

ANALYSIS OF EVERYDAY XENOPHOBIA: THE
CASE OF HIGHLY EDUCATED TURKS WITH
IMMIGRANT BACKGROUND IN AUSTRIA AND
GERMANY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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ABSTRACT

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Xenophobia and racism are contested. They are distinct but overlapping. This study analyses the relationship and interaction between these two concepts and seeks to unpack the true nature of contemporary xenophobia in Western Europe. It attempts to answer two key questions: 1) What constitutes the conceptual bases for these terms? 2) How do people report on their experiences on these concepts?

In addressing these questions, the study deconstructs and analyzes the multi-dimensional concept of xenophobia to arrive at a meaningful operational definition; explicates its overlooked normative framework constitutively shaped in the United

Nations; investigates the rising effects of immigration phenomenon, violent acts against immigrant groups, and the political discourse on the level of xenophobia; focuses on the related developments in Germany and Austria by narrating the events relevant to explain the rising xenophobia in these countries; and refers to reliable secondary data regarding xenophobic and racist perceptions, behaviors, and incidents gathered through research conducted under the supervision of international organizations and reports submitted by member states to such organizations. The study also seeks answers to these questions through an analysis of interview data conducted with highly educated Turks with immigrant background in Germany and Austria, which is characterized as the group least likely to experience xenophobia and racism. Research findings reveal that the interviewees experience both xenophobia and racism. The interviewees mostly regard racism and xenophobia as identical and declare that they are exposed to verbal violence.

Keywords: Xenophobia, racism, immigration phenomenon, metamorphosis of racism, xeno-racism.

ÖZET

GÜNDELİK YABANCI DÜŞMANLIĞININ ANALİZİ: AVUSTURYA VE ALMANYA'DAKİ GÖÇMEN KÖKENLİ YÜKSEK EĞİTİMLİ TÜRKLER ÖRNEĞİ

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Yabancı düşmanlığı ve ırkçılık tartışmalıdır. Farklıdırlar ancak örtüşürler. Bu çalışma, bu iki kavram arasındaki ilişkiyi ve etkileşimi analiz etmekte ve Batı Avrupa'daki çağdaş yabancı düşmanlığının gerçek doğasını ortaya çıkarmaya çalışmaktadır. Çalışma, iki anahtar soruyu yanıtlamaya çalışmaktadır: 1) Bu terimlerin kavramsal temellerini ne oluşturur? 2) İnsanlar bu kavramlarla ilgili deneyimlerini nasıl açıklamaktadır?

Bu soruları ele alırken, bu çalışma anlamlı bir operasyonel tanıma ulaşmak için çok boyutlu yabancı düşmanlığı kavramını yapılandırmakta ve analiz etmekte; Birleşmiş Milletler'de yapısal olarak şekillendirilen, nadiren ele alınan normatif çerçevesini

açıklamakta; siyasi yabancı düşmanlığının niteliğini izah etmekte; göç olgusunun, göçmen gruplara yönelik şiddet eylemlerinin ve siyasi söylemin yabancı düşmanlığının düzeyini artırıcı etkilerini araştırmakta; bu ülkelerde yükselen yabancı düşmanlığını açıklamak için ilgili olayları anlatarak Almanya ve Avusturya'daki gelişmelere odaklanmakta: yabancı düşmanlığı ve ırkçılık algılamaları, davranışları ve bunlarla ilgili olarak meydana gelen olaylar hakkında bazı uluslararası kuruluşların denetiminde yapılan araştırmalara ve üye devletlerin bu kuruluşlara sunduğu raporlar aracılığıyla elde edilen güvenilir ikincil verilere atıfta bulunmaktadır.

Bu bağlamda, ev sahibi toplumlara yüksek düzeyde entegre olmaları nedeniyle yabancı düşmanlığı ve ırkçılık yaşama olasılığı en düşük olan hedef kitle incelenerek bu sorulara yanıt arayan görüşmelere dayalı bir araştırma çalışması yapılmıştır. Araştırma, Avusturya ve Almanya'daki göçmen kökenli yüksek eğitimli Türklerin deneyimlerini soruşturmuştur. Araştırma sonuçları, görüşülen kişilerin hem yabancı düşmanlığı hem de ırkçılık yaşadıklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Görüşülen kişiler çoğunlukla ırkçılık ve yabancı düşmanlığını özdeş görmekte ve sözlü şiddete maruz kaldıklarını beyan etmektedirler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yabancı düşmanlığı, ırkçılık, göç olgusu, ırkçılığın dönüşümü, yabancı-ırkçılığı

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

*“All the people like us are We,
And everyone else is They.
And They live over the sea,
While We live over the way,
But – would you believe it? – They look upon We
As only a sort of They!*

[...]

*All nice people, like Us, are We
And everyone else is They:
But if you cross over the sea,
Instead of over the way,
You may end by (think of it!) looking on We
As only a sort of They”*

Rudyard Kipling (n.d.) “We and They”

*“Collective fear stimulates herd instinct, and tends
to produce ferocity toward those who are not
regarded as members of the herd.”*

Bertrand Russel (2010: 70)

1.1. Introduction

In the last 15 years of the 20th century, numerous media reports and analyses demonstrated the increase in xenophobia in Western Europe.¹ Along with this development, reports about violence against various categories of foreigners in some Western European countries made headlines. These violent acts shocked and alarmed both Europeans and the global community and have provided palpable evidence that the rise in xenophobia is not just a conjecture based on simple observation but a reality of the times. Certain scholars consider the violent acts that occurred in Germany at that time to be “racial violence” (Panayi, 1994: 265).

As a matter of fact, “A Statistical Analysis of Crime against Foreigners in Unified Germany” was prepared in the 1990s, which indicated that the “German unification and the transition to a market economy in the former East Germany have been accompanied by a high and rising rate of violence against foreigners. In 1992, the police recorded 6,336 crimes against foreigners, 2544 of which were violent crimes” (Krueger & Pischke, 1997: 182–83). Major assaults occurred in September 1991 against foreigners living in a home for asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda in Saxony. In August 1992, riots occurred against the asylum seekers in Rostock’s Lichtenhagen district. Another violent crime occurred two months later when three Turkish residents died during the firebombing of two residences in Mölln, Schleswig-Holstein in the western part of Germany. In May 1993, the house of a Turkish family in Solingen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, was firebombed, killing five Turkish people.²

¹ Although the term “Western Europe” geographically represents the western part of Europe, it does not have a precise definition. I consider “Western Europe” as a generic term that mainly includes countries that have a colonialist history and are situated in the western part of Europe, including the Scandinavian countries.

² In his article “Racial Violence in the New Germany 1990–93,” Panikos Panayi enumerates these attacks in chronological order (1994: 265–275).

The European Union (called the European Community at that time) had seriously considered the rise of racism and xenophobia in Europe in 1984, prior to these criminal and violent acts. In this context, the President of the Socialist Group of the European Parliament informed the President of the European Parliament, by letter of 12 September 1984, that more than 109 members had signed the proposal to establish a Committee of Inquiry to examine the rise of fascism and racism in Europe. This proposal was accepted by the President. However, in his letter of 27 December 1984, Mr. Le Pen, as Chairman of the European Right Group, questioned procedural issues and requested the suspension of the committee's work. The European Right Group applied to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for the annulment of the decision of the European Parliament on 1 April 1985. However, the Court found this application inadmissible and afterwards the Investigative Committee prepared and submitted the Evrigenis report in November 1985 (Evrigenis, 1985). The report recommended “to draw up a declaration against racism, racial discrimination, and xenophobia and in favor of harmonious relations among all the communities existing in Europe, to be adopted jointly by the Community political institutions” (Evrigenis, 1985: 95). It further proposed that “within the framework of Eurobarometer³ one or more surveys should be carried out on the present state of relations between the different communities living in Europe” (Evrigenis, 1985: 96).

In that respect, the creation of the above-mentioned Committee of Inquiry and its report contributed to the declaration regarding migration, prepared by the Commission in March 1985. Accordingly, the Commission proposed the adoption of a joint

³ According to the European Union’s website, the “Eurobarometer is the polling instrument used by the European Commission, the European Parliament and other EU institutions and agencies to regularly monitor the state of public opinion in Europe on issues related to the European Union as well as attitudes on subjects of political or social nature. The aim of the Eurobarometer is also to provide quality and relevant data for experts in public opinion and the public alike.” <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/about>

declaration against xenophobia and racism in view of the xenophobic attacks on migrant workers and their families that had occurred in several member states. The Council and Parliament responded favorably to the Commission's proposal and participated in discussions, which led to the drafting of the joint declaration against racism and xenophobia on June 4, 1986. The joint declaration stated that "The European Parliament, the representatives of the Member States meeting within the Council and the Commission, [recognize] the existence and growth of xenophobic attitudes movements and acts of violence in the Community, which are often directed against immigrants" and stressed "the importance of adequate and objective information and of making all citizens aware of the dangers of racism and xenophobia, and the need to ensure that all acts or forms of discrimination are prevented or curbed" (Joint Declaration Against Racism and Xenophobia, 1986).

1.2 Research on Xenophobia and Racism in Western Europe at the End of the 20th Century

Three years after the Joint Declaration, due to developments in Europe such as the unification of East and West Germany and the inclusion of new member states, the European Parliament decided to prepare a more comprehensive second report. For this purpose, a new Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia was established in November 1989. In the meantime, the Eurobarometer study on racism and xenophobia in the European Community was conducted in October and November 1988, as had been recommended in the Evrigenis report. The results were officially presented to the European Parliament on November 21, 1989, in parallel with the establishment of the Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia. The Eurobarometer survey on "Public Opinion in the European Community" focused on civil liberties and civil

rights, on attitudes to opinions about “others” as well as immigration policy in the European Community. As far as “otherness” is concerned, the survey found that “one European in three believes there are too many people of another nationality or race in his [or her] country” (Commission of the European Communities 1989: 5). “Otherness” was examined in terms of nationality, race, religion, culture, and social class. At the community level, the “other” religion is clearly Islam. Regarding race, the “other” is dark-skinned (“black”) people, except in France and the United Kingdom. For France and the United Kingdom, “others” are Arabs and Indians, respectively (Commission of the European Communities, 1989: 3–4). As per survey results, “in Europe, and in each Member State, one in ten respondents claims to approve racist movements, or to be more precise, of the position of racist organizations with regard to immigration” (Commission of the European Communities, 1989: 16).

The comprehensive report prepared by the European Parliament’s Committee on Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia in 1990 refers to the aforementioned Eurobarometer survey and underlines that “the survey confirms the seriousness of racism and/or xenophobia in Europe” (Ford, 1991, para. 4.2.7). Notably, the European Council made a declaration on antisemitism, racism, and xenophobia on June 26, 1990, in which it expressed “its deep revulsion at recent manifestations of anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia” (Presidency Conclusions 1990: 30). Additionally, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) report of September 16, 1993, which discusses the fight against racism, xenophobia, and intolerance, begins by stating that “In recent years, racism, xenophobia, and intolerance have resurfaced in Europe, and have led to a series of violent incidents” (Espersen, 1993b). PACE recommendation 1222 of 1993 states that “The Assembly is deeply alarmed by the resurgence of racism, xenophobia, and intolerance throughout Europe. It strongly

condemns the resulting acts of violence committed in several Council of Europe member states” (Espersen, 1993a).

Furthermore, the results of the surveys and decisions discussed above revealed further information about the strengthened presence of xenophobia and racism in Western Europe. For instance, 1997 was declared “the European Year Against Racism” by the EU Council of Ministers and representatives of the Member States’ Governments on July 23, 1996, to tackle the problems of racism, xenophobia, and antisemitism in EU societies (European Union, 1996).

An opinion poll was conducted by Eurobarometer between March 26 and April 29, 1997, in the fifteen Member States of the European Union. The poll included 16,154 participants and was commissioned as part of the European Year Against Racism. The first results were presented at the “Closing Conference of the European Year Against Racism” at Luxemburg in December 1997. A paper published by the EU described how the poll results “show how a worrying level of racism and xenophobia in the Member States, with nearly 33% of those interviewed openly describing themselves as ‘quite racist’ or ‘very racist’.” The EU paper further stresses that “many of the declared racists were in fact xenophobic, as the ‘minorities’ who were the target of racist feeling in each country, varied according to its colonial and migration history and the recent arrival of refugees.” Only one in three of those interviewed said they felt they were “not at all racist.” One in three declared themselves “a little racist,” and one-third openly expressed quite racist or very racist feelings. Nearly 9% of

interviewees placed themselves at the top of the racist scale, stating they were “very racist.”⁴

For the two Western European countries that this study specially focuses on, namely Germany and Austria, the scale of quite (26%) or very (8%) racist amounted to 34% of Germany’s total population. For Austria, 42% of the people identified themselves as quite racist (28%) and very racist (14%). Notably, Austria and Germany had the third and fifth highest percentage respectively of people who identified themselves as “very racist.”

The same results further stated that 79% of the respondents believed that minorities paid less into the social security system than they themselves claim; 59% said that minorities abused social benefit systems; 44.5% that the presence of minorities was a “cause of insecurity”; and 29% expressed that minorities’ religious practices threatened their own “way of life.” Moreover, 63% of respondents said that “the presence of people from these minority groups increases unemployment,” and 68% stated that minorities were performing jobs that nobody else wanted to do. To become fully accepted members of society, 36% of respondents said that “people belonging to minority groups must give up such parts of their religion or culture which may be in conflict with the law.” A quarter went further and said to be fully accepted, minorities must “give up their own culture.” Only 39% of those interviewed did not support either integration or assimilation. Over 60% disagreed that people belonging to minority groups “are so different, they can never be fully accepted members” of society. When

⁴ Racism and Xenophobia in Europe Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no 47.1. It was commissioned as part of the European Year Against Racism and coordinated by INRA (Europe). The data were analyzed under the responsibility of Jeanne Ben Brika and Gérard Lemaire (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris), and James S. Jackson (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan). See Brika, Lemaire, and Jackson (1997).

asked whether they thought their country “benefits from the presence of immigrants from non-European Union countries,” 48% said their country would “be better off” without their presence. Of the respondents, 43% said that “legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be sent to their country of origin if they are unemployed.”

The rise of racism and xenophobia was considered more worrying after the above-mentioned Eurobarometer survey of 1997. Hence, in parallel with calling 1997 “the European Year Against Racism,” the European Communities Council created a European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia in June 1997 in Vienna. However, because of the absence of explicit legal basis in the Treaties until 1999, the Centre was only formally opened on April 6, 2000. The main purpose of the Centre was to study the extent of—and trends in—racism, xenophobia, and antisemitism and to analyze their underlying causes, consequences, and effects. The Centre was tasked to establish and coordinate a European Racism and Xenophobia Network (Raxen). Raxen operates in conjunction with national university research centers, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations with experience in this field of work (Commission of the European Communities, 1998).

Noteworthy, in its introductory paragraphs, the Council Regulation establishing the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia refers to widespread racism and xenophobia, and states that “racism and xenophobia are phenomena which manifest themselves at all levels within the Community” (Council Regulation [EC], 2003: para. 16).

In 2000, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia commissioned a follow-up survey. The survey was administered using the framework of standard Eurobarometer public opinion surveys, and the results were published in

Eurobarometer Report Number 53 (European Commission, 2000: 53). According to paragraph 7.3 of the report, to measure the scale of xenophobia and racism, respondents were asked whether they personally considered the presence of people of another nationality, race, and religion disturbing. It was found that 8 in 10 EU citizens did not find this disturbing; however, 15% admitted to having a problem when they were in the presence of people of another nationality. The rates were about the same for race and religion.

In addition to this general survey, the Eurobarometer completed a special analysis for the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia about “the Attitudes toward minority groups in the European Union” (Thalhammer et al., 2001). The authors of the special report explained that “the report covers the questions pertaining to the relationship between majority and minority groups.” The most important set of questions in the study was related to “the tendency to blame minorities for negative social phenomena such as unemployment, crime or loss of welfare.” The authors identified these points as “xenophobic concerns” that seemed to constitute the core attitude within a set of negative and positive attitudes toward minorities. A total of 16,078 people were interviewed in the 15 EU Member States between April 5 and May 23, 2000. On average, 1,000 interviews were conducted in each country. Empirical findings of this survey, among other findings, highlight the following:

“... a majority of Europeans have voiced concern over minorities because they fear minorities are threatening social peace and welfare; this percentage increased over the period 1997 – 2000. People are worried about unemployment, a loss of social welfare, and a drop in educational standards. A small but relevant minority of Europeans feels personally disturbed by the existence of minorities.” (Thalhammer et al., 2001: 11)

Findings further reveal that one out of five Europeans supports the cultural assimilation of minorities. They argue that to become fully accepted members of society, people

belonging to minority groups should abandon their own culture. Thus far the largest groups in Europe, however, are the “passively tolerant” and the “ambivalent.” One of four Europeans has been categorized as “ambivalent,” meaning that they simultaneously exhibit both positive and negative attitudes toward minorities. The authors of the survey assert that:

“Since a large part of xenophobic concerns is about loss of welfare standards, policies, which lend large majorities the feeling that they can participate in the increase of wealth within a growing economy, will contribute significantly to reducing xenophobic concerns. Demographic developments and their impact have to be considered and researched. Particular attention should be paid to the number of retired people and the increasing number of old people with lower income and with low expectations within that group. An increase in hostility toward minorities might well get stronger in this group.” (Thalhammer et al., 2001: 14)

Apart from the two aforementioned surveys, an additional special analysis of the Eurobarometer 2000 Survey was performed for attitudes toward minority groups in West and East Germany. According to the findings of the survey,

“... in Germany as a whole, the level of acceptance of immigrants, especially of those who wish to work in the EU, is low. Germans favor the repatriation of immigrants somewhat more firmly than other Europeans, however, the level of support decreased over the period 1997 – 2000. The support for policies designed to improve social coexistence between majority and minority groups is similar to the support displayed by other Europeans and showed a slight increase over this period.” (Thalhammer, 2001:3)

Regarding tolerance and acceptance of immigrants, the survey findings suggested that intolerance was a phenomenon of the young generation (15- to 24-year-olds) in East Germany, but of the older generation (55-year-olds or more) in West Germany (Thalhammer, 2001: 4). People in West Germany were more likely to accept immigrants than people in East Germany. Survey findings demonstrated that:

“people from Muslim countries who wish to work in the EU are least accepted of all without restriction. 8% of the West German respondents and only 4% of the East German respondents accept immigrants from Muslim countries without restriction. Most (58%) of the respondents in Germany thought that people from Muslim countries should be accepted but with restriction. In East

Germany, every third citizen (32%) agreed that people from Muslim countries should not be accepted, in West Germany the rate of agreement is 3% lower.” (Thalhammer, 2001: 6).

1.3 What do the Eurobarometer Survey Results Tell Us?

The aforementioned survey results convincingly reveal that xenophobia and racism were on the rise during the last 15 years of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century in Western Europe. These surveys were administered based on concerns raised in the European Parliament; more than 109 Members signed a proposal to establish a Committee of Inquiry to examine the rise of racism in Europe. The empirical data collected through these surveys provide a reliable framework demonstrating that the concerns expressed regarding the rise of racism and xenophobia were not merely a conjecture but have a justified basis.

In this context, based on the credible secondary data collected in a scientific manner through the surveys conducted by the competent social research institutions under the auspices of the European Union (a supra national organization), we can acknowledge that xenophobia and racism were increasing in the last part of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century in Western Europe. Furthermore, based on this acknowledgment, we consider the rising xenophobia and racism in that time span to be a generally accepted understanding or the “conventional wisdom” of that period.⁵

⁵ I consider the term “conventional wisdom” in the meaning of ideas or explanations generally accepted as true by the public and experts as used by John Kenneth Galbraith in his book *Affluent Society*. The second chapter of that book, titled “The Concept of the Conventional Wisdom” (Fortieth Anniversary Edition. A Mariner Book- Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), states: “Familiarity may breed contempt in some areas of human behavior, but in the field of social ideas it is the touchstone of acceptability. Because familiarity is such an important test of acceptability, the acceptable ideas have great stability. They are highly predictable. It will be convenient to have a name for the ideas which are esteemed at any time for their acceptability, and it should be a term that emphasizes this predictability. I shall refer to these ideas henceforth as the Conventional Wisdom.”

As the aforementioned studies demonstrate, xenophobia and racism as concepts are considered inseparably linked. For example, as previously noted, the comprehensive report prepared by the Committee on Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia of the European Parliament in 1990 refers to the Eurobarometer survey on racism and xenophobia, and underlines that “the survey confirms the seriousness of racism and/or xenophobia in Europe.” Noteworthy, the European Parliament, in the aforementioned sentence, refers to xenophobia and racism as “racism and/or xenophobia” rather than separate and distinct concepts. The grammatical conjunction “and/or” is used in legal terminology to mean “either or both.” In this context, the European Parliament, by using this formulation, seemingly considered racism and xenophobia as interchangeable concepts. This approach may offer us a perspective to understand how the relationship between xenophobia and racism in Western Europe in the 1990s was addressed in the international forum that had a guiding influence in Europe.

1.4. Basic Premise and Key Questions of This Study

Conventional wisdom suggests that although they are distinct phenomena, xenophobia and racism are overlapping concepts. Racism is considered by some scholars as the “most closely related—and often interchangeably used—concept with xenophobia” (Yakushko, 2018: 16). In the context of this condensed and overlapping relationship, some scholars assert that “xenophobia may be a starting point upon which racism can be constructed” (Fredrickson, 2015: 6). These statements inform us that a close interrelationship and interaction exists between racism and xenophobia. To better analyze and understand the nesting character of these two concepts, in the framework of a general introduction, briefly considering the asynchronous evolution of racism and xenophobia as distinct phenomena is worthwhile.

The last quarter of the 19th century—as well as the first half and last decade of the 20th century—are of importance and constitute “critical junctures” for the history and evolution of racism and xenophobia.⁶ Social Darwinism, the eugenics movement, establishment of new empires like Germany, “Scramble for Africa,” rapid expansion of imperialism, and aggressive forms of colonialism are notable developments in these periods that contributed to increasing anti-Black and antisemitic forms of racism.

At the dawn of the 20th century, African American professor of sociology William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, in his 1903 essay “Of the Dawn of Freedom,” conjectured that “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line, the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea” (Du Bois, 2007: 15). Regarding his own work, he wrote “Herein lie buried many things which if read with patience may show the strange meaning of being black here in the dawning of the Twentieth Century... for the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line” (Du Bois, 2007: 3). Du Bois’s conjecture was found to be true; racism has precipitated significant problems and pain to humanity.

Ninety years after Du Bois wrote these lines, historian Eric Hobsbawm stated that “We live in an era when all other human relations and values are in crisis, or at least somewhere on a journey toward unknown and uncertain destinations, xenophobia looks like becoming the mass ideology of the 20th century *fin de siècle*” (Hobsbawm & Kertzer, 1992: 8). He further noted that “Moreover, as I already observed, the social

⁶ The term “critical juncture” was first used by Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan in 1967 as a “crucial juncture” in their study on Western European party systems. They stated that “Their model seeks to reduce the bewildering varieties of empirical party systems to a set of ordered sequences of decisions and developments at three crucial junctures in the history of each nation.” Later, it gained importance in comparative-historical analysis through Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier’s (2002) book on modes of labor incorporation in Latin America. In this book, they define the critical juncture as being “defined as a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis), and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies.”

mechanisms which assigned each group different and non-competitive niches are eroding or are politically unacceptable. The relatively sudden rise of xenophobic parties, or of the xenophobic issue in politics, is largely due to this.” (Hobsbawm & Kertzer, 1992: 7).

In comparison to the last quarter of the nineteenth and almost all the 20th century (except its last decade), racism is not the concept frequently used in Western Europe to describe discrimination in the 21st century. Instead, beginning in the 1990s, xenophobia has become a more commonly used concept to explain discriminatory approaches and actions. A well-known online dictionary named xenophobia as word of the year in 2016. (Dictionary.com, 2016; Steinmetz, 2016). The dictionary claimed that the increase in searches for the term could be related to the Syrian refugee crisis, refugee issues surrounding the Brexit debate in the United Kingdom, populism rhetoric used in the 2016 US Presidential election campaign, and attacks on foreigners in South Africa. Accordingly, some authors have stated that the term that most accurately captures the spirit of the age (zeitgeist) is “xenophobia” (Daley, 2016).

After the Second World War, in the first Nuremberg trials conducted by the International Military Tribunal of allies, members of the Nazi leadership received heavy sentences, including death and imprisonment for life. Through the punishment for their crimes, heavy penalties were indirectly imposed on them for the racism that formed the foundation of the Nazi party. Antisemitic practices and the horrendous Holocaust of the Nazi regime won the deep hatred of most of the world population. In such an environment, racism was ethically and morally condemned. For example, in Western Europe and especially in Germany, racism has become a hated concept because of its past sins. Attempts have been made to explain these sins to new generations through education. Moreover, efforts have been exerted to remove the

term racism from the agenda as much as possible and exterminate its vestiges. George M. Fredricson, while referring to “white supremacist ideological and institutional development in the southern United States between the 1890s and 1950s, and in South Africa between the 1910s and 1980s,” and horrendous Nazi Germany practices between 1933 and 1945, stated that “all of these racist regimes have been overthrown, and the ideologies on which they were based have apparently been discredited” (Fredricson, 2015: 99–100). After making this assessment, Fredrickson raised the fundamental question of whether the demise of these regimes “also means that the virus of racism has been exterminated or that it has merely mutated into new and still-virulent forms” (Fredricson, 2015: 9).

Writer and activist Ambalavaner Sivanandan (2008: 168), answered this question in 2001:

“But the other side of the coin of “the fear or hatred of strangers” is the defense and preservation of “our people,” our way of life, our standard of living, our “race.” If it is xenophobia, it is – in the way it denigrates and reifies people before segregating and/or expelling them – a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism, except that it is not color-coded. It is a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial countries, but at the newer categories of the displaced and dispossessed whites, who are beating at Western Europe’s doors, the Europe that displaced them in the first place. It is racism in substance but xeno in form -a racism that is meted out to impoverished strangers even if they are white. It is xeno-racism.”

These brief explanations concerning the evolution of racism and xenophobia bring us to the question that needs investigation: Has the traditional or old form of racism based on the anti-Black and antisemitic rhetoric changed, and, if so, has it transformed into new forms in the 21st century?

Scholarly explanations suggest that racism can evolve over time and adapt itself to new conditions. As mentioned above, Fredricson (2015:100) questions whether “the virus of racism has been exterminated or that it has merely mutated into new and still-

virulent forms.” Leading scholars on racism agree with historian George Mosse, best known for his studies of Nazism, that racism represents a flexible and constantly changing “scavenger ideology, which gains its power from its ability to select and utilize ideas and values from other sets of ideas and beliefs in specific sociohistorical contexts” (Mosse, 1985: 234; Solomos, 1996: 213). Further, racism is considered by certain scholars as “a dynamic process, a set of beliefs and practices that is embedded in a particular historical context, a particular social formation, and is thus continuously undergoing change, a plastic or chameleon-like phenomenon which constantly finds new forms of political, social, cultural or linguistic expression” (MacMaster, 2001: 2). In fact, the changing morphology of contemporary racism and shift in its meaning relative to the 20th century make it essential to reflect more thoroughly on the relationship between contemporary xenophobia in Western Europe and racism.

The study, in this general context, attempts to answer the following two key questions:

- 1) What constitutes the conceptual bases for these terms?
- 2) How do people report on their experiences on these concepts?

1.5. Research Design and Methodology

I consider the methodology as the basic rationale of the research, the perspective through which the analyses are performed. In short, the methodology is a general strategy, “the systematic procedure through which to organize research” and a “contextual framework” that summarizes the way the research is conducted. In this general framework, I regard the method as “the functional aspect of the research” (Grierson & Brearly, 2009: 5). It is a research instrument, a tool or means for data collection (Howell, 2013: ix). In the context of methodological issues, I consider it useful to start by explaining my research topic selection process.

1.5.1. Thoughts on Topic Selection and Topic Selection Process

As King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 14) suggested, “the specific topic that a social scientist studies may have a personal and idiosyncratic origin.” In fact, all scientific research begins with observation and subsequent rationalization of past observations. In the observation phase, “we observe a social phenomenon, event, or behavior that interests us,” whereas in the rationalization phase, “we try to make sense of the observed phenomenon, event, or behavior by logically connecting the different pieces of the puzzle that we observe” (Bhattacharjee, 2012: 20). King et al. (1994: 15) suggested, in reference to Phillips Shively, that “research projects in the social sciences should pose a question relating to a topic that is consequential for political, social, or economic life—for understanding something that significantly affects many people’s lives, or for understanding and predicting events that might be harmful or beneficial.” Shively (2017: 11) states that “research problems should be chosen that are of real importance for contemporary policy.”

However, Barbara Geddes (2003: 28) states that “curiosity, fascination, and indignation should guide the choice of research topic.” She further expresses her critical ideas concerning the five standard pieces of advice articulated by King et al. (1994). These authors advise researchers to pick topics that are important worldwide and that contribute to an “identifiable scholarly literature” (King et al., 1994: 15–16). Geddes draws attention to how these suggestions consider a priori “the relevant literature really does contain a considerable accumulation of theory and stylized facts.” (Geddes, 2003: 29). However, she asserts that “the literature on some subjects contains only a few arguments generally accepted as true; many controversies in which the hypotheses on both sides lack both clarity and strong empirical support; and large amounts of opinion and conjecture, unsupported by systematic evidence but

nevertheless often referred to as theory.” She asserts that “... good research in the field is more often motivated by curiosity about the world and intuition about cause-and-effect relationships.” Geddes (2003: 29) underlines that “contrary to the advice about looking for holes in the literature, good research in the comparative field often begins either with an intense but unfocused curiosity about why some event or process has happened.”

During the first six months of 2017, I conducted preliminary studies to redefine the subject of my thesis and, broadly speaking, I was interested in studying “the phenomenon of discrimination.” In this context, I was contemplating a study on the issue of discrimination against the disabled and older adults. During the preliminary literature review process, I noticed the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) report published in 2017 concerning the developments in 2016 on various discrimination issues. The report drew attention to the “strong surge of nationalistic populism, often generating and fueling xenophobic discourse and creating an atmosphere in which hate speech, and ultimately violence, were able to thrive; and the response of several member states to the continuation of Islamist terror attacks that affected Europe over the course of the year.”⁷ In this context, xenophobia and the resulting violence, hate speech were presented as the main sources of difficulties, which significantly affect numerous people’s lives, especially the lives of immigrants, refugees, guest workers, and foreigners living in Western Europe. I considered that xenophobia was accepted as the thought pattern or prevailing paradigm of the time reflecting the *zeitgeist* of the period.

⁷ CRI (2017) Annual Report on ECRI’s Activities covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2016. 35, p. 7. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/annual-report-on-ecri-s-activities-covering-the-period-from-1-january-/16808ae6d6>

In this context, I consider the term “paradigm”⁸ as “worldviews that encompasses all ways of experiencing and thinking about the world, including beliefs about morals, values, and aesthetics” (Morgan, 2007: 50). This paradigm or worldview also provides us a chance to observe, if any, the “anomalies” that are incompatible with the prevailing paradigm. This observation may pave the way for questioning the existing worldview, investigating the possible changes in the prevailing paradigm, exploring the nature of the change, and unpacking the puzzle (Kuhn, 1996: 52–65).

The presentation of xenophobia as the main culprit of these negative developments directed me to investigate whether the surge in national populism was the only reason for the increase in xenophobia and xenophobic discourse, and to investigate the true nature of xenophobia in Western Europe. Hence, I developed research questions to investigate these observations.

1.5.2. Case Selection and Defining Variables in the Framework of Research Design

Within the small-N study context, I have identified Germany and Austria as case study countries. I should stress that knowing the common languages of these two countries has an impact on selecting them as case countries. They have a shared ethnic identity, and their national identity is similar to a certain degree. In small-N research, a certain degree of unit homogeneity, at first glance, may be considered advantageous for obtaining smooth results. One can defend the view that there is a complete homogeneity between the researched units. Such a result could have no value,

⁸ Thomas Kuhn gave the popularity to the term “paradigm” by using the “paradigm shift” concept in his seminal book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962/1996). He describes the term “paradigm” as closely related to “normal science,” thus suggesting that “some accepted examples of actual scientific practice-examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research.” (p. 10)

especially for theory development. Even for research conducted mainly for heuristic purposes, such a result is usually not desirable for scientific purposes. Regarding this, George and Bennett (2005: 83) state that “cases should also be selected to provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem.” Although my cases were selected intentionally, I did not start by performing a calculated assessment for variation at the end of the research. Nevertheless, I did arrive at some meaningful variation between the two research units.

In my research, I selected the “level of xenophobia” as the dependent variable. Considering the difficulties of studying a vague concept—xenophobia—as a dependent variable, I conceptualized xenophobia and tried to apply it into an operational format. King et al. (1994: 141) suggest, as “purist advice,” that researchers should “always select on explanatory variables, never on dependent variables.” Geddes (1990: 131) further highlights this point, stating that “most graduate students learn in the statistics courses forced upon them that selection on the dependent variable is forbidden.” She, however, also expresses the view that “This is not to say that studies of cases selected on the dependent variable have no place at all in comparative politics. They are useful for digging into the details of how phenomena come about and for developing insights. They identify plausible causal variables. They bring to light anomalies that current theories cannot accommodate” (Geddes, 1990: 149).

In fact, my research can be compared to a study that corresponds to the objectives of heuristic⁹ purpose, i.e., studies that are not considered a part of the theory-building process and that aims “to arrive at a preliminary theoretical construct” (Eckstein, 2000: 137). The relevant literature suggests that heuristic case studies may “identify new

⁹ According to Eckstein, heuristic means “serving to find out.”

variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths” (George & Bennett, 2005: 75). Using narrow thought and research templates when using scientific research to examine social life may risk the elimination of creative thinking on social matters. I believe that considering the benefits of heuristic understanding in social science research would be useful for exploring a “preliminary theoretical construct” that may constitute “a slim clue to a valid general model” (Eckstein, 2000: 137). A heuristic approach, in this regard, can also contribute to disciplined-configurative studies that normally passively apply general laws or expressions in the literature with new findings that may emerge as a result of creative thinking and imagination.

1.5.3. Methods Employed in Research

A literature review in this framework is important in terms of guiding research questions or hypotheses (Creswell & Creswell, 2009: 68). The literature review in such a study may have comprehensive content and can also be used as a deductive framework for research questions or hypotheses (Creswell & Creswell, 2009: 68). This study examines concepts and reflects on how theory shifts loosely in relation to how the social researcher collects data (Bryman, 2012: 161). The study is based on analysis of secondary data on xenophobia and racism, and the analysis of interview data with a sample of highly educated Turks with a migrant background living in Austria and Germany. The interviewees have been recruited on the basis of Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS), and constitutes a select group that exemplifies represents the population of highly integrated individuals in Germany and Austria.

In the secondary data analysis, the data are collected by other researchers or institutions, including international ones (Bryman, 2012: 311). The secondary data analysis is based on Eurobarometer survey results, reports by international

organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) dataset on hate crimes, along with data collected by other researchers or publicly available third-party data. The OSCE dataset includes information on hate incidents in 44 participating States, as reported by 178 civil society groups, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and OSCE missions.

As per the information published on the European Union official website, “The standard Eurobarometer was established in 1973. Each survey consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country. Reports are published twice yearly.” Special Eurobarometer surveys are conducted along with standard ones. Special Eurobarometer reports contain detailed studies on a particular subject and these reports are included in Standard Eurobarometer studies. As mentioned earlier, in the context of this study, the most relevant Eurobarometer surveys are “Special Racism and Xenophobia report of 1989” and “Racism and Xenophobia: Human rights and immigration in the European Union report of 1997”—submitted at the Closing Conference of the European Year Against Racism in 1997.

Second, as mentioned earlier, semi-structured interviews were conducted on the basis of RDS. Germany and Austria were identified as case countries. Both countries have had high rates of incidents of racism reported. Germany has approximately 5 million immigrants of Turkish descent (Pini Kemppainen et al. , 2008:94) and Austria has approximately 400,000 Turkish descent immigrants (Ongen, 2011:3).

For the sample, considering that evaluating the interaction between racism and xenophobia requires more in-depth knowledge of meanings of these two concepts, a sample consisting of individuals with the highest educational attainment level

(graduate and postgraduate) was preferred. It is assumed that such a group is least likely to experience xenophobia and racism due to having highly integrated to the host societies and is able to evaluate socially sensitive issues by referring to adequate levels of abstraction and reasoning while describing their experience. The sample comprised of highly educated immigrant background individuals of Turkish origin, which also constituted a hard-to-reach group.

All ethics criteria for this research involving human participants were met. Participants are adult individuals with graduate and postgraduate degrees. In the recruitment process, confirmations of the participants' educational status and positions were made. All participants requested that their personal information and participation in the interview be kept confidential. Accordingly, the participants were assured that their personal data would remain confidential. Interviews were based on a standardized questionnaire consisting of 17 questions. The questions were prepared in three languages (English, German, and Turkish) and mainly focused on the existence and degree of xenophobia and racism in the respondents' countries; the relationship between xenophobia and racism; and the presence and degree of verbal and physical violence against immigrants, asylum seekers, and foreigners. In this context, Likert Scale¹⁰ responses were requested for some questions (Bryman, 2012: 66). While most interviewees answered the questions freely in a detailed and occasionally passionate manner, others preferred to answer the questions in writing. Interviewees included female and male respondents of various ages. Due attention has been paid to balance the number of male and female interviewees as far as possible.

¹⁰ According to Bryman, "The Likert scale, named after Rensis Likert, who developed the method. The Likert scale is essentially a multiple-indicator or multiple-item measure of a set of attitudes relating to a particular area. The goal of the Likert scale is to measure intensity of feelings about the area in question."

The numerical values of the samples of Germany and Austria, the number of female and male respondents, the education level of the interviewees (undergraduate-graduate) and age groups are summarized below:

- Interviews were conducted with thirty-four individuals in Germany.
- Twelve of the interviewees were female and twenty-two were male.
- Twenty-two of the interviewees have graduate level education and twelve have post-graduate education.
- Twenty-seven of the respondents are in the age group of 24-44, and seven of them are in the age group of 45-65.
- The number of interviewees in Austria is thirty.
- Eight of the interviewees were female and twenty—two were male.
- Fifteen of the interviewees have graduate level education and other fifteen have post-graduate education.
- Twenty-six of the respondents are in the age group of 24-44, and four of them are in the age group of 45-65.

1.6. Plan of Study

The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II explains the analytical and theoretical framework of the study. It provides an overview of the immigration phenomenon in general and explains its influence on Western European public opinion. Next, it examines the lexical meaning of xenophobia along with its multi-dimensional structure and the notion of political xenophobia. It develops dependent, independent, mediating, and moderating variables and highlights the key research questions. In addition to explaining the traditional theories about xenophobia, this chapter provides exclusive information on new racism, cultural racism, and differentialist racism discussions. It also includes a detailed discussion of the

interrelationship of racism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia. This chapter explains the concept of transduction and introduces the novel approach of metamorphosis of racism into new forms.

Chapter III introduces detailed information on the rarely examined normative framework of racism and xenophobia developed within the United Nations. In this context, Chapter III involves a rarely used approach to the evolution of the concepts of xenophobia and racism, and brings to attention the important role played by the UN as well as NGOs and activists to form the conceptual framework of xenophobia and racism. Chapter IV focuses on Germany and details the rise of xenophobia in this country at the turn of the 20th century.

Chapter V discusses the formation of national identity and the Nazi past of Austria and explains the developments regarding xenophobia in this country. This chapter also includes comparisons between Austria and Germany in terms of how extreme xenophobia developed over time.

Chapter VI presents the results of the research conducted to generate original data to help explain the conceptual transformation of xenophobia.

Chapter VII includes conclusions along with the final remarks.

CHAPTER II

ANALYTICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Xenophobia as Concept

Xenophobia is broadly defined as “the dislike, fear, or hatred against those perceived as strangers or foreigners.” Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary describes xenophobia as “fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that is strange or foreign,” while the Oxford Dictionary explains the term as “intense dislike or fear of foreigners or strangers.” If we look back to the old Greek origin and etymology of the word xenophobia, we find that “xenophobic individuals are literally stranger fearing.” Xenophobia is a combination of two Greek terms, and the word *xenos* can be translated as “stranger or guest.” The second term *phobos* means either “fear or flight and is the ultimate source of all English terms using phobia.” (Hornby & Cowie, 1989; Merriam-Webster, 2001: 1483)

According to Encyclopedia of Multicultural Psychology, the word xenophobia “was first used in a novel by Anatole France in 1901 and first appeared in a French dictionary in 1906. Several years later, it began appearing in English-language dictionaries.” In one of her articles, eminent sociologist Mabel Berezin explains that

the term xenophobia came into literary works thorough Anatole France's novel *Monsieur Bergeret à Paris* and was used in the French *Nouveau Larousse Illustré* for the first time in 1906. According to Berezin (2006: 275), "the Dreyfus affair fueled the development of the term."

These rather old lexical definitions highlight that "the term has been historically used to emphasize a sense of fright of outsiders. More recent definitions suggest that the fear of foreigners and their impact is linked with ethnocentrism, which is characterized by the attitude that one's own group or culture is superior to others" (Yakushko, 2008: 8).

It should be underlined that "there is no universally agreed-upon definition" of the term xenophobia. Although it is a word used daily, "it is an ambiguous and contested term in popular and scholarly debates" (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009; N. Lerner, 2002: 60; Misago, Freemantle & Landau, 2015: 17; Yakushko, 2008: 43–44). Considering more recent definitions, Berezin (2006: 273) defines xenophobia as the "fear of difference embodied in persons or groups." For Yakushko (2008: 43), "Xenophobia is a form of attitudinal, affective, and behavioral prejudice toward immigrants and those perceived as foreign" and a "psychological state of hostility or fear toward outsiders."

Extensive academic studies on xenophobia and its relations with racism exist in the context of the bitter experience of apartheid in South Africa. Some of these studies provide similar definitions of the term. In one of them, Nyamnjoh (2006: 5) defines xenophobia as "the intense dislike, hatred or fear of others perceived to be strangers." Bronwyn Harris (2002: 170), after referring to the common definition (dislike of foreigners), views xenophobia as "negative attitude toward foreigners, a dislike, a fear

or a hatred.” Kenneth Tafira (2011) took as basis May 11, 2008, the day when violence against black African immigrants erupted in South Africa. The violence had begun in the Johannesburg township of Alexandra and spread to other areas, leaving 62 people dead, hundreds injured, and thousands displaced. When discussing this, Tafira broadly defined xenophobia as “an intense dislike, hatred or fear of those perceived to be strangers” (Harris, 2002: 169–189; Nyamnjoh, 2006: 5; Tafira, 2011: 114–21).

It should be mentioned that there are numerous definitions of the term “xenophobia” in various sources, which repeat in different forms its dictionary meaning. However, most definitions, instead of comprehensively defining and analyzing the term by referring to its constituent elements and main features, merely adhere to its ordinary dictionary meaning.

If we consider the above-mentioned definitions, the key words for the term xenophobia are foreigner, stranger, fear, hatred, and dislike. The words foreigner and stranger have fluid and flexible natures, but both explain societal conditions. For example, Marotto (2017) explains that although the concepts of foreigner, stranger, and other are similar, they are not identical. When we speak of a stranger as a foreigner, they are usually people that we know and see. In that sense, per Marotto, a “foreigner is an embodied stranger” (2017: 10). The “other”, however, has no name or face. Marotto (2017:10), refers to how Kearney and Semonovitch (2011: 6) describe the relationship among these three concepts as follows:

“The Stranger occupies the threshold between the Other and the Foreigner. It is a hinge that conceals and reveals, pointing outward and inward at the same time. Foreigner is the stranger we see: The Other is the Stranger we do not see.

Two sides of the same visage-visible and invisible, inner and outer, immanent and transcendent.”

The words fear, hatred, and dislike exhibit substantially similar characteristics of psychological orientation. Thus, for the pertinent definition of xenophobia, it is more appropriate not only to focus on its psychological or sociological aspects, but also to merge the sociological and psychological concepts and create an interdisciplinary definition of the term. In this respect, one of the pertinent definitions of xenophobia is included in the joint paper prepared by the International Labor Office (ILO), IOM, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in consultation with the Office of the UNHCR for the submission to the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance of Durban (IOM, ILO, & OHCHR, 2001). According to that paper:

“[R]acism and xenophobia are distinct phenomena, although they often overlap. While racism generally implies distinction based on difference in physical characteristics, such as skin coloration, hair type, facial features, etc., xenophobia denotes behavior specifically based on the perception that the other is foreign to or originates from outside the community or nation. Xenophobia is the intense dislike or fear of strangers or people from other countries and it is an attitudinal orientation of hostility against non-natives in a given population” (IOM, ILO, & OHCHR, 2001: 2)

The ILO, IOM, and OHCHR joint paper underlines how the definition of xenophobia and its differentiation from racism and racial discrimination are still evolving concepts. In this context, it refers to a regional Preparatory Meetings for the World Conference, which suggests the following formulations for racism and xenophobia:

“• Racism is an ideological construct that assigns a certain race and/or ethnic group to a position of power over others on the basis of physical and cultural attributes, as well as economic wealth, involving hierarchical relations wherein the “superior” race exercise domination and control over others.”

“• Xenophobia describes attitudes, prejudices and behavior that reject, exclude, and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society, or national identity” (IOM, ILO, & OHCRH, 2001: 2)

In fact, the above-mentioned suggested definition for xenophobia, as per my archive review, was prepared by the Workshop Group on Migration and Trafficking and adopted by The Asia-Pacific NGO Meeting for the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Tehran on February 18, 2001. (Workshop Group on Migration and Trafficking, 2001).

According to a UNDP research paper titled “Xenophobia, International Migration and Human Development,” prepared by Jonathan Crush and Sujata Ramachandran (2009) (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009), the prejudice mentioned in the above definition of xenophobia may “extend toward non-citizens and other marginal groups. It can also be directed toward other ethnic minorities, including third or fourth-generation descendants of immigrants” (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009: 5). The said paper elaborates that xenophobia:

- “Consists of highly negative perceptions and practices that discriminate against non-citizen groups based on their foreign origin or nationality. It affects all categories of migrants, immigrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers. Different migrant groups may, however, experience xenophobia to varying degrees

depending on their cultural, racial, and ethnic make-up, class composition, and migrant status.”

- “Is perpetuated through a dynamic public rhetoric that actively stigmatizes and vilifies some or all migrant groups by playing up the ‘threat’ posed by their presence and making them scapegoats for social problems.”
- “Is not simply an attitudinal orientation hostile and skewed perceptions of migrant groups generally going hand in hand with discriminatory practices and poor treatment of such groups. Acts of violence, aggression and brutality toward migrant groups represent extreme and escalated forms of xenophobia.”
- “Is not a ‘natural’ response by native populations to the presence of foreigners like racism and nationalism. It is a social and political phenomenon that contributes to the marginalization and/or exclusion of migrant groups in social and national settings.”
- “Is crucially linked to nation-building and nationalism, in particular its aggressive forms” (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009: 6).

The definition of the term xenophobia mentioned in the joint paper of ILO, IOM, and OHCHR reflects an internationally accepted character and seems the most pertinent definition for indicating the distinctive features of xenophobia. It provides us with a proper basis for explaining and analyzing the features that constitute and distinguish xenophobia.

2.2. Xenophobia as a Multi-Dimensional Construct

In fact, “scientific research requires operational definitions that define constructs in terms of how they will be empirically measured” (Bhattacharjee, 2012: 11). The

above-mentioned dictionary definitions of xenophobia are not operational. We are, therefore, faced with a problem of producing an operational definition of xenophobia. As underlined above, despite its widespread usage, xenophobia is still not a well-established concept and has an evolving character. (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009; N. Lerner, 2002: 60; Misago et al., 2015; Yakushko, 2008: 43–46).

Trying to measure abstract concepts with concrete measurement units is one of the most challenging aspects of social science research (Bhattacharjee, 2012). There is no generally accepted measurement scale for xenophobia. For example, an important study on the measurement of political attitudes and behaviors, titled “Measures of Political Attitudes” (Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1999) does not include a scale to measure xenophobia. However, it includes a chapter on Racial Attitudes (Robinson et al., 1999: chap. 6).

To find a measurement unit for xenophobia, analyzing the components of this multi-dimensional construct seems most suitable. According to the above-mentioned definition, xenophobia has three components: attitude, prejudice, and behavior. Prejudice, which is not measurable, is not suitable for working on the measurable proxies. Attitude, however, could be measurable to a certain degree if we ask respondents direct questions regarding their thinking on specific issues. For example, Eurobarometer surveys ask respondents questions to gather information about their perceptions, attitudes, knowledge, and awareness on specific subjects, such as discrimination in the European Union or racism and xenophobia. As explained in detail in the first Chapter of this study, according to the Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no 47.1, which was conducted in Spring 1997 on racism and xenophobia in Europe, nearly 33% of those interviewed openly described themselves as “quite racist” or “very racist.”

According to the EU statement regarding the survey, “Many of the declared racists were in fact xenophobic” (Brika et al., 1997).

The last behavioral component which seems more meaningful to me in terms of developing a variable that can be a measurable proxy to xenophobia. Relevant literature describes human behavior as “potential and expressed capacity for physical, mental and social activity during the phases of human life” (R.M. Lerner, Kagan, & Bornstein, 2019).

In this sense, we can utilize the behavior component of the definition or description of xenophobia through its social activity sub-component. It is possible to connect social activity with the concept of social action. Max Weber explains the nature of social action as follows:

“In the sense adopted here, [human behavior] means the science whose object is to interpret the meaning of social action and thereby give a causal explanation of the way in which the action proceeds and the effects which it produces. By action in this definition is meant human behavior when and to the extent that the agent or agents see it as subjectively meaningful, the behavior may be either internal or external, and may consist in the agent’s doing something, omitting to do something, or having something done to him. By “social” action is meant an action in which the meaning intended by the agent or agents involves a relation to another person’s behavior and in which that relation determines the way in which the action proceeds.” (Weber, 1978: 7)

Violence is described as “an act of physical force that causes or is intended to cause harm” and “a relatively common type of human behavior that occurs throughout the

world” (Jacquin, 2006: 1307, 1309). Certain scholars state that “violence is neither a result of innate aggressiveness nor of externally induced ‘social ills’ but is something that requires intensive social action” (Malesevic, 2010: 3). In this context, I believe that aggression, violence, and collective violence fall into the scope of human behavior concepts that are relevant for scholarly studies on xenophobia.

2.3. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Xenophobia

Xenophobia has been central to political and social developments and has been the topic of various studies since the 1990s. However, it is difficult to claim that xenophobia has a proper conceptualization and operational definition. In this context, it is also hard to assert that the rise of xenophobia in Western European societies after the 1990s has been examined and analyzed comprehensively by centering xenophobia in research supported by scientifically collected data.

It is possible to state that the research examining the rise of xenophobia in Western Europe could have been conducted during certain periods by centering racism, immigration, violent acts against immigrants/foreigners, and strengthening of extreme-right parties in the study and referring to xenophobia as a side issue or an issue that was related to the central theme of the research. The theoretical explanations for the rise of xenophobia, especially in Western Europe, are limited. Most scholarly studies regarding the rise of extreme-right parties in Western Europe, immigration and xenophobia are considered as causal effects or independent variables. It is rare that scholarship regards xenophobia as an outcome, or dependent variable. This preference can be considered the result of failing to consider xenophobia as the research focus.

The secondary data analysis of the previously mentioned survey findings, by logical inference, points to a mutual interaction between the presence of “others,” who are

called immigrant, minority, or foreign groups, and the level of xenophobia in Western Europe. In one way or another, they all constitute a non-national or non-indigenous group of foreigners. Even if their purposes of arrival at—and presence in—a certain host Western European country may differ, they are grouped under the general and inclusive title of immigrant, and the impact of their presence on the host societies are usually analyzed through references to their status as immigrants.

Based on the observation that many studies tend to correlate rise of xenophobia and immigration, analysis of secondary data suggests that increased rate of immigration leads to an increased level of xenophobia in Western European countries.

There are several studies on the nexus between violent actions against foreigners and immigration. For instance, Braun and Koopmans (2014: 632) state that “the violent protests fundamentally altered the landscape of immigration politics in the reunified republic (unified Germany is mentioned) by fueling a fierce public debate on immigration and creating a momentum for restrictive immigration policies that subsequently lowered the influx of new immigrants.” In this context, I consider the number of violent events/actions against immigrants/foreigners as the mediating variable for understanding the link between xenophobia and immigration.

Koopmans, in a study on racial violence in 1996, investigated the causes of the rise in extreme-right and racist violence in Western Europe by referring to the available data on these types of violence in Germany, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. He stated that “Germany belongs to the countries with the highest levels of violence.” (Koopmans, 1996: 185). Koopmans also stated that Germany “reaches the highest level, with more than eight acts of heavy violence per million inhabitants in 1992” (Koopmans, 1996: 192–193) and has by far

the highest number of deaths in racist and extreme-right violence from 1988–1993, which he considered as “hardly an unexpected result” (Koopmans, 1996: 193). In this context, he developed an “opportunity model, which emphasizes the role of political elites in shaping mobilization opportunities for social movements” (Koopmans, 1996: 185). Koopmans stated that his findings supported the “analysis of the relationship between the development of extreme-right racist violence and the political debate on asylum legislation in Germany “ (Koopmans, 1996: 185). In another article, Koopmans and Olzak (2004a: 199) explore the link between violence and public discourse and argue that “public discourse significantly shapes the targets and the temporal and spatial patterns of radical right violence in Germany.”

In this framework, I consider public and elite discourse (in short, “discourse”) as a moderating variable in the genesis of violent events/actions against immigrants/foreigners.

The following nomological chart shows the relationships between variables.




Figure 1: Nomological chart of constructs and variables

Since I consider the “rate of immigration” as the independent variable and “violent events” as the mediating variable, these two variables merit further elaboration along with racism and right-wing extremism.

Western European countries, especially since the early 1990s, have been grappling with problems pertaining to immigration. The focus of this study is how immigrants' are referred to as people who are non-native and non-indigenous.

Europe has a rich immigration background; more than 40 million people had emigrated from Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Hatton and Williamson, 1992). This movement could be considered part of the flow of the European-based population from colonizing to colonized parts of the world (Geddes and Scholten, 2016: 8). However, this mass migration wave dropped off considerably because of the First World War and was halted by the Second World War. Some scholars, therefore, consider this a period of limited migration (Massey et al., 2005: 2). After 1945, a profound reversal of human movement occurred between Western Europe and overseas former colonies, causing a period of post-industrial migration. Instead of outward movement from Europe to overseas colonies, there was a flow of immigration from developing countries to Europe (Massey et al., 2005: 2; Moch, 2003: 108). Etienne Balibar (1991: 21), while examining Neo-Racism, stated that "The new racism is a racism of the era of 'decolonization,' of the reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises and the division of humanity within a single political space."

In the post Second World War period, in addition to migration from old colonies to the former colonial powers, migration of guest workers from the European periphery to Western Europe and mass movements of European refugees at the end of the war (including significant numbers from Germany and Poland) began. Refugees and asylum seekers who left their countries because of violent conflicts could be considered an important category of migration to Western Europe (Castles & de Haas, 2014: 102–103).

These large-scale migration flows to Western Europe in the post-1945 period, especially after the 1980s, became one of the top agenda items for Western European governments and societies. The inflow of asylum seekers and refugees originated mainly from Asia and Africa increased significantly in 1990s. This increase corresponded to the period of the dissolution of the political regimes in the former socialist states in Eastern Europe. Therefore, some Western European countries became more restrictive toward the immigration of asylum seekers and refugees in the 1990s, including Germany (Zimmermann, 2005: 5).

Together with immigration, one of the most frequently pronounced phenomena in the Western Europe context regarding the negative attitudes and hostile behaviors against the immigrant groups since the 1990s is xenophobia. There has been a rise in discrimination and violence directed against immigrant groups, such as refugees and non-nationals, by extremist groups in Western Europe beginning in the 1990s. Xenophobia is again the most important type of discrimination, which came to the forefront during that period. References to the phenomenon of xenophobia can be seen in almost all scholarly studies on extreme-right activities and discriminatory attitudes and behaviors toward migrant groups in Western Europe.

The historical development of racism and cruel practices under the Nazi and Apartheid regimes are examples of racism that were morally and legally condemned after the Second World War. We can further add to this list racial segregation practices in the United States, which were legally ended in the 1960s and eugenic sterilization programs in Scandinavian countries such as Sweden that had continued until the 1970s. After the Second World War and Nuremberg trials, in my judgment, even the using the word racism was ethically and morally condemned by the large segments of Western European societies. In this type of international medium, an environment

suitable for the social transformation of racism into xenophobia matured. I term this transformation process “social metamorphosis,” which can be described as a change in the nature or inherent character of social constructs such as racism. This social metamorphosis process can be explained by applying the biological concept of transduction, which envisages the transfer of genetic material from one organism to another by a viral agent to social facts. Acts of violence pushed xenophobia to extreme ends and that a form of extreme xenophobia similar to violent racism emerged in Western Europe after the 1990s, especially in Germany., especially in Germany.

Certain scholars consider violence a slippery term and a contested concept (Haan, 2008). As noted earlier, violence is considered a “relatively common type of human behavior that occurs throughout the world” (Jacquin, 2006: 1309). In numerous scholarly studies dealing with the phenomenon of immigration in Europe, there are references to racism and xenophobia and, in this respect, violent racist and xenophobic acts and incidents toward individuals and communities.

Xenophobia and extreme-right ideology are closely related. Koopmans (2000, 2001) identified xenophobia as the main component of right-wing extremism, and stated that engagement in right-wing extremist activities was, to a great extent, a function of the huge influx of foreigners into Germany in the 1990s. Chapin confirmed this by noting that “...the new right parties attract support because they focus on specific issues (i.e., immigration).” (1997: 68),

Regarding the ideology of extreme-right parties, Mudde suggested that xenophobia—along with nationalism—shapes the common core ideology of extreme-right parties. He stated that “xenophobia determines the world view of the parties in which everything ‘abnormal’ (that which is perceived as deviating from their own nation and

conventions) is regarded as negative and threatening. This includes both ‘internal enemies’ (e.g., immigrants, homosexuals) and ‘external enemies’ (e.g., supranational organizations)” (Mudde, 2000: 177). Art (2011: 24) also extensively dealt with the relationship between immigration phenomena and extreme-right ideology and stated that “...an anti-immigrant platform is a defining feature of radical right parties. Immigration is thus a necessary condition for radical right success, although it is clearly not a sufficient one.” He called the extreme-right parties in Western Europe “Anti-Immigrant Parties” (Art, 2011: ix).

I designated the discourse above as the moderating variable in the genesis of violent events/actions against immigrants/foreigners. Koopmans and Statham (1999) referred to the political claims approach and the qualitative discursive elements of claims. Koopmans and Olzak (2004a: 199) explained the link between violence and public discourse and argued that “in the public sphere, movement activists communicate messages to fellow activists and potential adherents, and they thereby gain crucial information about the actions and reactions of authorities, political opponents, allies, and sympathizers.” To explore this role of the public sphere, they introduced the notion of discursive opportunities, arguing that “it can serve to link political opportunity structure and framing perspectives on collective action” (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004a: 198). They defined discursive opportunities as “the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message’s chances of diffusion in the public sphere” (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004a: 202).

Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy (2005: 16), building on the theories of political opportunity structures, explain the impact of social structures as follows:

“... collective action does not directly reflect underlying social structures or the extent and nature of social problems and circumstances. Instead, each form of

collective action is understood as part of a larger political process and as being shaped by the opportunities and constraints offered by its political environment. The impact of social structures, problems, and circumstances - e.g., migration processes and cultural diversification- is, in this view, indirect and conditional to the extent that they lead to a reconfiguration of the political context of mobilization and thereby alter the balance of opportunities and constraints for particular collective actors and demands.”

The simplest explanation of claims-making is that it defines the “process of performing or articulating claims that bear on someone else's interests” (Lindekilde, 2013: 96). In the context of social movement studies and contentious politics, claims-making is “the conscious articulation of political demands in the public sphere” (Lindekilde, 2013: 96). As per Lindekilde (2013: 97) “the concept of claims-making has been used to analyze and compare media debates on contested issues, including immigration/integration. “

In his context, “protest event analysis, where instances of (physical) claims-making reported in print media are coded systematically, has been the most common way to empirically study variance in political claims-making. Following this path, Koopmans and Statham (1999: 207), “developed political claims analysis, an approach that further advances the strategy of event analysis” (Lindekilde, 2013: 97). Koopmans et al. (2005: 23) explains the empirical side of this approach as follows:

“Political claims analysis builds on protest event analyses as developed in the field of social movements and collective action but extends the method to include speech acts and public discourse variables. Protest event analysis records instances of collective protest, usually from newspaper sources, sometimes also from police records... Political discourse analysis is associated with the constructivist framing perspective... Whereas protest event analysis takes protest as an indicator of the level of challenges to the political system, political discourse analysis takes the emergence and public visibility of movement frames as an indicator for the ‘meaning giving’ side of challenges to dominant political and cultural norms, values, and problem definitions. The two approaches focus on different dimensions of collective challenges to political power: the first relating an action type variable—protests—to institutional political opportunities; and the second relating an interpretative scheme variable— frames—to the dominant sets of cultural and political norms, i.e., in our terminology, to discursive opportunity structures.”

Koopmans et al. (2005: 23) refer to a rather wide framework and go beyond simply counting the protest events and incidents, covering “all forms of public claims making, including purely discursive forms such as public statements, press releases and conferences, publications, and interviews, alongside conventional forms of political action such as litigation or petitioning, as well as classical protest forms such as demonstrations and political violence,” Koopmans et al. (2005: 24) define the “instance of claims making” as follows:

“...unit of strategic action in the public sphere that consists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which actually or potentially affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors.”

The critical component of xenophobia is that it also refers to claims-making for action for anti-immigration by groups of native populations. The current study aims to account for the possibility of such claims on migrants themselves and conducts the semi-structured interviews for studying this concept.

2.4. Theoretical Frameworks on Xenophobia

As discussed earlier, xenophobia describes attitudes, prejudices, and behavior that reject, exclude, and often vilify individuals based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society, or national identity. The literature highlights several theories explaining xenophobia under different names. Notably, some studies present untested hypotheses as theories despite not fully complying with the generally accepted criteria of scientific theories. In this context, it is a well-established fact that the term theory is used diversely (Bryman, 2012: 21). However, its more common meaning denotes the examination of natural or social behavior, event, or phenomenon in a logical, systematic, and coherent manner to explain why

they occur (Bhattacharjee, 2012: 25). Without prejudice to the above-mentioned caveats regarding the theories in the literature on xenophobia, we can say that these theories explain the phenomenon of xenophobia by using four sets of concepts that fall in the domain of four social science disciplines. The constituent elements of these concepts (i.e., attitude, prejudice, perception, and behavior) are primarily subjects within psychology. Further, elements like community and society are more sociological; national identity is political; and competition for resources is economic. Indubitably, these concepts are interrelated, and none of them can independently explain the causes and manifestations of xenophobia. They combine to create xenophobia in either a step-by-step or tightly interwoven process.

Instead of directly explaining these theories by naming them, I choose to classify them according to their main disciplines in social sciences and attempt to explain them from the perspective of their central focus. I consider four main orientations in theories explaining xenophobia: a) psychological, b) sociological, c) political, and d) economic.

2.4.1 Psychology-Oriented Theories

Phobia is the starting point for these theories. A specific phobia is a disproportionate fear caused by a specific object or situation. It is defined by a psychological dictionary as “an irrational and persistent fear of a particular thing, event, or situation which is extreme enough to bother the individual and often leads to irrational acts of avoidance” (Matsumoto, 2009: 384). Xenophobia is considered by some as a subaltern form of phobia and a kind of anxiety disorder. In this sense, another dictionary defines xenophobia as “1. Morbid fear or dislike of strangers, 2. Fear or dislike of foreign culture and places, 3. Fear of unfamiliar people; suspicious, hostile attitudes or

aggressive behavior toward people of other nationalities or minority groups” (Corsini, 2002: 1079). The ILO, IOM, and OHCHR joint paper describes xenophobia as an “attitudinal orientation of hostility against non-natives in a given population” (ILO, IOM, & OHCHR, 2001: 2).

Freud’s psychoanalytic theory postulated that “phobia is a form of ego defense mechanism used by an individual to protect him/herself from the high level of anxiety generated by conflicts and repressed impulses” (Omoluabi, 2008: 58). Some social scientists used this postulation to explain how xenophobia is formed. For example, Arieti (1979: 84, 95), after defining phobia as “the perception of a specific and definite danger and the emotional reaction to danger, in situations where there is no objective danger,” suggests that “in many cases of phobias a stage of relatively happy childhood is followed by a stage in which a generalized intangible fear, related to other human beings is perceived.” Based on Arieti’s definition, some social scientists claim that “xenophobia emerged in their adulthood when the children encountered strangers or foreigners to whom the anxiety was displaced because they had some semblance of the unreliable people.” In certain publications on psychology, fear of strangers is linked to “social anxiety disorder, which is defined as intense fear of strangers or social scrutiny panic disorder” (Kring, Johnson, Davison, & Neale, 2012: 184)

Psychology-oriented theories, in their essence, consider xenophobia an inherent attitude in human nature. Certain theories posit that specific phobias stem from childhood and use this argument to explain the fear of strangers in adulthood. Thus, the sociobiological theory proposes the argument that xenophobia is a part of human nature as an innate behavior, as exemplified by babies’ fear of strangers. Ginsburg, Heiner, and Kort (1994: 35) assert that the “biological basis for xenophobia seems plausible in light of the apparently innate fear of strangers that can be observed in

children. Infants turn away from strangers, avoiding eye contact with them, and start to cry when they are touched by them.”

In fact, the tendency for human beings to seek proximity to familiar faces and avoid unfamiliar faces that are considered dangerous is a universal phenomenon and an instinctive behavior; that is, it can be considered part of biological evolution. This tendency makes xenophobia seem inevitable in human affairs as similar people may tend to discriminate against those who are different. In this context, people’s natural propensity to fear and reject outsiders because of differences is taken for granted (Stolcke, 1995: 5–6). Such a perception creates fertile ground for the formation of prejudice. Moving forward from this thought process, we can easily conclude that it is quite normal to fear the stranger, nurture excessive perturbation against them, to consider them “other,” and eventually discriminate against them to protect both the self and the community. It is possible to interpret the result of such an approach as a normalization of xenophobia. In this context, it can be said that psychologically oriented theories try explaining the roots of xenophobia by using natural instincts.

2.4.2. Sociology-Oriented Theories

Psychology-oriented approaches and theories place the fear of—and prejudice toward—foreigners and strangers in the realm of individual feelings. Xenophobia combines the attitudes and prejudices that exclude foreigners from the community by considering them outsiders. This exclusion and setting aside others as outsiders cannot be considered only an individual behavior. In communal life, this is also reflected in in-group behavior. In *The Nature of Prejudice*, Allport (1954) explained the groups as “in group” and “reference group.” He mentioned that “members of an in-group all use the term *we* with the same essential significance” (Allport, 1979: 31).

He defined the “reference group” as “an in-group that is warmly accepted, or as a group in which the individual wishes to be included.” Allport elaborated that all groups develop a “way of living” and a “web of habits,” and when they “encounter an outsider who follows different customs,” they unconsciously say “he breaks my habit” (Allport, 1979: 37, 39, 46).

Allport argued that people prefer the familiar and feel slightly on guard when other people seemingly threaten or even question their habits. The group norm theory of prejudice developed by Allport can be considered the basis for several theories on racism and xenophobia, most of which are called conflict or competition theories.

Yakushko (2008: 11) referred to realistic group conflict theory to explain “how perceived feelings of threat contribute to the creation of negative views toward those who seem to challenge the economic well-being of the in-group.” Based on Sherif’s study of “The Robbers Cave Experiment,”¹¹, Yakushko (2008: 46) suggested that “competition to access to limited resources result in a conflict between groups. Competition for these limited resources between groups leads to prejudices against the out-group, whose members are viewed by the in-group as a source of competition.” (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1988:-9; Yakushko, 2008: 46)

Theories about social dominance and social hierarchy as well as justification of the systemic order are also utilized to explain how individuals develop xenophobic attitudes. The social dominance theory postulates that “the societies minimize group conflict by creating consensus on ideologies that promote the superiority of one group

¹¹ Sherif postulated that “if two in-groups thus formed are brought into functional relationship under conditions of competition and group frustration, attitudes and appropriate hostile actions in relation to the outgroup and its members will arise and will be standardized and shared in varying degrees by outgroup members” (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1988: 9).

over the other.” (Pratto, Malle, Stallworth, & Sidanius, 1994: 741). This theory further assumes that individuals prefer the dominance and superiority of their in-group over the out-groups along the line of superior-inferior dimension and tend to favor the hierarchical order; this brings to the fore the concepts of dominant and subordinate groups. (Pratto, Malle, Stallworth, & Sidanius, 1994)

Justification of the systemic order theory, in addition to ego-justification and group-justification, proposes a system-justification, which refers to the process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized at the expense of personal and group interest. Widespread beliefs about social groups are then fabricated as stereotypes that divide people into roles, classes, positions, or statuses to maintain the societal status quo (Jost and Banaji, 1994).

Conflict theories propose propositions resting on the concept of competition for limited resources. Owing to this, these theories are called competition theories. To maximize their shares in the society, both individuals and groups compete, which can precipitate conflict. In this competition, in-group versus out-group and dominant versus subordinate group relations as well as their perceptions and prejudices about each other gain importance. The source of competition might be economic, political, ethnic, or religious. In each case, each group could perceive a threat from the other group.

Blumer (1958) proposed that “race prejudice exists basically in a sense of group position rather than in a set of feelings which members of one racial group have toward the members of another racial group.” He argued that there are four basic types of feelings that arise in the presence of race prejudice in the dominant group: “a feeling of superiority; a feeling that the subordinate race is intrinsically different and alien; a

feeling of proprietary claim to certain areas of privilege and advantage; and a fear and suspicion that the subordinate race harbors designs on the prerogatives of the dominant race” (Blumer, 1958: 3,4). Building on this, Quillian (1995: 605–605) developed a group threat model concerning anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe, positing:

“prejudice in an EEC country is strongly related to the threat perceived by the dominant group resident there...The economic conditions in a country and the size of the racial or immigrant group influence people's views of group relations, and in so doing influence prejudicial attitudes. Threat is perceived by individuals, but its relationship to prejudice depends on a comparison of the relations between dominant and subordinate social groups.”

In this context, according to the group threat approach, it is possible that xenophobia is connected to the perception by the dominant group that its way of life, habits, native values, culture, and dominance in society are challenged and exposed to risk by the subordinate or out-group.

The scapegoating hypothesis of xenophobia is another sociological theory. Harris (2002: 171) explained scapegoating as “hostility toward foreigners in relation to limited resources.” Tsithereke stated that people often create a frustration-scapegoat when they are frustrated or disillusioned by deprivation. He states that “Integrating and relative deprivation theory and xenophobia enables us to better understand the underlying causes and dynamics of what happens when foreigners interact with nationals, particularly when the latter considers foreigners to be a security threat” (Tsithereke, 1999).¹²

2.4.3. Political-Science-Oriented Theories

¹² Walter Garrison Runciman, in general terms, explained relative deprivation as the discrepancy between social inequalities and people's feelings regarding complaints about such inequalities. He asserted that if people have no reason to expect more than what they can obtain, they will not be less satisfied with what they possess. In fact, they would be grateful for what they possessed at that moment (Runciman, 1976: 9).

Wimmer's attention-grabbing approach designed to explain xenophobia originated within political science. He stated:

“Xenophobia and racism should be seen rather as appeals to the pact of solidarity into which the state and society have entered in modern nation-states and which in times of intensified social conflicts seems fragile in the eyes of downwardly mobile groups... the xenophobic discourse serves not only to reassure identity when nationalistic self-images run into crisis but is an element of a political struggle about who has the right to be cared for by the state and society: a fight for the collective goods of the modern state.” (Wimmer, 1997: 17)

Wimmer reviewed and comprehensively analyzed the four models developed to explain xenophobia and racism: rational choice theory, functionalism, discourse theory, and phenomenology. He explained the core of the rational choice theory “as an intensive rivalry between migrant and indigenous groups (for) jobs and cheap housing” and of functionalism as “the cultural differentness of the immigrants...with the nativeborn.” Regarding functionalism, he stated that “according to this functionalist view, the inability of certain minorities to integrate into the structure and culture of the host society leads the majority population to xenophobic rejection” (Wimmer, 1997: 19–22). He further explained that the proponents of discourse theory argue that cultural differences, inability to assimilate, and insurmountable cultural differences constitute the basic elements of the concept of “otherness” and that this reality helps exclude immigrants from the core social group. Through this discourse, Wimmer claimed that official or semi-official power holders have created and institutionalized exclusions in their immigration policy. He stated that this rendered the consequences of the policies invisible and gave xenophobia a chance to be regarded as a cultural conflict. In short, he attempted to explain that the responsibility of being excluded from society is ultimately placed on those who are excluded from the society (Wimmer, 1997: 25).

According to Wimmer (1997: 27), the advocates of phenomenology assume that “hostility to foreigners and racism have less to do with the intentions of the bureaucratic elites or the growth of the foreign population than with an overall crisis of the entire society.”

Wimmer (2002) asserted that no research topic in social sciences was more politicized than racism and xenophobia. He related this phenomenon to the cultural compromise of the nation-state. His basic thesis (2002: 2) is that “democracy, citizenship, and national self-determination became the indivisible trinity of the world order of nation-states.” Wimmer (2002: 201) stated that in such an order, “xenophobia and racism will be interpreted as an extreme form of nationalism,” which is a consequence of the ordering of the modern world in line with the principle of the nation-state. He asserted that “racial and ethnonational markers were transformed into powerful elements of political discourse and practices of exclusion, and thus, xenophobia and racism became an integral part of the institutional order of the nation-state” (Wimmer, 2002: 2, 201, 212–217).

Despite his elaborate explanations of xenophobia, Wimmer stopped short of calling his approach a theory. Instead, he stated that “This is, of course, merely an outline of an explanatory approach. I have included as much empirical research as possible – much of it relegated to the footnotes – to establish an empirical base for the argument presented here. The theoretical outline should, however, be further elaborated and refined by future research” (Wimmer, 2002: 217). By doing so, he emphasized the importance of empirical research and relevant empirical data for the theoretical explanation of xenophobia.

Among the models mentioned by Wimmer, rational choice theory deserves special attention. The theoretical essence of this approach rests on the choice of individuals. Hechter pointed out that “This doctrine assumes the theoretical primacy of individual actors rather than of pre-existent social groups... The hallmark of this approach is the view that their selection of a course of action is rational and will be the most effective means of realizing their preferred goals” (Hechter, 1986: 264).

Competition theory of ethnic and racial conflict, which was also mentioned above as a sociology-oriented theory, is considered within the framework of rational choice theory. Olzak, in one of the most important empirical and theoretical works on competition theory, “examined newspaper reports of ethnic conflicts in the United States between 1876 and 1914 to test a hypothesis that the intensity of disputes related to various measures of competition—such as occupational segregation, economic depression, status of workforce training, immigration rates” and found out that “while the incidence of ethnic disagreements was not related to the rate of immigration, it was associated with proportional change in this rate” (Banton, 1998: 165). For her research, she “collected data mainly from daily editions of the *New York Times* and focused on actual newspaper articles rather than using the more limited information found in the *New York Times Index*” (Brown, 1994: 483). Olzak used a similar empirical analysis technique in her 2002 research on right-wing violence in Germany (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004b).

Several theories accept cultural differences as a primary source of prejudice regarding xenophobic attitudes and behaviors. In numerous cases, discourse on cultural differences has also been used as a tool to politicize xenophobia. It is, therefore, necessary to also focus on the issues of politicization of xenophobia and the use of cultural differences discourse as a tool to fuel xenophobia.

2.4.3.1. Politicization Process of Xenophobia and Political Xenophobia

Per conventional wisdom, the 1990s period was politically defined by a movement toward the right-wing, including increased support for far-right parties in Europe. Several different designations of far-right parties exist in the literature. For example, Mudde provided a comprehensive list of designations, such as extreme right, far right, radical right, radical right-wing populism. He also includes group names, such as xenophobic populist and anti-immigrant, to describe these parties. He clarified that “this terminological chaos is not the result of fundamental differences of opinion over the correct definition; rather, it is largely the consequence of a lack of clear definitions” (Mudde, 2007: 11–12). He further pointed out that these different terminologies are being used interchangeably. Hobsbawm also called these parties “xenophobic parties.” Xenophobia and being anti-immigrant are part of the basic ideology of all these parties. Mudde (2007: 69–70) said:

“Most of the literature focuses almost exclusively on non-European immigrants when addressing the xenophobia of populist radical right parties. Some authors have even adopted the term “anti-immigrant party” to label the parties, suggesting that their agendas are reducible to this single issue. There is no doubt that non-European immigrants are among the main enemies of these parties in Western Europe, particularly in their electoral propaganda.”

As I stated earlier, I use the term immigration phenomena as an umbrella term to cover the different categories of migrant groups like immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. This term is associated with foreigners whose country of origin is not the country they live in. Koopmans (as cited in E. Zimmermann, 2003) suggested that “xenophobia is the main component of right-wing extremism, engagement in right-wing extremist activities and violence being largely a function of the huge influx of foreigners into Germany in the 1990s” (Zimmermann, 2003: 213). To clarify the word

“foreigner,” Koopmans further suggested that the “repatriated German-speaking people or people of German ethnic origin from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Auslandsdeutsche)” were considered Germans by the German authorities and that “they enjoyed all the rights and benefits of the welfare state. They were granted passports and social support in terms of housing, employment, clothing, and other subsidies” (Zimmermann, 2003: 225–26). This treatment impacted the official definition of the status of immigrants.

In connection with this politicization process, Watts developed an elaborate political xenophobia approach. She described this approach as a “specific form of hostility toward foreigners that requires a chain of elements: prejudice as a ‘discriminatory potential,’ and a two-fold process of motivation and targeting whose elements are ideology and sense of threat (perception of negative instrumentality of foreigners).” According to Watts (1996: 97), “these elements together produce ‘political xenophobia,’ which refers to the desire or willingness to use public policy to discriminate against foreigners.”

Watts pointed out that prejudice against foreigners or strangers is not necessarily a political phenomenon in and of itself. For xenophobia to have political significance, it should be activated and directed. Until that happens, negative affect and fear of foreigners—xenophobia—can exist as a corrosive and potentially eruptive force in the culture. Before it becomes an operational factor, it must be directed and given a political focus. In other words, for xenophobia to be operationalized, targeting is necessary. Watts argued that if there is an understanding in the society that even threatening situations can be dealt with by means of accepted democratic mechanisms, the demand for dealing with the problem will remain peaceful. According to Watts, it is theoretically possible for a high degree of xenophobia to exist in a society without

violence or destructive discrimination if the concern of the discontented population is kept under control through factors such as faith in conventional social mechanisms, commitment to the democratic process, or trust in political leadership. However, “even moderate levels of xenophobia may produce dangerous disorder if political and cultural restraining mechanisms are ineffective or worse, if xenophobic outbreaks are officially promoted or tolerated” (Watts, 1996: 99). Watts further argued that although the absolute level of xenophobia per se is a necessary factor in political discrimination, it is the set of intervening factors—particularly those dealing with the targeting process—that are critical in giving force and direction to prejudice. In this respect, she focused on two mechanisms of targeting: ideology and threat. Watts defined (1996: 99) ideology as a “symbolic structure of thought in which positive and negative attitude objects are given their order, enemies can be identified, and action is implied.” Threat, meanwhile, was defined as a more “ephemeral and volatile set of beliefs that is responsive to new information and interpretation provided by media and social/political spokespersons.” (Watts, 1996: 99). In this sense, according to Watts, targets are defined in relation to the danger they pose to the material or symbolic culture, and hence, a demand for action is stirred up by the belief that the threat must be countered. Unlike ideological targets, which tend to be fixed elements in an integrated belief system, the groups identified in the process of targeting can be redefined and their hostility redirected by those who create political discourse (such as interest groups, parties, leaders, the mass media). The targeting process does not require a change in the objective basis of discourse since the primary mechanisms implied in both ideology and threat processes are subjective realities. This discursive element of arbitrariness emphasizes the role of symbolic elements in triggering xenophobia. However, objective reality can indeed change, and this contributes to a

deterioration of in-group expectations. In this model, it is the symbolic mediation of reality that connects with political xenophobia (Watts 1996: 99).

In this line of thought, Watts postulates that heightened fear of foreigners can lead to a convergence of ideological movements on the right and of threat-based anxieties in the broader political culture. Hence, this convergence may precipitate an increase in support for right-extremist groups; the penetration of rightist themes into normal political discourse; an increase in protest voting for rightist parties; the emergence of a populist xenophobia with some of the ideological trappings of the far right; and the emergence of broadening basis of support in the political culture for aggressive, anti-foreigner actions. According to Watts, xenophobia itself can be considered a private affair. The crucial point here is determining how to manage the xenophobia prevalent in society. In this sense, threats and blames increase and decrease the level of political xenophobia in society.

I believe that Watts used a balanced approach to analyze the natural and instinctive character of xenophobia at the personal level and the change that can occur in its natural character if it is diffused at the societal level. In that respect, Watts asserted that xenophobia at the societal level can be managed through political leadership.

2.4.3.2. Conceptualization of Culture in Political-Science-Oriented Theories

In their well-known book, Kroeber and Kluckhons (1963: 3) referenced Stuart Chase, stating that the “culture concept of the anthropologists and sociologists is coming to be regarded as the foundation stone of the social sciences.” They noted that this view may not be accepted by all social scientists. Few intellectuals would object to the approach that the idea of culture—in an anthropological sense—is among the key

concepts of contemporary thought. In this context, referring to Charles A. Ellwood, they explained the concept of culture as follows:

“Culture: a collective name for all behavior patterns socially acquired and socially transmitted by means of symbols; hence a name for all the distinctive achievements of human groups, including not only such items as language, tool making, industry, art, science, law, government, morals, and religion, but also the material instruments or artifacts in which cultural achievements are embodied and by which intellectual cultural features are given practical effect, such as buildings, tools, machines, communication devices, art objects, etc... Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action” (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1963: 65–66).

There are numerous definitions of culture. One definition explains culture as “a sign in the traditional semiotic sense, the connection between the signifier (the word ‘culture’) and the signified (what it represents)” and identified as “an empty vessel waiting for people- both academicians and everyday communicators- to fill it with meaning” (Baldwin, Hecht, & Faulkner, 2006: 4). In this sense, culture can be considered a “component of a (social) system and as such interact with other components (political, economic, psychological) as part of a common structure in which it is subordinate, equal, or superordinate.” Through this interaction, the anthropological conceptualization of “culture” through “semiotic practices,” which denotes meaning-making, can be applied as a casual variable in political science. Through this line of inductive reasoning, we may use culture as an explanatory or independent variable in political-science-oriented theories designed to explain xenophobia (Pickel, 2007: 8; Wedeen, 2002: 713).

The phrase “the way of life” is used in several definitions of culture as it encompasses values, ideas, attitudes, languages, and practices embodied in institutions and social

relations. For the purposes of this dissertation, culture may be explained as “a way of life of a group of people, the configuration of all the more or less stereotype patterns which are handed from one generation to the next through the language and imitation” (Faulkner, Baldwin, Lindsley, & Hecht, 2006: 32) or as the “way of life of a people... consists of conventional patterns of thought and behavior, including values, beliefs, rules of conduct, political organization, economic activity, and the like, which are passed on from one generation to the next by learning- and not by biological inheritance” (Baldwin et al., 2006: 180).

According to the arguments that use differentness and otherness as the basis to explain the distance between foreign or outside groups and native-born groups who consider themselves the real owners of the land, the incompatibility of cultures and ways of life lay the groundwork for conflict and xenophobic attitudes. Pursuant to this view, which Wimmer called a functionalist view, the inability of foreign or outside groups to integrate into the structure and culture of the host society leads most of the population to xenophobic rejection. Thus, owing to this unbridgeable difference in cultural differentness and distance, each group prefers “to remain among one's own kind and to wish others to remain among theirs” (Wimmer, 1997: 22).

Huntington hypothesized that “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural” (Huntington, 1993: 22). He describes civilization as a cultural entity and points out the “distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity” (1993: 23) and cultural fault lines. He further asserted that “The Velvet Curtain of Culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe” (Huntington, 1993: 31).

Huntington's article represents how overemphasis on cultural differences and cultural differentness in the analysis of political science theories can exceed the limits of objective observations and indulge in a kind of engineering of a new future by using the relatively vague concept of culture.

As explained above, the culture concept of the anthropologists and sociologists is regarded by some scholars as the foundation of the social and political sciences. Aronoff and Kubik (2013: 60–61), however, stated that “significant contemporary perspectives in anthropology challenge the utility and integrity of concept, and either avoid the term culture or bracket it quotation marks to signal its problematic nature.” According to some anthropologists, the issue is securing and exercising authority to define and characterize culture. In this context, noteworthy, some academics have argued that the concept of culture is disappearing, while intellectuals have defined it differently. For example, Brightman states that “the concept of culture does not consistently exhibit the qualities of historicism, totalization, holism, legalism, and coherence” and draws attention to the need for a relexification of the concept of culture (Brightman, 1995: 541).

2.4.3.3 New Racism, Cultural Racism, and Differentialist Racism Discussions and Xenophobia

The phrase “new racism” was first used by Martin Barker in 1981. He asserted that new racism had emerged in Britain based on the idea of a way of life, or a culture. In his analysis, he mainly focused on the immigration issue and argued that “just as dangerous as prejudices about other people, if not more so, are theories which result in justification for keeping ourselves separate.” His approach was generally labeled as cultural racism (Barker, 1981: 17, 18, 21). Taguieff and Balibar also argued

convincingly that there was a new racism. Their arguments were readily accepted in France because of the existence of the New Right (*La nouvelle droite*), which had been defending the view of the right to difference and demanding recognition of that difference. Further, they considered immigration an undeniably negative phenomenon. In fact, what they were advocating for was not fundamentally different from the views of Kallen, who defended “the inalienable right to be different” and the “American way of life” as cultural pluralism in the 1900s (The Pluralism Project-Harvard University, n.d.; Steiner, 2020). The theories of the New Right should be evaluated in the light of—and in some sense, as a response to—the new forms of anti-racism in the 1980s as a new generation of migrant communities began developing forms of political and cultural identification at that time by asserting their differences. They created the slogan “*droit à la différence*” to demand the right to be different and to have the same rights as the native population (Räthzel, 2002: 6–7)

Adopting the notion of “*droit à la différence*,” the New Right produced a counter argument that to preserve the variety of cultures, people from different countries needed to stay in their respective places. Concerning these ideas, Taguieff identified this approach as “differentialist racism” and argued that “the strategic intelligence of the New Right excels in opposing the ideas and positions of its adversary by recovering, diverting and reversing them.” Taguieff also referred to discrimination and exclusion, and argued that the New Right “stigmatizes the mixing of bodies and cultures (or mental forms) as the supreme evil and oscillates in its sociopolitical manifestations between a system of exclusion -separate development or discrimination-apartheid or genocide” (Taguieff, 1993: 31–68).

Balibar defined New Racism as the “racism of era of ‘decolonization,’ of the reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises, and the division of humanity within a single political space” (Balibar, 1991: 21). He focused on immigration in his assessments and stated as follows:

“Ideologically, current racism, which in France centers upon the *immigration complex*, fits into a framework of ‘*racism without races*’ which is already developed in other countries particularly the Anglo-Saxon ones. It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but insurmountability of *cultural differences*, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others, but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life styles and traditions, in short, it is what P.A. Taguieff has rightly called a *differentialist racism*.” (Balibar, 1991: 21).

Balibar predicted that differentialist racism would tend to present itself as the true anti-racism and, therefore, true humanism, and would easily connect with crowd psychology, which was enjoying something of a revival at the time. He identified this “as a general explanation of irrational movements, aggression, and collective violence, and, *particularly of xenophobia*” (Balibar 1991: 23).

2.4.4. Economy-Oriented Theories

As explained above, conflict theories generally propose propositions resting on the competition for limited resources. Owing to this, they are also referred to as competition theories. Competition over scarce resources may occur within a specific group or between groups. Competition theories also deal with the economic competition among ethnic and racial populations. Competition between groups over

limited resources may increase when the economy contracts. This development raises “the potential that dominant groups will restrain or exclude less powerful competitors.” (Olzak, 2013: 1). Competition for scarce resources may also directly affect the rise of xenophobic attitudes toward groups that are considered outsiders by the dominant group.

Bobo and Hutchins hypothesized that “individuals with low socioeconomic status or who experience changes in the racial composition of their neighborhoods or workplaces are more likely to regard out-group members as significant competitors for scarce social resources.” They asserted that “objective personal vulnerability to economic or political deprivation provides the direct basis for interethnic hostility” and “individuals who face unemployment, who are concentrated in low-status occupations, who have low incomes, or who face racially changing neighborhoods and workplaces, are most likely to feel threatened by competition from members of other” groups. They described this setting as an “objective basis for conflict” and explained competition for scarce resources with “the simple self-interest model” (Bobo & Huthcings, 1996: 953–57).

While criticizing the competition for scarce economic and social resources model, Wimmer stated that “at least since World War II the real competition for jobs between native-born and foreigners has been rather limited. Among economists, to be sure, intense discussion persists about whether immigrants replace or supplement indigenous work force” (Wimmer, 1997: 21).

It is not possible to explain the causes and manifestations of xenophobia with a single theory. Therefore, I have tried categorizing the various theoretical approaches according to their social science disciplines and explain the main features relevant to

explain the causes of xenophobia. Notably, all relevant theories were developed to explain various aspects of racism. More recent approaches deal with the issue of immigration and the problems of immigrants. Due to this, a certain degree of blurriness exists in the theoretical domain, which makes it difficult to clarify the specific causes of xenophobia. I think that the theories that combine the elements of social psychology and political sociology (including cultural aspects) seem most suitable for explaining the causes and manifestations of xenophobia.

2.5. Metamorphosis of Racism into Xenophobia

As explained earlier, although racism and xenophobia often overlap, they are considered distinct phenomena. While racism generally implies distinction based on differences in physical characteristics, such as skin coloration, hair type, facial features, xenophobia denotes behavior specifically based on the perception that the other is foreign to—or originates from—outside the community or nation. In conjunction with this, ethnocentrism and nativism are concepts that are frequently considered along with racism and xenophobia in literature. Another major active discrimination and intolerance type associated mainly with racism and xenophobia is Islamophobia. Since the beginning of the 21st century, we have witnessed a rising tide of Islamophobia. Therefore, these concepts need to be explained in more detail. Additionally, scholarly studies on xenophobia and racism generally do not address the loose ideologies, theories, and practices related with racism and xenophobia: Social Darwinism and eugenics. Although some scholars consider Social Darwinism and eugenics as archaic and no longer practiced, both deserve examination in discrimination-related studies. During the recent COVID-19 pandemic, practices such as the intentional herd immunity approach followed by some Western European countries and the negative effects of such practices, especially on older adults in certain

countries (e.g., Sweden), have demonstrated that practices inspired by Social Darwinism and eugenics can still be implemented in our modern times (Tulun, 2020). In this vein, I deem it useful to discuss the mentioned practices along with nativism, ethnocentrism, and Islamophobia in the context of their impact on—and relations with—racism and xenophobia.

2.5.1. Ethnocentrism and Prejudice

American sociologist and economist William Graham Sumner is considered to have popularized the term “ethnocentrism” in his 1906 book *Folkways*. Sumner, a Social Darwinist, wrote about the “sociobiological importance of usages, manners, customs, mores, and morals.” He explained the term as “things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it” (Sumner; 1906: 13). According to Sumner, “each group nourishes its own pride and vanity; boasts that it is superior and exaggerates everything in their own folkways; perceives outsiders with contempt; and considers its own folkways the only right ones: If it observes that other groups have other folkways,” it despises them (Sumner, 1906: 13). He also introduced and elaborated the oft-used concepts of in/we group and out/others group

The latest academic studies on the subject indicate that the initial use of the term ethnocentrism dates to late 19th century.¹³ In their work, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Nevitt Sanford, and Levinson (1950) describe ethnocentrism as a “pervasive and rigid ingroup-outgroup distinction involving stereotyped imagery.” They argue that this imagery involves stereotyped “hostile attitudes regarding outgroups and nurtures

¹³ According to a corrective note published in the Journal of Social and Political Psychology in 2014 regarding the article by Bizumic and Duckitt (2013) on the historical background of the term, Polish sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz may have coined the concept and used the term in at least seven publications written in German and Polish from 1879 until 1905 (Bizumic, 2014).

stereotyped positive imagery and submissive attitudes toward ingroups” (Adorno et al., 1950: 150). This view considers ingroups as rightly dominant and outgroups as subordinate

As observed in the pioneering studies regarding the explanations and definitions of the term ethnocentrism, ingroup-outgroup distinction and relations, and the stereotyped positive/negative imagery and attitudes vis-à-vis these groups are considered the basis for the formation of ethnocentrism. Allport (1979), after explaining the transformation of the term prejudice, argued that “human beings have a propensity to prejudice that lies in their normal and natural tendency to form generalizations and oversimplifications.” He stated that prejudice could include race prejudice, but asserted that prejudice historically rests on religion rather than race. He noted that he preferred the term ethnic to race since this term does not imply biological unity (Allport, 1979: Preface xv-xvi).

In light of this, Allport attempted to make the following final definition of negative ethnic prejudice: “Ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group” (Allport, 1979: 9).

As the above explanations reveal, ethnic identity is an important element of ethnocentrism. According to political psychologist Vamik Volkan (1997: 22, 25), “when ethnic groups define and differentiate themselves, they almost invariably develop some prejudices for their own group and against the other’ group...there is, therefore, a degree of ethnocentrism that appears to be universal.” Volkan (1997:17, 25, 27–28) introduces a terminology of “we-ness,” which references religious, ethnic,

national, or racial affiliation, and he connects this notion to a “large canvas tent” that shelters and protects the large group.

When examining the term racism, Taguieff used three levels of categorization: primary, secondary, and tertiary racism (Pierre-Andre Taguieff, 2001). He described primary racism, or “otherism,” as a general psychosocial phenomenon, and suggested that it could be a universal reaction reflecting feelings of distrust toward the “Other” (Pierre-Andre Taguieff, 2001: 44).

He defined secondary racism as a kind of “rationalization of primary racism in the name of arguments stemming from economic or political competition among human groups” (Pierre-Andre Taguieff 2001: 58). Taguieff, in this context, referred to the rationalization of “residues”¹⁴ (in Pareto’s sense: displays of the feelings or the instincts), “corresponds to what one designates, in ordinary language, by the terms xenophobia or chauvinism and, in scholarly metalanguage, by the term ethnocentrism” (Pierre-Andre Taguieff, 2001: 59). Taguieff identified this feeling/instinct as the pairing of ethnocentrism and xenophobia, comparing them to the same process that created “we” and “others.”

The last category Taguieff identified was tertiary racism. This category referred to “all the elaborate forms of the ethnocentrism-xenophobia pair, involving modes of theorization borrowed from the biological sciences” (Taguieff, 1993: 59, 63–64).

Young-Bruehl is one of the few academics who challenges the singular nature of prejudice. She argued that “It is a serious error to ascribe prejudice and discrimination to any singular taproot” (Young-Bruehl, 1998: 16). Drawing attention to the traditional

¹⁴ Residues, as mentioned in the text, represent the concept developed by Vilfredo Pareto, which can be generally explained as “non-logical sentiments, rooted in the basic aspirations and drives of people.” Residues are not rooted in reason.

use of the term ethnocentrism, she defined the usage as “the practice of putting one’s own ethnos or group (however one defines it) at the center of the world.” She found the term to be obscure because it was synonymous with the singular nature of prejudice; instead, she proposed the terms “ideologies of desire” or “orecticism” instead. She asserted that antisemitism, racism, sexism, and the homophobia in their modern forms are all orecticism, not ethnocentrism. She then referred to the concept of chimera and stated that ethnocentrism was expressed in xenophobic assertions (Young-Bruehl, 1998: 16, 77–80, 185). Langmuir (1996: 334) described the relation between xenophobia and the concept of chimera as follows:

“The Greek root of “chimera” makes it a fitting companion to “xenophobia,” but, more important, the ancient use of “chimera” to refer to a fabulous monster emphasizes the central characteristic of the phenomenon I wish to distinguish from xenophobia. In contrast with xenophobic assertions, chimerical assertions present fantasies, figments of the imagination, monsters that, although dressed syntactically in the clothes of real humans, have never been seen and are projections of mental processes unconnected with the real people of the outgroup. Chimerical assertions have no “kernel of truth.”

Fredrickson (2002: 155, 169), an influential scholar on race studies, suggested that “race and racism are peculiarly modern ideas and ... they are simply manifestations of the perennial phenomena of ethnocentrism and xenophobia.” He found racism to be “the evil twin of ethnocentrism.” Meanwhile, Taras (2012: 13) considered xenophobia to be the “flipside of ethnocentrism” and explained that “the first expresses a fear of dislike of foreigners, the second represents an assertion that of the primacy of one’s own group in considering the world which may become the basis of discriminatory practices.”

As mentioned earlier, regarding the preference of Allport’s use of the term “ethnic” instead of “race,” biological interpretations of race and human action draw deep suspicion, and in some cases, sociobiology is considered as “politics dressed up

science,” “pseudo-science,” “naive science playing into the hands of willing political ideologies,” or “a movement of far right.” Nevertheless, sociobiological definitions or explanations of these concepts are important for an in-depth analysis. In this context, I find it useful to provide a definition of ethnocentrism as developed by a social biologist, which considers ethnocentrism as schismatic in-group/out-group differentiation. In this definition, internal cohesion, relative peace, solidarity, loyalty, and devotion to the in-group is correlated with a state of hostility or permanent quasi-war toward outgroups that are often perceived as inferior, subhuman, and/or incorporating evil (Reynolds, Falger, & Vine, 1988: 1).

2.5.2. Nativist Antagonism and Racism

In simple terms, the nativist antagonism toward foreigners is called nativism. The term is mainly used in the United States and was coined by Louis Dow Scisco at the turn of the 19th century. It describes principles advanced by the anti-foreign and anti-Catholic American Party (Guia, 2016: 1).

There is a general agreement in the relevant literature that Higham’s work in the 1950s is the oldest authoritative source on nativism. Higham (2002: 4) defines nativism as “an intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign connections.” He explains that nativist antagonisms may vary in response to the changing character of minority irritants. However, each separate hostility takes its strength from modern nationalism (Higham 2002). Higham (2002), referring to ethnocentrism, expresses the view that ethnocentric judgment provides the cultural subsoil in which nativism grows.

More recent definitions of nativism deal with the immigrant issue and assert that nativism, among other things, denotes hostility toward immigrants and aspiring immigrants (Fry, 2007, 2; Higham, 2002: 10, 24).

In her working paper regarding the concept of nativism in the European context, Guia (2016: 11, 13) suggested that the primary objective of nativism might be to restrict immigration (Guia 2016, 11). She wrote that “Nativism is not a whitewash term for racism or Islamophobia. Nativists are often racists and Islamophobes, but nativism as a logic has historically not been constrained to a particular ‘ism’ or ‘phobia.’ Nativism is intrinsically xenophobic, but not always with the same groups.”

Nativism construes a discriminatory perception of “we, the natives” against “they, the newcomers.” It highlights a certain prejudicial discriminatory thinking and behavior toward the “newcomers,” such as immigrants or existing minority groups in the society. Nevertheless, as nativism is a more American-oriented term, it may not be considered a phenomenon, such as ethnocentrism and xenophobia, in the European context. Therefore, currently, it does not seem relevant for explaining the rising xenophobia in Europe.

It is useful to refer to the oft-used concepts of in-group/out-group dichotomy to explain racism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia. As the literature review indicates, the various explanations regarding the relationships among racism-ethnocentrism-xenophobia centers on in-group/out-group relations. In this context, the dichotomous nature of this relationship has been analyzed through onomastic means. In this sense, identical concepts—such as “otherness,” “we-ness,” “sameness,” “Other,” “we-group,” “others-group,” “other-group,” “otherism,” and “us-them”—have been introduced and included in academic terminology. This terminology consists of the derivatives of the

original version of in-group/out-group differentiation and rest on the interaction of these two groups. With relation to these concepts, these groups' "differentness" and their "distinctiveness" are also emphasized.

The contradictory nature of the in-group/out-group relationship bears importance not only for explaining the causes of ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and, in Taguieff's terminology, primary and secondary racism, but also for the result of this contradiction. The nature of this contradiction might be more meaningfully explained by its antinomic nature than its dichotomic one, since antinomy is more "localized, open-ended, and does not contain the sense of closure," whereas dichotomy is considered the "sum up of the whole range of possibilities" (Prokhovnik, 1999: 24–25).

In this sense, dichotomous contradictions are considered perpetual, whereas antinomic ones are open to successive synthesis. In-group/out-group relations are open to new synthesis. This understanding may help us explain the evolution of we-they or us-them relationships and contradictions in time, and the change in the character of this relationship. We/native–they/immigrant antinomy may, under certain conditions, evolve into anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions, and could consequently produce Islamophobia.

2.5.3. Social Darwinism and Eugenics to Contemporary Discrimination Studies

Considering that they have caused great human sufferings that still affect current situations, it seems appropriate to address the Social Darwinism "theory" and the Eugenics movement under a separate subtitle. I believe that ignoring this painful past in contemporary academic studies creates a deficiency when combating all forms of discrimination.

Social Darwinism, as an application of the theory of natural selection to social, political, and economic issues, advocated the formula of the survival of the fittest. Social Darwinists considered the life of humans in society as a struggle for existence. They believed that the process of natural selection would result in the survival of the best competitors. Societies were viewed as organisms that evolve in this manner. Social Darwinism was used as a philosophical rationalization for imperial, colonialist, and, most importantly, racist policies. Social Darwinists believed in Anglo-Saxon or Arian cultural and biological superiority; the theory removed the basis for asserting any essential difference between humans and animals. Members of this group were also skeptical about free will. Darwinism paved the way for the rise of the eugenics movement and “scientific racism,” especially in the United States.

The Eugenics movement advocated for the application of genetics and hereditary principles to improve the human race. The word “eugenics” comes from Greek roots that combine the words “good” and “origin,” indicating “good birth.” The term eugenics was first used by British intellectual Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin. Galton asserted that natural selection could be replaced by human selection to ensure that those more fit would be the ones who left most offspring. He argued that talent and character are hereditary. He further claimed that society should take steps to ensure that its most talented members left numerous progeny, while weak and members left fewer or none. The eugenics movement took root in the United States in the early 1900s, and Eugenic Record Office was founded. It became a popular social movement that peaked in the 1920s and 1930s. Some US states, such as Indiana and California, enacted sterilization laws that resulted in the forced sterilization of thousands of people. As per information provided by some scholars, “compulsory sterilization laws adopted by over thirty US states led to more than 60,000 sterilizations

of disabled individuals. Many of these individuals were sterilized because of a disability: they were mentally disabled or ill or belonged to socially disadvantaged groups living on the margins of society.” (Kaelber, 2012). Eugenics received substantial support in prestigious circles in Britain and the United States, and was supported by people other than merely extreme right-wing figures. Leading politicians, such as the twenty-sixth president of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt (Ball, 2013), and academics, such as John Maynard Keynes and George Bernard Shaw, publicly agreed with the policies. Bernard Shaw, for example, asserted that “the only fundamental and possible socialism is the socialization of the selective breeding of man” (Brignell, 2010). Winston Churchill was one of the Vice-Presidents of the International Eugenics Congress held in London in 1912 (MacKenzie, 1976: 518). Even well-known publications such as *New Statesman* and the *Manchester Guardian* (currently *Guardian*), which were otherwise known for their socialist orientation, supported eugenics. In the United States, prominent eugenics supporter Madison Grant published *The Passing of the Great Race*, a book that presented the history of Europe with the intention of supporting the greatness of the Nordic race and the threat posed to it by other races of lesser value. He advocated for a program of mandatory sterilization for those who were weak or unfit. His book was published in 1925 in German as *Der Untertang der Grossen Rasse*. This book attracted the attention of Adolf Hitler, who had been recently released from prison after an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government. Hitler was so moved by the book’s contents that he wrote to Grant to say “The book is my Bible.” Hitler’s writings, mainly *Mein Kampf*, contain a great deal of material that remarkably resembles Grant’s thinking; ultimately, *The Passing of the Great Race* was one element of Hitler’s concept of a racially pure Germany and Europe (Bouche & Rivard, 2014; Brignell, 2010; Mitchell, 2016b,

2016a; Weikart, 2004; Woodworth, 2009). Eugenics thinking and theories strongly influenced Nazi social policies. In 1935, the Law for the Prevention of Progeny Hereditary Diseases (Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses), mandating the forced sterilization of certain individuals with physical and mental disabilities, was adopted in Germany. The law provided a basis for the involuntary sterilization of people with physical and mental disabilities or mental illness. In 1934 “hereditary health courts” became active and began ordering compulsory sterilization (Popenoe, 1934). Then, the T4 euthanasia program, responsible for the death of approximately 70,000 Austrian and German disabled people and disabled children, was initiated. These inhuman, brutal practices became part of the Holocaust. The methodical persecution and murder of six million Jews with state support was built on the Nazi regime's belief that the Germans were racially superior and the Jews inferior. The Holocaust also targeted groups—such as the Roma and the disabled—because of their racial inferiority. Indubitably, Social Darwinism and eugenics alone cannot explain the cruel Nazi practices, particularly the Holocaust. Nevertheless, undeniably, eugenics beliefs, ethics, and practices significantly impacted Nazi thinking and policies.

After numerous years and the adoption of several declarations in the international arena designed to eliminate these vicious policies and practices, it might be regarded that the inhumane and atrocious beliefs, methods, and practices of the eugenic approach are not valid in the present day. However, this is not the case. Eugenics is still on the agenda of some western philosophers and prominent personalities. For instance, recently, a prominent and outspoken Australian philosopher at Oxford University expressed the following view:

“This term “eugenics” is very misunderstood... What people have in mind is the enforced sterilization of people deemed to be unfit to reproduce... But eugenics itself simply means having a child who has better prospects of a good

life. That is essentially the goal of clinical genetics – it's just not called eugenics today. It is true we need to recognize the mistakes of the eugenics movement of last century, but that doesn't mean that we can't use our knowledge of biology and genetics to enable people to better lives." (Mitchell, 2016a).

Without completely contradicting these remarks, eminent legal scholar and eugenics historian Professor Paul Lombardo states:

"We need to go slow, not in understanding, but in the way we take the insights we gain from science to make them into social policy... We want to wipe out disease, poverty and crime, but we should remember that we tried it before, and with a very heavy hand we did something we are ashamed of now." (Mitchell 2016a).

All the above-mentioned information and discussion indicate that eugenics-inspired thinking, both the genetic and moral aspects, have not vanished. The soft values underpinning the belief and theory of eugenics—such as deliberate differentiation, intentional segregation and discrimination, and exclusion—still have substantial basis in western societies. For instance, from late August to December 2010, Germany engaged in a curious debate about an anti-immigrant book titled *Germany Abolishes Itself: How We Are Playing with Our Future* (*Deutschland Schaft Sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen*) by Thilo Sarrazin. Sarrazin is a PhD-holding economist, bureaucrat, member of the Social Democrat Party, and former board member of the Bundesbank. In his book, while discussing the faults of the welfare state, education system, migrants, and poorly educated lower-class Germans, he asserted a number of calculated insults against Muslim migrants and, specifically, against Turks. Sarrazin intimated that certain groups of people are intellectually superordinate or subordinate to others. He explained this claim mainly in terms of discourse about class differences, but also discussed culture, gender norms, religion, and other hereditary disabilities, which he claimed affected the intelligence and learning abilities of Muslim immigrants

(Meng, 2015: 104). The book, which sold more than 1.5 million copies, advances ideas extremely similar to the basics of cultural and biological racism.

2.5.4. Islamophobia: “A New Name to an Old Phenomenon”

According to the *Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Society*, “the term Islamophobia denotes a range of negative feelings toward Muslims and their religion, from generalized bigotry, intolerance, and prejudice to a morbid dread and hatred. It may manifest itself in a broad range of negative actions and responses, including discrimination against Muslims, social exclusion, verbal and physical harassment, hate crimes, attacks on mosques, and vilification of Islam in the media” (Halstead, 2008: 762–764).

The term Islamophobia was described by Ekmelleddin İhsanoğlu, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), in his speech before the 61st session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on March 15, 2005 as follows:

“Islamophobia, which is **a new name to an old phenomenon**, has been recently brought to the fourth after the criminal, evil and tragic events of September 11, 2001. Although these horrendous atrocities received a swift and unanimous condemnation by OIC, Muslim leaders and scholars throughout the world, the irrational voices of hatred and bigotry were quick to demonize Islam and Muslims. Some Western media fueled the fear of Islam linking it with terrorism. Stereotypes and disrespectful comments about Islam were allowed to circulate and be published with the outcome that hatred and prejudice against Islam gained credibility, and the stereotyping in media coverage became a global sport.” (OIC, 2005) (emphasis by the author)

In most scholarly sources, the roots of Islamophobia are explained by returning to early Christianity and the Crusades. The phrasing “a new name to an old phenomenon” reflects the essence of such explanations in relation to Islamophobia.

There is a general agreement in academic sources that the term “Islamophobia” was popularized by a report titled “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All,” published by the race equality think-tank, the Runnymede Trust, in 1997 (Renton & Gidley, 2017: 7). Certain genealogical studies about the first use of the term Islamophobia refer to a use of the term by the Edward Said in his 1985 article “Orientalism reconsidered.” In this article, Edward Said used Islamophobia, without any explanation, in the context of the relationship between Islamophobia and antisemitism:

“Consider the case of one Orientalist who publicly attacked my book, he told me in a private letter, not because he disagreed with it on the contrary, he felt that what I said was just but because he had to defend the honor of his profession! Or take the connection explicitly made by two of the authors I cite in Orientalism, Renan and Proust - between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Here, one would have expected many scholars and critics to have seen the conjuncture, that hostility to Islam in the modern Christian West has historically gone hand in hand with, has stemmed from the same source, has been nourished at the same stream as anti-Semitism, and that a critique of the orthodoxies, dogmas and disciplinary procedures of Orientalism contributes to an enlargement of our understanding of the cultural mechanisms of anti-Semitism.” (Said, 1985: 8).

Prior to the 1997 Runnymede Trust report, “Islamophobia” was used in a 1994 report prepared by the same group titled “A Very Light Sleeper. The Persistence and Dangers of Antisemitism.” The report contains a subtitle of “Antisemitism and other forms of racism: Islamophobia.” The paragraph under the heading is as follows:

“77. There are some important similarities and overlaps between antisemitism and anti-Muslim feeling. The latter is also sometimes known as Islamophobia. At the same time, however, there are some significant differences. The similarities include the following: both Jews and Muslims are perceived by people hostile to them to be foreigners and intruders in European societies; there is a strong religious component in both kinds of hostility, dating back to medieval Christianity, with Jews seen as Christ killers and Muslims as infidels; the negative stereotypes prevalent in both kinds of hostility are used to justify processes of exclusion, marginalization and discrimination; the psychological processes and the interactions between attitudes and behavior are much the same in both instances; both require the same broad range of educational, legal and political measures to combat them; and there are links in both instances with global politics and relationships, specifically with the international

situation in the Middle East. The principal overlap lies in the fact that most racist and extremist organizations in Europe are simultaneously anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic.” (The Runnymede Trust, 1994: 55)

In the Foreword of the report, Anthony Lester, chairman of the Runnymede Trust from 1990–1993, and Trevor Phillips, chairman of the Runnymede Trust since 1993, stated that the commission found new examples of active prejudice against a religious minority of British Muslims, which is as alarming as antisemitism. They recommended that “the Runnymede Trust undertake further study into the phenomenon known as Islamophobia.” They also stressed that “the trustees will be considering this as a matter of urgency.” (The Runnymede Trust, 1994: 9)

In the Foreword of “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All,” Chair of the Commission Prof. Gordon Conway stated the following:

“.”We did not coin the term Islamophobia. It was already in use among sections of the Muslim community as a term describing the prejudice and discrimination which they experience in their everyday lives. For some of us on the Commission it was a new term, a rather ugly term, and we were not sure how it will be received by the readers of our document. However, it is evident from the responses which we received that Islamophobia describes a real and growing phenomenon- an ugly word for ugly reality. Hardly a day goes by without references to Islamophobia in the media (The Runnymede Trust, 1997: iii).

The report stated that the term Islamophobia “is not ideal, but recognizably similar to ‘xenophobia’... is a useful shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims” (The Runnymede Trust, 1997: 1). The report referred to the following three important phenomena in connection with the term Islamophobia: unfounded hostility toward Islam; practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities; and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs (The Runnymede Trust, 1997: 4).

A follow-up report published in 2004 highlighted the lack of progress in challenging and changing attitudes and behaviors against Muslims (The Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 2004). The new report asserts the following under the title of Islamophobia and racism:

“Hostility toward Islam and Muslims has been a feature of European societies since the eighth century. It has taken different forms at different times and has fulfilled a variety of functions. For example, the hostility in Spain in the fifteenth century was not the same as the hostility that was expressed and mobilized in the Crusades. Nor was the hostility during the time of the Ottoman Empire or that which prevailed throughout the age of empires and colonialism. It may be more apt to speak of ‘Islamophobias’ rather than of a single phenomenon. Each version of Islamophobia has its own features as well as similarities with, and borrowings from, other versions.” (The Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 2004: 7)

The most conspicuous feature of the 2004 report is that it discussed the relevance of arguments that consider Islamophobia a form of racism. When referring to terminology such as “anti-Muslim racism,” the report first stated that “An obvious objection to this suggestion is that Muslims are not a race.” However, after stating this, the report stressed “there is only one race, the human race” (The Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 2004: 11).

To mark the 20th-year anniversary of the 1997 report, the Runnymede Trust published another report in 2017 titled “Islamophobia. Still a challenge for us all.” The new report briefly defined Islamophobia as “anti-Muslim racism” and, then, explained:

“This is obviously a short definition. We have also developed a longer-form definition, building on the United Nations definition of racism generally. Longer definition: Islamophobia is any distinction, exclusion, or restriction toward, or preference against, Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.” (The Runnymede Trust, 2017: 1).

The 2017 report recognized Islamophobia as a form of racial discrimination. It stated pointedly that “A definition of Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism clearly, then, fits with historical and academic accounts of racism.” The report also stressed that “All forms of racism are based on non-scientific accounts of ‘races’ that seek to justify the persistent and extensive disadvantages and inequalities those groups face in society” (The Runnymede Trust, 2017: 8).

As mentioned by Kaya (2014: 747) in his article about Islamophobia, “there are a number of other possible terms to refer to negative feelings and attitudes toward Islam and Muslims, such as anti-Muslimism, anti-Muslim racism, intolerance against Muslims, anti-Muslim prejudice, anti-Muslim bigotry, hatred of Muslims, anti-Islamism, anti-Muslimism, Muslimophobia, demonization of Isla, and ‘demonization of Muslims’.” In that respect, Kaya (2014: 747) noted that “as Sivanandan rightly states, the term anti-Muslim racism is used to refer to hate crimes and to harassment, rudeness, and verbal abuse in public spaces, whereas the term Islamophobia refers to discourse and mindsets in the media, including the broadsheets as well as the tabloids” (see also Sivanandan, 2010).¹⁵ However, as mentioned by Kaya (2014: 747), “probably the most commonly used term in today’s world is Islamophobia.” In this context Kaya (2104: 749) used the term Islamophobia as “the overarching narrative which informs the manifestations of both anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Muslim racism,” suggesting that the term, therefore, refers to “a set of particular discourses and mindsets formed

¹⁵ This reference to Sivanandan reflects an interview with him in 2010 by the Institute of Race Relations. In this interview Sivanandan replies to a question of “How does this then relate to how we tackle Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism, are they really the same thing? Can the terms be used interchangeably?” by saying “Yes and no. Yes, Islamophobia is implicated in anti-Muslim racism; but no, the one does not equate the other. I see Islamophobia as a term relating to a set of ideas which indicate an antipathy to Islam – which can range from the crude and direct demonization we find in the tabloids to the intellectual sophistry we associate with people like Amis. Whereas anti-Muslim racism is the acting out of that antipathy that prejudice – in violent attacks on the street or, when institutionalized in the state apparatus, in the impact of the anti-terror laws, in racial profiling by the police, and so on.”

by the politicians, security forces, bureaucracy, media, and some civil society organizations and academics.”

Liz Fekete, Director of the Institute of Race Relations and a scholar focused on the relationship between racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia, stated that she is charting “the path from nativism to xeno-racism and the institutionalized anti-Muslim racism of today” (Fekete, 2009: 2). She succinctly described Islamophobia in Europe as follows:

“Post-September 11 the parameters of institutionalized xenoracism – anti-foreignness – have been expanded to include minority ethnic communities that have been settled in Europe for decades, simply because they are Muslim. Since Islam now represents “threat” to Europe, its Muslim residents, even though they are citizens, even though they may be European-born, are caught up in the ever-expanding loop of xeno-racism. They do not merely threaten Europe as the “enemy within” in the war on terror, their adherence to Islamic norms and values threatens the notion of Europeanness itself. Under the guise of patriotism, a wholesale anti-Islamic racism has been unleashed that it threatens to destroy the fabric of multiculturalism.” (Fekete, 2009: 44)

Based on these statements, it can be suggested that Islamophobia is a phenomenon marked by derived elements of racism. It could be considered a by-product or converted form of racism; hence, it deserves to be called anti-Muslim racism. It is also possible, as suggested by some scholars, to “compare and contrast the present European fear of Islam with the past European fear of Jews—in short, a comparative study of two temporally separate racisms” (Renton & Gidley, 2017: 4).

I should point out that the term “Islamophobia,” like xenophobia, does not have a universally accepted definition. Consequently, Bleich (2011: 1582) stated:

“It is extremely difficult to compare levels of Islamophobia across time, location, or social group, or to levels of analogous categories such as racism, anti-Semitism, or xenophobia. Without a concept that applies across these comparative dimensions, it is also virtually impossible to identify the causes and consequences of Islamophobia with any precision.”

Bleich (2011: 1585) “tried to make Islamophobia a more concrete and usable concept for social scientists” and defined the term as “indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims.” It should be underlined that Bleich's views on the measurability of Islamophobia are applicable to xenophobia.

These explanations lead me to focus more on racism, which is the most pertinent concept of collating all these new social phenomena under one roof, and to examine the possible transformation of this concept, namely racism, into different forms over time. At this point, it is worth remembering that some scholars qualify racism as a “scavenger ideology,” which “picks out and utilise ideas and values from other sets of ideas and beliefs in specific socio-historical contexts” (Solomos & Back, 1996: 213).

2.6. Metamorphosis of Racism

Around the turn of the 20th century, the United States witnessed a thought-provoking debate about racism sparked by the book *The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society*, written by Dinesh D’Souza. D’Souza stated his rejection of certain shared premises that shaped the conventional wisdom about racism and American civil rights laws. D’Souza explained these premises as follows:

- “Racism is simply an irrational prejudice, a product of ignorance and fear.
- Slavery was a racist institution, and the Constitution’s compromise with slavery discredits the American founding as racist and morally corrupt.
- Segregation was a system established by white racists for the purpose of oppressing blacks.
- In American history, racism is the theory and discrimination is the practice.
- Blacks and other persons of color cannot be racist because racism requires not just prejudice but also power.
- Racism is the main obstacle facing African Americans today, and the primary explanation for black problem” (1995: 2).

D'Souza (1995: 525) concluded that "racism undoubtedly exists, but it no longer has the power to thwart blacks or any other group in achieving their economic, political, and social aspirations."

The controversial claim by D'Souza was empathetically challenged by several academicians and public intellectuals who generally labeled his claim as dehistoricizing race and racism. Such claims have naturally paved the way to debates on whether racism has really disappeared.

David Theo Goldberg enthusiastically challenged the view that racism has ended. He defended the view that race "conceptually is made to disappear... rendered irrelevant socially... conceptually stigmatized so that only the obviously bigoted-extreme individuals- get to qualify...reduced in its supposed singularity to invoking race, not to its destabilizing structural effects or the legacy of its unfair impacts...pushed further and further out of sight, out of existence," and that there is "an increasing reluctance to acknowledge its traces, the legacy of its structural conditions, its continuing significance" (Goldberg, 2009: 360).

Goldberg drew attention to the point that "as the terms of articulation, analytic and critical are dimmed and deleted, distorted and redirected," the concept of race does not disappear but takes on a new form, which requires "new referential articulations." (Goldberg, 2009: 361). He stressed that his own developed concept of "racism without racists" did not adequately explain the new situation regarding racism and referred to the concept of "racisms without racism." According to Goldberg, this concept reflects the requirements of "post-human, post-anthropocentric ontology of our time" and denotes the "refusal to acknowledge racist expression" (Goldberg, 2009: 360–61).

In his 2015 book, Goldberg discussed the “post racial” period in-depth and underlined that “Far from being the end of racisms, then, postraciality represents rather a certain way thinking about race, and implicitly of racist expression” (2015: 24). He forcefully advocated that “The post racial, in short, far from being the end of the race, is a neo-raciality, racisms’ extension if not resurrection (2015: 24) ... Racism proliferate in the wake of the supposed death of race” (Goldberg, 2015: 152).

In his book *Racism Without Racists*, American political sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2010: 11–12), explained “the strange enigma of race in contemporary America,” underlining that “few whites in the United States claims to be racist... most whites claim that race is no longer relevant... whites have developed powerful explanations – which have ultimately become justifications – for contemporary racial inequality that exculpate them from any responsibility for the status of people of color... enunciates positions that safeguard their racial interests without sounding racist.” He considered this approach a “a new racial ideology” and labeled it “color blind racism” and “racism without racists” (Bonilla-Silva, 2010: 11–12). Richard John Perry (2007) referred to this type of racism as adaptive racism. He stated that “The terms may change, perhaps giving the impression that the old problems have disappeared, when in fact they have merely acquired protective coloration through semantic camouflage” (Perry, 2007: 215–216).

The above explanations point to the idea that racism is not bereft of life in Western Europe. Instead, it seems that racism has arisen in varied forms after being dormant for some time. At this point, it is possible to propose that racism never completely disappeared, by giving examples that even after the successes of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, racism persisted and Holocaust denial surfaced in the 1970s in various countries. Considering the emergence of Islamophobia as another

example of these issues, arguably, racism has never ceased. Here, I use the term dormant to mean temporarily in abeyance yet capable of being activated. In my judgment, dormancy is especially valid for Western Europe, which is faced with the heavy legacy of Nazi Germany. In plant dormancy—nearly all plants—whether growing indoors or outdoors in a garden, become dormant in winter. This period of rest is crucial to their survival and regrowth. The same could be analogous to racism in the Western European context. After the winter for racism, which began following the Second World War and horrific Nazi atrocities, the beginning of the 21st century saw the start of what I call the mutational rise of racism. Cultural differences and distinctiveness are the primary excuses for this mutational rise; I refer to these excuses as the “innocentization of racism.” In a sense, cultural differences are being used as camouflage for this behavior.

At the 1971 International Year for Action to Combat Racism, Lévi-Strauss’ stressed how the differences of cultures may be considered as the actual beginning of this innocentization (Levi-Strauss, 1985: xiv)¹⁶. Racism was hidden using the pretext of cultural differences and “semantic camouflage.” This created a fertile ground suitable for the transformation of racism into new formats.

In recent academic work, we observe a new terminology about racism that is well-suited to this transformation, especially in the European context. For example, Cole discusses the newer form of non-color-coded racism and called it hybridist racism, which includes Islamophobia and anti-asylum seeker racism. He also uses the term xeno-racism, which he borrowed from Sri Lankan origin novelist and philosopher Sivanandan. Mike Cole stresses that “Islamophobia became a major form of racism in

¹⁶ Levi-Strauss provided a detailed account of this lecture, wherein he stressed that “human societies exhibit a certain optimal diversity” and “this diversity results from the desire of each culture to resist the cultures surrounding it.”

Britain after the first Gulf War...Muslims may or may not be subject to color-coded racism and are often marked out not so much by their color as by their beards and headscarves” (Cole, 2016: 24, 27).

Sivanandan suggested that the xeno form of racism was “racism meted out to asylums seekers and migrants even when they are white” and related this phenomenon to xenophobia. He further asserted that this xenophobic behavior is designed to preserve culture, race, and nativism, and it “bears all the marks of the old racism, except that it is not color coded.” He stressed that this is “racism in substance, though xeno in form” and called it “xeno-racism, a racism of global capital” (Sivanandan, 2008: 168). Liz Fekete (2001: 23–24), referencing the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) European Race Bulletin (No. 37, June 2001) workshop paper, quotes Sivanandan on xeno-racism as follows:

“It is a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins from the former colonial territories but at the newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed, and the uprooted, who are beating at Western Europe’s doors, the Europe that helped to displace them in the first place. It is a racism [...] that cannot be colour-coded, directed as it is at poor whites as well, and is therefore passed off as xenophobia, a “natural” fear of strangers. But in the way it denigrates and retires people before segregating and/or expelling them, it is a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism. It is racism in substance, but “xeno” in form. It is a racism that is meted out to impoverished strangers even if they are white. It is xeno-racism.”

Metamorphosis refers to “a profound change in form from one stage to the next in the life history of an organism...the structural or functional modification of a plant organ or structure during its development” or “change of physical form, structure, or substance... a marked and more or less abrupt developmental change in the form or structure of an animal (as a butterfly or a frog) occurring subsequent to birth or hatching” (Merriam-Webster, 2001). Metamorphosis, therefore, indicates a transformational change in the organism, which organism may be living, or it can be a

system, structure, or construct that is analogous to—or resembling—a living creature or being. In this sense, we use the concept of metamorphosis to explain the changes in—or transformations of—certain social phenomena, such as racism.

Lederberg, who laid the foundation for modern molecular biology, genetic engineering and biotechnology, shared the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1958 for his discovery of “bacteria transfer genetic information, overturning the prevailing thought that bacteria weren't able to swap DNA.” (Adams, 2008: para 3). He asserted that “bacteria exchange loops of DNA called plasmids¹⁷... allow bacteria to pick up new genes, and therefore to adapt to new environments” (Adams, 2008: para 3). In his 1956 article, Lederberg explained the rule of inheritance in cell lineage as “the transmission of an undiminished legacy to each of a geometrically increasing family of descendants. Episodes of mutation or segregation may intervene, but further descendants will again follow this rule of clonal heredity.” (1956: 845). He defined transduction as “a mechanism of genetic recombination which is notable for the transfer of hereditary fragments from one cell to another.” Lederberg derived the term transduction from the Latin *transducere* (transfer) (Lederberg, 1956: 845).

The concept of “transduction is used in a range of scientific disciplines to denote various processes of change in form and matter,” including social processes. (Sthyre, 2010: 119). It is, thus, “a concept emphasizing the radical openness and emergence of any entity” (Sthyre, 2010: 118–119). French philosopher Gilbert Simondon (1992: 313) discussed the term transduction as follows:

¹⁷ Plasmid, as mentioned in the quoted passage, according to Dictionary.com. (<https://www.dictionary.com/compare-words/plasmid-vs-chromosome/22?scrollToId=paginated-list-section>) means “a segment of DNA independent of the chromosomes and capable of replication, occurring in bacteria yeast, used in recombinant DNA procedure to transfer genetic material from one cell to another.”

“This term denotes a process—be it physical, biological, mental or social—in which an activity gradually sets itself in motion, propagating within a given area, through structuration of the different zones of the area over which it operates. Each region of the structure that is constituted in this way then serves to constitute the next one to such an extent that at the very time this structuration is affected there is a progressive modification taking place in tandem with it.”

Simondon (1992: 313) likened this process to crystal formation and stated that “a crystal, beginning as a tiny seed, which grows and extends itself in all directions in its mother-water. Each layer of molecules that has already been constituted serves as the structuring basis for the layer that is being formed next, and the result is an amplifying-reticular structure.”

I consider the concept of transduction to be a process by which one form of entity, organism, object, or creature is transmuted by some type of medium—configuration or composition—into another form. Transduction can precipitate a metamorphosis or transformational change in the organism; transduction allows the “genetic information” of social phenomenon, such as racism, into the types of discriminatory social phenomenon, such as xenophobia. Similar to the “cell lineage” explanation of Joshua Lederberg, I deem it possible for the “undiminished legacy” and “hereditary fragments” of racism to be transmitted to xenophobia. In such a transmission, we need a certain “transfer system” or, as suggested in the terminology developed by Lederberg, a virus called a “plasmid.”

At this point, I shall advance the idea that the virus transmitting the genetic information of racism into xenophobia is violence. It is, therefore, necessary to succinctly explain the relevance of violence to racism and xenophobia. Balibar (1991: 17–18) defined racism as follows:

“a true “total social phenomenon” inscribes itself in practices (forms of violence, contempt, intolerance, humiliation, and exploitation), in discourses

and representations which are so many intellectual elaborations of the phantasm of prophylaxis or segregation (the need to purify the social body, to preserve “one’s own” or “our” identity from all forms of mixing, interbreeding or invasion) and which are articulated around stigmata of otherness (name, skin color, religious practices).”

In the above quotation, Balibar included the forms of violence in the practices of racism. He stated in the 1990s that “differentialist racism from now on will tend to present itself as the true anti-racism and therefore true humanism and will easily connect with ‘crowd psychology’ which is enjoying something of a revival, as a general explanation of irrational movements, aggression, and collective violence, and, particularly of xenophobia.” (Balibar 1991, 23).

The World Health Organization’s (WHO) definition of violence includes psychological harm and deprivation. According to the “World Report on Violence and Health,” violence involves three broad categories: self-directed, interpersonal, and collective. Collective violence is “subdivided into social, political, and economic violence... unlike the other two broad categories, the subcategories of collective violence suggest possible motives for violence committed by larger groups of individuals or by states.” Collective violence is defined as “the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group – whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity – against another group or set of individuals, to achieve political, economic or social objectives” (Krug, Mercy, Dahlberg, Zwi, & Lozano, 2002; 215).

In fact, the prominent factor that changes the nature of discrimination from some kind of passive type of personal or group prejudice to action-oriented discrimination that aims for social control through the collective-legitimation of the use of physical force is termed violence—specifically, collective violence (Short & Wolfgang, 2009: xiv).

Racism was criminalized in the Western European context after the Second World War mainly because of its contributory role in Nazi ideology and policies, which “viewed the world as being divided up into competing inferior and superior races, each struggling for survival and dominance” (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.) and left to dormancy. In parallel with innocentization attempts under the guise of cultural differences, racist thinking managed to camouflage itself, making the mutational rise of racism possible over time. This mutation occurred through transduction, or a transductional metamorphosis. Through this process, the most hazardous genetic trait of racism (violence, especially its collective form) was transferred into xenophobia.

When discussing extreme xenophobia, it is necessary to understand what is meant by extreme and how it can be measured. As explained earlier, xenophobia is essentially a personal passive concept. A person can individually feel uneasy about strangers without harming the other party. They may be uncomfortable being with strangers or even personally hate strangers, but that emotion, prejudice, or attitude can be kept under control as long as it does not involve the intention to inflict physical or verbal harm on the other party. The transformation of emotion, particularly from prejudice and attitude into an action—is a new phase. I mentioned earlier that the most pertinent definition of xenophobia is “attitudes, prejudices and behavior that reject, exclude, and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society, or national identity.” I also mentioned that human behavior includes hostile behaviors including aggression and violence. In this context, I stated that violence is an act of physical force that inflicts harm on the other party. Within the framework of these explanations, I believe that physical hostile behaviors, such as aggression and violence, change the character of xenophobia from passive to active.

Physical violence may include collective violence. In the verbal sense, “hate speech” also transforms xenophobia from passive to active. In summary, I assert that active physical and verbal xenophobic behaviors will transform xenophobia into extreme xenophobia.

The following figure illustrates the sequential steps that occur to reach the level of extreme xenophobia:




Figure 2: Step-by-step progression to extreme xenophobia

This logical sequence allows me to draw a parallel between Sivananda’s xeno-racism and extreme xenophobia. As noted earlier, Sivanandan asserted that today's racism is essentially racism in substance, but xeno in form. In this formation, the idea of xeno-racism innovatively and creatively combines the concepts of racism and xenophobia. I claim that this terminology explains that racism combines with xenophobia and nests itself in extreme xenophobia.

CHAPTER III

NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF XENOPHOBIA

3.1. Evolution of Discrimination as Wrongfully Imposed Disadvantageous Treatment

Seventy years after the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris (December 10, 1948) and more than 50 years after the conclusion of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, new forms and methods of discrimination still threaten the dignity, worth, and security of human persons. These new forms and methods also dangerously disrupt the social cohesion of societies and tend to seriously derange the international system shaped on the basis of painful experiences of the two world wars in the 20th century.

Discrimination is defined as the unjust treatment of one group of people relative to other people.¹⁸ Since the group is negatively categorized in society, it is easy to

¹⁸ Discrimination might be in favor of or against the person or group of people. The term as it is used in this study is its generally accepted negative meaning, described in the Oxford Online Dictionary as follows: “make an unjust or prejudicial distinction in the treatment of different categories of people,”

subjugate them to prejudicial treatment. Exclusion, rejection, ignorance, and social ostracism are the natural concomitants of this prejudicial treatment.¹⁹ The usage of discrimination as a term in connection with race and color dates back to the United States Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Greenfield & Kates, 1975). One of the oldest-credible contemporary definitions of discrimination dates to 1949. The Memorandum titled “The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination,” prepared by the Human Rights Division of the Department of Social Affairs of the United Nations for assisting the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities contains the following definition: “Discrimination includes any conduct based on a distinction made on grounds of natural or social categories, which have no relation either to individual capacities or merits or to the concrete behavior of the individual person” (Allport 1979, 52).

There are several specific forms of discrimination,²⁰ but it is generally accepted that approaches and policies directed against human beings on the grounds of race, color, and religion constitute the datum line for forms of discrimination. The issue of race and racial discrimination can be considered the main frame of all forms of discrimination. In this context, the United Nations Charter and the Universal

and in the Cambridge Online Dictionary as “the treatment of a person or particular group of people differently, in a way that is worse than the way people are usually treated.”

¹⁹ In this context I refer to “social ostracism” in line with the analysis of Kipling D. Williams. (Kipling, 1997: chap. 7). Kipling (1997: 133–136) defines social ostracism as “the general process of exclusion and rejection” and “individuals or groups are physically excluded (but are not physically assaulted or killed) from interacting with others.”

²⁰ The “UN and the Rule of Law” website, under the title of “Equality and Non-discrimination,” describes these specific documents as “the international human rights legal framework contains international instruments to combat specific forms of discrimination, including discrimination against indigenous peoples, migrants, minorities, people with disabilities, discrimination against women, racial and religious discrimination, or discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity,” and refers to the Special Rapporteurs for each of them. Article 13 of the EU Treaty of Amsterdam refers to the “discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”

Declaration of Human Rights can be used as basic international documents, which provide us a signpost of the ways to combat different forms of discrimination.

In its opening article, the United Nations Charter declares that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms “for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (UN, 1945: sec. 1). As this provision states, the Charter foresees four grounds for discrimination.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted three years later, expands the list of categories of proscribed grounds of discrimination and proclaims that everyone is entitled to human rights “without distinction of any kind, such as the following: “race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” The Declaration also states (Article 2) that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (OHCHR, 1948: chap. 2).

Several conventions and declarations on discrimination were adopted in the framework of the United Nations between 1948 and 1965, which refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in their preambular and operative paragraphs. They repeat the UDHR’s list nearly verbatim in their non-discrimination clauses.

For example, the ILO in June 4, 1958, adopted a Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (ILO, 1958). This Convention, in its preambular and operational paragraphs, refers to discrimination and states that “discrimination constitutes a violation of rights enunciated by the [UDHR].” (ILO, 1958). Article 1 (a) of the Convention defines discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or

impairing equality of opportunity, or treatment in employment or occupation.” (ILO, 1958). Apart from repeating the UDHR’s list of non-discrimination clauses with the exception of language, the key words contained in the Convention that explain the discrimination between individuals are distinction, exclusion, and preference.

After the adoption of the ILO Convention on discrimination, the “Convention against Discrimination in Education” was adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on December 14, 1960. This convention also follows the methodology of ILO and its preambular and operational paragraphs refer to UDHR and its list of non-discrimination clauses. Article I of the Convention reads as follows:

“For the purpose of this Convention, the term “discrimination” includes any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preferences which, being based on race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education...” (UNESCO, 1960).

As this paragraph shows, the UNESCO Convention uses more or less the same terminology on discrimination and non-discrimination clauses contained in the ILO Convention on discrimination.

3.2. Defying Racial Discrimination and Resultant Legal Framework

Beginning with the UDHR in 1948, we observe a determined position and firm resolve in the international community to avoid discrimination, exclusion, limitation, and preference made based on race, color, religion, opinion, origin, and status. This approach was conceptualized in 1963 by the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (OHCHR 1963).

Article 1 of the Declaration is as follows:

“Discrimination between human beings on the ground of race, color or ethnic origin is an offense to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as a violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the [UDHR], as an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among nations and as a fact capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples.”

The Declaration stresses that policies based on prejudice of racial superiority or on racial hatred jeopardize friendly relations among peoples, co-operation between nations, and international peace and security. The Declaration calls for particular efforts to prevent discrimination based on race, color, or ethnic origin, especially in the fields of civil rights, access to citizenship, education, religion, employment, occupation, and housing (OHCHR, 1963: pt. 3).

The efforts and studies of the international community within the framework of the United Nations regarding the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all paved the way for the preparation and conclusion of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (OHCHR, 1965). This document is the principal international instrument regarding non-discrimination.

The Convention, in its preamble, refers to Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, which, as mentioned above, emphasizes the importance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. It references the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including its non-discrimination list. The Convention then describes racial discrimination in Article 1 as follows:

“The term racial discrimination shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.”

In this light, arguably, one of the most important contributions of the Convention to the discrimination problem is merging the exclusionary approaches based on color, descent, nationality, and ethnic origin under the roof of racial discrimination. In this way, the Convention acknowledges the central role of the concepts of race and racism in the international fight against discrimination.

The Convention, in this context, declares all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred incitement as an offense punishable by law. Acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another color or ethnic group are also included in this category. It establishes a requirement for special measures aimed at ensuring the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals within those groups for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights as well as prohibiting and preventing racial discrimination. It also includes equity as a goal alongside the prohibition of racial discrimination (OHCHR, 1965: sec. 1, 2, 3).

With respect to the prevention and prohibition of racial discrimination, Article 1 proposes a series of affirmative steps that States Parties must implement toward its elimination. It specifically requires that special measures be adopted for ensuring equality—not only of individuals but also of groups. Governments are required to use special measures not only to prevent racial discrimination but also to achieve equality in the enjoyment of human rights (de la Vega, 2009: 1–2).

The Convention specifically refers to the two major troubles of the time—namely, apartheid and colonialism. In this respect, Article 3 of the Convention states that “States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their

jurisdiction.” Further, Article 15 deals with the rights of colonial countries and peoples. This Article states that “Pending the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, the provisions of this Convention shall in no way limit the right of petition granted to these peoples by other international instruments or by the United Nations and its specialized agencies.”

3.3. UNESCO Studies on Discrimination and Racism

Ideologies of racial discrimination and racial superiority cast an extremely dark shadow over the history of the world and especially negatively affected social life in Europe. Owing to this, the United Nations and newly founded UNESCO, immediately after the Second World War, identified racist doctrines and racial discrimination as major sources of worldwide tensions. Hence, a team of experts composed of biologists and social scientists was asked to explain in simple terms the outcome of scientific inquiry into the nature of racial difference and indicate its implications for social relations. Since ideas about race had been built on racial inequality, the central issue of this inquiry was “equality.” UNESCO published four statements during this process, in 1950, 1951, 1964, and 1967 (Hiernaux & Banton, 1969). There are important findings and explanations in each statement that concern the social side of racism and racial discrimination.

The first paragraph in the 1950 statement reads as follows: “Scientists have reached general agreement in recognizing that mankind is one: that all men belong to the same species, *homo sapiens*.” It proceeds by stating that “difference as exist between different groups of mankind are because of the operation of evolutionary factors of

differentiation... In these ways groups have arisen of varying stability and degree of differentiation which have been classified in different ways for different purposes” (Hiernaux & Banton, 1969: 30). The basic thought underlying this approach is an understanding of certain differences between the human groups. This “we are all equal, but...” approach reflects the biologists’ complaints that the ethic of universal brotherhood surpassed what could be affirmed on scientific grounds.

This process resulted in the adoption of Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice in 1978. This Declaration deals with all aspects of race issues and racial prejudice. In its introductory paragraphs, it underlines that the “Declaration is the only basic legal instrument applicable to the general issues of racism” (UNESCO, 1978). It was adopted unanimously and by acclamation. This extremely important instrument, for the purposes of this study, contains three crucial paragraphs. Paragraph 1/1 states that “All human beings belong to a single species and are descended from a common stock. They are born equal in dignity and rights and all form an integral part of humanity.”

Paragraph 1/2 reads:

“All individuals and groups have the right to be different, to consider themselves as different and to be regarded as such. However, the diversity of lifestyles and right to be different may not, in any circumstances, serve as a pretext for social prejudice; they may not justify either in law or in fact any discriminatory practice whatsoever, nor provide a ground for the policy of apartheid, which is the extreme form of racism.”

The third important paragraph concerns the population groups of foreign origin. After the Second World War, most colonized nations won their independence. New population movements occurred that brought previously separated people into closer contact. Some people from former colonies migrated to the countries that had colonized them, such as the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, as migrant workers. Germany was not a major colonial country. After the Second World War,

Germany imported labor first from Italy in 1955 and then from Turkey by a 1961 treaty. Turkish workers were considered guest workers and were allowed to bring their relatives to assist with family reunification (Adam, 2015: 451).

These developments placed migration and immigration, migrant groups and communities, and guest workers in the center of discrimination studies. In this context, paragraph 9/3 of the Declaration states:

“Population groups of foreign origin, particularly migrant workers and their families who contribute to the development of the host country, should benefit from appropriate measures designed to afford them security and respect for their dignity and cultural values and to facilitate their adaptation to the host environment and their professional advancement with a view to their subsequent reintegration in their country of origin and their contribution to its development; steps should be taken to make it possible for their children to be taught their mother tongue.”

In my judgment, the formulation included in paragraph 1 of the 1978 Declaration, which reads as “All individuals and groups have the right to be different, to consider themselves as different, and to be regarded as such,” has a direct influence on the new racism concept of 1980s since the discussions regarding this concept essentially rests on the idea of the right to be different.

3.4. New Tools to Combat Racism

Since the adoption of the UDHR, the international community has made important advances in the fight against racism and racial discrimination. National and international laws have been enacted that include important instruments such as the above-mentioned International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Most importantly, the world witnessed the defeat of apartheid in South Africa. However, as technology brings the people of the world together and political barriers tumble, new forms of racism and discrimination have come into existence.

Horrors such as ethnic cleansing have emerged. Ideas of racial superiority have spread into new media such as the Internet. Globalization has created new dimensions in inequality. As racial discrimination and ethnic violence grow in complexity, they become a greater challenge for the international community.

Therefore, in the context of the United Nations system, new tools to deal with the racism are called for, and the World Conference Against Racism was developed. In 1972, the United Nations decided to launch the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (UN, 1972). Related activities were official commended at the end of 1973, coinciding with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the UDHR. A Programme for the Decade was approved that provided intensive action on the national, regional, and international level.

A major feature of the program was a world conference on combating racial discrimination. The main theme of the conference was adopting effective ways and concrete measures to secure the full and universal implementation of United Nations decisions and resolutions on racism, racial discrimination, apartheid, decolonization, and self-determination. The first World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination was held in Geneva from August 14 to August 25, 1978, and a Declaration and a Programme of Action were adopted (UN, 1978).

The Conference declared that:

- “Any doctrine of racial superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust, and dangerous, and has no justification whatsoever.
- All peoples and all human groups have contributed to the progress of civilization and cultures which constitute the common heritage of humanity,
- All forms of discrimination ... based on the theory of racial superiority, exclusiveness or hatred are a violation of fundamental human rights and

jeopardize friendly relations among peoples, co-operation between nations and international peace and security” (UN, 1978: 10–11).

It specifically condemned apartheid, “the extreme form of institutionalized racism,” as a crime against humanity, an affront to the dignity of mankind and a threat to peace and security worldwide (UN, 1978: 11). In addition, it recommended that, because of the severe economic inequalities that resulted from racial discrimination, efforts to combat racism should include measures aimed at improving the living conditions of men and women. In paragraph 42 of its Programme of Action, the Conference recommended that another world conference be held at the end of the Decade “to review and evaluate the work undertaken during the Decade and to chart new measures where necessary.”

Along with this recommendation, the UN decided that the Second World Conference should be held in 1983 with the purpose of reviewing and assessing the activities undertaken during the Decade, and formulating the ways and means to create specific measures that could ensure the full and universal implementation of the decisions on racism, racial discrimination, and apartheid.

The second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, held in Geneva between August 1 and August 12, 1983, reviewed and assessed the activities undertaken during the Decade and formulated specific measures to ensure that the instruments designed during the Decade were implemented (UN, 1983). The UN General Assembly resolution concerning the Conference noted that, “despite the efforts of the international community, the principal objectives of the first Decade had not been attained, and that millions of human beings continued to be the victims of varied forms of racism, racial discrimination and apartheid.” Program of Action adopted by the Conference reaffirmed that the system of apartheid in South Africa was

the most extreme form of institutionalized racism and crime against humanity. The Programme openly stressed the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed peoples of South Africa and Namibia by all available means, including armed struggle (UN, 1983: sec. 3).

The Programme of Action also called upon the mass media to play a role in disseminating information on methods and techniques to be used in combating racism, racial discrimination, and apartheid, and warned of the possible one-sidedness or distortion that was possible when members of racial or ethnic minorities were denied self-expression. Other recommended measures included those designed to promote and protect the human rights of persons belonging to minority groups, indigenous populations and peoples, and migrant workers, and the establishment of recourse procedures for victims of racial discrimination.

3.5. New Forms of Discrimination and Xenophobia

The Second Decade between the years of 1983–1992 dwelled mainly on apartheid and witnessed one of the remarkable achievements of the international community in its combat against racism and racial discrimination. The South African Government released Nelson Mandela and began to dismantle the system of apartheid. With the end of apartheid, the attention of the international community started to shift its attention to new forms of discrimination. The World Conference on Human Rights that occurred in Vienna in June 1993 bore special importance as it adopted the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on June 25, 1993 (OHCHR, 1993: para. 15).

The Declaration stated among its major principles that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. The Conference welcomed the progress made in dismantling apartheid and referred to new forms of racism and racial

discrimination, particularly xenophobia. This is one of the pioneering references to xenophobia in the texts adopted in the normative studies made within the UN framework. Paragraph 15 of the Declaration reads as follows:

“Respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms without distinction of any kind is fundamental rule of international human rights law. The speedy and comprehensive elimination of all forms of racism and racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance is a priority task for the international community. Governments should take effective measures to prevent and combat them. Groups, institutions, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and individuals are urged to intensify their efforts in cooperating and coordinating their activities against these evils.”

The Declaration, while referring to the “gross and systematic violations and situations that constitute serious obstacles to the full enjoyment of human rights,” enlists these “violations and obstacles as torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary and arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detention, all forms of racism, racial discrimination and apartheid, foreign occupation and alien domination, xenophobia, poverty, hunger and other denials of economic, social, and cultural rights, religious intolerance, terrorism, discrimination against women, and lack of the rule of law” (OHCHR, 1993: para. 30).

The Conference urged governments to implement immediate measures and develop strong policies to prevent and combat all manifestations of racism, xenophobia, or related intolerance, where necessary, by enacting appropriate legislation, including penal measures, and by establishing national institutions to combat such phenomena (OHCHR, 1993: para. 20).

In the Declaration, there is an important reference to the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance (OHCHR, 2008: para. 21).

On December 20, 1993, the UN proclaimed the Third Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (1994–2003). In the same year, the Commission on Human Rights appointed a “Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.”²¹ Special Rapporteur’s general mandate was stated very briefly in paragraph 10 of the resolution as follows:

“Decides, in particular in the light of recent trends, to appoint, for a three-year period, a special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia and related intolerance, and requests the special rapporteur to report thereon to the Commission on an annual basis, beginning at its fiftieth session...”

Then, in 1994, the mandate was defined more precisely by a new resolution (UN, 1994). Operational paragraph 4 of the said resolution, which refers to xenophobia along with the other types of discrimination, including discrimination against Muslims, is as follows:

“Requests the Special Rapporteur to examine according to his mandate incidents of contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, any form of discrimination against Blacks, Arabs and Muslims, xenophobia, negrophobia, anti-Semitism, and related intolerance, as well as governmental measures to overcome them, and to report on these matters to the Commission at its fifty-first session...”

For the sake of narrative integrity, I find it useful to briefly explain the changes that occurred in the Special Rapporteur’s mandate in the first decade of the 2000s. In 2008, the Human Right Council adopted a new resolution and expanded the mandate for the Special Rapporteur (OHCHR, 2008).

²³ Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/20. (1993). Measures to combat contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance. 48th meeting. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/racism/srracism/pages/indexsrracism.aspx>

According to this resolution, the mandate of the Special Rapporteur includes the requirement “to gather, request, receive and exchange information and communication, and to investigate all forms and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.” It also specifically mentions “the phenomenon of xenophobia” as an issue which should be focused on.

As mentioned above, the UN proclaimed the 10-year period beginning in 1993 as the Third Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, and adopted the Programme of Action proposed for the Third Decade (UN, 1993).

The Third Decade has broadened and deepened the traditional views on racism. Signs of this new understanding are indicated in the resolution that began the Decade. For instance, the resolution refers to the evolution of racism in its introductory paragraphs and states that the UN member states are “deeply concerned about the current trend of the evolution of racism into discriminatory practices based on culture, nationality, religion or language.” (UN, 1993: Introductory paragraph 9). Another example appears in paragraph 9 of the Programme of Action:

“During the discussion at the substantive session of 1992 of the Economic and Social Council concerning the Second Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, many delegations expressed their concern with regard to new expressions of racism, racial discrimination, intolerance and xenophobia in various parts of the world. In particular, these affect minorities, ethnic groups, migrant workers, indigenous populations, nomads, immigrants and refugees.”

The international community has tried to determine the basic roots of racism and endeavored to introduce evolutionary changes to the old concepts to prevent the eruption of conflicts caused by racism or racial discrimination. Globalization has also exerted new social pressures and required new methods to combat racism and racial discrimination. The institutionalization of xenophobia coincided with these

developments and was highlighted by the implementation of measures against migrant workers in some states.

The Third Decade introduced new terminology for the discrimination studies. Traditional terms like racism and racial discrimination evolved into new formulations, such as contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.

According to my research, the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance played a special role in developing this new approach to discrimination. The Special Rapporteur submitted annual thematic reports in October of each year to the UN General Assembly that “documented the Special Rapporteur’s findings on particular topics and provided guidance and recommendations for UN member States, civil society organizations and other stakeholders” (OHCHR, 2019).

Beginning in 1994, we can observe that the Special Rapporteur drew attention to the flourishing of racism and xenophobia, particularly in Europe. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur underlined the rise of racist and xenophobic violence in Western European countries, as well as references to immigration. Highlighting these references in the 1994 report of the Special Rapporteur to the UN General Assembly in 1994 is relevant to explain the rise of xenophobia in Western Europe in the subsequent chapters.

The first report was submitted to the UN General Assembly by Special Rapporteur Prof. Dr. Maurice Glélé-Ahanhanzo (from Benin) on 23 November 1994 (UN, 1994). Paragraph 53 of the report states that “the Special Rapporteur ascertained that racism and racial discrimination persist, are taking increasingly violent forms and enjoy the

support of growing numbers of fringe groups in several regions, particularly America and Europe” (UN, 1994: 12). Paragraphs 57 and 58 explain the occurrences in Europe during that period in relation to the rising xenophobia, immigration phenomena, and violent acts against immigrant groups as follows:

“57. In Europe, an unwholesome climate may be observed in which xenophobia and racism are flourishing. The principal victims of this situation are immigrants and refugees from developing countries (Africans, Asians, Arabs and Turks) and the countries of Eastern Europe, including Gypsies. Legislation enacted by a number of European countries and by the European Union increasingly discriminates against these groups. There is thus a growing perception that Europe should be a continent inhabited chiefly, if not exclusively, by Europeans. Third country nationals have no rights under the Single European Act and the distinguishing criterion of race has been introduced with a system of pass laws.”

“58. Some think that the legal restrictions imposed on immigration and the right of asylum in Europe encourage xenophobia. In this regard, the Iranian Government declared that “the issue of the implications of Europe’s immigration policy for the practice of xenophobia needs to be considered by the Special Rapporteur, as well as the ways and means to overcome the adverse consequences of the restrictive measures of this policy.” In France, for example, the Movement against Racism and for Friendship among Peoples believes that the laws promoting racism are accepted, indeed justified. Xenophobia is becoming widespread and public opinion would appear to endorse the anti-immigrant laws. The malevolent physical attacks on foreigners which have been increasing recently in European cities bear witness to the very real hostility that exists toward foreigners” (UN, 1994: 13-14).

Paragraph 60 states that “There have been notable incidents of a xenophobic or racist nature in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Numerous acts of violence of a xenophobic or racist nature are perpetrated by national police forces” (UN, 1994: 14). Regarding Germany, paragraph 61 underlines that:

“In 1992, the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution recorded 2,584 acts of violence prompted by xenophobia, an increase of 74 per cent over the 1,486 acts of violence recorded in 1991. Seventeen people, of whom seven were foreigners, died in 1992 as a result of such acts. This is the

highest figure, recorded since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany” (UN,1994: 14).

The “Scope of Analysis” section (paragraph 19) of the report draws the analytical boundaries of their study, without going in the academic and theoretical discussions, in the following way:

“First of all, the complexity and subtlety of the central theme contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance – should be stressed. Without embarking on a lengthy academic discourse, given the wealth of scholarly and scientific literature on the subject, particularly that prepared under the auspices of UNESCO and the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, it is important to review the background briefly and to present some definitions drawn from conventions and international instruments to establish an analytical framework and define the scope of the study” (UN,1994: 6).

Paragraph 29 refers to xenophobia as follows:

“Xenophobia is defined as a rejection of outsiders. Heterophobia – that is, the fear of the Other – is only one of its dimensions. This feeling is based on the existence of persons resident in a country to which they do not belong. **There are those who would distinguish xenophobia from racism, but in many cases the two phenomena are similar** (Emphasis added). Xenophobia is currently fed by such theories and movements as “national preference,” “ethnic cleansing,” by exclusions and by a desire on the part of communities to turn inward and reserve society’s benefits in order to share them with people of the same culture or the same level of development. Today we seem to be witnessing an institutionalization of xenophobia in the form of the measures taken by certain States against migrant workers and asylum-seekers” (UN, 1994: 9)

In the 1997 report, the UN Special Rapporteur draws attention to “the alarming increase in manifestations of racism, racial discrimination xenophobia and related intolerance” in paragraph 46 (UN,1997:19) and makes the following recommendations in paragraph 48:

“(a) To convene, without further delay, a world conference on racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia and to include the question of immigration and xenophobia on the agenda.

(b) To consider taking action at the international level, by beginning studies, research and consultations immediately, over the use of the Internet as a vehicle for racist and xenophobic propaganda” (UN, 1997: 20).

In fact, prior to this report, the UN General Assembly resolution on February 25, 1997, stated that despite continuing efforts, “racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, as well as acts of violence, continue to persist and even grow in magnitude, incessantly adopting new forms, including tendencies to establish policies based on racial, religious, ethnic, cultural and national superiority or exclusivity” (UN, 1997).

3.6. The Durban Conference and New Forms of Discrimination

The United Nations decided to hold the 1997 World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance in Durban, South Africa. The Conference was held from August 31 to September 8, 2001, and adopted a landmark Declaration (OHCHR, 2002). The preambular paragraphs of the Declaration make an important reference to xenophobia: “Acknowledging that xenophobia in its different manifestations, is one of the main contemporary sources and forms of discrimination and conflict, combating which requires urgent attention and prompt action by States as well as by the international community,”

In the operative paragraph 16 of the Declaration, there is another reference to xenophobia:

“We recognize that, xenophobia against non-nationals particularly migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, constitutes one of the main sources of contemporary racism and that human rights violations against members of such groups occur widely in the context of discriminatory, xenophobic and racist practices.”

It is worth underlining that the Conference established a connection between the non-national migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and xenophobia, then used this

connection to indicate that xenophobia was as “one of the main sources of contemporary racism.” First, this cause-effect relationship establishes a direct connection between the migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Second, it qualifies xenophobia as one of the main sources of contemporary racism and reveals a direct relationship between xenophobia and racism. This paragraph also refers to xenophobic and racist practices. In my judgment, the practices mentioned in this paragraph also include violent actions or violent behaviors.

To translate the objectives of the Declaration, the Conference also adopted a Program of Action. It refers to xenophobia in two paragraphs. Paragraph 144 urges States and encourages the private sector to promote development by the print and electronic media to advertise a voluntary ethical code of conduct and self-regulatory measures, as well as policies and practices that aim to avoid stereotyping or promotion of false images of migrants and refugees. The goal was to prevent the spread of xenophobic sentiments among the public and encourage the objective and balanced portrayal of people, events, and history.

Paragraph 115 underlines the key role that politicians and political parties play in developing voluntary codes of conduct, which include internal disciplinary measures for violations and urges them to refrain from public statements and actions that encourage or incite xenophobia, among other attitudes.

The Third World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance had an important impact on combating contemporary forms of racism and racial discrimination. The inclusion of the term xenophobia in the conference’s title expanded the focus of discrimination studies from the traditional form of racism and racial discrimination, which was based in slavery, the slave trade,

and colonialism, to the new contemporary form, which is based mainly on attitudes toward migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers. The Durban Conference institutionalized the term xenophobia in discrimination terminology.

Finding a common denominator for the grounds of discrimination between the different regions and expanding it to cover the contemporary forms of racism and racial discrimination were among the major problems to be solved in the Conference. In this respect, because of the exclusive focus by African and Asian countries on racism, racial discrimination, and apartheid, problems regarding the definition of xenophobia and related intolerance and whether these acts constitute human rights violations emerged as obstacles in the negotiations. Some Asian and African countries considered that these acts should be classified only as violations (Sundberg, 2002: 301–317). Ultimately, a consensus was reached that xenophobia should be a term included in discrimination studies like racism and racial discrimination.

Prior to the Durban World Conference, regional conferences did occur with the goal of preparing contributions to the world conference. In October 2000, the member states of the Council of Europe held such a conference under the heading “All Different, All Equal: From Principle to Practice” and adopted a Political Declaration and a series of General Conclusions (Council of Europe, 2000).

The Political Declaration, after referring to continued and violent occurrences of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, antisemitism, and related intolerance, including contemporary forms of slavery both in Europe and in other regions of the world, stated that such occurrences are targeted based on language; religion, national, or ethnic origin; and persons such as migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees, displaced

persons, non-nationals, indigenous people, or other minorities—such as Roma and Travelers.

The European Conference urged member states to implement legal, policy, educational, and training measures to prevent and eliminate the types of incidents that the Declaration described as “evils.” The Conference also approved a set of General Conclusions that urged all states to reject ethnic and religious cleansing and genocide, and to never forget the Holocaust.

At the Durban Conference, Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Dr. Walter Schwimmer (2001: Paragraph 4 X), stated that “In close co-operation with the European Union, we thus coordinated the contribution of the European region to the World Conference in the form of a European Conference entitled ‘All different, all equal: from principle to practice’”. He spoke regarding the interrelationship among the xenophobia-immigration phenomena-violence triangle as follows:

“We are worried about the rise in xenophobia, discrimination, and racism, including acts of violence, against immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers; about the Roma/Gypsies and Travelers – the largest ethnic minority of Europe – being subject to racism, rejection, discrimination (both direct and indirect), acts of violence, and social exclusion; and about the use of racist and xenophobic arguments in political discourse” (Schwimmer, 2001: Paragraph 16 X)

The information provided above points out that the pioneering and fundamental studies on discrimination have been made by—and in the framework of—the United Nations. The resolutions adopted mainly in the United Nations General Assembly, conferences convened based on these resolutions, declarations issued in these conferences, and legally binding documents, such as the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination agreed on in the United Nations framework, not only created a normative framework for racism, racial discrimination, and xenophobia, but

also made a significant contribution to the knowledge base of the relevant academic literature. I believe that the phenomenon of xenophobia is conceptualized, internationalized, and institutionalized predominantly in the United Nations framework. After its use in the UN documents, the term xenophobia began to develop into an important term in discrimination studies. According to Baumgartl and Favell (1995: 379), “‘Xenophobia’ naturally enough has replaced ‘racism’ as the global umbrella term.” In short, the studies and documents prepared within the framework of the UN and its affiliates on xenophobia and various types of discrimination have created a strong normative infrastructure based on standards that guide scholarly studies.

CHAPTER IV

XENOPHOBIA IN GERMANY

4.1. Evolution of Xenophobia in Germany

A literature review on the resurgence of antisemitism and concomitant rise of violent acts against immigrants, refugees, and foreigners in Germany indicates that the early 1990s is a crucial turning point for analyzing the developments regarding xenophobia in the country. There is a general agreement that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) paid special attention to manifestations of racism and antisemitism since its foundation in 1949. There is also an agreement in the literature that the collapse of the regime in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and the ensuing unification of Germany brought to the fore not only joy and celebration in Europe, but also rekindled the recollection of the devastating consequences of the German national unification movement in the past (Bergman & Erb, 1997, 3; Taras 2012, 167).

For example, Kurthen stated that “in the early 1990s ugly pictures of xenophobia, violence, swastika graffiti, and vandalism replaced the joyful and peaceful pictures of

German unification, some observers speculated that the horrific past of Germany would surface again” (Kurthen, 1997: 39). Several sources mentioned that Germany has never managed to escape from the shadow of its Nazi past, horrors of the Holocaust, memories of cruelty, and feelings of guilt. Kurthen stated that “Since the foundation of the FRG, Germans have walked a fine line between suppression and remembrance, between the desire to distance themselves from deeds of the past and acceptance of collective guilt, shame and responsibility” (Kurthen, 1997: 40). There is a valid question concerning this “collective guilt”: Does this “guilt” belong only to the FRG, or do the other German descent states of the time, such as the GDR and Austria, also share this responsibility?

German sociologist Rainer Lepsius (1988) provided a pertinent answer to this question of “the legacy of the Nazi regime in three Germanic states, namely, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Austria.” According to Lepsius, different historical starting points were chosen in the restructuring of these three states. Austria’s future was determined by the allies, and its “Anschluss” past was totally ignored and externalized. The National Socialism era was considered part of German history. In the GDR, meanwhile, that period was not considered a part of the GDR’s history, but a responsibility of the capitalist FRG. National Socialism has been universalized in the category of fascism: It has, therefore, been argued that it is no longer a reference for the internal development of the GDR. The FRG, however, could not choose either the externalization strategy or the universalization strategy. Therefore, it can be said that National Socialism is normatively internalized in the FRG. To the extent that the Federal Republic sees itself as the legal successor of the “German Reich,” the externalization or universalization of the National Socialist “Third Reich” was impossible. This internalization of the past

is embodied, for example, in the law on compensation against victims of the National Socialist administration or keeping citizenship open to all who hold the citizenship of the “German Reich” and “Volksdeutsche.”²² After all, the full responsibility for the period of National Socialism was assumed by the FRG. In other words, the FAC became the successor state of the Nazi era (Lepsius, 1989: 250–251).

The above analysis shows how Austria skillfully externalizes its “Anschluss” past as a German problem, whereas East Germany (GDR) universalizes Nazi fascism as part of a global class struggle and West Germany (FRG) normatively internalizes the past and officially accepts the moral and material liability for Nazi crimes. Such an approach places all guilt from the Nazi period on the FRG. In fact, after the unification, FRG became the sole responsible of the extremely heavy past guilt luggage of all Germans.

Immediately after the unification, a sudden upsurge in violent acts and attacks against foreigners, immigrants, and asylum seekers brought to the attention the “continued antisemitism and xenophobic resentment in a nation that was responsible for the Holocaust” and viewed by most as “an indication that postwar Germany’s policy of dealing with the past has failed” (Kurthen 1997, 39). In fact, violent acts began before unification. For example, on December 17, 1988 (almost two years before the reunification of Germany), four people died after an arson attack in Schwandorf, a small town in the Upper Palatinate administrative district of Bavaria. The victims were a Turkish couple, the wife's eleven-year-old son, and a German who also lived in the

²² Adolf Hitler himself “supposedly coined the definition of “Volksdeutsche” that appeared in a 1938 memorandum of the German Reich Chancellery. The Volksdeutsche were people whose language and culture had German origins but who did not hold German citizenship. However, for Hitler and other Germans of the 1930s and 1940s, the term Volksdeutsche also carried overtones of blood and race not captured in the English translation of ‘ethnic Germans.’ According to German experts in the 1930s, about thirty million Volksdeutsche were living outside the Reich, a significant proportion of them in eastern Europe: Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Romania” (Bergen, 1994: 569).

house. The fire was set by a nineteen-year-old leading member of the illegal Nationalistic Front. The fire was set because the arsonist knew that foreigners lived in the house. After the arrest, the arsonist was charged only with arson rather than attempted murder. In 1990, more than one year later, the judges noted that arson attacks against foreigners were rampant and sentenced the arsonist to 12-and-a-half years of imprisonment (Von Trotha, 1995: 37; Koehler, 2017: 219).

Physical assaults and arson attacks occurred in Rostock-Lichtenhagen, Hoyerswerda, Frankfurt and der Oder and Magdeburg in the former GDR and in the West in Mölln and Solingen. The three days of violence during the Rostock attacks are considered “the most disturbing resurgence of right-wing, xenophobic violence since the rise of Nazism” (Kushner, 2017) and are marked as the resurfacing of racist/xenophobic violence in Germany. In the city of Hoyerswerda in Saxony, in September 1991, “a mob of right-wing radicals armed with Molotov cocktail type patrol bombs, tracer ammunition and stones attacked hostels for contract workers and asylum seekers and terrorized residents for full five days” (Erdmann 2014; Göktürk, Gramling, & Kaes, 2007: 13).

In 1993, in Solingen, North Rhine-Westphalia, five members of the Turkish Genç family were killed by four local youths. This was considered one of the most horrific arson attacks against immigrants in Germany and is remembered each year as the “Solingen Tragedy.” The attack occurred on May 29, 1993. Four young men aged between 16- and 23-years old set fire to the house of the Genç family, killing five people and injuring 14 others. Three of the attackers were sentenced to 10 years in prison, while one received 15 years imprisonment. In 1992, two young girls and their grandmother were killed when neo-Nazis set their house on fire in Mölln, which is in

the western state of Schleswig-Holstein (Daily Sabah 2017; Göktürk et al., 2007: 13, 106; Taras, 2012: 167).

This brutal attack in Mölln was reported by the *New York Times* as “the worst episode of violence against foreigners since Germany was unified three years ago” (Kinzer, 1992). *The New York Times* further reported that criticized for his reluctance to take a strong stand against violence, Chancellor Helmut Kohl denounced the attack as an awful and shameful incident. Mr. Kohl's spokesman, Dieter Vogel, told reporters in Bonn that the government felt “indignation, bitterness and sadness.” (Kinzer, 1992). However, Rita Sussmuth, who was president of Parliament at that time and a prominent leader of Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Union, criticized political leaders as being “far too weak” in facing the problem (Kinzer, 1992). As Taras (2012: 167) wrote about the indifference Chancellor Kohl showed toward the brutality in Mölln:

“The responses by Germany's leaders became controversial in their own right. Instead of meeting personally with the Mölln survivors, Chancellor Helmut Kohl sent a telegram of condolence to the Turkish President and dispatched Klauss Kinkel, his foreign minister to represent him at the funeral service. Kinkel displayed little more sensitivity than Kohl had. He listed down to the decimal point, the amount of taxes and duties paid by the Turkish population of the day. This was intended as an argument against killing them.”

Principles and forceful answers were given in response to this frightening rise of violent acts in Germany, especially in US academic circles. The essence of these responses was mainly based on the bitter past experiences suffered under the Nazi regime. These racist/xenophobic violent acts also triggered suspicions of a resurgence of antisemitism. Even the “philosemetism” and philosemitic official statements in Germany were openly questioned. Kurthen asked if antisemitism was “only disguised

under a thin layer of philosemitic official statements or was it merely replaced by a new scapegoat – xenophobia against immigrants?” (Kurthen, 1997: 39).

Another attention-grabbing question was put forth by Geis, who asked, “is Germany’s xenophobia qualitatively different from everybody else’s?” Geis (1995: 66, 72) stated:

“The common spin by Germans on German xenophobia, often repeated during the conference, is that it merely mirrors matters taking place elsewhere as well. It is also sometimes maintained that Germans have become more sensitive to issues of racism than people in the other nations because of their experiences under the Nazi regime... I regard German immigration policy as the litmus test of tolerance, the cornerstone of the country’s dealing with foreigners in their midst. In German, that policy says that they see such people as irredeemably different from “real” Germans, or to put the matter metamorphically, as weeds in a lively pristine Teutonic Garden... The German attitude toward foreigners in their midst fuel doubts concerning whether the Neo-Nazi movement, with its savage brutality, is but one of a considerable number of such movements throughout the world or whether it reflects a fundamentally distinctive German ethos ... ethos that pervades Germany, a piece of European territory whose people with stubborn and badly misplaced pride see themselves as unique and better, and one in which residents reinforce each other in that belief by constructing circumstances that inexorably make others in their midst – the non-Germans – look bad.”

As this shows, the xenophobic and antisemitic incidents involving violent acts, assaults, and arson attacks after the unification of Germany alarmed the international community. In that context, the German legal system’s policies on immigration and highly restrictive German citizenship and naturalization policy were constantly criticized. The FRG is considered to have “one of the most exclusive and restrictive citizenship policies within Europe and the entire industrialized world,” which “had no provisions for *jus soli*, the residency requirement for naturalization was fifteen years, and it had did not allow immigrants to hold dual citizenship (other than in exceptional circumstances)” (Howard, 2012: 39, 41).

Germany was assessed as having a highly restrictive citizenship policy historically. Additionally, it has not considered itself an immigration country. Germany “held fast

to its notorious Empire and State Citizenship Law of 1913, which invoked an ethnic descent-based principle of national belonging,” and accordingly, “a person could be born, work, and die on German soil without ever becoming a German citizen” (Göktürk et al., 2007: 3). German governments dealt with the immigration issue in the same manner for years and mainly employed ephemeral and vague policies, cultural initiatives, and social policies, “but the basic legal definition of Germanness remained unchanged.” (Göktürk et al., 2007:3). Public policy and sentiment toward immigration and imported foreign labor reflected this way of thinking (Gramling, Kaes, & Göktürk 2007, 3). From the unification through 1997, Germany was invited to change this restrictive policy and urged to adopt the idea of a multicultural society. Geis (1995: 73) stated:

“One can hope that in time Germans will come to appreciate that multiculturalism, with all its problems, offers a lovely array of cosmopolitan pleasures. Note might be made in this regard of the growing appeal of Turkish music in Germany, a development recently featured at length in Billboard, which observes an “increasing openness among Turks and Germans” particularly among younger people sharing musical tastes.”

In 1999, in response to these calls for change, Schröder’s newly elected government “complemented the blood-concept of German citizenship with a territorial principle akin to that in France and the United States,” and as of January 1, 2000, “a child of non-German parents with eight years of residency is automatically entitled to German citizenship at birth.” This change in the German citizenship policy could be considered a turning point for Germany to somewhat adapt itself to a multicultural approach at that time (Göktürk et. Al, 2007: 4; Kuechler, 1994: 72).

The violent xenophobic attacks that took place in Germany in the early 1990s seemed to encourage a number of academicians to seek the reasons behind the attacks. Many academic articles assessed the extent of xenophobia, role of right-wing extremism,

driving force behind xenophobic attitudes, degree of xenophobia in Western and Eastern Germany, and patterns of hostility to foreigners as well as comparisons of these patterns with other European countries. In most studies, the data collected in the Eastern and Western parts of Germany seem to have been used in more or less the same fashion.

According to Kuechler, “the civility of the Germans is called into question following the events in the (eastern) German city of Rostock in August 1992” (Kuechler, 1994: 47). He described the three days of riots and attacks on foreigners as brutal and drew attention to the passivity of authorities and “a large assembly of apparently sympathetic bystanders.” (Kuechler, 1994: 47). He used the data provided by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Verfassungsschutz*) and reported that 2285 right-wing extremist acts of violence occurred in 1992, representing an increase of 54% over 1991. He underlines that most victims were foreigners and that eight were killed. According to him, “the figure of 2285 does not contain other criminal offenses with a xenophobic background, for example those where an explicit link to right-wing extremism” (Kuechler, 1994: 47). While stressing the understandable sensitivity of Jewish groups to the clear rise of neo-Nazi activism and sentiment in Germany and their perception of failure by German authorities to stop the upsurge of incidents, Koehler asserted that the Simon Wiesenthal Center based in Los Angeles had “launched its undercover operation to counter the growth of right-wing extremist groups, dispatching an undercover operative to infiltrate the top leadership of the neo-Nazi movement in Germany.” He concluded that the “German government figure of 40,000 members in neo-Nazi groups is grossly underestimated, and that there is widespread police collusion effectively protecting neo-Nazis” (Kuechler, 1994: 47, 48).

As Adam (2015: 448, X) pointed out, the trial of a neo-Nazi underground group (the NSU – National Socialist Underground) that had killed nine Turks and bombed foreign shops for 10 years concluded “without the police investigating seriously.” He asserted that this trial revealed the “astonishing blindness of the German intelligence services toward right-wing extremism that only changed when a German policewoman was also murdered and a bank was robbed by the same group” (Adam, 2015: 448). In fact, the Simon Wiesenthal Center should be given due credit for their farsightedness.

Kouchler made use of the Politbarometer²³ and Eurobarometer surveys to assess xenophobic behavior in Germany. After analyzing these data, Kouchler stated that “German masses seem to be no more – and no less – xenophobic than the French or the British” (Kuechler, 1994: 69). He, however, drew attention to the 1920s and 1930s, when there was widespread antisemitism throughout Europe, and emphasized that only the Germans chose the “final solution.” He further emphasized that Germans should know that they would need to endure greater scrutiny than any other country and that right-wing extremism could always have more serious consequences in Germany than elsewhere. At the end of the article, he declared that “there is widespread xenophobia in Germany” (Kuechler, 1994: 69, 72).

I should underline that the projection of Kuechler's determination of widespread xenophobia in Germany in 1994 emerged like a photographic print in the survey I conducted.²⁴ In the survey, the interviewees were asked, among other questions,

²³According to GESIS (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences), the "Politbarometer" surveys are performed at monthly intervals, beginning in 1977, by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (Institute for election research) for the ZDF (Second German TV network). Since 1990, this information is also available for the newly formed German states. The intention is to poll the opinions and attitudes of eligible Germans regarding current events and issues as well as political parties and individual politicians. The data from all polls per year is integrated, documented, and archived in one cumulative data record at the GESIS Archive.

²⁴ The results of my survey are explained in Chapter VI in detail. Participants of the survey were highly educated individuals with immigrant origins living in Germany and Austria. In Germany, 93.90% of

whether xenophobia existed in Germany. To gain insight regarding the nature of the answers, the opinions of two participants are presented below:

- Too much. In such areas like politics, trade, sports, education etc. foreigners are being blocked or they can be successful under much more difficult conditions (Appendix B, I. Questions 3 and 5, B-1 Xenophobia, Germany-1, Gender: Male, Age Group: 35–44; Postgraduate).
- Much. Because people are still afraid to open their minds to foreign and unknown things, such as other cultures (Appendix B, I. Questions 3 and 5, B-1 Xenophobia, Germany-31, Gender: Male, Age Group: 35–44; Graduate).

In 1994, Alber admitted Germany had witnessed a vast increase in anti-foreign violence in the first half of the 1990 and tried to answer the following questions: to what extent is the outburst of xenophobic attacks a German peculiarity? And what are the explanations for the increasing violence? His answer was that “Germany is not the only European country to experience increasing anti-foreign violence...but the number and the intensity of these acts seems to be higher than elsewhere in Europe... data from comparative polls confirm that there is a remarkable degree of xenophobia in Germany” (Alber, 1994: 3).

Alber interpreted the surge of anti-foreign violence as the product of growing pressure from migration and its combination with the “mobilization of an ethnic concept of national identity.” He also contended that anti-foreign violence was not a persistent trait of German culture and characterized anti-foreign violence as a “transitory phenomenon” (Alber, 1994: 1–12).

The data from the years following Alber’s writing, including the data in my survey, did not ultimately support his notion that the increase in xenophobia and xenophobia-

the respondents declared that there is widespread xenophobia. Additionally, 53.2% of the interviewees declared that there is “too much + much” xenophobia.

based violence was transitory. In this context, as mentioned above, the survey that I conducted—the details of which are included in the sixth chapter—shows that xenophobia in Germany does not have a temporary character and does not lose its effect over time. In addition, in my survey, questions about xenophobic and racist-based violence were also asked. The results of answers to the question of whether there is verbal/physical violence against foreigners, immigrants, and asylum seekers in Germany revealed that such violence is prevalent in Germany.

In 1995, Willems and Eckert carried out research projects at the University of Trier on the development and characteristics of violence against foreigners in Germany between 1991 and 1994 with the sponsorship of the Ministry for Women and Youth and Ministry of Interior of Germany. Their projects intended to search for “not actual violent crimes but respondent’s attitude toward violence, that is, his propensity and acceptance of violence.” Willems referred to empirical data concerning the development of xenophobic crimes which were collected exclusively by the police and by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or BfV) and questioned its validity. To explain his questions, he cited several concerns:

“(1) Only the criminal and violent xenophobic acts registered with the police (i.e., reported), are included. The number of crimes that are not reported for various reasons remains an open question. It must be presumed that the actual number of xenophobic crimes and acts of violence is higher than the figure obtainable from police statistics. (2) The criteria according to which criminal and violent acts are categorized by the police as xenophobic are by no means unequivocal; the definition and categorization are different for each individual precinct. In some cases all crimes in which foreigners, refugees, or even other victims (gays, handicapped) are harmed are included in the statistics even if it is not clear whether rightist, racist, or other xenophobic motives were actually the underlying cause ... Uncertainties in the evaluation of the data arise, then, without the possibility of estimating the presumed distortions in terms of their quantitative values. Since the various selection mechanisms responsible for possible distortions in police statistics probably tend to compensate one another partially, we can assume that the available figures adequately

reproduce the changes in relative values at least. I, therefore, would like to look at the development of xenophobic crimes and acts of violence registered by police since these figures offer an important indication as to degree, structure, and dynamic of xenophobic violence. It must, of course, be considered that ***we view violence as a physical infringement and damage or the threat of corresponding infringements - our basis is a narrow concept of violence*** which is also the foundation of the state's monopoly on the use of force. In Germany, however, many groups and individuals use a different, much broader concept of violence: they consider the insulting and disgracing of foreigners as well as civil rights discrimination to be violence as well. As such they arrive at a much more dramatic image of the xenophobia and the threatening and harassment of foreigners and political refugees in Germany. ***Our use of a narrower concept of violence*** is not because we consider molestation, insults, and discrimination less important and unproblematic in the context of physical violence; it is because our data were obtained based on a narrow definition of violence, and because the limited concept of violence presents a kind of lowest common denominator for the intersubjective analysis of violence. Psychic and structural violence phenomena, though, are strongly dependent on subjective perception and definitions (emphasis added)" (Willems, 1995: 162, 163).

Willems stated that his team interpreted violence in a narrow sense, corresponding only to physical violence and excluding verbal violence. This enhances the validity of our explanations above concerning how violent acts lead to an extreme form of xenophobia, which includes hate speech as verbal violence along with the physical use of force, or physical violence. In this context, I underline that interpreting violence in a narrow sense unavoidably reduces the number of xenophobic violent incidences counted, which leads to overlooking the social dangers caused by xenophobic violence. Such an approach also creates an excuse for those who prefer not to publicly discuss the phenomenon of xenophobia in detail and who intend to sweep the problems created by xenophobia under the rug.

Using such a narrow approach, Willems enumerated typical xenophobic violent offenses such as murder, assault, arson, vandalism, and stressed that "these crimes also include the spreading of propaganda, the use of signs and symbols of unconstitutional organizations, as well as disturbing the peace." He provided the number of reported xenophobic crimes in 1991, 1992, and 1993 as 2426, 6336, and 6721, respectively.

Willems drew attention to the dramatic increase in typical violent offenses, such as attacks against individuals and arsons, and concluded that “xenophobic attitudes and violence cannot be traced back solely to personality deficits and socializations problems of individual perpetrators or to social, economic and cultural crises of society as a whole.” He underlined how “the origin of xenophobic nationalists movements...reach far beyond the right-wing political margin into the center of the society as a whole” (Willems, 1995: 164–180).

Willems (1995: 180–181) described the conflict on asylum as a “prelude to a fundamental conflict... over the immigration and by extension over the future definition of (our) society as a multicultural and multi-ethnic society” (Willems, 1995: 180–181). In fact, Willems, through these evaluations, delicately warned the German state authorities about the problems they might encounter in the future if Germany became a multicultural and multi-ethnic society. He also implicitly drew attention to the point that origins of xenophobia are deeply embedded in German society.

The summary of Willems’ work can be connected to the survey I conducted at the end of 2020 to show current developments. To eliminate the inconveniences caused by restrictive approaches to the violence types taken in previous studies and ensure that the effects of xenophobic or racist-based violence on immigrants, refugees, and foreigners can be measured more accurately, the questions asked were prepared in a two-stage method. As an examination of the questionnaire in Appendix A shows, the respondents were asked first whether there was verbal violence in the society they lived in, and then the question was repeated for physical violence. Verbal violence was described as (for example) accusing, undermining, verbal-threatening, trivializing, or blaming, whereas physical violence was described as “physical harm as a result of physical force.” Separate questions were also asked about whether the interviewees

themselves were exposed to verbal and physical violence. As mentioned above and as will be explained in detail in Chapter VI, 94.10% and 81.80% of the interviewees responded that there is verbal and physical violence in Germany, respectively. In my judgment, the results of my survey indicate that questions regarding xenophobic or racist violence to interviewees need to be more explicit and mutually complementary.

Per Karen Schönwalder, Wilhelm Heitmeyer is among the most influential sociologists, who worked on extreme right-wing and racism topics and empirically investigated Germany in the 1990s regarding attitudes among young Germans toward right-wing concepts (Schönwalder, 1995: 450–451). According to Heitmeyer, hostility toward foreigners was based on initially “feelings of estrangement,” followed by “fear” and then “hatred “of foreigners. He argued that politically motivated forms of action came into being with the belittlement of foreigners and that similar actions could be used to develop prejudice that could provide a basis for the defensive struggle against material (i.e., housing or jobs) and cultural competition with foreigners, and could even be justification for offensive acts against them (Heitmeyer, 1993: 18). Heitmeyer stated that “West Germany is dominated by a society with individualization processes while East Germany used to be dominated by repressive and authoritarian processes” (1995: 18) and asserted that in spite of this difference in their societal background, “public sympathy toward ‘extreme right-wing tendencies because of the problem with foreigners’ increased from 24 percent in December 1991 to 37 percent in April 1992 in both parts of Germany” (1995: 19). He argued that this trend pertains to the increase in political refugees and suggested that “the more strongly that social, occupational, and political processes of disintegration develop in a society to which foreigners migrate, the greater the problems that these migrants will face in their integration.” (Heitmeyer, 1995: 20). In my opinion, this statement implicitly

whitewashes the above-mentioned considerable public sympathy toward extreme right-wing tendencies in Western and Eastern parts of Germany. Heitmeyer concluded that, in parallel with the increase in social, political, or occupational disintegration, an increase in violence could occur because individuals would not consider—or would totally disregard—the consequences of their actions against others because of dissolving social responsibility and integration. He underlined that “when natural social membership and acceptance disintegrate to such an extent that only the certainty of being German remains, then violence is given a direction” (Heitmeyer, 1993: 27).

In relation to this, one of the interviewees in my survey expressed a similar view regarding the existence of xenophobia in Germany:

Yes. Much. Germany is a country with a lot of foreigners. It is now difficult to find even pure German. They may naturally feel themselves invaded. In my opinion this exists to a degree in every nation. For example, I suppose we would be disturbed if we would have seen many foreigners in Turkey more than Turks. Of course, foreigners are not guilty of this, but there is xenophobia among Germans. Right or wrong.” (Appendix B, I. Questions 3 and 5, B-1 Xenophobia, Germany 16, Gender: Female; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)

Nevertheless, regarding the assessments made by Heitmeyer, the following questions can be raised: a) Why should being German direct a German citizen to violence as the sole option against immigrants? b) Why do around 34% of the German population in certain times nurture sympathy about these violent tendencies? c) As Kuechler emphasized, given recent history, is there a need to keep Germany under closer scrutiny, since right-wing extremism there will always be more upsetting than elsewhere?

There can be no definite answers to these questions. However, considering the above-mentioned academic studies it can be asserted that for the healthy explanation of violent acts committed against foreigners in early 1990s in Germany, analyzing the

biographic data of the perpetrators of these crimes and individualizing these acts is not sufficient. Since the problem is “in the center of German society” (Schönwalder, 1995: 454), it might be more prudent to dwell specifically on the question of whether Germany is experiencing a resurgence of the past situations to a certain extent. These points also raise the following question: Is there a natural tendency toward violence in some segments of German society? It is naturally impossible to give a healthy answer to this provocative question without becoming mired in value judgments.

To better understand the true nature of rising xenophobia in Germany in the 1990s, we should try to elaborate on and diversify the above-mentioned questions. Somewhat analogous questions were asked by Del Fabbro (1995: 132) regarding the “new German xenophobia,” specifically, whether there was any new xenophobia at all, and if there was, how was it different from the old one?

Del Fabbro noted that he was somewhat different from most other German academicians dealing with the 1990s xenophobic violence and treatment of foreigners in Germany as his heritage included an Italian emigrant who had left Italy a hundred years ago. He provided background information on Germany’s long tradition of adapting itself to foreigners by giving examples of the French Huguenots²⁵ and Waldenses,²⁶ which represent a movement of elites invited to bring in their abilities to develop German territorial states, such as Prussia or Saxony, and also allow an inflow of a proletarian mass immigration, consisting mainly of Poles and Ruthenians (historic name of Ukrainians), Italians, and Dutch (Del Fabbro, 1995: 132–133). He emphasized

²⁵ The Huguenots were French Protestants, most of whom eventually became Calvinists and who fled France in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries due to religious persecution.

²⁶ A Christian movement that originated in 12th-century France, the devotees of which sought to follow Christ in poverty and simplicity. In modern times, the name has been applied to members of a Protestant church (centered on the Franco-Italian border) that formed when remnants of the earlier movement became the Swiss Protestant Reformers (Encyclopedia Britannica).

that conflict did exist between native people and foreign workers in that period, but that the conflict was generally not violent. Del Fabbro concluded that the “old xenophobia before 1990 normally had the form of non-violent discrimination and segregation in many sectors of public life,” whereas “new xenophobia in the Federal Republic...is certainly a xenophobia characterized by violence, with more numerous cruel acts of xenophobic violence here than in the rest of Europe” (Del Fabbro, 1995: 133, 145). This evaluation, made in 1995, is in line with developments over the next several years as violent acts and collective violence became important features of the new xenophobia.

A few of the explanations offered by individuals I interviewed bear a resemblance to Del Fabbro's assertions. For example:

“Yes. Because of the attacks. I come to this conclusion as there is daily basis no longer just verbal but physical violence on the streets occurs (Appendix B, I, A-Racism, A-1 Germany, Germany-5, Gender: Female; Age Group: 18–24; Graduate)

It should be stressed that the background information and further analysis on imported foreign labor to Germany is important and that the historical development of this issue requires further consideration. This issue will be discussed later in this chapter.

In connection with the violent feature of the “new xenophobia” in Germany, one of the most topical academic issue of the 1990s was the special character of xenophobia and antisemitism in the “East German länder.” Since most of the striking and spectacular xenophobic violence in the Eastern part of Germany took place in the 1990s, the academic interest vis-à-vis the attitudes of the East German population toward foreigners and the right-extremist culture in this part of the country has increased, as has the number of articles published on the topic.

Husbands pointed out that the former GDR, referred to in the conventional German parlance as the five new Federal regions or simply as East Germany,

“became a cauldron of all these types of animosity: there have been attacks there on Jewish cemeteries, though the country's Jewish population is now tiny; there has been a resurgence of traditional hostilities against the Poles who, even in the time of supposed socialist friendship between the former regimes, were subjects of [several] unfavourable stereotyped attitudes; there has been a widely documented increase in the most explicit forms of xenophobia.” (Husbands: 1991: 4).

Husbands (1991: 4), in defining these acts as the most explicit forms of xenophobia, describes the attitude toward tiny foreigner populations as “anti-foreigner hostility without foreigners.” He conspicuously characterizes these attacks also as an “extreme form of xenophobia” (Husbands, 1991: 6) and “aggressive xenophobia.” (1991: 8). Husband’s descriptions of xenophobia in Germany in 1991 are very similar to those I have used in earlier sections, such as the “extreme form of xenophobia” (Husbands, 1991: 6–8).

Reviewing the literature on the xenophobic, racist, and antisemitist developments in Germany during the 1990s, it is noticeable that several academicians who specialized in German history examined the threat of the radical right as well as both ethnic and national identity in both Eastern and Western Germany. For example, Fulbrook (1994: 59) drew attention to this point in 1994, noting that right-wing extremist attacks were mainly directed against people who were considered outsiders to Germany and underlining that the attackers mostly used the slogan “Germany for the Germans.”

Fulbrook (1994) pointed out that many Germans disapprove of extremist violence. She, however, added that there was also “possibly a silent majority with somewhat more problematic orientations, particularly in relation to the vexed question of German nationality. Large numbers of respectable Germans may disapprove of violence but

nevertheless agree that the ‘problem’ is too many foreigners” (Fulbrook, 1994: 60). She also called attention to the “common desire in German society to protect the ‘German’ culture from ‘pollution’ or mixing with foreign cultures (1994: 60). This observation is reminiscent with the resistance in German society to multiculturalism.

Staab, while explaining xenophobia in post-unification eastern Germany, introduced the notion of “latent xenophobia,” which described the support of the silent majority to this phenomenon. He emphasized that because of the wave of foreigners in 1990s, the German way of life could hardly be considered under attack. He explained that the lack of understanding for foreign cultures combined with the self-perception of the German nation and stated that “half a century after Auschwitz ethnic identities is likely to appear more pronounced in the German public psyche. In the west, the third postwar generation does not accept the collective shame...in the east, the considerable pressure on economic and civic-political identity markers gives ethnic identities the chance to re-emerge...” (Staab, 1998: 31, 43).

O’Brien also drew attention to German identity. He contended that the neo-Nazi phenomenon was marginal and asserted that “it holds a firm place at the very core of German political identity.” (O’Brien, 1994: 64). He provided examples from Germany’s immigration, refugee, and naturalization policies to assert that the Basic Law in fact reflected the racist definition of citizenry and exclusionary nationalistic mission of the state. He contended that “xenophobic neo-Nazi slogans and ideologies have a legitimate foundation in the Basic Law” (O’Brien, 1994: 64).

In his study on xenophobic violence in Germany, Eckert examined quantitative data gathered between 1990 and 2000. He used the data provided by the Eurobarometer between 1997 and 2000, the above-mentioned Trier survey, and ALLBUS (GESIS, the

German General Social Survey) survey documents as well as the Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik Staatschutz (PKS-S) overview of incidents and Kriminalpolizeiliche Meldedienst Staatsschutz (KPMD-S) xenophobic crime statistics. He presented findings on the spread of xenophobic attitudes in Europe, the change of xenophobic attitudes in Germany, and xenophobic right-wing extremist and antisemitic crime in the 1990s. He underlined that, since the German reunification, right-wing extremists had claimed the lives of 90 people, of which 50% were foreigners (Eckert, 2002: 231). According to PKS-S statistics, xenophobic and antisemitic crime showed a striking increase from approximately 1300 criminal acts per year in the 1980s to approximately 4000 per year in the 1990s. KPMD-S's detailed statistics of xenophobic crime, however, demonstrate that xenophobic crimes peaked in the years 1992 and 1993 at 6336 and 6721. Between 1995 and 2000, the number of such crimes leveled off to approximately 2000 to 3000 per year, then rose again in 2000 to 3494 (Eckert, 2002: 237–240).

Eckert pointed out that a change of definition for such crimes occurred in January 2001 and the narrow political definition of extremism was replaced by the more general expression “hate crime.” He also mentioned that, in 1999, the risk of foreigners being victimized in the East was 20 times higher than in the West. The risk was also higher in the North of Germany than the South. As to the antisemitic crimes, according to KPMD-S statistics, such crimes decreased from 1366 in 1994 to 846 in 1996, then fluctuated between 800–900 yearly; the numbers increased in 2000. Eckert admitted that neither of the factors explained why xenophobia and right-wing extremism took root to such a degree in Eastern Germany, where comparatively fewer immigrants live and inhabitants have limited contact with foreigners. He tried to explain this phenomenon through the new meaning of ethnicity (Eckert, 2002: 240–242).

Braun and Koopmans (2010), based on the event history analysis of instances of racial violence in 444 German countries (the Kreis) for the period between 1990–1995, asserted that political opportunities, ethnic competition, social disorganization, and media coverage were factors in the development of xenophobic violence. They stated that extreme-right activists learn about events elsewhere through media coverage and that this became a “template for imitation” (2010: 120). This imitation was especially valid for the “intense public debate on immigration,” which gives these incidents a “degree of legitimacy.” They shared their finding that geographical distance does not affect the diffusion of ethnic violence if a social similarity exists between two countries in terms of the strength of right-wing parties (Braun & Koopman, 2010: 111, 120).

These findings should be evaluated from the viewpoint of whether the template of imitation tends to radicalize or moderate the silent majority, which has somewhat more problematic orientations, particularly in relation to the vexed question of German nationality.

The literature review on the period from Unification through the year 2000 indicates a general agreement on the phenomenon of rising xenophobia in Western and Eastern parts of Germany. Most of the academic study on Germany that deals with this subject also dwells on the rise of xenophobic violence. The studies based on empirical data and involving conjectural types of assessments converge on the point that the rising xenophobia of the period was aggressive and violent. One study characterizes the xenophobia during that time as an extreme form of xenophobia, which has been discussed previously.²⁷

²⁷ My proposal for understanding of “extreme xenophobia” is explained in section 2.8.4 and in Figure 2.

Some of the studies specifically deal with the xenophobic violence in the Eastern part of Germany and link it to neo-Nazi and extreme-right groups. To a certain extent, this link also valid for Western Germany. It also highlights the phenomenon of collective violence.

A literature review on this period convincingly indicates a rise of xenophobia in its extreme form, which includes aggression and collective violence. There are sufficient empirical data in the above-mentioned studies to indicate that extreme xenophobia was prevalent in parts of German society during this time. Some studies, in my judgment, rightfully mention or indicate the existence of the silent majority which latently approves of the xenophobic stance against the foreigners. This is an important observation when explaining the deep-rooted anti-foreigner tradition and dominant character of the national-racial homogeneity understanding in the unified German society.

Xenophobic violence and crime in Germany peaked in 1992 and 1993, then declined slightly and steadied through 1999, but rose again in 2000. It can, therefore, be said that Germany started the 21st century with an increase in xenophobic violence and crime.

One study points out that “the risk for foreigners of being victimized is higher, too, in the North of Germany than in the South.” (Eckert, 2002; 240). No further explanation was found in the extant literature concerning the reasons for this judgment. It should also be mentioned that I did not come across any clear reference linking rising xenophobia in Germany to dominant religious tendencies in Eastern-Western or Northern-Southern parts of Germany. According to information provided by the Virtual Museum of Protestantism, “the Lutherans were the most numerous in most of

northern, central, and eastern Germany... were in the minority in the Rhineland and in southern Germany, with the exception of Wurttemberg.” According to the same source, “since the reunification of Germany, Protestants are slightly in the majority; there are 29 million Protestants for 27 million Catholics; (the Protestants are the majority in the former GDR)” (Protestant Museum, n.d.).

In an essay, Todd puts forward instigating ideas regarding xenophobia in the modern age in Europe. He stated that “Everywhere, xenophobia, until recently a characteristic of the poorer sections of the society, is starting to pervade the upper half of the social structure, generating a long-term oscillation between Islamophobia and Russophobia.” At the end of the Preface, he stated that “In a final act of modesty, I locate the epicenter of European Islamophobia outside France, as the reader will see: It lies in a world that was once originally Protestant, and more particularly Lutheran, one that has inherited, with dire consequences, the egalitarian concept of predestination. This claim has not been inspired by any Catholic sense of resentment, as the author’s origins are not exactly Catholic” (Todd, 2015: xi).²⁸

While dealing with the xenophobia in Germany, Todd referred to Sarazin’s work and stressed that Sarazin was born in the heart of Protestant Germany (Gera, Thuringia). He underlined the intensive activities of PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West – Patriotische Europa gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes) in that area.²⁹

²⁸ According to Todd (2015: X), “Lutheran predestination stated that human beings had an unequal chance of being saved. They were chosen or rejected even before they were born, by a decree of the Almighty that brooked no appeal.” (Todd 2015)

²⁹PEGIDA is a Dresden-based movement founded by Lutz Bachmann, a 43-year-old convicted burglar and cocaine dealer. According to press reports, he founded a political party and intends to join forces with the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). The new party will be called the Popular Party for Freedom and Direct Democracy (FDDV) (Goulard, 2016).

Todd emphasizes that “...the Europe of the Lutheran tradition, which practices its religion just as little as does the Catholic part of the continent, plays a particular role as a catalyst for Islamophobia.” He refers to the “Catholic zombie³⁰ backbone of Eurozone” and cites its bastions as Bavaria, Baden Württemberg, the Rhineland, Austria, the southern Netherlands, Flanders, Ireland, northern Italy, northwest Spain, and the periphery of France. Todd describes the “zombie Protestant” zone as more to the north and stresses that “it is just as inegalitarian but more active in its adoption of Islamophobic ideas.” He further underlines that “in the case of Lutheran Germany, we should add that this is just as it had been during the rise of anti-Semitism” (Todd, 2015: 111).

Todd’s reflections recall links between the Protestant Lutheran thinking on inegalitarianism as well as the Lutheran concept of predestination and the extensive xenophobic tendencies in mainly Protestant populated Eastern and Northern parts of Germany. Further, considering the Protestant background of the Afrikaner (mainly a mixture of Dutch, German, and French origin Protestants) who created the apartheid regime in South Africa and Namibia, it would be worthwhile to academically investigate the influence of Protestant Lutheran and Calvinist doctrines on the widespread xenophobic tendencies and attitudes in the Eastern and Northern parts of Germany.

One of the most outstanding studies on anti-foreign and right-wing violence in Germany at the beginning of the 21st century was conducted by Koopmans and Olzak (2002), who used data on collective violence against immigrants in Germany to explore the link between violence and the public discourse. Koopmans and Olzak

³⁰ Todd describes Zombie Catholicism as “the anthropological and social force that emerged from the final disintegration of the Church in its traditional bastions” (Todd, 2015: 39). The same description applies to Zombie Protestantism.

(2004b: 5) examined why and how public discourse affects ethnic violence and suggested that “instances of collective ethnic violence rarely occur in isolation and are usually embedded in waves of ethnic contention.” (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004b: 5)

Koopmans and Olzak argued that media attention for radical right violence and public reaction to the violence may encourage or discourage violent acts. They collected relevant data from newspapers using the content analysis method. Instead of articles, they employed “single communicative acts by non-media actors” as the units of analysis (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004b: 13). They referred to this unit as “political claims,” which included not only public statements, but also political decisions, judicial actions, demonstrations, protests, and various violent acts. The data were coded from all Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of the “national quality newspaper *Frankfurter Rundschau*” and for shorter periods from “the national tabloid newspaper *Bild-Zeitung*, the Turkish immigrant daily *Hürriyet* as well as from three East German local newspapers.” They concluded that “differential public visibility, resonance, and legitimacy of right-wing violence amplify the rate of some types of violence, while diminishing the other types of violence” (Koopmans & Olzak 2004b: 14–15). In its various sections, the study referred to collective violence without explaining or elaborating its meaning. It also used concepts such as collective action and collective attack. Scholars emphasize that collective violence is a means of social control and describes it as an act of personal injury perpetrated by a “group of five or more people acting in concert” (de la Roche 1996: 97). According to de la Roche, collective violence is a form of “popular justice,” (1996: 98) “the collectivization of violence is a direct function of strong partisanship,” and “strong partisanship arises when third parties support one side against the other and are solidary among themselves” (2001: 128).

According to de la Roche (2001: 126), “if the ultimate goal of a theory of collective violence is to predict and explain when and how it occurs from one case of conflict to another,” the theory must answer the question “why conflicts are handled by violence and why conflicts are handled collectively.” Most studies on xenophobic violence in Germany struggle to provide firm answers regarding why this type of violence occurs in Germany. Without full illumination, the questions put forward by de la Roche are reminiscent of the one I posed previously: Is there a natural tendency for violence in certain parts of German society?

Backes and Mudde (2000: 468) underlined that extreme-right “skinheads” are emotionally in touch with the “xenophobic sentiments among substantial parts of the population.” They also drew attention to how resentments in German society “transcend the borders of the party political camps” and that these resentments are “certainly not limited to the organized extreme right.” (2000: 468). As a rather striking observation, they stated that “xenophobic violence is therefore a broader societal phenomenon, with a considerable degree of independence from the extreme-right parties and their chances of mobilization” (Backes & Mudde, 2000: 468).

In 2002, Wahl wrote that in the early 1990s and in 2000, “crimes with xenophobic, antisemitic or right-wing extremist motivations were a frequent occurrence in Germany” (2002: 247) and asserted that “these patterns do not stem from economic cycles, or any of the other usual suspects commonly cited for xenophobic violence, such as a) economic development or unemployment, b) stress by social modernization and processes of disintegration, c) particularly the shock of modernization in East Germany, d) the afterglow of Nazi ideas- lacking historical and political formation, and e) the decay of values” (Wahl, 2002: 247). He summarized “the series of interdisciplinary empirical studies on the roots of xenophobia and aggression

conducted by the German Youth Institute (Munich) in co-operation with the universities of Munich and Jena” and pointed out that:

“analyses of police records, sentences, longitudinal studies, and intensive studies with xenophobic adolescents, offenders and control groups show different paths of development of aggression, xenophobia, antisocial behavior, and right-wing extremist ideologies. Some patterns of behavior and extreme emotions preceding later xenophobic violence (anger, hate, hyperactivity, aggression, anxiousness, fear, grief) can be detected early in childhood. Factors starting with differences in the temperament of the children and influences in families, schools and peer-groups can reinforce or reduce these tendencies. Prevention should concentrate on early emotional socialization and social learning.” (Wahl, 2002: 247).

He reduced the causes of xenophobic violence to the “development of the individual emotional personality,” which he stated, “begins from procreation” (Wahl, 2002: 254–255). Such characterization of the root-causes of xenophobic violence brings to mind Todd’s explanations concerning the concept of predestination.

The 2002 “Study on Racist Violence of the German National Focal Point” points out that the term “racial violence,” as defined by EUMC (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia), is not in general use in Germany, neither in the political debate nor in academic discourse or statistics. The study also explains that for incidents of racial violence, terms like right-wing extremism, xenophobia, and antisemitism are used (Rühl, 2002: 3). Apparently, the painful Nazi past keeps the German society from using this term openly. The study reveals that two-thirds of the victims of xenophobic violence are foreign nationals. The risk is higher for persons who are perceived as non-German because of their appearance. The study reflects 2002 data, which underlines that right-wing, xenophobic, and antisemitic criminal offenses reached their latest peak in the year 2000 with 15.951 crimes (Rühl, 2002: 20–21). This outstanding number clearly reveals the considerable rise in xenophobic violence and crime in Germany at the beginning of the 21st century. The study also refers to a new register system of

incidents called the KPMD-PMK (Criminal Investigation Registration Service- Politically Motivated Criminality / Kriminalpolizeilicher Meldedienst- Politisch motivierte Kriminalität) tracking extreme right-wing, xenophobic, and antisemitic violence and crimes (Eckert, 2002: 94).

According to the study, the new system is based on the perpetrators' motivation. This is addressed because individual federal states are responsible for the criminal persecution of criminal acts motivated by extreme-right ideology, xenophobia, and antisemitic sentiment. Since these cases are processed by local police authorities, it is difficult to determine whether the new system has been uniformly applied in all 16 German states (Rühl, 2002: 3).

Similar studies and reports on the racist violence in Germany point out the same deficiency in the registration system for these crimes. They indicate that the new system offers the opportunity to categorize crimes by right-wing perpetrators, crimes, and victims; however, it does not solve the difficulties of the police in categorizing and judging right-wing crime. In that respect, it may be that because of the association between hate crimes and right-wing extremism, many offenses are not reported as hate crimes, but are instead registered as bodily injuries. This deficiency paves the way for underreporting in bias-motivated crimes and creates unknown dimensions in such crimes.

In addition to the hidden, unreported, and unregistered crimes, there are considerable problems in surveys regarding asking sensitive questions about xenophobia and antisemitism in Germany. Krumpal (2012) warned about the sensitive nature of direct questions regarding xenophobia and antisemitism caused by social norms around these topics. He stated that it was not desirable for the public to see high scores of prejudices

on these two phenomena and pointed out that disclosing unsocial opinions could result in disapproval from the interviewer or social sanctions from third parties beyond the survey setting. He also drew attention to the possibility of social ostracism and argued that some survey respondents may have xenophobic or antisemitic attitudes, but hide what they really think and distort their true thoughts because of public norms against these attitudes (Krumpal, 2012: 1389). He called this deficiency “social desirability bias” and said that it could cause underreporting of xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes in surveys. To counteract this, he proposed the use of randomized response techniques instead of direct questioning (Krumpal, 2012: 1402). Krumpal’s analysis is helpful for shedding light on the claims that latent xenophobia exists in Germany.

The literature review from 2000–2016 indicates a general agreement on the phenomenon of prevailing xenophobia in Germany. After the shocking outburst of aggressive and violent xenophobic assaults against foreigners in the 1990s, a number of academic studies from the beginning of the 21st century examine the nature and causes of xenophobia and violence. All surveys point to the existence of considerable xenophobic tendencies in substantive parts of Germany society. We observe that the term collective violence is often connected with extreme-right violence and is used to explain the group character of violence (Koopman & Olzak, 2002). Mentions of “xenophobic sentiments among substantial parts of the population,” and comments such as “resentments vis-à-vis foreigners in the German society transcend the borders of the party political camps ... (and these resentments) are certainly not limited to the organized extreme right” began appearing in the literature (Backes and Mudde, 2000: 468). Such assessments, in my judgment, point to an emerging need to conduct a more in-depth analysis of xenophobic tendencies in German society. In addition, this broad-

minded approach considers xenophobic violence in a broader context independent of the activities of the far right and considers xenophobia as a social phenomenon.

The Schröder government, elected in 1999, changed the blood-concept of German citizenship through a territorial principle. The German Nationality Act of 1999 was approved in May 1999 and took effect on 1 January 2000. After this, while requirements were still quite difficult relative to other European countries, the long-standing definition of German citizenship based on German ancestry was changed. This eventually made it easier for people from family backgrounds that were not entirely German to become full German citizens (Morjé Howard, 2008: 48). This change in the German citizenship policy is considered a turning point for Germany in trying to adapt itself to a multicultural approach, and can even be considered the beginning of multiculturalism in Germany. Yet, Howard (2012) argued that despite the partial liberalization of dual citizenship in policy and practice, the new law contained explicit restrictions on dual citizenship for immigrants, both for naturalizing adults and for children who acquire German citizenship through *jus soli*, or birthright citizenship. In this context, the phenomenon of extreme form of xenophobia that involved collective violence in Germany between 2000 and 2016 and the newly introduced multicultural policies in Germany should be considered together.

Regarding the hate crime figures in the 21st century Germany, it is not possible to claim that multiculturalism diminished the xenophobic prejudice that existed in substantive parts of German society and or that multiculturalism stopped violent xenophobic crimes. The NSU murders can be considered the best example of this actuality. When German Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed in 2010 that a multicultural approach had “utterly failed” (Weaver, 2010), she tacitly accepted that, with or without multiculturalism, a strong feeling of xenophobia exists in considerable parts of German

society. From my perspective, when this strong and somewhat intrinsic feeling of xenophobia occurs for various reasons, particularly toward immigrants, foreign workers, and refugees, it becomes a xenophobic prejudice or xenophobic bias against those groups. This bias evolves into a physically aggressive and assaultive collective violence, allowing the phenomenon of xenophobia to become a black hole for the German society. German policies toward immigrants and foreign labor then become key determinants for understanding the root-causes of anti-foreigner attitudes in German society (Bild, 2010).

4.2. OSCE Hate Crime Data on Germany

According to the OSCE-ODIHR, hate crimes are criminal acts motivated by bias or prejudice toward certain groups of people. Bias motivations are broadly defined as preconceived negative opinions, stereotypical assumptions, intolerance, or hatred directed toward a particular group that shares a common characteristic, such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, gender, or any other fundamental characteristic. Hate crimes include threats, property damage, assault, murder, or any other criminal offense that is committed with a bias motivation. Racism and xenophobia are considered the most common bias motivations, but Antisemitism, bias against Muslims, Christians, and members of other religions, sexual orientation and gender identity, and people with disabilities are also included. Every year, ODIHR presents information from participating States, civil society organizations, and inter-governmental organizations on hate crimes, notable incidents, and policy responses. The data is released on November 16, International Tolerance Day, which falls on November (ODIHR, n.d.).

Table 1 reports hate crime data in Germany as reported to ODIHR between 2009 and 2018.

Table 1: Germany's Hate Crime Data, 2009–2018

2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009
8113	7913	3598	3046	3059	4647	4514	4040	3770	4583

Table 2 presents the total number and type of hate crimes recorded in 2015 with a motivation of xenophobia or racism; Table 3 presents crimes motivated by antisemitism; and Table 4 presents crimes motivated by anti-Christian bias or other religious bias.

Table 2: Recorded Hate Crimes Motivated by Racism or Xenophobia in 2015

Total	Theft/ Robbery	Desecration of graves	Arson	Homicide	Physical Assault	Damage to property	Disturbance of the peace	Threats/ threaten in behavior
2447	44	2	99	8	977	913	45	359

Table 3: Recorded Hate Crimes Motivated by Antisemitism in 2015

Total	Homicide	Physical Assault	Damage to Property	Arson	Theft/ robbery	Desecration of graves	Disturbance of the peace	Threats/ threatening behavior
192	-	34	115	2	17	3	-	21

Table 4: Recorded Hate Crimes Motivated by Anti-Christian Bias or Other Religious Bias

Total	Homicide	Physical Assault	Damage to property	Arson	Theft/ robbery	Desecration of graves	Disturbance of the peace	Threats/ Threatening behavior
339	3	85	154	5	1	3	6	82

In the 2015 report, there is no mention of “bias against Muslims.” However, the coalition of civil society groups (Hate Crime Counselling Project) reported 20 incidents targeting Muslims, including physical assaults, harassment, threats, damage to property, and other type of incidents.

The ODIHR analysis mentions that the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) recommended that the police be given an explicit duty to investigate and document any racist motive of criminal offenses. A recommendation was also made to train police “on reporting and investigating hate crimes, and to improve Germany’s hate crime data-collection system. CERD also expressed concerns about the increase in attacks against asylum-seekers and called for this group to be protected from racially motivated violence.” The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe also “called on German authorities to improve the recording of hate crimes, in particular by increasing the disaggregation of data, to introduce guidance for police and prosecutors, and to train all criminal justice actors on hate crimes.”

The reminder of the United Nations CERD to the German authorities that they have “an explicit duty to investigate and document any racist motive of criminal offences,” (CERD, 2015:5) and that they have a duty to “institute a comprehensive strategy, including mandatory training, to enhance the understanding of police, prosecutors and judges of the notion of racial discrimination and the way to combat it, and to ensure that any act that may contain racist motives is investigated effectively” (2015: 4) was bitterly verified by the late discovery of the neo-Nazi terror cell known as the National Socialist Underground (NSU). This group was accused of multiple murders, bombings, and bank robberies in various German states. McGowan (2014: 196) explained the lengthy criminal record of NSU as follows:

“On 6 May 2013 Munich became the setting for one of the high profile trials to occur in Germany over the last two decades. Branded sensationally by the media as the “Döner Morde” (Doner Kebab) murders, the case centers on the activities of the NSU that was responsible for conducting a spate of nine racially motivated murders, several bombs in Cologne and over a dozen bank robberies between 1999 and 2011. At the center of proceedings stands one of the NSU’s leaders, Beate Zschäpe (alongside four other close associates including Ralf Wohlleben) where she is accused of being responsible for being involved with a terrorist organization.”

Eight of the NSU’s 10 murder victims were Turks. All of these were small shop owners or employees of “kebab/döner” houses, flower shops, tailor’s shops, or greengrocers. One Greek national shop owner and a policewoman murdered in Heilbronn in 2007 were among the victims. The NSU leadership trio, according to McGowan, spent their formative school years in the GDR. The NSU was also held responsible for the June 2004 nail bomb attack in a Turkish neighborhood in Cologne that left 22 people injured (Saha, 2017).

McGowan asserts that

“this case posed a number of questions about the origins of this neo-Nazi cell, its leading members and their beliefs but has also raised serious questions about the state’s response to it and its inability to detect the NSU’s activities much earlier. Indeed, the police had not just failed to identify a far-right connection to the ten murders committed by the NSU but had steered their investigations toward the activities of the Turkish mafia. This alarming miscalculation has led to suggestions of *institutional racism*” (McGowan 2014, 196).

It is still debated why NSU’s crime wave was not detected in a timely manner and why German authorities did not properly investigate or analyze these serious incidents. Questions still persist about whether some members of the German police and intelligence had secret relations with the NSU,³¹ to what extent German intelligence

³¹ Deutsche Welle reported on September 12, 2017 that “One major unresolved mystery remains that of Andreas T., an intelligence officer for the state of Hesse who was sitting in the internet cafe in Kassel on April 6, 2006, when the owner, Halit Yozgat, was shot dead. He at first failed to come forward and, when his presence there was disclosed, he claimed to be unaware that the shooting had taken place. His case awakened further fears that German intelligence agencies may have in some way colluded with the NSU” (Saha 2017).

authorities acted on the information that they provided, and whether this information was really useful. It should be underlined that each of these incidents should be classified as hate crimes and cannot be considered only as right-wing or extreme-right violence. These were crimes of racial and xenophobic prejudice and should be identified accordingly.

After a trial that spanned 438 days spanning over five years, “the 6th Senate of the Munich High District Court—the state security senate—issued its verdict in the NSU trial in July 2018.” Since “two of the core members of the NSU, Uwe Bohnhardt and Uwe Mundlos, were found dead following the above-mentioned failed bank robbery and subsequent shoot-out, the only member of the trio that could be tried was Beate Zschäpe. Zschäpe was found guilty of being complicit in 10 murders, 43 attempted murders, two severe bombing attacks, and 15 bank and other robberies, and, consequently, was sentenced to life imprisonment.” The court confirmed her “particularly grave guilt.” According to Luxemburg Stiftung’s analysis of the court ruling, “Zschäpe could technically be released after serving 15 years—a common practice for life sentences in the German legal system. The prison sentences for the other two defendants held in investigative custody, Ralf Wohlleben and André Eminger, did not follow the suggestions of the federal prosecutor’s attorneys. Wohlleben received 10 years—two less than called for by the prosecution. Eminger received only two years and six months and was found partially not guilty.” There is a widespread general assessment that “the verdict failed to reveal the full background of the NSU murders and its connections within the German state and its intelligence community. In this respect, the verdict cannot be considered satisfactory in either providing justice or for easing public conscience. The court was evidently timid in its ruling” (Tulun, 2019).

Adam (2015: 446–447) also offered detailed analysis that emphasized the widespread national revival and indications of “a renewed anti-immigrant and racial sentiment” in larger sections of the German public. He paraphrased Menasse regarding the rise of xenophobic attitudes in Germany, stating:

“After the experiences of the first half of the 20th century, after the trauma of being crushed and after the “never-again” rhetoric of 1945, and after the decades long engagement for a united, peaceful, post-national Europe, it was inconceivable that in today’s Germany an enemy image is constructed so quickly, so efficiently, so fanatically, that unites in nationalist hate almost everyone, from the entrepreneur to the welfare recipient, against the “foreign parasites” to be punished for sponging on the “healthy German body politic.” (Adam, 2015: 447)

While explaining the data from the various public polls that openly show the rise of xenophobic feelings and attitudes in Germany, Adam (2015) asked whether the (German) political elite deceived itself by ignoring the simmering xenophobic sentiment from ordinary citizens. He also pointed to the “social desirability bias” in a number of surveys and stated:

“All German surveys trying to discern current anti-Semitism with items about Jews, no matter how well formulated, are tainted by what is called ‘Kommunikationslatenz.’ The concept refers to the German conformity pressure to express politically correct opinions as opposed to what the respondents hold as a private, real attitude. In short, within the unarticulated ordinary consciousness, the anti-Semitic sentiments are probably higher than the attitude surveys are able to capture.” (Adam, 2015: 450).

In this context, he stressed that xenophobia in the twenty-first century no longer singled out only or mainly Jews, but has found new targets and rationalizations, such as anti-Muslim beliefs. Adam’s assessments indicate that animosity toward foreigners in Germany has been narrowed to specific groups, particularly Muslims. He underlined that “a group of active and potentially violent xenophobes” (Adam, 2015: 453) still exist in Germany.

Jäckle and König (2017) suggested similar views in their article about attacks on refugees in Germany. They emphasized that “violence against refugees can be seen as a particularly strong expression of xenophobia” (2017: 2) and called attention to the point that “Germans’ openness toward foreigners [was] put to the test in the face of the large influx of refugees in 2015” after the awful experiences of the early 1990s. (2017: 1) They underlined the sensitivity of the year 2015 because of the emergence and strengthening of the nationalist and populist right-wing party of AfD (Alternative for Germany) and the concomitant rise of the PEGIDA movement. According to Jäckle and König, refugee inflows in 2015 led to a distinct increase in attacks on refugees; at that time, debate revolved around whether those attacks were “a particularity of the eastern part of Germany” (Jäckle & König, 2017: 22). They asserted that the strength of extreme right and populist right-wing parties at the German Federal Election of 2013 (and the election to the European Parliament in 2014 for robustness) incited violence against refugees. They did not see that radical right-wing parties had an inhibiting effect on attacks against refugees and put forward that attacks in one place increased the probability of further attacks in the same place or in nearby areas. They pointed to the importance of the state “stepping in and preventing others from copying previous attacks” (Jäckle & König, 2017: 23).

4.3. Imported Foreign Labor in Germany

According to Esser and Korte (2009), Germany was mainly an emigration country, and up until 1885, Germans emigrated mainly to the United States and, to a lesser extent, to Canada, Australia, and South America. Emigration peaked between 1881 and 1885, when 857,000 migrants left Germany. As the economy expanded, the number of emigrants dropped rapidly. The actual history of immigration began only after emigration declined.

One study on the immigration background of Germany emphasized that Germany “has never been known as a country of immigrants, and a German Dream is difficult to imagine” (Göktürk et al., 2007: 3). The same study also referred to Germany as a transit hub between West-East and North-South directions in the middle of Europe and asserted that “Germany has always been more ethnically diverse than the Nazi assertions about the purity of the ‘Aryan race’ claim” (Göktürk et al., 2007: 5). In this respect, the said study referred to the example of Huguenots and stated that “in 1685, Brandenburg-Prussia provided refuge for 20,000 Huguenots fleeing France because of their Protestant faith” (Göktürk et al., 2007: 5). Adams pointed out that “Germany has long been a de facto immigration country while de jure rejecting this designation.” (2015: 450). Geis (1995: 66–67) underscored that the German state, throughout its lifetime, imported foreign labor “to do their dirty work at cheap wages and under sordid living conditions that would only attract persons already existing in an even more wretched state.” He asserted that the German political system “has always been wary about allowing foreign laborers to linger overlong or otherwise to taint German society” and drew attention to the German terms like *Überfremdung* (over foreignization) and *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* (hostility to foreigners) for explaining such fear (Geis, 1995: 67).

According to Göktürk et al. (2007), after the Second World War, most foreign laborers left Germany and returned to their home countries. However, nearly 10 million displaced persons stayed in the four occupied zones of Germany. These people were mostly liberated POWs, political detainees, deserters, refugees, and survivors of the concentration camps. Some 4.6 million were repatriated by the end of 1945, but many refused to return to the eastern zone. At the end of the war, there were 11 million German POWs—7.7 million on the western front and 3 million on the eastern front.

Most German POWs returned to Germany between 1945 and 1950, with the Soviet Union releasing its last German POWs in 1955. Returnees found themselves in competition with refugees, expellees, and evacuees for housing and food. Nevertheless, the flow of Germans from the East provided the Federal Republic with the labor and energy necessary to rebuild the country. Refugees generally settled in rural areas since urban areas were completely destroyed during the war. Although they spoke their own dialect and gathered around their own organizations as politically expelled people, studies have stated that the native people did not consider them foreigners (Göktürk et al., 2007: 8).

The integration of the expelled persons and refugees reduced the need for foreign workers. There was, therefore, an interruption in the employment of foreign workers between the Second World War and the 1950s and 1960s, when the economic revival of the FRG created a labor shortage. Requests for the recruitment of foreign labor came first from agricultural and then from industrial sectors. Losing the traditional Polish labor pool, German Federal Labor Office turned to southern Europe. Labor agreements were signed with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, and Yugoslavia. Between 500 and 600 recruitment offices were established in home countries during the height of the recruitment drive (Esser & Korte, 2009: 169; Smith, 1994: 402).

The guest workers changed labor relations in the FRG; in the 1970s, “approximately 2.3 million Germans left industrial and agricultural jobs to become managers and clerks, while foreign temporary laborers took up the vacated positions.” The FRG Labor Ministry reported that “guest workers had paved the way for a shorter workweek and longer vacations for Germans. A representative of the Employers’ Association during the welcome ceremony for the millionth guest worker acknowledged the

contribution of the guest workers to the economic development of the FRG” (Göktürk et al., 2007: 8).

Smith, as an overall assessment, drew attention to the idea that employment of foreign labor in Germany is generally perceived as a phenomenon from the 1960s and that Germany's prewar experiences with foreign labor do not figure prominently in public discussions. Outside of the publication of some books and articles, she stated that this topic is almost “forgotten history,” but was able to draw significant parallels between foreign labor conflicts in the 1990s and those of prior periods. She interpreted the anti-foreigner violence in the 1990s as representing a failure of the state to maintain ideological unity without responding to powerful and enduring anti-foreigner pressure from the society. She further stated that Germany continued to rely on a labor force substratum comprising foreigners, a practice necessary to meet economic goals that contradicts its self-definition as a homogenous racial entity. In this context, she drew attention to a recurrent conflict between business enterprises that were committed to the importation of cheap foreign labor and anti-foreigner groups asking for their expulsion. This severe dispute, according to Smith (1994: 395), resulted “historically and actually in an enduring internal contradiction in the exercise of the state’s power”; during each labor importation, the confrontation between business interests and anti-foreigner sentiments created short-term compromises. She noted that the resilient anti-foreigner ideologies do not exist only in anti-foreigner groups, but are also articulated in German citizenship and naturalization laws. Smith also contended that “the widespread repression of the long history of German foreign labor importation is a fundamental disunity of the German state” (Smith, 1994: 395).

Geiss drew attention to the tendency in the German society to forget the history of imported foreign labor. He stated that Germans “pay little heed to the fact that their

society persistently has isolated such workers and persistently has defined them as unacceptably different, as a threat to what is truly and wonderfully German” (Geis, 1995: 67). Geiss’s statements also offer advice for understanding the anti-foreigner sentiments and xenophobic attitudes that exist in contemporary German society:

“Why do so many persons abroad regard conditions in Germany, such as the Neo-Nazis, the skinheads, and other forces of intolerance, with more concern than conditions elsewhere that appear on their face to be fairly similar, neither more nor less ominous in one place than the other. For an American like myself, with half a German Lutheran heritage (the other half is Polish Jewish), the answer has to be that the German record historically is very poor ... That record is not a function of something distinctively German, but it is a function of an ethos that pervades Germany, a piece of European territory whose people with stubborn and badly misplaced pride see themselves as unique and better, and one in which residents reinforce each other in that belief by constructing circumstances that inexorably make others in their midst – the non-Germans – look bad.” (Geis, 1995: 72).

A short review of the literature on the importation of foreign labor to Germany points out the existence of historically tenacious anti-foreigner sentiments and traditions in German society. This anti-foreign tradition, in my judgment, affects the development of xenophobic attitudes and prejudice as well as the tendencies toward aggressive and violent xenophobic assault.

CHAPTER V

AUSTRIA: NATIONAL IDENTITY, NAZI PAST, AND XENOPHOBIA

5.1. Nature and Development of Austrian National Identity

Compared to Germany, the academic literature on xenophobia regarding Austria is rather limited. Most academic writing in this respect focuses on Austria's Nazi past, the historical development of Austrian national identity, its connection with prejudice against foreigners, and antisemitism in the country. Increased support for the far-right party in some sections of Austrian society and the xenophobic attitudes adopted by this party are among the topics examined. In this context, the Austrian Freedom Party's (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs; FPÖ) Nazi past, its historical development at the end of the 20th century, and its electoral success in the first quarter of the 21st century is also discussed in xenophobia-related research.

Antisemitism in Austria has a prominent place in academic studies regarding xenophobia, particularly in studies related to prejudice after the Second World War. Wodak expressed her findings on this issue with the following striking sentence: "Antisemitic prejudices are ubiquitous in Austria" (Wodak, 1991: 80).

In the 1990s in Austria, a series of letter and pipe bomb attacks were perpetrated against various minority groups. These attacks were linked to the remnants of Nazi elements in Austria. References to these attacks in academic studies were made in connection with the analysis on the strong anti-foreign feelings entrenched in the various sections of society.

Louis James began his satirical book, *The Xenophobe's Guide to the Austrians*, with explanations of Austrian nationalism and identity with the metaphor that "Hypochondriacs worry about their ailment; Austrians worry about their identity." He followed this by saying "Austrian identity is suspended somewhere between imperial history and parochial loyalties." (James, 2000: 1). James continued his explanations by saying:

"When the celebrated Stone Age man (nicknamed Ötzi) popped out of a glacier in Tyrol in 1991, he was claimed by the Italians as one of them. A learned commission established that maybe he was lying just over the border by a meter or two, and a television reporter inquired satirically why they did not just look at his passport. The moral of this is: even the iceman after all those years in cold storage is still as confused about his identity as all other Austrians." (James, 2000: 10).

Allport (2002: 50) also humorously stated: "Austrian identity has always been a matter of great controversy. It seems that even the very first Austrian does not know if he is really Austrian at all." The essence of these humorous explanations is the core of most scholarly explanations on the subject. In this context, Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart (2009) pointed out that "Academic literature on Austrian identity deals mainly with historical perspectives and attempts to prove the existence of an independent Austrian nation and a national identity as well as to document, by means of empirical quantitative surveys, how this identity is rooted in the Austrian mind" (2009: 49). They also draw attention to the various interpretations of the historical birth

of the Austrian nation (Wodak et al., 2009: 49–50). Nevertheless, most analyses on the development of Austrian national identity often take the foundation of the First Austrian Republic as a starting point.

Some scholars have sought the roots of Austria in the existing Austrian provinces and have traced them as far back as 1196. Bruckmüller (1993: 196) explained the roots of Austria as follows:

To simplify the discussion, we will define “Austria” only as the territory constituting the Republic of Austria since 1919 and since 1945; it follows that the inhabitants of this territory may logically be described as “Austrians.” This, however, cannot avoid the complications arising from the fact that this Austria was for a long time a part of a much greater power structure, which was also known as “Austria.” It is preferable to call this greater power structure “the Habsburg Monarchy” for the period after 1867. In doing so, one should not forget that the name “Austria” had been identified with the Land of the same name which had existed since 1156, and which is today the province of Lower Austria. The Land of Upper Austria (Austria above the Enns) is also included in this definition of “Austria.” Moreover, the western half of the Habsburg Monarchy was unofficially known as “Austria” after the *Ausgleich* (Austro-Hungarian Compromise) of 1867. Its inhabitants were officially in possession of “Austrian” citizenship. This last version of Austria corresponds to almost all present-day Austria, together with territories of significant proportions which belong to existing Italy, Romania, Poland, and the former Czechoslovakia, USSR, and Yugoslavia.

Wodak et al. (2009: 50) mentioned that the 1000th anniversary of the toponym “Austria” was celebrated in 1996 by numerous ceremonies and a large historical exhibition, and that “The first mention of Austria as ‘Ostarrichi’ in a historical document on 1 November 996 referred to a region in what is today Lower Austria.”

There are also opposing views to the 1000 years of Austria and Austrian identity, which identify this narrative as “founding myths.” For example, Mathis (1997) argued that the 1000-year-old discourse of Austrian history not only contributed minimally to the creation of Austrian identity but also hindered the creation of a real and well-founded Austrian identity.

Cinar underlined that history is a “central aspect of Austrian Identity building” and “the Austrian political elite saw historical legitimization as indispensable to the nation-building process and relied on historical images to reinforce Austrian identity.” She also pointed out that “Austrian official history was predominantly organized around a contextual narrative” and that the past reaches us through interpretative processes conveyed by the narratives (Cinar, 2012: 160, 198, 13; Cinar, 2015: 52, 64).

Jelavich pointed out that the importance of the 1918 period is often emphasized in modern Austrian history. However, she stated that if the history of the Habsburg Empire was not explained, the period in question could not be fully understood. Jelavich noted that Austria is considered an independent state and is also part of wider German culture. In this context, she stated that the Habsburg Empire has historically played a leading role in Central Europe and argued that German unification might have been accomplished by Vienna instead of Berlin if historical events had taken a different direction (Jelavich, 1987: xi-xii).

Notably, the Austrian identity has a certain sectarian religious character. While Germany's population is mainly Protestant and Catholic, the Austrian population is predominantly Catholic. It is difficult to say whether this issue has been sufficiently examined in the studies on Austria's national identity. Thaler (2001: 59) is one of the few scholars who stated that “Austrian identity was formed by the Counterreformation and the baroque period and represented a Catholic antipode to Protestant Germany.” He also examined Catholic Austria versus protestant Brandenburg-Prussia religion dualism (Thaler, 1999: 282; Thaler, 2001: 60–61). He described “Brandenburg-Prussia as a Protestant counterforce to the Habsburg emperor” (Thaler, 2001: 56).

The Salzburg Festival, a world-famous music and drama event, is also part of the discussions about Austrian identity. According to Burri (2016: 147), “The Salzburg Festival acquired a symbolic authority during the First Austrian Republic... the festival’s prewar history, fortified a particular agenda of the Second Austrian Republic in defining Austrian history and national identity in the decades following World War II.” In the preface of *Austria as Theater and Ideology*, Steinberg (2000) stated that the Salzburg Festival was conceived by its founders as a stage for the reconfiguration of the Austrian identity. The festival is generally considered to represent “the Austrian Catholic legacy, and by alternative visions of the relationship between Austrian culture and a potentially emerging Austrian national state” as well as “the baroque unity of Catholicism” (Burri, 2016: 149).

As these examples show, disagreements about the nature and formation of Austrian identity have their roots in Austrian society. For example, even the Salzburg music and art festival has been discussed in the context of Austrian identity, and the deep-rooted Catholic-Protestant division has been used as a tool for this discussion. Friedrich Heer (as cited in Bischof & Pelinka, 2017) asserted that Austria, in its long struggle for a national identity, was unmatched by any other historic entity in Europe in the extent of its deeply-rooted identity problems. Heer stated that “throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century Austria lived in a never-ending crisis, constantly threatened by a complete loss of identity” (as cited in Bischof & Pelinka, 2017: 1–2).

Notably, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the Habsburgs collapsed during 1918, it had a population of over 50 million, and included 10 nationalities: Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Ukrainian, Polish, Rumanian, Croat, Slovene, Serbian, and German-Austrian (Barker, 1973: 4). German-speaking people of German-Austrian nationality had a privileged status, which might be considered as *primus inter pares*.

According to Jelavich, in the immediate pre-war period of 1914, “German-speaking people held the strongest political, economic, and social position in the monarchy,” but their national movement had not fully developed (Jelavich, 1987: 44). Jelavich further stated that the breakup of the Habsburg Empire came as an unexpected shock for Austrian Germans. Holding the “strongest historic position among the nationalities, the Germans had not felt it necessary to organize militant societies to achieve definite goals.” They only sought to keep the privileges that they enjoyed (Jelavich, 1987: 323).

Barker (1973: 8) described the conditions faced by German Austrians in 1918 and their mood, as well as the conditions under which the First Republic of Austria emerged in 1919, as follows: “the vast majority of ‘German Austrians’ entered their new life in a rump Austria in a state of shock and bewilderment, unprepared either psychologically or politically. The victorious Allies, for their part, seemed to have little idea of what they wanted to do with the ‘remnant’ Austria.”

In light of this, to better understand Austrian national identity, the stages in which the Austrian nation-state and identity were formed should be briefly discussed. Fellner (1988) divided the history of the political independence of today’s Austria and Austrians’ collective discovery of themselves as an autonomous community into six phases. He described the first phase as “from 1918 to 1934, Allied pressure forced Austria’s formal acceptance of its political independence, but Austria nevertheless continued to deny this ideologically and historiographically.” Fellner depicted the second phase as “the clerical- authoritarian regime that governed from 1934 to 1938,” which officially promoted Austrian independence but did not clarify whether Austria was destined for permanence and durability. He described the third phase from 1938–1943 by stating that “Austria was written off as an independent unit by the Allies.” The period from the Moscow Declaration on the re-establishment of Austria up to the

liberation of the country in 1945 is referred to as the fourth phase. Fellner marked the years from 1945–1955 as the fifth phase, during which the consolidation of Austrian independence was realized. According to Feller, the sixth phase began with the signing of the State Treaty in 1955 and continues to the 1990s, which “reveals Austria as a self-conscious as well as an autonomous element among the European states” (Fellner, 1988: 265–267).

5.2.1. Prelude to First Republic of Austria: German Austrians or Austrian Germans

The First Austrian Republic was founded by the German-speaking people of the multinational empire following the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. This new state defined itself as “German Austria” (*Deutsch-Osterreich*). In the fall of 1918, when the empire came to its end, Emperor Karl’s government proposed that the Empire be transformed into a federation. He then issued a manifesto offering to do so. Certain groups, like the Czechs and Slavs, did not accept this proposal and declared their independence. By October 21, 1918, the negotiations between the three German-Austrian political parties (Social Democrats, Christian Socialists, and German Nationalists) led to an agreement and the first meeting of the Provisional National Assembly formed by all the German deputies was held to elect the imperial parliament (Barker, 1973: 25–26). This assembly created a Political Council that represented all three parties and declared unanimously that “the German people in Austria are resolved to determine their future form of State, to form an independent German-Austrian State, and to regulate their relations with other nations by free agreement” (Barker, 1973: 28). The Provisional Assembly called on the Lands to form their own provisional assemblies and governments on a three-party basis and then, on November 12, 1918, declared German-Austria as a Republic (Barker, 1973: 30).

As this brief explanation reveals, the German-speaking people living within the Austro-Hungarian Empire wanted to become a nation-state of the German-speaking Austrians after the Empire dissolved. As an expression of the national right of self-determination, they declared their state as the German-Austrian Republic. They considered themselves as part of the newly born Republic of the German Reich. According to Bruckmüller, “Austrians themselves, or at least their most important representatives, clearly saw themselves as ‘Germans’” (Bruckmüller, 1993: 198).

This is quite an understandable consideration. Like the other nationalities (e.g., Czechs, Poles, Slovenians, Croats, Ruthenians, Italians), Germans identified themselves by their language. Since all the nationalities considered themselves “Austrians,” it is understandable for the German speakers of the defunct Empire to identify themselves as “German Austrians.” Lamb-Faffelberger (2003: 292) stated that the First Republic, based on this mindset, “identified itself as the second German state and embraced the German language and its cultural wealth to plant the seeds for a new identity.” Austria was, therefore, considered “part of the larger German *Kulturnation*.”

It should be underlined that the provisional national assembly drafted a provisional constitution. Article 1 of this constitution stated that “German-Austria is a democratic republic. All public powers are put into force by the people.” The second article of the constitution expressed the desire to join the Republic of Germany as follows:

“German-Austria is a constituent part of the German Republic. Special laws regulate the participation of German-Austria in the legislation and administration of the German Republic as well as the extension of the area of validity of the laws and institutions of the German Republic to German-Austria.”³²

³² The excerpts for the constitutional articles in question are quoted from “The World of the Habsburgs” webpage: <https://ww1.habsburger.net/en/chapters/12-november-1918>. Additionally, “Österreichische Nationalbibliothek” (Austrian National Library), Historische Rechts und Gesetzestexte Online (Historical legal and legal texts online). November 12, 1918. Retrieved from <http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?apm=0&aid=sgb&datum=19180000&page=26>

As per Gould, “of the three large political parties in Austria in 1918, the Social Democrats, the German Nationalists, and the Christian Socialists, the first two had a tradition of *Anschluss* agitation in the past,” and for the Social Democrats, “this tradition was a part of the ideal of a united Austro-German republic, a concept which dates back to the German revolution of 1848” (Gould, 1958: 221). In fact, according to Myers (1972), the coalition government saw little alternative to the Anschluss declaration proposed by Chancellor Renner. The State Council then placed before the Provisional National Assembly the draft of a law that proclaimed German-Austria a “democratic republic” and “a constituent part of the German Republic,” and it was unanimously passed by the assembly on November 12 (1972: 153–154). Notably, after 1918, during the Republic of German-Austria, according to Beller (2006: 1) “few ‘Austrians’ regarded this as the best response to the Monarchy’s collapse, most preferring Anschluss (union with Germany) instead.” It is possible to say that such information and assessments about the developments in 1918 point to the existence of a strong supporter group in the Austrian society for the union with Germany.

The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria; Protocol, Declaration and Special Declaration, which is known as “The Treaty of Saint-Germain” was signed in St. Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 1919. In its preamble, this treaty states that “the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has now ceased to exist and has been replaced in Austria by a republican government” and that “The Republic of Austria” was represented by “Mr. Charles Renner, Chancellor of the Republic of

Austria.” Hence, the Treaty formally changed the name of the “German-Austrian Republic” to “Republic of Austria.”³³

On March 12, 1919, the Constituent Assembly reaffirmed an earlier declaration that German-Austria was a constituent part of the German republic. Pan-Germans and Social Democrats supported the union with Germany, while Christian Socialists were less supportive. In the spring and summer of 1919, union talks between the Germans and Austria continued. This changed after June 2, 1919, when the draft peace treaty with Austria was presented and showed that Western Allies were opposed to any union between Germany and Austria. The treaty faced a serious public reaction in Vienna; large popular demonstrations were held in front of the parliament, and the pages of dailies were filled with statements that openly expressed sorrow. Some editorials criticized the changed name of the state and avowed that “we are not allowed to be the Republic of German Austria, but shall bear the name of the non-existent, collapsed great power” (Roberts, 1959: 89–90). The words of the Speaker of the National Assembly on the ratification of the Treaty in the Parliament reflected this profound disappointment:

“It is a very grave moment when a man is called upon to sign the death-warrant for another man. It is still graver when he must sign his own death-warrant, and this is our position today. I will say frankly, and we must continue to declare it, that even if we sign, we shall not be in a position to fulfill everything ... Our situation is terrible. But have we any choice? Is it possible for us to do today what we desire to do? We need the Entente, and since we need the Entente, we are obliged to sign. We shall sign, therefore, even though our hand finds it hard to take the pen. But we call the whole world to witness, we cry to all the world that we are being subjected to force, and that we had no choice but to act as we have done.” (Roberts, 1959: 94).

³³ The electronic version of the text of the “Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria; Protocol, Declaration and Special Declaration (St. Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919)” can be accessed via Australian Treaty Series 1920 No. 3. Retrieved from <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/3.html>

The most important article of this Treaty in terms of Austrian identity is also included in the Treaty of Versailles Treaty. It prevented the Anschluss. The articles included in both treaties are as follows:

“Treaty of St. Germain, Section VIII A General Provisions, Article 88

The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently, Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power.”

“Treaty of Versailles, Section VI, Austria, Article 80

Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.”³⁴ (Wright, 1944: 621).

As can be understood from these provisions, Austria was legally required to give up its goal of unification with Germany, and Germany was required to agree to respect the independence of Austria. The relationship between Austria and Germany was also to be supervised by the League of Nations. However, the resolution adopted by the National Assembly of the German-Austrian Republic on September 6, 1919, reflected the strong desire of German Austrians to join Germany. One excerpt, designed to show how the national identity developed between the world wars, is included:

“(National Assembly resolved) to protest solemnly before the world against the fact that the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, under the pretext of protecting Austrian independence, deprives the people of German-Austria of their right to self-determination and refuses them the fulfillment of their heartfelt desire, which also represents a vital economic, cultural, and political necessity: the union of German-Austria with the German homeland.

The National Assembly expresses its hope that as soon as peace has overcome the spirit of national hatred and animosity caused by the war, the League of

³⁴ The text of the Treaty can be retrieved from Library of Congress <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0043.pdf>

Nations will not lastingly deny the German people the right to national unity and liberty, which it grants all other nations.” (Thaler, 1999: 292)

In spite of the above-mentioned treaty provisions, German Austrians continued to consider Germany their homeland, and openly declared their desire through this resolution. Separately, individual Austrian provinces arranged plebiscites in support of their region’s union with Germany. For example, Thaler wrote that “on 24 April 1921, with approximately 90 per cent of the eligible electorate participating, 98.6 per cent of the Tyrolean voters endorsed union negotiations with Germany.” Additionally, on May 29, 1921, 99.3% of the voters in Salzburg also supported union with Germany (Thaler, 1997: 76). The National Assembly resolution represented a powerful declaration of intent, in both the legal and emotional sense, for the national identity of the German Austrians. This constitutes a good signpost to show the way to the Anschluss in 1938.

5.2.2. German-Austrian or Austro-German Identity in the Interwar Period

Wodak et al. (2009:55) stated that “the question of the relationship between Austria and Germany and the discussion of whether Austrians belong to any kind of (larger) ‘German nation’ represents, in the words of Albert F. Reiterer, the ‘touchstone’ of Austrian national identity.” They underlined that “more than a century of recent Austrian history has been characterized by this question” (Wodak et al., 2009: 55). In a similar fashion, Ritter stated that “Regardless of current taboos, the question of Austria's relationship to German nationality has been a recurring – and sometimes pivotal – issue for 150 years” (Ritter, 1992: 112). In this context, Ritter cited Fellner's views:

“The word 'German'... became taboo, the interdependence of Austrian history and the Austrian past with German history and the German present was

displaced; indeed, any historiographical engagement with this theme was stylized as high treason.... The problem of Austria's relationship to the German states was bracketed out of the political consciousness of Austrians - as if people were afraid that the historical and political business of working off the trauma of Austrian history's separation from or integration into German history could endanger that national political independence, that natural Austrian patriotism which has become a completely instinctive matter of course for the generation born after 1945.” (Quoted in Ritter, 1992: 114)

Academic literature on the national identity of Austria during the interwar period mostly points to the importance of rival concepts of *Kulturnation* (cultural nation) and *Staatsnation* (political nation or nation-state), and predominantly asserts that the *Kulturnation* idea dominated in the interwar period (Peniston-Bird, 1996: 16; Bulloch, 2002: 26). These concepts were advanced by Meinecke in 1908. According to Smith (1991: 8), Meinecke “distinguished the *Kulturnation*, the largely passive cultural community, from the *Staatsnation*, the active self-determining political nation.” Meinecke (1970: 10–11) explained these two concepts as follows:

“The first prerequisite for the development of a nation is the acquisition of a firm territorial base, a “fatherland.” There are, of course, wandering and geographically divided nations as well, but experience shows that only the ones that have possessed a permanent residential seat, a fatherland, over a long period of time have been able to acquire and maintain a reach substance and firm coherence. If we ask now from what sources this substance derives, two major categories will occur to us immediately. Despite all the obvious reservations that can be made, we can still divide nations into cultural nations and political nations, nations that are primarily based on some jointly experienced cultural heritage and nations that are primarily based on the unifying force of a common political history and constitution. A standard language, a common literature, and a common religion are the most important and powerful cultural assets that create a cultural nation and hold it together.... Members of different cultural nations can live within a genuine political nation, as the example of Switzerland shows; and a cultural nation, as the example of the entire German nation has shown, can experience within itself the growth of several political nations, that is, populations of states that shape their feeling of political unity into a distinctive individual form, that become a nation through this process and often consciously want to become one, but that also remain members of the larger, more comprehensive cultural nation whether they desire this and are aware of it or not.”

As Fulbrook (1999) suggested, “national identity does not exist, as an essence to be sought for, found and defined” (1999:1). In such a context, per Fulbrook, national identity is a human construct and “evident only sufficient people believe in some version of collective identity to be a social reality, embodied in and transmitted through institutions, laws, customs, beliefs and practices” (Fulbrook, 1999: 1). Complementing and expanding on this, Smith (1991) lists the key features of national identity as follows: territory, common myths and historic memories, common culture, common legal rights and duties, and common economy.

In light of the above explanations, I suggest that the national identity comprising the collective identity of the majority of the Austrian Germans during this period was shaped within the framework of German nations. This situation reminds us of the dominance of the *Kulturnation* concept in the national identity at that time. However, this attitude cannot be superficially interpreted as disloyalty to the Austrian state. Instead, I argue that a dual allegiance to both the German nation concept and Austrian state exists. Consequently, we should also consider the influence of the *Staatsnation* concept on national identity. Within the framework of these explanations, it seems possible that the Austrian national identity in the mentioned period was a combination of the *Kulturnation* and *Staatsnation* concepts, with *Kulturnation* being more dominant. I am aware that the concept of *Kulturnation* and notion of *Kulturnationalität* created suspicions because of their association with the rising ambitious German nationalism during that time and with the known antisemitic prejudices of Meinecke (Winkler, 2007: 213). Nonetheless, I consider these concepts and notions to be a useful analytical instrument for understanding the “German-Austrian” or “Austro-German” identity in the interwar period and for deconstructing all-encompassing Austrian

national identity, since it cannot be confidently asserted that there is a single Austrian national identity applicable at all times.

5.2.3. What Does the Anschluss Plebiscite Mean for the Austrian National Identity?

As noted earlier, three German-Austrian political parties (Social Democrats, Christian Socialists, and German Nationalists) had a common desire for an *Anschluss* of the German-Austria Republic to the newly founded German Republic. Wodak et al. (2009) point out that the Social Democrats' attachment to Germany can be attributed to their political affinity with the democratic Weimar Republic. However, the Christian Socialist Party which was in power between 1934 and 1938, was defending an "ambivalent Austrian patriotism" in "the authoritarian Corporatist State" system. According to Wodak et al. (2009: 51), Christian Socialists, simultaneously promoted a "Catholic and dynastic-orientated Austrian patriotism" and tried to turn Austria into a "better Germany." The years of Chancellors Dollfuss' and Schuschnigg's authoritarian governments (1933/34–1938) have been labeled as "Austrofascism" by the left or defended as a Christian corporate state (*Ständestaat*) by the right (Bischof, Pelinka, & Lassner, 2003: 1). During this period, Austria struggled to maintain its national independence vis-à-vis Hitler's Germany. Ultimately, the Nazis invaded Austria; although it was not completed in the preferred way, the long-desired Anschluss did occur. In this connection, to better understand the impact of Anschluss on Austria's national identity, I find it useful to focus more on some details of its realization process as well as the plebiscite held in that respect.

According to Kitchen (2006: 294), "in January 1938 Austrian police unearthed evidence that the National Socialists were planning to cause disorder that the Germans

would have an excuse to intervene in order to restore law and order.” Upon this intelligence, to ease the tension, the Austrian chancellor Schuschnigg visited Germany. Hitler, however, accused Austria of “racial treason.” On his return home, the Austrian chancellor called for a referendum for a “free, German, independent, social, Christian and united Austria.” The Austrian Nazis saw this as provocation, started a violent anarchy, and seized government buildings in Vienna. Hitler then gave orders to his troops to cross the frontier. Kitchen (2006: 295) summarized this as follows:

“The German army met with a rapturously enthusiastic welcome on March 12, and Hitler made a triumphant return to his birthplace at Braunau before moving on to Linz where, impressed by the vast and enthusiastic crowds, he announced that Austria would be incorporated into the German Reich. From Linz he traveled to Vienna where he addressed an even larger crowd of ecstatic devotees. On April 10, a referendum was held in which 99 percent of those eligible, including the Austrian Socialist leader Karl Renner, voted in favor of the Anschluss. Austria promptly ceased to exist and became a German province known as the Ostmark.”

There is a broad consensus in academic sources that Hitler was welcomed enthusiastically by the Austrians. Wodak et al. (2009: 52) underlined that “the Anschluss of Austria with National Socialist Germany on 11 March 1938...accompanied by euphoric celebrations by large segments of the Austrian population, marked the end of Austria’s independence as a state and its integration into the German Reich.” El Refaie (2004: 216) pointed out that “When German troops marched into Austria in March 1938, they were greeted with such frenzied acclamation that apparently it took even Hitler by surprise. A few weeks later, a plebiscite was organized, in which the Austrians were asked to endorse the Anschluss, and which resulted in an almost unanimous affirmative vote (99, 73%).” Journalist and historian Gordon Brook-Shepherd stated that “As everywhere, not every uplifted arm meant an uplifted heart. But of the 120,000 people that the city numbered at the time, 100,000 must have been out to watch the Führer arrive at 8 o'clock in the evening.” Brook-

Shepherd stated that the welcome in Vienna was perhaps less concentrated than that of Linz because of its large Jewish population and cosmopolitan character. Nevertheless, he stated that at the Heldenplatz on the morning of March 15, “a wildly cheering crowd over 200,000 strong jammed the historic square and the surrounding streets to watch Hitler take up his Austrian crown” (Brook-Shepherd, 1963: 190, 199–200).

The plebiscite question was this: “Do you acknowledge Adolf Hitler as our Führer and the reunion of Austria with the German Reich which was effected on March 13, 1938?” (Brook-Shepherd, 1963, 200). The official result was reported as 99.73% in favor, with a 99.71% turnout. The table below shows the plebiscite results.

Table 5: Austria, April 10, 1938, Anschluss Plebiscite Results

Territory	Austria	
Position	Independent state becomes part of the state (German Empire)	
Date	April 10, 1938	
Template	Connection to the German Reich, Reichstag list	
Question pattern	Decision question	
Voting type	Plebiscite → by government → ad hoc → level: self-determination	
Result	Accepted	
Majorities	Valid votes	
Voters	4,484,617	
Participation	4,471,618	99.71 %
Voices out of consideration	5,777	
Valid (= authoritative) votes	4,465,841	Based on the valid votes
Yes votes	4,453,912	99.73 %
No votes	11,929	0.27 %

Source: Database and Search Engine for Direct Democracy.³⁵

³⁵ Retrieved from <https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=at011938>

It has been widely and convincingly argued that this outcome was manipulated by the Nazi regime. Neither Jewish nor Roma people were allowed to vote. However, it is possible to assert that the outcome reflects the enthusiasm of Austrian people in 1938 for Anschluss, for the German union, and for the German identity. There are assertions that Nazi propaganda skillfully manipulated the portrayal of the Anschluss for their purposes. Some academic sources also give credit to the claims that Hitler's jubilant reception was staged Nazi propaganda. Hamann, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Anschluss with Germany in 2008, stated that "This kind of argument is used by the Austrians who claim that they are innocent, and the Nazis were the invaders."³⁶ Regardless of whether the results of the plebiscite were manipulated by the Nazis, I think these arguments suggest a debate about whether Austria was the first victim of Hitler's Germany or was both a victim and a perpetrator of National Socialism.

5.2.4. Second Republic of Austria and New National Identity Formation

During the Third Moscow Conference between the major Allies of World War II, held from October 18 to November 11, 1943, the foreign ministers from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China signed four declarations. One declaration, signed on November 1, 1943, by the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, concerned Austria. It stated:

"The governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any charges effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see

³⁶ Paterson, T. (2008). *Anschluss and Austria's Guilty Conscience*. The Independent [online edition], Retrieved from <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/anschluss-and-austrias-guilty-conscience-795016.html>

re-established a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring States which will be face with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace. Austria is reminded, however that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.”³⁷

This declaration of the allies gave Austria a special status starting during the war by declaring the Anschluss as null and void and expressing their wish to see a “re-established free and independent Austria” (see footnote 38). However, Austria was also reminded that “she cannot evade” her responsibilities for “participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany” (see footnote 38). This declaration was based on the period from the formation of the Second Republic of Austria to the signing of the Austrian State Treaty on May 15, 1955. This treaty recognized the re-establishment of Austria as “a sovereign, independent and democratic State” and ensured the withdrawal of all occupation forces, declaring Austria’s neutrality as a buffer zone between the East and the West (Barker, 1973: 137–147; Mosely, 1950: 220). Article 4 of the State Treaty prohibited political or economic union between Austria and Germany in any form whatsoever. In accordance with the same article, Austria undertook to prevent the “existence, resurgence and activities of any organization having as their aim political or economic union with Germany, and pan-German propaganda in favor of union with Germany.”³⁸

Along with the above-mentioned Declaration, and more specifically with the Treaty of re-establishment of Austria, Thaler stated that Austrian national identity underwent a marked transformation in the postwar decades and that the wider German sense of

³⁷ Text of the Declaration in Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library. The Avalon Project. Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. Retrieved from <https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/moscow.asp>

³⁸ Text of the State Treaty in United Nations Treaty Series Volume 217, 1955, No. 2949, pp. 223–292. Retrieved from <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20217/v217.pdf>

self, which was traditionally predominant among German-speaking Austrians, increasingly lost ground to an exclusively Austrian one. Thaler rightly suggested that “this change in national consciousness did not occur in a political vacuum.” He further stated that “utilizing the post-war geopolitical environment, which favored the emancipation of Austria from its traditional German ties, the country's political leadership set out to bolster Austria's political identity by promoting a more comprehensive national identity to support it” (Thaler, 1997: 69). Similarly, Fellner stated that “Austria has outgrown the belief in German unity that still dominated Austrian thought even between the two world wars and has embraced its own state independence as an indisputable reality under international law” (Fellner, 1988: 289). This new national identity formation process, which was nested in postwar Austrian nation-building, was explained by Kreissler as follows:

“The present study is strongly engaged: its purpose was radical destruction of the legend of the “German-Austrian” or even of the Austrian as the “better” German, and the portrayal of the growth and consolidation of the Austrian nation. This process requires the final eradication of pan-German ideology. In the course of its realization, such a comprehensive intention must ignore no suggestion, contribution, or assistance –wherever it might come from.” (Quoted in Thaler, 1999: 279).

As mentioned earlier, Wodak et al. (2009) stated that “academic literature on Austrian identity deals mainly with historical perspectives. It attempts to prove the existence of an independent Austrian nation and national identity as well as to show, by means of empirical quantitative surveys, how this identity is rooted in the Austrian mind.” As far as the empirical quantitative surveys are concerned, Thaler (2001: 178) suggested:

“An overwhelming majority of Austrians now define themselves as members of a distinct Austrian nation. They no longer consider Austrian identity a regional subcategory of German identity. Indeed, a considerable number of them define “Austrian” by way of its distinctiveness from “German.” At the same time, the Austrian populace continues to include an appreciable minority that insists on its German identity. Faced with official discouragement, the

share of this population group has decreased during the postwar decades. Considering the adverse political environment, however, Germanist sentiment in Austria proved quite persistent.”³⁹

The two separate tables below show the survey results between 1950 and 1994, concerning the development of Austrian identity.

Table 6: Survey Results on Perceptions of Austrian Identity

Survey Year/Institution	Percentages of Responses			
	Austria is a nation	Austria slowly begins to feel itself as a nation	Austria is not a nation	No indication
1956/Fessel-Institute	49%	N/a as survey option	46%	5%
1964/Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft (SWS)	47.37%	23.04%	15.34%	14.25%
1970/Austrian Gallup Institute	66%	16%	8%	10%
1980/Paul Lazarsfeld Society	67%	19%	11%	3%
1993/Fessel-GfK Institute	80%	12%	6%	2%

Source: Meral Uğur Cinar. (2001), Ph.D. Thesis. Page: 157.

Table 7: Austrian Identity Surveys - 1964, 1970, and 1994

Question: Many people say that Austrians are a nation. Other people say that Austrians are not a nation. Still others say that Austrians are slowly beginning to see themselves as a nation. Who is right?			
Answer: The Austrians	% support in 1964	% support in 1970	% support in 1994
Are a nation:	47.37%	66%	72%
Are slowly beginning to see themselves as a nation:	23.04%	16%	14%
Are not a nation:	15.34%	8%	8%
Don't know:	14.25%	10%	6%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Source: Peter Thaler. (2001). The Ambivalence of Identity. Page: 168.

³⁹ Thaler used “Germanist” and “Austrianist” terms to “designate the two competing identity conceptions in Austria. The Germanist conception views Austrian identity as part of a larger German identity ... whereas its Austrianist counterpart rejects the affiliation of Austrian with any form of German identity” (Thaler 1977, 90).

Research results indicated that support for an independent Austrian national identity has increased significantly over the years.

5.2.5. “Victim Thesis” of the Second Republic: Is Austria Really a Victim?

During the Second Republic, in parallel with the development of this new independent Austrian national identity, efforts were made to eliminate the dominance of German identity in Austrian society. Wodak et al. (2009: 56) stated that “after 1945 at the latest, whatever residual ‘German’ identification Austrians still retained was removed ... Academic discourse – which has always been politicized – on distinguishing identities developed along the lines of the dichotomy ‘German’ versus ‘Austrian’.” This approach paved the way for the genesis of the ‘victim thesis’ which portrays all Austrians as victims of Nazi Germany and the war, and which “many scholars regard as the *Lebenslüge* (‘grand delusion’) of the Second Republic” (Wodak et al., 2009: 56, 59). Bischof and Pelinka stated that “the Austrian intellectual elites constructed the founding lie myth (some call it the ‘big lie’) of postwar Austria as a nation of victim.” They further asserted that “the political elites reimagined Austrian identity radically anti-German to disconnect Austria from her World War II past ... and her citizens from any responsibility for Nazi war crimes” (Bischof & Pelinka, 2017: 3). In fact, this “victim thesis” enabled Austria to assert that she could not be held liable for the crimes committed by Nazi Germany. By doing so, Austria tried to avoid being held responsible as a perpetrator of the crimes of the Second World War and transferred the whole responsibility to what was then West Germany. This transfer of guilt enabled Austria to purify herself morally from the shames of the Second World War, and more importantly, to prevent herself from paying reparation or restitution.

Arguably, Austria's responsibility in Nazi crimes was officially a taboo issue in Austria until the 1990s. According to Bischoff, in the 1990s "the Austrian government finally abandoned its hegemonic post-war 'memory regime' – the infamous 'victim's doctrine' – the myth that all Austrians were victims of the Nazis and the war" (Bischof, 2004: 17). As per Wodak et al. (2009), Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky made a speech in the Austrian Parliament in 1992 and "became the first official to declare explicitly that Austria had been both a victim and a perpetrator of National Socialism." Vranitzky conceded that Austria had been slow to recognize its moral responsibility, and apologized to the victims of the Austrian Nazis. In 1994, the "Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), Greens, and Liberal Forum introduced a binding resolution in the Parliament, calling for the establishment of an aid fund." The resolution was adopted in 1995, and the National Aid Fund for Nazi Victims was endowed with a sum of ATS 500 million" (Wodak et al., 2009: 60–61). Austria's official acceptance during the 1990s coincided with the serious violent racist/xenophobic incidents occurring in Germany.

Austria has repeated this new official position during the 80th anniversary of Anschluss in 2018. At that time, President Van der Bellen of Austria urged Austrians to be vigilant about the threats to democracy and said that

"Austria used to see itself as the first victim of National Socialism [Nazism]. That is certainly true for all those who fought in the resistance, whom we cannot thank enough, and who will always be shining examples... But the ones who stood in such great numbers and celebrated in March 1938 in Heroes' Square (*Heldenplatz*) were no victims. The ones who watched and participated when their neighbors were robbed, expelled and murdered were no victims ... We have realized that Austria was not only a victim but also a perpetrator."⁴⁰ (Tulun, 2018).

⁴⁰ See also Deutsche Welle, "Austria marks 80 years since Nazi Germany annexation," 12.03.2018. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/austria-marks-80-years-since-nazi-germany-annexation/a-42935913>

In the context of “victim or perpetrator or both” discussions and the discussion of Austria’s Nazi past, “political elite discourse” theory is relevant. Art (2006) argued that debates among elites have been primarily responsible for influencing the public’s position toward Nazism in Germany and Austria. He explained that “public debates produce new ideas, shift the weight of elite opinion, and change the language elites use to discuss certain political issues” (2006: 1). He argued that public debates create consolidated “frames” for some aspects of the political world, and that these frames influence political behavior. Public debates, therefore, produce shifts in elite opinion and also shift the boundaries of legitimate discursive space. Change in discursive space reflects broader ideological shifts in politics and society. Art said that “political elites are the central participants in public debates” (Art, 2006: 1–2) and that elites have forged a “culture of contrition” in Germany. According to Art, this culture represents a compromise that accepts Germany’s responsibility in the Second World War and accepts the Holocaust as a painful fact of German history. In Austria, by contrast, a controversial view prevails, minimizing Austrian complicity and claiming that Austria was the first victim of Nazi aggression. Art (2006: 9, 216) presented his writing as theories rather than facts, said they were largely based on “historical narratives,” and explained their nature as follows:

“I present my theories in abstract, generalizable terms so that they may be used, or contested, by scholars working in other areas. I make no claim to have tested them here. For scholars less concerned with social science methodology and more interested in my substantive findings, theoretical architecture help to structure what would otherwise be an intricate, unwieldy narrative.”

Regarding his research design, Art stated that he conducted semi-structured interviews—50 with Austrian politicians and 75 with German politicians (Art, 2006: 19, 215). In addition, he stated that “in order to locate German public debates for analysis, I examined the political sections of *Die Zeit*, Germany’s weekly newspaper

of record, over a twenty year period (1980–2000) using a code scheme outlined in Appendix A, I counted the total column inches of stories related to the Nazi past each week” (Art, 2006: 44). Art did not explain the content analysis of the Austrian papers in detail, only stating that “The largest papers in each state are largest tabloids (Bild in Germany and Kronen in Austria). These tabloids have an enormous influence on public debate, and I focus on them. For several reasons, I have chosen an interpretative rather than a quantitative content-analysis to analyze these tabloids” (Art, 2006: 44–45).

Art admitted that he did not test the hypothesis in his book: “Although I admittedly do not test the hypothesis in this book, I believe that the long-term development of right-wing populist parties is critically influenced by the reaction of political parties, the media, and civil society to them.” (Art, 2006: x)

5.2.6. Impact of Neutrality on Austrian National Identity and Integration with Western Europe

There is no mention of neutrality in the State Treaty of 1955. During the bilateral negotiations in Moscow in April 1955, in exchange for the Soviet Union's approval of the State Treaty and withdrawal of their troops from eastern Austria, Austria agreed to follow a policy of permanent neutrality. On April 15, 1955, government delegations from Austria and the Soviet Union issued a joint memorandum on the outcome of the negotiations held in Moscow regarding how the treaty provisions would be implemented. Austria also pledged not to join any military alliances, not to allow military bases in its territory, and to issue a declaration that obliged Austria to permanently practice neutrality as Switzerland did. Austria submitted this declaration

to the Austrian Parliament immediately after ratification of the international treaty.⁴¹ Subsequently, the neutrality provision included in the separate Federal Constitutional Law of October 26, 1955, became part of the Constitution of Austria. The Soviet Union agreed to Austria joining the United Nations in December 1955 and the Council of Europe in April 1956 (Gehler & Kaiser, 1997: 83). The relevant part of this law is as follows:

“For the purpose of maintaining its independence over the long term and for the purpose of promoting the inviolability of its territory, Austria declares its permanent neutrality by its own will. Austria will maintain and defend this neutrality by all available means. In order to secure these purposes, Austria will not join any military alliances, nor will it allow the establishment of foreign states’ military bases in its territory.” (Wodak et al., 2009: 62–63).

Wodak et al. (2009) described the permanent neutrality as “the most important identity-promoting characteristics of the Second Republic” (2009: 63) and stated that there was no consensus up until the mid-1980s regarding whether Austria should have full membership in the European Community because of the fear that membership could not be reconciled with permanent neutrality. Austria’s foreign policy in this period was understood as “constant impartiality” (2009: 63) and designed on the basis of “active neutrality” (2009: 63), thereby distancing Austria from power-blocs and enabling her to pursue intermediary roles in the conflicts between the East and West as well as in those between the North and South. However, over time, questions have arisen about the benefits of permanent neutrality, especially because of economic decline and the changing geopolitical situation that followed the introduction of the

⁴¹ The text of the Memorandum was titled “Memorandum über die Ergebnisse der Besprechung zwischen der Regierungsdelegation der Republik Österreich und der Regierungsdelegation der Sowjetunion” (Memorandum on the Outcome of the Meeting between the Government Delegation of the Republic of Austria and the Government Delegation of the Soviet Union). Retrieved from CVCE (The Digital Research in European Studies) https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/memorandum_uber_die_besprechungen_der_sowjetunion_und_osterreich_15_april_1955-de-63977731-04e8-4657-87fa-1d48c3ea6a18.html

European Common Market. It was asserted that if Austria put forward its neutrality in an appropriate clause in the relevant documents, she would have access to the EU without incident since none of the documents related to neutrality (namely, the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943; Moscow Memorandum of April 15, 1955; State Treaty of May 15, 1955; and Neutrality Act of October 16, 1955) contained a precise definition of Austria's rights and obligations as a neutral state. A referendum on Austria's joining EU was held on June 12, 1994, and "resulted in a surprisingly high proportion of 'yes' votes (66 per cent)" (Wodak et al., 2009: 64). Austria became a member country of the EU on January 1, 1995. Despite extensive internal discussions, Austria's neutrality did not become an important subject in the process of joining the EU (Wodak et al., 2009: 62–64)

One of the most inclusive and relevant studies on xenophobia in Austria in the 1990s is *New Xenophobia in Europe*, edited by Baumgartl and Favell. In the book's preface, Baumgartl (1995: 2) wrote that the book "is the product of a researchers' initiative at the European University Institute, Florence" and "aims to analyze the phenomenon of new xenophobia across Europe." According to Wakolbinger (1995) in one of the chapters of the book, Austria's attitude toward foreigners in the 1990s was mainly affected by the government policy of internationalizing Austria as a neutral state and the economic policies related to guest workers who were employed to overcome a labor shortage (Wakolbinger, 1995: 1–11). Wakolbinger pointed out that since the 1960s, Austria became a European hub for international conferences such as OSCE and international organizations including the UN Vienna Office and had also signed labor agreements with Turkey in 1964 and, then, with Yugoslavia in 1966 for importing foreign labor as guest workers. In 1991, there were a total of 512,194 foreigners; the more important immigrant groups were former Yugoslavian citizens

(38.2%) and Turks (22.8%). Another 11.1% were from Germany, 3.6% from Romania, 3.6% from Poland, and 20.7% from the other categories (Wakolbinger, 1995: 10–13).

Wakolbinger (1995: 10) highlighted the treatment of the former Yugoslavians and Turks indicate that xenophobia in Austria was “closely connected with the economic and social status of foreigners” and that “social ‘under class’ foreigners are the main objects of xenophobic action in general.” She also drew attention to the minority groups in Austria, such as the Slovenes in Carinthia and the Croats in the Burgenland. In addition to these groups, Czechs, Hungarians, Slovaks, Roma and Sinti are officially recognized ethnic groups. All of these groups experience a certain degree of xenophobia. She also drew attention to the tension between “Slovenes and the Austrian population in Carinthia” that dated back to the 1955 State Treaty, which addressed minority rights. Nevertheless, the study asserted that “the Austrian minorities have not – so far – been the predominant ‘objects’ of xenophobic attitudes among the general public, although they are indeed targets of right-wing violence” (Wakolbinger, 1995: 12–13). As mentioned above, Wakolbinger emphasized the crucial importance of Austrian national identity on xenophobia in Austria. Along with the general economic and political conditions, it focused on two special psychological causes regarding xenophobia: “the specific role of Austria during the holocaust” and “the problematic notion of Austrian national identity” (Wakolbinger, 1995: 13). Wakolbinger referred to the remarkable tendency of Austrian society to place “all the blame of the Nazi era and the Holocaust on their bad brother”: Germany. She explained in detail that “after World War II, Austria successfully claimed to have been the ‘first victim’ of Hitler’s expansionary invasions” and Austrians “self-consciously distance themselves from having the slightest connection from Germany,” even though they strongly considered themselves to be “German Austrians” and 99% of Austrians voted in favor of

Anschluss after the intervention of Hitler in March 1938 (Wakolbinger, 1995: 13–15). Given this kind of self-purification deception, Wakolbinger suggested, it is not surprising to see a social and political claim that “something like xenophobia could not exist in Austrian society,” and even further, a claim that Austrians are more open to foreigners than anybody else (Wakolbinger, 1995: 14–16). She asserted that xenophobia in Austria occurs in three forms: “the legal discrimination of foreigners especially of foreign workers, which is a result of political conditions; the anti-foreign attitudes of the part of the population; and finally, as right-wing extremism” (Wakolbinger, 1995: 14–17).

Wakolbinger’s 1995 assessment that xenophobia in Austria was “closely linked to the economic and social status of foreigners” and that “social 'subclass' foreigners were the main objects of xenophobic activity in general” involved striking similarities with some of the views expressed by the interviewees in this research:

“(Racism) is embedded in them. The Austrian considers himself part of the German race. (Remember) Kristallnacht. There are descendants of WWII survivors and Neo-Nazis. I did not come across them. They did not dare to attack me. I have a certain place in the society. But, if you are a worker, you speak little German, of course they do it to them.” (Appendix B, I. Questions 3 and 5, A-2 Racism, Austria-5, Gender: Male; Age Group: 54–64; Postgraduate)


“Yes, there is xenophobia. The reason is fear and not knowing the other. There is also a fear that they will lose their jobs. Because the employer can employ the foreigner for less pay. Xenophobia is ingrained in them. They thought they were used by the Jews and tried to get rid of them. Therefore, Jews were class A-B. Neither the German nor Austrian governments view attacks on foreigners like attacks on Jews. Their reactions are different. For example, an attack on Jews is always immediately and widely reflected in the newspapers. However, an attack on a foreigner is not reflected in the press. There was a raid on the Synagogue and a kebab restaurant in Germany. When the attackers could not enter the Synagogue, they went to the kebab shop and killed the people there. The German government immediately rushed to the Synagogue. However, they did not go to the kebab restaurant. They only went where there were two bullet holes, but they did not go where people were killed.” (Appendix B, I. Questions 3 and

5, B-2 Xenophobia, Austria-5, Gender: Male; Age Group: 54–64; Postgraduate)

“Yes. There is. I will give an example: In the Vienna municipal elections, the FPÖ used the slogan “Vienna should not be Turkey” in its campaign and posters. Despite this, the Viennese chose the FPÖ. Another example, the perception against the Turks. They distinguish between Turks who were born here and Turks who were born in Turkey and came here to study. They are racist even when they say, “You are not like the Turks here.” I come across sentences like “But you are not like a Turk, you don’t look like a Turk at all.” Or they ask, “Why don’t you wear a headscarf?” Turkish and Muslim perceptions are quite different. They have a picture in their minds from years ago and they still judge people based on it.” (Appendix B, I. Questions 3 and 5, A-2/B-2, Racism/Xenophobia, Austria-12, Gender: Female; Age Group: 18–24; Graduate)

The analysis of the data collected for Austria chapter of the “European Value Study” (EVS) for the years 1990, 1999, and 2008 indicate an increase in the certain xenophobic attitudes in Austria (Friesl, Renner, & Wieser, 2010: 6–7). According to the study, education and old age, skepticism about freedom, moral rigorism, authoritarianism, political anomie, and individual materialistic attitudes are influential factors that increase xenophobic attitudes. “National pride” is also increasingly linked to ethnic exclusion tendencies. The study suggests that the emerging pride in citizenship correlates with the xenophobia index, which indicates intolerant traits in Austrian patriotism, and that a clear connection exists between pride in Austrian citizenship and cultural xenophobia. It also stated that the patriotic pattern of values shifted in content toward the nationalist one (Friesl et al., 2010: 25–26). To detect influential factors that can gauge Austrian national pride in 2008, a group of participants were asked “what is important to really be ‘Austrian’?” The following five answers were offered: Austrian ancestors, Austria as the country of birth, having lived in Austria for a long time, knowledge of the German language, and respect for Austria’s political institutions and laws. The following table shows the responses:

Table 8: What is Important to Really be “Austrian”? (2008) (percentages, values for approval)



Source: Friesl et al. (2010: 26)

These results show that the main criterion for being Austrian is speaking German. This demonstrates the importance of cultural values in Austrian national identity and the strong connection with the general German national identity. The criteria “Born in Austria” and “Austrian ancestors” correlate most strongly with pride in Austrian citizenship. Both are related to patriotism. This is also valid for the criteria of speaking German and living in Austria for a long time. Only respecting Austria's political institutions and laws is less associated with the pride factor, demonstrating that national pride is mostly based on ethnic criteria.

Krzyzanowski and Wodak (2008: 2) stated that the “confluence of nation and race is occurring at a time when the nation-state is itself undergoing a major transformation.” They argued that “in contrast to past experiences where nationalism was mainly directed against other nations, in current post-industrial/information societies, nationalism has become more defensive and is defined with reference to immigrants and other marginalized groups” (Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2008: 2).

5.3. Austrian Freedom Party: From the Margins to the Mainstream

There is a broad consensus in academic studies that extreme-right movements or parties in Western European have been using nationalist populist slogans to gain support from people who are susceptible to patriotic and nationalistic themes. Austria, which has gone through a difficult national identity formation process, is perhaps one of the most striking examples of this phenomenon. The FPÖ sets a good example in this respect.

According to Mudde, leader of the FPÖ Jorg Haider said in an interview that “Populism is gladly used as a term of abuse for politicians who are close to the people whose success lies in raising their voice for the citizens and catching their mood. I have always considered this designation as a decoration” (Mudde, 2007: 35). Luther stated that since the 1990s, there has been a considerable advance of certain radical right-wing movements “from the margins to the mainstream” in Western Europe. He argued that there was nowhere that this phenomenon was more pronounced than in Austria, where the FPÖ succeeded in entering the national government in February 4, 2000 (Luther, 2005: 185).

According to Art (2011:106), the origins of the Austrian Freedom Party “lie in the pan-Germanist sub-society (or *Lager*) that along with the Socialist and Catholic sub-societies formed the central lines of cleavage in Austrian politics from the 1880s until at least the 1980s.” The third *lager* has historically comprised both German nationalists and liberals and was characterized by its “intense anti-Semitism, desire for union with Germany, and embrace of fascism” (2011: 115). However, Art also drew attention to the important point that “the Christian Socialist Party (the forerunner of the Austrian People’s Party OVP) was the birthplace of political anti-Semitism, and the Socialists

routinely made antisemitic appeals too. Anschluss with Germany was popular among many Socialists.” He further explains that “it was not only members of the third lager who became Nazis and supported the Third Reich ... the Anschluss was very popular with ordinary Austrians and most supported the Third Reich until the very end of the war” (2011: 115). While explaining these issues, Art touched upon the role of Austrians in the Holocaust as follows: “Membership in the Nazi Party in Austria was above the German average, and Austrians played a central role in the Holocaust” (Art, 2011: 115–116).

In 1949, two Salzburg journalists, Viktor Reimann and Herbert Kraus, formed the League of Independents (Verband der Unabhängigen; VdU) and the party won 11.7% of votes in the 1949 national parliamentary elections. VdU quickly became the party of choice for former Nazis and embraced pan-Germanism. In 1955, the former Nazi minister of agriculture, Anton Reinthaller, founded the FPÖ, and most VdU supporters with Nazi backgrounds joined the new party. After Reinthaller’s death in 1958, “the former SS officer Friedrich Peter became the leader of the FPÖ, which further solidified its image as the party of former Nazis.” During this early period “FPÖ politicians and publications failed to clearly distance themselves from National Socialism” (Art, 2011: 116).

As can be understood from the brief information presented above, the history of the FPÖ was affected by the presence of Nazi and pan-German nationalist cadres from its founding. Luther “divided the development of the FPÖ between its foundation in 1956 and the general election of October 4, 1999, into five broad periods,” which are as follows: “a) the ghetto party—lasting until the mid-1960s; b) the normalization period—lasting until the mid-1970s; c) the period of acceptance—beginning in the late 1970s and lasting until September 1986; d) the period of populist protest—triggered

by Jörg Haider's assumption of the party leadership on September 15, 1986; e) governmental responsibility starting with entry into Austria's federal government on February 4, 2000" (Luther, 2005: 186). After Haider took over the leadership of the FPÖ, the party moved further to the extreme right of the political spectrum and become "a full-fledged populist radical right party" (Mudde, 2007: 42). In 2005, Haider and his most loyal supporters left the FPÖ and founded a new political party, the Bündnist Zukunft Österreichs (Alliance for Austria's Future; BZÖ).

Several studies note that xenophobia has been used for political gains by the FPÖ, which has a long tradition of anti-foreignism and neo-Nazism heritage (El Rafaie, 2004: 217–220; Wakolbinger, 1995: 15–20). The FPÖ was accused of "revisionist" discourses, which involved not only elements of Holocaust denial but also attempts to decriminalize National Socialist policies (Bailer-Galanda, 1997: 174, 187). Party members and representatives were involved in the Holocaust denial protests and, through those activities, minimizing National Socialist crimes. Haider had to resign as head of the provincial government of Corinthia (Landeshauptmann) for publicly praising the management of National Socialist employment policy in June 1991, when he stated that "in the Third Reich they had an orderly employment policy, that is, something your government in Vienna is not able to impose." (Wakolbinger, 1995: 15). As a further step in FDP's neo-Nazi style discourses and policies, Haider initiated a call for referendum against foreigners (Ausländervolksbegehren) as a reaction to the number of refugees from the former Yugoslavia who were living in Austria. Per Wakolbinger, the text of the referendum introduced xenophobic rhetoric, such as connecting immigrants to criminality and the effect of foreign workers on the unemployment rate (Wakolbinger, 1995: 16).

In October 1992, the Austrian government rejected the FPÖ's request to adopt the party program on immigration. Upon this rejection, Haider and the FPÖ launched a petition campaign to force the government to accept their request. FPÖ was expected to obtain one million signatures for the petition titled "Austria First: Through the creation of legal measures which permanently secure the right to a fatherland for all Austrian citizens and, from this standpoint, ensure a restrained immigration policy in Austria." However, given a massive propaganda campaign against the petition, only 417,278 signatures could be collected, representing approximately 7% of eligible voters (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 152). The text of the petition called for a constitutional amendment that would add the sentence "Austria is not an immigration country" to the federal constitutional law of 1920; freeze immigration until problems of illegal immigrants were solved; adopt "a federal law to institute a general identification requirement for foreign workers"; increase executive powers of the foreign and criminal police for the apprehension of illegal immigrants; adopt "a federal law for the immediate creation of permanent border troops"; adopt "a federal law to change the laws governing the organization of schools to ensure that only 30% of the students in compulsory and vocational school classes could be non-native German speakers"; ease the tension in schools "by having children whose native language was not German participate in regular classes only if they possessed sufficient knowledge of German"; "create a regulation in party law that ensured that only Austrian citizens could participate in party-internal primary proceedings"; adopt "a federal law to end illegal business activities for foreigner associations and clubs and establish rigorous measures against the abuse of social benefits; create the legal basis for the possibility of immediate deportation and imposition of residence prohibitions for foreign criminals"; and adopt "a federal law to establish an Eastern Europe Foundation to prevent

immigrational movement” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 152–153). This petition represents xenophobic, discriminatory, and exclusionary themes. It carries overly nationalistic, patriotic content. Reisigl & Wodak (2001)—while analyzing the developments regarding this petition, the speeches made in the Austrian parliament, and the discourses used in the debates—make the following assessments concerning the discriminatory and prejudicial attitudes in Austria toward foreigners:

“Having analyzed the “xenophobic” examples of five different genres from different fields of political action and public spaces, we will now attempt to draw some conclusions about the genesis, dissemination and impact of discriminatory argumentation within the discourse about “foreigners” and immigrants. In coantisemitism in Austria, hostility toward “foreigners” is rarely only latent or insinuated linguistically. In the contexts we analyzed, blatant and explicit prejudices against non-Austrian citizens or ‘foreigners’ are frequently visible in the streets as signs and posters in the texts of politicians of the FPÖ and the governing parties as well as in the media, in particular in the tabloid press ... The FPÖ has no difficulty with using a lexicon and vocabulary which are close to Nazi terminology, whereas this would be taboo for the mainstream parties ...” (2001: 196).

“Viewed from a historical perspective, racist, ethnicist, and “xenophobic” prejudices are strongly rooted in the Austrian tradition. Ethnic groups were often used as scapegoats for economic and social problems. Before World War Two, Jews were discriminated against, and antisemitism was a “normal” feature of Austrian political culture. Nowadays, at the beginning of the new millennium, hostility toward “foreigners” has become a quasi-“normality.” When the first immigrants from the former Eastern Bloc entered Austria in 1989/90, discriminatory slogans were used by all political parties except for the Green Party, but they were never as explicit as the slogans used by the FPÖ in the 1999 election campaign: The main poster of the FPÖ during this election campaign said, “*Stop der Überfremdung*” (“Stop over foreignization”), a term coined by the Nazis and used by Göbbels in 1933.” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001:199).



Figure 3: Poster used by the FPÖ in the Vienna election campaign of 2010

Text reads: “More courage for our ‘Viennese Blood.’ Too many foreigners are not good for anybody” (Translation in English by Ruth Wodak)

Source: Ruth Wodak, “‘Anything Goes!’ – The Haiderization of Europe,” p. 34. In *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse* (pp. 23–38). London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. ©Halge Fahrnberger.

These developments in Austria made xenophobia a central theme of political discussions. Studies have mentioned that “neo-nazi-like xenophobic positions have become acceptable ‘opinions,’ and hence the barriers to people showing their aversion against foreigners has become increasingly lower.” (Wakolbinger, 1995: 16). In fact, the results of the Austrian elections since 1990s openly display this tendency in Austrian society. In 1994, the FPÖ gained 22.6% of votes, representing a 6% increase from 1990 (Wakolbinger, 1995: 16–21). In the 2017 election, this number increased to 27%. This tendency can be seen as an indication of tangible xenophobic attitudes in large sections of Austrian society.

One of the most conspicuous topics for the xenophobic literature in Austria was the attacks in December 1993, when 10 letter bombs were sent to prominent members of minority groups, human rights activists, and politicians. Among them was Helmut Zilk, the Mayor of Vienna at that time, who lost his left hand in the attack. Four people were seriously injured in the attacks. Elizabeth El-Rafaie (2004: 2019) described these attacks as “racist bomb attacks.”

After that incident, another pipe bomb attack occurred in August 1994. The attack was on a bilingual school for the Slovenian minority in Carinthia; three policemen were seriously injured. In February 1995, four Romani were killed in the Austrian federal state of Burgenland. Further, four series of letter bomb attacks occurred between June 1995 and December 1996, targeting representatives of ethnic minority organizations, left-wing or liberal politicians, clergy and journalists, as well as people working in the field of human rights” (El Rafaie, 2004: 219, 220). At that time, the attacks were “interpreted as a sign that xenophobic sentiments were increasing among the Austrian population” (El Rafaie, 2004: 221). They were attributed to the Bajuwar Liberation Army (Bajuwarische Befreiungsarmee, BBA) which used the arguments and language of Austrian right-wing organizations in their statements. Several prominent journalists, artists, and commentators “saw these attacks as a symptom of Austria’s unacknowledged Nazi past and of the xenophobic climate stirred up by right-wing politicians and newspaper columnists” (El Rafaie, 2004: 221–224).

For some columnists in the Austrian press, these attacks, and the sympathy from some parts of society to them, represent “a sign of deep-seated prejudice and xenophobia in Austrian society.” (El Rafaie, 2004: 226). It was argued that violent xenophobia was previously limited to groups that openly embraced Nazi ideology. However, as per some commentators, since Haider and his party raised the issue of foreigners, the political atmosphere in Austria had changed so much that “racial violence is now acceptable” (El Rafaie, 2004: 226). In fact, such assessments amply suggested that xenophobia penetrates deep into—and takes root in—Austrian society.

5.4. OSCE Data, EU, Council of Europe, and UN Reports on Racism, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance in Austria

According to the OSCE-ODIHR, Austria regularly reports hate crime data to ODIHR. Table 9 shows Austria's hate crime data as reported to ODIHR from 2009–2018; Table 10 shows a breakdown of the hate crimes reported in 2018, broken down by the type of bias motivation (ODIHR, n.d.).

Table 9: Austria's Hate Crime Data 2009–2018

2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009
307	302	425	395	186	110	91	59	101	62

Table 10: Hate Crimes Recorded in 2018 by Bias Motivation and Type

Racism and Xenophobia	Antisemitism	Bias against Muslims
236	49	22

As seen above, Austria does not report separate data for racism and xenophobia-based bias. This reporting might be considered as evasive lump-sum declaration. The civil society information provided to the ODIHR for the year 2015 is slightly more detailed, but is still insufficient in relation to bias motivation. Table 11 shows the data provided by the civil society:

Table 11: Information Provided to ODIHR by Civil Society Concerning Austria for the Year 2015

Bias Motivation	Violent Attacks	Threats	Attacks Against Property
Racism and Xenophobia	11	4	19
Antisemitism	3	0	51
Bias against Muslims	19	2	33

Bias against Christians and members of other Religions	0	0	2
Total	33	6	105

The Fundamental Rights Report published by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) for the year 2017 points out the same deficiency. The “Racism, xenophobia and related intolerance” section of the report contains data pertaining to hate crime published in 2016, by bias motivation by EU Member States. Although the following chart includes eight categories for reporting, Austrian declaration includes only four categories. These are shown in Table 12.

Table 12: Data Submitted by Austria in 2016 Pertaining to Hate Crimes by Bias Motivation

Member State	Racism	Anti-Roma	Antisemitism	Anti-Muslim hatred	Religion	Extremism	Sexual Orientation	Gender Identity	Disability
Austria	323	-	41	31	-	523	-	-	-

Source : The Fundamental Rights Report 2017, 84

Considering these reports, Austria’s reporting and declarations on xenophobic incidents in the country do not seem to adequately meet the criteria set forth by international bodies; in fact, their submissions seem timid. Regarding this, the UN Human Rights Committee stated the following in its fifth periodic report on Austria in December 2015:

“It is concerned, however, about the increasing radicalization of extremist groups in the country, including members of the Muslim communities, and the resurgence of far right-wing and other groups inspired by extremist national socialist ideologies and neo-Nazism. The Committee is also concerned at the rise of advocacy of racial or religious hatred against Roma, Muslims, Jews, minorities, migrants and asylum seekers, including political hate speech, which have not been systematically countered, and advocacy of hatred against persons of a different faith by some radical Islamist preachers. The Committee

is concerned that hate speech on the Internet and online forums is on the rise” (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2015: para. 15).

The Committee urges Austria to implement the following measures:

“(The State party should) strengthen its efforts to combat acts or advocacy of racial or religious hatred, including by further enhancing awareness that hate speech, racist propaganda and the incitement of violence against racial or religious groups are prohibited under law, condemning such acts, in particular during election campaigns, and taking prompt action to bring those responsible to justice. The State party should also envisage adopting a national action plan against racism and pursue its efforts to harmonize the Austrian crime statistics and judicial statistics.” (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2015: para. 16).

The conclusions of the Committee also severely criticize the Austrian police for racially motivated mistreatment and highlight the below points:

“The State party should ensure that its legislation clearly prohibits racial profiling by the police and prevent investigation, arbitrary detention, searches and interrogation on the basis of physical appearance, color or ethnic or national origin. It should continue to provide all law enforcement personnel with racial sensitivity training in order to curb racial profiling and police misbehavior toward ethnic minorities. Law enforcement personnel who commit offences against persons belonging to ethnic minorities should be held accountable. The Austrian Ombudsman Board should take steps to raise awareness about its new competence to receive complaints and consider making use of its ex officio powers to open investigations into allegations of racial discrimination and racially motivated misconduct by the police.” (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2015: para. 20).

In parallel with the UN and the OSCE-ODIHR assessments concerning racism, xenophobia, and hate speech/hate crimes in Austria, the ECRI reported similar findings and assessments. In its 2015 report, ECRI stated that:

“in recent times, antipathy toward migrants has considerably increased. Several political parties and other organizations cultivate and disseminate racist, xenophobic, and neo-Nazi ideas. In particular hate speech of politicians is not systematically countered. A new generation of right-wing extremist organizations has appeared and others undergo radicalization. In 2013, 1900 incidents were denounced on a police website for reporting Nazi activities. There were several cases of racist attacks carried out by groups of perpetrators.” (ECRI, 2015: 9).

The mentioned report underlined that “experts and civil society consider that hate speech is generally under-reported.” The report recommended that more should be accomplished “to stop certain political parties and other organizations from cultivating and disseminating neo-Nazism, racism and xenophobia.” It reminded that “showing tolerance toward such parties and organizations and failing to take clear action to stop the dissemination of their ideology nourishes everyday racism and neo-fascism in Austrian society.” The report strikingly revealed that, according to Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) surveys of 2012, “7% of the respondents of Turkish origin indicated that they had been victims of attacks or other serious offences during the past 12 months” (ECRI, 2015: 17, 21, 23, 24).

ECRI’s sixth report on Austria was adopted on April 7, 2020, and published on June 2, 2020. The report highlights several concerning issues related to discrimination in Austria. Some important issues and recommendations are summarized below:

- “There are high levels of Islamophobia, and the public discourse has become increasingly xenophobic. Political speech has taken on highly divisive and antagonistic overtones particularly targeting Muslims and refugees. **Recommendation:** Political leaders on all sides must take a firm and public stance against the expression of racist hate speech and react to any such expression with a strong counter-hate speech message. All political parties in the country should adopt codes of conduct which prohibit the use of hate speech and call on their members and followers to abstain from using it.
- “The question of girls wearing headscarves at primary school is the focus of intense debate in Austrian society. A recent amendment to the School Education Act in 2019 raises concerns regarding the principles of lawfulness, neutrality and non-discrimination. **Recommendation:** The provision of the School Education Act concerning the wearing of headgear should be revised to ensure that it respects the principle of neutrality, pursues a legitimate aim and is free of any form of discrimination against any particular group of pupils.”
- “The anti-discrimination legislation remains complex and fragmented because of the division of competence between the Austrian Federal government and provinces (Länder)”
- “There is still no comprehensive and systematic collection of data on hate speech and hate motivated violence. The level of underreporting, especially

among vulnerable groups, is an issue. **Recommendation:** A comprehensive data collection system offering an integrated and consistent view of cases of racist and homo/transphobic hate speech and hate crime, with fully disaggregated data by category of offense, type of hate motivation, target group, as well as judicial follow-up and outcome should be set up” (ECRI, 2020: 7–8, 13, 37-38).

5.5. Observations on National Identity, Nazi Past, and Xenophobia in Austria

A literature review on the development of xenophobia and reports published by the international bodies concerning racism, xenophobia, and intolerance in Austria indicate the existence of prevalent racist and xenophobic tendencies and attitudes that are embedded in a considerable portion of Austrian society. As Reisigl and Wodak aptly stated, “from a historical perspective, racist, ethnicist and ‘xenophobic’ prejudices are strongly rooted in the Austrian tradition.” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 199), Furthermore, the presence of energetic racist, ethno-centrist, xenophobic extreme-right organizations, which are structured as political parties diffusing nationalist and xenophobic ideology, is remarkably increasing the power, effectiveness, and influence of racist and xenophobic way of understanding in Austrian society. One striking example in this context is the election achievements of the FPÖ. A political party with a solid Nazi background has achieved successful results in various elections, winning up to 26.7% of the votes to become a government partner. A rise in the votes of extreme right-wing parties also indicate the dominant role of the political motivations that take strength from anti-foreigner feelings in a society that is highly nourished by deeply-rooted neo-Nazi sentiments and sympathies that exist in large parts of the society. This is also closely related to anti-immigrant attitudes in the society.

Both past and present examples, such as the election successes of FPÖ, discredit—and even in some sense—refute the claims that Austria was the first victim of Hitler’s aggression and was innocent in the horrors of Nazi regime. This “victim” theory might still be valid for some segments of Austrian society. However, considering historical facts, it seems difficult to generalize all of Austrian society as innocent to the horrors of Nazi crimes. The reality that a certain portion of the Austrian population participated in the persecution of Jews, Roma, and the other “undesirables.”

In connection with this point,

“They wonder how Austrians can stake a claim to have been Hitler’s victims, when the evidence is plain that so many of them were perpetrators and counted among Hitler’s willing executioners, and when around one-third of Austria’s voters now support Haider and his misnamed Freedom Party.” (Pick, 2000: xiii)

She then sums up her thoughts on whether Austria was a “victim or perpetrator or both” as follows:

“At the end of my quest, I remain as convinced as I was before that there is no straightforward answer to the questions about Austria’s character and moral standing. The country is both victim and perpetrator. But there is no equivalence between the two: Austria has been far less victim than perpetrator.” (Pick, 2000:; xv).

I previously mentioned that racism represents a flexible and constantly changing “scavenger ideology,” which gains its power from its ability to select and utilize ideas and values from other sets of ideas and beliefs in specific sociohistorical contexts. The concept of “othering” now includes racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and Islamophobia. In this context, there is a “confluence of racism and xenophobia” in all levels of discourse ranging from the media, political parties, and institutions to everyday life (Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2008: 2). Racism and xenophobia, in most cases, are nested together. If racism exists somewhere, it is quite likely that xenophobia

is also present there. I have already mentioned the Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no 47.1, which was conducted during the European Year Against Racism. The degree of racism measured by countries in that poll is reflected in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no 47.1 (1997) Degree of Expressed Racism (distribution by country)

Source: Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no: 47.1

The figure above shows that racism measurements are given in the following four stages: a) very racist, b) quite racist, c) a little racist, and d) not at all racist. To display these figures more strikingly, comparisons between Austria and Germany and the total racism figures in both countries is shown in Table 13.

Table 13: Degree of Expressed Racism in Austria and Germany Spring 1997 (percentages)

	Not at all racist	A little racist	Quite racist	Very racist	Total racist
Austria	26	32	28	14	74

Germany	32	34	26	8	68
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Source: Compiled from Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no: 47.1

The common feature of those who describe themselves as very, quite, or somewhat racist is that they regard themselves as fundamentally racist, albeit to a different degree. Their common denominator, one way or another, is “being racist.” The proportion of those who defined themselves as “very racist” in Austria was 14% in 1997. Among the 15 EU members of that time, Austria was ranked third in this category. Despite the high rates of racism declared in Austria in the Eurobarometer survey at that time, the number of racist/xenophobic physical violence incidents included in various secondary data and reflected in the information provided in the literature was low in Austria. This also applies to collective violence. This needs further attention to analyze the nature of elevated levels of xenophobia in Germany and Austria, and for comparing these two countries.

The analysis of interview data conducted for this research also suggests that approximately four out of five of the interviewees in Austria declared that xenophobia exists in the country, and stated that racism existed. Among these interviewees, the total rate of those describing xenophobia as “much or too much” is close to three fourths in Austria and more than half of the interviewees in Germany, and more than half of the interviewees related xenophobia to racism. According to the figures I calculated (reflected in Table 13 above), in the survey conducted in 1997, 74% of the respondents in Austria and 68% in Germany did not hesitate to describe themselves as racist to varying degrees. The rate of those who do not associate themselves with racism in any way is 26% in Austria and 32% in Germany. When these figures are evaluated, a high degree of discrepancy does not exist between the results of the Eurobarometer survey in 1997 in terms of racism and the answers given by individuals

of immigrant origin regarding the presence of racism/xenophobia in the study I conducted at the end of 2020. The Eurobarometer survey conducted in 1997 only reflects the views of native individuals. In the study I conducted at the end of 2020, participants were highly educated individuals with a migrant background in Austria and Germany. It, therefore, becomes more appropriate to state that a high degree of discrepancy does not exist between the results of the survey in 1997 and the results of the survey I conducted. In addition, although quite a limited number of xenophobic/racist-based acts of violence in Austria appear in the secondary data and notifications made to the international organizations, in my study, 86% of the participants stated that verbal violence exists against foreigners, immigrants, and refugees in Austria, and approximately 76% stated that physical violence exists.⁴² In Germany, approximately 94% and 82% of participants agreed that verbal and physical violence occurred, respectively.⁴³ If we make an extremely rough assessment considering these aspects, it suggests that a deficiency could exist in the secondary data regarding acts of violence against foreigners, immigrants, and refugees, especially in Austria.

Analysis of the various aspects of xenophobia in Austria and Germany studied thus far suggests that there have been several stages of development of extreme xenophobia in these two countries. In this context, there are differences in the roles of discourse and violence within the forming of extreme form of xenophobia. The different approaches of the two countries regarding their Nazi past may have influenced this formation. The differences start with the re-establishment of the two countries after the Second World War. We mentioned earlier Art's "culture of contrition" belief for Germany and

⁴² See Figures 21 and 23

⁴³ See Figures 21 and 23

Austria's "victim theory." "Culture of contrition" identifies Germany's responsibility for the Second World War. There is no denial of Nazi atrocities; instead, there is a recognition of the Holocaust. FRG President Richard von Weizsäcker, in his address to Bundestag on May 8, 1985, stated that rather than forgetting the Nazi past, all Germans, whether guilty or not, whether young or old, had a responsibility to keep memories of the past alive (Art, 2006: 72–73).

In Austria however the Second Republic adopted a tolerant approach to the former Nazis through the "Austrianist elite discourse." Thereafter, excessive tolerance was shown against political parties of Nazi origin. These parties were comfortably included in the government as partners. Far-right parties used xenophobic / racist discourse openly and provocatively. The result was a serious increase in xenophobia.

In Germany, however, there was no tolerant attitude toward the far right within the framework of the "contrition culture," which accepted the responsibilities of the Nazi past. In this context, there was no elite discourse that tolerated the extreme right. In the 1990s, serious acts of physical violence against immigrants, asylum seekers, and foreigners suddenly began to occur. The xenophobic/racist discourse became more visible after physical acts of violence. The result is an increase in the level of xenophobia, as in Austria. However, as noted earlier, there was no meaningful physical violence against immigrants, asylum seekers, or foreigners in Austria.

To avoid the causality dilemma, it is worth remembering that I considered xenophobia as a dependent variable at the beginning of my study. In this regard, the illustrative diagrams showing the above explanations for Austria and Germany based on the variables determined at the beginning of the study are presented below.




Figure 5: Austria—Functioning of Variables During the Increase in the Level of Xenophobia




Figure 6: Germany—Functioning of Variables in the Process of Increase in the Level of Xenophobia

According to the analysis based on the secondary data and information in the literature, although different approaches were adopted toward the Nazi period in Germany and Austria after the Second World War, a high level of xenophobia was encountered in both countries. In my judgment, this high level can be labeled extreme xenophobia. The presence of immigrants in both countries, albeit to varying degrees, has played an important role in the rise of xenophobia. The nature of the violence that occurred in

each country is different, in parallel with the increase in xenophobia. Despite the existence of visible/observable physical violence in Germany, per the available secondary data used up to this point, such violence is seemingly almost non-existent in Austria. When these secondary data and information are analyzed together, it seems possible to assert that the main difference between the two countries in terms of the observable increase in xenophobia seems to lie in the type of violence.

These evaluations were made based on the analysis of secondary data. In the following chapter, findings related to the study I conducted are discussed. At this stage, the assessment regarding violence in Austria based on available secondary data does not accord with the results of the study I conducted. This difference will be explained in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI

FINDINGS ON TURKS WITH IMMIGRANT BACKGROUND IN GERMANY AND IN AUSTRIA

For research purposes, I postulated that the proposed group of “highly skilled and accomplished immigrants in Germany and Austria” interviewees would “have high educational attainment level among individuals with immigrant background in Germany and Austria.” In this context, “high educational attainment” corresponds to the “International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) Levels” of 5 (Bachelor's or equivalent), 6 (Master's or equivalent), or 7 (Doctoral or equivalent) maintained by the UNESCO.⁴⁴ (UNESCO/ISCED, 2011: 21). Against this background, “high educational attainment” represented the “highly qualified” or “overqualified” persons mentioned in the OECD/European Union report⁴⁵ who can be considered “highly skilled and accomplished immigrants.”

⁴⁴ UNESCO/ISCED. (2011). International Standard Classification of Education, p. 21. <http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/international-standard-classification-of-education-isced-2011-en.pdf>; OECD/European Union (2015), Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In, OECD Publishing, Paris/European Union, Brussels. (<https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264234024-en>)

⁴⁵ OECD/European Union report, p. 116.

Semi- structured interviews were conducted virtually. For the RDS based sample, considering that evaluating the relationship and interaction between racism and xenophobia requires greater in-depth knowledge of meanings of these two concepts, a sample consisting of individuals with the highest educational attainment level (graduate and postgraduate) was preferred. Additionally, it was assumed that individuals who constitute such a sample might have secured well-respected positions in the society they live in, and could comment on socially sensitive issues, such as racism and xenophobia, objectively—that is, without exaggeration. The sample comprised immigrants of Turkish origin. I tried to reach out to interviewees through associations and non-governmental organizations in Germany and Austria. I sent e-mails introducing myself and explaining my research topic, stating that the interviews will be conducted virtually.

All ethics criteria for the research involving human participants have been met. As noted earlier, participants are adult individuals holding graduate and postgraduate degrees. In the recruitment process, personal checks of the participants were performed. All participants were meticulously asked to remain anonymous, and confidentiality of their personal data were guaranteed so that they could not be associated with the participant's experimental data.

Interviews were based on a standardized questionnaire consisting of 17 questions. The questions were prepared in three languages: English, German and Turkish. The questions mainly focused on the existence and degree of xenophobia and racism in the respondents' countries; relationship between xenophobia and racism; and presence and degree of verbal and physical violence against immigrants, asylum seekers, and foreigners. In this context, Likert Scale responses were requested for some questions. While most interviewees answered the questions verbally in a detailed and

occasionally frank manner, some preferred to answer the questions in writing. Participants included men and women across various age groups. Due attention has been paid—as far as possible—to the balance between the number of participating men and women. The questionnaire is included in Appendix A.

When explaining the results below, relevant figures are placed under each paragraph to better explain the details of the results.⁴⁶ The main purpose of the detailed explanations given below regarding the results is not to overwhelm the reader with figures, but to record the data revealed by the study to form a basis to guide more detailed studies in the future.

6.1. Questions Investigating Whether “Racism” and “Xenophobia” Exist in the Society Where Respondents Live

These questions (Questions 3 and 5) were overwhelmingly answered as “yes exists” by the respondents. As depicted in Figures 7 and 8, thirty-three respondents out of 35 believe that racism exists in Germany. In Austria, this number is twenty-nine out of 33. As for xenophobia, 31 of the respondents believe that xenophobia exists in Germany. However, in Austria, this rate is 24.

⁴⁶ The figures show numerically how many of the interviewees answered a particular question in their samples in Germany and Austria. In the explanations made following the figures, after the numerical values were given, it was stated in parentheses what percentage of the sample this number represented. Since some respondents sometimes express more than one option while answering the question, there may be occasionally slight differences between the answers given to the questions and the number of respondents.




Figure 7: Does “Racism” Exist in the Society You Live In?




Figure 8: Does “Xenophobia” Exist in the Society You Live In?

The difference between the two countries in terms of the proportions of those who believe that racism is present in Germany and Austria is 6.4%, with Germany exhibiting a higher rate of racism. In terms of xenophobia, the difference is 14%, with xenophobia also higher in Germany. In Austria, there is a difference of approximately 8% between racism and xenophobia. Remarkably, racism and xenophobia rates are almost the same in Germany at 94%. These rates may indicate that these two phenomena are considered the same—or quite similar—by the respondents in Germany. The same perception does not seem to hold true for Austria.

Figures reflecting the answers of participating men and women to the questions about the existence of racism and xenophobia in the society where they live are presented in Figures 9 and 10.



Figure 9: “Does “racism” exist in the society you live in?”




Figure 10: “Does “xenophobia” exist in the society you live in?”

The number of female respondents is twelve in Germany and eight in Austria. As shown in Figure 9, twelve female respondents in Germany (one hundred percent of the number of women in the sample) and eight female respondents in Austria (one hundred percent of the number of women in the sample) declared that racism exists in the country they live. Regarding the xenophobia shown in Figure 10, in Germany, twelve

female respondents (one hundred percent of the sample) stated that there is xenophobia. In Austria, seven out of eight female respondents stated that there is xenophobia, while one female respondent stated that xenophobia does not exist.

Figures 11 and 12 show the education status of female interviewees responding to question 3 on racism and question 5 on xenophobia.




Figure 11: Education status of female interviewees responding to question 3 on racism




Figure 12: Educational status of female interviewees responding to question 5 on xenophobia

6.2. Perceived Degree of “Racism” in Germany and Austria

In question 4, “If ‘racism’ exists, to what degree does it exist, based on your judgment? Too much, Much, Not so much, Few, Very few,” a Likert scale was used to gauge the perceived degree of racism. Figure 13 shows the perceived degree of racism in each country.




Figure 13: Degree of “Racism”?

In both countries, the sum of the answers “too much + much” as a percentage is almost the same. A total of twenty respondents in Germany, corresponding to 64% of the German sample, and nineteen respondents in Austria, corresponding to 65%, of the Austrian sample responded in this way. Neither in Germany nor in Austria did the respondents choose the options of “Few” and “Very Few” degrees for racism.

6.3. Perceived Degree of Xenophobia in Germany and Austria

Similar to racism, the Likert Scale answers were requested also for Question 5 regarding xenophobia. Responses are shown in Figure 14.




Figure 14: Degree of “Xenophobia?”

A total of seventeen respondents in Germany, corresponding to 53% of the German sample, and nineteen respondents in Austria, corresponding to 70% of the Austrian sample responded in this way. Unlike racism, considerable variation (approximately 17%) exists in the total rate between the two countries.

The degree of the “not so much” option for racism in Germany and Austria shows a difference between the two countries: eleven respondents corresponding to 35.5% in Germany and nine respondents corresponding to 31% in Austria answered this way. For xenophobia, however, there is a greater difference—with thirteen interviewees corresponding to 40.60% in Germany and eight interviewees corresponding to 28% in Austria responded in this manner.

6.4. Observations Regarding the Questions About the Existence of Racism and Xenophobia in the Societies Where the Respondents Live

While answering questions 3 and 5 regarding the existence of racism and xenophobia in the societies where they live, some respondents in both Germany and Austria spontaneously emphasized that racism or xenophobia “exists in every society.” These answers, which do not find racism and xenophobia odd and in some sense almost normalize them, were reflected in Figures 6 and 7 as a new category of “exist in every

society,” along with the “yes” and “no” categories. The rate of this category of answers in Germany for “racism” and “xenophobia” is around 3% corresponding to one response in each category. However, in Austria, the rate of answers in the same category is 12.1% for racism corresponding to four responses and 10% for xenophobia corresponding to three responses. All the participants who gave this response in both countries were men.

It is possible to say that this result indicates that the attitude observed in some of the participating men, which somewhat normalize racism and xenophobia, does not generally exist in the women respondents. The responses from women also reflect evaluations that involve more dualistic Manichaeian type approaches (exist or not exist) on these issues.

Some participants in both Germany and Austria, when responding to the questions of “Do you think that ‘racism’ exists in the society you live in? Why?” and “Do you think that ‘xenophobia’ exists in the society you live in? Why?” (Questions 3 and 5 respectively), made salient comments for the “why” part of the questions. These comments can potentially provide us workable clues that can help unpack the true nature of racism and xenophobia in these societies through the prism of individuals with high educational attainment and immigrant backgrounds. A selection of such comments is presented verbatim in Appendix B.

Some of those living in Germany made comments regarding the existence of racism in that society that pointed to the dominance of “hidden everyday racism” instead of the prevalent “primitive racism” of neo-Nazi groups. In this regard, certain respondents stressed that individuals mostly act without realizing that they are engaging in racism, or that they even think that they are mostly being moral. As

examples of this behavior, they recalled being told: “You do not look like a Turk at all,” “It is obvious that you were not born here,” and “You are one of the educated Turks.” In this context, it was mentioned that this type of racism is “valid mostly for older people with old mindset,” whereas younger people are considered more tolerant.

Another remarkable comment was that the excessive suppression of nationalism in Germany after the Second World War resulted in people's inability to express themselves, and this was related to the expression of feelings and attitudes through implicit racist remarks.

One of the most frequently expressed comments in the answers given to the question about the existence of racism in Austria was the consideration that Austrians consider themselves a part of the German race and gave serious support to Nazi Germany in the past. In this context, more than one respondent emphasized that racism has a serious “historical and religious” significance in Austria. Austria's antisemitic past was also given as an example of the existence of racist substructure in the country. It was mentioned in the responses that the “superior Aryan race” concept still holds a place in Austrian society.

As for xenophobia, although the respondents in Germany stated that the existence of xenophobia is extremely high, their comments on this issue were less critical than their comments on racism. For example, some respondents stated that there were “too many foreigners” in Germany, and that this inevitably causes uneasiness among the German public; they suggested that if the situation in Turkey was the same, the same discomfort would be seen in Turkey. Similar expressions were made by respondents in Austria in comments that were less critical of xenophobia than racism. In this mindset, some

respondents noted that “with the increase in terrorist attacks, the mere presence of people of Muslim origin in the Austrian society increased the fears toward Muslims.”

6.5. Nature of Relationship and Interaction Between Racism and Xenophobia

To better understand the extent of the relationship and interaction between these two overlapping concepts, and to compile information about the true nature of this relationship, I formulated the following question: “Do you think that ‘racism’ and ‘xenophobia’ are the same or similar concepts? Why?” While formulating the question, I purposefully presented a question that asked only whether the two concepts are the same or similar and did not include a third option to indicate that they differed. Instead, I included the indirect question of “why” and tried to create an opportunity for the respondents to explain their views in a more detailed and broad-minded manner.

Figure 15 shows the responses to this question.




Figure 15: “Racism” and “Xenophobia”: Are They the Same, Similar, or Different?

The percentage of those who stated in their explanations that the concepts of racism and xenophobia were different was 30.3% in Germany corresponding to six respondents in the German sample and 24.1% in Austria corresponding to eight respondents in the Austrian sample. In their explanations, the respondents created an

option that was not presented to them in the question posed—Were they different? There is a difference in the answers given by men and women to this question.



Figure 16: “Racism” and “Xenophobia”: Are They the Same, Similar, or Different?

Among the possible answers to this question, the “similar” option mainly evokes fluidity between these two concepts. Considering these response rates, it is possible to state that women respondents have a relatively more definite judgment about these two concepts than men.

Some comments made by the respondents to this question are reflected verbatim in Appendix B with explanatory notes on the gender, age group, and educational attainment level of respondents.

In most answers from those in Germany who stated that racism and xenophobia are similar concepts, comments were made indicating a prevailing mentality in German society that Germany belongs to the German race and that all other races are alien elements in the society. Those who thought that they were different concepts articulated the view that racism corresponds to seeing your race as superior and valuable to other races and they, on the contrary, view xenophobia as a dislike of the presence of foreigners. In this respect, they provided the example of how a xenophobic

statement is not necessarily racist. Those who think that these two concepts are the same stated with a simpler logic that the two concepts ultimately mean not to like the person they consider as the other and, therefore, ultimately, mean the same thing.

The respondents who stated that these two concepts were the same in Austria mentioned that they both mean to not like the person they see as the other, as in Germany, and that both concepts serve the same purpose. One respondent in Austria explained the relationship between xenophobia and racism as follows: “I equate xenophobia with xenophobia, and racism with xenophobia, which is mostly politically motivated. Xenophobia is a natural affect, whereby this xenophobia can be used politically to lead a policy on a racist basis. That is why all racism is essentially based on fear of foreigners.” Those respondents in Austria who considered these two concepts similar generally pointed to the view that “the racism is the roof structure, and xenophobia is its extension and consequence.”

To examine the relationship between racism and xenophobia in more detail and to further understand how these concepts are used in society, Question 8 (“In your judgment, which one of the following concepts is more frequently used in the society where you live?”) was posed to the respondents, and racism and xenophobia were presented as two options.

Figure 17 shows the responses to this question.




Figure 17: “Racism” and “Xenophobia”: Which One is More Frequent in the Society Where You Live?

As the number of responses indicate, in Germany, using the concept of xenophobia is preferable to racism in society, while racism is preferable in Austria. Considering the connection of racism with Nazism in Germany and given its extremely negative historical background, it is not surprising that xenophobia is used more frequently in Germany. This point has been emphasized on several occasions.

Below, I quote from some of the notable comments made by the respondents while answering this question:

- Racism is used more. When everything is called racism, it becomes more dangerous. Racists are angry that others are not like them. Hostility to the races is much more dangerous. In xenophobia, the other side can change himself/herself. I am not saying that he/she should change himself/herself. But some kept themselves apart from the others. The two sides can come to an agreement. In terms of Islamophobia, I have been here for 47 years. At first, it was different; they approached us very well. They saw Islam closer to Catholics. Evangelists were more distant. When Islamists started to throw bombs on innocent people like Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, when the suicide bomber became a big fear for society, a great fear has started against the Islamic society. Then, the questions came into being. Nobody did more harm to Muslims than Muslims themselves. (Germany-28). (Gender: Female: Age Group 65 or more: Graduate)
- Racism is more commonly used. It is sometimes used by leaders like the current Chancellor or clearly former Chancellor Hitler, sometimes against Turks, sometimes against Jews, and sometimes against Muslims. A scapegoat can always be found. (Austria-2), (Gender: Male; Age Group. 25–34; Postgraduate)

- Both are used with the same frequency. Maybe xenophobia [is] a click ahead, but generally there is no difference. (Austria- 5). (Gender: Mail. Age Group: 54–64: Postgraduate)

6.6. Racism-Xenophobia-Islamophobia: Which is Dominant in the Society Where Respondents Live?

Number of the responses to Question 8 (“Racism, xenophobia and anti-Islam (or Islamophobia): Which of these is more common in the society you live in? (Please choose 2 options”) are reflected in Figure 18.




Figure 18: Racism, Xenophobia, and Anti-Islam (or Islamophobia): Which of These is More Common in the Society You Live In?
 (*) Not among the options: Mentioned spontaneously.

In this question, I included the choice “anti-Islam/Islamophobia” for the first time. It should be noticed that interviewees were given two options. Therefore, there is a difference between the number of respondents and the number of answers. Interestingly, the rate of anti-Islam/Islamophobia preference in both countries are almost the same (Germany 39.7 corresponding to 33 responses; Austria 41% corresponding to 31 responses), which exceeds the options of racism and xenophobia. In fact, the previous questions were constructed with the primary aim of gauging first the existence and then, the degree of racism and xenophobia. This result is in line with

the replies to Question 9 (“Which of the following types of discrimination do you think are more dominant in the society you live in? (Please tick three options.)”

Figure 19 shows the most dominant discrimination types in Germany and Austria.




Figure 19: Types of Discrimination: Which One Is More Dominant in the Society You Live In?

The numbers for “religious belief” and “ethnic” categories are similar in two countries. These results point to the existence of perception in the eyes of the interviewees that anti-Islam is a more widespread type of discrimination than racism and xenophobia.

6.7. Verbal and Physical Violence Against People with Immigrant Backgrounds In Societies Where Respondents Live

I have assumed that a correlation exists between the level of xenophobia and rate of immigration, and that this correlation is directly proportional. In the framework of this assumption, I designated the “level of xenophobia” as the dependent variable, the “rate of immigration” as the independent variable, and “number of violent events/actions against immigrants/foreigners” as the mediating (intermediate) variable.

The secondary data, including the information provided by international organizations such as the OSCE, shows the fluctuation and rising violent events and acts against

foreigners, immigrants, and asylum seekers in Western Europe, especially in Germany, since the 1990s. In interviews, I posed a series of intercorrelated questions to the respondents on verbal and physical violence in Germany and Austria. Among these questions, the first one (Question 11) is “Do you think that there is verbal violence (e.g., accusing, undermining, verbal-threatening, trivializing, blaming) against foreigners, immigrants, and asylum seekers in the society you live in?”; I presented the respondents with “Yes” and “No” options.

Figure 20 shows the responses.




Figure 20: Is There “Verbal Violence” Against Foreigners, Immigrants, and Asylum Seekers in the Society You Live In?

As Figure 20 reveals, thirty-two interviewees corresponding to 94% of the German sample and twenty-six interviewees corresponding to 87% of the Austrian sample answered this question with “yes.”

Figure 21 shows the responses separated by men and women who participated.




Figure 21: Is There “Verbal Violence” Against Foreigners, Immigrants, and Asylum Seekers in the Society You Live In?

As Figure 21 reveals, one hundred percent of twelve female respondents in the sample of Germany and six out of seven respondents (eighty-seven percent) in the sample of Austria declared verbal violence in their country of residence.

The 13th question regarding physical violence is as follows: “Do you think that there is physical violence (physical harm as a result of physical force) against foreigners, immigrants, and asylum seekers in the society you live in?” Figure 22 shows the responses.




Figure 22: Is There “Physical Violence” Against Foreigners, Immigrants, and Asylum Seekers in the Society You Live In?

Figure 23 shows the responses broken down by men and women who responded.




Figure 23: Is There “Physical Violence” Against Foreigners, Immigrants, and Asylum Seekers in the Society You Live In?

Question 14 regarding the degree of physical violence is as follows: “If ‘physical violence’ exists, to what degree does it exist, based on your judgment?”

Figure 24 shows the responses.




Figure 24: Degree of “Physical Violence”?

The answers given to the questions on violence reveal that most respondents with an immigrant background and high educational attainment in Germany and Austria

overwhelmingly believe that verbal and physical violence is prevalent against foreigners, immigrants, and asylum seekers in the society where they live.

This result is, in principle, in line with the secondary data and the assessments I made regarding the role of violence in determining the level of xenophobia (dependent variable) as a mediating (intermediate) variable. To further examine the responses to these four questions on violence, two more specific private questions were posed regarding whether respondents were personally subjected to violence. These questions are Question 15 (“Have you ever been exposed to verbal or physical violence while living in this society?”) and Question 16 (“If you have ever been exposed to violence, what was the type?”). The response given to these two questions are jointly reflected in Figure 25.




Figure 25: Have You Ever Been Exposed to “Verbal,” “Physical,” or “Verbal and Physical Violence” While Living in This Society?

No respondent in either Germany or Austria explicitly reported having personally experienced physical violence.

When the answers given to all the questions on the issue of violence are analyzed in a holistic manner, it seems possible to state that there is widespread verbal violence

against people with an immigrant background in both Germany and Austria. Respondents, with reference to what they saw and heard in their environment and read or followed in the media, also stated without hesitation that although they were not exposed personally, physical violence exists in the society they live in.

6.8. Question Regarding Possible Discrimination During the Covid-19 Pandemic

I posed a follow-up question to gather data concerning discriminatory behaviors against the respondents in the COVID-19 pandemic environment: “Did you experience any type of discrimination or exclusion (e.g., health care, lay-off, social ostracism) because of your foreign identity in the society you live in during the COVID-19 pandemic?” None of the respondents in either Germany or Austria declared discriminatory or exclusionary treatment in the pandemic period.

I present verbatim extracts from some relevant responses to this question, with notes indicating the respondents' gender, age group, and degree of education in Appendix B.

6.9. Assessment of the Results

The results of the study presented above indicate that most respondents—consisting of men and women of various age groups with high educational attainment and an immigrant background in Germany and Austria—consider that racism and xenophobia widely exist in various degrees in these countries. In this context, as noted above, 80%–94% of the respondents answered racism and xenophobia do exist. To better understand the characteristics of the rising racism and xenophobia in these countries in addition to their existence, I asked questions with Likert scale type answers for racism and xenophobia degrees of “too much,” “much,” “not so much,” “few,” and “very few.” I consider that the “too much” and “much” options indicate a degree above

neutral in this scale and can show us rising tendency of these phenomena. In this sense, considering the sum of these two options, in terms of xenophobia, these rates are 53.2% in Germany and 72% in Austria. The total percentages of respondents who consider that there is “too much” or “much” racism in Germany is 64.5% and in Austria 65.6%.

In this light, these figures may indicate not only the existence of racism and xenophobia in these countries, but also—to some extent—the rise of these phenomena in both countries. The true nature of the relationship and interaction between racism and xenophobia is one of the key issue to examine. For this purpose, the research target group were asked various questions on the explanations and evaluations regarding xenophobia and racism, the answers of which serve as checks for each other. For two countries, the average of those who believe that there is too much or much racism and xenophobia is 73%. These results reveal that almost three-quarters of the respondents have a perception, opinion, or assessment that almost equates racism and xenophobia. In addition, the ratios in question indicate a strong relationship, interaction, and fluidity between the two concepts.

When considered as a whole, study results and the detailed answers given to the questions indicate that racism and xenophobia are in mutual interaction and that this interaction has gained a character that has intertwined these two concepts over time. This interaction appears strong enough to create the impression in highly educated respondents with an immigrant background that the two concepts are the same or quite similar to each other. The results of this research, therefore, allow me to argue that a new hybrid type of racism and xenophobia (that is, xeno-racism), has emerged from the intertwined structures of these two concepts.

The results of this study show that participants, who were highly educated and had a migrant background in Germany and Austria, perceive a high rate of verbal violence in the countries they live in. The participants also mentioned the existence of physical violence at very high rates. However, when asked whether they had personally been subjected to such violence, none mentioned that they had been subjected to physical violence, but stated that they were aware of the existence of such violence through their social circles and media. Some of the interviewees explained that they were personally exposed to verbal violence by giving examples.

Based on secondary data and information in the available literature, I claim that there is both physical and verbal violence in Germany. Yet the results of my study did not confirm this judgment. The results of the research reveal that the respondents from immigrant backgrounds believe that there is a significantly high level of verbal violence in Austria. Even if they are not personally exposed, the same perception applies to physical violence. Considering the results of the research, although there are differences in the number and visibility of physical violence, it is not possible to say that there is a major difference between Germany and Austria in terms of the existence of violence. In this context, it should be remembered that the population of Austria is almost one-tenth of that of Germany.

Multiple studies and evaluations on xenophobia made in the late 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s were mentioned in this literature review. There are similarities between the studies and evaluations in the literature and results of my research. Statements of those who participated in the study I conducted indicate that the level of xenophobia, which has said to have reached its highest levels in the past in the mentioned countries, has not only maintained its level over time, but has also increased.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

“...The new racism thus exploits xenophobic frames and *topoi* (e.g., “constructing fear of the other”), ethnocentrism, male chauvinism, and “ordinary” prejudices in subtle ways and often, too, in ways that are unconscious or routinized. For these reasons the new racism can also be termed “xeno-racism,” a mixture of racism and xenophobia...”

(Krzyzanowski & Wodak, 2017: 2)

According to Eckstein, questions, to be answered by theories, must usually be restated as problems or puzzles (Eckstein, 2000: 127). More recent scholarly work explains “puzzle” as “something as-yet unexplained by existing theories” and “an explanandum, a conundrum about the social world that upsets our expectations or for which there is no ready explanation” (McDonnell, 2015). These brief explanations point out that if the knowledge on the topic has been limited and if the existing theories fail to explain the conundrum or enigmatic phenomenon, it is possible to talk about the

existence of a puzzle that needs to be questioned, and if possible, answered. In this respect, we can only provide conjectural answers to the conundrum.

In such a framework, the first question of this study constitutes a puzzle. It constitutes a conceptual puzzle for me how xenophobia remained at the center of the political and social developments and became the subject of various studies since the 1990s despite the fact that it was insufficiently conceptualized and devoid of operational definition. In most of the scholarly studies regarding the rise of extreme-right parties in Western Europe, immigration phenomenon and xenophobia are considered causal effects or, empirically, as independent variables. Almost no scholarly study regards xenophobia as an effect, outcome, or empirically dependent variable. This void in academic literature on xenophobia necessitates not only the development of an operational definition but also a detailed analysis of analogous concepts and constructs. When attempting to do so, we encounter the racism-xenophobia duo that is usually used as twin concepts in daily social life, in media, and even in academic circles.

It is generally accepted that racism and xenophobia are two distinct but interrelated and overlapping concepts. Racism, after developing in Western Europe in anti-Black and antisemitic forms, reached its climax during Nazi rule from 1933–1945. The Nazi regime committed the most heinous crime of the Holocaust, and millions of victims suffered from Nazi violence. After the defeat of the Nazi regime in the Second World War and Nuremberg trials, racism was ethically and morally condemned. It lost much of its power in Western Europe, especially in Germany. Meanwhile, all racist regimes that marked the 20th century were considered defeated, at least on paper. In the Western European context, an attempt was made to abandon racism to the depths of history to erase its painful memories. However, violence against immigrants and asylum-seekers occurred in some of the leading Western European countries at the end of the 20th

century, revealing that racism had not disappeared. In my judgment, to avoid recalling the bitter history of racism in Western Europe, an attempt is made to explain the cause for these violent incidents through the concept of xenophobia. Since then, scholars have been examining and researching the rise of xenophobia in Western Europe. For example, Koopmans (1996: 185), one of the most prominent sociologists conducting valuable research on migration, integration of migrants, social movements in Western Europe, considered the violence in Western Europe in that period to be “extreme-right and racist violence.” He stated:

“As these introductory lines already suggest, this paper focuses on **extreme-right and racist violence**. These two forms of violence are certainly not identical, since there is both racist violence which does not have an extreme-right background, and violence by extreme-right groups whose targets are not ethnic minorities but rather, for instance, left-wing groups. However, since the presence of ethnic minorities in West European countries has in recent years become by far the most important mobilizing issue for extreme-right groups and parties, the overlap between both forms of violence is in fact quite large, **with racist violence being the more inclusive category**, encompassing most extreme-right violence. A second, pragmatic, reason to analyze these two forms of violence simultaneously is that, due to the covert, anonymous and ‘speechless’ nature of most of this violence, it is in practice very hard to separate them.” (Koopmans, 1996: 185–186; emphasis added)

This terminology was mostly described as “xenophobic violence” in later works. The main issue that needs to be clarified in these examinations and research is whether these events in Western Europe can be explained only by the concept of xenophobia. The concept of xenophobia, in its basic meaning, is insufficient to explain these violent events on its own.

As I stated earlier, the more up-to-date and creative terminology suggested in the first years of 20 first century that optimally describes this situation in Western Europe is “xeno-racism.” As succinctly explained by Sivanandan, what is currently described as xenophobia in Western Europe is in fact a phenomenon that represents racism in

substance, but xenophobia in form. Sivanandan is not alone in this view.

Krzyzanowski and Wodak also stated that

“The new racism thus exploits xenophobic frames and topoi (e.g., ‘constructing fear of the other’), ethnocentrism, male chauvinism, and ‘ordinary’ prejudices in subtle ways and often, too, in ways that are unconscious or routinized. For these reasons, the new racism can also be termed ‘xeno-racism,’ a mixture of racism and xenophobia...” (Michal Krzyzanowski & Ruth Wodak, 2017: 2).

Additionally, Wodak brings to the fore the concept of “syncretic racism,” which includes xeno-racism along with Essed’s “everyday racism” concept. She explains this new syncretic racism concept as follows:

“The multidimensional nature of racism is usefully captured by the concept of “syncretic racism,” which encompasses concepts such as everyday racism, xeno-racism and other forms of racism (such as racialization, otherism, etc.). By “syncretic racism” I mean the construction of “differences” that serve ideological, political and/or practical discrimination within all levels of society. Old and new stereotypes and prejudices form a mixed bag of exclusionary practices; they are used whenever they are seen to be politically expedient – such as in gaining votes.” (Wodak, 2010: 358)

Regarding everyday racism Essed (1991: 45) stated that “racial discrimination includes all act - verbal, nonverbal, and paraverbal - with intended or unintended negative or unfavorable consequences for racially or ethnically dominated groups.” She underlined that “intentionality is not a necessary component of racism” and drew attention to the argument that “it is not the nature of specific acts or beliefs that determines whether these are mechanisms of racism but the context in which these beliefs and acts operate” (Essed, 1991: 45).

These explanations demonstrate that the term xenophobia is insufficient to explain the level of discrimination against immigrants, asylum seekers, and foreigners in Western Europe. I argued earlier that racism is not bereft of life. I stated in this respect that because of the Nazi cruelties, immediately after the Second World War, racism was declared guilty because of its Nazi past, especially in the Western European context.

In parallel with innocentization attempts under the guise of cultural differences, racism managed to hide itself. This camouflage made the “mutational rise” of racism possible. This “mutational rise” brought about a “transductional metamorphosis.” By way of this transduction, the most hazardous genetic trait of racism, which is collective violence, was transmitted into xenophobia and transformed xenophobia into an extreme form. I have already explained how extreme xenophobia came to existence in Austria and Germany and schematically illustrated my explanations on this issue. In this context, I pointed out that there is a strong elite rhetoric in Austria in terms of the formation of extreme xenophobia. However, I emphasized that neither the literature review nor the secondary data revealed significant physical violence data. Moreover, I stated that in Germany, firstly, physical violence occurred, and second, the discourse inciting hatred was added to physical violence. This means that both physical violence and discourse are present in Germany in terms of the formation of extreme form of xenophobia. I also called attention to the point that only the discourse element is present in Austria in terms of the formation of the extreme form of xenophobia.

As explained in detail in Chapter VI, the data I obtained in the interviews conducted with people with a higher education level and an immigrant background living in Germany and Austria revealed results that do not fully coincide with the evaluations I made based on secondary data and literature review. This is especially true for the phenomenon of violence. Respondents in Austria stated that there is widespread verbal violence against people with immigrant backgrounds in the country. They stated that this also applies to physical violence, although they have not experienced it themselves.

Additionally, the findings of my study considerably validated my proposition that racism and xenophobia interact and that these concepts were nested over time through

this interaction. This interaction appears strong enough to create the impression in the majority of participants (70% to 75% in Germany and Austria, respectively) that the two concepts are the same or quite similar to each other.

The secondary data and literature review and the findings of the research allow me to argue the emergence of a new hybrid type of racism and xenophobia, which is a combination emerging from the intertwined structures of these two concepts. The most important feature of this new genesis is the mixing of similar aspects of these concepts and the emergence of a new hybrid formation through social mutation. Hence, I refer to the similarity of racism and xenophobia as dizygotic twinship and call racism and xenophobia dizygotic twins. As is known, “monozygotic twins share 100 percent of each other genes.” Dizygotic twins, on the other hand, share approximately 50 percent of genes. In this sense, I claim that racism and xenophobia can be called as dizygotic (or fraternal) twins.

In the light of foregoing, as I mentioned earlier, the most appropriate contemporary description of this new genesis is xeno-racism. All these discussions justify the using the terms of xeno-racism and extreme xenophobia in the context of Western Europe instead of solely xenophobia, which essentially reduces the term to a passive one about self-preservation.

Meanwhile, the previous discussion draws our attention to the outdated character of term xenophobia for explaining the true nature of discrimination and exclusion directed to immigrants, asylum seekers, and foreigners. As noted earlier, the term xenophobia conceals racism, which in some parts of Western European countries is deeply resented for its brutal Nazi practices. Therefore, the use of the terms race and racism was generally avoided. The use of these terms was considered morally wrong

and socially harmful and were voluntarily erased from the public memory, especially in German-speaking countries. Wodak (2010: 358) stated:

“Since 1945, the use of the term “race” (Rasse) in the German-speaking countries of Germany, Switzerland, and Austria has been strictly taboo for politicians, for academics, and even for the people in general. In France, the expression *relations de race* would also be regarded as racist.”

In this environment, xenophobia substantially provides a camouflage that hides racism. Racism also gains the ability to change color like a chameleon. Since antisemitism and Islamophobia are terms that have special meanings and are closely related to certain religion groups, it seems easier and more attractive to hide the racism behind the vague term of xenophobia.

In this context, it is difficult to argue that xenophobia is placed in the correct theoretical framework in studies that consider xenophobia as a secondary auxiliary term used to explain the main subject. In most of the studies related to xenophobia, the term theory is being presented in hyperbolic, abstract, and generalizable terms without testing the conjectural propositions. This approach may help scholars who are less concerned with social science methodology and more interested in untested conjectural findings that may help further study in the specific subject. However, it is not appropriate to call these approaches a theory and present them as such. It does not seem possible to talk about the existence of a specific, generally accepted theory on xenophobia. For this reason, it is difficult to answer questions such as “what theory is this study based on?” To eliminate this deficiency, the concept and discourse of xenophobia should be examined in more detail, and its connection with concepts, such as racism, antisemitism, and anti-Muslimism, that directly affect the daily life of societies should be investigated. My suggestion in this regard is to support conjectural academic studies with field studies to help to develop the theoretical framework of xenophobia.

The signs that xenophobia and racism have undergone a qualitative change in the context of immigration problems have become more apparent during the last decade of the 21st century. The most significant reason for this is undoubtedly the migration problem caused by the Syrian civil war. The internal turmoil in Syria was considered part of the 2011 events that were eventually called the “Arab Spring,” denoting a series of uprisings that first erupted in Tunisia in 2010 and then spread to other Arab countries that challenged their existing regimes (Dornschneider, 2021). Within the framework of the Arab Spring, turmoil began in Syria in March 2011 and rapidly escalated into a civil war (Rabinovich & Valensi, 2021). Consequently, according to the UN refugee agency of UNHCR in 2022, 13.4 million people in Syria needed humanitarian and protection assistance, and 6.7 million people were internally displaced. Moreover, 6.6 million people of the total Syrian population became refugees worldwide, of whom 5.6 million are being hosted in countries near Syria.

According to EU reports, EU members faced an unprecedented influx of refugees in 2015 as more than one million people sought refuge in EU member countries (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights–FPA, 2016:7). According to some studies, approximately 1.3 million refugees arrived on the “European continent” to apply for asylum in 2015. The majority of these are refugees who are reaching Europe by crossing the Mediterranean in boats, and 2015 was described as the 2015 European migration crisis (Barlai, Fähnrich, Christina, Markus, & Peter, 2017:13). The 2016 FPA report refers to the problems created by the refugee influx in terms of xenophobia and racism in EU countries as follows:

“Je suis Charlie... Refugees Welcome! – The year 2015 was marked by the aftermath of terrorist attacks in France and Denmark and reactions to the arrival of asylum seekers and immigrants in large numbers across the EU. These events had a profound impact on the Union and its Member States, and the effects on society are likely to be felt for years to come. As this chapter shows, EU institutions and Member States are faced with open and sometimes violent

manifestations of racism, xenophobia, and related intolerance, as well as hate crime, which implicate Council Framework Decision (2008/913/JHA) of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law.” (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights-FPA, 2016:77).

Developments over time have revealed that the judgment in the above excerpt that EU institutions and Member States have been confronted with overt and sometimes violent manifestations of racism, xenophobia, and related intolerance, as well as hate crime, is not exclusive to EU member states. In the interviews I conducted with individuals living in Germany and Austria at the end of 2020, one of the most striking answers to the questions regarding the existence of xenophobia and racism in the country they live in was “there is some form of xenophobia/racism in any country as shown in Figures 8 and 9 in chapter VI, 10%–12% of respondents in Austria answered the related questions in this way. Developments over time show that non-western European countries have become examples that confirm the reaction that “there is xenophobia in every country.” In this context, there has been a great increase in the statements of some political party representatives, including certain party leaders and mayors, over time in the recent period, especially toward asylum seekers. Most of these statements can be characterized as hate speech. Worse yet, some cases attempt of hate crimes were committed.

These developments indicate that the world is faced with a serious level of xenophobic/racist incidents. I think more empirical studies are needed to trace the metamorphosis of xenophobia and racism around the world.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

INTERVIEW / INTERVIEW / MÜLAKAT	
Before I start asking you questions, I sincerely thank you for your kind cooperation.	
Bevor ich Ihnen Fragen stelle, danke ich Ihnen von Herzen für Ihre freundliche Zusammenarbeit.	
Size soruları sormaya başlamadan önce, nazik işbirliğiniz için içtenlikle teşekkür ederim.	
First-Middle-Last Name / Vor-Mitte-Nachname / İsim-Soyadı	
email / Email / e-posta	
Gender / Geschlecht / Cinsiyet	☐ Female / Weiblich / Kadın ☐ Male / Männlich / Erkek
Age / Alter / Yaş	☐ 18–24 ☐ 25–34 ☐ 35–44 ☐ 45–54 ☐ 54–64 ☐ 65 or more / 65 oder mehr / 65'den fazla
Education / Bildung / Eğitim durumu	☐ High School / Weiterführende Schule / Lise ☐ Graduate degree / Schulabschluss / Lisans ☐ Postgraduate degree / Aufbaustudium / Lisansüstü
From where did you or your family come to the country where you currently live in? / Woher sind Sie oder Ihre Familie in das Land gekommen, in dem Sie derzeit leben? /	

Siz veya aileniz şu anda yaşadığınız ülkeye nereden geldiniz?		
Your residence status in the country where you currently live / Ihr Aufenthaltsstatus in dem Land, in dem Sie derzeit leben / Halen yaşadığınız ülkedeki ikamet statüsünüz		
Country lived in / Land lebte in / Yaşadığınız ülke		☐ Germany / Deutschland / Almanya ☐ Austria / Österreich / Avusturya
Date submitted / Datum der Übermittlung / Tarih		
QUESTIONS / FRAGEN / SORULAR		ANSWERS / ANTWORTEN / CEVAPLAR
1	When you hear native people refer a person or group of people as “other” in the society you currently live in, whom do you think they often refer to—in terms of nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, and culture? Why? Wenn Sie hören, dass Ureinwohner eine Person oder eine Gruppe von Menschen in der Gesellschaft, in der Sie derzeit leben, als “andere” bezeichnen, wen bezeichnen sie Ihrer Meinung nach häufig als Nationalität, ethnische Zugehörigkeit, Rasse, Religion, Kultur? Warum? Yerel halkın, içinde bulunduğunuz toplumda bir kişiyi veya bir grup insanı “öteki” olarak adlandırdığını duyduğunuzda, genellikle milliyet, etnik köken, ırk, din, kültür olarak kime/kimlere atıfta bulunulduğunu düşünüyorsunuz? Neden?	
2	In your opinion, which two groups are the most perceived as “the other” among the ones I mention? Black, African, Arab, Roman, Asian, Turkish, Muslim, Jew, Orthodox Christian, Buddhist Welche 2 Gruppen werden Ihrer Meinung nach unter den von mir gezählten am meisten als „die andere” wahrgenommen? Schwarz, Afrikanisch, Araber, Romanisch, Asiatisch, Türkisch, Muslim, Jüdisch, Orthodoxer Christ, Buddhist	

	Sizce, içinde yaşadığınız toplumda, sayacaklarımdan hangi 2 grup en fazla “öteki” olarak algılanıyor? Siyah, Afrikalı, Arap, Roman, Asyalı, Türk, Müslüman, Yahudi, Ortodoks Hristiyan, Budist	
3	Do you think that “racism” exists in the society you live in? Why? Denken Sie, dass es in der Gesellschaft, in der Sie leben, “Rassismus” gibt? Warum? Yaşadığınız toplumda “ırkçılığın” var olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Neden?	
4	If “racism” exists, to what degree does it exist, based on your judgment? Too much, Much, Not so much, Few, Very few Wenn “Rassismus” existiert, welcher der folgenden Grade eignet sich für Ihr Urteil? Zu viel, Viel, Nicht so viel, Wenige Sehr, wenige. “İrkçılık” mevcutsa, sizce hangi derecededir? Çok fazla, Çok, Çok değil, Az, Çok az	
5	Do you think that “xenophobia” exists in the society you live in? Why? Denken Sie, dass es in der Gesellschaft, in der Sie leben, “Fremdenfeindlichkeit” gibt? Warum? Yaşadığınız toplumda “yabancı düşmanlığı” olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Neden?	
6	If “xenophobia” exists, to what degree does it exist, based on your judgment? Too much, Much, Not so much, Few, Very few Wenn “Fremdenfeindlichkeit” besteht, welcher der folgenden Grade eignet sich für Ihr Urteil? Zu viel, Viel, Nicht so viel, Wenige, Sehr wenige	

	“Yabancı düşmanlığı” mevcutsa, sizce hangi derecededir? Çok fazla, Çok, Çok değil, Az, Çok az	
7	Do you think that “racism” and “xenophobia” are the same or similar concepts? Why? Denken Sie, dass “Rassismus” und “Fremdenfeindlichkeit” dieselben oder ähnliche Konzepte sind? Warum? “İrkçılık” ve “yabancı düşmanlığı” kavramlarının birbirinin aynı mı yoksa benzer kavramlar olduğunu mu düşünüyor musunuz? Neden?	
8	In your opinion, which of the concepts, “racism” and “xenophobia,” is more frequently used in the society you live in? Welches der Konzepte von “Rassismus” und “Fremdenfeindlichkeit” wird Ihrer Meinung nach in der Gesellschaft, in der Sie leben, häufiger verwendet? Size göre, “ırkçılık” ve “yabancı düşmanlığı” kavramlarından hangisi yaşadığınız toplumda daha sık kullanılıyor?	
9	Which of the 3 types of discrimination do you think are more dominant in the society you live in? Age, Disability, Gender, Ethnic, Race, Religious Belief, Sexual Orientation Welche der drei Arten von Diskriminierung sind Ihrer Meinung nach in der Gesellschaft, in der Sie leben, dominanter? Alter, Behinderung, Geschlecht, Ethisch, Rennen, Religiöser Glaube, Sexuelle Orientierung Yaşadığınız toplumda sayacaklarımdan hangi 3 tanesinin, diğer ayrımcılık türlerine göre daha baskın olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz? Yaş, Engellilik, Cinsiyet, Etnik, Irk, Dini inanç, Cinsel yönelim	
10	Racism, xenophobia, and anti-Islam (or Islamophobia). In your opinion, which of these concepts or their combinations	

	is more common in the society you live in? (Please choose 2 options) -Racism, -Xenophobia, -Anti-Islam (Islamophobia) -Racism & Xenophobia, -Xenophobia & anti-Islam (Islamophobia) -Racism & anti-Islam (Islamophobia) Rassismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Anti-Islam (oder Islamfeindlichkeit). Welches dieser Konzepte oder deren Kombinationen ist Ihrer Meinung nach in der Gesellschaft, in der Sie leben, häufiger anzutreffen? (Bitte wählen Sie unten 2 Optionen) -Rassismus, -Fremdenfeindlichkeit, -Anti-Islam (Islamfeindlichkeit) -Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit -Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Anti-Islam (Islamfeindlichkeit) -Rassismus und Anti-Islam (Islamfeindlichkeit) İrkçılık, yabancı düşmanlığı ve İslam karşıtlığı (veya İslamofobi). Sizce bu kavramlardan hangisi veya bu kavramların hangi birleşimi yaşadığınız toplumda daha yaygındır? (Lütfen 2 tane söylemisiniz) -İrkçılık, -Yabancı düşmanlığı, -İslam Karşıtlığı, -İrkçılık ve Yabancı Düşmanlığı, -Yabancı Düşmanlığı ve İslam Karşıtlığı, -İrkçılık ve İslam Karşıtlığı	
11	Do you believe that there is verbal violence (e.g. accusing, undermining, verbal-threatening, trivializing, blaming) against foreigners, immigrants, and asylum seekers in the society you live in? Denken Sie, dass es in der Gesellschaft, in der Sie leben, verbale Gewalt gegen Ausländer, Einwanderer und Asylsuchende gibt (z. B. beschuldigen, untergraben, verbal bedrohen, trivialisieren, beschuldigen)? Yaşadığınız toplumda yabancılara, göçmenlere ve sığınmacılara karşı sözlü şiddet (örneğin suçlama, hakir görme,	

	sözlü tehdit etme, önemsizleştirme, tenkit etme) olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?	
12	If “verbal violence” exists, to what degree does it exist, based on your judgment? Too much, Much, Not so much, Few, Very few Wenn “verbale Gewalt” vorliegt, welcher der folgenden Grade eignet sich für Ihr Urteil? Zu viel, Viel, Nicht so viel, Wenige, Sehr wenige “Sözlü şiddet” mevcutsa, sizce derecesi nedir? Çok fazla, Çok, Çok değil, Az, Çok az	
13	Do you think that there is physical violence (physical harm as a result of physical force) against foreigners, immigrants, and asylum seekers in the society you live in? Glauben Sie, dass es in der Gesellschaft, in der Sie leben, körperliche Gewalt (körperliche Schädigung durch körperliche Gewalt) gegen Ausländer, Einwanderer und Asylsuchende gibt? Yaşadığınız toplumda yabancılara, göçmenlere ve sığınmacılara karşı fiziksel bir şiddet (fiziksel güç kullanımı sonucu fiziksel zarar verilmesi) olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?	
14	If “physical violence” exists, to what degree does it exist, based on your judgment? Too much, Much, Not so much, Few, Very few Wenn “körperliche Gewalt” vorliegt, welcher der folgenden Grade eignet sich für Ihr Urteil? Zu viel, Viel, Nicht so viel, Wenige, Sehr wenige “Fiziksel şiddet” mevcutsa, sizce derecesi nedir? Çok fazla, Çok, Çok değil, Az, Çok az	
15	Have you ever been exposed to verbal or physical violence while living in this society? Waren Sie jemals verbaler oder körperlicher Gewalt ausgesetzt,	

	während Sie in dieser Gesellschaft lebten? Bu toplumda yaşarken hiç sözlü veya fiziksel şiddete maruz kaldınız mı?	
16	If you have ever been exposed to violence, what was the type? Verbal, Physical, Verbal & physical Wenn Sie jemals Gewalt ausgesetzt waren, welcher Typ war das? Verbal, Körperliche Gewalt, Verbal und Körperliche Gewalt Şimdiye kadar şiddete maruz kaldıysanız, hangi türde şiddete maruz kaldınız? Sözel, Fiziki, Sözel ve fiziksel	
17	Did you experience any type of discrimination or exclusion (e.g., health care, lay-off, social ostracism) because of your foreign identity in the society you live in during the COVID-19 pandemic? How? Haben Sie irgendeine Art von Diskriminierung oder Ausgrenzung (z. B. Gesundheitsversorgung, Entlassung, soziale Ausgrenzung) aufgrund Ihrer ausländischen Identität in der Gesellschaft erfahren, in der Sie während der COVID-19-Pandemie leben? Wie? COVID-19 salgını sırasında yaşadığınız toplumdaki yabancı kimliğiniz nedeniyle herhangi bir ayrımcılık veya dışlanma (örneğin sağlık hizmetleri, işten çıkarılma, sosyal dışlama) yaşadınız mı? Nasıl?	

APPENDIX B SELECTED QUOTATIONS FROM RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS ON THE RATIONALE ["WHY" PARTS] OF SOME OF THE QUESTIONS

Certain respondents in Germany and Austria made salient comments for the “why” part of the questions. These comments have the potential to provide us workable clues to help unpack the true nature of racism and xenophobia in these societies through the prism of individuals who have high educational attainment and an immigrant background. Below, I provide a selection of quotations with explanatory notes for the gender, age group and educational attainment level of respondents in brackets.

I. Questions 3 and 5: “Do you think that ‘racism’ exists in the society you live in? Why?” and “Do you think that ‘xenophobia’ exists in the society you live in? Why?”

A) Racism

A-1 Germany

- A primitive racism is not dominant in society, as in the case of neo-Nazis. Although the racist and populist rhetoric of far-right parties, such as AfD, occasionally finds a response, especially in the former East German states, it can be found not only in the political field but also in the social field with democratic methods. However, the major problem is every day (hidden) racism. Evidently, individuals act without realizing that they are engaging in racism; they even believe that they are mostly being moral. Examples of this include the following sentences: “You do not look like a Turk at all,” “It is obvious that you were not born here,” and “You are one of the educated Turks.” In that sense, I have explained there is “much” racism. (Germany-32), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 35–44; Postgraduate)

- Yes, racism is everywhere. Some say it in a hidden way, and others say it openly. It is valid mostly for older people with old mindset. Young people are more tolerant. Racism is more common in job interviews. (Germany-8), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 18–24; Graduate)
- Yes. [This is true] because of the attacks. I come to this conclusion as not only verbal but [also] physical violence on the streets occurs on a daily basis. (Germany-5), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 18–24; Graduate)
- Yes. Unfortunately, there are even local politicians who insult foreigners through their social media accounts. There are thousands of people who claim to be racist. (Germany-13), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Graduate)
- Yes. [This is true] because the majority of Germans consider themselves superior, more valuable than other people, that is, people of different races. However, I do not want to generalize. There are also different Germans. (Germany-16), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate).
- Of course, in any society, some kind of racism exists since the unknown typically creates anxiety and fear, especially for uneducated parts of the society. (Germany-20), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 45–54; Postgraduate)
- Yes, as my college friend who grew up in Germany and studied at German Law School could not find a job given her headgear (interview was in English and the term “headgear” was used by the respondent) and received a job after giving up on it. Racism is too much. (Germany-21), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 25–34; Graduate)
- I did not detect it in the environment I live in. But I cannot say that it does not exist. (Germany-28), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 65 or more: Graduate)

- I am thinking. After the Second World War, they imposed a system aimed at suppressing nationalism. She/He expresses herself/himself that way in reaction. People do not know how to express their feelings under pressure. People do not know how to react, how to express their feelings. They give racist reactions. All of them nurture some form of racist feelings. (Germany-25), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Graduate)
- It exists in all societies I have lived in. These are in Bolivia, Mexico, USA, and Germany. (Germany-23), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 35–44; Postgraduate)
- Yes. For example, I perceived this in the place where I did my internship and work. It is a xenophobic reaction. (Germany-27); (Gender: Female; Age Group: 45–54: Graduate)

A-2 Austria

- Racism is a political concept that was developed in Europe after the nation-states came into being. Social hostility toward Turks and Islam has existed in Austria since 1529 and was reinforced in 1683 and constitutes one of the most important victories in Austrian military history. Because of the antisemitic past of Austria, I do not even need to talk about on this issue further. In addition, there is a very strong Eurocentrism in Europe, which subtly regards the European way of life as the highest standard. This thinking places itself above all other peoples and civilizations. (Austria-2), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Graduate).
- Yes, there is [racism]. It is embedded in them. The Austrian considers himself part of the German race, Kristallnacht, II. There are descendants of WWII survivors and Neo-Nazis. I did not come across them. They did not dare to attack me. I have a certain place in the society. But, if you are a worker, you speak little German, of

course they do attack them. (Austria-5), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 54–64; Postgraduate)

- Yes. During my own studentship experience, I was exposed to heavy pressure and violence many times, especially in government offices and during visa applications, because of being Turkish. In addition, the local people had an extreme prejudice against the Turks. They put every Turk in the same mold, and this pattern was revived in their minds as conservative. (Austria- 10), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)
- I went to Vienna from a metropolis like Istanbul for educational purposes. I did not experience such a problem in the intellectual environment, as my interlocutors and people with whom I interacted were students and [those from my] university circles. But it can be in macro. (Austria- 17), (Gender-Female; Age Group: 35–44; Postgraduate)
- Absolutely. At every opportunity, politicians and local press are negative about Turks and Muslims. We see that the incidents of racism have increased because of their words. (Austria- 20), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 35–44; Postgraduate)
- Yes. There is an increasing racism in the society I live in. In a panel I attended last year, I was surprised when two associations that reported racism in the country in a year said the number of racist incidents that had occurred. It was stated that most people remained silent when exposed to racism; in fact, there were more [unreported] cases of racism. (Austria-22), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 35–44; Graduate)
- Yes. Racism unfortunately exists in every society. This is more in some societies, less in others. Because in every society there are people who do not accept

difference. This includes prejudices, generalizations, etc. Adding to that, racism is created. (Austria- 28), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Graduate)

- Yes, there is. Why this is so, lies in the history of this country. (Austria-30), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 18–24; Graduate)
- Yes. We are always faced with racism, whether openly or covertly, [whether] small or big events. I know that the majority of people are not racist. But there have always been extremist racists among them. We even see those who have a terrorist approach to this matter, unfortunately. (Austria- 6), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 45–54; Postgraduate)

B-Xenophobia

B-1 Germany

- Yes. Too much. In areas like politics, trade, sports, education etc. foreigners are being blocked or they can be successful [only] under much more difficult conditions. (Germany-1), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 35–44; Postgraduate)
- Yes. Not so much. It is not common for local people to belittle other races with an emphasis on the superiority of their race as the Nazis did. There is more of a reaction against foreign cultures and religions. (Germany-2), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Graduate).
- Yes. Much. Germany is a country with a lot of foreigners. It is now difficult to find even pure German [people]. They may naturally feel invaded. In my opinion this exists to a degree in every nation. For example, I suppose we would be disturbed if we would have seen many foreigners in Turkey, more than Turks. Of course, foreigners are not guilty of this, but there is xenophobia among Germans. Right or wrong. (Germany 16), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)

- Of course, in any society some kind of xenophobia exists since the unknown typically creates anxiety and fear, especially for uneducated parts of the society. (Germany-20), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 45–54; Postgraduate)
- Yes, there is. Not so much. The reasons are prejudice, inferiority complexes, and otherness. (Germany-30). (Gender: Female, Age Group: 45–54); Postgraduate)
- Yes. Much. People are still afraid of to open their minds to foreign and unknown things, such as other cultures. (Germany-31), (Gender: Male, Age Group: 35–44: Graduate)
- Yes. People are also prejudiced against foreigners, though not as much as racism. Maybe because they are afraid, [or] maybe since they consider themselves to be superior. (Germany-12). (Gender: Female; Age Group: 25–34: Postgraduate)

B-2 Austria

- There is more or less xenophobia in every society. Xenophobia is a biological affect that arises in the first months of a new-born. Therefore, it always exists in some form. Especially with the increasing number of terrorist attacks [by] people of Muslim background increases the fear against Muslims as strangers in society. (Austria-2), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)
- Yes, there is. The reason is fear and not knowing the other. There is also a fear that they [natives] will lose their jobs. [This is] because the employer can employ the foreigner for less pay. Xenophobia is ingrained in them. They thought they were used by the Jews and tried to get rid of them. Therefore, Jews were class A-B. Neither the German nor Austrian governments view attacks on foreigners like attacks on Jews. Their reactions are different. For example, an attack on Jews is always immediately reflected widely in the newspapers. However, an attack on a

foreigner is not reflected in the press. There was a raid on the Synagogue and a kebab restaurant in Germany. When the attackers could not enter the Synagogue, they went to the kebab shop and killed the people there. The German government immediately rushed to the Synagogue. However, they did not go to the kebab restaurant. They only went where there were two bullet holes, but they did not go where people were killed. (Austria-5), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 54–64; Postgraduate)

- Yes, as I stated before, I learned that the number of racism is increasing gradually in the panel I attended last year. There are also people in my close circle who said that they were exposed to xenophobia. Unfortunately, I, myself, have been exposed to racism and xenophobia several times and often witnessed it. (Austria: 22), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 35–44; Graduate)
- Yes, as it is currently a political issue, which is being led by politicians and reinforced by the media. (Austria-21), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)
- Vienna is a social metropolis; you can meet many different people from many different countries here. There is no xenophobia in my area, but you can already experience it if you do not have sufficient knowledge of German in Austria. (Austria-15), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 18–24; Graduate)
- Yes. There is. I will give an example: In the Vienna municipal elections, the FPÖ used the slogan “Vienna should not be Turkey” in its campaign and posters. Despite this, the Viennese chose the FPÖ. Another example [is] the perception against the Turks. They distinguish between Turks who were born here and Turks who were born in Turkey and came here to study. They are racist even when they say, “You are not like the Turks here.” I come across sentences like “But you are

not like a Turk, you do not look like a Turk at all.” Or they ask, “Why do you not wear a headscarf?” Turkish and Muslim perceptions are quite different. They have a picture in their minds from years ago and they still judge people based on it. (Austria 12), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 18–24; Graduate)

II. Question 7: Do you think that “racism” and “xenophobia” are the same or similar concepts? Why?

A) Germany

- They are remarkably similar to each other because they both assume that this country belongs only to those of the German race and act on the basis that different races and foreigners are foreign elements that do not belong here. But, for example, German Muslims are not foreign to this country, but they are still subject to anti-Islamic racism. (Germany-1), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 35–44; Postgraduate)
- I do not think there is much xenophobia in the area where I live. Xenophobia is hating every person who is not like oneself. Racism is to hate only from a specific society, lineage, etc. I think that racism comes to the fore in the society where I live. More precisely, there is a rising hatred toward Turks (Muslims). (Germany-12), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 25–34; Graduate)
- I think different concepts. Xenophobia means “I do not want to see anybody other than German in my country” regardless of race. Racism means attacking people’s national, religious, and cultural values. I actually see the word racism as outright hostility. (Germany-4). (Gender: Male; Age Group: 18–24; Graduate)
- I do not think they are similar concepts; the term racism is a much more specific concept. It covers one aspect. Xenophobia is a much more general term.

Xenophobia is the subject of fear of strangers or the unknown. (Germany-5),
(Gender: Female; Age Group: 18–24; Graduate)

- Similar concepts. While racism is considered an ideology, xenophobia is a concept that can occur because one society disturbs the other. (Germany-7),
(Gender: Male; Age Group: 18–24); Graduate)
- I think, racism and xenophobia are different. Racism assumes that people should be viewed as part of a group, not as individuals. Racists assume that this group membership leads to fixed qualities, abilities, or qualities. It seems obvious that one's own group has a higher rank and has more rights. Regardless of its origin, racism can affect anyone. Phrases like "All Poles steal" or "Germans are punctual and dependable" are equally racist. Racism is a form of xenophobia that discriminates against foreigners based on their ethnic origin. Hostility and fear of anything perceived as foreign and therefore threatening familiar living conditions are directed at people who differ from their environment by origin, nationality (xenophobia), religion (antisemitism, Islamophobia) or skin color. (Germany-9). (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Graduate)
- They are similar concepts. Because it is racism that brings xenophobia. (Germany-15), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Graduate)
- It is pretty much the same concepts. At the end, you do not accept those who are not like you. (Germany- 17), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 25–54: Graduate).
- It is not the same. Because racism corresponds to seeing your race as superior and valuable to other races. Xenophobia, on the contrary is dislike of the presence of foreigners wherever they are and being hostile to them. This is not

to consider yourself superior or consider others not worthy enough to engage with them. However, both concepts are close and interconnected. (Germany-16), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)

- In my view, racism and xenophobia are similar concepts, since both relate to antipathy, non-tolerance, or even hatred toward “other” people not known personally. (Germany-22), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 35–44; Postgraduate)
- Although connected and intertwined, they are different concepts. For example, xenophobic speech is not necessarily racist. (Germany-32), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 35–44; Postgraduate)

B) Austria

- Although it seemed [to me] as if they are separate concepts before, xenophobia and racism are now the same concepts for me. The reason is that both aim to achieve the same goal. (Austria-3), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 35–44; Graduate)
- They are different concepts. While racism is the tendency of a particular race to hold itself superior and reject others, xenophobia, on the other hand, is the marginalizing movement toward a community, society, or national identity of different religion, language, race, or culture. (Austria-10), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)
- I equate xenophobia with xenophobia, and racism with xenophobia, which is mostly politically motivated. Xenophobia is a natural affect, whereby this xenophobia can be used politically to lead a policy on a racist basis. That is why all racism is essentially based on fear of foreigners. Over time, this fear can develop into hatred, which is mostly politically motivated. (Austria-2). (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)

- Although there are differences, they are similar concepts. (Austria-1), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)
- [They are] similar concepts but not the same. Xenophobia is a kind of intolerance. As for racism, it is a direct discrimination/hatred toward the other since they are from a different race. (Austria-12). (Gender: Female; Age Group: 18–24; Graduate)
- They are similar concepts. Because racism is at the base of xenophobia. (Austria-20), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)
- Similar concepts. However, racism tends to be expressed toward those who are physically different while xenophobia is a more general dislike of foreigners. (Austria-7), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)
- [They are] similar concepts. Racism is the root structure, and xenophobia is its extension and consequence. (Austria- 9), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 65 or more: Graduate)
- They are two close concepts that are not the same but have similar effects. Racism is a concept that does not accept anyone who is not of his/her own race, and that considers [one's] own [race] superior. Xenophobia means the alienation of foreigners. The common denominator of both concepts is to alienate people who are regarded as other people. (Austria-11) (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)
- Yes (Same). Because racism and xenophobia begin together, and they are hidden within each other. (Austria-21) (Gender: Female: Age Group: 25–34; Postgraduate)
- Racism is a disease without a cure. Xenophobia, on the contrary can be tackled through action. (Austria-19), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 35–44; Postgraduate)

- No! [Different] . One is created through ignorance, and the other is consciously created with knowledge. (Austria-23) (Gender: Female; Age Group: 18–24; Graduate)
- Yes [the same]. I guess, both are based on the same thing. In both, certain groups of people are unrecognized and mistreated. (Austria-30), (Gender: Female: Age Group: 18–24; Graduate)

III. Question 17: Did you experience any type of discrimination or exclusion (e.g., health care, lay-off, social ostracism) because of your foreign identity in the society you live in during the COVID-19 pandemic? How?

- Thank God, I did not need treatment. I did not experience such things [discrimination]. But I know that people with slanted eyes get harassed: Asian, Japanese, or something. My daughter's friend is Austrian by birth. Her/his mother and father were Chinese. She/he was verbally attacked. (Austria-5). (Gender: Male; Age Group: 54–64; Postgraduate)
- I certainly have never had such an experience. By the way, I should add this too; as a general appearance, I have blue eyes, blond hair, white skin. My German is particularly good. I do not come across such incidents much. I do not know whether this is because of my physical appearance. If I had another physical appearance, I do not know whether I would have been exposed to such behaviors. (Germany-25), (Gender: Male: Age Group: 25–34; Graduate)
- In general, I have not personally seen or experienced such things [discrimination], either during the COVID pandemic or in a different period. I always had fair teachers at school. Apart from that, there is an event I have experienced. In a job interview at the start of my professional life, the personnel manager (I was not

wearing a veil at the time) asked me if I wanted to wear a veil in the future, whether I was fasting in Ramadan and whether I was praying. He did not recruit me because of my answers and explained the reason for his decision by referring to my answers. (Germany-16), (Gender: Female; Age Group: 25–43; Postgraduate)

- During the pandemic, we provided food aid to people in need, and although there have been a couple of racist comments in the society we live in, we left a good impression in general. Particularly the mayor and officials thanked us. (Germany-13), (Gender: Male; Age Group: 25–34; Graduate)

