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GENESIS AND GENEALOGY OF THE CONCEPT OF POWER

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GENESIS AND GENEALOGY OF THE CONCEPT OF
POWER: THE 1998 OCTOBER CRISIS BETWEEN TURKEY
AND SYRIA

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

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Ankara

February 2018

To Özge



GENESIS AND GENEALOGY OF THE CONCEPT OF POWER: THE
1998 OCTOBER CRISIS BETWEEN TURKEY AND SYRIA

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
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
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ABSTRACT

GENESIS AND GENEALOGY OF THE CONCEPT OF POWER: THE 1998 OCTOBER CRISIS BETWEEN TURKEY AND SYRIA

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Although power is one of the central concepts of International Relations, it is obvious that there is lack of consensus on what the concept means. As a result, there are many power conceptualizations today circulating in the discipline. Given the centrality of the concept, diversity within power conceptualizations creates negative implications for International Relations, curbing scholarly communication among power analysts and reducing the analytical strength of the discipline. Having concerns about the implications of diversity within power conceptualizations, the dissertation conducts a conceptual analysis on the concept of power in International Relations in order to highlight fundamental differences between the existing power conceptualizations by revealing the historical and theoretical contexts in which they are embedded. Then, the diverse power conceptualizations in the discipline are applied on a case study that is the 1998 October Crisis in order to compare and

contrast their explanatory potentials and different focuses of aspects. Based on these, the dissertation aims to diminish the level of ambiguity on the concept of power, and to contribute the scholarly communication among power analysts in the discipline. To this end, the dissertation mainly asks three major questions: (1) why are there many power conceptualizations in International Relations? Or, how has power come to be conceptualized in many ways? (2) how has a specific power conceptualization come to mean as it is known to mean in a particular way? (3) what are the main features and focuses of aspects of the existing power conceptualizations?

Keywords: Concept of Power, Descriptive Conceptual Analysis, Performative Conceptual Analysis, Power Analysis, 1998 October Crisis

ÖZET

GÜÇ KAVRAMININ ORTAYA ÇIKIŞI VE ŞECERESİ: TÜRKİYE VE SURİYE ARASINDAKİ 1998 EKİM KRİZİ

Sarı, Buğra

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Serdar Şahabettin Güner

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Güç Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin temel kavramlarından bir tanesi olmasına rağmen kavramın ne anlam ifade ettiği üzerinde görüş birliği olduğu söylenemez. Bunun bir sonucu olarak, günümüzde disiplin içerisinde farklı birçok güç kavramsallaştırması mevcuttur. Kavramın Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini içerisindeki merkezi konumu dikkate alındığında, güç kavramsallaştırmaları dâhilindeki çeşitlilik güç analistleri arasındaki akademik iletişimi sekteye uğratmakta ve disiplinin analitik kapasitesini düşürmektedir. Güç kavramsallaştırmaları dâhilindeki çeşitliliğin olumsuz etkilerinden yola çıkarak, bu tez çalışması farklı kavramsallaştırmaları ortaya çıkaran tarihi ve teorik süreçlere odaklanarak, kavramsallaştırmalar arasındaki temel farklılıklara ışık tutmak amacıyla Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinde güç kavramı üzerine kavramsal bir analiz yapmaktadır. Bunun üzerine, disiplin içerisindeki güç kavramsallaştırmaları minvalinde Türkiye ve Suriye arasındaki 1998 Ekim Krizi incelenerek farklı güç kavramsallaştırmalarının açıklama potansiyelleri

ve örnek olay üzerindeki odak noktaları karşılaştırılmaktadır. Böylece tez çalışması disiplin içerisinde güç kavramının anlamı üzerindeki muğlaklığı gidermeyi ve güç analistleri arasındaki akademik iletişime katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçlara ulaşmak için, tez çalışması temelde üç ana soru sormaktadır: (1) Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini içerisinde neden birçok güç kavramsallaştırması mevcuttur? Veya güç kavramı Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini içerisinde nasıl birçok farklı şekillerde kavramsallaştırılmıştır? (2) Disiplin içerisinde güç kavramsallaştırmaları nasıl hâlihazırda sahip oldukları anlamlara sahip olmuştur? (3) Disiplin içerisindeki farklı güç kavramsallaştırmalarının temel özellikleri ve odak noktaları nelerdir?

Anahtar Kelimeler: Betimleyici Kavramsal Analiz, Edimsel Kavramsal Analiz, Güç Analizi, Güç Kavramı, 1998 Ekim Krizi

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The meaning of the word 'power' seems like a will-o'-the-wisp: it tends to dissolve entirely whenever we look at it closely. We are sure we meant something by the word and have a vague idea what it is: but this understanding tends to fade away upon examination, until 'power' seems nothing more than a "giant glob of oily ambiguity" (Morris, 1987: 1).

Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it. Just as farmers and meteorologists try to forecast the weather, political leaders and analysts try to describe and predict changes in power relationships. Power is also like love, easier to experience than to define or measure, but no less real for that (Nye 2004: 1)

1.1. The State of Power in International Relations

It can safely be argued that there is a consensus among International Relations (IR) scholars on the centrality of the concept of power in the discipline (Morgenthau, 1948: 13; Vasquez, 1983: 36; Stoll and Ward, 1989: 1; Mearsheimer, 2001: 55; Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 39; Bilgin and Eliş, 2008: 5; Mattern, 2008: 691-692; Finnemore and Goldstein, 2013: 4-5; Baldwin, 2013[2002]: 273). This is due to the fact that, as also being put by Mattern (2008: 691) and Baldwin (2013[2002]: 273),

politics is inherently linked with power. Hence, the concept of power is one of the fundamental concepts to study of international politics that is IR.

Although there is widely shared acceptance on the centrality of power in IR, there is lack of consensus on what the concept means, on which Morgenthau (1948: 13) states that “the concept of political power poses one of the most difficult and controversial problems of political science.” In line with Morgenthau, Gilpin (1981: 13) suggests that the definition of power is “one of the most troublesome in the field of international relations.” Sharing similar ideas, Waltz (1986: 333) proposes that the “proper definition [of power] remains a matter of controversy” in the discipline.

As there is controversy on what the concept means, we have many different power conceptualizations circulating in the discipline today. Summarizing those conceptualizations, while some conceptualizes power as actors’ possession of particular resources, some others understand it as a direct relationship between actors in which an actor causes others to do something that others would not do otherwise. It is also conceptualized as an indirect relationship that occurs through the intermediary of formal or informal structural settings, which advantage or disadvantage actors in their power relationship by setting the agenda, limiting alternatives, specifying rules and procedures that determine the process of negotiation, distributing resources, in other words, shaping the context in which actors interact with others. Additionally, it is formulated as a structural phenomenon that shapes identities and capacities of individual units, whether people, groups or states, and thereby makes them willing to accept their roles or positions in structure. Resting upon a rather different notion, power is also defined as discursive practices

based on a specific system of meanings that give rise to a particular world with particular subjectivities, identities, interests and in/appropriate behavior patterns.

Curbing the scholarly communication and reducing the analytical strength of the discipline, diversity within power conceptualizations create negative implications for IR. For looking at the way that the IR scholars have responded to the conceptual diversity of power, they tend to narrow their views on power by picking a specific conceptualization and ignore others in their power analyses rather than engaging in conceptual pluralism that the concept of power would facilitate to the discipline. As a result, as Mattern (2008: 691-692) puts it, IR becomes “a collection of insular research communities” which do not engage in scholarly communication rather than being a pluralist discipline. However, scholarly communication, providing scholars with an opportunity to express their ideas and criticize others, is key to the advancement of knowledge in any scientific discipline. In the establishment of such communication, concepts¹ play a major role since they are “the carriers of meaning” (Mouton, 1996: 181) by means of which scholars are able to identify, label, classify and relate the objects, events and phenomena to develop arguments that they can generate new questions, or apply to their research programs (Gilbert and Vick, 2004: 84). Hence, concepts, first, make it possible to distinguish a particular object, event, action or set of relations from whatever is not that object, event, action or set of relations (see Sartori, 1984: 74). Second, concepts constitute the basic building blocks of scientific knowledge production (Botes, 2002: 24; Goertz, 2006: 1).

¹ In the literature, there are various definitions of the term ‘concept’. For Sartori (1984: 74), concepts are tools to “distinguish A from whatever is not-A.” In similar fashion, Archer (1966: 37) identifies concepts as “the label of a set of things that have something in common.” Or, Harré (1966: 3-5) suggests that “concepts are the vehicles of thought.”




Figure 1: The Place of Concepts in Scientific Knowledge Production (Mouton and Marais, 1996 [1988]: 125)

Since scholarly communication and scientific knowledge production are primarily established upon concepts, conceptual clarity is of great importance. On its own terms, clarity refers to “the quality of being easily understood” (*Merriam-Webster*). The lack of clarity, thus, would inhibit the communication since there would be a confusion on what scholars imply with a concept. Moreover, if the definitions (or meanings) of concepts are muddled, unclear or confused, the arguments, which are built upon those concepts, become fuzzy and easily collapse. Such understanding is in line with Wittgenstein’s logic on definitions, which suggests that definitional confusions lead philosophical problems (Wittgenstein, 1986 [1953]: 19). Therefore, scholarly communication and scientific knowledge production require to develop clear identification of the relationship between concepts and the meanings they refer.

Understood in this way, the analytical strength of any scientific knowledge is directly proportional to the level of clarity of concepts, upon which it is built. This is to say that reliability and validity questions on scientific knowledge may arise because of poorly defined concepts, which is the case for IR due to the ambiguity on the

meaning of power, suggesting that the definition of power remains ambiguous within the diversity in power conceptualizations. Given the centrality of power in the discipline, the lack of consensus on the definition of the concept demands questioning on the analytical strength of IR. In this respect, validity questions have already been asked to one of the dominant theoretical traditions of IR concerning the poor utilization of the concept of power. Accordingly, Guzzini (2004: 537-544) states that the realist tradition in IR has an “identity dilemma”, resulting from the ambiguous definition of power, which constitutes one of the fundamental concepts upon which realists build their arguments. As a result, realism always has to come to choose between distinctiveness and determinacy, meaning that if realists stick with the narrow definition of power in their tradition, their explanations with respect to the international politics remain indeterminate, whereas when they relax their arguments and broaden the scope power, they lose their epistemological, methodological and ontological distinctiveness.

1.2. Organization of the Study, and Research Questions

Having concerns about the implications of diversity within power conceptualizations, this dissertation conducts a conceptual analysis on the concept of power in IR in order to highlight fundamental differences between the existing power conceptualizations in the discipline by revealing the historical and theoretical processes in which they are embedded and applying these conceptualizations on a case study. Achieving this aim, indeed, will make it possible to understand main features of each power conceptualization in IR, and thereby to demonstrate their

distinctiveness. Based on these, the dissertation aims to diminish the level of ambiguity on the concept of power, and to contribute the scholarly communication among the power analysts in the discipline.

To this end, this dissertation mainly questions the reasons of the multiplicity of power conceptualizations in the discipline and asks how power has come to be conceptualized in many ways with particular reference to the historical developments in world politics and theoretical debates within the discipline. Building upon this, the dissertation asks three main questions: First, why are there many power conceptualizations in the discipline? Or, how has power come to be conceptualized in many ways? Second, how has a specific power conceptualization come to mean as it is known to mean in a particular way? Third, what are the main features and focuses of aspects of the existing power conceptualizations? In order to answer these questions, there are multiple questions should be answered as well such as why it is difficult to develop a full-fledged power definition that would cover all aspects of the concept. Is it possible to establish a categorization that would include all power conceptualizations in the discipline? Related with this one, if yes, is it possible to do without having any limitations? What are the implications of historical developments in world politics and debates within IR theory on the evolution of the concept of power in the discipline?

In line with the research questions, this dissertation has three main purposes. First, it aims to demonstrate that it is difficult (if not impossible) to develop a full-fledged power conceptualization, or establish a categorization on different power conceptualizations in the discipline without limitations. This will be explained in the second chapter of the dissertation through referring three main thinking traditions on

power, in which the existing power conceptualizations in IR have their roots. These traditions are Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian. In simplest terms, the Weberian tradition makes sense of power in instances, in which actors have *conflict of interests*. On the other hand, the Lukesian tradition formulates power as *shaping actors' interests* so that conflict of interests would never arise while the Foucauldian tradition conceives power as a phenomenon that *produces all aspects of life* with the *subjectivities* in it.

The second purpose of the dissertation is to clarify why there are many power conceptualizations in the discipline. Briefly, this is due to the fact that power is both a policy-contingent and theory-dependent concept, meaning that any conceptualization of power is far from being neutral. As an implication, the meaning of the concept is always embedded in a particular political and theoretical context. Hence, given the intricateness of the international politics and the diversity of theoretical positions, it is not surprising to have many power conceptualizations in the discipline. This is to say that each one of the power conceptualizations is a product of a particular historical and theoretical processes. Therefore, the third chapter of this dissertation will conduct a combined analysis involving historical, theoretical and conceptual. That the chapter will scrutinize the impacts of the ground shaking developments in international politics and debates within IR Theory on the evolution of the concept of power.

In this respect, it is more than a coincidence that great theoretical debates happen in the discipline in parallel with the emergence of large-scale developments in world politics. These debates and developments have an undeniable impact on the evolution of the concept power. The concept of power entered the discipline as one

the founder concepts in the early period in which mainly the possessional conceptualization was embraced by power analysts. However, with the impact of developments in world politics, which the possessional conceptualization remained short in explaining, and epistemological and methodological novelties in the discipline, new power conceptualizations began to flourish. Therefore, each power conceptualization in the discipline, as aforementioned, is a product of particular historical and theoretical processes. Then, each power conceptualization in the discipline has its own area of explaining or understanding depending on the political and theoretical context in which it is embedded. Historicizing the concept of power in IR will reveal different power conceptualizations, and the analytical differences between them.

Hence, the third chapter will reveal the historical processes, and theoretical, epistemological and methodological requirements that give rise to specific power conceptualizations in the discipline. In other words, the chapter will historicize the concept of power in IR in order to discover how power has come to be conceptualized in many ways, and how a specific power conceptualization has come to mean as it is known to mean in particular way.

The third purpose of the dissertation is to compare and contrast the explanatory potentials of different power conceptualizations in the discipline. Each different power conceptualization in the discipline has its own explanatory potential based on its own focus of aspect (or research agenda), heavily influenced by specific epistemological, methodological and ontological concerns. In this respect, the fourth chapter of this dissertation will conduct power analysis on a case study in order to reveal different focuses of aspects and explanatory potentials of the power

conceptualizations at hand. That each different power conceptualizations will be applied to the case, the course of events between Turkey and Syria prior to the 1998 October crisis and its aftermath. In this respect, the chapter asks two basic questions: what are the distinct focuses of aspects of different power conceptualizations in the Turkish-Syrian relationship? And, to what extent are these conceptualizations able explain or understand the case? It is expected that not only the analytical differences between diverse power conceptualizations but also their explanatory weaknesses and strengths will be further revealed when they are applied to the case.

1.3. Methods of Inquiry

The dissertation employs multiple methods of inquiry in order to respond the distinct requirements that arise in each chapter. The second and third chapters of the dissertation adopt the method of conceptual analysis. Conceptual analysis as a method of inquiry has two versions in IR that are descriptive and performative. It is necessary to point that this dissertation presents a combined utilization of these two types of conceptual analysis in the discipline. And, the fourth chapter utilizes case study method to compare and contrast different focuses of aspects and explanatory potentials of the power conceptualizations at hand.

Descriptive conceptual analysis is a method of inquiry to clarify and explicate a concept, demonstrate linkages of that concept with other concepts and identify different utilizations of those concepts with their reasons and consequences. The advocates of descriptive conceptual analysis give importance to the conceptual clarity as the basic element to achieve scholarly communication, which is seen as the

key condition for the advancement of knowledge. Hence, the main motivation in descriptive conceptual analysis is to discover what the concept at hand means.

In IR, Baldwin's studies (1980 and 1997) utilize the descriptive conceptual analysis on the concepts of 'interdependence' and 'security'. In Baldwin (1997: 6)'s words, conceptual analysis "is concerned with clarifying the meaning of concepts." Hence, the way Baldwin understands conceptual analysis is a means to an end that is clarifying the definitional problems that obscures the meaning of a concept, and thereby achieving scholarly communication for the sake of the advancement of science. This is to say that descriptive conceptual analysis aims at condensing the meaning of a concept in order to provide research projects within a unity.

In this respect, the purpose in descriptive method of analysis is to develop a clear conceptualization for the concept at hand so that no one can define the concept arbitrarily, without explanation or justification (Baldwin, 1980: 472-473). Then, descriptive conceptual analysis is to "the elucidation of the language" of concepts (Oppenheim, 1975: 284). This means that scholars engage in descriptive conceptual analysis aim at establishing an analytical framework, which constitutes the borders, in which the concept can be defined, studied, empirically applied and analytically developed.²

² In order to achieve such aim, the examples of descriptive conceptual analysis in IR follow the rules and guidelines proposed by Malthus (1986 [1827]: 4-7), Machlup (1963: 3-6) and Oppenheim (1975: 297-309). Among these, Malthus' guideline seem to be more comprehensive, which suggests that

First. When we employ terms which are of daily occurrence in the common conversation of educated persons, we should define and apply them, so as to agree with the sense in which they are understood in this ordinary use of them. This is the best and desirable authority for the meaning of words.

Secondly. When the sanction of this authority is not attainable, on account of further distinctions being required, the next best authority is that of some of the most celebrated

On the other hand, a rather different from descriptive type, performative conceptual analysis is not so much interested in what a concept means because the advocates of the method argue that it is “impossible to isolate concepts from the theories in which they are embedded and which constitute part of their very meaning” (Guzzini, 2005: 503). Therefore, definitions of a concept cannot be neutral or descriptive. They will only make sense within the meaning world of theories that they are embedded in, referring that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between conceptual formation and theoretical formation.

In this respect, performative conceptual analysis is, first, interested in revealing the historical and theoretical contexts that give rise to particular meaning of a concept. In order to achieve this task, it engages into conceptual history or genealogy by questioning how the concept at hand has come to mean in a particular way. Performative conceptual analysis further asks that what a particular meaning of a concept does. Proponents of the method argue that a particular meaning of a concept does not only explain what that concept denotes but also have performative effects on the order of social relations, on the organization of which that concept takes place. In this vein, Guzzini (2005: 513) states, “a conceptual analysis of power in terms of its meaning is part of the social construction of knowledge.” In addition, Huysmans (1998: 232) suggests on the concept security that “While concept analyses of security

writers in the science, particularly if any one of them has, by common consent, been considered as the principal founder of it...

Thirdly. That [if there are changes proposed in the meaning of the term] the alteration proposed should not only remove the immediate objections, and on the whole be obviously more useful in facilitating the explanation and improvement of the science...

Fourthly. That any new definitions adopted should be consistent with those which are allowed to remain, and that the same terms should always be applied in the same sense, except where inveterate custom has established different meanings of the same word; in which case the sense in which the word is used, if not marked by the context, which it generally is, should be particularly specific.

in IR assume an external reality to which security refers ... It does not refer to an external, objective reality but establish a security situation by itself.”

From this point of view, performative conceptual analysis sees descriptive conceptual analysis itself a discursive practice that produces a social reality through defining concepts. Hence, performative analysis is actually analyzing the effects of the conclusions or definitions arrived through descriptive analysis on concepts. In doing so, performative conceptual analysis starts with revealing how the concept at hand has come to mean in a particular way in order to demonstrate the attributed definition of the concept is not impartial, but reflects particular perspectives available in a particular political and theoretical context. Then, it aims at discovering the effects of that particular meaning of the concept on the production of reality around it.

Understanding descriptive and performative types of conceptual analysis in these ways, this dissertation utilizes both in accordance with its purposes. In this respect, the second chapter conducts a descriptive conceptual analysis to discover the underlying deterministic features in Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian power understandings, the main three thinking traditions on power in discipline, in which the existing power conceptualizations have their roots. Speaking in line with the terms of Malthus’ guideline for conducting descriptive conceptual analysis (especially the second procedure in fn. 2), Weber, Lukes and Foucault are treated as the most celebrated thinkers in the power literature and the determining features are *conflict of interests* in Weberian tradition, *shaping of interests* in Lukesian tradition and *production of subjects* in Foucauldian tradition. These features will be utilized as criteria to demonstrate the limitations and internal inconsistencies in the existing

studies on power in the discipline that attempt to develop a full-fledged power conceptualization or establish a categorization on different power conceptualizations.

In the third chapter, this dissertation conducts conceptual analysis through the combination of descriptive and performative approaches. The third chapter, in general, scrutinizes the historical processes and theoretical, epistemological and methodological requirements that give rise to specific power conceptualizations in the discipline. Consistent with the departure question of the performative conceptual analysis (how has the concept at hand come to mean in particular way?), the chapter analyzes how power has come to be conceptualized in many ways, and how a specific power conceptualization has come to mean as it is known to mean in particular way. However, the performative analysis is utilized until this point, meaning that the chapter is not interested in discovering the effects of different power conceptualizations separately in shaping the political and theoretical sphere in the discipline, which has already been done by Guzzini (2005). The chapter, at the same time, conducts a descriptive conceptual analysis in the sense that it clarifies main features and focus of aspects of each power conceptualization in the discipline as being the products of ground shaking developments and great debates within IR Theory.

The fourth chapter is interested in comparing and contrasting the explanatory potentials of different power conceptualizations discussed in the third chapter. In order to fulfill this task, the chapter employs a case study that is the 1998 October Crisis between Turkey and Syria. The case will be analyzed through diverse power conceptualizations in the discipline. However, analysis of the case has a secondary

importance in the sense that the case is utilized, first and foremost, to highlight the focus of aspects and explanatory potentials of different power conceptualizations.

The 1998 October Crisis between Turkey and Syria is selected as the case in this dissertation because it contains multiple aspects that fall into the analytical frameworks of different power conceptualizations separately. Hence, the case provides with an opportunity to closely examine and compare the analytical frameworks of power conceptualizations within a specific context. As a result, it will be possible to demonstrate the areas of the case that power conceptualizations are strong to analyze, or remain weak to do so.

CHAPTER 2

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDIES ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN THE DISCIPLINE

There is a rich literature on the concept of power in the discipline. This is not surprising since power is one of the central concepts in IR as it is suggested by many. For example, Vasquez (1983: 36) identifies power as the most important among the disciplinary concepts in IR. In parallel with this argument, Barnett and Duvall (2005: 39) suggest, “the concept of power is central to international relations.” Also, as Finnemore and Goldstein (2013: 4-5) state “power ... has always at the core of our discipline”. Some even goes further and claims that “the fundamental concept in social sciences is power, in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental concept in physics” (Russel, 2004: xxiv).

Although there is a consensus on the centrality of the concept of power, there is lack of agreement on what it means as it was aforementioned. As a result, there are many different power conceptualizations based on different thinking traditions in the discipline today. Therefore, when scholars of IR talk about the concept of power, they have to be aware of the fact that they are actually discussing a specific power conceptualization among many.

The diversity of power conceptualizations creates some implications for the discipline. Given the centrality of power in the discipline and the lack of consensus on its meaning, the discipline's analytical strength becomes a questionable phenomenon. Also, the diversity creates difficulties for IR scholars working on the concept in the sense that in order to conduct a parsimonious power analysis, scholars have to enter the conceptual inventory of power in the discipline, pick one of the conceptualizations, and ignore others. Indeed, this prevents scholarly communication among power analysts working on different power conceptualizations since IR transforms into a collection of insular research communities that have no or a very limited connection between them. In this respect, each power community has been endeavoring themselves to work on their own research frameworks by "narrowing both their views on power and their empirical, methodological and normative schemas" (Mattern, 2008: 691-692).

Being aware of the negative implications emanating from the utilization of the concept of power in the discipline, power analysts tend to clarify the meaning of the concept, or to categorize different power conceptualizations in IR in order to bring an order to the field of power. In this respect, the studies given by Wolfers (1962), Baldwin (1979; 1985; 1989), Holsti (1964; 1983), Taber (1989), Caporaso and Haggard (1989), Guzzini (1993), Barnett and Duvall (2005) and Berenskoetter (2007) are the prominent examples. However, although these studies provide grounds, on which power analysts are able to communicate, they, one way or another, fail to capture all aspects of the concept of power or contain internal

inconsistencies. This is due to the ambiguous nature of power³ and difficulties of categorizing diverse power conceptualizations through systematic distinguishing criteria.

This chapter is devoted to demonstrate the difficulties (if not the impossibility) of developing a full-fledged power conceptualization, or establish a categorization on different power conceptualizations in the discipline without limitations. To this end, it is first analyzed the ambiguous nature of power. Then, the prominent studies on the concept in the discipline are examined through giving reference to three main thinking traditions on power, in which the existing power conceptualizations in IR have their roots. These are Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions. The deterministic features within the power understanding of these traditions are utilized as criteria to demonstrate the limitations and internal inconsistencies in the existing studies on power in the discipline that attempt to develop a full-fledged power conceptualization or establish a categorization on different power conceptualizations.

2.1. Power as an Ambiguous Concept

It is argued that ambiguity arises when one single term is used for the expression of several different concepts (Hospers, 1990 [1956]: 121). Wasow, Perfors and Beaver (2003) put that “an expression is ambiguous if it has two or more distinct denotations.” Based on this, the concept of power contains a high level of ambiguity since it has various denotations. *Collins English Dictionary* lists 22 possible

³ Rather than identifying the concept as ambiguous, some calls it “essentially contested” (e.g. Lukes, 2005:14) while some others describe it as a “family resemblance concept” (e.g. Haugaard, 2010). Moreover, for some it is “elusive” (Keohane and Nye, 1989 [1977]: 11; Schmidt, 2007: 46).

definitions for the word 'power'. Twelve of them is related to mathematics, statistics, physics, engineering and mechanics. Hence, the remaining ten definitions are of concern to this study. These definitions are

(1) ability or capacity to do something (2) ... a specific ability, capacity, or faculty (3) political, financial, social, etc., force or influence (4) control or dominion or a position of control, dominion or authority (5) a state or other political entity with political, industrial, or military strength (6) a person who exercises control, influence, or authority (7) a prerogative, privilege, or liberty (8) a. legal authority to act, especially in a specified capacity, for another, b. the document conferring such authority (9) a. military force, b. military potential (10) the ability to perform work (*Collins English Dictionary*).

In addition to its dictionary definitions, synonyms of the concept of power demonstrate its related concepts, and thus denotations. The synonyms of power are 'ability', 'capability', 'capacity', 'competence', 'competency', 'faculty', 'potential', 'property', 'ascendancy', 'authority', 'dominance', 'domination', 'mastery', 'influence', 'rule', 'command', 'supremacy', 'sovereignty', 'sway', 'strength', 'force', 'potency' (see *Collins Dictionary & Thesaurus*; *Oxford Thesaurus of English*). Since power has many denotations and synonyms inherent in its nature, it is safe to say that power is an inherently ambiguous concept.

There are two more reasons that further feed the ambiguity of power, and thus make it difficult to develop a comprehensive power definition. First, power is a policy-contingent concept that hampers the development of a general theory on power (Baldwin, 1979: 167). Second, power is a theory-dependent concept, pointing that what power means inherently depends upon the theories in which the concept is employed (Meritt and Zinnes, 1989: 27; Mearsheimer, 2001: 422; Guzzini, 2005: 496). Therefore, each attempt to define power is not more than representing a particular policy context in which the concept is utilized, or (meta) theoretical position in which the concept is embedded.

Similarly, attempts to categorize diverse power conceptualizations in the discipline are not free of difficulties. For every categorization has to rely on respective criteria to distinguish power conceptualizations in a systematic manner. These criteria, thus, constitute the analytical framework of the established categorization. This suggests that each categorization on the concept of power is limited to its analytical framework. Therefore, existing categorizations is either limited in the sense that they cannot include each thinking traditions on the concept of power in the discipline, or even if they are able to include each one of them, they have to deal with inevitable internal inconsistencies.

2.2. Three Traditions on the Concept of Power

In the discipline of IR, the existing power conceptualizations have their roots in three thinking traditions. These are Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions. The power understanding in these three traditions differ fundamentally based on their deterministic features. In simplest sense, Weberian tradition describes power in terms *conflict of interests*; Lukesian tradition in terms *shape of interests*; and Foucauldian tradition in terms of *production of subjects*.

Going into details, Weber (1947: 152) defines power (Macht) as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests”. Weber’s definition points a basic feature that power is a relationship between, at least, two actors. As the second feature, Weberian power understanding assumes that power is determined through actors’ (X) successful influence attempts to alter the behavior of

other actor(s) (Y) in line with his/her own will. This also includes the instances where X successfully prevents Y from altering behavior for the attainment of a desired end by X. From this point of view, power functions in the relationship between X and Y upon their conflicting interests because X forces Y to do something that Y resists, or Y would not do otherwise. Hence, overcoming resistance and thereby *conflict of interests* is a necessary condition in order to identify power in a social relationship.

Lukes (2005 [1974]: 27) points a different power conceptualization as he states

... A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have- that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?

In the light of this, conflict is not a necessary feature in Lukesian power understanding contrary to the conflict based Weberian power understanding. On this, Lukes (2005 [1974]: 27) states that “the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place”. Hence, Lukes sees power in the realization of wills not through conflictual ways such as forcing others to behave in a certain manner but through consensual means such as shaping the perceptions, wills and interests of others so that conflict would never arise. Hence, he defines power as the relationship in which an actor shapes the interests of another actor in accordance with his/her wills, meaning that *shape of interest* is the most intrinsic feature in Lukesian power understanding. This is put by Lukes (2005 [1974]: 28) as

... is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial?

Foucault, on the other hand, presents a very different notion on power compared to Weber and Lukes. While Weber and Lukes present interest driven and repressive power understanding by either conflicting with others or shaping others, Foucault underlines the productive aspect of power to the extent that he highlights the process of the constitution of a particular world with particular subjectivities, identities, interests and in/appropriate behavior patterns through discursive practices based on a specific system of meanings. Foucault (1994: 331) explains this aspect as follows:

This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him.

Together with its productive aspect, Foucauldian power understanding has also a nominalist character. This means that power comes from everywhere. It does not belong to any agent or structure, which fundamentally differentiates Foucauldian power understanding from Weberian and Lukesian power understandings. In Weberian and Lukesian understandings, power originates from the actions of individuals or set of relations within a structure to bring an outcome to the conflicts between actors or to the attempts of shaping people's interests. Rather, power, in Foucauldian understanding, is a strategy and something that manifests itself through discursive practices. Foucault (1978: 93) explains this characteristic as follows:

Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere... One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.

Accordingly, Foucault has a concept of power in his mind as something produces all aspects of life. Power produces a particular mode of life based on a specific systems of meanings, which defines and categorizes everything. Hence, when Foucault talks about power, he actually talks about *production of subjects*.

Based on their respective ideas on power, the table below show the deterministic features, in a broad sense, in Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian power understandings.

Table 1: Deterministic Features in Weberian Lukesian and Foucauldian Traditions

	Deterministic Feature
Max Weber	Conflict of Interests
Steven Lukes	Shape of Interest
Michel Foucault	Production of Subjects

2.3. Studies on the Concept of Power in IR that are Limited to Weberian Power Understanding

The concept of power has been studied in the discipline mostly in association with the terms coercion, domination, force and repression. This is one of the consequences of the dominance of the realist paradigm in the discipline. Realists in the discipline assume that international politics consists of nation states with their conflicting interests, in the essence of which there is the instinct of survival at the expense of others. In the pursuit of realizing conflicting interests in international politics, power is depicted as the main instrument. As a result, power is understood as the key component of the international politics by the realist paradigm, evident in the words of Morgenthau (1948: 13) “international politics ... is a struggle for power.”

There are two main views on the concept of power within the realist paradigm that are ‘power as possession’ and ‘power as relation’. The literature on the concept of power in IR, in fact, began to develop out of the debates between these two views on power. Fundamentally, these two views share the same analytical framework that is *conflict of interests* based Weberian power understanding. Studies on power given by Wolfers, Baldwin, Holsti and Taber conduct conceptual analysis on these two power notions.

2.3.1 Wolfers (1951), “The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference”; Wolfers (1962), *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*

Wolfers gave one of the earliest studies that critically analyzes the concept of power in IR. In his article “The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference” and seminal book *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Wolfers introduced his notion on power, on which Lasswell and Kaplan have an undeniable impact. In introducing their power understanding, Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) give emphasis to the relational aspect of power (‘power as relation’) as opposed to those who define ‘power as possession’. They claim that ‘power as possession’ actually refers “power over nature” as it describes power as the possession of specific resources. However, as they argue, in political science power makes sense in a relationship between individuals that is ‘power as relation’, which they identify as “power over other men” (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: 75).

Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 77) indicate that the notion ‘power as relation’ makes sense with three interrelated elements: weight, scope and domain. “The weight of power is the degree of participation in the making of decisions.” “[The] scope consists of the values [desired events, goal events or desired objects or situations] whose shaping and enjoyment are controlled.” And, “the domain of power consists of the persons over whom power is exercised.”

Wolfers applied ideas of Lasswell and Kaplan on the concept of power in international politics, and rejected the dominant understanding on power in the discipline at the time that identifies power of nations in terms of possession of specific material (and non-material to some extent) resources. For Wolfers, figures or

indexes that relate a country's power with the possession of specific resources and most of the time in relation to military strength are misleading. Power of a country, he argues, can only be measured through a careful estimation that takes the power of other countries and the features of the international relations into account since a general indicator on power resources does not have the same effectivity in all situations. As Wolfers (1962: 111-115) states, "not all forms of power can be applied with equal success under all conditions."

In addition to his rejection of the notion 'power as possession', Wolfers (1962: 103) also attempted to clarify the meaning of power. He began his attempt by distinguishing the utilization of the concept of power and the concept of influence. For Wolfers, power is associated with coercion, and influence relies on persuasion. The former is identified as "the ability to move others by threat or infliction of deprivations"; the latter refers to "the ability to do so through promises or grants of benefits." Hence, Wolfers rejects the definition of power "as the ability to move others, or to get them to do what one wants them to do and not to do what one does not want them to do." If, Wolfers argues, this broad definition of power is accepted, all foreign policy becomes a struggle for power that denotes coercive relations. Nevertheless, foreign policy is not only conducted through coercive means but also through foreign aids, cultural exchanges and cooperation. In order to capture both coercive and cooperative aspects of international politics, Wolfers suggests that it is necessary to distinguish power and influence.

It is obvious that Lasswell and Kaplan's ideas again constitute the base of Wolfers' distinction on power and influence. Accordingly, Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 71) define influence as a general concept in order to identify the instances, in which an

actor affects policies of others. Influence, they argue, may rest upon power, respect, rectitude, affection, well-being, wealth and enlightenment (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: 87). Power, here, is identified as a type of influence that it is enforced through severe sanctions. In line with this, Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 76) define power as “a special case of the exercise of influence: it is the process of affecting policies of others with the help of (actual or threatened) severe deprivations for nonconformity with the policies intended.” Hence, it can be said that Lasswell and Kaplan put emphasis on coercive means in order to distinguish power.

Building upon Lasswell and Kaplan’s logic, Wolfers equates power with coercion and influence with persuasion. However, the analytical distinction between power and influence based on coercion and persuasion is not easily identifiable in practice because coercive and persuasive elements are usually present together in international politics. Indeed, coercive and persuasive means coexist and complement each other most of the time in the pursuit of achieving national goals. To be more illustrative, influence based on persuasive means cannot supply the demands of nations for survival, expansion or security in international politics on its own without power based on coercive means. At the same time, influence is more preferable, beneficial or less costly in relations with allies or friendly nations (Wolfers, 1962: 106-111).

Therefore, Wolfers (1962: 104) depicts the relationship between power and influence within a spectrum. The far left of the spectrum symbolizes coercion that is pure power and the far right persuasion that is pure influence. States who adopt pure power strategies are put into the far left of the spectrum and states who adopt pure influence strategies are positioned in the far right of the spectrum.




Figure 2: The Relationship between Power and Influence for Wolfers

However, the distinction between power and influence based on the means to affect the policies of others such as coercion and persuasion reduces the analytical strength of the concept of power. It limits power to the instances, in which an actor employs force or communicates threats, as forms of coercion, against another actors. This is, first, contrary to ordinary usage of power. *Collins English Dictionary* defines power as the “ability or capacity to do something.” In this definition, there is no claim on the means as the condition of exercising power. Thus, it may rely on either coercion or persuasion. Second, Weber’s power conceptualization confirms the dictionary definition. To recall, Weber defines power (*Macht*) as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, *regardless of the basis on which this probability rests*” (Weber, 1947: 152). Hence, the means to be employed by one actor in order to intervene in the behavior of another actor do not constitute a determining criterion for the existence of power.

Moreover, it is difficult to separate coercion and persuasion as if they are two separate terms in order to distinguish power and influence. At first glance, it seems clear that coercion denotes threats, violence, and brute force, and persuasion is related inducement and rewards. However, persuasion and coercion are inextricably linked in practice. To begin with its ordinary usage, *Collins English Dictionary* defines ‘persuade’, verb form of persuasion, as such that “if you persuade someone

to do something, you cause them to do it by giving them good reasons doing it.” Understood in this way, persuasion is associated with giving good reasons to an actor to make him/her do something. Giving someone good reasons does not always imply giving rewards. It may sometimes come with communication of threats that X would inflict harm on Y if that Y should not comply with the wishes of X. Mario Puzo’s famous book, *The Godfather* has a great example of this kind of persuasion. Accordingly, upon Johnny Fontane, a Hollywood actor, requested from Godfather, Don Corleone, for persuading Jack Woltz, a director in Hollywood that rejected Fontane to have a role in a movie, Don Corleone persuaded Woltz by making him an offer he cannot refuse (Puzo, 1969: 32-33). This kind of persuasion is like the famous example between a thug and a victim ‘your life or your wallet’. In the end, the victim was persuaded to give his wallet just like Woltz was persuaded to give Johnny Fontane a role in his movie. In such an incident, persuasion and coercion are in a very close relationship that they are meshed. Hence, the distinguishing marker based on the means such as coercion and persuasion does not constitute a solid ground for the distinction of power and influence.

2.3.2. Baldwin (1979), “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends and Old Tendencies”; Baldwin (1985), *Economic Statecraft*; Baldwin (1989), *Paradoxes of Power*

In line with Wolfers, Baldwin (1979: 1989) disregards the notion that equates power with material assets a nation possesses. For him, the identification of political power as the aggregation of specific resources is unconvincing and misleading. In order to

demonstrate the deficiencies in the notion ‘power as possession’ or “potential power” as he calls it, Baldwin used an analogy between money in economics and power in politics. Money, Baldwin argues, is a much more fungible resource in economics than power in politics. The owner of money can use this resource in nearly all economic transactions. However, to what extent power resources can be effectively used across different policy instances is questionable. This is a result of the policy contingent feature of power. As Baldwin (1979: 165-166; 1989: 134) puts it,

The owner of a political power resource, such as the means to deter atomic attack, is likely to have difficulties converting this resource into another resource that would, for instance, allow his country to become the leader of the Third World. Whereas money facilitates the exchange of one economic resource for another, there is no standardised measure of value that serves as medium of exchange for political power resources.

Therefore, power, for Baldwin, is a relational phenomenon. Indicating that power is a relational phenomenon and in line with Wolfers, Baldwin states that power consists of three interrelated elements that are scope, weight and domain (Baldwin, 1979: 163-166).

In addition to his advocacy of the relational power conceptualization, Baldwin (1985: 9; 1989: 7) puts a clear distinction what power is and is not. He links power with “causally induced change” in behaviors, attitudes and actions of actors over whom power is exercised. This is to say that power implies causal conditions for successful influence attempts to change behaviors, attitudes and actions of others. Here, Baldwin seems to offer to identify power not only in terms of influence attempts by power holder but also in terms of the value system of the actor over whom power is exercised. In this regard, threats such as ‘your life or your money’ do not represent a power exercise if the threatened actor is seeking to suicide, meaning that there is not a *conflict of interests* situation.

The attempt to clarify the meaning of power based on the value systems of actors creates methodological difficulty for the assessment/measurement of power. The difficulty arises because Baldwin tends to embrace the positivistic research standards in his power analyses. In short, positivism requires to study on observable and testable phenomena. However, linking power to value systems of actors necessitate dealing with unobservable phenomena. Therefore, if the identification of power necessitates taking value systems of actors, positivist analyst may never reach a feasible conclusion.

2.3.3. Holsti (1964), “The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations”; Holsti (1983), *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*

Wolfer and Baldwin build their analysis on the distinction between the notions ‘power as possession’ and ‘power as relation’. However, as an implication of the concept, it is not an easy task to distinguish these two notions of power at first sight. Most of the times when power analysts go deeper to distinguish these two notions clearly, the blur and ambiguity grow rather than diminish, which arises because of the existing gray areas between them. In order to clarify these gray areas, first, Holsti (1964; 1983), and then Taber (1989) compare and contrast the notions ‘power as possession’ and ‘power as relation’.

In his work, “The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations”, Holsti conducts a conceptual analysis on power through a criticism directed towards Morgenthau’s utilization of the concept. For Holsti, Morgenthau calls international politics as a struggle for power but fails to explain what the concept of power

implies. Consequently, Holsti (1964: 179) acknowledges that “we do not know what the concept explains or fails to explain in international politics”

As a solution to the problem arising from the poor utilization of power, Holsti breaks down the concept into three elements: “capabilities, acts and responses” (Holsti, 1964: 182; 1983: 164-168). Accordingly, “power is (1) the act (process, relationship) of influencing other factors; (2) it includes the capabilities used to make the wielding of influence successful; and (3) the responses to the act” (Holsti, 1964: 182). Stoll and Ward’s (1989:2) interpretation on Holsti’s power definition is illustrative here that a state is powerful in the sense that (1) it has a large amount of resources to be used in influencing others (refers capabilities); (2) it undertakes effective actions to influence others (refers acts); (3) the target of influence attempts to resist or behaves in accordance with the desires of the state undertakes influence attempts (refers responses).

At first glance, the first point related with ‘capabilities’ in Holsti’s study seems to refer the notion ‘power as possession’. However, there is an important difference in detail. The notion ‘power as possession’ refers state power in terms of the aggregation of specific tangible and intangible resources. Hence, states that possess greater amount of resources are identified as ‘Great Powers’ while others that have lesser amount are ‘Small Powers’ or ‘Weak Powers’ (see Morgenthau, 1948; Organski, 1968; Spykman, 2008 [1942]; Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972; Cline, 1977; Wight, 1978; Waltz, 1979; Singer, 1988; Handel, 1990). In other words, resources in the notion ‘power as possession’ are regarded general indicators to measure state power without specifying their compatibility with particular goals, foreign policy objectives or features of the social relationship in which states interact.

While on the contrary, ‘capabilities’ in Holsti’s description are associated with power only when they are related to certain goals of states within a specific social relationship. Holsti identifies ‘capabilities’ as the capability to do specific actions. In this respect, inferring from Holsti’s understanding on power, measurement of power in terms of quantity and quality of resources has defects if these resources are not evaluated in terms of their compatibility with goals of states and the nature of the relationship between states (Holsti, 1964: 186-188).

Besides ‘capabilities’, Holsti argues that power ‘acts’ are at the central of international politics because they constitute the relations between states. ‘Acts’ are operationalized in the sense that “A commits toward B so that B pursues a course of behavior in accordance with A’s wishes” (Holsti, 1964: 180). This formulation is in line with the power notion available in Wolfers’ and Baldwin’s studies that is ‘power as relation’. Hence, Holsti, like Wolfers and Baldwin, formulates power in a social relationship. In this relationship, ‘acts’ towards an intended outcome are the locations where one can observe the function of power that consists of A’s efforts to realize its own will on B’s behaviors. This refers that ‘acts’ are the utilization of compatible capabilities towards the attainment of desired ends. Holsti (1964: 180) illustrates act as below:




Figure 3: Holsti's Illustration that Explains 'act'

2.3.4. Taber (1989), "Power Capability Indexes in the Third World"

In line with Holsti and uncomfortable with the formulation of the concept of power that blur the difference between 'power as possession' and 'power as relation', Taber (1989: 31) identifies four different power conceptualizations that are interrelated rather than being independent. He proposes a descriptive model, which depicts the relationship between those four conceptualizations.

⁴ For Holsti (1964: 181), "influence (an aspect of power) is essentially a means to an end".




Figure 4: Taber’s Descriptive Model on Different Power Conceptualizations

Taber (1989: 31) describes ‘power capability’ just as the notion ‘power as possession’. Accordingly, power is conceived as an attribution, and thus it is a possession of an actor, suggesting that control over resources in order to be used to control over outcomes. It should be noted that ‘power capability’ in Taber’s formulation treats resources as general indicators of power without considering the compatibility of capabilities with actor’s goals and the context in which that actor interacts with others.

Differing from ‘power capability’, ‘potential power’ in Taber’s formulation includes compatibility of capabilities with the features of the context. In Taber’s words (1989: 31), “potential power is power capability in context.” From this point, there is a strong similarity between Holsti’s understanding on ‘capabilities’ and Taber’s

formulation of ‘potential power’ because both of them identifies capabilities (or resources or attributions) as power in terms of their compatibility with the context in which they are to be utilized.

‘Applied power’, in Taber’s descriptive model, formulates power as the actualization of ‘potential power’ in direction of the actor’s preferences (Taber, 1989: 32). This suggests that the ‘applied power’ in Taber’s model is in line with what Holsti implies with ‘act’. As ‘act’ is the employment of capabilities to create successful influence attempts towards the attainment of ends in parallel with the wills of the power wielder, ‘applied power’ is the utilization of ‘potential power’ in the direction of actor’s preferences towards a desired outcome.

Highlighting the outcome of the power relationship between actors, ‘power situation’ is the last power conceptualization in Taber’s descriptive model. Hence, the power relationship starts (1) with the possession of resources that is ‘power capability’, (2) proceeds with the consideration of compatibility of the resources with the requirements of the context that is ‘potential power’, (3) turns out to be ‘applied power’ with the deployment of resources in accordance with the preferences of power wielder towards an outcome, and (4) ends with the outcome that is ‘power situation’.

In this respect, outcome is the result of a causal relationship between actors’ deployments of their capabilities (‘applied power’), whose compatibility is determined through the requirements of actor’s preferences towards a desired outcome in a particular context (Taber, 1989: 32). However, in most of causal relationships, all relevant actors within the power relationship appeal their ‘applied

power’ for the realization of their respective conflicting interests. Hence, the answer to the question ‘who has more power in the power relationship?’ depends on the nexus between the actors’ preferences in the relationship and the outcome of the relationship. This is to say that the actor, whose preferences are realized by the outcome of the power relationship is deemed to be more powerful than the other actor(s) in the power relationship

Overall, Wolfers, Baldwin, Holsti and Taber’s ideas on power include two main power conceptualizations in the discipline that are ‘possessional’ and ‘relational’. In this respect, opening up spaces for the emergence of a new power conceptualization in IR that is ‘power as relation’, these scholars built their power notions upon their rejection to the dominant power conceptualization in the discipline at the time that treats power as potential in terms of the possession of resources. Accordingly, the basic criterion for these power scholars in distinguishing different power notions is whether power is a possession or relation. In their formulation of the notion ‘power as relation’, Wolfers, Baldwin, Holsti and Taber are obviously influenced by political scientist Robert Dahl’s definition that conceives power as such, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957: 202-203).

However, these authors confine power to the instances in international politics, in which a state explicitly gets other states to do what it wants them to do that others would not do otherwise. Hence, their power notion is limited to relationships in which parties are in observable and direct *conflicts of interests*, the deterministic feature of Weberian tradition. Hence, having this basic limitation, the studies given

by Wolfers, Baldwin, Holsti and Taber neglect power conceptualizations that have roots in Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions.

2.4. Studies beyond Weberian Tradition

Although Wolfers, Baldwin, Holsti and Taber's studies only focus on the notions 'power as possession' and 'power as relation' that have roots in Weberian power understanding, there are other different power conceptualizations exist in IR, containing elements from each one of the Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions. Categorizations established by Caporaso and Haggard, Guzzini, Barnett and Duvall, and Berenskoetter on the concept of power in IR touch upon those power conceptualizations.

2.4.1. Caporaso and Haggard (1989), "Power in the International Political Economy"

Compared to studies reviewed in the previous section, Caporaso and Haggard (1989) present a more comprehensive categorization, in which they recognize four distinct power conceptualizations (or approaches as they call) in the discipline (Caporaso and Haggard, 1989: 99-120). These are 'decisional', 'structural', 'conversion-process' and 'locational' approaches. While the 'decisional', 'structural' and 'conversion-process' approaches are conflict based and have their roots in Weberian tradition, the 'locational' approach is a Lukesian power conceptualization.

In the ‘decisional approach’, power analysis involves examination on how actors that have conflicting interests deploy their resources to achieve outcomes in favor of their interests, meaning that power is linked with successful outcomes. In the ‘structural approach’, power is linked with the concept of interdependence. The power analysis in the ‘structural approach’ requires an examination on dependencies of actors in their relationship. For example, X who has fewer dependency is considered more powerful in its relationship with Y who has relatively more dependency because X would suffer less and Y would suffer more due his/her relatively more dependency in their *conflict of interests* situation. The ‘structural approach’, also, analyzes advantages and disadvantages of actors created through institutional mechanisms. The actor who has the capability to set the agenda in an institutional framework is considered to be in an advantageous position to limit the options available to others.

The ‘conversion process approach’, on the other hand, involves an examination on actors’ ability to convert their potential power resources into actual power (‘capabilities’ to ‘acts’ in Holsti’s terminology). The power analysis in the ‘conversion process approach’, then, looks for the successful or unsuccessful processes regarding how resources are deployed in order to influence other actors’ behaviors.

However, although the ‘structural approach’ shares fundamental characteristics with ‘decisional’ and ‘conversion process’ approaches, it points a considerable difference. The ‘decisional approach’ presents a typical Dahlian power notion, which refers that X has power over Y in the sense that if X achieves to make Y behave in accordance with his/her interests (Caporaso and Haggard, 1989: 103). ‘Conversion-process approach’ pays much attention to the context, in which X focuses on the

effectiveness of its tactics and strategies in order to efficiently use and convert its resources into influence over Y (Caporaso and Haggard, 1989: 110). Hence, the ‘decisional’ and ‘conversion process’ approaches refer to direct power relationships between actors in *conflict of interests* situations.

As distinct from the ‘decisional’ and ‘conversion process’ approaches, the ‘structural approach’ is able to explain instances where power is exercised indirectly between actors in the shape of limiting alternatives, silencing interest, agenda setting through a political organization (that is institutional setting) or political values (that is regimes) and their exploitation. These instances are where the Dahlian formulation of power cannot adequately explain due to its primary focus on the direct interactions between actors, in which actors explicitly make decisions in order to achieve their conflicting interests.⁵

In order to transcend the limits in Dahlian power conceptualization, ‘structural’ approach in Caporaso and Haggard’s categorization rests upon the framework proposed by two political scientists, Bachrach and Baratz (1962). Going into details, Bachrach and Baratz name the Dahlian conceptualization as the first face of power and theirs as the second face of power. Accordingly, they state as follows

Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962: 948).

⁵ It should be underlined that although this conceptualization of power is generally attributed to Dahl in the literature, this conceptualization is actually originated within Lasswell and Kaplan’s book *Power and Society* in which they claim, “power is participation in making decisions” (1950: 75).

In line with Bachrach and Baratz's conceptualization, Caporaso and Haggard (1989:113) define the 'structural approach' as such that "institutions and rules can provide the setting for strategic conduct and can create capabilities that empower and limit agents." Hence, the 'structural approach' can adequately explain the instances where outcomes are controlled through controlling the setting in which *conflict of interests* occurs indirectly rather than through a direct and overt confrontation. This approach shifts attention from direct and overt influence attempts of X to alter the behaviors of Y to indirect and latent influence attempts of X through silencing the interests or limiting the alternatives of Y through the intermediary of an institutional setting. In this respect, X and Y's positions within an institutional setting become an important site to be looked upon by power analysts because one side is advantaged structurally while the other is disadvantaged.

Accordingly, the 'structural approach' in Caporaso and Haggard's formulation points the second face of power in political science literature that is able to explain the instances where power is exercised indirectly between actors. This constitutes a considerable difference, yet still the 'structural approach' does not analytically differ from the 'decisional' and 'conversion-process' approaches. This is because the first face of power and the second face of power are, direct or indirect, *conflict of interests* based power conceptualizations, and thus have their roots in Weberian power understanding.

The 'locational approach' in Caporaso and Haggard's categorization, however, analytically differs from other power approaches. While the 'decisional', 'structural', 'conversion-process' approaches are *conflict of interests* based, the "locational approach" is a *shape of interest* based power conceptualization that has roots in

Lukesian power understanding. Hence, while the decisional', 'structural', 'conversion-process' approaches contain elements of intentionality, agency and strategic behavior in agent level, the 'locational approach' refers power relationships where intentionality and subjective strategic calculation of cost-benefit analysis play less (or no) role (Caporaso and Haggard, 1989:113).

Then, the 'locational approach' concerns the constitution of social capacities, positions, identities and interests through a particular configuration of structural environment. In such environment, actors behave in a certain manner not in accordance with their strategic conduct but in accordance with what they believe as appropriate to do. In this structural relationship, actors voluntarily comply with the standards of behavior produced in the line of hegemonic ideologies as these ideologies shape actors' perceptions of self-interest, referring that the 'locational approach' is able to explain the instances where overt or cover there is no *conflict of interests* at all but there is *shape of interests* in the background.

Including power conceptualizations from Lukesian tradition, Caporaso and Haggard's categorization covers power conceptualizations beyond Weberian understanding unlike the studies reviewed in the previous section. However, there is a weakness in the way that Caporaso and Haggard includes power conceptualization that has Lukesian elements.

Going into details, Caporaso and Haggard talk about a pure structural power conceptualization in identifying the 'locational approach', and thereby locate power into structure. This is explicit in their argument "power is best seen as a pure structure ... individuals cannot walk away with structural power" (Caporaso and

Haggard, 1989: 113). However, Lukes points a very thin structural element in his formulation, and thereby locate power into agents. To recall, Lukes defines power as such that X exercises power over Y by shaping his/her very wants.

As a result, we may infer that Caporaso and Haggard attempt to build a strong structural argument on Lukes' power conceptualization that has strong emphasis on agency, which has, at best, as Guzzini (1993: 470) states, a very thin concept on structure. However, this does not mean that the 'locational approach' and Lukesian power understanding are irreconcilable. On the contrary, they share a fundamental element that is their commitment on *shape of interest* rather than *conflict of interests* as it was mentioned. Yet, this is an analytical weakness for Caporaso and Haggard's 'locational approach' since they seem unaware of or even comfortable with the potential disparity between their strong structural argument and Lukes' strong agency-oriented power understanding.

Overall, Caporaso and Haggard present a comprehensive categorization that includes power conceptualizations rooted in Weberian and Lukesian understanding, neglecting an important power conceptualization in IR that is Foucauldian power understanding. The 'decisional' and 'conversion-process' approaches represent Dahlian power conceptualization, and the 'structural approach' corresponds to Bachrach and Baratz's second face of power. Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz's power conceptualizations are conflict based, and thereby 'decisional', 'conversion-process' and 'structural' approaches pursue Weberian tradition in IR. On the other hand, the 'locational approach' has roots in Lukesian tradition, as it is *shape of interest* based. In this respect, constituting its basic limitation, Caporaso and Haggard's categorization does not include Foucauldian power understanding, in which the

deterministic feature is *production of subjects*. Based on these, the table below shows the roots of ‘decisional’, ‘structural’, ‘conversion-process’ and ‘locational’ approaches in Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions.

Table 2: The Relationship between the Power Approaches in Caporaso and Haggard’s Categorization and Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian Traditions

	Caporaso and Haggard’s Power Categorization			
	Decisional	Conversion-Process	Structural	Locational
Weberian	✓ ⁶	✓	✓	X ⁷
Lukesian	X	X	X	✓
Foucauldian	X	X	X	X

⁶ ✓ indicates that “decisional approach” in Caporaso and Haggard’s power categorization originates from Weberian tradition.

⁷ X indicates that “locational approach” in Caporaso and Haggard’s power categorization does not originate from Weberian power understanding.

2.4.2. Guzzini (1993), “Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis”

Guzzini presents a categorization in his article “Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis” in order to show different structural power conceptualizations in IR. Compared to previous studies that are reviewed in this chapter, Guzzini’s categorization includes power conceptualizations in IR that have each one of the Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian elements within.

Guzzini begins his analysis with an examination on the power understanding in neorealist approach. For him, the neorealist concept of power contains “the contenders, their diverging interests and intentions, the open or tacit clash of wills, and the prevailing outcome” (Guzzini, 1993: 448). It is obvious that there is a strong Weberian tone in this depiction of neorealist concept of power because *conflict of interests* is at the heart.

Guzzini, also, points a common problem in the power conceptualization within neorealist approach. He states that neorealist power conceptualization has a dual and circular characteristic that feeds the ambiguity on the concept of power. The dual and circular characteristic is a consequence of confusing the notions ‘power as possession’ and ‘power as relation’. As Guzzini (1993: 449) puts it,

This conception of power has often been held to conceal an essentially circular argument both for assessment of the outcome and for the amount of power. On the one, it claims that (the distribution of) power is the main criterion for the explanation of outcomes. On the other, in some cases the outcomes are the main criterion for the assessment of power(s).

Having conducted a critical examination on the neorealist power conceptualization, Guzzini suggests that there are three different structural power conceptualizations in

IR. These are power as the production of ‘indirect institutional effects’, ‘unintended effects’ and ‘impersonally created effects’. The table below shows the examples, which Guzzini gives reference under each of his categories.

Table 3: Guzzini’s Categorization on Structural Power and Related Conceptualizations in IR

	Power as the production of		
	Indirect Institutional Effects	Unintended/Unconscious Effects	Impersonally Created Effects
Krasner	Metapower	-	-
Strange	Structural Power	Structural Power	
Caporaso; Caporaso and Haggard	Structural Power	-	Structural Power , Locational Power
Gill and Law	Structural Power	-	Hegemony/Structural Power
Ashley	-	-	Hegemony/In the Realm of Doxa

As explained by Guzzini, ‘power as the production of indirect institutional effects’ has a relational feature and is an update of the neorealist concept of power. Guzzini

(1993: 451), in order to explain ‘indirect institutional effects’, refers to Krasner’s concept of ‘metapower’, in which power is conceptualized in terms of intentional control over outcomes not through direct conflict situation but by changing the setting in which conflict takes place. Understood in this way, Krasner’s metapower concept (also the ‘power as the production of indirect institutional power’) shows similarities with Bachrach and Baratz’s second face of power, in which power functions indirectly between A and B’s conflicting interests through a social, political or institutional setting. Hence, ‘power as the production of indirect institutional effects’ is one of the power conceptualizations that represent Weberian tradition in IR since it explains power relationships *conflict of interests* occur indirectly through the medium of institutional settings.

Besides Krasner’s metapower, Guzzini, also, gives Susan Strange’s structural power as another example of ‘power as the production of indirect institutional power’. Guzzini (1993: 456) states that structural power conceptualization in Strange’s study is similar to Krasner’s metapower since they share similar elements, pointing an indirect power relationship between intentional actors. In Strange’s structural power conceptualization, a dominant state influences other states’ behaviors intentionally by shaping the security, financial, productive and knowledge structures of the global political economy (Strange, 1985: 13-25). Understood in this way, Strange’s structural power implies indirect control over actors’ behaviors through shaping the structures within global political economy. Therefore, her structural power shares the same analytical foundations with Krasner’s metapower that is Bachrach and Baratz’s second face of power, which puts it into Weberian tradition.

Guzzini refers to Strange's structural power conceptualization also in his category 'power as the production of unintended effects'. This category points that a state may influence outcomes unintentionally in the global economic system simply through its unilateral actions due to organization of the system in a particular way (Guzzini, 1993: 457). Indeed, Strange's structural power conceptualization has elements that falls into Guzzini's category 'power as the production of 'unintended effects'. For example, in "Toward a Theory of Transnational Empire", Strange (1989) suggests that the international economic structure appears to be a "transnational empire." Therefore, decisions taken by a state may systematically affect other actors even though that outcome was not intended.

However, due to its analytical limitations, Guzzini's categorization is not able to refer all aspects of Strange's structural power conceptualization. Guzzini categorizes power conceptualizations in terms their being as the production of 'indirect institutional effects', 'unintended effects' and 'impersonally created effects'. In the categories 'indirect institutional effects' and 'unintended effects', actors, intentionally or unintentionally, influences other's behaviors indirectly. The indirect power relationships within these two categories suggest that actors do not engage in shaping other's self-perceptions or interests but only in influencings others' behaviors. Therefore, we may name these two categories as Weberian since they are agent oriented and power relationship is seen only in terms of influencing behaviors actors. However, Strange's structural power conceptualization contains Lukesian elements as well, which Guzzini fails to include in his analysis due to analytical limitations.

By structural power, Strange (2004 [1988]: 26-28) refers the ability to shape the security, financial, production and knowledge structures. Control over the first three structures is Weberian. Security structure is about the control over people's security. It refers both threatening adversaries and protecting friends. Financial structure is related to control the supply and distribution of financial credits. And, production structure refers to control over the mode of production of goods and services. These three is about the ability to determine rules and procedures so that an actor can set the agenda and eliminate the issues detrimental to his/her interests which others may bring to the agenda. Understood in this way, control over security, financial and production structures have *conflict of interests* based perspective.

The control over knowledge structure in Strange's conceptualization differs from the other three in the sense it contains Lukesian elements. It suggests that the "changes in the fundamental perceptions of and beliefs about the human condition which influence value judgements and, through them, political and economic decisions and policies" (Strange, 2004 [1988]:20). In her article "An Eclectic Approach", Strange (1991: 37) explains what belief systems and their associated value preferences are. They imply something that inhabit or validate some kinds of roles together with their attached interests and actions instead of others. Hence, if one uses Strange's terminology, the control over knowledge structure involves in shaping perceptions and preferences or belief systems in such a way that other actors accept their roles in the structure because they are motivated to perceive their roles as natural and beneficial to them and because they see no alternative to those roles. Based on this, we may infer that the control over knowledge structure in Strange's conceptualization has a *shape of interest* based power understanding, which is the deterministic feature in Lukesian tradition.

In this respect, Guzzini is not able to refer the Lukesian aspect in Strange's structural power conceptualization because his categories are limited to a particular analytical framework. 'Power as the production of indirect institutional effects' is purely *conflict of interests* based and has emphasis on intentionality. 'Power as the production of unintended/unconscious effects' has its roots in unintentionality. And, 'power as the production of impersonally created effects' is not agency-oriented at all. In other words, Guzzini's analytical framework is unable to consider Lukesian aspects in Strange's structural power conceptualization, which has emphasis on intentionality of the power wielder and is *shape of interests* based that Guzzini cannot include in one of his categories, and ignores as a result.

Despite the limitations in Guzzini's categorization, its category 'power as the production of impersonally created effects' can include power conceptualizations that have Foucauldian elements, which is missing in the studies that are previously reviewed in this chapter. Guzzini (1993: 461-462) calls 'power as the production of impersonally created effects' as 'impersonal empowering' because, in his words, "the origin of the produced effect is not located at the level actors." In explaining 'impersonal power', Guzzini refers two fundamentally different power conceptualizations in IR. First conceptualization is described as "positional concept that focuses on the impersonal bias of international relations, which systematically gives an advantage to certain actors due to their specific positions or role in the international system." The second one implies "the link between knowledge and power, arguing that power requires prior intersubjective recognition" (Guzzini, 1993: 462).

Explaining the first conceptualization that is the positional concept in his ‘impersonal empowering’ category, Guzzini examines Gill and Law’s analysis on the power of capital in global level. It should be stated that, Gill and Law’s analysis perfectly fits in ‘impersonal power’ since they describe structural power in relation to the systematically created material and normative incentives and constraints (Gill and Law, 1988: 73). Rules and procedures of global political economy, Gill and Law (1989: 490) argue, constitute the material aspect of the structural power of capital by enabling and constraining particular set of behaviors. On the other hand, the widespread acceptance of the view in the global political economy that fundamentally connects the expectation for economic growth to the investment by private enterprise is the normative basis of the structural power of capital. This normative basis shapes states’ interests and preferences in the way that they compete with each other in order to attract foreign investment by multinational capital, which empowers the structural position of the structural power of capital. Understood in this way, it is mainly the structural functioning of global political economy based on material and normative aspects as the source of the power of global capital that shape the interests and beliefs of the actors functioning in the global economic structure rather than global capital’s bargaining strategies against state apparatus or labor unions.

Accordingly, Gill and Law argue that relational (or behavioral in their terminology) power conceptualization that focus on the process in which capitalists seeks to exert direct influence cannot fully grasp the power of global capital. It is necessary to combine relational power with structural one that functions through shaping the interests and beliefs of the actors (Gill and Law, 1989: 481). Hence, as they are explicit about it, Gill and Law follow Lukesian power understanding in explaining

their structural power conceptualization since *shape of interest* constitutes as the core component in the creation of material and normative aspects of the power of capital.

The second power conceptualization analyzed as ‘impersonal empowering’ in Guzzini’s categorization is Ashley’s analysis on power as power/knowledge. Ashley’s analysis suggest that power does not belong to any agent or structure but comes from everywhere and produces all social subjectivities, identities and interests. The systems of signification and meanings are the main pillars of this power understanding rather than intentionally motivated actions of agents, or particular way of functioning of a structure. Understood in this way, power originates from rites, routines and discursive practices, the effects of which produce, normalize, legitimize or delegitimize meanings, actions and subjects.

Ashley (1989: 269) employs Bourdieu’s concept of “doxa” in order to explain the system of normalization and legitimization and its functioning as power. This power conceptualization is both impersonal and *production of subjects* based since it concerns how meanings, actions and subjectivities are produced through discourses, rituals and practices without the intentional interference of actors or structurally determined incentives and constraints. Hence, Ashley’s power conceptualization in IR has its roots in Foucauldian tradition.

Overall, although the analytical framework of his categorization contains limitations, demonstrated in the case of Strange’s structural power concept, Guzzini’s categorization is able to include power conceptualizations in the discipline that have roots in each one of the Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions. This makes Guzzini’s study one of the comprehensive categorizations on the concept of power in

the discipline. The table below shows the relationship between Guzzini's categories of power and Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions.

Table 4: The Relationship between Structural Power Conceptualizations in Guzzini's Categorization and Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian Traditions

	Guzzini's Categorization on Structural Power Conceptualizations in IR		
	Indirect Institutional Power	Nonintentional Power	Impersonal Empowering
Weberian	✓	✓	X
Lukesian	X	X	✓
Foucauldian	X	X	✓

2.4.3. Barnett and Duvall (2005), "Power in International Politics"

Similar to Guzzini, Barnett and Duvall (2005) present a comprehensive taxonomy that includes various power conceptualizations in the discipline originating from Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions. Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy is built upon two analytical dimensions that are "the kinds of social relations through which power works (in relations of interaction or in social relations of constitution)" and "the specificity of social relations through which effects are produced (specific/direct or diffuse/indirect)". Based on these, Barnett and Duvall (2005: 45)

outline four power conceptualizations in IR that are ‘compulsory’, ‘institutional’, ‘structural’ and ‘productive’. Accordingly, their taxonomy is as follows

Table 5: Barnett and Duvall’s Taxonomy on Power in IR

		Relational Specificity	
		<u>Direct</u>	<u>Diffuse</u>
Power works Through	<u>Interactions of Specific Actors</u>	COMPULSORY	INSTITUTIONAL
	<u>Social Relations of Constitution</u>	STRUCTURAL	PRODUCTIVE

‘Compulsory power’ and ‘institutional power’ in Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy are conflict based conceptualizations since the former is in line with Dahl’s power definition and the latter rests on the analytical framework that Bachrach and Baratz introduced. Barnett and Duvall (2005: 51) describes ‘compulsory power’ as “the direct control of one actor of the conditions and actions of another.” Hence, ‘compulsory power’ focuses on the instances where X directly gets Y to behave in parallel to X’s preferences which Y would not do otherwise. Understood in this way, ‘compulsory power’ conceptualization points a similar notion with what Wolfers and Baldwin mean with the notion ‘power as relation’ and Caporaso and Haggard with ‘decisional approach’.

Whereas ‘compulsory power’ points a direct power relationship between actors, ‘institutional power’ implies indirect ways of control between actors. ‘Institutional power’ refers a power relationship between actors via the institutional arrangements. Then, the conceptual focus moves from the direct influence attempts of actors to

formal and informal institutional settings functioning as a regulatory mechanism of the relationship between actors (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 51). Accordingly, X has control over the behaviors of Y by setting the agenda, decisional rules, formalized lines of responsibility within an institutionalized setting. Hence, power does not typically occur through X's direct control over Y but through social, political or institutional arrangements as intermediate in power relationship between X and Y. Hence, issues of conflict are resolved through social, political or institutional arrangements rather than direct relationships. However, as they point direct or indirect conflict situations, both 'compulsory power' and 'institutional power' follow *conflict of interests* based Weberian tradition

'Structural power' in taxonomy suggests a way different power conceptualization analytically. In Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 53) words, "structural power concerns the determination of social capacities and interests." In 'structural power' conceptualization, there is no direct or indirect interest based confrontation between actors. On the contrary, 'structural power' looks at the material and normative determinants that shape actors' interests, and thus constrain them from recognizing their real interests (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 53). Hence, we may suggest that the *shape of interest* based Lukesian tradition constitutes the analytical core of 'structural power'.

However, the analytical base of 'structural power' category within Barnett and Duvall's analytical framework is slippery. Barnett and Duvall place 'structural power' at the intersection between 'social relations of constitution' and 'direct relational effect' in their taxonomy. In this regard, they identify 'structural power' as follows

Structural power concerns the structures- or, more precisely, the co-constitutive, internal relations of structural positions- that define what kinds of social beings actors are. It produces the very social capacities of structural, or subject, positions in direct relation to one another, and the associated interests, that underlie and dispose action (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 52-53).

The argument would have presented a consistent logic if Barnett and Duvall simply imply co-constitutive direct structural relations between master-slave, capital-labor, and so on. Indeed, the relationship between a master and a slave is co-constitutive since the identity of being a master is constituted in direct relation with the identity of being a slave, producing no problem in locating ‘structural power’ on the social relations of constitution’ and ‘direct relational effect’ intersection in the taxonomy. However, Barnett and Duvall also speak of the effects of structure on social subjects, which is obvious in their argument that is

Structural power shapes the fates and conditions of existence of actors in two critical ways. One, structural positions do not necessarily generate equal social privileges; instead structures allocate differential capacities, and typically differential advantages, to different positions... Two, the social structure not only constitutes actors and their capacities, it also shapes their self-understanding and subjective interests (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 53).

Here, Barnett and Duvall speak of constitution of actors by structure with their differential capacities and subjective interests, meaning that Barnett and Duvall explicitly state that there is a direct relationship between social structure and its role in constituting the social capacities of actors and shaping self-understanding and subjective interests of them. If the relationship between structure and the constitution of self-understanding and subjective interests of actors is portrayed as a direct relationship, the agent-structure relationship is reduced to a kind of behavioral fallacy. This is to say that structure becomes an independent variable and actors, together with their capacities, self-understandings and interests, become dependent variable.

Nevertheless, the constructivist tradition in IR demonstrates that the relationship between agents and structure is co-constitutive because it is the intersubjective understandings and practices of actors that also shape structure (see Wendt, 1987). From this point of view, we may infer that structure is a constitution upon the collective understandings of actors; in return, it constitutes the self-perceptions of actors. Also, the co-constitutive relationship between structure and actors points a diffusive process rather than a direct one. If the collective understandings on the shape of structure and self-understandings of actors are not diffused into the deepest veins of social life, the intersubjective reality on which structural power rests upon cannot be consolidated. Adler (1997:322)'s arguments on the consolidation of structures supports this argument here, "most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings; that they are reified structures that were once upon a time conceived ex nihilo by human consciousness; and that these understandings were subsequently diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted."

So far, it is suggested that 'compulsory power' and 'institutional power' conceptualizations in Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy have their roots in Weberian tradition and 'structural power' conceptualization has very much in common with Lukesian tradition. In addition to these, 'productive power' conceptualization in Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy is connected to Foucauldian tradition. Barnett and Duvall (2005: 55) defines 'productive power' as "the constitution of all social subjects with various social power through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general scope." Understood in this way, *production of subjects* based power understanding is at the heart of 'productive power' conceptualization. In the process of such production, language and discursive practice play an important role because conceptual focus in 'productive power' is on how systems of

signification and meaning produce all aspects of social life. Therefore, ‘productive power’ concerns the power of discourses in the production of human beings as subjects and the material and social world they live in as reality.

Including power conceptualizations from each one of Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions, Barnett and Duvall present a comprehensive taxonomy of power in international politics. The table below shows the relationship between the power conceptualizations in Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy and Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions.

Table 6: The Relationship between Barnett and Duvall’s Taxonomy on Power in International Politics and Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian Traditions

	Barnett and Duvall’s Taxonomy on Power in International Politics			
	Compulsory Power	Institutional Power	Structural Power	Productive Power
Weberian	✓	X	X	X
Lukesian	X	X	✓	X
Foucauldian	X	X	X	✓

Although they are successful at providing a comprehensive study on the concept of power in IR, the notion ‘power as possession’ which has considerable impact on the

study and practice of international politics is missing in Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy. Their analysis directly starts with 'compulsory power' conceptualization that has strong emphasis on the notion 'power as relation'. This is the main limitation of Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy since their analytical framework is unable to include the notion 'power as possession'. To recall, Barnett and Duvall build their taxonomy on two analytical dimensions, "the kinds of social relations through which power works (in relations of interaction or in social relations of constitution)" and "the specificity of social relations through which effects are produced (specific/direct or diffuse/indirect)". Since the notion 'power as possession' does not entail a social relationship within its conceptual scheme, Barnett and Duvall are not able to give this power notion a space in their taxonomy. Since the notion 'power as possession' occupies an important place in the study of international politics, being unable to give any place or even a mention of the notion constitutes a basic limitation in Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy.

2.4.4. Berenskoetter (2007), "Thinking About Power"

Berenskoetter (2007)'s study is another comprehensive overview of the diverse power conceptualizations in IR. In his study, Berenskoetter is able to include power conceptualizations in the discipline that have roots in each one of Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions. In his overview, Berenskoetter classifies different power conceptualizations into three categories (or dimensions in his terminology). He named the first category as 'winning conflict', the second as 'limiting alternatives' and the third as 'shaping normality'. While, the first and

second categories include power conceptualizations, which refer direct or indirect (overt or covert) *conflict of interests* situations, the third category covers not conflictual but consensual power relationships.

The first category ‘winning conflicts’ specifically points power conceptualizations in IR that adopted Dahl (1968: 405-15)’s definition of “A getting B to do something B would otherwise not do.” Hence, ‘winning conflicts’ involves a focus on the power relationships in which actors deploy their resources and capabilities in order to realize their subjective and contradictory interests. Accordingly, the first category in Berenskoetter represents the ‘power as relation’ notion in the literature on power. Moreover, as it focuses on the realization of contradictory interests in the assessment of power, we may suggest that the category ‘winning conflicts’ is *conflict of interests* based and thereby has its roots in Weberian tradition.

Similar to the first category ‘winning conflicts’, the second category ‘limiting alternatives’ includes *conflict of interests* based power conceptualizations in IR. However, whereas the first category considers direct conflict situations, the second category focuses on indirect power relationships between actors. In indirect power relationships, to recall, power works through institutional arrangements, which prevent contradictory interests to be voiced. Understood in this way, works through shaping the agendas, rules and procedures of institutional frameworks in order to eliminate the issues that are potential points of conflicts. In this respect, power is conceptualized in the category ‘limiting alternatives’ as such that X limits behaviors of Y in accordance with his/her interests indirectly through the rules and procedures that define formal and informal institutions.

Berenskoetter's third category 'shaping normality' is analytically different from the first and second categories. It contains element from both *shape of interest* based Lukesian tradition and *production of subjects* based Foucauldian tradition. In explaining the third category, Berenskoetter (2007: 10) explicitly refers the ideas of Lukes and Foucault on power. Referring Lukesian power understanding, he speaks of "the ability to shape the interests of others." In similar vein, referring Foucauldian power understanding, he talks about "the constitution of subject ... through discourses of normality." By referring these two power traditions, Berenskoetter is able to demonstrate that power does not only work through *conflict of interests* but also through the creation of consensus created by *shaping interests* and *production of subject*.

Overall, it is possible to say that Berenskoetter provides us a comprehensive overview of the concept of power in IR. He presents an analytical framework that is able to include diverse power conceptualizations in IR that have roots in each of Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian power understandings. The table below shows the relationship between Berenskoetter's categories and Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions.

Table 7: The Relationship between Berenskoetter’s Categorization on Power in IR and Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian Traditions

	Berenskoetter’s Categorization on Power Conceptualizations in IR		
	The First Dimension: Winning Conflicts	The Second Dimension: Limiting Alternatives	The Third Dimension: Shaping Normality
Weberian	✓	✓	X
Lukesian	X	X	✓
Foucauldian	X	X	✓

However, it is necessary to note that it is actually better to discuss Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions in two different categories since scholars who work on these traditions build their arguments on critiques directed to each other. For example, Lukes (2005: 88) himself calls Foucauldian power understanding as “ultra-radical”, which presents a rather different analytical framework compared to his own. Lukes criticizes Foucauldian power understanding in the sense that it does not give any possibility to escape from the effects of power since Foucault defines power as something not repressive but productive of meanings that constitutes all aspects of

life (see Foucault, 1980: 39). As Garland (1990: 138) comments on Foucauldian power understanding, “power operates ‘through’ individuals rather than ‘against’ them and helps constitute the individual who is at the same time its vehicle.” Hence, Foucauldian power understanding suggests that if there are no operations of power at work, the world would be meaningless and we would not talk about the existence of any subjectivity. The world we live in and we as the inhabitants of the world are all products of power. Therefore, freedom from the effects of power is an unattainable end.

In this respect, Lukes presents a fundamentally different power understanding. First of all, the Lukesian power understanding has an emancipatory agenda in the sense that it normatively aims to raise an awareness that the very interests of people might be shaped by the effects of power. This is obvious in the question Lukes (2005: 28) asked “is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people ... from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences ...?” Based on this, we may infer that as distinct from Foucauldian power understanding, Lukesian power understanding is built upon the possibility of a residue of subjectivity within human beings that is repressed by power rather than produced by it.

Accordingly, Lukes and Foucault point two normatively different understandings on power. There is also difference on analytical grounds that while Lukes accepts a minimal foundation regarding the subjectivity within human beings, which is repressed by power, Foucault rejects even a minimal foundation, and thereby assumes power as the underlying source of all aspects of life and subjectivities within. Hence, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions represent two different

phenomena, one is repressive and other one is productive, which Berenskoetter seems to neglect as he puts them in the same category and treats them as similar in ‘shaping normality.’

2.5. Concluding Remarks

This chapter provided an overview of the studies attempted to clarify the meaning of the concept of power or to categorize different power conceptualizations in IR. This was possible through a descriptive conceptual analysis to discover the underlying deterministic features in Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions, which were then utilized as criteria to demonstrate the limitations and internal inconsistencies in the existing studies on power in the discipline that attempt to develop a full-fledged power conceptualization or establish a categorization on different power conceptualizations.

The studies that attempts to provide a full-fledged meaning to the concept, unfortunately, remained short in this task since they could include elements from only one of the three thinking traditions on power that is Weberian. This is not surprising because when utilized as a scholarly concept, power makes sense only within the tradition in which it is utilized or embedded. This point is deeply elaborated in the next chapter.

The studies that categorize different power conceptualizations in the discipline, on the other hand, is either limited in the sense that they cannot include power conceptualizations from each one of the thinking traditions on the concept or even if

they are able to include them, there emerge inevitable internal inconsistencies. This is due to fact that every categorization has to rely on respective criteria to distinguish power conceptualizations in a systematic manner. These criteria constitute the analytical framework of the established categorization. But at the same time, each categorization on the concept of power becomes limited to these criteria. Table 8 below demonstrates a general outlook of the studies that were discussed in this chapter with their relationship with Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian traditions.

Overall, this chapter demonstrated that it is difficult (if not impossible) to develop a full-fledged power conceptualization, or establish a categorization on different power conceptualizations in the discipline without limitations. Therefore, this dissertation prefers to evaluate each power conceptualization in the discipline separately by historicizing their developments without engaging in categorizing them. Historicizing diverse power conceptualizations provides tools to understand why there are many power conceptualizations in the discipline with identifying the main features and focus of aspects of each power conceptualization in the discipline.

Table 8: A General Outlook of the Studies on the Concept of Power with their Relationship Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian Traditions

	Commonalities and Divergences Among Studies on Power in IR		
	Weberian	Lukesian	Foucauldian
Wolfers	-power as possession -power as relation	-	-
Baldwin	-power as possession -power as relation	-	-
Holsti	-capabilities -acts	-	-
Taber	-power capability -applied power	-	-
Caporaso and Haggard	-decisional approach -conversion-process approach -structural approach	-locational approach	-
Guzzini	-indirect institutional power -nonintentional	-impersonal power	-impersonal power
Barnett and Duvall	-compulsory power -institutional power	-structural power	-productive power
Berenskoetter	-the first dimension: winning conflicts -the second dimension: limiting alternatives	-the third dimension: shaping normality	-the third dimension: shaping normality

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICIZING THE DIVERSITY OF POWER CONCEPTUALIZATIONS IN THE DISCIPLINE

It was underlined in the beginning of the previous chapter that power has been a prominent feature of international relations from the ancient Greece to the present day. However, there is lack of agreement on what the concept means in the discipline, resulting there are many power conceptualizations circulating in the discipline.

It was also emphasized that there are two reasons that make it difficult to provide a full-fledged power conceptualization. The first reason stems from power's being a policy-contingent concept. Hence, any power analysis first requires for specification of the context, inhibiting the development of a general theory on power (Baldwin, 1979: 167). The second reason is related with theory-dependent character of the concept. This is to say that the concept of power acquires its meaning depending upon the theories in which it is utilized. The theory-dependent character of power is confirmed by many scholars. For example, Merrit and Zinnes (1989: 27) state, "the nature of our theory of international politics determines how we conceptualize

power.” In parallel, Mearsheimer (2001: 422) notes, “power can be defined in different ways ... a scholar’s theory, in fact, determines the appropriate definition.”

If power is both a policy-contingent and theory-dependent concept, it is not surprising to have many power conceptualizations in the discipline, given the intricateness of the international politics and the diversity of theoretical positions. This refers that each one of the power conceptualizations in IR is a product of a particular historical and theoretical processes. Hence, this chapter reveals these historical processes and theoretical, epistemological and methodological requirements that give rise to specific power conceptualizations in the discipline. In other words, the chapter conducts a performative conceptual analysis, and thus historicize the concept of power in IR in order to discover how power has come to be conceptualized in many ways, and how a specific power conceptualization has come to mean as it is known to mean in particular way. This chapter, at the same time, conducts a descriptive conceptual analysis in the sense that it clarifies the main features and focus of aspects of each power conceptualization as being the products of international political developments and debates within IR Theory.

3.1. Power Conceptualizations in Positivist Approaches

3.1.1. The Possessional Power Conceptualization: Power Enters the Scene of International Relations in the Interwar Period

The destruction of the World War I was enormous compared to the wars until that time that it was called as the “war to end all wars” (see Wells, 2010 [1914]). In order

to prevent future wars like the World War I, a group of practitioners and thinkers, known as idealists, developed a set of ideas. The idealists aimed to establish a peaceful world order based on international law, international organizations and morality (Jackson & Sorensen, 2003: 37). Woodrow Wilson, a prominent figure of idealists, argued that peace could be secured with the creation and maintenance international organizations, which would regulate the effects of balance of power and international anarchy. In this respect, idealists assumed that conflict could be resolved through non-violent mechanisms rather than wars (Dunne, 2006: 191). In order to achieve such world order, the League of Nations was formed and the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed. However, the Great Depression in 1929 and the rise of Fascism, Nazism and Communism all over the world in the 1930s demonstrated the failure of idealist projects in international politics.

In such an environment, realist thinkers assaulted the idealist ideas concerning international order and peace. This assault gave rise to a debate between idealism and realism, famously known as the 'First Great Debate' that shaped the International Relations Theory.⁸ Formulating realist arguments on the characteristics of international politics against idealists, Edward H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau are leading figures in the realist camp. Carr (1946 [1939]: 5) identifies idealist arguments

⁸ There are alternative views on the 'First Great Debate in International Relations Theory. For example, Brian Schmidt (2012 [2002]: 13-14) asserts that International Relations as a discipline emerged far before than 1919 when was the end of the World War I. Therefore, as Schmidt states, the belief that associates the emergence of the discipline with the so-called idealism is a myth. Since the beginning of the study of IR goes before the World War I, the so-called idealist-realist debate cannot be identified as the founding debate in International Relations Theory. Apart from Schmidt, Lucian Ashworth (2002; 2006: 291-292) asserts that the so-called 'First Great Debate' did not take place in International Relations Theory because, in his words, "an idealist paradigm did not exist, and that interwar references to idealism or utopianism are contradictory and have little to do with defining a paradigm. Not only is there no idealist paradigm in IR at this time, but authors from the interwar period that have since been dismissed as idealists rarely share the attributes assigned to idealism or utopianism by later writers." In line with Ashworth, William T. R. Fox (1989: 239) observed that the 'First Great Debate' was rather a "one sided" debate since it was hard to talk about a structured and self-proclaimed idealist camp against realists.

as “utopia” in his famous book *The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939*. Moreover, he states that idealist practitioners and thinkers have focused on the visionary projects for the attainment of the ends, which they desire with respect to the international order and peace, rather than paying attention to the realities of international developments through a cause and effect relationship perspective. As a result, idealists, Carr argues, missed the factors of power in international politics.

For Carr, the failure of idealist ideas was not surprising because idealists began their analyses with a misleading question that was “what should the international politics be?” According to realists, this question does not provide a solid ground for idealists since it is impossible to construct a theory for the attainment of desires with respect to the international order and peace without understanding the nature of international politics. Carr calls this tendency in idealist thinking as “wishing prevails over thinking”. Hence, realism starts its analysis by asking “what does international politics look like?” and places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts in international politics and focused on their causes and consequences (Carr, 1946 [1939]: 10)

In line with Carr, Morgenthau states that a theory cannot be constructed on preconceived abstract principles or concepts unrelated to reality. In Morgenthau (1985 [1948]: 3)’s words

a theory must meet a dual test, an empirical and a logical one: Do the facts as they actually are lend themselves to the interpretation the theory has put upon them, and do the conclusions at which the theory arrives follow with logical necessity from its premises? In short, is the theory consistent with the facts and within itself?

From this point of view, Morgenthau (1948: 13) answers the question, ‘what does international politics look like?’ as follows: “international politics, like all politics, is

a struggle for power.” He adds, “whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim”. Hence, realists put the concept of power at the center of international relations.

The interest of realist thinkers in power actually goes back to 1930s. As Baldwin (2016: 92) quotes, Nicholas J. Spykman, another leading realist thinker, presented a paper at the Fifth Conference of International Law in 1933 entitled “Methods of Approach to the Study of International Relations.” In this paper, Spykman describes international political relations as a struggle for power. In the same year, Frederick L. Schuman (1933: 491) published a textbook *International Politics*, which claims, “all politics is struggle for power, but while power is sought in domestic politics as a means toward other ends, power is sought as an end itself in international politics.”

For classical realists, the characteristics of human nature and the anarchical feature of the international politics are the determinant factors that make international politics as a struggle for power. In their conceptualization of human nature, Reinhold Niebuhr, who blended the realist arguments with Christian theology, was influential. Niebuhr (2011 [1944]: 19) claims that “there is no level of human moral achievement in which there is not some corruption of inordinate self-love.” From this point of view, since humans as being egoist actors run states, states are corrupted by selfishness. Hence, the international environment consists of egoist states. In such an egoistic environment, it is impossible to establish a harmony of interest between self-regarding states because the strength of individual interest is far bigger than collective interest (Niebuhr, 2011 [1944]: 38-41).

Concurring with Niebuhr, Morgenthau (1946: 14) claims that human nature is “the element of corruption and sin injects even into the best intentions at least a drop of evil and thus spoils it.” He adds that corrupted human nature is driven by two basic instincts. First, the egoist desire on scarce materials and ideational goods such as money, jobs, marriage and some other relations, which are vital needs of individuals. This egoist desire comes from the selfish drive to survive. Second instinct is the desire to maintain or improve the position of own position against others, which Morgenthau calls as “animus dominandi” or the desire to dominate (Morgenthau, 1946: 192-193). Hence, human nature makes all men have a “lust for power.” In this respect, Morgenthau (1946: 1968) describes man as such: “Man is a political animal by nature ... Man is born to seek power”. Based on this claim, Morgenthau (1985 [1948]: 4) sees politics as a realm that is governed by objective laws that have roots in human nature. Therefore, all politics are evil because they conducted by evil men with their corrupted nature with the lust for power.

Classical realists argue that egoistic passions driven by corrupted human nature can be tamed in a state in which there are vertical relations and hierarchical political structure. In this structure, there is a high authority to regulate the relations between egoist individuals. However, in international relations there is no such authority, meaning that anarchy prevails in international realm. Hence, there is not any enforcement body to prevent states from slitting each other’s throat. Since states are selfish units and there is absence of a centralized authority in international relations, each state tends to provide its own security through ‘self-help’. Self-help necessitates a state acquiring more and more power. As a result of a state’s having more and more power, other states start to feel insecure since they become weaker relative to that state acquiring more power. Therefore, other states begin acquiring more and more

power, too. This creates a dilemma in the relations of states, which John Herz (1950: 15) calls as “security dilemma”.

Accordingly, classical realists identify the concept of power as the core element of international politics as the outcome of human nature and anarchy. For example, Schuman (1933: 9) depicts the state of international relations as “the law of jungle”. If the law of jungle prevails in international realm, states have to be strong as much as possible in order to survive. Similarly, Spykman (2008 [1942]: 16-18) suggests that international society consists of sovereign states and does not have a central authority to enforce law and order, thereby improvement of relative power position against others becomes the primary goal of foreign policy. Hence, international politics becomes a struggle for power. Spykman also asserts that the anarchical character of international politics renders any form of coercion as permissible. Thus, struggle for power becomes identical with the struggle for survival. In addition, Schwarzenberger (1951: 147) argues that the overriding role of power in international relations is a result of corrupted human nature and anarchical feature of international relations.

As Carr (1946 [1939]: 102) notes “politics are ... in one sense always power politics”, power has a key role in realist arguments with respect to international relations. However, it is obvious that classical realists fail to give a clear definition of the concept. For example, Carr did not provide an explicit definition of power, but for the purposes of his discussion, he divided power into three categories: military power, economic power and power over opinion (Carr, 1946 [1939]: 108). Among them, military power constitutes the most important power instrument. Carr (1946 [1939]: 109) justifies this importance by stating,

the supreme importance of the military instrument lies in the fact that the *ultima ratio* of power in international relations is war. Every act of the state, in its power aspect, is directed to war, not as desirable weapon, but as a weapon which it may require in the last resort to use.

Having such an importance, Carr (1946 [1939]: 111) sees military power not only an instrument but also an end in itself. Giving a primary position to military power, Carr evaluates economic power to the extent that it contributes to the military instrument of a state. In his words, “Economic strength has always been an instrument of political power, if only through its association with the military instrument. Only the most primitive kinds of warfare are altogether independent of the economic factor” (Carr, 1946 [1939]: 113). In addition to military and economic power, Carr puts emphasis on power over opinion. He links power over opinion with propaganda, which becomes an effective instrument when it is combined with military and economic power. In this respect, Carr (1946 [1939]: 141) states that “slogans ... [has] no meaning or substance apart from the national policies of the countries by which they were used. Power over opinion cannot be dissociated from military and economic power.”

While Carr refrained himself from giving a definition for power, Morgenthau seems to have a confusion in defining power. On the one hand, he defines power through the relational conceptualization (‘power as relation’), on the other hand, he talks about possessional conceptualization (‘power as possession’) as the proper way to define power.⁹ Accordingly, Morgenthau (1948: 13) defines power at the beginning of the second chapter of *Politics Among Nations* as such: “When we speak of power, we mean man’s control over the minds and actions of other men”. After defining

⁹ To recall, the possessional conceptualization defines power with respect to the possession of some specific resources, while relational conceptualization refers to a power relationship between two or more actors in which “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957: 202-203).

power as such, Morgenthau defines political power as “a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised” (Morgenthau, 1948: 14). Here, Morgenthau goes to a sharp distinction between political power and military power. The distinguishing marker between the two is the actual exercise of physical violence, which Morgenthau sees as “the abdication of political power in favor of military or pseudo military power”. Hence, political power is linked to psychological influence of an actor over another actor, while military power is about exerting physical influence. These definitions, placing Morgenthau into the relational power camp in defining power, explicitly point relational power conceptualization

However, in the further chapters of *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau (1948: 80-109) equates power with the possession of several material and non-material resources. These are geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale and quality of diplomacy. For Morgenthau, these resources are the components of national power whose combination makes states powerful or less powerful. Understood in this way, unlike his definition of power in terms of ‘power as relation’, Morgenthau seems to suggest that power is the possession of resources. From this point, it is obvious that he has confusion in defining the concept of power.

Apart from his confusion on defining of power, there is a common misunderstanding on how Morgenthau conceives the elements of power. Accordingly, Baldwin (2016: 109) misinterprets Morgenthau’s power understanding. He suggests that Morgenthau evaluates power resources in terms of their contribution to military power of a state. In one way, Baldwin’s argument is right since Morgenthau considers the geography of Italy both as an advantage and disadvantage since “under all conditions of warfare

of which we know, this geographical situation has made it extremely difficult to invade Central Europe from Italy, while it has made it extremely difficult to invade Italy from the north” (Morgenthau, 1948: 81). Concerning natural resources, he talks about “countries enjoying self-sufficiency, such as United States and Russia.” For Morgenthau (1948: 83), these countries “need not divert their national energies from their primary objectives in order to make sure that their populations will not starve in war.” Moreover, he adds, “What holds true of food is of course also true of those natural resources which are important for industrial production and, more particularly, for the waging war”. On industrial capacity, Morgenthau (1948: 87) refers to the development of heavy industries that is key for the production of the technology of modern warfare and communications. Among the elements of national power, military preparedness is factor that gives the geography, natural resources and industrial capacity their actual importance (Morgenthau, 1948: 88).

Understood in this way, Baldwin is right to infer that the principal thinking in Morgenthau’s mind with respect to the resources is about war-making capability of a state. Although this is the case for many other realists¹⁰, this is not entirely valid for Morgenthau’s power understanding. For Morgenthau (1948: 105-108) considers the quality of diplomacy in peacetime as having same importance in contributing national power, evident in his words

the quality of ... diplomacy combines ... [other elements of national power] into an integrated whole ... The conduct of a nation’s foreign affairs by its diplomats is for national power in peace what military strategy and tactics by its military leaders are for national power in war.

¹⁰ As also Baldwin refers, Schuman (1933: 512) states that “military force has ever been the decisive means by which state power has been created, increased, reduced, or destroyed.” Carr (1946 [1939]: 109) asserts that “the supreme importance of the military instrument lies in the fact that the *ultima ratio* of power in international relations is war. Every act of the state, in its power aspect, is directed to war, not as desirable weapon, but as a weapon which it may require in the last resort to use.”

Hence, Morgenthau claims that a nation's capacity in peace is equally important to its capacity in wartime. Morgenthau demonstrates this by giving an example from U.S. foreign policy. Accordingly, although the United States (the US) was potentially powerful thanks to its geography, natural resources, industrial potential, and population in the interwar period, it played a minor role in world affairs due to its lack of diplomatic quality.

To wrap up, we can conclude that power entered the scene of International Relations with the ideas of classical realist thinkers targeting the idealists, who built their arguments on the desire of establishing a peaceful international order. In such an order, idealists assumed that international law and organizations would preserve peace and eradicate the effects of power politics. Against such views, classical realist thinkers identified international politics as a struggle for power in which states have lust for power since it is the only way to guarantee their survival. Hence, power is an essential element in international relations for realists. Although they give such an emphasis on power in their arguments, classical realists hesitate to give a definition of power. However, they seem to endorse possessional power conceptualization that equates power with the possession of some certain resources. In other words, they view power resources as if they are power itself.

Last but not least, we may suggest that classical realists at the time were heavily influenced by the diplomatic historians in conceptualizing power through the notion 'power as possession'. This is because the classical realists derived their assumptions mainly by examining the European diplomatic history. And, the dominant power conceptualization in the writings of diplomatic historians is the possessional conceptualization. For example, Gulick (1955: 24), a diplomatic historian, states,

“the power of individual states was conceived to be susceptible of measurement by certain well-defined factors” such as territory, population, material wealth and army size.

3.1.2. The Possessional Power Conceptualization under Criticism: The Rise of Relational Power Conceptualization

With the beginning of 1950s, there were series of ground shaking developments that affected the course of International Relations. In this period, international politics had faced several events such as decolonization process, Vietnam War and oil crisis. These events demonstrated the existing power conceptualization at the time, the possessional conceptualization, is limited to explain the all dynamics of power relationships in international politics.

In addition to the developments in international politics, a methodological debate within social science, which emerged at 1950's but intensified at 1960s and 1970s, began to influence the International Relations Theory. This methodological debate was revolving around the applicability of the methods in natural sciences to social sciences. Unavoidably, this debate led to criticisms against the existing power conceptualizations and the emergence of new ones in the discipline.

As a note, in analyzing the effects of international developments and the methodological debates to the evolution of concept of power in IR, it requires to assume them in relation to other rather than assessing them as separately. For the

parallelism between the developments in international politics and International Relations Theory is more than just coincidence.

3.1.2.1. Behaviorism in IR: Methodological Challenges to the Possessional Power Conceptualization

Began at 1950's but intensified at 1960s and 1970s, a new great debate took place in International Relations Theory between traditionalists and behavioralists. This was a methodological debate to the extent that traditionalists conducted their analysis through historical observation and interpretative judgments while behavioralists relied on the idea that the methods in natural sciences are suitable for the development of International Relations (McClelland, 1969: 4; Kaplan, 1974: 443). As the beginning point of the debate, behavioralists accused traditionalists of building their arguments upon unscientific methods. From this point of view, behavioralists claimed that the arguments of traditionalists are nothing more than philosophical discussions (Porter, 1994: 107).

The debate on being 'scientific' should be revealed further since this was already one of the issues that was raised against idealism by classical realist thinkers in the First Great Debate. Although realists during the first debate accused idealists of being unscientific, in the Second Great Debate behavioralists criticized both idealists and realists on the grounds of being unscientific. Therefore, the issue needs to be elaborated in order to understand how the issue of science differs between the first and the second debates in the discipline. In the first debate, the realist critique against idealism was about the research question that idealist thinkers asked in analyzing the

international politics. Idealists were asking, “what should international politics look like?” instead of “what does international politics look like?” For classical realists, by asking such imaginative questions, idealist thinkers conducted their analysis for the attainment of their visionary projects with respect to the nature of international relations instead of endeavoring themselves to explore facts and discover the cause-effect relations between them.

In the second debate, the science issue was discussed around methodological substance (Knorr & Rosenau, 1969: 12). Behavioralists found methods that traditionalists employed are problematic, and sought to introduce a systematic method of inquiry for IR. For them, IR could progressively move forward only if it relies on the scientific methods in the natural sciences, which allow for the collection of observable data, hypothesis testing and falsification (Kaplan, 1966: 4-5). As a result of this understanding, behavioralists endorsed a positivist understanding in their conduct of science.

In broad sense, positivism in social sciences can be best identified as the emulation of natural sciences by promoting scientific methods, which are mainly quantitative methods, as tools to uncover regularities within social realm and to predict future human behaviors (Linklater, 2007:49). There are four main assumptions can be identified on positivist way of science (see Smith & Owens 2006:274; Sterling-Folker, 2006: 6-7; Kurki and Wight, 2010 [2007]: 18-19; Wight, 2013 [2002]: 35-36). First, science is a unified body that natural and social sciences can be drawn on same methodologies. Second, the facts are neutral; therefore, there is a strong emphasize on the distinction between fact and values. Third, there are regularities in

social world as in natural one that can be discovered through theories. Fourth, empiricist epistemology is the only way to assess the validity of truth claims.

From the point of positivist way of science, the arguments of traditionalists regarding the nature of international politics were ambiguous and not suitable for empirical falsification. For behavioralists, if a theory is not falsifiable, it is not a theory at all (Sanders, 2002: 50). In order to understand this, an examination on the classical realist arguments about 'human nature' is useful. For classical realists, human nature is corrupted and selfish. This leads men to lust for power. Since men run states, states, too, have desires for power. As a result, international politics become a struggle for power. Such arguments with respect to the character of international politics cannot be tenable for behavioralists because corrupted human nature cannot be observed or falsified. Hence, according to behavioralists, classical realist analyses based on human nature are not scientific because human nature cannot be identified as an objective law on which the arguments concerning the characteristics of international relations would be built. Same logic is valid for the concept of national interest. The concept of national interest occupies an important place in classical realist paradigm, yet it is difficult to measure or observe it (Wendt, 2001: 48).

Looking at the other side of the second debate, traditionalists did not leave behaviorist criticisms unanswered. Hedley Bull (1966: 361) notes that "if we confine ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof there is very little of significance that can be said about international relations." From this point, traditionalists claim that natural sciences and social sciences have different characteristics. Based on this, Morgenthau (1952: 231) accused behavioralists of "misunderstanding of the nature of political theory and of its relationship to

empirical research.” Moreover, he states in *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* that “politics is an art and not a science” (Morgenthau 1946: 9)¹¹, meaning that while natural sciences are open to progress through hypothesis testing, social sciences are not suitable for such functions since social world consists of infinite numbers of intricate relations, impossible to test (Chernof, 2004: 52). In addition to its intricateness, the developments in social world are generally unique events, such as revolutions. According to K. W. Kim (1965: 319-320),

Generalizations about revolutions without the use of terms which are spatio-temporally limiting are bound to be quite inadequate in explaining any particular revolution which is historically significant. This, of course, does not imply that there are no significant generalizations to be made about revolutions. It is rather that any particular revolution is unlikely to be described by available generalizations.

However, although they rejected the criticisms targeting them, traditionalists failed to provide alternative methods or frameworks to study international relations against empiricist methodologies favored by behavioralists. As a result, the second debate in International Relations Theory was started to be considered as a ‘scientific revolution’ in the discipline, using the terminology of Thomas S. Kuhn. Hence, the debate was “non-cumulative developmental episode(s) in which an older paradigm [that was traditionalism] [is] (are) replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one” (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 92). Kuhn’s idea of scientific revolution is primarily concerning the progress in natural sciences, however, positivist scholars believe that the developments with the behavioralist turn in IR perfectly fits with such progress (see Knorr and Rosenau, 1969; Lijphart 1974).

¹¹ A detailed discussion of Morgenthau’s view on IR as a science is available at Wight (2013 [2002]: 33-34).

The scientific revolution in the discipline had undeniable effects on the concept of power. In order to meet the methodological requirements of the new positivist paradigm in the discipline, a new power conceptualization, which is the relational one, replaced the possessional power conceptualization of the old paradigm.

3.1.2.2. Vietnam War: The Failure of Possessional Power Conceptualization to Explain International Events

The Vietnam War (Second Indochina War or Resistance War against America) was the longest lasting war that US fought in its military history. It had lasted from 1954 to 1975 although it varied in intensity. The US spent 150 billion US dollars and mobilized 8,700,000 men. It dropped around 10 million tons of bomb on Vietnam. In the war, around 58,000 American soldiers died and 303,000 wounded. However, in the end the US lost the war.

The defeat of the US raised questions concerning the liability of the possessional power conceptualization since world's one of the most powerful states was defeated by a paramilitary army, Vietcong. According to the possessional power conceptualization and taking Morgenthau's elements of national power, the US had far more resources than the Vietcong. In terms of geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness and population, it is even ridiculous to compare the US with Vietcong. In Morgenthau's formulation, national character and national morale may be identified as the indicators that Vietcong would be superior to the US. However, it is questionable that these two indicators let alone were enough to defeat the world's most formidable military force at the time. It is obvious

that although the possessional power conceptualization provides researchers a general idea about potential power of a nation, it fails to give insights concerning the actualization of this potential power. As a result, power analysts in the discipline sought for new power conceptualizations in order explain the events that the possessional conceptualization remained short.

3.1.2.3. IR Meets a New Power Conceptualization: The Relational Power Conceptualization

As a result of the developments in international politics such as Vietnam War and debates in International Relations Theory such as the Second Great Debate, a new power conceptualization was developed by IR scholars, which is the relational power conceptualization. For the proponents of the relational power conceptualization, power should be studied as a relationship, in which they see power as a type of causation. The causal notion depicts power as a relationship between social actors, in which the behavior of A causes a change in the behavior of B (Baldwin, 2013 [2002]: 274). Understood in this way, proponents of the relational power conceptualization in IR endorsed Dahl (1957: 202-203)'s famous power definition that is "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."

The endorsement of Dahl's definition of power was closely related with the scientific revolution in IR. Dahl developed his definition of power for the improvement of the clarity of the concept to make it suitable for systematic study. In his words, "most people have an intuitive notion of what it means. But scientists have not yet

formulated a statement of the concept of power that is rigorous enough to be of use in the systematic study of this important social phenomenon” (Dahl, 1957: 201). In order to eradicate the lack of rigor on the definition of the concept of power, Dahl limited power to the outcome of the relationships between actors in which the concept becomes an observable phenomenon so that it becomes suitable for the conduct of positivist methodology.

This objective in Dahl’s endeavor is obvious in his discussion of the “properties of the power relation.” First, Dahl argues, there is a need of a minor lag between the actions of power wielder and responses of the actor over whom power is exercised (respondent). Second, there should be a connection such as between the influence attempt of power wielder and respondent. Third, the attempt of power wielder to influence respondent should be successful. These properties direct our attention to look for causation between the actions of power wielder and the responses of the respondent. Hence, power relationship is evaluated as a cause-effect relationship¹², in which power becomes an independent variable and the outcome of the power relationship between actors becomes a dependent variable.

Relying on the analytical framework of Dahl’s power definition, IR scholars began to present their views on power as critique to possessional power conceptualization. For proponents of the new conceptualization such as Wolfers (1951; 1962), Jones (1954), Snyder (1955), Sprout and Sprout (1956), Holsti (1964) and Baldwin (1979), the possessional conceptualization fails to specify scope, domain and weight of power

¹² Jack Nagel (1975:14) explains power relations as a cause-effect relationship very well. In his words, “Anyone who employs a causal concept of power *must* specify domain and scope. To say “X has power” may seem sensible, but to say “X causes” or “X can cause” is nonsense. Causation implies an X and a Y – a cause and an effect. If power is causation, one must state the outcome caused. Stipulating domain and scope answers the question “Power over *what*?”

relationships. In this respect, the proponents of the relational conceptualization put emphasis on the policy-contingent or situational nature of power.¹³

Going into details, for Jones (1954: 422), “power is ... defined as that which permits participation in the making of decisions”. He suggests that power becomes an obvious phenomenon when an actor (X) participates in the decision-making process of another actor (Y) to the extent that Y would not take a specific decision without X’s intervention. Therefore, power is not something that can be possessed by those who have a lot of resources, but it is something that can be referred in the relationship between two or more actors.

Similar to Jones, in their study “Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics,” Sprout and Sprout¹⁴ (1956: 39-49) rejected power approaches that consider particular material and non-material resources as national power. They state that national power analyses based on the accumulation of certain resources have no political significance unless they are formulated within a context, specifying who is trying to get whom to do what under which conditions. Sprout and Sprout call this feature of power as the “policy contingency framework.” In addition to Sprouts, Holsti (1964: 182) comments on the policy contingent feature of power that “power is situational to the extent that it is exercised within a framework of goals.”

¹³ It is obvious that Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) influenced the IR scholarship with regards to the policy contingency feature of power. In *Power and Society*, Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 92-94) talk about the contextual power analysis as follows: “What is common to all power and influence relations is only effect on policy. What is affected and on what basis are variables whose specific content in a given situation can be determined only by inquiry into the actual practices of the actors in that situation”. Then, they add, “Political analysis must be contextual, and take account of the power practices actually manifested in the concrete political situation.”

¹⁴ Note that Sprout & Sprout (1945) were proponents of possessional power conceptualization in their work *Foundations of National Power*. They, later, embraced the relational conceptualization.

In line with others, Wolfers (1951: 48; 1962: 89) offered one of the earliest criticisms to possessional power conceptualization. He claims that “to treat the quest for power ... outside the context of ends and purposes which it is expected to serve, robs it of any intelligible meaning ...” (Wolfers, 1951: 48; 1962: 89). He, then, comments on the frequent failure of the power predictions based on possessional power conceptualization that

There are several reasons for the frequent discrepancies between the appearance of power and its actual performance: one is the relativity of power, another is the gap between the estimate of power and its reality, and a third is the specificity of power, which means that it takes specific types of power to bring results under specific circumstances (Wolfers, 1962: 110-111).

Based on their ideas, these scholars define power within a social relation, and understand power not in terms of abilities or capabilities but within a specific context in which an actor actualized those abilities or capabilities towards the achievement of particular goals and objectives. Therefore, any power analysis first requires for specification of the context (Baldwin, 1979: 167).

The treatment of power as a policy-contingent concept brings several implications, which constitute the differences between the possessional conceptualization and the relational conceptualization in the discipline. These differences are about the bases of power, the degree of fungibility, and whether power is an end or means to an end.

Bases of Power

Given the policy contingent feature of power, the possessional conceptualization tells very little (or nothing) about the validity or relevancy of a power resource in a particular power relationship. Baldwin (1979: 164; 2013 [2002]: 277) depicts this deficiency in the possessional conceptualization through an analogy from card

games. Accordingly, “what constitutes a good hand in card games depends on whether one is playing poker or bridge.” Applying the analogy on warfare, a nation might have a huge arsenal of main battle tanks. However, if the battlefield is full of jungle as in the case of Vietnam War, main battle tanks do not make much difference. Hence, the relevancy of power resources depends on context in which they are planned to be deployed.

As opposed to the argument on the relevancy of power resources to the context, advocates of the possessional conceptualization seem to insist that if a resource contributes to war making capacity of a nation, it is always relevant for power analysis because war, they assume, is the basic characteristic of the international politics. On this, Schuman (1933: 512) states that “military force has ever been the decisive means by which state power has been created, increased, reduced, or destroyed.” Similarly, Carr (1946 [1939]: 109) asserts that

the supreme importance of the military instrument lies in the fact that the *ultima ratio* of power in international relations is war. Every act of the state, in its power aspect, is directed to war, not as desirable weapon, but as a weapon which it may require in the last resort to use.

In addition, although he is aware of that power may be defined as the variety of means to affect the behaviors of others, Inis Claude (1962: 6) prefers using “the term power to denote what is essentially military capability -the elements which contribute directly or indirectly to the capacity to coerce, kill and destroy.” Similarly, Mearsheimer (2001: 55-56), as a contemporary proponent of the possessional conceptualization, suggests that

In international politics ... a state’s effective power is ultimately a function of its military force ... The balance of power is largely synonymous with the balance of military power. I define power largely in military terms because offensive realism emphasizes that force is the *ultima ratio* of international politics.

Since power analysis has to take scope, domain and weight of the relationship between actors into account, the emphasis on the military instruments or the resources that contribute to war making capability as the basis of national power is misleading for the relational conceptualization. In international politics, there are many instances that military capabilities have no use. For example, it is illogical to expect that war making capabilities make difference in the relative power between Germany and France in their bilateral relations in the 21st century. On this, Sprout and Sprout (1951 [1945]: 4) claims that in addition to their military forces, states have many other options to affect the behavior of other states such as inducements, bargaining, negotiation, ideological propaganda, cultural attraction, economic productivity and any other non-military means. Later, Baldwin (2013 [2002]: 275) summarized these various means in four points: symbolic means (normative symbols as well as the provision of information), economic means, military means and diplomatic means.

The Degree of Fungibility

If something is fungible, its value or contribution in one issue-area is the same in another issue area. Fungibility is a troublesome issue that the proponents of possessional power conceptualization cannot adequately explain. They treat power resources as generalized means of exercising influence, and thus power resources are equally compatible within different contexts. Hence, they assume that power resources are fungible across issues.

Waltz (1986: 333) and Art (1996: 18), proponents of the possessional conceptualization, seem to suggest that the fungibility of power resources depends on

their amount, meaning that a power resource is relevant in different contexts in the sense that its effectivity depends on the amount of their deployment. This is to say that as amount of resources increases, their fungibility increases, too. On the contrary, Wolfers¹⁵ (1962) and Mearsheimer (2001), assuming power as fungible, the fungibility of power is not related with the amount of resources. They assert that regardless of the amount, fungibility is inherent in power. Wolfers (1962: 105) states that “in many respects, power and influence play the same role international politics as money does in a market economy.” In parallel, Mearsheimer (2001: 17) assumes that “power is the currency of great-power politics, and states compete for it among themselves. What money is to economics, power is to international relations.”

Proponents of the relational conceptualization refuse the idea that equates power in international politics with money in economics. They argue that it is not necessary to identify scope and domain of the context in which transaction is held by money in any market economy because the same money (euro, dollar or lira) can be used to buy a house, a car or some other goods. However, this is not the case with power resources in international politics. The effectiveness of a power resource depends on their compatibility with the scope and domain of the power relationship, referring that one cannot successfully exercise power through deploying a specific resource in all areas (Baldwin, 1971; 1979: 165; 2013: 278; 2016: 70-72; Keohane, 1986: 184-185).

¹⁵ We should note that although Wolfers endorsed relational conceptualization, he treats power a fungible concept.

Power as an End or Means to an End

The issue whether power is an end or means to an end is a controversy both among the proponents of the possessional camp and between the possessional and relational conceptualizations. Starting with the debate on the issue within the possessional camp, many proponents of possessional conceptualization such as Schuman (1933), Spykman (2008 [1942]), Morgenthau (1948) posit that since international politics is a struggle for power, and power is an end itself for states. Morgenthau (1948: 13), a prominent figure on this idea, states that “Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim”. As opposed to this view, Waltz (1979: 126; 1986: 334), a proponent of the possessional conceptualization, claims that rather than the maximization of power, states seek other goals. For him, “power is means and not an end ... They [states] cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue.” In his another study, Waltz (1997: 913) points the issue whether power is an end or means to an end as a distinguishing marker between his and Morgenthau’s realism, and suggests that “Believing that states strive for ever more power, Hans Morgenthau took power to be an end in itself. In contrast, I built structural theory on the assumption that survival is the goal of states and that power is one of the means to that end.”

There are dissident voices against the idea that conceives power as an end itself from the proponents of relational conceptualization as well. Among them, Harold Sprout (1949: 408) brought one of the early criticisms.

More difficult to appraise is Morgenthau's unqualified statement that power is always the "immediate" objective of state policy. ... Too insistent emphasis on power as the universal objective of state policy may easily depreciate in the reader's mind the importance of other specific objectives, their relative priority in the state's political strategy, and possible cause-and-effect relationships between short and longer term objectives.

Take, for example, the hotly debated subject of Soviet foreign policy. To say that power is the immediate aim of Soviet foreign policy, tells one nothing new or distinctive. What one wants to know is which has higher priority in Russian statecraft: security, territorial expansion, or world communism; and how these and other aims may be intertwined in Russian thinking.

Actually, the deficiency in the idea that equates power as the immediate aim of foreign policy results from its lack of understanding concerning the fungibility of power resources. The proponents of the idea that conceives power as fungible assume that there are certain resources states possess and these resources are the power itself in international politics. However, power resources do not have a high degree of fungibility, meaning that the effectiveness and the relevancy of power resources depend on their compatibility with the context of the power relationship.

If the deficiency emanating from the idea regarding the fungibility of power is taken aside, the idea, maximization of power is the aim of states, does not seem misleading because whatever a state aims, it has to have a certain amount of power to achieve that aim in international politics. Let us examine the aims of Soviet foreign policy, which Harold Sprout used to criticize the idea that assumes maximization of power is the aim of states. As he said, Soviets might aim territorial expansion, world communism or any other objective. Of course, Soviets would need various power resources that were relevant to respective contexts of these different goals. For the aim of territorial expansion, Soviets should have a capable armed forces, economy, and many other related resources. Moreover, these resources should be in maximum level to bring success. Or, for the aim of achieving world communism, Soviets

should have ideological resources together with many other resources, and again these resources should be in maximum level. This suggests that having maximum power is a precondition of achieving different objectives. Therefore, it does not seem illogical to assert that power is an end itself. Without maximum power, states cannot achieve their respective objectives. This argument is actually in line with what also Morgenthau seems to have in mind when he asserts that power is an end itself. He states that “Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity ... But whenever they strive to realize their goal ... they do so by striving for power” (Morgenthau, 1948: 13). However, one needs to be aware of the low fungibility of power resources in international politics and the degree of efficiency of the power resources depends on their compatibility with the requirements of the context, which Morgenthau seems as not aware of. Hence, maximization of power should be sought for relevant resources rather than for general resources identified without the context in which they will be employed.

3.1.2.4. Popularization of International Political Economy and Its Impact on the Relational Power Conceptualization: Asymmetric Interdependence Turns into Power

By the early 1970s, the landscape of international relations began to change as a result of a group of development. In 1971, the US government suspended the convertibility of the US dollar into gold, which meant the change in the rules of the international monetary system. This was followed by the Moscow Summit between the US and the Soviet Union (the USSR) in 1972, which gave rise to the hopes for

new economic opportunities thanks to the détente in great power competition. The year 1972, also, faced the expansion of European Economic Community (EEC) by the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. Then, oil crisis led to the increase of the energy prices in 1973, which brought enormous economic and political impacts on world politics. In the same year, the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) took place in Japan, in which developing countries emerged as major competitors to the developed countries in world trade. This competition sparked a protectionist trend in industrialized countries. Later, in 1974, developing countries pushed for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in a session of the United Nations General Assembly in order change the rules of the game, which was disadvantageous for them against the developed countries.

These developments in international politics, listed above, forced practitioners and scholars to pay more attention to the economic affairs in world politics. This led to a growing interest on the issues of international trade, tariff and non-tariff barriers, exchange rate policies, international capital movements, direct investments, multinational corporations and hegemony, which had been neglected in the studies on international politics for a long time (see Woods, 2006; Öniş and Kutlay, 2014).

Accordingly, in “International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect”, Susan Strange (1970) claims that the studies of IR scholars had neglected the economic dynamics between states, and at the same time economists had neglected political aspects of the interstate relations. However, international developments, Strange argues, showed that the political and economic aspects of international relations have to be merged to make sense the world politics. As a result of such view, plenty of academic works had been produced on international political

economy (see Cooper, 1968, Morse, 1969, Young, 1969, Waltz 1970; Strange, 1970, 1972; Kindleberger, 1970; Vernon, 1971; Rosecrance and Stein, 1973; Katzenstein, 1975; Keohane and Nye, 1972; 2012 [1977]; Bergsten and Krause, 1975; Krasner, 1976).

Upon the increased attention on international political economy, a debate among IR scholars broke out on the issue of whether international interdependence has increased or decreased in the twentieth century. Relying on the general systems theory and cybernetics, Karl Deutsch (1966: 300-301) argued that the international transactions, which he equates with interdependence, has a declining trend in the twentieth century. Moreover, he states that this trend is unlikely to be changed in the near future. Later, Deutsch and some others (Deutsch, Edinger, Macridis and Merritt) (1967) insisted on the claim. They based their arguments on the declining trend of the international interdependence on various economic indicators with reference to international trade. For them, compared to intra-national transactions, international transactions were declining.

Later, Waltz (1970: 205) joined the debate and called international interdependence as a myth. Nationalism and national interests, Waltz argues, are the primary determinants of the international politics, and thus citizens of a country are primarily turning to their own nation-states to meet their needs. As a result, national economies are structured in order to achieve self-sufficiency. In such an environment, Waltz indicated that we cannot talk about the increasing interdependence in international politics.

At the other side of the debate, scholars, who thought the international interdependence was actually increasing, claimed that the arguments concerning the decline in interdependence do not reflect reality (Cooper, 1968; Morse, 1969; Young, 1969; Rosecrance and Stein, 1973; Katzenstein, 1975; Keohane and Nye, 2013 [1977]). Young (1969: 734) criticized Deutsch's 1966 work in terms of his employment of a narrow range of tangible indicators, only trade flows, in measuring the level of interdependence. In parallel with Young, Morse (1969: 318) indicated that as opposed to Deutsch's claim on trade flows, interdependence is much more related with the increasing capital investment. In addition to them, Cooper (1968: 59) claimed that in order to measure interdependence, one needs to take the level of national sensitivity to external factors into account rather than only taking the level of trade flows into consideration.

Building upon the previous studies criticizing Deutsch, Rosecrance and Stein (1973) and Katzenstein (1975) pointed the problems of measurement error and data reliability in the works of Deutsch and his associates. Rosecrance and Stein (1973) corrected the errors in Deutsch and his associates' works and added new indicators for the measurement of interdependence. Hence, alongside with the level of trade flow, Rosecrance and Stein looked for growth in foreign investment, financial flows and political relations between states. Similarly, Katzenstein analyzed the level of world trade, foreign capital investments, international movement of people (labor migration, foreign students, and international tourism) and international communications (mail, telegrams, telephone calls) for the measurement of international interdependence. Based on the data obtained from those indicators, Rosecrance and Stein (1973: 21-22) and Katzenstein (1975: 1034) concluded that

international transactions and interdependence increased sharply in the twentieth century.

In the meantime of the theoretical discussions on the level of interdependence in international politics, a ground shaking development in international politics triggered a discussion on whether interdependence can be identified as power. This development was the 1973 oil crisis. In this crisis, a group of economically undeveloped, industrially less advanced and militarily weak countries were able to impose their wills on the world's most advanced industrialized and militarily giant states (Issawi, 1979: 3; Choucri, 1982: 2-4)

Going into details, oil was, and still is, one of the most important (maybe the most important) raw materials in the world, making its security of supply and logistics world's one of the most serious economic and political issues. The seriousness of the issue grows dramatically for the US, world's largest oil consumer in 1973 and now, since it was dependent on oil. Due to the increase in the effectiveness of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) as a cartel on the supply of oil in the Middle East, Arab countries decided to use this dependence as a leverage to alter the US policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict (Keohane, 2007: 226).

Pushing the US to change its Israeli policy was very important for the Arab states since the US had a unique role in shaping the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was the main donor for Israel both economically and militarily over the years since the establishment of the state of Israel. Baldwin (1985: 638-640, 675) notes that while the US provided about twenty dollars per person to the recipients of the Marshall

Plan and about one dollar per person to the Third World countries, Israel got about two hundred dollars per person aid within thirty years' time from its establishment.

In addition, the security and survival of Israel was under the guarantee of the US. This was evident in the foreign policy speeches of various US Presidents. For example, President Gerald Ford stated during an official visit of the Israeli Prime Minister Yithzak Rabin to Washington as follows, "The United States has been proud of its association with the State of Israel. We shall continue to stand with Israel. We are committed to Israel's survival and security" (Schmidt, 2011: 348). Hence, it can be concluded that there is a special relationship between the US and Israel.

Being aware of the US guarantees to Israel, Arab states sent a message to the US, communicating a threat that an oil embargo would be implemented in order to prevent possible American support to Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Sorley, 1983: 90; Licklider, 1988: 196-198). This threat was ineffective to deter the US from supplying Israel in the war. In response, OAPEC raised to price of oil from \$2 to \$5 a barrel. Also, oil ministers of the Arab countries agreed on an embargo to be implemented on the US and other industrialized states supporting Israeli stance during the war (Yergin, 2008: 587-589; Lenczowski, 1990: 130). Arab states could not achieve their political aims about preventing US economic and military supply to Israel. However, they were able to bring their cause to the forefront of the US agenda. In addition, Japan and European countries alienated themselves from the US position in the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to secure their oil supplies. More important, the US began to adopt a more conciliatory approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War.

At the same time, AOPEC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, did not deepen the embargo on the US because of the complex interdependence between Saudi Arabia and the US. Saudi Arabia had large investments in the US. Therefore, if the U.S. economy suffered too much, this would also damage the Saudi economic interests. Moreover, the US was also the guarantee of the stability in the Middle East, which is in parallel with interest of Saudi Arabia. Hence, Arabs could not push their oil weapon too far since it would also be detrimental to their interests.

Having seen that the interdependence might turn into a power relationship between states, scholars began to integrate these two concepts in order to provide a comprehensive power analysis in international politics (see Keohane and Nye, 1977). However, it should be noted that not all interdependence between states entails a power situation, which is actually in the first place about the definition of interdependence. If the interdependence is defined as the increasing interaction and transaction in international relations, which Katzenstein (1975) and Inkeles (1975) did so, the concept of interdependence has no use for power analysis because power analysts, resting upon the relational power conceptualization, need to observe where a state successfully alters the behavior of other state by using the interdependence between them as a power resource. Hence, not all interdependencies, but the interdependencies in which a state has relative advantage compared to other state so that it can use this advantage as a leverage to carry out his own will regardless of the resistance of the other state are suitable for the relational power analysis. Inevitably, this formulation reminds the argument of Hirschman (1945: 18) on the relationship between international trade and dependency,

The influence which country A acquires in country B by foreign trade depends in the first place upon the total gain which B derives from that trade; the total gain from trade for any country is indeed nothing but another expression for the total impoverishment which would be inflicted upon it by a stoppage of trade. In this sense, the classical concept, gain from trade, and the power concept, dependence on trade, now being studied are seen to be merely two aspects of the same phenomenon.

Hence, in order to be integrated with the concept of power, as Waltz (1970: 205-207) also puts it, interdependence should be costly to break.¹⁶ However, Waltz's definition cannot not completely save the concept of interdependence to be a valid power situation. Waltz's definition assumes that foregoing the relationship should be costly for both parties of the interdependence. This means that both of the interdependent parties will suffer if the relationship is harmed, saying anything about the degree to which party will suffer more so that the power analyst will be able to observe which party would have more power to push other party in parallel with its will. Therefore, Waltz's definition needs to be supplemented with the term 'asymmetry'. Asymmetry refers the "lack of equality or equivalence between parts or aspects of something" (*Oxford English Dictionary*), meaning that the cost of breaking the interdependence for a party should be greater than for other.

However, this is not enough for power analyst if that greater cost would be bearable for the party that will suffer from it. Hence, the cost of breaking the interdependence needs to be far greater than the limits so that the party, who will suffer would find it unbearable. If this is so, the other party, who has advantage with respect to the costs of breaking the interdependence, will be in a position that would let it dictate its will on the party, which will have an unbearable suffering. Then, if an interdependent relationship between states is asymmetric enough to create dependency of one to other, it can be identified as a power relationship in terms of the ability to inflict

¹⁶ This definition is also available in Krasner (1976: 320)

costs to alter the behavior of other party by severing the asymmetric interdependence relationship.¹⁷

On asymmetric interdependence, Keohane and Nye (1977: 10) suggest two analytical dimensions to measure the asymmetry between actors in international politics, “sensitivity” and “vulnerability”. Accordingly, “sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation. And, vulnerability can be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered” (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 11).

Baldwin (1979: 178) indicates that the sensitivity and vulnerability constitute the link between the concept of interdependence and the relational power conceptualization because these two dimensions actually demonstrate the policy contingent feature of interdependence to be evaluated as a power relationship. Therefore, although interdependence points a new kind of power relationship in IR, it is actually sub-field of relational power conceptualization, meaning that it does not offer a new power conceptualization analytically. On this, Baldwin (1979: 178) states that

although Keohane and Nye use these [dimensions] imaginatively to generate important observations about world politics, the distinctions themselves represent no new theoretical insights. ... The Sprouts have previously pointed out that power relationships in one policy-contingency framework are likely to differ from those in another.

¹⁷ This formulation is line with Harsanyi (1962: 67-80)’s analysis in “Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games” published in *Behavioral Science* where he states (p.68) “the opportunity costs to *B* of refusing to do what *A* wants him to do, i.e., of refusing to yield to *A*’s attempt to influence his behavior. As these opportunity costs measure the strength of *B*’s incentives for yielding to *A*’s influence, we shall call them the *strength* of *A*’s power over *B*.”

3.1.3. The North-South Debate: Emergence of the Structural Power

Conceptualization in IR

3.1.3.1. The North-South Debate

The terms 'North' and 'South' have been established in international political economy since the 1960s. These terms were employed as shorthand for distinguishing developed countries, majority of them located in the Northern Hemisphere, and less-developed countries (LDCs), majority of them existed in the Southern Hemisphere.¹⁸ Although these terms denote a geographical meaning, there are significant exceptions. For example, New Zealand and Australia are industrialized and have high income per capita although they are located in the South Hemisphere. Also, there are plenty of non-industrialized and low-income countries in the Northern Hemisphere. Hence, the core feature of the North-South divide is related with a deep international economic and political division rather than a geographic division (Davis 2012: 231). The deep economic and political division between North and South countries began to be apparent in international politics with the decolonization process but the roots of the division go back to the colonial practices since the North is mainly consisting of former colonial states.

Following to the end of the World War II, international political and economic sphere were shaped by the developed states, who were former colonizers. In this respect, the developed countries established regimes and institutions for the expansion and maintenance global capitalism, based on which they unequally benefit from. The first of these international organizations was the United Nations (UN),

¹⁸ There are various names of the LDCs such as non-industrialized countries, developing countries, or Third World Countries.

which constitutes the political structure of the post-war era. In addition to this, the International Money Fund (IMF), the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) configured the monetary, finance and trade structures of the post-war environment, which is known as the 'Bretton Woods System'. This reconfiguration of global economic and political environment around international organizations reflected a key feature of the regime of global liberal economy. Hence, the post-war institutions were established in order to guarantee the new system in international relations.

The new system was shaken by two developments. The first was the decision of the US to delink dollar from the gold standard, and the second was the emergence of new states in international system as a result of the decolonization process. The delinking dollar from the gold standard meant the collapse of the monetary control of the post-war system. However, the institutions of the system did not disappear. In contrast, they were reconfigured around the sets of economic and political objectives, which meant the preservation of the rules of the game that was established after the World War II.¹⁹

Meanwhile, the decolonization process led to the emergence of many LDCs in international system. These countries began to increase their political impacts on world politics under the roof UN as their numbers grow. Within fifteen years of time after the World War II, the number of member states to the UN General Assembly doubled from 51 to about 100. This number even increased to 150 in the mid-1970s. As a result, the UN General Assembly, the Human Rights Commission, the

¹⁹ See 'After Hegemony' (Keohane, 1984) thesis for the dynamics of the preservation of the rules of the game that was established after the World War II.

Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) became important platforms, in which new independent LDCs were able to raise their voices and formulate their positions in the global economic and political system.

In addition to their activities under the roof of the UN, the LDCs created their own multilateral platforms in international politics. Number of LDCs, who refused to be client of either the US or the USSR in the Cold War context, began to hold regular meetings under the auspices of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the first meeting of which was held in Bandung in 1955. The core principles of the NAM were the preservation of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and anti-imperialism.

In such multilateral platforms, the LDCs adopted a range of strategies in order to cope with their poverty and vulnerability in international system. For Krasner (1985: 3-4), there were domestic and external sources of LDCs' poverty and vulnerability. The LDCs had extremely limited national power capabilities, and their domestic social structures and central political institutions lacked the abilities to make societal adjustments to improve their developmental levels and absorb external shocks. In such situation, the economic and military resources that LDCs had at their disposal were unlikely to alter the behaviors of Northern states and the nature of international system

The nature of international system was further intensifying the vulnerabilities of LDCs because it was shaped by the international regimes that put developed countries in an advantageous position. In this respect, Krasner (1982: 186) defines regimes as follows

Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.

Understood in this way, as Krasner (1985: 4-5) states, liberal international regimes were the determinant feature of the international system. These regimes are based on the principle of the free flow of goods, meaning that the tariff and non-tariff barriers on international trade should be eliminated or at least reduced. Moreover, the government intervention to the functioning of the market have to be kept at minimum level. Within such regimes of international system, the LDCs were in a disadvantageous position because the allocation of resources was determined by the market structure rather than their governments.

Since the market structure based on liberal regimes is driven by the endowments and preferences of individual actors, the resource allocation was conducted in line with the interests of those individual actors rather than the needs of the LDCs. This created vulnerability for LDCs because their already limited capability to absorb external shocks was even diminishing more since they have limited (if not any) control over their resources. Hence, authoritative international regimes, in which governments would be able to allocate resources directly or indirectly, were started to be seen as more attractive by the LDCs. Because such regimes would give them capability to protect their internal structures against external shocks.

Accordingly, strategies of the LDCs concentrated on the alteration of existing characteristics of the international organizations and international regimes. In Krasner (1985: 7)'s words,

The regime objectives pursued by the Third World are designed to limit the market power of the North by enhancing the sovereign prerogatives of the South, either through universal international organizations in which each nation has a single vote, or by widening the scope of activities exclusively subject to the unilateral sovereign will of individual developing states.

In this respect, the LDCs supported new international regimes that would strengthen their positions in the international economic and political settings. One of the first result of these strategies was the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The UNCTAD was established “to maximize the trade, investment and development opportunities of developing countries and assist them in their efforts to integrate into the world economy on an equitable basis” (*United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*). This suggests that the UNCTAD was designed to counterweight the GATT, which the LDCs saw as an organization serving the Northern interests and dedicated to maintain liberal regimes (Krasner, 1985: 6; Balaam and Veseth, 1996: 317).

In its first meeting, Argentinean economist Raúl Prebisch, the executive director of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) at the time, was appointed as the founding secretary of the UNCTAD. Prebisch was famous with his ideas on structuralist economics and dependency theory (for detailed analyses of Prebisch's ideas see Prebisch, 1950; Love, 1980). Later, his ideas on structural economy and dependency theory formed the basis of the ECLA School. At the core of Prebisch's ideas, there is an understanding that the international institutions and agreements are created and maintained by power structures, which lie on the economic division of the world in the shape as ‘center’, consisting of industrialized countries, and ‘periphery’, consisting of less-developed and raw material producer countries. His ideas pointed that the price fluctuations for raw materials or primary products, such as agricultural goods are more unstable than the fluctuations for the prices of

manufactured secondary products. For Prebisch, this is an advantage for the manufacturer countries in the global trade system since they have the capacity to adjust the prices of secondary products to respond to the changes in demand while producers of primary products have to supply the same amount regardless of the price of the product (quoted in Love 1980: 55). In order to alter these inherent inequalities in international trade system, Prebisch advocated that the South should act collectively in order push the North for the implementation of new agreements on the protection of primary product prices and on the resource transfer from developed to developing countries (Davis, 2012: 236).

Together with the UNCTAD under the secretary-generalship of Prebisch, the 1973 Oil Crisis was another cornerstone in the growing attention of the Southern countries to alter the liberal international trade structure, detrimental to their development strategies and control capability on the commodity prices. In the oil crisis, it came into the open that the Northern countries were intimately tied to Southern countries with respect to the energy trade and other commodities, which made the Northern countries more sensitive to the issues of the Southern countries concerning unequal trade. In addition, the Southern countries revealed that they could exert power for the alteration of the international trade regime by severing the situation of asymmetric interdependence they have with the Northern countries.

As a result, a Declaration and Plan of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) was announced at the Fourth Summit Conference of the Organization of Non-Aligned States (ONAS - the institutional expression of the NAM) in 1973. One year later, the Declaration's key terms were accepted in the Fourth UNCTAD as the "New International Economic Order"

(NIEO). The NIEO aimed to restructure the existing international economic structure in favor of the LDCs. It was established on the principles such as the protection of national sovereignty so that LDCs would be able to regulate the activities of multinational corporations within their borders. Moreover, the NIEO envisaged that international trade should be reorganized to ensure stable and equitable prices for primary products, of which LDCs are the main producers.

However, the NIEO failed to realize the expectations of LDCs as a result of the negative attitude of the developed countries to the NIEO. This was because the NIEO, having potential to disrupt the macro functioning of global economy and trade, was to encourage micro administration in economic structure, to advocate highly self-sufficient economies and give the LDCs the capacity to regulate their economies. (Balaam & Veseth 1996: 318). And, the failure of NIEO demonstrated that the structural reconfiguration requires adequate amount of power in the hands of revisionist countries to be successful.

3.1.3.2. The ‘Structural Power’ Conceptualization

The struggle on the preservation or the alteration existing regimes in international political economy showed its impacts on the concept of power. As a result, a new power conceptualization that is the ‘structural power’ was developed in IR. Compared to the former power conceptualizations, this new one puts emphasis on structure, which regulates the behaviors and choice sets of actors in their relationships.

The structural power conceptualization directs the attention of power analysts to how structure advantages or disadvantages the actors in power relationship rather than looking at the direct relationship between two actors in which one side is powerful because of his/her success in pushing other actor to do something that the actor would not do otherwise. Hence, while power functions directly between actors in the relational conceptualizations, it works indirectly through the formal or informal institutional frameworks in the structural conceptualization.

Krasner's concept of metapower concept is a clear example of the structural power conceptualization in IR, pointing that

Relational power behavior refers to efforts to maximize values within a given set of institutional structures; meta-power behavior refers to efforts to change the institutions themselves. Relational power refers to the ability to change outcomes or affect the behavior of others within a given regime. Meta-power refers to the ability to change the rules of the game. Outcomes can be changed both by altering the resources available to individual actors and by changing the regimes that condition action (Krasner, 1985: 14).

In this understanding, international organizations and regimes, which form the structural configuration of international politics, constitute sources of power. Then, there are two ways of exercising power if we examine the difference between the relational and structural power conceptualizations. The first one (the relational conceptualization) involves in direct relationships between states in which State X exercises power over State Y in order to change the behavior of State Y. In such power relationship, State X possesses specific power resources (capabilities) to be employed in a specific context (scope and domain) in order to affect the behavior of State Y. The second one (the structural conceptualization), on the other hand, is about affecting behavior of State Y through limiting its alternatives or setting agenda thanks to the structural setting. In this power conceptualization, there is not a direct

confrontation, but State X controls the outcomes by changing the setting in which confrontation would occur. James A. Caporaso (1978: 4) explains the difference between relational and structural power conceptualizations as, “Bargaining power [relational power] is power to control the outcomes of specific events. But there is another kind of power which we have termed “structural power”. ... [Structural power] is a power to govern the rules which shape bargaining power.”

Among the structural power analysts, Susan Strange gives one of the most detailed definition. She links relational power with Dahlian formulation as “the power of A to get to B to do something they would not otherwise do” (Strange 2004 [1988]: 24). On the other hand, when she talks about structural power, she refers to “the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate” (Strange, 2004 [1988]: 24-25).

Hence, similar to Krasner and Caporaso, Strange points that structural power is about shaping the environment, in which states interact with each other. However, she goes one-step further and identifies four different but interrelated structures, which are security, finance, production and knowledge, in the world system. According to Strange (2004 [1988]: 26-28), structural power in international political economy lies at the intersection of these four structures. Security structure is about the control over people’s security. It refers both threatening adversaries and protecting friends. Finance structure is related to control the supply and distribution of credits. Production structure refers to control over the mode of production of goods and

services. Lastly, knowledge structure requires control over information, communication and fundamental perceptions and beliefs.

Based on the structural power conceptualization, the North-South debate was actually a struggle over the rules of international system. The Southern countries were disadvantaged in the existing institutions and regimes of the international system. They were producing raw materials, the price of which was fragile to the fluctuations in the trading system, which was created parallel to the interests of the Northern states. The Southern states had two options in order to cope with such situation. First, they would transform their domestic production structure to be able to produce manufactured goods in order to make better revenues from international trade. Yet, this was not an easy task since they were already economically less developed and materially weak. Second, the Southern countries would pursue policies to reshape the existing institutions and regimes to the extent that these would be designed to meet developmental needs of the LDCs rather than maintaining norms and principles of liberal trade regime. As the Southern states preferred the second option, they established UNCTAD and NIEO in order to create alternatives to GATT. However, since the Southern countries were lack in control over security, finance, production and knowledge structures (using Strange's terminology), their efforts to alter the existing institutions and regimes in parallel with their interests failed.

Then, it may be concluded that structural power serves to the interests of some specific actors at the expense of others. Those who establish and maintain the structural setting are usually the ones who benefit from the rules of that structure. Understood in this way, Baldwin (2013 [2002]: 285-286) comments on the structural

power conceptualization that “if structural power refers ... to power with respect to creation and/or control of structures, there is no need seek an alternative to the relational concept of power.” Then, he declares his stance by stating “structural power can easily be accounted for by proper specification of scope and domain. The creation and/or control of structures is simply an instance of influence with a particular scope and domain.”

However, Baldwin’s interpretation on structural power conceptualization is misleading. Indeed, scope and domain are the dimensions at the core of relational power conceptualization. Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 77) claims that “scope consists of the values [desired events, goal events or desired objects or situations] whose shaping and enjoyment are controlled; the domain of power consists of the persons over whom power is exercised.” Based on this definition of scope and domain, structural power is not simply an instance of influence within a particular scope and domain, which reduces it analytically an instance of relational power. Rather structural power involves in shaping scope and domain of power relationships. In other words, structural power determines the contexts in which relational power may take place, and in which an actor becomes structurally advantageous compared to others.

3.1.4. Common Features of the Power Conceptualizations in the Positivist Era

The relational and structural approaches constitute two major power conceptualizations in positivist era in the discipline. Despite their different

perspectives, they share common analytical grounds. These grounds can be identified in several points.

Power conceptualizations in the positivist approaches identify power relationship through methodological individualism. Methodological individualism suggests that researchers need to look at the actions of individuals to explain social phenomena. In other words, it traces causality from micro level that is individuals rather than macro level that is structure. This understanding of methodological individualism is in line with Fearon and Wendt (2002: 57-58)'s identification, which suggests that "In a strict form, methodological individualism requires that explanations in social science be reducible in the last analysis to 'micro foundations', which is to say statements about ontologically primitive individuals and/or their interactions."

The methodological individualism is easy to detect in the relational conceptualization since it depicts power interactions between individuals in which X has the ability to move Y in accordance with his/her desires. When it comes to structural power conceptualization, although it includes structural effects in power analysis, it is also necessarily ontologically individualist because structures are seen as creations of intentional actors in order to strengthen their ability to control over outcomes. In this understanding, structure is treated as an intervening variable in the power relationship between individual actors.

Hence, it can be argued that positivist approaches reduce power analysis to the interactions and decisions of individuals who are treated as rational actors. This is to say that actors are assumed to have preference orderings over the various possible outcomes based on their desirability and expected utilities. In this assumption, power

is outlined as the relationship in which actors interact in order to maximize their utilities based on their preference orderings over the possible outcomes.

This suggests that actions of individual actors, human or state, as purposive, intentional and self-propelled are exogenous the constitutive effects of structure (MacDonald, 2003: 558). This is to say that actions are driven by the 'logic of consequences'. Logic of consequence implies that actors behave in social life in accordance with their subjective calculation of cost and benefits (March and Olsen, 1998: 950; Checkel, 2005: 808-810; Hopf, 2010: 539-540). Hence, the actors in a power relationship that are X and Y engage in strategic cost-benefit analysis prior to their actions. X decides to exercise power over Y if doing so represents more benefits than costs. Moreover, Y complies with X's influence attempt if not doing so is more harmful than doing so. The same logic is valid also for the structural power conceptualization in positivist approaches. Given its strict definition, X may have the ability to create and reinforce structural values and practices that would serve its interests against Y. Based on logic of consequences; Y accepts such situation if not doing so would inflict further harms greater than the possible gains of doing so.

As another implication of methodological individualism, the exercise of power in positivist approaches refers to an implicit counterfactual assertion. The counterfactual argument implies that the outcome of a power relationship would be different if actor X would have acted differently towards actor Y. This is to say that X exercised power over Y to make Y behave in a certain manner is also to imply that Y could have acted differently if X did not exercise power over Y. This logic is also shared by Lukes (1974: 24) that "all those, whether observers or agents, who deny structural explanations of outcomes, explain them rather in terms of power, make

counterfactual claims to the effect that some specified agent or agents could have acted in a certain way.”

3.2. Power Conceptualizations in Post-Positivist Approaches

As the visibility of post-positivist approaches in the discipline increased, their methodological, epistemological and ontological premises showed their effects on power conceptualization. As a result, possessional, relational and structural power conceptualizations within the mainstream IR theorizing came under criticism from many aspects. This led to the development of new power conceptualizations. Before the discussion on power conceptualizations in post-positivist approaches, it is necessary to demonstrate the international context at the time and theoretical debates, which gave rise to the emergence of new power conceptualizations in order to understand their roots in the discipline.

3.2.1. The State of the Discipline in the Post-Cold War Era

3.2.1.1. The End of Cold War

Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1985, when the Union was facing economic and social problems. In order to cope with these, Gorbachev initiated deep structural changes. First, paving the way for private business ownership and foreign investment, he announced economic restructuring ‘perestroika’, which relaxed

principles of command economy in June 1987. Reforms in economic sphere were followed by the new policies in social area. As a result, the Gorbachev administration introduced 'glasnost', which means openness. With glasnost, there was considerable improvement in the freedom of press and in the transparency of state institutions in the USSR (Gaddis, 2005: 231-233; Gibbs, 1999: 3-7).

Gorbachev's reformist policies showed their effects on the US-USSR relations as well. The leaders of the two great powers, Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev first met on November 1985 in Geneva. Their second meeting was held in Reykjavík Summit. Then, these two leaders met in 1987 in Washington Summit. Their final summit was held in 1989 in Moscow. In these meetings, Reagan and Gorbachev, agreeing on reducing their countries' nuclear arsenals by 50 percent, signed Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and START I arms control treaty (Gaddis, 2005: 255).

These developments were followed by the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989. One year later, the USSR consented to German unification (Shearman, 1995: 76; Gaddis, 2005: 235-36). Moreover, the USSR declared that it would no longer intervene in the affairs of the socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe, meaning that Soviets would no longer maintain huge number of troops in those states (Shearman, 1995: 76; Gaddis, 2005: 248). Soviet alliance system, which deprived of Soviet military support, became vulnerable, and communist governments of the Warsaw Treaty countries were forced from power one by one. Between 1989 and 1991, the communist governments in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Bulgaria were dissolved. As a result, the Warsaw Pact disbanded on 25 February 1991. Afterwards, the USSR disestablished itself on December 1991, demonstrating the official declaration of the end of Cold War.

Producing inevitable consequences for IR Theory, the end of Cold War fundamentally transformed the international system. First of all, it symbolizes a major failure for the mainstream IR theories since they failed to predict such a ground shaking development in international politics. Far from predicting the end of the Cold War, the assumption with regard to the stability of the Cold War was widespread among the scholars of IR. For example, Kenneth Waltz, explaining the structure of the international system through the distribution of power between states, identified the structure during the Cold War as bipolar since there were two great powers in the international system. Waltz (1964: 899; 1979: 176-183) described bipolarity to be more stable than the other structures because of its being more transparent and simple to measure the relative power of the others, mainly the adversaries and the hostile alliances. Having seen Waltz's and other similar descriptions, Ruggie (1986: 148-152) and Lebow and Risse-Kappen (1995: 1-5) indicate that the dominant understanding in the IR Theory during the Cold War era devoted itself to explain bipolar equilibrium and the stability of the structure. Hence, research on the sources of a change such as the end of Cold War was mainly ignored by the mainstream IR theorizing.

As Grunberg and Risse-Kappen (1992: 105) stress, in addition to its failure to predict the end of Cold War, most of the forecasts concerning the possible end of the Cold War in the mainstream theorizing pointed an opposite scenario compared to what actually happened. Many mainstream scholars did not consider the possibility of a peaceful and voluntary disintegration of the USSR. Instead, they anticipated a violent conclusion for the Cold War. For example, Robert Gilpin's theory indicated that large-scale changes in international system are expected to come through a war. In his words, "the primary means of resolving the disequilibrium between the structure

of the international system and the redistribution of power has been ... hegemonic war” (Gilpin, 1981: 192).

Also, the forecasts in the mainstream theorizing with regards to the nature of the post-Cold War era proved to be wrong. Accordingly, Waltz (1993: 52-53) proposed that with the fall of the USSR, the structure of the international system became unipolar.²⁰ In such structure, other states would come together to form a balance of power against the remaining great power. In similar vein, Layne (1993:13) expected that the post-Cold War structure appeared as unipolar and “in a unipolar system states do indeed balance against the hegemon’s unchecked power.” However, contrary to such expectations, the demise of USSR led to a unipolar structure in which the USA remained as the sole hegemon, and others did not form an alliance to balance the US hegemony in the system.

As a result of these failures of the mainstream theorizing in the discipline with the unprecedented disintegration of the USSR, IR scholars began to reexamine their theories and assumptions, which gave rise to the ‘third debate’ in IR. In the third debate, new approaches emerged in the discipline, leading to the development of new power conceptualizations.

²⁰ Although Waltz (1993: 52) clearly indicated about the post-Cold War era that “bipolarity continues because militarily Russia can take care itself”, in three sentences later he stressed that “with the waning of Soviet power, the United States is no longer held in check by any other country or combination of countries.” From his second identification, we can conclude that Waltz was pointing unipolarity.

3.2.1.2. The Third Debate in the Discipline

By many scholars, the static material understanding of mainstream IR theorizing was considered as the main reason of its failure to anticipate the possibility of the end of Cold War (see Adler, 1997: 342; Lebow and Risse-Kappen, 1995: 2; Price and Reus-Smith, 1998: 265; Fierke, 2010: 178). Hence, IR scholars began to focus on the social dimensions of international relations and the dynamics underlying the possibility of change, as a result of which ‘post-positivist turn’ emerged against the dominance of positivist understanding in the discipline.

As Lapid (1989: 239) states, compared to positivist understanding, post-positivism in IR does not constitute a unitary philosophical tradition, meaning that post-positivism consists of different approaches based on their distinctive epistemological and ontological bases (see also Biersteker, 1989: 264). Indeed, there are critical theorists, feminists, poststructuralists and post-colonialists in the post-positivist camp. However, this is not to say that post-positivist tradition does not harbor several common features, among which their considerable dissatisfaction with positivism and its dominance in IR Theory is the most visible (Lapid, 1989: 237; Smith 1996: 12). In this respect, post-positivists differ from positivism on ontological and epistemological grounds. Moreover, these two camps have different perspectives on the relationship between theory-practice and agent-structure.

Ontological Ground

Opposing to positivist assumptions, post-positivists argue that intersubjectively shared meaning structures give shape of the material structures around us (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 393). In Adler (1996: 322)’s words, “constructivism is the view

that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.” From this point, post-positivists criticize positivists on the grounds that positivists envisage a world, which is fully constituted prior to social interactions; hence, the world is not a product of social relationships.

Differing from positivism, post-positivists emphasize a social ontology, meaning that the world cannot be separated from the normative, political and social processes that gave rise to it. In other words, while positivism accepts the world around us already given, post-positivism endeavors to understand the political and social processes that gave rise to the existing configuration or the prevailing order of the world.

Hence, post-positivists have critical lenses that question the prevailing order. These lenses enable an inquiry on the existing order concerning how it came into existence. To this end, post-positivist theorists attempt to demonstrate the un-uniqueness of the prevailing order, implying that it is just one of the alternatives. This process is called as “denaturalizing” process by Fierke (1998: 13). Pointing out that the prevailing order is among many alternatives, post-positivist approaches also aim to open up spaces for other alternatives through digging the social ground for the discovery of social processes that can potentially lead to change (see Cox, 1981: 129; Hobdon and Wyn Jones, 2006:237).

Epistemological Ground

Positivists and post-positivists embrace two different epistemological traditions, which have their roots in Max Weber’s distinction between Erklären and Verstehen. Weber (1978: [1922]: 4) identifies Erklären as the causal explanation proper to the

natural sciences, and *Verstehen* as the kind of understanding proper to social sciences. With Martin Hollis and Steve Smith's *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (1990), Weber's *Erklären* and *Verstehen* were popularized in the discipline as 'explaining' and 'understanding'.

Explaining and understanding point two different perspectives on the relationship between observer and observed. Rob Walker (1980: 4) comments on this that post-positivism involves an attempt "to make a decisive break from the comfortable, deeply ingrained and indeed addictive Western habit [referring positivist science understanding] of making a separation between subject and object, between the knower and the world to be known." This is to say that positivist tradition rests upon an assumption that refers to the separation of observer and observed, meaning that researcher is outside of what is researched. Hence, the researcher is not part of what is happening in the world and his/her values do not involve in research (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 45-67). This understanding is clearly put by Morgenthau (1973 [1948]: 4), who sought to develop a 'scientific' approach to international politics:

Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion- between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.

Later, commenting on Morgenthau, Stanley Hoffman (1977: 45) identified the problem of subjective judgment in 'science' as "profound conviction." He states "all problems can be resolved, that the way to resolve them is to apply the scientific method- assumed to be value free, and to combine empirical investigation, hypothesis formation, and testing." Based on such assumption, we may infer that

positivist scholars in IR seek to emulate methods that are available in natural sciences to identify general causes of events, actions and developments in the outside world. Emulating the so-called scientific methods, positivist scholars believe that they adopt neutral stance, and conduct objective research on their subject (Kurki and Wight, 2010 [2007]: 21).

Contrary to positivist understanding, post-positivists assume validity of interpretative and hermeneutic approaches in social sciences. In doing so, they recognize their own participation in the production of knowledge and thus the constitution of the world, which they attempt to observe and understand. Hence, post-positivists believe that there is always a relationship between observer and the observed in the sense that these two can never be separated (Hopf 1998: 184). According to Hollis and Smith (1990: 72), to locate the idea in an interpretative or hermeneutic setting, researcher needs to specify that there is meaning both in ‘the behaviour of others’ and in the ‘account’ which the acting individual takes of it. That leads directly to the central hermeneutic theme that “action must always be understood from within.” From this point, there is not a neutral or given world that researchers would be able to observe from outside, but there are many worlds, whose existences are dependent on the perspectives of researchers. Therefore, researcher is always a part of what is going on in the world.

Post-positivist scholars claim that being part of the research is actually also valid for positivist scholars since the positivist research community plays a key role in the production and validation of knowledge claims by putting and applying standards for the creation of reliable knowledge (Neufeld, 1994: 14). In this manner, post-positivists criticize positivism for ignoring the historical and social origins of the

nature of the so-called scientific standards to assess the reliability of knowledge claims. Moreover, positivism, by ignoring so, denies the time-bound character of those standards and seals the door for the emergence of alternatives.²¹

Theory and Practice

Positivism and post-positivism have also a disagreement on the relationship between theory and practice. Positivist scholars embrace an understanding that theory is derived from practice, meaning that practice is independent from theory. Waltz (1994: 913) defines on this “theory as a picture ... of abounded realm or domain of activity.” Hence, theory is a tool that depicts the realm of practice with the connections within. The task of theory, then, involves the objective explanation of the realm of practice.

Defining theory as a tool to explain practice, positivist scholars identify so-called ‘good’ theory to the extent that it meets the needs of the policymakers (George, 1993: 137-138; Wallace, 1996: 321; Walt, 2005: 28-34). Hence, theory should “address the day-to-day largely tactical needs of policymakers” (Stein, 2000: 56). In this respect, theory should be able to diagnose problems, make predictions and provide prescriptions for policymaking.

There is a rather different perspective on the relationship between theory and practice in the post-positivist camp. Contrary to the belief in positivism, post-positivist scholars define theory as constitutive of practice rather than as being simply an

²¹ While post-positivist scholars criticize positivism on such grounds, positivists assert that relying on the tradition of understanding creates an epistemological problem. Accordingly, Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 27) state that *Verstehen* can be defined as “the interpretation of meaning through empathetic understanding and pattern recognition”; however, “unless the interpreter’s judgments are evaluated according to systematic standards for assessing the quality of inferences, they remain only the personal view of the observer.”

explanation of the realm of practice. Therefore, theory and practice are “unavoidably and inextricably linked together” (Smith, 2003: 237) that “theory is ... implicated in practice, and practice is ... theoretical” (Smith, 1997: 514-515).

Understood in this way, post-positivists assume that theory is itself a form of practice. This perspective is a result of post-positivist embrace of ‘understanding tradition’ as its epistemological position. As Smith (2003: 235) states, there is no view from nowhere outside of political, economic, social and cultural contexts. As a result, all theoretical claims are partial, meaning that it is impossible to talk about objective and neutral truth to be discovered.

Then, theory, post-positivism argues, is not the mirror of the realm of practice, and knowledge claims are closely related with the power relationships within the society. Hence, the realm of practice with its political, economic, social and cultural aspects affects the realm theory to the extent that it constitutes the very categories within which the researcher thinks, and in return theory legitimizes the power relationships in the realm of practice within which it arises. Post-positivist scholars, in this respect, adopt a famous quote that was voiced by Robert Cox (1981: 128) “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.” With this argument, Cox has shed light on the dual characteristics of theory. The first one points that any theoretical enterprise has a politico-normative content that shapes theory’s perspective. As the second characteristic, theory has two types of relationship with practice based on its being “problem-solving” and critical.” Problem-solving theory seeks to help solving the problems that would emerge in the prevailing social and power relationships, which gave rise to that theory. Thus, problem-solving theory aims to make the existing order work smoothly. In contrast to problem-solving theory, critical theory questions

the origins of the prevailing social and power relationships in the sense that it aims to open up spaces for the possibility of alternative orders (Cox, 1981: 128-129).

Regardless of being problem-solving or critical, theory has a key role in the production and reproduction of the realm of practice in the shape of seeking the preservation of the existing order, or seeking the replacement of it. Here, a quotation from Smith is illustrative to understand the relationship between theory and practice in IR. Accordingly, Smith (1987: 198-199) states that

so closely identified with the foreign policy concerns of the country, it is not surprising that the assumptions of Realism have proven to be so difficult to overcome. This is because the focus of Realism, namely how to maximize power so as to manage international events, fits extraordinarily well with the needs of a hegemonic power. The three key elements of Realism's account of world politics, the national interest, power maximization and the balance of power, are particularly well-suited to the requirements of a foreign policy for the U.S.

Agents and Structure

In addition to their differentiation from positivist approaches on the relationship between theory and practice, post-positivists adopt a different understanding on the relationship between agents and structure as well. Positivist understanding on the agent-structure debate is obvious in structural realist thinking. Waltz (1979: 39-40), the leading figure in structural realist approach, assumes that structure and interacting units (or agents) have a causal relationship. Structure²² consists of the interacting units; in return, it functions as a constraining force on these units. In other words, there is a causation that “runs from structures to states and from states to structure” (Waltz, 1997: 914).

²² In Waltz's terminology, system and structure do not reflect same meanings. In his words, “a system consists of a structure, and the structure is the systems-level component that makes it possible to think of the units as forming a set as distinct from mere collection.

In such reciprocal causal relationship, states with their particular formation based on distribution of power form an international structure. And, international structure determines states' behaviors through its limiting force on states. In this understanding, states and international structure are treated as two separate entities. States with their characteristic features exist prior to their relationship with structure. In other words, there is not a constitutive but a causal relationship between states and structure.

Contrary to Waltz, post-positivist scholars assume a mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structure. This assumption has roots in 'structuration theory' mainly studied and developed by Philip Abrams, Roy Bhaskar, Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens and Derek Layder. Later, Alexander Wendt with his article "Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory" popularized the structuration theory in IR.

The structuration theory conceives agents and structure as ontologically different but mutually constitutive entities. Wendt (1987: 360) explains the relationship between the two as such that "social structures are the result of the intended and unintended consequences of human action, just as those actions presuppose or are mediated by an irreducible structural context." In this explanation, structures are understood in generative terms rather than as an entity that constrain the interacting units within, meaning that the very self-understanding of agents, which mainly shapes their activities and tendencies is constituted by social structures.

In return, the actions and perceptions of actors also constitute the structure. As Bhaskar (2015 [1979]: 38) underlines, "social structures ... do not exist

independently of the activities they govern.” He also adds, “social structures ... do not exist independently of the agents’ conceptions of what they are doing in their activity”, referring that structures are inseparable from the motivations of agents that pave the way for their actions. Hence, structures are dependent to and constituted by the practices and self-understandings of agents.

To sum up, post-positivism has gained ground in the discipline and reputation among the scholars of IR especially after the Cold War due to the insufficiency of mainstream IR theorizing to anticipate such ground shaking development. The ontological, epistemological and normative features of post-positivism have affected the basic concepts of the discipline. Power is one the most influenced concepts in the discipline because the proponents of post-positivism have replaced the analytical framework of the concept within the positivist era. The next section is devoted to the evolution of the concept of power with the rise of post-positivist premises in the discipline.

3.2.2. Fundamental Differences between Power Conceptualizations in Positivist and Post-Positivist Approaches

Since post-positivism represents a meta-theoretical commitment for diverse approaches in the discipline, it is difficult to talk about single power conceptualization that is shared by all post-positivist approaches. Moreover, based on their normative agendas and focus of analyses, post-positivist approaches in IR concentrate on different power conceptualizations. For example, while neo-Gramscian critical theory questions the role of power in the production and re-

production of hegemony in international system, feminist theories endeavor themselves in discovering the role of power on how practices and discourses reify masculine and feminine positions in IR and international relations. However, given their identified common features, post-positivist approaches share important points on how to study power.

Contrary to dominance of methodological individualism in the positivist power conceptualizations, post-positivism embraces ‘methodological holism’ in conceptualizing power. Methodological holism refers that individual actions cannot be understood without a focus on collectivities or structures (Wendt, 1999: 29). This is to say that social phenomena cannot be understood through a sole focus on individual actors without specifying the underlying processes of identity and preference formations. In such processes, as the structuration theory suggests, there is mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structure. This means that as opposed to the prominent understanding in methodological individualism which points that actions of individuals are exogenous to the constitutive effects of structure, methodological holism understands social phenomena through a dual understanding that is how structures constitute agents with their identities, interests, capacities and practices, and how actors produce and reproduce structure through their discourses and practices.

As an implication of methodological holism, post-positivist approaches analyze power relations not as a causal relationship but as a constitutive relationship. In a causal power relationship, causality is hypothesized between an independent variable and a dependent variable, meaning that causality is formulated between actor X’s influence attempt and actor Y’s response. This logic is plausible if the actors in a

power relationship are understood as distinct entities. However, methodological holism points that the actors in a power relationship are not completely distinct entities. They are constituted entities of the same structure and they have specific positions and roles in the structure, which determines the nature of their relationship.

Hence, the relationship between actors is shaped by the established norms and appropriate behavior patterns in the structure rather than the relative power capacity between them. This is to say that actors have constituted roles, identities and interests in an intersubjective context that dis/empowers them. The actions of actors are the result of their social roles, identities and interests because those actions gain meanings within an intersubjective context composed of norms, discourses and practices (Hopf, 1998: 173). The practice of those actions, in return, strengthens and reproduces the intersubjective context that constitutes actors.

Accordingly, post-positivism implies that the meaningful action is an intersubjective phenomenon (Guzzini, 2000: 149). It is not a product of choice specific strategic calculation processes. In other words, actions are assumed not to be driven by logic of consequences but logic of appropriateness or logic of habit in post-positivist power conceptualizations.

Logic of appropriateness refers that actors may follow appropriate behaviors attached to their identities without engaging in a strategic calculation of costs and benefits of doing so. The main motivation for action, then, is about fulfilling the requirements of an identity or role in intersubjective social context rather than the rational expectations from possible consequences that the action would bring (March and Olsen, 1998: 951). The sources of actions, according to logic of appropriateness,

comes from established norms and practices which actors accept as the right thing to follow.

The logic of habit constitutes another source for action in post-positivist power conceptualizations. While logic of appropriateness gives reference to explain the underlying reasons behind an action, logic of habit points actor's ready-made responses without even thinking on their appropriateness to their identities and roles (Hopf, 2010: 541). Unlike logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness, logic of habit does not entail a reflective understanding on the sources of actions. While logic of consequences raises strategic calculation and logic of appropriateness assumes norm following in explaining the motives of action, logic of habit searches for automatic and unconscious responses of actors. This is to say that while the logics of consequences and appropriateness deal with controlled and reflective responses of individuals respectively, logic of habit studies uncontrolled responses. Referring ideas from cognitive neuroscience, Evans (2008: 257) states that habits function in the automatic system of the brain. In addition, habits, Hopf (2010: 542) suggests, originate from social structures. Repeated instrumental cost-benefit calculations and socialization to some normative standards help the acquisition of habits in society. Habits may also be acquired through imitation of the set of actions in the world around.

From this point of view, we may suggest that the logic of habit follows a specific procedure in explaining the action. It assumes that habits shape actors' perceptions of reality. What actors perceive as reality is already pre-cooked in their minds. In this respect, actors make rapid categorizations of people and events depending upon their habits. Based on their categorizations, actors promote a specific set of behaviors and

demote others. To say that habits present motives for action by giving actors ready-made responses as they shape the reality that actors perceive.

Having embraced logic of appropriateness and logic of habits as the main sources of action, post-positivism points that the present configuration of the social context, together with the norms, practices, identities and habits within, are not determined by the nature itself, or the nature of things. Post-positivist approaches question the sources that give rise to the present configuration of the world. In other words, they question the social processes that produced/produces/are producing the current norms, practices, identities and habits in the world. For post-positivists, questioning on social processes is analytically akin to power analysis since it can be translated as a counterfactual argument that is ‘things could have been different otherwise’ (Guzzini, 2000: 150).

This means that the world we live in is not a product of nature and does not represent an objective phenomenon rather it is a product of particular power relationships. Accordingly, post-positivist approaches study power as an analytical tool to understand how the present configuration of the social context has come into existence. On this, post-positivist scholars endeavor themselves to conceptualize power as the production of the systematic effects such as actors with their associated interests, the social capacities of the positions within the structure, and the definition of what is possible, normal, rational and legitimate.

Hence, post-positivist power conceptualizations slightly differ from positivist conceptualizations. While positivist power conceptualizations see particular outcomes of the relationship between actors as effects of power, post-positivist

power conceptualizations observe the particular formation of identities, interests, appropriate behaviors, habits and order of things in the world as the effects of power. A comparison on their different perspectives on 'structural power' may illustrate the point.

In positivist approaches, the structural power conceptualization points the instances in which actor X has control over actor Y's decisions and behaviors through the intermediary of the rules and procedures, which define formal and informal institutions, regimes and multilateral settings. In such power relationship, power involves the manipulation of actor Y's choice set by putting constraints on certain decisions and behaviors that are detrimental to actor X's preferences, or by enabling certain decisions and behaviors that are beneficial to actor X's preferences. In other words, power works through putting limitation on actor Y's decisions and behaviors without shaping his/her core preferences and interests, suggesting that Actor Y is aware of his/her interests and associated identity or position in the structure, but due to his/her strategic calculation of costs and benefits, he/she behaves in a certain manner even such behavior is detrimental to his/her real interests. Then, the deterministic feature of this power conceptualization is *conflict of interests* in positivist power conceptualizations. Hence, power relationship occurs between two actors (individuals or groups) that have contradictory interests regarding the issue on which they develop their policies.

In post-positivist approaches, power functions in a different way. Structural power works not through putting limitation on actors' action choice sets but through shaping their very interests. Here, structure is understood in a broad sense. It points more than an institutional setting or formal and informal rules and procedures. The

structure consists of norms, practices, identities and interests. Through these elements, actors are constituted as social beings with certain identities, positions, roles and duties as the effects of power.

Actors gain social capacities and interests in accordance with their identities and positions in structure. In such power relationship, actors with their identities and positions exist only in relation with others' structural positions. The relationship between actors is shaped by power itself. If we take the relationship between a master and a slave in Middle Ages, we may see that slave behaves in accordance with his/her master not because of his/her strategic calculation of costs and benefits of doing so but doing so seems to be the right thing to do, or appropriate behavior to do. Slave does not even think behaving differently because it is already ignored or illegitimized within the structure and diffused on the actors. Post-positivists see how slave comes to believe his/her social position as normal and only alternative for him/her as an effect of structural power. Accordingly, there is a different deterministic feature of structural power in post-positivist approaches that is *shaping of interest* since power works through transforming actors' identities and associated interests.

3.2.3. Structural Power Conceptualization within Post-Positivist Tradition in IR

As the analysis on post-positivist power conceptualizations has already begun through a comparison of structural power conceptualizations within positivist and post-positivist traditions in the discipline, we may go into details of structural power formulations within post-positivist tradition. As it has been mentioned, different

post-positivist approaches share fundamental features in their power conceptualizations. However, they interpret those features in parallel to their research agendas.

The post-positivist structural power formulations assume that actors have differentiated capacities due to their respective positions in the structure they operate. Hence, structures do not allocate equal advantages and privileges to all agents. On this feature, Marxist scholars point the unequal social privileges and capacities between capital and labor, or feminists are interested in how social structures constitute different social positions, roles and capacities for masculine and feminine positions. Based on this, post-positivists assume that social structure shapes actors' identities and subjective interests that make them ready to accept their positions and roles. Actors behave in accordance with their structurally constituted identities and interests, which are posited as the effects of structural power. Hence, the post-positivist structural power concerns how actors perceive their identities and interests as natural, and how practices become routinized and normalized.

In order to understand the formation structural power and its effects in world politics, Marxist insights on idea of hegemony constitute an illustrative example. On this, building on the understanding developed by the Italian Marxist thinker, Antonio Gramsci, Robert Cox introduced a neo-Gramscian focus on world order. Through neo-Gramscian lenses, Cox (1981; 1983) identifies the hegemonic nature of the global capitalism as a particular structural setting, which produces and maintain the material and ideological inequalities through a combination of coercive and consensual means. Having similar lenses, Gill and Law (1989) seek to combine the concepts of power and hegemony. Gill and Law focus on the relationship between

the rise of modern inter-state system and production and maintenance of the capitalism across the world. In addition to these scholars, studies from other scholars such as Fred Halliday (1994), Rosenberg (1994) and Rupert (2003) touch upon similar points. They discuss how the interaction between state system and international economic institutions, and also the expansion of capitalism creates a form of global hegemony with its associated inequalities of capacities, resources, advantages and opportunities as the effects of the power. In this respect, these scholars analyze how the capitalist mode of world economic system has shaped the characteristics of individual nation-states and the relationship between them.

Taking a closer look on the neo-Gramscian understanding on hegemony is revealing the details of how the particular mode of life is constituted as an effect of the structural power. Unlike the conventional understanding in IR theory, which identifies hegemony as the dominance of a state in international politics based on its material capabilities, neo-Gramscian understanding see hegemony not as a dominance of a single state but as a world order consists of broadly accepted ideas supplemented by material resources and institutions (Cox, 1981:139). In his words, “hegemony frames thought and thereby circumscribes action” (Cox, 1992: 179). Understood in this way, hegemony represents a consensual order based on specific norms and values that shape social relations, and thereby reality. Reality, as used here, refers both the physical environment in which people interact and the ideological context supported by institutions (see Cox, 1997: 152).

In order to understand how hegemony is established and how it works, Cox (1981: 137) proposes the method of historical structure. The historical structure represents a historically limited totality that contains particular spheres of human activity. Then,

the historical structure is a simplified representation of a complex reality that is established by a hegemonic order. Cox (1981: 137-138) traces the establishment hegemony at the interaction of three spheres of activity that are ‘the social forces’ engendered by the social relations of production²³, ‘forms of state’ that represent historically and spatially contingent state/society complexes, and ‘world orders’ that represent specific of the norms, rules and procedures of states-system and world economy. The interaction of these three spheres of activity embodies and reifies particular configuration of structural power settlement (or historical structure). In addition, the three spheres are not only in interaction but also interrelated. This is to say that a change in the sphere of production may generate new social forces; new social forces may bring about changes in the forms of states; and the generalization of these changes may alter the word order. At the same time, particular world order may exert influence for the expansion of particular form of state and thereby particular configuration of social forces. Considering this interrelation, the figure below captures the point.




Figure 5: The Interrelation of the Spheres of Activity that Leads Hegemony

²³ Cox defines production in broad sense. He states that it is not confined to the production of physical goods used or consumed. It covers the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical goods (Cox 1989: 39)

As Cox (1981: 136) argues, there is a reciprocal combination of three additional elements within each spheres of activity. These elements are ‘ideas’, ‘material capabilities’, and ‘institutions’. ‘Ideas’ consist of intersubjective meanings and collective images. Intersubjective meanings are shared notions regarding the social relations, which contain habits and appropriate behaviors within. Accordingly, intersubjective meanings legitimize prevailing power relations within hegemony. ‘Material capabilities’, on the other hand, refer accumulated resources as well as technological and organizational capabilities. And, ‘institutions’ are the organizing factors of the previous two elements in order to stabilize or perpetuate prevailing order. Hence, institutions are embodied locations of the legitimized power relations of hegemony. The figure below shows how Cox depicts the interrelation between these three elements.




Figure 6: The Interrelation of the Elements of Hegemony

Formulated as a coherent conjunction between material capabilities, ideas and institutions within three spheres of activity that are social forces, states and world order, hegemony represents a prevailing historical structure (or structural power) in a certain time of history and place. Cox applies this method of historical structure to analyze specific hegemonic orders in world history, Pax-Britannica and Pax-

Americana. Pax-Britannica represents a hegemonic world order in 1800s based on London based financial globalization with the norms that regulate free trade, gold standard, and free movement of capital and persons. It was built upon manufacturing capitalism, of which Britain was at the center. Being one of its main tenets, the British sea power was there as the potential enforcer of the rules and regulations that Pax-Britannica represents. This hegemonic order began to decline during the period from the last quarter of 19th century to the Word War II. The end of British supremacy at seas was the underlying reason of the declining trend for Pax-Britannica. This was followed by the ideas such as protectionist liberalism and neo-imperialism. In the end, Pax-Britannica came to an end with the outbreak of World War II (Cox, 1981: 140).

Pax-Britannica was followed by a new hegemonic order that is Pax-Americana with the end of the World War II. Pax-Americana refers US-led hegemonic world order until the early 1970s. The stabilization of this hegemonic order was achieved through a global economic system organized around the idea of ‘embedded liberalism’, which refers the combination of the principles of free trade and the right for national governments to regulate their national economies. The Bretton Woods system and its institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were tools for the maintenance of the system as they provide fixed exchange rates (Bieler and Morton, 2004: 94).

The collapse of Bretton Woods system marked the end of Pax-Americana as a result of the world economic crisis in the beginning of 1970s. This end led to a structural transformation. Hence, a new hegemonic structure is formed through the internationalization of production and finance regulations. Cox (1981: 146-147)

claims that internationalization of production mobilizes social forces and plays a productive and reproductive role in shaping the forms of states and world order. The new order is established upon new norms, habits and appropriate behaviors to be followed by the units of the structure, at the top of which there is transnational managerial class, which includes executives of multinational corporations, senior officials of internationally-oriented sectors, officials from finance ministries, local managers of business enterprises that have role in international production systems and many others. The norms, habits and appropriate behaviors within the structure are reinforced and fixed by an institutional framework composed of the Trilateral Commission, World Bank, IMF, OECD and many others.

There are similar ideas to the Cox's within the Marxist camp about the exercise of structural power. For example, Gill and Law (1989) study structural power of capital, generated through the functioning of markets and material and normative elements attached to it (1989: 479-482). Material elements, Gill and Law argue, refer direct power exercises based on the material capabilities by a given group of capitalists against the disobedient groups to the norms, habits and appropriate behaviors of the structure. Normative elements, on the other hand, are related to creation of those norms, habits and appropriate behaviors around hegemonic ideology. For example, the structure of the economic order reinforces and maintains the view that economic growth is dependent on private investment as the appropriate behavior for the units of the structure. By doing so, structure empowers the role of private capital in the global political economy since units within the structure come to treat the idea of private investment as one of the most necessary component for the achievement of economic growth.

Accordingly, structural power conceptualization in post-positivist approaches refers to power seen as a structure at the intersection between the elements such as social capacities, habits and appropriate behaviors and the institutional frameworks that maintain these elements. Power, here, does not refer an individualist conception. The roles, identities and capacities of individual units, whether people, groups or states, are the effects of power. In this understanding, structure is not only a phenomenon that allocates resources but also shapes the very identities, interests and capacities of units. Understood in this way, structural power in post-positivist approaches has its roots in Lukesian understanding which describes the exercise of power as “shaping ... perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things” (Lukes, 2005: 28).

3.2.4. The Poststructural Power Conceptualization

Poststructuralism as an intellectual tradition began to be popularized in social sciences by the writings of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu and many others. Starting from the beginnings of 1980s, studies given by Richard Ashley, Michael Shapiro, Jim George, Rob Walker, David Campbell, James Der Derian, Hayward R. Alker, Rolan Bleiker have introduced poststructural tradition to IR. In the beginning, poststructuralist IR was seen at the margins of the discipline. However, in the wake of the end of the Cold War, poststructuralism stepped towards the centers of the discipline as questions have been raised concerning the explanatory and predictive capacity of positivist-rationalist-materialist approaches.

Poststructuralist scholars in IR unite on the argument that dominant understandings of world politics are both arbitrary and non-arbitrary. This is to say that the dominant understandings have become dominant among many possibilities, and at the same time, certain historical processes have given rise to them (Campbell, 2010 [2007]: 214). Based on this argument, poststructuralists have endeavored to examine how the world has come to be seen in particular ways and how those particular ways become possible in the line with relations of power. Hence, power is one of the central concepts in poststructural tradition.

The poststructuralist power conceptualization in IR has much indebted to the ideas of Michel Foucault. In Foucauldian understanding, power is not understood as something that can be located into agents (individual or state) thanks to their possession of weapons, money and capability to set norms, rules, procedures in an institutional framework, or into any structure based on their constitutive effects of social capacities, interests, habits and appropriate behavior. Instead, power is everywhere that it is impossible to escape from its effects (Taylor, 1986: 92).

For poststructuralists, power is a key concept in order to explore the conditions of social and discursive processes that produce all aspects of nature and social life among many other alternatives. Hence, power produces subjectivities and it lies at the bottom of all social practices. As a consequence of such understanding, poststructuralists assume that subjectivity is not a biologically given phenomenon. Instead, they suggest that subjects are constructions, in which power is an important element.²⁴

²⁴ Poststructuralist notion of the subject or subjectivity fundamentally moves away from the notion in positivist tradition. The notion of the subject in positivism is linked to the Cartesian understanding,

Poststructuralists insist on a close relationship between power and knowledge. For them, power and knowledge represent two inseparable concepts. On the relationship between power and knowledge, Foucault's ideas are treated as a guide for poststructural IR thinking. Foucault (1977: 27) states that "... power and knowledge directly imply one another ... [meaning that] there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations." This statement demonstrates the perpetual entanglement of and circular relationship between power and knowledge. This is to say that knowledge rests upon power, and power rests upon knowledge.

Accordingly, power means the authority that produces and validates knowledge. Knowledge, here, refers "a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements" within a specific historical era (Foucault, 1980: 133). Therefore, knowledge determines the standards of being true, right, scientific, rational, civilized and so on. Understood in this way, knowledge can be named as 'episteme' in Foucault's vocabulary, or 'habitus' in Bourdieu's terminology. In their simplest, episteme or habitus can be characterized as a way of making sense of the world. Habitus is a system of the schemes for the

which define subjecthood through "I think therefore I am." This definition points that the source of subjectivity is inherently related with 'self' that has independent from the world. This is to say that subject arrives in the world fully formed. Therefore, positivism puts a distinction between the subject and the world as if these two exists independently. As opposed to this understanding, poststructuralists assume that the sociological self is shaped by the social, economic, cultural and political environment. Hence, subject takes its form through a socialization process. On this point, poststructuralists are far more radical compared to other post-positivist approaches in the sense that they reject any residual remnant (genetic or spiritual) of preexisting subjectivity independent from the world. While critical theorists assume that there is a inherent subjectivity in all human beings that is restricted by ideological and physical chains and therefore they aim to uncover those chains in order to free individuals through emancipation (Booth, 1991: 319), poststructuralists insist that there is not an existence of subjectivity independent from the effects of the operations of power (Campbell, 2010: 224). Hence, subjectivity is constituted by historically contingent power structures (Foucault, 1982: 208).

production of meanings, identities, perceptions, practices and all aspects of nature and social life. As Bourdieu (1989: 19) puts it, “habitus produces practices and representations which are available for classification, which are objectively differentiated; however, they are immediately perceived as such only by those agents who possess the code, the classificatory schemes necessary to understand their social meaning.”

In parallel with Bourdieu’s definition of habitus, Foucault (1980: 197), referring that it represents a standpoint that separate truth from falseness describes episteme as the strategic apparatus for making particular statements and actions are possible. Hence, in Foucault (1989 [1966]: 183)’s word, “episteme ... defines the conditions of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in practice.”

In the manifestation of power-knowledge relationship, language and discursive power practices play an important role. Accordingly, as Derrida (1976: 158-159) puts it, “there is nothing outside the text.” Then, objects, subjects, practices, and the world we live in do not have ready names and meanings. They gain those traits through language and discursive practices. Hence, language is not only a tool for people to speak but something that constitutes them. It is language that determines how individuals see the world and what is possible to think, say and practice. Language and discursive power practices, here, are not understood in narrow sense. Instead, they represent a system of meaning depend on a historically contingent era built upon a broader web of social practices that attaches meaning to the so-called reality in which people understand themselves and their behaviors (George, 1994: 29).

Then any meaningful phenomena in the world has its roots in a particular system of knowledge because knowledge determines the general criteria as a classificatory scheme necessary for the production of meaning through discursive practices. Hence, systems of knowledge establish a specific way of life and order of things that produce all aspects of nature and social life. Poststructuralists call this production process as 'productive power'. For them, power does not simply represent repressive relations but it is also productive and disciplinary. Power is repressive in the sense that it imposes a system of meanings consisting subjectivities, actions and its own dichotomies, and thereby imposes a limitation and constraint on the infinite possibilities. It is productive at the same time since relations of power produce a specific system of meanings without which the world would be meaningless (Campbell, 2010: 225). In other words, power both produces and fixes the order of global things (Adler and Bernstein, 2005: 294). Or, as Weldes et. Al. (1999: 17) state, power produces "both conditions of possibility and limits on possibility."

Then, power is conceptualized through power/knowledge relationship in poststructural conceptualization. Embracing this power conceptualization, poststructural IR scholars believe that power and knowledge are closely related and their relationship paves the way for the production of a particular system of meanings based on discursive practices. Attributing a key importance to the relationship between power and knowledge, poststructuralists in IR focus on the question that how the discipline of IR actually produced a particular mode of international relations, and thereby certain specific norms, actions and perceptions are allowed to be possible while others are constrained. R.B.J. Walker (1993: 5) outlines this stance of poststructural IR as "They [theories of International Relations] can ... be read ... as crucial sites in which attempts to think otherwise about political possibilities are

constrained by categories and assumptions that contemporary political analysis is encouraged to take for granted.” Hence, poststructural IR reads theories of International Relations as sites where power practices are intensified by using a specific discourse regarding the production of characteristics of modern state and international politics. These discourses demarcate and discipline the political imagination beyond which they sketch a dangerous realm. Therefore, theories are not seen as tools for the explanation of world politics rather they are identified as constitutive power practices the effects of which can be identified in every aspect of international relations.

As theories are assumed to produce a constitutive space, discursive practices within theories are understood in terms of performative materialization rather than mere linguistic constructions. This is to say that discourses are seen as power practices in the shape of specific “modes of representations that give rise to the subjects of international relations and constitute the domain to which International Relations theory is purportedly only responding” (Campbell, 2010: 227). The understanding which attributes theory- and the specific discourses attach to it- a productive role makes poststructuralists treat theory as an object of analysis. By critically examining the historical roots of theories, poststructural scholars question how mainstream analytic approaches in the discipline contribute to the production of a specific landscape for international relations in which certain understandings are privileged and others are marginalized and excluded.

The questioning of theoretical approaches as power practices opens up spaces for poststructuralist scholars to engage with the political realist claims in IR critically. For example, Ashley (1987) argues that although realism presented itself as an

objective approach that search for answers to question what does the international politics look like?, it actually has a political interest in the guise of a timeless truth of international politics. As a result, Ashley (1987: 422) names realism “as discourse of power and rule in modern global life.” According to this perspective, realist discourse is a specific power practice, which is generated historically through the combination of Western rationalist discourse since Plato and the realist cast identified by the ideas of Thucydides Machiavelli and E.H. Carr that produces, conceals and disciplines the subjectivities and social context in the geopolitical space of international relations. Ashley (1984; 1988) proceeds his critical enquiry on realist tradition in his other studies in which he identifies anarchy is an integral part of realist theory. He demonstrates that anarchy, presented as a finding reached through factual observation as the underlying characteristic of international politics, is actually a particular discursive strategy that disciplines understandings and perceptions on the events in international politics. By doing so, realism is said to be the producer of a landscape associated with concepts loaded with particular meanings such as ‘anarchy’, ‘power politics’, ‘balance of power’, ‘the security dilemma’, ‘national interest’, on which ideas about international relations is furnished.

Poststructuralists are not limiting themselves only with power practices in macro level such as the production of the landscape of international relations. They also analyze how discursive power practices in world politics privilege certain perspectives concerning the interpretation of political development, and thereby activate certain policy options as among alternatives. For example, Campbell (1998: 33) demonstrates that the same events leading to the Bosnian War can be represented in various different ways with significantly different effects. Hence, the Bosnian War is a produced effect of a particular representation built upon a powerful discourse

based on a hostile self/other dichotomy between the parties of the conflict. In return, the War reproduced that hostile self/other dichotomy. Similarly, Shapiro (1988: 89-124) shows that how Guatemala was constituted as the Central American alien 'other' through the particular moral and geopolitical foreign policy discourse that made the US intervention is both necessary for the US foreign policy objectives and also for the sake of the target country.

Overall, we may summarize that the poststructural power conceptualization treats discourse as important sources of power, which generate a particular system of meanings on which reality is understood and explained. In this understanding, power is formulated as discursive practices that produces subjectivities with particular identities, interests and in/appropriate behavior patterns attached to them. Hence, discursive practices are sites in which meanings are forged, and thus a particular reality is produced. In Weldes et. al.'s words, "discourses bring with them the power to define and thus to constitute the world" (Weldes et. al., 1999: 18).

3.3. Diverse Power Conceptualizations in IR and Three Traditions on the Concept of Power

Overall, there are five main power conceptualizations in the discipline. These are the possessional power conceptualization, the relational power conceptualization, the positivist structural power conceptualization, the post-positivist structural power conceptualization and the poststructural power conceptualization. These power conceptualizations have their philosophical roots in three thinking traditions on power- namely, Weberian, Lukesian and Foucauldian. To recall, Weberian tradition

describes power in terms *conflict of interests*; Lukesian tradition in terms *shape of interests*; and Foucauldian tradition in terms of *production of subjects*. Locating the power conceptualizations in the discipline into these three traditions on power, the possessional power conceptualization, the relational power conceptualization and the positivist structural power conceptualization have their roots in Weberian tradition; the post-positivist structural power conceptualization has its roots in Lukesian tradition; and the poststructural power conceptualization has its roots in Foucauldian tradition.

Going into details, the possessional power conceptualization equates power with the possession of some certain resources. In this understanding, states possess power in order to maximize their interests, mainly survival in international system. Since all states strive to ensure their survival, and it is the possession of power that guarantees survival against others, there is *conflict of interests* nature at the heart of the possessional conceptualization, making it a Weberian conceptualization.

The relational conceptualization formulates power in line with Dahl (1957: 202-203)'s famous definition, "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do." This formulation explicitly understands power as a direct and observable *conflict of interests* relationship between actor. Hence, the relational conceptualization falls into Weberian tradition.

In the positivist structural power conceptualization, power functions indirectly between actors through the medium of formalized rules of activity, customary practices of engagement, established division of labor and formal or informal arrangements. Having this understanding, the positivist structural power

conceptualization analyzes indirect and latent influence attempts of State X on State Y through the intermediary of an institutional setting. From this point, the positivist structural conceptualization explains power relationships between actors through controlling the setting in which *conflict of interests* occurs indirectly. This makes the positivist structural conceptualization a Weberian power conceptualization.

The post-positivist structural power conceptualization concerns the constitution of social capacities, positions, identities and interests through a particular configuration of structural environment. Here, the exercise of power is not the kind of power that an individual, group, or state exercises over another. Rather it is a structural phenomenon that identities, interests and social capacities of individual units are shaped by the effects of structural power, meaning that the *shape of interest* based Lukesian tradition constitutes the analytical core of the post-positivist structural power conceptualization.

The poststructural conceptualization understands power as discursive practices that produce and maintain particular meanings, and thereby produce and maintain a particular reality. Here, discourses are seen as powerful practices that produce and maintain particular subjectivities with particular identities, interests and in/appropriate behavior patterns for states, groups and individuals (both of self and of others). Conceptualizing power as such, *production of subjects* is inherent in the poststructural conceptualization, which makes it a Foucauldian power conception.

3.4. Concluding Remarks

To wrap up the chapter, power entered the discipline as one of the founder concepts. Given the centrality of power, many different conceptualizations emerged in the discipline. This chapter, conducting a descriptive and performative analysis, revealed the historical and theoretical dynamics that gave rise to each specific power conceptualizations. By doing so, it became possible to clarify the main features and focus of aspects of each power conceptualization in the discipline.

Looking at the conceptual history of power in IR, although each new power conceptualizations in the discipline have been formulated mostly as a critique to the previous ones, we should not approach them as if they are rival explanations to world politics. Rather they are tools for explaining and understanding the world from different aspects. In simplest sense, power conceptualizations in IR represent two broad categories. First category treats power as an effect of international relations. The second one treats international relations as an effect of power. If we go in detail, some of them focuses on actor based conflictual relations; others look at institutional frameworks in the realization of actor's interests; others concentrate on functioning of global economy as sites where power is generated; others emphasize the role of structures in the constitution of unequal social capacities and identities; and others treat even the definition of power as a power practice as it is not pre-given but product of a particular ideological stance and political-theoretical context. The differences among power conceptualizations are, in fact, useful since they are parts of a whole. Each one of these parts points an important aspect of world politics. In this regard, as Smith (2010 [2007]: 3) reminds us, "in the social world there is always more than one story to tell."

CHAPTER 4

MANY POWER CONCEPTUALIZATIONS, ONE CASE STUDY: THE 1998 OCTOBER CRISIS BETWEEN TURKEY AND SYRIA

This chapter is devoted to analyze the 1998 October Crisis through different power conceptualizations in IR discussed in the previous chapter. The case is utilized to highlight different power understandings and explanatory potentials of those conceptualizations. Hence, each different power conceptualizations is applied to the case separately in order to clearly demonstrate their diverging focus of aspects in their analysis to the case.

The first section depicts the overview of the events shaping the 1998 October Crisis in order to provide a solid background for the conduct of analysis through different power conceptualizations. In doing so, the each remaining section conducts separate power analyses built on different power conceptualizations in the discipline. In this respect, the first three power analyses of the case in this chapter contain positivist power conceptualizations that are ‘the possessional conceptualization’, ‘the relational conceptualization’ and ‘the positivist structural conceptualization’. Among these, the

possessional power analysis looks at Turkey and Syria's possession of resources (GDP, population, military capabilities, military expenditure, geography etc.) in explaining the case. The relational power analysis looks at the scope, domain and weight of the power relationship between Turkey and Syria in the 1998 October Crisis in order to reveal which actor got the other one to do something that the other would not do otherwise. And, the positivist structural power analysis looks at institutional arrangements or regimes maintaining and regulating the power relationship between Turkey and Syria.

The last two power analyses of the case, on the other hand, are 'the post-positivist structural conceptualization' and 'the poststructural conceptualization' within post-positivist camp in the IR Theory. The post-positivist structural power conceptualization sees power as structural element that shapes actors' self-understandings and subjective interests together with their differential capacities and resources to their structural positions. Hence, post-positivist structural power analysis of the case looks at the effects of structural power through questioning how Syria's structurally shaped subjective interests in the post-Cold War international structure and the norms concerning the issue of supporting terrorism disempowered it to resist Turkey's demands in the 1998 October Crisis. And in the poststructural conceptualization, power refers to the production and maintenance of meanings, and thereby a particular reality through discursive practices. In line with this conceptualization, poststructural power analysis of the case seeks to understand the mutually constitutive relationship between Turkey's discursively produced state identity and the production of the 1998 October Crisis.

Accordingly, positivist power conceptualizations see particular outcomes of the relationship between actors as effects of power, and power conceptualizations within post-positivist camp observe the particular formation of identities, interests, appropriate behaviors, habits and order of things in the world as the effects of power. This is to say that while positivist power conceptualizations are interested in the role of power on how the world is governed, the post-positivist power conceptualizations look for power through which the world is made. The case study in this chapter better illustrates this basic difference between positivist and post-positivist power conceptualizations.

4.1. Overview of the Events Shaping the 1998 October Crisis

Turkish-Syrian relations have been never easy for both parties, as historically chronic and problematic issues have shaped their relations. The annexation of Alexandretta province (Hatay) by Turkey in 1939 marked the beginning of conflicts between the two countries. Syrian side has never recognized this annexation and continued to claim that Hatay belongs to Syrian state. Hence, Syria always viewed Turkish annexation of Hatay as a conspiracy in which Turkey took advantage of the period of Syrian weakness under the French mandate to adjust the borders in favor of its desires. Due to such interpretations, Syrians and especially the ruling Ba'ath Party have always regarded Hatay as an integral part of Syrian soil. As a result, the Hatay issue has been a source of tension between Turkey and Syria, which negatively affected their relations (Muslih, 1996: 113; Altunışık and Tür, 2006: 231; Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, 2009 [2001]: 291; Al-Taqi and Hinnebusch, 2013: 97).

Relations between the two continued to deteriorate during the Cold War era as Turkey aligned itself with the USA and became a member of NATO while Syria established close ties with the Soviet Union. Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc was seen by Syria as detrimental to genuine Arab needs and interests. In this respect, Turkey was identified as 'Western Trojan horse' in the Middle East, and thereby a potential threat to Syrian security. Similarly, Syria's improving relations with the Soviets caused grave concerns in Ankara because the Soviet Union was the primary national security threat to its territorial integrity for Turkey in the post-World War II environment (Anderson, 1995: 21-42; Muslih, 1996: 113; Soysal, 1998/1999: 106; Altunışık and Tür, 2006: 232; Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, 2009 [2001]: 630-632; Yılmaz, 2009: 127; Al-Taqi and Hinnebusch, 2013: 97-98).

Existing tensions within Turkish-Syrian relationship later intensified as a result of their dispute over utilization of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and the issue of terrorism. Regarding the issue of water, it actually goes back to 1960s, when the two countries embarked on dam projects on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for energy and irrigation purposes. However, the issue transformed into an international problem as the two countries adopted different approaches on how to share the waters. While Syrian side considered the Euphrates-Tigris basin as an international watercourse and claims 'acquired/historical' rights on the utilization of waters, Turkey defined rivers as transboundary waters, and advocated a 'need based' approach (Martin, 2000: 90; Kibaroglu, 2013: 149). This is to say that Syria, on the one hand, demanded equal distribution of water. Turkey, on the other hand, declared that it would release just a sufficient amount of water to meet Syrian needs.

In 1980s, the problems on the utilization of waters turned into a crisis when Turkey initiated the South East Anatolia Development Project (GAP), which includes twenty-two dams and nineteen hydroelectric power plants on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Upon the announcement of the GAP, Syria, regarding the construction of the GAP as robbery of its share in the waters of the Euphrates River, accused Turkey of not giving a notification to other riparian countries of the basin (Alantar, 2000: 150). Moreover, for Syria, Turkey was using Euphrates waters as a political leverage over Damascus. In this respect, it is argued that given Syria's rapid population growth, urbanization and increasing vulnerability to drought, Turkey's projects to dictate the distribution of Euphrates waters were a grave security threat for Damascus (Hinnebusch, 2002: 160).

The second problem that shaped the course of Turkish-Syrian relationship was the issue of terrorism. Although it was repeatedly refused by Syrian side, Turkey continually claimed during the 1980s and 1990s that feeling threatened by the giant water projects on the Euphrates-Tigris basin, Syria adopted acts against Turkey by providing diplomatic, financial, military and logistical support to the terrorist organization Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) as a leverage on Turkey to make it receptive to Syrian demands concerning the water issue.

It is argued that the Syrian support was the most the significant and comprehensive one among the entire foreign backing to the PKK, and thus unacceptable for Turkey (Barkey 1993: 53). For many, the PKK became capable of initiating cross-border assaults on Turkey after getting support from Syria (Barkey, 1993: 53; Criss, 1995: 32; Elekdağ, 1996; Olson, 1997: 170; Erlich, 1998; Kushner, 1999: 235; Naaz, 1999: 1554; Martin, 2000: 88; Sezgin, 2002: 44-45; Altunışık and Tür, 2006: 232-233). It is

asserted that the Syrian government provided safe havens to the terrorist organization in Syrian soil. The leader cadres of the PKK found refuge in Syria, and there was a PKK headquarter in Damascus under the protection of Syrian intelligence, Mukhabarat. The PKK was also given the permission to organize its congresses in Syria and Syrian-controlled Lebanese territories. Moreover, the PKK was allowed to establish training camps, in which its members got military and ideological training. Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK, stated, there were around 15,000 terrorists had been trained in the camps within Syria until 1994 (Özcan, 2000: 248).

Syria was also said to provide manpower to the PKK. In this respect, it was alleged that the Mukhabarat encouraged Kurdish teenagers in Syria to join the terrorist organization. In addition, the Mukhabarat provided identity cards and passports to the PKK militants, demonstrating the Syrian intelligence and the PKK were in close relationship. According to a Turkish intelligence report, Syria was also providing support to the PKK camps outside of Syrian and its-controlled territories. Aykan (1999: 175) suggests that 80 percent of the basic necessities of the PKK camps in northern Iraq was provided by Syria during 1980s and 1990s.

By 1983, Turkey began to declare its concerns on Syria's support of the PKK (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 14; Çarkoğlu and Eder, 2001: 60; Altunışık and Tür, 2006: 232). In order discuss Turkey's concerns on the issue of terrorism and Syria's concerns on the issue of water, the two countries engaged in a series of diplomatic meetings and signed protocols, which proved futile as Turkey continued to accuse Syria of providing support to the PKK, and Syria declared that Turkey had not released enough water even after the protocols.

Going into details of the Turkish-Syrian relationship in the 1980s and 1990s, there were multiple high level meetings between the Turkish and Syrian officials between 1984 and 1993. The first diplomatic attempt was made by Turkish President Kenan Evren in 1984 when he offered Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to fight against terrorism together. This offer was followed by the implementation of the 'Border Security Protocol' between Turkey and Syria (Özcan, 2000: 248). However, the Protocol failed to diminish the tensions between the two countries.

Later in 1987, Turkey and Syria signed another two protocols during Turkish President Turgut Özal's visit to Damascus; one was related with the issue of water and the other one was about the issue of terrorism between the two countries. The protocol related with the issue of water was called 'Economic Cooperation Protocol', which committed Turkey to release 500 cubic meters of water per second to Syria. The other protocol was the 'Security Protocol', which included that both Turkey and Syria would prevent terrorist activities against each other, originating within their territories (*Resmi Gazete*, December 10, 1987). These two protocols constituted a cornerstone in Turkish-Syrian relations because it was the first time the two countries officially connected the issue of water and the issue of terrorism and sought ways to resolve their disputes arising from these issues together. However, both sides seemed dissatisfied with the protocols as Turkey continued to accuse Syria of keeping its support to the PKK, and Syria, announcing that the water flow was below the agreed amount, protested Turkey (Gunter, 1992: 93; Alaçam, 1994/95: 14; Aykan, 1999: 175; Sezgin, 2002: 47; Oktav, 2003: 104; Altunışık and Tür, 2006: 232-233).

Having dissatisfied with the 1987 protocols, Turkey hardened its stance towards Syria. On November 1989, Özal publicly accused Syria of using the PKK against

Turkey and thereby not complying with its obligations resulting from the 1987 protocol. This was followed by Turkish threats to supply less than 500 cubic meters of water per second from the Euphrates River, further complicating the problems between the two countries. It seems that Syria was playing the PKK card in order to reach a conclusion on the water issue in favor of its interests while Turkey decided to not to proceed on the negotiations for the settlement of the water issue if Syria did not take any action against terrorism (Güner, 1997: 109; Altunışık, 2002: 282).

A new environment in the Middle East emerged with the outbreak of 1991 Iraqi War, in which Turkey and Syria found themselves on the same grounds, resulting from the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, a shared concern for the two. In this environment, Turkish and Syrian officials came together in order to discuss their problems on April 1992. The Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin, the Turkish Interior Minister İsmet Sezgin and the Gendarmerie Commander Gen. Eşref Bitlis visited Damascus and two protocols were signed between Turkey and Syria as a result. As in 1987, one protocol was related with the issue of terrorism and the other one with the utilization of water. In the security protocol, the two sides agreed on combating against terrorism, preventing training or propaganda activities of terrorist organizations, taking measures against infiltration and smuggling, and meeting in every three months to ensure the cooperation. With this protocol, Syria also outlawed the PKK (İmset, 1992: 177-178; Kushner, 1999: 236-237; Olson, 2001: 170-171). And in the protocol related with the water issue, Turkey promised to cooperate on the utilization of the Euphrates waters (Aras, 2009: 212).

However, Turkey and Syria continued their accusations, claiming that the PKK activities emanating from Syria have not stopped and the level of water flow was

below the agreement amount. In order to settle the ongoing dispute, Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel paid a visit to Damascus on January 1993. In this visit, Demirel reiterated Turkey's promise to release 500 cubic meters of water per second to Syria from the Euphrates River. In return, he asked for guarantees on the issue of terrorism. As a result of the negotiations between the two countries, Turkey and Syria signed the 'Joint Memorandum on the Security Issues'. By this memorandum, Syria declared the PKK as a terrorist organization, activities of which should be banned (Alaçam, 1994/95: 116; Olson, 1997: 171; Alantar, 2000: 152).

Nevertheless, the memorandum could not settle the disputes over the issues of water and terrorism. On the contrary, the situation worsened as Turkey claimed that the PKK was allowed to organize its third congress under the chair of Öcalan in Syria (Yavuz 2005: 418). Moreover, from the late 1994 the PKK expanded its terror activities to Hatay region, over which there are territorial disputes between Turkey and Syria regarding the sovereignty. In the meantime, Syria officially protested Turkey's ongoing irrigation and dam projects on the Euphrates River upon the completion of the Birecik Dam in 1995, claiming Turkey had not consulted Syria, the downstream riparian. As a response, Syria internationalized the issue and brought it on the agenda of the Arab States, which further strained the relations (Olson, 1997: 176; Alantar, 2000: 153; Çarkoğlu and Eder, 2001: 68; Oktav, 2003: 105).

The relations between the two were driven to nadir as Turkey asserted that Syria began allowing Öcalan to establish ties with other countries. For instance, it was claimed in 1995 that Öcalan had cultivated contacts with high-level German political and intelligence officials in Damascus (Sezgin, 2002: 49). As a result, Turkey decided to de-link the issues of water and terrorism and toughened its stance towards

Syria, dispatching a diplomatic note on January 23, 1996 officially demanding the extradition of Öcalan and declaring unhappiness with the Syrian policy of supporting the PKK. The note also stated that Turkey is determined to use its right of self-defense originating from the Article 51 of the UN Charter. The note was followed by Turkish military build-up along the Syrian border. Yet, Syria did not respond Turkey's diplomatic note. As a response, Turkey suspended all its diplomatic relations with Syria.

The tension within Turkish-Syrian relations remained hot throughout 1996 and 1997, then turned into an international crisis in 1998 as we know as the 'October Crisis' when Turkish political and military high-ranking officials publicly threatened Syria for its support to the PKK. The events were triggered on September 1998, when the Turkish Commander of Land Forces Gen. Atilla Ateş visited Hatay and warned Syria that Turkey's patience has limits. This was the first time, Turkey sent message to Syria through a high-ranking military general. Following, the Turkish President Süleyman Demirel, initiating the Crisis, gave a speech in Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on October 1. He repeated that Turkey's patience is running out, and declared that given the Syrian unresponsiveness to the diplomatic note in 1996, Turkey have right to take military action against Syria, alluding to the Article 51 of the UN Charter. Hence, Turkey announced at the highest level that it might resolve its differences with Syria by force if necessary. In parallel, the address of Turkish Chief of Staff Gen. Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu in TGNA demonstrated the seriousness of Turkey's stance. He stated that Syria have been waging an "undeclared war" against Turkey by using terrorist organizations (Makovsky, 1999; Aykan, 1999: 177; Sezgin, 2002: 49; Oktav 2003: 106; Altunışık and Tür, 2006: 237; Süer, 2008: 201; Aras, 2009: 217; Karakoç, 2010: 925).

Speeches by Turkish officials were followed by the developments on the ground. Turkey initiated diplomatic offensive before the world governments and international organizations, followed by military maneuvers to increase the credibility of its threats. In this regard, around 10,000 troops were deployed on the border and the press was invited to show this mobilization against Syria to the world. The military presence was intensified by Turkish jets, making low altitude flights over the Syrian border. In addition, the TGNA passed a resolution authorizing the government to use of force outside of Turkish territories on October 8 (Makovsky, 1999; Sezgin, 2002: 49-59; Oktav, 2003: 106; Aras 2009: 217).²⁵

Given the seriousness of the situation, the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak initiated a shuttle diplomacy for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. He visited Damascus on October 4, and then flew to Ankara on October 6. During his visit in Ankara, Demirel presented a file consists of Turkish accusations and gave Mubarak an ultimatum note to be conveyed to Syrian leadership demonstrating Turkey's demands from Syria. Turkish demands were specific and clear: the extradition of Öcalan and high-ranking PKK members, the cessation of financial and logistical support to the PKK, and the closure of training camps in Syria or Syrian-controlled territories in Lebanon.

After receiving the note, Mubarak was convinced about Turkey's determination to use of force if Syria fails to comply with the ultimatum. He flew back to Damascus in order to convey the note and persuade Assad to comply with Turkey's demands

²⁵ At that time, the authorization was mainly about deployment of forces on Kosovo as part of the NATO operations. However, Turkish officials interpreted the authorization as it covers a possible operation against Syria.

(*Milliyet*, October 7, 1998; also see Makovsky, 1999; Aykan, 1999: 178; Sezgin, 2002: 50; Aras, 2009: 218; Süer, 2013: 24-25)

As a result, Assad sent message Turkey via Iranian Foreign Minister Kemal Kharrazi that Syria is ready to take steps regarding Turkish demands on October 9. Then, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa delivered Turkey a message from Assad on October 13 that Syria expelled Öcalan and will prevent infiltration of the PKK terrorists, close down training camps in its territories and is ready for cooperation in the earliest time (Aykan, 1999: 178; Sezgin, 2002: 50). After it was confirmed that Öcalan was no longer within Syrian territories, the October crisis ended with Adana Accord signed by the two countries on October 20. According to the Accord, Syria, again, recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization and agreed on prohibiting all of its activities within Syria. The Accord also established a monitoring mechanism that allowed Turkey to verify the Syrian compliance to its commitments. Based on these, as Sezgin (2002: 50) suggests, the Adana Accord seems as a “lopsided agreement” in which only Turkey’s demands were sounded and the Syrian side capitulated. Indeed, the Adana Accord was the first agreement between Turkey and Syria, which Damascus consented to reach a conclusion on security issues without having a compromise on water issue in return (Oktav, 2003: 107; Süer, 2008: 202).

With the Adana Accord, a new era began in the relations between Turkey and Syria. The relations started to improve steadily as the two countries left the lack of trust at their behind and engaged in a trust-building process. A direct telephone link was established between Turkish and Syrian security officials and special representatives were assigned in the diplomatic missions in order to build trust. Moreover, Turkish and Syrian officials started to meet regularly in the Joint Security Committee. As the

level of trust increased between Turkey and Syria, the number of diplomatic visits at various levels increased as well. Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's attendance at the funeral ceremony of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad on June 2000 marked the change in the relationship between the two countries (Altunışık and Tür, 2006: 238-239; Süer, 2008: 214; Al-Taqi and Hinnebusch, 2013: 99).

4.2. Possessional Power Analysis of the 1998 October Crisis

To recall, the possessional conceptualization equates power with the aggregation of (mainly) material resources. In this understanding, a country that has more resources is identified as more powerful and therefore more capable of achieving its objectives compared to others. Hence, it is the distribution of power that first and foremost shapes the vulnerabilities, limits, and opportunities of states in world politics. In this respect, the possessional conceptualization looks for states' possession of power resources such as population, military size, GDP, weaponry etc. in identifying the power hierarchy among states.

The possessional conceptualization, relying on its conceptual scheme, is able to explain the 1998 October Crisis only through looking at differences and distribution of power between Turkey and Syria. However, since it, omitting their foreign policy motivations, focuses only on states' possession of power resources, the possessional conceptualization has a limited capacity explain the dynamics that led to the emergence of the Crisis. Regarding the reasons for the emergence of the Crisis, the possessional power conceptualization can only argue that Turkey had more resources

than Syria and therefore more powerful. This was the reason that Turkey was able to threaten Syria in order to realize its objectives.

Remaining short in explaining the dynamics that led to the Crisis, the possessional conceptualization explains the resolution of the Crisis in a similar fashion that of the break-up. Accordingly, Syria complied with the Turkey's demands on October 1998 because Turkey was materially more powerful than Syria.

Table 9: Conceptual Scheme of the Possessional Power Conceptualization on the 1998 October Crisis

Definition of Power	What to Look at?	Relationship Between	Explanation of 1998 October Crisis (Emergence of the crisis and/or its resolution)
Power is equated with the aggregation of specific (mainly) material resources.	Actors' possession of resources (GDP, population, military capabilities, military expenditure, geography etc.).	Differences and distribution of power between Turkey and Syria ↓ Vulnerabilities, opportunities, limits and behaviors of Turkey and Syria	<u>Emergence</u> Turkey was able to threaten Syria because Turkey was materially more powerful than Syria. <u>Resolution</u> Syria accepted Turkey's demands because Turkey was materially more powerful than Syria.

Looking at resources at their disposal, there was a huge imbalance between Turkish and Syrian material capabilities in favor of Turkey in 1998.²⁶ According to the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC), Turkey had about 4 times more capabilities than Syria at the time (The Correlates of War Project National Material Capabilities (v5.0)). In its calculation of national capabilities, the CINC includes the

²⁶ As the case is about a successful military threat of using force by Turkey against Syria, we look resources mainly related with war-making capabilities.

volume of ‘military expenditures (milex)’, ‘iron and steel production (irst)’, ‘primary energy consumption (pec)’, ‘the number of military personnel (milper)’, ‘total population (tpop) and urban population (upop)’. The composition of these indicators are called as ‘composite index of national capability score (cincs)’.

Table 10: Composite Index of National Capabilities of Turkey and Syria in 1998

	milex (\$ (.000)	milper (.000)	irst (tons) (.000)	pec (coal- ton eq.)	tpop (.000)	upop (.000)	cincs
Syria	986.000	315	70	28.901.000	15.333	7.325.000	0,00412
Turkey	8.955.000	788	14.144	113.655.000	64.479	25.219.000	0,165144

In addition to the CINC scores, Turkey’s material superiority over Syria in 1998 was evident in several more indicators such as territorial size, GDP, infrastructure and weaponry. Looking at their territorial sizes, Turkey has 780,580 km² area of territory while Syria has 185,180 km² (*CIA Factbook Data*), giving Turkey an advantage against Syria that it has considerably larger mainland depth in a possible war between the two countries.

Regarding economic figures of 1998, Turkey, having about 269,287 billion US dollars’ worth of GDP, had about 17,5 times bigger GDP than Syria, whose GDP was only around 15,201 billion US dollars (*World Bank Data*). Moreover, Turkey’s railroad coverage was 10,386 km and highways coverage was 381,631 km while Syria had 1,998 km long railways and 40,480 km highways, demonstrating that

Turkey's logistics infrastructure was also far more developed than Syria's in 1998 (*CIA Factbook Data*).

In terms of weaponry, Turkey, having more modernized and capable armed forces, had a significant superiority over Syria. Comparing modern main battle tanks (mbts), Turkish army had the US and German main battle tanks, 932 M-60 Patton most of which were with A3 upgrade package) and 397 Leopard (*The Military Balance*, 1999: 73).²⁷ On the other hand, Syrian modern main battle tank arsenal consisted of 1500 Russian T-72/-72M (mostly 72M) (*The Military Balance*, 1999: 147).²⁸ It should be noted that Turkish modern mbts in 1998 had a considerable advantage against their Syrian counterparts. While Turkish tanks were equipped with high-tech laser range finder systems and thermal sights, which gave them fighting capability at nighttime, Syrian tanks were mainly T-72M model, produced for exportation purposes with thinner armor and downgraded weapons system compared to proper T-72s (*Army Recognition*).

There was a similar picture in comparing their air forces. Although Turkish and Syrian air forces had similar numbers of jet fighters in their arsenals in 1998, Turkey's jet fighters, heavily relying on fourth generation fighters the most advanced fighters at the time, had far more advanced systems than Syria's jet fighters. In this respect, Turkish fleet consisted of 149 F-16C, 26 F-16D and Israeli modernized 54 F-4 Phantoms. Against modernized fleet of Turkey, Syria had only 20 MiG-29 as belongs to fourth generation (*The Military Balance*, 1999: 74 and 147).

²⁷ Turkey also had 2876 M-48 with its various variants.

²⁸ Syria also had 2150 T55 variants and 1000 T62 variants.

The naval forces were the military sector, in which there was the biggest imbalance in 1998 both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively, Turkish navy was composed of 15 submarines, 21 frigates, 50 patrol and coastal combatants, 29 mine warfare and 8 amphibious ships while Syrian navy had only 3 submarines (all non-operational), 2 frigates, 20 patrol and coastal combatants, 3 mine countermeasure and 3 amphibious ships. Qualitatively, Turkish navy had more advanced warfare technological level (*The Military Balance*, 1999: 73-74 and 147).

These indicators all together demonstrate that Turkey possessed considerably larger material resources compared to Syria in 1998, meaning that Turkey was more powerful than Syria according to possessional conceptualization. In this respect, the explanation that the possessional power conceptualization provides to the emergence of the October crisis is that Turkey was materially more powerful than Syria and therefore Turkey was able to threaten this country. In similar fashion, with respect to the resolution of the crisis, Turkey was materially more powerful than Syria and therefore Syria accepted Turkish demands regarding the extradition of Öcalan and high-ranking PKK members, the cessation of financial and logistic support to the PKK, the closure of training camps in Syrian or Syrian-controlled territories.

However, the explanation that the possessional power conceptualization provides has its own weakness. For, given the same indicators discussed, Turkey had been materially superior to Syria not only in 1998 but also throughout 1990s. For example, according to the CINC, Turkey was about 3 or 4 times more powerful than Syria between 1988 and 1998.




Figure 7: The CINC Scores of Turkey and Syria by Year 1988-1998 (The Correlates of War Project National Material Capabilities (v5.0))

Then, regarding the emergence of the crisis, we may ask that although Turkey had been materially stronger than Syria throughout 1990s, why it had not militarily threatened Syria throughout 1990s as in 1998. Alternatively, taking Turkey's attempts to push Syria to cease its support to the PKK in 1987, 1989, 1992 and 1993 into consideration, why Syria had not complied with Turkey's demands in those years similar to those in 1998 although Turkey had been materially stronger than Syria throughout 1990s. Such questions, nevertheless, are out of the scope of the possessional conceptualization as it only looks for differences and distribution of power between actors in its power analysis in explaining world events.

4.3. Relational Power Analysis of the 1998 October Crisis

To recall, the relational conceptualization understands power in a relationship between two (or more) actors in which an actor gets other actor(s) to do something that other actor(s) would not do otherwise. Since power is understood within a relationship, the relational conceptualization assumes that power is a policy-contingent concept, meaning that power has a situational nature. Therefore, power analysis first requires for identification of the situational features of the context in which power relationship occurs. These features are generally called as scope, domain, and weight of a power relationship. In order to identify these features, existing international and domestic circumstances, alliance formations, configuration of internal politics, objectives of the actors and means of influence that are deployed are important elements to be taken into consideration.

Conceptualizing power as such, the relational conceptualization explains the 1998 October Crisis as a power relationship between Turkey and Syria, in which the former successfully exercised power over the latter to make it extradite Öcalan and high-ranking PKK members, cease financial and logistic support to the PKK and close training camps in Syrian or Syrian-controlled territories, which the latter would not do so otherwise. And, the 1998 October Crisis emerged as Turkey militarily threatened Syria since the benefits of cutting Syrian support to the PKK in 1998 were higher than the costs of a possible military confrontation. In similar fashion, the crisis resolved as Syria accepted Turkey's demands since the costs associated with insisting on using the PKK card against Turkey's military threat were more than its benefits.

Table 11: Conceptual Scheme of the Relational Power Conceptualization on the 1998 October Crisis

Definition of Power	What to Look at?	Relationship Between	Explanation of 1998 October Crisis (Emergence of the crisis and/or its resolution)
Power occurs in a relationship between two (or more) actors in which an actor gets other actor(s) to do something that other actor(s) would not do otherwise.	Features of the context in which power relationship takes place (i.e. scope, deployed means, domain, weight).	Turkish attempts to exercise power over Syria to make it extradite Öcalan and high-ranking PKK members, cease financial and logistic support to the PKK and close training camps in Syria or Syrian-controlled territories ↓ Change in the behaviors of Syria with respect to its PKK policy	<u>Emergence</u> Turkey militarily threatened Syria since the benefits of cutting Syrian support to the PKK in 1998 was higher than the costs of a possible military confrontation. <u>Resolution</u> Syrian costs associated with insisting on using the PKK card against Turkey's military threat were more than its benefits As a result, Syria backed down from its policy of supporting the PKK.

As the 1998 October Crisis is a power relationship between Turkey and Syria in which the former successfully exercised power over the latter according to the relational conceptualization, it is first required to explain the features of the context- namely, scope, means deployed, domain and weight.

Table 12: Features of the Turkish-Syrian Power Relationship in the 1998 October Crisis

Year	Scope	Means	Domain	Weight	Result
1998	Prevention of Syria's Support to the PKK	Military Threats Combined with Diplomatic Offensive	Syria during the presidential transition process in the Post-Cold War Era and after the Suspension of the Middle East Peace Process	Syria Accepted Turkey's Demands (100% Weight on Syria's Decision)	Successful




Figure 8: Turkey's Successful Attempt in 1998

4.3.1. The Scope of Turkish-Syrian Power Relationship in the 1998 October Crisis

Scope of a power relationship points, to recall, the dimension of behavior to be affected by the exercise of power (Baldwin 2011: 586). In other words, scope refers to the kinds of policies to be affected in a power relationship (Baldwin 2011: 201). Accordingly, the scope of the Turkish-Syrian power relationship in the 1998 October Crisis was Turkey's objective of causing change in Syria's PKK policy. This was formulated in the ultimatum note given to Egyptian President Mubarak by Turkish President Demirel on October 6, 1998 to be conveyed to the Syrian leadership as the

extradition of Öcalan and high-ranking PKK members, the cessation of financial and logistic support to the PKK and the closure of training camps in Syria or Syrian-controlled territories in Lebanon.

4.3.2. The Domain for Turkey's Decision to Exercise Power over Syria and the Means Deployed in the Power Relationship

In order to achieve its objectives in the power relationship, Turkey adopted military threats as its main instrument combined with diplomatic offensive as it calculated that the prevention of Syria's support to the PKK would bring more benefits than the costs of a possible military confrontation with Syria in the domain of the 1998 October Crisis. To recall, domain refers to the actors whose policies are aimed to be affected in a power relationship. In other words, the actors (person, group or states) to be affected represent the domain of power (Baldwin, 2011: 201). In line with this, the domain of Turkey's power exercise in the 1998 October Crisis was Syria in the post-Cold War era and after the suspension of the Israeli-Syrian negotiations as part of the Middle East peace process. This domain was influential on and permissive to Turkey's decision to threaten Syria militarily in the October. This can be explained through a comparison between the domain of Turkish-Syrian power relationship in 1998 with Turkey's unsuccessful attempts to reach the same objective in 1987, 1989, 1992 and 1993.

Taking a closer look, Turkey had repeatedly attempted to make Syria cease its support to the PKK in late 1980s and throughout 1990s. Among these attempts, only the 1998 attempt was successful at making Syria comply with Turkey's demands. In

its previous attempts, while the scope of Turkey's power exercise was the same, Turkey adopted different means other than military threats to influence Syria's behavior due to the existence of different domains.

In 1987 and 1989, the domain of the Turkish-Syrian power relationship was Syria in the Cold War era, meaning that although the Soviet Union was at the brink of the dissolution at the end of 1980s, the Cold War was still in effect and the main determinant factor in international politics. At that time, Turkey was a member of the Western bloc, while Syria had strong economic, military and political ties with the Soviet Union, demonstrating that Syria was under the Soviet shield. Hence, a military confrontation with Syria to cut its support to the PKK would further internationalize the issue in the sense that the great powers would have intervened in the power relationship, which would reduce Turkey's capability to achieve its own interests. Given the costs attached to the employment of military threats in order to change the Syria's behavior regarding the issue of terrorism, Turkey employed rewards and threats related with the issue of water as its means to influence Syrian policy. To recall, in 1987, Turkey offered to release of 500 cubic meters of water per second as reward to Syria in order to alter Syria's policy on terrorism. Then in 1989, Turkey adopted threats about reducing the amount of water flow as means to influence Syrian behavior on the terrorism issue.

Coming to 1992 and 1993, the domain of the Turkish-Syrian power relationship was again Syria but this time in the aftermath of the 1991 Iraq War and during the Middle East peace process. In this period, the Syrian leadership was successful to understand the emerging dynamics with the end of the Cold War and pursued policies to ameliorate the effects of the demise of the Soviet Union, the key foreign source of

political, economic and military support for Syria. Hence, being aware of the fact that his country was losing grounds in international system, President Assad was convinced that the Syrian foreign policy could no longer be pursued in opposition to the US. In this respect, the Syrian leadership adopted a new policy in order to have a space in the emerging regional and global order shaped by the US. Eradication of its loneliness in the region occupied an important place in this policy. To this end, Syria sought ways to enter in a dialogue with the US, established diplomatic relations with Egypt, improved relations with Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries and softened its position vis-à-vis Israel (Shad, Boucher and Reddish 1995: 78).

The shift in the Syrian Foreign Policy was visible especially in the 1991 Iraq War (see Kienle, 1994: 383-398; Zisser, 2001: 49-62; Altunışık, 2002: 266-271; Sürer, 2008: 194-196). Accordingly, Syria was the first Arab country that condemned Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It, also, participated in the pro-American Arab coalition against Iraq and played an active role together with Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the arrangement of an Arab Summit held in Cairo on 10-11 August 1990. In addition to regional initiatives, Syria, sending troops to join the international force established by the US and joining the international embargo against Iraq, actively supported the UN resolutions concerning Iraqi invasion.

Syrian policies in the 1991 Iraq War gave their fruits not long after. Accordingly, high-level US officials visited Damascus and this was followed by George Bush and Hafez al-Assad meeting in Geneva on 23 November 1991. Then, the ‘Damascus Declaration’, demonstrating that Syria was a part of the new regional order, was issued on 6 March 1991. With this declaration, Syria and Egypt agreed to contribute the security of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. In

return, GCC countries guaranteed to provide 2 billion US dollars amount of aid to Syria. During the Iraq War, Syria was also able to recover 700 million US dollars amount of credit from European countries and Japan.

Syria further strengthened its international position in the post-Cold War era through participating in the Middle East peace process. For an Arab-Israeli peace was one of the main pillars of the US designed Middle East. Hence, entering in a peace process with Israel might buy the US favor for Syria. In fact, it is argued by many that the objective of Syria in the peace process was not to sign a peace agreement with Israel but to improve relations with the USA (Pipes, 1999; Altunışık, 2002: 271). As Syria expected, the US played a mediator role between Israel and Syria, as a result of which the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Damascus more than 20 times between 1992 and 1995. Also, the presidents of the US and Syria met twice, first in Geneva then in Damascus.

Building upon these, Syria had an improved its overall position in the Middle Eastern politics and achieved to have a secured place in the US shaped regional and global order in the aftermath of the 1991 Iraq War and during the Middle East peace process. In this era, Syria intensified its cooperation with Arab states, established dialogue channels with the US and negotiated peace with Israel. In this environment, it would be costly for Turkey to threaten Syria militarily in 1992 and 1993 since this country was in an advantageous position in the regional politics. Hence, Turkey, based on its strategic calculations on costs and benefits at the time, again raised the issue of water as means to push Syria on the issue of terrorism

In contrast to domains of Turkish-Syrian power relationships in 1987, 1989, 1992 and 1993, regional and international dynamics were permissive for Turkey to adopt military threats as its means of exercising power over Syria on the issue of terrorism in 1998. Syria was under the Soviet security shield in 1987 and 1989. In 1992 and 1993, it had a strong regional and international position as a result of its policies during the 1991 Iraq War and in the Middle East peace process. However, the regional and international dynamics in 1998 were not in favor of Syria. The peace negotiations between Syria and Israel were stalled after Benjamin Netanyahu came to power in Israel in 1996 (see Hajjar, 1999: 112-113). The failure of the peace process meant the loss of the US blessing on Syria.

In the meantime, Turkey and Israel signed defense agreements, which paved the way for cooperation on military sphere and joint military exercises, which the US also participated. The Turkish-Israeli rapprochement had two important apparent benefits for Turkey. First, this rapprochement was welcomed and supported by the US (Gresh, 1998: 190; Altunışık, 2000: 173-174; Hale, 2007: 72; Arbell, 2014: 7-8). This gave its fruits to Turkey in its military campaign against the PKK in northern Iraq as it got the US green light to the cross-border operations. It should also be mentioned that Israel assisted Turkey's military operations against the PKK by providing equipment and intelligence (Nachmani, 2009: 220). Second, Turkish-Israeli rapprochement had negative effects on the Syria's maneuvering capability in the region since its two neighbors, hostile to Syria, were in close military relationship. This made the Syrian leadership feel encircled from north and south. In addition to this, by strengthening its ties with the US, Turkey was able to put diplomatic pressure to ensure that Syria would not be removed from the US list of countries sponsoring terrorism (Olson, 1997: 177). Hence, military cooperation with

Israel made it possible for Turkey to curb Syria's strengthening position in the region after the 1991 Iraq War and the Middle East peace process. In the light of these, there was a considerably more suitable environment for Turkey to adopt military options to push Syria on the issue of terrorism in 1998 compared to the previous cases.

In addition to the permissive environment for the deployment of military threats as means of influence, there were some other important developments that affected Turkey's strategic calculation on costs and benefits of a possible military confrontation with Syria in order to prevent Syria's support to the PKK. In this respect, the Washington Agreement of 17 September 1998 caused a grave concern on Turkish decision makers. The agreement was brokered by the US and signed by the two major Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, Mahmoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, in order to cease their hostilities. More troublesome for Turkey was that the two agreed to work together on holding elections on the 1999 Summer to establish a joint administration in northern Iraq, which revived the prospects of an independent Kurdish state. Finding itself in a serious split in opinion with the US on the future of northern Iraq, Turkey was determined to cut the Syrian support to the PKK in order to solve its own Kurdish problem as soon as possible. This is to say that Turkey was ready to take the risks of a military confrontation with Syria (Aykan, 1999: 179-181; Sezgin, 2002: 62).

Accordingly, an explanation based on the relational power conceptualization would suggest that the benefits of cutting Syrian support in 1998 was more than the costs of a possible military confrontation with Syria due to the permissive regional and international environment and the imminent threat of an independent Kurdish state in

northern Iraq. Therefore, Turkey, contrary to the previous cases, adopted military threats as its means to alter the behavior of Syria in their power relationship in 1998.

4.3.3. The Domain for Syria's Decision to Comply with Turkey's Power

Exercise

In order to have a complete power analysis, the relational power conceptualization also analyzes Syria's strategic cost and benefit calculations that led it to accept Turkey's demands in the 1998 October Crisis, which reveals the domain of power relationship from the eyes of the actor over whom power was exercised.

Accordingly, there were several important points that affected the strategic calculation of the Syrian leadership in 1998. First point was about Syria's relative material weakness to Turkey, which was mentioned in the explanation provided through the possessional power conceptualization. Turkey was multiple times materially more powerful than Syria in 1998, and Syrian military command was aware of this situation. According to Turkish intelligence sources, the Syrian chief of staff, deputy chief of staff and the minister of defense argued in a meeting that Turkey would win in a case of military confrontation with Syria due to its material superiority, which would likely bring an end to Assad regime in the country (*Milliyet*, October 10, 1998).

In addition, the Syrian leadership realized that the likelihood of getting external support in a possible military confrontation with Turkey was unlikely. Although there were verbal and diplomatic condemnations from the Arab world to Turkey's

military threats, President Assad was assured by Egyptian President Mubarak that Syria will be alone against Turkey. According to Yetkin (2004: 75), one of the leading journalists in Turkey, President Mubarak stated in Ankara in his December 6, 1998 visit that he warned President Assad during the 1998 October Crisis that if a war breaks out because of Syrian support to the PKK, Syria will not get the Egyptian support on his side, and Egypt will declare Assad as the main responsible.

At the same time, it was apparent that Iran, Syria's main ally, would not be able to help Syria in a possible military confrontation with Turkey because Iran was at the brink of war with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. At that time, Iran was massing around 200,000 troops along its Afghanistan borders (Olson 2001: 122). Hence, it would be unable to spare extra troops for Syria at that time.

As the second reason, the top Syrian military officials warned President Assad that the PKK was actually losing its fight against Turkey (*Milliyet*, October 10, 1998). Turkey's military operations both within its territories and within northern Iraq dealt a huge blow to the PKK in 1997 and 1998, meaning that the terrorist organization would lose its function as a foreign policy instrument. Hence, the Syrian leadership assumed that it would not be rational to continue supporting the PKK, actually losing its fight against Turkey, at the expense of a military confrontation with Turkey, which would more likely result with a Syrian defeat.

The third reason was related with Syrian domestic politics. As of the October crisis, Syria was in the midst of a political transition period in which President Assad was clearing the ground for transferring power to his son Bashar al-Assad. This suggests that there was an ongoing governmental and military reshuffling process in the

country, in which the son Assad's most obvious rivals were replaced by loyal ones (see Zisser 1999: 37-44; Zisser 2000/a; Zisser 2000/b: 81-84; Zisser 2001: 154-165; Aykan 2002: 58-59). On February 1998, Rif'at Assad, the brother of Hafez and considered as the leading candidate for presidency after his brother, was dismissed from the chair of Vice President for security affairs, which he had held for 14 years. Then, in July 1998, the Chief of the General Staff since 1974, Hikmat Shihabi, was pensioned off and replaced by Ali Aslan, a member of Nusayri sect in Syria and from Assads' own tribe. Shihabi was another candidate for presidency and therefore his removal was another step in the clearing ground for Bashar's presidency. This was followed by the transfer of Vice President, Abl al-Halim Khaddam's authority in the sphere of foreign affairs to Bashar. As a result, Bashar began managing Syria's relations with Lebanon and Iran that was useful for gathering external support for his future rule. Moreover, there were wide-scale replacements in the Syrian army and security forces in order to create a generation of new and young officers loyal to Bashar as opposed to the older generations.

Accordingly, President Assad's main concern during the October crisis was to successfully complete the transition process within its country and ensure Bashar's succession. In this period, a military confrontation with Turkey was, probably, the last thing the Syrian leadership would want to face because a Turkish military campaign within Syrian territories could seriously jeopardize the political transition process (Aykan 2002: 61).

Taking these reasons together, the costs associated with insisting on using the PKK card against Turkey were more than its benefits in the context of the October crisis. As a result, Syria accepted Turkey's demands in the 1998 October Crisis, rendering

Turkey's exercise of power over Syria with respect to its policy of supporting PKK through military threats successful. Hence, Turkey was more powerful than Syria in the context of the October crisis under the specific scope and domain of this period because Turkey's military threats successfully altered Syria's PKK policy. This is to say that Syria's decision to extradite Öcalan and high-ranking PKK members, cease financial and logistic support to the PKK and close training camps in Syrian or Syrian-controlled territories was completely under the weight²⁹ of Turkey's power over Syria in the 1998 October Crisis since the outcome of the Turkish-Syrian power relationship in the 1998 October Crisis was completely in line with Turkey's desires. In the language of power, Turkey had power over Syria in 1998 to the extent that the former could get the latter to cease its support to the PKK, which the latter would not otherwise do.

4.4. Positivist Structural Power Analysis of the 1998 October Crisis

To recall, the positivist version of structural power conceptualization assumes that power works indirectly, as an actor's actions cause change in the behaviors or the conditions of another actor through formalized rules of activity, customary practices of engagement, established division of labor and formal or informal arrangements. This is to say that power relationship is not direct as in the relational conceptualization. On the contrary, power is matter of indirect effects emanating from formal or informal institutionally determined relations. Hence, the positivist structural conceptualization looks at institutional arrangements or regimes

²⁹ To recall, "The weight of an actor's power refers to the probability that B's behavior is or could be affected by A" (Baldwin 2013[2002]: 275).

maintaining and regulating the relationship between actors in analyzing power relations. This directs the attention of power analysts to power relationships occur through the intermediary of formal or informal structural settings, which advantage or disadvantage actors in a power relationship by setting the agenda, limiting alternatives, specifying rules and procedures that determine the process of negotiation, distributing resources, in other words, shaping the context in which actors interact with others.

Understood in this way, the positivist structural power conceptualization seeks to identify the casual relationship between Turkey's and Syria's indirect attempts to exercise power through the medium of formal or informal institutional frameworks in the 1998 October Crisis and change or continuation in the behaviors of the actors in the power relationship. However, the positivist structural power conceptualization offers a limited explanation to Turkish-Syrian power relationship in the 1998 October Crisis because Turkey and Syria settled their issues through direct bilateral interaction rather than indirectly under the mediatory of formal and informal settings such as international law, international regimes and international/regional organizations.

Table 13: Conceptual Scheme of the Positivist Structural Power Conceptualization on the 1998 October Crisis

Definition of Power	What to Look at?	Relationship Between	Explanation of 1998 October Crisis (Emergence of the crisis and/or its resolution)
Power works indirectly, as an actor's actions cause change in the behaviors or the conditions of another actor through formalized rules of activity, customary practices of engagement, established division of labor, and to sum up, formal and informal arrangements.	Institutional arrangements or regimes maintaining and regulating the relationship between actors.	Attempts to exercise power indirectly through formal and informal institutional frameworks by Turkey or Syria ↓ Change or continuation in the behaviors of the target actors	No explanation since Turkey attempted to exercise power over Syria directly through military threats.

Although the positivist structural power conceptualization remains limited to explain the Turkish-Syrian power relationship in the 1998 October Crisis, there are several aspects of the relationship between Turkey and Syria that can be explained through this power lens. In this respect, the structural power conceptualization provides a useful explanation to the issue of water between Turkey and Syria from a broader perspective related with the general principles of international water law. Accordingly, there are two principles considered to be cornerstones of international water law (Bağış 1994: 22; İnan 1994: 228-230; Turan 2011: 185-186; Kramer and Kibaroglu 2011: 216; also for the general principles and norms of international water law see Kibaroglu 2002: 119-158):

- the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and participation in the development of the watercourse by the riparian states

- the obligation not to cause significant harm to another watercourse state by utilizing the international watercourse

In the implementation of international water law, these two principles are interpreted as mechanisms to protect the rights of downstream countries since their utilization of watercourses are, first and foremost, dependent on the goodwill of upstream countries. In this respect, it is argued that the upstream countries are obliged to consult and cooperate with downstream countries before the initiation of projects on the watercourse. This interpretation was first implemented as a principle of international water law in 1957 ‘the Lake Lanoux Case’, an international arbitral tribunal between France and Spain. The interpretation was later affirmed by several judgements of International Court of Justice, such as ‘the North Sea Continental Shelf Case’, ‘Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland)’ and ‘Malta v. Libya v. Tunisia Continental Shelf Cases’. As it was repeated by many judgements, the interpretation was codified by the 1997 ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses’.

Knowing that general principles of international water law favor their position, Iraq and Syria argue that as the downstream countries of the Euphrates-Tigris basin, they have acquired rights on the watercourse. By this, they demand that any project that Turkey aims to implement on the watercourse is subject to their approval since these projects inevitably have an impact on the quality and quantity of water flowing to their territories (Turan, 2011: 185). Opposing to the Iraqi and Syrian demand, Turkey’s policy regarding the use of transboundary rivers indicates that “each riparian states of a transboundary river system has the sovereign right to make use of

the water in its territory without giving significant harm to other riparians” (“Turkey’s Policy on Water Issues”, *Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*).

As the general principles of international water law are in favor of its arguments, Syria internationalized the issue of water and successfully prevented Turkey’s efforts to find international funding for its water projects. For example, the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) rejected Turkey’s request for credits to raise funds for the construction of Keban Dam in 1965 due to the disapproval of the downstream riparians to the project. In the subsequent years, Syria was again successful in curbing international funds available to Turkey’s GAP thanks to the general principles of the international water law protecting the rights of downstream countries. As a result, Turkey started the implementation of the GAP through domestic financial sources. However, the completion of the project is continuously being postponed due to financial problems.

Turkey’s failure to get international funds to its water projects for a long time is a clear manifestation of structural power exercised by Syria through the medium of international water law. In this respect, Syria successfully prevented Turkey from getting international funds for the implementation of water projects on the Euphrates-Tigris basin. This was evident in a statement of a Turkish official involved in the negotiations with international institutions admitting that “during the construction of Keban, ICA (USAID) confronted us as if it were Syria’s attorney ...” (quoted in Turan 2004: 198). Hence, it may be concluded that Syria had structural power over Turkey on the issue of water by successfully depriving it from getting international funds.

4.5. Post-Positivist Structural Power Analysis of the 1998 October Crisis

Different from its positivist version, power in the post-positivist version of structural conceptualization does not refer an individualist conception. In other words, the exercise of power is not the kind of power that an individual, group, or state exercises over another. Instead, power is understood as a structural phenomenon that identities, interests and social capacities of individual units are seen as the effects of structural power. Here, structure is defined as co-constitutive relations of social positions such as master-slave, capital-labor, or core-periphery rather than an institutional framework, or formal or informal rules and procedures that guides, steers and constrains actions.

Understood in this way, the post-positivist power analyst sees power as an element of structure that shapes not only what actors do but also what actors want. This is to say that interacting within a particular society actors are socialized into accepting basic norms and appropriate behavior patterns in that society. The process of socialization has a constitutive function in the sense that it provides actors with the means of identifying themselves as social beings. It, at the same time, compels actors to think and act in certain ways in conformity with the norms and appropriate behaviors. This is called as the structural power in post-positivist approaches; that is actor's self-understandings and subjective interests together with their differential social relational capacities are shaped by the structural position they have. In other words, then, post-positivist structural power focuses on material and normative structural determinants that shape actors' interests.

Conceptualizing power as such, the post-positivist structural power analyst seeks to reveal the effects of structural power in the 1998 October Crisis through questioning how Syria's structurally shaped subjective interests in the post-Cold War international structure and the norms concerning the issue of supporting terrorism that disempowered it to resist Turkey's demands in the 1998 October Crisis. This suggests that it was the structurally determined interests and social capacities that shaped the resolution of the 1998 October Crisis. In this respect, the post-positivist structural power analysis, first, looks for how Syria's structural position and norms on the issue of terrorism shaped Syria's subjective interests in the post-Cold War international structure. Second, the analysis questions how its subjective interests shaped by the structural factors disempowered Syria in the 1998 October Crisis.

Table 14: Conceptual Scheme of the Post-Positivist Structural Power Conceptualization on the 1998 October Crisis

Definition of Power	What to Look at?	Relationship Between	Explanation of 1998 October Crisis (Emergence of the crisis and/or its resolution)
Power is a structural element that shapes actor's self-understandings and subjective interests together with differential capacities and resources to their structural positions.	Structural positions and the widely accepted norms in the structure that shape actor's subjective interests and social relational capacities.	Syria's structural position and norms concerning the issue of supporting terrorism ↑ ↓ Syria's subjective interests and social relational capacity shaping the resolution of the 1998 October Crisis	<u>Resolution</u> Syria's structurally shaped subjective interests in the post-Cold War international structure and the norms concerning the issue of supporting terrorism disempowered it to resist Turkey's demands in the 1998 October Crisis

4.5.1. Syria's Subjective Interests Shaped by Its Structural Position in the Post-Cold War International Structure

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new world order in which the US remained as the sole hegemon of the international structure, reinforced by global institutions and liberal Western values. In this new world order, Syria was in an uneasy position since it was classified as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979 and subject to various US economic and military sanctions. In this respect, Syria had been accused by many Western countries of granting safe havens to international terrorism and playing active role in international terrorist activities through providing financial, logistical and political support to terrorist groups in the Middle Eastern region (Collelo, 1988: 146; Zisser 2003). Being linked with international terrorism by Western countries among which the US and the United Kingdom (the UK) were at the fore, Syria was deemed to be an illegitimate actor in the new world order. This was explicitly put forward by Ronald Reagan, "... it [Syria] cannot expect to be accepted as a responsible power or treated as one as long as it continues to use terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy" (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, Book 1*, 1986: 1552).

Classified in the list of state sponsors of terrorism by the sole hegemon of the international structure, Syria found itself in an exposed structural position, which was exacerbated with the emergence of norms on the suppression of the financing international terrorism. Regarding the emerging norms on terrorism, resolutions adopted under the roof of the UN, as the primary institution reinforcing the new world order, constitute a striking example. For instance, the UN General Assembly

adopted a resolution concerning the elimination of international terrorism for the first time in 1994, calling upon all Member States

To refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist activities and to take appropriate practical measures to ensure that their respective territories are not used for terrorist installations or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts intended to be committed against other States or their citizens (*United Nations General Assembly A/RES/49/60*, 1994: Annex Paragraph 5a)

Later in 1995, the UN General Assembly called in another resolution to “act together to defeat the threats to States and people posed by terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations” (*United Nations General Assembly A/RES/50/6*, 1995: Paragraph 1). This was followed by the UN General Assembly Resolution in 1996 that called upon “to take steps to prevent and counteract ... the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations” (*United Nations General Assembly A/RES/51/210*, 1996: Paragraph 3f). The UN General Assembly passed another resolution in 1997, which reminded the Member States its previous calls “to refrain from financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise supporting terrorist activities” (*United Nations General Assembly A/RES/52/165*, 1997: Paragraph 3).

Due to the emerging norms on the suppression of the financing international terrorism and the accusations of sponsoring terrorism, Syria was in an illegitimate international position and at the edge of being identified as a ‘pariah state’ in the new world order, which deliberately shaped its subjective interests in the post-Cold War environment. In this respect, having witnessed the consequences of being identified as a pariah state in the case of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Syria reformulated its foreign policy objectives towards gaining legitimacy and being seen as a progressive actor in the new world order (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997: 83-84; Zisser, 2003). To remind the case, Iraq faced first international isolation and economic

sanctions, then military intervention authorized by the UN Security Council Resolution 678, which reasserted the US and the Western claim to ultimate rule-making and enforcement in the new world order as a result of Iraqi insistence on committing illegitimate acts irrelevant to rules and norms the post-Cold War international structure (see Hashim, 1992: 11-16; Kienle, 1994: 384).

In line with its structurally shaped interests, Syria pursued policies to increase its legitimacy in the new world order. In this way, it hoped to be removed from the list of state sponsors of international terrorism and to be accepted as a progressive actor rather than a pariah state in the post-Cold War international structure. To this end, enforcing the economic embargo and joining the international military coalition, it actively supported all relevant UN resolutions, including the Security Council Resolution 678, against Iraqi invasion. It, also, participated in the Middle East peace process under the auspices of the US, and engaged in bilateral talks with Israel without any preconditions. In addition, on the issue of sponsoring international terrorism, Syria refrained from getting involved in terrorist attacks on Western soil against Western targets (Zisser, 2003).

4.5.2. How Its Subjective Interests Disempowered Syria in the 1998 October Crisis

It is underlined in the previous sub-section that Syria was in an exposed structural position in the post-Cold War international structure due to its links with international terrorism, which deemed it as an illegitimate actor of the new world order. This structural position inevitably shaped Syria's subjective interests towards

gaining international legitimacy through actively complying with the rules and norms of the new world order.

In this respect, Syria pursued policies that would increase its legitimacy in the international system. However, it could not secure its structural position in the new world order since the US did not accept to remove Syria from the list and the peace talks with Israel were suspended in 1996. Therefore, Syria, coming to the 1998 October Crisis, was still in an illegitimate structural position and striving to move away from the possibility of being identified as a pariah state.

The 1998 October Crisis was initiated by Turkish accusations against Syria of supporting the PKK terror and military threats as an extension if Syria would not extradite Öcalan and cease its support to the terrorist organization. Initiated on the grounds of Syria's supporting an internationally recognized terrorist organization, the Crisis was actually disempowering Syria against Turkey. For while Turkey was an integrated actor to the new world order as a member of NATO and candidate country to the European Union, Syria was in an illegitimate structural position as it was in list of state sponsors of terrorism. This suggests that Syria was still striving to escape its exposed structural position and to be identified as a progressive actor during the outbreak of the Crisis. And in this environment, Syria was facing with accusations of providing support to the PKK, recognized as a terrorist organization by many international organizations and governments all around the world including the US, the UK, France and even Syria itself.

Hence, being a party to an international crisis in which it was linked with an internationally recognized terrorist organization was contradicting with Syria's

structurally shaped subjective interests. The image of being a supporter of an internationally recognized terrorist organization in the 1998 October Crisis before the international community would only reinforce Syria's illegitimate structural position. The indicator of such image came from the US President Bill Clinton in a letter delivered to Hafez al-Assad on October 6, 1998, stating

In the last 5 years, I have frequently asked you to take steps on putting an end to the Syrian support to the PKK and its leadership. As you are aware, we recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization. Your government should immediately take steps on ending to provide support, shelter, training facilities in Syria and Bekaa Valley to the PKK, and more importantly to protect the leader of the PKK, Öcalan (Yetkin, 2004: 67).

In similar vein, Mesut Yılmaz commented on disempowered structural position of Syria in TGNA on October 7, 1998 that

... Syria, as you know, is identified as a state that is sponsoring international terrorism in the annual reports published by the US Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Syria is using terrorism as its primary foreign policy toll to reach its political wishes. Hence, it is ignoring international law and recklessly violating the Charter of the UN, resolutions of the UN General Assembly, communiques of the Islamic Cooperation Organization and the treaties it is party with (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 07.10.1998: 321).

In the light of these, Syria had limited social capacities in the 1998 October Crisis to resist Turkish demands for the extradition of Öcalan and cessation of Syrian support to the PKK. This is because if Syria were to continue supporting the PKK, its illegitimate structural position would have deepened. Since Syria's structurally shaped subjective interests was about gaining international legitimacy through actively complying with the rules and norms of the new world order and moving away from the possibility of being identified as a pariah state international system, it did not have many options in the 1998 October Crisis but to accept Turkish demands. This is to say that complying with Turkey's demands in the Crisis was in line with Syria's structurally shaped subjective interests

To conclude, it was the structural power of the new world order that shaped Syria's subjective interests in the post-Cold War international structure. Having an illegitimate structural position, Syria reformulated its interests toward gaining legitimacy and being seen as a progressive actor in the new world order, which disqualified particular actions such as violating the norms defining the new world order. Having these structurally shaped subjective interests, Syria was disempowered in the 1998 October Crisis, at the heart of which there was the issue of sponsoring terrorism. In other words, Syria with an illegitimate actor identity in the new world order was an effect of structural power and this identity shaped its subjective interests, which disempowered it in the 1998 October Crisis because sponsoring terrorism was an inappropriate behavior in the structure.

4.6. Poststructural Power Analysis of the 1998 October Crisis

To recall, the poststructural conceptualization understands power as discursive practices that give rise to the particular subjectivities with particular identities, interests and in/appropriate behavior patterns attached to them. In this understanding, discourses are themselves regarded as important sources of power because they are believed to generate a particular basis on which reality around people is understood and explained. This suggests that discourses produce categories of meanings through which the world becomes a meaningful phenomenon. In other words, poststructural conceptualization looks for power in the discourses through which the world is made. Here, discourse, rather than being synonymous with language, refers to a broader

web of social practices that attaches meaning to the so-called reality in which people understand themselves and their behaviors (George, 1994: 29).

Understood in this way, discourses and meanings are central to the poststructural power conceptualization because they together generate the categories by which the so-called reality is understood, explained and classified. Separately identified, meaning are central because, as demonstrated by Wendt, people “act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the *meanings* that the objects have for them” (Wendt, 1992: 396-397 emphasis added by Weldes et al., 1999: 13), and discourses are they central because produce meanings, through which they produce the world we live in.

From this point, power in the poststructural conceptualization refers to the discursive practices that produce and maintain meanings, and thereby produce a particular reality. To be more specific, poststructural power analysis on foreign policy looks at discursive power practices that produce particular meanings consisting of identities for states, groups and individuals (both of self and of others), and thereby construct a particular reality in which particular foreign policy behaviors become possible. These foreign policy behaviors reaffirm those identities, which made them possible.

Conceptualizing power as such, the poststructural conceptualization seeks to understand the mutually constitutive relationship between Turkey’s discursively produced state identity and the production of the 1998 October Crisis. This, in the first place, requires for the interrogation on how the events in 1998 came to be constructed as a crisis. Poststructural analysis points that crises do not present themselves as objective facts of international relations. They are in fact social

constructions in the course of producing and reproducing state identity. Accordingly, events in international politics are constructed as crises when they pose threat to particular state identities (Weldes, 1999: 37). Based on this, the poststructural power conceptualization understands the so-called 1998 October Crisis not an instance of conflict of interests between Turkey and Syria, in which one side attempts to make the other do something that the other would not do otherwise, but a construction in relation with Turkish state identity produced through discursive power practices. In order to reveal this construction, the poststructural power analysis first questions the naturalness of the 1998 October Crisis. Then, it looks for how the events in 1998 were constructed as a crisis in Turkish Foreign Policy in relation with Turkish state identity.

Table 15: Conceptual Scheme of the Poststructural Power Conceptualization on the 1998 October Crisis

Definition of Power	What to Look at?	Relationship Between	Explanation of 1998 October Crisis (Emergence of the crisis and/or its resolution)
Power refers to the production and maintenance of meanings, and thereby a particular reality through discursive practices.	Discursive power practices that produce particular meanings that consist of identities for states (both of self and of others), and thereby constructs a particular reality in which particular foreign policy behaviors which reaffirm those identities in return become possible.	Discursively produced Turkish state identity ↑ ↓ Production of the 1998 October Crisis in relation with Turkish state identity	<u>Emergence</u> Syrian support was articulated a serious threat to the deeply entrenched Turkish state identity in the context of the developments in 1998 related with Turkey's PKK problem in broad sense <u>Resolution</u> The Crisis provided Turkey to an opportunity, realized in the Syrian pledge to comply with Turkey's demands concerning the Syrian support to the PKK, to reassert its identity

4.6.1. Questioning the Naturalness of the 1998 October Crisis

Regarding the existence of Syrian support to the PKK as a foreign policy crisis between Turkey and Syria, the power conceptualizations discussed above take it for granted from the outset. For those conceptualizations, the events in 1998 constituted an inevitable foreign policy crisis without questioning since Syria was providing political, financial and logistical support to a terrorist organization targeting Turkey. Power, for those conceptualizations, was a determinant factor in shaping the course of the crisis.

Differing from those, the poststructural conceptualization assumes that the 1998 October Crisis as a foreign policy crisis between Turkey and Syria does not have an objective and unquestioned status. This is due to the understanding that the articulation of events as crises, first and foremost, depend on identities of states. This demonstrates that a foreign policy crisis can only be produced as a particular insecurity for the deeply entrenched identity of a state, which is itself a production of discursive power practices. Here, states are not treated as alike units and natural phenomena of the international politics. Rather, each particular state is a unique social and cultural production forged in a set of statist discourses.

The statist discourse mainly consists of representations of insecurities fundamentally by state officials that produce and reproduce states with particular kinds of identities. In this understanding, state identities and insecurities are taken as inextricably linked elements, apparent in Weldes et al.'s argument "we treat them as mutually constituted cultural and social constructions: insecurity is itself the product of processes of identity construction in which the self and the other, or the multiple

others, are constituted” (Weldes et al., 1999: 10). This suggests that insecurities are not facts themselves given by the nature of international politics to states, but are implicated in and the effects of their identity production and reproduction processes.

Accordingly, crises are discursive productions forged in the course of producing and reproducing identities of states whenever events in international politics are articulated as insecurities for those very identities. Hence, similar events in international politics will in fact be produced as different kinds of crises, or not as a crisis at all, by and for states with different identities. This manifests itself in a striking example that the 1998 October Crisis was represented as two fundamentally different insecurities in the foreign policy discourses of Turkey and Syria in relation with their state identities.

For Turkey, the 1998 October Crisis was initiated by Turkish military threats as a result of Syrian unresponsiveness to Turkish diplomatic efforts to cut the ongoing Syrian support to the PKK since the early 1980s. In this respect, the responsibility for the Crisis rested with the Syrian leadership. However, the Syrian support to the PKK was a crisis not because it was a mere nuisance, but because, especially with the growing recognition by Europeans of the PKK as the political representative of Kurds in Turkey and the US brokered Washington Agreement signed by the northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders without including Turkey to the process in 1998, it transformed into a threat to, or an insecurity for, the very identity of Turkey, which rests upon a particular culture of insecurity. Turkey’s culture of insecurity is a specific discursive production that “has evolved across the centuries from a dominant offensive character into a dominant defensive one” (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 200). The defensive characteristic in Turkish state identity has a major component that is fear

from Western conspiracies against Turkey's national and territorial integrity. Produced in relation to Turkey's state identity, the Crisis provided Turkey to an opportunity, realized in the Syrian pledge to comply with Turkey's demands concerning to the PKK, to reassert its defensive identity.

For Syria, different from Turkish representation, the Crisis was an imminent Turkish aggression as an extension of the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement began in 1996. Taking a closer look, the 1996 Turkish-Israeli agreements were represented by the Syrian Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam at the time as a partnership between the old oppressor (Turkey as the successor of Ottoman Empire) and the modern usurper (Israel as the occupier of Palestine territory) and thereby "the greatest threat to the Arabs since 1948" (Bengio and Özcan 2000).

In this context, the issue in the 1998 October Crisis for Syria was a Turkish-Israeli imperialism and its threat to the Arab nation in general and to Syria as the main champion of the Arab cause in particular. This was evident in a statement issued by the Syrian embassy in Ankara during the crisis asserting that the Turkish military threats to Syria coincides with the establishment of the Turkish-Israeli military pact and the regional people's refusal to become part of it (*Hurriyet*, October 6, 1998). Understood in this way, the cause of the Crisis was, broadly, Turkish-Israeli aggression against Arab nation, and, more immediately, Turkey's unreasonable response to its allegations regarding the Syrian support to the PKK. Hence, Syria as the "beating heart of Arabism" and the vanguard in the protection of the Arab cause in the struggle with Israel was the identity, for which Turkish military threats as the extension of the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement were a foreign policy crisis (for Syrian state identity see Hinnebusch, 1991, 378; Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997;

59-60; Hinnebusch, 2002; 142-143). Then, the Crisis for Syria was a threat to its state identity as the center of Arab world posed by Turkish-Israeli alliance against Arab nation and Turkish military threats as an extension to this alliance. Produced as insecurity to the particular state identity of Syria, this Crisis, simultaneously, provided an opportunity, realized through the denunciation of Turkey's military threats and declaration of solidarity with Syria during the Crisis by the 22 members of the Arab League, to reassert that particular state identity as the champion of the Arab nation.

As these contesting narratives demonstrate, the 1998 October Crisis was produced quite differently in Turkish and Syrian representations. Hence, the nature of the crisis was not obvious, meaning that the 1998 October Crisis, as all crises, was not a natural fact; rather it was a discursive production related with Turkish and Syrian state identities. This indicates that Turkish and Syrian narratives represent the events in 1998 as different kinds of crises consistent with their state identities, and with notably different representation of events, the same events would not have constituted a crisis at all. Indeed, the arguments made by Turkey's main opposition party at the time suggest that the events in 1998 do not necessarily generate a foreign policy crisis.

Accordingly, it was questionable whether the Syrian support to the PKK constituted such material threat that would necessitate the initiation of a crisis. On this, Turkey's main opposition party at the time made an interpellation in TGNA on October 7, 1998 and asked,

Why did Turkey react as such [pointing military threats] in spite of the fact that Syria's policy of supporting terrorism has been continuing for many years and there is not any new development in that policy? Was there any development in the Syrian support to the PKK more serious than the existing one we have seen until today that make it necessary to take actions that would bring war between Turkey and Syria? ... Turkey has not directly targeted Syria even at the times terrorism hit the top and was the most important matter in country's agenda. And recently, it has continuously been expressed by the authorities that terror was defeated and the terrorist organization entered in a process of dissolution. In such a period when the terror is rooted out, why did Turkey regard threatening Syria as necessary? (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 07.10.1998: 321).

In this representation, Turkey's sudden escalation of the 1998 October Crisis was a surprising move since the Syrian support to the PKK had been ongoing for nearly fourteen years, and there was no immediate triggering development within Turkish-Syrian relations. Moreover, Turkey was actually winning its fight against terrorism in 1998. Hence, the 1998 October Crisis was not inherent in the presence of the Syrian support to the PKK, meaning that the 1998 October Crisis, as all crises, was not a natural fact; rather it was a discursive production related with Turkish state identity.

This suggests that the Syrian support to the PKK might have been understood as irrelevant to the Turkish defensive state identity, and doing so would not have triggered any crisis at all. In this respect, as these divergent narratives on the 1998 October Crisis demonstrates, crises do not have objective status to be initiated by state officials. Instead, events in international politics are constructed as crises in relation to discursively produced identities of states, indicating that the 1998 October Crisis was an effect of discursive power practices.

4.6.2. Turkish State Identity and the Discursive Production of the 1998 October Crisis

Since the Syrian support to the PKK does not necessarily generate a foreign crisis on its own as a material fact, the 1998 October Crisis was actually produced in representations of this support as a serious threat to, or the production of insecurity for, the deeply entrenched Turkish state identity in the context of the developments in 1998 related with Turkey's PKK problem in broad sense. Produced as a threat to the Turkish state identity, the 1998 October Crisis, at the same time, provided Turkey with an opportunity to reassert that identity through securing its precarious self. Hence, a discursively constituted Turkish identity, which rests upon a particular culture of insecurity, resides at the core of the 1998 October Crisis, indicating that the crisis was an effect of discursive power practices. In order demonstrate this, it is first necessary to highlight the features of Turkey's discursively produced identity built on country's culturally constituted insecurities, and then discover how the Syrian support to the PKK was represented as an acute threat to be dealt with in relation to that Turkish state identity at stake.

4.6.2.1. Turkish State Identity

Traditionally, Turkish state identity represents a unique characteristic shaped by particular culture of insecurities. Here, culture refers to an encompassing field for a collectivity that is composed of multiplicity of discourses through which meaning is produced. Building on this, culture of insecurity points a specific kind of discourse

that is culturally produced representations of danger through which insecurities and thus identities of states and communities are produced and reproduced.

Regarding Turkey's identity based on particular culturally produced insecurities, a defensive characteristic has been the dominant feature. In this culture, the traditional discourse, heavily affected by the bitter memories of the last century of the Ottoman Empire, has been that of the civilian-military bureaucratic and political elite of the Turkish Republic from the establishment since it was mainly the business of those who establish and run the state offices and institutions to identify danger and provide security.

Inherited from the Ottoman past through the negative representations of state elites on the Treaty of Sevrés, the traditional discourse on Turkey's insecurities has had a major component that is the fear from Western conspiracies against Turkish national and territorial integrity. For the Treaty of Sevrés was the document following of First World War that allowed the partition of the Ottoman heartland among the Allied powers. Although, the new Turkish state as the successor of the Empire never accepted the Sevrés and achieved to alter it through the Treaty of Lausanne at the end of Turkish Independence War, the memories related with the Sevrés left a negative imprint known as *Sevrés Syndrome* or *Sevrésphobia*, which can be identified as the conviction shaping Turkey's culture of insecurity that the great powers are conspiring to weaken and divide Turkey in order to revitalize the Sevrés (Mufti, 1998: 42).

To go into details, the Ottoman Empire, being in decline, became vulnerable to internal and external threats in the nineteenth century. During this period, the Empire

faced with ethnic and religious unrest threatening its national and territorial integrity due to continuous propaganda attacks, provocations, exploitation activities and outright aggression by the great powers of the time as the self-appointed protectors of the rights of minorities.

In this unrest, the Ottoman heterogeneous state and societal structure- namely, *millet* system- turned into a catalyst to the Empire's self-destruction (for millet system see Ortaylı, 2005: 66-70; Barkey and Gavrilis, 2016: 24-42; Aviv, 2016). For when the central authority weakened, the heterogeneous societal structure constituted the basis for the separatist nationalistic sentiments. These sentiments were exacerbated by the intervention of European powers in the internal affairs of the Empire, as a result of which the social and national integrity of the Empire fell apart into ethnic and religious lines desiring to disassociate themselves from the Empire. This inevitably led to the territorial disintegration of the Empire through the eventual separatism first by Christian peoples and then by Muslim Arabs of the Empire. In the end of this process, the Treaty of Sevrés, which envisaged the partition of the Ottoman territories among European powers and the establishment of an independent Armenian state in the northeastern Anatolia and an autonomous Kurdish state in the southeastern Anatolia, marked the end of the Empire (Aydın, 1999: 162-163; Aydın, 2003: 167-168; Bilgin, 2005: 183-184).

Seeing that the Ottoman national and territorial integrity fell apart due to the heterogeneous social structure and Western intervention to the internal affairs of the Empire, the new Turkish Republic has become extremely sensitive on the preservation of its unitary state structure rests upon a homogenous Turkish nation and the foreign intervention to the internal affairs of Turkey especially by Western

powers. In that regard, creation of a homogenous Turkish nation has become to be seen as an issue of existence for the newly established state. To this end, Turkey, unlike the Ottoman Empire, has endeavored itself to create and maintain a homogenous nation as the basis for the preservation of the newly established state's territorial integrity. In this endeavor, ethnic claims other than Turkishness have been treated as misnomers and hostile plots of *Dış Mihraklar* (external powers) targeting Turkey's national and territorial integrity (Aydın, 1999: 174). This manifests itself in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's words quoted in İnönü (1931: 16):

In today's political and social community of Turkish nation, we have citizens and fellow nationals who have been subjected to propaganda about the idea being Kurdish, Circassian, and even Laz and Bosnian. However, these misnomers, which are the products of the despotic eras of the past, have brought nothing but sorrow to the individual of this nation, except for a few enemy agents and brainless reactionaries. For the sons of this nation, as the whole Turkish community, have a unified history, morality and law.

Inherited by the founders of the Turkish Republic from the bitter memories of the Ottoman past, the traditional discourse in culture of insecurity on the fear from Western conspiracies against Turkish national and territorial integrity has continued to shape Turkish state identity. Identifying Turkey's relations with the West in the 1990s, Bülent Ecevit, who served as the Prime Minister several times, expressed that "Some Western countries are explicitly supporting the ones who are dreaming of dividing Turkey by revitalizing the Sevres" (*Milliyet*, July 25, 1992).

In line with Ecevit, President Süleyman Demirel indicated on May 2, 1995 that

I know what they [the West] desire. They want the Sevres. They want beyond the Euphrates. Whatever we do cannot satisfy them. We are the remains of Ottoman Empire. Twenty-five states came to existence out of Ottoman Empire. Only two did not: the Kurdish state and the Armenian State. Now, what is the West telling? Extend your arm... We ask what they will do with it. We will cut it out, they say. And, we will not let them cut our arm out (*Milliyet*, May 2, 1995).

In addition, framing the European Union's demands for reforms from Turkey as a foreign conspiracy aiming to divide Turkey, retired Gen. Suat İlhan (2000: 22; Turkish to English translation from Bilgin, 2005: 185) stated in his book that

The EU achieves the following as a result of Turkey's candidacy for membership: it enhances its horizons and sphere of influence to include Caucasias, Middle East, Central Asia; attains the opportunity to enhance and reinforce the advantages created by the Customs Union treaty . . . prepares the ground for the resolution of the Turco-Greek dispute in favor of Greece . . . paves the way for carving out Turkish territories via endeavors in 'minority rights'; and generates hope for the resolution of the 'Eastern Question' by way of side-tracking Turkey.

To wrap up, Turkey has a unique state identity produced by a traditional discourse in its culture of insecurity inherited from the traumatic experiences of the Ottoman past. At the heart of this identity, there is a fear from Western conspiracies against its precarious self that is unitary state structure, which rests upon the homogenous Turkish nation. This self is concretely expressed in the Article 3 of the Turkish constitution, "The State of Turkey, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity." Understood in this way, Turkish state identity has inherently a commitment on the preservation of the unitary state structure and the homogenous Turkish national identity against Western conspiracies.

4.6.2.2. Turkish State Identity and the Syrian Support to the PKK in 1998

The nearly fourteen years long Syrian support to the PKK was constituted as a crisis in Turkish Foreign Policy when it was articulated as a serious threat to the Turkish state identity in the context of the developments in 1998 related with Turkey's PKK problem in broad sense. On its own, Turkey's PKK problem had been detrimental to

Turkey's state identity since the PKK had separatist aims such as establishing a Kurdish state in the eastern part of Turkey with the help of financial and logistical support provided primarily by Syria (Barkey, 1993: 52-53; Barkey, 2007: 347-348). This had been expressed by various governments of Turkey throughout 1990s. For instance, pointing the PKK terrorism in the country, the program of the 54th Turkish government (1996-1997) stated,

The separatist terror backed by foreign countries has been continuing to threaten our internal security. In order to preserve the principles defined in our constitution, more particularly the unitary-nation state structure, the struggle with the terror will continue both inside and outside with determination (*The 54th Government Program*).

Although it was detrimental to Turkey's unitary state structure and homogenous national entity, the Syrian support to the PKK, had not been deemed to be a serious threat to Turkish state identity until 1998. In other words, the Syrian support to the PKK on its own had not evoked Turkey's fears emanating from its *Sevrés Syndrome* because it was the involvement of European powers and the US to be the most worrisome for Turkish elites (Barkey, 2007: 355). Indeed, the Syrian support was of vital importance for the PKK, but it was seen as a balancing act against Turkey on the issue of water between the countries, evident in the words of Deniz Baykal, the Turkish Foreign Minister in 1997, "some circles may claim that they need additional water to wash the blood of terrorism from their hands" (Sayarı 1997: 58). Hence, Turkey sought diplomatic solutions to cease the Syrian support to the PKK and signed security protocols, proven to be ineffective as Syria continued its support.

However, the Syrian support to the PKK transformed into a serious threat to the deeply entrenched Turkish state identity, resting upon the discourse or the discursive

power practice ‘great powers are conspiring to weaken and divide Turkey’, in the context of the developments during 1998. In 1998, the PKK actually lost its military capability as a result of Turkey’s massive cross-border operations in northern Iraq. Turkey’s Commander of the Second Army Gen. Aytaç Yalman at the time stated that Turkey had ensured military success in its fight against terrorism and maintained full domination against the PKK between 1996 and 1998 (Bila, 2007: 208). After its military defeat, the PKK gave an increasing priority to political means over violent ones. The objective of the PKK in doing so was about compensating for its losses on the battleground by gaining international recognition. Hence, the PKK projected that that once the violent means are abandoned, it will more likely become an acceptable actor in the eyes of Europeans.

Considering the increasing European involvement in Turkey’s PKK problem especially in 1998, the PKK gained a considerable success in being an acceptable actor to the Europe. In this respect, first, the Federal Chief Prosecutor of Germany, Kai Nehm, declared on January 13, 1998 that the PKK is no longer considered a terrorist organization. Soon after, the Turkish Foreign Minister at the time İsmail Cem indicated in his statement to the press that “the European Union is encouraging Kurdish separatism in the Middle East” (*Ayın Tarihi*, January 23, 1998).

Second, the reports in Turkey’s leading newspapers by Yavuz Donat, close to government circles, demonstrated the links between Öcalan and German parliamentarians from the governing party by asserting “Some circles in the West is planning to revitalize the Treaty of Sevrés and establish a Kurdish state in the southeastern part of Turkey” (*Milliyet*, January 30, 1998).

Third, the European Union called upon Turkey “to find a political solution to the problem of the repression by the Kurdish people ... [and] end its military operations in northern Iraq” in early 1998 (*European Parliament Report A4-0251/98*, 25 June 1998: 13). Such demands of the European Union from Turkey were represented by most of Turkish elites as Western conspiracies against the Turkey. Pointing the European criticisms against Turkey concerning the democracy and human rights violations in its struggle with the PKK, the Commander of the Military Academy, Gen. Nahit Şenoğlu states in his address to students made at the beginning of the academic year in 2000 that

You will see that Turkey has the most internal and external enemies of any country in the world. You will learn about the dirty aspirations of those who hide behind values such as democracy and human rights and who want to take revenge on the republic of Atatürk (Jenkins, 2001: 90; also see Bilgin, 2005: 184).

Fourth, the Fourth Kurdistan National Conference was scheduled to be held in London on October 11-12, 1998 (Olson, 2001:115). The organization of such event especially in Britain and on the Kurdish issue had a contributing effect on the fears from Western conspiracies to weaken and divide Turkey. For there were suspicions on the British involvement in the first Kurdish revolts during the first years of the Republic in order to revive the Treaty of Sevres has been still dominating the minds of Turkish elites (Barkey, 2007: 355).

And fifth, Italy allowed the meeting of the so-called Kurdish Parliament in exile, which consisted of outlawed Kurdish parliamentarians, mayors and prominent personalities due their alleged ties with the PKK, at Italian Parliament in September 1998. The meeting prompted Ankara to recall its ambassador to Rome in protest. In its written diplomatic protest against Italy, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

stated that “Allowing the meeting of an extension of the terrorist organization in Italian Parliament would only mean disregarding Turkey’s peace, stability and territorial integrity” (*Ayin Tarihi*, September 29, 1998).

With the increased involvement in the issue and growing recognition of the PKK as the political representative of Kurds in Turkey by the European powers, the PKK problem began to be seen as a serious threat by elites to Turkish state identity built upon the fear from Western conspiracies against Turkey’s territorial and national integrity. This was evident in the words concerning the increased European involvement in the PKK issue of retired Gen. Doğan Beyazıt, former Secretary General of the National Security Council 1992-1995,

For centuries, external forces, which find a self-sufficient and powerful Turkey, in this region with enormous geopolitical advantages, as threatening to their interests have adopted the covert policy of the ‘creation of a Kurdish state’ within Turkey. Indications are such that this policy is currently being forced upon the future of the country. Whenever this country has an opportunity to prosper, an ethnic or religious problem makes its appearance (Bayazıt 1998: 82-83).

In addition to these, the Washington Agreement of September 17, 1998 between the northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders, brokered by the US and without including Turkey to the process made Turkey’s fears hit the top. The agreement, committing the northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders to work together on holding elections in summer 1999 to establish a joint territorial administration, intensified Turkey’s suspicions of the US intentions concerning the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, which was represented by Turkish leaders as a threat to Turkey’s territorial and national integrity for long.³⁰ The agreement, also, had the potential of curbing Turkey’s

³⁰ The seriousness of the threat for Turkey emanating from an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq was underlined in a classified document prepared by Turkish Prime Ministry and distributed to top security institutions, later leaked into the *Hurriyet*. In this document, it was stated that “the

struggle with the PKK since the northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders expressed their determination to prevent outside encroachments into their territory, indirectly suggesting that Turkey's cross-border operations into the northern Iraq against the PKK would no longer be tolerated by the US (Aykan, 1999: 177). This further reminded Turkish leaders the conviction that the great powers are conspiring to weaken and divide Turkey in order to revitalize the Sevrés.

Hence, the developments regarding the PKK issue in 1998, all together, fed Turkey's fears from foreign conspiracies against its Turkey's territorial and national integrity. Building upon this, Turkish leaders were convinced that the PKK issue transformed into a tool to weaken and divide Turkey in the hands of the European powers and the US. In other words, as a results of the developments in 1998, Turkey began to be losing the upper hand on the PKK problem to the US and Europeans, conspiring against Turkey's territorial and national integrity, meaning that it was the Turkish state identity, built upon the commitment on the preservation Turkey's territorial integrity and national homogeneity against Western conspiracies, at stake in October 1998.

Therefore, as the PKK problem came to be understood as a serious threat to the deeply entrenched Turkish state identity, the Syrian support to the PKK became a serious danger to that identity because there was a widespread conviction that the Syrian support had a key importance for the PKK's existence. And, this was the underlying representation that produced the 1998 October Crisis, initiated by Turkey to eradicate the PKK threat to its state identity at its source.

declaration of independence of Kurdish state in northern Iraq will be considered as *casus belli*" (Hurriyet, May 16, 2001).

Accordingly, the 1998 October Crisis was a production in relation to the Turkish state identity since the PKK problem transformed into a Western conspiracy targeting Turkey's territorial and national integrity. Then, the Syrian support to the PKK, rather than being a mere nuisance or material threat, was began to be articulated as a threat to Turkish state identity with the growing recognition by Europeans of the PKK as the political representative of Kurds in Turkey and the US brokered Washington Agreement signed by the northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders in 1998. As Mesut Yılmaz, the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, said to the press while the crisis was ongoing,

Our enemies, who have not given up their conspiracies against our country, this time have been endeavoring to revive the separatist organization, who lost its social backing and has been defeated militarily, in political platforms. And actually, an effort to politicize the separatist terror in Turkey lies at the bottom of the recent activism that can be observed in some Western countries. The effort to politicize separatist movement is something that we must intensely resist with our full strength. For a desire to resurrect the Sevrés lies at the heart of the politicization of the separatist organization. Our nation, who tore the Sevrés apart and established a unitary nation state from the ashes of a destroyed empire at the era of chaos in the beginning of the century, cannot permit the efforts to resurrect the Sevrés in today's conditions either under no circumstance. We have the strength and capabilities to defeat all effort in this regard. In this context, we cannot tolerate the support to the separatist movement provided by some of our neighbors [Syria] any longer (*Sabah*, October 7, 1998).

Yılmaz's statement suggests that Turkey's fear from Western conspiracies was at the heart of the 1998 October Crisis. This is to say that the Syrian support to the PKK was represented as an acute threat to be dealt with in relation to that Turkish state identity at stake as Turkish leaders were convinced that the PKK issue transformed into a tool to weaken and divide Turkey in the hands of the European powers and the US. Therefore, the 1998 October Crisis was actually an effect of discursive power practices since Turkish state identity is a particular discursive production, in which the discourse on the commitment on the preservation of the unitary state structure

and the homogenous Turkish national integrity against Western conspiracies is the prominent feature.

To conclude, the 1998 October Crisis was enabled by discursive power practices, a particular representation of Turkey as a unitary nation state subjected to Western conspiracies to weaken and divide it. This crisis, in return, made it possible for that Turkish state identity built on the fear from Western conspiracies to be normalized and reproduced. In a TGNA session gathered to evaluate Turkey's position after the end of the 1998 October Crisis, all parties in the parliament representing diverse political ideologies expressed similar words regarding Turkey's unitary nation state identity and their commitment to preserve it against foreign and especially Western conspiracies. For instance, the representative of the Democratic Left Party, coalition partner at the time, stated that

This great nation will always defeat the efforts of some Western countries towards the revitalization of the Sevrés. The country will live as an indivisible entity and a strong state. No one and no state can disturb unity and solidarity of our country (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 18.11.1998: 470).

In similar fashion, the representative of the Virtue Party, the main opposition party at the time, indicated that

Today's mentality, understanding of the Europe is in tendency to redefine the description of minority in Turkey [determined in the Treaty of Lausanne that invalidated the Sevrés]. The effort of the European politics and diplomacy to transform our southeastern issue into a minority one is emanating from an understanding that has its roots in the Sevrés. From this perspective, we, as the whole Turkey, whatever our ideological and party differences are, have to be on full alert within national unity and solidary especially on this matter (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 18.11.1998: 471).

4.7. Concluding Remarks

This chapter analyzed the 1998 October Crisis through different power conceptualizations in IR. In accordance with their conceptual schemes, each of those conceptualizations directed power analysis to a different aspect of power in the 1998 October Crisis. Hence, it became possible to observe the areas in which each conceptualization remain weak or strong in their power analysis on the case. This provided an opportunity to reveal the explanatory potentials of different power conceptualizations in the discipline based on their own focus of aspects (or research agenda), heavily influenced by their particular epistemological, methodological and ontological concerns.

Accordingly, as the case study indicates, there is always various elements of power at play in any event of world politics that a specific power conceptualization is not able to grasp on its own. Therefore, a rigorous, and at the same time a complete, power analysis demands the utilization of different power conceptualizations in the discipline. Otherwise, the analysis will have a monolithic understanding that misses the attainable pluralism in power analysis. This will, also, result in narrowing the focus of the power concept despite the breadth of the conceptual inventory of power in the discipline.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1. Executive Summary and Arguments

This dissertation began its analysis on the argument; there are diverse power conceptualizations in the discipline of IR, obscuring what the concept means. In order to open up this argument, this dissertation engaged in revealing the underlying reasons of the diversity in power conceptualizations and clarifying the distinctive features of each conceptualization in the discipline. As the necessity of achieving such task, the dissertation asked three main research questions.

First question is, why are there many power conceptualizations in the discipline?, or how has power come to be conceptualized in many ways? This question deserved attention because although the concept of power is central to the discipline, there is a considerable lack of consensus on how to conceptualize it. The existing research communities from various epistemological and methodological traditions in the discipline have conceptualized power in many ways. As a result, the terrain of power has turned into a messy ground, which diminishes the analytical strength of the discipline as one of its central concepts has been loosely defined.

The explanation of the diversity in power conceptualizations in the discipline is twofold: one is about the nature of the concept, and the other one is related with the nature of the discipline. Starting with the nature of the concept, power is, first, a policy-contingent concept, rendering it impossible to define in a way that covers all instances of power. Second, power is a theory-dependent concept, referring that the theoretical position in which the concept is embedded determines its very definition. Taking these two points together, the concept of power has an ambiguous nature because the identification of power is always inextricably linked with the historical and theoretical context, in which the definition was forged. Hence, when it is utilized, power always has two or more denotations depending upon the audiences' political and theoretical perspectives.

This conclusion from the nature of power directly leads analysis to the nature of IR. IR as a social sciences discipline is interested in explaining or understanding the developments in international politics through variety of theoretical positions that rest upon specific epistemological and methodological traditions. Moreover, international politics represent a web of intricate relations between states, sub-state actors, individuals, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Given the intricateness of the international politics and the diversity of theoretical positions in the discipline, it is not surprising that the concept of power has been conceptualized in many ways.

Therefore, the answer to the second question- how have specific power conceptualizations come to mean as they are known to mean in particular way?- is inherently related with the historical processes, and theoretical, epistemological and methodological requirements, in which that specific power conceptualization is

embedded. Summarizing their historical and theoretical backgrounds, the possessional conceptualization constitutes the oldest power conceptualization in the discipline. The possessional conceptualization was raised by the classical realist thinkers in the discipline during the First Great Debate. The ideas of classical realists at the time were under heavy influence of the developments within the European diplomatic history. Hence, their understanding on power is in line with the dominant power conceptualization in the writings of diplomatic historians that is the possessional conceptualization.

The relational power conceptualization, on the other hand, began to take the attention of IR scholars after seeing the deficiencies of the possessional power conceptualization in explaining the events such as the victory of Vietcong in the Vietnam War over the world most formidable military and economic power at that time, the US. The historical context was also reinforced by the developments within IR Theory. Began at 1950's but intensified at 1960 and 1970s, a new great debate took place between traditionalists and behavioralists in IR. This was a methodological debate to the extent that traditionalists conducted their analysis through historical observation and interpretative judgments while behavioralists relied on the idea that the methods in natural sciences are suitable for the development of IR. As a result, a new power conceptualization was developed by IR scholars that is the relational power conceptualization.

Later, as the deep economic and political division between the North and South countries began to be apparent in international politics with the decolonization process, a debate between the Northern and Southern countries broke out over the rules of international economic system, in which the Southern countries were

disadvantaged in the existing institutions and regimes. Hence, the Southern states attempted to alter the existing institutions and regimes to the extent that these would be designed to meet developmental needs of the LDCs rather than maintaining norms and principles of the liberal trade regime, which they perceived as serving the interests of the Northern countries. In this manner, they established UNCTAD and NIEO as alternatives to GATT. These developments led to rise of the positivist structural power conceptualization in the discipline.

Coming to the end of Cold War, it reshaped the ground of IR as the mainstream IR theorizing failed to anticipate such a ground shaking development. More than being unable to anticipate, the predictions of mainstream approaches with respect to the characteristics of the international politics in the post-Cold War era were also proven to be wrong. Upon these failures, scholars of IR began to reexamine the existing theories and assumptions in the discipline. In this environment, the transparency of post-positivist approaches in the discipline increased, and their methodological, epistemological and ontological premises showed their effects on the concept of power. As a result, possessional, relational and structural power conceptualizations within the mainstream IR theorizing came under criticism from many aspects, which led to the development of the post-positivist version of structural power conceptualization and the poststructural power conceptualization in the discipline.

After revealing the historical processes, and theoretical, epistemological and methodological requirements that lead to specific power conceptualizations, third question in the dissertation scrutinized the main features, focus of aspects and explanatory potentials of each power conceptualizations in the discipline. Unavoidably, the third question is inherently related with the second question

because the concept of power, as it was emphasized, is inherently linked with the political and theoretical context, in which it is embedded. Building upon this, the dissertation employed a case study, the 1998 October Crisis between Turkey and Syria, to closely examine and compare the analytical frameworks of power conceptualizations within a specific context.

Based on the findings in the case study, the possessional conceptualization focused on Turkey and Syria's possession of specific resources in order to reveal which one was more powerful. According to the possessional power analysis of the 1998 October Crisis, Turkey was able to threaten Syria militarily because Turkey was materially more powerful than Syria. In similar vein, Syria accepted Turkey's demands because again Turkey was materially more powerful. However, this explanation contains an important weakness because Turkey had been multiple times more powerful than Syria throughout 1990s, but it was until 1998 that Turkish demands had been refused by Syria, especially in 1987, 1989, 1992 and 1993. Then, several questions appear to be answered which the possessional conceptualization leaves unanswered: although Turkey had been materially stronger than Syria throughout 1990s, why did it let Syria wage a proxy-war against Turkey by supporting the PKK until 1998? If Turkey had repeatedly attempted to prevent Syrian support to the PKK while it was multiple times more powerful during 1990s, what is the reason that Syria did not back down? It is obvious that these questions are out of scope of the explanatory canons of the possessional power conceptualization

The relational power conceptualization, as it understands power in a relationship between two (or more) actors in which an actor gets other actor(s) to do something that other actor(s) would not do otherwise, explains the October crisis as a power

relationship between Turkey and Syria in which Turkey successfully exercised power over Syria to make it cease its support to the PKK, which it would not do so otherwise. Moreover, identifying the features of the context- namely, scope, means deployed, domain and weight, the explanatory tools within relational power conceptual scheme made it possible for us to explain Turkey's failure to prevent Syrian support to the PKK in 1987, 1989, 1992 and 1993, which the explanatory potential of possessional conceptualization remained insufficient.

Looking at the positivist structural power conceptualization, it directs attention to a different aspect in the Turkish-Syrian relationship, where power works indirectly between actors, as actor A's actions cause change in the behaviors or the conditions of actor B through formalized rules of activity, customary practices of engagement, established division of labor, and to sum up, formal and informal arrangements. However, since Turkey and Syria prefer settling their issues through direct bilateral interaction rather than indirectly under the mediatory of formal and informal settings such as international law, international regimes and international/regional organizations, the positivist structural power offers a limited explanation to the 1998 October Crisis. Yet, this does not mean that the Turkey-Syria relations in a broad sense are totally out of the explanatory cannons of the power conceptualization at hand. The structural power conceptualization provides a useful explanation to the power relationship between Turkey and Syria in the issue of water regarding the general principles of international water law, which is structurally in favor of Syrian position. In this respect, building on the conceptual scheme of the positivist structural power conceptualization, Turkey's failure to get international funds for a long time to its water projects is a clear manifestation of structural power exercised by Syria through the medium of international water law.

Different from its positivist version, the post-positivist structural power conceptualization identifies power as a structural phenomenon that the roles, identities and capacities of individual units, whether people, groups or states, are seen as the effects of power. In this conceptual scheme, power is searched as a phenomenon that shape actors' self-understandings and subjective interests rather than being a conceptual explanation that seeks to explain direct or indirect control over others' behaviors. Understood in this way, the post-positivist power analyst sees power as an element of structure that shapes not only what actors do but also what actors want. Conceptualizing power as such, the post-positivist structural conceptualization revealed how Syria's structurally shaped subjective interests in the post-Cold War international structure and the norms concerning the issue of supporting terrorism disempowered it to resist Turkey's demands in the 1998 October Crisis.

Last but not least, the poststructural conceptualization provides a fundamentally different conceptual scheme that investigates discursive power practices, which give rise to particular subjectivities with particular identities, interests and in/appropriate behavior patterns. In this understanding, discourses are seen as powerful practices that produce and maintain particular meanings consisting of identities for states, groups and individuals (both of self and of others), and thereby construct a particular reality in which particular foreign policy behaviors become possible. These foreign policy behaviors, in return, reaffirm those identities, which made them possible. Building upon this conceptual framework, the poststructural power conceptualization discovered the mutually constitutive relationship between Turkey's discursively produced state identity and the production of the 1998 October Crisis. This is to say that the 1998 October Crisis was enabled by discursive power practices, a particular

representation of Turkey as a unitary nation state subjected to Western conspiracies to weaken and divide it. This crisis, in return, made it possible for that Turkish state identity built on the fear from Western conspiracies to be normalized and reproduced.

5.2. The Added Value of the Dissertation

Power analysts in the discipline, so far, have mainly strived to provide a full-fledged power definition or establish a categorization for the study of diverse power conceptualizations. However, these attempts were proven to be difficult (if not impossible) to achieve their objectives without limitations. For the studies in the discipline that endeavored to clarify and explicate the meaning of concept are not more than representing a particular political context in which the concept is utilized, or (meta) theoretical position in which the concept is embedded. Similarly, since they have to be built on a respective criterion to distinguish power conceptualizations in a systematic manner, categorizations for the study of diverse power conceptualizations are either limited in the sense that they cannot include power conceptualizations from each thinking traditions on the concept that are Weberian, Lukesian or Foucauldian, or even if they are able to include them, there emerge inevitable internal inconsistencies.

Therefore, rather than attempting to provide a full-fledged definition of the concept or establish a comprehensive categorization, this dissertation identified the underlying reasons of having diverse power conceptualizations in the discipline by conducting descriptive and performative conceptual analysis. By doing so, this

dissertation provided a performative examination on the historical and political processes that led to the existing power conceptualizations. This, also, made it possible to clarify the main features of each power conceptualization in the discipline. Such an examination was necessary and useful because this has been mostly neglected by power analysts in the discipline.

As a result, this dissertation assumes that it brought an order to messy terrain of power in the discipline by bringing an order to the utilization of the diverse power conceptualizations. Hence, the level of ambiguity on the concept of power in the discipline is diminished, which in turn will contribute the scholarly communication among the power analysts in the discipline.

5.3. Paths for Future Research

Throughout the dissertation, it is emphasized that power is central to the discipline. Most probably, this centrality will last so long as IR is accepted as a social sciences discipline because IR is a scientific but at the same time a political enterprise as Carr, (1946 [1939]: 5) puts it, “[International Relations] is the science not only of what is, but of what ought to be.” IR’s being a political enterprise means that power is always an integral part of it. This is not the case in natural sciences because the distinction between values and facts or observer and observed is not only theoretically valid but also attainable in practice. However, social sciences have a rather different characteristic, meaning that the purpose of the researcher is inseparable from the facts that are analyzed. Further, the purpose is itself among the facts because “purpose and analysis become part and parcel of a single process” (Carr, 1946

[1939]: 4). This is to say that the problems in social world we diagnose is inherently related with our point of views to that world. A socialist-minded would see the global liberal economic system as the source of the malfunction in world politics while a capitalist-minded would see any problem with it. As a result, our theories or ways of seeing with respect to understand the world is inherently political and related with our perspectives of what the international relations ought to be.

If there is always power where politics is available, both the way states interact with each other and the way we define the discipline is inherently linked with power as a result of IR's being an inherently political enterprise. This sometimes materializes itself as power relations as an effect of international relations, and sometimes as international relations as an effect of power relations. The former materialization falls mainly under the scope of the possessional, relational and positivist structural power conceptualizations while the latter is dealt mainly by post-positivist structural and poststructural power conceptualizations in the discipline. These two focuses of aspects of the power conceptualizations from positivist and post-positivists traditions need an in-depth look through case studies from world politics because they constitute the very functions of the concept of power in the discipline. Hence, a study on these two focuses of aspects would be subject to future research.

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