

A TALE OF TWO WARS:
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE
OTTOMAN PUBLIC OPINION

A Master's Thesis

by
ENES ŞAMİL KIRAZ

Department of
International Relations
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
June 2023

ENES ŞAMİL KIRAZ

A TALE OF TWO WARS:
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE OTTOMAN PUBLIC OPINION

Bilkent University 2023

To my family



A TALE OF TWO WARS:
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE
OTTOMAN PUBLIC OPINION

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

ENES ŞAMİL KİRAZ

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

June 2023

A TALE OF TWO WARS: THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE OTTOMAN
PUBLIC OPINION
By Enes Şamil Kiraz

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Sırrı Hakan Kırımlı
Advisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Onur İşçi
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Cemil Aydın
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

Refet Soykan Gürkaynak
Director

ABSTRACT

A TALE OF TWO WARS: THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE OTTOMAN PUBLIC OPINION

Kiraz, Enes Şamil

M.A., Department of International Relations

Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sırrı Hakan Kırımlı

June 2023

This thesis examines the repercussions of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 on the Ottoman public opinion. The Ottomans were glad to see Russia defeated, and even better, defeated by an “Eastern” nation that was ruled by feudal lords only four decades ago. Japanese victory set a precedent for the Ottomans to follow. Therefore, Islamists, nationalists, and especially the Young Turks urged the Ottomans to become Japan and not to become Russia. This is the story of two wars; an international war in the Far East and an internal intellectual war on how to save an empire in the Near East.

Keywords: The Ottomans, the Russo-Japanese War, the Young Turks

ÖZET

İKİ SAVAŞIN HİKÂYESİ: RUS-JAPON HARBİ VE OSMANLI KAMUOYU

Kiraz, Enes Şamil

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Sırrı Hakan Kırımlı

Haziran 2023

Bu çalışma 1904-1905 yılları arasında vukû bulan Rus-Japon Harbi'nin Osmanlı kamuoyu üzerindeki etkilerini incelemektedir. Osmanlılar Rusya'nın mağlubiyetinden memnun olmuşlardır. Bu mağlubiyetin daha kırk yıl önce feodal lordlar tarafından yönetilen “Doğulu” bir ülke tarafından tattırılması Osmanlılar için ayrıca sevindiricidir. Zira Japonya'nın galibiyeti Osmanlılara takip edilmesi gereken bir örnek teşkil etmiştir. Dolayısıyla, İslamcılar, milliyetçiler ve özellikle Jön Türkler Osmanlıların Rusya değil, Japonya olması gerektiğini savunmuşlardır. Bu çalışma iki savaşın hikayesidir; Uzak Doğu'da meydana gelen uluslararası bir savaş ve Yakın Doğu'da bir imparatorluğu kurtarmak üzere verilen düşünsel bir savaş.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Jön Türkler, Osmanlılar, Rus-Japon Harbi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would not have been possible without Hakan Kırımlı, who definitely was more than an academic supervisor to me. His wisdom, character, and dedication have been an example for me to follow. His teaching was not solely limited to academic matters; it was a continuous process of learning for me, be it through our gastronomic *ekspeditsias* or our discussions on the musical culture of Saxony. It is thanks to him that this thesis was written, but more importantly, I know the difference between waffle de Bruxelles and waffle de Liège.

I am extremely grateful to my committee member Onur İşçi, not only because of his contributions to this work but also for encouraging me to apply to Bilkent in the first place. I am thankful to my other committee member Cemil Aydın for making time for my work. Berke Torunoğlu's courses and recommendations facilitated my research, which I am also grateful for. Another facilitator to whom I am indebted is Ece Engin.

I could not undertake this journey without the lifelong support of my father, mother, and brother. Each of them has their unique ways of helping me throughout my journey. Therefore, I am deeply indebted to each of them for helping me to achieve my goals.

I also would like to salute the seven members of my cohort who were brave enough to embark on a graduate program at Bilkent. I am aware that my mental survival was partly dependent on them. I would like to specifically thank Ali and Emirhan for their annoyingly unending academic and non-academic questions.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my friends in Ankara, Talha, Erkam, Salih, Faruk, and Muvaffak. Our flaneurship and constant visits to concert halls made my Ankara years tolerable and brought me peace of mind.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZET	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I: THE RISING SUN OVER THE EAST: THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904-1905).....	9
1.1. Europe and the World at the Dawn of the 20 th Century.....	9
1.2. The Road to War: Russia and Japan.....	17
1.2.1. Russian Expansion Reaching its Limits.....	17
1.2.2. The Rising Sun, Japan.....	21
1.3. The War (1904-1905).....	26
1.4. The Treaty of Portsmouth and its Repercussions.....	31
CHAPTER II: ECHOES OF THE WAR: PUBLIC REACTIONS ACROSS THE GLOBE.....	35
2.1. The Imperialist Appreciation.....	37
2.1.1. Germany.....	38
2.1.2. Austria-Hungary.....	39
2.1.3. France.....	40
2.1.4. Britain.....	41
2.1.5. The United States.....	42
2.2. Global Enthusiasm of the Humiliated and Insulted.....	44
2.2.1 China.....	45
2.2.2. Korea.....	47
2.2.3. Southeast Asia.....	47
2.2.4. India.....	49
2.2.5. The Malay World.....	51
2.2.6. Egypt.....	51
2.2.7. Iran.....	52
2.2.8. The Polish.....	54
CHAPTER III: OTTOMAN PUBLIC OPINION AT THE PRELUDE OF THE	

WAR.....	56
3.1. Public Having an Opinion?.....	57
3.2. The Ottoman Proto-Public Opinion.....	58
3.3. The New Order, New Public (1831-1860).....	60
3.4. The New Public, Acquiring a Voice (1860-1876).....	63
3.5. The Reign of Abdulhamid II and the Double Movement.....	67
CHAPTER IV: THE TWO WARS: THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST AND THE WAR IN THE NEAR EAST.....	74
4.1. The Ottoman Relations with the Belligerents.....	77
4.1.1. Ottoman-Russian Relations Before the War.....	77
4.1.2. Ottoman-Japanese Relations Before the War.....	79
4.2. The War, anti-Russianism, and Japonophilia.....	80
4.2.1. The War and anti-Russian Sentiments.....	80
4.2.2. The War and Japonophilia.....	82
4.3. The War and the Hamidian Views.....	83
4.3.1. Abdulhamid II's Views and Policy.....	83
4.3.2. The Press under the Sultan.....	85
4.3.3. Pertev's Journey.....	88
4.4. The War and Nationlist-Islamic Responses.....	90
4.4.1. Muslims' Door to Japan: Abdürreşid İbrahim.....	91
4.4.2. The Torchbearer: <i>Sırât-ı Müstakîm</i>	94
4.4.3. The Turkic Nationalist Press.....	96
4.5. The War and the Young Turks.....	99
4.5.1. <i>Méchveret Supplément Français</i>	102
4.5.2. <i>Şûrâ-yı Ümmet</i>	104
4.5.3. <i>Osmanlı</i>	107
4.5.4. <i>Türk</i>	108
4.5.5. <i>Doğru Söz</i>	109
4.5.6. <i>İctihad</i>	110
4.5.7. <i>Volkan</i>	113
4.5.8. <i>Balkan</i>	114
4.5.9. <i>Servet-i Fünûn</i>	115
CONCLUSION.....	120
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	126

INTRODUCTION

*Turks and the Japanese are of the same race. The Japanese were nothing until thirty years ago. However, the law, freedom, determination, and effort they had thirty years ago made them one of the greatest nations in heroism, humanity, honor, and decency. Who can claim that the poor Turks, that noble nation, will not show the same ability tomorrow?*¹

Balkan, Filibe (Plovdiv), 1906

The Objective

When her second son Hikmetullah was born at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, Halide Edib recalls, he was called Togo, as in the case of other children who were born at that time.² Togo was the name of the Japanese admiral who brought victory to the Japanese navy. Why Halide's son was called by the name of a military leader of a distant nation which had no official diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire? What was the reason for the Ottomans' interest in that war? How did the Ottomans react to the war, and why did they react that way? This thesis attempts to shed light on these questions and tries to understand how different segments of the Ottoman public responded to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and why they reacted as such.

The global significance of the Russo-Japanese War stems from several reasons. As the first great war of the new century, the Russo-Japanese War provided the belligerents a chance to showcase the "achievements" of the 19th century. The first

¹ "Musâhabe 7," *Balkan*, December 9, 1906.

² Halide Edib Adivar, *Mor Salkımlı Ev*, (İstanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 2000), 138.

achievement was the industrial revolution which fundamentally transformed the world economy. Secondly, a novel type of political belonging has emerged. Now, the soldiers were not dying for their monarchs; they were dying for their nations.

Thirdly, thanks to the combination of the first two, wars had become much more lethal and burdensome for the belligerents. Fourthly, the first two elements enabled a new type of political and military expansion for a handful of states. European countries achieved vast colonial conquests, leaving no areas and populations untouched. Fifthly, the political and economic rise of Europe brought the notion of European superiority over other races.

Finally, developing technology, nationalism, and increasing educational opportunities facilitated people across the world to have a voice in state affairs through media. In most cases, the relations were two-dimensional, as in the case of the rise of public opinion and the proliferation of nationalist ideas. The Russo-Japanese War bore all the elements mentioned above. In this sense, the war was a precursor of the two world wars. Indeed, the war helped to shape the fates of the two world wars yet to come. While the war's impact on Europe contributed to the completion of the World War I alliances, it also gave birth to the Japanese-American rivalry in the Pacific, which would culminate in World War II. According to John Steinberg, the Russo-Japanese War was a total war, profoundly penetrating the belligerents politically, economically, and socially. And considering the international diplomatic and economic involvement in the war, he implies that the Russo-Japanese War was World War Zero.³

³ John W. Steinberg, "Was the Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?," *The Russian Review* 67(1) (Jan., 2008), 5-7.

No matter how it is named, the war and its results echoed across the globe thanks to the reasons mentioned above. For the Western public, the war signaled the joining of Japan into the civilized world, although the Western capitals had their own political reasons to endorse Japan against Russia. For the rest of the world, however, Japan's victory over Russia was much more important because it proved that the Japanese model was worth it. The non-Western world perceived the war as a triumph of an Eastern, non-Christian, and constitutional nation that underwent a process of modernization and protected its national existence by defying a European great power. Ironically, world public opinion preferred ignoring the war's imperialist nature and Japan's imperialist ambitions in Korea and Manchuria.

The Ottomans were no strangers to the war as well. As a multi-ethnic empire, the achievements of the 19th century did not fare well for the Ottomans. These achievements brought external threats from Europe and internal ones among the imperial subjects with different ethnicities. As a result, the empire was being carved out by the European powers on the one hand and was decaying from within for a century. Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals desperately sought ways of saving the empire from collapse. Therefore, the Ottoman rulers preferred to establish a "new order" through the adoption of European systems and notions, the "reorganization," and the "reform" of state institutions. However, not all Ottomans agreed with the statesmen.

The empire in the 19th century witnessed the rise of an intellectual class, public opinion thanks to the printed press, and the emergence of civil opposition. The Young Ottomans were a group of intellectuals with European education who

disagreed with the Tanzimat statesmen. Their intellectual and activist legacy gave birth to the Young Turks and later the Committee of Union and Progress. The Young Turks had a completely different vision for the empire than the Sultan. Yet, they were not the only intellectual trend in the empire. The early 1900s also witnessed the emergence of different circles, such as Islamists and Turkic nationalists. Each of them had overlapping responses to the Russo-Japanese War.

The Japanese attack on Port Arthur was a relief for the Ottomans. Russia was the most hostile and detrimental power for the Ottomans for almost two centuries, steadily swallowing the Ottoman lands and fueling ethnic divisions among the Ottoman subjects. Hence, the defeat of the archenemy was a reason for joy for the Ottoman rulers and the public. Indeed, the British vice-consul in Van was surprised by the “almost universal dislike of Russia” among the Ottomans, including the Armenians.⁴ Secondly, the Russian defeat did not come at the hands of another European nation; it was an Oriental power, Japan, that caused a humiliating defeat for Russia. Moreover, Japan was a friendly nation, proving her virtues at the *Ertuğrul* incident. Thirdly, Japan managed to win this war thanks to a rapid process of modernization which was a surprise to the world. Fourthly, during the process, the Japanese picked the path of selective acquisition, borrowing the science of Europe but simultaneously keeping their own national culture. Last but not least, Japan, the triumphant, was a nation with a constitutional government and a parliament, whereas Russia was a backward empire with an absolutist monarch.

⁴ Government Papers, The National Archives, UK, Kew, 1904. "*Asiatic Turkey. Further Correspondence*," FO 424/206, 48.

All these reasons led the Ottoman public to enthusiastically support Japan against Russia, although Abdulhamid preferred to stay neutral and not provoke Russia. Because of Sultan's stance, the Istanbul press reported the war neutrally. These newspapers covered the war comprehensively, full of encyclopedic information arriving from international news agencies; however, there were no opinions. On the other hand, the journals and newspapers of Islamists, Turkic nationalists, and the Young Turks were in love with the Japanese. The first four aspects mentioned above were the main dimensions the Islamists and Turkic nationalists appropriated. For these Ottoman intellectuals, Japan, an Eastern nation that defeated Russia thanks to selective acquisition, provided a model to follow. What set the Young Turks apart was, in addition to those four aspects, they brought a fifth dimension. They argued that the reason for Russia's defeat and Japan's victory was due to their political systems. Japan was a constitutional monarchy, whereas Russia was an absolutist regime. The Young Turks used this dichotomy to attack the Hamidian regime. For the Young Turk press, the Russo-Japanese War was not really about an international war happening in the Far East; it was a civil war of words between the Young Turks and Abdulhamid.

When we speak about the Ottoman public opinion's reaction to the Russo-Japanese War, we see two wars, not one. The first war was an international one in the Far East and lasted only two years. This war had significant implications for the other war, however. The real and the greater war was in the Near East and was ongoing for more than a century. It was an intellectual war between the diverse segments of an empire on how to prevent the collapse of the state. The Russo-Japanese War and

Japan's victory inspired the belligerents of the second war, providing the sides a model to follow.

Methodology

In order to grasp the spirit of the Ottoman public opinion at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, this study comprehensively utilizes the Ottoman press. The majority of the sources are the newspapers and journals published by the Ottomans. Most of these publications were in Turkish; however, some of them also had French supplements, as in the cases of *İctihad* and *Meşveret*. In fact, at the time of the war, only the French version of *Meşveret*, *Méchveret Supplément Français* was being published.

These newspapers and journals were not confined within the boundaries of the empire. Because of the constant threat of censorship and shutdown, especially the Young Turk publications were headquartered in numerous cities like Paris, Geneva, Cairo, Salonica, and Filibe (Plovdiv). In particular, Paris and Cairo was a hotbed for the Ottoman opposition's publications. Moreover, the publication locations of these changed occasionally. *Osmanlı*, for instance, started its publication life in Geneva and then moved to Cairo. *İctihad* followed the same route, eventually ending up in İstanbul after the Young Turk Revolution.

The press in the Hamidian İstanbul, like *Sabah*, *İkdam*, and *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, had to limit themselves in order not to raise the eyebrows of the Sultan. However, after the Young Turk Revolution, the Ottoman press flourished, with new newspapers and

journals such as *Volkan* and *Sırât-ı Müstakim* being launched in the imperial capital and also across the empire.

Apart from the newspapers and journals, this study makes use of memoirs, letters, travel writings, booklets, and compilations of the contemporaries of the war. These materials, with newspapers and journals, were accessed through the university libraries of Bilkent, Boğaziçi, İstanbul, and Ankara, and libraries of Atatürk, TTK, IRCICA, TBMM, National Library of Turkey, the periodical collections of Hakkı Tarık Us, ISAM, Tek-Esin Foundation, Salt Research, and Bibliothèque Nationale de France. I also used archival materials from the State Archives of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (BOA) and, to some extent, from the National Archives, UK. These materials are supported by secondary sources in order to locate them within their historical context.

Outline

The thesis begins with a summary of the Russo-Japanese War. After an overview of the political status quo at the turn of the century, it deals with the positions of the belligerents. Then, the war is narrated, followed by the peace treaty and its global repercussions. The second chapter delves into the reactions of public opinion across the globe. First, it presents the reflections of the European and the US public on the war. Later, it surveys the reactions across every corner of Asia.

The third chapter is about the Ottoman Empire and its public opinion before the war. It investigates the formation of the early phases of public opinion in the empire. Then, it presents the Ottoman press during the Tanzimat period and the Hamidian

Era. It pays specific attention to the time of Abdulhamid and the emergence of a loose opposition under the name of the Young Turks.

The final chapter presents the two wars: the Russo-Japanese War and its implications on the war among the Ottomans. It introduces the empire's relations with the belligerents and how the Ottoman public perceived those two. The section illustrates that the Ottoman public was already highly anti-Russian and was sympathetic toward the Japanese. Afterward, the official policy of the Hamidian government, the portrayal of the war by the Hamidian press, and the views of the Ottoman military observer Pertev Bey are presented. Later, the chapter introduces the reactions among the Islamist and Turkic nationalist press, with a special emphasis on Abdürreşid İbrahim. Finally, the chapter provides a detailed survey of the Young Turks' views of the war and its implications for the Ottomans. The final part of the thesis would be the conclusion.

CHAPTER I

THE RISING SUN OVER THE EAST:

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904-1905)

The Russian Czar, the same man who exhorted all the nations in the cause of peace, publicly announces that, notwithstanding all his efforts to maintain the peace so dear to his heart, efforts which express themselves in the seizing of other people's lands and in the strengthening of armies for the defense of these stolen lands, he, owing to the attack of the Japanese, commands that the same shall be done to the Japanese as they had commenced doing to the Russians, that is, that they should be slaughtered; and in announcing this call to murder he mentions God, asking the divine blessing on the most dreadful crime in the world. The Japanese Emperor has proclaimed the same thing in relation to the Russians.⁵

Lev Tolstoy, 1904

1.1. Europe and the World at the Dawn of the 20th Century

Fin de siècle in Europe was a time full of past achievements and hope for a promising future for the continent. European societies enjoyed the blessings of a century-long material and supposedly moral development. This Belle Époque was not limited to increasing economic welfare, relative peace in Europe, and imperial expansion worldwide. It was also characterized by technological innovation, industrialization, the scientific revolution, the proliferation of education, and the

⁵ Count Lev Tolstoy, "Bethink Yourselves!" *The Times*, June 27, 1904.

flourishing of culture. All these European deeds were epitomized in Paris in 1900.

An ambitious world fair, the Exposition Universelle was built at the heart of 19th-century Europe to salute the accomplishments of the European civilization. The keyword of the century was progress, "massive, enlightened, sure of itself, self-satisfied but above all inevitable."⁶

The foundations of the achievements were laid by the political and economic developments of the late 18th century. In 1789, the slogans *liberté*, *égalité*, and *fraternité* echoed through the streets of Paris and toppled down the Bourbon monarchy, which previously was believed to be the rulers by divine right. The drama in Paris and the new notions that arose, such as liberalism and nationalism, started to be the nightmares of European courts. Meanwhile, another trend, though much more gradual than the French Revolution, was taking place on the other side of the English Channel.

The second half of the 18th century witnessed the emergence of new means of production. Novel methods which enabled to utilize the steam power gave birth to new types of manufacturing. Handicraft manufacturing steadily left its place to machines and new forms of organization of labor. The economic implications of the Industrial Revolution, coupled with the political consequences of the French Revolution, determined the world's fate in the following century. The unique result of this dual revolution that took place roughly between 1789 and 1848 was the subordination of the whole world by a handful of European states.⁷ This domination

⁶ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1848-1875*, (London: Abacus, 1977), 16.

⁷ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 3.

would eventually reach its climax towards the end of the century with the scramble for Africa.

At the beginning of the century, however, European powers were busy with the rise of Napoleonic France. The result of a decade-long continental war was the final defeat of Napoleon and the emergence of a new power balance with the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Schroeder highlights the importance of the settlement and argues that 1815 succeeded in establishing a genuine peace that guaranteed the rights and status of the states while the continental powers discreetly accepted the British domination of the seas and Russian domination of the east. Accordingly, it was a political equilibrium, which was even better than the balance of power.⁸ The equilibrium created by Britain, Russia, France, Austria, and Prussia survived the revolutions of 1848, though with scars, and the Vienna settlement was to experience amendments on the road. The Crimean War was a consequence of Russia's increasing power and the changing balances in the Balkans. Thus, Britain and France, along with the Ottoman Empire formed a coalition to re-equilibrate the balance while Austria and Prussia quietly gave their consent. The unifications of Italy and Germany in 1871 initially did not shake the foundations of the balance in Europe. The order underwent some adjustments with relatively modest casualties resulting from Prussia's short wars with Austria and France.

The second half of the century was characterized by another phenomenon. The overseas territories of the European powers, combined with capitalist development, gave birth to a new type of imperialism. There was no escape for the rest of the

⁸ Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1996), 577-578.

world from European hegemony. The world has become a single economy with intertwined economic relations between the core and periphery, with no place remaining intact from the flow of goods, money, and people.⁹ The colonies provided the European powers with raw materials necessary for their developing industry, workforce, and also a vast market where the commodities could be sold. Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy partitioned the overseas territories among each other, later joined by newcomers such as the US and Japan. Canada, the Guianas, the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, Australia, China, India, Indochina, and the Malay islands would sooner or later be subjugated by a European power. Although Britain witnessed some drawbacks, such as the independence of the Thirteen Colonies, she expanded her control to almost every continent thanks to her naval power. Britain enjoyed unprecedented colonial supremacy from the early 19th until the middle of the 20th century; she was the empire on which the sun never set.

The European powers captured vast, unknown lands, and such colonialist expansion brought burdens. The Europeans perceived themselves as superior in every aspect compared to the populations they colonized. The rhetorical contrast was created between the West and the rest to define the European identity. Europe invented an imaginary Orient to refer to the 'other' human communities inferior to the Western civilization.¹⁰ The second half of the 19th century witnessed the extensive use of the phrase 'civilizing mission' connected with the notion of progress. Unlike enlightened Europe, the colonies were dark places of the earth full of barbarism.¹¹ These lands were 'waste places' full of 'untamed people' who needed the light of civilization.¹²

⁹ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 62.

¹⁰ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 2003), 1-5.

¹¹ "No Room to Live," *The Daily News*, November 6, 1899.

¹² "London, Saturday, February 4," *The Daily News*, February 4, 1899.

The colonialist perception consisting of a combination of authority, right, and duty embodied itself in an American poet's work. Rudyard Kipling's famous poem, the White Man's Burden, was first co-published in *the Times* in 1899 and immediately created a huge sensation. The poem called for the US to intervene in the Philippines and asked the white man to take up the burden of caring for the inferior people even if it had high costs for the white man.¹³ Such colonialist notions were in play at the European capitals as well as in the US in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War that took place in the lands of 'yellow men.' Of course, each great power involved had its own geopolitical and economic agenda in Manchuria, notwithstanding the moral obligation of the civilizing mission.

In fact, China has become a major topic of dispute among the great powers in the 1890s. Once a colossal empire that used to be one of the centers of world history, China became a playground for the European powers since her humiliating defeat in the Opium Wars. According to Taylor, China replaced the Ottoman Empire as “the Sick Man,” and the status of China was the chief parameter of the great power relations between 1897 and 1905.¹⁴ Britain, France, Germany, and Austria, to some extent, and a new power center, the US, all had different motivations in China and in the upcoming conflict between Russia and Japan.

Towards the end of the century, Europe was politically divided into two: on the one hand, there was the Franco-Russian alliance, and on the other hand, the Triple Alliance consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Britain, however, was trying to avoid continental affairs and focus on her imperial policy. Nonetheless,

¹³ Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man's Burden,” *The Times*, February 4, 1899.

¹⁴ A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1954), 391.

London was paying utmost attention to Russia's expansion into the steppes of Central Asia, which would facilitate a potential Russian reach to Afghanistan and later to India. Mutual concerns between the two capitals embodied in the Great Game and caused further estrangement. Increasing Russian activities in Manchuria was the factor that pushed Britain to end her traditional 'splendid isolation,' to accept unending Japanese desires, and to form an alliance with Tokyo in 1902. The following three years were the peak of the Anglo-Japanese partnership, and this partnership was to gradually fade after Portsmouth.¹⁵ What kept Britain hesitant about an alliance with Japan was a potential French involvement in favor of Russia.

The continental politics inevitably brought France and Russia closer to each other. Both countries were alarmed by a unified Germany, which defeated the French in 1871. Thus, the early 1890s mark the formation of a Franco-Russian Alliance against the German threat. The strategic alliance was reinforced by financial cooperation: Parisian lenders welcomed St. Petersburg's unending appetite for financial loans for ambitious projects such as the Trans-Siberian Railway. Yet, the question was how far France would go in support of the Tsar's ventures in the Far East and at the risk of a potential conflict with Britain in Europe. It turned out that Paris had no intention of risking a war with London because of the ambitious policies of her ally far away. Hence, France declared that she would honor her alliance with Russia, albeit in the form of absolute neutrality.¹⁶ Paris' foot-dragging would create a window of opportunity for another capital to win the heart of the Tsar: Berlin.

¹⁵ T. G. Otte, "The Fragmenting of the Old World Order: Britain, the Great Powers, and the War," in Rotem Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 100.

¹⁶ Patrick Beillevoire, "The Impact of the War on the French Political Scene," in Rotem Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 125.

After two short wars with France and Austria, Bismarck had succeeded in cooling down continental politics. He especially tried not to provoke the Tsar and push him towards Paris. Russia was the most serious potential threat to Germany, and a Franco-Russian security pact where Germany would be sandwiched by the two powers was Berlin's nightmare. Nevertheless, Bismarck's cautious *Realpolitik* did not fit the young Wilhelm II's ambitious plans. Therefore, under the new paradigm of *Weltpolitik*, Berlin started to expand her reach outside of Europe and acquire colonies at the cost of raising eyebrows in European capitals. A war between Russia and Japan that heaved in sight offered the Kaiser a window of opportunity to win the heart of Nicholas II. Kaiser already had a well-known contempt for Asian races like the Japanese: he declared the possibility of an attack on the Western civilization by the 'Yellow Peril'.¹⁷ Besides, keeping Russia busy in the Far East was a relief for Germany's eastern front since a significant amount of Russian soldiers were being transferred to the Pacific shores. Furthermore, during the war on July 1905, the Kaiser offered his cousin a defensive pact in Björkö. Nicholas even signed the treaty; however, the Russian Foreign Ministry was shocked and immediately convinced the Tsar to back away.¹⁸ Regardless, Berlin was satisfied with Russia's non-European distractions, and so was the other German power on the continent.

Austria-Hungary, defeated by Prussia in 1866, silently acknowledged the superiority of Berlin in continental affairs with an alliance pact. Italy joined the alliance in 1882, which became the Triple Alliance. Since she was a landlocked country after the loss of Venice, Austria-Hungary had no imperial aspirations. The primary concern of the

¹⁷ Rotem Kowner, *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War*; (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2006), 129.

¹⁸ Matthew S. Seligmann, "Germany, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Road to the Great War," in Rotem Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*; (New York: Routledge, 2007), 118.

Habsburgs was her immediate European neighbors, especially Russia. Vienna was increasingly at odds with Russia due to the Eastern Question. The efforts of Bismarck to revitalize the Holy Alliance between the three eastern monarchies failed in 1887, and the Balkans continued to be a hot topic between Russia and Vienna. A war in the Far East theoretically was of minor importance for Austria; however, if one of the warring sides were Russia, the situation would change. No significant event that occurred far away from Europe was Vienna's business; what mattered for Vienna was the potential implications of it on the continent, as in the case of a conflict in Manchuria.¹⁹ Hence, similar to Berlin's stance, Vienna was pleased with the fact that Russia was keeping herself busy away from the Balkans on the other side of the world.

Apart from the usual European powers, there was a new rising power on the other side of the Atlantic: The United States. The Thirteen Colonies gained their independence after a war with Britain which ended in 1783. The country's opening up to the world was painstakingly slow; however, it would have crucial global consequences. The US expansion started towards the west in the Pacific islands, notably in Hawaii. In fact, it was an American commercial fleet led by Commodore Perry in 1853-1854 that pushed Japan to open up to outside influence. Japan embarked upon a violent civil war between 1861 and 1865. Thirty years later, in 1898, the war with Spain and the capture of the Philippines heralded the US' emergence as the new member of imperial states. The Russian occupation of Manchuria at the turn of the century contradicted the US policies in China since Washington wanted an "Open Door" commercial policy in Manchuria. Opposition to

¹⁹ Monika Lehner, "A Different View: The War in Austro-Hungarian Political Cartoons," in Rotem Kowner, ed., *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05* vol. 1, (Kent: Global Oriental, 2007), 369.

the Russian occupation, combined with Theodore Roosevelt's sympathy towards Japan, led the US administration to lean towards the Japanese cause in Manchuria.²⁰

All in all, the international actors were cautious about the Tsar's ambitious gamble with Japan in the Far East, which would eventually backfire on the Tsar. Britain and the US were seriously concerned about the Russian plans in Manchuria. Even France, Russia's ally, implied that she would abstain from getting involved in a war in the Far East. Only Germany was supportive of the Tsar's Far Eastern policy since it would guarantee the security of her eastern border. Austria-Hungary's position was similar to Germany's; however, Vienna was much more discreet in its thrill with Russia's distraction. Nonetheless, the international dynamics did not keep St. Petersburg from continuing her provocative policy in the Far East that would have disastrous consequences for Russia, as will be discussed in the following section.

1.2. The Road to War: Russia and Japan

1.2.1 Russian Expansion Reaching its Limits:

The Russian Empire at the turn of the 20th century was comprised of a vast territory from the Baltics to the Pacific shores. Almost a century earlier, the Russian soldiers set foot in Paris during the Napoleonic Wars. Since then, the Tsars decided to assume the role of "gendarmerie of Europe." Throughout the century, Russia continuously expanded her reach in the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Manchuria. The only setback that halted the Russian expansion was the defeat against the united forces of Britain, France, the Ottomans, and Sardinia in Crimea in 1856.

²⁰ Tal Tovy and Sharon Halevi, "America's First Cold War: The Emergence of a New Rivalry," in Rotem Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 138.

Yet, it was only a temporary halt which would also urge the new Tsar Alexander II to implement reforms in the empire. As expected, the Russian army took the lion's share, which was followed by other reforms connected to the military. Railroads were constructed, the education system was modernized, and financial institutions were formed. The symbol of the reforms was the abolishment of serfdom in 1861. The industry was also taking baby steps, though it was limited to several urban centers on the west of the Urals. However, the modernization attempts of Alexander did not involve the westernization of the Russian political institutions and caused almost no improvements in the lives of the subjects. Thus, social unrest emerged, which was accompanied by methods of terror.

The lands north of the Amur River and the Sakhalin Island were captured during Alexander II's reign and the city of Vladivostok was founded at the shores of East Sea in 1860. The name of the city hinted at the aspirations of Russia: the ruler of the east. It was a crucial port for the empire; however, the port was inaccessible during winter. Thus the seeds of the conflict with Japan were planted. Eventually, the Tsar was assassinated by revolutionaries in 1881 and was succeeded by his son Alexander III. Thereafter, the new Tsar would inherit the practice of oppression, although continuing to develop the imperial economy. One of the most ambitious projects that the world has ever seen was developed under his reign. A railway project comprising nearly 10 000 kilometers, connecting Moscow and Vladivostok was approved by the Tsar in 1891. The chief aim of the project was to consolidate the Russian presence in the Far East. The same year, the Tsarevich Nicholas made a trip to Japan where he eluded an assassination attempt. As is seen, the young Nicholas' interest in the Far

East preceded his coronation. Three years later, he was crowned as the new Tsar upon his father's death.

The new Tsar immediately faced upheaval in the Far East. Japan launched a war against China in 1894 over her influence in the Korean peninsula and was wreaking havoc on the Chinese. Ultimately, China sued for peace in 1895, acknowledging the Japanese influence over Korea and ceding the Liaodong Peninsula to the Japanese. Russia was not happy with the fact that Japan acquired the peninsula and the strategic city of Port Arthur since Russia was planning to keep the peninsula for herself. Therefore, the Tsar asked the European powers to intervene. In addition to their ally France, Germany joined the wagon, hoping to divert Russia's attention away from Europe and also to carry out the *Weltpolitik* by acquiring territories in China. Faced with the diplomatic pressure from the troika, Tokyo had no choice but to withdraw from the peninsula. Unsurprisingly, the Triple Intervention was followed by Russia's swift capture of northern Manchuria, including Liaodong.

The Russian appetite for Manchuria was not just because of the enthusiasm of the young Tsar. He had his own visions: Peter the Great opened a window to the West with the foundation of St. Petersburg, and the young Tsar opened a window to the East by acquiring Port Arthur.²¹ What is more, his strategic calculations in Manchuria coincided with the economic plans of another group of people, championed by a Russian businessman and former officer Alexander Bezobrazov.

²¹ Denis Warner and Peggy Warner, *The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*, (New York: Charterhouse, 1974), 6.

A retired colonel who has been doing commerce, Bezobrazov saw huge economic capacity in Manchuria and Korea. He won the heart of Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, the Tsar's brother-in-law, and later had many audiences with the Tsar himself. In 1900, Bezobrazov founded the East Asiatic Company, a semi-state-owned enterprise under the auspices of the grand duke.²² Another supporter of Bezobrazov was Admiral Alekseev, the governor of Liaodong. However, this venture turned out into a stillborn child due to the strong opposition from the Minister of Finance Sergei Witte and Minister of War Aleksey Kuropatkin. The two ministers had opposing views on Korea; yet, they both were firmly against the *Bezobrazovtsy's* ambitions in Manchuria and Korea, which would provoke the Japanese. The opposition to Bezobrazov was completed with the joining of Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamsdorf. The Foreign Ministry was estranged from the Far Eastern policy, which became under the jurisdiction of Alekseev,²³ who would soon become the newly-formed Viceroy of the Far East after Kuropatkin.

The Boxer Rebellion and the following Russian occupation of Manchuria and Liaodong offered a great window of opportunity for the *Bezobrazovtsy*. Bezobrazov, Minister of Interior Vyacheslav Plehve, and Admiral Alekseev convinced the Tsar not to retreat from the areas that were occupied during the rebellion. Kuropatkin, with Witte and Lamsdorf, realized the potential Japanese aggression if they could not fulfill the obligation of retreat and halt Bezobrazov's activities.²⁴ The anti-Bezobrazov troika was correct; however, the Tsar, who could not perceive the

²² Richard M. Connaughton, *The War of the Rising Sun and the Tumbling Bear. A Military History of the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905*, (London: Routledge, 1991), 81.

²³ Igor V. Lukianov, "The Bezobrazovtsy," in John W. Steinberg et al., ed. *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*, (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 82.

²⁴ Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin, *Zapiski Generala Kuropatkina o Russko-Yaponskoi Voine*, Vol. II, (Berlin: J. Ladyschnikow Verlag G. m. b. H., 1911), 166.

severity of the situation, had a different opinion. On May 6, 1903, Bezobrazov was appointed as a state secretary by the Tsar.²⁵ Three months later, the hard rock Witte was ousted from his position. Kuropatkin followed suit, losing the viceroyalty to his opponent Alekseev and becoming a general under his command. The proponents of an aggressive policy in the Far East have won. Even in February 1904, the Tsar was still unaware of the possibility of a Japanese invasion, whereas the European media was already getting prepared for the upcoming war.²⁶ Meanwhile, some Russian statesmen were already on board for a conflict. Before Kuropatkin's departure for the Far East, Plehve addressed him: "Aleksey Nikolayevich, you don't know the internal state of Russia. To keep the revolution going, we need a little victorious war... As for the money, there is nothing to be afraid of since Japan will return everything through indemnities."²⁷ All these brought Russia to the brink of war with Japan, who had no intention to be a shy bystander in the Far East.

1.2.2. The Rising Sun, Japan:

On July 8, 1853, a US fleet under the command of Commodore Matthew C. Perry anchored off Tokyo, then Edo. The commodore's duty was to convince or coerce, if necessary, the Japanese to open up their ports to foreign trade. The Japanese rulers had sealed off the country entirely from outside influence since their rise to power after a civil war that ended in 1603. For more than two and half centuries, Japan was under the rule of the Tokugawa shogunate. In theory, the monarch was the ruler; in practice, a military government led by feudal samurais possessed the real power. The

²⁵ Lukianov, "The Bezobrazovtsy," 80.

²⁶ Frank Jacob, *The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century*, (London: Routledge, 2018), 6.

²⁷ Sergei Yulyevich Witte, *Vospominaniia Carstvovanie Nikolaia II*, vol. I, (Berlin: Slowo-Verlag, 1922), 262.

shogunate pursued an isolationist foreign policy and did not welcome foreign money, commodities, and, most importantly, Christianity.

However, Perry's arrival in Edo with advanced steam warships, which outmatched the Japanese ships, constituted a cornerstone for the Japanese. After seeing the severity of the threat that they were facing, the consortium on the isolationist foreign policy among the Japanese elite started to crumble. A year after Perry's arrival, the Japanese yielded the Western demands, which resulted in the penetration of the Western powers into Japan. Annoyed by the flow of foreign influence, the Japanese ruling elite demanded the restoration of the powers of the emperor. In 1868, the young emperor Mutsuhito adopted the name Meiji which meant "enlightened rule." After a series of military conflicts between the shogunate and the forces loyal to the emperor, Emperor Meiji achieved to withstand them.²⁸ Thus the Tokugawa shogunate ended and began the rule of the emperors. Nonetheless, the imperial rule was far from being absolutist; and was, in fact, an oligarchical rule.

Apart from the restoration of imperial rule, another significant consequence of the Meiji restoration was the path that the Japanese government steered the country into. The Perry expedition proved to the Japanese that they no longer can turn a blind eye to the developments in the world. The Meiji era is a period of fundamental and rapid political, economic, and social change in Japan. The central government expanded its reach to feudal areas, introduced a constitution in 1889, and formed ministries and a bicameral parliament, the Diet. The army was united under the imperial army and the imperial navy, dissolving the feudal militias.

²⁸ Kowner, *Historical Dictionary*, 169.

Likewise, Japanese society started to wholeheartedly adopt anything that was coming from the West, encompassing intellectual ideas as well as fashion. The printed press became widespread and technological innovations like the telegraph was introduced. The ongoing urbanization facilitated the proliferation of the Western lifestyle. The primary reason for the urbanization was the rapid industrialization in the country. The alliance between the government and the businessmen proved to be crucial for the success of industrialization.²⁹ The central government supported the construction of the Japanese industry without making concessions from its political power. Factories and shipyards were built, and railways started to expand swiftly. As a result, Japan experienced a huge economic boom. From 1880 to 1913, industrial production increased five-fold while the national income experienced a rise to double.³⁰ Financial parameters show a similar trend: within a decade, the deposits of the Japanese banks rose more than six-fold, and transactions at the Tokyo clearing house rose tenfold.³¹ Of course, economic development inevitably created numerous political implications for the empire, which would set her foreign policy for the following decades.

A developing country desperately in need of natural resources, the Japanese eyed nearby geographies for expansion. Indeed, the fundamental purpose of economic growth was to consolidate the political order against internal and external threats. The giant economic leap forward enabled the government to tame the national elite by supporting their economic ventures and also to develop a formidable military

²⁹ William W. Lockwood, "Economic and Political Modernization in Japan," in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, ed. *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1968), 119.

³⁰ Lockwood, "Modernization in Japan," 119.

³¹ Warner and Warner, *The Tide at Sunrise*, 23.

power to protect the country from external threats.³² The closest territories to the Japanese islands were the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria. They found the chance for a debut on the international stage in 1894.

The internal unrest that erupted in Korea increased the Japanese fear of potential Chinese intervention in Korea. Fearing the loss of Korean independence to China, Japan initiated a war against China in the summer of 1894. The result was astonishing from the Japanese point of view: a country that was ruled by feudal lords 30 years ago launched an invasion of the Chinese mainland, occupying the Korean and Liaodong peninsulas and reaching Manchuria. Only eight months later, China sued for peace. The Treaty of Shimonoseki declared that Korea was under the Japanese sphere of influence and Liaodong and Taiwan were to be given to Japan. Yet, as discussed earlier, the new status quo after the Sino-Japanese War triggered the triple intervention of the European powers led by Russia. Japan had to denounce her right over Liaodong, which was later occupied by Russia.

The Japanese government was already watching the Russian ventures cautiously in the Far East. The cession of Liaodong to the Russians demonstrated that the chances for the Japanese to get along with Russia in the Far East were almost impossible. The intervention had an immense impact on the national consciousness of Japan, marking a national humiliation by European powers.³³ Another important lesson for the Japanese was the high efficiency of war to achieve political aims. Therefore, the war set a precedent for a war against Russia. Indeed, the following decade witnessed increasing tensions between Russia and Japan, culminating in a war in 1904.

³² Lockwood, "Modernization in Japan," 125.

³³ Sandra Wilson and David Wells, "Introduction," in Wells and Wilson, ed., *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904-1905*, (London: Macmillan, 1999), 5.

The turn of the century brought new developments that threatened the Japanese influence in Korea. The Boxer Rebellion discussed earlier led to the Russian occupation of Manchuria. Although the occupation was supposed to be temporary, the Russians dragged their feet because of their own imperial aspirations in the region. Tokyo consistently failed to convince Russia to withdraw her forces and the other European powers to pressure Russia on this matter. Nonetheless, the Japanese secured an alliance with Britain to check the Russian navy in the Far East and also keep France out of a potential conflict with Russia. After endless negotiations, towards the end of 1903, the Japanese government understood that a war with Russia was inevitable and imperial ordinances for war preparations were declared in December.³⁴ One final reconciliation attempt was made by the Japanese on January 13, 1904, offering a revised settlement of the issue; however, St. Petersburg kept its silence for weeks. The desperation and disappointment of the Japanese authorities embodied itself in the Japanese ambassador Kurino's appeal to Witte, who was even no longer a minister in the council. According to Witte, Kurino asked him to influence the foreign ministry so that Russia would answer Japan's latest proposal. "The state of affairs brought Japan out of patience, that he [Kurino], as our [Witte] friend, begs to get an answer quickly, for if no answer comes within a few days, then war will break out."³⁵

1.3. The War (1904-1905)

The answer that Kurino begged so dearly did not come. On February 8, without a declaration of war, the Japanese fleet commanded by Admiral Togo Heihachiro

³⁴ Tatsuji Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire*, (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc, 1935), 142.

³⁵ Witte, *Vospominaniia*, 261.

launched a night attack on the Russian fleet moored up at Port Arthur. The Japanese strategy was clear: to nip the Russian threat in the bud. With Trans-Siberian Railway still incomplete, the Japanese decided that the sooner, the better, before Russia transported her massive troops stationed in Europe to the Far East. The Russian Army was the largest in the world, exceeding 1.1 million active units and almost 2 million reserves, while those who were stationed in the Far East were 100.000, concentrating at the vicinities of Port Arthur and Vladivostok. The Japanese Army, on the other hand, was comprised of 380.000 active and reserve units. Even with the inclusion of the second and conscript reserves, and trained men of the National Army, the numbers could not pass 850.000.³⁶ The ratio at the seas was more balanced but still favoring Russia. The Japanese had six battleships, 28 cruisers, 20 destroyers, and 90 torpedo boats, while the Russian Navy, the largest in the world after the British and French, possessed 20 battleships, combined with destroyers and cruisers that exceeded 100.³⁷ However, as in the case of the army, the Russian Navy was split into three isolated fleets: the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Pacific. The war for St. Petersburg was a limited war far away from Russia, whereas it was an all-in for Japan.

The intended blitzkrieg of Admiral Togo turned out to be a lengthy war of nerves. Although the Japanese neutralized two critical Russian warships at the night raid, they were unable to annihilate the fleet. Port Arthur, located in a bay that served as a natural barrier, was fortified with batteries to protect the port. The Russians twice attempted to break through the naval blockade, only to result in disaster: the second one resulted in the sinking of the flagship *Petropavlovsk*, killing 635 men including

³⁶ Kowner, *Historical Dictionary*, 41-43.

³⁷ Kowner, *Historical Dictionary*, 256-257.

Vice-Admiral Makarov.³⁸ With the death of Makarov and the sinking of *Petropavlovsk*, cried Witte, the Far Eastern fleet was doomed.³⁹ Admiral Vitgeft took the command and attempted one final move to deploy his fleet to Vladivostok. On August 10, Admiral Togo jumped on his prey, killing Vitgeft and chasing the Russian fleet back to Port Arthur. The Battle of the Yellow Sea was another failure for the Russians whereas the Japanese grew more impatient. Meanwhile, the developments on land were no good for the Russians. The inefficient division of the Russian forces in Manchuria isolated Port Arthur, causing its final fall.

Incompetence, logistics, and intra-staff rivalry sealed the fate of the Russian army in the Far East. Contrary to the Japanese who knew the terrain from the Sino-Japanese War and who excellently studied the last Russian war with the Ottomans in 1877-1878, the Russian army was passive, unprepared, and unserious.⁴⁰ Most importantly, the commanders of the army and the navy in the Far East were at odds with each other which created a problem of authority. Kuropatkin, knowing that the distance with the theater of war would create huge logistical problems and favored a cautious approach, was appointed as the Commander of the Imperial Manchurian Army, whereas Alekseev, who supported a more aggressive strategy, was the viceroy and Commander of the Imperial Navy. The divide among the general staff was so stark that Witte advised Kuropatkin that the only way to win this war was to arrest Alekseev and send him back to St. Petersburg.⁴¹ On the other hand, the Japanese were fast approaching: On the last day of April, the Japanese army crossed the Yalu River, the border between Korea and Manchuria, and launched a rapid assault

³⁸ Connaughton, *The War of the Rising Sun and the Tumbling Bear*, 43.

³⁹ Witte, *Vospominaniia*, 268.

⁴⁰ A. A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriya Russkoi Armii*, vol. III, (Moscow: Golos, 1994), 54-55.

⁴¹ Witte, *Vospominaniia*, 265

against the Russian positions at the banks of Yalu, pushing the Russians deeper. The Russians finally understood the gravity of the war.

Meanwhile, the Japanese were carrying out a landing operation at the narrowest part of the Liaodong Peninsula. Since the Japanese fleet could neither penetrate Port Arthur nor obliterate the Russian fleet, the army decided to surround the city from land. Thus, the Japanese landed in the Kwantung Peninsula, nearly 50 km east of Port Arthur, and attacked the Russian positions in Nanshan Hill. After two days of intense exchange of fire, the Japanese captured Nanshan and the city of Dalny, paving the way to Port Arthur. The defeat at the Battle of Nanshan alarmed Alekseev and pushed him to march south towards Dalny to prevent the fall of Port Arthur, notwithstanding fierce resistance from Kuropatkin. The two armies met at Telissu, to the north of Dalny. Nevertheless, Alekseev's efforts proved to be in vain, and the Japanese repulsed the Russian forces back to Mukden.

The Japanese army under General Oyama Iwao started to advance north, pursuing the Russians. Fearing the capture of strategic Liaoyang, which would also open the road to Mukden, Kuropatkin decided to meet Oyama at Liaoyang. The last days of summer witnessed the largest land battle between the belligerents until that day: 158.000 men under Kuropatkin defended their positions against 125.000 Japanese forces.⁴² Contrary to the intentions of Oyama, the Japanese could not annihilate the Russian army, which succeeded in retreating to Mukden. The Battle of Liaoyang proved to be the bloodiest one for both sides until then. However, unlike the Japanese, Russians were able to build up their military presence thanks to fresh

⁴² Kowner, *Historical Dictionary*, 206.

arrivals via Trans-Siberia. Hence, after the battle, the winds changed in favor of the Russians in Manchuria.⁴³ However, Kuropatkin's hopes to halt the dual Japanese advance towards Port Arthur and Manchuria failed in October at the inconclusive Battle of Shaho, pushing both sides to form trenches.

Meantime, another branch of the Japanese army marched south and closed into Port Arthur with the hope of neutralizing the Russian artilleries at the hills, which denied access to the Japanese fleet. It took months for the Japanese to capture the hills. However, once captured, especially Hill 203, the Japanese artillery was able to unleash hell against the defenseless and paralyzed Russian fleet at the harbor.⁴⁴ As a result, on January 2, 1905, the city finally surrendered.

The fall of Port Arthur enabled the Japanese to move their troops to Manchuria and join Oyama. Therefore, Kuropatkin sought to break through the Japanese positions at another indecisive Battle of Sandepu, reinforcing the stalemate for another month. The final showdown between Kuropatkin and Oyama took place off Mukden, the largest city of Manchuria, at the end of February and the first days of March.

300.000 Russian troops met 270.000 Japanese, and both sides fought relentlessly for 16 days, making it the longest⁴⁵ and the largest battle in history until then.⁴⁶

Kuropatkin's hesitance to launch an offensive and later to retire in time, and lack of intelligence altered the balanced position in favor of the Japanese. Kuropatkin later confesses his strategic miscalculations and takes responsibility.⁴⁷ The Russians fled

⁴³ S. C. M. Paine, *The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 66.

⁴⁴ Connaughton, *The War of the Rising Sun and the Tumbling Bear*, 171.

⁴⁵ Kowner, *Historical Dictionary*, 244-245.

⁴⁶ Ben-Ami Shillony and Rotem Kowner, "The Memory and Significance of the Russo-Japanese War from a Centennial Perspective," in Rotem Kowner, ed., *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05* vol. 1, (Kent: Global Oriental, 2007), 5.

⁴⁷ Kuropatkin, *Zapiski Generala Kuropatkina*, vol. II, 424-425.

north, digging up new positions. The exhausted Japanese army could not chase the Russians but occupied Mukden. However, the casualties were astronomical for both sides: The Russians' toll was 20.000 dead, 50.000 wounded, and 20.000 prisoners of war while the Japanese lost 16.000 men and almost 60.000 was wounded.⁴⁸ The Battle of Mukden brought the land theater of war to an end in favor of Japan, yet, the victory was a Pyrrhic one. What would determine the result of the war was yet to come.

On October 15, 1904, the Russian Baltic Fleet finally set sail en route to Port Arthur after three months of preparation. The fleet, comprised of 42 warships, was commanded by Vice Admiral Zinovii Rozhdestvenskii and was supposed to cover a distance of 33.000 km without any proper coaling stations. The fleet's misfortunes started in the first week of the voyage. The Russian warships mistook a British fishing boat off the coast of Britain as the enemy, and opened fire, hitting both the boat and each other. The Dogger Bank Incident created a massive public outrage in Britain but was appeased without initiating a war with Russia.⁴⁹ In midway, the fleet learned that Port Arthur has fallen, exacerbating the sailors' morale. After a fatiguing eight month-journey, the fleet finally reached the Tsushima Straits and was planning to dock at Vladivostok. However, Togo and his fleet were waiting for them.

Compared to Russian ships, Japanese ships were smaller but faster, which proved to be crucial. On 27-28 May, one of the most decisive naval battles in history occurred. The Japanese annihilated the exhausted Russian Baltic Fleet almost wholly. After an eight month-journey, only three warships out of 42, could arrive in Vladivostok

⁴⁸ Kowner, *Historical Dictionary*, 247.

⁴⁹ Connaughton, *The War of the Rising Sun and the Tumbling Bear*, 247-249.

whereas the Japanese only lost three torpedo boats.⁵⁰ The debacle at Tsushima was a huge blunder for Russia. Although the naval battle had little actual impact on the land theater in Manchuria, it tore down Russian morale. St. Petersburg was already trying to suppress the social unrest that started at the beginning of 1905. Broad segments of the imperial subjects rebelled against the palace due to the political, economic, and social hardships they faced. The workers went on strike, the urban population rallied in the streets and some members of the Russian military mutinied. To push the internally and externally vulnerable Russia for peace, the Japanese landed on Sakhalin Island, effectively ending the war.

1.4. The Treaty of Portsmouth and its Repercussions

After the call for negotiation of the US President Theodore Roosevelt, the belligerents convened at a naval shipyard in New England. The one-month-long negotiations were led by Witte and Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō. The Russians agreed to evacuate Manchuria, acknowledged Korea as a Japanese sphere of influence, and ceded the Kwantung Peninsula, including Port Arthur, to Japan. However, the topics of war reparations and the secession of Sakhalin Island proved to be contentious.

Despite the fact that the Japanese were the victorious party and Roosevelt was sympathetic to the Japanese, Witte used his wit and performed skillful diplomacy. Knowing the increasing Russian military build-up in Manchuria, he bluffed that the Russians might continue the war. He also understood the domestic political climate in the US and tried to win the hearts of the US public, especially of the Jews. He

⁵⁰ Kowner, *Historical Dictionary*, 394.

even paid a surprise visit to the Jewish quarter in New York.⁵¹ In this way, American public opinion gradually became less pro-Japan, pushing Roosevelt away from Japan. At one point, Komura objected to Witte's demands, shouting, "You always talk as if you are the victor!"⁵² Since the Japanese had no stamina to continue the war, Komura yielded from their demands for indemnity and accepted to divide Sakhalin between the two countries. On September 5, 1905, Witte and Komura signed the Treaty of Portsmouth, declaring the end of the war.

Although Witte played the triumphant in Portsmouth, he knew that back in St. Petersburg, the internal situation was critical. On January 22, the Imperial Guards opened fire at peaceful protesters, killing and injuring hundreds and triggering massive rebellions, strikes, and mutinies across Western Russia. The defeats in the Far East further diminished the state's legitimacy and power in the eyes of the opposition.⁵³ The war accelerated the revolution, forcing St. Petersburg to publish a manifesto on October 17, declaring the allowance for political parties, expansion of individual rights, formation of a legislative body, and a promise for a constitution. The revolution in 1905 did not bring an end to a revolution in Russia; it harbingered the revolutions of 1917 and the eventual end of the Romanov rule.

Understandably, the treaty was not welcomed in Japan either. After a total war which exhausted the Japanese economy and society, what Tokyo got from Russia was neither Manchuria nor reparation, only Port Arthur and the south of Sakhalin Island. The public harshly criticized the treaty and the government. Vocal critics turned into

⁵¹ Witte, *Vospominaniia*, 373-377.

⁵² Witte, *Vospominaniia*, 376.

⁵³ David McDonald, "Tsushima's Echoes: Asian Defeat and Tsarist Foreign Policy," in John W. Steinberg et al., eds., *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*, (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 550.

mass protests, and eventually, violence erupted. The protests at Hibiya park in Tokyo were suppressed by the police, causing deaths and leaving several hundred wounded.⁵⁴ Ultimately, the unanimous pressure led to the resignation of the cabinet of Katsuro Taro. Notwithstanding the public distaste, the war and Portsmouth heralded the opening of a new chapter in Japanese foreign policy, and it had profound implications for the Pacific region.

Emerging triumphant from a war with Russia boosted the Japanese self-confidence in the long run, laying the first stones to the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It made the Japanese foreign policy more aggressive and Tokyo continuously tested its limits in the Pacific. Five years later, Japan formally annexed Korea. Increasing Japanese appetite in the region raised eyebrows in Washington since the US had her own plans, and Roosevelt reevaluated his policy towards Japan. Therefore, a four-decade-long cold war⁵⁵ started between the two ends of the Pacific, which would end up in Pearl Harbor.

Another major implication of the war was on Europe. The manifestation of Russian fragility destabilized continental geopolitics. Russian vulnerability in Europe put Germany on the front stage of the continent. Although the increased presence of Berlin in continental politics may seem favorable for Germany, the new conjuncture pushed Britain to the Franco-Russian Alliance, leaving Germany with an encirclement by the three powers.⁵⁶ Britain and France were already experiencing a thaw in relations to overcome the Tangier Crisis. Similarly, Russia's defeat decreased

⁵⁴ Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire*, 155-156.

⁵⁵ Tovy and Halevi, "America's First Cold War," 138. Authors define cold war as a period of intense antagonism between two powers that includes a military build-up accompanied by diplomatic and political maneuvers aimed at deterring the adversarial power from declaring open war.

⁵⁶ Jacob, *The Russo-Japanese War and the Twentieth Century*, 7.

the threat perception of London significantly and enabled Britain to develop bilateral relations, even joining the Franco-Russian Alliance.⁵⁷ Thus, the two blocs that would fight with each other within a decade were almost completed. The Russo-Japanese War, the first greatest war of the 20th century, shaped the fates of the two world wars yet to come. While the war's impact on Europe contributed to the completion of the World War I alliances, the result of the war also gave birth to the Japanese-American rivalry in the Pacific, which would culminate in World War II.

⁵⁷ Rotem Kowner, "Between a Colonial Clash and World War Zero: The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War in a Global Perspective," in Rotem Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 8.

CHAPTER II

ECHOES OF THE WAR:

PUBLIC REACTIONS ACROSS THE GLOBE

In fifty years then, from the time that the intrusive American first broke her peace, Japan will experience her new birth and, reorganised from sandal to top-knot, play the samisen in the march of modern progress. This is the great advantage of being born into the New Era, when individual and community alike can get something for nothing—pay without work, education without effort, religion without thought, and free government without slow and bitter toil.⁵⁸

Rudyard Kipling

When everyone in Japan, the rich and the poor, came to believe in self-respect, the country became free. She could give Russia a slap in the face and today Japan's flag flies very high in the world. Though her people wear a yellow skin, Japan enjoys friendship with white England as between equals. In the same way we too need to feel the spirit of self-respect.⁵⁹

Mahatma Gandhi

The two men above had nothing in common and were supportive of profoundly opposite worldviews. Kipling was a white European writer and the avant-garde of *mission civilisatrice*. In contrast, Gandhi was the spearhead of the independence movement of India, which was a colony of Kipling's motherland. What united these two apostles of starkly opposite ideologies was their common sympathy for Japan

⁵⁸ Rudyard Kipling, *Letters of Travel (1892-1913)*, (Urbana, IL: Project Gutenberg, 2004). Retrieved March 4, 2023, from <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/12089/12089-h/12089-h.htm>

⁵⁹ Mahatma Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. VI, (Ahmedabad: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1967), 368.

during the Russo-Japanese War. The “Rising Sun” succeeded in winning the hearts of not only the colonies, the Orient, the humiliated and insulted, the uncivilized world, but also of their colonial masters, the white Europeans, and the old continent’s heir in the New World. The societies of both the West and the ‘rest’ sympathized with the Japanese cause, accompanied by an almost universal distaste for Russia. Even the French public, the sole ally of Russia, was skeptical about the Russian pretexts and gave credit for the Japanese achievements under Meiji. The German public shared similar contentions despite Kaiser’s warnings about the Yellow Peril. In comparison, the British and the Americans were staunch supporters of the Japanese and were starkly anti-Russian.

Nominally, the Western public seemed allured by the 40-year-long attempt of a feudal Eastern society to transform itself into a Westernized, modern, and civilized ‘nation.’ Moreover, the Western public applauded the possibility of Japan setting a precedent for other ‘uncivilized’ societies. Nevertheless, in reality, geopolitics was undeniably influential in determining the stances of the Western public during the war. The Russian activities in the Far East were seen as a threat to the British and American interests in the Far East, while the continental powers preferred a weaker Russia on their east.

On the other hand, the outcome of the war inspired a myriad number of societies, most of them under Western domination or under the threat of Western domination, across the globe. The victory of Japan sparked the hopes of these societies that had been humiliated by Europe materially and morally. Japan’s resolve in modernization, combined with patriotism, has materialized in Japan’s defeat of a mighty European

power. What was even more alluring was that while Japan was borrowing Western *weltanschauung* and technique, they did not compromise their own identity. Therefore, non-European societies realized that West-originated notions like nationalism, constitution, parliament, and modernity would not necessarily clash with their self-perceptions. Even more, the adoption of the Japanese precedent would break the chain of the humiliated and insulted and set them free from European oppression.

2.1. The Imperialist Appreciation

Kipling's testimony during his trip to Japan right before the eruption of the war is illustrative of European perceptions. He was simultaneously praising the Japanese material progress and reproaching the Japanese for their free-riding on Western civilization. His observations pushed him into mixed feelings about Japan, feelings that a majority of the Western public opinion sympathized with during the Russo-Japanese War. The Western feelings towards Japan during the war can be summarized as a combination of admiration, pride, and some envy. In contrast, Russia was met with suspicion and rage across Western societies. Japan was able to win the hearts of Western societies thanks to her giant leap toward modernization and Westernization. The Western public perceived Japan as a protege, a loyal pupil of the teacher: of the West. Ikura Akira named this tendency a part of Western paternalism, a common theme in Western colonial practices.⁶⁰ Japan opportunely instrumentalized this tendency through public relations campaigns in the Western capitals. Of course, the foreign policies of the individual states were highly

⁶⁰ Ikura Akira, "Japan under Paternalism: The Changing Image of Japan during the Russo-Japanese War," in John W. M. Chapman and Chiharu Inaba, eds., *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War*, vol. II, (Kent: Global Oriental, 2007), 258.

determinant in public perceptions; however, it was the modernist and civilizationist rhetoric that took the central stage.

Needless to say, the national public opinion diverged widely in each country, chiefly depending on the foreign policies of their governments. The voices were mixed in France, despite being Russia's ally, and in Germany and Austria. On the other hand, the Anglosaxon public opinion in Great Britain and the United States was highly homogenized, becoming staunch supporters of the Japanese cause and glaring at Russian activities in the Far East. Nevertheless, some credit must go to the Japanese, who embarked upon an ambitious public relations campaign in the Western capitals. Tokyo attempted to shift the deep-rooted Orientalist views of the East that Japan was weak, feminine, and semi-civilized.⁶¹ Such views were still prominent in some countries, despite China's crushing defeat at the hands of Japan in 1895. Among the public of the two dominant continental powers of Europe, Germany and France, Japo-skeptics were resistant, especially at the initial stages of the war.

2.1.1. Germany:

The most famous torch-bearer of the anti-Japanese clique in Europe was the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, who declared the Japanese the "Yellow Peril." Originally stemming from the xenophobic rhetoric of the Americans towards Chinese immigrant workers,⁶² Yellow Peril became a prevalent concept to demonize the Japanese in international politics. The opponents of Japan utilized the concept to draw a racial and civilizational contrast between the white Western races and the

⁶¹ Rotem Kowner, "Becoming an Honorary Civilized Nation: Remaking Japan's Military Image during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905," *The Historian* 64:1 (2001), 21.

⁶² Sven Saaler, "The Russo-Japanese War and the Emergence of the Notion of the 'Clash of Races' in Japanese Foreign Policy," in John W. M. Chapman and Chiharu Inaba, eds., *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War*; vol. II, (Kent: Global Oriental, 2007), 275.

lower yellow races. However, eventually, the Russian intentions backlashed, leading the Western press to declare Russia as the Yellow Peril. In hindsight, the shy German support for Russia's fight against the Yellow Peril seems instrumental and pragmatic rather than normative. According to the German press, Russia's distraction in the Far East would greatly benefit German security at the eastern front.⁶³ Moreover, the war provided the German press with an excellent opportunity to legitimize the German government by comparing it with turbulent, autocratic, and backward Russia.⁶⁴ Overall, Troy Paddock finds the German press "markedly neutral" on the question of which side was to blame for the war⁶⁵ despite the fact that Berlin was supportive of Russian actions in Manchuria.

2.1.2. Austria-Hungary:

The Austro-Hungarian public's contentions were mixed too, but they were much more silent. As a landlocked country with no overseas territories and no direct interests in the Far East, Austria-Hungary was less involved throughout the war. Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian press was underdeveloped and limited compared to its European counterparts.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, the subjects of the Habsburgs were informed about the war through newspapers and periodicals, portraying a balanced stance towards Russia and Japan. Some periodicals like *Kikeriki* adopted the metaphor of David and Goliath, portraying Japan as the weak but right side and Russia as the strong Goliath.⁶⁷ The David and Goliath metaphor became a recurring

⁶³ Frank Jacob, "The Russo-Japanese War and the Decline of the Russian Image," *CUNY Academic Works*, (2015), 15.

⁶⁴ Troy R. E. Paddock, "Still Stuck at Sevastopol: The Depiction of Russia during the Russo-Japanese War and the Beginning of the First World War in the German Press," *German History* 16:3 (1998), 359.

⁶⁵ Paddock, "Still Stuck at Sevastopol," 362.

⁶⁶ Lehner, "The War in Austro-Hungarian Political Cartoons," 372.

⁶⁷ Lehner, "The War in Austro-Hungarian Political Cartoons," 373.

theme in the portrayal of the belligerents in the Western and mainly British and American press.

2.1.3. *France:*

The intellectual circles of Paris gave mixed signals too. It was partially the result of French foreign policy. The French government, although an ally of Russia, declared its ‘absolute neutrality’ in the war. As usual, the French press acknowledged the fact that Japan had borrowed civilization from the West in her path of development.

Therefore, some in the French society believed Japan had betrayed Western civilization by using Western technology to attack a European power.⁶⁸ Hence, both acceptance and denial of the Japanese by the French public were in play.

Some French did not perceive the Russian Empire as a European power. An article in *Revue* recognizes the fear of so-called Japanese “Pan-Mongolism,” that is, the irredentist policies of an Asiatic power. Yet, *Revue* points out a more imminent danger compared to the Japanese Pan-Mongolism: Russian Pan-Mongolism, which would ultimately lead to world domination of the Russo-Mongol Bloc.⁶⁹ Unlike these grandiose plans underlined by *Revue*, there were more pragmatic approaches. Rene de Marmande, an anarchist journalist, argues that the conjuncture necessitating an alliance with Russia has passed, and Russophile emotions among the French have cooled down.⁷⁰ As is seen, even the public of Russia’s only ally was hesitant in his support for the Russian cause and bore mixed feelings towards the warring sides.

⁶⁸ Akira, “Japan under Paternalism,” 269.

⁶⁹ “Russia and the Yellow Peril,” *The Times*, February 18, 1904.

⁷⁰ Rene de Marmande, “French Public Opinion and the Russo-Japanese War,” *Fortnightly Review*, 76 (August 1904), 452; *British Periodicals*, 321-323.

The public feelings on the other side of the English Channel, on the contrary, were clear and unified.

2.1.4. Britain:

Considering the British alliance with Japan and clashing interests with Russia, the unequivocal support for Japan among the British is highly understandable.

According to Akira, the British sympathized with the Japanese because of two more reasons: they were the weaker party, and interestingly, both the British and the Japanese were island naval empires with monarchs.⁷¹ Obviously, the path of modernization Japan undertook was another prevalent reason for British sympathy. What is even more interesting, according to Colin Holmes and A. H. Ion, is that some British sought to imitate the Japanese combination of development, patriotism, and esprit de corps that materialized in the *Bushido* code in order to recover the shaky position of the British in world politics.⁷² One can trace such clues. *The Times* declared that “[i]t was the proud national traditions and the burning patriotism of the whole Japanese nation, not less than its high intelligence, which enabled its leaders to make the greatest severance with the past.”⁷³ Nonetheless, the coverage of the war in the British press reveals that most arguments are based on modernist and civilizational rhetoric.

The vivid support for and astonishment for the Japanese, accompanied by fierce anti-Russian rhetoric, is widespread in the press. *The Times* correspondent in Berlin argues that the real Yellow Peril is not Japan but Russia.⁷⁴ A similar point is being

⁷¹ Akira, “Japan under Paternalism,” 260.

⁷² Colin Holmes and A. H. Ion, “Bushido and the Samurai: Images in British Public Opinion, 1894-1914,” *Modern Asian Studies* 14:2 (1980), 315.

⁷³ “London, September 28,” *The Times*, September 28, 1904.

⁷⁴ “The King’s Visit to Kiel: German Misapprehensions,” *The Times*, June 3, 1904.

made in the same newspaper, questioning the whiteness of the Russian race and implying that they are Asiatic compared to the Japanese, who have learned much from Western civilization.⁷⁵ Defamation against Russia was accompanied by the excessive praising of the Japanese:

Japan has done what no other Oriental nation has ever made even an honest attempt to do: She has effectually and completely reformed herself from within, and the mere fact that she has accomplished this transformation, which is absolutely unique in the history of mankind, is a palpable and conclusive proof that she is not as they are.⁷⁶

As is seen, rather than focusing on the political and economic reasons for British support for Japan, the British public's assessments of the belligerents were dominated by modernist rhetoric. Another categorical support for Japan came from the other side of the Atlantic.

2.1.5. The United States:

Public opinion in the United States was much more vivid due to the institutional and social norms of the New World. The Russo-Japanese War was a significant topic of discussion in the country because of the US interest in pursuing an Open Door trade policy in the Pacific. Indeed, prominent Japanese such as Count Okuma, through the American press, constantly reiterated the Japanese commitment to Open Door.⁷⁷ The war can be considered the debut of the US in world politics, and it was the Roosevelt Administration who hosted the peace talks in Portsmouth. The US public opinion was almost identical to their British counterparts, apart from the fact that a liberal trade policy in the Far East was much more vital for Washington. Therefore, the Japanese domination in the Far East was more favorable than a Russian one for the US. The Pacific Northwest public, press in Oregon and Washington, for example,

⁷⁵ "London, January 7," *The Times*, January 7, 1905.

⁷⁶ "London, May 12," *The Times*, May 12, 1904.

⁷⁷ "Japan and the Open Door: Significant Utterance by Count Okuma," *Wall Street Journal*, August 2, 1905.

was the most outspoken supporter of the Japanese in the US because of their commercial interests in the Pacific.⁷⁸ They remained pro-Japanese even when some in the US were worried about a potential clash of interests with Japan in the Pacific after Portsmouth. Nevertheless, the US change of sentiments during Portsmouth must not be exaggerated. Yes, Portsmouth can be identified as a turning point in US-Japan relations. However, American public opinion did not change against Japan overnight; it was a much more gradual shift.⁷⁹

Widespread appreciation for the Japanese and defamation of Russia constituted the majority of the newspaper headlines. Japanese politicians such as Okuma, Kurino, and Kaneko made constant appearances in American social circles. They portrayed the war as a struggle to protect the benefits of Western civilization for Japan from Russian aggression, denying the allegations of Yellow Peril and arguing that the Japanese aimed to bring the benefits of Western civilization to Korea.⁸⁰ Baron Kaneko, guest of honor at a dinner at the Unitarian Club, vowed that “Japan’s great ambition is to engraft Western science upon eastern culture and to blend the Occidental and Oriental civilizations into one.”⁸¹

The American press gave comprehensive coverage not only to the Japanese politicians but also to the opinions of the Americans. Many in the US believed that Yellow Peril was a myth to cover up the Russian greed for conquest⁸² and compared

⁷⁸ Winston B. Thorson, “Pacific Northwest Opinion on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905,” *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 35:4 (1944), 315.

⁷⁹ Winston B. Thorson, “American Public Opinion and the Portsmouth Peace Conference,” *The American Historical Review* 53:3 (1948), 464.

⁸⁰ “Says Asia’s Salvation is Stake of the War,” *New York Times*, March 20, 1904, and “Japan Has High Aims,” *The Washington Post*, March 12, 1904.

⁸¹ “To Blend Civilizations,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 18, 1905.

⁸² A. G. P., “‘Yellow Peril’ a Myth,” *New York Times*, April 25, 1904.

it with the Black Peril, once considered a threat to the US.⁸³ Some used harsher allegations towards the Russians to crystallize the contrast with Japan. George Kennan, an American correspondent in the Far East, declared that “Japan, as a Power, is civilized and modern, while Russia, as a Power, is semi-barbarous and mediaeval.”⁸⁴

Nevertheless, another colleague of Kennan, despite being a pro-Japanese, was having difficulties facing the realities on the battlefield. Jack London, the novelist and a war journalist in Manchuria, could not hide his disappointment with them: “The Japanese resemble a prec[o]cious child who talks philosophy one moment and the next moment is making mud pies. One moment he is acting with the wisdom of the West and the next moment with the childishness of the East.”⁸⁵ Despite such drawbacks, the Japanese were considered an example of a backward Eastern country successfully emulating the Western civilization and are currently fighting against a despotic expansionist Russia to protect the Japanese achievements.

2.2. Global Enthusiasm of the Humiliated and Insulted

The global interest in the war and Japan’s path did not emerge suddenly. Indeed, Cemil Aydin identifies multiple references in the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and China since the mid-1890s.⁸⁶ It was Japan’s wars with China and Russia that significantly accelerated global curiosity about Japan. Press in China, Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, India, the Malay world, Egypt, Iran, and the Polish were amazed by

⁸³ JNO. T. G. Newsom, “Dangers that do not Exist,” *The Washington Post*, October 24, 1904.

⁸⁴ George Kennan, “Which is the Civilized Power,” *The Outlook*, (October 29, 1904), 515.

⁸⁵ Jack London, Typescript of an article “Russo-Japanese War Article Written by Jack London, July 1, 1904,” by Jack London, Utah State University, Merrill-Cazier Library, Special Collections and Archives, COLL MSS 10 Box 22 Folder 15.

⁸⁶ Cemil Aydin, “A Global Anti-Western Moment? The Russo-Japanese War, Decolonization, and Asian Modernity,” in Sebastian Conrad et al. eds., *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s-1930s*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 215.

Japan's victory over Russia. Accordingly, it was not solely a military defeat of a state at the hands of another state; it was the triumph of a thorough metamorphosis from an Oriental backward community into a modernized, civilized, industrialized, constitutional, and almost Western nation-state with imperialist ambitions without compromising traditional Japanese *volksgeist*. Thus, all non-Western societies fervently embraced Japan vis-a-vis an imperialist, absolutist, and racist European intruder in the Far East. The war considerably boosted the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asianist thoughts across Asia.⁸⁷ In the long run, the Western support for Japan during the war would ironically invigorate anti-imperialist and anti-Western nationalist movements among the Western colonies in Asia.

2.2.1. China:

The position of China during the war was unique because the war was fought in her territories, although Beijing was forced to be neutral throughout the war. The main battles of the war took place in Manchuria, Chinese soil - at least on paper. After the Boxer Rebellion, Chinese students and intellectuals started to pay closer attention to the Japanese model of development. When the war erupted, the Chinese were quick to understand that it was the Chinese who would be sandwiched between the belligerents. In general, the Chinese public opinion was favorable towards Japan; however, it was a wary support. The public was skeptical about the ulterior motives of Japan in Manchuria and realized that regardless of the outcome of the war, China would be the loser.⁸⁸ A modernized Eastern country, Japan, was considered the lesser evil compared to autocratic and European Russia, which occupied Manchuria after the Boxer Rebellion.

⁸⁷ Aydın, "A Global Anti-Western Moment?", 229.

⁸⁸ Harlod Z. Schiffman, "The Impact of the War on China," in Rotem Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*; (New York: Routledge, 2007), 172-173.

Therefore, many, like Sun Yat-sen, cheered for the Japanese victory. The Chinese public took advantage of the war to criticize the Beijing government's state of paralysis during the war. Beijing was compared to backward Russia and was declared the 'mirror image' of St. Petersburg.⁸⁹ The notion of the Chinese incompetence during the war was a significant factor for the Chinese public. Combined with the victory of a modernized Eastern nation over a European one, the Chinese discontent reinforced Chinese nationalism.⁹⁰ Some scholars even argue that the implications of the war and the Japanese model of modernization were central to the Chinese Revolution in 1911.⁹¹ Yet, some are less assertive on the determinative role of the war on the constitutionalist movement and the events in 1911, assuming an indirect effect.⁹² Overall, the Chinese public watched the Japanese with admiration during the war and tried to learn from Japanese nationalism, constitutionalism, and modernization, though with a constant distrust for the Japanese intentions in Manchuria. The Chinese concerns about Japanese expansionism would soon become true, as in the case of Korea.

2.2.2. Korea:

Although Korea was officially an independent kingdom, it was increasingly becoming a Japanese sphere of influence since the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876. Newly emerging Korean nationalist movements were highly against the Japanese control over Korea. Tokyo attempted to win the hearts of the Korean public by

⁸⁹ Jacob, *The Russo-Japanese War and the Twentieth Century*, 62.

⁹⁰ Yitzhak Schichor, "Ironies of History: The War and the Origins of East Asian Radicalism," in Rotem Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 215.

⁹¹ Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought*, (New York: Columbia UP, 2007), 77, and Jacob, *The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century*, (London: Routledge, 2018), 60.

⁹² Schiffrin, "The Impact of the War on China," 180.

promising guidance in the Korean path for modernization based on the Japanese model. However, the Koreans were not convinced of the Japanese intentions, and the plan failed.⁹³ The Koreans were against Japanese rule, yet, they were equally, or perhaps more vehemently, opposed to a Russian presence in the region. The correspondent of the British *Daily Mail* in Korea observed that during the war, many Koreans were sympathetic towards the Japanese, and they disapproved of the Russians.⁹⁴ Meantime, Korean guerillas were engaging with the Japanese forces, which continued after the war.⁹⁵ Thus, as in the case of the Chinese, the Korean public was against any kind of colonial rule, Russian or Japanese, over her territories. Nevertheless, this did not stop them from cautiously favoring the Japanese during the war.

2.2.3. Southeast Asia:

Apart from the Far East, Southeast Asian societies were onlookers of the war too. The Russo-Japanese War was not a distant notion to them: the Malays witnessed the passage of the legendary Russian Baltic Fleet through the Malacca Strait, and the Vietnamese saw the fleet docked at their ports. The war had varying repercussions on different parts of the Malay Archipelago, which was composed of British, French, Dutch, and American colonies and Siam. The two geographies particularly interested in the war were the eastern and western coasts of the South China Sea: Vietnam and the Philippines. In comparison, the rest of French Indochina, Siam, and British Burma remained relatively silent. The war and its outcome strengthened the

⁹³ Jacob, *The Russo-Japanese War and the Twentieth Century*, 57.

⁹⁴ Guy Podoler and Michael Robinson, "On the Confluence of History and Memory: The Significance of the War for Korea," in Rotem Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 192, quoted in F. A. McKenzie, *Korea's Fight for Freedom*, reprinted edn, (Seoul: Yonsei UP, 1969 [1920]), 80.

⁹⁵ Podoler and Robinson, "On the Confluence of History and Memory," 188.

already-existing Vietnamese affinity toward Japan. The Sino-Japanese War altered the Vietnamese perceptions of China as the patron and model, turning the role of patron over to Tokyo.⁹⁶ The Japanese resolve in 1894-1895 astonished the Vietnamese considerably and attracted immediate attention from the Vietnamese public to the power that could beat China and challenge European powers.

Prominent Vietnamese nationalists such as Phan Boi Chau visited Japan during the war with Russia, establishing high-level contacts with the Japanese statesmen. Moreover, he arranged plans for Vietnamese students to study in Japan since Japan was superior in science and knowledge.⁹⁷ Similarly, the Filipino nationalists looked with envy at the Japanese. Japan's victories over China in 1895 and Russia in 1905 triggered the hopes that Tokyo may assist the Filipinos in bringing an end to American imperialism. Some Filipino newspapers, such as *El Renacimiento*, saluted the Japanese victory over Russia and even endorsed a Japanese occupation of the Philippines to get rid of the Americans.⁹⁸ Of course, such delusions had no truth in them since Washington and Tokyo were in close cooperation in the Pacific, and Tokyo would never risk antagonizing the US. Although the Vietnamese and Filipino fascination for Japan was not widely shared in the southeastern edge of mainland Asia, one fundamental British colony to the west was even more enthusiastic towards Japan and Japan's war with Russia.

2.2.4. India:

⁹⁶ Paul A. Rodell, "Inspiration for Nationalist Aspirations? Southeast Asia and the 1905 Japanese Victory," in John W. Steinberg et al., ed. *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*, (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 648.

⁹⁷ Rodell, "Inspiration for Nationalist Aspirations?", 649-650.

⁹⁸ Rodell, "Inspiration for Nationalist Aspirations?", 642.

The British Raj, comprising a vast area with modern India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, has been one of the historical centers of the world. The Indian subcontinent was under the direct rule of London since 1857. The Indian public, under the oppressive rule of Lord Curzon, was passionately supportive of Japan during the war. The fact that an Asian power modernized itself and challenged a European power inflamed the nationalist sentiments under the Raj. “The Mikado of Japan has attained immortal fame by welding his subjects into a nation. But our Congress has been able to achieve nothing after twenty years of strenuous work.”⁹⁹ declared *Brahmodaya*, complaining about the incompetence of the nationalist movement.

The war and its outcome inspired the Indians immensely. It helped the Indian public to realize that independence is obtainable.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, India was overjoyed with the Japanese victory and took the opportunity to warn the British and the West: “We believe that the rise of Japan is a warning to the West of the corruption of its moral and spiritual ideas.”¹⁰¹ Moreover, to discredit the British, Indian intellectuals draw a parallel between the Raj and the Tsar. Mahatma Gandhi asserted that “ [t]here is much similarity between the governance of India and that of Russia... The only difference is that the power of the state is rather more brusquely exercised in Russia than in India.”¹⁰² Hence, the Indians perceived the Russo-Japanese War, in binary terms, as a struggle between the Orient and the Occident. The British Raj, in their

⁹⁹ India Office Library and Records, The Bombay Presidency, “Report on Native Papers for the Week ending 2nd September 1905,” 24.

¹⁰⁰ Steven G. Marks, “Bravo, Brave Tiger of the East! The Russo-Japanese War and the Rise of Nationalism in British Egypt and India,” in John W. Steinberg et al., ed. *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*, (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 611.

¹⁰¹ The Bombay Presidency, “Report on Native Papers,” 12.

¹⁰² Mahatma Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (1905-1906)*, vol V, (Ahmedabad: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961), 132.

eyes, was equivalent to oppressive Russia, whereas Japan was the equivalent of oppressed India.

The binary perceptions about the Japanese were not wholly accurate. The Indian nationalists, intentionally or unintentionally, ignored that Japan was becoming a colonial power.¹⁰³ Likewise, the public chose not to remember that the Japanese, the epitome of modernization, had an alliance with their oppressors, the British. The Japanese were highly idealized by the Indian public and fit into the internal political agenda of the Indians. Thus, the war became an indispensable reference point for the Indian public under British rule to promote their national aspirations. The remarks of *Phoenix* are highly demonstrative of the implications of the war:

The Russo-Japanese [W]ar will perhaps turn out to be one of the most decisive struggles of the world. It may inaugurate a new era. It is apparently the real war of emancipation. The emancipation of the coloured races will really tend to the progress and development of the world.¹⁰⁴

Ironically, The British, who sided with an Eastern nation against the struggle with Russia, inadvertently boosted the national awakening movements in her most precious colonial holding.

2.2.5. The Malay World:

National independence was not the only notion among the colonies inflamed by the Russo-Japanese War. The war also ignited religious feelings in the Malay Archipelago as a catalyst for independence from European rule. The Malaccan peninsula and northeastern Borneo were British colonies, while most parts of the archipelago were ruled by the Dutch. As in the case of Southeast Asia, Japan attracted attention in the Malay archipelago after her defeat of China in 1895. Japan's

¹⁰³ Tilak Raj Sareen, "India and the War," in Rotem Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 248.

¹⁰⁴ The Bombay Presidency, "Report on Native Papers," 23.

imitation of Europe and the creation of a nation were observed by the Malay world. As expected, Russia was blamed for the war, whereas the Japanese gained the admiration of the Malay world.¹⁰⁵ The public in the archipelago, Muslim and non-Muslim, saw that Japanese patriotism and resolution in the path of modernization helped the Japanese to repel the imperialist intrusions of the West. Like the majority of Asia, Muslim newspapers in the archipelago, such as *al-Imam*, stressed that Japan, regardless of her religion, must be imitated by the Muslims under colonial rule.¹⁰⁶ The Muslims of the archipelago did not perceive the religious difference as an obstacle to emulation. Moreover, this ethos was not limited to the Muslims in Southeast Asia. Appreciation for Japan and her war against Russia was also widely shared among Muslims in the Middle East.

2.2.6. Egypt:

The notion that an imperialist European power was defeated by an Eastern power brought joy to the Egyptians. Since 1882, Egypt was under a British “protectorate” at the hands of Lord Cromer, the “Consul-General” of Egypt. For the Egyptians, the war signaled the era of self-determination of the nations by defying the Western order. Reshid Riza, for example, a prominent Islamist journalist and scholar, wrote extensively on Japan in his newspaper *Al-Manâr*. The war, for him, was a clash between East and West, the West being Christian Europe and the East being Muslim countries of Asia.¹⁰⁷ The fact that the country that defeated the European power was not Muslim did not prevent Riza from consolidating the West-East dichotomy. He

¹⁰⁵ Michael Laffan, “Tokyo as a Shared Mecca of Modernity: War Echoes in the Colonial Malay World,” in Rotem Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 224-225.

¹⁰⁶ Laffan, “Tokyo as a Shared Mecca of Modernity,” 230.

¹⁰⁷ Rina Bieganiec, “Distant Echoes: The Reflection of the War in the Middle East,” in Rotem Kowner, ed., *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05* vol. 1, (Kent: Global Oriental, 2007), 449.

praised the selective acquisition of the Japanese, borrowing Western science but keeping their own national identity.¹⁰⁸ Ironically, the closest ally of the nation that Rıza saluted was the country that they wanted to get rid of.

A similar emphasis on Japan's selective acquisition and, as a result, her victory over a European power was prevalent in the writings of a notable Egyptian nationalist. Mustafa Kamil published a book named *The Rising Sun*, examining the Japanese path of progress. His newspaper *Al-Liwa* covered the Russo-Japanese War extensively. Amazed by Japanese patriotism, Mustafa Kamil and the other Egyptians' writings were mostly concerned with bringing an end to British rule in Egypt. The political institutions of Japan, for example, stayed out of the Egyptians' sight.¹⁰⁹ As in the case of Reshid Rıza, the alliance between the country they admired and the country they disliked remained unmentioned.

2.2.7. Iran:

The chief imperialist threat against Egypt was the British, whereas, for Iran, it was Russia. Iran, at the beginning of the 20th century, was ruled by the Qajars, and the developments in a far corner of the world were not supposed to be the Iranians' concern. Indeed, Iran had almost no knowledge of Japan. There were only some 'rumors' about her accomplishments in the path of modernization, with the exception of former Prime Minister Amin al-Sultan Atabak, who was astonished by the Japanese achievements and decided to pay a visit right before the eruption of the war.¹¹⁰ However, the early 1900s was a busy time for Iranian politics. Some

¹⁰⁸ Bieganiec, "Distant Echoes," 453.

¹⁰⁹ Marks, "Bravo, Brave Tiger of the East!," 620-624.

¹¹⁰ Hashem Rajabzadeh, "Russo-Japanese War as Told by Iranians," *Japan Association for Middle East Studies*, 3-2 (1988), 145.

segments of the public were becoming more vocal in their demands for a constitution and a parliament. These intellectuals frequently instrumentalized the Japanese instance to criticize the monarch. In a fictional travel book, *Siyahat-nama-i Ibrahim Beg*, an Iranian under the pseudonym of Zain al-Abidin, harshly criticizes the regime and compares Shah Nasraddin with the Japanese emperor's leadership.¹¹¹ A year after Portsmouth, the Iranian constitutionalists finally got what they wanted: a constitution and a parliament.

The constitutional revolution in Iran revived public interest in not only constitutional concepts but also the Russo-Japanese War, although the war was over a year ago. The Iranians embraced the constitutionalist and patriotic path set by an Oriental nation. "It has become well known in the world that a 30-year endeavor of a humble constitutional state destroyed the one hundred years of effort of a powerful despotic state,"¹¹² declared an Iranian newspaper after two years of the war. Nevertheless, admiration for Japan was not the only aspect of Iranian support. Apart from the constitutionalist and patriotic tone, the Iranian sympathy for Japan stemmed from the feeling of insecurity from Russia. Iran fought two wars against Russia at the beginning of the 19th century, resulting in Iranian defeat and the cessation of significant territories in the Caucasus. Therefore, the Russian defeat at the hands of the Japanese was a relief for the Iranians.

2.2.8. *The Polish*

¹¹¹ Klaus Kreiser, "Der Japanische Sieg über Russland (1905) und sein Echo unter den Muslimen," *Die Welt des Islams*, 21, 1/4 (1981), 218-219.

¹¹² Roxane Haag-Higuchi, "A Topos and Its Dissolution: Japan in Some 20th-Century Iranian Texts," *Iranian Studies*, 29, 1/2 (1996), 75, quoted in *Habl al-matin*, May 8, 1907.

Another community that was highly pleased by the sole fact that Russia was defeated was in another geography, in the Vistula basin. The Polish, partitioned between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, were also looking with affinity to Japan. Specifically, those who were the Tsar's subjects were highly supportive of Japan and against Russia. Many in Poland perceived the Japanese as a mirror of the Polish; however, this mirror was not entirely realistic and ignored Japanese imperialism.¹¹³ This overlooking of the Japanese intentions during the war has almost become a hallmark not only in Poland but also around the world. Some Polish were even ready to start an uprising during the war. Josef Pilsudski and the Polish Socialist Party visited Tokyo to establish contacts. He wanted to start an armed rebellion against Russia, while another prominent Polish, Roman Dmowski, opposed the proposal, arguing that the rebellion would not achieve the intended consequence.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, both Dmowski and Pilsudski unitedly backed Japan during the war. The Polish public was especially captivated by the notion of a strong state and strong nation embodied in the Japanese example and that the Polish were desperately in need of.¹¹⁵ Hence, Japan's victory constituted a precedent for the Polish people as well.

To sum up, the world public opinion's reception of the Russo-Japanese War can be sorted into two based on the origins of the reactions. The Western societies, the citizens of European imperialist states or the US, were astonished that Japan, an Oriental state, defeated one of the strongest empires of the time. American, British,

¹¹³ David Crowley, "Seeing Japan, Imagining Poland: Polish Art and the Russo-Japanese War," *The Russian Review*, 67:1 (2008), 69.

¹¹⁴ Ewa Palasz-Rutkowska, "The Russo-Japanese War and its Impact on the Polish-Japanese Relations in the First Half of the Twentieth Century," *Nichiro sensō to sekai – 100 nengo no shiten kara* [*The Russo-Japanese War and the World: A Centennial Perspective*], Tokyo 2004, 15.

¹¹⁵ Palasz-Rutkowska, "The War's Impact on the Polish-Japanese Relations," 24.

French, German, and Austrian societies followed the war and the Japanese victories intently. On the other hand, the Japanese had won the admiration of another, much more diverse and broad group of people, which constituted the majority of the global population: people who lived under colonial rule or the constant threat of imperialist conquest by Western states. The Japanese victory over a European imperialist power, Russia, echoed through China, Korea, India, Vietnam, the Malay Archipelago, Egypt, Iran, and Poland. Therewithal, there was one more country that fell into the allure of the Japanese performance during the war: “the sick man of Europe.”

CHAPTER III

OTTOMAN PUBLIC OPINION AT THE PRELUDE OF THE WAR

*Nowhere has the newspaper played a similar role to ours. Elsewhere it is one of the fields of action chosen for the wider dissemination of thought... In our case, all the signs come from there. The crowd is formed around it. It scripts the act of reading. It ignites the furnace that schools have prepared for a distant future.*¹¹⁶

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar

Perhaps Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar overestimated the peculiarity of the role of the Ottoman press in the modernization period vis-a-vis the European experience. Nevertheless, he is right about the centrality of the printed press in the late Ottoman Empire. Indeed, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the opposition newspapers, most of them being voices of the Young Turks, were a considerable headache for Abdulhamid II. However, only a century ago, newspapers were almost non-existent in the imperial domains, let alone Turkish-language newspapers. This does not necessarily mean that there was no public opinion at all before the establishment of the printing press. Therefore, before endeavoring to examine Ottoman public opinion during the Russo-Japanese War, it is imperative to understand if Ottoman public opinion really exists and, if so, what its journey was.

3.1. Public Having an Opinion?

¹¹⁶ Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *19uncu Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi* (Istanbul: Çağlayan Kitabevi, 1988), 250.

Discussing public opinion within a conceptual framework inevitably leads us to Jürgen Habermas. His introduction of the concept of *Öffentlichkeit*, the public sphere, is the backbone of the discussions on public opinion. Habermas points out the rise of the bourgeoisie in 18th-century Britain and France as the emergence of the public. Accordingly, these townsmen left their private spheres and constituted a public sphere, chiefly in coffeehouses and salons, where they exchanged information on numerous subjects, but most importantly, on state affairs.¹¹⁷ The dissemination of ideas among the public would later boost with the proliferation of the printed press. The growing urban middle class and its appetite for state affairs grew simultaneously. In the early stages, the public was predominantly interested in domestic affairs, such as the economy. However, the Napoleonic Wars and the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna proved the centrality of public opinion in international affairs as well.¹¹⁸ Indeed, the subsequent events after 1789 would bring novel notions to the public across Europe.

Nationalist ideas in the continent found fertile ground to spread in the 19th century, especially with the help of the printed press. One of the most influential theories of nationalism was centered around the printed press. Benedict Anderson argues that the nations were socially constructed thanks to print-capitalism, along with increasing literacy and the vernacularization of languages.¹¹⁹ So, public consciousness was crucial in the formation and dissemination of nationalist ideas. On the other hand, James Van Horn Melton reminds us of the double-edged nature of

¹¹⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), 23-32.

¹¹⁸ Hans Speier, "Historical Development of Public Opinion," *American Journal of Sociology* 55(4) (Jan. 1950): 379-385.

¹¹⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 39-44.

public opinion: Apart from disseminating liberal and democratic notions, 19th-century European public opinion was prone to propagate ultra-nationalist, racist, and militaristic ideas.¹²⁰ All in all, public opinion, since its emergence in 18th century Europe, with the development of democratic institutions such as the parliaments, has become pivotal to European politics at the turn of the 20th century. The Ottoman Empire was no stranger to this trend, and Ottoman public opinion in a modern sense was already in the making, although with some delay.

3.2. The Ottoman Proto-Public Opinion

It is frequently argued that, being an Oriental Despotism, there was no proper civil society and thus no public opinion in the Ottoman Empire even as late as the 19th century. Yet, one may object to this contention and argue that some forms of public opinion existed even before the 19th century. Şerif Mardin asserts that, in fact, civil society did exist in the Ottoman Empire, although not entirely coherent with the European experience. According to Mardin, *Sharia* provided some sort of guarantee for private property, which is a prerequisite for an autonomous civil society.¹²¹ In this vein, Bedri Gencer indicates the unnecessary of attempts to fit the Ottoman experience into the European experience. Mosques, *Sufi* lodges, guilds, coffeehouses, baths, funerals, and royal processions all constituted a form of a public sphere where the Ottoman community got a chance to interact.¹²² Haim Gerber specifically refers to guilds and waqfs and names the guilds as the paradigmatic institution that established a social contract between the state and the subjects.¹²³ In a

¹²⁰ James Van Horn Melton, *The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), 273.

¹²¹ Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1992), 28.

¹²² Bedri Gencer, "The Rise of Public Opinion in the Ottoman Empire (1839-1909)," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 30 (Spring 2004): 119-121.

¹²³ Haim Gerber, "The Public Sphere and Civil Society in the Ottoman Empire," in *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies* ed. Miriam Hoexter et al. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 80.

similar vein, the *ulema*, and the janissaries played an influential role in the organization of public manifestations in the form of uprisings in Istanbul.¹²⁴

Therefore, the imperial subjects had several occasions where they could form a proto-*Öffentlichkeit* way before the emergence of the printing press.

Although there was a printing house owned by the Sephardic Jews in Istanbul as early as 1493, the first Turkish printing house was founded in 1727 by Ibrahim Müteferrika. Yet, the venture was not entirely successful. Eighteen works were published within three decades, and the printing house was abandoned for another 28 years, only to be opened in 1784.¹²⁵ Even after the re-establishment of the printing house, the Ottoman subjects were devoid of newspapers, whereas Western European readers were long enjoying this new custom.

The first newspapers in the imperial domains would emerge four decades later. Two agents brought fundamental change to the empire and facilitated the foundation of the printing press: Selim III and Mahmud II. Selim III shifted the helm towards a new order, *Nizam-ı Cedid*. The administration perceived the European organizational structures as the cure for the empire's long-lasting bleeding and started to import them. After a brief backlash from the janissaries, Mahmud II accelerated the trend. The initial phases of the period of reform allowed newspapers to emerge thanks to the intensifying intellectual exchange with Europe, technological advancements, and the state's support.

3.3. The New Order, New Public (1831-1860)

¹²⁴ Gencer, "The Rise of Public Opinion," 128.

¹²⁵ Ahmed Emin (Yalman), "The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its Press" (PhD diss, New York, Columbia University, 1914), 24.

Meaningfully, the first newspapers established in the empire were not in one of the languages of the Ottoman subjects but were in French. The French Embassy started to publish *Bulletin de Nouvelles* in 1795, while the first private newspaper, *Le Smyrnéen*, was founded in Izmir in 1824.¹²⁶ Considering the Levantine population in Izmir, the joining of several other French newspapers to *Le Smyrnéen* makes sense. The first newspaper in Turkish would be published in 1831 with the instruction of Mahmud II. Interestingly, Istanbul's efforts were late compared to Muhammed Ali's Egypt, where the pasha launched *Vekayi-i Misriyye* in Arabic and Turkish three years earlier than Mahmud's *Takvim-i Vekayi*. In Egypt as well, the French initiated the first printing press. The French forces in Alexandria published a short-lived Arabic newspaper *al-Tanbih* in 1800¹²⁷ way before Muhammed Ali's venture. Notwithstanding, *Takvim* is still somehow considered to be the first newspaper in the empire. Besides, *Takvim* was a government newspaper: the formation of an audience and financial matters were not of its primary concern. Hence, its circulation was not high.

Another significant step forward for the Ottoman press was an English citizen's acquisition of a capitulation to establish a newspaper. In 1840, William Churchill launched *Ceride-i Havadis*, which was also subsidized by the Sublime Porte. *Ceride*, with *Takvim*, would be the only Turkish witnesses of the reform period of the empire until 1860 and would record fundamental domestic and international events. The fact that there would be no other Turkish newspapers autonomous from the state until as late as 1860 demonstrates another noteworthy aspect of Ottoman public opinion.

¹²⁶ G. Groc and I. Çağlar, *La Presse Française de Turquie de 1795 à nos Jours: Histoire et catalogue* (Istanbul: ISIS, 1985), 6-7.

¹²⁷ Elisabeth Kendall, "Between Politics and Literature: Journals in Alexandria and Istanbul at the End of the Nineteenth Century," in *Modernity and Culture from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean* ed. Leila T. Fawaz and C. A. Bayly (New York: Columbia UP, 2002), 331.

The evolution of the Ottoman public sphere and printing press differs from the West European cases. In Britain and France, the public sphere emerged as a natural result of the rise of the bourgeoisie. In the Ottoman case, the creation of a cultural public sphere was the result of state-led modernization. Unlike Europe, where the public sphere emerged naturally out of the demarcation of state and society, in the empire public sphere emerged out of their liaison.¹²⁸ Likewise, it was the official enterprise for reform that gave birth to a printing press in the empire.¹²⁹ To be clear, it was not an utterly artificial orchestration of the state. The imperial administration's reforms contributed to the emergence of a public sphere in indirect ways. Modernization attempts of the empire were interconnected with each other.

After the centralization of the imperial administration, a vast class of bureaucrats emerged in the capital. These bureaucrats were among the best educated in the empire, some of them even having experience in Europe. Most importantly, some could speak French, which allowed them to keep in touch with European ideas and politics. These bureaucrats were a relatively self-conscious stratum, and they were intrinsically interested in the fate of the empire and potential ways out from the imminent collapse. And the imperial capital was abundant in offering the bureaucrats to socialize and exchange ideas.

The most prominent venue for this relatively conscious public was the coffeehouses. Even before the proliferation of the printing press, coffeehouses were the most significant arena where the public exchanged information through oral

¹²⁸ Erol A.F. Baykal, *The Ottoman Press, 1908-1923* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 15.

¹²⁹ Murat R. Şiviloğlu, *The Emergence of Public Opinion: State and Society in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2018), 19.

communication.¹³⁰ Coffeehouses were the most accessible venue for the public; however, there were more exclusive places where public opinion was formed. *Konak*, the mansions of the pashas, the Masonic lodges, and the printing houses themselves were hubs of attraction for the literati of the capital for public discussions.¹³¹ Civil servants were not the only frequenters to the venues for the public, but no doubt, they constituted a considerable percentage. On the other hand, the transformation of the *kalemiye* into a modern bureaucratic class was not easy.

The bureaucratization of the empire in the 19th century brought an immense need for skilled labor. Schools of naval and army engineering were formed based on modern European military techniques during the last decades of the 18th century. Mekteb-i Ulûm-i Edebiyye and Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliyye, founded in 1838 and 1839, were considered the first specialized higher schools with modern education for training civil officials.¹³² Additional high-level educational institutions, such as Mekteb-i Mülkiyye and Dârülfünûn, were formed during the second half of the century. On the other hand, there was the Translation Office which was founded as early as 1821. Although it wasn't officially a school but a government office, it acted like a modern educational institution. Indeed, Carter Findley claims that the Translation Office offered the best modern education available and was the best place to start one's career.¹³³

¹³⁰ Cengiz Kırılı, "Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," in *Public Islam and the Common Good* ed. Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 76.

¹³¹ Şiviloğlu, *The Emergence of Public Opinion*, 85, 92, 178.

¹³² Carter V. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1989), 134.

¹³³ Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1980), 211, 216.

Meanwhile, the first French-style *lycée* was inaugurated in 1868. The education campaign reached its peak during Abdulhamid II's reign. Dozens of schools were erected not only in Istanbul but also across the empire. The spread of educational institutions served in the creation of a literate and educated populace. Hence, education played an indispensable role in the modernization of the empire by providing a path to the populace for socioeconomic progress.¹³⁴ As a matter of fact, students at these schools became highly politicized, especially in the Hamidian Era. *Harbiye* and *Tıbbiye* students, who were members of a secret committee, started publishing underground papers against the Hamidian regime.¹³⁵ In this way, the state's investment in education facilitated the growth of the Ottoman public sphere.

3.4. The New Public, Acquiring a Voice (1860-1876)

In 1860, Agah Efendi and Şinasi launched the private Turkish newspaper *Tercüman-ı Ahval*, and thus another milestone was achieved. The emergence of private newspapers was a breakthrough for the government's monopoly on knowledge production.¹³⁶ *Tercüman* offered a new source independent from the state. And thus, the initiation of opposition journalism has begun.¹³⁷ Two years later, Şinasi left *Tercüman* and established another newspaper, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*. *Tasvir* would acquire a significant place in the Ottoman press and would continue to be published up until 1925. Şinasi's primary concern in his newspaper was not conveying news. He first and foremost aimed to give voice to public opinion. Rather than just narrating the

¹³⁴ Benjamin C. Fortna, *Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 209.

¹³⁵ Ahmed Emin, "The Development of Modern Turkey," 67.

¹³⁶ Gül Karagöz-Kızılca, "News Publishing as a Reflection of Public Opinion: The Idea of News during the Ottoman Financial Crises," in *The Press in the Middle East and North Africa, 1850-1950: Politics, Social History and Culture*, ed. Anthony Gorman and Didier Monciaud (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2017), 32.

¹³⁷ Baykal, *The Ottoman Press*, 33.

political events, Şinasi wanted to portray the public's reaction to these events.¹³⁸ In this sense, *Tasvir-i Efkar* was true to its name, i.e., “the depiction of the ideas.” Within a decade, more than 40 newspapers were established,¹³⁹ including influential Islamic press organs like *Basiret*.

These ventures were not isolated from international developments. The 50s and 60s were a period of intensification of institutional, cultural, and intellectual importation from Europe. The Crimean War, in particular, was an essential catalyst for the Ottoman public interest in political affairs. The theater of war hosted the first war photographers, and the developments were being transmitted through newly established telegraph lines. Thousands of French and British troops stationed in Istanbul were another source of information not only on the war but also on European *weltanschauung*. These visits were not one-sided; visits of *Efendis* and *Beys* to Paris became frequent in the midst of the century.

Indeed, Şinasi himself was sent by the Porte to Paris for higher education. His career path signifies two fundamental trends. Firstly, being sent to Paris and securing a position in a bureaucratic body in the empire despite his humble background demonstrates that the reforms achieved establishing vertical mobility for the lower strata of the empire. Secondly and more importantly, Şinasi's career harbingers the genesis of an Ottoman intelligentsia. For the first time, private individuals, rather than the statesmen, concerned themselves with the modernization of the empire with no ambition to acquire a high office in the administration.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, Şinasi had

¹³⁸ Karagöz-Kızılca, “News Publishing as a Reflection of Public Opinion,” 45.

¹³⁹ Baykal, *The Ottoman Press*, 29.

¹⁴⁰ Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 2000), 256.

the necessary mean, a newspaper, and a thirsty audience, the public, to share his ideas.

Şinasi was not alone in his attempt to raise the voice of the public. He had several like-minded companions like Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha, and Ali Suavi. These people constituted the core of the first Ottoman intelligentsia and used their pen to shape the opinions of the public and the policies of the Porte. Although their ideologies were not uniform, they were all highly critical of the Tanzimat policies and the absolutist rule of Âli and Fuad Pashas. They agreed on the necessity of a constitution and a parliamentary body in order to save the empire. This loosely-coordinated group was called the Young Ottomans, and their ideals culminated in the declaration of the constitution and the inauguration of the parliament in 1876. The Young Ottomans were not the architects of the ideas they were defending but rather the importers of those ideas from Europe.¹⁴¹ Among this group of intellectuals, Namık Kemal, with Şinasi, had a special place in the formation of Ottoman public opinion.

If Şinasi was the facilitator of the birth of Ottoman public opinion, Namık Kemal was undoubtedly the one who provided the vocabulary for the public. He took charge of *Tasvir* after Şinasi left for Paris, co-edited *Muhbir* with Ali Suavi in Paris, and finally established *Hürriyet* in London. He was an outspoken believer in a synthesis of Islam and modernity. He wrote a defense against Ernest Renan's claims that Islam hindered progress. Yet, his Islamic discourse was intricately intertwined with proto-nationalist rhetoric. He introduced the concepts *hürriyet* (liberty), *vatan*

¹⁴¹ Server Iskit, "The History of the Turkish Press 1831-1931," *Gazette* 10(1) (1964), 18.

fatherland) and popularized the use of words like *millet* (nation or religious group), *Türk* (Turk), and *kavm* (tribe/nation).¹⁴² These concepts constituted the bulk of the Ottoman public discussions in the decades to follow.

The centrality of language in public opinion is indispensable. It was the case for the Ottoman public as well. Developments in Turkish and in other languages of the Ottoman subjects as well were crucial in the facilitation and proliferation of ideas through the press. As is seen by the simplification attempts of the Young Ottomans, Turkish was becoming more “Turkish,” through the vernacularization of the language. Arabic and Persian phrases were becoming less frequent in Turkish in an attempt to vulgarize Turkish. Even Mahmud II himself, with the foundation of *Takvim*, desired to form a populace that was conscious of itself by vernacularization.¹⁴³ In this vein, a new Turkish grammar book that was free from the domination of Arabic grammar was written. Mardin considers this development as a cornerstone in the modernization of Turkish.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, vernacularization and simplification of the language were not limited to Turkish. New ethnic languages of the empire, such as Bulgarian and (Western) Armenian, came into the stage.¹⁴⁵ The ethnic languages of the Ottoman subjects started to develop their own literary works and printing press simultaneously with the Turkish press.

What finalized the linguistic occurrences in the languages of the empire was the dissemination of the knowledge of French. It was vital for the Ottoman subjects,

¹⁴² Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 326-327.

¹⁴³ Şerif Mardin, “Some Consideration on the Building of an Ottoman Public Identity in the Nineteenth Century,” in *Converting Cultures: Religion, Ideology and Transformations of Modernity*, ed. Dennis Washburn and Kevin Reinhart (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 175-176.

¹⁴⁴ Şerif Mardin, “Some Notes on an Early Phase in the Modernization of Communications in Turkey,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3(3) (Apr., 1961), 264.

¹⁴⁵ Johann Strauss, “Who Read What in the Ottoman Empire (19th-20th centuries)?” *Middle Eastern Literatures*, 6(1) (2003), 41-42.

Turkish, Greek, or Arab, to learn French. French was the empire's door to the West, both materially and mentally. As already discussed, French-language newspapers predated the other newspapers in the other languages of the empire. Therefore, learning French was deemed imperative for the Ottoman public, who had more options to read as of 1860.

3.5. The Reign of Abdulhamid II and the Double Movement

The Ottoman press reached its zenith in the 1870s with dozens of newspapers and journals published within and outside the empire. One may even give some credit to Ottoman public opinion in the promulgation of the constitution. The coterie who throned Abdulhamid thought that the young sultan was easily controllable, yet, they were gravely mistaken. Abdulhamid succeeded in getting rid of Midhat, Hüseyin Avni, and Süleyman Pashas and gradually consolidated his power. And thus began one of the most controversial periods of Ottoman history.

Abdulhamid's reign was marked by two trends for the fate of the press. To borrow from Karl Polanyi, we may identify this trend as a "double movement." On the one hand, the voice of the opposition was turned down, either by coercion or consent. Journalists were being offered positions in the government in return for their silence. If they did not comply, they faced strict censorship. On the other hand, the sultan lavishly supported the newspapers that were appreciative of the Hamidian regime. Abdulhamid, after all, did not want to annihilate the press but to command it.¹⁴⁶ He wanted to create an imperial populace that was loyal to the regime. In fact, apart from the creation of a professional bureaucratic elite, the other aim of Abdulhamid's

¹⁴⁶ Baykal, *The Ottoman Press, 1908-1923*, 41.

ambitious modernization and spread of education was to oversee his subjects.¹⁴⁷

Indeed, the sultan achieved controlling a considerable portion of the press and public opinion. Nevertheless, he was not entirely successful in suppressing the voices of the opposition in the long run.

The double movement of proliferation and suppression of the press was reinforced by a catastrophic incident. The eruption of the war against Russia in 1877 gave impetus to public debates via the press and also provided a justification for Yıldız to crack down on the press. Indeed, the Sultan used the war as a pretext to annul the constitution and abolish the parliament. The press started to feel the breath of the palace down their necks. The regime's censorship practices were not administered centrally, though. As of 1878, offices were founded under the ministries of Police, Education, and Foreign Affairs to monitor the press.¹⁴⁸ Apart from the bureaucratic path, informal ways were also in play to dominate the press. *Hafiyelik*, surveillance became a common practice among public servants and civilians, and these reports were directly presented to the palace. The press crackdown would intensify as Abdulhamid continued to concentrate all the power in his hands in the three decades to follow.

The other movement initiated by the Russo-Turkish War was the intensification of public debate through newspapers. The examination of *Basiret*, which was among the most popular newspapers of the time, illustrates how the public was involved in the debates on the Porte's conduct of the war. *Basiret* instrumentalized the Ottoman

¹⁴⁷ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (New York: Oxford UP, 2001), 135.

¹⁴⁸ İpek K. Yosmaoğlu, "Chasing the Printed Word: Press Censorship in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1913," *The Turkish Studies Association Journal* 27:1/2 (2003), 24.

defeats to promote nationalist ideas and criticize the Porte's military strategies.¹⁴⁹

Moreover, *Basiret*'s extensive coverage of the publications on the war in the Russian and British presses triggered the Ottoman public to compare themselves with their international counterparts, contributing to the self-realization of a critical Ottoman public opinion.¹⁵⁰ The thorough involvement of the newspapers in international affairs and the spread of Western notions like nationalism would enter a new phase towards the mid-1890s.

Before jumping into the 1890s, another turning point in the history of the Ottoman press should be mentioned. The deepening and the spread of Ottoman public debate during the war were accompanied by another development that was a secondary result of the war. Kemal Karpaz marks 1878 as the birth of the modernistic period of the Ottoman press. Accordingly, the deterioration of the empire's relations with Britain and France pushed the government and the intelligentsia to acquire a self-reliant publication technology.¹⁵¹ In this way, the Ottoman press started to stand on its own feet. The material capabilities of the Ottoman intelligentsia would materialize in the late 1880s with the emergence of a new generation of people with similar goals.

The three-decade-long Hamidian regime inevitably created its own antidote. An ensemble of people who were called *Jeunes-Turcs* left their mark not only on the late Ottoman Empire but also on her inheritor, the Turkish Republic. The movement originated from *Tıbbiye* students Ibrahim Temo, Ishak Sükûti, Abdullah Cevdet, and

¹⁴⁹ Onur İsci, "Wartime Propaganda and the Legacies of Defeat: Russian and Ottoman Newspapers in the War of 1877-1878," *Russian History* 41 (2014), 191-193.

¹⁵⁰ İsci, "Wartime Propaganda and the Legacies of Defeat," 195.

¹⁵¹ Karpaz, *The Politicization of Islam*, 134.

Mehmed Reshid, who were against the sultan's policies. In 1889, this quartet formed the Ottoman Union Society (*İttihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti*), which would eventually transform into the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*). The secret student initiative would, in the following years, attract dozens of intellectuals, political activists, bureaucrats, officers, and members of the *ulema* who had very little in common but opposition to the regime. Indeed, the CUP was nothing but an anti-Hamid club with no uniform ideology until 1902.¹⁵² Moreover, being a Young Turk did not automatically mean membership in the CUP. Although the CUP stemmed from the Young Turks, the Young Turks were ideologically much more heterogeneous. Prince Sabahaddin, for example, a prominent Young Turk, was a staunch critic of the CUP and formed an opposition party during the CUP government after 1908.¹⁵³

The clique finally found a voice in the press when Ahmed Rıza founded *Meşveret* in 1895. Because of the constant threat of censorship from the regime, the newspaper was being published in Paris. Indeed, a majority of the Young Turkish newspapers were headquartered in Egypt, the Balkan states, France, and Switzerland, with some publications in other European states.¹⁵⁴ For instance, *Osmanlı* was published by Abdullah Cevdet and Ishak Sükûti in Switzerland, whereas Cairo hosted Murad Bey's *Mizan* and Ali Kemal's *Türk*. Similarly, *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* had multiple centers ranging from Cairo and Istanbul to Paris. Most of the newspapers were published both in Turkish and French, which allowed attracting a wider public.

¹⁵² M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York: Oxford UP, 1995), 4.

¹⁵³ Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks*, 213.

¹⁵⁴ (Yalman), "The Development of Modern Turkey," 69.

The CUP and its publications will be dealt with in detail in the following pages. Hence, it is adequate to illustrate their contributions to the flourishing of Ottoman public opinion and the Ottoman press. The genesis of the Young Turks and their press provided a significant arena for public debates and went hand in hand with the increasing politicization of the Ottoman public. The other stream of the double movement, the palace's pressure on the opposition, was getting harsher. Yet, despite the prosecution of the Hamidian regime, voices of the opposition, mostly comprised of the Young Turks, were increasing day by day thanks to the publications abroad and to a thirsty public.

In conclusion, on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, the Ottoman populace had sufficient means to access knowledge on imperial and international affairs thanks to the proliferation of the printed press. Yes, the Ottoman public did not utterly fit in the Habermasian conceptualization of the bourgeois public sphere, and the emergence of a public sphere was slower compared to the European states. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the imperial subjects had the opportunity to exchange political opinions on different occasions, such as coffeehouse chats or gatherings at the *Sufi* lodges. Furthermore, there were other centers for public discussions, although they were not entirely "public." The janissaries, along with the *ulema*, played an essential role as intermediaries between the population of the capital and the palace starting from the 17th century until their dissolution in 1826.

The 19th century, as in the case of other fields, marked a milestone in the genesis of Ottoman public opinion. Interestingly, the state played an essential role in the emergence of public opinion. The reform policies of the government gave significant

thrust to the foundation of the printing press, the proliferation of education, and intellectual exchanges with Europe. Indeed, Karpas indicates “[t]he monopoly of religious, political, and administrative knowledge was broken in the early nineteenth century, after the Ottoman government gradually assumed a variety of new functions in education, justice, sanitation, and so on, and knowledge was diversified and percolated down to the lower classes.”¹⁵⁵ Mahmud II’s foundation of *Takvim-i Vekayi* launched a new era for the Ottoman press. The flourishing of the printed press went in parallel with the emergence of an Ottoman intelligentsia and the eventual rise of political opposition to the government. Young Ottomans, Young Turks, and the CUP utilized the power of the printed press to propagate their opinions. Young Turks and the CUP were influential in the public debates, which inevitably shaped the Ottoman public’s reaction to the Russo-Japanese War.

¹⁵⁵ Karpas, *The Politicization of Islam*, 118.

CHAPTER IV

THE TWO WARS: THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST AND THE WAR IN THE NEAR EAST

*It can be said that the fire, intelligence and civilization emanating from the Japanese general staff, commanders, officers and soldiers, and even from their cannons and rifles, set Petersburg, Moscow, Warsaw, and Sevastopol on fire. Russia, that great and solid tyranny, was set on fire from its very foundations, leaving it in a life-and-death struggle.*¹⁵⁶

Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, Cairo, 1905

*Do ask, what kind of a nation are the Japanese?
I am unable to describe it!*

...

*You go and see the purity of Islam in Japanese.
The short members of that great nation are today.
They are unique in shielding the customs
To be called a Muslim, the only thing they lack is
tawhid.*¹⁵⁷

Mehmed Akif

*The small, yellow-skinned Japanese have shown a general tendency to change and have made such marvelous progress in a short period of time that today the whole civilized world acknowledges that they are great people with enlightened minds. In fact, forty years of hard work has produced a great and civilized state from scratch, and today the Japanese have reached a level where they are following step by step the scientific progress and industry of the most civilized countries.*¹⁵⁸

Asır, Salonica, 1904

¹⁵⁶ “İntibah,” Şûrâ-yı Ümmet 68 (February 6, 1905), 4.

¹⁵⁷ Mehmet Akif Ersoy, *Safahat*, hazırlayan., Necmettin Turinay, (Ankara: TBMM, 2021), 506. Sorunuz, şimdi Japonlar da nasıl millettir?/ Onu tasvire zafer-yâb olamam, hayrettir!... Siz gidin, safvet-i İslâm’ı Japonlarda görün!/ O küçük boylu büyük milletin efradı bugün,/ Müslümanlıktaki erkânı siyânette ferid;/ Müslüman denmek için eksiği ancak tevhid.

¹⁵⁸ “Ahvâl-i Umûmiye. Rusya-Japonya Muharebesi: Rusya’daki Te’sîrâtı,” *Asır*, March 14, 1904.

Just as the Russo-Japanese War united Iran and the Philippines; the Polish and India; the Malay Archipelago and Egypt; Kipling and Ghandi in sympathy towards the Japanese and adverse towards the Russians, it united the Ottoman public opinion. This liaison was so unique that an Islamist like Mehmed Akif and notable Young Turkish press such as *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* and *Balkan* were in unison glorifying the Japanese. At that time, it would be challenging to understand whether a eulogistic article about Japan was written by Islamist Abdürreşid İbrahim or materialist Abdullah Cevdet. Even Sultan Abdulhamid II was glad to see that Russia suffered a defeat, although later, he was discouraged by the domestic turbulence occurring in Russia. This unity among the diverse parties of the Ottoman public had several reasons.

First and foremost, nearly two centuries of adjacency with Russia has taught the Ottoman rulers and the public that the Russian appetite was difficult to satisfy. Wars against Russia have cost the Ottomans dearly, pressuring the empire both from the Balkans and the Caucasus. Therefore it was not a surprise that the Ottomans supported the adversary of Russia. Japan, on the other hand, had no direct interest in the Ottoman Empire and was far away. Moreover, some degree of sympathy for the Japanese among the Ottoman public was already present due to some incidents like the sinking of *Ertuğrul*. More importantly, in the eyes of the Ottomans, Japan was an Eastern nation trying to ensure her existence in the arena of a global colonialist scramble.

Abdulhamid's policy during the war was typical of his reign: to keep his head down, not to support Russia, but not to seem supportive of Japan. The Sultan's shadow over the Istanbul press was visible as well. Prominent newspapers like *Sabah*, *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, and *İkdam* confined themselves to monotonously and neutrally report the occurrences of the war. Nevertheless, their reporting was thorough and encyclopedic, gathering information from news agencies all around the world. Moreover, for the first time, the Ottomans sent a military observer, Pertev Bey, to the front. His testimony illustrates his deep admiration for the morality and patriotism of the Japanese.

Pertev was not alone in his enthusiasm. Diverse parts of the Ottomans united in passionately applauding Japan against Russia. Turkic nationalists, Islamists, and the Young Turks were the epicenters of public opinion formation and public debates in the empire, although almost all of the Young Turk press was published in Europe and Egypt. All these segments of Ottoman society eagerly praised Japan with the hope that the Ottoman Empire would become a Japan in the future. Almost all of them ardently opposed Russia and the Tsar, warning that if the Ottomans could not become a Japan, then they would end up being a Russia. Therefore, for the Ottoman public, the Russo-Japanese War was part of a century-long internal debate rather than being an international development occurring far away. The majority of these intellectuals happened to be activists and excellent agitators which helped them to find a wider audience.

One important issue to take into consideration is the elusiveness and fluidity of the classification of Islamists, nationalists, and the Young Turks. Concepts of Islamism

and Turkism were novel in the empire. Their first appearance as a way of policy was with Yusuf Akçura's article "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset", published in *Türk* in 1904. Nine years later, Ziya Gökalp consolidated this classification with his "Üç Cereyan", published in *Türk Yurdu*. Nonetheless, boundaries between the two currents would remain unclear until the republic. For example, İsmail Gaspıralı and Yusuf Akçura were considered to be prominent nationalists; however, the party they formed at the Duma was *İttifâk-ı Müslimîn*, the alliance of Muslims. Likewise, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Akçura wrote both in Islamist *Sırât-ı Müstakîm* and *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet*, the official organ of the CUP. Another Islamist who wrote at *Sırât-ı Müstakîm*, Musa Kâzım Efendi, was a CUP member, who also assumed the office of *Şeyhülislâm* after the Young Turk Revolution. Hence, at the time of the war and its immediate aftermath, these categorizations remained vague. Nevertheless, it is convenient to use these pre-mature classifications for examining the echoes of the Russo-Japanese War among the Ottomans.

4.1. Ottoman Relations with the Belligerents

4.1.1. Ottoman-Russian Relations Before the War:

Since their first military engagement in 1569 over Astrakhan, the Ottomans, and the Russians have warred with each other eleven times. The 19th century witnessed the most severe encounters in 1806-12, 1828-29, 1853-56, and finally, in 1877-78.

Almost all but one of the wars resulted in decisive Russian victories, which had disastrous territorial, political, military, and economic consequences for the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century.

The only exception was the war that took place between 1853 and 1856, namely, the Crimean War. The reason for this exception in favor of the Ottomans was due to the military involvement of France and Britain against Russia. The two European powers allied with the Ottomans because of the fear of Russian domination over the Ottoman territories. The “Eastern Question” was raised in the European capitals due to the steady retreat of the Ottomans from territories it had conquered since its foundation. Indeed, Winfried Baumgart argued, “[n]o other diplomatic question occupied international relations in the nineteenth century with such constancy and with so much inextricable tension as the Eastern Question.”¹⁵⁹ St. Petersburg was the one that benefitted the most from the Ottoman decay. Throughout the first half of the century, Russia was gradually expanding its territory and increasing its influence in the Ottoman territories in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

As a matter of fact, during the Kavalalı crisis, the Sultan asked for help from the Tsar by saying, “a drowning man will grab at a snake.” The Tsar sent his navy to Istanbul with pleasure, and his help bore fruit in 1833 with the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, a treaty that guaranteed the closure of the Black Sea in case of a Russian war with the Western powers. The Russian appetite, which perceived the Ottoman Empire as the “Sick Man of Europe,” could be tamed only temporarily in the Treaty of Paris in 1856. Indeed, twenty years later, the Russians almost captured Istanbul. Only with the intervention of the European powers the young Abdulhamid could get a “better” deal in Berlin. For the young Sultan, Russia became the most crucial determinant in his conduct of both internal politics and foreign relations throughout his reign.¹⁶⁰

Therefore, the Sultan did his best not to provoke the Russians. His attitude towards

¹⁵⁹ Winfried Baumgart, *The Crimean War 1853-1856*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), 3.

¹⁶⁰ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya: XVIII. Yüzyıl Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşına Kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basınevi, 2011), 99.

the belligerents during the Russo-Japanese War is a clear indication of Hamid's overly cautious foreign policy.

4.1.2. Ottoman-Japanese Relations Before the War:

Compared to the Ottomans' -mostly hostile- relations with the Russians that went back a long way, there were no contacts, let alone knowledge of, with Japan. One exception to that was *Cihannuma*, where Katip Çelebi briefly mentioned "Caponya."¹⁶¹ Neither Japan nor the Ottoman Empire had an interest in each other until the late 19th century. The first move came from Japan, which would also characterize a trend for bilateral relations for the following decades. In 1873, Fukuchi Genichiro, a Japanese diplomat at the Iwakura mission to Europe and the US, became the first Japanese to set foot on Ottoman soil.¹⁶² Throughout the decade, the two sides sought to establish formal relations. In 1881 the two governments launched the drafting of a commercial treaty via emissaries in St. Petersburg. However, the negotiations entered a dead end because of the Japanese desire for capitulations. While the Ottomans gave consent for commercial privileges, they were reluctant to grant legal ones.¹⁶³ A draft communique was presented to the Japanese cabinet in 1893, which was rejected.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Selçuk Esenbel, "A 'fin de siècle' Japanese Romantic in Istanbul: The Life of Yamada Torajiro and His 'Toruko gakan'," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 59:2 (1996), 238.

¹⁶² Hee-Soo (Cemil) Lee, *Osmanlı Japon Münasebetleri ve Japonya'da İslamiyet*, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989), 24.

¹⁶³ [Küçük] Mehmed Sa'id Paşa, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid'in Sadrazamı [Küçük] Mehmed Sa'id Paşa'nın Hatıratı, Cilt: 1*, (Istanbul: Ketebe, 2019), 59.

¹⁶⁴ Umut Arık, *A Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations: A Special Partnership*, (The Japan-Turkey Friendship Centenary Program Committee, 1991), 44.

Notwithstanding that, official and unofficial goodwill visits continued. In 1887, Meiji sent his nephew Prince Komatsu to meet with the Sultan.¹⁶⁵ To reciprocate, Abdulhamid sent the famous *Ertuğrul* frigate to Japan in 1889, which turned out to be a legendary odyssey with a dramatic finale. The frigate sank off the coast of Japan with few survivors. This incident and the following visits from Japan created mutual sympathy between the two countries. Although diplomatic relations were still yet to be established, a Japanese civilian, Yamada Torajiro, came to Istanbul to deliver the aid collected in Japan for the families of the *Ertuğrul*'s victims. Yamada settled in Istanbul, launched an export-import business between the two countries, and quickly became a person of interest among the Istanbul circles.¹⁶⁶

Selçuk Esenbel identifies two periods in bilateral relations. The main agenda until the 1890s was to sign a mutually desirable diplomatic and commercial treaty. whereas the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and Japan's joining the imperialist club dragged the Ottomans, who were aligned with Germany, away.¹⁶⁷ Therefore, bilateral relations were limited to diplomatic gestures and mutual public interest before the war with Russia erupted. The war and its consequence, however, would boost the Ottoman public's fascination with Japan tremendously.

4.2. The War, anti-Russianism, and Japonophilia

4.2.1. The War and anti-Russian Sentiments among the Ottoman Public:

¹⁶⁵ Tomoyuki Abe, *Japonya ve Türkiye: Dün, Bugün, Yarın* (Ankara: Japonya Büyükelçiliği, 2004), 32.

¹⁶⁶ Esenbel, "A Japanese Romantic in Istanbul," 241. Yamada stayed in Istanbul for more than twenty years until the Great War. He gathered information on the Black Sea fleet of Russia during the Russo-Japanese War at the request of the Japanese ambassador in Vienna, and he also met with Abdulhamid three times to provide information on the war.

¹⁶⁷ Selçuk Esenbel, *Japan, Turkey and the World of Islam: The Writings of Selçuk Esenbel* (Kent: Global Oriental, 2011), 108.

Being the archenemy of the empire, hatred towards Russia united all segments of the Turkish-Muslim subjects of the empire. The Ottoman public, who witnessed the occupation of the old capital, Edirne, the annexation of Kars, and the Russians marching at Ayastefanos, deeply felt the Russian threat. Moreover, Russia's diplomatic intervention during the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 in favor of the Greeks was still fresh among the public in the early 1900s. St. Petersburg was not only weighing against the Ottomans in the international arena but was also meddling with the empire's internal affairs. Considering herself the historical patron of the Orthodox Christians, Russia was constantly pressuring the Sublime Porte on almost every possible occasion.¹⁶⁸ The Balkans was especially a hotbed for Russo-Ottoman disputes, ranging from Greece to Bulgaria and Macedonia. Likewise, Russia's expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia was not welcome, especially among the Islamist and nationalist circles.

Hence, the Ottoman public had long-lasting anti-Russian feelings before the Russo-Japanese War. When the war broke out, it is no surprise to us that the Ottoman public enthusiastically supported Japan. In fact, the Ottoman public would support any country that would fight against Russia, regardless of the fact that the Ottomans were sympathetic towards the Japanese. Islamists, nationalists, and the Young Turks were all united in the joy of seeing the seemingly invincible Russia getting a humiliating defeat. Yet, there is one more reason for the anti-Russian sentiments of the Young Turks. They were against the absolutist state of Russia and Nicolas II's

¹⁶⁸ It is widely assumed that the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774 granted the Russians the right to become the patron of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. However, Roderic H. Davison underlines the 7th and the 14th articles of the treaty and exposes how wrong that assumption is and Russia had no such rights over the Ottoman Christians. See Roderic H. Davison, "‘Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility’: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered," *Slavic Review* 35:3 (Sep., 1976), 463-483.

rule. According to the Young Turks, the Tsar was not an ordinary absolutist monarch but also the patron of absolutism in the world, first and foremost, Abdulhamid's absolutist rule. Drawing parallels between the Tsar's regime and the Hamidian rule was a common theme among the Young Turks during the war.

4.2.2. The War and Japonophilia among the Ottoman Public:

The Japanese, on the other hand, had huge credit in the eyes of the Ottoman public even before the war. Japan's sudden rise in the east at the turn of the century was not a secret for the Ottomans.¹⁶⁹ High-level goodwill visits of the Japanese aristocracy attracted great interest among the population in Istanbul. The *Ertuğrul* incident and the return of the survivors by the Japanese furthered public sympathy. Nevertheless, this sympathy was not shallow; it contained multiple layers, depending on the *weltanschauungs* of the Ottomans.

Ottoman intellectuals with Islamic and Turkish connotations were deeply moved by an Oriental power that had no significance a few decades before was now outmuscling a mighty European power. The Ottomans were impressed by the Japanese path of modernization: borrowing science from the West without losing their own identity. For most of the Ottomans, the world was binary: West versus East, Christian Europe versus the rest, the Great Powers versus those who were under the influence of the Great Powers, and the colonizers versus the colonized. For the Ottomans, Japan was able to break this wheel and draw her own destiny by defying the Euro-centric international order.

¹⁶⁹ Selim Deringil, "Ottoman-Japanese Relations in the Late Nineteenth Century," in *The Rising Sun and the Turkish Crescent*, eds. Selçuk Esenbel and Inaba Chiharu (Istanbul: Boğaziçi UP, 2003), 43.

The Young Turks, on the other hand, had more reasons to get attracted by the allure of the Japanese model. For them, Japan not only transgressed the Western notion of the East being inferior but also proved that the Easterners were not destined to be ruled by autocracies. Accordingly, Japan succeeded in defying the world thanks to the promulgation of the constitution and the foundation of the parliament. Therefore, Japan became an excellent model for the Young Turks to utilize in their writings on the Ottoman political regime. The Japanese success for the Young Turks was more of an internal affair of the Ottoman Empire in their struggle against the Hamidian regime rather than a mere foreign policy issue. The Japanese success increased the hope for modernization, and some Young Turks even named the empire the “Japan of the Near East.”¹⁷⁰ Naturally, Abdulhamid perceived such notions as a threat to his rule, although he was glad to see an Eastern state developing and defeating the archenemy of his empire. The Sultan had reasons both to be pleased and to get anxious. This dilemma would reveal itself in his rhetoric and actions during the war.

4.3. The War and the Hamidian Views

4.3.1. Abdulhamid II's Views and Policy:

Abdulhamid's policy during the war was typical of his foreign policy: over-cautiousness. His major concern was not to look too pro-Japanese in order not to instigate a Russian response. Therefore, the Sultan's joy was discreet, and his actual policy seemed pro-Russian. The official stance of the empire during the war was neutrality, emphasized on several occasions.¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 23.

¹⁷¹ BOA, *HR.SYS*, Dosya no.: 2763, Gümlek no.: 65.

In reality, the Sultan did his best to please St. Petersburg. He intended to send aid via Red Crescent to the Russians fighting in Manchuria.¹⁷² His actions were not limited to such gestures. The Ministry of Navy allowed the passage of two Russian ships from the straits en route to the Far East and took precautions to prevent any potential Japanese assaults during the passage.¹⁷³ In addition to such major diplomatic maneuvers, even minor issues concerning the war were under the inspection of the Hamidian regime, as expected from Abdulhamid. For example, the Ministry of Internal Affairs prevented a printing house in Trabzon from printing the map of the Russo-Japanese War on cigarette papers.¹⁷⁴ Similarly, the ministry did not authorize a German to import postcards depicting the war.¹⁷⁵ Indeed, paying attention to such tiny details was a characteristic of the Sultan and his rule. The government closely watched an attempt of fundraising by Ottoman Greek merchants in Istanbul for the Japanese.¹⁷⁶ Even before the war, the Sultan had to extradite Abdürreşid Ibrahim because the Siberian-Tatar writer-activist's activities in Istanbul intimidated the Russians.¹⁷⁷ Hence, if the Sultan was genuinely glad to see Russia's defeat, his actions should have demonstrated it more obviously.

Abdulhamid's shy enthusiasm for the defeat of Russia would change after the eruption of the revolution in Russia. Seeing an autocratic monarch facing a social revolution, the Sultan got anxious. If such a revolution could take place in Russia, which has a relatively more centralized state apparatus, then it would occur in the Sultan's realm as well. Indeed, the Young Turks were rapid in capitalizing on the

¹⁷² BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK*, Dosya no.: 225, Gömlek no.: 137.

¹⁷³ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK*, Dosya no.: 223, Gömlek no.: 63.

¹⁷⁴ BOA, *MF.MKT*, Dosya no.: 780, Gömlek no.: 78.

¹⁷⁵ BOA, *DH.MKT*, Dosya no.: 883, Gömlek no.: 12.

¹⁷⁶ BOA, *Y.PRK.MYD*, Dosya no.: 25, Gömlek no.: 107.

¹⁷⁷ Renée Worringer, "Comparing Perceptions: Japan as Archetype for Ottoman Modernity, 1876-1918" (Chicago, The University of Chicago, 2001).

Russian Revolution and calling for a Turkish one. The regime harshened the censorship on the news from Russia, increased surveillance over people coming from Russia, and Muslim students from Russia was forbidden to be admitted to Ottoman educational institutions.¹⁷⁸ One of the Sultan's closest aides, Tahsin Pasha, claimed that the possibility of the Potempkin incident encouraging the military in Istanbul to do the same would cause nightmares for the Sultan.¹⁷⁹ The palace's concerns were not baseless. The Young Turks, through their newspapers abroad, were enthusiastically drawing parallels between the Hamidian regime and the Tsar. Yet, newspapers published in the empire were under the control of the regime, which provided a different angle of the war.

4.3.2. *The Press under the Sultan:*

In accordance with the Sultan's stance, newspapers of the empire took the duty of narrating the war rather than publishing op-eds. Newspapers like *Sabah*, *İkdam*, and *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* played the role of a mouthpiece of the court. Their reportings were monotone, encyclopedic, exhaustive, dull, and over-factual. These newspapers covered the war in full pages, showing that they were paying attention to the war. In reality, the newspapers were overwhelming the readers with factual information with no opinions on the war. The information, which arrived extensively from the European press, was not processed but directly presented to the reader.

Sabah, presenting the siege of Port Arthur, was giving the tiniest details about the boilers and the machines of the Russian warships that were not damaged.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Yuri A. Petrosian, *Mladoturetskoe Dvizhenie (Vtoraya Polovina XIX - nachalo XX v.)* (Moskva: Nauka, 1971), 216.

¹⁷⁹ Tahsin Paşa, *Sultan Abdülhamid: Tahsin Paşa'nın Yıldız Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi, 1990), 237.

¹⁸⁰ "Rusya ve Japonya Muharebesi," *Sabah*, February 11, 1904.

Similarly, *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* provided comprehensive information about the war, covering the Battle of Yalu, the condition of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the Russian General Staff, Grand Duke Boris, and Admiral Alekseev in sub-topics.¹⁸¹ Likewise, *İkdam* reported the eruption of the war in detail, elaborating on a wide array of topics: the termination of bilateral relations between St. Petersburg and Tokyo, the Russian press, Lamsdorf's remarks as well as the Japanese inhabiting in Russia.¹⁸² Among this voluminous amount of information, *İkdam*, *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, or *Sabah* provided no processed information at all.

İkdam, in one of its issues after Portsmouth narrated the post-war policies of Japan, Britain, Germany, and the US extensively; however, the policy of the Ottoman Empire was never mentioned.¹⁸³ *Sabah* was able to narrate the negotiations on Sakhalin Island in Portsmouth in detail, providing information on the stances of the delegations.¹⁸⁴ Sadly, the readers could not find news about the stance of Yıldız during the war. What is more interesting is unlike the Young Turk newspapers, these newspapers hardly ever mentioned a development that was connected to the war: the Russian Revolution. Surprisingly, the revolution was unnoticed by the editors of these newspapers. Unsurprisingly, the silence of the Istanbul press was due to the shadow of the Sultan over them. This shadow would also force the press not to annoy St. Petersburg during the war. *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* would address the Russian monarch as "His Majesty the Tsar,"¹⁸⁵ probably finding "Tsar" insufficient.

¹⁸¹ "Rusya-Japonya Muharebesi," *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, March 31, 1904.

¹⁸² "Rusya-Japonya," *İkdam*, February 9, 1904.

¹⁸³ "Japonya ve İngiltere," *İkdam*, October 11, 1905.

¹⁸⁴ "Rusya ve Japonya Muharebesi," *Sabah*, September 4, 1905.

¹⁸⁵ "Haşmetli Çar Hazretleri." "Rusya-Japonya Muharebesi," *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, May 29, 1905.

Nevertheless, the coverage of the war by these newspapers illustrated the utilization of advanced technology and also the maturing of the press in the Ottoman Empire. Every day, a vast amount of news was arriving in the Istanbul press from European media thanks to telegrams. *Sabah* was transmitting news from news agencies in London, St. Petersburg, and Hamburg.¹⁸⁶ Such news was not limited to the transmission of the developments in the war. Ottoman newspapers also portrayed the media coverage of European states extensively,¹⁸⁷ reporting European public opinion on the war to Ottoman readers. The multiplication of news sources showed how Ottoman journalism was, in fact, developed. These newspapers' publication policy bore a sense of objectivity, perhaps an annoying objectivity, compared to the world public opinion's enthusiasm for the Japanese. Moreover, some sense of journalistic ethics was in play in the Ottoman newspapers. Corrections to the previous news became frequent. For example, *Sabah* corrected the news they received from the *Associated Press*, New York, that Port Arthur was on fire.¹⁸⁸

As has been seen, foreign news agencies constituted the majority of sources for the Ottoman newspapers; however, the palace had another source of information for the war. With the advice of German General Colmar von der Goltz, the palace decided to send a military observer to the front.

4.3.3. *Pertev's Journey:*

On June 20, five months after the beginning of the war, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry appointed Pertev Bey as the Ottoman observer who was to monitor the war

¹⁸⁶ "Rusya ve Japonya Muharebesi," *Sabah*, June 19, 1904.

¹⁸⁷ *İkdam*, for example, received telegrams from almost every European capital while *Sabah* was reporting news from Tokyo, Vienna, Paris, and London. "Rusya-Japonya Muharebesi," *İkdam*, April 9, 1905. and "Rusya ve Japonya Muharebesi," *Sabah*, March 16, 1905.

¹⁸⁸ "Rusya ve Japonya Muharebesi," *Sabah*, February 11, 1904.

in Manchuria.¹⁸⁹ Pertev Bey was a colonel, who had graduated from the Ottoman Military Academy, had been sent to Germany, and had been appointed to the general staff under Goltz. For a year, he stayed in Manchuria and witnessed two crucial operations; the siege of Port Arthur and the Battle of Mukden.¹⁹⁰ He was even wounded during a Russian attack.¹⁹¹ During his mission, he wrote reports and memoirs and even photographed his journey.¹⁹² After a long journey, Pertev finally arrived in Tokyo on September 25. He started to meet with the Japanese officials and report his observations to Istanbul. For example, Pertev names Prince Ito as the “Bismarck” of Japan who paved the way for progress in Japan.¹⁹³ Throughout his journey, Pertev showed his fascination with the moral values, mental strength, patriotism, and self-sacrifice of the Japanese.

In his memoirs, Pertev constantly repeats the importance of moral spirit in Japanese victory. As a follower of Goltz Pasha, Pertev agrees with him on how the Europeans disregarded moral spirit, whereas the Japanese understood its significance.¹⁹⁴ For Pertev, the *Bushido* spirit of the Japanese is still alive, which equipped the Japanese nation with honor, bravery, self-sacrifice, and glory.¹⁹⁵ Pertev highlighted the moral strength of the Japanese despite their material limits:

With astonishing indifference, the Japanese, as if they were emotionless, heartless, soulless, silent machines, would rush at the enemy, sometimes following each other to their deaths in order to capture an important point or a line of defense... These small and frail men were like savage tigers in the face of the enemy, and when they came toe-to-toe with the enemy, whether with

¹⁸⁹ BOA, *I.AS.*, Dosya no.: 51, Gömlek no.: 56.

¹⁹⁰ General Pertev Demirhan, *Japonların Asıl Kuvveti: Japonya niçin ve nasıl yükseldi?* (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1942), 41.

¹⁹¹ BOA, *Y.MTV*, Dosya no.: 275, Gömlek no.: 103.

¹⁹² BOA, *BEO*, Dosya no.: 3876, Gömlek no.: 290666.

¹⁹³ General Pertev Demirhan, *Rus-Japon Harbi, 1904-1905: İstanbuldan Ayrılışımdan Port Arthur Muhasarasına Kadar* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ebüzziya, 1943), 87.

¹⁹⁴ Demirhan, *Rus-Japon Harbi*, 103.

¹⁹⁵ Demirhan, *Japonların Asıl Kuvveti*, 26.

bayonet or sword, they would not turn back until they had defeated the enemy.¹⁹⁶

According to Pertev, another reason for Japanese devotion is the doctrine of Confucius. Confucianism asks for unquestioned obedience to the elderly and love for the family and the country.¹⁹⁷

Pertev compares the Japanese with another Eastern state, China. “Poor Chinese!” sighed Pertev when he saw mainland China on the ferry: “What a lesson for nations that they [the Chinese] are a nation of hundreds of millions of people, and yet they are so silent only because of complacency, inertia, ignorance, and heedlessness!”¹⁹⁸ For Pertev, China is in this condition because she could not follow the path of Japan. The Ottomans, on the other hand, have the potential to be like Japan. The sacrifices of the Japanese sailors during an operation reminded Pertev of the Ottoman sailors’ sacrifices in the siege of Crete. For Pertev, it is no coincidence that both the Japanese and the Turkish are of Ural-Altaic origin.¹⁹⁹ What Pertev wanted for the Ottomans and later the Turkish Republic was to become a Japan, not China. In hindsight, Pertev argued, Japan’s victory over Russia heralded Asia’s domination over Europe.²⁰⁰

Apart from Pertev’s mission, two officers from the general staff undertook the duty of writing a comprehensive survey of the war for the Ottoman army. Major Osman Senai and Captain Ali Fuad wrote a five-volume examination of the Russo-Japanese War in 1906.²⁰¹ *Musavver 1904-1905 Rus-Japon Seferi* covered almost every aspect

¹⁹⁶ Demirhan, *Japonların Asıl Kuvveti*, 42.

¹⁹⁷ Demirhan, *Japonların Asıl Kuvveti*, 43-45.

¹⁹⁸ Demirhan, *Rus-Japon Harbi*, 118.

¹⁹⁹ Demirhan, *Japonların Asıl Kuvveti*, 52-53.

²⁰⁰ Demirhan, *Japonların Asıl Kuvveti*, 58.

²⁰¹ Osman Senai and Ali Fuad, *Musavver 1904-1905 Rus-Japon Seferi* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ahmed Ihsan, R-1321 [1905/1906]).

of the war, from the political, economic, and strategic conditions of the belligerents to the education systems. Yet, this work was not written for the use of the public but was instead meant for the army.

The newspapers and journals, not books, were the backbone of the Ottoman public's response to the war. The fractured Ottoman intelligentsia was united in the belief in the power of the newspapers. Ottoman intellectuals who perceived Islam as the path to survival welcomed the victory of Japan joyfully.

4.4. The War and Nationalist-Islamic Responses

Similar to the global trend, Ottoman intellectuals in the 19th century faced the threat of expanding European imperialism. Some intellectuals sought the answer in Islam and in the Muslim world. Accordingly, the Islamic way of living should be brought back and should be accompanied by the science and technique of the modern world. Only the adoption of European knowledge and the revival of Islam in every aspect of life would successfully resist the European threat. This notion was a defensive notion aiming to preserve the existence of Muslim societies.²⁰² In the eyes of these intellectuals, the Russo-Japanese War proved that their way of thinking was realizable. Japan, a backward country, defeated a mighty empire thanks to her successful adoption of Western knowledge. More importantly, the adoption process was selective, they did not adapt Western *weltanschauung* wholly. While modernizing, they protected their own cultural identity.

4.4.1. Muslims' Door to Japan: Abdürreşid İbrahim

²⁰² Ahmad Dallal, "The Origins and Early Development of Islamic Reform," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 6, edited by Robert W. Hefner, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), 147.

The first name that should come into our minds when mentioning Japan and the Ottomans is probably Abdürreşid Ibrahim. Abdürreşid was born in 1857 in Siberia to a family of Bukharan Uzbek origin.²⁰³ Leaving his lands behind, Abdürreşid traveled to almost every corner of Asia, from Istanbul to Tokyo. He established contacts with Russian, Ottoman, and Japanese statesmen and played the role of unofficial envoy for Japanese-Muslim relations. He published articles and launched newspapers in several countries. He was truly the man of his time: a time marked by intensified intellectual contacts across the globe and the culmination of public spheres. In this sense, his political activism and appearance in different courts resemble Jamaladdin Afghani. In fact, Abdürreşid had strong connections with Japanese intelligence during the war.²⁰⁴ Apart from his global vision with Islamic ideals, he was a Turkic nationalist in Russia. Hakan Kırımlı names Abdürreşid as the “indefatigable initiator”²⁰⁵ of all Turkic/Muslim political movements. Abdürreşid’s monumental work *Âlem-i İslam* is composed of his travels to Central Asia, Mongolia, Siberia, Japan, Manchuria, Korea, India, and Hejaz. His view of the Japanese in this book is full of fascination, emulation, and didacticism.

Abdürreşid’s second visit to Japan was three years after the war, where he got the chance to meet prominent Japanese like Prince Ito, Count Okuma, and Prince Oyama. Abdürreşid underlines repetitively how these great statesmen were living a modest life, Oyama being a school principal and Togo living in a tiny Tokyo house,

²⁰³ İsmail Türkoğlu, *Sibiryalı Meşhur Seyyah Abdürreşid Ibrahim* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1997), 7.

²⁰⁴ Selçuk Esenbel, “Japan’s Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945,” *American Historical Review* 109, no. 4 (October 2004): 1140–70.

²⁰⁵ Hakan Kırımlı, *National Movements and National Identity Among the Crimean Tatars (1905-1916)* (Leiden-New York-Köln: Brill, 1996), 59-60.

unlike Muslim rulers of the time.²⁰⁶ Perhaps the most telling example of Abdürreşid's amazement is his comments when he sets foot in Port Arthur:

Port Arthur: There is no doubt that the mere pronunciation of this name brings many things to mind. On the one hand, the breaking of the nose of the great Russian state. The tyrants who have been stepping forward in the East for two hundred years, making many of God's creatures and millions of people bleed, rolling back fifty years into the pit of destruction... [On the other hand,] the emergence of a tiny folk with no reputation in the world that made the entire humanity tremble is a marvel that will never be forgotten.²⁰⁷

Abdürreşid presented Japan as an Oriental nation, while not openly categorizing Russia as a Western one. His writings in *Âlem-i Islam* and *Sırât-ı Müstakim* and his conferences in Istanbul, Bursa, and Yalova highlighted a contrast between backward and barbaric Russia and virtuous, developed, and devoted Japan. His focus is on the morality and mentality of the belligerents but not on their material capabilities or political institutions. Hence, the Muslim world should follow the path of the Japanese to attain salvation.

For Abdürreşid, Russia was defeated because, the Russians were ignorant and lacked national feelings although they had the economic means.²⁰⁸ On the contrary,

Abdürreşid claimed that he had not met a Japanese who could not read.²⁰⁹

Abdürreşid points out the importance of literacy and acquiring knowledge in Japanese progress. He underlined the high quantity and cheapness of Japanese newspapers, stating that the aim of these newspapers is not profit but education.²¹⁰

While differentiating the Russian and the Japanese experience, Abdürreşid wanted the audience to take the Japanese path into consideration. He praised national notions

²⁰⁶ Abdürreşid Ibrahim, *Âlem-i Islam ve Japonya'da Islamiyet'in Yayılması*, cilt. 1, (Istanbul: İşaret, 2003), 501-4.

²⁰⁷ Abdürreşid Ibrahim, *Âlem-i Islam ve Japonya'da Islamiyet'in Yayılması*, cilt. 2, (Istanbul: İşaret, 2003), 68.

²⁰⁸ Abdürreşid Ibrahim and Musa Kâzım, "Ahvâl-i Âlem-i Islam Hakkında," *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(85) (April 21, 1910), 120.

²⁰⁹ Abdürreşid Ibrahim, "Şarkın Intibah ve Istikbali Hakkında," *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(91) (June 2, 1910), 229.

²¹⁰ "Abdürreşid Ibrahim Efendi'nin Nutku," *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(82) (March 30, 1910), 70.

but, in the meantime, highlights the importance of Muslim unity. In one of his speeches, he tells the reason why he is preaching about the Japanese:

The reason why I am telling you about the moral virtues and national feelings of the Japanese nation is that if we have good morals like them, we will be able to liberate ourselves from European domination just as they liberated themselves from European domination.²¹¹

Abdürreşid's promotion of Japanese values was intended to urge the Muslims to acquire those traits. Only in this way could the Muslims across the world who were under the chains of colonialism would break their chains and gain their own independence.

As a Siberian Tatar under the rule of Russia, Abdürreşid was highly against imperialism. However, it seems that he was against *European* imperialism rather than imperialism as a whole. He mostly ignored the fact that the Russo-Japanese War was a war for colony acquisition and that Japan had imperial ambitions in the Far East. He did not turn a blind eye to Japanese imperialism; on the contrary, he seems to endorse it. He claimed that the Japanese policy at the colonies is to revive and develop them.²¹² Therefore, he believed that the Chinese would benefit more than the Japanese after joining Japan.²¹³ Similarly, Abdürreşid quoted a Korean peasant who expressed his desire to join Japan since Japan is “a sun that has risen over the whole world.”²¹⁴ Ignorance of the role of Japanese imperial policy during the war was not limited to Abdürreşid in Islamist circles. Many writers praised how Japan challenged European imperialism.

²¹¹ Abdürreşid Ibrahim, “Ahvâl-i Âlem-i Islam Hakkında,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(84) (April 14, 1910), 107.

²¹² Abdürreşid, *Âlem-i Islam* c. 2, 32.

²¹³ Abdürreşid, *Âlem-i Islam* c. 2, 142.

²¹⁴ Abdürreşid Ibrahim, “Şarkın İntibah ve Istikbali Hakkında,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(93) (June 16, 1910), 266.

4.4.2. The Torchbearer: *Sırât-ı Müstakim* and the War:

The flagship of Islamist circles of the time was *Sırât-ı Müstakim*. The journal was founded by Eşref Edib and Ebü‘ulâ Mardin in 1908 after the Young Turk Revolution. Almost all prominent writers with Turco-Islamic worldviews were writing for *Sırât-ı Müstakim*: Mehmed Akif, Musa Kâzım, Ömer Ferid, Abdürreşid Ibrahim, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Yusuf Akçura. Most of these writers were glad to see Russia defeated but were even more glad to see that Russia was defeated by an Eastern nation. Accordingly, this Eastern nation equipped itself with the material power of the West and the moral power of the East.

For Musa Kazım, who served as the *şeyhülislâm* after the revolution, the Japanese successfully synthesized material and moral dimensions. Accordingly, France lacked morality, whereas Britain and Japan have both. Hence, the Ottomans should be like Japan so that they could “shake” Europe.²¹⁵ This ideal marriage of materiality and morality was a constant theme among the Ottoman intellectuals since the 19th century, and now Japan has constituted the greatest example of the success of this path.

In order to demonstrate the reasons for the Japanese success, the journal translated a French pamphlet examining the power of the Japanese. The pamphlet underscored the influence of Confucianism, Shintoism,²¹⁶ and the legacy of *Bushido*.²¹⁷ These tenets provided the Japanese the moral spirit they needed and prevented them from losing their *volksgeist*. Yet, as in the case of Abdürreşid, most of these intellectuals remained silent and endorsed the Japanese when they used their morality to acquire

²¹⁵ Abdürreşid Ibrahim and Musa Kâzım, “Ahvâl-i Âlem-i Islam Hakkında,” 124.

²¹⁶ “1909 Senesinde Japonya’nın Kuvâsı,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 3(64) (November 25, 1909), 183-184.

²¹⁷ “1909 Senesinde Japonya’nın Kuvâsı,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 3(69) (December 30, 1909), 262.

colonies. Veliyyullah Enverî's justification for the Sino-Japanese War is ironic. He mentioned that Japan attempted to awake China from her sleep by sending Prince Ito. Yet, the Chinese rejected the Japanese advice. Thus, the Japanese felt the necessity to correct China through war.²¹⁸ The rhetoric of Enverî was strikingly similar to the European colonizers who initiated the *mission civilisatrice*, but this time the mission was undertaken by a non-Christian state.

The religion of Japan was another topic of discussion among the Islamic circles in Istanbul. Many were convinced that Japanese ethics were close to Islam and that Japan would soon convert to Islam. Pertev Bey himself stated that except for the absence of hejab for women and consumption of alcohol, the Japanese customs were mainly in line with the sharia.²¹⁹ According to two pupils of Abdürreşid in Tokyo, Japanese ethics were precisely the same as Turco-Muslim ethics.²²⁰ As expected, Abdürreşid was the spearhead of such discussions. In Yalova, he declares that the Ottomans were still asleep, and

[a]mong the nations of the Orient, there is only one nation that has progressed, and that is Japan. If this tribe accepts Islam in its entirety, it will be possible for all Muslims in Asia to progress and grow into a man... The Japanese are the most advanced nation today. They will enlighten the whole Orient with their knowledge and skills.²²¹

So, the progress of Muslims was dependent on Japan's conversion to Islam.

Abdürreşid's companion and the first Japanese to convert to Islam, Hacı Ömer

(Yamaoka), repeated on several occasions that there are plans for the construction of

²¹⁸ Veliyyullah Enverî, "Japonlar ve Âlem-i İslam," *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(86) (April 28, 1910), 139.

²¹⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK, Dosya no.: 240, Gömlek no.: 5.

²²⁰ Hasan and Fehmi, "Mekâtib," *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 5(130) (March 2, 1911), 431.

²²¹ Abdürreşid İbrahim, "Müslümanlar Çalışırsa, Yaşayacak, İlerleyecek," *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(99) (July 28, 1910), 357.

mosques and Islamic schools across Japan.²²² The hope for Japanese conversion to Islam was not limited to Islamist circles.

4.4.3. *The Turkic Nationalist Press:*

Nationalist circles of the time, as already underlined, did not signify a clear distinction from an Islamist way of thinking. A Turkic nationalist was also a supporter of unity among the Muslims and vice-versa. Ironically, none of the Turkic nationalists who will be mentioned here were of Ottoman Turkish origin. Yusuf Akçura was from Kazan, Ismail Gaspiralı was a Crimean Tatar, Ahmed Agaoglu was an Azerbaijani Turkish, and Ziya Gökalp was Kurdish. The first three wrote about the war; however, they were more focused on its impact on Russia and the revolution since they were Muslims who lived under Russian rule.

Yusuf Akçura, for instance, was conveying the stance of Russian newspapers during the war. He complained about the bias of the Russian newspapers because they presented what the Russian public wanted to hear: victory.²²³ His article at *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* was much more comprehensive. He started his examination from the rise of knyazs until Nicholas II's rule. Accordingly, both the labor class and the peasants were displeased with the government, which in return triggered the revolution.²²⁴ However, he barely mentioned one vital foreign development that occurred during the revolution: the war with Japan. Unlike the Young Turks and some Islamist

²²² “Ahvâl-i Âlem-i Islam Hakkında Hacı Ömer (Yamaoka) Efendi'nin Nutku,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(83) (April 6, 1910), 88.

²²³ Yusuf Akçura, *Sürgünden İstanbul'a Dârulhilâfet Mektupları*, hazırlayan Ismail Türkoğlu, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2016), 213.

²²⁴ Akçuraoglu Yusuf, *Eski “Şûrâ-yı Ümmet”te Çıkan Makalelerimden*, (İstanbul: Tanin Matbaası, H-1329 [1911]), 59-60.

writers, Akçura was more cautious towards the Japanese path.²²⁵ Akçura was not alone in his balanced view of Japan.

Ismail Gaspiralı was another writer who was trying not to provoke Russia. He agreed on the benefit of establishing relations with Japan and the traits of the Japanese:

“[W]e saw with our own eyes how well-mannered, how loyal, how humanitarian this tribe was, and how much they loved us.”²²⁶ Yet, Gaspiralı seemed unconvinced whether Japan could constitute an example for the Muslims or not. He argued that Japan could not present a pattern or a specific way for Tatars, Turks or Iranians because the social conditions of Japan and these people were different.²²⁷ Gaspiralı’s doubts about the Japanese way of progress can be considered as a critique of the existence of one particular path for progress, which would, in the following decades named the modernization theory.

Another intellectual among the Muslim subjects of Russia was Ahmet Ağaoğlu. He was also cautious in his views about the belligerents of the war. He did not hide his positive views on Japan; however, he was also trying to appease Russia. He praised Japan, which had successfully transformed from a “community” into a “nation” by securing her sovereignty.²²⁸ During the debates of a potential conversion of Japan into Islam, he declared that “[i]t is through this hard-working nation that Islam can get rid of its current plight and shine like a sun.”²²⁹ Nevertheless, he felt the necessity

²²⁵ Kreiser, “Der Japanische Sieg über Russland,” 236.

²²⁶ Ismail Gaspiralı, “Japonya-Türkiye,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet*, September 9, 1907. Quoted in Hazırlayan Sabri Arıkan, *Kendi Kaleminden İsmail Bey Gaspiralı’nın İdealleri, İşleri, Tavsiyeleri ve Haberleri I*, (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2006), 197

²²⁷ Kreiser, “Der Japanische Sieg über Russland,” 235.

²²⁸ Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *İhtilâl mi İnkılâp mı*, (Ankara: Alaeddin Kırıl Basımevi, 1942), 69.

²²⁹ Ahmet Ağayev, “İslam ve Yaponya”, *İrşad* (118) (May 21, 1906). Quoted in Chingiz Asadov, “Ahmet Ağaoğlu’nun İrşad Gazetesi’ndeki Yazıları (1905-1906),” MA diss., (Marmara University, 2019), 43.

to remind the loyalty of the Russian Muslims to St. Petersburg and how bravely they fought against Japan.²³⁰ The reason for this, of course, was that *İrşad* was being published in Russian-controlled Baku. Praise of Japan would lead to the end of the publication of *İrşad*. Hence, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, as in the cases of Akçura and Gaspıralı, tried to keep a balance in their comments on Japan in order not to provoke Russia.

Ziya Gökalp, on the other hand, had no such concerns. His approach to Japan was based on his doctrine of nationalism. He argued that a nation was distinguished by its ideals and will, and the Japanese demonstrated a strong will for modernization.²³¹ Indeed, Gökalp integrated the Japanese path into his Durkheimian theory of sociology. While distinguishing culture and civilization, Gökalp pointed out the example of Japan. For him, Japan had joined the Western civilization without changing her culture. The Japanese were now considered Europeans, and they had achieved it without compromising their religion and national identity.²³² In this way, Gökalp was asserting that the same path would work for the Ottomans. Ali Canip, a fellow columnist of Gökalp in *Genç Kalemler*, also objected to the total imitation from the West and instead proposed the German and Japanese paths.²³³ This theme of selective adaptation was recurrent among the nationalist and Islamist circles of the Ottoman Empire.

²³⁰ A. Holly Shissler, *Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 155.

²³¹ Ziya Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, (İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2021), 64-65.

²³² Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, Hazırlayan Mehmet Kaplan, (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1972), 55-66.

²³³ Masami Arai, *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*, (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 42.

Authors like Ağaoğlu and Gökalp emphasized how Japan became a “nation” through the adoption of Western science but, more importantly, without abandoning her cultural identity. Their focus was on the nationhood of Japan. Intellectuals with more Islamic tendencies, on the other hand, frequently referred to the combination of Japanese moral traits and European science as the path that led to victory for Japan. The emphasis of nationalists and Islamists on Japanese ethics and culture would also repeat itself in the publications of the Young Turks. However, in addition to a civilizationist and culturalist interpretation of the Japanese victory over Russia, the Young Turks brought another fundamental dimension: A call for an end to absolutism and the restoration of the constitution.

4.5. The War and the Young Turks

The Young Turk movement that emerged during the reign of Abdulhamid claimed to be what the Sultan was not: the Sultan was authoritarian; they were liberal. The Sultan annulled the constitution and the parliament; they were staunch supporters of the reclamation of both. The Sultan was afraid of the people’s will; they were the voice of the people’s will. The Sultan was betraying the empire by fueling intra-empire ethnic disputes; the Young Turks were the true patriots who were trying to bond the empire. However, it would hardly prove to be the case.

Although the Young Turks claimed to be the representatives of the people’s will, in reality, they were an intellectual club that had little confidence in the opinion of the masses. Deeply influenced by Gustave Le Bon’s theory of the masses, the Young Turks did not want to delegate power to the parliament but instead wanted a rule of

the enlightened.²³⁴ Nevertheless, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the Young Turks were still in opposition. They did not have the opportunity to rule until 1908 or even until the 1910s. During the war, the Young Turks acted as they portrayed themselves. They played to the feelings of the Ottoman public opinion, presenting the war and Japan's victory as the triumph of modernized, national, and constitutional government. At that time; however, when the Young Turks referred to nationalism, they meant Ottomanism. The fear of the emergence of national movements among the imperial subjects forced the Young Turks to be more inclusive.²³⁵

Neither Islamists nor nationalists; no Ottoman has ever vehemently embraced the Japanese victory over Russia as the Young Turks did. For the Young Turks, Japanese victory was everything they yearned for. First of all, the archenemy of the Ottoman Empire was brought to her knees. Secondly, it was done not by the British or the Germans; it was done by an Oriental power: Japan. Thirdly, Japan achieved this by undergoing a rapid process of modernization which was assumed impossible by the West. Fourthly, during the process, the Japanese picked the path of selective acquisition, borrowing the science of Europe but simultaneously keeping their own national culture.

Last but not least, perhaps most importantly, Japan had a constitutional government with a parliament, whereas Russia was the patron of all absolute monarchies. This aspect drew the essential distinction between the Young Turk's fascination with

²³⁴ M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: the Young Turks, 1902-1908*, (New York: Oxford UP, 2001), 308-311.

²³⁵ Yuri A. Petrosian, *Turetskaia Publitsistika Epokhi Reform v Osmanskoi Imperii (konets XVIII — nach. XX v.)*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1985), 80.

Japan and other Ottomans. All aspects mentioned above were utilized by the Young Turks to promote their opposition against the Hamidian regime. Because the Japanese example, in the eyes of the Young Turks, constituted a three-sided response to the threats of dissolution, foreign intervention, and an autocratic sultan.²³⁶ The Russo-Japanese War in the Young Turk press was not really about an international war happening in the Far East; it was a civil war of words occurring between the Young Turks and the Hamidian regime.

The chief criticism of the Young Turks against the Sultan was his authoritarian rule, and the Young Turks did their best to use the Russo-Japanese War to shake Abdulhamid's rule. The Young Turks frequently compared the conditions of the great powers, Greece, Ottoman Turkey, and Iran, to prove how absolutist regimes are economically and culturally backward compared to constitutional governments.²³⁷ Ali Haydar Midhat Bey, for example, called the Ottomans to promulgate the constitution by following the path of Russia, Iran, and Japan.²³⁸ All major Young Turk newspapers and journals, *Mechveret*, *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet*, *İctihad*, *Osmanlı*, *Türk*, *Volkan*, and *Balkan* passionately supported Japan in her war against Russia.

4.5.1. *Mechveret Supplément Français*:

Meşveret was launched by Ahmet Rıza in 1895 in Paris, with its French version. The Turkish version was closed by the French government, whereas the French version kept publishing during the Russo-Japanese War. The newspaper was a significant mouthpiece of the CUP, and the discreet distaste for the masses can be detected.

²³⁶ Renée Worringer, *Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 145.

²³⁷ Petrosian, *Mladoturetskoe Dvizhenie*, 255.

²³⁸ Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 77.

Mardin calls this phenomenon the “element of complaint,” which constantly criticized the weaknesses of the empire.²³⁹ The major point that was criticized was, of course, the absolutist rule of the Sultan. The war provided Ahmet Rıza and other writers to attack Abdulhamid by comparing him with the Tsar.

Before mentioning the virtue of constitutionalism in Japan, the authors first praised Japanese modernization and her victory over a great power. “What a grandiose spectacle - and at the same time heartbreaking for our patriotism - that which is offered to us by Japan!” declares the author with the pseudonym Ottomanes, envying Japanese patriotism with a tone of complaint against Ottoman patriotism: “With a leap, so to speak, this people made its way through the disdain or presumptuous finesse of the Western nations and reaching the level of modern civilization.”²⁴⁰ The author was cheering for a non-Christian nation that achieved to give the West a taste of its own medicine.

Indeed, the fact that a non-Christian nation reaching a high degree of civilization confutes Western colonialism, which was allegedly a civilizing mission. For the West, Japan was an outlier for modernization since they were not Christians.²⁴¹ The Young Turks were, therefore, glad to see a non-Christian power rising because it showed that if an inner race, Japan, could achieve, the Ottomans could succeed as well. The Japanese were labeled “Yellow Peril,” a barbaric race, and put at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. Similarly, contended Ahmet Rıza, Turks were labeled as “Muslim Peril” during the war with Serbia and Montenegro.²⁴²

²³⁹ Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 188.

²⁴⁰ Ottomanes, “Turquie et Japon,” *Mécheret Supplément Français*, March 15, 1904.

²⁴¹ “La Guerre Russe-Japonaise et l’opinion Turque,” *Mécheret Supplément Français*, March 15, 1904. I am grateful to my brother Emre Can for helping me with the French translation.

²⁴² Ahmet Rıza, “La Leçon d’une Guerre,” *Mécheret Supplément Français*, November 1, 1905.

Another striking parallel the authors underscored repetitively was between Abdulhamid and Nicholas. Their reign was characterized by “irreducible autocracy, reign of caprices and morbid nervousness, corruptions, snitches.”²⁴³ The author was warning the Sultan by paralleling Nicholas, the monarch who lost the war and had to deal with internal uprisings, to Abdulhamid. Another anonymous article named “The Two Sultans” declared the archaism of Istanbul and St. Petersburg:

The Sultan and the Tsar, frozen in their torpor as eternal gods, pretend to impose this immobility on the spirit of the century. What demon is playing upon them and striking them with intense blindness - they can no longer see the fever for regeneration and the bursts of freedom that are shaking the nations? The Russian people, in their patience, docility, and mysticism, have seen the stupefaction.²⁴⁴

As is seen, the author highlights that the Russian people and the Tsar was on different sides, and he sympathizes with the Russian people. In fact, the animosity between Russia and the Ottomans was due to the monarchs; the two societies have common habits and customs.²⁴⁵ For the authors, regardless of the nation, the real enemy was the absolutist governments, not the people. Therefore, Ahmet Rıza revealed that

as Ottomans, our gratitude is doubled by this precious observation: it is that the Russian-Japanese campaign has revealed to us the moral, intellectual, and political disorganization of the government of the Tsar, of this government, which has the presumption of coming to civilize us.²⁴⁶

Indeed, the archaism of Russia was apparent in many aspects. The backwardness of the Russian naval artillery was critical in the defeat of the Russian navy in Tsushima.²⁴⁷ According to Ahmet Rıza, the war proved Russia was backward, and the example that the Ottomans should follow was Japan. Yet, there was a crucial

²⁴³ O., “Leçons Japonaises,” *Méchveret Supplément Français*, March 1, 1905.

²⁴⁴ O., “Les Deux Sultans,” *Méchveret Supplément Français*, February 1, 1905.

²⁴⁵ “Tzarisme Democratique,” *Méchveret Supplément Français*, July 1, 1905.

²⁴⁶ Ahmet Rıza, “La Leçon d’une Guerre.”

²⁴⁷ Ahmed Rıza, *Vazife ve Mesuliyet, ikinci cüz*, (Cairo, H-1322 [1905]), 24.

difference between Japan and the Ottomans. While the Japanese could avoid Western influence, the Ottomans did not have such an option due to political conditions and the geographical location of the empire.²⁴⁸ Nonetheless, for Ahmet Rıza, the Ottomans should stop being Russia and become Japan. In fact, some Young Turks preferred to refer to the empire after the revolution of 1908 as the “Japan of the Near East.”²⁴⁹ This line of thinking was prevalent in the official news organ of the Young Turks, *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet*.

4.5.2. *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet*:

Şûrâ-yı Ümmet was founded by Samipaşazade Sezai and Bahaeddin Şakir two years before the outbreak of the war. As usual, the journal was headquartered outside Abdulhamid’s domain, in Cairo. The cadre of the journal frequently wrote on two fundamental issues: finding methods to prevent the dissolution of the empire and uniting the diverse subjects of the empire.²⁵⁰ The journal’s coverage of the war was in line with those two themes. While writing about the war, the authors of the journal, like Samipaşazade, were actually commenting on the Ottomans.

A recurring concept in the journal’s articles on the war was “young.” Considering the epithets “Young Ottomans” and “Young Turks,” in the Ottoman experience, it is no surprise to see references to Japan as “young.” Accordingly, young Japan, resolved in progress, morality, education, and justice, gave life to old Asia.²⁵¹ The dichotomy of old versus young was complemented by another dichotomy, Europe versus Asia.

²⁴⁸ Ahmed Rıza, *La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient*, (Paris: Librairie Picart, 1922), 21.

²⁴⁹ Renée Worringer, “‘Sick Man of Europe’ or ‘Japan of the near East’?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36(2) (May, 2004), 213.

²⁵⁰ Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 253.

²⁵¹ “Muharebe: Rusya-Japonya,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 48 (March 3, 1904), 1.

For the first time, the yellows of Asia were able to stop the whites of Europe: “Now there is such an Asia that Europe will be obliged to treat it civilly and humanely.”²⁵²

In addition to Japonophilia, *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* was highly anti-Russian and, correspondingly, anti-Hamidian.

The authors were not shy of their anti-Russian stance:

This mortal enemy, who has treacherously coveted our national existence for two hundred years, who gave up his woman in Poltava, who burned the navy in Sinop, Çeşme, and Navarin and put an end to our sea power, the frightening dream of the north, the agony of this dragon that grows with every breath, is a great joy for us.²⁵³

Nevertheless, the cadres do not forget to differentiate between the Russian state and the Russian people. On the contrary, they cheered for the rise of the peasants and the labor class of Russia against their government to demand justice and freedom.²⁵⁴ As usual, whenever the authors spoke of Russia, Japan, or even China, they had in their minds the Ottoman Empire. Samipaşazade, for instance, implicated that the fate of absolutism was violent: “Petersburg is in revolt. Moscow is burning. Warsaw is on fire. Massacres are taking place in Odessa and the Caucasus. Here is the result of the tyranny!”²⁵⁵

Sometimes, the Young Turks were much more candid, directly asking the people to draw lessons from Russia and called for an uprising.

Ottomans! Learn your lessons. You were never a slave like the Russians. You were always free, always excited. Today you are more enslaved than Russian muzhik... None of you are rising up... With this stagnation we have shown, the

²⁵² “Muharebe ve İhtilal,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 72 (April 6, 1905), 1.

²⁵³ “Mekâtib: Hubb’ül Vatan mine’l İman ve Japonya-Rus Seferi,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 52 (May 1, 1904), 3.

²⁵⁴ “Rusya’da Fikir ve Asker,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 71 (March 31, 1905), 1.

²⁵⁵ Samipaşazade Sezai, “Rusya’da İhtilal Niçin Hâlâ Muvaffak Olamıyor?” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 87 (February 9, 1906), 1.

whole world considers us dead, and they are attacking us to plunder our heritage, from the biggest to the smallest of the nations.²⁵⁶ Even the Russian muzhik had better circumstances, according to the author. The inaction of the Ottoman people was not the only reason for that. As in the case of Russia, the real enemy of the people and the state was sitting on the throne: “Let us realize that the enemy who sold us and gnawed the homeland is inside the palace rather than outside, and let us work hand in hand as the Japanese have done.”²⁵⁷ Despite the poetic rhetoric, the Young Turks’ didacticism did not elaborate on specific solutions. Instead, they preferred to praise the bravery and patriotism of the Japanese.

Şûrâ-yı Ümmet kept elaborating on the similarities of Hamidian Turkey with Russia, though. An article published in the summer of 1904 was criticizing the internal quarrels of the Russian generals. Afterward, “isn’t the Ottoman army the same?” asks the author, recalling the incoordination, incapacity, and clumsiness of the Ottoman general staff during the war with Russia in 1877-1878 and Greece in 1897.²⁵⁸ After the Portsmouth, an article conveyed that the Japanese were dissatisfied with the result of the treaty. In a similar vein, the article continued, in 1897, the palace lost Thessaly and Crete despite the victories on the battleground; however, the people believed in the Sultan’s mouthpieces *İkdam* and *Sabah* and remained inactive.²⁵⁹

4.5.3. Osmanlı:

²⁵⁶ “Rusya’da Harekât-ı Fikriye,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 68 (February 6, 1905), 2.

²⁵⁷ “Hubb’ül Vatan mine’l İman,” 3.

²⁵⁸ “Japon ve Rus Orduları,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 57 (August 13, 1904), 3.

²⁵⁹ “Japonya’da Gayret-i Milliye,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 83 (September 30, 1905), 1.

Compared to the unmatched enthusiasm of *Méchveret* and *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet*, an article at another news outlet of the CUP was more prudent. *Osmanlı* was launched by Tunalı Hilmi, Ishak Sükûti, and Abdullah Cevdet in Geneva in 1897 after Mizancı Murad's shocking pivot to the Sultan. Later the newspaper moved to Cairo and continued its publication until 1904. Therefore, articles on the war were limited. Nonetheless, an article was calling for discretion, implying that although Russia is ruled by absolutism, it is baseless to think that the empire would collapse.²⁶⁰ Another issue of the newspaper was urging the Ottomans to pay attention to the impact of Russia's quagmire on the Balkans, specifically on Bulgaria.²⁶¹

The newspaper's pro-Japanese stance is well-grounded too, compared to the emotional articles written in the press. The author compares the telegraph engineers of Japan and the Ottomans, praising the Japanese education system and complaining that the Ottomans only had four engineers nearly fifteen years ago.²⁶² Similarly, the author locates the international position of Japan within the European alliances. He underlines that the Japanese alliance with the British was rational whereas impotent Abdulhamid turned away from the British in favor of Russia.²⁶³ Again, we see that the authors' fundamental concern is neither Japan nor Russia; it is the Ottoman Empire.

4.5.4. *Türk*:

Articles that appeared on another Cairo-based Young Turk newspaper, *Türk*, were also informative rather than emotional. Indeed, according to the newspaper, "[t]he

²⁶⁰ "Japonlar," *Osmanlı*, March 15, 1904.

²⁶¹ "Sâika-i İntikam," *Osmanlı*, September 5, 1904.

²⁶² "Japonlar."

²⁶³ "Japonlar."

duty is not to mislead the readers and the public opinion, in such cases one should be neutral and report what happened to the readers.”²⁶⁴ *Türk* was published by Ali Kemal between 1903-1907, coinciding with the years of war. An article on April 6, 1905, provided exhaustive information about the logistical conditions of the Russian army with detailed numbers.²⁶⁵ Such detailed information was not unique, but it was uncommon.

An article published a month after the outbreak of the war compared the war with other great wars of the past century and highlighted the importance of the economy and commerce. The author was pessimistic about the Japanese economy’s sustainability, even though Japan would win the war: Whereas GDP per capita in France was 125 francs, it was only 2,5 francs in Japan.²⁶⁶ Indeed, he was quite right; a year later, it was apparent that it would be unfavorable for the Japanese to continue the war due to limited national resources.

4.5.5. *Doğru Söz*:

Although it was not as prominent as *Osmanlı* or *Türk*, the Young Turk newspaper *Doğru Söz* was published in Cairo too. It was launched in 1906 by Mehmed Ubeydullah and Ahmed Kemâl. The memories of the Russo-Japanese War were still fresh and the Ottoman Empire was in the middle of a crisis with Britain over Aqaba. Ahmed Kemâl attacked the Ottoman government for yielding to the British ultimatum. He claimed that seeing what the Russo-Japanese War has done to Russia and the Tsar, the Sultan was afraid of launching a war. “As long as Russia’s war is in Sultan Hamid’s mind,” Ahmed Kemâl argued, “to avoid a war, even if he could win,

²⁶⁴ “Makale-i Mahsusa: Muharebe,” *Türk*, March 10, 1904.

²⁶⁵ “Havâdis-i Hâriciyye,” *Türk*, April 6, 1905.

²⁶⁶ “Makale-i Mahsusa: Muharebe.”

he [the Sultan] would even give Istanbul, let alone Aqaba.”²⁶⁷ It is noteworthy that Ahmed Kemâl was publishing this article in Cairo, which was under British rule.

Indeed, *Doğru Söz* was fiery when it came to criticizing Istanbul. Japan, again, provided an excuse for that. Mehmed Ubeydullah, for instance, mentioning the rumors of Japan converting to Islam, hinted that the caliphate of Abdulhamid was at risk. Accordingly, the Ottomans became caliphs because they were the most powerful Muslim state of the time. Now, if Japan converts to Islam, she would be the strongest Muslim country and obtain the caliphate.²⁶⁸ Mehmed Ubeydullah’s comments were a vulgar combination of animosity against the Hamidian regime and admiration for the Japanese, similar to the rhetoric of a prominent Young Turk, Abdullah Cevdet.

4.5.6. *İctihad*:

İctihad did not have the journalistic concerns of *Osmanlı* or *Türk*. The journal and its founder, Abdullah Cevdet, were one of the most vocal proponents of Japan and opponents of the Hamidian regime. Cevdet was an ardent sympathizer of the West. Although he was among the founders of the CUP, *İctihad* was not considered an organ of the CUP.²⁶⁹ Nevertheless, the Young Turk insignia was prevalent in the journal. *İctihad* was founded in Geneva in 1904, and it covered the war extensively as long as it was relatable to the Ottomans.

Abdullah Cevdet’s appraisal of the Japanese was in regard to their Westernization.

The common driver of Europe’s and Japan’s greatness was science:

²⁶⁷ Ahmed Kemâl, “Son Akabel!..” *Doğru Söz*, May 17, 1906.

²⁶⁸ Mehmed Ubeydullah, “Japonya’da İslam,” *Doğru Söz*, June 27, 1906.

²⁶⁹ Nazım H. Polat, “İctihad,” in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*.

Europe's greatness is thanks to science. The Japanese, the short, high-moral Japanese, thanks to their knowledge and virtue, beat giant Russia like a child; they chased them from Manchuria; They sank mountain-sized warships and captured more than half of them. Japan achieved this greatness thanks to science, freedom, and virtue. Virtuous Japanese! The Japanese were sending the watches, money, and valuables they found in the pockets of the Russian officers who died during the war to Russia to be given to their orphans and widows. O my Muslim compatriots, Don't you take the goods of your enemy killed in battle into your pockets as booty?²⁷⁰

As is seen, for Cevdet, Western science was accompanied by Japanese virtues that, in return, created gallantry, a virtue that the Ottoman soldiers did not possess. Cevdet went even further, arguing that the Japanese soldiers who died were martyrs, unlike the Sultan's soldiers who died in Yemen.²⁷¹ His sharp tongue and reductionist rhetoric manifested themselves in the anonymous articles of *İctihad*.

One anonymous article, for example, claimed that the Japanese soldiers were clever and intelligent, whereas the Russian soldiers were ignorant and stupid.²⁷² Disdain for the Russians was a common feature in the Ottoman press, yet, such a blatant choice of wording was rare. Another article, however, shows a bit more empathy for the Russian soldiers:

From another point of view, the Russian soldiers are even more worthy of our compassion, for they are inevitably reduced to defending their vast prison and making their already heavy chain heavier. the victory for which they expose their lives will be for them only the most disastrous defeat. The Japanese are fighting for a country where they are free, where they have their share of sovereignty through universal suffrage.²⁷³

After defining the roles of the Japanese and the Russians, *İctihad* proceeds to remind the duty of Japan. Cevdet invites the Japanese to undertake the venture of *mission civilisatrice*:

Japan is becoming more and more aware of its lofty civilizing mission in Asia. He does not only know how to take fortresses and conquer lands, he also

²⁷⁰ Abdullah Cevdet, *Bir Hutbe Hemşehrilerime*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i İctihad, 1909), 8.

²⁷¹ Abdullah Cevdet, "Rusya ve Japonya Muharebesi: Birkaç Söz," *İctihad* (7) (June/July 1905), 104.

²⁷² Abdullah Cevdet, "Rusya ve Japonya'ya Dair," *İctihad* (2) (January/February 1905), 10.

²⁷³ Abdullah Cevdet, "Russie- Turquie et la Paix Générale," *İctihad* (1) (September 1, 1904), 4.

knows how to open new horizons, a radiant horizon for the minds of Asians bruised by infamous despots and by their execrable obscurantism.²⁷⁴ While other Ottomans did this call discreetly, Cevdet craved it. Hence, he had no problem with Korea and Manchuria under Japanese rule; he was against Russian rule. For him, controlling these lands was not a right of Japan, but also was her duty because Japan was civilized and free. It was her duty to defy the oppressors like Russia: “Japan is a bearer of sword and torch: the sword, for the oppressors, for the insolent invaders; the torch for the oppressed for those who wither and die for lack of light and freedom. An admirable example to follow!”²⁷⁵ Indeed, Japan became both a sword and torch for Russia; a sword for the Tsar and a torch for the Russian people. Abdullah Cevdet was hoping that a defeat at the hands of the Japanese would bring an end to autocratic Russia and give an even more glorious victory for the Russian people.²⁷⁶

Ictihad did not waste time to imply that the Hamidian regime would face the same fate as the Tsar. Accordingly, St. Petersburg helped the Sultan consolidate his power and abolish the constitution because both had the same aim: the annihilation of Turkey.²⁷⁷ The Tsar-Sultan analogy was a fertile ground for the Young Turks; however, *Ictihad* took this analogy one step further and regularly implied that Nicholas was Abdulhamid’s patron. Per *Ictihad*, the Sultan expressed that “If the people make an attempt against me, they will find the Russian battleships in front of Beşiktaş and themselves under the whips of the Cossacks.”²⁷⁸ The Sultan was indeed anxiously following the unrest in Russia. Yet, it is highly unlikely that he would make such a statement. *Ictihad* made its intentions clear about the

²⁷⁴ Abdullah Cevdet, “Le Japon porteur de flambeau,” (5) (April/May 1905), 77.

²⁷⁵ Abdullah Cevdet, “Le Japon porteur de flambeau,” 77.

²⁷⁶ Abdullah Cevdet, “De la Russie,” *Ictihad* (2) (January/February 1905), 7.

²⁷⁷ Abdullah Cevdet, “Russie- Turquie et la Paix Générale,” 5.

²⁷⁸ “Rusya Ahvâline Bir Nazar,” *Ictihad* (3) (February/March 1905), 1.

Abdulhamid-Nicholas analogy when an article implied that Nicholas' fate resembled that of Louis XVI.²⁷⁹ In this way, *İctihad*, under Abdullah Cevdet, became a vocal supporter of Japan. The reason for this support was to emulate them, of course: "Look at Russia, look at Iran, look at Japan!"²⁸⁰ In all three, for Cevdet, the people took the power into their hands.

4.5.7. *Volkan*:

Derviş Vahdetî was also as interesting as Cevdet. He had contacts both with the Young Turks and the Hamidian government. After the restoration of the constitution in 1908, he launched *Volkan*. It became the official organ of the Association of Mohammedan Union (İttihâd-ı Muhammedî Cemiyeti), and the publication policy of the newspaper was declared to be Islamist, liberal, and humanist.²⁸¹ Yet, the life of the newspaper proved to be short, and so did the life of Derviş Vahdetî. He was hanged during political turmoil a year later as the perpetrator of the 31 March Incident.

Although four years passed since the Russo-Japanese War, the precedent of Japan was still fresh for Vahdetî. Japanese patriotism during the war inspired him: "Come heroes! Let us unite. Let us put on the old power of Islam. Let us be a noble nation, like the Japanese, who love their government and Mikado and sacrifice their lives on their path."²⁸² The rhetoric about the Ottoman government was divergent from the pre-revolutionary period. Because although Abdulhamid was still on the throne, the Young Turks seized power. Similarly, *Volkan* invited to draw lessons from the

²⁷⁹ "Rusya Ahvâli," *İctihad* (8) (June/July 1905), 123.

²⁸⁰ Abdullah Cevdet, *Uyanınız! Uyanınız!*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i İctihad, 1908), 15.

²⁸¹ Zekeriya Kurşun and Kemal Kahraman, "Derviş Vahdetî," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*.

²⁸² Derviş Vahdetî, "Öte, beri," *Volkan*, April 17, 1909.

Japanese patriotism and loyalty to Mikado, who was considered a god-like figure, during the war.²⁸³ Nevertheless, the Mikado of the Ottomans was not Abdulhamid; it was the Young Turk government as of the revolution. The Sultan was still under the spotlight. Muhyiddin bin Hacı Emin Ūşî criticized the years of the Hamidian regime, when Japan was marching towards progress, the Ottomans were under the absolutist rule of the Sultan.²⁸⁴

4.5.8. *Balkan*:

Edhem Ruhi was another harsh critic of Abdulhamid. He was a productive Young Turk who was the editor of *Osmanlı* and later, in 1906, founded *Balkan* in Filibe (Plovdiv). The echoes of the war were still present at the time of *Balkan*. The newspaper reported that the Turks were glad to see the Japanese progress and the defeat of a country that made the Muslims suffer tremendously.²⁸⁵ Similar to other Young Turk newspapers and journals, *Balkan* used the model of Japan to present a better, alternative future; and used Russia to frighten the Ottoman people with a darker possibility.

Many stories were told about the Japanese, regardless of the fact that they were true or not. For instance, the newspaper referred to the lavish and luxurious lifestyle of the Tsar and his family.²⁸⁶ On the other hand, according to *Balkan*, Mikado ordered to burn down his palace, arguing that it would be a disgrace for him to stay at a palace while his soldiers in Manchuria were freezing in their sleep.²⁸⁷ Japanese gallantry and patriotism during the war seemed to influence *Balkan* highly. As a

²⁸³ “Volkan: Namuslu Asker!” *Volkan*, April 13, 1909.

²⁸⁴ Muhyiddin bin Hacı Emin Ūşî, “Türkistan-ı Rûsî”den bir Sadâ-i Şükran,” *Volkan*, April 11, 1909.

²⁸⁵ “Japonlarla Türkler,” *Balkan*, September 4, 1906.

²⁸⁶ “İkinci Sulh Kongresi,” *Balkan*, October 3, 1906.

²⁸⁷ “Mikado,” *Balkan*, September 29, 1906.

matter of fact, an entire article named “Who are real Muslims, we or the Japanese?” cites a Quranic verse and implies that the virtues of the Japanese such as self-sacrifice and honor make them more Muslim than the Ottomans.²⁸⁸

For *Balkan*, the Ottomans were not the only ones who were pleased with the Japanese success. Thanks to the way the Japanese have paved, all Asian nations, the Chinese, the Philippino, Indians, and Afghans, were demanding a constitutional government. Yet, the greatest revolution in Asia, according to *Balkan*, would be in Turkey.²⁸⁹ Japan was considered to be the herald of the awakening of Asian nations vis-a-vis the imperial ambitions of Europe.

It is natural that the enemies of civilization, the Europeans, will not be able to bear the victory of Japan, which rose in a corner of Asia like the sun, which it deserved and won with its strength... If Muslim governments adopt the same methods that the pagan Japanese use to free themselves from the constant harassment of the notorious Europeans, they will be able to maintain their political presence on the world map like Japan.²⁹⁰

Again, Japan was considered to be a rising sun, a new great power that was able to defy the imperialist powers of Europe. The only way out for the Muslims of the world from being devoured by Europe was to follow the Japanese precedent: by the institution of a ‘national’ and ‘constitutional’ government.

4.5.9. *Servet-i Fünûn*:

Although it was not a Young Turk journal, *Servet-i Fünûn* was a significant journal of the time. *Servet-i Fünûn* was launched by Ahmed İhsan [Tokgöz] in 1891. It was not a political journal; it was a literary one. Indeed, it is considered to be one of the flagships of Turkish literature. *Servet-i Fünûn*’s coverage of Japan was not from a political perspective but more from a cultural one. To be clear, political and military

²⁸⁸ “Japonlar mı Müslüman, Biz mi?” *Balkan*, October 2, 1906.

²⁸⁹ “Osmanlı Meclis-i Meb’ûsânı,” *Balkan*, September 9, 1906.

²⁹⁰ “Kuvvet Hakka Galebe Eder,” *Balkan*, October 14, 1906.

topics occurred in the pages of the journal as well; however, they were not as prevalent as in the other journals. Surprisingly, these articles were among the most informative ones compared to other Ottoman newspapers and journals. Unlike the others, the journal was trying to brief the readers, not to convince them.

The interest of *Servet-i Fünûn* in Japan was already apparent even before the war. Captain Yusuf Ziya, for instance, examined the Japanese army and the navy, pointing out that the Japanese learned a great deal from German advisors and also from previous wars such as the Spanish-American War.²⁹¹ Similarly, an article reminded that the Japanese were historically a maritime nation in spirit and their navy became a modern one after 1868.²⁹² Apart from the navy, the army was under inspection too. An article at the time of peace negotiations praised the logistical capabilities and the field artillery of the Japanese, arguing that these proved to be crucial in Japan's victory.²⁹³ Indeed, logistics proved to be vital, considering the logistical disaster of Russia due to the insufficiency of the trans-Siberian railway. Moreover, the Japanese army was well-developed when it came to medical capabilities at the battleground, which according to the author should be a lesson to draw.²⁹⁴ Military superiority was not sufficient for a victory, though.

To carry the burden of modern war, a country's economy must be resilient. Thus, several issues of *Servet-i Fünûn* dealt with the economic conditions of Japan.

Accordingly, the small-scale industry was already present in Japan; however, within

²⁹¹ Yüzbaşı Yusuf Ziya, "Makale-i Askeriye: Japonya Devletinin Kuvve-i Berriye ve Bahriyesi," *Servet-i Fünûn* 503 (November 1, 1900), 4-5.

²⁹² "Musâhabe-i Fenniye," *Servet-i Fünûn* 696 (August 25, 1904), 307.

²⁹³ "Japon ve Rus Ordularının Nakliyatı," *Servet-i Fünûn* 750 (September 7, 1905), 338. And Hamdi, "Sahra Topçuluğunun Tesir-i Müterakkisi," *Servet-i Fünûn* 750 (September 7, 1905), 345.

²⁹⁴ "Japon ve Rus Muharebesi Derslerinden: Muhâriplerin Muhafaza-i Sıhhati," *Servet-i Fünûn* 747 (August 17, 1905), 290-291.

the last decades, the Japanese industry has taken huge steps, creating a considerable large-scale industry such as in beer and tobacco.²⁹⁵ As a matter of fact, Mehmed Câvid was confident that the Japanese industry and commerce would “shake” the British and French industry in the near future.²⁹⁶ Câvid’s examination of Japanese industry and commerce which developed only within a few decades convinced him even before the Russo-Japanese War:

European states felt the need to assign a position to this newly born country in the world of civilization. However, after a while, the newborn child started walking with giant steps and on his own... In half a century, Japan has succeeded in covering the way Europe has covered in hundreds of years to reach today's level of civilization. What great achievements he has shown in the way in which he is remembered with a culture of imitation and education, and a hunger for progress!²⁹⁷

Although for Câvid and his fellow writers Japan was an admirable example, they were not vocal in their call for imitation of the Japanese path as in the cases of Abdullah Cevdet or Abdürreşid İbrahim. Instead, *Servet-i Fünûn* continued to publish articles with substantial content.

In addition to a comprehensive review of the Japanese army, navy, industry, and commerce, *Servet-i Fünûn* also scrutinized the Japanese education system carefully. The journal published several articles on education. Accordingly, every child could join primary school, which would be followed by a high school education.²⁹⁸ The succeeding issue dealt with higher education, introducing the readers to the two universities of Japan, Tokyo, and Kyoto, which according to the article had approximately four thousand students.²⁹⁹ As in the case of other topics, *Servet-i*

²⁹⁵ “Japonya’nın terakkiyât-ı İktisâdiyesi: Japonya’da Sanayi,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 741 (July 6, 1905), 201-203.

²⁹⁶ Mehmed Câvid, “Musâhabe-i İktisadiye: Japonya’ya Dair,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 549 (September 18, 1901), 38.

²⁹⁷ Câvid, “Japonya’ya Dair,” 34.

²⁹⁸ “Japonlar’da Mâarif 2: Tedrisât-ı İdâdiye,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 750 (September 7, 1905), 342-343.

²⁹⁹ “Japonlar’da Mâarif 3: Tedrisât-ı Âliye,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 751 (September 14, 1905), 354.

Fünûn does not attempt to convince the reader to follow the Japanese example; they merely present it. It was a rarity compared to not only the Young Turks but also all Ottoman press.

All in all, the Young Turk newspapers and journals made the best of the Russo-Japanese War. As in the case of other Ottoman press, the Young Turks utilized the war in an attempt to break the dichotomies of West versus East, Europe versus Asia, civilized versus barbaric, modern versus backward, and Christian versus non-Christian extensively. In this regard, the rhetoric of the Young Turks resembled that of other intellectuals who were at the frontline of the press, like Abdürreşid İbrahim, Musa Kazım, and Ziya Gökalp. The writings of Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and İsmail Gaspiralı about the war were similar to the others to a certain extent. Islamist and nationalist circles emphasized the selective acquisition of Japan during their path to progress, emulating Western science but, the meantime keeping their national customs and identity.

What set the Young Turks apart was their novel contribution to this series of dichotomies: absolutism versus constitutionalism. They presented Japan as a successful country with a constitution and a parliament, dramatically defeating the patron of all absolutist monarchs, Russia. Of course, the Young Turks ignored the fact that the real political power in Japan was within the hands of a few people; not the parliament. More ironically, the Young Turks even envied the oligarchical government of Japan,³⁰⁰ which was suitable for their Le Bonian anti-mass stance.

Notwithstanding that, for the Young Turks, Abdulhamid's rule was no different than

³⁰⁰ Renée Worringer, "Rising Sun over Bear: The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War upon the Young Turks," in *"L'ivresse de La Liberté". La Révolution de 1908 Dans l'Empire Ottoman*, ed. François Georgeon (Paris- Louvain- Walpole, MA: Peeters, 2012), 455.

that of the Tsar. If the Ottomans could not pull themselves together and restore the constitutional regime and become Japan; then they would become Russia, which was trying to deal with an external defeat at the hands of the Japanese and an internal one at the hands of the Russians.

CONCLUSION

*Around us, it is calm; Hills are covered by mist,
Suddenly, the moon shines through the clouds,
Graves hold their calm.
The white glow of the crosses — heroes are asleep.
The shadows of the past circle around,
Recalling the victims of battles.*

*Dear mother is shedding tears,
The young wife is weeping,
All like one are crying,
Cursing fate, cursing destiny!*³⁰¹

On the Hills of Manchuria

These were the lines of Ilya Aleksevitch Shatrov, a Russian soldier and the bandmaster of a regimental orchestra in the Russo-Japanese War. He wrote and composed *On the Hills of Manchuria* after witnessing the greatest land battle of their time. More than half a million people slaughtered each other at the Battle of Mukden in order to ensure their respective states' imperialist expansions. The battle was a victory for the Japanese, ending the land phase of the war; however, it was a Pyrrhic one, causing vast casualties on the side of Japan. Two months later, at the Tsushima Straits, Admiral Togo wreaked havoc on the Russian Baltic Fleet, which spent eight months on the sea to break the Port Arthur siege and only to learn that Port Arthur had already fallen.

³⁰¹ "On the Hills of Manchuria," Accordeonworld, accessed June 9, 2023, <https://accordeonworld.weebly.com/manchuria.html>.

The Battle of Tsushima was the final nail in St. Petersburg's coffin, which was already in turmoil due to country-wide uprisings. With the mediation of a newly-emerging power, the US, the two belligerents sat on the peace table in Portsmouth. Russia eventually ceded Port Arthur and the south of Sakhalin to Japan and retreated from Manchuria; however, Japan could not get war reparations which she desperately needed. Although Japan emerged victorious, the war cost both sides dearly. Nicholas had to put an end to his dreams about the Far East, but more importantly, he had to cope with a revolution against his rule. Fueled by the effects of the war, the 1905 Revolution ultimately forced Nicholas to promulgate the constitution and establish a parliament. On the other hand, the triumphant Tokyo also had a difficult time after the war due to public dissatisfaction with the peace treaty and the huge economic burden the war brought.

Such impacts were the insignia of "modern" wars. Increasing population, cementing the involvement of the people in state affairs, developing industry, growing economic burden, enhancing technology, and escalating colonial competition have become the features of the wars at the turn of the century. The Russo-Japanese War was the inaugural war of the new century, a century that would witness two world wars.

Another feature of the time was the increasing awareness of the people about the political events occurring in their countries and around the world. Thanks to the advances in transportation and technology, the printed press flourished. Considering the increasing literacy and schooling rates, newspapers and journals reached a wider public all around the globe. Thanks to these developments, people around the world

were able to follow the war and form their own ideas about it. A wide array of people eulogized the Japanese. The West and the East; Europe and Asia; Christians and non-Christians; moderns and the barbaric; the civilized and the to-be-civilized; nations and folks; the colonizers and the colonized were united in applauding the Japanese victory against Russia. In their eyes, this victory symbolized the accession of an Eastern nation to the rank of civilized great powers.

The Ottomans were no strangers to this trend. Ottomans with different worldviews cheered for Japan's victory and Russia's defeat. This joy was parallel to the global trend and had several reasons. The past century was a century of reform for the Ottoman Empire, abandoning the old order and adopting a new one. The classical institutions and customs of the empire were leaving their places for modern ones, which were adopted from Europe. The need for such profound change did not come from out of nowhere; it resulted from a dire need to save the tumbling empire from imminent collapse. The threat of dissolution derived from the new notions and incidents that the 19th century brought, which were not specific to the Ottoman Empire.

The 19th century witnessed the process of industrialization, the rise of nationalism, the proliferation of colonialism, and the propagation of racism. These phenomena proved to be fundamental challenges for the Ottomans. As a multi-ethnic empire, the Ottomans struggled to suppress the national movements of the imperial subjects. Moreover, Istanbul could not cope with the imperialist policies of the European powers, which had modern armies. The rise of Europe to the detriment of the rest of the world led Europeans to racist interpretations, assuming that the current state was

a natural order of things. The combination of these factors was detrimental to the Ottomans, leading to vast territorial losses and European encroachment on the political and economic affairs of the empire. Among the foreign powers, Russia was the most destructive one. Hence, the Ottoman public was glad to see Russia getting defeated. The other belligerent, on the other hand, had no such dark history with the Ottomans and had already proved themselves to be sympathetic. Therefore, when the war erupted, there was no hesitance among the Ottomans.

This enthusiasm was not reflected in the foreign policy of the empire, though. Abdulhamid II's over-cautious attitude, especially when it came to Russia, pushed him to pursue neutrality; however, in reality, his actions implied that he was anxious about Russian pressure. In this vein, the Istanbul press, under the close watch of the Sultan, contented itself with reporting the events of the war. The rhetoric of these newspapers was neutral, and the only intent of them was to convey the recent developments without any comment. However, their journalism was detailed, informative, and advanced, with news sources from all around the world. Still, their journalism lacked a voice. The military observer who was sent to monitor the war, however, did have opinions about the war. Pertev Bey's enthusiasm for the Japanese was evident in his memoirs. His joy was widely shared among the different parts of the Ottoman public.

The Russo-Japanese War was a rare moment where a majority of the Ottomans agreed on a topic. Ottoman newspapers and journals ranging from Paris and Geneva to Filibe (Plovdiv) and Cairo univocally supported Japan, transcending both physical

and intellectual borders. Islamists, Turkic nationalists, and the Young Turks shared the same enthusiasm for the Japanese and the same hatred toward Russia.

The Islamists highlighted how Japan successfully combined Western science with Japanese morality. Similarly, Turkic nationalists praised Japanese patriotism, which adopted Western civilization but did not compromise their national culture. For them, the Japanese proved that a non-European state also could become a part of the civilization. Therefore, Muslims should follow the path of Japan in order to get rid of the European domination.

The Young Turks, on the other hand, in addition to these comments, came up with another interpretation of the war. For them, the war was not only between a European and Asian power; it was between an absolutist state which does not hesitate to crush its own people and a national constitutional state. The war provided a beneficial weapon for the Young Turks to attack the absolutist regime of the Sultan. They used every kind of rhetoric to shake the rule of Abdulhamid. Although they were the followers of a secularist path, they presented the war as a clash between Christians and non-Christians. They did not sincerely believe in the governance capacity of the masses but saluted Japan's parliamentary monarchy. They thought the decision-making power should be concentrated within a limited and elite people, yet, they declared war against the absolutist reigns of Abdulhamid and Nicholas. They became Muslims against the Christians and Asians against the Europeans. The Young Turks urged the Ottomans to restore the constitutional regime and become Japan, a civilized great power that was capable of defeating a vast empire; otherwise, they would end up being Russia, which despite her grandeur,

proved to be very fragile, suffering two defeats; one from the Japanese and one from the Russian people.

All in all, when it comes to discussing the Russo-Japanese War's echoes among the Ottomans, there were two wars, not one. The first war was an international -or inter-imperial- one in the Far East between Russia and Japan. It started in 1904 with Admiral Togo's raid on Port Arthur and ended in 1905 in Portsmouth. The second and the real war, on the other hand, was an intra-imperial one in the Near East. It was a war of words between different segments of the Ottomans and was about saving the empire from imminent dissolution. The Sultan, Islamists, nationalists, and the Young Turks, all had their own prescriptions. The Russo-Japanese War provided a precedent, and each of them perceived the war in their own paradigms and utilized the war accordingly. Unlike the Russo-Japanese War, which lasted two years, this war was already a century old, and it still persists.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources

State Archives of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (BOA), *BEO*, Dosya no.:

3876, Gömlek no.: 290666.

———. *DH.MKT*, Dosya no.: 883, Gömlek no.: 12.

———. *HR.SYS*, Dosya no.: 2763, Gömlek no.: 65.

———. *I.AS.*, Dosya no.: 51, Gömlek no.: 56.

———. *MF.MKT*, Dosya no.: 780, Gömlek no.: 78.

———. *Y.MTV*, Dosya no.: 275, Gömlek no.: 103.

———. *Y.PRK.ASK*, Dosya no.: 223, Gömlek no.: 63.

———. *Y.PRK.ASK*, Dosya no.: 225, Gömlek no.: 137.

———. *Y.PRK.ASK*, Dosya no.: 240, Gömlek no.: 5.

———. *Y.PRK.MYD*, Dosya no.: 25, Gömlek no.: 107.

India Office Library and Records. The Bombay Presidency, “Report on Native

Papers for the Week ending 2nd September 1905.”

Government Papers, The National Archives, UK, Kew, 1904. *“Asiatic Turkey.*

Further Correspondence”. FO 424/206.

Secondary Sources

(Yalman), Ahmed Emin. “The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its

Press.” PhD diss, Columbia University, 1914.

(Küçük) Mehmed Sa‘id Paşa, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid’in Sadrazamı [Küçük] Mehmed*

Sa‘id Paşa’nın Hatıratı, Cilt: 1. Istanbul: Ketebe, 2019.

Abdullah Cevdet, “De la Russie,” *Ictihad* (2) (January/February 1905).

———. “Le Japon porteur de flambeau,” (5) (April/May 1905).

- . “Russie- Turquie et la Paix Générale,” *İctihad* (1) (September 1, 1904).
- . “Rusya ve Japonya Muharebesi: Birkaç Söz,” *İctihad* (7) (June/July 1905).
- . “Rusya ve Japonya’ya Dair,” *İctihad* (2) (January/February 1905).
- . *Bir Hutbe Hemşehrilerime*, İstanbul: Matbaa-i İctihad, 1909.
- . *Uyanınız! Uyanınız!*, İstanbul: Matbaa-i İctihad, 1908.
- Abdürreşid İbrahim, “Ahvâl-i Âlem-i İslam Hakkında,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(84) (April 14, 1910).
- . “Müslümanlar Çalışırsa, Yaşayacak, İlerleyecek,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(99) (July 28, 1910).
- . “Şarkın İntibah ve İstikbali Hakkında,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(91) (June 2, 1910).
- . “Şarkın İntibah ve İstikbali Hakkında,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(93) (June 16, 1910).
- . *Âlem-i İslam ve Japonya’da İslamiyet’in Yayılması*, cilt. 1. İstanbul: İşaret, 2003.
- . *Âlem-i İslam ve Japonya’da İslamiyet’in Yayılması*, cilt. 2. İstanbul: İşaret, 2003.
- Abdürreşid İbrahim and Musa Kâzım, “Ahvâl-i Âlem-i İslam Hakkında,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(85) (April 21, 1910).
- Abe, Tomoyuki. *Japonya ve Türkiye: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*. Ankara: Japonya Büyükelçiliği, 2004.
- Adivar, Halide Edib. *Mor Salkımlı Ev*, İstanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 2000.
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. *İhtilâl mi İnkılâp mı*, Ankara: Alaeddin Kırıl Basımevi, 1942.

- . “İslam ve Yaponya”, *Irşad* (118) (May 21, 1906). Quoted in Chingiz Asadov, “Ahmet Ağaoğlu’nun İrşad Gazetesi’ndeki Yazıları (1905-1906),” MA diss., (Marmara University, 2019).
- Ahmad, Feroz. *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
- Ahmed Kemâl, “Son Akabe!..” *Doğru Söz*, May 17, 1906.
- Ahmed Rıza. *La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient*, Paris: Librarie Picart, 1922.
- . *Vazife ve Mesuliyet, ikinci cüz*, Cairo, H-1322 [1905].
- . “La Leçon d’une Guerre,” *Méchveret Supplément Français*, November 1, 1905.
- Akçura, Yusuf. *Eski “Şûrâ-yı Ümmet”te Çıkan Makalelerimden*, Istanbul: Tanin Matbaası, H-1329 [1911].
- . *Sürgünden İstanbul’a Dârulhilâfet Mektupları*, Hazırlayan İsmail Türkoğlu, Istanbul: Ötüken, 2016.
- Akira, Ikura. “Japan under Paternalism: The Changing Image of Japan during the Russo-Japanese War,” in John W. M. Chapman and Chiharu Inaba, eds. *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War*, vol. II. Kent: Global Oriental, 2007.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 2006.
- Arai, Masami. *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*, Leiden: Brill, 1992.
- Arık, Umut. *A Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations: A Special Partnership*. The Japan-Turkey Friendship Centenary Program Committee, 1991.
- Aydın, Cemil. *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought*. New York: Columbia UP, 2007.

- . “A Global Anti-Western Moment? The Russo-Japanese War, Decolonization, and Asian Modernity,” in Sebastian Conrad et al. eds., *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s-1930s*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Baumgart, Winfried. *The Crimean War 1853-1856*. London: Bloomsbury, 2020.
- Baykal, Erol A.F. *The Ottoman Press, 1908-1923*. Leiden: Brill, 2019.
- Beillevaire, Patrick. “The Impact of the War on the French Political Scene,” in Rotem Kowner, ed. *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Bieganiec, Rina. “Distant Echoes: The Reflection of the War in the Middle East.” in Rotem Kowner, ed. *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05* vol. 1, Kent: Global Oriental, 2007.
- Connaughton, Richard M. *The War of the Rising Sun and the Tumbling Bear. A Military History of the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905*, London: Routledge, 1991.
- Crowley, David. “Seeing Japan, Imagining Poland: Polish Art and the Russo-Japanese War,” *The Russian Review*, 67:1 (2008): 50-69.
- Dallal, Ahmad. “The Origins and Early Development of Islamic Reform.” in *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 6, edited by Robert W. Hefner. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010.
- Davison, Roderic H. “‘Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility’: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered,” *Slavic Review* 35:3 (Sep., 1976), 463-483.
- Demirhan, General Pertev. *Japonların Asıl Kuvveti: Japonya niçin ve nasıl yükseldi?* Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1942.

- . *Rus-Japon Harbi, 1904-1905: İstanbuldan Ayrılışımdan Port Arthur Muhasarasına Kadar*. Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ebüzziya, 1943.
- Deringil, Selim. “Ottoman-Japanese Relations in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in *The Rising Sun and the Turkish Crescent*, eds. Selçuk Esenbel and Inaba Chiharu. Istanbul: Boğaziçi UP, 2003.
- Derviş Vahdetî, “Öte, beri,” *Volkan*, April 17, 1909.
- Ersoy, Mehmet Akif. *Safahat*, Hazırlayan., Necmettin Turinay, Ankara: TBMM, 2021.
- Esenbel, Selçuk. *Japan, Turkey and the World of Islam: The Writings of Selçuk Esenbel*. Kent: Global Oriental, 2011.
- . “A ‘fin de siecle’ Japanese Romantic in Istanbul: The Life of Yamada Torajiro and His ‘Toruko gakan,’” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 59:2 (1996): 237-252.
- . “Japan’s Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945.” *American Historical Review* 109, no. 4 (October 2004): 1140–70.
- Findley, Carter V. *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- . *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Fortna, Benjamin C. *Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Gandhi, Mahatma. *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. VI, Ahmedabad: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1967.

- . *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (1905-1906)*, vol V, Ahmedabad: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961.
- Gencer, Bedri. “The Rise of Public Opinion in the Ottoman Empire (1839-1909).” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 30 (Spring 2004): 115–54.
- Gerber, Haim. “The Public Sphere and Civil Society in the Ottoman Empire,” in Miriam Hoexter et al., ed, *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002.
- Gökalp, Ziya. *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, Hazırlayan Mehmet Kaplan, Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1972.
- . *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, Istanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2021.
- Groc, G, and I. Çağlar, *La Presse Française de Turquie de 1795 à nos Jours: Histoire et catalogue*. Istanbul: ISIS, 1985.
- Haag-Higuchi, Roxane. “A Topos and Its Dissolution: Japan in Some 20th-Century Iranian Texts,” *Iranian Studies*, 29, 1/2 (1996): 71-83.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Trans. Thomas Burger, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991.
- Hamdi, “Sahra Topçuluğunun Tesir-i Müterakkisi,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 750 (September 7, 1905).
- Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. *Preparation for a Revolution: the Young Turks, 1902-1908*, New York: Oxford UP, 2001.
- . *The Young Turks in Opposition*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Hasan and Fehmi, “Mekâtib,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 5(130) (March 2, 1911).

- Hobsbawm, Eric J. *The Age of Capital, 1848-1875*. London: Abacus, 1977.
- . *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*. New York: Vintage Books, 1989.
- . *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848*. New York: Vintage Books, 1996.
- Holmes, Colin, and A. H. Ion, “Bushido and the Samurai: Images in British Public Opinion, 1894-1914,” *Modern Asian Studies* 14:2 (1980): 309-329.
- Isci, Onur. “Wartime Propaganda and the Legacies of Defeat: Russian and Ottoman Newspapers in the War of 1877-1878,” *Russian History* 41 (2014): 181-169.
- İsmail Gaspıralı, “Japonya-Türkiye,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet*, September 9, 1907. Quoted in Hazırlayan Sabri Arıkan, *Kendi Kaleminden İsmail Bey Gaspıralı’nın İdealleri, İşleri, Tavsiyeleri ve Haberleri I*, (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2006).
- Jacob, Frank. *The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge, 2018.
- . “The Russo-Japanese War and the Decline of the Russian Image,” *CUNY Academic Works*, (2015): 1-24.
- Kansu, Aykut. *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, Leiden: Brill, 1997.
- Karagöz-Kızılca, Gül. “News Publishing as a Reflection of Public Opinion: The Idea of News during the Ottoman Financial Crises.” In *The Press in the Middle East and North Africa, 1850-1950 : Politics, Social History and Culture*, edited by Anthony Gorman and Didier Monciaud. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017.
- Karpat, Kemal H. *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

- Kendall, Elisabeth. "Between Politics and Literature: Journals in Alexandria and Istanbul at the End of the Nineteenth Century," in *Modernity and Culture from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean* ed. Leila T. Fawaz and C. A. Bayly. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
- Kennan, George. "Which is the Civilized Power," *The Outlook*, (October 29, 1904).
- Kersnovsky, A. A. *Istoriya Russkoi Armii*, vol. III. Moscow: Golos, 1994.
- Kipling, Rudyard. *Letters of Travel (1892-1913)*, (Urbana, IL: Project Gutenberg, 2004). Retrieved March 4, 2023, from <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/12089/12089-h/12089-h.htm>
- . "The White Man's Burden," *The Times*, February 4, 1899.
- Kowner, Rotem. *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War*, (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2006),
- . "Becoming an Honorary Civilized Nation: Remaking Japan's Military Image during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905," *The Historian* 64:1 (2001): 19-38.
- . "Between a Colonial Clash and World War Zero: The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War in a Global Perspective," Rotem Kowner, ed. *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Kreiser, Klaus. "Der Japanische Sieg über Russland (1905) und sein Echo unter den Muslimen," *Die Welt des Islams*, 21, 1/4 (1981): 209-239.
- Kurat, Akdes Nimet. *Türkiye ve Rusya: XVIII. Yüzyıl Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşına Kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basınevi, 2011.
- Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich. *Zapiski Generala Kuropatkina o Russko-Yaponskoi Voine*, Vol. II. Berlin: J. Ladyschnikow Verlag G. m. b. H., 1911.

- Kurşun, Zekeriya, and Kemal Kahraman, “Derviş Vahdetî.” in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*.
- Kırlı, Cengiz. “Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” in Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman, ed, *Public Islam and the Common Good*. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
- Kırımlı, Hakan. *National Movements and National Identity Among the Crimean Tatars (1905-1916)*. Leiden-New York-Köln: Brill, 1996.
- Laffan, Michael. “Tokyo as a Shared Mecca of Modernity: War Echoes in the Colonial Malay World,” in Rotem Kowner, ed. *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Lee, Hee-Soo (Cemil). *Osmanlı Japon Münasebetleri ve Japonya’da İslamiyet*. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989.
- Lehner, Monika. “A Different View: The War in Austro-Hungarian Political Cartoons,” in Rotem Kowner, ed. *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05* vol. 1. Kent: Global Oriental, 2007.
- Lockwood, William W. “Economic and Political Modernization in Japan,” in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, ed. *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1968.
- London, Jack. Typescript of an article “Russo-Japanese War Article Written by Jack London, July 1, 1904,” Utah State University, Merrill-Cazier Library, Special Collections and Archives, COLL MSS 10 Box 22 Folder 15.
- Lukianov, Igor V. “The Bezobrazovtsy,” in John W. Steinberg et al., ed. *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*. Leiden: Brill, 2005.

Mardin, Şerif. *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992.

———. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000.

———. *Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1992.

———. “Some Consideration on the Building of an Ottoman Public Identity in the Nineteenth Century,” in *Converting Cultures: Religion, Ideology and Transformations of Modernity*, ed. Dennis Washburn and Kevin Reinhart. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

———. “Some Notes on an Early Phase in the Modernization of Communications in Turkey,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3(3) (Apr., 1961): 250-271.

Marks, Steven G. “Bravo, Brave Tiger of the East! The Russo-Japanese War and the Rise of Nationalism in British Egypt and India,” in John W. Steinberg et al., ed. *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*. Leiden: Brill, 2005.

Marmande, Rene de. “French Public Opinion and the Russo-Japanese War,” *Fortnightly Review*, 76 (August 1904), 452; *British Periodicals*, 321-323.

McDonald, David. “Tsushima’s Echoes: Asian Defeat and Tsarist Foreign Policy,” in John W. Steinberg et al., ed. *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*. Leiden: Brill, 2005.

Mehmed Câvid, “Musâhabe-i İktisadiye: Japonya’ya Dair,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 549 (September 18, 1901).

Mehmed Ubeydullah, “Japonya’da İslam,” *Doğru Söz*, June 27, 1906.

- Melton, James Van Horn. *The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe*.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Muhyiddin bin Hacı Emin Ūşî, “Türkistan-ı Rûsî’den bir Sadâ-i Şükran,” *Volkan*,
April 11, 1909.
- Newsom, JNO. T. G. “Dangers that do not Exist,” *The Washington Post*, October 24,
1904.
- O., “Leçons Japonaises,” *Méchveret Supplément Français*, March 1, 1905.
- . “Les Deux Sultans,” *Méchveret Supplément Français*, February 1, 1905.
- Osman Senai and Ali Fuad, *Musavver 1904-1905 Rus-Japon Seferi* Istanbul:
Matbaa-i Ahmed Ihsan, R-1321 [1905/1906].
- Otte, T. G. “The Fragmenting of the Old World Order: Britain, the Great Powers, and
the War,” in Rotem Kowner, ed. *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*. New
York: Routledge, 2007.
- Ottomanes, “Turquie et Japon,” *Méchveret Supplément Français*, March 15, 1904.
- P., A. G. “‘Yellow Peril’ a Myth,” *New York Times*, April 25, 1904.
- Paddock, Troy R. E. “Still Stuck at Sevastopol: The Depiction of Russia during the
Russo-Japanese War and the Beginning of the First World War in the German
Press,” *German History* 16:3 (1998): 358-276.
- Paine, S. C. M. *The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to
the Pacific War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- Petrosian, Yuri A. *Mladoturetskoe Dvizhenie (Vtoraya Polovina XIX - nachalo XX v.)*
Moskva: Nauka, 1971.
- . *Turetskaia Publitsistika Epokhi Reform v Osmanskoi Imperii (konets XVIII
— nach. XX v.)*, Moskva: Nauka, 1985.

- Podoler, Guy, and Michael Robinson, "On the Confluence of History and Memory: The Significance of the War for Korea," in Rotem Kowner, ed. *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Polat, Nazım H. "İctihad." in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*.
- Rajabzadeh, Hashem. "Russo-Japanese War as Told by Iranians," *Japan Association for Middle East Studies*, 3-2 (1988): 144-166.
- Rodell, Paul A. "Inspiration for Nationalist Aspirations? Southeast Asia and the 1905 Japanese Victory," in John W. Steinberg et al., ed. *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*. Leiden: Brill, 2005.
- Saaler, Sven. "The Russo-Japanese War and the Emergence of the Notion of the 'Clash of Races' in Japanese Foreign Policy," in John W. M. Chapman and Chiharu Inaba, eds. *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War*, vol. II. Kent: Global Oriental, 2007.
- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. London: Penguin, 2003.
- Samipaşazade Sezai, "Rusya'da İhtilal Niçin Hâlâ Muvaffak Olamıyor?" *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 87 (February 9, 1906).
- Sareen, Tilak Raj. "India and the War," in Rotem Kowner, ed. *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Schichor, Yitzhak. "Ironies of History: The War and the Origins of East Asian Radicalism," in Rotem Kowner, ed. *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Schiffirin, Harlod Z. "The Impact of the War on China," in Rotem Kowner, ed. *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Schroeder, Paul W. *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1996.

- Seligmann, Matthew S. "Germany, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Road to the Great War," in Rotem Kowner, ed. *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Shillony, Ben-Ami, and Rotem Kowner, "The Memory and Significance of the Russo-Japanese War from a Centennial Perspective," in Rotem Kowner, ed. *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05* vol. 1. Kent: Global Oriental, 2007.
- Shissler, A. Holly. *Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003.
- Şiviloğlu, Murat R. *The Emergence of Public Opinion: State and Society in the Late Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Speier, Hans. "Historical Development of Public Opinion," *American Journal of Sociology* 55(4) (Jan. 1950): 376-388.
- Steinberg, John W. "Was the Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?." *The Russian Review* 67(1) (Jan., 2008): 1-7.
- Strauss, Johann. "Who Read What in the Ottoman Empire (19th-20th centuries)?" *Middle Eastern Literatures*, 6(1) (2003): 39-76.
- Tahsin Paşa, *Sultan Abdülhamid: Tahsin Paşa'nın Yıldız Hatıraları*. Istanbul: Boğaziçi, 1990.
- Takeuchi, Tatsuji. *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire*. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc, 1935.
- Tanpınar, Ahmet Hamdi. *19uncu Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*. Istanbul: Çağlayan Kitabevi, 1988.
- Taylor, A. J. P. *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1954.

- Thorson, Winston B. "American Public Opinion and the Portsmouth Peace Conference," *The American Historical Review* 53:3 (1948): 439-464.
- . "Pacific Northwest Opinion on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905," *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 35:4 (1944): 305-322.
- Tolstoy, Lev. "Bethink Yourselves!" *The Times*, June 27, 1904.
- Tovy, Tal, and Sharon Halevi, "America's First Cold War: The Emergence of a New Rivalry," in Rotem Kowner, ed. *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Türkoğlu, İsmail. *Sibiryalı Meşhur Seyyah Abdürreşid İbrahim*. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1997.
- Veliyyullah Enverî, "Japonlar ve Âlem-i İslam," *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(86) (April 28, 1910).
- Warner, Denis, and Peggy Warner, *The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*, New York: Charterhouse, 1974.
- Wells, David, and Sandra Wilson, ed. *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904-1905*. London: Macmillan, 1999.
- Witte, Sergei Yulyevich. *Vospominaniia Carstvovanie Nikolaia II*, vol. I. Berlin: Slowo-Verlag, 1922.
- Worringer, Renée. *Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- . "Comparing Perceptions: Japan as Archetype for Ottoman Modernity, 1876-1918." The University of Chicago, 2001.
- . "Rising Sun over Bear: The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War upon the Young Turks." In "*L'ivresse de La Liberté*". *La Révolution de 1908 Dans*

- l'Empire Ottoman*, edited by François Georgeon. Paris- Louvain- Walpole, MA: Peeters, 2012.
- . “‘Sick Man of Europe’ or ‘Japan of the near East’?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36(2) (May, 2004): 207-230.
- Yosmaoğlu, Ipek K. “Chasing the Printed Word: Press Censorship in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1913,” *The Turkish Studies Association Journal* 27:1/2 (2003): 15-49.
- Yüzbaşı Yuzuf Ziya, “Makale-i Askeriye: Japonya Devletinin Kuvve-i Berriye ve Bahriyesi,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 503 (November 1, 1900).
- “1909 Senesinde Japonya’nın Kuvâsı,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 3(64) (November 25, 1909).
- “1909 Senesinde Japonya’nın Kuvâsı,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 3(69) (December 30, 1909).
- “Abdürreşid İbrahim Efendi’nin Nutku,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(82) (March 30, 1910).
- “Ahvâl-i Âlem-i İslam Hakkında Hacı Ömer (Yamaoka) Efendi’nin Nutku,” *Sırât-ı Müstakim*, 4(83) (April 6, 1910).
- “Ahvâl-i Umûmiye. Rusya-Japonya Muharebesi: Rusya’daki Te’sîrâtı,” *Asır*, March 14, 1904.
- “Havâdis-i Hâriciyye,” *Türk*, April 6, 1905.
- “İkinci Sulh Kongresi,” *Balkan*, October 3, 1906.
- “İntibah,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 68 (February 6, 1905).
- “Japan and the Open Door: Significant Utterance by Count Okuma,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 2, 1905.
- “Japan Has High Aims,” *The Washington Post*, March 12, 1904.

- “Japonlar,” *Osmanlı*, March 15, 1904.
- “Japonlarla Türkler,” *Balkan*, September 4, 1906.
- “Japonlar mı Müslüman, Biz mi?” *Balkan*, October 2, 1906.
- “Japonlar’da Mâarif 2: Tedrisât-ı İdâdiye,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 750 (September 7, 1905).
- “Japonlar’da Mâarif 3: Tedrisât-ı Âliye,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 751 (September 14, 1905).
- “Japon ve Rus Muharebesi Derslerinden: Muhâriplerin Muhafaza-i Sıhhati,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 747 (August 17, 1905).
- “Japon ve Rus Orduları,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 57 (August 13, 1904).
- “Japon ve Rus Ordularının Nakliyatı,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 750 (September 7, 1905).
- “Japonya ve İngiltere,” *İkdam*, October 11, 1905.
- “Japonya’da Gayret-i Milliye,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 83 (September 30, 1905).
- “Japonya’nın terakkiyât-ı İktisâdiyesi: Japonya’da Sanayi,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 741 (July 6, 1905).
- “Kuvvet Hakka Galebe Eder,” *Balkan*, October 14, 1906.
- “La Guerre Russe-Japonaise et l’opinion Turque,” *Méchveret Supplément Français*, March 15, 1904.
- “London, January 7,” *The Times*, January 7, 1905.
- “London, May 12,” *The Times*, May 12, 1904.
- “London, Saturday, February 4,” *The Daily News*, February 4, 1899.
- “London, September 28,” *The Times*, September 28, 1904.
- “Makale-i Mahsusa: Muharebe,” *Türk*, March 10, 1904.
- “Mekâtib: Hubb’ül Vatan mine’l İman ve Japonya-Rus Seferi,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 52 (May 1, 1904).
- “Mikado,” *Balkan*, September 29, 1906.
- “Muharebe: Rusya-Japonya,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 48 (March 3, 1904).

- “Muharebe ve İhtilal,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 72 (April 6, 1905).
- “Musâhabe 7,” *Balkan*, December 9, 1906.
- “Musâhabe-i Fenniye,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 696 (August 25, 1904).
- “No Room to Live,” *The Daily News*, November 6, 1899.
- “On the Hills of Manchuria.” Accordeonworld. Accessed June 9, 2023.
<https://accordeonworld.weebly.com/manchuria.html>.
- “Osmanlı Meclis-i Meb’ûsânı,” *Balkan*, September 9, 1906.
- “Russia and the Yellow Peril,” *The Times*, February 18, 1904.
- “Rusya Ahvâli,” *İctihad* (8) (June/July 1905).
- “Rusya Ahvâline Bir Nazar,” *İctihad* (3) (February/March 1905).
- “Rusya-Japonya,” *İkdam*, February 9, 1904.
- “Rusya-Japonya Muharebesi,” *İkdam*, April 9, 1905.
- “Rusya-Japonya Muharebesi,” *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, March 31, 1904.
- “Rusya-Japonya Muharebesi,” *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, May 29, 1905.
- “Rusya ve Japonya Muharebesi,” *Sabah*, February 11, 1904.
- “Rusya ve Japonya Muharebesi,” *Sabah*, June 19, 1904.
- “Rusya ve Japonya Muharebesi,” *Sabah*, March 16, 1905.
- “Rusya ve Japonya Muharebesi,” *Sabah*, September 4, 1905.
- “Rusya’da Fikir ve Asker,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 71 (March 31, 1905).
- “Rusya’da Harekât-ı Fikriye,” *Şûrâ-yı Ümmet* 68 (February 6, 1905).
- “Sâika-i İntikam,” *Osmanlı*, September 5, 1904.
- “Says Asia’s Salvation is Stake of the War,” *New York Times*, March 20, 1904.
- “The King’s Visit to Kiel: German Misapprehensions,” *The Times*, June 3, 1904.
- “To Blend Civilizations,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 18, 1905.
- “Tzarisme Democratique,” *Méchveret Supplément Français*, July 1, 1905.

“Volkan: Namuslu Asker!” *Volkan*, April 13, 1909.