

WHY DID INDIA NOT SIGN THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
TREATY?
AN ANALYSIS FROM REALIST AND CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVIST
PERSPECTIVES

A Master's Thesis

by

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Ankara
August 2006

To My Family;
Sevim, Tuncer, Burcu Akan

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August 2006

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ABSTRACT

WHY DID INDIA NOT SIGN THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY? AN ANALYSIS FROM REALIST AND CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVES

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August 2006

This thesis analyzes the reasons why did India not become a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Realism and critical constructivism are chosen as the two theories to examine the constant factors leading to the Indian decision. First, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is analyzed. Second, premises of offensive and defensive and neoclassical realism and their explanations of the Indian decision are highlighted and compared. Third, critical constructivist examination of the Indian decision is conducted mostly based on Jutta Weldes' arguments. Last, the explanations of three variants of realism and critical constructivism on India's decision are compared. It is concluded that realist variants explain the continuity of Indian decision as not joining the NPT mostly because of material elements, however, critical constructivists also show social, cultural and historical constructions behind the scene as important factors and try to point out to the internal dynamics that play a role in the representational practices.

Keywords: International Relations, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), India, Nuclear Weapons, Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, Neoclassical Realism, Critical Constructivism

ÖZET

HİNDİSTAN NEDEN NÜKLEER SİLAHLARIN YAYILMAMA ANLAŞMASI'NI İMZALAMADI? REALİZM VE ELEŞTİREL YAPISALCILIK AÇISINDAN BİR İNCELEME

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Bu tez çalışması Hindistan'ın Nükleer Silahların Yayılmama Anlaşması'na katılmamasının nedenlerini incelemektedir. Realizm ve eleştirel yapısalcılık, Hindistan'ın kararına neden olan sabit etmenleri incelemek için seçilen iki teoridir. Öncelikle, Nükleer Silahların Yayılmama Anlaşması (NSYA) incelenmiştir. İkinci olarak, savunmacı, çatışmacı ve neoklasik realizmin önermeleri ve bunların Hindistan kararını açıklama şekillerine dikkat çekildi ve bu açıklamalar karşılaştırıldı. Üçüncü olarak, çoğunlukla Jutta Weldes'in görüşlerine dayanarak, Hindistan'ın kararının eleştirel yapısalcı incelemesi yapılmıştır. Son olarak, realizmin bu üç dalının ve eleştirel yapısalcılığın Hindistan kararını açıklama biçimleri karşılaştırılmıştır. Realizmin dalları Hindistan'ın NSYA'ya katılmama kararındaki devamlılığı çoğunlukla maddi öğelerle açıklarken, eleştirel yapısalcılar perde arkasındaki sosyal, kültürel ve tarihi yapılanmaları göstermekte ve betimsel pratiklerde rol oynayan içsel dinamikleri işaret etmeye çalıştığı sonucuna ulaşmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası İlişkiler, Nükleer Silahların Yayılmama Anlaşması (NSYA), Hindistan, Nükleer Silahlar, Savunmacı Realizm, Çatışmacı Realizm, Neoklasik Realizm, Eleştirel Yapısalcılık

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi-vii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
 CHAPTER II: THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY	 6
2.1 THE GENIE IS OUT OF THE BOTTLE – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	 7
2.2 THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY – THE FUNDAMENTALS	 15
2.2.1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE IAEA	17
2.2.2 PROVISIONS	21
2.2.3 THRESHOLD STATES IN THE PAST AND TODAY	29
 CHAPTER III: THE INDIAN DECISION THROUGH THE LENS OF REALISM	 35
3.1 INDIAN SECURITY OBJECTIVES	35
3.2 BASIC REALIST PRINCIPLES AND INDIAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR POWER	 37
3.3 OFFENSIVE REALISM	42
3.4 DEFENSIVE REALISM	44
3.5 NEOCLASSICAL REALISM	49
 CHAPTER IV: CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW ON THE INDIAN DECISION	 56

4.1 SOCIAL AND CRITICAL CONSTUCTIVISM	57
4.2 THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL INTEREST REGARDING NUCLEAR POLICY	61
4.3 CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITIES IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR POLICY	64
4.3.1 CONSTRUCTION OF THE IDENTITY OF INDIA AND ITS OPPONENTS	65
4.3.2 INDIA AS THE LEADER OF REGIONAL AND NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT VS NEOCOLONIAL POWERS	71
4.3.3 ARTICULATION AND INTERPELLATION IN RELATION TO TECHNOLOGY	75
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION	83
BIBLIOGRAPHY	90

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Those nations who have atom bombs are feared even by their friends”

- Mahatma Gandhi¹

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), has been an issue of discussion in the international relations field in terms of its particular setup, regime, safeguards system and impact on disarmament, since it entered into force in 1970. The NPT has a goal of achieving universal adherence to its regime. Except the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that withdrew from the NPT in January 2003, and India, Pakistan and Israel have chosen not to join the treaty; every country in the world signed and ratified the treaty. Nowadays, the NPT is once again capturing world attention, as Iran successfully enriched uranium on an industrial scale and declared its action irreversible. Negotiations between Iran and Europe, and the possibility (although so far rejected by the US government) of direct negotiation between Iran and the United States are being discussed with reference to the NPT.

Another subject of discussion revolving around the NPT is the development in relations regarding nuclear issues between the United States and India. The United States has started bringing India into the fold with a significant agreement to

¹ Jasjit Singh, “Why Nuclear Weapons?” in *Nuclear India* Jasjit Singh (ed) (Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), p. 9.

cooperate with it in the area of civil nuclear energy. In turn, India has to take measures² to assure the Americans' security concerns regarding nuclear issues. However, this agreement is expected to be face obstacles before being ratified, such as Congress's disapproval, harsh criticism from the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and resistance from Indian society due to the country's tradition of non-alignment and its historically difficult relations with the United States. All in all, such a move will require a re-reading and re-evaluation of the NPT and will certainly lead to severe challenges from several countries party to the NPT.

In this thesis, the factors related to India's choice not to sign the NPT are the main focus. The analysis tests two theories (realism and constructivism) in terms of their ability to explain India's decision to remain outside the NPT. India is chosen for study for two main reasons. First, it is one of the countries that have never been a party to the NPT. In other words, its decision did not change due to relations with other countries as in the case of the DPRK. Indian policy regarding nuclear issues shows continuity, indicating that the decision is not coincidental but a conscious one based on specific motivations and cost-benefit analyses. The Indian situation, which of course has its own dynamics, may be a special case, but it is also enlightening in terms of determining how to understand the reasoning of other non-signatories of the NPT. Second, ahead of potential new debates concerning India and the NPT in the light of above-mentioned initiative of the United States, the Indian case study will clarify to understand the main route of Indian nuclear policy, why India has developed and maintained its nuclear policy in the way that it has and what kind of changes can be expected regarding the US initiative in the Indian policy.

The thesis indicates epistemological and ontological differences between the

² These measures are explained and discussed in the following chapters of the thesis.

explanatory factors of realism and constructivism, and identifies the antecedent conditions. These dimensions demonstrate the intrinsic importance of the Indian case by identifying those factors that remained constant for almost seven decades in India's security considerations and national interests.

Realism and constructivism were chosen as the two theories to examine the Indian decision, because they display two very different world views and present alternative explanations. Apart from analyzing Indian nuclear policy in relation to the NPT from broad realist and constructivist perspectives, this study also employs critical constructivism and different variants of realism as well such as defensive, offensive and neoclassical realism. These branches will enhance explanatory nuances in the same grand realist family. As to the constructivist analysis of Indian decision, the arguments draw mostly on critical constructivism with its premises being the closest to critical theory among in the constructivist family. The analysis trivially indicates explanatory differences between grand realist family and critical constructivism, yet it also reveals their common elements.

The research presented herein will try to answer the following questions: Why did India not sign the NPT? What has remained constant so that India has chosen to continue this nuclear policy? What is the Indian national interest in pursuing this policy? How did the decision serve to promote India's national interests and security objectives? In specific, what is the relationship between India's national interests and security objectives? How do offensive, defensive and neo- realism explain India's decision? Do these variants of realism differ from each other in terms of the reasons they give for this decision, and if so how? How might critical constructivists explain the Indian decision? What is the relationship among India's identity construction, culture and national interest? How can the findings of realism

and critical constructivism be compared? What are their weaknesses and strengths? What is the contribution of this study to international relations literature?

The second chapter focuses on the NPT. It is devoted to the historical developments leading to the establishment of the NPT, the specific rules and regulations of the NPT regime, the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the provisions of the treaty, and, lastly, the past and current situations of threshold states.

The third chapter lies out Indian national security objectives and national interests, and also will introduce realist concepts. First, we will discuss the general atmosphere in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, and then the conditions India felt itself humiliated and determined its national interests and security objectives will be clarified. This chapter helps to give an understanding the national interests of India in relation to its nuclear capabilities, since it discusses the main concerns and geopolitical problems of India. Then, the rationales and premises of offensive and defensive realism and neoclassical realism are explained, and the relationship among the geopolitical and strategic conditions of India, historical events and the country's national interests are analyzed separately from the perspectives of these three different variants of realism.

The fourth chapter centers on a critical constructivist examination of the Indian decision. First, it will look at the main principles of the social and critical constructivists as well as their critiques of realism. Second, the chapter analyzes the articulations embedded into the Indian national interests and establishment of these articulations by means of representational practices by state officials, and also the process of interpellating these articulations by individuals that embed state sentric approach as the national interest. The articulation and interpellation process are

discussed under three main headings: First, the opponent and self-identity articulation, second, the influences of India's postcolonial history on representational and interpellation practices, third, the link between technology, the articulation of the Indian identity, and the national interest.

The conclusion harmonizes theory with the practical implications of the analyses conducted. A comparison and evaluation of the weak and strong points of realism and critical constructivism are made, and includes a brief review of their claims regarding India, differences and critiques. Last but not least, the possible implications of the study for the analysis of other countries not party to the NPT will be considered.

CHAPTER II

THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The discussions on nuclear weapons began in the international arena with the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by American atomic bombs, and it seems like the problems related to their proliferation will continue to remain hot issues in the near future as well. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has been a diplomatic, technical and political obstacle for countries that have wished to possess nuclear weapons and technology, was not an overnight development, with countries suddenly realizing that they should “do something” about the nuclear arms race. Rather, it was the result of continuous efforts for almost three decades to prevent the spread of these weapons throughout the world. In order to grasp the importance of the NPT, it is crucial to understand the historical developments leading to the establishment of the treaty. These will be reviewed in the following section. Then, the second part will analyze the general provisions and trace the progress within the framework of the regime that the NPT created.

2.1 THE GENIE IS OUT OF THE BOTTLE– HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND

In world history, scientific/technological progress has always found its reflection in military technologies. In January 1939, German chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman discovered a new type of nuclear reaction called “fission”; their Austrian colleague, the physicist Lise Meitner, confirmed experimentally that this reaction released a vast amount of energy; a few weeks later the Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard, working in New York, showed that in the uranium fission process “about two” neutrons were emitted whenever a neutron released by this process collided with the nucleus of a Uranium 235 atom; and finally, in May 1939, Jean and Irène Joliot-Curie, Hans Halban and Leo Kowarski repeated Szilard’s experiment proving a self-sustaining fission reaction and took out the patents for the production of nuclear energy as well as nuclear explosives.³ This was the beginning of possible applications of nuclear energy for both civilian and military purposes. The discovery of atomic fission in the late 1930s, in combination with democratic institutions, public and private educational funding in America and the quickly evolving field of nuclear physics, prepared the necessary ground for the invention of the atomic bomb in the USA.⁴ The outcome of the Manhattan Project, directed by J. Robert Oppenheimer, was three atomic detonations. The first one was a test detonation in New Mexico. In fact, the Trinity test, as it was called, is often considered the official beginning of proliferation. The second was a uranium bomb called “Little Boy” that was dropped on Hiroshima and the third one was a plutonium bomb called “Fat

³ David Fischer, *History of the International Atomic Energy Agency-the First Forty Years* (Austria: the IAEA Publications, 1997), p.15.

⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 86-87.

Man” that targeted Nagasaki. This unconventional weapon⁵ was presented as being a tool for a quick and decisive United State’s victory over Japan in 1945.

Within a year of exploding the first atomic bombs, the American administration realized that there could be no guarantees that the Russians would not themselves build a bomb. The idea that the American atomic monopoly could be maintained was not realistic. Consequently, the United States accelerated an effort to bring nuclear energy and weapons under international control through the Baruch Plan, which was based on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report⁶ and then modified by Bernard Baruch who was a mentor and served American presidents in different capacities since the First World War. The Baruch Plan proposed “the ownership and control of all sensitive nuclear material and facilities by an ‘International Atomic Development Authority’, which would also closely monitor all less sensitive nuclear research activities”.⁷ Under the plan, states would be free to exchange nuclear information for peaceful purposes and nuclear energy would be subjected to a control mechanism based on inspection as to whether it was solely peaceful or not. If there were illicit activities, then the authority would have the power to impose penalties on any violators without the possibility of veto by Great Powers.⁸ It means that the provisions offered in these plans were even superior to the United Nations Security Council because even in the UNSC, the proposals that are vetoed by any great power cannot enter into force. Additionally, after all these parameters were settled, the system was intended to eliminate all existing nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union found the plan unacceptable. Although it was not accepted, the plan raised two

⁵ Unconventional weapons are also known as weapons of mass destruction, namely nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

⁶ This report was published in 1946 and was America’s first attempt to settle a policy on the control of nuclear energy.

⁷ Harald Müller, David Fischer and Wolfgang Kötter, *Nuclear Nonproliferation and Global Order*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.15.

⁸ Richard Smoke, *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma-An Introduction to the American Experience* (New York: Random House, 1987), p.135.

questions central to the evolution of nuclear diplomacy: “Firstly, can a clear technical distinction be made between military and civil nuclear activities? Secondly, if it cannot, is it acceptable to rely heavily on political commitments rather than technical distinctions and intrusive verification, to underpin any international regime created to manage them?”⁹ The problems that the NPT is facing today are related to these two questions.

In the meantime, the situation in the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear capabilities was evolving as well. The Soviet authorities learned that atomic bombs might be possible from a story by William Laurence published in the *New York Times* on 5 May 1940, and established a Uranium Commission, whose activities were interrupted by 1941 German invasion.¹⁰ Although the Americans were quite careful in maintaining the secrecy of the Manhattan Project, espionage was a very important non-count to the development of the Soviet bomb.¹¹ The invasion of uranium-rich territories¹² and the Hiroshima attack hastened the Soviet efforts to make a hydrogen bomb. This was one reason that the Soviets rejected the Baruch Plan; it would impede any chance for countries other than the United States to produce atomic weapons, and hence strengthen the American monopoly on nuclear technology. The other reason was that the Soviet authorities did not like the idea of being inspected by an international body that could spy on Soviet technology. The following year, the Soviets put forward a counterproposal involving inspections only for predesignated atomic facilities and leaving enforcement to the UNSC (United Nations Security Council).¹³ With this proposal, the Soviets hoped and expected to

⁹John Simpson, “Nuclear non-proliferation in the post-Cold War era”, *International Affairs*, vol. 70, No: 1 (January 1994), p. 19.

¹⁰Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 92.

¹¹Ibid., p.94.

¹²Ibid., p.95.

¹³Smoke, *National Security and Nuclear Dilemma*, p.135.

get the American arsenals under control and to have a strong say in the enforcement issues as a power having a veto the UNSC. On 29 August 1949, a successful atomic explosion was conducted in the USSR, and the phase of American nuclear monopoly turned into a bipolar nuclear scene.¹⁴ Proliferation to additional states was inevitable.

The Soviet test urged the United States to carry out certain adjustments in this new era. The American response was threefold. The United States expanded the production of atomic bomb; decided to produce a more powerful weapon based on fusion¹⁵ rather than fission and de-emphasized the utility of nuclear weapons.¹⁶ All these developments, needless to say, hampered any possibility of discussion of the international control of nuclear weapons proliferation. Both countries entered into an ambitious arms race and their stocks expanded steadily within a short while. This process is called “vertical proliferation”.¹⁷ In other words, vertical proliferation refers to proliferation of developing new types of nuclear weapons, technology and materials within states having nuclear weapons. Gaddis explains the paradox of the period in question: “as nuclear weapons became more numerous and more powerful, they also became less usable; but as nuclear weapons became less usable, one needed more of them to deter others who possess[ed] them”.¹⁸ The great powers were caught by this paradox and it took a considerable time for them to understand the value of curbing the proliferation of these weapons. In the context of horizontal proliferation, in chronological order, the United Kingdom acquired nuclear power in 1952, France in 1960 and China in 1964. Israel is believed to have produced nuclear

¹⁴ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 98-99.

¹⁵ Weapons based on fusion promised explosive power in the range of millions of tons of TNT.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp.100-101.

¹⁷ Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Kitle İmha Silahları Konusunda Asıl Tehlike Devlet Dışı Aktörlerdir”, 2023 (January, 2003), p.7.

¹⁸ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 101.

weapons with the help of France in the late 1960s.

The United States successfully detonated a hydrogen device in November 1952, and with this the United States and the world entered the thermonuclear age.¹⁹ In this age, threats were greater and the danger of a possible nuclear war was closer. On 8 December 1953, the United States President, Dwight Eisenhower delivered an important speech “Atoms for Peace” at the United Nations, which revealed the dangers of the nuclear era yet at the same time proposed a first step to put a brake on the arms race and lessen the threat of weapons of mass destruction.²⁰ The speech emphasized the importance of exporting nuclear materials for peaceful purposes under safeguards. In the 1950s, at least three types of peaceful use of nuclear energy were foreseen: Electricity production, propulsion and civil engineering and mining.²¹ A policy evolved in subsequent years, by which the United States sought to use its superiority in civilian nuclear technology to counter the spread of Soviet influence in the Third World.²²

Later, the speech was accepted as the keystone of the International Atomic Energy Agency (the IAEA), whose founding statute came into force in 1957. The IAEA played an important role both in promoting peaceful nuclear development and keeping the spread of nuclear weapons under control.²³ Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace proposal seemed easy to implement, and promised to create mutual trust in cases where the Americans and Soviets discovered that they could cooperate on a specific project.²⁴ Nonetheless, the general atmosphere after the speech was not very

¹⁹ Jack M. Holl and Roger M. Anders, “Atoms for Peace-Introduction” in *Milestone Documents in the National Archives* (N.a.), p.1. Available online at: <http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/atom1.htm>.

²⁰ Benjamin P. Grene, “Eisenhower, Science and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate 1953-56”, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 26, no: 4 (December 2003), p.160.

²¹ Simpson, “Nuclear Non-proliferation in the Post-Cold War era”, p. 20.

²² Müller, Ficscher and Kötter, *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order*, p. 16.

²³ Smoke, *National Security and Nuclear Dilemma*, p.136.

²⁴ Jack M. Holl and Roger M. Anders, “Atoms for Peace-Introduction”, p.3. Available online at: <http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/atom3.htm>

optimistic, because the Soviet Union rejected this proposal, even though it was not really a disarmament proposal²⁵, and in 1954 detonated a thermonuclear bomb that was stronger than the one detonated over Hiroshima.²⁶

By the mid-1950s, the superpowers were producing disarmament schemes due to a real desire to decrease the number of arms, because rapidly evolving strategic technology was offering less security as hydrogen bombs and long-range bombers proliferated on both sides.²⁷ Vertical proliferation was getting more lethal and so motivating the parties to adopt efficient arms control proposals.

In 1955, primarily in order to collect intelligence and secondarily in order to ease tensions between the two superpowers, Washington offered an “Open Skies” proposal. President Eisenhower reasoned that getting permission to over fly Soviet military facilities while granting permission for the Soviets to fly over American military installations would greatly contribute to confidence building.²⁸ The next year, the United States authorities also proposed a mutual cutoff in producing fissionable material.²⁹ It became quite clear that these attempts were for the sake of arms control, not of propaganda; however, the views of great powers were so divergent that no agreement could be reached. Even so, the atmosphere seemed promising in comparison with the past. The Antarctica Treaty of 1959 banned any sort of military base or activity there and held territorial claims in abeyance for thirty years.³⁰ In 1959 Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and in 1961 US President John F. Kennedy proposed plans for “general and complete disarmament”.³¹ Perhaps neither leader supposed that their proposals would be negotiated seriously but at

²⁵ Smoke, *National Security and Nuclear Dilemma*, p 136.

²⁶ Kibaroglu, “Kitle İmha Silahları Konusunda Asıl Tehlike Devlet Dışı Aktörlerdir”, p.6.

²⁷ Smoke, *National Security and Nuclear Dilemma*, p. 137.

²⁸ Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Public Website, *Open Skies Proposal*, (N.a.). Available online at: <http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/coldwar/cw12.htm>

²⁹ Smoke, *National Security and Nuclear Dilemma*, p. 137.

³⁰ Ibid., p.149.

³¹ Ibid., p.139.

least, this showed their good will and awareness of the need for action in the disarmament area.

The Atoms for Peace policy had significant consequences. The United States entered into numerous nuclear cooperation agreements with other nations and the IAEA began to safeguard nuclear operations on a modest scale.³² After realizing that earlier Soviet help had enhanced China's capabilities to acquire nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union changed its views regarding the desirability of a stronger non-proliferation regime. The new regime was to be based on the first IAEA comprehensive safeguards system, entitled INFCIRC/66, (1965) which was extended several times in order to cover all types of nuclear plants.³³ Moscow realized that a Chinese bomb was not less threatening than a German bomb.³⁴ It can thus be concluded that the Chinese acquisition of a nuclear weapon motivated the Soviet Union to "accept a regime which would allow the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, while at the same time creating a system of assurances against its diversion to military ends".³⁵ The United States also considered a wide range of responses to China's atomic test.³⁶ It was completely against the American national interests to loosen the control in terms of nuclear weapons over Asia, increasing the level of horizontal proliferation and geopolitical stability of Europe.³⁷ In other words, the Chinese bomb eased the path towards a common understanding and approval of the NPT regime by both superpowers.

Another major cause for the Soviet change of policy was the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which reminded both superpowers that nuclear war was a real threat

³² Kibaroglu, "Kitle İmha Silahları Konusunda Asıl Tehlike Devlet Dışı Aktörlerdir", p.16.

³³ Ibid., p.17.

³⁴ Simpson, "Nuclear non-proliferation in the post-Cold War era", p.22.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 22

³⁶ Francis J. Gavin, "Blasts from the Past-Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s", *International Security*, vol. 29, no: 3 (Winter 2004/05), p. 101.

³⁷ Ibid., p.107.

and that they had to improve their relations to counter this threat. This fearsome crisis led to establishment of the “hot line” telecommunications link between Moscow and Washington, which used Teletype because written communication was felt to leave less room for misunderstandings.³⁸ The second result of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a multilateral Limited Test Ban Treaty, dated 1963, which ended testing by the United States, the USSR and the UK in the atmosphere, in outer space and in the sea.³⁹ It brought the spread of radioactive materials in the atmosphere largely to a halt. As a consequence of this treaty, the world saw that arms control and disarmament agreements were possible even while the competition between blocs was continuing.⁴⁰

The Outer Space Treaty, signed in 1966 and entered into force in 1967, declared that “states shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner”.⁴¹

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco)⁴² predated the NPT and represented the first effort by a group of states to establish a nuclear weapons free zone in a region as a nuclear non-proliferation policy.⁴³ After these many steps, then the NPT came in

³⁸ Smoke, *National Security and Nuclear Dilemma*, p.143.

³⁹ Kibaroglu, “Kitle İmha Silahları Konusunda Asıl Tehlike Devlet Dışı Aktörlerdir”, p.17.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.19.

⁴¹ Office for Outer Space Affairs, the United Nations Office at Vienna, *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies*, (1967). Available online at: <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html>.

⁴² The Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed on 14 February 1967. This treaty constrained Latin American parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons. Additionally, the parties were not allowed to give consent to the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. For further information see Federation of American Scientists, *Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean the Treaty of Tlatelolco*; available online at: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/opanal/>

⁴³ U.S. Department of State, *Argentina and Chile Bring Into Force The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear in Latin America and the Caribbean (The Treaty of Tlatelolco)* (Fact sheet by Bureau of

1968.

2.2 THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY – THE FUNDAMENTALS

The NPT was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. According to this treaty, whose details will be examined in the following sections, countries that had possessed and/or tested nuclear weapons up until that time, would be labeled as nuclear weapons states and they would prevent nuclear weapons material leakages to countries that did not have nuclear weapons. In addition, nuclear weapon states would also show that they were making the necessary effort in order to achieve complete disarmament. One notable characteristic of this treaty is that states not having nuclear weapons would not produce nuclear weapons but would be allowed to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful ends. The NPT signatory non-nuclear weapon states were expected to comply with the decisions of the IAEA. In summary, the NPT is based on three pillars -nuclear non-proliferation, peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear disarmament- with each pillar contributing to the integrity of the whole.⁴⁴ The treaty stood as a strong diplomatic and political barrier for future would-be nuclear threshold states and the IAEA was entitled to be a technical institution that was forming the verification system within the NPT. It should be noted that, in the beginning, a long list of non-nuclear countries did not sign the treaty, including France (although it stated that it would abide by it), China, Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. In time, the non-proliferation trend improved and all countries except Israel, Pakistan and

Nonproliferation), (Washington, DC: 20 January 2001). Available online at <http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/2001/4595.htm>.

⁴⁴ “2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, Chapter 2 (New York: 2-27 May 2005), p.1. Available online at: <http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/presskit.pdf>.

India signed it.

The NPT has special characteristics that determine its framework. Operationally, Article VIII.3 specifies that once in every five years, the NPT signatories convene for Review Conferences in order to “review the operations of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized”.⁴⁵ This practice would enable the NPT to respond to modern-day threat perceptions and keep its system workable in the face of new developments. Another important characteristic of the NPT is its power of indirect sanction through the IAEA. Upon a referral from the IAEA Board of Governors based on a noncompliance report and sufficient evidence that a country is acting contrary to its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter the Security Council can impose mandatory economic, diplomatic or even military sanctions on that country. Third, nuclear weapon states are supposed to give two kinds of guarantees to non-nuclear weapon states in the context of NPT diplomacy. The first one is a negative security assurance, meaning that a nuclear weapon state would neither launch nor threaten to use a nuclear weapon against a non-nuclear weapon state. The second one is a positive security assurance. The concept of positive security assurance came to the fore on the initiative of Washington, the Soviet Union and the UK in 1968. They announced that they “would seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance in accordance with the United Nations Charter to any NPT non-nuclear weapon state threatened with the aggression involving nuclear weapons, or which is the victim of such aggression”.⁴⁶ This led to the adoption of Resolution 225. Accordingly,

⁴⁵ Tanya Ogilvie-White and John Simpson, “The NPT and Its 2003 PrepCom Session: A Regime in Need of Intensive Care”, *The Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 10, No: 1 (Spring 2003), p. 41.

⁴⁶ Federation of American Scientists, *A Declaration by the President on Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (Last

victims of the aforementioned aggression would be assisted and protected by the United Nations system. Both of these two security assurances have not been legally binding and have two objectives: Convincing non-nuclear weapon states to sign the treaty and protecting the established regime.

Since a better understanding of the verification system and provisions of the NPT will help to illustrate the importance of the treaty, first, brief technical information on nuclear weapons and the enrichment process will be given and the role of the IAEA as the technical-verification tool will be analyzed. Second, the main provisions and their further implications for non-proliferation will be examined. Lastly, the problems generated by threshold states will be explored and evaluate current situation of threshold states.

2.2.1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE IAEA

The explosive energy of nuclear weapons is derived from either fission (the splitting of the nucleus of an atom into two or more parts so highly enriched uranium and plutonium release energy and neutrons while being bombarded by neutrons), fusion (light isotopes of hydrogen, such as deuterium and tritium, join at high temperatures and release energy and neutrons) or a combination of the two nuclear processes.⁴⁷ Most of the commercial nuclear power reactors operating or under construction in the world today require plutonium (Pu^{239}) and uranium “enriched” in the U^{235} isotope for their fuel.⁴⁸ A large quantity of the uranium occurring in nature is in the form of the U^{238} isotope, which is heavier than U^{235} . Since the fuel for a

updated on 21 May 1996). Available online at:
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/nonucwp.htm>

⁴⁷ David Fischer, “Appendix A - Nuclear Weapons” in *Towards 1995: The Prospects for Ending the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (Geneva: Dartmouth/Aldershot, 1992), p. 169.

⁴⁸ Uranium Information Centre Ltd, “Uranium Enrichment”, *Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper*, no: 33 (June 2003). Available online at: <http://www.uic.com.au/nip33.htm>.

commercial reactor or the material for a nuclear weapon has to be made up of 90 percent or more U^{235} , natural uranium must be enriched at an enrichment plant to achieve this concentration.⁴⁹ There are two techniques for enrichment: the gaseous diffusion method and the gas-centrifuge method⁵⁰. The latter involves smaller equipment and is easier to hide than the former in the case of illegal activities. Breeder reactors are based on plutonium recycling. Compounded with the dual-use⁵¹ of some nuclear materials, principally both breeders and gas-centrifuges are especially subject to IAEA inspections because the materials in a reactor designed for peaceful purposes can be used in weapons production processes as well. But what is the IAEA and under what authority does it inspect nuclear materials of the NPT signatories?

The International Atomic Energy Agency was founded in 1957 to promote nuclear cooperation and the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies. The IAEA is a specialized agency integrated within the United Nations system. It has three main roles: furthering peaceful uses of nuclear energy in science, especially for the critical needs of developing countries; promoting nuclear safety and security for nuclear and radioactive materials in civilian use; and, verifying in more than 900 civilian facilities that nuclear materials are not used in making nuclear weapons. The IAEA is not a party to the treaty but under the NPT, the agency has specific roles as the international safeguards inspectorate and as a channel for transferring peaceful applications of nuclear technology.⁵² The IAEA has been conducting inspections of nuclear facilities more than four decades and the agency

⁴⁹ David Fischer, "Appendix B " in *Towards 1995: The Prospects for Ending the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (Geneva: Dartmouth/Aldershot, 1992), p. 171.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

⁵¹ Some nuclear materials, technologies and equipments might be used both for peaceful purposes and nuclear weapon production. These are called "dual-use" nuclear materials.

⁵² International Atomic Energy Agency, *The IAEA & NPT: Key Roles*. Available online at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Npt/key_role.shtml

expanded its activities noticeably after the NPT came into force in 1970.⁵³ Article III of the NPT states that non-nuclear weapon states have to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and declare all of their nuclear material and facilities in which it is processed or used; this material subjected to IAEA inspections or safeguards.⁵⁴ This statement illustrates the fact that the NPT is not based solely on political commitments but also on technical commitments. The parties to the treaty have to sign INFCIRC/153, which is the basis for agreements with non-nuclear weapon states regarding safeguards.⁵⁵ The Agency also acts as a channel for the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in consideration of the needs of the developing areas of the world under Article IV and has roles in connection with verification of nuclear-weapon-free zones and ex-nuclear weapon material.⁵⁶

Until the expansion of the IAEA authority through the Model Additional Protocol⁵⁷ (May 1997), inspectors suffered from strict limitations under the NPT safeguards system. In the first phases of the treaty, the inspection system was considered as something unduly troublesome, increasing the operational costs of nuclear industry, and inspectors were suspected of being industrial spies.⁵⁸ This approach reversed the course of the safeguards system and led to the safeguards under the NPT being applied only to the “flow” of nuclear materials, with routine inspections being conducted at mutually agreed “strategic points” in nuclear plants

⁵³ Kaleb J. Redden, “Inspecting the Inspectorate: A Look at the Financial and Political Support for the IAEA”, *The Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 10, no: 3 (Fall/Winter 2003), p. 35.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁵⁵ Fischer, *Towards 1995: The Prospects for Ending the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, p. 87.

⁵⁶ International Atomic Energy Agency, *The IAEA & NPT: Key Roles*.

⁵⁷ The IAEA Model Additional Protocol (also known as INFCIRC/540) is a text that, once ratified, will assist the IAEA to conduct more effective inspections by enhancing tools and techniques for use in non-nuclear weapon states, giving it the authority to provide information related to all aspects of a nuclear fuel cycle and all buildings in a nuclear site, and broader physical access. As of February 2005, 90 NPT states had concluded additional protocols and 63 of them had ratified it.

⁵⁸ Fischer, *Towards 1995*, p. 55.

by surveillance instruments (such as cameras and sensors) and containment (use of seals and instruments to identify any effort to open a sealed store).⁵⁹ Additionally, an NPT non-nuclear weapon state can announce that a plant has been closed down and that all nuclear material formerly in it has been removed.⁶⁰ In this case the IAEA has no authority to inspect this plant. Despite these shortcomings of the safeguards, countries have tried to strengthen nuclear export controls by establishing new institutions and groups. For instance, the Zangger Committee had its origins in 1971, when major nuclear suppliers regularly involved in nuclear trade came together. In 1974 they “published a Trigger List, that is, a list of items that would “trigger” a requirement for safeguards and guidelines (“common understandings”) governing the export of those items to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that are not party to the NPT”.⁶¹ The most important feature of the guidelines is that in order to supply nuclear materials or equipment, it requires an IAEA safeguard and obliges the receiver to apply the same conditions when transferring the materials to another non-nuclear weapon state. Another effort to ensure that nuclear transfers would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear explosive activities was the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG). It was created following the Indian explosion in 1974, which demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused. The NSG Guidelines were published in 1978 as IAEA Document INFCIRC/254 to apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes.⁶²

There are other limitations of the system and endeavors to overcome them; however, they are not directly linked to the main issue of this study. Despite the

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 56.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 57.

⁶¹ International Atomic Energy Agency, *Information Circular 539*, (16 September 1997). Available online at: <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/inf539.shtml>.

⁶² Nuclear Suppliers Group, *History of the NSG* (2000). Available online at: <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/history.htm>.

imperfections of safeguards system, a country's signing the NPT and accepting its verification system is still one of the best ways to give assurance that all its nuclear activities are peaceful, and thus creating confidence among nations.⁶³

2.2.2 PROVISIONS

The NPT text is composed of ten articles. It is the document that politicians, international relations scholars, whose area of interest is nuclear weapons, and nuclear arms control experts most often refer to. In this respect, it would be useful to analyze the articles of the NPT. This examination is intended to explain both the main motives and concerns of parties to the treaty and to show actual and potential breaches of these provisions.

Article I constrains the transfer of nuclear weapons or material from a nuclear weapons state⁶⁴ (henceforth NWS) to any non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS).

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.⁶⁵

The first article of the treaty thus concerns the limitations upon nuclear weapon states. My interpretation of this article is as follows: Since a very limited number of countries are allowed to have nuclear weapons, the NPT must contain something that

⁶³ Fischer, *Towards 1995*, p. 63.

⁶⁴ A nuclear weapon state is a country that produced and detonated a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967.

⁶⁵ "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" in *2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, 2-27 May 2005), p.1.

makes NNWSs believe that this treaty promotes their security even though they do not have nuclear weapons and NWSs do not have unlimited rights regarding to nuclear energy. Although they are free to have nuclear weapons, they cannot transfer these materials or weapons to other NNWSs. In this way, a NNWS does not need to worry that one of its neighbor countries that is supported by a NWS, can develop a nuclear weapon programme with the latter's assistance. Within this scope, the steadfast priority given to NNWS status reflected itself in the first article immediately. All NNWS, which are party to the treaty, are aware of the fact that none of them are allowed to transfer a nuclear device or weapon so under this situation, proliferation is avoided. This is why states accepted NNWS status. The treaty guarantees non-proliferation among them and proves that the treaty serves for their nuclear security. On the other hand, the article does not prohibit the transfer of nuclear material among the NWSs. For instance, the USA can cooperate with the UK in its nuclear weapon programmes.

It should be kept in mind that not all of the five NWSs were party to the NPT at that time. In 1968, China and France did not sign the treaty.⁶⁶ In 1988, China concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and on 9 March 1992 it acceded to the NPT as the fourth nuclear weapon state.⁶⁷ As early as 1968, France announced that it would act as if it were a party to the treaty but it was the last acknowledged nuclear weapon state, joining the NPT on 2 August 1992.⁶⁸

The efforts by states party to the treaty, however, could not eliminate possibility of breaches. The United States and Britain were accused of helping

⁶⁶ Fischer, *Towards 1995*, p. 30.

⁶⁷ "Chronology of Events Relating to Nuclear Non-Proliferation" in *2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, 2-27 May 2005), p.1.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.4.

South African to prospect, develop and process its uranium reserves.⁶⁹ The most important doubts about the breach of the article concern American aid given to the Israeli nuclear programme after the NPT entered into force. On the other hand, Israel and South Africa had already acquired critical technology from France and firms in the Federal Republic of Germany long before the NPT existed.⁷⁰ India, as one of threshold states, was provided a nuclear plant by Canada in 1956 and received heavy water from the United States.⁷¹ Pakistan and India received help from China and used plants and material illegally exported from the USSR.⁷² All these examples, although they were not reported officially, show the difficulties in achieving meaningful results in nonproliferation efforts.

Article II focuses on the role of NNWSs within the scope of the NPT.

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.⁷³

NNWSs are forbidden to acquire nuclear weapons/devices by this article. The provision does not touch upon the issue of actual “possession” because in the late 1960s, no country other than the “nuclear five” was recognized as a nuclear weapon state.⁷⁴ If a threshold state or newly independent state that have nuclear weapons having nuclear weapons, decided to sign the NPT, it would have to dismantle them immediately and place all nuclear materials under the IAEA

⁶⁹ Fischer, *Towards 1995*, p.35.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.38.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 38.

⁷² Ibid., p.39.

⁷³ “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, p.2.

⁷⁴ Fischer, *Towards 1995*, p. 43.

safeguards system.⁷⁵ The cases of South Africa, when it decided to become a party to the NPT in 1991 and Ukraine (1994) are the examples of the successful operation of this mechanism.

North Korea is believed to make a breach of this article. North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea – DPRK) officially became party to the NPT in 1985. In 1992, North and South Korea agreed to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and North Korea signed the IAEA safeguards agreement. By this decision, it accepted all the IAEA safeguards in order to ensure that the DPRK does not acquire nuclear weapons and uses its nuclear technology for peaceful ends. However, in 1993 the DPRK refused to accept a special IAEA inspection team and announced that it was withdrawing from the NPT.⁷⁶ The United Nations Security Council Resolution 825, the talks among the DPRK, the United States and the IAEA resulted in a suspension of the North Korean withdrawal and an “agreed framework” that allowed the construction of two new proliferation-resistant light-water moderated nuclear plants in exchange for the shutdown of all other plants in the DPRK in 1994.⁷⁷ Nonetheless, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 2003, so the safeguards agreement is no longer in force. All these events triggered the doubts of North Korea received transfer of some kinds of nuclear weapons and/or devices and made a serious breach of Article II during its membership of the NPT.

The Iraqi breach in 1991 was the first case that the IAEA found of a state in violation of its safeguards agreement. In July 1991, the IAEA discovered that Iraq

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 44.

⁷⁶ Federation of American Scientists, *NPT Chronology*. Available online at: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/chron.htm>

⁷⁷ Ibid.

had clandestinely tried to produce highly enriched uranium by the use of calutrons (a form of mass spectrometer separating U^{235} from U^{238}) and had succeeded in producing a small amount of lithium, which is generally used for the production of hydrogen/thermonuclear weapons. These findings were obvious breaches of Article II, indicating that Iraq had secretly attempted to manufacture nuclear weapons. The Board of Governors of the IAEA handed in its report to the UNSC, and Resolution 687 was passed, requiring the destruction of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities under the auspices of the IAEA. Later on, this event furthered studies on enhancing the ability of the IAEA to detect clandestine activities and led to the establishment of a model Additional Protocol and the 93+2 programme.⁷⁸

Article III generally sets the rules between the IAEA and signatory states regarding safeguards.

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth

⁷⁸ 93+2 Programme aimed to strengthen the verification system with full-scope safeguards. The deadline of the Programme was the NPT's Review and Extension Conference 1995 so it was called '93+2'.

in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.⁷⁹

If Article III.1 and III.2 are analyzed, it is possible to conclude that safeguards aim to eliminate undetected nuclear material transfer. The safeguards that the IAEA applies to NNWSs that did not sign the treaty, upon the demand of these countries, regarding any bilateral or multilateral arrangement related to nuclear energy, are based on the document entitled INFCIRC/66 Rev.2. It is “item specific” and covers individual facilities, specified nuclear material and/or specified items of equipment or non-nuclear material.⁸⁰ The safeguards that are applied to NNWSs party to the treaty are set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/153, which offers broader and clearer guidelines than INFCIRC/66 in regard to application of safeguards.⁸¹ In one-year period, IAEA safeguards inspectors carry out over 2000 inspections at over 600 facilities.⁸² The IAEA can certainly get involved if it finds an unreported nuclear material or plant⁸³, as in the Iran case, but it is not allowed to apply safeguards to an entire facility. Additionally, it cannot inspect nuclear materials that are used for military purposes in a NWS.

Since the first three articles are the main provisions determining the logic and mechanism of the treaty for tackling with horizontal proliferation, the remaining

⁷⁹ “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, p.2.

⁸⁰ “International Atomic Energy Agency” in *2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, 2-27 May 2005), p. 2.

⁸¹ Fischer, *Towards 1995*, p. 85.

⁸² International Atomic Energy Agency, *The IAEA Verification Activities at A Glance* (2004).

Available online at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Npt/activities_glance.shtml.

⁸³ Fischer, *Towards 1995*, p. 58.

articles will be discussed only briefly here. Article IV states that the NPT does not impair countries' right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. All party states "have the right to participate in transfer of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy".⁸⁴ The article also emphasizes the need of these kinds of exchanges between the regions of developing NNWSs within the context of the tangible social and economic benefits that these exchanges can offer for these countries' sustainable development.

Article V guarantees access to the benefits of the peaceful application of nuclear explosions under international observation on a non-discriminatory basis. Today, this technology is not valid but at the time the article was written, nuclear explosions were presumed to be necessary for nuclear research and development.

Article VI calls upon every NWS and NNWS to commit itself to work towards eliminating arms race and complete nuclear disarmament at an early date. Treaties such as the ABM (Treaty on Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems), SALT I and II (Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms), the INF (Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles), CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) and SORT (Strategic Offence Reductions) Treaties, as well as initiatives such as START I and II (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), the Soviet Threat Reduction Act (Nunn-Lugar legislation) and the Trilateral Initiative Working Group consisting of the Russian federation, the United States and the IAEA, and announced amounts of permanent removal of fissile materials can be considered as achievements of the NPT Article VI.

Article VII is a short provision noting that countries are free to conclude

⁸⁴ "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (Article IV.2), p.2.

agreements in order to establish Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ), that is, a concrete mechanism ensuring total absence of nuclear weapons in a specified territory. In this regard, the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga - 1985), the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (the Bangkok Treaty - 1995), the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty - 1996) and Mongolia's Nuclear Weapons Free State Status are not alternative but complementary to the NPT.

The regular review conferences of the NPT specified in Article VIII are still being held. Every five years, NPT signatories convene with the objective of reviewing the operation of the NPT, facilitating dialogue between the signatories and if necessary, making amendments responding to new challenges facing non-proliferation by a majority vote, which must include five NWSs. Among these reviews, the Review and Extension Conference (1995) was a groundbreaking meeting. This conference extended the treaty indefinitely. By this way, parties to the treaty were guaranteeing their commitments to facilitate nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.⁸⁵ It also strengthened the review process of the treaty, and in addition, a resolution on the Middle East was adopted.⁸⁶ The last Review Conference was held from 2-27 May 2005 in New York.

Article IX covers the details related to the ratification process and Article X puts forward the special conditions for withdrawal from the treaty (on three months notice) and schedules a conference in the twenty-fifth year of the NPT's coming into

⁸⁵ British American Security Information Council, *The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference* (N.a.). Available online at: <http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/1995revcon/main.htm>.

⁸⁶ Federation of American Scientists, *NPT Chronology*. Available online at: <http://fas.org/nuke/control/npt/chron.htm>

force regarding its extension, namely the Review and Extension Conference that was held in 1995.

The NPT is a milestone international agreement, whose goal is preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and their technology, facilitating peaceful uses of nuclear energy and eventually achieving nuclear disarmament. The means the treaty provides to achieve these goals are forbidding the transfer of nuclear weapon materials from NWS to NNWS, the acquirement of nuclear weapon materials transfer by a NNWS and putting all transfer among states under safeguards. Despite some defects, the NPT, which has been signed by 188 states, has been the basis of global the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

2.2.3 THRESHOLD STATES⁸⁷ IN THE PAST AND TODAY

In 1954, India was the first country to suggest the conclusion of an agreement banning the testing of nuclear weapons, either as an independent measure or as one item in an agreement on more comprehensive forms of disarmament.⁸⁸ On the other hand, it also was one of the first countries, along with Pakistan and Israel that chose not to join the treaty. India refused to join the treaty on the basis that it was a discriminatory because of its grouping of countries as NWS and NNWS. And, in 1974, it was the first country that openly went 'threshold'. India's 'peaceful nuclear explosion' at Pokhran in Rajasthan in that year was a sore shock for the non-proliferation regime. It was the first explosion officially proclaimed by a nation classified by the NPT as a NNWS. If the Pokhran test had taken place before 1

⁸⁷ Threshold states are the countries, whether a party to the NPT or not, with at least the capability of developing nuclear weapons.

⁸⁸ Müller, Ficsher and Kötter, *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order*, p.17.

January 1967, India would have been one of the five (in that case six) nuclear-weapons states under Article IX.3 of the NPT.⁸⁹ India used plutonium produced in a reactor that Canada had supplied in the late 1950s for nuclear research for peaceful use, without safeguards, in the aftermath of the Atoms for Peace programme.⁹⁰ Similarly, India has continued with efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, and on 11 and 13 May 1998 it conducted a series of nuclear tests, proclaiming itself a NWS. In its current position, India uses nuclear reactors both for weapons manufacturing and energy production. (India gets 3.3% of its electricity from 14 operating reactors and 9 more are under construction.)⁹¹

Pakistan followed India in seeking nuclear weapons. By the late 1970s, Pakistan was able to build an unsafeguarded plant for producing enriched uranium.⁹² After India's so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, both the USA and France feared a likely Pakistani nuclear test as a response to India and stopped the flow of military and economic aid to Pakistan.⁹³ In these years, Pakistan was believed to begin receiving support from China in relation with its nuclear rivalry with India. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States renewed its aid programme to Pakistan in order to strengthen its hand in front of the Soviet Union. However, this aid was given on the condition of assurance that Pakistan did not process a nuclear weapon, and in November 1990, the American administration was unable to provide such a certification.⁹⁴ In 1992, Pakistan publicly admitted that it had the ability and elements which, if put together, could create a nuclear device.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ Fischer, *Towards 1995*, p.4.

⁹⁰ Müller, Fischer and Kötter, *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order*, p.22.

⁹¹ "International Atomic Energy Agency", p. 6.

⁹² Fischer, *Towards 1995*, p. 5.

⁹³ Ibid. p.5.

⁹⁴ Lewis A. Dunn, *Containing Nuclear Proliferation*, Adelphi Papers, vol. 263 (London: IISS, 1991), p. 9.

⁹⁵ Fischer, *Towards 1995*, pp. 5-6.

In the end, Pakistan tested its nuclear devices on 28 and 30 May 1998, just after Indian tests. On 6 June 1998, the Security Council, in Resolution 1172, condemned the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan as a threat to global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.⁹⁶ The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference also reaffirmed that any new party to the treaty would be accepted only as a NNWS.⁹⁷ In other words, the accession of a state, having nuclear capabilities, to the NPT is not acceptable unless it puts all its nuclear material under the IAEA safeguards and foregoes its nuclear weapons.

Israel is believed to have acquired its first nuclear weapon before the NPT came into force, most probably in the late 1960s. Israel used plutonium produced in *Dimona* reactor, which was the result of the secret nuclear cooperation between Israel and France that was formalized in a set of agreements between the two governments in October 1957.⁹⁸ Regarding the nuclear weapons issue; however, Israel neither confirms nor rejects the existence of a nuclear programme but only states that “Israel will not to be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East”.⁹⁹ It is estimated that Israel has about forty hundred nuclear warheads in various tonnages, which are sometimes referred to “bomb in the basement”.¹⁰⁰ By the censorship¹⁰¹, the word “bomb” in reference to Israeli weapons was banned and the only phrase commentators were allowed to use was “the nuclear option”.¹⁰²

⁹⁶ “Chronology of Events Relating to Nuclear Non-Proliferation”, p.6.

⁹⁷ *2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, 2-27 May 2005), p.2.

⁹⁸ Avner Cohen, “Nuclear Weapons, Opacity and Israeli Democracy” in *National Security and Democracy in Israel*, ed. Avner Yaniv (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 200.

⁹⁹ Ibid. p.197.

¹⁰⁰ Kibaroglu, “Kitle İmha Silahları Konusunda Asıl Tehlike Devlet Dışı Aktörlerdir”, p. 14.

¹⁰¹ Not only military officers and diplomats but also academia and media does not use the term of “nuclear weapons” but nuclear option (Thanks to Associate Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu for providing this information).

¹⁰² Cohen, “Nuclear Weapons, Opacity, and Israeli Democracy” p. 209.

Aside from these three main threshold states, there have been other states that were on the way to acquire nuclear weapons but which then sign the NPT, as well as states that were parties to the NPT but later on had problems regarding adherence to the treaty obligations. South Africa was a threshold state that announced in 1976 that it had built a pilot plant to enrich uranium without the IAEA safeguards¹⁰³ and was suspected of testing a nuclear device in cooperation with Israel pinned on the basis of images taken by a US satellite over the South Atlantic in 1979. In 1988, South African foreign minister publicly acknowledged that his nation had the ability to produce a nuclear weapon.¹⁰⁴ In 1991, South Africa joined the NPT and in 1993, its president announced that the country had developed six fission devices and they were in the process of producing the seventh one.¹⁰⁵ All of them were dismantled and put under the safeguards of the IAEA in order for South Africa to be declared a NNWS.

In 1970s and 1980s, Argentina and Brazil were competing with each other to be the first to manufacture a so-called “peaceful” nuclear explosive device, which was permissible under the Tlatelolco Treaty.¹⁰⁶ These acts along with the tension between the two nations were decreased to an extent with the establishment of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials in 1991. Argentina acceded to the NPT in 1995 and Brazil in 1998.

As related above, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003. It is important to note that the DPRK is a rare case in terms of its constructing a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon without foreign assistance from the

¹⁰³ Fischer, *Towards 1995*, p.4.

¹⁰⁴ Federation of American Scientists, *NPT Chronology*.

¹⁰⁵ Kibaroglu, “Kitle İmha Silahları Konusunda Asıl Tehlike Devlet Dışı Aktörlerdir”, p. 9.

¹⁰⁶ Fischer, *Towards 1995*, p. 6.

advanced nuclear-suppliers countries.¹⁰⁷ The IAEA Board of Governors states that the Agency's NPT safeguards agreement with the country remains binding and in force.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the DPRK's status poses a severe challenge to the non-proliferation regime since the IAEA has not had access to the DPRK to conduct verification activities since December 2002, so that the Agency cannot provide any level of assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material.¹⁰⁹

Libya signed the NPT in 1968, ratified it in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1980. Unfortunately, its commitments did not keep Libya, under Muammer Qadhdhafi, seeking with varying degrees of success, nuclear technologies, fissile materials, and weapons designs and know-how from several countries including China, Pakistan, the Soviet Union/Russia, Belgium, and Ukraine.¹¹⁰ However, in December 2003, Libya announced that it had decided to eliminate materials, equipment and programmes that might be used to produce internationally banned weapons and accepted international inspection teams to verify its compliance with its commitments.¹¹¹ In 2004, Libya signed the Additional Protocol.

Like the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Islamic Republic of Iran over the years engaged in undeclared nuclear activities. In 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors disclosed that Iran had failed to report certain nuclear material and activities.¹¹² In the same year, Iran signed the Additional Protocol to its IAEA

¹⁰⁷ Fischer, "Appendix A", p. 173.

¹⁰⁸ "International Atomic Energy Agency", p. 4.

¹⁰⁹ *2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, p. 4.

¹¹⁰ Nuclear Threat Initiative, *Libya Profile-Nuclear Overview* (Last updated in December 2005).

Available online at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/3939.html.

¹¹¹ *2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, p. 4.

¹¹² "Chronology of Events Relating to Nuclear Non-Proliferation", p. 7.

safeguards agreement. On 15 November 2004, Iran, France, Germany and the United Kingdom came to an agreement and Iran decided to continue and extend its suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities¹¹³. Nevertheless, the IAEA was not in a position to ensure that there were no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.¹¹⁴ By the beginning of 2006, Iran initiated a plan to restart nuclear research of civilian nuclear power. Great powers still work on a resolution text on the issue. Currently, Iran's compliance with its commitments is a very delicate and serious topic for nuclear non-proliferation and the future of the Middle East.

India, which is one of threshold states, will be the case study of this study. In the following chapter, India's decision not to become a party to the NPT and its ongoing foreign policy in terms of nuclear power will be analyzed through realist lenses. Different types of realism such as defensive, offensive and neoclassical realism will help in understanding the Indian decision from different rationalities within realist framework.

¹¹³ 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, p. 4.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p. 5.

CHAPTER III

THE INDIAN DECISION THROUGH THE LENS OF REALISM

The control of the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries has been the goal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for almost four decades. All but three countries in the world, India, Pakistan, and Israel have currently ratified it. Except for North Korea, which joined the NPT in 1985 and recently withdrew, these countries have not changed their decision of not being a party to the treaty up until now. India and Pakistan's criticisms concentrated on the discriminatory nature of the NPT, as it divides the world into haves and have-nots¹¹⁵ and becomes a legal basis for the recognition of the monopoly of five nuclear weapon powers to possess and use nuclear weapons.¹¹⁶ These critiques have usually been presented as one of the basic tenets of the Indian, and also the Pakistani, decision not to sign the treaty.

3.1 INDIAN SECURITY OBJECTIVES

If a clear definition of Indian national security objectives is obtained, it will be much easier to establish the relationship of Indian security objective concept with

¹¹⁵ Ahmad Kamal, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Alternatives and Parallel Measures", *UNIDIR Newsletter*, No. 26/27, June/September 1994, p. 7.

¹¹⁶ Tatyana L. Shaumian, "India's Foreign Policy: Interaction of Global and Regional Aspects" in *Introduction to International Relations and India's Foreign Policy* V. Grover (ed) (Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1992), p. 572.

Indian national interests that will be defined in the following section. On the official website of the Indian Ministry of Defence, we can see an overall picture of the security objectives formulated around the core concerns of India:

1. Defending the country's borders as defined by law and enshrined in the Constitution;
2. Protecting the lives and property of its citizens against war, terrorism, nuclear threats and militant activities;
3. Protecting the country from instability and religious and other forms of radicalism and extremism emanating from neighboring states;
4. Securing the country against the use or the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction;
5. Development of material, equipment and technologies that have a bearing on India's security, particularly its defence preparedness through indigenous research, development and production, inter-alia to overcome restrictions on the transfer of such items;
6. Promoting further co-operation and understanding with neighboring countries and implementing mutually agreed confidence-building measures; and
7. Pursuing security and strategic dialogues with major powers and key partners.¹¹⁷

The second, fourth and fifth points are related to the nuclear policy of India.

It can be seen from the second and fourth points that India aims to protect the country and its citizens against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. These nuclear threats, of course, are not explicitly stated in the text. Excluding terrorist nuclear attacks, at the regional level there are two countries that can be inferred as being the possible nuclear threats to India: China and Pakistan. Additionally, the fifth point indicates that India intends to overcome all restrictions on the transfer of material, equipment and technologies that are seen as essential to India's defence. It should be borne in mind that India always points out that its nuclear weapons program is purely for defensive purposes.¹¹⁸ Accordingly, India opposes the restrictions that are imposed by the IAEA on the NPT signatories because these limitations do not allow the country to have a nuclear program even

¹¹⁷ Ministry of Defence, *Indian Armed Forces*. (N.a.). Available online at: <http://mod.nic.in/aforges/body.htm>

¹¹⁸ Girilal Jain, "On the Defensive" in *Introduction to International Relations and India's Foreign Policy* V. Grover (ed) (Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1992), p.491.

for defensive reasons. Under India's security objectives, it is not possible to accept regulations limiting the development of its nuclear capacity.

The national security objectives outlined above present the background to the current situation. In the 1960s, Pakistan was not a nuclear power. Rather, the main nuclear threat was China. October 16, 1964 was one of the most significant moments affecting Indian nuclear policy because on that day China became a nuclear power and Indian policy-makers began to think seriously about acquiring nuclear weapons.¹¹⁹ India also perceived its soil as being vulnerable to the missiles deployed by the US and USSR in those years.¹²⁰ Having a nuclear state as a neighbor and in addition feeling threatened by the ballistic missiles of the Great Powers, India chose to develop a nuclear capability for protecting its territory. The NPT restrictions, which put strict limitations on transfers of materials and obliged its signatories to announce themselves as non-nuclear weapon states, were totally contrary to its security concerns. India decided not to accept the status of a NNWS, since China was legally recognized as a nuclear weapon state.

3.2 BASIC REALIST PRINCIPLES AND INDIAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR POWER

In order to understand the fundamental Indian national interest, it is necessary to take a quick look at how realism paints the picture of world politics. Even though the variants within realism come up with different assumptions, there

¹¹⁹ K. Subrahmanyam, "Indian Nuclear Policy – 1964-98 (A personal collection)" in *Nuclear India* Jasjit Singh (ed) (Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), p. 26.

¹²⁰ Tara Kartha, "Ballistic Missiles and International Security" in *Nuclear India* Jasjit Singh (ed) (Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), p.115.

are three cornerstones that show continuity: state centrism, survival and self-help (the ‘three Ss’).¹²¹

The ordering principle of the international system is anarchy. There is no higher authority other than the states themselves to check and balance their actions. Consequently, nation-states are the main players in this system. In other words, sovereignty inheres in states, because there is not a higher ruling body in the international system.¹²² This is known as state centrism. Survival is continuing to be sovereign. Sovereignty is the distinctive feature of states and its meaning is strongly tied to use of force.¹²³ According to the most of the realist variants, states are “black boxes”; the determinative factor is states’ observable behavior, not their leaders’ characteristics, their decision making processes or their government systems.¹²⁴

Realism, in its purest form, is based on the following assumptions: In the absence of a higher authority, states cannot be sure of the intentions of other states. This uncertainty leaves states in a self-help system. Due to the uncertainties of anarchy, states have to guarantee their own survival, and this is the main driving motive of states.¹²⁵ They cannot rely on any authority, state or institution other than their own capabilities. Because states must take care of themselves, the most effective means to protect themselves are the military capabilities.¹²⁶ Realism claims that states are rational actors that are able to make cost and benefit

¹²¹Tim Dunne & Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism” in *The Globalization of Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, John Baylis and Steve Smith 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 163.

¹²² John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, *International Security*, vol.19, No:3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 10.

¹²³ Dunne & Schmidt, “Realism”, p. 172.

¹²⁴ Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists-Cooperation as Self-Help”, *International Security*, Vol.19, No: 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 99.

¹²⁵ Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, pp. 10-11.

¹²⁶ Glaser, “Realists as Optimists”, p. 101.

calculations and try to maximize their national interests. National interest results in the development of a set of maxims to preserve and maintain the survival and security of sovereign state in the anarchic system. Sometimes, states are threatened by other powers, which can call the sufficiency of a country's capabilities into question. In cases where the survival of a state or a number of weaker states is threatened by a coalition of states and/or a hegemon, they must establish an alliance in order to sustain their survival and balance the opponents' power.¹²⁷ This is the balance of power mechanism.

India is simply another rational unitary state pursuing its national interests in order to ensure its survival. A long history of conflicts with its neighbors, namely Pakistan and China, made India sensitive to any change in its neighbors' strategic steps. India began its nuclear research in 1944 and until the 1962 Sino-Indian war (which was a humiliation for India) and the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosion, the primary objective of the Indian nuclear programme was the development of a power supply to meet long-term civilian needs.¹²⁸ After China became a nuclear power in 1964, India first became concerned about having a neighbor, with whom India had problematic border relations, with nuclear weapons. It would be almost impossible to deter an attack from China with conventional weapons. In regard to this development in 1964, "Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri launched a program to reduce the time needed to build nuclear arms to six months"¹²⁹. India's perception of a prior threat originated with the Chinese nuclear test, and India started to change the direction of its nuclear research at that time.

¹²⁷ Dunn & Schmidt, "Realism", p. 164.

¹²⁸ Devin T. Hagerty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation-Lessons from South Asia* (London: the MIT Press, 1998), p.72.

¹²⁹ Hagerty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation*, p. 73.

India meant to reach its security objectives through various channels. Between 1964 and 1965, India not only modified its nuclear research policy in the light of Chinese nuclear status, but also bide for a nuclear guarantee from NWSs. India conducted this policy to secure its existence against nuclear China even at the probable cost of compromising the country's nonaligned stance.¹³⁰ However, in May 1965, it was proved that no nuclear guarantee would come out of visits to the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.¹³¹ Two years after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, in 1967, the United States offered a guarantee but since it did not have the force of law, it failed to meet the Indian requirements.¹³²

China had officially announced its support for Islamabad's advocacy of a plebiscite in Kashmir, which India was strongly against, during the 1962 conflict.¹³³ Hence, the close relationship between China and Pakistan was already a source of tension. Indian national interests necessitated obtaining a binding security guarantee against both the new Chinese nuclear threat and a potential Sino-Pak nuclear collaboration, as was proven in mid-seventies after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. Geographically, India was between Pakistan and China. A Sino-Pak alliance, especially a nuclear one, could have ended up disastrously for India, which was sandwiched between the two states. Ironically, the NPT, which was signed in 1968, presented India as a NNWS whereas China, which had initiated an armed conflict against India in 1962, was given NWS status.

Unless a regional disarmament was reached it was unacceptable for India to sign the NPT. India was in favor of overall nuclear disarmament and a nuclear

¹³⁰ Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II-The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program", *International Security*, Vol.23, No:4 (Spring 1999), p. 153.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 155.

¹³² Ibid., p. 157.

¹³³ Hilary Synnott, *The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests*, Adelphi Paper, No: 332 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 15.

weapon free zone in South Asia. India still has not changed its stand on this issue. Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated that his “government's policy is consistent with the nuclear disarmament policy that successive governments have followed.”¹³⁴ Although the NPT had provisions regarding the encouragement of nuclear disarmament, there has been little development of disarmament of great powers. This has always been a justification for India. In the absence of an agreement on a timetable for nuclear disarmament, India has had to assure its security by nuclear means.¹³⁵ In accordance with Indian national interests, it might be said that India's policy of keeping its options open to develop nuclear weapons was born with New Delhi's decision not to accede to the NPT.¹³⁶

In the final analysis, it can be concluded that India's utmost national interest was guaranteeing its survival and sovereignty. Consequently, the nuclear policy of India was set up in order to guarantee its border unity against China's nuclear weapons. China's nuclear capability and its close relations with Pakistan were perceived as threats to national security and existence from the Indian side. However, while India's national interest includes its national security objectives, it cannot be reduced only to security objectives. In fact, it might be said that security objectives are antecedent variable as motivating operational tools influencing and strengthening the power of the national interest to determine the foreign policy of the state.

In the subsequent sections, three different variants of realism will be used in order to analyze India's decision not to sign the NPT. Using these variants will help to identify constant indicators for this continuing policy from different realist

¹³⁴ Embassy of India-Washington DC, *Interview with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee* (N.a.). Available online at: <http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/pm-interview.htm>

¹³⁵ Synnott, *The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests*, p. 23.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

perspectives. This method will also facilitate the examination of whether there might have been other foreign policy options open to India.

3.3 OFFENSIVE REALISM

Another variant of realism is offensive realism. The best-known offensive realist is Professor John Mearsheimer. While he agrees with defensive realism on many assumptions, he differs from common defensive realist premises, where the behavior of states is concerned.¹³⁷ Mearsheimer states that the anarchical international system forces states to maximize their relative powers because the uncertainty of other states' intentions reinforces the self-help principle based on relative gains.¹³⁸ Mearsheimer claims that "offensive military action is always a threat to all states in the system".¹³⁹ Focused on relative capabilities, states, as they become more powerful, will try to maximize their influence and control over the international environment.¹⁴⁰ The accumulation of power often works at the expense of other states. It is the only way to guarantee state survival, and aggression is the cornerstone of state relations.

In the realm of state security, relative power is described in terms of military capabilities. There are two important aspects of military power: the distribution of power between states and the nature of the military power available to them.¹⁴¹ Distribution has to do with the number of poles and their relative power.¹⁴² States

¹³⁷ Dunn & Schmidt, "Realism", p. 170.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 170.

¹³⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future-Instability in Europe after the Cold War", *International Security*, vol.15, no:1 (Summer 1990), p. 10.

¹⁴⁰ Alexandra Siddall, *The Misapplication of Defensive Realism: The Security Dilemma and Rising Powers in East Asia*. Paper presented at the meeting of Australasian Political Studies Association 2000 Conference, Anu, Canberra (3-6 October 2000), p. 2. Available online at: <http://apsa2000.anu.edu.au/confpapers/siddell.rtf>

¹⁴¹ Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future", pp. 10-11.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 11.

pursue expansionist policies when and where the benefits prevail over the costs.¹⁴³ If the nature of military power favors offence, it is expected that states having expansionist motivations (aggressor) will go to war.

In summary, in situations other than bipolarity and nuclear deterrence, security is scarce and states formulate their foreign policies around their relative capabilities and their external environments.¹⁴⁴ Offensive realism usually makes its predictions about foreign policy decision on the basis of systemic factors. Units are undifferentiated and exist in an anarchy defined in Hobbesian terms.

Clearly, it can be concluded that according to offensive realism, it would have been a disaster if India had decided to sign the NPT as a NNWS. Since India could never be sure about its neighbors, with whom it had had severe border disagreements and armed conflicts, it had to follow the current developments in their military capabilities and act accordingly, calculating its own military power in comparison with theirs. China's nuclear test in 1964 both unbalanced the distribution of military capabilities of the region and completely changed the nature of those capabilities. First, China became one of the five NWS and thus was promoted to the status of a great power. Second, China turned out to be a strong candidate for regional hegemony due to its nuclear capability. In addition to this, the unconventional character of this new capability could easily change the balance to India's disadvantage. From the offensive realists' perspective, the only secure periods in world politics are periods of bipolarity and nuclear deterrence.¹⁴⁵

In the absence of nuclear deterrence, India was under threat of Chinese military aggression all the time. The same was valid for Indo-Pakistani relations after Pakistan acquired nuclear capability. Indeed, deterrence is a demanding

¹⁴³ Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy", p. 128.

¹⁴⁴ Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", p. 149.

¹⁴⁵ Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future", pp. 11-18.

strategy, but Mearsheimer defines nuclear weapons as a superb deterrent; they ensure high costs and are practical in terms of self-defense if not aggression.¹⁴⁶ Nuclear weapons have some pacifying effects; they provide security, generate caution, impose forceful equality and create a clear relative power.¹⁴⁷ So, India's decision to go nuclear after rejecting the option of signing the NPT was very rational in offensive realist terms. India could not rely on an international treaty that recognized China as a NWS while placing India in a NNWS status. Even if the structure of the treaty had not been otherwise, in an international system whose main principle was self-help, India should not have become a party to a treaty like this. States can guarantee their survival only by relying on their relative power, and international institutions and norms will not benefit them in the long run.

In conclusion, India's decision regarding the NPT and nuclear capabilities was rational. It was an appropriate foreign policy decision according to the offensive realist position, because India was disturbed by the changing relative power relations in the region and had to develop a military capability that ensured its security and basic national interest, survival.

3.4 DEFENSIVE REALISM

Defensive realism agrees with the basic principle of the realism paradigm that world politics is anarchic, but assumes a more peaceful atmosphere than the Hobbesian state of war. States are not at war with each other all the time because security is not scarce and states can understand or learn how to achieve it by

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 30.

experience.¹⁴⁸ Units (states) are highly differentiated. Rational states are security-seekers, which try to maintain the status quo, and they respond to external threats, which rarely appear, primarily by balancing the power distributed among states.¹⁴⁹ This means that anarchy's repercussions are not constant. States are "defensive positionalists" because they try to preserve the balance of power.¹⁵⁰

The security dilemma¹⁵¹ and its variability are very important concepts in defensive realism.¹⁵² The security dilemma always exists, but states resort to aggression only if structural modifiers change the offense-defense balance in favor of offense. Stephen Van Evera defines the offence-defence balance as an aggregate of military technology and doctrine, geography, national social structure and diplomatic factors such as defensive alliances and balancing behavior.¹⁵³ Military technology can favor the offender or the aggressor.¹⁵⁴ Natural or human-made obstacles and wide buffer regions such as third states or demilitarized zones insulate states from invasion.¹⁵⁵ Yet, the closer are two foes to each other, the more intense the security dilemma.¹⁵⁶ Additionally, access to raw resources also influences the severity of the security dilemma within the geographic parameter. Regimes that are popular with their societies are usually better at both conquest and self-defense.¹⁵⁷

¹⁴⁸ Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, Vol.51 (October 1998), p. 149.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

¹⁵⁰ Randall L. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism" in *International Relations Theory-Appraising the Field* Colin Elman & Miriam Fendius Elman (ed) (London: MIT Press, 2003), p. 328.

¹⁵¹ "The measures a state take to increase its own security usually decrease the security of other states". John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), p.35-36.

¹⁵² Matt MacGregor, "Understanding Kennedy's Alliance for Progress", paper at Tufts University website (2003), p.11. Available online at: <http://ase.tufts.edu/hemispheres/2003/MacGregor.doc>

¹⁵³ Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War", *International Security*, Vol.22, No: 4 (Spring 1998), p.56.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

¹⁵⁶ MacGregor, "Understanding Kennedy's Alliance for Progress", p. 11.

¹⁵⁷ Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War", p. 69.

The perceptions of state leaders and elite are influential.¹⁵⁸ Lastly, collective security systems, defensive alliances and the balancing behavior of neutral states strengthen the defense of a state.¹⁵⁹ Whereas Van Evera presents four different structural modifiers are presented as the influencers of the level of the security dilemma, Jeffrey M. Taliaferro states that the third modifier –the national social structure’s affect on foreign policy and domestic politics- is explained in accordance with defensive neoclassical assumptions.¹⁶⁰ Since it represents a variant of neoclassical realism, they will not be used directly for analyzing Indian case under the heading of defensive realism, but rather under that of neoclassical realism.

The intractable nature of the security dilemma forces defensive realists look for implications of this phenomenon in the Indian case as well. The security dilemma posits that military buildups can change the adversary’s beliefs in such a way that the former believes that the other state is more dangerous than previously thought.¹⁶¹ India, which experienced a devastating war with China in 1962, believed that the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosion not only changed China’s status from a regional power to a global nuclear power but also posed a serious threat to India’s existence by means of this new weapons system. In the face of new developments in the Chinese nuclear buildup, “Indian analysts concluded that without nuclear weapons, India would face bullying and further aggression akin to the 1962 débâcle.”¹⁶² Moreover, the security dilemma had implications for the entire subcontinent. The 1971 war between India and Pakistan that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh persuaded Pakistan, which was conventionally weak in

¹⁵⁸ MacGregor, “Understanding Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress”, p. 12.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 71.

¹⁶⁰ Jeffrey M. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy-Defensive Realism Revisited”, *International Security*, Vol.25. No: 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 141-143.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 136.

¹⁶² Neil Joeck, *Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia*, Adelphi Paper, No: 312 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 37.

comparison with India, that it needed a nuclear capability. Joeck summarizes the situation as follows: “India’s competition with China also fuels Indo-Pakistani competition.”¹⁶³ The military build ups appended to a history of conflicts drew these three states, which did not foresee each other’s intentions clearly, into a severe three-sided security dilemma.

A security dilemma is presented as being the source of extreme competition and war, yet its level of intensity depends upon structural modifiers. These are the relative distribution of capabilities that determine an individual state’s particular diplomatic and military strategies.¹⁶⁴ Improvements in the firepower and strength of neighboring countries are incentives to build strong central institutions, maintain large standing armies and adopt offensive strategies.¹⁶⁵ Geographically, India was able to defend itself against both Pakistan and China. India was more powerful than Pakistan in view of size and potential. It would also be in a better position to defend itself if a war like that of 1962 occurred with China because the forces that could be deployed and sustained on Himalayan borders were limited.¹⁶⁶ These geographic factors have not changed from 1968 to 2006. Consequently, geographic structural modifier did not change; it is eliminated as an explanatory variable of the continuity of the Indian decision. The second structural modifier within the scope of the security dilemma is military technologies/capabilities. In a conventional military scenario, India is able to sustain its national security. Singh underlines the significance of the nature of military systems in threat perception by stating “it is the nuclear factor that places us at a disadvantage by neutralizing the [our] intrinsic

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁶⁴ Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy”, p. 137.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 139-140.

¹⁶⁶ Singh, “Nuclear Diplomacy”, p. 290. Singh claims that India is now in a better position because there is a certain limit to quality and quantity of force that China can deploy on Himalaya border, India has shorter logistic lines and Indian air power is superior to China’s.

superiority on the two [Chinese and Pakistani] key frontiers.”¹⁶⁷ One of the prime predictions of the offense-defense theory is that “a state will initiate and fight more wars in periods when it has, or thinks that it has, larger offensive opportunities and defensive capabilities.”¹⁶⁸ India perceived the situation as being that if India did not establish nuclear capabilities; it would furnish China with offensive opportunities because it would not be possible to deter nuclear weapons with Indian conventional forces. It would disturb the offence-defense balance in favor of offense for China, and leave India open to Chinese attacks.

Unless nuclear disarmament, which is fundamental to Indian strategic and security interests, is implemented, India believes its only option is to initiate and further its nuclear capabilities in the face of a potential nuclear threat. Becoming a party to the NPT would leave India vulnerable to China’s nuclear weapons and the indirect danger of export of nuclear technology by China to the countries in the region. Since the mid-1960s, when China as a NWS threatened to enter the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war on Islamabad’s side, a possible Sino-Pakistani front has been a chronic worry.¹⁶⁹

In the light of the Indian national security objectives and interests cited, it can be concluded from the view of defensive realism that India could not choose to sign the NPT and could not be expected to become a party to the treaty as a NNWS. Joining the treaty would be risky for India’s survival. India, considering its location in a region with a strong NWS, China, and the possibility of China’s entering into an alliance with Pakistan involving the transfer of nuclear technology and devices (see

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 290.

¹⁶⁸ Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War”, p. 72.

¹⁶⁹ Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, *Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation*, Adelphi Paper No: 313 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), p. 18.

the Indian national interest and security objectives). Defensive realism explains the situation in terms of the security dilemma (Indo-Chinese competition that also triggers Indo-Pakistani competition), especially on the basis of the military capabilities, the structural modifier. Not only has the situation vis-à-vis China not changed, but the same kind of Indian response that was generated by the newly emerging unconventional nature of the Chinese military system in the 1940s has now been elicited by the presence of an additional nuclear actor, Pakistan. Situated as it now is between two neighbors having nuclear weapons, India should not be expected to sign the NPT as a NNWS in the near future.

3.5 NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

Neoclassical realism primarily examines the relationship between the foreign policy of a nation and its domestic politics. Neoclassical realists do not counter Waltz's ideas on international structure and its consequences, but also add first and second image¹⁷⁰ variables in order to analyze foreign policy.¹⁷¹ They are realists because they believe that the international system and relative power capabilities largely shape the foreign policy of a state; but they are neoclassical realists because they state that unit-level intervening variables affect the impact of structure and relative material capabilities on foreign policy.¹⁷² Gideon Rose claims that political leaders' and elites' perceptions of relative power do matter in the foreign policy decision-making process, and this is why some states' behaviors do not match the

¹⁷⁰ The first and second image variables are "domestic politics, internal extraction capacity and processes, state power and intentions, and leaders' perceptions of the relative distribution of capabilities and of the offense-defense balance." Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism", p. 317.

¹⁷¹ Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism", p. 317.

¹⁷² Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", p.146.

predictions of the balance-of-power theory: leaders or elites can misperceive the real distribution of capabilities.¹⁷³ Zakaria reformulates traditional realist assumptions about expansion. He states that when important decision-makers perceive a relative increase in state power, nations try to expand their interests abroad.¹⁷⁴ Thus, statesmen are the main actors. Additionally, national power is not the same as state power, which is a “fraction of national power that the state apparatus can extract for its purposes.”¹⁷⁵ It means that the unit of analysis is not the nation but the state. Expansionism is a tendency arising both from the international and the domestic power of a state.¹⁷⁶

In summary, neoclassical realists argue that there is not any direct link between relative material capabilities and foreign policy decisions. The perception of relative power on the part of political leaders’ and the elite is the intervening variable. Thus, analysis of power has to include the strength and structure of a state in its examination. Lastly, systemic pressures might influence the general direction of foreign policy but not the details of state behavior.¹⁷⁷

Is neoclassical realism capable of explaining the Indian decision not to become a party to the NPT? Does taking the perception of leaders’ and the elite into consideration change the overall picture of this foreign policy decision? The answers to these questions require an analysis of Indian elite perception and the general Indian political framework. Accordingly, first, the Indian elite’s perception of nuclear weapons will be analyzed. It will then be integrated into the overall picture of the period of the late sixties and early seventies.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 147.

¹⁷⁴ Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism”, p. 337.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 337.

¹⁷⁶ Jeffrey W. Legro & Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, *International Security*, vol. 24, no: 2 (Fall 1999), p. 28.

¹⁷⁷ Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, pp.146-147.

The Indian armed forces have always supported the idea of preserving national security by means of the nuclear option. Even though the Indian Army was excluded from nuclear decision making until 1995-96, it had demanded nuclear weapons since the mid-1960s.¹⁷⁸ In addition, the Indian nationalist elite saw the Indian nuclear weapon and missile capability as being very important. Nuclear weapons possessed a significant power because India itself developed these high technological weapons and they would help to regain the relative power advantage in the face of Chinese nuclear tests.

India began its civilian nuclear programme under Nehru in 1948.¹⁷⁹ India had a hesitant attitude towards nuclear weapons because of its *ahimsa*¹⁸⁰ tradition. Nehru believed that “military spending was, at best, a necessary evil.”¹⁸¹ However, the defeat of India by China and Beijing’s nuclear tests made it necessary to reevaluate this attitude. Just before the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war ended, one hundred members of the Lok Sabha¹⁸² called for India to exercise the option to develop nuclear weapons in letters to Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri.¹⁸³ This was a prime indicator of how the Indian political elite favored the nuclear option and put pressure on the government for this end for achieving a better relative position against Pakistan. After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s failed attempts to get a nuclear guarantee, which indeed proved once again that the Indian government viewed the situation as being dangerous in relative capability terms and the

¹⁷⁸ Sidhu, “Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation”, p. 29.

¹⁷⁹ Synnott, *The Causes and Consequences of South Asia’s Nuclear Tests*, p. 19.

¹⁸⁰ Ahimsa means non-violence.

¹⁸¹ Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II”, p. 150.

¹⁸² The Lok Sabha (House of People) is the lower house in the Indian Parliament.

¹⁸³ Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II”, p. 156.

emergence of a different group of political leaders in India, the decision to prepare a nuclear test was made in 1972.¹⁸⁴

Nuclear capabilities were seen in some quarters in India, notably in the Ministry of External Affairs, as indicators of state power.¹⁸⁵ Leaders and the elite perceived a country like China, which supported Pakistan and with which India had severe border disagreements, as with nuclear weapons, an immanent threat. Unless global disarmament was achieved, signing the NPT as a NNWS would decrease India's relative power in the region, especially against its traditional enemies China and Pakistan. Since military and political elites believed that its possession would put India at a similar level with China and prevent nuclear blackmail by Washington or Beijing.¹⁸⁶ Otherwise, India would be in a disadvantageous position due to its decreased relative capabilities. The Indian government did not have to use domestically popular policies in order to persuade the public to support its decision, because there was in fact no resistance from society against the nuclear option. In terms of Zakaria's state power concept, India was domestically powerful in this regard. Thus, in the early 1970s, "India had both the capability and the political motivation to conduct a nuclear test."¹⁸⁷

To sum up, defensive realism posits two structural modifiers to explain security dilemma that India experienced. One of them is geographic proximity. India and its neighbors' borders have not changed significantly since India's independence; the geographic modifier is sufficient to prove the severity of the security dilemma faced by India. Accordingly, it could not explain why India chose not to sign the NPT. The military technology that China had was the main element

¹⁸⁴ Synnott, *The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests*, p. 19.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁸⁶ Synnott, *The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests*, p. 21.

¹⁸⁷ Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II", p. 159.

that could be put forward as a basic change in Sino-Indian military relations according to the tenets of defensive realism. In order to guarantee its survival, India did not sign the NPT and went nuclear. It should be noted that if the situation regarding the possession of unconventional weapon systems by the three countries (India, China and a nuclear latecomer of the region, Pakistan) does not change overall, it will not be possible for India to become a party to the NPT. In other words, in the absence of a global and/or regional nuclear disarmament, India will not change its decision.

Offensive realists can find Indian decision rational as well. China's nuclear test altered both the distribution of military capabilities and their nature. India's relative military capability significantly decreased in comparison with China's and this situation endangered Indian national security objectives. According to the tenets of offensive realism, India was right to choose going nuclear in order to ensure its survival without relying on any outside institution or treaty.

Neoclassical realism puts forward another perspective regarding the Indian decision. Although it states that relative power does matter as an independent variable, and foreign policy is the dependent variable, neoclassical realism claims that the perception of state leaders and the elite is the intervening variable. State leaders and the elite perceived China's nuclear status as a disconcerting element to the disadvantage of India in terms of relative capabilities. This was why India did not sign the NPT. However, there is a point here to clarify. The assumptions of defensive and offensive realisms are valid as long as the theoretical conditions that they specifically asserted are met for India. In the paragraphs above, it was indicated that these conditions have not changed. On the other hand, neoclassical realism seems to explain a foreign policy decision only for a given time in a certain

situation. Since the main aim of this study is to find the basic motivations underlying the continuity of Indian nuclear policy, neoclassical realism might be inadequate in terms of providing a general explanation. Of course, it is possible to conclude that successive governments and political and military elites have maintained the same perception regarding Indian relative capabilities. However, it is not possible to say that these successive governments and elites have maintained the same perception unless analyzing them as well. So the continuity of the foreign policy is not as clear-cut as it is in defensive and offensive realism. Overall, it seems that these two variants of realism –defensive and offensive- provide the most compelling analysis of India's decision to remain outside of the NPT and develop a nuclear capacity.

Within the scope of this analysis, a quick overview of three realist variants on independent variables that remained constant will be useful. Offensive realism suggests that any state might initiate an aggression any time because of their expansive nature. Rapid military buildup is essential because states must employ all their resources to maximize their power. Since the unclear intentions of states towards each other shadow the possibility of trust, it is not possible to rely on international organizations and treaties. Consequently, India's relative power concerns in the face of China's nuclear tests led to the refusal of being a party to the NPT. Today, India still cannot be sure about China's intentions and as long as China and Pakistan keep their nuclear weapons, India can never sign the treaty. On the other hand, defensive realism concludes that except the conditions that aggressive rhetoric worsens the international atmosphere, states are security seekers that only respond to threats. States intend to modernize their weapons in order to reach a moderate par with the closest competitor/opponent. The security dilemma is

shaped around security modifiers such as the nature of weapons and geographic proximity. The severe security dilemma between China (later also Pakistan) and India, which coupled with the unconventional nature of nuclear weapons and India's security objectives, does not allow India to sign the NPT. Neoclassical realism puts forward that state leaders and political elite have perceived keeping nuclear option open as an efficient way to secure India's relative power in the international atmosphere especially against China and Pakistan. Unless a drastic change in these political elites' minds on the Indian relative power occurs, it is rational for India not to become a party to the NPT.

In the next chapter, India's decision will be analyzed through constructivist lenses and see ontological, epistemological and methodological difference between constructivism and realism. The next chapter will also provide a critique of realist theory too.

CHAPTER IV

CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW ON THE INDIAN DECISION

When the Indian decision was analyzed and explained through the various realist lenses, the arguments are built mostly around concepts such as national security, national interest and relative security. Although the three realist variations differ from each other to an extent, they share a more or less common understanding of these terms. Moreover, realist theory (except in the case of neoclassical realists, in view of their inclusion of domestic politics) defines the above-mentioned terms based on conceptualizations made by state officials. Besides, the ruling principles of the world of international politics (anarchy and the self-help system) are objective facts and they are given. Since these realities exist ‘out there’ to be discovered, realism does not leave much room for change in basic principles and concepts.

On the other hand, constructivism proposes quite a different way of analyzing world politics and its bases. According to social constructivism, all the actors and relations among them are socially constructed. These actors do, however, have certain identities, and their national interests are shaped around these identities. In the following sections, the main constructivist premises and their implications for the analysis of Indian national interests will be discussed in more detail.

This chapter will question the Indian decision not to sign the NPT from a

critical constructivist perspective. The first section will set forth the general claims of social constructivism and critical constructivism, and will discuss how constructivists counter realist arguments. In other words, it will serve as a space for criticizing realism. With this as background, the second part of the chapter will focus on the Indian decision as based on Indian national interest, and try to determine how this national interest has been produced through articulation and interpellation. Indeed, the main source of this analysis will be Jutta Weldes' studies on national interest. Weldes' constructivism provides two very important tools: first, it gives a social constructivist view of international relations, and second, her critical perspective leads this study toward a more comprehensive path by including to a certain extent a discourse analysis examining the articulation and, to an extent, interpellation mechanisms. This will allow the reader to see how India's post-colonial and non-aligned identity and its position as the regional leader both shaped its national interests and their expressions and was shaped by them. In order to reveal the continuity and/or discontinuity of certain identities, examples from recent history will be given as well.

4.1 SOCIAL AND CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

Social constructivism is regarded primarily as a theory that tries to bridge the gap between rationalist theories (neo-realism, neo-liberalism and Marxism) and alternative approaches (post-modernism, feminism, normative theory, historical sociology and post-colonialism). Divergent branches of constructivism (trivial, radical, social, critical and cultural constructivism) occupy different polls of this bridge.

A survey of the concepts and claims of social constructivism, which

distinguish it from rationalist theories, will serve to clarify the differences between the realist paradigm and constructivism. The central argument is the way it regards reality as being constructed¹⁸⁸. In contrast to the realist claim, reality is not out there waiting to be discovered; rather, it is socially and historically produced, and, moreover, “culturally bound knowledge enables individuals to construct and give meanings to reality”.¹⁸⁹ Consequently, the international environment in which states exist consists of not only material factors but also cultural and institutional factors. This has a number of implications. For example, the identities of actors and the terminology they use are socially constructed. Interests, and concepts such as anarchy, balance of power, and relative security are not givens; they are the results of a specific social interaction process. Actors give meanings to their actions and the objects they construct. So, while rationalists define culture as a constraint on action, social constructivism disagrees with this, stating that culture provides the meanings that people give to their actions.¹⁹⁰ Since all meanings are the consequences of certain interactions, they are subject to change. From this formulation, it can be derived that international norms, rules and regulations have an effect on states’ policy making. Moreover, social constructivism also opens up the ‘black box’. It does not accept the state as the only actor in world politics. It emphasizes the role of non-state actors and domestic politics on foreign policy decision making. Lastly, for social constructivists, “power is not only the ability of one actor to get another actor to do what they would not do otherwise but also the production of identities and interests that limit the ability to control their fate”.¹⁹¹ Thus, identifying identities and

¹⁸⁸ Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism”, in *The Globalization of Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, John Baylis and Steve Smith 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 259.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 259.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 260.

¹⁹¹ Barnett, “Social Constructivism”, pp. 263-64.

interests is a source of power.

There are various power nodules that influence identity. Constructivism deemphasizes the state and highlights these nodules, so it draws a different picture of world politics and power than realism does. This picture dilutes the power of power and its concentration, displaces it and opens up possibility for change. It is also a more complex framework than the international relations understanding of realism.

Critical constructivism also critiques realism's understanding of actors, insecurities and threats of realism as fixed entities. This understanding leads to, in certain respects, self-evident conclusions. For example, realism argues that in an anarchical world, the security dilemma is inevitable and perpetual. This perception does not allow for any change in the situation, and expects states to accept this situation and act accordingly. This is a problem because policies based on fix insecurities, threat perceptions and identities make the cooperation between states harder and does not allow for new openings in foreign policy. Thus, insecurities are unavoidable realities, which are constructed based on the security of pre-given entities, usually the state.¹⁹² Critical constructivism tries to call the taken-for-granted status of political actors and their insecurities into question and seeks to denaturalize them to show how they are culturally produced.¹⁹³ In part, this production of insecurities is linked to states' identities; in part, the cultural production of these identities shapes the perceived insecurities.¹⁹⁴

Identities influence the threat perception and are affected by it, but also emerge in relation to difference. What makes an identity unique is its difference from other identities; however, the difference of other identities sometimes threatens

¹⁹² Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, "Introduction: Constructing Security" in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and Production of Danger* Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall (ed.) (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 10.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

the established identity as well.¹⁹⁵ At this stage, difference is usually presented as otherness, and in turn as a source of insecurity.

The social construction conclusion of critical constructivism does not deny the material facts, but rather analyze how the meanings of these material entities are produced, reproduced and transformed culturally and historically. Critical constructivists focus on identities, presentations and the productive powers of discourses; therefore, critical constructivists work deconstructively. Common reference points of critical constructivists serve to clarify their claims further:

1. What is understood as reality is socially constructed.
2. Construction of reality reflects, enact, and reify the relations of power. In turn, certain agents or group of agents play a privileged role in the production and reproduction of these realities.
3. A critical constructivist approach denaturalizes dominant constructions, offer guidelines for the transformation of common sense, and facilitates the imagining of alternative life-worlds. It also problematizes the conditions of its own claims; that is, a critical constructivism is also self reflexive.¹⁹⁶

Hence, critical constructivism looks at world politics within a social and cultural environment, but at the same time it adds a critical dimension in order to reform these environments for contributing the achievement of constructivism applied as a referent.¹⁹⁷ It is an invitation to rethink conceptual foundations of policy-making instead of a recognition positivist tenet that are accepted as given. Not just that “critical” implies an awareness of power dynamics that underlie the identity process, and the fact that knowledge is power and each type of knowledge is produced by somebody for a reason. So the knowledge realism produces serves to keep the status quo and justifies a certain type of power. Dislodging knowledge from this power is only possible if the main pillars of that knowledge, such as national

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁹⁷ Martin Dougiamas, “Critical Constructivism” in *A Journey into Constructivism*, (November 1998). Available online at: <http://dougiamas.com/writing/constructivism.html#critical>

interest, are dislodged and re-constructed. It leads to an underlying effect: if it is not believed that the national interest is the only given truth, than it is no longer believed that the people in power “must” know it as it is and be right. This is one of the most distinctive features of critical constructivism.

Since state-centric approaches are generally the most widely dominant discourses,¹⁹⁸ critical constructivists question the production and reproduction of these discourses and power-knowledge relation in their construction. Discourses are both linguistic and nonlinguistic practices, and they also have material effects.¹⁹⁹ Thus, critical constructivism does not merely analyze “just words” but is intensely interested in the material effects of discourses as well²⁰⁰. An analytical examination of discourse and its material effects will be presented in detail in the following section to provide a critical constructivist explanation of the Indian decision regarding the NPT.

4.2 THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL INTEREST REGARDING NUCLEAR POLICY

In the last chapter, viewing the situation from the realist perspective, the analysis of India’s decision regarding its nuclear policy was predicated on India’s national interest. Most articles on Indian nuclear policy discuss this decision based on the same terms. It is important to note that realism is unable to answer the following questions: If national interests are objective and unchanging unless the structure of power dynamics change, how do new policies emerge in the absence of

¹⁹⁸ This does not mean that state centric approaches are the only dominant ones producing representations of dangers. Nationalist and transnational discourses also produce “imagined communities” and “representation of dangers”. For a detailed discussion of this subject, see Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, “Introduction: Constructing Security” in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and Production of Danger* Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall (ed.) (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

¹⁹⁹ Weldes (et al.), “Introduction: Constructing Security”, p. 16.

²⁰⁰ See the second and third points of shared references.

significant structural change, or alternatively why “loser” policies that obviously harm national interest remain? What are the restraints on decision-makers to change policies, or alternatively not to change those even though “clear judgment” would have them take other steps?²⁰¹

As was indicated in the last chapter, at the center of the Indian national interest is the survival of the state and its sovereignty. However, Weldes finds the realist notion of national interest problematic primarily for two reasons.²⁰² First, its substance is very general and uncertain. It does not give any clue as to how specific policy choices of states in specific areas can be explained. Second, it is based totally on an empiricist epistemology that leaves no room for interpretation. It is only possible to apprehend why some situations possess a threat to a country and why responding to them is ‘in the national interest’ of that country.²⁰³ This means that national interests are derived from the representations “through which state officials and others make sense of the world around them.”²⁰⁴ Representational practices are also tied to power relations, because some discourses are more powerful than others and thus can privilege some players and their ideas while marginalizing others.²⁰⁵ The most prominent example of such representations is state centric approach.

Within the representational process, state officials first, set up representations of ‘the self’ and other states and their officials, non-state actors, and the like. Whether distinct or indistinct, all these objects are given identities, such as hostile, strong, regional leader, or puppet of a particular system.²⁰⁶ Then, relations with and

²⁰¹ I am grateful to Asst. Prof. Burcu Akan Ellis for her contribution.

²⁰² Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interest”, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.2, no:3 (September 1996), p. 278.

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 279.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 280.

²⁰⁵ Jutta Weldes, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Critical Constructivist Assessment”, *Mershon International Studies Review*, vol. 42, supplement 2, (1998), p. 221.

²⁰⁶ Weldes, “Constructing National Interest”, pp. 281-282.

actions to be taken against the others are set according to these identities.²⁰⁷ Finally, through these representations, national interests have been defined. Representations have inclined to determine the self, the others, threat perceptions and the appropriate responses to these threats. This is a noticeable social process that, in the end, endows states with specific national interests.

These representations are constructed with two mechanisms, interpellation and articulation, which facilitate in the “politics of meaning fixing”.²⁰⁸ Articulation is a process wherein linguistic resources and cultural raw materials produce meanings.²⁰⁹ To put it in a different way, it is “the establishment of certain compelling links between elements of meaning.”²¹⁰ The language of national interest is based on terms and ideas that are extant and make sense within a culture in order to “produce contingent and contextually specific representations of the world.”²¹¹ Successful articulations cause linguistic elements to be inherently connected and their constructed meanings appear natural as if they were a true portrayal of reality.²¹² On the other hand, since articulations are social processes, they might also change or be contested. So, they must be produced, reproduced and successfully transformed through the discursive practices of actors,²¹³ in other words state officials.

Interpellation is the second constructive element. It refers to the situation in which “identities or subject-positions are created and recreated and concrete

²⁰⁷ Weldes states that these relations are mostly in the form of quasi-causal arguments, since they may or may not be empirically valid.

²⁰⁸ Himadeep Muppidi, “Postcoloniality and the Production of International Insecurity: The Persistent Puzzle of U.S.-Indian Relations” in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and Production of Danger* Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall (ed.) (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 126.

²⁰⁹ Weldes, “Constructing National Interest”, p. 284.

²¹⁰ Muppidi, “Postcoloniality and the Production of International Insecurity”, p. 125.

²¹¹ Weldes, “Constructing National Interest”, p. 284.

²¹² Ibid., p. 285.

²¹³ Weldes, “Bureaucratic Politics”, p. 218.

individuals are ‘hailed’ into or interpellated by them”.²¹⁴ In fact, intrepellation is a test for articulation chains to determine how convincing articulations are for people.²¹⁵ Successful interpellations appear as common sense. For instance, representations usually put ‘the state’ as the main subject, and its national interest rationalizes its actions in defense of these interests. Citizens are interpellated into the national interest of this specific state. They may use “we” in place of the state when talking about foreign policies.²¹⁶

In the end, the elements that are presented by realism as being observable and natural, are in fact socially constructed through articulation and interpellation. Dominant constructions of national interest, which are usually perceived as common sense, are the results of successful articulation and interpellation. At this stage, critical constructivism tries to denaturalize “the common sense understandings to make their constructedness apparent”.²¹⁷ The next section will examine a concrete example of these processes.

4.3 CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITIES IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR POLICY

In this section, what kinds of identities were distributed to which subjects by Indian officials will be analyzed. Representational practices, the articulation and interpellation will be more thoroughly examined by focusing on the construction of India’s own identity, the identification of neighbors and the West as opponents, and

²¹⁴ Ibid., p. 287.

²¹⁵ Muppidi, “Postcoloniality and the Production of Insecurity”, p. 126.

²¹⁶ This example is derived from the example of interpellation of the United States: Weldes, “Constructing National Interest”, pp. 287-88.

²¹⁷ Weldes, “Bureaucratic Politics”, p. 220.

the implications of nuclear power for India in technological terms. The way in which the national interests of India in the late 1960s and early 1970s had already been defined by these representations will in this way be more clearly seen. To indicate continuity and/or contradictions, examples from the cent past will be given as well.

4.3.1 CONSTRUCTION OF THE IDENTITY OF INDIA AND ITS OPPONENTS

The Indian nuclear programme began under the authority of Jawaharlal Nehru, who thought that “military spending was, at best, a necessary evil.”²¹⁸ He generally tried to remain on good terms with China, and only nine days before he died, stated that “we are determined not to use weapons for war purposes. We do not make atom bombs. I do not think we will.”²¹⁹ However, the 1962 Sino-Indian border war and the Chinese nuclear test had a number of repercussions in India. Suddenly, a China in possession of nuclear weapons was announced as the most serious threat to India’s national interest. In addition, the very existence of these weapons was declared as having the most immediate importance for India. Indian authorities were afraid of Chinese nuclear weapons not only because of their absolute deterrence but also because of their psychological effects on Indian society: “...China may subject a non-nuclear India to periodic blackmail, weaken its people’s spirit of resistance and self-confidence, and thus achieve without a war *its major political and military objectives in Asia*”²²⁰ (emphasis added). China was pointed to as an opponent that has particular policies over Asia, which could be pursued by deteriorating Indian society’s *shakti*, and these policies were against the security of Indian territories.

²¹⁸ Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokrahan II”, p. 150.

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 153.

²²⁰ Ibid., p. 152.

During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, China supported Pakistan diplomatically and threatened to open another front along India's Himalayan border.²²¹ Thus, the identity given to China by India as a deadly enemy was reaffirmed. The articulation was made of China as being an aggressor, an expansionist country with nuclear weapons and the neighbor of India. The meaning that Indian officials²²² gave Chinese actions shaped the relations between the two countries in the following years. Using the word 'articulation' does not mean that China was not in fact an aggressor, but merely that the Indians named it as such. This means that one of the significant building blocks of Indian national interest, on which the decision to refuse to sign the NPT rested, was created by the identity that India attributed to China and its policies. India could not accept being a party to a treaty that privileged its *opponent* at the expense of its own security. In this way, critical constructivism counters the realist assumption that national interest is an objective reality for statesmen. It is rather a social construct, whose development begins and sometimes changes direction according to cultural and historical relations and conflicts. It is different from the perceptions in realist terms because in this process, a goal is perceived. Self and other identities are constructed without relying on perceptions and/or misunderstandings.

The representational practices leading to the definition of national interest related to the nuclear policy in the years close to the signing of the NPT is the main topic of analysis of this study. However, showing the continuity of these representations and this policy is also of great significance. Examination of the situation today, therefore, has particular importance as well. Pakistan, with whom India has had numerous severe problems and armed conflicts, went nuclear after

²²¹ Ibid., p. 156.

²²² In India, articulation was mostly driven by diplomats, government officials and political party members.

India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. In this sense, Pakistan's representation is also a matter to be considered in relation to nuclear policies. Long before it went nuclear, Pakistan was regarded as a long-term adversary of India. One of the most notable developments of Indian nuclear policy was the 1998 Indian nuclear test.²²³ The reasons given for this test also seemed to demonstrate that India still maintained similar representations of its enemies, with its growing conventional/unconventional capabilities and arms transfers to Pakistan, China still appeared to be regarded as a threatening neighbor. Swamy asserts that shared distrust between India and its neighbors, primary China but Pakistan as well, has led to a reckless race for security.²²⁴ India and Pakistan have been racing to increase the size, sophistication and operational readiness of their nuclear strike arsenals for a long time, but the tests and declarations of May 1998 made a qualitative difference in the situation.²²⁵ Pakistan's launch of the Ghauri missile, developed with Chinese assistance, in March 1998 had been the most immediate provocation.²²⁶ The articulation of the identities of these countries may have strengthened the view that India was not allowed to respond in a different way. Considering serious problems of India with China and Pakistan, India perceived threat from these countries. The nuclear developments in Pakistan and China may have served as a trigger for India to evaluate these developments as being evidences of their hostile intentions. Additionally, India's articulations of these countries might have created a self-fulfilling prophecy on the hostile intentions of China and Pakistan regarding the nuclear developments in these countries. Within this framework, conducting the 1998 nuclear test was in the

²²³ After this test, India was considered a nuclear power.

²²⁴ Dalip S. Swamy, "Defence, Diplomacy and Development", in V. Grover (ed), *Introduction to International Relations and India's Foreign Policy* (Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1992), p. 564.

²²⁵ Peter R. Lavoy, "Managing South Asia's Nuclear Rivalry: New Policy Challenges for the United States", *The Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 10, no:3 (Fall/Winter 2003), p. 86.

²²⁶ Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokrahan II", p. 173.

national interest of India.

On the other hand, India's own identity emphasizes its *peaceful* and *moderate* responses to threats arising from its aggressive neighbors. According to the website of India's Ministry of Defence, "India's response to these threats [tribal, ethnic, left wing and radical jihadi movements in India and the possibility of gaining access to weapons of mass destruction in Pakistan being the perceived threat] and challenges has always been restrained, measured and moderate in keeping with its peaceful outlook and reputation as a peace loving country."²²⁷ India's identity is thus constructed upon the basis of its peaceful and moderate characteristics. If the articulation of this identity results in differences between the self and the others, it is expected that countries that India perceives as threats, will be labeled aggressive and extremist. And indeed, looking again at the website of the Indian Ministry of Defence, it is possible to see such features attributed to Pakistan: "...the *single greatest threat to peace* and stability in the region is posed by the combination of terrorism nurtured in and by Pakistan for its strategic objectives, and the *ingrained adventurism* of the Pakistani military motivated by its *obsessive and compulsive hostility* towards India. (...) It [Pakistan] is the root and epicenter of international terrorism *in the region and beyond*"²²⁸ (emphasis added). Bearing in mind the fact that India perceives itself as a regional hegemon, security in the region is thus considered within the context of national security. The *single greatest security threat in the region*, named as terrorism, is the threat toward India, and the source is Pakistan. While in the former quotation, terrorism was presented attributed some segments in Pakistan and India, in the latter, it is Pakistan as a state that is presented as the epicenter of terrorism. Its military is adventuristic, and this quality is

²²⁷ Ministry of Defence, *Indian Armed Forces*. (N.a.)

²²⁸ Ibid.

inherited. In other words, it is a *given* that Pakistan's military follows adventuristic strategies, and this cannot change. Additionally, Pakistani hostility towards India is obsessive (fanatical) and compulsive (uncontrollable). In the end, it was not and is not possible for India –a peaceful and moderate country, whose nuclear weapons are “only for self-defence and ...to ensure that India's security, independence and integrity are not threatened in the future”²²⁹ — to sign the NPT (in the past and now) as a NNWS, while there exists a nuclear China supporting (a now nuclear) Pakistan — a terrorist, hostile, adventuristic and threatening country.

Historically and socially, it is understandable that states present themselves as peaceful and moderate. The same claim can be valid when it comes to defending their nuclear policies. On the other hand, India's stress on the defensive nature of these weapons and the peaceful path of Indian foreign policy has native cultural roots. First, Nehruvian secularists see these weapons as a guarantee against external attacks and important tools to provide national security in the eyes of the Indian people and to ensure the unity of India. This argument will be discussed in the following sections. Second, Hindu nationalists refer to history of the Indian civilization as follows: Hindus have always suffered at the hands of Greek, Islamic and Christian invaders. Postcolonial India's decision to keep its nuclear option open is seen in defensive and moral terms. Trough nuclear deterrence, Hindu civilization will survive in the future without having to endure new invasions (due to the defensive nature of nuclear weapons). Moreover, Hindus have never harbored aggressive inclinations against others²³⁰, and thus the acquisition of nuclear weapons could not be morally wrong since they would not be used for aggression by the Indian state. It can be therefore seen that besides the workings of the social process,

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Gaurav Kampani, “Stakeholders in the Indian Strategic Missile Program”, *Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 10, no: 3 (Fall/Winter 2003), p. 61.

the cultural meanings of nuclear weapons have also contributed to the articulation and interpellation process regarding nuclear policy.

Even the signal of the government in 1971 to nuclear scientists to go ahead and prepare for underground tests was motivated by defensive reasons “in the deepest sense of the word”, because the country was alone and vulnerable “in the face of the massive influx of refugees from East Bengal and the explosion has [had] taken place in the wake of the massive piling up of highly sophisticated weaponry in the Persian region.”²³¹ In this sense, India went nuclear because of defensive concerns due to circumstances involving its neighbors. This can be regarded as the naturalization process in relation to Indian nuclear power. Again, this does not mean that Pakistan and/or China do not pursue strategies contrary to the Indian national interest. The aim of analyzing these presentations is to show how articulations had already defined the national interest of India.

These kinds of articulations help to produce a broader “we”. This “we” is not simply the state, decision-makers or society alone but all of them. Weldes points out that this concept results in recognition as follows: “Yes, ‘we’ are like *this* (i.e., a tough leader, democratic, and in favor of freedom) and not like *that* (i.e., alien, despotic, and aggressive).”²³² These differences provide identity distinctiveness.

One of the interesting features of the articulation of the Indian national interest vis-à-vis Pakistan is that successful articulation of Pakistani identity in India accelerates the intensity of interpellation. Accordingly, a socially constructed Indian national interest is accepted by Indian citizens with the help of interpellation. Yet at the same time, this interpellation of individuals puts an additional burden on foreign

²³¹ Jain, “On the Defensive”, p. 491.

²³² Jutta Weldes, “Cultural Production of Crises: U.S. Identity and Missiles in Cuba” in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and Production of Danger* Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall (ed.) (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 55.

policy makers in terms of nuclear deterrence requirements. After a time, nuclear arsenals must be large enough not only to deter the ‘enemy’, but also to be able to promote confidence among the domestic citizenry in their own country’s security.²³³ In this sense, articulation shapes society’s perception, but these constructed intractable ties of individuals also influence the response of India of what it is that is ‘in the national interest of India’. In other words, the nature of the national interest is determined by the presentational practices of Indian officials and in some cases interpellated individuals as well.

4.3.2 INDIA AS THE LEADER OF THE REGIONAL AND NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT VS THE NEOCOLONIAL POWERS

Today, India perceives itself as a preeminent regional power. With its economic and military power and its huge size in terms of territory and population, India continues to assert its role as a regional hegemon. On the other hand, it has been emphasized that obtaining a leadership position in the region did not bring about expansionist designs in Indian foreign policy.²³⁴

After independence, the country’s authority as an influential political force in the international relations and its being recognized as the leader of the non-aligned movement²³⁵ were the main triggers of this perception²³⁶; the role of India was presented as the arsenal and supply base of the democracies has increased its self-

²³³ Lavoy, “Managing South Asia’s Nuclear Rivalry”, pp. 89-90.

²³⁴ Vijay Sen Budhraj, “Indian Foreign Policy: the Indira Gandhi Era” in V. Grover (ed), *Introduction to International Relations and India’s Foreign Policy* (Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1992), p. 347.

²³⁵ The term non-alignment movement refers to the decision of over one hundred countries not to take part in either of the blocs during the Cold War. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was the leading proponent of this idea.

²³⁶ Shaumian, “India’s Foreign Policy”, p. 567.

confidence.²³⁷ Moreover, after its victory in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, India was perceived as the greatest power on the subcontinent.²³⁸ It was important for India's national interest to keep the nuclear option open in order to maintain its identity as a regional hegemon in the face of a nuclear China. The unique character of India as a democratic, powerful and independent South Asian power necessitated making this decision in the face of the "unique challenges"²³⁹ India has in the region. It must be taken into account that all these characteristics have a meaning within a cultural context. Uniqueness comes from the cultural and social difference from other identities. Difference shapes identity, but in order to protect identity, difference is converted to otherness, which in the end becomes a threat to identity.²⁴⁰ The "unique character" of India was threatened by the "others", who were then named as "unique challenges". In the face of these unique challenges, following a different nuclear policy (i.e., not joining the NPT) was presented as being in the Indian national interest.

Considering India's leadership of the non-aligned movement and its colonial history, it can be claimed that India's desire to use nuclear power as a means of pursuing security is rooted in its post-colonial identity. Since its independence, India has always supported the idea of independence from "European domination", of developing a new Asiatic outlook on international relations and of shifting the centre of gravity of world influence from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.²⁴¹ Europe was interpreted as a group of powers pursuing domination. After the colonial era, Europe remained from the Indian point of view a threat to Indian core values and

²³⁷ P. N. Kirpal, "Speculation on the International Relations of a Free and United India in the Post-war World" in V. Grover (ed), *Introduction to International Relations and India's Foreign Policy* (Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1992), p. 5.

²³⁸ Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokrahan II", p. 159.

²³⁹ Ministry of Defence, *Indian Armed Forces*. (N.a.)

²⁴⁰ Weldes, "Cultural Production of Crises", p. 59.

²⁴¹ Kirpal, "Speculation on the International Relations of a Free and United India in the Post-War World", pp. 5-6.

independence because Europe continued to perceive the West as the center of international politics.

Of course this articulation was not established only for Europe; The United States was also involved in the process. Kirpal does not hesitate to point out directly the harsh opposition of India to neocolonial endeavors: "...the Asiatic peoples will never again accept the old colonial systems of Great Britain, France, Holland and the United States; and any attempt to revive these systems will stimulate strong national movements of resistance."²⁴² Moreover, the close U.S.-Pakistani relations strengthened the opponent identity of Pakistan as an opponent and the US as a neocolonial power for Indian citizens and facilitated their interpellation. In another case, an increase in the presence of the United States in the Indian Ocean was a sufficient reason for vocal opposition by India.²⁴³ However, such opposition has also been presented within the context of the defensive nature of Indian foreign policy. Neocolonialism is still an important matter in the international arena²⁴⁴, and India's every move to counter colonially motivated acts is regarded as defensive. In other words, the (neocolonialist) West is taking an offensive course and (non-aligned) India is on the defensive. Affirmative neutrality and non-alignment raised India's international prestige²⁴⁵, and this articulation of the West/Europe was interpellated to many individuals in the third world. Consequently, India's non-aligned leadership was produced by articulation of identities of the Indian self and the West and supported by the interpellation of a large number of individuals, including many who were not Indian citizens. Moreover, India's growing nuclear capability further

²⁴² Ibid., p. 5.

²⁴³ Jain, "On the Defensive" p. 488.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 492.

²⁴⁵ Shaumian, "India's Foreign Policy", p. 567.

boosted India's image abroad,²⁴⁶ especially in the region.

India has refused to become a signatory to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) because it has not wanted to accept rules that had already been defined by nuclear weapon states²⁴⁷ – including one of its main opponents, China, and the past colonizer of India, the UK. Indians have argued that it is no accident that the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are the countries that have nuclear weapons. Shaumian pointed out that the NPT is discriminatory because it became a specific legal ground for the “recognition of the monopoly right of five nuclear powers to possess nuclear weapons and use them for strengthening their *domination* of the international arena” (emphasis added).²⁴⁸ India was determined to attain self-reliance in defence and to make it known that the nation would not allow discriminatory treatment at the hands of the nuclear great powers with a treaty that was unequal, discriminatory, conferred unequal privileges on nuclear haves and imposed one-sided restrictions on non-nuclear states.²⁴⁹ Accepting this would be accepting a kind of inferior status for India, one that disregarded its size, long heritage of civilization and economic potential.²⁵⁰ India embraced opposition to every kind of neo-colonial attempt, that could be a potential source of the imposition of Western values and a status quo where the West had a privileged position upon other states, and the NPT was presented as one of these attempts.

Refusing to join the NPT also reasserted its identity as a regional and non-aligned leader. Leadership identity generally requires being credible, and country that wishes to have this identity must continuously demonstrate its capability to counter threats by opponents and refusal to give concessions even under pressure.

²⁴⁶ Vijay Sen Budhraj, “Indian Foreign Policy”, p. 351.

²⁴⁷ Varadarajan, “Constructivism, Identity and Neoliberal (in)Security”, p.333.

²⁴⁸ Shaumian, “Indian Foreign Policy”, p. 572.

²⁴⁹ Budhraj, “Indian Foreign Policy”, p. 350.

²⁵⁰ Ganguly, “India's Pathway to Pokrahan II”, p. 174.

This is of course, a masculine definition of leadership. At any rate, Indian proposals that called for the right of NNWSs to carry out “peaceful nuclear explosions” and nuclear guarantees for NNWS were not accepted by the UN Political Committee in 1965.²⁵¹ Consequently, India demonstrated its credibility as a “strong” leader and did not sign the NPT. Ganguly states that Indian politicians feared that India’s efforts to get a nuclear guarantee from the NWSs “would compromise their country’s nonalignment stance”.²⁵² Indeed, seeking guarantees from NWSs was a rational behavior in terms of creating a middle ground, which could make it possible for India to take part in the NPT; however, even this action was interpreted as giving concessions to the great powers. From the perspective of this masculine understanding of leadership, seeking a peaceful solution was considered a potential weakness.

4.3.3 ARTICULATION AND INTERPELLATION IN RELATION TO TECHNOLOGY

Indian “peaceful nuclear explosion” on May 18, 1974 met with severe international reactions. However, the nuclear export limitations of the industrial powers made the Indian programme of necessity indigenous.²⁵³ This situation brought scientific elites a privileged status because they were the ones who developed this high technology. Most of the scientific elite believed that nuclear weapons would improve India’s security and presented them as near-mythical elements in the defence of the country. Developing nuclear capabilities was also a chance to demonstrate India’s scientific capabilities. The Indian nationalist elite saw modernity as coming from the legacy of the British Empire – Western

²⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 155-158.

²⁵² Ibid., p. 153.

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 161.

education, the judicial system and social reforms, to name but a few.²⁵⁴ Consequently, it was very important to prove for all to see that India could develop its own high technology. The above-mentioned peaceful explosion was a sign that India was on par with NWS in nuclear technology.²⁵⁵ Nuclear power and scientific progress were linked closely, and the declaration of May 11 –the day of the first tests in 1998- as ‘Technology Day’ is the most obvious example of how such linkage was established between Indian indigenous technological development and nuclear weapons.²⁵⁶

Ganguly is averse to seeing the influence of the scientific elite’s ideas on political decision making.²⁵⁷ However, even if they were not successful in affecting bureaucratic decisions regarding nuclear policies, it does not mean that their ideas had no effect on decision-making at all. It would be inaccurate if the role of powerful scientific and industrial lobbies such as the Department of Atomic Agency (DAE), the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and the Indian Space and Research Organization (ISRO) in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and strategic missiles were to be ignored.²⁵⁸ Additionally, whenever there is a successful achievement in the nuclear field, the technological elite is applauded by society. Events like that lead to the legitimization of the technological elite’s suggestions in the eyes of the public; their statements come to be taken more seriously and their voice becomes more hearable due to their popularity at all levels of society.

It cannot be denied that the scientific elite also played an influential role in smoothing the interpellation process regarding these policies. Even though the scope

²⁵⁴ Varadarajan, “Constructivism, Identity and Neoliberal (in)Security”, p. 332.

²⁵⁵ Budhraj, “Indian Foreign Policy”, p. 350.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 340.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 175.

²⁵⁸ Kampani, “Stakeholders in the Indian Strategic Missile Program”, p. 49.

of my study does not allow for an extensive analysis of interpellation process, one example will be given in order to clarify the interpellation practice. Especially after the nuclear tests of 1998, Indian citizens regained self-confidence, which had declined after the fading away of the non-aligned movement, and strengthened *shakti* (strength) within that reinforced the faith in the state as well. In other words, it can be said that 1998 tests underlie the state centric approaches and representational practices and speeded up the interpellation process. *The Sunday Observer Special* (New Delhi, Mumbai, May 24-23, 1998) undertook a campaign to communicate messages from the public to the government under the title 'Mr. Prime Minister We Are With You'. A typical message read as follows: "Today, we feel even more proud to be Indian. By successfully exploding five indigenously developed nuclear devices, our scientists have shown that we are as good as the best in the world."²⁵⁹ The subject, the Indian state, is here thus accepted by the individual citizens, and the 'we' feeling –of being one of the world's "bests" as technologically developed and powerful Indians - legitimizes Indian nuclear policy in the eyes of society and helps to make common sense of the national interest. Moreover, even while thanking the Prime Minister, people did not forget the role of scientists in this achievement.

The cultural importance of technology in the articulation process again derives primarily from India's colonial past. Nehruvian secularists state that in the colonial age, pre-industrial India was used as a source of raw material and a market for finished industrial products by British industry.²⁶⁰ India struggled to foster 'national unity' after its independence, and both national unity and technological improvement (in order to eliminate India as being the market of industrial world)

²⁵⁹ Sanjay Chaturvedi, "Representing Post-colonial India: Inclusive/exclusive Geopolitical Imaginations" in K. Dodds & D. Atkinson (eds), *Geopolitical Traditions : A Century of Geopolitical Thought* (London: Routledge, 2000) p. 227.

²⁶⁰ Kampani, "Stakeholder in the Indian Strategic Missile Program", p. 61.

perceived as ‘musts’ for the security of the country. Consequently, in India, nationhood and modernity were considered as closely related in terms of the development and dignity of the society, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles was considered necessary to guard “the strategic frontiers and political ego of the Indian state, and by its extension, that of Indian peoples.”²⁶¹ As can be seen from this quotation, the ‘Indian state’ is extended to encompass ‘Indian people’, and it may be seen as a way of transforming state centric articulation to interpellation, which in fact has already defined the Indian national interest as accepted by the Indian people.

To summarize the Indian national interest regarding the NPT revolved around the articulation of many representational objects and arguments based on Indian non-aligned and regional leadership and post-colonial identities, and the related interpellation of individuals, mostly Indian citizens but also citizens of other countries in the non-alignment movement. In other words, nuclear proliferation in India was related to national prestige, ambitions of great powers, the post-colonial project of modernity and the need to get free of the ghost of colonialism.²⁶² These articulations entailed the production and reproduction of certain identities through cultural and social processes. Missile artifacts were efficient tools to strengthen the Indian “state” and reinstate its importance as the protector of “modernity, security, and stability in an increasingly fractionated polity suffering from a crisis of governance.”²⁶³ State identity was restored through successful articulations. It should be taken into account that in developing countries like India, producing national security goods for the common good is an effective means of contributing to

²⁶¹ Ibid., p. 61.

²⁶² Ibid., p. 49.

²⁶³ Ibid., p. 60.

state and nation building.²⁶⁴

First, the NPT was articulated as a specific design of Western powers, most of which were indeed past colonial powers, in order to make the Third World accept the rules and norms of the West. Additionally, China (and Pakistan after it went nuclear) was one of the most prominent and aggressive opponents against which preventive measures were needed. Second, India was articulated as a Third World country pursuing its own independence in opposition to the West at any cost. These were the linguistic bases that had the capacity to affect Indian society by means of interpellation of the prospective definition of national interest that needed to be examined more thoroughly. In all these processes, state centric approach that determines the state as the main subject and distributes identities and meanings to other objects, prevailed over other discourses, so that state officials have been the primary source of the articulations. Discourses were mostly formulated around the sharp differences between the West and India to emphasize the reasons of disagreement for the parties' regarding Indian nuclear policy. In other words, differences and otherness both constituted and threatened²⁶⁵ Indian self-identity.

One of the main consequences of the articulation and interpellation process was the legitimization within India of the Indian decision not to sign the NPT, because the contrary was not appropriate for India as a country that had active nonalignment policies and a postcolonial identity. Continuity of this policy reasserted Indian state identity and “permitted reproduction of a broader ‘we’”²⁶⁶ around this identity. Thus, Indian identity was created around terms such as leadership, regional hegemony, the non-aligned movement, technological

²⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 61.

²⁶⁵ “They [otherness and difference] constitute it [self-identity] and they threaten it.” Weldes et.al., “Introduction”, p.11.

²⁶⁶ Weldes, “Cultural Production of Crises”, p. 48.

development, independence from the West, credibility and nuclear strength. However, leadership and strength were masculine elements in this identity, which were understood as “toughness”. By defining its opponents as aggressive, terrorist, expansionist, domination-oriented and inherently hostile, by going nuclear and relying more on its nuclear weapons capability, India reproduced its own masculine identity.

At this point, one factor is important to mention. First, even Weldes usually focuses on the process of articulating the national interest by decision-makers in her studies. After this national interest becomes mature, interpellated people may also directly or indirectly affect the course of pursuing this interest. In the case of India, government officials might consider society’s expectations due to the political concerns when increasing the level of nuclear arsenals, and favorable attitudes towards the scientific elite created by the 1998 tests might qualify the elite’s right to have a say in the decision-making process. Of course, the level of this effect is open to discussion; however, it is an important factor not to overlook in this chapter.

Second, state centric articulations marginalized other alternatives for India related to the NPT. India was always presented as having no other rational alternative but refusing to sign the NPT. For example, left-wing groups denigrated nuclearization because they considered a symbol of the colonization of India’s political conscience and accused the government of copying the national security models of more advanced capitalist countries in disregard of India’s humane, equitable, moral and just view of international order.²⁶⁷ State centric approach silenced all these claims, and sometimes, not only silenced but also brought accusation against those that made claims contrary to the state centric approaches.

²⁶⁷ Kampani, “Stakeholders in the Indian Strategic Missile Program”, p. 62.

Human rights defenders have often been under duress from both state and private actors, and their activities labeled as “anti-national”.²⁶⁸ Moreover, according to Chaturvedi, the “anti-national” label is not limited to human rights defenders but applied to anyone who disagrees with ‘pro-nuke’ policies, and the term “anti-national” is just one in the list of expressions of condemnation like *deshdrohis* (traitors), “west-inspired anti-nationals” or, simply, CIA agents.²⁶⁹

On the other hand, India is on the verge of a change in this regard. Even though India has never joined the NPT and tested nuclear weapons in 1998, President George W. Bush’s agenda includes sharing American civilian nuclear technology with India. In return, India is expected to take steps to ensure the Americans that it will not export weapons technology, and that it will continue to observe a moratorium on testing and separate its civilian and military nuclear programmes, with the former subject to an inspection regime.²⁷⁰ Although this move has not been formally ratified,²⁷¹ this development still demonstrates that the past articulations regarding nuclear policy and the United States might change and a new understanding of the NPT and nuclear inspections appear.

Third and perhaps more importantly, this social construction reemphasized and legitimized the above-mentioned identities of India in the eyes of the Indian people. Indian identity was reproduced and individuals were interpellated into it.

In summary, the Indian national interest regarding nuclear power has never been a given. The meanings of the events and identities leading to the present understanding of national interest were constructed socially and culturally. The

²⁶⁸ Amnesty International, *Public Statement-India: Amnesty International calls for repeal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act.1958*. (2005). Available online at: <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA200202005>

²⁶⁹ Chaturvedi, “Representing Post-colonial India”, p. 227.

²⁷⁰ *The Economist*, “A Passage to India”, February 25th – March 3rd 2006, p. 11.

²⁷¹ It is not certain whether this decision will receive the approval of the US Congress and the sympathy of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Indian refusal to be a party to the NPT as a NNWS and its ongoing policy of nuclear development have reenacted and reproduced Indian self-identity. India's post-colonial history also makes this case study interesting from the perspective of cultural construction of insecurities between the West and the rest of the world in relation to nuclear power. Most of the time, Indian nuclear policy has been a proving ground for reproducing its postcolonial identity in opposition to the West.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

“We do not believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is essential for national security, and we have followed a conscious decision in this regard. We are also convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons diminishes international security. We, therefore, seek their complete elimination. These are fundamental precepts that have been an integral basis of India’s foreign and national security policy.”

-Salman Haider, India’s Foreign Secretary, March 1996, before the Conference on Disarmament²⁷²

The nuclear programs of the DPRK, Israel, India, Pakistan and Iran present serious challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The discussions on the reasons and impacts of these challenges and the possible counter measures to be taken against them generally revolve around the NPT in reference to its setup and fundamentals. While talking about these issues, two topics have crucial importance: becoming familiar with the NPT (with its specific regime, nature, provisions and obligations) and, at least, arriving to a basic understanding of motivations toward conducting nuclear programs of these countries. The analysis of the Indian decision not to be a signatory to the NPT is presented to serve as a tool to understand these two points.

The analysis was prepared to be a guide firstly for figuring out the nature of the NPT and then the Indian motivations for its certain nuclear policy. First, we traced the origins of nonproliferation policy back to the World War II in order to get a better understanding of how the treaty turned out to be a diplomatic, technical and

²⁷² Praful Bidwai, “Nuclear India: A Short History” in *Out of Nuclear Darkness. The Indian Case for Disarmament MIND (Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament)* (New Delhi: TNI Publications, 1998). Available online at: <http://www.tni.org/archives/bidwai/history.htm>.

political obstacle for countries that might pursue nuclear proliferation policies. After that, in order to understand why non-signatory parties see the treaty to be unacceptable, we made an overview through the articles of the NPT and its verification system in cooperation with the IAEA. The analysis also revealed the main motives and concerns of the signatories to the treaty and potential and past breaches of the provisions. Lastly, the information regarding threshold states, which India is involved too, is given to explain the extent of challenges to the nonproliferation regime by these states.

Why did India not sign the NPT? International relations discipline is a fragmented one in terms of theories. There is no grand theory of international relations and there is not a sensible chance creating one in the near future as well. Accordingly, in order to answer the above-mentioned question, we used a two-way approach. In two separate chapters, India's decision was analyzed through three variants of realism, namely offensive and defensive and neoclassical realism and critical constructivism. Leaving neoclassical realists aside, who include first and second image variables such as internal extraction processes, domestic politics and leaders' perceptions; realist view does not consider any influential actor in anarchical world other than state. This is one of the most distinctive features of realism than critical constructivism. Critical constructivism focuses on international relations in an entirely different perspective. It includes all actors in relation to the creation of representational practices in the analysis of India's nuclear policy whereas realist variants are mostly interested in the international system and its effects on the Indian "state" regarding its nuclear policy. Realists attempt to see the behaviors of states by analogy with the behavior of individuals making calculated and rational

choices.²⁷³ Critical constructivism make us see the root causes that why India follows a path that is different from the rest of the world regarding nuclear disarmament. Apart from realism, it also answers the question of “how is it possible that India can change its root in terms of nuclear policies regarding the US initiative in the absence of a significant structural change?”. From critical theory perspective, as long as US (or any other country) treats India as a sovereign, technologically developed and equal party, India can take US (or other countries’) offers into consideration.

Moreover, realism assumes that state preferences are fixed and uniformly conflicting.²⁷⁴ However, this assumption does not mean that every situation in state preferences is conflicting (particularly in the case of defensive realism). The nature of explanations related to state preferences are highly connected to realism’s belief in ‘given’ concepts. The terms like national interest, anarchy, security dilemma and the like are given. They cannot change depending on time or place. For critical constructivists, there is every reason to question the ‘given’ character of these concepts. Realities are socially, historically and culturally constructed. The change in the way we think about international relations or, for this specific case, the construction of India’s national interest in regard to nuclear policy will bring awareness that leads to a realization of the constructedness of “common sense” in terms of nuclear policy. Critical constructivism especially focuses on how representational practices such as articulation and interpellation are tied together and how they define the national interest of a country beforehand. Indeed, national interest is not given but rather it is constructed. India’s nuclear policy, which is defined as a tool for pursuing national interest, is accepted as given by successful articulations of opponents, putting itself as a regional leader and non-aligned power

²⁷³ Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (London: Longman Publishing Group, 1999), p. 14.

²⁷⁴ Legro & Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, p. 13.

against neo-colonialism and related links between technological development and nuclear policy. The articulations are further strengthened and measured by their interpellation into society. However, interpellation process analysis in this study is very limited because of limited scope and data of the thesis.

Realism describes international structure to be having a basis on material capabilities. Even though (defensive) neoclassical realists claim that state leaders' observations play an important role in forming the responses of states to the structural modifiers,²⁷⁵ at the end of the day, neoclassical realists conclude that "the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy [are] driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and particularly by its relative material power capabilities".²⁷⁶ In other words, no matter what the antecedent conditions are, the realist variants mentioned in this study take material capabilities and their distribution as the main elements in the definition of the structure.

In general, constructivism and particularly critical constructivism think that the view a structure depending solely on material capabilities does not meet the standards of constructivist view of international relations. Shared knowledge and social, historical and cultural practices are as important as material capabilities. Because people/actors give meanings to objects and perceive them according to these meanings later. For instance, the discursive constitution of Indian threat perception from Chinese nuclear weapons does not mean that these weapons are made up but that that their meanings are constructed.

Lastly, critical constructivism aims to attract the attention towards how reality construction reifies, reflects and enacts relations of power and denaturalizes dominant constructions and raises awareness for alternative world views. The

²⁷⁵ Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy", p. 142.

²⁷⁶ Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism", p. 316.

emphasis of realism on 'objective/given' nature of certain terms is criticized by critical constructivists because this attitude strengthens the state centric approach. State-centric approach either reemphasizes or creates state identity and the identity of opponents and the interpellation of these articulations silences other alternative discourses. Realism overlooks the centrality of process of interpretation. In this regard, by accepting one discourse as the sole reality, it also ignores other openings on security issues in relation with nuclear weapons as well.

In summary, realist variants explain the continuity of Indian decision as not joining the NPT mostly because of structural variables, however, critical constructivists also show social, cultural and historical constructions behind the scene as important factors and try to point out to the internal dynamics that play a role in the representational practices.

Although realists and empiricist epistemology are harshly criticized by critical constructivists, claims of critical constructivists are not problem-free. In the process of interest and identity construction, both social and critical constructivists are inclined to override the significance of the global economy as a constitutive factor.²⁷⁷ Actually, India's postcolonial identity has a strong connection with the global economy. The influence of the exploitative economic relationships with the British Empire led to state planning and the promotion of self-reliance (*swadeshi*) in the economic policy of independent India.²⁷⁸ India was determined not to be a part of global capitalist games of 'exploitative Other'. Varadarajan claims that the initiation of the economic liberalization program demanded by the IMF shook "a constitutive element of India's postcolonial identity, enabling a discourse of 'lost

²⁷⁷ Varadarajan, "Identity and Neoliberal (In) Security", p. 320.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 335.

self-esteem’”.²⁷⁹ The neo-liberal reforms threatened India’s self identity but the 1998 nuclear tests proved that “postcolonial state had not completely failed” because carrying out these nuclear tests was a way to demonstrate that “India could still chart its own course” facing opposition from the great powers.²⁸⁰ As Varadarajan points out, constructivism and critical constructivism fails to take global economy into account while analyzing identity formation.

Finally, there is a practical problem in applying critical constructivist claims to some studies. Critical constructivism is especially known for its stress on the effects of culture in constructions of identities, threats and insecurities. A deep analysis of certain policies necessitates having an adequate knowledge of anthropology and political science as well as international relations. On the other hand, it is not usually possible for an undergraduate or even Masters Degree student to have a profound familiarity with all of these disciplines. In accordance with this, these students’ applications of critical constructivism to their studies might be imperfect or they might hesitate to use this theory in their academic works.

Although this analysis particularly deals with India’s nuclear policy, it also stands as an exemplar for studying the nuclear policies of other countries that have never been a party to the NPT. This study suggests a ground for observing how two mainstreaming theories differ over explaining the Indian decision. This situation enables us to see their strong and weak points in explaining a case. A comparative study like this can provide a broader picture for the reasons why Israel or Pakistan does not become a party to the NPT. The same framework might be applied to the DPRK and to an extent to Iran by using method of difference instead of method of agreement, which was used throughout this study, in examining the development of

²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 337.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 339.

nuclear policy in regard to the NPT. In a few words, the study tries to establish a comparative work to be applied to countries that have problematic relations with the NPT regime. By this way, their main motives giving rise to these problems might be seen from different angles. Since understanding a problem is the half of solving it, this various-level approach can provide a comprehensive bargaining card for the NPT signatories against thresholds to attract them into the nonproliferation regime.

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