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**MUSA KAZIM'S APPROACH TO ATTEMPTS AT THE WESTERNIZATION OF THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE BEFORE AND DURING THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL
PERIOD**

**BY
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Abstract

Musa Kazım Efendi was *Şeyh-ül-İslam* six times in the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1919) of the Ottoman Empire and a member of the "Great Scientific Council" established by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Between the years 1895 and 1918 he published many articles in journals and newspapers, as well as making speeches at the *Şehzadebaşı* Club of the CUP. As a *medrese* scholar in the years 1893-1908, he wrote within the intellectual tradition of Islamic Modernism, expressing views in line with those of the Young Ottoman thinkers of the 1860s and 1870s, defending Islam as a source of civilization and progress. He accepted the need for reform to match the material progress of the West, but argued that for this too Islam could be the source. The traditional side of his attitudes perhaps most reveals itself in his writings on the subject of women.

After the beginning of the Second Constitutional Period, the nature of his writings underwent a subtle change when he chose to cooperate with the Committee of Union and Progress. Many of the members of the CUP regarded Islam unfavorably or, at best, as a means of popularizing policies, of winning over the ulema and of creating social stability. Musa Kazım Efendi's writings of this period, while still claiming Islam as a positive force and as the basis for reforms, were directed towards justifying the policies of the CUP, even where these policies tended towards secularization. Musa Kazım's career showed that members of the ulema could obtain office and a voice within the new constitutional regime, but whether such a solution favored the objectives of Islamic Modernists is more doubtful.

Özet

Musa Kazım Efendi İkinci Meşrutiyet döneminde (1908-1919) altı defa Şeyh ül islamlık makamına gelmiş, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin kurmuş olduğu ilim komitesinde de yer almıştır (Meclis-i Kebir-i İlmi). 1895 ve 1918 yılları arasında çeşitli gazete ve dergilerde (Sırat-ı Müstakim, Tercüman-ı Hakikat, İslam Mecmuası, vb.) yazıları yayınlanmıştır. İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti'nin Şehzadebaşı kulübünde düzenlediği konferanslarda bulunmuştur. Bu konferanslardaki konuşmaları Mevaiz-i Diniyye (iki cilt) adı altında yayınlanan kitapta yer almaktadır. 1893 ve 1908 yılları arasında bir medrese hocası olarak İslamcı modernleşme düşüncesini temsil eden ve 1860'ların Genç Osmalılarının düşünceleriyle aynı çizgide yazılar yazmıştır. Bu yazılarında İslam dininin medeniyetin ve ilerlemenin kaynağı olduğunu göstermeye çalışmıştır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda reform yapabilmek için Batı'nın maddi değerlerinden faydalanmak gerektiğine inanmış ancak bunun kaynağının İslam dini olduğu görüşünü savunmuştur. Musa Kazım Efendi İslamcı modernleşme görüşünü temsil eden liberal bir İslamcı düşünür olmasına rağmen, kadın konusundaki yazılarında ondaki muhafazakar yanı görmek mümkün olmaktadır.

İkinci Meşrutiyet ilan edildikten ve İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti üyesi olduktan sonra, dönemin politik atmosferine uygun olarak, yazılarının konuları ve içerikleri değişmeye başlamıştır. Başlangıçta, İttihatçılar İslam dinini ilerlemeye bir engel olarak görmüşler ve sert bir tavır almışlardır. Ancak daha sonraki politik ve toplumsal gelişmeler karşısında İslam'ın sosyal fonksiyonlarından faydalanıp halkla ve islamcı çevrelerle iyi ilişkiler kurmak yolunu tercih etmişlerdir. Aslında, halkı reformlara ve meşrutiyetin meşruluğuna (dini anlamda) inandırmanın başka yolu olmadığını kavramışlardı. Musa Kazım Efendi'nin İkinci Meşrutiyet dönemindeki yazılarında İslam'ı reformlar ve ilerleme için asıl kaynak olarak göstermeye devam ediyor ancak bunu yaparken İttihatçıların reform girişimlerini İslami çerçeve içerisinde rasyonalize etmeğe çalışıyordu. Musa Kazım Efendi'nin şeyh ül islam olarak yeni sistem içerisinde edindiği yer, bize ulema sınıfında meşrutiyet rejimi içerisinde yer alıp etkinlikde bulunabileceğini göstermektedir. Fakat, yeni sistem içerisinde bu şekilde var olmak İslamcılarının amaçlarına ve görüşlerine uygun düşüyor muydu sorusu tartışılabilir.

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Introduction

I chose this subject in order to understand the responses of Islamic circles to the attempts to modernize Ottoman society in the period of transformation from Empire to Republic. It is possible to study this subject effectively through the writings of *Şeyh-ül-islam* Musa Kazım Efendi, since he was the most powerful person among the ulema of his time. The interesting point about Musa Kazım Efendi is that although he was a *şeyh-ül-islam*, he was also a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and, as *şeyh-ül-islam*, he tried to rationalize in accordance with Islam the CUP's attempts at reform.

There are very few works about the ulema of this period as Faruk Bilici has pointed out his article "İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyet'e Geçiş Döneminde Osmanlı Uleması".¹ Concerning Musa Kazım Efendi specifically, relatively little has been written. There is a short article by David Kushner "Şeyh-ül-islam Musa Kazım Efendi's ideas on state and society" in which he mainly summarizes Musa Kazım Efendi's political thought very briefly.² Abdülkadir Altunsu in *Osmanlı Şeyh-ül-İslamları* and Sadık Albayrak in *Son Devir Osmanlı Uleması* give

¹ Faruk Bilici, "İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyet'e Geçiş Döneminde Osmanlı Uleması", V. Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi (İstanbul, 1989), pp. 709-719.

² David Kushner, "Şeyh-ül-islam Musa Kazım Efendi's on State and Society", *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, N. I, 1967.

bibliographies for him.³ İsmail Kara in *İslamcılık Düşüncesi I* also gives a bibliography as well as translations of some parts of his writings.⁴ There is no other article or book related directly with *Şeyh-ül-İslam* Musa Kazım Efendi, though he is mentioned in some parts of Tarık Zafer Tunaya's books, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler I* and *İslamcılık Cereyanı*.⁵ As primary sources I used the writings of Musa Kazım Efendi that were published in contemporary newspapers and journals; the collection of his writings printed with the title *Külliyat*, and his speeches at the *Şehzadebaşı* Club of the CUP, printed in *Mevaiz-i Diniyye I and II*.⁶

In the first chapter, in order to be able to understand the origin of the discussions on westernization, I examine the ideological and political atmosphere of the Ottoman Empire between late Tanzimat Period and the beginning of the SCP. The Young Ottomans before the SCP and the Young Turks during the SCP were the protagonists in the discussions on westernization. Therefore their ideas and roles are examined briefly. Before the SCP, the Young Ottomans were the ones who struggled for constitutionalism. In this chapter the Young Ottomans' ideas on reform are examined. The formation of the CUP and its role in the discussions on westernization is also discussed.

³ Abdüladir Altunsu, *Osmanlı Şeyh ül İslamları* (Ankara, 1972), pp. 255-259, Sadık Albayrak, *Son Devir Osmanlı Uleması* (İstanbul, 1981), pp. 252-253.

⁴ İsmail Kara, *İslamcılık Düşüncesi* (İstanbul, 1986).

⁵ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*, (İstanbul, 1991).

⁶ *Külliyat -Dini İctimai Makaleler-*, İstanbul, 1336; *Mevaiz-i Diniye*, 2 vols.(İstanbul, 1912-13).

In the second chapter I deal with the ideological and political atmosphere in the Ottoman Empire before the SCP at which time Musa Kazım Efendi was a Islamic scholar. In this chapter I examine Islamist movements of the time in order to understand the attitude in Islamic circles towards the discussion on westernization. To be able to evaluate Musa Kazım's place as a member of the ulema in these discussions, I deal with the Islamist side of the CUP and the position of the ulema and of the Young Turks in general.

In the third chapter I examine Musa Kazım's political and religious ideas during the SCP at which time he became Şeyh-ül-islam. I dividing this subject into two: Musa Kazım Efendi's social, religious and political ideas concerning the discussions on westernization before the SCP (chapter 2), and his ideas on these topics during the period of the SCP (chapter 3). I make such a division due to the content of his writings changed between these two periods because of the changes in the political regime. During the SCP he wrote at length about the issues concerning women. Since this subject constitutes a central feature of the discussions on westernization in Moslem countries, I examine Musa Kazım's approach to these issues.

Chapter 1

1. The ideological and political atmosphere of the Ottoman Empire before and during the Second Constitutional Period

1.1 The Young Ottomans

In 1860, there was a group of men known as "Young Ottomans" (*Yeni Osmanlılar*) who opposed the Tanzimat regime and defended Islamist ideas. Among the members of this Young Ottoman movement, the best known are Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi and Ziya Paşa.⁷ The spread of the influence of material civilization of Europe and the need to solve the problem of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire united these men. At the same time, they opposed the "concession" policies of Ali and Fuat Pasha towards the great European powers.⁸

⁷ In 1865 six young men, Mehmed Bey, Nuri Bey, Reşad Bey, Namık Kemal, Ayetullah Bey, Refik Bey came together in Belgrad Forest for a picnic, and formed the secret association İttifak-ı Hamiyyet — "Patriotic Alliance". Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 10-13. Later they were called *Genç Osmanlılar* "The Young Ottomans". Sina Akşin mentions that although in Europe generations of Namık Kemal, who worked for the First Constitutional Regime, and those who worked for the establishment of the Second Constitutional period, were commonly called Young Turks, the term more likely is used in Turkey for the activists who strove for the Constitutional regime. Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 1987, pp. 18-19. In 1889 a group of Medical students established the *İttihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti*. In 1894, in Paris the *İttihad-ı Osmani* and a group of Ottomans who were challenging the Hamidian regime united, and established *Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, "Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress". Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük*, I (İstanbul, 1985), pp. 173-174, 180.

⁸ Mardin, *Genesis*., p. 10-12

In the 1860s these Ottoman intellectuals believed in two principles, the first of which was "liberty" (*hürriyet*). Without liberty, they argued, there could be no intellectuals and therefore no-one to struggle for the salvation of the Ottoman Empire. Their second principle was the necessity to prevent the disintegration of the Empire and to keep it united. For this, radical reforms in every field of the Empire and the so-called "political brotherhood" (*uhuvvet- i siyasiye*) were judged to be necessary.⁹

To realize these two principles the Young Ottomans relied on Islamic sources and Islam was also the source from which they justified their opposition to the state. Their aim was both to keep Ottoman culture intact in the face of the expansion of Western culture, as well as to make use of what they saw as the benefits from the functions of Islam in the society, while at the same time opposing the palace and its policies.¹⁰ Both Rahman and Mardin mention that the Young Ottomans defended ideas similar to those of Islamist Modernist movements earlier in the nineteenth century.¹¹ Rahman mentions that five prominent Islamist Modernists of the nineteenth century—Sayyid Ahmed Khan and Sayyid Amir Ali from India, Jamaal al- Din Afghani and Namık Kemal from Turkey, and Muhammed Abduh—preached the cultivation of science and the adaptation of the scientific spirit of the West. Their way of thinking was

⁹ Mümtazer Türköne, *Siyasi ideoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, (İstanbul, 1994), 2nd. ed., 97.

¹⁰ Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak...*, p. 78

surprisingly similar, although they had never met each other. The reason for this similarity in their thinking was that they had the same aim: to resist the colonization of Muslim countries by the West and to struggle against the cultural deformation of Muslim societies, in short to prevent their nations and states from collapsing. And the source they looked to was the same—Islam.¹²

Among the Young Ottomans, the writings of Namık Kemal (1840—1888) remain the most important, though there are other writings by Ali Suavi and Ziya Paşa. Their use of certain concepts of Islamist Modernist thought displays parallels with that of Musa Kazım, although they were not contemporaries.

The Young Ottomans in the 1860s consciously used Islam as a source of their opposition in the struggle for reforms and for a constitutional régime. They considered Islam as the only factor that could provide a common public support for their struggle against the political domination of the Tanzimat bureaucrats.¹³ They realized that there was a need to convince the people of the need for modernization in certain fields of social life, such as institutions, education and the judicial system. These ideas constituted the origin of Islamist Modernist thought in the nineteenth century in Muslim societies facing the threat of Western colonization.

¹¹ Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis...*, 1962, 81-82, Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity* (Chicago, 1982), p. 50.

¹² Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*, (Chicago, 1982), 50-51

¹³ Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak...*, p. 77-78

1.2 Islamic Modernism

European countries colonized most Islamic countries and, as a result, Islamic countries had lost their self-confidence; they had become incapable of keeping their cultural heritage and had been intimidated into trying to adopt and adapt modern western thought.¹⁴ To overcome the backwardness of Islamic countries, certain Muslim intellectuals expressed arguments which were later called "Islamist Modernism". It was in the nineteenth century that Islamist Modernism appeared as an intellectual movement. For these Muslim intellectuals, the reason for the backwardness of Islamic countries was not Islam, but, on the contrary, the corruption of it. Rahman mentions that attempts at the reform of Islam opened the way for modern developments, not only through their "purificative endeavour", but also by reasserting the definite authority of the Quran and of the "prophetic example" (*sūnnet*) or Sunna.¹⁵ Islamist Modernists also mentioned that there was no contradiction at all between science and Islam.¹⁶

Another common point among Islamist Modernists was the underlining of the need for activism in the acquisition of military strength for the country. Islamic Modernism also stressed the importance of the cultural and historical background of Islam in providing self-confidence for Muslims in the face of the expanding

¹⁴ Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1979), pp. 212-213.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Rahman, *Islam*, p. 216, H.A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, (Chicago, 1945), p. 44 Afghani's ideas about Islamic reform and relation between science and Islam are expressed in Nikkie Keddi, *An Islamic Responde to Imperialism*, (Princeton, 1989), pp. 3-45. Afghani, Muhammed Abduh and Seyyid Ahmed

Western culture. They also stressed the rational and civilizing function of Islam in history and its role in human development.¹⁷

Rahman mentions that the Modernist argument for the rational and civilizing function of Islam originates in the idea of Muhammed being the final prophet and Quran being the last revelation.¹⁸ According to this idea, human beings had reached a state of maturity in their development where there was no need for the help of a ready-made revelation in order to achieve moral and ideological salvation. They could find their own moral and intellectual salvation and their destiny by themselves.¹⁹

1.3 Political Modernism

The first Islamic Modernist idea for political reform was argued by Jamal al-Din Afghani. The unity of the Muslim world—Panislamism—and populism were two principal elements of his political thought. According to Afghani, only through these principles would it be possible to prevent foreign encroachments and the domination of Muslim lands. Afghani's ideas became influential in the

Han's ideas are discussed in Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, Chicago, 1966, seconded, 1979, 216-217.

¹⁷ Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, p. 220 .Rahman mentions that this idea was first argued by Muhammed Abduh and developed by Muhammed İkbāl.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 220-221.

Ottoman Empire too.²⁰ Afghani evoked not only Islamic sentiments, but also national and local feelings. In the Ottoman Empire, after a long debate between Islamists and Nationalists, the Nationalists had gained the upper hand for several reasons. The most immediate example of this was the rebellion of the Arabs against the Turks during the First World War.²¹ The fundamental problem of Modernist Muslims was how to rehabilitate history so that Islamic society could once again flourish as a divinely guided society.²² The second feature of Modernist Islam was its double orientation. Islamic regeneration was to appear in two directions: against internal decay and against external threats or domination.

In the Ottoman Empire all the ideas of Islamic Modernism mentioned above were defended by the Young Ottomans. They wished to save the empire from collapse and, to achieve this aim, their method was to use Islam as the source of their opposition to the palace and to the policies of the Tanzimat bureaucrats. In other words, they proclaimed that true Islam would restore the glory of the Empire.

It is possible to say that *Şeyh ül-islam* Musa Kazım Efendi should be seen in the context of the development of Modernist Islamic thought. His writings both before 1908 and after 1908 display parallels with other Modernist Islamist

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 227. The men of the Tanzimat invited Afghani to İstanbul to make a speech in order to convince public about the reformation attempts in the Ottoman empire.

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 228. Rahman says that the most important reason of this victory of Nationalists against the Islamists was the personality of Atatürk himself.

intellectuals such as Afghani, Abduh, Rida, Iqbal, etc.²³ The reason Musa Kazım Efendi could take his place within the CUP, as one of the representatives of the Islamic Modernist thought of the Young Ottomans, was because he was the most authoritative person from the religious sphere, as a *şeyh ül islam*..

The Young Ottomans' policy of using Islam as the source of their opposition had not passed over into the ideas of the nucleus of the CUP in 1889. At the beginning of their struggle the Young Turks followed a completely different approach, at least until they realized the function and the significance of Islam in Ottoman society.

1.4 The Young Turks and Westernism in the CUP

In 1889 a group of students in the Medical Military School (*Asker-i Tıbbiye-i Şahane*), who were later to call themselves the "Young Turks", were discussing the same question that had been put forward by the Young Ottomans of the 1860s: how to save the Empire from collapse. The Young Turks were in opposition to the autocratic rule of Abdülhamid II. Their main aim was to restore the constitution of 1876.²⁴ Although it is not possible to talk about a single Young

²³ His religious and political thought will be discussed in the section two

²⁴ In Medical Military School this Young Turk group that established İttihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti in 1889 were constituting one of the influential opposition groups in the Ottoman society. İttihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti was established by İbrahim Temo, İshak Sükuti, Abdullah Cevdet, Mehmed Reşid. In time, many groups joined to this nucleus of the CUP, thus, it would not be possible to talk about a certain Young Turk ideology. Including this nucleus group, Young Turks

Turk ideology, it may be said that the idea of Ottomanism united them. The nucleus of the CUP aimed to prevent the Empire from collapse by the creation of an Ottoman citizenship.²⁵ This nucleus, who might be regarded as Ottomanist/Westernists, insisted on the need for reforms of a Western kind, replacing religion with science. This group's approach towards Islam was quite different from that of the Young Ottomans in the 1860s: Islam was seen to be the main obstacle to the progress of Ottoman society. For them Western reforms and application of scientific principles to every sphere of social life were the only ways to progress. Unlike the Young Ottomans, they did not consider Islam to be the source of their opposition to the Sultan. Ideas deriving from the eighteenth century European Enlightenment, including notions of biological determinism and the positivism of Auguste Comte, whose motto was science "as a new religion of societies", influenced them considerably.²⁶ However, they never rejected the social functions of Islam. For example, Ahmed Rıza Bey, who may be regarded as one of these Westernists, regarded Islam as crucial to society in terms of its social functions, although he did not see any divine value in it.²⁷ Namık Kemal also stressed the social functions of Islam. He argued that if the religious authorities, instead of giving theological speeches in the mosques, would teach the essence of religious subjects to the public, then misconceptions about Islam would be

were from different origins, but they were seeing themselves as Ottoman patriotists. In abroad Young Turks ideologically were generally in conflict.

²⁵ Hanioglu, p. 69-70

²⁶ Hanioglu, p. 46

eliminated.²⁸ Among the Young Turks, Abdullah Cevdet, like Ahmed Rıza Bey, took into consideration Islam's social functions. For him Islam played a corrective role in stabilizing society.²⁹

The Young Turks, like the Young Ottomans, accepted the superiority of the West and searched for the sources of this superiority. The answer lay for them in “abstract and practical sciences” (*ilim* and *fünun*).³⁰ In the Ottoman press, of both traditionalist and Westernist persuasions, a number of articles stressed the need for the development of abstract and practical sciences for the progress of Ottoman society. For them, developments in abstract and practical sciences and the consequent progress explained the superiority of European countries.³¹

In the exited atmosphere of these discussions, the Young Turks neglected the fact that these ideas were, to a great extent, in opposition to the realities of Ottoman society. In Ottoman society religion was one of the main determinants of social structure. For the Young Turks, Islam was an obstacle to society's progress. Time showed however that it was unwise to apply these ideas in a simplistic way to Ottoman society.³²

When the Young Turks did not receive the response they desired from the public in terms of opposition to the Hamidian regime, they realized the

²⁷ Mardin, *Genesis...*, p. 183n.

²⁸ Mardin, *The Genesis...*, p. 322

²⁹ Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 5th. ed. (İstanbul, 1996), p. 231

³⁰ Hanioglu, p. 16-20, N 31-36.

³¹ Hanioglu, p. 21.

³² Hanioglu, p. 40-41.

importance of religious values as a means of convincing people of the need for reforms and to get their support against the autocratic regime. Around 1895 the Young Turks tried to establish relationships with various groups in society with the aim of uniting them under their association. Among these social groups the ulema was the first to whom they turned. As early as 1894, Hüseyinzade Ali and İshak Sükuti, who founded the first organizational branch of the nucleus of the CUP, secured a promise of support from Ubeydullah Efendi, a prominent member of the ulema.³³

The common points of the Young Ottomans from the 1860s to 1876, and of the Young Turks after 1900, prior to the Second Constitutional Period, were their endeavour to benefit from Islam's social functions, the application of Islamic terminology as a means to communicate with the public, and the attempt to use Islam as a means of providing legitimization for their actions and of penetrating the public mind and the ulema.³⁴ But the Young Turks' attitude to Islam was not the same as that of the Young Ottomans. The Young Ottomans had used Islam as a means of defense against Western cultural influence.³⁵ In contrast, the Young Turks did not try to use Islam because they believed in it, but tried to adapt Western concepts to it and used it as a legitimizing factor for new ideas and as a means of explaining them. On the other hand, as Şerif Mardin argues, despite their desire to be radical reformers, the Young Turks' thought was not radical, but

³³ Ş. Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford, 1995), p. 50.

³⁴ Mümtazer Türköne, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, 2nd ed., (İstanbul, 1994), p. 78.

conservative.³⁶ The concepts of democracy and liberty did not belong to their basic principles; they were a mechanism to prevent the collapse of the empire. They believed in the necessity of the dominance of freedom and democracy in a political regime so that the different ethnic groups of the empire would not demand to separate.³⁷

The reason for their essential conservatism and their failure to become radical reformers was that they had the characteristics of the society in which they grown up.³⁸ They appeared as the product of the Tanzimat period's ideological atmosphere. As Şerif Mardin argues, since the men of Tanzimat could not find anything to replace the Sharia in political terms, an ideological gap occurred. Western ideas and secular thought were not able to fill this gap and this caused an identity problem in Ottoman society.³⁹

1.5 Islamist Movements in the Second Constitutional Period

Following on from the organizations which had developed from 1889 onwards and which had become connected with Paris, the main CUP branch was established by the "military officers" in 1906 under the name of "The Ottoman Freedom Association" (*Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*). In 1907 this group joined with the group in Paris, adopting the name "Progress and Union" (*Terakki ve*

³⁵ Mardin, *Jön Türklerin...*, pp. 90-92.

³⁶ Mardin, *Jön Türklerin...*, p. 304.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 301

³⁸ Hanioglu, p. 613

İttihat) and later "Union and Progress".⁴⁰

The establishment of the CUP by these military officers led to the predominance of the military members in the committee, though civilians joined them.⁴¹ The Reval meeting of the monarchs of Great Britain and Russia, and their common intention to reform Macedonia, led the military officers to act. "The Military Officers of the Army", in the period 10-23 July 1908, succeeded in forcing the Sultan to reinstitute constitutional government, the beginning of the Second Constitutional Period.⁴²

The declaration of the SCP was conceived of as the triumph of the CUP, and it became the most influential political power of the country. However, it is difficult to talk about a homogeneity of political ideas among members of the CUP. In time this led to divisions within the committee. Although there were many groups within it, these can be divided roughly into three: the Islamists, the Ottomanist/Westernists and the Turkists. The latter became influential in particular after the Balkan wars. Although traditionalists like the *Şeyh ül İslam* Mustafa Sabri Efendi split away from the CUP, Islamists became more influential, like *Şeyh ül İslam* Musa Kazım Efendi, Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Babanzade Ahmed Naim and Said Halim Paşa. Abroad, the nucleus group of the CUP—men like İbrahim Temo, Abdullah Cevdet, İshak Sükuti and Ahmed Rıza Bey—were

³⁹ Mardin, p. 118.

⁴⁰ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, I, 2nd. ed., (İstanbul, 1988), p.7.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 22.

discussing the ideology of the CUP: that is, whether the collapse of the Empire could be prevented on Islamist premises or on Ottomanist/Westernist ones. Although there was no homogenous ideological structure within the CUP, this body constituted the major political power between 1908 and 1918 (except for a short interlude) by providing "freedom" to the régime and undertaking reforms in the country. The extent to which Unionists succeeded in accomplishing their aims is debatable. Nevertheless the CUP movement played a crucial role in terms of the discussions on Westernization in the period of transformation from Empire to Turkish Republic.⁴³

1.6 Islamist movements against the CUP's political power in the SCP

The new regime faced its first crisis in Istanbul on October 7th with the actions of Kör Ali⁴⁴. The *müezzin*, Kör Ali, demanded a return to the former regime, leading a group of people to the Yıldız Palace and asking Abdülhamid II for the abolition of the constitutional regime and for a return to the Sharia.⁴⁵ On

⁴² *Ibid*, p. 23.

⁴³ Scholars like, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de ...*, III, p. 9, Şükrü Hanioglu, Feroz Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki* (İstanbul, 1971), pp. 65-66, Şerif Mardin *Jön Türklerin...*, p. 301, commonly mention that although CUP aimed to bring freedom or democracy to the country, it could not succeed in performing these aims, however, it was the first organization united masses and motivate them for reforms. T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de...*, p. 8.

⁴⁴ In November 5, 1908 Bulgaria declared its independence, Austria-Hungary took Bosnia-Herzegovina, Girit decided to unite with Greece, but it wasn't accepted. These developments abroad caused unease in the Ottoman Empire, especially among the religious groups who were resisting to CUP's political power.

⁴⁵ Ahmad, *İttihat ve...*, p. 56; Akşin, *Jön Türkler...*, p. 93.

the same night, Abdülkadir, the deputy of a imam, incited people during public worship in the Yeni Cami mosque to attack cinemas and places in which Karagöz was being performed, arguing that the new regime had weakened the faith and caused increases in "heresies" (*bidats*).⁴⁶

In the course of the SCP, some religious associations and newspapers opposed to the CUP were founded. One of these was the "Party of Liberals" (*Ahrar Fırkası*). It was constituted by the intellectual circle of Prens Sabahattin.⁴⁷ Its ideology was based on individualism, liberalism, private enterprise and the opposition to administrative centralization. The party did not have a particular newspaper, but almost every newspaper or journal that was against the CUP supported *Ahrar Fırkası*.⁴⁸ It was founded by former members of the CUP who had separated from it at the congress of 1902. Some of its party members were prosecuted and some escaped abroad after the 31 March revolt. Thus the political life of the party ended in April 1909.⁴⁹

Another party was "The Mohammedian Unity Party" (*İttihad-ı Muhammedi Fırkası*), founded by Derviş Vahdeti (5 April, 1909), with its press organ *Volkan*.⁵⁰ This party was particularly associated with the revolt of 31 March (13-25 April 1909), since its leader Derviş Vahdeti was held responsible for the

⁴⁶ Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve...*, p. 94.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 143

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 147

⁴⁹ Members of the *Ahrar Fırkası* tried to benefit from the revolt to demolish the CUP's political power and Abdülhamid. *Ibid*, 148

⁵⁰ T. Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de...*, VI, p. 183.

revolt.⁵¹ Although they supported the constitutional regime—as a protector of the Sharia—they strictly opposed the CUP, especially the Ottomanist/Westernist wing of the CUP represented by Ahmed Rıza, Hüseyin Cahit, Talat Bey, Rahmi Bey and Bahattin Şakir Bey.⁵² The Mohammedian Unity Party accepted the Unionists as the founders of the regime, but distinguished "four or five European Imitators" from the CUP as a whole.⁵³ Its party program depended on the Quran and opposed any unification of the people under the ideology of Ottomanism.⁵⁴

A different traditionalist/religious group was organized under the name of "The Association of Islamic Scholars" (*Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i İslamiyye*), founded in September 1908 with its organ *Beyan ül Hak*. The Association of Islamic Scholars reacted to the 31 March Revolt since it had put the ulema into a very difficult situation, the ulema being held responsible for the revolt and blamed for attempting to destroy the constitutional regime. During the 31 March revolt, although *Beyan ül Hak* was apparently criticizing it, in reality it tolerated it.⁵⁵ In its early editions *Beyan ül Hak* supported the CUP, but later it became opposed to it.

Another party shaped by conservative and populist features was the "The People's Party" (*Ahali Fırkası*). Gümülcineli İsmail Hakkı Bey was the leader, and Mustafa Sabri Efendi, as one of the most influential religious personalities of the

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 185.

⁵² *Ibid*, p. 187.

⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 194.

⁵⁴ Ahmad, *İttihat ve...*, p. 78.

time, was among its founders.⁵⁶ The members of the party comprised people who had split from the CUP after the 1908 elections.⁵⁷ This party was not able to have any influence outside parliament and in 1911 it joined to "The Freedom and Association Party" (*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*).

The nucleus of "The Freedom and Association Party" (FAP) was constituted by The People's Party and Mustafa Sabri Efendi.⁵⁸ In the SCP, the FAP was the most influential opposition party against the CUP; its members supported the constitutional regime but opposed the monopolist political power of the CUP. However, as an opposition they did not constitute an ideological unity.⁵⁹ Against the increasing Turkism of the CUP, they defended Ottomanism as the only ideology able to provide unity among the people.⁶⁰ Within the FAP, as in the CUP, many splits and conflicts occurred. T.Z. Tunaya reports that the first conflicts originated in the discussions between Westernists and Ulema.⁶¹

Although many opposition parties and associations were established with the intention of ending the CUP's political hegemony, the coup d'état of January 1913 stabilized the CUP's power in the country. Actually, in the first months of the SCP, influential journals and newspapers of the country (*İkdam*, *Sabah* and

⁵⁵ Sina Akşin, *31 Mart Olayı*, (Ankara, 1970), pp. 21, 235-40.

⁵⁶ T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de...*, I, p. 234, 240. Mustafa Sabri Efendi was one of the most influential person in the Cemiyet-i ilmiye-i islamiyye and the member of the CUP. Sadık Albayrak, *Türkiye'de Din Kavgası*, 4th ed., (Istanbul, 1984), p.101

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de...*, VI, p. 265

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 264, 268

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 268.

Sırat-ı Müstakim) published articles that praised the CUP.⁶² In time though, opposition groups arose. It can even be argued that these opposition groups originated from the CUP itself as its members started to differentiate themselves as Ottomanist/Westernists, Islamists, and later as Turkists. Although such an ideological differentiation arose, generally the nucleus of the CUP continued to try to apply Westernist and Turkist principles in social and cultural life. They attempted to make reforms towards secularization: for example, in education and in the judicial system.

In education there was the foundation of the *Dar ül Hikmet-i İslamiyye*, an organization that had the objective of separating religious issues from secular education, and also the granting of autonomy to the *Dar ül Fünun*. In the judicial system the most important secular arrangement was that *kaza* power was separated from Islamic law and placed under the Ministry of Justice.⁶³ Such arrangements, and the foundation of ministries of justice, education and of pious foundations, limited the power of the ulema. The effects of such secular reforms on the ulema class will be examined below in the section "The ulema and the CUP". All these arrangements aimed at secularization were published in the report of the 1917 congress. But the process of providing a basis for these arrangements started before 1917. In 1913, after the CUP had stabilized its power in the country, it had to get public support for its modernization attempts and for applying reforms. This

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 280

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 33

was very difficult after the disappointing results of the Balkan wars. Thus the journal *İslam Mecmuası* (IM) was founded by the CUP in February 1914.⁶⁴ The objective of its foundation was to constitute an intellectual movement that would consider Islamic ideas and also support reforms, in order to convince the ulema and the *fetva* department.⁶⁵

1.7 Islamism and the CUP

After the declaration of the Second Constitutional Period the most important development in terms of the Young Turks' attitude towards religion was that they did not use Islam as the source of their opposition. Instead, they used Islam as a justifying and supporting factor.⁶⁶ This argument might be regarded as especially valid for the Ottomanist/Westernist group of the Young Turks.⁶⁷

Şeyh ül islam Musa Kazım Efendi (1858-1921), Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı (1846-1912), Mehmet Akif Ersoy (1873-1936) and Sait Halim Paşa (1863-1921) were among the most influential Islamists of the CUP. Apart from the above Islamist thinkers, the adherents of Sufism or Islamic Mysticism were among the members of the CUP (and of the opposition "Freedom and Association Party")

⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 36

⁶⁴ *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, ed. N. Berkes (London, 1959), ch. VI, p. 318n.

⁶⁵ Y.H. Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı...*, II, pp. 375-376.

⁶⁶ İsmail Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri* (İstanbul, 1994), p. 37. Their use of Islam's social function in society to get support from the public for innovations is discussed in section 1.2.1.

(*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*)). Adherents of Sufism published the journals *Ceride-i Sufiye*, *Tasavvuf* and *Mühibban* and founded "The Association of the Sufis" (*Cemiyet-i Sufiye*).⁶⁸ The head of the Association of the Sufis was Musa Kazım Efendi.⁶⁹ Although Sufism did not constitute a definite political movement, during the SCP it made its political presence felt in the CUP. Especially after the dispersion of the center of the CUP (İstanbul) in 1895,⁷⁰ the structure of the Istanbul center became so different from that of the Medical students' one; representatives of the ulema were there in number, civil servants and military officers constituted its body. It can be assumed that from now on imams and the ulema, who had previously hesitated to join the CUP, now formed its central structure.⁷¹

In the discussions how to save the Empire from collapse, the common point of the influential Islamists thinkers in the CUP like *şeyh ül islam* Musa Kazım Efendi, *şeyh ül islam* Mustafa Hayri Efendi⁷², Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Sait

⁶⁷ The nucleus group of the CUP in Medical Military School, like Abdullah Cevdet, İbrahim Temo, İshak Sükuti, could be example for this group.

⁶⁸ Mustafa Kara, *Din Hayat Sanat Açısından Tekkeler ve Zaviyeler*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul, 1990), pp. 276-280, 287- 289.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 287

⁷⁰ Because of Young Turks activities and coup d'état attempts, the palace abolished the Istanbul center. Abdullah Cevdet, İsmail İbrahim Bey, İshak Sükuti, İbrahim Temo were in exile. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak...*, p.186.

⁷¹ Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak...*, p. 188.

⁷² Mustafa Hayri Efendi was also an influential *şeyh ül islam* during the SCP. Although he believed in the principles of Islamic Modernism, he refused to take a position under the CUP. Although he did not publish any works, it is known that he strictly adhered to the principles of Islam. Therefore he did not want to justify the Western kinds of reform favored by the CUP in the SCP.

Halim Paşa and Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı was that to save the Empire the original Islam should be understood and revived. They argued that Islam was not a barrier to progress. On the contrary, for them Islam was capable of ordering progress through science and education. For them, the constitutional regime was in accordance with the Sharia and a guarantee of the application of those original Islamic principles which had brought welfare and progress to the Muslims in the Middle Ages, when Europe had been in its "dark age". Musa Kazım Efendi's historical importance among these thinkers originates from his position as a member of the ulema and later as a *şeyh ül islam*. It is particularly interesting to examine, through the writings of such an authoritative religious figure, how it was possible to rationalize the CUP's modernization attempts in terms of Islam. Even though Musa Kazım Efendi and other Islamist thinkers were defending principles of Islamic Modernism, it would seem, on the face of it, to have been difficult for them to rationalize through Islam the CUP's attempts at reform, especially those which tended towards secularization. In this thesis I will try to understand whether Musa Kazım Efendi as a *Şeyh ül islam* could or could not achieve this.

1.8 The Ulema and the Young Turks

In general, in Ottoman history, the ulema opposed attempts at reform, whether in the military sphere as in Selim III's and Mahmud II's time, or in the

cultural and social spheres in the CUP's time.⁷³ Mahmud II had implemented two kind of policies towards ulema; while he was providing good opportunities to the ulema who supported his reforms, he exiled or dismissed the ulema who opposed the innovations. Those who resisted reforms could be accused not only of opposing secular authority , but also the Sharia itself.⁷⁴ The compromise between the ulema and Mahmud II caused division within the ulema. On the one hand, there was an ulema class who had benefited from the opportunities the state offered, supporting and legitimizing modernization in Islamic terms towards the end of the collapse of the Empire. On the other hand, a part of the ulema class resisted modernization and were therefore exiled by the Sultan. This group directed conservative public groups against reform towards the end of the Empire.⁷⁵ In addition to bringing about this division among the ulema, reforms had also lessened the prestige and authority of the ulema. The establishment of secular schools, of secular courts, of the ministries of the justice, education and pious foundations, restricted the functions of the *Şeyh ül islam* and ulema, and

⁷³ Selim III's reformation attempts were called by the ulema as irreligious behaviors. Mahmud II was also blamed by the ulema of being irreligious and called as *gavur padişah*. Both Selim III and Mahmud II's reformation attempts in military spheres resisted by the ulema., Sina Akşin, "1839'da Osmanlı Ülkesinde ideolojik Ortam ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin Uluslararası Durumu" in *Bildiriler, Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Dönemi Semineri*, Ankara, 13-14 Mart 1985 (Ankara, 1985).

⁷⁴ A.Levy, "Osmanlı Uleması ve Sultan II. Mahmud'un Askeri Islahatı", in *Modern Çağda Ulema*, ed. Ebubekir Bagader (İstanbul, 1991), p. 29-30.

⁷⁵ İsmail Kara, *İslamcılarının...*, p. 48.

damaged the ulema's position.⁷⁶

In the Ottoman Empire, from its foundation, the *ilmiye* class and the institution of *Şeyh ül islam*, as its most authoritative organ, held a crucial position in the Ottoman state organization. Both of them held delegated power in the judicial system, (*teşri, icra, kaza* powers), in education (education belonged to them through the *medreses*), and in pious foundations (through pious foundations they were conducting the state's economic actions).⁷⁷ It can be assumed that this separation was still relevant when the CUP appeared in the political life.

If we consider the response of the ulema class to modernization movements even in the 1800s, the opposition to the Young Turks' attempts at reform in social and cultural life was natural where the social structure was determined by Islam. Şükrü Hanioglu mentions that there were two important relations between the ulema and the Young Turks. On the one hand, for most of the Young Turks, religion was an obstacle to the progress of society, on the other hand, they had to get the support of the ulema. They needed them to approve of the new regime in Islamic terms so as to prevent potential reactions from the opposition, which was arguing that the constitutional regime was invalid in the

⁷⁶Mekteb-i Mühendishane-i Bahr-i Hümayun was founded in 1773, Mekteb-i Mühendishane-i Berr-i Hümayun in 1795, Mekteb-i Tıbbiye in 1827, Mekteb-i Harbiye in 1834; "Secular courts" nizami mahkemeler were founded in 1871; ministry of pious foundations was founded in 1826, of education in 1846, of justice in 1870. İsmail Kara, *İslamcılarının...*, p. 47.

⁷⁷ İsmail Kara, *İslamcılarının...*, p. 46.

Sharia.⁷⁸ The ulema was aware both that the new regime needed them and that they should also consider their place in the new regime. For them there were two alternatives: to support the new regime, to provide religious rationalization for it and to obtain a new position in the new system, or they could dissolve into the system because of the opposition coming from religious people who were treating the constitutional regime as irreligious in the name of Islam.⁷⁹ People such as those involved in the 31 March revolt put the ulema in a very difficult position in society. They were blamed for destroying the constitutional regime (which was regarded as the only solution to save the Empire from collapse) and for acting together with Abdülhamid II. Since the 31 March revolt, with the slogan "We want the Sharia" (*şeriat isteriz*), caused very strong criticisms of the ulema. Members of the *ilmiye* class, by rejecting this slogan in the name of Islam, were opposed to them. *Cemiyet-i ilmiye-i islamiye* in *Beyan ül Hak* published an article addressed to military officers who joined the 31 March revolt, again with the slogan — "we want Sharia" (*şeriat isteriz*).⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak...*, p. 112

⁷⁹ İsmail Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi...*, p. 119.

⁸⁰ "(...)Bugün biz Peygamberimiz Efendimiz hazretlerinin acizane varisleri bulunduğumuz cihetle O'nun emri makamına kaim olmak üzere bizim sözümüzü, nasihatımızı dinleyeceksiniz. Çünkü, Peygamberimizin yüzbinlerce ehadis-i şerifesini biz okuyoruz, biz biliyoruz. Ku'an-ı Kerim'in mana-yı münifini biz anlıyoruz, bu kadar tefsir, akaid, fıkıh kitaplarına mütalaa ediyoruz. Size dininizi biz öğretiyoruz. Biz olmasak şeriatı nerden bileceksiniz, kıymetini nasıl takdir edeceksiniz. Madem ki şeriat istiyormuşsunuz, ne güzel talep, ne ali hikmet. Lakin yavrularımız afv edersiniz o bizim vazifemizdir, sakın vazifemizi gasb etmeyiniz. Sizin vazifeniz cihad-ı fi sebilillhaktır yani muharebedir. (...): "Asker

In general Islamists thought that if the Sharia and the constitutional regime (*meşrutiyet*) were treated as different things, they would lose their place in the system. Therefore they preferred to preserve the ties between the Sharia and the constitutional regime.⁸¹ In other words, the ulema supported the CUP's ideas about reform and rationalized the constitutional regime in Islamic terms by arguing that it was in accordance with the Sharia. Furthermore, some of them argued that the constitutional regime and Islam were the same thing and that the announcement of the SCP was the victory of Islam.⁸² Although the ulema in the first days of the SCP hesitated to join the CUP, in a very short time they decided to take their place within it and became very influential in the central committee of the CUP. However, there was a big difference between the Young Turks and the ulema in terms of their mutually supportive relationship: although the Young Turks seemed to use traditionalist and Islamic values to communicate with the public, in reality they were aiming more towards nationalist and secular developments. On the other hand, the Islamists expected to reach a more religious and moral administration through the constitutional regime.⁸³ Although the expectations of Islamists and the Young Turks from the constitutional regime were different, each side tried to benefit from this relationship. But time showed that the Islamists' expectations were to be disappointed.

Evladlarımıza Hitabımız ", Beyan ül Hak, II/29, p. 669, 28 R.evvel 327/6 Nisan 1325, as quoted by İsmail Kara, *İslamcıların...*, p. 52n

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İslamcılık...*, p. 99

The CUP gave importance to the benefit of Islam's social function in reaching the public and in preventing religious opposition.⁸⁴ Therefore, the CUP tried to communicate with the Islamists and to attract them to their movement. They invited respected Islamists of the time to the CUP clubs for conferences.⁸⁵ The basic purpose of these conferences was to teach and treat the requirements of the constitutional regime within an Islamic context. *Şeyh ül islam* Musa Kazım Efendi took his place in these conferences as a member of the CUP. As a *Şeyh ül Islam* and an influential Islamist of the time, his speeches and writings display interesting points in explaining the constitutional regime in the context of Islam.

⁸³ İsmail Kara, *İslamcılarının...*, p. 62.

⁸⁴ Even in some cases the CUP behaved like Islamits in order to impose the idea that their political line was not different from them. For example, when the Volkan's oppositions were felt and effected society, the CUP started to play mevlits. *Ibid*, p. 64n.

⁸⁵ The conferences were given at the Şehzadebaşı club of the CUP was published with the title "Mevaiz-i Diniye", *Mevaiz-i Diniyye I* (İstanbul, 1912), *Mevaiz-i Diniyye II*, (İstanbul, 1913).

Chapter 2

2.Musa Kazım Efendi's Social, Religious and Political Ideas and his discussions of Westernization Before the SCP

2.1 His Concept of "Human Being"

To understand Musa Kazım's religious thought, it is necessary to appreciate his understanding of the concept of "human being", since he bases his arguments concerning religion on human nature. Thus, before examining how he defines the concept of religion, his discussion of the concept "human being" should be summarized first.

Among his writings there are two articles directly related to this concept. In his article entitled "what is a human being?" (*insan nedir?*) man is defined as follows. Man is a physically weak animal. Every animal a short time after its birth becomes capable of defending and preserving itself by its organs, whereas human beings until a certain age cannot do this. Until the age of two he cannot walk and in general is not capable of living independently until the age of twenty. In spite of this, human beings became superior to other animals and created science and industry, because he has the reasoning faculty bestowed by God.⁸⁶

Musa Kazım, in his article "Some words about science and the human being" (*ilm-i İnsana Dair Bir İki Söz*) argues that animals cannot progress since

⁸⁶ ...insan teşekkülât-ı 'uzviyesi ve ecza-yı bedeniyesi i'tibarıyla 'adeta bir hayvandır. Hemde 'aciz ve naçiz bir hayvandır. "İnsan Nedir", *Külliyat...*, p.87, 87-88

they have no reason. Through their reason and intellectual power human beings can progress.⁸⁷ For Musa Kazım, the human being is created with sensual and bestial forces that belong to the nature of mankind and which should be satisfied.⁸⁸ In nature there are many ways for people to satisfy their desires, such as "instigation" (*fitne*), "mischief" (*fesad*), "vanity" (*batıl*), and "justice" (*hak*). But nature did not determine which of these is the appropriate way to satisfy their bestial forces and sensual desires. People themselves have to choose an appropriate one. Religion or the law of God would orient them to choose the right one.⁸⁹ There are four forces in the nature of the human being; "sensual forces" (*şehvaniyye*), "forces of wrath" (*gazabiyye*), "forces of groundless fear" (*vehmiyye*), "forces of the reasoning faculty" (*kuvve-i akliyye-i melekiyye*).⁹⁰ Among these forces only one, "reason", can orient people toward goodness. Thus the forces of reason do not require any moral improvement and "correction" (*te'dib ü tehzib*). Reason is the result of "celestial holy souls" (*ervah-ı kudsiyye-i ulviyye*). But, the other three—the sensual forces, the forces of wrath

⁸⁷ ...hissiyât ve idrakât-ı hayvaniyye hîn-i hilkatden beri ahlâ terakkî etmemiş ve heman olduğu mertebede 'alî hâle kalmıştır... her nevin efrâdı o neve mahşûş olan bir rûfîle, bir hünere çalışa gelmiş ve hepsi o fi'ili icrada heman müsâvi kalarak birisi diğerine tefavvuk edememiştir. insan ise böyle olmayub kuvve-i 'akliyye ve meleke-i fikriyyesi sayesinde şimdiye kadar nice muhterâât-ı ve şinâat-ı ğaribe zuhura getirmiş ...ve getireceği derkâr bulunmuştur..."ilm-i insana Dair Bir iki Söz", *Külliyat*., pp. 96- 97.

⁸⁸ M. Kazım, "Medeniyet-i Sahiha, Diyanet-i Hakka" in *Külliyat -Dini İctimai Makaleler* (İstanbul, 1920), p. 9. This article has been first published in *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* in 11 July, 1898.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.103.

and the forces of groundless fear—are only "bestial" (*hayvani*) and "devilish" (*şeytani*) forces that always orient people to "wickedness" or "harm" (*şerr*). If a human being does not train his bestial and sensual forces, it is not possible for him to use his reason. Thus they should be corrected, punished and morally improved. These three forces are interrelated in terms of their functions: the sensual forces are present for obtaining "carnal pleasures" (*lezaiz-i şehvaniyye*); the forces of *gazabiyye* are for giving people troubles, and the forces of groundless fear orient people to usurp power, and to dominate and oppress people. Therefore they always require moral improvement.⁹¹ Following the creation of human beings their bestial and sensual desires increased and caused conflicts and quarrels among them. God sent them prophets to eliminate the quarrels among them and to orient people toward goodness.⁹²

Musa Kazım, through discussion of the nature of mankind, provides a basis for his ideas concerning the necessity of religion, the concept of civilization and the importance of science. As will be seen below, these three concepts—religion, civilization and science—are closely interrelated in Masa Kazım's thought and depended upon the nature of mankind.

2.2 The Definition of Religion; Its Functions

Musa Kazım defines religion as the "the law of God" (*Kanun-ı Sübhani*)

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² "Diyanet-i Hakka" in *Ibid.*, p. 14. This article was written in August 1898 but in Külliyyat there is no information about where it is published.

and the "Divine Sermon"(*Vaz-ı ilahi*).⁹³ Although God is "above everything" (*müstağni*) and receives no benefit from sending divine law, God determined such a law to protect people.⁹⁴ When human beings were created there was no religious law, while their bestial and sensual forces had not clearly appeared and expanded. When they had clearly appeared and increased, people started to attack each other to satisfy their sensual and bestial desires. God sent them prophets in order to remove the quarrels among them and to spread the law of God.⁹⁵ Musa Kazım also mentions that the holy books of these prophets propagated monotheistic religions in harmony with their own historical conditions.⁹⁶

Musa Kazım states that the "the just religion" (*diyanet-i hakka*) is such a crucial thing that without it it would not be possible for any nation to attain civilization. Every civilized and developed nation experienced troubles and difficult times, but through the law of God, brought by the prophets, they overcame these troubles and attained civilization.⁹⁷ One of the examples he gives for a civilized and progressed nation is the Jews. Their time of slavery lasting two

⁹³ "...(*Dīn Luġatda iḡāʿat, cezā ve ʿavz, deʿb ve ʿadet* gibi birçok maʿnalara mevzuʿ olub iştilāʿ-i şerʿide ise (insanları kendi ihtiyār ve iradeleriyle umur-ı ḡayriye ve efʿal-i ḡaseneye sevk eden bir vazʿ-ı ilahi ve bir kânûn-ı sübhāni) maʿnasında müstaʿmeldir..."

Ibid,p. 13.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*., p. 13.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 13-14.

⁹⁶ "...bir nebī tarafından tebliġ edilecek olan aḡkamın beheme hal o nebinin baʿş olduğu ḡavmīn ḡāl ve şanıyla, aḡlaḡ ve eḡvarıyla mütenāsib olāşı muḡteżā-yı ḡikmet olduğunu..." *Ibid*.,p. 22 ; ...ḡaḡ teʿala ḡazretleri her ḡavme kendi ḡāllerine, kendi zamanlarına , kendi mizaclarına muvāfiḡ aḡkāmı vermiş..." in *Ibid*., p. 26

⁹⁷ *Ibid*., 21

centuries ended with the coming of the prophet Moses. They founded one of the most civilized and developed nations in the world.⁹⁸ In the time of the prophet Solomon (*Süleyman*) the Jewish state included even Egypt and Yemen. The law of the Pentateuch enabled them to establish a great civilized nation.⁹⁹ However, after the death of the prophet Solomon, they lost their religious way of life and were defeated by their sensual desires, and thus conflicts arose among them. Then they were divided among themselves and never acquired their former power again.¹⁰⁰

For Musa Kazım the historical experience of the Jews is a good example of the significance of the function of religion and of the prophets in the progress of nations. Musa Kazım claims that for an irreligious nation it is not possible to attain civilization.¹⁰¹ In his detailed writings on the notion of civilization, we will see that, for Musa Kazım, civilization and religion are tightly interconnected.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.21

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁰⁰ "...eğer onlar Hazret-i Süleyman aleyhi's-selām'ın vefatından sonra dahi aḥkām-ı diniyelerini ve aḥlāk-ı milliyelerini muḥafaza ederek zulm-ı taaddi yollarına sapmamış ve heveṣat-ı nefsanîyelerine maḡlûb olmamış olsalar idi ne beynlerinde ihtilaf zuhûr edecek, ne de şu ihtilâfın neticesi olan aḥvâl-i mezkûre-i melâlet-i iştimalle duçar olacaklardı..."

¹⁰¹ "...bir kavm, bir millet farz edelimki hepsi dinsiz olsunlar. Acaba bunların teşkil-i medeniyet ederek refah ve şâadet üzere yaşayabilmeleri kabil olabilir mi ? heyhât!..." Medeniyet-i Sahiha-Dinayet-i Hakka, Külliyyat..., Tercüman-ı Hakikat, 11 Temmuz 1314 (11 Temmuz 1898), p. 6.

2.3 Prophets and Nesh

Musa Kazım states that every monotheistic prophet declared a holy book which is divided into two parts: "fundamental laws" (*ahkam-ı asliyye*) and "secondary laws" (*ahkam-ı fer'iyye*). The belief in God Almighty and the belief in the next world of heaven and hell constitutes the fundamental laws. Although these did not change throughout all the declarations of prophets over the centuries, the secondary laws, with the progress and development of humanity, underwent modifications, and new revelations were sent from the Creator. Musa Kazım demonstrates this argument through the historical periods of Moses and of Jesus Christ. He says that in the Pentateuch there are very simple religious laws that it is difficult to call "divine laws" since humanity at the time of Moses was in a very primitive stage of development.¹⁰² At the time of Jesus Christ humanity had reached a more advanced stage and thus the laws of Christianity were harmonious with their needs. But later generations corrupted these laws by importing the dogmas of "the reincarnation and the trinity" (*hulul* and *teslis*).¹⁰³ Furthermore, in the New Testament it is difficult to find any concrete rule for the administration of

¹⁰² "...Tevrat mütâlaâ olunur ise öyle sade hükümlere teşadüf edilirki insan onlara "ahkâm-ı ilahi" namını vermeye cesâret edemez..." "Diyânet-i Hakka" in *Ibid.*, p.17.

¹⁰³ "...kendisine incil-i şerifin ahkâmı dahi onların hâl ve şânlarına tamamıyla muvâfık idi..." *Ibid*, p. 23 ; " Zira o zamân, zamân-ı fetret olub insanlar bütün delâletde kalmış idi.vâkıfan hâzret-i İsa'nın tēsis etdiği dīn güzel bir dīn idi. bi'z-zat nebi-i müşârun ileyh tarafından yazılmış bir incil-i şerif olmadığından urûclarından yirmibeş otuz sene sonra bazı havariyyun tarafından inciller yazılmaya başlanmış ve bu incillerde ise hakık-ı bâride maḥāl olan hulul ve ittihād gibi şeyleri müşîr bir takım ayât-ı müteşâbihe bulunmuş olmasına mebni sonra

2.4 Political Thought

In the 1890s concepts of civilization, especially European concepts of civilization and science, were intensely discussed among Ottoman Intellectuals. While Islamists accepted that an advanced level of science was the main factor in progress, they defended the idea that imitation of Western cultural and moral values was the cause of Ottoman society's decline. In other words, questioned the moral and cultural values of European civilization. What they understood by civilization was "material civilization", social and cultural issues were regarded as a totally different sphere. While Ottoman Intellectuals were discussing these issues, the future "Unionist" *Şeyh ül islam*, Musa Kazım Efendi, was also writing about civilization and science. His writings seem as a kind of answer to these discussions about "civilization and science" (*ilim ve fûnun*).

For him civilization is a part of the nature of human beings and means to live as a group in mutual cooperation, in a community, in a city or in a village.¹⁰⁴ In his first article, "The Means of Civilization and Arabic Language" (1897) (*Vasıta-i Medeniyet ve Lisan- ı Arabî*) Musa Kazım did not discuss civilization as a concept and did not give its definition in a general sense. Instead, what he called civilization was the "Islamic" civilization. In this article, by praising the literary qualities of the arabic language, he stresses that the arabic language was crucial in

¹⁰⁴ "Medeniyet bir şehirde, bir köyde neresi olursa olsun toplu olarak yaşamak demektir. Bu da nevi^{*} beşerin mukteza-yı hilkat ve tabi^{*}atıdır...." : "Medeniyet-i Sahiha-Diyanet-i Hakka", *Külliyat...*, 11 Temmuz 1314 (11 Temmuz 1898), p. 5 ; "insan hilkaten medeni olduğundan benî nevi^{*}yle müşâreket ve yekdiğerine

the expansion of Islamic civilization and stresses the importance of learning it, since it is "a duty" (*vacib*) of Islam for the Ottomans.¹⁰⁵ In his later articles, it is possible to find discussion on civilization as a concept and its definition in a more general sense.

The most remarkable point in his discussion of civilization is that religion and morality are the two factors that provide a "true civilization" (*medeniyet-i sahiha*). For Musa Kazım, civilization does not only mean progress in natural sciences and in mathematics, the invention of numerous industries, the development of the means of communication, but it also represents an opportunity for the welfare and happiness of all the people in that nation. For him, the aim of true civilization is to provide welfare and happiness to people.¹⁰⁶

For Musa Kazım material progress, such as developments in natural sciences or industry, does not always bring welfare and happiness to people. In this point he seems to criticize people who accept Western civilization as the "true civilization". He demonstrates that in the countries where industry and natural sciences have progressed furthest, only one percent of the population have the

müfavenetsiz yaşaması kabil olmadı..." "Vasita-i Medeniyet ve Lisan-ı Arabi", Tercüman-ı Hakikat, 3 Mart 1313, Külliyyat..., p. 68.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ "...bu medeniyet-i kâmile denilen şey bir kavmin ulûm-ı tab'iyye ve riyâziyyede terakki etmesi ve envâir şınay'î ihtirâ eylemesi; vapurlar, şimendiferler icâd ederek nakliyyât için bunca teshilât göstermesi, büyük şehirler, vâsi' caddeler, 'ali binalar vücuda getirmesi vesairesi değil mi ?...hayır! yalnız bunlar değil. Çünkü medeniyetden ma'şad aşlî bi'l- cümle ahalinin refâh ve sa'âdet üzere yaşamasıdır..." "Medeniyet-i Sahiha Diyanet-i Hakka", Tercüman-ı hakikat, 11 Temmuz 1314, Külliyyat..., p. 5.

chance to benefit in terms of welfare. The rest of the population cannot even have a dwelling place, and suffer in earning their livelihood. However, "a true civilization" provides justice, welfare and happiness to all the people. And this means "honesty in every matter" (*istikamet*), "to be just in every matter" (*muavenet*), "to help people" (*mucanebet*) and "to keep away from the blemishes of the reason" (*ma'ayib-ı akliyyeden mucanebet*). Only religious and moral values could orient people to behave in accordance with these four principles of civilization, which can only last with a "true piety" (*diyanet-i hakka*). Because, if religious and moral values are absent in people's mind, sensual or bestial forces would dominate them; then they could not use their reason.¹⁰⁷ The development of the knowledge of skills, industry and trade lead to the continuity of a civilization and to the achievement of the level of a "true civilization". However, it is necessary that these factors should be associated with "celestial piety and exalted morality" (*bir diyanet-i semaviyye* and *ahlak-ı aliyeye mukarenet*). Since civilization means to form a community or to organize a nation resting on the principle of "mutual assistance" (*teavün ü tenasür*), such a structure necessitates "true brotherhood" (*uhuvvet-i sahiha*) and an everlasting compassion among the members of the community. Religion and morality could provide these values in

¹⁰⁷ ...medeniyet-i şahiha insanlara her dürlü esbâb-ı saâdet ve refahiyyeti bahş eden bir medeniyetdir ki o da her işte istikâmet, her hûşûsda'adâlet, benî nevî'ne muavenet, bütün ma'ayib-ı akliyyeden mucanebet ile hasıl, bunlarda ancak diyanet-i hakka ile ka'imdir...." *Ibid*, p. 5-6.

the community.¹⁰⁸

For him it is impossible for an irreligious community or nation to establish civilization and to live in welfare and happiness, even if they progress in science and education. Musa Kazım most probably refers to Western countries.¹⁰⁹ He opposes the idea that European countries had progressed because religion and moral values had not prevented their development process. They achieved their material progress only through scientific development.¹¹⁰

He says that European countries progressed, not only because they advanced in the knowledge of science and industry, but also because religion and

¹⁰⁸ "Hami-i Medeniyet", Külliyyat..., p. 72.

¹⁰⁹ "...her ne hâlde her ne şıfatda bulunurlar ise bulunsunlar dinsiz adamların bir yere gelerek bir medeniyet-i şahiha teşkil edebilmeleri dahi kâbil değildir. Binaen 'aleyh medeniyet-i şahihanın ancak ahlâk-ı fazilu ve evşâf-ı aliyye ile, bunlarında diyanet-i hakka ile huşûl-pezir olacağı her türlü şübhe ve azâdedir." Medeniyet-i Sahiha-Diyanet-i Hakka", Tercüman-ı Hakikat 11 Temmuz 1314 (11 Temmuz 1898), Külliyyat..., p.7

¹¹⁰ "...Avrupa ahalisi, dîn ve ahlâka o kadar ehemmiyet vermedikleri hâlde bugünkü terakkiyat-ı maddiyeleri bütün cihânı duçar-ı hayret ediyor. Eğer medeniyetin gerek be'kasında, gerek te'alisinde dîn ve ahlâkın medhali olsa idi onlarda bu terakkiyat görülmez idi tarafında bir itirâz edilir ise bu itirâza iki vecihle cevâb verilir. Evvela Avrupa'nın şu terakkiyata nâil olması yalnız ulûm ve fûnûn sayesinde değildir. Dîn ve ahlâkında onda dahli küllisi vardır. Ama eğer ahvâl-i ahalinin birbirine uhuvvet-i ciddiye ve muhabbeti kavîyyelerini mûcib olan o rabîta-i semâviyye onlarda olmasa idi şu gördüğümüz terakkiyata nâil olmaları şöyle dursun kûrûn-ı mâziye ahlâkı gibi onlarında herc ü merc olacakları muhakka idi. Şaniyen eğer ulûm ve mâârif ve sînâî sayesinde Avrupa ahalisi bugün terakki-i maddiyenî evc-i balâsına irtikâ etmişler gibi görünüyorlar ise de erbâb-ı hakikat nezdinde bu terakkiyatın, bu medeniyetin aslâ değeri yoktur. Zira Avrupa'da bir müddet-i ma'hdûdadan beri mebnâ-i metîn-i medeniyet olan "teavûn ve teşâur" kâidesine su-i ahlâk neticesi olarak hâlel fâri olmaya başlamış olduğundan kariben o esâs-ı kavmin bi'l-küllîye mahvıyla ihtirâsât-ı şahsiyyenin herşeye galebesiyle şu terakkiyatın bi't-tab müthiş bir tedenniyâta tahavvül ve inkılâb eyleyeceği dahi emr-i zarûridir. " Ibid, p.72.

moral values played important role in their progress. If they had no religious values, they would disappear¹¹¹. Secondly, he says that although science or education or industry provided the Europeans' progress, this does not have any value in the face of divine authority, because they are misusing moral values. Therefore in time their "progress" (*terakki*) will turn into "retrogression" (*tedenniyat*).¹¹²

In addition to the importance of religion and moral values ("true piety"), another point he stressed as necessary for a true civilization is the need for a "teacher" (*muallim*) and a "guide" (*mürşid*). Musa Kazım mentions that human beings, differing from animals by their reason and intellectual superiority, made many innovations and established numerous industries. However, without a teacher or a guide, it is not possible for people to use their reason and intellectual power in the proper way to progress and to reach civilization.¹¹³ He supports this argument by the example of tribes which lived in a state of savagery for centuries, since they had no teacher or a guide. Concerning the development of a nation and the reaching of civilization, he gives the examples of America and of European countries. He says that when America was discovered four hundred years ago,

¹¹¹ "Hami-i Medeniyet, Külliyyat..., p. 72

¹¹² "...erbâb-ı hâkikat nezdinde bu terâkkiyatın, bu medeniyetin aşlâ değeri yoktur. Zira Avrupa'da bir müddet-i mahdudedden beri mebnâ-yı me'îni medeniyet olan "teavün ü tenasur" kâidesine su-i ahlak neticesi olarak hâlel-fârî olmaya başlamış olduğundan kariben o e'sas kavmin bi'l-küllîye mahvıyla ve ihtirasat-ı şahsiyenin her şeye galebesiyle şu terâkkiyatın bi't-tabî müdhiş bir tedenniyâta tahavvül ü inkılâb eyleyeceği dahi emr-i zarûridir..." *Ibid*, 72.

¹¹³ "İlm-i insana Dair Bir iki Söz", Külliyyat..., p. 96

there was nothing in the continent. Then many teachers were sent there to teach "science" (*ilim ve fûnun*).¹¹⁴ Then they started to progress and became one of the most civilized nations in the world.¹¹⁵ The second example he gave for developed nations is Europe. He asserts that actually there is no need to go back to America to understand importance of teachers and of guides for progress. Europe is the best example for this. He asserts that in Europe, presently admired for its material progress and civilization, people were killing each other four hundred years ago. Then, after they inherited Greek sciences and Islamic knowledge, they progressed to their present level.¹¹⁶

As it is seen from these discussions Musa Kazım uses the term "progress" together with civilization. But he does not give any definition of the term progress or particularly talk about its requirements. It may be possible to assume that he

¹¹⁴ Instead of teacher he uses the terms ulema "doctors of Muslim theology" and hükema "philosophers". But, in the context what he means is not ulema and hükema in their original meanings. He uses ulema and hükema like teachers and guides.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*

¹¹⁶ "...ne hâcet işte Amerika kıta-i cesîmesi meydanda duruyor bu kıta ahalisi orada nice aşîrlar imrâr-ı hayat etmişler ve hâlbuki o uzun hem de pek uzun bir müddet zarfında hiçbir hüner ve hiçbir kemâl ibrâz edememişler ve binaen'aleyh kendilerini dereke-i süfla-yı hayvaniyyeden hâlâşa muvaffak olamamışlardır. Bundandörtüyz sene evvel kıta-i mezkûre keşf olundu badehu oraya birçok 'ulemâ ve hükemâ gönderildi. Ahali çalışdılar ve yavaş yavaş terakkiye başladılar. Nihâyet şimdiki dereceye vâsıl oldular ve kendilerini bütün cihâna beğendirdiler...o kadar uzağa gitmeye gerek yok. işte bugün terakkiyat-ı mâdiyesine hayran olduğumuz Avrupa dahi bundan dört beşyüz sene evvele gelinceye kadar aynı hâlde olub ahalisi yekdiğerine yemek derecesine gelmemişler mi idi ? ba'dehu bir taraftan fûnûn-ı Yunaniyye, diğertarafdan 'ulum-ı islamiyyeye vâriş olarak bu fûnun, bu 'ulum sayesinde terakki ede ede nihayet şimdiki hâl-ı hayret istimâli ihraz eylemediler mi ?..." *Ibid*, pp. 97-98.

uses progress with the same meaning as civilization, or perhaps as the process towards civilization. Musa Kazım, as a Modernist Islamic thinker, accepts the superiority of the West and the necessity for scientific developments in the progress of a nation. If we consider his writings before the Second Constitutional Period, between 1895 and 1908, we see that his ideas for the progress of the Ottoman nation differed from those of the Young Turks in the 1880s and in the 1890s who constituted the first members of the CUP. However, considering how Musa Kazım became a member of the CUP in the SCP, although his religious-political ideas were incompatible with the members of the CUP, the answer lies in the ideological and political atmosphere of the Ottoman State in the SCP.

2.5 Science and Islam

Musa Kazım's discussion of science goes along with his discussion of civilization, since for him it is one of the components of civilization, like religion and moral values. Musa Kazım asserts that there is no any incompatibility between contemporary scientific developments and the Quran, as some people argued. He demonstrates that contemporary scientific developments, like the knowledge of astronomy and laws of the solar system, are available in the Quranic verses.¹¹⁷ Musa Kazım argues that, unfortunately for the Ottoman Empire, this scientific knowledge is not extended sufficiently among the population.

He criticizes the people who deny the truths of contemporary scientific knowledge in the name of Islam or the Sharia. In this sense it can be assumed that

Musa Kazım criticizes the traditionalist/conservative Muslims who had always been against innovations in the Empire. He says that Islam followed Judaism and Christianity, and while rejecting some of their laws, accepted some others. Then it reached a more perfect level than any other religion could reach. The Quran itself is the proof of the truth of Islam. It includes knowledge from mysticism and morality to science in every sphere of life.¹¹⁸ Musa Kazım in all his writings admires the virtue of science and criticizes people who deny its virtues. However, he implies that science is not under the monopoly of Europe. Islam orders the search for science and the demonstration of this is in the Quran.¹¹⁹

Musa Kazım criticizes the Islamic countries' level of progress. He asserts that the reason for the decline of the Islamic countries is not Islam, as argued by Europe; the lassitude of Islamic countries is the reason for their decline. When they started to progress through scientific knowledge, Islamic countries did not give importance to it because of their lassitude and they entered a period of

¹¹⁸ "...Kur'an-ı muciz beyan böyle nice hakāik-i fenniye ve esrār-ı kevnîyyeyi mutazammın bulunmuş ve bu cihetle fūnūn-ı maddiye-i şahîha ve 'ulūm-ı beşeriyye-i hakîkaya muhalefet şöyle dursun, belki muāvenet bile eylemişken garibdirki bizler...şer'at-ı garra-ı ahmediyye ahkāmını seve seve kabūle sevķ ve teşviķe şarf-ı himmet etmiyoruz. Bi'l-ākis onların nazarında kesb-i kaḫfiyyet etmiş olan fūnūn-ı hāzirayî şeriāt, dīn nāmına redde çalışıyoruz...fūnūn-ı hāzireyle ayāt-ı Kur'aniyye arasında hemen hiçde mübāyenet olmayub bi'l-ākis beynlerinde muvaffakāt-ı kāmile bulunduğu...taşavvuf, ahlāk, usūl-i fiķh, şarf, nahv, lugat vesaire, 'ulum ve fūnun-ı islamiyyenin kaffesi Kur'an'da ahz ü iktibas edilmiştir..." "Diyanet-i Hakka", August 1314 (1898) *Külliyat...*, pp. 34-36.

¹¹⁹ Faza'il-i 'ilm", 24 Teşrin-i Sani 1311 (24 November 1895, *Külliyat...*, p. 39.

stagnation.¹²⁰ Then they started to denigrate and see Islamic countries as inferior. He implies that Ottoman Empire had been, in this respect, at one time in advance of Europe. In this point, he strictly denies the idea that Ottoman society could not progress because Islam was an obstacle to progress and opposes people in the Ottoman state who discredit their own societies because of Islam.¹²¹ Musa Kazım, while accepting the need to import European industries, objects to imposing European moral values and traditions on Ottoman society.¹²² For him, not only the Ottomans, but every nation would dissolve if it loses its own moral and traditional values. He gives examples from Greek, Iranian and French history.

¹²⁰ . "Beyan-ı hakikat", 19 March 1314 (18 March 1898), *Külliyat...* p. 81.

¹²¹ "...ûlûm ve fûnûnun pek çok...müterakki olduğu ve bina'en'aleyh dîn ve'ulûm arasında 'adeta bir tezâd-ı kâmil zann olunduğu bir zamanda erkan-ı dîniyye ve hakâik-i İslamiyemizi dela'il ve izâha ve berâhîn-i ka'ifa ile erbâb-ı fûnûn ve ashâb-ı ma'ârifeye karşı isbat etmeğe ve bu suretle onları dîn ve milletimize muhabbet ettirmeğe lüzum...vardır....Her müşkülümüzü halle, her ihtiyacımızı def'e kâfi, insaniyet ve beşeriyete ta'alluk eden bi'l-cümle fa'zâ'il ve vazâ'ifi ta'lîme vafi olan Kur'ân-ı mehuz beyan nev'i beşerin nasıl ta'lîm ve terbiye edileceğini ve da'ire-i insaniyet ve medeniyete ne yolda erşad olunacağını beyan ve izah etmektedir..."

"...şu hâl-ı pestide kalışımız fırsat add ederek bu babda ağızlarına gelen hezeyanı söylemeye cür'et almışlardır. Şurası şayân-ı tesâdüfdür ki bu hezeyânlara cür'et edenler yalnız ecnebiler olsa idi bir dereceye kadar mâzûr görülebilir idi. Bizim kendimizden de buna cür'et edenler vardır. Nitekim bunların vasıta-i neşr-i efkârı olan bazı cerâid bu maddeyi arasına herkese karşı bir suret-i mahirânede göstermektedirler..." *Ibid*, 81.

¹²² "...Avrupa ahlâk ve 'adâtını 'aynen kabûl etmeli imiş ! Edebiyatda, hikemiyatda Zolaların, Hugoların, ve daha ve bilmemkimlerin eserlerine tamamıyla iktifâ eylemeli imiş. Hâşılı Avrupa'da ne kadar rezâlet var ise cümlesini medeniyet nâmına olarak memleketimize bi'l-idhâl ahaliye kabûl etdirmeli imiş ! (Ama şâyâyî değil ha ! Çünkü şâyâyî ile uğraşmak icra-i sefahata mânî olduğundan anı

By those he criticizes for claiming wrongly that Islam was an obstacle, Musa Kazım most probably means the Young Turks and Newspapers like *Meşveret*, *Osmanlı* and *İctihad*. In the year 1898, the Young Turks were opposed to Islam since they saw it as an obstacle to progress and to reforms in Ottoman society and saw themselves as a separate intellectual group. Musa Kazım's criticisms of intellectuals who defended the importation of European culture into their country are similar those of the Young Ottomans in the 1860s. In Musa Kazım's thought it is possible to see parallels with those who reflected the features of the modernist Islamic movement. For him too, European values were causing Ottoman cultural and moral values to deteriorate, and this deterioration in return prevented the progress that was necessary to reach civilization. Since if a nation lost its cultural and national values, it could not progress. For him too, the solution to the collapse of the Empire lies in the original Islam, which itself is the source of European civilization.

In Musa Kazım's discussion of Natural Laws and Divine Laws it may be possible to see other similarities with the Young Ottomans, particularly with Namık Kemal, and to see contrasts with the nucleus of the CUP in the 1890s, particularly with Abdullah Cevdet and Ahmed Rıza Bey.

yine Avrupa ahalisine terk etmek ve icāb halinde pare vererek anlardan eşya mübayā'a eylemek daha hayırlı değil mi so, very *Ibid*, p.82-83.

2.6 Natural Laws and Divine Laws

Musa Kazım opposes the idea that the universe runs according to natural laws that the order of the universe is not related to the divine laws. Musa Kazım is against the people who argue that, if there is a divine authority superior to everything, there would be no "unequality and differences" (*tefavüt ü tegayür*) among the people. For example, there would be no rich nor poor, no clever nor slow-minded, no learned nor illiterate people. Divine authority would create all of them equal. He calls defenders of this thought *bazı* "some new thinkers" (*yeni fikir adamları*).¹²³ Musa Kazım calls these new men's arguments "null and void" (*batıl*) or "invalid".

With the term "new men" he most probably refers to the Young Turks of the 1890s, the Nucleus of the future CUP in the Medical Faculty School and the group of Ahmed Rıza Bey who may be called Ottomanist/Westernist side of the CUP. Because, they were strictly against idea of "divine laws" (*ilahi kanunlar*) they were influenced by the principles of positivism and defended the validity of natural laws for the ordering of the universe and of societies.

Musa Kazım mentions that differences among creatures are "proof of the presence of the Creator and of order in the universe" (*'alemde medar-ı hüsn-i intizam ve sebeb-i kıvam-ı 'alem*). For him there are three reasons for these

¹²³ "...Ba'zı efkār-ı cedīde erbābı eğer bu kâinat şıfāt-ı kemāliyeyi müstecmī bir zāt-ı vacibū'l vücudun eser-i şunı olsa idi, beyne'l maḥlūqāt müşāhede etdiğimiiz şu tefāvüt ve tegāyür bulunmazdı. Meşelā, insanların kimisi zeñgin, kimisi fakir, kimisi zeki, kimisi ğabi, kimisi ālim, kimisi cāhil olmaz idi ve bu 'adem-i intizām

"differences". Firstly, if there is no *tefavüt ü tegayür* in the universe, there would be no "pluralities" (*tenvi'at*).¹²⁴ Secondly, if there is no *tefavüt ü tegayür*, the minds of people could not find any answer to the presence of a single divine authority.¹²⁵ The third reason, possibly the most important one, is that the lasting of the order of the universe would not be possible if "differences" were absent. This means that, if people were created as equal, they would not help each other and benefit from each other's industries and arts. In this point, we can see that Musa Kazım, through this idea, rationalizes the usefulness of getting scientific developments and industries from the West, even though their religious beliefs and moralities are against Ottoman ones. He provides a religious base to this idea by quoting a verse of the Quran.¹²⁶

For Musa Kazım, "nature" (*tabiat*) like other "symptoms of the world" (*a'raz-ı sa'ire*) needs a divine authority to occur and to last in the world. For him, since God and His laws, "the divine laws" are the source of everything, nature was one of the creations of God. Therefore, the universe runs by means of the law of God, not by means of a law of nature. Natural law is the will of the divinity and

'ālemde görülmez idi. Zira 'adālet-i ilahi bunların her hūşūşda mūsāvat üzere olmalarını iktiza eder." Külliyyat..., Hikmet-i Tefavüt-i Hilkat, p. 65 .

¹²⁴"...tefavüt ve tegayür olmadıkça ta'addüd ve tenevvu' olmaz...ve bu taqdirde hayret-bahşā-yı 'uqūl olan şu tenevvuat-ı bi-nihaye ve tekennüvāt-ı bi-gaye vücud-pezir olmaz idi..." Külliyyat, p. 65

¹²⁵"...icra-yı te'sir eden ve aşarında muktezāsı ašlā tebeddül ve tāgayyür etmeyen bir mü'essiri, tabiatdan başka bir şey'e havl mümkin olamayacağından eğer beyne'l-eşya tafavüt ve tegayür bulunmasa idi, 'alemin bir hakīm-i muftal ve bir hüdā-yı layezal halk ve icad buyrulmuş olduğuna 'uqūl-i naş bir yol bulamaz idi..."

the universe has been arranged according to divine laws. Divine laws include natural laws; they can not be taught as a different sphere, because, he says, in the universe nothing can create itself. Everything needs a divine power to be created. However, he does not deny the presense and influences of nature.¹²⁷ Musa Kazım proves this idea through concept of '*adetu'l-llah*' which is used for natural events in Islam.

These ideas of Musa Kazım are much more similar to those of the Young Ottomans. For example, if we consider Namık Kemal's ideas about natural laws and divine laws, it would be easy to see similarities between Musa Kazım and Namık Kemal. Actually, not only in terms of the discussion of natural law and divine law, but in general Musa Kazım's political ideas are similar to Namık Kemal's. Namık Kemal's attempt at a synthesis between Islamic and Western conceptions prefigure Musa Kazım's approach to Islamic and Western concepts.¹²⁸

The Young Ottomans attempted to demonstrate that Sharia law was in accordance with reason. In doing this, they were applying the concept of natural

¹²⁶ "... bir ve takva üzere birbirinize mu'âvenet ve nusret ediniz. *Ibid.*

¹²⁷"...Acaba birşey'in kendi vücudu için muhtâc olduğu diğer bir şeyi yaratmış olması kâbil olabilir mi ? şübhe yokki olamaz. Öyle ise bu kâ'ınatın ancak aşâr-ı tabîyyeden ibaret bulunduğuna dâ'ir serd edilen delilin butlânında dahi şekk yoktur

"...bizim bu beyanımızdan âlemde tabî'atın vücûd ve tesîrini inkâr etdiğimiz alaşılmasın..." *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Şerif Mardin, The Genesis..., p. 287

law.¹²⁹ Among them, Namık Kemal vehemently defended the superiority of Islamic law. During his lifetime he was opposed to secular laws, for him the law must depend on divine authority.¹³⁰ He was also opposed to attempts to secularize law in the Tanzimat.¹³¹ Both Musa Kazım and Namık Kemal argued that law must be based upon divine authority. However, although Namık Kemal's attempt to legitimize Islamic law against the superiority of Western laws was similar to that of Musa Kazım, he differed from Musa Kazım in terms of source of the law. For Namık Kemal, Islamic law was deduced from the natural law that is present in the verses of the Quran.¹³² For Musa Kazım, on the contrary, the source of nature and its laws was divine authority. In Sunni Islam, natural laws are symptoms of God in the universe; there is no concept like that of Namık Kemal.¹³³

Musa Kazım, in accordance with Sunni Islam, argues that the source of laws are "the verses of the Quran" (*nass*). In general, Musa Kazım in rationalizing his arguments, refers to *nass*. The tradition of interpreting the verses according to requirements of the time had continued since Tanzimat (1839) and the Constitutional Period (1876).¹³⁴ The most famous ones are *meşveret*, *şura*, *i'dad-ı*

¹²⁹ Mümtazer Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji...*, p. 135.

¹³⁰ Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak...*, p. 100n. Namık Kemal, *Mecmua-i Ebuziyya*, "Hikmet-i Hukuk", cüz. 48, CA 1302, 28 Mart 1844

¹³¹ Mardin, *Genesis...*, p. 315

¹³² "şariat...usulü ayat ve ehadiste mevcut olan hukuk-ı tabiyyeden bi'l-istinbat çıkmıştır." Türköne, p.135n.

¹³³ Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak...*, p. 137; Mardin, *Genesis...*, p. 315 Mardin says that Namık Kemal's understanding of law was influenced from Volney and Locke.

¹³⁴ İslamil Kara, *İslamcıların...*, p. 39

kuvvet, uhuvvet, ittihat, and so on.¹³⁵ The Young Ottomans had tried to adopt new meanings to these old concepts.¹³⁶ In the SCP, too, this tradition of the adoption of new meanings to religious concepts and new interpretation of verses continued. In this period these concepts gained political meanings, which was a modern attitude.¹³⁷

On the other hand, there were differences between Musa Kazım and the Westernist side of the CUP in the 1890s in terms of the source of the natural law.¹³⁸ For example, for Ahmed Rıza Bey things and material entities were connected to each other through natural laws.¹³⁹ He says that without the help of nature nothing would happen.¹⁴⁰ However, Ahmed Rıza Bey did not deny Islamic values in his writings. That is, although he did not give importance to Islam as a "a divine inspiration" (*vahy-i ilahi*) he considered its social functions important for progress, even more than those of Christianity.¹⁴¹ For him it was not possible to convert a learned and cultured Muslim to Christianity, but it was possible to

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak...*, p. 102

¹³⁷ İsmail Kara, *İslamcıların...*, p. 39. Interpretation of these concepts is present in Musa

Kazım's writings.

¹³⁸ See for more about the ideas of the Westernist side of the CUP -Young Turks in the Medical Faculty School and Ahmed Rıza Bey.

¹³⁹ Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin...*, p. 181n. "Cihanın kudret ve serveti vatanımızda toplansa kavanin-i tabiiyenin hükmünü değiştirmez. Kürre-i arzın üzerindeki dağlar, nehirler nasıl bir kanuna tabi ise hayatı o ürre'ye merbut olan insanlar da her şeye kavanin-i tabiiyyeye itaat ve inkıyat etmeye mecburdurlar." (Ahmed Rıza Bey's writings from *Layihâ*).

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, p.183.

convert the same person to positivism.¹⁴² In this point his ideas showed similarities to Musa Kazım's, but they are differentiated from Musa Kazım's in terms of the source and applicability of the law of Islam as a divine power. In the 1890s Musa Kazım and Ahmed Rıza Bey in their articles were discussing the same subjects —natural law and divine law, the function of Islam and its role in progress—. But Musa Kazım's ideas about the source and role of Islam were totally different from those of Ahmed Rıza Bey.¹⁴³



¹⁴² As Şerif Mardin argues although Ahmed Rıza Bey mistaken with this thought, he did not treated Islam as an obstacle. *Ibid*, p. 184.

¹⁴³ Ahmed Rıza Bey expressed his ideas in *İmprimerie Nationale*, in 1312, in *Mechveret* in September 15, 1896. Musa Kazım had written in February 8, 1313 (February 2, 1897) about the same topic with Ahmed Rıza Bey. Şerif Mardin mentions that Ahmet Rıza Bey's ideas displays some differences in the Turkish and French journal *Meşveret*. *Ibid*, p.188. He says that in the French *Meşveret* while universal ideas were taking place, in Turkish one more patriotic ideas and critical attitude toward pdishah's despotism took place. In other words, artikles in the Turkish *Meşveret* displayed influence of center of the CUP, *Ibid*, p. 188.

Chapter 3

3. Musa Kazım's Religious and Political Thought in the SCP

After the announcement of the SCP, Musa Kazım Efendi became a member of the "The Great Scientific Council" (*Meclis-i Kebir-i İlmi*) of the CUP, founded shortly after the announcement of the constitutional regime.¹⁴⁴ His career as a *Şeyh ül islam* began in the cabinet of Sadrazam İsmail Hakkı Paşa (July 12, 1910). During the SCP he became four times *Şeyh ül islam* in the cabinets of İsmail Hakkı Pasha (June 12, 1910-September 29, 1911), of Said Pasha (September 30, 1911-December 3, 1911), of Said Halim Pasha (May 8, 1916 -February 3, 1917), and of Talat Pasha (February 4, 1917 -November 8, 1918, the date the CUP's political life ended in the Empire).¹⁴⁵ For a short time, while İsmail Hakkı Pasha was in Europe, he became the deputy of "the Grand Vizier" (*sadrazam*) in the cabinet. Then, with the resignation of the cabinet, his duty as a *şeyh ül islam* ended.¹⁴⁶ In the Talat Pasha cabinet, in addition to being *şeyh ül islam*, he also became deputy of the "the Ministry of Mortmain Estates" (*evkaf nezareti vekilliği*). During the Mondros Armistice period, when the members of the CUP were arrested by the Damad Ferit Pasha government, he was first arrested in Bekirağa Bölüğü, then, because of his

¹⁴⁴ Abdülkadir Altunsu, *Osmanlı Şeyh ül İslamları* (Ankara, 1972), pp. 234- 237. In the Second Constitutional Period this council was founded by the CUP to provide a scientific basis for decisions.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*,

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

illness, he was exiled to Edirne, although others were deported to the island of Malta.¹⁴⁷ Shortly afterwards Musa Kazım died in Edirne.

In examining Musa Kazım's political ideas, it strikes us immediately that Musa Kazım defends the constitutional regime in accordance with Islam and the Sharia.¹⁴⁸ He bases his discussion of the constitutional regime particularly on the concept of "consultation" (*meşveret*) on the notion of consulting with the community about political matters.¹⁴⁹ Therefore it would be proper to discuss the two concepts "constitutionalism" and "consultation" together.

3.1 "Consultation" (Meşveret)

Musa Kazım mentions that the prophet Mohammed declared the "divine orders" (*ahkam-ı ilahi*) which consisted of two parts: "orders pertaining to the Next World" (*ahkam-ı uhreviyye*) and "worldly orders" (*ahkam-ı dünyeviyye*) these in turn divided into two as "fundamental" (*asli*) and "secondary" (*fer'i*) rules. Secondary worldly rules consisted of Islamic orders pertaining to "worldly issues" (*muamelat*) of which the issue of "punishment" (*ukubat*) is a part. If fundamental rules are not applied, it is meaningless to apply secondary ones. For Musa Kazım the principles of fundamental worldly rules are as follows: "to consult the community about every matter, to apply the principles of justice and

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ This attitude was not peculiar to Musa Kazım, it was general behavior of Islamists of the time, whether traditionalist-Islamist or not, like Mustafa Sabri Efendi, İsmail Hakkı Bey.

equality, to entrust to God's competent administrators for the country's affairs."¹⁵⁰

In order to prove his arguments he referred to six Quranic verses.¹⁵¹ For Musa Kazım the most important thing for rulers to possess was "fear of God" (*takva*). Musa Kazım explains "fear of God", the refraining from the violation of the rights of God and his people. Thus, to be able to apply the principles of "consultation" as ordered by God, rulers have to know the rights of God and of people very well.

In the article *İslam'da "In Islam the Principles of Consultation and Liberty"* (*Usul-i Meşveret-Hürriyet*) written on July 24th 1908, one day after the announcement of the SCP, Musa Kazım referred to Mohammad's time and argued that in the original Islam there was consultation. By explaining the time of Mohammad he argued that the principles of "consultation", of "equality" (*müsavat*), of "freedom" (*hürriyet*), and of "justice" (*adalet*) were given to all

¹⁴⁹ Musa Kazım Efendi, "Meşrutiyet", *Mevazir-i Diniyye*, Part II.

¹⁵⁰ "İslam'da Usul-i Meşveret ve Hürriyet, *Külliyat...*, (Risale-i Mahsuse, July 24, 1908), p. 243

¹⁵¹ "...and consult Them in affairs (of moment)...", Al-i İmran verse 159,
"...and when ye judge between man and man, that you judge with justice...", Nisa verse 58,

"...To you make you swerve

"...To wrong and depart from Justice. Be Just...", Maide verse 8,

"...And weight with (full) justice;-

No burden do We place

On any soul, but that

Which it can bear;-

Whenever you speak, speak justly,

Even, if a near relative

Is concerned; and fulfil

The Covenant of God...", En'am verse 152

The Holy Qur'an, translated by A. Yusuf Ali, (Beyrut, 1987).

Moslems and all people one thousand three hundred years ago.¹⁵² However, after the period of the four caliphs the "the political orders of religion" (*ahkam-ı siyasiyye-i diniyye*) were abolished by rulers and some misunderstandings or "null and vain beliefs" (*mevani-i batıla*)¹⁵³ arose about Islam, leading to the idea that Islam is an obstacle to progress.¹⁵⁴ The main point of this article is that in so far as the constitutional regime is in harmony with Islam, its principles are already present in the original Islam and the reason for the decline of Islamic governments is the giving up of the principles of *meşveret*.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, at the *Şehzadebaşı* Club of the CUP in one of his speeches, he claimed that the reason for European

¹⁵² "...işte görülyorki uşul-imeşveret, müsāvat, hürriyet, ādalet gibi insāniyet ve medeniyetin esasü'l-esasını teşkil eden erkān bundan bin üç yüz sene evvel taraf-ı ilahiden Müslümanlara ve bütün insanlara bahş olunmuş bir hak-ı meşrūdur...", *Ibid*, 246

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

¹⁵⁴ "...hulefā-i raşīdinden sonra ahkām-ı siyasiyye-i diniyye başka kalıblara döküldü, makām-ı hilafete gelen zevat menafi-i zatiyelerini düşündüler. İğraz-ı nefsanıyelerine fām oldular, bu maksadlarını temin uğrundabütün insanlara bir lütf-i vacibi'l-şükranı olan bu hukuku, bu hürriyet, bu müsāvat, bu ādaleti gasb ettiler. ...şadr-ı İslam'da ve ahkām-ı şer'-i mübine vukufu olmayan bir takım cehāletin akidesini "İslam mani-i terakkidir" diye ifşād ettiler..." *Ibid*, p. 246

¹⁵⁵ "...Cenāb-ı hak bu dīn-i mübīnin hāmi-i hakikisi olduğu ve ile'l-ebed şeriat-ı garra-ı Muhammediyye'nin ahkām-ı hürriyet bahşāsını hıfz ve şıyāneti ve add buyurduğu cihetle padişahımız efendimiz hāzretleri makām-ı hilāfet kübrāya gelir gelmezuşul-i meşvereti meydana koydular, Kanūn-ı Esāsi'yi ilan etdiler. Fakat ... dīn ve milletin tavsilāt ve ilkāāt-ı melanetkaranesiyle bu kanun-ı münīfin ahkām-ı münderecesini mevki-i tatbike vaz' etmeye muvaffak olamadılar. Bugün o gibi mevani-i batıla büsbütün bertaraf ve mündefi olduğundan zat-ı hümayunları Oxford kanun-ı münifin artık mevki-i tatbike vaz'-ı zamanı geldiğine derk buyurarak min-taraf-ı l-lah uhde-i şahanelerine terettüb eden bir vazife-i muqaddeseyi ifāya teşebbüs eylediler. Ve bu sebeble bütün alem-i İslamiyet ve insaniyeti kendine mecbur-ı şükran kıldılar....millet-i İslamiyye ve Osmaniyye'yi böyle nımet-i hürriyete nāilliyetle her an şadūman buyursun..." *Ibid.*, p. 243-248.

progress was the presence of constitutional regimes.¹⁵⁶

Musa Kazım interestingly praised Abdülhamid II, by arguing that as a "real" duty of a caliph he announced in 1876 the *Kanun-ı Esasi*, in other words *meşveret*. However, he argues that, because of some enemies of religion and the community the padishah had no chance to execute the *Kanun-ı Esasi*. But after the elimination of "illegitimate obstacles" (*mevani-i batıla*) the padishah had the opportunity again to put the constitution into practice.¹⁵⁷

In Musa Kazım's writings during the SCP it is possible to see some features of the Young Ottomans. It can be assumed that while the aim was to provide Islamic justification for the new regime, suggestions concerning the worsening condition of Ottoman society were still in accordance with the the ideas of the Young Ottomans.

Şerif Mardin argues that Namık Kemal, like Musa Kazım in most of his articles, stressed the necessity of the establishment of a system of *meşveret* in the Ottoman Empire. Unlike Musa Kazım, in Namık Kemal's writings the term *meşveret* was used as equal to "representative government", not to constitutionalism.¹⁵⁸ For Namık Kemal, constitutionalism was not the most important political goal, because there was the Sharia that was already providing

¹⁵⁶ Musa Kazım, "Meşrutiyet", *Mevaiz-i Diniyye*, II

¹⁵⁷ see, n. 161

¹⁵⁸ Mardin, *The Genesis...*, p. 308. Mümtazer Türköne mentions that the term *meşveret* especially in Namık Kemal's writings was used equal to democracy, Türköne, *Bir Siyasal İdeoloji...*, p. 107n. Although in Musa Kazım's writings it is

fundamental political principles to guide the statesmen.¹⁵⁹ In contrast, in Musa Kazım's article about the principles of *meşveret* (July 24, 1908), we see that he used it as equivalent to "constitutionalism".¹⁶⁰

Among the Young Ottomans, Ali Suavi too claimed that the reason for the decline of the Islamic countries was abandonment of the principles of *meşveret* which are the orders of the Sharia. Suavi also mentions that the equality and justice that is necessary for a constitutional regime should dominate in Ottoman society.¹⁶¹

Musa Kazım's discussion on *meşveret* is centered around the concepts of "liberty" (özgürlük), "equality" (müsavat), "progress" (terakki), and "the people's sovereignty" (hakimiyet-i milliye). To be able to understand his approach towards the Western kind of reforms in Ottoman society during the SCP, it is necessary to describe his discussion of these concepts.

not impossible to see some signs for principles of democracy, he never used the term "democracy".

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ see above, n.158, 160.

¹⁶¹ "...Muḥātārāt-ı vakıânın ref'i cehāletle olmaz, 'adāletle olur. İşte ḥāḳkın istediği de 'adāletdir. 'Adālet müsāvatdır. Müsāvatsız 'adālet yokdur. Buy kâide-i külliyyedir. 'Adāletin icrāsı ise tarz-ı idaremizin değışmesiyle olur. Meşrutiyet-i idare şu başı açık istiklallere bir had vāz etmek demektir. Böyle keyfiidare olmaz. Böyle devlet yürümez. Bizler Müslümanız, İslamiyeti'in hürriyet ve adalet üzere müesses olduğunu biliriz. İstedğimiz usul-i meşveret ve meşrutiyet kitab ve sünnet ve icma-i ümmet ile sabit.", qoted in Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji*...., p. 108, n. 31.

3.2 "Liberty" (Hürriyet)

Musa Kazım defined liberty as "being free" (*azade olmak*). However, he says that this does not mean to be free of every restriction. In other words, there is no "absolute freedom" (*hürriyet-i mutlaka*) in the world.¹⁶² He says that if there is absolute freedom for every creature in the universe, every creature would have the right to behave according to its own interests which in turn would terminate any order. No mutual assistance would remain among the created beings.¹⁶³ To avoid this situation, the principle of liberty is limited by the "religious" (*milliye*) and "national" (*kavmiyye*) customs of every nation.¹⁶⁴ There are "natural laws" (*kavanin-i tabiiyye*) in the universe to satisfy physical desires and there are "Sharia rules" (*kavanin-i şer'iyye*) to satisfy spiritual needs.¹⁶⁵ However, these laws are not applied in every country in the same way. They are applied according to the religious values and customs of that country.¹⁶⁶ Musa Kazım means that they are relative laws.

In a country people have to obey to the laws of that country, although they are free. This is a necessity of humanity and civilization. Since human beings are

¹⁶² "Hürriyet-Müsavat", *Külliyat...*, pp. 248-249

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 250-251.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ "...bütün efrād-ı beşer yekdiğerine ta'āvün ve iştirāk husûşlarında bir takım kavanin-i mevzûa ahkâmına dahi inkiyâd mecburiyetindedir. Ve bu mecburiyet, dünyanın her tarafında hüküm-fermadır. Şu kadar ki bu kanunlar her yerde aynı derecede, aynı meâlde olmayub her memleketin, her iklimin mizâcına, örf ve âdatına kavâid-i mezhebiyesine göre tanzim eylemiştir...", "Hürriyet-Müsavat", *Külliyat...*, p. 250.

social creatures,¹⁶⁷ they have to serve according to general interests of his society. Because, if everyone attempted to perform only his own private interests, this complete freedom would lead to the domination of bestial tendencies in satisfying their personal desires. As a result, they will attack to the rights of the others. Then nobody will obey to the rules that are the bases of society. Finally there would be no social order in society, while conflicts would arise.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, he mentions that there are pluralities in societies. If there is no common set of rules to be obeyed, it would be difficult to differentiate the just and the unjust within the society.¹⁶⁹

Another definition Musa Kazım makes of liberty is that liberty is an "natural event" (*emr-i tabi'i*), and it means to be free in our actions, but not by encroaching on the rights of the others.¹⁷⁰ Musa Kazım stresses that the Constitution provides such a liberty and which is in harmony with the necessities of the religious and national values of the Ottoman society, and which does not include any non-legitimate rules.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ "Hürriyet- Müsavat", *Külliyat...*, p. 250-251.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

¹⁷⁰ "...hürriyet, müsāvatın bir emr-i tabi'i olduğunu beyān edelim: Ma'lūmdurki hürriyet ğayrın hūkūkuna tecāvüz etmemek şartıyla kendi fi'l ve hareketinde serbest kalmaktır., bu da muktezā-yı tabi'dir...", "İstaibdad-Hürriyet-hakimiyet-i Milliye", (1912), *Mevaiz-i Diniyye*, Part I, p. 27.

¹⁷¹ "...Kānūn-ı Esāsımızın bize bahş ettiği hürriyetden maqşad bundan evvel taht-ı kahr ve istibdātında özlediğimiz ğayr-ı makūl ve ğayr-ı meşrū bir takım kuyūd-ı batıldan azāde bir hürriyet derki o da kavanūn-i mevzu'a ve kavāid-i diniyemiz ve 'adāt-ı milliyemiz dairesinde serbestāne hareketden ibāretidir.", *Ibid.*, p. 251.

In a concrete sense, in order to show the principle of liberty in action, Musa Kazım refers to the articles of the Constitution. With "legitimate rights" most probably he means the rights which the Constitution provides to the subjects. This attitude of Musa Kazım can be understood from his reaction to the demonstration that took place shortly after the declaration of the SCP. There he complained about the peoples' ignorance of the rights given by the Constitution.¹⁷²

In political sense, Musa Kazım approaches the principles of liberty as the right to reject any unjust treatment, even if it comes from the rulers, and the ability of the community to defend its legitimate rights without attacking the rights of the others.¹⁷³ At the same time, Musa Kazım stresses the importance of the application of the rules of the Constitution in harmony with Islam, due to the fact that the Constitutional regime originates from Sharia itself.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² "...bu kanun-i münîfin ahkâmına riâyet husûsunda duçar-ı hürriyet olduk. Kanun-ı Eşasi nedir ? bunun hâvi olduğu ahkâm ve bize bahş ettiği hukuk, hürriyet ve müsâvât neden ibâretdir ? Ekser ahalimiz bunlardan gâfil, bir kısımda müteğâfil olduğu ve binaen'aleyh bu yüzden: Hürriyet var, müsâvat var ! diye şu günlerde kanun-ı mezkûre ile aslâ münâsebeti olmayan şayan-ı teessüf bazı ahval-i gayr-ı lâyık vukûa gelmekte...", "Hürriyet-Müsavat", *Külliyat...*, p. 248.

¹⁷³ "... (Hürriyet) başkasının hukukuna tecâvüz etmemek şartıyla, velevki bir hükümdardan sadır olsun, her hangi bir haksız mufameleyi redde ve her hangi bir hakkı müdafâaya bütün milletin salahiyetdâr olmasından ibaretdirki 'akl ve hikmetin kabul ettiği hürriyetde budur...", "İslam ve Terakki", *Külliyat...*, pp. 280,281

¹⁷⁴ "...bi'l-haşşa şariâtımız, cihetini yani ahkâm-ı dünyeviyye ve ahreyyeyi câmi' olduğu ve ekser kavanin-i mevzuâımız ve âle'l-huşûş kanun-ı medenimiz ahkâmı-ı hukukumuz münhasıran kavanin-i şerfiyyeden muktebes bulunduğu cihetle bizim kavâid-i diniyye ahkâmıyla mukayyed olmamız kendi heyet-i ictimaiyye ve menaff-i milliyemiz iktizâsından bulunduğunu beyana hacet yoktur.", *Hürriyet-Müsavat, Külliyat...*, p. 253

In his discussion on liberty the main point he emphasizes is that the Constitution brought people liberty within the framework of Islam. Thus, it limits this liberty according to the religious and national values of the Ottoman society. Musa Kazım, in this discussion, did what was expected of him as a member of the ulema by the CUP: he rationalizes the rules of the Constitution and justifies the necessity of its application in Islamic terms. In this discussion he does not refer to any verses of the Quran, but instead, he bases his arguments on the "concept of man", although in discussing other concepts — equality, progress, sovereignty of the public — he rationalizes them by referring to the verses in the Quran.

In discussing the concept of liberty in the context of the Constitution, he refers to the subject of the veiling of women. Since he makes a large discussion on the subject of "woman" in the constitutional regime, this issue will be discussed in section 3.6.

3.3 "Equality" (Müsavat)

Musa Kazım's discussion of the term equality was based on the concepts of "natural law" and "divine law".¹⁷⁵ About equality among the human beings, in sum, he argued that if there were no "differences and oppositions" in the universe, there would be no existence of "plurality and variation" (*taaddüd ve tenevvü*). Then, the permanence of the "World Order" (*Nizam-ı Alem*) would not be possible¹⁷⁶.

¹⁷⁵ see section 2.6.

¹⁷⁶ "Hikmet-i Tefavüt-i Hilkat", *Külliyat...*, p. 66.

In addition to the above argument, made in 1897, after the announcement of the SCP, while briefly repeating this argument, he talks additionally about equality in two sense: legal equality and equality between human beings and nature. For the former, he defends the equality of people regarding the laws. He argues that this is crucial because otherwise "human rights" (*hukuk-ı beşeriyye*) would be destroyed. In such a case, powerful people would attack the rights of the weak and "the process of civilization" (*temeddün*) would be destroyed. This is the main reason why people had to respect the principle of equality with regard to legal conduct and "Islamic conduct" (*muamelat*).¹⁷⁷

Musa Kazım argues that, like absolute liberty, absolute equality does not exist in the universe. He demonstrates this argument as follows. First of all, such an absolute equality had not been observed yet . Secondly, the existence of absolutely equal things was logically impossible. If this were to occur, there could not be any of the separation and plurality that provides the order of the universe.¹⁷⁸

Another point he makes about necessity of equality in the universe is that "without equality it is not possible to preserve the jurisprudence that is crucial for keeping people in cooperation in society."¹⁷⁹ In concordance with the general trend

¹⁷⁷ "Hürriyet-Müsavat", *Külliyat...*, pp.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ "...bununda (müsâvatın) tabî olduğu şübhe yoktur. Zira müsâvatsız hûkûku muhafaza mümkün değildir. Halbuki insanları hâl-i ictima'da bulunduracak ve yekdiğerine muayyen...kılacak şey beyinlerinde muhafâza-i hûkûk....metin ve râsîn bir surette tesîs etmesine vâbestedir...", "İstabad-Hürriyet-Hakimiyet-i Milliye", *Mevaiz-i Diniyye*, I, p. 27.

of Modernist Islamizers, Musa Kazım, refers to verses of Quran to prove the relevance of his arguments in Sharia.

3.4 "Progress" (Terakki)

As is mentioned in section 2.4, Musa Kazım's discussion on civilization goes side by side with his concept of progress. He uses the term progress together with civilization. In this article, written after the Balkan wars, he seems to be answering people who attacked Islam for the results of the Balkan wars. After the disastrous results of the Balkan wars, the idea dominant within the group of traditionalist Islamists was that the Ottoman state had been defeated in the Balkan wars because statesmen had abandoned religious values.

In accordance with the general attitude of Islamist Modernizers, Musa Kazım was strictly against the European notion that Islam was an obstacle to progress. As is mentioned before, according to him religion played a crucial role in the foundation of European civilization and in their material prosperity. And, if there was an abandoning of religious values, it would not be possible for a nation to progress. He claims that it is not Islam that caused the decline of the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, it is Islam that orders progress and includes the means for it.¹⁸⁰ For Musa Kazım these means are "parliament" (*şura-yı ümmet*), "liberty"

¹⁸⁰ "...dīn-i İslām mani'i-i terakki imiş !...ne Büyük bir iftira ! ne 'azim bir bühtān zira dīn-i İslām mani'i-i terakki değil, bi'l-akīs amir-i terakki, saik-i te'ālīdir. Çünkü bu dīn bir milletin temeddün ve terakki etmesi için iktiza eden uşul ve esāsātın cümlesini hāvidir...", *Ibid.*, p. 279, "İslam ve Terakki", *Külliyat...*, pp. 278-284.

(*hürriyet*), "justice" (*adalet*), "equality" (*müsavvat*), "brotherhood" (*kardeşlik*), and "preparation of force" (*idad-ı kuvvet kuvvet hazırlamak*).

He states that liberty is one of the main principles of Islam. Liberty in Islam is not "carnal liberty" (*hayvani hürriyet*) it is such kind of a liberty that is itself a cause of humanity and civilization.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, in Islam, liberty provides people with the right to reject any unjust treatment, even it come from the rulers.¹⁸²

The second means in Islam to reach progress is "justice" (*adalet*). Musa Kazım mentions that to abandon cruelty and to be just in every matter in the name of Islam are peincipal duties of the all Muslims. Through hadithes he demonstrates that in Islam "oppression" (*zulm*) was definitely forbidden and Islam certainly commanded justice.¹⁸³

"Brotherhood" is another principle in Islam to reach progress. It is necessary for a nation to last. Since human beings cannot live alone, to cooperate they have to construct brotherhood among themselves.¹⁸⁴ He also claims that Islam orders brotherhood among all Muslims. This is demonstrated through verses in the Quran.

¹⁸¹ "...Esasât-ı İslamiyett'den biri de hürriyettir. Dîn-i İslâm'ın hürriyet kelimesinden maqşadı insaniyet'in bafis-i felâketi, medeniyetin en müdhiş afeti olan hayvânî bir hürriyet olmayub insâniyet ve medeniyetin sebab-i tekemmül ve tealisî olan 'ulvî bir hürriyettir...", "İslam ve Terakki", (27 February 1903), Külliyyat..., pp. 280-281.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

¹⁸⁴ "...İslâmiyetin mühim esâslarından biri de uhuvvetdir ki bir milletin hayat ve bekâsı için birinci derecede elzem olan şeyde budur. Zira insan tab'ın medenî olub pek çok ihtiyacâta mâruz bulunduğu ve halbuki muhtâc olduğu şeylerin bir tanesi bile yalnız başına tedarikden aciz bulunduğu cihetle yaşamak isteyen bir milletin

In the Quran it is said that "all Muslims are "brothers and sisters" (*mü'minler kardeşler*)." He argues that Islam has the necessary means to provide and preserve brotherhood among the believers.¹⁸⁵ Musa Kazım, in proving his arguments on "brotherhood" refers to the time of Mohammad. In line with the general trend of all Islamist modernizers, Musa Kazım, in proving his arguments, repeatedly refers to the original Islam, that is, in the time of Mohammad.

"Preparation of force" is the fourth principle that is crucial for providing progress. It is "an obligatory act" (*farz*) for all Muslims.¹⁸⁶ It is made an obligatory act for all Muslims through the verse "prepare force against your enemies" (*düşmanlarınıza karşı iktidarınız yetdiği kadar kuvvet hazırlayınız*).¹⁸⁷ By this obligatory act Musa Kazım means the preparation of a powerful army. Since it is an obligatory act in Islam, its requirements — industry, agriculture, art, wealth — also constitute obligatory acts in Islam. Because, in a country, if there is no industry, agriculture, art and wealth, it would not be possible to prepare army. Musa Kazım claims that, in this point it is possible to understand how much Islam is beneficial to people for providing their happiness.¹⁸⁸ Thus, laziness is definitely forbidden in

efrâdı arasında gâyet samimi bir uhuvvetin te'ssüsüne eşit lüzum vardır...", *Ibid.*, p.282.

¹⁸⁵ "...Dīn-i İslām Kūrān-ı Kerim'in (mü'minler kardeşler) me'âlindeki bir ayet-i kerimesiyle ve hâzreti peygamberin Medine-i münevvereyi teşrif buyurduklarında her şeyden evvel beyne'l-müslimin 'âkâd-ı uhuvvete mübâşeret buyurmuş olmasıyla...", *Ibid.*, p. 283.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 284.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ "...dīn-i İslām düşmana karşı 'idâd-ı kuvveti farz kılmış olmasıyla anın mevkûf-ı aleyh olan servet, mârifet, san'at, ticaret, zira'at ve sâfire gibi şeylerin

Islam. In the time of original Islam, people were hardworking, and thus Islamic civilization expanded from the Arab Peninsula to the Atlantic Ocean.¹⁸⁹

Musa Kazım ends his discussion on "progress and Islam" with a "conclusion" (*hatem*). In this conclusion, he asks people who argues that Islam is an obstacle to progress: "Which religion has these means necessary to reach progress, except for Islam?"; "Is it right to search for the reasons of disasters in Islamic countries in Islam itself? The reason for their backwardness is their own "idleness and ignorance" (*'atalet* and *cehalet*).¹⁹⁰ When this article was written in the year 1903, Musa Kazım had not yet become Şeyh ül İslam. He discusses the relationship between progress and the power of a nation philosophically in terms of the Islamic context. In proving his arguments he refers to verses in the Quran.

In another article, written in 1912, he approaches the same issue in a more concrete sense by referring to the conditions of the Ottoman state. In the article "The main principle of power is union and alliance" (*Kuvvetin Esası İttihad ve İttifaktır*) Musa Kazım supports constitutionalism and explains the reasons for it. In this article he again stresses the importance of a nation's power for its durability as a nation or community. He says that if a community has no power, it cannot last

kāffesini daḥi farʿ kılmuş oluyor demektir. Saʿadet-i beşeriyenin tēmini için gelmiş olan bir din-i semaviyyenin insanlar hakkında yapacağı iyilik işte bu kadar olabilir...", *Ibid.*, p. 284.

¹⁸⁹ "...İşte şadr-ı İslam'da müslümanlar dīn-i İslam'ın kendilerine bahş eylediği...esasât-ı mühimmeye şon derece riāyet etdiklerinden dolayıdırki yirmi otuz sene zarfında şems-i münir-i İslāmiyyet bütün ceziretül-ʿarabi envār füyūzzat bahşıyla tenvīr etdikden şonra hudūd-ı Çin'den baḥr-ı muhiṭ-i atlasiye kadar olan māmūre-i cihānın kāffesi daḥi vāyedār-ı füyūzzat eylemiştir...", *Ibid.*, p.285.

a long time. It cannot defend itself against its internal and external enemies.¹⁹¹ He asserts that if there is no unity, a community cannot acquire the things crucial for its life. Musa Kazım discusses this issue by referring to the time of Mohammad.¹⁹² And if there is no unity or alliance within a community or nation, the invasion of that community or nation is inevitable. Musa Kazım proves this argument through the examples of Andalusia and of Tatar government, both of them destroyed. Other examples given are those of India, that came under the control of England, and Morocco that came under the control of France. Iran is also another example Musa Kazım talks about in terms of a state's losing its unity. Iran announced constitutionalism before the Ottoman state and was occupied by two big powers.¹⁹³ For Musa Kazım the only and main reason for these states' loss of political powers was "discord and contention" (*nifak* and *şikak*). He states: "The Ottoman state should see these warnings and learn lessons from them. Today except for here, there is no other asylum for the Muslims. The government of İslam (the Ottoman state) is being destroyed and reasons for its destruction are known. Therefore, we are all responsible for the treatment of this "illness" (*maraz*).¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 285.

¹⁹¹ "Kuvvetin esası ittiḥād ve ittifaḳdır", *Külliyat...*, p. 302.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 302.

¹⁹³ In here Musa Kazım means occupation of Iran by Great Britain and Russia in 1907.

¹⁹⁴ "...işte bunlar bizim için büyük büyük ibretlerdir. Demek oluyorki ʿumūm kūrre-i arzda mevʿūd üçyüz milyonu mütecāviz müslūmanların bir melceʾi kalmış ise o da burasıdır. Artık buradan başka İslām için bir melceʾ yoktur. Münkariz olan Hükūmāt-ı İslāmiyyenin esbāb-ı inkırazı ne olduğu anlaşıldı. Bu halde bu marazın tedavisi çaresine çalışmak cümlemizin borcudur.", "Kuvvetin Esası

In the year 1912, when this article was written, he was a member of the CUP and twice he had become *şeyh ül islam* in cabinets supported by the CUP.¹⁹⁵ After examining these two articles written in different years —the first in 1903, the second in 1912— on the same subjects, we see that the nature of his discussion has changed. Before becoming a member of the CUP and *şeyh ül islam*, he discusses subjects like liberty, equality, progress and the importance of the preparation of force more in terms of Islamic philosophy. The above discussion of "preparation of force" is a good example of this feature of Musa Kazım. After 1908 he discusses the same subjects by referring to concrete events and directly referring to constitutionalism and the Ottoman state's condition.

After "progress", Musa Kazım discusses "the people's sovereignty" as the fourth crucial component of constitutionalism in the Ottoman lands.

3.5 "Sovereignty of the Public" (Hakimiyet-i Milliye)

The terms "national" (*milli*) or "nation" (*millet*) have quite diverse meanings. Especially during the nineteenth century, the use of these terms was very complicated. This is partly due to the fact that, before the use of these terms began in Ottoman lands, the terms "religious" (*dini*) and "community" (*ümmet*) were used. In the nineteenth century the meanings and use of all these terms became

İttihad ve İttifakdır", Külliyyat..., August, 1912, p. 305.

¹⁹⁵ July 9, 1910-September 29, 1911, cabinet of İsmail Hakkı Pasha, September 30, 1911- december 3, 1911, in the government of Said Pasha).

confused with each other. The nineteenth-century dictionaries, *Lugat-ı Naci* and *Kamus-ı Turki*, both defined the term *milli* in almost the same way. They defined *milli* as "member of a nation" (*bir millete mensub*), but they do not use the term *millet* in the sense that "nation" was normally used in the West in the nineteenth century.¹⁹⁶ Musa Kazım, when he uses the terms *millet* or *milli* in his articles, generally defines these terms by giving a variety of related concepts, after which it is rarely clear which of these concepts he specifically refers to when using the terms. This was quite reasonable in a situation where Ottoman intellectuals were struggling to extend and change the concepts attached to the term *milli* or *millet*, but where no clear set of concepts attached to these terms had yet been established.

Musa Kazım states that the "people's sovereignty" is a natural phenomenon and in accordance with Sharia, like liberty and equality.¹⁹⁷ For him sovereignty could be possible only with power, which in turn could be possible only with "community" (*ümme*). For Musa Kazım "national sovereignty" (*milli hakimiyet*) is "natural" as well as "canonical" (*şeri*).¹⁹⁸ To prove his arguments he gives the verses *Al-i imran* 3/158 and 3/110. In this article he favors constitutionalism and says that it provides the community with the opportunity to make their own decisions. He says that in the constitutional system there would be no autocracy and

¹⁹⁶ Muallim Naci, *Lugat-ı Naci*, , Şemseddin Sami, *Kamus-ı Turki*, .

¹⁹⁷ "İstibdad- Hürriyet-Hakimiyet-i Milliye", *Mevaiz-i Diniyye*, I, p. 29.

¹⁹⁸ "...Hakimiyet-i Milliye'nin tabîi olduğuna defilimiz; hakimiyetin kuvvetle ve kuvvetin bütün milletle kâim olacağı meselesidir. Yani: hakimiyet ancak kuvvetledir, kuvvet is bütün ümmetledir, ümmetle kaimdir. Hatta idare-i mutlakada bile hüküm-ferma olan yine hakimiyet-i miliyedir. ..", *Ibid.*, p. 29.

unjustness.¹⁹⁹ Musa Kazım defines how constitutionalism works in a country: people accepts laws and send them to the monarch; the monarch confirms them and applies in the country; then welfare and happiness occur in that nation. He argues that it is "a natural command" (*emr- i tabi*'). He demonstrates its compatibility with the Sharia through verses in Quran, as usual. He explains the verses.²⁰⁰

In this article Musa Kazım discusses the issue of "the people's sovereignty" in parallel with the concept of "autocracy" (*istibdad*). He defines autocracy as "to differentiate" (*bedd*). He argues that in an autocracy the ruler does not behave in accordance with the general will of the community. He behaves only according to his own desires and decisions. Thus, every decision he takes would not be in favor of people. Musa Kazım stresses the relationship between "autocracy" (*istibdad*) and "oppression" (*zulüm*). In such a case the community, inevitably, would never live in happiness and welfare.²⁰¹ Musa Kazım mentions that if autocracy takes place in a nation in the name of religion, the people would feel themselves responsible to obey it. This is the situation people had experienced in Islamic lands. Muslims obeyed the rules of autocracy, since they believed that it was an order of Islam. With this argument Musa Kazım implies the people's innocence in obeying autocracy. In a nation where autocracy exists, it is certain that that country will destroy or be destroyed, he claims. Andalusia, India and the Crimea are the examples Musa Kazım gives for destroyed states.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

In his discussion of autocracy Musa Kazım talks about the CUP's role as a "saviour" (*fırka-ı münciyye*) . For him it is the CUP that had been working for a long time to end the autocratic regime. As a result it had succeeded in constructing a just government based on the principles of liberty and equality in accordance with the Sharia.²⁰²

Musa Kazım in his discussion of constitutionalism defined and expressed the concepts "consultation", "liberty", "equality", "progress", "parliamentarism", "brotherhood", "the preparation of force" and "sovereignty". He does not discuss these concepts only in the context of Islam. Instead, he attributed to them political meanings. İsmail Kara argues that in the periods of both *Tanzimat* and *Meşrutiyet* the meanings of these concepts had expanded to a much greater extent than had happened before in the history of Islam. These concepts acquired political meanings in these periods.²⁰³ Going back to original sources and trying to find proper political and social solutions was another feature of the Islamists of these periods.²⁰⁴ It is possible to see this feature in Musa Kazım, too. Almost in every discussion he has a verse or verses to prove his arguments in an Islamic context. This is not surprising,

²⁰¹ "İstibdad-Hürriyet-Hakimiyet-i Milliye", *Mevaiz-i Diniyye*, I, p. 25.

²⁰² "...Bu mesleğin (istibdād) dīn ile, şerīāt ile, insāniyet ile asla münāsebeti olmadığını bilen bir fırka-i münciyye senelerden beri can feda edercesine çalışma nihayet bu gayr-ı meşru mesleğe hem nihayet vermiş ve ... anın yerine hem tab'î, hem de şer'î olan (hürriyet-müsavat) esası üzerine bir hükümet-i 'adile teşkiline muvaffak olmuştur...", *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁰³ İsmail Kara, *İslamcıların...*, p. 39; Mümtazer Türköne also points out the same subject, Mümtazer Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak...*, pp. 102-122.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

because his duty after becoming a member of the CUP was to convince people of the relevance of the new regime to Islam.

Musa Kazım's use of these concepts by attributing to them political meanings seems to show a similar attitude to that of the Young Ottomans. For example the Young Ottomans, in attributing to them new political meanings, were trying to find Islamic concepts to replace these western-originated concepts. For example, they used instead of democracy, *meşveret*, instead of parliament, *şura-yı ümmet*.²⁰⁵ In Musa Kazım's various statements in the discussion of the concept *meşveret* too, it is possible to see some signs that indicate democracy. It can be assumed that Musa Kazım in his discussion of these concepts extends the meanings of these concepts.

Another important subject through which to understand Musa Kazım's approach to Western kinds of reform in Ottoman society is that of "woman". In the discussions of westernization the subject of woman has been an important criteria through which to evaluate a nation's degree of modernization. Especially in Islamic countries like in the Ottoman Empire, the attitude to women has been one of the basic signs of that nation's cultural values, originating, natuarlly, from Islam's commands concerning women.

²⁰⁵ For more about use of these terms by atributing them new meaning by the Young Ottomans like, Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi and Ziya Pasha see Mümtazer Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak...*, pp. 102-122.

To examine Musa Kazım's discussion on woman might be interesting in terms of understanding his approach to Westernization in the most visible area of society, that is concerning woman's place in society.

3.6 Woman

In the article, "Liberty-Equality" (1908), Musa Kazım answers people who try to show the "Ottoman nation" to the world as "an uncivilized community; a cruel nation" (*vahşi bir kavim, zalim bir millet*) through the subject of "woman".²⁰⁶ Musa Kazım states that in this article he aims to answer three important arguments about woman's position in Islam. Veiling, polygamy and divorce are the well-known subjects.

3.6.1 Veiling

He claims that "some people", by which in fact he means some women, do not follow religious rules and he criticizes those people who have the attribute of a Muslim, but do not obey even "one" rule of Islam. Musa Kazım considers such an attitude of ignoring the rules of Islam as an attack on the rights of the hundreds of millions of Muslims who see the rules of Islam as dearer than their lives and holier than their souls.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, he also mentions that this situation is not only contrary to Islam itself, but also to the rules of *Kanun-ı Esasi*. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the government to take necessary precautions to prevent the

²⁰⁶ "Hürriyet-Müsavat", *Külliyyat...*, (1908), p. 259.

²⁰⁷ "Hürriyet-Müsavat", *Külliyyat...*, p. 253-254.

corruption of the constitution. He states that, according to the fourth and eleventh articles of the constitution, the official religion of the Ottoman state is Islam.²⁰⁸

Musa Kazım demonstrates his arguments concerning the issue of veiling in the context of Islam as follows. First of all, since women are delicate by nature and object to molestation by men, the obligation of veiling in front of strangers is a great favor to them. The presence of a beautiful woman exposed to the view of lustful men as well as her conversation with such men means the loss of self-respect of a woman.²⁰⁹ The main duty of women at their creation is to marry, bring up children and organize matters related to the family.²¹⁰ Musa Kazım stresses the importance of the family institution. For him there are two important obligations to secure the family institution. The first consists of duties concerning home, the second one concerns exterior duties, such as the earning of money. For a wife and a husband it is not possible to perform these domestic and exterior duties alone. Thus, it is necessary to undertake a division of labour. Thus, in accordance with the nature of man and woman, domestic duties were given to woman, while exterior duties were given to man in Islam. An opposite situation is not possible, because woman's

²⁰⁸ "...muḥafāzasına yemin ettiğimiz Kānūn-ı Esāsi aḥkāmına da münafi olduğundan hükümetimizin bu bābda tedābir-i müeşşireye tevessül etmesi lazımdır. Zira Kānūn-ı Esasi'nin dördüncü ve onbirinci mādeleri hükmünce devlet-i ʿOsmaniyyenin dini din-i İslamdır... Zira bu devlet-i ʿaliyyenin tabʿiyyetine hāiz olan bir müslümanın aḥkām-ı dinden bir hükme rʿayet etmemesi ve o hükmü tahkire kadar varması Kānūn-ı Esāsimizin... aḥkāmıyla kāhil-i teʿlif olamayacağından bu gibi kimseleri hükümetimizin teʿdib ve terbiye mecburiyeti kendisine taʿalluk eden vazāif-i mühime cümlesindendir..." , *Ibid.*, pp. 253- 254.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

delicacy and fragile nature is not suitable to cope with the conditions of working life which sometimes is troublesome. On the other hand, for a man it is not possible to deal with domestic duties, which is contrary to natural law. Therefore, since woman's obligations are determined in Islam as being a wife and a mother with her domestic duties, it is not suitable for women to enter into public places without a veil to be exposed to the glances of the eyes of lustful men without veil and by showing her attractiveness. Happiness in a family depends on the mutual love of the partners. Because in reality the husband and wife are strangers to each other, love is the only bond between them. Thus it is a necessity to preserve and strengthen the love between them. However, if a woman freely talks with strange men and even invites them to her house, it is probable that she can be in love with another man who is more polite and charming than her husband. In the end, naturally, she will have lost her love for her husband. Musa Kazım says that the same situation is also relevant for man too. If women walk around in public places without veiling, man can be drawn to another woman who is more beautiful and young than his wife. Relying on the above reasons, *şeriat-ı Muhammediyye* ordered the veiling of women. Musa Kazım implies that it is a favor given to women.²¹¹ He also adds that veiling does not prevent women from the requirements of civilization. For example, they can be educated, which is an obligation ordered in Quran, says Musa Kazım.²¹²

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 254-255.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 256.

For him there are some differences between man and woman in terms of degree of education, and that this is a privilege for woman.

3.6.2 The "Privileges" of Women in Islam

Musa Kazım argues that men, after finishing elementary, secondary and high schools, have to continue at "universities" (*mekatib-i aliyye*) whereas it is not necessary for women to attend universities. This is because the "rationale" (*hikmet*) of their creation is to bring up children and perform domestic duties. Elementary, secondary and high school education are enough for a woman to settle her domestic duties properly. For him, after finishing high school, women should not waste time in the universities, but stay at home for their primary duties in life. However, he also adds that he is not against the higher education of women, but sees it as unnecessary. He says that the Sharia is not against women's higher education, but there is no need for it, because in Islam it is not the responsibility of woman to earn money. Therefore, she does not have to go to university in order to have a job and work.²¹³ In the Sharia the husband has to earn money for his family. Under the Sharia woman never has to think about her family's subsistence. Even in the condition of *kaza*, she does not have to cook, do the washing and under certain conditions does not have to suckle her baby.²¹⁴

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 257- 258.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

In conclusion, Musa Kazım argues that in Islam women have no material responsibilities. Therefore higher education is not necessary for them. If they desire it, they may continue their education, but it is unnecessary.

After all these discussions on veiling and woman's privileges in Islam, Musa Kazım asks: "Be fair! In which Sharia, in which system, are so many priveleges given to women?"²¹⁵ It can be seen from his discussion on veiling and the position of woman in Islam, that he is not very tolerant towards Muslim women living in Ottoman lands, if they are not veiled or not behaving according to the rules of the Sharia. Even the participation of women in social and professional life, he sees as unnecessary. He evaluates women only by their biological features, as is usual in the doctrines of orthodox Islam. It is also difficult to argue that Musa Kazım pays considerable attention to woman's role when discussing the issue of Westernization, especially within the framework of what he calls "civilization". Whatever he says in the name of civilization, like education, is not forbidden in Islam for women, but "unnecessary". To form associations, to give speeches or to go on journeys are not forbidden for women, but these must be among themselves.²¹⁶

²¹⁵ "...Şimdi insāf edelim, kadınlara bu kadar imtiyazatı şeriat-ı Muhammediyyeden başka hangi kanūn, hangi şeriat bahş etmiştir ? Bunun içündürki kadınlarımız aqvām-ı sairenin kadınları gibi ticarete vesa'ireye sülūk mecburiyetinde değildir. ...", *Ibid.*, p. 258.

²¹⁶ "...kadınlarda kendilerine mahsus bir edeb-i terbiye dāireseinde kendilerine mahşuş mesirelere gidebilir. Kendilerinden cemiyetler teşkil ederek birbirlerine konferanslar verebilir. Şeriatımız bu gibi şeylere ma'ni olmaz. Kezālik, kadınlar mesture olmakla müfessir-i medeniyyeden mahrūm olmazlar...", *Ibid.*, p. 256; for the same subject see *Ibid.*, p. 259-260.

For Musa Kazım women are free in Islam. They are not slaves in Islam as many people think, and the analogy of women being chickens in a poultry house is totally baseless.²¹⁷ Their legitimate rights are under the guarantee of Sharia.²¹⁸ Musa Kazım strictly opposes the people who think that "women are slaves in Islam". For him this is just a vain idea.²¹⁹ He says that the aim of this article is to draw the attention of women and men and make them love the orders of Islam.²²⁰ It is highly questionable whether people like the orders of Islam or not.

3.6.3 Poligamy

Musa Kazım argues that marriage has two functions: the continuing generation of progeny and the preservation of chastity. Through these two functions marriage is justified.²²¹ Marriages provide continuity of the existence of mankind on Earth. However, he argues there are some marriages without children. He stresses that there are even some cases where, if polygamy was forbidden, the race of many men would not continue.²²² He claims that since for the progress of a nation a numerous population is necessary, polygamy is inevitable.²²³

²¹⁷ "...Nisvân-ı İslâmiyye sizin zan ettiğiniz gibi esir değildir. Onlar da hürdür. Onların mestûre olmalarını bir tavuğun kümesine kapatılmasına teşbihiniz batıldır..." *Ibid.*

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

²²⁰ "...meseleyi yazmaktan maşadımız, bazı nisvân-ı İslâmiyyemizin ve hatta birçok riçâlimizin nazar-ı dikkatlerini celb etmek ve bütün aḥkâm-ı diniyyemizi onlara sevdirmeye çalışmak idi..." *Ibid.*, p. 260.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 261.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 262.

²²³ *Ibid.*

According to Musa Kazım, in some marriages there may be conditions in which the preservation of chastity cannot be possible. For example, if the wife has a chronic illness or suffers from bodily weakness, sexual intercourse will not be possible. In this case, it will be difficult for the husband to suppress his sexual desire due to his nature. In such a condition, the practice of polygamy is necessary to avoid the destruction of the family institution.²²⁴ Women's menstruation and pregnancy also give the opportunity to practice polygamy in Islam.²²⁵ Musa Kazım expresses his wish about single women: "I wish there were many powerful men to be with many productive women so that there were not many aged women".²²⁶ Musa Kazım argues that, on the other hand, the practice of polygamy can only be possible by the application of the principle of justice among women. If a man cannot obey this rule, the Sharia orders the man to stay with one woman.²²⁷ Musa Kazım says that "as it is understood from these discussions, polygamy, like the issue of veiling, is not contrary to civilization or humanity."²²⁸

3.6.4 Divorce

For Musa Kazım the preservation of the integrity of the family is crucial. He says that the practice of divorce is something to be abhorred.²²⁹ However, he mentions that divorce in some cases can be necessary. For example, if there is an

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

²²⁶ "...keşke müteaddid zevceler idaresinde muktedir adamlar olsada mezari'-i enşāl olan birçok nisvān olurda muḥaṭṭal kalubda kocamasalar...", *ibid.*, p. 263.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

oppositeness of characters between the partners, then divorce becomes inevitable.²³⁰

Since the preservation of the institution of family is the basic objective, the question of who will have the right to decide about divorce is an important subject, argues Musa Kazım.

There are three parties in deciding a divorce case: the wife, the husband and the court. For Musa Kazım it is not possible to give the right of decision on divorce to woman. This is because of her nature. Women are quick to take offence and to be affected by an insignificant event. Musa Kazım argues that because of their nature, if they will have the right to divorce, then many families would be destroyed because of an unnecessary reason. Secondly, to give the right of divorce to women means to give her domination over the family. This is not just, because it is impossible to suppose that the domination of a woman over the husband who has to provide his family's subsistence by earning money.

For Musa Kazım, it is not suitable to give this right of decision to the court. Although the judge possesses "public guardianship" *velayet-i amme* for Musa Kazım the dealing of a third party with the reasons of incompatibility between the partners is not suitable. A man, he argues, has his own "personal guardianship" *velayet-i hassa* which comes before "public guardianship".²³¹ According to Musa Kazım the judge cannot force partners to love each other, if they hate each other.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

What he can do is only to give some paternal advice.²³² Musa Kazım means that matters concerning sentiments and conscience cannot be settled by a third party. For Musa Kazım there is a second reason for not leaving the decision to a court: if this happens, it necessitates revealing the position of the woman to the public, thus compromising her in the public eye. This situation would lead to the humiliation of the husband in front of his neighbours because of his wife.²³³

The most proper person to whom to give the right to divorce is the husband. If one of the above cases occurs, he will divorce his wife without telling the public.²³⁴ Musa Kazım says that the punishment of divorce will have a corrective effect on the woman's character. She will acquire goodness, so that if she marries again, she will have a happy life.²³⁵ Musa Kazım furthermore mentions that not only man, but also the woman or her guardian can also apply to the court for divorce. This is possible in Sharia. If the woman's reasons for divorce are relevant, the Sharia can divorce them by protecting the partners' rights.

Musa Kazım admits that in recent times there had been some wrongdoings about the case of divorce, but this was not caused by Sharia. The reason for husbands' divorcing their wives unjustly and without depending upon proper reason originated from "lack of general education" (*terbiye-yi umumiye*). Musa Kazım

²³² *Ibid.*

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

argues that the Sharia forbids persons who are not capable of following rules of marriage.

In his discussion of veiling, polygamy and divorce, to what extent Musa Kazım is successful in rationalizing woman's position in Islam seems to be a large area to study. However, if we evaluate his arguments in terms of woman and civilization, we see that he does not propose a considerable place for woman to benefit from the favors of civilization. Whatever he enumerates for civilization is "unnecessary" for woman.²³⁶ Musa Kazım Efendi seemed to me not to be discussing the subject of woman in terms of woman's place in newly structured societies after Westernization. As Tarık Zafer Tunaya mentions, although women's natural rights are mentioned in *Kanun-ı Esasi*, Islamists were opposed to this idea²³⁷. Musa Kazım was one of these Islamists opposed to the liberty of woman in every area of social life.

For him, women during reform period in Ottoman society should live in the way that Sharia proposes, although the constitution was providing liberty to women. For him, liberty was not only restricted through law, but also through Sharia. This is true for the liberty of women too. Musa Kazım mentions that there is no reason not to benefit from industrial and scientific progress of European civilization²³⁸, but he does not discuss what will be woman's new place in this

²³⁶ see section 3.6.2.

²³⁷ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de...*, I, p. 478.

²³⁸ "Hürriyet-Müsavat", *Külliyat...*, p. 271.

progressive society. Will the benefits of civilization (progress)²³⁹ be "unnecessary" for woman? I think it is difficult to find the answer of this question in Musa Kazım's thought.

The CUP had struggled to break traditionalist views about woman. When the CUP held political authority alone, they made concrete attempts to provide woman with liberty.²⁴⁰ Although there were many resistances, the CUP opened a way towards secularization.²⁴¹ If we consider the Westernist side of the CUP's attitude towards issue of woman, it is too difficult to argue that CUP benefited from Musa Kazım Efendi's ideas to rationalize reform attempts on this issue, unlike in the other fields of social and political life.

²³⁹ He uses the term "civilization" similar with "progress".

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 476, 478.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 479.

Conclusion

In line with the general trend in the writings of Islamic Modernists, who saw the reason for the decline of Islamic countries in the abandoning of original Islam, Musa Kazım, too, attempted to demonstrate the presence of the principles of civilization within Islam, by drawing on what he saw as the features of original Islam. For him there was no need to apply European political concepts or European social values, since Islam already had made available to people the most beneficial political concepts and social values. In agreement with most Ottoman Intellectuals of his time, Musa Kazım Efendi, too, admired the material civilization of the European countries. For Musa Kazım Efendi civilization (or progress) meant "material civilization." For him social and cultural issues had to be discussed within a different sphere, that is, within the sphere of Islam.

Musa Kazım Efendi, after 1908, in accordance with the CUP's policy of using some key political concepts that had religious meanings, tried to provide a religious basis for constitutionalism. Before 1908, Musa Kazım had discussed the same subjects as the Young Turks, but from a different point of view. If we consider the content of Musa Kazım's before the SCP, it can be seen that there was little if any compromise between Musa Kazım and the Young Turks. For instance, the most Westernist wing of the CUP were influenced by the principles of positivism and of the Enlightenment. In the 1890s, in their articles, they were discussing positivist principles as a potential replacement for Islam. In the same

years Musa Kazım Efendi, primarily then a *medrese* scholar, wrote against them.²⁴² He had not at that point become a member of the "Great Scientific Council". It can be assumed that, because of this, he was in a position to oppose the Young Turks freely before the SCP. Even in the first years of the SCP, it is possible to see in his writings criticisms of the CUP's attempts at reform, especially those which concerned women. Although he respected the rights of women, it is difficult to say that he regarded women as equal to men. His writings on women prompt us to ask whether it would have been possible for him to write such articles after 1913, when the nucleus of the CUP was effectively in control of political and social life.

In 1908, the Westernist/Ottomanist Young Turks of the CUP had realized the useful functions of Islam within society. Thereafter, although their aims were different from those of the Young Ottomans, they used the same policy: to attempt to benefit from Islam's social functions to prevent potential resistance from the traditionalist and conservative side of society. The Young Turks did not approach Islam as the solution to prevent the collapse of the Empire, as the Young Ottomans had done. For the Young Turks it was only a means for them to penetrate into Ottoman society. Therefore they chose influential religious people of the time to speak for them, people like Musa Kazım Efendi.

The Young Ottoman's had attempted to find Islamic counterparts to, and alternatives for, Western concepts, so as to demonstrate Islam's superiority. This

²⁴² He was teaching in Fatih Medrese. Later on he also taught in Dar-ül-Fünun.

attempted development of "new, but Islamic" concepts may be a subject that merits further study. In Musa Kazım's writings it is possible to see such an attitude, too. Had Musa Kazım and the Young Ottomans been contemporaries, it seems that he would have made quite an effective advocate for their attempts to westernize the Empire within the context of Islam. In view of the topics Musa Kazım Efendi discusses, it would be interesting to know whether and to what extent he was familiar with the works of Young Ottomans, such as Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi.

In this thesis I have divided Musa Kazım's writings into two: before the SCP and after the SCP. This is because I realized that there was a difference in the nature of his writings in these two periods. Before the SCP he was a Islamic scholar and the titles and content of his writings were in accordance with this career. During the SCP, especially after 1913, his writings projected a political image in accordance with the CUP's policies.

I have tried to examine to what extent *Şeyh-ül-islam* Musa Kazım Efendi was successful in justifying the CUP's attempts at reform in terms of Islam doctrine, especially those reforms which tended towards secularization. I wanted to examine this issue in my thesis in order to shed light on the origin of today's religious upsurge in the Turkish Republic. Musa Kazım Efendi manages quite effectively to rationalize, in accordance with the premises of Islamic Modernism, the attempts to modernize the Ottoman Empire, except in the case of issues concerning women. He cannot be treated as being a whole-hearted liberal among the Islamists of his

time, but he was certainly prepared to show a considerable flexibility in his application of Islam to the problems of his day.



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