NATION AND NATIONALISM ACCORDING TO ISLAMISTS DURING
SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD, A CASE STUDY: SIRAT-I
MÜSTAKİM-SEBİLÜRREŞAD

A Master's Thesis

by

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The Department of History

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

Ankara

February 2014

To My Beloved Melis

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Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

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ABSTRACT

NATION AND NATIONALISM ACCORDING TO ISLAMISTS DURING SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD, A CASE STUDY: SIRAT-I MÜSTAKİM-SEBİLÜRREŞAD

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This study examines Islamist understanding of nation and nationalism during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) by examining the most important Islamist journal of that era; *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad*. Islamism emerged as a reactionary ideology against Western threats toward the 'backward' Islamic world and the Ottoman Empire. This ideology sought to establish genuine Islam by looking back into original sources and the Golden Age (*Asr-ı Saadet*). This process aimed to revitalize the Islamic world and unite Muslims against the Western threats. As an Islamist journal in the Second Constitutional Period, *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* presented an Islamic modernist understanding dependent upon the revival of Islam and the Ottoman Empire with reference to real Islam against the Western threats. However, according to Islamists ethnic and secular nationalisms corrupted the unity of Muslims. This study argues that the journal, *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad,* was against separatist nationalism(s), especially Muslim nationalism(s) for the sake of the

Ottoman Empire's survival and Islamic unity (Pan-Islam). This study begins by presenting a general discussion of Islamism in the historical context of the Ottoman Empire, examining the history of the *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* journal, and its emphasis on nation, nationalism and their relation with Islam and the Ottoman Empire. This study assess how selected texts from the *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* represent Islamist understandings of the nation and nationalism and how Islamists identified the Islamic nation concept. In summation this study argues that *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* had an Islamist national understanding which aimed to save first the Ottoman Empire, then the Islamic world through the revival of Islam.

Keywords: Islamism, Pan-Islamism, Second Constitutional Period, Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad, Nation, Nationalism.

ÖZET

II. MEŞRUTİYET DÖNEMİ'NDE İSLAMCILARA GÖRE MİLLET VE MİLLİYETÇİLİK, BİR ÖRNEK ÇALIŞMA: SIRAT-I MÜSTAKİM-SEBİLÜRREŞAD

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Bu çalışma II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nin (1908-1918) en önemli İslamcı dergisi olan *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* dergisini inceleyerek İslamcılığın millet ve milliyetçilik anlayışını ele almaktadır. İslamcılık, İslam dünyası ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin 'geri kalmışlığından' dolayı kendilerini tehdit eden Batı'ya karşı bir ideoloji olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Gerçek İslam'ı, İslam'ın asıl kaynaklarına ve Asr-ı Saadet'e dönüp bakarak kurmayı hedefleyen bir ideolojidir. Bu süreç İslam dünyası tekrardan canlandıracak ve Müslümanlar'ı Batı tehdidine karşı birleştirecektir. II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde İslamcı bir dergi olan Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad, gerçek İslam'ı esas alarak İslam'ın ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin yeniden canlanmasına dayanan bir modern İslam düşüncesine sahiptir. Fakat, İslamcılara göre etnik ve seküler milliyetçilikler Müslümanlar'ın birliğini mahvetmektedir. Bu çalışma Osmanlı Devleti'nin hayatta kalması ve İslam birliği (Pan-İslam) uğruna *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* dergisinin ayrılıkçı milliyetçilik(ler)in, özellikle Müslüman milliyetçilik(ler)inin, karşısında durduğunu tartışmaktadır. İslamcılık hakkındaki

genel tartışmaları Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun tarihsel bağlamında verdikten, *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* dergisinin tarihini inceledikten, millet, milliyetçilik ve onların İslam ve Osmanlı Devleti olan ilişkisini tartıştıktan sonra; bu çalışma *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad*'den konu ile alakalı seçilmiş metinlerin İslamcıların millet ve milliyetçilik anlayışlarını nasıl resmettiğini ve İslamcıların İslami millet anlayışını nasıl tanımladıklarını irdeleyecektir. Çalışma *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* dergisinin ilk olarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nu, daha sonra İslami dünyayı yeniden canlandırarak kurtarmayı hedefleyen İslami millet anlayışını tartışacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslamcılık, Pan-İslamcılık, İkinci Meşrutiyet, Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad, Millet, Milliyetçilik.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1.   The Subject Matter

This thesis is about so called Islamists who were actually Islamic modernists affiliated with the journal *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* in the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918). This study attempts to find out what kind of an ideology *Sebilürreşad* circle used regarding nation and nationalism. Moreover, it tries to prove that Sebilürreşad aimed at an Islamist understanding of nation and a patria (fatherland) which had its basis in Islam and the concept of *vatan*. This Islamist national understanding (1908-1912) had similarities with Ottomanism. But after the Balkan War, Islamists' Ottomanist affinities were channeled into an Islamic national concept (1912-1914/1918) for the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire who were mostly Turk and immigrating to Anatolia. After a while this Islamic-Ottoman nation concept turned into a conservative patriotism with Islamic sentiments (1918-1925) during the end of the First World War and the National Struggle when the country was threatened and occupied by the Great Powers. This thesis interrogates the question of why Islamists were against ethnic nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire and defended an Islamic nation.

The Islamic world faced a predicament during 19th century because of Western expansion among Muslim lands and Western technologic, military, economic and scientific superiority. In that century there were two types of empire; the first group were maritime empires that dominated the world as industrial and financial powers, while the second were traditional empires such as Ottoman Empire that were governed by central bureaucracies and absolute monarch, and established from agrarian societies.[1] Most Muslim lands were colonized or semi-colonized by these European maritime empires. When Muslims realized that they were incapable of withstanding European expansion, their self-confidence was demolished with much of the Islamic world annexed by European powers.[2] Muslims were anxious about their lives and lost their self-confidence because the social world they were used to evanished.[3]

Islamic masses and elites started to think about their future looking at Western supremacy.[4] Islamists or Islamic modernists established modern Muslim political thought that reacted against Western expansion from its own political legacy and origins. This intelligentsia purported that the Islamic world must return to basic Islamic principles from the Golden Age (*Asr-ı Saadet*), to save Islam from corruption, and re-open *ictihad* gate that will reestablish Muslim power and guidance for progress.[5] The eclipse of the Islamic state in the occupied Islamic world incited this Muslim intelligentsia to ask for some instruments to reestablish Islamic culture

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[1] Dominic Lieven, "Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918. Power, Territory, Identity," *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no. 2 (1999): 163.

[2] Selçuk Akşin Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)" (unpublished master thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1987), vii.

[3] W. Montgomery Watt, "Islam and the West," in *Islam in the Modern World*, ed. Denis MacEoin and Ahmed Al-Shahi (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 6.

[4] Selçuk Akşin Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)" (Boğaziçi University, 1987), vii.

[5] Ibid.

and identity.[6] The search for a means of reestablishing Islamic identity was a result of the challenges posed by European domination of the Islamic world.[7] Islam was not a means for domination in this period, but rather, a source of salvation. Because of this, Islamists or Islamic modernists defended freedom.

'Islamism' was an outcome of modernity and imperialism in the Western hemisphere and anti-imperialist tendencies in Islamic lands. This intellectual movement emerged among Muslim intellectuals as a reaction against Western domination and in order to re-gain the lost self-confidence of Muslims.[8] In addition to that, modernity created a post-traditional understanding of life and politics among Muslims, at least among Muslim intellectuals. Islamism is a tendency among Islamic modernists to organize politics and society on the basis of Islamic faith and origins. The definition of Islamism corresponds to a large group of intelligentsia and their subsequent *modus vivendi* from the middle of the 19th century to the present era. According to Islamists, an alternative way of progress and development was possible. That is to say, Islamism has totally emanated from Islam. Although it deals with political issues, it is still a religious matter because of its religious mottos. Since Islam ordered the same political perspectives, Islamism is not a political attitude, but a clarion call.

Islamism was a call to all Muslims and Muslim rulers to unite against the West. It aimed to return the original Islam in order to provide salvation for the Islamic world and unite it around that idea through the adoption of Western

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[6] Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 7.

[7] Jeffrey T. Kenney, "Pan-Islamism," in *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, ed. Maryanne Cline Horowitz (New York: Thomson Gale, 2005), 1711.

[8] Selcuk Aksin Somel, "Islamic Modernism," in *Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Selcuk Aksin Somel (Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2003), 139.

technology and by recovering Islam's scientific legacy.[9] The material development and techniques of modernity were accepted and used by much of the Islamic world; on the other hand moral, a social and cultural substrata of Western modernity was often rejected.[10] The adoption of Western culture created a division among Muslims according to Islamists. That division disturbed the idea of Islamic unity. (Pan-Islamism)

As the only major independent state in the Islamic world, the Ottoman Empire found out that other Muslim communities were demanding help from her in order to get their independence back.[11] The Ottoman Empire seized the leader position of the Islamic world with the objective of achieving greater Islamic unity amongst all Muslims.[12] The Ottoman Empire was seen as the torchbearer of Islam since the Ottoman Sultan was Caliph himself. Sultan Abdulhamid II started to use his caliph title effectively, which was used slightly by former sultans in the 19th century. However, Islamism was not a product of Abdulhamid in the Ottoman Empire. As a Young Ottoman ideology, Islamism emerged as a reaction against the secular Tanzimat regime and its high-ranking bureaucrats, Âli Paşa and Fuad Paşa. The intellectual legacy of the Young Ottomans passed to the Young Turk Era in which Islamic modernists or Islamists defended an Islamic way of freedom and constitutionalism against the Hamidian regime.

Islamism is considered one of the most influential ideologies of the Second Constitutional Period which offered political solutions for the revitalization of the

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[9] Ibid.

[10] Laura Guazzone, *The Islamist Dilemma : The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995). 6.

[11] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*: 4.

[12] Bernard Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire and Its Aftermath," *Journal of Contemporary History* 15, no. 1 (1980): 27.

Ottoman Empire. Second Constitutional Period ideologies have generally been placed into four categories; Westernism, Ottomanism, Turkism and Islamism. It is very clear that all of the Second Constitutional Period ideologies aimed to stop the decline of the Empire and to restore it again as a powerful state. The names of the Westernists, Islamists and Turkists were established after the genesis of the Turkist group, who were Russian émigrés and were influenced by Russian classification of these thoughts as Westernists or Islamists.[13] Babanzade Ahmed Naim who was a prominent figure of Islamism criticized the adoption of these words, Islamist or Turkist, because for him it was absurd to call a Muslim an Islamist, or a Turk a Turkist.[14]

The political condition of the Second Constitutional Period made available hybrid ideologies. In such an atmosphere, different ideologies met under the rubric of imperial salvation. *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürresad* journal was one such meeting point for these ideologies[15], except Westernism, but its Islamist side was most intense. The introduction of publishing, the printing press, and newspapers awoke an awareness among the Turkish-Muslim community.[16] In the Ottoman case, religion and the printing press shaped the nationalization process of the Ottoman Empire, both for Ottoman or Turkish nationalism, as well as the Islamic concept of nation. As an Islamist journal, *Sebilürreşad* also influenced the intellectual atmosphere of the period with the help of the printing press.

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[13] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1998). 337-38.
[14] Babanzade Ahmed Naim, "İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyet," *Sebilürreşad* 12, no. 293 (1330/1914): 118. "*Bu –cı edatının Türk ile İslam kelimelerine iltihakı ne kadar fena oluyor. Ben burada bir manayı tasannu istişmam ediyorum… Zira Türk ve Arap olan kimse Türkçü, Arapçı olamaz. O kısaca Türktür, Araptır. İslamcının da müslüman demek olmadığı lügat-ı Türkçe ile edenni mümaresesi olanlarca malumdur.*"
[15] Adem Efe, "Uzun Soluklu İslâmcı bir Dergi: Sebilürreşad," *Marife* 8, no. 2 (2008): 158.
[16] Soner Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 2006). 6.

Until the Balkan Wars, Islamists did not clash with other ideologies. They worked together in order to save the Empire and to solve its problems. However, after 1912, *Sebilürreşad's* attitude turned into an Islamist national understanding which was absolutely against all kind of ethnical nationalisms, especially Muslim nationalisms such as Albanian, Arab and Turkish nationalisms. After the First World War, the hopes of Islamists changed, and they tended to have a more Anatolian or Turkish political and social understanding that included Islamic senses. The migrations from lost territories to the fatherland created a sense of defense. This sense focused on both Turkishness of the community and Islam.

1.2. Primary Sources and Methodology

This thesis focuses on an Islamist journal published during the Second Constitutional Period. As an Islamist journal, *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* was the most important Islamist circle that shaped the intellectual legacy of the Ottoman-Turkish history. *Sırat-ı Müstakim*, later *Sebilürreşad*, started to publish just after the re-proclamation of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 in 1908. Publication of the journal lasted until 1925; moreover, during the First World War it wasn't published due to lack of paper and censorship. As the most important Islamist journal in the Ottoman-Turkish historiography, *Sebilürreşad* includes a huge accumulation of knowledge. It was published 641 times in its first period.[17] Since Islamists claimed that their ideology was the true path for the salvation of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world, they titled the journal as *Sırat-ı Müstakim* and *Sebilürreşad* that mean more or less the 'true path' in Islamic terminology. *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad*

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[17] Second period of *Sebilürreşad* is between 1948 and 1966.

was a hybrid journal for a period; however, editorial control was in the hands of Islamists. Some members of other ideologies of the Second Constitutional Period, except Westernism, wrote for the journal, e.g. Turkists. Furthermore, it is difficult to imply that there was only an Islamism. Islamists did not constitute a single monolithic block; the term Islamism was an umbrella term.[18] Though, *Sebilürreşad* circle represented a generally Islamic modernist side of Islamism, it had a heterogeneous structure.

Sebilürreşad has characteristics which can represent all Islamist features. Because of this, *Sebilürreşad* will be the focus of this case study. Since this study emphasizes the nation and nationalist understanding of Islamism in the Second Constitutional Period, essays and news regarding nation and nationalism in the journal will be the primary sources of the study. It is a massive work to read and transcribe all volumes and issues[19] of *Sebilürreşad* from Ottoman Turkish to Turkish; however a selection of writings regarding the topic will be substantial. Articles were selected based on these keywords; nation (*millet-kavmiyet-ümmet*), and nationalism (*kavmiyetçilik*, *milliyetçilik*) and other related terms. İsmail Kara, who is the most influential academician of Islamism in the Turkish academy, transcribed some primary sources of Islamism from Ottoman Turkish into Turkish in three volumes of his work.[20] However, many essays and articles regarding discussions of nation and nationalism were not transcribed into Turkish. This study presents these primary sources in the context of nation and nationalist discussions of Islamists in the Second Constitutional Period. These articles are analyzed in the context of national

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[18] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 8.
[19] It has 25 volumes and 641 issues in 17 years.
[20] İsmail Kara, *Türkiye'de İslâmcılık Düşüncesi : Metinler/Kişiler*, 4th ed., vol. 1 (İstanbul: Dergah, 2011).

understanding of Islamists. Mehmed Akif's *Safahat* and Babanzade Ahmed Naim's *İslam'da Dava-yı Kavmiyet* will structure the main theme, however other essays and articles will support the discussion.

1.3. Literature Review

There is a wide selection of works about Islamism in the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world. In addition to that, Islamism in the Second Constitutional Period has been widely discussed as well. *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* was also used as a primary source or main subject of these works. *Sebilürreşad* which is the most influential Islamist periodical in the Second Constitutional Period is analyzed in the work of Esther Debus.[21] which mainly focuses on key word analysis regarding Islamist thought. Selçuk Akşin Somel's unpublished master thesis[22] is probably the best work about *Sırat-ı Müstakim* that deals with political and social thought of selected authors of the journal. Fatma Bostan's master thesis[23] deals with two periods[24] of *Sebilürreşad* in the context of their political view, however this work is too short to fulfill the expectations with respect to the rich intellectual legacy of Islamic political thought. There are also several works in Turkish about the journal; however they do not fully consider discussions of nation and nationalism.

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[21] Esther Debus, *Sebilürreşâd: Kemalizm Öncesi ve Sonrası Dönemdeki İslamcı Muhalefete Dair Karşılaştırmalı Bir Araştırma* (Istanbul: Libra Yayınları, 2009).
[22] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)."
[23] Fatma Bostan, "Political Perspectives of Sebilürreşad" (Boğaziçi University, 1996).
[24] 1908-1925 and 1948-1966.

The *İslamcılık*[25] volume of *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* is the most comprehensive work about Islamism. It includes wide selection of essays from various academicians and authors who are experts of Islamism. İsmail Kara's work[26] which was edited from his PhD thesis contains content analysis of Islamists on their political and social discussions, especially about the concepts; caliphate and constitutionalism. Kara criticized Islamists because of their modernist interpretation of Islam, and their reference methods to religious texts in order to match modern concepts such as constitution.[27] Moreover, according to him, Islamists padded religious terms such as *meşveret*, *şura* and *biat* for political reasons.[28] Mümtaz'er Türköne's work[29] on the genesis of Islamism primarily asserted that Young Ottomans were the founding fathers of Islamism, especially Namık Kemal. His work focused on the genesis of Islamism as a Young Ottoman ideology in the Ottoman Empire as a reaction to Tanzimat regime.

Tarık Zafer Tunaya's work[30] on the historical development of Islamism in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey analyzed the concept from a secular point of view and identified Islamism as a movement. According to Tunaya, Islamism was an ideology because it asserted to be a thought and belief system, as well as a movement in order to perform its thought and belief system.[31] Tunaya described Islamism as a counter ideology and political movement against progressivism.[32] Niyazi Berkes' idea about Islamism compliments Tunaya's idea; both identify Turkish history as a clash

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[25] Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce - İslamcılık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005).
[26] İsmail Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2001).
[27] Ibid., 39.
[28] Ibid., 39-40.
[29] Mümtaz'er Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu* (İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 2011).
[30] Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003).
[31] Ibid., 1.
[32] Ibid.

between secularists and religious people.[33] On the other side Sadık Albayrak considers Islamism as a reaction against secularist regimes.[34]

According to Şerif Mardin, Islamism is a movement that emerged at the periphery of the Ottoman Empire and India, however in the 1870's it became powerful ideology at the center of the Ottoman Empire.[35] Hilmi Ziya Ülken categorizes Islamists in the Second Constitutional Period into four; traditionalist Islamists, modernist Islamists, Islamists who try to hybridize modernity and tradition, and anti-modern Islamists.[36] Sait Özervarlı classifies Islamists in the Second Constitutional Period into three; *Sebilürreşad* journal, *Beyan'ül-Hak*, and *İslam Mecmuası*. According to Özervarlı even though these subdivisions had different priorities, they shared some common features such as reviving Islamic thought, refusing Western materialism, and the role of religion.[37]

None of the works related with Islamism conceptualize Islamist understandings of nation and nationalism with their common discussion; moreover, they define Islamism as a counter ideology with respect to their understandings of nation and nationalism. The definitions of Islamism within these works do not put emphasis on the national understandings of Islamists in the Second Constitutional Period, which attached importance to Islamic national understanding. As such, there is a paucity of discussions and works regarding Islamists in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey and their perception and understanding of the concept of nation. Moreover,

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[33] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*.
[34] Sadık Albayrak, *Siyasi Boyutlarıyla Türkiye'de İslamcılığın Doğuşu* (İstanbul: Risale Yayınları, 1989).
[35] Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991). 9.
[36] Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, 3. ed. (Istanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1992).
[37] M. Sait Özervarlı, "Alternative Approaches to Modernization in the Late Ottoman Period: İzmirli İsmail Hakkı's Religious Thought against Materialist Scientism," *Internation Journal of Middle East Studies*, no. 39 (2007): 82-83.

these Islamists were against the concept of (ethnic) nationalism according to these works. It is crucial to scrutinize the national understanding of Islamic modernists in the Second Constitutional Period (*Sebilürreşad* circle) in order to comprehend the transformation of the conceptualization of Islam in a modern sense as a salvation ideology of Islam and the Ottoman Empire against Western (Christian) imperialism. The Islamist conceptualization in the Second Constitutional Period, of those who wrote for *Sebilürreşad* should be reevaluated with respect to their national understanding. The purpose of this research is to ascertain whether the national understanding and perception of Islamic modernists (Islamists) in the Second Constitutional Period who wrote for the periodical *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* is either against nationalism or aimed at an Islamic concept of nation dependent upon the idea of *vatan* which corresponded with ummah for the salvation of Islam and the Ottoman Empire.

There is a need to revise the discussion of nationalism overwhelmingly shaped by the Western academy since their discussion depends frequently on Western ethnocentrism.[38] Both nationalism and religion are able to justify distressing social arrangements and to create beliefs in a just social order.[39] Secular nationalism is not the only path of nationalism, as non-Western nationalism that is sometimes religious has challenged Western types of nationalism. European secular understandings of nationalism are not enough to explain the structures of nation and nationalism within the Ottoman Empire which faced the great impacts of nationalism as a non-national state. Pan-Islamism may also be argued as one species of

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[38] William W. Haddad, "Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire," in *Nationalism in a Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 4.
[39] Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism and the Mind: Essays on Modern Culture* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications Limited, 2006). 96.

nationalism, rather than a command of Islam.[40] In the context of Islamism, Islam was considered a base for solidarity, common citizenship and social cement.[41] Religion and nation are identical concepts in the eyes of Islamists; because of this reason secular or ethnic nationalisms are not necessarily permissible or rational. Islamism also benefited as nationalisms did from early military victories and cultural superiority for the sake of revival.[42] Islamism intended to create an Islamic identity or nation which was primarily based upon being an Ottoman Muslim (mostly Turkish Muslim) and collaterally being a Muslim, especially outside of the Empire. The search for a revival of Muslim identity as a nation utilized historical symbols and commonalities as did secular or ethnic nations. *Sebilürreşad* as an Islamist journal in the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire had an Islamic conception of nation that was primarily against ethnic and secular understandings of nationalism since member of that circle believed that ethnic and secular understandings of nationalism would corrupt the unity of the Islamic world and the Ottoman Empire and cause an apocalypse for Muslims. From these point of views, Islamists of *Sebilürreşad* were theoretically Islamist, practically patriots, and partially nationalists that depended upon the concept of an Islamic nation.

In the first chapter, I discuss Islamism as an ideology. I introduce Islamism with respect to general discussions about it in the context of its origins and political thought. In addition to that, I discuss three eras of Islamism and Pan-Islamism in the historical context of the Ottoman Empire; Tanzimat, Hamidian and Young Turk

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[40] Adeeb Khalid, "Pan-Islamism in Practice: The Rhetoric of Muslim Unity and its Uses," in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 222.
[41] Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' in Modern Turkish Political Thought," *The Muslim World* 89, no. 3-4 (1999): 352.
[42] Nikki R. Keddie, "The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid II," *Middle Eastern Studies* 3, no. 1 (1966): 50.

Eras. In the Tanzimat Era, Islamism and Pan-Islamism appeared as a Young Ottoman ideology and a reaction against the Tanzimat regime. Furthermore, I focus on discussions of Pan-Islamism and its practice during the Hamidian Era referring to Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and the use of the caliphate, hajj and Friday sermons as means for Pan-Islamism. And finally this chapter discusses Islamism in the Young Turk Era with respect to the CUP's Islamist politics and Islamists in Russia.

The second chapter of the thesis deals with an inquiry into the journal *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* as an Islamist journal during the Second Constitutional Period. Print capitalism accelerated the distribution of newspapers and journals in Europe and at its periphery. This phenomenon forms the first part of this chapter. The Ottoman Empire also experienced this rapid acculturation in the sense of increasing distribution of newspapers and journals, and literacy. The main focus of this chapter is the history of *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad*. The meaning and change of its title and the authors of *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad*, Russian émigrés and their relations with the CUP, will be discussed in this context. In addition to that, I examine the ideology of the journal. Finally, I explain the journal's attitude during the First World War and the National Struggle.

I scrutinize, in the third chapter, the relationship amongst Islam, nation, and nationalism concerning the Ottoman Empire. A literature review will be helpful to better understand nation and nationalism. I prefer to discuss etymological and historical processes of nation and nationalism as a means for understanding the foundations of these phenomena. I argue that nations are the outcomes of the creations of common histories, symbols and cultures through a nationalization process. The relation between Islam, nation and nationalism is comprehensible through an examination of Islamic etymology of nation and nationalism, and the

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relation between Western imperialism and the Ottoman response to it. Discussing nationalism in the Ottoman Empire is crucial for understanding the political and social atmosphere.

In the fourth chapter, I concentrate on the ideology of *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* regarding their attitude towards nation and nationalism. The topic is discussed through the Islamist response to nationalism, ethnic nationalisms and critiques of Turkism. However, an alternative way of nationalism is suggested by Islamists through the search for an Islamic revival. The First World War and its aftermath shaped the final part of this chapter. In short, I analyze the concept of nation and nationalism in the articles of the journal associating them with discussions of nation and nationalism in the Young Turk Era and its aftermath.

CHAPTER II

ISLAMISM AS AN IDEOLOGY

This chapter discusses Islamism as an ideology and an historical concept within the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world. Moreover, it focuses on Islamism and Pan-Islamism in the periodization of Tanzimat, Hamidian and Young Turk Eras. Firstly it deals with the Tanzimat regime and Islamist reaction in the context of Young Ottomans, as well as the origins of Pan-Islamism in the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, it focuses on the Hamidian Era, highlighting general discussions of Pan-Islamism among Hamidian public and foreign policy, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and the use of caliphate, hajj and Friday sermons as political instruments. Finally it draws attention to the Young Turks Era in relation with the CUP's (Committee of Union and Progress) Islamism and Islamists in Russia.

Islamism was the only ideology[43] which did not attempt to change Islam or to shape it during modernization period in the Islamic world. Islamism can be defined as a reaction to the consequences of the manifestations of modernity in the Islamic world. Islamism is, in general, a title for political movements that aim to establish a

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[43] Selin Çağlayan, *Müslüman Kardeşler'den Yeni Oslmanlılar'a İslamcılık* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2011). 45.

regime dependent on the Quran and the Sunnah, as well as the glorious past of Islam and the Golden Age (*Asr-ı Saadet*).[44] According to Islamism, traditional Islam could not solve the problems of modernization which caused rapid social change in the traditional way of life. Islamism emerged because a rapid and radical shift in values[45] was seen in Islamic societies during the 19th and 20th centuries. Islamism could hence be considered as a premature child of modernity in traditional Islamic societies which had to deal with the challenges of modernization. As an example of Muslim society, modernization of the Ottoman Empire correlates firstly with territory losses and imperialism, secondly with Orientalism (namely, the Eastern Question) and missionary actions.[46] As a reaction against Western imperialism in Muslim society, mass media and intellectual publications were established and they shaped a new ideology of Islamism as a unique articulation of modernity. This process created different problems for Islamism as a new ideology within Islam itself, because Muslim societies did not come face to face with modernity as the Western world did. Türköne suggests that Islam itself can be seen as an ideology which offers a symbolic system (semiotic) similar to the political ideologies of modern times.[47] Nevertheless, Islam offered a reaction against Western imperialism and the disintegration of the Islamic world. In short, Islamists, who were *Sebilürresad* journal authors in this thesis' case study, pointed to a midway between Western progress[48] and the 'Golden Age' of Islam (*Asr-ı Saadet*). They also considered the Golden Age as the original version of Islam.[49]

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[44] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)."

[45] Nikki R. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," *The Journal of Modern History* 41, no. 1 (1969): 17.

[46] Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri*: 19.

[47] Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu*: 28.

[48] It aimed only the technological development of the West, but not moral values of it.

[49] Beşir M. Nafi, *İslamcılık: Siyasal İslam ve Akımları* (İstanbul: Yarın Yayınları, 2012). 25.

2.1. A Look at Islamism

Islam could be distinguished as a religion, a motive or social bond, but it should not be defined only as a religion. Hence, like other religions it is also a social phenomenon. Religion can be understood as a cohesive social collectivity. Islam insists on 'community' or 'collectivity'. It also creates political collectivity ruled initially by its Prophet Mohammad. Nonetheless, Islam does not separate political and religious spheres from each other as Christianity did. What's more temporal and religious authority coexists under the caliphate itself. However, modern understandings of the caliphate had different meanings in that they mainly focused on political aspects. Christianity was in the background of the daily life throughout the Reformation[50]; as for Islamist reformism, it placed religion at the core of life. Islamist reformism also used the title caliphate as a political instrument. Islam was defended as an ideology which suits rationality, modernity and paradigms of the modern age by Islamists.

Islamism as an ideology appeared at the end of the 1860s in the Ottoman Empire. Although some claimed that Islamism appeared during the Young Turk Era, it was an outcome of 'İttihad-ı İslam'[51] which was cause of the Young Ottomans.[52] Albert Hourani states that:

> "They set high value on the social morality of Islam, and tried to justify the adoption of western institutions in Islamic terms, as being not the introduction of something new but a return to the true spirit of Islam. In political matters they were democrats, believing that the modern parliamentary system was a restatement of the system of

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[50] Mehmet Murat Karakaya, *İslâm ve Terakki* (Ankara: Fecr Yayınları, 2010). 44.
[51] The meaning of ittihad-ı Islam will be discussed in further pages
[52] Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu*: 37.

constitution which had existed in early Islam and was the sole guarantee of freedom …"[53]

Türköne[54] assumes that Tunaya starts Islamism up during Young Turk Era; however, according to Tunaya, the Islamist movement wasn't introduced in Young Turk Era, but reached its homogeneity and crystallization during that time. Although the Young Ottomans are often considered as the founding fathers of Islamism, their ideology also shaped Westernism, Ottoman Constitutionalism and Turkism of the Young Turks and the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918). The shared feature of these ideologies was opposition of the 'despotism' of Sultan Abdulhamid II himself and the Hamidian Era (1876-1908/9). Following the re-establishment of the Constitution, separation among these ideologies became clearer gradually.[55]

Islamists are a group of people who came to public through ways of modernization. Names such as Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi, Muhammad Abduh, Said Halim Paşa, Mehmed Akif and Babanzade Ahmed Naim were either Islamists or had an Islamist way of life at least. Even though Islamists had common views, their understanding of society, politics and other affairs are dependent on the period in which they lived or their social circles that were multifaceted through different ideologies and benefits. However there are some vivid proponents of Islamism during the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876), Hamidian Era (1876-1908/9) and II. Constitutional Period (1908-1918).

As for Türköne's definition, Islamism arose as a consequence of the synthesis of Western ideology and traditional Islamic values, and also as a re-methodizing of

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[53] Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). 68.
[54] Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu*: 37.
[55] Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri*: 24.

Islam within its ideological form.[56] As Tunaya discussed through quotes from Said Halim Paşa: "Islamization is the movement of re-commentary of Islam according to time and space with respect to its principles of faith, morality, social and political system."[57]According to Islamism, there was a need to reform Islam, because Muslims were claimed to be deviating from a fundamental understanding of Islam. Namely the imitation of the West, passivity and inanimateness, slackness, economic servitude (capitulations and debts) were some reasons for this deviation. Negligence and faults of the ulama and administrators were the other reasons for setting Islam down the wrong path. Some of the other reasons for this backwardness were ignorance and stagnancy. This is where the Islamists blame Ottoman society and other Muslim populations for their religious ignorance. Many Muslims were far removed from the real Islam according to the Islamists.[58]

> "According to the modernists the contemporary Islam is the primary cause for the backwardness of the Islamic countries. For them, the basic way to save Islamic societies from backwardness, is the return to the basic principles and practices of Islam, the opening of the gate of ictihad and thus regaining the ability to adopt the religion and technology which, according them, is in essence "an Islamic property which has been lost but now founded in the hands of Europeans" and to establish an Islamic union containing all the Muslim communities in the world in order to resist the European expansion."[59]

As a result, the notions of backwardness and decline were quite popular among Islamists intellectuals in the modernization period of the Ottoman Empire.

Islamists also used this discourse in order to explain the ongoing situation in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. For them, one of the reasons for this

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[56] Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu*: 29.
[57] Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*: 13.
[58] Ibid., 10.
[59] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 15-16.

backwardness was the superficial imitation of the West. Tunaya quotes from Mehmed Akif, "When a society imitates everything such as religious imitation, mundane imitation, imitation of clothing, imitation of greeting, imitation of language and words; then that society can't be viewed as a genuine society, moreover, its members cannot live."[60] Islamists also discussed the economic dependency on the West which was, at that time, ensured via the continuation of capitulations. In their view, Islamic societies were backward in technology, art, and science and so forth. Whereas Islam originally commands being active in technique, art and commerce, Muslims were in terrible conditions regarding their economic status.[61]

Islamism was a bilateral ideological formula which had to be applied to social and political life and it consists of the principles of faith, thought and behavior. It had something to say both for public and private realms. On the one hand, it aimed at forming the lives of all members of the Islamic world, especially Muslims'. It presented an idealized prototype to all members of Islamic society. On the other hand, it had a political collective plan which aimed to demonstrate the true path to all societies of the Islamic world. In short, Islamism intended to describe an idealized *modus vivendi* for individuals and societies.[62] Islamist politics was not only interested in an united Islamic state, on the contrary, every ethnic group or nation in the Islamic world had to progress and unite around the Caliph and against the West which was curtailing the freedom of Muslims. When genuine Islam was reestablished, progress, unity and rise would automatically come to Islamic society. As an ideology Islamism embraced an emancipatory stance. Creating a new understanding of education and civil society would also be very beneficial to

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[60] Mehmed Akif, "Tefsir-i Şerif," *Sebilürreşad* 9, no. 209 (1328/1912).
[61] Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*: 11.
[62] Ibid., 19.

progress and salvation. Thus Islamism backed up co-operation against unity regarding Islamic togetherness as a resistance against Western imperialism.

According to Islamists the single source of salvation for the Ottoman Empire and Islamic societies was the process of Islamization (Islamism). Moreover, this process had to turn its face to the Islamic roots and the Golden Age. However, the progress of Europe and Western pressure on the Ottoman Empire created a reaction which had rough effects on the genesis of Islamism. The domination of Western acculturation spurred reactions against Western modernity in Islamic societies. This reaction was sometimes identified with Islamism. In other words, Islamism was an ideology of Islamic modernism and a particular kind of modernity within Islam. Although Islamism was itself a part of modern thought, it was against Western style modernization. For instance, Islamism was completely against positivism which defended the priority of science over religion. Despite the similarities between Islamism and other ideologies, and the emphasis on progressivism (like socialism, liberalism), which used the notion of progress as its motto, it had an antagonist attitude towards other ideologies. According to Islamists, progress was not only the purpose, but rather the means to establish a good society.

Frankly speaking, although Islam was seen as an obstacle against progress in Western ideology and by Westernists in the Ottoman Empire, it did not function as such.[63] According to W. C. Smith, Islam was the reason for the yawning gap between Arabs and the West.[64] Because of these claims, Islamists sought to prove that Islam was not a hindrance to progress. The decline of the Islamic world had several reasons, but Islam itself was not the reason for that decline. On the one side, Islamic

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[63] Ibid., 14.
[64] Muhammed Hüseyin, *Modernizmin İslâm Dünyasına Girişi* (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2004). 92.

rationality lost its roots; on the other side, it was misunderstood in the practices of those times. As stated in Tunaya's work, Islamists discussed that Islam, as a reformist religion, in fact orders progress (*amir-i terakki*, not *mani-i terakki*). Stagnation or decline was the fault of Muslims, not Islam.[65] This decline could only be prevented through the re-adoption of Golden Age practices. In fact, during its Golden Age, Islam advocated a reformist doctrine that fostered revolutionary ideas. Centuries ago Islam succeeded in creating structures which were seen as modern and original by the West.[66] The revolution of Islam was very progressive during that century in which it had rapidly diffused, especially within Arab societies.

Islamism was against Orientalist discourses and tried to prove that Islam was not against progress. It also considered Islamic civilization as the one and only civilization ever.[67] According to Islamists the West took science and scientific techniques from Islam, especially from *Al-Andalus*. This discourse shaped the whole Islamic reactionary discourse against the West. An example of this transfer of science, literature and technique pertains to Victor Hugo. According to Kara's quotation from Ali Tayyar's essay titled as '*İslâmiyet-Terakkiyat*' at *Beyanü'l Hak*, some of Victor Hugo's books were adapted from Arabic booklets.[68] Islamists defended that Islam was as a conceivable system as Western ideologies. What the West did was simply to continue this mode of progress and to develop already existing Islamic knowledge.

Turning back to the principles of real Islam would call for the progress of the Ottoman Empire according to Islamists. In line with this, Islamists endeavored to

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[65] Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*: 17.
[66] Ibid., 16.
[67] Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri*: 26.
[68] Ibid., 27.

research Islam and the East in order to better understand and prove the existence of Islamic civilization.[69] As an Islamist intellectual, Mehmet Akif[70] points out the clear reality that there are only two paths for Muslims; to progress with modernization as an Islamic state or to become a non-Muslim society.[71] According to his ideas it is impossible to remain a traditional society; hence the need for a re-Islamization of Muslims. Muslims who used to practice Islam in the wrong way had to be converted again to genuine Islam. In short, real Islam and its understanding had to be reestablished according to the ideas of Islamists.

Islamism referred to the Golden Age in order to recreate Islam from its origins. The romanticism of Islamism is apparent when looking back to the Golden Age and quoting reforms from this period. "For Muslims, the great age of early Islam served as an image of what the world should be."[72] This shows that Islamism was in fact not a reform itself, but just an ideology reviving Islamic origins. Tunaya argues that this movement aimed at an Islamic Renaissance.[73] Although Christian reforms had clashed with Catholic origins and created new sects against Catholicism, Islamic reforms were not against religious origins. The enemy set against Islamic reform was not original Islam, but rather traditional Islam (wrong Islam). While the Islamist method was reformist, it did not create new facts. One of its main goals was 'revitalization' of Islamic society. Although some asserted that Islamism tried to look back toward the Golden Age and its origins, its efforts were primarily directed at

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[69] Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*: 20.

[70] Akif did not call himself and anyone as an Islamist. 'Islamism' term was an apocryphally notion. The term Muslim was enough for the members of this circle.

[71] Mehmed Akif, "Mevize," *Sebilürreşad* 9, no. 230 (1328/1913): 375. "Bütün insaniyet alabildiğine pek uzaklardaki bir noktaya, bir gayeye doğru koşup gidiyor. Beşeriyet coşkun bir sel gibi umman-ı terakkiye atılmak için alabildiğine akıyor. Bu selin önünde durulamaz. İşte biz de ya boğulacağız, ya o sel ile beraber gideceğiz."

[72] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*: 8.

[73] Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*: 2.

inserting modern notions into an Islamic framework.[74] Most Islamists had no antagonistic tendencies, but they were more likely congruent intellectuals. Islamist movements also utilized psychological indoctrination and power.[75]

Although Islamism argued that it was against the modernity of the West, it used the methodology of Western modernization. For instance, Islamism focused on individuals and called Muslims to join a modern movement while traditional Islam emphasized obedience, fate, and consent. Islamism requires the reform of individuals, whereas Islam interferes with individual lives of Muslims in order to reform the community and Islam itself. Islamism did not only aim at communities as Islam did; rather, it targeted masses for illumination. These implications were argued by Young Ottomans against fatalist religious understanding. Ali Suavi also claimed that Westernism and Islamism cannot clash with each other.[76] Young Turk Era Islamists had also similar understandings.

The proportion of the Muslim population within the Empire gradually increased during the end of 19th century and the beginning of 20th century because of territorial losses. This rising of Muslim population rate inclined Ottoman administrators and intellectuals to argue about the situation of the Empire and Islam. As a consequence of this, the Islamist movement in the Ottoman Empire found its political drive. For instance, some high-ranking bureaucrats[77] were in the Islamist circle. But the Islamist movement branched off into different categories; in addition to this, Islamism was associated with Westernists and Turkists during Young Turk Era. Islamists criticized not only autocratic entities like the Hamidian regime, but

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[74] Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri*: 8-9.
[75] Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*: 3.
[76] Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*: 91.
[77] Said Halim Paşa who became grand vizier would be a very beneficial example.

also the whole of Islamic history, excluding the Golden Age and Rashidun period. Islamists, compared to other ideologies of the Young Turk Era, i.e. Westernists and Turkists, were more conservative and rationalistic. However some of Islamists defended the same ideas as the Turkists and Westernists.

2.2. A Nascent Ideology: Islamism during Tanzimat Era (1839-1876)

Islamism emerged as a reactionary movement in the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world. The Tanzimat regime engendered intellectual opposition. Tanzimat regime was a Western type of modernization that sought to establish the Ottoman nation and equality of citizens. Ottoman populations turned from *reaya* into *teba'a*. "The period of the institutional reforms, from 1826 to 1878, was a period where gradually secular institutions, imitations of the European originals, began to dominate public life in the Ottoman Empire at the expense of the traditional Islamic institutions."[78] However Tanzimat's secular laws and politics were criticized by a young generation of Muslims, especially Turks who later formed the Young Ottomans. Islamism emerged as a reaction against the outcomes of the Edict of Reform [*Islahat Fermanı*].[79] The Tanzimat regime was anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish according to Ziya Paşa and Namık Kemal, leading figures of the Young Ottomans.[80] An Islamic political movement emerged as a faction among the Young Ottomans.[81] Secular laws of the Tanzimat regime were criticized by Young Ottomans on behalf

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[78] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 31.
[79] Ali Bulaç, "İslâmın Üç Siyaset Tarzı veya İslâmcıların Üç Nesli," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim 2005), 48.
[80] Fazlur Rahman, *Islam&Modernity: Transformation on an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982). 49.
[81] Umit Cizre Sakallioglu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 2 (1996): 233.

of withdrawing Islamic law and sharia.[82] For Young Ottomans, the Sublime Porte's policies were irreligious, especially those of Âli Paşa and Fuad Paşa. "In other words, sharia was providing a basis for the opposition against the sultans and bureaucracy in the Ottoman Empire."[83] Even so Young Ottomans did not directly criticize the Sultan himself, but Âli Paşa and Fuad Paşa.[84] "In general, the gearing of Turkish reform to the wishes of the Christian populations of the empire made reform something lopsided in which the Moslem populations had no share."[85] Pro-Western attitude and pro-Christian policies of the Tanzimat regime sparked a reaction that lead to the creation of Islamism[86] among Muslim intellectuals who gathered as Young Ottomans.[87]

2.2.1. Young Ottomans' Islamism

The reactionary movement of Young Ottomans was based on a modern understanding of Islam that criticized the Tanzimat's secular regime and laws that allegedly favored non-Muslims. For Young Ottomans, Christians had more rights and privileges than Muslims.[88] Young Ottomans were frustrated with Tanzimat reforms that helped Christians of the Ottoman Empire more than Muslims.[89] They

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[82] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*: 216.

[83] Necmettin Doğan, "The Origins of Liberalism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire: (1908-1914) (A Sociological Perspective)" (Freien Universität Berlin, 2006), 36.

[84] Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton: Syracuse University Press 2000). 108.

[85] Ibid., 18.

[86] Mümtaz'er Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslâmcılığın Doğuşu* (İstanbul: Etkileşim, 2011). 77.

[87] Rahman, *Islam&Modernity: Transformation on an Intellectual Tradition*: 49. Carter V. Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity : A history, 1789-2007* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). 106.

[88] Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslâmcılığın Doğuşu*: 74.

[89] Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," 20.

criticized economic favors that were granted to the Christians after 1856.[90] Inequality between Muslims and Christians and secular laws drove Young Ottomans towards an Islamist policy for the sake of Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire. For the intellectuals of the 1860s who were against Tanzimat's policies and laws, Islam relied on the use of rhetoric for broader aspects of politics which included Islam as a social bond that can create civil community, common language, a solution for identity crisis, and an opportunity for opposition against the dictatorship of the Sublime Porte.[91]

Young Ottomans decided to use Islam as an instrument of opposition against the Sublime Porte.[92] Although the deployment of sharia against the government is a common tradition in Islamic history, Young Ottomans for the first time in the Ottoman Empire referred to the Golden Age (*Asr-ı Saadet*).[93] They did not only use old Islamic terms to put forward new ideas, but also they referred to Islamic methods of reasoning to justify their actions through Islam.[94] Young Ottomans' main idea was that reforms should be based on Islam, not simply Western imitation.[95] "They were, in fact, pioneers of Islamic modernism. They attempted to synthesize modernization with Islam and re-emphasized Islam as an essential basis of Ottoman state and society."[96] Even though Young Ottomans used Islam as an instrument and created

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[90] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*: 96.
[91] Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslâmcılığın Doğuşu*: 98.
[92] Ibid., 84.
[93] Ibid., 82.
[94] Carter Findley, "The Tanzimat," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 32.
[95] Erick Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010). 68.
[96] Çetinsaya, "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' in Modern Turkish Political Thought," 352.

Islamism as an opposition policy against the Sublime Porte, they were not practicing and devout Muslims, especially during European stays.[97]

Publication of newspapers had a transformative and determinant effect on the genesis of Islamism[98] as an ideology. Islamist-opposition newspapers writing against the Tanzimat regime included *İbret*, *Hürriyet* and *Basiret*. Some of these journals were published by Young Ottomans, a heterogenous group of young people who shared the anti-Tanzimat ideas. Their common characteristic was being antagonist intellectuals against the Tanzimat regime. Some of them were educated in Western schools, some were aristocrats and some were members of Chambers of Translation. As an Islamic reactionary movement, Young Ottomans' had no concrete or clear theoreticians.[99] The ideologues of the Young Ottomans were not homogenous either. Some were Islamists, some defended a republican understanding and even a kind of pre-Turkism. Since Young Ottomans were journalists, they wrote daily essays; as such, their essays sometimes did not fulfill ideological stability. Furthermore they wrote according to concurrent political situation and social changes.

With respect to the modernization of the Ottoman political system they offered Western institutions with an Islamic justification. Namık Kemal was likely the first person who invented modern Islamist political thought in the Ottoman Empire's Turkish speaking parts.[100] Islam was not just an instrument for Young Ottomans; furthermore it became a base for freedom, constitutionalism and equality

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[97] Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslâmcılığın Doğuşu*: 92.
[98] Ibid., 65.
[99] Şerif Mardin, "19.yy'da Düşünce Akımları ve Osmanlı Devleti," in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Murat Belge (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 346.
[100] Michelangelo Guida, "Al-Afghānī and Namık Kemal's Replies to Ernest Renan: Two Anti-Westernist Works in the Formative Stage of Islamist Thought," *Turkish Journal of Politics* vol. 2, no. 2 (2011): 66.

for Young Ottomans.[101] Namık Kemal, Ziya Paşa and Ali Suavi were the first Islamist group to react against Western imitation; however they also established a Western conceptual framework.[102] On the one hand they were the first Muslims to justify modern institutions in terms of Islam.[103] On the other hand, Young Ottomans benefited from Islamic political thought and its vocabulary in their writings.[104] They invented or reinterpreted Islamic concepts such as *meşveret* (consultancy), *şura* (counsel), *vatan* (fatherland), *hürriyet* (freedom) and *terakki* (progress). They used these concepts, especially constitutionalism, to check the government and Tanzimat pashas, and as a unifying factor against nationalist movements.[105]

Young Ottomans' Islamism can be summarized as a search for ways to apply Western universal values to the Ottoman Empire through the lens of Islamic and intellectual history.[106] Their Islamism was not only dependent upon introducing modern institutions and concepts, but also a leading position for the Islamic world in order to get back its strength and to maintain its independence.[107] "The concept of Muslim unity was defined also as the search for progress, modernity, or civilization."[108]

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[101] Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslâmcılığın Doğuşu*: 93.

[102] Bulaç, "İslâmın Üç Siyaset Tarzı veya İslâmcıların Üç Nesli," 52-53.

[103] Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2002). 50.

[104] Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*: 81.

[105] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 32.

[106] Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslâmcılığın Doğuşu*: 108.

[107] Mehrdad Kia, *The Ottoman Empire* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2008). 133.

[108] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*: 122.

2.2.2. Origins of Pan-Islamism in the Ottoman Empire

Although Abdulhamid benefitted from his Pan-Islamist policy to keep the Empire alive, Özcan claims that the political usage of Pan-Islamism started before the Hamidian Era with the extensive usage of religious notions, symbols, religious dignitaries, and emphasis on the unity and solidarity of Muslims.[109] Pan-Islamism emerged as a reaction against the situation of the Muslim world and the European threat. In the Ottoman Empire reactionaries, liberals and Muslim progressives expressed an interest in Pan-Islamism.[110] The Ottoman Empire would get back its strength through a Pan-Islamist ideology and Islamic revival.

Pan-Islamism was invented by Young Ottomans.[111] They presented it as a solution for the calamities of Muslim societies and explored ideological potentials of Islam.[112] Newspapers such as *İbret* and *Basiret* became the spokesman of Pan-Islamist ideology. Young Ottomans published several articles regarding the unity of Muslims in these journals. Some members of the Young Ottomans, especially Namık Kemal, were initially ideologists of Pan-Islamism.[113] During 1860's Young Ottomans suggested the term *İttihad-ı İslam* (Islamic Union – Pan-Islam). In fact, Ziya Paşa, one of the leading figures of Young Ottomans, coined the term.[114] After a while, Namık Kemal named his article '*İttihad-ı İslam*'[115] and explained Islam and

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[109] Azmi Özcan, *Pan Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)* (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 25-6.

[110] Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," *The American Historical Review* 47, no. 2 (1942): 283.

[111] Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*: 60.

[112] Özcan, *Pan Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)*: 34-5.

[113] Keddie, "The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid II," 48.

[114] Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 3.

[115] Basiret, 8 April 1872.

propounded pan-Islamist thought. According to Namık Kemal's ideology, for the progress of Muslims, unity was essential.

Since Young Ottomans had a constitutionalist ideology, they were eager to include Pan-Islamist features by laws in the constitution. To illustrate, the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 had several pan-Islamist components, e.g. Islam became the official religion of the Empire and the Ottoman Sultan's protectorate over the Muslims as the Caliph formalized in writing. However they did not only defend a pure Islamism, but Ottomanism too. Their Pan-Islamism (*İttihad-ı İslam*) did not clash with Ottomanism (*İttihad-ı Anasır*).[116] For instance Namık Kemal's ideology was a unification of Pan-Ottomanism and Islamist nationalism.[117]

Ottoman intellectuals, especially Young Ottomans were influenced by the 'Pan' ideologies of Europe, but as a reactionary movement. The unification of Germany and Italy, themselves outgrowths of Pan-Slavism, impacted the Young Ottomans' thoughts.[118] Although pan ideologies had nationalist aspects in Europe such as pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism, Pan-Islamism was generally against (ethnic) nationalism. Pan-Islam had a character of religious anti-imperialism. Pan-Islam is the only 'Pan' ideology which was based on religious commonalities, others were based on ethnicity, race or geographical area. Ottoman intellectuals tried to use Pan ideology as a unification instrument for Islam against the Europeans.

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[116] Kasuya Gen, "The Influence of al-Manar on Islamism in Turkey: The case of Mehmed Âkif," in *Intellectuals in the Modern Islamic World: Transmission, Transformation, Communication*, ed. Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Komatsu Hisao, and Kosugi Yasushi (New York: Routledge, 2006), 80.
[117] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*: 221.
[118] Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," 20.

2.3. Islamism during Hamidian Era (1876-1908/1909)

Abdulhamid became the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire in 1876 and after a while he accepted the promulgation of the Ottoman Constitution.[119] Due to the Russian war of 1877-1878, he suspended the Ottoman Parliament indefinitely and that was the end of First Constitutional Period.[120] In that process he exiled many opposition figures and intellectuals and started to establish his own unique regime that was heavily dependent upon Young Ottomans' Pan-Islamist ideology as the Caliphate of Muslims. His era is identified with the rise of Pan-Islamism as a foreign policy, however his Pan-Islamism never turned to an anti-Western challenge, because his foreign policy is heavily dependent on balance policy. He was obliged to accept the Young Turks' request for the re-proclamation of the 1876 Constitution in 1908 and continued his Sultanate until the 31 March Incident in 1909. Even though he had a Pan-Islamist ideology, he was criticized by modern Islamists because of his despotic regime. In order to understand the Islamist transition from Young Ottomans' legacy to Young Turks, Hamidian Pan-Islamism will be examined with respect to all spheres of Pan-Islamism.

2.3.1. A Way of Unity: Pan-Islamism

Until the end of the nineteenth century Islamic societies did not face a social evolution which caused nationalist movements and modernization. The idea of Pan-Islamism originated from the West as it is understood from its prefix 'pan', but it was against Western imperialism and aimed to increase religious sentiments among

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[119] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 117.
[120] Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity : A history, 1789-2007*: 133.

Muslims. Pan-Islamism meant, in short, the unity of Islam with the intention of uniting all Muslims with religious bonds around that ideology.

> "Pan-Islam at first glance might seem to be the continuation of a largely traditional sentiment, since Islamic thinkers had often spoken of the unity of all believers, their common action against the non-Islamic world, and, at least in the classical period, their loyalty to a single caliph. Yet, on closer examination, Pan-Islam seems to have more resemblance to modern nationalist movements than to older Islamic feelings. Pan-Islam, like Asian and African nationalism, was primarily a reaction to Western imperialism."[121]

Islam is itself a 'Pan' movement because one of its provisions orders brotherhood, but pan-Islamism occurred as a reactionary movement against the West, especially orientalists. Islam itself has international features with respect to its emphasis on equality[122] because it prohibits discrimination based on the ethnicity, gender, or race of individuals and/or societies. Being a Muslim means to become equal as individuals. Islamic equality promulgates the brotherhood of the Islamic community and its individual constituent. Pan-Islamism could then be described as a reactionary, uniting, progressive and religious movement during the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, and became a state-policy during Hamidian Era. Its impacts are still felt in the political and social structure of the Islamic world today. That is to say, the phenomenon of 'East vs. West' had its origins within Pan-Islamism. In summation, pan-Islam was a modern phenomenon, but it also had religious origins regarding its motives.

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[121] Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," 18.
[122] C.H.Becker, "Panislâmizm," in *Siyasi İslâm ve Pan İslamizm*, ed. Mümtaz'er Türköne and Ümit Özdağ (Ankara: Rehber Yayıncılık, 1993), 21.

Gabriel Charmes was the first person to have used the term 'pan-Islam' in an extensive way.[123] His interpretation meant a reaction against the Christian Powers and a call for Muslim union. Lee states that Franz von Werner made the term popular at the beginning of 1880s.[124] However, in German, the word 'Pan-Islamismus' was used before July 1876. Furthermore, in English the term was used in December 31, 1877 by Arminius Vambéry in a letter published in the Daily Telegraph. During 1880's, the term pan-Islam was used in various types of works, especially in the periodicals. According to Lee;

> "In regard to the general character of Pan-Islamism the orientalists have clearly shown that its ultimate objective was the 'realization of the Islamic ideal, the unity of the world in Islam, the central direction under a leader (Imam) of the world community', and that the basic concept from which thought and action sprang was religious rather than racial or national."[125]

Pan-Islamism is like a synonym for *İttihad-ı İslam* which had its roots in idea of unity for the whole Islamic world.

Political unity or single Islamic state was only an utopia, and in parallel to this the aim of Pan-Islamism was to create a religious union between individuals and states because religious unity would create a reaction against the heathens, but not a unique Islamic state. However, unity was already established amongst Muslims. Since the Arabic language is the language of the Quran, it serves as a unifying factor for all Muslims. Thus, it had already created a unity within Islam in terms of language. When it comes to Pan-Islamism it is not an organized movement, but a

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[123] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 2.
[124] Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," 281.
[125] Ibid., 279.

tendency in the Islamic societies.[126] "The Pan-Islamic propaganda was thus carried on mainly through the medium of the Arabic language and with the help of men of Arab origin."[127] As in Germany, Italy and the USA, Muslims had to be united in a federal structure for setting up a Great Power with the Caliphate at the center. The center would be the most powerful Islamic state, i.e. the Ottoman Empire.

There was debate regarding this federalist idea. One problem pertained to where 'the center' would be located because some non-Turk Muslim groups would not want a political center within the Ottoman Empire, i.e. a Turkish center. Another problem with Pan-Islam was associated with the concept of nation. Although the Quran condemned divisiveness, the historical and social background caused problems within the Muslim societies. It laid the foundation for nationalist sentiments, especially after the First World War. "…Pan-Islam, which had its heyday in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was an important step in the transition from Islamic to national loyalties."[128] Nationalism within the Islamic societies was a potential handicap for the Pan-Islamic ideal. According to some critiques, one of the reasons behind the clashes within the Islamic societies is the Great Powers' provocations.

> "The Christian powers were stirring up mutual hatred between Muslim groups, as when they roused the Bosnians, then the Albanians, to demand independence from Turkish 'despotism'; or the French encouragement of a revival of the Berber language, to foster their separate identity; or the British, Italians, and French stirring up the Arabs against the Turks."[129]

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[126] C.H.Becker, "Panislâmizm," 40.
[127] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*: 106.
[128] Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," 18.
[129] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 81.

The British also attempted to create an Arab caliph who could be an alternative to the Ottoman sultan and to break down his power. Pan-Islamism could be seen from this aspect as a policy of territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire. This separatist policy would supply easy paths for occupation of Muslim lands. Although Pan-Islamism was originally a religious movement, it was a considerable political drive.

One of the core matters of pan-Islamism was the so-called 'Eastern Question'. The Eastern Question referred to the sharing of Islamic land and the Ottoman Empire, which created a negative backlash against the Great Powers. Western and Christian imperialism led to the formation of pan-Islamism. "The tendency toward Pan-Islamism was one aspect of the reaction of Moslems [Muslims] to the impact of Christian West."[130] A West-East dichotomy was the reality at the beginning of the 20th century. The Indian example of British imperialism shows that pan-Islam had its roots within colonialism since Pan-Islamism also existed into India.

> "It was from the late 1870's onwards that the Indo-Muslim interest in the Ottomans reached its peak and assumed a dramatic character. In the face of western encroachments on the Muslim lands, the Ottomans appeared to represent all that the Indian Muslims aspired; they viewed Turkey as the pride of Islam and the Sultan-Caliph as the symbol of universal fraternity and the protector of all Muslims."[131]

Because of the British and Russian expansions, Asiatic and Indian Muslims were eager to flirt with Pan-Islamism; in addition, they appealed to the Ottoman Sultan for help against those non-Muslims. But the Ottoman Sultan could not efficiently be of

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[130] Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," 281.
[131] Özcan, *Pan Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)*: IX.

any help. This ensured that "pan-Islam was a spiritual rather than a political concept"[132] in Indian and Asiatic sense.

Pan-Islamism attempted to turn the focus back to the fundamentals of Islam. Pan-Islamism was generally associated with unity (*ittihad*) and co-operation (*ittifak*) of Muslims; moreover, it vehemently rejected the divisiveness (*tafarruk*) among Muslims. Some Islamists argued that there were differences between the notions unity and co-operation. Even though Pan-Islamism was the ideal of Pan-Islamists, it was just an utopia for several reasons. Muhammad Abduh, pupil of Afghani and one of the leading intellectuals of Islamic modernism in Egypt[133] claimed that a united cosmopolitan Muslim state was a politically vain effort, although he called Muslims to unite against heathens.[134] He focused more on social reforms rather than political unity.

Some intellectuals who were not Islamists defended aspects of Pan-Islamism. Pertaining to unity, Prens Sabahaddin, nephew of Sultan Abdulhamid and one of the leaders of Young Turks[135], placed blame on former sultans and Ottoman bureaucrats for not using the office of the Caliphate for centuries. Landau points that, "Yet, it had been the seat of the Caliphate for four centuries, without doing anything for the political union of Muslim nations. Only in the second half of his reign had Abdulhamid been favouring such a policy – on a religious level, in order to strengthen his hold on the Muslims within his own empire."[136] The 'leader' of the Young Turks, Ahmed Rıza, also mentioned Pan-Islam and declared that "as a

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[132] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 157.
[133] Ibid., 16.
[134] Ibid., 25.
[135] Nezahat Nurettin Ege, *Prens Sabahaddin: Hayatı ve İlmi Müdafaaları* (İstanbul: Güneş Neşriyat, 1977). 25. Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1983). 173.
[136] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 28.

sentiment of solidarity and desire for union Pan-Islam was praiseworthy and considerably less dangerous than either Pan-Slavism or Pan-Germanism."[137] Mizancı Murad, one of the leading figures among Young Turks at the end of 19th century, also discussed Pan-Islam and advised Muslims to do business everywhere, to set up Muslim schools in Black Africa, to send the Caliph's representatives to every Muslim land.[138] Even though his recommendation was against European imperialism which was dominating the East, his ideas related to Africa and other places ironically involved imperialistic tendencies.

2.3.1.1. Hamidian Pan-Islamism

The key policies of Abdulhamid established a balance between the Great Powers and Pan-Islamism. Pan-Islamist policies started with the treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* (Kuichiik Kainarja) in 1774 which enabled the Ottoman Empire to have religious sovereignty over the Crimean Muslims. However, the actual impact of Pan-Islamism started just prior to the Hamidian Era. In 1874 Sultan Abdulaziz sent some ammunition and Ottoman officers to Yakub Beg to train troops in Kashgar.[139] On the other side, British attitude towards Pan-Islamism was pro-Pan-Islamist until the Berlin Treaty. The Caliph-Sultan Abdulaziz helped the British in India by calling for Indian Muslims to obey British rule. In the meantime, he took some measures against Russian expansion. Despite the Sultan's supports for the British in India, his measures against Russia show his bilateral Pan-Islamist policy. Meanwhile, British friendship with the Ottoman Empire gradually turned hostility. "Pan-Islamism

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[137] Ibid., 29.
[138] Ibid., 33.
[139] Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," 284.

appeared to be a great menace to the British Empire was the result of the change between 1878 and 1895 from British friendship for the sultan-caliph to hostility."[140]

Sultan Abdulhamid systematized his uncles' (Sultan Abdulaziz) Pan-Islamist policies.[141] He produced a multifaceted Pan-Islamist policy which attempted to help many Muslim societies. For instance, Abdulhamid sent Ottoman battleship *Ertuğrul* to Japan to visit Muslim communities. In addition to his uncle's missions, he sent a mission to Afghanistan. Another mission to the East, led by Hasan Enver Celâlettin Paşa, was sent to the Muslims of China. The Sultan's North-African policy was intended to stir up Islamic sentiment against the French. The Hamidian project, in Chad had to give up because of lack of funds.[142] There are several examples of similar missions directed at helping Muslims all over the world. Abdulhamid's policies also prevented the Great Powers form progressing into Muslim lands. For instance British occupation in India or Egypt was affected by pan-Islamist policy and was transformed into a reaction or strike against imperialists. Two important concrete outcomes of Hamidian Pan-Islamism were the Hijaz Railway and Red Crescent Society (Osmanlı Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyeti).[143] The Greco-Turkish war during 1897 also successfully increased the popularity of Abdulhamid[144] with regards to his Pan-Islamist policy.

When Abdulhamid became the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, he first moved the center to the palace (Yıldız). The shift from Bab-ı Ali to Yıldız created a new circle around the Sultan. Abdulhamid created his own circle with men who were

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[140] Ibid., 286.
[141] Ahmet Şeyhun, *Said Halim Paşa: Osmanlı Devlet Adamı ve İslamcı Düşünür (1965-1921)* (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2010). 37.
[142] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 41.
[143] Ibid., 55.
[144] C.H.Becker, "Panislâmizm," 34.

interested in the idea of Pan-Islam. For instance, Arab İzzet Paşa and Hayreddin Paşa had strong interests in Pan-Islamism. Arab Izzet Paşa was responsible for the construction of Hijaz Railroad.[145] This circle was trying to propagate inside and outside so that people were made to believe that Abdulhamid was the Protector of all Muslims and the only Caliph.

Although Hamidian regime conflicted with Young Ottomans' constitutionalism, his Pan-Islamist policy matched with Young Ottomans' Islamism. Since he used the caliph title as a political instrument, he had to deal with Muslims' social, political and economic issues. Özcan declares that;

> "He took his duties and responsibilities as sovereign ruler and as Caliph seriously and was anxious to ensure the welfare of all Muslims. In fact, it was because of his consideration that his external Pan-Islamism was also directed at bringing about unity and solidarity among the Muslims so that their cultural, religious, social, and material progress could be achieved. This side of his Pan-Islamism was, needless to say, the legacy of Young Ottoman thought."[146]

Sultan Abdulhamid promulgated a sensitive side of his caliphate, evidenced by the fact that he did not belong to neither Qureish tribe, nor to the Arab nation. "To counteract such propaganda and to popularize his position as true Caliph, many books and pamphlets were written containing the verses of the Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet"[147] It is clear that Abdulhamid was against Turkish nationalism because of his pan-Islamist policy, but at the same time, he was highlighting the Turkish characteristics of the Ottoman dynasty.

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[145] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 70.
[146] Özcan, *Pan Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)*: 47.
[147] Ibid., 49.

In order to increase the effect of his Pan-Islamist policy Sultan Abdulhamid used various propaganda tools. Firstly, during pilgrimage it was circulated that Hamid was the only Caliph and cared for all Muslims. He also included Kurdish and Albanian troops to strengthen Islamic forces and to unite all Muslims in the Empire.

> "By such gestures as the employment of numerous Arabs and Albanians in his service, the conferral of privileges and decorations on Albanian, Arab, and Kurdish chieftains, and the placement of Arab provinces at the top of the list in official yearbooks, Abdulhamid II attempted to forge a polyethnic brotherhood of Muslims."[148]

In line with his aim, he founded a school called *aşiret mektebi* or -tribal school- in the capital in order to create a united Islamist bond between tribes.[149] The curriculum of the school was focused on some religious sciences, as well as Islamic history and Ottoman geography. As for religious sects (*tarikats*), they were not involved in the politics of pan-Islam. It was particularly thanks to Abdulhamid that they were excluded from political discussions.

Another propaganda tool was the press. Strikingly Abdulhamid himself paid some authors and newspapers to promote his Pan-Islamist policy. As Landau confirms "In London, there seem to have been irregular press publications subsidized by Abdulhamid, but in Paris, from the 1880s until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, there regularly appeared a weekly named *L'Orient Journal de Défense des Intérêsts de l'Empire Ottoman*."[150] These periodicals emphasized that there were no political intentions behind Hamidian Pan-Islamism, especially against the Great Powers, but that they had only religious intentions for uniting the Muslims. There

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[148] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*: 130.
[149] Eugene L. Rogan, "Aşiret Mektebi: Abdülhamid II's School for Tribes (1892-1907)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 01 (1996).
[150] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 63.

were probably also some periodicals in the Arabic lands to propagate the idea that Abdulhamid was the successor of the Prophet Muhammad and the Protector of all Muslims.

Although the Sultan was the Caliph of Muslims, he had to convince European powers that his own spiritual leadership of Muslims everywhere was a significant contribution to his power.[151] Abdulhamid himself focused on Muslims all over the world, not only on his Ottoman subjects. During his reign, the number of devout Muslims in the bureaucracy and the palace increased. Sultan Abdulhamid himself focused on the ulama class, especially judges (*kadis*) and appointed some of them himself. His attention to the ulama class, religious schools, and their conditions is a sign of his Pan-Islamist policy. One of the goals behind Hamidian Pan-Islamism was to rescue the Ottoman Empire from the Great Powers. "…when the powers were persuaded that the Sultan-Caliph's appeal to their own Muslim subjects was effective they would be deterred from attacking the Ottoman Empire."[152] That is, Abdulhamid used Pan-Islamic propaganda against the Great Powers[153] to prevent any possible territorial losses against them, because they had Muslim colonies.

Hamidian Pan-Islamist policy proved successful especially because Arabs were not involved in any separatist or nationalist movement until the First World War. Nonetheless, "There is no evidence to suggest that he ever seriously and realistically contemplated the formation of a global Muslim united front for military

[151] Ibid., 37.
[152] Ibid., 39.
[153] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*: 130.

purposes against the Christian domination, nor did he encourage the Muslims to rise against their Christian rulers." [154]

> "Contrary to the assertions of many Westerners, there is no evidence to the effect that Abdulhamid ever claimed political sovereignty over the Muslims outside his dominion. But he was persistent in exercising his caliphal rights to appoint religious officials to the former Ottoman territories, now under foreign rule, in order to maintain his influence among the Muslim residents of these territories, as well as to meet their religious needs." [155]

Despite all this discussion of Abdulhamid's having no intention of having sovereignty over all Muslims, it is undeniable that he tried to create a universal ulama. With this purpose, he invited some ulama members to his palace. Even Afghani came and stayed in the Ottoman capital.[156]

During the Hamidian Era, there was a rapprochement between Iran and the Ottoman Empire with respect to pan-Islamist policies. "For example, the Ottoman ambassador in Tehran reported that for the first time in Iran prayers were publicly offered for the victory of the Ottomans during the Russo-Turkish war."[157] Moreover, the Shah visited Istanbul and presented a Quran to Abdulhamid in 1900.[158] Meanwhile, Kaiser Wilhelm supported and tried to benefit from pan-Islamism, since there was no German dominion over Islamic lands. His visit to the Ottoman Empire and the Holy Land shows how important pan-Islamism was to him and Germany. "Wilhelm II wished to become not only the Protector of all Christians in the Holy

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[154] Özcan, *Pan Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)*: 51.
[155] Ibid., 51-2.
[156] Aytek Sever, "A Pan-Islamist in Istanbul: Jamal Ad-Din Afghani and Hamidian Islamism, 1892-1897" (Middle East Technical University, 2010), 130.
[157] Özcan, *Pan Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)*: 56.
[158] Ibid., 58.

Land but, simultaneously, the Friend of Muslims everywhere as well – no mean achievement."[159]

There were three groups of ideas regarding the pan-Islamist aspect of Abdulhamid. The first group argued that Hamid's pan-Islamist policy was against the Christian members of the Ottoman Empire, as well as Ottomanism. Another group asserted that there was no pan-Islamist side of Hamid at all. The final group supported Hamidian pan-Islamism, because according to them, there was no other way to revive the Empire. Each of these claims can be justified only if their pan-Islamist definition and understanding is examined. While Hamidian pan-Islamist policy was criticized from opposing perspectives, it had succeeded in bringing about 30 years of a common spiritual solidarity.

2.3.1.2. Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani

Since Afghani is considered by some as one of the leading Islamists and a defender of Pan-Islam who lived in the Ottoman capital for several years, it is beneficial to discuss his ideas regarding Pan-Islam. According to Türköne, the idea that Afghani was a founder of Islamism is a myth because his ideology was not original whereas Young Ottomans' thoughts were comprehensive and consistent.[160] Kara argued that Afghani gave more importance to proto-nationalism rather than pan-Islam.[161] Afghani remains the most discussed figure with respect to the modernization of the Islamic world and Islamism.

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[159] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 47.
[160] Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu*: 39-40.
[161] Kara, *Türkiye'de İslâmcılık Düşüncesi : Metinler/Kişiler*, 1: 38.

Afghani's views of the religious reformation were similar to some other Islamists. "Religious reform, he thought, had been the key to subsequent European progress and power, and such a reformation was also needed for the Islamic world to achieve the same goals."[162] Afghani further discussed that the Islamic world also needed co-operation within itself "For a Muslim, however, whether he was Turkish or Arab, the seizure of power by Europe meant that his community was in danger."[163] This potential co-operation against the West was possible through rapprochement of Iran and the Ottoman Empire. One of his suppositions was the existence of difference between Sunnites and Shiites and he suggested the bridging of these sects. According to him, the differences between the two destroy the potential for Islamic unity. Afghani also had a plan regarding the acceptance of the caliphal Sultan by Iran. With recognition of Abdulhamid as the caliph by Shias, the Sultan would recognize the Shah as independent; moreover, a general conference would be held in the Ottoman capital after that rapprochement.[164]

His pan-Islam not only meant religious and political unity, but he also pointed to the solidarity of the Islamic community 'umma'.[165] This would bring some responsibility for each and every Muslim, so too the Islamic community itself. Afghani's primary pursuit was the elimination of Western powers from Muslim lands, especially the British. He hated the British Empire, because most of the Muslim lands were under the control of British dominion. According to Afghani, each Muslim had to help other Muslims, especially when a Muslim community fell under foreign domination. "Aware of the particularism characteristic of the

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[162] Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani": A Political Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). 141.
[163] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*: 103.
[164] Ibid., 116.
[165] Ibid., 117.

populations he had visited, he incited each to demand reforms and, even more insistently, to seek means and arms for resisting European intervention or domination."[166] Another supposition of Afghani was that Muslims cannot unite and work together because of crazy rulers. He was particularly interested in nationalism within Pan-Islam. "For him, nationalism and Pan-Islam complemented one another in their 'liberationist' aspect."[167]

Afghani wrote a letter to Sultan Abdulhamid and presented his anxieties regarding the state of the Islamic nation.[168] This letter contained suggestions which were a mixture of a liberalist vision and realpolitik for the unity of the Islamic world, 'Pan-Islam'. He was trying to unite all independent Muslim states which are the Ottoman Empire, Persia and Afghanistan intimately for more powerful reaction. He was invited to the Ottoman capital either to get involved in Hamidian Pan-Islamic propaganda or to be suppressed by the Hamidian regime because of his suspicious efforts.

2.3.1.3. Means for Pan-Islamism: The Use of Caliphate, Hajj and Friday Sermons

Pan-Islam could be seen as the only recourse against the European colonization of Muslim lands. In order to become powerful against the Europeans, Muslims had to be united around the Caliph according to that idea. When the lands of Islam (*Dar'u-l-İslam*) became a colony of heathens (West), so to say *Dar'ul-harb*, the caliphate had the right to claim jihad against heathens. The cry was that 'Islam

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[166] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 14.
[167] Ibid., 15.
[168] Ibid., 19.

was in danger' and the source of that danger was 'the Western Christian Powers'. The remedy was sought by 'rallying round the Caliphate'. This simple formula did appeal to the millions of Muslims around the world whose minds had traditionally been conditioned to expect a savior, the Mahdi, when the world of Islam was in crisis.[169] Ottoman sultans also used their caliph titles from the eighteenth century onwards. "The sultan's claims to protection over Muslims outside his own territory were first put forward in answer to Russian claims to protect Ottoman Christians, in the Treaty of Kuichiik Kainarja in 1774, and it was from this date on that the Ottoman sultans made increasing claims for their caliphal position."[170] Abdulhamid II was the most influential sultan to use the title of caliph successfully.

There were several factors that assisted Islamic states during the end of the nineteenth century with respect to the caliphate institution: to assist the anti-French revolt in Algeria in 1871 intervention, in East Turkestan in 1874, to help a military mission to Tunisia in 1875.[171] "Although unable to meet these requests for help, Sultan Abdulaziz was probably influenced by them in his increasing claims for a caliphal position with influence over all Muslims."[172] This was when the Ottoman Empire had the power of the Caliph in the Islamic world. "… The sultan's objective was to enhance his prestige and power through emphasis upon his headship of the Islamic world by virtue of the title of caliph."[173] Even though Ottoman sultans started to benefit from the title of the Caliphate, there were some Muslim groups that did not support an Ottoman Caliphate. However, the fear of Western imperialism lionized

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[169] Özcan, *Pan Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)*: 62.
[170] Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," 19.
[171] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 12.
[172] Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," 20.
[173] Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," 279.

most Muslim groups and states to support the Ottoman caliphate. They saw the Ottoman Empire as the lesser of the evils. This empowered the hand of the caliph.

When the caliphate passed to Umayyad, the religious side of the caliphate had started to shift to the ulama. The caliph was only the political leader of Islam from this moment on.[174] Discussions about the nationality of the caliph were popular for pan-Islamists because, according to a belief, the caliph must be a member of the Qureish tribe, so an Arab. Suavi, who was a Young Ottoman, argued that the only caliph was Abu Bakr; afterwards, the caliphate institution was a fabrication of late comers.[175] The political power of the caliphate was the only motive after the Golden Age.

There was another side of Pan-Islamism which was related to the unifying potency of pilgrimage. Pilgrimage was a religious institution through which propaganda could easily be disseminated to other Muslim lands by pilgrims. It brings Muslims together and creates an intimate atmosphere. The religious unity of pilgrimage also creates a social unity because at Mecca, Muslims from all over the Islamic world from various ethnicities come together. The Hajj season is a communication instrument for Muslims, which was beneficial particularly for Pan-Islamist policy at the time. Taking advantage of this, the Ottoman Empire tried to increase her prestige amongst Muslims during pilgrimage. "Again, since the annual Hajj gathering was the primary source of dissemination of information for the Muslim world, the exaggerated ceremonial proceedings in the Holy cities in the

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[174] For instance according to Becker ,Harun al-Rashid was not determining religious issues itself and was asking to ulama. C.H.Becker, "Panislâmizm," 25.
[175] Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*: 80.

name of the Ottomans Sultans undoubtedly went a long way in strengthening Muslim affiliation and loyalty to the Ottomans."[176]

The Ottoman Empire as a host of pilgrimages produced propaganda for pan-Islamism, especially during Hamidian Era. Another propaganda tool was the Friday sermons. Special Friday sermons for the purpose of Islamic union or unity were another beneficial form of communication, since the mosques could be seen as social, educational, literary and political clubs.[177] "At the same time Pan-Islamic propaganda was made possible, perhaps actually engendered, by the mechanical progress in communications, the introduction of the printing press, and the increase of commerce brought to the Islamic world from the West."[178]

2.4. Islamism during Young Turk Era[179] (1908-1918)

When the Committee of Union Progress (CUP) took the control of the Empire and Abdulhamid had a ceremonial role, the Pan-Islam discussion started to change the arguments of Islamism and Islam itself. The name of CUP emphasized Union and Progress, but the 'Union' meant the unity of all Ottomans. In order to unite all elements CUP used Islamism in a utilitarian way. Conversely, they were partially against Hamidian Pan-Islamism. Some of Young Turks saw Pan-Islam as a reactionary movement which was damaging their ideology of Ottomanism.[180] The CUP was formed by different groups and different ideologies in order to overthrow

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[176] Özcan, *Pan Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)*: 28-9.
[177] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 83.
[178] Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," 281.
[179] Islamists circle during the Young Turk Era gathered around some periodicals such as *Sebilürreşad*. Since this circle will be discussed in following chapters, it would not argue in this chapter in details.
[180] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 87.

the Hamidian regime and establish constitutional regime. For this reason even the ulama became members of the CUP and supported it. Moreover, Afghani and his pupil Abduh were connected with the CUP.[181]

By the time the CUP took control over the government in 1912 and moved their center to Istanbul from Salonika, they started to support some Islamist policies. Because of the expansionist policy of Pan-Islamism, Young Turk leaders thought that they could reclaim some Muslim lands and add them to the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, they were using Pan-Islam as a reactionary balance against Britain and France. The Young Turks were also aware of the importance of religion in the Ottoman Empire, As such, they were generated their policies very carefully. Meanwhile, Young Ottomans and Young Turks shared the idea of benefiting from religion as an instrument of social consolidation for the sake of political purposes.[182]

Islamists argued that a plan which aimed to set up a unique state for all Muslims contradicted the laws of both history and human nature and was a fantasy, just like Pan-Hellenism. Pan-Islam should aim, instead, to raise and develop Muslim society, in the spirit of the Committee of Union and Progress. During Young Turk Era with the loss of lands at Balkans, the idea of pan-Islamism became stronger. From that point it could be argued that Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were the only group who was hoping for the survival of the empire.

While there was a dominant Pan-Turkist faction in the CUP, they continued to support some Pan-Islamist policies. For instance, some Muslim associations in Istanbul were encouraged by the CUP. The CUP made an effort to implement the

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[181] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 34.
[182] Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri*: 22.

policy of creating Sunni-Shite togetherness. "The Imam of the Great Mosque and the protector of Caliph Ali's grave in Najaf was preaching Pan-Islam intensively there; in addition, he was distributing quantities of Pan-Islamic pamphlets, provided by officers of the Committee."[183] The CUP also sent a delegation to Mecca to persuade pilgrims for the new regime. Other propagandistic activities during the Balkan Wars were performed by the CUP delegations, and some Pan-Islamist policies were used to recruit Kurds in Anatolia. During the First World War, Said Halim Paşa who was an Islamist and member of Khedive family became grand vizier. After Young Turk Era Islamism became more like discussions of Ottoman times which also affected the Republican Era. In short, the CUP benefited from Islam, however it did not believe in the value of Islam; instead, it used Islam as an instrument for defense against the Western influence.[184]

2.4.1. Islamists in Russia

The impact of Russian Islamists was significant, especially in the Young Turk Era. Intellectuals like Gaspıralı, Akçura, Ağaoğlu, Abdülreşid İbrahim[185] shaped Islamism and pan-Islamism in Russia. Despite the fact that other European powers had Muslim colonies, Russia had Muslims subjects in its own country. Because of this, Pan-Islam had a different effect on Russian politics. With the help of new transportation technologies, more pilgrims from Russia started to visit Istanbul. Those visits had a great impact with the connections of other Pan-Islamists.

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[183] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 91.
[184] Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908*: 90-92.
[185] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*: 146-51.

This circle had two important policies: gaining more rights in Russia and empowering Islam all over the world. There were two possible ideologies for Russian Muslims who were mostly of Turkic origins; Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkism. Although these ideologies seem to have two different paths, in the Russian example both had similar attitudes and were complementary. "Even so, because of the conditions mentioned, an uprising against the Russians, coordinated by Pan-Islam, was a practical impossibility."[186] Turkish intellectuals in Russia had great expectations from the Young Turks, and some of them were also member of the CUP. The example of Japan as an Eastern state increased the expectations further. "The Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5. To Muslims everywhere, this event proved that an Oriental state can achieve victory over a major Christian European power."[187] To some extent other Great Powers supported pan-Islamist movement in Russia since it was shackling Russian expansionist policy. "It seems rather that the British, like the Russians, Germans, and French, made use of prior Pan-Islamic sentiments when they found it suitable for their imperial goals, as in combating the Russian advance into Central Asia."[188]

This chapter discussed Islamism and Pan-Islamism in the historical context of Ottoman modernization. Islamists defended the revival of the Islamic world and the Ottoman Empire through a religious understanding of progress and by analyzing the original sources. Pan-Islamism was the outcome of Islamism aimed to unite or create a sense of unity between Muslims as a reaction against the Western threat. These ideas shaped the intellectual legacy of Second Constitutional Period and *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* journal.

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[186] Ibid., 144.
[187] Ibid., 146.
[188] Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," 19.

CHAPTER III

SIRAT-I MÜSTAKİM-SEBİLÜRREŞAD: AN INQUIRY ABOUT AN ISLAMIST JOURNAL

3.1. The Mass Media

Printing was one of the dominant forces of capitalism and modernity throughout world history. With the advent of publishing houses, newspapers, and journals, media became an important, perhaps even the most important, education and information technology system for societies and individuals. The Industrial Revolution made possible publication for the masses, spreading these publications quickly, collecting news more and more rapidly and especially advertising opportunities for products.[189] Print-capitalism made possible cheaper and more widespread publication to maximize circulation, enabled the standardization of national languages and dissolution of medieval languages such as Latin, and finally framed the genesis of modern nations as imagined communities.[190]

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[189] Carlton J. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959). 240.

[190] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006). 37-46.

Even though Ottoman modernization was something different from Western modernization, it too experienced modernization through print from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. Yalman describes this change as a tremendous one which enabled the sleepy, self-satisfied medieval communities to modernize within a short time.[191] Despite the Hamidian regime's control, mass media had a new lease on life in the early years of the Second Constitutional Period. The Islamist movement during the period had also the chance to publish its own journals. *Sebilürreşad-Sırat-ı Müstakim* was one of the most important Islamist journals in the period. *Sebilürreşad* engendered an Islamist intellectual circle during the first decade of the 20th century. This circle was generally against the Hamidian regime and supported Young Turks. Although they had the same pan-Islamist world view as Sultan Abdulhamid II, they were against his despotism. Therefore, they supported the constitutional monarchy and the Committee of Union and Progress. The CUP was seen as the savior of the Empire and freedom.[192] Journals with Islamist and Turkist tendencies gradually became popular because of this political juncture in the Empire. The Second Constitutional Period accelerated the publication process of Islamist journals. The number of Islamist journals in the period increased gradually. *Sebilürreşad* which defended the salvation of Islam and the Ottoman Empire was one of the most important and leading journals of the period. This part of the thesis will address the evolution of the printing press in the Ottoman Empire; *Sırat-ı Müstakim/Sebilürreşad*'s history, printing life and characteristics, authors, relations with other ideologies and the CUP, attitude during the First World War and the National Struggle.

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[191] Ahmet Emin Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press* (New York: Columbia University, 1914). 49.

[192] Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*: 58.

3.2. The Ottomans Press

As the process of modernization is generally linked to the advent of the printing press, so too was Ottoman modernization linked to its emergence. With the help of printing technology and understanding of modernization, the printing press emerged as a new system for disseminating information and propaganda. Newspapers were published everywhere for different subjects and distributed more easily via modern transportation systems. In addition they brought Muslims together from different communities by informing them about themselves.[193] Despite the printing press being a modern technology, according to Yalman it was a logical continuation of prior methods of employing official historiographers to publish historical annals.[194] In the 19th century and afterwards, the printing press grew gradually in the Ottoman Empire. According to Karpat, mass media in Turkey in the 19th century expedited the development of political culture and made possible the integration of various parts of society in the process of modernization.[195]

With the advent and development of the printing press, different ideologies emerged, were shared, and discussed regarding the so-called backwardness of the Ottoman Empire. Print capitalism shaped society through different ideologies, such as Ottomanism, Westernism, Islamism and lastly Turkism. Certain types of national consciousness that emerged during modernization were affected by printing. Firstly, Ottoman identity emerged with the help of the printing press, followed by other ideological identities, e.g. as Muslim, Turkish, etc. In short, it can be argued that mass media in the Ottoman Empire shaped political identities through their

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[193] Khalid, "Pan-Islamism in Practice: The Rhetoric of Muslim Unity and its Uses," 205-06.
[194] Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*: 29.
[195] Kemal H. Karpat, "The Mass Media: Turkey," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 255.

publication process. Moreover, it created different kinds of intellectual circles which strengthened the Ottoman intelligentsia. Due to the agenda of that intellectual group, the Ottoman press mostly dealt with political and social issues. However, their reporting position remained weak.[196]

The intelligentsia of the period not only continued, but added to the heritage of the Young Ottomans. "The post-revolutionary period witnessed the most far-ranging intellectual debate in the late Ottoman history."[197] In the first years of the Second Constitutional Period, there was a relatively free atmosphere. The 1908 Young Turk Revolution enabled liberties for all the segments of society for the first years of that period. In these years, all ideological stances were afforded the chance to say something about the social situation because of this free atmosphere: "They spoke of a free press, and of virtually unlimited individual liberties."[198] Newspapers and journals also benefited: "These papers, though united against the oppressive rule at home, variously embraced populist-Islamist-nationalism, revolutionary socialism, and a special brand of elite Ottoman nationalism."[199]

The Tanzimat and Hamidian eras had no strong press milieu as the Second Constitutional Period had. "The papers which appeared on July 25th [1908] were nothing but a fervent outcry of joy."[200] Because, according to intellectuals of the Second Constitutional Period the survival of the state depended on the freedom of press in the period.[201] Just after the reestablishment of constitutional monarchy, many

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[196] Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Hürriyeti Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını* (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010). 13.

[197] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*: 183.

[198] Ibid., 150.

[199] Karpat, "The Mass Media: Turkey," 260.

[200] Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*: 87.

[201] Enver Benhan Şapolyo, *Türk Gazetecilik Tarihi ve Her Yönü ile Basın* (Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1969). 6.

journals were published all over the Ottoman Empire, especially in the capital, Istanbul. The Ottoman press experienced an outburst in the days immediately following the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Period.[202] With the freedom of the Second Constitutional Period, the interests of people in news and journals had rapidly increased. The beginning of this period coincides with the maximum number of newspaper carriers and publishers.[203]

Before the Second Constitutional Period, there were few newspapers in the Empire, but with the re-proclamation of the Constitution, a new understanding of the press (relatively huge numbers of newspapers) was established with its own attitudes. The first seven years of the Second Constitutional Period was a period in which there were significant developments for the press and its technologies.[204] "Censorship was lifted and newspapers and magazines, representing all the communities of the empire and a wide assortment of opinions, flooded the market to satisfy the curiosity of an eager public."[205] The numbers of copies, at the beginnings of this period were not enough to satisfy the expectancy of the readers. For this reason, several extra copies of newspapers and journals were published. Some newspapers went on the black market, such as *İkdam*.[206] When taking charter for the publication of a journal became easier in the Second Constitutional Period, an outburst occurred; however, most of these publishers lost their monies and their journals were closed after a while.[207] Although there was a significant increase in the number of journals in this

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[202] Kocabaşoğlu, *Hürriyeti Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını*: 4.
[203] Orhan Koloğlu, "Osmanlı Basını: İçeriği ve Rejimi," in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Murat Belge (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 89.
[204] Ibid., 91.
[205] Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 1992). 31.
[206] Hıfzı Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003). 82.
[207] Ali Birinci, "Meşrutiyet Matbuatı (1324-1325) / I," *Kebikeç* I, no. 2 (1995): 143.

period, most of them lacked both the financial resources, business acumen, and intellectual knowledge to sustain publishing.[208]

Statistics regarding the publication of journals and newspapers during this period are numerous. "The number of newspapers and magazines increased thirty fold, fostering a very lively debate about all kinds of questions."[209] The peak for published journals and newspapers was the first year of the Second Constitutional Period. "One year after the revolution, according to some incomplete statistics, the total number of newspapers and periodicals published in the Ottoman Empire amounted to not less than 350."[210] French journal *Revue du Monde Musulman* reported that the number of published journals in the Ottoman Empire numbered 739 in the first year of the period.[211] However, this number included all the journals and newspapers in the empire. During the first three and a half years of the Constitutional Period, 607 newspapers and journals were published.[212] This number decreased gradually for several reasons, such as lack of intellectual knowledge and financial issues.[213] Most of them were closed just after their few issues. "The dailies which did not succeed were generally founded by men without any business experience, who had simply followed the fashion of publishing a paper, or who sought to acquire political prominence by publicity."[214] The 31 March incident, which was called counter-revolution, also affected press in a negative manner, because it initiated censorship of the CUP. Short-dated journals were described by Cemil Meriç as flowers which live mostly for a season, and rare lucky ones address a

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[208] Kocabaşoğlu, *Hürriyeti Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını*: 9.
[209] Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* 215.
[210] Karpat, "The Mass Media: Turkey," 268.
[211] Kocabaşoğlu, *Hürriyeti Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını*: 7.
[212] Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*: 84.
[213] Kocabaşoğlu, *Hürriyeti Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını*: 10.
[214] Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*: 88.

generation.[215] The total number of published journals and newspapers between 1908 and 1919 was more than two thousand according to Yalman.[216] Another statistic gives the number as more than one thousand. [217] Both can be exact numbers, because most of the journals and newspapers never appeared, even though they had their charters.

Papers during this period attached importance primarily to editorial pieces; moreover, news was selected in accordance with its ideological stance with respect to the salvation of the Ottoman Empire.[218] Most of the intellectuals from the Ottoman press could not be included in a single, unique ideology; furthermore, some of them wrote in different journals which represented various ideologies.[219] Most of the papers were controlled by the CUP during the Second Constitutional Period.[220] It can be argued that the 1909 Press Law was very liberal, but CUP did not endeavor to uphold it. The culture of the Turkish press did not create a strong opposition against governments, because it did not evolve like the British press evolved.[221] Although publishing in the Second Constitutional Period had achieved its ostensible heyday, in a broad sense, it was mostly under the control of the CUP administration.

The new intelligentsia which consisted of students, retired officials, feminists and reformers of every ideology, had the opportunity to ameliorate the situation and provide new ideas via printing their names in the press.[222] Islamism also had the chance to promulgate its own ideas to the public through the printing press. "In this

[215] Cemil Meriç, *Bu Ülke* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985). 87.
[216] Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*: 113.
[217] Bülent Varlık, "Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet Dergileri," in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Murat Belge (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 116.
[218] Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*: 48.
[219] Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi*, vol. II/IV (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983). 439.
[220] Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*: 95. *Sırat-ı Müstakim* was one of the journals which was not controlled or financed directly by the CUP.
[221] Kocabaşoğlu, *Hürriyeti Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını*: 78.
[222] Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*: 126.

environment, the Islamic religious press, of which Abdulhamid had never been tolerant, also emerged."[223] Karpat states:

> "Although the transformation of Islamic societies has been viewed as being almost solely of the work of the "transforming elites"—usually bureaucrats and intellectuals who openly espoused Western ideas— the majority of both the traditionalist, conservative masses and the middle classes also became advocates of change in harmony with their Islamic ethos."[224]

Islamic reformists benefited from the methods of mass communication via pilgrimage to circulate their ideology and methodology. Their ideology was adapted by the intelligentsia who intensified their methodology and impact with the help of the press.[225] Islamism benefited from the press in order to spread its ideology; moreover, Islamist ideology was adopted by middle classes through the printing press. "The emergence of Islamism was possible only because of a new education system and the spread of new media, which were useful in propagating its ideas."[226]

3.3. *Sırat-ı Müstakim/Sebilürreşad*: The History of an Islamist Journal

During the Second Constitutional Period, Islamism was not represented by just one journal. Islamists, who were also against the Hamidian regime as other ideologies were, published many journals, such as *Sırat-ı Müstakim/Sebilürreşad*. Toprak describes the journal as the first Islamist-Turkist opponent of the Hamidian

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[223] Orhan Koloğlu, "Newspapers," in *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters (New York: Facts on File, 2008), 434.
[224] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*: 20.
[225] Ibid., 23.
[226] Guida, "Al-Afghānī and Namık Kemal's Replies to Ernest Renan: Two Anti-Westernist Works in the Formative Stage of Islamist Thought," 59.

regime.[227] However, there were different types of Islamism and different Islamist associations and journals. According to Shaw, *Sebilürreşad* was the most intellectual Islamist journal which defended the cohesion between the constitution and Islam in the Second Constitutional Period.[228] According to Tiftikçi, they did not differ much from each other.[229] Despite this, *Sebilürreşad* was an ecole for the Islamist historiography. It was superior to the other Islamist journals with respect to its influence on society and politics during the Second Constitutional Period. On the other hand, the number of researches on *Sebilürreşad* shows us its superiority and importance more clearly when compared to other Islamist journals such as *Hikmet, Beyanü'l-Hak,* and *Islam.* According to Eşref Edib, who was the co-owner of *Sırat-ı Müstakim* and the owner of *Sebilürreşad*, the public showed interest in *Sebilürreşad* and it became the most important journal in the Empire.[230] People were supporting *Sebilürreşad* and trusted it.[231]

Sırat-ı Müstakim which was one of the long-lived journals[232] established on 11 July 1324/24 July 1908 and it began publishing on 14 August 1324/27 August 1908 just after the reestablishment of the constitutional monarchy. After the day of the re-proclamation, Serezli Hafız Eşref Edib and Mardinizâde Ebu'l Ulâ took the publishing charter for *Sebilürreşad*. The first issue was published several times[233], because there was too much interest in the journal. The first essay of the first issue

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[227] Zafer Toprak, "II. Meşrutiyette Fikir Dergileri," in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Murat Belge (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 126.

[228] Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 304.

[229] Osman Tiftikçi, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu: Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Gelişimi* (İstanbul: Akademi Yayın, 2011). 203.

[230] Caner Arabacı, "Eşref Edib Fergan ve Sebîlürreşad Üzerine," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce: İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 101.

[231] Hayrettin Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*, Fahrettin Gün ed. (Istanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 2011). 104-05.

[232] Kocabaşoğlu, *Hürriyeti Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını*: 5.

[233] M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar III* (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2006). 176.

named as '*Hürriyet-Müsavat*'[234] [Freedom-Equality] which was written by Musa Kazım Efendi who would be Şeyhü'l-Islam in the following years.[235] This first essay demonstrates the Islamist interest in freedom and equality. Because of that, the first issues of the journal were published by the Ottoman official press (*Matbaa-i Âmire*). Although *Sebilürreşad* was not an official journal, the CUP supported it for a while.

After 182 issues, the name of the journal was changed as *Sebilürreşad* on 24 February 1327/8 March 1912.[236] Although the journal was sometimes censored by the government and closed down because of political and economic reasons, it continued publishing until 4 March 1925[237]. The journal had been closed by Independence Courts because of its oppositional character to the new Republican regime due to Decree of Silence (*Takrir-i Sükun*) by Independence Courts (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*). After 22 years, *Sebilürreşad* started to publish again, but its influence and intellectual capacity was much limited.[238] Its publication process was separated into two periods; the first period was between 1908 and 1925, and the second period was between 1948 and 1966. The journal published 641 issues which were bound under 25 volumes in its first period. The owners of the journal were Eşref Edib and Ebu'l Ulâ Zeynel Âbidin Mardin. After the name was changed, Mardin left the journal and started to publish his own journal which was named as *Kelime-i Tayyibe*.[239] Another reason for Mardin's withdrawal from the administration of the journal relates to his deputy election and academic research which severely

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[234] Musa Kazım, "Hürriyet-Müsavat," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 1, no. 1 (1324/1908).
[235] Toprak, "II. Meşrutiyette Fikir Dergileri," 126.
[236] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 5.
[237] Ibid., 7.
[238] Since the interest of this thesis would be the Second Constitutional Period and its aftermath, the second period of *Sebilürreşad* will not be discussed.
[239] Mustafa Gündüz, *II. Meşrutiyet'in Klasik Paradigmaları: İçtihad, Sebilü'r-Reşad ve Türk Yurdu'nda Toplumsal Tezler* (Ankara: Lotus Yayınevi, 2007). 222.

hampered the time he was able to dedicate to the periodical.[240] Mehmed Akif took an important position when Mardin left the journal.

The printing process of the journal was sometimes interrupted for several reasons. Although *Sebilürreşad* was a weekly journal, sometimes it was published biweekly. During the last two years of the First World War, it could not be published for twenty months. Because of censorship, the 300th issue was renamed as *Sebilünnecat,* which has a similar meaning to *Sebilürreşad* and means 'The Road of Salvation'. During the last two years of the First World War, the CUP closed the journal because of its critical stance regarding the CUP's war policy and ideology. Following this conflict, the CUP started to gradually censor the journal more.[241] *Sebilürreşad* was suspended by the CUP for twenty months until the fall of the government.[242] When Sultan Vahdettin ascended the throne, the journal was republished. The paper quality of the journal diminished gradually until the War of Independence. When the government cut off paper aid for the journal, they could not publish the journal for some time during the First World War. However, during occupation days the journal was published with clear pages in order to protest the occupation.[243] During the War of Independence, the journal was published in Kastamonu, Ankara and Kayseri in order to make propaganda for the war. In this period, the government supported the journal which was published in an official

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[240] Arabacı, "Eşref Edib Fergan ve Sebîlürreşad Üzerine," 101. Bostan, "Political Perspectives of Sebilürreşad," 1.
[241] İsmail Kara, "Sırat-ı Müstakim," in *Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Ezel Erverdi, Mustafa Kutlu, and İsmail Kara (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1998), 6-7.
[242] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar III*: 164.
[243] 402th and 403th issues were published together; there were some blank pages and missing parts at that issue. 3 Nisan 1335 (3 Nisan 1919)

printing house in Ankara.[244] The government distributed these issues all over the country.[245]

The journal was priced at 65 kurus annually or 35 kurus semi-annually in the capital, 90 kurus annually and 50 kurus semi-annually throughout the Ottoman Empire, and 100 kurus annually and 55 kurus semi-annually in foreign countries. The journal priced out 50 paras for a single copy. The journal was published with a four-page cover and sixteen pages.[246] There were only six photos in *Sebilürreşad* for this entire period.[247] The journal also published some books which were introduced in the journal.[248]

According to the first issue, the journal dealt with religion, philosophy, literature, law and science.[249] "In SM [*Sırat-ı Müstakim*] under the titles, *şuun* (affairs), *mekâtib* (letters) and *matbuat-ı İslâmiye* (the Islamic press), news concerning Muslims in Russia, events about Islam in Japan and the country itself, news and articles about Islam in the world and about Pan-Islamism were published."[250] *Sırat-ı Müstakim*, compared to *Sebilürreşad*, did not single out politics as a special area. When the name was changed into *Sebilürreşad*, politics appeared in the corresponding area of the journal.[251] With its new name, the journal categorized its sections more vividly, into different social science categories.[252] The journal was separated into two sections. The first section dealt with religion, literature and law

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[244] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar III*: 157.
[245] Ibid., 178.
[246] Ibid., 156. Kara, "Sırat-ı Müstakim," 6.
[247] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar III*: 160.
[248] Ibid., 156.
[249] "Din, felsefe, edebiyat, hukuk ve ulumdan bahs haftalık risaledir." On the headline of the first issue. , *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 1, no. 1 (1324/1908).
[250] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 4.
[251] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar III*: 155.
[252] Mehmet Emin Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif* (Istanbul: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2006). 41.

while the second section dealt with politics, society and philosophy. The essays and the news in *Sebilürreşad* mostly dealt with Western foreign policy, Islamic world, conditions of Islamic countries, and contemporary politics such as Balkan Wars. The language of the *Sebilürreşad* was mostly Turkish. This demonstrates that its target group was Ottoman Muslims and Turks abroad.

When Ebulula and Edib decided to publish the journal, they wrote down some names who could be the authors of the journal in future.[253] Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı who was a scholar at Mülkiye School was on the top of the list. Mehmed Akif was on the list who was also one of the instructors at Mülkiye. The journal had a wide range of author selections. Mehmed Akif (Ersoy) Bey, Ebu'l Ulâ (Mardin), Eşref Edib, Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı Efendi, Babanzade Ahmed Naim Bey, Musa Kâzım (Şeyhü'l-İslam), Bereketzâde İsmail Hakkı Bey, Ferid (Kam) Bey, İskilipli Mehmed Atıf, Abdülreşid İbrahim Efendi, Mehmed Fahreddin Efendi, Bursalı Mehmed Tahir Bey, Kazanlı Halim Sabit Efendi, Mehmet Şemseddin (Günaltay) Bey, Ispartalı Hakkı Bey, Tahirü'l Mevlevi Bey, Edhem Nejad Bey, Mithat Cemal (Kuntay), Halim Sabit (Şibay), Aksekili Ahmet Hamdi Efendi were some of the well-known writers of the *Sebilürreşad*. Mehmed Akif was the editor-in chief of the journal. There were many other authors of the journal as well. Some Russian émigré Turks such as Yusuf Akçura, İsmail Gaspıralı and Ahmed Ağaoğlu also wrote for the journal. Some translations from Muhammad Abduh, who was the student of Afghani and the mufti of Cairo, were published in the journal several times. Even Kolağası Niyazi who was the hero of the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Period wrote for the

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[253] Ibid., 96.

journal.[254] Finally an essay[255] by Ahmed Emin (Yalman) was quoted and published in the journal.

As an instrument of modernization, Islamists used journalism in order to enlighten Muslims, as in the case of *Sebilürreşad*. According to the journal, Muslims had to be aware of themselves all over the world.[256] The information agenda of the *Sebilürreşad* had an encyclopedic bent. *Sebilürreşad* was aware of the importance of the press in the Islamic societies. Since most Muslim communities were under occupation of heathens, and they misunderstood, the journal had to teach the real Islam and raise awareness in the society in order to save Muslims and Muslim lands. For this reason, the journal started to publish information about the Muslims communities from every side of the world.[257] *Sebilürreşad* aimed to distribute the journal all over the Muslim world; besides, it reported and wrote about the Muslim world outside the Ottoman Empire. The journal created a mass communication among Muslims all around the world. The journal was successful in ensuring a news network between Muslim populations and the empire. It sent some journalists to countries in which Muslims lived in order to get information and inform them about the situation throughout the Islamic world. *Sebilürreşad* created the idea all over the Muslim world that every Muslim society or community should reform itself.[258]

Russian Muslims used to read *Sebilürreşad* and send news and writings from Russia. In addition, some Muslims from Russia wrote for the journal. Russian

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[254] Kolağası Niyazi, "Selma Hanımefendi Ünvanlı Makaleye Cevab," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 1, no. 6 (1324/1908).

[255] Ahmed Emin Yalman, "Din ile Devletin Tefriki," *Sebilürreşad* 15, no. 380 (1334/1918).

[256] This news were published in the affairs (*şüun*) part of the journal.

[257] See Ethem Nejat, "Hariçteki Dindaşlarımız," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 6, no. 142 (1327/1911). "Yuhannesburg Müslümanları," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 7, no. 170 (1327/1911).

[258] Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif*: 100.

government banned *Sebilürreşad* and banned it within Russia.[259] "Tsarist Russian censorship was trying, therefore, to prevent the domestic inflow of this magazine."[260] This Russian concern about the journal shows its effects throughout the Islamic world. Because of this, the office of the journal became a meeting point for non-Ottoman Muslims such as Ağaoglu, Akçura, Gaspıralı, Ayaz Ishaki, Abdürreşit İbrahim.[261] Although *Sebilürreşad* seemed like an Islamist journal, it opened its sheets to every intellectual with the exclusion of Westernists. This intellectual structure continued until ideological conflicts between Islamists and others came to a head in 1912. *Sebilürreşad's* pluralist side began to turn into an Islamist point of view after the political circumstances of the Balkan Wars and Tripoli's annexation.

The *Sebilürreşad* circle did not call themselves Islamists during their publication life, but they were labeled as Islamist by [others].[262] One of its contemporaries, Yalman, described them as the new Mohammedan attitude of mind towards religion.[263] People who attached importance to Islam and tried to recruit and reform it were called Islamists after a while. Although this notion seems to satisfy the terminology, Islam already inherently commands this behavior as duty; for this reason it is meaningless to call them as Islamists. The *Sebilürreşad* circle was also included in this terminological category because of their devoted works for Islam.

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[259] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar III*: 158.
[260] Abdullah Gündoğdu, "Sırat-ı Müstakim (later, Sebilürreşad) and the Origin of the Japanese Image in Turkish Intellectuals," *Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies* 23, no. 2 (2007): 247-48.
[261] Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif*: 100.
[262] M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar II* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlâhiyât Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2006). 38-39.
[263] Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*: 89.

3.3.1. Meaning and Change

It is hard to translate the meaning of the journal's name(s) without giving special importance to its religious meaning. *Sırat-ı Müstakim* can be translated as "the straight road" "the straight path", "bridge of righteousness", "straight bridge" "true-path"; however, these translations are not enough to satisfy its religious meaning. In fact, the phrase can be translated as "the path to The Truth, *Veritas*" The phrase of '*sırat-ı müstakim*' is observable in many verses of the Quran. [264] When a Muslim performs salaat five times in a day, he/she repeats surah al-fatihah which includes the phrase of '*sırat-ı müstakim*' forty times. On other hand, according to Islamic belief, '*sırat-ı müstakim*' is the thin bridge which has to be passed in order to get into heaven. Nevertheless, the name was changed as *Sebilürreşad* [Fountain of Orthodoxy] which has a similar meaning to *Sırat-ı Müstakim*. *Sebilürreşad* is also a quotation from the Quran.[265] The journal offered its readers the path to truth in order to become a true Muslim.

Eşref Edib claims that many names were forwarded, but none of them was liked by the circle. According to him, the name of the journal was his idea. He forwarded the phrase, '*Sırat-ı Müstakim*' and Ebu'l Ulâ and others accepted it with great admiration.[266] The journal's name was changed with Abbas Halim Paşa's idea during a meeting in his home in Heybeliada.[267] According to his idea, a random page

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[264] http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=24&verse=46 "We have certainly sent down distinct verses. And Allah guides whom He wills to a straight path." Quran 24, 46 Surat An-Nur (The Light)

[265] http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=40&verse=38 And he who believed said, "O my people, follow me, I will guide you to the way of right conduct. Quran 40,38 Surat Ghafir (The Forgiver God)

[266] Eşref Edip, "Ebülulâ Beyle Beraber Nasıl Çalıştık? Sırat-ı Müstakîm'i Nasıl Çıkardık?," *Sebilürreşad* 10, no. 238 (1956): 200.

[267] Efe, "Uzun Soluklu İslâmcı bir Dergi: Sebilürreşad," 161-62.

would be opened from the Quran and that would be the name of the journal.[268] However, Tahirü'l Mevlevi held the royalty of *Sebilürreşad*. He transferred his rights to the circle upon Mehmed Akif's request.[269]

3.3.2. Authors

In this period, coffeehouses (*kahvehanes*) and teahouses (*çay evi*) became meeting points for political and literary discussions.[270] The *Sebilürreşad* circle primarily gathered at a teahouse of İsmail Aga at Direklerarası. Mehmed Akif, Babanzade Ahmed Naim, Ispartalı Hakkı, Mithat Cemal, Arif Hikmet and others were habitués of this teahouse (*çay evi*).[271] The intellectuals who gathered at these coffeehouses and teahouses were too young for the leadership of a movement. The age of members of the *Sebilürreşad* circle ranged from nineteen to forty. However, this period was the era of young people (Young Turks). When Ebulula and Eşref Edib established the journal, they were comparatively young to the contemporary editors. Ebulula was 27 and Edib was 26 years old.

Authors of the journal had different backgrounds and professions. Edib was a child of a Turkistani immigrant family to Serres and was born in 1882. Both, Edib and Mardin graduated from Law School (*Mekteb-i Hukuk)* which was a modern school. Eşref Edib had a PhD in law.[272] Ebulula belonged to the famous family of Mardinizade's. Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı who came from Manastır was the master of

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[268] Arabacı, "Eşref Edib Fergan ve Sebîlürreşad Üzerine," 101-02. Adnan Gül, "Sebilürreşad (Sırat-ı Müstakim) Dergisi'ne Göre Batılılaşma Problemi" (Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 2006), 81.

[269]Tahir'ül-Mevlevi, *Matbuat Hayatım ve İstiklâl Mahkemeleri* (Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1991). 34-35. Quoted from Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 12.

[270] Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*: 34.

[271] Cemal Kutay, *Necid Çöllerinde Mehmet Akif* (Istanbul: Tarih Yayınları, 1963). 247.

[272] Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 19.

Eşref Edib. Another İsmail Hakkı, who came from İzmir, continued his education at both a modern school and a madrasa. This bipolar educational life shaped his modernist-Islamist ideology.[273] Babanzade Ahmed Naim, who came from Baghdad to Istanbul, was a Kurd and graduated from Galatasaray High School (Lisesi) and Mülkiye. Babanzade Ahmed was the rector of *Darülfünun* (Istanbul University) after the First World War. He was the best friend of Mehmed Akif, and his grave was placed near Akif's grave. Şemsettin Günaltay who became one of the prime ministers of Turkish Republic wrote for *Sebilürreşad*. Mehmed Emin Erişirgil who became the Minister of Interior of Turkish Republic also wrote for the journal and worked with Akif in the first years of the Second Constitutional Period at the Office of Agricultural Affairs.[274] Akif was an Albanian. Said-i Nursi who wrote some articles for the journal was Kurdish. According to Edib, some writers of the journal were considerably affected by him.[275] These examples show that authors of the journal gathered around the unity of Islam, not ethnicity and profession.

It is necessary to give special attention to the editor of the journal, Mehmed Akif. Akif followed his ideals. He was a self-disciplined and modest person. For this reason, he did not sell his pen or overpraise the government and sultan in order to benefit from them. Akif was an idealist and pragmatist poet; that being said, his aim was not to write nice poems but promote his ideals.[276] Akif never wore a turban on his head.[277] This is a clear proof that he had a modernist side although he was a true

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[273] Özervarlı, "Alternative Approaches to Modernization in the Late Ottoman Period: İzmirli İsmail Hakkı's Religious Thought against Materialist Scientism," 79.

[274] Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif*: 318.

[275] Hüseyin Çelik, "Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and the Ideal of Islamic Unity," in *Third International Symposium on Bediuzzaman Said Nursi-The Reconstruction Of Islamic Thought In The Twentieth Century And Bediuzzaman Said Nursi* (İstanbul1995), 3.

[276] Sabiha Zekeriya Sertel, *Tevfik Fikret-Mehmet Akif Kavgası Münasebitle Sebilürreşatçıya Cevap* (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1940). 5.

[277] Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif*: 97.

believer. According to the information in the Erişirgil's book, Babanzade Ahmed convinced him to quit alcohol.[278] Akif tolerated most of the things during his life except religious orders.[279] Mehmed Akif was against the translation of the Quran into Turkish for several reasons.[280]

On the other hand, Akif had official duties. He traveled to Berlin in an official capacity[281] and visited with İzmirli İsmail Hakkı in Lebanon.[282] He made comparisons of East and West from his Berlin and Najd (Arabia) duties.[283] His Arabia duty was related to the religious affairs with the local leaders of the region in order to convince them to remain faithful to the Ottoman Empire and not to fight beside British forces against the Ottoman Empire. His thoughts about Arabia and Arabs were different before his visit, but then he had the chance to get to know them and their situation deeply.[284] This duty provides a very clear picture of his Islamist side. His Arabia visit showed him that different kinds of ethnicities and sects within the empire had sneaky thoughts and positions regarding the empire.

When the Republic was established, he became an oppositional character and immigrated to Egypt for 13 years. There were many discussions about Akif's immigration to Egypt.[285] According to Georgeon, Akif immigrated to Egypt because Islamic reformation process had been successful in Egypt; moreover, it was the

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[278] Ibid., 186.
[279] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar II*: 32.
[280] Debus, *Sebilürreşâd: Kemalizm Öncesi ve Sonrası Dönemdeki İslamcı Muhalefete Dair Karşılaştırmalı Bir Araştırma*: 126-27.
[281] Mehmed Akif Ersoy, "Berlin Hâtıraları," in *Safahat* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Mehmed Akif Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2005).
[282] Kutay, *Necid Çöllerinde Mehmet Akif*: 95.
[283] Ibid., 128.
[284] Ibid., 186.
[285] Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif*: 331.

capital of Islamic reformation according to Akif.[286] Besides, he had a very close relationship with the Prince, Abbas Halim Pasha, who supported the journal financially and welcomed Akif during his Egypt years. Akif also wrote a poem for the prince.[287]

According to Tiftikçi, some Islamists were said freemasons. According to him, Said Halim Pasha, Babanzade Ahmed Naim and Abbas Halim Pasha were freemasons. Abbas Halim Pasha was the financier of the *Sebilürreşad* and one of the great supporters of Akif.[288] Abbas Halim Pasha and Said Halim Pasha were the grandsons of the Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha. Although most authors were not dedicated followers to a tarikat, Bereketzâde, Musa Kâzım and Babanzade were members of tarikats. "Bereketzâde believed in the superiority of Sufi practice over the theological view of Islam, Musa Kâzım was the member of the Nakşbend, Babanzâde of the Halvetiyye sects."[289]

3.3.3. Russian Émigrés

Until Balkan Wars, the *Sebilürreşad* circle did not take a negative stance against other ideologies, except Westernism.[290] Russian émigrés who mostly had a Turkist ideology cooperated with the *Sebilürreşad* circle and wrote for the journal.[291] "Thus, the magazine became the coordinating point of the Central Asian *Jadidism*

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[286] François Georgeon, *Osmanlı -Türk Modernleşmesi: 1900-1930* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2006). 14.

[287] Mehmed Akif, "El-Uksur'da (Prens Abbas Halim Paşa Hazretlerine)," *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 326 (1330/1915).

[288] Tiftikçi, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu: Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Gelişimi*: 126-27.

[289] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 302.

[290] Debus, *Sebilürreşâd: Kemalizm Öncesi ve Sonrası Dönemdeki İslamcı Muhalefete Dair Karşılaştırmalı Bir Araştırma*: 33.

[291] Gündoğdu, "Sırat-ı Müstakim (later, Sebilürreşad) and the Origin of the Japanese Image in Turkish Intellectuals," 246-47.

and Arabic reformism at the beginning of the 20th Century."[292] Akçura visited *Sebilürreşad's* office and met with Mehmed Akif.[293] *Sebilürreşad's* office was a meeting point of intellectuals who came from Russia. Even though non-Islamists wrote for the journal, the administration of the journal always belonged to the Islamists.

Sebilürreşad became the publishing center of Turkish Association [Türk Derneği] when it was founded in 1908, because the journal informed Russian Muslims about Islamic world and the Ottoman Empire and Turkish intellectuals about the Muslims in Russia.[294] The journal announced Turkish Association's regulation (Türk Derneği Nizamnamesi).[295]A. Sevindik wrote a greeting essay for Turkish Association.[296] It also announced the establishment of Turkish Hearts (Türk Ocakları) to the public.[297] Islamists supported Turkist émigrés until Balkan Wars which created conflicts between them. However, they left the journal because they started to publish their own journals. When Akçura and Ağaoğlu left the journal, the quality of the international politics portion of the journal diminished.[298]

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[292] Ibid., 247.

[293] M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ, *İslam ve Irkçılık Meselesi* (İzmir: Çağlayan Yayınları, 1997). 7.

[294] Gündoğdu, "Sırat-ı Müstakim (later, Sebilürreşad) and the Origin of the Japanese Image in Turkish Intellectuals," 247.

[295] "Türk Derneği Nizamnamesi," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 1, no. 21 (1324/1909).

[296] A. Sevindik, "Akvam-ı Türkiye'ye Müjde ve Türk Derneğini Tebrik," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 1, no. 25 (1324/1909).

[297] Toprak, "II. Meşrutiyette Fikir Dergileri," 126.

[298] Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri*: 25.

3.3.4. Relations with the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress)

The *Sebilürreşad* circle had strong ties with the CUP since it defended the constitutional regime through Islamic sentiments.[299] The authors of the journal preferred a secular CUP period, rather than the Hamidian regime, because of the CUP's references to constitution and freedom. "CUP did not represent a certain ideology, but gathered many ideologies which were against the Hamidian regime."[300] Members of the CUP saw themselves as not only party members, but also brothers. Many of *Sebilürreşad* authors were the members of the CUP or had close ties with it. For instance, Akif was a CUP member. Akif decided to become a CUP member during the weekend of the re-proclamation at *Direklerarası*.[301] Akif did not swear an oath in the ceremony for CUP membership, but he promised to maintain his works for the sake of his beliefs.[302] "Though opposed to the secularist tendencies of the Committee of Union and Progress, he remained an active member of this party until the end of World War I."[303] İzmirli İsmail Hakkı who was not a political figure, as many other intellectuals were, did not become a member of the CUP which was very powerful for the last years of the Ottoman Empire.[304] Mehmed Şemseddin (Günaltay) was also a member. "During his fellowship at the Süleymaniye medrese – after the declaration of the SCP – he joined the CUP."[305] Babanzade Ahmed Naim

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[299] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," viii.
[300] Ibid., 43.
[301] Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif*: 91.
[302] Ibid., 92. Edib
[303] Selcuk Aksin Somel, "Ersoy, Mehmed Akif," in *Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Selcuk Aksin Somel (Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2003), 86.
[304] Özervarlı, "Alternative Approaches to Modernization in the Late Ottoman Period: İzmirli İsmail Hakkı's Religious Thought against Materialist Scientism," 83-84.
[305] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 247.

also joined the Committee.[306] Musa Kazım became a member of the CUP just after declaration.[307]

The name of the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) shows its unionist side; for this reason, they tended to unite all parts of society in order to save the empire. Islamists supported the CUP because of its unionist side, not its secular one. Since, the *Sebilürreşad* circle was against the Hamidian regime, they agreed with the CUP. "Islamist movements, which had suffered persecution at the hands of Abdülhamid II, enjoyed a period of relative growth and tranquility under the CUP."[308] Because of this reason, according to Kara, *Sırat-ı Müstakim* supported the CUP.[309] *Sırat-ı Müstakim* pegged down pro-CUP ideas from the very beginning except for the disagreements about religion and the CUP's secular politics. They published the declaration of the CUP Congress in September 1911.[310] In one of Manastırlı's writings, the CUP was introduced as a respectful and sacred organization.[311] According to Tiftikçi, Mehmed Akif always followed the politics of the CUP.[312] Nevertheless, within a few years, when the CUP started to seize the power, the journal turned out to be seen as an opponent of the CUP. According to them, the government of the constitutional monarchy became worse than the Hamidian regime.[313] After 1912, Islamists took an oppositional stance against the CUP, although they supported the CUP's government because of its liberal and

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[306] Ibid., 166.
[307] Ibid., 130.
[308] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*: 186.
[309] Kara, "Sırat-ı Müstakim," 7.
[310] "Ahali-i Osmaniyyeye Hitaben, İttihad ve Terakki Kongresi'nin Beyannâmesidir," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 7, no. 162 (1327/1911).
[311] Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı, "Mevaiz," *Sırat-ı Müstakim*, no. 7 (1324/1908). Quoted from Düzdağ 2002, 19 "O cemiyet yok mu? Vallahi öyle muhterem, mukaddes bir cemiyettir ki, Kıyamete kadar pâyidar olsun."
[312] Tiftikçi, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu: Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Gelişimi*: 206.
[313] Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*: 109.

unionist position at first. "Babanzâde Ahmed Naim, at the beginning of the SCP member of the CUP and having the position of inspector in the Committee, gradually became an opponent to it because of the oppressive policies against the opposition and because of its latent secular and nationalist tendencies."[314]

The CUP leaders were aware of the consolidating power of the press.[315] The CUP supported the circle until they published their own journal, *Islam*. At this point, the CUP government tried to suppress or to control the press in several ways. The CUP government censored or suspended *Sebilürreşad* several times because of its opposition.[316] According to Düzdağ, Mehmed Akif's journal *Sebilürreşad* was censored, besides he was sacked from his position at the university due to his oppositional character.[317] Akif withdrew his support from the CUP.[318] Although the *Sebilürreşad* circle, especially Mehmed Akif, held oppositional views against both CUP and Kemalist governments they did not pose extremist oppositional attitudes against them, because they were anxious about the future of the country due to unending wars which were started just after the re-proclamation of the Constitution.

3.3.5. Ideology of the Journal

The main policy of the *Sebilürreşad* circle was to inform society via published media, thus it aimed to keep the empire and its components together just like other contemporary ideologies such as Ottomanism, Westernism and Turkism.

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[314] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 41.
[315] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*: 165.
[316] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar III*: 183.
[317] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar II*: 30.
[318] Yaşar Demir, "Jön Türkler ve Siyasetlerine Yönelik Farklı Bir Algılama: Muhafazakârlar," *21. Yüzyılda Eğitim ve Toplum* I, no. II (2012): 117.

Nevertheless, its tools and mottos were different from those of the others. *Sebilürreşad* was an outcome of religious scholars' intellectual Islamic discourse.[319] However, *Sebilürreşad* did not represent all kinds of Islamists and Islamism. The ideology of the circle was based on a combination of the Islamic institution, *meşveret* and the constitution[320], as the Young Ottomans defended. The main theme of the journal was to stop the threat from the West (degeneration) towards the Islamic community. In order to prevent this Western imperialist threat, Muslims had to return to their basic principles by importing Western technology and science. "Islamic modernists contributing to *Sırat-ı Müstakim* believed that a nation's essential religious character did not have to be lost when it absorbed Western principles and would assist in the filtering out of harmful European influences."[321] They criticized Westernist intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire.[322] "Intellectuals could not yet see that nations had to follow different roads to progress according to their own background and experience and that the road of the Islamic world was not that of the West."[323] The journal did not create a new ideology, but maintained an Islamic modernist understanding with respect to the Ottoman case. In short, they offered an Islamic way of progress and modernization. According to the Sebilürreşad circle without Islam and religious sincerity, neither was possible.

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[319] Şerif Mardin, "İslâmcılık," in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Murat Belge (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 1403.

[320] "İslâmlar Her Yerde Meşrûtiyetperverdir," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 4, no. 82 (1325/1909).

[321] Renée Worringer, ""Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36, no. 2 (2004): 218.

[322] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*: 186. Quoted from Ferid, "Tarih-i İstikbâl," Sebil'ür-Reşad,11/283 [February] 12, 1914], p. 358.

[323] Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, II: 304-05.

They were a continuation of Young Ottomans and Islamic modernists in other Islamic societies.[324]According to Georgeon, both, Muhammad Abduh and Turkish émigrés from Russia influenced *Sebilürreşad* circle.[325] It can certainly be claimed that the religious ideas expressed in the *Sırat-ı Müstakim* have much the same characteristics as that of the Islamic Modernists such as Afghani, Abduh and F. Vagdi.[326] Even though Islamists in the Second Constitutional Period benefited from the Islamic modernist intellectuals such as Muhammad Abduh, they could not produce a concrete solution to the Ottoman society. "Some of these modernists' papers were published in the journal. In his book *Safahat*, Akif referred to Abduh in some parts. Akif translated some works of Abduh and published them in *Sebilürreşad*.[327] He declared that he also wanted a reform in the Ottoman Empire, as Abduh did for Islamic world.[328] Akif called Abduh "the greatest master (*üstad*) of the East".[329] He followed the reformist way of Afghani and Abduh.[330] Young Ottomans also influenced the ideological patterns of the *Sebilürreşad* circle. Besides, Doğan argues that Namık Kemal's influence on Akif was more effective than that of Abduh's.[331]

They were modern, but Islam was always *a priori*. It is quite clear from their understanding of women's place in the society. Although the *Sebilürreşad* circle was against Western imperialism which was seen as a threat to the Muslim community,

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[324] Kara, "Sırat-ı Müstakim," 7.

[325] Georgeon, *Osmanlı -Türk Modernleşmesi: 1900-1930*: 14.

[326] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 300.

[327] Muhammad Abduh, "Hanotaux ve İslâm," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 3, no. 64 (1325/1909). Muhammad Abduh, "Vahdet-i İslâmiye," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 2, no. 52 (1324/1909). Muhammad Abduh, "Cinsiyet ve Diyanet-i İslamiye," *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 325 (1330).

[328] Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif*: 279.

[329] Gündoğdu, "Sırat-ı Müstakim (later, Sebilürreşad) and the Origin of the Japanese Image in Turkish Intellectuals," 247.

[330] R. İhsan Eliaçık, *İslam Yenilikçileri: İslam Düşünce Tarihinde Yenilik Arayışları, Kişiler, Fikirler, Akımlar*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: İnşa Yayınları, 2012). 655.

[331] Doğan, "The Origins of Liberalism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire: (1908-1914) (A Sociological Perspective)," 84.

especially as cultural one and through its missionary schools; it supported Western technology and science. Thus, some of them attended Western types of Ottoman schools such as Mülkiye. Since Islamists were pragmatists for the salvation of the Ottoman Empire and Muslim community, their political attitude differed according to political juncture.

Although *Sebilürreşad* was an Islamist journal, it was against the 31 March incident[332], because the circle defended freedom and constitution as an Islamic sensibility. *Sebilürreşad* described this movement as a political and reactionary tragedy, although it seemed religious.[333] "The magazine supported the new monarchy of the Ottoman Empire, and adopted a definite position on the 1909 reactionist upheaval of March."[334]

Islam was much more important than other issues according to the *Sebilürreşad* circle. Hence, they had a kind of intellectual responsibility to Muslims in the Ottoman Empire and all over the world. Akif criticized the East [Muslims] because of its outsider position from science and moral behavior, but being in a rudimentary (primitive) situation.[335] Mehmed Akif reprobated the ulama class, because according to his thought they were not eager to learn positive sciences.[336] They aimed at a Japanese model[337], which was not Western but modern, for the modernization of the Ottoman Empire. Modernization did not mean just Westernization of the state and society according to them. Technical and scientific

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[332] See "Din Elden Gidiyor Yaygarasıyla Halkı İğfale Çalışanları Tenkid ile İlgili Bir Açıklama," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 3, no. 61 (1325/1909).

[333] Abdullah Gündoğdu, *Ümmetten Millete: Ahmet Ağaoğlu'nun Sırat-ı Müstakim ve Sebilürreşad Dergilerindeki Yazıları Üzerine Bir İnceleme* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2007). 63.

[334] Gündoğdu, "Sırat-ı Müstakim (later, Sebilürreşad) and the Origin of the Japanese Image in Turkish Intellectuals," 247.

[335] Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif*: 279.

[336] Kutay, *Necid Çöllerinde Mehmet Akif*: 260.

[337] See Abdürreşid İbrahim, "Japonları Adam Yetiştirmek için Nasıl Çalışıyorlar," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 5, no. 114 (1326/1910). Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012). 16.

progress could be possible along an Eastern and conservative trajectory as Japan had done. On the other hand, the circle had a pro-German attitude.[338] Mehmed Akif led a propaganda group that included himself, Salih el-Sunusi, Tunuslu Salih Bey and Mısırlı Fuat Bey in order to convince Muslim captives of Germany of Germany's pan-Islamist attitude. [339] Kaiser Wilhelm ordered this duty to the German ambassador to Istanbul Baron von Marschall. [340]

3.3.6. *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* during the First World War

With the beginning of the First World War, the number of published journals in the Ottoman Empire decreased year by year. However, at the end of the war it started to increase again. Many journals encountered paper scarcity, financial issues and censorship. "During the Great War, the few newspapers that remained relied on a government supply of printing paper to issue two-page dailies made up largely of fulsome praise for the CUP's leadership of the war effort."[341] When the number of published journals decreased, *Sebilürreşad* could not be published for twenty months, either. There were several reasons behind it such as lack of paper, censorship, and so on. With the enthronement of Sultan Vahdettin, they started to publish journals again after twenty months.[342] In the 623th issue, Eşref Edib described the closure as a consequence of the journals decision to speak of religion which was

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[338] Debus, *Sebilürreşâd: Kemalizm Öncesi ve Sonrası Dönemdeki İslamcı Muhalefete Dair Karşılaştırmalı Bir Araştırma*: 88-89. See "Almanya ve Alem-i İslâm," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 7, no. 169 (1327/1911). "Osmanlı ve İslâm Muhibbi Almanlara Açık Mektup," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 7, no. 169 (1327/1911).
[339] Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif*: 207.
[340] Kutay, *Necid Çöllerinde Mehmet Akif*: 10.
[341] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, "The Second Constitutional Period: 1908-1918," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 100.
[342] Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 13.

forbidden in the twentieth century. Since the journal spoke of religion, it was closed for two years according to his argument.[343] Because of CUP oppression and for the salvation of the empire, *Sebilürreşad* did not assume a political opposition, but a cultural and intellectual one against the government during the First World War.

3.3.7. National Struggle and Sebilürreşad's Closure

National Struggle movement needed support of the press, especially the Islamist one in order to legitimize its actions and to get support. According to Eşref Edib, Mustafa Kemal invited him and Mehmed Akif to publish *Sebilürreşad* in Ankara to support the war against occupation.[344] Because of this reason, he sent Ali Şükrü Bey to invite them to the editorial office of *Sebilürreşad*.[345] This office was used as a communication port between Ankara and Istanbul, when the official ways of communication were controlled by occupation forces.[346] Akif accepted this offer. He went to Ankara to join the National Struggle and to publish *Sebilürreşad* in Ankara with Eşref Edib.[347] Before they went to Ankara, the journal propagated in the capital against occupant forces and supported the National Struggle. When British forces started to censor *Sebilürreşad* because of its support for the War of Independence, essays in the journal were shattered and sometimes its pages were blank.

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[343] Kara, "Sırat-ı Müstakim," 6.
[344] Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 35.
[345] Ibid.
[346] Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif*: 294.
[347] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar III*: 151. Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif*: 297. Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 14.

During the War of Independence, *Sebilürreşad* published pro-nationalist essays supporting Ankara government. *Sebilürreşad* included religious, moral and spiritual side of the National Struggle.[348] *Sebilürreşad* was the unique journal of the National Struggle which benefited from the religious sentiments of the people to mobilize against enemies. *Sebilürreşad* was against the imperialism of the Great Powers and occupation of the fatherland by them. When the lands of the Empire were occupied by the Great Powers and the Greek, all ideologies were bound against imperialism and occupation with patriotic feelings. After Friday prayers, *Sebilürreşad* was read to people in order to make propaganda. *Sebilürreşad* strengthened the moral and spiritual side of the National Struggle. Ankara government supported its publication through printing it in state printing house.[349] These issues were sent to all administrators of all cities, provinces and towns[350] in order to inform society. Furthermore, it was distributed to troops for Islamic propaganda in order to get the support of people who had close intimacy with religion.

Mehmed Akif supported the National Struggle with his poems[351] which were mostly related to political and social life. According to Düzdağ, Mehmed Akif was the spiritual leader of the National Struggle.[352] His published speeches had a simplistic language in order to inform everyone in the society.[353] He always tried to convince and enlighten people via Islamic fundamentals. The journal and Akif tried

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[348] Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 12.
[349] Matbuat ve İstihbarat Matbaası.
[350] Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 81.
[351] Eliaçık, *İslam Yenilikçileri: İslam Düşünce Tarihinde Yenilik Arayışları, Kişiler, Fikirler, Akımlar*, 1: 655.
[352] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar II*: 47.
[353] Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 91.

to convince people that the National Struggle was a jihad against non-believers.[354]
Ali Şükrü Bey's Kayseri Ulu Mosque speech was published in 490th issue entitled as
"*Anadolu'nun Büyük ve Mukaddes Cihâdı*" which means Holy and Great Jihad of
Anatolia.[355]

These issues were full of sermons by Mehmed Akif at mosques.[356] Akif used
Quran as a reference for his speech, which placed in the journal, quoted from 118th
verse of The Family of Imran (*Al-i Imran*) sura.[357] He also included several
quotations[358] from the Quran during other speeches. It was presented as a religious
duty to fight against occupants and to spread those speeches. According to Akif in
his Nasrullah speech[359], caliphate, sultanate, religion and belief were under the attack
of heathens.[360] He travelled around Anatolia during the National Struggle. He visited
Afyon, Kayseri, Eskisehir, Antalya, Konya, and Kastamonu in order to convince
people. In Antalya, he also made some contacts with businessmen in order to supply
money to buy weapons for the National Struggle.[361] When Akif and Edib returned to

[354] Debus, *Sebilürreşâd: Kemalizm Öncesi ve Sonrası Dönemdeki İslamcı Muhalefete Dair Karşılaştırmalı Bir Araştırma*: 105. Kutay, *Necid Çöllerinde Mehmet Akif*: 213. Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 27.

[355] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar III*: 153.

[356] Kutay, *Necid Çöllerinde Mehmet Akif*: 231.

[357] http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=3&verse=118 "O you who have believed, do not take as intimates those other than yourselves, for they will not spare you [any] ruin. They wish you would have hardship. Hatred has already appeared from their mouths, and what their breasts conceal is greater. We have certainly made clear to you the signs, if you will use reason." Quran 3,118 Surat Al-Imran (The Family of Imran)

[358] "http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=12&verse=87 "O my sons, go and find out about Joseph and his brother and despair not of relief from Allah. Indeed, no one despairs of relief from Allah except the disbelieving people." Quran 12,87 Surat Yusuf (Joseph)
http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=15&verse=56 "He said, "And who despairs of the mercy of his Lord except for those astray?" Quran 15,56 Surat Al-Hijr (The Rocky Tract)
http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=39&verse=53 "Say, "O My servants who have transgressed against themselves [by sinning], do not despair of the mercy of Allah. Indeed, Allah forgives all sins. Indeed, it is He who is the Forgiving, the Merciful." Quran 39,53 Surat Al-Zumar (The Groups)
http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=41&verse=49 "Man is not weary of supplication for good [things], but if evil touches him, he is hopeless and despairing."

[359] Mehmed Akif, "Nasrullah Kürsüsünde," *Sebilürreşad* 18, no. 464 (1337/1921).

[360] Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 88.

[361] Kutay, *Necid Çöllerinde Mehmet Akif*: 225.

Ankara, Mustafa Kemal appreciated their works[362] because of the positive effects of Akif's speeches which made better propaganda.

Some intellectuals such as Akif were dismissed by the new parliament just after the wars were won. Akif was not nominated as the deputy candidate for the first parliament of the republic.[363] When Akif was not reelected as deputy, he transferred the journal back to Istanbul again in May 1923. The journal continued its publication in Istanbul for two years. "After nationalists' victory, the *Sebilürreşad* removed back to Istanbul. Between 1923 and 1925, the *Sebilürreşad* was an opposition journal criticizing the secularist-nationalist policies of the newly established republic."[364] In 1925, just after the Decree of Silence (*Takrir-i Sükun*), *Sebilürreşad* was closed along with several other journals and newspapers by Independence Courts (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*)[365], because they were accused of being against the regime and got involved in Sheikh Said Rebellion. Eşref Edib also was judged by these courts and acquitted.

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[362] Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 94-5.
[363] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar II*: 48.
[364] Bostan, "Political Perspectives of Sebilürreşad," 3.
[365] Topuz, II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi: 148.

CHAPTER IV

NATION, NATIONALISM, ISLAM AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

> "No individual, no country, no people, no history of a people, no state is like any other. Therefore, the true, the beautiful, and the good are not the same for them."[366]

The terms 'nation' and 'nationalism' are the outcomes of modernity. Communities became nations as part of a set of historical process originating in Europe which included Renaissance, Reformation and the Enlightenment. The phenomenon of nation diffused outward from Europe to its periphery at first, then to the whole world gradually through the vehicles of capitalism, imperialism, and territorial, economic and cultural domination of the West upon non-Western communities. This process started with the centralization of European dynasties. "The main dynasties of Europe were able over time to centralize wealth and therefore power, to impose a greater degree of administrative control and uniformity, and thereby weaken regional sources of authority."[367] Feudal regimes transformed into

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[366] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism : A Study in its Origins and Background* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005). 433.

[367] Clive Christie, *Race and Nation: A Reader* (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1998). 33.

central dynasties that created the idea of equal citizens rather than subjects. This centralization and nationalization process enabled modern central armies and bureaucracies, national languages, national education and national territories. Nation building process created the common identity with the help of these institutions and instruments. In short, nations are the outcomes of modernity, the centralization of dynastic state, the idea of popular sovereignty and scientific revolution.[368] The Ottoman Empire also tried to establish a nation based on the central dynasty (nation) through modernization of the Empire. This chapter will provide a general discussion of nation and nationalism, elements of the nation building process, the relationship between Islam and nationalism, and the national discussions of the Ottoman Empire.

4.1. Literature Review

Notions of nation and nationalism are defined and discussed in different ways by different intellectuals and authors. It is necessary to discuss important definitions and arguments in order to understand the intellectual legacy of the nation and nationalism discussion. Herder argued at first that societies live with national and peculiar features, rather than general and universal ones.[369] For Weber there are many types of nations; however, he associates them with ethnicities which were bound to a myth of common descent through different political projects.[370] According to Weber, it was the duty of intellectuals to spread out the nationalist

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[368] Ibid., 32.
[369] Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism : A Study in its Origins and Background*: 429.
[370] John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: A Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 15.

thought through society.[371] For Renan[372] and Kirchhoff[373] nation is a group of people who have the desire to live both independently and together; furthermore, they are ready to sacrifice for the community. The nation is a daily plebiscite according to Renan.[374] Giddens identifies nation as a bordered power-container and formalized monopoly over the means of violence within territories.[375] For Gilbert it is the legal conception of a sole authority within borders[376] or scientific classification of social groups.[377] According to Stalin, a nation is a community that was constituted through history, but not race or tribe. [378]

According to Hobsbawm, nation is an elite tradition in order to legitimize their power in the country.[379] Hroch disagrees with Hobsbawm, arguing that nation building is not a product of elites or intellectuals who can only invent national communities with certain preconditions.[380] The new intelligentsia led the nation-building process vis-à-vis mass education and its utilitarian sides according to Gellner.[381] Benedict Anderson defines nation as an imagined community through print capitalism.[382] Gellner promulgates the importance of high-culture which has a process of clerk, reading, language, education and nation that created boundaries

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[371] Montserrat Guibernau, *Milliyetçilikler: 20. Yüzyılda Ulusal Devlet ve Milliyetçilikler* (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1997). 41.

[372] Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Paris 1882 quoted from Otto Bauer, "The Nation," in *Mapping The Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), 71.

[373] Alfred Kirchhoff, Zur Verständigung über die Begriffe 'Nation' und 'Nationalität', Halle 1905 quoted from ibid.

[374] Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism: A Reader*: 15.

[375] Anthony Giddens, "The Nation as Power-Container," in *Nationalism: A Reader*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 34-35.

[376] Paul Gilbert, *The Philosophy of Nationalism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998). 9.

[377] Ibid., 10.

[378] Joseph Stalin, "The Nation," in *Nationalism: A Reader*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 18.

[379] Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism: A Reader*: 48.

[380] Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe," in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. . Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), 79.

[381] Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism: A Reader*: 47.

[382] Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.

between different cultures.[383] Nationalism, which is rooted in modernity, is a need for modern societies to become culturally homogenous.[384]

Smith points out the importance of scientific state and the dual legitimation crisis between divine authority and secular state power. He thinks nationalism arises out of this crisis.[385] For Kedourie, "Nationalism is a form of secular millenarianism that has arisen from Kantian conceptions of human beings as autonomous, which, in turn, has led to politics replacing religions as the key to salvation."[386] For Gellner it is an outcome of the transition from agro-literate societies with an unevenness of industrialization.[387]

Kohn compares Western and Eastern nationalisms. According to him, Western nationalism is a civic nationalism which refers to the state over ethno-cultural appeals to solidarity; furthermore, Eastern nationalism is the authoritarian form of nationalism.[388] Put simply in the West, nation states created nation and nationalism while in the East, nationalism was identified before the creation of nation-states.[389] That's to say, nation is modern phenomenon that created its own way of life through creating national histories, symbols and languages with the help of centralization of state power through taxation and national armies and accelerated by the Industrial Revolution. This is also effective for the Islamic nation discussion.

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[383] Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism and High Cultures," in *Nationalism: A Reader*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 63.
[384] Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism: A Reader*: 47.
[385] Ibid., 48.
[386] Ibid., 47.
[387] Ibid.
[388] Ibid., 160.
[389] Haddad, "Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire," 10.

4.2. Etymology and Historical Process of Nation and Nationalism

The word nationalism is an outcome of the word nation which is derived from the Latin *nasci,* 'to be born. This word, which has a relationship with the English word *race*, refers to societies which are constituted by common birth or descent.[390] "In late Roman and early medieval texts, *natio* was less frequently used than gens, which also meant groups of common descent, though emphasizing kinship and family rather than race."[391] Nations were the quarters in the medieval universities in which students were placed according to their places of origin.[392] Nation mostly referred to people, however this group is differentiated from others in terms of birth or descent.[393] The modern meaning of the word evolved through other linguistic concepts, such as volk, and the sovereignty of people. Patriotism which is a kind of nationalism, has deep roots in Roman antiquity. The words patria and *patrius* refer to fatherland, city or familiar place.[394] "In terms of the "role of father," patria and *patrius* have subtle connections with property, authority, and status. The word patriarch evolves from this dimension."[395] With the rise of nationalism these Roman terms referred to a specific land in which the nation lived. The love of the patria or fatherland is called patriotism.

There was a shift in Europe during pre-modern times, from feudal structures to central dynastic states. Bureaucratic absolutist states consolidated small lands and borders became more concrete. There was the rise of bourgeoisie that united all small

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[390] John Breuilly, "Nation," in *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, ed. Maryanne Cline Horowitz (New York: Thomson Gale, 2005), 1572.
[391] Ibid.
[392] Bernard Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (New York: Schocken Books, 1998). 80.
[393] Gilbert, *The Philosophy of Nationalism*: 8.
[394] Andrew Vincent, "Patriotism," in *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, ed. Maryanne Cline Horowitz (New York: Thomson Gale, 2005), 1722.
[395] Ibid.

parcels under the sovereign. A process of centralization standardized administration and law within the community, and that transformed people as citizens via state education.[396] This secular ideology contested the authority of kings and claimed that the nation was more legitimate to reign over the country than a divine authority.[397] Nationalism which started to be a Western phenomenon became the religion of the modern age. While nationalism was the religion of modern age, religion served as an instrument of nation building.[398] Nationalism tried to assimilate ethnicities or to create nations from different ethnicities. It attempted to integrate the masses into a political form through symbols and commonalities. Other communities imitated the ideology for their very own national identities.

Nation is described as a community which has the ability to govern itself in the past, present and future.[399] The state created the nation through central taxation, mobilization around the corporate identity and the promotion of loyalty.[400] Moreover, this allowed for the development of a mentality by which one is willing to repeatedly sacrifice themselves[401] for the good of the community. Borders became concrete with the emergence of nations and national states. "In most senses, the modern frontier was another invention of the Enlightenment."[402] Nation-states have to clarify their borders, so their territories in order to secure their nationalist purposes and to govern itself as a single power. "In this respect the modern state differs from

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[396] Eric Hobsbawm, "The Nation as Invented Tradition," in *Nationalism: A Reader*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 77.
[397] Timothy Baycroft, "Nationalism: Overview," in *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, ed. Maryanne Cline Horowitz (New York: Thomson Gale, 2005), 1578.
[398] Greenfeld, *Nationalism and the Mind: Essays on Modern Culture*: 93.
[399] Anthony H. Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 6.
[400] Anthony D. Smith, "The Origins of Nations," in *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 116.
[401] Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?," in *Nationalism: A Reader*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 17.
[402] R. J. B. Bosworth, *Nationalism* (Harlow: Pearson, 2007). 53.

older ones where frontiers were "porous and indistinct," since no question arose as to whether people had rights entitling them to some particular statehood."[403] However, it is hard to define the uniqueness of the community through different identifications. Therefore, the nation-state building process relied on education and manipulation, rather than compulsion and force.

The Industrial Revolution created cities and a bourgeoisie class that enabled the transformation of subjects into class identifiable citizens. "People who uprooted from their villages, separated from their families and their priests, and moved to anonymous townships, can find some comfort in the identity offered by nationality."[404] Industrial systems were firstly national, secondly international, besides every economic affair and institution became national, such as national resource and national market.[405] Capitalism and nationalism made assessments of their progress mutually.[406] It would be impossible to feed central armies without the help of Industrial Revolution.[407]

Nation differs from other collective identities such as class, region, religion, and gender.[408] National identification became popular during the nation-state building processes rather than religious, local, sexual and ethnic identification. As a consequence, the national-building process correlates with the development of schools as state and popular institutions in order to mobilize individuals as a

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[403] Gilbert, *The Philosophy of Nationalism*: 92.
[404] John Breuilly, "Approaches to Nationalism," in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), 154.
[405] Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*: 238.
[406] Bosworth, *Nationalism*: 5.
[407] Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*: 239-40.
[408] Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism: A Reader*: 4.

nation.[409] Modern men needed education in order to become more effective citizens and individuals in the formation of nation-states. Mass publication helped this process by packaging and disseminating ideology and its formation through books, associations and newspapers.[410]

Nationalism is a term which refers to an ideology or doctrine of the organization of authority.[411] As for its historical processes, there have been several types of nationalism; however, every type of nationalism presented a quest for political representation, legitimacy or power.[412] That is why it is hard to define or to stereotype nations or nationalisms. Every nation building process and nationalism is unique and demonstrates different characteristics. According to Weber "For there is need, I believe, of emphasizing the fact that nationalism is plural rather than singular."[413] In short, every kind of nationalism has a unique position as the case study of Ottoman nationalism (Ottomanism) or nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire demonstrates.

4.2.1. National Symbols, Cultures and Histories

Nation states emerged after the advent of modern, bureaucratic, central governments. The centralization of power needed the centralization and the standardization of language, religion and culture, so a common understanding of identity. The creature of the common identity was possible through historic events

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[409] Etienne Balibar, "The Nation Form: History and Ideology," in *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 142.
[410] Bauer, "The Nation," 46.
[411] Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration*: 4.
[412] Baycroft, "Nationalism: Overview," 1578.
[413] Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*: v.

and emblems (symbols) which symbolizes unity and concretizes the borders from others. "The fundamental problem is therefore to produce the people. More exactly, it is to make the people produce itself continually as national community."[414] Nationalist intellectuals used communal histories as liberation myths and cult of heroes for moral purification and political mobilization.[415] The notion of freedom created an understanding of new nations. A nation was no more just a geographical or physical entity, but a political recreation of a community through historical creation by the action of the State.[416] These symbols and commonalities have always existed, even before the rise of nationalism. However, they were transformed, since nationalism is neither a natural outcome nor a natural phenomenon.[417] "Nationalism cannot be properly understood if it is limited to linguistic/ethnic/cultural identities and/or nationhood. Instead, it is a question related to the organization of state power in modern society."[418]

Blood ties, race, language, religion, customs, culture, territory, ideals, values, equality, homeland, and solidarity were assumed to be the common features for the building processes of nations necessarily. These commonalities created the nation which shared a common history and a future project through self-determination. Mass publication shaped this process by promoting these commonalities, via educational means such as history and common language. This increased the literacy rate which subsequently increased nationalist sentiments within the community. However, sometimes some of these features are not compulsory for nation building.

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[414] Balibar, "The Nation Form: History and Ideology," 138.
[415] Smith, "The Origins of Nations," 121.
[416] Lord Acton, "Nationality," in *Mapping The Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), 32.
[417] Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism : A Study in its Origins and Background*: 6.
[418] Elizabeth Özdalga, "Islamism and Nationalism as Sister Ideologies: Reflections on the Politicization of Islam in a Longue Durée Perspective," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 3 (2009): 419.

For instance, some nations had different official languages or some different official religions.

History had a special place for the spread of nationalism and nation-state. The rise of nationalism created a new understanding of history; yet simultaneously, this new understanding of history created nations. History as an academic field was used in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in both European and non-European universities to construct the nation-state. History was not understood as a mechanism for uncovering what happened in the past, but for what is thought about what happened.[419] Any criticism to these studies was seen as unpatriotic, even as a threat to the integrity of the field of history and its self-proclaimed objectivity.[420] The formation of national histories created national myths, and vica-versa.

The loyalty of pre-modern people was to city, locality, ruler or empire, but never nation.[421] Through nationalist understanding, though, new symbols and loyalties of national identity were created with the use of education, history, and language. "Loyalty to the ruler was increasingly accompanied by patriotism, a sense of identification with a particular state and its territory and people."[422] A hero or heroes were created through history in order to empower national pride against other nations. A charismatic leader or leaders fulfilled a need for the creation of national identities and the nation building process.

Nation building started initially as a cultural and social process, but not political. When the borders of the nation-states in Europe became more concrete,

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[419] İsmail Kara, "Turban and Fez: Ulema as Opposition," in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 182.
[420] Kevin Passmore, "National History," in *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, ed. Maryanne Cline Horowitz (New York: Thomson Gale, 2005).
[421] Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*: 6.
[422] Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism: A Reader*: 7.

political attempts at national building emerged all over the world. Culture was not enough to create a sovereign, but political instruments helped culture to build nations.

> "It is no longer the family, the tribe or the village that constitutes the main survival unit for the individual, but the state. The ideology that binds the individuals to this modern survival unit is nationalism. That is what I see as the actual reason behind the 'persistence' and 'durability' of this ideology in our time, not the 'older beliefs, symbols, and rituals of traditional religions'."[423]

4.3. Religion, Islam, Nationalism and Islamism

Before modernity, religions created an identity which is over the national and tribal identity. "Religion was the great dominating force before the rise of nationalism in modern times. This is true in Western as well as Eastern Christianity, in Islam and in India."[424] Before nationalism and secularism, disloyalty to the religious identity used to be defined as heretical. Nonetheless, nationalism replaced the political culture of religious loyalty and benefited from its power, since it is understood as a modern religion. Nationalism shares central features, which render them functionally equivalent, with religions.[425] However, nationalism turned into a framework that is the identity character of the age; and replaced the basis of religious identity.[426] The love of patria and nation were much more important than the love of God and religious community. "Patriotism is in political life what faith is in religion, and it stands to the domestic feelings and to homesickness as faith to fanaticism and

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[423] Özdalga, "Islamism and Nationalism as Sister Ideologies: Reflections on the Politicization of Islam in a Longue Durée Perspective," 419.
[424] Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism : A Study in its Origins and Background*: 14-15.
[425] Greenfeld, *Nationalism and the Mind: Essays on Modern Culture*: 94.
[426] Ibid., 95.

to superstition."[427] National identity took the precedence of religious identity. However, some national identities still were under the influence of religion as in Russia being Orthodox.[428] On the other hand, religion was used sometimes for the formation of nation. "Whether benign or malign, organic or synthetic, the tight fit between religion and nationalism and the power of their combination emerged as conventional wisdom."[429] Religion is not in any case the precise nationalization institution, there are secular nations anyway.

Nationalism influenced Islam and Islamic communities, too. The influence of nationalism in Europe shaped the ideology of modern Muslim thinkers who adopted nationalism and interpreted it with Islamic discourse.[430] Since Islam did not prohibit ethnic and linguistic identities, before modernity these identities within Muslim communities survived. However, they remained in the background, while religious identity was the most important. An ethnic separation which was based upon language between Islamic communities was not strong.[431] Some Muslim thinkers identified nationalism as an anti-Islamic discourse, because a Muslim's nationality (*millet*) is his faith.[432] Nationalism was a threat to Muslim unity according to Muslim modernists. Nationalism in the Islamic communities was a response to modernity and an outcome of it. In modern times, Muslim unity was not a pure Islamic discourse, rather an anti-colonial ideology.[433] "Both patriotism and nationalism were alien to

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[427] Acton, "Nationality," 33.
[428] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996). 137.
[429] Tristan James Mabry, "Nationalism, Language and Islam: A Cross-Regional Comparative Study of Muslim Minority Conflict" (University of Pennsylvania, 2007), 18.
[430] Elie Kedourie, *Islam in the Modern World and Other Studies* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1980). 40.
[431] İlber Ortaylı, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Millet," in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Murat Belge (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 997.
[432] Sami Zubaida, "Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions," *Nations and Nationalism* 10, no. 4 (2004): 407.
[433] Khalid, "Pan-Islamism in Practice: The Rhetoric of Muslim Unity and its Uses," 204.

the world of Islam. Alike in the titulature of monarchs and in the writings of historians, nation and country neither delimited sovereignty nor defined identity."[434]

> "The three major peoples of Middle Eastern Islam, the Arabs, the Persians and the Turks, were proudly conscious of their national heritage – their languages and literatures, their history and culture, their presumed common origins, their distinctive manners and customs. There was also a natural attachment to the land of one's birth [patriotism] – love of country, local pride, homesickness, are all familiar in/ Islamic as in Western literature. But these carried no political message, and at no time before the intrusion of Western ideas was the idea accepted or even known that the nation or the national homeland was the unit of political identity and sovereignty. For Muslims, their identity was the Faith, and their allegiance belonged to the ruler or dynasty that ruled over them in the name of that Faith."[435]

However, these hidden features of the knowledge of every Muslim ethnic group came to light and supported nation building processes. Indigenous interpretations of Islamic heritage, historical or imagined, have become important building blocks in the construction of modern national identities.

The ummah under the unity of the Caliphate has several characteristics in common with nations. Kedourie draws a parallel between nation and the ummah. For nationalism, individuals have to cut off their tribal, communal and family ties according Islamic principles break through tribal structures in order to create ummah, Islamic community.[436] Another connection between the nation and ummah pertains to their relationship with law, since both have a specific and articulated legal system.[437] "This means that both doctrines include an element of populism and/or constitutionalism, the latter meaning that the laws stand above all particular interests,

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[434] Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2000 Years* (New York: Scribner, 1996). 328.
[435] Ibid., 327-28.
[436] Özdalga, "Islamism and Nationalism as Sister Ideologies: Reflections on the Politicization of Islam in a Longue Durée Perspective," 416.
[437] Ibid.

including that of the head of state."[438] Ummah shaped the new kind of national understanding in Islamic communities. Islam was a cultural identity which is defined by history, language, customs, institutions and self-identification of Muslims.[439]

> "Thus the idea of One Caliph, intended to tie the entire Muslim community together into one politico-spiritual entity, suffered a serious setback early in Islamic history, In addition to the feud over the method of succession, the Umma, divided into tribes and nations ignored the teachings of One God commanding unity beyond tribal and geographical boundaries."[440]

There is a similarity between the state-nation and caliphate-ummah structures that has to be considered in the theories of nationalism.[441]

There were some analogies between classical Islam and nationalism; however, with the rise of Pan-Islam these get a new direction.[442] Islamism was an ideology which had similar nuances with nationalism. Even though it prohibited separatist nationalisms, it had similar methodologies and similarities with nationalism. "Yet, on closer examination, Pan-Islam seems to have more resemblance to modern nationalist movements than to older Islamic feelings."[443] It was a step between classical Islam and modern nationalism. Islamism enabled a period of national transitions for Islamic communities.[444] That is why Islamism could be identified as an effective force behind the historical process of nationalism.

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[438] Ibid., 417.

[439] Mabry, "Nationalism, Language and Islam: A Cross-Regional Comparative Study of Muslim Minority Conflict," 8.

[440] L. Ali Khan, *The Extinction of Nation-States: A World without Borders* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996). 47.

[441] Özdalga, "Islamism and Nationalism as Sister Ideologies: Reflections on the Politicization of Islam in a Longue Durée Perspective," 408.

[442] Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," 21.

[443] Ibid., 18.

[444] Nikki R. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," *The Journal of Modern History* 41, no. 1 (1969): 18.

4.3.1. Islamic Etymology of Nation and Nationalism

There is no consistency of the usage of the words regarding nation such as *millet*, *asabiye*, *ümmet* and others during modern periods. The meanings of these words have changed according to context, time, and authorship. *Umma* and *millet* are the Arabic words which refer to group identity. *Millet* (*milla*) is an Arabic word which corresponds to nation. In the Ottoman Empire it referred to a religious community that belonged to an Abrahamic religion under the status of *zımmi* (*dhimmi*) and Muslims (*İslam milleti*). The Ottoman Empire perfected the millet system of the early years of Islam, which allowed some communities autonomy in religious affairs, law and education.[445] These communities had the autonomy that was led by an official authority from that community. The differences between *millets* did not depend upon ethnicity, but religion. The word *millet* did not correspond to the modern meaning of nation before the modernization of the Ottoman Empire. "The Ottoman Empire was politically corporatist, identifying its many separate "nations" or communities by ethnic origin, communal tradition or history, or religion."[446] In classical Arabic, it mostly referred to non-Muslim religious communities.[447]

In the 19th century, the meaning of *millet* started to change and in the 20th century it took its contemporary meaning. During this transition period, the meanings of religion and nation were often confused. Secularist ideas of Tanzimat transformed *millet* into a modern shape that refers to nation or people.[448] "The term millet no longer referred to a strictly religious congregation or to various non-Muslim groups

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[445] David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism* (London: Cass, 1977). 23.
[446] William Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993). 92.
[447] Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*: 83.
[448] Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*: 23.

(*anasir-i muhtelife*) but rather to a political community made up of Muslims."[449] Following nationalistic ideas, the word *millet* was transformed as nation, *milli* as national, *milliyet* [*milliyetçilik*] as nationalism, and *milliyetçi* as nationalist.[450] For the nation, *ummah* (*ümmet*) and *milla* (*millet*) were used with their new meanings.

Indeed ummah refers to all of the Muslim community. Both terms *ümmet* and *millet* started to be referred to as nation. "*Ümmet* originally referred to the community of all Muslims and millet referred to a religious community."[451] Both terms were found in the Quran. Ummah refers to community of believers.[452] "The Arabic word used to designate the community is *umma* probably borrowed from the Hebrew *ummah*, nation."[453] Islam shaped the Arabic unbeliever community into a community of believers of Muhammad, so the ummah.[454] The understanding of ummah created the huge Islamic community in which Muslims pushed their non-religious identities into the background. However, their meanings did not correspond to the modern meaning of nation in an exact sense. Even though there are some discussions[455] about the similarities between community formations of nation and ummah, they are indeed not the same, but similar. Although *ümmet* today refers an antonym for *millet*, in fact it corresponds the modern meaning of *millet*, so nation.[456]

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[449] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*: 126.

[450] Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*: 83.

[451] Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity : A history, 1789-2007*: 123-24.

[452] Francis Robinson, "Islam and Muslim Seperatism," in *Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (London: Routledge, 2000), 916.

[453] Bernard Lewis, "Politics and War," in *The Legacy of Islam*, ed. Joseph Schacht and C. E. Bosworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 157.

[454] Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*: 82.

[455] See Özdalga, "Islamism and Nationalism as Sister Ideologies: Reflections on the Politicization of Islam in a Longue Durée Perspective."

[456] Abdullah Manaz, *Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de siyasal İslamcılık* (İzmir: Ulusal Birlik İçin Düşünce - Eylem Vakfı, 1998). 461.

Another term related to nation, *asabiye* (*asabiyah*) was an invention of Ibn Khaldun. Al Asabiya means "tribalism, racialism, fanaticism, team spirit, national consciousness and nationalism".[457] According to Karpat the term turned into the usage of *milli asabiye* which corresponds to a kind of proto-nationalism and social mobilization founded before modern nation understanding was created.[458] The term *kavmiyye* which is also related to the discussion of nation referred mostly to ethnic identities. *Kavmiyye* pointed to "nationality and nationalism".[459] It also underwent several meaning changes. It mostly referred to separatist nationalisms as in the usage of the word *kavmiyetçilik*. The French word *nation* and *nationalité* substantially means *kavmiyet*, however, it was translated as *millet* or *milliyet*.[460]

Vatan, a term related to nationalism, was first thought of as the fatherland, *patria* and homeland. *Patria* in Latin and *patris* in Greek that refer to fatherland are both derived from the word father.[461] The Arabic word *watan* which is also used in Turkish and Persian, means a place of residence that can be adopted or is temporary.[462] *Vatan* simply refer to a town or village of anyone. But, the word *vatan* transformed into a modern meaning that corresponds to the whole country, became a phenomenon which can be died for. Fatherland as a concept is a production of the 1870's[463], especially of the Young Ottomans who had a nationalist side. *Vatan* provides a sacred territory to a community that has to be defended by each member

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Hans Wehr, "Asabiya," in *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, ed. J. Milton Cowan (New York: Spoken Language Services, 1976).[457]

[458] Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*: 545.

[459] Hans Wehr, "Qavmiya," in *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, ed. J. Milton Cowan (New York: Spoken Language Services, 1976).

[460] Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*: 24.

[461] Bernard Lewis, "Watan," *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no. 3/4 (1991): 523.

[462] Ibid., 524.

[463] Roderic Davison, "Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response," in *Nationalism in a Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald (Columbus: , : Ohio State University Press, 1977), 40.

of that community. *Vatancılık* means "nationalism, national sentiment and patriotism."[464] As a form of nationalism, patriotism was defined as the greatest virtue of the Ottomans.[465] However, the rise of non-Muslim nationalism evolved *vatan* understanding into a Turkish-Muslim concept. Moreover, love of *vatan* evolved as a must of faith. Namık Kemal's famous play *Vatan yahut Silistre* (Fatherland, or, Silistre) pictured patriotism through a heroic warfare against Russians in the play.

The transition of the meaning of *millet* basically demonstrates the process of changing ideologies in the Ottoman Empire. Whereas millet referred to religious communities in classical period, *cemaat* or *unsur* were thought to refer these communities in the modernization period that were mostly belonged to different ethnicities.[466] Conservatives regarded the term as a religious term; however, modernists viewed it as a worldly and political community.[467]

> "Millet, previously used to refer to the Christians, was appropriated by the Muslims as the "national" name of all those who shared Islam. For the Ottoman Muslims, it first denoted a religious-national identity and only later acquired ethnic connotations; but Russia's Turks from the start gave millet mainly a national-ethnic and territorial meaning."[468]

As stated above, the term *millet* was considered to have different meanings from national to religious depending upon content, time and place. The modern meaning of millet turned into larger community mainly based on the building processes of nations. Every ethnic community in the Ottoman Empire started to turn into nations such in the case of Greek nation and those that followed.

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[464] Hans Wehr, "Wataniya," in *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, ed. J. Milton Cowan (New York: Spoken Language Services, 1976).

[465] Kemal H. Karpat, "Nationalism," in *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters (New York: Facts on File, 2008), 424.

[466] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*: 331.

[467] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*: 126.

[468] Ibid., 334.

4.4. Imperialism, Nationalism and the Ottoman Response

Capitalism and imperialism threatened classical empires. The process of nation formation and nationalism in the Middle East was a special case because of socio-political structure, culture and imperialism.[469] Imperialism and domination created a sense of common identity in colonies or threatened lands such as the Ottoman Empire. As a classical empire, the Ottoman Empire was under the threat of separatist nationalism and Western imperialism. Reaction against Western imperialism created a nationalism that aimed to ensure collective freedom[470] from foreign domination. "The powerful ideology of nationalism sealed the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The emergence of nationalism among Ottoman peoples resulted in the transformation of imperial space and multiethnic structures into nation-state territories and national identities."[471] As a reaction, Ottoman intellectuals introduced Ottomanism at first, Islamism, and finally Turkism. "Thus a range of international developments, including war and invasion, produced a sort of anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist Muslim nationalism represented by the Ottoman state and its sultan-caliph."[472] Since the Ottoman Empire was the most powerful state of and representative of Islam.

Under this imperialist threat, non-Western countries started to think about their territories, differences and commonalities against Europe within national structures. This created a sense of nation identities within Muslim communities. "Starting in the late nineteenth century there was an increased consciousness of an

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[469] Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*: 544.
[470] Greenfeld, *Nationalism and the Mind: Essays on Modern Culture*: 106.
[471] Behlül Özkan, *From Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). 27.
[472] Karpat, "Nationalism," 423.

ethnic community among the Muslim groups."[473] However, Ottoman Muslims prefer a Muslim rule, whether good or bad, rather than a non-Muslim occupation It was not only multi-ethnic formation of the empire which threatened its unity, but geographic distribution of ethnicities rendered the situation complex.[474] Anti-imperialist attitude started to turn into a national character, even though it had religious sides.

Modern Islamic ideologies and their leaders were against European invasion.[475] After the Balkan Wars in 1912, Muslims were aware of their situation. They had to fight for their independence against foreign powers. "In this grim struggle where nationalism and Islam fought hand in hand, unity and solidarity were the overriding dictates."[476] For instance, the Turkish War of Independence had an Islamist side.

> "The cycle of wars and reforms revitalized religious identities, and nineteenth-century Ottoman nationalist discourse was framed in terms of Islamic identity. The Ottoman political elite utilized Islamic concepts to promote the idea of territory as the new foundation for statehood and to disseminate the view that the fatherland comprised the space that was necessary for the survival of this Islamic community. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman elite had begun to use fragments of Ottoman-Islamic political thinking to articulate new concepts such as homeland (vatan), nation (millet), and public opinion (kamuoyu)."[477]

The Ottoman Empire had a classical imperial state understanding until she faced the clashes of nationalism and Western imperialism. The classical system did not request ideological conformity, religious conversion, or social conformation from

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[473] Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 11.
[474] Davison, "Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response," 30.
[475] Bauer, "The Nation," 72.
[476] Fazlur Rahman, "Revival and Reform in Islam," in *The Cambridge History of Islam: Islamic Society and Civilization*, ed. P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 650.
[477] M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 43.

its subjects, but obedience, tribute and taxes.[478] Though the Ottoman Empire was the largest Islamic state during the nineteenth century, it was not modern at all.[479] Since there was a situation of backwardness in the Ottoman Empire, it tried to suit the national understanding in the Empire with the advent of the ideology of Ottomanism. This was the basic limitation of central government, army and taxation systems of Western dynasties. For the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman nation meant a continuation of pax-Ottoman. Even though there was the understanding of *din-u-devlet* (state-faith) which were seen as twin brothers, state was more important for the Ottoman center. "The existence of the state was rationalized by the need to ensure the survival of the nation."[480]

However, Ottoman central power was not so powerful as to supply social, economic, political and institutional structures or to create a nation that governs itself. The Ottoman nation idea depended on just institutional references, not common history, language, and culture. "Tanzimat reforms did not create an Ottoman nation, but a reactionary movement of Islamism, and a collective Muslim identity."[481] Since it was a multi-national empire, it could not succeed in creating a single nation through cultural assimilation. "Furthermore, the Ottomans suffered from the same problems that other multinational states did at this time, when the idea of national self-determination had taken hold."[482] The Ottoman Empire suffered from the disruptive feature of nationalism which enabled disintegration for some communities in the Empire.

[478] Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism*: 94.
[479] Ibid., 93.
[480] Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*: 43.
[481] Haldun Gülalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti: Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamın Temelleri* (İstanbul: Metis, 2003). 28. Quoted from Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918*: 207.
[482] Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 291.

Nationalism movements in the Ottoman Empire emerged among Ottoman intellectuals as Ottomanism and Islamism.[483] Ottomanism as a secular Tanzimat ideology emerged in the Ottoman Empire. Islamism emerged as a reactionary ideology against Tanzimat's secular policies and laws. Due to nationalism, the Ottoman central government had a policy to unite all kinds of communities in the empire under a common identity; at first as the Ottoman, then as Islamic and finally as Turkish. "The migrations from territories ceded to European powers under the Treaty of Berlin transformed the multireligious empire into a Muslim country. After the treaty left Muslims as the clear majority in the Ottoman state, its promotion as the spiritual home of Muslims proved to be easier."[484] A national imagination which depended upon the territorial unity of the Ottoman subjects was not successful.[485] The Ottoman Empire was not powerful enough to create a common culture to bind non-Muslims to the center and its politics was not enough for the Ottoman nation building process, either. There was no possible Ottoman nationalism, but Ottoman patriotism, which was mostly dependent upon Turkish-Islamic sentiments.

4.4.1. The Non-Muslims and the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire

Ottoman Christians realizing their religious and linguistic differences with the weakness of the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis the Great Powers, developed their own nationalisms.[486] Ethnic identity, however, maintained its importance with religious

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[483] İlhan Yerlikaya, *XIX.Yüzyıl Osmanlı Hayatında Basiret Gazetesi ve Pancermenizm-Panislamizm-Panslavizm-Osmanlıcılık Fikirleri* (Van: Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1994). 102.

[484] Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*: 43.

[485] Gülalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti: Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamın Temelleri*: 27.

[486] Selcuk Aksin Somel, "Nationalism," in *Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Selcuk Aksin Somel (Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2003), 211.

identity in the Ottoman Empire. Though Ottomanism aimed to create an Ottoman nation, only some Muslims identified themselves as Ottoman. Other elements of the empire defined themselves still with reference to traditional identities or ethnicities. Ottomanism became a Muslim identity, because it was only adopted by Muslims in the empire. It was viewed as a sort of Islamic identity.[487] Despite the fact that *reaya* became *teba'a* did not satisfy the integration of the Ottoman Empire as a nation. "Modern nationalism, however, could not exist with a millet system. Instead, it required one territory – usually viewed in emotional terms as "homeland" or "sacred soil" – and one law."[488] The failure of uniting communities under the model of a traditional empire provided the rise of absolutist states that created nation states.[489] The Ottoman Empire, as a result, disintegrated and divided into different nation-states.

When imperial subjects lost their connections with and loyalty to the empire, they started to build their own communal loyalty which created nations afterwards. In the nineteenth century, non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Balkans started to rise against the Ottoman center. The Great Powers influenced the advent of the Balkan nations and nationalisms. "Western Europe perceived positively the stirrings of these nascent national groups, whose identities had been kept alive by the failure of the Ottomans to integrate their subjects because of the millet system."[490] Serbia was the first one in 1804, then in 1821 Greece separated from the Ottoman Empire. Russian influence on Orthodox communities of the Ottoman Empire, with respect to

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[487] Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*: 546.
[488] Davison, "Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response," 37.
[489] Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism: A Reader*: 6.
[490] Haddad, "Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire," 14.

their protection, caused loss of lands.[491] Ottoman center could not create an emancipatory politics for those communities. "Whenever possible, however, the Ottoman answer to nationalist subversion was to repress it with whatever force was necessary."[492]

The Ottoman case of nationalism is not a classic discussion of nationalism as in the European context, but it was a phenomenon through non-Muslims subjects and sometimes a religious issue. In these cases religious incentives formed the national-secular identities. According to Greenfeld, religion played a midwife at the birth of nationalism and was occasionally used as instrument[493] in such cases. The Ottoman experience of nationalism is not secular like European nationalism. Nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire were connected with religion, especially non-Muslim nationalisms. For instance, national churches emerged such as the Bulgarian church. However, it was sometimes not a religious issue. Language within the Ottoman context elaborated the discussion about nation. There were some Greeks who had no idea about the Greek language. There were also some Turks who had no idea about Turkish.[494] According to some, Christianity was the reason for non-Muslim nationalism in the Ottoman Empire; however, for some it was the printing press.[495]

Muslim nationalisms were the latecomers in the Ottoman Empire. The word Arab had a meaning as the word Turk had. Both referred to nomads until the reproduction of their meaning in the modernization period. They did not mean a national community. Before modernity, in the West Turk referred to a Muslim; however, linguistic and cultural differences remained effective within Arab and Turk

[491] Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism*: 97.
[492] Davison, "Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response," 45.
[493] Greenfeld, *Nationalism and the Mind: Essays on Modern Culture*: 104.
[494] Davison, "Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response," 32.
[495] Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism: A Reader*: 5.

communities. "Islam was practically identical with the Turks and 'Turk' was becoming synonymous with 'Muslim'."[496] Nevertheless, Arabic language remained a common factor between Muslim communities. Moreover, Arabs were seen as the noble nation by other Muslim communities.[497] These features survived the loyalty of Muslims of the Ottoman Empire until the very end.

Arabs had no intention to create their own nation-states until the end of First World War. Contrary to what is believed, Arabs fought for the salvation of the Ottoman Empire. There were local Arabic revolts but they did not turn into nationalist movements which aimed to create their own sovereignties outside of the Ottoman Empire.[498] Arabic people mostly remained loyal to Ottomanism and Ottoman dynasty that was not seen as a foreign colonial power by Arabs.[499] For most Muslims, especially for public, nationalism meant nothing until the very beginning of 20th century.[500] However Christian-Arabic nationalism stirred up Muslim-Arab intellectuals to start an Arabic nation. At the end of the First World War, Arabs were separated from the Ottoman Empire. When Arabs were separated from the Ottoman Empire, Islamism lost its ground since it aimed at an Islamic nation.[501] After the First World War, nationalism remained the only ideology.[502]

Ottoman Muslims did not face nationalism until the very end of the Ottoman Empire. The power of Ottoman sultan and his caliphate title over Sunnis in the

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[496] Maxime Rodinson, "The Western Image and Western Studies of Islam," in *The Legacy of Islam*, ed. Joseph Schacht and C. E. Bosworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 31.

[497] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*: 346.

[498] Davison, "Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response."

[499] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*: 321.

[500] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918*: 3.

[501] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)."

[502] Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics : the Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1959). 28.

Ottoman Empire helped to reduce the effects of nationalism. Nevertheless, there were some separatist movements by Sunni Muslims, such as Albanians. "Though state and dynasty-oriented patriotism had existed among Sunni Muslim Turks since earlier times, this feeling developed into Turkish nationalism chiefly as a reaction against other nationalism within the empire."[503] As a consequence Muslim nationalisms did not emerge as a non-Muslim nationalism emerged, and Turkish nationalism emerged as a reactionary nationalism against the nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire.

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[503] Somel, "Nationalism," 211-12.

CHAPTER V

ISLAMIST UNDERSTANDING OF NATION AND NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF SIRAT-I MÜSTAKİM/SEBİLÜRREŞAD

"Fear not, the crimson banner that proudly ripples in this glorious dawn, shall not fade,
Before the last fiery hearth that is a blaze within my homeland is extinguished.
For that is the star of my people, and it will forever shine;
It is mine; and solely belongs to my valiant nation.

Frown not, I beseech you, oh thou coy crescent,
Smile upon my heroic nation! Why the anger, why the rage?
Our blood which we shed for you might not be worthy otherwise;
For freedom is the absolute right of my God-worshipping nation."[504]

Sebilürreşad was obviously prejudiced against ethnic nationalism; however, it defended an Islamic nation or community against the fear of European heathens and imperialists. Even though *Sırat-ı Müstakim* did not show a distinct anti-nationalist attitude and some Turkists wrote for the journal, the political conjunctures like the Balkan Wars crystallized the journal's attitude against nationalism. *Sebilürreşad* was explicitly against ethnic nationalism both within the Ottoman Empire as well as in other Muslim communities. The nationalist movements of Muslim communities were described as irreligious affairs since Islam clearly forbade those actions. However, their attitudes, especially those of Akif and Edib, shifted

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[504] The Turkish National Anthem

toward a defensive warfare and nationalist movement since the Ottoman Empire lost most of its lands, and Anatolia was threatened by imperialists. Hence, the journal associated with nationalists in order to save the country that, last castle of Islam. For the journal, the National Struggle was a religious war, a jihad. It is clear from the content of the Turkish National Anthem wherein Akif does not mention the star, but rather the crescent. Moreover, in the Anthem the word Turk does not exist, but *millet* does. This shows that his Islamist tendencies trumped his nationalist concerns. In short, while the journal has a historically anti-nationalist slant, its voice changed from time to time with respect to political events, time, place and the content of the issue that was discussed.

5.1. Nation and Nationalism Discussion according to Islamism

Even though there were ideological discrepancies within Islamist ideology during the Second Constitutional Period all Islamist ideologues defended the unity of Muslims at first. They attempted to enlighten Muslims against the disruptive effects of nationalism on behalf of Islam. The Muslim commonwealth, Muslim league, united Islamic states, and Islamic caliphate state were some of the possibilities they presented against separatist nationalism. Nevertheless, Islamists primarily cared about the survival of the Ottoman Empire and her leadership for the Islamic community. Nationalism was seen as a European threat for the Muslim lands; it was a means to disrupt the unity amongst Islamic communities and to annex Islamic territories easily. Islamists tried to maintain the unity of Islam whereas nationalism threatened it. However, Islamism has some ideas in common with nationalism, one of the outcomes of modernity. Islamism aimed to create an ideology which was very

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similar to Western nationalist ideologies because Islamists saw the Islamic community as a nation, the ummah. The concept of nation is very similar to the concept of ummah.[505] The Islamic community was very similar to modern nations since both proposed a common history, language, and identity to establish communal togetherness. From this point of view, Islamism can be identified as a modern or nationalist ideology that was mainly against Western colonialism. Their discourse depended on the motto that nationalism was a sin; however, they predicted an Islamic nation that relied on the independence of the fatherland (*vatan*).

The ideology of *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* regarding nation and nationalism can be separated into three periods. During the first period from 1908 and 1912, the journal was published under the name *Sırat-ı Müstakim* is. In this period, *Sırat-ı Müstakim*'s attitude towards nationalism was not so clear, since some Turkists wrote for journal. However in the second period between 1912 and 1914/1918, the journal struck a tone that was sharply against separatist nationalist movements, especially Muslim nationalisms. In the third period between 1918 and 1925, just after the First World War and its aftermath, the journal supported the National Struggle, which was seen as a religious movement that fought alongside Turkish nationalists.

For Karpat, the writers of the journal were against nationalism since they believed in the universality of Islam.[506] The majority of these authors considered nationalism a great threat to Islam.[507] In reference to Tunaya, Islamists saw Turkism as nationalism (*kavmiyetçilik*) that caused dispersion and disunion; furthermore, they

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[505] Özdalga, "Islamism and Nationalism as Sister Ideologies: Reflections on the Politicization of Islam in a Longue Durée Perspective," 408.
[506] Karpat, *Turkey's Politics : the Transition to a Multi-Party System*: 21.
[507] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," viii.

defended a community that depended on religious brotherhood and would create a supra-national identity.[508] Debus, who wrote the most influential work about *Sebilürreşad*, argued that the journal's attitude towards nationalism depended on international politics and Turkish nationalism's own development.[509] According to Ceyhan who prepared an index of the journal, pro-Islamist side dominated the journal and followed a nationalist path.[510] However, Gündüz identifies the nationalism of the *Sebilürreşad* circle as an intense form of Ottomanism; moreover, for him the existence of Turkist authors in the journal was not sufficient to label it as nationalist.[511]

Sebilürreşad always tried to create an understanding of unity because of the Ottoman Empire's predicament. They preferred this stance due to ongoing warfare in the Ottoman Empire and Islamic lands. That's why the journal generally had a contrary position towards nationalism. Every kind of division was seen as the reason for the problems of the Empire since divisions created individualism and self-interests.[512] Islamists held a 'corporatist' understanding of society with respect to their imagined community. Islamists in *Sebilürreşad* opposed all kind of separatisms. For instance, they were against the establishment of the Freedom and Accord Party.[513]

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[508] Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*: 69.

[509] Debus, *Sebilürreşâd: Kemalizm Öncesi ve Sonrası Dönemdeki İslamcı Muhalefete Dair Karşılaştırmalı Bir Araştırma*: 185.

[510] Abdullah Ceyhan, "Türk Yayın Hayatında Sırat-ı Müstakim ve Sebilü'r-Reşad Mecmualarının Yeri," *Türk Kültürü*, no. 335 (1991): 34.

[511] Gündüz, *II. Meşrutiyet'in Klasik Paradigmaları: İçtihad, Sebilü'r-Reşad ve Türk Yurdu'nda Toplumsal Tezler*: 227.

[512] Sebilürreşad, "Şayan-ı Teessüf Haller: Fırkacılık İhtirasâtı," *Sebilürreşad* 18, no. 446 (1335/1919): 48. "*Bir zamanlar ümmet arasında ihtilaf zuhur edince kitab ve senete müracaat olunur, onların huzur-u azimet ve kudsiyetinde bütün münaz'alar helal olunurdu. Şimdi ise herkes şahsi içtihadından nefsi ihtirasatından başka hiçbir kayd ile ma-kayd değil.*"

[513] Kara, "Sırat-ı Müstakim."

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In a way, *Sebilürreşad's* political tone was a mixture of Islamism and Islamic nationalism dependent on the survival of the fatherland. Nevertheless, their nationalist understanding dismisses ethnic nationalism and racism. For instance, Babanzade Ahmed Naim proposed a religious community ideal, but not a racial or national one.[514] However, his religious community ideal bears a striking resemblance to the framework of nationalism, such as using history and religion as an instrument for the unity of the community. Furthermore, Mehmed Akif defended an understanding of nation that depends on Islamic unity rather than ethnic nationalism or racism.[515] Ethnic nationalism (*kavmiyetçilik*) would bring about the darkness of the Age of Ignorance (*Cahiliye Dönemi*). Islam united all tribes and ethnicities under the name "Islamic unity" and got over the darkness of Age of Ignorance. Unity meant progress for Islamists; moreover, the unity of Islam would extend progress throughout the Islamic world.

The Quran commands that Muslims belong to a universal religious community, the ummah, which is divided into different tribes and nations; however, it prohibits claims of superiority from one over another.[516] In the last speech of the Prophet Mohammed, it is very clear that racism is forbidden:

> "All mankind is from Adam and Eve. An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, nor does a non-Arab have any superiority over an Arab; white has no superiority over black, nor does a black have any superiority over white; [none have superiority over another] except by

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[514] Naim, "İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyet," 116. *"Evet, bundan gaflet etmeyiniz daima kendisine 'Ey Türk' diyecek yerde 'Ey Müslüman' diye hitap ediniz kendisine, daima Müslümanlığından bahsediniz, Türklüğü'nden bahsetmeyiniz."*

[515] H. İbrahim Şener, "Abdü'l-Hak Hâmit ve M. Âkif'e Göre Çağdaşlaşma ve İslâm," in *Türkiye'nin Çağdaşlaşma Problemi ve İslâm*, ed. Mehmet Demirci (İzmir: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1997 (2000)), 109.

[516] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*: 310. http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=49&verse=13 "O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted." Quran 49, 13 Surat al-Hujurat (The Dwellings)

piety and good action. Learn that every Muslim is a brother to every Muslim and that the Muslims constitute one brotherhood. Nothing shall be legitimate to a Muslim which belongs to a fellow Muslim unless it was given freely and willingly. Do not, therefore, do injustice to yourselves."[517]

Islam is founded upon the equality and the brotherhood of Muslims; for this reason racism is forbidden.

It is open for debate as to whether the *Sebilürreşad* circle was against nationalism or not. They had a unique understanding of nationalism which depended upon Islamic sentiments and cared for Ottoman non-Muslims. For the first period, the journal maintained an Ottomanist national understanding that was based upon Islamic sentiments. For instance Tahir el-Mevlevi described the community as Ottoman in his poetry.[518] Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı claimed that there was a need for unity between Muslims and non-Muslims.[519] They identified such an understanding with the Islamic nation[520] that allows members of Abrahamic religious to live under the authority of Muslims as *dhimmi*.

The ideology of Islamists concerning nationalism varies with respect to political conditions and amongst individual intellectuals. For some, nationalism was a total sin, while for others, it was a beneficial ideology for the sake of Muslims and the Ottoman Empire. Sometimes they defended cultural and religious nationalism while at other times they were against all kinds of nationalism. As such, it is hard to discern whether Islamism had a consistent attitude towards nationalism. Until the

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[517] http://www.islamreligion.com/articles/523/
[518] Tahir el-Mevlevi, "Surûd-ı Millet," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 4, no. 80 (1325/1909): 26. "*Osmanlıdır unvanımız.*"
[519] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 80.
[520] Gündüz, *II. Meşrutiyet'in Klasik Paradigmaları: İçtihad, Sebilü'r-Reşad ve Türk Yurdu'nda Toplumsal Tezler*: 228.

1910's, they did not present an argument against nationalism. The period between 1911 and 1912 was the milestone for the rise of Islamist critics against nationalism, especially Turkism.[521] After the Balkan Wars and other political upheavals, the nationalist side of the journal promoted an Islamic understanding of community which referred to ummah. However, Islamists, in this instance the *Sebilürreşad*, tersely declared ethnic and separatist nationalisms as a sin against the unity of Islam and promoted the Islamic concept of nation, the ummah.

Islamism can be classified as a nationalist movement with respect to its understanding of language, culture and literature. Islamists supported the simplification of language. For instance, Akif wrote his poems in Turkish, even though he knew Arabic and Persian.[522] The *Sebilürreşad* circle's Islamic conception of nation was not like the French model that was based on citizenship or the German model that was backed up ethnicity; on the contrary, their priority was religion. Although some sub-identities survived and existed in the Islamic community, e.g. the Turkish ethnic identity, one's Muslim identity was still one's genuine identity. When a sub-identity became more important than one's Muslim identity, this was considered a sin and a threat according to Islamists. Muslims had to take action against these transgressions.

The legitimate ruler within the Islamic understanding of nation was the Caliph himself with his power to unite all Muslims. Even though it was very hard to establish a single Islamic state, they wanted to maintain the dream of it. They were aware of the possible dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and emergence of new

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[521] Debus, *Sebilürreşâd: Kemalizm Öncesi ve Sonrası Dönemdeki İslamcı Muhalefete Dair Karşılaştırmalı Bir Araştırma*: 187.
[522] Niyazi Berkes, *Arap Dünyasında İslamiyet Milliyetçilik Sosyalizm* (İstanbul: Köprü Yayınları, 1969).

nation states. For this reason, they attempted to create an awareness of Muslim identity as one's genuine identity, centered upon the ummah. They presupposed "the Ottoman nation" based upon Islam(ism) as Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı stated so.[523]

5.2. Islamist Response to Nationalism

Islamists were very sensitive about the usage of words related to nation, such as *ümmet*, *kavmiyet* and *millet*.[524] They used the word *millet* sometimes for non-Muslims and non-Turks that was the true usage in the Arabic language.[525] Some other time they used the word for Islamic ummah. Musa Kazım, who later became the Şeyhü'l-Islam of the CUP governments four times in 1910, 1911, 1916 and 1917, separated religious terms as *milliye*, national as *kavmiyye*.[526] The usage of these words pertaining to the issue of nation and nationalism were absolutely related to content, time, place and political structure. For instance, they were against nationalist movements that were identified as *kavmiyetçilik* or ethnic nationalisms in the Empire, especially Turkism.[527]

Separatist movements in the Ottoman Empire orientated the Ottoman central government for a unifying Ottoman nation idea that was Ottomanism. Islamism was another ideology regarding the issue of separatist nationalisms in the Empire, especially Muslim nationalisms. Islamists idealized an Ottoman community or nation that had similarities with the classical Ottoman community and was based on Islamic

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[523] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 80.
[524] Niyazi Berkes, *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler* (Istanbul: Yön, 1965). 100.
[525] Ibid.
[526] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 149. Quoted from Musa Kazım, "Hürriyet-Örf Adet Hakkında," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 1, no. 7 (1324/1908): 99.
[527] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 7.

rules. Thus, the journal condemned Western style nationalism, as in the case of India[528], since it splits up real nations that dependent upon religion. The survival of the Ottoman Empire was dependent upon Islam; besides, a Muslim had to protect unity for the sake of Islam and its existence.[529] Islam was the only solution for a multi-identical (religious, ethnicities) community according to Islamists.[530] Non-Muslim subjects of the empire were not a problem, since Non-Muslims had been living for centuries under Ottoman (Muslim) sovereignty. However, any possibility of a non-Muslim government or mandate was staunchly criticized. Islamists were against becoming a dominion of Western-Christian imperialism.[531]

Bereketzâde İsmail Hakkı associated nationalism with pre-Islamic tribalism that he called the "darkness of ignorance"[532] and quoted from the Quran[533] to emphasize his position. Babanzade Ahmed Naim saw nationalism as belonging to the Cahiliye period, the period of ignorance.[534] Abdülaziz Çaviş also argued that Muslims had to unite in order to preserve their own existence as Arabs did in the very first years of Islam, because the Prophet Muhammad abolished asabiyah

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[528] Rabındranath Tagor, "Garbda Milliyetperverlik," *Sebilürreşad* 22, no. 563-564 (1339/1923): 139.

[529] Ömer Rıza, "Türkçülük, Memleketçilik," *Sebilürreşad* 18, no. 448 (1335/1919): 69. *"Hiç şüphesiz memleketimizin ruh-ı mevcudiyeti Müslümanlıktır."*

[530] Sebilürreşad, "Millet Vahdete Muhtaçtır," *Sebilürreşad* 17, no. 427-428 (1335/1919): 94. *"Başımıza gelen her felaket böyle bir hareketin pek tabii bir ma-ba'dı olarak gelmedi mi? On seneden beri kanımızı emen ve nihayet bizi bu derece zayıf ve natuvan bodurca sefil ve perişan bırakan facialar gibi tefrikaların esiri değil mi"*

[531] Sadık Albayrak, *Doğunun İsyanı* (İstanbul: Risale Basın Yayın, 1987). 29.

[532] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 120. Quoted from Bereketzade İsmail Hakkı, "Necaib-i Kur'aniye," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 1, no. 10 (1324/1908): 148-49.

[533] http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=3&verse=103 "And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided. And remember the favor of Allah upon you - when you were enemies and He brought your hearts together and you became, by His favor, brothers. And you were on the edge of a pit of the Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus does Allah make clear to you His verses that you may be guided." Quran 3,103 Surat Al-Imran (The Family of Imran)

[534] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 202. Quoted from Babanzade Ahmed Naim, *İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyyet* (Darülhilâfe: Tevsi'-i Tıbaat Matbaası, 1332/1916-1917). 5.

between Muslims and provided Islamic unity.[535] When people were separated, messengers and prophets were sent to them in order to unite them again.[536] Islam united all tribes of Arabs and other ethnicities together as a Muslim nation.[537] Akif separated the nation into two categories, *milliyet* and *kavmiyet*. *Kavmiyet* which corresponds to ethnic nationalism is strictly forbidden according to him.[538] He homologizes the period of the prophet Mohammad and his time with respect to division of the community into different sects and parts. The Prophet succeeded in establishing this unity because of the power of Islam, so Muslims had to abide by the rules of Islam in order to survive. Akif states:

> *"Yaşanmaz böyle tek tek, devr-i hâzır: Devr-i cemi'yyet.*
> *Gebermek istemezsen, yoksa izmihlâl için niyyet.*
> *"Şu vahdet târumâr olsun!" deyip saldırma İslâm'a;*
> *Uzaklaşsan da îmandan, cemâ´atten uzaklaşma.*
> *İşit, bir hükm-i kat´î var ki istînâfa yok meydan:*
> *"Cemâ´atten uzaklaşmak, uzaklaşmaktır Allah'tan.*
> *Nedir îman kadar yükselterek bir alçak ilhâdı,*
> *Perîşân eylemek zâten perîşan olmuş âhâdı*
> *Nasıl yekpare milletle, var etrafında bir seyret,*
> *Nasıl tevhid-i âheng eyliyorlar bak da al İbret."*[539]

However, detached sects were observed; moreover, Genghis and Timor demolished the unity of Islam.[540] With the detachment and division of Muslims Islamic lands

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[535] Abdülaziz Çaviş, "Kavmiyet ve Din," *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 335 (1331/1915): 179. "*Zira mevcudiyetini muhafaza edecek menafi-i müdafaaya mukadder olacak bir kitle halinde arz-ı vücud edebilmesi ancak bu suretle kabildir. İşte Arabın sarılmış ve istinad etmiş olduğu bu rabıta, nisb ve sıhriyet rabıtalarıyla kabail arasındaki metin ittifakları idi.*"

[536] Tarık Z. Tunaya, "Amme Hukukumuz Bakımından İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasi Tefekküründe İslamcılık Cereyanı," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası* XIX, no. 3-4 (1954): 646. Quoted from Naim, *İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyyet*: 28-29..

[537] Ahmet Hamdi Aksekili, "İctimaiyet: Her Kavmin Kendi Başına Hareketi İslam için Felakettir," *Sebilürreşad* 12, no. 290 (1330/1914): 66. "*Evvelce asabiyet-i kavmiyet ile kan deryasına dönmüş olan cezire-i el-Arab bir kitle haline gelerek, bir fikir, bir nokta etrafında toplanıyorlardı: Bu esas metin üzerinde hareket eden Müslümanlar az bir müddet zarfında dünyalar titretecek kadar kuvvet iktisab etmişlerdi.*"

[538] Mehmed Akif Ersoy, *Safahat* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Mehmed Akif Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2005). 161-62. "*Fikr-i kavmiyyeti şeytan mı sokan zihninize?/Birbirinden müteferrik bu kadar akvâmı,/Aynı milliyetin altında tutan İslâm'ı,/Temelinden yıkacak zelzele, kavmiyettir.*"

[539] Ibid., 413-14.

became easy pickings for Europeans; because of this reason, the salvation of Islam depended on the unity of Muslims, not that of ethnicities.[541] If any Muslim ethnicity followed its own way without consulting any other, then it would be the destruction of Islam.[542]

Muhammad Abduh argued that Islam hinders aggression between Muslims, so there is no need of asabiyah.[543] A Muslim must place his community [ummah] before even family.[544] Brotherhood and community is a blessing of Allah.[545] *Kavmiyet* and *asabiye* would cause punishment with divine retribution.[546] For instance, the Balkan Wars were a punishment by Allah because of these separatist nationalisms.[547] Religious unity, for this reason, is the most important matter for a Muslim. Musa Kazım correlated the Islamic principle of brotherhood with progress; thus, inclinations such as nationalist and racist movements are dangerous for the progress of Islamic communities.[548] If Muslims wanted to progress, the unity of ummah or the Islamic concept of nation was necessary for them. Islamists' motto regarding the division of the community can be identified with the phrase of "united we stand, divided we fall".

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[540] Ahmet Hamdi Aksekili, "İctimaiyet: Her Kavmin Kendi Başına Hareketi İslam için Felakettir," *Sebilürreşad* 12, no. 290 (1330/1914): 66 "*Hala Cengiz'in, hala Gönün, Timurlenkin vahşetleri vahdet-i İslamiyeyi bir daha iltibas-ı bezir olmayacak surette parça parça etti…*"

[541] Ibid. "*Bu suretle parçalanan İslam alemi Avrupalılara lokma lokma oldu. Bunları sayıp dökmekten maksadımız İslamın perişan ve şeref olan asr-ı evliyanın vahdet sayesinde olduğu gibi bu hale gelmesi de nifak ve tefrika yüzünden ileri geldiğini söylemektir.*"

[542] Ibid. "*Yoksa her kavm kendi başına harekete başlarsa maazallah izmihlal muhakkaktır.*"

[543] Muhammad Abduh, "Cinsiyyet ve Diyanet-i İslâmiyye," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 3, no. 54 (1325/1909): 19. "*İşte bu sebepten dolayı asabiyet-i cinsiye tabi'i olduğuna zahib olamayız.*"

[544] Tunaya, "Amme Hukukumuz Bakımından İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasi Tefekküründe İslamcılık Cereyanı," 651. Quoted from Naim, *İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyyet*: 19-20.

[545] Tunaya, "Amme Hukukumuz Bakımından İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasi Tefekküründe İslamcılık Cereyanı," 651. Quoted from Naim, *İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyyet*: 28-29.

[546] Tunaya, "Amme Hukukumuz Bakımından İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasi Tefekküründe İslamcılık Cereyanı," 662. Quoted from Naim, *İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyyet*: 41.

[547] Tunaya, "Amme Hukukumuz Bakımından İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasi Tefekküründe İslamcılık Cereyanı," 662. Quoted from Naim, *İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyyet*: 42.

[548] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 159. Quoted from Musa Kazım, "İslâm ve Terakki," in *Külliyât-Dinî, İçtimaî Makaleler*, ed. Musa Kazım (İstanbul: Evkâf-ı İslamiye Matbaası, 1336/1920), 283.

In his famous article *İslâm'da Dava-yı Kavmiyet*, Babanzade Ahmed Naim criticized nationalism which suppresses the brotherhood sentiment of Islam. Islam prohibits all kind of nationalism (*dava-yı kavmiyet ve cinsiyet*).[549] He emphasized the importance of religion, brotherhood and group solidarity.[550] Akşin Somel remarked concerning this issue:

> "Babanzâde Ahmed Nâim was an uncompromising Muslim thinker who rejected any kind of political allegiance except to the religious community. For him nationalism was akin to idolatry. For these reasons – and that he was of Kurdish origin – he constantly attacked Turkist and Westernist intellectuals, rejected the nationalist movement in Anatolia, and remained hostile to Atatürk."[551]

Akif used a tree metaphor to describe nation; without roots (glorious Islamic past) a tree (nation) can't live anymore.[552] From this point of view, Akif believed it necessary to convince all Muslim populations of the Empire and other Muslims to keep adherence to Islam. The unity of Muslims was the only solution for the renaissance of Muslims because this separation and nationalist process between Muslims would be their undoing. The individualism of Muslim communities and ethnicities was identified as apocalypse by Akif. He criticized the separatist movements in Islamic communities, since Islam does not allow ethnic separatism.[553]

> *"Sizin felâketiniz: Târumâr olan vahdet.*
> *Eğer yürekleriniz aynı hisle çarparsa;*

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[549] Naim, "İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyet," 114. *"Fil vâki ... bir millet adâvetten, gıybetten, bühtândan, yalandan, nifak ve şikâktan, tefrika, fitne ve fesâddan, iddia-yı cinsiyet ve kavmiyetten şiddetle men edilmezse, o millet arasında uhuvetten eser bulunamaz. Binaenaleyh öyle bir milletin yaşaması da kâbil olmaz..."*

[550] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 194. Quoted from Naim, *İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyyet*: 19-20.

[551] Selcuk Aksin Somel, "Babanzâde Ahmed Nâim " in *Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Selcuk Aksin Somel (Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2003), 29.

[552] Ersoy, *Safahat*: 171. *"Sonra, dikkatlere şâyân olacak bir şey var:/İnkişâfâtını bir milletin erbâb-ı nazar,/Kocaman bir ağacın tıpkı çiçeklenmesine,/Benzetirler ki, hakîkat, ne büyük söz bilene!/Bu muazzam ağacın gövdesi baştan aşağı,/Sayısız kökleri, tekmil dalı, tekmil budağı;/Milletin sîne-i mâzîsine merbut, oradan/Uzanıp gelmededir... Öyle yaratmış Yaradan."*

[553] Ibid., 247.

Eğer o his gibi tek, bir de gâyeniz varsa;
Düşer düşer yine kalkarsınız, emin olunuz…
Demek ki birliği te'min edince kurtuluruz.
O halde vahdete hâil ne varsa çiğneyiniz…
Bu ayrılık da neden? Bir değil mi herşeyiniz?
Ne fırka herzesi lâzım, ne derd-i kavmiyyet;
Bizim diyanete sığmaz sekiz, dokuz millet!"[554]

Moreover, Akif identified the disturbance of unity as apocalypse in his poem.

"Sen! Ben! Desin efrâd, aradan vahdeti kaldır,
Milletler için işte kıyamet o zamandır."[555]

İzmir deputy, Abdullah Efendi quoted Russian novelist Tolstoy, who declared that peace would come with religious unity.[556] This unity was ensured by the Islamic community, the Islamic nation, according to Islamists. Akif saw all ethnic and racial communities of Islam as the elements of the Islamic nation. For him all Muslims are brothers and sisters who establish the ummah. This community is called the ummah of Muhammad.[557] According to Mehmed Fahreddin[558], who was a mufti, Islam has just one nationality; furthermore, religion and nationality are twin brothers in Islam.[559] Religion creates the nation that consists from different ethnicities and communities; furthermore, whatever a Muslim's ethnicity is, his/her nationality is Islam.[560] An Indian Muslim prefers his Ottoman Muslim brother rather than a

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[554] Ibid.
[555] Ibid., 418.
[556] Abdullah, "İttihad-ı İslam: İslam'da Cinsiyet ve Kavmiyet Yoktur," *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 325 (1330/1915): 100. *"Tolstoy akvamın ittihad ve imtizacına hıdmet edecek olan ittihad-ı İslam Kongresine tebrik ettikten sonra diyor ki: "Bence beşeriyetin sükun ve istirahatını te'min edecek olan yegane ittihad, ittihad-ı diniyedir."*
[557] Düzdağ, *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar II*: 42.
[558] There are some discussions that Mehmed Fahreddin was a nick name for Mehmed Akif. Nuri Sağlam, "II. Abdülhamid'in Hal' Fetvasını Mehmed Âkif mi Yazdı? Nâm-ı Diğer Mehmed Fahreddin," *Türk Edebiyatı*, no. 434 (2009).
[559] Mehmed Fahreddin, "Son Darbe Karşısında Milliyet Kavgaları," *Sebilürreşad* 11, no. 277 (1329/1914): 261. *"İslamda milliyet, diyanet tevemdir."*
[560] Ibid., 262. *"Bu tevhid ile şunu anlamak isteriz ki diyanet, ayn-ı milliyettir. Milletleri vücuda getiren dindir. Milletler de akvam ve anasırdan merkebdir. İnsanın kavmiyet ve unsuruiyeti ne olursa olsun iman ettiği dinin milletindendir."*

Christian Indian; furthermore an Ottoman Muslim prefers an Indian Muslim rather than a Christian Ottoman.[561] However, that does not mean turning away from non-Muslim Ottomans. Nationality for Islam is a spiritual notion rather material phenomenon.[562] The nation of Mohammed [Islamic ummah] fights against the West.[563]

The Christian World attempted to create division amongst Muslims through nationalism that depended on ethnicity (*kavmiyet*/*cinsiyet*); however, religion and nation were not separate from each other in Islam.[564] According to Ömer Rıza (Doğrul), son-in-law of Mehmed Akif, nationalism is not found in Islam; moreover, it is strange for Islam since it is a Christian and European development.[565] Nationalism could be beneficial for progress in European countries, but for Islam it would be a disaster for the Islamic community.[566] Since nationalism originated from Europe, it would be not beneficial for Islamic communities. Somel states: "Because according to him there is no doubt that the abandonment of the *milli*, religious traditions and the imitation of European customs and way of life in the present state of weakness of the Empire will ruin the Ottoman existence from its foundations, let

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[561] Sebilürreşad, "Asabiyet-i Kavmiye Davaları Etrafında," *Sebilürreşad* 11, no. 279 (1329/1914): 301. "*Anlaşılıyor ki Hindli bir Müslüman vatandaşı olan Hristiyandan ziyade Osmanlı Müslüman kardeşini, Osmanlı bir Müslüman da Hristiyan vatandaşından ziyade Hindli Müslüman kardeşini seviyormuş.*"

[562] Fahreddin, "Son Darbe Karşısında Milliyet Kavgaları," 262. "*Milliyet-i İslamiye maddi ve unsuri olmaktan ziyade ruhi ve lahutidir.*"

[563] Ibid., 263. "*İşte Şarkda istihfaf olunmağa başlanılan (milliyet-i Muhammediye) Garb'a hicret ediyor!*"

[564] Abdullah, "İttihad-ı İslam: İslam'da Cinsiyet ve Kavmiyet Yoktur," 100. "*Yine bugün ayan beyan zahir oldu ki Alem-i Nasraniyet Müslümanların arasına kavmiyet ve cinsiyet gibi nezvir ile zahirde cemiyet-i İslamiyeye mensub münafıkını alt ederek tefrika sevketmeğe çalışıyor. Din-i İslam yalnız ahirete müteallık bir takım nesayihten ibaret olmayıp içtimaiyatla siyasiyat dahil din de dahildir. Bundan dolayı (din ve millet birdir) sözü İslamda asıl el-asıl siyasettir.*"

[565] Rıza, "Türkçülük, Memleketçilik," 69. "*Hem bunların milliyet dedikleri Hristiyanlığın inkişafından doğan bir şeydir. Müslümanlıkta böyle bir şey yoktur. Müslümanlık bunların anladıkları tarzda milliyeti ikna etmiştir.*"

[566] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 202. Quoted from Naim, *İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyyet*: 4-5.

alone make progress."[567] Islamic communities had to unite against European Christians who intimidated Muslims as they united against Islam.[568] Yunus Nadi, who is a journalist and founder of *Cumhuriyet* newspaper, emphasized the importance of Islamic unity that is the first duty of a Muslim for that period against Great Powers for the salvation of Muslims.[569] That is to say, Muslims must abandon European imitation regarding their social and moral life. Ömer Rıza criticized Westernists who worked for the non-Islamic; for him, national unity was impossible without Islam.[570]

Nationalism is identified as a monster that smuggled into Muslim lands by British and was working to separate Muslims into different communities through their ethnicities. When nationalism achieved its goal, the unity of Islam and the caliphate would be eliminated. Akif stated:

> *"Bize İngilizler olup hâli önceden müdrik;*
> *O beyne pençeyi taktık, o göğse yerleştik.*
> *O halde bir kolu kalmış ki bize çullanacak,*
> *Yolundadır işimiz bağladık mı kıskıvrak!*
> *Hem öyle zorla değil, çünkü "fikr-i kavmiyyet"*
> *Eder bu hayeyi teshîle pek büyük hizmet.*
> *O tohm-ı lâneti baştan saçıp da orta yere,*
> *Arab'la Türk'ü ayırdık mı şöyle bir kerre,*

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[567] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 171-72. Quoted from Kazım, "Hürriyet-Örf Adet Hakkında," 100.

[568] Abdülaziz Çaviş, "Kavmiyet Ve Din," *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 336 (1331/1915): 186. "*Avrupa eskiden beri birbirini veli eden muharebelere bitmek tükenmek bilmeyen akınlara sahne olmuştur ki bütün bunların esbabı sineleri dolduran kin ve buğz-ı mütekabilden başka bir şey değildi. Vakten ki alem-i İslama karşı harb açmak hususunda sözü bir ettiler. Artık o sinelerdeki ateşler söndü. O birbirine kin ve husumet besleyen kalpler birleşti.*"

[569] Yunus Nâdi, "İttihad-ı İslam," *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 322 (1330/1915): 79. "*Taraf taraf birlik bayrakları altında toplanarak Moskoflara, İngilizlere ve Fransızlara, Müslümanlık bevazlı ve ebedi düşmanlarına karşı saldıramağa başlamış bulunuyorsanız, böylece arş ileri... Fevz ve felah sizindir!..*"

[570] Ömer Rıza, "İttihad-ı Milli," *Sebilürreşad* 16, no. 402-403 (1335/1919): 403. "*Ahval gayr-i tabiiyenin er geç nihayete ermesi muhakkak olmakla bu Garblılaşmak ceryanının da bir sıdma-ı İslam ile na-bedid olması muhakkaktır... Fakat ittihad-ı milliye doğru atılacak en mühim en esaslı, en büyük hatve, bu gayr-i tabii, ceryanın tahribatına bir hatime çekecek, milleti hak yoluna iade edecek, kuvva-ı milliyeyi sev-i istimal pençesinden, İslam medeniyetini mükerrem, mahkumiyetinden, İslam müessesatını izmihlalden kurtaracak olan mübadi-i İslamiyenin temin-i inkişafı uğrunda anlayacak azimkar, metin hatvedir. Bu hatveyi atmak için lazım olan kuvvet ruh-u millette payidardır.*"

> *Ne çırpınır kolu artık, ne çırpınır kanadı;*
> *Halifenin de kalır sade bir sevimli adı!"*[571]

Abdullah discussed that Islam is the natural religion of human beings; moreover, the Ottoman Empire was the representative and the most powerful state of Islam and with the empowerment and progress of the Ottoman Empire, Islam would be empowered again.[572] According to Akif, Islam does not just belong to Arabs. Historical Islamic states collapsed because of division and separation; following that logic, it was easy to say ethnic nationalism was strictly harmful for the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the survival of Islam would be possible with the survival of the Ottoman Empire.[573] Akif's understanding of nationalism depended upon an Islamic Ottomanism. Akif stipulated that if Muslims of the empire tried to separate from the empire, they would soon be under the dominion of Western Powers. Thus, he referred to the glorious days of the Ottoman Empire.

> *"O birkaç hayme halkından cihangirâne bir devlet*
> *Çıkarmış, bir zaman dünyayı lerzan eylemiş millet."*[574]

Akif's response to nationalism was strikingly very similar to the structure of nationalism. It required a unity in which Muslims tie with Islamic sentiments and non-Muslims with patriotic sentiments as an Ottoman community.[575]

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[571] Ersoy, *Safahat*: 303.
[572] Abdullah, "İttihad-ı İslam: İslam'da Cinsiyet ve Kavmiyet Yoktur," 99. "*Kim ne derse desin hakikat-i katii şudur ki İslam terakki ettikçe Devlet-i Aliye kuvvetlenecek, Devlet-i Osmaniyenin kuvvet ve salveti tezayüd ettikçe İslam fevz ve felah bulacaktır.*"
[573] Kâzım Yetiş, *Mehmet Âkif'in Sanat, Edebiyat ve Fikir Dünyasından Çizgiler* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 1992). 194.
[574] Ersoy, *Safahat*: 73.
[575] Abdullah Alperen, "Çağımız İslâm Dünyasında Modernleşme Hareketleri ve Türkiye'deki Etkileri" (Erciyes Üniversitesi, 1998), 225.

Islam is not against the awareness and the knowledge of ethnicity or ethnic origin, but the discussion of superiority of an ethnicity over another one. It is forbidden to favor one's own ethnicity over one's Muslim identity. Akif was aware of his Albanian origin; however he did not praise his Albanian origin. Saying "I am Turk" does not come to mean that he is only a Turk, but a Muslim who has a Turkish origin.[576] Ethnic nationalism and racism are strictly forbidden in Islam. Thus, it is nonsense to search for another identity other than Islam. Abduh disagrees with the organicism of ethnic nationalism (*asabiyet-i cinsiye*), because the order is better with a religious unity of the community.[577] Muslims had to consider the religious order, not an ethnic nationalist understanding, because a religious person had to care his/her Muslim brothers/sisters rather his ethnic community. The hadith 'whoever calls for nationalism (asabiyah/tribalism/ethnic nationalism) is not one of us' is quoted by Abduh as proof of this sentiment.[578] Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi pointed out the dangers for Islam and the negligence of Muslims about these dangers.[579] Musa Kazım suggested education to stabilize the unity and alliance between Ottoman communities.[580]

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[576] Hasan Hikmet, "En Yüksek Hars, Hars-ı Dinidir," *Sebilürreşad* 24, no. 615 (1340/1924): 263. "*Bir Türk, ben Türk'üm demekle sade kendi milliyetini kastetmiş olmaz. Belki ben Müslüman milletine mensup Türk unsurundanım demek ister.*"

[577] Abduh, "Cinsiyyet ve Diyanet-i İslâmiyye," 20. "*İşte sakin oldukları iklimlerin bu kadar tenvi'yle beraber Müslümanların cinsiyete katiyen itibar etmemeleri, asabiyet-i diniyeden başka ne kadar asabiyet varsa hiç birini tanımamaları bu hükümete menbiyedtir. Zira din-i İslam ile mütedeyyin olan bir adem itikadında rüsuh bulunduğu gibi cinsiyet ve kavmiyet gibi şirlerden sırf nazar ederek, rabıta-ı hususiyeyi bir tarafa bırakarak beş-on efrad milini cem eden alaka-ı umumiyeye hasr-ı nazar eder ki o alaka, alaka-ı diniyeden ibarettir.*"

[578] Ibid. "*Cenab-ı peygamber "Asabiyete davet edenler asabiyet için maktelede bulunanlar, asabiyet uğrunda ölenler bizden değildir.*"

[579] Aksekili, "İctimaiyet: Her Kavmin Kendi Başına Hareketi İslam için Felakettir," 65. "*Acaba bunlara karşı şimdiye kadar Müslümanlar ne yaptılar? Başlarının üstünde dönen bu kadar felaketler kulaklarını dolduran bu kadar gürültüler, cihanları sarsan bu kadar hadisat… Acaba Müslümanları ikaz edebildi mi?..*"

[580] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)." Quoted from Musa Kazım, "Kuvvet Hazırlamak," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 3, no. 59 (1325/1909): 102.

5.2.1. Ethnic (Muslim) Nationalism(s)

Akif criticized the Muslim separatist nationalisms and discussions in the Islamic community, especially in the Ottoman Empire. Babanzade did not separate Islamic communities from each other or see any kind of superiority among any of them.[581] Although Babanzade declared that any community in the Islamic community had no superiority to anyone, he had 'feeling of love towards the Arabs'.[582] Moreover, Ahmed Naim was one of the founders of the *Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Kurdish Help and Progress Association).[583] However, Bereketzâde İsmail reacted against ethnic associations in the Islamic communities which were founded during the Second Constitutional Period, such as Arabic, Kurdish, Albanian associations in the Empire.[584] The Albanian separatist movement was also criticized in the journal.[585] Akif demanded that these activities be ceased for the sake of victimized and colonized Muslim communities, since the Ottoman Empire was the only escape for the survival of Muslims all over the world.[586]

According to Akif, the identity of a Muslim is his religious identity, not an ethnic one. He is against the ethnic identity search of Muslims such as Albanian, Kurdish, etc.

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[581] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 198. Quoted from Naim, *İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyyet*: 39.

[582] Naim, *İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyyet*: 51-52. "*Hazret-i Peygamber (s.a.v.)e karâbeleri, lisân-ı Ku'an olması nimet-i İslâmı neşr ederek bütün müslimîne velinimetlik etmeleri dolayısıyla hepsinden, hatta kendi kavmimizden ziyâde severiz.*"

[583] Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1988). 404.

[584] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 120. Quoted from Hakkı, "Necaib-i Kur'aniye," 148-49.

[585] Ç-Ş-Z, "Arnavudluk ve Hissiyat-ı İslam," *Sebilürreşad* 8, no. 194 (1328/1912): 226. "*Arnavutlar safdil etmişler de yerli ve yabancı bazı müfsidlerin telkinatına kapılıyorlarmış.*"

[586] Mehmed Akif, "Makalat: Hasbihal," *Sebilürreşad* 9, no. 221 (1328/1912). "*Artık Allah için olsun birbirimizle uğraşmaktan vazgeçelin. Artık bu fıkralara, bu mel'un tefrikalara nihayet verelim. Biliyorsunuz ki şarkta, garpta, şimalde, cenupta ne kadar Müslüman varsa hepsi mahkûm; hem de mahkûmiyetlerin en zelîli, en sefîli ile mahkum. İşte o zavallıların şimdilik dinlerini olsun muhafaza edebilmeleri de şu hükümet sayesindedir...*"

"Hani, milliyetin İslâm idi… Kavmiyyet ne!
Sarılıp sımsıkı dursaydın a milliyetine.
Arnavutluk ne demek? Var mı Şerîat'te yeri?
Küfr olur başka değil, kavmini sürmek ileri.
Arab'ın Türke, Lâzın Çerkese, yâhud Kürde;
Acem'in Çinli'ye rüchânı mı varmış? Nerde!
Müslümanlıkta "anasır" mı olurmuş? Ne gezer!
Fikr-i kavmiyyeti tel'în ediyor Peygamber.
En büyük düşmanıdır Ruhu Nebî tefrikanın;
Adı batsın onu İslâma sokan kaltabanın!
Şu senin âkıbetin bin yıl kadar evvel,
Sana söylenmiş iken doğru mudur şimdi cedel?"[587]

Mehmed Fahreddin argued ethnic nationalism in Islamic communities was irrational.[588] Meanwhile, nationalism actually does exist in Islam, however religion and nation are equal concepts to each other; moreover, the nation of Islam is the only possibility for Muslims; thus being a Turk, Arab, Circassian, Tatar or Kurd form the whole Islamic nation.[589]

According to Ömer Rıza the Ottoman sultanate was consisted of three Islamic ethnicities that were Turks, Arabs and Kurds.[590] There was no Turkish, Arabic or Kurdish nation, but an Islamic nation that existed in the Ottoman sultanate.[591] For these reason, Islamic ethnicities such as Arabs and Kurds would not care about

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[587] Ersoy, *Safahat*: 183-84.
[588] Mehmed Fahreddin, "Müslümanlıkta Bir Millet Var," *Sebilürreşad* 11, no. 279 (1329/1914): 298. "Vahdet-i milliye-i İslamiye içinde milliyet davasına akıl erdirecek bunun imkanını, vücudunu inbat edebilicek, bir sultan-ı hükma varsa bize anlatsın!"
[589] Hikmet, "En Yüksek Hars, Hars-ı Dinidir," 263. *"İslamiyet'te milliyetçilik esasen mevcuttur. "Din ve millet" mefhumlarının ikisi birdir. (...) Gaye itibarıyla müşterek yalnız bir millet vardır ki o da millet-i İslamiye'dir. Türklük, Araplık, Çerkeslik, Tatarlık, Kürtlük namı altında toplanan efrad bir ailenin aile-i İslamiye'nin azasından başka bir şey değildir."*
[590] Ömer Rıza, "Türk, Arap, Kürt," *Sebilürreşad* 17, no. 429-430 (1335/1919): 111. This essay is published just after the First World War; because of this reason it focuses on the Islamic elements of the Ottoman Empire in order to propagate the unity of Islamic elements in the Ottoman Empire. *"Saltanat-ı Osmaniyeyi teşkil eden erkan-ı esasiye bu üç ümmet-i İslamiyedir."*
[591] Ibid. *"Türk, Arap, Kürt milleti yoktur. Bunları vesair akvam-ı İslamiyenin milleti birdir. O da İslam! Müslümanlık. Akvam-ı İslamiye arasından kavmiyetin dalaletlerini, hurafelerini, taassublarını ve hodkamlıklarını izale etmiştir."*

nationalist movements.[592] In Islam, ethnical patriotism was not possible, since Arabism, Turkism and Kurdism were forbidden with respect to their separatist attempts. These explanations of Islamic nations appeared after the First World War. There only existed Islamic patria or fatherland.[593] For Mustafa Nazmi real patriots who cared for the wealth of the nation were religious people; moreover, they cared only for the Islamic nation, ummah.[594] The patria of the Muslim is where sharia rules, i.e. Dar'ul-Islam, according to Said Halim Paşa.[595] However, there are no exact borders of Dar'ul-Islam.

5.2.2. Critics on Turkism

Islamism and Turkism were not mutually exclusive ideologies. Islamists shared the same mottos with Turkists with respect to independence of the country and anti-imperialism. Though Islamists were against Turkists because of their solid ideology (formalism and prescriptivism), that did not support reformism.[596] They criticized all kinds of nationalist movements including Turkism because they would collapse Islamic unity.[597] Turkism was seen as a sickness that could breed bad blood between Islamic communities; moreover, it was seen as disrespectful and irreligious,

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[592] Rıza, "Türkçülük, Memleketçilik," 69. "*Binaen aleyh milliyet hareketi ruh-ı İslama yabancıdır. Ve Müslümanlar arasında revaç bulmayacağı aşikardır. Şurada, burada birisinin veya birkaç kişinin "ben Müslümandan evvel Arabım, yâhud Türküm, yâhud Kürdüm" demesi Müslümanlığın rabıta-ı uhuvvetini sarsacak bir mahiyette olamaz.*"

[593] Sebilürreşad, "Asabiyet-i Kavmiye Davaları Etrafında," 301. "*İslamiyetde ancak Müslümanlık vatanı vardır...*"

[594] Mustafa Nazmi, "Hakiki Vatanperverler Kimlerdir?," *Sebilürreşad* 18, no. 450 (1335/1919): 96. "*Vatanın teali ve milletin refahını ahkam-ı şeriatın hüsn-ü tatbik ve siyaset-i İslamiyetin takib ve muhafazasına arayanların bu gayenin vücud bulmasına vakıf hayat edecek maheb-i din ekabir-i ümmetin na-ehillerden tefrik edilmesiyle mümkündü.*"

[595] Said Halim Paşa, "Müslümanın Vatanı Şeriatın Halim Olduğu Yerdir," *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 331 (1331/1915).

[596] Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*: 203.

[597] Ibid.

and could crush the unity of Islam.[598] However, Çetinsaya argued that there was a close relationship between Turkishness and Islam that were linked to the evolution of Turkish nationalism and modernist Islam; moreover, even though there were antagonists among Islamism and Turkists who were against Turkish nationalism and Islamism, these were in small quantity.[599] The discussion between Islamists and Turkists did not depend upon a theoretical or ideological framework, but a pragmatic one.[600] Religion was the prime matter of Islamists, but Turkists cared more ethnicity or nation than religion.

In the first period, the journal combined national (Turkish) sentiments with Islamic fundamentals. There were some articles that argued that Turks has a special place in Islamic historiography.[601] According to them Turks would be the pioneers and spirit of Islamic revival. The synergy between Turkists and Islamists did not last until the end of the Ottoman Empire. After the occupation of Tripoli and the Balkan Wars, the journal assumed a negative attitude towards Turkists and Turkists policies of the CUP. They argued that it was high time for the realization of Islamic unity, not Turkist separatism.

During the first years, the journal announced the establishment of *Türk Derneği* (Turkish Society)[602] which later became *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths). It

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[598] Sebilürreşad, "Kavmiyetçilik Hastalığı," *Sebilürreşad* 18, no. 453 (1336/1920): 131. "*Türkçülük namıyla vaktiyle burada türeyen kavmiyetçilik rabıta-ı İslamiyeyi hiledar etmek itibarıyla hakiki Müslümanları ne kadar mütesir ettiyse şimdi hariçten gelen aks sedaları da o derece düçar- te'sir ediyor. Saçılan nifak tohumları filiz vermeye başladığından dolayı komitacılar ne kadar iftihar etseler yeridir.*"

[599] Çetinsaya, "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' in Modern Turkish Political Thought," 351.

[600] Gökhan Çetinsaya, "İslamcılıktaki Milliyetçilik," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce - İslamcılık*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), 425.

[601] Efe, "Uzun Soluklu İslâmcı bir Dergi: Sebilürreşad."

[602] "Türk Derneği," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 1, no. 20 (1324/1909).

also published the regulation of the Turkish Society.[603] On one of the following issues a greeting essay was published.[604] There was an apparent partnership between Islamists and Turkists that lasted until the Balkan wars. Meanwhile, Turkists published their own journal. The synergy between Islamists and Turkists was not just a political strategy, but a structural one as well. This is because Turkism was not powerful enough to create an historical and sociological foundation for a secular nationalism. That is to say, it was necessary to make an alliance between Turkists and puritan Islamists.[605]

Until 1912, the journal did not assume a position against Turkists. Furthermore, some of them wrote for the journal and the journal was very connected to the Turkish world and Russian Muslims.[606] "Toward the end of the year 1911, however, when the war in Tripoli against Italy was going on, some connected with *Sırat-ı Müstakim* began to believe that Turkish nationalism would bring dangerous results to the Ottoman Empire." [607] In particular, the Balkan Wars were conducive to harsh criticisms of nationalism, which peaked during the Balkan Wars. Akif did not criticize nationalism until after 1912.[608] After this dissociation, Turkists started to publish their own journals *Türk Yurdu*.

Sırat-ı Müstakim did not focus on the issue of nationalism as *Sebilürreşad* did. Furthermore, the words Turk, nation (*millet, kavmiyet*) were less seen in *Sırat-ı Müstakim* than *Sebilürreşad*. Reference to Turk and Turkey increased gradually after

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[603] "Türk Derneği Nizamnamesi."
[604] Sevindik, "Akvam-ı Türkiye'ye Müjde ve Türk Derneğini Tebrik."
[605] Süleyman Seyfi Öğün, "Ağaoğlu Ahmet," *Tarih ve Toplum* 20, no. 116 (1993).
[606] İsmail Kara, "Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e İslâmcılık Tartışmaları," in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Murat Belge (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 1413.
[607] Gündoğdu, "Sırat-ı Müstakim (later, Sebilürreşad) and the Origin of the Japanese Image in Turkish Intellectuals," 248.
[608] Kara, "Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e İslâmcılık Tartışmaları," 1414.

the Balkan Wars. They became very popular in *Sebilürreşad's* essays[609] as the discussion around nation and nationalism became more popular.

Hanioğlu described some Islamists who defended constitutionalism, but criticized nationalism, especially Turkism, with respect to Islam as supporters of Abduh.[610] However, Turkists benefited from Afghani's ideas since Ağaoğlu had a close relationship with him.[611] Akif who was deeply influenced by Abduh objected to Turkism, which was identified as ethnic nationalism that hindered Islamic unity. This shows that Turkists and Islamists obtained some ideas from Abduh and Afghani who had the relationship of mentor-protégé even though they had some different ideas regarding nationalism.

Akif criticized Turkism, identified as ethnic nationalism (*kavimcilik*), by referencing the prophet Muhammad[612] who cursed that ideology.[613] This is obvious in a poem by Akif who calls Turkism nonsense, since ethnic nationalism of Islamic ethnicities is not a solution for the salvation of Islam and the Ottoman Empire.

> "*Müslümanlık sizi gayet sıkı, gayet sağlam,*
> *Bağlamak lâzım iken, anlamadım, anlayamam,*
> *Ayrılık hissi nasıl girdi sizin beyninize?*
> *Fikr-i kavmiyyeti şeytan mı sokan zihninize?*
> *Birbirinden müteferrik bu kadar akvâmı,*
> *Aynı milliyetin altında tutan İslâm'ı,*
> *Temelinden yıkacak zelzele, kavmiyettir.*
> *Buna bir lâhza unutmak ebedî haybettir.*
> *Arnavutlukla, Araplıkla bu millet yürümez...*

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[609] See Abdullah Ceyhan, "Sırat-ı Müstakim ve Sebilürreşad Mecmuaları Fihristi," ed. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1991).

[610] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*: 186.

[611] Gündoğdu, *Ümmetten Millete: Ahmet Ağaoğlu'nun Sırat-ı Müstakim ve Sebilürreşad Dergilerindeki Yazıları Üzerine Bir İnceleme*: 22. Kara, "Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e İslâmcılık Tartışmaları," 1413.

[612] Ersoy, *Safahat*: 184. "*Müslümanlıkta "anasır" mı olurmuş? Ne gezer!/Fikr-i kavmiyyeti tel'în ediyor Peygamber.*"

[613] Çağlar Kırçak, *Meşrutiyetten Günümüze Gericilik: 1876-1950* (Ankara: Bilar Yayınları, 1989). 118.

Son siyasetse Türklük, o siyaset yürümez!"[614]

However, Akif was in the middle of Islamism and cultural nationalism; while he was against political nationalism or Turkism; however, he supported cultural nationalism as a helpful movement for the Ottoman Empire.

Akif was aware of the origins of Turks and Turkish identity. He reflected upon about the Turkish place of origin in Asia.[615] In addition to that, he was also conscious of his Albanian origin; however he regarded himself as Turk. Nevertheless, this awareness did not surpass his Islamic identity. Eşref Edib indicated that Akif supported purification of the Turkish language and literature but criticized political Turkism that was against Islam's national sentiments.[616] Akif defended an Ottoman society which was governed by Muslims and consisted of everyone from Muslims to non-Muslims who would live under the name of Islam. According to Islamists, the cosmopolitan structure of the Ottoman Empire had to be preserved in order to create an Islamic unity.[617] Hence, Turkism was absurd for him, since it aimed at a society which was dominated by Turks. He was aware of the importance of Turkish language and culture, but he did not separate Islamic culture from Turkish culture. For instance, according to Akif, the Turkish language survived with the help of Arabic and Persian languages.[618] Ahmed Naim criticized pro-French intellectuals who argued the effect of the Arabic language on the Turkish language.

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[614] Ersoy, *Safahat*: 161-62.

[615] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 239.

[616] Eşref Edip Fergan, *İstiklâl Mahkemelerinde: Sebilürreşad'ın Romanı* (Istanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 2002). 159.

[617] Mardin, "İslâmcılık," 1403.

[618] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 239.

According to him, Arabic is the language of Islam; furthermore, it enriches the Turkish language.[619]

Islamists were aware of their Turkishness and its importance regarding the cultural and lingual aspects of it. Moreover, Turks had a special place in Islamic history, but this special reference does not mean the superiority of Turks via other Muslim people.[620] On the contrary, their awareness of their Turkishness and the importance of Turks were not separated from Islam. As non-believer Turkists had to support Islam because it was for the benefit of the nation, so too were Turkishness and Islam not separated from each other.[621] This is a uniting ideology that gives importance to Turkishness that does not aim at separatist -ethnic- nationalism. On the other hand, some Islamists were against the use of the words which referred to ethnicity such as Turk. "Islamists scolded such innovations and denounced *kavmiyet* (nationalism) as blasphemy."[622] According to Babanzade[623] Turkism is a kind of racism which is forbidden by Islam. However, their critics were not enough to prevent the usage of the word Turk since non-Muslim communities separatist activities increased.[624]

Babanzade divides Turkists into two: Turkists and Islamic Turkists. Turkists were on the way toward an absurd ideology according to Babanzade. He also criticized Islamic Turkists believing it was an impossible path for the Ottoman

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[619] Babanzade Ahmed Naim, "Lisan Meselesi," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 3, no. 55 (1325/1909): 40. "*...Arabinin Türkçe inşa ve kitavatını takviyeye medarı olur...*"

[620] Debus, *Sebilürreşâd: Kemalizm Öncesi ve Sonrası Dönemdeki İslamcı Muhalefete Dair Karşılaştırmalı Bir Araştırma*: 186. Quoted from Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı, "Mevaiz (Fitne, Hainlik, Mücadele)," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 2, no. 27 (1324/1909).

[621] A. Süleyman, "İslâmiyet ve Türkler," *Sebilürreşad* 8, no. 191 (1328/1912): 166. "*Benim fikrime göre dinsiz olanlar da pan-İslamizm fikrini ta'kib etmelidirler. Pan-Turanizm taraftarı olabilmeleri için Pan-İslamizm fikrini kabul etmelidirler.*"

[622] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*: 373.

[623] Ibid., 374.Berkes identifies Babanzade Ahmed Naim as the most influential Islamic figure against the nationalism, especially Turkish nationalism.

[624] Ibid.

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Empire.[625] Islamist responses to Turkism were not just a political objection; they were also a religious objection. Akif's attitude towards Islamic Turkists was not as strong as Babanzade, but he also slammed Ziya Gökalp because of his Turkist ideology.[626] *Sebilürreşad* described Turkists as people who gathered around Gökalp and had different ethnicities even though they defended Turkism; moreover it accused them of importing nationalist ideology from the English.[627] Babanzade declared Gökalp an atheist and Ağaoğlu as a half-apostate because of their Turkist ideas.[628] According to Babanzade neither Islamic Turkism nor Gökalp's trilogy of Turk, Ottoman, and Muslim could assure Ottoman survival. In fact, he believed it would be a disaster for Islam and even Turkishness.[629]

> "… He called the Islamists to a Holy War against the Turkists. Nationalism, he wrote, was one of those evils taken over from Europe. It was a "foreign innovation as deadly to the body of/Islam as cancer is to man." With the aid of scores of âya and hadith he argued that nationalism was condemned and prohibited by the Şeriat. It was the severest blow vet directed against the unity of Islam. "At a time when the enemy has set foot on our breasts" he said, "it is madness to divide Islam into nationalities."[630]

During the Turkist politics of triumvirate, Enver-Cemal-Talat, governance of the Empire during the First World War with the politics of Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism was described as absentminded.

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[625] Naim, "İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyet," 117. "*Ey Türkçü-İslamcı kardeşler, işte görüyorsunuz ki ne kadar hüsn-ü niyetle çalışsanız taraf-ı Hakk'tan nehy edilmiş yollardan nâil-i maksûd mümkün değildir… pek ziyâde korktuğum Türklük nâmına sizden niyaz ederim, istirhâm ederim, halkı 'çifte mefkure' sahibi etmeyiniz.*"

[626] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 212.

[627] Sebilürreşad, "Türkçülerin Siyasi Mefkureleri," *Sebilürreşad* 15, no. 375 (1334/1918): 211. "*Her biri ayrı ayrı kavmiyetlere mensub olduğu halde Gökalp Bey'in etrafında toplanan Türkçülerden Çerkes Ömer Seyfeddin Bey… Çok zahmete katlanmaksızın sayelerinde mefkûrelerine kavuştuklarından dolayı Türkçüler İngilizlere bir de teşekkür nama göndermeliler.*"

[628] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 186. Quoted from Mehmet Emin Erişirgil, *Ziya Gökalp: Bir Fikir Adamının Romanı* (Istanbul: Remzi, 1984). 105.

[629] Çetinsaya, "İslamcılıktaki Milliyetçilik," 428.

[630] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*: 374-75.

Üç beyinsiz kafanın derdine, üç milyon halk,
Bak nasıl doğranıyor? Kalk, baba kabrinden kalk![631]

According to Ömer Rıza, Westernists created a Turkism which was a poor version of Christian nationalism and not at all related to Islamic sentiments.[632] Ömer Rıza criticized Turkists who declared that it was the age of nationalism and promoted Turkish interests over Islamic interests.[633] On the other hand, the journal quoted from a non-Ottoman newspaper, *Kafkasya*, which accused Ottoman Turkists of ignoring Turks in Russia against Bolsheviks and of being Westernists.[634]

Turkists invented Turkishness according to Babanzade Ahmed Naim; hence, there is no Turkish history without Islamic history.[635] Turkists created a history without an Islamic reference as the case of Genghis Khan. In the 79th issue of *Türk Yurdu* a poem praised Genghis Khan. *Sebilürreşad* criticized this poem that admires Genghis Khan who was seen as non-believer and the enemy of Islam, Turks, and humanity.[636] The assertation by Turkists that Genghis used war to establish a Turkish Empire was criticized by Islamists, since Genghis killed many Turks according to

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[631] Ersoy, *Safahat*: 181.
[632] Rıza, "Türkçülük, Memleketçilik," 69. "*Hem bunların milliyet dedikleri Hristiyanlığın inkişafından doğan bir şeydir. Müslümanlıkta böyle bir şey yoktur. Müslümanlık bunların anladıkları tarzda milliyeti ifna etmiştir.*"
[633] Ibid. "*Son senelerde türeyen Türkçülük: "Asrımız milliyet asrıdır. Biz de asrımıza uyacağız. Artık ümmet devri çıktı. Her millet ancak kendi işleriyle, mukadderatıyla alakadar olacak. Her millet kendine baksın. Kendini kurtarsın" dedi ve ne yapsa iyi. Cengiz, Timur, Hülagüyü mukaddesler meyanına idhal ederek bu zekveret misallerini, Kara-Kurumi Kızıl Elma Ergenekon hülyalarını yaymağa, akvam-ı İslamiye meyanında tefrika-ı tahmimlerini serpmeğe başladı.*"
[634] Sebilürreşad, "Türkçülük Böyle mi Olacaktı?," *Sebilürreşad* 24, no. 609 (1340/1924): 176. "*Zavallı Kafkasya, feryad ediyor. İmtizal eden Türkçülere serzenişlerde buluyor. Fakat heyhat! Artık bu feryadlar bizim kulağımıza girmiyor.*"
[635] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*: 375.
[636] Sebilürreşad, "Edebiyat: Kavmiyet Hissi, Fikirleri Nereye Sürüklüyor? Şevketi Nasıl Saadet Şeklinde Gösteriyor?," *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 332 (1331/1915): 154. "*… içimizden birinin çıkıp da İslamiyetin de, beşeriyetin de, Türkün de düşmanı olan bir şaki (dinsiz) hakkında kaside-i medhiye neşr etmesi biz bir dürlü havsalemize sığdıramadık.*"

them.[637] Babanzade criticized Turkists declaring that sickness of Genghis Khan would be a threat for Islamic unity.[638] Turks were not a pure race, since they were mixed with other groups and their language was not pure; because of this reason, the claims of being descendants of Genghis Khan or others were just sickness.[639] Another problem stemmed from the myth of Turan, i.e. the patria of Turks according to Turkists. The myth of Turan became the tactic of the Turkists that was the cause of the loss of many lands according to Akif.

> *"Hürriyeti aldık dediler!", gaybe inandık;*
> *"Eyvah, bu bâziçede bizler yine yandık!"*
> *Cemiyette bir fırka dedik, tefrika çıktı;*
> *Sapasağlam iken milletin erkânını yıktı.*
> *"Turan ili" namıyle bir efsâne edindik;*
> *"Efsane, fakat gâye!" deyip az mı didindik?*
> *Kaç yurda veda etmedik artık bu uğurda?*
> *Elverdi gidenler, acıyın eldeki yurda!"*[640]

The newspaper *İleri* was published by Celal Nuri (İleri) and was a continuation of the *Ati* newspaper which published a picture of a grey-wolf's head, a mythological symbol of Turks and useful iconography for Turkism.[641] This was criticized by *Sebilürreşad* since it was a non-religious symbol and emblematic of separatist nationalism.[642] According to Berkes Islamists criticized Turkists for importing non-Islamic elements into the culture. "They introduced those strange

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[637] Ibid., 155. "*Cengiz muazzam bir Türk İmparatorluğu teşekkül etmek istiyormuş da onun için dünyayı kasıp kavuruyormuş! 'Irkı sev!' diyen Cengizin defter emelinde milyonlarca ma'sum Türkün de kanı olduğunu unutmamalısınız!*"

[638] Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*: 210.

[639] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 203. Quoted from Naim, "İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyet," 116.

[640] Ersoy, *Safahat*: 419-20.

[641] Sebilürreşad, "Bozkurt Kafası," *Sebilürreşad* 23, no. 584 (1340/1924).

[642] Ibid., 191. "*Böyle iken bir kurt resmi yapması ve böyle garip dosyaları havi bir makaleyi derç etmesi o sev-i telakkileri ve tesvilatı tezbide sebeb olmaz mı?*"

Turkish names in place of those beautiful Muslim names. They have invented strange

national days. They would almost revive the ancient Shamanistic cults."[643]

Babanzade ridiculed Turkists' historiography by referring to their

contradictory discussions of progress and attempts at reviving superstitious legends

of the millennial past of Turks.[644] His understanding of Turkish history was

completely based on Islamic history. Turkish history should be thought of in relation

to Islam according to Babanzade.[645] When he became the rector of the university, he

sided with Damad Ferid government and developed a negative stance towards

Turkist lecturers in the university. During the War of Independence Babanzade was

aware that Turkists dominated them.[646]

An essay written by İsmail Hakkı [Baltacıoğlu][647] in *Tevhid-i Efkar* states,

discussed the Prophet Abraham's Turkishness.[648] The search of Turkishness of

Prophet Abraham was nonsense since it could not be proven; moreover, ethnical

pride was forbidden in Islam as in the case of Prophet Mohammed for Arabs.[649] This

nonsense search of Turkism could cause a division among Muslims and seeking for

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[643] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*: 375.
[644] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 203. Quoted from Naim, "İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyet," 117.
[645] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 204. Quoted from Naim, "İslamda Dava-yı Kavmiyet," 116.
[646] Somel, "Sırat-ı Müstakim - Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1912)," 188. Quoted from Erişirgil, *İslamcı Bir Şairin Romanı: Mehmet Akif*: 267-68.
[647] The response doesn't indicate that he is İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, however Ayvazoğlu discusses so. Beşir Ayvazoğlu, *Tanrıdağı'ndan Hıra Dağı'na: Milliyetçilik ve Muhafazakarlık Üzerine Yazılar* (İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2009). 61. "Hazret-i İbrahim Aleyhisselam Türktür", Tevhid-i Efkâr, 1340/1924.
[648] Sebilürreşad, "Hazret-i İbrahim'in Türklüğü," *Sebilürreşad* 24, no. 604 (1340/1924): 92. "*... Türklerden bir çok peygamberler gelmiş olduğunu davasını ortaya atmış ve birkaç tanesinin isimlerinden bizi haberdar etmişti. Şimdi de İsmail Hakkı imzasını taşıyan bir zatın, "Tevhid-i Efkar" gazetesinde bu davayı tecdid ve istinaf etmiş olduğunu görüyoruz.*"
[649] Ibid. "*Arab ırk ve kavmi dahi, kendine mensub bulunan hazreti Muhammed aliye-i İslam ile – ırkıyet ve kavmiyet nokta-ı nazarından – iftihara hakkı yoktur.*"

ethnical prophets.[650] The journal also disagreed with the attempt to create awareness about brotherhood and historical synergy between Turks and Magyars since they had no common religion.[651] One is Muslim and other one is Christian even though both had common ancestors.

The journal published many facsimile essays from different Islamic communities in order to proliferate its Islamist ideology via informing the whole Islamic community about one another. The journal quoted an essay from an Arabic paper called *Feth-el-Arab* from Beirut. It discussed Akçura's Turkist ideology critically.[652] Neither Arabs nor Turks could establish their own governments, since Muslims had to unite for the salvation of Islam.[653] A facsimiled essay from *Ez-Zuhur*, again an Arabic journal, criticized Turkism and Arabism which violated Islamic unity and created division amongst Turkish and Arab elements of Islam.[654] Turks and Arabs had to cooperate, not to fight against each other for the salvation of

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[650] Ibid., 93. "*Türklük'e maddi ve manevi hiçbir faidesi olmayan bu davayı ortaya atmak Müslümanlar arasında yeni bir sebeb-i ihtilaf ihdas etmek tehlikesini haizdir.*"

[651] Sebilürreşad, "Türk ve Macar Birleşmesi," *Sebilürreşad* 24, no. 616 (1340/1924): 288. "*Türk hayat-ı içtimaiyesi hiçbir zaman hiç vechle onlar ile beraber değildir. Onların – en vas'i manasıyla – layıklıkları da hiçbir din ile mütedeyyin olmamak demektir. Bir din ile mütedeyyin olmamak Müslümanlığı terk ederecek Macar diniyle mütedeyyin olmak demek değildir Binaen aleyh müderris-i muhteremin Türkler ile Macarlar arasında din nokta-ı nazarından vahdet husule geldiğine zahib olmasını pek garib buluyoruz.*"

[652] Feth el-Arab, "Kavmiyet Cereyanlarını Arabistandaki Tesiratı," *Sebilürreşad* 12, no. 299 (1330/1914): 242. "*Revabata bakılırsa Yusuf Akçura'nın takib ettiği Türklük, rabıta-ı Osmaniyenin yerine kaim olacak bir şekl-i siyasetten ibaret imiş. Çünkü Türkler kendi başlarına müstakil bir unsur-u esas teşkil ediyorlarmış.*
Biz buna inanmıyoruz. Mamafih şayet böyle bir maksad-ı hafi varsa bundan pek çok tenafir hasıl olacağını idrak etmek güç değildir."

[653] Ibid. "*Memleketin vaziyet-i siyasiyesini idrak eden hiçbir Osmanlı tasvir edemeyiz ki Türklerin , yahud Arabların yalnız başına bir satvet ve hükümet teşkil edebileceğine kan'i olsun, hususuyla medde-i düvelinin zaafı rekabet ve ihtiraz düvelinin artması, artık bu ülke için kalben, hissen, fikren birleşmekten başka hiçbir çare-i selamet olmadığını ihtar ediyor.*"

[654] Ez-Zuhur, "Kavmiyet Tefrikası," *Sebilürreşad* 11, no. 273 (1329/1914): 205. "*... vahdet-i İslamiyeti ihlal edebilecek bir mahiyette ceryan eden Türklük ve Arablık ceryanlarını şiddetli bir surette tenkid ediyor... katlanan bu iki İslam unsuru arasında müdhiş bir uçurum peyda olmağa başladığını ileri sürüyor... Türklük ceryanını idare edenler hakkında hiçbir şey demiyor ise de, Irak taraflarında Arablık ceryanı başında bulunanların henüz kendilerini idareden aciz birkaç mekteb çocuğundan ibaret olduğunu söylüyor.*"

Islam.[655] An essay from the newspaper *Rumeli* argued that whomever prefers ethnicity over religion could not succeed; moreover, it criticized *Tanin* because of its Turkist attitude regarding military issues.[656] It also emphasized that it is hard to discuss the pureness of Turkishness since they coexisted with other components of Islam.[657]

In a quoted essay from *Akşam* that was founded by repeat Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Galatasaray Sports Club chairman, and sociology professor, Necmeddin Sadık (Sadak) it was argued that nationalisms like Turkism were a movement that could only harm and destroy all the things for the sake of progress.[658] However, the journal criticized Necmeddin Sadık, because it was against separatist nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and between Islamic communities, but Necmeddin Sadık was against the nationalism that created a defensive understanding against foreigners who invaded the Ottoman Empire.[659] This critique of Necmeddin Sadık shows that Islamists were nationalist people, but were against nationalism without a religious understanding, which created division.

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[655] Ibid. "*Şu halde Türklük bu hareketi neden fena oluyor? Hem Türkler hem Arablar aynı maksadla aynı hat-ı hareketi ta'kib etseler mi daha iyi olur, yoksa birbirine düşman iki garib halinde bulunsalar mı? Bu cihheti takdir etmeyecek bir sahib-i akıl bulunabilir mi?*"

[656] Sırat-ı Müstakim, "Matbûat-ı İslâmiye: Rumeli'de Kavmiyete Dair," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 4, no. 86 (1326/1910): 144. "*Kavmiyetini dinine tercih etmek isteyenlerin daha pek çok asırlar için muvaffakiyet ümit etmeleri imkanını göremiyoruz. Tanin gazetesine, Türklerin anasır-ı saire-i İslamiyeye karşı bile müsavatsızca hareket ettiğini yazmak hafifliğinde bulunan zat evvelsi günkü Tanin refikamızda harbiye nazırı Paşa ile bütün Osmanlı orduları kumandanları meyanında bir Türk bile bulunmadığı hakkındaki yazıları görerek menair olmaz mı?*"

[657] Ibid. "*Türkler mevcudiyet-i milliyelerine, anasır-ı saire-i İslamiyeyi o kadar karıştırmışlardır ki, tarihimizin kemal-i şarkla yad ettiği en büyük rical içinde sair unsurlardan olanların mevcudi Türklerin yekunundan pek çoktur.*"

[658] Necmeddin Sadık, "Tahribkâr Milliyetperverlik," *Sebilürreşad* 24, no. 605 (1340/1924): 106. "*Bilmeliyiz ki her coşkun bir seyl gibi müvazenesi ve şuuru olmayan bu nevi' ceryanlar ancak tahribkar olabilir. Ve terakki namına önüne gelen her şeyi yıkar... Burada "Türkleştirmek" gayesiyle ne yapılmış ise, yalnız mevcudi tahrib etmiştir. Türkleştirmek istediğimiz her şey ve harir sadece mahv oluyor. Nasıl ki İstanbul sönmek üzeredir.*"

[659] Foreigners refer to imperialists who invaded Anatolia.

Akif criticized clubs such as Turkish Hearts (*Türk Ocağı, Arap Ocağı, and Tatar Bucağı*), because according to his view the meeting point of a Muslim must be the mosque.[660] He identifies the activities of Turkish Hearts as deviance.[661] The journal criticizes the evolution of Turkish Hearts from the love of Genghis and Ergenekon epic to Westernism and finally concerts and proms.[662] *Sebilürreşad* offered to forgive these activities and focused on the real issues of the nation.[663] As a response to Tevfik Necati's essay, the journal criticized Turkish Hearts' events than consisted of concerts, balls and proms; however, according to the journal, the aim of the Turkish Hearts must include educational and religious activities for youth rather than entertainment.[664] For the sake of the nation the journal sought to engender a conservative youth that was not affected by Westernist ideas. They criticized Westernism spawned Levantenism which was seen as a kind of formalism of Western culture and as a sickness.[665] *Sebilürreşad* generally did not uncouple Turkism from Westernism.

In spite of the fact that the journal generally criticized Turkists and their discussions, Ispartalı Hakkı Bey pointed out the glorious past of Turks in an essay in *Sırat-ı Müstakim*. He criticized the contemporary status of Turks even though they were the mother of the civilization, humanity, states and communities and created the

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[660] Sertel, *Tevfik Fikret-Mehmet Akif Kavgası Münasebitle Sebilürreşatçıya Cevap*: 38.

[661] Fergan, *İstiklâl Mahkemelerinde: Sebilürreşad'ın Romanı*: 157.

[662] Sebilürreşad, "Türk Ocağı, Balolardan, Konserlerden Ne Hayır Bekliyor?," *Sebilürreşad* 24, no. 609 (1340/1924): 170. "*Türk Ocağı tesis etti edeli bir türlü salim bir istikamet tutmaya muvaffak olamadı. Bir zamanlar Cengiz'in yasasıyla, Kızıl Elma ile Ergenekon ile uğraştı durdu. Sonra da Türkçülüğü bırakarak Garbçılığa döndü. Döne dolaşa nihayet baloculukta, konsercilikte karar kıldı.*"

[663] Ibid., 171. "*Biz Türk ocağına kemal-i samimiyetle tavsiye ederiz ki böyle şeylerden millet için zararlı olan böyle yollardan geçsin. Milletin ızdıraplarına, dertlerine çare bulmaya uğraşsın.*"

[664] Tevfik Necati, "Türk Ocağı: Türk Ocağından Neler Bekliyoruz," *Sebilürreşad* 24, no. 599 (1340/1924): 14. "*Gençleri yalnız konser ve balo ile celb etmekten başla çaremiz kalmamışsa bu çok büyük bir felaket-i içtimaiyedir.*"

[665] Sebilürreşad, "Gençlerde Milliyet Hissi Ölüyor: Levantenizm," *Sebilürreşad* 8, no. 191 (1328/1912): 157. "*Levantenizm nedir? Levantenizm garb adab ve muaşeretini fena bir surette nakil eden bozuk nesillerin içtimai hayata imtisali!..*" Akif's Asım is the prototype of that generation.

spirit of the contemporary situation.[666] The speech of Ahmed Midhat Efendi, organized by *Rusyalı Alem Talebesi Cemiyeti* at Mülkiye, which spoke of Turkishness was also published. He praised the associations that worked for the salvation of Turks and Islam, especially Russian émigrés.[667]

5.2.3. Turkists' Views on the Relationship between Islam and Nationalism

Some Turkists who cared about the importance of Islam discussed the compatibility of Islam with nationalism. They defended that Turkism would empower the Islam.[668] For instance, Ağaoğlu tried to convince Islamists that Turkism did not clash with Islam, especially with Süleyman Nazif and Babanzade Naim.[669] Ağaoğlu in his response[670] to Babanzade differentiated the terms *milliyet* and *asabiyet*. Hadith did not prohibit nation (*milliyet*), but asabiyah (*asabiyet*) according to Ağaoğlu.[671] The first one [*milliyet*] referred to community that share common religion, language and history while the other one [*asabiyet*] slides people into struggle.[672] Nationalism is shown as the dynamic power of the Islam in the essay of Ağaoğlu.[673] According to Islamists, nationalism could dominate religion and shape the society into a secular mood. Ağaoğlu criticized this argument and defended that

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[666] Ispartalı Hakkı, "Türklük Gayreti," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 6, no. 141 (1327/1911): 165. "*Allah aşkına kıymetimizi bilelim. Türklük, o ayağıyla yerleri sarsan bayrağıyla gökleri tutan taşkın alay. Aylık yürüyüşüyle ellere şan gövdelere, can vermiştir. Bugünkü cemiyetler, devletler, bugünkü beşeriyet, medeniyet hep o anadan doğmuştur. Bugünkü ruh, bugünkü hayat hep o peykardan fışkırmıştır.*"

[667] Ahmed Mithad, "Türklüğe Dair," *Sırat-ı Müstakim* 1, no. 20 (1324/1909): 318. "*Terakki ve tealli-i İslam için cemiyetler muftelif olmakla beraber maksadları birdir. Tıpkı ilm-i servetteki taksim imal kaidesi gibi görülecek işleri taksim etmişlerdir… Maksadları Osmanlının, İslamiyetin teali ve terakkisini teminden ibaret. Cemiyat-ı muhtelife meyanında küçücük bir cemiyet de "Rusyalı İslam Talebesi Cemiyeti"dir.*"

[668] Tamer Balcı, "From Nationalization of Islam to Privatization of Nationalism: Islam and Turkish National Identity," *History Studies* I, no. I (2009): 84.

[669] Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*: 401.

[670] Ahmed Ağaoğlu, "İslamda Dava-yı Milliyet," *Türk Yurdu* 6, no. 10 (1330/1914-1915).

[671] Ibid., 2323.

[672] Ahmed Agayef, "Türk Alemi," *Türk Yurdu*, no. 10 (1327/1911-1912).

[673] Öğün, "Ağaoğlu Ahmet," 48.

religion was necessary for nationalism by referring to Renan's typology of nationalism.[674] However, in one of his essays in *Sebilürreşad*, Ağaoğlu supported the Islamist view. According to him, all Muslims had rally around Islam for the preservation and defense of Islamic principles.[675]

He criticized some Islamists for being against Europe. According to him, it was essential to adopt sciences and learning, and their associative methods from Europe, because these had previously been adopted from Islamic learning in several ways. This was not just a moral issue which was defended by Islamists with respect to Western adaptation.[676] He supported modernist Islamists with respect to their modernist side.[677] Ağaoğlu was against racist attitudes which refused religion.[678] His Islamism and Turkism aware not political oriented toward a united Turkish or Islamic state. According to him, these were just dreams.[679] He criticized Islamists because of their connivance of the importance of history and sociology.[680] Briefly, his solution was Turkism for the salvation of the Ottoman Empire.[681]

Another Turkist, Yusuf Akçura discussed three possible solutions for the Ottoman Empire, Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism.[682] Turkism was the only ideal ideology for the Ottoman salvation. Because of this, Islam was of secondary importance within his ideology. According to Akçura, Islam had to accept the historical reality of nationalism; moreover, powerful Turkish nationalism would help

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[674] Ibid.
[675] Ahmed Ağaoğlu, "Müslümanların Livay-ı Kavmiyet Değil, Livay-ı İslam Etrafında Toplanmaları Vakti Geldi," *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 321 (1330/1915): 72. "*... külliyat ve esasatı müdafaa ve muhafaza için bütün İslamların livay-ı İslam etrafında toplanmaları vakti gelmiştir.*"
[676] Öğün, "Ağaoğlu Ahmet," 46-47.
[677] Ibid., 47.
[678] Ibid., 48.
[679] Ibid., 47.
[680] Ibid., 47-48.
[681] Karpat, *Turkey's Politics : the Transition to a Multi-Party System*: 23.
[682] Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Lotus Yayınevi, 2005).

to empower Islam.[683] According to him, Turks had served Islam for several centuries, and now it was now the turn of Islam to serve Turks.[684]

5.3. The First World War and Aftermath

According to these intellectuals, the calamities and outcomes of the Balkan Wars were due to impiety and the lack of a fatherland and national sensibility.[685] Moreover, they were due to division in the Empire that hindered the creation of the nation.[686] Even though the First World War was seen as the war of nations, according to Eşref Edib, it was the war of religions. The Çanakkale Front was the last castle of the Islam according to Akif. If it was lost, then it would be the end of Islam and the Ottoman Empire[687]; moreover, it would be the victory of the Great Powers that were trying to convince Islamic communities for the nationalist and separatist ideas. When Allied Powers conquered Jerusalem in the First World War, some Germans and Austrians were delighted with it although their countries fought with the Ottoman Empire against Allied Powers.[688] Hence, this was not the war of nations, but religions and a jihad against heathens.

After the First World War, the journal's attitude against nationalism changed with respect to the invasion of Anatolia. The invasion of Anatolia created a common

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[683] François Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri : Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986). 43.
[684] Ibid.
[685] Müftüzade Mehmed Esad, "Millet İrşada Muhtaçtır," *Sebilürreşad* 10, no. 258 (1329/1913): 389. "*Balkanlarda muharebe-i meş'umesinden dü-çar olduğumuz mağlubiyetlerde, felaketlerde dinsizlik büyük ve mühim bir mevki' işgal etmiş, ... Heriflerde vatan hissi milliyet duygusu kökleşmiş.* "
[686] Sebilürreşad, "Millet Vahdete Muhtaçtır," 94. "*Başımıza gelen her felaket böyle bir hareketin pek tabii bir ma-ba'dı olarak gelmedi mi? On seneden beri kanımızı emen ve nihayet bizi bu derece zayıf ve natuvan bodurca sefil ve perişan bırakan facialar gibi tefrikaların esiri değil mi?*"
[687] Yetiş, *Mehmet Âkif'in Sanat, Edebiyat ve Fikir Dünyasından Çizgiler*: 197.
[688] Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 82.

reaction against imperialist invaders, but there was still a disagreement between intellectuals and no consociation.[689] The War of Independence was also seen as a religious war by Islamists, especially Mehmed Akif and Eşref Edib. However, the conjuncture after the First World War shaped Islamists' counter-nationalist ideology, too. Islamists in that political condition did not write theoretically or practically anything against nationalism.[690] However, it still defended an Islamic nation. For instance, it published the conservative speech of Kazım Karabekir at university.[691]

The War of Independence was performed for the sake of the nation, but the definition of the nation for the time was not apparent. "The battle was being waged on behalf of the '*millet*' in the sense of a community defined on the basis of common religion which included not only Turks but also such Muslim groups as Kurds, Albanians and Circassians whose efforts were crucial to the eventual victory."[692] For most, the war was a religious one fought against Christian invaders of Anatolia. The National Struggle for them was a jihad tinted with nationalist references to *vatan*, kind of symbiosis of nationalism subjugated to Islamism in defense of the Islamic *vatan*.

Akif saw the National Struggle as the final struggle against heathens. According to Akif, the division of society into different segments was due to the efforts of foreign invaders of Anatolia.[693] He quoted hadith, and also directed

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[689] Sebilürreşad, "Millet Birleşiyor da Münevverler Neden İttihat Edemiyor?," *Sebilürreşad* 16, no. 416 (1335/1919): 240.

[690] Çetinsaya, "İslamcılıktaki Milliyetçilik," 432.

[691] Sebilürreşad, "Milleti Müslümanlık Kurtardı," *Sebilürreşad* 23, no. 576 (1339/1923).

[692] Benjamin C. Fortna, "The Ottoman Empire and After: From a State of "Nations" to "Nation-States"," in *State-Nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945*, ed. Benjamin C. Fortna, et al. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 5.

[693] Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 31.

verses[694] from the Quran[695], since the war was a religious war. Muslims had to fight together against the enemies of Islam according to these verses. The division of the community would cause slackness, fear and weakness that would be the reason of loss of the country according to Akif.[696]

Akif also continued in his Nasrullah speech to focus on nationalism and nationalist separations from the Ottoman Empire. According to him, until the advent of nationalism in the Empire, everything was on its way; moreover, Islam supplied all the best elements for a better society. Because of this reason, this big empire was pushed into Anatolia, mostly because of nationalism. Islam embraced all languages, races, morals, customs, regions and climates.[697] On the other hand, with the advent of nationalism this unity was broken. He was in favor of freedom of Islam and Islamic world. Hence, he was against the mandate idea.[698] His all-out opposition against the Western occupation of the Eastern or Islamic world set him against the mandate idea. This might refer to a nationalist point of view, but again it is very important to say that Akif was against all kinds of separatist nationalisms, especially within Islamic societies.

The journal discussed the issue of the mandate, which was very popular at this time with respect to Wilsonian principles. Any possibility of a mandate was

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[694] http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=3&verse=103 "And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided. And remember the favor of Allah upon you - when you were enemies and He brought your hearts together and you became, by His favor, brothers. And you were on the edge of a pit of the Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus does Allah make clear to you His verses that you may be guided." Quran 3,103 Surat Al-Imran (The Family of Imran)
http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=8&verse=60 "And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged." Quran 8,60 Surat Al-Anfal (The Spoils of War)
[695] Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 31.
[696] Ibid., 82.
[697] Ibid., 83.
[698] Ibid., 87.

strictly criticized by the journal since Turks lived for centuries independently, from the very beginning.[699] In addition to that, Turks couldn't renounce their territorial integrity because of Wilsonian principles that proposed independence for every ethnic or at least national community.[700] They were against the domination and in favored the independence of Muslims and Turkey. It should also be noted that *Sebilürreşad* favored the word Turk in that essay.

The Islamist side of the journal declined after the War of Independence with respect to its attitude against nationalism, especially Turkish nationalism. The journal identified Turks as the leader nation of the Islam; moreover, Turks would endeavor to uphold the unity of Islam in myriad ways.[701] The journal was still an Islamist journal; however, its attitude against Turkism changed with respect to the loss of Muslim lands and some other political conjuncture. For instance, Eşref Edib discussed pan-Islamism and its possibilities with Mustafa Kemal at Recep Peker's office in parliament. According to Edib it was impossible to create one unique Islamic state; on the other hand, he said they needed to ensure cultural, economic, social and political ties among Islamic states. In addition to that, the Turkish nation was the only possible society to put this into practice.[702]

Although the *Sebilürreşad* circle dismissed nationalism, the change in their ideas was obvious. Their Turkist side was created for several reasons during the National Struggle. Karan quotes from Eşref Edib who declared that a united Muslim

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[699] Sebilürreşad, "Manda Meselesi," *Sebilürreşad* 17, no. 437-438 (1335/1919): 175. "*Asırlardan beri istiklal ve mevcudiyetlerini şanlı bir surette muhafaza etmiş olan Türklerin milli hudutları dahilinde istiklal, hakimetlerini tehdid ile nihayetnecek her teşebbüs daimi ve umumi sulhun esas-ü'l-esası olan Wilson prensiplerine müthiş bir zorbadan başka bir şey olmaz.*"
[700] Ibid., 176.
[701] , *Sebilürreşad* 22, no. 547-548 (1339/1923): 1. "*Alemdarı-ı İslam ola milletizin … Asırlardan beri İslamın payitahtı olmak şerefini ha'iz olan Dâr-ü'l-Hilafemiz düşman ayaklarıyla çiğnendi…*" ibid.
[702] Karan, *Eşref Edib: Milli Mücadele Yılları*: 98.

nation or state was impossible, but that there must be cultural solidarity, economic cooperation, and other alliances between Muslim states.[703] The ideological transformation of Islamism according to Edib's declaration was clear because, during the first years of the Second Constitutional Period, Arabs were still under Ottoman authority; and thus, the impact of the national struggle became more vivid for the Islamists. Their understanding of Islam and Islamism depended upon an international Islam which consisted of different Islamic states. For this reason, the abolition of the caliphate in 1924 was a disaster for united Islamic states and communities. Although Islamists supported the National Struggle and pre-supposed an Islamic-Turkish state, the ideology of new republic was totally secular and against Islamism.

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[703] Ibid., 58-60.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Islamism appeared as a reactionary movement or ideology against Western imperialist threat, 'backwardness', and secular regimes in the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world in the midst of 19th century. Islamism was a modern phenomenon that aimed at progress in the Islamic world through the reformation of society with the help of its own origins. For Islamism, Islam was not just a religion, but a social and political matter. The true practice of Islam would bring salvation for the Islamic world and the Ottoman Empire against the Western threat; moreover, they would regain their power as in the Golden Ages. They offered a modus vivendi for Muslim individuals or communities; a life, modern but Islamic.

In the first chapter the emergence of Islamism and Pan-Islamism is discussed regarding the Ottoman case in a historical context with respect to its prominent figures. They were a group of intellectuals, bureaucrats, etc. from various Islamic communities with different ways of understanding for different issues. However, they shared the same motto; Islam is always preeminent. They aimed to combine Islamic values with Western methodology of technology. The Islamic world needed reform for progress because it was in an inferior position economically, militarily,

and financially. The Western world dominated science, economics, territories, and culture. However, their progress wasn't a Western way of progress, but a combination of Islamic science and Western technology. Islam is no obstacle to progress, and was once even a representative of science. For Islamists, the West continued an Islamic legacy of science. Islamists' understanding would create an Islamic Renaissance from its very origins that would revitalize the whole Islamic world. Without it, the Islamic world had no chance to survive under the threat of Western supremacy.

In the Ottoman Empire, Islamism emerged as a reactionary movement between Young Ottomans who were against the Tanzimat's secular regime. For them, the Tanzimat regime was pro-Christian. Moreover, they were against complete Western imitation. They argued that Islam already contained Western institutions prior to modernity, such as the *meşveret* which corresponded to parliament. Young Ottomans in fact adopted Western institutions through an Islamic legitimation. They benefited from the power of publishing newspaper and journal in order to inform the public and Muslims because there was a need for Islamic unity (Pan-Islam)

The symptoms of Pan-Islamism started before Young Ottomans and Abdulhamid; however it emerged as a Young Ottoman ideology and was used by Sultan Abdulhamid very effectively. Pan-Islamism aimed to unite all Muslims around the leadership of the caliph and was the only religious Pan movement, because others depended heavily on ethnicity. Even though Abdulhamid exiled most of the Young Ottomans, he used their Pan-Islamist ideology under his authority. The caliph, in this case he was the Ottoman sultan, is the leader of the Islamic community, ummah. In the modernization period, the caliph was used as a political instrument against Western threat for the benefit of Pan-Islamism. He invited

Afghani who is the most prominent figure of Pan-Islamism and Islamism to Istanbul. Despite the fact that Abdulhamid benefited from Pan-Islamism as a foreign policy, he never abandoned the balance of power policy among the Great Powers. He systematically improved Pan-Islamism as real-politik through edifices such as the Hijaz Railway. In addition to that, he used hajj and Friday sermons as political instruments in order to legitimize his Caliph title due to an assertion in Arabic lands that the Caliph title belongs to the Qureish tribe, i.e. an Arab. Hamidian Pan-Islamism was successful, because there was no Muslim nationalism for that time. However, Sultan Abdulhamid was heavily criticized by Young Turk opposition. Islamists or Islamic modernists also supported Young Turk opposition because they saw the Hamidian regime as absolute and totalitarian.

The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) took control and re-promulgated the 1876 Constitution. The CUP as a unionist party benefited also from Pan-Islamism; moreover, Islamists in this period supported the CUP for some time. Russian Islamists, some of whom later became Turkists, affected the ideology of the CUP. They at first defended Islamism because of the Russification policies of Russia; however, it turned into Turkism in the Ottoman Empire. Finally, Young Turk Era Islamism benefited from the legacy of Young Ottomans also. They started to publish several newspapers and journals, including Sırat-ı *Müstakim*.

In the second chapter of the study I discussed the emergence of print capitalism, the Ottoman publishing and press and the history of the *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* journal with respect to its ideology. Print capitalism shaped the communication of 19th century. It increased literacy, made publication cheaper and more widely distributed. The Ottoman Empire also experienced a similar process. After re-proclamation of the 1876 Constitution the, Hamidian censorship and

suppression of publishing was lifted. In 1908, there was an explosion of publishing because of this free atmosphere. Several newspapers and journals emerged from various ideologies generally at the capital. This publication process shaped the ideological structure of the Second Constitutional Period. However, this free atmosphere only survived for a short period. The CUP also started to suppress, censor, and control the press.

In this political atmosphere *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* started its publishing life and survived until 1925. It was the most important and long-lived Islamist journal of the period. It was published for 17 years as 25 volumes and 641 issues under the name *Sırat-ı Müstakim* later *Sebilürreşad*. This journal published articles regarding politics, religion, society, current affairs, etc. Until the annexation of Tripoli and the Balkan Wars, it included non-Islamist authors, except for Westernists. It carried a wide selection of intellectuals. The *Sebilürreşad* circle used the press as an enlightenment instrument for Muslims, because they wanted to inform every Muslim from everywhere about every other Muslim and Muslim community. The title of the journal is an Islamic phrase can be transcribed as 'the path to the truth' i.e. -*veritas*-. The authors of this Islamist journal were mostly young religious. In addition, Russian émigrés also wrote until they published their own journals. Abbas Halim Paşa, the younger brother of Islamist Said Halim Paşa, was a very close friend of Mehmed Akif and sponsored the journal several times. The members of the *Sebilürreşad* circle were mostly CUP members or supported it, because they were against the autocracy of the Hamidian regime. Their ideology was dependent upon a vision of Islamism that worked for the salvation of the Ottoman Empire, then the Islamic world. The Western threat also shaped their Pan-Islamism, which aimed to import Western technique and combine it with Islamic principles. After all, the

salvation of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world would come true. They continued the ideology of Young Ottomans with respect to Abduh's and Afghani's ideology. They supported a Eastern way of modernization as Japan did through using positive sciences.

The third chapter of the study deals a discussion of nation and nationalism, its emergence, and relationship with Islam and the Ottoman Empire. Nations were the outcomes of modernity. Feudal regimes turned into nations through the dynastic centralizations. Languages, territories, education, bureaucracies and armies produced nations in this processes. Nations are created by commonalities such as a common history, symbols, languages and religions. Centralization of state power through taxation and central armies generated nations as sovereignties during modernity with the help of Industrial Revolution.

The meaning of nation evolved as national community from its pre-modern meanings that, however, meant something else. In addition to that, the meaning of patria also evolved as national territories for which the members of the nation can or have to sacrifice. Nation became a community that governs itself in the past, today and in the future. Secularization of power created nations as the unique power of politics and sovereignty. In that process, borders became concrete. Immigration of people from their villages to towns or cities created also secularization through the Industrial Revolution. National identity became more important than other identities, especially religious identities. Nationalism is the ideology that defends the emergence and the survival of the nation. Nationalists benefited from some commonalities such as blood ties, language, religions, customs, culture, territory, ideals, values, equality, fatherland and solidarity for the sake of nation. Loyalty of individuals turned into national loyalty from prior religious or local loyalties.

Nationalization and nationalism affected the Islamic world and the Ottoman Empire, too, since it was the age of nations. In the Islamic world, religious identity was menaced by national identities. However, Islam prohibited nationalism that was mostly understood as an ethnic nationalism. Pan-Islam occurred as a reaction to that process, too. It aimed to re-establish the sense of ummah that can be interpreted as an Islamic nation. The relation between state and nation is identifiable with the relation of caliphate and ummah. The language of the Islamic world and the Ottoman Empire was affected by this nationalization process. The meaning of words such as *millet* started to change. *Vatan* also turned into fatherland from a city or place in which a Muslim or someone lives. *Millet* meant nation, but Islamic nation; besides, *kavmiyet* represented the ethnic nation. However, their usage changed according to time, place, and ideology. For Islamists, *millet* was Islamic nation; for Turkists, it was Turkish nation, and for Ottomanism, it was Ottoman nation.

The centralization process created maritime empires in the Western hemisphere with respect to the Industrial Revolution. These empires threatened the traditional empires such as the Ottoman Empire. Nationalisms for traditional empires were the beginning of the end. These imperialist and nationalist threats created ideologies such as Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism that offered solutions against the European invasion. However, the Ottoman center was not powerful enough to create a nation against these threats. Islamism and Turkism are other kinds of nationalism were the only two possible solutions for the Ottoman Empire due to the increase of ethnic nationalisms starting with the Greeks. At the very end, Muslims latecomers started to think about their ethnicities as Albanians did in 1913. In addition to that, Arabism emerged between Christian Arabs, and

influenced Muslim Arabic intellectuals. However, until the very end of the Ottoman Empire, Muslim Arab masses did not defend an Arabic nation or nationalism.

The discussion in the previous chapters argued that Islamism emerged as a reaction against Western threats that included nationalism, too. The *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad* journal, as an Islamist periodical embedded within that atmosphere, defended an Islamic way of nation in order to save the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world. As such, members of this Islamist circle were against ethnic nationalism. However, until the Balkan Wars they worked together with Turkists. Afterwards their Islamism was sharpened due to Muslim immigrations and decreasing hope for survival. For them, the Islamic vatan was under the threat of the West which threatened or occupied Muslim lands. Islamic unity would save the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world under the leadership of Caliph.

According to the journal *Sebilürreşad*, nationalism is a virus that was spread out by West in order to destroy Islamic unity. As a result, they were against all kinds of division. They criticized ethnic nationalisms, especially Muslim ones. *Kavmiyetçilik* (ethnic nationalism) brings the community to the Age of Ignorance that is the age of tribalism. Even the Quran commands unity for Muslims. They suggested an Islamic community such as a traditional Ottoman community but in a modern incarnation, in which non-Muslims could live. Islamists used commonalities just as nationalism did, such as common language, culture, and symbolisms. Their community understanding was very similar to the community understanding of nationalism for which members of the community can or must sacrifice.

They identified the meanings of the words; *kavim*, *millet* and *ümmet*. *Millet* and *ümmet* corresponded to the Islamic community, *kavim* corresponded to ethnicity. The survival of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world is depended on Islam that

was the only solution for holding people together. Because of this reason the ummah, i.e. Islamic nation, must always come first for Muslims. Every Muslim is a brother or sister, which creates the togetherness of Muslims and the Muslim community. Unity was a prerequisite for defending the Islamic *vatan* against European heathens. Because of this reason *kavmiyetçilik* (ethnic nationalism) that is strictly forbidden was not natural and rational for Islam. Islam did not try to homogenize Islamic community, every ethnicity was aware of its ethnicity; however, it is also prohibited to see one's own ethnicity as superior to other Islamic ethnicities.

Muslim ethnic nationalisms such as Kurdish, Albanian and Arabic were strictly criticized by *Sebilürreşad* circle. According to them, there is no difference between Arabs, Turks, Circassians, Tatars or Kurds. In the same vein they criticized Turkists. Although Islamism was not exactly opposite of Turkism, for Islamists, Turkism could collapse Islamic unity. Before the Balkan Wars, Turkists and Islamists worked together. *Sırat-ı Müstakim* published announcements about Turkish associations and articles written by Turkists. After the Balkan Wars, Turkists started to publish their own journal, *Türk Yurdu*. This process crystallized the differences among Second Constitutional Period ideologies. Since nationalism was a product of Western political thought, Turkism was also identified as a version of Christian nationalism, not Islamic. Islamists critiqued Turkist concern about non-Islamic Turkish history. The love of Genghis, Ergenekon or Turan was identified as sickness and heavily criticized by Islamists. The most interesting discussion between Turkists and Islamists was about the Turkishness of the Prophet Abraham. For Islamists, it was nonsense to identify him as Turk. Although Islamists criticized ethnic nationalism and Turkism, *Sebilürreşad* supported the National Struggle in order to save the last castle of Islam. National Struggle was seen as a jihad against the

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heathens who occupied the *Islamic* vatan. In addition to this, they were against the Wilsonian principles and the idea of a mandate since it would mean the end of Islam.

This thesis studied Islamist understandings of the nation and nationalism during the Second Constitutional Period, examining the journal *Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad*. It argued that Islamists were against ethnic nationalisms, without totally rejecting nationalism. The creation of nations and Islamic political thought shows us that Islamists in that period had an Islamic national understanding that aimed to create an Islamic unity (Pan-Islam), or ummah, set against the threat posed by the West. This idea is supported through an examination of Islamism, the journal, and the concepts of nation and nationalism in the context of modernization history of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world. Transcribed articles from Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad structure this discussion about nation and nationalism according to Islamists who benefited from history, culture and religion just as ethnic nationalism(s) did.

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