

Husserl and Austin: A Relationship Between ‘Act’ and ‘Meaning’

Hakan Başaralı



YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
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Hakan Başaralı

Ph.d. Thesis
Philosophy Department

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Saffet Babür

YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
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Date : 23/03/2021

Name/Surname: Hakan Başaralı

Abstract

In this thesis, I try to make a comparison between Husserl and Austin. The essential subject of this comparison consists of ‘meaning’ and ‘act’. Accordingly, first, I give an exposition of Husserl’s general account of language and then the relation between syntactic structures and their correlates that which are intentional experiences (namely, acts). Second, by drawing the outline of Austin’s speech act theory, I give an account of Austin’s conceptualisation of ‘meaning’, ‘force’, and ‘truth’ within this general frame. Third, I attempt to compare the conceiving ways of ‘meaning’ and ‘act’ in Husserl and Austin in terms of their account of ‘sentence’ and ‘truth’.

Özet

Bu tezde Husserl ve Austin arasında bir karşılaştırma yapmaya çalıştım. Bu karşılaştırmanın esas konusu ise ‘anlam’ ve ‘edim’. Bu doğrultuda, ilk olarak önce Husserl’in ‘Mantıksal Araştırmalar’daki genel dil görüşünü ve sentaktik yapılar ile onların korrelatı olan intentional yaşantıların (yani edimlerin) aralarındaki ilişkiyi serimledim. İkinci olarak, Austin’in söz edimleri kuramının ana hatlarını çizerek; bu genel çerçeve içinde Austin’in ‘anlam’, ‘güç’ ve ‘doğruluk’ kavramsallaştırmalarını açıkladım. Üçüncü olarak, Husserl ve Austin’in ‘anlam’ ve ‘edim’ kavrayışlarını, ‘tümce’ ve ‘doğruluk’ görüşleri bakımından karşılaştırmaya çalıştım.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the very outset of the last century, on the one hand Husserl's *Logical Investigations* had a contention to make a new beginning in philosophy, called as phenomenology, in which the main goal of it is the description of the essential structures of lived experience and in pursuit of objectivity of meanings, the ultimate target concerning knowledge has found its strength via intuitions grounded on empty intentions. On the other hand, another way of philosophy ascribes a priority to the field of philosophical investigation of language which would be dubbed as 'analytic'. As an Oxford philosopher Austin develops his understanding of ordinary language analysis in this milieu which simply aims at words and sentences in compliance with intentions, conventions and speech circumstances.

Even if it is not in a similar way with a similar framework, yet we come across in Husserl's phenomenology, chiefly in *Logical Investigations*, a vein of linguistic concern which appears as a laborious semiotic, semantic, and syntactic interest in an intertwined manner. Yet, there are some prominent issues which remain incompatible in each other. On the one hand, the explanatory source and vehicles in I. Investigation on semiotic themes depend on 'presence' of perception¹, on the other hand the themes as to the pure grammar in the IV. Investigation, regardlessly of presence of perception, totally depend on formal structures internal relations. Nonetheless, Husserl's interest essentially rests on consciousness of words and judgements centered on the subjects lived experiences of language rather than words and judgements.

¹ DonnWelton, "The Origins of Meaning: A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomenology", p.41 : "...Husserl has established in his own mind a vital link between meaning, indication, occasionality and perception" :

Apart from it, as occupying a pragmatic-semantic interface Austin's originality is coming from both the invention of performative utterance with speech act theory and his new approach to the problem of truth in connection with the speech act theory. Then, it could be asked immediately that how could we appraise his rupture from the received view of grammarians and logicians on 'statements' to the performatives and illocutions? If we keep in mind the concern of Husserlian phenomenology in describing the essential structures of lived experiences, then what arguments would it be required to follow for any attempt to reflect on Austinian speech acts as the experience of language that appears in the addresser and the addressee?

In what follows I argue that

1) For Husserl, since sentences arbitrarily express concepts and propositions which are ideal meanings, their instantiation remains blind to the contextual form of 'meaning', whereas Austin attempts to account for contextual form of 'meaning' as 'the total speech situation' which orients our attention not only to the sentences but also to the speaking circumstances, intentions, and purpose of the speech. Therefore, I claim that Husserl's way of intentionality of expressions to be not directed to world is not the biggest problem, for even in the semantic approach words and sentences do not refer deictically to world. That is, in effect, as Austin specifies the nexus of the problem is how we could situate statements in connection with their meanings in a speaking circumstance. Between Husserl and Austin, the underlying difference on language in connection with meaning is originating essentially neither from internalism /externalism attitudes nor intentionalism/conventionalism attitudes, but from (Husserl's) literal meaning / (Austin's) contextualist meaning account. Even Husserl never talks about literalism, the core of the literalist idealization is based on

this claim: “For every statement that can be made using a context-sensitive sentence in a given context, there is an *eternal sentence* that can be used to make the same statement in any context.”²

In Husserl’s both early and later writings together, rather than a linguistic context, we find a developed conception of context on the basis of perception. According to *L.I.* it is a presence as perception, in his intersubjective writings on communicative speech it is ‘shared knowledge’ in empathy, in which it is the acquaintance of others’ meaning-intention through indication, in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and other later writings, it is found in occasional judgements and perceptual background as horizontal experience which in sum are, yet, not enough to constitute a linguistic context.

2) For Austin, if a statement would be truth-evaluable, we have to know beforehand its entailments, presuppositions, and the intention, purpose of the utterer with the speech circumstances. Whereas Husserl construes a statement as an expression of a proposition which correlates to a propositional act in subjective experience. The correlated conscious lived experience of each word as Husserl says ‘verbal consciousness’ (Wortbewusstsein) attaches to single-rayed nominal acts, and they form a many-rayed propositional act. The problem is that propositional acts are not directed at a proposition, but a state of affairs. And what is judged in a judgement (or proposition, Satz) is state of affairs (Sachverhalt). However, this judged state of affairs is a founded reality as a categorial object. That is, it is not a naked presence of perception on the source of givenness, but a conception-dependent situation which is

² François Recanati, “Literal Meaning”, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.84; mention is mine.

founded on the subject's awareness. The oddity here lies on the confusion between proposition and state of affairs which causes too many trouble in semantics. Künne clarifies this oddity as reads: "The truth-value bearer is the "Satz (in the logical sense)", i.e. the meaning of a complete declarative sentence, whereas a state of affairs is that in virtue of whose obtaining (Bestehen) a truth is a truth."³

However, in Austin's naive realism, we do not meet with a theory of judgement in connection with state of affairs. Instead, he puts forward three requirements⁴ to claim a statement true or false: 1) what a sentence *is*, 2) what it *means*, 3) the circumstances in which it is uttered. Moreover, against Husserl's contention that of act-quality moment, Austin proposes "there is no kind of sentence which *as such* is evidence-providing, just as there is no kind of sentence *as such* is surprising, or doubtful, or certain, or incorrigible, or true."⁵ So, Austin concerns about the interdependency of speaking circumstances and truth-evaluable content of statements.

3) Husserl distinguishes meaning in solitary speech and meaning in communication and prefers the former in due to its availability for retaining objectivity of logic.

Yet, his preference seems to be waned in his later writings, along with the same line with his extended conception of intentionality. As seen in a concise manner, "the theory of intentionality begins with a psychology of cognition, then - after the rejection of psychologism - moves to a theory of meaning (*Investigations I & II*), which is taken up *into a phenomenology* of knowledge (*Investigation VI*), With the discovery of the "*epoché*" (1905), the same intentionality (*Ideas I*) becomes

³Wolfgang Künne, "The Intentionality of Thinking: The Difference between State of Affairs and Propositional Matter", in *Speech Act and Sachverhalt; Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, 1987, Springer, p.184

⁴ Austin, "Sense and Sensibilia", p.111

⁵ *ibid.*

constitutive of the object that is intended, and eventually of the “world.”⁶Hence, if it is set aside *Ideas I*, we can see a transition from the intentionality of subject (with respect to the ideal meanings construed in soliloquy of a subject) to the intentionality in intersubjective. Though the tendency towards meaning in communication, firstly he would not never give linguistically based an exposition, as done in his L.I., of the intentionality in intersubjective in which he believes that opinions of the speaker of a certain community have also a constitutive role for each cognitive acts of a subject of that community. Secondly, Husserl does not ever talk about intentionality of utterances of an actual language, rather he gives an account of the interconnection between an act intending a word-consciousness and an object through the medium of meaning that word. But if we take attention to the status of the intentionality of an utterance, then we will be aware that the issuing of utterance immediately turns out to be the second medium between act and object.

Ensuing, the intentionality of a statement in solitary speech does not matter, since in that case it is no more than the cloth of the intentional content of the propositional act that is correlated to the statement which permits the subject to instantiate it in which nothing essential changes in terms of its intentional content. However, in communicative speech the intentional object and intentional content of the same statement uttered by two persons usually differs depending on the circumstances. Let’s look at Charles Travis’ example⁷ of speaker-use sensitivity inspired by Austin. In the first situation, Hugo seats in the breakfast table, and looks at his cup of black coffee, idly stirring with the spoon, and Odile volunteers “There is milk in the refrigerator”. In the second situation, Hugo undertakes the task of cleaning

⁶Jitendranath N. Mohanty, “Husserl’s Total Theory of Intentionality: An Outline”, https://orbi.uliege.be/bitstream/2268/29368/2/Future_Husserlian_Phenomenology.pdf, p.15

⁷ Charles Travis, “The Uses of Sense”, Oxford University Press, 1989, p.18

refrigerator, but keeps on sitting on his armchair. Then Odile opens the refrigerator and looks at the milk on the bottom of the refrigerator, and reproaches Hugo by saying “There is milk in the refrigerator”. Both the intentional content of the same sentence differs as two different statements, and their illocutionary force changes as volunteering and reproaching. Austin encapsulates this idea as follows: “Do we all say the same, and only the same, things in the same situations? Don’t usages differ?”⁸

Now, according to Husserl the propositional act of ‘There is milk in the refrigerator’ is directed to the state of affairs which is already categorial. Depending on the mode of attention, the subject may consider the proposition either as posited state of affairs in the sense of actual or as supposed state of affairs. In the latter, the status of modifications pertains to its non-obtaining. The obstacle is that Husserl assigns the intricate status of assertions in communicative speech to the indications in which the intersubjective agreement would be worked out on the ground of perception’s immediacy through reciprocally conceiving the meaning-intention and meaning-bestowing of the speaker and hearer in issue. However, the constitution of occasion sensitivity of the speakers cannot be reducible to the perceptual content, but requires to normalize the circumstances as a linguistic context. In other words, Husserl points out the problem of occasional expressions (and also proper names) in connection with constituting a linguistic context amounts to grasp the way how to individualize ideal meanings (so to speak, concepts and propositions) in nominal and propositional acts. Furthermore, the effects of this problem extends above the evaluation of ascriptions of knowledge. I contend that, though the strivings for in later writings, Husserl fails in achieving a sense of occasion, whereas Austin succeeds in it.

⁸ Austin, “A Plea for Excuses”, in P.P., p.183

4. For Austin, a statement could be assessed from different dimensions of assessment such as assessment of satisfactoriness-unsatisfactoriness, assessment of relevancy-irrelevancy, assessment of sincerity-insincerity, and assessment of truth-falsity. Therefore, Austin criticizes the received common view which reduces all possible dimensions of assessments to only the assessment of truth-falsity. Moreover, according to the same common view, in the latter dimension all statements have to be either true or false, but no place for words such as “rough”, “exaggerated”, “exact”, “ambiguous”, “imprecise”, “detailed”, “inaccurate”, “couched in general terms”, “not very full, or complete”.

Furthermore, a statement's being false is not identical with its being nonsensical. Austin remarks that all infelicities of illocution are not-true but 'incorrect' and also they are not nonsense, and their ways of being nonsensical are not the same, “rather special varieties of ‘nonsense’ ”⁹ Thus, we find in Austin a clear objection of word to world harmony¹⁰ which is an all-or-nothing matter that conditions assessment and the confusion between negation and falsity, whereas in Husserl disharmony may be found in degrees between the meaning-intention and its fulfillment with perceptual content. However, Husserl firstly applies to a teleological guarantee between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is meant’¹¹ , which prevents from the beginning a disharmony. Secondly, a disharmony only occurs in the moment of act-content. That is, ‘S is P’ is a lived experience of agreement, whereas ‘S is not P’, “the representation of predicate disharmonized with the object of the representation of subject”¹². The state of affairs of a negative judgement is in the way of nothingness, but the latter is not a privation.

⁹ Austin, “HTDTWW”, p.4

¹⁰ Jean-Philippe Narboux, “‘There’s Many a Slip between Cup and Lip’: Dimension and Negation in Austin”, in *The Philosophy of Austin*, ed. by Martin Gystafsson, Richard Sørli, p. 206

¹¹ This ‘meant’ (gemeint) is a mental referent.

¹² Hua XL, “Untersuchungen zur Urteilstheorie”, p. 132

“The negation is not an act”, but an operator of the semantic content of the proposition. . However, he does not suspect from this equation: ‘S is not P’ is equal to ‘it is false that S is P’. Austin does not agree with him and says “too many philosophers maintain,..., that a negation is just second order affirmation”¹³. Austin radically rejects the constructed link between being self-contradictory and senseless in terms of negation as in the following way: “I suggest that ‘I think x exciting but I do not approve of it’ is ‘perfectly good sense’ may very well be neither self-contradictory nor yet ‘perfectly good sense’...”¹⁴

6. According to Husserl, intentional experiences can never *fail* to be about something, given that the impeccable flow of the directedness. Even in the case that they are about undeterminate intentional objects, yet they necessarily have an object. So, it is allowed to speak of aboutness even whenever its intentional object to be defaulted or vague. If we carry this relation over the practical field, then, how we can give an account of fallible actions or speech acts (utterances). However, for Austin, insofar performative utterances are subjected to fail in different ways, they are not the same as (being) non-performative utterances but misapplications, flaws, hitches as void acts and abuses; or excuses as an unaccomplishment of action “can be done unintentionally, unwillingly, involuntarily, insincerely, unthinkingly, inadvertently, heedlessly, carelessly, under duress, under the influence, out of contempt, out of pity, by mistake, by accident, and so on?”¹⁵ In virtue of reflections on human fallibility on actions (including speech acts), Austin discloses the decisive role of circumstances in connection with intentionality.

¹³ Austin, “Truth”, in P.P., p. 128

¹⁴ Austin, “The Meaning of A Word”, in P.P., p.66

¹⁵ Stanley Cavell, “A Pitch of Philosophy”, p.87

After these clarifications, to put it briefly, the aim of this thesis is to explore in a comparative way both authors' different conceptions of 'meaning' and 'act(ion)' from their own perspectives. The task of phenomenology as mentioned in L.I had remained as an unachieved task which was already accepted by Husserl in a brief¹⁶ to Roman Ingarden written in 1918, in due to the way of attaching sense and propositions with ideal meanings which are characterized as formal structures (species). The source of this fault relies on, in effect, adopting a strategic decision from the very outset of the L.I. to execute smoothly, without causing tremendous troubles that would ruin all his project, so to speak, the problem of grounding pure logic which depends on both the constitution of forms and laws and the subjective conditions of the attainment of self-evidence in line with his deployed elaborative searches on semiotics, semantics and syntax but not pragmatics or in any connection with pragmatic perspectives. This decisive choice is to grasp speech as soliloquy and to relinquish communicative speech for the aim of applying soliloquy easily all along his way of doing phenomenology. However, starting from 1913-14, with a pile of drafts for a revised second edition of L.I. Husserl begins to bequeath his former decision on giving priority to soliloquy, and to make some rearrangements on the backbone of L.I. by writing on communicative speech and other concerned linguistic themes. Then, afterwards 1920's Husserl changes his mind and contends the foundation of subjectivity only by precedence of a presupposed intersubjectivity. So, the transition from solitary speech to communicative speech is also reflected on Husserl's account of intentionality of (ideal) meanings in L.I. to horizontal intentionality. Yet, even in these later writings, he does not renounce, except with

¹⁶ Husserl, Briefwechsel, p.182

some modifications, his former conception of expression, judgement, proposition on his analysis of communicative speech.

Hence, within the scope of this thesis the relevance of Austin to Husserl's shift from soliloquy to communicative speech hinges on the former's possible contributions to Husserl's phenomenology, in terms of assessment ways of utterances, towards acquiring a better understanding of how the relation between words and world essentially works. More precisely, Austin counters against the view, which is also defending indirectly by Husserl, that which claims a word to world harmony. Travis deems his stance as "Austin's focus on statements as *situated* representing"¹⁷

The particular views of these two philosophers, on the nexus of language, meaning and truth, are exposed in two distinct chapters. Next, I attempt to reach a better understanding about some certain shared problems. By doing this, I also intend to find out whether it would be proper to grant a 'primacy to perception' or 'primacy to language' by examining the limits of intentionality in the encounter with the 'world'. This finds its expression in a concise manner in Austin, as in the quotation below:

"There must also be something other than the words, which the words are to be used to communicate about: this may be called the world."¹⁸

The appreciation of this encounter essentially depends on two different conventions in Austin: descriptive conventions and demonstrative conventions¹⁹, and furthermore the role of the conventions again play a role in 'How to Do Things with

¹⁷ Charles Travis, "Thought's Footing", p.186

¹⁸ Austin, "Truth"; in P.P., p.121

¹⁹ *ibid*, p.121-121

Words' in respect of the speech act theory. On the basis of these two ways of convention, Austin defends a 'fit theory' of truth and these conventions allow for the linguistic context. Thus, speaker's intentions and purposes within some circumstances could possibly be appreciated in virtue of a linguistic context. Thereby, Austin's contextualism provides a more precise account of language and meaning connection than Husserl's account of language. According to the latter, in L.I. an act of meaning-intention²⁰ is directed to a word, or a sentence and that meaningful empty intention becomes ready to be fulfilled with perception by the act meaning-fulfilling²¹. Then, in the revised edition of the L.I. Husserl introduces a new pair of conception²²: latent and patent meaning-intention. The former acknowledges the intersubjective priority of meaning-intentions which is originally coming from the common language of a particular speakers community, "it is hidden meaning (Meinung), latent, ideal possibility of an act of meaning (Meinen)". However, the latter is my intentional act as meaning-intention just as it is used in the L.I.

Here, Husserl's underlying presupposition regarding the intentional act is its adequately aiming at (Abzielen) the object, or say, what the act is *about*. Intentional act is nothing but a conscious experience. It may be about real, mental, imaginary, material, or immaterial. That's why, Husserl is not only concern with intentional acts. Meanings (Bedeutungen) are neither intentional acts nor linguistic acts. However, we cannot know anything without them. Therefore, Husserl's phenomenology simply based on this tripartite structure: act, object, meaning. If one consciousness can carry out an aiming at something, its possibility of carrying out it relies upon being already 'givenness' of the object to the consciousness. Simply, I cannot think about something that is not given to the consciousness, even if we are mostly unaware of them. Before

²⁰ L.I./1 p.281;Hua XIX/1, p. 44; Only in virtue of it, we can talk about 'sense'

²¹ L.I./1 p.281;Hua XIX/1, p. 45

²² Hua XX/2, p. 220

going further, we have to make some clarifications about Husserl's 'given'. Primarily, if our departure point of inquiry begins at the moment of directedness of lived experiences, they will offer themselves with an emptiness and vague remoteness. This emptiness belongs to the thought, that is, the meaning-intention act which is not yet fulfilled with the presence of perception. Therefore, Husserl says, I am interested not in mental experiences but instead 'their mode of givenness'²³. Between the two ends, that is, 1) *complete unclarity*, in which consciousness is 'blind' and 2) *complete clarity*; there are "*degrees of givenness, of intuitedness, and of clarity*"²⁴. Therefore, he clarifies that '*given as it itself*' (or briefly he calls it 'given') and '*given originally*' of which not as perceptual (somit nicht als wahrnehmungsmässige) are different. So, we could consider this clarification in the sense that in the phenomenological investigation we are dealing with degrees of givenness which are not totally perceptual. I mean, for ex., if I see a pen on the desk, its sight is partly and perspectively. But what is given in degrees consists only of perceptual content? No. Both in what is perceptual and what is linguistic (if we don't neglect it which is the ground of, I don't already prefer to say all our knowing acts, at least making phenomenology by employing words, even for neologisms), there to be found this originally given non-perceptual²⁵. This non-perceptual givenness would be one of the main interests in Husserl's later work, particularly in '*Experience and Judgment*' and we see this sort of givenness under the name of sensations. So, both in his 'static phenomenology' and also 'genetic phenomenology', the non-perceptual givenness or

²³Ideas p.153; Hua III, p. 141

²⁴Ideas p.154; Hua III, p. 142

²⁵Jocelyn Benoist, "Linguistic Phenomenology?"; in "Meaning and Language", p. 219 : Benoist says that "phenomenology as such is supposed to be specifically concerned with some kind of 'non-linguistic' givenness." While I am agreeing with this statement, I think, to make equal 'non-linguistic givenness' with the 'perceptual givenness', as a common presupposition in his article, would remain a bit imprecise. Yet, in his brilliant article, he explicitly mentions the lack of phenomenology in this manner: "Phenomenology, basically, is a philosophy of *seeing*. As such it rests on the silent evidences of consciousness as it is presented with itself." p.217

sensations would be the constitutive element of our capacity of judgment. Whereas, in contrast to Husserl's position, Austin claims that 'senses are dumb' in the way stated below:

"Our senses are dumb...our senses do not *tell* us anything, true or false."²⁶ So senses do not 'speak' like anyone in the street. Hence, this curious critique has the capacity to manifest the underlying presupposition of phenomenology which makes *the things speak*²⁷ in an anthropomorphic manner. Even in the writings of most leading figures in phenomenology have never been held a suspicious attitude against *the things speak*²⁸. Austin, in another place, stresses the same issue but leaves open this problem by grounding the senses on an unjustified term, namely, 'previous experience' as being taken for granted in this way:

"It is as if *sensa* were literally to 'announce themselves' or to 'identify themselves'...*sensa* are dumb, and only previous experience enables us to identify them. If we choose to say that they 'identify themselves' (and certainly 'recognizing' is not a highly voluntary activity of ours), then it must be admitted that they share the birthright of all speakers, that of speaking unclearly and untruly."²⁹

Now, the problem is that if neither *sensa* tell us anything nor things speak, then we should, in deed, turn our attention to linguistic meanings and linguistic context which cannot be totally characterized as internal or external, but both. Austin

²⁶ Austin, "Sense and Sensibilia", p. 11

²⁷ Benoist, "Linguistic Phenomenology ?", p. 229

²⁸ For ex. in Paul Ricoeur, "Phénoménologie du Vouloir et Approche par le Langage Ordinaire", p. 92: "Pourquoi Husserl dit-il que le vécu ststructuré, a un sens, est *dicible*? Parcequ'il est intentionnel et qu'il est toujours possible d'expliciter le sens d'un vécu par *l'objectité qu'Il vise*." (Why Husserl says that the mental experience (*Erlebnis*) is structured, has a sense, is *sayable*? Because, it is intentional and is always possible to explicate the sense of a mental experience by *the objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit) which is aimed at.*) [Mentions belong to me.]

²⁹ Austin, "Other Minds", in P.P., p. 97

shows this sort of characterization through the varieties of *infelicities* as the failures of performatives which depend on the conventional procedures, that come into existence through the conventionality dimension of the linguistic activity whose principle lies only in the normativity of acts. The important point of these infelicities, in Austin's words *certain whole dimensions of unsatisfactoriness*, is based on the idea that the conventions in the extent of which they are applied in the actions suppose *intentionality*.

Now, in searching for an available comparative understanding of 'act' and 'meaning' between, first it needs to state how Husserl distinguishes his account of 'act'(Akt) from 'activity' (Betätigung) as reads:

"In talking of 'acts' (Akten), on the other hand, we must not anymore to think of the original word of *actus*: all thought of activity (Betätigung) must be rigidly excluded."³⁰

In the footnote, Husserl expresses that he admits Natorp's view on this subject and opposes the view that 'mental acts' should not be considered as 'activity of consciousness' adding that consciousness is not a 'doing' (Tun) and its subject as doer (Täter). So, it could be *roughly* claimed about performative³¹ utterances and their fallible cases as infelicities that since some (not all) speech acts and their infelicities

³⁰ L.I./2 p. 563; Hua XIX/1, p. 393

³¹ These two terms, namely 'performative' and 'performance', are different. Here is an example for Austin's usage of the word performance: "the performance of the locutionary or the illocutionary act"

The only remark I have hitherto seen on this distinction belongs to Barbara Cassin, "La performance avant le Performatif ou La Troisième Dimension du Langage", in "*Geneses de L'Acte de Parole dans Le monde Grec, Roman et Médiéval*", p.124-24, 141. According to Cassin, the prefix of both words *per-* denotes 'the accomplishment to the end'. While 'performative' is invented and marked by Austin, whereas 'performance' is taken by her as *epideixis* which is a term, dedicated to Plato (for ex. *Hippias major*, 282c, 286a; *Hippias Minor*, 393c; *Gorgias*, 447c), pertains the discursivity of sophists (p.124-125). "L'*epideixis* est l'art de montrer 'devant' et de montrer 'en plus'...Montrer 'devant', publiquement, aux yeux de tous: une *epideixis* peut être ainsi une démonstration de force..., une manifestation, une exposition." (The *epideixis* is the art of showing 'before' and showing 'additionally'...Publicly to make shown to everyone's eye: an *epideixis* in this way may be a demonstration of force,..., a manifestation, an exposition.)

depend on context and circumstances, we cannot reject the idea of intentionality in Austin's infelicities of some groups of speech acts.

This ambivalent character appears, for ex., in one of the subgroups of felicities, namely 'misfires'. Austin tells that "at a party, you say, when picking sides, 'I pick George': George grunts 'I am not playing'. Has George been picked?"³² So, the act is not accomplished but the agent has already picked George. In Husserl's terms, the one who picks George has experienced an meaning-intention in the propositional act of 'I pick George' and it aims at its own object. Yet, the consequence, in reality, is not an 'action', it does not bring about any effect. Nonetheless, we can at least admit that the negation underlying the infelicity of a performative may be held to have a more or less external scope (or equivalently a more or less internal scope). "Neither can the negation underlying the infelicity be completely *internalized* nor can it be completely *externalized* in principle"³³. Apart from infelicities, as to the illocutionary acts we can also argue a kind of negation between force and meaning, which are not separate³⁴, and conventions. Actually, Austin never explicates that the relevant conventions attach the words to a certain act, yet we can derive the implication of this association from the negation of illocutionary force³⁵. Truly, this matter plays a central and crucial role to grasp unaphopantic logic. We can find some critics which distinguish acts (intentional experience) from actions,

³² Austin, "HTDTWW", p. 28

³³ Jean-Philippe Narboux, "'There's Many a Slip between Cup and Lip': Dimension and Negation in Austin", in *The Philosophy of Austin*, ed. by Martin Gystafsson, Richard Sørli, p.234

³⁴ Austin, "How to Do Things with Words", p. 73: "precision in language makes it clear *what is being said* – its *meaning*: explicitness, in our sense makes clearer the *force of the utterances*, or 'how...it is to be taken' Though most of the author who are interested in speech act theory misunderstood the unseparatedness of meaning and force. See also: Marina Sbisa, "Speech Acts without Propositions", p.164 "Thus a divide is generated between expressing meanings and indicating force which was not included in Austin's proposal."

³⁵ Jocelyn Benoist, "Les limites de l'intentionnalité: Recherches phénoménologique et analytiques", p.53: "Yet, it has to remark that Austin has never said that conventions that he speaks of consists in to associate such words to such acts. Probably, for him it would be exactly there in the negation of the illocution."

likewise Husserl, but assign illocutionary acts under the class of ‘actions’ without addressing to their intentional dimension in connection with their consequences. It is because of the inattention to the negational moment in illocutionary acts³⁶. I will put some remarks about this negational moment in the section 3.2.

Here, let me clarify the discussion about ‘mental act’ in a more precise fashion. In the first section of his Fifth Investigation, Husserl presents three conceptions of consciousness³⁷:

1) Consciousness as the entire, real (*reelle*) phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified stream of consciousness

2) Consciousness as the inner awareness of one’s own psychic experiences.

3) Consciousness as a comprehensive designation for ‘mental acts’ (*psychische Akte*), or ‘intentional experiences’ of all sorts.

Husserl plainly expresses that the conscious intentional relation of the *ego* to its objects is simply carried out in the intentional experiences and admits that this account brings him to the third conception of consciousness. That is, in the L.I. Husserl’s main field of research consists of mental acts or lived experiences. Now in the last quote what he calls and acknowledges as ego is nothing but an empirical ego, which is set against the Kantian pure *I* (“I must frankly confess, however, that I am quite unable to find this ego...The only thing I can take note of...are the empirical ego³⁸). Ensuing, Husserl in L.I. deals with the empirical ego though its relations to both ‘merely intentional’ and ‘existent’ objects. This preference of consciousness

³⁶ For example Roberta De Monticelli, “Alles Leben ist Stellungnahmen – Die Personals praktisches Subjekt”, in “Die Aktualität Husserls”, p.45

³⁷ Hua XIX/1, p. 355-356 ;L.I./1 p. 535

³⁸ L.I./1 p. 549 ; Hua XIX/1, p. 374

because of its immanency conveys some crucial ambiguities, given that appearances are not appearing but only experienced by the empirical ego in the extent of the objects (this kind of object, however, does not refer to anything external) of experience appear.

“We cannot too sharply stress the equivocation which allows us to use the word ‘*appearance*’ both of the experience in which the object’s appearing consists (the concrete perceptual experience, in which the object itself seems present to us) and of the object which appears as such.”³⁹

Thus, appearance is both the experience and the object itself insofar object appears. According to this account, intentional acts do not refer to the world. Yet, Husserl acknowledges the existence of an outer world regardless of a consciousness. Instead, Husserl is interested in ‘real (reel) phenomenological treatment’ according to which objectivity is that which transcends the act. For real phenomenology, all different kinds of beings are represented on the ground of basic representations. Since all objects are either ‘merely intentional’ object or ‘existent’ (and again intentional) objects. There is no difference insofar they are intentional object whether it is number ‘2’, a wooden made table, ‘Sherlock Holmes’, god Zeus, Leibniz’s ‘monad’, Treaty of Bretton Woods, a circle triangle, or something else. Husserl specifies it in this manner:

“It makes no difference...whether this being is real(real) or ideal, genuine, possible or impossible, the act is ‘directed upon’ it...This reference (Beziehen) to an object

³⁹ L.I./2 p. 538 ; Hua XIX/1, p. 359

belongs peculiarly and intrinsically to an act-experience, and the experiences manifesting it are by definition intentional experiences or acts.”⁴⁰

By saying that, in effect, Husserl *does not reject*, for ex., the physical reality of a wooden made table but conceives it from the direction of an act to object or vice versa. But then we can immediately ask, to Husserl, where does it remain the differences among intentional objects? “*All differences in mode of objective reference (gegenständlichen Beziehung) are descriptive differences in intentional experiences*”⁴¹

So, how Husserl establishes the relation between “objective reference” in consciousness and transcendent things? In the 14th section of the Sixth Investigation, while Husserl tries to distinguish the signitive and intuitive intentions, he determines that there isn’t something common between the sign and the thing it signifies, so the relation is totally conventional. There is no fault about that but Husserl carries over this manner of conventional relation to the relation between sensation (which has the character of non-intentional) and object. Thereby, it makes the perception (in the character of intentional) a merely convention⁴². Therefore if the immanent experience represents the transcendent object, it is only possible through considering *the immanent experience as a sign of a transcendent thing*. Hence, Husserl puts forward a

⁴⁰ Husserl, L.I./2 p. 538 ; Hua XIX/1, p. 359

⁴¹ *ibid.*

⁴² Vittorio de Palma, “Husserls Phänomenologische Semiotik; in Logische Untersuchungen Edmund Husserl, ed. By Verena Mayer, p. 55: “Denn die signitive Bedeutungsintention, die in der Apperzeption eines sinnlich Gegebenen als sprachlich Zeichens fundiert ist, nach gilt für ihn als Muster, nach dem alle Arten von Intentionalität verstanden werden, und zwar auch die von ihr strukturell verschiedene perzeptive Intentionalität.”

perception-based intentional theory which is constituted through a semiotic apparatus⁴³.

In addition to the mentioned impasse, the presented semiotic structure in the *Logical Investigation* could also be evaluated as an important step in constructing a realist view in virtue of the constitutive context-dependent indication function (Anzeigefunktion) and 'occasional expressions'. So, apart from the transcendental idealism of Husserl which amounts to *idealism of senses*, but not idealism of being, we can find some sort of a realist frame in Husserl's thought. In a letter to Émile Baudin he identifies himself as 'not any common realist is so realistic and concrete than me'⁴⁴. Against all, we cannot find any room for how to appraise statements as situate representing in particular occasions.

⁴³Moreover, de Palma mentions that "The perception-sense could not be conceived through analogy with the linguistic meaning. The linguistic meaning is not given in the experience, but established originally in sense-bestowing acts" (Der Wahrnehmungs sinn ist nicht durch Analogie mit der sprachlichen Bedeutung zu begreifen. Die sprachliche Bedeutung ist nicht in der Erfahrung gegeben, sondern wird ursprünglich in sinngebenden Akten gestiftet...) ibid, p. 57

⁴⁴*Keingewöhnlicher "Realist" ist je so realistisch und so concret gewesen als ich, der phänomenologische "Idealist" (ein Wort, das ich übrigens nicht mehr gebrauche) : Hua Briefwechsel, Band III, Teil 7, Wissenschaftler korrespondenz, p.16*

2. Husserl

2.1. Husserl's Account of Language

In this study, I will set aside the relation of noetic-noematic correlation, which is accounted for elaborately in *Ideen*, with respect to language. Though, on occasion, I will address Husserl's some new conceptions respectively the dealt subjects in question, the main structure of noetic-noematic and its subsequent problems will be dismissed. The underlying idea of this restriction is based on Husserl's decisive shift concerning the scope of terms 'meaning' [or signification (*Bedeutung*)] and 'to mean' [or signifying (*Bedeuten*)] of which are not anymore only relate to the field of language, but applied to all sorts of objectifying or non-objectifying acts, such as, for instance, perceiving, remembering, imagining and wishing, fearing, asking etc. Therefore, under the noetic-noematic structure the boundary between what is linguistic and non-linguistic is apparently waning. Husserl describes this decisive shift as follows:

"We shall restrict our interest exclusively to 'to mean' (*Bedeuten*) and 'meaning' (*Bedeutung*). Originally, these words concerned only the linguistic sphere, that of 'expressing'. But one can scarcely avoid and, at the same time, take an important cognitive step, *extending the meaning of these words and suitably modifying them* so that they can find application of a certain kind to the whole noetic-noematic sphere: thus, *application to all acts*, be they now combine with expressive acts or not."⁴⁵

Subsequently Husserl makes a distinction between 'sense' (*Sinn*) and 'meaning' (*Bedeutung*), according to which the former is ascribed for 'all intentional

⁴⁵ Hua III/1, p.285; Ideas I, p. 294 Emphasis belongs to me

lively experiences, whereas the latter is preserved in the extent of his previous conception of meaning, namely, ‘in the complex locution of ‘logical’ or ‘expressive’ meaning”⁴⁶. Yet, Husserl again in the same place loosely specifies that he uses the word ‘sense’ in general as being equivalent to ‘meaning’.

2.1.1. Expression and Meaning

In the first Investigation, Husserl arranges his theory of language, with an essential mention, in terms of expression, within a theory of signs, and meaning. In fact, Husserl tells us nothing about the essentials of the term ‘sign’, except the claim that “every sign is sign for something, but not every sign has ‘meaning’, a ‘sense’ that is ‘expressed’ by the sign”⁴⁷. In another way, every expression is a sign but every sign is not an expression. That is, on the one hand, expressions, for Husserl, are linguistic signs and on the other hand, non-linguistic signs or, as Husserl calls them, indications (*Anzeichen*) are to be distinguished under two subgroups: natural signs (for ex. fossil bone indicates an animal or the Martian canals indicates the existence of intelligent beings in Mars), and artificial signs (for ex. the stigma is sign of a slave, a flag the sign of a nation)⁴⁸. In the Logical Investigations, the third group is called *expressions*, and in 1914 he changes his mind and counts the second group also as expressions.

Linguistic signs ‘stand for’ what they signify in an ‘evident’ (*einsichtig*) way which has a logical necessity because expressions express the thought in the manner of meaning, for instance the word ‘notebook’ stands for notebooks; whereas non-linguistic signs as indications are not based on a ‘stand for’ relation, rather “a thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to indicate something to

⁴⁶ *ibid*

⁴⁷ Hua XIX/I, p. 30; L.I/I, p.269

⁴⁸ Hua XIX/I, p. 31; L.I/I, p.270

some thinking being.”⁴⁹ For example, if I see a fossil bone, it indicates the reality of certain other things, namely a kind of animal once lived. However, the relation between the indication and the indicated is not grounded upon a logical necessity, but ‘an unevident motivation’ as a belief in the reality of the other. So, the ground of indications is called by Husserl as ‘association of ideas’⁵⁰, and we ‘feel’ such a sort of connection. This way of induction not only implies the accompaniment of ideas stated in relation, but also the association operates ‘creatively’, in the sense that it can create new unities between the indication and the indicated.

Hence, Husserl is come up with a distinction, but not as “the relation of more the extensive genus to narrower species”⁵¹, between expression and indication. Even if both are signs, indication expresses nothing because Husserl assigns meaning-function (*Bedeutungsfunktion*) merely to expressions. Following this, Husserl likewise markedly distinguishes ‘to mean’ (*Bedeuten*) and ‘to indicate’ (*Anzeige*). That is, the sign which has meaning is called expression, whereas the sign which has no meaning, or is not the carrier of meaning is called indication. Expressions are linguistic assertions that sign the inner process of thought. That is, expressions have function only to externalize these inner processes of thought which could be characterized as the cloths of thought, or say, of intention. Hence, “the expression seems to *applied* to the thing and to clothe it like a garment.”⁵² Though this view is characterized throughout the whole investigations as a general idea, yet, Husserl deviates from it in particular points, for instance, the indexical naming of somewhere as ‘this’.⁵³ This character of linguistic signs or expressions is exposed to many criticism due to not to

⁴⁹ Hua XIX/I, p. 31; L.I./I, p.270

⁵⁰ Hua XIX/I, p. 35; L.I./I, p.273

⁵¹ Hua XIX/I, p. 30; L.I./I, p.269

⁵² Hua XIX/II, p. 559; L.I./II, p.688

⁵³ For a detailed lay out see Section 2.4.

assign any function for language by alone with respect to its so-claimed structure to establish meanings for its own sake.

Then, Husserl specifies the characteristics of expression and indication both within communicative speech and lonely mental life (*einsam Seelenleben*) in an oppositional position. Hence, in the latter, expressions unfold their meaning-function but these expressions indicate nothing, by contrast in the communicative speech to mean is always intertwined (*verflochten*) with an indicative relation. Husserl prefers the latter one for overcoming the arisen problems regarding his own phenomenology of language. The idea behind such an understanding is that, for Husserl, lively experiences, namely the representations of the subject, cannot be carried through expressions. So, one's representations could be only indicated to others. That's to say, in a soliloquy one does not speak to oneself by using words as signs of one's own inner experiences. For Husserl, while I am talking to myself, it is not through actual, sensible words, since in such an inwardly experience, we live in the understanding of a word and we do not need the actual word instead, what we live is the imagined (*vorgestellten*) words and and this way of unrealistic characterized expressions directly points without indication.

“But if we reflect of expression to meaning, and to this end break up our complex, intimately unified experience of the sense-filled expression, into the two factors of word and sense, the word comes before us as intrinsically indifferent, whereas the sense seems the thing aimed at by the verbal sign and meant by its means: *the expression seems to direct interest away from itself towards its sense, and to point*

to the latter. But this pointing is not an indication in the sense previously discussed*”⁵⁴

Husserl conceives the possibility of an inner monologue through imagination (*Phantasie*). However, what is imagined by imagination not the images of the words, but the imaginative presentations (*Phantasievorstellung*) of the words. In inner thinking and speaking a flow of imaginative representations is accomplished. With Husserl’s own words:

“In imagination a spoken or printed word floats before us, though in reality it has no existence. We should not, however, confuse imaginative presentations, and the image-contents they rest on, with their imagined objects. The imagined verbal sound (Wortlaut), or the imagined printed word, does not exist, only its imaginative presentations does so. The difference is the difference between imagined centaurs and the imagination of such beings.”⁵⁵

Now, it would be appropriate to mention another characteristical difference between expression and indication which is that the former is to mean something in a categorially articulated manner, whereas indication has nothing to do with categoriality. It functions through a sensible way as a mere intuition or perception. Even in the case of communicative speech, for the indication (*Kundgabe*) and the receipt of indication (*Kundnahme*), there is no any conceptual grasp, since an expression of any speaker functions for a hearer as an indication of the thought of the speech of a certain speaker. In communication, expressions function as an indication and do not have meaning-function. What is received by the hearer is nothing but the thought, or let’s say “meaning-intention”, of the speaker’s speech as the content of the

⁵⁴ L.I./1 p. 279, Hua XIX/1, p. 42 * i.e. in communicative speech [Mention belongs to me]

⁵⁵ Hua XIX/I, p. 42; L.I./I, p.279

intimated experience of the speaker. Thus, through this acquisition, the hearer does not accomplish a judgment but only gets the other's speaking as a perception. Husserl offers a narrow sense and a wider sense of "indicating-function".

"...all expressions in *communicative* speech function as *indications*. They serve the hearer as signs of the 'thoughts' of the speaker, i.e. of his sense-giving inner experiences, as well as of the other inner experiences which are part of his communicative intention. This function of verbal expressions we shall call their *intimating function*."⁵⁶

In the narrow sense, it is "*sense-giving acts*, while the *wider* sense will cover *all* acts that a hearer may introject into a speaker on the basis of what he says (possibly because he tells us of such acts)."⁵⁷ So to speak, according to Husserl's instance, whenever we state a wish, in the narrow sense we only indicate our judgment concerning that wish, but that does not, in fact, indicate that wish. It could be indicated only through a wider sense.

In the primary distinction, expressions have both physical side, that is as sensible signs they have verbal sound (*Wortlaut*), or pressed signs and psychic side as well which is performed by virtue of meaning-function as an intentional act. Through the accomplishment of such an intentional act, the signs are related to the signified object of reference. In other words, an expression, by virtue of its meaning, is directed intentionally to the object about which the expression speaks of (*Gegenstandswörter*). Husserl gives particular emphasis to this term especially in an extended way in his '1908 Lecture on Meaning' in terms of its place within the process of

⁵⁶ L.I./1 p. 277, Hua XIX/1, p. 40

⁵⁷ Hua XIX/I, p. 40; L.I./I, p.277

realizing an act of meaning. In the first Investigation, Husserl presents concisely the relation between meaning and objective reference (*Gegenständliches Beziehung*) in the following way:

“An expression means only when it acquires an objective reference, it can be rightly said the expression signifies (names) the object through its meaning. An act of meaning (*Bedeuten*) is the determinate manner of intending (*Meinen*) of particular object, though this mode of significant intending and thereby the meaning itself could change while holding identical the objective reference (*Richtung*).”⁵⁸

In the second distinction, Husserl separates the meaning-function of expression which is essential to expression, in the sense of meaning-intention [or as he says meaning-conferring (*bedeutungsverleihend Akt*) acts⁵⁹], from its intuitive function which is not essential to expression. Through intuitive fulfilling, the relation of the expression to the expressed object is *constituted*. Only by means of the intuitive fulfilling the empty meaning-intention, which remains as *unrealised*, turns into *realised* in reference to the expression of its object and only through this intuitive fulfilling act, an expression is to be more than a verbal sound which is called by Husserl as “the appearance (*Erscheinung*) of the expression”⁶⁰. Thus, expression is to be a verbal sound as an animated with sense (*sinnbelebter*). It is here noteworthy to remark that for Husserl, appearance itself and what appears in this appearance are not equivalent. Well, it could be claimed that these two distinctions bring about some problems that Husserl would present a tentative analysis still after *Logical Investigations*. The foremost prominent problems are dealing with how the meaning-

⁵⁸ Hua XIX/I, p.54-55; L.I./I, p.289

⁵⁹ Hua XIX/I, p. 44; L.I./I, p.281

⁶⁰ Hua XIX/I, p. 44; L.I./I, p.280

conferring empty-intention unifies with the verbal sound and also how the wordless recognition could be achieved on the ground of mere intuition.

To notice, the fulfilling of the empty meaning-intention is not a necessary operation. With Husserl's own words, 'a name, e.g., names its object whatever the circumstances, in so far as it m e a n s (*m e i n t*) that object. But the object is not intuitively before one, and so not before one as a named or meant object, mere meaning (*Meinung*) is all there is to it."⁶¹ So, according to this passage, meaning-intention as an intentional act is *unconditionally* functioning regardless of intuitive fulfilling act. In other words, here Husserl implies that mere intention is characterized as an act of thought, or supposition (*Vermeinen*). It has a different characterisation than intuitive fulfilling act which is to be applying to present or past perceptual contact. To intend is *independent* from any perceptual presence of any object. The distinction between intention and fulfillment will be extended by Husserl within the field of his theory of knowledge in the last Investigation, through making some contributions to its application such as by inserting a new kind of acts, namely, "signifying acts" which also runs according to intending-fulfilling pair.

Now, Husserl speaks of "the phenomenological unity of these acts", which is the title of the tenth chapter of the I. Investigation. These two acts "form an inner fused (*verschmolzene*) unity of peculiar character"⁶² and they are not an "aggregate of simultaneously given items in consciousness". In other words, they are not operating as if running subsequently. Act of fulfilling is not added to act of intending as a separate process as such.

Meaning as such is seen here as the object of a detailed investigation, of which from the beginning of the first chapters of I. Investigation Husserl deals with the

⁶¹ Hua XIX/I, p. 44, L.I/I, p.280

⁶² Hua XIX/I, p. 45, L.I/I, p.282

intentionality of meaning, or meaning-intention (*Bedeutungsintention*). Evidently, it requires to notice that this first step is, as committing a prominent breakthrough character, the essential difference in contrast to Brentano's model of intentionality which has nothing to do with meaning. Since the main character of the latter's model of intentionality is presented as in the formula: 'relation to a content' (*Beziehung auf einen Inhalt*) or object. Accordingly, his main claim proceeds in this way: Every psychical activity is characterized as such by the relation to something as an object. Therefore, Husserl's conception of meaning-intention can be deemed as a new way of intentionality which is a *rupture* from the Brentanian model of intentionality. However, the case is not so simple because the above-mentioned infusion between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilling occurs through the appearance of linguistic signs in the sense of expression with verbal sounds, which produces complication pertained to how to assign the status of signs in between the realization of act of meaning as lived experiences and abstract, ideal content of meaning. Their status is to be puzzling, I will later address to it, as to whether they would be contingent or have a strict necessity.

In the fifth Investigation, by means of developing a crucial distinction between reel and intentional content, which would again in *Ideen* deployed as a central distinction in a revised manner, Husserl presents an account of intentionality, as you will see in the next chapter, different from that found in the first Investigation. By changing his views, Husserl begins to evaluate each different kind of act as sense itself in the broadest way. Meaning is attributed *only* for the meaning of expressions whereas sense is for all other non-linguistic phenomena.

Before finishing the section, let me touch on some points about 'linguistic meaning' communicative speech. Husserl finds his methodological certainty through

immediacy in the way of pointing without indicating, since only in this, the way to ideal meanings would be opened. However, separating the expressing from the indication function would be like isolating the color of an object from its extension⁶³. Husserl claims that “Each expression not merely says something, but says it *of* something.”⁶⁴ But, in communication each expression is also *to* say someone. Yet, in one place from the 1914 dated writings of the revision of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl talks about the difficulties of the phenomenological clarification of the correlative conscious situations (Bewusstseinslagen) of addresser and addressee with a given example. This example⁶⁵ is important to get a better understanding of why Husserl never reaches to grasp a ‘linguistic meaning’ con-text in a dialogical manner. First, he takes into consideration of a reciprocal speaking as reciprocal perceptual representations of both speakers. That is to say, speaker A has a representation of B as an addressee and the same for B for A. Then the speaker A has a representation for itself as an addresser to B, secondly B reflects over itself this first level mutuality and A does it either, and thereby this process goes to infinite regress. But he totally ignores the content of the speaking, way of speaking, speakers’ circumstances, conventions, and mentions no understanding about ‘what is said’. The origin of this lack, in Husserl’s phenomenology, is based on not dealing with ‘sentences’, even talking on dialogue, but relies upon giving priority to ‘intentionality of perception’ rather than ‘intentionality of (linguistic) meaning’. This claim is also at work for

⁶³ Donn Welton, “The Origins of Meaning”, p. 27-28

⁶⁴ L.I./1 p. , Hua XIX/1, p. 52

⁶⁵ Hua XX/2, p.36 : “Zum Beispiel, der Adressant A stellt seinen Adressaten B vor als sein Gegenüber und als sein Sprechen verstehend. Dieses vorgestellte Verstehen ist aber nichts anderes, wird man sagen, als ein vorgestelltes Vorstellen des B des Verhältnisses, dass A das und das spricht und zu ihm, dem B, spricht; also hat A einmal die perzeptive Vorstellung von B, fürs Zweite eine vorgestellte Vorstellung von B, wie er andererseits von sich einmal die direkte innere Erfahrung hat und fürs Zweite eine Vorstellung hat, nämlich die er dem B als Angeredeten und ihn Verstehenden einlegt. Nun ist aber B in der Vorstellungs-Vorstellung des A vorgestellt als Angeredeter, also auch als die Anrede Verstehender, also den A als zu ihm sprechend Auffassender, also kommen wir auf eine dritte A-Vorstellung und eine dritte B-Vorstellung usw. *in infinitum*. Es scheinen also A und B sich nicht nur wechselseitig vorzustellen, sondern unendlich vielfältig vorstellen zu müssen.

meaning-intention, whose ultimate aim is to be satisfied intuitively by the act of meaning-fulfilling. So, Husserl's phenomenology deals with statements, names, and also syntax, that we encounter in lots of instances in the *Logical Investigations*, and also in his lecture records before and after the *Logical Investigations*, but always in relation to perceptual relation and motivated by the concern of what they show, and how they show it. We can find this priority of perceptual sense also, for instance, in his 1908 lecture: "The essence of perceiving determines here (he gives this example, 'This is a green tree') the possible essence of expressing and predicating meaning-intention."⁶⁶

Therefore, to exclude the material side of the sign has a crucial consequence towards neglecting the determination of the 'linguistic meaning' which is informed in the web of the different signifiers, as a 'chain of signifiers'⁶⁷ or in the context of 'linguistic meaning'.

Now, apparently the indication (Anzeichen) and the pointing (Hinzeigen) function belong to each other, and they are not operating separately. The indication is attached to a certain transcendent but indicates which is absent. What makes possible that attachment is a pointing function which is the non-corporeal side of the sign, whereas the corporeal side is sounded word (Wortlaut). Since after the *Logical Investigations* Husserl kept on working on these terms⁶⁸ for many years, now and then we come across the pointing function in different manner.

⁶⁶ Hua XXVI, p.211

⁶⁷ Rudolf Bernet, "Husserl's Theory of Signs Revisited", p. 9-10: "...blindness toward a contextual form of meaning production are due to a strong logical and psychological interest which makes Husserl practically reduce the sign to the function of signifying and to reduce this function itself to an indirect intentional acts of consciousness". Bernet does not go into a distinction as contextual form of 'linguistic meaning'. However, as I will mention in Husserl there is a contextuality, but a perceptual contextuality based on the occasionality.

⁶⁸ Mostly I will use particularly, among these texts, Hua XXVI and Hua XX/2

2.1.2. Names and Statements: Nominal Acts and Propositional Acts

As it was set out in the first section, since Husserl's main concern is to ground logic in a strict certainty, he undertakes to offer elaborated clarifications of particular terms such as sign, indication, and expression. All the made distinctions among them is aimed to constitute a firm basis for logic, at issue. Among these terms "expression", which are to be the carriers of meaning, that Husserl deals with in the V. Investigation are names and statements. For Husserl, in general sense, names are 'expressions of representations'⁶⁹. So to speak, since Husserl in this definition uses representation in the sense of objectifying act, it amounts to say that names are expressions of objectifying acts. More precisely, Husserl employs the term representation "to cover acts in which something becomes objective (gegenständlich) to us"⁷⁰ likewise the manner in which perception grasps its object in a single-rayed (einstrahlig) way. As a general pattern, Husserl applies, as elsewhere in Logical Investigations, another correspondency between names, statements, and their intentional acts. Respectively, names correspond to nominal acts that are pre-predicative (vorprädikative), and statements correspond to propositional acts that are predicative. Only their act-matter is different. Ensuing, nominal acts are *single-rayed acts* and propositional acts are *many-rayed acts*. The determination that names indicate single-rayed nominal acts amount to say that a nominal act indicates only one object, e.g. 'the horse' but not 'the horse and the cat', because a name is *directed* only one object. But there may be some

⁶⁹ Hua XIX/I, p.477 ; L.I./II, p.622

⁷⁰ *ibid*

exceptional examples in the case of proper names. For instance⁷¹, the play of ‘Romeo and Juliet’ written by Shakespeare is a (proper) name, but as referring to present time, lively two person as ‘Romeo and Juliet’ is not a name.

However, before to make precise these definitions for aiming to give sufficiently a clear idea about what a name is, it needs to lay out Husserl’s general treatment concerning names. So, I will come back to the relation of names, statements and their correlative acts in the following pages. In the first Investigation Husserl exclaims that for each name it is valid to distinguish its two functions: “what it indicates (psychic lived experiences) and what it means”⁷² Nonetheless, the first function indication (Kundgabe) only indicates in a communicative speech, but in a soliloquy it does not.

Against the current understanding, Husserl does not understand by names merely nouns. To be a name, it requires definite or indefinite articles in addition to nouns whether they are coupled with an attributive or relative clause. So, words or words-groupings that are to be counted as names “when they either stand for some *complete simple subject of a statement* (thereby expressing a complete subject-act) , or at least *could* perform such a simple subject-function in a statement without change”⁷³. The given examples for name, as a subject of a statement or a subject-function, are as follows: “ ‘The horse’, ‘a bunch of flowers’, ‘a house built of sandstone’, ‘the opening of a Reichstag’, also expressions like ‘that the Reichstag has been opened’ are names.”⁷⁴ According to this definition of ‘name’ as a subject-position, a remarkable instance is that the word ‘and’, which has a syncategorematic

⁷¹ Verena Mayer/ Christopher Erhard, “Die Bedeutung objectivierender Akte”; in “Logische Untersuchungen”, edited by Verena Mayer and Christopher Erhard, p. 173

⁷² Hua XIX/I, p.38 ; L.I/I, p.276

⁷³ Hua XIX/I, p.481; L.I/II, p.625

⁷⁴ *ibid*

meaning for Husserl, could be a name as well as in the following question: “*And* is a particle ?”⁷⁵

Yet, not all subject positions are assigned to be name. Only categoric manner of subject positions could be possibly ascribed as names, but not necessarily. Whereas conjunctive or disjunctive forms of subject positions are excluded from the field of names. So to speak, word groupings in the form of ‘A and B are P’ (the former) and ‘A or B is P’ (the latter)⁷⁶ could not be a name, since they are not standing for a complete simple subject of a statement.

Though Husserl here offers *the only* condition of a name from the aspect of executing a subject-function; yet, Husserl had already given a predicate functioning to the names in the I. Investigation, as we will stress in section 2.3. Namely, as an example of the sort of expression which has the same meaning but different objective reference (Beziehung), e.g. ‘Bucephalus is a horse’ and ‘That cart-horse is a horse’. Therefore, contrary to Husserl’s assertion, in the I. and V. Investigation, we can find incompatible different definitions of name, both as a subject position and predicate position. This situation weakens the strictness of the definition of name in the V. Investigation.

In ensuing, it is seen that Husserl in elsewhere offers two different types of name, as in the following manner.

Separate from the definition of names within a statement, Husserl had already in the II. Investigation made a distinction in the field of names: ‘individual names’ or as its synonym ‘proper names’ like ‘Socrates’, ‘Athens’ and ‘specific names’ like ‘Red’, ‘Four’. Here, Husserl defines the term ‘name’ in relation to object and meaning. That is, he says “to these names certain meanings correspond, and through

⁷⁵ Verena Mayer/ Christopher Erhard, “Die Bedeutung objectivirender Akte”; in “Logische Untersuchungen”, edited by Verena Mayer and Christopher Erhard, p. 173

⁷⁶ *ibid*

these we refer to objects.”⁷⁷ The object of a proper name, e.g. ‘Socrates’, is the person Socrates, namely the individual object, whereas the number four or the colour Red are ideal objects. In reference to its object a proper name does not function as an indication. On the other hand, in the statement ‘Four is a prime number relatively to seven’, what is meant by the name ‘four’ is the Species Four.

This determination concerning the specific names brings about an unclarity in relation to their objects. Hence, the Species ‘one’ “whose meaning never differs but anyone should not identify the various ‘ones’ which occur in a sum: they all mean the same, but they differ in objective reference.”⁷⁸ Then the case seems imprecise because, for ex., if ‘one’ is to be used as a predicate like the instances in the previous paragraph, the answer to the question of what would be then the object of the name as species ‘one’ would remain obscure. In addition, for Husserl various people have the same name ‘Socrates’, therefore it means different for each particular Socrates which is called as ‘equivocal’, whereas Husserl remarkably contrives *‘the number two’ (die Zwei), redness (die Röte) as proper names* which name general objects. He asserts that “wherever the word has one meaning, it also names one object.”⁷⁹ Then, Husserl distinguishes the equivocal names that have *many* meanings (*vieldeutigen*) from the latter many *values [universal, comprehensive (vielumfassenden)] names*. So, it is quite obscure how Husserl understands the distinction between specific name (‘four’, ‘red’) and the proper name of general objects (‘the number four’, ‘redness’). This account of names is evidently incompatible with the above-mentioned requisition of the definite or indefinite article for names. Now, what is named is an object and it has no connection with the representation of that certain object. Through this

⁷⁷ Hua XIX/I, p.144; L.I./I, p.366

⁷⁸ Hua XIX/I, p.53; L.I./I, p.288

⁷⁹ *ibid*

determination, Husserl criticizes Mill's view of proper names which, allegedly, confuses of both⁸⁰.

2.1.2.1. Positing and Non-Positing Names

Both positing (setzend) and non-positing names correlate to some nominal acts whether the related objectivity exists or not. But, as a term, for Husserl, a positing name intends and names its object as 'actually existent (wirklich seiend)'⁸¹ The suggested instances for positing names are 'Prince Henry', 'the statue of Roland in the market place', 'the postman hurrying by'. Husserl, in a quite weaken manner offers a condition for these names. That is, if someone uses these names "in sincere discourse and in normal sense" (in wahrhafter Rede und in normalem Sinne), then 'knows' that Prince Henry is a real and not a mythic person, that a statue of Roland does stand in the market place"⁸². Ensuing, only the name 'S' is enough to imply its existence without employing a statement which says 'that S exists'. In this sense, for Husserl, naming and stating are not identical. Yet, here the apparent deficit of supposing in a certain naming such as 'Prince Henry, is its necessary consequent that Husserl ignores the possibility of 'Prince Henry' which could be as a mythic person. According to Husserl, "A statement can never function as a name, nor a name as a statement, without changing its essential nature, i.e., its semantic (bedeutungsmäßig) essence."⁸³

Husserl specifies the term 'semantic essence' as a condition of the act's intentional essence. In the case of meaning-conferring acts to expressions, the semantic essence of the acts of meaning-conferring constitutes "the reel phenomenological correlate of their meaning" which "coincides with its intentional

⁸⁰ Hua XIX/I, p.63; L.I/I, p.295

⁸¹ Hua XIX/I, p.481; L.I/II, p.625

⁸² Hua XIX/I, p.482; L.I/II, p.625

⁸³ Hua XIX/I, p.494; L.I/II, p.634

essence.”⁸⁴ So to speak, when a statement, ‘the earth is round’, is stated for many times through many individual acts of meaning-conferring by different persons or by the same person in different times, the identity of the statement consists in an identity of meaning “repeated as the same” and “represented in them by their semantic essence.” In other words, though the ideal meanings are not dependent to change, in their real phenomenological correlate acts of meaning-conferring depend to change. By means of introducing the term ‘semantic essence’, therefore, Husserl suggests to obtain the identity of a statement, or the identity of multitude individual acts. However, this introduction of the term does not entirely work out the problem of the instantiation of ideal meanings.

By the way, it requires to address that existence-valued character of positing is not restricted with names but it is also to be assigned to the intuitive presentations (sense-perception, recollection, and anticipation) which are not themselves in anyway nominal. Rather, they contribute to the fulfillment of the nominal acts of meaning. Next to nominal acts, these intuitive representations, whether single-rayed acts or many-rayed acts, could also function as positing or non-positing. Therefore, illusions are considered, by Husserl, as non-positing intuitive presentations⁸⁵. In other words, between positing acts and non-positing acts the difference lies not in the act-matter, because it is the same, but in act-quality. And one of the most contested point is that whether to posit an intuitive representation is independent from applying any nominal acts. Noticeably, here Husserl understands from the term act-quality slightly different from his first usage, namely as concerning the kind of acts such as judgment, perception, recollection, etc. This new understanding of act-quality is extended in

⁸⁴ Hua XIX/I, p.435; L.I./II, p.593

⁸⁵ Hua XIX/I, p.483; L.I./II, p.626

Ideen I, by changing slightly to the doxical modifications through undertaking new attitudes (*Stellungnahme*) as to confronting one's own lively experience.

Nominal acts are categorial acts that do not need a particular propositional act in order to be accomplished. However, each propositional act contains nominal acts as parts of a proposition. "All predicative acts are categorial. But categorial acts could also be non-predicative. A grasping (*Auffassen*) or recognizing, for instance, on the ground of mere perception, without words and word-meanings, catches (*faßt*) in itself certain categorial act-forms, but which are not predicative."⁸⁶

Next, for Husserl, even a positing name is not a statement, that is, no independent predication, yet it has affinities with predicative judgments. For instance⁸⁷, a positing name 'the postman hurrying by' implies as a presupposition to the judgment 'The postman is hurrying by'. The intentional content of them is indifferent, but their verbal form differs. Here, this positing name may function as an indication for "the thetic subject-function, which points towards the predicative positing." In elsewhere, Husserl deals with the positing names in the form of 'that clauses'. Accordingly, "That rain has set in at last, will delight the farmers"⁸⁸. This declarative sentence (*Aussagesatz*) appears to have two functions: to function as an actual statement and name. The latter is so because the subject-sentence is a name, "That rain has set in at last". What the farmers are glad *about*, is the state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*) appears in the manner of "that so-and-so" is the fact, so to speak, "that at last rain has fallen". This state of affairs is unchanged and posited as existent even it is named in various ways⁸⁹: "this", "this fact", "the fact of the set-in rain, of the setting in of the rain", "that the rain has set in". As 'that clauses' four of them are

⁸⁶ Hua XXVI, p. 59

⁸⁷ Hua XIX/I, p.485; L.I./II, p.627

⁸⁸ Hua XIX/I, p.490; L.I./II, p.631

⁸⁹ Hua XIX/I, p.491; L.I./II, p.632

names and have the same sense since what they name is the same empirical fact. So, what is the precise difference between the naming and the statement of the state of affairs, that is, “Rain has at last set in”? The second part of the sentence, “That will delight the farmers”, is the dependent thesis of the first thesis, “Rain has at last set in”. The dependent thesis is “a thus and thus qualified psychic event” which points to the empirical fact that rain at last has fallen. Husserl separates ‘naming a judgment’ from ‘naming some state of affairs as a logical subject’. So to speak, “That S is P is delightful” is a judgment and it judges about some state of affairs, but the judgment is not delightful. What is delightful is the state of affairs. In fact, the so-called difference between a name and a statement is not something lively experience. The only difference is that a name posits the state of affairs nominally which is single-rayed act, whereas statement posits the state of affairs propositionally in a many-rayed act. This is based on the idea that every act is either an objectifying act or founded on another objectifying act. In fact this idea is the modified way of the more original Formula, that is, “each act is either a representation, or is founded on one or more representations.”⁹⁰ Simply, many-rayed acts have many-rayed propositional matter and they are founded upon single-rayed acts which have single-rayed nominal matter. Yet, both are positing objectifying acts. Husserl clarifies that the difference between conferring meaning for naming and statement is in ‘*intentional essence*, and therefore in *act-species*.’⁹¹

2.2. Intentionality: Act, Object, Meaning

In 1925 Lectures Husserl succinctly expresses the exclusive theme of the Logical Investigations “as the psychic as correlative to the objectivities (Gegenständlichkeiten) intended in each case (and especially the logically ideal

⁹⁰ Hua XIX/I, p.491; L.I./II, p.632

⁹¹ Hua XIX/I, p.496; L.I./II, p.636

objectivities), thus, the multiplicity of psychic modes in which, purely in the immanence of psychic life, concepts, judgments, theories, are formed as ideally identical unities of sense”⁹². Here, the mentioned correlation between the psychic experience and the objectivities (sensible, reel or categorial, ideal) occupies one of the central themes of Husserl’s throughout philosophy career in order to overcome the problems arisen from the irreconciliated objects of the science of logic and psychic experiences. We can see this correlation as a pattern extended in so many fields, but in the foremost between the object of experience and the mode of givenness. Husserl, in his later seminal work, ‘Crisis’, emphasizes this matter of correlation as a spreading task for his whole philosophical career. In particular, Husserl asserts that before his “first breakthrough of ‘transcendental phenomenology’ in the Logical Investigations” no anyone in philosophy had ever evoked wonder, though it was felt among the pre-Socratics and Sophists, of “the correlation between world (the world of which we always speak of) and its subjective manners of givenness”⁹³. Husserl tells us the significance of this breakthrough within his personal history as follows:

“The first breakthrough of this universal apriori of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness (which occurred during work on my Logical Investigations around 1898) affected me so deeply that my whole subsequent life-work has been dominated by the task of systematically elaborating on this apriori of correlation.”⁹⁴

First of all, to acquire essentials of Husserl’s phenomenology demands a clear account of his ‘descriptive eidetic’ analysis of experience in which it is conducted in

⁹² Hua, IX, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, p. 37

⁹³ Hua VI, p.168; “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”, p.165

⁹⁴ Hua VI, p.169; “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”, p.166

the fifth Investigation. In this Investigation, Husserl presents his own solution to intentional experiences and their contents mainly through making criticisms of Brentano and Twardowski's way of intentionality. So, primarily for Husserl all experiences are not characterized as intentional. Apart from Brentano who acclaims sensible contents as also something intended, or directed on something under the title of 'psychic phenomena'; Husserl dismissed sensible contents as only 'experience', rather than 'intentional experience'. Husserl explicitly clarifies, to make clear the terminology required for his project of phenomenology, to avoid Brentano's expression of 'psychic phenomena', instead he proposes to use 'intentional experiences', of which this adjective 'intentional', as Husserl states, "names the essence common to the class of experiences,... the peculiarity of *intending* (*Intention*), to refer in the way of presentation...to a objectivity." Accordingly, the phenomenology of intentional experiences could be achieved only through thematizing the intentional objectivity of these experiences, and this objectivity is intended by a particular act. So, for brief usage of 'intentional experience' Husserl prefers to use the term 'act'⁹⁵. This 'act' consists of both reel contents and intentional contents which in below will be laid out. However, Husserl suggests that his present analysis does not have any purpose to resolve acts into their parts, rather the analysis tries to distinguish the 'abstract moments' in acts, "they are moments contained in the essence of the acts themselves."⁹⁶

Husserl acknowledges that the term 'act' is the most controversial term in descriptive psychology (in the second edition, descriptive phenomenology); moreover the account of act would be decisive in terms of consciousness, since Husserl's one of

⁹⁵ Hua XIX/I, p. 392 ; L.I. /II p.562

⁹⁶ Hua XIX/I, p. 475 ; L.I./ II, p. 621

three conceptions of consciousness is laid out “as a comprehensive designation for ‘psychic acts’ or ‘intentional experiences’, of all sorts.”⁹⁷

Since Husserl had shaped his way of intentionality through Brentano, firstly we have to take a look at the points which Husserl finds as unsuitable and ambiguous. According to Brentano’s distinction, namely physical and psychical phenomena, what is characteristic of psychic phenomena is the reference to an object, and they are presentations or have presentations as their foundations. Both of them are ill-defined properties. For instantiating the first property Brentano says that in presentation something is presented, in judgment something judged, in love something loved, in hate something hated, in desire something desired. This property is expressed by Brentano in the following way:

“Every psychic phenomenon is characterized by what the medieval schoolmen called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and by what we, not without ambiguity, call the relation to a content, the direction to an object (by which a reality is not to be understood) or an immanent objectivity. Each mental phenomenon contains something as object in itself, though not all in the same manner.”⁹⁸

Well, this ‘intentional inexistence’ or ‘intentional reference’ brought about a long discussion among many philosophers at that time. In this account, the object of an act is contained in the act. Husserl criticizes this relation between two things, namely an act and an intentional object, which are *reel* in consciousness and considers it as “a sort of box-within-box structure (Ineinanderschachtelung) of psychic

⁹⁷ Hua XIX/I, p. 356 ; L.I./ II, p. 535

⁹⁸ Brentano, “Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 68; “Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt”, I. Band, 1973, p.124-25

contents”⁹⁹. Through ignoring two things present in experience Husserl rejects the suggested expression ‘immanent objectivity’ to name the essential peculiarity of intentional experiences and ‘mental inexistence’ of an object. So, with Husserl’s own words, “we do not experience object and beside it the intentional object, only one thing is present, the intentional experience, whose essential descriptive character is the intention in question.”¹⁰⁰ Then, every object is already intentional, and since an intentional object only functions as an objective content of a representation, it does not matter, for Husserl, whether the intentional object is real, imaginary or absurd (impossible, for ex. three angled circle) because “for consciousness the given is essentially the same whether it is represented, fictive or absurd”¹⁰¹. This view gives the core of Husserl’s conception of truth, as we will address it later on, according to which depends on the idea that modes of consciousness correlatively correspond to ways of givenness (Gegebenheitsweise) what Husserl called act-quality. A perception of a particular house ahead of me is given to my perception in a particular way of givenness to my consciousness apart from the way of givenness of an imagined God Jupiter, as an example given by Husserl, whose object is given again to my consciousness but just in a different manner. In a concise way, Husserl formulizes it in this way: “if the intended object exists, nothing becomes *phenomenologically* different.”¹⁰²

So, Husserl gives a reconsideration of Brentano’s conception of ‘intentional reference’ chiefly in two points: Firstly, Husserl allows for certain lived experiences which have no intentional reference; for instance a piece of sensed visual field is an experience consists of many part-contents, I see a particular bird in the backyard

⁹⁹ Hua XIX/I, p. 385 ; L.I./II, p. 557

¹⁰⁰ Hua XIX/1, p. 386 ; L.I./II, p. 558

¹⁰¹ Hua XIX/1, p.387 ; L.I./II, p. 559 translation slightly changed

¹⁰² Hua XIX/1, p.387; L.I./II, p. 559 emphasis belongs to me

within too many particular other things as a background which is not the object of my attention, which are not referred to, therefore, not intentionally objective. Secondly, the intentional experiences do not contain something as their object, put in briefly, intentional experience or act is not a container of 'its own products' as objects; for example, a particular judging act does not contain its product as a particular judgment¹⁰³.

Additionally, in the writings of Brentano "object" and "content" are used occasionally as interchangeable terms which cause another ambiguity for Husserl to acquire an elaborated conception of content. Therefore, to make this distinction clear he contrives new terms as reel contents of an act and ideal contents. Reel contents of an act are the psychological contents of the act that these contents depend to an alteration among the same representations of the same thing for the same person for different times, whereas the intentional contents are above the psychological realities. By virtue of the latter, we are allowed to identify representations with separation from subjective contents as the objective content, the ideal meaning.

Reel contents of an act contain two components in an act: sensations (or sensuous contents) and apperception. Husserl conceives sensations in a manner of dumb empirical data. In the same moment different people can perceive, can hear the same twittering of the birds but the sensational contents would differ for each one. What allows for one and the same, for a man, the manifolds of fluid sensational contents which are varied in a particular duration, is apperception. By means of an apperception which is 'a surplus', as in a lived experience, a 'raw existence of sensations' is ensouled (*beseelt*)¹⁰⁴. I see a bird but I do not see my sensations. On the basis of perceptions of different objects, there may lie the same complex of sensation

¹⁰³ For this dispute among the Brentanists, see particularly Twardowski's 'Actions and Products, and Miskiewicz's 'On Actions and Products'

¹⁰⁴ Hua XIX/I, p.399 ; L.I./II, p. 567

contents¹⁰⁵. We are not conscious of sensation contents but of perceived objects are reel conscious (reel bewusst). In other words, we experience (erleben) sensations in a particular consciousness as a perception of a related object. “*Sensations* and the interpreting (auffassend) them, are aliked experienced, but they do not appear as objects...*Objects* on the other hand, appear and are perceived, but they are not experienced.”¹⁰⁶

Now, for instance, a visual perception, whether as a hallucination, illusion or in an ordinary way, is a perception of an object, that’s to say, colour contents receive an ‘objectifying interpretation’¹⁰⁷ in a particular perception and appear as a seen colour. We do not intend to sensations but perceived objects. In that account, for Husserl, appearances and sensations are in the same line. “The appearing of the thing is not the thing which appears (that seems to ‘stand before’ (‘Gegenüberstehende’) us in propria persona (leibhafter Selbstheit).”¹⁰⁸ So, a phenomenological concern is not about ‘appearing of the object as such’ regardless of being experienced. Here, we come across one of the hallmark of Husserl’s thought which deems a correlation between appearances and experiences. In a nutshell, Husserl says: “*The appearances themselves do not appear, they are experienced.*”¹⁰⁹ Therefore, to this extent, we can not talk about appearances that are not experienced and on the contrary, only objects appear. In the case of a lack of apperception, appearances do not have an identity and remain hidden, but objects appear and hence are public. So, since an object is that in which the attributed act pertains to the unity of consciousness, it is intentionally directed; on what, the experiences (both of intentional and non-intentional

¹⁰⁵ Hua XVI, p. 44

¹⁰⁶ Hua XIX/I, p.399 ; L.I./II, p. 567

¹⁰⁷ Hua XIX/I, p.358 ; L.I./II, p. 537

¹⁰⁸ Hua XIX/I, p.359 ; L.I./II, p. 538

¹⁰⁹ Hua XIX/I, p.360 ; L.I./II, p. 538 translation is slightly changed. “Die Erscheinungen selbst erscheinen nicht, sie werden erlebt.” Emphasis is mine.

experiences) are only each reel part of the unity of consciousness. In other words, an act is a representation (*Vorstellung*) which gives to an experiencing subject an object. This definition of act is also entitled, by Husserl, as ‘objectifying act’, that is to say, acts through which something becomes objective to us in a certain manner. Now, it requires to elaborate on the elementary structures of the above-mentioned distinction, namely act-matters and act-quality.

2.2.1. Structures of Objectifying Acts: Act-matter, Act-quality and Intentional Essence

Thus, Husserl distinguishes three conceptions of intentional content; the *intentional object* of the act, the *intentional material* of the act (as opposed to its intentional *quality*) and the *intentional essence* of the act.¹¹⁰

As *abstract moments* of an act, ‘matter’ and ‘quality’ are inseparable and there is no any ‘matter’ apart from an objectifying quality. This intentionally characterized ‘Matter’, which is a phenomenological content of an act, has two functions: 1) it gives act the “reference (*Beziehung*) to an object”, 2) it grasps that object “*as what*”, namely, “the properties, the relations, categorial forms, that it itself attributes”¹¹¹ to object. Whereas ‘quality’ determines the way of given any particular matter, that is; judging, wishing, asking, hoping, etc. In the ultimate sense, ‘matter’ allows for the identity of ‘reference to an object’ in different kinds of nominal or propositional acts. So to speak, the same content may be the content of a representation, judgment, question, doubt, wish, hope, etc. Respectively, as Husserl exemplifies it¹¹², all these the judgment “It will rain today”, the surmise “It may well

¹¹⁰ Hua XIX/I, p.413 ; L.I./II, p. 578

¹¹¹ Hua XIX/I, p.430 ; L.I./II, p. 589

¹¹² Hua XIX/I, p.429 ; L.I./II, p. 588

rain today”, the question “Will it rain today?” and the wish “Oh that it would rain today !” have one and the same state of affairs but each one exemplifies identity in two ways: First, as regards objective reference *in general*, second as regards a *new sense of objective reference*. Even if they refer to the same state of affairs they refer it in a different manner. So, between these both expressions, as it is put above, the first function of ‘matter’ is to be achieved as same, but the second is to be achieved in a different manner. Therefore, the exemplified matter in these instances is *not totally same*. Husserl calls this situation as that they are partially agreed in *intentional essence*, which is the union of ‘quality’ and ‘matter’.

Next to it, “We shall have rain” and “The weather is becoming rainy” have different matters but directed to the same object. Both are partially agreed in intentional essence.

Husserl presents a reconsideration of the pair of matter and quality in the VI. Investigation and changes these terms with others. Then, matter turns into the moment of ‘representation’ (Repräsentation) which is at the very beginning of the Investigation is deployed as a newly coined term. So, Husserl speaks of matter thereafter as “grasping (Auffassung), apperception, sense-giving (Sinnegebung) and quality as positing (Setzung), thesis, position-taking (Stellungnahme)”¹¹³. Then Husserl, in *Ideen*, would remove the pair of terms, namely act-matter and act-quality, and in a modified way begins to use the pair of noema and noesis which are not within the scope of this study.

2.2.2. Objectifying and Non-Objectifying Acts

Objectifying acts are such intentional acts that in which something becomes objective to us. In the widest sense, what becomes objective to us is, for Husserl, the

¹¹³ Melle, Ulrich, “Objektivierende und nicht-objektivierende Akte”, in “Husserl-Ausgabe and Husserl-Forschung”, ed. by Samuel IJsseling, p. 38

presentations. So, objectifying acts designates representations. Therefore, through non-objectifying acts directly nothing becomes objective to us, that is, they can not direct by themselves to any intentional object. But they become objective to us via an underlying objectifying act. For instance, a fear is underlying on a representation, but we live through a fear not the ‘representation’ of that certain fear. In other words, there is no objectless fear. Briefly, for Husserl, each act is either an objectifying act or has its ground on an objectifying act in itself¹¹⁴. This formula, which is encountered in multiple times in *Logical Investigations*, is a reformulation of Brentano’s general formula, namely, “all psychic phenomena are either representations or founded on presentations as their grounds.”¹¹⁵

Since objectifying acts designates representations, in the extent of the various kind of representations, Husserl speaks of, there is a quite long list of distinguished acts. Pre-predicative acts such as categorial acts, nominal acts (in fact, categorial acts are nominal acts and vice versa), perceptual acts are objectifying acts as well as predicative acts such as judgmental acts and propositional acts. Both for nominal and propositional acts, Husserl presents another distinction of positing and non-positing acts. Next to them, as it is displayed in the first Investigation, both meaning-intentions and meaning-fulfillment acts fall under the same class of objectifying acts. Besides, in the revised version of the VI. Investigation in 1913, Husserl, this time makes another distinction between signitive and significative acts. In sum, for Husserl, all these acts are objectifying acts¹¹⁶.

¹¹⁴ Hua XIX/I, p.514; L.I./II, p.648

¹¹⁵ Brentano, “Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt”, p. 120 / Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint, p. 65

¹¹⁶ See the tables on classification of acts in Mohanty, “Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning”, p.47/97

“We can define objectifying acts as those whose syntheses of fulfillment have a character of identification, while their synthesis of frustration has a character of distinction.”¹¹⁷ Hence, as members of possible syntheses of identification and distinction, objectifying acts have “a possible knowledge-function.”

So, if we talk about, let's assume, one 'matter' which is to be founded on another 'matter(s)'. Then, the matter of this complex act is based on the simple 'matter'. Therefore, whether it is a single-rayed act or many-rayed act, on the basis of all acts there lies 'nominal acts' (or according to the most preferred term in VI. Investigation, it is 'categorical acts'). In other words, “each ultimately underlying objectifying act is nominal.”¹¹⁸ If we remind that the only carrier of the matter of an act is the objectifying act, then it could be claimed nominal acts only bear the matter of an act, rather than its quality.

Even though Husserl in his ethic lectures of 1911 identifies objectifying acts as belong to intellectual acts and non-objectifying acts as belong to feeling-acts and will-acts, this identification is not appropriate for *Logical Investigations*, because within the extent of the latter some intellectual acts such as asking and supposing are non-objectifying acts. Then, how could be objectifying and non-objectifying acts distinguished in an exact way? In a non-objectifying act, for instance of an act of asking, what is represented is not what is asked about rather only the act of asking itself, whereas objectifying acts modified through their qualities which are characterized by the 'belief' to the matter, for example, appears as positing or non-positing acts. Therefore, we can conclude that the main distinguished character of non-objectifying acts is that they do not have content. It is possible to think of them as

¹¹⁷ Hua XIX/II, p. 585 ; L.I./II, p. 709

¹¹⁸ Hua XIX/I, p.519 ; L.I./II, p.651

performing an act of asking without anything asked, or to experience an act of wishing without anything wished.

Thus, since only the meaning-bestowing acts are meaning-intention acts, namely, objectifying acts, it follows that non-objectifying acts do not bestow any meaning. Husserl conceives them as being built upon judgments¹¹⁹ which are also objectifying acts, but *they have no involvement, interference* on the content of judgment, or let's say the judged about, that is the state of affairs (Sachverhalt). For example, in the following sentences since the content of the judgment is the same, their meanings are the same: "the weather is sunny", "I wish the weather is sunny", "I hope the weather is sunny", "I am afraid the weather is sunny". Or if we would utter "The weather is sunny." and "Is the weather sunny?" , they would have the same content as well, but the difference depends on containing different non-objectifying acts.

In the revised version of the Investigations (Hua XX/2), we can find interesting doubtful remarks on the basic underlying idea of objectifying acts that they do not have contents. Husserl asks in elsewhere in a likewise manner "whether there is content of asking, content of wishing, content of desire corresponding to the content of judgment, whether we have 'appearances' of state of affairs (Sachverhalten) and parallel appearances of state of wishing (Wunschverhalten), state of willing (Willensverhalten)"¹²⁰ So to speak, if we admit that in the way of his new suggestion, it could be talked about there are state of wishing, state of asking, state of hoping, etc. next to state of affairs, which is one of the the main underlying idea within the general structure of the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* would, then, be *replaced*.

¹¹⁹ See below, Chapter 4.1.

¹²⁰ Hua XX/II, p. 249

In another place, Husserl explicitly accepts this above assumption, and claims that “we have a doctrine of apophantical forms, but also a doctrine of suppositional sentence forms (Formenlehre der Vermutungssätze), doctrine of possibility sentence forms.”¹²¹ In the footnote of the same page Husserl likewise mentions apophantical judgments as ‘state of affairs–judgment’ and non-apophantical judgments as various modalified judgments¹²².

Though such novelties with respect to his underlying ideas do not replace the main pattern of ‘S...P’, in order to conceive all apophantical expressions on the model of a relation between subject and predicate. What Husserl essentially sustains in the new drafts is that only categorical judgments (S is P) could be assigned to be a judgment in the exact sense. In support of this view, he argues more that “The different ground forms of categorical statements, with the ground form S P, in the wider sense apophantical predicatives, then could vary in the same manner, through conjunction, disjunction, and hypothetical and causal modification and unification.”¹²³

However, the point is that the non-apophantical expressions are not to describe any state of affairs. Given that they do not include any objectifying acts, that is, do not make anything as their object, in fact, they could not be counted in the field of expressions because from the respect of intentionality, objectlessness amounts to say meaninglessness at the same time. However, Husserl makes a sort of juggling to save his model¹²⁴.

¹²¹ Hua XX/II, p. 445

¹²² *ibid.* “ ‘Identifizierendes’ Urteil, apophantisches Urteil (Sachverhalts-Urteil), Vermutung, Möglichkeitsurteil, modalisiertes Urteil (Möglichkeitsinhalt, Vermutungsinhalt), Werurteil, axiologisches, praktisches Urteil (Wunschinhalt, Willensinhalt)”

¹²³ Hua XX/II, p. 446

¹²⁴ See below Chapter 4.1.

2.3. Ideal Meanings and Act of Meaning

For Husserl, ideal meanings do not change by reel, individual meaning-bestowing acts. An ideal meaning, which is also characterized as irreel, does not depend on meaning-bestowing acts carried out by different people in different times. If I say, as Husserl put, “The three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect in a point”, this statement has two sides: psychic side as a judgment act of a certain consciousness which is accomplished through an appearance of expression and the ideal content of the judgment which is irreel, and could be instantiated, quoted, repeated by manifold acts. The content of the above judgment is independent of my thinking of it. “Multiplication of persons and acts does not multiply propositional meanings; the judgment in the ideal, logical sense remains single.”¹²⁵ This constant identity is the identity of the species and the ideality of meanings is a particular case of the ideality of what is specific.

For Husserl, a species can embrace in unity (ζυμβάλλειν εἰς ἓν) “the dispersed multiplicity of individual singulars.”¹²⁶ Here, Husserl presents a correlation between the manifold singulars for the ideal-one meaning and act-moments of meaning. Accordingly, it is claimed three moments, first is the ‘Redness in specie’, the second is its correlate to the slips of paper which lie here and ‘have’ the same redness, the third moment is the individual redness which constitutes its own differentiability as to extension, form. Only the third moment has reality, the second moment is a particular case of what is specific but not the species itself which is the first moment. Husserl conceives species as ‘universal objects’ and meanings constitute a class of concepts in the sense of ‘universal objects’, “but the meaning in which an object is thought, and

¹²⁵ Hua XIX/I, p. 105; L.I./I, p.329

¹²⁶ Hua XIX/I, p. 105-6; L.I./I, p.330

its object, the species itself, are not one and the same.”¹²⁷ Moreover, these meanings which form ‘universal objects’ exist neither in the world nor in a divine mind. So, species is an object and meaning is the thought of that object. Therefore, species and meaning are ‘not one and the same’. Husserl understands being ‘not one and the same’ as not in the sense of distinct or different. Husserl, in the first step, distinguishes the irreel, and in the second step employs an analogy from the sphere of individuals which gives rise to obscurity. Analogy runs in this way: the distinction between “Bismarck himself and representations of Bismarck, e.g. *Bismarck- the greatest of German statesman* etc...the number 4 itself and the representations, i.e. meanings, which have 4 as their object, as e.g., *the number 4 – the second even number in the number-series* etc.”¹²⁸ This idea is to be partially left behind, by Husserl, beginning from the time of his 1908 Lectures, because of its brought about some unresolved situation with respect to the empirical meanings, as what he describes it. I will give below an exposition of it.

On the contrary to the monologue, in a communicative speech an empirical expression is directed to someone functions as an indication, and both my intimation and the receipt of that intimation by the hearer are the manifold of temporally flowing acts that belongs to two separate person’s psychic experiences. Therefore, two separate persons in communication, have separate and not the same representation of the above judgment, even if its content as ideal meaning always remain the same. This is so because Husserl understands the matter as that by reporting that judgment to the hearer, “the hearer perceives the speaker as *manifesting* (äußert) certain psychic experiences, and to that extent, he also *perceives* these experiences themselves: he

¹²⁷ Hua XIX/I, p. 108; L.I./I, p.331

¹²⁸ Hua XIX/I, p. 108; L.I./I, p.331-2

does not, however, himself experience them, he has not an '*inner*' but an '*outer*' perception of them."¹²⁹

So, inner experience could be only, for Husserl, manifested, or say externalized in communicative speech, which could not remain the same with the former. Since the act of meaning-intention is separate from the intimating-function, or, say, communicative acts. Moreover, act of knowing (Erkenntnisakt), which is concisely the unification of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilling, stands separate from intimating-function. Under this determination, every single representation of an objective content (as that of the above judgment) even though articulated in the form of words and also have word-meaning (in the sense of meaning-intention of the words)¹³⁰, they are originally composed of private 'train of thoughts' (Gedankenreihe). Hence, the meaning-carriers are not expressions as linguistic signs, but the psychic acts as intentional acts. Next to it, "The appearances of word (and in general the representations of word) are carrier of meaning acts."¹³¹ Thus, verbal sounds are the carriers of meaning acts, and meaning acts are carriers of meanings in specie. Then, meaning is the ideal content of individual acts and independent from them. It is only possible under Husserl's strict distinction between meaning (Bedeutung) and object (Gegenstand). In fact, under this distinction lies another distinction as its condition. Namely, what an expression says and what an expression says *of something*. It is stated in the following manner:

"Each expression not merely says something, but says it of something: it not only has a meaning, but refers to certain *objects*. This relation sometimes holds in the plural for one and the same expression. But the object never coincides with the meaning...and if

¹²⁹ Hua XIX/I, p. 41; L.I./I, p.278 Emphasis belongs to me

¹³⁰ Hua XIX/I, p. 77; L.I./I, p.307

¹³¹ Hua XXVI, p.13

we distinguish between ‘content’ and ‘object’ in respect of such ‘presentations’(Vorstellungen), one’s distinction means the same as the distinction between *what is meant or said*, on the one hand, and *what is spoken of*, by means of the expression, on the other.”¹³²

By the way, this distinction would also appear in a different manner in *1908 Lectures of Meaning (Hua XVI)*, and *Ideen I*, as one of the basic distinctions between subjective objects regarding the real side of noesis and its noematic correlate, namely, ‘what is judged about (das beurteilte)’ and ‘what is judged (das geurteilte)’¹³³.

So, through this distinction between meaning (content) and object, Husserl claims that several expressions may have the same meaning but different objects, as well as they may have different meanings but the same object. If we exclude Husserl’s extended term of ‘objectivity’(Gegenstandlichkeit), which includes both real objects and properties, presentations, and state of affairs, it is possible to compare Frege’s ‘Meaning’ (Sinn) and ‘Reference’ (Bedeutung). Accordingly, Husserl’s Bedeutung is more or less similar to Frege’s Sinn and Frege’s Bedeutung is similar to Husserl’s Gegenstand. However, to differ the term Sinn and Bedeutung is a suspicious distinction. For, Husserl explicitly claims to use two terms as synonyms¹³⁴. The given examples about this distinction by Husserl is in this way¹³⁵: ‘The victor of Jena’ and ‘The vanquished of Waterloo’ or, the names ‘London’ and ‘Londres’, or ‘the equilateral triangle’ and ‘the equiangular triangle’, or ‘a is greater than b’ and ‘b is smaller than a’ have the same object but different meanings.

¹³² Hua XIX/I, p.52 ; L.I./I, p.287

¹³³ Hua III, p. 216-17

¹³⁴ Hua XIX/I, p.58; L.I./I, p.292

¹³⁵ Hua XIX/I, p.52-53; L.I./I, p.287-88

Firstly, Husserl calls, other than the proper names like ‘London’, the descriptions like ‘The victor of Jena’ or ‘The vanquished of Waterloo’ names. They name the same object, that is, ‘Napoleon’. It is noteworthy to remark that, in *Logical Investigations* one of the most recurred patterns, in different connections, is ‘correlation’. Well, a meaningful name as an expression corresponds not only to a real object or an irreel object, but also a judgment corresponds to a state of affairs, which is another distinguished character belong to Husserl’s understanding of judgment apart from Frege’s of which depends on ‘truth values’. Secondly, and conversely, even if the expression, ‘a horse’, has the same meaning in which context it occurs, there are, yet, some cases whose meaning remains the same but their objective reference (*Beziehung*) differs: ‘Bucephalus is a horse’ and ‘That cart-horse is a horse’.

2.4. Empirical Meanings and Occasional Expressions

In the preface for the second edition (1913) of the *Logical Investigation*, Husserl in a self-criticizing way evaluates the I. Investigation, from the aspect of its way of dealing with the most difficult problems of consciousness of meaning, as “without doing full justice” to these problems. Among them, one of the most severe problems is the problem of occasional meanings. So, where this problem arises from? Occasional expressions and meanings amount to a matter of decisive challenge for Husserl’s conception of ideal objective meanings. These expressions are those “whose meaning *shifts (schwankenden)*”¹³⁶. These occasional meanings are on the contrary to the ‘ideal objective meanings’ which are characterized as ‘truth in itself’ and they are

¹³⁶ Hua XIX/ I, p.83 ; L.I./ I, p. 312

described in the same preface as a ‘stroke of violence’ (*Gewaltstreich*). It appears as follows:

“The manner in which it deals with occasional meanings (to which, however, in strictness, all *empirical predications* belong) is a *stroke of violence* – the enforced consequence of the *imperfect* conception of the essence of ‘truth in itself’ in the *Prolegomena*.”¹³⁷

Thus, on the one hand, the “objective expressions” are like the judgment “ $2+2=4$ ” whose meaning does not depend on temporal flow, and the person who addressed it to anyone. On the other hand, the “essentially subjective and occasional expressions”, without pointing to the actual world or a certain fictional context, have not by themselves fulfilled meanings, conversely to the objective expressions. Namely, since any sentence like “I will tell you tomorrow what to do there” contains indexical words “I”, “you”, “tomorrow”, “there”, to get a clear meaning of this sentence we have to get acquaintance with what those words point to by its utterer. Yet, Husserl does not ignore the general aspect of these indexical words regardless of their vocation by particular subjects on certain occasions. Husserl calls this unchanged aspect of these words ‘indication’¹³⁸. Even the utterance of the word “I” refers to different persons and therefore has a different meaning in each case, in speaking of oneself everyone uses the word “I” according to its being self-referential. That is, the word “I” has “the character of a universally operative indication of this fact”. This property of these words distinguishes *their* ambiguity from that of a casual equivocation¹³⁹.

¹³⁷ Hua XVIII, p. 13; L.I./I, p.48 Emphasis belongs to me.

¹³⁸ Hua XIX/ I, p.88 ; L.I./ I, p. 316

¹³⁹ Hua XIX/ II, p. 554 ; L.I./II, p.683

Ensuing, Husserl calls this general functional aspect of these words “indicating meaning”, and secondly what is indicated in actual certain circumstances of their employment is called “the meaning indicated”. Needless to say, in the time of Husserl, the problem of ‘indexicality’ was a very new particular theme in philosophy which was first discussed by Pierce and Russell. In particular, occasional expressions have to take into consideration the person who utters those certain words and judgments. As Husserl argued for “only by looking to the *actual circumstances of utterance* can one definite meaning out of all this mutually connected class be constituted for the hearer.”¹⁴⁰

For Husserl, in the case of occasional expressions, intuition may be allowed to contribute to the meaning of a perceptual statement. That is, without seeing the paper lies on the table I cannot mean and say *that* paper. But Husserl warns that “this does not imply that the intuitive act is itself a carrier of meaning.”¹⁴¹ It is so because Husserl strictly distinguishes meaning and object. Regarding that, Husserl coins a new term ‘This-pointing’ (Dies-Meinen) which has a controversial signification as it is both directed upon the perception in question and is dependent on it. It amounts to say the intertwining of ‘this-pointing’, which may contain both (and unnecessarily) categorial and perceptual content and the perception in question.

“I say ‘this’, and now mean (meine) the paper lying before me. The relation to *this* object owes to the words of perception. But in this does not lie meaning (Bedeuten). When I say ‘this’, I do not merely perceive, but on the ground of perception it is builded a new act of This-Pointing (Dies-Meinen), an act directed

¹⁴⁰ Hua XIX/ I, p.87; L.I./ I, p. 315 Emphasis belongs to me.

¹⁴¹ Hua XIX/ II, p. 554 ; L.I./II, p.683

upon the perception and dependent on it, despite its difference. The meaning lies only and entirely in this pointing reference (hinweisenden Meinen).”¹⁴²

While in the I. Investigation the problem of occasional meanings and expressions includes the problem of indexicality, thereafter especially in the 1908 Lectures and second drafts of Logical Investigation in 1913 deal not only with indexicality but moreover the tension between objective facts and their intentionally individuation, so to speak the involvement of the first-person perspective within the individuation of facts. Husserl in 1908 Lectures discusses ‘The problem of Ideality of Meanings’ under the distinction between pure and empirical meanings. Here, the main concern is not the indexicality. The problem that Husserl concerns, for this time, is “how empirical meanings are constituted and objective which is essentially other than how pure meanings are”¹⁴³.

On the ground of empirical meanings, we see that Husserl distinguishes objects into two groups: ideal objects and empirical objects. In the same line of this distinction, we come across with ideal judgment ($2 \times 2 = 4$) and empirical judgment (“This paper is white”); ideal truth and empirical truth¹⁴⁴. The former goes to ‘ideal’ and is already given in the Ideation. In an ideal object, the essence of the object and the essence come into a coincidence since it is completed determined essence (voll bestimmtes Wesen). Husserl considers it as absolutely grasped, whereas empirical object has an essence, but it is not essence-itself. As it is argued nominal meaning is an ideal-unity against a multitude of possible acts. Then, Husserl asks how it is possible this ideal-unity. The answer says that it is to make a distinction between meaning and act and this distinction could not be proved (erweisen), but only be

¹⁴² Hua XIX/II, p. 554 L.I./II, p.683 The translation slightly changes.

¹⁴³ Hua XXVI, p. 203

¹⁴⁴ Hua XXVI, p. 208-209

exhibited (aufzuweisen) as evident¹⁴⁵. An empirical object is not given with its completed essence. It is a ‘this’ (ein Dies) and is meant with some sort of essence. The intricate lies between the determinate-content of a certain intuition of ‘this’ posited object and its posited *indeterminate determinate-content*. So to speak, a ‘this’ which is there is with meant according to others (nach anderem *mitgemeint* ist)¹⁴⁶. Since a particular ‘this’ always resides in an environment, a horizon is also meant mediately with a particular ‘this’ that Husserl calls as *mitgemeint*. This horizontal content makes that determinate ‘this’ as indeterminate because of the horizon itself.

So, in 1908 lectures Husserl even if in elsewhere uses the terms empirical and occasional interchangeably, the scope of the term empirical meanings is more extended than occasional meanings in the sense of indexicals. Husserl explicitly says that empirical meanings cannot be resolvable (ablösbar) from acts and thereby from persons¹⁴⁷. Thereupon, Husserl applies for a thought experiment, which is argued for, in a likewise manner, by Putnam after seventy years in his article ‘The meaning of “meaning”’, which assumes two man in the world as placed in the same circumstances and in the same position, both as having completely the same appearances, and under these conditions, they also utter the same words. Then, Husserl asks whether “do the words on both sides have the same meaning?”¹⁴⁸ Even if we would choose the word ‘no’, which is not an indexical word either. Ultimately, both ‘no’ are not the same because though the same empirical intuitions which are found in completely the same objectivities, they are interwoven with intentions of grasping (Auffassungsintentionen), empirical positing and components of experience

¹⁴⁵ Hua XXVI, p. 208

¹⁴⁶ Hua XXVI, p. 210

¹⁴⁷ Hua XXVI, p. 211

¹⁴⁸ Hua XXVI, p. 212

which make their meanings from the beginning not exactly the same¹⁴⁹. What is at stake here for Husserl that whether could it be possible the identity of empirical meanings (Bedeutungen) depending on singular empirical presentations. The given answer is not clear but Husserl implies at least that in both cases their similar intentional content would not be sufficient for the identity of meaning. Since meaning, in a wider sense, is the bearer of objective truth, it seems contradictory to talk about empirical truths which are nothing to do with species. Since any empirical truth of empirical judgment is only for once (einmalig) and as 'this'. In other words, the truth of any empirical judgment could not maintain a basis for the truth of any other singular the same judgment, for what is judged about are only for once.

More precisely, Husserl asks when could individual thing-meanings (individuelle Dingbedeutungen¹⁵⁰), in general empirical meanings be identical? An empirical judgment like "Göttingen is placed in the line" is not a pure idea or essence like ' $2>3$ '¹⁵¹. Göttingen could be presented and named in innumerable ways of which belong to the one and the same world. Even all of the possible namings have a common essence, it is not sufficient for the identity of empirical relation. It is claimed that "the empirical object has an essence, but it is not essence-itself."¹⁵² As it is mentioned above, this empirical object is a 'this' and allegedly belongs to the experienced world through 'This-pointing' (Dies-Meinen). That is to say, the individuation of facts is not derived from the ideal essence of a lived intentional content, it also needs to pointing to the actual world to be individualised. However, this 'This' does not express in the sense of conceptual expressions. Husserl briefly put

¹⁴⁹ ibid. "Oder genauer gesprochen: Sie werden von vornherein nicht für beide Menschen in den gleichen Umgebungen genau dieselben gewesen sein."

¹⁵⁰ Hua XXVI, p. 206

¹⁵¹ Hua XXVI, p. 216-7

¹⁵² Hua XXVI, p. 210

the matter in this way: “They say nothing, that it is in truth what is there exhibited, and to lie before an evidence, a fit of pointing to the intuition.”¹⁵³

In the revised version of Logical Investigations (XX/2), Husserl in a different way once more changes the sense of occasional truths, according to which, such transcendent truths of temporal contingent objects “have their objectivity necessarily in the intersubjectivity, of which actual act of judging and intuition of singular real ego-subjects is unessential to them”¹⁵⁴. Here, Husserl goes through the pair of empirical ego and pure ego which are in a detailed way laid out in *Ideen*.

However, an interesting comment on empirical statements in this new edition of Logical Investigation Husserl assesses occasional expressions as loaded with underground implications. According to the given instance, the word ‘Chicago’ is senseless if we are not already acquainted with that it is ‘a city in America, under so and so degree of longitude and degree of latitude’¹⁵⁵ and if and only if I am realized that I am departing from my given environment. So to speak I, the speaker grasp myself as the central part of an environment and also other people next to myself. Empirical expressions are meant by individual presentations and these presentations have an ‘underground’ which are brought into being in the actual ego-environment (Ichumgebung)¹⁵⁶. So, Husserl in the new edition of L.I. accounts for the aspect of the way of spatially boundness of empirical expressions in this manner. On the other hand, the expressions of facts are also only ‘temporally valid’. The sentence “My lamp lightens this sheet”¹⁵⁷ is valid only up to the switch off the lamp. If thereafter I switch off the lamp and say that “My lamp lightens this sheet”, it would be invalid.

¹⁵³ Hua XL, p. 364

¹⁵⁴ Hua XX/I, p. 264

¹⁵⁵ Hua XX/II, p.373

¹⁵⁶ Hua XX/II, p.374

¹⁵⁷ Hua XX/II, p.370

2.5. Independent and Dependent Meanings: Categorematic and Syncategorematic Expressions

In the IV. Investigation Husserl attempts to develop a theory of syntax under the title of “apriori grammar”. Other than formal logical laws that guard against nonsense (Widersinn), apriori grammar as apriori laws “determine the possible forms of meaning”¹⁵⁸ and guard against senselessness (Unsinn). Since a theory of syntax deals with particular different kinds of words in connection to the sentences of which they are consisted of those articulated words, Husserl takes into consideration categorematic and syncategorematic expressions through presupposing a correlative bound between independent (selbständig) objects and dependent (unselbständig) objects with their independent meanings and dependent meanings. If we remind the general structure of intentionality which is already put forward in the I. Investigation, according to which, each expression, in virtue of its meaning, is directed intentionally to the object; hence, this pursuit is followed in the case of independent and dependent meanings in connection to their objects *within sentence*.

Husserl begins from the distinction of simple and complex meanings since this investigation conveys the underlying mereological structure of III. Investigation which is mainly based on the account of the relation between parts and a whole. On the one hand, a complex expression like ‘a man of iron’ consists of parts and the meaning of this complex expression has part-meanings as those of ‘man’, ‘iron’. ‘A man of iron’ has one meaning and its meaning is independent. So, as a complex expression this is an instance of categorematic expression. On the other hand, ‘a’ and ‘of’, of ‘A man of iron’, which are syncategorematic expressions are dependent expressions because only in such a complex expression their meaning to be fulfilled.

¹⁵⁸ Hua XIX/I, p. 302; L.I./ II, p. 493

In other words, syncategorematic expressions have their own meanings in isolation, they are not senseless. But since they demand a fulfilling meaning in a certain complex expression or in a sentence, they are dependent expressions. However, the complexity or simplicity of the objects does not necessarily reflect the complexity or simplicity of the meanings. Both of these are possible: complex meanings may present simple objects and also complex objects may convey simple meanings. For the former Husserl presents the expression “simple object”¹⁵⁹ which is a complex expression but its object is simple, and for the latter, the names like ‘one’ and ‘something’ are simple expressions but their objects are complex because they may refer to various things. Moreover, in the case of a complex meaning, it refers to a complex object, and parts of the complex object do not need to correspond to each simple part of the meaning. Here, Husserl uses Bolzano’s instance: “a land without mountains”¹⁶⁰. Through this example, Husserl evidently rejects the idea, which was argued by Twardowski, that the meaning has to be identified with the intuitive representation. Husserl has already rejected in the I. Investigation such a mental picture as a representation of meaning, as contrary to Mill’s view, and it also strengthens his rejection with respect to the syntactical standpoint as it is instantiated here.

Then, Husserl enters into the question of the meaningfulness of syncategorematic components of complex expressions by distinguishing different sorts of complete and incomplete expressions by appealing to Brentano’s triple distinction¹⁶¹: 1) complete and incomplete expressions of presentations, 2) complete and incomplete expressions of judgments, and 3) complete and incomplete expressions of feeling and will. So, Husserl in a wider sense employs the term

¹⁵⁹ Hua XIX/I, p. 304; L.I./ II, p. 495

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*

¹⁶¹ Hua XIX/I, p. 311; L.I./ II, p. 500

categorematic to cover all independently significant or complete expressions of these three ways of intentional experience. Whereas a syncategorematic expression fulfills the same meaning-intention in each different complexes, since they have always “a *determinate* meaning-relation to our total thought.”¹⁶²

However, to get a short cut understanding as to whether a given expression is simple or compound is not too easy. Husserl gets involved with this problem by discussing the case of proper names. Accordingly, while a name like ‘Schultze’ refers to a certain person before me, its meaning is ‘single-ray’, or simple since the pointing reference is constant and one. On the other hand, whenever I think of different characters of that Schultze, as in the form of “E which is a, Ea which is b, Eb which is a etc.”, then it appear as ‘many-rayed meanings’¹⁶³.

Then, Husserl proceeds in a decisive step and resembles this dual side of proper names to other general names like “human being, virtue, just etc.”. Plainly argues that any alleged *logical definition* is “merely a logical artifice”, and would bound its existent meaning which could be found in a wider sense. Interestingly, at the end of the section in question, there is a note as to the dual side of meaning-intention annexed for the second edition which confesses the insufficient treatment of the first edition about this subject. Husserl in a self-critical manner suggests that he had not figured out the full sense of this distinction and admits that “VI. Investigation does not give a proper account of it.”¹⁶⁴ Next to it, again at the end of the same section another footnote but from the first edition argues for another interesting contribution to the general frame of *Logical Investigations*. Because, here, Husserl speaks of that there are meanings which carry certain distinguishable moments but not in the form of separate meanings but as complex contents. Ensuing, such meanings are *implicating*

¹⁶² Hua XIX/I, p. 315; L.I./ II, p. 502

¹⁶³ Hua XIX/I, p. 308; L.I./ II, p. 498

¹⁶⁴ *ibid*

or have *implicated content*. Then, adds that “On each implicating meaning there is another (meaning) which articulate or explicate its content.” In fact, Husserl ceases to elucidate and elaborate such an implicated content. If the proceedings were not being ceased then it would certainly present a new way for the development of Husserl’s phenomenology. As we will see in the third and fourth chapters, the problem of implication plays a crucial role in terms of Husserl’s phenomenology and Austin’s speech acts.

Consequently, even if it is said that categorematic expressions convey independent meanings and on the contrary syncategorematic expressions convey dependent meanings, it is not always the case. As it is attempted to be exhibited, there are not such strict formulations for independent and dependent, or simple and complex meanings.

2.6. Meaninglessness

As we have stressed since the essence of expression lies solely in meaning, and meaning as such is characterized as timeless, ideal and could be quotable in various times by different single meaning-intentions; it is evident for Husserl that meaning content is independent of subjective representations and apart from that meaning content lies on the ground of logic. When a word or a sentence is translated from one language to another, for Husserl, what is translated is nothing but its meaning content. Since the relation to the object is constituted in meaning, and therefore in its content, in every expression, there is a relationship with an object, “whether the object exists or is fictitious or even impossible”¹⁶⁵. For, the terms “sense” and “meaning” not only bound up with the content of meaning-intention but

¹⁶⁵ Hua XIX/I, p.59 ; L.I./I, p.293

also attach to the content of meaning-fulfillment, and this brings about ‘a most unwelcome ambiguity’¹⁶⁶.

Thus, Husserl approaches to ‘meaningless’ by offering a criticism to the logicians, like Frege, Sigwart and Marty regarding to deal with the problem in question. First, the problem concerns with the distinction between expression, or linguistic sign, which was defined previously by Husserl as carriers of meaning, and non-linguistic signs. So, a meaningless expression is no expression at all, they hold only a verbal sound such as ‘Abracadabra’. On the other hand, a not well-formed syntactic structure is also meaningless. Due to such a structure, an expression does not correspond to a unified meaning, like his given example ‘Green is or’.

Next to that, a name is meaningless when no such object has a relationship with it. The origin of absurdity and contradiction is “the *a priori* impossibility of a fulfilling sense” which amount to say (intuitive) objectlessness. So, “round square” is an absurd name and not an expression because it does not correspond to any intuition. “An expression has meaning in this sense if a possible fulfillment, i.e. the possibility of a unified intuitive illustration, corresponds to its intention.”¹⁶⁷ If there corresponds to no intuition for a particular meaning-intention, then we apprehend its impossibility of meaning-fulfillment. However, there remains still a difference among such absurdities, that’s to say, names such as ‘round square’ and ‘married bachelor’ have different senses, in terms of objectlessness. Concerningly, Husserl remarks that “even *senselessness* understood as absurdity or contradiction, is also constituted in sense”¹⁶⁸. Since a particular senselessness is just meant, this being meant allows for it to distinguish from other particular senselessness. Because that act of meaning consists

¹⁶⁶ Hua XIX/I, p.58 ; L.I./I, p.291

¹⁶⁷ Hua XIX/I, p.61; L.I./I, p.294

¹⁶⁸ Hua XIX/I, p.72; L.I./I, p.303

of mere intention, namely thought. Husserl claims it in this way: “*speech without intuition need not be deprived of thought.*”¹⁶⁹

In addition to, in the sphere of symbolical arithmetical thinking we do not use meaningless signs, rather they are taken in a certain ‘*game-meaning*’ (Spielbedeutung) in the sense that the chess pieces through the rules of the game give them their fixed game-meaning. In such symbolically functioning thought “we mean (meinen) this or that with our spoken or written signs, and that this meaning is a descriptive character of understood speech and hearing.”¹⁷⁰ Lastly, meaningless expressions, to some extent, yet some sense which make us available to conceive them as different meaningless expressions. So to speak, if we could to differ, it is only via our act of meaning or intending. Since, to intend we do not need anything but to be conscious, then it is possible to say that there only different ways of meaningless expressions. However, it is separate from the case that signs which are non-expression have already no capability to mean.

¹⁶⁹ Hua XIX/I, p.73; L.I./I, p.304 Emphasis is mine.

¹⁷⁰ Hua XIX/I, p.76; L.I./I, p.306

3. AUSTIN

3.1. Performative Utterances versus Constative Utterances

3.1.1. The preliminaries regarding the distinction between Performative and Constative Utterances

Austin's purpose as to coining the term performative, as against to constative, is to demonstrate that *statement*¹⁷¹ as a declarative sentence, which is a particular subject of logic, is not ideally pure descriptive. At the very first page of his Harvard Lectures he begins with to express the assumption of philosophers, which would be challenged through and through in elsewhere, that "the business of a 'statement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact', which it must do either truly or falsely."¹⁷² So, for Austin, there are such statements that are not true or false since they are not "always and simply to *state* something"¹⁷³. In these cases, which look like statements, it is not intended to give information about the state of affairs. Austin calls such statements "masqueraders"¹⁷⁴ which do not necessarily masquerade as descriptive. They only indicate but "(not to report) the circumstances in which the statements are made"¹⁷⁵. Therefore, they do not report reality through descriptions. If we do not come to such an understanding and realize it, according to

¹⁷¹ Along the text, Austin uses 'constative utterance' and 'statement' interchangeably. Besides, in the Anglo-French conference held at Royaumont in 1958, Austin makes a presentation, called 'Performative-Constative', in French, and uses the term 'assertion' for 'statement' in which it is read frequently both in his Harvard Lectures and articles. The English translation of his speech is herein: Austin, "Performative-Constative"; in, "Philosophy and Ordinary Language", ed. by Charles Catton, 1963 :

"The constative utterance, under the name, so dear the philosophers, of *statement (assertion)*, has the property of being true or false.
However, in his article "Truth" (p.120, in Philosophical Papers) Austin says that 'Assertion' is slightly wider than statement.

¹⁷² Austin, "How to do things with words", p.1; Hereafter HTDTWW.

¹⁷³ HTDTWW.,p.12

¹⁷⁴ HTDTWW.,p.4

¹⁷⁵ HTDTWW.,p.3

Austin, we would fall into a “descriptive fallacy”¹⁷⁶. Austin deems some of these masqueraders as performative utterances. Yet, it is so only, except that the implicit performative utterances, providing that a performative utterance “assumes its most explicit form”. As he presents in a preliminary way, which would be exposed into some variations and would call them ‘explicit performatives’, all those performative utterances will have “humdrum verbs in the first person singular present indicative active”¹⁷⁷; as such as uttering in the moment of smashing the bottle against the rear of the stem “I name this ship the Queen Elisabeth”.

In this preliminary line, Austin also exemplifies descriptive fallacy, which can be read in the opening stage of the discussion, with ‘ethical propositions’ which are intended “to evince emotion or to prescribe conduct or to influence it in special ways”. As being something not new, ethical propositions do not describe the states of affairs but deals with, in general sense, feelings of the addresser about what ought to be, and the anticipated influence on the addressee. We will, in the following lectures, find the effect of those sorts of utterances under the name of ‘perlocutionary act’ (act by saying) apart from ‘illocutionary act’ (act in saying). In a preliminary and provisionally way, as Austin expresses, these non-descriptive utterances are to satisfy these two conditions:

“A. they do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constatae anything at all, are not ‘true or false’; and

B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not *normally* be described as, or as ‘just’, saying something.”¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ HTDTWW.,p.3

¹⁷⁷ HTDTWW.p.5

¹⁷⁸ HTDTWW.p.5

This sort of statements is not just saying something but by saying and in saying something we are doing something. Austin's first examples of performative utterances, or as he shortly calls it "performative", are marrying, naming, bequeathing, betting¹⁷⁹. The distinction simply put in a footnote in the following way: " 'constative' utterances: to issue a constative utterance (i.e. to utter with it a historical reference) is to make a statement. To issue a performative utterance is, for example, to make a bet."¹⁸⁰

Austin notices that the term 'performative' in the following lectures "will be used in a variety of cognate ways and constructions"¹⁸¹. Indeed, we come across along the lectures this promised variety, yet Austin says something common about the choice of the term 'performative' which is derived from perform that is "the usual verb with the noun 'action': it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performance of an action"¹⁸². If we combine the definition with the above condition B, then "the doing of an action" and "the performance of an action" seems to say the same. This issuing of the utterance is not just saying something, or say, talking about the meaning content of a certain utterance. By the way, to be noted, with the aim of not to bring about any confusion, Austin does not prefer to use the already similar used term, among lawyers, 'operative'¹⁸³ instead of performative.

The main point of Austin to take attention by 'masqueraders' and 'descriptive fallacy' is to put in question the widespread assumption of logicians with respect to the 'model of the statement'. According to that, a statement has to be descriptive, and bears truth evaluability because of its 'correspondence to the facts'. However, Austin claims that "the principle of Logic, that 'Every proposition is true or false' has too

¹⁷⁹ HTDTWW.P.5

¹⁸⁰ HTDTWW., p.6

¹⁸¹ HTDTWW., p.6

¹⁸² HTDTWW., p.6

¹⁸³ HTDTWW., p.7

long operated as the simplest, most persuasive and most pervasive form of *descriptive fallacy*”¹⁸⁴. He assaults the common tendency of his own time philosophers that under the influence of giving priority to timeless, abstract propositions they “interpreted all ‘propositions’ on the model of the statement that a certain thing is red”. But that would be just to ignore that there are some utterances which have to be taken as statements that “are not in fact descriptive, nor susceptible of being true or false”¹⁸⁵. Those utterances, which have been taken to be statements by others, in fact are not statements. They might appear as “a formula in a calculus”, “a performatory utterance”, “a value-judgment”, “a definition”, “a work of fiction”¹⁸⁶. Their common character is to be not to correspond to the facts and not to be truth-evaluable, because they do not declare anything. Therefore, asks Austin whether we would then “call such masqueraders ‘statement at all’ and should we extend the uses of ‘true’ and ‘false’ in ‘different senses’”.

However, it needs to add that all kinds of utterances do *not only* consist of performative utterances and constative utterances; there are utterances, as mentioned above, like ‘value-judgment’ or ‘work of fiction’ which are neither constative nor performative. Therefore, a constative utterance, up to here, is characterized by its being statement and truth-evaluable, whereas a performative utterance, as laid out above by conditions A and B, do not constate anything, are not true or false, the uttering of a sentence is doing an action which amounts to not only to say something. The important point, of Austin’s first presentation of the distinction and to be sure not the examined version, is to note that these properties of constative and performative utterances are *not intersectional*. To notice, the writings that we talk about are the lecture notes, which were delivered to a group of students. Therefore, Austin exposes

¹⁸⁴ Austin, “Truth”, in *Philosophical Papers*, p. 131, Emphasis belongs to me.

¹⁸⁵ *ibid*

¹⁸⁶ *ibid*.

his ideas gradually. Some commentators forgot this fact and tries to show some discrepancies or contradictive assertions regarding Austin's own attitude toward his disputations. However, Austin advanced in the lectures by using "asking whether..." form. Whenever it is forgotten, then, it would become easy to find incompatible situations.

Well, since a performative utterance is not a statement in the sense of a declarative sentence, it could not be true or false. And it could not describe or report any state of affairs, and is not merely to say something. On the contrary, a constative utterance is a statement that describes a fact, that's why it is true or false. The issuing of the constative utterance is not doing an action¹⁸⁷ because it merely says something of a fact. But, what about those utterances mentioned above in the paragraph, which are neither performative nor constative? They are not truth-evaluable and do not correspond to the facts which are described in the way of constative utterances, yet the utterance of the sentence is not, part of, doing an action. Austin gives some further elaborations regarding this matter under the title of "etiologies"¹⁸⁸.

3.2. (In)felicity Conditions

Whenever a particular constative utterance does not correspond to the state of affairs which is described by that utterance; then the statement would be false. However, the principle of negation running in the performative utterances is not likewise to the yes/no opposition of the constative utterances. Then, under what conditions and in what way a certain performative utterance would be successful or

¹⁸⁷ Even issuing an utterance is not an action in terms of constative, Austin ascribes it as an action in the level of locutionary. See below: Chapter 3.6.1.

¹⁸⁸ See below; Chapter 3.3

unsuccessful? Austin's response is that there are "types of cases in which something *goes wrong* and the act –marrying, betting...– is therefore at least to some extent a failure."¹⁸⁹ Thus, these unaccomplished performative utterances would *not be false*, like in the manner of constative utterances, but they would be "in general *unhappy*"¹⁹⁰. Subsequently, Austin gives a detailed exposition as to the occasion of such utterances which he calls "the doctrine of *Infelicities*". Infelicitous are in various ways in contrast to yes/no opposition of constative utterances. Being unhappy of a performative utterance is used by Austin in the same sense of an arisen infelicity. An infelicity only arises whenever "certain rules, transparently simple rules, are broken."¹⁹¹ So, Austin enumerates the necessary conditions for the happy functioning of the performative utterances in the following way:

"(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further

(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure involved.

(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and

(B.2) completely

(Γ. 1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further

¹⁸⁹ Austin, HTDTWW, p. 14

¹⁹⁰ *ibid*

¹⁹¹ Austin, "Performative Utterances", in *Philosophical Papers*, p. 237

(Γ . 2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.”¹⁹²

In the case of a violation among any one of these six ‘rules’, the performative utterance in question will be ‘unhappy’ in different ‘ways’. These ‘ways’ listed by Austin as six types of infelicity are parallel to these six rules. Thus, Austin’s purpose of presenting an exposition of different kind of infelicities is to demonstrate the unaccomplished cases of which the intended performance is not achieved successfully. But, in the first step, Austin distinguishes them under two name¹⁹³: *Misfires* (a general name for the infringement of the rules of A.1, A.2 and B.1, B.2) and *Abuses* (a general name for the infringement of the rules of Γ . 1 and Γ . 2) . Now, it requires to notice that the first four rules, A and B which are characterized by *conventional procedure*, are opposed to the two rules of Γ which are characterized by *feelings, thoughts and intentions*. As an instance, for a misfire, Austin reads that, if an already married man purports to marry a woman, “our act (marrying, &c.) is void or without effect”¹⁹⁴. In that case, Austin says, lots of things will have been done such as committing the act of bigamy but “we shall not have done the purported act, viz., marrying”¹⁹⁵. Since there is a conventional procedure for marrying in English according to which an already married man or woman cannot marry twice. Austin makes precise his claim that our act would be “without effect” does not mean “without consequences, results, effects”¹⁹⁶. That is to say, in the case of such an infringement of a certain conventional procedure of marriage, there will be emerged something as results, but that would not be the act of marriage. Yet, what Austin calls

¹⁹² HTDTWW., p. 14-15

¹⁹³ HTDTWW., p.16

¹⁹⁴ HTDTWW., p.16

¹⁹⁵ HTDTWW., p.17

¹⁹⁶ *ibid.*

‘abuse’ is not void but hollow. For example, if I say ‘I promise’ without having any intention to keep it, then I have promised but that would be ‘hollow’¹⁹⁷.

As it is stated, Austin gives a common name for the infelicities of A.1, A.2 and B.1 and B.2, for the cases of which a conventional procedure that a speaker “purport to invoke” but turns into void, which is called as ‘misfires’. The infelicities of type A are called ‘misinvocations’ in which either there is no conventional procedure for the infelicity A.1, or the procedure in question cannot be applied in the purported way, namely A.2. Austin calls the latter ‘misapplications’, whereas he could not find a particular name for A.1. Whereas the infelicities of type B are called ‘misexecutions’ of which divided into two branches, namely ‘flaws’ for B.1 and ‘hitches’ for B.2. In type B infelicities the participants may remain unaccomplished to execute the conventional procedure in question ‘correctly’(B.1) and ‘completely’(B.2).

Even though, Austin defines the term “infelicity” as “an ill to which *all* acts are heir which have the general character of ritual or ceremonial, all *conventional* acts”, he thereafter quickly restricts the scope of conventional acts only to the “special reference to verbal utterance”¹⁹⁸ within the type A infelicities, given the fact that there are many conventional acts which can be performed in non-verbal ways. While in attempting to classify types of infelicities, Austin sometimes expresses the existence of uncertain cases where it is difficult to draw strict borders among types. Moreover, there are some cases in which different types of infelicities may collide. Even more, particularly for the first four types of infelicities, namely A.1, A.2, B.1, B.2, “they generally overlap with (a) misunderstandings, a type of infelicity to which all

¹⁹⁷ HTDTWW.,p.16

¹⁹⁸ HTDTWW.,p.19

utterances are probably liable, and (b) Mistakes, and acting under duress”¹⁹⁹. Now, let’s see Austin’s examples and related remarks for each type of infelicities²⁰⁰:

Misfires

Infelicity A.1 (No name): The issuing of the utterance “ ‘I divorce you’, said to a wife by her husband in a Christian country, and both being Christians rather than Mohammedans”. In this case, the aim of being divorced can not be achieved. Furthermore, we can find another instance such as in the case of Don Quixote’s unaccomplished challenges.²⁰¹

Infelicity A.2 (Misapplication): The cases of baptizing the wrong baby with the right name or baptizing a baby ‘Albert’ instead of ‘Alfred’ or, apart from those instances, the act of baptizing by saying “I baptize this infant 2704” or “appointing a horse as Consul”.²⁰²

Infelicity B.1 (Flaw): “If I say ‘my house’ when I have two, or if I say ‘I bet you the race won’t be run today’ when more than one race was arranged.”²⁰³ The flaws are mostly fallen under the title of inexplicit formulas or vague formulas. However, Austin notices that they are not ‘misunderstanding’ since a flaw appears in the procedure of the ritual and “the audience took it”.

¹⁹⁹ HTDTWW., p.39

²⁰⁰ It is required to underline that Austin sometimes uses other names for each type of infelicity. Therefore, it would be useful to look at the note of one of the editors of the book, Urmson, : “A.1, Non-plays; A.2, Misplays; B, Miscarriages; B.1, Misexecutions; B.2, Non-executions; Γ, Disrespects; Γ.1, Dissimulations; Γ.2 Non-fulfillments, Disloyalties, Infractions, Indisciplines, Breaches.” p.18

²⁰¹ HTDTWW., p.27

²⁰² HTDTWW., p.35

²⁰³ HTDTWW., p.36

Infelicity B.2 (Hitch): “My attempt to make a bet by saying ‘I bet you sixpence’ is abortive unless you say ‘I take you on’ or words to that effect; my attempt to marry by saying ‘I will’ is abortive if the woman says ‘I will not’ ”²⁰⁴. The crucial point in this kind of infelicity is that there are some acts which could be accomplished not in a way of ‘unilateral’. Because both parts have to agree since these are bilateral acts. But, Austin clarifies that some unhappiness cases which arise from a mistake of performer’s or disagreements over matters do not fall under this type of infelicity. For example, he says “there is no convention that I can promise you to do something to your detriment”²⁰⁵. This is not an instance of a hitch because the existence of a particular conventional procedure is the condition, and this condition is not fulfilled.

Abuses

Infelicity Γ.1 (Insincerity): “ ‘I congratulate you’, said when I did not *feel* at all pleased” and “ ‘I advise you to’, said when I do not *think* it would be the course most expedient for you. ‘I find him not guilty –I acquit’ said when I do *believe* that he was guilty.”²⁰⁶ These acts are not void, but accomplished by stating. Yet, they are hollow. The speaker *does not mean* what he or she says.

Infelicity Γ.2 (Breach): “ ‘I promise’ said when I do not intend to do what I promise. ‘I bet’, said when I do not intend to pay. ‘I declare war’ said when I do not intend to fight.”²⁰⁷ It is the case when the speaker through asserting something is supposed to execute certain tasks in the future. In other words, the assertion bounds the speaker as

²⁰⁴ HTDTWW.,p.36-37

²⁰⁵ HTDTWW., p.37

²⁰⁶ HTDTWW., p.40 Emphasis belongs to me

²⁰⁷ HTDTWW., p.40 Emphasis belongs to me.

a responsibility in the future. But later, if the same speaker would refuse his made assertion under the same circumstances, then that assertion turns out to be dubious. That is, this type of infelicity does not intend to fulfill what it undertakes to be responsible for.

In his late 1958 presentation, Austin brings together the infelicity A.1, A.2 and B.1 and B.2 under the heading of “nullity”(or in the same sense “void”). Therefore classifies three kinds of unhappiness, namely, “nullity, abuse (insincerity), and breach of commitment.”²⁰⁸ Nonetheless, the whole field of unhappiness does not consist of these types. Whoever falls into one of the above-classified infelicity types, he or she undertakes *responsibility* of that particular situation. However, “actions in general (not all) are liable, for example, to be done under duress, or by accident, or owing to this or that variety of mistake, say, or otherwise unintentionally.”²⁰⁹ That is, as to the claim that we have already performed an action by issuing a performative utterance, there might appear some “overriding consideration that”²¹⁰ in which we may be doing *under duress, by accident or unintentionally*. As a result, these situations “makes us not entirely responsible for doing what we are doing.”²¹¹ Thus, Austin does *not* restrict the scope of unhappiness of the performative utterance in terms of being in charge of the action. In other words, “any kind of non-responsibility might be called an unhappiness”²¹², but doing *under duress, by accident or unintentionally* is a different kind of unhappiness of which Austin has attempted to analyze by specifying six rules and their corresponding types of unhappiness.

²⁰⁸ Austin, “*Performative-Costative*”; in, “*Philosophy and Ordinary Language*”, p.24

²⁰⁹ HTDTWW, p. 21

²¹⁰ Austin, “*Performative Utterances*”, in *Philosophical Papers*, p.240

²¹¹ *ibid.*, p.240

²¹² *ibid.*, p.240

3.3. Etiolations of Language

Hence, accordingly, what Austin says is that there are three particular ways of situations in which we are not responsible for what we are doing by saying something, and these might be called unhappiness either. In addition to them, there are, furthermore, “quite differently again” ways of issuing utterances in which we are not responsible for doing what we are doing. For example, utterances of any kind whatsoever in the course of acting a play, making a joke, or writing a poem. The common characteristics of this kind of utterances is to be not “seriously meant”, therefore the act at issue shall not be “seriously performed”²¹³. Austin’s aim to speak of these sorts of “unserious” ways of language uses, which is called by him “etiolations of language”, is to exclude them from consideration within the general outline of his analysis, and therefore not to be involved throughout his writings.

In the second lecture of HTDTWW, it is explicitly specified by Austin that the etiolation of a particular performative utterance, against the commonly accepted view after Derrida’s famous critics²¹⁴ on the matter of etiolations in which he misleadingly considers Austin’s presented account of truth and force as similar, is still to keep going on to be a performative utterance. But the problem of whether it could have an illocutionary force like a “normal” or “serious” way of using language remains as a puzzling question. The way of the etiolations which are not issued in ordinary circumstances is told by Austin as follows:

“as utterances our performatives are also heir to certain other kinds of ill which infect all utterances. And these likewise, though again they might be brought into a more general account, we are deliberately at present excluding. I mean, for example, the

²¹³ Austin, “Performative Utterances”, in *Philosophical Papers*, p.240-41

²¹⁴ Jacques Derrida, “Signature, Event and Context”, in “*Margins of Philosophy*”

following: a performative utterance will, for example, be *in a peculiar way* hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies in a similar manner to any and every utterance – a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways – intelligibly used not seriously, but in ways *parasitic* upon its normal use – ways which fall under the doctrine of *etiolations* of language. All this we are excluding from consideration.”²¹⁵

Here the point is if someone issues the utterance ‘I promise...’ in a stage as an actor, or whenever we see a line of poem which begins with ‘I promise...’, or jokingly a friend says that ‘I promise...’; then, performative utterances in such circumstances perform illocutionary acts²¹⁶ as in the form of ‘I promise...’ would have an illocutionary force likewise in ‘normal’, ‘ordinary’ circumstances. That is the puzzling question. As “an important commonplace” Austin admits the vagueness of the term ‘serious’ but mentions that “the words must be spoken ‘seriously’ and similarly must be taken ‘seriously’”²¹⁷ by the hearer. He thinks of this issue seemingly as a matter of judiciary, morally in which amounts to the saying quoted by Austin “our word is our bond”²¹⁸. If we set aside the long debate between Searle and Derrida over ‘serious’, and ‘normal’, then what Austin emphasizes, in an undetailed way, on this point is merely to take in charge of the speaker for the spoken words in a literal use and to be irresponsible for the non-literal uses of the utterances. That is, “if the poet says ‘Go and catch a falling star’ or whatever it may be, he doesn’t seriously issue an order”. Here, the order is not taken as an order since it is a matter of

²¹⁵ HTDTWW., p.21-22

²¹⁶ For illocutionary act see below; Chapter 3.6.2.

²¹⁷ HTDTWW., p.9

²¹⁸ HTDTWW., p.10

figurative use of language which was already distinguished by Austin in passing by as “ ‘a poetical use of language’ ” from “ ‘the use of language in poetry’ ”²¹⁹ So, for Austin when we use speech in “acting, fiction, and poetry, quotation and recitation”²²⁰ and furthermore in “insinuating (and other *non-literal* uses of language), joking (and other *non-serious* uses of language), and swearing and showing off (which are perhaps expressive uses of language)”²²¹ we have not to forget the possibility of the etiolation of which the essential deprivation is not on the level of locutionary meaning, but on the illocutionary level of force.

The word, that Austin chooses, ‘etiolation’ is a botanical term which means the anomalous growth of a plant under the condition of lack of light. The other one is ‘parasitic’. So, just at the outset of the insertion of the term Austin does not open to discuss what means the ground of ‘normal’ and acknowledges it in a common way which will appear as the usually criticized point by the successor speech act theorists. Since parasitic uses of language are derivative use of language, could not they bear a value of being speech act? Austin says that they could not be accomplished speech acts given that “these references to ‘use of language’ have nothing to do with the illocutionary act.”²²² But why is it so? In a brief note of Austin presumably written in 1951, which is from his unpublished manuscripts, that we learn from Marina Sbisa, “Austin sketchily suggests to view quotation as aetiolation of authority, soliloquy as aetiolation of address, acting as aetiolation of both, joking as aetiolation of sense and fiction as aetiolation of reference.”²²³ From this interesting note, it could be claimed that what is ‘serious’ or ‘normal’ in Austin is built on, at least, three points: authority,

²¹⁹ HTDTWW., p.104

²²⁰ HTDTWW., p.122

²²¹ HTDTWW., p. 92

²²² HTDTWW., p.104

²²³ Marina Sbisa, “How to read Austin”, p. 20

address and reference. However, in Austin writings, we can not find any elaborative explanation of these terms in connection with the speech acts in general.

3.4. Grammatical and Verbal Criterion of Performative Utterances

As it was stressed briefly²²⁴ at the very first pages of the HTDTWW, Austin put forward whether there is any grammatical criterion to distinguish a performative utterance sharply apart from the constative utterance. According to that assumptive criterion some verbs have to be “first person singular present indicative active”, such as ‘I bet’, ‘I promise’, ‘I bequeath’. These are called by Austin ‘explicit performatives’ in contrast to ‘implicit performatives’. In explicit performative utterances, two things have to be made explicit²²⁵: 1) the issued utterance is a performative utterance, 2) which act it is that is being performed. By means of being explicit, there should not be any hesitation for the listener that any performative utterance addressed to himself/herself were a bet or warning or something else.

As it is pointed out by Austin, “‘making explicit’ is not the same as describing or stating (...) what I am doing.”²²⁶. For example, ‘I salute you’ is not describing my performance, but to perform an act of salutation in an explicit way; whereas by uttering “I insult you”²²⁷ we are not performing an act of insult since it is not conventional to insult by saying “I insult you”, but to say “Damn”²²⁸, if it is happy, then it is performed the act of swearing.

On the contrary, the character of ‘inexplicit’ or implicit performative is based on its being left uncertain in terms of the way the performative is being used. For

²²⁴ above footnote 10

²²⁵ HTDTWW., p.62

²²⁶ HTDTWW., p.69 and Austin, “Performative Utterances”, in *Philosophical Papers*, p.245

²²⁷ Austin, “Performative Utterances”, in *Philosophical Papers*, p.245

²²⁸ Austin, “Performative Utterances”, p.246

instance, in such an inexplicit formula like ‘go’²²⁹ in an imperative mood, it is unclear whether the utterer is ordering, advising or entreating. Even we could imagine that it might be used in a way of making irony, parody, mockery and etc. Other examples of Austin are ‘There is a bull in the field’ and ‘I shall be there’. The former is not clear whether it is warning or not, and the latter is likewise unclear whether it is a promise or not. If the utterance is in an inexplicit form, then it would be possible to take it in a non-performative way because of its unambiguous character for the addressee. Another example, given by Austin, is “ ‘it is yours’ may be taken as equivalent to either ‘I give it to you’ or ‘it (already) belongs to you’ ”²³⁰.

Throughout the lecture notes as to whether there is a formal grammatical criterion for performative utterances, Austin finally comes to the conclusion that there is not such a grammatical criterion. The breach for such a criterion is essentially due to the inexplicit performative utterances which could be uttered in various shape. Let’s take above mentioned example for the inexplicit performative utterances, namely, “There is a bull in the field”. Austin points out that instead of this sentence we may only say “bull”, which would also be a performative utterance, which means a warning or giving information the fact that “there is a bull in the field”. Or instead of “Shut the door” we may use the utterance “door”. Both types of utterances are inexplicit performative utterances and their mode of conventionality are loose, inexplicit but in different degrees. Yet, ultimately Austin states that any performative utterance “should be reducible, or expandible, or analyzable into a form, or reproducible in a form, with a verb in the first person singular present indicative active (grammatical).”²³¹ It means that the verbal formulas of “Shut the door”, or “Door” could be reducible or reproducible in the form of “I order you to shut the

²²⁹ HTDTWW.,p. 33

²³⁰ HTDTWW.,p.62

²³¹ HTDTWW.,p.62

door!”, but not in a necessary strict manner because given that what is meant by the utterer in such utterances depend on the circumstances as well as the familiarity degree of the addresser and the addressee²³². For example, if someone stranger in the street suddenly tells you “Shut the door”, you shall find that expression irrelevant; because of being surprised you may even issue the same utterance “Shut the door” as a quick repetition which functions as the sign of being incomprehension. Thus, the latter could not even be evaluated as an order. Or, the other utterance, “Door”, may be issued by someone who just wants to direct the attention of his/her friend to the ornaments of the door right around there. Even more, the other possible ways of how is to be taken “the *force* of the utterance”²³³ (of which I will discuss, later on, the term ‘force’ in connection to ‘meaning’), in the example of “Shut the door”, is laid out followingly²³⁴:

‘Shut it, do’ resembles ‘I order you to shut it’.

‘Shut it –I should’ resembles ‘I advise you to shut it’.

‘Shut it, if you like’ resembles ‘I permit you to shut it’.

‘Very well then, shut it’ resembles ‘I consent to your shutting it’.

‘Shut it if you dare’ resembles ‘I dare you to shut it’.

Therefore, ‘Shut the door’ could not be reducible or reproducible necessarily as “I order you to shut the door”. Next to them, I can accept a bet just by saying “Done”, or I may find someone guilty simply saying “Guilty”, or to kick out someone

²³² see Goffmann, Erving, “Felicity’s Condition”; The American Journal of Sociology, vol.89/no:1, 1983

²³³ HTDTWW.,p.73

²³⁴ HTDTWW.,p.73

by saying “Out”²³⁵. So, Austin happens to show that “first person singular indicative active” criterion would not be evaluated as a strictly valid criterion.

Yet, Austin does not cease to ask what happens if the verbal formula of the performative utterance is not in the first person singular present indicative active. The utterance would then turn into a report of an event, or as Austin calls it an “asymmetry”²³⁶. For example ‘he bets you sixpence it will rain tomorrow’, or ‘she promised to come early this morning’. In these examples, the utterer is not performing an action as betting or promising, but describing or reporting an act of promising. In other words, an explicit performative utterance has to be self-reflexive. That is to say, the person who issues such-and-such an utterance in a so-and-so circumstance has to be the performer of the action of which its performed act is done through that certain utterance. However, as it is said already, this assumptive criterion is valid only for some verbs with which has the peculiarity of performative-looking. Therefore, it is not arisen such an asymmetry between, for example, ‘I run’ and ‘he runs’. So, at the end of the lesson VI, Austin attempts to group some verbs which could be used in performative utterances as ‘explicit’ and other verbs as under the column of “half-descriptive” and “reports”²³⁷. Hence, for such an attempt, it is called the *verbal criterion* of performative utterances.

Next to it, as being apart from the case of asymmetry, whenever the verbal formula of the utterance is deprived of a reference to the person ‘I’, or proper name, the one who issues the utterance, of which the utterer has to be the performer of the performed action through uttering, then in that case for that particular person the pronoun ‘I’ might be referred in one of two ways:

²³⁵ HTDTWW., p.58

²³⁶ HTDTWW., p.63

²³⁷ HTDTWW., p.79,83

“a) In verbal utterances, *by his being the person who does the uttering...*

b) In written utterances (or inscriptions), *by his appending his signature*”²³⁸

In this way, for the purported criterion of the first person singular present indicative active Austin put in order some counter-examples of performative utterances to exemplify the inessentiality of person and voice. “We promise, we consent” or “the verb in the second or third person (singular or plural)” with “the verb in the passive voice” and “impersonal”²³⁹. Following examples are:

(1) You are hereby authorized to pay...

(2) Passengers are warned to cross the track by the bridge only.

(3) Notice is hereby given that trespassers will be prosecuted.²⁴⁰

In (1) and (3) we can also see the ‘hereby’ formula which is usually employed in the legal occasions with a second singular person and impersonal, respectively. Particularly, the word ‘hereby’ in (3) is served, in written utterances, with the aim of effecting the act of warning or act of authorizing. In the case of the removal of the word ‘hereby’, since that sentence would turn into a description, ‘hereby’ may function as a criterion. However, if we take attention to the non-formal and inexplicit performative utterances, these types of given examples which satisfy the criteria such as person, voice, or hereby formula would comparatively remain only as a small group of the performative utterances.

Hence, Austin presents a suggestion to make a list of such verbs. However, since both the laid out considerations for a grammatical criterion in the previous

²³⁸ HTDTWW., p.60

²³⁹ HTDTWW., p.57

²⁴⁰ HTDTWW., p.57

paragraphs and the trial to make such a verbal criterion does not bear a general character of the criterion for the explicit performative utterances. Such a search, in respect of Austin's strategy, in fact, just hints at the faintness of the apparently sharp distinction between constative utterances and performative utterances. Thus, it is manifested that there is not a distinctive grammatical category of 'statement' that could be assigned to a constative utterance which has an exactly shown determinate border with a performative utterance, contrarily as supposed at the beginning of the HTDTWW.

3.5. The distinction between Performative and Constative Utterances born to be break down?

“A straightforward constative (if there is such an animal)”²⁴¹

To be sure, Austin already admits that “it is impossible to lay down a list of all possible criteria”²⁴² for the distinction between performance utterances and constative utterances. Because the waning of the distinction depends on the circumstances in which the utterance is issued. Concisely, Austin says that “the same sentence is used on different occasions of utterance in both ways, performative and constative.”²⁴³ It implies that one statement, which is isolated from the speaking circumstances, is capable of being both happy, true and unhappy, false. Furthermore, most of the utterances, as a possibility, might be put in a shape of an explicit performative utterance.

²⁴¹ HTDTWW., p.110

²⁴² HTDTWW., p.67

²⁴³ HTDTWW., p.67

So, would it amount to say, as claimed by some commentators, that Austin's performative-constative distinction is an already self-defeating argument? No, it is not if one would not miss Austin's strategical way of presenting his arguments in HTDTWW. First of all, the ultimate claim of Austin is to elucidate that in fact "all speech should be considered as action"²⁴⁴. This claim is based on the idea of "the total speech-act"²⁴⁵, namely, "the total situation in which the utterance is issued". If the total speech-act would be considered then it would appear that Austin, in fact, makes the distinction in an assumptive way to demonstrate the validity of "the total speech-act" in "the form of a proof by contradiction"²⁴⁶. That is to say, "the thesis proposed at the beginning is the opposite of the intended one and its refutation serves as a proof of the intended thesis."²⁴⁷ More precisely, he first put the claim that *as if* there were a genuine distinction between constative and performative utterances. Thereafter, Austin, in a different way, attempts to demonstrate the *invalidity* of the distinction through employing arguments and their refutation with the purpose of *reductio ad absurdum*. Therefore, since Austin is in pursuit of a more general theory of speech acts, he definitely summarizes the aim of his project in the following manner:

"And the more we consider a statement not as a sentence (or proposition) but as an act of speech (out of which the others are logical constructions) the more we are studying the whole thing as an act."²⁴⁸

In the same vein, Austin's objection evidently is being provided from the abstraction of "proposition" which does not allow to give an account as to what is

²⁴⁴ Marina Sbisa, "How to read Austin", in *Pragmatics* vol.17, p. 463

²⁴⁵ HTDTWW., p.52

²⁴⁶ Marina Sbisa, "How to read Austin", in *Pragmatics* vol.17, p. 463

²⁴⁷ *ibid.*

²⁴⁸ HTDTWW.,p.20

going wrong with the statement. Hence, this objection tells us that “the traditional ‘statement’ is an abstraction, an ideal, and so its traditional truth and falsity.”²⁴⁹

Therefore, without taking into consideration the total speech-act, it is not possible to get hold of “the parallel between statements and performative utterances.”²⁵⁰ Once, if we considerably be careful as to what Austin concerns with is “not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation”²⁵¹, then we can easily realize that stating is also performing an act “absolutely on a level with arguing, betting and warning”²⁵². So, now let us see in detail how Austin concludes that 1) statements too are capable of being happy or unhappy, therefore not merely saying something but also doing something, and next 2) some performative utterances might describe a fact, therefore could be evaluated as true or false.

The knot of the problem, hereof, is revealed primarily in terms of the comparison between the implications of some of the constative and performative utterances. For the former, Austin, at first, exposes just three types in which “a statement implies the truth of certain other statements”²⁵³, namely; *entail*, *imply* and *presuppose*. First, entailment, as known as a common sensical matter, is the requirement for a proposition in order not to fall inconsistency. That is, “ ‘All men blush’ entails ‘some men blush’ ”²⁵⁴. In the case of its negation, the proposition falls into contradiction like in this way: “All men blush but not any men blush”. Second, the discussion of implication, which was pointed out by G.E. Moore, is about issuing an utterance about a fact which implies one’s already acknowledged belief of that fact. So, Austin tells us that “my saying ‘the cat is on the mat’ implies that I believe it

²⁴⁹ HTDTWW.,p.148

²⁵⁰ HTDTWW.,p. 52

²⁵¹ HTDTWW. p.139

²⁵² HTDTWW.,p.134

²⁵³ HTDTWW.,p.46

²⁵⁴ HTDTWW.,p.47

is”²⁵⁵. However when the reverse is said, namely, “the cat is on the mat but I do not believe it is”, then that utterance would not be an inconsistency of the proposition, since “they are perfectly compatible”²⁵⁶. Third, presupposition tacitly presupposes some truth as to the uttered proposition. For example, the sentence “ ‘All Jack’s children are bald’ presupposes that Jack has some children”²⁵⁷. But, if we say that “All Jack’s children are bald but Jack has no children”; then it would be senseless in a different way from implications, yet not be a contradiction.

The aim of this exposition, three of the among possible many ways, is just to oppose the idea that we can rightly reduce all kinds of different cases as to the related many ways of “outraging speech” to “some blanket term, ‘implies’ or ‘contradiction’”²⁵⁸. Austin, again, evidently attacks the attitude which overlooks the aspect of the differences that are brought about in the negation of statements. In fact, according to Austin, these three ways are nothing but a draft of a should be extended project, whose major questions are: “how many ways, and why they outrage speech, and wherein the outrage lies ?”²⁵⁹.

Now, after a coarse outline of the implications (unlikely to the above distinguished specific sense) regardind the constative utterances or statements, let me turn to the aforementioned problem as to the comparison between the implications of constative utterances and the “ ‘implications’ of performative utterances”²⁶⁰ whose breaches heuristically characterizes the sharp distinction between both kinds of utterances. Hence, Austin exemplifies the truth of four connexions in which they are

²⁵⁵ HTDTWW.p.48

²⁵⁶ HTDTWW.p.49

²⁵⁷ HTDTWW.p.48

²⁵⁸ HTDTWW.p.48

²⁵⁹ HTDTWW.p.48

²⁶⁰ HTDTWW.p.46

implied by a performative utterances, namely “I apologize”²⁶¹ for the first three one, and the contractual utterance for the fourth one. This change of view means *the change of criteria* for the performative and constative utterances, because “for a certain performative utterance to be happy, certain statements have *to be true*.”²⁶² These four connexions are put in order in a more precise way in the following manner:

“(1) If the performative utterance ‘I apologize’ is happy, then the statement that I am apologizing is true.

(2) If the performative utterance ‘I apologize’ is to be happy, then the statement that certain conditions obtain –those notably in Rules A.1 and A.2– must be true.

(3) If the performative utterance ‘I apologize’ is to be happy, then the statement that certain conditions obtain –those notably in our Rule Γ.1– must be true.

(4) If performative utterances of at least some kinds are happy, for example contractual ones, then statements typically of the form that I ought or ought not subsequently to do some particular things are true.”²⁶³

For Austin, there are three ways of “similarity, and even perhaps identity”²⁶⁴: I) between the second connexion and the ill of ‘presupposition’ that of which belongs to the constative utterances, II) between the connexion third and the ill of ‘implications’ that of which belongs to the constative utterances, and III) between the fourth connexion, namely, a breach of commitment, and the ill of an entailment. Austin also, in elsewhere, clarifies that “ills that have been found to afflict statements

²⁶¹ HTDTWW.p.46

²⁶² HTDTWW.p.45

²⁶³ HTDTWW.,p.53-54; For Rules section 3.1.1

²⁶⁴ HTDTWW.,p.53

can be precisely paralleled with ills that are characteristic of performative utterances.”²⁶⁵

So, these three ways of failing of constative utterances, or statements correspond to the three ways of infelicities of performative utterances.

Similarity 1) ill of presupposition ↔ void

Similarity 2) ill of implication ↔ insincerity

Similarity 3) ill of entailment ↔ breach of commitment

Accordingly, the presupposition, “All John’s children are bald but John hasn’t got any children”, is similar to the connexion (2), for example, “the case of a contract for the sale of a piece of land when the piece of land referred to does not exist”²⁶⁶, in which the sale is void or “I bequeath my watch to you, but [or ‘and’] I haven’t got a watch”²⁶⁷. The common property of both is “the lack of reference”²⁶⁸. Secondly, the implication, “The cat is on the mat but I do not believe it is” resembles the connexion (3), such as “I promise but that I shall I be there but I haven’t the least intention of being there.”²⁶⁹. For this time, the common feature of these two sentences is being “insincerity”. Thirdly, the entailment among statements such as “ ‘All the guests are French’ entails ‘It’s not the case that some of the guests are not French’ ”²⁷⁰ is similar to the fourth connexion, breach of commitment, as in the example of “ ‘I define the word thus’ (a performative utterance) and then proceeds to use the word with a

²⁶⁵ Austin, “Performative Utterances”, in *Philosophical Papers*, p.249

²⁶⁶ Austin, “Performative Utterances”, in *Philosophical Papers*, p.248

²⁶⁷ Austin, “Performative-Constative”; in “*Philosophy and Ordinary Language*”, p.28

²⁶⁸ Austin, “Performative Utterances”, in *Philosophical Papers*, 249

²⁶⁹ Austin, “Performative Utterances”, p.248

²⁷⁰ Austin, “Performative-Constative”; in “*Philosophy and Ordinary Language*”, p.28

different meaning.”²⁷¹ If I utter in a particular room ‘All the guests are French’, then I commit myself for future to count the guests as French, however, if I would then say something incompatible with it, for example ‘There are British guests’, Austin says that “there will be a breach of commitment”²⁷² likewise, in some manner, to a performative infelicity type of breach of commitment.

The change of view as to the distinction, so, tells us that: 1) a performative utterance could also be true or false, and describe a fact. 2) a constative utterance could also be unhappy(or infelicity) likewise performative utterance. So, Austin does not find anymore a “necessary conflict between

a) our issuing the utterance being the doing of something,

b) our utterance being true or false.”²⁷³

The example which fulfills this both conditions reads as “ ‘I warn you that it is going to charge’ where likewise it is *both a warning and true or false* that it is going to charge;”²⁷⁴ Therefore, Austin assesses this change of view as a break down of the distinction. Yet, the cases of performatives which are truth-evaluable, such as in the given example, are just some exceptions among many. Thus, in general, Austin nevertheless does not change his mind. Consequently, Austin merely endeavours to emphasize the incidental character of some, but not all, performative utterances. Therefore, more precisely, he says that “performatives are, of course, *incidentally* saying something as well as doing something, but we may feel that they are not essentially true or false as statements are.”²⁷⁵ It means that, through bracketing the exceptional example of utterances, Austin, in fact, does not change his mind in general. Its most evident expression is seen in the following way:“ ‘I promise that’ is

²⁷¹ Austin, “Performative-Constative”, p.29

²⁷² *ibid.*

²⁷³ HTDTWW., p.135

²⁷⁴ HTDTWW., p.136 Emphasis belongs to me.

²⁷⁵ HTDTWW., p.140

not a description, because (1) it could not be false, nor therefore, true; (2) saying ‘I promise that’ (if happy, of course) *makes* it a promise, and *makes* it unambiguously a promise.”²⁷⁶

Actually, Austin’s concern with language is different from logicians, grammarians or semioticians. The aim of introducing the underlying idea as to the unhappiness of performative utterances, in which it is not capable of accomplishing such-and-such a particular action, is to demonstrate that these performative utterances are “subject to certain whole dimensions of unsatisfactoriness to which all actions are subject”²⁷⁷. However, all kinds of unhappiness that Austin exposes including their overlapping cases, are just a part of all actions which are subject to unsatisfactoriness, as it is said earlier. For if we get more familiar with the involved consideration in Austin’s articles²⁷⁸ such as ‘A plea for Excuses’, ‘Pretending’ and ‘Three Ways of Spilling Ink’, it would be easier to derive the conclusion that Austin’s speech act theory, in HTTWW, is only an aspect for a common theory of action which has not been accomplished neither by Austin nor any following speech act theorists afterwards.

3.6. Sea-Change: Speech Acts (Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Act)

Hitherto, I have presented the main points as to how Austin elucidates the weakness of “the supposed contrast between performative and constative utterances”²⁷⁹ through exceptional or contra cases. The strict criteria, formerly put, for the conditions of performative and constative utterances by this means appear to fade

²⁷⁶ HTDTWW., p.70

²⁷⁷ HTDTWW., p.21

²⁷⁸ in “Philosophical Papers”

²⁷⁹ HTDTWW, p.91

away. The availability for both kinds of utterances the state of unhappiness, the failure of finding a grammatical criterion for performative utterances, the indeterminacy of a given utterance whether it is performative or not, the problem of what kind of statements would be truth-evaluable, etc. leads Austin “to make a fresh start on the problem”²⁸⁰. This new start aims to resolve these imprecise explanations regarding the dichotomy of performative and constative utterances. In order to achieve this aim, Austin distinguishes “a whole group of senses of ‘doing something’ ”²⁸¹, or say “action”, which is a “very vague expression”²⁸². The main three different senses of doing something reveals as 1) saying something is doing something, 2) in saying something doing something, 3) by saying something doing something. So, these three ways of doing something are the “different senses or the dimensions of the ‘use of a sentence’ or of ‘uses of language’ ”²⁸³. Respectively, they are named by Austin as locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary. But why Austin needs to shift away from his performative/constative distinction to the locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary acts? This attempts to introduce a new distinction, the “sea-change”²⁸⁴ as he calls it, in terms of speech acts stands to “the *general* theory”²⁸⁵ whereas constative/performative distinction stands to “the *special* theory”. The reason of the need for the general theory is stemming from the complicated status of ‘statement’ (constative utterance) which is “an abstraction, an ideal, and so its traditional truth or falsity”²⁸⁶. Now, let me point out the matter in detail.

²⁸⁰ *ibid.*

²⁸¹ HTDTWW., p.94

²⁸² HTDTWW., p.92

²⁸³ HTDTWW., p.109

²⁸⁴ HTDTWW., p.150

²⁸⁵ HTDTWW., p.148

²⁸⁶ HTDTWW., p.148

3.6.1. Locutionary Act

As it is exclaimed, the performance of the locutionary act is just to say something. However, it consists of three rough distinctions, namely, the phonetic act, the phatic act, and the rhetic act. The phonetic act is producing sounds as noises that do not build up a speech. The phatic act is, however, the uttering of particular vocables or words “as conforming to a certain grammar, with a certain intonation”²⁸⁷. And, the rhetic act is the uttering words “with a certain more or less definite sense and reference”²⁸⁸. To remind, since Austin distinguishes the act of uttering, or as he prefers usually to say “issuing of an utterance”, and the utterance as a product; in the same manner we can enumerate the pairs as follows: 1) phonetic act – phone, 2) phatic act – pheme, 3) rhetic act – rheme. Among them, only rheme could be meaningful. Even if, Austin in elsewhere does not go into a strict distinction between ‘language’ and ‘speech’ which has been made in the field of linguistics, he employs the term pheme as “a unit of *language*”²⁸⁹ whose typical fault is to be meaningless, whereas rheme is “a unit of *speech*”²⁹⁰ and its standard failure is to be vague or void or obscure. If a monkey mumbles a sound like the word ‘go’, it is not a phatic act. However, each phatic act consists of a phonetic act, yet it does not amount to a meaningful word or an articulation of words. A particular comprehension of the meaning of some certain words by a particular utterer does not have to accompany a phatic act. For example, “ ‘cat thoroughly the if’ or ‘the slithy toves did gyre’ ”²⁹¹ are nonsense articulations. Well, here it can be asked the status of poetry according to these distinctions. I reserved to discuss some aspects of this matter under the section of etiolations of language. Austin, in an uncertain manner, distinguishes the phatic act

²⁸⁷ HTDTWW., p.92

²⁸⁸ HTDTWW., P.95

²⁸⁹ HTDTWW., P.98

²⁹⁰ HTDTWW., P.98

²⁹¹ HTDTWW., p.96

from the phatic act in terms of the mode of quotation. That is, a phatic act is uttered by a direct quotation in which “inverted commas” are used, whereas phatic act is uttered by an “indirect speech”. Thus, a sentence -The cat is on the mat- is seen in these ways²⁹²:

Phatic quotation: ‘He said “The cat is on the mat” ’

Rhetic quotation: ‘He said that the cat was on the mat’

The ambiguous point concerning the distinction between phatic act and phatic act brings about some difficulties to subsume both of them under the locutionary act. For, as it is seen, it is not possible to talk about of a locutionary act in its entirety which consists of three kinds of act as separate moments that are at work at the same time. According to Austin, as it seems, of a phatic act, it can be said that one could make a quotation without understanding the meaning of what he/she quotes. His emphasis is on the usage occasions of inverted commas as being unclear of what is meant through which is said. More precisely, Austin specifies that whenever the sense or reference of the issued utterance is *not* taken as clear, whether taken by addresser or addressee is not in dispute, then the whole or part would be in inverted commas. Another example shows that, if one says ‘He said I was to go to “the minister”, but he did not say which minister’²⁹³. This example is a phatic act in the manner of assertion, but its reference is vague which is the standard fault of phatic act.

Another difference is seen in the property of the phatic reports, being apart from the phatic reports, that are characterized by their sentential modification such as

²⁹² HTDTWW., p.95

²⁹³ HTDTWW., p.97

assertive, interrogative, imperative, etc. According to Austin's other instances²⁹⁴, while a phatic report 'He said "Get out"' only gives information about what is said, whereas 'He told me to get out' is an implicit imperative sentence. Or, 'He said "Is it in Oxford or Cambridge?"' is not an interrogative, but 'He asked whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge' is in a mode of interrogation. Thus, it would be proper to evaluate this distinction not as separable components of the utterer's active behaviour but as "highlighting bundles of aspects of the total speech act"²⁹⁵. Even if, as frequently seen, some commentators assess Austin's rhetic act as proposition, such an interpretation does not seem to be right. Since, though the deprived unity of locutionary act, the purpose of the three titles as to the locutionary act through several examples is essentially to demonstrate the inseparability of some locutionary acts from their illocutionary forces. Austin points this matter, against the common tendency of the commentators' conception concerning the putative illocutionary force-free locutionary act as an isolated proposition, in a precise way as reads "The locutionary act as much as the illocutionary is an abstraction only: every genuine act is both."²⁹⁶ Yet, such an interpretation could also be derived from the lectures, if we think of Austin's main purpose, in the ultimate sense, of attempting to take into consideration the total speech act in its total speaking circumstances. For, well indeed, Austin identifies locutionary act with rhetic act, and therefore to 'meaning', but 'roughly' as he notices. So, "we perform a *locutionary* act, which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to 'meaning' in the traditional sense."²⁹⁷

²⁹⁴ HTDTWW., p.95

²⁹⁵ Marina Sbisa, "Austin on Language and Action", in *J.L. Austin on Language*, p.17

²⁹⁶ HTDTWW., p.146

²⁹⁷ HTDTWW., p.109

3.6.2. Illocutionary Act

After a brief and not sufficiently clear explanation about locutionary act, Austin begins to elucidate, in discourse, as to what an illocutionary act is? How to understand the tie between meaning and force? In what way an illocution is distinguished from other ways of use of language? How many illocutionary types are there? To begin with, it is highly noteworthy to remark that Austin's essential interest in the "sea-change" to the doctrine of speech acts is "to fasten on the second, illocutionary act and contrast it with the other two"²⁹⁸, namely, locutionary and perlocutionary acts. So, to elucidate illocutionary act is *the primary goal* of the rest of the lectures, even more perhaps the whole of the lectures.

Primarily the given definition of the performance of illocutionary act is "an act *in* saying something"²⁹⁹. The illocutionary act is characterized by having a certain force in saying something. By the coined term "illocution" (in+locution) Austin refers to "the doctrine of the different types of function of language", in other words "the doctrine of 'illocutionary forces' "³⁰⁰. So, what makes the illocutionary act so essential for Austin is its status of being neglected "for too long" by the philosophers. Since the matters within the scope of locutionary acts, more or less, have been dealt with as the traditional theme of 'statement' (or, as considered by Cassin, "apophantic"³⁰¹), whereas the 'perlocutionary acts' as effects of the speaker's speech on the audience(s), speaker or others, which will be the subject of the section 3.6.3., have been treated by the philosophers under the title of 'rhetoric'³⁰². Therefore, by

²⁹⁸ HTDTWW., p.102

²⁹⁹ HTDTWW., p.99

³⁰⁰ HTDTWW., p.100

³⁰¹ Barbara Cassin, "La performance avant le Performatif ou La Troisième Dimension du Langage", in "Geneses de L'Acte de Parole dans Le monde Grec, Roman et Médiéval", p.125; "Un normal statement est un *logos apophantique*"

³⁰² Barbara Cassin, "La performance avant le Performatif ou La Troisième Dimension du Langage", p.126

means of the acts in saying something, Austin is aiming to set the scene to expose the slippery distinctions, through discussing particular instances, among these supposed acts in the total speech situation.

3.6.2.1. Meaning and Force

Hence, in this mentioned direction, we first encounter with a crucial distinction between two levels of use of language on what “meaning” is referred to the uttering of locution as “equivalent to sense and reference”³⁰³, and “force” is referred to the uttering of illocution. In an elsewhere, Austin presents this distinction in the following way: “...precision in language makes it clearer what is being said – its *meaning*: explicitness, in our sense, makes clearer the *force* of the utterances, or ‘how (in one sense; see below) it is to be taken’.”³⁰⁴ So, here is the formula; in its explicitness, meaning as ‘what is being said’ and force as ‘how it (utterance) is to be taken’³⁰⁵.

To notice, the term ‘force’ is first used in this way by Frege in his famous article ‘Thought’. In that article Frege presents a triple distinction among 1) the grasp (das Fassen) of a thought – thinking (das Denken), 2) the acknowledgment (die Anerkennung) of the truth of a thought – the act of judgment (das Urteil), 3) the manifestation (die Kundgebung) of this judgement – assertion (das Behaupten) ³⁰⁶. Next to it, an assertoric sentence/proposition (Behauptungssatz) consists of both: content and assertion. So, Frege says that, for instance, an interrogative sentence and an assertoric sentence may have the same content but while the former is a request (Aufforderung) the latter is an assertion. First, a thought is grasped, after an

³⁰³ HTDTWW., p.100

³⁰⁴ HTDTWW., p.73

³⁰⁵ See Husserl’s term ‘Stellungnahme’

³⁰⁶ Frege, “Thought”, in “Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy”, p. 355-356; “Der Gedanke” (1918), in “Logische Untersuchungen”, p.35

investigation, if this thought is recognized as true, Frege calls the recognized truth of a thought as a judging and we express it in the form of an assertoric sentence. Hence, “the properly assertoric force” (die eigentlich behauptende Kraft) lies in the form of an assertoric sentence. It has nothing to do with being true. However, Frege assigns the “assertoric force” only to the sentences which can be true or false, which would be implicitly objected by Austin in his felicity doctrines.

In appealing such a triple distinction just above Frege, in fact, is considering the procedure of knowledge in science, he claims that the progression in science works in these three steps. From such an exposition, we can easily derive the idea that ordinary speech is not in the scope of his research. If an assertoric sentence is pronounced without assertoric force, then “we are not speaking serious (Ernst)”³⁰⁷, as in the case of stage, poetry, fiction. In other words, any assertion in one of them would not be truth-evaluable. Without hesitation, this way of being not “serious” reminds Austin’s definition of etiolations of language. Besides, what makes distinguished Austin’s way of tackling ‘assertoric force’ is not to limit it only for truth-evaluable sentences, but also for non truth-evaluable sentences such as performative utterances in which an illocutionary act is performed.

Well, by coining the term “illocutionary force”, Austin essentially aims to replace the vagueness as to the term ‘use’ and ‘meaning’, since “ ‘use’ is a hopelessly ambiguous or wide word, just as the word ‘meaning’ ”³⁰⁸. In other words, there are different senses of the expression “ ‘uses of language’, or ‘use of a sentence’ ”³⁰⁹. He mainly speaks of four levels of use of language: 1) locutionary, 2) illocutionary, 3) perlocutionary, 4) etiolations of language or “non-serious uses of language”³¹⁰.

³⁰⁷ Frege, “Thought”, p. 356; “Der Gedanke” (1918), p.36

³⁰⁸ HTDTWW., p.100

³⁰⁹ *ibid.*

³¹⁰ HTDTWW., p.122

Austin's this objection as to the ambiguity of the sense of 'use of language' and the endeavours to restrict it in a more definite classifications could be deemed against Wittgenstein's answer to the question that "how many kinds of sentence are there ?", to which he replies that "there are *countless* kinds"³¹¹. Austin, by admitting the many uses of language and tempts to get a strong grip of their classification, does evidently object to the idea that there is countless kind of sentences in this manner:

"We need more of a framework in which to discuss these uses of language; also I think we should not despair too easily and talk, as people are apt to do, about *the infinite uses of language*. Philosophers will do this when they have listed as many, let us say, as seventeen; but even if there were something like ten thousand uses of language, surely we could list them all in time."³¹²

Thus, illocutionary force is the way of use of language or, say, use of locution. In this line, for an explicit performative utterance such as 'I promise that', Austin specifies that " 'I promise' makes it clear how what is said is to be understood"³¹³. If we recall the above formula about 'meaning' and 'force', then it would be clear of Austin's statement that meaning and force are, in fact, *inseparable* from each other, although there exists an already made distinction between the level of locution and illocution. In other words, though the formal distinction between meaning and force in the above way, in the opposite way Austin admits that "we can use "meaning" also with reference to illocutionary force"³¹⁴; since the occasion of utterance matters a lot,

³¹¹ Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §23, p. 14 (Wieviele Arten der Sätze gibt es aber? Etwa Behauptung, Frage und Befehle? Es gibt *unzählige* solcher Arten")

³¹² Austin, *Performative Utterances*, in *Philosophical Papers*, p.234 ; Emphasis belongs to me.

³¹³ HTDTWW., p.70

³¹⁴ HTDTWW., p.100

any such strict distinction would be elusive. As in the way Austin put it in words, “in performing a locutionary act we shall also be performing such an act as:

asking or answering a question,

giving some information or an assurance or a warning,

announcing a verdict or an intention

pronouncing sentence, making an appointment or an appeal or a criticism,

making an identification or giving a description, and the numerous like.”³¹⁵

Thus, we should say that the felicity conditions³¹⁶ of the performative utterances are the conditions of illocutionary acts to be successful since what is done through performative utterances, like the enumerated instances above, are nothing but illocutionary acts.

While Austin was previously searching for a list of explicit performative verbs in terms of performative/constative pair; now, from the aspect of the general theory, however, “what we need is a list of *illocutionary forces* of an utterance.”³¹⁷ But, as a deficit, Austin apparently brings about a confusion between “being said” (locution) with “being uttered assertively” (constative) by claiming that “with the constative utterance we ... concentrate on the locutionary aspects of language”³¹⁸

3.6.2.2. Distinctive Effects of Illocutionary Act

The illocutionary force is mostly featured by conventional procedures and only through conventional procedures an action turns into an illocutionary act. Definitely,

³¹⁵ HTDTWW., p.98

³¹⁶ See section 3.2.

³¹⁷ HTDTWW., p.150

³¹⁸ HTDTWW., p.145-46

we do not forget the $\Gamma. 1$ and $\Gamma. 2$ infelicity conditions of a performative utterance which stipulate the role of thought, feelings and intentions in the conventional procedures. Put aside it, even the locutionary act involves conventions. It is not “an ‘act’ as a fixed physical thing that we do”³¹⁹ as similar as the difference between kicking a wall and kicking a goal. Given that not only the locutionary acts but also the perlocutionary acts bring about consequences in their own way, as to the former the uttering of words with a certain meaning is a consequence of uttering the words whereas in the latter what happens is the producing an effect in the hearer in a non-conventional way. That’s why, in order to distinguish illocutionary acts from the other two kinds of acts, Austin hopes to “isolate” the peculiar consequences *only* pertains to the illocutionary acts. Thus, an illocutionary act is connected with three kinds of effect, as reads³²⁰:

1) the securing of uptake: this kind of effect, which has to be provided by the utterer, amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and force of the locution in the addressee. That is, the illocutionary act of the speaker must be understood by the hearer. Doubtless, to render it the addressee firstly has to hear what the speaker says. If the speaker aims to warn his addressee, he or she has to hear speaker’s warning words or non-verbal expressions.

2) ‘takes effect’ in certain ways: this kind of effect amounts to produce *conventional* states of affairs apart from changes “in the natural course of events”, namely, the perlocutionary consequences. Austin gives an example of an institutional act which addresses, without mention, the felicity conditions of A.1 and A.2 under the name of

³¹⁹ HTDTWW., p.107

³²⁰ HTDTWW., p.116-17

“conventional procedure”³²¹: “‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’ has the effect of naming or christening the ship”. Next to it, this conventional effect is grounded on an explicit or tacit “intersubjective agreement”³²². In other words, this conventional effect is possible only on the base of agreed conventional procedures. The social interactions which depend on deontic level are made or annulled through such conventional effects.

3) the inviting by convention a response or sequel: this kind of effect, depending on the illocutionary act, invites ‘one-way’ or ‘two-way’ response or sequel. For instance, an order (as one-way likewise promise, argue, suggest) is inviting the response of an obedience, whereas an asking or offering (as two-way) require a second act by the speaker or another person.

Concisely, the conditions to successfully perform an illocutionary act, by a speaker, is that the speaker has to want his or her interlocutor to understand that he or she performs a particular illocutionary act, for example, warning. Moreover, this illocutionary act has to be rendered through a conventional procedure. However, the third effect of the invitation of a response by a convention is not available for all illocutionary acts as such as in the case of assertions or advices. Furthermore, given the fact that conventions are being manifested during a conventional procedure which are set in a particular stage which is constituted by addresser(s) and addressee(s), they unavoidably involve non-verbal parts which make them complicated to comprehend and to analyze in a short cut solution. Austin expresses it in the following way:

“There cannot be an illocutionary act unless the means for achieving it non-verbally must be conventional. But it is difficult to say where conventions begin and end.”³²³

³²¹ See above; footnote 27

³²² Marina Sbisa, “Illocutionary force and degrees of strength in language use”, in “Journal of Pragmatics”, p.1796

³²³ HTDTWW., p.119

3.6.3. Perlocutionary Act

A perlocutionary act is “to produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons”³²⁴ by saying something. These consequential effects are done “with the design, intention or purpose of producing them”. In being so, the speaker of a particular speech act turns out to be undertaken the responsibility of those consequential effects. They are not conventional acts unlikely to the illocutionary acts. Aiming to get clearer the scope of perlocutionary acts apart from illocutionary acts, Austin first needs “to draw the line between an action we do (here an illocution) and its consequences.”³²⁵ Yet, due to the difficulties to determinate the border between the end of a certain action and its starting consequences, Austin immediately assesses such a distinction as an “intricate matter”. Though the scope of perlocutionary acts seems quite widespread, it is possible that we might specify some of the most prevalent of them such as surprising, convincing, persuading, misleading, deterring, rousing, alarming, annoying and etc.

By saying these utterances, the speaker is brought about some consequential effects on the listener through mainly in two ways: 1) intended, 2) unintended. Set aside the unintendedly brought about effects which might occur in various ways, Austin divides the production of an intended consequential effect into two. So, if the speaker intends a particular effect, then the expected effect might be either *succeeded* or *failed*. However, Austin says, there is a “complication” here. That is, the speaker fails in two ways. Either I) the speaker intends to bring about the effect but fail in “the achievement” or II) the speaker intends to bring about the effect but fail in “the

³²⁴ HTDTWW., p.101

³²⁵ HTDTWW., p.111

attempt”³²⁶. For (I), say, my friend wants to buy some books but among them one of it is highly expensive than its regular price but she was not aware of it and I told her ‘Don’t buy it’ intending to persuade her. As a result, I am sure that she hears me but does not understand what I mean by ‘it’. For (II), say, my friend wants to buy again the same book under the same circumstances and I say ‘Don’t buy it’ intending to persuade her not to buy it, but she gets annoyed against my utterance and replies that ‘how dare to interfere my job’. Therefore, my utterance causes her being in the state of annoyance instead of intended persuasion.

Furthermore, Austin presents another distinction, according to which, perlocutionary acts are either the achievement of a “perlocutionary object” or the production of a “perlocutionary sequel”³²⁷. For example, while I am walking around with my friend I saw a bike riding head in to her but I realize she was unaware of it, so I warn her ‘look ahead’ to alert her which is the perlocutionary object of the warning, however, my friend not only alerted but also feel alarming which is the perlocutionary sequel of the warning. Or, I warn my friend to deter her from doing something which is the perlocutionary object, but since she is not used to hear issuing warnings from me, she gets surprised which is the perlocutionary sequel. So, both intended and unintended perlocutionary sequels occur in various ways at issue, it might be sometimes by illocution or only by locution.

Moreover, it is usual for perlocutionary effects such as frightening, or surprising that they may be come up through a non-locutionary means. That is, I may also frighten someone just by honking at that person.

³²⁶ HTDTWW., p.106

³²⁷ HTDTWW., p.118

3.7. Truth

A right understanding of Austin's striking account of truth, first, requires evaluating it as a critic of the preceding perspectives as to the question of truth in which different ways of analyses were revealed in the writings of Frege, Russell, Tarski, Ayer, and Carnap. Excluding their proper characteristic views in respect of 'truth', we can claim that what Austin rejects as the common ground is the idea of the abstract truth-bearer that is called 'proposition' in the sense of sentence-types. On the contrary, since Austin's account of truth gives priority to utterances, some authors say it is a kind of "utterance semantics"³²⁸ or "pragmatics"³²⁹. Its main feature is "that *token utterances*, not *sentence-types*, are assessed as true or false"³³⁰. In other words, Austin essentially deals with truth "as a dimension of what he calls the criticism of speech"³³¹. Before passing into the discussion of Austin's account of truth, let me state that his own attitude towards the complexity of the matter appears as being sheerly against "over-simplification" of philosophers, according to which, Austin's view, in a nutshell, reads as "...but life and truth and things do tend to be complicated. It's not things, it's philosophers that are simple."³³²

The essential contribution of Austin to the question of truth is first revealed in his famous article 'Truth', which was published, in 1950, in *Aristotelian Society*. It embarks a debate with Strawson on how to understand the problem of truth. At the very first paragraph of the article Austin gives some clue about the target of his ensuing critics, so to speak, "For 'truth' itself is an abstract noun, a camel, that is, of a

³²⁸ Krista Lawlor, "Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims", p.59

³²⁹ Charles Travis, "Pragmatics", in *Occasion-Sensitivity*.

³³⁰ Krista Lawlor, "Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims", p.59

³³¹ Stanley Cavell, "Performative and Passionate Utterance"; in "Philosophy The Day After Tomorrow", p.157

³³² Austin, "Performative Utterances", in *Philosophical Papers*, p.252

logical construction”³³³ and rather he suggests discussing certain uses of the predicate ‘is true’. Then, a variety of questions as to the usage of ‘is true’ are discussed. Then, he immediately put forward three primary forms of expression what the predicate ‘is true’ can be attributed to:

“It is true (to say) that the cat is on the mat.

That statement (of his, etc.) is true.

The statement that the cat is on the mat is true.”³³⁴

While the first expression only in an implicit way involves a statement, whereas others are explicit statements. So, for Austin’s account, truth is a “dimension of assessment” of statements and the truth-bearers are nothing but the statements. But, what is a statement? How to understand it apart from proposition and sentence? In the given definition it is claimed that,

“A statement is made and its making is an historic event, the utterance by a certain speaker or writer of certain words (a sentence) to an audience with reference to an historic situation, event”³³⁵.

Thus, a statement looks like an event that we are frequently doing in our daily conversations. It’s made by means of words and sentences or, say, we use words and sentences to make a statement. We do not use statements, instead we make them. “A sentence is made *up of* words, a statement is made *in* words.”³³⁶ However, only a

³³³ Austin, “Truth”, in *Philosophical Papers*, p.117

³³⁴ Austin, “Truth”, in *Philosophical Papers*, p.118

³³⁵ Austin, “Truth”, p.119-120

³³⁶ Austin, “Truth”, p.120

group of utterances are statements. Performative utterances do not describe anything of a bit of world (for ex., Shut the door!), but do various things; promise, warrant, threaten, apologize. Indeed, statements are truth-bearers since they are capable to describe a bit of the world. Furthermore, we can make two different statement with the same sentence. Since what is said by a sentence in a particular context is not the same in another context.

As Ayer did, to designate the term ‘proposition’ to a class of sentences which have all *the same meaning* and thereby to construe ‘propositions’, and not sentences, as truth-evaluable, for Austin, brings about the core of the problem. As to the question of truth and falsehood, put aside the analytic sentences, Austin tells us that it “does not turn only on what a sentence *is*, nor yet on what it *means*, but on speaking very broadly, the circumstances in which it is uttered. Sentences are not as such either true or false.”³³⁷ So, to know 1) what a sentence is, and 2) what it means, are *not sufficient* to claim about the truth or falsity of a sentence. Moreover, it needs to be acquainted with the circumstances in which a sentence is uttered.

Therefore, by employing the same sentences we could describe two different bits of the world. Yet, it may not be a general rule for statements to be truth-bearer, says Austin, since there are such “masqueraders” which look like statements (in fact, which are not statements). Just because they do not give us any description, they have no capability for being truth-bearer.

“Not merely is it jejeune to suppose that all a statement aims to be is ‘true’, but it may be further questioned whether every ‘statement’ does aim to be true at all. The

³³⁷ Austin, “Sense and Sensibilia”, p.111

principle of Logic, that ‘Every proposition must be true or false’, has too long operated as the simplest, most persuasive form of the descriptive fallacy.”³³⁸

Here, in this quote, Austin criticizes the logical sense of the term ‘statement’. The statements which do not aim to be true, namely, “masqueraders” are such as “a formula in a calculus”, “a performatory utterance”, “a value-judgment”, “a definition”, “a work of fiction” do not correspond to the facts. Austin says that these masqueraders are neither descriptive nor truth-bearer. Therefore, he adds, “it is better, when a masquerader has been unmasked, *not* to call it a statement and *not* to say it is true or false.”³³⁹ Now, one can immediately claim that Austin is defending the correspondancy theory of truth which ascribes one-to-one relation between word and world. However, Austin rejects such a strict sense of correspondence, rather he offers a “fit” theory, as I will address below, that based on a similarity relation between words and world in a non strict way. Hence, we can ascribe to statements more or less a degree of truth in terms of being “fit” to the situation at issue. It needs to notice that, as said before, statements as speech acts (utterances) both perform locutionary acts (namely, meaning) and might have illocutionary force.

The crucial point here is to reject the perspective of logical theory in respect of its abstract truth and to correct the tie between facts and truth through a new account of statement in which a theory of ‘fit’ is employed, as reads: “There are various *degrees and dimensions* of success in making statements: the statements fit the facts always more or less loosely, in different ways on different occasions for different intents and purposes.”³⁴⁰

³³⁸ Austin, “Truth”, p.130-31

³³⁹ Austin, “Truth”, p.131

³⁴⁰ Austin, “Truth”, p.130

So to speak, apart from logical theory, truth is unavoidably dependent on the occasions, which are external to the speaker, and also it depends to the intents and purposes, which are internal to the speaker. From this perspective, Austin's statement as a truth-bearer is diametrically opposed to the truth view of Frege in which it is dealt with 'thought' that is characterized as timeless, unperceivable and context-independent. Austin's primary purpose is to assault this account on the base of the idea that relates truth with meaning, in which only the meaning of a sentence, without taking into consideration the use of that sentence, determines its truth-conditions. According to this view, the meaning of a sentence amounts to *merely* the answer of 'what is said', or, let's say, the content of the sentence. This neglect of the truth-conditions semantics is explicitly clarified by Austin in the following way, "The truth or falsity of a statement depends *not merely* on the meanings of the words but on what act you were performing in what circumstances."³⁴¹ So, Austin gives us a complex matter of statement, in which we come across with 1) statement as a meaning content, 2) statement as an act, 3) circumstance-dependency, or say, occasion-dependency. Moreover, for Austin, stating truly or falsely depends on not only its context, but also the intents and purposes of the utterance.

To remind, we have already abovementioned that Austin coins the term "constative utterances", in HTDTWW, which is to make a "statement" and to be truth-bearer. But, philosophers mostly suppose that every utterance states a fact and describes a bit of world. Austin calls this mistake "descriptive fallacy". For there are also aforementioned "performative utterances" which do not describe anything and do not state a fact. In an early article, Austin had already suggested descriptive fallacy, as

³⁴¹ HTDTWW., p.145 Emphasis is mine

reads, “To suppose that ‘I know’ is a descriptive phrase, is only one example of the descriptive fallacy, so common in philosophy.”³⁴² Therefore, the utterance “I know” when is uttered to anyone in which the felicity conditions have been satisfied would be a performative utterance. Such a performative utterance does not describe anything. Unlikely, constative utterances are called “utterances which are *statements*”. In ensuing, Austin put in contrast the performative utterances with “the supposedly familiar ‘statement’”. By the way, the term “assertion” as well is mostly employed in the same way as “statement”, but assertion “is slightly wider”³⁴³. We see furthermore in Austin’s article “How to talk” that, in fact, “asserting” is only the “generic”³⁴⁴ name of “four species” speech acts (calling, describing, exemplifying, classing).

Nonetheless, we encounter a puzzling issue in the writings about two different ways of usage of “statement”. One is the ‘statement’ inherited from the logical theory in the sense of “proposition” and the other is “statement” as a performance, an act at which, as he says, its making is an historic event by a certain speaker to an audience. Indeed, in the first footnote of the HTDTWW, Austin surprisingly says that “the statement itself is a ‘logical construction’ out of the makings of statements.” The former is in the sense of “proposition” as an abstract logical construction, whereas the latter “making of statements” refers to an actual performance as an historic event. Austin offers the latter as his new framework in the first lecture of HTDTWW: “the more we consider a statement not as a sentence (or proposition) but as an act of speech (out of which the others are logical constructions) the more we are studying the whole thing as act”³⁴⁵. Towards the end of the lectures, he again declares that

³⁴² Austin, *Other Minds*, p.103

³⁴³ Austin, “Truth”, p.120

³⁴⁴ HTDTWW., p.140

³⁴⁵ HTDTWW., p.20

“stating is performing an act”³⁴⁶. However, Austin does not leave behind the usage of “statement” in the sense of “proposition” as a timeless ‘what is said’ abstracted from actual performance of statement as a historic event. So, this is the “double-sidedness”³⁴⁷ of Austin’s account of statement as the *content-view* and the *act-view*. These common ways of approach³⁴⁸ are both preserved in Austin’s account of truth at two different levels.

Now, it requires to remind Austin’s notions of locutionary act and illocutionary act that are different levels of performativity; in which, the former amounts to an act of saying something and roughly equivalent to ‘meaning’ in the Fregean way, whereas the latter is an doing an action *in* saying something. The point is that an illocutionary act is only possible through performing a locutionary act, as Austin reads, “To perform a locutionary act is, in general, we may say, also and *ipso facto* to perform an illocutionary act.”³⁴⁹ Therefore, *primarily* the felicity conditions (which is separate from conditions of being true of a statement) of an illocutionary act needs to be satisfied for a statement to be true. That is, the first pragmatic dimension that amounts to the happiness of the illocution is also the condition of being a truth-bearer, otherwise a statement could not be true.

Thus, whenever an actual statement is made only thereafter it would be liable to be truth-bearer. In addition, an abstract “content” merely can not be the candidate of being truth-bearer, for it does not talk about, at least, any particular historic situation, or event in the world. The content-view, by alone without associating a

³⁴⁶ HTDTWW., p.139

³⁴⁷ Jocelyn Benoist, “What is a Statement”, in *Context, Truth, and Objectivity: Essays on Radical Contextualism*, p. 23

³⁴⁸ It needs to notice that the question of which comes first in both them (that is, acts first ? or contents first ?) is “at the center of debate in philosophy of language and mind in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology, and it is so now again, in strikingly similar ways, in contemporary analytic philosophy” (Introduction by Frederic Moltmann and Mark Textor, in “Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content”, p. VII)

³⁴⁹ Austin, HTDTWW, p.98

particular speech act, that's, without taking into account the circumstances in which the statement is made, would be thoroughly erroneous, because as Austin clarifies it, "we never say 'The meaning (or sense) of this sentence (or of these words) is true'"; rather we say, in the way of a jury or judge, that " 'The words taken in this sense, or if we assign to them such and such a meaning, or so interpreted or understood, *are true*'"³⁵⁰. In other words, the dimension of the "true", which is merely one dimension of assessment, turn out to have an "indexical character"³⁵¹. Given that meaning neither as in a Fregean way refers to a "thought" nor in a Husserlian way the meaning of the expression "a horse" while remaining the same only its intentional objectivity differs, for ex., 'Bucephalus is a horse' and 'That cart-horse is a horse'³⁵²; but, whereas apart from them, in Austin "a meaning *deictically referred* to a state of affairs."³⁵³ More precisely, the actual statement has "the merit of clearly referring to the historic use of a sentence by an utterer"³⁵⁴

Pre-Austinian view is uninterested in how to apply, for example, the proposition "The cat is on the mat" in a particular (historic) situation. It deals only with whether the ascription of a predicate to a subject is proper or not which makes it 'true' or 'false'. However, for Austin our proposition "The cat is on the mat" by alone is not enough to determine what it says, that is to say its description. Namely, when we just hear without any seeing the historic situation, we cannot determine whether the cat is kept in a box which lies on the mat, or whether the cat's paws are out of the mat, or whether the mat is rolled up and the cat is inside the rolled mat³⁵⁵.

³⁵⁰ Austin, "Truth", p.119

³⁵¹ Jean Philippe Narboux, "The Logical Fabric of Assertions. Some Lessons from Austin's 'How to Talk: Some Simple Ways'", in *Austin et La Philosophie du Langage*, p.211

³⁵² See section 2.4.

³⁵³ Jocelyn Benoist, "What is a Statement", p. 23

³⁵⁴ Austin, "Truth", p.121

³⁵⁵ Charles Travis, "Truth and Merit", in *The Philosophy of J.L. Austin*, p.175-203

Now, it would be better to take a closer look at two sets of conventions to get a grip how to have this merit. Austin's truth account of "fit" depends mainly on two types of conventions, according to which "descriptive conventions" link sentences to type of situations and; in opposition direction to that, "demonstrative conventions" link the certain statement or, say, act of stating to a historic situation.

"Descriptive conventions correlating the words (=sentences) with the *types* of situation, thing, event, etc, to be found in the world.

Demonstrative conventions correlating the words (=statements) with the *historic* situations, etc., to be found in the world.

A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions."³⁵⁶

Here, the term "type" is not used in the sense of "universal", but "being sufficiently like". It is what Austin means by 'the same', in a paradoxically way, which does not always mean the same. "The same" has no meaning like 'horse', or 'red', rather "it is a (typical) device for establishing and distinguishing the meanings of ordinary words."³⁵⁷ "The same", "real", "like", even "truth", "exactness", these are called, by Austin, as "adjuster words" in 'Sense and Sensibilia'.

1) Descriptive Conventions: Sentence ↔ Types of Situation

2) Demonstrative Conventions: Statement (Act of Stating) ↔ Historic Situations

words (=Sentences)

³⁵⁶ Austin, "Truth", p.121-122

³⁵⁷ Austin, "Truth", p.120

Types of Situation ↔ ↔ Historic Situations

words (=Statements)

A statement would be true, if and only if both conventions fasten each other, and not the other way around. Both may be included under “semantic”, but the point which is mostly dismissed is that “they differ greatly”. On the one hand, we can not make a statement without a possibility of describing; on the other hand, sentences do not have any capability to link themselves to types of situation without the possibility of making statement. Moreover, to notice that this fitting is not realized as a full-achievement, since “there are various *degrees and dimensions* of success in making statements: the statements fit the facts always more or less loosely, in different ways on different occasions for different intents and purposes.”³⁵⁸ If we ignore under which circumstances those statements were made, for what purposes or intents, then only for the bare act of stating we cannot talk about a dimension of assessment as true.

“In real life, as opposed to the simple situations envisaged in logical theory, one cannot always answer in a simple manner whether it is true or false. Suppose that we confront ‘France is hexagonal’ with the facts, in this case, I suppose, with France, is it true or false?...It is a rough description; it is not true or false...., the intents and purposes of the utterance and its context are important.”³⁵⁹

In ensuing, Austin states that such a description like “France is hexagonal” is good enough for top-ranking general but not for a geographer. Given that the description is rough, in a similar way the statement is rough, but not true or false. This

³⁵⁸ Austin, “Truth”, p.130

³⁵⁹ Austin, HTDTWW p.143

tenet is the central idea of contextualism from a pragmatic perspective. “Truth” is only one dimension of assessment, but words may be assessed from other dimensions such as the dimension of originality, of sincerity, of relevance, etc. Austin says that “the more you think about truth and falsity the more you find that very few statements that we utter are just true or just false.”³⁶⁰ Moreover, ‘true’ and ‘false’, which used mostly by logicians, are “the general labels for a whole dimension of different appraisals”. Rather than such a generalized “truth” as a consequence of “onomatolatriy”³⁶¹, Austin underlines³⁶² the statements as being “rough”, “exaggerated”, “exact”, “ambiguous”, “imprecise”, “detailed”, “inaccurate”, “couched in general terms”, “not very full, or complete”

Hence, if we turn back to both sets of conventions, it is required additionally to say something of the long and significant footnote on the aforementioned definition at issue, in which it is put in briefly that if a statement would be true, one state of affairs has to be *like* certain other state of affairs. This likeness is a natural relation. Moreover, that particular state of affairs has to be “also sufficiently like to merit the same ‘description’” and that is the unnatural relation.

“ ‘Is of a type with which’ means ‘is sufficiently like those standard states of affairs with which’. Thus, for a statement to be true one state of affairs must be like certain others, which is a natural relation, but also *sufficiently* like to merit the same ‘description’, which is no longer a purely natural relation...That things are similar, or even ‘exactly’ similar, I may literally see, but that they are the *same* I cannot literally see –in calling them the same colour a convention is involved additional to the

³⁶⁰ Austin, “Performative Utterances”, in Philosophical Papers, p.250

³⁶¹ Austin, “Truth”, p.128: “*Unum, verum, bonum*- the old favourites deserve their celebrity, there is something odd about each of them. Theoretical theology is a form of onomatolatriy.”

³⁶² Austin, “Sense and Sensibilia”, p.126-129

conventional choice of the name to be given to the colour which they are said to be.”³⁶³

That is, each statement conjoins a historic situation to a type of situations. The correlation between 1) sentence and the type of situation and 2) the statement made in that sentence with reference deictically to an historic situation is “*absolutely and purely conventional*”³⁶⁴. So, what needs for a type of situations to be a type is a range of standard samples of it. In making a statement we are referring deictically to historic situations through demonstrative conventions and the situation that we hook is in various ways similar and also dissimilar from those standard samples. So, one convention is of the arbitrarily chosen name to sign the type of situations and the other one is of getting a decision whether the present situation is “sufficiently similar” to the standard samples.

Austin’s account of truth based on two conventions is exemplified by Barwise and Etchemendy as in the following:

“Claire’s Hand: You are watching a card game, and you note to another observer, ‘Claire has the ace of hearts’. It so happens that the player before you is not Claire but Abby (you mistake them). Nonetheless at that very instant, Claire herself, playing at a different table, holds the ace of hearts.”³⁶⁵

Since there is not a match between the description “Claire has the ace of the hearts” and the demonstrated situation which is before you that is not Claire but Abby, under these circumstances it is false. First, the puzzling point is that the

³⁶³ Austin, “Truth”, p.122

³⁶⁴ Austin, “Truth”, p.124

³⁶⁵ Barwise and Etchemendy, “The Liar: An essay on Truth and Circularity”, 1987, p. 121

statement as a speech act is not accomplished but *void*³⁶⁶ because you make a mistake by calling her Claire “unintentionally”. So, to remind that for a statement to be a truth-evaluable, the condition is that the act of stating must be *happy*.

4) Husserl and Austin

4.1) Declarative Sentences and Other Kind of Sentences

Once we have got a decision to make a comparison between Husserl and Austin, the first and foremost concern, for throwing a bridge between them, would be to figure out whether the declarative sentences [statement (Aussage)] are different from non-declarative sentences and if there is such a difference how it is related with their truth-evaluability in terms of describing state of affairs. To prepare for such a comparative study, I have already hitherto addressed some crucial controversial themes in both chapters, so I shall enlarge these themes, by giving their details, with the aim of obtaining an elaborative exposition of the general conceptual frameworks of both philosophers around the problem at issue.

In the last sections of VI. Investigation of L.I. Husserl discusses whether, apart from declarative sentences, non-declarative sentences could also be regarded as *judgments* or not. To remind, the act of judging (Urteilen) is expressed by the statement. This discussion is dealt with “the most important and difficult point at issue”³⁶⁷. But, why this problem is so important? I will first give key terms to elucidate Husserl’s view about the problem in the L.I. and then present some changing points in his other texts. So, his answer to this disputed matter in L.I. is that non-statements that which consist of the interrogative sentences, imperative

³⁶⁶ Austin, HTDTHWW, p.21

³⁶⁷ Hua XIX/2, p.737; L.I./II, p.839

sentences, optative sentences, willing sentences, etc., contain a judgment. As the expression of intentional lived-experiences of wishes, questions, volitions; these types of sentences contain judgments, but they are not counted as statements. By doing that, Husserl does away with the trouble of “permit acts of all sorts to confer or fulfill meaning”³⁶⁸. It amounts to say that Husserl seems to be successful to save his own main plan, in virtue of such a juggle, on the L.I. of which essentially depends on making all meaning the genus of objectifying acts, namely, both of signitive and intuitive acts. [In the meantime, according to the rule of intentionality, there is no expressed meaning (Bedeutung) out of an act of meaning (Bedeuten)]. That is, non-statements have not meanings peculiar to their own essences. In other words, it would be wrong to say that there exist, for Husserl, supposedly distinguished kinds of meanings attributed peculiarly to the imperative sentences, optative sentences, interrogative sentences which possess particular essences of these types of sentences respectively.

More precisely, Husserl does not assign a capability of attributing multiple types of sentences to one type of sentence, instead what is expressed “in the interrogative sentence a question, in the optative sentence a wish, in the declarative sentence (Aussagesatz) a judgment”³⁶⁹. Such an ambivalent decision seems “unavoidable” to Husserl, in respect of its reconciliation with “the other phenomenological facts”. In a succinct manner, a non-statement must contain a judgment in order to have a meaning; however, what is expressed in a non-statement is not a judgment, but volition, wish, question, order, fear, hesitation, hope, joy, etc.

That is why, *only a statement could be true or false*, since only statements are capable of saying that something is or that something is not, or, say something about

³⁶⁸ Hua XIX/2, p.749; L.I./II, p.850

³⁶⁹ Hua XIX/2, p. 740; L.I./II, p.842

something. In other words, only they can assert or judge upon state of affairs. It is quite important to determine this distinction; since, according to Husserl's view, *meaning* lies in the act of judging as the identical judgment-content. Thus, given that statements contain judgments and judgments judge upon the state of affairs, a statement is capable of truth-evaluability. It follows that, for now, a statement bounds up judgment, meaning, and truth-evaluability. These three terms play a central role in acquisition an evident way in Husserl's phenomenology as he expressed it firstly in 'Prolegomena to Pure Logic'.

As it has been aforementioned, on the one hand, the only meaning "carriers" are objectifying acts. These intentional acts have a constitutive function on the construction of acts of knowledge (Erkenntnisakt) by means of the pair of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilling acts which are nothing but objectifying acts. On the other hand, Husserl classifies intentional acts of volition, desire, wish, fear, hope, etc. under the title of "non-objectifying acts"³⁷⁰. If we remind Husserl's way of intentionality as consciousness of something, it is an act of objectifying act, whereas a non-objectifying act is founded on an objectifying act because it can not function as meaning-intention *by itself*, namely, cannot be a meaning carrier. To be noted, as coined by Husserl in the first Investigation, through the intimating function³⁷¹, in communication we both intimate to the hearer both the 'thought' of our utterance and certain psychical lived experiences. So, the intimating function, in the narrow sense is about the intimated act of judging as a content, whereas in the wider sense it is about the psychical lived experiences. The former is the judged state of affairs, and the latter is the psychic lived experiences. Doubtless, they are not being intimated to the hearer separately. Besides, this intimating functions differently in statements and non-

³⁷⁰ See above: Chapter I, Section 2.2.2

³⁷¹ See above, footnote 40 and 85

statements. According to this view, which laid out in the first Investigation, what is intimated in a statement is the psychic lived experience of stating or believing and what is stating about is the state of affairs which is “the objectively apprehended”. Whereas, in the non-declarative sentences, for example, a wish sentence both expresses a wish and intimate a judgment upon that wish. However, in the sixth Investigation Husserl makes some changes in his final criticism for the non-declarative sentences.

So to speak, in this turn, what is expressed in a wish sentence is not a judgment upon that wish, but the act of wishing. But, how could we exactly know in an assured way that what is expressed against us is whether the act of judging (Urteilen), act of wishing (Wünschen), act of willing (Willen), the act of interrogation (Anfragen); given that they are lived experiences as intentional acts. Instead, what we might know is the judgment, the wish, the action and the decision, and the question. The lived experiences and their iterable, timeless, ideal content are distinguished from each other by Husserl. Only, by means of such a distinction, I can express representations of words and apperception of words (Wortvorstellungen, Wortapperrzeption) without experiencing any act of judging, wishing, or etc. That is, I can understand a wish sentence without actually wishing and thereby to have an intention of wish. In other words, the lived experience of wishing is the act-moment of the non-objectifying act which is expected to be expressed in a wish sentence.

Though all, not yet dissolved ambiguity could be easily seen; that is, on the one hand, the only meaning carrier is objectifying acts and thus non-objectifying acts do not carry meaning; on the other hand, the non-objectifying acts of wishing, desiring, asking are expressed in their proper sentences and by founding on an objectifying act turns into a meaning carrier. So, since the underlying objectifying act

would be expressed by judgments, therefore non-objectifying acts would be indirectly expressed by judgment. Briefly, it would amount to say that expressed non-objectifying acts, for ex., in a wish sentence would turn out to be a statement.

Husserl presents a solution for this ambivalent position that proceeds in two steps:

- 1) Put in order the non-declarative sentences as declarative sentences by using the patterns such as “ ‘I ask whether...’, ‘I command, wish that...’ etc.”³⁷². So, the interrogative formula ‘Is S P’ is switched into ‘I ask whether S is P’.
- 2) In order to exclude the particular difficulties regarding the dialogue or communication, the speech is considered as a monologue. And, then ‘I ask whether S is P’ lost its addressee and addresser, by which the logical structures is allowed for being used in making phenomenology.

Husserl says that as staying alone by myself whenever I ask a question to myself, that “interrogative expression becomes a mere name, or not really even that”³⁷³. Therefore, I find myself as a knower of the seeming question and “the expression becomes one with the *intuited inner experience (angeschauten inneren Erlebnis)* as a knowing of the latter”³⁷⁴. In dealing with such an “internal question”, there would not be any change in the meaning of the interrogative sentence unlikely to the intimation. Yet, this unchanged meaning of the internal question still has to be a judgment about the relevant act of asking. Now, we come to the juggling for overcoming the impasse regarding the judgment. The required judgment was not a predicative judgement, but “the positing objectivation”.

³⁷² Hua XIX/2, p.750; L.I./II, p.851

³⁷³ Hua XIX/2, p.747; L.I./II, p.848

³⁷⁴ *ibid.* Emphasis is mine

“If there is no place for judgments here in the narrower sense of predications – Aristotle certainly had this conception of the controversial sentences – perhaps there is place for them in a wider sense of positing objectivations³⁷⁵ (setzende Objektivationen) in general.”³⁷⁶

Hence, judgment in the sense of “positing objectivations” makes non-declarative sentences possible to contain statements. Thus, the non-objectifying acts could be capable of meaning carrier via ‘positing objectivations’. Nonetheless, the difference between statement as predicative judgment and statement as ‘positing objectivations’ remains blurred without no further precise explanation. Husserl explains this intricate problem, in elsewhere, by eliminating the possibility of “meaning of wish” (Wunschbedeutung). For this time again considered in a monologue, when I reflect over my act of wishing he says “we have...an inner perceiving of wishing built on a referring, a knowing, a judging.”³⁷⁷ Here, the product of this act of judging (but not as a predicative judgement) is called ‘positing objectivation’ which makes available non-objectifying acts as meaning carrier and moreover which is not in the form of ‘S is P’.

4.2. Truth: Husserl and Austin

Now, to the argument about the conversion of non-declarative sentences to declarative sentences Husserl argues against Bolzano’s claim and adds to it a further step. First, Bolzano’s suggestion is that an interrogative sentence states nothing about the interrogated state of affairs, but if we convert it into a sentence which indicates our desire to be informed that ‘S is P’, then it would state something. Thus, the new

³⁷⁵ See above: Chapter 1, Section 2.1.2.1

³⁷⁶ Hua XIX/2, p.742; L.I./II, p.844

³⁷⁷ Hua XX/2, p.429: “Bei den Ichaussagen haben wir, wenn sie in Reflexion auf das aktuelle Wünschen vollzogen sind, ein inneres Wahrnehmen des Wünschen, darauf gebaut ein Beziehen, ein Erkennen, ein Urteilen.”

formulated sentence would be truth-evaluable. It would be false if our desire is indicated incorrectly by it. Second, Husserl does not agree with Bolzano that the new formulated sentence would only be evaluated from the dimension of truth-evaluability. Bolzano, according to Husserl, is not clear on the two levels of evaluation regarding the new formulated sentence:³⁷⁸

- 1) The adequacy (Angemessenheit) or inadequacy of an expression to our thought.
- 2) The truth or falsehood which relates the expression to the content of that thought and its adequacy to the thing.

The first, such an inadequacy relation appears either as unsuitable (unpassend) or as insincere (unwahrhaftig). The case of choosing a wrong word for an expression of the thoughts in the mind is unsuitability between the “linguistical customary meaning” (sprachübliche Bedeutung) of the chosen word and the thought in the mind. The case of deliberately deceptive, lying speech, or pretending is insincerity, in which the speaker does not want to express the thought in mind when making a speech.

Now, Husserl’s rejection is based on the idea that every expression could be evaluated from the dimension of unsuitability and insincerity; however, only statements could be true-evaluable. Whenever an interrogative sentence switches into a declarative sentence, that new formulated declarative sentence would be capable of being objected from two dimensions:

- 1) “the factual objection” which is aimed at the statement. This dimension of assessment is *only* dealt with truth.

³⁷⁸ Hua XIX/2, p.738; L.I./II, p.840

2) “the objection of insincerity or inadequacy” which is aimed at the questioner.

Husserl also calls the first manner of objection “objective” and the second one “subjective”³⁷⁹. Thus, we can claim that Husserl in such a suggestion of three different dimensions of assessment (truth/falsity, suitability/unsuitability, sincerity/insincerity) in one sense supports Austin’s criticism of true/false fetishism in respect of reducing other possible dimensions of assessment merely to truth-evaluability. In the revision of the second edition of the VI. Investigation, we can find an example, which can only be evaluated in terms of insincerity or inadequacy, without its truth-evaluability, though it is a *sort* of statement, but not containing a judgment of predicative statement, rather a judgment in the sense of ‘positing objectivation’: “Against the one, who says ‘S might P’, cannot be said ‘It is false’ ”³⁸⁰ Well, since ‘S might P’ is a judgment in the second sense, it has meaning. Nonetheless, it is not in the form of predicative sentence. Husserl does not leave his opinion about this subject, even in his late work ‘Formal and Transcendental Logic’. He encapsulated this view in the following way:

“...alteration of attitude which makes it possible at any time to give expression to wishing and wish, asking and question, or the like, not immediately but mediately, after the fashion of a judgment –that is to say: through the mediation of a judgment positing (Urteilssetzung) by which the direct wish, for example, becomes changed into a judgment statement (Urteilsaussage) concerning that wish. In its modified expression, which indicates the mediation, the wish is now a moment in a judgment-

³⁷⁹ Hua XIX/2, p.750; L.I./II, p.851

³⁸⁰ Hua XX/2, p.419: “Nun wird man aber nicht dem, der sagt „Möge S P sein!“ entgegensagen „Das ist falsch“.Aber doch nur, weil vielmehr die Tatsache des Wünschens ausgedrückt wird, und da sagt man höchstens „Du lügst“, „Du sprichst unwahrhaftig“.”

expression, as when we say, ‘I wish that S might be P’, instead of saying ‘May S be P’ ”³⁸¹

Through such a mediation, Husserl, indeed, finds a clear-cut solution to include “all other meanings” into the extent of “logic of judgments”. That is, through this kind of mediation “the realm of judgment significations (das reich der Urteilsbedeutungen) absorbs all other significations, and consequently the logic of judgements is able to include the logic of all other significations, as in a certain fashion, part of itself.” In other words, it is implied that there are non-judgmental meanings as non-objectifying acts, but their being ‘non-judicial’ is in the sense of predication, but not ‘judgment positing’.

Briefly, we realize that the term ‘judgment’ has two senses:

- 1) positing objectivation, or judgment positing
- 2) predicative judgement or judgement statement.

According to this division, their account of ‘truth’ is also different. For the former,

*“Truth is an Idea, whose particular case is an actual experience in the inwardly evident judgment. The inwardly evident judgment is, however, an experience of primal givenness: the non-self evident judgment stands to it much as the arbitrary positing of an object in imagination stands to its adequate perception.”*³⁸².

So, according to this paragraph what is called primal givenness is nothing but the perception. Ensuing, its experience is evident judgment, whereas imaginations, expectations, remembering, etc. are the non-evident judgments. This sense of judgment is a sort of original unity among images and concepts that carries meaning.

³⁸¹ Hua XVII, p. 28; Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, p.24

³⁸² Hua XVIII, p.193; Husserl, “Prolegomena to Pure Logic”, p.194-95

Husserl's this original but trouble-making conception of judgment depends on the view of 'inner evidence' which means "experience of truth". So, truth is an idea and it has its particular cases. Here, Husserl, as his one of the foremost leitmotif, makes a correlation between idea(l) and object(ive). As an idea truth is experienced in the inwardly evident judgment. According to this account of judgment, what must we demand from each judgment is that "it asserts as true what is true"³⁸³. This means, in a naive way, that what I see is what is seen. Nothing more. The problem regarding 'truth' in this sense arises from Husserl's way of canceling ascertainment of truth with the 'experience of truth'. Since if we experience truth, there is no need to ascertain it.

"As in the realm of perception, the unseen does not at all coincide with the non-existent, so lack of inward evidence does not amount to untruth. *The experience of the agreement* between meaning and what is itself present, meant, between the actual *sense of an assertion* and the self-given *state of affairs*, is inward evidence: The *Idea* of this agreement is truth, whose ideality is also its objectivity."

I) Meaning ↔ What is meant

II) Sense of assertion ↔ Self-given state of affairs

So, if these two ways of correlation *in the experience* agree with each other, it is called inward evidence which is nothing but the 'experience' of truth, whereas *the Idea* of this agreement is truth. The leitmotif runs between the experience (act level) and the ideal (content level).

Secondly, the "truth" account of predicative judgments is essentially a reply to the aforementioned "factual objection" (which passess in the VI. Investigation) that is

³⁸³ Hua XIX/2, p.139; Husserl, "Prolegomena to Pure Logic", p.152 (Translation slightly changes): "daß es als wahr behaupte was wahr sei"

aimed at the statement. It is about the state of affairs, rather than the multifarious lived experience of the questioner, wisher, orderer, etc. But, Husserl notices that to rewrite a declarative sentence by using ‘I state that...’ is unlikely to the case of conversion of non-declarative sentences to the declarative sentences in which the interrogation or imperative sentences are rewritten in the form of declarative sentences by employing the patterns ‘I ask for...’ or ‘I order that...’. That is why, if we add a pattern such as “I state that...”³⁸⁴ for a predicative judgment ‘S is P’, then two sentences would not be the same. So to speak, ‘S is P’ and ‘I state that S is P’ are not the same, because the latter is a “modified statement”. Thus, the non-declarative sentences are capable of convertible to a declarative sentences, whereas declarative sentences are not capable of convertible to the same declarative sentences.

So, it is clear that in L.I. the term ‘judgement’ is used in various senses. In another place³⁸⁵ Husserl determines four kinds of judgment in relation to statement as follows:

- 1)Judgment = Statement in the sense of Assertion (Behauptung), counts with linguistic expression.
- 2)Judgment = Assertion, but under abstraction from the linguistic expression. (it is a “belief”, that something is or is not)
- 3)Judgment = Objective content of statement = claimed truth
- 4)Judgment = Representation content of the assertion

Well, Husserl’s term of “positing objectivation” refers both to the second and third options, whereas Austin only deals with the first option, which is realized in a social context. Hence its doing action in three different levels (locutionary, illocution, perlocution) could be satisfied in a certain speaking situation, in which, we may say,

³⁸⁴ Hua XIX/2, p.739; L.I./II, p.841 “*ich sage aus, daß...*”

³⁸⁵ Hua XX, p.335

other three kinds of judgement could still be found. But they would be irrelevant for Austin's ultimate aim of conceiving total speech act in a total speech situation.

4.3. Some Austinian Hints in *Hua*, XX/2

Though the fact that, we find in Husserl the general tendency to evaluate all declarative sentences as a statement which gives a description of a bit of world; yet, Husserl, in the writings of *Hua* XX/2, here and there realizes the “descriptive fallacy”, and the performative level of speech and, moreover, the perlocutionary dimension of the utterance without giving no enough attention to. This fact, I believe, may mean as a moral that to realize some problems momentarily is not sufficient to assess it as a new exploration. Nonetheless, we can find some tentatives, in the writings of Husserl, in connection to figure out the contextual side of speech, especially focusing on “occasional judgments”, of which I will address to it in below. Now, I will array some of Husserl's instances related to the concerns of Austin.

I) From an earlier writing dated to 1898-1900, in which Husserl attempts to lay out some differences between objective and occasional expressions, Husserl compares two expressions in terms of their truth-evaluability³⁸⁶:

- 1) “In America it is raining at the time-point t.”
- 2) “Shoot!” (“Feuer!”)

Accordingly, the first expression is capable of true or false, whereas the second expression is not. Before pass into the first sentence, he says that the sentence ‘it rains’ is incomplete (unvollständig), since to know completely what it means is

³⁸⁶ *Hua* XX, p. 376

related to “circumstances” (Umstände), and it needs to be aware of by whom it is uttered and received. These are exactly Austinian tenets of knowledge claims.

For the second expression, Husserl justifies why such a conventionally abbreviated form of an order, ‘Shoot’, is not truth-evaluable with respect to its being not capable to express any perceptual content. Rather, he writes that what ‘Shoot!’ means (besagt), in a given case, can be true or false. That is, we can figure out what such an expression means by converting it into a complete declarative sentence which is capable of truth-evaluability. In addition, a sentence which is, in the ordinary sense, conceptual positing (begriffliche Setzung) is true, if an adequate intuitive positing (anschauliche Setzung) corresponds to it. This last determination, as we know, is the general formula of the Logical Investigations. Here, the point is that Husserl implicitly acknowledges that a conventional form of order, such as ‘Shoot!’ belongs to neither conceptual positing nor intuitive positing, therefore is not capable of being truth-evaluable. However, does not realize its performing an action in issuing its utterance before someone.

II) “The coachman should drive!”, “Johann bring me water!”³⁸⁷

Husserl, while discussing the condition of an order to be actually performed, indeed, gives the A.1 and A.2 felicity conditions³⁸⁸ of Austin’s, which claims that to have a conventional effect there have to be an accepted conventional procedure, and this procedure consists of “the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances”, and this procedure can only be invoked by the particular person, here in Husserl’s instance the “Master”. Husserl’s given instance is called by Austin ‘misapplication’ which is the one way of infelicity.

³⁸⁷ Hua XX/2, 435

³⁸⁸ HTDTWW, p.14-15 ; see above footnote:214

So, according to the instance, I, as the master, order to my servant Johann to drive the coachman. But, after a minute Johann resigns from being the master's servant, and then Johann replies "I shall not, I am not anymore your servant". After that, Husserl says that "I have an order, but have no assertion (Behauptung), have not pronounced an objective statement." Thus, my utterance turns out to be "unaccomplished". This is exactly what Austin says about the particular way of infelicity as "misapplication". Thus, the utterance of ordering is not senseless but "void".

III) "You are a donkey"³⁸⁹

What is the relation between orders and enunciations? For Husserl, the answer is so simple; orders belong to the class of enunciations. On the one hand, we can speak of an order sentence directed to someone such as "You should do it, you should bring me a glass!", on the other hand, it is possible to issue an enunciation (Äußerung) such as "You are a donkey". What is the matter with both in respect of Husserl's concern? The point is that both have no propositional content (Satzinhalt) unlikely the statements uttered with the aim of intimating a content. For a communicative speech appears between 'I' and 'you', or a third one and there the communication belongs to the content. However, "enunciations are in and for the other" which includes all orders and requests (Bitten) such as condolence enunciations (Beileidsäußerungen) or congratulations and *they have no content*.

Once, it needs to point out that an order is a proper act of will which aims others' conduct (Tun). To get a correct account of such an act of will, we have to take into consideration: Talk, understanding, conduct, as a consequence of an order uttered

³⁸⁹ Hua XX, p.247

to me what is done (Tun). From Austinian conceptual framework, these four are the exact requirements for establishing the *security uptake*³⁹⁰, which stipulates a speech act to have illocutionary force. In the absence of an established security uptake, according to Austin, we cannot speak of a performative level of a speech.

Well, now let us take a look at what is “directly” expressed in an order, for example, “You should drive!” ? It expresses both: 1) The action of driving on the side of “you”, and 2) This action as an object my act of will. Husserl deliberately prefers the word “directly”, since in orders he says since there is no content to intimate as in the case of communicative statements, or communicative questions directed to someone (Anfragen). More precisely, in a communicative statement, an occasional expression such as “You hear now a melody of Schubert”, it has a content, which is expressed, let us say from Husserlian perspective, indirectly to the addressee.

Whereas in the given instance of enunciation “You are a donkey!”, Husserl again underlies the necessity of the conditions, which are called by Austin as “security uptake”. The addressee of such an enunciation has to be understood from the receiver, otherwise, illocutionary force of such a performative utterance would be annihilated. Husserl describes such a possibility in the case of uttering “You are a donkey” in a monologue, in which I can make an imaginary speech by myself as conceiving such an utterance as *friendly*. It is quite important because here Husserl explicitly underlies the conventional side of such abbreviated ordinary speeches. Thus, to utter it in “an actual society against another person” would bound us in virtue of the conventional meaning(s) of such phrases, apart from our possibility to attribute those phrases various meanings as we wish as in the case of inner monologue. To remind, so, we can reconsider Husserl’s methodological preference of monologue for his

³⁹⁰ See above, Chapter 2, Section 5.2.2.

phenomenology, as an *aetiolation of address*³⁹¹ from the perspective of Austinian terms. Therefore, he concludes that a phrase such as “Franz should drive” can be counted as an order only “taking from the circumstances of the speech” (Umstände der Rede). Needless to say, the circumstances of the speech and with which intention and purpose it is uttered is playing a significant role in Austinian account of truth.

IV) Perlocutionary Level of Speech and Inviting a Response

For Husserl, in expressing an interrogative sentence, a wish sentence, or adding a hope, fear, hesitation as a subjective attitude to a declarative sentence, we do not only want to express a truth but also to intimate something to the receiver. Furthermore, my living experiences as act of wishing or act of asking that are intimated by means of the expressions of them make available the addressee *not only* to get the intimation, but also have such and such “effects”³⁹². Austin takes into consideration such effects under the title of “perlocutionary acts”³⁹³, which essentially have arisen upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience. Besides that, on the same page, Husserl adds that through the declarative sentences while we are expressing some facts and brings about some effects on the audience, moreover we also want to arise a response (Antwort) on the audience. Again, this is described by Austin as the third kind of effect which is connected to the illocutionary act, namely, “the inviting by convention a response or sequel”³⁹⁴.

4.4. Husserl’s Context vs. Austin’s Occasion-Sensitivity

‘Circumstances’ or ‘context’ has a decisive role to assess what is said and what is done by words, both for Austin’s account of truth and his speech act theory.

³⁹¹ See above, Chapter 3, Section 3.

³⁹² Hua XX/2, p.424

³⁹³ See above, Chapter 2, Section 5.3.

³⁹⁴ See above, Chapter 2, Section 5.2.2

Capability of a statement to be truth-evaluable depends not only on the meanings of the words but also on what we are doing by uttering those words in such-and-such circumstances. Austin suggests taking into consideration both the intents and purposes of the utterance and its speaking circumstances as context. The point is “not a matter of what *kind of sentence* I use in making my statement, but of what *the circumstances are* in which I make it.”³⁹⁵ So, unlikely to the grammarians concern in distinguishing the kind of sentences such as declarative, interrogative, optative, imperative, exclamatory, etc. in terms of clarifying their own characteristic properties is, *by alone*, not the essential target of Austin’s investigations in relation to how we use them to make a statement. We have already aforementioned³⁹⁶, how Husserl attempts to do such an investigation on different kinds of sentences. Austin’s emphasis to the context of utterance also appears both in the felicity conditions of illocutions, particularly as A.1 and A.2., and in his celebrated article “Truth”, as dealing with under the head of “demonstrative conventions” which are not a natural reference to the external reality, and needs to get in touch with descriptive conventions to say something true. Thus, the context of utterance is connected with both Austin’s speech act theory and his account of truth.

Whereas Husserl concerns essentially with the ideal meanings and their objective expressions which do not require to attend the context of utterances. This neglect in L.I. appears as a common strategy. Only in the third chapter of the first Investigation it is dealt with the opposite way of objective expressions, namely, “occasional expressions”³⁹⁷. Given that the determinant difference between the occasional expressions and objective expressions, which express empirical and ideal meanings respectively, is based on the idea that in the former truth and possibility are

³⁹⁵ Austin, “Sense and Sensibilia”, p.114

³⁹⁶ See above, Chapter 4, Section 1

³⁹⁷ See above, Chapter 2

separate, whereas in the latter truth and possibility coincide with each other³⁹⁸. Simply, the account of truth concerning the deictically referred sentences is contrary to the account of truth concerning arithmetical expressions. In which any arithmetical equation could be repeatable without any change of meaning regardless of who declares it from any different part of the world.

Thus, given that the meaning of occasional expressions requires to take into consideration the context of issuing utterance, then to put forward the project of phenomenology as received in *Investigations* would turn out to be a vexed issue and cause a huge incoherency if the occasional expressions were played a central role in connection to the general conceptual framework of *Investigations*.

Since I have already given an outline of “occasional expressions” in above, I will remark the reshaped version of it through undergone a changing some essentials of the previous account by Husserl, as being construing “occasional judgments” which is appeared in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. In this text, we come across the contrast between the descriptive declarative sentences uttered in ordinary life and the scientific declarative sentences. Accordingly, “the occasional or situational statements (Situations-Aussagen) are related to the concrete situation in which the ego, in the course of its life, has its experiential evidence and has sufficiently in its experience, insofar the ego can extend it proceedingly in terms of its *practical intentions*”³⁹⁹. The essential character of occasional judgments depends on the idea that they point to a *practical situation*. However, it is not a necessity for the first person subject to be present in a certain particular practical situation. Instead, to report by others being in such a certain situation is enough to allow for it. So, we can extend from the present or perceptual surrounding (*Wahrnehmungsumwelt*) to a wider

³⁹⁸ Hua XXVI, p. 208

³⁹⁹ Hua XVII, p.440

surrounding that turns into “thoughts”. New practical situations would only be then available by means of these thoughts. Each person under such a practical situation knows that situation in the extent of his or her present experiencing life which is appeared in a not-evident way. That is, we learn from others how to use the words for making a statement, as being more or less convenient to the common meanings of those words. Undoubtedly, this learning process depends on our own experiences which are connected to our practical intentions.

Thus, the judgment-evidences of scientific statements include the *presuppositions*, not straightly to their own hypotheses, but “in the domain of evidence pertaining to the material underlay (sachlichen Unterlagen)”⁴⁰⁰ which amounts to say one’s ordinary life within a certain society. In scientific investigations, such presuppositions can not be fixed since the interest of cognition does not lie in that direction. However, these embedded presuppositions come to be realized in occasional judgments. *They have their intersubjective truth or falsity*. Husserl now inserts a new way of truth account which is grounded on conventions in one sense similar to Austin’s “demonstrative conventions”. Now, let us see how Husserl expresses this new account of truth:

“This truth and falsity obviously depends on the relatedness of the single subject’s and the community’s whole daily life to a *typical likeness among situations (typische Gleichartigkeit der Situationen)*, such that...who enters a particular situation has, by the very fact of being normal, the *situational horizons* belonging to it and common to all.”⁴⁰¹

⁴⁰⁰ Hua XVII, p.207; Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.199

⁴⁰¹ *ibid*; *ibid*

So, the context of issuing the utterance depends on first to enter a certain practical situation and then, each utterer gets acquaintance with such *typical likeness among situations* which are characterized conventionally. To notice, Austin's important long footnote on his way of using the term "type" specifies how to combine two sets of conventions, one is natural regarding the state of affairs and the other is unnatural regarding sufficiently like to merit the reputable same description.

"...for a statement to be true one state of affairs must be like certain others, which is a natural relation, but also *sufficiently* like to merit the same 'description', which is no longer a purely natural relation..."⁴⁰²

In fact, we find a demonstrative conventional dimension that is possible through situational horizon in late Husserl. Yet, unlikely to Austin, the demonstrative conventions are not conceived by Husserl as being attached to the descriptive conventions as another set of conventions. Rather, Husserl mentions the dependency of occasional judgments to the utterance context in terms of their running ground "*constituting horizon-intentionality*", which is a kind of passive intentionality, extends to the surrounding world of everyday life. Thus, such a constituting horizon-intentionality as situational horizon offers, indeed, a pragmatic perspective in an Austinian manner, to determine the meaning of the occasional judgments far beyond to "what is said and can be said, expressly and explicitly, in the words themselves."⁴⁰³ This clarification is surprising because it assumes *implicit meanings* of which are especially excluded from his way of phenomenology for the sake of being evident. So, these horizons are nothing but the aforementioned "presuppositions". They

⁴⁰² Austin, "Truth", p.122 ; See above: footnote: 383

⁴⁰³ Hua XVII, p.207; Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.199

continually determine the sense of the object of the immediate surrounding in due to being “as intentional implicates (Implikate) contained in constituting intentionality.” This new account of intentionality is diametrically opposed to his previous view of idealized presuppositions of predicative judging. Yet, Husserl declares his lack in the *Investigations* in the following way:

“In the *Logische Untersuchungen* I still lacked the theory of horizon intentionality, the all-determining role of which was first brought out in the *Ideen*. Therefore, in the earlier work, I could not finish with occasional judgments and their signification.”⁴⁰⁴

We may consider such a self-criticism in the way that Husserl shortens the distance to Austin’s position towards his own criticism, in HTDTWW, against logicians account of timeless, abstract statement as “proposition”. However, Husserl does not leave his main conceptual frame whose basis is characterized *perceptually*, even in presuppositions as horizon. That is, since he is aiming to explicate the transcendental structure of experience and experience is essentially constructed on perception, the research subject as presuppositions is tackled in a perceptual frame (albeit, in his later writings Husserl focuses on the historicity of presuppositions, but again in a non-linguistic frame). Rather, what is offered regarding “presuppositions” in Austin’s account is a linguistic analysis which deals with statement-based problems. To note, Austin’s well-known examples of “John’s children are bald”⁴⁰⁵. Furthermore, only by adopting Husserl’s non-linguistic account of “presuppositions”, we can never get an idea of how to distinguish affirmations, presuppositions, implications, their own proper temporality and verbal applications, etc., which is a

⁴⁰⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁰⁵ See above; Chapter 3, Section 4;

foremost subject of discussion in semantics, pragmatics, and speech act theory. In other words, Husserl's attempt to get involved in the intersubjectively constituted meanings and their conventional characterisation as presuppositions, it is not enough to understand the multifarious features of speaking and speaking to someone.

4.5. Action: Intentionality, Intention, Convention

4.5.1. Husserl: Intention and Intentionality

For Husserl the term intentional, in general sense, is called “the essence common to the class of experiences we wish to mark off”⁴⁰⁶. These experiences consist of a wide range of experience such as perception, imagination, belief, wishing, desiring, judging, expressing, etc. In the L.I., Husserl distinguishes *intending* (Intention) from intentional object, according to which, the former is “specially noticing, or *attending* (Aufmerken) to something” and the latter “*need not, however, always be noticed, or attended to.*” Intentional object is something that we are conscious of, whereas Husserl attributes to the term intention a special attending to something. Furthermore, in the same place he speaks of narrower and wider conceptions of intention. According to the former, empty aiming-at need to be fulfilled by other acts such as judging, desiring, willing and we come across with such a conceiving in Husserl as a judging-intention, desiring-intention, willing-intention. This is the narrower one. However, the wider concept of intention does not need another fulfillment, it is self-sufficient, or self-fulfilling, such as perception, imagination. But the common function of these two conceptions of intention is a pointing at (Meinen) an object whether it exists or not. So to speak, whether it is merely intentional object or existent object. To

⁴⁰⁶ Hua XIX/2, p. 392; L.I/II p. 562

notice, the adjective intentional in intentional object is a property and whenever the act of pointing comes to stop, then that property is waned too. As follows, Husserl uses the words ‘Intention’ and ‘Meinen’ interchangeably. Accordingly⁴⁰⁷, there are two ways of object: 1) ‘merely intentional’ object occurs in which the intention (die Intention), reference (das Meinen) exists, but its related object does not exist 2) ‘existent’ object which is referred to (Gemeinte).

Now, the point is neither intending nor intentional object makes an act ‘intentional’. So, for Husserl, what makes an act intentional, or a representation of an object, is the *intentional content*. However, interestingly, “we are ordinarily not even aware of this content”⁴⁰⁸. That’s why, the goal of phenomenology as description is to describe the essential structures of the covert, unaware content of the act. That is, intentional content is not transparent. In 1914 Lectures on Ethics⁴⁰⁹ Husserl makes many determinations about intentionality of will, in which the distinction between ‘decision-will’ and ‘action-will’ is relevant to my question. The former is planning accompanies by self-consciousness, the intentional deciding which follows a deliberative process and the latter is doing spontaneously without particular attention in an ongoing action. For ex., I intend to drink water this is the decision will. Then, I stand up from the chair and begin to step into kitchen, get a glass from cupboard, and so on. In doing all of them I bear an action-will and they are, in effect, attach to the ‘decision-will’ of drinking water. Therefore, I do not get separate ‘decision-will’ for each bodily different movements along the duration till I drink water. Once we get a

⁴⁰⁷ Hua XIX/2, p. 439; L.I./II, p.59

⁴⁰⁸ Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith, “Theory of Intentionality”, in *Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook*, Washington, D.C.; Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1989, p.155

⁴⁰⁹ Hua XXVIII, p. 102-111

decision to do something then within that plan most of our moves are performed spontaneous.

Now, in order to understand the possible relations between this drawn picture so far and Austin's speech act theory in terms of intentionality, we might raise the question that what is/are the intentional object(s) of unintended speech acts? After introducing Austin's general view of intention and intentionality, I will try to answer this question.

4.5.2. Austin: Intention(al) – Convention(al)

One group of the conditions for happy performatives are the $\Gamma. 1$ and $\Gamma. 2$, which necessitate for the performer to hold certain intentions while issuing the utterance. So, the one who is uttering the promise should intend to keep the promise otherwise it will be an "abuse", an act professed but hollow. In similar situations, the act is not "void", but performed and it commits the promise. With respect to this way of "abuses", a speech act such as a promise is done without intending. Because from the perspective of the hearer, the speech act is done by the speaker via its utterance and the psychological states of the speaker are irrelevant.

Furthermore we have not only Austin's Harvard Lectures in which he had firstly revealed his theory of speech acts but also his three articles 'A Plea for Excuses', 'Pretending', 'Three Ways of Spilling Ink' that essentially revolve around the problem of 'actions', which could be considered as a tentative for 'a general theory of

action’ as he mentioned in HTDTWW. Let’s begin with a long paragraph⁴¹⁰ in which Austin accounts for in general terms what he understands about the term ‘intention’:

“The most subtle of our notions is that of intention. As I go through life, doing, as we suppose, one thing after another, I in general always have an idea –some idea, my idea, or picture, or notion, or conception- of what I’m up to, what I’m engaged in, what I’m about, or in general what I’m doing. I don’t ‘know what I’m doing’ as a result of looking to see or otherwise conducting observations: only in rare and perturbing cases do I discover what I have done or *come to realize* what I am or have been doing in this way. It is not in such fashion that *I* know what I am doing when I strike the match in the vicinity of the haystack. (This is the sense in which in general and obviously I know what I’m doing: *contrast* the sense in which you *suppose*, dubiously, that I know what I’m doing when I strike the match so close to the gasoline.) I must be supposed to have *as it were* a plan, an operation-order or something of the kind on which I’m acting which I’m seeking to put into effect, carry out in action: only of course nothing necessarily or, usually, even faintly, so full-blooded as a plan proper. When we draw attention to this aspect of action, we use the words connected with intention”

So, except being in such ‘rare and perturbing cases’, we do not figure out just by looking at what is in issue and infer a causal link that ties the events and persons through intentions. They are *as if* plans but it is no need to suppose them necessarily. Therefore, an intention is usually a requisition to carry out an action that which is constitutive of the idea of the action; however, it is not a necessity. But Austin does

⁴¹⁰ Austin, “Three Ways of Spilling Ink”, in P.P. p.283

not construe intentions as Gricean intentions which are psychological states that play an operator role of speech acts. Barnish classifies internalism and externalism discussion in speech act theories under three subgroups as “Convention-Rule-Norm based theories, Intention-Inference based theories, and mixed theories.”⁴¹¹ Accordingly, Grice is internalist, Gazdar is externalist, and Austin, Searle and himself is mixed. While I am agreeing on this classification, Barnish traces the main route of Strawson (1964)⁴¹² and Searle (1969)⁴¹³ by only mentioning ‘illocutionary uptake’ for the distinctive effects of illocutionary acts and therefore, likewise them, he ignores the other two ways of effects⁴¹⁴. Hence, neither conventions nor intentions perform the illocutionary act. Instead, it is done by ‘persons’, the utterers. Austin says that “actions can only be performed by persons, and obviously in our cases the utterer must be the performer.”⁴¹⁵. Here, Austin regards the action from the standpoint of ethics and law, therefore this conception of person is the one who might undertake responsibility for the performed action.

Remind that since certain conventions are found limited in social interactions, mostly we involve in implicit speech acts. In these acts the central problem is the “disagreements as to the description of illocutionary acts...disagreements as to the description of ‘locutionary act’”⁴¹⁶ This problem is not only restricted to the speech acts but also ‘actions in general’ as follows: “How far, that is, are motives, intentions and conventions to be part of the description of action?”⁴¹⁷. This is the shared

⁴¹¹ Barnish, M.Robert; “Internalism and Externalism in Speech Act Theory”, 2009, p.11,

⁴¹² Strawson, P.F.; “Intention and Convention in Speech Acts”, in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, 1971, Methuen&Co.Ltd.

⁴¹³ Searle, John; “A Theory of Speech Acts”, Cambridge University Press, 1969

⁴¹⁴ see above, Chapter 3.6.2.2.

⁴¹⁵ Austin, HTDTWW, p.60

⁴¹⁶ Austin, HTDTWW, p.116

⁴¹⁷ Austin, “A Plea for Excuses”, in P.P., p.201

common theme between Austin and Anscombe⁴¹⁸ and we see that Austin reflects on conventions and intentions both within speech acts and his truth account. According to the latter, he proposes two sets of conventions, namely, descriptive (semantic) and demonstrative (indexical) conventions in which insofar they are tied up each other a true statement is available. Nonetheless, locutionary and illocutionary levels of speech are liable to the ambiguities and failures respectively, because of Austin's introducing the intentions and two kinds of conventions with illocutionary effects to the description of action. Austin continues as follows:

“Difficulties about conventions and intentions must arise in deciding upon the correct description whether of a locution or of an illocution: deliberate, or unintentional, ambiguity of meaning or reference is perhaps as common as deliberate or unintentional failure to make plain ‘how our words to be taken’ (in the illocutionary sense)”⁴¹⁹

Now, on concerning the question of intention and its adverbial form ‘intentionally’, Austin warns us about the term ‘intention’ for not to suppose it in all the time in which it will always make sense to stick in ‘intentionally’ after every verb of action. Then, he proposes that ‘I ate my dinner intentionally’ or ‘I sit in the chair intentionally’ may bear a sense “only when there is some suggestion that it might have been unintentional”⁴²⁰. Austin formulates his argument about the subject as “‘intentionally’ serves to rule out ‘unintentionally’ ”⁴²¹. For instance, if I am dizzy because of running and want my breath to return normal, I may sit in the chair

⁴¹⁸ Anscombe, G.E.M.; ‘Intention’, Harvard University Press, 1957

⁴¹⁹ Austin, HTDTWW, p.116

⁴²⁰ Austin, “Three Ways of Spilling Ink”, in P.P., p. 284

⁴²¹ *ibid*

intentionally. In other words, we do most of ordinary stuff without a certain attending. But, even in these cases, it does not mean that an action does not have an intentional content in the Husserlian sense. Moreover, insofar an action is intentional it has to be under a description as a particular action. Thus, an illocutionary act can be intentional only under a particular description and this guarantees therefore its effects to be conventional. If it would not be under a particular description, otherwise we cannot distinguish illocutionary effects which are indeed based on intersubjective agreement from the perlocutionary effects. Besides, a common fault in considering Austin's speech act theory is to separate an illocutionary act from its consequences whether they be intentional or unintentional.

Austin imagines some cases in which it is hard to judge whether the alleged action in question is done intentionally or unintentionally. Such cases in between evoke us to get into account motives, intentions, premeditations, plans, motives, deliberations, different kinds of effects, in other words 'the total speech act', insofar we would make a decision about what is really going on. For example, "I tie a string across a stairhead. A fragile relative from whom I have expectations, trips over it, falls and perishes."⁴²² Austin comments on it as neither I tied it intentionally nor I did it unintentionally. Suspicion keeps going on the possibility whether it is done by accident, by mistake, or inadvertently. Given that Austin is also interested in the alleged agent (of course, if it turns out to be an action) from his perspective of first person experiences, in effect, it is a way of phenomenology of action. Then, he examines extraordinary possibilities by comparing 'intentionally' with 'deliberately' and 'on purpose'. He concludes that there are such cases in which "a thing is done

⁴²² Austin, "Three Ways of Splinning Ink", in P.P., p. 274

intentionally but not deliberately”, or “it is fully possible to act both deliberately and intentionally yet ‘not on purpose’, and on the following pages⁴²³ he goes on to draw up other possibilities. By doing this, he tries to demonstrate the vulnerability of human action. Cavell brilliantly depicts it as follows⁴²⁴:

“What does it betoken about human actions that the reticulated constellation of predicates of excuse is made for them—that they can be done unintentionally, unwillingly, involuntarily, insincerely, unthinkingly, inadvertently, heedlessly, carelessly, under duress, under the influence, out of contempt, out of pity, by mistake, by accident, and so on? . . . It betokens, we might say, the all but unending vulnerability of human action, its openness to the independence of the world and the preoccupation of the mind.”

So, Austin rejects this dichotomy, intentional-unintentional, like others by showing that they are often only apparently opposite words, and the negation of an intentional action may appear in too many different ways in a similar manner which he claims for the infelicities that “there are more ways of outraging speech than contradiction merely”⁴²⁵

Now, let’s turn back to the aforementioned question of what is/are the intentional object(s) of unintended speech acts? Even if Austin did not focus on the matter of whether unintentional speech acts are possible or not, we can infer from Austin’s main determinations that they are, in effect, possible in three ways: Unintended perlocutionary consequences, unintended illocution act as abuses (for ex. of a bad

⁴²³ *ibid*, p. 276-279

⁴²⁴ Stanley Cavell, “Pitch of Philosophy”, p.87

⁴²⁵ Austin, HTDTWW, p.48

faith promise), and excuses as unintended acts. First, I can bring about some ‘unintentional’ consequences when ‘by saying *x* I was doing *y*’⁴²⁶. Second, it is the case when Hippolytus says ‘my tongue swore to, but my heart did not’⁴²⁷ in which an unhappy swearing happens because of not intending to do it. Third, for example if someone says “I apologise: I didn’t intend to insult you”⁴²⁸, it implies that the speaker, indeed, *did* insult. That is, there already occurs an event as insult, if not, then excuse would be senseless. In fact, the intentional content of what is happened, in some extent, depends on the first person experience of the action and the description of that action. Austin confirms this connection as reads: “the problems of excuses and those of the different descriptions of actions are throughout bound up with each other.”⁴²⁹

At last, an attempt to encapsulate this section appears in the following way:

1. An illocutionary act is not done by conventions or intentions but a person
2. Neither a convention nor an intention is a *sine qua non* condition of an illocutionary act.
3. In order to distinguish an illocutionary act from a perlocutionary act, it has to take into consideration what sort of consequences the former beget.
4. Description of an illocution act depends on its own consequences.
5. Only under a particular description of the utterer’s own behavior, the utterance might be tied up, as a bond, with the hearer as the alleged speech act.
6. We can talk about an illocutionary act insofar it might hold a possible intentional object. That is, intentional in the Husserlian sense in which its intentional object

⁴²⁶ *ibid*, p.107

⁴²⁷ *ibid*, p.9

⁴²⁸ Jesus Navarro-Reyes; “Speech Acts, Criteria and Intentions”, 2010, Lodz Papers in Pragmatics

⁴²⁹ Austin, A Plea For Excuses, in P.P., p.201

“need not, however, always be noticed, or attended to.” In addition, we may be unaware of its intentional content.

7.1. An illocutionary act requires the utterer to intend to do the action by issuing the utterance, but it does *not* hold a strict necessity. That is, intending in the Husserlian sense of attending.

8. A certain illocutionary act should be evaluated according to the conventions in issue, if there exists, and the intentional and unintentional consequences of the act.

9. Illocutionary effects have conventional characters consisting of three ways of effects (see above, Chapter 3.6.2.2.) which, in effect, rely upon an agreement among the parts which is liable to be broken down.

10. Even though Austin’s intentions might bear a causal relation with action, they do not have capability to operate by themselves.

5.CONCLUSION

As adopted tacitly in Husserl's L.I., semantics and syntax precede pragmatics in connection with the theory of intentionality of expressions. However, we find a new semantic which is grounded on pragmatics in Austin, in which a new way of practical intentionality tacitly adopted. Therefore, this picture shows us two different accounts of truth and meanings. In regard to this link, Austin's difference essentially depends on abolishing the necessary connection between truth and meaning. Besides, in communicative speech we are only realizing intimating function and communicate experiences in empathy from the perspective of Husserl. But, as Austin shows in his speech act theory, we are also doing some actions in saying such as promising, warning, ordering, threatening, etc.

I think, the idea of intentionality in Husserl because of its *one-way directedness* (in other words by excluding bilateral actions made in and by speech) ignores 1) the variety of human situations (as Austin specifies in the unhappy performatives), 2) the variety of speech acts (as it is shown by Austin). Another deficit of Husserl's language account depends on his insistence on the analysis of sentences whether declarative or not, on the basis of 'S is P'. It is carried out with two moments: subjectively experienced quality and objective factual content. Thereby, we can consider Husserl as the traditional heir of the idea of 'modality' that goes back to the Port-Royal grammarians. Austin by developing illocutionary force (as the second level of meaning) in its relation to meaning takes into consideration the intentions, speaking purpose, and speech circumstances. Thus, Austin elaborates the account of illocutionary acts in which he relinquishes the mentioned distinction of subjective and objective parts of propositions. In doing that, he also applies some criteria to

distinguish them from perlocutionary effects as in the way of rhetorics. But yet he does not totally leave behind the 'statement' in the sense of proposition. Despite all, Austin subverts the traditional logical tendency in respect of assessing statements. And Husserl in his language account, set aside to his novelties, is attached to Bolzanian conception of 'proposition in itself' until he had passed into his period which is sealed with the priority to intersubjective.

In conclusion, the tenet of the followed arguments in this thesis is based on the essential view that Husserl's conception of intentionality has to be contrived *unlikely* than as the metaphor of arrow flow in which it is considered in as one-way irreversible directedness of a particular subject's conscious intentional lived experience to an object (given, or partially given, or ungiven) through concepts and propositions (that is, meanings as formal entities). The salient lack of arrow flow directedness to an object is to neglect the openness character of the object side which is tied to the circumstances as speaking context that rests beyond the target of intentional acts in connection to both thinking and expression. To rectify such a lack, I have sketched out some of the basic characters of Austin's way of practical intentionality of action which includes his speech act theory. Husserl's presented structure of intentionality as the intentional relation which reveals between act and object in virtue of meaning needs to be saturated by taking into Austin's account of 1) the speaking circumstances of certain utterances among person which are embedded into a normativity of ordinary language, 2) the priority of description of action to action which recognizes intentions, conventions, even circumstances and 3) the confusion between negation and falsity.

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