

**GALATASARAY UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL WARS:
INWARD AND OUTWARD ORIENTATIONS OF A COMPLEX
CONFLICT TYPE THROUGH CASE STUDIES**

PhD THESIS

Özden Selcen ÖZMELEK

Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Erhan BÜYÜKAKINCI

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACD	: Armed Conflict dataset
ADF	: Allied Democratic Forces
ADF/NALU	: Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
AFL	: Armed Forces of Liberia
ADFL/AFDL	: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
ANC	: Congolese National Army
APCLS	: Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo
BDK	: Bundi Dia Kongo
CNDP	: National Congress for the Defense of the People/ Congrès national pour la défense du peuple
CNDD-FDD	: The National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy
CNDP	: National Congress for the Defense of the People
CNL	: National Council of Liberation
COMISH	: United States Military Mission in the Congo
COPDAB	: Conflict and Peace Data Bank
COW	: Correlates of War
CPA	: Coalition Provisional Authority
CSDP	: Common Security and Defense Policy
DDR/RR	: Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement
DRC	: Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	: Economic Community of West African States
EU	: European Union
FAC	: Armed Forces of the Republic of the Congo/Forces armées de la République du Congo
FAR	: Rwandan Armed Forces/Forces Armées Rwandaises
FARDC	: The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDLR	: Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FLN	: National Liberation Front
FNLA	: National Liberation Front of Angola
FLNC	: Front de Liberation National Congolese/Front for Congolese National Liberation
FNL	: National Liberation Forces
FPLC	: Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
FRF	: Republican Federalist Forces
FRPI/FPJC	: Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri/Popular Front for Justice in Congo
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GEDS	: Global Events Data Survey
GPUs	: Regional geopolitical units
IAPF	: Inter-American Peace Force

ICB	: International Crises Behavior
ICISS	: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICW	: Internationalized civil war
INA	: Iraqi National Accord
INC	: Iraqi National Congress
IRA	: Irish Republican Army
ISAF	: International Security Assistance Force
ISI	: Inter-Services Intelligence
ISIS/Da'ish	: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria)/al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham
KDP	: Kurdistan Democratic Party
KDP-QM	: Kurdistan Democratic Party-Provisional Command
LRA	: Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE	: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MLC	: Congo Liberation Movement
MNF	: Multi-National Force
MNF-I	: Multi-National Force Iraq
MONUC	: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPLA	: People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
M23	: March 23 Movement
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	: Non-governmental organizations
NLF	: National Liberation Front for South Vietnam
NSAs	: Non-state armed groups
NTEs	: Non-territorial entities
OAS	: Organization of American States
OAU	: Organization of African Unity
OSCE	: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OECS	: Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
OIR	: Islamic State-Operation Inherent Resolve
OND	: Operation New Dawn
ONUC	: United Nations Organization in the Congo/Opération des Nations Unies au Congo
OPEC	: The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Palipehutu-FNL	: Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu/Forces Nationales de Libération
PARC-FAAL	: Party for Action and the Reconstruction of the Congo-Allelujah Armed Forces
PDPA	: People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PITF	: Political Instability Task Force
PRIO	: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
PUK	: The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RCD	: Congolese Rally for Democracy
RCD-ML	: Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement
RPA	: Rwanda Patriotic Army
RSM	: Resolute Support Mission
RJF	: Reformation and Jihad Front

RPF	: Rwandan Patriotic Front
R2P	: Responsibility to protect
SCIRI	: Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SOFA	: A Status of Forces Agreement
TQJBR	: Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn
TNSM	: Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
TRNC	: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TTP	: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
TULF	: Tamil United Liberation Front
UCDP	: Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UIFSA	: United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan
UK	: United Kingdom
ULIMO	: United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
UN	: United Nation
UNAMA	: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI	: United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNHCR	: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner/UN Refugee Agency
UNITA	: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
USA	: United States of America
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEIS	: World Events Interaction Survey
WMD	: Weapons of Mass Destruction

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RÉSUMÉ

Les guerres civiles, signifiant les conflits de haute intensité entre les acteurs étatiques et acteurs non-étatiques armés, sont intervenues depuis l'Antiquité. Bien qu'elles aient existé depuis longtemps, le principe fondamental de cet acte violent a été la souveraineté. D'autre part, jusqu'à ce principe a été systématiquement reconnu et implanté au cœur de la sous-discipline de la politique internationale, les guerres civiles se sont produites d'une manière proche de sa forme contemporaine. Alors que les conflits armés entre Pompée et son adversaire César ou entre Octavianus et son adversaire Antonius pour saisir le pouvoir central de l'Empire Romain ont montré que les guerres civiles étaient même présentes dans les temps antiques, les guerres sécessionnistes entre la Confédération et l'Union aux États-Unis ou les conflits séparatistes dans l'Empire Ottoman qui ont commencé avec l'indépendance de la Grèce et ont diffusé aux régions plus éloignées comme au Yémen, prouvent que les guerres civiles ont eu lieu à chaque époque de l'histoire mondiale.

En plus, il serait injuste d'affirmer que ces guerres se sont déroulées uniquement entre les deux parties: Les parties en guerre des guerres civiles ont constamment reçu le soutien de acteurs tiers. En supposant que les autorités centrales sont les côtés plus puissants en face des groupes armés non-étatiques (ANE), grâce à leur capacité supérieure, les groupes rebelles auraient certainement besoin d'un soutien externe pour atteindre leurs objectifs. Cependant, si la guerre civile est initiée pour profiter des faiblesses de l'acteur dirigeant, l'autorité centrale aurait besoin d'un soutien externe pour maintenir sa position. En d'autres termes, les guerres civiles rarement représentent des événements avec deux parties belligérantes. En ce qui concerne la participation de nouvelles parties belligérantes à la guerre civile, il n'est pas difficile de comprendre les motivations des acteurs internes pour coopérer avec les pouvoirs étrangers. Pourtant, déchiffrer les raisons des acteurs tiers pour prendre le grand risque de s'engager dans les guerres d'autres pays reste problématique. Dans ce contexte, l'objectif de cette étude est de découvrir les dynamiques de l'internationalisation des guerres civiles et de dévoiler les motivations des acteurs tiers pour s'impliquer dans ces événements violents. Tout en analysant ce phénomène, les questions suivantes seront prises en compte pour clarifier le sujet en main : Existe-t-il des relations entre les causes d'éclatement des guerres civiles et la participation des acteurs tiers? Quelles sont les méthodes d'intervention/implication des pouvoirs étrangers et dans quel contexte devrions-nous les examiner? Y a-t-il des ressemblances et des différences entre ces méthodes d'internationalisation lorsqu'elles sont appliquées aux différents cas des guerres civiles?

Malgré sa réalité historique, il n'a pas été facile de traiter les guerres civiles et leur internationalisation de façon académique. Comme la souveraineté signifie la monopolisation de l'usage de la force par une autorité centrale dans les territoires définis de son pays, toute agression d'un groupe armé non-étatique la rend illégale et il est accepté que le privilège de faire la guerre appartienne aux acteurs étatiques. Par conséquent, les acteurs étatiques ont refusé de reconnaître les acteurs non étatiques comme leurs égaux et c'est pourquoi les acteurs non étatiques des guerres civiles

n'ont pas été considérés comme des groupes depuis longtemps. Au lieu de cela, ils sont considérés comme des rebelles, des insurgés, les émeutiers, etc. Cette argumentation était justifiée par plusieurs raisons juridiques et politiques, mais l'idée principale de l'exclusion des ANE en tant que parties belligérantes était liée à l'inacceptabilité du transfert du droit de recours à la force à un acteur non étatique. Aussi, au point de vue juridique, si les ANE sont légalement reconnus comme des parties belligérantes, les gouvernements doivent accepter leurs combattants en tant que soldats et appliquer le droit international humanitaire dans leurs conflits. En considérant que les guerres civiles comportent des formes des guerres asymétriques, dans la pratique, il n'est pas possible d'établir des conditions de guerre égalitaires. Sur le plan politique, les gouvernements nationaux perçoivent les ANE comme des terroristes, qui mettent le régime existant et ses citoyens en danger, la reconnaissance des acteurs non-étatiques en tant que parties belligérantes légitimes signifie l'érosion du pouvoir et de la légitimité de l'État. Ainsi, dans la pratique, il ne constitue pas une condition souhaitable.

Dans ce contexte, au plan académique, les guerres civiles ont été refusées et la littérature de guerre, dominée par la théorie réaliste, a adopté les guerres interétatiques comme son sujet principal et d'autres types de guerres restent absents dans le domaine des discussions théoriques pour longtemps. Cependant, le nombre de guerres civiles est devenu non négligeable à la suite d'une augmentation rapide pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les années de décolonisation et, la fin de la guerre froide. Cet accroissement a conduit un changement dans cette approche. D'un côté, les guerres d'indépendance combattues par les peuples contre leurs dirigeants coloniaux et, d'autre part, les guerres de formation d'Etat menées par divers groupes armés ont montré que le concept de guerre ne pouvait pas se limiter aux acteurs étatiques. Ce fait politique frappant a incité les chercheurs à adopter de nouvelles définitions dans le contexte des conflits et des guerres.

Bien que des approches différentes aient été adoptées pour analyser ces actes de violence reconnus, le behaviorisme, qui visait à adopter une approche scientifique en sciences sociales, est devenu la théorie et la méthodologie éminente. Depuis les années 1940, les études behavioristes ont essayé de classer et d'expliquer différents types de conflits, tels que les coups d'états, les révoltes, les révolutions, les conflits et les guerres, en s'appuyant sur leurs caractéristiques mesurables. Lorsque les guerres civiles ont commencé à être reconnues dans une terminologie académique, la littérature behavioriste est devenue la ressource principale pour concevoir et expliquer les conflits internes, comme nous les comprenons aujourd'hui.

Malgré le fait que jusqu'aux années 1980, ils avaient également adopté un point de vue centré sur l'état concernant l'étude scientifique des conflits et des guerres, l'attention croissante aux guerres civiles avec la fin de la guerre froide, en particulier en raison des guerres au Rwanda, en Bosnie et en Somalie, cette approche a été érodée. Cette nouvelle perception a changé plusieurs aspects des études comportementales, telles que leurs classifications, leurs débats et leurs méthodes de génération de données, et a permis aux guerres civiles d'être discutées sur une base académique fiable. D'autre part, cette multiplication dans les études internes de conflit a créé de nouveaux défauts académiques. Pour que chaque étude utilise sa propre terminologie, ses méthodes de codification et son ensemble de données, les guerres civiles n'étaient discutées que dans des spectres conceptuels étroits et divisés au lieu d'une perspective plus large et inclusive.

Alors que les débats académiques sur les guerres civiles ont été déclenchés, sur l'arène politique, les conflits internes ont été tellement reconnus que les organisations internationales ont commencé à se repositionner contre ces incidents violents à partir des années 1990. Par conséquent, après la fin de la guerre froide, les Nations Unies ont adopté une approche plus active contre les guerres civiles, mais les opérations de paix sous son parapluie ont fait face à des échecs successifs, et cette situation a entraîné l'adoption de plusieurs concepts nouveaux autour des nécessités des interventions humanitaires et de la coopération élargie pour la paix internationale. Par la suite, l'idée que la souveraineté avait deux facettes (internes et externes) a acquis une large acceptation des États, et concernant les opérations de la paix, les Nations Unies ont reconnu un partage opérationnel et matériel avec d'autres organisations et des coalitions d'État dans les limites du droit international. Ainsi, le long terme pratique des interventions dans les guerres civiles est juridiquement et politiquement redéfini. À cet égard, l'internationalisation des conflits internes a acquis de nouvelles dimensions: premièrement, la notion d'intervention étrangère dans les conflits internes est devenue plus légitimée et institutionnalisée au niveau systémique. Deuxièmement, les ANE ont pris une forme plus transnationale en établissant des réseaux relationnels en dehors de leur pays d'origine et en développant des stratégies de recrutement internationales plus sophistiquées. Ainsi, les relations complexes entre les États, les organisations internationales et les ANE se sont approfondies et ont encerclé les guerres civiles avec des réseaux verticaux et horizontaux.

En plus de ces développements, les attentats du 11 Septembre et la guerre contre le terrorisme international menée par les États-Unis ont suscité de nouvelles discussions sur les aspects juridiques, opérationnels et pratiques des interventions. Par conséquent, d'une part, la compréhension des interventions, des parties intervenantes et leurs motivations sont devenues plus claires en raison des données historiques et des explications scientifiques fournies par les études behavioristes, mais d'autre part, les taux croissants des guerres civiles internationalisées (GCI) et les nouveaux concepts, comme la responsabilité de protéger, a confondu la compréhension des internationalisations. De plus, malgré les contributions considérables apportées par les études behavioristes au sujet, l'étude scientifique des conflits et des guerres ne peut pas nécessairement éclairer certains problèmes. Comme l'application de la théorie behavioriste exigeait l'utilisation de données statistiques sensibles et de modèles économétriques, les résultats de ces études présentaient des résultats diversifiés concernant les guerres civiles et leurs internationalisations. Par conséquent, la littérature a été remplie de nombreux résultats empiriques testés, liés aux petites fractions du sujet, qui ne conviennent pas à une interprétation commune. Les éléments internes des guerres civiles n'avaient pas de réflexions étendues par rapport au processus d'internationalisation, et l'influence des dynamiques externes n'a pas été largement évaluée en fonction de leurs résultats internes. Les méthodes et les raisons de l'internationalisation ne pouvaient pas être expliquées de manière systématique car elles n'étaient pas considérées d'une manière compréhensive.

Par conséquent, en ce qui concerne les objectifs de cette étude, la littérature behavioriste est acceptée comme la source académique fondamentale et ses résultats et justifications empiriques désagrégés sont incorporés par une méthode de recherche inductive permettant de développer un cadre théorique et conceptuel commun aux

guerres civiles et leurs internationalisations. Les résultats quantitatifs dérivés de différents modèles économétriques sur l'internationalisation des guerres civiles sont regroupés à l'aide d'une approche qualitative et sont intégrés de manière unifiée et cohérente. En conséquence, le cadre d'internationalisation a été façonné en deux modèles principaux: vers l'intérieur et vers l'extérieur. Ce cadre à deux piliers permet de analyser l'internationalisation des guerres civiles en incluant des interventions et des implications d'états, d'organisations internationales / régionales et d'acteurs non étatiques. Ainsi, grâce à cette structure, il est possible d'examiner les différents cas des GCI par une approche unifiée et d'une manière compréhensive, détaillée et multidimensionnelle. En outre, comme les piliers théoriques de cette thèse sont générés à la lumière des résultats quantitatifs, les recherches désintégrées de la littérature sont liées ensemble dans un cadre explicatif et inclusif.

Suite à la construction de notre cadre théorique, les études de cas étaient nécessaires pour évaluer notre structure. À cette fin, trois d'études de cas ont été élaborés comme l'Afghanistan, la République Démocratique du Congo et l'Irak, étant classifiés comme des GCI selon différents ensembles de données. Aussi, ces études de cas incluent les périodes de la Guerre Froide, de l'après-Guerre froide et de l'après-11 Septembre. Dans cette sélection, le facteur déterminant a été leur internationalisation après la fin de la Guerre froide. Ceci est dû à la fin du monde bipolarisé, des facteurs idéologiques et des guerres par procuration, qui ont été principaux moteurs des GCI pendant cette période. Ces dynamiques cachaient les composantes intrinsèques des guerres civiles et de leurs internationalisations. Cette étude vise à définir les dynamiques des guerres civiles libérées de ce système bipolaire et exposer leurs dimensions polyvalentes. Ainsi, même si les continuités historiques, les transformations entre les types de guerres et conflits au cours de différentes périodes (de la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale à nos jours) des études de cas seront examinés, l'internationalisation de ces guerres civiles et leurs dynamiques seront évalués pour la période après la fin de la Guerre froide. Pendant ces efforts, une approche comparative sera adoptée pour l'examen des études de cas, pour qu'il soit possible de discuter quand, pourquoi, comment, par qui et par quelles méthodes ces guerres civiles ont été internationalisées et quels sont leurs éléments convergents et divergents. De cette façon, l'applicabilité de notre cadre théorique, son étendue et sa validité seront testées en détail, ce qui permettra de déterminer si notre cadre d'internationalisation peut servir d'examiner autres cas des GCI. Tout en examinant les méthodes d'internationalisation intégrées, en évaluant leurs relations les uns avec les autres et en testant l'existence des modèles anticipés dans les études de cas susmentionnées, les GCI seront divisés en phases afin d'observer les phénomènes d'internationalisation soit vers l'intérieur, soit vers l'extérieur. Cela nous permettra de réaliser une analyse plus approfondie des méthodes d'interventions et d'implications pendant les phases d'éclatement, de durée et de terminaison et mettra en évidence l'importance de ces processus dans les GCI à côté de leurs différents cadres d'internationalisation.

ABSTRACT

Civil wars, signifying high intensity conflicts between state actors and non-state armed groups, have been recorded since antiquity. Although there were civil wars long before the concepts of society and state were crystallized, the primary principle behind such violent acts has been sovereignty. On the other hand, until the principle of sovereignty was systematically recognized and emplaced at the heart of the sub-discipline of international politics, civil wars had been occurring in a manner close to its modern form. While the armed conflicts between Pompey and its adversary Caesar or between Octavianus and his opponent Antonius for the central power in the Roman Empire showed that civil wars were even present in ancient times, the secessionist wars between the Confederacy and the Union in the United States or the continuous separatist conflicts in the Ottoman Empire that started with the independence of Greece and reached out to farther regions, such as Yemen, prove that civil wars kept occurring in every period of the world history. Furthermore, it would be unfair to affirm that these wars took place solely between two sides: Warring parties of civil wars have consistently received the support of third parties. Supposing that central authorities are the more powerful sides in these wars due to their higher capacity, opposing non-state actors would certainly need external support to attain their objectives. However, if the civil war is initiated to take advantage of the governing actor's weaknesses, then central authority would need external support to maintain its position. In other words, civil wars rarely represent events with two warring parties. Regarding the participation of new warring parties into civil wars, it is not difficult to understand the motivations of internal actors to cooperate with foreign powers. Yet, deciphering the reasons of third parties to take an immense risk and engage in the wars of other countries is problematic. In this context, the aim of this study is to uncover the dynamics behind the internationalization of civil wars and to unveil the motivations of third parties to get involved in these violent events. While analyzing this phenomenon, the following issues will be held to clarify the subject in hand: Are there any relations between the onset causes of civil wars and the participation of third actors? What are the intervention/involvement methods of foreign powers and in what context should we examine those? Are there any resemblances and differences between these internationalization methods when they are applied to different civil war cases?

Despite its historical reality, academically it has not been easy to discuss civil wars and their internationalization. As sovereignty signifies the monopolization of the use of force by a central authority within the defined territories of its country, any assault coming from a non-state armed group (NSAs) renders it unlawful and criminal and the right to war has been accepted to be the privilege of state actors. Consequently, state actors have refused to acknowledge non-state actors as their equals and this is why non-state actors of civil wars were not considered as secondary warring parties both politically and academically for a long time, but were rather seen as rebels, insurgents, rioters etc. This line of argument was justified on several legal and political reasons but the main idea behind the exclusion of NSAs as warring parties was related to the unacceptability of the transfer of the right to resort

to the use of force to a non-state actor. Judicially, accepting the NSAs as warring parties necessitates accepting their fighters as soldiers and applying international humanitarian law in the conflicts. Yet, considering that civil wars embody asymmetrical war methods, in practice it is not possible to establish egalitarian warring conditions. Politically, as states perceive NSAs as terrorists, who endanger the governing regime and its citizens, the recognition of non-state actors as legitimate warring parties means the erosion of state's power and legitimacy. Thus, in practice it does not form a desirable condition.

In this context, civil wars have been academically denied and war literature, dominated by the realist theory, has adopted inter-state wars as its main focus and other type of wars remained omitted from the sphere of theoretical discussions for a long time. However, the number of civil wars became non-negligible as a result of a rapid increase during the period following the Second World War, the subsequent increase during the decolonization years and finally its worrying peak towards the end of the Cold war led to the gradual change of this approach. On the one side, the independence wars fought by the peoples against their colonial rulers and, on the other side, state-forming wars fought by various armed groups against each other showed that the war concept could not be limited to state actors. This striking political fact incited academics to embrace new definitions in the context conflict and war research.

Even though different approaches were adopted to analyze these politically acknowledged violent acts, behaviorism became the prominent theory and methodology, which aimed to bring a scientific approach to social sciences. Behaviorist studies have been trying to categorize and explain different types of conflicts, such as coups d'états, revolts, revolutions, conflicts and wars, relying on their measurable features since 1940s. When civil wars started to be recognized, behaviorist literature became the main resource to conceptualize and explain the internal conflicts, as we understand them nowadays. Despite the fact that they too adopted a state-centric point of view until 1980s concerning the scientific study of conflicts and wars, the rising attention to civil wars with the end of the Cold War, particularly due to wars in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia, eroded this approach. This new perception changed several aspects of behaviorist studies, such as their classifications, debates and data generating methods, and allowed civil wars to be discussed on a reliable academic basis. On the other hand, the multiplication of internal conflict studies with divergent datasets and coding methods inhibited the formation of a common terminology and created new academic defaults. As each study was using its own terminology and dataset, civil wars was discussed only in narrow and divided conceptual spectrums instead of a wide and inclusive perspective.

While academic debates on civil wars were triggered, in the political arena, internal conflicts were so recognized that international organizations began to reposition themselves against these violent incidents starting from the 1990s. Therefore, after the end of the Cold War, the United Nations adopted a more active approach against civil wars but peace operations under its umbrella faced successive failures against them, and this situation brought the adoption of several new concepts revolving around the necessities of humanitarian interventions and a widened cooperation for international peace. Subsequently, the idea that sovereignty had two facets (internal and external) gained the broad acceptance of states and the United

Nations acknowledged an operational and material burden sharing with other organizations and state coalitions within the boundaries of international law. Thus, the long-standing practice of interventions in civil wars became legally and politically redefined. In that regard, the internationalization of internal conflicts gained new dimensions: Firstly, the notion of foreign intervention in internal conflicts became more legitimized and institutionalized in a systemic way. Secondly, NSAs took a more transnational form by establishing relational networks outside the range of their home-countries and by developing more sophisticated international recruitment strategies. Thus, the complex relations between states, international organizations, and NSAs became deepened and encircled civil wars with vertical and horizontal networks.

In addition to these developments, the 9/11 attacks and the war against international terrorism driven by the United States of America caused further discussions on the legal, operational and practical aspects of interventions. Consequently, on the one hand, the understanding of interventions, intervening parties and their motivations became clearer because of the historical data and scientific explanations provided by behaviorist studies, but on the other hand, the increasing internationalized civil war (ICW) rates and new concepts, such as the responsibility to protect, blurred the understanding of internationalizations. Moreover, despite the considerable contributions of behaviorist studies to the subject, the scientific study of conflicts and wars could not necessarily shed light to these issues. As the application of the behaviorist theory required the use of sensitive statistical data and mathematical models, the findings of these studies exhibited diverse results concerning civil wars and their internationalizations. Consequently, the literature has been filled with numerous tested empirical findings related to small fractions of the subject, which were ultimately irrelevant to each other and not suitable to lead to a common interpretation. The internal elements of civil wars were lacking any wide-ranging reflections in relation to the internationalization process, as the influence of external inputs was not broadly evaluated in regard to their internal outcomes. The methods and reasons of internationalization could not be explained in a systematic manner, as they were not considered in a comprehensive manner.

Therefore, in respect to the aims of this study, the behaviorist literature is accepted as the fundamental academic source and their disaggregated empirical findings and justifications are incorporated through an inductive research method to allow the development of a common theoretical and conceptual framework to civil wars and their internationalizations. Quantitative results deriving from different mathematical models and tests on the internationalization of civil wars are gathered together using a qualitative approach and they are integrated in a unified and consistent manner. As a result, the internationalization framework has been shaped in two main patterns: Inward and outward. This two-pillared framework allows the analysis of the internationalization of civil wars by including interventions and involvements of states, international/regional organizations, and non-state actors. Thus, through this structure, it is possible to examine diverse ICW cases through one unified approach and in a comprehensive, detailed and multi-dimensional manner. Also, as the theoretical pillars of this Thesis are generated in the light of quantitative findings, disintegrated researches in the field are linked together under an explanatory and inclusive framework.

Following the construction of our theoretical framework, case studies were necessary to comparatively test our structure. To that end, three cases are chosen in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq, which were classified as ICWs according to different datasets and continued through the Cold War period, the post-Cold War era and lasted after the 9/11 attacks. In this selection, the determinant factor has been their internationalization after the end of the Cold War. This is due to the end of the bipolarized world, along with numerous ideological factors and proxy wars, which were the driving forces of ICWs in this period. These dynamics were hiding the intrinsic components of both civil wars and their internationalizations. This study aims to define the dynamics of civil wars freed from this bipolar system and include their versatile dimensions. Thus, even though the historical continuities, the transformations between war types and conflicts in our cases during their different time periods (from the end of the Second World War to the present day) will be examined, the internationalizations of these civil wars and their dynamics will be evaluated for the period following the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, a comparative approach will be adopted for the examination of the case studies, so that it will be possible to discuss when, why, how, by whom and through what methods these civil wars were internationalized and what their converging and diverging elements are. In this way, the applicability of our framework, its extent and validity will be tested in detail and this will allow to determine whether our internationalization framework can be the basis for further research regarding other ICW cases. While examining the embedded internationalization methods, evaluating their relations with each other and testing the existence of anticipated patterns in the abovementioned case studies, ICWs will be divided into phases in order to observe in which stages inward and outward internationalization took place. This will allow a deep analysis of the intervention and involvement methods during the onset, duration and termination phases and will highlight the significance of these processes in ICWs in addition to their various internationalization frameworks.

ÖZET

İç savaş kavramı, başka bir deyişle devletin ülke içinde silahlanan başka gruplarla çatışması, toplum ve devlet konseptleri ortaya çıktığından beri tarih sahnesinde yerini almıştır. Her ne kadar bu kavramın arka planında yer alan birincil prensip egemenlik olsa da egemenlik anlayışı kendini kanıtlayıp uluslararası ilişkiler disiplinin merkezine yerleşene kadar iç savaşlar bugünkü manasına yakın bir şekilde cereyan etmiştir. Roma İmparatorluğu'nun içinde merkezi otoriteyi elinde bulunduran Pompey ve karşısındaki Sezar veya Octavianus ve karşısındaki Antonius arasındaki gücü ele geçirmek için gerçekleşen silahlı çatışmalar bunların Antik çağlara kadar uzandığını gösterirken, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde güney eyaletlerinin Konfederasyon çatısında birleşerek ayrılık için verdiği silahlı mücadeleler, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun dağılması sürecinde Yunanistan'ın bağımsızlığını kazanmasıyla başlayıp Yemen'e kadar uzanan çatışmalar iç savaşların tarihin her adımında karşımıza çıktığını ortaya koymaktadır. Üstelik, bütün bu savaşların sadece iki taraf arasında gerçekleştiğini söylemek haksızlık olacaktır. Savaşan taraflar hemen her daim başka aktörlerden yardım almıştır. Genelde merkezi otoritenin güçlü taraf olduğu düşünülürse özellikle buna meydan okuma emeli güden devlet-dışı aktörler amaçlarına ulaşmak için dış yardımlara muhtaçtır. Eğer merkezi otoriteye meydan okuyan taraf bunu merkezin zayıflamasına istinaden gerçekleştiriyorsa, işte o zaman merkezi güce sahip olan tarafın elindekileri kaybetmemek için başkalarından yardım almaması kaçınılmazdır. Kısacası iç savaşlar nadiren iki taraflı bir oyuna dönüşmektedir. Burada ilginç olan ise savaşan tarafların işbirliği motivasyonlarını anlamak kolayken, taraflardan birine destek verenlerin neden kendilerini riske atarak çatışmaya dahil olduğunu anlamaktır. Bu nedenle, bu tezin gayesi iç savaşların uluslararasılaşmasına neden olan dinamiklerin ortaya konulması ve bu zincire dahil olan farklı aktörlerin ve sahip oldukları amaçların incelenmesidir. Bunu yaparken iç savaşların çıkmasına neden olan konularla üçüncü bir aktörün bu savaşa katılmasına neden olan konular arasında bir bağlantı bulunup bulunulmadığının araştırılması; farklı iç savaşlara müdahale etme ve/veya dahil olma yöntemlerinin hangilerinin olduğu ve hangi unsurlar doğrultusunda incelenebileceğinin analiz edilmesi; ve son olarak da incelenen uluslararasılaştırma metotları arasında ne gibi benzerlik ve farklılıklar bulunduğunun gösterilmesi bu tezin amaçları olarak özetlenebilir.

Bütün bu tarihi gerçekliğine rağmen iç savaşları ve bunların uluslararasılaşmasını akademik açıdan tartışmak bu kadar kolay olmamıştır. Egemenlik silahlı gücün belli coğrafi sınırlar dahilinde tekelleştirilmesini ifade ettiğinden, bu hakkı kendinde gören gruplar devletler tarafından denk aktörler olarak muhatap alınmak istenmemiştir. Bir grubun devlete silahlı olarak saldırması doğrudan onu haksız ve suçlu duruma düşürmektedir. Bu nedenle de iç çatışmaların devlet dışı oyuncularını ikinci bir aktör değil, asi, başkaldıran, çete vb. şekillerde kabul edilerek, savaşların ancak iki devlet aktörü arasında gerçekleşebileceği, aksi halde bunun bir savaş değil isyan veya ayaklanma olarak kabul edilmesi gerektiği fikri siyaset bilimi ve uluslararası ilişkilerin genel geçer bir prensibi haline gelmiştir. Bunun hukuki ve siyasi olarak bir çok nedeni vardır. Ancak her halükarda ağır basan

düşünce devletin sahip olduğu yetkinin devlet dışı bir aktöre devredilmesinin kabul edilemezliğidir. Hukuken, aksi durum iç çatışmalara dahil olan insanları savaşçı statüsüne koymayı ve her iki tarafın insancıl hukuk kurallarına uyarak çatışmasını, aksi halde sorumluluk sahibi olmasını gerektirir. Asimetrik olarak yürütülen iç çatışmaların eşit şartlarda gerçekleştirilmesi ise pratikte mümkün değildir. Siyasi açıdan ise, devletin kendisine ve vatandaşlarına zarar veren teröristler olarak gördüğü bu grupları eşit statülerle tanıyarak meşru bir hareket olarak tanımlaması kendi gücünü ve yasallığını tartışması anlamına geleceğinden pratikte sorunlar yaratmaktadır.

İşte bu nedenlerle uzun yıllardır iç savaş kavramı özellikle devletler-arası savaş literatürü tarafından gölgelenmiş ve realist teori tarafından tartışılmaya kapalı bir konsept olarak ortaya konuşmuştur. Fakat, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nı takip eden dönemde artan, dekolonizasyon süreci ile hızlanan, Soğuk Savaş'ın bitimine doğru zirveye ulaşan iç savaşlar göz ardı edilemez bir hal almıştır. Gerek sömürge ülkelerinin halklarının kendilerini yöneten güçlere karşı verdikleri bağımsızlık savaşları, gerekse devlet kurma sürecine girerek merkezi otoriteyi ele geçirmek için birbirleri ile çarpışan gruplar savaş kavramının devletlerin tekelinde olmadığı gerçeğini göstermişlerdir. Bu durum akademik literatürü de açıklayıcı bir tutum almak durumunda bırakmıştır.

Bu açıklamalar farklı bakış açıları tarafından öne sürülse de savaş incelemelerinde öne çıkan teori ve metot, sosyal bilimlere bilimsellik kazandırma arzusunda olan davranışsalcılara ait olmuştur. 1940lardan bu yana savaşı kategorize etme ve rakamlara dayanarak darbe, başkaldırı, ayaklanma, çatışma ve savaş gibi kavramları birbirinden ayırmaya çalışan bu akım iç savaşların kavramsallaşmasında ve günümüzdeki halini almasında baş rolü oynamıştır. Her ne kadar davranışsalci literatür de özellikle 1980'lerin ortasına kadar savaşları devlet-merkezli olarak ele almaya devam etse de Soğuk Savaş'ın bitmesi ile beraber Ruanda, Bosna ve Somali savaşlarına artan uluslararası ilgi ile akademik çalışmaların bir çoğu iç savaşa yönelmiş ve devlet-aktörü bazlı yaklaşım giderek erozyona uğramıştır. Bu durum davranışsalci çalışmaların sınıflama, tartışma ve veri oluşturma gibi birçok alanında değişikliğe yol açarak iç savaşların günümüzde tartışılabilir bir platform bulmasına izin vermiştir. Fakat, bu incelemelerin bir çok farklı veri tabanı ve kodlama yöntemine dayanıyor olması iç savaşlar için ortak bir kavramsal dilin kurulamaması ile kendi sorunlarını beraberinde getirmiştir. Her bir çalışmanın kendi terminoloji ve veri tabanı çerçevesinde tartışmalara katılması iç savaşlar konusunun geniş bir perspektiften değil dar bir kavramsal yelpazede fikir teatisi yapabilmesine izin vermektedir.

Bütün bu çalışmalar olanca hızı ile devam ederken iç savaşlar siyasi alanda da kendini kabul ettirmiş, hatta 1990'lardan itibaren uluslararası örgütler kendilerini iç savaşlar karşısında yeniden konumlandırmıştır. Birleşmiş Milletler'in (BM) Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde iç savaşlar karşısında aktif bir tutum takınmaya çalışırken üst üste başarısızlıklarla karşılaşması öncelikle insancıl müdahale kavramının, devamında da uluslararası güvenlik için işbirliği anlayışının nüfuz etmesini sağlamıştır. Böylelikle devletlerin egemenliklerinin iç ve dış olarak iki yönü olduğu fikri giderek yaygınlaşırken, BM iç savaşlar karşısında operasyonel ve maddi sorumluluğun başka örgütlerle hukuk çerçevesinde paylaşılmasının ihtiyaç dahilinde ve gerekli olduğu fikrini benimsemiştir. Böylelikle eskiden beri gerçekleşen iç savaş müdahaleleri kendine hukuksal ve siyasi yeni bir çerçeve edinmiştir. Tam bu

gelişmeler çerçevesinde müdahale kavramı giderek sistemsel seviyede meşrulaşırken devlet dışı silahlı aktörlerin de giderek devlet sınırlarının dışına taşan ilişkiler kurarak operasyon alanlarını genişletmeleri ve savaşçı toplamada daha global yöntemler izleyerek büyümeleri iç savaşların uluslararasılaşmasına yeni boyutlar getirmiştir. Giderek derinleşen devlet-uluslararası örgüt, devlet-devlet dışı silahlı grup ve devlet dışı silahlı grup-devlet dışı silahlı grup ilişkileri iç savaşları içeriden dışarıya uzanan ağlarla örmüştür.

Bu gelişmelerde Soğuk Savaş kadar 11 Eylül saldırıları da rol oynamış ve uluslararası terörizme savaş açan ABD ile müdahalelerin hukuksal, operasyonel ve pratik boyutlarının giderek daha fazla tartışılmasına neden olmuştur. Bir yandan davranışsalci çalışmaların verileri ile geçmişteki iç savaşlara müdahale eden ve dahil olan taraflar ve motivasyonları daha iyi anlaşırken, diğer taraftan giderek artan uluslararasılaşmış iç savaş oranları ve gündeme giren koruma sorumluluğu gibi kavramlar ile uluslararasılaşmanın anlamı bulanıklaşmıştır. Üstelik davranışsalci teori bu konuları aydınlatmada yeterli olamamıştır çünkü yöntemin spesifik istatistiki veriler ve matematiksel modellemeler kullanılmasına dayanması nedeni ile hem iç savaşlar hem de uluslararasılaşmaları için her biri birinden bağımsız farklı ampirik sonuçlar elde edilmiş ve literatür her biri konunun ufak bir parçası ile ilgili test edilmiş bulgular sunan birbirinden alakasız çalışmalarla dolmuştur.

Bu nedenlerle bu çalışmanın amacına yönelik olarak davranışsalci teoriye ait literatür temel akademik kaynak olarak benimsenmiş, ve tümevarımsal bir araştırma yöntemi ile birbirinden bağımsız olarak üretilmiş ampirik sonuçlar ve açıklamaları iç savaşları ve uluslararasılaşmalarını teorik ve kavramsal bir çerçevede anlatmak için bir araya getirilmiştir. Farklı modellerden ve testlerden elde edilen kantitatif sonuçlar nicel bir yaklaşımla ele alınmış, birbirine bağlanmış ve tutarlı bir şekilde bağdaştırılarak uluslararasılaşma için *içe doğru* ve *dışa doğru* olmak üzere iki ana biçimde kalıplaştırılmıştır. Böylelikle uluslararasılaşma biçimleri hem müdahaleleri, hem dahil olma yöntemlerini, hem devletleri, hem de devletlerarası ve devlet dışı aktörleri içine alacak şekilde bir analiz çatısına kavuşturulmuştur. Bu çatı, birbirinden farklı uluslararasılaşmış iç savaşları tek yaklaşımla, ama genel, ayrıntılı ve çok yönlü şekilde incelemeye izin vermekte, böylelikle birbirinden farklı vakaları aynı yöntemle incelemeyi sağlamaktadır. Bu çatının sütunları kantitatif verilere dayandıkları için birbirinden bağımsız araştırmalar açıklayıcı ve kapsayıcı bir bütüne sahip olmaktadır. Böylelikle iç savaşların yerel nedenlerinin uluslararasılaşma sürecindeki etkisi ve savaşların uluslararasılaşmasının iç dinamiklere etkisi değerlendirilebilecek ve daha önceden kapsamlı bir uluslararasılaşma çatısı kurulmadığı için sistematik bir şekilde açıklanamayan uluslararasılaşma metotları ve yöntemleri karşılaştırmalı bir şekilde açıklanabilecektir.

Bunu takiben oluşturulan kavramsal çatının vaka incelemelerine uygulanması sorunsalı ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu amaçla da farklı veri tabanları tarafından uluslararasılaşmış olarak kabul edilen, hem Soğuk Savaş döneminde, hem sonrasında, hem de 11 Eylül saldırılarından sonra süregelen üç iç savaş belirlenmiştir. Afganistan, Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti ve Irak savaşları böylelikle ön plana çıkmıştır. Bu vaka belirlemede ise Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde iç savaşların uluslararasılaşmış olması öncelik nedeni olmuştur. Zira Soğuk Savaş döneminde iç savaşların iki kutuplu dünya, ideolojik etmenler ve dolaylı savaşlar güdümünde uluslararasılaşmış olması güncel ve gerçek nedenleri maskeleymektedir. Halbuki kurduğumuz çatı yaklaşım ile aranan uluslararasılaşma yöntemlerinin iki

kutuplu sistemden bağımsız ve tek yönlülükten uzak bir şekilde tanımlanmasıdır. Bu nedenle bu üç vaka incelemesinde tarihsel devamlılıklar, çatışma ve diğer savaş yöntemleri arasındaki geçişler İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası her dönem için gösterilecek olsa da iç savaşlarının uluslararasılaşması ve dinamikleri Soğuk Savaşın bitimini takip eden dönem odağa alınarak incelenecektir. Bu analiz gerçekleştirilirken de karşılaştırılmalı bir yöntem benimsenecek böylelikle üç uluslararasılaşmış iç savaşın hangi aşamalarda, neden, nasıl ve kim tarafından hangi şekillerde uluslararasılaştırıldığı benzeyen ve ayrışan yönleri ortaya koyacak şekilde tartışılacaktır. Böylelikle kurulan çatının uygulanabilirliği, kapsamı ve geçerliliği etrafı bir şekilde test edilecek, gelecekte benzer nitelikte çalışmalara izin verip vermediği tartışılacaktır. Bunu yaparken bahsi geçen vakalar farklı nitelikte uluslararasılaştırma yöntemlerinin birbiri ile bağlı olup olmadığını, hangilerine izin verdiğini ve birbirileri arasında bir bağlantı taşıyıp taşımadığını anlayabilmek için süreçlere bölünerek, her bir süreç için iç ve dış doğru yöntemlerden hangilerini içerdiğine bakılacaktır. Bu da savaşların çıkış, devam, bitiş dönemlerinin müdahale ve dahil olma metotları açısından derinlikli olarak analiz edilmesine olanak sağlayacak, kurulan çatı yaklaşıma ek olarak iç savaşların süreçler açısından nasıl bir önem taşıdığını anlamamızı sağlayacaktır.

INTRODUCTION

Nunc Minerva, postea Palas
(First wisdom, then war)
An old Latin proverb

Civil wars, internal armed conflicts or intra-state wars, regardless of how a researcher prefers to name them, have become the fundamental form of organized violence in the contemporary era, in which inter-state wars and extra-state wars have been fading. Conversely, it is only recently that this subject gained the attention of scholars, even though the internal conflicts have been an important part of the world politics as a historical reality. The existence of a war between the governing central authority and its non-state armed challengers intrinsically puts forward the sovereignty principle. Yet, until this principle was added into the scope of the political science and international relations there have always been internal conflicts and rivalries between the ruling elites and their opponents. For instance, the war between the Roman Emperor Gaius Octavius against Marcus Antonius to maintain the central authority between 33-30 B.C., the wars between the claimers of the caliphate in Omayyad, particularly after 684, the civil war between the French monarchy (Francis I) and the nobility with the inclusion of Calvinism as an opposing instrument during 1560s, the American secessionist civil war between the Union and the Confederate States of America from 1861 to 1865, the Satsuma Civil War of 1877 between the centralized bureaucratic state and the alienated former elites in Japan can be used as examples of the historical civil war understanding in various parts of the world. Thus, internal conflicts have always been in progress before and after the acceptance of sovereignty in modern terms.

In addition to all these civil wars in diverse socio-political contexts, their warring parties have been rarely limited to central authorities and their challengers. Thus, in civil wars it is not uncommon that at least one of the warring parties receives supports of a third party or profit from an external intervention on their parts. From the point of view of a rebellious group, defying the state actor necessitates additional assistance. Ordinarily, governmental structures benefit from economic, political, military and judicial instruments to fight against the non-state

armed groups (NSAs) and in that regard, they possess higher capacities against the non-state actors. In such case, NSAs need to obtain further supports in addition to their domestic potentials in order to be able to organize significant rebellions. However, internal conflicts can arise because of the weaknesses of the states. If a rebellious group decides to take advantage of the weakened state of the governing actor and resorts to violence, central authority can find itself in a difficult position. Being challenged by a non-state actor with supposedly inferior capacities incites the state actor to seek external support. In both cases, according to the type and origins of the wanted support, both state and non-state actors can provide external assistance to warring parties. Thus, civil wars are rarely two-person zero-sum games rather they represent multilateral scenes. On the other hand, while the pursuit of an external support is understandable from the warring actors side, the enigma lies in the intervention or involvement decisions of the third parties. In an interdependent world, external assistance is not provided with no strings attached or without any ulterior motivations. As the decision of intervening or into another country's civil war carries great risks, the interference decision of a foreign actor raises many questions.

In this context, the main objective of this Thesis is to explore the mechanism behind the internationalization of civil wars and reveal its diverse features. Despite its historical reality, the theoretical state of civil wars and their internationalizations in the academic debates have not been easily consolidated. Politically, seizing and maintaining the national power and sovereignty are directly related to the legal right to resort to violence within the borders of a country, thus, defining and accepting the non-state warring party of civil wars have been problematic for the state actor. Accepting non-state actors as an interlocutor of the state means eroding the state's sovereignty against an unequal actor type. This is why NSAs have been labeled as *rebels* or *bandits* as opposed to central authority, instead of another warring party and war making was privileged to state actors. This political understanding was reflected on the earlier classical works of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz etc. and despite the long-standing political, economic and sociological importance of civil war, studies on conflicts and wars were lacking perspective on the issue. Moreover, the dominance of realist theory on the academic sub-discipline of international politics consolidated the superiority of inter-state wars over other war making actors and conflict types. Thus, the rich literature heritage guided by the

more contemporary realist academics such as Morgenthau, Waltz, Wallerstein etc.¹ kept excluding the non-state actors from becoming a warring party and civil war theorization has been overshadowed by inter-state war discussions.

On the other hand, following the Second World War, civil war numbers started to climb up, kept increasing during the decolonization years and finally peaked towards the end of the Cold War. Particularly, the increasing numbers of independence wars placed the emphasis on war-related facts and non-state actors, who were undeniably fighting against Western countries and the subsequent state formation wars between the quasi-authoritative entities rendered the existence of civil wars non-negligible.

This increasing visibility of civil wars in international politics challenged the academic debates to come up with credible explanations because even though the birth of civil wars was not an outcome of the altering systemic conditions and its existence was as old as war itself, it was an overlooked or underrated category: There were neither a common civil war definition nor an actor-centric approach that was present for a long time. Most of the war related definitions were adopted from international law or classic texts on war, which were mainly focused on state interactions and core questions regarding the goals, methods, types or aims were lacking a theoretical background. Thus, all these circumstances put forward the behaviorist approach and the scientific research on wars, which had been trying to conceptualize conflicts and wars from a scientific point of view since 1940s.

The scientific study of international conflicts and wars had gained the momentum after the end of the Second World War and became the forthcoming approach to wars due to its value-free analysis, independent from political and military manipulations and decision-making instruments. However, even the scientific study of war had set the civil wars aside and until the update of Correlates of War Project's (COW) categorizations in 1982, and the definitions of war types were fixed to inter-state and extra-state wars. Moreover, publications of other leading international conflict research institutes such as Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) were more

¹ For a deepened debate see. Hans Joachim Morgenthau, **Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace**, New York: A. A. Knopf, 1948; Kenneth Waltz, **Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959; Immanuel Wallerstein, **The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements and the Civilizations**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

focused on the subjects as the behaviors of nation-states and their interactions, arms races, balance of power, international cooperation, and colonial violence, even though they also rarely put the emphasis on ethnic problems or civil protests. This concentration was related to two main reasons. First, the state-actor dominated-perspective was present in the early works of behaviorist approach and the studies of war were more occupied with the concerns to explain and define the First and Second World Wars or the dynamics of Cold War. Secondly, as behaviorist approach was directly linked to working with data sets and statistical references, the difficulty of measuring civil wars was creating practical challenges. Methodologically, the measurability of civil wars in terms of battle deaths, warring party numbers, and the intensity calculations remained low and ambiguous compared to inter-state wars. As states have been the major (and only for a long time) information reporters of the datasets generated by behaviorist institutions and academics, data on civil wars remained less accessible and reliable.

While inter-state wars have monopolized the war discussions even in behaviorist debates until the recent updates on the war type/actor categorizations and diversifications of data resources, the political context of the international system towards the end of the Cold War have pushed the scientific studies of international conflicts and wars to renew themselves. In addition to independence and state formation wars, civil wars in the early 1990s, particularly the ones in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia guided conflict studies to focus on civil wars and academic debates slowly accepted the erosion of state actor's monopoly in war making. This increased attention incited the development of a growing body of literature on civil wars, along with the use of behaviorist research methodology on war studies. The expansion of scientific research institutes in the field and collaborating researchers² has resulted in the multiplication of conflict research institutes and correspondingly their datasets and coding systems. This pluralism has caused the absence of common definitions, categorizations, terminologies and conflict thresholds, which determine the principle distinctions between wars, their types and other conflicts. This was an

² The pioneers of this field can be assumed as in the following. They also represent the datasets used and benefited in this Thesis: Correlates of War Project (COW), Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University (UCDP) and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), The Political Instability Task Force (PITF), Michael D. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, James D. Fearon and David Laitin.

important defection as the absence of a common language rendered the academic dialogue on civil wars considerably difficult.

This fragmentation on research topics and disintegrated findings without any links between them was an inevitable result due to the behaviorist methodology that necessitated context sensitive statistical studies and specific mathematical modeling related to the issues in hand. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler's concentration on the economical causes of civil wars, Fearon and Laitin's focus on ethnical dynamics in civil wars, Regan's inquiries on interventions to civil wars, Gents's process-related studies on civil wars, Gleditsch's work on the transnational activities during the civil wars can exemplify this situation.³ Thus, even though these scholars used different issues as the focus of their research, each time the issue in hand aimed to explain a specific element of civil wars. Indeed, the complexity of civil wars and their international elements obligated this kind of a layer-by-layer studying method. Yet, all these diverse results were lacking an incorporating and explanatory approach that could explain the internationalization of civil wars through a qualitative methodology, tying together the diverse quantitative findings.

This belated multiplication and increased attention to civil wars was also linked to the shifts in the international system and consequently the understanding of conflict. When the bipolarized world abolished and introduced a new order, in which the pendulum has been moving between a unipolar and multipolar system, it had immense effect on several areas including the course of wars, particularly civil wars. First, the prominence of nuclear warfare over other conflict-related subjects, which was symbolized with the *balance of terror* or *mutual assured destruction* concepts, signifying the fear of the world annihilation due to the nuclear weapons competition between the USA and the Soviet Union, lost its priority. Its vanishing allowed other research topics surface and flourish. Secondly, civil wars driven by revolutionary ideals lost their main *raison d'être*. During the Cold War, superpowers had employed various domestic actors in numerous states by providing support to warring parties according to their ideological background in the context of *proxy wars*. Moreover,

³ For example, see Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War", **Oxford Economic Papers**, Vol.50, No.4, 1998, p.563-753; James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War", **American Political Science Review**, Vol.97, No.1, 2003, pp.75-90; Stephen E. Gent, "Strange Bedfellows: The Strategic Dynamics of Major Power Military Interventions", **The Journal of Politics**, Vol.69, No.4, 2007, pp.1089-1102; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Transnational Dimensions of Civil War", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.44, No.3, 2007, pp.293-309.

while some civil wars were fueled by the USA and the USSR, such as the civil war in Afghanistan, some others were hindered by supporting powerful national leaders who could suppress probable uprisings, such as Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In that regard, the virtual macro war between the ideologies of communism and liberalism had taken a tangible form all over the world, especially in third world countries. Yet, when the Cold War ended due to the disappearance of one of the two major rivals, both revolutionary civil wars and external support to leaders dramatically reduced, as a result of radical changes of strategy and priorities in specific regions.

Academically, all these political changes put the emphasis on civil wars, firstly because the nuclear war debate had lost its prominence and secondly due to the onset of high intensity civil wars after the end of the Cold War. While the end of the Cold War and proxy wars could decrease the number of civil wars, the result was the opposite as felt with the examples in Bosnia or Rwanda: *“The dissolution of multinational empires and states that accompanied the end of the Cold War resulted in a steep increase in conventional civil wars”*⁴. This unexpected outcome has been related to several dynamics: (1) The state forming processes, which were accompanied by intense domestic conflicts, (2) the revelation of political, ethnic problems and natural resource partition rivalries that had been curtailed by more important global security issues, (3) the end of external security offers and restraints of superpowers in third world countries, (4) the economic crises that emerged in support-receiving countries, (5) the quest of armed groups to find new enemies in order to be able to continue their existence.⁵

Moreover, while the new era started with the multiplication of civil wars, their increase shaped the understanding of global security and cooperation. Until 1990s, the United Nations (UN) was relatively inactive in the face of civil wars, the regional and other international organizations were less involved in intra-state

⁴ Stathis N. Kalyvas, Laia Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol.104, No.3, 2010, p.417.

⁵ For a deepened debate see. Robert Jervis, “The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?”, *International Security*, Vol.16, No.3, 1991-1992, pp. 39-73; Amitav Acharya, “Beyond Anarchy? Third World Instability and International Order After the Cold War”, in Stephanie G. Neumann ed., **International Relations Theory and the Third World**, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, pp.159-211; Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century”, *International Affairs*, Vol.67, No.3, 1991, pp.431-451; Stathis N. Kalyvas, Laia Balcells, “International System...”, pp.415-429.

conflicts, non-state actors were less visible compared to state actors that had aggregated around superpowers and the interaction between individuals were less efficient due to the absence of high-tech, easily accessed common communication systems. Yet, in the 1990s the UN adopted an enhanced cooperation understanding with other agents to maintain world peace and security in the face of intra-state wars. In that regard, actors, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union and the African Union started to take more initiatives in intra-state conflicts, in collaboration with the UN, and *ad hoc* coalitions became a more frequent practice, such as the French operations in Côte d'Ivoire, Central African Republic or the Italy-led peace operation in Albania.⁶ Also, non-state armed groups widened their operation and recruitment areas and became more and more transnational, which consequently challenged the emergence of the *war against terrorism* approach in the 2000s.

Thus, while the concept of civil wars had started to be examined in academic literature towards the end of the Cold War, politically and militarily they became more attractive to international factors, particularly in the form of interventions and involvements. Admittedly, proxy wars had already attracted military interventions and involvements, yet even these interactions were controlled and managed by super powers. Nevertheless, starting from 1990s an unregulated international system met the uprising understanding of international cooperation in relation to security issues, and transnational actors empowered with technological advancements. All these changes rendered the international civil war web more complex and multilayered, with increasing actor and interference types engaged in civil wars. Hence, while the period towards the end of the Cold War had brought the civil wars into the forefront of academic concerns, the period after its end, in addition to the renewed roles of systemic actors, underlined the internationalization of civil wars. This change was also consolidated with the unexpected shock that came with the 9/11 attacks, which caused the questioning of the triumphant side of the Cold War and opened a new chapter in international relations. In this context, the top leader candidate of a probable unipolar world, the United States, eased the way towards military interventions with its successive operations -at times disregarding the United Nations

⁶ For a deepened debate, see. Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams, "Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations", **International Security**, Vol.29, No.4, 2005, pp. 157-195.

Security Council- and its definition of new threats as the *rouge states* and international terrorism.

Until the 9/11 attacks, the role of the United Nations as the fundamental actor of international cooperation against brutal civil wars with the idea of humanitarian intervention had started to gain leverage, but the period after the 9/11 attacks displayed undisputable quantitative changes. In 1991, there were no internationalized civil wars (ICWs) amongst the 13 wars (of which the 11 were internal wars) experienced in that year, but in the next 25 years that rate has immensely increased. In 2015, while there were 11 wars in the world and all of them were civil wars, 10 of these were ICWs. Also, after 2001 until 2015, almost each year (with the exception of 2002 and 2004 which can be accepted as a transition period) at least half of the wars were consisting of ICWs, while the rest was always covering other civil wars. Only exceptionally in 2001 and 2003, there were cumulatively three inter-state wars and one of them marked the initiation of the Afghan internationalized civil war while the same happened for Iraq.

In that regard, the internationalization of civil wars initiated further relevant studies in the behaviorist literature and this multiplication provoked the further disaggregation of academic researches. In the last 25 years, works on ICWs have rapidly increased such as Gurr's actor-related studies on internationalized intra-state conflicts, Zartman's motivation based explanations on interventions, Vasquez's research on the contagion and diffusion of civil wars, Salehyan's transnational activities and relations of rebel groups, but none of them could be used to explain and give an overview of the internationalization of civil wars by themselves.⁷ Because, preliminarily, almost any study focusing on the internationalization of civil wars was either accepting the interventions as the internationalization element or was solely focusing on the involvements of third parties (state or non-state) into the civil wars. Hence, none of them was integrating the intervention and involvement activities into together and establishing a comprehensive interference framework that could explain the diverse mechanisms in different phases (onset, duration, termination) of ICWs. Thus, it was not possible to present in an accurate and

⁷ For example see. Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), **The Internationalization of Communal Strife**, New York: Routledge Revivals, 2014; Idean Salehyan, **Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics**, New York: Cornell University Press, 2009; Karen Rasler, "Internationalized Civil War: The Impact of the Syrian Military Intervention on the Lebanese Civil War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.27, No.3, 1983, pp.421-456.

comprehensive way the multi-dimensional actors and the dynamics of the internationalization of civil wars.

In this way, the findings on the diverse issues of ICWs could either be applied to a limited number of cases, where the dynamics in question existed, or could explain only one dimension of the civil wars during the process of internationalization. Moreover, they could not exhibit the links between the internal and external causal factors, onsets and internationalization process of civil wars. They were also not useful to compare the motivations, methods and relational networks of actors embedded in diverse ICWs. Also, as datasets show, ICWs occur in relation to differing political and military contexts in which other types of wars display transformational processes during the different phases. Thus, examining and explaining these relationships within one-dimensional studies were not possible. Finally, they could not illustrate the similar or different dynamics and traits of the internationalization and escalation of ICWs by themselves.

In sum, none of the researches in the scientific study of international conflicts and wars could explain whether there are any convergent or divergent actors, aims, methods and patterns embedded during and between the onset and the internationalization of civil wars in a qualitative and comprehensive way by unifying the findings of disaggregated studies. Thus, establishing this comprehensive framework that can allow the identification of the links between the above-mentioned factors and the comparative analysis of all these diverse dynamics became the main motivation of this study.

In this context, this Thesis offers to (1) establish a common civil war concept derived from prominent datasets, (2) reveal the internal features of civil wars in a systemic and well-defined way, (3) form an internationalization framework that could include both interventions and involvements, (4) exhibit their different actors at system, state and individual levels, (5) demonstrate the relations between the different types of wars, such as the one between inter-state wars and intra-state wars with view to examine in detail the transition process between these war types, (6) find the internal and external designs embedded in these internationalization methods and finally (7) analyze their diverging and converging traits in a comprehensive way, which can be applied to various internationalized civil wars.

Hence, incorporating the international features of civil wars firstly necessitated a two-pillared research. According to these pillars, in the first part the emphasis is put on the methodological and internal components of civil wars. In the second one, the focus is directed to international elements of civil wars and their theoretical framework is constituted. However, the aims of this Thesis necessitate applying the structured findings to case studies, so that convergent and divergent characteristics of diverse internationalized civil wars (ICWs) can be revealed and compared, and the comprehensiveness of the theoretical framework on internationalizations can be tested. Consequently, a third pillar is established to complete the needs of this study in which case studies will become the application and verification platform of theoretical background.

According to the prospects embedded in examining ICWs, determining the cases was an essential task. The first trait required in the process of case selection was the common acceptance of cases as civil wars and not as conflicts according to the thresholds of different datasets used in this Thesis. Thus, the first attempt was to find civil wars that were common in the selected datasets. The second characteristic needed to appear in these civil wars was their internationalization. As internationalization is commonly accepted as a military intervention, which is defined differently by the various research institutes, the cases selected had to be viewed as internationalized civil wars according to the datasets used in this Thesis. Also, in addition to their internationalization, they should have been incorporating international involvements, because in this Thesis the involvement methods and relevant actors besides the states are included to the internationalization webs of civil wars once they are defined as internationalized civil wars.

The third factor that was taken into account was the timeframe of the Thesis. In this context, the civil wars of the cases had to be prolonged enough to reveal the systemic and periodical features of their intra-state wars. In other words, they should have occurred after 1945, be exposed to the systemic fraction after the end of the Cold War and continued until after 2001, so that they could incorporate international changes into their processes. In terms of time, their progression after the end of the bipolarized world was a major element so that their internationalizing characteristics could be examined in a more contemporary environment. Also, their continuation after the 9/11 attacks was strongly desired to see whether this international event had

any impact on the occurrence of civil wars. Finally, in order to reveal complex relational and effectual traits of the selected cases, the civil wars had to be impactful in their surroundings, and preferably to have regional, and even international, repercussions. Thus, instead of micro-size cases, internationalized civil wars with macro inputs and outputs were searched for, so that their complexity would be enough to exhibit as many characteristics, diverging points and converging traits as possible. The theoretical framework used in this Thesis was intended to be as comprehensive as possible, so that it can be applied to a large number of internationalized civil war types and their internationalizing actors that might have diverging methods, aims and goals. Only in this way, it would be possible to reveal and examine extensive features of internationalized civil wars.

In this context, three ICWs come to the fore as the ICWs of Afghanistan, DRC and Iraq. Historically, all these three countries have been the interest zones of big powers. Afghanistan has been ruled under the British Empire, DRC was colonized by Belgium monarchy and Iraqi territory belonged to Ottoman Empire. All these countries gained their independences in the 20th century and consisted of multiple identity groups. Until their independences, Afghanistan witnessed a system war that was identified as the *great game*, DRC was a victim of economic colonization, and Iraq was a product of the dissolution of an empire. In their differing contexts, it is possible to say that their historical heritages dragged them to their subsequent civil wars in the 20th century by depriving these states from possessing a consolidated nation-state system and stable economies. When they gained their independences, they all have had significant interactions with their proximate regions and neighbors, by means of wars, ethnic and religious relations and economic interests. Thus, examining these states' wars particularly after the end of the Cold War allows us to display their authentic characters such as their enforcements to import governmental systems, exposures to political and economic interests of third parties and non-resistances to identity quarrels.

According to the requirements of our research, it is also possible to affirm that firstly, the civil war in Afghanistan took place after the end of the Second World War, and both caused and covered up the post 9/11 attacks period. It is classified as an internationalized civil war in several datasets, it has taken place between 1978-2015 and involved major international inputs and outputs. As much as it had regional

impacts, it has been a global phenomenon in which the international community has been deeply engaged. It also provided a wide-range network of different actor types, and included international interventions in addition to third party involvements. Moreover, it involved transitions between different types of war and conflicts, and showed a rich goal, method, and aim repertoire of both internal and international elements.

Secondly, DRC covers various civil wars that took place between 1960 and 2014, there were transitions between different war types and conflicts, where multiple actors, characteristics of diverse time periods, goals, aims and methods can be observed. Moreover, it carries great importance for the whole African continent and the UN, due to its complicated mechanisms and the interaction between different actors. Also, different datasets perceive it in a similar way regarding its internationalized civil wars. It also allowed us to compare it with Afghanistan's internationalized civil war in terms of our theoretical framework established in the second pillar of this Thesis.

Thirdly, Iraq's various conflicts and wars cover the period from 1958 to 2015 and it is classified as having internationalized civil wars after 2003 by various datasets. The Iraqi war maintains regional and global dynamics, effect and outcomes. Regarding its goals, aims, methods, and actors, it has had a rich repertoire, same as the Afghan and Congolese internationalized civil wars. It included both convergent and divergent patterns with the other case studies, and allowed us to observe multiple agents and their interaction, including states, non-state entities and international organizations.

Thus, all three case studies offer a wide range of actors including state actors, neighbors, regional and international organizations and non-state actors, which render the findings of this Thesis as substantial as possible. In addition to the actors, their wide-range political, economic, ethno-religious and geographical causes and dynamics will reveal their internal characteristics in a very extensive way. Finally, regarding their internationalization, the conclusive theoretical framework of this Thesis, built upon inward and outward internationalization mechanisms, covering a large repertoire of qualities derived from model-based findings will be supported by significant convergent and divergent features.

Regarding all the selected case studies, the focus is directed to in the period after the end of the Cold War, because the ICWs of the bipolarized world are inarguably driven with ideological factors and proxy wars, thus their intrinsic dynamics and the authentic motivations of the internationalizing third parties are thoroughly veiled. In this context, even though it is possible to apply this Thesis's internationalization frame to any era and discover the hidden dynamics behind the internationalization of civil wars, the major answers to find during the Cold War will be linked to international system's context. Hence, in order to uncover more authentic variables widely freed from the system-related political and military relations the main attention will be directed to the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall. On the other hand, in order to maintain an inclusive, sustainable, comprehensive and comprehensible approach, and not to isolate contemporary conditions from their historical contexts, the warfare dynamics of cases studies starting from the end of the Second World War will be taken into account. As many different conflict and war periods will be examined, there will be minor differences regarding in datasets regarding their war categorizations. However, these differences will also allow us to compare datasets in a practical way and demonstrate the transitions between conflicts, wars and their types in a detailed manner.

Therefore, in this Thesis there will be three parts based on the three pillars of our study, which will be integrating inductive and comparative methods. In the first two pillars, an inductive method will be conducted to construct the theoretical framework. As the aim here will be unifying an explanatory structure a broad literature, both behaviorist and non-behaviorist, will be examined and used to illustrate the components of internationalizing civil wars. In the third pillar, a comparative method will be adopted to compare and reveal common and differing characteristics of ICWs, and to verify the practical attributions of theoretical elements.

In this spirit, in the first part, the concept of war and civil war will be examined in detail in two substantive chapters. In the first one, the understanding of war according to both earlier war definitions and contemporary classifications will be used to highlight the difference between classical and behaviorist approaches. Hereby, various datasets and their coding systems will be examined in order to establish a combined methodology and an inclusive war categorization. In this

context, the diverging methodological, categorical and operational researches of COW, UCDP/PRIO, Fearon & Laitin, Doyle & Sambanis and PITF will be reconciled.

To this aim, the COW's war types categorization will be accepted as the starting point with the addition of Fearon & Laitin's and the UCDP/PRIO's perceptions on the intra-state / war-extra state war separation. Thus, civil wars will be accepted as a sub-type of intra-state wars, but the principle of taking the bulk of fighting, if the main actors and motivations remained in the war scene, will be excluded from transferring the civil war into an extra-state war. Moreover, as all these datasets emphasized, intervention will be taken into account as the catalyst of the internationalization of civil wars. Yet, actor discussions will be extended to international and other inter-governmental organizations by following the footsteps of Doyle & Sambanis, who had concentrated on the role of the UN in civil wars. Also, in order not to ignore the importance of NSAs and the methods of internationalization other than interventions, involvement strategies, motivations and relational networks within those will be included to the examination of civil wars once they are accepted to be internationalized. This way, as inter-governmental organizations will not be excluded from the ICWs, NSAs will also be taken into consideration as an additional internationalizing actor. Rebel groups' recruitment strategies, operation areas, and relations with both other NSAs and state actors will be explored to show that internationalization in the 21st century goes beyond the intervention method. This will reveal the state actors' multifaceted actions other than interventions and system and individual level analysis will become a part of civil war research in addition to state level studies.

Once the methodology behind the diversification and conceptualization of civil wars is revealed, in the second chapter the nature, goals and dynamics of civil wars will be illustrated in a theoretical way, which will allow us to internalize the conceptual, type and cause-related aspects of civil wars in a comprehensive way by relying on model-based findings. This inquiry will reveal to which end civil wars onset, what they aim and why they occur. Moreover, the behaviorist approach presented in this Thesis will be challenged by the "New Wars" debate, which had a significant impact in the literature due to its different theoretical approach, in order to show how other point of views study civil wars and why our methodological

approach is robust. Hence, before moving to the second part, the methodological, definitional, conceptual and practical aspects of civil wars will be discussed in a comprehensive way.

In the second part, the focus will shift towards the internationalization of civil wars and our analysis will serve to establish a theoretical framework describing and illustrating the diverse internationalization reasons, aims and methods. To this end, there will be two main chapters. In the first chapter, military intervention will be accepted as the constituent element of civil war internationalization and thus, their actors, methods, aims and interaction qualities will be examined. This inquiry will put state actors and international organizations forward as the main agents of interventions.

In the second chapter, firstly, internationalization webs will be examined thoroughly by showing how involvements accompany interventions and in what way the non-state actors play a role in relation to other types of actors and why all these diverse actors might interact with each other. Finally, our actor, method and causality based explanations, relying on model-based findings, will be integrated in a unifying approach to create the internationalization framework. This framework will have two main structures. First, it will be exhibited that there are *inward internationalizations* relying on voluntary interventions and involvements of third parties due to various reasons, goals and methods. Secondly, *outward internationalizations* will be discussed to clarify how third parties might be pulled into civil wars as intervening or involving agents due to externalization effects. Finally, their effect on the course of civil wars will be displayed so as to achieve a process-focused understanding of the operation of internationalized civil wars.

In the final part, all these unified theoretical findings will be tested on the abovementioned-selected cases. In that regard, there will be two main chapters dedicated to this aim. In the first chapter, a general overview of the selected cases will be offered by illustrating their diverse war types after the Second World War. Afterwards, their underlying causal mechanisms will be uncovered by presenting the causal roots, goals and dynamics embedded in diverse conflicts of these countries. Finally, internationalized intra-state wars in these cases following the Cold War will be outlined with their political and operational contexts.

In the second chapter, the internationalization mechanisms and networks of the internationalized intra-state wars of the selected cases will be compared on the basis of the structure established in the second part of this Thesis, under the framework of inward and outward internationalization methods. By examining when, how, by whom and why civil wars internationalize in a comprehensive and structured framework with inward and outward internationalization templates, we will be able to determine potential patterns between key internationalized civil wars by relying on the convergent and divergent elements embedded in their internationalization mechanisms.

Before concluding, it is important to highlight the differences between the terms *internationalized civil wars*, *internationalized intra-state wars* and *internationalized internal armed conflicts* which are employed in this Thesis. According to the Correlates of War Project's (COW) categorization, civil wars represent a sub-category of intra-state wars, in which a government battles with a non-state entity, while it is possible to find a more variable mix of actors in the upper category of intra-state wars. However, other sub-categories of intra-state wars, which are regional internal wars and communal wars, are rarely specified in quantitative researches and, even when they are listed, they only represent a very small part of intra-state wars. Hence, even though the terms *internationalized civil wars* and *internationalized intra-state wars* represent diverse concepts, their interchangeable usage can be understood due to practical reasons and due to the fact that a civil war is indeed an intra-state war. On the other hand, according to the categorization of UCDP and PRIO, *internationalized internal armed conflicts* exist as a specific category, which signifies a battle between a government and a non-state entity as in the category of *internationalized civil wars*. Nonetheless, the conflict threshold indicates less intense combats with fewer battle-related deaths, thus the term *internationalized internal wars* can be accepted as a synonym of *internationalized civil wars* when the UCDP/PRIO's classification terminology is being used. Yet, the term *internationalized internal armed conflicts* does not exclude wars, because even though war implies a more intense battle-related death result, the term conflict is used to distinguish between conflicts from less intense violence events and is frequently used to refer to conflicts and wars together, which remain above the threshold of less intense violence acts, such as riots. Thus, when the term *internationalized internal armed conflict* is used in this Thesis, unless it is specified

that conflicts are being addressed separately, it refers to conflicts and wars collectively. Consequently, it is possible to say that non-state wars, regional internal wars and communal wars are not under the scope of this Thesis. Also, the focus of this research is on wars and not on conflicts, but conflicts might be referred to or included into specific parts in order to show the threshold transitions or to use inclusive quantitative results.

Finally, war making techniques, insurgency strategies, military technologies of rebellions, and distinctions related to those within civil wars are not within the scope of this Thesis. In other words, when a civil war is discussed whether it has been a hybrid war or whether high conventional arms are used, or the insurgency was conducted with an asymmetric rebellion are not related to our research. What goes under the scope of this Thesis is the transitions between internationalized civil wars and other types of wars and conflicts, the nature of the actors involved in those, the international support provided to these wars and their warring parties, the intervention and involvement types of third parties, their aims, goals and motivations to do so and the implications of these dynamics. In that regard, in the following parts, the abovementioned three pillars and their elements will be examined through an inductive method with view to establish a unified framework and through a comparative method to test its applicability to different cases.

PART I - WARS AND THE PHENOMENON OF CIVIL WARS: PATTERNS OF ANALYSIS

Civil wars are the most common type of systematic violence in the 20th century. Although we find a historical background for civil wars, such as Spanish Civil War, American Civil War or the Russian Civil War, the last century has witnessed a great increase in the emergence and proportion of civil wars within large scale violence cases. During this era, an extreme complication of civil wars has been observed, firstly as a result of the decolonization process and the political context during the Cold War, and later with the emergence of unconventional actors and manners in conflicts. This complication prepared a melting pot for various actors and war causalities, thus the internationalization of this prominent conflict type became inevitable. In this chaotic environment, studies on civil wars have showed their multi-faceted aspects and academics have put a great deal of effort to shape a more concentrated theoretical framework.

However, these modern efforts to understand the internationalization and complication of civil wars, their contexts and circumstances are inevitably part of a longer heritage of studying wars, which include assessments, conceptualizations and approaches from different historical periods that gave birth to more contemporary and well-founded methodologies regarding civil wars in the second half of 20th century. Thus, in order to be able to unveil the central factors of internationalized civil wars of our era, a study of earlier understandings on war, their actors and their dynamics should be conducted as well.

In this context, the debate revolving around civil wars firstly start from the main question of “what is war” and evolve into “how to define civil wars” distinctly from classical and less refined war studies. Secondly, delimiting the framework of civil wars necessitates examining their emergence, reasons, and implications. Finally, clarifying the meaning and dynamics of civil wars will allow us to outline how, why and by whom these conflicts take an international form. Hence, this complementary perspective and a corresponding literature review will pave the way to understand the international elements of civil wars and their features.

Chapter I - Studying Civil Wars: Concepts, dynamics and actors

Categorizing and understanding war and conflict types require a thorough examination of and elaboration on the actors, time periods and violence levels. In order to be able to acquire this kind of knowledge, a philosophical and conceptual scan will be firstly realized for war and war-related matters, the cumulative approaches of war and their evolution through time should be examined for comprehending the debates on modern conflicts. In this context, after explaining the conceptual background on the theorization of war, a more focused analysis for the conceptualization of civil wars will be conducted.

Section I - Conceptualization of war: Evolution of war into civil war

Describing the state of war has been a concern for many different social scientists, since Thucydides wrote about the Peloponnesian Wars. Clerics of every known religion, lawmakers and legal scholars, philosophers, sociologists, ideologues, politicians and economists have been involved in analyzing this phenomenon that affects mankind in every way possible. International relations and war researches build upon all these different social sciences in order to gain insight of the concept of war, while searching for its roots within these domains is crucial as its analytical inquiry requires a level of theoretical knowledge, historical orientation, ontological familiarity and empirical approach. While doing this, we should be asking the right questions to resolve the problem of what is the essence of war, who makes wars and how we can define wars.

a. Links between human nature and war

Clausewitz gives us a certain essence for war in his definition: *“War is, therefore, not only a true chameleon, because it changes its nature in some degree in each particular case, but it is also, as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it, a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the*

reason.”⁸. According to Clausewitz, the founding element and the driving force of war act is physical violence⁹ and this is framed by three attributions: *Passion* of warring people, the *chance* of winning for generals and their armies, and the *political reason* of rulers who pave the road for war.¹⁰ This interaction, containing hatred, animosity and lust, takes us to the famous linkage between animal and human behavior, called as *political animal*¹¹ by Aristotle. If we add George Orwell’s political approach to this debate¹², we find ourselves back to Clausewitz’s words, according to which human behavior is extended to the geopolitical sphere and violence actually drives the phenomenon of war.

Regarding the link between human nature and war, we come across certain traits of violence: Violence among animals occurs between limited numbers of livings in a narrow area but wars occur among multiple sides in a widespread area. But despite this distinction, motivations in the conflicts of the former species may be observed in the latter as following: Territorial defense, resource supply and concern of survival.¹³ These instincts drive animals to be involved in fights but humans as a species possess a higher quality in resolving these issues: Communication, which leads societies to obtaining organizational skills.¹⁴ This superiority makes us question the mankind’s resort to war even more. Thus, following Clausewitz’s definition of human nature within the understanding of war, reference should be made to Thomas Hobbes, who has been one of the pioneer thinkers on this issue. According to him, “*Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal ... and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of*

⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, **On War**, translated by Col. J.J. Graham, New and Revised edition with Introduction and Notes by Col. F.N. Maude, Kegan Paul, London: Trench, Trubner, 1918, Vol. 1, p.39.

⁹ Hew Strachan, **Clausewitz’s on War: a Biography**, New York: Atlantic Books, 2007, p.3.

¹⁰ Hew Strachan, **The Changing Character of War**, Geneva: Europaeum Lecture Series, 2007, p.28.

¹¹ Dimitris Papadis, “Is man by nature a political and good animal, according to Aristotle?”, **Phronimon**, Vol:7, No:1, 2006, p.21.

¹² “*There is no such thing as ‘keeping out of politics’ because all issues are political issues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophrenia*”; George Orwell, **Politics and the English Language**, 1946, http://www.orwell.ru/library/essays/politics/english/e_polit/ (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹³ Quincy Wright, **A Study of War**, Vol. II, The University of Chicago Press, Illinois, 1942, p.1199.

¹⁴ Quincy Wright, **A Study of War**, Vol.I, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1942, pp.49-51.

violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."¹⁵. This explanation shows us his perception on human nature and war. According to Hobbes, in the state of nature there is a state of war where every man is against every man and this is the conflictive nature of mankind that gives birth to "universal war". This evil indicted interpretation of human nature is accepted but also contested by many philosophers. While Jean Jacques Rousseau points out that war happens because there is nothing to prevent it¹⁶, idealist and liberal schools of thought led by philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant and John Locke, do not completely deny the Hobbesian construction on human's natural character but rather highlight that it is an avoidable state of the establishment of rights, conditions and circumstances. So, in fact, the existence of war and the evil interpretation of human nature have led these thinkers to focus on peace conditions rather than war.¹⁷ On the other hand, Hobbes claims that governments exist in order to bring a minimum order into this chaos, but, as Kenneth Waltz argues, *"While human nature no doubt plays a role in bringing about war, it cannot by itself explain both war and peace, except by the simple statement that sometimes he fights and sometimes he does not"*¹⁸. Thus, according to him, the warring act is not dependent on human nature and the role of governments should be elaborated with different points of view.

b. Who makes war? Describing the actors of wars

This reflection brings us to the need of distinguishing individual violence that only concerns a limited number of people from organized violence, meaning war. Because war is defined as a collective act in which a form of organization is needed.¹⁹ This structural aspect is also found in Clausewitz's definition and is illustrated as *"a political instrument, which it belongs purely to the reason"*²⁰. Politics, according to his definition, stress the need for a political organization and political leaders who produce reason to battle. This emphasis holds two meanings: First of all, war is a social phenomenon produced by a political entity because it is not possible to reduce this act to an individual level and also economic units do not

¹⁵ Thomas Hobbes, **Leviathan or the Matter Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil**, Chapter XIII, Section 9, South Australia: The University of Adelaide, 2016.

¹⁶ Waltz, **Man, the...**, p.29, 232.

¹⁷ Jack Levy, "War and Peace", in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons eds., **Handbook of International Relations**, London: Sage, 2002, pp.352-353.

¹⁸ Waltz, **Man, the...**, p.29.

¹⁹ Armelle Le Bras Chopard, **La Guerre: Theories et idéologies**, Paris: Montchrestien, 1994, pp. 8-9.

²⁰ Clausewitz, **On War**, translated by Graham, p.39.

fight; they just compete in the business field. Secondly, organized violence illustrates that this act is not random but just focused on its aims.²¹ Overall, war involves a significant number of people and an operative synchronization of their behaviors that require a distinct organization.²² Therefore, the need for a political organization, which is capable of the act of war, has put forward the State actor (*Nation-State*²³) as the initiator of war and the sole reflection of political units for a long time. Although the emergence of the State actor has begun with the Westphalian order that gave birth to the modern term of sovereignty and the Nation-State actor can only be traced till the French Revolution, the concept of war and the attribution of political units to States can be traced back to antiquity.²⁴

While seeking for earlier views of different intellectuals who lived in separate periods, such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, it is possible to recognize that war is perceived in a similar way; it is defined as a phenomenon that exists in the nature of relations among the political units and the concern of survival, whose main dynamics involve security and threats.²⁵ This firstly raises the question of who those *political units* are. The realist paradigm, which has overwhelmingly prevailed as the mainstream theory in international relations, has granted the warring privilege to state actor, starting with the classical approaches. This understanding has excluded the cases of internal conflict and organized group conflicts from war researches until recent studies of sociology and international relations have accepted a wide range of transnational actors and gave an end to the monopoly of the State as the sole actor in

²¹ John A. Vasquez, **The War Puzzle Revisited**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.25.

²² P. Meyer, "Human nature and the function of war in social evolution: A critical review of a recent form of the naturalistic fallacy", in Johan M. G. van der Dennen, Vincent S. E. Falger, **Sociobiology and Conflict: Evolutionary perspectives on competition, cooperation, violence and warfare**, London: Chapman and Hall, 1990, p.228.

²³ "Nation-state is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence."; Anthony Giddens, **A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism: The nation-state and violence**, Volume 2, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p.121.

²⁴ "With first the establishment of the Westphalian state system and later the emergence of national armies during the period of the Napoleonic Wars, citizen-soldiers (and thus citizen-armies) became the accepted norm, and military service came to be associated with nationalism. It was only under Louis XIV in the seventeenth century that an organized national standing army came about, a concept later perfected by Frederick II of Prussia. Finally, the introduction of conscription during the French Revolutionary Wars set in motion the development of modern mass armies built around a professional nucleus and organized into specialized units for combat and support."; Kalevi J. Holsti, **The State, War and the State of War**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.1; Michael A. Innes, **Making Sense Of Proxy Wars: States, Surrogates & The Use Of Force**, Washington: Potomac Books, 2012, <https://books.google.com.tr/books?isbn=1597975869> (accessed 10.03.2017)

²⁵ Cemil Oktay, **Modern Toplumlarda Savaş ve Barış**, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012, p.20.

wars.²⁶ The thinkers of the Renaissance period, such as Niccolo Machiavelli, who defines war as an ordinary act, have heavily influenced realist paradigm that excludes non-state actors. Also, he may be perceived as the first intellectual who discussed the practice of war and its aims headed towards victory.²⁷ According to him, wars happen between the *belligerent powers* for two main reasons: Occasions may lead to them or they are planned carefully beforehand.²⁸ Reciprocal effects of history on realism and realism on history are also revealed in Thucydides' writings who did not only determine warring parties as sovereign units but also explained the circumstances of wars in his own period. He showed that they aimed to maintain freedom from external raids²⁹ and focused on power relations between actors in order to explain the phenomenon of war.³⁰ Subsequently, in each examination of war, there are traces of an organizational sovereign group either named as a government, state, political unit. The common component of these differently termed actors is crucial for their success to organize and lead a large number of people into battle for an aim, obtaining a tool of sovereignty and control over their choices. This trait is significant for understanding the definitions and actors in all kinds of wars and particularly, in the case of civil wars.

c. Definitions of war and their significance

As understood from the discussions about the nature of wars and the actors involved, defining war in a theoretical manner is a very difficult task to accomplish. This is because it necessitates a philosophical and pragmatic approach by which thinkers actually explain their comprehension, reasoning and causality of war and delineate the actor element that may take place in the game.

One of the first philosophers of war, China's Sun Tzu, does not define war in modern terms, but perceives it as an art and assesses domestic politics, military

²⁶ Chopard, *La Guerre...*, pp. 8-9.

²⁷ F. L. Taylor, *The Art of War in Italy: 1494-1529*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921, p.157.

²⁸ Niccolo Machiavelli, *Titus Livus'un ilk On Kitabı Üzerine Söylevler*, İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 2009, p.251.

²⁹ H.V. Wees, "Bizans'ın Savaş ve Barış Kavramı", translated by Onur Atalay, in A. Hartman, B. Heuser, *Avrupa'da Savaş ve Barış*, İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 2006, pp. 66-72.

³⁰ "And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger. (...) The secret being that where force can be used, law is not needed (...) If we had done so, not even would they have disputed that the weaker must give way to the stronger." Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by Richard Crawley, produced by Albert Imrie, and David Widger, iBooks. <https://itun.es/tr/lazkE.l>, 2009, pp.107-109.

strategy, and external politics as related issues.³¹ According to him, warring actors are the political entities who have concerns about their own territorial integrities. He even takes his reflections to the next stage and considers military capacity of the conflicting parties in order to evaluate the risks of loss and observes domestic determinants of war as the people, leaders, and soldiers.³² Yet, he separates from the modern scholars of war, with his own argumentation of “art of war” instead of considering it as a political or scientific phenomenon.

Another difficulty to define war within the classical thought is the fact that the early-time thinkers accepted war as a natural order and focused on searching how to win wars, what their aims were and how the wars in their historical periods occurred, instead of questioning why those entities chose to *warre* in the first step.³³ Under these circumstances, it is possible to say that Sun Tzu was relatively ahead of his own time by at least examining capacity-related issues and the different levels of war.

More scientifically, it is possible to find the word of *war* etymologically deriving from *werra* as it was used by Hobbes in his studies, “*meaning confusion, disaccord or strife*”.³⁴ Yet, its distinguishing features need more detailing in order to comprehend this separate category of macro-level violence.³⁵ In this context, classical, modern and recent works of war use three types of definitions: Functional, judicial and operational. Most of the scholars of social sciences, who try to give a practical value to war by defining its motives and aims, provide a functional definition. On the other hand, war is not only a social and political phenomenon, but also a reality of the international system, which needs to have its own rules and to be legitimized under certain circumstances.

Therefore, the legal aspect of war necessitates its own definitions, specifically to clear out warring actors and their limits. Although this effort is largely connected with the political definitions of war, it is also enriched by operational definitions of war developed largely by the behaviorist approach. In the present Thesis, we will be

³¹ M. McNeilly, **Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p.14.

³² Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Domestic Politics and International Relations”, **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol.46, No.1, 2002, pp.1-9.

³³ Johan M.G. van der Dennen, **The origin of war: Evolution of a Male-Coalitional Reproductive Strategy**, Groningen: Origin Press, 1995, p.53.

³⁴ **Ibid.**, p.69.

³⁵ **Ibid.**

mostly using this methodology that integrates quantitative criteria in the classic war definitions by using a profound examination on intensity of wars, war types, political positions of warring parties and different elements.³⁶ These quantitative qualifications and categorizations, which were developed after the 1930s with the contributions of Quincy Wright, P. Sorokin and L. Richardson,³⁷ will be elaborated separately in the following sections. Yet operational explanations will be provided in this section, because many definitions of war connect different traits together, so one definition may fall into multiple categories. Therefore, we will try to acquire a synthetic approach of war by combining functional, legal, sociological, operational, military and political views before explaining the quantitative methodology of war in detail.

In this sense, Clausewitz's war definitions seem to be one of the first clarifications, which are also widely accepted on the subject. He claims "*war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means*"³⁸ as "*an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our will*"³⁹. This approach is read through the definition of war as "*a mere continuation of state policy by other means*"⁴⁰. From this "functional" explication, war is perceived as an instrument to obtain political aims. There are alternative ways to war as diplomacy or political bargaining, yet one of the parties may be willing to pursue its objectives even if these instruments fail and want to take the risk of fighting for its particular needs and ambitions.⁴¹ Another widely accepted and a more modern definition belongs to Bronislaw Malinowski who used an anthropological approach by defining war as "*an armed contest between two independent political units, by means of organized military force, in pursuit of a tribal or national policy*"⁴². This definition, just like Clausewitz's, projects that war is an instrument used to reach political goals. On the other hand, while the qualification of actor is not just limited with governments and only a collective group is foreseen, he emphasizes the independency of warring entities, meaning that conflict forms, such as liberation

³⁶ Harvir Singh, "Study of War", **Indian Defence Review**, Vol.12, No.1, 1997, pp.106-108.

³⁷ David Singer, "From a Study of War to Peace Research: Some Criteria and Strategies, in David Singer, **Explaining War: Selected Papers from the Correlates of War Project**, London: Sage Publications, 1979, pp. 21-25.

³⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, **On War**, translated by O. J. Matthijs Jolles, book 8, chapter 6, New York: Random House, 1943, p.596.

³⁹ Clausewitz, **On War**, translated by Graham, p.23.

⁴⁰ **Ibid.**, p.15.

⁴¹ Vasquez, **The War...**, p.35.

⁴² Bronislaw Malinowski, "The Deadly Issue", **The Atlantic Monthly**, Vol.158, 1936, p. 659.

combats and independence movements, shall not be accepted as wars.⁴³ Nonetheless, Carol and Melvin Ember's definition of war, according to which “*the fighting between two or more territorial units (at the community level on up) as long as there is a group of fighters on at least one side*”⁴⁴, considers neither a condition of independency nor a governmental rule and puts forward a collective territorial belonging to the heart of the concept. In these various definitions, it is possible to find a common point as perfectly clarified by Margaret Mead: “*War is a social invention*”⁴⁵ and “*Whether social groups are multiplied in different forms in different approaches it is clear that war works as a social phenomenon. Or to put in another word wars are the products of the civilization in which they are waged. Their specific character is dependent upon the specific organization of society in times of peace. Since it is always a society that is at war with another society, any aspect of war is fully intelligible only when it is seen in relation to the given organization of those societies, their technologies and their institutions, their material resources and their morals.*”⁴⁶

Therefore, we may recognize that if wars include hostilities of organized societal forces they also take place for political reasons.⁴⁷ Similarly, Hoffman Nickerson defines war as an instrument of political aims and neither calls the name of a national organization, such as the “government” nor looks for the criterion of independency. He takes war as “*the use of organized force between two human groups, pursuing contradictory policies, each group seeking to impose its policy upon the other*”⁴⁸ and in this way he highlights the aspect of rivalry in wars. As reflected on political goals, rivalry may have countless reasons. For example, David Riches approaches war as “*the authorized employment of physical force against other persons, as a means by which groups competing for control of public resources and benefits attempt to influence the outcome of the competition in their favour*”⁴⁹. This definition illuminates the subject in three ways: First of all, war incarnates

⁴³ Vasquez, **The War...**, p.24.

⁴⁴ Dennen, **The origin...**, p.71.

⁴⁵ Vasquez, **The War...**, p.31.

⁴⁶ Hans Speier, “Class Structure And Total War”, **American Sociological Review**, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1939, p. 370.

⁴⁷ Dennen, **The origin...**, p.74.

⁴⁸ Norman D. Palmer, Howard C. Perkins, **International Relations: The World Community in Transition**, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957, p.213.

⁴⁹ D. Riches, “Violence, peace and war in ‘early’ human society: The case of the Eskimo”, in Colin Creighton, Martin Shaw, **The Sociology of War and Peace**, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987, p.17.

authorized force, which is linked to sovereign units. Secondly, war is connected with public benefits, which may originate in several ways. Thirdly, wars derive from competitions of several parties. Here, the term *competition* gives meaning to both the causality and judicial aspects of wars, which leads to other topics of discussions in this field.

While war is, in the widest explanation, a “*violent contact of distinct but similar entities*”⁵⁰, it is Cicero’s definition of “*contending by force*”⁵¹ that leads us to the legal sense of wars. Yet, Grotius, who gave the modern meaning of war in judicial approaches by saying that “*war is not a contest but a condition*”,⁵² has criticized Cicero’s words. While international lawyers and diplomats have followed Grotius’ conception of war, Cicero’s perspective was integrated in this concept rather than being ignored or removed. This definitional enhancement added a final legal element to the concept of war as “*the condition of those contending by force as such*”⁵³. According to this definition, controversies could have been arising from any kind of ruling actors for any kind of reasons having no limitation to inhibit its occurrence.⁵⁴ This wideness led the legal definition to adopt a more actor-focused view. For example, Lassa Francis Oppenheim discussed war as “*a contention between two or more states through their armed forces for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of the purpose as the Victor pleases*”⁵⁵ and explicitly added the “State” criterion into the concept of competition. However, many followed Wright’s approach and have accepted war as “*the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force*”⁵⁶ by not limiting themselves to the State level. This definition also incited the discussion of terminology of war, which still included many ambiguous forms such as in the following: *(Armed) conflict, armed contest, armed combat, force or (physical) violence, assault, inter group competition, inter group homicide...*⁵⁷

⁵⁰ Quincy Wright, **A Study of War**, Vol. I, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1942, p.8.

⁵¹ **Ibid.**, p.9.

⁵² **Ibid.**, p.10.

⁵³ **Ibid.**, p.8.

⁵⁴ **Ibid.**, p.430.

⁵⁵ Lassa Oppenheim, **International Law: A Treatise, Vol. II, War and Neutrality**, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1906, p. 56, cited in Rogier Bartels, “Timelines, borderlines and conflicts The historical evolution of the legal divide between international and non-international armed conflicts”, **International Review of the Red Cross**, Vol. 91, No. 873, 2009, p.47.

⁵⁶ Wright, **A Study...**, Vol.I, p.8.

⁵⁷ Dennen, **The origin...**, pp.71-72.

This discussion led us to use with operational or synthetic definitions, which gave great importance to delimiting the scope of each term used. As an operational and functional definition, Hedley Bull claimed that “*war is organized violence carried on by political units against each other*”⁵⁸ and gave us the opportunity to discuss the extent to which each concept is examined with its unrestricting and practical perception. Nonetheless, without having systemic and detailed explanations, the concept of war remains immensely ambiguous. This obscurity of terms, causalities, and actors also inhibits displaying different types of war, which evolves day by day under the current conditions. For example, Keith Otterbein defines “armed combat” as “*fighting with weapons that is performed by military organizations*”⁵⁹ and extends his definition by making a distinction between internal and external wars: “*When political communities within the same cultural unit engage in warfare, this is considered to be internal war. When warfare occurs between political communities, which are not culturally similar, this is referred to as external war. If there is more than one military organization within a political community, and these military organizations engage in armed combat, this is considered feuding or civil war depending upon the scope of the conflict*”⁶⁰. Thus, all these different terms and various definitions give us the right direction to proceed by pointing out the crucial criteria of war, such as the meaning of collective violence, the scope of political units, the need of an organization, the practices of political aims and the practical status of all these concepts. As we see in scientific and qualitative approaches of war, it is critical to delineate terms in order to categorize and comprehend all types of armed conflicts.

d. Late emergence of academic debates on civil war

These distinctions, difficulties, complex explanations, cause-related and actor-focused problems are extremely important for this study, because civil war is considered as a sub-category of war. As aforementioned, with the impact of realism in the academic domain, the State was accepted to be the only possible actor involved in war, so any other type of war, except the ones between states, was

⁵⁸ Hedley Bull, **The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics**, London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 184.

⁵⁹ Keith F. Otterbein, **Feuding and Warfare: Selected Works of Keith F. Otterbein**, Langhorne: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1993, p.37.

⁶⁰ **Ibid.**

excluded from the terminology of war. The main reason behind this conceptual delay is connected to the realistic conception of governors, who hold a great deal of power over State. In other words, this exclusion is hidden in its political significance. Naming a group as a warring party within a State necessitates the acceptance of the existence of a strong, effective opposition, and the recognition of its capacity against the state authority; because of this semantic and political risk, civil war is defined as “*trouble, emergency, or situation*” for a very long time, while the warring parties facing the governmental authority are described as “*rebels, bandits or terrorists*”⁶¹. On the other hand, the destruction derived from inter-state conflicts have prevented a different approach from being adopted in war studies. Especially the multi-faceted effects of the great wars, such as the First and the Second World War that shaped the international system, attracted the attention of scholars specialized on war studies. Understanding and preventing the phenomenon of war was largely connected to these experiences. Following these great wars, international relations entered into a new phase, where the mutual destruction theme became the essential element of conflict research. The emergence of two polarized blocks and the issue of nuclear weapons dominated this field of research.⁶² Within these political affairs, there have been two significant alterations in world politics that put internal wars into the academic perspective: The decolonization process that started in the 1940s and the end of the Cold War.

The former drastically changed the shift of war types towards internal wars away from inter-state wars. According to Correlates of War Project (COW) findings, between 1945 and 1997 there were 23 inter-state wars with 3.3 million battle deaths, while there were 108 civil wars with 11.4 million deaths.⁶³ Also K. J. Holsti affirms that 77% of 164 wars, which took place between 1945 and 1995, were internal. This picture is the proof for the alteration of armed combats, which shifted from external states to domestic state authorities.⁶⁴ That was a big deflection for conflicts because until 1945 war studies were mainly focused on inter-state wars, however with the end of World War II conflicts started to happen mainly within the states. This change had three facets: National liberation movements, secessionist initiatives and national

⁶¹ Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Civil Wars”, in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, **The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.416.

⁶² Jack S. Levy, “Reflections on the Scientific Study of War”, in John A. Vasquez, **What Do We Know About War?**, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, p.319.

⁶³ Jack S. Levy, William R. Thompson, **Causes of War**, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p.186.

⁶⁴ Holsti, **The State...**, pp.21-22.

unification efforts. First, the national liberation movements represent the decolonization wars conducted against Western countries, whose rulings in Africa and Asia were not accepted as legitimate by the indigenous populations. The main purpose of the national or local fighters involved in these wars was to gain independence or autonomy from the imperial rule and transform the old colonies into states, governed by their own local representatives. The wars of independence in Indonesia or Algeria against the Dutch and French rulers can be accepted in this category. It is possible to find here, within this category, the secessionist wars that were aimed to gain independence from both the colonial interveners and the dominant social group fighting against these colonial forces. This purpose should be observed and understood in the context of the simultaneous state-nation building process in the country that gained independence from the colonial rule by force with its national liberation war. The third type signifies national unification wars in divided regions that were split by the great powers after the World Wars. They aimed to recover an earlier territorial integrity, as in the cases of Korea or Vietnam, and these wars were also associated with the ideologies of the Cold War period, which veiled greater ethnic and social dissociations and led to proxy wars by the two polarized blocks in different regions.⁶⁵ As understood, the end of the Second World War, the termination of the competition for resources and markets and the weakening of European states broadened the understanding of war, thus forcing us to distinguish between war types. In this sense, elements, such as “*purposes of wars, role of civilians during wartime and the institutions of war*”⁶⁶ gained importance against the dominance of state actors and the role of great powers in war studies.

While this process broke the primacy of understanding of inter-state wars, it did not give an immediate weakening in “civil war studies” because that field was still far away from viewing these conflicts as distinct categories. Yet, it gave a daring perspective to warfare by including unusual targets, blurring soldiers and innovative weapons into the traditional forms of warfare. Starting from 1945, targets became more focused on enemies’ will, civil populations and economic resources instead of armed forces of another state. As a result, there was a decline in regular armies as they were generated from civilians, who did not wear a regular army uniform, hid their weapons and did not internalize military hierarchy. At the same time, weapons

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.25-27.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.27.

became smaller and more tactical which means that they were not preferable for battlefield confrontations but rather more suitable to destroy critical targets.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War era has made a major contribution to civil war studies. Although the decolonization process had established the basis for understanding unconventional wars, the intensity of the Cold War and the nuclear threat dominated war research till its historical end. With the dissolution of this bipolarized system, suppression on minor powers diminished and this allowed these states to focus on their own problems that were being ignored due to major international issues. Also, this positive change in the international system affected the domestic balance of many (especially heterogeneously built) states and pushed them into more chaotic political situations. Unfortunately, these conditions resulted in traumatic civil wars, not only for local populations but also for the international society, as in the cases of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the Caucasus area. While these combats showed the violent side of unconventional wars in a clear way, inter-state wars became less frequent. Consequently, the new global perception of threat shifted to civil wars and research on war studies finally took them into their analytical focus.⁶⁸

Briefly, even though the academic world ignored a distinctive category of civil wars or “intra-state wars” until the second half of the 20th century, this type always existed by “*involving organized, purposive violence, undertaken by one willful group against another*”⁶⁹. Because war, as an instrument of political process aiming to remove problems and change current power relations, always tended to occur in domestic spheres as much as it did at international level.⁷⁰ However, when it entered the academic field, it was extremely valuable, not only because academics started to develop categories that could eliminate its conceptual ambiguity, but also because there was much intensive quantitative research in order to fill in the gaps in the area of terminology. Under these circumstances, the use of quantitative methodologies, the databases connected to these research fields and the characteristics of civil wars will be discussed in the next sections.

⁶⁷ Christian Malis, “Unconventional Forms of War”, in Julian Lindley-French, Yves Boyer, **The Oxford Handbook of War**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp.185-186.

⁶⁸ Peter Wallensteen, “Theoretical Developments in Understanding the Origins of Civil War”, in Edward Newman et Karl DeRouen Jr, **Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars**, London: Routledge, 2014, p.13.

⁶⁹ Lawrence Freedman, “Defining War”, in Lindley-French, Boyer, **The Oxford...**, p.20.

⁷⁰ **Ibid.**, p.26.

Section II - Characteristics of civil war and datasets treating them: Evolution of scientific study of war and its correlation with civil wars

As a source of mass dislocations and deaths, environmental degradations, famines, epidemics and infrastructure destructions, civil wars occupy a significant place in global affairs. Wars are in general related with all these outcomes, yet intra-state wars seem to have a larger effect than other types. First of all, civil wars became the principal type of war since the end of the Second World War.⁷¹ Secondly, between 1945 and 1999, it has had a tremendous impact on human lives; intra-state wars have directly caused 16 million of deaths, leaving many other injured, relocated, and distressed.⁷² Finally, it is one of the greatest aggressive phenomena compared to than any other war type because it directly targets human lives rather than the state apparatus as we see in conventional war types and also because it recruits civilians to combat instead of officers whose main profession is to fight.

In this context, this section will focus on defining the notion of civil war. To this aim, an evolutionary explanation of civil war will be held firstly. Secondly, quantitative research related to this subject, cumulatively called “Scientific Study of War”, will be examined. This part will also build our methodological approach for the Thesis. Finally, various databases and their classifications of civil war will be described in order to build a stable category for civil wars. Quantitative characteristics of civil wars in history will be discussed in the second section, after the first definitional section. These sections aim to observe the realities of civil wars within an undivided historical context and in a more complementary way of understanding. It is important to comprehend the basics of war data before exploring them in depth in the following sections.

a. The Conceptual evolution of civil war: Debates from various thinkers

Before 1945, civil wars were rarely taken into account in the context of war studies researches. There have been a few exceptions to this practice, such as the American Civil War (1861-1865), the Russian Civil War (1917-1923) or the Spanish

⁷¹ Edward Newman, **Understanding Civil Wars, Continuity and Change in Intra-State Conflict**, New York: Routledge, 2014, p.1.

⁷² Stathis N. Kalyvas, Paul Kenny, “Civil Wars”, in Robert A. Denemark (ed.), **The International Study Association Compendium Project**, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, p.2.

Civil War (1936-1939), but even these cases were examined by historians rather than international relations scholars. This exclusion was fundamentally related to the characteristics of civil wars and the difficulty of understanding and conceptualizing their actors and outcomes because these wars were fought in a different manner according to their significance.⁷³ Yet, the decrease of inter-state wars after the Second World War, the increase of intra-state wars with multiple causes during and after the Cold War period and finally the growing interest of economists specializing in development issues, especially with decolonized African economies, have resulted in a shift of focus towards war studies.⁷⁴ Until this surfacing, intra-state wars were considered to be part of general war studies. Also, even after the concept of civil war was integrated into academic research, realist and neo-realist theorists, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Kenneth Waltz or John Mearsheimer, chose to overlook this subject and insisted on keeping non-state actors out of the game.

The undeniable and obvious wave of civil war onsets came with the decolonization process and its unconventional ways. After the Second World War, imperial powers were both politically and economically weakened and developing countries in Africa and Asia (or “Third World” as put by many academics) started to make claims for independence from colonial governments by using unequal weapons, logistic arrangements and guerrilla tactics, which were pretty different from the conventional European warfare notion.⁷⁵ That change of power in numerous territories made researchers to focus on this specific kind of war, however the terminology used was more inclining towards “political struggle”, “small wars” or “limited wars” instead of civil wars. Even though these wars fit into Stathis Kalyvas’s civil war definition, which is “*Armed combat taking place within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities*”,⁷⁶ as they are being fought between sovereign parties and their societies. On the other hand, it is important to point out that in the modern classification these wars are generally accepted within the “extra-state” category including colonial and imperial wars. Yet, the first understandings of

⁷³ Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Changing Character of Civil Wars”, Hew Strachan, Sbylle Scheipers, **The Changing Character of War**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 202-204.

⁷⁴ Kalyvas, “Civil War”, p.417.

⁷⁵ Martin Navias, Tim Moreman, “Limited War and Developing Countries”, in Lawrence Freedman, **War**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp.309-312.

⁷⁶ Stathis N. Kalyvas, **The Logic of Violence in Civil War**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.17.

civil wars in academic literature were dependent on irregular fighting, compromising all the campaigns, such as rebellions, insurgencies, revolutions, and guerrillas, where organized armies were fighting against their enemies without regular troops.⁷⁷

Clashing without regular armies has been the main observation of theoreticians when it came to conceptualize these conflicts. K. J. Holsti use the term “traditional warfare” for *institutionalized war* and “civil warfare” for the *wars of third kind*. According to him, these were new wars and dominated the international scene starting from 1945. They departed from the main characteristics of traditional wars and drew the line between soldiers and civilians in an utterly blurry way so all communities within a fighting society were labeled as fighters by their governments. That relation brings an important dilemma: While non-state groups rely on civilians for military capacities, such as manpower, logistic and material support and intelligence, they also target these groups with their combat tactics. This situation shifts the war’s focus from the interests of groups to individual people, because in these cases people become both the aim and the target of fighting groups, as they are combatants and victims at the same time.⁷⁸

This evaluation brings up the fact that the manners of war have been evolving and thereby, internal wars do not fit into the strict understanding of war, which involves two fighting sovereign states; they rather include both state actor and non-state actors. Thus, they represent a variation from the traditional understanding of war studies, they do not fit into the legal categories of international war and they differ from inter-state wars in many ways. These alterations difficult to reach a consensus on the definition of civil war due to its complexity causing a conceptual overlap with the other types of armed conflict, such as revolutions, political violence, ethnic conflicts, and terrorism. Also, different terms, such as *intra-state wars*, *internal wars*, *new wars*, *civil wars*, and *wars of the third kind* and *modern wars* became interchangeable for the same subject over time. This problem called for a way to distinguish civil wars from other types of conflicts by involving some kind of an *ad hoc* or value-based judgment, which can shape a more systematic and accurate term and formalization. In this perspective, Kalyvas offered five criteria for establishing a complete definition of civil war: “(1) *The goal of armed entities in civil war is power*, (2) *the entities that participate in a civil war must be organized*,

⁷⁷ C.E. Callwell, “Small Wars”, in Freedman, **War**, p.315.

⁷⁸ Holsti, **The State...**, pp.37-41.

*(3) the means by which these goals are accomplished is violence, (4) the context in which a civil war takes place is the sovereign nation state, and (5) it is implicit in the definition that one of the participants is a government”.*⁷⁹

Although these elements guide us concerning the combating sides and show the minimums of civil war institutionalization, the distinction of civil war from other forms of collective violence is highly debatable and the methods, scope and phases of intra-state wars are varied and have evolved over time. However, it became obvious that a singular category would not be enough to define them from an analytical standpoint.⁸⁰ Thus, the problematic concept of civil wars, the growing recognition of the complexity of intra-state wars, the need to categorize and conceptualize different types of conflicts and the attempts to systematically analyze and model war patterns required a more analytical approach and this need resulted in implementing scientific methods into war studies.⁸¹ The ambiguity could only be resolved through the help of empirical methods and quantitative orientation, thus integrating scientific methods into war studies. It is what is called “the scientific study of war”.

b. Using the scientific methodology to explain wars

Quantitative research, which entered the academic sphere in the 1950s with the behaviorist approach, uses numerical data and brings together scholars from different academic fields, such as economics, history, politics, psychology or anthropology.⁸² In quantitative studies it is possible to find two types of data sources and two types of statistics produced from these data. For data resources, firstly, there is “soft data” depending on subjects that are difficult to measure objectively, such as people’s opinions and feelings.⁸³ Secondly, there is “hard data”, which depends on provable numbers and facts.⁸⁴ Statistical models, on the other hand, signify arithmetic representations of reality, which are used to explain two major types of data: Descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics are the illustrations of data allocation in that they offer simple explanations or remarkable

⁷⁹ Kalyvas, Kenny, “Civil Wars”, p.3.

⁸⁰ Newman, **Understanding Civil...**, pp. 4-5.

⁸¹ Levy, “Reflections on...”, pp. 325-326.

⁸² Govinda Clayton, “Quantitative and Econometric Methodologies”, in Newman, DeRouen Jr, **Routledge Handbook...**, pp.28-30.

⁸³ <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/business-english/soft-data>, (accessed 09/05/2015)

⁸⁴ <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/business-english/hard-data>, (accessed 09/05/2015)

features through frequency tables, tendency measures or dispersion levels. They usually assist in noticing overlooked factors and show important elements of the subject matter, where inferential statistics include a deeper analysis by incorporating the researcher's claims, findings and inferences allowing to generalize the sample under investigation.⁸⁵

The exclusion of these methods from war studies inhibits the achievement of confirmed information submitting indications about the origins, types and phases of wars. Without offering objective facts on war, it does not seem possible to analyze and understand the characteristics of warfare. Therefore, researchers in war studies were largely dissatisfied about the knowledge in hand and started to import the methods of science and applied them to the study of war. In this context, historical war records were transformed into databases, analyzed statistically and gave birth to results concerning the generalizations and specific determinants of wars. In this way, because of the accumulation of information and their analyses, comprehension of war was enriched with scientific results.⁸⁶

The pioneers of this methodology in the scientific study of war are Pitirim Sorokin, Lewis Fry Richardson, Quincy Wright, Melvin Small, and J. David Singer. These researchers have been in charge of initial data generating projects that conducted the collection of historical records in an organized and categorical technique, which produced information about war types, methods, interactions, causes, and outcomes.⁸⁷

One of the first data collectors and analysts in war studies is Pitirim Sorokin, a sociologist who presented vast data on the incidence, frequency, and severity of war in his book, *Social And Cultural Dynamics Vol. 3: Fluctuation Of Social Relationships, War, And Revolution* published in 1937. His data covered a long period from the fifth century B.C. until 1925, but his collection of conflicts and wars only included the ones between states that had been diplomatically active.⁸⁸ He was not concerned with identifying war dates and their actors; he rather gave a general

⁸⁵ Clayton, "Quantitative and...", pp.30-31.

⁸⁶ Stuart A. Bremer, Cynthia Cannizzo, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., James Lee Ray, "The Scientific Study of War: A Learning Package", in John A. Vasquez, Marie T. Henahan, **The Scientific Study of Peace and War**, USA: Lexington Books, 1999, p.375.

⁸⁷ Kelly M. Kadera, Dina Zinnes, "The Origins and Evolution of SSIP: How methods met models, with a short interlude", in Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Paul F. Diehl, James D. Morro, **Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes**, USA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, p.6.

⁸⁸ David Singer, Melvin Small, **The Wages of War: 1816-1965 A Statistical Handbook**, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972, p.9.

estimation on war quantities, army sizes and death results of these wars.⁸⁹ Overall, he assessed a huge temporal period and reached inferential conclusions as the *warlikeness* of states.⁹⁰ Secondly, one of the major works, which affected different studies in many ways, belongs to Lewis Fry Richardson, a British mathematician, physicist, and meteorologist. While he was working as an ambulance driver during the First World War, he witnessed the cruel face of war, which pushed him towards researching human violence in a quantifiable method. Being inspired by weather patterns, he tried to find out why and how people kill other people. This motivated Richardson to come up with data, which included all kinds of human violence starting from minor categories, such as gang fights, to major categories, such as world wars, and he defined all these events as *deathly quarrels* in general.⁹¹ He started producing this data in the 1930s, published his first statistics in 1950 (*Statistics of Deathly Quarrels*)⁹² and then the final version was published as a book in 1960. In his work he tried to describe and foresee the magnitude, onset, escalation, duration, termination, and possible spread of *deadly quarrels*.⁹³

Thirdly, Quincy Wright's great contribution to the scientific study of war derives from his *Study of War* books published in 1942 and 1965. The main objective of Wright was to find a way to control and prevent war. In this perspective he believed that a vast inquiry of wars was necessary. He analyzed 278 different wars, occurred between 1480 and 1940, in order to understand and compare the points of convergence and divergence of these wars. Under a strict method of observation, he presented each war in his statistics by pinning their onset and termination dates, treaties which ended them, combatant parties along with their entrance into force dates and actors' roles according to their offensive and defensive positions. He also added a number of battles for each war and provided estimates for casualty and

⁸⁹ David Singer, "From a Study of War to Peace Research: Some Criteria and Strategies", in J. David Singer, Bruce M. Russett, et al., **Explaining War: Selected Papers from the Correlates of War Project**, London: Sage Publications, 1979, p.25.

⁹⁰ "In the life history of nations, the magnitude of war, absolute and relative, tends to grow in the periods of expansion-political, social, cultural, and territorial of the nations at least as frequently as in the periods of decline"; Pitirim Sorokin, **Social And Cultural Dynamics Vol 3: Fluctuation Of Social Relationships, War, And Revolution**, New York: American Book Company, 1937, p.364.

⁹¹ Kadera, Zinnes, "The Origins...", p.11.

⁹² Lewis F. Richardson, Quincy Wright, C. C. Lienau, **Statistics of Deadly Quarrels**, Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960.

⁹³ In *deadly quarrels*, Richardson presented several information on wars by "1) geocoding wars by location or mapping them, 2) a matrix representation of belligerent dyads, or analysis of relations between pairs of actors, 3) sequential representations of war, and 4) ranking wars by their importance or severity"; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Nils W Metternich, Andrea Ruggeri, "Data and progress in peace and conflict research", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.51, No.2, 2014, p.303.

combatant numbers in some major events.⁹⁴ Another important contribution of his work is the classification of wars according to the causes and states involved in the wars and the categorization of war types: Balance-of-power wars, civil wars, defensive wars, and imperial wars. In this context, Wright defined civil wars as the wars “*between factions in the same state*”⁹⁵ aiming to “*preserve internal order and unity or common standards of religion or nationality*”.⁹⁶ He also explained that these wars cannot be completely separated from the balance-of-power wars, because ideas and beliefs travel across state lines and civil wars can provoke interventions or alterations in the balance of power at international level. Thus, civil wars may encourage states to launch campaigns or establish the need to defend the state from external interventions.⁹⁷ In this perspective, he shed some light on the reasons of internationalization of wars with a glimpse to the relation between different types of wars. Consequently, he dealt with the patterns of wars with an empirical and quantitative analysis and contributes profoundly to the evolvement of the war studies.

Finally, there is J. David Singer and Melvin Small’s statistical masterpiece *The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook* published in 1971. The main motivation for this book was Sorokin, Wright and Richardson’s databases and it covered the most vast time period available in a database. The aim of this work was not to discover the causes and correlations of wars, but to present a detailed description of wars by measuring their frequencies, magnitudes, severities, intensities, trends, and distributions.⁹⁸ This new dataset was prepared and developed simultaneously with the Correlates of War Project, which was hosted and initiated by Michigan State University at Ann Arbor. COW can be seen as the acceleration factor of scientific study of war, David Singer was the founder of this project in 1963 and *The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook* co-written with Melvin Small was the starting point of this influential school. Concerning the war indicators examined in this book, “frequency” represents the onset of military conflicts, “severity” signifies the number of battle deaths, “magnitude” shows the time length and actors involved, and finally “intensity” indicates the ratio of battle losses of

⁹⁴ Bremer, Cannizzo, Kegley, Ray, “The Scientific...”, pp.376-377.

⁹⁵ Wright, *A Study...*, Vol.I, p.103.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.639.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.639-640.

⁹⁸ J. David Singer, “A Study of War to Peace Research: Some Criteria and Strategies”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.14, No.4, 1970, pp.532-533.

parties to time or their population.⁹⁹ This data does not only display the distribution of different wars in time and space, it also gives birth to a progressive and permanent research program that allows to test more specific, more wide-ranging, and simpler propositions for war.¹⁰⁰

While these datasets became the focus of the quantitative movement in war studies at start, in the following years producing static models, orienting on events and generating linear, causal connections between variables became the main trends of scientific research of war and international conflicts, which caused the appearance of unrelated and diverse technical jargons, making the results very difficult to compare and collaborate. Yet, this diversity changed its course and reflected on the quantitative analysis by adding dynamic components to them, such as administrative processes of legislative policy making, the stability of international systems, the management of war and regime change. This accumulation required utilization of hard data and an advanced computational capacity. Thus, these efforts concluded with the multiplication of databases as International Crises Behaviour (ICB), Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), Global Events Data Survey (GEDS) and World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS).¹⁰¹ These databases differ in their informational resources, subjects in focus, definitions and results. This diversification calls for a careful selection of studies because the integration of a database into a research limits and frames certain classifications, definitions and compatible information. In this perspective, the next section will focus on different datasets and their significances.

c. Available research projects and their characteristics

With the diversification and increase of quantitative research institutes and projects, there appeared various datasets aiming to measure dependent, independent and control variables of wars according to their interests. Their compositions change according to the focus of the projects and cover inter-state conflicts, intra-state and civil war variables, conflict management, economic factors of conflicts, geography

⁹⁹ J. David Singer, "Accounting for International War: The State of the Discipline", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.18, No.1, 1981, p.6.

¹⁰⁰ Roslyn Simowitz, "Measuring Intra-programmatic Progress", in Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman, **Progress in International Relations Theory Appraising the Field**, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003, p.406.

¹⁰¹ Monty G. Marshall, "The Scientific Study of International Conflict Processes: Postcards at the Edge of the Millenia", **Occasional Paper Series 1**, Center for Systemic Peace, 1998, p.13.

related issues of wars, domestic politics, capacity measurements, international law and institutions or demographic and social factors.¹⁰² In other words, as W. D. Eberwein and S. Chojnacki put it, “*the real world is one, but the data on violent conflicts suggest different worlds of violence...world of war is what researchers make of it*”¹⁰³, consequently, each dataset can only spot a specific fragment of violence.¹⁰⁴ Regarding the scope of our study, only civil war related datasets and definitions will be considered in this section. After explaining the particularities of these projects and highlighting their major categorical differences, a definitional and data-related selection will be made in an eclectic way.

In this context it is possible to define five major resources for civil war definitions and datasets. Before starting this difficult task, we have to underline two issues: First, war represents a separate and more intense violence type than conflicts. It is a major armed conflict type and there have been several discussions concerning its difference from a conflict. At what point an armed conflict transforms from a minor violence event to a major violence fact? There are numerous criteria for separating these two, yet all non-consensual definitions use a battle death number threshold in order to distinguish between these terms. This brings us to our second point; while battle death numbers are important to measure the scope of violence, actors and spatial factors are used to distinguish types of wars.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, war defining elements and war classifications diversify in these datasets.

The dataset to start with is the COW project initiated by David Singer in 1963 at University of Michigan. The goal of the project is to systematically accumulate the scientific knowledge about war. While *The Wages of War* written by Singer and Small in 1972 established a standard definition of war for the COW and other researches on this area, the main aim of the project went beyond the initial efforts of measuring the temporal and spatial distribution of war and focused on identifying factors that would analytically clarify this distribution. Scott Bennett, Glenn Palmer, Paul Diehl and Zaev Maoz have been leading the project and made efforts to expand,

¹⁰² Paul R. Hensel, “Review of Available Datasets”, in McLaughlin Mitchell, Diehl, Morro, **Guide to...**, pp.46-55

¹⁰³ Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Sven Chojnacki, “Scientific necessity and political utility: A comparison of data on violent conflicts”, **WZB Discussion Paper**, No: P 01-304, 2001, p.8 et p.29.

¹⁰⁴ **Ibid.**, p.27.

¹⁰⁵ Newman, **Understanding Civil...**, pp.58-59.

determine and frame its limits, categories and definitions.¹⁰⁶ Since the establishment of that project, the COW researches have served as a guide to quantitative studies and other data projects aiming to identify types of war and their elements. Yet, while the understanding of war has developed, changing international circumstances reflected on wars led the COW project to review its assessment of the methods, geographies and arms of wars. Therefore, COW's war typology and its measurement have been modified a few times.¹⁰⁷

Regarding the international context, after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the traditional facet of global affairs changed and during the last thirty years actions of *sub-national*, *intra-national* and *extra-national* entities have increased and gained importance. While new states have emerged by gaining independence, the appearance of quasi-legitimate states or unconventional groupings was not institutionalized in the usual ways. This situation caused the multiplication of non-state groups and their involvement in numerous activities, such as engagement in warfare within or across state borders and establishment of private armies.¹⁰⁸ These changes caused many challenges for COW typology. First of all, with the escalation of non-state actors within war, actors defied the war definition regarding actor type. Secondly, evolving actors, methods and threats created an unconformity between existing war categories and contemporary conflicts. Finally, different battle death thresholds in distinct war categories caused severe criticisms from the academic world. All these factors contributed to the update of the initial COW coding twice; firstly in 1994 and then in 2001.

In the latest version of COW, war is accepted as a “*sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in more than 1000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a 12-month period*”¹⁰⁹, which does not seem much different than the original approach. Yet, the most recent changes in the classification and measurement components ended up altering COW's state-centric perception in

¹⁰⁶ The Correlates of War Project, “History”, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/history> (accessed 15.05.2015)

¹⁰⁷ Meredith Reid Sarkees, Frank Whelon Wayman, J. David Singer, “Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816–1997”, **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 47, No.1, 2003, p.49; See. “Details and Evolution of COW Classification” in Appendix I for the modifications over time.

¹⁰⁸ Meredith Reid Sarkees, Phil Schafer, “The Correlates Of War Data On War: An Update To 1997”, **Conflict Management and Peace Science**, Vol: 18, No: 1, 2000, p.123.

¹⁰⁹ Anouk S. Rigterink, New Wars in numbers: An exploration of various datasets on intra-state violence, **MPRA Paper 45264**, University Library of Munich, 2012, p.8, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45264/1/MPRA_paper_45236.pdf (accessed 17.03.2017)

which emphasis was given to the territory element as the essential qualification of system members. Instead, with new coding rules, a new perception focused on actors was adopted, and four actor-related conflict possibilities emerged: *“Wars between or among states, wars between a state and non-state forces outside of the state, wars within states, and wars between or among non-state actors taking place outside of states”*.¹¹⁰ In this context, new categorizations of war emerged and nine sub-types of war now exist. The only preserved category is inter-state wars. While extra-systemic wars have been transformed into extra-state wars and civil wars are redefined within intra-state wars. Furthermore, there appears a whole new category of non-state wars, which is completely innovative for COW categorizations. The broad traits of new COW typology is going to be described in the next section, in order to show the selected typology and the war definitions within this Thesis’ scope, but there are still a few necessary remarks to be made here. At first, the current COW typology altered the concept of extra-systemic war and eliminated the difference between the “metropolis” and the “periphery”: *“This change ensured that all wars that take place within the recognized territory of a state would fall under the intra-state war category and, conversely, that only wars between a state and a non-state entity outside its borders would be included in the extra-state war category.”*¹¹¹ Also, the fatality figures of wars used to be defined differently for each category. New changes now guarantee *“the current requirement for all categories of wars is 1,000 battle-related deaths per year (twelve-month period beginning with the start date of the war) among all the qualified war participants. Battle-deaths include not only those armed personnel killed in combat but also those who subsequently died from combat wounds or from diseases contracted in the war theater. In determining if the war battle-related death threshold has been reached, civilian fatalities are excluded regardless of which type of war is under consideration”*¹¹². Lastly, concerning the internationalization of wars, certain attributes are clarified: For inter-state wars, an involvement of another state does not change the frame of war because the war is already among state actors. On the other hand, extra-state and civil wars involve non-state actors. Thus, in these cases the intervention of another state internationalizes the

¹¹⁰ Meredith Reid Sarkees, Frank Whelon Wayman, **Resort To War: A Data Guide To Inter-State, Extra-State, Intra-State, And Non-State Wars 1816–2007**, Washington: CQ Press, 2010, p.47.

¹¹¹ Meredith Reid Sarkees, “The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4 of the Data)”, 2010, p.11, http://cow.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/WarData_NEW/COW%20Website%20-%20Typology%20of%20war.pdf (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p.15.

war. A third-party can be defined as a war participant if it suffers 100 battle-deaths during the combat or commits 1,000 troops to the conflict. The intervener may join the conflict in order to support either of the sides, however if the third party takes the bulk of fighting from one of the parties, then war may transform into an inter-state or an extra-state war. In that case, the classification should be reviewed.¹¹³ A more detailed assessment of this dataset will take place in the next section of the Thesis.

In addition to COW, the second major group of war datasets on wars and definitions, which are vastly used by quantitative researchers, are produced by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO). These datasets include all armed conflicts between 1946 and 2013.¹¹⁴ Regarding its temporal cover, we may affirm that it is the most updated dataset in the field. UCDP/PRIO datasets cover information about multiple facts of international violence including conflicts and wars, parties involved in wars, all actor-related types of conflicts and one-sided violence. Their focus is also diverse, as their aim is to understand war causes, escalations, spreads, preventions, and resolutions.¹¹⁵

Regarding their definitions, the UCDP/PRIO datasets prefer the term “armed conflict” in their coding, which means “*a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year*”¹¹⁶ and has two sub-types (conflict and war due to their battle-related death results). In this context, the first step taken by this research program is to draw the line between wars and conflicts. Conflict is “*a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state*” and “*war is as a high intensity of armed conflict resulting in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a single year*”.¹¹⁷ According to this definition, the terms conflict and war obligate a state-centric actor. On the other hand, state

¹¹³ Sarkees, Wayman, **Resort To...**, pp.56-57.

¹¹⁴ In order to access to all **UCDP/PRIO datasets**: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/replication_datasets/; or <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/> (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹¹⁵ Erik Melander, “Uppsala Conflict Data Program: An Overview”, 2014, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/program_overview/, (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹¹⁶ Lotta Themnér, Peter Wallensteen, “Armed conflicts, 1946–2013”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol: 51, No: 4, 2014, p.553.

¹¹⁷ Sven Chojnacki, Gregor Reisch, “Perspectives on War Collecting, Comparing and Disaggregating Data on Violent Conflicts”, **Sicherheit und Frieden**, No: 26, Vol: 4, 2008, p.237.

actors are defined loosely compared to other datasets, by mentioning that it “*is an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specific territory or an internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory*”¹¹⁸. Thus, for a state actor, neither a population of 500,000 nor the condition of recognition is demanded.

Another aspect and difference of UCDP/PRIO datasets are linked to its battle related deaths recognition. According to their definition, battle-related deaths “*refer to those deaths caused by the warring parties that can be directly related to combat*”.¹¹⁹ This definition is broader than other datasets battle-death descriptions, because UCDP/PRIO states that all kinds of attacks both in battlefield and cities (including guerrilla activities, explosions, and assassinations) should be accepted as battle-related fatalities. Due to the aims of these attacks, which are to harm either the military forces or partisans of warring actors, all civilian losses should be considered as battle-related deaths.¹²⁰

Subsequently, according to actor types, there are four main war types that go under the war category used by UCDP/PRIO: Extra-systemic armed conflict, inter-state armed conflict, internal armed conflict and internationalized armed conflict. A detailed description of these conflict types will be provided in the following section, yet it should be noted that UCDP/PRIO produced one sided-violence and non-state conflict datasets, in which non-state conflict is defined as the “*use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year*”.¹²¹ The inclusion of non-state conflicts and one-sided violence datasets within the program attracted severe academic criticism against this classification, however it seems now that the inclusion of non-state oriented conflicts is accepted in the academic literature.

¹¹⁸ Lotta Themnér, Peter Wallensteen, “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2013”, **Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)**, 2013, p.4, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/167/a_167198-f_codebook_ucdp_prio-armed-conflict-dataset-v4_2013.pdf, (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹¹⁹ Therése Pettersson, “UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Data set Codebook, Version 5.0-2015”, **Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)**, 2014, p.5, <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/brd/ucdp-brd-codebook.pdf>, (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.6

¹²¹ Therése Pettersson, “UCDP Non-State Conflict Codebook, Version 2.5-2016”, **Uppsala Conflict Data Program**, 2016, p.2 <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/nsos/ucdp-nonstate-25-2016.pdf>, (accessed 18.02.2017)

Concerning their scope and findings, these datasets reveal that 144 armed conflicts (47 wars) occurred since 1989, while 254 armed conflicts (114 wars) occurred since 1946. In addition to this, they affirm that there were 33 armed conflicts active worldwide and all of them were internal conflicts, while 27% of these were internationalized in 2013. These wars occurred in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, United States of America (the conflict between the government of USA and Al-Qaeda) and Yemen. At the same time, seven of these 33 armed conflicts reached to the violence level of war (in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, South Sudan and the DRC).¹²² These datasets also provide most useful and insightful information by presenting these variables for each year of each conflict: Location, warring sides (primary and secondary), type of conflicts, intensities, and episodes. Finally, they are extremely practical by including all types of conflicts in one large data and thus allowing to trace the transformation of wars.

The third definition and dataset belongs to Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, who aim to find solutions to the instability problems after the termination of civil wars. Their data is called "International Peace building: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis" dataset and was developed under the auspices of the World Bank projects.¹²³ The purpose of this data is to predict how renewed hostilities might be prevented after the end of a civil war, how states can avoid chaos after the departure of peacekeeping missions and what kind of politics should be adopted by post-conflict peace-building organizations in order to help and guide unstable governments.¹²⁴ This study defines civil war as *"an armed conflict a) causing more than 1,000 deaths overall and in at least a single year b) challenging the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state c) occurring within the recognized boundary of that state d) involving the state as a principal combatant e) including rebels with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the state and f) has parties concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war"*.¹²⁵ Although this definition is similar to Singer and Small's definition, the

¹²² Themnér, Wallenstein, "Armed conflicts...1946–2013", pp.541-545.

¹²³ In order to access to **International Peacebuilding dataset**: <http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20701031~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html>, (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹²⁴ Michael W. Doyle, Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis", **American Political Science Review**, Vol: 94, No: 4, 2000, p.779.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.783.

1,000 annual death threshold has been replaced by a 1,000 deaths threshold for the total length of war, as long as the war causes 1,000 deaths in any single year. This difference is implemented as most of the cases meet the violence and other criteria cited. At the same time, it is observed that the majority of the cases had in fact resulted in 1,000 or more deaths annually. In this context, 124 civil wars have been reported between 1944 and 1997. This number includes the wars going on in 1999, which were showing strong signs of termination.¹²⁶ This research was basically focused on peace-building efforts and considered the following questions: Did the war end (did the violence return)? Did low level violence end after the war (considered for two and five years of periods)? What is the level of democratization after the war (considered for two and five years of periods)? Did the war end successfully (measured with termination success and non-division of state authority)?¹²⁷ Therefore, this data is mainly concerned with post-war processes, such as democratization efforts, socio-economic developments and with how to guide peace-building operations. That is why some details are irrelevant to the present study; yet, it is useful to trace the United Nation's (UN) involvement, civil war causalities, civil war types and the relapse of violent events.

The fourth source for definitions and dataset on war is provided by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin¹²⁸. Their research largely focused on the frequency of civil conflicts and their relationship with the end of the Cold War. They examine why some countries fell into civil war and why some others did not. Their dataset covers 161 war-affected countries with a population of more than 500,000, between 1945 and 1999. In this dataset, they found 127 civil wars, which caused approximately 16.2 million deaths as a direct result of conflict, five times higher than

¹²⁶ Michael W. Doyle, Nicholas Sambanis, "Data Set Notes for International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis", 2000, pp.1-4, <http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/cohen/codebook.pdf>, (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹²⁷ Doyle, Sambanis, **International Peacebuilding...**, p.798. To explain above-mentioned questions, it is possible to add following complementary information. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis dataset's coding is organized through following variables: "*a) Categories of cases: terminated, internationalized, divided sovereignty, successful termination...* b) *War related variables: start and end years, reasons of wars -ethnic/religious/identity conflict or ideological/revolutionary/other war-, geography, numbers of military and total deaths, displaced people...* c) *Socio-economic indicators: populations before and after war, GDP per capita, population growth, energy consumption, ethno-linguistic fractionalization...* d) *International assistance evaluation: The UN involvement, type of the UN operation, peace operation by a third party, net transfers to the balance of payments...*"; Doyle, Sambanis, "Data Set Notes...", pp.12-22.

¹²⁸ In order to access to James D. Fearon, David D. Laitin, **Macro Data**, www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/publicdata/publicdata.html (accessed 18.02.2017) : Replication Data set for Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", pp.75-90.

the death toll of inter-state wars.¹²⁹ In their subsequent studies, Fearon & Laitin concentrated on the factor of ethnicity and its relevance in civil wars. This is why this data shows the cultural diversity and grievances within the countries affected by civil wars, and also targets to reveal the conditions that favor insurgencies in these states.¹³⁰ In this context, they also affirm that “*no plausible definition of ethnic group will by itself imply a unique list of groups for a country*”¹³¹ yet they try to trace certain common elements¹³². Regarding their definitions of civil war, they adopt the following criteria: “(1) *Involves fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, non-state groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies.* (2) *The conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100.* (3) *At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels).* The last condition is intended to rule out massacres where there is no organized or effective opposition”.¹³³

At this point, it is possible to outline a few differences from other datasets. First of all, concerning the effective resistance criteria, which are used to distinguish massacres from intra-state war conditions, COW's datasets are based upon the stronger side's casualties that represent at least 5% casualties of the weaker side's loss. Yet, Fearon & Laitin relax this criterion with the condition of 100 military casualties for measuring effective resistance.¹³⁴ Secondly, there are a few differences concerning extra-state wars. According to Fearon & Laitin, “*an involvement by foreign troops does not disqualify a case as a civil war*”¹³⁵ indicates that extra-state wars should be treated from a different perspective. Also, anti-colonial wars are accepted within the civil war data, such as France's armed struggle against National

¹²⁹ Sven Chojnacki, “Anything new or more of the same? Wars and military interventions in the international system, 1946–2003”, **Global Society**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2006, p.28.

¹³⁰ For a deepened debate see. James D. Fearon, “Ethnic Structure and Diversity by Country”, **Journal of Economic Growth**, Vol. 8, No.2, 2003, pp.195-222; James Fearon, “Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Conflict”, in Barry R. Weingast, Donald Wittman, **The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.852-869; James D. Fearon, David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity”, **International Organization**, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2000, pp. 845–877; James D. Fearon, Kimuli Kasara, David D. Laitin, “Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset”, **American Political Science Review**, Vol. 101, No. 1, 2007, pp.187-193.

¹³¹ Fearon, “Ethnic Structure...”, p.200.

¹³² For elements of prototypical ethnic group (7 features) and their selections according to different cases see. **Ibid.**, pp. 201-202.

¹³³ Fearon, Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency...”, p.76

¹³⁴ Nicholas Sambanis, “What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition”, **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 48, No. 6, 2004, p.823.

¹³⁵ Fearon, Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency...”, p.76.

Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria. This shows that there is no difference between a war within the state borders and a war in an acquired territory outside the mainland.¹³⁶ In this context, they focus on the following questions: Is there any relevance between a country's ethnic or religious diversity and tendency to civil war? Do higher levels of per capita income affect the probability of civil war in a country with a high ethnic diversity? If the country has an ethnic majority facing a significant minority, does this situation create a greater risk possibility for civil war? Do the levels of civil liberties and democracy affect the civil war tendency? Does discrimination in favor of particular languages and religions raise the risk of civil war? How does the income inequality influence civil war likelihood? How does geographic proximity affect insurgency?¹³⁷ This data is mainly focused on ethnicity and war causality and thus seems limited for the present Thesis' scope. Yet, it is important to evaluate and compare war definitions, measurements, and causality of civil war and understand conditions for insurgencies. It also offers insightful information about the phases during the duration of a war.

Finally, there is "The State Failure Task Force", founded in 1994 following a special request from the US Vice President Al Gore and revised as "The Political Instability Task Force". This proposal produced the State Failure Problem Set dataset in 1999 under the direction of Ted Gurr and Monty G. Marshall at Centre for International Development and Conflict Management.¹³⁸ In 2005, the State Failure Problem Set dataset was revised by the Centre for Global Policy of the George Mason University, which was at the time headed by Monty G. Marshall. Since 2010, this research and the related publications have been maintained by a private company, Societal-Systems Research Inc.¹³⁹ The aim of the study has been to establish a data-driven study on the correlations of state failure in order to identify key factors and critical thresholds for high-risked political crises in different countries.¹⁴⁰ Civil wars in Somalia and Bosnia were the motivating factors for

¹³⁶ **Ibid.**

¹³⁷ **Ibid.**, pp.78-82.

¹³⁸ Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, "Data set and Coding Guidelines For PITF - State Failure Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955-2015", **Political Instability (formerly, State Failure) Task Force (PITF)**, Vienna: Societal-Systems Research Inc, 2016, p.1, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/PITFProbSetCodebook2015.pdf> (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹³⁹ **Ibid.**, pp.1-2.

¹⁴⁰ Daniel C. Esty, Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Pamela T. Surko, Alan N. Unger, Robert Chen, "Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects, and Consequences", **The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning**, West

gathering independent researchers to systematically study the dynamics and elements of the post-Cold War world. While this group discovered main factors effecting state failure (quality of life, international influences, such as openness to international trade, international organization membership and neighboring state's conflicts-, regime type, ethnic or religious composition), they assessed nearly 600 variables, including demographic, societal, economic, political and leadership related issues. In this context, they spotted 113 cases of state failure between 1955 and 1994.¹⁴¹ Similarly to other datasets, countries with populations over 500,000 were considered, yet, unlike the other datasets, this project looked for cases of state failure decomposed in four different types: "*Revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, genocides and politicides*".¹⁴² Regarding the measurement thresholds of this dataset, for revolutionary wars and ethnic wars conflict intensity requires (minimum) 1,000 direct conflict-related deaths during all the years of open armed conflict (war) and at least in one year the annual conflict-related death toll should exceed 100 fatalities.¹⁴³ While these datasets spot 55 revolutionary conflicts¹⁴⁴ and 55 ethnic conflicts¹⁴⁵, they provide insights about the causes of state failures in a detailed way and examine conflicts according to the number of fatalities

Lafayette: Purdue University, February 25-27, 1998, http://www.comm.ucsb.edu/faculty/mstohl/failed_states/1998/papers/gurr.html (18.02.2017)

¹⁴¹ Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc Levy, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Pamela T. Surko, Alan N. Unger, "State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings", in Ellen M. Brennan (ed.), **Environmental Change and Security Project Report**, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, No: 5, 1999, pp.49-50.

¹⁴² Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc A. Levy, Monty G. Marshall, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Colin H. Kahl, Pamela T. Surko, John C. Ulfelder, Jr., Alan N. Unger, "State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings", **Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)**, McLean, Virginia, 2000, p.V, <http://www.raulzelik.net/images/rztextarchiv/uniseminare/statefailure%20task%20force.pdf> (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹⁴³ While The State Failure Task Force dataset fatality numbers exclude civilian losses related to government campaigns of genocide and politicide (coded separately), diseases and starvation, there are 5 different types of fatality magnitudes measured (0 = less than 100 fatalities; 1 = 100 to 1000 fatalities; 2 = 1000 to 5000 fatalities; 3 = 5,000 to 10,000 fatalities; 4 = more than 10,000 fatalities) with deaths related to fighting, armed attacks, protests including rebel fighters and leaders, demonstrators, regime forces and officials, civilians massacred in war zones or caught in cross-fire, and victims of terrorist attacks. For adverse regime changes, it is possible to outline revolutionary changes, state dissolutions and central authority collapses; Marshall, Gurr, Harff, "Dataset and Coding...", p.5, 10-11.

¹⁴⁴ Political Instability (formerly, State Failure) Task Force (PITF), **Revolutionary War Dataset 2015.xls**, Center for Systemic Peace, Vienna: Societal-Systems Research Inc., 2016, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> (accessed 15.03.2017)

¹⁴⁵ Political Instability (formerly, State Failure) Task Force (PITF), **Ethnic War Dataset 2015.xls**, Center for Systemic Peace, Vienna: Societal-Systems Research Inc., 2016, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> (accessed 15.03.2017)

related to fighting through five (5) different magnitude measurements ranging from zero (0) to four (4).¹⁴⁶

Section III - The scope of methodology: Selecting war typology and using datasets

Scientific revolution in international relations and quantitative studies of conflict and war studies has received tremendous critique. First of all, using scientific methods meant the careful study of the structure and behavior of world politics, especially through observation, identification, description, experimentation, verification, modelization, and theoretical explanation. In international relations however, experimentation, certain predictions and reoccurrence are not possible. Secondly, for historically and judicially dominated areas it was difficult to incorporate mathematical and data-based researches and consequently the results in these studies were frequently sidelined.¹⁴⁷ In both of these cases, observation, identification, description and theoretical explanations based on hard data were disfavored. Thus, in the discipline of social sciences and particularly in international relations, the idea of scientific research is not easily accepted as “*no strictly scientific theory can come to grips with the central issues of international relations...which concern the value premises of international conduct*”¹⁴⁸. In that case, such scientific information is required to be processed with the researcher’s interpretations.

Therefore, in this research different hard data sources will be used. This means the integration of both descriptive and inferential statistics into the content of the present Thesis. The aim of this methodology is not to discuss the contribution of data utilization to the conflict processes, but rather to build the substance of this research on an objective resource based on facts instead of theoretical and abstract findings. Secondly, the main aim of this Thesis is to test ideas about when, how and under what conditions external actors involved in civil wars and how civil wars are transformed into internationalized civil wars. Through analyzing and comparing case studies, this study will try to reveal patterns concerning the internationalization of civil wars and highlight common operative circumstances of these violent occasions. If not, this research will endeavor to find the differential points and *ad hoc* variables

¹⁴⁶ Marshall, Gurr, Harff, “Dataset and Coding...”, p.8.

¹⁴⁷ Kadera, Zinnes, “The Origins...”, p.3.

¹⁴⁸ Hedley Bull, referred in Marshall, “The Scientific Study...”, pp.1-2.

of the case studies. Therefore, this investigation will necessitate measuring, comparing and fully discovering the processes of initiation, duration and termination in different civil war cases as well as defining their actively and passively involved actors. It will also require the sub-categorization of selected wars from a periodic point of view in order to show how these transformations can be so complex and how the war definitions can become fragile and ambiguous in multi-layered conflicts. While doing this, it will be unavoidable to discuss the historical background of these case studies, to analyze and compare their internationalization processes and examine the links of civil wars with other war types (extra-state, non-state and inter-state). This will allow us to discuss the cognitive utility of war typologies and to determine whether civil war is an independent notion that could be conceptually separated from other types of conflict. This can only be achieved by using datasets and objective information about wars.

Hence, although the utility of scientific information is criticized when it comes to social sciences, it is important to apply concrete facts to international relations especially when we try to understand wars. War studies come along with a wide range of perspectives, motives, expectations, and objectives, and, in order to decrease the probability of war, we should approach it with impartiality and give it a universal objective meaning instead of manipulative considerations. Thus, in order to comprehend the internationalization of civil wars, descriptive statistics, such as historical records of different databases, will be used to elaborate on the case studies related to the current research. These databases also provide insights about the determinants and characteristics of intra-state wars and will ensure the utilization of inferential statistics within the Thesis, especially in order to understand the patterns of internationalization of civil wars. As one dataset can only reveal a unilateral face of violence, our study will incorporate different datasets, as well as their divergent definitions.

Although working with empirical sources liberates the study from working with conceptual frameworks of war, which are open to subjective interpretations, it creates another challenge: There are no common, universal and acknowledged definitions and typologies regarding different datasets. As above-mentioned, this study relies on five different datasets, all used in their own coding techniques. This

necessitates a careful utilization and mixture of their definitions, typologies and datasets.

a. War typologies of datasets in focus

Until now, we have focused on how wars and conflicts are depicted differently within dataset categorizations and what criteria are valid to define civil wars. In this section we will concentrate on war types as approached by different research centers and the significance of these datasets for our study.

Table 1 - COW's War Typology¹⁴⁹

I. Inter-state wars (war type 1): Wars conducted between or among members of the inter-state system.		
II. Extra-state wars: Wars conducted between a system member and a non-state entity (not a system member) outside of state's territory.	<i>A. Colonial:</i> Conflict of a state actor with its colony (war type 2)	
	<i>B. Imperial:</i> Conflict of an imperial state against a non-state actor (war type 3)	
III. Intra-state wars: Non-state participants in intra-state wars can be a variety of types of actors, including: regional geopolitical units (GPUs), and non-territorial entities (NTEs) or non-state armed groups (NSAs) that have no defined territorial base.	<i>A. Civil wars:</i> Civil wars involve the government of the state against a non-state entity within its borders	1. For central control (war type 4)
		2. Over local issues (war type 5)
	<i>B. Regional internal</i> (war type 6): regional internal wars involve the government of a regional subunit against a non-state entity within existing system members' territory	
	<i>C. Inter-communal</i> (war type 7): conflict between/among two or more non-state entities which take place within the existing system members' territory	
IV. Non-state wars: Wars conducted by non-system member actors that take place beyond the confines of one state.	<i>A. In non-state territory</i> (war type 8): contains those wars that take place in a non-state territory, or generally the territory of autonomous entities, or territory in pre-state formation areas.	
	<i>B. Across state borders</i> (war type 9): wars by non-state entities that take place	

¹⁴⁹ This table is prepared by using Meredith Reid Sarkees, "Non-state Wars (Version 4.0): Definitions and Variables", **Correlates of War (COW) Project**, University of Michigan-Dearborn, 2010, p.1, <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war/non-state-wars-codebook-1> (accessed 15.03.2017); Meredith Sarkees, "Codebook for the Intra-State Wars v.4.0: Definitions and Variables", **Correlates of War (COW) Project**, University of Michigan-Dearborn, 2010, pp.2-3, <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war/intra-state-war-data-codebook> (accessed 15.03.2017); Meredith Sarkees, "Extra-state Wars (Version 4.0): Definitions and Variables", **Correlates of War (COW) Project**, University of Michigan-Dearborn, 2011, p.4, <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war/extra-state-wars-codebook> (accessed 15.03.2017); Meredith Sarkees, "Inter-state Wars (Version 4.0): Definitions and Variables", **Correlates of War (COW) Project**, University of Michigan-Dearborn, 2011, p.1, <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war/inter-state-wars-codebook> (accessed 15.03.2017)

The first dataset, which was also mentioned earlier in the Thesis, is the COW's dataset. Throughout its definitional scope and clarity of warring actors, it is the first dataset to guide us. The most important point here is the separation of “intra-state wars” from the other types and their sub-categorization. Civil wars include only two sub-categories of those due to their causalities, yet this table shows us how civil wars are difficult to be separated from other war types, which include non-state actors versus governmental institutions and other non-state actors.

Table 2 - UCDP/PRIO's War Typology¹⁵⁰

<u>Extra-systemic armed conflict</u> (conflict type 1)	Conflicts conducted between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory.
<u>Inter-state conflict</u> (conflict type 2)	Conflicts conducted between two or more states.
<u>Internal armed conflict</u> (conflict type 3)	Conflict conducted between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states.
<u>Internationalized internal armed conflict</u> (conflict type 4)	Conflict conducted between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides.

The UCDP/PRIO typology is based on a less complex categorization. The main difference from COW's typology is the inclusion of internationalized civil war (ICW) as a direct conflict type. Also, internal wars are not distinguished on the basis of their warring causalities. For COW's typology and datasets each intra-state and non-state war type is mentioned as either internationalized or not, but UCDP/PRIO uses a whole distinct category for internationalized internal wars, which facilitates to point out which wars should be taken into account.

Doyle & Sambanis's dataset allows tracking civil wars within all war types compared to these two because they only focus on civil wars. It is also in our advantage when we want to follow the start, termination, and processes of internationalization or elapse of these wars and follow how their cycles evolve. This dataset also provides great information about the causalities of wars (ethnic, religious, ideological, etc.). Finally, it is useful to track the UN's involvement in these conflicts. The main problem of this dataset is its time span because it only

¹⁵⁰ This table is prepared by using Themnér, Wallensteen, “UCDP/PRIO Armed...”, p.9.

covers the time period between 1944 and 1997.¹⁵¹ This limitation necessitates the utilization of more updated datasets as COW and UCDP/PRIO.

Regarding Fearon & Laitin's research, we see that their dataset concentrates on the domestic dynamics of civil conflicts as well. Their study is more focused on internal reasons of civil wars rather than external actors involved in them. It is valuable to understand the ethnicity problems in the countries involved and other conditions that encourage rebellions.¹⁵² The main reason for the inclusion of this dataset is its definitional conditions rather than its dataset information. Considering the internationalization process, Fearon & Latin do not qualify the involvement of troops in a civil war as a transformation to the extra-state war¹⁵³, while COW distinguishes the taking over of the bulk of the fighting on the basis of the number of battle deaths and accepts it as the transformation of civil war into extra-state war¹⁵⁴ and not into an ICW. Fearon & Laitin also extend the civil war category and do not recognize a difference on the basis of territoriality during fighting; they rather categorize anti-colonial wars as civil wars and not as extra-state wars.¹⁵⁵ So, while their dataset examines civil wars between 1945 and 1999 and has a more limited time coverage compared to our study, their definitional perspective holds importance for our research.

Table 3 - The State Failure Task Force/Political Instability Task Force's War Typology¹⁵⁶

<u>Revolutionary wars</u> (conflict type 1)	Episodes of sustained violent conflict between governments and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region.
<u>Ethnic wars</u> (conflict type 2)	Episodes of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in status.
<u>Adverse regime changes</u> (conflict type 3)	Major, abrupt shifts in patterns of governance, including state collapse, periods of severe elite or regime instability, and shifts away from democracy toward authoritarian rule.

¹⁵¹ Doyle, Sambanis, "Data Set Notes...", pp.1-4.

¹⁵² For a deepened debate see. Fearon, "Ethnic Structure...", pp.195-222; James Fearon, **Ethnic Mobilization...**, pp.852-869; Fearon, Laitin, "Violence and the Social...", pp. 845-877; Fearon, Kasara, Laitin, "Ethnic Minority...", pp.187-193.

¹⁵³ Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", p.76.

¹⁵⁴ Sarkees, Wayman, **Resort to War...**, p.54.

¹⁵⁵ Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", p.76.

¹⁵⁶ Goldstone, Gurr, Harff, Levy, Marshall, Bates, Epstein, Kahl, Surko, Ulfelder, Unger, "State Failure...", p.V.


Genocides and politicides (conflict type 4)	Sustained policies by states or their agents, or, in civil wars, by either of the contending authorities that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal or political group.

Regarding the typology of the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), this dataset is important for three reasons. Firstly, civil wars are divided into categories and we find the strict distinction between the different types (revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides) much more comprehensive than in previous datasets. While it does not utterly fit into our research area, it is significant to see the different internal violence types and understand the causality of wars. Secondly, this dataset has a larger coverage of civil wars compared to other datasets, because its fatality threshold criterion is much lower and inclusive than in the others. Thirdly, the adverse regime changes dataset unveils failed state conditions where democratic institutions and violence are evaluated. This provides information on the general circumstances of civil war onset and duration. Yet, in these datasets fighting actors are not described thoroughly described and the process of internationalization is not elaborated either. Finally, it allows us to examine and compare war types, but it is difficult to use it as a main dataset.

b. Methodological difficulties and request for research design

All these different definitions, criteria of violence, typology and dataset coding led to confusion and different conclusions and observations, even when the same sources are used. Considering intra-state wars, it is possible to observe that none of these datasets proclaim similar evaluations. For example, if the time period between 1948 and 1997 is studied, it is possible to conclude that COW, UCDP/PRIO and PITF have reported dissimilar numbers for intra-state wars. Particularly in 1994, PITF doubles the COW project cases and triples the UCDP-PRIO reports for intra-state wars. This is related to PITF battle death threshold, which is more inclusive than the others, as it can be seen in Figure 1 below.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ Charles H. Anderton, John R. Carter, "Conflict Datasets: A Primer For Academics, Policymakers, And Practitioners", **Defence and Peace Economics**, Vol.22, No.1, 2011, p.35.

Figure 1 - Institutional difference on intra-state war records¹⁵⁸

Relying on data creates other difficulties as well. Other than dissimilar war numbers and evaluations, all datasets explained in the previous sections cover different time periods. This necessitates the utilization of multiple resources for different time periods. While reading these datasets, it is observed that each dataset uses its own coding, so tracing one war from various datasets becomes difficult. All datasets code same wars differently and they even classify war types in diverse manners. Subsequently, an intra-state war within Sambanis's dataset might fall into an extra-state war classification in COW's dataset. Moreover, a combat can be classified as a war in UCDP/PRIO's, while it is accepted as a conflict in COW's.¹⁵⁹

After making a detailed inquiry concerning the scientific study of war, available datasets for our study, their typologies, their definitions, characteristics and difficulties in using them, in order to be able to trace the internationalization of civil wars, a comprehensive classification of war will be made. This classification would acknowledge the number of war types increased with the inclusion of the latest actors, a threshold of battle deaths will be needed in order to separate conflicts from

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.34.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.41.

wars, a dataset composition to base our research on an empirical ground, and finally a process of internationalization to define the actors.

In that sense, firstly, Kalyvas's definition of civil war covers five principles: *"(1) The goal of armed entities in civil war is power; (2) the entities that participate in a civil war must be organized; (3) the means by which these goals are accomplished is violence; (4) the context in which a civil war takes place is the sovereign nation state; and (5) it is implicit in the definition that one of the participants is a government"*¹⁶⁰. These principles will be the starting point of our study. While he gives clear motivations, operational and geographical conditions for war occurrence, he also widens the actors' involvement and permits *ad hoc* initiatives. Regarding war classification, COW's typology (internality, types of participants and degree of effective resistance)¹⁶¹ based on three criteria is going to be integrated in our study due to its actor-based sorting. In this typology, the concept of civil war is more clear and detailed than the other typologies due to its three-dimensional categorization. Also, definitions of non-state wars are solid and help to pursue war transformations. This is why the conceptual logic of the COW project's typology is going to be mainly followed. UCDP/PRIO's violence threshold will be used operationally in order to define the intensity of violence, which determines the conflict criterion to 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year and establishes the war criterion to at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.¹⁶² The reason for this choice is related to the "battle-related death" benchmark for the fatalities, because civil wars form a different way of fighting that transcends battlefield combats, such as inter-state wars, and in that sense, a deeper understanding of human losses, which also has its limitations in a chaotic fighting world, seem more proper.

Considering the internationalization of civil wars, firstly, Fearon & Laitin's *"an involvement by foreign troops does not disqualify a case as a civil war"*¹⁶³ actor-based approach will be integrated in our work. The reason for taking into account this expression is to make sure that a civil war will be an internationalized civil war when another state takes the bulk of fighting in cooperation with either the state or non-state actors. Because a deepened involvement into an civil war should not transform it into an extra-state war, provided that the principal causes remains the

¹⁶⁰ Kalyvas, Kenny, "Civil Wars", p.3.

¹⁶¹ Sarkees, Wayman, **Resort to War...**, p.64

¹⁶² Themnér, Wallensteen, "UCDP/PRIO Armed...", p.9.

¹⁶³ Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", p.76.

same and all former actors stay in the war scene. Secondly, we should define who can take part in as third parties when it comes to the internationalization of civil wars. Apparently, defining states and NSAs as “*sizeable groups with clearly defined, shared agendas, which might include ethnic, religious, geographic, economic, social, or political aspirations that may be in support of the state or against the state*”¹⁶⁴ is necessary to describe a civil war.

The question is who can internationalize the war between these groups. To discuss the actors who intervene in civil wars, a large spectrum of third parties is needed: States (neighboring or not), rebel groups, transnational civil society or international community under the umbrella of international organizations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).¹⁶⁵ Yet, while civil society may have both malign and benign effects on civil wars, it is still difficult to affirm that they play a major role as third parties in civil wars. Therefore, in this research they will be narrowly considered as internationalizing actors. While the role of states is undeniable, non-state armed groups and international or regional organizations are more disputable as internationalizing actors. It may seem as a false accusation to say that international organizations may be a part of a war, while they pursue peace-maintaining efforts.

However, in the post-Cold War era, the members of the UN found the opportunity to undertake more active roles in the international arena with an enhanced institutional cooperation, both due to the end of bloc competitions and the multiplication of intra-state wars that necessitated a more humanitarian approach.¹⁶⁶ Thus, international and regional institutions have started to take more active initiatives in wars, particularly starting with Rwanda and former Yugoslavia especially in the context of peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations whose limits became increasingly blurred due to their complexity.¹⁶⁷ In addition to these actors and the position of non-state armed groups, the problem is much clearer now. It is quite common that rebel groups cooperate with each other against national

¹⁶⁴ Small Arms Survey and Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “Mapping of Non-state Armed Groups in the ECOWAS Region”, **Preliminary report presented at the 6th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network**, Bamako, Mali, 27–29 May 2004, p.3

¹⁶⁵ Jeffrey T. Checkel, **Transnational Dynamics of Civil War**, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p.3

¹⁶⁶ Dilek Latif, “United Nations’ Changing Role in the Post-Cold War Era”, **The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations**, Vol.30, 2000, pp.35-36.

¹⁶⁷ United Nations, “Peace and security”, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml> (accessed 18.02.2017)

governments during civil wars and so it may seem as a local dynamic. Nevertheless, non-state armed groups have increasingly become transnational, as they take action in multiple states. A rebel group can be considered as internationalizing, if it is located on the territory of another state (not using a branch or an offshoot) and sends armed forces composed of foreign warriors. NSAs may support the local rebel groups as well as the national government. Consequently, within the scope of this research, states, civil society extensions, international/regional organizations and non-state armed forces will be examined as third parties.

In this context our research will rely on following datasets, which will be presented below in a synchronized manner:

Table 4 - Different datasets that are integrated to this research

Dataset Characteristics	Conflict	War	Fatality Criterion	Year
UCDP/PRIO				
Armed Conflict dataset (ACD)	✓	✓	✓	1946-2015
External Support Project Disaggregated/Supporter dataset	Can be linked to ACD through conflict ID	Can be linked to ACD through conflict ID	-	1975–2009
External Support Project Primary Warring Party dataset	Can be linked to ACD through conflict ID	Can be linked to ACD through conflict ID	-	1975–2009
Non-State Conflicts dataset	✓	✓	✓	1989-2015
COW Project				
Inter-state wars dataset	✓	✓	✓	1816-2007
Intra-state wars dataset	✓	✓	✓	1816-2007
Extra-state wars dataset	✓	✓	✓	1816-2007
Non-state wars dataset	✓	✓	✓	1816-2007
Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis				
Peace building Dataset	-	✓	✓	1945-1999
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin				
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War dataset	-	✓	✓	1945-1999
Political Instability Task Force (PITF)				
Coups list and dataset	-	✓	✓	1955-2015
Revolutionary/ Ethnic Wars datasets	-	✓	✓	1955-2015
Adverse regimes changes dataset	-	✓	✓	1955-2015

To conclude, one of the most updated datasets belongs to UCDP/PRIO. The most important element in its datasets is the distinction of secondary parties involved in wars. While ACD considers secondary parties, the other two UCDP/PRIO datasets

show the origins of external aid, the year of support and the type of support received by primary actors. This renders these datasets extremely important as our research is focused on the internationalization of civil wars. Also, ACD includes all types of wars, which means that, treating different processes of the same war is really easy because they are listed together in following rows. On the other hand, while the COW project provides the clearest war typology, it presents divided war datasets, which are disaggregated according to their types. Yet, this is why its datasets are also neat and structured. It also has the oldest observations about wars and offers a wide collection on civil wars. Nevertheless, distinctive processes of the same wars (due to transfer of one war to another) can be found in different datasets so it is difficult to trace wars from various datasets. Finally, both COW and UCDP/PRIO provide information about the type of combat (whether it is a conflict or war) and it is really important to follow the transformations of wars through time. This distinction does not exist in the other selected datasets.

Doyle & Sambanis and James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin's datasets are the most outdated ones, reaching out only up to 1999. However, only Doyle & Sambanis's Peace Building dataset includes clear information about the UN involvements in civil wars. COW and UCDP/PRIO datasets are more state and non-state actor focused, so this dataset serves to fill this big gap. Yet its time coverage does not allow evaluating current civil wars. While PITF datasets are perfectly updated and show observations until 2015, they mostly offer information about the original causality and magnitude of civil wars. This is why these three sources will be used as secondary ones, with view to understand the causes of civil wars rather than their manners and purposes of internationalization.

In brief, our work will rely largely on the COW (especially on war typology) and UCDP/PRIO (especially on internationalization questions) datasets. Considering the UN's actions and involvements, the datasets of Doyle & Sambanis will be evaluated and for the causality of civil wars Fearon & Laitin's and PITF's datasets will be taken into account.

Chapter II - The nature and roots of civil wars after the Second World War

Civil war is “*an evolving and dynamic historical phenomenon rather than one that remains constant over time*”¹⁶⁸, thus, civil war studies should take into account the characteristics of different historical periods even though civil war types may show common traits. Their nature, methods, causes and types are profoundly debated in the academic world, yet, before examining these qualities, the impact of the international system on these wars should be revealed in order to understand their conceptual framework.

In this sense, it is possible to divide civil wars into three phases after the end of the Second World War. The first phase is the decolonization process during which colonies fought with imperial forces to gain their independence. These are generally considered as extra-state wars according to the COW's typology due to their geographical understanding. As explained before, these wars are also called anti-colonial wars, imperial wars or independence wars, because they took place outside the western states' main lands. The decolonization process involved both voluntary and forced retreats of western powers and eventually doubled the number of sovereign states between 1940 and 1970. Considering violent ones, such as the Britain's retreat from India or the French exit from Indochina, the international community witnessed state building and unification efforts of native populations against foreign rulers.

Some of these wars involved secessionist movements within them, which were battled by smaller nationalist or regionalist groups against the main belligerent local forces. The eventual separation of India and Pakistan in compliance with differing religious communities and the creation of Vietnam, independent from the Indochina region, are among most obvious examples of these territorial battles.¹⁶⁹ Yet, anti-colonial wars are not the focus of our research due to their peculiar and in any case particular reasoning. In fact, these wars shall be tracked to Wilson's “self-determination” principle and its international outcomes¹⁷⁰ together with Lenin's anti-imperialist views which revealed “*an ongoing tension between centripetal and*

¹⁶⁸ Kalyvas, Balcells, “International System...”, p.416.

¹⁶⁹ Juliet Kaarbo, James Lee Ray, **Global Politics**, Boston: Wadsworth, 2011, pp.61-63.

¹⁷⁰ Erez Manela, **The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp.6-12.

centrifugal forces”¹⁷¹. Even though Wilson’s thoughts were driven by the First World War’s dynamics and Lenin’s views were related to the communist revolution, the idea of rebelling against colonial rule found its place in African and Asian countries after the Second World War. They mostly founded their internal support on nationalist movements, as predicted by Wilson, as they were exhausted by poverty and inequality. Furthermore, these movements were also fed by socialist ideologies commonly driven by Russian and Chinese leaders.¹⁷² Despite their complexity and historic importance, these wars are considered as decolonization or independence wars rather than civil wars due to the global context and the conditions of their era. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that, starting from 1945 till the end of the Cold War, the first wave of civil wars is fought under these conditions. We should not overlook this process because most of these wars transformed into ideological civil wars within the Cold War dynamics, through which the USA and USSR tried to gain influence on these newly independent countries and showed direct or indirect involvement in their internal affairs.¹⁷³

Fearon & Laitin evaluate this first wave of wars as civil wars and suggest that it is not appropriate to consider wars as independence wars due to their success. Thus, they accept anti-colonial wars as civil wars, such as the Algerian battle against the French and Mau Mau rebellion against the British in Kenya, even though they took place in transoceanic territories.¹⁷⁴ They also recognize smaller civil wars as “sons of the soil” wars, as seen in Chakma’s resistance in Bangladesh, Nagas and other tribes’ fights in India, the Muslim Moros’ rebellion in Philippines and the Tamils’ battle in Sri Lanka.¹⁷⁵

Although each colonial war was fought in a limited time span and towards well-framed goals, such as gaining independence from a foreign rule, the Cold War dynamics had a distinct effect on these newly established nations. This is why civil war literature tends to separate civil wars as the Cold War civil wars and the post-Cold War civil wars. In this research, we will be using this differentiation and accept

¹⁷¹ Sharad Chari, Katherine Vardery, “Thinking between the Posts: Post colonialism, Post socialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War”, **Comparative Studies in Society and History**, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2009, p.7.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, pp.7-8

¹⁷³ Kaarbo, Ray, **Global Politics**, p.63.

¹⁷⁴ James D. Fearon, “Why do some civil wars last much longer”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 41, No.3, 2004, pp.281-282.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.283.

the first wave of civil wars after the Second World War as a distinct period of anti-colonial wars. In this section, we are first going to examine the general characteristics and objectives of civil wars through time, then second we will focus on their causes and reasoning in order to find a causality pattern for civil wars and finally we will discuss whether and how the end of the Cold War might have transformed different aspects of civil wars.

Section I - Goals of civil wars

Categorizing war types and examining civil wars in a structured way requires a rather demanding task. Consequently, after revealing all war types, it is inevitable to distinguish between the civil war types on the basis of their motivation and objectives, which are extremely diverse. Fearon lists 128 civil wars and presents numerous civil war types: “1789- style social revolutions (e.g. Iran 1978, Nicaragua 1979); bloody coups and the violent shuffling of juntas (e.g. Argentina 1955, Iraq 1959); big classical civil wars in which relatively well-defined and well-armed adversaries vie for control of a recognized central state apparatus (e.g. China 1945, Angola 1975, Afghanistan 1978); many secessionist wars, some big and destructive (e.g. Nigeria 1967 or Ethiopia 1974), others highly persistent but so small as to verge on banditry (e.g. Northeast India 1952, some cases in Burma); some 'ethnic' wars (Sri Lanka 1983), some 'ideological' civil wars (El Salvador 1979), and some anti-colonial wars (France/Algeria 1954)”¹⁷⁶. Despite this diversity, Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min make a simpler classification for civil wars, also proposing that wars should be distinguished on the basis of their aims rather than their actors and civil wars shall be examined as *secessionist* or *non-secessionist* wars due to participant's intentions.¹⁷⁷ In this context, it is possible to create two larger categories of civil wars according to their ultimate aims: Governmental and territorial¹⁷⁸ or, to put it differently, *civil wars for central control* and *civil wars for local issues* as COW puts it. The first one might include revolutions, coup d'états, junta acts, well-defined

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.278.

¹⁷⁷ According to this typology ... civil wars are subdivided depending on whether the participants try to establish a new independent state (secessionist war) or gain/retain control over an existing one (non secessionist civil war); Andreas Wimmer, Brian Min, “From Empire to Nation-State: Explaining Wars in the Modern World, 1816–2001”, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 71, December 2006, p.879.

¹⁷⁸ Also referred as to central and exit wars by Fearon, Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency..., pp. 75–90.

larger civil wars, ideological wars and some ethnic wars,¹⁷⁹ which aim to acquire state control/central authority in order to either modify the political system in force or the operative and ruling governmental group or its composition.¹⁸⁰ On the other hand, territorial civil wars infer to *territorial, secessionist or autonomy seeking civil wars*, which are fought to separate an acclaimed territory within state borders¹⁸¹ and might also involve revolutionary, ideological and ethnic based ideas. Before examining the features of these categories, it is important to remember that the UCDP/PRIO's violence threshold, covering at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year, is adopted and thus smaller ideological movements, revolts or rebellions are excluded.

a. Civil wars over central control

The establishment of new political systems has been connected to revolutions and civil wars for centuries. The American Civil War and French Revolution during the 18th century have been the milestones for warfare when ideology became the combat motivation and was carried to battle zones.¹⁸² Revolutions, which are described as the “*appearance of contenders, or coalitions of contenders, advancing exclusive competing claims to control of the state, or some segment of it; commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the citizenry; incapacity or unwillingness of rulers to suppress the alternative coalition and/or commitment to its claims*”¹⁸³, hold great importance in history, especially starting from the late 15th century. According to Charles Tilly, if revolutions succeed, governors may retreat from administration, soldiers of revolutionary coalitions may seize the armed forces of the state, armed forces of an old regime might be dissolved or state apparatus may be taken by the revolutionary coalition.¹⁸⁴ Despite the fact that revolutions were a big part of history, these asymmetrical wars were not the main concern of African and Asian countries until the end of the Second World War when nations gained their independence from colonial rules.¹⁸⁵ As mentioned earlier, not all revolutions turn

¹⁷⁹ Also referred as to ideological civil wars, Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Ethnic Defection in Civil War”, **Comparative Political Studies**, Vol.41, No.8, 2008, pp.1043-1068.

¹⁸⁰ Karl DeRouen, Jr, **An Introduction to Civil Wars**, USA: SAGE Publications, 2015, p.56.

¹⁸¹ **Ibid.**, p.65.

¹⁸² Dennis M. Drew, Donald M. Snow, **Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy: An Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems**, Alabama: Air University Press, 2006, p.7.

¹⁸³ Charles Tilly, **Avrupa'da Devrimler 1492-1992**, İstanbul: Literatür, 2005, p.17.

¹⁸⁴ **Ibid.**, p.59.

¹⁸⁵ Drew, Snow, **Making Twenty-First-Century...**, p.252.

into civil wars, but they may also remain social movements aiming to seek autonomy, self-expression (oriented towards feminist, environmental or identity values) or economic changes.¹⁸⁶ However, it is not uncommon that they are transformed into civil wars, especially within the context of a struggle between capitalism and socialism during the Cold War, considering the newly independent state's instabilities after the anti-colonial wars.

The frequency of revolutions within civil wars is evaluated differently. While the latest developments in the study of revolutions indicate that they are “*one of the most common events producing civil wars*”¹⁸⁷, Fearon specifies there have only been three revolutions within 128 civil wars between 1945 and 1999.¹⁸⁸ On the other hand, various datasets show that revolutionary wars have the highest frequency in Latin America and they are the only civil wars occurring 100 years after the nation-state creation.¹⁸⁹ Although datasets offer diverse information on the occurrence of revolutionary civil wars, there are also incontestable historic cases treated by all datasets. For example, Angola fell into a revolutionary civil war between 1975 and 1989, when the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which dominated the central government following left-leading ideas,¹⁹⁰ fought against the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) coalition for central control.¹⁹¹ Angola had gained independence from the Portuguese rule in 1974 and all these three parties participated in the liberation movements against the Portuguese rule although they

¹⁸⁶ See. “New social movements” in Charles Tilly, **Social Movements: 1768-2004**, Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, 2004, pp.70-71.

¹⁸⁷ Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder and Mark Woodward, “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability”, **American Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2010, p.191.

¹⁸⁸ Fearon, “Why do some...”, p.280.

¹⁸⁹ Wimmer, Min, **From Empire...**, p.883-884.

¹⁹⁰ John A. Marcum, **Angolan Revolution - Vol. 2: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962-1976**, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1978, p.252.

¹⁹¹ PITE, **Revolutionary War Dataset**; Peace Research Institute Oslo, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research (PCR) at Uppsala University (UCDP/PRIO), **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**, 2016, <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/> (accessed 15.03.2017) : Replication dataset for Erik Melander, Therése Pettersson, Lotta Themnér, “Organized violence, 1989-2015”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.53, No.5, 2016, pp.727-742; Lotta Harbom, Erik Melander, Peter Wallensteen, “Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-2007”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.45, No.5, 2008, pp.697-710.

were all coming from different social roots. After the independence, MPLA gained state apparatus and fought against its ex-allies who aimed to seize central control.¹⁹²

A different example of revolutionary civil war can be seen in South Vietnam, where the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF), a communist rebel group supported by North Vietnam, fought against the regime between 1958 and 1975.¹⁹³ Datasets disagree about the origins and battle dates of this war, yet all quantitative arguments support that between 1960 and 1965 the country went through a revolutionary civil war. According to UCDP/PRIO this revolutionary act started in 1955 and remained a civil war until 1962, but, with the involvement of the USA along with the South Vietnamese government, the events transformed into an ICW and continued until 1965.¹⁹⁴ The UCDP/PRIO dataset classify the following period as an inter-state war with multiple warring parties but not as a civil war.¹⁹⁵ According to the COW, while there was a revolutionary civil war in South Vietnam between 1960 and 1965, the civil war turned into an inter-state war after 1965, when the USA, Cambodia, South Korea, Philippines, South Vietnam, Vietnam, Thailand and Australia took part in different time periods.¹⁹⁶ Only PITF describe the following period as an ICW and all those three datasets claim that the war ended in 1975. Despite the differences, it is clear that all datasets accept the period between 1960 and 1965 as a civil war over central control, which had both ideological and revolutionary roots with international support and multiple contenders.

Beyond these two examples, we see that royalist and republican forces fought over central control in North Yemen between 1962 and 1970, which was labeled as a revolutionary war. Also, between 1970 and 1975 there was an ideological civil war in Cambodia among communist rebels and royalist central government forces but it was not considered as a revolutionary civil war according to PITF, COW and UCDP/PRIO datasets.

While we find various civil wars connected to revolutionary movements, this type of act is not the only source for the occurrence of civil war. Coup d'états, which

¹⁹² For more information, see. Fernando Joao da Costa Cabral Andresen Guimaraes, "The Origins of the Angolan Civil War International Politics and Domestic Political Conflict 1961-1976", **Doctorate Thesis**, London: University of London, March 1992.

¹⁹³ PITF, **Revolutionary War Dataset**.

¹⁹⁴ UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

¹⁹⁵ **Ibid.**

¹⁹⁶ The Correlates of War (COW) Project, **The Inter-State War Data (v4.0)**, 2011, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war> (accessed 15.03.2017)

can be described as “*illegal but not necessarily violent acts undertaken by any elite (military or not) who is part of the state apparatus aiming to overthrow state’s primary leader by using different tactics*”¹⁹⁷, may also result in violent civil wars. J.M. Powell and C. L. Thyne have tried to establish an inventory of coups d’états between 1950 and 2010 in order to understand their relationship with civil wars, regime instabilities, and democratization processes and found 457 coup attempts during this time period, out of which 227 (49.7%) were successful and 230 (50.3%) were unsuccessful.¹⁹⁸ When these results are compared with the COW and UCDP/PRIO datasets, we see that five of these coup d’états are coded as internal armed conflicts/wars over central control and six more seem to have sparked civil wars over central control in the COW datasets.¹⁹⁹ As for the UCDP/PRIO datasets, 38 coup d’états are coded as internal armed conflicts/wars and 12 more seem to have sparked internal armed conflicts/wars.²⁰⁰

As we have mentioned before, conflict and war difference is important for this research’s scope. In that sense, while the COW dataset accepts 5 of these coups as civil wars, the UCDP/PRIO classifies only one of these coups as a civil war. Consequently, in the COW dataset we find that Bolivia’s leftist MNR coup in 1952, Iraq’s pro-western junta coup led by Abdul Wahab al-Shawaf in 1959, Chile’s Pinochet led military coup in 1973 and Afghanistan’s leftist military coup, called as Saur Revolution, in 1978 have been connected to civil wars.²⁰¹ The only common case between COW and PRIO, related to a coup and causing a civil war, is the coup attempt of exiled Yemenite Socialist Party leader Abdul Fattah Ismail against Ali Nasir Muhammad in 1986 for the leadership of the YSP, which was the ruling party of the time, giving Muhammad the title of the State President. Although he was ousted, Ismail was killed and eventually central control was resumed by Ali Salim al-Beidh, who was a member of the same faction as Ismail.²⁰²

Although both revolutions and coup d’états are gradually related to civil wars over central control, it is possible to mark a few differences between them. First of

¹⁹⁷ Jonathan M Powell, Clayton L. Thyne, “Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset”, **Journal of Peace Research**, No.48, Vol.2, 2011, pp.250-252.

¹⁹⁸ **Ibid.**, p.255.

¹⁹⁹ **Ibid.**, Appendix Table I.

²⁰⁰ **Ibid.**, Appendix Table II.

²⁰¹ The Correlates of War (COW) Project, **The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)**, 2010, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war> (accessed 15.03.2017)

²⁰² Fred Halliday, **Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen**, 1967-1987, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.41-44.

all, revolutions seem to be more linked to ideological, political and social changes, while coups derive from personal and military initiatives. Yet, there are also coups with revolutionary results as the 1933 Nazi coups d'état in Germany or the 1958 Iraqi coup. Secondly, coups tend to be more focused by directly targeting chief executives instead of the political system as a whole. Third, revolutions take longer time while coups succeed or backfire in a more limited time span. Finally, revolutions include more mass participation than coups, which may simply be seen as the replacement of one elite group by another.²⁰³

The reasons behind civil wars will be examined after an assessment of territorial civil wars, yet there is one element that requires our attention, the ethnicity in civil wars. After the end of the Cold War, when ideological factors started to fade from the international arena and the civil war battlefields, the leading characteristic of the post-Cold War civil wars became the role of ethnicity, which caused the academic literature to generate and adopt an *ethnic civil war* approach and terminology.²⁰⁴ Even though today ethnicity is more commonly handled as a civil war causality variable rather than a specific civil war type, the above-mentioned trend in the literature should not be ignored. Ethnic or religious reasons could be the driving force for both secessionist and governmental civil wars meaning that ethnic civil wars could be fought either for central control or for a separatist purpose. This overlap can be simplified with the ethnic war classification of PITF, framing ethnic wars as “*episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status*”²⁰⁵. For example, the civil war in Rwanda was one of the most violent ethnic civil wars, which shaped the post-Cold War conflicts understanding. Despite the fact that the war was axed on Hutu-Tutsi

²⁰³ Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, “A Theory of Revolution”, **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 11, No.3, 1967, pp.264-267.

²⁰⁴ For a deepened debate see. Donald L. Horowitz, **Ethnic Groups in Conflict**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985; Ted Robert Gurr, **Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts**, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993; Ted Robert Gurr, **Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century**, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000; Kristine Eck, “From Armed Conflict to War: Ethnic Mobilization and Conflict Intensification” **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol.53, No.2, 2009, pp.369-388; Fearon, Laitin, **Violence and the Social...**, pp.845-877; Fearon, and Laitin, **Ethnicity, Insurgency...**, pp.75-90; Nicholas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Non ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (1)” **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.45, No.3, 2001, pp.259-282; Andreas Wimmer, **Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

²⁰⁵ Marshall, Gurr, Harff, “Data set and Coding...”, p.6.

hostility and the reciprocal destruction of adverse ethnic groups, the aim of war was to gain central authority and state apparatus.

On the other hand, secessionist movements are perceived as the synonym of ethnic wars. Although secessionist civil wars generally include ethnic components, they could also be independent of ethnic reasons and governmental civil wars could be related to ethnic reasons.

Figure 2 - Correlation of ethnicity and civil war types since 1946²⁰⁶

		<i>Gleditsch et al. (2002)</i>		<i>Fearon & Laitin (2003)</i>	
		<i>Territorial</i>	<i>Governmental</i>	<i>Exit</i>	<i>Center</i>
Sambanis (2001)	Ethnic	40	30	33	27
	Other	5	36	7	33
Licklider (1995)	Ethnic	41	32	32	31
	Other	2	30	5	25
Goldstone et al. (2000)	Ethnic	40	29	35	25
	Other	3	23	3	24
Fearon & Laitin (2003)	Ethnic	33	27	37	29
	Other	3	29	3	31

As we can also see in the figure above, while most of the ethnic wars coincide with territorial demands, there are datasets showing that ethnicity does not form the only reason behind secession motivations. On the other hand, ethnic wars generate almost half of civil wars over central control showing that ethnicity is a major feature in all kinds of civil wars.

Thus, while ethnic civil wars could be perceived as a distinct type of civil wars, it is more appropriate to handle ethnicity as a causality variable rather than a type on its own. This situation leaves one last question to be addressed: Why do rebels aim for the whole state apparatus provoking a governmental civil war instead of just making territorial demands? Research over this question takes into consideration many variables, such as population, democratic conditions, economic indicators, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and the exportation of primary products, size of countries and ethnic fractionalizations. Whereas a civil war could include both goals or its ultimate aim could be shaped during the warring process²⁰⁷,

²⁰⁶ Halvard Buhaug, "Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 43, No. 6, 2006, p.693.

²⁰⁷ Horowitz, **Ethnic Groups ...**, p.232

the main reason to demand a governmental or territorial change is connected to the capacity of rebels relative to the government. “*While revolutions break out when both parties have realistic chances of victory, weaker dissidents seek autonomy or secession*” because seizing the central rule necessitates more power and resources than securing a limited territorial authority.²⁰⁸ All other causality variables affecting the breakout of civil wars, including ethnicity, will be examined in detail in the following sections.

b. Territorial civil wars

Territorial civil wars break out driven by the demand for a change within the sovereign state’s territory with the aim of secession/partition, separation (de facto partition) or gaining autonomy (territorial power sharing) resulting in a border transformation of the state in question.²⁰⁹ There are two main differences between autonomy seeking civil wars and civil wars for central control. First, territorial conflicts target a political change only for a part of the state territory, while the latter aim for a general alteration in the state politics. Of course, the separation of a country is a major issue for the central government and the state as a whole, but from the rebels’ perspective the territory in question is rather a micro and local issue. Secondly, these wars are fought in the periphery rather than the capital itself. This creates a more limited fighting area away from the core and the majority of the general population where fighters are mainly accumulated and organized.²¹⁰

Secessionist movements must figure out their motivations and founding principles very clearly in order to be able to claim a specific territory and demand self-determination apart from the existing state. They must rely on some identity element different from the rest of country, which reflects the special features of a particular region. This identity element can be territorial, communal or ideological. Territorial identity is based on common residence in the region and contains diverse characteristics from the core. This could be a historical, cultural, economical, geographical or ethnical feature distinguishing the residents of the acclaimed territory from the rest of the state population. This is the starting point to identify the

²⁰⁸ Buhaug, “Relative Capability...”, p.694.

²⁰⁹ Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallenstein, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, Håvard Strand, “Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Data set”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2002, p.619.

²¹⁰ DeRouen, **An Introduction...**, p.10.


movement's physical base up against central government and the principal element that draws the borders of autonomy seeking movement. Communal identity on the other hand, determines the membership criteria for the population living in the region and might rely on racial, religious, linguistic, regional or cultural differences compared to the state population. The distinction of communal identity from territorial identity is the kinfolk of the group rather than the diverse physical and civic characteristics of the region. Finally, the region with its particular traits could lack genetic liaisons and in that case ideological identity may come to the fore as the distinctive characteristic of the people. These three identities assist a regional movement to align itself apart from the hosting state and pave the way to self-determination.²¹¹

As much as regional and domestic support is indispensable for the success of a viable insurgency by providing shelter, fighters or funding, secessionist movements also habitually require external support.²¹² Even though there is no external support during a civil war, a secessionist movement will eventually need the international recognition of other states in order to achieve statehood and be accepted into the international community. It is possible to understand the importance of the recognition element and international support regarding the independence process using the cases of Kosovo, Taiwan, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Palestine as examples. Apart from official recognition, external aid and support during the territorial dispute is often provided either by neighboring countries or by regional and international powers that have cultural, ethnical, religious, political or economic interests. In the end, as Horowitz puts it, “*whether a secessionist movement will achieve its aims, however, is determined largely by international politics, by the balance of interests and forces beyond the state*”²¹³.

²¹¹ Stephen M. Saideman , Beth K. Dougherty, Erin K. Jenne, “Dilemmas of Divorce: How Secessionist Identities Cut Both Ways”, **Security Studies**, Vol. 14, No 4, 2005, pp.611-612.

²¹² **Ibid.**, pp.613-616.

²¹³ Horowitz, **Ethnic Groups ...**, p.230.

Figure 3 - Outbreak of civil wars according to type and period 1946-2004²¹⁴

When we look at the ratio of secessionist conflicts to governmental conflicts, we see that until the end of the Cold War governmental conflicts were more frequent than the secessionist ones. To be more precise, one-third of internal armed conflicts between 1946 and 2004 have been territorial while the remaining two-thirds were governmental.²¹⁵ This could be attributed to several factors. First of all, the role of ideology and consequently the intention to form a new governance system were more effective during the Cold War era, pushing the insurgencies to face their regimes directly rather than just producing regional claims. Secondly, the international support of the USA and USSR within the scope of their influence rivalry had turned both governments and rebel groups into stronger opponents, which equipped rebel groups with high capacity to directly challenge governments with revolutionary agendas. Also, against these groups there were internationally supported states that could respond to threats and defend the status quo through the use of violence.²¹⁶ Third, the end of the Cold War minimized the impact of revolutionary ideas and even decreased the motivation of rebel groups forcing them to give up their political agendas or find alternative ways to push their agenda. Fourth, the end of the Cold War reduced the international support of “superpowers” leaving both states and rebel

²¹⁴ Buhaug, “Relative Capability...”, p.693.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.692.

²¹⁶ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.397-400.

groups in attenuated forms. Fifth, the collapse of communism caused the dissolution of many countries, such as Yugoslavia and the USSR, and then generated a different political environment compared to the Cold War period.²¹⁷ All these changes influenced the concept of civil war and its motivation around the world. As a result, revolutionary and ideological central power struggles decreased, the establishment of new states, priority of regional questions, security dilemmas and group defense came to the fore. These new developments challenged the governmental and territorial conflict ratio and marked the peak decade (1990-1994) for territorial civil wars, but also turned into opposite direction between 2000 and 2004.

Amongst different cases both COW and UCDP/PRIO accept Nigeria's Biafra struggle between 1967 and 1970 as a territorial civil war. Nigeria gained independence from the British rule in 1960 as a federal state and had problems to maintain internal stability within a vast territory and 250 linguistically distinct groups. While national government faced two military coups in 1966, which resulted in administrative changes in the federal structure, in the Eastern region the Republic of Biafra declared its independence on 30th May 1967, which led to the outbreak of a civil war between Biafran and the federal troops. This war continued until the surrender of Biafra on 13th January 1970 and showed the importance of tribal relations within the Nigerian politics.²¹⁸ While there were political, economic, ethnic, cultural and religious problems inherited from the decolonization process, ethnicity was a significant element towards the civil war due to people of Igbo, who played a major role in the first coup. Although Igbo generals were ousted by the counter-coup and the government's retaliation continued on Igbo people. This detail holds importance because the Eastern region declared its independence after three periods of violent attacks on Igbo civilians.²¹⁹ The war also drew great attention from the international community because gaining control over oil production in the Niger Delta and the involvement of Nigeria in the global oil industry were significant features of this civil war.²²⁰

²¹⁷ Kalyvas, Balcells, "International System...", p.421-422.

²¹⁸ John J. Stremlau, **The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970**, Princeton University Press, 1977, p.4, 29-32.

²¹⁹ Douglas Anthony, "Ours is a war of survival: Biafra, Nigeria and arguments about genocide, 1966-70", **Journal of Genocide Research**, Vol.16, No.2-3, 2014, pp.205-206.

²²⁰ Zach Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war, 1967-70", **Journal of Genocide Research**, Vol.16, No:2-3, 2014, p.274.

Also, the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka provides an important example with its dual civil war context. A civil struggle in Sri Lanka started after its independence from Britain in 1947, but it took the form of civil conflict/war after 1983 and continued on and off until 2009. Sri Lanka's internal problems started with the systemic cultural oppression of the government against Sri Lankan Tamils, who represented 19% of the population within a dominant ethnic Sinhalese population of around 74%.²²¹ There have been two facets of this civil war. First, Tamils tried to defend themselves using violence against the Sri Lankan government, who applied linguistic, cultural, economic and democratic pressures against them.²²² The defense did not take a violent form until 1972 and it was after 1977 that it took an organized and armed secessionist format.²²³ After 1983, it turned into a severe internal conflict following the ban of Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), an umbrella party for Tamils, due to their support for the establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka.²²⁴

The second and simultaneous civil war is also linked to the Sri Lankan Tamils and should be studied in the context of the "Sons-of-the-Soil Wars" which contain specific ethnic elements. According to this sub-category, indigenous groups perceive themselves as the authentic owners and possessors of a region and strongly oppose any migratory flows due to scarce resources and work.²²⁵ In Sri Lanka, civil war also took an intra-regional form, because of the government's settlement policies in the Tamil-populated zone.²²⁶ This intra-regional "takeover" strengthened LTTE and the

²²¹ James D. Fearon, David D. Laitin, "Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War", **World Development**, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2010, p.202.

²²² In economic area, Tamils used to be the dominant, well educated elite in bureaucratic service with a 50% position occupation during colonial rule, which decreased to 5% until 1974. Also, Tamil owned industries were deliberately weakened by capital in different ways, such as the nationalization of shipping companies in 1967. Linguistically, English speaking Tamils witnessed the nationalization process of Sinhalese language with Language Bill in 1956 and 1972 Constitution of First Republic of Sri Lanka, which resulted in the destruction of Tamil language signs and the abandonment of utilization of any other languages in public area; Manus I. Midlarsky, **Origins of Political Extremism Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century and Beyond**, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp.201-202.

²²³ Fearon, Laitin, "Sons of the Soil...", p.202.

²²⁴ Kenneth D. Bush, **The Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Learning to Read between the Lines**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.41.

²²⁵ DeRouen, **An Introduction...**, p.67.

²²⁶ Whereas firstly Indian Tamils and Muslims were located in fertile Eastern province starting from 1930s, after 1949 Sinhalese villagers were also installed there, and they received better lands than the others. This resettlement policy caused a demographic threat for Tamils as well as economic problems and a *security dilemma* appeared between Tamils and government-supported migrants. While riots, reciprocal violent attacks, rapes and lootings became a part of daily life in Eastern province, LTTE established its military control over Jaffna and Northern Sri Lanka until 1986; *Security Dilemma*: "The situation in which a group feels threaten by another group as a result of the absence of security

government's disadvantageous policies towards Tamils fuelled up the fight. After 1983 the situation got worse. According to COW, between the years 1983-2002 and 2006-2009, Sri Lanka experienced a territorial civil war.²²⁷ On the other hand, the UCDP/PRIO dataset indicates that in Sri Lanka from 1984 to 2002, the internal struggle took the form of conflict during five years (in 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988 and 1994), while civil war threshold with secessionist reasons was reached during the rest. Also, the UCDP/PRIO dataset perceives 2003 and 2005 as civil conflict years, while the period between 2006 and 2009 is accepted as territorial civil war years.²²⁸ Territorial civil war ended in 2009 when the central government defeated the LTTE forces.

In sum, both governmental and territorial civil wars have very complex dynamics, while each war has its unique elements and they evolve according to both domestic and international context. In this sense, it is possible to syllogize a few common patterns amongst them. First, most of the internal armed conflicts of the 20th century may be linked to national consolidation and centralization efforts, which derive from state building efforts. While the European states' nation-forming process was a few centuries older, following the Second World War new states gained their independence and showed some similar traits with the older European states. Both Nigerian and Sri Lankan civil wars may be perceived in this context.²²⁹ Secondly, these wars were often fought as post-independence civil wars following the decolonization process, especially in Asia and Africa. Many newly born states have experienced civil wars after an armed resistance to colonial powers. These civil wars are directly related to the diverse heritage of the colonial ruling, such as unstable inter-communal affairs, weak institutions and economic problems. The civil wars in Sudan (1963-1972) or Mozambique (1979-1992) also fit into this pattern. Third, ideological motives had different groups competing over the type of the regime. They were fed with the Cold War context and started to decline with its end. The

guarantees whether or not there is a real threat", Neal G. Jesse, "Ethnicity and identity conflict", in Newman, DeRouen Jr, **Routledge Handbook...**, p.97; Fearon, Laitin, "Sons of the Soil...", pp.202-203; Midlarsky, **Origins of...**, pp.203-204.

²²⁷ COW, **The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)**.

²²⁸ UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

²²⁹ Edward Newman, "Statebuilding, Upheaval and Civil War", in Newman, DeRouen Jr, **Routledge Handbook...**, p.179.

wars in Vietnam and Angola were part of this pattern.²³⁰ Fourth, following the end of the Cold War ethnicity based civil wars came to the fore when state failures and security dilemmas reached their peaks. The wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda serve as evidence as they shadowed international cooperation and challenged academics and politicians to question shared values.

Despite all these different historical contexts, civil wars always create chaos and leave behind ruins, death and suffering states. Understanding the causes of civil wars is the key to finding prevention methods. Thus, in the next section it will be examined why or how these wars break out in an attempt to identify their common and distinctive characteristics before moving to their international dimensions.

Section II - Dynamics of civil wars: Studying causes

In recent years, especially after the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, civil war studies have made tremendous efforts to understand the onset of civil wars. In order to prevent and end civil wars, it is important to understand the roots of conflicts. Civil war literature often determines the types of civil wars, such as revolutionary, ideological, secessionist or ethnic, giving us some clues about the content of internal conflicts. Irrespective of the type, internal conflicts may have similar or completely distinct causes. Also, whereas each war has its own character, actors and dynamics, there are common elements that make countries more prone to the civil wars, increasing the risk of a civil war onset. A great amount of quantitative research has been made on the causes of civil wars, but there is no consensus on the civil war occurrence. This is partly due to the fact that each study has different focus and aims. Considering that civil wars are complex phenomena, each study has different conclusions depending on how the variables are being used or interpreted.²³¹

Furthermore, even the “cause/causality” terminology is not universally accepted, because it is proposed that the elements in question prepare the conditions on the path to civil war but not directly produce the conflicts. It is more appropriate

²³⁰ Newman, **Understanding Civil...**, pp.154-156.

²³¹ Jeffrey Dixon, “What Causes Civil Wars”, **International Studies Review**, Vol.11, No.4, 2009, pp.707-708.

to name these “correlates” or “determinants” rather than “causes”.²³² With any terminology, conflict-inciting factors of civil wars cumulate in cultural, political, economic and demographic/geographic categories. These classified factors are majorly explained with the greed, grievance, opportunity, organization of rebellion, and contest and bargaining models of violence approaches, which will be presented within the examination of causes. In this section, an evaluation of the diverse quantitative findings will be made in order to identify the main causes of civil wars and their significance. The effect of international factors on the onset, duration and termination processes will be excluded from this section, which will be discussed subsequently in the Thesis in a more detailed manner including their varying actors, forms and other complementary dimensions. Finally, rebellion and violence models will be used again in the following chapters to analyze civil war processes.

a. Ethno-cultural causes

The first category will focus on identity war or in other words, on ethnic war, which for some scholars constitutes a type of war rather than a war determinant. Scholars who accept ethnic wars as a distinct type also discuss if identity and non-identity wars have the same causes or not, underlying that a number of factors are more significant for some wars.²³³ Considering that each war has its unique elements, it is possible that identity wars have different tendencies compared to others. Yet, this argument can be suggested for all civil wars, recalling that ideology comes forward for revolutionary wars, geographic issues (such as a non-continuous territory) can be the main subject for secessionist wars or seizing the state apparatus (in a governmental civil war) may be the essential concern for a newly established state. Thus, it seems more significant to assess the role of identity or ethnicity and its correlates.

In this study, “identity” means “collective identity” and used interchangeably with “ethnicity” which signifies an inclusive conception in terms of *ethnie*, defining groups according to their “*ascriptive differences whether the indicum is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some*

²³² Anke Hoeffler, “On the Causes of Civil War”, **Draft Chapter for the Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict**, 2009, pp.1-2, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/Hoe_Chapter1_Oct09.pdf (access 15.03.2017)

²³³ Sambanis, “Do Ethnic...”, pp.259-260.

combination of thereof.”²³⁴ In addition to these distinctive traits, ethnic involve emotional and cultural qualities describing “*a named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, including a link with territory, and a measure of solidarity...*”²³⁵.

On the other hand, even identifying a group as sharing a collective identity or as an ethnicity does not help when it comes to distinguishing identity wars from others. There is not a common perceptive on how to label conflicts as ethnic wars or religious wars. Is it when the conflict is based on identity issues or when the conflict is simply between different ethnic/religious groups?²³⁶ The PITF Project defines ethnic wars as “*episodes of violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities challenge governments seeking major changes in their status*”²³⁷ accepting all wars involving identity groups as an actor against government as ethnic wars. This approach eliminates all types of civil wars and identifies the conflict as ethnic civil war when a collective identity group is involved in the war. This is why in this study ethnicity is accepted as a risk variable.

There are two main approaches on the role of ethnicity regarding civil wars: Primordialism and constructivism. Primordialism sees ethnicity as an inherent fact, which cannot be changed or denied. This ancestral bond drives a person with an instinct to protect its community for survival. Thus, ethnic conflict relies on real genetic and cultural differences between communities who would have different demands and interests. On the other hand, constructivism perceives ethnicities as socially fabricated identities that are constructed to supply the need for inclusion and commonly used as an instrument for political objectives.²³⁸ Whether in primordialist or constructivist sense, identities become a tool for political interests and that put ethnicity into the *conflict raising elements* list. If ethnicity/identity factor is shred for a risk assessment, the following main measurement variables come across: Fractionalization (ethnic, religious, linguistic) and polarization. In addition to these measurable determinants, the role of ancient hatreds and conflicts, the rise of security

²³⁴ Horowitz, **Ethnic Groups...**, pp.17-18.

²³⁵ Anthony D. Smith, **Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, p.27.

²³⁶ Jonathan Fox, “Religion and Intra-state Conflict”, in Newman, DeRouen Jr, in **Routledge Handbook...**, pp.157-159.

²³⁷ Esty, Goldstone, Gurr, Harff, Levy, Dabelko, Surko, Unger, **State Failure...**, p.68.

²³⁸ Jesse, “Ethnicity and...”, pp.94-95.

dilemma and the role of leaders who manipulate identities are also taken into account for understanding ethnic causes regarding the civil war onset.

Regarding measurable factors, fractionalization measures the likelihood that two randomly chosen people from a country do not speak the same language or do not belong to same ethnicity or religion.²³⁹ It basically shows how diverse a country is in the terms of ethnicity, language and religion. On the other hand, questioning fractionalization as a proxy for internal tensions does not seem enough on its own; it is evaluated along with polarization and ethnic dominance variables. Polarization is an index of ethnic diversity, which shows the balance between ethnic groups and reaches its maximum when a country is established upon equally sized identity groups.²⁴⁰ Ethnic dominance signifies a high demographic and politic influence of an identity group against other minor groups. In this context, identity/ethnic diversity is measured quantitatively with these proxies and there are four possibilities according to researches: Variables may have a positive relationship with civil war in a linear way²⁴¹; variables may have an inverted U-shape relationship with civil war onset²⁴²; variables may have a negative effect on the civil war onset; and variables may have no relationship with the civil war onset no matter how low or high it is.

Considering ethnic diversity indications and their significance due to civil war onset there is a high discord within quantitative results. This is mainly related to the dissimilar understanding of diversity and operationalizing of measurement criteria, particularly to the choice of dependent and independent variables within research designs. Also, differing time periods, regional characteristics and research objectives play significant role in these variations. This problem is also valid for other proxies under discussion, while there are some common findings; most of the quantitative data show diverse results. Regarding ethnic diversity, it is possible to draw some conclusions. For example, for fractionalization proxy, a high rate, meaning the existence of too many ethnic groups, is mostly found insignificant or it decreases the

²³⁹ Hoeffler, "On the Causes...", p.19.

²⁴⁰ Marko Klasnja, Natalija Novta, "Segregation, Polarization, and Ethnic Conflict", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 60, No.5, 2014, p.928.

²⁴¹ Linear Relationship: *Any given change in an independent variable will always produce a corresponding change in the dependent variable* <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/linear-relationship.html>, (accessed 18.02.2017)

²⁴² U-shape/curve Relationship: *As one variable increases, so does the other variable, but only up to a certain point, after which, as one variable continues to increase, the other decreases* <http://www.omnilexica.com/?q=u-shaped>, (accessed 18.02.2017)

emergence of civil war.²⁴³ One of the rare findings showing otherwise belongs to Tanja Ellingsen, who finds a linear relationship between civil war onset and fractionalization.²⁴⁴

On the other hand, Fearon & Laitin find ethnic and religious fractionalization and polarization virtually insignificant²⁴⁵; Paul Collier and Anka Hoeffler find that neither ethnic nor religious fractionalization are linked to civil war onset and socially diverse societies actually raise a lower risk of conflict²⁴⁶; and Hegre & Sambanis conclude that the relationship between ethnic diversity and civil war onset is not strong.²⁴⁷ These findings are usually correlated with the lack of one big stable group who can easily distribute gains and manage inter-group and intra-group conflicts.²⁴⁸ When there are too many ethnic groups, mobilization, recruitment, cohesion, organization and commitment of groups are weaker compared to this stable group who can raise demands against governments and these conditions diminish the civil war probability. Finally, it is important to add that when these tests are driven focusing on ethnic civil wars only, it is found that religious polarization and animist diversity (number of followers of animist cults) is correlated with ethnic civil war incidence and indicates more significance than linguistic differences and other social cleavages.²⁴⁹ Also, animist diversity is found to be more a characteristic for Sub-Saharan countries²⁵⁰, which shows that these results hold more regional importance compared to others.

Although an increased number of ethnic groups could be irrelevant or negatively connected with the likelihood of civil war, existence of one big ethno-political majority against a large and undivided minority is found to be positively

²⁴³ Dixon, "What Causes...", p.710.

²⁴⁴ Tanja Ellingsen, "Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew? Multi ethnicity and Domestic Conflict during and after the Cold War", **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2000, p.241.

²⁴⁵ Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", p.83.

²⁴⁶ Paul Collier, Nicholas Sambanis, "Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, No. 46, Vol.3, 2002, p.9.

²⁴⁷ Nicholas Sambanis, Håvard Hegre, "Sensitivity Analysis of the Empirical Literature on Civil War Onset", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.50, No.4, 2006, pp.508–535.

²⁴⁸ Christopher Blattman, Edward Miguel, "Civil War", **Journal of Economic Literature**, Vol. 48, No.1, 2010, pp.15-17.

²⁴⁹ Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars", **Journal Of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2002, p.52.

²⁵⁰ **Ibid.**, p.42.

affective for the onset of civil war.²⁵¹ This shows that if ethnic diversity is bipolarized, then it is riskier and the country is more prone to civil war.²⁵²

In an ethnically diverse country, where the ethnic dominance of a group over another is explicit, ethnic competition is high ethnic diversity overlaps with class cleavages and a politically dominant group feeds minorities' threat perceptions by excluding the other group from institutional bodies, debarring them economically, and consequently deepening polarization.²⁵³ Thus, Collier & Hoeffler suggest that while ethnic fractionalization negatively affects the onset of civil war by decreasing the rebellion possibility, ethnic dominance increases the civil war probability.²⁵⁴ This approach is also linked to the *security dilemma* approach, which was firstly posited by Robert Jervis²⁵⁵.

When an ethnic group feels threatened by government or another ethnic group they mobilize and form an organization. This attracts civilian participation because even though a person does not feel in danger, he/she would like to be ensured against a concrete or an elusive threat. This organization also puts the member of identity group in danger because ethnicity has its visible and distinguishable features and if the group becomes targetable by government or another group it becomes difficult to be unrecognized even if the person participates in a rebel group or not. Simultaneously, especially in a bipolarized society, this ethnic organization could be perceived as a threat by other ethnic groups, causing a conflict spiral where each defensive action of one group would be perceived as the proof of an aggressive action, causing another responsive defensive action, which would be perceived as a

²⁵¹ Paul Collier and Anka Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", **Oxford Economic Papers**, Vol.56, No.4, 2004, pp. 563–595, 2004; Sambanis, Hegre, **Sensitivity Analysis...**, pp.508–535; Ibrahim Elbadawi, Nicholas Sambanis, "How Much Civil War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.46, No.2, 2002, pp.307-334; Ellingsen, "Colorful Community...", pp. 228-249; Reynal-Querol, "Ethnicity, Political...", pp.29-54.

²⁵² Marta Reynal-Querol, J. G. Montalvo, "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict And Civil War", **American Economic Review**, Vol.95, No.3, 2005, pp.796-816.

²⁵³ Nicholas Sambanis, "Using Case Studies to Refine and Expand the Theory of Civil War", in Paul Collier, Nicholas Sambanis eds., **Understanding civil war Vol:1 Africa**, The World Bank, 2005, p.313.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.312.

²⁵⁵ Robert Jervis, **Perception and Misperception in International Politics**, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp.75-76.

threat once again.²⁵⁶ Under anarchic conditions, security dilemma would work more efficiently, triggering reciprocal fears and responses to grow further.²⁵⁷

As ethnically bipolarized societies are more vulnerable to civil war, they are also easier to mobilize and consequently more prone to security dilemma; spiral conflict conditions render groups more manipulable to “*ethnic entrepreneurs or elites pursuing private interests and capitalizing on the availability of ethnic networks*”²⁵⁸. Group leaders play an important role over the civil war onset. They tend to present group grievances to political authorities with corresponding demands and claim their group identity is in danger. Usually, this action has two aims: First, gathering the ethnic group for collective action and second, using this force to achieve their private gains, as well as enforcing their political position as a leader.²⁵⁹ When these strategies coincide with an environment involving security dilemma, civil war becomes almost inevitable.

Naturally, political claims, societal discordances, aggressive leaders and civil war conditions do not occur without other dynamics, but sometimes primordial reasons, quantitative arguments or constructivist cultural explanations may fail to fully explain the onset of civil wars. Why ethnic dominance is a catalyst for civil war emergence? Why do masses follow aggressive leaders? Are cultural differences enough to light civil wars’ fire? At this point horizontal inequalities approach, taking Ted Gurr’s relative deprivation explanation²⁶⁰ into focus and centering upon inequalities between culturally defined identity groups and their grievances seem practical. According to this assessment, there may be multiple inequalities between identity groups involving cultural, political and socio-economic dimensions. While vertical inequalities signify categorical differences between individuals, horizontal inequalities theory compares the variations between identity groups according to these categories without regard to their internal distributions.²⁶¹ These may be either quantitatively measurable or dependent on perceptions. If a group, sharing a cultural identity, feels dissatisfied, its mobilization against the dominant group would be

²⁵⁶ Kristine Eck, “From Armed Conflict to War: Ethnic Mobilization and Conflict Intensification”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 53, No.2, 2009, p.374.

²⁵⁷ Rogers Brubaker, David D. Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 24, No.1, 1998, p.437.

²⁵⁸ Sambanis, “Do Ethnic...”, p.263.

²⁵⁹ Jesse, *Ethnicity and...*, p.97.

²⁶⁰ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.

²⁶¹ Lars-Erik Cedermen, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Halvard Buhaug, *Inequality, Grievances and Civil War*, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp.31-32

principally due to its objective and subjective inequalities.²⁶² These inequalities may be economic, social, political and cultural, but the important part is that all these horizontal inequalities strengthen other deprivations and create an infinite loop among them. Regarding cultural inequalities, a hierarchical status between diverse groups' beliefs, traditions and rules creates a discriminatory environment where denied group becomes more bonded, more committed to their differences and more involved with their interests.²⁶³ This motivation pushes masses to follow loud-voiced personages who refer to their disadvantages and claim more political power with the promise of more socially and economically equivalent state of affairs.

As horizontal inequality approach shows, even cultural grievances are not single-handedly a catalyst for civil war onset. There are complex layers within ethnic and identity reasoning. While ethnic diversity rates (ethnic fractionalization, polarization and dominance) can provide the necessary conditions for civil war occurrence, leaders and the existence of deprivations trigger civil war onset. Thus, cultural grievances are dangerous when accompanied with other horizontal inequalities and political discrimination because without political or economic exclusion, cultural diversity forms nothing but richness.

b. Political causes

The second main reasoning for civil wars belongs to the political area. In quantitative analyses regime type, regime change, institutional capacity, political inclusiveness and political discrimination seem to be the key measurement subjects. These criteria are strongly related to “*grievance*” model for civil war onset, which are expanded in daily life over time and prioritize political, legal, social, and identity issues reflected on state administration.²⁶⁴ Economic deprivations are also included in grievance model, which will be discussed in the following section. These proxies are also related to horizontal inequalities explanation, which also features social (access to public services) and political inequalities (distribution of political rights and power)²⁶⁵.

²⁶² Arnim Langer, Frances Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict, Conceptual and Empirical Linkages” in Newman, DeRouen Jr, **Routledge Handbook...**, pp.104-105.

²⁶³ **Ibid.**, pp.105-107.

²⁶⁴ DeRouen, Jr, **An Introduction...**, pp.82-83.

²⁶⁵ Langer, Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities...”, p.105.

Main focus of empirical studies regarding civil war is the regime type. Democracy is often accepted as the most peaceful system possible, permitting different groups to get involved with state affairs, assuring multi-vocality, providing transparent decision-making, diminishing corruption probability by its transparent methods, ensuring fundamental rights and freedom and consequently raising the expectations for low civil war rates.²⁶⁶ This is why most analyses start political causality testing from regime type, especially searching for the effect of democracy on civil war. Studies on regime type tend to define three main state administrations: Democratic states, semi-democratic states (also named as anocracies) and autocratic states.

Regarding these regimes, empirical results show that there is a U-curve relationship between democracy and civil war onset²⁶⁷ which means that democracies or autocracies have lower civil war probability while semi-democratic regimes are more open to civil war onset. Democracies are found to be less dangerous because they have inner inclusive and non-violent mechanisms, which can prevent war emergence with self-expression freedom, protest rights and parliamentary settlements. Autocracies also prevent civil war emergence due to their severe repression mechanisms, by not allowing any political organizations to be formed from the beginning.²⁶⁸ Semi-democracies (or anocracies), on the other hand, lack both mechanisms, violent or non-violent, not being able to ensure freedoms and mechanisms that can democratically solve problems or repress smaller insurgencies violently and prevent their up growth.²⁶⁹

Also, regime change in the form of democratization renders a country unstable and vulnerable, if democratic targets are not reached yet and regime characteristics

²⁶⁶ Håvard Hegre, "Disentangling Democracy and Development as Determinants of Armed Conflict", **Working Paper No.24637**, The World Bank, NW, Washington, 2003, p.1.

²⁶⁷ Edward N. Muller, "Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence", **American Sociological Review**, Vol.50, No.1, 1985, pp.47-61; Terry Boswell, William J. Dixon, "Dependency and Rebellion: A Cross National Analyses", **American Sociological Review**, Vol.55, No.4, pp.540-559; Ellingsen, "Colorful Community...", pp. 228-249; Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellington, Scott Gates, Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Towards A Democratic Civil Peace? Opportunity, Grievance, and Civil War 1816–1992", **American Political Science Review**, Vol.95, No.1, 2001, pp.33-48; Reynal-Querol, "Ethnicity, Political...", pp.29-54; Sambanis, **Do ethnic...**, pp.259-282; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Håvard Hegre, "Regime Type and Political Transition in Civil War", pp.261-302 in Newman, DeRouen, **The Routledge...**

²⁶⁸ Hegre, "Disentangling Democracy...", p.10.

²⁶⁹ Wimmer, Min, "From Empire...", p.885.

still lie somewhere between democracy and autocracy.²⁷⁰ Same explanation can be made for an autocratization process, because while democratization can create opportunities for ethno-national or ideological leaders to follow their own interests and rebel against the new and transitioning weak government, autocratization would increase oppressor strategies against civilians, which would decrease the legitimacy of government and create unsatisfied groups who would be exposed to domestic violence. Therefore, until each transition period would be accomplished, regime change is completed and institutional consolidation is assured, in short run, the country would be destabilized and at risk of civil war.²⁷¹

If the regime change is dangerous for the stability of a country, then state building process is certainly hazardous. This project often comes with a nationalization process, which works in advantage of the dominant ethnic group, worsening the minority groups' legal and political status. As we have understood from the democratization process, preliminary phases of regime transformation lack stable democratic elements until a certain point is achieved. This is a very threatening situation for minorities whose linguistic, religious and administrative habitudes are mostly denied in behalf of nationalization and unification processes. That kind of ignorance may be followed with one of two outcomes, either, minority groups may resort to separatist movements to establish their own rule, or, new governments may resort to annexing ethnically similar neighboring regions or half autonomous areas in the name of national unification or to prevent secessionist insurgencies.²⁷² National unification, as a component of state building, which implies establishing a modern, centralized and regulatory authority is a characteristically coercive and often-violent process, involving competing militarized groups against the consolidation of central control, new political ideology, different regulations, monopoly of legitimate violence, bureaucratization and taxation policies. Above all, if ethnic exclusion from administrative bodies, clientelism and oppressive policies accompany to this imposed unification process in a culturally and socially divided society, escalation of internal conflict shall be inevitable.²⁷³ Whereas violence is expected to be reciprocal under these conditions, only a strong and resourceful state

²⁷⁰ Bethany Lacina, "Civil Conflict after the Cold War", *Security Dialogue*, Vol.35, No.2, 2004, pp.194-195.

²⁷¹ Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, Gleditsch, "Towards a Democratic...", p.35.

²⁷² Wimmer, Min, "From Empire...", p.874.

²⁷³ Newman, "Statebuilding, Upheaval...", p.173-175.

can overcome this process with following political and economic liberalization strategies, which could take the pressure off different groups by their inclusion to all governmental and economical advances. On the other hand, state-building²⁷⁴ almost never include equitable policies, instead, newly born governments often apply threats and punishments to defiant groups who are motivated by rebel leaders using financial incentives and ethnic discourses to form armed-actions against the absence of non-violent means for political and economical inclusiveness, underlying and exploiting grievances created by poor state building policies.²⁷⁵ In that case, governments can be rational and apply bargaining policies to prevent the escalation of conflicts, but usually misperceptions of governments' on rebel opponents' relative strength or rebels' misperception on their opportunities for action²⁷⁶; the indivisibility of issues in question; and the lack of government's commitment to promises with the fear of power alterations in future; the hope that opponent's loss of military strength; and the lack of an enforcing higher institution cause a relapse with the initial civil war conditions.²⁷⁷

State-building or not, political grievances resulting from institutional capacity and legitimacy problems; discrimination and lack of political inclusiveness; and weak governance play a fundamental role in civil war emergence. These criteria are also the determinants of a state's situation between being a failed, weak or strong state. As long as it is possible to run quantitative tests on the strength and war proneness of a state, there are common traits, which determine civil war emergence that can be viewed in the following table. Ultimately, while strong states are less risky for the outbreak of civil wars, weak states are prone to civil wars and failed states mostly already include civil wars.

²⁷⁴ State-building and initiating a state-building process mean "(1) the alignment of the internal and external stakeholders (2) to the goal of a functioning sovereign state that creates internal and external legitimacy (3) through the formulation and calibration of rules of the game (4) mobilization of sufficient resources (5) establishment of processes and organizations (6) designation of critical tasks, by (7) credible leadership and management, (8) measured through iterative monitoring."; Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, Michael Carnahan, "Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building", **Working Paper 253**, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2005, p.13.

²⁷⁵ Blattman, Miguel, "Civil War", pp.14-15.

²⁷⁶ Collier, Sambanis, **Understanding Civil...**, p.4.

²⁷⁷ Blattman, Miguel, "Civil War", pp.10-14.

Table 5 - Characteristics of states according to their strength²⁷⁸

Strong State	Weak State	Failed State
There is a consolidated government and regime type with an ideological consensus providing the individuals necessary conditions for welfare.	The governing group is suspicious due to its means and illegitimate actions; the line between state and civil society is unclear.	There are multiple sovereign authorities who defy central government and capable of legislation and execution.
Identity groups are well assimilated or under an assured protection by minority rights and administrative techniques and can participate in state administration.	There are different identity groups who are treated differently: An ethnic can hold an advantage or disadvantaged position compared to others.	External powers have the power of influencing all governmental bodies according to their will.
There are doubts about territorial frontiers.	A particular group, who excludes other from attaining and joining administrative bodies, dominates the state apparatus.	There is communal war/conflict within state, which cannot be ceased or prevented by central authority.
Civilian control is consolidated over all governing bodies, including military.	Captured state apparatus is used for private enrichment of a family or a clan: This type of governance is also known as "kleptocracy".	Government cannot secure daily life activities, such as commerce, transportation or communication and instead non-legal groups deal with the organization and durability of such events.
Personal wealth is gained by legal ways and not through clientalism or political dominance.	Loyalty of groups to the state is low compared to other external or primordial bonds.	
	The state cannot deliver basic services or provide its own security. Government is not perceived as a legitimate authority by its own society and lack public confidence.	

In conclusion, most studies come to determine that while discrimination and repression augment the risk of civil war, inclusiveness and freedom reduce it.²⁷⁹ In a political area, this could be related to the existence of a democratic regime or not but in the end, justified grievances relying on political repression, horizontal inequalities and exclusion from power play an important role for preparing rebellion ground and create strong motivations for civil war emergence. On the other hand, keeping in mind the U-Curve relation of democracy level and internal violence, it is clear that democracy by itself is not the only way of preventing civil wars but harsh oppression policy can be another strategy. This only proves the importance of stable institutions,


²⁷⁸ Prepared according to K.J. Holsti's definitions: K.J. Holsti, "War, Peace, and the State of the State", *International Political Science Review*, Vol.16, No.4, 1995, pp.331-333.

²⁷⁹ Dixon, "What Causes...", pp.718-719.

democratic or not, which would be threatened in case of a positive or negative political change in regime type.²⁸⁰

Moreover, democracy is not a sufficient proxy to prevent civil wars. Consolidated democratic capacity is usually accompanied with economic welfare and social prospect, making researchers wonder if economic levels should be taken into account as a key feature instead of democratic proxies.²⁸¹ Because if poorer countries with democracies are prone to civil conflict and richer countries with stable regimes (democracy or not) have more effective tools to prevent civil wars, is it the regime type that is more important or economic welfare regarding the break out of civil wars?

Figure 4 - The risk of civil war in democracies and non-democracies at different levels of income²⁸²



The World Bank's research on the emergence of civil wars, focus on economical, social and political dimensions of civil war in long term and as shown in the graphic above, civil war is highly correlated with economical standards even though the regime type is democratic. They explain this relation with a "*conflict trap*" model which suggests that development is the key feature regarding civil wars and not the regime type because ultimately an incidence of war slowdowns the development and where economic proxies cannot improve "*countries are at higher risk of becoming caught in a conflict trap in which war wrecks the economy and*

²⁸⁰ Gleditsch, Hegre, "Regime Type...", pp.147-149.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp.146.

²⁸² Paul Collier, V. L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, Nicholas Sambanis, **Breaking the Conflict Trap Civil War and Development Policy**, A World Bank policy research report, Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2013, p.65.

increases the risk of further war”²⁸³. This explanation can be valid for countries where civil war keeps repeating but for the first emergence of civil war we need further support. This discussion highlights the “*opportunity/feasibility*” explanation of Collier & Hoeffler against the “grievance” model. They claim that grievances exist in almost every country but not all countries experience civil war. This selectiveness is related to the “*feasibility hypothesis*’: *that where a rebellion is feasible it will occur*”²⁸⁴ meaning that it is not the motivation that triggers civil wars but opportunity. This brings us to investigate “opportunity” and “greed” as explanations of civil war instead of the “grievance” model, because while regime type, credibility, legitimacy, openness, inclusiveness, distribution of political power, electoral rules, parliamentarianism, multiculturalism, political stability and regime transformation proxies seems to be crucial elements for the emergence of civil war²⁸⁵, none of these components alone can explain all the complex layers of the civil war outbreak.

c. Economic causes

Grievances are also related to economic standards, such as the division of resources; envies created by clientelism; dissatisfaction of people versus their expectations; frustrations over corruptions; and barriers behind economic development tools²⁸⁶ but these elements are directly linked to political choices and discriminative policies. Core economic measurements regarding civil war emergence are more likely to benefit from capacity measuring methods, particularly economic capacity proxies, such as income, development and growth, prosperity, industrialization, trade, aid and existence of natural resources.²⁸⁷ First of all, the role of these variables should be tested independently before linking them to a model established around greed or opportunity because the general situation of a state’s economy illuminates us about the probability of civil war. To begin with, Fearon & Laitin suggest that income proxies are strongly related to civil war onset, specifying that per capita income less than \$1,000 is correlated with 41% odds of civil war, and moreover when per capita income is controlled neither democratic regime proxies

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.1.

²⁸⁴ Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Dominic Rohner, “Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war”, *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol.61, No.1, 2009, p.24.

²⁸⁵ Sambanis, “Using Case...”, pp.314-317.

²⁸⁶ DeRouen, *An Introduction...*, p.83.

²⁸⁷ Dixon, “What Causes...”, pp.714-715.

nor civil rights' presence do not play a significant role for civil war emergence.²⁸⁸ According to Collier & Hoeffler, per capita income and growth are significantly related to civil war onset and when these variables have higher values, they reduce the civil war probability. They also conclude that grievance proxies, such as inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization, and religious fractionalization do not really matter compared to economic factors except the ethnic diversity variable which has an inverted U-relationship with civil war onset, meaning that homogeneous and extremely diverse societies are safer than a society where ethnic dominance of a major group is experienced.²⁸⁹

Both Collier & Hoeffler and Fearon & Laitin conclude that per capita income also strengthens military capacity due to durable tax income of government, which is necessary to deter rebellions. Additionally, Fearon & Laitin affirm that high per capita income would also enhance financial, administrative, legal and police capacities of the state, favoring state's abilities and reducing rebellion probability.²⁹⁰ Sambanis also agrees with these findings, affirming that the income and civil war are extremely correlated and he adds that growth also reduces the civil war occurrence but it is also possible to find some high-growth periods prone to civil war emergence.²⁹¹ Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler agrees with these findings, suggesting that civil war cost in the shape of rebellion expenditures and the destruction of present economic activities, thus, a society with a high income would have more to lose compared to a low-income society, so, rebellion in a richer country would be less attractive.²⁹² Finally, World Bank's research confirms that civil wars are accumulated in low-income countries and the most efficient way to prevent their emergence is to create economic development methods.²⁹³

Although almost all quantitative findings confirm the importance of income and economic growth due to civil war emergence, opportunity and greed models emphasize other economic proxies as natural resources' types and their correlation with trade methods which are in fact linked to availability of rebel finance and the cost of insurgencies.²⁹⁴ Dependence on primary commodities of a country in its'

²⁸⁸ Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", pp.81-84.

²⁸⁹ Collier, Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance...", p.588.

²⁹⁰ Hegre, "Disentangling Democracy...", p.8.

²⁹¹ Sambanis, "What is Civil...", pp.840-843.

²⁹² Collier, Hoeffler, "On Economic...", p.565.

²⁹³ Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, Sambanis, **Breaking the Conflict...**, p.91.

²⁹⁴ Collier, Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance...", p.588.

exportation is the main focus of this discussion because that kind of reliance creates two diverse risks. First of all, it creates a location-based income source, which renders a regional conquest into a very profitable act. Secondly, it makes a country more vulnerable to global economic crises because primary commodities prices are more unstable than other produced goods. In sum, dependence on primary exports renders a country more prone to civil wars unless governments use high resource income from these exportations to create a well-distributed welfare²⁹⁵, avoid clientelism and *Dutch disease*^{296 297}.

According to the greed model, rebel leaders have private motives and aim to get richer by turning war into a business model. For that kind of act, the state's trade should be depending on primary commodities, especially on lootable resources, which are specifically defined as oil, diamonds and timber.²⁹⁸ Similarly, opportunity model suggest that rebellion is only possible when it is financially and militarily feasible and the most effective way to provide an army to fight and the budget to recruit these fighters is to have access to tradable natural resources.²⁹⁹ For example, a diamond mine would create a durable income for leaders and fighters who are normally excluded from distribution of welfare and experience poverty. In that case, profit, gained from diamond would be the financier of a rebel army and be distributed to low cost fighters, already living in limited economic standards. Thus, motivation for rebellion would be higher due to the existence of an alternative and well paying source of income.³⁰⁰

On the other hand, Collier & Hoeffler find that while natural resources create higher risk of rebellion by attracting rebels to seize a rich but corrupted government

²⁹⁵ Hoeffler, "On the Causes...", pp.14-15.

²⁹⁶ Dutch disease signifies "a decrease in the rate of economic growth after the discovery of a natural resource... Resource abundance exacerbates income inequality between the populace and the political elite (a political oligarchy or a dictator). Part of the elite's political power derives from their greater share of national income. In the model, resource abundance increases income inequality due to a direct and an indirect effect. The direct impact is due to the elite's control over the government, which allows it to obtain a larger share of the resource rent. The indirect impact is due to the economic decline associated with the Dutch disease, which increases income inequality because the benefits from growth are more evenly distributed than resource rents."; Ricky Lam, Leonard Wantchekon, "Dictatorships as a Political Dutch Disease", **Working Paper**, Economic Growth Centre, Yale University, 1999, p.2.

²⁹⁷ Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", p.81; Gudrun Ostby, Henrik Urdal, "Demographic Factors and Civil War", in Newman, DeRouen Jr, **Routledge Handbook...**, p.132.

²⁹⁸ Patrick M. Regan, Daniel Norton, "Mobilization in Civil Wars", **Journal Of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 49, No. 3, June 2005, p.319.

²⁹⁹ Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", p.87.

³⁰⁰ P. Lujala, "Valuable Natural Resources", in Newman, DeRouen Jr, **Routledge Handbook...**, pp.120-121.

or just the profitable part of state's territory, a significantly high ratio of natural resources decreases the conflict probability. Because when government possesses a strong finance potential, its ability to defend itself against rebel groups augments due to its enhanced military power.³⁰¹ Therefore, regarding greed based rebellion incidences or durable opportunities to finance insurgency, military strength and dominance of capital holds great importance.

Additionally, the relation between extractable resources and the civil war onset is highly discussed when it comes to the type of natural resource. The debate is over the difference between oil and other lootable resources as gemstones, drugs and timber. This distinction is due to their concentration: Oil is a point resource while others are more widely dispersed. All these resources have played important roles for financing different civil wars, yet, dispersed resources are easier to seize control and more difficult for a government to control.³⁰² Despite the varied results about the primary commodities³⁰³ most of the studies accept that oil has an initiator effect for civil wars and oil exporter countries are under higher risk.³⁰⁴ Principally, secessionist civil wars are more prone to the existence of natural resources, particularly to oil, due to their regional concentration.³⁰⁵ Regarding diamonds and other natural richness, researches are more limited³⁰⁶, and discussion mostly revolves around the specific traits of gemstones: Primary diamonds are more difficult to reach, necessitate big investments to extract, thus create more of a governmental resource while secondary diamonds are easier to access and more lootable. In sum, according to tests, diamonds seem to be less correlated with the onset of civil wars compared to oil: They can be dangerous under certain circumstances (due to location and type of

³⁰¹ Collier, Hoeffler, "On Economic...", p.571.

³⁰² Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, "The Geography of Civil War", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.39, No.4, Special Issue on Civil War in Developing Countries, 2002, pp.419-420.

³⁰³ Collier, Hoeffler, "On economic...", pp.563-573, Collier, Hoeffler, **Greed and Grievance...**, pp. 563-595; Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", pp.75-90; Elbadawi, Sambanis, "How Much...", pp.324-325.

³⁰⁴ Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", p.85; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "The Political Economy of Secession", **World Bank**, Development Research Group, Washington DC.: University of Oxford, Centre for the Study of African Economies, 2002, pp.1-37; John C. Anyanwu, "Economic and Political Causes of Civil Wars in Africa: Some Econometric Results", **The African Development Bank**, 2002, p.10.

³⁰⁵ Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, Sambanis, **Breaking the Conflict...**, pp.60-61.

³⁰⁶ Macartan Humphrey, "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering The Mechanisms", **Journal Of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 49 No. 4, 2005, pp.508-537; Paivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Elisabeth Gilmore, "A Diamond Curse? Civil War and Lutable Resource", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol 49, No.4, 2005, pp. 538-562.

mines and other proxies, such as ethnic problems)³⁰⁷ and they tend to lengthen the existing civil wars rather than fuelling them.³⁰⁸ Hence, diverse results indicate that not all natural resources necessarily cause civil war and their effect can change according to its nature: Drugs are related to civil conflicts with less battle deaths; diamonds cause more battle deaths but they are still linked to less intensive conflicts; and oil is linked to more battle deaths and more severe conflicts.³⁰⁹

Even though greed and opportunity models drive the grievance variables into the second place, poverty is privileged in the proxies of income, income distribution, development, national wealth, labor-intensive production and dependence on primary commodity in exportation has dramatic effect. It creates horizontal inequalities and grievances concretely noticeable in the daily life and frustration against the government.³¹⁰ It also lowers the cost of rebellion by creating a cheap labor through GDP per capita and growth collapses³¹¹ and any accessible income source, legal or not, is perceived as an opportunity and extracts more attention.³¹² Therefore, it is a multi-faceted proxy that proves each theory's different dimensions. Moreover, positive economic proxies could also create negative effects on civil war occurrence. While most of the studies show that economic growth policies would reduce the risk of civil war for creating legal business opportunities and stabilizing political situation³¹³, it is also possible that they enflame civil conflict in very poor countries.³¹⁴ Especially following the Cold War period, many researchers have argued that rapid economic growth would have a destabilizing effect³¹⁵ by either destructing traditional business systems or causing a frustration between expected and net earnings.³¹⁶ Nonetheless, growth rate is a crucial subject for a degraded

³⁰⁷ Paivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Elisabeth Gilmore, "A Diamond Curse? Civil War and Lutable Resource", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol 49, No.4, 2005, pp.558-559.

³⁰⁸ Michael L. Ross, "Natural Resources and Civil War", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.41, No.3, 2004, p.352.

³⁰⁹ Lujala, "Valuable Natural...", p.123.

³¹⁰ Hae S. Kim, "The Determinants of Internal Conflict in the Third World", *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Summer/Fall, 2006, pp.104-105; Ellingsen, "Colorful Community...", p.230.

³¹¹ Collier, Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance...", p.569.

³¹² Collier, Hoeffler, Rohnerz, "Beyond greed...", p.13.

³¹³ Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict...*, p.166.

³¹⁴ Scott Gates, "Empirically Assessing The Causes Of Civil War", *Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association*, New Orleans, March 24-27, 2002, p.10.

³¹⁵ Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict...*, p.307.

³¹⁶ Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", p.78.

country, which has no other chance to escape from its conflict trap and break the vicious circle.

Regarding economic proxies, conflicted results derive from many reasons. Firstly, all quantitative studies choose their dependent and independent variables distinctively; observe different regions and time periods. Secondly, each country and civil war has its unique indicators and domestic conditions. Under these circumstances each proxy has diverse effects on distinct systems, challenging universal studies to find common traits. Therefore, in addition to main causality linkages, it appears that population-based and geographic conditions should be taken into observation, not as main causes of civil wars but as important correlations of civil war occurrences. It is not possible to separate grievance, opportunity and greed models from these variables, which show the extent of ethnic, political and economical factors.

d. Demographic and geographic correlations

Regarding demographic and geographic dimensions, variables in focus are high population, population density, and dispersion of population, education, unemployment, participation of genders in work life, presence of youth bulges, and internal geographic traits as territorial size, forests and mountains.³¹⁷ Higher population is correlated with higher civil war risk in most of the studies.³¹⁸ This proxy is mainly read through the more probable existence of an outraged group in a larger population who wants to defy the state but there are many small wars fought in small countries, which challenge us to correlate the high population with other proxies.³¹⁹ Following the consensus on higher population risk, population density and growth are debated. Considering these proxies, results are varied, since high dispersed population can facilitate insurgent activity by offering hideouts to rebels where no man is located and it can also aggravate insurgency by reducing the effectiveness of rebels who cannot establish a control over a population despite the territory they seize. Yet, Sambanis argues that population density gives clues regarding the break out locations of civil wars. On one other hand, population growth

³¹⁷ Dixon, "What Causes...", pp.710-713.

³¹⁸ Wimmer, Min, "From Empire...", p.889; Fearon, Laitin, **Ethnicity, Insurgency...**, p.85; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.46, No.1, 2002, p.17; Sambanis, "Do ethnic...", p.272.

³¹⁹ Sambanis, "Using Case...", p.310.

causes a different discussion because although economic imbalances due to extreme population growth could create problems, it largely depends on ethnic dynamics of country (mostly the affect of differential ethnic growth on social mechanisms, distribution of income between identity groups and security dilemmas) and not specifically to the population growth.³²⁰ On the other hand, while Collier & Hoeffler confirm that larger populations have more civil war risk and have longer civil wars, they also find no significant relationship with population density and growth³²¹ but add that dispersion of the population might affect the civil war by challenging governmental forces to defend the territory.³²²

From a different point of view, Gudrun Ostby and Henrik Urdal relate population log and growth to resource rivalry and scarcity and find diverse indications according to quantitative study results. Firstly, high population growth and density could cause scarcity regarding the access to resources as land, water and fishing opportunities and for that reason they could trigger armed conflict. Secondly, same proxies could give birth to mandatory economic and technologic advances and consequently lower the civil war probability and create new prosperities. Also, even though these variables could affect the civil war onset, they are to be perceived as secondary factors compared to other political and economic variables. Yet, if population growth is associated with growing horizontal inequalities, then it could increase domestic violence.³²³

Other proxies relevant to demographic indicators are the youth bulges, unemployment and education levels. These variables mostly concern young men group between 14-25 years who show the most incentive to participate rebellion. These men constitute both the opportunity and motivation for insurgencies³²⁴ by creating a cheaper and larger pool of combatants who have high financial gain expectations from rebel act and experience socioeconomic grievances, such as poverty,³²⁵ especially when they face high rates of unemployment. Unemployment is an important measure to understand rebel supply and related to lower income rates, which form one of the main reasons for civil war occurrence.³²⁶ The debate revolves

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.311.

³²¹ Collier, Hoeffler, "On Economic...", p.570.

³²² Collier, Hoeffler, "On the Incidence...", pp.17-18.

³²³ Ostby, Urdal, "Demographic Factors...", pp.131-135.

³²⁴ Blattman, Miguel, "Civil War...", pp.23-24.

³²⁵ Ostby, Urdal, "Demographic Factors...", pp.135-136.

³²⁶ Sambanis, "Using Case...", p.306.

around secondary education rates, which is seen as the remedy of unemployment and rebellion attraction.

All four researchers, Sambanis, Collier & Hoeffler and Hegre, claim that secondary education is essential to reduce civil war risk. While school enrolment is accepted as the chance to prevent rebellion motivation and opportunity by forging an alternative occupation in short term and assuring better revenue in long term, Hegre introduces Robert Dahl's argument to this thesis and explains another dimension of secondary education: The agony of insurgency is suffered by ordinary citizens who find themselves in a dead end, where they are forced to feed and support rebel groups, especially in rural regions. In numerous civil wars, civil groups try to resist these demands and defy rebel groups. This choice is neither easy nor safe and requires a collective action.

According to Dahl, education helps people to enable this incentive, thus it takes an important support away from rebel groups and diminishes civil war occurrences.³²⁷ Moreover, Collier & Hoeffler determine three main variables that could statistically reduce civil war occurrences: Education enrollment, per capita income and growth. These proxies are both the sources of grievances and they make rebel activity cheaper and more feasible, so, improvement of these areas would provide an advantage for all dimensions of civil war.³²⁸ Finally, Sambanis points out that, while education is an important proxy to reduce civil war onset, it holds a few contradictions depending on the area. For example, although most of the African civil wars verify that lower education rates affect civil war onset, the Ex-Yugoslavian civil war or East European civil wars contradict with this variable. Also, Saudi Arabia constitutes a different case with its low civil war rate despite its low secondary education levels. Sambanis also discusses that schooling could work to the detriment of social cohesion through curriculums where national agendas are imposed to children from younger ages as it happened in Lebanon and Caucasus.³²⁹ Unemployment, education and youth bulges discussions are mainly found on male gender, but according to Caprioli, economic gender equality; in other words, female

³²⁷ Hegre, "Disentangling Democracy...", pp.8-9.

³²⁸ Collier, Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance...", p.588.

³²⁹ Sambanis, "Using Case...", p.310.

participation in businesses could have a preventive effect on civil war onset. Yet, this subject is still under-studied and needs more quantitative work.³³⁰

Final discussions regarding this section involve geographic indicators, such as territorial scope, rough terrain, mountainous geographies, non-contiguous territories, and natural resources' locations. As in the case of demographic factors, these are also accepted as secondary elements, which usually has effect on the length of civil war rather than its occurrence, so they are tended seen as correlates of civil war instead of causes. On the other hand, since Machiavelli, the most important information in battle zone has been seen as the geographic traits of the warring area (terrain and climate), which shape war tactics and total extent of the war.³³¹ Also, existence of non-contiguous territories meaning a territory separated from state territory by another state territory or geographic conditions, such as sea might have an initiative effect on civil war onset³³², providing more feasible conditions for rebels.³³³

Similarly, territorial size of a country pointing large countries has influence value over civil war onset, just as in populous states, raising difficulties to the capital for control; facility to interact for distantly concentrated groups³³⁴, especially if it consists of large minorities living at periphery³³⁵ and simply by creating more battle zones. Under these circumstances, civil war is expected to be territorial/secessionist, rather than governmental and they tend to continue longer than civil wars in smaller countries.³³⁶ Also, concentration of natural resources in distant areas from capital plays an important role by causing more greed and opportunity for belligerents to seize regional control where it is difficult for central government to manage.³³⁷

Keeping in mind that, rough terrain indicating mountainous and forested areas, makes it difficult to assure police control, most of the studies confirm that mountainous geography renders a country more prone to civil war.³³⁸ This kind of geography also forces central government to use counterinsurgency tactics instead of

³³⁰ Dixon, "What Causes...", p.716.

³³¹ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Quentin Skinner, Russell Price eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp.52-53.

³³² Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", pp.81-85.

³³³ Hoeffler, "On the Causes...", pp.25-26.

³³⁴ Blattman, Miguel, "Civil War...", p.21.

³³⁵ Hoeffler, "On the Causes...", pp.25-26.

³³⁶ Buhaug, Gates, "The Geography...", p.430.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.420.

³³⁸ Hegre, Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis...", p.531; Blattman, Miguel, "Civil War...", p.22; Hoeffler, "On the Causes...", pp.25-26; Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", p.85.

total war methods, and complicates war conditions for capital that battles against local rebels who know the region more profoundly. Yet, Sambanis claims that while rough terrain can affect the duration of civil war, it is not robust concerning the civil war onset³³⁹ and a neighboring country can create same opportunity structure, thus the probability of other variables renders this proxy less valuable.³⁴⁰ Moreover, verification on the effect of forested areas on civil war onset is absent.³⁴¹

In conclusion, despite the variety of empirical results there is a consensus that poverty and featuring economic factors are significant causes for civil war onset. Secondly, ethnic diversity plays a role in civil war onset; it has its proportional particularities and effects, but when it is accompanied with political grievances it may take a dangerous form. Third, dependence on natural resources especially to oil increases the risk of civil war. Forth, education is a key factor to decrease civil war occurrence. Finally, mountains terrains, geographic magnitude and large population facilitate rebel activity. In addition to these factors, there are various much-debated and complex correlates for civil wars: Level of democracy and political impasses, the transformation of regime, horizontal inequalities, ethnic and religious proxies, the role of security dilemmas and population growth.³⁴² All these variables are approached through three different models: Grievances, greed and feasibility. While these have complementary elements, discussion on the priority of which continues to occupy civil war literature.

Section III - Analyzing civil wars with other points of views outside the behaviorism

As seen until now, civil wars theory and literature rely on multiple inter-disciplinary sources, empirical inferences, historical debates, ideological challenges, international inter-actions, and contemporary developments. Thus, understanding wars and civil wars is linked to a vivid context where history, scientific methodology and theoretical discussions clash and bear further developments. The inclusion of civil wars in the academic literature are products of this process. Until the emergence of scientific schools, the warring actor status was a privilege for states, at least older

³³⁹ Sambanis, "What is Civil...", pp.840-844.

³⁴⁰ Sambanis, "Using Case...", p.311.

³⁴¹ Hoeffler, "On the Causes...", pp.25-26.

³⁴² Nicholas Sambanis, "A Review of Advances and Future Direction in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War", **Defence and Peace Economics**, No:3, Vol:13, 2002, pp.229-234.

texts were interpreted that way, which consequently embed the inter-state war in the focus of conflict analyses.. Yet, the appearance and settlement of scientific methodology and empirical studies disarrayed inter-state orthodoxy in war studies and reformed our understanding on war. This shift necessitated the acceptance of new actors in war studies, such as freedom fighters, non-sovereign actors, terrorists, non-state actors... and obligated a clear categorization of wars according to actor types, issues under contention and territorial criteria. After this mission was accomplished, varied types of war including extra-state, intra-state and extra-state wars and their sub-categories in addition to inter-state wars extended our perception and knowledge of wars which consequently brought a deeper inquiry on causes, correlates and reasons of several war types in order to obtain information on how to prevent wars and how to end the existing ones.

In this study, we have dealt with each one of these issues: Classic texts on wars, their significations, their effect on modern war discussions, emergence of scientific study of war, methodology of scientific war inquiry and the relevance of datasets with their common or diverging characteristics, descriptions and typologies. After determining this Thesis' methodological compass, civil wars are taken into account in detail, apart from other war types and as a sub-category of intra-state wars, with their specific traits. This focus had two research objectives to fulfil, namely to what end civil wars break out and what their triggering reasons are. The task of answering these questions was heavily linked to historical facts and understanding civil wars were related to understanding their era and its events. This is why the end of the Second World War, the de-colonization process, the Cold War time and the post-Cold War period have been repeatedly mentioned. These historical periods did not only shape our contexts and cases but also conducted our theoretical understanding of civil wars, their conceptualization and most importantly our perceptions of civil wars, in other words the way we see civil wars.

Shifts in international environment, differing civil war periods and multiplied perceptions resulted in an active intellectual debate on nature of civil wars. Particularly Holsti's *wars of third kind*³⁴³, Creveld's *transformation of war*³⁴⁴, and Kaldor's *new wars*³⁴⁵ approaches shaped the discussions on civil wars. The debate

³⁴³ Holsti, **The State...**

³⁴⁴ Martin van Creveld, **The Transformation of War**, UK: The Free Press, 1991.

³⁴⁵ Mary Kaldor, **New and Old Wars**, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998.

question revolves around specific points: Is there a rupture between contemporary wars and former wars considering methods, actors, targets and goals? If there is a rupture when did this rupture start: After the Second World War, during the anti-colonial period or following the end of the Cold War? In order to be able to answer these questions in the following section, different point of views on the transformation of war will be summarized and evaluated. This debate incarnates important perspectives on civil wars and our study because the nature of civil wars is directly related to categorization, actors, goals, and methods of civil wars, in short, to the whole understanding of them. Thus, before examining the phases and internationalization of civil wars, both this thesis' approach, methodology and standpoint on civil wars and the argumentation of a rupture from past should be tested in the framework of contemporary civil wars debate.

a. "New wars" debate and arguments

Aside from the scientific researches on conflict and war, qualitative studies have also started to show interest in the subject since the end of the Cold War. Even though they do not represent a theoretical relevance with this Thesis, they are important due to their contribution to war debates. Mostly, they claim that the character and nature of war and conflict have changed, while behaviorist approaches try to explain the shifts in them with the changes in the international context and perceive these subjects as a cumulative result of the history. In other words, while quantitative researches suggest that the increasing frequency of intra-state wars represents a wave within an integrated historical approach, following researches claim that there is a contextual and operational rupture from the conflicts and wars of the history. In this regard, in order to explain how they enflamed the discussions in the academic literature on war and to challenge the behaviorist approach with diverse point of views these debates will be explained here.

The first argument concerns a collapse from Clausewitz's classical trinitarian warfare and came from Creveld³⁴⁶. He first suggested that, actors of war were changing: States, meaning politicians and military generals, are no longer the privileged actors of war, rather non-state actors in the form of terrorist or guerrillas are filling the war zone and their organization is rallied around a charismatic leader

³⁴⁶ Martin van Creveld, "Transformation of War Revisited", **Small Wars and Insurgencies**, Vol.13, No.2, 2002, p.8.

instead of an institution.³⁴⁷ Second, since 1945, quantitatively both in form of frequency and war related death figures; low intensity conflicts are substituting inter-state wars. War related deaths are usually anonymous, in other words not related to any armies, and much higher when compared to inter-state war numbers since the end of the Second World War.³⁴⁸ Third, the change in war types and warring actors towards low intensity conflicts and non-state actors are also reflected in war tactics: War has no more borders where armies clash, classical war strategies disappear and military bases are replaced with hideaways, propaganda and terror become the main strategy to gain civil population.³⁴⁹

Consequently, war is becoming more about having precise targets and destroying them where technology is becoming a bigger part of battles; information is becoming the main tool of wars which perform in the shape of computers, phones, internet and communication networks permitting to reduce the costs of rebellion, separate territory from warfare giving it a more mobile context and augmenting the rebel's asymmetrical capacity against more powerful state actors.³⁵⁰ The disappearance of front clashes in battles between armies and the transfer of combats from war zones to artificially created complex environments render war technology more critical: Bigger and heavier artilleries are becoming outdated, nuclear weapons are becoming worthless and smaller, lighter weapons, surveillance technologies are replacing them.³⁵¹ Fourth, all kinds of international law regarding wars, starting with Geneva Conventions are becoming useless and inapplicable due to actor change and the frequent departs from international rules, such as the usage of forbidden arms and the attacks on religious and historical monuments.³⁵² In summary, war became a type of violence, which supports personal interests rather than political ends³⁵³ and it is qualitatively and quantitatively different from older types of violence regarding its actors, methods and cost, thus classical forms of war concepts cannot satisfy contemporary war's norms.³⁵⁴

³⁴⁷ Martin van Creveld, **La Transformation de la Guerre**, Paris: Editions du Rocher, 2011, pp.251-253.

³⁴⁸ **Ibid.**, pp.39-40.

³⁴⁹ **Ibid.**, pp.262-263.

³⁵⁰ Creveld, "Transformation of...", pp.9-12.

³⁵¹ Creveld, **La Transformation...**, pp.267-269.

³⁵² **Ibid.**, pp.259-260.

³⁵³ Creveld, **Transformation of War Revisited**, p.13.

³⁵⁴ Patrick A. Mello, "In Search Of New Wars: The Debate About A Transformation Of War", **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol.16, No.2, 2010, p.298.

Borrowing Creveld's idea on the fading of Clausewitzian war, Holsti offers another argumentation regarding the disappearance of the conventional wars³⁵⁵. As mentioned before, Holsti suggests that war is de-institutionalizing and giving birth to the wars of third kind, where *"there are no fronts, no campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honors, no points d'appui, and no respect for the territorial limits of states. There are no set strategies and tactics. Innovation, surprise, and unpredictability are necessities and virtues. The weak must rely on guile, and often crime, to raise funds for the bombings, assassinations, and massacres. Prisoners are used as hostages to extract political gains; terrorist incidents are designed to make publicity, not to defeat an enemy armed force. Terror is also used to cow the timid, the "collaborators" and the indifferent. The clear distinction between the state, the armed forces, and the society that is the hallmark of institutionalized war dissolves in peoples' war"*.³⁵⁶ So, Holsti claims that since 1945 inter-state wars, which used to show some consistency during the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe with regard to warring methods,³⁵⁷ have transformed into people's war, according to which state's power and dominance as the main actor have eroded, both declaration and result of war became vague, distinction between soldiers and civilians have blurred, and the aim of wars have changed from security or foreign policy to governance and the status of actors within authority.³⁵⁸ In this sense, he explains that the transformation of war should be measured by three criteria: *The purposes of war, the role of civilians during wartime and the institutions of war*.³⁵⁹ He applies this method to history starting from 1648 and detects three war types in this framework: Institutionalized war, that attributed the monopoly of use of force to the state actor and continued until Napoleonic wars, total war, that relied on national armies, hatred, unlimited aims and ran on until 1945, and wars of the third kind or peoples' wars, that is linked to gaining one's own country and reaches to contemporary time.³⁶⁰ Thus, wars of the third kind establish the third phase of war types of the last 350 years.

While both Creveld and Holsti introduce the transformation of war starting from 1945, Mary Kaldor who develops the third main argumentation of the debate

³⁵⁵ Holsti, *The state...*, p.36.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.36-37.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.27

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.20-21.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.27.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.28-40.

differs on the date and points the end of the Cold War as the emergence of *new wars*. She refuses the terms as internal, civil, post-modern, hybrid ... wars, low intensity conflicts, degenerate warfare etc. used in the academic literature to describe the dominant type of violence of the last decades and adopts “new wars” description to emphasize the rupture from earlier war perceptions.³⁶¹ In fact, despite the emergence of several explanations on the changing character of war, it is Mary Kaldor’s approach that fuelled the heated debate on war theorization. The debate is multifold, inspired by two former approaches and mostly unresolved. Yet, it is critical to evaluate our understanding on war, particularly civil war.

The key aspects of Kaldor’s argument involving variation in goals, methods and finance can be described as follows: The priority of identity politics in wars, the erosion of state power and frequency in state collapses, the effect of globalization, the prominence of war economy, the multiplicity of fighting units and the revolution in social relations of war. The first aspect suggests that “*identity politics meaning movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or the religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power*”³⁶² has taken the place of “*geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars*”³⁶³ Subsequently, the character of new wars are no longer determined by ideology or state management projects but by the demand of a homogeneous population based on identity.³⁶⁴ This change of war goals is explained in relation with the globalization process: First, globalization creates two waves of social and economic interaction forms, localization and trans-nationalization and these two waves establish both reaction and insecurity across communities.³⁶⁵ Secondly, while populations deal with these sentiments, globalization also trims state power and the monopoly of use of violence from above and below: From above, states find themselves in an international regime where interconnectedness of foreign relations limited the use of violence between states and from below, violence is privatized due to declining economies and increasing criminal activities.³⁶⁶ Consequently, the third effect of globalization is the creation of new war economy, which accompanies the state failure. New wars mostly emerge in failed states where legitimacy of government is disputable and it can no longer assure the monopoly of

³⁶¹ Mary Kaldor, *New and...*, pp.1-3.

³⁶² *Ibid.*, p.79.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.7.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.104.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.73-81.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.5-6.

violence and tax collection; international community resists on inapplicable economic and political reforms; and internal actors emerge with economic, political and military claims.³⁶⁷

In this context, the relation between economy and war takes an unusual profile. In a globalized war economy national production is very low compared to global rival economies due to liberalization processes, unemployment is exorbitant, external aid and credits form the spine of domestic economy, legal trade is interrupted due to physical conditions, blockades and scarcity of products.³⁶⁸ Thus, black market (under the control of continued violence containing trafficking of arms, people and drugs), looting and profiting of national resources (such as diamonds by illegal trade)³⁶⁹ and external financing (from Diasporas, humanitarian groups and foreign governments)³⁷⁰, become the operational economy. In this environment, fighting groups multiply by means of plenty opportunities and according to Kaldor they can be summarized as regular armed forces, paramilitary groups, self-defense units, foreign mercenaries and foreign troops who function unincorporated and in cooperation.³⁷¹ Finally, social and military revolutions in warfare imply multi-layered alterations. As Holsti, Creveld and Kaldor stress that internal wars take the place of inter-state wars and add that war is no longer about creating a state, but about creating chaotic, uncontrollable, anarchist areas where insecurity and hatred root.

This purpose directs the violence against civilians instead of governments, in the form of ethnic massacres and forced migrations as central methodology of armed conflict, which is in absolute contrast with the revolutionary wars of Mao Tse-Tung and Che Guevara, that aimed to gain the support of local population in order to gain a territory.³⁷² As stressed by Malender, according to Kaldor, all these changes in goals, methods and finance reflect on war data as following changes: *The number of civilians killed in civil conflicts is increasing; the number of civilians displaced in*

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.94-96.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.107-108.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.10.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.108-110.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp.96-101.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, pp.102-106.

*civil conflicts is increasing; and the ratio of civilians to combatants killed in civil conflicts is increasing.*³⁷³

b. Scientific challenge of the “new wars”

These three arguments suggesting the emergence of a new type of war, which is different than we have experienced and studied in war literature, have been severely criticized. Before taking several critical reviews into consideration, it is practical to show how Creveld, Holsti and Kaldor differ in their approaches. For starters, Holsti and Creveld affirm that the transformation of war begins following the end of the Second World War, while Kaldor states that they start after the end of the Cold War. This cleavage in time creates multiple contradictions between arguments. Kaldor takes ethnic wars into the focus of her approach and identity politics, globalization and the criminality of war compose the main aspects of her new wars.

On the other hand, both Creveld and Holsti take anti-colonial wars, state building wars, ideological wars and ethnic wars as components of emerging and distinguished war types. In that sense, Holsti emphasizes the state weakening and suggests that strong states are the solution to contemporary conflicts³⁷⁴, which have the purpose of creating new countries. Distinctly from Holsti and Kaldor, Creveld stresses that the key aspects of transformed wars are their low intensity character and the transition of war as a tool; it no longer serves to gain power but it is the power.³⁷⁵ In addition to the divergence on goals, the acceptance of diverse conflict types as the wars of contemporary time reflects on method conceptualization. While Kaldor insists that ideological wars used to rely on popular support of people, Holsti and Creveld suggest that people's wars/low intensity conflicts show same amount of criminality, trans-nationality, terror and violence with Kaldor's ethnic wars. This weakens Kaldor's argumentation on both controlled violence and globalization aspects of new wars compared to wars between 1945 and 1990. Despite the several

³⁷³ Erik Melander, Magnus Öberg, Jonathan Hall, “Are ‘New Wars’ More Atrocious? Battle Severity, Civilians Killed and Forced Migration Before and After the End of the Cold War”, **Sage Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research**, Vol. 15, No.3, 2009, p.512

³⁷⁴ Holsti, **The State...**, pp.xi-xiii

³⁷⁵ Creveld, **La Transformation...**, pp.279-280.

differences, all these three academics for their own reasons³⁷⁶ accept that Clausewitz's Trinitarian war concept is not valid anymore and therefore, have raised similar points of criticism.

Critics rally around four main perspectives: Firstly, the rupture from Clausewitzian war is questioned; secondly, actors of new wars, their methods and violent acts are compared to the elements of earlier civil wars; thirdly, the impact of globalization on finance mechanism is evaluated; and fourthly, the goals of contemporary wars and their empirical outcomes are examined. Mainly, the actual newness embedded in the character of contemporary wars and the level of transformation are questioned. In this sense, post-Clausewitzian argument is assessed on the basis of Clausewitz's main assumptions on war, which begin with the Trinitarian elements.

According to Hew Strachan, the Trinitarian elements do not imply a precise task sharing between the government, the military and the people.³⁷⁷ They are actually the attributes of passion, chance and reason, but were introduced as actor qualities, because of misreading and misunderstanding of the Clausewitzian texts. When Kaldor and Creveld say that war separates from state apparatus and becomes privatized, they exhibit this as a fall back from the Clausewitzian war. This interpretation departs from the understanding of war as a tool of foreign policy, which can only be used by governments. Yet, war as a political instrument refers to the political identity of war, which addresses more than a foreign policy or any policy: It addresses the epitome of war as the overarching unity of three attributes.³⁷⁸ Thus, in fact, Clausewitz only refers to political organizations for passion and to political leaders for reason as the necessities of battles, but the Westphalian order and Napoleonic wars attribute these traits to states and governments.

There are two important issues that should be taken into consideration: "*War ... is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will*"³⁷⁹ and "*War is, therefore, not only a true chameleon, because it changes its nature in some*

³⁷⁶ Holsti, **The State...**, pp.7-19; Creveld, **La Transformation...**, pp.75-90 ; Mary Kaldor, "In Defence of New Wars", *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, Vol.2, No.1, 2013, pp.10-13.

³⁷⁷ Creveld, **Transformation of War Revisited**, p.8.

³⁷⁸ Strachan, **The Changing...**, pp.28-30.

³⁷⁹ Von Clausewitz, **On War**, translated by Graham, p.23.

*degree in each particular case...*³⁸⁰. Firstly, war is a tool for realizing our goals against a rival, which already separates the purpose of war from other strict aims, such as ideology or state-building, as Kaldor claims, and secondly, the transformation or evolvement of war over time is already a prediction made by Clausewitz and can be accepted as a historic reality. Thus, even though warfare mutates over time, it is hard to accept this as a post-Clausewitzian outcome.³⁸¹

Secondly, actors and their violent methods of contemporary wars are discussed among the critics. In new wars theories, it is assumed that violence became uncontrolled and barbaric due to the multiplication of undisciplined actors while older wars were more regulated in the frame of army rules. Also, it is argued that new wars directly target civilians since there are no more frontlines between armies and the purpose is to maintain control of areas by means of terror rather than gain a victory against an opponent.³⁸² This necessitates two different questions: “Is it true that violent methods are new?” and “Are these actors new?”.

Concerning methods, it is incorrect to claim that neither forced migration (consciously and as a result), targeting civilians, ethnic massacres, rape, employment of child soldiers were absent from former wars, nor that these are only attributable to civil wars.³⁸³ Violence has been the common characteristic of all wars, ethnic or not, throughout history: The Japanese massacre in Nanjing in 1937 revealed every trait of unlimited violence³⁸⁴ where rape, looting and ethnic mass murders were not only tolerated, but also encouraged among undisciplined soldiers.³⁸⁵ Comfort women was a wide-range tactic of Japanese military who were violently captured and exploited from almost all South Asian countries during the Second World War³⁸⁶, children soldiers were present in ideological wars of Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and during the Chinese Cultural Revolution³⁸⁷, while forced migration was no less

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.39.

³⁸¹ Strachan, *The Changing...*, p.31.

³⁸² Stathis N. Kalyvas, “New and Old Civil Wars A Valid Distinction?”, *World Politics*, No.54, 2001, pp.101-102.

³⁸³ Edward Newman, “The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol.35, No.2, 2004, pp.180-181.

³⁸⁴ Takashi Yoshida, “A Battle Over History The Nanjing Massacre in Japan”, in Joshua A. Fogel eds, *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, pp.70-71.

³⁸⁵ Toshiyuki Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution During World War II and US Occupation*, UK: Routledge, 2002, p.28.

³⁸⁶ Hayashi Hirofumi, “Japanese Comfort Women in Southeast Asia”, *Japan Forum*, Volume 10, Issue 2, 1998, pp.213-214.

³⁸⁷ Kalyvas, “New and...”, p.115.

common in revolutionary conflicts than it was in ethnic wars³⁸⁸. Therefore, it is difficult to claim that violent tactics targeting civilians are not common to contemporary wars.

Regarding the multiplication of actors, who are linked to non-state involvement in battles, coercive tactics against civilians and looting, history contradicts with new wars theories. Ideological movements, such as the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions, the anti-colonial conflicts, such as the one in Indonesia during the 1940s, the leftist movements in Latin America and Vietnam have all included various rebel groups who applied forced displacements, extensive coercive recruitments and large-scale lootings.³⁸⁹ Thus, the myth of popular support in older wars³⁹⁰ and the claim of the emergence of non-state actors after the Second World War or the Cold War does not seem acceptable in this context.

Third, critics of new wars argue that it is not the post-Cold War globalization that brought transnational and black market finance into the war zones. While smuggling and black market were widespread during the Second World War, in addition to these, looting of enemy camps has always been a part of any civil war. Additionally, during the Cold War, rebel armies were heavily dependent on external aid in the form of money, arms, logistics and medical supplies and they also exploited and sold national resources, applied revolutionary taxes³⁹¹ and benefited from illegal economic activities. Furthermore, it is argued that the suggestion that war economy or lootable resources can single-handedly create war zones is too simplistic. Warlords represent more than just greedy businessmen; through taxing, administering justice and order in the region, trading with transnational firms and foreign governments over raw materials and weapons they function as state authority.³⁹²

Despite the fact that there are certain regions where scarcity and poverty are prominent factors, as in the case of Sierra Leone, ideology, grievances, inequalities, territorial aims and various other causes and correlates have always contributed to civil war emergences both after and before the Cold War. While rebel groups, black

³⁸⁸ Melander, Öberg, Hall, "Are 'New Wars'...", p.530.

³⁸⁹ Kalyvas, "New and...", pp.109-110.

³⁹⁰ Roland Marchal, Christine Messiant, "Les guerres civiles à l'ère de la globalisation: Nouvelles réalités et nouveaux paradigmes", *Critique Internationale*, Vol.1, No.18, 2003, p.97.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp.99-100.

³⁹² Kalyvas, "New and...", p.104.

market, transnational finance or illegal trades are not peculiar to contemporary wars, it is presumptuous to say that war economy is the fundamental reason of contemporary wars. Various reasons attract and compel the actor to participate in wars; they can never be perceived as mono-causal events.³⁹³

Finally, contemporary war claims are tested empirically and evaluated with regard to their goals. Concerning empirical findings there are five assumptions of new war theorists: First, intra-state wars have higher frequency rates than inter-state wars since 1945; second, battle death numbers have increased compared to former periods; third, the number of civilian losses in battles has augmented; fourth, the ratio of civilian deaths to combatants have increased; and fifth, forced migration is increasing due to new war tactics targeting civilians.

The analysis of the relation between inter-state and intra-state wars shows interesting results. According to all datasets used in the field, there is no doubt that intra-state wars have been the increasing trend in wars after the Second World War. Yet, when this relation is examined in a wider historical view, we recognize that throughout the 19th century the most common war type was not inter-state wars, instead intra-state wars have been the most dominant violence type for each single decade since 1815, except the period between 1930 and 1939. Thus, despite the fact that civil war prevalence has increased over the last 60 years, the frequency of civil wars is not a new phenomenon. Furthermore, Fearon & Laitin confirm that between 1945 and 1999 civil wars have killed five times more than inter-state wars.³⁹⁴ This is a normal outcome when civil wars are accepted deadlier than inter-state wars as a prior knowledge. In this context, the question to examine is if the post-Cold War civil wars are deadlier than former ones. When we check datasets³⁹⁵ and compare the post-Cold War civil wars to the post-colonial civil wars in Africa and Asia, ideological civil wars in Latin America, revolutions in Russia and China and civil war in Afghanistan, it is difficult to say that new civil wars are deadlier than former civil wars³⁹⁶, except the peak in 1993. Regarding the extreme numbers between 1992 and 1994, we should separately discuss the effects of the end of the Cold-War as an instant international system influence, ad hoc dissolution of Soviets and the

³⁹³ Newman, "The 'New Wars'...", pp.181-182.

³⁹⁴ Chojnacki, "Anything New...", p.28.

³⁹⁵ See. Figure 1- Institutional difference on intra-state war records

³⁹⁶ Melander, Öberg, Hall, "Are 'New Wars'...", p.507.

emergence of new states within this context rather than using these changes as an excuse for overgeneralization.

Considering third and fourth assumptions many studies affirm that the magnitude of direct violence against civilians have diminished, in other words civilian deaths and civilian deaths proportion to military deaths have decreased.³⁹⁷ Yet, there is a common disagreement on this issue. There are also studies saying that the ratio of civilians among the total number of war victims have increased in 1990s³⁹⁸ and most of the studies affirm that *“the ratio of civilian to military casualties is not possible to evaluate directly since there are no systematic data on this aspect of armed conflict”*³⁹⁹.

In regard to this issue, Mary Kaldor reassesses her empirical arguments due to several critics and contradictions. She comes to conclusion that UCDP, COW and Peace and Conflict Survey datasets all find that battle deaths are declining despite her calculations in the framework of the United Nations University Project. She explains this contradiction with the inaccuracy of civilian casualties in datasets (military deaths are received from governments but civilian deaths come from multiple unclear resources), the difficulty of distinguishing civilians from combatants in battle fields and the doubts about the nature of civilian deaths (it is not clear if civilian deaths are related to direct or indirect effects of civil wars).⁴⁰⁰

Finally, in regard to refugee flows, almost all studies confirm that the number of displaced people has increased since the 1970s and forcing undesired groups to flee is a central tactic of civil wars to gain territorial.⁴⁰¹ On the other hand, there are three points of criticism in relation to this issue. More specifically, civilian displacements do not show a linear pattern over time (thus, augmentation is not a consistent trend)⁴⁰². Due to the improvement in data collection, particularly after 1998, former quantitative resources on migration should not be trusted, as compared with latest indicators, the refugee figures form a cumulative index because people do

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.507.

³⁹⁸ Collier, Elliot, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, Sambanis, **Breaking the Conflict...**, p.17; Holsti, **The State...**, p.37.

³⁹⁹ Melander, Öberg, Hall, “Are ‘New Wars’...”, p.507.

⁴⁰⁰ Kaldor, **New and...**, pp.208-212.

⁴⁰¹ Chojnacki, “Anything new...”, pp.29-30.

⁴⁰² Melander, Öberg, Hall, “Are ‘New Wars’...”, p.507.

not return home (in that case it is not possible to find declining numbers in any future).⁴⁰³

In this context, final evaluation of theories concerns the goals of civil wars. While new civil wars are found less linked to the achievement of political targets and the motivations are perceived related to identity politics⁴⁰⁴ the reality is different. New wars incarnate both economic interests and power gaining methods by using identity issues, but they are neither limited to these factors nor they are absent of geo-political and ideological motivations.⁴⁰⁵ Governmental civil wars and territorial civil wars are still the bigger picture where state-building efforts enhance with regional dynamics and complicate war outcomes. As most prominent examples ISIS/Daesh⁴⁰⁶ (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham) and Al-Qaeda both benefit from war economies and function over religious aims. But they also target either building a new state or gaining the state apparatus. This is valid for the Iraqi civil war, where economics and identity hold importance but also secession is a big part of war goals for various rebel groups.

Regarding all these critics Mary Kaldor publishes a new article in 2013⁴⁰⁷ and defends her arguments on new wars term. Yet, in this article she ignores above-mentioned critics about the historically existing characteristics of new wars but she emphasizes that *“the aim of describing the conflicts of the 1990s as ‘new’ is to change the way scholars investigate these conflicts and thus to change the way policy-makers and policy shapers perceive these conflicts.”*⁴⁰⁸ She suggests that this need derives from separating warring agents from traditional state actors, recognizing non-state warriors as actors instead of barbaric fighters⁴⁰⁹ and developing appropriate policies for the outcome of wars where there might be no winners.⁴¹⁰ In this perspective, she actually refers to our earlier enquiry of late emergence of civil wars within war studies and the evolution of research on war through quantitative studies. Consequently, even though she is right about the need

⁴⁰³ Kaldor, **New and...**, p.213.

⁴⁰⁴ Newman, “The ‘New Wars’...”, p.177.

⁴⁰⁵ **Ibid.**, pp.183-184.

⁴⁰⁶ Even though both names have the same signification, only in different languages (English and Arabic), the name of this rebel group has been subjected to many political and academic discussions. As Daesh is the official name used by NATO and ISIS is the name used in COW and UCDP/PRIO datasets we preferred to use both names in this Thesis.

⁴⁰⁷ Kaldor, “In Defence...”, pp. 1-16.

⁴⁰⁸ **Ibid.**, p.3.

⁴⁰⁹ **Ibid.**, p.4.

⁴¹⁰ **Ibid.**, p.13.

to improve the classical understanding of war, she again disregards the evolution of war studies, throughout which the orthodoxy of one-track war reading concept was shuttered starting from the 1950s.

The fundamental interpretation that can be derived from these criticisms is that: In fact, the discussion of transformation of war, war of a third kind and new wars perspectives overlap with the developments in scientific study of war. It is true that after 1945, the focus of war studies have shifted from inter-state war to intra-state war. This is why war categories started including uprising actors and their fading military traits, such as uniforms, innovative weapons and their effects on warfare, ever-mounting political demands and broadened categories from monadic understanding of inter-state war to extra-state wars, intra-state wars and finally to non-state wars. Thus, the problem is if these are actually new wars, breaking the continuous historical war patterns or these are new names for already existing categories, which were already altered according to the needs of time.

This question is important because correlates and etiologies of new wars theorists correspond to the well-categorized, valid and effective scientific categories of war.⁴¹¹ Therefore, even in scientific studies of war, it is undeniable that the distinction between combatants and civilians has blurred, symmetry in wars has faded and wars have become more asymmetrical, the frequency of intra-state wars has increased, the identity has become a critical issue for civil wars, while illegal trade, trafficking, resource exploiting, power struggles have expanded.⁴¹² As a result, non-state actors have become more visible, technology and communication systems have developed, and terrorizing methods against individuals have diffused in the second half of the 20th century, but they were never absent.

In this context, due to the development of research methodology and the work of scientific institutions, emerging wars have been integrated in the academic field as a result of the alterations in the historical context, because ultimately “*the face of war does change, constantly and in forms that are contextually unique in every manifestation of conflict*”⁴¹³ and this constant change is a character of war so it is not possible to accept that these changes are a result of a break in time and war, and

⁴¹¹ Errol A. Henderson, J. David Singer, “New Wars” And Rumors Of “New Wars””, **International Interactions**, Vol.28, No.2, 2002, p.186.

⁴¹² Mello, “In search of...”, pp.301-302.

⁴¹³ Alexander Mckenzie, ‘New Wars’ Fought ‘Amongst the People’: ‘Transformed’ by Old Realities?, **Defense Studies**, Vol.11, No.4, 2011, p.588.

these patterns are not new; instead they are enlarged and improved. The perspective of war and the international system changed during the second half of the 20th century, researches criticized former thinkers' approaches for being state-oriented but that change was never attributed to the nature of war: It was the nature of understanding that was evolving and counting according to altering conditions and contexts.

One of the issues that gave birth to these disintegrator approaches can also be linked to the application of empirical data to contemporary times, which most commonly start from the 19th century and rarely from the 17th century, thus from "*where data are available, rather than to earlier periods*".⁴¹⁴ Yet, the phenomenon of war is as old as human history; both civil wars and non-state actors existed until and after 1648 or 1945. They were not clearly categorized but various definitions had accepted the existence of non-state actors. It was researchers who chose to ignore these actors next to state actor and driving force of this behavior was legal definitions of war but after the Second World War, it became inevitable to disregard those due to international context. In this sense, scientific study efforts began and Richardson, Wright and Singer became the first ones that paved the way for recognizing civil wars in their modern meanings.

Consequently, the change in war concept should not be looked for in the nature of war, but in the changes of international contexts and their extensions and impacts in wars. War is still "*involving organized, purposive violence, undertaken by one willful group against another*"⁴¹⁵ and all possible methods, actors, goals, tactics, finances, causality changes are related to systemic changes and their domestic reflections. Civil wars are not new but they are transforming and evolving because everything else is transforming and evolving. When new technologies, communication methods, state relations, individual connections, finance means emerge, everything related to those will evolve including wars, administration techniques, societal classes etc. This should not be seen as a brand new advancement; instead it is a part of time, former processes, and older patterns and their reflections. This is also why scientific study of war has appeared: To understand these new complexities and develop our understanding of war. In the end as Clausewitz states "*Every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions,*

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.580.

⁴¹⁵ Freedman, "Defining War...", p.20.

and its peculiar preconceptions. It follows that the events of every age must be judged in the light of its own peculiarities".⁴¹⁶ Thus there are "new" traits of wars but it is not enough to suggest that the nature of war has been modified.⁴¹⁷

In sum, critics show that there is no rupture between old and new wars, as the existing typologies may be applied to them as well and history is dealt with a Euro-centric and limited view. In addition, empirical evidence does not suit arguments and defenders of new wars arguments have not reached a consensus on the causation of new wars.⁴¹⁸ Yet, these debates demonstrate how important international system and internationalization of civil wars are. State-building, consolidation of central authority and centralization historically have always been a part of civil wars; the decolonization process triggered civil wars focused on state-building, economic deprivations, weak governance and ethnic relations; the Cold War context highlighted ideological civil wars; the post-Cold War conditions put state-failures, greed, territorial and governmental struggles and internal securities forward.⁴¹⁹ Civil wars should be examined with domestic sources and dynamics, but especially after the Second World War, international system became the central driving force of intra-state wars.⁴²⁰

Thus, new war debates challenge us to puzzle out the more complex methods, goals, actors of evolving civil wars as a mixture of internal and international warfare where global context has wide impacts⁴²¹ by means of state-building and peacekeeping missions, financial aids, economic trades etc. Even though the character of war stays the same, civil war components multiply and put forward the internationalization dynamics as the critical survey quest. That quest obligates us to assert their extended actors, goals and forms by focusing on the international(ization) prospects of civil wars.

⁴¹⁶ C. Kennedy, T. Waldman, "The Changing Nature of Intra-state Conflict and "New Wars"", in Newman, DeRouen Jr, **Routledge Handbook...**, p.222.

⁴¹⁷ **Ibid.**

⁴¹⁸ Mello, "In search...", p.305.

⁴¹⁹ Newman, **Understanding Civil...**, pp. 154-157.

⁴²⁰ **Ibid.**, pp. 159-160.

⁴²¹ Jed Odermatt, "'New Wars' and the International/Non-international Armed Conflict Dichotomy," paper without date, p.1, <http://www.isisc.org/portal/images/stories/PDF/Paper%20Odermatt.pdf> (accessed 15.03.2017)

PART II - INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL WAR: FRAMING ACTORS AND DYNAMICS

If the evolution of civil wars and the adapting character of internal armed conflicts into the 21st century with their causes and actors are the principal factors for better understanding the civil strife, then the other main characteristic of civil wars following the changes of international system is the internationalization of these violent events.⁴²² According to the PRIO armed conflict dataset, in 1991, following the end of the Cold War, there were 52 armed conflicts in 38 countries, including 48 internal armed conflicts, and 2 inter-state conflicts (17 of them were marked as wars).⁴²³ 1991 was the most violent year during the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. Yet, there were no internationalized internal wars in 1991 due to major structural changes in the international system.⁴²⁴

Below, it is possible to find the tables of distribution of conflicts and wars over time. In the first one, conflict numbers between 1989 and 2003 are presented; while in the second one numbers between 2004 and 2015 are exhibited. In both of them, the distribution follows a fluctuant manner.

⁴²² Patrick M. Regan, "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts", **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.40, No.2, 1996, p.337.

⁴²³ Mikael Eriksson, Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict, 1989–2003", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.41, No.5, 2004, p.626.

⁴²⁴ Lotta Harbom, Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946–2004", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.42, No.5, 2005, p.627.

Table 6 - Conflict distributions between 1989 and 2003⁴²⁵

Type of Conflicts	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Internal	33	44	48	44	37	46	37	36	35	32	32	32	32	29	27
Internationalized internal	4	3	2	4	6	2	2	3	4	6	6	4	5	3	3
Interstate	2	2	2	1	0	0	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2
All conflicts	40	49	52	49	43	48	40	41	40	40	40	38	39	33	32
Type of wars															
Internal wars	7	11	12	9	5	9	7	8	5	8	6	8	5	6	3
Internationalized internal wars	3	2	0	1	4	0	1	2	2	3	4	2	3	0	1
All wars	10	14	13	11	9	9	8	10	7	13	12	11	10	6	5

From 1992 to 2003, intrastate and internationalized intrastate armed conflict numbers declined in a non-linear trend and 2003 became the most peaceful year since the 1970s with the fewest conflict numbers (32 conflicts in total with 27 internal, 3 internationalized internal armed conflict and 2 inter-state conflicts of which 5 are marked as wars) and lowest warring country (22 countries in conflict) records since the early 1950s.⁴²⁶

Table 7 - Conflict ratios between 2004 and 2015⁴²⁷

Type of conflicts	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Internal	29	27	28	31	30	30	23	30	23	27	27	29
Internationalized internal	4	5	5	4	7	7	8	7	9	9	13	20
Interstate	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
All conflicts	33	32	33	35	38	37	31	38	33	36	41	50
Type of wars												
Internal	6	3	3	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	4	1
Internationalized internal	1	2	2	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	8	10
All wars	7	5	5	4	5	6	5	6	6	6	12	11

On the other hand, in the following years, international involvement of states in internal conflicts started to climb up. This trend is mostly linked to the new chapter in international relations that started with the attacks on 11 September 2001. Most countries engaged in conflicts for different reasons and various countries around the world, such as Norway or El Salvador, sent troops to wars in Afghanistan and

⁴²⁵ This table is based on UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

⁴²⁶ Harbom, Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict...", p.623.

⁴²⁷ This table is based on UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

Iraq.⁴²⁸ While the internationalization of civil wars was a common phenomenon during the Cold War, the period after 2003 witnessed an uprising trend in this area such as the war in Iraq. While the absence of large-scale inter-state wars became the new characteristic of this period,⁴²⁹ internationalized internal armed conflicts showed a non-linear increase until 2015 and the 2003-2014 period is the first decade since 1946, which evidenced so many internationalized conflicts.⁴³⁰

In addition to empirical findings, new international system dynamics, the emergence of new approaches, such as *war against terrorism*, *responsibility to protect (R2P)* and *preemptive strike*, the evolution of communication technologies, the adaptation of the UN to the political balances of the new international system during the post-Cold War period, the undeniable emergence and acknowledgement of the individual as one of the most fundamental actors in wars and international politics, beside states and international organizations, the trans-nationalization of all networks, instruments and relational methods through the acceleration of flows of material and non-material domains and the improvement of datasets permitting the understanding of new dimensions of intra-state wars rendered the internationalization of civil wars as the foremost subject in war studies. The internationalization of civil wars is not new, but now, we have the necessary understanding and ability to decipher its dynamics without the pressure of orthodox subjects dominating research, such as the nuclear war, the realist dominance of thinking and the Cold War conditions. It is also possible to admit that the internationalization of intra-state wars can stop being viewed in the shadow of these overbearing dynamics, because it has currently become the essential dynamic in every level of politics: System-wise, state-centric and individual.

While the war literature primarily focuses on interventions as the internationalization method, there are still three sub-questions that need to be unfolded: Firstly, what triggers external actors to intervene, secondly, what is the role of involvements in this process, and finally, how do these internationalizations affect the progression of war? In this context, the first question necessitates focusing

⁴²⁸ Harbom, Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict...", p.627.

⁴²⁹ Therèse Pettersson, Peter Wallensteen, "Armed conflicts, 1946–2014", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.52, No.4, 2005, p.537.

⁴³⁰ Lotta Themnér, Peter Wallensteen, "Armed conflict, 1946–2010", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.48, No.4, 2011, p.528.

on interventions that actually took place, which permit us to observe how these interventions took place and which conditions attracted them. Regarding the second question, internationalization or, in other words trans-nationalization of civil wars, brings forward different ways of actor multiplication, which can attract interventions into civil wars: Spillovers are major examples of this probability. In these cases, non-state actors and individuals play the main role in internationalizing civil wars and pulling other agents into wars.⁴³¹ Although intervention choices are more debated in war studies, trans-nationalization stays as a more blurred process and is rarely discussed as an internationalization instrument. Therefore, there is not a common template of internationalization causalities, according to which new actors and methods are clearly positioned. Thus, in this study we will try to establish which agent relations exist in the internationalization of civil wars and how these new involvement manners shape the civil war processes. This obligates us to go beyond the interventions themselves and search deeper for possible relations between diverse agents, such as the problems of finding transnational support and neighboring sanctuaries for rebel groups⁴³² or the outcomes of mass dislocations in civil wars. The final question urges us to examine the consequences of interventions and other involvements in the context of what they bring into civil war processes. This does not signify the post-conflict analyses or peace-agreement methods: Instead, the main focus of the present study is on the way that civil conflicts escalate into wars, then their transformation into international civil wars and the types of conflicts/wars that these transformations are observed in. Thus, in the following sections, the transformation of civil wars into international issues will be discussed and these questions will enable the establishment of a causality pattern for realized interventions, a network schema as an outline of involvements leading to interventions and a transformation format to explain the occurrence of internationalizations.

In light of these objectives, in this section, military intervention as the acknowledged internationalization method and its elements will be evaluated. At first, the actor types that could play a role in the internationalization processes will be examined, next the internationalization forms with their ulterior motivations will

⁴³¹ Aysegul Aydin, **Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012, pp.3-4.

⁴³² William Zartman, "Internationalization of Communal Strife: Temptations and Opportunities of Triangulation", in Midlarsky (ed.), **The Internationalization of ...**, p.27.

be discussed and then, the impact of civil war internationalizations will be analyzed. In this context, according to the findings of COW and PRIO, the following sections will be based on the recognition of military interventions as the internationalization method. While our study will focus on internationalized cases as described by our datasets, we will go one step further and explain the involvement relations within these cases, signifying the conflict interconnections between insurgents, warring states, supporting states, NGOs and international organizations within the ICWs so that it is clear what attracts and pulls actors to intervene into civil conflicts.

Chapter I - Defining intervention as a fundamental type of internationalization and its types: What is an intervention?

External powers can have great effect on the evolution and termination of wars by influencing the capacity of warring parties. Understanding the role of interventions in civil wars could illuminate different aspects of conflicts, such as the processes of wars and their meaning for international politics.⁴³³ Yet, intervention types, such as diplomatic, economic or military interventions, and intervener types, such as states, intergovernmental organizations, non-state actors and their collaborations show great variation.⁴³⁴ Thus, in order to understand actors, their motivations and timing in the internationalization of civil wars, first, the concept of intervention will be clarified.

Section I - Understanding the concept of intervention

Before explaining the practical conditions of military interventions, there are some clarifications that need to be made about the concepts of intervention and internationalization of civil wars. Concerning the scope of this study, there are four datasets that were used for the establishment of this Thesis' basis regarding the civil war internationalization approach. First, according to COW, in an ICW, a system member intervenes to a civil war outside its borders and creates an international warfare,⁴³⁵ but if this actor takes the bulk of fighting from the rebel party, the civil war becomes an inter-state war. If the external actor takes the bulk of fighting from the government, then it becomes an extra-state war.⁴³⁶ In this context, taking the bulk

⁴³³ Aydın, **Foreign Powers...**, p.2.

⁴³⁴ **Ibid.** p.4, 14.

⁴³⁵ Sarkees, Wayman, **Resort To...**, p.42.

⁴³⁶ **Ibid.**, p.63.

of fighting is perceived as becoming the primary warring party that causes the greatest number of battle-deaths.⁴³⁷ On the other hand, the UCDP/PRIO dataset distinguishes the internationalization of internal armed conflicts as the intervention of states (secondary parties) in favor of one or both sides⁴³⁸ and defines secondary parties as the actors who enter the conflict actively with troops and share the position of primary warring party for whom they fight for.⁴³⁹

In addition to these factors, Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis's dataset acknowledges all domestic and international parties, who participate actively in the fighting of civil wars and subsequently the UN's involvement is integrated into the dataset as part of the internationalization process.⁴⁴⁰ Finally, while Fearon & Laitin's dataset is more focused on the internal reasons of civil wars rather than the external actors involved in them, their dataset does not qualify the heavy involvement of troops in a civil war as a transformation into extra-state war and the territorial condition for internationalization of civil wars is relaxed.⁴⁴¹

In the present study, we will follow Fearon & Laitin's internationalization narrative and the profound involvement of external actors in civil wars will not be recognized as extra-state wars if the principal causes and actors stay in scene. This is also consistent with the PRIO/UCDP datasets, where a distinction for taking the bulk of fighting does not exist. We also add Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis's agent perception to the COW and PRIO/UCDP datasets descriptions, according to which intervening actor covers domestic and international parties and the concept of interveners is not exclusively limited to states. Finally, it should be underlined that, regarding the intervention definition, all these datasets consider strictly military interventions as the internationalization catalyst for civil wars, which excludes economic and diplomatic interventions. Additionally, Rosenau and Regan's definitions of intervention, which will be explained hereafter in detail, construct the basis of the understanding of intervention for both implanted empirical literature and database resources. Thus, it should be noted that any internationalization aspect evaluated in the following sections has these conceptual limitations.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.54.

⁴³⁸ Themnér, Wallensteen, *UCDP/PRIO Armed...*, p.7.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.2.

⁴⁴⁰ Doyle, Sambanis, "Data Set Notes...", p.14.

⁴⁴¹ Fearon, Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency...", p.76.

a. What does intervention imply?

Foreign intervention in its simplest description is the procurement of support to one of the warring parties by an external power. This support manipulates the belligerents or the governments' capabilities in the warfare.⁴⁴² On the other hand, the intervention as a term needs certain conceptual limits because unclear and inconsistent descriptions in the literature render it as a synonym of influence. For an operational definition, it is essential to point out two criteria mentioned earlier: First, interventions are convention-breaking actions, which represent a deviation from an actor's earlier policies. Secondly, interventions have authority-oriented nature, which means that they aim to have a political impact on the targeted society in order to change or preserve the configuration of the state authority.⁴⁴³ Thus, it is possible to define "*third-party interventions in intra-state conflicts as convention breaking activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces*"⁴⁴⁴.

Regarding intervention strategies, it is vital to underline that military intervention is not the sole type of intervention used in civil wars. Actors can also take economic and diplomatic measures into account as non-military intervention types, such as "*the partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations*"⁴⁴⁵ and if these strategies are found insufficient to resolve the problem, then military action is considered.⁴⁴⁶ While diplomatic interventions mostly imply mediation efforts, they can also include official public declarations in support or against one of the warring parties, demands for ceasefire, diplomatic assistance or sanctions⁴⁴⁷, international forums, recall of ambassadors and arbitration.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴² Adam Lockyer, "Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous resources on the course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts", *PhD Thesis*, Department of Government and International Relations, Sydney: University of Sydney, December 2008, p.94.

⁴⁴³ James N. Rosenau, "Intervention and World Politics", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.22, No.2, 1968, pp.166-167.

⁴⁴⁴ Patrick M. Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict*, Ann Harbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2002, p.10.

⁴⁴⁵ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Article 41, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf> (accessed 19.03.2017)

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Article 42.

⁴⁴⁷ Renato Corbetta, "Between indifference and coercion: Third-party intervention techniques in ongoing disputes", *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 32, No.1, 2015, p.11.

Regarding the type of external actors in diplomatic interventions, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, states, coalitions of states, individuals and *ad hoc* groups can take part in diplomatic efforts, such as mediations that can also involve multi-party actions with different agents who may try to influence the process from different perspectives or act cohesively.⁴⁴⁹ Although diplomatic interventions include involvements of third parties to mediate conflicts, they do not hold great political risk, they have different cost-benefit and timing calculus compared to other intervention methods, and they mostly aim to secure the existing status quo. On the other hand, military and economic interventions aim to alter the conditions on the ground⁴⁵⁰ by targeting authority structures and performing convention-breaking actions.⁴⁵¹

As a type of non-military intervention, economic interventions are effective methods of managing internal armed conflicts through awards, threats and punishments. Choosing an intervention strategy is related to the present conditions and expected behaviors and economic interventions are oriented to achieve these

⁴⁴⁸ Mediation is “*a mode of negotiation, in which third party helps the parties find a solution, which they cannot by themselves*” and is a non-violent and non-binding type of intervention. It is an important indicator for the status of conflict because it shows that all parties voluntarily accept to negotiate with the mediator who can to affect, change, modify, or influence the conflict outcome. Before starting the meetings, parties determine the format, location and the context of discussions ahead. Mediator has an important role both to initiate and facilitate the bargaining process and mostly operates to assure reliable information to all sides by laying the differences and demands of conflicting parties on the table. This communication ground is crucial to decrease the trust between warring sides and to conceive a compromising outcome that comes into being as a peace agreement. International forum is the second type of external diplomatic effort, which is also non-binding. It gathers representatives of several countries and not only the warring parties of the conflict, in a formally organized meeting. Thirdly, recall of an ambassador is not exclusive to conflict managements, but if the diplomat is recalled due to governments actions in its internal conflict, it can be perceived as a diplomatic effort to change the progress of internal armed conflict. Finally, mediation offers can be rejected by one of the warring parties, and in that case they are recorded as diplomatic efforts. Aydın, **Foreign Powers...**, p.128; William Zartman, Saadia Touval, “International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era”, in Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall eds., **Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict**, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, p.446; Patrick M. Regan, Richard W. Frank, Aysegül Aydın, “Diplomatic Interventions And Civil War: A New Data set”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.46, No.1, 2009, pp.138-139.

⁴⁴⁹ Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall, “Rising to the Challenge of Multiparty Mediation”, in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall eds., **Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World**, Washington D.C.: U.S. Institution of Peace Press, 1999, p.686.

⁴⁵⁰ Patrick Regan, “Choosing to intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts”, **The Journal of Politics**, Vol.60, No.3, 1998, p.757.

⁴⁵¹ Patrick Regan, “Complex Strategies: Interventions and the Management of Civil Conflicts”, **paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association**, New Orleans, LA, March 23-27, 2002, p.22.

expected goals without fighting.⁴⁵² Regarding economic sanctions, there are multiple forms, which aim to disrupt the target state's trade, aid, finance, currency, and assets.⁴⁵³ These sanctions can come in the form of a threat or promise to influence a warring party's behavior before actually applying them and can be applied both unilaterally and multilaterally through an inter-governmental organization. Economic interventions would be more effective in the second case due to their more collective character. It needs to be highlighted here that each intervention's goals would be more attainable if they are more modest, considering that the target economy is already weak, the sanctions are imposed rapidly and determinedly, and interventionists can afford long-term costs.⁴⁵⁴ As it easily understood, intervening countries have to bear certain costs in the context of economic interventions, but these costs as well as the risk are much lower compared to military interventions.

Therefore, economic interventions occupy a middle position between diplomatic attempts and the use of military force, which shall be preferred when military action is not feasible for domestic or international reasons. They are also useful due to their rapid decision and application process and provide more time to external actors to evaluate their position.⁴⁵⁵ Moreover, abandoning economic sanctions is less costly and less disreputable compared to being defeated in the battlefield or withdrawing military forces. Yet, they are the least preferred types of intervention (following the Second World War there has been 1846 diplomatic, 182 economic and 846 military interventions in 2874 encounters) and are mostly criticized for their ineffectiveness.⁴⁵⁶ Finally, economic interventions are public, institutional, transparent and explicit as methods, thereby they should not be

⁴⁵² Regan, "Conditions of Successful...", p.339, 341, 347; David Lektzian, Patrick M Regan, "Economic sanctions, military interventions, and civil conflict outcomes", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.53, No.4, 2016, pp.554-568.

⁴⁵³ Trade sanctions such as arms embargos are the most common economic interventions and can be applied on import or export goods. Financial sanctions can include loans or investments targeting the resource flow of the warring country. Monetary sanctions signify destabilizing country's currency, which would cause inflation and debt. Country's assets may be frozen to cut access to properties, securities and bank accounts, which would weaken and limit any economic mobility. Finally, aid represents a positive sanction type but the withdrawal of aid can play a negative role as well; Jonathan Kirshner, "The micro foundations of economic sanctions", **Security Studies**, Vol.6 No.3, 1997, pp.36-37.

⁴⁵⁴ Kimberly Ann Elliott, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Barbara Oegg, "Sanctions", **The Library of Economics and Liberty**, 2nd edition, <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Sanctions.html> (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁴⁵⁵ Jonathan Masters, "What Are Economic Sanctions?", **Council of Foreign Relations Backgrounders**, 8 February 2017, <http://www.cfr.org/sanctions/economic-sanctions/p36259>, (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁴⁵⁶ Renato Corbetta, "Between indifference...", pp.10-12.

confused with economic or material support provided by external actors to a warring party during internal conflicts.

Before explaining military interventions, it is important to understand sovereignty and its reflections on international law because the use of armed force is prohibited by the Charter of United Nations, and the whole international community is established around this notion.⁴⁵⁷ In this context, the use of armed force and military intervention tend to contradict international rules and regulations. The prohibition of violent acts against another state is associated with sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention in internal affairs. Sovereignty is an accepted norm since the 1648 Westphalia Treaty and has been a vital concept since the foundation of League of Nations: “Sovereignty is absolute in the legal sense, and means the *de facto* control by a government within its borders”⁴⁵⁸ and together with the non-intervention norm, they were established to bring order to an anarchic world system by diminishing conflicts.⁴⁵⁹ On the other hand, this ultimate concept of sovereignty has changed throughout the years. The ideas of Bodin⁴⁶⁰ that gave sovereignty its indivisible and absolute character have evolved over time. Democratic movements in the 17th and the 18th centuries have transferred the source of sovereignty from the King to the people in the domestic context, but have left the state actor as the sole authority in international politics, which could behave as it wishes amongst its equals. Furthermore, in the 19th and 20th centuries, following the end of the Second World War, the creation of the UN, the signing of the Geneva Conventions and the rulings of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials have changed this unlimited perception of state sovereignty. In order to prevent wars, state leaders became liable for their actions and all wars, except those of self-defense, became illegitimate. External sovereignty did not completely disappear but international law started to play a bigger role against sovereign states’ actions. Subsequently, in the 20th century, the

⁴⁵⁷ “We The Peoples Of The United Nations, determined to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used”, United Nations, **Charter of...**, Preamble To The Charter Of The United Nations.

⁴⁵⁸ Joseph S. Nye Jr, **An Introduction to Theory and History: Understanding International Conflicts**, New York: Longman, 1997, p.135.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.133.

⁴⁶⁰ “Let this be the first and chiefe marke of a soueraigne prince, to bee of power to give lawes to all his subjects in general, and to euerie one of them in particular, without consent of any other greater, equall, or lesser than himself”, J. Bodin, **The Six Bookes of a Commonweale**, edited with an introduction by K. D. McRae, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, p.159 cited in John K. Hord, “The State-Organized Progress or Decay Product?”, **Comparative Civilizations Review**, Vol.21, No.21, 1989, p.20.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the subsequent treaties significantly modified the idea of sovereignty: The idea of intervention in order to protect people became a reasonable act.⁴⁶¹ The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs was based on the respect to the fact that states are equal, independent and autonomous actors who are responsible for their internal acts, governance and prosperity. Yet, with the rising importance of human rights, internal sovereignty started to challenge external sovereignty, giving birth to conditional sovereignty discussions. According to these discussions, a state's legitimacy and the right to sovereignty depends on its capacity to guarantee the security of its people, and if such legitimacy is lost in the eyes of its society, the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs loses its legitimacy as well and external powers can disregard equality and autonomy of other states in the name of the protection of people.⁴⁶²

Consequently, even though the idea of intervention became more and more acceptable, there are many legal restrictions regarding the internal conflicts of foreign states.⁴⁶³ As the most influential guide on the issue of use of force, the UN Charter makes it clear that "*The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members*"⁴⁶⁴, while it affirms that the purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security by preventing and removing threats to peace, suppressing acts of aggressions and adjusting international disputes.⁴⁶⁵ Thus, a paradox lies amid the first article of the UN Charter, which emphasizes the main mission of the UN as assuring justice and human rights in the international area, and the second article that accepts states as sovereign actors and prohibits the use of force

⁴⁶¹ Don E. Scheid, "Introduction To Armed Humanitarian Intervention", in Don E. Scheideds, **The Ethnicity of Armed Humanitarian Intervention**, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp.10-12.

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, pp.12-13.

⁴⁶³ The rules and principles regarding the use of force can be found in the 1907 Hague Regulations, the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, and customary International Humanitarian Law; International Conferences, **Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land**, 18.10.1907, articles 22-28 and article 43, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/must000001-0631.pdf> (accessed 19.03.2017); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), **Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I and II)**, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 and 609, Protocol I, articles 48 and seq., <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201125/volume-1125-i-17512-english.pdf> (accessed 19.03.2017), Additional Protocol II, articles 13 and seq., <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201125/volume-1125-i-17513-english.pdf> (accessed 19.03.2017), J.M. Henckaerts, L. Doswald-Beck, **Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, rules 1-24, pp. 3-76.

⁴⁶⁴ United Nations, **Charter of...**, Article 2.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Article 1.

with the exception of self-defense cases or following the authorization of the UN.⁴⁶⁶ This contradiction creates a loophole concerning interventions in internal armed conflicts, and challenges the Security Council as the ultimate authority who determines whether there is going to be an intervention, which actors will be engaged in the intervention and what kind of intervention there will be.⁴⁶⁷

Before moving on, there are two points that should not be overseen. First, intervening into an internal armed conflict of another country is one of the most complicated foreign policy actions,⁴⁶⁸ which may compel leaders to consider combining different intervention strategies to influence the conflicts.⁴⁶⁹ While strictly military interventions remain the most visible form of internationalization representing the 70% of all interventions, it is common to combine economic and military interventions (23%). Moreover, mixed interventions have brought the most successful results (35%) compared to monolithic military interventions (30%).⁴⁷⁰

Secondly, the *UCDP External Support – Primary Warring Party Data set* shows that, in order to have an active external actor in an internal armed conflict that can be considered as involved⁴⁷¹, sending troops as the secondary warring party is not the only option. An external supporter can also grant access to its territory, its military or intelligence infrastructure, donate weapons or other material, provide logistics, training or expertise, ensure funding or intelligence support and give direct economic support.⁴⁷² Thus, while military intervention from external powers in civil wars draws us the framework for internationalization, other support and influence relations between actors within ICWs shall not be ignored. Consequently, in the following sections only militarily intervention cases will be acknowledged as ICWs,

⁴⁶⁶ Sarah E. Kreps, "Multilateral Military Interventions: Theory and Practice", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol.123, No.4, 2008, pp.584-585.

⁴⁶⁷ Sang Ki Kim, "Third-party intervention in civil wars: motivation, war outcomes, and post-war development", **PhD thesis**, Department of Political Science, Iowa: University of Iowa, December 2012, p.16.

⁴⁶⁸ Corbetta, "Between indifference...", p.3.

⁴⁶⁹ Regan, "Complex Strategies...", p.1.

⁴⁷⁰ Regan, "Conditions of Successful...", p.345.

⁴⁷¹ Mihai Catalin Croicu, Stina Högladh, Therése Petterson, Lotta Themnér, "UCDP External Support Project Primary Warring Party Data set CodebookVersion 1-2011", Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2011, p.2, http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/extsup/ucdp_external_support_primary_warring_party_codebook_1.0.pdf (accessed 19.03.2017)

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*, p.8.; Also see. "Military interventions encompass the supply or transfer of troops, hardware, intelligence, air or naval support, and logistical support to the parties in conflict or, as may be the case, the cutoff of any such aid currently in place.", Regan, **Civil Wars...**, p.25.

but economic and other types of support in these cases will also be taken into consideration as internationalizing dynamics.

b. Military Intervention in focus

In cases that civil wars advance beyond internal issues and transform into an international concern, military intervention is a more dramatic and straightforward alternative compared to non-military interventions in the sense that they represent a deviation from existing policy patterns and they target authority structures.⁴⁷³ While economic interventions are mostly accepted as indicators of a future military intervention, it can also be the primary decision of external powers.⁴⁷⁴ Foreign military intervention in its largest meaning refer to the deployment of troops or equipment, sanctions, and the use of force indicated by military clashes⁴⁷⁵, which can signify a range of actions. Thus, in a more limited description military intervention imply actions “*undertaken directly by regular military forces within foreign lands in such a manner as to risk immediate combat, hence war, if they encounter resistance. It includes all combat-ready deployments of conventional ground forces, air and commando raids, and naval and artillery shelling, whether or not such operations result in direct bloodshed situations...Blatant forms of international operations as covert actions, military alerts, shows of force, pacific military deployments, incidental incursions, cross border small arms fire, aerial or naval encounters, actions of irregular forces*”⁴⁷⁶ that do not have to include active participation in fighting or direct military assistance of national forces of several states or regional organizations, but that hold immediate combat risk. In addition to these, there are secondary internationalization activities along with indirect military assistance in the form of offers, sales and provision of advice, arms, funds, or machinery as they also fuel strife, deter the parties in the domestic conflict and trigger new developments in relation to the future of the combat.⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷³ Rosenau, “Intervention and...”, p.168.

⁴⁷⁴ Corbetta, “Between indifference...”, p.10.

⁴⁷⁵ Sang Ki Kim, “How to Intervene in Civil Wars: Strategic Interests, Humanitarianism, and Third-Party Intervention”, paper without date, p.2, <http://myweb.uiowa.edu/bhlai/workshop/kim.pdf> (accessed 20.03.2017)

⁴⁷⁶ Herbert Tillema, “Foreign Overt Military Intervention in the Nuclear Age: A Clarification”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.26, No.2, 1989, p.419.

⁴⁷⁷ Eleanor Lumsden, “An Uneasy Peace: Multilateral Military Intervention in Civil Wars”, **NYU Journal of International Law and Politics**, Vol.35, No.995, 2003, pp.798-799.

In this context, the most detectable form of intervention is the use of military force in the midst of convention-breaking and authority-targeted policies envisaging civil wars.⁴⁷⁸ It also is the riskiest form due to reputational, economic and human cost and therefore it is much more difficult to gain the support of international and domestic audiences.⁴⁷⁹ This is why policy makers resort to military alternatives only under certain circumstances. Herewith, we can presume to see a military intervention when its success is relatively probable, the expected effect of intervention is likely to occur within a shorter time frame and public opinion does not strongly oppose to such intervention. Thus, if there is no high prediction of success in the near future and the cost of intervening cannot match the prospective benefits, then military intervention is not a viable option.⁴⁸⁰

In addition to success and support expectations, intervening strategies are also influenced by other complex mechanisms, such as the “*characteristics of the country in conflict, characteristics of the intervener, linkage patterns between the groups in the target and intervener, and the character of the international system*”⁴⁸¹. This is why trying to answer what kind of civil conflicts would hold more probability of a military intervention is an extremely tricky question to answer. Many scholars try to discover whether the intensity, the number of neighboring countries and the type of internal strife have a clear effect on the likelihood of military interventions but most of these inquiries fall victim of the rapidly changing and *ad hoc* conditions of civil wars. For example, Regan’s research (published in 1998), claiming that interventions in internal armed conflicts were more likely during the Cold War than its aftermath,⁴⁸² wore off due to the increasing active involvements of intergovernmental organizations after the Kosovo war in 1998 and “the war against terrorism” after the 9/11 attacks. His research still sheds light to issues such as the reservation of neighbors in getting involved with next-door civil wars in order to be more cautious or because of the problems of collaborative action in cases of numerous neighboring countries’.⁴⁸³ Nonetheless, regarding the fact that, the majority of interventions between 1946 and 2004⁴⁸⁴ were realized by neighbors, a

⁴⁷⁸ Regan, “Conditions of Successful...”, p.339.

⁴⁷⁹ Corbetta, “Between indifference...”, p.9.

⁴⁸⁰ Regan, **Civil Wars...**, pp.40-41.

⁴⁸¹ Regan, “Choosing to...”, p.755.

⁴⁸² **Ibid.**, p.771.

⁴⁸³ **Ibid.**, p.775.

⁴⁸⁴ Harbom, Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict...”, p.628.

more updated and comprehensive quantitative research is needed to be conducted in relation to this observation. It is also possible to say that today's intervention reasons will have a modificative effect on the interventionist actions in the following years.

The same argument is valid for Frederic Pearson's research (published in 1974), where he argues that, while armed attacks, deaths from domestic violence, irregular power transfers, government sanctions (arrests, censorship, and so on), executions, revolutions, or rebellions (including civil wars or coups), and regular executive transfers, including peaceful cabinet changes, are the main targets of military interventions, all forms of domestic violence-assassinations, purges, and riots, together with non-violent protest demonstrations, governmental crises, and unsuccessful regular executive transfers are the least appealing types of domestic problems leading to military interventions.⁴⁸⁵ These results seem to be outdated because of the post-Cold War climate. The Cold War had completely different dynamics that led states to intervene based on ideological reasons and in particular manners but it would be abnormal to expect peaceful cabinet changes would decide in favor of any military interventions in the 21st century. It is possible that there are still valid results, but overall a revision or an update is needed. Pearson still has valid arguments, particularly in relation to the military intervention's risks. He argues that an intervention could be unsuccessful and damage the intervener's reputation if the supported side loses, the secret interference of the country becomes revealed in time or the internal conflict becomes even more deadlier and spreads to its surroundings despite the engagement of the third party.⁴⁸⁶ Yet, his eroding findings show that the attractiveness and selectiveness of military interventions should be evaluated on the basis of the various characteristics and linkage patterns regarding internal armed conflicts and research needs to be attentive to time periods and international system's features. Also, we should be cautious and careful while using quantitative results and indications.

Accepting that the decision of intervening is broadly based on different factors, the ultimate goal of a foreign intervention is invariably aimed at stopping the conflict because without a sustainable ceasefire, it is impossible to achieve any other

⁴⁸⁵ Frederic S. Pearson, "Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol.18, No.3, 1974, p.275.

⁴⁸⁶ **Ibid.**, p.259.

objectives.⁴⁸⁷ If the decision for a military intervention is put into force, there are several dynamics that should be evaluated. First, what strategy do external actors follow regarding their military involvement? Second, who are the actors that get involved and how do they collaborate? Finally, what kind of interests do these interveners have in mind? As the two latter questions necessitate a thorough investigation, they will be examined in detail in the following sections, yet before handling actors and their motivations regarding civil wars, methods targeting them will be discussed here in order to have a comprehensive understanding of military interventions before moving on to more complex issues.

In this context, external actors' military interventions aim to generate a change in the domestic affairs during an ongoing conflict and this is certainly not a random action. External actors choose their strategies, which can support their motives and promote the attainment of their secondary goals besides ending the conflict.⁴⁸⁸ After all, external involvements can affect the outcome of civil wars in the form of warring parties' probable victory or future distribution of resources by changing the cost of the fighting and the course of the negotiations during the ceasefire.⁴⁸⁹ Keeping in mind that the victory of a warring party depends on its relative power against its adversary, gaining supporters and mobilizing funds to keep the parties fighting, military interventions can play a vital role in a fight. As mentioned earlier, this is the reason that the ability to extract resources, the existence of a rough terrain or other geo-strategic conditions are important for the capacity of a warring party. The gap between the strength of the two opponents is the key element and interveners have the power to shift that balance.⁴⁹⁰ Therefore, when actors opt for intervening, the method of involvement, which can be biased or neutral, holds great importance.

Concerning biased military interventions, an external actor can align with the government or the opposition. If the intervention is in favor of the government, it is assumed that the intervener prefers the government's existing policies and expects the opposition to modify the state's policies in case of winning. Under these circumstances, the intervention aims to reinstall the pre-war status quo. If the

⁴⁸⁷ Douglas Lemke, Patrick M. Regan, "Interventions As Influence", in Paul F. Diehl eds, **The Scourge of War: New Extensions on an Old Problem**, Ann Harbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004, p.149.

⁴⁸⁸ Kim, **Third-party intervention...**, p.5.

⁴⁸⁹ Regan, "Complex Strategies...", p.10.

⁴⁹⁰ Kim, **Third-party intervention...**, p.59.

intervention aligns with the opposing group, then there is an already existing discontent with the governments' earlier policies and the external power prefers an alternate ideology, regime and mode of government of opposing groups. In that case, the intervener wants to alter the pre-war status quo instead of reinforcing it.

From another perspective, this choice could imply a dislike for one of the parties rather than a preference. This feeling can also reflect in the intervention method, which could take the form of a punishment.⁴⁹¹ Supporting the opposition with view to modify the earlier system equals to punishing the government's side. Also, if the external actor supports the government, not because of its preference for the earlier system of governance, but because of a dislike for the opposition, then it is possible to say that the opposition is being punished for its ideas, ideologies and future behavior. Consequently, a third party can intervene to support or impede one of the warring parties, due to a preference or a dislike, which renders the intervention as supportive or antagonistic due to such a political affinity. Political choices affecting such biased intervention decisions can be seen as assisting, or antagonizing one of the parties.⁴⁹² On the other hand, if the intervention is a neutral involvement, then it shows that the interveners are trying to strike a balance of power between the parties and reduce the warring parties' motivations to continue fighting by deploying troops, creating buffer zones and exerting material pressure. Thus, they are not trying to favor one of the parties and contribute to the victory of one side, but the aim is instead to push parties towards having a negotiated resolution and reaching a settlement instead of a victory in the fight.⁴⁹³

Section II - Actors of Interventions

Military intervention is clearly not an invention of the last two decades, but interventionism has become a significant method to prevent or put an end to civil wars in the aftermath of the Cold War. Especially following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, arguments favoring military intervention into domestic struggles of other states gained momentum; the idea of maintaining and reinstating international and regional security against obscure regimes and ineffective governments became

⁴⁹¹ Lemke, M. Regan, "Interventions as...", p.151.

⁴⁹² Corbetta, "Between indifference...", p.12.

⁴⁹³ Kim, **Third-party intervention...**, pp.65-66, 71-72.

more and more legitimized at the cost of undermining national sovereignty.⁴⁹⁴ Even in a world increasingly in favor of military interventions, there are still constraints to and concerns about the use of force. Such limitations are established by the UN Charter and there are three exceptions regarding the prohibition of the use of force in international politics: Self-defense, state consent and authorization of the Security Council under Chapter VII.⁴⁹⁵

All these exceptions can be observed within the scope of interventions into a civil war, and all those three can be used in different ways before being applied.⁴⁹⁶ In this regard, the United Nations has a major role to play in relation to such interventions, which can be realized through international and regional organizations or in the form of *ad hoc* coalitions and unilateral actions of states. While the role of non-governmental actors in the internationalization of internal conflicts is limited, as interventions emphasis will be given to international and regional organizations first, secondly states and coalition of states will be discussed, and then the implications of the international actions of non-state actors will be examined.

a. The role of the United Nations and Regional Organizations

The United Nations were established in 1945 with the mission of maintaining international peace and security. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with its five permanent members (China, Soviet Union/Russian Federation, USA, France and United Kingdom) and ten non-permanent members, was founded as the responsible organ of this ambitious mission. At this point, it should be underlined that the assessment of international organizations, the UN in particular, necessitates a custom approach. By their nature, international organizations, which are to a large extend inter-governmental organizations, are limited to their members' policies, interests, motivations and thereby they lack independent decision-making

⁴⁹⁴ Chojnacki, "Anything New...", p.27, 46-47.

⁴⁹⁵ Monica Hakimi, "To Condone or Condemn? Regional Enforcement Actions in the Absence of Security Council Authorization", **Vanderbilt Journal Of Transnational Law**, Vol. 40, No.643, 2007, pp.644-645; Also see. United Nations, **Charter of...**, Article 2, Articles 39-51.

⁴⁹⁶ For a deepened debate see. Shane Darcy, "Retaliation and Reprisal", in Marc Weller (ed.), **Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp.879-896; Leslie M. Rose, "Is The U.S. Bombing Of Afghanistan Justified As Self-Defense Under International Law?", **Guild Practitioner**, Vol.59, No.65, 2002, pp.65-75; David K. Linnan, "Self-Defense, Necessity And U.N. Collective Security: United States And Other Views", **Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law**, Vol.1, No.1, 1991, pp.57-124; Ashley S. Deeks, "Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy", **Harvard International Law Journal**, Vol. 54, No.1, 2013, pp.12-48; David Wippman, "Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent", **Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law**, Vol.7, No.1, 1996, pp.209-240.

capabilities and as a result they are bound to their members' political decisions. Concerning military interventions, decisions are completely monopolized by the UNSC members, whose own interests can effectively instrumentalize the UN and harm the organization's legitimacy and credibility, if manipulated.⁴⁹⁷ This is why actions and decisions of the UN regarding civil wars and interventions should not be interpreted as autonomous outcomes and the role of states in these processes should not be overseen.

In this perspective, the Cold War conditions had disabled the Council from becoming an efficient and active instrument regarding acts of aggression, threats to peace and breaches of peace because its members hardly ever had a consensus.⁴⁹⁸ Yet, after the end of the Cold War two variables shifted: First, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Security Council's activity increased and second, international order became more affected by civil wars rather than inter-state wars. While the first change was related to a more consentient decision-making process about military decisions in the Council, the second one put the UN into the spotlight as the legitimate arbitrator of interventions into domestic disputes of sovereign states. Under these circumstances, the UN became more involved in military conflicts in accordance with its primary mission of maintaining international peace and security.⁴⁹⁹

Regarding the UN's activities to maintain peace and security pursuant to the first article of the Charter⁵⁰⁰, there is not a clear definition of what can be accepted as threats, breaches and aggressions, thus the assessment and the decision on these issues are made by the Security Council members on a case by case basis. As the UNSC is the ultimate decision-maker, who can circumvent the non-intervention rule and claim the right to intervene in domestic politics concerning internal conflicts, there are two chapters in the Charter for the perusal of the members if the assessment of a given situation is in line with the first article. In this regard, Chapter VI

⁴⁹⁷ Jacob Bercovitch, Richard Jackson, **Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, methods and approaches**, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2012, pp.71-72.

⁴⁹⁸ Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "The United Nations and Internal Conflict", in Michael E. Brown (ed.), **The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict**, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996, p.489.

⁴⁹⁹ Ramses Amer, "The United Nations' Reactions to Foreign Military Interventions – A Comparative Case Study Analysis", **Umeå Working Papers in Peace and Conflict Studies**, No.2, 2007, p.1.

⁵⁰⁰ "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace...", United Nations, **Charter of...**, Article 1.

envisions conciliatory and peaceful measures and Chapter VII describes coercive measures for managing internal and other conflicts.⁵⁰¹ The aim of these policies is the initiation of peace operations, which involve numerous types of UN peace missions that can be distinguished as traditional peacekeeping expanded peacekeeping, humanitarian missions or peace enforcement missions. All these operations have different levels of use of force and rely on different authorization dynamics.⁵⁰²

None of these operation types were mentioned or described in the Charter, therefore their introduction, utilization, and evolution developed over time due to the needs and context of international politics and security issues. At first, peacekeeping missions, otherwise called traditional peacekeeping missions, were influenced by the Cold War conditions. In essence, they were mostly targeting inter-state wars, with the exception of the Congo civil war in the 1960s, troops were lightly armed, aimed at creating buffer zones between the belligerent parties, monitoring and observing peace processes in the form of ceasefires, withdrawals, agreements and implementation of these elements.⁵⁰³ They were all deployed with the voluntary consent of warring parties, had impartiality as the main rule, and used minimum force (restricted to self-defense instances). These missions provided an enabling environment for peace and did not mean to enforce peace conditions as their role was limited to not altering any political or military situation on the battlefield. This is why traditional peacekeeping missions are referred as “Chapter-six-and-a-half” activities, which are actually non-coercive tools despite the fact that they involved military personnel. Therefore, these *missions fall somewhere between Chapter VI-the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” and Chapter VII - “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”*.⁵⁰⁴ Following that, expanded peacekeeping operations evolved during 1990s to address increasing civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. They are also described as second generation peacekeeping missions which entail complex mission layers due to the involvement of both civilian and military personnel, aiming at reinforcing the peace process rather than only observing it and were designed to resolve

⁵⁰¹ Oudraat, “The United Nations...”, pp.492-493.

⁵⁰² Trevor Findlay, **The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations**, Oxford: SIPRI Oxford University Press, 2002, p.3.

⁵⁰³ Margaret P. Karns, Karen A. Mingst, **International Organizations: The Politics and Global Governance**, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp.306-311.

⁵⁰⁴ Bercovitch, Jackson, **Conflict Resolution...**, p.77.

problems at the origin of conflicts in order to prevent their of re-escalation and rebuild deeply harmed societies.⁵⁰⁵ In this spirit, they had “*less concern for the obtaining of consent from all parties, a rethinking of the notion of impartiality and greater flexibility in the use of force (meaning, inevitably, greater use of force)*”.⁵⁰⁶

Peacekeeping operations evolved with accompanying doctrines, such as *R2P*, which had an impact on the reasoning and functioning of peacekeeping missions. As a special form of extended peacekeeping missions, humanitarian intervention was born out of the need to respond to civilian catastrophes, such as genocides and human right abuses, which required multifaceted methods of response, including peace-making (diplomatic actions to end conflicts), peace-keeping, peace-building (long term operations envisaging to establish necessary conditions for sustainable peace) and peace-enforcement missions. In order to be able to protect civilians from the violence between their own governments and other belligerents, the need for consent, the idea of impartiality and the possibility of not using force were distorted in the context of humanitarian operations.⁵⁰⁷ Thus, peacekeeping missions evolved to respond to civil war dynamics, civil war conditions brought the idea of humanitarian intervention and the needs of humanitarian intervention triggered the incidence of peace-enforcement missions. In that context, for peace-enforcement operations consent was not a necessary condition because it would mean authorizing an international mission against the governments themselves. Impartiality and non-use of force are still aimed outcomes, because the defeat of a warring party is not the ultimate goal. But, in order to coerce warring parties, reinforce peace and protect civilians from violence, the use of force beyond self-defense and the penalization of a warring party can become inevitable in peace-enforcement operations for realizing the abovementioned objectives. The use of force can excess self-defense while exercising the right to move freely on the ground, defending the objectives of a mission, preventing warfare, expelling or capturing war criminals and enforcing disarmament. This kind of assignments could also undermine the maintenance of an impartial behavior in practice. Consequently, as a distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, there is no doubt that peace-enforcement operations derive from Chapter VII that gives the authorization for the use of force beyond self-

⁵⁰⁵ Karns, Mingst, **International Organizations...**, pp.312-314.

⁵⁰⁶ Findlay, **The Use of...**, p.3.

⁵⁰⁷ Bercovitch, Jackson, **Conflict Resolution...**, p.102-103.

defense. But, the line between what is allowed and what is not can be very fine in these operations and it is actually dependent on the behavior circumstances of each case (along with impartiality and consent) because the UNSC does not produce crystal clear resolutions regarding the use of force in its mandates: They approve the engagement of “all necessary means” to accomplish the mission but without specifying the limits of these means, namely the extent of the use of force authorization.⁵⁰⁸

The inclusion of coercive methods in peace operations, the rise of humanitarian intervention debates and the erosion of sovereignty have unveiled a heated discussion on the responsibility of international community to protect civilians. The term R2P was firstly introduced in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001.⁵⁰⁹ Following the efforts of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, all members of the organization accepted their responsibility to protect their civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity at the United Nations World Summit in 2005 and it was officially referred by the UNSC resolutions after 2006.⁵¹⁰ Thus, during the 2000s, humanitarian intervention and coercive interference gained a new doctrinal ground in the face of internal violence.⁵¹¹ R2P has also been applied to Darfur in 2006 (UNSC resolution 1706⁵¹²) and to Libya in 2011 (UNSC resolution 1970⁵¹³). It is still a much-debated norm in international politics but holds great importance to understand how the UN’s role in internal armed conflicts has evolved over time and what are the limits of its authority in such interventions.

As understood, the deployment of armed forces within Chapter VII can be problematic and not only due to political, legal and illegitimate reasons but also

⁵⁰⁸ Findlay, *The Use of...*, pp.6-9, 356-359.

⁵⁰⁹ For further information on descriptive, legal, operational and military dimensions of R2P see. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, **The Responsibility to Protect Report**, Canada: International Development Research Centre, December 2001, <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf> (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁵¹⁰ For the first reference regarding the subject see. UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1674**, 28.04.2006, S/RES/1674, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1674\(2006\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1674(2006)) (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁵¹¹ Alex J. Bellamy, **Global Politics and The responsibility to Protect: From words to needs**, London: Routledge, 2011, pp.26-29.

⁵¹² UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1706**, 31.08.2006, S/RES/1706, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1706\(2006\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1706(2006)) (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁵¹³ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1970**, 26.02.2011, S/RES/1970, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970\(2011\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011)) (accessed 18.02.2017)

because of financial issues as well. While article 43 of the UN Charter⁵¹⁴ had envisioned the military participation of all members in peace operations through additional agreements, but these were never negotiated and signed, therefore peace operations were realized with the contribution of voluntary states.⁵¹⁵ After the end of the Cold War, the UN became more active through peacekeeping and enforcement operations but there has not been a similar increase in the resources and the increasing expenses put more pressure on a small group of members who kept supporting these missions. Subsequently, limitations on resources and the increasing numbers of interventionist actions in civil wars put forward the idea of collaboration between the UN and other regional organizations⁵¹⁶, which was already mentioned in the Charter under chapter VIII on regulating regional arrangements.⁵¹⁷ The prohibition of the use of force without the authorization of the UNSC remains for regional and sub-regional organizations, but, as the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared in 1992, the UN specifically recognizes them as reliable partners, who are encouraged to join the UN missions and offer support in dealing with crises in their own regions in conformity with the purpose and principles of the United Nations. It is deeply believed that support of regional agencies would lighten the burden of the UN as the main regulator of international security, and would create a profound sense of participation, consensus and democratization in the international community.⁵¹⁸

This collaboration regarding military interventions is called *procedural multilateralism*, which implies the authorization of regional agencies, such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of Eastern

⁵¹⁴ United Nations, **Charter of...**, Article 43.

⁵¹⁵ Oudraat, "The United Nations...", pp.493-497.

⁵¹⁶ Lumsden, "An Uneasy Peace...", p.834.

⁵¹⁷ "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.", United Nations, **Charter of...**, Article 53.

⁵¹⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping", **Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council**, New York: United Nations, 31 January 1992, Chapter VII, Articles 60-65.

Caribbean States (OECS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) etc. by the UNSC to interfere in civil wars.⁵¹⁹ Many regional organizations have been founded during the last 50 years with the purpose of promoting peace and security, democracy, trade and even integration. Amongst several political factors driving states to establish organizations, which can promote regional cooperation, internal and external threats have been important factors.⁵²⁰ While the importance of security and the prominence of collective defense following the Second World War and the Cold War contributed to the creation of these organizations, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent multiplication of threats have made the countries' involvement in peace operations a reality: Regional organizations have been taking part in numerous conflict management missions since their establishment but their role has been significantly expanded in the last 20 years.

The increase of inter-governmental institutions, who take part in the prevention, control and resolution of conflicts is a significant development for pluralist global governance, collective security consciousness and inclusive world order. However, the cooperation of these organizations can sometimes be problematic: First of all, while prior authorization for military actions is necessary, it does not always proceed in correct order. The NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is a good illustration of this problem, because it was perceived legitimate for humanitarian purposes, but remained illegal in relation to the process.⁵²¹ While the international community found NATO's intervention rightful, it cannot always be the case if the UNSC authorization was not provided. Secondly, regional organizations lose impartiality and the absence of a superior moral authority, without the supervision of the UN, to control the advancement of the events can result in unaccountability of the behavior and the conduct of the parties involved.⁵²² This has been experienced in the case of the Economic Community Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the course of action undertaken by the ECOWAS in 1990. While the intervention temporarily stopped the civil war in Liberia, there were many allegations against the ECOWAS for not applying impartiality and allying with the

⁵¹⁹ Kreps, "Multilateral Military...", p.589.

⁵²⁰ Karns, Mingst, **International Organizations...**, pp.145-153.

⁵²¹ Jennifer M. Welsh, **Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp.110-119.

⁵²² Nicholas Sambanis, Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, "Evaluating Multilateral Interventions in Civil Wars: A Comparison of UN and Non-UN Peace Operations", in Dimitris Bourantonis, Kostas Ifantis and Panayotis Tsakonas (eds.), **Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization**, London: Routledge, 2008, pp.252-256.

NSAs, particularly with the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). There were allegations about engaging in lawless activities, such as looting, harassments and unnecessary detentions, insufficiently controlling and investigating human rights abuses; and not showing enough effort to include and promote human rights during peace-talks.⁵²³ Third, the lack of sufficient control of such organizations can be related to lack of resources and technical capabilities of these regional organizations. Relatively low experience on the ground, inadequate training of military personnel, unsatisfactory knowledge of organizational issues compared to the UN can be seen as operational failures.⁵²⁴ Fourth, while even within the UN operations, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement lines can get blurry, regional organization mandates can easily exceed their original, authorized and stipulated limits. This is also interrelated to issues of legality and legitimacy of military action taken by regional agencies, because while these issues are examined within the Charter's out-contracting methods and the applications on the ground, it is rarely discussed whether these organizations are initially entrusted with the power to engage in peace keeping or enforcement activities by their own founding treaties and constitutions.

This is a problematic regarding the Organization of American States (OAS) intervention in the civil war in the Dominican Republic in 1965 through the establishment of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), because when the OAS was founded, there were not any references neither to peacekeeping nor to peace-enforcement activities in its charter. However, this issue is related to the common perception about the role of regional organizations whose legitimacy has been gradually more and more accepted in relation to military interventions.⁵²⁵ From another point of view, there are several advantages in employing regional organizations in their own geographical area. Firstly, they would be able to act faster due to geographic proximity; secondly, their expertise in the region would render them more effective in achieving a kind of resolution of the local conflicts; third, they could represent an alternative to the UN when slow decision-making

⁵²³ Human Rights Watch, "Liberia: Waging War to Keep the Peace ; the ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights", **Africa Watch Report**, Vol.5, No.6, June 1993, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/liberia/> (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁵²⁴ Sambanis, Schulhofer-Wohl, **Evaluating Multilateral...**, p.268.

⁵²⁵ Lumsden, "An Uneasy Peace...", pp.814-818.

mechanisms cause inactivity within the organization⁵²⁶; and finally, their perceived legitimacy and impartiality might be higher than completely foreign troops but this is a very difficult argument to make from a practical point of view, not to mention that it is difficult to quantify impartiality and legitimacy.⁵²⁷

Despite their deficiencies, regional and sub-regional organizations are crucial actors for maintaining peace all over the world. They do not only intervene in their regional conflicts but they also engage in relief efforts in other regions. For example, the EU has been involved in 12 military (6 completed, 6 ongoing) and 21 civilian (11 completed, 10 ongoing) missions around the world since the establishment of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in 2003. The EU missions have been involved in domestic disputes from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Somalia, from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁵²⁸ Thus, interventions of collective security organizations have become frequent and valid policy methods. On the other hand, they are not the only actors who can conduct peace missions besides the UN, as states can also act in *ad hoc* coalitions or unilaterally in carrying out military operations.

b. States and State Coalitions

Multilateralism represents more than a uniform collaboration, it is “*the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions*”⁵²⁹, and thus, while interventions through institutions signify the *procedural multilateralism*, alternatively they can be made through *ad hoc* coalitions and are entitled *operational multilateralism*.⁵³⁰ This kind of coalitions allow diverse issues to be included within a very busy international security agenda; the content of such of such coalitions vary all the time according to the compatibility of issues at stake related to the outcomes of interventions and the interests of states.⁵³¹ In brief, there are multiple intervention methods: (a) The UN

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.832.

⁵²⁷ Sambanis, Schulhofer-Wohl, “Evaluating Multilateral...”, p.269.

⁵²⁸ Arnold Kammer, “From EUPM Bosnia to EUMAM RCA: Snapshot of ongoing and past CSDP missions and operations”, in Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume (eds.), **Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union**, Vienna: Armed Forces Printing Centre, 2015, pp.106-111.

⁵²⁹ Robert Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research ”, **International Journal**, Vol.45, No.731, 1990, p.731.

⁵³⁰ Kreps, “Multilateral Military...”, p.586.

⁵³¹ Karns, Mingst, **International Organizations...**, p.270.

can directly get involved in civil wars; (b) a regional organization can act on behalf of the UNSC (procedural multilateralism); (c) an *ad hoc* coalition can get established in order to intervene in a civil war (operational multilateralism). Additionally, not all interventions are performed with consensual mechanisms and in a multilateral way, therefore, some peace missions can reflect the decision and action of a sole country, such as in the case of France's interventions in Côte d'Ivoire and Mali. If a military intervention is performed by a single state, it is a unilateral intervention.

The multiplication of actors, regionalization and hybridization of peace operations has become a reality in the beginning of 21st century. Amongst the conceptualizations of *ad hoc* coalitions/operational multilateralism, the *minilateralism* approach offers another perspective: This definition is used to describe the “*action of small groups of states that accept compliance with worldwide multilateral principles, but that either on a single occasion or recurrently decide to act independently of worldwide organizations*”⁵³². This classification can be used to make a political distinction between procedural multilateral operations performed through institutional linkages and operational multilateral operations that come with the formation of a political group behaving in a compatible way to their interests and show selectiveness with regards to the application of multilateral principles. Minilateralism, same as unilateralism, can be useful to overcome the slow mechanisms of collective organizations, but it diverges from unilateralism by attaching plural actors and their goals to interventions and creating a legitimate perception through political views compared to unilateral actions.⁵³³

While unilateral interventions are the most discussed ones within the legitimacy framework, reality can be different from theory: Not all peace missions are conducted according to the UN Charter, nor they are always legal or legitimate. Thus, an intervention can take a multilateral or a unilateral form and abide by the rules of the UN or not. In other words, regarding interventions, any kind of actor or groups of actors can act legally and legitimately or violate non-intervention rule.⁵³⁴ If interventionist powers do not get authorization from the UNSC, their obtained

⁵³² Fulvio Attinà, “Global Power competition and the rise of Minilateralism in Peace Operations”, in Fulvio Attinà, Daniela Irrera, **Multilateral Security and ESDP Operations**, New York: Routledge, 2016, p.21.

⁵³³ **Ibid.**

⁵³⁴ David Carment, Joe Landry, Yiagadeesen Samy, “State Failure, Development, and International Security”, in Newman, Rouen Jr., **Routledge Handbook...**, pp.340-341.

consent from a warring country for external support is debatable, their self-defense argument is questionable and their missions go beyond proportionate means, thus their involvement can attract reactions and can create further problems on the battlefield. If the institutional affiliation regarding interventions is an indicator of a legitimate act and even the absence of the UN from the operation can be criticized, interventionist state coalitions or unilateral intervention actions may create much doubt. The principal distinction between multilateral and unilateral interventions lies upon the common share of admissibility of the decision, the financial burden, the responsibility of action, and the accountability of multiple actors for the outcome.⁵³⁵ Thus, participation creates a notion of legitimacy.

Nonetheless, the dilemma between waiting for collective approval and acting against security threats to regional or international stability erodes the application of Chapter VII and broadens its interpretation in practice. Civil conflicts are the major reason behind this expansion by their multi-layered problems as refugee flows or non-state actor's unexpected actions.⁵³⁶ In that regard, many norms, including multilateral action, consent, self-defense, and authorization, lose their actual meaning in the face of the challenging context of civil wars. Under such conditions, it becomes really difficult to assess which military interventions are more legitimate in civil wars. While common opinion supports the idea that "*multilateral interventions are preferable to unilateral actions because the presence of many states acting together as a coherent whole adds a measure of legitimacy to the specter of unwanted foreign military intervention in the affairs of sovereign states*"⁵³⁷, even procedural multilateralism does not render single-handedly an intervention legal, legitimate or multilateral in real sense. A peace operation can be:

- Authorized and led by the UN, with or without the valid consent of the warring country, irrespective of whether it relies on a solid self-defense argument or not, regardless of the fact that the contribution and participation from member states can be high or low;

- Authorized or not authorized by the UN, led by a regional organization, with or without the valid consent of the warring country, irrespective of whether it relies

⁵³⁵ Regan, **Civil Wars...**, pp.110-111.

⁵³⁶ Ruth Wedgwood, "Unilateral Action in the UN System", **European Journal of International Law**, Vol.11, No.2, 2000, p.356.

⁵³⁷ Lumsden, "An Uneasy Peace...", p.834.

on a solid self-defense argument or not and regardless of the fact that the contribution and participation from member states can be high or low;

- Authorized or not authorized by the UN, led by an *ad hoc* coalition, with or without the valid consent of the warring country, irrespective of whether it relies on a solid self-defense argument or not and regardless of the fact that the contribution and participation from various states can be high or low;

- Authorized or not authorized by the UN, with or without the valid consent of the warring country, irrespective of the fact that it relies on a solid self-defense argument or not, even if it is led unilaterally.

Table 8 - Mandate and status type of peace operations

Interventionist Actor	Authorization of the UNSC		Consent		Self-Defense		Institutional Affiliation	Participation	
UN	✓		✓	X	✓	X	✓	✓	X
Regional organizations	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	✓	X
<i>Ad hoc</i> Coalitions	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Unilateral	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	X	X	

Hence, in its narrowest interpretation, legality is obtained through the UNSC authorization, through self-defense and the given consent conditions. The last two are the exceptions of the use of force as the sovereign rights of states and therefore they are out of the UN's reach. But, in a larger sense, legality discussions can be extended to the conditions and context of given consent and self-defense claims. On the other hand, as legality does not directly render legitimacy to military actions, legitimate operations may opt out of legal frameworks. Thereby, legitimacy of peace operations with or without the UNSC authorization should be analyzed on a case by case basis following investigating the position of states within the UN, the validity of the intervention arguments, the reactions from other organizations or the public opinion and outcomes of a probable inaction or action in the eyes of humanitarian intervention and R2P doctrines.⁵³⁸

⁵³⁸ For a deepened debate see. Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, **Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions**, New York: Zone Books, 2010; Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, Rosa Brooks, **Can Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights", **International Affairs**,

Table 9 - The Peace operations mandate and their legality (1947-2008)⁵³⁹

	European	Ad hoc coalitions	African	CALC	American	total	%
UN-led POs	-	-	-	-	-	83	40.5
Security council-authorized POs	10	10	5	-	-	25	12.2
Security council-endorsed or recognized POs	11	7	10	3	1	32	15.6
POs without recognition or explicit endorsement	15	12	9	8	6	50	24.4
POs with mandate/status missing information	10	5	-	-	-	15	7.3
	46	34	24	11	7	205	100.0

Compared to the legality or legitimacy discussions, multilateralism is a more measurable concept and linked to a detailed participation analysis. The firmness of a multilateral action does not equate with institutional affiliation, the UNSC authorization or a crowded operational multilateral action. Various elements as participating country numbers, contribution percentage of countries to coalition troops and finance, and the power symmetry within the coalition should be taken into account. For example, regarding participation numbers and percentages, if a country leads the operation by a tremendous contribution difference compared to its small coalition group, this intervention approaches to the qualities of a unilateral action. Also, if a major power leads minor or middle power countries that have little effect on the intervention policy, it may be perceived as a unilateral action as well. But, if there are major and minor powers within the peace operation, who are linked to warring parties from various angles and their burden sharing draws an equitable

Vol.69, No.3, 1993, pp.429-449; Eve Massingham, "Military intervention for humanitarian purposes: does the Responsibility to Protect doctrine advance the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends?", **International Review of the Red Cross**, Vol.91, No.876, 2009, pp.803-831; Simon Chesterman, "Legality Versus Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council, and the Rule of Law", **Security Dialogue**, 2002, Vol.33, No.3, pp.293-307; Antonio Franceschet, "Kant, International Law, and the Problem of Humanitarian Intervention", **Journal of International Political Theory**, Vol.6, No.1, 2010, pp.1-22; Oscar Schachter, "The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion", **The American Journal of International Law**, Vol.78, No.3, 1984, pp.645-650; Richard Falk, "Legality to Legitimacy", **Harvard International Review**, Vol.26, No.1, 2004, pp.40-44; Janne Haaland Matlary, "The legitimacy of military intervention: How important is a UN mandate?", **Journal of Military Ethics**, Vol.3, No.2, 2004, pp.129-141; Edward Newman, "Review Article - Humanitarian Intervention Legality and Legitimacy", **The International Journal of Human Rights**, Vol.6, No.4, 2002, pp.102-120; Martin Binder, "What explains the UN's selective response to humanitarian crises?", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.52, No.6, 2015, pp.712-726.

⁵³⁹ Six type of actors initiated these peace operations: UN, European (NATO, OSCE, and EU), African (OAU, AU, ECOWAS, and CEMAC), CALC (Commonwealth, ArabLeague, and CIS), American (OAS), and *ad hoc* coalitions; Attinà, "Global Power...", p.31.

picture, then, whether it is under a procedural multilateralism or minilateralism umbrella, it can be accepted as a firm multilateral action.⁵⁴⁰

The strategy of organizing an intervention is not attached to legality and legitimacy concerns, but it is an indicator of the political issues at stake. As interventions are costly policy instruments and legitimacy can become a problematic issue, it is not ideal for states to intervene unilaterally: Yet, they still do. Then, what does influence the states to decide to intervene unilaterally or multilaterally? It is *a priori* accepted that interventions in civil wars are performed with a humanitarian or security rationale and aim at managing conflicts by preventing, dealing with them or ending them. In reality, even though these can be the primary reasons, external actors are motivated by their strategic interests, domestic political reasons, each conflict's *sui generis* dynamics and its impact on the international or regional system. Thus, while they intervene for various reasons, external actors need to consider other actors' perspectives and reactions. In that regard, according to a conflict's nature, the actors' own motivations and the specific characteristics, they choose to cooperate or not. According to Gent, there are three possibilities regarding the political willingness of external actors regarding civil wars: (1) There can be consensus over the ideal policy (*consensus issue*); (2) there may be opposing views on the future behavior regarding the problem (*divisive issues*); (3) or both converging and diverging elements might be linked to the intervention (*intermediate issues*). He suggests that, contrary to expectations, *consensus issues* would not bring joint interventions and they are more probable to result in unilateral actions. Consensus issues are more likely to relate with public interest, for instance ending genocides and in those cases any actor would choose to free ride and let others bear the costs instead of participating in a collective action. Consequently, an intervention, in case that consensus has been reached, would only be possible if one state takes the initiative to intervene and burden the costs.⁵⁴¹ If a regional or global power decides to lead the military intervention, other states can follow the lead and cooperate under the umbrella of an inter-governmental organization. Thus, if the public pressure is high enough not to free ride and one power takes the essential burden, unilateral

⁵⁴⁰ Kreps, "Multilateral Military...", pp.585-597.

⁵⁴¹ Gent, "Strange Bedfellows...", pp.1089-1091.

action can take the form of a multilateral operation,⁵⁴² but it does not necessarily render it a firm multilateral intervention, as participation can be perfunctory.

Concerning *divisive issues*, states would either intervene unilaterally or chose not to intervene depending on the deterring capacity of the opposing side. The choice here lies between the benefit of intervening, not intervening and letting the rival intervene and intervening at the risk of a counter-intervention: In any case, intervention takes a unilateral form. Finally, the pendulum starts to shift to multilateral intervention when there is an *intermediate issue* at stake. First of all, as understood from unilateral intervention preference in divisive issues and free riding and inaction probabilities in consensus issues, the temptation to take part in intervention is stronger when the level of divisiveness increases. Secondly, intervening even in favor of the public good would create an extra sphere of influence to the intervener in the future and may grant extra advantages that can make up for the costs of intervention. In that case, varying policies on the future of a conflict region, diverse strategic interests and the probability of gains may compel actors to join the action and cooperate even though they would rather intervene unilaterally.⁵⁴³ Nobody would like to be left out of game when the intervention creates a new playground. Thus, the fear of granting too much incentive to a sole intervener or facing a detrimental outcome from another actor's intervention may contribute to multilateral interventions.⁵⁴⁴ This approach is very successful in explaining the inaction in cases of high domestic violence or civil wars and many pre-emptive interventions intended to create influence spheres during the Cold War era. It also shows that multilateral action is not correlated with shared values but with differing political interests and this is why states are more concerned with cost-benefit analyses than the legitimacy of their actions.⁵⁴⁵

When the reflection of intervention types after the Cold War is examined, the multiplication of intervening actors and the initialization of non-UN led operations seem to increase substantially. While cumulatively the UN operations still represent the majority of peace operations and have the highest enduring in terms of duration, non- UN operations have caught up in regard of numbers and most of them have been performed in recent years.

⁵⁴² Paul F. Diehl, **Peace Operations**, Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008, p.163.

⁵⁴³ Gent, "Strange Bedfellows...", pp.1093-1096.

⁵⁴⁴ Diehl, **Peace Operations**, p.169.

⁵⁴⁵ Gent, "Strange Bedfellows...", p.1101.

Figure 5 - Distribution of peace operation initializations by numbers per years (1947-2008) ⁵⁴⁶





Figure 6 - Distribution of peace operation initializations by numbers by international organizations and coalitions (1947-2008) ⁵⁴⁷



On the other hand, the most difficult cases to succeed that surpass the capacity of a single country or cumulative strength of a few states are undertaken by the UN, which is also reflected on the UN-led peace operations' duration figures. Thus, while empirical evidence does not provide a clear understanding over this issue, it appears that unilateral interventions are the product of a different cost and benefit calculus focusing on interests and while the UN operations are established after long and inclusive discussions, unilateral or minilateral interventions are characterized by

⁵⁴⁶ Six type of actors initiated these peace operations: UN, European (NATO, OSCE, and EU), African (OAU, AU, ECOWAS, and CEMAC), CALC (Commonwealth, ArabLeague, and CIS), American (OAS), and *ad hoc* coalitions; Attinà, "Global Power...", p.29, 30.

⁵⁴⁷ Six type of actors initiated these peace operations: UN, European (NATO, OSCE, and EU), African (OAU, AU, ECOWAS, and CEMAC), CALC (Commonwealth, ArabLeague, and CIS), American (OAS), and *ad hoc* coalitions; **Ibid.**

easier and more reserved formation processes.⁵⁴⁸ This situation shows the importance of discussing intervention and involvement motivations to understand the process of internationalization of civil wars.

Chapter II – Discussing the Forms of Internationalization: Moving beyond interventions

As interventions construct the basis of internationalizations, third parties engage in more diverse activities during the civil wars of other countries, particularly in the form of involvements. In that regard, including diverse interference methods offers us a richened actor spectrum in which it is possible to find non-state actors such as rebel groups, diasporas and immigrant communities in addition to states and international organizations. Moreover, all these actors engage in relational networks between themselves, which create a complex mechanism regarding the internationalization forms of civil wars. Thus, in order to reveal these internationalization patterns, which will be presented in the second section of this chapter under the frameworks of inward and outward internationalizations, primarily involvements and their actors will be studied in the following section. Then, interventions and involvements will be integrated to each other in a more comprehensive understanding, in which actors, their motivations, methods will be embodied together.

Section I - Non-State Actors and International Involvements in Civil Wars

Intervention is a prominent way of internationalization of civil wars; yet, it is not the primary method at all. As discussed in the previous sections, *new war discussions* are related to the changes in the image of war: Even though the nature of war has not changed, its understated and unheeded features became more relevant and significant in the post-Cold War period and one of the most essential pieces of this puzzle is *rebel groups*.⁵⁴⁹ In that regard, the examination of non-state actors regarding civil wars does not suit orthodox internationalization discussions focusing on state actors' behaviors and this is why the intervention and involvement

⁵⁴⁸ Patrick M. Regan, "Interventions into Civil Wars: A Retrospective Survey with Prospective Ideas", **Civil Wars**, Vol.12, No.4, 2010, p.473.

⁵⁴⁹ The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva Call, "Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends & Future Challenges", **DCAF Horizon 2015 Working Paper**, Geneva, No.5, 2015, pp.6-7.

distinction is necessary. Furthermore, non-state actors cannot be thought as independent organisms. They heavily rely on other individual actors such as recruited fighters, immigrant communities and diasporas for their compositions and activities. In that regard, while we'll be searching for the relations between rebel groups with states, their connections with other actor groups will be examined to show how they interact within civil war environments.

a. Rebel groups as primary non-state actors of civil wars

While not all non-state actors resort to violence or can be labeled as warring agents, internal conflicts are characterized by a high amount of belligerent rebel actors who can be defined as *“organized groups with a basic structure of command operating outside state control that uses force to achieve its political or allegedly political objectives”*. Despite the fact that rebel groups are not a new phenomenon; they are the most vital players behind the internationalization of civil wars. Recent developments in the mobility of people, commodities, resources, identities and ideas have contributed to the bloom of non-state groups, who build their operations upon transnational and global strategies, networks, territories and funds.⁵⁵⁰ Thus, while civil wars signify internal struggles, even without interventions, there is nothing domestic about them. Rebel groups are rarely local agents, according to empirical results since 1945, 55% of these groups have been involved in extraterritorial operations besides their target states, thus contrary to their territorially constrained state opponents, rebel groups are transnational entities, who operate beyond national borders.⁵⁵¹

In the essence of civil wars, rebel groups may demand territory or claim for governmental takeover, rely on grievances or opportunities based on ethno-cultural, political, demographic or economic causes or use violence as a bargaining tool to achieve their goals.⁵⁵² In this context, non-state actors have many diverging and converging traits; their goals, capacity to control territory, access to resources, formation of identities, warfare types, recruitment strategies and relations with the civilian population may differ widely,⁵⁵³ but their key feature is always the same,

⁵⁵⁰ Fiona B. Adamson, “Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and Networks of Violence”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol.18, No.1, 2005, pp.31-32.

⁵⁵¹ Idean Salehyan, *Rebels without...*, pp.4-6.

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*, p.19.

⁵⁵³ DCAF, “Armed Non-State...”, p.8.

which is to violently challenge governments to accomplish their objectives. While rebel groups emerge due to grievances or greedy motivations, in any case, feasibility of civil wars is related to the resources in hand. In order to be able to organize a war, belligerent groups should be able to become a viable threat by possessing arms, recruiting soldiers, assuring control over at least a part of national territory.⁵⁵⁴ During the Cold War this was the involvement characteristic of the USA and USSR, who financed and promoted counter groups, but the dissolution of USSR put an end to this influence competition and rebel groups were forced to find new domains for survival. Many rebellious groups operate in diverse environments depending their potentials: The strength of the opposed government, the existence of rough terrain or access to natural resources may affect the rebel group's capacity. If resources cannot be provided or state repression is too strong, rebels might need to flee to other countries in order to promote their operations. While the lack of indispensable supplies forces rebels to seek for external support, the facilitation of mobilization and interaction by uprising technical communication and the logistical methods encourages rebels to spread in other regions.⁵⁵⁵ This shows that as much as domestic factors produce rebel groups, external conditions also contribute to this process.

In this regard, rebel groups interact with five major agents: States, diasporas, refugee networks, other rebel groups and individuals. Amongst states, concerning both intervention⁵⁵⁶ and involvements, neighbors are the primary compradors of rebel groups.⁵⁵⁷ Their support can take the form of access to territory, access to military or intelligence infrastructure, procurement of weapons, materiel, logistics, training/expertise, economic support or intelligence material.⁵⁵⁸ Funding an armed group or providing material is a frequent foreign policy method and also a valid income source for violent opposition groups. If they are unable to reach such support and are deprived of diamond extracting or taxing civilian population, it is common that they engage in illegal activities, such as drug trade, human trafficking, scamming NGOs or searching for external funds.⁵⁵⁹ Yet, funding a rebel group is

⁵⁵⁴ David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, "Non-state actors in civil wars: A new dataset", **Conflict Management and Peace Science**, Vol.30, No.5, 2013, pp.522-524.

⁵⁵⁵ Adamson, "Globalisation, Transnational...", pp.33-35.

⁵⁵⁶ Regan, "Interventions into...", p.476.

⁵⁵⁷ Eriksson, Wallenstein, "Armed Conflict...", p.629.

⁵⁵⁸ Stina Högladh, Therése Pettersson, Lotta Themnér, "External Support in Armed Conflict 1975-2009: Presenting New Data", **Unpublished manuscript presented at the International Studies Association Convention**, Montreal, 2011, p.8.

⁵⁵⁹ Adamson, "Globalisation, Transnational...", pp.43-44.

more common for distant external actors, who are more limited in their involvement than neighbors who have a wide range of opportunities to offer. The aid of neighbors, on the other hand, would be more efficient in regard to obtain intelligence and materials or access to training and logistics. Neighbors can even distribute external funding to rebel groups and form a bridge for the rebel organizations with the external world.⁵⁶⁰ Thus, amongst these aid methods, sanctuaries are maybe the most crucial aid for rebel groups because neighbors can help in increasing the radius of action in an internal war.

Providing sanctuaries to rebel groups would enable them to grow and develop. Gaining a sanctuary would create a space away from the scrutiny of the state due to its dependence on territorial limits⁵⁶¹ and this would have several implications for both belligerent parties.

First, states would have many challenges to fight back with rebel groups who are hosted in other countries because organizing counter operations in the rebel group's hiding territories would be difficult in regard to sovereignty of the host state. Following a rebel group into another state's territory would violate its sovereignty and raise the risk of engaging in an inter-state war.⁵⁶² Second, entering and pursuing a rebel group in another soil would not be very feasible for a government due to its lack of knowledge of the physical traits of the territory and the population of the area.⁵⁶³ Third, even though the hot-pursuit strategy is not abandoned, target government would not be able to monitor rebel group, get reliable intelligence for its activities and learn about their relative strength. This would complicate peace negotiations due to trust issues: The government would never be able to completely confirm the disarmament of a rebel group in case of a treaty because the rebel group might deceive the state about its actions; for instance, it can either destroy or hide its military materials.⁵⁶⁴ Even though a sanctuary away from the security forces and repressive capacities of the state would lower the costs of fighting and shift the

⁵⁶⁰ Avraham Sela and Robert A. Fitchette, "State, Society and Transnational Networks: The Arab volunteers in the Afghan War", in Dan Miodownik, Oren Barak (eds.), **National and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century : Nonstate Actors in Intrastate Conflicts**, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, pp.67-68.

⁵⁶¹ Scott Gates, "Recruitment and Allegiance: The Micro foundations Of Rebellion", **Journal Of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.46, No.1, 2002, p.126.

⁵⁶² Salehyan, **Rebels without...**, pp.38-39.

⁵⁶³ Idean Salehyan, "Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States As Sanctuary For Rebel Groups", **World Politics**, Vol.50, No.2, 2007, p.223.

⁵⁶⁴ Salehyan, "Transnational Rebels...", p.227.

balance to the advantage of rebels by providing a vicinity to attack the opponent and flee to rally to a more secure training area, a larger mobilization zone, a bigger population to recruit and wider opportunities to obtain supplies; it may also submit unwanted outcomes.

First, the intelligence networks of rebel groups are not as sophisticated as states, thus a base away from conflict region might cause alienation from war zone, which would lower the adaptation capacities of the rebel group with the changing circumstances. Secondly, the local population of the host state might accuse rebel groups of causing security problems and pull them into new conflicts in their sanctuaries. Third, the support of an external power would cause a political dependency for the rebel group, which would ultimately influence their demands and goals.⁵⁶⁵

The transnationalization of a rebel group is strongly related to the support coming from another state. The need and motivation to territorially expand is comprehensible for a rebel actor but the host state's motivations to provide this opportunity are more open to discussion.

Firstly, it is common that foreign governments intervene or provide support for ethnic relations. If there is an ethnic kin residing in more than one states, a foreign government may have the intention of annexing this neighboring region or just want to protect these populations whose existence is threatened by other government. In that case, it is expected to see an increase in the soldier recruitment of the rebel group, because civilian relatives could associate themselves with the objectives of that group.

Secondly, hostility between neighbors can lead states to support rebel groups in order to fuel internal problems of their rival. Rivalry represents a competitive relationship, formed through past reciprocal foreign affair experiences and established upon hostility with the priority of harming the contender rather than benefiting for self.⁵⁶⁶ It can particularly enhance an involvement in case of a regional competition for influence, a protracted dispute or an older, prolonged rivalry. In that

⁵⁶⁵ Salehyan, **Rebels without...**, p.10, 37.

⁵⁶⁶ John A. Vasquez, "Factors Related to the Contagion and Diffusion of International Violence" in Midlarsky, **The Internationalization of...**, pp.152-155.

context, the rival state would engage in the necessary activities to destabilize their opponent.⁵⁶⁷

Third, internally weak and non-democratic regimes (anocracies), inconsistent and instable political settings and mountainous terrain provide opportunities for rebel groups to emerge⁵⁶⁸ by not creating democratic channels to treat grievances, using oppressive methods against political and social demands, dissatisfying economic and social expectations and not being able to maintain full superiority against armed groups.⁵⁶⁹ These conditions can be extended to weak neighbors because they lack the skills and resources to militarily banish rebel groups, monitor and prevent their emplacement. The weakness of the state would cause non-resistance to the rebel group activities and offer a blossoming environment for rebel groups. Moreover, the rebel hosting state might not only tolerate the illegal settlements of a group in its territory but also explicitly assist and aid the rebel group due to its hostile relationship with the warring state. Hence, rivalry between these states would get deeper due to the manipulation of rebel groups in the name of political competition.⁵⁷⁰

Under these circumstances, involvement of governments in a civil war would still represent a big risk. Because rebel groups may enlarge their activities and objectives due their relative strengths and that would cause the host government to face a well-trained, armed, radical and stateless aggressive groups, which have influence, knowledge and social ties within their own territories.⁵⁷¹ Moreover, even though a rebel group does not expand its ideological scope against its supporters, any cutback in the support provided by a state would probably cause hostility because the rebel group would try to maintain that support and stability by resisting any change in the status quo.

In addition to this multi-layered interaction between states and non-state actors, rebel groups are not constrained to cooperate with states. They can also seek allies amongst other transnational non-state actors, who may create a shift in their relative power. Their association can be based on ethnic or ideological ties between domestic

⁵⁶⁷ Salehyan, **Rebels without...**, p.25, 49.

⁵⁶⁸ Sidney Tarrow, "Inside Insurgencies: Politics and Violence in an Age of Civil War", **Perspectives on Politics**, Vol.5, No.3, 2007, p.589.

⁵⁶⁹ Adamson, "Globalisation, Transnational...", pp.43-44.

⁵⁷⁰ Salehyan, "Transnational Rebels...", p.225.

⁵⁷¹ Sela, Fitchette, "State, Society...", p.79.

and foreign groups or basically they can manipulate such similarities to attract external rebel groups. The quest for involving foreign rebel groups is more desired when rebel group is relatively weak against the state actor. Thus, the need for additional resources, such as new fighters, arms, intelligence, funds and expertise, would push a warring rebel group to coalesce with transnational rebel groups.⁵⁷² The decision to ally with other rebel groups can be related to the identity of groups, solidarity characteristics, elite decisions, resources and strategies. Mainly, at the beginning of civil disputes rebel groups are more disadvantaged than states due to their newly established capacities and thus they can seek for internal or external alliances that could improve their chance for victory.⁵⁷³ On the other hand, this decision can be affected by external actors, particularly their decision to intervene, which could easily influence power asymmetries or the perceptions of groups about their relative capacities.

As explained in the previous sections, this intervention can be a biased one against state, for rebels, against rebels or for state. It can also be a neutral intervention, more focused on freezing the war on the ground instead of shifting power balances. Therefore, in case of an intervention, seeking to ally with other rebel groups would arise if intervention causes substantial power asymmetries, it creates a common cause to fight against and/or necessitates new power assumptions.⁵⁷⁴

Moreover, the interaction between foreign rebel groups would not only alter the capacity and probability of the victory, it could also change the rebel group's goals, identity and forms of violence. If a foreign rebel group is successful, has a charismatic leader and provides new channels for gaining additional support and resources, both the identity and goals of the other group may transform over time. A nationalist group may become more religious or a religious group may import ideological references, thus characteristics and motivational backgrounds can transform according to the strength of the newly established ties. The same outcome can be observed in their violence tactics: External rebel groups can introduce new kinds of military material or fighting forms as suicide bombings or kidnappings.⁵⁷⁵ However, these partners can become rivals in time, particularly if domestic

⁵⁷² Bakke, "Copying and learning...", pp.33-35.

⁵⁷³ Akcinaroglu, "Rebel Interdependencies...", pp.881-882.

⁵⁷⁴ Marie Olson Lounsbury, "Foreign Military Intervention, Power Dynamics, and Rebel Group Cohesion", *Journal of Global Security Studies*, Vol.1, No.2, pp.137-139.

⁵⁷⁵ Bakke, "Copying and learning...", pp.35-41.

resources, such as drugs or diamonds, become part of a competition, one group becomes weaker or stronger compared to others and the field of conflict cannot be controlled by the government.⁵⁷⁶ Thus, same as other alliances, rebel group interactions bear considerable risks for their coherence.

b. Foreign recruitment, immigrants and diasporas

Rebel groups can establish allegiances with very diverse actors. Starting from the beginning, the establishment of a rebel group already involves transnational relations and benefits from previously existing and newly emerging transnational networks even without creating new bonds and affiliating with various actors at individual level. Foreign recruitment and the spread of a rebel group's ideologies through propaganda to the local populations and international community are the results of these communication technologies. In our days, information is no longer limited to molding national broadcasts, as global television channels, media outlets, social media networks and countless other devices connected to the internet are available to anybody, independently of where they live, how old they are or what kind of ideas they have. This virtual community has the means to travel easily, which creates a physical linkage with this cyber diffusion of ideas. Advanced means of globalization allows non-state actors to extend and function transnationally from their inception.⁵⁷⁷

Joining a rebel group and fighting in a battlefield is a life and death decision, thus recruitment strategies should be effective. Domestically, regardless of the nature of rebellious group (loot-seeking, ideological, ethnic, secessionist, governmental...) enforcement is the primary strategy to recruit soldiers. Threats, harsh punishments and executions are both common and effective for recruiting soldiers.⁵⁷⁸ Yet, regarding foreign recruitment, enforcement is both impossible and impractical. In this respect, it is suggested that greed based/opportunistic reasons attract foreigners to join rebel movements; however, *“data from diverse cases indicate that recruiters typically explicitly inform volunteers prior to their enlistment that their services will bring minimal, nonguaranteed payments, often in a nonconvertible currency. Even when large land grants were offered as direct payment for paramilitary service,*

⁵⁷⁶ Hanne Fjelde, Desiree Nilsson, “Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel Groups”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.56, No.4, 2012, p.622.

⁵⁷⁷ Adamson, “Globalisation, Transnational...”, pp.36-37.

⁵⁷⁸ Scott Gates, “Recruitment and Allegiance...”, p.116.

*large numbers of victorious foreign fighters have left conflict zones without claiming their bounty”.*⁵⁷⁹

Also, even though rebel movements become successful and new governments offer financial initiatives for fighters as in the case of Israel, it is found that more than 90% of foreign volunteers leave when the war is over. Thus, opportunistic behavior is more capable of explaining the motivations of domestic fighters rather than external ones.⁵⁸⁰ Amongst different recruitment patterns that extremist groups use, it is possible to outline the impact of already existing networks, personal connections and familial ties to attract participation⁵⁸¹, which is discussed in detail while examining the issues of immigrants and diasporas. On the other hand, how these rebel groups can manage to recruit complete strangers living at the other part of the world, away from the conflict zones is a big question. Even with the help of communication technologies, they should apply sophisticated methods so that people would believe, support and join their causes.

According to a constructivist point of view, identities are socially constructed through social interactions, which form people's values, beliefs and personalities. The key strategy behind the recruitment process lies beneath this approach: Ethnic, national or religious identities are compatible with different affiliations; thus, crosscuts between different beliefs can be manipulated and identities can be re-engineered.⁵⁸² In that context, *a priori* social structures have bigger effect on individual choices rather than personal opinions and foreign recruitment does not rely on salient identities, but their components. If people have strong connections with their communities, their weaker identities gain significance and they start to define themselves with the subgroups in societies where they feel most fitted, rather than outside of them.

At this point, rebel recruiters concentrate on two approaches: First, propaganda messages are shaped with larger meanings and sentiments, which exceed local issues and can be relatable in a more global sense. This framing technique helps people in the outer world to identify themselves with a given cause through a sense of justice,

⁵⁷⁹ David Malet, “Framing to win: The Transnational Recruitment of Foreign Soldiers”, in Miodownik, Barak, **National and Ethnic...**, p.37.

⁵⁸⁰ **Ibid.**

⁵⁸¹ Adamson, “Globalisation, Transnational...”, p.35.

⁵⁸² Neal G. Jesse, Kristen P. Williams, **Identities and Institutions: Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies**, Albany: State University of New York (SUNY) Press, 2005, p.8.

victimization or inequality so that they can take sides, perceive the matter as a global problem and form stronger bonds in time. This idea and shift in claims provides sympathy allowing to bridge consistent but irrelevant ideas, attach to new groups, who feel involved through the notion of common interest. Following this step, in order to turn sympathy into mobilization, recruiters try to persuade their connections to believe that inactivity will cause even greater losses and suffering, that fighting under tough conditions for their cause is a chivalry and selfless action, and their actions are crucial to preclude bigger tragedies, which would have global outcomes impacting larger groups of the population instead of just local ones.

In this way, recruiters manage to interconnect a domestic problem to a global range.⁵⁸³ Under these circumstances, appealing foreign individuals with non-pecuniary rewards becomes a much more effective method to recruit and expand beyond borders.⁵⁸⁴

Although transborder recruitment is a significant aspect for internationalization of civil wars, foreign recruitment, mobilization of fighters and funds are much more common through immigrant and diaspora networks. Immigrants have become one of the most crucial subjects of internal armed conflicts, because civil wars are refugee manufacturers: In 2013, there were cumulatively 232 million people as international migrants (3.2 % of world population) and in 1990 it was almost the half with 154.2 million (2.9 % of world population)⁵⁸⁵. Civil wars are the major reason behind this problem, because, according to the UN Convention (1951), refugee is someone *“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”*.⁵⁸⁶ This requires more than mere economic reasons to leave than those that can be created under war

⁵⁸³ Malet, “Framing to win...”, pp.40-44.

⁵⁸⁴ Gates, “Recruitment and Allegiance...”, p.127.

⁵⁸⁵ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “World Migration in Figures”, **the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development**, 3-4 October 2013, pp.1-2, <https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf> (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁵⁸⁶ United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, “Convention And Protocol Relating To The Status Of Refugees”, **United Nations**, 28 July 1951, Geneva, 189 UNTS 137, Article 1 A (2), <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10> (accessed 18.02.2017)

conditions. What makes refugees more than the outcomes of a civil war is their potential to become future fighters: These people leave their lives behind, take shelter in refugee camps, which mostly operate under very difficult conditions, thus their grievance and the fact that they do not have much to lose increase the probability of them turning into warriors.⁵⁸⁷ Moreover, even though refugees may only flee internationally to avoid further violence, refugee camps offer sanctuaries away from governmental pressure, where operations can be led, more fighters can be recruited and new resources can be supplied. Thus, keeping in mind that it is extremely difficult to separate civilians from rebel fighters, refugee camps can turn into exchange nests of fighters, arms and ideologies.⁵⁸⁸

While *refugee warriors* have become a reality, the establishment of refugee camps and the acceptance of refugees are much more fragile subjects to be labeled by prejudices. In this context, three issues should be clearly discussed: First, the origin of refugees, secondly the host states' behavior, and finally how to trace refugee manipulation. Regarding the refugees and in the name of not equating all forced migrants as fighters, it is important to define their characteristics. According to Lischer, it is possible to define three refugee types, namely situational, persecuted and state-in-exile refugees.

The first category of people run away from chaos and violence and are willing to return home if peace and stability can be assured. Due to their political neutrality, they are unlikely to be recruited as new fighters. The second category consists more of political migrants, who leave their country as they are being directly targeted for their race, religion or ideologies. Thus, the outcome of the war, as opposed to the situational refugees, who seek for peace regardless of the outcome, is more important to persecuted refugees: They pursue a political change and might be willing to join rebel forces for the sake of change or because of their social grievance. The third category signifies defeated rebel leaders, who are willing to control the refugee populations outside the borders in order to legitimize, organize, sponsor and support themselves. They tend to use refugee camps or other humanitarian assistance as a point of reference, gather strength abroad, exploit other refugees in both material and non-material ways and not return home until their own victory. They also present a

⁵⁸⁷ Salehyan, **Rebels without...**, pp.40-41.

⁵⁸⁸ Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War", **International Organization**, Vol.60, No.2, 2006, pp.341-342.

threat to their host countries due to their aggressive nature and organizational aims.⁵⁸⁹ This distinction is important in order to be able to understand and manage refugee crises instead of labeling all migrants as perpetrators of war or as innocent victims.

Secondly, as much as the origin of refugees, the policy of the host state in regard to refugees is an important indicator for the marginalization of migrant groups. There are two main factors in this context: willingness and capacity. The willingness of the host state also shows the side of the host state: It can choose not to get involved in the ongoing war, take action on the basis of their own security perceptions or try to influence the recourse of events in the warring country. In the first scenario, we can expect a more neutral approach towards refugees. For the last two, the host state may choose to provide material or other kind of support in order to either consolidate their own security by controlling the refugee populations or manipulate the power balance in the warring country to gain some future advantages.⁵⁹⁰ Regarding the host states' capacity, the state may not have enough power to control and guarantee security, law and order in refugee populated areas or camps⁵⁹¹ and, as we have discussed before, weak states stand for natural sanctuaries and operational bases for rebel groups, particularly in neighboring territories.

Finally, as for the manipulation of refugees in conflict relieving zones, in addition to interest seeking host states and rebel leaders, both major and middle powers can also take advantage of refugee groups by providing rebel leaders with access to military material or funds for trading profits, national interests, ethnic affinities or ideological reasons, which in any case would lead to more involvement of refugees and marginalization of the situation in the battle ground.⁵⁹² Moreover, this complexity in refugee camps and conflict zones would complicate the work of international institutions, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner/UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), NGOs or other voluntary relief organizations, who would eventually find themselves between the choices of

⁵⁸⁹ Sarah Kenyon Lischer, **Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid**, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006, pp.19-25.

⁵⁹⁰ Stephan John Stedman, "Conclusions and Policy Recommendations", in Stephen John Stedman, Fred Tanner (eds.) **Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering**, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, p.173.

⁵⁹¹ Stephen John Stedman, Fred Tanner "Refugees as Resources in War", in Stedman, Tanner, **Refugee Manipulation...**, p.9.

⁵⁹² Stedman, "Conclusions and...", p.174.

willingly or unwillingly contributing to the situation on the ground in order to be able to assist real victims. The dilemma that these organizations would face would range from providing food or medical care to combatants to taking care of warring unit's families, from supporting a war economy by allowing rebel leaders take over the distribution process of all humanitarian aid to legitimizing camp exploiting rebel groups' image in the fund-raising global communities' eyes, from sustaining sanctuaries to rebel groups to gaining time for military and political counter-strategies...⁵⁹³ Manipulation of actors range from refugees to NGOs, and the even more brutal fact is that forced migration, internal and external displacement and ethnic cleansing are used as preplanned strategies, organized by violent perpetrators who are well-conscious of their actions and all these complexities.⁵⁹⁴

Either through international migration or externally recruited fighters, it is obvious that warring countries' politically, militarily and culturally concerned societies do not only reside in those states' territories.⁵⁹⁵ Transnational communities, which transcend national borders benefit from unrestricted political domains and operationalize with more freedom.⁵⁹⁶ Diaspora networks, which globally mobilize multifaceted dynamics and manage to combine violent and non-violent complex strategies, in order to create a political change in their home states, are amongst these most striking conducts by transnational actors.⁵⁹⁷ Various diasporas get involved directly and indirectly with civil wars in their home countries. While all these interconnected communities reside abroad, they represent heterogeneous agents, who may rally around different affinities, such as history, culture, religion, nationality or ethnicity, they may have diverse density levels of linkages to their groups and hold distinct goals regarding their objectives.⁵⁹⁸

The reasons that diasporas appeal their communities can range widely: They can include people who are expelled from their home countries due to their ethnicity, they may be built upon people who support territorial separation or full independence in their homelands, they can involve people who have suffered cultural, economic,

⁵⁹³ Lischer, **Dangerous Sanctuaries...**, pp.6-8.

⁵⁹⁴ Idean Salehyan, "Forced Migration as a Cause and Consequence of Civil War", in Newman, Rouen Jr., **Routledge Handbook...**, p.271.

⁵⁹⁵ Idean Salehyan, "Transnational Rebels...", p.224.

⁵⁹⁶ Sarah Wayland, "Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora", **Review of International Studies**, Vol.30, No.3, 2004, pp.406-409.

⁵⁹⁷ Adamson, "Globalisation, Transnational...", p.37.

⁵⁹⁸ Hazel Smith, "Diasporas in International Conflict", in Paul Stares, **Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers?**, Tokyo: United Nations University (UNU) Press, 2007, p.5.

socio-politic discriminations or deprivations or their members may be facing legal persecutions in their home states. In either case, they form a sort of interaction between grieving individuals, homelands and host countries. As the number of migrants around the world rise, their numbers and effectiveness keep up with this increase. They might organize both negative and positive actions depending on their political goals and participate in pacifist or aggressive activities to resolve their home countries' internal armed conflicts.⁵⁹⁹

While diasporas are known for providing financial, material support and manpower to rebel movements, their political impact is not limited to their illegal bonds with the warring parties. They can act as brokers between their homelands and host states regarding bi-political relations, gather diaspora members' opinions and interests promote policies around the same purposes by mobilizing them through kinship, guilt, or social obligations, strengthen their cultural traits abroad defying any group delinking or assimilation, involve in domestically forbidden activities through lobbying, create political parties and work on legitimizing the rebel group causes, engage in legal and pacifist activities such as filming documentaries and organizing demonstrations to gain sympathy and be able to shape the political approaches of the foreign countries in relation to ongoing wars and conflicts.⁶⁰⁰ Thus, with multi-layered activities of diasporas an awareness of their political situations is created and they become powerful actors who rely on communal feelings, identity emotions and historical commonness.

Although they perform a long-distant involvement, they have strong bonds with all those left behind and they hang on to these original sentiments to keep their identities alive.⁶⁰¹ The problem with this strategy is their fragility, which can be exploited and manipulated by rebellious movements to maintain financial support for conflict making. Countless diasporas have become a disguise for their violent branches and work as agents for material and financial support: Hamas in Palestine, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and Al-Qaeda (through various Islamic diasporas) are some well-known examples of this kind of an organization. Most criminal groups benefit from traveling facilities,

⁵⁹⁹ Gabriel Scheffer, "A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Roles of Diasporas" in Miodownik, Barak, **National and Ethnic...**, pp.94-96.

⁶⁰⁰ Fiona B. Adamson, "Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War", Checkel, **Transnational Dynamics...**, pp.68-78.

⁶⁰¹ Smith, "Diasporas in...", p.36.

untraced information flows, political assistance and disguise, social and enlistment supports. In some cases, diaspora networks cooperate with rebel groups for illegal trading or money laundering activities. Unfortunately, similarly to the case of migrants, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between negative and positive diaspora organisms.⁶⁰² While most diasporas engage in purely political, social and cultural activities, there are also ones that pretend to be the innocent displays of rebellious organizations.

On the other hand, regarding aggressive diaspora networks, their contribution to war maintenance is widely proven. For example, Tamil Tigers are estimated to have received 80 million dollar funds a year during the Sri Lankan Civil War, which was mainly used to buy military material.⁶⁰³ Most of the money was coming from countries, such as Canada, India, Australia, Switzerland, where both fundraisers used sophisticated methods to gather money from volunteers or workers who were socially repressed to donate a certain percentage of their income each month.⁶⁰⁴ Global funds do not only affect the course of the war, but also add elements to it. International money, not depending on local populations, renders violent behaviors of warring parties regardless of domestic demands and raises the insistency of high or impracticable requests while decreasing the chances of having a negotiated settlement. Thus, it is possible to expect the continuation of the war until a specific governmental victory or the full acceptance of the rebellious groups' political terms.⁶⁰⁵

Section II - Internationalization forms, motivations and effects: Linking the explanatory methods and discussing their impacts

Internationalization of a civil war is a multidimensional and complex process, which can include various actors and reasons that change according to the traits of (1) an ongoing civil war; (2) the warring country; (3) the intervening actors; (4) bilateral relations between warring and intervening agents; (5) multiple interactions between intervening or involved actors; (6) the altering warring actors and their aims

⁶⁰² Scheffer, "A Conceptual...", Miodownik, Barak, **National and Ethnic...**, pp.99-101.

⁶⁰³ Sarah Wayland, "Ethnonationalist Networks...", pp.421-422.

⁶⁰⁴ Kyle Beardsley, Brian McQuinn, "Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations: The Political Effects of the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.53 No.4, 2009, p.633.

⁶⁰⁵ Zlatko Skrbis, "The mobilized Croatian diaspora: Its role in homeland politics and war", in Stares, **Diasporas in Conflict...**, p.235.

during the war; and (7) other regional and international aspects of the war. This variation may lead to the assumption that interventions in civil wars are *sui generis*, due to their differing motivations and strategies.⁶⁰⁶ While this is not an incongruous conclusion and shows the importance of case studying when it comes to such a multifaceted subject, it is still possible to identify common motivations and strategies through background information, formations, applications and the impact of involvements or interventions. Regarding our study, varying ideas on motivations of interventions/involvements are acknowledged because interventions are multi-purposed foreign tools, which represent the choice to use force amongst others. As a tool of policy and a choice, intervention is never a random decision. In each case, there is a clear motivation, which shows analogous patterns with other interventions.⁶⁰⁷ In addition to this, involvements in civil wars are vital both as causes and consequences of the internationalization of civil wars. In the end, to find the convergence and divergence between motivations, involvements and interventions, case studies are necessary, thus the cases of Afghanistan, DRC and Iraq will be used in the next sections, in order to be able to see different interventionist reasons presented herein below.

Before starting to model inward interventions in civil wars, which explain the intervention/involvement of an external actor into a civil war by choice and not due to pull factors, there are two research-related notes to be taken. First, most of the literature focuses on how civil wars can cause inter-state wars and take the internationalization of a conflict as the transformation into an international or regional war. On the other hand, as we have seen in the first section after the investigation of various datasets, the internationalization of an internal armed conflict is a rather blurred concept that can be substituted with inter-state or extra-state wars. Also, after the Cold War, there has been a great decline in inter-state war numbers and an opposite trend in internationalization of civil wars. This can be explained through the preference and the strategy of states regarding their war-making methods. Traditional inter-state war reasoning has been replaced by intra-state involvements and interventions, which allow rival states avoid direct hostilities

⁶⁰⁶ David Carment, Dane Rowlands, "Three's Company: Evaluating Third Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.42, No.5, 1998, p.574.

⁶⁰⁷ Martha Finnmore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing beliefs about the use of force*, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp.3-6.

and still have the opportunity to challenge an opponent through *proxy wars*^{608, 609}. In this regard, while assessing the internationalization motivations and aims of civil wars, there are many traits borrowed and adopted from international conflict approaches, which hold very similar calculi and parameters. Secondly, the relevant literature is mostly preoccupied by the internationalization of ethnic conflicts, but almost all internal wars demonstrate socio-cultural, ethnic and religious aspects. Moreover, in most cases ethnicity is a façade for non-ethnic factors, such as economy and politics because ethnicity or religion is not a sufficient reason to rebel and use force. Thus, as all types of civil wars (governmental or secessionist) may include ethnic causes, ethnic civil wars may include non-ethnic reasons. The combination of various factors, such as human rights, income distribution and group exclusion, play a crucial role in all civil wars.⁶¹⁰ In this regard, approaches developed for the internationalization of ethnic civil wars are engrafted within our modeling of internationalization of civil wars as well.

a. Inward interventions and involvements: Internationalizing civil wars

As mentioned in the previous sections, the main objective of a third-party intervention is to end the fighting, because, even though external actors have other intentions behind their policy choices, without ending the violence, none of them can be attainable. To this end, a third party may intervene in favor of a group to punish one of the sides or out of its empathy or support for another, it can intervene in an unbiased manner to halt the violence or can simply aim at establishing order in a region where a chaotic environment reigns and no control exists. In each case, the

⁶⁰⁸ Proxy wars represent “*conflicts in which a third party intervenes indirectly in order to influence the strategic outcome in favor of its preferred faction (...) They are the product of a relationship between a benefactor, who is a state or non-state actor external to the dynamic of an existing conflict, and the chosen proxies who are the conduit for the benefactor’s weapons, training and funding. In short, proxy wars are the logical replacement for states seeking to further their own strategic goals yet at the same time avoid engaging in direct, costly and bloody warfare (...) Proxy wars are not merely regional wars that seemingly mirror broader ideological struggles perpetrated by influential superpowers. Neither are they exercises in direct military intervention by third parties; nor do they necessarily constitute a form of ‘covert action’ simply because the third party’s armed forces and special forces are not deployed. Certainly, proxy wars may well be conducted covertly, but the definition here of ‘proxy warfare’ still rests on an underlying premise of indirect engagement, with State A hiring proxies in State B to conduct ‘subversive operations’ on its behalf.*”, in Andrew Mumford, “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict”, **The RUSI Journal**, Vol.158, No.2, 2013, p.40.

⁶⁰⁹ Idean Salehyan, “No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict”, **The Journal of Politics**, Vol.70, No.1, 2008, p.54 .

⁶¹⁰ David Carment, Patrick James, Zeynep Taydas, “The Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict: State, Society, and Synthesis”, **International Studies Review**, Vol.11, No.1, 2009, p.65.

intervener prefers to get involved in an ongoing conflict and uses the intervention firstly to end the war and afterwards to secure its aims.⁶¹¹ This proposition is also coherent with the influence theory of Regan about interventions, according to which third parties intervene to obtain their preferred outcomes.⁶¹² However, similarly to rebellious groups, state actors can directly or indirectly profit from prolonged war conditions and prefer the state of war than the peace.

This reality can be read through both involvements and interventions of actors, which necessitates a detailed investigation of the motivations of all interfering actors. Until now, we have explored the coalescing conditions of these interventions, their judicial aspects and practical provisions. But since internal conflicts gradually become internationalized by various actors who get involved by bringing their own support, causalities and outcome expectations⁶¹³, causing an *escalation* to an internal conflict⁶¹⁴, we need to unpack the opportunities and motivations embedded in these interventions, which push actors to make serious cost-benefit assessments, take risks of defeat, face probable international and domestic objections, and still decide to intervene. This logic of intervention (which depends on each actor's own choices and motivations instead of them being pulled into civil wars and deciding to intervene because of externalities) represents *inward interventions* and *conflict extension/escalation* according to which a new state or a non-state actor gets involved into a civil war and engages through its own set of motivations and aims into the war and extends the civil war's initial scope.⁶¹⁵

Regardless of its type, unilateral, minilateral or multilateral, opportunity and willingness are the first requirements to be fulfilled before an intervention is performed. In this sense, opportunity represents *"the possibilities that are available to any entity within any environment, representing the total set of environmental constraints and possibilities. While opportunity thus represents macro level (environmental and structural) factors, willingness represents the choice processes that occur on the micro level, that is, the selection of some behavioral option from a*

⁶¹¹ Jacob D. Kathman, "Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.55, No.6, 2011, p.852.

⁶¹² Regan, "Choosing to intervene...", p.756.

⁶¹³ Carment, James, Taydas, "The Internationalization of...", p.71.

⁶¹⁴ "Escalation of the conflict will then occur when groups forge alliances with affinity groups across their borders and/or when outsiders perceive opportunities in joining ongoing internal conflicts", in Jennifer L. De Maio, "Is War Contagious? The Transnationalization of Conflict in Darfur", **African Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2010, p.28.

⁶¹⁵ Carment, James, Taydas, "The Internationalization of...", pp.69-71.

range of alternatives”⁶¹⁶. In other words, both opportunity (the capacity and the chance to execute an intervention) and willingness should be present for any foreign involvement. Any change in the social environment of an actor, such as a civil war in a neighboring country, can lead to a new assessment of the risks involved and the opportunities to get involved and this assessment may increase the willingness.⁶¹⁷ These set of conditions are valid for all actors, who choose to be involved in a civil war, such as states, international/regional organizations, rebel groups, diasporas and individuals. On the other hand, regarding interventions only, opportunities to be engaged in a civil war are explained by proximity and interaction levels. As for proximity, in other words contiguity of states, which indicates the distance between them, provides the milieu for intrusion, rendering neighbors the most available actors for intervention by delivering the foremost opportunity and feasibility.⁶¹⁸

The number of neighboring states has a particular impact on rebel-biased interventions.⁶¹⁹ As for interaction, when the interaction between actors increases so does the major conflicts of interest. While neighbors interact more frequently, this approach also suggests that there is natural involvement between neighboring states, but it does not limit the opportunities available to them. Globalization and innovative technologies create an easier environment to interact, thus, major or middle powers with the capacity to intervene are expected to make interventions.⁶²⁰ Both explanations can be applied to the willingness element of interventionist motivations. Proximity can increase the willingness to engage in the civil war of a neighboring country by providing the most crucial opportunity to intervene, and the interaction between states through economic, political, social and military relations, would be affected and altered in case of civil wars. Such states would have the highest probability to get involved in these types of war either for protection or revision of these ties and would be extremely interested in influencing the outcome of the civil

⁶¹⁶ Randolph M. Siverson, Harvey Starr, “Opportunity, Willingness, and the Diffusion of War”, **American Political Science Review**, Vol.84, No.1, 1990, p.48.

⁶¹⁷ Benjamin A. Most, Harvey Starr, “Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War”, **The American Political Science Review**, Vol.74, No.4, 1980, pp.933-934.

⁶¹⁸ John A. Vasquez, “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.32, No.3, 1995, pp.287-288.

⁶¹⁹ Stephen E. Gent, “Going in When It Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts”, **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol.52, No.4, 2008, p.730.

⁶²⁰ Vasquez, “Why Do...”, pp.287-288.

war.⁶²¹ In sum, physical proximity and both positive and negative relations prior to the civil war create a strong motivation for interventions.

Opportunities and willingness are turned into interventions for various *instrumentalist* reasons ranging from economic aims to domestic issues.⁶²² In fact, *instrumental motivations* and *opportunism*, as shaped by national interests, appear to be one of the most fundamental reasons to internationalize a civil war. As civil wars are not simply domestic events and have extensive regional and international effect, their manipulative environments can offer several benefits to third parties in different contexts. For example, earlier negative relations with neighbors can particularly create several windows of opportunity for those who have nefarious intentions. Possible weaknesses of the warring state, continuous instability and violence provides the opportunity to challenge rivals.⁶²³ In this case, the most preferred choice is to get involved into the war instead of directly intervening because direct interventions can create sovereignty problems and have higher costs than supporting a rebel group through providing weapons or sanctuaries.⁶²⁴ Also, involvements allow the meddler to deny any affiliation with rebel parties.⁶²⁵ In addition to this, opportunistic involvement is not limited to state actors who may support a warring party to further weaken an opponent but the lack of central authority would also attract foreign rebel groups who would benefit from the unstable environment to secure material and political gains.⁶²⁶

Interventions, direct or indirect, aim at weakening the opponent in the long-run by employing its capacities into domestic affairs eliminating the competition so that the intervening party becomes a regional power.⁶²⁷ While political and military gains may seem indispensable in the geopolitical power game for the most influential state in a region, more concrete intentions may lie behind any involvement. Neighboring

⁶²¹ *Ibid.*, p.280.

⁶²² David Carment, Patrick James, "Third-Party States in Ethnic Conflict: Identifying the Domestic Determinants of Intervention" in Steven E. Lobell, and Philip Mauceri, eds., **Ethnic Conflict and International Politics : Explaining Diffusion and Escalation**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.12.

⁶²³ Ann Hironika, **Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War**, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008, pp.141-142.

⁶²⁴ Gleditsch, "Transnational Dimensions...", 2007, p.296.

⁶²⁵ Idean Salehyan, "The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict", **American Journal of Political Science**, Vol.52, No.4, 2008, p.791.

⁶²⁶ Steven E. Lobell, Philip Mauceri, "Diffusion and Escalation of Ethnic Conflict Steven" in Lobell, Mauceri, **Ethnic Conflict...**, p.4.

⁶²⁷ Michael E. Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict", in Brown, **The International Dimensions...**, pp.597-598.

states usually have expansionist ideals, but borders and territorial integrity are protected by international law. Thus, especially if the civil war is a secessionist one, the rival neighbors may make *irredentist* attempts to claim the disputed region as their own.⁶²⁸ In that case, transnational ethnic ties play an important role in the escalation of internal armed conflicts. In addition to states that might intervene in the name of their ethnic kin, ethnic relatives, who happen to be separated along bordering lines, can show additional interest for the neighboring country's policy and become distinctly involved in a next-door war. This would also strengthen the irredentist aims of the governments and open the way to the manipulation of these ethnic ties for other objectives.⁶²⁹

While state support for rebel groups in the form of proxy battles includes irredentist claims or regional aspirations, it may serve other purposes. For example, another eminent type of using opportunities involves retributions in the form of *tit-for-tat*, in which the state retaliates an earlier support of the opponent for rebel groups against itself. This support may be continuing or over, but in either case the neighbor would have the willingness and the opportunity to intervene and aiming for reprisal.⁶³⁰ More specifically, the neighbor would simply want to replace the hostile regime with a more sympathetic one and thus show its support for the more preferred side.⁶³¹

As it is understood, there are various political and military instrumental reasons to intervene directly or indirectly. In addition to those, economic interests may heavily motivate third parties to intervene in civil wars. Civil wars create weaker states, which would allow other actors to engage in a conflict to exploit resources.⁶³² Aside from gaining future investment and trade benefits, loutable resources, such as alluvial diamonds, drugs, timber and oil, may motivate third parties in engaging in civil wars. These resources are easy to extract (except oil, which requires a longer-term investment) and have high market values. Thus, an external power may have the intention of gaining access to these resources, if they did not have such access

⁶²⁸ Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, Kenneth Schultz, "Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.52, No.4, 2008, p.485.

⁶²⁹ Maio, "Is War Contagious...", p.28.

⁶³⁰ Gleditsch, Salehyan, Schultz, "Fighting at Home...", p.485.

⁶³¹ Gleditsch, "Transnational Dimensions...", p.299.

⁶³² Boaz Atzili, "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict", *International Security*, Vol.31, No.3, Winter 2006/2007, p.153, 171-172.

before and will therefore use their military forces to control these resource rich areas. The interveners may use these resources to obtain direct profits in the international markets or to fund the costs of the intervention and enjoy a beneficial outcome from the civil war.

Secondly, third parties may intervene to assist one of the warring parties and hope for future gains through these resources at the end of civil war as being supportive of the winning side. Finally, if the external actor had already access to these resources, it can intervene to protect its investments and access rights, and prevent other actors from gaining access to these areas.⁶³³

Opportunism and instrumental reasons drive third-party interventions that are performed for non-war related reasons; instead they are excuses to take advantage of a country's internal situation. In these cases, external actors benefit from generated opportunities using reasons unrelated to war.⁶³⁴ Inward interventions can depend on territorial, economic, military and political objectives or simply aim at influencing the political outcome of the civil war for maintaining long-term profits. In this context, civil wars in weaker states attract more military interventions compared to stronger states.⁶³⁵ In addition to these unreserved ambitions, opportunistic mentality can depend on the *domestic* motivations of a state. Regarding opportunism, traditional *diversionary* theory suggests that internal wars can turn into inter-state conflicts because the leader of the warring country would try to create a "rally around the flag" effect, increase internal coherence and divert the internal attention of the warring parties to an external common enemy.⁶³⁶

On the other hand, empirical studies have found that the traditional diversionary theory in the form of increase of external conflict probability due to internal unrest, which would eventually reduce internal conflicts when initiated, is flawed. In most cases, the warring country does not start a new war to divert internal problems⁶³⁷; instead, elites are more likely to get involved in international

⁶³³ Michael G. Findley, Josiah F. Marineau, "Lootable resources and third-party intervention into civil wars", **Conflict Management and Peace Science**, Vol.32, No.5, 2015, pp.468-470.

⁶³⁴ Gleditsch, Salehyan, Schultz, "Fighting at Home...", pp.480-483.

⁶³⁵ Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique", in Manus I. Midlarsky ed., **Handbook of War Studies**, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993, p.270.

⁶³⁶ Carment, James, Taydas, "The Internationalization of...", p.72.

⁶³⁷ Levy, "The Diversionary Theory ...", pp.268-270.

interferences when they have relatively more secured political positions.⁶³⁸ As Hazelwood suggests, domestic problems can affect state aggressiveness but not when internal violence is too high. When an event like a civil war absorbs all capacities of a state in question, *encapsulation* will be in order, according to which leaders would be too withdrawn into internal situation to initiate an external attack. On the other hand, when there is a non-violent internal dissatisfaction, which is also high enough to threaten the elite's political survival, state capacity would be directed to an international issue to divert the attention from the internal problems.⁶³⁹ For example, leaders may try to bolster domestic support by accusing refugees or a civil war in a proximate geographical area as the source of their problems, use them as scapegoats and conceal the real reasons for the troubles.⁶⁴⁰ Also, various state-specific researches, which mainly focus on the USA confirm this type of behavior and affirm that American presidents have manipulated domestic politics by engaging in other state's wars.⁶⁴¹ Thus, if a state leader feels internally threatened, he/she can use weaker outside targets to shift the focus away from the original problems and get internal support.⁶⁴² While none of the diversionary conflict tests point towards a certain result, and Graeme A. M. Davies' findings are not in line with Hazelwood's ones⁶⁴³ it is undeniable that *domestic politics* have a tremendous effect on how international affairs are conducted. Borrowing from Carment and James's ethnic interventionism approach, we can try to understand how political character and conditions of a state can shape the interventionist character of states.

According to their approach, two fundamental criteria determine the interventionist character of states in ethnic conflicts: Ethnic composition and

⁶³⁸ Giacomo Chiozza, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, H. E. Goemans, "Civil War, Tenure, and Inter-state Insecurity", **paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association**, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, 2 September 2004, p.23, http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/seminars/gleditsch_f04.pdf (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁶³⁹ Leo Hazlewood, "Diversion mechanisms and encapsulation processes: The domestic conflict, foreign conflict hypothesis reconsidered", in Pat J. McGowan ed., **Sage international yearbook of international studies**, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1975, cited in Graeme A. M. Davies, "Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts: A Directed Dyad Analysis, 1950-1982", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.46, No.5, 2002, p.673.

⁶⁴⁰ Jack S. Levy, "International Sources of Inter-state and Intrastate War" in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Olser Hampson, Pamela Aall, eds., **Leashing the Dogs of War**, Washington D.C.: Unites States Institute of Peace, 2007, p.32.

⁶⁴¹ For a deepened debate see. Charles W. Ostrom, Brian L. Job, "The president and the political use of force", **American Political Science Review**, Vol.80, No.2, 1986, pp.541-566; Patrick James, John R. Oneal, "Influences on the president's use of force", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.35, No.2, 1991, pp.307-334.

⁶⁴² Maio, "Is War Contagious...", p.29.

⁶⁴³ Davies, "Domestic Strife...", p.673, 689.

institutional constraints.⁶⁴⁴ While ethnicity and ethnic interventionism are components of effective motivation, which will be discussed in the following pages, this theory depends on the democratic character of states (as an indication of institutional constraints) and popular support (as an indication of ethnic composition), thus, it is possible to replace ethnic interventionism with interventionism in general and reveal how domestic politics can affect the interventionist decision-making process. In this context, Carment and James define the institutional mechanism's traits as "*regular, free, and fair elections; universal voting franchise; referenda on matters of high constitutional importance; constitutionally guaranteed and enforced civil liberties; an independent judiciary; and various checks and balances on executive decision-making, such as federal structures, shared authorities, congressional or parliamentary override and procedures for executive impeachment*".⁶⁴⁵ These criteria indicate whether a state's regime is totalitarian/authoritarian (in case of low scores) or democratic (in case of high scores). Regarding the degree of populist governance, ethnic domination is associated with the monopoly of a single group on political apparatus, which provides a more individual decision-making process for the ruling group, while ethnic diversity suggests a distribution of power amongst diverse groups, which obliges governments to satisfy more than one group's demands in order to gain votes.⁶⁴⁶

Under these circumstances, first, homogeneously ruled and anti-democratic regimes are more inclined to intervene in civil wars in accordance with the interests of the dominant group, which would increase the coherence of the state, while it would allow leaders to defeat their opponents, distract the attention of the society and consolidate their power. Second, heterogeneous and undemocratic regimes would prefer passive lobbying for fear of disrupting the sensitive internal balance and this would not allow the exploitation of the traits or interests of a single group. Third, democratic and homogeneous states depend heavily on the society's point of view and due to probable future political changes, public opinion would oblige elites to intervene in civil wars or not. Finally, in democratic and heterogeneous states, realpolitik would be the driving force behind the decision to intervene because the

⁶⁴⁴ David Carment, Patrick James, "Explaining third-party intervention in ethnic conflict: theory and evidence", **Nations and Nationalism**, Vol.6, No.2, 2000, pp.176-179.

⁶⁴⁵ Carment, James, "Third-Party States...", p.18.

⁶⁴⁶ **Ibid.**, pp.17-18.

plurality of societal groups and high political constraints influence the elite decisions.⁶⁴⁷ Thus, opportunism, willingness and the limits of diversion are related to domestic dynamics as much as to beneficial options and conditions generated by civil war environments.

In addition to political and social factors, relative capabilities of third parties may affect intervention choices. Non-ethnic wars attract more non-major power interventions and this shows that national interests play a bigger role in their decision-making due to the increased need for opportunity windows.⁶⁴⁸ On the other hand, instrumental motivations can only constitute the basis for an increase of conflicts and they are not the sole stimuli for voluntary involvement in civil wars. Former interdependent relations in the form of *liberal affinities*, such as democratic, institutional and trade-based relations can also be the driving force⁶⁴⁹ for third party interventions. In this context, instrumental motivations generally have *affective* components as former political and military alliances, economic interdependence, common historic relations, such as colonial ties, shared ideologies, ethnicity, religion, identity and culture or simply humanitarian considerations. On the other hand, states do not intervene based on merely affective reasons because high-cost interventions demand more rational causes, which can be provided by instrumental reasons. Thus, interventions include either purely instrumental motivations or incorporate both instrumental and affective factors.⁶⁵⁰ Per contra, security related reasons present more intrinsic issues, and in that sense they can be linked to survival and existence, which will be examined in the following section.

Regarding *affective* factors, ethnicity based wars have attracted great attention in the literature. First of all, ethnic wars increase the probability of intervention for both states and international organizations. Secondly, ethnic affinity makes states keener to intervene in civil wars in process. Because, as discussed before, domestic support is an important aspect in the decision-making of interventions and, if ethnic

⁶⁴⁷ **Ibid.**

⁶⁴⁸ Shale Horowitz, Ada Huibregtse, "International Intervention in Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars", **Paper presented at the 2011 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association**, Seattle, WA, 1-4 September 2011, p.17.

⁶⁴⁹ Zeev Maoz, Davis Lesley G. Terris, Ranan D. Kuperman, Ilan Talmud, "What Is the Enemy of My Enemy? Causes and Consequences of Imbalanced International Relations, 1816–2001", **The Journal of Politics**, Vol.69, No.1, 2007, p.113.

⁶⁵⁰ Carment, James, Taydas, "The Internationalization of...", pp.69-70.

brethren are in danger, there is a social pressure on the government to help them.⁶⁵¹ Subsequently, outside powers can interfere into ethnically divided states unilaterally or multilaterally, in order to satisfy their domestic citizens if they are ethnically related to one of the fighting groups, particularly if these groups are aligned across borders.⁶⁵² These interventions are less likely to be in favor of governments.⁶⁵³ In addition to interventions, those wars also attract intense diaspora help, fighter mobilization either through refugees or transnational ethnic relatives and indirect state involvements. On the other hand, regarding strict traditional peacekeeping missions, there are two irregularities. First, while ethnic civil wars attract a considerable amount of state conducted peacekeeping missions, non-major powers are more likely to intervene compared to major powers. Secondly, genocides are less likely to mobilize peacekeeping missions.

These findings can be explained in the following way. Firstly, major powers have more influence on regional and international organizations than non-major powers, thus, they are more likely to urge these institutions to take the matter in their hands.⁶⁵⁴ Secondly, most of these wars take place in less developed regions where identity groups are separated from each other not on the basis of demographic criteria.⁶⁵⁵ In this context, neighbors in these regions, who are not major powers, are more prone to the kin-country syndrome.⁶⁵⁶ Finally, as discussed in the previous sections, consensus issues either bring unilateral interventions or inaction due to free riding motivation. In addition to these, it should be underlined that not all ethnic conflicts draw the same attention, which would lead to the launch of state conducted peacekeeping missions. In order to be motivated with ethnic kin protection, the civil war should not be threatening the major ethnic group in the warring country; instead the kinship between the second largest ethnic group as a fighting party and the major ethnic group of a potential intervening country attracts more intervention possibilities, due to the perception of a high degree of threat.⁶⁵⁷

⁶⁵¹ Michael G. Findley, Tze Kwang Teo, "Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor-Centric Approach", **The Journal of Politics**, Vol.68, No.4, 2006, p.829.

⁶⁵² Lobell, Mauceri, "Diffusion and Escalation...", p.5.

⁶⁵³ Gent, "Going in...", p.730.

⁶⁵⁴ Nicolas Rost, J. Michael Greig, "Taking matters into their own hands: An analysis of the determinants of state-conducted peacekeeping in civil wars", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.48, No.2, 2011, pp.181-182.

⁶⁵⁵ Jacob D. Kathman, "Civil War Contagion and Neighboring Interventions", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol.54, No.4, 2010, p.1004.

⁶⁵⁶ Atzili, "When Good...", pp.152-153.

⁶⁵⁷ Rost, Greig, "Taking matters...", p.179.

Moreover, ethnically dominant, but fractionalized, states are both more keen to intervene in other civil wars and experience interventions by others due to their more vulnerable internal balance and possible foreign kinships.⁶⁵⁸ Yet, it should not be ignored that the capacity of third parties are the main determinants for intervention, thus, major powers are always more keen to intervening in civil wars than non-major powers⁶⁵⁹ but when both type of external actors can direct their capacities towards an intervention, ethnicity can play a role in their intervention choices.

Apart from ethnic affinities, regime type, strategic alliances, economic ties and common history can have an effect on intervention decisions. First, *democracy* may have a double effect in attracting foreign interventions for both opportunistic and affective reasons. Instrumentally, a third party may want to take advantage of an ongoing conflict and be inclined to replace an antagonistic regime with a more preferred one. This would be a possible scenario for both autocratic and democratic warring governments. In either case, an outsider with the opposite regime type would rather replace the warring government with one of a similar/compatible ideology. Also, if the warring party is a democratic one under the threat of being replaced by an autocratic regime, other democratic states close to the warring government would want to protect the regime and prevent a counter revolution, thus they would be more keen to intervene into the civil war as well.⁶⁶⁰

Secondly, *alliances* can have an interesting role in intervention decisions. While there are findings supporting that alliances increase the likelihood of interventions,⁶⁶¹ their effect is mostly observed through intervention formations. For example, considering interventions in case of international law transgressions, the international community considers only a few criteria before it decides to take action or not. The two main characteristics of this assessment are the vulnerability of the transgressor against military and economic sanctions and penalties.

If the state is strong enough to resist military and economic challenge, then the intervention is off the table. But if the state is weak against military and economic sanctions, the intervention seems to be a possible scenario unless a hegemonic power has strong security and strategy ties with the transgressor. This relation can be in the

⁶⁵⁸ Horowitz, Huibregtse, "International Intervention...", pp.16-17.

⁶⁵⁹ Findley, Teo, "Rethinking Third-Party...", p.837.

⁶⁶⁰ Aysegul Aydin, "Where Do States Go? Strategy in Civil War Intervention", **Conflict Management and Peace Science**, Vol.27, No.1, 2010, p.57.

⁶⁶¹ Findley, Marineau, "Lootable resources...", p.467.

form of an alliance, but not obligatory. Even though a hegemon would have a tight security relationship with the transgressor, the strategic importance of the transgressor for the hegemon at that moment is the vital determinant for other actors to be deterred from intervening or not.⁶⁶² Similarly, alliances between global or regional powers and civil war experiencing states are important regarding peacekeeping activities. In case of a military alliance between those states and the UN would be less inclined to organize peacekeeping missions but regional organizations that have pacts with the state in question, would be more willing to intervene in civil war. While the intervention of an ally makes sense in judicial form, this also shows that major powers would hold the UN off their influence areas and prefer to work under the umbrella of regional organizations that would be more inclined to behave according to the major powers' national interests.⁶⁶³ Lastly, as for taking sides in interventions, alliances can play a role in the interveners' choices. While third parties intervene, they either choose to balance opposite viewed interveners or bandwagon with their alliance partners according to common or conflicting political and strategic interests of other parties. Thus, they take into account both groups' dynamics and concerns of other competitive interveners.⁶⁶⁴

Third, common history and colonial ties can be important in relation to intervention choices. As mentioned earlier, the de-colonization process led to numerous civil wars in newly built states. In these cases, ex-colonial powers were urged to intervene in civil wars on behalf of their favored groups.⁶⁶⁵ Thus, colonial relations are one of the most influential factors deciding to intervene. This motivation is related to many characteristics of ex-colonies.

To begin with, common history provides interventionist emotions for both societies and governments who share a common past. The sense of responsibility of leaving a stable former colony and welfare is an overbearing political task. Furthermore, colonial ties reflect present economic and social links.⁶⁶⁶ Many of colonial relations are associated with dual citizenships or tight immigration relations,

⁶⁶² Eelco van der Maat, "Sleeping hegemon: Third-party intervention following territorial integrity transgressions", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.48, No.2, 2011, p.203, 210.

⁶⁶³ J. Mullenbach, "Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.49, No.3, 2005, p.536, 549-550.

⁶⁶⁴ Findley, Teo, "Rethinking Third-Party...", p.829, 837.

⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.832.

⁶⁶⁶ Rost, Greig, "Taking matters...", p.174.

which would create social and political pressures. Additionally, ex-colonialists mostly benefit from trade facilities and have large investments in their former colonies, which bring us to fourth possible affective motivation for taking the decision to intervene: Trade ties.

Regardless of being former colonists or not, economic relations hold great importance and create inter-dependence in the context of bilateral relations. In addition to economic opportunity windows in the future of a warring state, present economic ties attach national interests to the civil wars. Interruption of trade and destruction of investments are great threats for third parties, thus they become inclined to intervene in order to protect their assets and obtain any economic loss. Particularly proximate states that are in more interaction with their neighbors would be more vulnerable to these disruptions.⁶⁶⁷ Moreover, general economic indicators can influence intervention choices: Low-income countries are more difficult to manage and rehabilitate subsequent to interventions during the post-war process as they need more ventures invested compared to states who had sustainable economies before the war. In that sense, possible failure of establishing peace and recurrence of civil war create reservations for third parties be involved in these civil wars.⁶⁶⁸ Considering that most civil wars break out in poor countries, this indicator creates dilemmas and raises opportunistic, particularly economic, doubts about the intentions of the interveners in civil wars.

While instrumental and affective motivations are the driving force for interventions, these are not the only factors that need to be mentioned. Many interventions since the end of the Cold War have taken place for *humanitarian* reasons. Although most of the time strategic motives are attached, at times interventions are launched with purely humanitarian intentions. As it seems dignified, it may create other problems: States invest high stakes in interventions in terms of resources and prestige, the weak intentions result in weak-scale interventions⁶⁶⁹, as they lack the necessary skills and motivation to deal with the problems on the battle field. This explains the failure of many humanitarian

⁶⁶⁷ Kathman, "Civil War...", pp.991-992.

⁶⁶⁸ Aydin, "Where Do...", p.57.

⁶⁶⁹ Daniel L. Byman, Kenneth M. Pollack, "Things Fall Apart: Containing The Spillover from An Iraqi Civil War", **The Saban Center Analyses Paper**, No.11, 2007, p.15.

interventions as in the case of Rwanda.⁶⁷⁰ Regarding these low-cost interventions, the main objective is not to make structural changes in the state structure but rather to cover humanitarian needs, establish peace talks that can lead to negotiated settlements and stop the violence.⁶⁷¹

On the other hand, as discussed in the previous chapters, the intervention methods have been changing, thus peace enforcement missions were established in order to avoid these kinds of failures. While states have been intervening for humanitarian purposes for centuries, the multiplication of intervening actors have created a burden-share opportunity for high-cost humanitarian activities. In other words, humanitarian interventions have evolved into more comprehensive, effective, multilateral interventions to meet the enhanced needs of complicated humanitarian cases.⁶⁷² This does not suggest that humanitarian interventions are only realized under institutional umbrellas. Consensus issues related to public good can take the form of unilateral or multilateral interventions. They can even take minilateral or operational multilateral form, but that happens rarely, considering that in relation to the last two types national interests are attached to the interventions. On the other hand, it is true that major powers are more capable of influencing international institutions in line with their own national interests⁶⁷³ and this complicates how to fully separate humanitarian interventions from interest driven ones. Yet, it is why case studies should be carefully conducted with focus on the civil war characteristics, the participants of interventions, the warring countries traits and the international aspects of civil wars.

Regarding humanitarian interventions, even though the aim is to end the fighting and protect civilians from further suffering regardless of their form, there are multiple factors that can affect case selections.⁶⁷⁴ In that sense, intensity, urgency and other traits of conflicts, levels of domestic support, chances of success, and the *CNN effect* play a considerable role. In regard to intensity and urgency, there are conflicting findings about intervention motivations. While intensity can deter

⁶⁷⁰ Kyle Beardsley, "Peacekeeping and Contagion of Armed Conflict", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol.73, No.4, 2011, p.1062.

⁶⁷¹ Carment, James, Taydas, "The Internationalization of...", p.70.

⁶⁷² Finnmore, *The Purpose of...*, p.148.

⁶⁷³ Rost, Greig, "Taking matters...", p.182.

⁶⁷⁴ Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Han Dorussen, Todd Landman, Abhinay Muthoo, Hugh Ward, "Civil War in Transnational Perspective", Project **proposal submitted to the ESRC**, p.3, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/grow/ESRC.pdf> (accessed 18.02.2017)

interveners, who can take account of the excessive costs, the fewer prospects for negotiated outcomes and the higher risk for the soldiers⁶⁷⁵, some of the research projects have shown that states do not avoid difficult humanitarian cases where civilian needs are imminent. Yet, major and non-major powers differ on the perception of urgency, as *“major power peacekeeping is strongly driven by conflicts that show the greatest capacity to spread, those producing the highest numbers of battle-deaths and involving a large number of warring parties; minor power peacekeeping is less influenced by the intensity of fighting, is more strongly encouraged by concern about consequences for civilians, encouraging them to intervene in long running, ethnically-rooted civil wars that produce large numbers of refugees”*⁶⁷⁶. Particularly for neighbors, it is difficult not to get involved in civil wars next door,⁶⁷⁷ but it should be underlined that most of these involvements, especially in high intensity civil wars, are linked with security concerns for both neighbors and major powers and have a stronger pull-factor effect than push-factor motivations, which will be examined in the following sections.

On the other hand, regarding the UN interventions, both intensity and duration of the war affect the engagement choice: the UN-led interventions are mostly observed in civil wars with higher battle related deaths and longer durations. While this can be interpreted as evidence that the UN does not back out from hard cases, there lies a contradiction because the UN also prefers to intervene in smaller countries with lesser population and smaller governmental armies, which implies that the UN tends to avoid wars of greater magnitudes. In coherence with this self-reservation, it is observed that the UN prefers to send missions to civil wars with more heterogenous ethnic affinities, where sons of soil wars do not exist and where geographic conditions do not challenge the missions' future as it could the case in more mountainous areas. Interestingly, the UN also tends to get involved in civil wars, in which rebel groups exploit natural resources, a fact that can be linked with both more interest related interventions and longer and tougher civil wars.⁶⁷⁸

⁶⁷⁵ Aydin, “Where Do...”, p.58; Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline, Kyle A. Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.45, No.3, 2008, p.348; Seden Akcinaroglu, Elizabeth Radziszewski, “Expectations, Rivalries, and Civil War Duration”, **International Interactions**, Vol.31, No.4, 2005, p.352.


⁶⁷⁶ Rost, Greig, “Taking matters...”, p.182.

⁶⁷⁷ Deepa Khosla, “Third World states as intervenors in ethnic conflicts: Implications for regional and international security”, **Third World Quarterly**, Vol.20, No.6, 1999, p.1047.

⁶⁷⁸ Michael J. Gilligan, Ernest J. Sergenti, “Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference”, **Quarterly Journal of Political Science**, Vol.3, No.2, 2008, pp.102-109.

While conflict characteristics have an effect on the UN operations, the level of domestic support, the chances of success and the CNN effect are prominent factors for all types of (unilateral/multilateral/minilateral) interventions. Yet without domestic support or chance of success, no motivation, benign or malign, can lead to an intervention. In this case, it is the CNN effect that creates domestic and international motivation to compel elites into mobilizing humanitarian interventions. This effect is produced through all branches of media, such as TVs, radios, newspapers and social media networks, which blame leaders for inaction against unacceptable violence. Thus, even though governments shall be hesitant to intervene in troublesome civil wars, raising domestic and international support through the influence of media networks may create viable conditions for foreign interventions.⁶⁷⁹

Figure 7 – Template of Inward Internationalization



⁶⁷⁹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.33, No.2, 1996, pp.211-212.

b. Outward interventions and involvements: Externalization of internal conflict and its effect on internationalization of civil wars

In the previous section, we have observed that civil wars can, to a certain extent, be attractive for third parties and this in turn can lead to conflict escalation. Yet, internationalization of civil wars does not always unfold via voluntary practices; as much as civil wars have pushing dynamics, they also contain compelling pull factors. In other words, the internationalization is based on bidirectional reasons: Third parties can choose to involve in them or outside actors can find themselves drawn into another state's civil wars unwillingly.⁶⁸⁰ In the latter case, externalization of civil wars has two critical dynamics: (1) It shows that, in addition to domestic problems, civil wars can also arise from external causes through diffusion and contagion mechanisms; (2) In addition to instrumentalist, affective and humanitarian reasons, civil wars can also get internationalized due to deterrence or containment attempts of third parties to preserve national, regional and international security and stability.

To start with *contagion* and *diffusion* processes, it is crucial to provide some definitions against the existing terminological multiplicity. In the civil war literature, it is commonly seen that different terms, such as contagion, diffusion, spillover, spread, imitation, horizontal escalation, demonstration, bandwagoning... etc. are used interchangeably or for defining different processes. In this definitional richness, most of the literature takes diffusion as a process and separates it into various sub-categories, such as contagion, mimicry, imitation, demonstration effect etc. according to their research questions.⁶⁸¹ On the other hand, regardless of its terminology, a civil war is expressed as an infectious disease, which affects other healthy organisms by *spillover/spread* of different factors.⁶⁸² This can be a direct or indirect spread. *Direct spillover* process includes the transfer of tangible factors, such as refugees, arms, economic outcomes, diseases; and *indirect spread* defines the reception of intangible externalities, such as inspiration, probability of success and violence strategies, which can increase the incentive to raise voice and have more

⁶⁸⁰ Carment, James, Taydas, "The Internationalization of...", p.73.

⁶⁸¹ Zachary Elkins, Beth Simmons, "On Waves, Clusters, And Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework", **The Annals Of The American Academy of Political and Social Science**, Vol.598, No.1, 2005, p.37.

⁶⁸² Halvard Buhaug, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol.52, 2008, p.220.

demands.⁶⁸³ Thus, through the direct or indirect spread of civil war externalities, violence spills over from one place to another.

In this study, two processes of spill over/spread are defined to avoid terminological pollution: First, “*contagion refers to a medical, not spatial term. It implies that learning and example are important in spreading war. It also suggests that what ‘infects’ one political actor to go to war may affect others.* Second, *diffusion is a physical and mechanical metaphor; it suggests that one can study how war spreads as one studies the spilling (and spreading) of a liquid. The focus is on geography and direct contact*”.⁶⁸⁴

In this context, the term of *diffusion* includes the spatial spread where an internal conflict escalates through spillover and creates other intra-state conflicts in proximate states. Secondly, *contagion* refers to the demonstration effects in other countries where anti-regime activities or ethnic demands stimulate other groups to rebel. Thus, while both represent uncoordinated interdependence of domestic and international factors, diffusion refers to a more physical mechanism depending mostly on direct spillover or practice. Contagion is extended to include similar inspirational terms as emulation, demonstration, mimicry, and policy transfer etc. depending mostly on indirect spillover or information.⁶⁸⁵ Moreover, Vasquez suggests that if factors revolving around shared qualities and affinities, such as alliances, rivalry, trade relations incite third parties to take part in wars by creating opportunities; territorial contiguity and geographical variables pull third parties into wars by generating threats and uncertainties.⁶⁸⁶ Furthermore, diffusion process can be both in the form of *relocation*, according to which same or similar violence shifts its geographical scope and appears in new areas or in the form of *spatial expansion*, according to which the same conflict keeps expanding in new areas nearby.⁶⁸⁷ Also, as contagion can travel both in time and space in the form of inspiration, then this adaptive process can have both spatial and temporal effects.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸³ Erika Forsberg, “Diffusion in the Study of Civil Wars: A Cautionary Tale”, **International Studies Review**, Vol.16, No.2, 2014, p.193.

⁶⁸⁴ Vasquez, “Factors Related...”, p.162.

⁶⁸⁵ Elkins, Simmons, “On Waves...”, pp.38-39.

⁶⁸⁶ Vasquez, “Factors Related...”, p.163, p.167.

⁶⁸⁷ Sebastian Schutte, Nils B. Weidmann, “Diffusion Patterns of Violence in Civil Wars”, **Political Geography**, Vol.30, No.3, 2011, pp.144-145.

⁶⁸⁸ Tim Krieger, Daniel Meierrieks, “What Causes Terrorism?”, **Public Choice**, Vol.147, No.1/2, 2010, p.8.

In practice, it is not very easy to separate one from other, because they often overlap and contain interrelated processes,⁶⁸⁹ it is thus hard to trace these infections without mistakenly correlating certain dynamics. First, while the flow of arms or ideologies can facilitate the onset of a new civil war, spatial or temporal clustering of civil wars should not be linked to the original one without a detailed evaluation. Poor countries usually have poor neighbors, undemocratic countries mostly have undemocratic neighbors and it is hard to determine whether the following civil war is created through domestic factors or external factors.⁶⁹⁰ Secondly, even though two wars may happen several years apart, both the flow of fighters or arms and the origins of ideological reasons can have close links.⁶⁹¹ When a civil war ends, manpower and ammunition are not destroyed; instead they travel via illegal trafficking. Also, most civil wars end by repressing war-initiating demands rather than satisfying them. Thus, these factors can be both irrelevant to a nearby conflict as well as a distant conflict. In either case, these mechanisms should be observed carefully before coming to a conclusion about diffusion and contagion without ignoring the fact that civil wars increase the risk of other wars in near or farther regions and periods.

Between contagion, diffusion and clustering theories what is important for the purposes of this study is the internationalization of civil wars. In this context, (1) the onset of new civil wars due to external causes that are related to diffusion and contagion processes (2) which are at the same time the consequences of different actors' involvements in preceding civil wars and (3) the intervention of third parties to deal with and prevent these spreading dynamics from forming a vicious circle, are the key factors of outward internationalizations.

On the other hand, if there is no link between cumulative regional wars or within the leap of war from one country to another, then it is outside the scope of the present study. Thus, we need to observe the relations between successive civil wars, such as rebel transfers or interventions originating from a spillover mechanism to affirm internationalization. While cause-consequence links between civil wars and involvement-intervention activities can be related to the internationalization process,

⁶⁸⁹ Jonathan Fox, "Is Ethnoreligious Conflict a Contagious Disease?", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol.27, No.2, 2004, p.90.

⁶⁹⁰ Buhaug, Gleditsch, "Contagion or Confusion...", p.218.

⁶⁹¹ Forsberg, "Diffusion in the...", pp.194-195.

random clustering cases, where only weak causality or externality links can be established, should be excluded from the internationalization context.

Hence, regarding these processes it is important to understand that outward internationalization holds two successive phases: (1) A civil war may spill over to another country or a region through diffusion or contagion mechanisms, where it onsets new civil wars; (2) This spillover can incite external actors to intervene in the source of spreading violence or the affected areas with security concerns. Under these circumstances, in this section reference will be made to firstly, sources of spillover mechanisms, secondly links that provide opportunities to spread and thirdly potential targets' vulnerability so that we understand this input-output relationship and the role of indirect interventions. Finally, the process leading to direct interventions due to instability and insecurity created by the spread of violence will be evaluated.

Regarding dynamics that can contribute to contagion or diffusion, *characteristics of civil wars* hold important role. To begin with, ethnically driven wars spill over for two different reasons: They can encourage their kindred in neighboring states to replicate their cause and engage in a similar pursuit or ethnic networks can directly support foreign recruitment and create transborder rebel groups.⁶⁹² Also, they usually create large refugee flows due to the displacement of a whole identity group,⁶⁹³ which would eventually contribute to the generation of contagion-diffusion. On the other hand, governmental civil wars, particularly ideological ones, can become growingly popular and incite new rebellions on a regional or global basis.⁶⁹⁴

In addition to these, secessionism, high intensity and rebel success in conflicts can have positive effect on contagion or diffusion processes. First, secessionist conflicts can spread through a region, particularly if there is an ethnic kin separated from the conflict zone with borders.⁶⁹⁵ Neighboring relatives can either be inspired to start a similar secessionist war or try to join powers with their bordering area with an

⁶⁹² Nathan Wolcott Black, "The Spread of Violent Civil Conflict: Rare, State-Driven, and Preventable", **PhD Thesis**, Massachusetts Institute Of Technology, Department of Politcal Science, June 2012, pp.46-47.

⁶⁹³ Rost, Greig, "Taking matters...", p.182.

⁶⁹⁴ Douglas J. Macdonald, "Falling Dominoes and System Dynamics: A Risk Aversion Perspective," **Security Studies**, Vol.3, No.2, 1993, p.245.

⁶⁹⁵ Byman, Pollack, "Things Fall...", pp.13-14; Buhaug, Gleditsch, "Contagion or Confusion...", p.222.

irredentist attempt. Second, more intense conflicts cause more destabilization by affecting trade networks, weakening economies, producing more refugees and therefore they are more likely to trigger spillover mechanisms.⁶⁹⁶ Yet, at the same time, more intense rebellions can also have the reverse effect of horrifying people with their brutality and can dissuade other groups from participating in internal conflicts.⁶⁹⁷ Finally, rebel success in a civil war be a source of inspiration more than failed rebellions, thus they are more likely to diffuse amongst rebellious groups.⁶⁹⁸

In addition to the characteristics of civil wars, the *characteristics of the country in civil war* can affect the spread mechanisms. If the falling country is a major power, which has significant regional or global influence, its civil war would have wider contagion or diffusion effect. Also, if a country in civil war shows similar state structures to its surrounding environment, these similarities can have in transformative consequences.⁶⁹⁹ On the other hand, the weakness of a country can also contribute to the spillover process: These countries would be less competent to halt refugee flows, or prevent arm, fighter and drug trafficking in and out of their borders.⁷⁰⁰ Thus, while the fall of major country can have a strong effect on neighbors, the fall of a weak country can also cause serious problems.

From another perspective, Nathan Black argues that, in addition to structural and non-state factors, state actions are also important for the spread of a civil war. Regarding *warring state's actions*, evangelization and expulsion are key determinants. In his approach, evangelization represents the activities of a rebel group, who gains governmental control in its war and afterwards sponsors rebel groups in its surrounding area to fuel nearby civil wars. The reason behind this is to create a new region compatible or in line with this group's policies and aspirations, where their ideology expands and becomes influential. Secondly, expulsion means the discharge of fighters from the country in conflict to another state. In this case, the expelling government tries to secure its own territory but, following this relocation,

⁶⁹⁶ Kathman, "Civil War Diffusion...", p.857.

⁶⁹⁷ James Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in David Lake, Donald Rothchild eds., **The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation**, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998, pp.112-113.

⁶⁹⁸ Forsberg, "Diffusion in the...", p.190.

⁶⁹⁹ Jack Snyder, "Introduction", in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder eds., **Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p.7.

⁷⁰⁰ Atzili, "When Good...", p.153, 172.

combatants initiate a new war in their new country.⁷⁰¹ In both cases, the conflict inevitably spreads to other countries.

Apart from the traits of conflicts, the relation between a conflict driven country and other actors may contribute to the initiation of the spillover mechanism. These *source-target links* may depend on several factors. Initially, geographical proximity to war zones seems to be the first factor to contribute to the war spread by creating threats⁷⁰² because geographical closeness increases the level of exposure to civil war externalities.⁷⁰³ Regarding neighbors, longer shared borders create more opportunities for spillovers by causing difficulties to monitor transborder activities revolving around refugees and illegal trafficking. The same proposition has been made for mountainous borders but there is no empirical evidence supporting this argument.⁷⁰⁴ Nevertheless, in general, geographical proximity to a civil war raises spillover possibilities, because it facilitates access to foreign territories, movement of people, ideologies, antagonism and illegal activities.⁷⁰⁵ On the other hand, most of the studies reveal that proximity is not a determinant by itself, but rather a factor for spillover when added to other factors. While proximity has an impact on opportunist aims⁷⁰⁶, for outward internationalizations it plays a role as a transaction factor. Thus, proximity is a feature of outward internationalizations, because it raises the interaction levels between countries.⁷⁰⁷

This brings us the importance of transnational ties between countries. First, transnational ethnic links are crucial in civil war spillovers.⁷⁰⁸ Transnational communities can be affected by nearby conflicts of their relatives in various ways: They can be manipulated by next-door governments to contribute to their ethnically driven causes⁷⁰⁹, they can be inspired to demand autonomy or secession⁷¹⁰ or they

⁷⁰¹ Black, **The Spread of...**, p.3, pp.33-34, pp.58-63.

⁷⁰² Vasquez, "Factors Related...", p.167.

⁷⁰³ Zaryab Iqbal, Harvey Starr, "Bad Neighbors: Failed States and Their Consequences", **Conflict Management and Peace Science**, Vol.25, No.4, 2008, p.320, pp.327-328; Hegre, Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis...", p.532.

⁷⁰⁴ Forsberg, "Diffusion in the...", pp.191-192.

⁷⁰⁵ William Young, David Stebbins, Bryan A. Frederick, Omar Al-Shahery, **Spillover from the Conflict in Syria**, Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 2014, p.14; Myron Weiner, "Bad neighbors, bad neighborhoods: an inquiry into the causes of refugee flows", **International Security**, Vol.21, No.1, 1996, pp.5-42.

⁷⁰⁶ Jacob D. Kathman, "Civil War Diffusion...", p.854.

⁷⁰⁷ Vasquez, "Why Do...", p.280.

⁷⁰⁸ Gleditsch, "Transnational Dimensions...", pp.303-304.

⁷⁰⁹ Maio, "Is War Contagious...", p.27.

⁷¹⁰ Forsberg, "Diffusion in the...", pp.191-192

can support their disadvantaged ethnic kin in neighboring civil wars.⁷¹¹ In addition to these links and probabilities, Jonathan Fox affirms that religion is the key determinant of this spread as well “*Violent conflicts only cause violent conflicts in bordering states if there is a minority in the bordering state religiously similar to the rebelling minority in the state where the original conflict is occurring. In contrast, there is no evidence that rebellion by a group of one religion is likely to spread to a group of another religion in a bordering state...*”⁷¹². Thus, without a shared religion the spillover of war does not seem feasible. Moreover, Fox makes other important observations: While religious links transfer the civil war from one minority to another minority, these conflicts do not have to involve religious motivations; but if a civil war has religious motivations, when the fundamentalists gain access to governmental power, they sponsor other religious groups to extend their revolutions across national boundaries. Moreover, this support does not solely concern the immediate environment because first, the success of a theocratic rebel group would inspire similar revolutions across the globe and secondly, fundamentalist combats usually provide training and expertise for fighters from all around the world who afterwards return home and join new religious rebellions.⁷¹³ In sum, while transnational ethnic links can be affiliated with contagion and diffusion, transnational religious ties are the determinant factors of these relations.

In addition to ethno-religious ties, transnational economic relations can have a serious impact on civil war diffusion and contagion. Civil wars destabilize economic dynamics, decrease growth, create crises and cause great losses to their regions: “*The costs of fighting terrorists emanating from the civil war-wracked country; and the potential costs of civil disturbances and overt military interventions can all be crippling for weak states and burdensome for strong ones. Moreover, the increased crime, drug trafficking, and other problems that often come with refugees and cross-border violence impose further costs. There are also secondary, but often equally costly, effects on the economies of neighboring countries. Trade can decline, even plummet, if the country consumed by civil war was an important external trade partner for its neighbors. Likewise, increased violence in a region frightens away trade partners and investors*”⁷¹⁴. Thus, while economic indicators decline due civil

⁷¹¹ Gleditsch, Dorussen, Landman, Muthoo, Ward, “Civil War...”, p.3.

⁷¹² Jonathan Fox, “Is Ethnoreligious...”, p.99.

⁷¹³ **Ibid.**, p.90, 100.

⁷¹⁴ Byman, Pollack, “Things Fall...”, p.18.

war conditions, rebel groups gain power,⁷¹⁵ benefit from economic unrest and lowered recruitment costs⁷¹⁶.

Ultimately regarding warring country-potential target links, refugee flows can have a great impact on contagion and diffusion processes and turn domestic issues into internationalized problems. Large-scale dislocations of people due to the chaotic environment of civil wars have many outcomes for refugee hosting states. Firstly, the settlement of refugees within national borders can destabilize inter-communal harmony by changing the religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic traits of host societies. Alterations in primordial identities and demographic dynamics cause resistance and reaction amongst both displaced and host populations. Both parties try to preserve their shared identities and this complicated integration process causes conflicts between different groups.

Secondly, most of refugee-hosting states are poor countries, which already have inadequate resources and limited capacity to deal with refugee flows. The necessity of providing extra food, fuel, housing, land, public services and other humanitarian assistance burdens these states and causes further scarcity.⁷¹⁷ In further economic terms, refugee flows exacerbate competition between locals and foreigners by lowering labor wages and increasing housing, food and other services' prices. This decline in living standards tends to fuel civil conflicts, particularly in refugee receiving regions of host country.⁷¹⁸

Thirdly, large-scale refugee flows and crowded camps may damage public health, cause infectious diseases, such as HIV, malaria or diarrhea and increase mortality rates due to unsanitary conditions and overwhelming health care needs.⁷¹⁹ Fourth, the existence of different ethnic or dissident political groups in the same region or camps can cause fractional conflict between refugees in the host state. New conflicts amongst these groups based on earlier hostilities can cause serious tensions in the receiving state and this violence can escalate further if one of the factions has local supporters.⁷²⁰

⁷¹⁵ Kathman, "Civil War Diffusion...", p.850.

⁷¹⁶ Buhaug, Gleditsch, "Contagion or Confusion...", p.220.

⁷¹⁷ Alan Dowty, Gil Loescher, "Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action", **International Security**, Vol.21, No.1, 1996, pp.46-48.

⁷¹⁸ Salehyan, Gleditsch, "Refugees and the...", pp.343-344, 349.

⁷¹⁹ Salehyan, "The Externalities of...", pp.789-790.

⁷²⁰ Lischer, **Dangerous Sanctuaries...**, pp.13-14.

Finally, refugee-receiving regions are mostly near border areas where they may have ethnic kin. This can either encourage the inhabitants of the region to engage in demonstration activities or facilitate arms and combatant trafficking in solidarity with their relatives.⁷²¹ These diffusion and contagion processes can manifest themselves in political and military engagements. Politically, refugee communities can influence the political decisions of the host state, especially the policies regarding their home countries. Militarily, refugee camps can turn into sanctuaries for expelled fighters who may continue their illegal trade and war activities, such as raids, guerilla attacks, smuggling and terrorism.⁷²² Even though not every refugee participates in military activities, refugee camps provide housing, recruitment and mobilization opportunities for rebel groups who can continue to pursue their war from abroad and convert refugees into warriors for their purposes. Thus, even though refugee flows arise from humanitarian needs and it is the easiest way for migrants to run away from conflicting states taking shelter in neighboring countries, they can to spread the conflict and hostile activities beyond national borders.⁷²³

Hereby, the characteristics of a conflict, the features of warring country and the links between a warring state and third parties can contribute to diffusion and contagion. Yet, for a country to be affected from the spillover process, weak *domestic characteristics* or structural problems arising from internal dynamics should preliminarily exist. A state with fragile internal balances would be harmed by a neighboring conflict, but for a stable country destabilization would not be a strong possibility.⁷²⁴ Thus, the strength of a state is the first requirement to protect itself from the consequences of the civil war, such as large-scale migration, circulation of drugs, arms and fighters and from contagion and diffusion processes. In theory, states are responsible for overcoming the spillover factors using the military, political and economic resources that they are handed to them, which should be instrumentalized to neutralize external factors.

Yet, the problem arises when states remain weak against international pressures.⁷²⁵ States that are not able to integrate refugee populations into their socio-economic structure, secure their territorial borders, and maintain internal coherence

⁷²¹ Salehyan, Gleditsch, "Refugees and the...", p.336, 350.

⁷²² Dowty, Loescher, "Refugee Flows...", pp.48-49.

⁷²³ Salehyan, "The Externalities of...", p.791.

⁷²⁴ Forsberg, "Diffusion in the...", p.191.

⁷²⁵ Black, **The Spread of...**, p.56.

are exposed to spillover effects. This ability to resist is linked to a state's capacity in the form of "*the endogenous resources that a state possesses that can be mobilized to deal with emergencies. As such, this concept encapsulates stability, control, protection from predation, the extraction of resources, and the ability to adapt and respond to unexpected crises*".⁷²⁶ In line with the earlier chapters, where the dynamics of civil war onset were discussed, the components of this capacity are economic indicators, such as GDP per capita, economic growth and control of natural resources, political system indicators, such as repression levels, democratic institutions, stable governmental and military control, geographic conditions such as rough terrain⁷²⁷, demographic levels, such as population size and unemployment rates, socio-cultural identity conditions, such as ethnic polarization. In addition to social grievances, horizontal inequalities and the existence of latent conflicts have the probability to affect the sensibility to external destabilizing inputs.

Regarding empirical research on civil war spillovers and domestic characteristics, Lake and Rothchild affirm that the spread of internal conflicts would be more probable in countries already at risk, where latent conflicts exist. Forsberg confirmed that ethnic polarization makes countries more prone to diffusion and contagion⁷²⁸ and Kathman argues that deficiency in GDP per capita, shortage of democracy, complicated ethnic constitution and increasing population figures increase the spread of a civil war into another state.⁷²⁹ Braithwaite agrees with these findings and adds that, while proximate civil wars increase the risk of civil war onsets in its neighborhood compared to more stable regions without internal conflicts, regarding contagion and diffusion processes, state-centric instability plays a bigger role than regional instabilities. In other words, proximity matters for spillovers when civil war areas are surrounded with weak states. According to him, in addition to common variables measuring civil war onset risk via domestic capacities, the elites should be able to connect with the public sentiment to prevent local groups from participating in rebellious activities, guide them into demanding

⁷²⁶ Alex Braithwaite, "Resisting infection: How state capacity conditions conflict contagion", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.47, No.3, 2010, p.313.

⁷²⁷ Hegre, Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis...", p.531.

⁷²⁸ Erika Forsberg, "Transnational Dimensions of Civil War: Clustering, Contagion, and Connectedness" in T. David Mason, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell eds., **What do We Know about Civil Wars**, Boulder: Rowman&Littlefield, forthcoming, p.10, http://www.saramitchell.org/forsberg_chapter (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁷²⁹ Kathman, "Civil War Contagion...", pp.997-998.

their rights through political means and should have enough power to secure their borders and suppress external threats as well as illegal activities.⁷³⁰

In addition to the target state's characteristics, *target state's actions* play a role in contagion and diffusion processes. First, as spillover factors may encourage a third party's citizens to oppose to their governments due to former grievances and demands, leaders tend to repress their people preemptively before violence starts within the national borders. The elites' fear of diffusion/contagion, their wish to differ from surrounding examples and aim to prevent a probable internal violence lead to subsequent repressive policies,⁷³¹ but these attempts only facilitate the conflict's further spread within national borders.⁷³² Secondly, as mentioned before, neighboring states often intervene in warring countries' internal affairs by supporting rebel groups. This is a risky policy, which can create a boomerang effect and internal displeasure, because rebel groups are not reliable partners. They benefit from material, logistic and informative aid provided, but they do not work on behalf of their supporters.⁷³³ Hence, there is always the risk of turning against their supporters if they fall afoul with their policies or if they are not pleased with the support that they receive. Furthermore, their knowledge about host territories, illegal activities, sanctuaries, recruitment abilities and influence within the meddling states provide these groups with various opportunities to spread their war. Concerning internal displeasure, intervening in other states' civil wars can damage reputation and legitimacy of the intervening governments and divert national resources from domestic needs. Thus, discontent populations of meddler states can violently or non-violently oppose to their government with view to channel attention and expenditure back to internal issues and opposing groups can take advantage of the troubling circumstances to replace their governments through rebellious actions.⁷³⁴

To sum up, the characteristics of the conflicts, the features of warring countries, the links between warring states and third parties, the traits of target countries and their actions can contribute to contagion and diffusion processes. While these dynamics can be used to trace civil war onset causalities and understand

⁷³⁰ Braithwaite, "Resisting infection...", p.314-318.

⁷³¹ Nathan Danneman, Emily Hencken Ritter, "Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.58, No.2, 2014, p.255, 272-273.

⁷³² Black, **The Spread of...**, p.25.

⁷³³ Byman, Pollack, "Things Fall...", p.23.

⁷³⁴ Black, **The Spread of...**, pp.65-66.

how diverse factors affect the internationalization of civil wars through states, non-state groups and individuals, they mostly help us understand the interrelated networks of civil wars and their pressurizing effect on all actors. In addition, security related concerns are the key factors that pave the way for interventions and these concerns mostly arise from civil war externalities.

Security concerns of third parties can depend on many circumstances and keeping in mind that one of the main purposes of interventions into civil wars is to deal with violence within a state's neighbors and block externalities that can harm other actors, it is realistic to expect interventions as a result of these concerns. Civil war penetrates security webs in waves. First, its primary effects are felt in the surroundings of the conflict area, afterwards it may start to destabilize the whole region and if the violence is not suppressed, it can become an international problem. The spread of violence brings forward the prominence of national security and may lead to an intervention decision in order to eliminate the encountered threats and limit the violence to the warring state itself.⁷³⁵ As a rule, states do not violate other states' sovereignty unless they are attacked. An assault may establish the legal excuse to intervene by creating an action-reaction relation in the context of a proportionate self-defense. Yet, the perception of threat can also impact the actor's decision to intervene despite the lack of a real assault. In security dilemmas, agents fight with each other with the expectation of a counter attack. Hence in highly intense civil wars, the perception of danger can push an outsider to intervene and, as in the case of inter-state wars, uncertainty and fear can become the driving force behind interventions.⁷³⁶ Regarding this destabilizing threat, neighbors face the highest risks because they face higher uncertainty than others. Even the degree of proximity in terms of the length of shared borders can increase fear and uncertainty.⁷³⁷

This situation reflects on the intervention decision, which becomes more complex due to the level of costs, risks and benefits. This evaluation process is also related to the capacity of the state as much as it does to its intention to reduce the threat and uncertainty. If a state has limited strength and cannot control the

⁷³⁵ Kathman, "Civil War Contagion...", pp.991-992.

⁷³⁶ Siverson, Starr, "Opportunity, Willingness...", p.50.

⁷³⁷ Harvey Starr, "'Opportunity' and 'willingness' as ordering concepts in the study of war", **International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations**, Vol.4, No.4, 1978, p.377.

continuum of the externalities, uncertainty keeps growing.⁷³⁸ Regarding the tangible threats and civil war externalities faced by neighbors, first, *stray fire* can take a very unsettling and hostile form. Battle zones are frequently in peripheral areas, close to the borders next to neighbors, away from big cities or capitals as rebel groups start gaining power away from the central authority's control regardless of the type of civil war (secessionist or governmental). Also, in civil wars between governments and ethnic groups, combats generally take place near borders where ethnic groups typically live and this causes damages to the neighbor's security infrastructure and close cities in the form of stray fire. Secondly, rebellious fighters run to neighbor states to regain force when they are injured during combats, and governmental forces keep tracking them into neighbor's territories. This action of *hot pursuit* can turn into *cross-border fighting* when they exit national borders and enter into foreign lands.⁷³⁹ These practices provoke neighbors. Furthermore, when there are refugees in neighboring states, their *camps become the target* of warring governments, who see them as rivals in asylum.⁷⁴⁰ Refugees may not ceasefire after taking shelter in neighboring states and may keep performing attacks against their homeland. In that case, the warring government can accuse the refugee-receiving state of supporting rebels and may *attack the host state to prevent* further support. From the perspective of refugee hosting neighbor, the government may be conducting a proxy war through a rebel group, it may be too weak to control its borders or may deny its involvement even though the accusations are true.⁷⁴¹ In either case, *cross-border counter insurgency, hot pursuits, bombing of refugee camps and retaliatory attacks* violate state sovereignty and provoke the neighboring state to defend itself and prevent these externalizations.⁷⁴²

As mentioned before, the externalities of civil wars are not just related to close areas; the interactions at regional and international level are deepened by globalization process. If the spread of violence is not controlled, the destabilizing outcomes of civil wars, such as state failures or spillovers induce international organizations to step into this fragile environment and prevent it from becoming an

⁷³⁸ Most, Starr, "Diffusion, Reinforcement...", p.935

⁷³⁹ Salehyan, "No Shelter...", p.57.

⁷⁴⁰ Lischer, **Dangerous Sanctuaries...**, p.11.

⁷⁴¹ Salehyan, "The Externalities of...", p.791.


⁷⁴² Gleditsch, Salehyan, Schultz, "Fighting at Home...", pp.485-487, 497.

international issue.⁷⁴³ If fear becomes an international concern, due to unstable environments created by the civil war conditions, which invite all kinds of rebel groups' activities to the region, the international community may mobilize because non-state groups are located, are being trained and improve in unauthorized grounds. Non-resistance against these illegal actions encourages further recruitment and victimization of civilian populations. Victimization and utilization of civilians increase the levels of battle related deaths while they undermine the value of human lives. This in turn further radicalizes the rebel groups in the battlefield, who can migrate and spread to different regions and become threats.⁷⁴⁴



⁷⁴³ Iqbal, Starr, "Bad Neighbors...", pp.325-329.

⁷⁴⁴ Byman, Pollack, "Things Fall...", pp.8-10.

Figure 8 – Template of Outward Internationalization

Thus, third parties may intervene in civil wars in order to safeguard local populations, block spillovers, profit from new opportunities and protect their prerogatives, provide advantage to one of the belligerents, or put an end to violence. They also engage in complex relations with belligerent actors via involvement strategies to promote their interests. The question arising from these engagement relations regardless of their motivations or methods is whether they are successful in ending violence or whether they end up escalating the existing fights and contributing to further spillovers. While empirical studies show mixed results, findings indicate that they can escalate civil wars' intensity, enlarge their scope,

lengthen the conflicts' duration, create new wars or get successful results.⁷⁴⁵ Thus, before moving on to our case studies, the impact of interventions and involvements will be briefly discussed to observe how they may affect the course of events.

c. Impact of internationalizations on internal conflicts

Civil wars *outbreak* between a government and one or more rebel groups, due to causes mentioned in the previous sections. As discussed, the outbreak of a civil war can both be triggered by an international element (involvement or intervention; contagion or diffusion) or can result from domestic dynamics (economic, political, socio-cultural, demographic etc.). Regarding international elements, civil wars and third parties generate contagion or diffusion processes, which start new wars by producing further inspiration, guidance, activism (through diaspora or affiliated states), mobilization facilities (in the form of training, arms, supplies, combatants, sanctuaries etc.) and influencing belligerent parties' capacities.⁷⁴⁶ The involvement of third parties into civil wars via various support methods facilitates contagion/diffusion of the initial civil wars into other states. This outcome applies to both cases, in which the other state is either too weak to protect itself or too ambitious to stay out. Thus, the primary outcome of direct and indirect intervention process is escalation/extension and contagion/diffusion. As contagion/diffusion is the reason for escalation/extension, this latter can also be a reason for the former one: Civil war can become "*the inciting incident; the catalyst*"⁷⁴⁷ for a new civil war or an intervention decision.

Secondly, following the outbreak, there are two other dimensions of civil war processes: Duration and outcome. Thus, while internationalization can be observed in the outbreak continuum, it also affects the duration of civil wars as well as their outcomes. *Duration* implies the advancement of civil wars when new actors get involved, escalation/extension is observed, battle deaths accumulate, contagion or diffusion processes operate, new goals and interests add up etc.; and it indicates the operational context of war. In the previous section, we have examined what can

⁷⁴⁵ Khosla, "Third World...", p.1143.

⁷⁴⁶ Ted R. Gurr, "The Internationalization of Protracted Communal Conflicts since 1945: Which groups, where and how", in Midlarsky, **The Internationalization of...**, p.27.

⁷⁴⁷ This is a quotation from the movie **Lucky Number Slevin**, said by Mr. Goodkat, directed and written by Paul McGuigan, Jason Smilovic, distributed by Ascendant Pictures, Capitol Films, The Complex Studio, FilmEngine, VIP 4, DVD, USA: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, The Weinstein Company, 2006, sc. 00:15:37 – 00:15:45.

happen during the civil wars in detail: Both involvements and interventions have the ability to influence the progression of war. Involvements in the form of economic, political, military and ideological support from an ethnic kin, various rebel groups or other states and interventions of international organizations, states or state groups are impactful for belligerent actor mobilization and success. These types of support can be both in favor of a warring government or a rebel group, but regardless of their types and targets, these activities can escalate violence, create the circumstances for contagion/diffusion processes and affect the course of conflicts. In this section, rather than searching what duration includes, the international dynamics' impact on the period of civil war will be discussed.

Outcome, on the other hand, means the end of a civil war, when one of the parties, government or rebels, achieves a victory or both parties decide that they can make peace. Thus, an outcome can either be a single-sided victory or a double-sided negotiated settlement.⁷⁴⁸ Surely, conflicts can also last for years without coming to an end by becoming protracted, where only impermanent ceasefires are implemented to halt combats without reaching a conclusive outcome. But when there is a clear end, the outcome of a civil war signifies the start of the post-conflict era, during when peace negotiations can continue, agreements can be implemented, keeping the peace by assuring economic growth, social harmony (through programs such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), political institutionalization and infrastructure becomes the focus until civil war recurs. Thus, it represents a whole new phase on civil wars, which is outside the scope of the present research. In this context, what matters to our research is to observe if international activities within the duration of civil wars have any effect on the outcome of the war.

To sum up, until now, the influence of internationalization on the progress of civil war has been discussed, but, in this section, the focus will be on the effect of internationalization on the temporal and result-based angles of civil wars.

As civil wars are complex events, when focusing on the duration and outcome of civil wars, both structural conditions related to the emergence of conflicts and variable factors that take place during the conflicts play different roles. Structural conditions mostly concern characteristics of the warring country, such as GDP rates,

⁷⁴⁸ Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline and Kyle A. Joyce, "Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.45, No.3, 2008, pp.346-347.

natural resources, ethnic balances, political institutions and variable characteristics are related to the external interveners' actions.⁷⁴⁹ While structural conditions can affect the external actors' participation in the conflicts, new parties' variant influences can alter the function of the structural conditions. In this context, “(1) *the nature of the issues underlying conflicts*, (2) *the internal politics of each side*, (3) *the military balance in the field*, (4) *the role played by outside parties*”⁷⁵⁰ are the variables that effect the duration and outcome of civil wars. Thus, first, while assessing the effect on duration and outcome, both initial country characteristics in disposal of internal parties and additional factors brought by external parties should be considered. Secondly, following traits that can affect the duration and the outcome should also be taken into account: The variety of causes triggering the civil war, new goals implemented during the progress of civil war, relations amongst the agents relying on conflicting demands, informational exchanges, commitment problems⁷⁵¹ and multiplication of self-interest seeking players.⁷⁵²

Regarding the internal features of civil wars, strong rebels with high military capacity fight shorter wars. Also, strong governments hold an advantageous position and are likely to win wars at the beginning but if they cannot obtain quick victories, their chances start decreasing and wars tend to prolong. Moreover, weak rebels, who particularly fight in the periphery that they have control are more likely to fight longer wars. While democratic institutions alone do not have the ability to reduce the duration of wars once they onset, the existence of a political parties related to rebel groups can have an impact on shortening war durations. Considering civil war types, *coups d'état* are linked to shorter wars⁷⁵³ as well as anti-colonial wars. If rebel groups rely on extracting natural resources, such as opium and diamonds thus if a civil war is based on greed and rebels benefit from cost-reducing sources, they tend to fight longer civil wars. In addition to these, conflicts revolving around land or

⁷⁴⁹ Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Måns Söderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.41, No.3, 2004, p.253.

⁷⁵⁰ James B. Rule, “Book Reviews: Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End edited by Roy Licklider, New York: New York University Press, 1993, 354p”, **American Political Science Review**, Vol.89, No.2, p.517.

⁷⁵¹ David E. Cunningham, Scott Gates, “The Impact of International Intervention on Conflict Trends”, **Paper Prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association**, Washington, DC, 30 August 2010, p.2.

⁷⁵² David E. Cunningham, “Veto Players and Civil War Duration”, **American Journal of Political Science**, Vol.50, No.4, 2006, p.877.

⁷⁵³ David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome”, **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.53, No.4, 2009, pp.586-591.

natural divisions, which also involve ethnic issues, such as sons of soils war, represent highly indivisible conflicts and thus mostly continue for longer periods.⁷⁵⁴

It can also be concluded that ethnicity based problems cause longer wars.⁷⁵⁵ Ethnic fractionalization, on the other hand, has a non-linear effect on war duration: Highly divided societies tend to make shorter wars, while moderately fractionalized states between a majority and a minority have longer wars due to their high cohesion within warring groups but religious fractionalization seems to have no effect on the duration of civil wars showing that ethnicity may be a more effective reason for group cohesion.⁷⁵⁶ Population size seems to be positively correlated with war duration in almost all quantitative tests but mountainous terrains, military personnel numbers, GDP, battle deaths and lootable resources lead to conflicting results.

While larger governmental armies are linked to a higher possibility of ending the conflict⁷⁵⁷, they can also cause longer civil wars as they are targeting victories instead of settlements⁷⁵⁸, mountainous areas are likely to prolong fighting⁷⁵⁹, GDP has no relation to the duration of war, high battle deaths are associated with longer wars⁷⁶⁰ and lootable resources help rebels continue fighting. It is also found that lootable resources, except diamonds, are non-significant with war duration, intense wars result in shorter conflicts, high GDP rates indicate more persisting governments who tend to fight until victory⁷⁶¹, while mountainous terrains can shorten the duration of the conflict.⁷⁶²

Even though there is lack of consensus among empirical results, diverse studies emphasize the balance or imbalance of capacity between parties as the key to conflict termination and duration.⁷⁶³ During wars, both parties try to increase their capacity to

⁷⁵⁴ James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.41, No.3, 2004, p.277.

⁷⁵⁵ Ibrahim Elbadawi, Nicholas Sambanis, "External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars", **paper presented at the World Bank's Development Economic Research Group (DECRG) conference on "The Economics and Politics of Civil Conflicts"**, New Jersey: Princeton University, March 18-19, 2000, p.15.

⁷⁵⁶ Collier, Hoeffler, Söderbom, "On the Duration...", pp.263-267.

⁷⁵⁷ Gilligan, Sergenti, "Do UN Interventions...", p.101.

⁷⁵⁸ T. David Mason, Patrick J. Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach", **Journal Of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.40, No.4, 1996, p.546.

⁷⁵⁹ Gilligan, Sergenti, "Do UN Interventions...", p.101.

⁷⁶⁰ Cunningham, "Veto Players...", p.889.

⁷⁶¹ Aysegul Aydin, Patrick M. Regan, "Networks of Third-party Interveners and Civil War Duration", **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol.18, No.3, 2012, pp.588-589.

⁷⁶² Cunningham, "Veto Players...", p.889.

⁷⁶³ Elbadawi, Sambanis, "External Interventions..."; Collier, Hoeffler, Söderbom, "On the Duration..."; Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, Paivi Lujala, "Geography, Rebel Capability, and the

win war (soldiers, troops, weapons, logistics, economic resources, and intelligence) and structural conditions are important for their role in these calculi.⁷⁶⁴

There are also diverse approaches with different focus on the subject: Economic approaches evaluate the costs of war on the outcome and the duration of civil wars and argue that a decrease in wars cost will cause longer wars due to reduced motivation to end the war. Informational approaches highlight the perceptions about warring parties' capacities and suggest that information about the opposing side's demands and capability affect the war duration and outcome. Commitment approaches emphasize on the motivations of belligerent parties to commit to agreements and argue that the credibility of the opposing side's intentions influence the duration and outcome of wars. The veto player approach uses the number of warring parties and their diverge demands to explain the duration of the outcome in civil wars.⁷⁶⁵ This is why when third parties are involved or intervene in civil wars, their greatest impact is on the balance of power between the parties in different ways. They can alter the time until the end of war, define the outcome by changing the economic conditions of the warring parties, influencing information exchanges, contributing to commitment problems and increasing veto players in the war. In the end, irrelevant of the affected dynamics, foreign involvements have profound effects on the progress of a civil war. They can both promote or prevent a particular outcome and inevitably change the duration of the war.

The main debate about the duration and outcome of civil wars goes beyond the internal belligerents or their demands and revolve around third parties that bring their own agenda into the war and become one of the civil war actors who have their own goals, bear lower costs of fighting than domestic actors, do not negotiate easily and have the ability to influence any other actors in the war.⁷⁶⁶ In this context, empirical researches evaluate the impact of third parties according to the nature of their involvements in biased, neutral, simultaneous and opposing manners in order to assess the diverse intentions behind interventions and their diverse impact.

Duration of Civil Conflict", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.53, No.4, 2009, 544–569; Cunningham, Gleditsch, Salehyan, "It Takes..."

⁷⁶⁴ Kim, "Third-Party Intervention...", p.59.

⁷⁶⁵ Cunningham, "Veto Players...", p.876.

⁷⁶⁶ David E. Cunningham, "Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.47, No.2, pp.116-119.

There are five preliminary points to be made before continuing with these measurements: First, as mentioned before, strategic and opportunistic interests are mostly linked to unilateral and biased interventions, which can also turn into multilateral or minilateral engagements in case of convergence of goals or divergence of concerns over intermediate issues. Humanitarian reasons, on the other hand, bring forward multilateral and unbiased interventions, unless one major power undertakes the costs of the intervention, due to its intense relations with the warring country or the severity of the violence necessitates a biased engagement.⁷⁶⁷ Secondly, there is a natural capability gap between governments and rebel groups: Governments already possess permanent armies, benefit from national economic resources, and hold various advantages against newly established belligerents. In that case, strong governments are already likely to defeat weak rebel groups without outside assistance.

Thus, outside interveners ally with governments when they face strong rebels whom they cannot beat alone. External involvement on the side of the rebels who normally need more outside help is likely when they are already strong, most likely to win and the intervention is not likely to fail.⁷⁶⁸ Third, as the balance between warring parties changes following an external involvement, interventions can equalize the capacity of the parties by strengthening a weaker party, can break a deadlock by empowering one of the parties⁷⁶⁹ or cause a lock-in either by supporting both parties or blocking any support to the warring parties.⁷⁷⁰ Fourth, the choice of sides depends on the policy of the intervener who may either wish to change the prewar status quo of the warring country or restore it. Finally, measuring the impact of interventions on the duration of civil wars is highly problematic because longer civil wars attract more parties and it is difficult to separate the cause and effect: Conflicts last for long time due to their tougher components (indivisible issues, persisting parties, resources available) and, as they continue, they attract more

⁷⁶⁷ Kim, **Third-Party Intervention...**, p.179.

⁷⁶⁸ Gent, "Going in...", p.714.

⁷⁶⁹ David Carment, Dane Rowlands, "The Role of Bias in Third Party Intervention: Theory and Evidence", **BCSIA Discussion Paper 2001-08**, International Security Program, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 2001, p.14.

⁷⁷⁰ Balch-Lindsay, Enterline Joyce, "Third-Party Intervention...", p.359.

interventions and involvements, so it becomes unclear whether the longer duration is related to the original problems or the additional actors.⁷⁷¹

Luttwak suggests that interventions only tend to interrupt the natural course of wars by relieving warring parties and offer them more time to fight instead of reaching a peace agreement relying on exhaustion,⁷⁷² most of the empirical studies show that any intervention in a civil war tends to lengthen its duration.⁷⁷³ That is mainly linked to rising player numbers in the game, who make a negotiation much more difficult,⁷⁷⁴ irrespective of any good intentions to help ending the war.⁷⁷⁵ On the other hand, due to commitment problems, external actors can contribute to the conclusion and enforcement of peace agreements by passing hesitation and conflicts of interest.⁷⁷⁶ Apart from these general assumptions on third parties' interventions, disaggregated research on neutral and biased interventions present more insightful and diverse results.

Regarding biased interventions in favor of rebels, the most common argument is that they help to shorten the duration of the war and defeat governmental forces.⁷⁷⁷ Even if the government cannot be defeated, they assure that the internal conflict endures for a shorter time and there is a favorable outcome for the rebels. Because external support increases the capacity of the rebel group, which could already challenge the government's military and political capacity.⁷⁷⁸ Moreover, thanks to foreign support, rebel groups put more pressure on the government as they now have to fight against an even more powerful opponent capable of winning the war. Thus, the government will become more likely to give up the combat in the short run.⁷⁷⁹ On the other hand, Aydın and Regan make a distinction between the different types of rebel biased interventions and emphasize the importance of different bandwagoning tendencies in favor of rebels. They argue that if multiparty involvements include diverging interests, they may have no impact on the war duration because they would

⁷⁷¹ Patrick M. Regan, "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts", **Journal Of Conflict Resolution**, Vol.46, No.1, 2002, pp.57-59.

⁷⁷² Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol.78, No.4, 1999, p.44.

⁷⁷³ Sambanis, "Using Case...", p.319; Regan, "Third-Party Interventions...", p.71; Elbadawi, Sambanis, "External Interventions...", p.10.

⁷⁷⁴ Cunningham, "Veto Players...", p.876.

⁷⁷⁵ Cunningham, "Blocking Resolution...", p.125.

⁷⁷⁶ Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, Joyce, "Third-Party Intervention...", p.348.

⁷⁷⁷ Collier, Hoeffler, Söderbom, "On the Duration...", p.267-268.

⁷⁷⁸ Patricia L. Sullivan, Johannes Karreth, "The conditional impact of military intervention on internal armed conflict outcomes", **Conflict Management and Peace Science**, Vol.32, No.3, pp.271-272, 283-284.

⁷⁷⁹ Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, Joyce, "Third-Party Intervention...", p.349, 356.

not be intense enough to impose a common policy. Yet, if bandwagoning is established with similar interests, it has the ability to decrease the duration of the war by facilitating the creation of a common policy for rebels and putting pressure on them to make an acceptable agreement.⁷⁸⁰

Moreover, other empirical studies show that the type of foreign support can have diverse effect and increase the time of the war by establishing a convertible rebel capacity and decreasing their intention to settle. While troop support to rebels allows them to engage in combats due to their unconvertible nature, it has the effect of reducing the duration of war. On the other hand, financial support and small arms can be used to gain alternative goals, and be traded for the long-term needs of the rebels. Thus, they may have the effect of lengthening the conflict duration.⁷⁸¹ Also, sanctuaries and external bases in foreign lands can have prolonging effects on war duration by tempting rebels to engage in hit and run combats instead of using more open tactics that can lead to direct defeat or victory.⁷⁸² Finally, interventions or signs of probable interventions in support of rebels have the ability to affect the rebel behavior and encourage them to coalesce and benefit from the foreign support.⁷⁸³

On the other hand, pro-government interventions are less effective than pro-rebel interventions. Usually they have no effect on the victory of the government,⁷⁸⁴ but they can reduce the odds of certain loss against rebel groups. This indicates that they may promote negotiated settlements by helping the governments to win over rebel groups.⁷⁸⁵ Thus, while biased interventions in favor of governments are found to be ineffective⁷⁸⁶ and uncorrelated with the duration of war,⁷⁸⁷ especially against weak rebels, it is still important for a government to increase its capacity against a powerful opponent who has the ability to gain a victory. Also, these interventions have the risk of unifying rebel groups against governments, who are weak due to their corrupted, unpopular image and unsettling domestic politics.⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁸⁰ Aydin, Regan, "Networks of...", pp.586-587.

⁷⁸¹ Katherine Sawyer, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, William Reed, "The Role of External Support in Civil War Termination", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 4 September 2015, pp.6-7, 16-18.

⁷⁸² Aydin, Regan, "Networks of...", p.576.

⁷⁸³ Lounsbery, "Foreign Military...", pp.138-139.

⁷⁸⁴ Gent, "Going in...", p.714.

⁷⁸⁵ Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, Joyce, Third-Party Intervention..., p.349, 356.

⁷⁸⁶ Collier, Hoeffler, Söderbom, "On the Duration...", p.267.

⁷⁸⁷ Regan, "Third-Party Interventions...", p.71.

⁷⁸⁸ Sullivan, Karreth, "The conditional impact...", pp.271-274, 283-284.

Additional international support to these regimes can unintentionally cause a backlash and help rebel groups gain more support from people even though the intervention can be based on humanitarian reasons. Thus, it may not even be able to help the government to close the capacity gap and can only lengthen the time until the rebel victory.⁷⁸⁹ On the other hand, large-scale interventions in support of governments or the high probability of those in case of high level liberal or political affinities, can become a deterrent for rebels, who will not engage in combats and this will create less conflict prone states⁷⁹⁰, but once rebellion onsets they are less likely to deter fighters to split and stop fighting.⁷⁹¹

Regarding neutral interventions, empirical results indicate that they tend to cause even longer wars than biased ones. Neutral interventions aim at keeping both parties at their current condition and work on the imposition of a peace agreement by mainly creating buffer zones between the warring parties or inhibiting their access to materials. Yet, they only tend to contribute to the stability if violence has already ended but they are not successful at ending the war.⁷⁹² Their effect is mostly found to be positive in equalizing the capabilities on the battleground, but they also create longer stalemate between parties where belligerents keep fighting but without gaining a victory⁷⁹³ as in this way the chances of defeat are reduced for both parties and this complicates the resolution process.⁷⁹⁴

Similarly, the UN operations are also effective in maintaining peace but they are unsuccessful in ending the violence or having a positive influence in battle zones. The UN peacekeeping missions tend to be useful while their influence on ongoing wars is absent and they cannot reduce war durations.⁷⁹⁵ While they are more cooperative than unilateral interventions and include a larger range of policies, these operations are not effective in creating any quick de-escalation between the warring parties. They can eventually manage to freeze the violence but even in that case, the problem seems to be forestalled rather than resolved.⁷⁹⁶ Thus, they have no causal

⁷⁸⁹ Kim, **Third-party intervention...**, p.8, 92.

⁷⁹⁰ Cunningham, Gates, "The Impact of...", pp.23-25.

⁷⁹¹ Lounsbury, "Foreign Military...", p.139.

⁷⁹² Regan, "Third-Party Interventions...", pp.71-72.

⁷⁹³ Carment, Rowlands, "The Role of...", p.14.

⁷⁹⁴ Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, Joyce, "Third-Party Intervention..." p.359.

⁷⁹⁵ Gilligan, Sergenti, "Do UN...", pp.113-114.

⁷⁹⁶ Paul F. Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider, Paul R. Hensel, "United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict", **International Organization**, Vol.50, No.4, 1996, pp.685-688.

impact on the duration of war⁷⁹⁷ and their effectiveness in creating a resolution is debatable.

Finally, more complex intervention methods, as simultaneous interventions or opposing interventions, have no positive effect on the duration or outcome of the civil war. If anything, they only create longer civil wars,⁷⁹⁸ where lock-in is promoted and bargaining becomes more complicated than usual.⁷⁹⁹



⁷⁹⁷ Regan, “Third-Party Interventions...”, p.72.

⁷⁹⁸ Aydin, Regan, “Networks of...” p.586; Regan, “Third-Party Interventions...”, pp.70-71.

⁷⁹⁹ Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention...”, p.349, 356-361.

PART III - ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES: AFGHANISTAN, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND IRAQ

For understanding the complex mechanism of civil war internationalization, including the actors, methods and motives, a theoretical framework should be applied to identify comparative patterns, converging and diverging elements of internationalization of civil wars and assess the consistency of earlier empirical findings. This highlights two important features of choosing case studies: First, cases are chosen in order to lead to rich and diverse results; second, the timeframe is selected so that it could allow a viable comparison.

The first concern compelled us to select ICWs so that the maximum number of elements can be found within the internationalization patterns, different regional variables may be observable, periodical limitation can be applied and their attributes fit into the war categories rather than the conflict categories according to the quantitative classifications of diverse datasets. Three cases were chosen, namely Afghanistan, the DRC and Iraq. These countries permit us to examine the how diverse civil war causes, dynamics and internationalization processes can be, but at the same time, we can analyze how they have similar characteristics, such as state failure, autocratic regimes, and ethnic tensions. Moreover, the wars in each of these countries influenced their regions deeply, while they were immensely internationalized with multiple actors and they all had a long history of civil wars.

Regarding the second feature, the end of the Cold War is a milestone for the present research. Even though civil wars did not appear as a new and distinct phenomenon after the Cold War, their conditions, which are perpetuated by international system and national dynamics have changed. The Cold War period was influenced by the characteristics of a bipolar international system, which led two bloc leaders into providing material, ideological and military support to warring parties of civil wars to gain global and regional leverage against each other, to undermine each other's authority in remote areas and ultimately to become the dominant power by creating spheres of influence. This competition turned the Third World into a war zone and its end marked the beginning of a whole new era, which

developed its own dynamics and effects on regions, countries and rebel organizations.⁸⁰⁰ On the other hand, when the Cold War came to an end, a new world order between multipolar and unipolar systems started, in which internationalization gained a new meaning other than ideological rivalry and civil wars occurred outside the bipolarized world's restrictions. In addition to these changes, all civil wars throughout the histories of selected cases have own internal dynamics and historical characteristics, which constitute the onset environment for subsequent civil wars. In this context, earlier wars, which increase the war-proneness of the state, shape the society and reveal inter-balance mechanisms within a country should not be completely overlooked. Thus, in order to avoid too much detail but to provide a consistent background, the war timeframe of Afghanistan, the DRC and Iraq will start from the end of the Second World War.⁸⁰¹ Yet, the evaluation of their ICWs will be starting from the end of the Cold War, due to the changes in the war and intervention reasoning.

Chapter I - Three Civil Wars, Three Geographies, and Three Histories: Reasons and Processes of the civil wars

Three cases that can epitomize the links between the internationalization patterns and civil wars are Afghanistan, the DRC and Iraq. Long-term civil wars in these countries, which have started during the Cold War years and reach nowadays, have attracted immense attention from the international community due to their wide-range regional and international impacts. They possess diverse elements and actors due to massive interventions and involvements. Moreover, their chaotic environments provide safe havens to numerous transnational and local NSAs. In that regard, they present the most convenient platforms to apply inward and outward internationalization templates. However, in order to understand the motivations of third parties and internationalizing elements of these cases, firstly their civil war

⁸⁰⁰ Regarding the system traits following the end of the Cold War: See. Buzan, "New Patterns of...", pp. 431-451; Robert Jervis, "The Future of...", pp. 39-73.

⁸⁰¹ Inter-state wars will be included into these lists only if they are directly related to Intra-state war onset, duration or termination. If they play a secondary role in involvement relations they will be mentioned within the text or footnotes. Otherwise, they are perceived to represent a different war mentality, which do not obligatorily occur within national territory, do not effect daily life as dominantly as intra-state wars and thus they are excluded from the lists due to low relevancy. However, Extra-state wars are directly included to these lists due to classification distinctions; they have the probability of corresponding to internationalized intra-state wars. Finally, non-state conflicts will be listed without extra detailing in order to show daily instability in national territories and within societies.

dynamics and historical traits should be illustrated. That way, we will be able to see the big picture of their civil wars and perceive their contexts that led to complex internationalizations after the end of the Cold War.

Section I - Afghanistan: Black Box of International Politics

As the first of the selected case studies, Afghanistan represents a substantial issue in world politics. In order to understand its international elements, in this section, firstly, wars in the Afghani territory that took place after the Second World War will be revealed to exhibit its historical context. To that end, the datasets of COW and UCDP/PRIO will be presented separately in order to observe if they have diverse perceptions on the types of conflicts or they agree on war periods and types. Secondly, the internal traits of Afghanistan that can contribute to its war proneness will be treated according to the datasets of Doyle & Sambanis, Fearon & Laitin and PITF. As these datasets offer more internally focused information, they will lead us to evaluate the domestic heritages, which resulted in the civil wars and the internal dynamics that steered the motivations of third parties behind their interventions and involvements. Finally, internationalized intra-state wars of Afghanistan in post-Cold War period will be taken into focus, in order to understand the political and legal context of the ICWs, their actors and the chains of events related to the onset, duration and termination of them. In this way, we will be able to see the comprehensive dynamics of Afghan civil wars before evaluating them with the inward and outward internationalization patterns.

a. Types and periods of wars after the Second World War

Afghanistan was liberated from the British domination by taking advantage of the weakness of the British army after the First World War and gained its independence in 1919 following the third Anglo-Afghan War (the first one was between 1839 and 1842 and the second one was between 1879-1880).⁸⁰² After its independence and until 1929, it witnessed two intra-state wars (1924-1925 and 1928-1929), both in relation to the reformation process of Afghanistan. While the ruler Amānullāh Khān survived the first civil war, a Tajik bandit, Habibullah Kalakani, won the second one, drove Khan away from power and put an end at the

⁸⁰² Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union and Afghanistan", **Current History**, Vol.82, No.486, 1983, p.318.

modernization era of Afghanistan. On the other hand, after the seizure of power by the Musahiban brothers from Kalakani and within nine months Afghanistan went through a stabilized and relatively peaceful period until 1978.⁸⁰³ Despite the political changes in Afghanistan over time and even after its continuous warfare, which started after 1978, a major characteristic of the country that did not change has been the tribal structure of Afghanistan, which acknowledges a certain amount of private zones to each ethnic identity groups.⁸⁰⁴ Moreover, Ghilgazi and Durrani clans have always been the dominant actors in Afghan politics, which still remains as a fact that has not changed.⁸⁰⁵

Regarding the period following 1978, Afghanistan wars have peculiar characteristics due to their duration and diversity: The country has been in a continuous warfare for the last four decades with multiple war types and varying actors. The complexity of the Afghan case allows us to observe the effect of different international systems on war types, major and minor actor interventions and involvements, coalition formations and unilateral actions, inward and outward internationalizations as well as escalation and diffusion of conflicts.

⁸⁰³ Thomas Barfield, **Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History**, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010, p.169.

⁸⁰⁴ Olivier Roy, **Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp.11-15.

⁸⁰⁵ Ahmed Shah, the founder of the modern state of Afghanistan in 1747 and Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014 are both from Durrani family as well as various other political Afghan leaders. See. Abraham Rosman, Paula G. Rubel, Maxine Weisgrau, **The Tapestry of Culture: An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology**, Lanham: Altamira Press, 2009, pp.349-350.

Table 10 – COW's Classification on Afghan Wars⁸⁰⁶

Year	War Type	Parties
1978	Intra-State War	Government of Afghanistan vs. Leftist Military
1978-1980	Internationalized Intra-State war	Governments of Afghanistan and USSR vs. Mujahedeen groups ⁸⁰⁷
1980-1989	Extra-state war	Government of Afghanistan and USSR vs. Mujahedeen groups
1989-1992	Intra-State war	Government of Afghanistan vs. Mujahedeen groups
1992-2001	Intra-State war	Government of Afghanistan vs. Mujahedeen groups
2001-2001	Inter-state war	Government of Afghanistan vs. Governments of the USA, Canada, France, the United Kingdom (UK) & Australia
2001-2007	Extra-state war	Governments of the USA, France, Australia, Germany, the UK, Canada & Afghanistan vs. Al-Qaida & the Taliban

According to the COW data, in 1978 the leftwing, under the umbrella of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), initiated a coup d'état against Da'ud Khan, who had come to power following a bloodless coup in 1973, abolished monarchy, established the Afghanistan Republic with the support of the PDPA itself.⁸⁰⁸ The coup d'état, known as the Saur Revolution of 1978, brought Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin to power, which led to a civil war with 3,000 battle deaths in one year.⁸⁰⁹ The communist influence in Afghan politics and the handover of power created reactions from religious anti-Soviet groups (*ulema*) and PDPA factions (disfavored *Maoists*) as well as diverse ethnic and tribal

⁸⁰⁶ Prepared according to The Correlates of War (COW) Project, **The Extra-State War Data (v4.0)**, 2011, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war> (accessed 15.03.2017); COW, **The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)**; COW, **The Inter-State War Data (v4.0)**.

⁸⁰⁷ Mujahedeen groups consist of varying factions as Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Society of Afghanistan), Harakat-I Inqilab-I Islami-yi Afghanistan (Movement of Islamic Revolution), Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Party-Hekmetyar), Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan-Khalis faction (Islamic Party-Khalis), Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan (National Salvation Front of Afghanistan), Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan), Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan), Military faction (forces of Shahnawaz Tanay), Hizb-i Wahdat (The Unity Party), Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami (The National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan), Taleban, UIFSA (United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan), National Liberation Front, Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Union of Afghanistan, Zadran Tribe, Nuristan Front, Islamic Revolutionary Movement, Organization of Victory Guardians of the Islamic Holy War, Invitation to the Unity of Afghanistan, Party of Islamic Thunder of Afghanistan, United Front, Council of the Islamic Revolutionary Alliance, Organization of the Holy Warriors of the Oppressed Afghanistan, Pashrau-i Jihad, Hezbollah, Islamic Alliance of Afghanistan Mujahedeen, Sayyid-Mansur-led Ismaili Militia, Jauzjani Uzbeks and other rebels including Mutineers; COW, **The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)**; UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

⁸⁰⁸ Ralph H. Magnus, Eden Naby, **Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, And Mujahid**, Colorado: Westview Press, 2002, pp. 231-233.

⁸⁰⁹ Data set covers between 1816 and 2007; COW, **Intra-State War Data (v4.0)**.

circles.⁸¹⁰ Uprisings followed discontent and in December 1979 the USSR intervened in the civil war along with the Afghan government that was fighting against anti-governmental Mujahedeen groups. This action turned the civil war into an ICW. Hence, in December 1979, the Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan and brought Babrak Karmal to power. While this shift is considered as the beginning of an extra-state war (imperial) by COW, events fueled up anti-communist backlash and brought together dissimilar Mujahedeen groups against the USSR mandated government and sparked off the ICW that continued until 1989.⁸¹¹ All these warring groups aimed to expel the Soviet army and gain governmental control, but their final agenda attached to this goal were shaped individually, because different groups received external support from different patrons, mainly the USA, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China and Iran.⁸¹² In this context, USSR backed Karmal who ruled until the end of 1986, when they started to recognize that their effort and finance policy were failing to lead to a military victory. In November 1987, Karmal was replaced by Mohammad Najibullah to manage the national reconciliation.⁸¹³ USSR, under the leadership of Gorbachev, was convinced to put an end to the Afghan problematic situation, which has been exploiting state resources without serving any objectives. The signature of the Geneva Accords, which were under debate since 1982, addressed this concern. The negotiations for these treaties were initiated between the USA, the USSR, Afghanistan and Pakistan regarding the application of non-interference and non-intervention principles: the USSR claimed that its military presence on Afghan soil did not signify an occupation but a protection against Pakistani supported Mujahedeen. Thus, for USSR to leave Afghanistan, the territorial integrity of the Afghani state had to be guaranteed against any interference and intervention. In 1988, peace talks came to an end when Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed on amending their bilateral relations by signing a non-interference agreement and allowing the return of Afghan refugees back from Pakistan. Soviets accepted to retreat militarily from the Afghan territories, while the USA and USSR declared to guarantee the application of the Accords.⁸¹⁴ In this way, the intense nine-year period

⁸¹⁰ Roy, **Islam and Resistance...**, pp. 98-99.

⁸¹¹ Ahmed Rashid, **Taliban**, UK: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2012, p.82.

⁸¹² Barnett R. Rubin, "Women and Pipelines: Afghanistan's Proxy Wars", **International Affairs**, Vol. 73, No. 2, 1997, p.285.

⁸¹³ Magnus, Naby, **Afghanistan: Mullah...**, p.128.

⁸¹⁴ Amin Saikal, **Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival**, UK: I.B.Tauris, 2004, p.201.

of extra-state/internationalized intra-state wars finished for Soviets when they withdrew their military forces in 1989 according to the Geneva Accords.

Even though the war came to an end for USSR, the intra-state war for Najibullah's regime against the Mujahedeen continued. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989, USSR continued to support the Afghan government. Yet, the fall of Berlin Wall, which was followed by the collapse of Communism and the end of Cold War, took Soviets out of the game after 1991 as supporters of Najibullah.⁸¹⁵ On the other hand, international attention on the Mujahedeen groups decreased, but did not completely disappear. While the warfare turned into a civil war from an ICW with the Soviet retreat and the withdrawal of support from the USA, the UK, China and Egypt; Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan stayed in the frame as involving parties. Also, countries, such as Russia, Uzbekistan or India, had involvements in the Afghan territory until 2001.⁸¹⁶

According to the COW datasets, intra-state war between the Afghanistan government and the Mujahedeen groups from 1989 to 2001 had two phases: 1989-1992 and 1992-2001. During the first phase of the civil war various Mujahedeen groups aimed and succeeded to overthrow Najibullah's communist government. On the other hand, the second phase witnessed two sub-stages namely between 1992-1996 and 1996-2001. Between 1992 and 1996, firstly, Mujahedeen groups (mainly Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's forces) and then the Taliban challenged the Mujahedeen based government led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. This stage of war had inter-communal intra-state war traits too, as rebel groups fought between themselves and against Rabbani to seize Kabul, the capital. Following the seizure of power by the Taliban in 1996, the second sub-stage started and continued until 2001, during when united Mujahedeen groups fought against the Taliban government under the auspices of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) to gain governmental control.⁸¹⁷

⁸¹⁵ William Maley, *Afghanistan Wars*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p.168.

⁸¹⁶ Peace Research Institute Oslo, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research (PCR) at Uppsala University (UCDP/PRIO), **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**, 2011, <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/> (accessed 15.03.2017) ; Peace Research Institute Oslo, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research (PCR) at Uppsala University (UCDP/PRIO), **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**, 2011, <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/> (accessed 15.03.2017) : Replication datasets for Stina Högblad, Therése Pettersson, Lotta Themnér, "External Support in Armed Conflict 1975–2009: Presenting new data", **Paper presented at the 52nd Annual International Studies Association Convention**, Montreal, Canada, 16-19 March, 2011.

⁸¹⁷ Dixon, Sarkees, *A Guide to...*, pp.558-560, 576-579.

In 2001, the Afghan civil war transformed into an inter-state war after the invasion of Afghanistan by the US government and their allies. This war quickly ended within the year, with the remaining presence of the interveners in the Afghan territories, changing the war into an imperial extra-state war conducted against the Taliban and al-Qaida by the newly constituted government of Afghanistan, the government of the USA and its allies.⁸¹⁸

Table 11 - UCDP&PRIO's Classification on Afghan Wars⁸¹⁹

Year	War Type	Parties
1978-1979	Intra-state War	Government of Afghanistan vs. PDPA & Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
1979	Inter-state Conflict	Government of Afghanistan vs. Government of USSR
1980-1989	Internationalized Intra-state War	Governments of Afghanistan & USSR vs. Mujahedeen groups
1989-1992	Non-State Conflicts	
1994-1996	Non-State Conflicts	
1990-2000	Intra-state War	Government of Afghanistan vs. Mujahedeen groups & UIFSA
1998	Non-State Conflicts	
2001	Internationalized Intra-state War	Government of Afghanistan vs. UIFSA and Government of Iran
2001	Inter-state War	Government of Afghanistan vs. Governments of the USA & the UK
2001	Internationalized Intra-state War	Government of the USA & varying allies ⁸²⁰ vs. Al-Qaida
2002	Intra-state Conflict	Government of Afghanistan vs. Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
2002-2004	Non-State Conflicts	
2002-2010	Internationalized Intra-state Conflict	Government of Afghanistan, Governments of the USA, the UK & varying allies vs. Al-Qaida
2003-2004	Internationalized Intra-state Conflict	Governments of Afghanistan, the USA, the UK & varying allies vs. Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan & the Taliban
2005-2014	Internationalized Intra-state War	Governments of Afghanistan, the USA, the UK, Pakistan & varying allies vs. Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan & the Taliban

⁸¹⁸ COW, **The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)**; COW, **The Inter-State War Data (v4.0)**; COW, **The Extra-State War Data (v4.0)**.

⁸¹⁹ Prepared according to UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**; Peace Research Institute Oslo, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research (PCR) at Uppsala University (UCDP/PRIO), **UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset version 2.5-2016**, 2011, <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/> (accessed 15.03.2017) : Replication dataset for Ralph Sundberg, Kristine Eck, Joakim Kreutz, "Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.49, No.2, 2012, pp.351-362; Erik Melander, Therése Pettersson, Lotta Themnér, "Organized violence, 1989-2015", **Journal of Peace Research**, 2016, Vol.53, No.5, 2016, pp.727-742.

⁸²⁰ Allies cover a wide range of profile including: Governments of Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Rumania, the UK, the USA, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Pakistan, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Jordan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Government of Singapore, Government of Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Armenia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Montenegro, South Korea, El Salvador, Tonga and Bahrain; UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

2006	Non-State Conflicts	
2010-2011	Non-State Conflicts	
2011-2012	Internationalized Intra-state Conflict	Governments of the USA, Afghanistan, Pakistan, France & Jordan vs. Al-Qaida
2013	Internationalized Intra-state Conflict	Governments of the USA, Afghanistan, Pakistan & Jordan vs. Al-Qaida
2013-2015	Internationalized Intra-state Conflict	Governments of the USA, Afghanistan & Pakistan vs. Al-Qaida
2015	Internationalized Intra-state War	Governments of the USA, Afghanistan & Pakistan vs. the Taliban
2015	Internationalized Intra-state Conflict	Governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan & the USA vs. ISIS/Daesh
2015	Non-State Conflicts	

While the UCDP/PRIO datasets agree with COW datasets in terms of actors, their classification of war phases do not match the one under the COW. According to their data, following the intra-state war in 1978, USSR firstly entered in an inter-state war with Afghanistan in 1979 by bringing Karmal to power and then in 1980, the Soviets intervened in the subsequent civil war as a new party. Following this, the civil war on Afghan soil turned into an internationalized intra-state war in lieu of an extra-state war. The following nine years are viewed as an internationalized intra-state war that continued until the withdrawal of the Soviets. During this period, UCDP/PRIO identifies three non-state conflicts between the Mujahedeen groups, which correspond to the COW's designation on governmental intra-state war for those years, during which inter-communal characteristics can be found. These non-state conflicts occurred between 1989 and 1992, between 1994 and 1996 and on 1998, and at the same time, overlapped with the phases designated above. While both datasets agree on the intra-state war classification between the end of 1989 and 2000, the events following 2001 are evaluated differently. Same as the COW datasets, the UCDP/PRIO dataset indicates an inter-state war between the government of Afghanistan and the government of the USA and its allies as a consequence of the invasion of Afghanistan. Yet, the ongoing war that started after 2001 is classified as an internationalized intra-state war or a conflict with simultaneous non-state conflicts⁸²¹, while the COW describes this period as a continuous extra-state war.

Despite the differences, the critical conclusions to draw from these datasets can be summarized as follows: (1) none of the intra-state wars in Afghanistan aimed for secession despite the number of conflicting ethnic and tribal factions (2) the war in Afghanistan between 1989 and 2000 was an intra-state war without interventions;

⁸²¹ *Ibid.*; UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset version 2.5-2016**.

(3) involvements were also present during this period as well as other war phases; (4) this war escalated massively after 2001 by becoming an international affair and turned into an internationalized intra-state war (at least according to the UCDP/PRIO data and considering the *extra-state - internationalized intra-state war* distinction of this research). Thus, as this study questions *internationalized intra-state* wars after the end of the Cold War, only the war in Afghanistan after 2001 comes into our focus.

b. Towards the Internationalized Intra-state wars after the Cold War: Underlying Causal Mechanisms

The Afghan war in 2001 stands out, not only as the single ICW in Afghanistan after the Cold War, but also due to its onset and complexity. Before investigating the global political context of the war, its international actors, their interference levels and the traits of the war in the following years, its conditions regarding the nature, goals and dynamics of this ICW will be discussed in this section.

Afghanistan is a vast country (652,090 square kilometers) that has borders with four countries⁸²² and according to Doyle & Sambanis's data it has a high level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization index with 66 points. There were two civil wars in Afghanistan: The war between 1978 and 1992 was fought under Cold War conditions and ended with the victory of rebels against the government in which one major power intervened. After seizing power, victorious rebels were also challenged by the Taliban between 1993 and 1997.⁸²³ While it is not possible to track the UN's role due to limited time frame of this dataset, it is important to note that hostility in the country raised almost 20% (from 0,4269283 to 0,5145466) between the two wars, which may explain the uninterrupted duration of the civil war first until 2001 and then until today.⁸²⁴

⁸²² See. Map of Afghanistan and the region of Afghanistan in Appendix II for the geographical presentation.

⁸²³ This data set covers until 1997; Michael Doyle, Nicholas Sambanis, **International Peacebuilding Data set, data notes, and log results**, World Bank, 2000, <http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20701031~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html> (accessed 13.03.2017); Replication dataset for Michael Doyle, Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis", **American Political Science Review**, Vol.94, No.4, 2000, pp.779-801.

⁸²⁴ Doyle, Sambanis, **International Peacebuilding Data set**.

Regarding Fearon & Laitin's data, ethnic fractionalization has been vastly high (around 75%) as well, where the largest ethnic group represented only 38% of the whole country while the second one was only represented by 25%. There are eight different languages spoken in the country and religious fractionalization is lower than ethnic fractionalization with 99% of Muslim population.⁸²⁵ According to our earlier research findings, ethnic fractionalization renders rebellion more difficult due to the fact that organizational skills and religious fractionalization contributes to war onset. Yet, Afghanistan has been particular with its warring faction numbers where more than six different rebel actors are detected,⁸²⁶ who mostly belong to the same religion even though they may belong to different sects. Taking into account the hostility index of Doyle & Sambanis and considering that the Pashtun dominance is a cultural fact in Afghanistan, this can be correlated with a high polarization feature. In addition to these, Afghanistan is a very large and mountainous country (almost 65% of the country) with a dispersed population, which renders central control over the state more difficult.

On the other hand, it is a contiguous country without a separated region from the motherland and has no oil as a natural resource.⁸²⁷ Thus, while the two latter indicators should have lowered civil war onset probabilities, the GDP per capita of the country has been alarming: It has had very low levels around \$250 during 1970s and from 1981 to 2001 it kept lowering until it hit the bottom with \$119.90 in 2001.⁸²⁸ On the other hand, population kept augmenting after 1977, and reached 25 million (25,761,000) in 1999.⁸²⁹ Moreover, Afghanistan has always been ruled by anocracies between 1977 and 1999 regardless of the sovereign group⁸³⁰, which is an upsetting civil war onset characteristic in terms of political causes. It should also be noted that, even though oil competition is not a debatable issue for Afghanistan, rebel groups benefited from low cost fighters living in a scarce economy and relied on all kinds of illegal trade, notably drugs. This is largely related to the limited economic opportunities in Afghanistan. Even though the datasets available do not provide information on the issue, for a long time, Afghani farmers, who have not had

⁸²⁵ Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

⁸²⁶ Doyle, Sambanis, **International Peacebuilding Data set**.

⁸²⁷ Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

⁸²⁸ "Afghanistan - GDP per capita", <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/afghanistan/gdp-per-capita>, (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁸²⁹ Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

⁸³⁰ **Ibid.**

access to other lines of work in the highly unemployed country, preferred cultivating opium and selling it to mainly the Taliban due to the high income. Thus, the Taliban had been exporting opium mostly to drug dealers in Iran and Pakistan, massively benefiting from its trade and funding their armament in this way. Even though the NATO has been involved in the war against opium production since 2005 in collaboration with Afghan forces, the numbers show that it has increased 35% since the intervention of the government of the USA and its allies due to the augmenting unemployment rates and lack of illegal actions steered by bribery and corruption.⁸³¹

All these traits when added to the earlier continuous wars significantly increase war proneness in Afghanistan. Even though this is not a newly established state⁸³², it has experienced serious political instability: According to PITF data, between 1978 and 2002, the Afghan state witnessed three successful coups d'état (by Abdul Qadir with Nur Muhammad Taraki in 1978, Babrak Karmal in 1979 and Mujahedeen guerrillas with Ahmed Shah Massoud in 1992) along with two unsuccessful coups d'état (by unknown parties in 1979 before Karmal's putsch and by supporters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in 2002). These events exceeded 5,000 deaths, regardless of the political quarrels in their aftermath.⁸³³ Moreover, in 1992, the fall of the Najibullah regime was followed by a revolution that succeeded with the entrance of Mujahedeen forces into Kabul to establish a new government, which caused the complete collapse of the state until 1996 and signified the transfer of power from one autocratic leader to another. The state failure in Afghanistan recurred between 2001 and 2002 after the success of the American and British air bombings and the revolution oriented United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) attacks against the Taliban government.⁸³⁴ Intra-state wars in Afghanistan between 1992 and 2001 are accepted as ethnic wars by the PITF data for being fought between Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek/Turkmen and Hazara/Shiite groups⁸³⁵,

⁸³¹ Jessica Saifee, "The War on Opium in Afghanistan", 05.05.2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jessica-saifee/the-war-on-opium-in-afgha_b_9828506.html (accessed 23.04.2017); Edwin Mora, "Afghan Opium Production Increases 35-Fold Since U.S. Invasion", 10.02.2015, <http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/02/10/afghan-opium-production-increases-35-fold-since-u-s-invasion/> (accessed 23.04.2017)

⁸³² Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

⁸³³ Political Instability (formerly, State Failure) Task Force (PITF), **Coups d'Etat, 1946-2015 Excel Coup List and Excel Time Series**, Center for Systemic Peace, Vienna: Societal-Systems Research Inc., 2016, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> (accessed 15.03.2017)

⁸³⁴ Political Instability (formerly, State Failure) Task Force (PITF), **Adverse Regime Changes Dataset**, 2016, Center for Systemic Peace, Vienna: Societal-Systems Research Inc., 2016, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> (accessed 15.03.2017)

⁸³⁵ PITF, **Ethnic War Dataset**.

even though the aim was to gain central control. Yet, according to PITF, wars between 1978 and 1992 as well as the war between 2001 and 2015 are revolutionary intra-state wars for governmental control as these groups were united against a common enemy.

Thus, Afghanistan has been trapped in a war cycle since 1978, where civil wars for central control with coups and revolutionary, ethnic and international components exist. Furthermore, political, economic, ethno-cultural dynamics and other correlations show a high war-proneness for Afghanistan.

c. Internationalized Intra-state wars after the Cold War: Outline of war since 2001

In terms of political context, until 2001, the Taliban regime could not have a healthy foreign policy due to the disfavoring attitude of international community against it, especially by the USA who had once supported Mujahedeen against the Karmal regime during the Cold War. The relations between the USA and the Taliban government had started to deteriorate after the non-extradition of Osama Bin Laden after the Al-Qaida bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998.⁸³⁶ At the same time, the American role in the Gulf war had created a rigid anti-Americanism throughout Islamic circles, which caused further radicalization.⁸³⁷ Despite several financial sanctions and military actions of the USA, the Taliban regime refused to hand in Bin Laden who had moved Al-Qaida's base to Afghanistan after the declaration of the Taliban regime and developed close relations with the ruling party.⁸³⁸ This political discontent continued until 11 September 2001, when two airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center towers in New York⁸³⁹ where 3,000 people, 19 hijackers, more than 800 responders died⁸⁴⁰, and opened a whole new era in international politics history. Rapid measures were taken immediately; for the first time in the NATO history, Article 5 of the Washington

⁸³⁶ Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", **CRS Report for Congress**, USA, March 25, 2004, p.5.

⁸³⁷ Mariam Abou Zahab, Olivier Roy, **Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection**, London: Hurst&Company, 2004, p.57.

⁸³⁸ Lawrence Wright, **The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11**, USA: Knopf, 2006, pp.287-289.

⁸³⁹ "The 9/11 terrorist attacks", http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/the_september_11th_terrorist_attacks, (accessed 09.01.2017)

⁸⁴⁰ "9 Years Later, Nearly 900 9/11 Responders Have Died, Survivors Fight for Compensation", 11.09.2010, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/09/09/report-responders-died-ground-zero-illnesses/>, (accessed 09.01.2017)

Treaty stating “*An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all (...)*”⁸⁴¹ was invoked⁸⁴² against Osama bin Laden who was protected by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. On 7th October 2001, the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was launched as a response to the attacks, with the goal of dismantling the Al-Qaida terrorist organization, stopping the Taliban from providing a safe haven to Al-Qaida, overthrowing them from power and establishing a viable democratic state⁸⁴³. American and British air raids along with UIFSA (also known as Northern Alliance) attacks on the ground succeeded on 13th November 2001 and allies entered Kabul that was evacuated by the Taliban.⁸⁴⁴ This left Afghanistan as a failed state again, in need of building a new one from scratch. This need was satisfied under the Bonn Agreement passed on 5th December 2001, which established a transnational Afghan authority, presided by Hamid Karzai.⁸⁴⁵ They were to hold power for six months until “*the convening of a Loya Jirga in June 2002 that would elect a provisional government and a president for 18 months. The holding of nationwide elections at the end of the period would be preceded by the adoption of a new constitution*”.⁸⁴⁶

Before the USA and the UK stepped in to overthrow the Taliban and fight with Al-Qaida, Iran was already a secondary party to the UIFSA war against the Taliban⁸⁴⁷ who was being supported by Pakistan. Yet, with overseas interference Iran left the Afghan territory after 2001, leaving allies to combat. Allegedly, it started to provide weapons to the Taliban between 2007 and 2009.⁸⁴⁸ On the other hand, the actor multiplicity in Afghanistan goes beyond dyadic encounters and extends to international organizations, such as the UN and NATO, as well as Afghanistan based insurgent groups, particularly, the Taliban, Al-Qaida and Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan.

⁸⁴¹ NATO, **the North Atlantic Treaty**, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, article V, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed 09.01.2017)

⁸⁴² “Collective defense - Article 5”, 22.03.2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm, (09.01.2017)

⁸⁴³ Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-War...”, pp.7-8.

⁸⁴⁴ “The Fall of Kabul”, *The Economist*, 13.11.2001, <http://www.economist.com/node/862752>, (accessed 09.01.2017)

⁸⁴⁵ Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-War...”, pp.7-8.

⁸⁴⁶ Angelo Rasanayagam, **Afghanistan: A Modern History**, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2003, p.257.

⁸⁴⁷ UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

⁸⁴⁸ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

The initial war coalition that entered Afghanistan in 2001 was established under the Operation Enduring Freedom, led by the USA and the UK who were later joined by other forces (Governments of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Turkey in 2001).⁸⁴⁹ The UNSC had already unanimously recognized the combat by all means against terrorist attacks causing threats to international peace and security by the right of individual or collective self-defense on 12th September 2001⁸⁵⁰, the day after the attacks to the World Trade Center towers. In that regard, the coalition was in conformity with international law. Furthermore, the day after the seize of Kabul, on 14th November 2001, the UNSC once again affirmed its support to UIFSA and external forces in their efforts to expel Al-Qaida and overthrow the Taliban regime who was providing sanctuary to Al-Qaida on its territory.⁸⁵¹ Following the inauguration of the Bonn Agreement on 22nd December 2001, the UN authorized the deployment of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to secure Kabul and its surroundings based on the permission of the Afghan authorities and related clauses of the Bonn Agreement.⁸⁵² The ISAF mission was extended until 2014 and gave different mandates to different countries including the conduct of security operations throughout the country to assist, advice and train Afghan forces.⁸⁵³ Thus, after 2002 there were two different international forces on the ground, one led by Enduring Freedom Mission, the USA and the UK, which stayed in the country until the beginning of 2015 and one led by the UN members, which completed its mission at the end of 2014. Hence, in addition to the USA-UK coalition forces, which waged the war against Al-Qaida, the UN was militarily involved in the Afghan war in various ways against the Taliban and the other Afghan terrorist groups.

In addition to the UN's initiatives, NATO was also engaged in the Afghan war by taking the command of ISAF in August 2003. As mentioned before, the UN

⁸⁴⁹ UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

⁸⁵⁰ UN Security Council, **Security Conseil Resolution 1368**, 12.09.2001, S/RES/1368, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 09.01.2017)

⁸⁵¹ UN Security Council, **Security Conseil Resolution 1378**, 14.11.2001, S/RES/1378, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/638/57/PDF/N0163857.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 09.01.2017)

⁸⁵² UN Security Council, **Security Conseil Resolution 1386**, 20.12.2001, S/RES/1386, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement>, (accessed 09.01.2017)

⁸⁵³ "ISAF's mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014)", 01.09.2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm (accessed 09.01.2017)

strategy to cooperate with regional organizations by sharing financial and military responsibilities should be perceived within this frame. NATO had already lined up with the USA following the 9/11 attacks by invoking the 5th Article but formally set foot in Afghanistan by taking the lead of ISAF until its abolition in December 2014. During this intervention, the NATO forces under ISAF aimed at cleaning Afghanistan from terrorist groups, terminating their safe havens on Afghan territory, providing security across the country and helping to build a platform for governmental forces based on dialogue and cooperation with the Operation Enduring Freedom forces. In 2011, the responsibility to secure the country has started to be yielded to Afghan forces, which became the principal actor in control of coordinated security operations in 2013. Between 2003 and 2014 ISAF became NATO's most challenging and longest mission, where more than 130,000 military personnel have been engaged from 51 NATO and partner countries. At the beginning of 2015, the ISAF mission ended leaving a new non-combat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan, which was responsible for providing training, guidance and assistance to national Afghan forces.⁸⁵⁴ Thus, NATO became one of the driving actors of the war with its military commitment and cooperation on the ground.

While Afghanistan has benefited from a massive international intervention and involvement during the period between 2002 and 2009, no country or a terrorist group has intervened or involved into the war in favor of Al-Qaida or the Taliban, except Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP-Pakistani Taliban) who was alleged to provide sanctuary in tribal areas of Pakistan. Even though Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan fought against external forces and the government of Afghanistan, it did not collaborated neither with Al-Qaida nor with the Taliban, who were fighting against the same enemies. Consequently, even though it was not a continuous alliance, Al-Qaida and the Taliban had to support each other from time to time by sharing intelligence, military material, logistics and engaging into joint operations.⁸⁵⁵ Thus, the lack of external support forced these groups to rely heavily on domestic recruitment, their international diaspora channels and affiliates.⁸⁵⁶ On the other hand,

⁸⁵⁴ "NATO and Afghanistan", 13.10.2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm, (accessed 09.01.2017)

⁸⁵⁵ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

⁸⁵⁶ Donald Holbrook, **The Al-Qaeda Doctrine: The Framing and Evolution of the Leadership's Public Discourse**, USA: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014, p.155; for a deepened debate see. Daniel Byman, **Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs**

Pakistan, who stood by the Taliban and supported Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan until 2001, cut its support to both parties and intervened into and supported the war against those groups along with Afghan and American governments. Yet, Pakistan allegedly supported Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan once again between 2008 and 2009.⁸⁵⁷ The same applies to Saudi Arabia, who used to finance and provide weapons to Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and the Taliban: the Saudi leaders decided to collaborate with the Afghan and American governments between 2001 and 2007 in their war against terrorist groups. Yet, considering the fact that the government of the USA used to provide weapons, material, logistics, and funding to terrorist groups in Afghanistan, including Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, the above ‘change of teams’ should be perceived in the context of systemic shifts in international relations, war processes in Afghanistan and realpolitik choices of states.

Since the beginning of 2015, external actors in Afghanistan were still the USA and Pakistan. The latter stood by as a secondary party along with the USA and Afghanistan in the wars against both the Taliban and Al-Qaida. While the intensity of battles with the Taliban decreased to internationalized intra-state conflict levels in 2003 and 2004, it scaled up to internationalized intra-state war between 2005 and 2015. On the other hand, fight against Al-Qaida stayed within internationalized intra-state conflict levels since 2002.⁸⁵⁸ Yet, when these battles are evaluated cumulatively, it is possible to conclude that they rendered Afghanistan a vast war zone since 2001.

Moreover, there are two more actors that should be weighed differently. The first one is Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, the long-term warring terrorist group gathered under the leadership of Hekmatyar. After 2013, it left the war zone due to the peace negotiations that started between Hekmatyar and the government of Afghanistan. After two years of cease-fire, on 29th September 2016, the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani formalized the peace agreement⁸⁵⁹ with Hizb-i Islami-yi

to Know?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015; Rohan Gunaratna, **Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror**, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

⁸⁵⁷ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

⁸⁵⁸ UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

⁸⁵⁹ For the full text of the agreement, see. “Full text of agreement between GoIRA & Hezb-e-Islami of Afghanistan led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar”, 26.11.2016,

Afghanistan, which had been signed a week before. This was the first peace treaty between any warring parties in Afghani soil since the commencement of the war against the Taliban in 2001 and it was expected to have influence on the relations of the Afghan government with other warring groups.⁸⁶⁰ The second actor is ISIS/Daesh, who started initiating attacks on Afghan territory as well as other countries. In 2015, the fights between governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the USA against ISIS/Daesh took the form of an internationalized intra-state conflict, which was the first time that this new actor has been marked as a warring party in Afghanistan.⁸⁶¹

Section II – The DRC: The Knot of African Continent

The second selected case study concerns the DRC. Its continuous wars and components raise critical issues both for the African continent (particularly for the Great Lakes Region) and the UN. In order to understand its international elements, in this section, firstly, wars in the Congolese territory that took place after the Second World War will be discussed to portray its historical context. To that end, the datasets of COW and UCDP/PRIO will be presented separately in order to observe whether they are diverse perceptions on the types of conflicts or they agree on war periods and types. Secondly, the internal traits of the DRC that can contribute to its war proneness will be treated according to the datasets of Doyle & Sambanis, Fearon & Laitin and PITF. As these datasets offer more internally focused information, they will lead us to evaluate the domestic heritage, which resulted in the civil wars and the internal dynamics that steered the motivations of third parties and led to their interventions and involvements. Finally, internationalized intra-state wars of the DRC in the post-Cold War period will be taken into account, in order to understand the political and legal context of the ICWs, their actors and the chain of events related to the onset, duration and termination of them. In this way, we will be able to see the comprehensive dynamics of the Congolese civil wars before evaluating them with the inward and outward internationalization patterns.

<http://www.kabultribune.com/index.php/2016/09/26/full-text-of-agreement-between-goira-hezb-e-islami-of-afghanistan-led-by-gulbuddin-hekmatyar/>, (accessed 09.01.2017)

⁸⁶⁰ “Afghanistan: Ghani, Hekmatyar sign peacedeal”, 29.09.2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/afghanistan-ghani-hekmatyar-sign-peace-deal-160929092524754.html>, (accessed 09.01.2017)

⁸⁶¹ UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

a. Types and periods of wars after the Second World War

The Democratic Republic of the Congo gained its independence from Belgium in 1960,⁸⁶² which had ruled the country since 1908. Starting from its independence the DRC witnessed diverse internal wars for various causes, with varying actors and internationalization effects. The particularity of the DRC wars is founded upon its causality and actor repertoire, which includes ethnic tensions, state building problems, ideological differences, horizontal inequalities, troubled relations with neighbors, economic scarcity that contradicts natural resource richness, clientelism, regional spillovers, interventions from both western and regional actors as well as the UN engagement.

Table 12 - COW's Classification on Congolese Wars⁸⁶³

Year	War Type	Parties
1960- 1963	Internationalized Intra-State war	Government of the DRC & United Nations Organization in the Congo/Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) vs. Anti-Lumumba Coalition (Disaffected Soldiers, Katanga, Kasai, government of Belgium and European Mercenaries)
1963-1965	Intra-State war	Government of the DRC vs. Jeunesse warriors
1964-1965	Internationalized Intra-State war	Governments of the DRC & Belgium vs. Gbenye followers
1978	Internationalized Intra-State war	Governments of the DRC, Belgium & France vs. Front de Liberation National Congolese/Front for Congolese National Liberation (FLNC)
1996-1997	Internationalized Intra-State war	Government of the DRC, UNITA & Mercenaries vs. Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL is more commonly referred as AFDL), Governments of Rwanda (via Rwanda Patriotic Army-RPA), Uganda, Angola & Mai Mai
1998 – 2002	Internationalized Intra-State war	Governments of the DRC, Chad, Namibia, Angola, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic & Hutu militia vs. Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), Congo Liberation Movement (MLC), Governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

According to the COW data, the first internal war of the DRC started after its independence in 1960 and was fought primarily in the Katanga and Kasai regions, which were rebelling for their secessions. Both regions are rich in natural resources, such as copper, cobalt, and diamonds.⁸⁶⁴ Belgium became a warring party in this war

⁸⁶² The country became independent from Belgium under the name of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It was officially known under this name until 1971, when President Mobutu changed it to Republic of Zaire. Its original name was restored in 1997 by the new president Kabila after the fall of President Mobutu. In this context, the country will be referred with the name of Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) instead of Zaire, which was the name used between 1971 and 1997. As the sole difference relies on a renaming process and has nothing to do with a succession or dissolution, the name Zaire will not be used to represent the period between 1971 and 1997.

⁸⁶³ Prepared according to COW, **The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)**.

⁸⁶⁴ Léonce Ndikumana, François Emizet Kisangani, "The Economics of Civil War The Case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo", in Collier, Sambanis eds., **Understanding Civil...**, pp. 66-67.

to support Katanga's secession, protect its business interests and help Belgian nationals under attack escape. The rebellion in Kasai ended six months later after the conference organized by the UN at Lovanium University (in the DRC) in 1961, which brought the provincial leaders of the DRC together to discuss the future of the state. The conference resulted in the creation of new provinces in the DRC and the conciliation of pro and anti Lumumba rebel groups by restoring central authority through the establishment of a new central government, in which Cyrille Adoula replaced Patrice Émery Lumumba as the Prime Minister.⁸⁶⁵ While this progress deflated the mutiny in Kasai, the situation in Katanga could only be resolved through the military efforts of the UN who had been on the DRC soil since July 1960.⁸⁶⁶ The UN's Organization in the Congo (ONUC) was established in 1960 on the demand of Congolese authorities to protect its territory against external aggression, which led the UNSC to demand Belgium to withdraw its military troops from the DRC.⁸⁶⁷ ONUC helped the newly established state to maintain its independence, territorial integrity, law and order and to prevent any external interference and civil war by using force if needed.⁸⁶⁸ In 1963, the Katanga rebels got defeated by ONUC and fled to Angola where they fought with Portuguese colonialists against Angolan national groups in their war of independence.⁸⁶⁹ Following the integration of Katanga into the state apparatus, the ONUC mission forces started to leave the country, a process that lasted until 1964.

Even though the internationalized intra-state war phase ended, the DRC witnessed a new secessionist intra-state in the Kwilu region led by Pierre Mulele, who went to exile after his refusal to cooperate with the new government. In 1964, Mulele organized a rebellion based on ethnic affinities of the region but was defeated by the government in 1965 without any external interferences.⁸⁷⁰ The civil war in Kwilu signifies the last secessionist demand in the DRC⁸⁷¹ and differentiates from

⁸⁶⁵ Dixon, Sarkees, *A Guide to...*, p.611, 615.

⁸⁶⁶ François Emizet Kisangani, *Guerres civiles dans la République démocratique du Congo 1960-2010*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2015, pp.39-40.

⁸⁶⁷ UN Security Council, **Security Conseil Resolution 143**, 14.07.1960, S/RES/143, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/143\(1960\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/143(1960)) (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁸⁶⁸ "Republic of Congo - ONUC Background", <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm> (accessed 18.02.2017); UN Security Council, **Security Conseil Resolution 161**, 21.02.1961, S/RES/143, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/161\(1961\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/161(1961)) (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁸⁶⁹ Ndikumana, Kisangani, "The Economics of...", p.73.

⁸⁷⁰ Kisangani, *Guerres civiles...*, p.40.

⁸⁷¹ COW, *The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)*.

other secessionist wars for not being “*motivated by the control of provincial mineral resources*”⁸⁷².

Even though the Adoula government was supposed to undertake national unification, secessionist civil wars and the increase of Belgium control over governmental decisions undermined and led this initiative to a failure. Following continuous instability, President Joseph Kasavubu adjourned the Parliament in 29th September 1963, yet this action contributed to aggravate the situation by unifying fractionalized opposition groups. As a response to the suspension of the Parliament, opposition groups formed a new entity called National Council of Liberation (CNL) with the aim of gaining governmental control and putting an end to the political and economic influence of Western countries.⁸⁷³ Under the command of the CNL leader Christophe Gbenye, Laurent Kabila started a rebellion in the Eastern DRC, which relied on young, uneducated, and unemployed Congolese warriors with certain ethnic affinities and was financed by the rich mineral resources of the region. In the face of this threat, Kasavubu assigned Moise Tshombe as the Prime Minister in 10th July 1964 replacing Adoula. He was the leader of the unsuccessful secessionist war in Katanga and had been in exile since his defeat.

On the other hand, he had strong political connections within state officials as well as Belgian representatives. Therefore, he was expected to have enough influence to achieve national reconciliation and deal effectively with the new civil war.⁸⁷⁴ Tshombe’s battle against rebel groups was not easy because of the weakness of the Congolese Army (ANC). Accordingly, he sought external assistance from the USA and Belgium, who firstly involved into the intra-state war by sending advisors and creating military brigades within the Congolese forces as part of the United States Military Mission in the Congo (COMISH). Later they intervened directly into the intra-state war with the Dragon Rouge operation, which aimed at rescuing Western citizens taken as hostages by rebel groups. After the capture of foreign citizens from CNL, ANC and Western troops defeated rebels in 30th September 1965. During the war, the transitional government of Tshombe held elections in 30th April 1965, which was won by Tshombe’s coalition. Yet, his reliance on foreign troops led Kasavubu to appoint Evariste Kimba from the anti-Tshombe coalition as

⁸⁷² Ndikumana, Kisangani, “The Economics of...”, p.69.

⁸⁷³ Chimelu Chime, **Integration and Politics Among African States Limitations and horizons of mid-term theorizing**, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1980, p.213.

⁸⁷⁴ Ndikumana, Kisangani, “The Economics of...”, pp.70-71.

the new Prime Minister on 13th October 1965, after the victory of the government. This shift paralyzed the governmental function and Joseph Mobutu, the general of ANC, took advantage of this power gap by staging a coup and seizing state apparatus.⁸⁷⁵

This last internationalized intra-state war and the coup of 1965 represent a milestone in the DRC history. While earlier secessionist intra-state wars were a part of state building efforts of the decolonization process, Kabila-led rebellion signified the transition from state building conflicts to Cold War conflicts as evidenced by the American support to ANC during the war and its support to Mobutu after the coup. He stayed in power for almost thirty years relying on American support provided against the communism threat, which ended promptly after the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁸⁷⁶

According to the COW dataset, Mobutu faced one more internationalized intra-state war until the US external support was terminated. That war took place in the Shaba region, whose name was changed from Katanga as part of the Zairianization process declared by Mobutu (within the same program the state's name was changed to Zaire from Congo as well). Following the *Zairianization* program⁸⁷⁷ of Mobutu, two rebellions took place: Shaba 1 in 1977 and Shaba 2 in 1978, which incorporated mass movement impacts with hostile neighborhood relations⁸⁷⁸ and turned into an internationalized intra-state war. The Front for

⁸⁷⁵ Dixon, Sarkees, **A Guide to...**, pp.617-618.

⁸⁷⁶ Kisangani, **Guerres civiles...**, p.179.

⁸⁷⁷ Zairianization signifies the nationalization process of companies owned by foreigners between 1973 and 1975. While the large mine companies had already been nationalized during 1960s, Zairianization aims other strategic sectors like agriculture and transportation. In large or medium sized companies, original owners were preserved as partners or delegates who were assigned by the government. On the other hand, smaller company owners sold off their businesses and left the country. After the failure of this program due to patronage and misconduct of services, 60% of these companies, except strategic ones like energy, timber and transportation, were returned to original owners under the Retrocession program launched in 1974. This process also included a nationalist political pillar, which led Mobutu him to change his name to Mobutu Sese Keko from Joseph-Désiré Mobutu and state's name to Zaire from Congo; Scott F. Bobb, Emizet Francois Kisangani, **Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo**, USA: Scarecrow Press, 2009, p.496; "Mobutu dies in exile in Morocco", 7.09.1997, <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9709/07/mobutu.wrap/> (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁸⁷⁸ Refugee movements concern Congolese people who fled to Angola after their defeat in Katanga war. There, they cooperated with Portuguese soldiers against Angolan rebels who were fighting for their independence. After Angola gained its independence in 1975, Cuba staged an intervention to back MPLA (the leftist People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) in the name of communist bloc against FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) who were being supported by the DRC and South Africa in the name of western bloc. That firstly caused an inter-state war in Angola between South Africa, the DRC, Cuba and Angola in 1975 and secondly aggravated the relations between the DRC and Angola. In that

Congolese National Liberation (FLNC) was responsible for these mutinies in the Katanga region, aiming to control the rich mineral resources of the region and overthrow Mobutu. Both attempts in 1977 and 1978 failed because of the intervention of 700 French troops and 1,700 Belgian soldiers in favor of the government that logistically relied on the American Air Force.⁸⁷⁹

Table 13 - UCDP/PRIO' Classification on Congolese Wars⁸⁸⁰

Year	War Type	Parties
1960-1962	Intra-state Conflict	Government of the DRC vs. Independent Mining State of South Kasai
1961-1962	Intra-state Conflict	Government of the DRC vs. State of Katanga
1964-1965	Intra-state War	Government of the DRC vs. CNL
1967	Intra-state Conflict	Government of the DRC vs. Military Faction (Forces of Jean Schramme)
1977	Internationalized Intra-state Conflict	Governments of the DRC, Morocco & Uganda vs. FLNC
1978	Intra-state Conflict	Government of the DRC vs. FLNC
1993-2004	Non-State Conflicts	
1996-1997	Internationalized Intra-state War	Government of the DRC vs. AFDL, Governments of Angola, Rwanda & Uganda
1998-2000	Internationalized Intra-state War	Governments of the DRC, Angola, Chad, Namibia & Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) vs. MLC, RCD, Governments of Rwanda & Uganda
2001	Internationalized Intra-state Conflict	Governments of the DRC, Angola, Namibia & Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) vs. RCD & Government of Rwanda
2006-2008	Intra-state Conflict	Government of the DRC vs. National Congress for the Defense of the People/Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP)
2007-2008	Intra-state Conflict	Government of the DRC vs. Bundi Dia Kongo (BDK)
2007-2008	Non-State Conflicts	
2011	Intra-state Conflict	Government of DR Congo vs. PARC-FAAL (Party for Action and the Reconstruction of the Congo-Allelujah Armed Forces)
2011-2014	Non-State Conflicts	
2012	Internationalized Intra-state Conflict	Government of the DRC vs. March 23 Movement (M23), PARC-FAAL, Governments of Rwanda & Uganda
2013	Internationalized Intra-state War	Government of the DRC vs. Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS), Forces of Paul Joseph Mukungubila, M23 & Government of Rwanda
2013-2014	Intra-state Conflict	Government of the DRC vs. Kata Katanga
2014	Intra-state Conflict	Government of the DRC vs. APCLS, PARC-FAAL

context, first, while inter-state war in Angola ended in 1976, it turned into an internationalized intra-state war between Angola, UNITA, Cuba and South Africa, which continued until 1991. Second, the initial interference of the DRC caused the Angola president António Agostinho Neto to welcome and host FLNC who realized both Shaba rebellions between 1977 and 1978; Kisangani, *Guerres civiles...*, p.173 ; UCDP/PRIO, *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016*; COW, *The Inter-State War Data (v4.0)*; COW, *The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)*.

⁸⁷⁹ Ndikumana, Kisangani, "The Economics...", p.75.

⁸⁸⁰ Prepared according to UCDP/PRIO, *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016*; UCDP/PRIO, *UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset version 2.5-2016*.

According to the COW datasets, after the end of the Cold War there have been two more intra-state wars between 1996 and 1997 and between 1998 and 2002, which were internationalized. On the other hand, while the UCDP/PRIO dataset agrees with the classification of these internationalized intra-state wars after the Cold War, it covers a further timeline and thus adds one more internationalized intra-state war in 2013 and therefore the number of internationalized intra-state wars after the Cold War is increased to three. Moreover, the classification of wars according to these two datasets differs regarding the wars between the Second World War and the Cold War. According to the UCDP/PRIO dataset, neither the secessionist conflicts in Katanga and Kasai nor the war against CNL were internationalized.⁸⁸¹ Also, regarding the Shaba rebellions, there is a slight difference between the two datasets: For the second rebellion in 1978 UCDP/PRIO disregards France and Belgium's intervention and classifies it as an intra-state conflict without an internationalization element, while COW classifies it as both a war and an internationalized event. The difference between the intensity of these rebellions can be explained through the battle death coding and the actor differentiation can be justified by the concept of external support as defined by the UCDP/PRIO, according to which France, Belgium and the USA seem to have been providing weapons, material/logistics, and training/expertise to the DRC in 1978.⁸⁸²

Despite these differences, as this study focuses on internationalized intra-state wars after the Cold War, it is possible to affirm that three wars (1996-1997; 1998 – 2002; 2013) come within our scope and two out of three of them are unanimously classified in the same way by both the COW and UCDP/PRIO datasets while the information about the third war is not included in the COW's dataset.

b. Towards the Internationalized Intra-state wars after the Cold War: Underlying Causal Mechanisms

In order to be able to understand the three internationalized intra-state wars in the DRC after the Cold War, the political and economic heritage of the earlier wars should be understood. In that regard, the DRC is three times larger than Afghanistan

⁸⁸¹ UCDP/PRIO, *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016*.

⁸⁸² UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset*; UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset*.

(2,344,860 square kilometers) and even bigger than all its nine neighbors.⁸⁸³ In Doyle & Sambanis's dataset, it is only possible to track two wars (1967 and 1975-1979) before the end of the Cold War. Both of these wars were resulted in governmental victory, relied on identity issues and did not involve the UN. On the other hand, a major power intervened in the first one. While these wars were fought under the Cold War conditions, in their dataset there is one civil war after the end of the Cold War, which was fought between 1996 and 1997. Regarding all these wars, the ethno-linguistic fractionalization has been off the charts with 90 points but warring faction numbers were less than in the case of Afghanistan (where at least six factions were involved in the war) with only two different rebel parties being involved in the pre-Cold War wars and four factions in the post-Cold War civil war.

Moreover, while the hostility index was also lower than Afghanistan and got even lower between the first two wars (from 0.3714446 to 0.3566428), it increased rapidly (0.4798494) until the war in 1996 despite the lack of a continuous warfare or successor wars.⁸⁸⁴ The higher ethno-linguistic fractionalization and the lower hostility index explain the lower warring faction numbers in the pre-Cold War era, on the basis that fractionalization renders social rebellion and recruitment strategies harder, while polarization facilitates them. The shortage of factions also unfolds the secessionist nature of the earlier wars. However, the intra-state war in 1996 revolved around gaining central control and faction numbers expectedly increased to four. This increase creates a more similar context to the congested wars in Afghanistan, which also focused on gaining governmental control and the struggle for central power.

Concerning Fearon and Laitin's data, ethnic fractionalization has been vastly high (around 90%) and the largest ethnic group represented only 16% of the whole country, while the second one was only represented by 10%. There is a tremendous diversity of 22 different languages spoken in the country and religious fractionalization has also been very elevated (68%). These numbers show the complete cultural disunity in the country.⁸⁸⁵ While this diversity explains the

⁸⁸³ Clionadh Raleigh, Håvard Hegre, "Population size, concentration, and civil war. A geographically disaggregated analysis", *Political Geography*, Vol.28, No.4, 2009, p.236; See. Map of the DRC and Africa in Appendix III for the geographical presentation.

⁸⁸⁴ This dataset covers until 1997; Doyle, Sambanis, **International Peacebuilding Data set**.

⁸⁸⁵ In this dataset numbers are identical between 1977-1999, thus they are taken into account as a fact for the wars in 1990s and 2000s; Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

secessionist character of the earlier wars, regarding the non-state actor multicity after the end of the Cold War, understanding this non-uniform demography is as important as understanding the economic conditions of the country.

In this demographic context, first, wars mostly occurred in the most populated and remote areas, which were hard for the central government to control; second, population density varies greatly from region to region and there is evidence of the accumulation of ethnic affinities.⁸⁸⁶ Also, while the DRC is not a mountainous country (mountains cover only 4% of the country), which should increase the governmental control efficacy, demographic factors complicate the management of the state. Moreover, from 1960 to 1999 the population almost tripled reaching 48 million (48.215,270).⁸⁸⁷ On the other hand, the growth of GDP per capita has not been as extensive: From 1960 to 1978, GDP per capita had a non-linear growth by increasing from \$220 to \$616.18. Following this increase, it kept declining until 1999, when it went as low as \$100.⁸⁸⁸ Thus, while population had tripled between 1960 and 1999, GDP per capita had a 50% decrease. The economic rise was related to foreign aid, loans and funds coming mainly from France and the USA, who were supporting the Mobutu regime against the communist threat. Yet, the corrupted distribution of this income and the insisting undemocratic manners of Mobutu resulted in the cessation of foreign help and the beginning of an irrevocable economic fall.⁸⁸⁹ In this context, the DRC has never been able to break the autocratic regime cycle until 1999, which shows the constant political repression. Moreover, the DRC does not possess any oil reserves as Afghanistan⁸⁹⁰, but unlike Afghanistan it has extremely precious natural sources, such as copper, cobalt⁸⁹¹, timber, gold, diamond, coltan and other minerals, which were at the epicenter of the multifaceted international attention and interventions in the DRC.⁸⁹² Also, in this context, the DRC was dependent on natural resource exportation while the unequal concentration

⁸⁸⁶ Raleigh, Hegre, "Population size...", pp.224-227.

⁸⁸⁷ Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

⁸⁸⁸ "DRC - GDP per capita", <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/dem.-rep.-congo/gdp-per-capita>, (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁸⁸⁹ Harish Venugopalan, "Understanding the Conflict in Congo", **ORF Issue Brief**, No. 139, 2016, p.2.

⁸⁹⁰ Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

⁸⁹¹ Particularly found in Katanga region; Ndikumana, Kisangani, "The Economics of...", p.65.

⁸⁹² Venugopalan, "Understanding the...", p.8.

and distribution of these resources amongst ethnic groups caused further domestic discontent.⁸⁹³

All these features contributed to the war proneness of the DRC combined with other grave political elements in the state politics. Following the state-building process started in 1960,⁸⁹⁴ there was much political instability: After the successful coup d'état of Mobutu in 1965 it witnessed two unsuccessful coups in 2004 and two more unsuccessful coups in 2011 and 2013.⁸⁹⁵ Furthermore, the internationalized intra-state war between 1996 and 1997 against the Mobutu regime, which was led and won by Kabila, caused the complete collapse of the state authority in 1997. The same year Kabila acquired governmental power as the new leader of a failed state but was unable to guarantee state control in the substantial part of the country until the end of 2000. In 2001 and 2002 partially provided state authority failed again completely following the assassination of Kabila in 2001 and this chaotic situation continued until the signature of the peace agreements in 2003, which ended the continuous internationalized intra-state war of the DRC between 1998 and 2002.⁸⁹⁶ During both ICWs in the DRC after the end of the Cold War (in 1996-1997 and 1998-2002), warfare had both ethnic and revolutionary characteristics due to the collective roots of the widely organized rebellions and the international interventions supporting these insurgences against state leaders (Mobutu and Kabila).⁸⁹⁷ These massive intra-state violence periods were not solely triggered by domestic dynamics: Surrounding wars in Sudan, Angola, Congo, Central African Republic, Uganda, Burundi and notably Rwanda excessively destabilized the DRC.⁸⁹⁸ While reciprocal refugee movements between these countries created severe internal problems in the DRC and attracted further international actors into its territory, while the involvement of the DRC leaders with the rebellious non-state actors from these countries contributed to further internationalization of the intra-state wars.

⁸⁹³ Ndikumana, Kisangani, "The Economics of...", p.63.

⁸⁹⁴ Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

⁸⁹⁵ PITF, **Coups d'Etat, 1946-2015 Excel Coup List and Excel Time Series**.

⁸⁹⁶ PITF, **Adverse Regime Changes Dataset**.

⁸⁹⁷ PITF, **Revolutionary War Dataset**; PITF, **Ethnic War Dataset**.

⁸⁹⁸ Herbert Weiss, "Civil War in the Congo: War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo", **Society**, Vol.38, No.3, 2001, p.67.

c. Internationalized Intra-state wars after the Cold War: Outline of wars in 1996-1997, 1998-2002 and 2013

The first internationalized intra-state war after the Cold War period involved an extensive number of actors who had many diverse motives and aims. Internal and external causes as well as actors all mixed to each other throughout the war but all parties were united against Mobutu with the aim of overthrowing him from power. After he came to power, Mobutu's politics caused both internal and external reactions. Internally, he followed a populist and nationalist rhetoric, strengthened his authority by monopolizing political and economic instruments, created a bureaucratic entourage based on clientelism, channeled external aid to extravagant projects but drew back from public services, made demographically unbalanced investments in country's regions, allowed illegal economic activities (black market, smuggling, tax fraud etc.) to become common and popular endeavors, and targeted ethnic groups as responsible for internal setbacks and used them as a distraction from the real problems.⁸⁹⁹ The most obvious attempt of victimizing ethnic groups was the citizenship removal of the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge groups that were living in the Northern and Southern Kivu regions.⁹⁰⁰

In this chaotic environment, inter-communal conflicts between various groups living in North Kivu (Banyarwanda against Nande, Hunde and Nyanga) took off in 1993 due to ethnicity-based problems mixed with political provocation, competition over territory, natural resource domination quarrels and administrative discrimination. Inter-communal conflicts aggravated after the massive immigration of Hutu groups from Rwanda. The DRC became the most affected country from the 1994 genocide: Most of the refugees were Hutu extremists belonging to Interahamwe and ex-FAR (former members of the Rwandan Armed Forces/Forces Armées

⁸⁹⁹ Boaz Atzili, "Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict", **International Security**, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2006/2007, pp.158-163.

⁹⁰⁰ Banyarwanda represents the Rwandese people migrated to Nord-Kivu region of the DRC in 20th century before its independence. It includes both Hutu and Tutsi origins. At the beginning of the 1990s they became the second largest group in Nord Kivu after Nande. Even though they gained citizenship in 1971, the law produced under Mobutu rule in 1981, which could never been implemented, aimed to strip them of their rights. Banyamulenge signifies the Tutsi originated Rwandese people in Sud-Kivu Province who migrated to the DRC during the 19th century and formed the Congolese Tutsis during the upcoming century. They were subject to the same citizenship rights as Banyarwanda. In 1995, they were forced to exile from the DRC with other Rwandese originated people living in Congolese soils. Both of these groups gave their support to AFDL against Mobutu regime between 1996 and 1997 under the leadership of Kabila; Bobb, Kisangani, **Historical Dictionary...**, pp.102-105.

Rwandaïses) who lost the fight against Tutsi-dominated RPA. After they left their country, they were installed in the Kivu region across the Rwanda border and changed the ethnic balance of the region, which was already facing communal conflicts. There, they collaborated with other Rwandese and Congolese Hutus and participated into ethnic cleansing against Tutsis and Hunde, who cooperated against them or fled to Rwanda from the DRC.⁹⁰¹ The effect of the mass movement into the DRC soil was not limited to internal conflict: While refugee camps became the hosting bases for Hutu extremists who continued killing Tutsis in the DRC with the monetary and military help of Mobutu⁹⁰², they also kept organizing attacks against the new Tutsi dominated Rwandese government. This situation put Mobutu into a troublesome position and paved the way for the internationalized intra-state war. First, Mobutu's politics against ethnic groups in the DRC and his support to Hutu extremists started an internal rebellion against him. Second, Hutu attacks to Rwanda coming from Congolese refugee camps and the call of the DRC Tutsis for Rwandan help (which can be considered as a kin syndrome) led to the Rwandese intervention into the DRC to destroy camps and overthrow Mobutu on the side of domestic rebellious groups rallied under the AFDL umbrella.⁹⁰³

In November 1996, AFDL and RPA initiated a grand attack against refugee camps in the eastern DRC and Goma. After the fall of Goma, soldiers from Angola, Uganda and Mai Mai (which had around 15,000 child soldiers named as *kadogos*) joined the rebellion forces, marched to Kinshasa and replaced the 30 years old regime of Mobutu with Laurent-Désiré Kabila in 1997.⁹⁰⁴ During these events, Mobutu urged the UN and OAU to take action against the invasion in the DRC territory. Yet, international community was convinced that it was a revolutionary movement against the Mobutu regime, thus they did not condemn or act against these developments. Without any external support the Mobutu's army withdrew from all fronts, where they engaged in serious looting, killing and raping, which increased the popularity of AFDL. Mobutu only received help from ex-FAR/Interahamwe and the

⁹⁰¹ Rusamira Etienne, "La dynamique des conflits ethniques au Nord-Kivu : Une réflexion prospective", *Afrique contemporaine*, Vol.3, No.207, 2003, pp.150-153.

⁹⁰² Herbert Weiss, "Civil War...", p.69.

⁹⁰³ Atzili, "Fixed Borders...", p.168.

⁹⁰⁴ François Emizet Kisangani, *Guerres civiles dans la République démocratique du Congo 1960-2010*, L'Harmattan, 2015, p.180.

UNITA (Angolan NSA) soldiers against the international support of AFDL⁹⁰⁵ and merely from the government of France that helped Mobutu so that he could leave the country.⁹⁰⁶

After the escape of Mobutu and the seizure of power by Kabila, the country's name was changed back to the DRC from Zaire. As the leader of a failed state, Kabila tried to initiate a new cultural revolution based on a Maoist ideology and social classes, which did not gain popular support. He also resorted to autocratic policies, such as torturing opposition and forming espionage institutions (People's Committee) relying on civilians spying each other and informing on other civilians.⁹⁰⁷ Moreover, he kept ethnic troubles alive by not granting the Banyamulenge group its citizenship back and allowing, if not encouraging, massacres against Tutsi originated groups.⁹⁰⁸ In addition to his repressive internal politics, in foreign affairs he started to have problems with the states that had supported him during the First Congo War. In order to prove himself to the Congolese society as a legitimate and independent leader from other African countries, he disregarded foreign advice and demands; and furthermore, he asked Rwandese and Ugandan troops to leave the DRC.⁹⁰⁹ These developments turned the previous allies of Kabila against him. Hence, Rwanda (with RPA soldiers-Rwandan Patriotic Army), Uganda (who created its own rebel group in the DRC under the name of MLC - Congo Liberation Movement) and other discontent local groups formed a united front against Kabila under the umbrella of RCD in 1998.

Following its foundation, in August 1998, RCD started a rebellion in Goma, which was supported by Rwandese and Ugandan troops with the aim of overthrowing Kabila from power. Tutsi people and forces from the Armed Forces of the Republic of the Congo/Forces armées de la République du Congo (FAC) cooperated with foreign troops that entered in the Congolese soil. On the other side,

⁹⁰⁵ Herbert Weiss, "War & Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo", **American diplomacy** (Online), Vol.5, No.3, 2000, Part 1.

⁹⁰⁶ Howard W. French, "Mobutu Leaves Capital of Zaire In What Many See as End to Rule", 08.05.1997, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/08/world/mobutu-leaves-capital-of-zaire-in-what-many-see-as-end-to-rule.html>, (accessed 18.02.2017); Venugopalan, "Understanding the...", p.6.

⁹⁰⁷ Robert Anthony Waters Jr., **Historical Dictionary of United States-Africa Relations**, USA: Scarecrow Press, 2009, pp.136-137.

⁹⁰⁸ Atzili, "Fixed Borders...", p.168.

⁹⁰⁹ Herbert Weiss, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Story of Lost Opportunities to Prevent or Reduce Deadly Conflicts", in R. Cooper, J. Vořnov Kohler, Juliette Vořnov Kohler eds., **Responsibility to Protect: The Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp.119-120.

Hutu soldiers as well as troops from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe joined the Kabila's front. Later on, the governments of Chad, Sudan and Central African Republic came to the government's side. The Burundi government joined the Kabila opposition, which turned the war into an African World War drawing all regional actors into the DRC territory.⁹¹⁰ This massive internationalization of intra-state war with multiple actors turned into a deadlock between 1998 and 1999, where none of the parties could defeat the others. This situation triggered international pressure to find a diplomatic solution and in 1999 the Lusaka agreement was signed between warring agents (the governments of the DRC, Namibia, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) and contributed to contain the regional war in the DRC.⁹¹¹ At this point, the UN took action and established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) with view to achieve ceasefire and deliver humanitarian help to the region.⁹¹²

Despite the signing of the Lusaka agreement and the operation of MONUC in the DRC, fighting did not stop. The number of both local and foreign actors in the war and their shifting alliances, and the opportunity to finance the war through illegal trade of natural Congolese resources, such as coltan, gold and diamonds, contributed to the prolongation of the war. In 2001 Kabila got assassinated and his son Laurent Kabila became the new ruler by acquiring Angola, Zimbabwe and Western governments' support to implement the Lusaka agreement's conditions, including the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC and the holding of general elections.⁹¹³ In that context, a new ceasefire agreement was signed on 16th December 2002 when there was a consensus between the signing parties on the new leader of the DRC, who would integrate the warring local factions into the Congolese army. In 2003 peace accords ending the war were signed in South Africa and subsequently a new government of the DRC got established.⁹¹⁴ In this way, the second internationalized intra-state war of the DRC after the Cold War finished with tens of thousands civilian and military deaths, lost children, raped women, a heavily affected

⁹¹⁰ Dixon, Sarkees, **A Guide to...**, p.664.

⁹¹¹ Herbert Weiss, "The Democratic Republic...", p.121.

⁹¹² UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1279**, 30.11.1999, S/RES/1279, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1279\(1999\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1279(1999)) (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁹¹³ Kisangani, **Guerres civiles...**, pp.216-219.

⁹¹⁴ Dixon, Sarkees, **A Guide to...**, p.665.

environment, epidemics of contagious diseases, poor economic conditions, and a brand new political system that had to be built from zero.⁹¹⁵

Following the new era of the DRC, interventionist powers retreated from the Congolese territory but intra-state conflicts did not cease. MONUC was now the only foreign troop holder in the DRC⁹¹⁶, whose mandate and soldier capacity increased over time. In 2000, MONUC received permission from the UNSC to take the necessary action to protect its personnel and civilians and reinforced its military capacity with 5,537 military personnel on the ground.⁹¹⁷ In 2004, it received further authorization of the UNSC to use force to protect civilians and personnel against any physical violence, to implement previous measures envisaged by UN resolutions, to guarantee the security of state institutions and ameliorate humanitarian conditions; and to disarm rebellious groups. In addition, MONUC was given the rather ambitious mandate to carry out numerous tasks with the Government of National Unity and Transition, such as the implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDR/RR) program for ex-combatants, aiming at the promotion of human rights and the arrangement of a smooth electoral process.⁹¹⁸

All these powers granted to MONUC created the perception that the UN was actually a warring party on the ground and triggered a lot of discussion about the impartiality of the UN missions.⁹¹⁹ By 2004, the military personnel of the UN amounted to 16,000 who faced various internal rebels in the DRC, such as “*Mai Mai, Ugandan-backed Ituri warlords, foreign guerrilla groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF; Uganda), Forces nationales de libération/National Liberation Forces (FNL; Burundi), and the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), and troops loyal to Laurent Nkunda*”⁹²⁰. Between 2006 and 2008, Nkunda’s Tutsi originated groups, the National Congress for the Defense of the

⁹¹⁵ Kisangani, *Guerres civiles...*, pp.220-225.

⁹¹⁶ For Military and Police personnel information see. “MONUC Facts and Figures”, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/facts.shtml> (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁹¹⁷ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1291**, 24.02.2000, S/RES/1291, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1291\(2000\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1291(2000)) (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁹¹⁸ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1565**, 01.10.2004, S/RES/1565, [https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1565\(2004\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1565(2004)) (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁹¹⁹ John Karlsrud, “The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peace keeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.36, No.1, p.43.

⁹²⁰ Cathy Nangini, Mainak Jas, Hugo L. Fernandes, Robert Muggah, “Visualizing Armed Groups: The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s M23 in Focus”, *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, Vol.3, No.5, p.3.

People (CNDP) and the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (BDK: Ethnic-religious and political sects based in the Bas-Congo region), became the prominent NSAs but conflicts got less intense due to the peace agreement between the CNDP and the DRC government. This agreement granted political status to CNDP and created the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), which integrated soldiers of rebel groups into its structure.⁹²¹ While this agreement lowered the internal tension for a while, the lack of training, consistent salary payments, personnel supplies and other operational problems in FARDC resulted in its soldiers looting and abusing civilians. Acknowledging that same capacity shortfalls existed in other state institutions,⁹²² it did not take a long time for the DRC to fall into conflict again. Meanwhile, in 1st July 2010, MONUC was transformed into the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to emphasize the beginning of a new era in the DRC and extended its military capacity to 19,815 soldiers, which rendered it the largest UN peacekeeping operation in history.⁹²³

In that context, in 2012, a new rebel group established by ex-CNDP soldiers and was named the March 23 Movement (M23) after the day of the 2009 peace agreement signed between the DRC government and CNDP. The group revolted against the government, which once again put the state in an internationalized warfare phase with Rwanda and the involvement of several other transnational non-state actors on the side of M23. Their demands were the amelioration of the FARDC conditions and the procurement of better commandment positions for ex-CNDP rebels in the army rankings. However, bearing in mind that these rebels still had access to arms and mineral resource financing, their main desire was to return to warfare conditions in which they would acquire more benefits than in peace conditions. Their rise has been very fast, particularly due to their strategic collaborations in the Kivu, Ituri and Kasai regions.⁹²⁴

⁹²¹ **Ibid.**

⁹²² Alexis Arieff, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Background and U.S. Policy", **CRS report**, USA, 2015, p.10.

⁹²³ **The UNSC resolution 1279**; "MONUSCO Mandate", <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/mandate.shtml> (accessed 18.02.2017); "MONUSCO Facts and Figures", <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml> (accessed 18.02.2017); Arieff, "Democratic Republic...", p.2.

⁹²⁴ Nangini, Jas, Fernandes, Muggah, "Visualizing Armed...", pp.3-4.

These events compelled the UN to establish its first-ever combat force, the “Intervention Brigade” within MONUSCO in March 2013, which is responsible for neutralizing and disarming local (such as Mai Mai) and foreign-armed groups (such as the Lord’s Resistance Army - LRA) in the Eastern DRC, specifically the M23. The Security Council also granted this Brigade the permission to act unilaterally against threats, in order to achieve its main goal, namely to make the DRC a stabilized country capable of functioning.⁹²⁵ The Brigade was composed of 3,000 troops sent from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi and it was successful in confronting and defeating the M23 in 2013. Even though the activities of M23 have only been disturbed on the Congolese soil due to impossibility of hot-pursuit operations, after the signature of the peace agreement and the disarmament of the M23 in exchange of criminal amnesty and the release of imprisoned soldiers, the Brigade launched operations against other armed groups while FARDC fought against FDLR, who has been operating in the country since the Rwandese genocide.⁹²⁶

On the other hand, MONUSCO and the Intervention Brigade have not been the sole internationalizing actors in the DRC intra-state conflict/war between 2012 and 2013. The government of Rwanda intervened in the war on the side of the rebel groups while Uganda affiliated with them.⁹²⁷ Rwanda had already been providing access to its territory and intelligence infrastructure, while they were also providing military, material, logistic aid, and ensuring training to CNDP between 2006 and 2008.⁹²⁸ After the dissolution of the CNDP in 2009, Rwanda continued to support M23 substantially since its formation with the collaboration of Uganda.⁹²⁹ In light of the insisting interfering behaviors of Rwanda and Uganda, in 2013 the UN achieved the signing of a Framework Agreement between the DRC and its neighbors to guarantee the application of the non-interference principle within the region. According to the agreement, the DRC’s neighbors accepted to halt their support to armed groups in the Congolese territory and the DRC accepted to introduce certain reforms. Moreover, the parties declared to initiate and promote regional economic

⁹²⁵ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 2098**, 28.03.2013, S/RES/2098, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2098\(2013\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2098(2013)) (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁹²⁶ Arieff, “Democratic Republic...”, pp.9-10.

⁹²⁷ UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

⁹²⁸ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

⁹²⁹ Arieff, “Democratic Republic...”, p.9.

integration.⁹³⁰ However, it is reported that Uganda has been allowing the movement of M23 leaders in its territory even after the signature of this agreement, while Rwanda disregards the open recruitment tactics that this group is using to attract members from the Rwandese society.⁹³¹ As a result, despite the massive military and diplomatic efforts to stabilize the DRC, various rebel groups, such as the FNL supported by Burundi and LRA and ADF supported by Uganda, keep operating within the Congolese territory.⁹³²

Section III - Iraq: Crossroads of Conflicts in the Middle East

Internationalized civil wars in Iraq are important for deciphering the historical and socio-political dynamics of both Middle Eastern and international politics. In order to seize the international elements, in this section, firstly, the wars in the Iraqi territory, which took place after the Second World War, will be discussed to analyse their historical context. To that end, the datasets of COW and UCDP/PRIO will be presented separately in order to observe whether they are diverse perceptions on the types of conflicts or whether they agree on the war periods and types. Secondly, the internal traits of Iraq that can contribute to its war proneness will be examined according to the datasets of Doyle & Sambanis, Fearon & Laitin and PITF. As these datasets offer more internally focused information, they will lead us to evaluate the domestic heritage, which resulted in the civil wars and the internal dynamics that steered the motivations of third parties and led to their interventions and involvements. Finally, the internationalized intra-state wars of Iraq in the post-Cold War period will be taken into account, in order to understand the political and legal context of the ICWs, their actors and the chain of events related to the onset, duration and termination of them. In this way, we will be able to see the comprehensive dynamics of Iraqi civil wars before evaluating them with the inward and outward internationalization patterns.

a. Types and periods of wars after the Second World War

Iraq has been through continuous and recurring civil wars all driven by similar motivations. All these inter-state wars have contributed to a destabilized environment

⁹³⁰ **Ibid.**

⁹³¹ Nangini, Jas, Fernandes, Muggah, "Visualizing Armed...", p.4.

⁹³² Arieff, "Democratic Republic...", p.11.

and the country has experienced so many coup d'état attempts that bloodless power transfer tends to become an exceptional situation. The distinctness of Iraqi civil wars is embedded in their actors who have been the same during the last five decades: They have the same ethnic structures and rebels with the same motives. Moreover, they have been acquiring external support particularly relatedly to the inter-state wars of Iraq and ethnicity has always been a central problem between the central government and the society.

Table 14 - COW's Classification on Iraqi Wars⁹³³

Year	War Type	Parties
1959	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq, Kurdish factions & Communist factions vs. Shammam Tribe & Pro-Western Officers
1961-1963	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq & Jash ⁹³⁴ vs. Barzani-led Kurdish tribes & Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
1965-1966	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq & Jash vs. KDP
1968-1970	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq & Jash vs. KDP
1974-1975	Internationalized Intra-State war	Government of Iraq vs. KDP, Government of Iran & Iranian Kurds
1985-1988	Internationalized Intra-State war	Government of Iraq & Jash vs. KDP, The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Iraqi Communist Party, Socialist Party of Kurdistan-Iraq & Government of Iran
1991	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq & Jash vs. KDP, PUK, Shiites, Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq & Jash defectors
1994-1995	Intra-State War (inter-communal)	PUK vs. KDP and Islamic Movement of Kurdistan
1996	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq and KDP vs. PUK and Iraqi National Congress
1997	Intra-State War (inter-communal)	PUK vs. KDP
2003	Inter-state war	Government of Iraq vs. governments of Australia, the UK & the USA
2003-2010	Extra-State war	Al-Qaida & Iraqi resistance vs. governments of Australia, the USA, the UK, Netherlands, Spain, Poland, Italy, Ukraine, Republic of Korea
2010-2015	Internationalized Intra-State war	Governments of Iraq and the USA vs. Iraqi Sunnis

⁹³³ Prepared according to COW, **The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)**; COW, **The Inter-State War Data (v4.0)**; COW, **The Extra-State War Data (v4.0)**. Information after 2007 is acquired from Dixon, Sarkees, **A Guide to...** which added present warfare in Iraq as an additional intra-state war data.

⁹³⁴ *Jash* represents military factions composed of unaffiliated Kurdish people.

In 1958, General Abd al-Karim Kassem organized a coup⁹³⁵ against the monarchical administration of Iraq, which was established in 1921 in line with British interests.⁹³⁶ In 1959, during the establishment of new government agencies, a new coup was initiated by the commander of the Mosul garrison, Abd al-Wahhab Shawwaf, who was supported by pro-western military units. This coup turned into a civil war for the control of the central government and the Kasim's side won the war.⁹³⁷ Interestingly, this was the only international system related civil war that took place in Iraq and the only central power seizure attempt until the end of the Cold War, which is contradictory considering all other civil war circumstances of its time.

This difference relies on three characteristics of Iraq. First, Iraq's own internal dynamics are stronger than international system effects. It is true that during secessionist wars and coups, Marxist ideology and Soviet aid played a role in forming and consolidating political parties and armed rebel groups⁹³⁸, but, unlike other countries, internal groups who survived the Cold War based on their ethnic and political aims despite the fall of USSR, seemed to have instrumentalized external support for their gains rather than the opposite. Second, the state-building process in Iraq has never recessed due to its *ethno-sectarian societal structure* fractured between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, whose rivalry symbolizes a sentiment of "not wanting to live together" since 1921. Only Sunnis have adopted a national agenda and claimed sovereignty with this aim, which caused further resentment from other ethnic groups.⁹³⁹ Third, the leadership's willpower and regional dynamics have been driving forces of Iraqi politics. The latter can be summarized as follows: Powerful, dominant and long-term national and sectarian leaders, such as General Kassem, Saddam Hussein, Barzani (family) and Jalal Talabani; inter-state wars that took place due to regional rivalries, such as the Arab-Israel war in 1948, Yom Kippur in 1973, the Iran-Iraq wars in 1974 and between 1980-1988 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which turned into the Gulf War in 1991⁹⁴⁰; and persisting coups, coup d'état

⁹³⁵ PITF, *Coups d'Etat, 1946-2015 Excel Coup List and Excel Time Series*.

⁹³⁶ Adeed Dawisha, *Iraq: A Political History*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013, p.56.

⁹³⁷ Dixon, Sarkees, *A Guide to...*, p.366.

⁹³⁸ For example PUK advocated Marxist principles since its formation See. Michael M. Gunter, "Foreign Influences on the Kurdish Insurgency in Iraq", *Conflict Quarterly*, Vol.12, No.4, 1992, p.13; Israil, Iran and the USA supported KDP against pro-soviet Ba'ath regime see. Dilip Hiro, *The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict*, New York: Psychology Press, 1989, p.15.

⁹³⁹ Dawisha, *Iraq: A Political...*, p.13.

⁹⁴⁰ COW, *The Inter-State War Data (v4.0)*; UCDP/PRIO, *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016*.

attempts, coup plots and alleged coup plots⁹⁴¹ that are instrumentalized for gaining central authority at national level.

Even though in 1959 Mustafa Barzani cooperated with the Kassem government to defy the Mosul revolt, his raising reputation in the Northern region intimidated the central authority, which used it to fuel up inter-communal grudges between Kurds, weaken Barzani's political influence.⁹⁴² This interference would push KDP against the central government and initiate the future fractionalization of Kurds between KDP (supported by Erbil based Kurdish tribes led by Barzani family) and PUK (supported by Sulaymaniyah based Kurdish tribes led by Jalal Talabani).⁹⁴³ In this way, the first of what can be characterized as a never-ending Kurdish autonomy war started in 1961. The same war would recur in 1965 and 1968. Then, it will recommence in 1974 and 1989 in an internationalized context, as part of the Iraq-Iran inter-state wars. However, throughout these years clashes kept happening at a lower intensity level, as intra-state conflicts⁹⁴⁴ thus earning the use of the term *never-ending war*.

The intra-state wars based on Kurdish autonomy demands between 1961-1963, 1965-1966 and 1968-1970 ended with agreements due to stalemates between the parties. The first one of these wars broke out because of the objection of Kurdish groups to taxes and the government's agrarian reform law. Following the clashes between 1961 and 1963 the government agreed to guarantee a level of autonomy to the Kurdish region lower than that of an autonomous administration stage. Yet, this was deemed insufficient by the Kurdish opposition and Barzani declared autonomy in 1965, which provoked the second intra-state war between 1965 and 1966. Barzani and Talabani led their cooperating fractions against the central government and, after two years of war, despite the lack of victory, they succeeded in gaining further linguistic and cultural rights from the government still with a lower than autonomy status. However, this development incited inter-communal battles in 1968 between Barzani and Talabani for the leading Kurdish faction. The government wanted to take advantage of this disarray and supported the weaker Talabani fraction against Barzani, who in return gained Iran's support to stay in the game. While the Ba'ath party took the control of the central government with a coup in 1968, Iran lowered its

⁹⁴¹ PITF, *Coups d'Etat, 1946-2015 Excel Coup List and Excel Time Series*.

⁹⁴² Dixon, Sarkees, *A Guide to...*, p.367.

⁹⁴³ Laurie King-Irani, "Iraq: A Look Back", *Orbis*, Vol.51, No.1, 2007, p.101.

⁹⁴⁴ UCDP/PRIO, *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016*.

support to Barzani and clashes reached another stalemate.⁹⁴⁵ Thus, in 1970 the government signed an agreement with Mustafa Barzani, granting cultural and administrative autonomy to the Kurdish region for the first time. The agreement, which also promised representation in the central executive and legislative institutions, was to be implemented in four years. In 1974, it became obvious that Baghdad preferred military consolidation⁹⁴⁶ instead of implementing all conditions of the agreement and that the Kurdish opposition desired much more than autonomy and in fact aimed for a federation. Also, oil rich Kirkuk's political status was still debatable, a fact that fueled both parties' discontent.⁹⁴⁷

The collapse of the agreement revamped the war between the central government and the Kurdish forces, which were immensely supported by Iran. Thus, this time the Kurdish autonomy war had a new actor, who had openly interfered from abroad. This confrontation between the national governments of Iraq and Iran was related to the context of the international system, in which Iran played the pro-Western role while Iraq took the pro-Soviet character. When Barzani attacked the governmental forces, Baghdad responded in an organized and efficient way, which led Barzani to rely on further support from Iran.⁹⁴⁸ During the war, Barzani declared the independence of the Kurdish region with assistance from Iran, who both channeled Israeli and American arms to KDP and militarily intervened into the fighting. In early 1975, Iran came to the realization that KDP was inciting secessionist hopes in the Iranian Kurds and Iraq started to suffer from severe material and human losses. In this context, Iran and Iraq signed the Algiers Accord, which regulated the Shatt-al Arab front in favor of Iran.⁹⁴⁹ In return, Iran stopped helping the Iraqi Kurdish, which resulted in the disintegration and the runaway of the Kurdish opposition.

The second internationalized intra-state war during the Cold War was driven by the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988. In 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ousted the Shah and founded a fundamentalist Shia regime in Iran, which rejected the Algiers Agreement. This had two outcomes, first, the Kurdish insurgent groups

⁹⁴⁵ Dixon, Sarkees, **A Guide to...**, pp.367-368, 373-374.

⁹⁴⁶ George S. Harris, "Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds", **Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, Vol. 433, 1973, pp.120-121.

⁹⁴⁷ King-Irani, "Iraq: A Look...", p.101.

⁹⁴⁸ Harris, "Ethnic Conflict...", p.121.

⁹⁴⁹ Hiro, **The Longest...**, pp.15-17.

reestablished in the Iranian territory; and second, in 1980 Iraq invaded Iran.⁹⁵⁰ Despite the initial disagreement between KDP and PUK during the war between Iran and Iraq, following the transfer of the war from Iran to the Iraqi territory in 1983, PUK and KDP allied with Iran against Iraq in 1986 and all-diverse opposition groups gathered together under the umbrella of the Kurdistan Front in 1987.⁹⁵¹ In 1988, Iran and Iraq agreed on a UN brokered ceasefire, leaving the opposition to its own destiny. That resulted horribly for the Kurdish society. In 1988, Saddam Hussein gained an unconditional victory against the opposition by initiating the Anfal Campaign, in which the use of chemical weapons and mass killing of civilians were embedded in an ethnic cleansing practice, leaving at least 100,000 Kurds murdered by the government.⁹⁵²

Table 15 - UCDP/PRIO's Classification on Iraqi Wars⁹⁵³

Year	War Type	Parties
1958-1959	Intra-State Conflict	Government of Iraq vs. Military faction (forces of Abdul Wahab al-Shawaf)
1961-1963	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq vs. KDP
1963	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq vs. Military faction (forces of Abd as-Salam Arif), NCRC
1964	Intra-State Conflict	Government of Iraq vs. KDP
1965-1966	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq vs. KDP
1967-1968	Intra-State Conflict	Government of Iraq vs. KDP
1969	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq vs. KDP
1970	Intra-State Conflict	Government of Iraq vs. KDP
1973	Intra-State Conflict	Government of Iraq vs. KDP
1974-1975	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq vs. KDP
1976-1987	Intra-State Conflict	Government of Iraq vs. Kurdistan Democratic Party-Provisional Command (KDP-QM), PUK & KDP
1982-1984	Intra-State Conflict	Iraq government vs. Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
1987	Intra-State Conflict	Iraq government vs. SCIRI
1988	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq vs. KDP & PUK
1989-1990	Intra-State Conflict	Government of Iraq vs. KDP & PUK
1991	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq vs. KDP & PUK
1991-1996	Intra-State Conflict	Government of Iraq vs. SCIRI
1992	Intra-State Conflict	Government of Iraq vs. PUK
1992-1997	Non-State Conflicts	
1995-1996	Intra-State Conflict	Government of Iraq vs. PUK
2000	Non-State Conflicts	
2002-2004	Non-State Conflicts	

⁹⁵⁰ Gunter, "Foreign Influences...", pp.13-14.

⁹⁵¹ Dixon, Sarkees, **A Guide to...**, pp.394-395.

⁹⁵² Tom Keating, **The Hutchinson Dictionary of World History**, UK: Helicon Publishing, 1998, p.950; Gunter, "Foreign Influences...", p.15; Dixon, Sarkees, **A Guide to...**, p.395.

⁹⁵³ Prepared according to UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

2003	Inter-State War	Government of Iraq vs. governments of Australia, the UK & the USA
2004-2008	Internationalized Intra-State War	Government of Iraq & allies ⁹⁵⁴ vs. al-Mahdi Army, Ansar al-Islam, ISIS/Daesh & Reformation and Jihad Front (RJF)
2007	Non-State Conflicts	
2009	Internationalized Intra-State War	Government of Iraq & allies vs. ISIS/Daesh
2010	Internationalized Intra-State War	Government of Iraq & the USA vs. ISIS/Daesh
2011	Internationalized Intra-State Conflict	Government of Iraq & the USA vs. ISIS/Daesh & Ansar al-Islam
2012	Intra-State Conflict	Government of Iraq vs. ISIS/Daesh
2013	Intra-State War	Government of Iraq vs. ISIS/Daesh
2013-2015	Non-State Conflicts	
2014-2015	Internationalized Intra-State War	Government of Iraq & allies ⁹⁵⁵ vs. ISIS/Daesh

Although the COW and UCDP/PRIO datasets mostly accord on the war classifications of Iraq, there are still a few differences. First, while COW defines the 1959 events as an intra-state war, the UCDP/PRIO perceives it in a conflict level. Second, regarding the clashes between 1961 and 1963, UDCP/PRIO adds 1963 coup as an intra-state war, while COW disregards it in terms of a war. Third, COW accepts the war between 1974 and 1975 as an internationalized war, while UCDP/COW takes it as an intra-state war and accepts Iran's military involvement as a supporting indicator.⁹⁵⁶ Finally, as the COW accepts the Iranian interference between 1985 and 1988 as an internationalizing effect for the intra-state war, UCDP/PRIO again rejects the collaboration of Kurds and Iranian troops as an internationalizing factor and perceives Iran as a supporter of the Shiite rebel group SCIRI between 1982 and 1984 and in 1987.⁹⁵⁷

Regarding the period following the end of the Cold War, both institutions perceive the 1991 battles as an intra-state war. In order to understand the complex mechanisms of that year, we should analyze the events in detail. In August 1990,

⁹⁵⁴ Allies consist of the governments of Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Tonga, Ukraine, the UK, the USA, Armenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**

⁹⁵⁵ Allies include governments of Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Jordan, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, the UK and the USA. **Ibid.**

⁹⁵⁶ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

⁹⁵⁷ **Ibid.**

Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait⁹⁵⁸ claiming that this territory had historically belonged to the Iraqi state as a part of the *vilayet* of Basra.⁹⁵⁹ Following this, the UNSC authorized the member states to use force against the invasion.⁹⁶⁰ The USA started air strikes against the Iraqi troops in 17th January 1991 and international intervention took the form of a land assault under the name of *Operation Desert Storm* led by governments of the USA, the UK, France and Saudi Arabia.⁹⁶¹ Before the initiation of the ground operation, the USA invited Kurdish and Shiite groups to rebel against Saddam, which initiated the intra-state war between the government of Iraq and the KDP-PUK alliance in the Northern Iraq and between the government of Iraq and Shiite-SCIRI groups in the Southern Iraq. This plan aimed to stall and preoccupy Saddam⁹⁶², and brought results in only two days with the defeat of Saddam in Kuwait. After his defeat, Saddam returned and attacked Shiite groups in the South, repressed them bloodily and rapidly marched to the North against the Kurdish uprising. Afraid of Saddam's harsh response and lacking American support on the ground, almost two million Kurds escaped to the mountainous areas near the Iranian and Turkish borders, tried to flee out of Iraq but thousands of them died. The

⁹⁵⁸ Iraq has had the desire to follow an irredentist policy against Kuwait for a long time; in 1932 and 1961, this argument was debated in Iraq, and moreover in 1961 Iraq had declared the annexation of Kuwait but afterwards it was obliged to renounce its statement. Thus, in 1990, two years after the end of exhausting Iran war, Saddam Hussein found itself in an impasse: Iraq had entered in an economic decline during the war and the last two years had not been enough to improve its situation. In this context, before invading Kuwait he accused Kuwait extracting Iraqi oil and involving in a mass oil production policy, which was creating harmful economic outcomes for Iraq, and hence demanded Kuwait to erase Iraq's debts. Thus, after the rejection of his demand he started an invasion and announced the appropriation of Kuwait as the 19th region of Iraq. As both COW and UCDP perceive it as an inter-state war, in 1991, several states intervened into war, turning it in an international war known as the Gulf War. Before the international intervention, the UN Security Council urged Iraq to retreat its troops from Kuwait with several resolutions, and finally in 29th November 1990, it authorized member states to use all necessary means to implement earlier resolutions in collaboration with the government of Kuwait, unless Iraq withdrew from Kuwait soil until 15th January. According to COW inter-state war dataset, the governments of the USA, Canada, the UK, Italy, Morocco, Egypt, Oman, France, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Syria intervened into the war on the side of the Kuwait; according to UCDP/PRIODAC in addition to those states, the governments of Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Greece, Honduras, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Turkey and United Arab Emirates intervened into the war on the side of Kuwait; See Baskın Oran, **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan bugüne olgular, belgeler, yorumlar, Cilt II: 1980-2001**, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001, p. 255; Dawisha, **Iraq: A Political...**, p.164; For more information see related documents: UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolutions 660-662, 664-667, 669, 670, 674, 677 and 678**, 1990s, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1990.shtml>. (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁹⁵⁹ Zoey Moore Lowery, **Key Figures of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan**, EPUB: Britannica Educational Publishing, 2015, p.20.

⁹⁶⁰ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 678**, 29.11.1990, S/RES/678, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/678\(1990\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/678(1990)) (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁹⁶¹ Baskın Oran, **Türk Dış...** Cilt II, p.255.

⁹⁶² **Ibid.**, p.259.

images of civilians under inhuman conditions, which were shown by the media, caused great international anxiety⁹⁶³ and the UNSC adopted the Resolutions 687 and 688.

The Resolution 687 did not include any reference regarding the intra-state war in Iraq but urged the Iraqi government about the significance of not using any chemical and biological weapons.⁹⁶⁴ The Iraqi government had violated the rule of non-usage of unpermitted weapons since the Kurdish massacre in 1988 and this disobedience kept echoing until the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Resolution 688, on the other hand, condemned the repression of Kurdish population, demanded from Iraq to stop threatening international peace, invited Iraq to let international humanitarian aid into Iraqi territory and called its members and other organizations to address urgent civilian needs.⁹⁶⁵ This resulted in the establishment of the Operation Provide Comfort in 7th April 1991⁹⁶⁶ that would stay in the region until the end of 1996. Even though there were military troops from 13 contributing nations on the ground for a short period of time to ensure the protection of Kurdish civilians and no fly zones and safe corridors were created on the Iraqi territory through international assistance, due to its humanitarian character⁹⁶⁷ neither COW nor UCDP/PRIO view this involvement as an internationalizing element and listed the war in 1991 as an intra-state war.⁹⁶⁸

For that matter, 2003 is the turning point for Iraqi civil wars. According to the UCDP/PRIO dataset, the only internationalized intra-state war of Iraq after the end

⁹⁶³ Dawisha, **Iraq: A Political...**, pp.165-166.

⁹⁶⁴ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 687**, 03.04.1991, S/RES/687, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/687\(1991\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/687(1991)) (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁹⁶⁵ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 688**, 05.04.1991, S/RES/688, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/688\(1991\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/688(1991)) (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁹⁶⁶ Philip A Meek, "Operation Provide Comfort: A Case Study in Humanitarian Relief and Foreign Assistance", **Air Force Law Review**, Vol.37, 1994, p.228.

⁹⁶⁷ James Cockayne, David Malone, "Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation Provide Comfort and the No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the Iraq Crisis of 2003", **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 37, No.1, 2006, pp.127-128; Dilek Latif, "United Nation's Changing Role in the Post-Cold War Era", **The Turkish Yearbook**, Vol.30, 2000, pp.37-38.

⁹⁶⁸ Simultaneously between 1991 and 1999, Turkey has conducted two operations along Iraqi borders. The first one was attached to Operation Provide Comfort II, started in the summer of 1991 and lasted until the end of 1996. The second operation called Operation Northern Watch was subsequently established and continued until the summer of 1999. These national operations were authorized according to the Resolution 688 and donated Turkish government with the right to combat with rebellious Kurdish groups (particularly with PKK) in Iraqi territory relying on the hot pursuit principle. Military aspect of these missions were not considered as an internationalizing factor of Iraqi civil war but according to the COW datasets they were marked as the extra-state war of Turkey with PKK in Iraqi territories between 1991 and 1999. Baskın Oran, **Türk Dış...Cilt II**, pp.261-267; COW, **The Extra-State War Data (v4.0)**.

of the Cold War started following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and continues till the present date (except the two year secession between 2012 and 2013). On the other hand, according to COW, the extra-state war after the 2003 war, which is managed by a vast international coalition, turned into an internationalized intra-state war after 2010 and continues until now. Based on these typologies, the period after 2003 comes into our focus as the internationalized intra-state war stage in Iraq.

b. Towards the Internationalized Intra-state wars after the Cold War: Underlying Causal Mechanisms

The warfare in Iraq after 2003 represents a highly ICW. Before discussing its development, political context, characteristics, international actors and their roles in the war, the conditions that set the scene between 2003 and 2015 will be evaluated in this section. Due to time limitations of the datasets of Doyle & Sambanis and Fearon & Laitin, the internal dynamics of Iraqi war can only be evaluated until 1997 and 1999. However, considering that warring parties were roughly the same throughout the last six decades, these datasets still offer valuable insights about Iraq.

According to Doyle & Sambanis, Iraq is a medium country of 438,320 square kilometers and shares borders with six other states.⁹⁶⁹ Its ethno-linguistic fractionalization index appears not to be high with 36 points. According to their data, there has been four different civil war periods in 1959, between 1961 and 1975, between 1988 and 1994, between 1991 and 1994. This shows that Iraq has been really open to war onset because, even though Afghanistan and the DRC were involved in continuous wars as well, Iraq has the most civil war breakouts. Moreover, even though its hostility index was low in 1959 with 0.3801993 points, it increased radically to 0.534917 until 1961. It represents the highest hostility point compared to both other cases and other war periods in Iraq. This extreme hostility rise only lowered to 0.4866393 until 1991, which is still higher than all hostility indicators in other countries, except the Taliban rule period in Afghanistan (which was 0.5145466). Faction numbers during these wars were around four, all based on ethnic structures.⁹⁷⁰ These numbers are capable of explaining societal polarization in Iraq. It also proves that recruitment is based on ethnic segregation, which facilitated the numerous war onsets in Iraq.

⁹⁶⁹ See. The Iraq map in Appendix IV for the geographical presentation.

⁹⁷⁰ Doyle, Sambanis, **International Peacebuilding Data set**.

According to Fearon & Laitin's dataset, the ethnic fractionalization of Iraq again represents the lowest level with 54% (while Afghanistan has 75% and the DRC has 90% ethnic fractionalization). Yet, in contrast with Afghanistan (38% - 25%) and the DRC (16%-10), there is a major ethnic group in Iraq with 62% representation, while the second largest group represents the 20% of the society. This difference shows that the relation between the majority and the minority is an issue for the Iraqi state. Also, there are six different languages spoken in Iraq with a relatively high religious fractionalization (almost 50%) as well. While Iraq is a flat country (where mountains cover only 6% of the territory)⁹⁷¹ and has no areas separated from the mainland, the Iranian and Turkish borders are the mountainous areas, which host the major rebellious groups. Also, settlement is divided, according to ethnic division, thus similar demographic groups are accumulated in defined regions. In addition to this demographic dispersion, Iraqi population has only reached 24 million people (lowest amongst our cases) in 1997, with an immensely high GDP per capita compared to other countries experiencing civil wars: From 1960 to 1974, GDP per capita raised to \$1,000 from \$230; from 1974 to 1980, it fluctuated between \$2,700 and \$3,800; and it suddenly jumped to \$10,000 in 1990. From then until 2004, it experienced an immense linear fall to \$1,300 and rose back to \$6,420 until 2014.⁹⁷² These numbers inform us about the following issues: First, the Iraqi state has had an extremely unstable economy due to regional wars and the international affairs of the country. Second, Iraq possesses oil as a natural resource and benefits highly from its revenues.⁹⁷³ In this context, Iraq is different from the DRC and Afghanistan, which are countries with really low economic indicators. It also diverges from the DRC, which cannot benefit from its own natural resources. On the other hand, politically Iraq is similar to the DRC and Afghanistan by being engulfed into several civil wars and being ruled by anocracies regardless of the ruling elites' origin.⁹⁷⁴

Thus, in addition to its economic instability, politically Iraq has been a very unstable state with an intense political competition, which is reflected on the numbers of coups d'état in the country. Iraq has had four successful coup d'états (in 1985 by Abdul Karim Kassem, in 1963 firstly by Abdul Karim Mustapha Nasrat and

⁹⁷¹ Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

⁹⁷² "Iraq - GDP per capita", <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/iraq/gdp-per-capita> (accessed 18.02.2017)

⁹⁷³ Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

⁹⁷⁴ **Ibid.**

secondly by Abdul Aref, in 1968 by Abdul Razzak al Nayef); 16 failed coups between 1959 and 1995; three coup plots and five alleged coup plots between 1959 and 2011.⁹⁷⁵ Therefore, the political situation in Iraq is problematic, not to mention that the role of the army is non-negligible. On the other hand, it has only experienced one state failure where the central authority collapsed and this was caused by external factors, namely the invasion of Iraq in 2003.⁹⁷⁶ Despite numerous coups and coup attempts, the Iraqi state has experienced only one revolutionary war in 1959; all other civil wars had ethnic basis including the civil war following 2003. While ethnic wars until 2003 were triggered by Kurdish autonomy demands, after the overthrow of the Ba'ath regime by the invasion coalition, Sunni and Shiite militants have been the dominant actors in the intra-state war.⁹⁷⁷

c. Internationalized Intra-state wars after the Cold War: Outline of the Iraq war after 2003

In terms of political context, until 2003 the Saddam Hussein regime was deeply disfavored, especially by the subsequent American administrations. Under the Clinton administration, the USA had adopted a dual containment policy in 1993, according to which Iran and Iraq were to be economically and politically isolated through the UN sanctions. Moreover, in 1998, Clinton introduced the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, which initiated the financing of Saddam Hussein opposition in Iraq. The Iraqi National Accord (INA), KDP, PUK, SCIRI, Iraqi National Congress (INC), the Islamic movement of Kurdistan and the Constitutional Monarchy Movement gained economic support from the American government against Saddam Hussein rule but it is worth mentioning that this support did not include military equipment. This support mechanism was put into action as a means against the alleged mass destruction arms in Iraq, notably nuclear and chemical weapon developments of the Saddam Hussein regime. The same concerns led to the four-day bombings of Iraq by the governments of the USA and the UK under the name of *Operation Desert Fox* in December 1998, due to the Iraqi regime's disobedience to the UN disarmament resolutions and its non-collaboration with the UN weapon inspecting team.⁹⁷⁸ Thus,

⁹⁷⁵ PITF, *Coups d'Etat, 1946-2015 Excel Coup List and Excel Time Series*.

⁹⁷⁶ PITF, *Adverse Regime Changes Dataset*.

⁹⁷⁷ PITF, *Revolutionary War Dataset*; PITF, *Ethnic War Dataset*.

⁹⁷⁸ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012, pp.64-69.

the repercussions of the Gulf War and the Resolution 678 of the UNSC continued until the 2000s, leaving Saddam Hussein discredited in the international arena.

However, the game changing events were triggered with the 9/11 attacks. Already perceived as a threat, Iraq was declared to belong to the “Axis of evil” with Iran and North Korea, who were accused of being involved in terrorist trafficking.⁹⁷⁹ In this context, President G.W. Bush revealed his pre-emptive strike doctrine, according to which war against terror required the adoption of an offensive approach if it was to be won. In 2002, in line with his policy against Iraq, Bush gained approval to use force against Iraq from the House of Representatives and one month later the UNSC adopted the Resolution 1441⁹⁸⁰, which warned the Iraq regime that it will face serious consequences if it continued to violate its disarmament obligations.⁹⁸¹ Even though the Security Council did not explicitly allow the use of force against Iraq, the governments of the USA, the UK and Australia initiated⁹⁸² the *Operation Iraqi Freedom* in March 2003, they conquered Baghdad and they took control of the country only in a few weeks. Despite the end of the military operation, their soldiers remained in Iraq.⁹⁸³ The justification behind the coalition forming were: (1) Saddam Hussein’s defiance to allow the UN weapon inspection teams, (2) The manufacturing and possession of mass destruction weapons, (3) The launch of international security-threatening relations with Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups, (4) The establishment of democratic regimes in the Middle East.⁹⁸⁴ Even though coalition forces were not welcomed as a liberation army, which would overthrow the repressive dictator, Kurds with their *Peshmerga* forces, the INC and the INA collaborated with the coalition forces on the ground.⁹⁸⁵

Three weeks after the end of the coalition operation, on 22th May 2003, the UNSC adopted a new Resolution (Resolution 1483), which recognized the authority of the occupying forces in Iraq and further initiatives to safeguard Iraq’s security and

⁹⁷⁹ Julian Borger, “President broadens war on terrorism”, 31.01.2002, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/31/usa.julianborger> (accessed 14.02.2017)

⁹⁸⁰ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1441**, 08.11.2002, S/RES/1441, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf> (accessed 14.02.2017)

⁹⁸¹ Benjamin S. Lambeth, **The Unseen War: Allied Air Power and the Takedown of Saddam Hussein**, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013, pp.12-14.

⁹⁸² COW, **The Inter-State War Data (v4.0)**; UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

⁹⁸³ Barbara Salazar Torreon, “U.S. Periods of War and Dates of Recent Conflicts”, **CRS Report for Congress**, USA, 29.09.2016, p.8.

⁹⁸⁴ Roaa Al-Momani, “Legitimacy of War on Iraq in International Law”, **Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization**, Vol.24, 2014, p.15.

⁹⁸⁵ Allawi, **The Occupation of...**, pp.90-91.

rebuild the state were encouraged.⁹⁸⁶ Thus, even though the operation of the coalition forces was illegal⁹⁸⁷ under the UN Charter, with this resolution their actions were legitimized. Moreover, in the first two years after the invasion, the Iraq Survey group, the mass destruction weapons investigator team, reported that they did not find any weapons of mass destruction belonging to the Saddam Hussein regime.⁹⁸⁸ Furthermore, in 2007 the UNSC adopted the Resolution 1762 and withdrew the authority of any institution to look for further evidence for the existence of weapons in Iraq⁹⁸⁹. Relying on the *Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)*, which explained that the results were inconclusive and the available evidence showed that the relocation of WMD from Iraq to Syria was unlikely.⁹⁹⁰

While the main justification behind the invasion could not be verified, a new era in Iraq started with the overthrow and the subsequent execution of Saddam Hussein. First, the occupation of Iraq resulted in the collapse of the central authority and left a power vacuum, which got filled by Islamist forces in several Iraqi cities.⁹⁹¹ Second, until the end of 2003 the insurgencies against the coalition forces, governmental bodies and security authorities in Iraq reached a very high level, turning the inter-state war into an intra-state one (or to extra-state one according to

⁹⁸⁶ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1483**, 22.05.2003, S/RES/1483, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/368/53/PDF/N0336853.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 14.02.2017)

⁹⁸⁷ Interpretation of Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations during the events in 2003: “*Question: Done without UN approval - or without clearer UN approval? Annan: Without UN approval and much broader support from the international community. Q: I wanted to ask you that - do you think that the resolution that was passed on Iraq before the war did actually give legal authority to do what was done? A: Well, I'm one of those who believe that there should have been a second resolution because the Security Council indicated that if Iraq did not comply there will be consequences. But then it was up to the Security Council to approve or determine what those consequences should be. Q: So you don't think there was legal authority for the war? A: I have stated clearly that it was not in conformity with the Security Council - with the UN Charter. Q: It was illegal? A: Yes, if you wish. Q: It was illegal? A: Yes, I have indicated it is not in conformity with the UN Charter, from our point of view and from the Charter point of view it was illegal.*”, “Excerpts: Annan interview”, 16.09.2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661640.stm (accessed 14.02.2017)

⁹⁸⁸ “Iraq Weapons Inspections Fast Facts”, 04.03.2014, <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-weapons-inspections-fast-facts/> (accessed 14.02.2017)

⁹⁸⁹ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1762**, 29.06.2007, S/RES/1762, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/resolutions/s-res-1762.pdf> (accessed 14.02.2017)

⁹⁹⁰ “Prewar Movement of WMD Material Out of Iraq”, in **Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD**, March 2005, p.1., https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/addenda.pdf (accessed 14.02.2017)

⁹⁹¹ Allawi, **The Occupation of...**, pp.91-94.

COW), into which the external interveners found themselves drawn.⁹⁹² Third, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) planned to transfer governmental control to an interim authority, but the Iraqi security forces and the army started to dissolve and joined anti-American rebellions, urging the coalition to create new security units, in addition to new political institutions.⁹⁹³ Last, the UN engaged in Iraq's situation on 14th August 2003 with the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)⁹⁹⁴, whose mandate was to be defined later on with the adoption of the Resolution 1546 by the UNSC.

According to this resolution adopted in June 2004, UNAMI joined the state-building activities along with CPA, working on the establishment of a sovereign Interim Government in Iraq, which would take up its powers by 30th June 2004. UNAMI was responsible to assist this process and assure the conduct of elections by 31 December 2005.⁹⁹⁵ Later on, UNAMI expanded its responsibilities, which seem similar to a political authority responsible for Iraq's whole state-building process and stability, and readmitted the Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) as the security authority of Iraq.⁹⁹⁶ Thus, even though Iraq held Parliamentary elections on 30th January 2005 under the auspices of the externally imposed Iraqi government, which took over after CPA on 28th June 2004.⁹⁹⁷ This newly elected Parliament established a new Constitution in 2005⁹⁹⁸, as the state remained in need of international assistance to effectively deal with the rising internal violence.

In this regard, along with the design of the political framework of UNAMI in the Resolution 1546 on 8th June 2004, the military aspect of external assistance to maintain stability and security, under the umbrella of the Multi-National Force

⁹⁹² Paul Rogers, **Iraq and the War on Terror: Twelve Months of Insurgency**, UK: I.B.Tauris, 2005, p.65.

⁹⁹³ Charles Tripp, "The United States and state-building in Iraq", **Review of International Studies**, Vol.30, No.4, 2004, pp.550-552.

⁹⁹⁴ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1500**, 14.09.2003, S/RES/1500, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1500\(2003\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1500(2003)) (accessed 14.02.2017)

⁹⁹⁵ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1546**, 08.06.2004, S/RES/1546, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 14.02.2017)

⁹⁹⁶ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1770**, S/RES/1770, 10.09.2007, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/456/04/PDF/N0745604.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 14.02.2017)

⁹⁹⁷ Kenneth Katzman, "Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution", **CRS Report for Congress**, USA, 02.08.2005, pp.1-2.

⁹⁹⁸ For more information see. **Iraq's Constitution of 2005**, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf (14.02.2017)

(MNF), which included troops from 30 different countries, was also authorized.⁹⁹⁹ Afterwards, its mission was extended until 31 December 2008 with the UNSC Resolution 1790 and in the beginning of 2009 its timeframe expired.¹⁰⁰⁰ Yet, it kept operating on Iraqi soil until 2010, due to the signature of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a Framework Agreement between President Bush and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on 14th December 2008.¹⁰⁰¹ Following these developments, the MNF mission ended on 31st August 2010 and the external military engagement was transformed into a new transitional structure called Operation New Dawn (OND). This was consist of solely American soldiers, and was responsible for advising, assisting and supporting Iraqi security forces. Yet, after one year, on 15th December 2011, President Obama declared the official end of the American engagement in Iraq after eight years.¹⁰⁰²

In this context, the COW datasets perceive the period between 2003 and 2010 as an extra-state war until the abolition of MNF.¹⁰⁰³ On the other hand, according to UCDP/PRIO, the period following the inter-state war of 2003 represents an internationalized intra-state warfare.¹⁰⁰⁴ However, according to both institutions, the war in Iraq after 2003 was fought between the international coalition along with the government of Iraq and numerous rebellious groups forming the Iraqi resistance. These groups had conflicting demands, and were formed of different ethnicities, but as a common trait, their resistance was triggered by the invasion of external armies in Iraq, who were perceived as occupiers even though they established a national coalition in 2004. Within these groups, there were (1) sectarian secessionists, (2) anti-governmental insurgents, (3) religious fundamentalists, and (4) parallel power structures forming their own institutional bodies. Regarding these groups, it is possible to determine various ethnic factions: First, there are Sunni groups. Starting from the first day of the invasion, Sunni groups never aligned themselves with the coalition forces and resisted to foreign intervention. After the establishment of a new government dominated by Shiite and Kurdish political structures in 2005, the Sunnis

⁹⁹⁹ **Security Conseil Resolution 1546.**

¹⁰⁰⁰ UN Security Council, **Security Conseil Resolution 1790**, 18.12.2007, S/RES/1790, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/650/72/PDF/N0765072.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 14.02.2017)

¹⁰⁰¹ M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Legal Status of US Forces in Iraq from 2003-2008", **Chicago Journal of International Law**, Vol.11, No.1, 2010, p.2.

¹⁰⁰² Torreon, "U.S. Periods of...", pp.8-9.

¹⁰⁰³ COW, **The Extra-State War Data (v4.0).**

¹⁰⁰⁴ UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016.**

appeared as government dissidents with multiple insurgent factions. In addition to these rebel groups, the Sunni fundamentalists appeared in the war scene, gaining the loyalty of some of these insurgent groups. This type of rebellious organization represents the majority of extremist terrorist groups in Iraq, which carried out sectarian attacks against Shiite civilians. Despite the fact that most of the Sunni groups did not support separatist arguments, notably considering the possibility of a Sunni Iraq without oil resources, the Sunni-based Mujahedeen Shura, which appeared as a part of Al-Qaida and transformed into ISIS/Daesh (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), declared the creation of a greater Islamist State incorporating the territories beyond the Sunni-dominated regions.¹⁰⁰⁵

Second, the Shiite groups can be divided into two different categories according to their aims. One party of Shiite civilians supports the idea of secession with an autonomous Shiite region in Southern Iraq. The leading organization advocating this idea is SCIRI that has existed in Iraqi soil since the war with Iran in the 1980s. Another Shiite faction is led by the Al-Mahdi Army, which has its roots in the Badr Organization formed during the Iran war as well. However, the Al-Mahdi Army appeared after the invasion in Iraq and created a quasi-state on Iraqi soil, which rendered social services to Shiite groups as an institutional body, guaranteed the protection of Shiite civilians against extremist Sunni groups and organized violent attacks against Sunni civilians.¹⁰⁰⁶ Al-Mahdi Army has organic relations with the Iranian regime, who allegedly provided training, weapons and logistic support in 2004, 2007 and 2008.¹⁰⁰⁷ In addition to these internal dynamics, the Kurdish groups have aligned with the coalition forces since the beginning of the Iraq invasion, and hence, they have been benefiting from an autonomous status in the North. Their region possesses the oil resources, they rely on *Peshmerga* forces, which have been *de facto* functioning for nearly five decades; and at last they are visibly represented in the central government and Parliament.¹⁰⁰⁸ Thus, the civil war scene in Iraq was highly fractured with diverse aims and rebel organizations, which created the chaotic environment in the country.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Edward O'Connell, Bruce R. Pirnie, **Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006): RAND Counterinsurgency Study - Volume 2**, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008, pp.21-23.

¹⁰⁰⁶ **Ibid.**

¹⁰⁰⁷ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

¹⁰⁰⁸ O'Connell, Pirnie, **Counterinsurgency in Iraq...**, p.24.

Although the government of USA and its allies fought against these groups alongside with the Iraqi government, according to the UCDP/PRIO dataset, after the abolition of the MNF in 2010 and the OND in 2011 the internationalization of the intra-state war ended in Iraq. Yet, according to the COW project, the abolition of the MNF just changed the status of the coalition allies and the engagement of the USA never really ended due to the remaining soldiers on the ground. Despite this difference, after the period between 2012 and 2013, ISIS/Daesh has changed the game one more time, and internationalized the intra-state war in 2014, causing the establishment of the Islamic State-Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR).

In the face of escalating violence in Iraq and the growing threat of ISIS/Daesh, which has found itself an enabling environment due to the chaotic conditions in Iraq and Syria, the decision to take an action is adopted at a NATO conference in September 2014.¹⁰⁰⁹ Relying on that, the government of USA intervened in the Iraq war under the OIR and the intra-state war became re-internationalized. In 2015, following the authorization of the UNSC granted by the Resolution 2249)¹⁰¹⁰, other countries started to contribute to the mission with air strikes both in Iraq and Syria.¹⁰¹¹ Briefly, after the inter-state war of Iraq in 2003, international involvements and interventions became a part of Iraqi politics, where national unity and peace have failed to be implemented under the new regime.

Chapter II - Comparing the Dynamics of Internationalization in the Selected Cases

These three cases represent extremely complicated civil war dynamics with vast regional and international interference features and outcomes. Hence, in this chapter, we will try to determine their convergent and divergent elements within the inward and outward internationalization models analyzed in the previous sections.

¹⁰⁰⁹ “History of Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve”, **Fact Sheet**, p.1, <http://www.inherentresolve.mil/Portals/14/Documents/Mission/History.pdf?ver=2016-03-23-065243-743> (accessed 17.02.2017)

¹⁰¹⁰ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 2249**, 20.11.2015, S/RES/2249, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2249.pdf (accessed 17.02.2017)


¹⁰¹¹ Countries that contributed to the Air Strikes in Iraq and Syria within the OIR mission: “*In Iraq: (1) Australia, (2) Belgium, (3) Canada, (4) Denmark, (5) France, (6) Jordan, (7) The Netherlands, and (8) UK; In Syria: (1) Australia, (2) Bahrain, (3) Canada, (4) Denmark, (5) France, (6) Jordan, (7) The Netherlands, (8) Saudi Arabia, (9) Turkey (10) UAE and (11) UK*”, “Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations Against ISIS Terrorists”, https://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve (accessed 17.02.2017)

Unveiling their dynamics and applying distinctive processes of internationalizations to case studies will show the underlying qualifications of our approach and reveal the predominant traits of the ICWs after the end of the Cold War.

Before realizing a detailed comparison of converging and diverging features of these ICWs, there are a few points to clarify within the framework of the inward and outward of internationalization processes of our model. As revealed in the previous sections, (1) ICWs present complex intertwined dynamics that cannot be reduced to a simple point of view, (2) ICWs are not phenomena produced in short time periods instead they are the results of long-term politics, internal and external variables, and unstable environments, (3) as ICWs consist of different processes, each phase is capable of bearing different characteristics constituting the continuum of the ICW, (4) involvements and interventions generate the complementary picture of ICWs. In the following sections, firstly, disaggregated images of internationalization methods of our case studies will be presented in their time frames; secondly, a general assessment of the process-related dynamics will be made due to their converging and diverging characteristics; thirdly, their common and diverse inward internationalization features will be introduced; finally, their similar and dissimilar traits will be discussed within outward internationalization elements.

Section I - Overall assessment of the case studies in comparison


In this section, a general evaluation regarding the common and labile aspects of the ICWs of selected case studies will be made. Yet, before presenting these aspects, their internationalization patterns based on periodic explanations will be shown below to be able to discuss the inherent qualities of these ICWs more clearly. For each ICW case, we separately produced a timeline to display these traits.

Figure 9 - Internationalization processes and patterns in Afghanistan

Regarding the characteristics of inward and outward internationalizations, Afghanistan possesses various qualities: Until the onset of ICW in 2001, several inward involvements into Afghan politics and intra-state wars are detected, which contributed to the empowerment of rebel groups and created an unstable environment in both internal and external relations. In 2001, the intra-state war in Afghanistan leapt out to the USA with the 9/11 attacks and led the American administration to take action against Afghanistan with its allies in order to eliminate the threat. After 2001, ICW escalated with the failure of the state and the overall state-building process initiated by the foreign interveners. While the number of internationally engaged soldiers was diminished and the security maintaining task

was yielded to national forces between 2011 and 2015, the weakening of Afghanistan security resulted in the appearance of the ISIS/Daesh in Afghan soil, as well as the resurgence of the Taliban against the government.


Figure 10 - Internationalization processes and patterns in the DRC



Regarding the inward and outward internationalization characteristics, the DRC possesses a complex mechanism at work: The outward internationalization of the Rwanda civil war into the DRC in 1993 resulted in inter-communal conflicts due to distorted social harmony and refugee camps in the DRC turned into safe havens for Hutu extremists, who organized internal and external attacks with the support of the Congolese government. These events transformed the situation into an ICW in 1996, with the outward intervention of neighboring states. Even though the internationalization process is based on an outward framework, a careful examination of the war and particularly the second ICW following this one highlight the embedded inward motivations of the intervening actors. Hence, the end of the first ICW in 1997 did not solve the problems or ended motivations of diverse actors, but basically paved the way towards another ICW, this time explicitly through an

inward internationalization pattern in 1998. Interventions on the sides of both rebels and the government resulted in a deadlock and finally came to an end with peace accords concluded in 2003. Until 2013, the intensity of combats continued at conflict levels with the inward involvements of the UN military forces that were on the ground since 1999, and by the presence of neighboring states, which kept supporting rebel groups. In 2013, the conflict levels raised to war between the UN supported-government and the externally sustained rebel groups, which ended in the same year with an international agreement brokered by the UN.

Figure 11 - Internationalization processes and patterns in Iraq



Regarding inward and outward internationalization characteristics, Iraq presents a variety of features: From 1980s to 1996, inward involvements related to the intra-state wars took place in Iraqi soil, including Iranian and American support to rebel groups and the establishment of no-fly zones and safe corridors in Northern Iraq under the authorization of the UN. In, 2003, the government of the USA and its allies invaded Iraq having security concerns created by fear and uncertainty about the existence of mass destruction weapons and to provoke the change of Saddam regime. However, the fact that no weapons were found proved that the real intervention mechanism at work was a product of an inward internationalization process with instrumental motivations. Inter-state war quickly turned into an ICW in 2003 in a failed state environment and in the context of a state-building process managed by interveners. During this phase, both inward interventions and alleged inward involvements took place. Between 2011 and 2013 the intensity of combats decreased to conflict level, while international troops withdrew from Iraq. This de-internationalization proved to be weakening Iraq against rebel groups with the emergence of ISIS/Daesh as a transnational rebel organization. In 2014, the intra-state combats firstly escalated to war level and then, an outward internationalization is generated with the spillover of the ISIS/Daesh conflicts to other countries. Finally the second stage of the outward internationalization into Iraq took place with the aim of containing the violence.

In this context inward internationalization motivations as well as outward internationalization features will be examined in detail and a comparison will be conducted with a phase related evaluation after an overall assessment of common and diverse internationalization characteristics.

a. Analyzing the convergent patters: Internal and external elements

In all three cases, both involving and intervening actors had the opportunity and showed willingness to interfere in troubled countries. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the alliances surrounding the government of the USA would not have taken part in the war, unless they had maintained the opportunity and willingness to intervene just as in the case of the governments of Rwanda, Uganda or Burundi (during the 1990s and the 2000s) in the DRC,¹⁰¹² or Al-Qaida who supported the Taliban in

¹⁰¹² UCDP/PRIO, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016; COW, The Intra-State War Data (v4.0).

Afghanistan in 2007 or the UNITA that supported the government of the DRC in 1998 or the government of Iran who allegedly supported Al-Mahdi Army in 2008.¹⁰¹³ Considering the opportunity and willingness of external actors, the weaknesses of the combat-zone-states established the background for both of them. According to Holsti's definitions¹⁰¹⁴, all these three case studies could be given the status of somewhere between a weak state and a failed state before the initiation of ICWs. The governing groups did not possess complete legitimacy in the eyes of their societies with multiple identities and were either challenged by other domestic sovereign entities or open to the external powers' influence. Also, they all had communal wars within their borders and various ethnic groups were either exposed to violence or excluded by a dominant governing structure. Moreover, governing elites exploited national wealth for personal gain and the populations under these rules had less loyalty to the central authorities compared to their primordial liaisons. Finally, state infrastructure and public services were not in the disposal of the major part of the population under equal conditions. These were the circumstances that formed the willingness and opportunities for external actors to engage into the civil wars of Afghanistan, the DRC and Iraq.

Secondly, in all three cases, rebel groups found some suitable environment to flourish and gain strength because of the lack and excess of authority. Moreover some of them gained some level of legitimacy in the eyes of their communities. Between 2001 and 2002, in Afghanistan between 1996 and 1997 and between 2001 and 2002 in the DRC as well as in 2003 in Iraq, the state institutions completely collapsed¹⁰¹⁵ and the state failure became here the main factor allowing the creation of chaotic conditions. The only exception to that is the ICW period in 2013 in the DRC. In the PITF dataset, there is no information about the conditions in that country after 2003, when there was a state failure in a substantial part of its territory instead of a complete failure.¹⁰¹⁶ Despite the insufficient data, in other research institutes' studies, the DRC in 2013 is presented as the most troubled country in the world after Somalia with various state failure elements, such as the existence of rebel groups, a weak national army, large-scale diseases as Ebola and examples of

¹⁰¹³ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

¹⁰¹⁴ K.J. Holsti, "War, Peace, and the State of the State", **International Political Science Review**, Vol.16, No.4, 1995, pp.331-333.

¹⁰¹⁵ PITF, **Adverse Regime Changes Dataset**.

¹⁰¹⁶ **Ibid.**

enduring sexual violence.¹⁰¹⁷ Thus, it is possible to affirm that, despite the absence of state failure data in PITF, the conditions of state failure continued even after 2003 till the war in 2013.

From a third angle, the conditions that created the state failures in these countries following the onset of ICWs, there is a high degree of resemblance: In all cases, ICW periods began with other wars, even though they differed in their types. In Afghanistan, the ICW in 2001 was triggered by an inter-state war initiated by the coalition of the governments of the USA, the UK and Australia. This exact same pattern with identical actors curiously recurred in Iraq in 2003. Considering the DRC, the first ICW onset was triggered by a neighboring ICW and the second one was produced by the previous ICW conditions. The converging pattern here is the onset of ICWs with other wars.¹⁰¹⁸ Yet, in the DRC, ICW onsets diverge in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq as they were not effectuated by inter-state wars.¹⁰¹⁹ Regarding the third Congolese ICW in 2013, it is not possible to affirm a different war impact on the ICW; it was mainly produced by the continuous warfare conditions in the DRC itself.¹⁰²⁰

This point brings forward the significance of earlier wars, the continuous warfare conditions and political instability: As latent conflicts are accepted as a domestic element that increases war proneness for spillover effects, it also proves to be an impactful component in civil war internationalizations in the form of interventions. All these countries have long civil war histories: Afghanistan had been in civil war since 1978 and the last period of this continuous warfare was between 1992 and 2001, which was fought against a firm autocracy. The DRC had recurring civil wars until 1979 and was ruled by the same oppressive dictator until the onset of the ICW in 1996. Similarly, Iraq had recurring civil wars until 1997 and was ruled by

¹⁰¹⁷ J. J. Messner, Kendall Lawrence, "Failed States Index 2013: The Troubled Ten", **The Fund for Peace**, 24.06.2013, <http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi13-troubled10> (accessed 10.02.2017)

¹⁰¹⁸ COW, **The Inter-State War Data (v4.0)**; COW, **The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)**; UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

¹⁰¹⁹ It should also be added that ICWs in the DRC presented some inter-state war characteristics in the frame of actor involvements, their goals, coalitions and intervention legality issues. The internationalized intra-state war between 1998 and 2002 is also named as the "Africa's World War" or the "Great Lakes War" and frequently compared to First and Second World Wars due to its scale, actor multiplicity, intensity and fatality.

¹⁰²⁰ In that point, it also should be recalled that the UN missions have never ceased in the DRC after the second ICW. Even though for UCDP/PRIO and COW datasets, the existence of an active UN mission is not confirmed as an internationalizing element, as this study considers other types of involvements within the internationalization processes, it is important to underline the presence of an international mission on the ground.

the same repressive regime until 2003.¹⁰²¹ Thus, if wars were the triggering events for the onset of ICW in these cases, then latent conflicts and dictatorships were their chaperons.

Fourthly, all these cases share another common feature due to their rebellion types. Even though all cases possess ethnic characteristics regarding their warring non-state parties, in all the ICWs after the end of Cold War, the aim has been to seize the central power. In Iraq, before 2003 secessionist (internationalized or non-internationalized) intra-state wars took place; in the DRC before 1996, there were also secessionist (internationalized or non-internationalized) civil wars and in Afghanistan there has never been a secessionist intra-state war.¹⁰²² Yet, regarding the ICWs in these cases, after the end of the Cold War, they were all headed for governmental control. On the other hand, it is possible to outline different groups having separatist goals in addition to central control in Iraq after 2003 and in the Congolese case; there were minor conflicts with secessionist aims beside the war for central control.

These qualities lead us to two different inferences: (1) After the end of the Cold War, ICWs for central government were more predominant than ICWs with secessionist aims, (2) it is not an fair perspective to identify ethnicity embedded wars with separatist ambitions, as it is not exceptional that ethnic groups target to rule the whole state. Even though these generalizations should be tested within large-N studies, in our case it can be summarized that gaining central control has been the main aim of these rebel groups and civil wars have been largely internationalized.

Finally, in all the ICWs, state actors received external support. In Afghanistan, no other actor intervened on behalf of the NSAs, as in the case of Iraq, except alleged involvements in favor of the rebels. In these cases internationalized coalition on the side of the governments combated against more than one rebel group, and even then, these groups did not provide support to each other or unified their organizations against the common enemy. They only cooperated to share intelligence resources at times.¹⁰²³ Moreover, in both cases frequent involvements on

¹⁰²¹ COW, *The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)*; UCDP/PRIO, *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016*, PITE, *Adverse Regime Changes Dataset*.

¹⁰²² PITE, *Ethnic War Dataset*; COW, *The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)*; UCDP/PRIO, *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016*.

¹⁰²³ COW, *The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)*; UCDP/PRIO, *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016*.

the side of rebel groups and provision of varying types of support diminished radically after the internationalizations of civil wars.¹⁰²⁴ This shows that overt interventions tend to eliminate support to rebel groups. On the other hand, this argument is mostly valid for the support of state actors. External support to rebel groups seems to be less common than state-based support to both states and rebel groups with or without overt interventions.¹⁰²⁵ Yet, it also seems that internationalization of these wars was a less dissuasive factor for the involvement of external rebel groups. Contrary to Iraq and Afghanistan, the DRC is the only case that received intervention in favor of both rebel actors and the governments. Also, this is the only case where the governments received military aid from non-state actors during ICWs.¹⁰²⁶ In the first ICW in the DRC, the UNITA and ex-FAR groups fought for the government while external state actors collaborated with rebel groups. In the second ICW, the government received external state's interventions on its side while the same happened for rebel groups, and in the third ICW, the government cooperated with the Intervention Brigade under the auspices of the UN while external actors supported rebel groups.¹⁰²⁷ All these explanations show that complex mechanisms conducted the course of ICWs, even though interventions on behalf of governments have been the common feature in our case studies.

Table 16 - Common points in comparative assessment for overall study

	Afghanistan	The DRC	Iraq
Opportunity & Willingness	Present	Present	Present
Weak State characteristics before ICWs	Present	Present	Present
Failed State and an unstable environment for rebel groups to strengthen	Present	Present	Present
Tipping points of ICWs	War: Inter-state	War: Neighboring Intra-state	War: Inter-state
Latent conflicts and autocratic regimes	Present	Present	Present
Rebellion Types	Over central control	Over central control Minor secessionist goals	Over central control Minor secessionist goals
Ethnic characteristics	Present	Present	Present
External support on the side of the state actor	Present	Present	Present

¹⁰²⁴ UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset*; UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset*.

¹⁰²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰²⁷ COW, *The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)*; UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset*; UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset*.

Before moving to the distinct particularities of these wars, it is essential to outline that the UN has been present in all these cases. Yet, its interference levels and methods have been diverse in all these cases, which is a characteristic that is worth readdressing in the following sections.

b. Evaluating the divergent practices of the intervening actors: Legality and process issues

As mentioned earlier, the initial stage of an ICW is the onset. In the above subsection, it was shown that ICWs in all cases, except the one in the DRC in 2013, were generated by other wars. As two of these wars were inter-state wars, one was a neighboring ICW and one was an internal ICW, the transitions between those wars come to our focus. In that regard, we see that our cases to carry out as much differences as their similarities.

First, regarding the foreign actors involved, all three cases include coalitions and the UN interferences but they all are characterized by different types of methods and legality processes. As internationalizing causalities of actors will be discussed in the following sections, the emphasis will now be on their involvement methods and legitimacy. In this context, the only similarity is in relation to the initial inter-state coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which consisted of the governments of the USA, the UK and Australia.¹⁰²⁸ In both cases, they initiated the inter-state war against the country in question and then coalitions, which were built around them, cooperated with the Afghan and Iraqi state officials during the ICWs prompted by these inter-state wars.

On the other hand, the DRC experienced a different ICW process. More specifically, in the first ICW, there were no state actors on the side of the government, external state actors sided with domestic and transnational rebel groups (as AFDL included various military factions) and fought against the government, while the Mobutu regime was being supported by a transnational rebel group (UNITA). In the second ICW, both warring parties opted for coalitions with external states and non-state actors and fought with each other. In the third ICW, the government did not receive a cooperation from any other external state or non-state actor, except the international combat force under the auspices of the UN that has

¹⁰²⁸ COW, *The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)*; UCDP/PRIO, *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016*.

fought against domestic rebel groups who were receiving support from other states.¹⁰²⁹

In addition to the differences in external actors' alignment side, a main distinction arises from the legality of their internationalization processes. Among these cases, only the war in Afghanistan became an international issue with a form of legality provided by the UNSC. The intervening coalition in Afghanistan had received the UN Security Council's permission to act, it was thus legitimate according to the NATO and gained further legitimization and military support by the UN during the state building process (with the creation of ISAF and due to the relevant resolutions) and finally NATO's military involvement on the ground took place (through the takeover of ISAF by NATO). Thus, there were no legality discussions in relation to ICW in Afghanistan, neither during its inter-state war phase nor afterwards.

In the DRC, however, the internationalization process of the first two wars was largely disregarded by the international society. The UNSC urged the states in the Great Lakes Region to renounce their acts of violence and cease hostilities¹⁰³⁰, but (1) none of the states were particularly condemned or sanctioned for their activities, (2) the UN did not get militarily involved on the ground until the creation of MONUC in 1999, and (3) until then no international organization could neither implement ceasefire nor assist, control or support humanitarian activities in the war zone. That involvement was an instrument to implement the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed in 1999 by the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, which were the warring parties in the second ICW of the DRC. Thus, (1) during the first ICW in the DRC, external actors received neither a legal authorization, (2) nor an overt condemnation or sanction for their interference. (3) Moreover, the UN did not establish an active peace mission in the DRC until the end of the second ICW (4) but at that time it brokered a peace agreement for the external actors. Concerning the third ICW of the DRC in 2013, there were no state or non-state actors intervening on behalf of the government, except the UN itself with the

¹⁰²⁹ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**; COW, **The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)**; UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

¹⁰³⁰ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1078**, 09.11.1996, S/RES/1978, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1078\(1996\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1078(1996)) (accessed 11.02.2017); UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1080**, 15.11.1996, S/RES/1080, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1080\(1996\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1080(1996)) (accessed 11.02.2017)

creation of the Intervention Brigade under the umbrella of MONUSCO, which was involved in the combats before and after 2013 as well. Against the coalition between the international mission and the government of the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda intervened and got involved into the war through their engagement with PARC-FAAL and M23 but only this time they were warned overtly by the expert reports and resolutions of the UNSC¹⁰³¹. Also, in the end the UN brokered the international Framework Peace Agreement signed between all the countries of the region in 2013.¹⁰³² Thus, regarding the third ICW in the DRC, the UN played a more active role by engaging in the whole process by (1) through persistently condemning civil war internationalization and its actors that had been on the ground even before 2013, through (2) being engaged in the combats to prevent the escalation and neutralize the rebels before and after the onset of the ICW and ultimately (3) brokering a peace deal to stabilize the country.

Even though the inter-state war coalition in Iraq consisted of the same countries as in Afghanistan, and there was a similar transitional process towards an ICW (the transition from inter-state war to internationalized intra-state war), legality in Iraq lacked a solid ground. Although the coalition in Iraq used the resolution 1441 (2002) of the UNSC as a legal authorization, this resolution had not permit states to use force against Iraq, hence Iraq war in 2003 lacked a legal background. Yet, another distinction is the latent resolution of the UNSC (Resolution 1483 – 22.05.2003) generated after the invasion in Iraq, which legitimized the coalition forces after the war. That was an exceptional legalization method for the UN, due to the need for the authorization of the use of force before the initiation of a war to prevent random violent acts.¹⁰³³ Even so, in addition to the authorized coalition

¹⁰³¹ For more information see. The Democratic Republic of Congo Sanctions Committee, “Group of Expert Reports on DRC”, **Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning The Democratic Republic of the Congo**, <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1533/work-and-mandate/expert-reports> (accessed 12.02.2017); reports and resolutions embedded within the UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 2078**, 28.11.2012, S/RES/2078, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2078\(2012\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2078(2012)) (accessed 12.02.2017)

¹⁰³² Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Angola, Uganda, South Sudan, South Africa, Tanzania and Congo-Brazzaville are the parties of the agreement, “Eleven states signed United Nations deal for peace in Congo”, 24.02.2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/24/eleven-states-sign-congo-deal> (accessed 12.02.2017)

¹⁰³³ A similar case happened in Kosovo war in 1999, when NATO used force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Operation Allied Force). There, the UN authorization was lacking but the operation was legitimized after the bombings. Yet, as a difference from Iraq, in Kosovo, the operation was based on urgent humanitarian grounds to save civilian lives; Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo”, **Survival**, No.41, Vol.3, 1999, pp.102-123. However in Iraq,

forces (MNF) charged to assure the security, which received great military contribution from other states after their legitimization, the UN established the widely supported UNAMI to manage the state-building process. Thus, the ICW in Iraq had a rare and distinct legalization process as a result of the later authorization by the UN.

To sum up on the legality issues in these cases, (1) the only previously legalized internationalization process was the ICW in Afghanistan, (2) Iraq had a unique ICW process as it was legitimized after the war without a humanitarian background. (3) In the first two ICWs in the DRC there were no UNSC condemnations or legalizations, although there were major internationalization processes on the battle zones and (4) in the latter ICW, the UN mission was a direct warring party in the war on the side of the government, while the UNSC condemned the international involvements and interventions throughout the whole process.

Regarding the duration of these wars, all actors that interfered into the civil wars with their own motivations and created impacts on the courses of these ICWs (in terms of escalation and diffusion) there is going to be a further evaluation in the subsequent sections on inward and outward internationalization processes. Yet, one final element concerning the overall assessment Afghanistan, the DRC and Iraq is the outcome of these wars, as all cases differ in regard to their results. In Afghanistan, the intra-state war was never de-internationalized since 2001, even though the warring actors have varied over time. NATO, for instance, abolished the military presence of ISAF in 2014 but launched the RSM to assist national security forces in 2015.¹⁰³⁴ The government of the USA has reduced the number of its troops to 8,400 soldiers, who kept playing a role in counter-terrorism operations alongside the Afghan forces and have been training and advising national forces of Afghanistan.¹⁰³⁵ Also, even though there has not been either a victory or a complementary peace agreement to end the war, one of the warring rebel parties,

before the initiation of inter-state war by the coalition forces there was no war to protect people from and the main argument to initiate attacks (the existence of chemical and mass destruction weapons) was refuted in the following years.

¹⁰³⁴ “NATO and Afghanistan”, 13.10.2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm, (accessed 12.02.2017)

¹⁰³⁵ Carol E. Lee, Felicia Schwartz, “Obama to Slow Troop Withdrawal From Afghanistan”, 07.07.2016, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-to-slow-troop-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-1467817803>, (accessed 12.02.2017)

Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, signed a peace agreement with the government. Finally, since 2001, the phases of the ICW have occasionally decreased at conflict levels, even though it still maintained ICW characteristics in 2015¹⁰³⁶. Similar to Afghanistan, in Iraq there has not been an end to the war either with the existence of a victorious side or a peace agreement. Yet, distinctively from Afghanistan, the ICW in Iraq de-internationalized in 2012 and 2013 due to the end of the MNF and OND mandates, but in 2014 American troops re-intervened into the war relying on their bilateral agreement with the Iraqi government and, after the Resolution 2249 (2015) of the UNSC and the support of NATO, international forces returned to battleground under the umbrella of OIR. This evolvement was the result of the decreased intensity of the warfare to conflict levels in 2011 and 2012. However, with the rising power of ISIS/Daesh, the intra-state war became re-internationalized again before such termination was really concrete. The only similarity that the DRC has with these cases is the fluctuation of intensity levels between war and conflict over time. On the other hand, regardless of the outcome of the ICWs in Afghanistan and Iraq, the first ICW in the DRC ended with the victory of the rebellious groups, the second one ended with a peace agreement between the parties due to a deadlock and the third one ended with an international peace agreement while M23 and PARC-FAAL were defeated by the Intervention Brigade and FARDC operations.

The unique problem in relation to the DRC can be described within the “conflict trap” approach. Even though the ICWs ended after several warfare episodes, (1) rebel groups reformed, summoned up and reappeared to fight again under diverse organization names, (2) despite the repeating international agreements to assure the non-intervention principle in the region, involvements and interventions into the DRC’s intra-state wars did not cease and (3) the devastating economic, social, political and cultural conditions were never effectively improved. Regarding these issues, the DDR/RR program under the MONUSCO has been generated in 2002, with the hope of creating a change in the DRC and breaking the recurring conflict cycle.¹⁰³⁷

¹⁰³⁶ UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

¹⁰³⁷ “DDR/RR within the MONUSCO Activities”, <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/ddr>, (accessed 17.02.2017)

Table 17 - Diverging points in comparative assessment for overall study

	Afghanistan	The DRC	Iraq
Involved actors	On the side of the government (state and international organizations)	On the side of government (non-state) and rebels (state and non-state)	On the side of the government (state and international organization)
		On the side of government (state and non-state) and rebels (state and non-state)	
		On the side of government (international organization) and rebels (state and non-state)	
Legality of internationalization attributed by the UNSC	Present	None	Not present at the beginning, authorization is held after the intervention
		None	
		Condemned	
Outcomes in terms of a victory or peace agreements	None	Victory of rebellious groups	None
	Only one peace agreement with one of the parties	International peace agreement due to a deadlock	
		International peace agreement after government's victory	
Violence levels	Fluctuation in intensity levels	Fluctuation in intensity levels	Fluctuation in intensity levels
			De-internationalization and re-internationalization

To sum up, it is possible to say that the ICWs in Afghanistan, the DRC and Iraq have many distinct features in addition to their shared ones. Despite their dissimilarities, it is observable that the ICW periods do not always have the same intensity, instead they fluctuate between conflict and war levels, even though an intra-state war may be coded as a continuous ICW, the actors engaged in the war and their motivations can vary over time, while the UN plays a role as a both legalizing and internationalizing actor, but its operational engagement to most cases was following the operation of the coalitional military forces (legalized or not). In other words, its missions did not initiate any wars; instead they were involving already internationalized conflicts or operations in already chaotic environments, which were generated under its authorization or not.

Section II – Motivations of the foreign actors in comparison: The Inward Internationalization Cases

Regarding our case studies that have high internationalization levels, there are various reasons for external actors to intervene or get involved in civil wars. Among those, some interference causalities present similar rationale, while others rely on diverse dynamics. In this section, the analysis of inward affiliations in the ICWs will be evaluated through a comparative approach with view to determine their common and diverse motivational elements and to understand where they belong in the inward internationalization model.

a. Debating the systemic factors as converging points

One of the most striking common motivations to take part in intra-state wars is the existence of earlier negative relations. Regarding all our cases, intervening or involving actors come from a complicated relation path with battle zone countries. For instance, in Afghanistan the governments of the USA, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia came forward as intervening and/or involving actors in the first phase of the ICW, which have had been meddling in Afghan politics and conflicts for decades. The US government had provided weapons, material and funding to dissident groups (Mujahedeen) against the government of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1992.¹⁰³⁸ Even though its support was discontinued after the end of the Cold War, this relation paved the way for the subsequent American intervention in 2001. The government of Pakistan, which intervened in favor of the Afghan government in its fight against rebellious groups from 2004 until now,¹⁰³⁹ has provided material, expertise, training, weapon and funding to numerous Mujahedeen groups between 1979 and 1996¹⁰⁴⁰ and has provided the Taliban weapons, training and funding between 1996 and

¹⁰³⁸ These groups included Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan, Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan, Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

¹⁰³⁹ UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

¹⁰⁴⁰ These groups included Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan, Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan, Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, Taliban; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

2001.¹⁰⁴¹ The Iranian government also supported the Afghan rebellious groups in 1980 and between 1989 and 2001; it provided weapons, material, training and access to military infrastructure to various rebellious parties and did the same with the government of Rabbani¹⁰⁴², but it stopped all its support to parties after intervening into the intra-state war on behalf of UIFSA from 2001 until 2002. Finally, Saudi Arabia, who supported the government of Afghanistan against its war with the Taliban in 2003,¹⁰⁴³ has been involved in the Afghan wars since 1979. Between 1979 and 1992, it provided weapons and funding to the same rebellious groups¹⁰⁴⁴ as did the US government between 1993 and 1998 supported the Rabbani led government, and afterwards provided the Taliban and the Taliban-led government with material, logistic and economic support.

In the DRC case, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Burundi came forward as the predominant intervening and/or involving actors in the ICWs, which had been involved in the Congolese politics and conflicts for decades. Their relations were heavily stimulated by the cumulative intra-state wars of the region, which had started to accumulate following the successive independences of Sub-Saharan countries. For instance, Rwanda experienced intra-state wars between 1963 and 1964, in 1994, between 1997 and 1998, in 2001; Uganda had intra-state wars in 1966 and between 1982 and 1986; Angola faced intra-state wars between 1976 and 1991, between 1992 and 1994, and between 1998 and 2002; Burundi went through intra-state wars in 1972, between 1993 and 1998, and between 2001 and 2003.¹⁰⁴⁵ All these wars, when added to the continuous conflicts, indicate three important elements regarding the relations in the region: Firstly, the region has been extremely destabilized after the de-colonization processes in Africa; secondly, there are several transnational rebel groups operating in the Sub-Saharan Africa¹⁰⁴⁶ and these groups that created a

¹⁰⁴¹ **Ibid.**

¹⁰⁴² These groups included Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Hizb-i Wahdat, Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, UIFSA and government of Afghanistan; **Ibid.**

¹⁰⁴³ **Ibid.**

¹⁰⁴⁴ These groups included Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan, Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan, Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan; **Ibid.**

¹⁰⁴⁵ Dixon, Sarkees, **A Guide to...**, pp.605-606.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Examples of these groups can be presented as the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) and ALIR (Army for the Liberation of Rwanda) of Rwanda, ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) and LRA (Lord Resistance Army) of Uganda, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) of Angola, CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy) and FNL (National Forces of Liberation) of Burundi.

complicated support and involvement network between other rebel groups and national governments. Thus, regarding the DRC and the surrounding area, there is an intense negative relationship environment.

For the ICWs in Iraq it is not possible to debate that there were positive relations before the war as well, especially concerning the relations between the Saddam regime, Iran and the USA. Iran and Iraq have experienced many wars during the last century and, in addition to these wars, Iran had supported SCIRI between 1982 and 1996 in any way possible against the government of Iraq.¹⁰⁴⁷ The USA, on the other hand, has partly conducted its negative relations with the government of Iraq through its impact on the UN, which authorized the use of force in Kuwait in 1991 and the establishment of no-fly zones as well as safe corridors between 1991 and 1996. Moreover, the implementation of a dual containment policy in 1993 and the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998 did not favor the Saddam regime in the US until the 9/11 attacks, when the President G.W. Bush declared the “war against terrorism” and specifically named Iraq as a member of the *Axis of evil*.

Before revealing the common motivations rooted in these involvements, another argument for the inward internationalizations should be tested: Does proximity facilitates and contributes to the internationalization of a civil wars as a component of the opportunity variable, particularly in regard to the neighbors’ supports to NSAs? Concerning the external actors in Afghanistan, it is possible to justify this argument using the involvement of Pakistan and Iran. They have undisputedly got involved with Afghan rebel groups until the onset of ICW. Moreover, Iran has been allegedly involved with the Taliban in 2007 and 2008 by providing access to military or intelligence infrastructure, while Pakistan has been allegedly involved with Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan between 2008 and 2009.¹⁰⁴⁸

Considering the role of the external actors in the ICWs of the DRC, it is impossible to overlook the importance of proximity in inward internationalizations. To begin with, the government of Rwanda was involved in AFDL in 1997 and the RCD between 1998 and 2001. Moreover, it kept providing CNDP material, training, expertise, access to territory and infrastructure as well as the intelligence against the government of the DRC between 2006 and 2008. The government of Uganda supported AFDL between 1997 and 1998, MLC between 1998 and 2001 and the

¹⁰⁴⁷ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

¹⁰⁴⁸ **Ibid.**

Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD/RCD-ML) between 1998 and 2000. Also, the government of Burundi supported RCD between 1998 and 1999.¹⁰⁴⁹ Thus, the successive conflicts in the Great Lakes Region created a very unstable environment with an extended war zone due to geographical proximity.¹⁰⁵⁰

Regarding the role of the external actors in the ICWs of Iraq, an intense influence of Iran is observed, firstly during its involvements until 1996, later with its alleged involvements with the Al-Mahdi Army in 2004, 2007 and 2008.¹⁰⁵¹ However, as mentioned before, proximity works in relation to the inter-action level of actors, which has been altered due to globalization.

In that regard, the involvement of the governments of the USA and Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan until 2001 and the large-scale internationalization of the intervention in Afghanistan (instead of a more regional context), when added to the negative interactions between the governments of the USA and show that opportunity and willingness should be explained with more than a proximity variable. The same proposition can also be made for the case of Iraq, where the intervention involves a wide international community with a large actor spectrum. Yet, according to our case studies, the impact of proximity in the involvement actions, as in relation to the support provided to rebel groups, is confirmed, especially in the case of numerous neighbors. However, as exemplified by the involvements of the governments of the USA and Saudi Arabia, and the actor diversity in the interventions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the willingness to support rebel groups and states or to intervene cannot solely be explained by the opportunities embedded within the proximity variable. Proximity is an indicator of the interaction level that increases the involvement of other actors in the nearby wars, but globalization facilitates nowadays any kind of interference, regardless of geographical contiguity.

¹⁰⁴⁹ **Ibid.**

¹⁰⁵⁰ Filip Reyntjens, "The Second Congo War: More than a Remake", *African Affairs*, Vol.98, No.391, 1999, p.241.

¹⁰⁵¹ Moreover, after the fall of Saddam Houssein, the government of Iran has been attempting to influence Iraqi politics, firstly by supporting the political Shia bloc in the Parliament, and secondly by providing material support to rebellious Shiite factions such as Badr Organization and Al-Mahdi Army. The first tactic paid off by empowering the Shiite parties, such as the Supreme Islamic Council in Iraq and the Da'wa Party under the umbrella of United Iraqi Alliance and by the rise of Shiite politicians as Ibrahim al-Jafari and Nuri al-Maliki; Kenneth Katzman, "Iran's Influence in Iraq", in Steven J. Costel, *Surging Out of Iraq?*, New York: Nova Publishers, 2008, pp.169-170. These involvements are accepted as allegations according to UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset*; UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset*.

Regarding the motivations embedded in these cases of inward internationalization, two political/instrumental factors can be found in common: At first, the desire to undermine rivals and become the dominant actor in the region and secondly, the tit-for-tat. The first one, namely sponsoring domestic rebel organizations of rivals, is an old tactic to destabilize target governments. During a rebellion, a hostile government can support a rebel group with affective reasons, but they do not directly sponsor it unless they have some bigger aims regarding the target state. The weakening of the rival through rebel organizations offers the external actor an undeniable leverage over any issue concerning its relations with the troubled country. Also, this weakening eliminates the rival from the regional or global dominance competition and puts forward the more stabilized actor. In that regard, Iran was supporting Iraqi rebel groups until 1996, in parallel with its inter-state wars with Iraq during the 1980s and 1990s.

Moreover, becoming the dominant actor in the region has never ceased to be a goal for Iran, particularly since Shah came to power.¹⁰⁵² For example, the rise of the Shiite groups in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein¹⁰⁵³ and the alleged Iranian involvements in the same period¹⁰⁵⁴ can be evaluated in this perspective. On the other hand, regarding the involvement of the government of the USA in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is possible to affirm that the intention to consolidate the American global power and the aim of undermining the rivals were present. In fact, after the election of G. W. Bush as the US President and the simultaneous rise of neo-conservatism,¹⁰⁵⁵ the American foreign policy took a new direction especially following the 9/11 attacks. These terrorist attacks formed a perception in the USA that the American power was castrated in the global scene and thus it had to reform its image as the dominant power in the world. In that regard, a more aggressive policy, based on a Jacksonian patriotism and militarism, was adopted to show that

¹⁰⁵² Barry Rubin, "Iran: The Rise of a Regional Power", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.10, No.3, 2006, pp.142-143.

¹⁰⁵³ Vali Nasr, "Regional implications of shi'a revival in Iraq", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.27, No.3, 2004, pp.17-20, 22.

¹⁰⁵⁴ UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset*; UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset*.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Neo-conservatism feeds from a long-term political tradition with an intellectual background going back to 1930s. Their pessimist and militarist point of view consists of three main ideas (1) the political realm represents a moral choice between good and bad (2) inter-state relations are determined in the frame of use of force and the will to apply it (3) Middle East and Islam are the intersection point of over-seas national interests of USA; Füsun Türkmen, *Türkiye ABD İlişkileri: Kırılğan İttifaktan Model Ortaklığa*, İstanbul:Timaş yayınları, 2012, pp.189-190.

America stood still against the evil failed state of Afghanistan.¹⁰⁵⁶ It also wanted to show that it was against *rogue states*, such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, which were defined by the American administration as the countries that disregarded and violated international law, possessed WMDs, sponsored terrorism and undermined human rights and universal values.

In this context, the American foreign policy was restructured to fight and destroy terrorism and prove to the world its own global authority.¹⁰⁵⁷ Thus, destroying Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and toppling Saddam in Iraq were not solely intended to undermine their Afghan and Iraqi rivals or to reinforce the supremacy of the USA in the Middle East, but it was part of a larger American program, focused on consolidating their super power role in worldwide and undermining any attacks against it.

Also, regarding Afghanistan in general and before the initiation of a ICW, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the USA supported rebel groups to weaken the anti-Soviet government and boost the Islamic ideology¹⁰⁵⁸, while the government of Iran has always been supporting Shiite groups in Afghanistan, as it saw this country as its primary zone of influence, just like it also did in the case of Iraq.¹⁰⁵⁹ In addition to Iran, Pakistan has always seen Afghanistan as a zone of influence to maintain its own national agenda as a regional power, particularly against the policies of India, which is reflected on its involvement in Afghanistan mainly through the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI)¹⁰⁶⁰ as well as on its religious liaisons with Afghanistan via numerous madrasas.¹⁰⁶¹

In the DRC, external support was used as a complementary tactic by Rwanda and Uganda in the first two ICWs, in order to invade the Eastern DRC and create an influence and exploitation zone in collaboration with their non-state allies.¹⁰⁶² Moreover, both Rwanda and Uganda kept providing support to Congolese rebels

¹⁰⁵⁶ Gearoid Tuathail, "Just Looking for a Fight: American Affect and Invasion of Iraq", *Antipode*, Vol.35, No.5, 2003, pp.859-860, 865.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Jeffrey Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*, USA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, pp.10-13, 21.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, David E. Cunningham, "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups", *International Organization*, Vol.65, No.4, 2011, pp.712-713, 733.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ariane M. Tabatabai, "Saudi Arabia and Iran Face Off in Afghanistan: The Threat of a Proxy War", 05.10.2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2016-10-05/saudi-arabia-and-iran-face-afghanistan> (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹⁰⁶⁰ Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship", *Asian Survey*, Vol.31, No.6, 1991, pp.496-511.

¹⁰⁶¹ Zahab, Roy, *Islamist Networks...*, p.58.

¹⁰⁶² Venugopalan, "Understanding the...", p.7.

despite the signature of international agreements anticipating not to interfere in domestic politics. This kind of conduct can only be explained by regional power balance strategies. Hence, regarding all these interventions that were directly targeting the rulers of these countries, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Mobutu and Kabila in the DRC, and Saddam in Iraq, it is possible to say that they were aimed to undermine and defeat their adversaries regardless of the internationalization types.

As the second instrument, these regional rivalries have been accompanied with the aim of tit-for-tat. Regarding Afghanistan, the only case of tit-for-tat is valid for Pakistan: The Afghan government had supported the Baluchi separatists in Pakistan between 1975 and 1977¹⁰⁶³ before this country had started to support the Afghan rebel groups during the 1980s and 1990s. Concerning the DRC case, it is possible to affirm a full string of external support of the states to rebel groups in the region: The DRC has provided support to Rwandese rebel groups between 1998 and 2002, to Ugandan groups in 1999; and to Burundian groups in between 1998 and 2002¹⁰⁶⁴, while all these states were already supporting rebel movements in the DRC. In this region, another complex phenomenon is the support of these rebellious groups to state actors. More specifically, all states in the region have received non-state actor support during their civil wars. This indicates that rebel groups in Sub-Saharan Africa operate as strongly as state-actors, which can be taken explained with the undisputable empowerment of the warlords by taking advantage of the region's chaotic environment. Beside Afghanistan and the DRC, Iraq has been involved in tit-for-tats in its relations with Tehran by engaging with various rebel groups in Iran¹⁰⁶⁵ between 1979 and 2001 as response to the Iranian reciprocal involvement in its own territories.

Regarding affective motivations implanted in the inward internationalizations of these ICWs, it is found that ethnic affinities and regime types play significant roles. Ethnic affinities raise the intervention probabilities by creating public pressure on external actors to protect their ethnic brethren, ease its people's concerns about the danger that their relatives face, and these interferences are rarely in favor of governments. Thus, regarding the ethnic affinity, involvements in these wars were

¹⁰⁶³ UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset*; UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset*.

¹⁰⁶⁴ The DRC has supported ALIR between 1998 and 2001 and FDLR in 2002, in Rwanda; supported ADF in 1999 in Uganda; supported CNDD-FDD between 1998 and 2001 and FNL between 1999 and 2002; *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Iraq has supported APCO in 1979, KDPI in 1981 and MEK between 1986 and 1988, between 1991 and 1993, in 1997 and between 1999 and 2001; *Ibid*.

based on religious or ethnic reasons with the exception of the government of the USA and its allies' intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a major power coalition, the USA and its western allies did not have any similarities with Afghan and Iraqi people. On the other hand, Iran's involvement in both Afghan and Iraqi cases was constructed around the "*Shia symbolism*"¹⁰⁶⁶, through which the Iranian government tried to consolidate its authority in the region as well as its influence on its trans-border ethnic kin. Pakistan has also religious and ethnic ties (particularly Pashtuns and Baloch) with Afghanistan and has been providing much support to these groups for decades, including safe havens in its own territory.¹⁰⁶⁷

Also in the DRC case, ethnic ties have played a major role for the internationalization of civil wars. Even before the Rwandan war, there were domestic tensions between different groups, but the genocide in Rwanda caused a regional polarization between Hutu- and Tutsi-originated people, who have been dispersed all over the states in Sub-Saharan Africa. The encouragement of "Interahamwe" and the exclusion of Tutsi people (both indigenous Tutsis in the DRC and undocumented immigrants that came to the DRC after 1960s) by Mobutu and afterwards by Kabila provoked the external actors to support and align with Tutsi-originated rebel groups to battle against the governments of the DRC.¹⁰⁶⁸ This alignment of external forces with the threatened Tutsi groups in the ICWs of the DRC was a clear example of kin country syndrome.¹⁰⁶⁹ During the rule of both Mobutu and Kabila, Rwandese officials frequently expressed their concerns about a new upcoming genocide against the Tutsi in the DRC soil and their determination to support endangered communities until Interahamwe groups were stopped.¹⁰⁷⁰

In addition to external actors intervening or being involved on the side of their ethnic kindred, ethnic affinity also affects the rebel group recruitment via identity networks. In all three case studies, rebel groups profited from religious or ethnic affinities in attracting more members. In Afghanistan, where religion was a common

¹⁰⁶⁶ Rustam Ali Seerat, "Iran and Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan: For the religious rivals, Afghanistan is another front in the fight for influence", 14.01.2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/iran-and-saudi-arabia-in-afghanistan/> (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹⁰⁶⁷ Alexander Thier, "On the Issues Afghanistan/Pakistan", 04.01.2008, <http://www.usip.org/publications/the-issues-afghanistanpakistan#state> (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹⁰⁶⁸ Reyntjens, "The Second...", pp.243-246.

¹⁰⁶⁹ The government of Uganda declared that their aim "*was to stop the renewed 'genocide' against the Banyamulenge*" during the second ICW of the DRC; John F. Clark, "Explaining Ugandan intervention in Congo: evidence and interpretations", **The Journal of Modern African Studies**, Vol.39, No.2, 2001, p.271.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Paul S. Orogun, "Crisis of Government, Ethnic Schisms, Civil War, and Regional Destabilization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo", **World Affairs**, Vol.165, No.1, 2002, pp.29-30.

component for the 90% of the country, Mujahedeen groups were divided according to their ethnicities and sectarian differences. For example, the Taliban and the Hizb-i Islami-yi factions were Pashtun dominated, Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and Shura-e Nazar were Tajik dominated, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami was Uzbek/Turkmen dominated and Hizb-I Wahdat was Shiite dominated.¹⁰⁷¹ In contrast, Al-Qaida recruited and operated through a global network regardless of ethnicity. Yet, regarding ethnicity based groups, foreign soldiers or formerly dislocated Afghans were recruited particularly from Pakistan and Iran, and they were attracted by these groups according to their identities. In Iraq, a similar logic prevailed, as a dominantly Muslim country, sectarian diversities and ethnicities play roles in group organization and recruitment. For example, KDP and PUK represent Kurdish rebellious groups, while the Al-Mahdi Army is a Shiite group and ISIS/Daesh recruited from Sunni backgrounds.¹⁰⁷² Throughout the last decades, there has been an intense trans-border recruitment process between Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. While Kurdish people coming from those countries have joined Kurdish rebels,¹⁰⁷³ Shiite people have joined Shiite rebellious factions¹⁰⁷⁴

Thus, in both examples, external support and recruitment processes have relied on religion and ethnicity. Also, in the DRC it is possible to identify a similar logic, yet this time religion seems to be substituted by language and localness/territory factors, while ethnicity remains in the picture. For example, AFDL recruited populously from Banyamulenge ethnic groups who were united against Mobutu, while APCLS gained substantial support from the Hunde ethnic group, who was opposing the Tutsis in the DRC. Also, CNDP (the NSA established and ruled by Nkunda) was established to represent the Tutsi interests, while Mai-Mai Kata Katanga recruited particularly from domestic citizens to defend its territory against any armed groups.¹⁰⁷⁵ Thus, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, rebel groups in the DRC were divided according to their cultural traits and collaborated with external actors on the basis of these values.

As another political affective motivation, the regime type and the relations with the rulers have been a substantial reason to intervene in other countries. In 2001, in

¹⁰⁷¹ For more information see <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/groups> (accessed 18.02.2017)

¹⁰⁷² **Ibid.**

¹⁰⁷³ Idean Salehyan, **Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons For Iraq And Afghanistan**, USA: The Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010, p.10, 37-39.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Louise Richardson, "Terrorists as transnational actors", **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol.11, No.4, 1999, pp.215-216.

¹⁰⁷⁵ For more information see <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/groups>, (accessed 18.02.2017)

Afghanistan, in the first and the second ICWs of the DRC, and in 2003 in Iraq intervening actors had overtly declared their intentions to overthrow the existing regimes. Even though Afghanistan and the first DRC wars were internationalized with outward internationalization factors, regime change was overtly added into the agenda as inward internationalization logics. In Afghanistan, the intervention was not triggered by sympathy for another group, but it was related to the antipathy towards the Taliban regime, which was allowing Al-Qaida to operate. In the first ICW of the DRC, the common idea was to overthrow Mobutu, whose repressive politics, violent strategies and corrupt economic policies had united all domestic opposition groups against him that were also supported by the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola holding a deepened antipathy for him, instead of sympathy for another personality. In the second ICW of the DRC, opposing groups were united to overthrow Kabila, who used to be perceived as promoting the Rwandan and Angolan interests¹⁰⁷⁶, when he decided to expulse foreign forces from the Congolese territory and eliminate the Banyamulenge and Tutsis from the government.¹⁰⁷⁷ This attempt was disputed by Rwandese, Ugandan and Burundian officials, as it was seen as an attempt to exclude them from having access to the political institutions/centres of decision.¹⁰⁷⁸

Yet this time, other state actors supporting Kabila coalesced with him to prevent that change and the ICW took a form of the Africa's World War with a fight over the name that will rule the DRC¹⁰⁷⁹ and each actor had its own reasons to support Kabila or not. Amongst these actors, Angola has been the only one to switch sides from rebels to government. This was related to many reasons, including ideological fidelities between Kabila and the Angolan president, José Eduardo dos Santos,¹⁰⁸⁰ and the antipathy of dos Santos towards the Rwandan and Ugandan presidents whose close relations with UNITA had started to jeopardize the Angolan security interests against Kabila's less supportive approach to UNITA in the DRC.¹⁰⁸¹ Thus, as a ruler, Kabila was more preferable for the Angolan government, due to its ongoing war with UNITA and Angola took his side in the second ICW in

¹⁰⁷⁶ Ndikumana, Kisangani, "The Economics of...", p.76.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Clark, "Explaining Ugandan...", p.268, 271.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Kisangani, *Guerres civiles...*, p.199, 214-215.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Salehyan, *Transnational Insurgencies...*, p.10, 24-25.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Willame Jean-Claude, *L'Odyssée Kabila: Trajectoire pour un Congo nouveau?*, Paris: Karthala, 1999, p.225.

¹⁰⁸¹ Colette Braeckman, *L'Enjeu congolais: L'Afrique centrale après Mobutu*, Paris: Fayard, 1999, p.395.

the DRC. In Iraq, in 2003, there was no favored candidate for interveners, but the common driving force was the antipathy towards Saddam Hussein. Thus, in all these wars, the main idea was to replace the administration with another one, relying on the antipathies or sympathies for the existing rulers and not necessarily the sympathy for an opponent.

Following these affinities, the importance of alliances as an affective motivation comes to our focus. As argued before, regarding the increased probabilities of intervention, it is expected that the intervened state shall be weak against military and economic penalties and should not have strong ties with a hegemon. Also, the UN is more inclined to initiate peacekeeping missions in ICWs in the absence of a military alliance between the transgressor and a global power. Finally, it is also expected that alliances play a role concerning the side to intervene either as in bandwagoning or balancing acts. As an intervention and side-taking calculus, it is found that alliance-oriented principles fit into both inward and outward internationalizations as an element of inward reasoning.

In our cases, the governments of Afghanistan, the DRC and Iraq were not closely affiliated with a hegemon and were not able to challenge military interventions. On the contrary, they all rapidly transformed into failed states without any significant resistance. Thus, regarding alliances of transgressor countries, interventions were probabilistic in all these cases. Also, the UN took action in all these cases despite the diversification of the engagement phases and levels. Nevertheless, the UN actions fit into the framework for ICWs where either the transgressor did not have a major supporter or a major power instrumentalized an international organization in line with its national interests.

Still, regarding the coalition formations during the internationalization of these wars, it is possible to confirm both similar and dissimilar traits, but clearly Gent's coalition formation approach has been confirmed in these cases. First, in all three cases, initial coalition formations were minilateral: The governments of the USA, the UK and Australia in Afghanistan and Iraq and also the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola in the DRC. Second, in Afghanistan and Iraq these coalitions took the form of procedural multilateralism, as legalized by the UN and supported widely by the international community, including the NATO in the case of Afghanistan. Also, even though minilateral coalitions turned into multilateral interventions, there are a few differences between the Afghan and Iraqi cases. In

Afghanistan, the outward internationalization formed a consensus issue and when the big powers led the military intervention, other states cooperated and bandwagoned under the auspices of a procedural multilateralism. Even though a bandwagoning under the auspices of a procedural multilateralism also occurred in the case of Iraq, this time the issue was an intermediate case as an inward internationalization, in which the fear of granting too much incentive to a sole intervening coalition or facing a detrimental outcome from another actor's intervention contributed to the multilateralism in question.

Besides, while the DRC presented a consensus issue in the first ICW as an outward internationalization process, in the second ICW it became a divisive issue. The minilateral coalition of intervening states turned into a counter-intervening game with changing sides and an increased number of interveners who were motivated by the principle of "*the enemy of my enemy is my friend*"¹⁰⁸². Finally, the third ICW took place also in a divisive environment, where the government of Rwanda acted unilaterally (with the contribution of Uganda) against the government of the DRC, who was being supported by a procedural multilateral military force of the UN (United Nations Force Intervention Brigade). In these examples, the inward internationalization process is compatible with the presence of divisive issues. Thus, according to these cases, it is also possible to infer that outward internationalizations synchronize with consensus issues, while inward internationalizations bring out differences of opinions leading to intermediate or divisive issues due to the extent of disagreements.

As a final common affective motivation, the role of historical relations and colonial ties as the driving force of the civil war internationalization should be analyzed. These relations illustrate the cultural, political and economic ties formed with troubled countries and their old colonial rulers. In our cases, only minimal traces of these relations are present. Afghanistan and Iraq became independent from the British rule in the first half of the 20th century, while the DRC became independent from Belgium in the second half of the same century. The UK government took part in the inter-state wars of Afghanistan and Iraq that initiated their ICWs, and Belgium was an intervening force in the ICWs of the DRC only before the end of the Cold War. Yet, in the first ICW of the DRC after 1991, Belgium played a minor role in helping Mobutu to escape the country. On the other

¹⁰⁸² Herbert Weiss, "Civil War...", p.67.

hand, regarding the UK, it is debatable whether the intervention of the government was related to its historical relations with Afghanistan and Iraq or its relations with the government of the USA in an alliance formation attempt. As the latter seems more convincing, it is possible to say that colonial or historical relations could be more important within a closer time period to the de-colonization era, but realpolitik, instrumental motivations and other affective liaisons and security concerns seem more predominant in the 21st century.

Table 18 - Common points for inward internationalizations

	Afghanistan	The DRC	Iraq
Earlier negative relations	Present in phase 1	Present in phase 1	Present in phase 1
Proximity	Present in phases 1 and allegedly 3	Present in all phases 1-2-3-4-5	Present in phases 1 and allegedly 3
	Should be perceived in an inter-action level approach		Should be perceived in an inter-action level approach
Instrumental motivations/Opportunism			
Political			
Undermine Rivals	Present in phases 1-2 and allegedly 3	Present in phases 2-3-4-5	Present in phases 1-2 and allegedly 3
Tit-For-Tat	Present in phase 1	Present in phase 3	Present in phase 1
Affective motivations			
Ethnic affinity / Identity networks	Present in phases 1 and allegedly 3	Present in phases 2-3	Present in phases 1 and allegedly 3
	Important for recruitment and networking	Important for recruitment and networking	Important for recruitment and networking
Regime Type (+/-)	Present in phase 2	Present in phases 2-3	Present in phase 2
Alliances	Present regarding general principles	Present regarding general principles	Present regarding general principles
	Present in alliance formation: Consensus issue	Present in alliance formation: Consensus and divisive issues	Present in alliance formation: Intermediate issue
History/Colonial Ties	Minimized for the UK	Minimized for Belgium	Minimized for the UK

Regarding these common traits, it is important to note that (1) even though an ICW arises from an outward internationalization, there can be an inward logic embedded in the process, because affective and instrumental motivations are complementary to the security concerns within the intervention calculi. (2) Inward involvement is a highly-preferred strategy for undermining rivals and (3) changing the regime type is a common factor in all of our cases regardless of the intervention process. (4) Ethnic affinities are more significant for networking and recruitment strategies compared to intervening actor characteristics and (5) earlier periods of

negative relations in the form of inward involvement can be seen as a premonitory stage for future interventions.

b. Divergent features of inward internationalizations: The political and economic expectations of the external actors

As much as Afghanistan, the DRC and Iraqi cases show common characteristics in the framework of inward internationalizations, they also have *sui generis* elements embedded in their own ICWs. Regarding political/instrumental motivations, expansionist ideals are only observed in the Congolese case. In Afghanistan and Iraq, none of the inward interferences were related to the desire for territorial gain. However, in the ICWs of the DRC, while “*Ugandans and Burundians were seen as the expansionists wanting to create a so-called ‘Hima’ empire at the expense of ‘Bantu’*”¹⁰⁸³, Rwanda followed its own irredentist aims. This country has always been an over-populated country neighboring with the vast territories of the DRC and starting from 1996, the idea of the *Greater Rwanda* was overtly presented by Rwandese officials. According to this idea, certain zones in the Kivu region ancestrally belonged to Rwanda and thus this area should have been annexed. In this spirit, during the first ICW of the DRC, the Tutsi forces of Rwanda, Burundi and the Eastern DRC cooperated to take control of the region, in order to maintain their historical territorial claims. Even though these zones were never ruled by a unified Tutsi authority or by Rwanda, irredentist desires were integrated within the first two ICWs of the DRC. To that end, the rebel groups of Mai Mai, which had operated in both North and Sud-Kivu from the second half of the 1980s to protect the Tembo, Hunde, and Nanda rights against Banyarwanda, came back to the surface with the support of Rwanda to accomplice its aims.¹⁰⁸⁴

Apropos of any ICW, economic opportunism has proved to be an effective instrumental motivation in the form of gaining future investment and trade benefits, maintaining access to lootable natural resources and protecting access rights as well as investments. While this kind of an enthusiasm did not exist in the case of Afghanistan, it existed in both cases of the DRC and Iraq, even though their reflections were manifested in diverse patterns. Regarding the DRC, the two ICWs in 1990s were illuminating examples of the relationship between future financial

¹⁰⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.68.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Kisangani, *Guerres civiles...*, pp.206-210.

interests and the impactful conflicts in other states. External actors, both state and non-state, exploited diamonds, coltan, timber, gold and other resources, exported them to gain profit and increased the national income, and financed the war.¹⁰⁸⁵ Even though in both ICWs, external actors in the DRC affirmed that their involvement was the result of security concerns, it was obvious that economic factors played a substantial role within the internationalization process. With regard to Rwanda and Uganda, a detailed investigation of their national economies offers many hints: Even though they do not possess any diamonds, in 1997 Uganda exported 198 tons of diamonds while Rwanda exported 720 tons and in 1998 Uganda exported 1,440 tons of diamonds which raised to 1,813 tons in 1999. Despite the fact that Rwanda's diamond exportation decreased to 439 tons until 1999, its coltan exportation increased to 224 tons in both 1997 and 1998 (it was zero in 1994), and Uganda's coltan exportation increased to 3 tons from zero in 1997 and afterwards increased to 69 tons until 1999.¹⁰⁸⁶

Moreover, both countries started exporting gold. Ugandan export profits were \$110 million in 1996 from around \$12 million between 1994 and 1996, while Rwanda's gold production increased radically in 1997 even though there was only a minimal production of 8 kilos per year until then. Also, between 1998 and 2001, the exploitation of timber in the DRC by Rwandese and Ugandan companies caused a worrying deforestation. In addition to export indicators, Zimbabwe relied on diamond looting to finance its war in the DRC, while Rwanda's coltan exportation alone was profitable enough to finance the war for Rwanda. Exceeding national economic gains, UNITA also looted diamonds in the DRC during the Mobutu rule to finance its war in Angola and RCD-ML invested in gold production as war spoils.¹⁰⁸⁷ In this context, several private companies and political elites, such as the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's family members, the Rwandan vice-President Paul Kagame, the Rwandan Chief of Defense James Kabari became regional warlords with substantial personal and institutional gains.¹⁰⁸⁸ Still, armed groups managed to be involved in a substantial illegal trafficking of gold out of the DRC via Uganda, which equals to 98% of the gold produced in the DRC.¹⁰⁸⁹

¹⁰⁸⁵ Ndikumana, Kisangani, "The Economics of...", p.77.

¹⁰⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.77-79.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Venugopalan, "Understanding the...", pp.6-9.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Reyntjens, "The Second...", p.249.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Arieff, "Democratic Republic...", p.12.

As for the ICW in Iraq, the economy was a major motivation for the onset of war. The American economy in 2000s was facing serious challenges. The domestic market was inactive and the efforts to activate it through decreasing the interest rates and reducing the taxes were failing. Importing from China was more profitable than producing in the USA, so the Afghan war expenditures and the failing domestic economy and the foreign trade deficit was growing. Finally, the urgency of stirring the economic indicators encouraged irrational investments, which caused bankruptcies and financial scandals and inevitably foreign capital started being withdrawn from American enterprises. In this context, the first economic motivation embedded in the war was related to the Iraqi oil, which would ensure future gains and would obtain long-term concession contracts in the form of access to oil resources and future investment opportunities.¹⁰⁹⁰ For these reasons, the American-led intervention in Iraq, which overthrew Saddam, started to transform the Iraqi market from a state-dominated system to the liberal system. In this new system, free trade was the predominant principle, the supply side tax policy was established and nationalized Iraqi oil supplies were privatized for the benefit of foreign companies.¹⁰⁹¹

On the other hand, direct gains from oil remained modest. The only big American oil company that entered Iraqi oil sector in 2004 was Exxon, while other American oil engineering and serving companies, such as Bechtel and Halliburton, acquired major contracts for setting up the Iraqi energy infrastructure and distributing oil.¹⁰⁹² Hence, while the American companies gained access to oil and acquired investment opportunities, governmental benefits from access to natural resource were not limited to direct profits, but there were many other aspects connected to oil schemes, which will be explained in detail under affective economic factors. However, regarding maintaining future trade benefits, it is important to note that oil was not the sole driving force behind the Iraqi war. The elites of the Bush administration, such as Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld, were

¹⁰⁹⁰ Baskın Oran, **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan bugüne olgular, belgeler, yorumlar, Cilt III: 2001-2012**, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013, p.23.

¹⁰⁹¹ Ronald C. Kramer, Raymond Michalowski, "War, Aggression and State Crime: A Criminological Analysis of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq", **British Journal of Criminology**, Vol.45, No.4, 2005, p.452.

¹⁰⁹² Nayna J. Jhaveri, "Petroimperialism: US Oil interests and the Iraq War", **Antipode**, Vol.36, No.1, 2004, pp.8-9.

the big investors of oil, automotive and arms sectors.¹⁰⁹³ Thus, the military industry that had lost its momentum and support after the end of the Cold War were once more perceived as the propellant powers of the American economy, which needed an impetus to get out of the economic stagnation of the time.¹⁰⁹⁴

Instrumental motivations can also arise from domestic dynamics. As discussed before as an inward internationalization motivation, a political ruler can interfere with an external civil war to divert the attention from the internal problems and gain an increased domestic support. The threat of an exterior danger would lessen the internal discontent and permit the political leader to channel national income to his/her preferred domains. In our cases, traces of these policies are found in the DRC and Iraq. In the DRC, both Mobutu and Kabila resorted to *scapegoating* towards the Banyamulenge groups (minority Tutsis of the South Kivu region, who immigrated to the DRC from Rwanda in the beginning of the 20th century), whose numbers increased due to the Rwandan civil war. Their exclusion has been a long-term internal tactic to consolidate the ruling elite's legitimacy that had deteriorated due to political and economic inadequacies.¹⁰⁹⁵ As this was a clear example of blaming refugees in order to gain popular support, it is possible to outline similar elements regarding the intervening/involving states into ICWs of the DRC. Internationalizations of civil wars in the DRC were based on the argument that the leaders of the DRC were assisting diverse warring factions of neighboring states. While this argument will be explained in detail regarding outward internationalization methods in the DRC, it is important to underline that Rwanda, Angola, Uganda and other states involved in the Congolese wars have been experiencing long-term intra-state wars, had very poor economic conditions, and from a political and institutional perspective had non-democratic and repressive regimes.¹⁰⁹⁶ Hence, the survival of political leaders was strained, and they needed to use a neighboring intra-state war as the source of their internal problems. In that context, as economic opportunities to internationalize the DRC civil wars possessed profitable stakes, politically they were also very advantageous.¹⁰⁹⁷ This is why it is

¹⁰⁹³ Baskın Oran, **Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan bugüne olgular, belgeler, yorumlar, Cilt III: 2001-2012**, İletişim Yayınları, 2013, p.24.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Kramer, Michalowski, "War, Agression...", p.456.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Atzili, "When Good...", pp.162-163.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

¹⁰⁹⁷ For example concerning Uganda, Museveni's long-term struggle to stay in power was secured with exploitation and exportation of Congolese natural resources; Clark, "Explaining Ugandan...", p.277.

crucial to highlight the inward internationalization elements (the existence of earlier negative relations, proximity, undermining rivals, tit-for-tat, ethnic and trade-related affinities, altering the regime, alliance formations, expansionist aims, resource exploiting and diversionist policies) embedded in the ICWs of the DRC, which became clearer during the second ICW, even though the first internationalization of the DRC civil war is classified as an outward internationalization in general.

Considering the ICW of Iraq, contrary to the case of the DRC but as a component of diversionary motivation, the policies of G.W. Bush created a *rally around the flag* effect and contributed to his re-election in 2004. When G.W. Bush was firstly elected as the President of the USA in 2000, it was one of the most competitive presidential elections in American history. Bush assured his second presidential mandate by gaining the majority of both electoral and popular votes.¹⁰⁹⁸ This electoral victory was mostly fed by his foreign policy strategy, particularly on the rhetoric of *war on terrorism* and the Iraqi intervention. For the electoral tendencies, voters' decisions were mostly influenced by moral values (22%). Yet, this research also showed that, when the prominence of terrorism (19%) and the war in Iraq (15%) were combined together, they were having the biggest impact on voting decisions. Moreover, when the significance of political issues regarding the elections was questioned by the electors, terrorism was perceived as the most important issue (45.4%) amongst them, which was followed by employment concerns (39.8%).¹⁰⁹⁹ Thus, as a domestic variable, Iraq and war on terrorism had been highly impactful for the re-election of Bush in 2004 by creating a clear *rally around flag* effect, which resulted in the establishment of a hard-liner foreign policy strategy.

All these domestic dynamics are also meaningful to explain the interventionist character of external actors in our case studies and their decision-making in the internationalization process. Regarding Afghanistan and Iraq, there are several common actors, such as the USA, the UK, Australia and Iran. Concerning the USA, indicators show that it is a heterogeneous (both ethnically and religiously) state with a stable democracy. The UK seems to be ethnically less diverse compared to the USA but religiously presents a heterogeneous image, with a stable democracy.

¹⁰⁹⁸ "2004 Presidential Election", http://www.270towin.com/2004_Election/index.html, (accessed 20.02.2017)

¹⁰⁹⁹ D. Sunshine Hillygus, Todd G. Shields, "Moral Issues and Voter decision Making in the 2004 Presidential Election", **Political Science and Politics**, Vol.38, No.2, 2005, pp.202-203.

Australia is an ethnically homogenous state while religiously holds a more diverse repertoire, and also has a stable democracy.¹¹⁰⁰ Thus, regarding these three countries, it is possible to affirm that their governments either rely on popular opinions or consider realpolitik dynamics regarding their foreign policies. This conclusion explains their changing policies or intervention decisions, which are also in line with the realpolitik variables. Iran does not show similar traits: It is an ethnically heterogeneous state where religion has a more homogeneous dynamic. In this context, the dominant group of Shiites possesses the control of state with an anocracy.¹¹⁰¹ Hence, Iran should be considered as a homogenous and non-democratic country where the intervention or involvement decisions are made in accordance with the interests of the dominant ruling elite. This explains their long-term Shia symbolism in both Afghanistan and Iraq regardless of the changing undercurrents of the region.

Concerning the specific third parties as involving and intervening actors in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia is even more homogeneous than Iran in both terms of religious and ethnic factors. The country is ruled directly by a monarchic dynasty in the framework of the Salafi interpretation of Sharia Law. This is how and why this country has relentlessly supported the extremist Islamic movements for decades. Moreover, in case of a policy change, the royal family does not need to account for their decisions, as none of the foreign policy moves are open to public discussion. This provides Saudi leaders the freedom to act as they wish. As an active external actor in Afghanistan, Pakistan appears to be an ethnically heterogeneous country where there is a religious homogeneity. It is also accepted as a democratic country despite its defaults.¹¹⁰² In that case, its foreign policy decisions are taken in a more complex environment. The ruling party may try to achieve its own goals, which can both overlap with and diverge from the popular opinion, but political constraints would still oblige the government to respect and consider the realpolitik. This is why Pakistani foreign policy towards Afghanistan was yielded to ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), who has been working secretly since the beginning of 1980s. That way, the Pakistani government easily cooperated with other states in the context of the international intervention in the country, even though its earlier efforts were in conflict with those of its new allies.

¹¹⁰⁰ Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

¹¹⁰¹ **Ibid.**

¹¹⁰² **Ibid.**

In the Congolese case, Burundi, Rwanda, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Uganda came forward as the internationalizing state actors. First, all these countries are ruled by anocracies and corrupted, repressive rulers.¹¹⁰³ Thus, the society or the realpolitik dynamics have minor effect on their foreign policy making process. Second, these countries show diverse features in regard to their ethnicities. In the cases of Burundi, Rwanda and Zimbabwe, there is one majoritarian ethnic group consisting of more than 75% of the population, with a big minority ethnic group as the second largest identity in the country. In Angola and Zambia ethnic fractionalizations are higher with more than 0.70 fractionalization indexes, where majoritarian and secondary ethnic groups have relatively closer ratios. However, in Uganda, ethnic fractionalization is ultimately high with 0.92 fractionalization index where the majoritarian group only comprises of 16% of the society and other identities seem to be below 1% of the population. Third, all these countries have high religious fractionalizations in addition to their ethnic structures.¹¹⁰⁴ Besides, ethnic polarization or fractionalization in most of these countries did not hold ruling groups back from not disrupting sensitive internal balances or excluding certain groups. Conclusively, it is possible to make three inferences from these variables: (1) External actors in the DRC were non-democratic and either ethnically polarized or heterogeneous countries, whose governments made the interventionist decisions according to the dominant group's choices. (2) In all these countries there were serious domestic security problems with ongoing intra-state conflicts. (3) Thus, these decisions were aimed to increase the power of the ruling circles and eliminate their rivals. This interpretation also signifies that it should not be expected that heterogeneous and non-democratic regimes, such as Uganda would prefer passive lobbying over an intervention decision to avoid upsetting the fragile balance of the society as argued by David Carment and Patrick James.¹¹⁰⁵ However, it is possible to proclaim that their remaining interventionist typologies fit into the conditions of our case studies.

In relation to affective motivations, trade ties represent an important variable in the form of protecting present economic ties or preventing them from being interrupted and destructed. Even though it has been a lacking factor in the case of Afghanistan, notably in the second ICW of the DRC, Zimbabwe's intervention in

¹¹⁰³ **Ibid.**; PITF, **Adverse Regime Changes Dataset**.

¹¹⁰⁴ Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**.

¹¹⁰⁵ David Carment, Patrick James, "Third-Party States...", pp.17-18.

favor of the government showed the significance of this phenomenon. During the first ICW in the DRC, Zimbabwe had lent a large sum of money to Kabila to help him gain the central control. When Kabila's ex-allies turned against him during the second ICW, the ruling party of Zimbabwe feared that in case of overthrowing Kabila, they would not be repaid, thus they supported Kabila. Moreover, since the rise of Kabila to power private sector leaders of Zimbabwe had invested in the DRC within a patronage framework. Hence, in order to protect their investments, they needed Kabila's survival.¹¹⁰⁶ These liaisons encouraged the Zimbabwe government to intervene in favor of the government and locate its troops around the mining zones of the DRC, where Zimbabwean officials and businessmen became deeply involved in looting activities during the second ICW of the DRC.¹¹⁰⁷

In Iraq, trade relations were major components of the internationalization of war. After the 9/11 attacks, the securitization of energy resources and their prices in Middle East became a significant issue for the US government due to its economic relations with Saudi Arabia, which has been one of the predominant supporters of extremist organizations during the last decades. As the number one oil supplier of the USA, Saudi Arabia also had a tremendous effect on the global prices of oil as a "swing producer".¹¹⁰⁸ ¹¹⁰⁹ As relations were intensified after the declaration of war on terrorism, the USA had to find a way to balance the Saudi effect on the oil sector and diversify its trade resources as well as the relations instituted around them. In that regard, Iraq as the owner of second largest proven oil reserves within The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and another swing producer represented the opportunity to access cheap oil and counter-balance oil prices.¹¹¹⁰ Moreover, a second trade scheme embedded in this arrangement was related to the situation of the petro-dollar: The switch of Iraq from dollar to euro in oil trades in

¹¹⁰⁶ Reyntjens, "The Second...", p.241.

¹¹⁰⁷ Atzili, "When Good...", p.169.

¹¹⁰⁸ "The system dynamics model portrays the global oil industry in terms of three main types of oil producers—the Independents (non-OPEC), the Swing Producer and the Opportunists (both OPEC). Each producer group is characterised by its own set of policies governing capacity investment and production decisions. Price is set in the market by the balance of supply and demand, and cannot be set directly by OPEC. However, OPEC can influence the price by setting a quota that is above or below the call on OPEC. Also, the swing producer can influence price by withholding/increasing production when the current oil price is below/above OPEC's intended marker price."; Paul A. Langley, John D.W. Morecroft, "Performance and learning in a simulation of oil industry dynamics", *European Journal of Operational Research*, Vol.155, No.3, 2004, p.718.

¹¹⁰⁹ Jhaveri, "Petroimperialism: US...", p.7.

¹¹¹⁰ Andrea K. Riemer, "Petro-imperialism: Strategic trends and the importance of the Middle East", *AARMS (Academic and Applied Research in Military Science)*, Vol.5, No.4, 2006, pp.581-582.

2000¹¹¹¹ caused a panic to the government of the USA. The probability that OPEC could prefer euro instead of dollar would destabilize its long-term value against euro, which had already declined 17% in 2002. Even though this would not signify an unbearable economic adaptation, the exchange of dollar with euro in international oil transactions and the replacement of petrol-related central bank reserves with euro would significantly devalue dollar and cause inflation in the long run.¹¹¹² In this regard, to prevent a probable future loss, Iraq represented a strategic element for the American interests in relation to its affairs with Saudi Arabia, OPEC and petrodollar.

As the final component of inward internationalization, humanitarian motivations to end the violence, protect the civilians and/or refugees can be observed in ICWs. In our case studies, none of the intra-state wars were directly internationalized with a humanitarian reason being the essential motivation embedded in the process. Yet, amongst internationalizing actors, it is possible to trace humanitarian engagements during the ICWs. In overall, solely humanitarian initiatives are observed to be taken within the UN peace operations. Regarding firstly the Afghan ICW, there is neither a peace mission nor an international force on the ground located to halt violence or protect civilians. Here, the ISAF mission was created under the auspices of the UNSC and then led by NATO, but its mandate was beyond peacekeeping and concerned fighting against the Taliban and Al-Qaida in the country. This was a peace enforcement mission rather than a humanitarian one. In this context, the only humanitarian activity under an international organization is assorted by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which was established in 2002 to support the implementation of the Bonn Agreement and manage the relief and recovery programs on Afghan soil.¹¹¹³ Yet, due to its non-military character it is out of this component's scope as an internationalizing element.

¹¹¹¹ Faisal Islam, "Iraq nets handsome profit by dumping dollar for euro", 16.02.2003, <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/feb/16/iraq.theeuro> (accessed 20.02.2017)

¹¹¹² William Clark, "The Real Reasons for the Upcoming War With Iraq: A Macroeconomic and Geostrategic Analysis of the Unspoken Truth", 17 February 2003, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CLA302A.html> (accessed 20.02.2017)

¹¹¹³ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 1401**, 28.03.2002, S/RES/1401, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/309/14/PDF/N0230914.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 20.02.2017); Report of the Secretary-General, "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security", **General Assembly Security Council**, No.278, 2002, <http://afghanistan-un.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/S20022781.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2017)

On the other hand, in the DRC at the second year of the second ICW (1999), MONUC was created to implement the ceasefire accepted with the Lusaka agreements, control the withdrawal of foreign troops, deliver humanitarian assistance and protect civilians.¹¹¹⁴ It expanded its mission and delivered further authorizations from the UNSC regarding its mission but never held back from its task to halt violence, protect civilians, and assist humanitarian efforts. MONUC operated until 2010 and was successively transformed into MONUSCO with the mandate to use all means to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights representatives.¹¹¹⁵ Its mandate was renewed until 31st March 2017, to encounter the violence against civilians and will be accompanied by the Intervention Brigade to apply further measures.¹¹¹⁶ Thus, the military presence of the UN in the DRC is strictly related to humanitarian reasons, even though it was not the principal internationalizing actor.

Studying the Iraqi case from the perspective of humanitarian motivations, it is possible to highlight the UN missions: Before the internationalization of war in 2003, the Operation Provide Comfort was established with a humanitarian mandate by the Resolution 688 of the UNSC in 1991. It operated in Northern Iraq to protect Kurdish civilians from governmental violence and deliver humanitarian assistance to the refugees that had piled along the borders. In this context, international forces had created no-fly zones and safe corridors to ensure the mission on the ground. However, the conditions surrounding this humanitarian effort to protect civilians and refugees did not create an ICW due to its collaborative character in the process. Following this earlier humanitarian initiative, after the onset of ICW in Iraq, the engagement of the UN by the major interveners, who are also amongst the permanent members of its Security Council, remained as a political assistance. This implication could be perceived very clearly within the framework of UNAMI, created in 2004 with the Resolution 1500 of the UNSC. Its mandate was described with the Resolution 1546 and it was planned to stay in Iraq until the 31st July 2017.¹¹¹⁷ Military troops engaged in UNAMI are only in charge of protecting the international buildings and staff or observing the developments. Nonetheless, the same resolution

¹¹¹⁴ “MONUC Mandate”, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/mandate.shtml> (accessed 20.02.2017)

¹¹¹⁵ “MONUSCO Mandate”

¹¹¹⁶ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 2277**, 30.03.2016, S/RES/2277, [https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2277\(2016\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2277(2016)) (accessed 20.02.2017)

¹¹¹⁷ UN Security Council, **Security Council Resolution 2299**, 25.07.2016, S/RES/2299, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2299\(2016\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2299(2016)) (accessed 20.02.2017)

that described the UNAMI mandate declared that the UN was recognizing MNF as the security force in Iraq, which was accounted for building an Iraqi security by advising, assisting and training national forces that lacked the capacity to protect the civilians. Additionally, it has been in charge of conducting offensive operations against rebel groups to secure the internal stability.¹¹¹⁸ In that context, while it is true that MNF was established to provide domestic security as a non-UN international military mission, it is also difficult to admit that it is a humanitarian instrument. Unquestionably, MNF played a crucial role in the efforts to stabilize Iraq during the state failure but keeping in mind that the domestic violence was produced as a reaction to the existence of foreign state actors in Iraq, MNF may also be accepted as the source of internal violence as the extension and instrument of the invading powers. Thus, it is debatable whether MNF is a military mission with humanitarian motivation to end the internal violence or it is a tool to eliminate any threat against the externally built Iraqi state by taking the place of national security forces. The latter argument seems more convincing, because after 2004 and until the end of its mission, it became an essential tool of the new Iraqi state to maintain its survival and after its departure, even though the intensity of combats lowered to conflict levels in first two years, afterwards national forces that took the place of MNF could not stop the growth and spillover of ISIS/Daesh, which inevitably led to the re-internationalization of the war.

Table 19 - Diverging elements within the inward internationalizations

	Afghanistan	The DRC	Iraq
<i>Instrumental motivations/Opportunism</i>			
<u>Political</u>			
Expansionism	None	Present in phases 2-3	None
<u>Economic</u>			
Exploit resources	None	Present in phases 2-3-4	Present in phases 2-3
<u>Domestic motivations</u>			
Diversion: Rally around the Flag/scapegoat	None	Present in phases 1-2-3 regarding both Congolese and intervening leaders	Present in phase 2 regarding the re-election G.W. Bush in 2004
Interventionist character	Present types are heterogeneous democratic, homogenous democratic, and homogenous non-democratic	Present types are heterogeneous non-democratic and homogenous non-democratic	Present types are heterogeneous democratic, homogenous democratic, and homogenous non-democratic

¹¹¹⁸ “Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I)”, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/mnf-i.htm> (accessed 20.02.2017)

<i>Affective motivations</i>			
Trade relations	None	Present in phases 2-3	Present in phases 1-2
<i>Humanitarian Reasons</i>			
End the fighting/halt violence	None	Present in phases 3-4-5	Debatable for phase 3
Protect civilians/Refugees	None	Present in phases 3-4-5	Present in phase 1

As divergent traits of inward internationalizations of our case studies are aligned as above, hereafter outward internationalizations of three case studies with their common and diverging elements will be evaluated.

Section III – Spillover Elements in the Civil Wars: Comparative Study of Outward Internationalizations

In our case studies with high internationalization levels, apart from various motivations to get involved, civil wars tend to spill over and draw other actors into their complex environments. In this section, we will try to demonstrate the spillover mechanisms in selected cases and explain how they interacted with external actors and drew them into wars. In this spirit, in the first sub-section the converging features of case studies will be discussed, while the second sub-section will focus on the diverging elements within outward internationalizations.

a. Discussing convergent aspects of the spillover processes in the selected ICW cases

Tracing convergent explanations in selected cases means that we need to observe their spillover mechanisms and methods. As discussed before, direct spillovers are also known as diffusion processes, which contribute to the spread of a war through tangible factors, such as arms, refugees, and money, while indirect spillovers, in other words contagions, indicate the spread of a conflict through learning and inspiration. In our cases, three non-state actors came forward as the driving forces of detected spillovers: In Afghanistan, it was Al-Qaida, while it is possible to observe *Interahamwe*/ex-FAR in the DRC and ISIS/Daesh in Iraq.

In that context, the diffusion of Afghan intra-state war towards the USA was due to the 9/11 attacks. Because of the Al-Qaida's attacks in 2001, the diffusion effect was realized with *direct contact* between the USA and Afghanistan. Moreover, that spillover pulled the US government into Afghanistan, which resulted in the fulfillment of the cycles of outward internationalization analyzed in earlier chapters.

The first outward internationalization of the Afghan civil war was the transfer of the Afghan civil war to the American territories and the second outward internationalization was the participation of the USA and its allies into the civil war in Afghanistan due to pull factors.

In the case of Congo, it is possible to affirm a full cycle of outward internationalization as well, due to the diffusion of the Hutu-Tutsi war from Rwanda to the DRC through the mass dislocation of Hutus. Rwanda's intra-state war ended with the invasion of the Tutsi-led RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), who performed an attack from its bases in Uganda. After taking over the central control by the RPF, millions of Hutus left the country under the guidance of ex-FAR with the aim of creating an exile government abroad. They were primarily directed to Tanzania and the DRC, where more than 2 million of people were hosted. While the government of Tanzania managed to control the refugee migration, their adaptation and disarmament, the government of the DRC, ruled by Mobutu at the time, was both too weak and involuntary to control the situation in refugee camps.

Moreover, Mobutu's scapegoating tactic resulted in the provision of governmental support to Interahamwe forces, which led to their atrocities primarily against the Congolese Tutsis, and afterwards their attacks against Rwanda. Ex-Far militants were recruited and fed at the camps in the DRC supplied by international organizations and this situation was creating a great humanitarian dilemma. In this context, as a response to the activities of Interahamwe, Rwanda acted against Mobutu with the revolutionary forces of Kabila in the first ICW of the DRC. Afterwards, under the auspices of Kabila, the Hutus continued using violence against non-Hutu groups, which again ended in the internationalization of the intra-state war, primarily with the intervention of Rwanda in addition to other actors.¹¹¹⁹ However, it is important to note that, as argued before, especially in the second ICW of the DRC, inward motivations, such as exploiting natural resources and influencing the authority of the Congolese government, were the predominant causes rather than the war between Hutus and Tutsis.

Yet, in the second ICW, just as in the first one, external attacks initiated from refugee camps paved the way for external actors to get involved with instrumental aims. In the end, the relocation of the Rwandese Hutus in the DRC formed the first

¹¹¹⁹ Salehyan, "The Externalities of...", pp.794-795.

phase of outward internationalization of the Hutu-Tutsi war from Rwanda to the DRC. Afterwards, the militarization of camps in the DRC, the activities of the ex-Far militants that were located in the refugee camps against indigenous and Rwandese Tutsis in addition to their direct attacks to Rwanda provoked the national government besides other external actors to participate into the intra-state war of the DRC. Hence, this pull effect resulted in the completion of the cycle of outward internationalization through the participation of regional actors into the war against Mobutu and later Kabila.

Concerning Iraq, ISIS/Daesh has been the driving force behind the full-cycle outward internationalization of the civil war. During the ICW in Iraq, ISIS/Daesh appeared as a branch of Al-Qaida established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, unifying Sunni groups who acted against the invasion in Iraq. The fall of Saddam Hussein left a power vacuum in Iraq and the politics of Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki favoring Shiite groups against the Kurds and Sunnis deepened the social grievances by creating horizontal inequalities between various identity groups. Thus, *“while Al-Qaida’s central organization emerged from an alliance between ultraconservative Saudi Salafism and radical Egyptian Islamism, ISIS was born of an unholy union between an Iraq-base Al-Qaida and offshoot and the defeated Iraqi Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein”*.¹¹²⁰ In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took control of ISIS/Daesh and initiated the break-up from Al-Qaida. In 2014, he declared himself as the caliphate of Muslims, which instigated the diffusion of ISIS/Daesh in Middle East and North Africa.¹¹²¹ Syria was the main target of ISIS/Daesh due to the ongoing civil war, which created the opportunities to spill over with the existence of grieving, poor, disempowered and marginalized Sunni groups.¹¹²²

Therefore, the Al-Qaida’s war¹¹²³ had spilled over to the USA due to its main principle of fighting with the “far enemy”, described as the non-Muslims in America

¹¹²⁰ Fawaz A. Gerges, “ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism”, **Current History**, Vol.113, No.767, 2014, p.339.

¹¹²¹ Zana Khasraw Gulmohamed, “The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (Levant) ISIS”, **Global Security Studies**, , Vol.5, No.2, 2014, pp.1-3.

¹¹²² Michael Stathis, “ISIS, Syria, and Iraq: The Beginning of a Fourth Gulf War?”, **Critical Issues in Justice and Politics**, Vol.8, No.2, 2015, p.4, 8-9.

¹¹²³ Osama Bin Laden had warned the Muslim communities to avoid internal war and declared war against the imperialist powers of the West, particularly the USA in 1996. For more information see. Osama Bin Laden, “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holiest Sites”, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Declaration-of-Jihad-against-the-Americans-Occupying-the-Land-of-the-Two-Holiest-Sites-Translation.pdf> (accessed 01.05.2017)

and Europe, who had dominated Muslim countries and thus were attacked as the self-defensing act of the Jihad policy. In contrary, ISIS/Daesh diffused to its proximate areas by targeting non-Sunni Muslim sects and “near enemies” that are described as secular regimes in Muslim countries and the governments of Iraq and Syria. ISIS/Daesh has also grown across the Iraqi borders towards Syria and Lebanon because of its economic networking and expansion in the rural area. Before ISIS/Daesh, jihadist groups, primarily Al-Qaida, were composed of presiding elites and mostly university-graduated lower-middle-class recruits. However, ISIS/Daesh adopted a diverse social profile, which employed leading cadres and recruits from rural areas. That helped ISIS/Daesh to diffuse in an unstable, civil war across Middle East countries, particularly in Iraq and Syria. Also, ISIS/Daesh employed patronage relations and offered economic privileges, such as the protection of illegal trafficking to gain support from the local Sunni communities.¹¹²⁴ Thus, in this context, as a first phase of outward internationalization, ISIS/Daesh diffused to Syria from Iraq and further claims on Lebanon are still under development. In addition to its spillover to nearby areas, ISIS/Daesh conducted terrorist attacks in France (Nice, Normandy and Paris), Germany (Berlin), Belgium (Brussels), Switzerland (Zurich)¹¹²⁵, and Turkey (Ankara, Istanbul, Adana, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa etc.)¹¹²⁶. Following all these attacks, the second phase of the outward internationalization of war occurred in 2014, with the engagement of OIR and the contribution of external actors to air strikes in Iraq and Syria. Hence the whole cycle of outward internationalization in Iraq was completed with the ongoing international quarrel in the regions affected by ISIS/Daesh.

In addition to the diffusion processes that are common in all selected cases, contagion processes seem to have accompanied direct spillovers for Al-Qaida, Hutu groups and ISIS/Daesh. First of all, Al-Qaida that was established in Afghanistan in 1988 with the cooperation of Pakistani Abdullah Azzam and Osama Bin Laden, who had sought to bring all the Muslims together in Afghanistan in order to achieve the universal Jihad in the name of oppressed Muslims against their corrupted regimes. Even though Al-Qaida’s primary target was the USA that was seen as the evil

¹¹²⁴ Gerges, “ISIS and the...”, pp.340-341.

¹¹²⁵ Nash Jenkins, “A Timeline of Recent Terrorist Attacks in Europe”, 20.12.2016, <http://time.com/4607481/europe-terrorism-timeline-berlin-paris-nice-brussels/> (accessed 28.02.2017)

¹¹²⁶ Bahadır Özgür, “İŞİD kurulduğundan beri Türkiye’ye saldırıyor”, 21.07.2015, www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/isid-kuruldu%C4%91undan-beri-turkiyeye-saldiriyor-1400940/ (accessed 28.02.2017)

imperial authority dominating Muslim countries, it also aimed to overthrow governments in the Arab countries, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Caucasus, Central Asia, Kashmir, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, Philippines, Indonesia, and Europe. In the light of this very long list, Al-Qaida advanced in Afghanistan until 1992, moved to Sudan until 1996 and relocated in Afghanistan after 1996. There, dozens of already established training camps were put in operation, in which around 20,000 foreign fighters were trained. These camps aimed to promote the jihadist cause and provide support to foreign insurgencies like in Tajikistan, Kashmir and Chechnya.¹¹²⁷ In that context, firstly, besides their collaborations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al-Qaida supported directly the conflicts in Philippines (via MILF and ASG between 1990 and 2001), in Ethiopia (via Al-Itahad al-Islami in 1993 and 1996), Chechnya (via the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in 1999), Pakistan (via Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi -TNSM- and TTP between 2007 and 2009), and allegedly in Iraq (via Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn -TQJBR- and ISIS/Daesh between 2004 and 2009) and Nigeria (via Boko Haram in 2009) by providing funding, training, intelligence and weapons.¹¹²⁸ In addition to providing support, foreign warriors trained by Al-Qaida returned to their home countries to fight in the name of Jihad, joined the wars of other Muslim communities on behalf of religious fraternity and fought aside them like in Bosnia and Kosovo.¹¹²⁹ In that regard, Al-Qaida represented the biggest inspiration and learning centre for religious movements based on the jihadist aims throughout 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, they prepared the infrastructure of ISIS/Daesh in Iraq, who afterwards became the main concern of the international community due to its fast-track spillover.

Regarding the contagion processes, inspirational elements were also present in the DRC. Even though immigration of Hutus had directly carried the Rwandese intra-state war to Congolese territories, before their relocation, there were already Hutu and Tutsi people leaving in Southeastern part of the DRC. After the settlement of new refugees, indigenous Hutus joined the Interahamwe groups in their atrocities against Tutsis, which was a result of deepened ethnic differences and the rise of xenophobic identity questions due to the deterioration of the population balance.¹¹³⁰

¹¹²⁷ Byman, Pollack, "Things Fall...", pp.57-60.

¹¹²⁸ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

¹¹²⁹ Byman, Pollack, "Things Fall...", p.31.

¹¹³⁰ Orogun, "Crisis of Government...", pp.29-30.

Without the support of domestic groups and government, ex-Far militants could not undertake such actions against local and migrated Tutsis,¹¹³¹ hence the inspiration and encouragement of Hutus by the neighboring genocide, despite the loss of intra-state war in Rwanda, was present in the DRC throughout the 1990s. Moreover, the Tutsis in the DRC collaborated between themselves and other groups that were threatened by the Hutus, in order to fight back. That organization was a result of the learning process from the earlier Tutsi-Hutu war in Rwanda, in which Tutsis became the main victims of mass killings.

Regarding ISIS/Daesh, in addition to diffusion, contagion process has been existent in Middle East and other regions. First, in Egypt, one of the most extremist groups, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, declared its loyalty to ISIS/Daesh and recognized the caliphate of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2014. Following their allegiance, some of the extremist groups in Libya affirmed their participation in ISIS/Daesh.¹¹³² In this way, from the beginning of 2014, 43 different groups pledged loyalty to ISIS/Daesh, which have comprised of diverse organizations from Sudan to Philippines, from Libya to Algeria, and from Somalia to Russia.¹¹³³ Thus, as ISIS/Daesh cannot directly spill over to all these countries, there is an explicit contagion process in operation regarding the growth of ISIS/Daesh in the world. Moreover, in 2015, stray extremist groups in Afghanistan, duplicated their counterparts and brought ISIS/Daesh in existence in the homeland of its founder group Al-Qaida. Even though this has been an ironic development, it also proves the networking between Al-Qaida and ISIS/Daesh since the establishment of the chaotic environment in Iraq after the intervention in 2001, which has apparently resulted in reciprocal learning and inspiration processes as well as the reciprocate contagion methods between these two countries.

These spillovers in both diffusion and contagion methods bring out the background mechanisms in work. The first set of elements that affects the operation of spillover is the characteristics of civil wars in process. Regarding these, the type of the conflict may have an impact on the spillover process: Governmental civil wars, particularly ideological ones, are expected to become popular amongst various

¹¹³¹ Howard Adelman, "The Use and Abuse of Refugees in Zaire, April 1996 to March 1997", <https://web.stanford.edu/~sstedman/2001.readings/Zaire.htm> (accessed 01.03.2017)

¹¹³² Stathis, "ISIS, Syria...", p.4, 8-9.

¹¹³³ "Islamic State's 43 Global Affiliates, Interactive World Map", <https://intelcenter.com/maps/is-affiliates-map.html#gs.w1EP6XE> (accessed 28.02.2017)

regions, while secessionist civil wars tend to spread through the region when there are separated ethnic groups in neighboring states. Moreover, neighboring kindred tend to join rebellions in proximate regions or replicate the ongoing conflicts. If identity-related issues are included in any of these conflicts, then they are expected to create greater refugee flows. In regard to these features, all selected cases share the same type of civil wars: Governmental. Even though there are diverse characteristics embedded in Afghanistan, the DRC and Iraq, in each ICW the main idea is to capture central control. In Afghanistan, that aim was paired with an ideological war, according to which the Taliban, Al-Qaida and recently ISIS/Daesh have been fighting for since 2001. The Jihadist ideology raised by these non-state actors has been spreading across the world from Afghanistan through religious networks since the 1990s. In addition to the role of religion as a conveyor element, neighboring kindred has been important in the recruitment processes. Despite the latest activities to recruit more diversely, the Taliban has always been a Pashtun-dominated organization and have been using Pakistani sanctuaries to recruit from Pashtun communities.¹¹³⁴ Al-Qaida, however, has a different profile as a multinational organization, which has mixed various ethnic groups, languages and nationalities. Yet, it instrumentalizes familial relationships and recruits largely from the members' entourages.¹¹³⁵ In that context, the Taliban have relied on Pashtun based ties to recruit from neighboring states and thus stayed as a local non-state actor, while Al-Qaida has targeted Muslims from all around the world regardless of their nationalities and this is why it became a worldwide organization. The latter logic also applies to ISIS/Daesh, but with a limitation of the target group to Sunni-Muslims. This group has been the reason for the worldwide replication of ISIS/Daesh within a short period of time, including the stray groups in Afghanistan. Aside from these groups, other rebellious groups in Afghanistan have played on ethnic lines to recruit soldiers, while Hizb-i Islami-yi factions had a Pashtun recruitment pool as Taliban, Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and Shura-e Nazar had Tajiks as the target group, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami recruited from Uzbeks/Turkmens and Hizb-i Wahdat had Shiite populations for recruitment purposes. All these ethnic-based factors created an intense trans-border flow for importing and exporting fighters.

¹¹³⁴ Antonio Giustozzi, "The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns", **The Afghanistan Papers**, The Center for International Governance Innovation, No.5, 2010, p.3.

¹¹³⁵ Gunaratna, **Inside Al Qaeda...**, p.96.

Regarding the Congolese case, both the war in Rwanda that moved into the DRC and the ICWs following that diffusion have been focused on central governance. Even though the ICWs of the DRC have been governmental civil wars, their background was based upon ethnic differences, with occasional secessionist demands. In that regard, as expected, the ICWs of the DRC and the civil war in Rwanda have produced a great amount of refugees due to the easy identification of civilians by their racial qualities. In 2014, the Congolese refugee population abroad represented the sixth largest dislocated community with over half a million refugees fleeing from the DRC during the first and second ICWs.¹¹³⁶ The major role of identity in the ICWs of the DRC was evident during the spillover processes into the DRC from Rwanda and in recruitment strategies of NSAs.

Concerning recruitment strategies, transnational rebel groups that participated in the ICWs of the DRC have been recruiting from ethnically similar and local populations. FDLR was formed by Rwandese Hutus and kept recruiting from Hutu people, Republican Federalist Forces (FRF) declared to be fighting for the interests of the Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsis) and recruited accordingly, Mai-Mai groups from South Kivu have relied on local villagers and their participation into their local causes against others, the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC) in North Kivu recruited from ethnic lines, the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU) were located in Beni area of North Kivu and developed alliances with Mai Mai groups, the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri/Popular Front for Justice in Congo (FRPI/FPJC) has been operating in Southern Ituri and recruited from this area.¹¹³⁷ Thus, regarding the organization of armed forces clashing in the DRC, the principle of territoriality and ethnic affiliation have been the constituent elements. In consideration of the spillover process into the DRC, following the resettlement of the Hutus, their encouragement by Mobutu and Kabila and the support of indigenous people have resulted in the replication of the Hutu-Tutsi war experienced in Rwanda. Therefore, identity elements had a strong effect on the outward internationalization of Congolese civil wars, while the main target has been to take over governmental control.

¹¹³⁶ “Congolese (DRC) Refugees”, www.resettlement.eu/page/congolese-drc-refugees (accessed 01.03.2017)

¹¹³⁷ “Who’s who among armed groups in the east”, 15.05.2017, www.irinnews.org/report/89494/drc-who’s-who-among-armed-groups-east (accessed 01.03.2017)

In Iraq, while the main demand of warring agents was the control of governmental power, ISIS/Daesh paired this demand with expansionist ideals with the aim of creating the caliphate in Iraqi and Syrian territories. Their main aim was to capture both countries' central authority and unite the regions under the rule of Islamic law.¹¹³⁸ Regarding its spillover, as mentioned before, the protests of Sunni groups that have remained in the Shia Crescent have played an important role.¹¹³⁹ On the other hand, the recruitment of fighters have gone beyond the Sunni group and relied on a wide network: *"The profile of foreign fighters ...can range from ignorant novices who view joining as a rite of passage to diehard militants looking for combat and martyrdom, while individuals that for go humanitarian reasons are often kidnapped or forced to fight (...) Motivations may include the prospect of adventure, a desire to impress the local community or opposite sex, a search for identity, feelings of revenge, the search for camaraderie, the desire to make history, and much more."*¹¹⁴⁰ In all recruitments, there were 20,000 foreign fighters including underprivileged and alienated people as well as well-educated individuals, who were mostly attracted to fight through social media.¹¹⁴¹ Even though it is hard to understand how this kind of a variety was achieved, the way that religion and its role in fighting injustice are narrated through the social media seem to have been influential tools in recruiting fighters.¹¹⁴² At this point, it is important to note that the use of the Internet to recruit foreign fighters from Europe is a learned quality from Al-Qaida, which had instrumentalized Internet to extend its global network for a long time.¹¹⁴³ However, ISIS/Daesh has further developed its techniques alongside with the technological advancements.

Considering the characteristics of civil wars, one last question remains to be answered: Has the success of these wars inspired further rebellions or has their intensity horrified people and made them abstain from undertaking similar conflicts? The answer to this question is the same for all selected studies: None of these conflicts caused others to take a step backwards from initiating new conflicts, on the

¹¹³⁸ Scott Gates, Sukanya Podder, "Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State", **Perspectives on Terrorism**, Vol.9, No.4, 2015, p.108.

¹¹³⁹ Gulmohamed, "The Rise...", p.5.

¹¹⁴⁰ Gates, Podder, "Social Media...", p.109.

¹¹⁴¹ **Ibid.**, pp.107-109.

¹¹⁴² Michael Weiss, Hassan Hassan, **ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror**, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016, pp.162-163.

¹¹⁴³ Peter R. Neumann, **Joining Al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe**, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp.54-55.

contrary, despite international interventions against the movements in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the loss of war by the Hutus in Rwanda in addition to Mobutu's overthrow from power, they did not prevent further conflicts and kept inspiring others who were not discouraged by the absence of full success. Even though this is an awkward finding, there are various elements hidden in this indication: Primarily, the ideology is a very powerful tool. Pledging to a non-state actor does not necessarily signify a collaboration or alliance; instead it signifies a partaking within a world-view presented by this organization. Regarding Al-Qaida and ISIS/Daesh, the jihad against the far or near enemy to prevail the supremacy of Sharia law happens to be the case that loyalty is declared for. Regarding the Hutu-Tutsi wars, first, ethnicity may be accepted as an ideology. The supremacy of a race against others and the polarization of people due to intrinsic elements are found in any ideological implication. Religion or ethnicity show how people define their worlds and live with a deepened sense of belonging, which is a valid notion for any ideology too.

Also, ideology or identity itself is not enough for starting wars. In Afghanistan, Iraq and the DRC, both political and economic grievances already existed, and the prominence of identities has been directly related to the horizontal inequalities, observed as social class deprivations produced by governing elites. In these cases, economic opportunities have been significant factors for poor, uneducated and unemployed populations. For example, during its ICW, Afghanistan has become the world's main opium producer and exporter, in addition to its centralization for arms dealing under the auspices of warlords.¹¹⁴⁴ Other than these illegal activities, economic alternatives have been scarce and limited to certain groups' disposal. Thus, in chaotic environments like in our cases, being a warrior meant providing an income for the individual as well as a new lease of life. Thus, regarding spillovers and evaluating their effect as horrifying or inspiring elements, more accurate terms should be adopted instead of abstract narratives: Ideologies are apparently successful in instrumentalizing grievances, horizontal inequalities and opportunities if they can find anarchic environments and underprivileged populations to flourish. As long as these elements are present as in the cases of Afghanistan, the DRC and Iraq, joining networks do not become dissuaded with the intensity of wars.

¹¹⁴⁴ Barnett R. Rubin, "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan", **World Development**, Vol.28, No.10, 2000, p.1790.

Instead, new alternatives to their economic, political grievances and opportunities embedded in these stimulate civilians to organize or participate in violent rebellions.

Following the characteristics of civil wars, characteristics of the war-zone country have an effect on the outward internationalization processes. The main item in this category is linked with the capacity of the state in war. If the civil war experiencing country is a major power, it is expected to have a more disturbing effect at a regional and global scale.¹¹⁴⁵ It is true that, due to the major power's relational links, it could create a wider spillover effect, but this contradicts with other outcome variables: Weaker countries would be less competent to halt mass refugee flows or to control illegal trades, while more powerful states would have more control over these. If a major power, such as the USA, Russia, the UK, France, Germany, China and Japan¹¹⁴⁶ had an intense civil war in their territory, their power would prevent further spillovers. When Afghanistan, the DRC (and Rwanda as the DRC's major intra-state war exporter and intervener) and Iraq are evaluated in this context, it is firstly possible to affirm that none of them were major powers. Instead they were all weak states and hence they immediately became failed states with their ICWs and experienced overwhelming spillovers.

Thus, as a common characteristic, none of the selected case studies were a major power and their weaknesses caused their inability to prevent externalization of spillovers. For instance, in Afghanistan, the Taliban could neither control Al-Qaida's growth nor its attacks to the USA. Also, after the military intervention in 2001, none of the actors could prevent illegal trafficking of arms and drugs as well as their production, which was also uncontrollable before the ICW. Regarding the ICWs in the DRC, the intra-state war of Rwanda that spilled over to the DRC due to Rwanda's lack of control, and then the governments of the DRC were neither powerful nor voluntary to stop the Congolese refugee flows, the attacks of Interahamwe and other non-state actors from its territory to the neighbors, and illegal trafficking of natural resources.¹¹⁴⁷ It is the Congolese weakness and inaction that created the outward internationalization in its civil wars. Last, in Iraq the weak

¹¹⁴⁵ Snyder, "Introduction", p.7.

¹¹⁴⁶ Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, Ryan G. Baird, "Major Power Status in International Politics", in Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, Ryan G. Baird eds., **Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp.14-15.

¹¹⁴⁷ Atzili, "When Good...", p.166.

political and security institutions could not resist against the strengthening, growing and externalization of ISIS/Daesh. While it expanded with diffusion and contagion mechanisms, the Iraqi government remained so powerless that the de-internationalized intra-state war was re-internationalized against the threat of ISIS/Daesh.

In addition to the characteristics of the country in war, the links between the source and the target of outward internationalizations influence the spillover process. As a primary variable within these, proximity seems to be effective. Despite Afghanistan's diffusion to the USA, its global contagion and the intervention of the international community were not enabled by territorial proximity, the spillover of Al-Qaida from Afghanistan to Iraq as ISIS, and the return of ISIS to Afghanistan from Iraq were facilitated by proximity and networking. Also in the DRC, the spillover of the Hutu-Tutsi war from Rwanda to the DRC and the reprisal of the Interahamwe from the DRC territories that came as a result of the outward and inward interventions, were eased by the proximity. Likewise, the primarily spread of ISIS to Syrian territories from Iraq was not a coincidence; it was undoubtedly enabled by territorial contiguity. In addition to proximity, the existence of transnational ethnic and religious communities enhances spillovers. Regarding Al-Qaida, the spread of the war to American territories was not linked to any religious links between Afghanistan and the USA, but the transformation of Al-Qaida into a global network that could organize attacks all over the world and bring out demonstration activities, was carried out through religious links that were allowing them to operate in Muslim countries or in states with Muslim communities.¹¹⁴⁸ Also, due to both proximity and religious/ethnic links, Pakistan has suffered from spillovers from Afghanistan. Following the ICW in Afghanistan, the Taliban have been weakened in the Afghan territories, but this affected Pakistan mainly through TTP because of the relations between Afghan and Pakistani non-state actors.¹¹⁴⁹ In 2007, TTP initiated a civil conflict in Pakistan, which elevated to war levels in 2008. Since that year until the present day, TTP and other religious groups (Lashkar-e-Islam, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jemaat-ul-Ahrar and Lashkar-e-Islam) have been fighting with the government of Pakistan. That spillover can be perceived as an

¹¹⁴⁸ Gunaratna, **Inside Al Qaeda...**, p.95.

¹¹⁴⁹ Transnational relations between Afghan and Pakistani non-state actors are developed through personal connections, madrasas, training camps and other social networks based on common interests; Zahab, Roy, **Islamist Networks...**, p.58.

enhanced contagion that did not reach the level of diffusion, but in which a strong link between the groups of the two countries included access to military or intelligence infrastructure in 2008 and 2009.¹¹⁵⁰ Thus, in the case of Pakistan, both the learning process and physical support were in operation. As this example indicates, a complicated process between diffusion and contagion, in a diffusion process it is necessary to find the same organizational group of people fighting for the same causes and consequently the TTP of Pakistan is neither the Afghan Taliban nor Al-Qaida due to its own definitional, presentational and organizational structure. Yet, the spillover from Afghanistan to Pakistan showed elements of strong and long-term connections including few common fighters serving similar aims, which were generated through the proximity and identity links between two countries. Those links have particularly revealed with the internationalization of the war in Pakistan in 2015, in which Afghanistan intervened in favor of the Pakistani government, as the former target of similar groups' threats.¹¹⁵¹

Concerning the ICWs of the DRC, ethnic ties bore the direct and indirect transfer functions. They were specifically important because without the autochthonous ethnic discourses and competitions centered on the indigenous and immigrant Tutsi and Hutu communities, outward internationalizations between Rwanda and the DRC could not have been generated.¹¹⁵² For these two countries, three different spillover mechanisms linked to transnational ethnic communities were present: Indigenous and immigrant Hutus and Tutsis in the DRC have been manipulated by both Rwandese and Congolese governments, the same groups were also inspired by their ethnic relatives to initiate new conflicts and the Rwandese government internationalized the intra-state war in the DRC to support the disadvantaged Tutsis against the attacks of the Interahamwe and their allies. Last, concerning the spillovers from Iraq to Syria and other countries, religious links were again in operation. The diffusion process into Syria was a product of allying Sunni networks just as the additional contagion processes to further countries. Thus, regarding the outward internationalizations from Afghanistan and Iraq,

¹¹⁵⁰ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

¹¹⁵¹ Salehyan, "Transnational Insurgencies...", p.10, 39-40; UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

¹¹⁵² Kevin C. Dunn, "'Sons of the Soil' and Contemporary State Making: autochtony, uncertainty and political violence in Africa", **Third World Quarterly**, Vol.30, No.1, 2009, pp.113-115.

religious/sectarian ideology has been a key determinant, while transnational ethnic groups employed similar mechanisms in the DRC.

In order for the effect of the civil war characteristics and links between countries to operate and transfer the civil war from one country to another, the infected state should have certain domestic characteristics. In other words, rebel groups can only root and flourish if they encounter favorable conditions in the target countries. In this context, firstly, regardless of the type and demands of the rebellious actors, it is possible to affirm that all contagion cases were enabled by the domestic weaknesses of the state actors. The first rule of diffusion/contagion is finding the unresisting states with low capabilities to flow in. Secondly, apart from the attacks to the USA, all spillovers were internalized due to the existence of weak states. The leap of ISIS/Daesh from Iraq to Afghanistan can be attributed to the security defaults of Afghanistan, while the same logic applies to the resurgence of TTP in Pakistan.¹¹⁵³ Moreover, the spread of Hutu militias from Rwanda to the DRC, where they were reorganized and armed was facilitated by the unwillingness and weakness of the Mobutu and Kabila governments. Lastly, the diffusion of ISIS into the Syrian territories was fed by the chaotic environment of Syria and the inability of the Syrian government to prevent this spillover. These weaknesses in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the DRC, Iraq and Syria are reflected in their economic indicators, such as GDP per capita, economic growth and control of natural resources and also in their political system indicators, such as repression levels, democratic institutions, stable governmental and military controls. Likewise, their fragility against spillovers was enhanced by the existence of domestic latent conflicts and high polarization levels.¹¹⁵⁴

¹¹⁵³ Salehyan, "Transnational Insurgencies...", p.10, 39-40.

¹¹⁵⁴ In addition to already explained domestic indicators of Afghanistan, the DRC and Iraq, Pakistan has 0.64 points of ethnic fractionalization with a dominant ethnic group (%66) facing a big minority (%13). Same logic applies to Syria, where ethnic fractionalization is affirmed to be 0.58 points with a dominant ethnic group (%62) facing a big minority (%14). Regarding religious fractionalizations in these countries similar numbers appear, with 0.36 points for Pakistan, where a dominant religious group (%77) faces a big minority (%20) and with 0.41 points for Syria, where a dominant religious group (%74) faces a big minority (%16). In both countries democracy and stable governments have been absent with a deficient democratic regime in Pakistan and with long term anocratic regimes in Syria; Fearon, Laitin, **Macro Data**. Moreover, both countries have experienced civil wars before (a revolutionary governmental civil war in Syria between 1979 and 1982 and secessionist civil wars in Pakistan between 1971 and 1977) in addition to other types of conflicts; PITF, **Ethnic War Dataset**; PITF, **Revolutionary War Dataset**; COW, **The Intra-State War Data (v4.0)**; UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**. On the other hand, economic indicators of Pakistan and Syria are not as disastrous as in Afghanistan and the DRC (see. www.indexmundi.com); their further fragilities mostly rely on societal grievances and horizontal inequities.

In particular, regarding the second phase of outward internationalizations, during which the external actors became involved in the intra-state wars, security concerns of third parties played a major role. These concerns may include tangible reasons or can arise from uncertainties and fear. In each case, third parties may internationalize the intra-state wars with the aim of containing or eliminating the threat. Apropos of Afghanistan, in 2001 the intervention of the government of the USA and its allies and the successive interference of the international community under the auspices of the UN and NATO were initiated with aim of eliminating the threats of the Taliban and Al-Qaida. Moreover, the deepened intervention of Pakistan after 2005, which left the government of Pakistan as the lone external actor in Afghanistan in 2015 besides the government of the USA, against Al-Qaida, the Taliban and ISIS/Daesh was the illustration of the willingness to exterminate the menace next-door.¹¹⁵⁵

In the Congolese case, eliminating a neighboring threat had been a fundamental element, particularly in its first ICW. The DRC's weakness and unwillingness to control the activities within its borders were reflected on the alliance of the external actors against Mobutu, because, in addition to the manipulation of the refugee camps by the Hutus against Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola were also suffering from hosted rebel groups. Hence, they participated in the first ICW as they were determined to put an end to the activities of rebel groups that were supported by the DRC. Their concern was primarily linked to the retreat of belligerents to the Congolese territories after their attacks.¹¹⁵⁶ In more detail, Angolan government's fight was with UNITA, which was benefiting from the Congolese support in the form of safe havens, funding, weapons and logistics from 1975 to 1995. As argued before, the change of sides for Angola during the second ICW in the DRC was based on the dynamics regarding its war against UNITA. The government of Angola became more disturbed by the relations between UNITA, Uganda and Rwanda, rather than by the Congolese government's reduced support.¹¹⁵⁷ For Burundi, the support of the DRC towards the National Council for the Defense of Democracy/Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and the Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu/Forces Nationales de Libération

¹¹⁵⁵ UCDP/PRIO, **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016**.

¹¹⁵⁶ Reyntjens, "The Second...", p.242.

¹¹⁵⁷ Herbert Weiss, "War & Peace...", Part 4.

(Palipehutu-FNL) was the problem, which started in 1996 and continued until 2002, in the form of providing safe havens, material, logistics, funding and weapons. For Uganda, the problem was the support of the DRC towards ADF between 1996 and 1999 (with an exception in 1998). The support had been in the form of providing safe havens until 1997, but in 1999 weapons and material were also provided to the rebels.¹¹⁵⁸ Thus, especially the procurement of safe havens to foreign rebel groups that were initiating attacks from the DRC territories was the main reason behind security concerns. In the following years, the goal of eliminating the threat was pursued by the Intervention Brigade, which was created in 2013 under the mandate of MONUSCO.¹¹⁵⁹ As it fought with M23 as its main opponent and cleared this threat off the DRC during the same year, it turned its face to other long-term terrorist organizations that could not be eradicated for a long time.

In regard to the ICW of Iraq in 2003, even though the later indications showed that the intervention was related to the various national interests and the internationalization process was in fact an inward one, the claims of the third parties concerning their intervention were focused on the threat of Saddam for possessing WMD and supporting terrorist organizations. In this context, the alleged motivation for the intervention possessed an outward internationalization reasoning with the aim of containing and eliminating the threat of Saddam by taking preemptive action.¹¹⁶⁰ As WMD were not found and the claims concerning the contribution of the Iraqi state to the emergence of terrorist threats were in fact very common during the post-intervention period due to the chaotic environment created in the country. Thus, the acclaimed outward reasoning used for intervening in Iraq was originally an instrumental argument belonging to the context of inward internationalization pattern. However, the creation of OIR and the participation of the international community to the fight against ISIS/Daesh in the last phase of the ICW in Iraq were based on the aim of eliminating the menace of ISIS/Daesh that had created great domestic, regional and global danger.¹¹⁶¹ This time, the war in Iraq genuinely

¹¹⁵⁸ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

¹¹⁵⁹ Karlsrud, "The UN...", pp.40-41.

¹¹⁶⁰ Robert L. Jervis, "The Confrontation between Iraq and the US: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence", **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol.9, No.2, 2003, pp.318-319.

¹¹⁶¹ Maya Rhodan, "U.S. Military Action Against ISIS Deemed 'Operation Inherent Resolve'", 16.10.2017, <http://time.com/3511264/operation-inherent-resolve-isis-iraq-syria/> (accessed 01.03.2017)

constituted an outward reasoning since the security concerns provoked the international community to act against the threat of ISIS.

Finally, regarding the security concerns attached stray fires, none of the selected cases involved this concern as the outward internationalization reasoning. In all cases, there were several elements linked to security issues, but stray fires have never been used as a reason to intervene or get involved in ongoing wars.

Table 20 - Common points for outward internationalizations

	Afghanistan	The DRC	Iraq
Spill-over/direct: Diffusion	Driven by Al-Qaida in phases 2-3	Driven by Hutu – Tutsi quarrels in phases 1-2	Driven by ISIS/Daesh in phase 5
Spill-over/indirect: Contagion	Driven by Al-Qaida in phase 1-2	Driven by Hutu – Tutsi war in phases 1-2-3	Driven by ISIS/Daesh in phase 5
	Driven by ISIS/Daesh in phase 4		
Characteristics of Civil War			
Conflict Type: Governmental/Ideological; Secessionist	Governmental and ideological	Governmental and ethnic with minor secessionist demands	Governmental and ideological with expansionist demands
Kinship and religious factors	Religion is the driving factor behind the spillovers	Ethnicity is the driving factor for both externalization of civil wars and the recruitment of fighters into transnational rebel groups in all phases	Religion is the driving factor behind the spillovers and recruitment in phases 4-5
	Ethnicity as a recruitment element for the Taliban in phases 1-3		
	Religion as a recruitment element for Al-Qaida in phases 1-3		
	Ethnicity and religion for the recruitment of other rebel groups mostly in phase 1		
Inspirational/horrifying	Present element is inspiration	Present element is inspiration	Present element is inspiration
Characteristics of the Country in War			
Major power/weak state	Weak state	Weak state	Weak state
Weakness to halt	Present for Al-Qaida's contagion and diffusion in phases 1-2-3	Present for Rwanda in phase 1	Present for ISIS/Daesh's contagion and diffusion in phases 4-5
	Present for illegal arms and drug trafficking in phases 1-2-3-4	Present for preventing external attacks in phases 2-3	
		Present for inhibiting illegal natural resource trades in phases 2-3-4-5	
Source-Target Linkages			

Proximity	Present for Al-Qaida and ISIS/Daesh relations in phases 3-4	Present for all phases	Present for ISIS in phases 4-5
	Present regarding the actions of TTP in phases 3-4		
Ethnic linkages/Religion: Manipulated, inspired	Religion as a key determinant	Ethnicity as a key determinant	Religion as a key determinant
	Present for the international contagion of Al-Qaida in phases 1-3-4		
	Present for the contagion of the Taliban and Al-Qaida to Pakistan in phases 3-4	Present for Hutu-Tutsi groups in phases 1-2-3	Present for ISIS in phase 5
	Present for the contagion of ISIS in phase 4		
Domestic Characteristics			
State strength & Willingness	Lack of state strength as the primary condition of contagion	Lack of state strength as the primary condition of contagion	Lack of state strength as the primary condition of contagion
	State strength lacks regarding the internalization of ISIS by Afghanistan in phase 4 and internalization of non-state groups by Pakistan in phases 3-4	Both state strength and willingness lacked regarding the internalization of Hutu-Tutsi war in phases 1-2-3	State strength lacks regarding the internalization of ISIS by Syria in phase 5
	Willingness to prevent was not a lacking element		Willingness to prevent was not a lacking element
Latent conflicts and threatening polarization levels	Present in Afghanistan and Pakistan	Present in the DRC	Present in Syria
Security Concerns			
Contain/eliminate threat	Present in phases 2-4	Present in phases 1-2-5	Alleged to exist but not present in phase 2
			Present in phase 5
Stray Fire	None	None	None

As shown comprehensively in the table presented above, there are several common points in relation to the outward internationalization process of Afghanistan, the DRC and Iraq. In the following sub-section, the diverging traits of outward internationalizations will be discussed to fully comprehend and complete the analysis of the selected case studies.

b. An extended debate on the diverging components of spillovers in selected ICW cases

Concerning the externalization of civil wars, it is possible to state that they can either relocate in a new area or expand their range to near territories. In this context, the foremost distinction belongs to diffusion and contagion processes. As diffusion is the outcome of direct spillovers, while contagion represents the inspirations of and interactions between rebel groups, the distinction between relocation and expansion can only be applied to the former one. As mentioned before, pledging to a rebel organization means vouching to an ideology instead of merging with the organizational structure of a committed group.¹¹⁶² Thus, as Al-Qaida became a global network during 1990s and 2000s with independent branches operating all over the world, and ISIS/Daesh has attracted numerous rebel organizations to participate to its cause in the last few years, the spread tool of these NSAs has been their ideology and not the war conducted by them. Consequently, in order to inform the expansion or relocation of civil wars, only diffusion processes should be included in the examination.

Apropos the diffusion of the selected cases, it is possible to affirm that they show diverse mechanisms. First, the spread of the war from Afghanistan to the USA in 2001 was signified by the appearance of Al-Qaida violence in American territories, while the NSA was originally operating in Afghanistan. This shift in the geographical scope was a clear display of relocation. Also, in the ICWs of the DRC, the transfer of the Hutu-Tutsi conflicts was organized through the dislocation of Rwandese populations and their reappearance as warring factions that settled in the refugee camps after the end of the Rwandese intra-state war. In this spirit, the original Hutu-Tutsi war of Rwanda relocated to the DRC. If the intra-state war in Rwanda had not ended and instead had expanded and had perhaps become a part of the new conflicts in the DRC, it was possible to affirm an expansion, but in this case, the former initiators of the Rwandese war relocated and restarted the war in the DRC territories. Although the spillover mechanisms in Afghanistan and the DRC had similar traits, the outward internationalization of the Iraqi war diverges from those. As ISIS/Daesh follows expansionist ideals and conducts the war in both Iraq and Syria, its diffusion mechanism represents a spatial expansion. ISIS/Daesh advances

¹¹⁶² Jason Burke, "Al Qaeda", *Foreign Policy*, No.142, 2004, p.18.

in both countries through constant conquests of new villages and incorporates them to the economic and political system of the organization. The belligerent organization plans to transform this temporary scheme into a state structure.¹¹⁶³

Regardless of the type of the spread processes, the actions of the state in a war have a direct effect on the spillover of the civil war to other countries. These activities mostly revolve around the evangelization of terrorist groups by governments or the expulsion of these groups by their home countries. Concerning Afghanistan, the expulsion of Al-Qaida by other states and its evangelization by the Taliban was an effective reason for the development of this organization. When the Taliban took over the central control of Afghanistan in 1996, after a long civil war, the international community refrained from recognizing the group as the official government. The strict application of sharia law was the main reason behind this resistance and only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates established diplomatic relations with the Taliban government. Moreover, after the 9/11 attacks, both Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates discontinued their relations with the Taliban, when the Afghan membership was retained within the UN.¹¹⁶⁴ This long-term international exclusion effectively isolated and marginalized the government of the Taliban and encouraged it to collaborate with Al-Qaida as an alternative.

While the Taliban were going through international repressions, the situation was similar for Al-Qaida. Osama bin Laden was back to his country, Saudi Arabia, after the victory of the Afghan resistance against the Soviets, but there he fell afoul with the government of Saudi Arabia during the First Gulf War, when officials supported the American causes. As a result, his Saudi citizenship was revoked and subsequently he transferred the Al-Qaida base to Sudan in 1992. Four years later, the government of Sudan expelled him from its territories following pressure from the USA. Hence, in 1996, the victorious, but isolated and economically deprived Taliban's path crossed with the unwanted, stateless but well-funded Al-Qaida. In this context, the Taliban hosted Al-Qaida within its territories and provided a safe haven and immunity from extraditing demands, while the other one offered economic resources and opportunities for political alliance. Thus, the evangelization of the

¹¹⁶³ Sebastian Ille, Dina Mansour, "Rational Atrocities and State Formation: A Game Theoretic Approach to the Case of ISIS", **The Economics of Peace and Security Journal**, Vol.10, No.2, 2015, pp.21-30.

¹¹⁶⁴ Lawrance Azubuike, "Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda Soldiers: Another Viewpoint", **Connecticut Journal of International Law**, Vol.19, No.1, 2003, pp.131-133.

ideologically friendly Al-Qaida by the Taliban equipped the former with the chance to realize their international terrorist attacks, which resulted in the overthrow of its guardian, due to the insisting rejections of all extradition requests even after 2001.¹¹⁶⁵

Also, in the ICWs of the DRC, both the effects of expulsion and evangelization were present. First, until the end of the Rwandese war in 1994, the first wave of immigration involved Rwandese Tutsis, who were being slaughtered by FAR in line with the orders of the Hutu-led government. However, after the Tutsi-led RPA became government, the falling Hutu government demanded Hutu groups to leave Rwanda for fear of genocidal reprisal. Even though some of the fleeing groups left in fear, many others were forced to leave so that the FAR soldiers could blend in the crowded civilian refugee movements. In this context, about a million people came to the DRC refugee camps voluntarily or by force.¹¹⁶⁶ After this expulsion, ex-Far militants started killing both Rwandese and Congolese Banyarwanda Tutsis in the DRC and because of the growing racism agitated by the Rwandese Hutus, the Congolese Hutus participated in the assaults against the Congolese and Rwandese Tutsis. Whilst the government of Mobutu (whose policies will be replicated by the Kabila government as well) participated in the evangelization of the Hutu groups, while the Tutsis were disfavored. While the ex-Far soldiers and their allies started to attack all Tutsi civilians since 1995, the Mobutu's army joined the attacks against the Banyamulenge. Moreover, in 1995, a law banned Tutsis from owning houses and the land, and within six months other ethnic groups were authorized to expel Tutsis from the land. This authorization was implemented by both the Interahamwe soldiers and the Congolese army. The following year, the Congolese army continued killing Banyamulenge civilians in collaboration with Hutu militias. Towards the end of 1996, it was announced that the Banyamulenge in South Kivu province were to be deported and unless they left within a week, they were going to be captured as rebels.¹¹⁶⁷

These developments resulted in the toppling of Mobutu by an internal alliance, which included military forces of external actors. He was replaced by the leader of

¹¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.135

¹¹⁶⁶ Cynthia Boaz, Cheryl Schoenberg, "Refugees, War Criminals, and International Law", *Peace Review*, Vol.14, No.2, 2002, pp.202-203.

¹¹⁶⁷ Christian P. Scherrer, *Conflict Roots, Mass Violence and Regional War*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002, pp.155-156; Willie Breytenbach, Dalitso Chilemba, Thomas A. Brown, Charlotte Plantive, "Conflicts in the Congo: From Kivu to Kabila", *African Security Review*, Vol.8, No.5, 1999, p.36.

this alliance, Kabila, who seemed to be favoring the Tutsi people at least in the beginning. However, after a year, he started to develop racist activities, as he excluded the Banyamulenge (and the Tutsi) from power, stimulated anti-Tutsi feelings via propaganda to gain national support and overtly encouraged the killing of Tutsi civilians. Hence, Banyamulenge acted against the Kabila government in an environment of fear, which caused the second ICW.¹¹⁶⁸ Thus, the actions of the governments in Afghanistan and the DRC, revolving around facing expelled terrorist groups and evangelizing them, were behind the internationalizations of their civil wars. However, in Iraq, none of these mechanisms were relevant to the internationalization process of the intra-state war, rendering their ICWs free of expulsion and evangelization actions.

Following the state actions as the catalyst of internationalization processes, the links between the source and target states demonstrate diverging features. Amongst those the length of shared borders has had diverse effect. At this point, it is also important to remind that contagion processes do not need shared borders, as the inspiration and learning through networking exceed neighborhood relations, and its effect can travel in time and space. On the other hand, diffusion processes can be linked to the length of shared borders. However, even in this context, as in the case of Afghanistan, neither the spillover towards the USA nor the subsequent interventions had any relevance with the long-shared borders, as there were none between Afghanistan and the USA and the majority of the intervening actors. Also, the globalization of Al-Qaida and the leap of ISIS to Afghanistan had nothing to do with long shared borders, as there were again none. However, one can search for the effect of long shared borders regarding the spillovers to Pakistan, but the elements embedded in this spread were stronger than the long-shared borders. In particular, Pakistan and Afghanistan's interaction levels has always been high due to regional politics, power struggles, shared ethnic and religious groups in addition to other variables, which created a common history for them. As all these numerous elements are discussed within inward internationalization motivations and proximity variables, it would be quite simplistic to measure interactions between Afghanistan and Pakistan just on the basis of the length of borders.

¹¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.39-40.

Regarding the spillovers in the DRC, even though proximity did play a role, long shared borders again seem to be irrelevant, because the DRC is a vast country with nine neighbors and amongst those neighbors Rwanda has the shortest shared borders with the DRC.¹¹⁶⁹ Hence, in the ICWs of the DRC, other mechanisms, such as mass migration outcomes, warring state actions, security concerns, instrumental aims and the existence of transnational ethnic communities along the borders are much more important variables.

Lastly, regarding Iraq, again the contagion of ISIS/Daesh has nothing to do with shared borders, as since 2014 the name of ISIS/Daesh has been involved in more than 140 attacks around the world, in addition to the ones in Iraq and Syria. While more than 2000 people died in these terrorist attacks¹¹⁷⁰ and more than 40 groups declared loyalty to ISIS/Daesh, it is possible to state that long shared borders had no impact in these contagion processes. However, regarding the diffusion of ISIS/Daesh to Syria, it is possible to affirm that long-shared borders have had at least a minor effect on the spillover process. When the diffusion of ISIS/Daesh is examined on a regional map¹¹⁷¹, it is clear that the leap into Syrian territories is realized through the bordering areas.¹¹⁷² The Iraqi village Qaim marks the southernmost corner with the Al Kamal city facing it in Syria, and it reaches up until the city of Sinjar in the northernmost corner of Iraq. This highlights the crucial role of Anbar and Ninawe provinces neighboring Syria, which are the areas along the frontlines.¹¹⁷³ Also, these areas are rural, lacking big cities, thus easier to be captured, controlled and held. In this context, even though Syria does not share the longest frontiers with Iraq (Iraq's third longest frontline is with Syria after Iran and Saudi Arabia), they are still considerably long with 605 kilometers¹¹⁷⁴ and this length must have facilitated the diffusion process. On the other hand, as other neighbors of Iraq, who share even longer borders, are not as affected as Syria by the ISIS/Daesh

¹¹⁶⁹ United States Central Intelligence Agency, **The CIA World Factbook 2010**, New York: Skyhorse Publishing Inc., 2009, p.157.

¹¹⁷⁰ Tim Lister, Ray Sanchez, Mark Bixler, Sean O'Key, Michael Hogenmiller, Mohammed Tawfeeq, "ISIS goes global: 143 attacks in 29 countries have killed 2,043", 13.02.2017 <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/index.html> (accessed 05.03.2017)

¹¹⁷¹ See. the Map of Iraq and Middle East in Appendix IV for the geographical presentation.

¹¹⁷² "Islamic State and the Crises in Iraq and Syria in maps", 20.01.2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034 (accessed 05.03.2017)

¹¹⁷³ For more information see. related articles and maps;

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/12/world/middleeast/the-iraq-isis-conflict-in-maps-photos-and-video.html> (accessed 05.03.2017)

¹¹⁷⁴ U.S. CIA, **The CIA World...**, p.330.

threat, it is possible to assert that the primary factor behind this spillover is linked to the weakness of the Syrian state due to its chaotic civil war and the existence of deprived Sunni groups that represent a transnational community. Hence, although the long borders between Iraq and Syria have facilitated the diffusion, their role has been relatively minor compared to other elements.

As another component of the source-target links, the effect of mass migrations and refugee camps established in the host countries can play a vital role in spillover processes as these deprived civilians can damage the inter-communal harmony by challenging local cultures and demographics. For instance, if the host country is not a wealthy one, it can suffer from scarcity related conflicts and further weakening burdens; unsanitary camps can produce infectious diseases; migrating communities can carry their inter-communal tensions to the host states and provoke domestic violence by pulling local civilians into their own conflicts. Moreover, neighboring ethnic kin can contribute into the conflicts with the feeling of solidarity or engage in demonstration activities. Moreover, these displaced communities can influence the policies of the host countries in favor of their home countries; refugee camps can be transferred into military bases where warrior recruitments and illegal trades can take place. It is noteworthy that all these elements were present in the ICWs of the DRC. The Congolese case has been deeply affected by refugee movements and turned into a disordered environment.

First, as explained before, the immigration of Rwandese Hutu and Tutsi disturbed the fragile domestic balance, caused both clashes between immigrant groups, and tribal conflicts between refugees and local people, which escalated and even involved former migrants. These conflicts were as much related to the scarce productive soil to the extent that they were linked to ethnic sentiments. Yet, regarding the onset of conflicts, the role of ethnic kindred and demonstration effects were crucial. Firstly, ethnic groups influenced the overthrow of the Congolese leaders (Mobutu and Kabila), who were criticized for their policies regarding refugees and their home countries.¹¹⁷⁵ In addition to the evangelization actions of the above rulers, the local management of refugee camps became highly problematic. The generals of ex-Far and Interahamwe transferred them into military bases, where weapons were stockpiled, recruitment of new soldiers from the refugees was

¹¹⁷⁵ Breytenbach, Chilemba, Brown, Plantive, "Conflicts in the...", pp.33-42.

conducted and new militants were trained. Their two fundamental aims were to complete the Tutsi genocide that was left unfinished following the defeat of the Hutus and regain the governmental control of the Rwanda that was seized by the Tutsis. In this context, while they assaulted Rwandese Tutsi immigrants and local Tutsis of the DRC to exterminate them, they also organized attacks from these camps to weaken and defeat the Rwandese government.

The Ex-FAR and Interahamwe soldiers were terrorizing unarmed humanitarian workers, which was letting them gain access to all supplies. They were using these resources to support themselves and, moreover, they were using these items to manipulate the Hutu civilians that were trying to survive under difficult conditions of refugee camps.¹¹⁷⁶ This aggravated situation in the camps, which was allowing domestic and external attacks on the Tutsis, was the main reason behind Rwanda and others' decision to intervene, particularly in the first ICW of the DRC, which will be reconsidered as a part of the security concerns below. Lastly, one of the reasons that worsened the internal dynamics was the widespread dispersion of maladies, which affected both villages and refugee camps. Local and immigrating populations suffered from HIV/AIDS due to high sexual violence¹¹⁷⁷ during the ICWs, while the scarcity of food and water added to the already unsanitary conditions of camps and underprivileged villages led to thousands of diarrhea and malaria cases.¹¹⁷⁸

Despite these social conditions in the refugee camps in the DRC, neither Afghanistan nor Iraq showed any concern and their ICWs led to exporting refugees instead of importing them. While all these ICWs were triggered by other wars, the ICWs of Afghanistan and Iraq were products of inter-state wars, while in the case of the DRC it was a neighboring intra-state war. In this context, negative elements related to refugee camps may be more detectable in another ICW that were incited by a neighboring intra-state war, but not in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq.

In addition to the dynamics between source and target states, the domestic characteristics of third parties can influence spillovers into their territories. One of

¹¹⁷⁶ Lischer, **Dangerous Sanctuaries...**, pp.1-2; Boaz, Schoenberg, "Refugees, War...", pp.203-204.

¹¹⁷⁷ Jonathan Crush, Mark Lurie, Brian Williams, Belinda Dodson, Sally Peberdy, Chitra Akileswaran, Nicola Ansell, Monica Gyimah, Ari Johnson, Barbara Rijks, **HIV/AIDS, Population Mobility and Migration in Southern Africa: Defining a Research and Policy Agenda**, International Organization for Migration, Geneva, 2005, pp.10-63.

¹¹⁷⁸ Aidan A. Cronin, Dinesh Shrestha, Paul Spiegel, Fiona Gore, Heiko Hering, "Quantifying the Burden of Disease Associated with Inadequate Provision of Water and Sanitation in Selected Sub-Saharan Refugee Camps", **Journal of Water and Health**, Vol.7, No.4, 2009, pp.557-568.

the fundamental issues is the boomerang effect. As explained before, supporting rebels can have negative effect in the long-run and the meddling state can become the target of its former ally. In this context, regarding the ICW of Afghanistan, in 2001 the USA became the victim of its earlier policies, which caused the boomerang effect. Between 1979 and 1992, the government of the USA provided weapons, material, logistics and funding to seven different Mujahedeen groups in order to overcome the Soviet power in Afghanistan.¹¹⁷⁹ As soon as the Cold War ended and the USSR was dissolved, the government of the USA cut any relations with these groups and left Afghanistan in its own internal war between well-funded and armed belligerents. The war took four years until the Taliban defeated its rivals and gained the central control. After its rise to power, the new government hosted Al-Qaida, whose target was mainly the USA. Thus, it was like a boomerang that hit the Americans on 11th September 2001. Also, a similar logic applies to the spillover to Pakistan after 2007, through Al-Qaida,¹¹⁸⁰ which resulted in a civil war between 2008-2015.¹¹⁸¹

Between 1979 and 2001, Pakistan provided weapons, material, logistics, funding, training and expertise to nine different rebel groups and afterwards to the government of the Taliban.¹¹⁸² The long-term engagement was the outcome of Pakistan's numerous inward motivations, but, after the intervention of the international community following the attacks against the USA, the government of Pakistan did not only cut its support to rebellious organizations, it also participated to the alliance on the side of the new Afghan government.¹¹⁸³ In that regard, as that was a provocation for the rebel groups to turn against Pakistan, their deepened knowledge about the Pakistani state and its territories was a facilitating element to encounter the government.

Concerning the DRC, it is possible to identify a similar logic, but it is almost impossible to track such relations. Despite their civil wars, the Sub-Saharan states have been massively involved with rebellious groups, which in return brought tit-for-tats, boomerang effect and all kinds of protests and reactions in their

¹¹⁷⁹ UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset*; UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset*.

¹¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸¹ UCDP/PRIO, *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016*.

¹¹⁸² UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset*; UCDP/PRIO, *The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset*.

¹¹⁸³ UCDP/PRIO, *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016*.

domestic/internal affairs. In the case of the boomerang effects, changing teams and cutting down support was seen in Angola and Zimbabwe. Between 1976 and 1997, Angola has been dealing with six different rebel groups in four different countries. However, in following years the government of Angola quit supporting some of these rebel groups and took the side of the governments in both Congo and the DRC. Likewise, Zimbabwe supported AFDL in the DRC during 1997, but then took the side of the Congolese government between 1998 and 2001.

Moreover, Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe have been involved with so many groups in so many countries that rebel groups became as powerful regional actors as them. Also, the successive governments of the DRC did not follow consistent policies regarding their meddling actions. Between 1975 and 1995, the government of the DRC supported three rebel groups in Angola, but between 1997 and 2001 its support was given to the government, between 1996 and 2002 three different rebel groups were supported in Burundi, between 1996 and 1999, external support was provided to both rebel groups and the government in Uganda, where the recipient of the support changed one year after another and finally in Rwanda, the Rwandese government was supported in 1990 and 2009, while two different rebel groups were supported between 1998 and 2002.¹¹⁸⁴ All these inconsistent policies inevitably created complex networks, in which the aims, targets and rivals became blurry. This type of interactions was one the main elements drawing the background of the Sub-Saharan conflict traps that has been relentless and incessant over the last four decades. However, despite these findings, it is not possible to outline any boomerang effects in the case of the ICWs of Iraq. Neither the interveners in Iraq had supported Saddam until 2003 nor the government of Iraq had given any support to ISIS/Daesh or other Iraqi rebellious groups and their former organizations until its ICW.

Finally, as the last component of outward internationalizations, security concerns play an active role in the internationalization processes. As discussed earlier, these concerns can rely on both threat perceptions and assaults. Apropos of threat perceptions, fear and uncertainty can pull third parties into regions under risk. This probability has been exemplified in the war in Iraq. The fear and security concerns created by Iraq regime grew in the 1990s, and discredited Saddam during

¹¹⁸⁴ UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Disaggregated/Supporter Level Dataset**; UCDP/PRIO, **The External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset**.

the following decade. In particular, the government of the USA under the presidency of G.W. Bush argued that, in order to prevent attacks from Iraq, a defensive war against Saddam should be initiated. This proposal was justified on the basis of the alleged relations of Saddam with Al-Qaida and the existence of WMD in Iraq. While this fear and uncertainty proved to be wrong, the defensive argument of the American government turned out to be an offensive act. As Bush claimed that the Western security was under risk due to the illiberal politics of Saddam that was causing security defections, the overthrow of the Iraqi dictator and the establishment of a democratic regime did not bring peace or security to either the Iraq or the West.¹¹⁸⁵ In this spirit, fear and insecurity created by Iraq, considered as the elements of outward intervention reasoning, were manipulated by third parties to cover their inward motivations. Moreover, the ICW in Iraq is the only internationalized case with intangible security concerns amongst our case studies, which highlights how fragile this motivation can become.

On the other hand, regarding the tangible threats within the security concerns of the outward internationalization template, the impact of hot pursuits and destabilizing conditions of external attacks from/to refugee camps have been observable in the DRC. While there were many inward motivations embedded in the first ICW and the second ICW was in fact classified under inward reasoning, the situation in the refugee camps played the leading role in the initial internationalization process. The establishment of massive refugee camps along the Rwandese borders, which were soon captured and managed by Hutu militias, became the military bases for ex-Far soldiers and Interahamwe militants for launching anti-Tutsi attacks across the borders.¹¹⁸⁶

In that context, Rwanda's first intervention was a response to the continuing Tutsi genocide organized by the new rebellious structures in refugee camps, the disarming of belligerent Hutus and augmenting insecurity along the Rwandan border.¹¹⁸⁷ As other rebel groups that were the source of security concerns for

¹¹⁸⁵ Lawrence Freedman, "Iraq, Liberal Wars and Illeberal Containment", *Survival*, Vol.48, No.4, 2006, pp.52-53.

¹¹⁸⁶ Jeff Crisp, "Africa's Refugees: Patterns, Problems and Policy Challenges", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol.18, No.2, 2000, p.167.

¹¹⁸⁷ Danielle Beswick, "Unpacking Rwanda's Involvement in DR Congo and the International Response", 19.12.2012, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/19/unpacking-rwandas-involvement-in-dr-congo-and-the-international-response/> (accessed 08.03.2017); Clark, "Explaining Ugandan...", pp.267-268.

Angola, Uganda and Burundi were located out of refugee camps but along their borders, thus these camps were mainly the concern of the Rwandese government. However, all these countries were engaging in hot pursuits in the DRC borders during their clashes with belligerent parties. Many activities, such as the abduction of people from their homelands or the invasion in small villages along the borders, where immediate governmental response was difficult, were creating pulling effects for all parties. Still, it is not possible to affirm that hot pursuits were the main internationalizing dynamic because there were pre-existing legal frameworks regarding the subject between these two countries and other instrumental motivations were clearly more predominant compared to this. As Mobutu did not object to any hot pursuit actions within the DRC territories and Kabila even bilaterally legalized them, as in the example of “Memorandum of Understanding” signed with Uganda,¹¹⁸⁸ it is possible to affirm that hot pursuits had a minor effect on the internationalization of the wars, instead of directly provoking them. Moreover, during the internationalization of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, hot pursuits were irrelevant. For instance, the primary neighboring and war-affected countries, namely Pakistan and Syria, have been so overwhelmed with other dynamics that none of these countries has ever diplomatically or militarily challenged Afghanistan and Iraq on the basis of their concerns over hot pursuit activities.

Table 21 - Diverging elements within the outward internationalizations

	Afghanistan	The DRC	Iraq
Spatial expansion	None	None	Present in phase 5
Relocation	Present in phase 2	Present in phases 1-2-3	None
<i>Warring State Actions</i>			
Evangelization	Present in phases 1-2	Present in phases 1-2-3	None
Expulsion	Present for Al-Qaida in phase 1	Present for Hutu groups in phase 1	None
<i>Source-Target Linkages</i>			
Longer shared borders	Not present in contagion mechanisms	Minor element regarding the interactions with Rwanda in all phases	Not present in contagion mechanisms

¹¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.272-273.

	Not present in diffusion mechanisms		Minor element for the diffusion into Syria in phase 5
	Minor element for spillover to Pakistan in phase 3-4		
Refugees: Camps, Inter-communal harmony	None	Present in phases 1-2-3	None
Domestic Characteristics			
Boomerang effect	Present for the USA: American aides in phase 1 were confronted in phase 2	Complicated rebel group-government relations in Sub-Saharan Africa, which most probably has paved the roads for boomerang effects.	None
	Present for Pakistan: Pakistan aides in phase 1 were confronted in phases 3-4		
Security Concerns			
Fear & Uncertainty	None	None	Present in phases 1-2
Hot pursuit	None	Present as a minor element in phases 1-2-3	None
External attacks to/from camps	None	Present in phases 1-2	None

Hence, as the diverging points of outward interventions are summarized above, they represent the last evaluations about the internationalization patterns of civil wars and their application to the case studies. They show the results for the convergent and divergent traits of the selected ICWs and the testing of the inward and outward models on three diverse case studies involving massive internationalized civil wars with destabilizing regional and international effect. Following these theoretical and practical findings, in the next chapter, the significance of these findings and their importance for understanding the ICWs will be illustrated.

CONCLUSION

Cultivating and constructing the world as well as destroying it have been the dilemma of the human race. The importance of the Earth has been fixed to mankind since we started walking between the forests, plains, mountains, rivers, oceans etc. that were offered to us by nature. We started to rule over our environment by the power invested in our minds and did not stop there. We also managed to govern the people around us, guide them, gather them together and eventually kill them. Every productive undertaking we did has been benefited by our kind and every destructive act of ours has been endured by the living creatures of the world, but mostly by humans.

As much as our successes have been fascinating, our failures have been even more disappointing. We did not just kill our own kind for our instinctive needs but we did it for power, enrichment, beliefs and more. We did not settle with individual killings to protect ourselves or punish others but we organized, developed, and invented new ways of violent acts to get what we wanted. We created weapons, military methods and political alliances to arrange wars, pointed the guns to each other and pulled the triggers.

This cruelty in such grand scale in an institutionalized form has always frightened and fascinated me. The undeniable and unbearable existence of political violence challenged me to search and investigate it, in order to be able to understand when, why and how we found ourselves in this era of systematized violence where the absence of conflicts is unusual, although it should have been the otherwise.

Following several readings, conferences, debates and argumentations during the past few years, the major revelation that I have had is despite the consistency of the change in everything, the nature of wars have stayed the same. Humans stayed the same. The reasons we hid behind, the manners we invented, the weapons we used, the political contexts we created, and the names we gave have changed; yet the war itself did not. From the appearance of the first political configurations to the most modern ones, which can be called with different terms, such as tribes, clans, feudal structures, kingdoms, empires, nation-states, there have been three types of

wars: (1) Wars between the power-holders, to expand and to empower; (2) wars between the power-holders and their subjects to consolidate or produce a change of position, and (3) wars between different entities to maintain territorial control when there is no higher authority. As Ancient Greek cities, such as Sparta and Athens, went into wars with each other and brought their own alliances (Peloponnesian League on the side of Sparta and Delian League on the side of Athens) into these wars, 19 centuries later, Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia, which turned into a world war between the alliances of Central Powers and the Entente Powers. As William II was militarily challenged by the unified army of several barons, who supported his brother Robert after the death of William the Conqueror of England and Normandy in 1088, Empress Taitu was militarily challenged by the forces gathered under the command of Negus Mikael who was representing the succession of his son against the widow of Ethiopian Emperor in 1916. As Tokugawa Iyeyasu fought against other feudal entities and became the *Shogun* (head of the Tokugawa dynasty) of Japan establishing a dictatorial rule over others in 1605, Juan Manuel de Rosas, the leader of the forces of Provinces, fought with Unitarians and gained the total control of state apparatus in Argentina in 1831. Thus, the wars between Greek city-cities turned into inter-state wars, succession wars turned into civil wars for central control, and feudal wars turned into non-state wars. Yet, regardless of time and space, the nature and type of wars remained the same.

An important change in the last few thousand of years has been observed in the political systems and the ideological backgrounds embedded in those. Feudal system turned into Kingdoms, Kingdoms transformed into Empires, Empires dissolved and created nation-states. Even though the mankind itself did not transform, it transformed its surroundings in political and military terms. The Westphalia Order that was formed in 1648, the French Revolution that started in 1789, the Vienna System that started after 1815, two world wars that were initiated in 1908 and 1945, the Cold War that ended in 1991 are examples of this transformation process. Therefore, wars have had the ability to shape and alter the system, state structures and principles that they were built on and on the other hand, the wide-range changes in the system and the understanding of political authorities, and the ideas that constructed those affected the function and operation of wars.

Even though the repercussions of these changes were easily felt at state and system levels, the third analysis level, individual, has suffered from a deliberate

political exclusion for a long time. Rulers were agreeing on several ideas, such as the sovereignty principle and the equality of states, and these decisions were directly reflected on the system and the way that states interacted with each other. Yet, ordinary people or individuals -in its modern sense- were losing their significance and impact compared to other levels of international politics. This reality surprisingly continued until the second half of the 20th century. Admittedly, society never ceased to be the constructive element of other levels as leaders came from political parties supported by crowds, revolutions were built on the will of masses, and armies were consisting of people. Yet, their deserved value and emphasis were always missing in both the political and academic arena, as elites never hesitated to repress their opposing citizens harshly, military and political decisions dislocated innocent people from their homes, immigrant hosting states and their people discriminated against migrating communities, while scholars kept giving the emphasis of their research to the interests of nations and the chaotic conditions of the international system.

This trend to lower the importance of individuals was prominent until liberalism placed the individual at the center of politics. On the other hand, liberal theories were much focused on subjects, such as peace, globalism, economy, international regimes. Thus, conflict and war, the essential dynamics of international politics, were still lacking individual-centered approaches. Finally, despite the long-term exclusion and devaluation, starting from 1950s, individuals started to gain the attention of politicians and scholars. They were indisputably warring against the state actors and their visibility in the system was increasing.

Quantitatively, the number of wars between individual actors and states were surpassing the ones between states. This had three kinds of outcomes: First, states recognized the individuals as warring actors and instrumentalized them against other states instead of entering into expensive military conflicts. Second, states also allied with each other to face the threats created by non-state actors and fought against the common enemy of rebel groups together, while the NSAs did the same against them. Third, scholars acknowledged the individuals' academic value in the area of conflicts and wars. Hence, internal conflicts, as we have discussed in this study, came into the academic discussions towards the end of the Cold War.

On the other hand, the end of the 20th century did not only underline the role of individuals, but also, an important transformation is felt at the system level against the wars, particularly civil wars. First, the international community's consciousness

has risen immensely due to informational evolution. Almost every civilian everywhere around the world has gained access to new technological devices, such as radios and televisions, and consequently to all new developments worldwide. This raising of awareness had an irreversible influence on their political representatives, who wanted to hold public support to their advantages. Secondly, following the explicit decrease in the rivalry between the superpowers, the United Nations finally turned into a political synergy center, where states actually managed to exchange diplomatic considerations and take political and military decisions. With the increase of the UN's role in relation to global peace and security issues, a further burden sharing between international actors and the UN began, which contributed to the expansion of international networks and cooperation in relation the intra-state and non-state wars.

Thus, when the international society's approach and responses to civil wars changed, the internationalization of internal conflicts gained a more legitimate and institutionalized context. The ideas revolving around humanitarian interventions and responsibility to protect started to shadow the interventions led by superpowers to protect and expand their sphere of influence. Yet, the increase of the intervening actors caused another defect. Differing actor types resulted in differing intervention motivations disguised behind new humanitarian principles. Moreover, the states and international/regional organizations did not only become motivated to intervene in civil wars but also did not hesitate to intervene for reasons related to their security. The idea of interventionism was becoming more widespread and normalized due to the multiplication of intervening actors and practices. The fast-track interventions with increased numbers of actors following the 9/11 attacks is an ideal example of the broad acceptance of the concept of interventions and the facilitation of taking action.

In this context, particularly starting from the first decade of the 21st century, internationalized civil wars became the most observed war type amongst all and scholars gave immense attention to this subject matter. On the other hand, the non-state wars remained less common in the literature as non-state territories almost did not exist anymore and non-state combats mostly remained at conflict levels. Also, this type of conflicts were mostly linked to conditions created by other wars, particularly civil wars, thus intra-state conflicts attracted more academic interest. Despite the increasing number of studies on these issues, there was still an academic

ignorance at the individual level of analysis. Interventions were accepted as the key to internationalize civil wars, which is an action limited to states and international organizations. Thus, regarding the war studies of the new era, the leading role was again appointed to the analyses at the state and system levels. Numerous studies have been recognizing the interaction of states and NSAs, and have been accepting how transnational rebel groups have evolved. Yet, the internationalizing element was again privileged to the actors at both system and state level, although the involvement of states with NSAs and the interaction of NSAs between each other might have become the most significant component of civil wars.

In this context, the role of the elements at the individual level needs to be re-conceptualized and underlined in the analysis of international politics. It is possible to redefine sub-state actors and separate the NSAs from individuals in addition to other forms of actors, such as non-governmental organizations, activist groups etc. Alternatively, the trans-nationalization of actors should be reevaluated at the individual level. Also, it is possible to redefine the internationalizing elements and relations within the area of international politics, particularly in intra-state and non-state wars. For instance, when the wars in Iraq and Syria are examined, emphasis is placed on the territories of these countries. However, when an actor, such as the ISIS/Daesh, operates in more than one country the activities of the NSAs become the key to comprehend the context of these wars. Yet, if state actors are not engaged into a civil war, but NSAs and other individuals create transnational networks surrounding the internal conflict, it is still claimed that the wars in question are not internationalized. Moreover, state actors frequently use involvement methods to interfere in internal conflicts of other countries. In these cases, it would be controversial to argue that these wars are not internationalized. Hence, involvements play a vital role in understanding the internationalization of internal conflicts and they should be taken into serious account.

Due to the rapid development of technology and relationship forming strategies, individuals should be re-acknowledged as equal internationalizing actors of states and systemic actors. This change should reveal the state actors' deceitful actions in civil wars. Their involvement should explicitly be affirmed as internationalizing actions, regardless whether they have been engaged in interventions and finally they should be confronted with the outcomes of their actions accordingly. While doing so, the rising individual actors should also face

institutionalized and appropriate sanctions and punishment. As their role and share of responsibility are still not well defined within the context of wars, they are either killed in battles or forced to hide underground while civilians, who are not related with the violent acts, can suffer non-descript imprisonment and encounter inhuman conditions. None of these outcomes are just. First, the role of individuals should be clarified within the wars, so that the function of actors engaged in violent activities can be distinguished from the role of civilians. Second, states should not be freed from being held accountable for their involvement, which most of the time create the conditions for the chaotic situations and complex interventions. In both instances, involvement actions should be regarded as internationalizing actions same as interventions.

In regard to all these concerns, the preceding chapters of this Thesis offer a number of observations and key arguments. The main aim has been to establish a comprehensive explanatory framework, relying on the integration of diverse findings that can establish the link between the internal and international dynamics of civil wars, which can allow the comparison of *sui generis* cases of the ICWs, and allow us to observe and assess the bigger picture. Hence, the involvement and the role of all actors into ICWs have been integrated within the intervention framework. Consequently, the internationalization structure is expanded to all levels of analysis.

In this spirit, the structure of this study is designed to address these needs. In the first part of our three-pillar research, first, we have tried to reconcile differing war type categorizations and quantitative criteria of previous research on conflicts and war by incorporating five different dataset generating institutes and researches. Secondly, after our efforts to reconcile differing war type categorizations and quantitative criteria of researches on conflicts and war, the goals and causes of civil wars have been taken into account. In respect to the COW's categorization of the goals of civil wars, they have been perceived to serve two outcomes: Seizing the control of the central government or secessionism. This diversification is important because understanding the goals of a civil war is crucial to comprehend their ultimate purpose linked to the onset, internationalization, termination or non-termination of the conflict. It identifies the civil wars in a practical way oriented to the problems and demands. From the rebelling actors' point of view, goals explain the willingness, opportunities and feasibility conditions of rebellious groups. What NSAs want, what opportunities they have that could be taken and how they can be directed to

attainable objectives are directly reflected on the goals. From the third parties' point of view, interfering into a civil war necessitates to choose a side or to remove the origin of the conflict once for all; thus, knowing the goals of the warring sides has an impact on the intervention or involvement methods and decision-making calculi.

However, identifying the goals are not enough to fully understand or permanently resolve a civil war. All wars possess intrinsic issues and without understanding the underlying questions, a war would not offer more than a closed book. If the goals determine the course of civil wars, then causes create the demands shaping these goals. Regarding the causes, researches give emphasis to greed, grievance and horizontal inequality approaches. While greed explains the economic reasons, grievance puts the emphasis on political and ethno-cultural causes. On the other hand, horizontal inequalities underline the deprivations of identity groups, which can have cultural, political and socio-economic dimensions. Although all these approaches present different aspects of war-inciting conditions, none of them is sufficient to explain the complete picture. Economic causes of civil wars can arise from deprivations and opportunities to make the civil war but without any political deficits and demands to for a change, mobilizing a rebellion does not seem possible. Consequently, as greed can explain one component of the civil war onsets, grievance has to be present for the onset of internal conflicts.

Moreover, as the horizontal inequalities approach suggests, deprivations can take collective forms targeting certain identity groups. In that case, communication and inter-action levels of these groups can provide the enabling platform to organize rebellions. If security dilemmas are added to these conditions and hostility, polarization or fractionalization indexes are in risky levels, then ethno-cultural, political and economic issues tend to turn into internal conflicts. Furthermore, demographic and geographic correlations can increase the feasibility conditions and particularly affect the onset and duration of civil wars under convenient conditions.

The causes and goals of civil wars show us two very important characteristics of intra-state conflicts. First, they necessitate a process-related examination of civil wars. Without defining the war process as preparing conditions, onset, duration and termination phases, the civil wars' dynamics cannot be separated from each other. When, why and how a civil war occurs can only be examined through separate phases as in this way we can observe the causes, goals, participating and original actors, their motivations and demands as well as the impact of all these dynamics in

relation to the termination, escalation and prolongation of civil wars. Secondly, processes are important to understand the role of external actors' participation into the civil wars. As goals and causes of civil wars are important for making a decision to interfere into these wars, understanding when, why and how a civil war internationalizes is important for the course of conflicts. Did internal or external actors incite the onset of the civil war? How the engagement of third parties affected the course of war? Why and when did external parties interfere? These are fundamental questions regarding the overall dynamics of internationalized civil wars and only a process-related approach can allow deciphering these dynamics.

In this context, in the second part of the Thesis, the internationalization understanding of civil wars is taken into account. Concerning the internationalization of civil wars in practice, intervention is perceived to be the main action by all of the abovementioned researchers and institutes.

Accordingly, first, the concept and content of interventions are examined. In that regard, the difference between military interventions and economic or diplomatic interventions is thoroughly evaluated in respect to Regan's intervention approach, which has been acknowledged by the majority of the civil war literature. By doing so, a large body of literature on the choice of intervention methods (military, economic, diplomatic), military intervention policies regarding the nature of the conflicts (divisive, intermediate, consensus issues), motivations behind the coalition formations (multilateral, minilateral, unilateral), aims and methods of military interventions (to contain or end the violence or the reason behind biased or neutral interventions) is examined, in an attempt to provide relational explanations and incorporate all these elements together. Second, the internationalization framework is expanded to involvements and non-state actors are taken into focus as the main actors of ICWs. In that regard, their interactions with state actors, with other NSAs, their recruitment strategies and relational networks with migrating communities and diasporas are examined thoroughly to describe their operational conditions within the wars. By doing so, the manner that NSAs function during wars and their differing ways of creating transnational networks are explained to adopt an actor-centric approach and to underline the significance of non-state actors in internationalization processes.

Differing dynamics of ICWs with all abovementioned factors have been the constituent layers of our comprehensive and explanatory two-pillared

internationalization template, which are explained through inward and outward internationalization models in the second chapter of the second part of this Thesis. Inward internationalizations consist of instrumental and affective motivations of third parties to intervene or to get involved in civil wars. Even though the main aim of engaging in civil wars is either to end or to contain the internal violence, examining the motivations of internationalizing civil wars has showed that third parties have their own agendas in relation to a civil war. Primarily, opportunities embedded in civil wars provoke external actors to take action. Yet, opportunities alone are not enough to mobilize them, so they should also have a strong willingness and prospect of success to interfere. Hence, foreign interveners' capacities play an important role in the decision-making process. In the end, feasibility and willingness complement the opportunities ahead of intervening or involving into civil wars.

In this context, instrumental motivations are focused on political and economic gains and the political reasons can be summarized as follows: (1) Undermining a rival by taking advantage of its weakened situation to consolidate the interveners' regional or international political power, (2) influencing the future political structure, regime and leadership of the warring country in a way that would generate a preferred governing elite in the country in question, (3) pursuing long-term goals regarding the warring country, (4) taking revenge from the state in war for a negative policy that took place in the past such as a former meddling realized by that country, and (5) creating a diversion from its own internal problems. From an economic perspective, gaining present or future economic benefits in the warring state's market and exploiting the resources of the weakened country that do not exist in the intervening country are the predominant instrumental issues.

As it becomes apparent, opportunities, willingness, feasibility and the prospects of success are the most important factors for third parties compared to the causes and goals of the civil war in question. Yet, the motivations incited by instrumental motivations are not sufficient to drive an external actor to take action. If these aims are complemented with affective elements with regard to the causes and goals of the civil war, then intervention is more probable. Affective reasons consist of multi-layered ties, in terms of the existence of political and military alliances, the level of economic interdependences, common historic, political and cultural ties established by colonial relations or even shared ideologies and identity. Also, the severity of humanitarian conditions can create affective motivations, particularly as a

result of CNN effect. Hence, the existence of solely instrumental motivations can encourage a third party to use only involvement methods, but the presence of both instrumental and affective methods can incite an intervention. Yet, involvement and intervention choices are mostly associated with the capacity of the third party: If the external actor is powerful and willing enough to intervene, one of the motivations could suffice, but if the external actor's capacity is not strong enough, its action will not go beyond the involvement level unless its willingness challenges the third party to coalesce with other actors. Regarding all these factors, proximity and firmness of interaction levels are effective because they tend to increase both the opportunities and the willingness of external actors.

On the other hand, internationalization of civil wars is not always created by voluntary actions. The impact of a civil war in a country can be so disturbing that third parties can find themselves drawn into it. Outward internationalizations have dual significance; firstly, they can spill over with contagion and diffusion mechanisms and create new civil wars in other countries and secondly, they can bring third parties into their war zones in order to contain the violence and preserve security. Most of the times these are successive processes but the suffering and engaging actors are not necessarily the same. Particularly, the involvement of third parties into civil wars can incite the first phase of the outward internationalization, as NSAs tend to transfer their supporters into new war zones. Also, the first phase tends to entail an intervention of the inflected country but its weakening and the severity of its conditions can bring other actors driven by containment concerns. Regarding both phases, the internal causes and goals of the civil war onset gain predominance in outward internationalizations compared to inward ones. Also, the internal dynamics of the third party are equally important for both protecting itself from a spillover and intervening into a belligerent country to ensure the security.

In this context, the main determinants of both phases in outward internationalizations consist of (1) the characteristics of the country in war, such as its evangelization or expulsion actions, (2) the characteristics of the civil war, such as the type or intensity of the conflict, (3) the domestic characteristics of third parties, such as the state strength, (4) the interactions between the warring and third parties, such as the existence of refugee flows and ethnic ties and (5) the substance of security concerns, such as blocking the externalities or containing the violence.

All these components of inward and outward internationalizations derive from narrowly defined empirical researches and have been comparatively applied to case studies with a view to determine whether their relational justifications were well structured and whether they could explain diverse cases of internationalizations. In that regard, the following criteria were essential to choose the case studies examined in the third part of this Thesis. First of all, the war in the country should be indicated as an internationalized civil war in both the COW and UCDP/PRIO datasets. Secondly, the war timeline of the country should include the period following the Second World War, it should have continued after the end of the Cold War and the more recent 9/11 attacks. In this way, periodic differences of civil wars and their contemporary conditions could be presented. Also, by examining a long-term war-zone country, the complex and multifaceted internal dynamics of civil wars in terms of goals and causes can be demonstrated. In addition, the wars examined in the cases studies should have a subtle impact on their regions or international system. Finally, they should be complicated enough to reveal the intervention and involvement dynamics as well as the components of inward and outward internationalization patterns. Hence, in the light of these requirements three cases came forward: Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Iraq.

In order to uncover the internal and external dynamics of the ICWs of these states, firstly, their wars from 1945 until the present day are presented through to both COW and UCDP/PRIO datasets. By doing so, the practical coding differences of the existing researches are demonstrated and the long-term political and military context of the countries is illustrated. In this way, it is also possible to shed some light to the goals of the civil wars of the case studies. Secondly, the internal dynamics of the three countries are examined with the variables of Doyle & Sambanis, Fearon & Laitin, and PITF datasets, which allows for the internal causes and correlations behind the civil war onsets to be revealed. Thirdly, the ICWs after the end of the Cold War of the selected cases are taken into account so that their political, economic, ethno-cultural causes are investigated as well as the actors in these wars and their intervention and involvement methods. Thus, a detailed view of the ICWs in terms of the nature of conflicts, their actors (international, state, non-state), the goals of the conflicts, their internal causes and the internal and external components over the course of the conflicts is offered.

Subsequently, the inward and outward models of the internationalization are applied on the well-explained cases in order to analyze the ICWs in a comparative method. Here, the emphasis is not put on the civil war narratives as they are thoroughly explained in the previous chapter. Instead, ICWs are tested with the elements of the inward and outward internationalization patterns in order to understand the consistency of the templates and illustrate the diverging and convergent traits of the cases. Yet, in order to be able to apply this method, a preliminary effort to separate the phases of these ICWs was inevitable. As intervening and involving actors bring their own agenda to ICWs and thus evolve the course of the war, it is not possible to define an ICW just as inward or outward in total over one measurement. All the selected ICWs are a product of a long-term relational mechanism, in which the dynamics keep changing. In regard to this, the selected ICW cases are divided into phases, according to their major changes and tipping points. Overall, these phases concern (1) the background of the ICWs when earlier involvements or interventions took place and influenced the actual conditions of ICWs, (2) the onset of the war, (3) the duration of war, which can be divided into further phases in respect to the changes in the ICW mechanisms, (4) the outcome, such as the recurrence, escalation or de-escalation of the ICWs, as none of them has been steadily resolved.

In this context, the ICW of Afghanistan is divided into four phases (1979-2001, 2001, 2001-2014, 2015), the ICW of the DRC is divided into five phases (1993-1996, 1996-1997, 1998-2002, 2003-2012, 2013) and the ICW of Iraq is divided into four phases (1980s-1996, 2003, 2003-2010, 2011-2013, 2014-2015). This division has offered us three insights. Firstly, none of the ICWs is characterized by a strictly inward or outward internationalization method, instead, unexceptionally, both of these mechanisms are found in differing phases of the wars. Secondly, even though one of the patterns exists in a phase, it might also be accompanied by the reasoning of the other pattern. In other words, both inward and outward mechanisms can be found together in an isolated process of the ICW. Thirdly, this highlights the fact that the interfering actors' claims on the internationalizing patterns can be manipulative and used to hide the real agenda in hand. Thus, inward and outward internationalization methods are supplementary patterns and they are valuable to explain how civil wars internationalize, how one type of war transforms into another and what roles third parties play in these transitions. In the light of these

explanations the tables below show the inward and outward mechanisms of the ICWs of the selected cases.

Table 22 - Internationalization Patterns regarding the Overall of ICWs

Phases in General			
	Afghanistan	DRC	Iraq
Inward	In phases 1 – 3 (alleged)	In phases 2 (embedded reasoning) -3-4-5	In phases 1-2-3
Outward	In phases 2-3-4	In phases 1-2	In phases 2 (alleged) - 5

Table 23 - Disaggregated Phases and Their Internationalization Patterns

	Afghanistan	DRC	Iraq
Background	Inward	Outward (spill over into DRC)	Inward
Onset	Outward (Spill over towards USA)	Outward (including inward intentions)	Inward (Claimed to be outward)
Duration	Outward intervention and alleged inward involvements	Inward	Inward intervention and alleged inward involvements
Outcome	Outward (Spill over into Afghanistan)	Inward	Outward
			Spill over towards other countries
			To contain and eliminate violence

In addition to the findings derived from these comparisons, there are a several inferences to make regarding the examination of these ICWs adopting a comprehensive approach. Firstly, regarding the intervention methods in these wars, it is possible to observe a degree of consistency in the internationalization patterns illustrated in this Thesis. As the authorization of the UNSC or the firmness of multilateralism are perceived to distinguish the just interventions from the interest-driven ones, the methods of interventions are important to challenge the inward and outward labeling of the civil war internationalizations.

Regarding Afghanistan, the existence of the UNSC's authorization for the use of force in the initial unilateral intervention and its transformation into procedural multilateralism fit into the outward internationalization mentality. In the first ICW of the DRC, the initial unilateral coalition of the neighboring states as the reflection of a consensus between them supports the outward reasoning, while the lack of an earlier authorization of the UNSC to resort to force supports the existence of the embedded inward intentions. Moreover, the fractionalization of these coalitions into two operational and unilateral sides that fight each other consolidates the earlier

argument and illustrates the inward reasoning in the second ICW. Also, in the third ICW, the existence of a unilateral intervention by Rwanda (with the contribution of Uganda) against the government of the DRC that was being supported by a procedural multilateral military force of the UN (United Nations Force Intervention Brigade) is consistent with the never-ending inward internationalization character of the DRC war. Concerning Iraq, the belated authorization of the UNSC to use force for the initial minilateral coalition realizing the Operation Iraqi Freedom strengthens the argument that the war was internationalized through an inward method, despite the claims for being an outward one. On the other hand, the multilateral procedural character of the OIR supports the outward internationalization mentality of the second ICW.

Secondly, both Afghanistan and the DRC had failed state characteristics before the onset of their ICWs. In this case, it is possible to affirm that failed states attract following intra-state wars, particularly internationalized ones. Only Iraq was not a failed state and, until the intervention in 2003, the state was not in a civil war despite the existence of earlier conflicts. This implies that the civil war environment and the failure of the state institutions were created by the Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition to Iraq, the ICWs of Afghanistan and DRC were provoked by wars, which indicates that ICWs can be perceived as the products of other wars. In this perspective, these case studies have been extremely useful for observing the transformation of wars. In Afghanistan, the civil war incited the subsequent inter-state war, which brought the ICW. In DRC, a neighboring civil war provoked the ICW by transferring the perturbator elements into the country. In Iraq, the inter-state war brought the long-continuing ICW by compromising the stability of the state. However, it should be noted that all these three states had been experiencing anocratic regimes for decades, which inevitably increased the war proneness of these countries. Especially when this variable is put together with the long history of intra-state and non-state conflicts, it is possible to infer that, once a war cycle becomes chronic, it is hard to escape from this and the ICWs tend to be created in anocratic and unpeaceful countries. Thus, both internal and external dynamics play crucial roles on the onset of ICWs.

Thirdly, regarding the international characteristics of these wars, it is observed that involvements have always accompanied the intervention processes. Specifically, it can be argued that, before the ICWs, there have always been

international involvements, which paved the way for future wars. Incorporating involvements into internationalization factors holds a second meaning. As it can be understood from the recent updates in war categorizations by research centers due to the increasing role of NSAs, involvements have become crucial in tracing the actions of individuals and their relations with other actor types.

Fourthly, it is possible to observe that in none of the case studies the UN has played the main role in the internationalization of the civil wars, but in each of them, once the wars were internationalized, the UN got involved. The UNSC either authorized the intervening coalitions or took a military action on the ground. Its absence in DRC until 1999 caused a big gap by allowing the development of a chaotic environment but it is also debatable whether its participation brought a positive outcome. Furthermore, the significance of the entry of the UN into the ICWs in Afghanistan and Iraq is also debatable. In Afghanistan, it yielded its mission to NATO and stayed in the country having political missions, but the ISAF under the command of both the UN and the NATO could not be sufficient to permanently end the conflicts. In Iraq, even though the UNSC did not have a military mission, its belated authorization of the Enduring Freedom Mission caused a long-standing debate on the legitimacy of the war in Iraq and affected the future of Iraq in a way that cannot be conceived under the current situation.

All these inquiries bring forward the question of the impact of the internationalization of civil wars on their duration and outcome. To begin with, as mentioned before, none of these ICWs reached a permanent settlement or a victory that ended the violence. Hence, interventions seem not to have had any impact on the resolution of the conflicts.

Concerning the duration, there are a few observable and non-observable conditions. In Afghanistan, it is impossible to infer a factual impact, as it would not be possible to determine whether the war was internationalized because of its long-term duration or whether the internationalization of the war has prolonged its time. However, in the case of the DRC it is possible to argue that the opposing interventions in the second ICW prolonged the war and caused a deadlock, as it was expected. In the first ICW, the intervention was on the side of the rebel groups and it ended quickly after two years with the victory of united NSAs. Yet, it is not sufficient to argue that an intervention against the government can shorten the ICWs and lead to the victory of the rebels. As the third ICW in the DRC has similar traits

and that war temporarily ended with the signature of a peace agreement after the success of the government against the rebels. However, it should also be underlined that the MONUSCU and the Intervention Brigade were on the government's side in the third ICW and, despite the counter interventions, the ICW again continued for two years. Correspondingly, this finding weakens the argument that opposing interventions prolong the ICWs and thus necessitates further case studies to generate a more credible conclusion. In Iraq, it can be argued that the intervention did not just prolong the civil war, but it actually created it. In the light of these findings, it is not possible to sustain a generalized view on the impact of interventions on the duration and outcome. This conclusion also concurs with the conflicting empirical findings on the subject.

Overall, the internationalization templates and the approach of this study allow observing the links between internal and external dynamics, converging and diverging actions of diverse actors, the relations between them, and understanding the broader picture of ICWs. In that regard, when we compare inward and outward internationalization models, it is seen that inward internationalizations have more diverging traits than outward internationalizations, although they both reveal several convergent and diverging elements. This difference can be justified by the divergent mentality of inward and outward internationalizations. Outward internationalizations are intrinsically related to security concerns and thus cases with outward internationalization reasons do not differ immensely. However inward internationalizations are the products of instrumental motivations and affective reasons, thus they can greatly differ due to the possibility of a wide-range motivation spectrum and affective relations repertoire. Consequently, inward internationalizations are prone to create more *sui generis* cases, but it would still not be possible to argue that outward internationalizations can be generated under less diversified conditions.

On the other hand, there are two points of criticism that can be made about the outward internationalizations. First, the only element that did not exist in any of the outward internationalization cases was the stray fire. Even though it was included into the template as a potential variable, our research has shown that none of the ICWs became internationalized due to stray fire impacts. Thus, amongst all variables, stray fire comes forward as the least effective factor and worthy of fighting. Second, even though fear and uncertainty was included into the outward

internationalization template as a variable of security concerns, it only existed in the ICW of Iraq and it was used as a manipulation factor to conceal the inward intentions of the interveners led by the USA. The generation of the *pre-emptive strike* doctrine was the concretization of this policy. Hence, even though fear and uncertainty is a variable for outward internationalization, it is a highly exposed to manipulation. As with security dilemmas that exist in civil wars and inter-state wars, it can undoubtedly play a role in the internationalization of an intra-state war, yet its opaque character should be taken into consideration during the evaluation of an ICW case.

Briefly, in this Thesis we tried to develop a relational framework that can explain both the internal and external dynamics of ICWs, examine involvements along with interventions, and explain the internationalization of civil wars in a systemized and comparative way. To this end, empirical findings of were reviewed and incorporated in an inductive way, which guided us to establish a comprehensive template that allowed comparisons and revealed the multidimensional traits of the ICWs. Methodologically, explanatory and causal mechanisms regarding civil wars have been derived from a behaviorist literature relying on several modelizations. In other words, the theoretical structure of this Thesis is built upon the model and statistical based findings as in the works of Kalevi J. Holsti, David Singer, Meredith Reid Sarkees, Peter Wallensteen, Michael Doyle, Halvard Buhaug, Harvey Starr. Almost every resource referred in the theoretical parts of this work presents mathematically tested results.

Moreover, other conceptual, definitional or regional studies included in this study belonging to non-behaviorist academics have been selected carefully to make sure that they are widely acknowledged by the behaviorist literature, such as the works of Carl von Clausewitz, Patrick M. Regan, and Olivier Roy. Other than those, international treaties, official documents, institutional reports, and media sources are included in the relevant sections. Thus, firstly, we combined quantitative and qualitative research to build the pillars of this Thesis and used an inductive method to construct its theoretical framework. Secondly, the inferences extracted from the theoretical findings should have been applied to case studies in order to be examined under various circumstances, and this need presented a third pillar based on case studies. Selecting and applying the theoretical framework to these case studies

necessitated a comparative method, so that the convergent and divergent traits of these cases could be revealed according to the theoretical findings of earlier pillars.

Consequently, even though it is evident that the internationalization of civil wars represents a very tangled process, the case studies showed that inward and outward internationalization templates are useful in understanding the comprehensive context of ICWs. Firstly, through these templates we managed to display the disintegrated empirical researches within a unifying framework. Secondly, when a researcher wants to approach an ICW in order to unveil its dynamics, these bidirectional explanations offer a guide according to which the embedded characteristics of the conflict can be revealed. The inward and outward internationalization patterns do not exclude any of the fundamental elements to search for in ICWs: (1) Internal features or external motivations can be used to show the trigger points of interventions, (2) examining both intervention and involvement activities assist in understanding the escalation and externalization forms of internal conflicts, (3) political, economic, ethno-cultural and security related issues of internationalizations can easily be determined for the previous periods of an ICW as well as for its duration, and (4) these templates even lead us to decipher the coalitional dynamics, legal bases and possible manipulative maneuvers of the ICWs.

In addition, these templates allow the researchers to recognize the roles of individual actors in the internationalization process in terms of migrating groups, ethnic communities, NSAs, diasporas and to understand their relational networks with all kinds of actors. Moreover, the phase-related approach adopted in the Thesis shows the importance of examining ICWs in separate time periods as they include differing internationalization mechanisms: Treating ICWs as monolithic events can be misleading and it causes to ignore certain internationalization layers as well as the activities of diverse actors. Finally, inward and outward internationalization templates enable a researcher to compare different ICW cases as well as their dynamics in diverse phases. Thus, our approach offers a rich and guiding qualitative analysis based on statistical and mathematical findings of the behaviorist literature.

Yet, the cohesiveness of these internationalization models should be tested with further case studies to make sure that our approach is suitable for explaining diverse ICWs. As many controversial events have recently occupied the international politics, such as the ICWs in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine, it would be desired to examine these cases within the comprehensive framework of this study, in order to

investigate their intrinsic characteristics and complex layers. For example, the civil war in Libya possesses intriguing qualities: In 2011, the war between the government of Muammar Gaddafi and rebellious forces encountered an intervention of NATO relying on the Resolution 1973 of UNSC, which for the first time explicitly included the R2P as the legal basis of intervention. The death of Gaddafi following the bombings of foreign coalition forces and the subsequent chaotic environment created in the country, which now serves as a safe haven to numerous military factions affiliated with religious and ethnic armed groups (particularly with Al-Qaeda and ISIS/Daesh), show many common traits with the diverse phases of the ICW in Iraq even though they differ in legal bases, the state-building process and the intensity of conflicts. These cases exhibit convergent and divergent dynamics that are worth examining within the inward and outward internationalization framework.

Also, ISIS/Daesh has spilled over to Syria in the past few years, which suffers from a long-standing anocratic and repressive regime. Following this diffusion/contagion mechanism, the graveness of the situation pulled multilateral intervention into the country and caused further spillovers to other territories particularly via massive migration flows. All these traits, in addition to high-intensity conflict levels, remind us the ICWs in DRC, especially the first one. Examining the dynamics of the civil war in Syria using the methodology developed in this Thesis would be illuminating and informative as in the case of the ICW in DRC.

Hence, once the role of individuals and mechanisms other than interventions are examined within the internationalization framework of this study, it would be possible to shed light on the complicated features of diverse ICWs and compare them. Moreover, this kind of a perspective could lead to the reevaluation of intra-state and non-state conflicts in their internationalization contexts by demonstrating the pivotal role of the individual level of analysis vis-à-vis the context of wars.

APPENDIX

I. DETAILS AND EVOLUTION OF COW CLASSIFICATION OVER TIME

COW's original classification of wars and their measurement components were included in *The Wages of War 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook* and in *Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816–1980*, published in 1982. According to the initial norms, there were two criteria to define wars: “*the threshold of battle-related fatalities or troops in combat, and the status of the war participants*”¹¹⁸⁹. According to these criteria, a threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths as the scale of aggressions distinguishes war from other types of violence, so war is perceived as a sustained combat between or among military organizations, resulting in 1,000 deaths (subsequently, this requirement became 1,000 battle-related fatalities within a twelve month period).¹¹⁹⁰ While casualties were used to draw the line between wars and conflicts, the actor criteria defined the types of wars in this context. The war definition required at least one of the parties had to be a member of the international state system. This requirement could be met either by being a nation-state with at least 500,000 population, by an achieved membership in an international organization, such as the League of Nations or United Nations or by being recognized by at least two major powers.¹¹⁹¹

In addition to these requirements, in this original classification there were two kinds of international wars: *Inter-state* and *extra-systemic*. According to this categorization, *inter-state* wars signified “*the hostility, in which a territorial state that qualifies as a member of the inter-state system is engaged in a war with another system member and these parties should have at least 100 fatalities in armed conflicts or a minimum of 1,000 armed personnel engaged in active combat*”.¹¹⁹² Regarding the extra-systemic wars, the criteria called for an inter-state system

¹¹⁸⁹ Sarkees, Wayman, **Resort To...**, p.40.

¹¹⁹⁰ Sarkees, “The COW Typology...”, p.1, 13-14.

¹¹⁹¹ Chojnacki, “Anything new...”, p.32.

¹¹⁹² Melvin Small, J. David Singer, **Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980**, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982, p.56.

member who is engaged in a war with a political entity, who is not acknowledged as a system member but able to conduct combat actions against the other party. In these wars it is required that the system member should experience at least 1,000 battle-related fatalities during each year of combat. Extra-systemic wars signify imperial and colonial wars that are conducted outside the state party's territory against an independent adversary seeking to gain independence or against its colony aiming to remove colonial administration from its territory.¹¹⁹³ In 1982, Singer and Small expanded the COW's classification and added civil wars to their categorization. According to this addition, civil wars were defined as "an armed conflict involving a military action within the metropolis of an inter-state system member, in which the national government participates actively against an insurgent group defying its regime".

In this definition, effective resistance from both sides is needed as well. Thus, civil war was clearly framed apart from other forms of internal armed conflict, such as genocides, pogroms or uprisings with the condition that state violence should be sustained and reciprocated.¹¹⁹⁴ Another distinction within these definitions was the *battle death* element: While in inter-state wars a total of 1,000 battle fatalities among all of the system members were required, in extra-systemic and civil wars an annual average of (minimum) 1,000 battle deaths during each year of combat - as a measure of sustained hostilities - was required.¹¹⁹⁵ Also, the difference between extra-systemic and civil wars was linked to a territorial condition; while extra-systemic wars took place outside of inter-state system member's territory, civil wars occurred within its integrated regions, in other words, its' borders where members of society has the right to participate in government and aren't discriminated based on religious or ethnic differences.¹¹⁹⁶ A final adjustment to these classifications was the inclusion of ICWs as a term. ICWs were defined as the involvement of a state into a civil war, ongoing within another state.¹¹⁹⁷

¹¹⁹³ Sarkees, Wayman, **Resort To...**, p.42.

¹¹⁹⁴ Sambanis, "What Is...", p.816.

¹¹⁹⁵ Sarkees, Wayman, Singer, "Inter-State, Intra-State...", p.58.

¹¹⁹⁶ Small, Singer, **Resort to...**, pp.211-212.

¹¹⁹⁷ Sarkees, Wayman, **Resort To...**, p.42.

II. MAP OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE REGION OF AFGHANISTAN

Figure 12 - Map of Afghanistan¹¹⁹⁸



¹¹⁹⁸ <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/afghanis.pdf> (accessed 16.03.2017)

Figure 13 - Map of Afghanistan's Region¹¹⁹⁹



¹¹⁹⁹ http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=1056 (accessed 16.03.2017)

Figure 15 - Map of Africa and Independence Years of Countries¹²⁰¹¹²⁰¹ <http://www.globalissues.org/article/84/conflicts-in-africa-introduction> (accessed 16.03.2017)

IV. MAP OF IRAQ AND MIDDLE EAST

Figure 16 - Map of Iraq¹²⁰²

¹²⁰² <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/iraq.pdf> (accessed 16.03.2017)

Figure 17 - Map of Middle East¹²⁰³

¹²⁰³ <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/mideastr.pdf> (accessed 16.03.2017)

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BIOGRAPHY

Özden Selcen (Sarı) Özmelek, was born on October 16, 1985 in Kadirli, Turkey. In 2003, she graduated from ÇEAŞ Seyhan Anatolian High School. Same year she attended to the Department of International Relations (in French), in the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, at Galatasaray University for her undergraduate education and graduated from there in 2009. During this time, she also studied in the Catholic University of Louvain for a semester (Belgium - Spring 2008), via Erasmus Exchange Program Scholarship. After her graduation, she was awarded with the Jean Monnet Scholarship and pursued the Master Program of the Specialists in European Community Integration and the European Neighborhood Policy in the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne (France – 2009/2010). In Fall 2011, she enrolled to the International Relations Ph.D. Program at the Institute of Social Sciences at Galatasaray University.

TEZ ONAY SAYFASI

Üniversite	GALATASARAY
Enstitü	SOSYAL BİLİMLER
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JÜRİ ÜYELERİ

Ünvanı, Adı, Soyadı

Prof. Dr. Erhan BÜYÜKAKINCI



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Prof. Dr. Harun ARIKAN

Doç. Dr. Selcan SERDAROĞLU POLATAY

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Öner AKGÜL

İmza



Enstitü Müdürü

Prof. Dr. M. Yaman ÖZTEK

