

THE NEXUS BETWEEN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY:
POLAND'S (DE) EUROPEANIZATION

A Master's Thesis

by
SELEN EŐENÇAY

Department of
International Relations
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
September 2022

To my family



THE NEXUS BETWEEN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY:
POLAND'S (DE) EUROPEANIZATION

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by
SELEN EŞENÇAY

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY ANKARA

September 2022

ABSTRACT

THE NEXUS BETWEEN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY: POLAND'S (DE) EUROPEANIZATION

Eşençay, Selen

M.A., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dimitris Tsarouhas

September 2022

Starting from the fall of communism, Poland underwent various changes in its domestic and foreign policies. The country's desire to strengthen ties with the West through EU and NATO membership has changed traditional concepts, systems, and norms. This thesis aims to show Poland's transformation from Europeanisation to de-Europeanisation by testing the de-Europeanisation theory in an EU Member State. With an application of de-Europeanisation theory, this thesis aims to demonstrate whether there is a link between de-Europeanisation domestically and foreign policy behavior. By using primary, and secondary sources as well as semi-structured elite interviews, I divide Poland's recent political history into two distinct periods. Therefore, I demonstrate both the existence of a Europeanization effect from the 1990s until 2010 and a de-Europeanization effect following the coming to power of the PiS and the global financial crisis and multiple Euro crises. The first part (1990-2010) adopted two cases; the 1997 Constitution and EU-NATO membership, while the second part (2010-2020) tested the theory with the anti-abortion bill and the Syrian refugee crisis. Hence, this thesis has two fundamental aims; depicting the extent to which there is democratization and de-

Europeanization in a Member State of the EU and demonstrating through the case studies, (Poland's de-Europeanisation) that the nexus between these domestic policies feeds into foreign policy behaviour.



ÖZET

İÇ POLİTİKA VE DIŞ POLİTİKA ARASINDAKİ BAĞ: POLONYA'DA AVRUPASIZLAŞMA

Eşençay, Selen

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: : Doç. Dr. Dimitris Tsarouhas

Eylül 2022

Komünizmin çöküşünden itibaren Polonya, iç ve dış politikalarında çeşitli değişimler geçirmiştir. Ülkenin AB ve NATO üyeliği yoluyla Batı ile bağlarını güçlendirme arzusu geleneksel kavramları, sistemleri ve normları değiştirmiştir. Bu tez, Avrupasızlaşma tezini bir AB Üye Devletinde test ederek Polonya'nın Avrupalılaşmadan Avrupasızlaşmaya dönüşümünü göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu tez, Avrupasızlaşma teorisinin bir uygulamasıyla, ülke içindeki Avrupasızlaşma ile dış politika davranışı arasında bir bağlantı olup olmadığını göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Birincil ve ikincil kaynakların yanı sıra yapılandırılmış elit mülakatları kullanarak Polonya'nın yakın siyasi tarihini iki farklı döneme ayırıyorum ve hem 1990'lardan 2010'a kadar bir Avrupalılaşma etkisinin varlığını hem de PiS'in iktidara gelmesini, küresel mali krizi ve çoklu Avro krizlerini takiben bir Avrupasızlaşma etkisinin varlığını gösteriyorum. İlk bölümde (1990-2010) 1997 Anayasası ve AB-NATO üyeliği olmak üzere iki vaka ele alınırken, ikinci bölümde (2010-2020) kürtaj karşıtı yasa tasarısı ve Suriyeli mülteci krizi ile teori test edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla, bu tezin iki temel amacı vardır; AB Üye Devletlerinde demokratikleşme ve Avrupalılaşmanın ne ölçüde gerçekleştiğini

göstermek ve vaka çalışmaları aracılığıyla (Polonya'nın Avrupalılaşması) iç politika ile dış politika davranışları arasındaki bağı ortaya koymak.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor Associate Professor Dimitris Tsarouhas for his encouragement, patience, understanding and invaluable guidance during my graduate studies. I would not have written this thesis without his advice and endless support. He has been the best thesis advisor a master's student can imagine with his patience and encouragement.

I would like to thank Associate Professor Selver Buldanlıoğlu Şahin for accepting to join my thesis committee and for her support and help whenever I needed. I also wish to thank my thesis committee member Associate Professor Zeynep Arkan Tuncel for her constructive feedback and comments on this thesis. Last but not least, I am grateful to all the interviewees that took time to answer my questions and share their insights.

My dear Iqra and Nabiya, thank you so much for being there for me whenever I needed. This journey would not be possible without your friendship, love, support and kind-heartedness. You are the best roommates anyone could imagine. I will never forget the teas, coffees and meals you prepared and brought me; the motivational speeches you gave me when I came late from work. I would like to mention the support that I had from the new colleagues from the College of Europe, your final push meant a lot. Thanks, should also go to Moumou for accompanying me on this long journey with infinite faith and support. I am really grateful to have you by my side. And special thanks to Efe for everything he has done for me. I will be forever indebted to you.

Last but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to my precious family for their endless love and support throughout my master's degree. You always support every decision I take with endless love.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	I
ÖZET	III
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	V
TABLE OF CONTENTS	VII
LIST OF TABLES	X
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	XI
CHAPTER 1	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Poland as a case study	5
1.2 The communist era (1945-1989).....	9
1.3 A new chapter for Poland, after 1989	14
1.4 Recent trends in the country: A populist and illiberal turn (2010s).....	17
1.5 Illiberal turn in the world and Populism	17
1.5.1 Kaczynski's Poland and Populism.....	22
1.6 Chapter Breakdown.....	23
CHAPTER 2	25
(DE) EUROPEANIZATION: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY	25
2.1 Theoretical Framework	25
2.2 Europeanization.....	27

2.2.1 Literature Review	28
2.2.2 Methodology & Data.....	39
2.2.3 Limitations	41
2.2.4 Next Chapter	42
CHAPTER 3	43
1989-2010 / EUROPEANIZATION PERIOD IN POLAND	43
3.1 How domestic politics became Europeanized: Polish Law-New Constitution of 1997	50
3.2 Polish Foreign Policy and Europeanization: EU membership process, NATO enlargement, relations with the West.....	59
3.3 Discussion: Analysis of the consequences and what the nexus between domestic and foreign policy means in Poland.....	65
CHAPTER 4	80
2010-2020 / DE-EUROPEANIZATION PERIOD IN POLAND	80
4.1 Domestic Politics and de-Europeanization: Women's Rights- the Case of Abortion Rights	85
4.2 Polish Foreign Policy and De-Europeanization: 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis.....	99
4.3 Discussion and Analysis: the nexus between domestic and foreign policy means in Poland.....	107
CHAPTER 5	117
CONCLUSION	117
5.1 Why does Poland matter?	120
5.2 What do we learn from it regarding both Europeanization and de-Europeanization?	121
5.2.1 The 1997 Constitution.....	124
5.2.2 EU-NATO Membership.....	125
5.2.3 The Anti-abortion bill	127
5.2.4 The Syrian Refugee Crisis	129
5.3 Conclusion	130
REFERENCES.....	131

APPENDICES	141
Interview 1: High Level Polish Diplomat (Consul General of Turkey) in Turkey 15/03/2022	141
Interview 2: Jaras Gwizdak-Former Polish Judge (via Zoom)-16/07/2022.....	141
Interview 3: Pawel Dobrowolski-Former Polish Ambassador (via Zoom)-16/07/2022	141
Interview 4: Erin Kristin Jenna - Professor at the International Relations Department at Central European University-10/08/2022	141
Interview 5: Anna Maria Augustyn - European Commission Evaluation Expert (via Zoom)-18/07/2022	141
Interview 6: Anna Wojcik- Assistant Professor at Polska Akademia Nauk (via Zoom)- 13/08/2022	141

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 List of Polish Constitutions in Chronological order	51
Table 2 Crucial dates on Poland-EU-NATO relations.....	60
Table 3 Developments of the abortion rights in Poland.....	85
Table 4 Attitude to the anti-abortion act according to party preferences'	96

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AWS- Solidarity Election Movement (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność)
CEE-Central and Eastern European
CFSP-Common Foreign and Security Policy
CNU-Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe)
CP-Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska)
EBRD-The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC-European Community
ECE-East Central Europe
EIGE-The European Institute for Gender Equality
EU-European Union
FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fiatat Demokraták Szövetsége)
GDP-Gross Domestic Product
KOR-Workers' Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników)
MS-Member State
NAP-National Action Plan for Women
NATO-The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO-Non Governmental Organization
PChD-Christian Democratic Party
PiS-Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość)
PHARE-The Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) Programme
PM-Prime Minister
PZ-The Greens (Partia Zieloni)
PZPR-Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza)
SD-The Alliance of Democrat (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne)
SDPL- Social Democracy of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Polska)
SLD- Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej)
UNHRC-United Nations Human Rights Committee
UP-Labor Union (Unia Pracy)
US-The United States
USSR-The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V4 Group-Visegrad Group Countries
WWI-The First World War
WWII-The Second World War

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to test the de-Europeanisation theory in Poland that is an EU Member State by showing country's transformation from Europeanisation to de-Europeanisation. The research question is "how does de-Europeanisation impact Poland's domestic and foreign policy?" By adopting de-Europeanisation theory, this thesis targets to demonstrate whether there is a link between de-Europeanisation domestically and foreign policy behaviour. In order to analyse the transformation and test the theory, I divide Poland's recent political history into two distinct periods and demonstrate both the existence of an Europeanization effect from the 1990s until 2010 and a de-Europeanization effect following the coming to power of the PiS and the global financial crisis and multiple Euro crises. The first part (1990-2010) adopted 2 cases; the 1997 Constitution and EU-NATO membership in order to examine the Europeanisation framework in the country. The second part (2010-2020) tested the theory with the anti-abortion bill and the Syrian refugee crisis in order to show the de-Europeanisation in Poland. In order to show the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy, each part adopted one domestic and one foreign element. For the domestic politics elements; the 1997 constitutional amendment – (Europeanisation) and the anti-abortion law – (de-Europeanisation) have been chosen. Regarding the foreign policy elements; the EU-

NATO membership – (Europeanisation) and the Syrian refugee migrant crisis – (de-Europeanisation) have been selected. In order to present the nexus and the interactive dynamic between these domestic and foreign components, a methodology was used which paired the dyadic cases as domestic elements with the foreign elements. By demonstrating the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy in the Polish context, this thesis contains the recent transformation the country has gone through and explores the mechanisms that have led to Poland's contemporary transformation from Europeanisation that was stated in the literature as taking place from the 1990s to 2010s, to de-Europeanisation from 2010 to 2020s. Studying Poland is especially noteworthy given Warsaw's domestic politics and foreign policies owing to the alterations that happened in the country's domestic politics with the ruling party, Law and Justice's electoral success, and the following backlashes in the core values of the European Union, such as the rule of law and democracy. From a poster child of successful transformation in the 1990s and 2000s, the former communist state is now often accused of not only embracing illiberal political practices but even of rejecting core EU values and principles. The driving factors of the changes in the direction of the domestic political agenda and its implications on foreign policy will be examined with a particular emphasis on Poland's relationship with the EU. The study will start by giving a brief history of the communist regime in the country before it starts to show the transition to the democratic era in the late 1980s to identify the crucial factors that pushed the country closer to its Western neighbours. Since the government does not have one prime motivation that shapes its decision-making processes, country's foreign policy decisions are expected to depict differences depending on the subjects that are on the agenda (from refugee crisis to the ant,-abortion bill). That is why, this thesis assumes that the transformation Poland had and the relationship

between domestic politics and foreign policy will show the pragmatic approach that the Polish government adopted (Markowski, 2018). It means that in order to maximize its profits and gains in diversified examples in the international area; the country forms its foreign policy direction from time to time. Hence, this thesis has two fundamental aims; firstly depicting the extent to which there is democratization and de-Europeanization in Member State of the EU and demonstrating through the case studies, and secondly (Poland's de-Europeanisation) the nexus between domestic politics feeds into foreign policy behaviour.

The story of the establishment of the Polish state begins with the conversion of the Polish King Mieszko I in 966 to Christianity. In the Middle Ages, the states of Poland and Lithuania entered into a close union of fate, and the Jagiellonian Dynasty, which ruled between 1385-1569, ruled both countries simultaneously. As a result of the Lublin Union signed by the nobles of both countries in 1569, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was born. This state, constantly at war with the Ottoman Empire, became one of the most powerful states in Europe in the 17th century. The Ottoman Empire's The Second Siege of Vienna failed because the King of Poland, Jan Sobieski III, came to help the Habsburgs. However, Poland started to weaken in the 18th century, and Russia, Austria, and Prussia, who took advantage of this weakness, occupied this country together between 1772 and 1795 and wiped it off the European map. After this date, it was possible for the Poles to re-establish a state in 1918, after the end of the First World War. The Second World War started with the invasion of Poland, which was independent between 1918-1938, by Germany in 1939. After the end of the Second World War, Poland came under the influence of the Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact, which was established between the Eastern Bloc countries, was signed in Warsaw, the capital of Poland, on 14 May 1955.

However, Communist rule reached a dead end in the 1980s. For this reason, the Government, unable to withstand the strikes and protest demonstrations that spread throughout the country, allowed the elections to be held freely. In the elections held on July 4, 1989, the Solidarity Party led by Lech Walesa won a great victory, and thus the communist rule in Poland ended. Poland joined NATO in 1990 and the EU in 2004. Today, the Republic of Poland has a unitary state structure and a parliamentary democracy.

As a part of the European studies in the social science literature, the seventh-largest country in Europe (McMullen & Pierce, 2004, p.8), Poland, has been one of the most attractive countries due to its history, transformation, political developments, and the recent changes in its relationship with Brussels and European values. Since the EU membership and Poland's alliance with the West affected almost every corner of its domestic politics and foreign policy decisions, from political life to economic and social aspects, Poland illustrates a compelling case study for international relations and political science scholars. This thesis sheds light on the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy by focusing on the Polish case. In order to show the link between these two, the research adopted the Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation theories to show the connection between domestic and foreign politics and the transformation that took place in the country from the period of 1990-the to the 2020s. To do so, employing a theoretical framework focusing on the concept of (de)Europeanization links Poland's foreign policy evolution to the lively debate on the effects of democratic backsliding¹ in its foreign policy decision-making.

¹ V-dem varieties of democracy Report on Poland: https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr_2022.pdf

This introduction chapter is going to cover the following: what the thesis is about; the research topic and question; the main arguments; the justification of our research agenda; the relevance of the research topic to the analytical toolkit of de-Europeanization; the reasons for choosing Poland as a case study; my main assumptions related to the subject; and the breakdown of this thesis.

1.1 Poland as a case study

The Polish state has historically been divided several times in its long history, such as between Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1795. As a result of the 1795 Third Partition (McMullen & Peirce, 2004); Prussia, Austria and Russia divided the former Polish and Lithuanian Commonwealth territories. Starting from this division by the external actors, the Polish history and society went through a lot in different ruling systems² (Wandycz, 1996). Along with these powers, the dominance of the European continent was also subject to the competition between France and Great Britain (Baugh & Baugh, 2014). The emphasis on being divided among powers and suppressed by them created the "suffering" nation myth that characterized Polish attitudes to the World War I (Zechenter, 2019). Owing to the constant fight for independence in the country's history, the Polish nation came together around the myth of a strong nation during and after the World War I (Stokłosa, 2018). Nevertheless, despite the hopes of the Polish citizens, the early disappointments at the realities of the war were much more powerful. Even today, despite all the great losses and damages that Poland has suffered so far, the WWI is presented as one of the main turning points in the history that brought liberty (Stokłosa, 2015).

² For more on the history of Poland, see: McMullen, M., & Peirce, G. (2004). Poland: The Land and Its People A Curriculum Guide for Secondary School Teachers. *e Center for Russian and East European Studies*, 1-90.

Since the late 18th century, the Polish nation had longed for independence. After the WWI, the sovereign state was finally created in November 1918 and changed the balance in the region. Since Germany had lost the WWI, Poland's western borders were secure during the years 1918-1919. When the country regained its independence, it went through a brief experiment with parliamentary democracy (Ajnenkiel, 1992). After this period of instability since the country could not get its independence back after the Second World War, Jozef Pilsudski (Smogorzewski, 2021), who was a Polish statesman who served as the Chief of State (1918–1922) and was made First Marshal of Poland in March 1920, seized power and established an authoritarian regime (Stachura, 2004).

With Germany and Russia gaining power, Poland was shared by these two states for the fourth time in the late 1930s. In January 1933, Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany and decided to reverse the Treaty of Versailles³ regarding its financial, territorial and military provisions. In order to overturn the situation, the government focused on uniting ethnically German regions into the Reich as the first step for forming a German Empire in the European continent. In 1939, Hitler stated his territorial demands on Poland. He demanded the annexation of the Free City of Danzig⁴ that was under the control of the League of Nations, to Germany since the majority of the people living in Danzig, now named Gdansk. Ethnically German presumably. Hitler also demanded extraterritorial access for Germany through the so Polish Corridor to East Prussia (Prauser & Rees, 2004). Hence, after almost 1.5 million German soldiers crossed the border of Poland on September 1, 1939 with nearly 2,000 airplanes and 2,500 tanks (Snyder, 2002); the British gave Hitler an ultimatum in order to finish Germany's presence in Poland (Rosenthal,

³ Peace treaty that brought World War I to an end.

⁴ It was a semi-autonomous city-state from 1920 to 1939.

1964). However, Hitler disregarded this request which was followed by the war declaration of France and the Great Britain. Thus, the German invasion launched the Second World War (Charnysh, 2019). On August 23 1939, Joachim von Ribbentrop, who was foreign minister under the Nazi regime, and Vyacheslav Molotov, who was Soviet commissar of foreign affairs, signed a non-aggression pact in Russia. It was a secret protocol assigning Soviet and German domains of effect in Central and East Europe (Williams & Deletant, 2001). Within two weeks, the USSR began attacks and Poland was divided between Eastern and Western powers. At that time, the country was divided not only by the USSR and Nazi Germany, but also Slovakia and Lithuania. In this case, a movement arise against this occupation named as the Polish Underground State (Polskie Państwo Podziemne)⁵. Although the Polish citizens formed an underground resistance (Polish Underground State) that was consisted of both men and women regardless of their social classes, with participation in the military formations in the country, six million citizens were killed during the war and could not be successful in taking the conquered parts back. The Polish Underground also defined their resistance as “this resistance does not operate on behalf of any political party, any social group or any ideological view. The underground shall not become a place of rivalry for political influence in the homeland” (Commander of the Polish Underground, December 4, 1939).

Even though the communist regime was restricted to the Soviet Union in 1945, it expanded its functioning area to Central and Eastern European states. In this respect, the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, France, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, Hungary,

⁵ To read more on this, see: <https://warsawinstitute.org/the-armed-independence-underground-in-poland-1944-19561963-genesis-aims-operations/>

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Italy and France came together and formed the Cominform⁶⁷ in Belgrade on September 22, 1945. This unification turned into an agent, which aimed to spread and promote the communist movement and the ideology. The communist political leaders gradually gained key positions within these Central and Eastern European countries with the help of communist propaganda. Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania were all forced into the Soviet Union embrace. In short, the Soviet control and the creation of the communist People's Republic of Poland altered the country radically⁸. The shift from the west to the east came after a rooted change in the country's boundaries. The Second World War homogenized the Polish population and eliminated ethnic and religious diversification in the society owing to boundary changes and the destruction of Jews in the Holocaust (Klaus, 2020) (McMullen & Peirce, 2004). Not only the domestic image of the country was changed but also the policy they followed in the international arena was also influenced. Polish foreign policy had been impacted by the wars, especially after the kick-off of the Second World War.

In 2004, after becoming one of the EU member states, Poland was depicted as a successful example of Europeanization. In this respect, Polish foreign policy has been formed around EU norms and values, and marked by a significant degree of national structures' adaptation and policies in line with EU foreign policy cooperation (Kaminska, 2007). Nevertheless, due to the rise of right-wing and populist movements such as the

⁶ The Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties

⁷ The Cominform was the official organization of the International Communist Movement in 1947-1956 period.

⁸ Resistance began in the country against the occupying Powers. For instance, The Home Arm that was the underground resistance in German-occupied part of Poland in the WW II, failed in 1944 uprising. In 1945, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, also known as the Red Army, drove out the German occupiers and a compliant communist regime was installed in Poland till 1989.

current Polish Law and Justice Party's stance, the country's Europeanization process and its commitment went through a novel challenge. Even though Poland does not represent the sole instance of populist governments, the recent disputes between Warsaw and Brussels create the need for understanding how Polish foreign policy decision-making works and what are the factors impacting this process (Dyduch & Müller, 2021). That is also one of the reasons why I choose Poland to study its foreign policy in the concept of de-Europeanization with internal reasons.

1.2 The communist era (1945-1989)

As McMullen and Pierce (2004) argued, "when the country (Poland) came under communist control in 1945, Polish society was subjected to a set of rigid ideological tenets. Communist dogma failed to change the intellectual or spiritual outlook of most Poles, however, because traditional institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church and the family remained strong support structures for alternative viewpoints" (McMullen and Pierce, 2004, p.8). The history of Poland from the period 1945 to 1989 spans the period of communist rule (Fleming, 2009). Anti-communist groups were not successfully united and coordinated until the second half of the 1970s. The reason was stated in the literature as the Civic Platform's (political party in Poland) commitment to the communist regime and the readiness by the Soviet Union under Stalin to suppress any attempt to revolt against them in the Central and Eastern European Union. One of the main sources of the uprisings in the country that caused the change of regime was economic hardship. The command-led statist system of "real existent socialism" disregarded consumers and workers alike, treating the latter as pawns implementing the grand ideas of the state (Kamińska, 2014). Demanding political and economic changes in 1956, workers went on the streets in the

fourth largest city of Poland, Poznan. However, the authorities brutally suppressed these protests. In 1968, intellectuals and students came together to demand an increase in political freedom as an additional motivation to challenge the ruling government in the context of worldwide movements by young people. Nevertheless, again, they could not achieve what they wanted to. Two years later, renewed demands for reform in the workplace and better wages led to protests anew (Kersten, 1991). At the beginning, as it can be understood from the time of their protests, these movements could not achieve bringing the opposition together against the communist regime. Nevertheless, since the problems experienced were an important factor in the unification of these groups such as Workers' Defence Committee (*Komitet Obrony Robotników*, KOR), the 1976 revolt due to the price hikes brought intellectuals, students and workers together to voice their demands. Briefly, the opposition came together to revolt in order to avert the parliament from approving the increase in prices.

On August 1, 1975, 35 nations signed the Helsinki Final Act⁹ resulting from the Conference on Security and Cooperation. Intellectuals launched the Committee for the Defence of Polish Workers after massive worker detentions in 1976. This fundamental aim was to increase workers' wages and to support their families. Later, the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights was founded a year later by anti-communists to force the government to follow human rights standards. Especially, the death of 23-year-old anti-communist activist¹⁰ revived the student mobilization in 1977 and resulted in a

⁹ The Helsinki Final Act aimed to cover four different areas. The first one focused on ten tenets, from territorial integrity and border security to implementing confidence-building measures. Secondly, the part covers economic collaboration. The third category underlined human rights. Last but not least, the final basket regularised the elements of applying the following procedures.

¹⁰ To see more on this: <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/polands-solidarity-movement-1980-1989/>

new student organization, the Student Committee of Solidarity. The uprisings that started to occur against the communist regime and administration developed in many different ways, such as the training for students. For instance, the Association for Academic Courses that offered courses from economics to alternative history was created in 1978. Besides, the press also began to build underground structures to publish anti-government opinions in 1979.

Karol Wojtyła, known as John Paul II, was chosen Pope in 1978. With the election of Pope John Paul II in 1978, the discourse on human rights and freedom of expression began to spread. During his visits to different cities from Krakow to Warsaw, he openly spoke on state radio and TV. To follow these speeches, large crowds began to gather, and for the first time in Poland's communist history, such a high turnout took place. Citizens realized that when they came together against the power of the communist regime. In short, the coalition between the students, workers, and Catholic Church members was formed during that time. It became one of the forces that would lead to change in Polish society by the end of the 1970s. This non-violent gathering and mobilization formed an alternative to the existing communist authoritarian regime. The opposition in the country, namely the Solidarity movement, carried out numerous activities to mobilize people against the communist system in the USSR and domestically. These efforts resulted in the initiation of various civic organizations.

Increasing economic difficulties in these years led to protests where the protestors gathered in many parts of the country in the summer of 1980. The shipyard city of Gdansk, Lech Walesa was an electrician at a factory and under his leadership, workers started to come together and the Solidarność (Solidarity) movement was founded. It was the first

mass-independent trade union in communist states with the unification of 36 regional unions. This movement tempted people that surged to 10 million Polish citizens. Owing to its immense support, Solidarity gained a reform lobby power. Even though the fundamental motivation behind its establishment was not driven by political ambitions, the communist regime and people's dissatisfaction with them shaped their arguments over time. Because of their political involvement, Pope John Paul II also encouraged the movement and gave his support (McMullen & Peirce, 2004). Essentially, the reason why Walesa formed this movement was to demand wage increases and the reinstatement of laid-off colleagues.

During the 1980s, this Solidarity movement was defined as an anti-bureaucratic social movement that adopted civil resistance methods to improve workers' rights and introduce social change. Therefore, since the communist ideology and how the government was designed to function were not in line with this movement, the government attempted to eliminate the union by imposing martial law and restoring "stability". Nevertheless, these initiatives failed and the movement continued to operate by receiving financial support from the United States and the Vatican. On August 31, 1980, authorities and strikers reached a consensus. After that arrangement, communist authorities agreed on creating a space for free political and religious expression in the country and an allowance for independent union existences. The Solidarity movement delegitimized the communist regime and constructed an independent political room where alternative discourses could be aired along with various institutions and activities. One of the fundamental components of this movement was its non-violent methods. It always pursued its goals through peaceful techniques. That is why its existence played a significant role in the power transformation achieved peacefully in 1989. The tools of this

non-violent opposition movement during the 1980s were wide-ranging, such as hunger strikes, waving flags, using music-film and humor, and distributing posters and magazines in the streets. This system also marked foreign policy decisions. The continuity of the support given to democracy also contributed to the shaping of the country's strategy after 1989, the balance it tried to establish between neighbouring countries and the strategies it adopted against Russia.

On December 13, 1981, the authoritarian government introduced martial law in Poland with General Wojciech Jaruzelski as a leader and the Military Council of National Salvation. The Solidarity movement improved its popularity and began to ask extract reforms from the ruling party. The internal factors and the external actors, such as the pressure from Kremlin, contributed to the domestic environment. That is why General Wojciech Jaruzelski considered martial law the only way to keep the country stable (Ścierańska, 2015). As a result, the Solidarity movement was shut down, and anti-government figures were also arrested. However, martial law did not help the government. After martial law was lifted in 1984, the members of Solidarity who were arrested during this period were released. The dispute between the society and the state resulted in the deepening of the economic crisis from 1982-1988. Just before the communist regime ended, the number of protests and riots had increased. For this reason and to maintain stability, the government was ready to cooperate with Solidarity. As a result, an agreement was reached on the re-legalization of this movement.

The 'round table talks between the opposition and the communist government in 1989 sparked a flurry of legislation and constitutional amendments combining democratic reforms with institutions and laws inherited from communist rule. The intense

experimentation of democracy that followed the communist regime yielded mixed results between 1989 and the mid-1990s, when the restored Polish Republic was still trying to find its political direction (McMullen & Peirce, 2004). The roundtable discussions that took place for three months in 1989 resulted in holding free parliamentary elections in June. This agreement was marked as a great and determinative victory for the opposition, the Solidarity in particular. Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the first non-communist prime minister in the region was elected in August 1989. The parliament appointed him in order to enforce social and economic reforms to provide stability in Poland.

The politics from various angles, from internal security to migration management, changed substantially in Poland following the demise of the communist regime. After 1989, Poland embarked on a long process of democratisation in political and economic life. In foreign policy terms, since the system changed, Poland positioned itself close to the Western world and the EU in particular. The orientation towards EU and NATO membership resulted in numerous policy reforms and changes in the country. The idea of ‘return to Europe’¹¹ consisted of the main motivation in building its politics and policies. In order to prepare itself for accession, the country had to Europeanize itself and the way it functioned. However, four decades of communist rule had created legacies and institutions that would now need to be overcome.

1.3 A new chapter for Poland, after 1989

"As the country (Poland) moved away from its communist past, it was drawn toward its future with the West and entry into Western culture and institutions" (McMullen

¹¹ In more detail see: I Mazowiecki, Tadeusz: “Powrót do Europy. Przemówienie na forum Rady Europy w Strasburgu” (A Return to Europe. A Speech Held in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg), Znak, No. 416, Kraków (January 1990), pp. 3-9.

& Peirce, 2004, p.9). On June 4, 1989, the country experienced the first multiparty elections since the Second World War. After the collapse of the communist regime, the country began to introduce reforms in many areas to decrease the cost of transformation for the Polish citizens and build an alliance with the West due to security concerns caused by Poland's history. These changes were visible in the political system with the new constitutions and the adoption of international agreements in the country due to the privatization of state-owned firms and companies (McMullen & Peirce, 2004). After the collapse of the communist regime, as a result of assistance from the West, namely "the Polish Aid"¹², Poland started to provide democracy aid to post-communist states by the late 1990s (Pospieszna, 2018). To be more specific about the aid that Poland received, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was established to help the Central and Eastern European countries to recover after communist regime and the Cold War. In October 1989, the idea of initiating a European Bank came from French President François Mitterrand. There was a great emphasis on the private sector, liberalization of prices and system as the greatest solution for the Central and Eastern European countries' development. The country benefited from the West's assistance by applying assistance to democracy related subjects by launching and reforming NGOs and public institutions¹³. A country with many examples of supporting democracy outside of its borders had this approach reflected in its foreign policy decisions; from launching the Polish Foundation for International Cooperation for Development "Know-How" to the creation of a platform

¹² To read more on financial and democracy aid, see: Paulina Pospieszna, *Democracy Assistance Bypassing Governments in Recipient Countries: Supporting the "Next Generation"* (London and New York: Routledge, 2018)

¹³ For more on the subject, see: Galia Chimiak, *The Growth of Non-Governmental Development Organizations in Poland and Their Cooperation with Polish Aid* (Warsaw: IFiS, 2016).

to share democratization experiences, to the establishment of the Solidarity Fund PL foundation in 2013 in order to ensure democracy aid (Petrova and Aydın-Düzgit, 2021).

Public opinion on European integration reflected that there was support for advancing the ties between member states and their peoples and pushing integration further (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). As a part of this pro-integration flow, Central and Eastern European states demonstrated an outstanding level of approval from their citizens in the membership process to be a part of the Western world, starting from the collapse of the communist regime until their 2004 EU accession. The 2004 enlargement signified significant changes within the EU and Central and Eastern European. The effect of post-communist members' accession to the Union brought the topics of their new role within the democracy club and the potential impact of the Union on these states sociologically, politically, and economically (Klatt, 2011, p.1) since the influence was not coming from one side to another only (Ilves, 2005). The realization of membership in the EU has been possible with the harmonization programs carried out in Poland under the membership criteria adopted by the European Council of Heads of State and Government in Copenhagen in 1993.

In addition, there is an external dimension to the process and work related to the preparation of Poland for EU membership. Elements of this external dimension are information exchange, promotion, consultation, negotiations, and agreements with EU institutions and member states. The political dialogue that developed with the EU gradually started to include more representatives in public institutions, and the scope of the discussed issues expanded. Owing to these developments, it has emerged as an increasing need to determine a common and consistent position on behalf of Poland vis-

à-vis the EU and its member states. As a result of these developments, it has emerged as an increasing need to determine a common and consistent position on behalf of Poland vis-à-vis the EU and its member states. Not only the enlargement process but also democratization and stabilization in the country formed the core foreign policy objectives of Warsaw and the government's perception of the national interests. This perception¹⁴ and understanding were highly influenced by a strong support for EU integration¹⁵.

1.4 Recent trends in the country: A populist and illiberal turn (2010s)

In October 2015, Polish politics was well and truly turned on its head. After years of mainstream centrist politics, the right-wing nationalist-populist Law and Justice party (PiS) was elected with a majority in both the upper and lower houses of parliament. In less than two years the policies of PiS begun to transform Polish politics and its relationship with Brussels. The ruling Law and Justice Party has launched a process of 'de-Europeanisation' to "establish a greater sense of sovereignty" in the country and to oppose the model that was projected as Western Member States of the EU's model. To illustrate the change, the ruling Law and Justice party leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski said that "Poland belongs in the European Union but should be careful not to be 'infected by social diseases'". in 2018, ahead of local elections. Poland's ruling party worked to distance itself from Brussels by offering economic and ideological concerns as reasons. From an ideological point of view, the PiS depicts the EU as a threat to Poland's identity and culture.

1.5 Illiberal turn in the world and Populism

¹⁴ Opinion poll results and reports from the year 2000, from the CBOS Data:
https://www.cbos.pl/EN/publications/public_opinion.php

¹⁵ Opinions on democracy (CBOS, 2000):
https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2000/08_2000.pdf

Even though the illiberal turn has shown its obvious face especially after the outbreak of the pandemic (Eşençay, 2020), the Court of Justice of the European Union already noted in 2018 that the norms and core values of the Union cannot be presented and exercised in all the Member States anymore (Kyle & Meyer, 2020). Although Western democracies have been supporting democracy around the globe for many years, Central, Eastern European countries, and the Middle East have supported this core value democracy from time to time. Nevertheless, democratic backsliding has been experienced in many new members of this democracy club in the world.

The coalition government under the right-wing Law and Justice party's leadership launched various decisions which put the Polish government on the opposite side of the European Commission after 2015. The disputes originated on a wide range of subjects from the government's control over the media and the relocation scheme for the Syrian refugees. Despite the populist and nationalist ruling government in the Central and Eastern European, like in Poland, the public approval towards the relationship with the EU are still pro-EU. As the recent research showed "a total of 85% of Central and Eastern European respondents favour the EU acting as a unified bloc on the world stage and ensuring that the EU's potential in foreign policy does not remain untapped. This is preferred especially amongst the older generation with a university degree"¹⁶. Within this data, Poland had 88% in the opinion poll that was in favour of strengthening the Union (Tothova, 2021) (Hooghe and Marks 2008). However, despite the approval by the citizens, on the political level, politicians continued to use the language targets the EU and accuse

¹⁶ Page 6

Brussels¹⁷. The advancement of nationalist sentiments in political discourse and its reflections on the voter base show a great change in the balance between negative and positive opinions on European integration.

Briefly, populism serves two purposes aligned with strengthening the electoral power of political leaders. The first goal is to create hatred against elites by depicting the populist leader as a hero of citizens who preserves their rights and well-being. Drawing on the division between elites and citizens enables politicians to influence their voter base because citizens begin to accept their leader as the remedy to make their life better as a “saviour” when faced with corrupt and unaccountable elites. Even though the populist leader defines himself/herself as the only representative of the citizens as the “vox populi/voice of people,” his/her statements introduce the “perfect citizen,” which polarizes the society by creating an “us vs. them” dichotomy. An eligible citizen determined by the ruling party is an individual who does not express minority views and different political views as (s)he fights for the nation's survival and is responsible to the state. Moreover, the scholarly literature on Central and Eastern Europe has so far either focused on populism, extremism and radicalism with their influences on the European values such as democracy and the rule of law. Another part of the literature looks at foreign policy in isolation from domestic dynamics. This thesis aims to act as a sort of bridge between the two literatures so as to enable a better understanding of the loopback effects between domestic policy and foreign policymaking. The overall goal is to research the way in which this dynamic affects Poland’s relationship with the European Union.

¹⁷ As an example, see: Michał Wilgocki, “*Polexit? Nie ma na to zgody. W Grupie Wyszehradzkiej Polacy są największymi euroentuzjastami*”, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 16 August 2017, available at, <http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,22238501,polexit-nie-ma-na-to-zgody-w-grupie-wyszehradzkiejpolacy.html?disableRedirects=true>.

Populism has been discussed to examine political decision-making process since the number of populist leaders has grown enormously in the last decade. Even though the negative impacts of populism have been examined regarding the rule of law and democracy, the academic literature linking the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy orientation is still weak. There are numerous instances, which demonstrate the electoral tools of the populist leaders such as the Syrian refugee crisis began in 2015 (Beckstein & Rampton, 2018). Hungary and Poland demonstrate reluctance to take a part in the relocation system introduced by the EU. The studies and research proved the success of adopting a populist approach by politicians to increase their electoral support and justify their actions against human rights and democracy (Yabancı, 2020). Most academics agree on the basic tenets of populism based on the emergence of this term during recent years (Havlík & Stojarová, 2018, p.315). Cas Mudde defines populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people (Mudde, 2004, p.562).” According to Muddle (2001), there are three type of populism named as Agrarian Populism, Economic Populism, and Political Populism (Mudde, 2001, p.34). One of the assumptions that academics accept when they define populism is the division that populism creates between "the elite" and "the people" (Müller, 1987). Judis and Teixeira established a link regarding this division by showing elites as the only powerful part of the society that requires hatred from "the people" (Judis & Teixeira, 2002). This cleavage not only polarizes the country based on various priorities but also demonizes "the elites". Despite polarization within the country because of the demonization of elites, the rest, which was referred to as "the people", does not display homogeneity since the populist

leader selects the group with certain segments. Paul Taggart suggests a replacement from "the people" to "the heartland" where there is a unified population as populist leader dreamed of. Utilizing "the people" requires clarification to avoid misinterpretations since the populist governments do not aim to welcome every citizen in the country, especially the part which goes the contrary to the traditional values of the nation (Taggart, 2000, p.95). The presence of a charismatic leader with a strong direct communication with "the people" is also popular among populists. Political success has been facilitated as a result of the increase in direct interaction with the voters (Beyme, 1996). Populist strategies also include demagoguery and opportunism to enhance electoral support.

Since illiberalism has flourished in European countries, the primary concentration is on the Visegrad countries¹⁸. Although illiberal tendencies¹⁹ were existing with populist leaders as far back as in 1990s (Deegan-Krause, 2012), these four countries began to come back to their old tradition of marginal political parties with populist strategies starting from 2010. Since there are exceptions, variations in the case of how these countries adopted illiberal turn, the generalization is not possible and accurate. Owing to the many patterns and shapes of illiberalism, and the fact that every political culture and institutional configuration gives shape to different political outcomes, each country must be studied on its own merits before concluding as to how and why they are becoming an instance of illiberalism (Havlík & Stojarová, 2018). Among these four countries, Hungary and Poland have received most attention due to the changes caused by their institutional reforms (Eşençay, 2020).

¹⁸ On the Visegrad Group, see: <https://www.visegradgroup.eu/about>

¹⁹ Example: Vladimír Mečiar, from a national-populist political party in Slovakia called "The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia" during the 1990s. His political party and career illustrate the influence of populism on democracy.

1.5.1 Kaczynski's Poland and Populism

Despite the effort to achieve a complete democracy within Polish borders for 30 years, Poland has been experiencing democratic backsliding since 2015 (Drinnoczi and Bien-Kacala, 2019, pp.1141). The ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) has been ruling Poland under the leadership of Jarosław Kaczyński. The party's leading echelons identified the mission of the party as opposing "liberal elites" and supporting nationalism for a "better future" in Poland (Joanna Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016). Anna Wojcik (2022) argues that "Many of the state institutions were captured after 2010s by the governing party, PiS. People who were loyal to the party were hired. Hence eventually they changed the character of Polish democracy" (Wojcik, 2022). Poland has also clientelist relations, new patrimonialism, and corruption under the Polish government (Drinnoczi and Bien-Kacala, 2019, pp.1141). Identity politics is also one of the popular ways Polish political leaders are utilizing to consolidate their power. Under the rule of Law and Justice Government, foreign policy and its goals have altered significantly with a de-Europeanization process visible and underway. However, the strategies that the populist government utilized shaped not only foreign policy but also affected domestic politics. The transition from communism to capitalism came with specific alterations regarding the welfare state reforms in Poland due to the increased need for governmental support. The burden of caring for children while parents are working, elderly care, and people with disabilities highlighted the need for reform. That is why most of the population welcomed political leaders such as Kaczyński, who campaigned on and became successful through programs such as child subsidy programs.

By use of the (de)Europeanization theory, this thesis will demonstrate the effects of de-Europeanization period and domestic politics in Poland on its foreign policy decision-making process along with its outcomes of relationship with the EU. By examining the effects of domestic policy change, the de-Europeanization on Poland's foreign policy will be depicted, focusing on its approach towards the EU. The study demonstrates the implications of growing evidence that Polish Foreign Policy is highly de-Europeanized in the last decade, especially after the populist turn in the country in 2015. In addition to the de-Europeanised foreign policies, domestic politics has a significant influence on foreign policy. The aim is to bridge (link) the literature of populism and the de-Europeanization framework to understand how internal politics in Poland affect its foreign policy decision-making vis-à-vis the EU.

1.6 Chapter Breakdown

This thesis is divided into five chapters. In addition to the first introduction chapter that talks about Poland briefly, the second chapter outlines the thesis' theoretical frameworks, Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation. It does so by discussing the application of Europeanization and de-Europeanization as a research agenda to the unique area of foreign policy while showing the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy in the Polish case. In order to explain why I adopted de-Europeanization as a central theory and how I will make use of it, Europeanization theory will be also studied prior to it. By showing the transformation in Poland from Europeanization (1990s-2010) to de-Europeanization (2010-2020), the impact of domestic politics on the foreign policy will be covered in detail. Moreover, the second chapter will also introduce the methodological approach and the data adopted along with the limitations.

The third chapter will cover the Europeanisation in Poland between 1990 to 2010 by discussing two cases; one domestic element as the 1997 Constitutions and one foreign policy element as the EU-NATO membership (Gwiazda, Democracy in Poland: Representation, Participation, Competition and Accountability Since 1989, 2016). The last part of the third chapter will present a discussion part to talk more about the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy in Poland's case.

The fourth chapter explains and analyses the mechanisms leading to de-Europeanization between 2010 to 2020 by covering two cases; the anti-abortion law and the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis. The nexus between domestic political imperatives will be among the necessary components analysing the transformation of Poland to detect foreign policy re-orientation. The last part of the fourth chapter as the previous one will present a discussion part to talk more about the link between domestic politics and foreign policy.

Finally, the last chapter will summarize the main arguments research question by aiming to illustrate which mechanisms seem more relevant regarding the nexus between domestic politics and the foreign policy field and why. After a summary of the whole thesis, the last chapter will underline that Poland is a case study of de-Europeanisation. The discussion will also demonstrate a link between (de)Europeanisation and European integration more generally and ponder as to its consequences.

CHAPTER 2

(DE) EUROPEANIZATION: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Theoretical Framework

This thesis uses the concept of (de)Europeanization as the central theoretical framework to depict, analyze and understand the policy nexus of Poland's foreign policy and its linkages with the country's domestic policy trajectory. In the International Relations literature, Poland was depicted as a successful example of Europeanization soon after becoming an EU member state in 2004 (Jasiecki, 2008). In this respect, Polish foreign policy has been formed with European norms and values and marked by a significant degree of national structures' adaptation and policies in line with EU foreign policy cooperation (Kaminska, 2007).

As Quaglia et al (2007) argued "There is no one theory of Europeanization" (Quaglia, Neuvonen, Miyakoshi, & Cini, 2007, pp.406)²⁰. Even though this framework has been depicted in the social science literature as a 'contested and multifaceted concept' (Vale, 2011) that creates confusion and therefore suffers from important epistemological weaknesses, the influence of the EU on the domestic politics of its member states has been

²⁰ For more on this, see: Quaglia, L. Neuvonen, M., Miyakoshi, M. ve Cini, M. (2007) 'Europeanization' (içinde) M. Cini, European Union Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, sayfalar 405-420.

demonstrated through the literature discussed below, and thus constitutes a valid point of theoretical departure by many scholars who make use of Europeanization and de-Europeanization theories in their research (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). To give but one example, Hix and Goetz, 2000 also argue that the fundamental focus of the concept was oriented around the domestic impact of the EU on institutions and policies.

The Europeanization concept has been depicted as a ‘two-way process’ in which both the EU institutions come to affect the national level of policy-making and national policies end up ‘uploaded’ to the EU level as well (Börzel, 2002, pp.193) (Buller and Gamble, 2002) (Bulmer and Burch, 2001). In this respect, the horizontal movement²¹ among EU members regarding their methods and policies is explained with the help of the Europeanization framework in the literature (Beck & Grande, 2007). These theories have been utilized to explain not only Poland but also other Central and Eastern European countries along with their motivation to join the Western alliance due to economic cooperation between members and the political benefits they derive from it. Not only the existing EU members but also the continuation of the desire to be a part of the Union by the candidate countries is a powerful indicator of the appeal that the Europeanization concept and its practical use continue to exert. The fundamental focus of the conceptualization was oriented around the domestic impact of the EU on institutions and policies (Hix and Goetz, 2000).

Prior to discussing Europeanization in detail and given the series of challenges that the EU integration project has suffered from throughout the last decade, it is important to

²¹ *Horizontal Movement*: “In sociology, the term ‘horizontal Europeanisation’ denotes a variety of cross-border interactions between European countries in terms of communication, the exchange of ideas and meanings, collective mobilisation across borders as well as cross border mobility and networks” (Mau, 2012, p.4).

underline that although the Europeanization concept has been found as a useful framework in academic studies, the de-Europeanization framework has recently started to be used in the literature as well. The social science literature has begun to argue that even the EU itself started to de-Europeanize in addition to some of its member states (Thomas, 2021), again pointing to a high degree of mutuality in the relationship between the core EU institutions and the constituent units of this quasi-confederation, namely its member states. Especially after Brexit, the de-Europeanization concept has become significant theory to understand and explain the transformation both the union and the members went through.²² There is also little doubt that de-Europeanization complements the Europeanization framework in Poland, if one considers the massive political rupture that the country has experienced over the last decade.

2.2 Europeanization

In the most straightforward formulization of Europeanization, it is described as the process of downloading EU instructions, institutional structures and arrangements to the domestic standards (Howell, 2002). These criteria have been extended with an inclusion of EU's identities, policy transfers, political discourses and both formal and informal rules. Ladrech (1994)²³ who has adopted 'top-down approach' to the Europeanization framework has defined the concept as 'an incremental process of reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the extent that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making' (Ladrech, 1994). According to the conceptualization of Dyson and Goetz (2003), European integration has

²² For more on this, see: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07036337.2021.1927013>

²³ "Incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that E' political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making" (Ladrech, 1994)

been impacted in terms of both public policies and domestic politics as a result of both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ process. In this case, scholars argue that domestic actors in the country make use of Europeanization to alter and form domestic politics in a direction that major political actors and elites deem desirable for their own purposes (Dyson & Goetz, 2003). The ‘bottom-up approach’ refers to the ability of member states of the EU to form and upload politics, policies and institutions of the EU, and therefore use the European Union as a platform through which their preferences can be legitimized and broadened. (Hang, 2011).

2.2.1 Literature Review

2.2.1.1 Europeanization

For more than two decades, Europeanization has been a popular term in academic research and has been covered in various areas from the EU proper (Grabbe, 2002) and its Member States’ foreign policies to several other policy areas (Schimmelfenning & Sedelmeier, 2007). EU mechanisms, such as monetary aid, enabled the Union to promote its image in Europe and around the globe. This system also boosted the Europeanization process throughout the continent; candidate countries have been particularly impacted. Briefly, the instruments of the EU, along with its implementation mechanisms such as trade agreements, and membership, facilitate it to serve as the most powerful actor in promoting Europeanization throughout the continent. In this respect, European integration has been demonstrated as an integral player in the domestic political change in the literature by various scholars (Olsen, 2002; Radaelli, 2003; Ladrech, 1994).

The term ‘Europeanization’ has been used very often in the literature of social sciences, especially in international relations and European studies (Grabbe, 2001). The

term is used when the impact of the EU and membership became visible on domestic structures, national interests and identity of that particular country. This influence of this union is generally measured with the pressure it implements. Although this framework is widely utilized and known, the common description and practicality has been extremely discussed. According to Philomena Murray (2009), the framework transformed both the member states and the union itself by “the transnationalism and the interdependence of the EU and of national administrative and governance systems”. That is why this concept brought the power and limit of EU effects into the academia.

In the European Union studies, especially areas focusing on the integration and accession processes of the Member States; the framework of Europeanization has caused controversy due to the difficulty of providing an agreed definition among scholars. This has been argued as a concept with "internal complexity and Wittgensteinian ambiguity" (Gwiazda, 2002, p.2). Thus, Europeanization has been debated endlessly, and some have even gone as far as to claim that it is meaningless to employ as a regulating concept (Kassim, 2000). Various criticisms of the concept have surfaced in the literature over time and some of them will be discussed here. Olsen (2002) listed the Europeanization concept through five distinct usages such as governance institutions' developments at the EU level and defining it as a concept targeting to create stronger and unified Europe. Furthermore, Harmsen and Wilson (2000) conceptualized the concept with eight parts; from depicting the European integration as a driving force for the new forms of European governance to the benefits of economic modernization for the Member States such as urbanization and advanced economic prosperity. Bache and Jordan (2006) contributed to the literature with their six categories by referring the concept such as equalizing Europeanization and European integration as this equation has been discussed by Gwiazda (2002) as

“Europeanisation means European integration and institution-building” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998; Colino, 1997; Moravcsik, 1999). Bache and Jordan (2006) also touched upon the growing impact of the membership on domestic politics and foreign policies. This mechanism functions through learning from each other, in this case the EU and its members can be shown as an example, based on exchange of ideas and policies.

Change is a common thing the EU brought to its Member States along with influence on its candidate countries. In this respect, the attention on foreign policy, especially from the reverse transition from Europeanization to de-Europeanization has not been studied sufficiently. Until the 2000s, the literature used to define the Europeanization concept as the correlation between European and domestic politics-policies. In this respect, the only actors that were indicated in the research were the EU member states and their behaviour. Another strand of the literature that does not preoccupy us in this thesis also looked at the domestic “black box” of states by examining the effects of Europeanization on non-state actors, such as trade unions and welfare arrangements (Tsarouhas 2008), the global impact and interaction of Europeanisation with globalization (Tsarouhas & Ladi 2013) and similar.

Starting from the late 1990s and early 2000s, Europeanization became a framework of analysing the extent, pace and direction of EU travel for Central and East European candidate states. It is in that respect that the framework fits this thesis’ emphasis on the nexus between the domestic political arrangements prevalently in Poland in the 1990s and 2000s, and their effects on its foreign policy orientation. The domestic concept in the Union has changed after enlargement to the east. This alteration has transformed the Europeanization description in the research: “a process of construction, diffusion and

institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2004) (Alpan, 2014, pp.69).²⁴

Before moving on to the Europeanization of foreign policy, its impact and applicability on the internal politics needs to be explained. First of all, Europeanization is happening at a national level such as on the policy process, political structure and administration where these adopted a European direction (Nugent, 2006, pp.523). Thus, the national adaptation of this framework results in domestic changes as well as foreign policy implications.

The term in European studies was defined by Claudio M. Radaelli (2004, p.3) as “...processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational)discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2004). The way Radaelli (2004) described the framework acknowledges the EU impact on national policies and structures even though there is a majority in the literature that defends “the mutual constitutive” way of change. Therefore, the way this theory was designed reflects two-way interaction-relationship between structure and agency. Agency is shaped by its interaction with the Union due to its structure and at the same time, the process and structure within the EU were also shaped

²⁴ Başak Alpan, “Europe-as-Hegemony and Discourses in Turkey after 1999: What has Europeanization got to do with it?”, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2014, p. 69.

by agency participation (Boerzel, 2003). There are clear echoes of a constructivist approach to the operationalization of the term, a particularly useful approach if the aim is to disentangle the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics through the prism of material power, normative values and identity formation.

Due to its wide scope, the operation of this concept has become a subject of great interest (Wallace, 2005). Especially due to its effect on foreign policy, the role of national inputs of the members and its influence on EU policies in the institutions have been analyzed within various scholarly works (Milward, 1992). The influence of national inputs on the EU institutions, especially on the decision-making process has been categorized in many diversified ways in the literature. Wallace (2005), for instance, covered the subject by working on the policies from its design to the implementation process. From Alberto Sbragia's point of view (1994, pp.70), the Member States have been examined through political debates, discourses, and policies.

The literature is also stated clearly that the vertical dimension consists of the Europeanization framework as member state and EU in addition to horizontal dynamics between nation states. To give an example, through a culture of collaboration among Member States, the horizontal dynamics have been established within the context of the EU. This kind of cooperation gives the idea of strengthening the harmonization within the union via increasing the number and level of common ideas and policies (Radaelli, 2004). In this case, the EU can be seen simply as a platform for idea exchanges. However, since the supranational institutions within the union do not possess sufficient power, its weakness illustrates that the union remains weak in terms of Europeanization promotion.

Despite the weakness, Bulmer and Radaelli (2004, pp.345) claim that this framework is still valid even though it is voluntary (Klatt, 2011, p.3).

2.2.1.2 Measuring of Europeanization

Since the 1980s, the influence and role of European integration has been at the centre of the policies of countries which are now members of the EU. The requirements of the accession²⁵ to the EU that are stated in the Copenhagen European Council are ranging from economic and political to the *acquis* criteria (Gwiazda, 2002). The founding members of the union have been demonstrated as the countries that are still functioning as the main actors of the integration process, especially in policy development. However, the multidimensional effect of EU institutions on Member states has been enhanced systematically along with their reciprocal relations such as utilizing a common currency and the EU Reform Treaty (Jasiecki, 2008).

The Europeanisation framework has been studied and analysed by many scholars over years. Nevertheless, one of the first and acknowledged definitions has been given by Ladrech (1994) as an “incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making.” (Ladrech, 1994). As Olsen (2002) argues, Europeanization is a significant and controversial concept, which has often been more confusing than clarifying. It is for this reason that the definition used in this chapter to discuss Poland’s evolution is adopted early on. Today, the term is widely used to denote the institutional adaptation processes and their reactions at the national level in the face of

²⁵ "Three main requirements for the EU membership:
These conditions are known as the 'Copenhagen criteria' and include a stable democracy and the rule of law, a functioning market economy and the acceptance of all EU legislation, including of the euro."
(https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/joining-eu_en)

pressures from the EU or its institutional units. At the root of this interaction is European integration, the growth and deepening of the institutional arrangements created at the national level and, as a result, the existence of a political system with the authority to set rules at the supranational level. As certain norms, directives and values created by this system begin to penetrate national institutions and decision-making processes, harmonization occurs between the European and national levels (Morlino, 1999, p.3). Finally, yet importantly, these studies have also reflected that the Europeanisation concept has an inevitable spillover effect among various sectors, from economic to others, and therefore has the potential of affecting integration at multiple levels. This functional spillover has been demonstrated as a leading factor in further European integration, thanks to political spillovers (Jasiecki, 2008). In this case, integration refers to the advancement and increase in Member States' interaction. And this Europeanisation period has often been seen as a positive thing in Poland as Kolodziejczyk (2016, p.10) says the EU membership “have become beneficial for Poland because the adjustments to EU standards have supported the country’s modernisation.” (Kolodziejczyk, 2016).

The Europeanisation concept in the literature covers the combination of the different interpretations and representations of various actors (Sipahioğlu, 2017, pp.53). The actors that this definition mentions are studied as political actors along with civil society activists and journalists (Aydin-Duzgit & Kaliber, 2016, pp.16).²⁶ Even though scholars came up with various concepts and mechanisms to explain the Europeanization framework by commonly stating that there is a domestic alteration as a result of EU

²⁶ Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Alper Kaliber, “Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate Country?” *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (2016), p.16.

membership or the EU candidacy process; the most significant part continues to focus on the measurement of the EU's influence. Briefly, it has been conceptualized under five distinct results (Börzel, 2003) to indicate the domestic change (Heritier, 2001).

The first, 'retrenchment', is referring to conditions under which EU requirements face resistance and this reluctance comprising negative alterations or nationalized policies. The second outcome is 'inertia' that presents resistance against European legislation. 'Absorption' is the third one, which displays the unification of EU demands with no major domestic policy modification; therefore, the level is low in the policy changes. Another one is 'accommodation' that takes place when a country fits the requirements set by the EU by complying their policy without replacing their main characters. In this respect, this process has to remain in a limited scope due to the partial change capacity. The last component 'transportation' can be explained with a replacement of an existing policy with a new one or at least altering the core features which leads a social, economic and political change systematically. The currencies can be given as an instance along with transformations in domestic political culture (Risse, Cowles & Caporaso, 2001).

To sum up the diversifications in the conceptualizations and definitions; Europeanization has been perceived from two levels. It was used to refer to "European polity-building" as Harmsen describes (2000, pp.52): "The emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules (Risse, Cowles & Caporaso 2001: 3)." This definition demonstrates the Europeanization framework almost as a synonym for integration, since it refers to

Europeanization as the concept, which is a backlog of institutional regulations. However, unlike this first concept, the Europeanization framework has been depicted as the transformation of existing structures in the country with an emergence of the new European governance (Harmsen, 2000, pp.52). In this case, Europeanization has been used to focus on the national matters from the domestic policies to the national interests and beliefs. Therefore, Landrech (1994, pp.69) described the concept as an “incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making”.²⁷ This could be exemplified when the EU and its institutions began to influence and transform the national policy decisions with their economic dynamics (Ladrech, 1994, pp.69). In this respect, the adaptation of the organizational and institutional level policy changes became the focus with a representation of EU models to implement on domestic structures.

2.2.1.3 De-Europeanization

“De-Europeanisation’ is defined as the loss or weakening of the EU/Europe as a normative/political context and as a reference point in domestic settings and national public debates of both candidate and member countries. It manifests itself in two basic ways: as the weakening of the appeal and influential capacity of European institutions, policies, norms and values, leading to a retreat of EU/ Europe as a normative/political context for society and politics in a candidate/member state; and as growing scepticism and indifference in a given society towards the EU/Europe.” (Kaliber & Aydın-Düzgit, 2017). As Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016) defined the concept, the decline in the image

²⁷ Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, (1994), p. 69.

of Europe and the EU in the political context is the reason why the states that have depicted Europeanization already is now exemplifying de-Europeanization. This conceptualization does not completely abolish or undermine the previously successful example of Europeanization, but rather represents a turning back from European core norms, values and rules.

The de-Europeanization framework has been extensively described as the decline in motivation about the EU candidacy. Furthermore, in the literature it has been shown as an issue caused by the loss of the European values and principles which have received the EU project since its understanding (Nivet, 2016). The reason why de-Europeanization has become a reality within the Union along with candidate countries are explained with various examples such as the 2008 financial crisis and the Syrian refugee and migrant crises. In this respect, these incidents illustrated an EU as an entity that is about to collapse and close its functioning mechanisms. Even though the Europeanization concept has been perceived as positive with reforms and developments, this reverse framework signifies a negative notion. However, since Europeanization demonstrates a system in line with the core European norms and values; the changes in the international politics and relations may challenge the countries' ongoing system and this could result in a change in orientation. Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016) also defined this concept as the EU and Europe the decline in the normative power and the value of the EU and Europe by referencing to the domestic affairs aspect.²⁸ This transformation from Europeanization to de-Europeanization has been marked with the rise in scepticism towards Europe. This

²⁸ Aydın-Düzgit, S. & Kaliber, A. (2016) 'Encounters with Europe in an era of domestic and international turmoil: is Turkey a de-Europeanising candidate country', *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 1–14.

presents a decrease in the EU's influence power and a shift in the route of member states such as Poland and Hungary away from European norms and values. Some perceived de-Europeanization as a process and a clearer conclusion manufactured by both EU policies and domestic factors.

The de-Europeanization framework has been studied not only based on its dynamics and existential reasons but also scholars questioned whether this trend is an internal process within the union or politics related subject (Smith 2021).²⁹ This also queried the EU's legitimacy and legitimacy by examining the levels of implications of the EU required reforms and policies in both member states and candidate countries (Smith 2021).

The rise of de-Europeanization has been associated with the desire for seeking national interests and sovereignty of the member states despite their promises of giving up some of them for their accession process.³⁰ The political leaders of these states have largely argued in their political discourses that Brussels and the EU foreign policy function against their certain values and interests by undermining their sovereignties (Müller, Pomorska, and Tonra, 2021). This claim has been used as a justification mechanism for their reluctance to engage in common actions and act along with the collective foreign policy decisions as a union. Therefore, this shift in the decisions and policies at the EU and national levels signifies that the leaders began to prioritize their bilateral and multilateral relations and actions over the EU. Since the transformation and the way in

²⁹ Michael Smith (2021) De-Europeanisation in European foreign policy-making: assessing an exploratory research agenda, *Journal of European Integration*, 43:5, 637-649, DOI: [10.1080/07036337.2021.1927012](https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2021.1927012)

³⁰ Müller, Pomorska, and Tonra 2021 Müller, P., K. Pomorska, and B. Tonra. 2021. "The Domestic Challenge to EU Foreign Policy-Making: From Europeanisation to de-Europeanisation?" *Journal of European Integration* 43 (5): 519–534. [[Taylor & Francis Online](#)], [[Google Scholar](#)], XX

which member states exercise de-Europeanization process based on their commitment level to the union. Thus, the decrease in their commitment harms the EU collective actions and effectiveness. De-Europeanisation has also defined as a process that echoes erosion of the central normative promises involved in the foreign policy of the EU (Smith, 2021). On the other hand, not only the alterations and transformations occurring in the union due to both internal and external factors but also there is a correlation between de-Europeanization and the rise in the nationalist and populist political leaders at the ruling parties (Smith, 2021).

2.2.2 Methodology & Data

There is a data triangulation among the primary, secondary sources and semi-structured interviews in the qualitative methodology that this thesis adopted. This thesis utilizes a qualitative methodology of both primary and secondary sources. The literature review allowed this thesis to benefit from various scholarly works, treaties, journalistic analyses, newspapers and government policy statements related to the selected topic. In addition, and as part of the triangulation method, select interviews with policy-makers, scholars and analysts have been made to verify what sources suggest and to explore in more detail aspects of the empirical material that is particularly important.

The interviews were either conducted online via Skype and Zoom or conducted through e-mail. Due to the COVID19 pandemic, none of the interviews were conducted face to face. However, online meetings gave flexibility to ask further questions during the interviews and the response rate was high. Interviewees did not accept me to record it but four of them accepted me to quote from their answer and use it in this thesis. Besides, they

were not asked similar questions since they were coming from different research interests and background. There were generally 4-5 questions for each interviewee.

Primary documents from the Polish Presidential Website, the ruling Political Party's official website and European Commission's documents and reports as well as the statements and reports from the European Parliament were all used as a part of the observable evidence. Data on the subjects were obtained from published EU acquis and national official government documents and reports, academic publications, unpublished master's and doctoral theses, and opinion articles in the press.

This thesis adopted the process tracing method to analyse the two processes. This method helped answer the research question and understand the transformation of (de)Europeanization in Poland. In order to examine the subject, the temporal sequence of incidents was examined by looking at diagnostic proofs from the changes that happened in domestic politics, policies and the attitudes of the Polish Government. Since I can speak Polish, I was able to analyse the official Polish Government documents and the ruling and opposition political party responses to subjects. I have also spent more than six months in Poland that made me familiar with the political and societal culture. My experience in Poland also allowed me to benefit from my insider perspective to a certain extent.

Regarding the data I utilized during this study, the presidential website of Poland has been examined in order to understand the country's stated strategy. EU policy documents have been used as primary source along with the EU official website announcements and leaders' political discourses have been collected along with the European Commission reports. The speeches were available in Polish and partly in English. Discourse analysis had been applied to the study and expanded the variety of

materials used in the research. The political party programs from several Polish parties have been collected to be used in the discourse analysis to comprehend the priorities and stances of the governments from different periods. In this case, majority of the sources were composed of the PiS and PO political discourses. In the chapter discusses the de-Europeanization framework, women's rights have been selected as a case. In this respect, the section benefited from the data collected and published by the European Institute for Gender Equality.

I also utilize opinion polls taken from the "Europe Elects" platform to depict the support for each political party along with the pro-EU level in the country. The opinion polls on the relationship between the popularity of politicians and their level of engagement with the discussions related to the examples chosen to study each framework helped to reflect the influence and the efficiency of the anti-choice groups. Furthermore, as secondary sources, the news and the academic literature are used to give a clearer picture of the reflections of the topic and the debate of the anti-abortion bill on society.

2.2.3 Limitations

Since this thesis adopted a single case study, there is always a room for subjectivity in the case of in-depth analysis. The qualitative research method does not enable scholarly works to interpret the particular subject from a broad perspective with a fruitful discussion³¹. The fact of bias can also take part during the interviews with the biased answers and interpretation. Not only the answers but also the question qualities are often

³¹ For more on this, see: Baxter, P., 2008. Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers. *The Qualitative Report*, 13(4), pp.544–559.

considered as one of the limitations³² in the qualitative research method. Even if the research forms the questions according to what (s)he thinks it is right, it would not be the best way to get information from the person that they interview. Furthermore, scholars studied the theories used in this research came up with multiple definitions and argument. This also creates ambiguity to rely on one solid concept to research. Besides, because qualitative method is open-ended and not statistically representative, the output of the research cannot be verified.

The opposite outcomes of the Europeanisation, for instance de-Europeanisation, have often been disregarded in the social sciences literature. The studies, in general, covered the Europeanisation framework with its success despite the ups and downs in targeted countries. Press Release Database and the opinion polls are taken into consideration as well while building the arguments between the years 2000-2020. However, since the archive was not available electronically for some years and translations were not always provided, this posed limitations to the research.

2.2.4 Next Chapter

In the next chapter, Europeanization period in Poland will be discussed based on two examples; the 1997 Constitution and EU-NATO membership. In the end, the analytical part will be provided to talk about the application of Europeanization theory in Poland's 1989-2010 period.

³² For more on the limitations, see: Barbour, R.S., 2000. The role of qualitative research in broadening the "evidence base" for clinical practice. *Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice*, 6(2), pp. 155–163.

CHAPTER 3

1989-2010 / EUROPEANIZATION PERIOD IN POLAND

“We are united by the will to build a strong European Union, active in relations with neighbours of Europe in the South, and European neighbours in the East”
-Radosław Sikorski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs³³

This chapter is going to cover the Europeanisation period of Poland in the time period of 1989 to 2010 by focusing on two examples; first, Polish law and especially the new constitution of 1997, drafted during the deepening of democratization in the country, and second the alliance with the West exemplified through EU and NATO membership. Following a descriptive account of how the two cases fit the thesis’ theoretical framework, a more analytical section will demonstrate how these case studies emphasize the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy.

The literature on European Studies was shaped around the improvement of common policies and institutions at the supranational level. In this instance, the Europeanisation framework has been studied, proposed and elaborated upon based on the level of European integration (Ette & Faist, 2007). Among the scholars who covered Europeanisation, the influence of the EU on domestic political structures and policies has been also chosen as

³³ Policy Statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Radosław Sikorski, Warsaw, 17 February 2009, available:
<http://www.ms.gov.pl/Minister,of,the,Foreign,Affairs,,Mr,Radoslaw,Sikorski,,on,the,goals,of,the,Poland%20foreign,policy,for,2009,25449.html>

a perspective to analyse the degree to which Europeanisation is indeed taking place. The Europeanisation concept has been defined and analysed by many scholars and explained by use of different frameworks in the literature. This third chapter is going to benefit from one of the broadest description to study the Europeanisation in Poland. “Europeanization is treated as looking for some universal system of values, characteristic of the European culture and importing legal institutions created on the Western European continent to Poland.” (Golebiowska, 2022).³⁴ According to this rather normative definition, the Europeanisation framework is also used as both direct and indirect interaction with the EU and Poland, where there is impact on national law and legal orders because of the core norms and values of the EU as well as EU institutions and structures (Golebiowska, 2019). As Anna Golebiowska (2022) argues, Poland experienced a systemic influence from the EU law in its administrative and legal order. That is why it can be said that integration of European rules, norms and values in the Polish system is an indication of the Europeanization in the country.

The fact that member and candidate states (need to) transfer their sovereignty to Brussels significantly reshaped the interests and behaviours of national actors and institutions based on the European level (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Bulmer and Burch, 1998). The necessity of fulfilling certain obligations in the harmonization process of the members of the EU and candidate countries are to meet the membership requirements in a whole series of national policy areas. In this respect, following and meeting criteria are formed within the EU policy-making processes and then included in the national policies and institutions, increasingly turning into the subject of policymaking

³⁴ Page 542

at the European level and merging those previously distinct sets of literature (Börzel, 2007). That is why, Europeanization is stated in the literature as a process in which member states and candidate countries are influenced by EU policies, rules, practices and values; both in terms of policy-making processes and policy implementation. The next step in the process is to harmonize their national policies with the EU (Bulmer and Burch, 1998, p.602).

The 2004 enlargement³⁵ has been praised as one of the most powerful and crucial EU achievements. It is true that enlargement to ten new countries has been seen as a major EU success, alongside the formation of the Single Market. The Central and Eastern European enlargement has been described as the most influential democracy promotion mechanism ever created and used (Ekiert, 2011). The CEECs³⁶ exemplified successful democratization within the EU thanks to fulfilling the 1993 Copenhagen criteria for their accession process (Uğurlu, 2013). The outcome of membership was visible on the democratic regime in these states and its quality, which allowed for the process of democratic convergence with the northwestern nations of Europe. In this respect, and prior to EU accession, Poland had turned its direction and fundamental values to the West in order to work on its strategic purpose of being a part of the European project following the collapse of the communist regime. It is at this stage of the democratization and modernization process of this country, and the rest of the former communist states, that Europeanization entered the dictionary of both policymakers and the popular press.

³⁵ Öztürk, Y. K. & Akgoz, S. S. (2012). “Avrupa Birliği’nin Genişleme ve Küreselleşme Stratejileri: Polonya Özelinde Bir İnceleme”, International Conference On Eurasian Economies, <http://avekon.org/papers/503.pdf> (Access Date: 02.02.2022).

³⁶ For more on this, see: Agh, A. (2013). “Europeanization of Public Administration in Eastern and Central Europe” *Europeizacija Javne Uprave-HKJU-CCPA*, 13(3): 739-762.

Europeanization has been seen as one of the most essential facts and concepts regarding the process of harmonization with the EU (Ugur & Dogan, 2017). “Europeanisation in Poland started as early as the early 1990s as a consequence of interactions between Polish and European policy-makers and Polish and international institutions” (Szałańska, 2020). The primary way of Europeanisation enabled Poland to learn new EU policies and transfer them to its system (Nowak and Szlachta, 2021). The literature therefore claims that mechanisms of policy learning and policy diffusion had been present in that respect from early on, which again suggests important links between Europeanization and policymaking.

After 1989, the collapse of the USSR; the Central and Eastern European countries started to experience a democratization period by possessing a larger agenda that focuses on the Euro-Atlantic world. The literature on democratization and the EU depicted that the Visegrad Group emerged as a new actor in the world that promotes democracy internationally. Nevertheless, these four countries could not form and introduce a sustainable democratization agenda for both their domestic and international politics. The effort for their national politics resulted in the backlashes in the rule of law as it could be seen in Hungarian (Eşençay, 2021) and Polish case, has also failed to go along with their ambitious international agenda.

However, despite all these listed factors, Poland has shown itself as the fundamental actor for a long time starting from the 1990s. The country’s size, history and special weight in the region afforded it a prominent role compared to other Visegrad members. After the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, a new system was formed in the country based on political pluralism, the powerful role of the President and the principle of the division

of power between different branches of authority (Jaskiernia, 2015, p. 79). Brudzinska (2021) says “Warsaw became the headquarters of both the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Community of Democracies” as an instance to show the particular interest of Poland towards democracy promotion, and the symbolic usage of Poland as the latest prominent addition to the club of democracies (Brudzinska, 2021). By being a fundamental proponent of the European Endowment for Democracy, Warsaw prioritized promoting democracy outside its borders along with initiating the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union³⁷ (Union, 2022). The 1993 Copenhagen summit highlighted four criteria for membership “1) stable democracy, respect of human rights and protection of minority rights; 2) a functioning market economy; 3) the ability to meet the demands of EU competition and market forces and 4) the ability to assume responsibilities resulting from membership (implementation of *acquis communautaire*).”³⁸ (Jasiecki, 2008).

Czachór (2000) also attributed for Poland's effective steps towards integration with the West to three factors (Tomaszyk, 2013, p. 4)³⁹:

- Poland wanted to secure its regional position with strong supporters in the first stage. At this point, although the European Community and NATO were seen as primary partnership targets, all the powerful actors of the West found a place in Poland's new foreign policy agenda (Czachór, 2017).

³⁷ "The Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009, as a joint initiative between the EU. EU member states. There are six Eastern European and South Caucasus partner countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine." (Union, 2022).

³⁸ Page 368.

³⁹ M. J. Tomaszuk, Poland in the Stage of system Transformation and Integration with the European Union, in: Public Policy and Economic Development, Issue 4.

- In the second stage, Poland, realizing the importance of being a balance element between the West and the East in the new conjuncture, tried to protect its own identity in this way and thought to create a protective shield for itself with its power received from its possible Western allies.
- In the third stage, Poland thought it would be the right choice to make the necessary concessions in cooperation with the parties that promised it this dynamism to become a dynamic country.

Regardless of the backlashes in democracy and rule of law at home in those four members of the V4 in the case of democracy, they have prioritized encouraging democratization in the region. In this respect, it can be said that through the International Visegrad Fund⁴⁰ (EFSA, n.d.) and the EU, they promote democratization in the region. Their foreign ministries are responsible for coordinating the common agenda along with the other ministries focusing on project implementation.

In 1989 and for the following decade, Poland made a great effort to join Euro-Atlantic world. This effort was followed by the ambitious reforms in both economy and politics to join NATO alliance and the European Union. Hence, supporting democracy⁴¹ and the rule of law became one of the most essential values of the new Polish foreign policy. CEECs experienced comprehensive political and economic changes and transformations in general to adapt to the new system and to acquire membership in the

⁴⁰ "The Fund is an international donor organization, established in 2000 by the governments of the Visegrad Group countries—Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia to promote regional cooperation in the Visegrad region (V4) as well as between the V4 region and other countries, especially in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership regions. The Fund does so by awarding €8 million through grants, scholarships and artist residencies provided annually by equal contributions of all the V4 countries" (EFSA, n.d.).

⁴¹ Gwiazda, A. (2016). *Democracy in Poland: Representation, participation, competition and accountability since 1989*, New York: Routledge.

European Union and NATO. Reforms and changes in the institutions and foreign policy orientations have begun after the collapse of communism. The literature studied the transformation in political system and frameworks in Poland had as a necessary factor that has resulted as Europeanization (Bieńczyk-Missala, 2016).

As stated in the 1997 Constitution, Warsaw's foreign policy goals were to maintain and preserve the country's sovereignty, integrity and security. In this regard, by considering the history of the country, building an alliance with the West and strengthening ties with the US⁴² had been stated as the best option for Poland in the literature for country's security understanding. Poland has showed great progress and success in the accession period to the EU. The democratization of the country along with the liberalization of the economy have both demonstrated parallels to the European norms and values. As a result, the country experienced a fundamental alteration in both its regional and local governments. Not only the balance of power changed in the Polish government but also the mobilization of state funds improved their efficiency and effectiveness for the accession process to the EU and NATO. As the previous part focusing on the 1997 Constitution illustrated, Europeanisation of the Polish law and legal system exemplifies their progress and successful outcome.

The accessions and integration efforts to the EU and the NATO brought the combination of market reforms and democratization. The expectations from the Polish government forced the country to develop mechanisms in order to meet EU requirements and standards (Jasiecki, 2008). Analysing the EU influence on Poland has been studied as the Europeanization period the Polish government experienced. Jacques Rupnik (2007)

⁴² Yürür, P. (2006). "Doğu Avrupa ve Balkanlarda Amerika Destekli Sivil Toplum Direnişleri", Journal of Yasar University, 1(1): 69-80.

argues that the stability after the communist regime in the country has been achieved thanks to the contributions came during the EU accession and integration period. The “Return to democracy”⁴³ period has been supported and promoted by the Western countries not only for Poland but also in the CEECs more generally. Briefly, from exporting the political organization structures from the EU members to the development of the way the government reply to the Brussels’ expectations (Poland, n.d.); Warsaw⁴⁴ has shown a clear instance of Europeanization. In this case, as it has been discussed in the International Relations literature, this thesis adopts the understanding of Europeanization as the EU effect on the country’s political behaviours and actors on Poland (Jasiecki, 2008).

3.1 How domestic politics became Europeanized: Polish Law-New Constitution of 1997

Poland’s constitutional history dates back to the 16th century with the Constitution of 3 May 1791 (*Konstytucja Trzeciego Maja*) adopted by the Polish Parliament (*Sejm Wielki*) (Biernat & Kawczyńska, 2019). This Constitution was Europe's first and the world's second written Constitution. In Poland's history, there has been a total of nine constitutions, namely 1791, 1807, 1815, 1921 (*Konstytucja Marcowa*), 1935 (*Konstytucja Kwietniowa*), 1947 (*Mała Konstytucja z 1947*), 1952, 1992 and 1997 Constitutions (Grzeszczak, Europeanisation of Polish Law Following Poland’s Accession to the European Union, 2017). The 1952 Constitution adopted by the communist regime has been amended many times since 1989.

⁴³ Mazowiecki, Tadeusz: "Powrót do Europy. Przemówienie na forum Rady Europy w Strasburgu" (A Return to Europe. A Speech Held in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg), Znak, No. 416, Kraków (January 1990), pp. 3-9.

⁴⁴ To see the official statement, see: <https://www.gov.pl/web/eu/poland-in-the-eu>

Table 1 List of Polish Constitutions in Chronological order

English/Latin	Polish	Year
Neminem captivabimus acts	nikogo nie uwięzimy bez wyroku sądowego	1430
Nihil novi acts	nic nowego	1505
Henrician Articles	Artykuły henrykowskie	1573
Constitution of 3 May	Konstytucja 3 maja	1791
Constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw	Konstytucja Księstwa Warszawskiego	1807
Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland	Konstytucja Królestwa Polskiego	1815
Organic Statute of the Kingdom of Poland	Statut Organiczny dla Królestwa Polskiego	1832
Small Constitution of 1919	Mała Konstytucja z 1919 roku	1919
March Constitution	Konstytucja marcowa	1921
August Novelization	Nowela sierpniowa	1926
April Constitution of Poland	Konstytucja kwietniowa	1935
Small Constitution of 1947	Mała Konstytucja z 1947 roku	1947
Constitution of the Polish People's Republic	Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej	1952
April Novelization	Nowela kwietniowa	1989
Small Constitution of 1992	Mała Konstytucja z 1992	1992
Constitution of Poland	Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej	1997 ⁴⁵

However, the most significant changes were made on December 29, 1989. These changes were the removal of the Marxist ideology, the role of the pro-Communist PZPR as the leading party and the supremacy of the working class in the Constitution. Besides,

⁴⁵ The Table of Chronological Order for Polish Constitutions

the state's name was changed from the People's Republic of Poland to the 'Republic of Poland'.

Poland's government structure was changed three years after the 1989 Round Table Agreement. This agreement forced the country to transform its system from a unitary hierarchy that was the case in Soviet times. This system was solely a bureaucracy to enforce decisions made by the constitutional parts of the PZPR. After the agreement, three different power bodies in the government were established, namely the executive, legislative, and judicial. Starting from the 1990s, the government had progressed its system with parliamentary and presidential democracy with an independent judiciary (McMullen & Peirce, 2004). Although the old socialist order seemed to have disappeared in theory in 1989, a large part of it continued to exist for a while in practice. This was mostly down to the negotiated settlement of 1989, which allowed members of the old elite to retain certain privileges. For example, General Jaruzelski remained the head of state. Changes made on issues such as the nature of the regime, its source of power, the position of the party, and the characteristics of the economic system were also continued in the "Minor Constitution" (*Mala Konstytucja*) adopted in 1992, which was a transitional constitution. References to communism were omitted from the Constitution. In addition, the Polish National Assembly was bifurcated into the Sejm (i.e. the lower house) and the Senate (i.e. the upper house).

The Round Table Discussions, which started on February 6, 1989, and concluded on April 4, was conducted by three central committees. There were also eleven working groups and sub-tables on law reform, media, local governments, associations, education,

youth policy, agriculture, housing policy, mining, health, and environment. However, not all of the opposition was represented in these talks.

In December 1991, the European Communities, its members, and Poland signed the Europe Agreement (Parliament, n.d.). This agreement was about transmitting international organisations' competencies and creating the legal basis for the upcoming EU accession process to develop the conditions for robust and efficient reforms. It also aimed to supply the institutional framework and legal basis for relations between Union and Warsaw. The Agreement contains various zones of common interest, from trade in industrial and freedom of movement to political dialogue and cultural and economic cooperation. Nevertheless, due to all these inclusive agendas, the core aim was to improve the collaboration between Brussels and Warsaw and bring them closer⁴⁶.

The process of creating an entirely new post-communist constitution was completed in 1997 (Biernat & Kawczyńska, 2019). The current Polish Constitution, adopted on April 2, 1997, is built on basic principles for state administration and public bureaucracy (Çınar, 2004, p.307). These four basic rules: Poland is a unitary state, the government is decentralized, local governments are a constitutional form of administrative organization, and public administration is organized in line with the principle of locality (Kutlu, 2006, p.169).

The first part of the 1997 Constitution, which defines the characteristics of the republic, is followed by the second part, about rights and freedoms, and the third part, which describes the sources of law. The political system of the Republic of Poland is a “parliamentary system”, and the state has a unitary structure. The Polish political system

⁴⁶ For more on this agreement, see: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/12a3_en.htm

is based on the separation between the legislative, executive and judicial powers (Article 10). In the Constitution, legislative power is vested in the national parliament, the Sejm, executive power is vested in the council of ministers, which is responsible to the president and parliament, and judicial power is vested in the courts. The legislative body, the parliament, consists of two wings: the “Sejm” (Lower House) with 460 deputies elected for a four-year term, and the “Senate” (Upper House) with 100 representatives with a four-year term of office. The Sejm, which plays a vital role in the legislative process, is in a superior position to the Senate. With the 1997 Constitution, essential steps were taken to strengthen the executive in Poland⁴⁷. Within the executive, the powers of the president were limited, and those of the prime minister and the council of ministers were increased. According to the new constitution, although the president remains the country's commander-in-chief and highest-ranking official, (s)he is no longer the sole and supreme decision maker, especially in foreign policy and defence matters. (S)he must cooperate with the prime minister and authorized ministers in these areas. In addition, the president's power to dissolve parliament is limited and can do so only if the government fails to get a vote of confidence or pass a budget law.

One of the first indicators of the Europeanisation framework in Polish case has been stated as the changes in law and standards. In this case, the laws had been updated and formed based on EU standards, even partially borrowed EU law and the respective *acquis* (Grzeszczak, Charakter i rozwój procesu europeizacji prawa polskiego , 2016). After the communist regime, Poland took important steps towards becoming a neo-liberal state, not in terms of the economic content of the regime’s policies but with reference to the adoption

⁴⁷ Gwizdak, J. (2022, 07 16). Former Polish Judge Interview.

of constitutional principles that are integral to older liberal democracies and occasionally on display in newer democracies as well (Parlak and Doğan, 2015, p.232). In this framework, “democracy, rule of law, respect for individual rights, private property and market economy” have become significant principles of the Polish government (Kızılcık, 2003: 563). As the Former Polish Judge states, “I took part in projects and seminars for Judges and lawyers organised in France, Germany and Finland. I began to participate in 1990s. We had a chance to exchange our experiences and knowledge with our European colleagues. For example, I stayed in Dresden, Germany for 2 weeks in the court.”⁴⁸ (Gwizdak, 2022). Therefore, there were many projects initiated between the EU member states and Poland for information and experience exchange.

Today, Poland is a Republic and it is governed by a semi-presidential system as a unitary state (Kutlu and Usta, 2013: 508). Poland's first contacts with the EU started in the 1980s (Erdal and Çolakoğlu, 2007: 76). EU principles and policies had a crucial effect and role in the establishment of a liberal state structure in the country (Parlak and Doğan, 2013, p.232). In this case, the 1997 Polish Constitution adheres to the following four principles in the context of state administration and public bureaucracy (Kutlu, 2012, p.167):

- Poland is a unitary state,
- The government is decentralized, in accordance with some of the regional policy requirements of the EU

⁴⁸ Gwizdak, J. (2022, 07 16). Former Polish Judge Interview.

- Local governments are a constitutional form of administrative organization, a principle fully compatible with the EU's emphasis on local administrations and the principle of subsidiarity adopted in 1992

- Public administration is organized within the framework of the principle of subsidiarity.

In this direction, the reforms made in Poland since 1989 have progressed in three main directions (Çınar, 2009, p.584-585):

- The first main axis is a democratic system based on democratic rights and freedoms, including individual and public freedoms similar to Western democracies,
- The second main axis is the construction of an economic system based on private property and a market economy, compatible with the EU *acquis* and the relevant chapters.
- The third main axis is restructuring the management system for desired political and economic reforms.

After 1990, Poland was organized in the context of constitutional amendment (Çınar, 2009, p.556) with two classical structures of public administration based on the distinction between central government and local government. With the implementation of the democratic local government approach, important steps have been taken to create a civil state and to form new political elite from the bottom up (Salihoğlu and Koca, 2016: 283). Decentralization was considered both more democratic and EU compatible (Kutlu and Usta, 2013: 517). However, until 1990 local governments were not very active (Çetin, 2016: 353; Swianiewicz, 2010: 101). To remove the traces of the communist period, Poland followed a large-scale decentralization policy within the EU membership process context. Moreover, the mandate of the central government was limited and transferred to

the local (Salihoğlu and Koca, 2016: 284-285). To this aim, the European Charter of Local Self-Government was approved in 1993 (Kutlu and Usta, 2013: 519). As a matter of fact, there are many articles regulating local governments in the Polish Constitution (Toksöz et al., 2009: 102). Thus, the establishment of autonomous local governments in Poland was envisaged (Kızılcık, 2003: 569; Siemienska, 2001: 348). In this context, local services carried out by the central government were transferred to local governments. Policy planners were inspired by the EU prototype and sought to instil the spirit of the EU approach to the national context, in this way both absorbing the normative content of Europeanization understood as value-driven policy and allowing for the instrumental goal of EU membership over time (Demiral, 2009: 100; Sanford, 2002: 230-231).

During the presidency of Lech Walesa, the state administration changed within the framework of the presidential system and the parliamentary system, and political crises have occurred between the prime ministers of coalition governments and the president (Çınar, 2009, p.556). After the communist regime collapsed, parliamentary elections were held four times in a ten-year period in the country, suggesting a degree of instability as democracy was struggling to get consolidated. During these periods, three presidents, eight prime ministers and five foreign ministers were replaced by others (Erdal and Çolakoğlu, 2007, p.75). The coalition governments established in the 1990s did not last very long. This situation has become more stable after the 2000s (Çınar, 2009, p.559). Poland went through a regime change with the 1997 Constitution and adopted the semi-presidential government system by taking France as a model country (Yücel, 2003, p.342). According to Article 10 of the Constitution, Poland “is governed by the principle of separation of powers, in which the legislative, executive and judicial powers are separated and balance each other” (Aytuğ, 2016, p.135).

The 1997 constitution changed the effects of the former communist era so that Poland could be integrated into the European integration process, and become more liberal, pluralistic with a modern constitution. The Copenhagen Criteria adopted by the EU in its 1993 Summit were also decisive in the creation of this constitution, as they made important suggestions regarding the principle of restricting the powers of the executive and allowing for the resolution of conflict between different sources of authority. According to the 1997 Constitution, therefore, the powers of the president were restricted. On the other hand, in the parliamentary elections held in 1997, the victory of the Solidarity Election Movement (AWS, *Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność*), a centre-right union, and the continuation of the former socialist Aleksander Kwasniewski's duty as president, brought about the establishment of a more democratic order by ensuring that the prime minister and president came from different political parties representing different sources of authority and political legitimacy (Özkural, 2012: 465; Antoszewski, 2000: 73).

Since the EU designates criteria as to the functioning of law for member states by use of both its primary (Treaty of the European Union) and secondary law (the EU *acquis*), its systems maintain special significance for the Union's citizens and can be very influential for member states, especially in the period prior to accession and when the carrot of membership appears very lucrative for former communist states. Not only Europe's laws and signed treaties but also national standards and unwritten/informal regulations are therefore subject to the process of change influenced by EU sources of law and concomitant political authority. It is hardly an accident that this authority had been highest in the period prior to accession.

From a scholarly point of view, EU law⁴⁹ impacts the legislative process and content in several ways. For instance, EU law can ask to cover a subject that has not been indicated in the national legal framework to date. Owing to the intensity of EU legislative adaptation and the level-speed of development in Polish law, the framework of Europeanisation's scope has affected environmental protection, competition, and agricultural law. Although these specific laws do not originate from the national legal system, the EU institutions had already acquainted these as a part of their shared heritage and their transposition to the national level in Warsaw followed as a result.

3.2 Polish Foreign Policy and Europeanization: EU membership process, NATO enlargement, relations with the West

In the period following the end of the cold war the West, and especially the US, have defined phenomena such as regional, ethnic and religious conflicts, extreme nationalism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, immigration, international terrorism, and drug trade, which gained more weight with the end of the Cold War, as new threats. They argued that these novel developments threaten world peace and stability and that NATO needs a renewal of its mission and vision to adapt to new threat perceptions in the shifting international environment. NATO's function; is set out in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty. In particular, the collective security-related Article 5 emphasizes that an attack against the territorial integrity, political independence and security of one of the

⁴⁹ "The European Union has a legal personality and as such its own legal order, which is separate from international law. Furthermore, EU law has direct or indirect effect on the laws of its Member States and becomes part of the legal system of each Member State. The European Union is a source of law. The legal order is usually divided into primary legislation (the Treaties and general legal principles), secondary legislation (based on the Treaties) and supplementary law." (European Parliament, Sources and scope of European Union law).: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/6/sources-and-scope-of-european-union-law>

NATO members would be deemed to have been made against all of them, and the alliance could collaborate (Zięba, 2019).

Table 2 Crucial dates on Poland-EU-NATO relations

Event	Date
The Polish Round Table talks take place in Warsaw	6 February – 5 April 1989
Poland elects first non-communist and pro-western government in the parliamentary elections	4-18 June 1989
Fall of the Berlin Wall	9 November 1989
Poland becomes a member of the Visegrad Group	15 February 1991
Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact military structure	31 March 1991
Poland signs the Association Agreement called the Europe Agreement	16 December 1991
Dissolution of the Soviet Union	26 December 1991
The NATO summit in Brussels provides Poland with proposals for cooperation with NATO under the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP)	10 January 1994
Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak signs the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace during his visit to NATO headquarters	2 February 1994
Poland submits application for the EU membership	8 April 1994
The U.S. House of Representatives adopts the National Security Revitalisation Act providing for the extension of NATO to include Poland	16 February 1995
The first meeting within the framework of the individual dialogue between Poland and NATO takes place in Brussels	7 May 1996
The first session of the accession talks between NATO and Poland commence	16 September 1997
Poland-EU negotiation process begins	31 March 1998

Event	Date
NATO Secretary General Javier Solana sends formal invitation to Poland to join NATO	29 January 1999
Poland joins NATO	12 March 1999
Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski sends 2,000 troops to the Persian Gulf to take part in the invasion of Iraq	17 March 2003
Poland signs the Treaty of Accession	16 April 2003
Poles vote to join the EU in referendum	7-8 June 2003
Poland becomes a full EU member	1 May 2004
Poland joins the Schengen Area	21 December 2007
Jerzy Buzek elected President of the European Parliament	14 July 2009
Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union	July-December 2011
Prime Minister of Poland, Donald Tusk, was chosen to be President of the European Council	1 December 2014

Perceiving NATO Enlargement as a threat to itself after the Cold War, Russia has always referred to NATO enlargement in the foreign policy and security strategies. Russia both developed relations with NATO and opposed NATO enlargement. Towards the middle of the 1990s, Central and Eastern European countries applied for NATO membership. Not only did their membership prospect rattle Moscow; it also confirmed that NATO was busy redefining its role after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and would continue to constitute the primary security organization of the expanding western alliance (Eisold, 2000, p. 20).

On the other hand, the transformations in the international system after the Cold War undoubtedly affected the Union (the European Community at that time) as well, and the member countries of the community began to take steps to make changes in the

structure of the community to take a more active role in the new international system. One of the most important of these steps was the signing of agreements on the creation of a financial and political union, which can be called a turning point for the transformation of the European Community into the "European Union" because of the meetings held in Maastricht on 9-11 December 1991. The region's countries, such as Poland, turned their faces to the West right after they removed Soviet influence. European Union membership was the culmination of the "Return to Europe" policies of the countries in the former Soviet sphere of influence, a goal it shared with the rest of the Visegrad Group.

Eisold (2000, p. 20) highlighted the following elements in his study, in which he investigated the factors behind Poland's motivation to become a NATO member:

- The freedom and security concerns of the country motivated the country to benefit from NATO assurance.
- Poland saw its place and identity as critical, especially regarding Europe's perceptions of security towards the East.
- Poland, due to its experiences, no longer wanted to be seen as a safe zone or grey zone; Poland now wanted to present itself as a vital security partner.
- The Polish government considered the European Community and NATO membership a combined process for political recovery, economic empowerment, and military security.

The Round Table Agreement impacted the US approach towards Poland. Washington began to support democratization in the Polish government and provide economic assistance.⁵⁰ In order to strengthen its national security after early September 1989, Poland decided to focus on its national security. As the scholars argued, based on

⁵⁰ For more on this, see: Davies, Norman (2001). *Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland's Present*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

the political leaders' discourses and their strategies, in the period of 1993-1995, the country formed its foreign policy priorities around its Western alliances with a political consensus in its domestic structure (Steves, 2001). In this respect, the country opted for the collective defence guarantees proposed by NATO, not least due to the steadfast and close alliance formed with the United States after the 1980s. In March 1999, after obtaining membership in NATO, Poland became a vital member in terms of its geostrategic location and proximity to the former Soviet space. The role played by Poland today in the context of the war in Ukraine is very characteristic of that salience, both in terms of military supplies to Ukraine and the humanitarian role exercised by Poland's public, NGO and private authorities.

The policy defined as "*Return to Europe*", was based on the priority of establishing institutional ties with the West. As former Polish Ambassador states "In Communist Poland the constitution, quite "democratic" on paper, was never invoked. The Party ruled according to its own decisions. The 1997 Constitution was a result of the compromise among political parties of that period but all agreed that basic principles of democracy – such as the tripartite division of power etc. – were the backbone for the Polish bid for European Union membership"⁵¹ (Dobrowolski, 2022). This policy, shaped by the idea and belief of "being European" from its broad cultural meaning to the specific political and social aspects of civic life, has been shaped by reforms and regulations in a variety of fields, starting with the liberalization of the economy. These changes and adaptation efforts were visible in rhetoric and discourses. Aleksander Kwasniewski, who served as President between 1995-2005, commented on the country's EU accession process that "I

⁵¹ Dobrowolski, P. (2022, 08 10). Polish Diplomat. (Author, Interviewer)

am optimistic about Poland's chances of joining the European Union following talks in London with British Prime Minister Tony Blair”⁵² (President.Pl, 2004).

As Kamińska (2014, p.9) states Poland went “from the country that was at a core of the Soviet Bloc, towards becoming a most loyal NATO member” (Kamińska, 2014). The accession period launched a series of changes in Polish foreign policy. As Kamińska (2014) claims, to fully sense the effect of the EU on the country's foreign policy, one needs to look into institutional structures’ alterations and both internal and external factors of the policies (Kamińska, 2014, p. 10).

Even after accession, Warsaw continued to highlight the significance of the cooperation with the West. Kwaśniewski said "after Poland entered the path of building a democratic state based on the rule of law, the evolution of Polish-German relations has been an important factor in our transition. We are glad that we have been able to achieve whatever is necessary in treaty issues and economic co-operation, and we do appreciate all the changes for the better that have occurred" (Poland T. o., Visit of the President of Germany and his spouse to Poland, 2004). This demonstrated that despite the hardship of the transition after the communist regime, Warsaw is happy to be a part of the democratic alliance. This signifies Europeanisation concept in the country.⁵³

With economic and political transformation in the country along with its democratization period, Warsaw has been seen as one of the members that greatly made use of EU membership (Buras, 2018). The World Bank⁵⁴ report depicted the advancement

⁵² For more on this, see the presser transcription: <https://www.president.pl/archive/news-archive-2000-2010/news-2004/press-conference-given-by-the-prime-minister-tony-blair-and-the-president-of-poland-aleksander-kwasniewski-in-london,37910>

⁵³ <https://www.president.pl/archive/news-archive-2000-2010/news-2004/visit-of-the-president-of-germany-and-his-spouse-to-poland,37921>

⁵⁴ "According to the World Bank economists, Poland's growth potential - a measure of the medium-term development capacity of the Polish economy - slowed from 3.7% during 2002-07 to 3.3% in 2010-19.":

of the Polish economy by measuring GDP per capita in a particular relation with the EU average (Ridao-Cano & Bodewig, 2018) and found that Poland's GDP growth on average per capita surpassed that of all other EU member states, new and old (Bank, 2022). Moreover, Warsaw has been the only EU member state that did not suffer during the 2008 financial crisis and was able to increase its GDP growth levels in 2009 (Buras, 2018).

In the period 2007-2015; the liberal, pro-EU political party, *Civic Platform- Platforma Obywatelska*, was in power under the leadership of Prime Minister and later EU Council President Donald Tusk. Tusk maintained the political and economic reforms that had occurred since the 1990s and in some respects built on them to advance a reformist agenda further. To give an instance, Prime Minister Donald Tusk "implemented strongly pro-business and pro-European Union policies that benefited the Polish economy, which, robustly bolstered by EU funds, survived the global economic downturn of 2008–09 and the resulting euro-zone debt crisis to continue to grow while the economies of other EU member countries were badly shaken."⁵⁵ (Wallenfeldt, n.d.)

3.3 Discussion: Analysis of the consequences and what the nexus between domestic and foreign policy means in Poland

Europeanization and, concretely, Poland's EU membership has been mentioned frequently in the literature. European geography is brought to the fore in terms of Poland's geopolitical position in the new period and the value system it would follow going forward. On the Atlantic side, we see the influence of the US and Atlanticism as a trend. The tangible result of this is Poland's NATO membership. Scholars claimed that the most critical issue in Poland's Europeanism is economic development and financial aid.

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/07/18/world-bank-poland-growth-potential-could-reach-4-percent-with-reforms-and-investments>

⁵⁵ More on Donald Tusk, see: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Donald-Tusk>

Poland's motivation to become a member of the EU was mainly to recover its post-communist economy and move to a Western-style liberal economy, along with a respected and authority-enhancing political system. Therefore, financial aid from the EU and reforms to be undertaken within the membership vision come to the fore when bound to and linked with economic development.

While Europeanism can be associated with increasing Poland's economic welfare level, security concerns come to the fore in terms of Atlanticism and the country's NATO commitment. When we discuss the security issue, it is discussed whether Poland should stay closer to Europe or NATO, led by the US and which power should be entrusted with the country's security. The fact that the EU has not been able to create its own, autonomous security structures and that the Atlantic Alliance is still seen as primary in terms of the security of the region are among the most important reasons that we can explain for Poland's getting closer to the USA and NATO for the purposes of its security. From the perspective of Poland, Europeanization is the expression of a sociological evaluation that emphasizes social transformations from the West and is therefore to be understood primarily as a force of socio-economic change. There is also an emphasis on process in Europeanization. After 1989, Poland considered Europe and the Atlanticist dimension together while determining its foreign policy line, seeing them as complementary to each other and acknowledging that NATO's prominence was there to stay. In fact, it is only recently and mostly down to French President Macron's initiative, as well as the cooling of Transatlantic relationship, that a form of Security Autonomy for the EU is discussed.

At the official policy level in Poland, EU and NATO memberships have come to the fore on domestic and foreign policy issues, and it has been argued that these two

membership processes complement each other. According to the official discourse, the EU and NATO are the two modern institutions of the West, and Poland has determined its place in the new international system by becoming a member of these two modern institutions after 1989. Poland provides for its security with the support and alliance US and NATO, while its economic and social development is heavily dependent, and partly intertwined, with its EU membership.

From 1989 to the present, it is possible to divide Polish foreign policy into four sections: vital interests, security, economic development and the state's position in the international system. The first period is the post-communist transition period between 1989 and 1993. In this process, Poland tried to establish its relations with its border neighbours and the new political-economic order brought by independence and sovereignty. In the second period, 1993-1997, it is possible to observe efforts to strengthen its position in the system. Concerning this, we see that the issue of "security" comes to the fore and the goal of NATO membership becomes the primary motivation in foreign policy. In this process, the rapprochement with the US led to a substantial cooling of relations with Russia, as the latter sought to re-establish itself as a prominent world power following the lost decade of the 1990s. In the period between 1997 and 2003, when the signals multiplied that Poland would become a NATO member in a few years, relations with the EU began to be emphasized by policy makers as the next big goal.

The Europeanisation of Polish law leaned on bringing standards of the Union to the country by partially borrowing the legal context and paradigms from the EU. Nonetheless, as membership continued since 2004, the Europeanisation concept has become more observable and influential in the debates, especially in legal solution

creation⁵⁶. Since the EU membership process has been completed, the legal order in Poland has been consisted of combination of the EU law and Polish law system.

Both security concerns due to the country's history and financial stance have been referred to as the primary goals of Poland's strategy towards the West. Briefly, the nexus between domestic politics and Poland's foreign policy decisions in terms of the Europeanisation concept could be explained by looking at the reorganization of the parliamentary process and regulation of the 1997 Constitution to meet the requirements and demands of the Union. The political leadership have also been included in these changes and transformations of the Europeanisation framework in the Polish case (Bretherton & Mannin, 2013). The literature also refers to the ways in which European integration played a role in the Europeanisation concept in Poland and affected the political party structure by forming intraparty relations and shaping parliamentary competition (Szczerbiak, 2002). Moreover, the successful implementation of EU regulations in the Polish legal system and law are an essential part Europeanization concept (Golebiowska, 2022). This conclusion has been drawn in the literature after analysing legal provisions in Poland and studying public administration activities.

Even though domestic politics and foreign policy did not show a direct and clear nexus due to their subjects, for example one focuses on the country's health policies while the other covers the country's relations with its neighbours; the public influences foreign policy decisions since the candidate they vote for comes with an agenda, including the country's foreign policy. Foreign policy is undoubtedly influenced to domestic developments, and the two find themselves in a process of interaction. For example, after

⁵⁶ For more on this, see: R. Grzeszczak, *Władza wykonawcza w systemie Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa 2011, p. 79 *et seq.*

the communist regime, there was a pro-EU majority⁵⁷ within the population. Broad consensus on the orientation of the EU became one of the primary motivations and strategies for the politicians who came to power to shape the country's politics, expecting to reap electoral benefits.

Europeanisation of law in Poland has been explained and analysed by scholars with particular attention to the history of the Union law's impact on the country from 1993 to 2004. Membership has made courts and legal practitioners in Poland accustomed to the Europeanisation notion. That is why this brought new realities to the legal system in Poland. These changes have been referred to as an ongoing process in the literature due to social, political and economic alterations (Grzeszczak, 2017, p.63). In the last two decades, Poland underwent a difficult transition in its political, economic, social and legal systems. These changes brought democratization to the country and introduced a new 1997 Constitution. Thus, a new governance framework and political and legal implementations were launched during the accession preparation for the EU and NATO. Furthermore, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy has a motivation to strengthen the image of the Union in the international area by highlighting the necessity of unity. The idea of being stronger together compared to solely standing as a nation state can be seen in the case of Poland. That is why Poland's strategy and desire to return to Europe has been prioritized and followed by the EU and NATO applications. This prioritization was clear in the political discourses, such as “Together with the Germans, the Americans, the British and with other nations we are in NATO, guaranteeing peace and security not only here and not only across our region, but wherever it can reach out

⁵⁷ To read more on the Poland's support to the EU, see: <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,22238501,polexit-nie-ma-na-to-zgody-w-grupie-wyszehradzkiej-polacy.html?disableRedirects=true>

with its values. We also participate in a new form of cooperation and partnership, unprecedented in the history of our continent: in the EU." (Poland T. o., 2004)⁵⁸.

Europeanisation in various areas from economy culture to politics and society was the case in Poland and in Polish law since the 1990s. The Europeanisation process was thus depicted as a direct application of EU law standards in Poland's legal system, national law applications, harmonization of national, and EU frameworks in the country. Briefly, the constitutional law in the country enabled Poland to adopt a legal basis for EU integration within its constitutional law system, harmonizing its national legal system and the Union's legal order (Szmyt & Rytel-Warzocha, 2019). All of these changes became visible in the constitution. In this case, the 1997 Constitution has two provisions regarding this integration process, in Articles 90 and Article 91⁵⁹. These two articles present a legal basis for transfer of the state authority organs' competences to supranational organization and

⁵⁸ In order to see the full text, see: <https://www.president.pl/archive/news-archive-2000-2010/news-2004/participation-of-the-president-of-the-republic-of-poland-in-the-celebrations-to-commemorate-the-60th-anniversary-of-the,37918>

⁵⁹ **Article 90**

1. The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international agreements, delegate to an international organization or international institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain matters.
2. A statute, granting consent for ratification of an international agreement referred to in para.1, shall be passed by the Sejm by a two-thirds majority vote in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies, and by the Senate by a two-thirds majority vote in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Senators.
3. Granting of consent for ratification of such agreement may also be passed by a nationwide referendum in accordance with the provisions of Article 125.
4. Any resolution in respect of the choice of procedure for granting consent to ratification shall be taken by the Sejm by an absolute majority vote taken in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies."

Article 91

1. After promulgation thereof in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland (*Dziennik Ustaw*), a ratified international agreement shall constitute part of the domestic legal order and shall be applied directly, unless its application depends on the enactment of a statute.
 2. An international agreement ratified upon prior consent granted by statute shall have precedence over statutes if such an agreement cannot be reconciled with the provisions of such statutes.
 3. If an agreement, ratified by the Republic of Poland, establishing an international organization so provides, the laws established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict of laws."
- (Poland's Constitution of 1997)

international authorities, with a clear eye to the EU and then membership process that was launched. The presence of the international agreements and organizations were also within the articles.

Since the accession process had enabled the EU to set requirements for candidate states to complete, the Polish government has undertaken significant reforms, especially in the areas of not only human rights and fundamental freedoms but also economic reform (Keyman & Düzgit, 2007). Institutional reforms and political changes were necessary and important responses to EU conditionality for its accession process. Because the standards stated in the Copenhagen Criteria have been clearly required standards and benchmarks, Europeanization in the country has become a period that was demonstrated in the scholarly work.

The source of Europeanisation in Poland is about the obligations caused because of the EU membership (Golebiowska, 2022). Participation at the EU institutions and other international organisations such as the Council of Europe created an obligation and pressure on Warsaw to follow certain standards. Moreover, the ratification of agreements and conventions, for instance the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, was achieved to Europeanise Poland's legal order and make it possible for Poland to function within a very specific legal and political context (Golebiowska, 2022, pp.540).

In September 6, 2001, the European Parliament passed the Code of Good Administration as a guideline for EU institutions and bodies. Shortly, the fundamental principles stated in their articles were the rule of law, equality, legal certainty, proportionality, transparency and taking actions at appropriate time. The provision of this

implementation contained the principles that were existing in Poland's code of administrative proceedings (Groussot, 2006).

Poland's accession to the EU made it necessary to harmonize its national domestic law with EU laws, among other things, such as democracy, rule of law and a functioning market economy, under the 1993 Copenhagen membership criteria (Goetz, 2001: 1036). This has resulted in fundamental reforms in many policy areas, including various organizational changes at all levels of the Polish public administration. The EU requested from Poland an institutional structure that will implement the basic values such as liberalization and democratization in the political field, privatization in the economy, pluralism and individualization in the society, and to fulfil all the responsibilities and requirements in various common policy areas in the *acquis* by assuming the respective EU obligations (Jablonski, 1997: 4). The new 1997 Constitution empowered the Sejm (Polish Parliament) and the Prime Minister. Naturally, the fulfilment of such demands generally depended on the rise and consolidation of liberal democracy and, accordingly, the realization of different democratic institutional arrangements at the national level (Agh, 2013: 741). At this point, the transition from a centralist state structure to a decentralized, participatory, transparent and questionable public administration has come before Poland in the candidacy process as an integral part of the consolidation of democracy. The strengthening of democracy and the full and effective implementation of the EU *acquis* have revealed the necessity of having a certain level of administrative capacity in the country in question (Balci, 2005: 24-25).

The fact that Poland has a public administration capable of adopting the EU *acquis* has undoubtedly created an important degree of harmony between the EU and Poland's

national levels, created by Europeanization. Poland's legacy of communist public administration played an important role in the formation of this early dissonance. As a matter of fact, when we look at the general principles of public administration in Poland at the beginning of the 1990s, the party bureaucracy and state administration are intertwined and the rule of law is generally ignored, party decisions take priority over legal norms, and a strong hierarchical state with a personnel system based on party control (Goetz, 2001: 1033). This has led to the emergence of the lack of a public administration understanding at the national level, which is based on the multi-layered governance model, the fusion of national administrations and the implementation of supranational legal-institutional mechanisms, as well as some general principles of public administration such as openness, participation, accountability and efficiency at the EU level (O' Dwyer, 2006: 225-226). In this context, the existence of the inconsistency between European norms, rules, regulations, institutions and procedures and their national equivalents, which emerged at the national level, has revealed the pressure of harmonization, which constitutes the first condition of Europeanization, as we have mentioned above. Thus, Europeanization created a strong adaptation pressure on the Polish government to reform its public administration in line with its EU aspirations (Tsarouhas, 2020)⁶⁰.

The actors in Poland, above all, have been the catalysts of the process in eliminating the incompatibility and experiencing a change in the direction of harmonization with European policies, despite the high pressure to adapt in the Europeanization process (Kaminska, 2007: 9-12). The emergence of such a situation in Poland is directly related

⁶⁰ For more on this, see: Dimitris Tsarouhas (2020) Policy Transfer, External Actors and Policy Conditionality: Public Financial Management Reform in Turkey, *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, 11:4, 341-357, DOI: [10.1080/21520844.2020.1832876](https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2020.1832876)

to the fact that, during the realization of the public administration reform, the multiple veto players in the country do not play a role that prevents or slows down the change in the direction of harmonization with European policies. EU membership has been stated as a confirmation for Poland for their Europeanness after the communist regime. Despite the economic concerns due to the transition from communism to economic liberalism, the possibility of mutual gains from cooperation with the Union motivated the country and gave the Polish government and society high hopes. In addition, the country had interest in joining the European structures and took the first steps toward transforming its political and economic system. This exemplifies how the Europeanization framework coincided with the democratization process and transformation of the country's political scene, creating a strong reformist drive during a particular point in time that was subsequently crystalized in EU membership and the changes brought about by the adoption of the 1997 constitutional charter.

Actors in Poland saw the Europeanization process as an opportunity structure that would lead to the redistribution of resources and re-authorization of actors within the country. Accordingly, it has been seen that in the case of moving toward harmonization with the EU, there will be a transition from a centralized state structure to a decentralized, participatory, transparent, and accountable public administration in the Polish public administration (Jablonski, 1997: 2).

The necessity of reforming at the national level in line with EU norms and values played an important role in this process, as a way for Poland to establish itself as a European state with other actors in the international system and to be included in the international system quickly (Sienkiewicz and Michałowski, 2017; Kaminska, 2007);

Kaczynski, 2008; Goetz, 2001). In this direction, Polish actors have preferred to move away from the Soviet heritage public administration approach in order to integrate with the world, and to act within the framework of the public administration approach that the EU member states have and all countries in the world take as an example. In this way, it was believed that Poland would attain the status of a much-desired modern state (Sienkiewicz and Michałowski, 2017). In short, Polish actors have realized that Poland's involvement in world politics as an important country is through moving away from the legacy of the communist era and sharing the values of western countries. In order to achieve this, it was seen that it was inevitable to move to a decentralized, participatory, transparent and accountable public administration, as in the EU level, and thus, it became easier for Poland to Europeanize public administration and to adopt EU values in the field of public administration (Augustyn & Gusztáv, 2014).

The most important catalyst for such reforms in the Polish public administration has been European integration and the EU membership process. The EU's request from the candidate countries to make necessary changes at the national level according to the principles and rules formed at the EU level in order to fully and fully implement the EU acquis and to keep up with the new formations has revealed the necessity of reforming the public administration in Poland. Thus, the Europeanization process, which expresses the harmonization of Poland's national policies with the EU, has occurred at a significant degree. In the candidacy process of Poland, due to the significant incompatibility between the national level and the EU level in the field of public administration, an important degree of harmonization created by Europeanization took place occurred, and this harmonization pressure has created the impetus for the realization of reforms at the national level.

In this respect, the public administration system has also been affected by the political culture and developments (Uğur & Doğan, 2017, p. 35). A republican regime governed Poland from 1918 to 1939. The country, which came under the orbit of the Soviet Union after World War II, remained under the communist system until 1989 (Candan, 2014, p. 105). After the 1990s, within the framework of the collapse of the USSR, there was a transformation towards a liberal, free-market economy and democracy, taking EU values as a guide for their reform implementations. Poland's primary goal after 1989 became associated with its EU membership and participation in all western institutions (Kutlu ve Usta, 2013, p. 507). The EU and NATO membership influenced and formed Poland's transition from the communist regime. The accession processes to both were the primary basis for eliminating Poland's security concerns, while the European Community could be described as a trigger and supportive actor for its financial and administrative transformation (Kaminska, 2014, s. 77). Poland's motivation to become a member of the EU was defined in the literature mainly to recover its post-communist economy and move to a Western-type liberal economy. Therefore, financial aid from the EU and reforms to be undertaken within the membership vision come to the fore when it is seen as the way of economic development.

PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) is one of the EU's pre-accession financial aids to candidate countries undergoing post-communist transformation. In the PHARE program, CEECs had the opportunity to restructure their economies with the support of the EU. These aids, which were first started to be given to Poland and Hungary in 1989, were later expanded to benefit most candidate countries. The PHARE program promoted democratization in Poland, with particular emphasis on civil society. It aimed to reach non-governmental organizations such as trade

unions, associations and environmental organizations. In addition, there were objectives such as ensuring transparency in public administration, developing non-governmental organizations and independent media, raising awareness of democracy, and protecting minority rights and equality of opportunity. The EU, which aims to bring economic rather than political priorities to the fore with its financial aid through PHARE, has requested that the sequence of the transition phase be determined in this way.

Although anti-European parties are in the parliament, EU membership has been one of the top priorities of Polish foreign policy. At this point, it is necessary to emphasise the public support that sees EU membership as a way of economic development and prosperity. Of those who said no in the pre-accession referendum held in 2003 were 22%. In the 2003 Referendum, there were 29.868.474-registered voters while only 17.452.624 of them were valid ones. The result was 45,25% “Yes” with 13.516.621 in total while only 13.18% was “No” with 3.936.012.⁶¹ This support was also calculated with the data from the CBOS Institute as “in April support for European integration had reached 68% of the population according to an opinion poll” (Schuman, n.d.)⁶². This is proof of an indirect relationship between public speaking and the Euroscepticism that emerged due to the elections. This issue is also an example of how the discourses of political parties in domestic politics and the promises they talk about in election campaigns impact the foreign policy and decisions of the country. Citizens' support for EU membership has affected the positions of political parties on this issue. For this reason, elected political parties have prioritised the EU in foreign policy decisions and domestic politics. Political

⁶¹ Polish State Election Commission, <http://www.pkw.gov.pl/>.

⁶² For more on that, see: <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/eem/0203-referendum-on-the-european-union-in-poland-7th-8th-june-2003>

parties supported membership not only to please the electorate but also because of the economic and political benefits that EU membership would bring to the country. And this situation exemplifies the nexus between domestic politics on foreign policy. On this subject, they exemplified in the literature that political parties sometimes direct the voters to them to mobilize support for their policies towards the EU.

“As a result of Poland’s accession to the EU, the former classic structure based on the co-existence – in different configurations – of rules of international and national law was supplemented by a new, though built on foundations of international law, legal system of the Union.” (Grzeszczak, *Europeanisation of Polish Law Following Poland's Accession to the European Union*, 2017). In this respect, the standards had been set by the primary and secondary law of the Union and new European legal area had been introduced in the country. Along with these alterations, to meet the Union’s legal requirements and commitments, unwritten principles and standards had also been issued. The EU law system is critical for European citizens, from entrepreneurs and consumers to students and employees (Bretherton & Mannin, 2013).

Between 1992 and 1993, when significant steps were taken toward membership and as the country was heavily lobbying Brussels to enlarge, the coalition government led by Hana Suchocka consisted of parties that varied due to their European approach. In addition to the pro-European and liberal parties, the coalition also included the anti-European integration, strongly Catholic ZChN (Christian National Union), SLCh (Christian People's Party) and PChD (Christian Democratic Party). Although the PSL does not openly reject EU membership, some party politicians have expressed that European integration does not coincide with Polish national values such as 'Catholicism' and 'patriotism'. The fact

that political parties express their concerns or support for the EU membership process in domestic politics and election campaigns and measure the reactions of their voters is also due to the inevitable interaction of domestic politics with foreign policy. Rather than pursuing dynamics that would gain the support of the public, the parties directed the voters by mobilizing support for their policies toward the EU.

Last but not least, not only the NATO membership, but also maintaining the cooperation with the US remained as one of the most crucial component in Poland's foreign policy strategy. For instance, the emphasis and will to maintain-improve the cooperation with Washington was repeated many times as the Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated "the US can count on Poland whenever it needs, and Poland can count on the US whenever Poland is in need. And this is our belief, the embodiment of the idea of solidarity, in the international dimension" (U.S.-Poland Relations, 2008) in the presser he gave with the US President George Bush on March 10, 2008.⁶³

⁶³ To more on the presser, see: <https://www.c-span.org/video/?204357-1/us-poland-relations#>

CHAPTER 4

2010-2020 / DE-EUROPEANIZATION PERIOD IN POLAND

Among the conceptualizations existing in the international relations literature, the term de-Europeanization has gained notoriety over the last few years. In terms of its definition, Smith sees it as follows: “De-Europeanisation refers to dynamics where Member States pull back from previously established common European understandings, roles and priorities that have emerged through Europeanisation. (Smith, 2021 pp. 524)”. If this constitutes the generic treatment of the term and gives us a fairly solid first understanding as to its content, Müller et al. go into considerably more depth, and allow for a linking of the term with foreign policy change, among others: “De-Europeanization relates to situations where EU foreign policy making runs against the grain of certain Member States’ declared values and interests; where Member States are less willing to engage in collective foreign-policy making at the EU-level, prioritising other multilateral frameworks or (unilateral) national actions; and where the results of that policy making are, on occasion, explicitly undermined by Member State practice.” (Müller, Pomorska, & Tonra., 2021, p. 519).

According to these definitions, at the foreign policy level along with the indications from the political discourses, diplomatic rhetoric and national statements; members that experience de-Europeanization have started to highlight the significance of their country’s

sovereignty, and national interest by regularly opposing and challenging the priorities, positions, policies and the interests of Brussels (or “Brussels”). Rejection of elemental norms is an aspect of de-Europeanisation that involves a deterioration from a commitment to well-described procedural and core values and norms of the Union (Manners, 2002). This fourth chapter is going to cover the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy with a particular emphasis on the de-Europeanization transformation of Poland in the period between 2010-2020. This will act as a complementary analytical framework to chapter 3, will underline the degree and pace of change that Poland has faced over the last decade and will allow for an evaluation of this thesis’ theoretical framework.

In the case of policy-making, the concept of de-Europeanisation describes in which the members of the EU are less willing to participate in collective actions and undermine cooperation within their alliance, which is a precondition for the smooth functioning of the EU. In this respect, while some of the members experience domestic changes in their institutions as a reflection of the decrease in their willingness to cooperate across national borders, others threaten the EU in the context of their attempt to adopt a systematic instrumentalization of their veto power in the decision-making mechanisms (Smith, 2021). Members that are subject to this concept often have been argued in the literature as nativist, nationalist, populist or-and semi-authoritarian political culture in their domestic politics (Bürkner, 2020). That is why the structure of this kind of political dynamic has been stated by scholars as a challenging mechanism to the EU position and policies, potentially undermining the coherence of the EU as a political project.

For more than a decade, the literature has concluded that there has been deterioration and backsliding in the democratic and institutional quality of CEECs

(Kochenov, 2008) (Sedelmeier, 2014). This backlash concept has been studied with a particular focus on Hungary and Poland (Müller, 2014; Herman, 2016; Kelemen and Orenstein, 2016), which are often portrayed and discussed as the two cases where backsliding has travelled furthest among the former communist EU members. For Poland, a symbolic date and event are often used as the starting point of the relevant analysis.

In October 2015, Polish politics was well and truly turned on its head. After years of liberalism, centrist mainstream politics and enthusiastic participation in the process of European integration, the nationalist-populist Law and Justice party was elected with a majority in both the upper and lower houses of parliament. In less than two years, the policies of PiS have transformed Polish politics and the Polish state. The winner of the elections was the conservative Law and Justice Party, with 39% of the vote. In 2015, the PiS, led by Beata Szydło in Poland, which has a population of approximately 38 million, achieved an absolute majority with 242 deputies in the 460-seat parliament to form a government alone. Thus, by electing 242 deputies in the 460-seat Sejm, he achieved the absolute majority needed to form a government on his own. In the country where political instability has been experienced for nearly a decade, the centre-right Civic Platform (PO) vote rate, led by the ruling Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz, remained at 23 percent.

Freedom House has registered a continual drop in democratic indicators since 2015 in Poland (Nations in Transit 2020: Dropping the Democratic Facade, n.d.). In the literature, the turn that Polish government had was stated as a transition to an authoritarian state (Kelemen 2017), and some depicted it as authoritarian populism (Bugaric and Kuhelj 2018, 22). However, democratic backsliding is an agreed fact to describe the way the country has changed over time (Holesch & Kyriazi, 2021). Most academics specify the

reason as the grip on power by Poland's conservative and nationalist party, the Law and Justice Party, and the series of changes, institutional and otherwise that the party has been able to introduce in Polish public life.

Despite the successful and incremental period of Europeanization in Poland, the country began to move away from European policies, values and norms in several policy areas gradually (Ün & Arıkan, 2021). The beginning of these changes have been associated with the electoral success of the Law and Justice Party in the literature by many scholars (Smith, 2021) (Buras, 2018).

Even though post-communist societies have experienced corruption, just as every other state has, Poland's liberalization and democratization of its institutions and independence of the judiciary along with the freedom of the media had captured international press' attention and got praised for its advancement in these respects during the 1990s and early 2000s (Europe, 2017). However, the image of the country has been completely altered in the last decade (Buras, 2018). For over ten years, the power of media and its policies in Poland were inseparably connected to the democratization process (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2006) (Goban-Klas, 1990). Therefore, the literature confirms that the democratization in the media system in Poland had unexpected turns compared to other public institutions. A few months after the Law and Justice Party came to power, the European Commission launched a rule and law dialogue with the government to make investigations on the public media and constitutional tribunal. In the first meeting of 2016, the College of Commissioners debated various crucial topics, from the management of the refugee crisis and the treatment of China to the current situation of the rule of law in Poland. In the case of the recent developments in Poland, the European Commission

highlighted that the value of the rule of law is among the top priorities of the Union. That is why the Commission must pursue and preserve the EU law and how the MS respects it. However, since the current domestic structure concerned the Commission to step into the ongoing situation in Poland, they raised concerns (Commission t. E., 2016). They asked for information and examination from the Constitutional Tribunal to see the alterations in the Polish law, for example, on the Public Service Broadcasters.⁶⁴ This has been followed by the Commission asking members to state the risks of violating European values and norms in Poland (Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independence in Poland, 2017).

In order to demonstrate the de-Europeanization framework within the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy, this chapter seeks to illustrate the phenomenon by use of two different examples. The first one is the 2015 Syrian refugee / migrant crisis and how the Polish government instrumentalized the incident in both its domestic politics and foreign policies. This crisis enables the thesis to show how Warsaw began to challenge the EU, its values and norms through a concrete example that set ideological forces in Warsaw against what they depicted as the liberal elite consensus of the EU. The second case is going to be the backlash in women's rights, with a particular attention on the anti-abortion law debates. As Anna Maria Augustyn states "there is a general strategy for parties like the PiS. They always need an enemy to strengthen their support. The PiS has coalitions with the Catholic Church. That is why the Church agenda such as the anti-abortion law becomes important for politics. Their enemy was refugees from Syria before

⁶⁴ See the official statement from the European Commission: "Rule of law in Poland: Commission starts dialogue": https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/WM_16_2030

the abortion law”⁶⁵ (Augustyn, 2022). Hence, the anti-abortion law as a case illustrates de-Europeanisation in Poland. Both the anti-abortion bill (as a domestic component) and the Syrian refugee crisis (as a foreign policy component) will present the fundamental dimensions of de-Europeanization of both migration and women's rights policies.

4.1 Domestic Politics and de-Europeanization: Women’s Rights- the Case of Abortion Rights

Among the core values of the Union, human rights and gender equality can be listed at the top of the list. Moreover, Poland is among the members that must respect and follow the EU's agreed values and rules. Until the 2020s, Brussels never mentioned the subject of gender equality within the prioritized topics that work under the Gender Mainstreaming strategy (Jeglertz, 2021).

Table 3 Developments of the abortion rights in Poland

Date	Risk to life	Risk to health	Rape	Fetal impairment	Economic or social	On request
11 November 1918 - 1 September 1932	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
1 September 1932 - 9 March 1943	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗
9 March 1943 - July 1944/January 1945	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
July 1944/January 1945 - 8 May 1956	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗
8 May 1956 - 14 March 1993	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
14 March 1993 - 1 April 1997	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
1 April 1997 - 18 December 1997	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗
18 December 1997 - 27 January 2021	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
27 January 2021 -	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗

⁶⁵ Augustyn, A. M. (2022, 07 18). European Commission Evaluation Expert. (Author, Interviewer)

“Governments across East Central Europe (ECE) passed a slate of laws in the late 1990s and early 2000s designed to secure men’s and women’s equal opportunities in the workplace, to secure equal treatment in state social security benefits, and to legally protect state and private employees from sex discrimination”⁶⁶ (Anderson, 2006). As Anderson (2006) illustrated, gender-related policies in the ECE, such as gender equality⁶⁷, began to improve with the EU membership process. However, even though the accession criteria and the EU standards were one, the speed of transformation in each country was not the same, along with the depth of domestic compliance with European objectives. The author also argued that Poland opposed the Union's equity laws and secured the right-wing suggested policy positions. Although the Union has been presented as one of the most crucial external impacts on its members and candidate countries in the case of gender equity policies, the reality, for instance in Poland, was insufficient to present the same standard applied to all of its members. The EU has the power to influence and shape the national legislation and ask its members and candidates to provide equal opportunity to all with binding requirements and agreements. That is why, for instance, the Sejm discussed a Law requiring the political institutions in Poland to have its employees at least 40 % of women in February 1997, and nevertheless, it did not pass. Prior to this, again in 1997, the government worked on the National Action Plan on Women after the United

⁶⁶ (Anderson, 2006, p.101)

⁶⁷ From the 1997 Constitution: “**Article 33: 1.** Men and women shall have equal rights in family, political, social and economic life in the Republic of Poland. **2.** Men and women shall have equal rights, in particular, regarding education, employment and promotion, and shall have the right to equal compensation for work of similar value, to social security, to hold offices, and to receive public honours and decorations.”

Nation's Beijing conference⁶⁸ covering women's rights. Within the new 1997 Constitution, there was a section covering bans and sanctions against discrimination of many forms, from gender equality to equal payment and social security. Nevertheless, this general clause did not have any constitutional guarantee.

In the literature, the reproductive health and women's rights have been discussed in many countries including Poland. Bucholc (2022, p.74) highlighted the sensitivity of the subject by saying "the regulation of abortion is a point where religious, moral, political and legal considerations converge and cross to create a global normative landscape of unsurpassed complexity." (Bucholc, 2022, p.74). Women's bodies have been used as a political battleground for various political parties throughout Polish history. Hence, politicians who were depicting themselves as the protector of family undermined women's rights and, by extension, of democracy in the country (Hadj-Abdou, 2018). As a result of an analysis on the evolution of abortion in Poland, one can see that the current gender regime of the Law and Justice Party and the protests gender regime are not something new for Polish society. Each Polish political party had a crucial role in the abortion discussions over time (Bucholc, 2022). Especially right-wing political parties had adopted pro-life stance in their political agenda. Their close ties with the Catholic Church affected their political agenda regarding the issue of abortion. On the other hand, in the case of centrist parties such as the opposition Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska), they used a pro-choice discourse whenever the topic arose. However, their political agenda did not adopt anti-abortion as their priority.

⁶⁸ Bretherton C., "Gender Mainstreaming and the EU Enlargement: Swimming against the Tide?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 8:1(2000): 66-69.

The role of women in Poland during the communist regime was not only as specified in the traditional definition of family structure. Until the mid-1970s, women made up almost half of the Polish workforce. As it was stated in the literature “before 1990, Polish women constituted almost 50 percent of the nation’s workforce, which was then one of the highest proportions in Europe. Women also accounted for more than half of college graduates in Poland and were substantially overrepresented among the ranks of financial sector employees relative to the Western European countries (Lisowska 1998).” A new debate arose about the role of women in Polish society after the end of the communist regime. The new political regime and the Catholic Church, which interpreted the active role of women in business life and their contribution to the domestic economy by working longer than men during the communist regime, argued that women's activity should also decrease after the regime change. They argued that because the communist regime forced women to work, the traditional Polish family structure weakened and went backward. In addition to the decline of women's rights and the gradual decrease in their visibility in society, the restrictive speeches made on abortion rights have provoked the reaction of the Church and the political administration. That is why women came together in 1990 against the anti-abortion legislation (McMullen & Peirce, 2004).

Access to abortion has been a controversial topic in Polish politics since the end of the communist regime. On 16 April 2020, the ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) has been blamed for taking advantage of the outbreak of the COVID19 pandemic for allowing the anti-abortion bill to be discussed at the parliament (Eşençay, 2020). However, the source of this anti-choice proposal was not the PiS government but the citizens’ initiative. Due to the measurements taken against the pandemic, people could not come together to protest but instead used alternative solutions to oppose the Stop

Abortion Bill⁶⁹. Consequently, the parliament postponed it, and the protests succeeded in removing the possibility of adopting the complete restriction of abortion.

Displaying the ruling PiS as the fundamental enemy of Polish women tends to ignore the heritage of gender politics from the former conservative governments and leaves undisputed the process of neo-liberal transition detrimental particularly for women. Before the end of the communist regime in Poland, between 1947-1989, it was a structure for the benefit of women in Poland because the church and state administration were separated from each other. Despite the historical importance of the Catholic Church and its power in society, women's power in society and their participation in business life were high in the communist regime. The collapse of the communist regime in 1989 led to a series of political and economic transformations. Most detrimental to access to reproductive health services was the growing political role of the Catholic Church during this period. Increasing Church power quickly began to show its effect on women's rights in the country and advocated restrictive policies on issues such as abortion and birth control methods. The Church also prompted a change in 2002 to eliminate health insurance coverage for birth control. At the same time, the Church began to pressure doctors to reduce the number of birth control prescriptions and began to encourage doctors to call for conscientious objection. The post-socialist era also ushered in economic transformations that proved to be more damaging to women's health. The leader of the Solidarity Movement, Lech Wałęsa, due to the neoliberal path he followed when he came to power, began to make cuts in social welfare services that prioritized economic and

⁶⁹ The Stop Abortion Bill: A civil initiative collected signatures and applied the Sejm in order to ban abortion in Poland entirely in September 2015. Nevertheless, it was rejected by 206 votes rejecting it while 178 MPs voted in favor of the anti-abortion bill.

social policies and began to privatize the services provided by the state for free. In this process, maternity leave was interrupted, childcare centres were privatized, and the amount of cash assistance given to families was reduced.

“Since 2011, Poland’s government has launched repeated attacks on women’s reproductive rights. In 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2016 draft legislative proposals were introduced that contained total or near total bans on abortion. Following massive public protests, such as the Black Protests in 2016, these draft bills were defeated.” (Polish Parliament Must Protect Women’s Health and Rights, 2018). This quotation is taken from the Joint Statement Poland Abortion Ban 2018 that has two hundred three signatures from various organizations from Poland and around the world to protest the anti-abortion bill.

The ruling Law and Justice Party has started regulations and policies that are challenging women’s rights in its domestic politics (Jeglertz, 2021). Political authorities in Poland had been argued as being able to demonstrate backsliding tendencies of women’s rights by framing gender equality policies via the domestic political institutions. As the European Institute for Gender Equality⁷⁰ has showed the progress of gender equality in Poland with annual index, Warsaw started to remain below the European Gender Equality Index⁷¹ average score (Jeglertz, 2021). As a part of the populist government’s strategy, the ruling party used the abortion debates from time to time in order to shift the public’s attention and divert attention away from other serious problems in the country. “Law and Justice (PiS), a traditional conservative catholic party, acquired the Church’s political power despite its diminishing support from the Polish people

⁷⁰ European Institute for Gender Equality, the Analyses on Poland, see: <https://eige.europa.eu/countries/poland>

⁷¹ The Gender Equality Index is a hybrid sign measuring gender equality according to the Union's policy framework. It also helps to examine the progress of gender equality within the member states.

themselves (Heinen & Portet, 2009). The PiS proposed new legislation to impose further restrictions on abortion, which would result in a complete ban. However, due to mass protests starting in 2016, no further restriction on abortion has subsequently been imposed (BBC, 2018).”

Not every political party decides to stay away from the abortion discussions or support the anti-choice movements in Poland. In this respect, there are some political parties namely SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, Democratic Left Alliance), SDPL (Socjaldemokracja Polska, Social Democracy of Poland), the Greens (Zieloni), Twój Ruch (Your Move) and Razem (Together) which have the liberalization of abortion in their political agenda. Because of the number of representatives from these parties in the parliament, it is not enough to challenge the anti-abortion bills or the ruling party stance (Chojnicka, 2016, p.7). Even the political parties that support liberalization, do not have a clear discourse expressing their stance. Instead of openly supporting liberalization and the loosening of current abortion-related restrictions, their language possesses ambiguous meaning due to including the ethical and moral side of the issue, both of which are undoubtedly subjective and thus hard to legislate on. Such unclear and careful formulation of parties' positions on abortion appears to be a conscious strategy of decreasing the risk and danger of provoking voters. Nevertheless, even though this strategy benefits the politicians and political parties by increasing their public support, it has serious outcomes in terms of gender equality and women's rights. First of all, it marginalizes the abortion debates by making it invisible in the public debate. Secondly, taking a determinative and obvious attitude in favour of legal abortion becomes almost merely a mission for feminist activists and journalists, exalting their poor reputation and marginalizing the field of activism as akin to anti-government behaviour.

In 2011-2012, abortion was considered highly unpopular to support. Hence, the pro-abortion group could not collect enough signatures to submit a proposal on the liberalization of abortion to parliament. However, the change in political opportunities, the increase in the attempts to introduce anti-abortion bills, and the improvement of the alternative gathering opportunities for activists, such as through social media, caused a different answer from society and changed the balance between pro- and anti-choice politics. Social media became more and more visible with an improvement in the awareness of the youth in the country featuring prominently in this process. Moreover, the change in the inclusion of women's mobilization created a distinction and allowed the movement to include people from wider backgrounds. Elites and intellectuals used to be a majority of the resistance, with their successful stories and capacities to make a change. However, social media allowed to express the movement and increase the participation by improving consciousness on the debate and offering a participation platform to other, more numerous and populous social groups. Consequently, these allowed mobilizing against the violation of women's rights better and more efficiently. There is a positive correlation between the voting for conservative and religious party and powerful opinions on issues of morality and identity, with the inclusion of religiosity and anti-abortion (GDULA, 2017, pp.35). To support Kaczyński, Prime Minister Beata Szydło (in office: 2015-2017) depicted her complete acceptance for prohibition of abortion, regardless of the circumstances. Hence, people came together to protest under the name of Black Monday, and those attempts continued against abortion in the following years. Although the resistance improved its power during that time, governmental changes and the alterations in the relationship between the ruling party and the church continued to challenge pro-choice groups.

The route of women's resistance serves a good demonstration of a broader alteration in Polish activism against the right-wing populist government (Hall, 2019, pp.1512). In 2011, the bill that for the first time called for a complete ban on abortion was proposed. This proposal continued to impact the debate over abortion ever since, despite the fact that it was not adopted. The government's favourable attitude towards this project, which was reflected in directing it to further work in parliament, became the reason for the organization of black protest. Tens of thousands of demonstrators participated in this protest in many Polish cities. Shortly after the protests, the government withdrew from supporting the submitted project. However, the case was not closed, because the parliament again had a project to tighten the ban on abortion (GDULA, 2017, pp.19).

The Black Monday demonstration, *Czarny Protest*, began in September 2016. The All-Poland Women's Strike, *Ogólnopolski Strajk Kobiet*, initiated these protests on both October 3 and 24, 2016. There were further amendments to the anti-abortion law in 2013 and 2015. "Many of the protesters and organizers did not identify as feminists or even as activists, they just felt that "enough is enough", that in the face of grave danger to all women's health and lives they just had to act. To many, the All-Poland Women's Strike (*Ogólnopolski Strajk Kobiet*) became a revolutionary moment when fear and anger were transformed into feelings of solidarity and empowerment, a moment of personal and collective transformation." (Korolczuk, 2016, p.92) The anti-abortion law proposal (requesting a total prohibition and the criminal prosecution for women asking for it with the doctors accepting to conduct the process) was submitted on July 5, 2016 by Ordo Iuris Institute with a support from the Catholic Church and the Stop Abortion network. Moreover, the anti-abortion group initiated a campaign in March 2016 and collected more than 400.000 signatures in a period of three months. According to Polish Law, citizens

can collect signatures and submit their proposal to Parliament. Moreover, if the number of signatures is at least 100.000 in three months, Parliament can agree to discuss the proposal or outvote it (Korolczuk, 2016). The ruling Law and Justice Party did not propose the bill, hence, after the mass gatherings against the bill, the party remained distant from the debates over this bill.

In order to support the pro-choice movement, there were various grassroots level organizations, especially on social media, calling for resistance. One of the groups on Facebook called Gals for Gals (*Dziewuchy Dziewuchom*) became the leading one. It also underlined the significance of the usage of social media to mobilize people and protest. This movement also received support from the extra-parliamentary leftist political party named Left Together (*Lewica Razem*)⁷². As a result of increased support, there were small-scale actions such as stop going to the Church on Sundays and sending packages (symbolizes unsafe abortions) to Prime Minister Szydło's Office (Wodecka, 2016).

On May 2016, Save Women (*Ratujmy Kobiety*), a feminist organization, was established and began to prepare a law proposal for the liberalization of abortion. This proposal received more than 240.000 signatures, and was subsequently submitted to Parliament (Kubisa 2017). However, parliament voted against the proposal but decided to discuss the bill submitted by the Ordo Iuris Institute (Wodecka 2016). The anti-abortion proposal submitted by the Ordo Iuris Institute to a parliament where the majority was socially conservative thus gained wider acceptance. Furthermore, the Law and Justice Party received support from anti-choice groups in the elections it placed special emphasis on the issue during the pre-election campaign (Korolczuk, 2016, pp.101).

⁷² The political party was formed in 2015 with the name "Together". The aim was to answer the failed attempt to form a left-wing political party in the 2015 presidential election.

To sum up, the bill was rejected because 352 MPs voted to negate the proposal while 58 MPs voted in favour and 18 refrained. However, the debate on the access of abortion was not resolved since Jarosław Kaczyński depicted his stance towards the issue by saying that: “We will aim to ensure that even in very hard cases, when the child has no chance of surviving, seriously malformed, there is delivery, so that the child can be christened and buried, has a name.” (Mikulak, 2016). The Black Monday demonstrations stopped the bill from being discussed and also altered public opinion on the anti-abortion movement. Hence, the number of people opposing the anti-choice bill increased and the demand for the liberalization of abortion also expanded according to the OKO Press 2017⁷³.


Due to the collaboration between the Polish government and the Roman Catholic Church, abortion controversies could not be debated across society via a referendum, for example. In this case, some observers stated that the accession process to the EU in Poland required a consent from the Catholic Church. Hence, this signals that the rights are granted to people temporarily, instead of being the result of their citizenship-induced package of natural rights (Mikulak, 2016).

Considering the conservative supporters of the PiS, the party’s cooperation with the Catholic Church is a remarkable and crucial source of their legitimacy. Therefore, Kaczyński’s comments on the debate can be an answer to the disappointment caused by the decision to negate the proposal to set up further legal restrictions. Nevertheless, considering the amplified worry around the Ordo Luris Institute’s project, the mentality has been that PiS is not looking for a complete prohibition of abortion. As the graph below

⁷³ OKO. Press. Zdecydowana przewaga zwolenników aborcji na żądanie [Vast majority of Poles are for liberalization of abortion law]; 2018. Available from <https://oko.press/zdecydowana-przewaga-zwolennikow-dopuszczeniaaborcji-na-zadanie-nad-przeciwnikami-sondaz/>

depicts the balance within the political parties in 2017 affected by the Black Monday Resistance.

Table 4 Attitude to the anti-abortion act according to party preferences^{74,75}



The use of the term ‘eugenic abortion’ in political discourses began to increase. Having refused the excessive anti-choice proposal of Ordo Luris, the ruling party has taken precautions by positioning itself where it can potentially display its own plan as yet another ‘reconciliation’ and attempt to convince the majority of the population for its own purposes. Thus, such a move is far better in line with the public’s opinion on the matter than the rejected entire restriction on the access to abortion. In 2016, according to the survey, the approval for abortion was 80% when the mother is in danger, for instance.

⁷⁴ In red individuals who think the law should be toughened up or abortion completely prohibited and in green individuals who think the law should be softened by allowing abortion due to the difficult situation of a woman

⁷⁵ (CHRZCZONOWICZ, 2017): CHRZCZONOWICZ, M. (2017, 03 30). Już 42 proc. Polaków za liberalizacją ustawy antyaborcyjnej. Nowy sondaż OKO.press. Retrieved from OKO.press: <https://oko.press/juz-42-proc-polakow-liberalizacja-ustawy-antyaborcyjnej-nowy-sondaz-oko-press/>

Regarding securitization, for instance, Kaczynski said on April 2019 that “Gender constitute serious threats to our identity, to our nation and to the Polish state.” (Varieties of Populism, 2019). Securitization of women and women’s rights as a threat to family, nation and society makes difficult for people to position themselves in various topics such as abortion. Populist parties are benefiting from gender features regularly with attempt to restrict women’s reproductive rights. Kaczyński said, “In these matters, as a Catholic, I follow the teachings of the bishops.” (Varieties of Gendered Populism, 2019). Nevertheless, the Black Monday demonstrations in 2016 made the ruling Law and Justice Party back away from the abortion debate.

Since the collaboration between the ultraconservatives and the right-wing populists has been growing in Poland, the reproductive rights of women position at the center of the political struggles. Even though J. Kaczyński is not the fundamental proponent of the ultraconservatives’ agendas, he often utilizes the anti-gender language and statements whenever it serves for his political interests. However, by doing this, he rapidly withdraws this political party’s support for particular issues when the resistance is too powerful. Because of Kaczyński’s attitudes, the latest anti-abortion bill proposal gathered more criticism. Women’s rights activists and NGOs generalized his attitudes with the stance of his political party and accused him for benefiting from the COVID19 pandemic. Nevertheless, although the anti-choice bill was going to be discussed in the parliament as a popular initiative, the statement of the Polish President strengthened the critiques and reinforced the accusations. On April 2020, the Polish president Andrzej Duda, told Polish Catholic news outlet Niedziela that “if legislation on this will cross my desk, I will certainly sign it into law,” defending, “I believe that killing disabled children is simply murder.” Some analysts have viewed his statements as a venture to court the

predominately conservative, Catholic and right-wing voters, whose support PiS lean on to preserve their majority in the country (Kentish, 2020). Due to the measures taken against the pandemic, people could not mobilize against the ruling political party and the bill via mass gatherings. As a result, they used alternative ways to depict their opposition to the anti-abortion bill.

The Presidential election motivated Duda to satisfy his conservative and religious supporters as well as the Catholic Church. However, even though the majority was against the restrictive abortion bill, especially after the Black Monday, and the PiS did not take a position as a ruling party towards the bill; his statements was against the women's rights.

Polish politicians possessed a desire to increase their supporters in the electoral campaigns through the fulfilment of one of their election promises. The liberalization of the abortion law is associated with the maintenance of the post-communist left ideology towards in the shape of fulfilling a promise. Hence, liberalization symbolizes a mechanism that was designed to satisfy voters with political premises by utilizing woman as their tool. As a result of the power of language, the ruling party achieved to gather capacity to polarize the Polish society, also in the abortion debate. Creation of the "us vs them" causing a strong polarized society. Due to polarization, the pro-choice are hurt by the system. As a result, anti-choice and pro-choice groups began to see each other as an enemy. Therefore, it weakens the society because of the political manipulation.

Overall, the discussions over the access to abortion have not begun with the electoral success of the ruling Law and Justice party, for the first time, in 2015. Gender has been an integral and strategic part of the political and ideological debates in Poland. The political environment regarding the debate on the abortion law is divided between pro-

choice and anti-choice groups. Firstly, the right-wing parties are anti-abortion impacted by their close relationship with the Catholic Church (Nowicka, 2011). Even though Poland is a democratic country, still, the influence of the Church is evident in the decision-making process within various instances from the history (Fuchs, 2013). Paradoxically, despite the attack of the ruling Law and Justice Party against women's rights with their stance in the abortion debate, they maintained their support from female voters. Populist leaders should stop defining woman as object with no right to express themselves rather than subject (Ostaszewska, 2018, 96). Attacking on women regarding their reproductive rights and weakening their positions in the country not only harm Poland but also Polish democracy. However, as it can be understood from the latest instance, women are more conscious about their rights and the strategies used by their government and the Catholic Church.

4.2 Polish Foreign Policy and De-Europeanization: 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis

“De-Europeanisation depicts an erosion of the central normative commitments within the EU among the members” (Smith, 2021) During the 20th century, Poland was a country that sent immigrants and refugees to other countries. Owing to the economic problems and war, more than a million Polish migrants left the country and went to the US and western European countries (Bachman, 2016). On the other hand, this sending of migrant's position was altered in the 1990s with the change of policies after the fall of communism. As the economy and politics in the country started to become more liberal, the government formed its foreign policy around its Western neighbours. In those years, the Polish government adopted and implemented a generous asylum regime by welcoming

Chechens and Bosnians fleeing war and prosecution. However, this generosity has been changed after EU membership was accomplished due to the new policy environment that Poland had to abide by and the subsequent legal obligations it had to undertake. More than 206.000 Polish citizens migrated to the UK for work-related reasons and around 1.3-2 million left the country for other member states (Bachman, 2016). Migration in Poland varies from other EU member states. Emigration still surpasses the level of immigration even though the balance has moved on the side of the latter since the 2015 refugee crisis (Troszynki & El-Ghamari, 2022). While the country benefited from the free movement with increased number of labour migration, the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis and Poland's reaction showed that the government has changed its perception towards generous migration policy despite the benefit it was gaining as a member of the EU.

The literature has also covered the refugee crisis in Poland from a media coverage point of view. In this case, the government not only benefited from their electoral campaigns and speeches but also the media channels, especially those that are conservative and pro-government such as *Gazeta Polska Codziennie*. The way newspapers and TV Channels talked about the refugees and migrants achieved to have an impact of citizens' perception. To give an example, *Gazeta Polska Codziennie* focused on the negative outcomes of the refugee flow to the country while showing the anti-refugee protests and crime related news from the other part of the world. Some scholars already argued the effectiveness of the media in polarizing people's opinions (Mertens et al., 2019, pp.150) and the Polish case exemplified this argument.

Starting from the 2010s, Poland has gone through a political transformation and the country began to experience an increase in populism adopted by their political leaders

along with democratic backsliding. These have been supported and fed by the various tools that have been instrumentalized by political leaders. One of the strategies was the utilization and securitization of the Syrian refugee crisis. That is why not sharing the burden of human crisis in 2015 along with the other member states had caused lots of criticism and Warsaw has been accused of hypocrisy and worse. Another example can be given from the answer of Interior Minister Mariusz Błaszczak⁷⁶ (2015-2018) to the journalists in Brussels to justify their reluctance to take part in the EU quota system for the refugees by saying, “in agreeing to take in refugees, the [previous government] put a ticking bomb under us” (CIENSKI, 2017)⁷⁷. The literature displayed the country with its criminalization and securitization of the refugee flow⁷⁸ with an absence of refugees within the country as a clear representation of Poland’s transition from Europeanization to de-Europeanization, especially if one conceives of those terms both normatively and practically. Warsaw began to demonstrate an increased populist and nationalist attitude and approach in its both domestic and foreign policies, feeding one off the other and suggesting that this nexus can have deep repercussions for EU member states (Klaus, 2020).

For more than a decade now, the EU has been subjected to a various unheard-of tensile experience from the Ukraine conflict, the Eurozone crisis to Brexit (Bürkner, 2020). And one of the tensile events is the Syrian refugee crisis that hit most of the region with the refugee flow in 2015. The growing number of refugees and migrants knocked the EU’s

⁷⁶ Also: <https://tvrepublika.pl/minister-blaszczak-mocno-o-multi-kulti-uleganie-poprawnosci-politycznej-to-przynosi-tragiczne-zniwo,49478.html>

⁷⁷ For more on this: <https://www.politico.eu/article/politics-nationalism-and-religion-explain-why-poland-doesnt-want-refugees/>

⁷⁸ Vink, M. P. (2002). “Negative and Positive Integration in European Immigration Policies”. European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 6(13), <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2002-013.pdf> (Access Date: 21.02.2022).

door and not only test the EU in terms of how it deals with its internal struggles, but also its solidarity and the unity in the face of a challenge caused by external factors. Moreover, the commitment to the core values and norms of the Union have been tested by mirroring the EU-optimism and integration levels of the member states. For example, since in addition to prioritizing women's rights among the Union's core values, United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) also emphasized the abortion right and importance in its official statement, "Although States parties may adopt measures designed to regulate voluntary termination of pregnancy, those measures must not result in violation of the right to life of a pregnant woman or girl, or her other rights under the Covenant. Thus, restrictions on the ability of women or girls to seek abortion must not, inter alia, jeopardize their lives, subject them to physical or mental pain or suffering that violates Article 7 of the Covenant, discriminate against them or arbitrarily interfere with their privacy" (HRC, 2019)⁷⁹.

Since 2014, an unprecedented number of refugees that were fleeing from destabilized countries has influenced the EU. That is why the debate around the refugee crisis affected the contribution of the EU Member States and led to a wider reflection on their domestic and foreign policies. The domestic policies and usage of media had a crucial position in informing the public and establishing the perceptions of people on this crisis.

Even though before 2015, the EU had already introduced the refugee and immigration policy, political tension has followed an incremental increase within the Union and among the member states due to the lack of agreement and cooperation. The frontline members such as Greece and Italy had begun to shoulder the burden while others, like Poland and

⁷⁹ United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) (2019) General comment no. 36, Article 6 (Right to Life), CCPR/C/GC/35. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e5e75e04.html>

Hungary, refused to take a part in the refugee crisis management process (Alkopher, 2018). At the beginning of the refugee flow, the frontline countries could not pay attention to the Dublin Regulation and its “first-country-of-entry principle” due to the illegal entry of refugees and the urgency of the situation, and could not regulate the movement of the undocumented migrants within the EU. On the other hand, the Visegrad group members refused to follow the European Commission’s quota system⁸⁰ to share the responsibility. As a part of the European Agenda on Migration formed in May 2015, the Commission worked on the humanitarian crisis and came up with detailed proposals in order to address the crisis. Briefly, the European Commission suggested within the new quota system for the refugee crisis, "The new set of measures will alleviate pressure from the Member States most affected – notably Greece, Italy, and Hungary – by proposing to relocate 120,000 people in clear need of international protection to the other EU Member States." (Commission E. , Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action, 2015)⁸¹. However, the Central and Eastern European countries refused to follow the Commission plan and share the burden of Italy and Greece mainly as the European Parliament noted in its official statement on the subject as “on 26 August 2016, in Warsaw, the countries of the Visegrad group (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) reminded the German Chancellor of their opposition to the refugee quota system. According to the Polish Foreign Minister, ‘not everyone in Europe can afford the type of policy proposed by Germany. Many countries, including Poland, have very limited capabilities and means.’ (Parliament, 2016)⁸².

⁸⁰Scheme to relocate 160,000 refugees from overburdened frontline states Greece and Italy”

⁸¹ To see the official statement of the European Commission, see:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_5596

⁸² To read the whole statement, see: europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-006652_EN.html

Unlike the first two stated ways, countries like Sweden and Germany adopted an open door policy for the migrants. Hence, the political turmoil occurred within the EU boosted the reluctance of the V4 Group to host Syrian refugees to share the burden on the Union. As the Union had struggled to manage the massive influx of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers, the continent has stated as divided between the East and the West (Bachman, 2016). The Central and Eastern European members were against the relocation plan for the refugees across the continent that was supported by the Western members. Finally, in September 2015, the Visegrad Group that consists of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia, released a joint statement “any (EU) proposal leading to (the) introduction of mandatory and permanent quota for solidarity measures would be unacceptable” (Alkopher, 2018). After the demonstration of reluctance to take a part in the European Commission’s refugee quota system that would have seen 7,000 asylum seekers resettle in Poland out of the 160,000 distributed across the Union, the Civic Platform Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz voted to adopt the relocation proposal. This vote in favour of welcoming asylum seekers was faced with criticism from the V4 members at the beginning. Nevertheless, Warsaw’s commitment to work towards a common EU migration policy did not last long. The nationalist-right-wing party PiS achieved to capture the majority of the seats in the 2015 parliamentary election and immediately adopted harsher language in their discourses on the refugee subject. Polish citizens also gathered in the streets and marched in different cities by saying “Poland, free of Islam!” and “Today refugees, tomorrow terrorists!” (Bachman, 2016). Elżbieta Witek, the former Minister of the Interior and Administration and chief of the PM’s cabinet office, said, “A good Christian is someone who helps, not necessarily by accepting refugees” (Cienski, 2017). And former Polish Defence Minister Błaszczak supported the ruling party’s stance by

saying agreeing on the EU quota system and let the Syrian refugees in the country “is a straight road to a social catastrophe, with the result that in a few years Warsaw could look like Brussels.” (Cienski, 2017). Hence, the country started to have an incremental increase in the anti-European sentiment among citizens. Since the ruling party PiS' stance against the refugees in its foreign policy and domestic political strategy, the leading opposition party also was influenced by this by seeing the success of this rhetoric with an increase in the public support for the PiS leaders. For instance, the leader of Civic Platform, Grzegorz Schetyna, said his party was also against the Commission's quota system by referring to a previous experience that his party had when it was in power and accepted to welcome 6.200 asylum seekers from the Union (CIENSKI, 2017). The reaction and attitude change in the opposition party has also value since Brussels tried to make a change in Poland's behaviour in the case of welcoming refugees. However, after Schetyna claimed as such, owing to the reaction and pressure from Brussels, he later claimed that he is against those that are illegal migrants and he agreed to have “the few dozen people who want to come to Poland.” Thus, this exemplifies the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policies with both internal and external actors in Polish case (Cienski, 2017).

The ruling Law and Justice Party adopted a party agenda and language around national identity, tradition, Polish culture and Christian identity. Politicians formed their arguments around the promotion of the common good. Using offensive language against the Syrian refugees to consolidate electoral power in the 2015 election can be seen in the refugee crisis management since the EU came up with unpopular compulsory migrant relocation as a solution. In this respect, the Muslim refugees and migrants have been presented as a serious threat to the nation and culture by the ruling party owing to the assimilation of the national security of Poland.

Mostly the older Member States were trying to have solidarity on shared responsibility for migrants and refugees, due to the diversifications of the strategies in managing crisis, the governments of the Visegrád countries stood against the relocalization of migrants inside the EU and adopted fundamentally restrictive policies. They strengthened their ties in the region (Central and Eastern Europe) and developed a common political front against old EU MS regarding the migration issues. In Visegrád countries, Hungarian and Polish governing party the Fidesz- *Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége* (Hungary) and PiS (Poland) adopted similar stances towards the crisis. Moreover, their spectacular decisions against the refugees caused fear among the citizens, so, the crisis had been used as an advantageous tool in the presidential and parliamentary election campaigns in 2014 and 2015. However, their attitudes towards Muslims and the refugee crisis depicted differences in varied periods. Supported by a growing anti-migrant public discourse in Europe, Hungarian and Polish governing parties had adopted similar stances towards Muslims and refugees to maximize electoral gain in the political campaigns. Despite facing many other issues in their own domestic politics, the refugee crisis was at the centre of both political agendas of Hungary and Poland. In order to stay in power, to improve their electoral success and to shift the public's attention from domestic problems (such as corruption and problems in the health care system); governing parties securitized the migration issue, polarised the society and shaped the political agenda around this question and by this mean legitimized controversial domestic policies. Moreover, right-wing politicians, far-right movements, and the media played a significant role in radicalizing the public discourse with influential anti- refugee campaign linking terrorists and Muslims & refugees. As a result, a crucial shift in public opinion on Muslims and refugees were recorded with a shift from positive perception to negative one. Even though the EU

immigration policy had failed to cope with the crisis, the quota solution was proposed to encourage MS that are opposing to accepting refugees. As a result, those V4 countries were threatened by being subject to sanctions by the EU. However, the application of sanctions did not create a significant change in the migration policy and the stances of Hungary and Poland.

Although “Neither Hungary nor Poland have ever been with a crucial Muslim population or experiences a serious refugee inflow” (Sosnowska, 2018, p.149), they talked about the issue as a threat in many different security aspects, such as threat to their territorial integrity, terrorist attacks, national autonomy, culture, and economy. The reasons for Poland’s unwillingness to accept refugees have been listed in the literature as the following, history with Muslims and refugees, fear of identity loss, nationalism, and lack of experience, economic fears, and integration difficulties.

4.3 Discussion and Analysis: the nexus between domestic and foreign policy means in Poland

As Jiri Pehe (1998, p.61) stated “foreign policy is never merely a mirror of the domestic conditions of given country” (Pehe, 1998). However, Nick Evans (2009) argued that public opinion has a great impact on government’s decisions, and eventually on foreign policy. In this respect, both domestic policy and foreign policy decisions share the similar tendencies, ideological goals, strategies and ambitions (Evans, 2009). Interlink between domestic and foreign policy is significant to comprehend the transformation from Europeanization to de-Europeanization that Poland had. The international relations literature has argued that foreign policy has been utilized as a legitimisation mechanism for the domestic regime (Meister, 2019). The instrumentalization of foreign policies has

been serving for political leaders' aim to distract public attention from government's failures and domestic problems. The prevailing opinion handles that national values and interests make collective action problematic at the Union level. These cases show that the national values and preferences improve their dominance over the EU and these results in a decrease in the effectiveness and legitimacy of Brussels, practices and EU institutions.

In 2015, the ruling party PiS formed a government with many promises to strengthen the country's foreign policy. Thenceforth, nevertheless, the country's status in the EU has hardly enhanced even a tiny portion and even it adopted an opposite direction from the EU policies (Evans, 2009). The literature exemplifies that there is comprehensive proof of the ways in which national cultures can influence the potential experience for de-Europeanisation in the country. The ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) has launched a process of 'de-Europeanisation' to establish a greater sense of sovereignty in the country and to oppose the model that was projected as western Member States of the EU's imposed model. Polish populist and right-wing ruling party has been stated as working to distance itself from Brussels due to the economic and ideological concerns. From an ideological point of view, the political party depicts the EU as a threat to Poland's identity and culture. Moreover, the ruling party projected the EU as the source of limit for Poland's ambition of becoming one of big trading centres among the Member States. In pursuit of its goals, the Law and Justice Party tried to form alternative alliances such as the Visegrad Group, and improve bilateral relations with countries such as the UK, by pushing its long-standing partners away. As part or result of the de-Europeanization of Poland, and the Visegrad group neighbours, with a small leverage, as a distancing and challenging and components from the EU. In his case, the ruling party PiS demonstrated that Warsaw has made an effectively inconsistent balancing act between potentially conflicting configurations

(Dyduch & Müller, 2021). There is some evidence that the Polish government would prefer to prevent unilateral deflection and build alliances with the Visegrad Group to cover its intentions and eliminate the potential high costs. To reverse the situation in Poland, Dyduch and Müller (2021) suggested that the re-Europeanization is possible still if the country experiences a domestic regime change (Smith, 2021). This understanding confirms that there is a nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy in Poland. Poland's opposite direction from the Weimar Triangle also represented the rightward transition that Warsaw had experienced. The Weimar Triangle is a term grouping Germany, France and Poland by aiming to promote the cooperation between each other. This was first established in 1991 in order to assist Polish Government after the abolishment of the communist regime (Bachman, 2016). To consider all these, briefly, de-Europeanization is about the decrease in the willingness of member states to take a part in the common EU policies and collective actions. In this respect, these reluctant states start to prioritize their national values and interests over the EU decisions.

According to the survey conducted by the PEW Research Center's Spring 2016 Global Survey, in Poland, 73% of the population stated that the refugees from Syria and Iraq are a threat to the country and are a security problem. In this case, Warsaw has the highest stance among other member states whose populations share a similar stance for being anti-refugee. Moreover, in another survey focusing on the negative view of refugees and Muslims, Polish society depicted a result where favorable is 51% while unfavourable part is higher with 81%. Last but not least, another survey asked if the increase in diversity within the society is a good thing; Polish society answered that diversity is the worst thing,

with 40%, while only 14% described it as a good thing.⁸³ Since democracy is among the core European norms and values, as Krizsan and Roggeband (2018) argue, democracy and its level could be examined by the responsiveness of the country along with the level of inclusiveness (Krizsan and Roggeband, 2018, pp.91). The literature has also demonstrated Poland as a flawed democracy country due to the backlashes in democracy and the rule of law in the country (Krizsan and Roggeband, 2018, pp.93). Even though the country fits to the democratic state profile with its constitution and procedures, the lack of securitizing human rights and limiting government's power have been illustrated as illiberal democracy (Surowiec, Kania-Lundholm, & Winiarska-Brodowska, 2019) (Grzebalska and Peto, 2018).

As part of de-Europeanization and the transformation of Poland, this chapter examined two examples; the anti-abortion law and the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis. First of all, abortion is not the one and only problem on which the political representatives that should reverberate the range of people's ideas and perspectives are much more conservative than the average Polish voters. In this case, both the ruling party and the opposition consist almost only of conservatives has a specific social result. The liberal worldview of a significant part of the Polish society is not represented politically, for example, their views on abortion. The issues that they care about are labelled as surrogate problems (*problemy zastępcze*). Hence, the Polish political sphere is much more unequivocal than the Polish public opinion. Overall, the balance between pro-abortion and anti-abortion groups is impacted by the change in the government. Whenever there was a conservative and religious leader supporting the restriction of abortion publicly, the society was shaped

⁸³ For more on this, see: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/>

accordingly. However, the change in other factors began to alter the efficiency and power of the leader towards this debate. Since 2016, because of mass demonstrations, even though leaders are stating their personal opinions time to time, in order to not lose a majority of the public, they try to exclude their party out of this debate. Moreover, although the opposition in the parliament is weak and it is not easy for younger politicians to win the election as a result of big party politics system, the strong and efficient resistance was formed by the societal groups such as women's rights activists and NGOs.

Although the party began to cause backsliding in the country, its support and popularity maintained. The reasons why were discussed in the both international relations and political science literatures. Due to the party rhetoric's focus on the socio-economic subjects improved the welfare state status, they achieved to strengthen their voter base. For example, because the party leaders kept their promises about many of the high-profile social spending pledges, the 2015 election was able to maintain the majority of the votes. The 500+ child benefit program (*Rodzina 500+*) (First results of Poland's Family 500+ programme released, 2018) has been introduced in the country in 2016. The initial aims are to boost birth rates and diminish child poverty by advancing large families' living standards. Since there were a high number of families that suffered from the post-communist economic transformation, this subsidy program was very much welcomed. By implementing reforms that are in favour of the traditional family structure in the country enabled the political party to consolidate their power and improve their electoral success (Szczurbiak, 2019). In addition, even though experiencing the political leaders keeping their promises by the Polish society and witnessing the expansion of the social spending along with tax cuts created massive strain on public finances; the ruling party politics achieved to maintain the voter support.

The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) depicted that Poland ranked 24th in 2020 European Equality Index with a score below the average. The assessment of EIGE compared the member states and assessed the gender equality overall according to the EU frameworks and regulations (EIGE, 2020). Although the gender equality has been preserved in the Polish Constitution with particular gender law, since 2015 the Polish government has not introduced any additional policy to the existing one (EIGE, 2019). This exemplifies how the Polish government altered the advancement in the human rights, in particular women's rights, and not include the subject in its priorities (Graff, 2014). Nevertheless, Brussels possesses crucial components to create pressure on Warsaw regarding the implementation of gender equality strategies via European Social Fund in the country by using the legal framework (Gerber, 2010, p.31).

In the EU accession process and afterwards, in order to cope with the domestic gender inequality problem in the country, various changes have been introduced in Labor Code and improved the anti-discrimination law. These changes have been made in line with the EU Equal opportunities strategy that was present in Poland namely National Action Plan for Women (NAP). The second NAP had been also followed the first goal of corresponding the EU policy requirements. Even though the accession forced the Polish government to reformulate its existing gender strategy and policies, the second NAP dissolved in 2005 (Rutkowska, 2008, pp.94-95). However, the importance of gender equality has lost its value in years and the value of family and family related policies began to improve its significance.

The ruling political government conceptualized the gender ideology as a threat to the traditional Polish family values and parenthood. Even though the government had never

explicitly depicted gender equality is a bad thing, the link they created between the ideology and the western idea served for the increase in the Euroscepticism in the country. With the help of political discourses favouring the value of children, tradition, family structure; the Polish government achieved to present the EU as a thing that does not correspond values promoted by Poland. In this case, Warsaw delegitimized the EU approach, values and its required policies. By illustrating the Polish identity, values and culture as a priority; the government showed this challenging Brussels as a securing mechanism for the sake of the country. The misfits between the Polish ruling party priorities and agenda, and the EU expectations and regulations have been strong.

Not only the political reasons but also the religion played a role in the question of gender and abortion rights in the country. The political agenda repeatedly adopted the question of abortion. The literature discussed that the Catholic Church had a significant impact on the society and eventually on the politics (Szelewa, 2016, pp.739). EIGE, that is the EU knowledge centre focusing on gender, has a part related to the reproductive health and rights within its regulations; “women should have the right to her own body, hence deciding when or if she wants to have children” (EIGE, 2019). That is why the abortion rights and the implementations in Poland became a matter of the European Union. That is why the evolution of women’s rights and current situation in Poland have been stated as diverged from the EU norms and values due to the framing gender equality, particularly the abortion rights. The domestic pressure from the conservative and right-wing voters that are in favour of banning the abortion rights completely in the country along with the Catholic Church support legitimized the ruling PiS’ stance vis a vis the EU. In this case, the Commissioner for Human Rights, European Parliament and European Commission criticized the government and commented on the regulations in the country.

As a result of the interlink between domestic politics and foreign policies, the PiS achieved to benefit from the misfits with the EU and de-Europeanization by postponing the integrational processes, required follow up EU regulations. The transformation to de-Europeanization and instrumentalization of the dispute with Brussels fasten its speed after 2016 until early 2020. The government's Family 500 plus program that is a subsidy program for families to support having children and introducing incentives to families, aiming to bolster the highlight on family importance in the society. This, again, exemplified the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy decisions and relations.

Secondly, widely studied and defined Syrian refugee crisis, its impacts in Europe played a great role in the scholarly works in the period 2015-2018 (Troszynski & El-Ghamari, 2022). Populist leaders define their supporters and depict an enemy to fight with by using "us vs them" rhetoric (Görlach, 2018). As the Syrian refugee crisis became an enemy to Poland, the image of gender began to be blurry since 2015. The discriminatory narratives of the government and specifically the anti-gender statements of leaders such as Kaczyński with his right-wing populist supporters expand the gap within the society. Consequently, liberals, feminists and genderists became "them" while religious, nationalists and conservatives became "us". Because populist leaders introduced themselves as pro-natalist, they achieved to be recognized as defenders of the Polish families from society's point of view. Due to their heroic position, their anti-gender stances were not questioned a lot.

The political discourse has been stated as successful to shape the public opinion and influenced the demand of citizens. When the Poles were on the streets and marched against

the refugee relocation quota system of the EU, the Polish government found a justification mechanism for its foreign policy decisions. The refugee crisis became central to the EU due to the mass migration and problems in the management. In the domestic context of Poland, with the 2015 Parliamentary election and the 2018 local election campaigns demonstrated reflections of this refugee crisis in the political discourses and voter demands. This clearly represented the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy in the country. Michal Krzyzanowski also stated, “The second half of 2015 brought a significant change to the Polish political discourse. This change was characterized by a rapid move from a near lack of any immigration-related debates, to a strong and forceful anti-immigrant rhetoric of discrimination or even outright hatred towards migrants and, in particular, asylum seekers arriving in Europe” (Krzyzanowski, 2018, p.76). The motivation of the Polish political leaders that have securitized the refugee crisis have been explained with different reasons from ideological, historical to the concern over Islamic radicalization possibility in the country. Politicization of immigration and the securitization of the refugees enabled the government to shape their arguments in the domestic concept and justified their foreign policy decisions even they were not in line with the EU requirements.

The governing party's political discourses began to emphasise its sovereignty's importance and shaped its actions accordingly. This pattern is also among the indications of the de-Europeanisation concept. Furthermore, the domestic approach going against the previous Europeanisation in the country began to be challenged by the decrease in the foreign policy cooperation between the EU and Poland. In this respect, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland altered the fundamental approach of its diplomatic service and strategy from *"To serve Poland – to build Europe – to understand the world"* phrase to

*"Faithful to my Homeland, the Republic of Poland"*⁸⁴ where they did not mention the EU (Buras, 2017). As part of the shift in Poland's governing party rhetoric, the leaders stated that they want to choose their main partners in the foreign policy within the Union. In 2016 for instance, Witold Waszczykowski, the Polish Foreign Minister, showed Germany as a member state that is no longer the country's priority partner. This is also indicating the country's Europeanisation concept pursuing to be close to the western allies with, for example, mantra saying "the road to Europe goes through Germany".⁸⁵ In 2016, the Prime Minister Beata Szydło said she will "defend Poland's reputation. In Brussels, I will be talking facts. Don't you think that we will lead our foreign policy on our knees" as a response to the European Commission.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ See the current website of the Polish Ministry of Foreign affairs here: <http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/>; and the archived page with the previous standfirst here:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20170313153402/http://www.msz.gov.pl:80/en/>.

⁸⁵ https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_reparations_and_the_crisis_of_polands_foreign_policy_7224/

⁸⁶ <http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/bede-bronic-dobrego-imienia-polski>.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis took the (de)Europeanization as the central theory and tested it in an EU member state (Poland) to demonstrate whether there is a nexus between de-Europeanisation domestically and foreign policy behavior. In order to test and depict the link and the transformation Poland had, Europeanisation theory has also been analyzed. I divided Poland's recent political history into Europeanisation (1990-2010) and de-Europeanisation (2010-2020). Each period was examined with one domestic and one foreign policy component to show the relations between and the transition. I have chosen Poland as my case study since I wanted to test the de-Europeanisation theory in an EU Member State. Moreover, due to Poland's dynamic processes of Europeanization and democratization has changed in recent years; the country was an excellent example to study the selected theory and to test if there is a link between domestic politics and foreign policy. Furthermore, many de-Europeanization studies in the literature focus on other countries with a general tendency to study de-Europeanisation by focusing on democratic backsliding and populism. That is why I wanted to adopt another perspective to analyze the subject. In conclusion, the research and the interviews I conducted also confirmed that the de-Europeanisation in Poland has implications. Therefore, these implications are valid even if for the member state of the Union. Moreover, it is still very possible that the dominant party, like the PiS in Poland, utilizes conservative-authoritarian values of the

society and uses institutional mechanisms such as judiciary throwback to Europeanization. Briefly, paired cases have been utilized to demonstrate precisely the nexus that is formed whereby domestic political transformation with Europeanization in the first phase and the de-Europeanisation in the second phase feeds into foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, this thesis benefited from a data triangulation that consist of primary sources, secondary sources and semi-structured Elite Interviews.

For a long time, Poland was governed by the Soviet system dominated by a strict authoritarian and bureaucratic regime. The country turned its direction and fundamental values to Europe, especially after the 1990s, with its exit from the communist system. After the end of the Cold War, Polish foreign policy has been a comprehensible centric point of many areas for academics and policymakers. Not only the collapse of communist regime, but also the efforts to be a member of democratic Union, the EU, became a great influence⁸⁷ on Poland's symbolic alteration and transformation. The Union has been an attractive with the security, economic and social benefits offered to its members, in the international area. Since the various fields in the literature states that the EU is a crucial part of the national politics not only for its members but also in the region and for the candidates for the membership, this thesis has an importance for covering the de-Europeanisation concept. The end of communist regime in 1989 and the Cold War by 1991, the provisions of the Amsterdam, Maastricht, and Nice Treaties that served for the EU Member States' integration, along with the enlargement in 2004, conceded to discussions on various theoretical approach to examine and clarify EU foreign policy-

⁸⁷ David L. Ellison, "Divide and Conquer: The EU Enlargement's Successful Conclusion?" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

making from Europeanization to de-Europeanization⁸⁸. This has revealed the process of Europeanization, one of the essential facts and concepts regarding harmonization with the EU. Depending on its political, social, and cultural dimensions, the Europeanization process also affected the Polish public, legal, and administration systems.

Since Poland has been changing the centre of its focus after the fall of communist regime and orienting it around its national interests and sovereignty in several styles and forms (Grzeszczak 2017). After that, Warsaw tried to integrate with the West economically and politically without wasting time. In this process, integration with the West, strengthening relations, and making up for the damage caused by the communist regime and history with was in the country were among the most critical goals on the road map that Poland drew for itself. The two main pillars of Poland's relations with the West were, at that time, NATO and the EU. Poland initiated ambitious political reforms along with the economic ones in order to join the NATO and the EU. In this case, to be a part of the Western world, supporting and adopting democracy both domestically and internationally became a necessity for country's foreign policy decisions. In the Polish foreign policy, the country formed its policies and stance close to the EU in economic issues and to the USA and NATO in political and security issues and has regulated its foreign policy which is influenced by domestic policy. After the communist regime ended in 1989, the effort to establish an alliance with the West and the steps taken to do the necessary in this regard started the Europeanization process in the country. Many articles in the literature examine the Europeanization process through the example of Poland. Polish political actors, who wanted the country to be included in the European integration

⁸⁸ For more on this, see: Moravcsik, A., Vachudova M. A. "National Interests, State Power and EU Enlargement" *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 17, No. 42, 2003.

after the Cold War and its rapid integration with the West, formed essential support elements of the Europeanization process of public administration in order to eliminate the incompatibility that emerged between the national level and the EU level during the candidacy process. This thesis focuses on Poland's new constitution adopted in 1997 and the EU-NATO membership processes to explain the Europeanization process. The Europeanization process stopped after the election victories of the PiS political party, which is still in power, and the de-Europeanization process started. Although this reverse process from Europeanisation to de-Europeanisation and the changes in the country were not explained much with a particular emphasis on Poland in the social sciences literature, EU experts and academics have noted this reversion in their studies.

5.1 Why does Poland matter?

Warsaw has undergone a massive transformation in its international and domestic environments in the last two decades. As a result of all the alterations, political crisis and usability, financial problems, and alliances also experienced fast shifts. The geopolitical position of Poland and the loss of independence on its lands repeatedly in its history have been among the reasons for choosing it to study and analyze in the literature as a country. Two significant threats came from its eastern and western borders: Poland struggled for independence for years under the pressure of Germany and the USSR. This struggle was influential in the roadmap Warsaw drew for himself after the collapse of the communist regime. In addition, in the post-communist era, the country began to look for new alliances to strengthen its position in the international area. After Poland successfully completed the EU membership process in 2004, which made many changes and implemented many reforms for the membership process, the country often took place in the literature as an

example of successful Europeanization and democratization (Kutlu, 2006, p.172). The alterations in Poland's domestic political landscape since 2004 EU membership along with the changes in the government with diversified priorities for each have made the case of Poland relevant to study in International Relations literature.

As a result of the international agreements, Poland gave up on its complete independence to become an EU member and started to benefit from the opportunities that emerged in many economic and political issues thanks to its membership. However, over the last decade, the country's attempts to undermine EU integration processes from time to time by putting its national interests and sovereignty first, refusing to contribute to common policies suggested by the European Commission, and its efforts to form other alliances as an alternative to EU membership, such as the US and the V4 Group, have made the country an attractive country to study in the social sciences literature. Being a country that went through these changes and transformations, Poland became an attractive case study for a long time in the literature⁸⁹ (Grabowska 2014).

5.2 What do we learn from it regarding both Europeanization and de-Europeanization?

Briefly, this thesis benefited from the Europeanisation theory as the effect of the EU on its member states while de-Europeanisation as moving away from common policies and distancing itself from Brussels and its core values and norms (Vink and Graziano 2008). In addition to this, the research findings once again proves that there is a nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy, and these two cannot be considered without each other. Due to the limited scope of the thesis, many convenient and related topics had

⁸⁹ To read more, see: <https://pl.boell.org/en/2014/07/22/gender-equality-poland-after-eu-accession-expectations-and-reality>

been skipped or simply referred to in passing and chosen ones as two examples for each concept have been explored in detail. That is why the (de)Europeanisation framework and the transformation have been analysed as the following with particular examples.

Today, the term Europeanization is widely used to indicate the institutional adaptation processes and their reactions at the national level in the face of pressures from the EU or its institutional units (Olsen, 2002). At the root of this interaction is the growth and deepening of the institutional arrangements brought about by European integration at the European level. As a result, the existence of a political system that has the authority to set rules at the supranational level. As certain norms, directives, and values created by this system begin to penetrate national institutions and decision-making processes, harmonization occurs between European and national levels (Morlino, 1999, p.3). In other words, the emergence of a process of harmonization between the EU and national levels is “the emergence of a distinctive political system at the European level and a set of political institutions that make the constant interaction between the actors official and routine, and the development of a political network specialized in the creation of European rules with sanction power” (Cowles et al., 2001, p.4).

The Europeanization framework that this thesis adopted is the following; “Europeanization is treated as looking for some universal system of values, characteristic of the European culture and importing legal institutions created on the Western European continent to Poland.” (Golebiowska, 2022), “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech,

1999, p. 71)⁹⁰, and, “a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making” (T. Börzel, 1999, p. 574)^{91,92}.

European integration⁹³ has altered nation-states with their domestic institutions and political cultures (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001). Europeanization caused different transformations in the institutional structures in the domestic context of its states. Each member of the Union had to modify its existing systems and policies in order to adapt itself to the EU standards. The general description of the Europeanization concept refers to its influence on domestic politics as noncontroversial in the literature. However, politics within the EU members have been affected and changed daily by the Union in various ways due to Brussels’ actions and legislation. The fact that member and candidate nation states transfer or will transfer their sovereignty to Brussels significantly reshaping the interests and behaviors of national actors and institutions according to the European level (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Bulmer and Burch, 1998). Because of the obligation of fulfilling certain obligations in the harmonization process of the member states and candidate countries acting in order to meet the membership requirements, the national policy areas, which are formed within the EU policy-making processes and then included in the national policies and institutions, increasingly turn into the subject of policy-making at the European level (Börzel, 1999, p.574). In this context, Europeanization is “a process in which member nation states and candidate countries are under the influence of EU

⁹⁰ Lawton, T. (1999). Governing the Skies: Conditions for the Europeanisation of Airline Policy. *Journal of Public Policy*, 19(1), pp. 91-112.

⁹¹ Börzel, T., & Risse, T. (2000). When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change. *EUI Working Papers*, RSC No. 2000/56, European University Institute in Florence.

⁹² Börzel, T. (2002). Member State Responses to Europeanization. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), pp. 193-214.

⁹³ Dyson, K. (2002). Introduction: EMU as Integration, Europeanization and Convergence. In: Dyson, K., (Ed.), *European States and the Euro. Europeanization, Variation and Convergence*. Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press.

policies, rules, practices, and values in terms of both their policy-making processes and policy implementation and accordingly harmonize their national policies with the EU” (Bulmer and Burch, 1998, p.602) (Knill and Lenschow, p.1998).

As the concept has been discussed in the third chapter, Europeanization framework was analysed through the 1997 Constitution and the EU-NATO membership process of Poland.

5.2.1 The 1997 Constitution

After the 1989 elections, the Polish government made great efforts to transform the structure of the state into a better organized, effective, and civil-oriented solid administrative structure. Following the abandonment of the communist order in 1988, the basic principles taken into account in the restructuring of the state structure in Poland; democracy, the rule of law, respect for individual rights, private property, and a market economy. The law was accepted in the Parliament on October 17, 1992 and was called the "Little Constitution" (Kızılcık, 2003, p.563).

Europeanisation was visible in the new 1997 Constitution with the inclusion of the core European norms and values such as the protection of human rights, respect for the rule of law and democracy.⁹⁴ First of all, The Republic of Poland is a secular state as stated in the Article 25.2 of the 1997 constitution⁹⁵. To give another example, The 1997

⁹⁴ **The 1997 Constitution:** “**Article 32:** 1.All persons shall be equal before the law. All persons shall have the right to equal treatment by public authorities. 2.No one shall be discriminated against in political, social or economic life for any reason whatsoever. **Article 33:** 1.Men and women shall have equal rights in family, political, social and economic life in the Republic of Poland. 2.Men and women shall have equal rights, in particular, regarding education, employment and promotion, and shall have the right to equal compensation for work of similar value, to social security, to hold offices, and to receive public honours and decorations.”

⁹⁵ To have more information, see: <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/POL>

Constitute for example guaranteed the freedom of expression in Article 54. Even earlier to the new Constitution, in 1991, the Europe Agreement was signed to develop the conditions for robust and efficient reforms in the country's economy and politics. It also aimed to supply the institutional framework and legal basis for relations between Union and Warsaw. Besides, the section on the citizens' rights and freedoms, and the third part, describes the sources of law illustrate the Europeanisation by showing common values with the Union. Last but not least, decentralization after the communist regime illustrated a clear example of Europeanisation in Poland since this structure is the one that European Commission supports.

5.2.2 EU-NATO Membership

In “1 September 1993: President Lech Wałęsa, in a letter addressed to NATO Secretary General, stated that NATO membership was one of the priorities of the Polish foreign policy.” (Poland n.d.).⁹⁶ Polish government prioritized the EU membership in the post-communist era. All the reforms, institutional and political changes were formed and made according to the EU standards and membership requirements. On the contrary, as the opposite concept has been discussed in the third chapter, the de-Europeanization framework was analyzed through the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis and the anti-abortion law developments in Poland.

The de-Europeanization framework that this thesis adopted is the following;

⁹⁶ To more on Poland's defence and security, see “Poland in NATO - more than 20 years”: <https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/poland-in-nato-20-years>

“De-Europeanisation refers to dynamics where Member States pull back from previously established common European understandings, roles and priorities that have emerged through Europeanisation” (Smith, 2021 pp. 524) and “De-Europeanization relates to situations where EU foreign policy making runs against the grain of certain Member States’ declared values and interests; where Member States are less willing to engage in collective foreign-policy making at the EU-level, prioritising other multilateral frameworks or (unilateral) national actions; and where the results of that policy making are, on occasion, explicitly undermined by Member State practice.” (Müller, Pomorska, & Tonra., 2021, p. 519).

In 2004, after becoming one of the member states, Poland was depicted as a successful example of Europeanization. In this respect, Polish foreign policy has been formed with European norms and values; and marked by a significant degree of national structures' adaptation and policies in line with EU foreign policy cooperation (Kaminska, 2007). Nevertheless, the country's Europeanization process and commitment underwent a novel challenge due to the rise of right-wing and populist movements such as the current Polish Law and Justice Party's stance. Even though Poland does not represent the sole instance of populist governments, the recent disputes between Warsaw and Brussels create the need to understand how Polish foreign policy decision-making works and the factors influencing this process (Dyduch & Müller, 2021). One of the basic building blocks of the EU is the supremacy of EU law over national legislation. The EU Member States consented that they will act in line with the standard criteria and principles of the Union to ensure harmony among each other such as in their administrative systems⁹⁷ that

⁹⁷ Diplomat, P. (2022, 03 15). Embassy Official. (Author, Interviewer)

includes constitutional provisions. In addition, the decisions of the European Court of Justice are binding for the institutions and national courts⁹⁸ of all member states. For this reason, EU membership has often been interpreted in the literature as a complete and unlimited commitment to shared values, a common European identity and rules. Since the EU is a supranational organization, the states that are members of the Union agree to comply with the *acquis*, rules and values before becoming a member of the EU. They transfer some of their sovereign rights to the EU institutions in this direction. In other words, member states become members by accepting that the laws of the EU are superior and prioritized over their national laws. This situation is very clearly revealed in the *acquis* of the European Union. Due to the EU's mechanism, academic studies have frequently shown that the concept of de-Europeanization in Poland and the attitude of the Polish government that ignores or constantly criticizes the EU are contrary to the basis and logic of EU membership. Therefore, the European Commission and the literature have stated that the attitude Poland⁹⁹ has taken today against the rules it accepted while becoming a member is unacceptable (Nowak & Szlachta, 2021). As Anna Wojcik also states the ruling party, “PiS always looked at the EU with a great suspicion, but the EU is very popular in the population. They understand also they greatly benefit from the membership” (Wojcik, 2022).

5.2.3 The Anti-abortion bill

⁹⁸ Gwizdak, J. (2022, 07 16). Former Polish Judge. (Author, Interviewer)

⁹⁹ After joining the EU in 2004, Poland gradually became the largest beneficiary of financial transfers under the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF). The EU programs its policies and budget in a multiannual financial framework (MFF) for seven years in the last few time horizons (2007-2013, 2014-2020 and 2021-2027). In addition, about 1/3 of the EU budget expenditure is released under the European cohesion policy.

As it was discussed various times by many scholars like Piotr Buras (2017) "Poland's Law and Justice Party (PiS) has embarked on a process of 'de-Europeanisation' to give the country a greater sense of sovereignty and to push back against the socio-cultural model that it feels is imposed by western Europe." (Piotr Bura, 2017, p.1). Among the subjects impacted by the de-Europeanisation transformation, the literature covers the anti-abortion bill in Poland.

The fall of communism in 1989 influenced and altered Polish women's rights and access to reproductive health care. Accordingly, the government subsidies and services for families with children and affordability of the health services for women were all changed negatively because of the increased power of the Catholic Church. Since the country adopted neoliberal economic reforms, not only religion but also the cutbacks in social services were caused due to changes in governmental policies. The privatization of women's health services posed new challenges for the access to the abortion services and the birth control pills. In addition to these restrictions, in 1993, the Polish government introduced a ban on abortion.

Transformations and changes¹⁰⁰ that took place in the internal affairs and legal structures of the EU member states or the candidate countries were named as Europeanization framework in the literature, briefly (Soyaltin-Collella and Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm, 2020). Among many policy areas, the principle of equal pay for men and women was adopted in Article 119 of the 1957 Rome Agreement. The prohibition of discrimination and equal treatment directives adopted in the 1970s formed the legal infrastructure of gender equality policies. On the eve of the 1995 Beijing Platform

¹⁰⁰ Wojcik, A. (2022, 08 13). Assistant Professor at Polska Akademia Nauk. (Author, Interviewer)

for Action, the promotion of gender equality within and outside the EU was identified as an essential part of EU identity construction (Kunz & Maisenbacher, 2017). In this context, the EU is involved in the employment policies of the member states (Zartaloudis, 2011; Zartahoudis, 2015), the reconciliation practices of work and family life (Eräranta and Kantola, 2016), and the enactment of gender equality laws in post-communist countries (Anderson, 2006; Chiva, 2009; Avdeyeva, 2015) has been effective. The 2018 report of the European Parliament Policy Department on Civil Rights and Constitutional Affairs highlights that there has been a decline in gender equality policies in six EU countries (Austria, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Romania, and Slovakia)¹⁰¹ after the EU¹⁰² membership (European Parliament, 2018). This report reveals that EU membership and the full membership award, which is often emphasized within the framework of Europeanization, do not make reforms and policies towards gender equality sustainable.

5.2.4 The Syrian Refugee Crisis

The political discourses of refugees and migration in Poland influenced the Europeanisation concept's political dimension and direction. This has been achieved with the political leaders' nationalist and conservative demonstration of Brussels as a dictator and attacker of its national interests. The literature and policymakers stated that since their electoral power in 2015, the ruling Law and Justice Party has been expressing dissatisfaction with Brussels and the EU's suggested society standard. This dissatisfaction's roots have been called de-Europeanisation in the country, mainly resting in deeply rooted beliefs about culture, nation, and Europe within the ruling Law and

¹⁰¹ To read more on the EU gender policies, see: <https://kockam.ku.edu.tr/avrupa-birligi-feminist-bir-aktor-olabilir-mi/>

¹⁰² Anderson, L. (2006). European Union gender regulations in the East: The Czech and Polish accession process. *East European Politics and Societies*, 20, 101-125.

Justice party and its voter base. That is why the ruling PiS has been depicted as a political party purposely moving away from the Europeanisation approach-direction¹⁰³ that began in the 1990s and was adopted by the Polish governments in their search for modernisation and desire to build an alliance with the West¹⁰⁴. Remarkably, the Polish government redirected from formulating and showing the Union and membership as an opportunity for the country and began to illustrate the EU as a risk (Buras, 2017).

5.3 Conclusion

“Regular studies commissioned by the European Commission clearly indicate that Poles are among the least Eurosceptic nations in the EU. In 2019, 68% of Poles believed that EU membership was generally beneficial (7% more than the EU average)” (Szałańska, 2020, p.14). That is why this makes the study of de-Europeanisation in Poland interesting. The chosen domestic politics and foreign policy cases for both Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation depict that the foreign policy decisions are not taken independent from the domestic politics. To sum up, by taking all the conducted interviews, official documents, the publications from the social science literature; Poland clearly represents a case study in which the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy.

¹⁰³ Cowles, M., Caporaso, J. & Risse, T. (Eds.) (2001). *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

¹⁰⁴ Jenne, E. K. (2022, 08 10). Professor at Central European University. (Author, Interviewer)

REFERENCES

- About the Visegrad Group*. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.visegradgroup.eu/about>
- Alkopher, T. D. (2018). EU's Disunited Response to the 2015 Refugee Crisis: A View from the Perspective of the Psychological Theory of DID. *Political Psychology*, 1389-1403.
- Arkan, Z. (2015). Imagining 'Europe': Constituting Turkey's Identity on the Path to EU Membership. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 134-146.
- Arkan, Z., & Gürleyen, I. (2015, December 8). The Europeanization of education in Turkey. In A. Güney, & A. Tekin, *The Europeanisation of Turkish Public Policies*. Routledge.
- Augustyn, A. M. (2022, July 18). European Commission Evaluation Expert. (Author, Interviewer)
- Augustyn, A., & Gusztáv, N. (2014). Catching up with the West? Europeanisation of rural policies in Hungary and Poland. *Studies in Agricultural Economics*, 114-121.
- Bachman, B. (2016, June 16). *Diminishing Solidarity: Polish Attitudes toward the European Migration and Refugee Crisis*. Migration Policy Institute.
<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/diminishing-solidarity-polish-attitudes-toward-european-migration-and-refugee-crisis>
- Barwiński, M. (2013). Polish Interstate Relations With Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania After 1990 In The Context Of The Situation Of National Minorities. *European Spatial Research and Policy*, 6-23.
- Bank, T. W. (2022, July 18). *World Bank: Poland's Growth Potential Could Reach 4 Percent with Reforms and Investments*. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/07/18/world-bank-poland-growth-potential-could-reach-4-percent-with-reforms-and-investments>
- Będę bronić dobrego imienia Polski*. (2016, 01 13). Retrieved from <https://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/bede-bronic-dobrego-imienia-polski>
- Biernat, S., & Kawczyńska, M. (2019). The Role of the Polish Constitution (Pre-2016): Development of a Liberal Democracy in the European and International Context. In A. Albi, & S. Bardutzky, *National Constitutions in European and Global Governance: Democracy, Rights, the Rule of Law* (pp. 746-795). UK: ASSER PRESS.

- Bretherton, C., & Mannin, M. (2013). *The Europeanization of European Politics*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brudzinska, K. (2021, June 17). *Central European Support for Democracy: New Drivers and Challenges*. Carnegie Europe. <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/06/17/central-european-support-for-democracy-new-drivers-and-challenges-pub-84759>
- Bucholc, M. (2022). Abortion Law and Human Rights in Poland: The Closing of the Jurisprudential Horizon. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, 73–99.
- Buras, P. (2017, September). Europe and its Discontents: Poland's Collision Course With the European Union. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/europe_and_its_discontents_polands_collision_course_with_the_eu_7220/
- Buras, P. (2018). How Poland is Drifting Away from Liberal Democracy. *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Political Dialogue Asia*, 135-143.
- Bürkner, H.-J. (2020). Europeanisation versus Euroscepticism: Do Borders Matter? *Geopolitics*, 545-566.
- BTI. (2022). *Poland Country Report 2022*. Retrieved from <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/POL>
- Ciensi, J. (2017, May 21). *Why Poland doesn't want refugees*. <https://www.politico.eu/article/politics-nationalism-and-religion-explain-why-poland-doesnt-want-refugees/>
- Chambers, G. (2006). The Dual Challenge of Democratisation and European Integration in Post-Communist Poland. *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, 213-244.
- .
- Charlish, A. (2022, January 21). *Former Polish president and Solidarity leader Walesa has COVID*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/former-polish-president-solidarity-leader-walesa-has-covid-2022-01-21/>
- Cimoszewicz, W. (2003). The Eastern Dimension of the European Union: The Polish View. *The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood*. Speech at the Conference.
- Council of Europe (2017, July 17). Poland has a duty to preserve judicial independence. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/poland-has-a-duty-to-preserve-judicial-independence>

- Council of the European Union. (2022). What is the Eastern Partnership?
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/#:~:text=The%20Eastern%20Partnership%20was%20launched,Republic%20of%20Moldova%20and%20Ukraine>
- Czachór, Z. (2017). The enlargement of the European Union – Poland’s example. Between unity and diversity. *Przegląd Politologiczny*.
- Deegan-Krause, K. (2012). Populism, democracy, and nationalism in Slovakia. *Populism in Europe and the Americas*, 182-204.
- Deutsche Welle. (2022, March 4). *In U-turn on migrant policy, Poland rolls out welcome mat for Ukrainians*. <https://www.dw.com/en/in-u-turn-on-migrant-policy-poland-rolls-out-welcome-mat-for-ukrainians/a-61019601>
- Diplomat, P. (2022, March 15). Embassy Official. (Author, Interviewer)
- Dobrowolski, P. (2022, August 10). Polish Diplomat. (Author, Interviewer)
- Dyduch, J., & Müller, P. (2021). Populism Meets EU Foreign Policy: The De-Europeanization of Poland’s Foreign Policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. *Journal of European Integration*, 569-586.
- Dyson, K., & Goetz, K. (2003). Living with Europe: Power, Constraint, and Contestation. *Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraints*, 14.
- European Food Safety Authority. (s.d.). *Visegrad Fund*. <https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/funding/programmes/visegrad-fund>
- Ekiert, G. (2011). Dilemmas of Europeanization: Eastern and Central Europe after the EU Enlargement. *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, 1-28.
- European Commission. (2015, September 9). *Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action*. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_5596
- European Commission. (2016, January 13). Rule of law in Poland: Commission starts dialogue. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/WM_16_2030
- European Commission. (2017, December 20). *Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independence in Poland*. Press release. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm

- European Commission. (2018, May 16). First results of Poland's Family 500+ programme released. <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1246&newsId=9104&furtherNews=yes>
- European Commission (2019, April 3). Rule of Law: European Commission launches infringement procedure to protect judges in Poland from political control. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/IP_19_1957
- Eşençay, S. (2020, June 24). *Engenderings*. London School of Economics. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2020/06/24/when-covid-19-becomes-a-political-ally-polands-law-on-abortion/>
- Eşençay, S. (2021). Playing with Democracy: Hungary 101. *Political Reflection Magazine*, 40-42.
- Ette, A., & Faist, T. (2007). The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration: Research, Questions and Concepts. *Regulating Migration in Europe*, 3-32.
- Evans, N. (2009, May 16). *What is the Relationship Between Domestic and Foreign Policy? Should they even be Distinguished?* E-International Relations. <https://www.e-ir.info/2009/05/16/what-is-the-relationship-between-domestic-and-foreign-policy-should-they-even-be-distinguished/>
- Fisher, M. (2014, September 3). *Everything you need to know about the 2014 Ukraine crisis*. Vox. <https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know>
- Freedom House. (s.d.). Nations in Transit 2020: Dropping the Democratic Facade. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping-democratic-facade>
- Golebiowska, A. (2022). Europeanization of Law in Poland and Ensuring Information Security as a Task of Public Administration. *European Research Studies Journal*, 538-548.
- Grabowska, M. (2014, July 22). *Gender equality in Poland after EU accession. Expectations and reality*. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. <https://pl.boell.org/en/2014/07/22/gender-equality-poland-after-eu-accession-expectations-and-reality>.
- Grzeszczak, R. (2016). Charakter i rozwój procesu europeizacji prawa polskiego. *Prawo Europejskie Praktyce*, 12.
- Grzeszczak, R. (2017). Europeanisation of Polish Law Following Poland's Accession to the European Union. *Studia Iuridica*, 61-71.

- Gwiazda, A. (2002, September 19-22). *Europeanisation in Candidate Countries from Central and Eastern Europe*. http://aei.pitt.edu/737/1/C2W3_Gwiazda.pdf
- Gwizdak, J. (2022, July 16). Former Polish Judge. (Author, Interviewer)
- Hang, N. T. (2011). Europeanization: Simply a Top-Down Process? *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, 135-151.
- Holesch, A., & Kyriazi, A. (2021). Democratic backsliding in the European Union: the role of the Hungarian-Polish coalition. *East European Politics*, 1-21.
- Howell, K. (2002). Developing Conceptualizations of Europeanization and European Integration: Mixing Methodologies. *ESRC Seminar Series / UACES Study Group on the Europeanization of British Politics*, 1-27.
- Jasiecki, K. (2008). The Europeanization of Polish Democracy. *Polish Sociological Review*, 359–383.
- Jeglertz, C. R. (2021). The Backsliding of Women's Rights in Poland: A Qualitative Study of the Polish Framing of the European Union's Gender Equality Policies and Gender Mainstreaming. *Bachelor Thesis for C-Seminar in Political Science*. Umeå University: Department of Political Science.
- Jenne, E. K. (2022, August 10). Professor at Central European University. (Author, Interviewer)
- Joannin, P. (2003, June 8). Poland - Referendum on UE membership. European Elections Monitor. <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/eem/0203-referendum-on-the-european-union-in-poland-7th-8th-june-2003>
- Kaliber, A., & Aydin-Düzgit, S. (2017). *Is Turkey De-Europeanising?: Encounters with Europe in a Candidate Country*. Routledge.
- Kamińska, J. (2014). *Polska polityka zagraniczna po 2004 roku*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo.
- Kenney, P. (2002). *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989*. Princeton University Press.
- Keyman, E. F., & Düzgit, S. A. (2007). Europeanization, Democratization and Human Rights in Turkey. 69-89.
- Klaus, W. (2020). How Does Crimmigration Unfold in Poland?: Between Securitization Introduced to Polish Migration Policy by Its Europeanization and Polish Xenophobia. *Crimmigrant Nations*, 298-310.

- KOÇKAM. (2020, 11 11). *Avrupa Birliği Feminist Bir Aktör Olabilir mi?* Retrieved from <https://kockam.ku.edu.tr/avrupa-birligi-feminist-bir-aktor-olabilir-mi/>
- Kolodziejczyk, K. (2016). Poland in the European Union. Ten Years of Membership. *Revista UNISCI / UNISCI Journal*, 40, 1-18.
- Kyle, J., & Meyer, B. (2020). *High Tide? Populism in Power, 1990-2020*. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. <https://institute.global/sites/default/files/2020-02/High%20Tide%20Populism%20in%20Power%201990-2020.pdf>
- Ladrech, R. (1994). Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 69.
- Maciejewski, U. B. (2022, 03). *Sources and scope of European Union law*. Retrieved from European Parliament: Fact Sheets on the European Union: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/6/sources-and-scope-of-european-union-law>
- McMullen, M., & Peirce, G. (2004). Poland: The Land and Its People. A Curriculum Guide for Secondary School Teachers. *Center for Russian and East European Studies*, 1-90.
- Meister, S. (2019). The domestic and foreign policy nexus. *Politics, threat perception and Russian security strategy*. Routledge.
- Müller, P., Pomorska, K., & Tonra., B. (2021). The Domestic Challenge to EU Foreign Policy-Making: From Europeanisation to de-Europeanisation? *Journal of European Integration*, 519–534.
- Nivet, B. (2016). De-Europeanization. *Revue internationale et stratégique*, 50-59.
- Nobel Prize. (s.d.) Lech Walesa – Biographical. <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1983/walesa/biographical/>
- Nowak, M. J., & Szlachta, J. (2021). Europeizacja Polityki Przestrzeżonej Polski. 1-18: Reflection Papers numer 3 Komitetu Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Kraju PAN.
- Quaglia, L., Neuvonen, M., Miyakoshi, M., & Cini, M. (2007). Europeanization. *European Union Politics*, 405-420.
- European Parliament. (s.d.). *Note on Poland's Political and Economic Situation and its Relations with the European Union with a View to Accession*. Briefing No 12. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/12a3_en.htm
- European Parliament. (2016, September 2). *Visegrad group: opposition to the refugee quota system*. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-006652_EN.html

- Pehe, J. (1998). Connections between Domestic and Foreign Policy. *Perspectives*, 61-64.
- Petrova, T. (2014). From Solidarity to Geopolitics: Support for Democracy Among Postcommunist States. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Petrova, T. (2014). Polish Democracy Promotion in Ukraine. *Carnegie Rising Democracies Network*, 1-4.
- Petrova, T., & Aydin-Düzgit, S. (2021, January 5).
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/05/democracy-support-without-democracy-cases-of-poland-and-turkey-pub-83485>
- Pichlak, M. (2013). Zamknięty system źródeł prawa. *Studium instytucjonalizacji dyskursu prawniczego*, 19.
- Poland, W. o. (n.d.). *Poland in NATO - more than 20 years* . Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/poland-in-nato-20-years>
- Poland (s.d.). *Poland in the EU*. <https://www.gov.pl/web/eu/poland-in-the-eu>
- Poland. (s.d.). Solidarity Fund PL. <https://www.gov.pl/web/polishaid/solidarity-fund-pl>
- Poland (1997). Poland's Constitution of 1997. constituteproject.org.
- Poland (2004, May 6). Press Conference Given by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair and the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski in London. president.pl/archive/news-archive-2000-2010/news-2004/press-conference-given-by-the-prime-minister-tony-blair-and-the-president-of-poland-aleksander-kwasniewski-in-london,37910
- Poland (2004, August 1). *Participation of the President of the Republic of Poland in the celebrations to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising*.
<https://www.president.pl/archive/news-archive-2000-2010/news-2004/participation-of-the-president-of-the-republic-of-poland-in-the-celebrations-to-commemorate-the-60th-anniversary-of-the,37918>
- Poland (2004, July 15). *Visit of the President of Germany and his spouse to Poland*.
<https://www.president.pl/archive/news-archive-2000-2010/news-2004/visit-of-the-president-of-germany-and-his-spouse-to-poland,37921>
- Poland (2022, May 18). *Poland and Ukraine - Thirty Years of Partnership and Friendship*.
<https://www.gov.pl/web/southafrica/poland-and-ukraine---thirty-years-of-partnership-andfriendship#:~:text=Poland%20actively%20supported%20the%20democratic,on%20Maidan%20in%20February%202014.>

- Pospieszna, P. (2018). *Democracy Assistance Bypassing Governments in Recipient Countries: Supporting the "Next Generation"*. London and New York: Routledge.
- POUSHTER, J. (2016, 09 16). *European opinions of the refugee crisis in 5 charts*. Retrieved from <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/>
- Relations, A. P. (2022, July 16). (Author, Interviewer)
- Sahin, S. B. (2012). Timor-Leste: A More Confident or Overconfident Foreign Policy. *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 341-358.
- Ścierańska, K. (2015, August 21). *The Introduction of Martial Law in Poland*. ENRS. <https://enrs.eu/article/the-introduction-of-martial-law-in-poland>
- Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2005). Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. *Cornell University Press*.
- Smith, M. (2021, July 2). De-Europeanisation in European foreign policy-making: assessing an exploratory research agenda. *Journal of European Integration*, 637-649. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07036337.2021.1927012>
- Solidarity Fund PL. (s.d.). Democracy support programmes. <https://solidarityfund.pl/en/co-robimy/demokratyzacja/program-wsparcie-demokracji/>
- Sorokowski, A. D. (1996). Treaty between the Polish Republic and Ukraine on Good-Neighborliness, Friendly Relations, and Cooperation. *Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State*, 305-3012.
- Steves, F. (2001). Poland and the International System: external influences on democratic consolidation. *Poland and the international system*, 339-352.
- Surowiec, P., Kania-Lundholm, M., & Winiarska-Brodowska, M. (2019). Towards illiberal conditioning? New politics of media regulations in Poland (2015–2018). *East European Politics*, 1-18.
- Szałańska, J. (2020). Conflicting Conceptualisation of Europeanisation: Poland Country Report. Warsaw: Global Migration: Consequences and Responses.
- Szczerbiak, A. (2002). The Political Context of EU Accession in Poland. *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 1-12.

- Szczerbiak, A. (2019, October 1). *Why is Poland's Law and Justice party still so popular?* London School of Economics. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2019/10/01/why-is-polands-law-and-justice-party-still-so-popular/>
- Szmyt, A., & Rytel-Warzocho, A. (2019). Europeanization of Law in Poland from the point of view of Constitutional Law. *Law Review of Kyiv University of Law*.
- Thomas, D. C. (2021). The Return of Intergovernmentalism? De-Europeanisation and EU Foreign Policy Decision-making. *Journal of European Integration*, 619–635.
- Tonra, B. (2018). *Europeanisation and De-Europeanisation of EU Member State Foreign Policies: Mirror Image or Discrete Phenomenon?* <http://www.eufp.eu/europeanisation-and-de-europeanisation-eu-member-state-foreign-policies-mirror-image-or-discrete>
- Tothova, L. (2021). GEOPE – “Geopolitical Europe: Are the EU Member-states Ready for It?”. *Mind the Opinion - Stronger Together for a Stronger EU*, 1-14.
- Troszynki, M., & El-Ghamari, M. (2022). A Great Divide: Polish Media discourse on migration, 2015-2018. *Humanities and Social Sciences Communicatios*, 1-12.
- Tsarouhas, D. (2008). Social Partnership in Greece: Is There a Europeanization Effect? *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 347-365.
- Tsarouhas, D. And Ladi, S. (2013). Globalisation and/or Europeanisation? The case of flexicurity. *New Political Economy*, 480-502.
- Tsarouhas, D. (2019). Europeanization without substance? EU–Turkey relations and gender equality in employment. *Comparative European Politics*, 778-796.
- Tsarouhas, D. (2020). Policy Transfer, External Actors and Policy. *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, 341-357.
- Ün, M. B., & Arıkan, H. (2021). Europeanization and De-Europeanization of Turkey's Gender Equality Policy: The Case of the Istanbul Convention. *Journal of Common Market Studies*.
- UNION, C. O. (2009). *Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit*. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.consilium.europa.eu%2Fmedia%2F31797%2F2009_eap_declaration.pdf&clen=175443&chunk=true

- Ugur, O., & Dogan, K. C. (2017). Avrupa birliği uyum sürecinde polonya kamu yönetimi: avrupalılaştırmanın etkisi. *ASSAM Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi*, 30-50.
- Uğurlu, S. (2013). Political criteria for accession to the EU: human rights conditionality and the Croatian case. *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 165-190.
- Ukraine. (2022, May 22). Volodymyr Zelenskyy supports Andrzej Duda's initiative for a new good-neighborly agreement between Ukraine and Poland, which would help enhance relations between the two countries. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/volodimir-zelenskij-pidtrimuye-iniciativu-andzheya-dudi-shod-75273>
- United Nations. (2019). General comment no. 36, Article 6. CCPR/C/GC/35. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e5e75e04.html>
- U.S.-Poland Relations. (2008, March 10). Retrieved from C-SPAN: [c-span.org/video/?204357-1/us-poland-relations#](https://www.c-span.org/video/?204357-1/us-poland-relations#)
- Vale, R. J. (2011, January 17). *Is 'Europeanization' a Useful Concept?* E-international Relations. <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/01/17/is-%E2%80%99europeanization%E2%80%99-a-useful-concept/#:~:text=It%20is%20evident%20that%20the,'misfit'%20between%20domestic%20and%20>
- Vink, M. P., & Graziano, P. (2008). *Europeanization*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wach, K. (2015). Conceptualizing Europeanization: theoretical approaches and research designs. *Europeanization Processes from the Meso-economic Perspective: Industries and Policies*, 11-23.
- Wallenfeldt, J. (s.d.). *Donald Tusk: prime minister of Poland*. Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Donald-Tusk>
- Wojcik, A. (2022, 08 13). Assistant Professor at Polska Akademia Nauk. (Author, Interviewer)
- Yılmaz, G. (2016). Europeanisation or De-Europeanisation? Media Freedom in Turkey (1999–2015). *South European Society and Politics*, 147–161.
- Zięba, R. (2019). The 20th Anniversary of Poland's Accession to NATO. In *OPEN DOOR NATO AND EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR* (pp. 197-214). Foreign Policy Institute and Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs.

APPENDICES

Interview 1: High Level Polish Diplomat (Consul General of Turkey) in Turkey
15/03/2022

Interview 2: Jaras Gwizdak-Former Polish Judge (via Zoom)-16/07/2022

Interview 3: Pawel Dobrowolski-Former Polish Ambassador (via Zoom)-16/07/2022

Interview 4: Erin Kristin Jenna - Professor at the International Relations Department at
Central European University-10/08/2022

Interview 5: Anna Maria Augustyn - European Commission Evaluation Expert (via
Zoom)-18/07/2022

Interview 6: Anna Wojcik- Assistant Professor at Polska Akademia Nauk (via Zoom)-
13/08/2022