perspective, yet my aim will be limited to the incorporating schizoanalysis on through its relation to the machine concept that operates through the field of psychoanalysis.

After discussing the machine concept in detail, I will compare Guattari's and psychoanalysts' approaches to physics, time and temporality to clarify how Guattari managed to bring about an original term functioning differently. The approach marks a historical and foundational difference between different thinkers of the unconscious. Therefore, the discussion in the fourth chapter aimed to represent the originality of each position. For this purpose, I will consider whether the psychoanalytic thinkers indeed have a mechanical perspective and why they adapt such a perspective. Since it provides a striking mutual ground for both machine and mechanics, I will devote a discussion on the laws of thermodynamics. Under different names and descriptions, all three thinkers attributed a central place to the discussions of energy, entropy, and temporality; their idiosyncratic views on those concepts correlated to different thermodynamic understandings. Hence, I will stress the first and second laws of thermodynamics in their relations to the mechanic and cybernetic features, as they substantially influence psychoanalytic theories. Comparing the features emerging from those laws with Guattari's authentic reading of thermodynamics will clarify the potential for heterogeneous, machinic functions bringing alterities into the dominant ideal planes.

To conclude the thesis, I will reflect on Guattari's philosophical stance and the machine's role in it. As the pinnacle of anti-dogmatic attitude, machines are the creations of Guattari's unorthodox way of thinking; in the final chapter, I will briefly discuss his mode of thinking. In addition to my comments on Guattari's philosophy, I will indicate the possible fields of research related to the topic and the two main problematic issues about the machine concept.

CHAPTER 2

PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTS AND NON- MACHINIC CRITICISMS

Before I elaborate on the criticisms from different philosophers who either integrate the psychoanalytic framework into their approach or rejecting its social and political consequences without proposing another method, a significant issue must be noted. Frequently, supporters of particular thinkers divert different comments and criticisms by referring to different stages of thinkers' thought. I am aware that Freud, Lacan, and Guattari had their particular course of thinking. They discarded some of their old conceptions and adopted new ones, yet, most of the time, echoes of one stage are still audible in the next. As all those categorizations of "stages" are somewhat subjective, I will refer to thinkers' own textual evidence as long as they are available.

2.1 Background Information

In this case, Freud's views about the meanders of his thought are pretty clear. In his *An Autobiographical Study*, he explained that he began with hypotheses on strictly anatomical causation for the psychic phenomena and later left those views due to the unconformity of empirical data.⁶ He then adopted the pleasure principle as one of the central regulative mechanisms of the psychic apparatus. According to that principle, the psyche was hardwired to align itself towards the pleasurable stimuli, simultaneously avoiding unpleasure as much as it can.⁷ For him, dreams, jokes, and slips of the tongue are the most well-known examples of the pleasure principle. They represent the fulfillment of unconscious desires even if the context does not match with the fulfillment action. Dreams, most evidently child's dreams, often represent the unattained gratification of daily life. For example, they might simply represent a specific food that a person craved during the day.⁸ Jokes become funny as long as they coincide

with unconscious repressed thoughts (frequently sexual), which require an opportunity to express themselves.⁹ Slips of the tongue are slips because they reveal incompatible thoughts waiting for satisfaction. The demand for pleasure for the unconscious is so strong that it does not consider contextual conformity. To explain one obvious exception of this principle, namely traumatic dreams, Freud adopted the reality principle as a counterweight in his theory. According to that principle, harshly standing against the person, the limitations of reality cause some unconscious desires to be repressed and condemn them to repetition in a compulsive fashion.

With that model of psychic apparatus in a balance between pleasure and reality principles are at hand, Freud attempted to form a comprehensive *metapsychology* that scientifically (physically whenever possible) determines the field and function of psychology. This endeavor was the ultimate aim of psychoanalysis for him, and through it, he aimed to describe every mental event by three distinct coordinates: Dynamic, topographical, and economic.¹⁰ Although he did not complete his project, concepts of metapsychology continued shaping the content of his later work. As his final model, Freud provided a structural model for the psyche consisting of Id, Ego, and Superego after stabilizing his Oedipus complex theory.¹¹ No matter how his model changed through his career, Freud considered the psyche as an apparatus bound with conflicting powers. To sustain its balance, it required the mechanical processes guiding the energetic substance of the psyche.

In the case study of Aimee for his doctorate thesis, Lacan returned to Freud in his search of a foundation for his observations on paranoia and psychosis. He selectively employed Freud's texts to support his claims heavily influenced by the psychic apparatus model and biologism. He explicitly referred to constant mechanisms and laws governing the formation of psychic phenomena.¹² Lacan's first groundbreaking contribution, the mirror stage, resulted from such a reading of Freud.

Lacan's theoretical work of psychoanalysis in its early stages was largely an extended project of returning to Freud. In his doctorate thesis, in a very similar vein to psychic apparatus, he defined personality as "the totality of the specialized, functional relationships that adapt the human-animal and society."¹³ Those relationships consist of different social forces acting on each other, and their balance (or imbalance in some cases) defines the personality. The concept illustrates how Lacan's initial stance was reminiscent of Freud's mechanical/energetic concept of apparatus.

Later on, incorporating Claude Levi-Strauss's and Ferdinand de Saussure's works with Freud's writings on unconscious and anthropology, Lacan adopted a structuralist position towards psychoanalysis with an increasing emphasis on language. In a remarkable commentary of Edgar Allen Poe's "The Purloined Letter," he delineates the symbolic order of language. As he explains the symbolic order and its structure, he employs cybernetics and machines to characterize the dialectic between presence and absence.¹⁴ This feature proves vital for the thesis, and I will further elaborate on it in another section.

Towards the end of his career, Lacan renounced the primacy attributed to the symbolic and maintained a more balanced attitude based on the three main tenets of his psychoanalytic thought: imaginary, symbolic, and real. In this late period, he distanced himself from the previous biological, mechanical, and -to some extent- Freudian perspective; the concept of lack and the topological modeling gained ground opening new horizons beyond language structure. Nevertheless, it is hardly a defensible claim that Lacan disposed of the whole body of his early theories. It is rather a period of rectification to better cope with the limitations (such as putting an end to analysis) brought about by the primacy symbolic register.¹⁵ The body of comments in this thesis is intentionally directed to his enduring concepts, and the accuracy of comments should be evaluated considering the evolution of Lacan's texts.

Along with Jean Oury, a member of Lacan's Freudian School of Paris, Guattari began his career in the experimental clinic of La Borde as an analyst. Following Oury's advice, he began to follow Lacan's seminars and started his self-analysis under his supervision. As a result, his thought was substantially influenced by the Lacanian context, and his criticisms were mainly directed towards Lacanian psychoanalysis, especially in his early textual works.

The therapeutic problems he faced in La Borde, such as the effectivity of heterogeneous group subjectivity in contrast to Lacan's hierarchical lack-bounded subject, and the role of psychoanalysis institutions, were the contents of his early studies. In time, he developed a comprehensive philosophical perspective on various topics such as politics, cinema, ecology, ethics, and aesthetics. He is even contrasted with Deleuze in a critical tone, as a thinker who has many words to utter on every possible topic.¹⁶

The machine concept, however, integrated into his discourse around 1969 in its conjunction with desire and subjectivity. In his momentous text, "Machine and Structure", the role of machines, structures and subjectivity were elaborated based on Lacanian terms with a whole new perspective on those concepts. From that date on, machines and their subversive, revolutionary function in the structures became the inseparable elements of his philosophy.

Shortly, I will discuss the criticisms on psychoanalysis' social and political approach with their relevant aspects and then show how Guattari's radical perspective centered on the machine concept eluded those criticisms by forming radical machinic connections with those relevant aspects of psychoanalytic theory.

For Guattari and his long-term philosophical partner Deleuze, philosophy was an art of forming, inventing, and producing concepts.¹⁷ Therefore, the permanence of the concepts was not an issue, and the machine concept was not an exception to that. In an interview, along with Guattari, Deleuze asserted that using a successful term continuously is dangerous; one might not break out of it and get caught in a trap. To perpetually alter their stance against the dominant order, they felt an urgency to discard even their most successful inventions.¹⁸ Notably, he referred to schizoanalysis and desire machines as the successful and to-be-replaced concepts.

Interestingly, for Guattari, machines maintained their importance throughout and even achieved an ontological status transgressing the Lacanian structures.¹⁹ The transformation of the concept is essential for the purposes of this thesis to illustrate how it radically functioned through the dominant psychoanalytic theories. The dynamic delineation of machines aimed to subvert those theories to create a broader, unbounded approach. A reasonable method would be to indicate those restrictions through the frame of criticisms of psychoanalysis.

2.2 Lack in the Freudian Context and Its Critics

The first criticism is the constitutive role of lack in Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis and its repercussions, especially in social and political philosophy. Although it did not receive a direct emphasis in Freud's psychoanalytic discourse, lack is situated in relation to desire in his model. In a prototypical Oedipal family setting, beyond the immediate needs of the organism, the sexual desires of a child for his mother exist, and they are destined to be repressed, controlled, and castrated by the father's direct or indirect authority. Castration occurs either through a perceived threat of loss of the existing penis or through the child's interpretation of its absence. In both instances, the complex's solution revolves around the possible (female) or actual (male) lack of penis and its relation to the repression.²⁰ This foundational repression places the subject into the normative developmental trajectory as a conforming member of the social order. What includes the subject into the social order is actually the integration of the castrating agent into the psychic device of the person. Named as the superego, this repressive agent is internalized to the psyche, and it continues its operation throughout one's life, most notably even without the physical existence of the castration agent.²¹

Freud extended the Oedipal setting from family to anthropological studies and to the political circumstances of the early 20th century. According to his anthropological hypothesis, the clan's young males were banned from access to resources and women by the father's dominance, the head of the patriarchal order. "[O]ne day, the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde."²³ In their father's absence, brothers could not sustain the premeditated order or the anticipated surplus enjoyment, and, in time, the resultant equality between the killers and their kin became so untenable that the lacking (dead) father is venerated to the level of god to restore the order of their father. The remorse and guilt they felt for their deed and the will to avoid the father's fate caused them to accept a socially based restriction for fratricide.

Later this restriction extended for everyone and transformed into "Thou shalt not kill." In this myth of Freud, society and religion were founded upon a common crime and resultant sense of guilt and remorse.²⁴ The lack of the father, the internalization of the repressive mechanism, and the superego formation played a crucial role in all these developments.

In another later work of his, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud further investigated the role of the superego in his day's social and political circumstances. The book was published in 1930, after the first world war, which disclosed the destructive desires of the masses on an unprecedented scale. Before that date, Freud already wrote his monumental works *Id and the Ego* and *Beyond the Pleasure Principles*. Those texts and their impact on Freudian psychoanalysis greatly shaped Freud's late social and political understanding.

After these two texts, his theory attained a dialectical mode by introducing the model of an energy-driven psychic device that is constantly trying to achieve a balance between life and death drives. In this model, the energy had a biological source and a relatively mechanical definition. Freud approaches drive, sometimes translated as instinct, from a physical, energetic position, and in this sense, drive finds its clearest expression in Laplanche and Pontalis' definition as "the dynamic process consisting in a pressure (charge of energy, motricity factor) which directs the organism towards an aim."²⁵ Freud described its aim as the elimination of the tension caused by the instinct and determined its source as the bodily stimuli. Drive's energy can achieve its aim either by being invested in the organism itself or the objects of desire. Very importantly, for the following sections of this thesis, only the energy of object drives is named as libido unless otherwise specified.

In addition to those foundational concepts, Freud came up with fundamental principles according to which the psychic apparatus operates. In his physiology-based metapsychological

attempt, he attributed a principle of inertia to specific neurons. According to this principle, the stimulated neurons would discharge all of their excitation energy.²⁶ The tension caused by drives and the organism aiming to relieve this tension is considered a universal mechanism and is named the principle of constancy; the tension removal mechanism is named the Nirvana principle by Freud.²⁷ This name also contained an echo of the dying out of the desire in both Hindu and Schopenhauer's philosophies, which later became a vital quality. The principle of constancy or the Nirvana principle in time was conflated to designate the well-known pleasure principle. The antithesis of the pleasure principle, the detours of desire and postponements of achieving constancy due to reality's obstacles, is set forth as the reality principle.²⁸ The final duality persisted until the very end of Freud's career.

Both reality and pleasure principles are described on biological or real-physical foundations. Following those principles, Freud introduced the life and death instincts: Eros and Thanatos, respectively. Life instincts aim to unite the elements of life, as in the case of Aristophanes' myth in Plato's Symposium.²⁹ On the other hand, death instincts strive to dissolve all existing life formations and return all life into the inorganic state.³⁰ They represented a universal characteristic in which the Nirvana principle is generalized and placed at the intersection between the psychological and organic systems of a human being. These principles and instincts, along with the role of superego and the inexistent agent of castration, determined the main axes on which Freud formed his book *Civilization and Its Discontents*.

Starting with an evaluation of his friend Romain Rolland's claim of a shared religious feeling in all humans, Freud argues that religious experience and the "oceanic feeling" defining that experience is not common ground between people.³¹ Instead, they are the residues of the primary narcissism stage of an infant. In that stage, the infant cannot distinguish himself from his environment and lives in a sense of unity. As the reality begins to hinder his demands, in accordance with the reality principle, the infant realizes the existence of otherness in the form of desire objects and the obstacles in between. Because of the infant's helplessness, he requires a protective and powerful father figure which is the common precursor of gods in religions.

Following the reality principle discussion, Freud describes the pleasure principle's operation in its positive and negative aspects. Positively, the pleasure principle aims to reduce the tension of a desire by satisfying its needs. In the face of the reality principle, when the postponement and detours of desire cannot provide an opportunity for desire's satisfaction, the negative aspect of the pleasure principle dictates the aversion of displeasure. The person might sublimate or deflect his desires into different fields such as aesthetics, scholarship, asceticism, and others, where the satisfaction of redirected desires is still possible.³²

For Freud, civilization is the outcome of such a pursuit of avoiding unpleasure. Civilized members of society trade the immediate and intense satisfaction of their desires with a regulated and secure way of pleasure distribution. Nevertheless, the development of civilization brings its own impasse, as brutally demonstrated by the First World War. Why is a civilization not formed to maximize the satisfaction of human desires? Freud answers this question by asserting that society is not grounded solely on reason. Drives play a significant role in societies, and an “aggressive instinct” accounts for the ceaseless social conflict.³³ Even in the formation of society, as previously explained in the primal family of *Totem and Taboo*, those aggressive-death instincts had a vital responsibility.

A significant character of the drives is their two-dimensionality for Freud. They can either be directed outward, towards the objects or inward, against oneself. As the internalization of the castrative authority figure, the agency of the superego compels a person to revert the aggressive drives inwards when it is not possible to discharge them externally. Unless the authority is internalized in the form of the superego, a person exerts his aggressivity on the possible objects or other human beings. His only fear would be the fear of disclosure. When the authority is internalized, however, one starts to feel guilt and need for punishment even for the intentions he never put into operation. Due to remorse from their actualized deeds and guilt from their intentions, civilized people are neurotic. Nevertheless, Freud is very cautious in applying psychoanalysis to societies and does not reach a definite conclusion about the future of civilization, but throughout his texts on civilization, a pessimist attitude is dominant.³⁴

In Freudian texts, other than the newly formed terminology and principles of psychoanalysis, one of the main aspects is the normative internalization of the castrative authority figure. Even in its physical absence, it is placed into a crippling, controlling, and enforcing position for the “normal” people who are at least partially successful in solving the Oedipus complex.

Freud considered that the Oedipal riddle, which began with the given meaning to lack of the penis and the threat of castration, is universal. He extended the same setting to social, political, anthropological, and religious phenomena. In the end, the universality of these forces and mechanisms resulted in a system of a restrictive, all-containing determinism. However, Freud also attempted to attribute a liberating and transforming feature to the ego. He said, “It is also possible to intervene in the external world by changing it, and to establish in it intentionally the conditions, which make satisfaction possible. This activity then becomes the ego’s highest function.”³⁵ For him, discovering the ways of the unconscious by outlining desires, drives, principles, and their mechanics was an effort to contribute to the transformative function of the rational ego.

Even though Freud himself was a reformist in bourgeois values about sexuality, his uncritical assumption of the many other values of bourgeois society was a problematic issue for his critics. However, the mainstream attitude for his critics is to modify Freud's commentary on civilization and politics. They assumed the Freudian context to some extent and did not radicalize its implications. In that sense, their stance differs from Guattari's and his machines. For example, Herbert Marcuse was a sympathetic commentator on Freud's work. He employed many of his insights in his book *Eros and Civilization*. According to Marcuse, Freud was mistaken to believe that civilization was an essentially subjugating agent against human desires, and Freud's own theories contained the key to correcting his mistake.³⁶ Marcuse's method mainly consisted of historicizing the reality principle and strengthening the ego to make it possible to gradually release control of the drives and resolve the conflicts between freedom and civilization.³⁷ Although the bourgeois society and its values were indeed repressive, a differently characterized society could have a different, possible non-repressive, value set.

Next, the primacy of the ego as the focus of rational faculties and emancipatory politics against the blind desires of the unconscious is criticized as an essentialist humanistic approach. In Freud's reading, human rationality contains the means for freedom, and the ego, with the proper support, can pave the way for freedom subverting the repressive forces of dominating society. The view gained ground within the psychoanalytic community, and later the prominent figures of this view, such as Erich Fromm and Carl Rogers, supported such a humanistic psychology and influenced the psychoanalytic practice in North America. Humanist psychoanalysis in the United States is frequently subjected to criticisms in Guattari's texts throughout his career.³⁸

Against this described stance, critical thinkers of the Frankfurt School claimed that the emphasis on the ego as the agent of rational domination deteriorates the psychic balance. Adorno, in an interesting and contentious way, "argued for a conception of reason that might better account for the 'unaccountable' aspects of emotional and aesthetic experience"³⁹ For him, the ego's supremacy against the id reflects the enlightenment idea that human knowledge can completely comprehend the human condition and rational thinking rightfully guides moral choices. In *Dialectic and Enlightenment*, Adorno and Horkheimer claimed that the enlightenment is as totalitarian as any other system, and it results in a reductive understanding of reality, in which the myths of the fantasy and the instrumentality.⁴⁰ Most significantly, instrumentality recognizes the world "as an abstract mechanical system."⁴¹ Their solution was to seek a balanced dialectic between ego and id and support an aesthetic approach towards

objects to achieve freedom from the guidance of moral action. Freud himself was also aware that the sharp distinction between the compartments of the structural model of the psyche was problematic; hence he stated that “there are no sharp boundaries within the psyche, only artificial ones.”⁴² Still, in both positions, the conceptualization of a psychic balance is maintained along with the definite structures of the psyche separated with transitory boundaries. For this reason, one can argue that, those comments do not function in a transforming, machinic fashion.

In conjunction with the structural primacy discussion, Freud’s inclination towards the theoretical formation of dualities was also criticized. He is said to be “misled by his metaphysical bias toward dualism.”⁴³ Despite his modifications towards the structural unity, he more or less retained the antagonistic dualities of life and death instincts along with pleasure and reality principles. The formation of the ego and the superego as the dual, antagonistic elements stemming from the preceding Id could also be considered under the same light. Dualities as the general scheme of psychoanalysis, later developed by Lacan and consisted a significant limitation for the psychoanalysis. That bifurcating attitude is thoroughly evaluated and criticized in D&G’s collective text *A Thousand Plateaus*.

Finally, besides lack, universality, ego’s agency of freedom, and duality criticisms, the mechanisms he attributed to unconsciousness to cope with civilization’s repression remained a matter of debate for critics. Especially the term sublimation, its difference from the symptom and its relation to social values became a significant criticism to Freud’s theories on civilized individuals. In their psychoanalytical dictionary, Laplanche and Pontalis noted that “the instinct is said to be sublimated in so far as it is diverted towards a new, nonsexual aim and in so far as its objects are socially valued ones.”⁴⁴ For my research, the significance of this definition is the social valuation of particular objects and actions. As also mentioned in the dictionary entry, the pragmatics (contextual dependence in a linguistic sense) of these social values are unclear, and Freud’s value attributions are not very well supported in his discussion of sublimation.

A comparison between Freud’s analyses on Judge Schreber and Leonardo da Vinci illustrates this point explicitly. According to Freud, Leonardo’s artistic and scientific success and the obsessive behavior and fantasies of Judge Schreber are both the outcomes of repressed homosexual desires. However, Leonardo’s field of interest is admittedly an example of sublimation, whereas Judge Schreber’s thoughts and behaviors exhibit neurotic symptoms as they do not fit the social order.⁴⁵ Such a classification includes explicit normative social value judgments, and these judgments are not appropriate for Freud’s declared scientific and solely

descriptive methods for psychoanalysis. In a sense, considering sublimation as the function of the psyche operating on itself and transforming the outcome by regulating the libidinal investment results in the mystification of its methods. As described in later sections, Guattari's machines operate on more than one level of the unconscious as the dynamic agent and propose an original explanation for the unclear cases of Freudian sublimation.

2.3 Constitutive Lack in the Lacanian Context and Its Criticisms

Similarly, in the works of Jacques Lacan, the "lack" became a central concept and profoundly shaped his psychoanalytic teachings. For him, the concept had an ontological import in relation to existence. This profound status of the lack laid the groundwork for his linguistic structuralism and the later psychoanalytical politics inspired by his work. Naturally, all these positions were frequently criticized, but I will not address the criticisms directed explicitly to linguistics in this thesis. Political approaches and criticism cannot be apprehended in isolation, yet the criticisms on linguistics constitute separate literature by themselves and will not be evaluated here. Therefore, I will introduce Lacan's concept of lack using the necessary background, and I will limit myself to particularly influential aspects of political and social debates.

Following Freud's footsteps, Lacan also employed the case of a care-dependent baby and the Oedipal setting to describe the indispensable role of the lack, but with a more flexible scope of roles and a whole different characteristic of the concept. Alluding to Freud's story about his grandson playing a game "fort - da" (there - here), Lacan ascribed a structuring role to lack on structuring the mental phenomena. In the story, the baby had a toy on a string; as he throws the toy and loses it from his sight, he utters "fort" (there) when he reels the cord and finds the toy again, this time cheerfully says "da" (here). To Freud's amazement, the baby repeated the game tirelessly.⁴⁶ Freud came up with a hypothesis to analyze the baby's simple game and claimed that it is a simulation of his mother's appearance and absence. As the mother alternates between these two positions, the baby has a hard time struggling with reactive emotions. Therefore, he invents a game simulating the case and utilizes it as a practice to master the situation where his mother is absent. This story and analysis marked an essential aspect of the psyche, namely the repetition compulsion. Unexpectedly, even the traumatic, unpleasant experiences are repeated in a compulsive fashion, transgressing the pleasure principle. Despite its pivotal importance for Freud, he did not explicitly connect this story to the issue of lack. For Lacan, however, this temporary absence of the mother is the beginning of dramatic changes.

In his version of the Oedipal story, the baby's lack of mastery of the bodily functions renders him dependent on the caregiver, so that baby cannot conceive himself as a separate entity.⁴⁷ The caregiver was given the name of the mother throughout, noting that it does not need to coincide with the biological mother. In time, as the baby faces problems in the immediate satisfaction of his needs, he slowly realizes that he is not part of his mother. At that stage, the baby feels a lack of satisfaction for his needs when he observes that the mother spends time apart from him. The baby infers the situation such that the mother simultaneously lacks something and is not content with solely the baby's existence. He is puzzled by the question: "What does the mother want?", as a reaction to this question, he desires to be the object of the mother's desire, the object that the mother lacks. It is this question and answer process where the baby is first introduced to the functions of language, as a language is the system of differences, substitutions, exclusions.⁴⁸

From the baby's perspective, the mother's perceived lack is named the imaginary phallus by Lacan. Lack bounds both baby and mother as stated by Benvenuto and Kennedy: "the infant is bound to the mother, who is herself bound to the phallus in so far as she does not have it."⁴⁹ The baby vainly tries to fill the lack himself and satisfy the mother's desire by becoming the imaginary phallus but cannot succeed. This imaginary frustration of inability is the core of one's ego for Lacan. The baby's will to present himself as the object of desire for another (mother in this case) places him into the dialectic of desire. Here, desire initiates a dialectic in a Hegelian sense. The baby perceives that the mother has a desire and infers that it requires an object to satisfy her desire (a thing in itself), and later through that perception, he conceives himself as the subject, in other words, as the perceiver of the object (the thing for itself). Nevertheless, he cannot break out of the dialectic of desire as he recognizes himself through his role in the constitution of the desire object. Once a part of this dialectic, the child first opts for replacing the lack in the other with the dreams of parental grief resulting from his own inexistence. The temporal precedence relation here is the key to desire's process. An earlier lack responds to the present one and covers it in a dialectical fashion.⁵⁰

Later, a third figure emerges as the representative of law and the owner of phallic power; the figure radically separates the child from his desire and irreversibly represses his desire of being the object of desire. This repression is an essential one and is named the primary repression. With the father's entrance as the phallic representative, the dual and imaginary relationship of the baby with the mother is interrupted, and the child realizes "in the figure of the father that a wider familial and social network exists of which it is only (a) part."⁵¹ Thus, the child is now also forced into the field of symbolic relations in addition to existing imaginary ones. The

baby's hopeless struggle for being the mother's object of desire on the imaginary plane ultimately fails and opens itself into a symbolic world via castration.

Castration in the Lacanian context is this forced entry of the omnipotent figure, which is not necessarily the biological father or even a human being, but the agent of the symbolic order named the big Other, between the child and the imaginary phallus. In this setting, the Oedipal complex's solution is to accept both the impossibility of identifying with the imaginary phallus and the interpretation of lack with an unidentifiable symbolic signifier. The dialectic of desire is not broken even after the introduction of the symbolic realm. It keeps repeating itself. The object of desire can never be precisely determined; as such, the object can only be referred through a symbolic representation of a signifier that perpetually evades identification. Hence, in this case, the signifier is the signifier of lack, and it is called the symbolic phallus. It is what introduces the child to the language through the symbolic order.

The child's position against the phallus is a submissive one. According to Hook, "there is no use in competing with father; the father always wins."⁵² This comment is indeed a politically controversial one, and I will discuss that later. The submissive child accepts the external law represented by the father and the impossibility of attaining the object of the main constitutive desire: returning to the state of completeness. Still, to form the necessary relations under the law of the father and to articulate his hopeless quest for the lost object of desire, the child is immersed into the language as the system of signifiers. Therefore, the child now becomes a subject by being castrated and split from the object of his desire. Lacan defines this unattainable desire object (not the signifier) as the *objet petit a*, making it one of the substantial concepts of his original theory. "The objet petit a is something from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ. That serves as a symbol of the lack, that is to say, of the phallus, not as such, but insofar as it is lacking."⁵³

The only possible way open for the child to express himself and gain recognition is the mediation of language. Thus he is in the field of the big Other, as he cannot reach his desires and express them without a detour; he is essentially alienated from himself. The big Other "designates radical alterity, an otherness which transcends the illusory otherness of the imaginary because it cannot be assimilated through identification."⁵⁴ Although the structure between the subject and his desire is explicit, the subject can never comprehend and assimilate the structure because the structure itself is necessarily incomplete and thus compelled to extension and change. Although the subject's desire never reaches a definite point due to the incompleteness of structure, his desire revolves around the pre-defined coordinates of structures and the subject can barely maneuver out of the structure. How does

the symbolic structure assert itself continuously? Not only by adding new signifiers, but the structures also define the desire relationships of the subject. As language is the necessary medium to imply the impossibility of the subject's achievement of the imaginary desire object, the subject is ultimately contained within the symbolic structure. Hence, the dynamic potential for change in the Lacanian theory is attributed to the unstructured, linguistically inexpressible realm of the Lacanian real and the subject relationship.

In addition to its central role in the Oedipus Complex, the lack also has an ontological import for Lacan. He claimed that the "structuring function of lack" is itself predicated upon a pre-ontological 'gap' that is precisely 'the gap of the unconscious.'⁵⁵ The pre-ontological gap mentioned here is the non-existence preceding one's being and the source of the unconscious. Thus, Lacan implies that the being is destined to be permanently incomplete. It is important to note that Lacan does not mean a segment of the psychic device by the unconsciousness. Such an approach could be, at least partially, attributed to Freud; however, for Lacan, the unconscious consists of the exterior linguistic, social, economic, scientific and artistic formations taking place before the structuralization of consciousness. It is in this sense that the role of lack is an ontological one. The structuring incompleteness complies with the incompleteness of the signifying chain in his approach to language. It is always possible to extend the signifying chain of language by adding new signifiers into it, yet the ontological condition is the impossibility of adding the missing signifier of the primal repression in the Oedipus complex. The lack is, therefore, the ontological element that forms the subject and conscious - unconscious division by the signifying chain.

Further, according to Lacan, the subject is sexualized by his attitude against the symbolic phallus, the lack in the Other. One can either select to own phallus symbols such as wealth, power, status, etc., or become the symbol itself. The first approach represents the masculine attitude, and the second one is the feminine; hence the sexual position corresponds to another foundational lack. As signifiers bound the subject and the signifiers are only the unequal, lacking representatives emerging in the field of the big Other, the subject's sexual position revolves around the fundamental, inexhaustible lack in the big Other. This relation covers a preceding lack, out of which the living being emerges. In parallel to Freud's definition of the death instinct as the intention of living beings towards death, the real lack is what the individual lost from his complete biological being due to sexual reproduction. For a sexed individual, it is no more possible to perpetually reproduce itself by producing a copy; a lack (e.g., the half of the chromosome set) is necessarily posited into the process. This specific lack is defined as real because the being is condemned to death for his role as the subject of sexual

reproduction; as the reproduction reproduces a different being, the parent cannot escape death.⁵⁶ The temporal relation between the real lack and the symbolic also characterizes the previously mentioned dialectic of desire.

The Lacanian real is not the direct representative of the conditions surrounding the subject in a classical manner. His idea of the real is directly related to the lack that permanently resides in the structure and the impossibility of representing it in a regime of signifiers. The object petit a is referred to as the “leftover of the process of constituting an object, the scrap that evades the grasp of symbolization.”⁵⁷ In a sense, the real is the field of the permanent loss, the brute materiality which retained its non-symbolic characteristic after the subject’s integration into the chain of signifiers. Since the subject’s means to articulate himself and to form his own reality is within the symbolic structure, the real is impossible.⁵⁸ The real can only make itself known by the traumatic encounters of the subject with its own materiality. Therefore, it is actually what “happens to us.”⁵⁹ With its relationship to object petit a and desire, the real is placed beyond what is available for the subject and the other members of the same representation structure as it is in essence beyond the structure itself.

In the Lacanian works, both his contemporaries and those coming later mainly attributed the potential of change to the subject’s creative capabilities during his vain pursuit of the lost object. The possibility of change is ensured by the impossibility of comprehending the real: Lacan’s protege, J. A. Miller elaborated on this issue and the subject’s creative role. He said the lack is the place of “suture” in which the subject is placed as it is the lack that motivates the action of structure. The subject-structure relation is a relation of misrecognition, and the system of representations is grounded on the fundamental absence in the structure. This system particularly “compensates for the production of lack.” Complementing the external symbolic system, the imaginary functions as the “means of structuration with its own specific mechanisms of production.”⁶⁰

Also, for some other thinkers, the subject with the lack is particularly crucial for any potential change, as it is the impossibility of a complete subject that makes it open to the contingencies and re-interpretations. The real is not a metaphysical or essential outside, but the irreducible inside between the subject and the symbolic. Thus it is the viable ground (or non-ground) for the resistance. The real and the incomplete reciprocity between the subject and the symbolic render the subject indeterminate and open it to new possibilities of political identities, contingency, and change. However, the characteristic of this change is also contingent and not comprehended in advance.⁶¹ Although Lacan himself did not develop those concepts into a

stand-alone political perspective, he claimed that the question of ethics “is to be articulated from the point of view of a person’s location concerning the Real.”⁶²

Following Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse and attributing the agency of change to the subject with its relation to the unrepresentable lack, a group of political philosophers became prominent, especially in continental Europe. Members of the Ljubljana School of Psychoanalysis, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Alain Badiou, and Saul Newman, can be included in the list of those thinkers. Even though those thinkers do not constitute a single body and frequently position themselves against one another, their mutual attitude is to accept the lack as a constitutive, normative, and ontological operator.⁶³ Here I will not refer to each thinker and the particularities of their political philosophies; rather, I will address the criticisms directed to the different substantial roles attributed to the “constitutive” lack and “constituted” subject.

As the imaginary and the symbolic lack are the parts of the event of castration, the lack is frequently associated with negation. Any formation of identities, such as subject or society, mainly sutures the void and necessarily contains the negativity as the part of the transformation. In the case of society, this negativity is the social antagonism, and the society itself is an illusion concealing the antagonism taking place on a more fundamental level.⁶⁴ The necessity of lack and the impossibility of envisioning any political system without it radically restricts the capacity of achieving any substantial change in the current state of affairs and ultimately leads to a pessimistic political outlook.

In addition, the imperative of acknowledging the lack effectively determines the opposing factions of the social antagonism. People who suffer the consequences of any political change of situations necessarily suffer them due to the inevitable nature of the antagonism. The political attitude of accepting the inevitable strife discriminates the groups of people socially for the sake of approving the lack and the inevitable outcomes. Such an attitude abandons any possibility of solidarity or compassion with the victims of social antagonisms and categorizes people into different relatively impermeable groups based on their positions in the face of the lack and social antagonism.⁶⁵

Next, the potential of contingent change attributed to the ontological role of the lack posits the lack also as the positive ground for political change. In other words, if there is a change in the political context, lack necessarily plays a structuring role for that change. Even though Lacanian thought is determined to avoid any essentialism, this positive reference to the lack

posits it as a common substance with the function of negativity, paradoxically transforming it into an omnipotent dogmatic entity.

Positing the paradoxical lack onto an ontological level hence induces a problematic epistemology. According to Andrew Robinson, with this status of the term, the lack functions as a “Barthesian” myth. “Empty facticity” of a particular ideological term or schema and its operation on an ontological level without any explanation or argument about its constitutive status characterizes the myth. The ontological status of the myth is open to people readily accepting the case, yet its epistemological dullness undermines the analytical functioning of theory.⁶⁶ The resulting analysis based on the myth refers to the categorical objects. In this form of analysis, the entities and functions are fixed in advance, and the cases only reproduce the dogmatic schema. A hierarchical relationship exists between the analytical schema and the cases elaborated by it, favoring the former.

The analytical schema based on the myth’s function is remarkably in line with the features of a mechanical understanding. In a general definition, mechanisms are based on two kinds of components: the material objects and their interactions.⁶⁷ Although the materiality of components might not be applied to all the components of the analytic mechanism here, the effective model of functioning through definite components and their interactions can pertinently be referred to as mechanical understanding. I will elaborate further on the issue of mechanics later in the fourth chapter.

The delineated mechanics results in the reduction of complex multidimensional problems into predefined categories. A mechanical method of analysis, ironically according to Lacanian lack and its necessity, truncates the information into the categories and cannot avoid the losses meanwhile. When the negativity, lack, and social antagonisms are lumped into an overly arching category, one can hardly address the particularities of any unexpected traumatic event.⁶⁸ The ultimate bothersome outcome of this stance is to label threatening environmental, social, and political events as a constitutive and indisputable part of the process. The only barrier between the event and such a classification is the thinker’s level of radicality.

Other than the theoretical traits of Lacanian politics and their criticisms, there is a central event that connects Lacan’s thinking into practicality: The events of May 1968. May of 1968 was a remarkable peak of the civil unrest and revolutionary fervor in France. Being a prominent figure by the time of the events, Lacan’s position towards the events and the university students’ movement has stood as a matter of debate ever since. According to the psychoanalysis historian Elizabeth Roudinesco, Lacan maintained the figure of a “stern father”

around the revolutionaries. He selected a position of knowledge, an authoritarian figure who was always supposed to know better than the revolutionary students.⁶⁹ During a discussion with the students, he famously claimed: “The revolutionary aspiration has only a single possible outcome – of ending up as the master’s discourse. This is what experience has proved. What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a master. You will get one.”⁷⁰

Still, it is very hard to claim that Lacan’s position was counter-revolutionary. He explicitly stated that he was not a leftist⁷¹, yet his attitude was mainly due to his belief that the only “true” revolution could result from psychoanalytic studies. Against a financial request from the GP (the leading Maoist left group of 1968 in universities, of which his daughter Judith Miller and his protege Jacques-Alain Miller were also members), he replied: “I am the revolution. I do not see why I should subsidize you. You are making my revolution impossible and taking away my disciples.”⁷² He believed the university students represented the bureaucratic discourse of the university even in their revolutionary efforts. Maoist students, for example, were after the totalized knowledge and subversion of the system as a whole. According to Lacan, without the guidance of psychoanalysis, their revolutionary practice was condemned to restate the repressive power structures. The role of psychoanalysis here was to elucidate the hidden power relations.

Lacan’s criticisms were aligned with other thinkers who were against the bureaucratic university and unconsciously controlled students. Their struggle resulted in a widespread questioning of universities’ conventional functions and, finally, the initiatives for alternative non-repressive academic institutions. By the end of 1968, the radical movement’s alternative approaches embodied the Paris Vincennes VIII. A safe haven for militant activities, with a free atmosphere of discussion, and with the courses directly devoted to psychoanalysis, even it was not an actual revolutionary way of approaching the university problem for Lacan.

Since the administered society displays a tremendous capacity to transform dissent into its structure and produce consent even out of the non-conformities, one can hardly judge Lacan’s ambivalent attitude towards the revolutionaries. The May 1968 movement, indeed, did not culminate with the radical revolution anticipated by the students or workers, yet substantially altered many fields, including political philosophy. In 1969, Lacan himself published his well-known four discourses (Master’s, University’s, Hysteric’s, Analyst’s) to rectify the Oedipal scheme based on the May 1968 experience. In the end, parallel to his political followers’ stance, Lacan was not an active supporter of the revolutionary movement. He mostly lumped different groups of revolutionaries into his group of “university students unconsciously

reproducing the discourse of university“ and retained an authoritarian role with minimal support to alternative groups practically searching for new modes of politics.

Throughout this section, numerous criticisms have been discussed. In the paragraphs devoted to Freud’s theories and perspective on society, politics, and civilization, I have tried to show that the main attitude of the critics is to assume Freud’s theories to some extent and modify them according to their views. Selected critics did not strive for revolutionizing the psychoanalytic thought as radically as Guattari tried. Their perspective is marked with similarities with Freud as much as the differences.

Against Lacanian psychoanalysis, however, I wanted to reflect the rejection of political perspectives along with the definite, mechanical role of subject, structure, and outcomes. These criticisms also did not strive to radicalize and transform the insights of Lacan throughly as Guattari did. They pointed out the possible adverse outcomes of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Lacan-influenced contemporary political thought. Yet, their effort did not create another radical perspective for the action. As discussed previously, in the events of 1968, Lacan himself also hesitated to politically collaborate with non-psychoanalytic organizations. Philosophically, his insights, such as the ontological function of lack, mainly aimed to support his psychoanalytical claims instead of forming a multidimensional, creative path. In contrast, as I will discuss in following chapters, Guattari came up with the machine concept to function through those limitations of Lacan and his critics.

2.4 The Conception of Psychoanalysis and the Role of the Psychoanalyst

For Freud, psychology mainly refers to three distinct fields of research. First, the method is designed to investigate the unconscious processes; second, the therapeutic method to treat neurosis; and finally, the theoretical body formed on top of the findings of the first two.⁷³ Since the unconscious is not directly open for the inquiries of the conscious part of the psyche, psychoanalysis’ method of investigation requires the existence of an analyst and an analyzand. The subject-to-subject relationship created between the analyzed person (the analyzand) and the analyzing person (the analyst) creates the psychoanalytic experience.

There is no definite distinction between Freud’s and Lacan’s approach in this very basic dual setting. Fundamentally, psychoanalysis has only one medium for both: “the patient’s speech.”⁷⁴ The response given to this speech characterizes the differences between Freudian and Lacanian methods of analysis. They attribute different roles to analysis and the analyst, shaping the technique of psychoanalysis and the power relations between the participants of

analysis. Those relations have been exposed to many criticisms, particularly from a political perspective. Before going into the criticisms and their details, two essential concepts need clarification: Transference and Counter-transference.

When he first came up with the term transference, Freud employed it in a mechanical sense similar to displacement. The early definition of transference was the connection formed between the unconscious idea, which cannot make its way to consciousness, and another already conscious idea.⁷⁵ This is how the analyst reaches the symptomatic repressed idea. Later, when he incorporated the Oedipus complex to the very center of his theories, Freud also altered the description of the transference. This time, the analyst assumes the role of the analyzand's existing prototypical Oedipal figures, mainly the figure of the father. This role allows the analyzand to stage the problematic aspects of his Oedipal solution; thus, he commonly appeals to the analyst with an instinctual ambivalence. Although Freud frequently emphasized the role of his self-analysis (without an analyst) in his psychoanalytic discoveries, he also indicated its limited character. The transference relation is the key to posit the analyst in a position of authority and make his interpretations valid.⁷⁶

Lacan associated the transference relationship with a symbolic one. According to him, the analyst is supposed to identify the existence of transference when he can represent the subject. That is why the analyst is also known as the "subject supposed to know"⁷⁷ in his discourse. The Lacanian analytic technique is characterized by the silence and the attentive listening of the analyst. The dialog is formed, even in the silence, as long as the analyst audits the analysis. Most importantly, for an analysis to be formed differently than a mere suggestion, the analyst needs to know how to handle the transference relation. He needs to refuse the power attributed to him by the analyzand. The training analysis becomes vital to make sure the analyst can maintain control.

Counter-transference is basically the resistance of an analyst to the process of analysis. Lacan's definition covers the meaning of the concept for both psychoanalytic schools. He says countertransference is "the sum of the prejudices, passions, perplexities, and even the insufficient information of the analyst at a certain moment of the dialectical process of the treatment."⁷⁸ The conception of analysis based on the transference confers a unique, hierarchically superior role to the analyst, and as I delineate this role, the politically problematic aspects will present themselves in the relevant criticisms.

With his science-influenced outlook for psychoanalysis, Freud used an analogy to describe the role of the analyst. For instance, chemists analyze the components of compounds and discover

the relations between them, even when they are no longer directly visible anymore. Similarly, the psychoanalyst determines the instinctual components of highly composite manifestations of the psyche and informs the analyzand by bringing back the repressed material. When an instinctual component is released from one symptomatic connection, he claims, it immediately forms a new connection because of the psychic propensity for unification.⁷⁹ As such, the analyst's task is to guide the analyzand to dissolve the problematic connections and provide opportunities for new ones.

Interestingly, Lacan carries Freud's chemist analogy to another closely related one: the hydraulic engineer. For him, an analyst needs to regulate the course of analysis by applying technical principles. It is his task to raise artifices to make sure "the crossing of certain dams, and that the course must proceed according to the laws of a kind of gravitation that is peculiar to it, which is called truth." The truth is the introduction of ideal movement by analysis into reality.⁸⁰ Real is in the Lacanian sense here, and the truth is the function of transference existing in the analysis. Analyst expertise serves to distinguish the valuable part of the analyzand's speech. He evaluates an everyday speech as a "fable addressed to the world of wise," a Freudian slip as an utterance, and "the rest of silence as the whole lyrical development."⁸¹

Both analogies depict the analysis as a neutral, rule-following, quasi-scientific activity determined by definite principles. However, the limits of authority and the application of psychoanalytic techniques remained vague. Naturally, the described analytical setting and the analyst's position are criticized frequently. Now, I will mention some of those which are primarily related to the power relations and the implied political choices, as that setting and related problems motivated Guattari, especially in the early texts, to come up with the machine concept.

In his influential book *Le Psychanalisme: L'ordre Psychanalytique et Le Pouvoir*, a contemporary of Guattari's machines, Robert Castel argues the logic of psychoanalysis. His book constructs a well-formed argumentative criticism instead of hasty generalizations. Therefore his hypotheses are worth noting here. First, psychoanalysis and its function cannot be thought of in isolation. Second, the analytical relationship between the participants is necessarily biased, and the analytic convention disregards the socio-political relations resulting in blindness to power relations. Finally, as a result of the first two, based on the psychoanalytic setting, it is possible to deduct the privilege of psychoanalysis in today's dominant power instruments.

According to Castel, for analysis to function properly, there needs to be a contract on the suspension of reality to provide access to the unconscious. The arbitrary artifices are required, as Lacan described, to reach the unconscious, but meanwhile, the extra-analytical reality is only neutralized, not excluded. The establishment of transference is also dependent on the analyst's control of his neutrality. Both of these neutrality assumptions of the analyst and analyzand lead to conformism eliminating the political question from the analysis. "Technically speaking, analytical neutrality is a condition of the possibility of transference: politically speaking, it is the incarnation of the politics of apoliticism."⁸²

Castel illustrates this fairly vague political aspect of analysis in the money relation of analysis. In psychoanalytic discourse, an amount of payment is required to form a transference relationship as it prevents analysts from feeling they are being exploited and comforts the analyzand since he is not indebted any further than the payment. The striking issue here is not the justification of the analyst's economic requests from the analyzand as a client but the reduction of an obviously socio-economic relation into its assumed symbolic significance "without residue." Such symbolic reductions (e.g., traveling to the analyst's office, the laying down ritual of the analyzand while the analyst remains seated) and their theoretical justifications conceals the superiority and power due to his professional status and cultural position within the analytical convention. He concludes, "the reciprocity of transfer and counter transfer is not a relation of equality, but a structure of inequality set up to produce effects of controlled reciprocity."⁸³

The assumed neutrality and the selection of analysis material by the analyst as described by Lacan also raises epistemological questions. In addition to the sharp division between political groups discussed in the last chapter, classifying the material as analyzable and non-analyzable leads to a dualist categorical division. Non-analyzable material is only defined and approached negatively, leading to an "analytical absolute idealism" or the Manicheist affirmation of presumed irreconcilability of analytic theory with the excluded matter.⁸⁴ From the perspective of necessary lack, the analyst's work contributes to drifting away from the questioning of essential theorization and transforms his work into a mere technical drill.

Finally, Freud's statement on the independence of unconscious revelation from the analyst and Lacan's induction of the subject's own "truth" into the Real is also dubious due to the necessary detour of the subject's speech. Analysis indeed enables the subject to speak of himself but only through the double mediation of the analyst and the psychoanalytic theory. In that respect, the mediating psychoanalysis also subtly enacts the power relations within the analytical setting for the emancipation of the subject. As a response to this mediation criticism, psychoanalysts

often assert that the analysis process does not provide a certain scientific, repeatable and falsifiable result; hence its results are full of risk. However, the distribution of risks is clearly imbalanced towards the disadvantage of the analyzand. Here too, psychoanalysis posits the analyst to a position of power without much of a responsibility. According to Bourdieu and Passeron's definition, as quoted by Gordon, psychoanalytic power exerts symbolic violence, since "every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specific force to those power relations."⁸⁵

Throughout this section, I have provided the classical Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic analyst-analyzand setting. About power relations, the positions of participants and their relations defined by the transference and counter-transference proved significant for Guattari's approach in the following chapters. Intentionally, I refrained from mentioning Guattari's own criticisms in this chapter to not fall into a cycle and limited myself to Robert Castel's brilliant insights. He exposes the subtle power relations, yet he does not aim to provide another fundamental approach through psychoanalysis. It is certainly possible to answer those criticisms from a Freudian or Lacanian framework, yet my interest is not in the exact precision of provided criticisms. Instead, from now on, my focus will be on the elements of psychoanalytic theories which made those criticisms possible. In the next chapter, I will thoroughly investigate Guattari's machine concept by its foundational relations to psychoanalysis and its distinct characteristics mainly revolving around the discussed issues.

CHAPTER 3

WHAT IS THE MACHINE?

The word “machine” might have many different meanings depending on the context. As early as 1919, the concept was introduced into psychoanalytic literature by Victor Tausk. Interestingly, he reported that some of the schizophrenic patients complained about an “influencing machine.” According to patients, this machine contained mechanical elements similar to such things as boxes, cranks, buttons, etc. The technological development could have indeed explained the connection between those features in a mechanical system, but the technical information does not help to reveal the reason how and why do the patients hallucinate an influencing machine with an irresistible power to persecute them. They reported experiences such as the machine influenced them by showing them two-dimensional pictures similar to a cinematograph; by inducing or removing feelings through various flows such as x-ray, radiation, and air; by removing flows such as seminal flow to reduce the potency of the person also; and by creating pathological responses and foreign sensations in their bodies via the alien medium of x-ray, radiation, and the air.⁸⁶ By his correspondence with Deleuze, we know that Guattari is aware of that paper, yet it is an uneasy task to determine to what extent he employed Tausk’s ideas.⁸⁷

According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, a machine is “a mechanically, electrically, or electronically operated device for performing a task.”⁸⁸ Even though the dictionary writers preferred to list the operation methods of a device to define the word, Guattari grounded his machine concept on the machine’s function of performing an activity, especially production. Guattari, striving to break any rigid conception, never aimed to supply a complete definition for his machines. As expected, his new concept of machine perpetually changed attributes primarily due to its employment in different contexts. To better follow the flow of his

machines, I will be discussing the concept through its chronological and conceptual features. Even though it could be very differently ordered, I will investigate what the machine is and how it works under four sections for the sake of practicality.

The first section will consist of his earlier works, including the pivotal text “Machine and Structure”, in which Guattari introduced the concept by elaborating it in detail. He introduces the concept in a search for an alternative potential of change in Lacanian structuralism and as a prospect of including historicism into psychoanalytic thinking. His aims, in this sense, are very much related to the role of the analyst and the political repercussions of psychoanalytic discourse. From that point on, Guattari’s machines began to function as machines through psychoanalysis. They do not modify or reject the concepts altogether; rather, they radically operate to change underlying assumptions and the resultant political stance.

Second, the development of the machine concept into an essentially central element of Guattari’s collaboration with Deleuze in the first volume of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project: the *Anti-Oedipus*. In that book, machines became the fundamental concept of analysis in conjunction with the three syntheses of the unconscious: connective, conjunctive, and disjunctive. Radically changing the status of subjectivity, their perspective dislodged the deep-rooted questions and made it possible to ask new ones. The machine concept was relativized to the Body without Organs (BwO) and began to assume the character of a substantial pair operating through the psychoanalytic dualisms. Those changes are also projected on their political and economic analysis.

Third, the second volume of Deleuze & Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia project, *A Thousand Plateaus*, also had a strong emphasis on machines and machinic functions. Along with the concepts of stratum and planes of consistency, the discussion extended to contain the abstract and concrete machine pair as stabilizing and subverting connective entities. In a historical-political analysis from the perspective of change, they elaborated on the war machine concept. Again an old concept, introduced in “Machine and Structure,”⁸⁹ war machine gained ground, and it is still an influential concept for political philosophy. Both abstract and concrete machines and war machines depict the machinic function of Guattari’s machines under different contexts.

Finally, in his later works, the extended context of machines did not break them off the psychoanalytic thought. Instead, they functioned to subvert the dominant, repressive psychoanalytic theories to create other planes from their elements. The later works, containing Guattari’s solo texts during the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project, will illustrate those

peculiar functions of machines. By the end of this section, the discussion relevant to the machinic perspective will be mature enough to unfold its roots within the physical and temporal originalities of Guattari's views.

3.1. The Machine Concept in Guattari's Early Texts

As early as 1957, Guattari qualified the speech aspect of psychoanalysis as a "verbal machine."⁹⁰ From early on, the word machine retained its character of qualifying many different entities such as the state, speech, voice, etc. At this stage, the concept is closest to Tausk's influencing machine because the main aspect of these Guattari machines is their capability of influence and their emergence out of the connections between different elements (not necessarily mechanical). A state machine, for example, mostly stood for the state's permanent repressive action towards the subjective production within any group.⁹¹

Guattari's early texts focus on the issue of subjectivity in psychoanalysis. In *La Borde*, he had worked with schizophrenics, and the Lacanian approach to schizophrenia did not offer much prospect for his work. As previously discussed, the Lacanian subject emerges by one's immersion into the symbolic realm through the law of the father. In other words, the castration of the language's symbolic representative system is the primary mode of any social and subjective relation. The schizophrenic is, by Lacanian definition, the one who did not acknowledge the role of the father and could not integrate himself into the symbolic realm. Language does not represent the schizophrenic, and for him, words are "not the murder of the thing: it is the thing"⁹² due to the continuing prevalence of the Real.

Guattari's criticism of Freudian-Lacanian theory relied on two substantial differences. First, the expression or the formation of subjectivity is not necessarily a linguistic performance; hence the Lacanian approach is reductive. Second, the Oedipal triangulation is not a necessary form but a historically contingent one.⁹³ Guattari's criticisms until he met with Deleuze in 1969 had focused on the psychoanalytical theory for the subjectivity formation and the role of the psychoanalyst. With the text "Machine and Structure," those criticisms, combined with Deleuze's approach to structuralism, opened up to new horizons of historicism, philosophy of difference, politics, and many more. I will briefly elaborate on those to clear about the background for the machine concept.

For Guattari, subjectivity was not necessarily centered around the individual in his relationship with society and language. Still, his position was not an anti-psychoanalytic one. He agreed that a "signifying machine" constitutes the individual through dictating the consumption of

what is good and rejection of what is bad. Nevertheless, he was inquiring about an alternative for attributing the structuring power to a father-president figure in the absence of a religious almighty king castrated by history.⁹⁴ In his inquiry, Freud's anthropologic hypothesis in *Totem and Taboo* did not provide much support, but Freud's philosophical significance was elsewhere. It was Freud who came up with the foundational concepts of "unconscious subject" and "death drive" for subjectivity. Philosophers hesitated to integrate those concepts into their thinking and contented themselves with a short-sighted philosophy of subjectivity. (e.g., Sartre's rejection of unconsciousness) Lacan's role in this respect was to return to philosophers of subjectivity from Descartes to Husserl within a Freudian framework.⁹⁵ In the end, Guattari considered his authentic alternative: the group subjectivity "an extension to the Freudian theory." Freud described the subject as "fundamentally unconscious, escaping individual determination for the most part and marked almost indelibly by the structural relationships of the social group and its various modes of communication."⁹⁶ Guattari founded his own approach to subjectivity based on this definition.

Practically, in La Borde clinic, he applied group sessions for schizophrenics and observed that they could form subjective groups with creative potentials. In his "Transversality" text, he defined *transversality* as a coefficient with a threshold for a particular group. Coefficient here implies relativity between different entities; as a particular quality of one entity is measured based on the other, there exists a coefficient related to their relationship. It is this relativity that creates the transversality between the members of different groups. The group included both the "patient," the "analyst," and any other required element from a voice recorder to the clinic's cook or anyone available within the institution. Such heterogeneous formations revolutionized the fixed transference relation and subverted the privileged position of the analyst. The doctor-patient relationship defined on the strict "territorialized" roles for both positions resulted in stereotypic bourgeois repression and the rigid castes with their "reactionary group fantasies."⁹⁷ In other words, roles and responsibilities of one definite group assert themselves to people who assume them, and they leave no room for subjective relations other than reactive, ideal group positions.

Therefore, Guattari sought the potentially original subjectivity within the new definition of people's roles within the context and radically altered the function of the institution. Guattari here introduces a distinction between what he calls "subject groups" and "dependent groups." Subject groups embraced even the nonsensical instinctual urges without the need of an analyst's intervention in a transference perspective. The subject groups "try to accept the meaning of their praxis ... thus putting themselves in a position of having to bring about their

own death.”⁹⁸ Those groups do not insist on the persistence and unification of themselves; their death and dissolution are as usual as their formation.

In contrast, the dependent groups that create themselves around the rigid set of meanings and identities, evading the seemingly external nonsense, eradicates the possibility of novelty and creativity. Guattari expressed his hypothesis as: “it is possible to change the various coefficients of unconscious transversality at the various levels of an institution.”⁹⁹ The subjectivity offered here is an ultimately temporary occurrence based on the connectivity between the different elements of the perpetually reconstituted institution. Here institution is against the hierarchical verticality and the situational horizontality, inserting people into roles and situations. For example, in the psychiatric hospital, doctors’ vertical, hierarchical superiority allows them to organize the patients horizontally into different wards and alter conditions without their consent. Institutions, however, try to increase the interaction in and between groups of people, and transversality indicates the level they are successful at it. The foundational importance of connectivity, temporality, formation and dissolution paved the way for characterizing machines.

Along with the existing deviancy on subjectivity and the role of an analyst, Guattari’s relation with psychoanalysis further deteriorated after the events of May 1968. Guattari openly praised the students and their role in the events and criticized the student unions and communist parties due to their signifying and mystifying influence on students and workers. Although he did not mention Lacan’s name, his words on the authoritative figures reflected his position against Lacan’s:

As if they were ashamed of this detour of history, as if it should never have happened with the students! Yet, it could also have taken place elsewhere precisely because it started with the students! These stupid groupuscules (small political groups) saw it as shameful to think that the workers would have had to follow a movement started by students, or petit bourgeois, etc. An infraction of class morality!¹⁰⁰

The strained relationship between Guattari and the Lacanian school snapped when Lacan requested from Guattari a review of Deleuze’s groundbreaking books of *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense*. The requested review culminated in the “Machine and Structure” text. Guattari used the insights of Deleuze’s books to criticize Lacan’s view by introducing the key concept of the machine.

3.1.1 Introduction of Guattari's Machines into the Structures

Guattari defined the terms “machine” and “structure” in a footnote at the very beginning of the text. Structure, accepted in a Deleuzian sense, is “characterized by a position of exchange or substitution of particularities,” and the machine is described in relation to the Deleuzian term of repetition: “as a conduct and as a point of view [concerning] non-exchangeable and non-substitutable singularities.”¹⁰¹ However, Guattari distinguished his position by stating Deleuze's three minimum determinant conditions of structure and only accepting the first two.

- 1- There must be at least two heterogeneous series, one of which is defined as the signifier and the other as the signified.
- 2- Each of these series is made up of terms that exist only through their relationship with one another.

The disputed third condition of Deleuze is that “two heterogeneous series [converging] toward a paradoxical element, which is their ‘differentiator.’”¹⁰² Guattari places the machine precisely at this junction. To clarify Guattari's contribution, I will briefly describe Deleuze's perspective on structuralism and his insights on his terms in their contexts.

Both of Deleuze's books provided investigations on structuralism, which could be conceived as the “search for regular and fixed patterns of relations that can be discerned within a particular field.”¹⁰³ He challenged structuralism mainly by exhibiting its inability to account for the genesis of the actual elements and structural relationships in a given setting. Even though the instance of one element could be explained by referring to another, this explanation results in an infinite regress or accession of a primary signifier. Deleuze proposed a different route and divided the structuralist approach into two different levels. The *actual* is composed of individualities with differences, and the *virtual* is composed of differentiated pre-individual entities. The passage from virtuality to actuality is via the “differentiator” element, actualizing the virtual differentiation.

Next, he employed the term “event” as the introducer of novelty within an established structure. Those events are not separate or external from the structures, yet they contain the differentiated pre-individualities and series of “singular” points. Such a perspective evolved the Saussurean linguistics to a point, where the differentiation between signifier and signified series leads to a distribution of singular points at the conjunction of those series because of “a natural excess of the signifying series and a natural lack of the signified series.”¹⁰⁴ Saussure's one-to-one mapping semiotic schema of representation¹⁰⁵, as illustrated in Figure 1, is no more

valid due to the existence of singular points. For some signifiers, there was no signifier, and for some signifieds, there was more than one signifier.




Figure 1: Saussure's Semiotic Correspondences

The excess - lack relation and their “determinations are interchanged without ever reaching equilibrium.” Deleuze named the perpetual element of imbalance the “empty square” as a subgroup of the term differentiator.¹⁰⁶ A compatible term to the empty square was also existent in Levi-Strauss' and Lacan's texts as Zero Symbol, but Lacan did not attribute a philosophically important differentiation function to the term.

Levi-Strauss brought about the concept to explain how human beings adopted the signifier-signified relationship as their main mode of operation within the field of knowledge. He said that even though the world contained symbols as signifiers, it was not suddenly that people began understanding their meaning; instead, they needed time and a mediating Zero symbol in between the different sets as those sets are inadequate. In other words, people needed “floating signifiers” which do not signify any definite content but can assume any symbolic content.¹⁰⁷ For Lacan, however, the Zero symbol's function would mediate the dialectic of desire in the imaginary realm and the symbolic structure. Only the constitutive lack could assume such a function as previously discussed; hence for Lacan, the differentiator was contained within the signifier-signified framework, and the matter was not the actual being of the Zero symbol but “rather the signifier of the lack of this zero symbol.”¹⁰⁸

Furthermore, Deleuze provided an account for the differentiation between sense and nonsense in language from a developmental psychology position. To distinguish the bodies from the sound and organize the sound into meaningful propositions, a child needs to go through a three-level development. First, he needs to be able to distinguish the phonetically significant elements from the environmental noise and create an interconnected collection of sounds “no longer a noise but is not yet a language.”¹⁰⁹ Second, he needs to experiment with those phonetic

elements and combine them into composite sounds. Finally, the composite elements are organized according to their conformance to phonetic rules depending on the differences between elements. Deleuze named those levels of syntheses as connective, conjunctive, and disjunctive.¹¹⁰ The order of sense is distinguished from the chaotic phonetic-noise mixture by those syntheses and provides the stable ground for the language. Those three syntheses later became essential elements for the machinic perspective in *Anti Oedipus*.

Guattari elaborated on the machine concept to incorporate it into the body of Deleuze's work on structuralism. His first reflection on the primacy of machines was through a comparison to Lacanian lack in 1964. For Lacan, the "dehiscence at the heart of the organism;"¹¹¹ in other words, the constitutive gap underneath the language, along with the subjectivity, and culture enforced the social division of labor to the human beings for survival. Guattari indicated the historically developing prominence of machines against that perspective. Instead of human beings and their symbolic relationships, in time, he said, the survival of humankind will depend more and more on the cybernetic machines and their capabilities, such that: "it will, therefore, be impossible to respond to the attack of a new virus without the intervention of continuously advancing computers."¹¹² Similarly, in "Machine and Structure," he explained how human labor is reduced to a residue of the machine work, and thus the machine settled right at the "heart of desire."¹¹³ The substantial changes in the structure's elements and relations are, as a result, historically contingent. Now, the unconscious subjectivity is a matter of the machinic function as much as it is a linguistically modeled structure of individual-social relationships. To strengthen his position of introducing historical contingency into structuralism, he employed the Deleuzian terms.

The machine is the productive force behind the historical change, and it causes a contingent structural configuration. As previously mentioned, the machine is related to the order of repetition. Deleuze explicitly characterized structuralist repetition with generality, where generality expresses a point of view according to which one term may be exchanged or substituted for another. Then, he claimed in contrast, "repetition is a necessary and justified conduct only in relation to that which cannot be replaced."¹¹⁴ It is neither a member of heterogeneous series nor the outcome of the series constituting the structure. For this reason, the machine itself is not a member of the structure. However, the machine is not a separate agent; instead, the "machine is inseparable from its structural articulations and, conversely, that each contingent structure is dominated by a system of machines, or at the very least by one logic machine."¹¹⁵ Such a position is only possible by positing machines at the grounding plane of psychoanalysis: the unconsciousness. Guattari, similar to Lacan, evaluates

unconsciousness as the foundational, exterior multidimensionality before the emergence of consciousness.

3.1.2 Machinic Subjectivity

Guattari distinguished the conscious and unconscious subjects. The conscious subject is related to “being an ego,” and the unconscious subject has the Lacanian definition of the term: “a signifier represents it for another signifier.”¹¹⁶ The unconscious subject is placed *alongside* the machine, and the word selection here precisely ascribes the function of Deleuzian differentiator or Lacanian zero symbol to the term. It stands between signifier and signified and functions by “detaching a signifier as a representative, as a ‘differentiator,’ as a causal break, different in kind from the structurally established order of things.” The machine’s function removes the possibility of determining the subject’s truth “on the level of representation, information, communication, social codes and every other form of structural determination.”¹¹⁷

With his concept of machine, Guattari also challenged the Lacanian comment on the introduction of truth by the analyst through transference. In addition to the truth relation, he combined the machine’s influence with transversality and the group subjectivity, broadening his criticism on structural linguistics as a model for psychoanalytic practice. Every machinic function in a structure is accompanied by anti-production within the structure. Guattari gives an explanation to the term in “Machine and Structure”:

Anti-production will be, among other things, what has been described under the term "production relations." Anti-production will tend to effect a kind of re-tilting of the balance of phantasy, not necessarily in the direction of inertia and conservatism, since it can also lead to generalizing within a given social area a new dominant mode of production, accumulation, circulation and distribution relations, or of any other superstructural manifestation of a new type of economic machine.¹¹⁸

Particularly, anti-production characterizes the structures and expresses rigidification against machines' original, subjective, creative operations. The term finds its implication in the relation between conscious and unconscious. For example, in the context of the dream, the unconscious latent material is processed by the machine and expressed as the conscious material bearing the mark of the distortion of anti-production. The inexpressible “umbilicus” of the dream, objet petit a, evades both the consciousness and unconscious structures. It is objet petit a that dissociates the individual from itself as an eternally missing part and prohibits the individual from merging with the other as a constant reorganizer of desire.

Guattari later developed his claims on group subjectivity to the field of semiotics. He claimed that there are a-signifying signifiers that operate without the requirement of making sense. They are not dependent on the rules and differences between the chain of signifiers in a linguistic sense, but they are only chains of codes that “do not express any sense that exists outside of themselves.” The functioning of genetic codes and computer codes illustrates such a-signifying semiotic chains.¹¹⁹ In this thesis, I will not elaborate thoroughly on the peculiar characteristics of Saussurean - Lacanian linguistics and Guattari’s alternative Hjelmslev inspired semiotics. Even though they constitute a crucial part of the machine’s background and operations, a detailed account of them is too cumbersome. Whenever it is necessary to allude to semiotic-linguistic specifications, the concepts will be specified with minimum possible details.

The machinic criticisms described in this section on the necessity of linguistic structuralism provide major contributions to the theory. The machine and unconscious subject relation posit the unconscious subject on a level preceding the structure and its determination. Guattari’s machines are inserted into structures as the dominant active agents, and structural determinations are limited to the consciousness’ constitution. The machine concept was planted to disrupt psychoanalysis’ theoretical boundaries and generalizations. In this sense, machines assumed their machinic function and began to destroy existing dispositions of structures to synthesize new connections.

Essentially, a machine operates by breaking the structure apart, and it is indistinguishable from the order of the unconscious subject. In the event of trauma (abrupt, catastrophic experience), the linguistic articulation capabilities cannot conflate the event into the symbolic structure. For example, the loss of speech against the frightful accidents illustrates the inability. In that case, the event cannot be assimilated into the heterogeneous series of a structure or their relations, and it begins to function as a machine, dominating and transforming the structure. When the symbolic representation of a trauma machine is initially impossible, the machine itself formed with the event represents the subject for another signifier in the chain of signifiers. Hence a language with a written form cannot adequately structure the unconscious subject. That is a radical opposition to Lacan’s famous quote: “the unconscious is structured like a language.”¹²⁰ The opposition to linguistically structured unconscious laid the path for the approach in *Anti-Oedipus*.

All those discussions supported the claims on the influence of history for the unconscious subject in a Marxist sense. In this model, the technological production machines and corresponding infrastructural production relations determine the cultural and semiotic

superstructures (in the case of the asignifying codes of a computer). Hence, the machinic conditions of the unconsciousness remain historical even though the consciousness remains structurally determined by the linguistic, structural relations.

The “Machine and Structure” paper ended with a comment on the May 1968 movement. Guattari asserted that a revolutionary movement needs to struggle against any structuralization attempt of its dynamic potential. No single theoretical body, including Marxism, can provide a permanent account of machinic influence on structures; hence the theoretical effort needs to be combined with the analytic in every stage to determine the responsibilities of people who have the means to direct the class struggle.¹²¹ Here, the rejection of any master figure and the definite (e.g., Lacan’s own) revolutionary prescriptions are rejected to be replaced with a dynamic, constructive revolutionary program. Analytically, breaking down to form connective alternatives characterized Guattari’s endeavor as an author from the beginning to the end.

3.2. Machines in *Anti - Oedipus*

When Guattari handed the “Machine and Structure” text to Lacan, he rejected publishing it, possibly due to the criticisms towards his theories. However, Guattari also sent a copy to Deleuze, and the resultant correspondence culminated in the *Anti-Oedipus*, which is the first publication of their joint project: *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. In this project, the machine concept was among Guattari’s main contributions with a vast expansion of its role as the analytic and practical element in *Anti Oedipus*.

In the first pages of the book, D&G expressed this expansion: “Everywhere it is machines-real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections (...) Everything is machine.”¹²² Their omnipresence is directly related to production and desire. Desire is designated as a machine that connects the different flows, breaks, and cuts those flows in order to make them flow; those interruptions and breaks are what characterized the flow and assigned an inseparable connection between machines and flows. Therefore, desiring as production has a machinic character, and desiring machines are in the order of repetition where the repetition stands outside the structure. Appropriately, the desire is always outside itself through repetition, and desiring machines only function by breaking down; they do not maintain a definite structure.

The desiring machine approach brought about notable originality for characterizing desire. The classical Platonic desire logic, which enforces the “acquisition,” causes a primary lack in

desire that Lacan also endorsed. D&G, however, chose the side of production as the character of desire. The machinic cuts and breaks do not refer to any lack in flow; it is what brings about the flow. Flow as a concept has its own different functions in different texts. In general, it designates the unorganized material, energy (psychical or physical), capital, and desire. Flow's status is primary and not separate from the machine. There is no agent or manipulator before them in the form of the subject. The following quote expresses the position of D&G:

Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression. Desire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine of a machine¹²³

The quote exemplifies a machinic function within the field of psychoanalysis. Still, repression creates the fixed subject yet authors' position radically transforms the presupposition of the subject's foundational status. With the productive aspect of the machine at hand, D&G describe nature as a "process" of production. They mean that the distinctions about the independent spheres of production, distribution, and consumption from the man-nature, society-nature, and industry-nature relations result from false consciousness. For that matter, there is no independence of different fields. To describe the production, particular fields of consumption and recording are introduced immediately to production. Those fields characterize different syntheses, and they will be described in the syntheses associated with them. Production is within them, and they determine the production. In *Anti-Oedipus*, D&G described those fields, refined the connective essence of the machine¹²⁴, and the delusion of the subject's primacy through modifying Deleuze's three syntheses in *Logic of Sense* as syntheses of the unconscious.

3.2.1 Three Synthesis of *Anti-Oedipus*

The first synthesis is the connective synthesis, the machinic function of breaking flow through the machine's connection with other machines. The connective functioning of machines in flow as being flows themselves is the production of production. Connective synthesis here guarantees the one machine is always in connection with the other, then another, and then another, and so on...The form of the connective synthesis is hence: "and.." "and then..."¹²⁵ Connective synthesis, or in other words, productive synthesis, is always accompanied by anti-production since the connections could be mistakenly grasped as if they are creating and re-creating an order. As a result, the connective synthesis creates the non-productive body without organs (BwO from now on), which has the utmost importance for D&G's philosophy and politics.

It is possible to speculate on the BwO from the perspectives of different syntheses. For the production, as stated previously, anti-production introduces production relations. Expectably, for connective synthesis, the machine-BwO relationship is precisely a Marxist one. D&G associated labor with the machine (as labor-machine) and capital with the BwO. Even though the machine produces the surplus-value in production, the capital so closely accompanies and overshadows the machine of production. As a result, the surplus-value appears to emanate from the capital. Such a perspective is a faulty approach to the connective synthesis. They quoted from Marx's *Capital* to illustrate their point:

With the development of relative surplus-value in the actual specifically capitalist mode of production, whereby the productive powers of social labour are developed, these productive powers and the social interrelations of labour in the direct labour-process seem transferred from labour to capital. Capital thus becomes a very mystic being since all of labour's social productive forces appear to be due to capital, rather than labour as such, and seem to issue from the womb of capital itself.¹²⁶

The social interrelations mentioned above contributed to the claim of an inherent nonproductive element within the social production under the name of the *socius*. Socius is BwO, and it provides a surface on which the production is recorded. It might be the Earth, the tyrant, or the capital depending on the dominating synthesis of the historical era. After elaborating on the main modes of transcendental (immanent) syntheses of unconsciousness, I will devote a section on the discussion of socius. For now, it is essential to mention that the socius as the full body of anti-production actually resists the function of machines.

As production passes from machines to the BwO, recording accompanies the production, and the disjunctive synthesis governs this process as the second synthesis. Machines connect themselves to the BwO as the disjunction points; they mark the surface like a grid and form a network of new syntheses. The marking on the surface is the production of recording in the form of an inclusive "either... or...or". The recording concept is an imminent aspect of the production. The meaning of it discussed in the correspondence between Deleuze and Guattari before *Anti-Oedipus*, and Deleuze expressed his understanding of the term as an 'inside-outside' of the production: "the recording is an outside-inside, an enveloping limit, 'outside' because it brings in a surface of exteriority on which the results are transcribed, 'inside' because it is a constitutive part of the machine and regulates the process of production."¹²⁷ Therefore, the connective and disjunctive syntheses coincide, and the problematic transcendental approach to the production of recording through the disjunctive synthesis is to a large extent responsible for the universal triangulation of Oedipus.

The inclusive “either...or...or” is the antidote of this universality, and it is possible to provide a negative description of it by the double bind. A double bind is the simultaneous transmission of two conflicting and reciprocally restrictive messages. It is the double impasse in the sense of Russell’s paradox; the alternatives are both exclusively defined by the principle and at the same time correlated by it. Oedipus, according to D&G, does the same. Oedipus governs both the relationship of differentiated desire objects, by the subject’s internalization of parental coordinates; simultaneously the relationship between subjects through the threat of undifferentiation. If one does not internalize the exclusive differentiation of Oedipus, he falls into the darkness of schizophrenia.¹²⁸ Lacan’s work was a potential breakthrough for preventing the universalization of Oedipal coordinates, but his step subjected the unconscious to “the despotic apparatus” of the Law of Father, phallus, and signifier.¹²⁹ All those predefined coordinates, guides, and blueprints that define the machine’s function exhibit the false application of disjunctive synthesis. The recording does not precede the machinic function; rather, it is immediately produced by the machinic production and BwO as an integral part of the process.

The final component of the production is the consumption production, and it is also integral to the process, as in the case of recording. The conjunctive synthesis of the unconscious produces the consumption by distinguishing it with a determination in the form of “so it’s...”¹³⁰ reflecting an identification. The distinctive attribute of that identification is its perpetual change, its *nomadic* evasion of rigidity, its state of constant imbalance. The way the third synthesis functions is associated with numerous different machine terms, and it is also closely tied with Deleuze’s virtual-actual perspective.

For example, the celibate machine is associated with the third synthesis. It produces intensive quantities by causing new alliances between desiring machines and BwO. Intensive quantities are akin to the schizophrenic experience of formless and shapeless states of pure intensity. They are stemming from the opposition between attractive and repulsive forces. The opposition is a matter of force flows with breaks and cuts, hence variable interactions. The process does not culminate in a natural state of balance but “produces open series of intensive elements, all of them positive, that are never an expression of the final equilibrium of a system, but consist, rather, of an unlimited number of stationary, metastable states through which a subject passes.”¹³¹ The forces and metastable states characterized Guattari’s approach to physics and influenced the machinic perspective. I will address this issue further in Chapter 4.

The positivity of the intensities is with respect to the BwO, which is the zero intensity. Intensive quantities are, in a sense virtualities, they are strictly distinct from the representations

and resemblances of actuality. The zero intensity BwO is similar to an egg; it consists of thresholds, lines, and gradients “marking the transitions and becomings;”¹³² neither the BwO nor those potentialities express any sense outside themselves as in the case of genetic and computer codes.

The subject, which is perpetually unstable, is the byproduct of the machinic function. It is not in the center of production, the machine is; and positing the subject as the agent of production is the transcendent, inappropriate use of the conjunctive synthesis. The false precedence of the subject to the production is the reason behind the acquisition of Platonic desire logic. As noted previously, for D&G, there is no subject, and there is no lack in desiring production. Unrepressed, the nomad subject detaches from the process of production as a residue. The nomad subject always strives for unexpected ways of escape. This effort brings in the revolutionary probabilities for Guattari, not the conflicts existing in the structure.¹³³

3.2.2 The Socius

After introducing three syntheses of production and their immanent and transcendent uses, I will discuss the concept of socius in more detail as it finds its meaning through the production of production, recording, and consumption. Socius as a concept constitutes a network with other central terms of D&G’s philosophy; it reaches out to a manifold of relations between desire and society. Deleuze provided an initial definition for the concept in his Anti-Oedipus seminars:

Socius is not society, but rather a particular social instance which plays the role of a full body. Every society presents itself as a socius or full body upon which all kinds of flows flow and are interrupted, and the social investment of desire is this basic operation of the break-flow¹³⁴

Socius historically changes and provides a dynamic body on which the relations between desire production and social production operate. Desire productively invests in the socius, carves the recording on its surface, subjectivizes the desiring subject, and meanwhile encounters the anti-production. Insofar as the desiring production organizes the BwO, the anti-production regulates the desiring production. The reciprocal organization bears the mark of George Bataille’s notion of expenditure; according to him, expenditure of the vital excess organizes the society.¹³⁵ It is the expenditure that renders the production process pertinent. The source of the vital excess is the excessive energy received by the planet through solar radiation. Different organic compounds and living beings transform and expand the abundance of this natural energy. Bataille’s perspective, developed by D&G, radically rejects the conception of

lack as the foundation of desire and power relations. Instead, anti-production governs the way in which society regulates the surplus.

The anti-production operations and organizations of flows on the socius provide ground for the symbolic order. The symbolic order determines the codes by which matter, energy, and desire are exchanged in the social plane. For the structuralism of Lacan and Levi Strauss, society is the identical organization resulting from the exchange systems, no matter what the exchanged entities are. In *Anti Oedipus*, D&G aim to show that the codes and exchange methods are substantially different in different modes of social production; therefore, societies and their organizations are also contingent and not structurally determined.

Anti-production on the socius, functioning within the excess of energy and matter flows, reappropriates the machine's products in the form of debt. For the social conditions, the regulative element of the anti-production is not the debt itself but the mediating agents. Shamans, clerics, and financial institutions collect the debt and keep the anti-production functioning in different forms of the socius. The introduction of the debt is the production of lack. "Lack is a countereffect of desire; it is deposited, distributed, vacuolized within real."¹³⁶ Desire is bereaved of its objective being by the social organization.

The management of excess and debt defines the social organization of flows and machinic operations. Two methods exist for social organization: it is either qualitative-quantitative or symbolic-economical. In a primitive society, social codes qualitatively determine the valuable items and their surplus through accumulation.¹³⁷

As discussed in Marcel Mauss' book, *The Gift*, an extensive accumulation compromises the existing power relations between clans and kin groups. To prevent the superiority of a single human group, valuable items are intermittently destroyed in customary rituals.¹³⁸ The debt is paid reciprocally in turns, and the reciprocal positions of various clans and kins are maintained. Earth assumes the role of the socius, forming the ties in between human groups and the members of those groups via kinship relations. The primitive social machine functions on earth and produces recording on the body of the people and the body of the earth. Vocal utterances and inscriptions are independent at this stage; they do not function through the signification process. In other words, they are a-signifying signifiers of expression machines. Inscriptions mark the bodies of people and earth to create territorializations, and this concept is an essential part of the anti-production.¹³⁹

Territorialization is originally a psychoanalytical term; it represents the specific body parts on which the libido invests itself after the stage of primary narcissism.¹⁴⁰ Those body parts (e.g., the erogenous zones) receive sexual value and become objects of desire. Sexual desire is *territorialized* on those *territories* of the body. Freud utilized the term “polymorphously perverse” to describe the condition of people, especially children, who sexually enjoy the stimulation of body parts other than genitalia. He generally focused on the negative outcomes of the condition in a social context.¹⁴¹ Deleuze and Guattari stood against Freud’s consideration of that nonconformity. They aimed to disclose the forced territorializations, organizations, Oedipalizations interrupting the free flow of desire, and alternative methods against them. Accordingly, they frequently referred to the territorialization concept along with the reterritorialization and deterritorialization processes.

In the existence of the next socius, the despotic regime, the debt is infinite, one-directional, and always territorialized on the despot. The despot becomes the exclusive agent of anti-production, and the uncommon, locally determined values do not match with despot’s values in circulation. Therefore, gold assumes the role of the value signifier and overcodes the surplus in all the society. The prominence of gold is a critical occurrence as it provides the historical ground on which the master signifier (the phallus) can be situated. In that respect, the phallus as the signifier of lack and the law of the father(despot) is a historically contingent product of the despotic machine, not a universal component of the lacking desire. Gold’s determination as to the value signifier for D&G does not depend on the practicality of commerce but on the payment of the infinite debt to the despot. The approach is particularly original since deterritorialization of value from the objects and the exchange of human groups by gold precedes gold’s mediation of the contractual relationship between people. As a currency with an abstract value, gold is enforced by the despotic state machine and barely regulates the people’s economic relations in themselves. Therefore, the surplus remains overcoded by the political supremacy of the despot even if its value is abstracted.¹⁴²

In parallel with Guattari’s discussion of humans against technological machines, the capitalist social machine stemmed from the deterritorialization of serfs and peasants from the common agricultural lands. The vagabond laborers reterritorialized in the newly founded industrial cities, where the machines already began revolutionizing the production. Capitalism, as a peculiar characteristic of its own, organizes society via the process of axiomatization. Axiomatization does not assign any meaning to objects, bodies, or practices; it directly joins different quantified flows. For example, the flow of industry capital forms a conjunction with the flow of deterritorialized labor of worker masses. Axiomatization attributes values to

different entities independent of meaning, belief, and custom but actively defies and subverts them. “Axiomatization not only does not depend on meaning, belief, and custom but actively defies and subverts them, giving capitalism its distinctive dynamism and modernism.”¹⁴³

The required condition for the conjunction of flows is the prospect of surplus-value. Its prediction becomes primarily a matter of economics, not of the symbolic. As earlier discussed by Guattari, calculations for the complex social phenomena transferred to cybernetic machines, hence with all its dynamism, the capitalist social machine breaks free from human beings. Qualitative enforcement of overcoding in both primitive and despotic social machines transforms into the decoding of the capitalist machine. In the market conditions, where money is the universal value signifier, all the production, products, and labor are reduced to aggregates of quantities. Hence, the production process mystified as if it was all a result of capital, the socius of the capitalist social machine.

The debt still organizes the flows, and the state keeps on existing, but their functions are substantially differentiated. The state does not overcode any value anymore; it only serves the social forces and regulates the decoded flows and axiomatization.¹⁴⁴ For the continuous working of the surplus-value cycle, people need to feel they lack things to consume and to produce. Their debt is to capital in this sense, to the progressively increasing productivity and the maintenance of surplus-value creation. “Capitalism’s supreme goal...is to introduce lack where there is always too much, by effecting the absorption of overabundant resources.”¹⁴⁵ Psychoanalysis is not exempt from capital’s function, with its power to decode every relation, money de- and reterritorializes the libido also in the psychoanalytic relation. Returning to Castel’s criticism, instead of insuring the psychoanalyst’s and analyzand’s “neutral” connection to the process, money creates the territory on which the psychoanalytic relation operates. It directly influences reality, libido, and desire production with its universal signifying character.

3.2.3 Schizoanalysis and the Machine’s Original Function against Criticisms

Desire, with its objective existence as the production, is the Real in and of itself. D&G’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia project forms the foundation of a new discipline of schizoanalysis, emphasizing the Real in the Lacanian sense. Parallel to Kant’s critical revolution as an endeavor to determine “the criteria immanent to understanding to distinguish the legitimate and illegitimate uses of the syntheses of consciousness,”¹⁴⁶ schizoanalysis inquires into the immanent criteria of the unconscious, discloses the transcendent uses of those criteria, and rejects them as metaphysics. As discussed throughout the pages devoted to three

syntheses, Oedipus and the mystification of the BwO are the false applications of those syntheses. Hence, neither capitalism and its bourgeois values nor the Oedipus as the general conduct of a normal psyche are necessary truths. Instead, they are the outcomes of machines functioning within the structures, and they will again be subverted by machines only to be replaced with new contingent formations. Schizoanalysis utilizes the machinic perspective to analyze the psychoanalysis' limitations and does not aim to replace psychoanalysis. It proposes a means to reach the unrestrained parts of the unconscious which perpetually evade the psychoanalytic -double binding- formations with their peculiar social, political, civil outcomes.

Naturally, an inquiry on the formations of the unconscious has a strong political aspect, and one of its central problems is the old question: "How could the masses be made to desire their own repression?"¹⁴⁷ Guattari, in one of his contemporary solo works, outlines the schizoanalytic politics with the terms and syntheses in *Anti-Oedipus*:

Schizo-analytic politics would be led to consider that the death instinct is not something that exists in itself, but that it is linked with a certain way of posing the problem of desire in a certain type of society. Desire is unaware of death, of negation, and the tragedies the familialist Grand Guignol (theatre) strike it as funny. Since negation is always related to the position of a subject, an object, and a reference point, desire, being purely and intensively positive; changes around subjects and objects; it is flux and intensity¹⁴⁸

Schizoanalysis approaches the problem of desire from a distinct notion of collectivity. Guattari, as discussed earlier, emphasized the role of collective subjectivity. In *Anti-Oedipus*, with the introduction of BwO into the machinic theory, the status of the unconscious subject is relegated to being an indirect product of the machinic function. Therefore, the "collectivity direction of libido to parts of the body, groups of individuals, constellations of objects and intensities, machines of every kind"¹⁴⁹ transforms desire in between Oedipal coordinates and extreme novelty to the point of dissolution. The transformation between those positions discloses many unprecedented possibilities, and desire is not an infinite loop of lack rather an affinity for the social environment.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, the machine concept itself is mutated and gave way for novel approaches toward many concepts. In the early period of Guattari up to "Machine and Structure," the machine is sometimes elaborated as a technological device and sometimes as the internal externality locus of change in the structure. At that point, the structure-machine relationship could be considered as a limiting one, as if machines only existed in connection to the structure. In *Anti-Oedipus*, D&G firmly associated the machine with production in the general

and particular sense. They clarified the machine's status, independent of anything else but production, material flows, and syntheses. They asserted: "The desiring-machine is not a metaphor; it is what interrupts and is interrupted in accordance with these three modes (of syntheses)."¹⁵⁰ Similarly, the products of their functions cannot be wholly confined to the limits of structure; hence in the realm of Real in the Lacanian sense, they are not metaphors but the machine's actual or virtual effects.

The systematic, transcendental approach towards machine and production had a major influence on the political role of analysts or any other master figure. The function of the machine and the unconscious is not a matter of meaning anymore. The question of analysis changed to "How does it work?" from "What does it mean?"¹⁵¹ Thus, the meaning is not sought after in the meaning, in the myths, tragedies, or the representations collective memory of humanity; it is the function and the connectivity bringing about the content to the unconsciousness. For psychoanalysis, without the mediation of analysis, the psychic energy cannot be invested in social or metaphysical fields. However, D&G demonstrated that it is a delusion. Desiring machines and the energetic investments are productive like a factory, assigning them the ancient theater stage as the model replaces the units of unconscious production with representation. Rejecting the unconsciousness's productive expression and assuming a mythically grounded, meaning bounded expression finally subverts the philosophically significant insistence of psychoanalysis on the unconsciousness.

Another aspect further developed in *Anti-Oedipus* is the inclusion of history in analytic theory. Both in "Machine and Structure" and *Anti-Oedipus*, machine and production with the historical contingency of the products and structures recall the critical thoughts of Herbert Marcuse. As discussed in the related section, he claimed that civilization is not necessarily repressive, and strengthening the ego's control on drives could resolve the tension between freedom and civilization. D&G agree with the historical contingency of the civilization, as they proposed the concept of machine predominantly to provide a philosophical ground for it. It is hard to determine whether it is their ultimate judgment, but they seem to accept civilization's repressive influence in their claim: "There is always social repression, but the apparatus of repression varies...."¹⁵²

That does not necessarily imply there is nothing to be done about the repression, yet strengthening the ego is not their way of approaching the problem. Considering their perpetually changing nomad subjects, a claim on the ultimate stable reconciliation between freedom and civilization would hardly be possible. Also, consciousness and the ego are prone to the transcendent use of the conjunctive synthesis, as structuralization by Oedipal roles.

Strengthening one's ego in this respect does scarcely bring novelty into the existing structure. It is the machines and their machinic function that break out from the repression of civilization. Appropriately, in *Anti-Oedipus*, D&G explicitly criticized Marcuse as taking the social character of desire lightly and stubbornly maintaining the Oedipal structure.¹⁵³

3.3 Machine in *A Thousand Plateaus*

The second part of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project investigates the ubiquitous multiplicities in a wide variety of fields. Machines, their connections, their productions, and their functions again constitute a crucial part of these multiplicities. However, this time, D&G utilized the concepts to discuss the existing and transforming multiplicities, along with the context of machines from various perspectives with different references. The new perspectives do not reject or subvert the *Anti-Oedipus* for a new one but extend the discussion and adds new terms for a broader range of possibilities. Deleuze and Guattari say, what “we talk about are multiplicities, lines, strata and segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machinic assemblages and their various types, bodies without organs and their construction and selection, the plane of consistency, and in each case the units of measure.”¹⁵⁴ All those concepts relate to those new perspectives and have their relations with the machines, especially in their role in multiplicities for bringing about changes and differences. In this section, I aim to clarify them as they contribute to the development of investigation on machines.

3.3.1 Rhizome, Abstract Machines and Concrete Assemblages

The book opens with a rejection of binary logic and the promotion of the logic of multiplicities and connections. Their first example of binary logic is linguistics. It is an advanced discipline, with an arborescent model (represented in Figure 1), as the image of the structure. The arborescent model consists of tree-like trunks and roots with their separate, individual formations. The same model is operative in the subject-object division and psychoanalysis as mentioned in Chapter 2. D&G's alternative is a perpetually connective and constant incomplete network, which they call *rhizome*.

Incompleteness distinguishes the rhizome, but this incompleteness is not constructed through an irreconcilable lack; it surpasses totality by being fragmented. The concept is originally a biological one; plants (potatoes, couch grass) or some animal groups (rats, Tasmanian devils) form underground connections with different ramifications to supply themselves or move underground. Rhizome, as an alternative to the trunk-root model, is heterogeneous and connective. In contrast to a linguistic structure progressing with dichotomies from a root

concept, the rhizome connects different fields and asignifying signifiers which are not within the realm of language. This connectivity is about the machines, as could be anticipated. The introduction of the rhizome is to push the abstract model to the extreme with the *abstract machine* concept. Abstract machines “consist of unformed matters and nonformal functions. Every abstract machine is a consolidated aggregate of matters-functions (phylum and diagram).”¹⁵⁵ The authors discussed the concept concerning multiplicities using the terms plane of consistency and the machinic assemblages. D&G chose to group the agents producing machinic effects as abstract machines and concrete assemblies; they are not posited in contrast but to reflect different aspects of the same issue. Abstract machines, in that sense, correspond to the “immaterial element(s) that disassembles any transcendent or symbolic function of technical, concrete, or social assemblages.”¹⁵⁶

A machinic assemblage is a continuum of flows. One side of the machinic assemblage is open to connections and circulations of asignifying particles, intensities, and the incessant disorganization of BwO. Those circulations and connections statistically converge on sites called the plane of consistency. “Relations of consistency are alogical and asubjective. They cannot be predicted. They can only be discovered through experimentation.”¹⁵⁷ The other side is facing the organizing, subjective, signifying *strata*. Strata ground the concrete assemblages and converge towards the petrified formations with high inertia. D&G thoroughly analyzed the strata and the concrete assemblages to strengthen their perspective on the multiplicities and novelty. They distinguished three different strata: physical, organic, and linguistic.

Stratification is a transformation between content and expression, between form and substance. Every different stratum is differentiated by another through the domination of their abstract machines. An abstract machine, here, is the process of double articulation. The example of calcite stones illustrates its operation on substance and form. In a river flow, particles precipitate based on their weight and shapes as the matter of the stone. According to the river’s regime of flow, their organization and accumulation is the form imposed on the substance. That is the first articulation. In the second, the river flow statistically determines the dispersion of formed particles to organize themselves as substances, namely calcite stones. The articulation results in the aggregation and formation of assemblages. The distinction between concepts is knotted here: An assembly is bound with the stratum on one side, the accumulation and organization of the stratum increase the load on that side. However, it is still open to the other strata and BwO on the other side.¹⁵⁸ At this point, D&G explicitly warned the readers about two potential blunders about the group of concepts.

First, one should not confuse the abstract machine and the concrete machinic assembly. The abstract machine has mainly “two very different modes of existence.” Those modes are not independent alternatives but complete each other. In the Ecumenon mode, the abstract machines are either surrounded in a particular stratum and determine stratum’s compositional unity, the balance between forces of attraction and repulsion, governing its relative deterritorializations.¹⁵⁹ Such a state is never permanent and necessarily destratifies through the machinic function. In the Planomenon mode⁴, it cuts and breaks through different strata and creates its own plane of consistency by providing its diagram. Planomenon represents the machinic effect on flows leading to their “absolute deterritorialization.”¹⁶⁰ Concrete assemblages, however, function in a wholly different manner even though it is “very closely connected with” the abstract machines. They are responsible for the biunivocal relations between pieces of expressions and contents within a stratum. A biunivocal relation is the same as bijection and a term of set theory; it defines the one-to-one relation between elements of different sets. For example, in a univocal case, the relation could also be many-to-one, but biunivocality allows instead one-to-many. Concrete machinic assemblages also operate between the strata, as it conducts relations between substrata bringing the changes into the organization without radically altering it. Also, they are in touch with the plane of consistency since they “effectuate” abstract machines within the stratum that surrounds them in Ecumenon mode and between the particular stratum and plane of consistency in the Planomenon mode. How do concrete machinic assemblages “effectuate” the abstract machine?¹⁶¹ Even though the authors themselves ask the question, their answer is short and unclear: “Classify assemblages.”¹⁶² To clarify the issue further, explanations of *A Thousand Plateaus* commentators guide our way.

In the literature, Brent Adkins came up with an explanation for this question. He refers to the nuances of English and French on the work “effectuation;” in English, he says, it has rather causal and practical meaning. In comparison, the French version is more about performance and creativity. With that in mind, he claimed: “an assemblage is a concrete expression of an abstract process.”¹⁶³ However, he also remarked that one needs to be cautious about two aspects. To begin with, according to him, concrete is not the opposite of abstract. Rather, it expresses a continuum, the opposite of discrete. Further, there is no temporal difference between abstract machines and concrete machinic assemblages. Their relationship is neither a temporal sequence nor a possibility vs. necessity opposition; it is a matter of topology in the lexical meaning of the term. Topology is defined as “the study of geometrical properties and spatial relations unaffected by the continuous change of shape or size of figures.”¹⁶⁴ The way

they relate to each other is a reciprocal positioning in a continuous space consisting of strata and plane(s) of consistency. These aspects of the relationship lead him to conclude that: abstract machines are the problems, and the concrete machinic assemblages are solutions for them.

His example is a stimulating and contextually convenient one. The solar energy reaching the planet, discussed in the previous section, brought about a problem of internalization with it. An animal with a problem of internalizing energy and maintaining life from the environment is an example of an abstract machine. The animal groups with different strategies of solutions for the problem are assemblages. In this case, there are herbivore and carnivore assemblages with connections to different food, digestion, excretion, and many more strata. Herbivores have a specifically modified digestive system capable of containing, processing, and discharging large amounts of vegetative intake. They spend more energy on grazing and slowly roaming towards the fields of nutrients.

On the other hand, carnivores invest more energy in the skills and actions required for tracking and hunting other animals. They exploit the herbivores' energy extraction through plants by consuming their nutrient-dense flesh. Humans' solution is another stratum as they use fire to prepare their meals, hence externally digesting the food. It provides them the opportunity to extract energy from a wide variety of nutrition sources. In humans' case, the energy is mostly used to maintain the brain instead of digestion as in herbivores' case or mobilization as in carnivores. For the abstract machine of animal energy internalization, herbivores, carnivores, and humans(omnivores) are topologically only different coordinations in the same continuous space. "They are not pre-existing types but continuous variations of one another. They are assemblages of the same abstract machine."¹⁶⁵ Therefore, their formation is contingent and transitional; under different conditions and for different abstract machines, constitutions of assemblages would vary vastly. The abstract machine, and its function as the problem, classifies the assemblages.

The second blunder is forming a duality out of seemingly opposite terms of concrete and machinic assemblages, stratum, and the plane of consistency. Adkins warns readers about the same confusion. Although D&G delineate the terms with differentiations between them, they did not posit any representative or sequential relation.¹⁶⁶ Rather, strata and assemblages are transitional agglomerations of the perpetually disorganizing BwO through the abstract machines' functioning within or between those strata. Nevertheless, the agglomeration is not unidirectional from the abstract machine to strata and assemblies: "a true abstract machine pertains to an assemblage in its entirety: it is defined as the diagram of that assemblage."¹⁶⁷

The diagrammatic function of the abstract machine is the destratification, the implication of continuous variation into the strata. The diagrammatic function stands in opposition with axiomatization, aiming to capture all escaping flows under reterritorializing agents. In the case of capitalism, money and market axiomatize the older value systems and empty their content, as discussed in *Anti Oedipus*. Abstract machines, however, produce the lines of flight according to which creative deterritorializations and new potentials of connectivity between multiplicities emerge. Topology again provides a plausible way to consider the line of flight concept; different territories on the continuous space have lines connecting them. In this context, the role of abstract machines is to problematize the relationship between outside and inside.¹⁶⁸ D&G gives the name *mechanosphere* to the collection of assemblages and abstract machines in, between, and external to the strata.¹⁶⁹

3.3.2 Nomadology and The War Machine

The line of flight and inside-outside perspectives culminate in a central concept of D&G's philosophy, namely: the war machine. Even though it was introduced first by Guattari in "Machine and Structure", a detailed description of the concept is provided in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Throughout his career, war machines maintained their central importance as the machines of external territories, resistance, and revolutions. The reason behind the proposition of war machines is to elaborate on the potential alternative to the stratification of the state. The first axiom of the war machine illustrates this reason: "The war machine is exterior to the state apparatus."¹⁷⁰

The state apparatus incessantly organizes, regulates, and reigns over the flows and connections of multiplicities. It also strives to capture the escaping flows along the lines of flight and functions by a double articulation. The function results in a duality of interiority and exteriority to the stratified state. It is actually the reason why the external machines assume the name of war machines; the war stands outside the sovereignty. The state authorizes its servants such as police, guards, and jailors to prevent the violence and simultaneously raises and maintains an army to justify the conditions of war and military function internally.

As a stratum striving to capture and recode all escaping flows, the state cannot succeed in its attempt. The hierarchical - sovereign organization of space is not the only mode of function, and the comparison between the games of Chess and Go illustrates the status of alternative modes. In the game of Chess, the board and the roles of the differently shaped pieces are pre-determined. Even though there are enormous numbers of possible moves, it is an organization, a stasis. Hence Chess is a game of state. In Go, on the other hand, all pieces are simple,

identical stones, and their roles in a particular game are determined by their topological dispersion on the Go board. In this case, Go is a game of externality; it operates on the *smooth space*, whereas chess is structured on a *striated* one.¹⁷¹

After this example, D&G point out that the interiority of the State is the habitual model of thinking. For this reason, “it is necessary to reach the point of conceiving the war machine as itself a pure form of exteriority.”¹⁷² The war machine's function might cause confusion as if its power belongs to the State's stratum. One should not confuse the structural formations between the despotic and legislative polarities of state with the dynamic relations between these poles in the case of the war machine. In short, the war machine has a different origin which is external to the state. It has a different nature than the state and can only be understood by the negative categories, especially when considered in the habitual mode of thinking. The state cannot acquire a war machine for its own. That is why the state never trusts the army as it is a tamed and organized adaptation of the war machine with origins external to the state. In countries where the power balance between the state and army is delicate, the war machine concept explains the distrust between two organizations as a solid political determinant.

The relation between smooth and striated spaces leads to a distinction between different modes of science. In the history of science, D&G determines two modes of sciences based on their position with regard to the war machines. The royal science contributes to the stratification of state, and the nomad/eccentric science investigates the lines of flight out of the structures. The ancient atomism of Democritus and Lucretius and Archimedean geometry exhibits the characteristics of nomad science. According to D&G, four main characteristics differentiate and externalize nomad science. Firstly, instead of a theory of solids, hydraulics as the fluid-centered model embodies the nomad approach. Ancient atomism reflects on flows, consistencies, and their influences on the Real. The preference embraces continuity instead of discreet, discontinuous models. For the hydraulic model, solids are only temporary form-substance transformations, and they are also constantly flowing.

Secondly, nomad science's model is “a passage to the limit, an exhaustion, a paradoxical” model. It gives primacy to becoming and heterogeneity over essence, permanence, completeness, and stasis. According to D&G, the possibility of a paradoxical model of becoming was first proposed by Plato in *Timaeus* and immediately rejected. In Lucretius' atomism, however, the atom's deviance from the linear trajectory is discussed by the term *clinamen*. Clinamen is the key concept for Lucretius' rejection of comprehensive physical determination. It breaks the necessarily linear trajectory of lines and opens the possibility between lines and curves. Similarly, the Archimedean definition of a line as the “shortest

distance between two points” provides a method for later linear approximations of curves. In those short examples, nomad science is posited outside the strata of linear geometry and physics.

Thirdly, nomad science’s concept of space does not confine itself to lines, parallels, and laminar flows. Instead, vorticities, inclinations, and curvilinear trajectories constitute its space. Referring back to the smooth and striated distinction, multiplicities of flows and their machinic formations require a smooth, topographical, transitional space while the restriction of transformations occurs on the striated space of royal science.¹⁷³

Lastly, as in the case of abstract machines, the model of nomad science is problematic, not theorematic. Figures in the space, for example, gain their characteristics by their reciprocal affective relationships. Those relations involve the transgression of stable predefined figures, “all kind of deformations, transmutations, passages to the limit, operations in which each figure designates an event much more than an essence; the square no longer exists independently of a quadrature, the cube of a cubature”¹⁷⁴

Archimedean geometry illustrates the nomad science’s case against the Euclidean. Euclidean theorems determine the essences of different geometrical shapes and relations; they represent a discrete ideal understanding of reality. D&G posit the Archimedean geometry against this position.¹⁷⁵ Their motivation for giving a different role to Archimedes is not obvious. However, according to textual references in *A Thousand Plateaus*, two reasons might be effective in their choice. First, the Archimedean Point presupposes an aspect of externality and projection depending on the reciprocal relationship of positions in a particular space. Second, Archimedes is known for creating various war machines to defend his hometown, Syracuse, against the Roman Empire’s siege in the Second Punic War. The nomad science, all in all, problematizes the affectional, dynamic relationships between the flows on the smooth space external to the striated space of royal sciences.

The central example of the nomad war machine in *A Thousand Plateaus* is the nomadic man-horse assembly equipped and encountered with various weapons in relation to the technological lineage of production. Development of long lances, swords as extensions of daggers follow the man-horse assembly and its evolution with stirrup. Still, those developments are contingent; the process is continuous, “becoming” better describes it instead of being. The technological lineage, both transforming and transformed by the assemblages, is the *machinic phylum*. D&G describe its properties as: “At the limit, there is a single phylogenetic lineage, a single machinic phylum, ideally continuous: the flow of matter-

movement, the flow of matter in continuous variation, conveying singularities and traits of expression”¹⁷⁶ Singularities of the flows distribute themselves in the smooth space forming constellations, in other words creating grids as in the case of conjunctive synthesis of *Anti-Oedipus*. Those formations determine the assemblies as contingent structures, discontinuities, and stabilities in the ideal flow of phyla. In that sense, machinic phylum coexists with the flow and carries different singularities between the assemblies.

Returning back to the example of the nomad war machine, D&G question the man, horse, stirrup, and weapon machine from the framework of the phylum. They claim the flow of material as the machinic phylum, metallic or metallurgical.¹⁷⁷ To grasp the meaning of this claim, one should refer to the account of metallurgy in contrast with hylomorphism. In the case of hylomorphism, the thresholds of material and form are predetermined. Once a threshold is met, the formed matter could be the matter for the next formation, but the order and steps of operations are predefined. Progressive die stamping exemplifies the case: if the predetermined deformation is applied in one step, it destroys the material by surpassing both the material’s strength and form tolerance thresholds. However, applying it in a sequence of assemblies creates many forms which are the matter for the next forming operation.




Figure 2: Iron-Carbon Phase Diagram¹⁷⁸

“In metallurgy, on the other hand, the operations are always astride the thresholds, so that an energetic materiality overflows the prepared matter, and a qualitative deformation or transformation overflows the form.”¹⁷⁹ Iron-carbon phase transformations, for example, define

the phase boundaries as shown in Figure 2. Different cooling profiles from the liquid state result in different phases and their combinations, with their own peculiar strength and flexibility qualities. In the diagram, each bounded region represents a different microstructure, and, as shown through different points, it is only possible to reach some areas in the graph by following certain alloy content and temperature lines. Especially when the mechanical properties of more than one area need to be combined, one needs to follow precisely the red lines for cooling. For metallurgical steel and casting processing, the qualities and forms exhibit a continuous transformation even though the resultant formations are rigid.

The flow of material, metal, is not a matter or an embodiment of a form but the body without organs. In the end, the machinic phylum is open to different dimensions of machines and assemblages:

On the side of the nomadic assemblages and war machines, it is a kind of rhizome, with its gaps, detours, subterranean passages, stems, openings, traits, holes, etc. On the other side, the sedentary assemblages and State apparatuses effect a capture of the phylum, put the traits of expression into a form or a code, make the holes resonate together, plug the lines of flight, subordinate the technological operation to the work model, impose upon the connections a whole regime of arborescent conjunctions.¹⁸⁰

A Thousand Plateaus is a pivotal text for the course of the machine concept in Guattari's (and Deleuze's) thinking as the final book of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project. From an original endeavor to introduce the change and contingency to psychoanalytic discourse, the machine concept further evolved into a political, scientific, and philosophical machine within D&G's philosophy of variety, difference, and rejection of dualities without discarding the earlier roles. In this text, a whole range of new concepts surrounded the machine along with the psychoanalytic stratum. *The machine concept itself, thus, formed an abstract (diagrammatical) machine to create a plane of consistency.* As a characteristic feature of Guattari's texts, many of the previously introduced concepts (e.g., Guattari introduced the war machine eleven years ago) were elaborated in later texts and made clear. In this sense, the main importance of *A Thousand Plateaus* is the detailed account of concepts, their roles, and connections illuminating the machinic function of the machine concept itself.

Through the Capitalism and Schizoanalysis project, Guattari had developed his own set of concepts enabling him to transgress the psychoanalytic terms and their philosophical boundaries. He extended his philosophical endeavor beyond the criticism of structuralist models of Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis and began to express his original philosophical outlook. The semiotic aspects of the machine concept and content-expression relationships

instead of signifier-signified are also thoroughly discussed in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Nevertheless, as explained previously, I chose to mention them only about the machinic function of the machine concept. Therefore, I had to discard other contextual determinant aspects such as the development of Hjelmslev linguistics compared to Jakobson's and Lacan's, and Guattari's parting ways in their views of semiotics.

The criticism of arborescent linguistic models in the book is also directed towards the unconscious's representative structure and presupposed existence. In addition to the *Anti-Oedipus*, this time, D&G frequently employed examples and developed their own perspective on history with a different body of terms. In interviews after *Anti-Oedipus*, as previously mentioned, Deleuze said that the successful terms of "desiring machines" and "schizoanalysis" need to be discarded; new terms should be found to "upset the order." With Guattari, he continued, they decided to discard both terms in order not to "get caught in a trap."¹⁸¹ They indeed kept their word for desiring machines throughout *A Thousand Plateaus*. Instead, they introduced machines and their machinic function with a further non-humanist perspective focusing on the production, state, organizations, and structures. Their views on politics and power relations continued further deterritorializing psychoanalytic and capitalist strata. Insights from the book became vital in both their contemporary and later solo works, especially Guattari's effort to form molecular revolutions for different fields of struggle.

3.4 Machine in Guattari's Late Solo Works

After the impact of *Anti-Oedipus*, Guattari kept on producing politically influential texts until the very end of his career. In 1973, for example, his article named "Three Billion Perverts: The Big Encyclopedia of Homosexualities"¹⁸² in the magazine *Recherches* (Research) sparked a public scandal, and Guattari was sued for indecency. His other texts were not less effective in forming machinic connections through the "decent" strata either, and in this section, I aim to follow the machine concept's diagrammatical, machinic function through the psychoanalytic theory's axiomatics. Evaluated psychoanalytic perspectives and criticisms will guide this section, as the focus here will be on politics and power relations.

3.4.1 Preview on Guattari's Radical Politics

Guattari's approach towards the problem of political power is not centered around ideologies or rigidly structured ideas but rather perpetual revolutions with changing possibilities. Ideologies are only secondary when compared with the libidinal economy in between the revolutionary connections. In fact, he considered ideological dogmatism as an inability to

accept where the revolution possibly will not occur. The main question he asked here is, “why desire is being delegated to representatives and bureaucrats of all kinds, why revolutionary desire is turned into organizational microfascism?”¹⁸³

Factually, there needs to be a stronger libidinal investment to microfascisms against the revolutionary desire. For Guattari, that investment is not limited to the capitalist economic tools, class subjugation, or the pressure of authority figures; it also rises on top of the *semiotic subjugation* of all individuals. To define microfascism, he collects all individual ethnic, political, social, sexual, and collective struggles under the term. Microfascism transforms all the object values and desire values into the values of exchange and use. “[S]emiotization is what happens with perception, with movement in space, with singing, dancing, mimicry, caressing, contact, everything that concerns the body.”¹⁸⁴ The language of power reduces all the semiotic possibilities of connections into the molar, accepted language. For this reason, Guattari is the villain of psychoanalysis, because as previously discussed, it “triangulates” every form of desire into familial coordinates.

Mostly, people do not even realize the semiotic subjugation is the perpetrator as the political organizations with all their bureaucracy. Unless people analyze the microfascisms of their organizations along with their ways of reproduction, there is no way they can create a war machine against it, and microfascism keeps haunting them. Such an analysis is only possible with a machinic approach. One can only follow along the flow of libido and desiring machines as he inquires on the concrete machinic assemblages of potentials and connections in the political stratum.

The political stratum has the concrete machine of signification altering the potentials on desire, unconscious, and modes of subjectivity. Concrete machines of signification are always in relation with power formations in the way that formations of power regulate and hierarchically position those machines. Desire is also not separate from power, and Guattari even equates them.¹⁸⁵ At this point, it is possible to illustrate how he developed his understanding of power structures, revolution, and possibilities of freedom with the machinic function of the machine concept starting from psychoanalysis. To do so, it is plausible to revert to the discussion of unconsciousness, about which Guattari praised the Freudian discovery in the first place.

3.4.2 Guattari on the Unconsciousness and Desire

In addition to the productive, machinic features of unconsciousness, Guattari provided it another definition: “The unconscious is constituted by machinic propositions that no

semiological or logico-scientific propositions can ever grasp in an exhaustive fashion.”¹⁸⁶ Its structures and the molecular machines constantly connect and disconnect, but their relationship cannot be reduced to any axiomatics or time and space coordinates. They are governed by probabilistic machine and assembly interactions. Nevertheless, assemblies are not passive and petrified matter of machinic function created by random matter flows. On the contrary, they accompany the concrete, both technological and historical, machinic phylum with connections to the abstract machines and their plane of consistency. When considered together with the discussion about science in Chapter 1 and 4, Guattari’s approach indicates a foundational perspective difference between psychoanalytic thinkers and himself towards science as the investigation method of the unconscious.

The Lacanian account attributes a linguistic structure to the unconscious. It requires the necessary mediacy of symbolic order for a subject to be represented to another one through a signifier. Articulation of subjects is dependent on the semiotic subjugation through representation, triangulation, and the existence of phallus and castration.

Lacan’s approach to the structure is characterized by the supremacy of signifier over signified and the subject’s necessary misrecognition of lack through the dialectic of desire, and Guattari’s understanding of structure as the machine dominated heterogeneous series differs fundamentally about the status of change in a structure. The former assumes the lack of a machinic nucleus in the case of microfascisms, which is the lack of singularity within the structural assemblages, confines the power relations and political struggles into the predefined boundaries. Guattari calls these the molar existential politics. In contrast, the connections of machinic nuclei between assemblages produce molecular existential politics. Machinic connections function through “a threshold phenomenon concerning the abstract consistency of the possible. Beyond a certain intensity, a certain acceleration, a certain threshold of consistency, machinic deterritorialization crosses the network of actualized flows, codes and stratifications.”¹⁸⁷ New actualizations with different machinic propositions emerge through the planes cutting many statistically distributed planes of assemblies. Assuming lack as the constitutive essence, the ontological operator, as discussed in Chapter 2, results in a limited and problematic political perspective. Nevertheless, Guattari manages reach beyond solely indicating the problems and provides an original account switching the site of change from the subject and lack to the machines.

At this point, Guattari does not reject the existence of a proto-subjectivity in organic and material assemblages. Nevertheless, this proto-subjectivity does not need to be on the level of an individual or in his relation to any presupposed structure. That illustrates how his machine

concept functions through Freud's idea of the unconscious subject. Instead of confining the concept into physical, mechanical, and energetic boundaries, his version opens it towards a universe of possibilities. The machinic unconscious and the unconscious subjectivity is neither a representational system nor a codified, genetically determined system of separate compartments; it is rather a continuum, a rhizome with the characteristic of being a *map*.¹⁸⁸ Its connections have the ability to disconnect, reconnect and modify their way of relations. Therefore, an arborescent formalism cannot grasp machinic function and its potentials. Maps, and cartographies, are Guattari's terms for explaining the rhizomatic connections of machines. They stand in opposition to structures, constituting a significant portion of Guattari's peculiar philosophical attitude.

The new approach to the question of subjectivity necessarily relocates the hierarchical relationships, positions of master and slave, analyst, and analysand. As Guattari has propounded very early, group subjectivity fits this perspective as the main mode of "human" subjectivity. Hence, the transference, interpretative method, and ego strengthening approaches do not lead to any creative potential but to their suppression. The structural linguistics or transcendent archetypes cannot define the new possible modes of unconscious subjectivity; they are the products of *machinic creationism*. As a result, there is no place for the god, and Guattari's philosophy is "radically atheistic." One might ask accurately here: Is this a new cult of machine replacing the god? Guattari says: "Perhaps, but surely not within the framework of capitalistic social relations!"¹⁸⁹ The increasing emphasis on machines makes it almost an omnipotent concept, and Guattari's quote does not clarify the issue. As I will later reflect, the vastly comprehensive status of machines stands as a problem or at least as a question.

Without the agency of individual, rational, deliberate subjects, what can one argue about freedom? Is there machinic freedom? The answer is again a change of perspective. The machinic freedom would offer the universe of degrees and thresholds. The capitalist (contingent and socius based) way of producing a subject in a market or in a dominant language, with the representative medium, determines the perception of space and time. Hence, a peculiar mode of relation to socius, to collectivity, and subjectivity. Freedom, in this case, could be understood as the freedom of choice in this particular system. What machinic freedom approach offers is "to finish with the dictatorship of the Cogito as an obligated reference for assemblages of enunciation and accept that material assemblages, social assemblages, etc. are capable of 'machining' their own kind and creating heterogeneous complex universes."¹⁹⁰ Again, the machinic assemblages function within the stratum of Cogito to create new connections and passing beyond the free will. Such machinic function subverts

the theoretical certainty on unconscious material and takes into account the infinite possibilities of connections, deterritorializations of abstract machines (Planomenon) without the agency of any supreme being.

From the machinic perspective, the mission of schizoanalysis is to analyze the restrictions on those connections instead of promulgating people's free will. Guattari's approach here partially supports Adorno's claim as the aesthetic and emotional experiences are indispensable components of the unconscious. Nevertheless, their practical employment as the balance within Id-Ego dialectic does not find any support here as Freud's structural model is not accepted as the sole model of the psyche. Also, relegating the status of human beings as the subjects of freedom separates Guattari's approach authentically.

The function of abstract machines described above is not unidirectional. Abstract machines themselves emerge from the politics of desire at a level closer to unconsciousness, even before the subjects and objects are positioned. Hence, confining their functions and the resultant assemblages into culturally formed psychological occurrences is a biased approach. Freud claims that after the solution of the Oedipus complex, the child represses material related to ungratified sexual desires, and about the pre-Oedipal period, he only remembers the "vague, incomprehensible memories."¹⁹¹ The vagueness and incomprehensibility of those memories are not qualities of the memories but the outcomes of the "white, civilized, normal, adult" psychoanalyst's perspective. Indeed, the civilization is repressive, but not in the way of Freud's Oedipus governed Eros-Thanatos duality; it is repressive in a level preceding the civilized person. There is no recuperation for the repression, no guidance for the individual's desire into a normal expression. For a machinic approach towards desire, seeing how it is formed through the machine concept, the following elements should be kept in mind along with their interrelations.

All individual social-psychological instances necessarily connect to the phylum of concrete instances of machines and strata as much as they are connected to abstract machines and their plane of consistencies. This existential quality of in-betweenness is the *machinic enslavement*. As previously discussed, the *singularity points* permanently prevent the congruity between history and the structure. The non-individualistic, non-totalitarian body without organs, on which the machinic connections create grids and references, are called the *machinic territorialities*. *Subjection* relations embody the machinic materialities through the interaction between singularity and machinic nuclei. Desire, with its relations, deterritorializes various flows standing in between the two different sides of machinic creation. It reshapes the relations

between the abstract and concrete machines by the machinic function of diagrammatization. Guattari illustrates the location of desires in Figure 3.¹⁹²




Figure 3: Triangle of Desire

Guattari's machines create a machinic effect on desire, as shown by elaborating on it through many aspects, including desire's confinement (e.g., machinic enslavement) and potential for change (e.g., machinic core); such an attitude expectedly had political repercussions. What would be Guattari's way of politics with all those original perspectives on unconsciousness, subjectivity, and desire? Obviously, he never tried to transform himself into a master figure to guide political movements. Against all limits and restraints, he ironically states the "micropolitical axiom: the refusal of legitimating the signifying power demonstrated by the evidences of dominant grammaticalities."¹⁹³ Politics should avoid the microfascisms of particular, bounded movements and their limited aims; from the strata of concrete assemblages, the revolutionist should create new war machines with circumstances for the question directed by abstract machines.

Lenin and October Revolution is the prime example for Guattari in his commentary. Within the political environment of 1917 Russia, the April Theses and the decisive separation from social-democrats illustrates Lenin's desire and creation of an unprecedented plane of consistency that resulted in the subversion of the existing system. Stalin's bureaucracy later stratified the Leninist revolution and exemplified how an abstract machine functioning through different historical events towards a revolutionary path could be stopped and petrified.

Guattari's aim with the graph was not to praise and illustrate Lenin's strategic genius. His position seems to support the idea that after the initial success of the revolution, the issue is not to create a permanent organization or a program but to mutate the social pragmatics. It is nevertheless impossible to determine universal laws of pragmatic changes; one can only be aware of inevitable formations of assemblies, dissolution of strata, and the rhizomatic extension of potentialities. The Leninist cut, as Guattari named it, is illustrated in Figure 4 along with Stalin's stratification.¹⁹⁴




Figure 4: Rhizome of the Leninist Divide

The problematic issue with Guattari's illustrative rhizome here is that it is a retrospective analysis. For example, the Leninist Divide and his other politically illustrative commentaries on events of 1968 depict retrospective analyses. Although, it could be argued that, it is the usual course of theories. However, at this point, it stands as a question: how could a political

effort utilize the machinic approach? As I will briefly reflect at the end, that issue stands as a problem and an area of further research for Guattari literature.

Even though they do not clarify how the machinic politics would function on a concrete example, Guattari collected his advice under Eight Principles for “great politics”.¹⁹⁵

- 1- “Don’t hold back”: Stand at the limits and embrace the collapse of theories, dissolution of organizations.
- 2- “When something has happened, this proves that something has happened”: Desire, assemblies, and machinic functions do not always meaningfully express themselves in the dominant semiotic system, but they do not deceive. Therefore, there is no need for a mediator to interpret the events and expressions.
- 3- “The best position for accessing for the hiding place of the unconscious does not necessarily consist in remaining seated behind a couch.”
- 4- “The unconscious drenches those who approach it”: The happened something provides an optional material, and neutrality is not an option against it.
- 5- “The important things never happen where we expect”: No theory can define the path for initiation and maintenance of happy revolutions. The issue is to form heterogenous, rhizomatic collectives capable of following lines of flight out of capitalist reductions.
- 6- A machinic transference needs to place itself before the individuals through asignifying diagrammatic semiotics. It should include elements from the flows other than people (e.g., the voice recorder in the case of La Borde).
- 7- “Nothing is ever given”: No stage or complex is ever crossed or ever surpassed. They are situated on a plane open to connection and reconnection.
- 8- “Any principle idea must be held suspect”: Even the machinic cult, most probably.

Throughout this chapter, starting from the psychoanalytic background of machines, I have discussed Guattari’s attitude against structuralism, especially through the emphasis on historical contingency. Incorporating his machines into Deleuze’s delineation of structuralism, Guattari managed to expound the machine concept grounded on Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis without rejecting or modifying it. Instead, as discussed in detail, the concept functioned through psychoanalysis by transforming its very foundation and opening it to an authentic way of philosophizing. Through his cooperation with Deleuze, machines first

assumed the function of a medium for destratifying and analyzing psychoanalysis in *Anti-Oedipus*. Next, by *A Thousand Plateaus*, the machinic perspective culminated into an independent agent of explanation, carrying insights from psychoanalysis. Finally, in Guattari's later texts, the machine concept is heavily evaluated through its political implications. Priorly introduced concepts proved necessary for the later works, and even though there are problems regarding the status and time aspect (retrospection) of machines, it was possible to delineate Guattari's general political position.

In addition to the machinic concept and its general course, there were responses and reviews of different criticisms directed to psychoanalysis in Chapter 2. Against Freud's views of civilization and its critics, Guattari (along with Deleuze) either explicitly targeted their presumptions as in the case of Freud himself and Herbert Marcuse or distinguished himself via his original machinic perspective from other critics as in the case of Adorno. As previously noted, Guattari's method did not consist of rejecting or modifying the existing ideas; rather, he reached a fundamentally different perspective via machines functioning through psychoanalysis. In the discussion about lack, for example, machinic perspective leads to entirely different possibilities for the political field compared to the Lacanian thought and political views inspired by constitutive lack.

CHAPTER 4

MACHINES, PHYSICS, AND TEMPORALITY

In the preceding sections, I have tried to explain the concept of the machine in its context. Since it emerged within the psychoanalytic discourse, intending to introduce historical contingency into the structures, I opted for discussing the concept from the stratum of psychoanalysis with its political implications. In the previous section, I tried to illustrate the machine concept itself developed into a machinic connection of flows previously stratified by psychoanalysis. Now, I will consider machines in their conventional context of mechanics and physics as this context substantially influenced the course of psychoanalysis and the emergence of machinic thought. Discussing different approaches to physical phenomena sheds light on the foundational differences between Freud's, Lacan's, and Guattari's terms of references as they articulate their own stances.

The late 19th century provided an intellectual atmosphere of physics and science's rapidly expanding influence in every academic and practical field. When Freud began working on the psychic phenomena, humanity stood on the brink of groundbreaking changes in the dominant physical worldview. The speed of perspective shifts in science only increased throughout his active years; naturally, many of those changes fundamentally influenced Freud's approach to psychoanalytic issues.

Even though the mechanism concept has roots as deep as the Ancient Greek, the prominent usage of the word in the physical context coincides with Descartes' definition of it. According to him, physics, as the discipline on the relations between moving material bodies, needed ground on mathematics and geometry as the extension is the essence of the matter.¹⁹⁶ The mechanisms operate by the exchange of that motion between different bodies, and in his perspective, could only function through direct physical contact between its subparts. The

early mechanical model of immediate connection inevitably faced shortcomings, for example, in inelastic collisions and deformation of bodies, hence, in time, modified with the introduction of energy.

4.1 Freudian Approach Towards Mechanics, Thermodynamics and Time

Achieving a broader perspective with the energy concept, the dominant physical world-picture shifted toward thermodynamics. Albert Einstein distinguished thermodynamics as a “theory of principle” from constructive theories that “attempt to build a picture of complex phenomena out of some relatively simple proposition.” He designated theories of principle by stating that their foundations “are not hypothetical constituents but empirically observed phenomena, principles from which mathematical formulae are deduced of such a kind that they apply to every case which presents itself.”¹⁹⁷

The first law of thermodynamics, in other words, the conservation of energy, characterized the early years of Freud’s psychological theories. Explanations of psychic phenomena via mechanical relations and the energy flows within different organic conduits, also known as psychophysics, were a dominant method of the time. One of the prominent figures of the psychophysics movement Gustave T. Fechner was particularly important for Freud’s studies, as he developed an earlier equivalent of Pleasure and Nirvana principles in his own psychic model from the first law of thermodynamics.¹⁹⁸ Following Fechner, through his own similar-minded professors Brücke and Helmholtz, Freud structured his early psychophysical models in an energetic-mechanical fashion. According to previously explained principles, he theorized libido as the quantified energy flowing through a differently characterized group of neurons.

Libido and its quantification were vital for the early model, since the Newtonian calculus as the mathematical model governed the mechanical-energetic view. In this context, a mathematical model might be defined, as quoted by Robert Langs, “the symbolic representation of a real system constructed so that certain quantitative variables associated with the system can be calculated when other variables associated with it are known.”¹⁹⁹ Newtonian calculus is a system that represents direct causality in a Cartesian mechanical sense, observed from a detached position of a passive observer. “Stability, order, uniformity, linearity, universal laws ... the search for equilibrium points and steady states” characterize the mechanical-energetic view. Reversible temporality is the mode of time in Newtonian calculus insofar as, “given the knowledge of a body and its immediate movements, it is possible to calculate the entire past history and future of the system.”²⁰⁰

Even though Freud's psychophysical approach largely represented the mechanical-energetical view, it is impossible to reduce his model to the limits of that view. Temporality is an essential aspect that distinguishes Freud's model. Freud interestingly stated that peculiarity in a letter to his friend William Fliess:

I am working on the assumption that our psychic mechanism has come into being by a process of **stratification**: the material present in the form of memory traces being subjected from time to time to a rearrangement in accordance with fresh circumstances – to a retranscription. Thus what is essentially new about my theory is the thesis that memory is present not once but several times over, that it is laid on in various kinds of indications.²⁰¹

Here, the temporality is not a straight line calculable based on the historical data. Freud further maintained his original approach to temporality after incorporating the term unconscious, asserting that the unconscious is timeless.²⁰² The case exemplifies Freud's open-mindedness on incorporating different approaches whenever required. Similarly, when he began to receive empirical data both from his therapeutic works and his self-analysis incompatible with the available model, he was able to decide to leave his model altogether for another one.

A change in Freud's theory, the shift from scientific-physical psychology to psychoanalysis proper, followed Ludwig Boltzmann's and Max Planck's work on thermodynamics²⁰³ with only a few decades. The concept of entropy was previously introduced to the theory of thermodynamics as the explanatory term for the losses of usable energy and increasing system disorderliness. Boltzmann managed to develop a formula to calculate the entropy within a system, positing it as a quantified energy-like entity. The Second Law of Thermodynamics stated the existence of entropy and its perpetual increase. The law explained the gradual deterioration of the usable amount of energy when the particular system approaches equilibrium.

Entropy reflects the abrupt changes in singularity points within the system. Catastrophic qualitative changes resulting from the quantitative changes mark the bifurcation points in the particular process. Systems open to catastrophic changes unavoidably adopt the irreversible time conception. Calculating the whole sequence of a system's past and future based on the historical set of data is not analytically possible anymore; the main method of temporal calculation is rather probabilistic (stochastic). "With irreversibility comes information and innovation, disorder, instability, diversity, disequilibrium, and especially nonlinear relationships. The complexity of systems emerges, and the role of feedback, bifurcation points, chance, and probability come under investigation."²⁰⁴ Qualitative changes emerging from the

quantities require a different mathematical approach, and topology provides the means. Henri Poincaré, whom Guattari repeatedly quoted, created *descriptive maps and diagrams* reflecting the limits of Newtonian calculus. His maps functioned to determine the qualitative motion characteristics via topological relations between different elements within a system.

How are all these physical theories related to Freud's psychoanalytic models, and why? There are three main fields on which thermodynamics offers plausible explanations for the problems of natural philosophy. First is the ontogenetic problem of complex mental phenomena. How are the childhood experiences of a person effective on the formation of his adult mental characteristics? What characterizes the continuum of mental states? Freud was interested in this problem from the beginning of his career until the very end. Second is the neurological disposition of the human brain. How do the different sections of the brain with their connections, synapses, and other collective formations affect the mental processes? Apprehending the active mechanisms of the brain as machines in a Cartesian mechanic sense was already an old-fashioned approach in the late 19th century. Nevertheless, the information processing mechanisms like the brain's sensible linguistic competency, such as connective, disjunctive, and disjunctive syntheses in a Deleuzian sense, required material clarifications. Third, all those questions required a harmonizing body of theories between mental and material objects, covering the peculiar mental actions of perception, interpretation, information, and decision.²⁰⁵

The Cartesian mechanic approach could not provide satisfactory explanations for these problems, especially the last one. Conservation of energy based purely quantitative energetic approaches also proved insufficient for explaining the increasing prominence of unconsciousness in Freud's later work.²⁰⁶ To cope with that deficiency, Freud chose to modify the available energetic method and propound an alternative energy concept explaining the mental phenomena. In "Neuropsychosis of Defense," he said:

the concept that in mental functions something is to be distinguished -a quota of affect or sum of excitation-which possesses all the characteristics of a quantity (though we have no means of measuring it), which is spread over the memory-traces of ideas somewhat as an electric charge is spread over the surface of a body.²⁰⁷

A physical theory, allowing the qualitative, abrupt changes from the quantitative relations, extended the model's potential to become a candidate.²⁰⁸ However, one can hardly claim Freud's new approach smoothly modified every outdated aspect of his perspective. His relational model between psychoanalyst and analysand exhibited the requirement of a detached observer as in the case of Cartesian mechanics referred above. Psychoanalysts

achieved the status of the detached observer by controlling the effects of counter-transference to a negligible level in a system with universal laws, such as the Oedipus complex and pleasure principle. Moreover, Freud also elaborated on the psychic apparatus by analogies of conventional, mechanical machines with certain mechanical efficiency, transforming only a fraction of the available input energy. After all, it would not be unjust to claim he sustained a hybrid, transitive position in between energetic and entropic perspectives with a relatively classic mechanical understanding of machines.

Another decisive turn on thermodynamics appeared around the Second World War, with the theories of Erwin Schrödinger. Perpetual increase of the system entropy implied that the heat within a closed system would dissipate as the time converged to infinity, and the system would be completely dead and frozen down to the vibrations of atoms. In other words, the universe as a closed system is thermodynamically determined, and it is “approaching inevitable death.”²⁰⁹ Erwin Schrödinger, however, associated life with ‘negative entropy,’ as life has the means to temporarily evade the thermodynamic equilibrium with the maximum entropy (disorderliness and death). According to him, an organism continuously absorbs negative entropy from its environment; it “succeeds in freeing itself from all the entropy it cannot help producing while alive.”²¹⁰ In addition to that, his claims suggest a connection between feeding on the negative entropy and the existence of *aperiodic solids* in organisms. His examples of aperiodic solids are the chromosomes, as the sequence of nucleobases in a DNA chain carries the required information for the reproduction of cells feeding on negative entropy.²¹¹ Schrödinger’s claims result in two major influences in psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis. First, Freud’s universal principles faced formidable challenges even from his closest companions:

When Ernest Jones disputed Freud’s hypothesis about the death drive, he did so precisely by invoking the second law of thermodynamics. Insofar as living beings are not closed systems, he argues they can take energy from outside and acquire what Schrödinger called ‘negative entropy.’ On that ground, Jones believed that Freud’s attempts to bring entropy and the death drive together has been a failure.²¹²

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Schrödinger’s aperiodic solids simulating Guattari’s asignifying signifiers brought the information elements into the irrevocable relations with living organisms. As a discipline studying connections between information machines and human organisms, cybernetics appeared as a quasi-scientific discipline intersecting with psychoanalysis research. Indeed, early founders of cybernetics associated their claims with the physical and thermodynamic concepts. In his book *The Human Use of Human Beings*, Norbert

Wiener claimed that “information in a system is a measure of its degree of organization, so the entropy of a system is a measure of its degree of disorganization; and the one is simply the negative of the other.”²¹³

4.2 Lacan’s Understanding of Cybernetics, Physics and Logical Time

Partially due to the popularity of cybernetics in the 1950s, partially for its compatibility with his structuralist approach to language, Lacan’s Seminar II of 1954-55, sometimes also known as Cybernetics Seminar, focused on the discipline’s relations with psychoanalysis. Through this seminar, Lacan put forward the bulk of his views on machines and their role in his model. According to psychoanalysis historian Elizabeth Roudinesco, when *Anti-Oedipus* was first released, Lacan claimed that the desire machine concept existed in his own theory.²¹⁴ Following his Seminar II, I will try to evaluate the accuracy of his claim without limiting the machine discussion only to dominant machines in structures.

In his tripartite system, cybernetics reflected “the radical difference between the symbolic and the imaginary orders,”²¹⁵ and the machinic side of cybernetics provided means to explain the radical difference. For Lacan, the machine essentially represented an automatic repetition situated at the intersection between two orders. Emerged from the same intersection, the subject finds its fundamental incompleteness through the different functioning regimes of machines in imaginary and symbolic. Machines of the symbolic order formalize the representative elements of a particular term (circle, in a literal sense, as the trajectory of a point on a rolling wheel), whereas the imaginary machines do not conceive such representative forms. “One encounters unprecedented difficulties, except in the most artificial manner, in getting one circle to correspond to another by means of a dialogue between two machines.”²¹⁶ The subject’s imaginary, non-representative machines, and symbolic representations necessarily diverge, and the divergence is also a result of the machinic function in different strata in Guattarian terms. Parallel to his views, the subject is secondary when compared to machines and their functions in these two different fields.

Lacan reads Freud’s pleasure principle as a function of “the homeostat,” which regulates the stimuli and thus ensures the survival of the living being by reducing the excitation to a minimum. The absolute minimum of energy and maximum entropy again represents death, and Lacan expresses the negative entropy of the living being as: “the machine looks after itself, maps out a certain curve, a certain persistence.”²¹⁷

Freud's transition from the early spatial psychic apparatus model to an immaterial, drive and Oedipus-centered model is referred to as a transition "from a mechanic to a logical model" by Lacan.²¹⁸ From these two comments, one can conclude that he associates machines with logical functioning, which is also a textually plausible position, similar to Guattari's introduction of the concept. In "Machine and Structure", as noted previously, Guattari said: in "each contingent structure is dominated by a system of machines, or at the very least by one logic machine."²¹⁹ Machines' position regarding subjectivity and their possible relation to logic in Guattari's thought supports Lacan's claims. Nevertheless, their views mostly diverge about the characteristic of machines.

As discussed previously, criticism against necessary triangulation was one of the main issues in *Anti-Oedipus*. However, Lacan structured the triangulation purposefully and claimed that machines were based on the symbolic representations of existence and absence, 1 and 0, respectively. According to him, when there is a sequence of 0 and 1, there is a following third term required for logical operations; logical triangularity as such is the "very structure of the machine."²²⁰ For Guattari, such a structural formulation is not plausible at all for describing all machines. Even though they are open to forming ternaries, they do not have any essential form or structure as their blueprint.

Functioning as a mutual ground for intellectual effort for all thinkers, time as the transcendental form surrounds the physical concepts. The irreversible, statistically estimated time of catastrophic events historically replaced the reversible, thoroughly calculable linear time conception through thermodynamics' development. In a similar fashion to Freud's authentic conception of time, Lacan also formulated his original intersubjective conception of logical time. He claimed that, in a closed system, pre-defined initial conditions result in a conception depending on topological relations between the constitutive elements.

The conception of logical, intersubjective time develops Freud's time understanding further. For his mechanical, psychophysical models and energetic relations, Freud assumed the reversible, calculative time; yet, for the unconscious problem, he notified that time is not linear and the unconscious lacks a stable sense of time. Even though one can deduce Freud was open to the co-existence of different time conceptions, he did not clarify any of them. With the logical, intersubjective time, Lacan gave an explicit determination to an alternative time understanding along with the time conception of developing thermodynamics. All those efforts proved fertile ground for Guattari's philosophy of multitude to be applicable also on the time conception.

The logical problem between the three prisoners illustrates the intersubjective time. Prisoners are informed that each of them is wearing either black or white hats selected from a group of three white and two black hats in total. The prisoner who is first able to report the colors of each prisoner's hat correctly will be released. The prisoners observe the colors of the others' hats. Their optimal decision would be formed as follows:

I am a white, and here is how I know it. Since my companions were whites, I thought that, had I been a black, each of them would have been able to infer the following: "If I too were a black, the other would have necessarily realized straight away that he was a white and would have left immediately; therefore I am not a black." And both would have left together, convinced they were whites. As they did nothing of the kind, I must be a white like them. At that, I made for the door to make my conclusion known.²²¹

Time in such a context manifests a dialectical, intersubjective relation. Lacan shows with his example atemporality is not an option, and as long as there is a logical relation between elements, the system necessarily depends on temporality. However, logical time is different from the chronological time of linear successions, and it also exhibits a tripartite structure. There are moments and intervals for perception, understanding, and conclusion forming the logical relations. For Lacan, the machine and the person distinguish themselves in their relation to time: "With a machine, whatever does not come on time simply falls by the wayside and makes no claims on anything. This is not true for man, the scansion is alive, and whatever does not come on time remains in suspense."²²²

Seemingly, Lacan's machines, subjects, and energy also have different relations compared to Guattari's. The precedence of the conventional machinery, for Guattari, was not a necessity but a historical occurrence, yet for Lacan, machines are necessarily the products of human beings. Machines find their place in between the human being and subjectivity in Lacan's thinking. They are our products, and they only think according to our built-in programming. Still, subjectivity does not necessarily mean progress; he says "men only think very rarely." It is not due to an existential incapacity but rather an effect of subjective castration of the social order. People are truncated into subjects in the symbolic order, and their response is strictly limited to the field of language. Machines are not subject to the same effect; when "you give a thinking machine different elements, it, at least, answers something different."²²³

Guattari's flows are inseparably integrated to machines, and without flows, there is no machine. Lacan says that, however, energy is secondary to the existence of machines; before the machinic operation, there is no energy. His position gains coherence when considered together with his comment on the tool-machine relationship. Lacan asserts that the creation of

machines and tools belongs to different principles. Tools seem to have the role of basic mechanical mediators for human beings, whereas machines are built to collect and accumulate energy through entropy increasing operations. Since he reads entropy as a concept immediately related to the signifier, he claims it is the function of the signifier, the entropy creating the machine.²²⁴

Lacan's concept of the machine in the cybernetic discussion exhibits the character of the concrete machinic assembly in between different psychoanalytic strata such as subjectivity, time, thermodynamics. Nevertheless, it does not achieve the status of an abstract machine for Guattari as it cannot form a plane of consistency and returns back to the petrified stratum of structuralist psychoanalysis. Lacan's definition of the machine illustrates the concreteness in the Guattarian sense: "The machine is the structure detached from the activity of the subject."²²⁵ Even though it precedes the subject, it is nothing other than the repetition of the structure restraining the subject.

4.3 Guattari's Views on Cybernetics, Entropy and Time

Guattari's tool-machine comparison has a wholly different tone, reflecting the main disagreements between his and Lacan's understandings. In their *Balance Sheet for Desiring Machines* text, D&G criticize the progressive developmental scheme for machines from tools. According to this view, tools are "extensions and projections" of human beings, and as they evolve into machines, they become more and more independent from people. The problem with this schema is that it is abstract and human-centered; also, it situates machines as events on a "mechanical lineage that begins with a tool."²²⁶ D&G claim, however, there is a necessary difference between the tool and the machine from the beginning:

[T]he one as an agent of contact, the other as a factor of communication; the one being projective, the other recurrent; one referring to the possible and the impossible, the other to the probability of a less-probable; the one acting through the functional synthesis of a whole, the other through real distinctions in an ensemble.²²⁷

Here, the machine is not a functional synthesis of a designed whole but the creative connections between humans and tools as the components. For example, horses, stirrups, and bows were existent as tools, and when they were combined as the components of the nomadic war machine, they devastated the majority of the known world. For Guattari, therefore, the human-machine relationship was not an issue of scientific-grounded cybernetics; rather, humans frequently constituted a component of the machine. The machinic phylum precedes

tools, and it decides who will connect them as components in a particular society. The connection determines the individuals' subjectivities.

To illustrate this radical human component relation to machines, Guattari frequently referred to works of literature. In particular, Kafka's works provided invaluable examples. For Kafka, even the technological machines have both men and women (sexualized objects) as components along with "structures, metals, and materials."²²⁸ With his human-machine assemblies, Kafka did not aim to reduce the alienation of people to compulsory mechanical work. He extended transformed people into components "even more so in their adjacent activities, in their leisure, in their loves, in their protestations, in their indignations, and so on."²²⁹ The mechanic, for example, is the component of the machine even when he ceases to be a mechanic. The machine's primacy determines the human in his connections; hence the machine is posited on a preceding ontological level.

As discussed previously, the machinic phylum is not solely consisting of technological, social, or desiring machines. Mechanics and mechanical machines are not any different; they are the constituents of the phylum, but the phylum is radically different from their aggregate. Guattari referred to that issue from the immense creative potential of artworks. He remarked:

[Aesthetic paradigm] is installed transversally to technoscience because technoscience's machinic Phylums are in essence creative, and because this creativity tends to connect with the creativity of the artistic process. But to establish such a bridge, we have to shed our mechanist visions of the machine and promote a conception which encompasses all of its aspects technological, biological, informatic, social, theoretical and aesthetic.²³⁰

One must carefully distinguish mechanism and machinism in this context. Machinism assumes a double characteristic here. On one side, it produces, reproduces, and dissolves itself within flows; on the other, it ontologically supports the undetermined multiplicity in existence. There are no eternal, necessary forms, contents, or representations; everything that exists is contingent and subject to perpetual change. However, mechanistic perspectives assume the validity of unchanging relations between the elements of a mechanism, and in principle, accept the possibility of determining the existing entities and their changes.

With all the information on Guattari's machines, one can readily conclude he would not consent to boundaries of thermodynamics. Indeed, he criticized Freud's employment of thermodynamic machine analogies since the thermodynamics and dominant scientific formalization methods repress the lines of flight.²³¹ However, his own approach to thermodynamics, particularly to entropy, is quite radical and worth noting here.

In a commentary to Jacques Tonnelat's *Thermodynamics and Biology* text, Guattari claimed that the second law of thermodynamics did not necessarily imply a direct correlation between the increase in entropy and disorderliness of a particular system.²³² Entropy is defined through the dispersion of the system's elements in space and their energy levels. However, for Guattari and Tonnelat, the increase in entropy is strictly about the modifications of energy levels within the system. Hence, it is wrong to admit a necessary correlation between entropy and the increasing disorder. As a result, reaching an equilibrium might imply the emergence of energized local singularity points as much as it implies disorderliness. Consequently, the existence of living structures does not contradict the second law of thermodynamics. Life can sustain itself through energized singularities and the realization of different virtualities with surplus energy.

In the discussion of entropy, Guattari again opts for the option that allows machines to function within the flow of energy. He associates the entropy, the bringer of the inevitable heat death, with the system of Oedipus and says: "Oedipus is the entropy of the desiring machine, its tendency to external abolition. It is the image, or the representation slipped into the machine, the stereotype that stops the connections, exhausts the flows, puts death in desire."²³³

In accordance with his choice, libido has a different meaning for Guattari when compared with Freud's quantifiable energy. For him, libido provides the energy for desiring machines and "invests every social difference as being a sexual difference, including class differences, racial differences."²³⁴ Libido is not necessarily subject to the hydraulic control of the unconscious formations; its configurations can also break through the dams and channels and open itself to nonhuman subjectivity.

Finally, as the machine concept creates an original philosophical outlook, Guattari's position requires an authentic temporality perspective. From very early on, Guattari connected temporality with the machinic function. In his scheme, time precedes the subject-object differentiation; therefore, it cannot be reduced to relative movements of objects or transcendental form of experience. In "Machine and Structure," he claims, "Temporalization penetrates the machine on all sides and can be related to it only after the fashion of an event."²³⁵ Here, the event is the harbinger of change in the Deleuzian sense, and machines operating within flows bring about the event. Hence, the change brought by the machine marks a date, a penetration through the representations of structure.

As much as it is related to the change, Guattari's time conception also stems from the part-whole relationship developed by both Deleuze and himself. For them, a whole is never

complete and never equal to the totality of its parts. Parts and their relations are historically contingent; they perpetually change. The resultant whole is not a complete, essential being but an inconstant, heterogenous becoming; it is in this sense that temporality penetrates it on all sides. No matter how seemingly stable and complete, the whole is never completely distinct from the machinic connections. Temporality envelopes the machinic changes, and it is conceived as it accompanies machines and assemblies.

Strata and planes of consistency exhibit different qualities; expectedly, their temporal relations are not the same. In addition to temporality itself, different qualities of temporality are also characterized as continuous spectrums. The Aion and Chronos distinction in *A Thousand Plateaus* delineates the two extremities of those continuums. “Chronos is the eternal now that excludes both past and future while Aion is the unlimited past and future that never lets the present appear. (...) Chronos is the temporal series of corporeal mixtures, while Aion is the temporal series of incorporeal meanings.”²³⁶ Even though these terms have their separate definitions, temporality can never be reduced to one of them. They are the two faces of the same coin representing both the irreversible time of abrupt changes and statistical, quantificational quality changes and the reversible time of structural, linear changes. Chronos, with its depth in the infinite now, contains many virtualities, and the actuality is the contingent, corporeal multitude of qualities that occur from the virtualities. In that sense, Chronos could be read in a similar position to the irreversible time, because determining past and future through the actuality is not possible as it externally posited outside of the instances of inputs. Aion, however, excludes the exact now, as in the case of a Newtonian differential calculus problem. One can approach a temporal point from the future and past; depending on their consistency, the value of the function at that point can be determined. The value is the outcome of the function’s continuity around the specific point. Aion, in that sense, contains the reversible time in calculations but cannot be limited by it. As long as machines exist, create new connections and dissolve, both aspects of temporality are necessarily in place to govern the different formations in different circumstances.

Throughout Guattari’s works, the multi-dimensional continuum perspective persists. It is hard to address the exact notion of temporality around the machinic function other than a multi-dimensional approach to time as a continuum consisting of Chronos and Aion. From textual evidence, one can deduce there is no precedence relation between machine and time, and both temporality and machines are at the very foundations of changes and structures. Nevertheless, seemingly for Guattari, if there is no machine, there is no change; hence there is no temporal marking. Also, as long as machines exist, temporality is necessarily there to mark the changes

and the continuum of changes. In addition to the retrospection problem indicated in the previous chapter, the description of the time-machine relationship also remains an issue. It requires further clarification and commentary based on the available material.

By the end of this chapter, I have discussed the influence of mechanics and thermodynamics, physics in general, on the differentiating perspective of unconscious phenomena. From Freud's explicitly mechanical and physical approach, the path followed by different thinkers was directly influenced by the historical developments of physical laws and conceptualizations and their idiosyncratic readings of those changes. The characteristic machinic pattern also followed in this section; Guattari did not reject or modify the psychoanalytic approach to physics. Instead, he adopted an original reading for the same field of phenomena to reach different outcomes embracing difference and contingency. The discussion on physics illustrates the different stances of Guattari's when compared to Freud's and Lacan's in so far as it indicates the foundations of differences between thinkers.

As the knowledge of unconsciousness is only indirectly possible, the time aspect governing the realm of unconsciousness is very hard to address. Nevertheless, from the beginning of psychoanalytic thinking, a path could be delineated following the reversible, irreversible time conceptions concerning the models of different thinkers and their approaches to thermodynamics. The common characteristic uniting all three thinkers was their recognition of multi-dimensional temporal understanding. No definition by itself comprehensively defined the time and its role for the unconsciousness for any of the thinkers. Between Lacan and Guattari, in addition to that multi-dimensionality, the ontological level of temporality became a matter of separation when Lacan chose to relate logical time to the level of the symbolic order and the genesis of subjectivity. On the other hand, Guattari maintained a machine-dependent temporality, placing both machine and time at the same level as the transcendental accompanies of difference and change. Still, as indicated above, Guattari's account of time is not an explicit and clear one. Hence, the status temporality remains a field of research in his philosophy.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

After the lengthy discussion on machines and surrounding conceptualizations, one can very expectedly ask why Guattari came up with the concept in the first place. Other than the function of machines, how did his general philosophical project looked like? From the very beginning, Guattari strived to undermine the petrified models of unconscious, politics, and philosophy. His political and institutional effort disclosed the hints of his perspective.

As the part of the war machine of a peculiar thinker, who constantly sided with the change, renewal, and revolution, the machine concept has been among his most peculiar and far-reaching contributions to the philosophical endeavor of his and his companions. The model of the world machines proposed was a polyvocal, infinitely variable, and perhaps, chaotic one. The concept was heavily burdened with the activity of penetrating all the existent dominant structures in an immense variety of fields. From bird-watching to religion, Guattari has pursued the potential for revolutionary change by the agency of machines. Even though he philosophically created concepts, relations, and metamodels, he never left the attitude of an analyst towards the unconscious as his primary tendency. He sought to remove the repressive barriers on the unconscious without any presupposition of therapeutic intervention or normalization. The machine concept, for this purpose, operated on various strata connected to the main stratum of psychoanalysis to transform them.

Throughout the thesis, to clarify the machinic function of the machine concept, I introduced the psychoanalytic, schizoanalytic, political, and physical-thermodynamic concepts surrounding the matter. For congruence, I chose not to elaborate on the semiotic aspect of machines. Although semiotics is a major aspect of the concept, research on them would deviate

from the scope of the thesis. Nevertheless, the machines' semiotic function and its particularities also stand as a fertile field for further investigation.

In the end, I tried to illustrate the radical function attributed to the concept of the machine through psychoanalytical politics, and physics. The concept itself functioned through the field of psychoanalysis to create new perspectives in politics when compared to the approaches of different critics. The unconsciousness represented the ground for all thinkers, and the peculiar approaches towards the field resulted in various challenging views.

Similarly, approaching a foundational law of physics from a different perspective creates a whole different picture of the world. Such an attitude marks Guattari's stance, chasing possibilities, differences, and contingent, temporary formations. It is that original perspective that made the emergence of his machines in the first place. In his pursuit, he differentiated himself from psychoanalysis associated with the theory of bounding rules and relations of unconsciousness. The originality of his perspective later continued to be nourished from the machine concept and its peculiarities.

It is possible to direct many criticisms on the machine concept after discussing the immense field that it functions through. I will only state the two main and profound criticisms that remained open for me after researching Guattari's work. First, as could easily be argued, the referent of the machine concept is too broad, and it is hardly possible to distinguish it from other elements in a context; the highly crucial task to identify abstract and concrete machines is even more difficult. The atheistic machine proposition posits the machine into a godlike entity without a will; then, is it really atheistic or "machinistic"? While trying to break through the limitations of existing theories and perspectives, is Guattari caught up with an all-unifying, omnipotent conceptualization of machine? Explicitly answering those questions is not an easily achievable feat as the machines always carry an element of contingency. As in Adkins' abstract – concrete machine relationship²³⁷, any explanative approach could be read differently based on the material at hand. Nevertheless, Guattari was also aware of the godlike position of machines as the sole agency of activity. He wrote that it might indeed be considered as an anti-capitalist cult²³⁸, but, as far as his attitude is concerned, creating or leading a machinic cult could only be a negative symptom of the enormous power attributed to machines.

Second, according to textual analyses, machinic analyses of Guattari made great predictions indeed. In his paper named "Transference", he said: "In the future, [the] survival will depend on the capacity of cybernetic machines to resolve humanity's problems. It will, therefore, be impossible to respond to the attack of a new virus without the intervention of continuously

advancing computers.”²³⁹ The text was written in 1964, and today one can hardly argue the prediction has been botched, especially after the Covid-19 incident. Still, his direct political analyses solely functioned retrospectively. He somehow refrained from making direct predictions on the future events and analyzed only the past occurrences, such as the 1968 and October Revolution events. Is it possible to infer that, the analytic capacity provided by machines can be employed only retrospectively? Can a process be identified only after the machines leave their places to new ones and their effects dissolve or settle as new strata? Of course, it would be an entertaining thought to imagine a person in March 1917 who could confidently express that the Leninist movement would succeed. Thus, I suppose Guattari’s advice here would be to try to form new connections one after another without focusing on the result. His career as a political militant exemplifies such an attitude. No matter how seemingly inconsequential the political action, he did not hesitate to join whenever he considered it could initiate a change in the dominant power structures.

Finally, Guattari’s machines, I think, propound an unbounded potential for heterogeneity and connections. Even the most distant features could be the elements of the same machine resulting in unexpected, groundbreaking outcomes. For me, Guattari is the pursuer of these possibilities with unlimited and genuine compassion towards the differences. Even in one person, he believes many people might reside and form connections. His friends reported that according to him, even a personal encounter was not simply between two people; in themselves, they are already multiple, and together they would become quite a crowd.²⁴⁰ Without such an attitude, machines would not be possible, and without machines, such an attitude would not be well-founded. Embracing the omnipresent multiplicity, including the variety within us, is what Guattari and his machines are after. In their struggle, they are not alone:

Countless people live in us
I think or feel but ignore
who is he that thinks or feels
I am simply the place
where thoughts are felt or thought.

I have more souls than one
There are many I's than myself
I always exist
indifferent to all these
I silence them: I speak.

The opposing impulses
that I feel or do not feel
struggle in who I am

I ignore them. They dictate nothing
to the one whom I know: I write.

Fernando Pessoa



NOTES

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Felix Guattari'nin alışmalarına nemli bir temel saęlayan Sigmund Freud'un hayatı boyunca, psikanalitik alışması kapsamlı bir teoriler btnne dnşt. Bireysel bir psikoloji araştırmāsından yola ıkarak teorilerinin kapsamını antropoloji, din ve politikaya kadar geniřletti. alışmaları sırasında, kendisini fizięi andıran bilimsel psikanalizin ncs olarak gryordu. Freud'un psikanaliz teorisinin makine konseptiyle ilgili birok yn, izleyen yıllarda felsefi ve politik dřncede temel olarak nemli olmuřtur. Bu konseptlerin en bilinenlerinden biri Oidipus kompleksi, rneęin, psikanalizin merkezi bir terimi olarak belirlendikten sonra toplumun her bir yesi iin kesin rollerle bir aile tablosunda yapılandırıldı. Freud vaka incelemeleri, dini yorumları ve politik analizleriyle bunu yaklařımı birok farklı alanı kapsayacak řekilde geniřletti.

Deleuze ve Guattari, makine konseptini zgn bir řekilde kullandı. Bu kavramla, Oidipus'un ve medeniyet ve analist analizan ortamı gibi dięer etkili psikanalitik kavramların tutarlı bir eleřtirisini oluřturdular. alışmalarına kadar, psikanalize ynelik toplumsal ve politik eleřtiriler, nadiren onun erevesini kırmaya alıřtı. Dřnrler ya psikanalitik perspektifi ve onun arka planını (rneęin, Sartre ve Popper) tamamen reddettiler ya da perspektifi kendi argmanlarına zemin saęlamak iin deęiřikliklerle kullandılar (rneęin, Adorno, Horkheimer ve Marcuse) Doęrudan Lacancı psikanalitik teoriye dayanan makineler, fizik ve felsefeye farklı yaklařımıyla psikanalitik teoriden kopan zgn bir bakıř aısı ortaya ıkarma iřlevi grd. Bylece makineler, mevcut eleřtirilerin tesine gemek ve psikanalizin iine dřtę tuzaklardan kaınmak iin anahtar bir kavram haline geldi.

Yazarların ortak metni olan Anti-Oidipus boyunca, Oidipal yapıya ynelik eleřtiriler makineler aracılıęıyla ayrıntılı olarak irdelendi, ancak tezimde bařka bir yol izlemeye ve kendine has zellikleriyle makine kavramının psikanalitięi radikalleřtirme iřlevi grdę

argümanını geliştirmeye çalışacağım. Bu tezin sonunda, Guattari'nin makine kavramının nasıl sonsuz olasılıklar için ortak bir ad olarak hizmet ettiğini ve kendisinin Freudyen - Lacancı psikanalitik düzlemde bir Guattari makinesi yarattığını açıklamak niyetindeyim. Kavram, psikanalitik zeminden kaynaklandığı ve ikinci bölümde değindiğim gibi, katılmış, kendi kendini üreten psikanalitik bakış açılarını ve bunları sosyo-politik bağlamda düzelten ya da yok sayan eleştirilerin yerine geçtiği ölçüde bir makine işlevi görür. Ayrıca Guattari'nin radikal makine bakış açısının, psikanalize kıyasla fiziğin temel yasalarına son derece farklı bir yaklaşımla olağanüstü yıkıcı potansiyeline ulaştığına da değineceğim, çünkü makinesel işlev, özgünlüğünü fiziksel ve mekanik çerçevelerin anlaşılmasındaki derin farklılıklardan alıyor.

Oidipus'a yönelik ilk eleştiri, eksikliğin Freudyen ve Lacancı psikanalizdeki kurucu rolü ve bunun özellikle sosyal ve politik felsefedeki yansımalarıdır. Freud'un psikanalitik söyleminde doğrudan bir vurgu almamış olsa da, eksiklik onun modelinde arzuya ilişki içindedir. Prototip bir Oidipal aile ortamında, organizmanın acil ihtiyaçlarının ötesinde, bir çocuğun annesine yönelik cinsel arzuları vardır ve bu arzular, babanın doğrudan veya dolaylı otoritesi tarafından bastırılmaya, kontrol edilmeye ve hadım edilmeye mahkûmdur. Kastrasyon, ya var olan penisin kaybedilmesi tehdidiyle ya da çocuğun penisin yokluğunu yorumlamasıyla gerçekleşir. Her iki durumda da kompleksin çözümü, olası (dişi) veya fiili (erkek) penis eksikliği ve bunun bastırma ile ilişkisi etrafında döner. Bu temel bastırma, özneyi toplumsal düzenin uyumlu bir üyesi olarak normatif gelişimsel yörüngeye yerleştirir. Özneyi toplumsal düzene dahil eden, aslında hadım eden failin kişinin psişik aygıtla bütünleşmesidir. Süperego olarak adlandırılan bu baskılayıcı unsur içselleştirilir ve kişinin yaşamı boyunca, iğdiş etme ajanının fiziksel varlığı olmadan bile işleyişini sürdürür. Bu anlamda yaklaşımın ana yönlerden biri, hadım edici otorite figürünün normatif içselleştirilmesidir. Fiziksel yokluğunda bile hadım edici yapı, Oidipus kompleksini çözmede en azından kısmen başarılı olan “normal” insanlar için sakatlayıcı, kontrol edici ve zorlayıcı bir konuma yerleştirilir.

İlerleyen dönemlerde Freudyen teori, sürekli olarak yaşam ve ölüm dürtüleri arasında bir denge kurmaya çalışan enerji güdümlü bir psişik aygıt modelini diyalektik bir tarzda sunar. Bu modelde, enerjinin biyolojik bir kaynağı ve görece mekanik bir tanımını vardı. Freud, bazen içgüdü olarak tercüme edilen dürtüye fiziksel, enerjik bir konumdan yaklaştı.

Freud'un bu yaklaşımına ve genişletilmiş politik okumalarına yönelik pek çok eleştiri yapıldı. Makine konseptinin getirdiği bakış açısından uzak bazı eleştirilere ikinci bölümde yer verildi. Örneğin, Herbert Marcuse'ye göre Freud, uygarlığın esasen insan arzularına boyun eğdiren bir etken olduğuna inanmakla yanıliyordu ve Freud'un kendi teorileri yine kendi hatasını düzeltmenin anahtarını da içeriyordu. Marcuse'nin yöntemi esas olarak gerçeklik ilkesini

tarihselleştirmek ve dürtülerin kontrolünü kademeli olarak serbest bırakmayı ve özgürlük ile medeniyet arasındaki çatışmaları çözmeyi mümkün kılmak için egoyu güçlendirmekten oluşuyordu.

Bunun dışında, Frankfurt Okulu düşünürleri tarafından rasyonel yetilerin odağı olarak egonun önceliği ve bilinçdışının kör arzularına karşı özgürleştirici siyasetin anahtarı olması , özcü hümanist bir yaklaşım olarak eleştirilir. Freud'a göre, insan rasyonalitesi özgürlüğün araçlarını içerir ve uygun destekle ego, egemen toplumun baskıcı güçlerini altüst ederek özgürlüğün yolunu açabilir. Adorno, ilginç ve çekişmeli bir şekilde, duygusal ve estetik deneyimin 'açıklanamaz' yönlerini daha iyi açıklayabilecek bir akıl anlayışını savunur. Ona göre, egonun id'e karşı üstünlüğü, insan bilgisinin tamamen insan durumunu kavrar ve rasyonel düşünce ahlaki seçimlere doğru bir şekilde rehberlik eder.

Yapısal öncelik tartışmasıyla birlikte, Freud'un ikiliklerin teorik oluşumuna yönelik eğilimi de önemli bir eleştiri konusudur. Freud'un yaklaşımının düalizme yönelik metafizik bir eğilim taşımakta olduğu iddia edilmiştir.

Freud'un Oidipus yaklaşımından farklı olarak Jacques Lacan'ın Oidipus kompleksi versiyonunda, bebeğin bedensel işlevlere hakim olmaması onu bakıcıya bağımlı kılar, böylece bebek kendini ayrı bir varlık olarak kavrayamaz. Bebeğin bakış açısından, bağımlı olduğu annenin zaman zaman ilgisini yönelttiği ve kendisinin ne olduğunu bilemese de algıladığı eksiklik, Lacan tarafından hayali fallus olarak adlandırılır. Bebek boş yere bu eksikliği kendisi doldurmaya ve annenin arzusu olan hayali fallusa dönüşerek tatmin etmeye çalışır ancak başarılı olamaz.

Anne-bebek ilişkisinde bir süre sonra üçüncü bir figür, yasanın temsilcisi ve fallik gücün sahibi olarak ortaya çıkar; bu figür, çocuğu arzusundan radikal bir biçimde ayırır ve anne arzusunun nesnesi olma arzusunu geri dönülmez bir şekilde bastırır. Böylece çocuk artık var olan hayali ilişkilere ek olarak sembolik ilişkiler alanına da girmeye zorlanmaktadır. Lacancı bağlamda hadım edilme, her şeye gücü yeten figürün, yani mutlaka biyolojik baba veya hatta bir insan değil, büyük Öteki adlı simgesel düzenin failinin çocuk ve hayali fallus arasına bu zorunlu girişidir.

Büyük Öteki'nin bu müdahalesinden sonra çocuğun kendini ifade etmesi ve tanınırlık kazanması için artık mümkün olan tek yol dilin kullanımıdır. Böylece, arzularına ulaşamadığı ve onları dolambaçlı yoldan ifade edemediği için büyük Öteki'nin alanındadır; esasen kendisine yabancılaşmıştır. Dil aracılığına hapsolan birey ve dilin sembolik alanı içerisinde Lacancı düşünürler değişim potansiyelini esas olarak öznenin eksik olan arzu nesnesini boş

yere aramakta kullandığı yaratıcı yeteneklerine bağlarlar. Bu görüşe çeşitli eleştiriler yöneltilmiştir.

Örneğin, dil aracılığını kabul eden bireyin tanıdığı sembolik eksiklik hadım etme olayının bir parçasıdır. Bu anlamda yokluk sıklıkla olumsuzlamayla ilişkilendirilir. Hadım edilmiş bireylerin bir araya geldiği toplumun kendisi, daha temel bir düzeyde meydana gelen antagonizmanın üzerini örten bir yanılsamadır. Eksikliği kabul etme zorunluluğu, toplumsal antagonizmanın karşıt gruplarını etkili bir şekilde belirler. Herhangi bir siyasi durum değişikliğinin sonuçlarına maruz kalan insanlar, antagonizmanın kaçınılmaz doğası gereği, zorunlu olarak bunlara maruz kalırlar. Eksikliğin ontolojik rolüne atfedilen olumsal değişim potansiyeli, eksikliği aynı zamanda her şeye gücü yeten dogmatik varlık için siyasi değişim için olumlu bir zemin olarak kabul eder. Bu nedenle eksiklik, karmaşık çok boyutlu problemlerin önceden tanımlanmış kategorilere indirgenmesine neden olur.

Hem Freud hem de Lacan psikanalitik deneyimi öznel arası bir deneyim olarak kurgular. Her iki düşünür için de analiz edilen kişi (analizan) ile analiz eden kişi (analist) arasında yaratılan özne-özne ilişkisi, psikanalitik deneyimi yaratır. Bu temel ikili kurguda Freud'un ve Lacan'ın yaklaşımları arasında kesin bir ayrım yoktur. Bu ikilik de eleştirmenler tarafından etkili bir biçimde eleştirilmiştir.

Örneğin Robert Castel'in psikanalizi incelediği kitabı, genellemeler yerine iyi biçimlendirilmiş argümantatif bir eleştiri kurmuştur. Bu nedenle kendisinin düşünce aşamaları değinilmeye değer. İlk olarak, psikanaliz ve işlevi tek başına, izole bir biçimde düşünülemez. İkincisi, katılımcılar arasındaki analitik ilişki zorunlu olarak taraflıdır ve analitik uzlaşım, iktidar ilişkilerine körlükle sonuçlanan sosyo-politik ilişkileri göz ardı eder. Son olarak, ilk ikisinin sonucunda, psikanalitik kurguya dayanan, günümüzün egemen güç ilişkilerinde psikanalizin kurucu ve yeniden üretici rolünü ortaya çıkarmak mümkündür.

Bütün bu görüşler psikanalizi çeşitli açılardan eleştirmek ve analiz etmekte oldukça başarılıydılar. Ancak, psikanaliz tutumunu reddeden ya da düzeltmeye çalışan bu yaklaşımlar Guattari'nin kastettiği anlamda birer eleştiri makinesi oluşturmaktan uzak kaldılar. Guattari bu noktada eleştirisini psikanalitik teorinin ön kabulleri seviyesine yöneltti ve bu kabulleri dönüştürmeyi amaçladı. Kendisinin Freudcu-Lacancı teoriye yönelik eleştirisi aslen iki önemli farklılığa dayanıyordu. İlk olarak, özneliğin ifadesi veya oluşumu mutlaka bir dilsel performans değildi; dolayısıyla Lacancı yaklaşım indirgeyici bir etki yaratmaktaydı. İkincisi, Ödipal üçgenleme zorunlu bir biçim değil, tarihsel olarak olumsal şekilde meydana gelen bir biçimdi ve bu anlamda başka biçimler de farklı tarihsel koşullar altında mümkün olabilirdi.

Guattari, Deleuze'un yapının belirleyici üç asgari koşulunu ortaya koyup yalnızca ilk ikisini kabul ederek konumunu netleştirdi.

- 1- En az iki heterojen seri olmalıdır, bunlardan biri gösteren, diğeri gösterilen olarak tanımlanır.
- 2- Bu dizilerin her biri, yalnızca onların aracılığıyla var olan terimlerden oluşur.

Deleuze'un tartışmalı üçüncü koşulu da şuydu: "iki heterojen seri, onların 'farklılaştırıcısı' olan paradoksal bir öğeye doğru yakınsar. Guattari makinelerini tam da bu paradoksal ögenin pozisyonuna yerleştirmiştir. Makinenin kendisi yapının bir üyesi değildir. Aynı şekilde, makine dışsal bir aracı değildir; bunun yerine, makine yapısal içerimden ayrılamaz ve tersine, her olası yapıya bir makineler sistemi ya da en azından bir mantık makinesi hakimdir. Böyle bir konum, ancak makineleri psikanalizin kök saldığı düzleme, yani bilinçdışına yerleştirerek mümkündür. Guattari, Lacan'a benzer şekilde, bilinçdışını, bilincin ortaya çıkmasından önceki temel, dışsal çok boyutluluk olarak değerlendirir.

Bütün bu tartışmalar, Marksist anlamda tarihin bilinçdışı özne üzerindeki etkisine ilişkin iddialarıyla da desteklenmekteydi. Bu modelde, teknolojik üretim makineleri ve buna karşılık gelen altyapısal üretim ilişkileri, kültürel ve semiyotik üst yapıları belirler. Bu nedenle, bilinç yapısal olarak dilsel, yapısal ilişkiler tarafından belirlenmiş kalsa bile, bilinçdışının makinesel koşulları tarihsel kalır.

Deleuze ile girişecekleri Kapitalizm ve Şizofreni projesinde makine konsepti, Anti Oidipus'taki analitik ve pratik unsur olarak rolünün büyük ölçüde genişlemesiyle Guattari'nin ana katkıları arasındaydı.

Kitabın ilk sayfalarında, Deleuze ve Guattari kavramın kapsamındaki bu genişlemeyi şöyle ifade ettiler: "Her yerde makineler var - figüratif değil, gerçek makineler: diğerk makineleri çalıştıran makineler, diğerk makineler tarafından çalıştırılan makineler, gerekli tüm birliktelikler ve bağlantılar (...) Her şey makine" Alıntıda da belirtildiğı gibi makineler bağlantıları, çoğulluğı ve çeşitli sentezleri belirleyen yapılar halinde ortaya kondular. Makinelerin işlevini ortaya koymak için Deleuze ve Guattari üç farklı ve bütünleyici sentezden faydalandı.

İlk sentez, makinenin diğerk makinelerle bağlantısı yoluyla akışı kesmenin mekanik işlevi olan bağlayıcı sentezdi. Akış halindeki makinelerin kendileri akış olarak bağlantılı işleyişi, başka bir üretimin üretir. Üretim makinelerden organsız bedene geçerken, bir kayıt oluşturur ve ayrıştırıcı sentez bu süreci ikinci sentez olarak yönetir. Makineler, ayrılma noktaları olarak

kendilerini organsız bedene bağlarlar; yüzeyi bir ızgara gibi işaretlerler ve yeni bir sentez ağı oluştururlar. Üretimin son sentezi tüketimin üretimidir ve kayıt durumunda olduğu gibi sürecin ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır. Bilinçdışının birleştirici sentezi, tüketimi, bir özdeşleşmeyi yansıtan “demek ki bu odur...” biçimindeki bir belirlenimle ayırt ederek üretir. Sürekli olarak kararsız olan özne, makinesel işlevin yan ürünüdür. Özne üretimin merkezinde değildir, merkezde olan makinedir; ve özne üretimin faili olarak konumlandırılmaz.

Kapitalizm ve Şizofreni projesinin ikinci kitabı Bin Yayla, çok çeşitli alanlarda her seviyede bulunan çokluklardan söz açar. Makineler, bunların bağlantıları, üretimleri ve işlevleri bu çoklukların önemli bir parçasını oluşturur. Kitap, ikili mantığın reddedilmesi ve çokluklar ve bağlantılar mantığının teşvik edilmesiyle başlar. Kök ve gövde modeli ikiliklerle ilerleyen dilsel bir yapının aksine, köksap, dil alanı dışında kalan farklı alanları ve göstermeyen gösterenleri birbirine bağlar. Köksap düşüncesinin ortaya konma sebeplerinden biri, soyut bir model ile soyut makine konseptinin gündeme getirilebilmesini, sağlamaktır. Makinesel düzeneğin bir tarafı, göstermeyen gösterenlere, çoklu bağlantılara, yoğunluklara ve organsız bedenin aralıksız düzensizliğine ve dolaşımına açıktır. Diğer taraf ise örgütleyici, öznel, anlamlandırma katmanlarıyla karşı karşıyadır. Tabakalar somutlaşan yığınlar zemini hazırlar ve yüksek ataletle sahip taşlaşmış oluşumlara doğru yakınsar.

Tam bu noktada Deleuze ve Guattari okuyucuları, kavram grubuyla ilgili iki olası sorun hakkında açıkça uyarır. Öncelikle somut, soyutun zıttı değildir. Daha ziyade, parçalılığın karşıtı olan bir sürekliliği ifade eder. Ayrıca, soyut makineler ile somut mekanik düzenekler arasında zamansal bir fark yoktur. Aralarındaki ilişki ne zamansal bir sıralamadır ne de bir olasılık-zorunluluk karşıtlığıdır; terimin sözlük anlamında bir topoloji meselesidir. Topoloji, “şekillerin sürekli şekil veya boyut değişiminden etkilenmeyen geometrik özelliklerin ve uzamsal ilişkilerin incelenmesi” olarak tanımlanır. Birbirleriyle ilişki kurma biçimleri, katmanlardan ve tutarlılık düzlemlerinden oluşan sürekli bir uzayda karşılıklı bir konumlanmadır.

İkinci olarak, somut ve makinesel birleşimler, katmanlar ve tutarlılık düzlemi gibi görünüşte karşıt terimlerden bir ikilik oluşturmaktır. Örneğin, somut birleşimler, Soyut makinelerin yaratıcı yersizyurtsuzlaştırmaları ve çokluklar arasında yeni bağlantı potansiyellerinin ortaya çıkarak kaçış çizgilerini ürettiği belirli bir oluşumu temsil eder. Kaçış çizgisi ve iç-dış perspektifleri, Deleuze ve Guattari’nin felsefesinin merkezi bir konseptinde, yani savaş makinesinde doruğa ulaşır. Savaş makinelerinin devletten farklı bir doğası vardır ve bu makineler, özellikle alışılmış düşünce tarzına göre düşünüldüğünde, yalnızca olumsuz kategoriler tarafından anlaşılabilir. Devlet kendi başına bir savaş makinesi edinemez. Devlet

ve savaş makinesinin üzerinde işlediği farklı düzlemler, farklı bilim modları arasında bir ayırma yol açar. Kraliyet bilimi, devletin katmanlaşmasına katkıda bulunur ve göçebe/eksantrik bilim, yapılardan yola çıkarak kaçış çizgilerini araştırır.

Göçebe bilimin uzay kavramı, kendisini çizgiler, paralellikler ve laminar akışlarla sınırlamaz. Bunun yerine girdaplar, eğimler ve eğrisel yörüngeler onun uzayını oluşturur. Pürüzsüz ve bölünmüş ayırma atıfta bulunarak, akışların çokluğu ve bunların makinesel oluşumları, düz, topografik, geçişli bir uzay gerektirirken, dönüşümlerin kısıtlanması kraliyet biliminin bölünmüş uzayında gerçekleşir. sSyut makinelerde olduğu gibi, göçebe bilim modeli teorik değil sorun temellidir. Göçebe bilim, genel olarak, devlet ve savaş makinelerinin üzerinde çalıştığı farklı yüzeylerdeki akışlar arasındaki duygusal, dinamik ilişkileri sorunsallaştırır. İki bilimin yarattığı topluluklarla hem dönüşen hem de dönüştüren teknolojik akış, makine filumudur. Makine filumu, makine ve düzeneklerin farklı boyutlarına açıktır.

Bin Yayla'da psikanalitik söyleme değişimi ve olumsuzluğu yerleştirmeye yönelik özgün bir çabadan hareketle, makine kavramı, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin çeşitlilik, farklılık ve ikiliklerin reddedilmesine yönelik felsefesi içinde daha önceki rolleri terk etmeden daha da politik, bilimsel ve felsefi bir makineye dönüşür. Metinde, psikanalitik katmanla birlikte bir dizi yeni kavram makineyi çevreler. Bu nedenle, makine kavramının kendisi, bir tutarlılık düzlemi yaratmak için soyut (diyagramatik) bir makine oluşturur.

Makine perspektifinden hareketle Guattari nasıl bir politik tutum geliştirir? Guattari'nin siyasi iktidar sorununa yaklaşımı, ideolojiler veya katı bir şekilde yapılandırılmış fikirler etrafında değil, değişen olasılıklarla sürekli devrimlere odaklanmaktadır.

Aslında mevcut durum göz önüne alındığında, devrimci arzuya karşı mikrofaşizmlere yönelik daha güçlü bir libidinal yatırım yapıldığı ortadadır. Guattari'ye göre bu yatırım, kapitalist ekonomik araçlar, sınıf boyunduruğu veya otorite figürlerinin baskısı ile sınırlı değildir; aynı zamanda tüm bireylerin semiyotik boyun eğdirilmesinin bir sonucudur. Mikrofaşizmi tanımlamak için tüm bireysel etnik, politik, sosyal, cinsel ve kolektif mücadeleleri bu terim altında toplar. Mikrofaşizm, tüm nesne değerlerini ve arzu değerlerini değişim ve kullanım değerlerine dönüştürür. İnsanlar, örgütlerinin mikrofaşizmlerini yeniden üretim biçimleriyle birlikte analiz etmedikçe, ona karşı bir savaş makinesi yaratmalarının hiçbir yolu yoktur ve mikrofaşizm onlara musallat olmaya devam etmektedir. Böyle bir analiz ancak makinesel bir yaklaşımla mümkündür.

Guattari'ye göre bilinçdışı, hiçbir göstergebilimsel yaklaşımın ya da mantıksal-bilimsel önermenin ayrıntılı bir biçimde kavrayamayacağı makinesel önermelerden oluşur. Yapılar ve

moleküler makineler sürekli olarak bağlantı kurar ve bağlantılarını koparır, ancak ilişkileri herhangi bir aksiyomatiğe veya zaman ve uzay koordinatlarına indirgenemez. Olasılıklı makine ve montaj etkileşimleri tarafından yönetilirler. Soyut makineler ve onların tutarlılık düzlemleriyle bağlantıları olan hem teknolojik hem de tarihsel, somut makine filumuna eşlik ederler.

Yine de Guattari, organik ve maddi topluluklarda bir ön-öznelliğin varlığını reddetmez. Bununla birlikte, bu ön-öznelliğin bir birey düzeyinde veya onun herhangi bir varsayılan yapıyla ilişkisi içinde olması gerekmez. Bu, Freud'un bilinçdışı özne fikri aracılığıyla onun makine kavramının nasıl işlediğini gösterir. Kavramı fiziksel, mekanik ve enerjik sınırlarla sınırlamak yerine, onun versiyonu onu bir olasılıklar evrenine açar. Öznellik sorununa yeni yaklaşım, hiyerarşik ilişkileri, efendi ve köle, analist ve analizanın konumlarını zorunlu olarak yeniden konumlandırır.

Bilinçdışı, öznellik ve arzu üzerine tüm bu orijinal bakış açılarıyla Guattari'nin siyaset tarzı nasıl olurdu? Açıkçası, siyasi hareketlere rehberlik etmek ya da kendisini bir usta figürüne dönüştürmeye çalışmak kendisinin tarzına pek yakın değildi. Bu doğrultuda, tüm sınırlamalara ve kısıtlamalara karşı, ironik bir şekilde mikropolitik aksiyomunu egemen dilbilgisinin kanıtlarının dayattığı anlamların gücünün reddi şeklinde dile getirir. Guattari'ye göre siyaset, belirli, sınırlı hareketlerin mikrofaşizmlemlerinden ve onların sınırlı amaçlarından kaçınılmalıdır; devrimci, somut düzeneklerin katmanlarından, soyut makineler tarafından yönlendirilen sorun için koşullara sahip yeni savaş makineleri yaratmalıdır.

Makine konseptinin ortaya koyduğu özgün perspektifin arka planını netleştirmek için konsepti geleneksel mekanik ve fizik bağlamında ele almak uygun bir yöntem olabilir. Zira bu bağlam psikanalizin gelişimini ve makinesel düşüncenin ortaya çıkışını büyük ölçüde etkilemiştir. Fiziksel fenomenlere yönelik farklı yaklaşımları tartışmak, Freud'un, Lacan'ın ve Guattari'nin kendi duruşlarını ifade ederken temel terimleri arasındaki temel farklılıklara ışık tutar.

Bu farklılıkların temelinde yer alan yaklaşımlardan biri mekanik bakış açısıdır. Mekanizma konseptinin fiziksel bağlamda öne çıkan modern kullanımı, Descartes'ın mekanizma tanımıyla ilişkilendirilebilir. Mekanizmalar, bu hareketin farklı cisimler arasında değiş tokuşuyla çalışır ve onun bakış açısına göre, yalnızca alt parçaları arasındaki doğrudan fiziksel temas yoluyla mümkün olur. Zorunlu fiziksel temas gerektiren erken mekanik model esnek olmayan çarpışmalarda ve cisimlerin deformasyonunda kaçınılmaz olarak eksikliklerle karşı karşıya kaldığından zaman içerisinde enerji konseptinin de mekanizmalara eklenmesiyle değişti.

Freud'un psikofiziksel yaklaşımı büyük ölçüde mekanik-enerjik görüşü temsil etse de, onun modelini bu görüşün sınırlarına indirgemek imkansızdır. Zamansallık, bu bağlamda Freud'un modelini ayıran temel bir özelliktir. Zaman, Freud'un modelinde başlangıçtaki verilere dayalı olarak hesaplanabilen düz bir çizgi değildir. Freud, bilinçdışı terimini kullanmaya başladıktan sonra sonra, bilinçdışının zamansız olduğunu öne sürerek, zamansallığa yönelik özgün yaklaşımını açıkça ortaya koymuştur.

Freud'un teorisindeki psikofiziksel anlayıştan Oidipus'a doğru görülen değişim, başka bir değişle bilimsel-fiziksel psikolojiden geç dönem psikanalize geçiş, Ludwig Boltzmann ve Max Planck'ın termodinamik üzerine çalışmalarıyla yakın bir döneme rastlar. Freud'un zihinsel fenomenleri açıklamak için yaptığı çalışmalarda ilham aldığı ölçülebilir enerji modeli bu çalışmaların ortaya koyduğu bir gereksinimdir. Bu gelişmelerin ardından termodinamikte bir başka belirleyici dönüş, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında Erwin Schrödinger'in teorileriyle ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu görüşe oluştururken, Erwin Schrödinger, yaşamın, maksimum entropi (düzensizlik ve ölüm) ile termodinamik dengeden geçici olarak kaçma araçlarına sahip olduğunu iddia edip, yaşamı "negatif entropi" ile ilişkilendirdi. Ona göre bir organizma, çevresinden sürekli olarak negatif entropiyi emer ve canlılığını sürdürebildiği sürece entropinin sonuçlarından kurtulmayı başarır. Bunu yaparken Schrödinger, canlıların dışarıdan enerji ve negatif entropi dediği şeyi alabileceklerini ve elde edebileceklerini savunur. Sonuç olarak bu durum Freud'un entropi ve ölüm dürtüsünü bir araya getirme girişimlerinin başarısızlığına mahkum olmasına sebep olur.

İkincisi ve belki de daha önemlisi, Schrödinger'in Guattari'nin göstermeyen gösterenlerini simüle eden "periyodik olmayan katıları", bilgi unsurlarını canlı organizmalarla geri dönülmez ilişkilere sokar. Bu anlamda sibernetik, Lacan'ın da bazı seminerlerinde yer verdiği popüler bir alan haline geldi. Onun üçlü sisteminde sibernetik, "simgesel ve imajiner düzen arasındaki radikal farkı" yansıtıyordu ve sibernetiğin makinesel yönü, bu radikal farkı açıklamak için araçlar sağladı. Lacan için, makine esasen iki düzen arasındaki kesişme noktasında yer alan otomatik bir tekrarı temsil ediyordu. Guattari'nin kavramı tanımlamakta kullandığına benzer şekilde mantıksal işleyiş ile makineleri ilişkilendirir.

Lacan'a göre, makine ve kişi, zamanla olan ilişkilerinde birbirlerinden ayrılırlar. Lacan'ın makineleri, öznel ve enerjisi Guattari'ninkinden farklı ilişkilere sahiptir. Guattari için geleneksel makinelerin önceliği bir zorunluluk değil, tarihsel bir olaydır, ancak Lacan için makineler zorunlu olarak insanların ürünleridir. Guattari'nin akışları ayrılmaz bir şekilde makinelere entegre edilmiştir ve akışlar olmadan makine olmaz. Lacan, bununla birlikte enerjinin makinelerin varlığına göre ikincil olduğunu söyler; ona göre mekanik işlemden önce

enerji yoktur. Lacan'ın makine tanımı, Guattari'nin kullandığı anlamda somut alan ile sınırlıdır: "Makine, öznenin etkinliğinden kopuk yapıdır." Özneden önce gelse de özneyi sınırlayan yapının tekrarından başka bir şey değildir. Dolayısıyla Guattari için insan-makine ilişkisi bilimsel temelli bir siberetik meselesi değildi; daha ziyade, insanlar sıklıkla makinenin bir bileşenini oluşturur.

Termodinamik alanına gelindiğinde, Guattari ve Tonnelat için, entropideki artış, tanım gereği sistem içindeki değişiklikler enerji seviyeleri ile ilgilidir. Dolayısıyla, entropi ile artan düzensizlik arasında zorunlu bir korelasyon olduğu anlamına gelmez. Sonuç olarak, sistem bir dengeye ulaştığında, düzensizlik artabileceği gibi, enerji seviyeleri değişen tekillik noktalarının ortaya çıkması da mümkün olabilir.

Guattari'nin zaman anlayışı hakkında bir açıklamada bulunmak gerektiğinde, zamana Chronos ve Aion'dan oluşan bir süreklilik olarak çok boyutlu bir yaklaşım dışında, makinesel fonksiyon etrafında tam bir zamansallık kavramını oluşturmak. Metinsel kanıtlardan, makine ve zaman arasında bir öncelik ilişkisi olmadığı ve hem zamanın hem de makinelerin, değişimlerin ve yapıların temelinde yer aldığı açıktır. Yine de görünüşe göre Guattari için makine olmadan değişim de olamayacağından zamanı ifade edecek bir işaretin olmayacağını savunur. Buna göre, makineler var olduğu sürece, değişimleri ve değişimlerin sürekliliğini işaretlemek için zamansallık zorunlu olarak var olacaktır.

Tüm bu yaklaşımlar göz önüne alındığında, Guattari'nin makineleri, heterojen bağlantılar için sınırsız bir potansiyeli ifade etmek üzere ileri sürülmüştür gibi görünür. En ilgisiz görünen özelliklerin bile beklenmedik, çığır açan sonuçlara yol açan öğeleri olabileceğinin bir ifadesi olarak makineler, Guattari'nin özgün felsefesinin temel yapı taşlarından birini oluşturur.

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